Language and Comprehension, Volume 9 (Advances in Psychology)

LANGUAGE AND COMPREHENSION

ADVANCES IN PSYCHOLOGY 9 Editors

G . E. STELMACH

P. A. VROON

NORTH-HOLLAND PUBLISHING COMPANY AMSTERDAM. NEW YORK OXFORD

LANGUAGE AND COMPREHENSION Edited by

Jean-Fraqois LE NY U .E.R . de Psychologie Universite de Paris VZZZ and

Walter KINTSCH Department of Psychology University of Colorado

1982

NORTH-HOLLAND PUBLISHING COMPANY AMSTERDAM. NEW YORK . OXFORD

North-HollandPublishing Company, 1982 A11 rights reserved. No part of this publicationmay be reproduced,stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,recordingor otherwise, without the prior permissionof the copyright owner.

ISBN: 0444 86538 1

Publishers: NORTH-HOLLAND PUBLISHING COMPANY AMSTERDAM. NEW YORK . OXFORD

Soledistributors to the U.S.A.and Canada: ELSEVIER SCIENCE PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC. 52 VANDERBILT AVENUE NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

V

PREFACE

This book has been originally edited for publication in French, in a special issue of the Bulletin de Psychologie' ,1982, volume XXXV, under the t i t l e "Language e t Comprehension". We are grateful to this journal's director, D. Voutsinas, for having kindly permitted this simultaneous publication in English. Although largely developed now, objective study of comprehension in i t s relationship to language is a rather new problem; not too long ago, science oriented psychologists would not have dared to set it, and even, to use, in a research context, such a word as discourse "comprehension". This word then belonged t o what the surrealist poet Paul Eluard described in a book t i t l e as "quelques-uns de ces mots qui m'btaient jusqu'ici mystgrieusement interdits" - " some of these words that were till now mysteriously forbidden to me".

It is a sign of the progress cognitive psychology, and more widely cognitive research, has made that it is a t present possible to publish in the series "Advances in Psychology" such a set of articles. Yet this is only a sample, which we have tried t o make reasonably representative, of the many studies made throughout the world on this matter. What is comprehension? It is difficult to give a precise answer t o this question, and the reader might turn out t o find it even more difficult, rather than easier, when he has read through this book.

So, the criteria that have led to the collection of these articles have a touch of arbitrariness. We started from an a priori allotment of space, approximately balanced among American, non-French European, and French authors. We unfortunately could not request for an article all the authors it was desirable t o publish; and not all the authors we asked could comply with our request, or wanted to;with the limits and regrets that such a venture involves, we have yet the satisfaction t o have collected a large set of very representative papers. We are very grateful to all authors who sent a contribution for this book, with particular mention for our colleagues working in the field of Artificial Intelligence, who wrote their articles according to the expectations of a psychological audience. By this "audience design" they have, in a way Clark and Murphy very well explain below, not only written about comprehension, but also for comprehension. We are grateful as well to M.Y. Carfantan, who has been a major help for the book's organization and preparation. 'Bulletin

de Psychologie, 17 Rue de la Sorbonne, 75005, Paris, France.

vi

Preface

Such a range of authors introduced some heterogeneity in the design of the articles: according to the first editing, some authors were requested to rather present a synthesis of their recent work; the other authors have, as a rule, written more specific articles. We believe this variety to have more advantage than disadvantage,

It has been difficult to classify and t o order the articles. We first took into consideration a gross and simple subdivision: comprehension of large versus small sections of discourse, of which sentence and whole text are respective prototypes. Within this subdivision we took into account proximity created by presence of such matters of cognitive (lexical, conceptual, imaged) structures, importance attached to syntactic versus semantic processing, emphasis on reading activity or on pragmatics, modelizationand simulation, etc. Paul Eluard, to quote him again, entitled an anthology of poems collected by him "the best selection of poems is the one everybody makes by himself". We hope that, from this book and the references it contains, every reader may better apply this maxim to the study of comprehension.

Jean-Francois Le Ny and Walter Kintsch

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface

V

1. COGNITION, ATTITUDES AND COMPREHENSION F. Klix, J. Hoffmann and E. van der Meer The Storage of Concepts and their Cognitive Application

1

M. Denis Images and Semantic Representations

17

R.J. Spiro Subjectivity and Memory

29

T.A.van Dijk Opinions and Attitudes in Discourse Comprehension

35

2. PERCEPTION, IDENTIFICATION AND COMPREHENSION C.A. Perfetti Discourse Context, Word Identification and Reading Ability

53

J. Segui, J.Y. Dommergues, U. Frauenfelder and J. Mehler The Perceptual Integration of Sentences: Syntactic and Semantic Aspects

63

R.J. Jarvella and T. Russell Nelson Focus of Information and General Knowledge in Sentence Understanding

73

3. SENTENCE COMPREHENSION D. Dubois Lexicon and Representations in Sentence Comprehension

87

viii

Table o f Contents

J. Engelkamp, H.D. Zimmer and P. Leclere Focusing and Presupposition in the Understandingof Sentences

97

G. Noizet Operative Activity during Sentence Reading

107

J.-F. Le Ny, M. Carfantan and J.C. Verstiggel Accessibility from Working Memory and the Role of Reprocessing in Sentence Comprehension

123

G. Bramaud du Boucheron Comprehension and Sentences Describing Unfamiliar Events in 4-to-8-Year-OldChildren

135

4. COMPREHENSION AND TEXT MEMORIZATION A.J. Sanford and S.C. Garrod Towards a Psychological Model of Written Discourse Comprehension

147

M.-F. Ehrlich An Experimental Study of the Relationship between Comprehension and Memorization of a Text

157

S. Ehrlich Construction of Text Representation in Semantic Memory

169

R. de Beaugrande General Constraints on Process Models

179

5. COMPREHENSION AND STRUCTURATION M.J. Adams Models of Reading

193

J.M. Mandler Recent Research on Story Grammars

207

G. Denhiere Do We Really Mean Schemata?

219

Table of Contents

K. Haberlandt Reader Expectations in Text Comprehension

ix

239

6. COMPREHENSION AND COMMUNICATION

H. Hormann Hidden Determinants of Understanding

251

0. Findahl and B. Hoijer The Problem of Comprehension and Recall of Broadcast News

261

M. Hupet and J. Costermans Towards a Functional Approach of Language Processing in Context

273

H.H. Clark and G.L. Murphy Audience Design in Meaning and Reference

287

7. MODELIZATION AND SIMULATION OF COMPREHENSION W. Kintsch Aspects of Text Comprehension

301

G. Sabah A Natural Language Comprehension

313

D. Coulon and D. Kayser Understanding: A Variable-Depth Process

325

M.G. Dyer and W.G. Lehnert Question Answering for Narrative Memory

339

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LANGUAGE AND COMPREHENSION J.-F. Le Ny, W. Kintsch (editors) @ North-Holland Publishing Company, 1982

1

THE STORAGE OF CONCEPTS AND THEIR COGNITIVE APPLICATION Friedhart Klix Joachim Hoffmann Elke van der Meer Department of Psychology Humboldt University of Berlin Berlin G.D.R. Concepts are independently formed classes of objects and phenclllena of OUK environment that are represented as cognitive units in our mermry. They are the basis of m s t different cognitive activities. The present investigations analyze the use made of Conceptual kncwldge in the conceptual identification of objects, the verification of relations between sub- and superconcepts and the fulfihmt of conceptual analogy tasks. It can be s h m that the cognitive effort required in coping with conditions is systaMtically dependent on the specifics of the feature characteristics of concepts. INTRODUCTION The meaning of a word is comprehended by the linguistic stimulus activating memory contents that represent our knowledge of the things and phenomena denoted by the word. Investigations have been made over the last few years to try and analyze this process of comprehension in detail (Frederiksen, Kroll ( 1 9 7 4 ) ; Rosinski, Golinkoff, Kukish ( 1 9 7 5 ) ; Rayner, Posnanski ( 1 9 7 8 ) ; Taft ( 1 9 7 9 ) ; Adams ( 1 9 7 9 ) ) . Results show that word meaning can only in exceptional cases be immediately activated by the linguistic stimulus. As a rule, the complex stimulus of the given word must be recognized as a certain lexical unit to allow its meaning to be grasped. It was then demonstrated that visually offered words do not have to be phonetically recoded before their meaning is recognizable. Visual stimulus structure alone can provide access to meaning - at least for experienced readers. Far more diversified are, however, the considerations concerning the characteristics of the memory structures activated by a word. What matters here is the question of the representation of concepts in memory. How is our knowledge of the mode of manifestation of classes of objects or events organized in memory? Answers differ. Arguments have been put forward that suggest a representation in the form of a set of individual examples (Landauer, Maier ( 1 9 7 2 ) ; Anderson, Bower ( 1 9 7 3 ) ) . And investigations have been made that support the idea of prototype representation (Rosch ( 1 9 7 3 , 1 9 7 5 ) ; Hacker et al. ( 1 9 8 0 ) ; Oden ( 1 9 7 7 ) ) . According to these investigations, a set of objects united into a concept is represented by a cognitive unit, a prototypical member, ideally uniting the essential properties of the whole set. We, on our part, hold a third view: that concept representations can be described by a well-ordered set of features that reflect the essential properties of the phenomena united by a concept. The latter view has repeatedly been expressed in literature and is sometimes used to explain empirical phenomena (Rips, Shoben, Smith

2

F. Kiix etai.

(1973, (1976,

1 9 7 4 ) ; Tversky ( 1 9 7 7 ) ; Hayes-Roth, Hayes-Roth ( 1 9 7 7 ) ; Linny 1 9 8 0 ) ) . In these investigations, links were, on the whole,

observed to exist between the typicality of concept relations, on the one hand, and the degree of abstraction of concepts and the cognitive performance depending on it, on the other. The connections were explained by means of ad hoc assumptions concerning the relative feature composition of the concepts used. This paper seeks to differentiate the connections even further. Proceeding from empirical analyses, it makes statements on the kind of features characterizing concept representations, and gives examples that show how cognitive performance over concept representations is being determined by the specific feature composition of the concepts in question. FEATURE CHARACTERISTICS OF CONCEPT REPRESENTATIONS Concepts unite individually different objects and phenomena of our environment into cognitive units. The objects and phenomena have real properties; they occur in certain relations, enter into relations with other objects and phenomena, and can be proved to have an effect on the fulfilment of our needs. In accordance with laws that we can hardly keep track of, some of these objective properties are reflected in our conceptual knowledge of our environment. We know that a tree is made up of roots, a trunk and a top, that there are deciduous and coniferous trees, that a tree offers shelter from the rain, and that we can use wood to make paper or to kindle a fire to warm our bodies. All these are obviously features of our conceptional knowledge of TREE. In our memory, they reflect objective, real properties of the objects belonging to the concept; and, as a result, they permit the differentiation of concept representations. In other words, we define conceptual features as cognitive units reflecting properties of our environment and allowing us to distinguish between concept representations. Starting from these ideas, Klix ( 1 9 8 0 , 1 9 8 2 ) proposed a systematization of conceptual features, which is shown in Fig. 1 . Distinctions are made between simple and complex features,

Phoneticographemic

dog

Canplex

features

Defining features

Occasional features

Characteristic relations

paw tail hair paws bark tam keep watch kennel hunt breeding

Figure 1 Hypothetical assumption concerning the feature representation of concepts exemplified by the concept of DOG

The Storage of Concepts

3

and optional and compulsory ones, which can refer either directly to sensory effects of the objects belonging to the concept, or to abstract derived properties. It is particularly important that relations with other concepts are included in the feature characteristics of a concept. Two kinds of relational features are distinguished: fixed references other concepts (in the sense of output relations), and fixed references from other concepts (in the sense of input relations). These relational features give rise to an additional differentiation of concepts in accordance with the different contexts in which they occur. In this way, features link information on the mode of manifestation of the objects belonging to the concept, with information on important situational relations in which they occur. To subject these feature assumptions to empirical verification, we analyzed the feature characteristics of a total of 1 6 5 concepts of different degrees of abstraction. The concepts comprised classes of objects from the following (partly overlapping) spheres: plants, trees, tools, food, vehicles, ships, birds, musical instruments, and weapons. Fig. 2 shows three examples of the conceptual hierarchies used.

Level of abstraction Superconcept Medium-leve1 concepts

owl predatory bird

Subconcepts

eagle goshawk vulture

vegetable fruit rose tulip narcissus

IaPPle

I

Figure 2 Examples of the conceptual hierarchies used. What are called primary concepts are marked in every hierarchy.

Subjects were told, e.g., to name, for every concept, features that they thought could be used to recognize an object belonging to the concept. They were given 40 sec to do so. We will here give only some of the data obtained (cf Hoffmann, Ziessler (1982)). What strikes us first is that subjects named very different information as features. Table l illustrates this, relying on the feature characteristics of two concepts. Some of the features referred to the immediate sensory effects of the objects classified. We called them figurative features. Sensory qualities such as colour and form were named, and so were complex features relating to sensorily distinguishable parts of the objects. The non-figurative features mainly included relations to superconcepts, the listing of subconcepts, and relations to our knowledge of properties of materials, their uses, situational conditions of

F. Klix etal.

4

Table 1 Figurative and non-figurative features of two concepts named by subjects when being questioned about features. The figures show the relative frequency with which the particular features were named. TREE Figurative features

VEHICLE

Foliage/leaves Trunk Branches Twigs Needles

0.79

TOP Green Tall/large Fruit/fruits "Stout"

0.24

Wood Plant Roots Oak-tree Deciduous tree Coniferous tree Pine

0.24

. ..

Non-f igurative features

0.76 0.53 0.29

Wheels Seats Body Steering wheel

0.43 0.17 0.14

..

0.06

0.29

0.20 0.20

0.09

0.06

0.20

0.15 0.09 0.09 0.09

0.06

Car Transportation Means of locomotion Engine Move Ship Bus Train Driving gear Quick Persons Lorry

...

0.43 0.23 0.23 0.14 0.11 0.09

0.09 0.09

0.09 0.09 0.09 0.06

their occurence, etc. Some of the features named can be regarded as compulsory: they were named by most subjects. Others reflect to a considerable extent individual experience, which was shared by a very few subjects only. To the extent that the namings of features allow assessing the information linked with a concept in memory, they confirm the hypothetical feature characteristics of concept representations in Fig. 1. Comparable results have been described by other authors (Ashcraft ( 1 9 7 8 ) ; Hzuser ( 1 9 8 1 ) ; Denis ( 1 9 8 2 ) ) . Since our material used concepts on three different levels of abstraction (cf Fig. 2 ) , changes in composition of the features of concepts can be verified in dependence on their degree of abstraction. Three basic trends have been established. ( 1 ) The higher the degree of abstraction, the smaller the number of feature namings. Concrete concepts,

The Storap of Concepts

5

it seems, are linked with a larger number of differentiating pieces of information in memory than abstract ones are. ( 2 ) The higher the degree of abstraction, the smaller the relative share of figurative features. And among the non-figurative features, there is an increase in the enumeration of subconcepts relative to the total set of the features namedl). (3) Superconcepts are named as features. The higher the degree of abstraction, the relatively rarer are, however, such references to superconcepts (cf Fig. 3 ) .

Id B

V W

5

C

V

r

g w

$

.?

_. -

30

25 520 a

15 !I0 5

5k

SUB.

SUP MID.

SUP MID SUB SUP MID. SUB. Abstraction l e v e l of the presented concepts

Figure 3 Changes in the feature characteristics of concepts with different degrees of abstraction THE IDENTIFICATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN CONCEPTS We can regard as a fundamental property of man's intelligence his ability to use cognitive operations for processing not only information obtained from the environment, but also information stored in memory. Results of information processing can, in turn, be subjected to cognitive operations independently of the influence of the environment and any number of times. This very performance may be one of the essential sources of the superiority of human intelligence. From this general statement we can derive the assumption that many of the pieces of information available to us are not directly stored in memcry, but must be generated by applying cognitive procedures to the data stored in memory. This consideration leads to a strict separation of factual and procedural information storing in human long-term memory. The analysis of mechanisms of procedural information processing gives us the opportunity to verify the feature representation of natural concepts empirically if the procedural derivation of information can be shown to rely on a comparison between the features of two concept representations. This is extremely likely to apply to a number of relational links between concepts. To start with, let us consider some of the relations occurring between natural concepts. The relation existing between GRASS and GREEN, or CHALK and.WHITE can, we think, best be described as an attribute relation. If we believe in a feature representation, we will arrive at the assumption that, by the representation of the feature, the attribute relation is stored immediately in the conceptual unit. Its recognition will, accordingly, require nothing but the activation of the conceptual features and the

F. Klix et al.

6

identification of the critical feature in the set of features activated. Concepts such as DAY and NIGHT, or LIGHT and SHADOW are linked by a contrast relation. It is not very likely that all possible contrast relations between concepts are stored in a direct manner. We can assume instead that the recognition of a contrast relation usually relies on a comparison of the feature characteristics of the two concepts. The comparison procedure must, in addition to the activation of conceptual feature sets, include at least two further operations: the identification of a common feature dimension in which the contrast becomes recognizable, and the identification of the opposite direction of feature localization in this dimension. Let us finally consider the comparative relation existing between concepts like MOUNTAIN and HILL, or WIND and STORM. The relation is based on feature differences that are specific not with regard to their direction, but with regard to the degree of localization in one direction of the feature dimension. We are inclined to assume that at least three operations are needed to recognize it: the identification of the common feature dimension, the identification of the same direction of the feature localization, and the identification of the different degrees of feature localization in this direction of the common feature dimension. Proceeding from the assumption that there is a feature representation, we have in this way derived hypotheses on the cognitive efforts to be expected if relations are to be recognized. Should corresponding cognitive procedures be attributed to these feature characteristics, attribute relations would have to be recognized more rapidly than contrast relations, and the latter, in turn, more rapidly than comparative relations. This expectation was experimentally verified by means of the analogy recognition method (Klix, van der Meer (1978,

1979,

1980)).

Subjects were offered two pairs of words and were asked to decide as rapidly as possible whether the relation between the two concepts of the second pair was analogous to that between the concepts of the first. They were to decide, e.g., whether GRASS is related to GREEN like CHALK to WHITE, or DAY to NIGHT like LIGHT to SHADOW, or MOUNTAIN to HILL like STORM to WIND. We do not at this point wish to deal with the details of the modelling of the processes underlying the acceptance of analogies of this kind (cf the literature given). We would merely like to emphasize that the acceptance of analogies presupposes the recognition of the particular critical relations between the two concepts of a pair. The derived differences in the cognitive efforts required to recognize the three relations were, as a result, expected to have an effect on the time needed to accept corresponding analogies. This expectation is confirmed by the data obtained (cf Fig. 4 ) . With conditions otherwise the same, analogies on the basis of the attribute relation are recognized more rapidly than analogies on the basis of the contrast relation, and the latter, in turn, more rapidly than analogies on the basis of comparative relations. THE IDENTIFICATION OF RELATIONS IN CONCEPTUAL HIERARCHIES The analysis of cognitive processes underlying the identification of relations between sub- and superconcepts has been the subject of a large number of investigations (Collins, Quillian ( 1 9 7 2 ) ; Collins, Loftus ( 1 9 7 5 ) ; Rips, Shoben, Smith ( 1 9 7 3 , 1 9 7 4 ) ; Rosch et al. ( 1 9 7 6 ) ; etc.). The investigations concentrated on the influence exercised by the degree of abstraction of concepts, the distance between concepts

The Storage of Concepts

7

01

E

2600

2

4-

B

5 2LOO c C

Q,

z

2 200

2 000

Attribute Contrast Comparative Type o f semantic relation

Figure 4 Recognition times for attribute, contrast and comparative relations within a hierarchy, and the typicality degree of the relation between concepts, on the time needed to identify or verify a sub-superconcept relation. In the interpretation of the findings, a controversy has developed between the advocates of what are called network models and those of conceptual feature representation (cf Hollan ( 1 9 7 5 ) ) . We do not, however, wish to discuss the controversy in any detail. Suffice it to say that even those who believe in feature representation have no more than vaguely tried in the experiments made so far, to relate the interpretation of the data and the model considerations to concrete, empirically verifiable feature characteristics of the concepts used (cf Smith, Shoben, Rips ( 1 9 7 3 ) ) . On the basis of empirically obtained feature characteristics of natural concepts, the attempt has been made at our laboratory to explain phenomena of the identification of the relations between sub-superconcepts and super-subconcepts. What we tried to prove was the effect of special conceptual feature characteristics on the course of cognitive processes over information stored in memory. The experiments were made by Hauser ( 1 9 8 1 ) . In our considerations we started from the observation that the feature characteristics of many concepts contain references to the relevant superconcept. In the case of feature characteristics of this kind, the superconcept is, in the sense of a complex feature, a direct component of the feature characteristics of the particular subconcept. In accordance with our assumptions, the detection of one or several common features is the pre-condition for the identification of subsuperconcept relations or super-subconcept relations respectively. If the set of features of a subconcept contains a superconcept as a complex feature, the recognition of a sub-superconcept relation should get considerably simplified. The time required to identify a relation of this kind can thus be regarded as a function of the probability with which the particular superconcept is represented as a feature in the feature characteristics of the subconcept. The greater the distance is between the sub- and the superconcepts within

8

F. Klix eta/.

a conceptual hierarchy, the lesser this probability. We assume that when the distance between the sub- and superconcepts is great, the detection of common features of the two concepts is made possible through a process of division of complex features (superconcept). This breakdown of stored sets of features for the next level of the hierarchy requires additional cognitive effort. As a result, the times required for the recognition of sub-superconcept relations that are more than one stage apart in the hierarchy must be expected to be longer. Let us now take a somewhat closer look at the super-subconcept relations. Our empirical analyses of feature characteristics of concepts reveal that superconcepts represented on relatively concrete levels within a conceptual hierarchy will hardly include references to subconcepts in their set of features. When there is a super-subconcept relation with a minor distance within the hierarchy in concrete categories, its recognition will, in comparison with the subsuperconcept relation, require additional cognitive effort, because the feature characteristics of the superconcept that is decoded first do not yet include a feature belonging also to the subconcept. These common features can only be detected by activating the feature characteristics of the subconcept and subsequently comparing the two sets of features. These considerations explain the asymmetry of the amount of effort required for the recognition of sub-superconcepts. Recognition should be more rapid from sub- to superconcept than from the latter to the former. This statement should, however, apply only to more concrete categories. The reason is as follows. Our empirical analyses of features have shown that the higher the degree of abstraction of the concepts to be defined is, the lower is the relative frequency of the namings of superconcepts. With many abstract concepts there is even a trend for subconcepts to be named as complex features. In the case of more abstract categories, the concept is directly available as a complex feature through the activation of the set of features of the superconcept. The presence of this condition should make the identification of the super-subconcept relation easier so that the asymmetry effect will vanish. These expectations were experimentally tested by means of the analogy recognition method. Subjects were offered another two pairs of words and were asked to decide as rapidly as they could whether the relations between the concepts of the two pairs were identical or analogous. The investigations proceeded from three-stage conceptual hierarchies (Fig. 5). Conceptual hierarchies of this kind offer splendid opportunities for varying distance within a hierarchy (e.g. dove:bird or dove:animal) and also the sequence in which the relation is offered (e.g. bird: dove as a member for the super-subconcept relation, and dove:bird as one for the reverse relation). As Fig. 6 shows, these experimental variations lead to the effects predicted. Three aspects are worth emphasizing: ( 1 ) The recognition of sub-superconcept terms of the cognitive effort required. more rapidly when the direction is from when it is reversed (see test condition

relations is asymmetric in The relations are recognized sub- to superconcept than l/l).

The Storap of Concepts

9

Sub

Figure 5 Test programme to check the efforts involved in recognizing relations between sub- and superconcepts in analogies. Three-stage conceptual hierarchies are used (on the left: general characteristics: on the right: examples).

6 E

2000

-

W

c

c 1800 -

9

w

0

u

1600 -

C

W

z!

1400

-

Figure 6 Characteristics of the efforts to detect analogies in sub-super- and super-subconcept relations ( 2 ) The asymmetry is not generally valid, but depends on the level of abstraction. It does not occur with abstract categories (see test condition 2 / 2 , the differences not being significant). These results cannot be found reasons for if we assume that concept relations of this kind are stored stationarily in memory. They point out that the type of conceptual relations described is determined by cognitive operations.

( 3 ) The efforts required to recognize analogy in sub-superconcept relations and their reversal are the greater, the greater the

10

F. Klix etal.

distance is between the particular concepts within the conceptual hierarchy. These are effects that can be seen as due to laws of the feature characteristics of natural concepts. THE CONCEPTUAL IDENTIFICATION OF OBJECTS Concept formation and concept representation hold out very important advantages in the exchange of information. The amount of information to be perceived and processed can be dramatically reduced. Not all sensory effects of an individual object retain their importance for the calculation of behaviour after they have been conceptually united: only those do which mark the object as an element of the concept. Individual details can be neglected in processing. On the other hand, concept representation leads to an extraordinary reduction in insecurity within the exchange of information because the organism is now in a position to respond appropriately to objects never known and perceived before, as long as they can be recognized as an element of a concept already formed. The realization of the advantages requires concepts to be so represented in memory that contents of perception can be attributed to them both rapidly and reliably, and can thus be given conceptual identification. Our assumptions concerning the feature representation of concepts appear to suggest that, of all the features stored in memory, the figurative ones play a special role in the process of conceptual object identification. Since we can at first rely only on the sensory effects of an object in the process of recognition, every conceptual object identification must be assumed to begin with a comparison between sensory effects of the object and figurative features stored in memory. The characteristics of figurative features therefore become our most important concern. The feature analysis of natural concepts cited above revealed that the individual concepts are marked by figurative features in differing degrees (Hoffmann, Ziessler ( 1 9 8 2 ) ) . Table 1 contrasts two concepts whose feature characteristics are very different indeed. While the concept of TREE is almost predominantly marked by figurative features 6'2% of all feature namings), the concept of FOOD is almost completely defined by the listing of subconcepts (58% of all feature namings). In accordance with their relative share of figurative features, concepts can, in the first place, be roughly divided into two classes. Sensory concepts are marked more by figurative features than by enumerations of subconcepts, whereas for categorial concepts subconcepts are named as features relatively more frequently than figurative properties. Although the criterion chosen for the division is as simple as anything can be, there are a number of empirical data that support the psychic reality of the distinction emerging in the process between sensory and categorial concept representations (cf Hoffmann, Ziessler ( 1 9 8 2 ) : Hoffmann ( 1 9 8 2 ) ) . It is hardly surprising that the higher the degree of abstraction, the rarer is the occurrence of sensory concepts (cf Hauser ( 1 9 8 1 ) ) . What strikes us here is that in virtually all the conceptual hierarchies we have investigated, the transition from sensorily to categorially represented concepts is final. Within a rising hierarchy, concrete concepts are up to a certain degree of abstraction described by sensory representation. Moving further up, we find only categorially represented concepts. It seems that sensory abstraction is the preferred strategy of human concept formation. The following rule appears to apply: whenever this is possible, sensory properties

The Storage of Concepts

11

of the objects united are used to mark concepts. Only when, with a rising degree of abstraction, the sets of objects become so heterogeneous that no sensory properties characterizing the total set can be abstracted any more, will conceptual characterization take place in accordance with other, non-figurative features (cf Hoffmann ( 1 9 8 1 ) ) . That is why, within a conceptual hierarchy, the relatively most abstract, but still sensorily defined concept takes a special place. We call it primary concept. It represents in our memory the relatively largest set of objects that can still be characterized and united by a few common sensory effects. The differentiation of special subconcepts requires account to be taken of additional figurative features, while more abstract superconcepts are categorially repres nted, i.e. almost without any reference to figurative features?)

.

Proceeding from the assumption that conceptual object identification is essentially determined by a comparison between the sensory effects of an object and figurative features, we can derive accurate assumptions as to the amount of cognitive effort in a conceptual object identification from the feature assumptions that have been explained. The identification of an object as belonging to the primary concept can be expected to require the least cognitive effort. A comparison of relatively few features will here already allow the object to be attributed to a concept. The identification of more special subconcepts should, in contrast, require additional efforts for the comparison of further features. Attribution to more abstract, categorial concepts should similarly require more effort since, because of the non-figurative feature characteristics of categorial concepts, attribution must first be mediated via a sensory subconcept. These expectations were checked by means of different methods in a number of experiments (Hoffmann, Ziessler ( 1 9 8 1 ) ; Hoffmann ( 1 9 8 2 ) ) . Subjects were asked to decide as rapidly as they could whether an object presented in the form of a drawing could be attributed to a concept that had earlier been named verbally. The time was measured that passed between the presentation of the object and the response by the subjects. The critical variable was the feature characteristics of concepts on different levels of abstraction. In our material, three types of hierarchies can be distinguished according to the relative level of abstraction of the particular primary concepts: hierarchies with primary concepts on the upper, the medium and the lower levels. Fig. 2 gives one example of each type. It is worth remembering that, according to our feature analyses, the particular primary concept, whatever its degree of abstraction, is represented with relatively few figurative features, and that more concrete sensory subconcepts are stored in memory through additional figurative features, and abstract categorial superconcepts primarily through the enumeration of subconcepts. A s Fig. 7 shows, the average times needed for conceptual object identification correspond to these qualitative feature characteristics. Whatever the degree of abstraction of the particular concept, the same objects are attributed to the primary concepts with the greatest speed. Attribution to more concrete sensory subconcepts and to more abstract categorial superconcepts requires additional effort, which is probably due to the comparison of further figurative features or to the activation of sub-superconcept relations. It has thus been shown how conceptual recognition performance is determined by the feature characteristics of the concept representations stored in

12

ms

F. Klix et al.

4

EAGLE

4

i

BANANA SUP

PRIMARY

PRIMARY

M;D

@ PRIMARY

Figure 7 Average response times for identifying objects (drawings) as belonging to concepts of different degrees of abstraction memory. CONCLUSIONS

The interior structure of our memory store can only be ascertained through the close observation of its effects on cognitive performance. This paper has given examples to show that the concept representations activated by words in our memory can influence the course of cognitive processes via or by their features. They influence the identification of relations between concepts, determine the amount of cognitive effort necessary to recognize sub-superconcept relations, and constitute what the conceptual identification of objects in our environment crucially depends on. Concepts are not inseparable cognitive units in our memory. They can be split into smaller units that can produce differentiating effects, depending on requirements. These units, which differentiate the effect of concept representations in cognitive performances, are called by us features of concept representations. They reflect in our memory real properties of the objects united into a concept: In the process, sensory effects of objects are taken into account to the same extent as situational relations that objects in our environment enter into with other phenomena. What is represented will probably depend on criteria such as conspicuousness, frequency of occurrence, and significance for the control of behaviour. How this is represented depends on the type of information. The representation of singular features can be thought to form a well-ordered list. The representation of situational, context-dependent relations, however, can be considered to take the form of relational references to or from other concepts. Properties of feature models are in this conception linked with properties of network models. The lists of features allow objects to be identified swiftly and reliably. Relational links ensure that, together with the conceptual identification of an object, concept-specific, contextdependent eqperience and situational relations become immediately

The Storage of Concepts

13

available; and the latter are often more important for our behaviour than object-specific properties. Features and relations that are stationarily stored in our memory are the data that are drawn upon in cognitive operations when information is being perceived and also when new information is being derived or generated. This allows the conspicuous, the frequent and the significant to be represented directly in our memory in a quickly retrievable manner, without the inconspicuous, the rare and the insignificant getting lost as long as they remain derivable from the stationarily stored by means of cognitive operations. FOOTNOTES "Hoffmann and Ziessler ( 1 9 8 2 ) have shown that their relation can even be differentiated by distinguishing different types of conceptual hierarchies. 2, Rosch and her assistants, proceeding from their analyses, arrived

at similar statements on the structure of conceptual hierarchies. The "basic level" that she proposed corresponds to a far-reaching extent to our considerations concerning the level of the primary concepts within a conceptual hierarchy. Differences of view mainly concern the assumptions regarding representation. While Rosch, on the whole, proceeds from prototype representation, our own considerations suggest that the level of the primary concepts inevitably results from the mutual relations of the feature characteristics of all concepts of a hierarchy (cf Hoffmann ( 1 9 8 2 ) ) .

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and language comprehension, in: Gregg, L.W. (ed.) , Cognition in learning and memory (New York, 1 9 7 2 ) .

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[ 9 ] Hauser, D., Untersuchungen zur Reprasentation semantischer

Beziehungen im menschlichen Langzeitgedachtnis, Ph.D. Thesis, Dept. of Psychol., Humboldt Univ. of Berlin (1981).

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[111 Hoffmann, J., Begriffe, ihre Herausbildung, Reprasentation und Identifikation, Proceedings of the XXIInd International Congress of Psychology (Leipzig, 1980). [121 Hoffmann, J., Representation of concepts and the classification of objects, in: Klix, F., Hoffmann, J. and van der Meer, E.

(eds.), Cognitive research in psychology (Berlin, Amsterdam,

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[131 Hoffmann, J. and Ziessler, M., Components of perceptual classification, 2. Psychol. 189 (1981) 14-24. [141 Hoffmann, J. und Ziessler, M., Begriffe und ihre Merkmale, 2. Psychol. 190/1 (1982) 46-77. [I51 Hollan, J.D., Features and semantic memory: set-theoretic or network model? Psychol. Res. 82 (1975) 154-155. [161 Klix, F . ,

ffber Grundstrukturen und Funktionsprinzipien kognitiver Prozesse, in: Klix, F. (Hrsg.), Psychologische Beitrage zur Analyse kognitiver Prozesse (Berlin, 1976).

[171 Klix, F., Erwachendes Denken (Berlin, 198oa). [181 Klix, F., On stationary and inferential knowledge representation - an experimental approach, in: Klix, F., Hoffmann, J. and van

der Meer, E. (eds.), Cognitive research in psychology (Berlin, Amsterdam, 1982).

[191 Klix, F., Die allgemeine Psychologie und die Erforschung kognitiver Prozesse, 2. Psychol. 188 (1980) 117-139.

- an approach to cognitive microprocesses as well as to intelligence performance, 2. Psychol. 186/1 (1978a) 39-47.

[201 Klix, F. and van der Meer, E., Analogical reasoning

- an approach to mechanisms underlying human intelligence performances, 2 . Psychol. 186/2 (1978b) 170-188.

[211 Klix, F. and van der Meer, E., Analogical reasoning

[221 Klix, F. and van der Meer, E., The method of analogy recognition

for the determination of semantic relations in long-term memory, in: Klix, F. and Hoffmann, J. (eds.), Cognition and Memory (Berlin, 1980)

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[231 Landauer, T.K. and Meyer, D.E., Category size and semantic

memory retrieval, Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 1 1 (1972) 539-549.

[241 Le Ny, J.F., Der semantische Transfer bei der Einpragung von Satzen, 2. Psychol. 184 (1976) 432-444.

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[ 2 5 ] Le Ny, J . F . ,

Selective activities and elective forgetting in the process of understanding and in the recall of semantic contents, in: Klix, F. and Hoffmann, J. (eds.), Cognition and Memory (Berlin, 1 9 8 0 ) .

[ 2 6 1 Oden, G.G., Fuzziness in semantic memory: choosing exemplars of subjective categories, Memory and Cognition 5 ( 1 9 7 7 ) 1 9 8 - 2 0 4 . 1 2 7 1 Rayner, K. and Posnansky, C., Stages of processing in word identification, J. exper. Psychol. General 107 ( 1 9 7 8 ) 6 4 - 8 0 . [ 2 8 1 Rips, L.J., Shoben, E.J., Smith, E.E.,

Semantic distance and the verification of semantic relations, Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 1 2 ( 1 9 7 3 ) 1 - 2 0 .

[ 2 9 1 Rosch, E., Cognitive representations of semantic categories, J. exper. Psychol. 104 ( 1 9 7 5 ) 1 9 2 - 2 3 3 . [ 3 0 1 Rosch, E . , Mervis, C.B., Gray, W.D.,

Johnson, D.M., BoyesBraem, P., Basic objects in natural categories, Cogn. Psychol. 8 ( 1 9 7 6 ) 382-439.

[ 3 1 ] Rosinski, R.R., Golinkoff, R.M., Kukish, K., Automatic semantic

processing in a picture-word interference task, Child Development 5 6 ( 1 9 7 5 ) 2 4 7 - 2 5 3 .

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Shoben, E.J., Rips, L.J., Structure and process in semantic memory: a featural model for semantic decisions, Psychol. Rev. 8 1 ( 1 9 7 4 ) 2 1 4 - 2 4 1 .

[ 3 3 1 Taft, M., Lexical access via an orthographic code: the basic

orthographic syllabic structure (BOSS), Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 1 8 ( 1 9 7 9 ) 2 1 - 3 9 .

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LANGUAGE AND COMPREHENSION J.-F. Le Nv, W. Kintsch (editors) 0 North-HollandPublishing Company, 1982

IMAGES AND SEMANTIC

REPRESENTATIONS

M i c h e l Denis L a b o r a t o i r e de Psychologie U n i v e r s i t e de P a r i s V I I I Sai nt-Deni s , France

I n t h i s c h a p t e r a r e summarized and discussed s e l e c t e d d a t a f r o m a r e s e a r c h program on t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between imagery and semantic processing. W i t h i n t h e framework o f a f e a t u r a l approach t o conceptu a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , imagery i s viewed as a c o n s t r u c t i v e process t h a t s e l e c t i v e l y a p p l i e s t o , and t r a n s i e n t l y a c t u a l i z e s , s p e c i f i c subsets o f semantic f e a t u r e s , t h e s o - c a l l e d f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s . INTRODUCTION The l a s t t w e l v e y e a r s o f r e s e a r c h i n psychology have been c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y a number a o f t h e o r e t i c a l and e m p i r i c a l e f f o r t s w i t h t h e aim o f g i v i n g mental imagery l o n g - s t a n d i n g theme i n our d i s c i p l i n e - a renewed t h e o r e t i c a l s t a t u s . Research has s i m u l t a n e o u s l y developed i n two main d i r e c t i o n s . On t h e one hand, imagery was i n v e s t i g a t e d as a n independent v a r i a b l e , i . e . , as a process i n t e r v e n i n g o r l i k e l y t o i n t e r v e n e i n t h e course o f many p s y c h o l o g i c a l a c t i v i t i e s , such as memorization, comprehension o f sentences, problem s o l v i n g , e t c . As a general c o n c l u s i o n , i t may be s t a t e d t h a t t h e use o f imagery has p o s i t i v e e f f e c t s o n most o f these a c t i v i t i e s , whatever t h e i n d i c a t o r s o f performance.

-

However t h i s k i n d o f approach i s u n l i k e l y t o t h r o w much l i g h t on what a n image i s and how t h e i n t r i n s i c p r o p e r t i e s o f t h i s p s y c h o l o g i c a l e v e n t may a c c o u n t f o r i t s e f f i z n c y . Thus, what can be named t h e "second g e n e r a t i o n " o f contemporaneous r e s e a r c h i n imagery i s more concerned w i t h q u e s t i o n s such as : What a r e t h e chara c t e r i s t i c s o f images, i n c o n t r a s t w i t h o t h e r ways people evoke concepts ? What i s t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h i s p s y c h o l o g i c a l e v e n t ? To what e x t e n t s h a l l we c o n s i d e r i t as an " a n a l o g i c a l " mode o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ? Must we c o n s i d e r t h a t images have genuine s p a t i a l p r o p e r t i e s ? How s h a l l we c o n s i d e r t h e i r temporal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ? Whatever t h e r e s e a r c h e r s ' s p e c i f i c f o c u s as r e g a r d s imagery, i t i s obvious t h a t r e s e a r c h i n t h i s f i e l d i s f u n d a m e n t a l l y concerned w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between images and knowledge. No d o u b t t h a t images a r e a p r i v i l e g e d modal i t y f o r a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f some aspects o f knowledge, b u t a number o f o t h e r a s p e c t s a r e u n a b l e t o be f i g u r a t i v e l y r e p r e s e n t e d . I n any case, a p e r s i s t e n t f e a t u r e i n t h e l a s t t e n o r t w e l v e y e a r s o f psychology w i l l have been t h e f e e b l e e f f o r t , o r t h e l a c k o f a widespread e f f o r t , t o s y s t e m a t i c a l l y connect t h e s t u d y o f imagery t o t h e w i d e r f i e l d o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f knowledge. D u r i n g a l o n g time, r e s e a r c h i n imagery developed w i t h o u t any concern o f c o n v e r g i n g w i t h t h e models o f semantic memory t h a t attempted t o d e s c r i b e t h e s t r u c t u r e o f knowledge and i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n i n l o n g t e r m memory. We a r e s t i l l g r e a t l y unaware o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between, on t h e one hand, a c t i v a t i o n o f semantic s t r u c t u r e s l e a d i n g t o t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f meaning i n t h e mind o f a r e a d e r who has t o v e r i f y a statement (such as : A canary has wings . . . ) and, on t h e o t h e r hand, t h e imagery e l i c i t e d by t h i s statement. These q u e s t i o n s i n f a c t were expressed i n s e v e r a l e m p i r i c a l approaches w i t h v a r i o u s t h e o r e t i c a l backgrounds, b u t w i t h t h e common concern o f d e l i b e r a t e l y i n t r o d u c i n g imagery i n t h e s t u d y o f semantic a c t i v i t i e s - c o n t r a r y t o what was t h e case i n s e v e r a l former, l e a d i n g models ( c f . C o l l i n s and Q u i l l i a n , 1969 ; Smith, Shoben, and Rips, 1974). One widespread e m p i r i c a l approach was sentence

18

M. Denis

verification, in an attempt t o measure verification latencies of sentences varying in t h e i r a b i l i t y t o e l i c i t visual images t h at represent t h e i r content. Results i n i t i a l l y presented by Jorgensen and Kintsch (1973), and l a t e r by Holmes and Langford (1976), attested a f a c i l i t a t i n g ef f ect of the imagery value of sentences on t h e i r verification. However such a relationship i s d i f f i c u l t t o inte rpre t, mainly because of the d i f f i cu l t y in distinguishing the e ffe c ts of imagery from the e f f e c t s of the semantic complexity of sentences ( c f . Holyoak, 1974). More recent experiments by Glass, Eddy and Schwanenflugel (1980) demonstrated t h a t the reading of descriptive sentences may in f act be accompanied with a n imagery a c t i v i t y , objectively detected by appropriate experimental procedures, b u t without allowing the researcher t o ascribe t o these images a decisive role in verification processes per se. Such a conclusion i s i t s e l f in agreement with hypotheses concerning the abstract, amodal format of representation of sentence meaning ( c f . Potter, Valian,and Faulconer, 1977). An other procedure, in some respects similar t o the former one, was equally used f o r examining the possible role o f imagery in sentence verification - the mental comparison technique. In these tasks, the subject has to evaluate as true or f a l s e sentences asserting a r el at i o n , such as : A lobster i s larger t h a n a crayfish. I n opposition t o Paivio's (1975, 1978) arguments favoring the explanatory role of visual imagery in the evaluation of such sentences, c r i t i c a l arguments, such as Friedman's (1978), were developed in favor of different forms of mental representa tio n , other than "analogical". The most recent trends seem t o favor mixed models, postulating parallel processing of analogical representations, such as visual images, and propositional representations ( c f . Kosslyn, 1980 ; Kosslyn, Murphy, Bemesderfer, and Feinstein, 1977). Lastly, a paradigm t hat looks relevant t o the f i el d of research discussed above i s the so-called sentence-picture comparison paradigm, where a picture i s to be compared by subjects with the semantic content of a descriptive sentence (such as: The plus i s above the s t a r . . . ) . After a long lasting controversy between proponents of "imagistic" interpretations ( c f . Huttenlocher, 1968) and those of "propositional" accounts ( cf . Carpenter and J u s t , 1975 ; Chase and Clark, 1972), t h i s paradigm was more recently used in a new perspective, emphasizing stra te gie s t h a t d i f f e r e n t i a t e individuals in such tasks ( c f . MacLeod, Hunt,and Mathews, 1978). Thus i t i s possible to identify subjects w i t h c le a r preferences f o r " ling u is t i c " s t r a t e g i e s (they compare a l i n g u i s t i c description of the picture t o the semantic representation of the sentence) and subjects inclined t o "visual" s t r a t e gies (they more readily compare the picture t o the visual image of the pattern described in the sentence) (see also Beech, 1980 ; Dubois and Weil-Barais, 1980). The major idea stemming from these current research trends i s tha t the role of radical imagistic positions in the f i e l d of language understanding has lessened and t h a t presently more weight i s given t o propositional interpretations, c a lling upon abstract, amodal semantic representations, which are neither linguistic nor imaginal, b u t which have the open p o s s i b i l i t y of optional stra te gie s making use of visual imagery. In t h i s paper I briefly describe a s er i es of steps which are part of a research program devoted t o the question of the relationships between the domain of images - more s p e c i f i c al l y , images involved with l i n g uistic a c t i v i t y , mainly comprehension of sentences - and the domain of semantics, by a n approach i n i t i a l l y concerned with lexical u n i t s , then with sentences. FIGURATIVE SEMANTIC FEATURES The major working hypothesis here i s t h at there i s no de finite separation between the conceptual approaches t o imaginal representations and to semantic representations. More precisely, the idea developed here i s tha t imagery i s a modality for the actualization of semantic representations o f sentences, through a highly

Im@s and Semantic Representations

19

s p e c i f i c f o r m a t o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , m a i n l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d by i t s s t r u c t u r a l analogy w i t h p e r c e p t u a l events. Semantic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s can be analyzed i n t o components, some of which may be a c t u a l i z e d under a s p e c i f i c f o r m a t and r e s u l t i n t h e e l a b o r a t i o n of c o g n i t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s ' m i m i c k i n g p e r c e p t u a l experiences t o some e x t e n t ( c f . Oenis, 1979). The approach i l l u s t r a t e d h e r e r e l i e s upon t h e h y p o t h e s i s t h a t t h e f o r m a t o f t h e most elementary u n i t s o f c o g n i t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s i s l o w e r t h a n t h e l e x i c a l format. A f u l l e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e arguments s u p p o r t i n g t h i s c l a i m , o r r a t h e r t h e f a m i l y o f t h e o r i e s h a v i n g t h i s c l a i m i n common, i s i m p o s s i b l e h e r e . L e t us however c o n c e n t r a t e on t h e i d e a t h a t concepts t o which l e x i c a l i t e m s a r e a t t a c h e d can be analyzed i n t o more elementary u n i t s o f meaning, o r semantic f e a t u r e s . T h i s s t a t e ment does n o t o n l y mean t h a t humans (among them, p s y c h o l o g i s t s ) a r e capable o f a n a l y z i n g a concept i n t o s m a l l e r p i e c e s o f meaning, b u t t h a t t h e r e e x i s t arguments i n s u p p o r t o f t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y o f t h e n o t i o n o f semantic f e a t u r e s as elementary components o f c o g n i t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s (e.g., Eysenck, 1979 ; Le Ny, 1979 ; M i l l e r and Johnson-Laird, 1976). For i n s t a n c e , l e t us c o n s i d e r t h e meaning a t t a c h e d t o t h e l e x i c a l u n i t k n i f e . The concept t o which t h e word k n i f e r e f e r s may be analyzed i n t o a s e t o f f e a t u r e s among which we would p r o b a b l y i n d : BLADE, HANDLE, LENGTHENED SHAPE, CUTS, USEFUL, DANGEROUS, e t c . Two general c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f such f e a t u r e s e t s should be underl i n e d : ( a ) t h e i r h i e r a r c h i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , which r e f l e c t s t h e unequal c o n t r i b u t i o n o f these f e a t u r e s t o t h e concept ; ( b ) t h e i r f l e x i b i l i t y , i.e., t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t r a n s i e n t r e o r g a n i z a t i o n s o f t h e h i e r a r c h y , depending on f a c t o r s such as l i n g u i s t i c c o n t e x t , i n d i v i d u a l ' s c o g n i t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n , e t c . However, my paper w i l l t r e a t e s s e n t i a l l y t h e m a j o r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f meaning a c c o r d i n g t o t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h a t i s : Meaning e l i c i t e d by a word i s a c o g n i t i v e c o n s t r u c t which r e s u l t s f r o m t h e c o m p o s i t i o n o f a s e t o f semantic f e a t u r e s . Among t h e s e t o f f e a t u r e s t h a t d e f i n e t h e concept KNIFE, some f e a t u r e s a r e r e l a t e d t o t h e p h y s i c a l p r o p e r t i e s o f k n i v e s , i . e . , p r o p e r t i e s t h a t have been p e r c e p t u a l l y experienced as such by t h e i n d i v i d u a l . T h i s i s t h e case o f f e a t u r e s such as BLADE, HANDLE, e t c . These u n i t s a r e presumably i n v o l v e d i n sone p r i v i l e g e d way n o t o n l y i n v i s u a l imagery e l i c i t e d by t h e word k n i f e , b u t a l s o i n any a c t i v i t y a i m i n g a t d e p i c t i n g t h e f i g u r a l appearance o f a k m as i n a p i c t o r i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . F o r t h i s reason, I c a l l such u n i t s o f meaning " f i g u r a t i v e semantic f e a t u r e s " , i n c o n t r a s t w i t h o t h e r k i n d s o f f e a t u r e s t h a t do n o t d i r e c t l y r e f l e c t t h e f i q u r a l p r o p e r t i e s o f o b j e c t s . Such i s p r o b a b l y t h e case f o r USEFUL and f o r DANGEROUS. We c e r t a i n l y a r e a b l e t o c o n s t r u c t v i s u a l images t h a t r e f l e c t t h r o u g h some k i n d o f a s s o c i a t i v e imagery t h e u s e f u l n e s s o r t h e danger o f a k n i f e . However i t i s obvious t h a t such an imagery i s n o t as " d i r e c t " as when t h e f e a t u r e s BLADE o r HANDLE a r e used t o evoke t h e concept KNIFE. That i s why i t seems more a p p r o p r i a t e t o q u a l i f y f e a t u r e s as t o t h e p r o b a b i l i t y w i t h which imagery processes may a p p l y t o them. I n t h i s manner i t would be p o s s i b l e t o i s o l a t e from among t h e s e t o f f e a t u r e s d e f i n i n g a concept a subset o f f e a t u r e s t o which imagery processes may a p p l y w i t h maximal p r o b a b i l i t y . These a r e t h e f e a t u r e s I s h a l l c a l l i n a b b r e v i a t e d f o r m " f i g u r a t i v e (semantic) f e a t u r e s " . I n my i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , imagery i s t o be viewed as a c o n s t r u c t i v e process t h a t g i v e s a s p e c i f i c , l i m i t e d subset o f f e a t u r e s a t r a n s i e n t c o g n i t i v e a c t u a l i t y , t h r o u g h a s p e c i f i c t y p e o f mental e x p e r i e n c e ( m a i n l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d by i t s s t r u c t u r a l analogy w i t h p e r c e p t u a l e x p e r i e n c e ) . IMAGERY VALUE AN0 SEMANTIC COMPOSITION Several techniques have been developed i n o r d e r t o "measure" imagery e l i c i t e d by l i n g u i s t i c i n p u t s . One o f them r e l i e s on t h e n o t i o n o f "imagery v a l u e " , t o which r e s e a r c h gave a n e m p i r i c a l s t a t u s a t t h e t i m e o f t h e renewal o f p s y c h o l o g i s t s ' i n t e r e s t f o r imagery (see P a i v i o , 1971). Imagery v a l u e o f a word i s d e f i n e d as t h e a b i l i t y o f t h i s word t o e l i c i t an i m a g i n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n t h e i n d i v i d u a l , t h a t i s a c o g n i t i v e e v e n t w i t h a f i g u r a t i v e c o n t e n t . I t i s o p e r a t i o n a l l y d e f i n e d by t h e

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mean v a l u e g i v e n t o t h i s word by cases a seven-point scale, whose one hand, "no image" and, on t h e r a t e a sample o f words on such a meaningful, and words i n general t h i s i n d i c a t o r a l s o shows a h i g h

M. Denis a group o f s u b j e c t s on a r a t i n g s c a l e , i n most extreme p o i n t s f o r i n s t a n c e a r e l a b e l e d , on t h e o t h e r hand, " h i g h l y v i v i d image". When s u b j e c t s s c a l e , n o t o n l y i s t h i s t a s k accepted as s c a t t e r o v e r t h e whole range o f t h e s c a l e , b u t degree o f i n t e r - and i n t r a i n d i v i d u a l c o n s i s t e n c y .

Defined i n t h i s way, t h e imagery v a l u e o f words has proved t o be a s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r i n many k i n d s o f p r o c e s s i n g o f l i n g u i s t i c m a t e r i a l : comprehension, v e r i f i c a t i o n , memorization, e t c . L i n g u i s t i c messages made w i t h high-imagery words a r e b e t t e r memorized t h a n messages made w i t h low-imagery words. However, t h e q u e s t i o n s t h a t were s u r p r i s i n g l y absent f r o m r e c e n t d i s c u s s i o n s a r e : What does imagery v a l u e measure ? What does i t r e f l e c t , e s p e c i a l l y r e g a r d i n g t h e s t r u c t u r e o f knowledge about c o r r e s p o n d i n g o b j e c t s ? I n o t h e r words, what happens i n someone's mind when he o r she c o n s t r u c t s an image i n o r d e r t o e v a l u a t e i t s v i v i d n e s s , i t s c l a r i t y , o r i t s richness ?

My t e n t a t i v e answer i s t h a t imaging r e s u l t s f r o m a process t h a t a p p l i e s t o t h e

subset o f f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s o f a concept. C o n s t r u c t i n g images i n response t o words i s i d e n t i f i e d as t h e a c t u a l i z a t i o n , i n a s p e c i a l i z e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l system, o f f i g u r a t i v e components o f concepts, through a s p e c i a l i z e d process whose major c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s t h e a b i l i t y t o c o n s t r u c t mental events w i t h a s t r u c t u r e and an i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t a r e a n a l o g i c a l w i t h those o f percept u a l events. T h i s a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s presumably takes p l a c e w i t h i n a "framework", a k i n d o f a G e s t a l t s p a t i a l scheme, which i s t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e g l o b a l shape o f t h e o b j e c t ( c f . t h e n o t i o n o f " s k e l e t a l encoding" i n Kosslyn, 1980). Whatever t h i s h y p o t h e t i c a l framework, t h e v e r y f i r s t s t e p i n my r e s e a r c h program c o n s i s t e d i n t e s t i n g t h e main consequence o f t h e assumption t h a t l i n k s imagery and semantic s t r u c t u r e s , i.e., one s h o u l d p r e d i c t t h e imagery v a l u e o f words from t h e r i c h n e s s o f t h e corresponding concepts i n t h e s o - c a l l e d f i g u r a t i v e features. The f i r s t experiment whose o b j e c t i v e was t o examine t h i s h y p o t h e s i s i n v e s t i g a t e d t h e imagery v a l u e o f general and s p e c i f i c words, and i t s r e l a t i o n w i t h t h e semant i c composition o f t h e s e words. The g e n e r a l i t y - s p e c i f i c i t y dimension i s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o a dimension t h a t one may c a l l r i c h n e s s o f concepts i n f i g u r a t i v e semantic f e a t u r e s . I f one c o n s i d e r s a branch i n a taxonomy whose u l t i m a t e t e r m i s a p h y s i c a l o b j e c t - f o r i n s t a n c e , LIVING BEING - ANIMAL BIRD - PARROT, - i t i s obvious t h a t , as one moves down t h e taxonomy, n o t o n l y do concepts grow r i c h e r i n semantic f e a t u r e s , b u t t h e y a l s o grow r i c h e r i n semantic f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s . A c o r o l l a r y o f t h i s statement i s t h a t t h e more s p e c i f i c t h e concepts, t h e e a s i e r t h e y a r e t o evoke t h e o b j e c t s as images, whereas images f o r more general concepts s h o u l d e i t h e r be v e r y poor o r c o n s i s t i n i n s t a n t i a t i o n s ( t h a t i s , images o f subconcepts r i c h e r i n f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s ) .

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I t has been demonstrated t h a t general terms, such as f u r n i t u r e , c l o t h i n , e t c . a r e l e s s l i k e l y t o e l i c i t images t h a n more s p e c i f i c terms, such pants, e t c . But t h i s i s m a i n l y apparent i n t a s k s emphasizing t h e speed w i t T i T K c h images a r e t o be c o n s t r u c t e d . As a general r e s u l t , imagery l a t e n c i e s a r e l o n g e r t o general terms t h a n t o s p e c i f i c terms. T h i s d i f f e r e n c e a l s o h o l d s f o r drawing l a t e n c i e s t o t h e s e terms. However, when one c o n s i d e r s imagery values ( t h a t a r e g i v e n w i t h o u t any temporal c o n s t r a i n t s ) , t h e r e i s i n most cases v e r y l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e between general and s p e c i f i c terms. A l i k e l y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s t h a t when s u b j e c t s have t o r a t e f o r imagery v a l u e a general t e r m t h a t i s poor i n f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s , t h e y t e n d t o l o o k f o r a s p e c i f i c exemplar i n t h e c a t e g o r y , and t h e y f i n a l l y g i v e t h e experimenter t h e imagery v a l u e f o r t h e a s s o c i a t e d s p e c i f i c term, n o t t h e imagery v a l u e f o r t h e general term i t s e l f .

4,

F i g u r e 1 i s a schematic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f f o u r h y p o t h e t i c a l l e v e l s i n a taxonomy, f r o m t h e h i g h e s t , more general l e v e l ( I ) t o t h e l o w e s t , more s p e c i f i c l e v e l ( I V ) .

Imaps and Semantic Representations

21

A t each l e v e l t h e f e a t u r e s d e f i n i n g t h e corresponding concept a r e l i s t e d as lower-case l e t t e r s . According t o such an approach, a concept a t any l e v e l i s composed o f t h e s e t o f f e a t u r e s d e f i n i n g t h e s u p e r o r d i n a t e concept, p l u s a s p e c i f i c s e t o f f e a t u r e s . For i n s t a n c e , BIRD would comprise a l l t h e f e a t u r e s f o r ANIMAL, p l u s some new ones : WINGS, FEATHERS, e t c . A t t h e l o w e r l e v e l , PARROT would comp r i s e a l l t h e f e a t u r e s f o r BIRD, p l u s some new, s p e c i f i c ones : MANY-COLOURED, REPEATS, e t c . ( c f . Le Ny, 1979). I n t h i s framework, s p e c i f i c a t i o n i s t h e r e f o r e m a i n l y viewed as a semantic enrichment.

I (a, b, c l I 1 t a , b, c l & 111 { a , b, c l &

(4, e, ti,

fl

e, f l &

Iq, h, i )

Figure 1 Schematic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f o r f o u r h y p o t h e t i c a l l e v e l s i n a taxonomy I n F i g u r e 1, u n d e r l i n e d l e t t e r s correspond t o f e a t u r e s t h a t a r e supposed t o be f i g u r a t i v e ones, i.e., f e a t u r e s r e f l e c t i n g o b j e c t p r o p e r t i e s d i r e c t l y accessed by p e r c e p t u a l processes ( v i s u a l , i n t h e examples discussed h e r e ) . Thus, i n most taxonomies, t h e h i g h e r l e v e l concept would e s s e n t i a l l y be composed o f n o n - f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s , corresponding t o v e r y g e n e r a l , a b s t r a c t p r o p e r t i e s (a, b, c ) . The i m m e d i a t l y l o w e r concept would be composed o f t h e same s e t o f f e a t u r e s (a, b, c ) , p l u s a f u r t h e r s e t (d, e , f ) , i n which f e a t u r e d would r e f l e c t a p h y s i c a l p r o p e r t y and would be l i k e l y To be f i g u r a t i v e l y represented, e i t h e r i n a v i s u a l image o r i n a drawing. My c o n t e n t i o n i s t h a t such f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s become more and more numerous as one goes down f r o m one l e v e l t o a l o w e r l e v e l i n t h e h i e r a r c h y . I t i s l i k e l y t h a t such an a n a l y s i s w i l l make t h e p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between imagery value and s p e c i f i c i t y more obvious, n o t o n l y because more s p e c i f i c concepts a r e composed o f a g r e a t e r number o f f e a t u r e s , b u t because t h e y a r e composed o f a g r e a t e r r e l a t i v e number o f f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s i n t h e whole s e t o f f e a t u r e s d e f i n i n g these concepts. ( I s h a l l i n s i s t a g a i n t h a t i t i s f o r b r e v i t y ' s sake t h a t I speak of " f i g u r a t i v e " v e r s u s " n o n - f i g u r a t i v e " f e a t u r e s . I t i s more l i k e l y indeed t h a t any semantic f e a t u r e i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e degree o r t h e p r o b a b i l i t y w i t h which i t can be r e p r e s e n t e d i n an image.) My i n i t i a l e f f o r t c o n s i s t e d i n d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h a t ( a ) general concepts a r e composed o f a l e s s e r number o f f e a t u r e s t h a n more s p e c i f i c ones, and ( b ) s p e c i f i c concepts a r e composed o f a r e l a t i v e l y g r e a t e r number o f f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s ( o r , a c c o r d i n g t o an a l t e r n a t e f o r m u l a t i o n , t h e mean " f i g u r a t i v e n e s s " o f f e a t u r e s comp o s i n g s p e c i f i c concepts i s h i g h e r than f o r more general concepts). I n t h i s exper i m e n t , p a i r s o f s u b s t a n t i v e s were used, one general and one s p e c i f i c . (One should however keep i n mind t h a t t h e r e a r e no a b s o l u t e " g e n e r a l " n o r " s p e c i f i c " words. G e n e r a l i t y o r s p e c i f i c i t y o f a word i s always r e l a t i v e t o t h a t o f another word. T h a t i s why t h e s t r i c t e s t f o r m u l a t i o n would be t h a t , i n p a i r s of s u b s t a n t i ves, one was more g e n e r a l , o r l e s s s p e c i f i c , t h a n t h e o t h e r one.)

Two k i n d s o f general concepts were c o n s i d e r e d : general concepts A (such as TREE, BIRD, FISH, e t c . ) and general concepts B (such as VEHICLE, FURNITURE, VEGETABLE, e t c . ) . General concepts A subsume members t h a t have a g r e a t number o f f i g u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n common. F o r i n s t a n c e , t h e r e i s a h i g h degree o f s i m i l a r i t y between most b i r d s as t o t h e i r g l o b a l shape, t h e p a r t s t h a t compose them,and t 2 e r e l a t i o n s between these p a r t s . Such concepts a r e c l o s e t o "base l e v e l concepts a c c o r d i n g t o Rosch's t e r m i n o l o g y ( c f . Rosch, M e r v i s , Gray, Johnson, and BoyesBraem, 1976), t h a t i s concepts a t t h e most i n c l u s i v e l e v e l where t h e v a r i o u s members have a g r e a t number o f p r o p e r t i e s i n common, e l i c i t s i m i l a r b e h a v i o r a l

22

M. Denis

programs, and possess h i g h l y s i m i l a r f i g u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . These concepts a r e c l o s e a l s o t o what Hoffmann (1982) d e f i n e d as " p r i m a r y concepts" i n a s i m i l a r , independent approach. General concepts 8 , on t h e o t h e r hand, subsume members w i t h a h i g h degree o f f i g u r a l d i s c r i m i n a b i l i t y . For i n s t a n c e , when one c o n s i d e r s t h e c a t e g o r y o f v e h i c l e s , t h e f i g u r a l appearance o f a t r u c k i s s t r o n g l y d i s t i n c t f r o m t h a t o f a b i c y c l e , o r a h e l i c o p t e r , o r a space r o c k e t .

A s p e c i f i c t e r m was p a i r e d w i t h each general term. I t was a h i g h a s s o c i a t e , non ambiguous word, whose frequency was equated w i t h t h e frequency o f t h e g e n e r a l term. A f i r s t group o f s u b j e c t s were presented w i t h t h e s e l e c t e d terms ( d i f f e r e n t s u b j e c t s were presented w i t h t h e general o r t h e s p e c i f i c t e r m i n a p a i r ) , and t h e y gave l i s t s o f p r o p e r t i e s f o r t h e designated c l a s s e s o f o b j e c t s . From these l i s t s were d e r i v e d l i s t s o f f e a t u r e s h y p o t h e t i c a l l y d e f i n i n g each o f t h e general and s p e c i f i c concepts. Features were l e x i c a l l y expressed e i t h e r by s u b s t a n t i v e s ( f o r i n s t a n c e , f o r t h e concept SNAKE : SCALES, TONGUE, VENOM), o r by a d j e c t i v e s (LONG), o r by verbs (CRAWLS). Only responses g i v e n by a t l e a s t 30 p e r c e n t of t h e s u b j e c t s were considered. T h i s , f o r i n s t a n c e , i s t h e l i s t o f f e a t u r e s d e f i n i n g t h e concept FLOWER, presented i n decreasing o r d e r o f t h e i r frequency : PETALS, STEM, LEAVES, STAMENS, POLLEN, PISTIL, SMELL. I t was found, as expected, t h a t t h e mean number o f f e a t u r e s was l o w e r f o r general t h a n f o r s p e c i f i c concepts. However, when c o n s i d e r i n g o n l y general concepts A and t h e i r s p e c i f i c c o u n t e r p a r t s , t h e d i f f e r e n c e i s h a r d l y n o t i c e a b l e , whereas t h e d i f f e r e n c e i s v e r y c l e a r i n t h e case o f general concepts B. The n e x t s t e p c o n s i s t e d i n o b t a i n i n g an i n d i c a t o r o f t h e " f i g u r a t i v e n e s s " o f f e a t u r e s . T h i s was performed by a s k i n g a new group o f s u b j e c t s t o r a t e a l l t h e f e a t u r e s o n a s c a l e s i m i l a r t o t h e imagery v a l u e scale. Then i t was p o s s i b l e t o sum t h e o b t a i n e d mean values f o r a l l t h e f e a t u r e s composing a concept, t h i s r e s u l t i n g i n a "Composite imagery v a l u e " f o r each o f t h e general and s p e c i f i c terms. When one l o o k s a t t h e whole m a t e r i a l , i t appears t h a t t h e composite imagery v a l u e i s lower f o r general t h a n f o r s p e c i f i c terms. As p r e v i o u s l y seen, t h e r e i s a v e r y small d i f f e r e n c e between general terms A and t h e i r s p e c i f i c c o u n t e r p a r t s , whereas between general terms B and t h e i r s p e c i f i c c o u n t e r p a r t s t h e d i f f e r e n c e i s l a r g e and s i g n i f i c a n t . The composite imagery v a l u e o f general terms B i s t h e l o w e s t . These terms do then r e f e r , as p r e v i o u s l y argued, t o concepts whose f e a t u r e s have a v e r y low degree o f " f i g u r a t i v e n e s s " . Moreover t h e c o n t r a s t beween t h e s e terms and a l l t h e o t h e r s i s much more pronounced than was t h e c o n t r a s t p r e v i o u s l y observed when " g l o b a l imagery v a l u e s " were considered. I t t h u s appears t h a t "composite imagery v a l u e " g i v e s a b e t t e r r e f l e c t i o n o f t h e " f i g u r a t i v e n e s s " o f t h e semantic components o f concepts, and t h a t t h i s i n d i c a t o r i s much l e s s l i k e l y t o be b i a s e d by i n s t a n t i a t i o n processes t h a n i s t h e " g l o b a l imagery v a l u e " . One however has t o examine t h e f o l l o w i n g argument : The a d d i t i v e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e h y p o t h e s i s i l l u s t r a t e d by F i g u r e 1 i s such t h a t i t i s j u s t s t a t i s t i c a l l y l i k e l y t h a t t h e composite imagery values i n c r e a s e when t h e number o f f e a t u r e s t a k e n i n t o account i n c r e a s e s . The answer i s t h a t when one computes t h e mean imagery v a l u e f o r a s i n g l e f e a t u r e , t h i s value i s s t i l l t h e l o w e s t f o r general concepts, and s t i l l l o w e r f o r f e a t u r e s composing general concepts B t h a n f o r f e a t u r e s composing any o f t h e o t h e r concepts. I t must be noted however t h a t t h e range o f t h i s i n d i c a t o r i s l i m i t e d , due t o t h e f a c t t h a t a l l t h e considered concepts are, on t h e whole, on t h e " p o s i t i v e " s i d e o f imagery values. They a l l subsume p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s o r c l a s s e s o f p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s . T h a t i s why I t u r n e d t o o t h e r m a t e r i a l s , i n t h e hope t h a t t h e y would produce c l e a r e r d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s . The general purpose was t h e same, w i t h t h e a d d i t i o n a l a t t e m p t t o demonstrate t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e number o f f e a t u r e s composing a concept and t h e i r " f i g u r a t i v e n e s s " . I n o t h e r words, concepts r i c h i n semantic f e a t u r e s - as was t h e case a t t h e l o w e s t l e v e l s o f t h e taxonomies, a c c o r d i n g t o t h e p r e v i o u s approach - would by t h i s v e r y f a c t be r i c h i n f i g u r a t i v e semantic f e a t u r e s , whereas concepts p o o r e r i n semantic f e a t u r e s - f o r i n s t a n c e , a t t h e t o p o f taxonomies would be poorer i n f i g u r a t i v e semantic f e a t u r e s .

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Images and Semantic Representations

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Having looked f o r a corpus whose elements would w i d e l y s c a t t e r on t h e r a t i n g scal e s t o be used and furthermore would n o t be s y s t e m a t i c a l l y h i e r a r c h i z e d a l o n g t h e g e n e r a l i t y - s p e c i f i c i t y dimension, I t u r n e d t o terms d e s i g n a t i n g o c c u p a t i o n s . T h i s semantic f i e l d i s v e r y l a r g e , w i t h a wide v a r i e t y o f elements d i s p e r s e d o v e r t h e whole range o f t h e imagery v a l u e scale, f r o m occupations w i t h s a l i e n t f i g u r a t i v e a t t r i b u t e s , such as f i r e m a n o r judge, t o occupations w i t h none o r almost none o f these a t t r i b u t e s , s u c h d i t o r m a n a g e r . From a l i s t o f 155 terms d e s i g n a t i n g occupations t h a t had been r a t e d f o r imagery v a l u e by a group o f s u b j e c t s , I s e l e c t e d f o u r groups o f items ( A , B, C, D ) f r o m t h e l o w e s t t o t h e h i g h e s t imagery value.

m-)

Without d e s c r i b i n g h e r e t h e d e t a i l s o f t h e analyses - which f o l l o w e d t h e same steps as i n t h e p r e v i o u s experiment, - t h e main r e s u l t s were s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . The mean number o f f e a t u r e s p e r concept i s p o s i t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h t h e imagery v a l u e o f corresponding terms. I n o t h e r words, t h e imagery value o f a word i s c l o s e l y dependent o n t h e r i c h n e s s o f t h e corresponding concept i n semantic f e a t u r e s . Furthermore, concepts r i c h e r i n semantic f e a t u r e s a r e r i c h e r i n f i g u r a t i v e semant i c f e a t u r e s . A c t u a l l y , n o t o n l y t h e composite imagery v a l u e a t t a c h e d t o concepts i n c r e a s e s from i t e m s A t o items D, b u t t h e mean imagery v a l u e f o r a s i n g l e f e a t u r e i t s e l f i n c r e a s e s f r o m items A t o items D. A s i g n i f i c a n t , p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n was computed between t h e g l o b a l imagery v a l u e o f words and t h e l a t t e r i n d i c a t o r . The mean imagery v a l u e f o r a s i n g l e f e a t u r e i s t h u s l i k e l y t o r e f l e c t t h e r i c h ness o f t h e corresponding concept i n f i g u r a t i v e semantic f e a t u r e s ( c f . Denis, 1982 a ) . ACTUALIZATION OF FIGURATIVE SEMANTIC FEATURES AND THE COMPREHENSION OF SENTENCES The p r e s e n t s e c t i o n i s i n t e n d e d t o g i v e some s u p p o r t t o t h e hypothesized v a l i d i t y o f t h e f e a t u r a l approach. One c o u l d indeed argue t h a t such an a n a l y s i s i s a p u r e l y t h e o r e t i c a l , s p e c u l a t i v e m a t t e r , and t h a t t h e r e i s n o t h i n g i n t h e human mind t h a t resembles f e a t u r e s , as components o f l e x i c a l meaning. A f u r t h e r s e r i e s o f e x p e r i ments were d i r e c t e d towards t h i s p o i n t , i . e . , t o demonstrate t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e t o a c t u a l i z e i n someone's mind n o t o n l y w h o l i s t i c concepts, b u t a l s o p a r t s o n l y o f concepts, t h a t i s subsets o f f e a t u r e s . The f o l l o w i n g experiments were a l l concerned w i t h s e l e c t i v e a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f f i g u r a t i v e ( o r n o n - f i g u r a t i v e ) components o f conceptual r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , m a i n l y d u r i n g sentence comprehension (see Denis, 1982 b ) . The n o t i o n o f s e l e c t i v e a c t u a l i z a t i o n i s c e n t r a l i n a componential model of conc e p t u a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . When p o s t u l a t i n g t h a t a concept can be analyzed i n t o a s e r i e s o f components, one s i m u l t a n e o u s l y p o s t u l a t e s t h a t a c t i v a t i n g processes may s e l e c t i v e l y a p p l y t o some o f these components, o r groups o f c o r r e l a t e d components. C o g n i t i v e a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f a concept may be " g l o b a l " when a l l t h e f e a t u r e s t h a t compose i t a r e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a c t i v a t e d . I t may be " p a r t i a l " as w e l l when a s m a l l e r number o f such components a r e a c t i v a t e d . So I attempted t o e x p e r i m e n t a l l y a c t i v a t e some s p e c i f i c components o f a conceptual r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and then d e t e c t b y some a p p r o p r i a t e procedure t h e g r e a t e r c o g n i t i v e a c t u a l i t y o f these components r e l a t i v e l y t o o t h e r s . For i n s t a n c e , when f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s o f a concept have been a c t i v a t e d , i t may be expected t h a t t r a n s i e n t l y p e r s i s t e n t t r a c e s o f t h i s c o g n i t i v e e v e n t w i l l l a t e r f a c i l i t a t e t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f a p i c t o r i a l s t i m u l u s showing t h e corresponding p r o p e r t i e s .

I n one experiment, s u b j e c t s had t o l i s t e n t o l i s t s o f words d e s i g n a t i n g o b j e c t s i n c l a s s e s , f o r i n s t a n c e a l i s t o f musical i n s t r u m e n t s . They then had t o search i n t h e i r memory whether t h e i n s t r u m e n t s possessed such o r such f i g u r a t i v e p r o p e r t y . For i n s t a n c e , when presented w i t h words such as piano, v i o l i n , a c c o r d i o n , cymbal, e t c . , s u b j e c t s had t o c l a s s i f y them a c c o r d i n g t o m r p o s s e s s i o n o f c e r t a m s i c a l p r o p e r t i e s , such as has s t r i n g s , o r has keys. T h i s t a s k was p u r p o r t e d l y a c t i v a t i n g i n s u b j e c t s ' w o r k i n g memory some f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s o f t h e corresponding concepts and i t was hypothesized t h a t , as a r e s u l t , these f e a t u r e s would t r a n s i e n -

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t l y be maintained a t some s i g n i f i c a n t l e v e l o f c o g n i t i v e a c t u a l i t y . I n an o t h e r c o n d i t i o n , o t h e r s u b j e c t s had t o c l a s s i f y t h e same l i s t o f words, b u t a c c o r d i n g t o o t h e r , n o n - f i g u r a t i v e p r o p e r t i e s , such as i s o l d (i.e., b e f o r e t h e 2 0 t h c e n t u r y , as p r e v i o u s l y i n d i c a t e d ) , o r i s d i f f i c u l t t o W T h i s t a s k was p u r p o r t e d l y a c t i v a t i n g some n o n - f i g u r a t i v e ( o r v e r y p o o r l y f i ' g u r a t i v e ) f e a t u r e s o f t h e same concepts. A f t e r t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , s u b j e c t s were unexpectedly presented w i t h p i c t u r e s r e p r e s e n t i n g musical i n s t r u m e n t s , among which t h e y had t o r e c o g n i z e as f a s t as p o s s i b l e those p r e v i o u s l y c l a s s i f i e d , from d i s t r a c t o r s . Although a l l s u b j e c t s , i n b o t h c o n d i t i o n s , had p r e v i o u s l y processed t h e v e r y same l i s t o f concepts, s u b j e c t s i n t h e f i r s t c o n d i t i o n gave r e c o g n i t i o n responses s y s t e m a t i c a l l y f a s t e r t h a n s u b j e c t s i n t h e second c o n d i t i o n . Such a r e s u l t may be accounted f o r i f one assumes t h a t s u b j e c t s i n t h e f i r s t c o n d i t i o n , a t t h e end o f t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n t a s k , m a i n t a i n e d i n t h e i r w o r k i n g memory a t r a n s i e n t t r a c e o f p r e v i o u s l y a c t u a l i z e d f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s . These s u b j e c t s t h u s were i n a f a v o u r a b l e p o s i t i o n f o r responding t o p i c t u r e s s i n c e t h e m a j o r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f any p i c t o r i a l mater i a l i s t o d i r e c t l y show t h e f i g u r a t i v e p r o p e r t i e s o f o b j e c t s . Conversely, s u b j e c t s i n t h e second c o n d i t i o n i n i t i a l l y a c t u a l i z e d n o n - f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s o f concepts and thus were l e s s a b l e than o t h e r s t o r e c o g n i z e s t i m u l i ( p i c t u r e s ) showing p r o p e r t i e s o f another k i n d ( f i g u r a t i v e p r o p e r t i e s ) . T h e r e f o r e s e l e c t i v e a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f f i g u r a t i v e semantic f e a t u r e s i s r e f l e c t e d i n t h e way s u b j e c t s l a t e r process a p i c t o r i a l m a t e r i a l . One should a l s o mention t h a t when s u b j e c t s had t o g i v e t h e i r r e c o g n i t i o n responses n o t t o p i c t u r e s b u t t o w r i t t e n names o f i n s truments, t h e r e was no l o n g e r any d i f f e r e n c e between t h e two c o n d i t i o n s . On t h e whole, c o n c l u s i o n s f r o m t h i s experiment a r e i n agreement w i t h r e s u l t s such as those presented by Johnson-Laird, Gibbs,and de Mowbray (1978), a c c o r d i n g t o which t h e semantic p r o c e s s i n g o f a word does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e a l l t h e elements o f i t s meaning.

A f u r t h e r s t e p i n t h i s r e s e a r c h c o n s i s t e d i n demonstrating t h a t s e l e c t i v e a c t u a l i z a t i o n may o p e r a t e w i t h i n t h e subset o f f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s as w e l l . I n l i n e w i t h a componential approach o f mental r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ( c f . Le Ny, 1979), t h e f o l l o w i n g h y p o t h e s i s was examined, i . e . , semantic a n a l y s i s o f a sentence a c t u a l i z e s i n a r e a d e r ' s mind s p e c i f i e d subsets o f f e a t u r e s , r a t h e r t h a n whole s e t s o f f e a t u r e s composing a l l t h e concepts r e f e r r e d t o i n t h e sentence. For i n s t a n c e , t h e concept u a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f o r t h e word e a g l e i s l i k e l y t o be composed w i t h f e a t u r e s such as HOOKED BEAK, LARGE WINGS, C L A W m L D , DANGEROUS, e t c . However, when one reads a sentence as : The e a g l e suddenly swooped down and snatched t h e weasel, i t i s supposed t h a t a p r e f e r e n t i a l a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f t h e f e a t u r e CLAWS occurs, w h i l e t h e r e i s a l e s s e r a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f t h e o t h e r f e a t u r e s , o r even no a c t u a l i z a t i o n a t a l l f o r some o f them. There i s some evidence f o r t h i s i n an experiment t h a t was conducted w i t h J.-F. Le Ny. A f t e r h a v i n g r e a d such a sentence, s u b j e c t s were p r e sented w i t h a p i c t u r e showing a p a r t o f an eagle, and t h e y were i n s t r u c t e d t o say whether t h e p i c t u r e i l l u s t r a t e d a p a r t o f an o b j e c t d e s c r i b e d i n t h e sentence. When t h e s u b j e c t s were presented w i t h a p i c t u r e showing an e a g l e ' s claws, t h e i r responses were f a s t e r t h a n when t h e y were presented w i t h f o r i n s t a n c e e a g l e ' s wings. I n t h e same way, a f t e r r e a d i n g a sentence whose c o n t e n t focused on t h e f e a t u r e WINGS, such as : The e a g l e soared s l o w l y and m a j e s t i c a l l y i n t o t h e heavens, s u b j e c t s now responded f a s t e r t o t h e p i c t u r e o f wings than t o t h e p i c t u r e m s . Such r e s u l t s may be accounted f o r i f we a d m i t t h a t semantic p r o c e s s i n g o f d e s c r i p t i v e sentences u n e q u a l l y a c t i v a t e s components o f meaning. The f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s focused on by t h e sentence a r e p r i m a r i l y a c t i v a t e d and m a i n t a i n e d i n memory, whereas o t h e r f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s a r e a c t i v a t e d a t a l o w e r degree, o r even n o t a c t i v a t e d a t a l l . I t i s worth n o t i n g t h a t t h i s d i f f e r e n c e i n l a t e n c i e s was no l o n g e r observed when s u b j e c t s had t o respond, n o t t o p i c t u r e s , b u t t o w r i t t e n words ( i n t h i s example, t h e word claws or t h e word w i n g s ) . T h i s r e s u l t was o b t a i n e d i n a f u r t h e r e x p e r i ment, a n d i t s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n e l a b o r a t e d by t h e r e a d e r o f t h e sentence, t h a t i s m a i n t a i n e d w h i l e he o r she i s w a i t i n g f o r t h e t a r g e t item, a c t u a l l y c o n t a i n s a s p e c i f i c a l l y f i g u r a t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n . Is t h i s p s y c h o l o g i c a l e v e n t t o be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as a v i s u a l image ? Is i t " o n l y " a c o g n i t i v e , non

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i m a g i n a l a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f t h e f i g u r a t i v e p r o p e r t i e s t h a t have been evoked i n t h e sentence ? A d e f i n i t e answer i s hard t o g i v e . I w i l l however n o t e t h a t t h e e x i s tence o f such t r a n s i e n t mental r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s c o n t a i n i n g some a c t u a l l y f i g u r a t i ve i n f o r m a t i o n has been suggested by r e s u l t s d e r i v e d f r o m an o t h e r experiment, which was conducted w i t h D. Dubois. Without d i s c u s s i n g t h e d e t a i l s o f t h i s experiment, I w i l l o n l y m e n t i o n t h a t , i n one c o n d i t i o n , s u b j e c t s had t o r e a d d e s c r i p t i v e sentences, such as : A m a j e s t i c swan was s i l e n t l y g l i d i n g on t h e l a k e i n t h e park, and t h e n t o d e c i d e whether a p i c t u r e c o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d as an i l l u s t r a t i o n t o t h e sentence. F o r p i c t u r e s supposed t o e l i c i t p o s i t i v e responses, l a t e n c i e s were s h o r t e r t o t h e p i c t u r e o f a t y p i c a l swan t h a n t o t h e p i c t u r e o f a l e s s t y p i c a l one (such as a b l a c k swan). But t h e r e l e v a n t f i n d i n g here i s t h a t f o r p i c t u r e s supposed t o e l i c i t n e g a t i v e responses, l a t e n c i e s were l o n g e r t o p i c t u r e s t h a t c o n t a i n e d more f i g u r a t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e t y p i c a l i t e m . F o r i n s t a n c e , n e g a t i v e c o r r e c t responses were slower t h e p i c t u r e o f a goose ( a b i r d t h a t possesses a number o f f i g u r a t i v e p r o p e r t i e s i n common w i t h t h e t y p i c a l swan, such as t h e c o l o r w h i t e , a long neck, e t c . ) t h a n t o t h e p i c t u r e o f an owl. So i t i s l i k e l y t h a t t h e semantic represent a t i o n o f t h e t h i n g s d e s c r i b e d i n t h e sentence has an a c t u a l l y f i g u r a t i v e cont e n t , b u t i t i s n o t p o s s i b l e t o s t a t e t h a t t h i s c o n t e n t i s always and f o r e v e r y body expressed through a conscious c o g n i t i v e experience, as a v i s u a l image. As a f i n a l comment, I w i l l r e l a t e t h e r e s e a r c h e f f o r t s d e s c r i b e d above t o t h e c u r r e n t t r e n d t h a t g i v e s a growing importance t o p a r t i a l a c t u a l i z a t i o n and focal i z a t i o n processes i n c o g n i t i v e a c t i v i t i e s . I t i s a m a t t e r of f a c t t h a t r e l a t i n g t h e s t u d y o f f i g u r a t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t o t h e s t u d y o f language comprehension gave prominence t o t h i s s i g n i f i c a n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f c o g n i t i v e processes. More g e n e r a l l y , h a v i n g s t u d i e d t h e d a t a , t h e r e a r e good reasons f o r o u r b e l i e v i n g i n t h e f r u i t f u l n e s s o f a mutual s e t t l e m e n t i n t h e approaches o f r e s e a r c h e r s i n language comprehension and o f those i n imagery. NOTE The r e s e a r c h r e p o r t e d above and t h e p r e p a r a t i o n o f t h i s c h a p t e r were supported n o 235. by t h e L a b o r a t o i r e de Psychologie, Equipe de Recherche associee au C.N.R.S. A u t h o r ' s address : L a b o r a t o i r e de Psychologie, E.R.A. au C.N.R.S. no 235, U n i v e r s i t @ de P a r i s V I I I , 2, r u e de l a L i b e r t e , 93526 Saint-Denis Cedex 2, France. REFERENCES Beech, J.R., An a l t e r n a t i v e model t o account f o r t h e C l a r k and Chase p i c t u r e v e r i f i c a t i o n experiments, J o u r n a l o f Mental Imagery, 1980, 4, 1-11. Carpenter, P.A., and J u s t , M.A., Sentence comprehension : A p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c p r o c e s s i n g model o f v e r i f i c a t i o n , P s y c h o l o g i c a l Review, 1975, 82, 45-73. Chase, W.G., and C l a r k , H.H., Mental o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e comparison o f sentences and p i c t u r e s , i n L.W. Gregg (ed.), C o g n i t i o n i n l e a r n i n g and memory, New York, Wiley, 1972. C o l l i n s , A . M . , and Q u i l l i a n , M.P., R e t r i e v a l t i m e f r o m semantic memory, J o u r n a l o f Verbal L e a r n i n g and Verbal Behavior, 1969, 8, 240-247. Denis, M.,

Les images mentales, P a r i s , Presses U n i v e r s i t a i r e s de France, 1979.

Denis, M., V a l e u r d ' i m a g e r i e e t c o m p o s i t i o n semantique : a n a l y s e de deux e c h a n t i l l o n s de s u b s t a n t i f s , U n i v e r s i t e de P a r i s V I I I , Documents du L a b o r a t o i r e de Psychologie, 1982 ( a ) . Denis, M., On f i g u r a t i v e components o f mental r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , i n F. K l i x , J. Hoffmann and E. van d e r Meer (eds.), C o g n i t i v e r e s e a r c h i n psychology :

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Recent approaches, designs and r e s u l t s , Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1982 ( b ) . and Weil-Barais, A . , A c t i v i t e s a n t i c i p a t r i c e s dans une tdche de comparaison de dessins e t de phrases, i n J . Requin ( e d . ) , A n t i c i p a t i o n e t 1980. comportement, P a r i s , E d i t i o n s du C.N.R.S.,

(8) Dubois, D.,

(9) Eysenck, M.W., The f e e l i n g o f knowing a word's meaning, B r i t i s h J o u r n a l o f Psychology, 1979, 70, 243-251. (10) Friedman, A., Memorial comparisons w i t h o u t t h e "mind's eye", J o u r n a l o f Verbal L e a r n i n g and Verbal Behavior, 1978, 17, 427-444.

(11) Glass, A.L., Eddy, J.K., and Schwanenflugel, P.J., The v e r i f i c a t i o n o f h i g h and low imagery sentences, J o u r n a l o f Experimental Psychology : Human L e a r n i n g and Memory, 1980, 6, 692-704. (12) Hoffmann, J . , R e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f concepts and t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f o b j e c t s , i n F. K l i x , J. Hoffmann and E. van d e r Meer (eds.), C o g n i t i v e r e s e a r c h i n psychology : Recent approaches, designs and r e s u l t s , Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1982. and Langford, J., Comprehension and r e c a l l o f a b s t r a c t and con(13) Holmes, V.M., c r e t e sentences, J o u r n a l o f Verbal L e a r n i n g and Verbal Behavior, 1976, 15, 559-566. (14) Holyoak, K.J., The r o l e o f imagery i n t h e e v a l u a t i o n o f sentences : Imagery o r semantic f a c t o r s ? J o u r n a l o f Verbal L e a r n i n g and Verbal Behavior, 1974, 13, 162-166. (15) H u t t e n l o c h e r , J . , C o n s t r u c t i n g s p a t i a l images : A s t r a t e g y i n reasoning, P s y c h o l o g i c a l Review, 1968, 75, 550-560. (16) Johnson-Laird, P.N., s i n g , and memory f o r (17) Jorgensen, C.C., and sentences, C o g n i t i v e (18) Kosslyn, S.M., 1980.

Gibbs, G., and de Mowbray, J., Meaning, amount o f proceswords, Memory and C o g n i t i o n , 1978, 6, 372-375. Kintsch, W . , The r o l e o f imagery i n t h e e v a l u a t i o n o f Psychology, 1973, 4, 110-116.

Image and mind, Cambridge, Mass.,

Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press,

(19) Kosslyn, S.M., Murphy, G.L., Bemesderfer, M.E., and F e i n s t e i n , K.J., Category and continuum i n mental comparisons, J o u r n a l o f Experimental Psychology : General, 1977, 106, 341-375. (20) Le Ny, J.-F., La semantique psychologique, P a r i s , Presses U n i v e r s i t a i r e s de France, 1979. (21) MacLeod, C.M., Hunt, E.B., and Mathews, N.N., I n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e v e r i f i c a t i o n o f s e n t e n c e - p i c t u r e r e l a t i o n s h i p s , J o u r n a l o f Verbal L e a r n i n g and Verbal Behavior, 1978, 17, 493-507. (22) M i l l e r , G.A., and Johnson-Laird, P.N., Language and p e r c e p t i o n , Cambridge, Mass., Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press ; Cambridge, England, Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1976. (23) P a i v i o , A., Imagery and v e r b a l processes, New York, H o l t , R i n e h a r t E Winston, 1971 (Second p r i n t i n g , H i l l s d a l e , N.J., Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1979). (24) P a i v i o , A., Perceptual comparisons through t h e m i n d ' s eye, Memory and Cognit i o n , 1975, 3, 635-647. (25) P a i v i o , A . , Mental comparisons i n v o l v i n g a b s t r a c t a t t r i b u t e s . Memory and Cognition, 1978, 6, 199-208. (26) P o t t e r , M.C., Valian, V . V . , and Faulconer, B.A., R e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a sentence and i t s p r a g m a t i c i m p l i c a t i o n s : Verbal, i m a g i s t i c , o r a b s t r a c t ? J o u r n a l o f Verbal L e a r n i n g and Verbal Behavior, 1977, 16, 1-12. (27) Rosch, E., Mervis, C.B., Gray, W., Johnson, D., and Boyes-Braem, P., B a s i c o b j e c t s i n n a t u r a l c a t e g o r i e s , C o g n i t i v e Psychology, 1976, 8, 382-439.

Images and Semantic Representations

27

(28) Smith, E.E., Shoben, E.J., and Rips, L.J., Structure and process i n semantic memory : A featural model for semantic decisions, Psychological Review, 1974, 81, 214-241.

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29

SUBJECTIVITY AND MEMORY Rand J . S p i r o Center f o r t h e Study o f Reading U n i v e r s i t y o f I l l i n o i s a t Urbana-Champaign U.S.A.

Imagine y o u r s e l f ( o r someone you a r e r e a d i n g a b o u t ) w a l k i n g along a dockside l a t e on a foggy n i g h t . For most people t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n evokes a mood, one o f m y s t e r y o r , perhaps, suspense. Whatever words you choose, however, t h e d e s c r i p t i o n w i l l d i f f e r f r o m t h e a c t u a l experience o f t h e mood.

Saying something i s

m y s t e r i o u s i s o b v i o u s l y d i f f e r e n t from f e e l i n g t h e sense o f m y s t e r y .

What does

contemporary c o g n i t i v e science have t o say about these two ways o f t h i n k i n g about t h i n g s ? latter.

A l i t t l e b i t about t h e former and n e x t t o n o t h i n g about t h e

Almost a l l r e c e n t Anglo-American r e s e a r c h has focused on aspects o f

mental a c t i v i t y t h a t can be p u t i n t o words o r a t l e a s t r e p r e s e n t e d i n some d i s c r e t e p r o p o s i t i o n a l form.

Other than a small amount o f r e c e n t work on s t a t e -

dependent r e t r i e v a l processes, t h e p o t e n t i a l i n f l u e n c e o f i n t e r n a l experience on c o g n i t i o n has been ignored.

When a f f e c t i s c l e a r l y i n v o l v e d i n understanding

( f o r example, i f a c h a r a c t e r i n a s t o r y i s a n g r y enough t o i n f l u e n c e h i s a c t i o n s ) , t h e t e m p t a t i o n i s t o p r e d i c a t e a v e r b a l d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e a f f e c t i v e s t a t e as a property o f the individual.

The a f f e c t i v e s t a t e may be analyzed t o determine,

among o t h e r t h i n g s , t h e k i n d s o f i n f e r e n c e s i t enables.

Such an approach i s

c e r t a i n l y u s e f u l , b u t i t does n o t c a p t u r e t h e d i r e c t , e x p e r i e n t i a l aspect o f t h e state.

The l a t t e r i s n o t j u s t a n o t h e r p r o p e r t y , b u t something t h a t pervades t h e

things the individual thinks

about.

Furthermore, i t w i l l o f t e n f u n c t i o n as a

background t o foregrounded a c t i v i t i e s . and a c t a n g r i l y .

So i f someone i s angry, t h e y w i l l t h i n k

The q u e s t i o n t h a t must be asked i s whether t h e k i n d o f perva-

s i v e background ' ' c o l o r a t i o n ' ' t h a t seems t o c h a r a c t e r i z e moods and o t h e r a f f e c t i v e s t a t e s has any f u n c t i o n a l r o l e i n c o g n i t i o n and, i f so, whether such r o l e s can be studied empirically. F i r s t , i t s e m s somewhat s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n has n o t r e c e i v e d more attention.

B a r t l e t t . (1932) p l a c e d vague, l a r g e l y a f f e c t i v e , general impressions

o f t h e whole of a p a s t event ( w h i c h he c a l l e d a t t i t u d e s ) a t t h e c e n t e r of h i s t h e o r y o f r e c o n s t r u c ' t i v e memory. T h i s aspect o f h i s t h e o r y i s v i r t u a l l y t h e only one t h a t has n o t l e d t o f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h i n t h e l a s t t e n y e a r s .

Four common

b e l i e f s can be o f f e r e d as reasons f o r t h i s n e g l e c t . F i r s t , i n t e r n a l experience i s p r i v a t e . You cannot know what a n o t h e r f e e l s as he f e e l s i t . T h i s i s

30

R.J. Spiro

certainly true.

Second, t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t f e e l i n g s f u n c t i o n a s background

g e s t a l t s t h e y c o u l d n o t be modeled even i f t h e y were n o t p r i v a t e .

When you

a n a l y z e something you p u t i t i n t o t h e foreground, t h u s making i t i n t o a d i f f e r e n t k i n d o f t h i n g , and when you a n a l y z e a whole i n t o i t s p a r t s you l o s e i t s h o l i s t i c character.

This i s also true.

The t h i r d and f o u r t h reasons a r e t h a t background

f e e l i n g s and moods a r e n o t causal agents i n c o g n i t i v e a c t i v i t y ( i . e . ,

they are

epiphenomenal) and, i n any case, q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g them cannot be e m p i r i c a l . I t i s w i t h t h e s e two assumptions t h a t I d i s a g r e e .

F i r s t , even i f f e e l i n g s do

have epiphenomenal o r i g i n s , once had t h e y c o u l d t h e n become u s e f u l .

Second, i f

you cannot model some h y p o t h e s i z e d a s p e c t o f mental f u n c t i o n i n g , you can s t i l l t e s t i t i n d i r e c t l y by d e s i g n i n g experiments t h e r e s u l t s o f which may p r e c l u d e a l t e r n a t i v e a c c o u n t s t o t h o s e i n v o k i n g t h e proposed c o n s t r u c t .

I n t h i s paper, I

w i l l o u t l i n e some ways phenomena r e l a t e d t o mental s t a t e s may be i n v o l v e d i n t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and r e c a l l o f t e x t and r e a l e v e n t s . ARGUMENTS FOR FEELINGS BEING REPRESENTED I N MEMORY I t seems l i k e l y t h a t f e e l i n g s a r e l e f t behind i n some d u r a b l e f a s h i o n i n

l o n g - t e r m memory.

T h i s would make sense f r o m an e v o l u t i o n a r y p o i n t o f v i e w .

Remembering t h a t a c u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n i s l i k e a p a s t one t h a t was f e a r f u l , f o r example, b e f o r e remembering any o f t h e e p i s o d i c p a r t i c u l a r s would have o b v i o u s a d a p t i v e value.

To t h e e x t e n t t h a t f e e l i n g s a r e s o m a t i c a l l y i n v o l v i n g t h e y may

be more e n d u r i n g .

To t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e y a r e g e s t a l t s t h e y would be h i g h l y

chunked and t h u s amenable t o e f f i c i e n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and r a p i d scanning i n memory (see b e l o w ) .

Perhaps most i m p o r t a n t , t h e y a r e f r e e b y - p r o d u c t s o f l i v i n g .

You u s u a l l y do n o t have t o engage i n any e f f o r t f u l p r o c e s s i n g t o have f e e l i n g s ; t h e y j u s t happen. Beyond t h e s e common-sense arguments, t h e r e i s some s u p p o r t i v e d a t a , a l b e i t scant.

B a r t l e t t found t h a t vague h o l i s t i c i m p r e s s i o n s were t h e f i r s t t h i n g s t o

come t o mind i n remembering s t o r i e s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e a n e c d o t a l r e p o r t s o f h i s memory s u b j e c t s .

Recent work on state-dependent r e t r i e v a l (e.g.,

Bower, 1980)

shows t h a t b e i n g i n a d i f f e r e n t emotional mood s t a t e a t t h e t i m e o f r e c a l l t h a n a t t h e t i m e o f a c q u i s i t i o n i n h i b i t s memory performance.

I would l i k e t o argue,

however, t h a t t h e state-dependent approach c o n s i d e r s o n l y a s m a l l p a r t o f t h e f u n c t i o n of f e e l i n g s i n memory.

Feelings are n o t j u s t another f a c t o r i n f l u e n c i n g

t h e a c c e s s i b i l i t y o f i n f o r m a t i o n i n memory.

Rather, t h e y may p l a y a u b i q u i t o u s

f u n c t i o n i n v a r i o u s a s p e c t s o f t e x t r e c a l l ( a s w e l l as i n m e t a c o g n i t i o n and accommodative l e a r n i n g ; see S p i r o , i n p r e p a r a t i o n ) .

The q u e s t i o n t h a t we w i l l

ask, then, i s n o t m e r e l y do you need a mood match between a c q u i s i t i o n and r e c a l l , b u t how does h a v i n g a mood i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e make a d i f f e r e n c e .

Subjwtivity and Memory

SIGNATURE FEELINGS:

31

THE P E R V A S I V E COLORATION MODEL

The e m p i r i c a l r e s e a r c h on f e l t . experience and memory i n my l a b o r a t o r y i s guided by a f a i r l y s i m p l e model, t h e r u d i m e n t s o f which can be o u t l i n e d s u c c i n c t l y ( f o r more d e t a i l and some o m i t t e d c o m p l e x i t i e s , see S p i r o , i n p r e p a r a t i o n ) . proposed t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t e x t and r e a l events has two a s p e c t s :

It i s

proposi-

t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of c o n t e n t i n t h e c o n t e x t o f r e l e v a n t p r e e x i s t i n g knowledge schemata and analog r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f c o l l a t e r a l e x p e r i e n t i a l s t a t e s .

An e a r l y

Much as a hand-

metaphor we used t o d e s c r i b e t h e l a t t e r i n v o l v e d h a n d w r i t i n g .

w r i t i n g e x p e r t can draw c o n c l u s i o n s about t h e a f f e c t i v e s t a t e o f a w r i t e r based on a specimen o f h i s h a n d w r i t i n g , t h e r e i s a mental " h a n d w r i t i n g . "

Furthermore,

we a r e a l l f a i r l y e x p e r t , i n v a r y i n g degrees, i n i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .

Thus i n

a d d i t i o n t o r e p r e s e n t i n g c o n t e n t , something a b o u t t h e manner o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n c a r r i e s i n f o r m a t i o n about e x p e r i e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .

A l t h o u g h t h i s metaphor

i s u s e f u l i n g i v i n g a f i r s t a p p r o x i m a t i o n t o o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l n o t i o n , we no l o n g e r employ i t ( f o r reasons t o o l e n g t h y t o go i n t o h e r e ) .

A more a c c u r a t e

n o t i o n can be g o t t e n by t h i n k i n g o f a l l c o n t e n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n as h a v i n g a backThe n a t u r e o f t h e c o l o r a t i o n corresponds t o t h e n a t u r e o f t h e

ground c o l o r a t i o n . f e l t experience.

When an event has a c o n t i n u o u s dominant e x p e r i e n t i a l q u a l i t y ,

as events o f t e n do ( c f . , James, 1890), t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e event w i l l have a r e l a t i v e l y homogeneous background c o l o r a t i o n .

When such homogeneity p r e v a i l s ,

I r e f e r t o t h e event as having a s i g n a t u r e f e e l i n g ( I use s i g n a t u r e i n much t h e same way as m u s i c i a n s w i l l r e f e r t o t h e compositions o f Beethoven, f o r example, as having c e r t a i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t a c t as h i s s i g n a t u r e ) . The r o l e o f f e e l i n g - b a s e d background c o l o r a t i o n i n memory can t h e n be summarized as f o l l o w s : 1.

R e t r i e v a l i n d e x i n g and e f f i c i e n c y .

I t i s hypothesized t h a t , f i g u r a -

t i v e l y speaking, background c o l o r a t i o n i s v i s i b l e f r o m a g r e a t e r d i s t a n c e than specific content.

I n f o r m a t i o n i n r e t r i e v a l c o n t e x t s f i r s t l e a d s t o memory f i l e s

t h a t c o n t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n about s i g n a t u r e f e e l i n g s .

T h a t i n f o r m a t i o n i s t h e n used

f o r a p r e l i m i n a r y scan o f t h e more d e t a i l e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , b u t a t a " d i s t a n c e " t h a t allows detection o f coloration but not content specifics.

When a c o l o r a t i o n

match i s found, t h e memory area w i t h t h a t c o l o r a t i o n i s t h e n " m a g n i f i e d " a l l o w i n g r e t r i e v a l of s p e c i f i c memorial i n f o r m a t i o n . [The process i s a c t u a l l y q u i t e a b i t more complicated, i n v o l v i n g a p r o g r e s s i v e refinement o f t h e t a r g e t c o l o r a t i o n w i t h succeeding r e t r i e v a l passes, b u t t h e d e t a i l s a r e beyond t h e scope of t h i s paper.]

Since c o l o r a t i o n i s v i s i b l e f r o m g r e a t e r d i s t a n c e s and can be checked

r e l a t i v e l y r a p i d l y " a t a glance," t h i s f i r s t pass h e u r i s t i c scan i n c r e a s e s t h e e f f i c i e n c y o f remembering ( w i t h some c o s t s r e l a t e d t o f a l s e p o s i t i v e r e t r i e v a l s t h a t may be d e t e c t e d i n t h e more c a r e f u l second stage a n a l y t i c check). 2.

Cohesion.

To t h e e x t e n t t h a t c o n t e n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a r e a s s o c i a t e d

32

R.J. Spiro

w i t h homogeneous e x p e r i e n t i a l q u a l i t i e s ( i .e.,

high conformity t o signature

f e e l i n g s ) , t h e c o l o r a t i o n w i l l a c t as a k i n d o f cohesive g l u e t o i n h i b i t d i s i n t e g r a t i o n o f memories o v e r t i m e .

T h i s mood-based cohesion i s v e r y d i f f e r e n t

from t h e t r a d i t i o n a l k i n d s o f s y n t a c t i c and semantic cohesion. 3.

C o n s t r a i n t s on r e c o n s t r u c t i o n .

p a s s i v e r e t r i e v a l o f s t o r e d memory t r a c e s .

Remembering i s more t h a n j u s t t h e A c t i v e r e c o n s t r u c t i v e processes a l s o

p l a y a v e r y i m p o r t a n t p a r t ( B a r t l e t t , 1932; S p i r o , 1977).

Since r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s

a r e l i k e l y t o be incomplete, w i t h much i n f o r m a t i o n processed a t i n p u t i n such a way as t o l e a v e i t t o be d e r i v e d l a t e r i f needed ( S p i r o & E s p o s i t o , i n p r e s s ) , many s p e c i f i c s a r e i n f e r r e d a t t h e t i m e o f r e c a l l i n such a way as t o make t h e complete r e c o l l e c t i o n b o t h i n t e r n a l l y c o n s i s t e n t and c o n s i s t e n t w i t h knowledge o f t h e way t h e w o r l d u s u a l l y works.

The s i g n a t u r e f e e l i n g c o n s t r a i n s t h i s process

by a c t i n g as a check on generated c a n d i d a t e memories.

I n f o r m a t i o n t h a t may

l o g i c a l l y and p r a g m a t i c a l l y f i t w i t h t h e r e s t o f an e v e n t can be d i s c o u n t e d Furthermore, t h e

i f i t would s e r i o u s l y d i s t o r t t h e s t a b l e s i g n a t u r e f e e l i n g .

s i g n a t u r e f e e l i n g can be used as a c r i t e r i o n g u i d i n g t h e i n i t i a l g e n e r a t i o n o f candidates.

A PRELIMINARY TEST OF THE MODEL I w i l l i l l u s t r a t e one o f t h e paradigms we have developed and one s e t o f r e s u l t s t h a t bear on t h e f o r e g o i n g d i s c u s s i o n . To s t a r t a t t h e beginning, i t makes sense t o i n q u i r e as t o what h a v i n g a c l e a r and s a l i e n t mood does f o r you as compared t o n o t h a v i n g one.

A s t u d y by

S p i r o and Crismore ( i n p r e p a r a t i o n ) addressed t h a t q u e s t i o n .

Subjects read v e r y

d r y and t o n e l e s s passages about c h a r a c t e r s e x e c u t i n g chores.

These passages were

n o t e v o c a t i v e o f any mood.

I n t h e experimental c o n d i t i o n , s u b j e c t s were presented

w i t h b r i e f e x c e r p t s from poems such as t h e f o l l o w i n g one f r o m C o l e r i d g e ' s

Frost

a t Midnight: ' T i s calm indeed! so calm t h a t i t d i s t u r b s And vexes m e d i t a t i o n w i t h i t s s t r a n g e and extreme s i l e n t n e s s .

A poem e x c e r p t was presented b e f o r e each o f two passages.

S u b j e c t s were i n s t r u c -

t e d t o read t h e poem e x c e r p t and t o t r y t o g e t a f e e l i n g o r mood from i t .

They

were t o l d t h a t t h e r e were no r i g h t o r wrong moods, t h a t whatever t h e y f e l t was right.

The i n s t r u c t i o n f o r u s i n g t h e poem was s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d :

t h e y were t o

keep t h e f e e l i n g o r mood i n t h e back o f t h e i r minds w h i l e r e a d i n g t h e passage, much l i k e background music i n a movie. It was hypothesized t h a t i n t h e poem c o n d i t i o n t h e background mood would

p r o v i d e a p e r v a s i v e background c o l o r a t i o n t o t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e events i n t h e passages, whereas i n t h e c o n t r o l c o n d i t i o n no such u n i f y i n g c o l o r a t i o n would be a v a i l a b l e .

A c c o r d i n g l y , i t was p r e d i c t e d t h a t d i s i n t e g r a t i o n o f t h e events i n

Subjtctivity and Memory

t h e passages over t i m e would be lessened i n t h e poem c o n d i t i o n . T h i s should be e s p e c i a l l y t r u e f o r i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t had l e s s cohesive support from p r e e x i s t i n g knowledge s t r u c t u r e s (a more e f f i c i e n t way t o connect i n f o r m a t i o n ) .

The passages

each c o n s i s t e d o f four general t o p i c s (e.g., c l e a n i n g , working on photographs, r e p a i r i n g t h i n g s ) . I t was expected t h a t these t o p i c s would n o t have s u b s t a n t i a l p r e e x i s t i n g knowledge c o n n e c t i o n s . For each general t o p i c , t h r e e s p e c i f i c a c t i o n s were mentioned i n t h e passages (e.g., the topic "cleaning").

washing t h e f l o o r o r d o i n g t h e d i s h e s f o r

Given t o p i c a v a i l a b i l i t y , knowledge-based cohesion was

expected t o be g r e a t e r w i t h i n t o p i c s t h a n across them. The r e s u l t s were as p r e d i c t e d by t h e c o l o r a t i o n model.

Immediate f r e e r e c a l l

i n d i c a t e d a s l i g h t b u t s t a t i s t i c a l l y n o n s i g n i f i c a n t advantage i n t o p i c r e c a l l f o r t h e no-poems c o n t r o l c o n d i t i o n .

However, a f t e r two t o f o u r weeks s u b j e c t s i n t h e

poem c o n d i t i o n r e c a l l e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y more o f t h e general t o p i c s than were r e called i n the control condition.

T h i s t r e n d was e s p e c i a l l y pronounced f o r sub-

j e c t s s c o r i n g below t h e median on a vocabulary t e s t , s u b j e c t s you would expect t o have l e s s w e l l developed v e r b a l - a n a l y t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r a t e g i e s and perhaps t o manifest a g r e a t e r r e l i a n c e on mood-based cohesion as compensation.

There was no

d i f f e r e n c e between poem and c o n t r o l s u b j e c t s i n t h e c o n d i t i o n a l p r o b a b i l i t y o f r e c a l l i n g s p e c i f i c a c t i o n s g i v e n t h a t t h e general t o p i c was r e c a l l e d .

This

i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f a cohesive mood background f a c i l i t a t e d r e c a l l p r i m a r i l y by h o l d i n g t o g e t h e r t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n which had l e s s e r a p r i o r i conncctedness, i n accordance w i t h t h e c o l o r a t i o n model.

The g e n e r a l i t y o f t h e s e r e s u l t s

i s a t t e s t e d t o by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y a p p l i e d t o m a n i p u l a t e d moods as d i f f e r e n t as t h o s e o f calmness and t u r b u l e n c e , suggesting t h a t t h e f i n d i n g s a r e n o t t h e mere r e s u l t o f emotional a r o u s a l o r t r a n q u i l i z a t i o n .

Furthermore, t h e r e was no seman-

t i c c o n n e c t i o n between t h e poem e x c e r p t s and t h e passage c o n t e n t s , and t h e r e was no c o r r e l a t i o n between whether s u b j e c t s i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e y had t r i e d t o f i n d a c o n n e c t i o n between t h e poems and t h e passages o r n o t and t h e amount o f r e c a l l , making depth o f p r o c e s s i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s u n l i k e l y .

A l s o , enhanced imagery

based on t h e poem's mood i s an u n l i k e l y account o f t h e r e s u l t s - - s u b j e c t s would be u n l i k e l y t o e l a b o r a t e g e n e r i c c a t e g o r i e s w i t h mood i n f o r m a t i o n w h i l e n o t e l a b o r a t i n g the s p e c i f i c concrete actions (e.g.,

calmness p a r t i c u l a r i z i n g t h e c a t e g o r y

" c l e a n i n g " b u t n o t t h e c o n c r e t e a c t o f washing t h e f l o o r ) .

It i s also interest-

i n g t o n o t e t h a t d e b r i e f i n g responses i n d i c a t e d t h a t s u b j e c t s d i d n o t appear t o have t o r e c a l l t h e poem mood a t t h e t i m e o f r e c a l l f o r t h a t mood t o have a f a v o r able e f f e c t . THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE M I N D What a r e mental moods? There a r e obvious l i m i t a t i o n s on answering t h i s q u e s t i o n , such as t h e p r i v a c y problem mentioned e a r l i e r . D e s p i t e t h e c o n s t r a i n t s , an approach a t a v e r y general l e v e l i s p o s s i b l e .

Most would accept t h e n o t i o n

R.J. Spiro

34

t h a t t h e r e i s a stream o f thought something l i k e t h a t d e s c r i b e d by, say, W i l l i a m James (1890) o r , perhaps Henri Bergson (1903).

I f one f u r t h e r a l l o w s t h a t t h i s

.e., stream i s sometimes experienced by us i n some d i r e c t p r e s e n t a t i o n a l way (i we can be aware o f o u r mental s t a t e s w i t h o u t m e d i a t i o n a l c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s ) , than i t i s t h a t immediate s u b j e c t i v e aspect (Dewey, 1910) t h a t I r e f e r t o as f e l t experience o r mental mood.

I t h i n k t h a t most o f u s would agree t h a t a p a l p a b l e

atmosphere pcrmeates o u r thought, p a r t i c u l a r l y when o u r purposes do n o t wander much.

It i s

our awareness o f t h e s e atmospheres t h a t leads, f o r example, t o t h e

spark o f r e c o g n i t i o n we f i n d i n t h e n o v e l s o f stream o f consciousness w r i t e r s l i k e James Joyce, V i r g i n i a Woolf, and Marcel P r o u s t (whose view o f memory and a f f e c t i s n o t t h a t d i s s i m i l a r from t h a t advanced h e r e ) .

The n a t u r e o f t h i s mental atmo-

sphere may n o t be t h e same f o r everybody ( i t almost c e r t a i n l y i s n o t , beyond t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f some general l e v e l s i m i l a r i t i e s ) , b u t i f i t e x i s t s , and i t i s a n a t u r a l and e f f o r t l e s s by-product o f thought, then i t would be h i g h l y w a s t e f u l f o r i t n o t t o be p u t t o some i n t e r n a l use.

REFERENCES B a r t l e t t , F.C. Bergson, H.

1903.

Bower, G. H. Dewey, J.

1932.

Cambridge:

"Mood and Memory."

1890.

S p i r o , R. J.

New York:

The P r i n c i p l e s o f Psychology.

1977.

hpproach."

New York:

( I n J. Dewey, The

H o l t , R i n e h a r t & Winston.)

New York:

"Remembering I n f o r m a t i o n from T e x t :

I n R.C.

Bobbs-Merrill.

American P s y c h o l o g i s t 36, 129-148.

"The P o s t u l a t e o f Immediate Empiricism."

I n f l u e n c e o f Darwin on Philosophy. James, W.

Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press.

An I n t r o d u c t i o n t o Metaphysics.

1980.

1936.

Remembering.

Henry H o l t . The ' S t a t e o f Schema'

Anderson, R. J. S p i r o , & W . E. Montague (Eds.),

Schooling and t h e A c q u i s i t i o n o f Knowledge.

H i l l s d a l e , New Jersey:

Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. FOOTNOTE T h i s r e s e a r c h was supported i n p a r t by t h e N a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e o f Education under C o n t r a c t No. US-NIE-C-400-76-0116.

Many he1 p f u l d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h Avon

Crismore and Terrence Turner a r e g r a t e f u l l y acknowledged.

LANGUAGE AND COMPREHENSION

J.-F. Le Ny, W. Kintsch (editors)

0 North-HollandPublishing Company, 1982

35

OPINIONS AND ATTITUDES IN DISCOURSE COMPREHENSION Teun A. van Dijk University of Amsterdam Dept. of General Literary Studies Section of Discourse Studies

Not only knowledge but also opinions and attitudes play an important role in the comprehension and cognitive representation of discourse. To model this 'subjective understanding' we need a format for the representation of opinions and attitudes in semantic memory and strategies for their use in comprehension. It is shown how opinions and attitudes are involved in the establishment of local and global coherence and how this personal 'bias' in understanding is represented in episodic memory.

1. INTRODUCTION One of the most important contributions of psychology and A1 to the study of discourse in the last decade has been the recognition of the pervasive role of knowledge in discourse processing. It has been shown that discourse understanding involves both bottom-up and top-down processing and that many inferences must be made in order to establish local and global coherence in textual representations. Both kinds of processing presuppose large amounts of world knowledge --besides the textual and contextual information conveyed in the communicative situation. In order to access and use this information effectively, it has been assumed that knowledge must be intelligently organized. Notions such as frame (Minsky, 1975), script (Schank & Abelson, 1977) and schema (Norman & Rumelhart, 1975) have been proposed for the representation formats of knowledge in long term memory. At the same time, it has been shown in psychology that these kinds of knowledge organization indeed play a role in understanding and representing discourse (Bower, Black & Turner, 1979; Haberlandt & Bingham, 1982; Reiser & Black, 1 9 8 2 ) . In this paper it will be argued that similar observations may be made for the role of other kinds of cognitive information,such as opinions and attitudes. That is, language users in natural communicative situations will not only bring to bear their knowledge about persons, objects, events, actions or episodes referred to by a text, but also organized sets of e v a l u a t i v e b e l i e f s . The use of such beliefs will not only imply that a language user assigns evaluations to textual information, but also that the very processes of understanding may be affected. In this way, lexical search, the assignment of propositions to clauses, the establishment of local coherence between propositions and the derivation of semantic macrostructures (discourse topics) may take place under the control of a personal, subjective b i a s . And, of course, the result of these subjectively controlled processes will be a subjective representation of a discourse in episodic memory. In order to model these processes of subjective understanding, we first need to devise an appropriate representation format for beliefs, opinions and attitudes. Despite a long research tradition in social psychology about opinions and attitudes, we still know very little about their nature and their structures. Secondly, we also need to formulate the basic principles, the rules and strategies, for the

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T.A. van Dijk

effective use of opinions and attitudes in various cognitive tasks, such as understanding actions and episodes or the discourses about these. It might be assumed that theory formation in this area of cognitive information processing could simply extend our current insights about the structures and the use of knowledge to such forms of 'hot' or 'soft' cognition as opinions and attitudes. And indeed, it seems plausible that there will be an analogy between the fundamental principles of organization and use in both sub-domains. On the other hand, opinions and attitudes involve evaluations and are related to values and norms, which are notions that are traditionally linked with reputedly vague things like affect and emotions. In other words, the extension from a model of objective or inter-subjective understanding to a model of subjective understanding might not be straighforward. The discussion about the role of opinions and attitudes in discourse comprehension will take place against the background of my earlier work, partly in collaboration with Walter Kintsch, on the structures and processing of discourse (Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). In this strategic model of discourse processing it has been shown how various kinds of information (textual, contextual and epistemic) are effectively used, at various levels of understanding, in the construction of textual representations in episodic memory. Strategic understanding is an on-line process accepting incomplete information from various sources and yielding semantic representations, in the form of proposition schemata, for clauses, sentences, sequences of sentences and whole discourses. This process is monitored by a control system featuring semantic macrostructures, superstructures (textual schemata, such as narrative or argumentative ones), and a representation of the actual communicative context, e.g. involving goals and perspective. It is also assumed in this model that strategic understanding not only leads to the construction of a textual representation (TR) in episodic memory, but also to the construction or up-dating of a so-called situation m d e l in episodic memory. Such an episodic situation model (SM) is an integrated structure featuring traces of previous experiences about the same or a similar situation the actual discourse 'is about'. These previous experiences may be representations of previous events, actions or discourses, and will permanently up-date what we know about concrete persons, events, actions or episodes, such as the actual civil war in El Salvador. A situation model, once activated --or actually being constructed, will not only supply the necessary basis of reference and co-reference for textual expressions, but will a l s o serve as the locus for the actual use and integration of more general knowledge needed during comprehension. We will see below that situation models will also be crucial in the use of opinions and attitudes during the comprehension of discourse. 2 . SUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING

Recent work in A1 has shown some interest for processes of subjective understanding. After earlier work by Abelson (Abelson, 1973, 1979; Abelson & Carroll, 1965) on belief systems, Carbonell, jr. developed a computer model of subjective understanding, specifically designed to process politically relevant discourse, such as newspaper stories (Carbonell, 1979). He has shown that newsstories about international political events involving the USA and the Soviet Union presuppose knowledge about the respective ideologies of the international policies of these countries Such ideologies will not only feature general values and norms but also beliefs about mutual goals. Modelling a subjective reader of newsstories, then, means a representation of his or her beliefs, and inferred expectations, about what e.g. the american administration will decide to do in a situation in which its basic goals are threatened by actions of the russians. Similarly, Wegman (1981) devised a computer model for the understanding of beliefs as expressed in interviews about nuclear energy. Expressions about a belief-object like nuclear energy may thus be understood as exhibiting beliefs about the fulfillment or blocking of goals of a

Opinions and Attitudes in Discourse Comprehension

37

believer. These models are important first steps in our understanding of the role of speaker's and hearer's beliefs in discourse processing. Yet, they do not fully account for possible differences between knowledge and subjective beliefs, nor do they explicitly discuss the nature and representation of opinions and attitudes. And finally they only provide a partial answer to the problem of the actual psychological processes and memory constraints involved in the use of beliefs, opinions or attitudes. Abelson (1979) has listed some of the differences between knowledge and belief: (i) there is no consensus about beliefs, (ii) beliefs are often about the existence of entities (such as God), (iii) beliefs often involve 'alternative worlds' (such as a more just social world in socialist or communist belief systems), (iv) beliefs have affective or evaluative components, (v) belief systems are more 'open', and feature personal experiences, and (vi) beliefs can be held with varying degrees of certitude. This --provisional-- list contains important suggestions for a more specific representation format of beliefs, opinions and attitudes, and we will see below what additional features should be made explicit. Before we are able to provide some further conceptual analysis of subjective cognitions, some more general remarks are in order about the very nature of subjective discourse understanding. First, a distinction should be made between a subjective understanding of a discourse and a subjective understanding of the situation a discourse is about. In the first case, the object of belief, opinion or attitude will be a direct function of the actual communicative context, and will involve an evaluation of the discourse, or some discourse properties (such as style, semantic coherence or expressed opinions), or an evaluation of the speech act performed by the utterance of the discourse, or --by attribution-- an evaluation of the speaker. In the second case, the beliefs, opinions or attitudes are formed or activated with respect to the referents, local or global, of the discourse, such as a political event, a social situation or participants in such events and situations. We have assumed above that we make a distinction between a textual representation (TR) and a situation model (SM) in episodic memory. The difference between opinions about the discourse and opinions about the referents of the discourse can be represented easily in the framework of these two kinds of episodic structures. Of course, these different kinds of evaluation may mutually affect each other: a negative opinion about a speaker or discourse may lead to a negative opinion about the topic and whence about the object of reference, and vice versa (one of the reasons why messengers of bad news risked to be killed). Secondly, subjective understanding involves both the use of already established beliefs, opinions and attitudes, and the formation of new ones.'In the first case, just as for knowledge, we assume that belief structures are accessed and selectively instantiated, and thereby control the whole understanding process, including the representation of 'factual' information. In the second case, the language user may evaluate the information, thus represented, and assign new beliefs or opinions or 'confirm' instantiated previous ones. Again, although cognitively distinct, these two processes will often be closely cooperating. Thirdly, subjective understanding takes place both at the local and at the global level. Evaluations may be attached to single concepts or propositions, as expressed by the sentences of a discourse, but may also (or only) be assigned to higher level structures, such as the theme or topic of the discourse, or to the whole (complex) action, event or episode denoted by such a macroproposition. Finally, just like understanding in general, subjective understanding is a strategic process. Evaluations are not assigned to sentences or discourses 'after the fact', but on line, that is at the same time as the formation of atomic and complex propositions in a text base and the activation and up-dating of a situation model. This means, first, that the assignment of opinions may be both a topdown and a bottom-up process. ~ f for , instance, we already have a situation model about the civil war in El Salvador, featuring specific opinions, reading a newsstory about a recent episode in this war may well influence, top-down, the formation of particular opinions about this episode (or about the newsstory about this episode). Secondly, strategic subjective understanding will also mean that a language user will operate on incomplete extant or incoming information and thus

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form hypothetical opinions, for instance based on only a few words or sentences in the discourse. This evaluative hypothesis may later of course be revised or confirmed. Thirdly, textual, contextual or already present cognitive information need not always lead to the inference of the same belief or opinion. Thus, our situation model about the civil war in El Salvador may contain negative evaluations about the fascist regime in that country, but a newsstory about the outcome of the elections might contain information which is subjectively incoherent with inferences drawn from this situation model: we do not expect that fascists win elections, unless we suppose the elections have not been free. Similarly, we may have a conflict between contextual information about a speaker and the information conveyed by his or her discourse. A strategic model of discourse comprehension will have to specify what the eventual representation will be,given such conflicting information. The goals and interests of the reader or listener may in such a case be decisive in the formation of a more or less 'neutral' text representation (as may be the case in a recall task for instance) or of a more personally biased up-dating of the situation model. 3 . BELIEFS, OPINIONS, ATTITUDES

One of the first tasks of an adequate model of subjective understanding is an explicit analysis of such notions as belief, opinion and attitude. Despite a vast amount of experimental work in social psychology, a precise cognitive analysis has never been provided. The notions of opinion and attitude have usually been lumped together as 'evaluative beliefs', where evaluation is taken as a scalar concept, most often studied on the basis of sophisticated scaling techniques and corresponding experimental designs (Himmelfarb & Eagly, 1974; Fishbein E Ajzen, 1 9 7 5 ) . In recent years there has been a rather strong reaction against this traditional approach and a plea has been held for a more cognitive social psychology (Stotland E Canon, 1972; Carroll E Payne, 1976, Abelson, 1976; Cushman E McPhee, 1980). Social cognition in these approaches has been modelled in terms of e.g. frames, schemata or scripts. After the early example of Bartlett ( 1 9 3 2 ) , who not only used the notion of schema in order to account for discourse processing and knowledge, but also as a foundation for social psychology (see the rumor studies by Allport E Postman, 1947, inspired by him), it was above all Abelson (1973) who has been one of the main inspirators of this new approach. Against the background of this development we would first like to make a number of distinctions between the notions involved. First, the notion of belief. We will indeed take this notion as the basic one. Generally speaking, each proposition (or similar structure) of an individual's cognitive system may be taken as a belief. In logical terms, this would mean that a belief is any cognitive unit which may be true or false in some possible world. More specifically, again in logical terms, such a truth value would be evaluated respective to the possibleworlds accessible from the individual (see Hughes E Cresswell, 1968; Hintikka, 1 9 7 1 ) . Hence, such propositions may denote facts also in 'private' worlds, such as dreamworlds and other 'imagined' states of affairs. A proposition is essentially a semantic structure consisting of an n-place predicate, a number of arguments (in various semantic roles, such as Agent, Patient or Instrument), and overall modalities, for instance for tense or necessity (for details, see van Dijk E Kintsch, 1 9 8 3 ) . At the referential level such a proposition would be interpreted as a property of or a relation between individuals. Beliefs, taken as propositions, may be atomic, as in 'This is a knife', or a complex structure of atomic propositions, as in 'This knife was used in the murder of the postman', whereas complex propositions may again be organized in different compound and hierarchical configurations. This notion of belief is fairly general and abstract, though. In more mundane terms, beliefs are usually taken as a specific kind of personal knowledge, as e.g. specified by Abelson (1979; see above): they are non-consensual, non-certain, more open and may involve personal experiences. We here are confronted with the usual distinction between knowledge and belief

Opinionsand Attitudes in Discourse Comprehension

39

Already in philosophy, such a distinction has often been made (Hintikka, 1962). Thus, if we say that someone knows p , this implies that p is true, an implication which does not hold when we use the 'propositional attitude' of belief. Apart from the many philosophical, logical and linguistic intricacies involved, a model of social cognition would need to operate on the basis of beliefs. Knowledge in that case consists of beliefs which are (i) assumed by the speaker or observer to be true, or more generally (ii) which are true or verifiable with respect to the truth-criteria of a socio-cultural group. Knowledge in this sense, thus, is 'justified' belief. It follows that if we consider an individual cognitive system, there is no point to make a distinction between knowledge and belief. If however we compare individual beliefs with those of others, or with certain norms or criteria, such a distinction becomes relevant. Since persons do evaluate their own beliefs relative to those of others or to generally accepted norms or truth-criteria, they may of course also distinguish among their own beliefs between those which are merely privately held and those which are based on certain kinds of evidence, such as observation, credible sources or discourse and inference. If this evidence is estimated to be sufficient, the individual will self-evaluate his or her beliefs as knowledge. To cut a long discussion short, we will assume that in strictly cognitive terms there is no distinction between knowledge and belief, but that such a distinction becomes relevant in a model of social cognition, in which beliefs of others and of ourselves are evaluated with respect to those of others,or with respect to the norms and criteria shared in a group or culture. In this theoretical perspective, we will further assume that beliefs therefore are organized in ways which have been made explicit for knowledge, for instance in terms of frames, scripts o r schemata. There is one interesting difference however. Frame- or script-like organization of knowledge presupposes that hierarchically organized clusters of propositions are about stereotypical objects or episodes: they organize general, socially shared beliefs. These are necessary to be able to participate in many social interactions, such as discourse understanding. Personal beliefs however are much less able to thus organize social interaction, although they will of course be a component in personal actions or the interpretation of actions of others. Beliefs, therefore, are much more episodic, based on personal experiences or personal inferences. As soon as more evidence is available and socially normalized, learning may take place, through processes of abstraction, generalization and de-contextualization, leading from accumulated beliefs to more general, 'accepted' knowledge of a more permanent kind. Yet, for both knowledge and beliefs, as well as for the notion of opinion to be introduced below, we will make a distinction between p a r t i c u l a r and general cognitions. Thus, particular beliefs are about particular individuals and/or particular properties or relations. General beliefs are rather context-free, and about classes or generic concepts. Thus, 'John is ill' would be a particular belief (or knowledge) and 'Tigers have stripes' or 'God exists' a more general belief. Opinions, next, will be taken as evaluative beliefs. That is, the predicate of the proposition defining an opinion must be an evaluative predicate. Although it may not always be easy to make a precise distinction between evaluative and other predicates, we assume that typically an evaluative predicate denotes a scalar property of an individual relative to some dimension (e.g. 'stupid' on the dimension of intelligence, or 'ugly' on the dimension of beauty). We will also call predicates evaluative though when they imply such a scalar value assignment. Thus, 'John is a traitor' or 'Mary cheated Larry' would be opinions if 'to be a traitor' or 'to cheat' imply negative values (e.g. on the goodness dimension). Opinions are commonsense categories to denote personal, subjective evaluative beliefs: they embody the individually variable assignment of values to objects, persons, states, events and actions. People may have the same opinions, so that we can speak about group or public opinions, but whereas for knowledge we are expected to conform to social norms and criteria of truth, opinions are allowed to be held and to vary individually. This does not mean that opinions should not be socially accounted for, e.g. in terms of general, shared values and norms.

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There may even be laws regulating the expression of opinions in social contexts, e.g. anti-discrimination or anti-libel laws. Hence, it makes sense to distinguish between opinions which are instantiations of or inferred from general norms or values (e.g. 'John is a traitor') and opinions based on purely personal preferences (e.g. 'I like this apple'), even if both types of opinions are individually held. For reasons of simplicity we will call these social and personal opinions, respectively. As we suggested above, another distinction should be made, viz. between particular and general opinions, defined in the same way as particular and general beliefs. Thus, 'I like this apple' is a particular, personal opinion, and 'Traitors should be punished' a general, social opinion. In order to retrieve and use opinions effectively, we should assume that they are organized. Their organizing principles, however, cannot simply be derived from those elaborated in A1 for frames or scripts. Objects or episodes may be assigned conventional or stereotypical structures or properties, but their evaluation does not seem to allow a straightforward application of knowledge organization formats. We know much about houses or about episodes such as taking trains, but opinions, taken as evaluative personal beliefs may be more ad hoc, accidental and episodic: we may like this house, but not anoter, or may prefer on certain occasions to take a train above taking our car or perhaps, in general, like train rides. Organization becomes relevant however as soon as we have clusters of opinions about objects. Such organized packages of opinions, especially of general opinions, will be called a t t i t u d e s . We here deviate from the definition of an attitude as an evaluation of an object (e.g. in Fishbein & Ajzen, 1 9 7 5 ) . Attitudes are schema-like organizations of general opinions. A first organization principle is hierarchy: attitudes will feature higher (more general) and lower (less general) opinions. Thus, the attitude opinion 'I am against nuclear energy' will be more general than the opinion 'Nuclear radiation is dangerous'. Higher level opinions are macropropositions (van Dijk, 1980) relative to their lower level opinions. Secondly, opinions in an attitude should be, directly or indirectly, about the same object, which implies organizational coherence for an attitude. This object will mostly be a 'social' object, that is a thing, person, group, event, issue --or types of these-which are relevant in social interaction for social members. The attitudinal organization of opinions, thus, is related to an effective planning, execution and evaluation of our and others' social actions. We have attitudes about social groups, such as businessmen or blacks, about issues such as nuclear energy or birth control, but not about an apple or apples or other objects which are not involved in a complex system of opinions and social interactions. Thirdly, attitudes may be organized according to their prominence or relevance for an individual. A lower level opinion such as 'Waste products of nuclear plants ruin the ecological system' may well for certain individuals be more relevant or prominent than higher level ones about dangers of radiation (Rokeach, 1968, 1973). Finally, attitudes are themselves organized in complex systems of i d e o l o g i e s . That is, there may be systematic relations, e.g. of coherence, between different attitudes, such as those about 'American foreign policy', 'social structure', 'economic power' and 'international communications', for instance within a socialist political ideology. Since attitudes organize many beliefs and ideologies organize many attitudes, ideologies are the fundamental system underlying social interaction, and will hence pertain to group membership, group interests and conflicts, and general values and norms for the actions leading to group goals. We will not further explore the nature of ideologies here, nor other general systems such as those of norms and values. Also, we will further ignore the emotional or affective basis of opinions and attitudes, regulating, among other things, the strength of evaluations and the nature of motivational structures (desires, wishes, preferences) underlying decision making and planning of action.

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After this sketchy specification of the nature and organization of opinions and attitudes, we need some more insight into their use, so that below we can investigate how they are involved in discourse comprehension. As soon as we encounter an attitude object, either directly or as represented in a discourse, the corresrepresented ponding attitude system will be activated. Depending on context , in the control system as discussed above, this attitude schema will be searched for the relevant general opinions. If a particular object or property is processed in STM, such a general opinion will be instantiated and integrated into the actual situation model. Thus, if I address the general opinion 'I am against american foreign policy', this opinion may be instantiated as 'I am against the aid given to the regime in El Salvador' as soon as the information 'american aid to the regime in El Salvador' is processed. Hence, the situation model will not only contain a model of the actual situation, including events, actions and participants, but also instantiated or inferred opinions about this situation. We have seen earlier that a general opinion may be taken up as an evaluative macroprcposition in the control system and thus monitor, top down, the local opinions about individual actions or events. From this sketch of some principles of the use of opinions and attitudes we may conclude that attitudes are used only in an indirect way, that is via general opinions, which need instantiation or which allow inferences in order to become relevant for the local and global evaluation of incoming information about social objects.

4. OPINIONS AND ATTITUDES IN DISCOURSE UNDERSTANDING In order to be able to become more specific let us now try to develop a number of hypotheses about the role of opinions and attitudes in the understanding of discourse. Above, it was already suggested that this kind of subjective understanding may involve both the evaluation of the text or the speaker, and the evaluation of the referents of the discourse, as represented in the situation model. For our discussion we will limit ourselves to the latter kind of evaluation: how do the opinions and attitudes about some object influence understanding the discourse about such an object? As an example we will use fragments from a text which appeared in Newsweek (March 1, 1982, p. 16). Details about the comprehension processes involved in understanding this text are given in van Dijk & Kintsch (1983). This text is part of a vast newsflow, both in the USA and internationally, about events in Central America and in particular in El Salvador. The present text is about the situation in Guatemala, and presupposes knowledge about this situation in El Salvador. The first paragraph of this text runs as follows (we do not respect the column boundaries of the weekly and have numbered the respective sentences):

(1)

GUATEMALA : NO CHOICES ( 1 ) Compared with the relative shades of gray in El Salvador, Guatemala is a study in black and white. (2) On the left is a collection of extreme Marxist-Leninist

groups led by what one diplomat calls "a pretty faceless bunch of people " ( 3 ) On the right is an entrenched elite that has dominated Central America's most populous country since a CIAbacked coup deposed the reformist government of Col. Jacobo Arbenz Guzmsn in 1 9 5 4 . ( 4 ) Moderates of the political center, embattled but alive in El Salvador, have virtually disappeared in Guatemala --joining more than 30,000 victims of terror over the last fifteen years. ( 5 ) "The situation in Guatemala is much more serious than in E l Salvador,"declares one Latin American diplomat, "The oligarchy is that much more reactionary, and the choices are far fewer."

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Let us assume that this text is read by a reader who has acquired knowledge about the events in Central America from several news sources, who is not directly engaged in any political action in or with respect to Guatemala, and has a 'lefti&'or socialist ideology. Without fully spelling out all details of the opinions or attitudes of such a reader, we may partly reconstruct the evaluative, subjective understanding of this passage within the overall strategic model as it is been specified in van Dijk & Kintsch (1983): After having activated knowledge and beliefs about the communicative situation (reading a weekly), about Newsweek, and about the political opinions of this weekly (and about the american media in general), the reader first will have constructed in the control system an overall representation of his or her goals and interests, e.g. with a proposition such as 'I want to know what the actual situation is in Central America'. The situation model about the communicative situation itself will feature the relevant information about the weekly and about reading weeklies and previous experiences, including opinions about this weekly. Under control of this contextual information, the reader will first process the (boldly printed, on top) title, specifying fragments of the macrostructure (topic) of this text. The major argument of the macroproposition is 'Guatemala' and the predicate is more or less vague or general, but with the contextual information that the weekly will (now) probably specify political information, a strategic choice may be made for a topic like 'There are no political choices in Guatemala'. This macroproposition will be added to the information in the control system and will control further processing. That is, first general information (knowledge and beliefs) about Guatemala will be activated (e.g. that it is a country in Central America), as well as a current state of the situation model, featuring traces of previous information about the actual political situation in Guatemala. Part of this information may be in the form of opinions, such as 'Guatemala has a fascist regime' and 'The regime systematically kills all her opponents'. If indeed such opinions are part of the situation model, they will trigger more general opinions and attitudes about the political situation in aentral America, about fascist regimes, and about the role of the USA. In other words, the title alone will provisionally activate and instantiate many general and episodic opinions and will also activate some fragments of relevant attitudes (e.g. opinions about fascism in Latin America rather than opinions about fascism in Nazi Germany). For the understanding process the activation of such opinions and attitudes will imply that besides the topical macroproposition, there may also be a topical macroopinion stored in the Control System, e.g. 'Guatemala has a fascist regime', which will also control understanding and evaluation. Of course, another reader,with less political information or different opinions,will have no or different controlling information in the Control System o r in the episodic model. The first, metaphorical, sentence will allow only partial interpretation. The information constructed or activated so far hardly allows a complete comprehension of the color metaphors. But we know that two countries are compared, and we may infer that this comparision will probably be about the political situations in these countries (activating a POLITICS frame). 'Black and white' in this frame might in that case be interpreted as 'marked political contrast', a strategic interpretation which will indeed be confirmed by the following sentences. The scalar predicates used, even if they are metaphorical, also suggest that a political evaluation (by the journalist) is denoted. More specifically it may be inferred that the journalist thinks that the situation in Guatemala is much worse than in El Salvador. Obviously, our reader will activate his or her opinions about the respective countries, maybe involving an evaluation of El Salvador which is much less positive. If that is the case, the reader will match the own opinions with those expressed in the text, and this may lead to an evaluation of the journalist or the weekly.

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The second sentence needs the activation of much political knowledge and opinions: we need to know about political parties involved, in particular about communist ones,and the evaluation of such parties by other participants in the conflict. Besides the usual processes of comprehension (which will not be detailed here), there are indications in the sentence that specifically call upon the opinions and attitudes of the reader. First, a leftist reader will activate his or her positive opinions about leftist guerrilla forces in fascist countries, and beliefs about the opinions of the USA and american media regarding such groups. The interpretation of the word 'extreme' in that case may imply an evaluation ('They find all communists extreme') confirming such beliefs. Similarly, the interpretation of the embedded opinion clause "a pretty faceless bunch of people" may conflict with the own (positive) opinion of the reader, and hence may result in a negative opinion about the cited diplomat. That the opinion of the diplomat may be believed to be congruent with an american evaluation is shown in one of the recall protocols collected for this text, in which the opinion is ascribed to an "american congressman". The third sentence expresses information which is fairly consistent with the activated opinions and attitudes: conservative regimes are indeed entrenched elites and have been in power a long time in Central America. The CIA, next, may activate rather strong opinions, such as 'They protect the interests of american foreign policy and business' or 'They destabilize groups or governments opposed to american interests'. Part of the activated situation model around the concept CIA may for instance feature their action in Chile and other Latin American countries. That they deposed a reformist government in Guatemala, therefore, comes as no surprise and will merely instantiate these general opinions, and the information may be added to the situation model about actions of the CIA. In the fourth sentence there may be a further conflict between the opinions of our reader and the information given in the text. On the one hand, the opinion that fascist regimes kill their opponents will be instantiated and confirmed. On the other hand, the evaluation of the centrist regime in El Salvador as 'moderate' may not be congruent with the activated opinion that also in that country the regime is responsible for many killings (according to the situation model of the reader). The interpretation of the verb 'embattled' therefore becomes problematic: in El Salvador the Christian Democrat regime is opposed by progressive forces, whereas in Guatemala it is decimated by the regime itself. Finally, the expression '30,000 victims of terror' will again be a confirmation of the expectation, derived from the FASCISM attitude schema, that fascist regimes commit mass murders. Finally, the next sentences confront the opinion about the situation given by another (anonymous) diplomat with the opinions of the reader: the reader may agree that the situation in Guatemala is also very serious, but that 'moderates' in El Salvador are also murderous. This opinion is also not quite congruent with the denoted opinion that the choices are fewer in Guatemala, if it is believed that the political center is not a democratic solution either. From this, still very informal, analysis of the first few sentences of the text, we may conclude that besides the usual frames and scripts, such as those around the concepts GUATEMALA, EL SALVAWR, CENTRAL AMERICA, COMMUNISM, FASCISM, CIA and USA, the reader will activate the corresponding attitudes and opinions. At some points these opinions lead to expectations that are confirmed by the information in the text. At other points, the evaluations expressed or denoted by the text are in conflict with those of the reader, especially when the evaluation of the role of the guerrilla forces and the Christian Democrats is concerned. Both the topical macroproposition and the macro-opinion, strategically formed upon the information in the title (and corresponding frames and attitudes) do organize the expressed information in the text on the one hand and the possible opinions of the reader on the other hand. At the local level, new opinions are formed, by instantiation and inference, e.g. about the role of the CIA and the fascist regime in Guatemala.

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The 'doxastic' (from Greek d o x P , opinion) interpretation of the rest of the text runs along similar lines. Depending on the precise point of view, the information that Jimmy Carter cut military aid to Guatemala because of human rights abuses, may be evaluated positively or more or less negatively if it is believed that Carter's humanrights policy was merely superficial face keeping and never really affected the fascist regimes in Latin America if fundamental american interests were involved. Similarly, against the background of opinions about the current (Reagan) administration in the US, the reader may confirm his expectation that fascist regimes in Latin America would welcome Reagan's election, as it is later stated in this text. When the reader also obtains information that a White House aide had business relations with Guatemala, the attitudes about the american foreign policy will be coupled with those about big business, an expectation derived from the more general ideological system involving coherence between capitalism and fascism. Another interesting doxastic conflict may arise in a later sentence in which it is stated that especially Israel is the principal source of weapons and training personnel for the Guatemalan regime. For some readers such an information may be consistent with the view that Israel, because of its violent anti-PLO politics, is itself fascist or at least anti-revolutionary. For anti-fascist readers of the left who have a more positive opinion about Israel --explaining the anti-PLO policy as a necessary policy of self-defense or survival-- the information cannot easily be dealt with: how could a positively evaluated country help a fascist regime? At the local level, such an information may result in a local negative opinion about Israel (the 'criticism of friends' strategy), or higher level opinions may be activated to explain such an action (e.g. 'Israel must sell weapons in order to survive economically'). The resolution of this kind of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1962) appears to involve several possible doxastic strategies, such as the 'exception to the rule' strategy, which allows lower level opinions to conflict with higher level ones, or the activation of other attitude schemata providing opinions which can act as 'bridges' to explain apparently incoherent facts, so that the doxastic system need not be changed. It is indeed the aim of our model to spell out in detail the complex cognitive strategies that are involved in such rather vague traditional terms as cognitive dissonance (see Abelson et al. 1 9 6 8 ) . A final example provides the sentence about the guerrilla forces: "They may also be bolstered by assistance and training from Communist-bloc countries". This modalized ('may') proposition, suggesting communist outside help, may activate in the reader not only international POLITICS frames and attitudes, but will more in particular 'remind' him or her of a information in a situation model saying that the usual american allegations about foreign help (by Cuba, the Soviet Union) for guerrilla forces in Central America are seldom proven and rather taken as a justification to interfere in internal political situations of these countries itself. On the basis of such an opinion, the reader will be able to infer the opinion that also in Guatemala the 'international communtst conspiracy' is again taken as an excuse for killing and terrorizing the people, or for aid to governments who claim to fight international communism. The few informally analyzed examples of this text yield some insights into the role of opinions and attitudes in discourse comprehension. These results may be generalized in the following hypotheses: (a) Reading a politically relevant text, e.g. in the press, will usually not only activate appropriate knowledge frames or scripts, but also relevant attitude schemata. (b) Given information from text and context,relevant fragments of these attitude schemata may be instantiated and integrated into the situation model now activated or constructed in episodic memory. (c) Initial information from the text, e.g. as expressed in the title, will first lead to the formation of a (partial) macroproposition representing the topic of the text (on the basis of frames and scripts), and will secondly lead to

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the instantiation or inference Jf a macro-opinion from the situation model. These two types of macro-information will be inserted into the Control System and will further control comprehension and evaluation at the local level. At the local level, we will first encounter the activation and possible actualization or formation of opinions about each concept denoted by the text, as well as about the lexical choice of the author to describe this concept. Such concepts are combined into propositions, denoting facts, and the reader will next evaluate each fact with respect to the attitudes and inferred opinions activated by the concepts themselves. In our text, for instance, the evaluation of the fact 'The CIA deposed a reformist government' will be a function of the attitude and hence the specific opinions and episodic information about the CIA. Propositions, next, are organized into sequences (a text base) which must be both locally and globally coherent. Local coherence presupposes for instance conditional (causal or other) relations between facts or functional relations between propositions (e.g. specification or contrast) (van Dijk, 1977). According to the opinions of the reader such relations may well not hold, even if the speaker/text do presuppose them. In our example, sentence (5) expresses a (functional) conclusion with respect to the previous sentences, but this conclusion may not be acceptable to the reader. In other words, from a subjective point of view, there would not be a sufficient condition for local coherence. The reader, however, also has a partial model about the opinions and attitudes of the author, and will therefore be able to assign what might be called intended or speaker coherence to the passage. The activation, actualization and formation of opinions is an on-line, strategic process, using various kinds of contextual information, fragments from the text, as processed linearly, together with inferences from general attitudes and episodic experiences. The various doxastic comprehension steps described above should therefore be considered to occur at several levels and in cooperation. Thus, sometimes a reader may directly activate certain opinions; in other cases 'judgement may be suspended' until a large part or the whole of the text has been read. On the other hand, this kind of after the fact, explicit (macro-)opinions probably do not exclude the possibility that less conscious activation and use of opinions and attitudes takes place and influences comprehension. From these few hypothetical conclusions we obtain a view of discourse comprehension which is rather different from the current models. In these models it is merely the information expressed in the text together with world knowledge which leads to the construction of a textual representation. We have first stressed that natural discourse processes take place in communicative contexts, and hence involve pragmatic and interactive goals, about which the reader or hearer will have opinions and attitudes, which will determine the understanding process. Secondly, the reader will not only try to construct or up-date a situation model, but such a model will also feature specific opinions (or previous opinions) about the whole situation, about similar actions or events or the same participants. Again, also this doxastic information will be used in the local and global comprehension of the text. Doxastic comprehension takes two forms, however. On the one hand evaluative beliefs are formed about elements in the situation (or about the way the text represents the situation). These beliefs will be added to the situation model and to the controlling mechanisms. On the other hand, these opinions may also influence the other aspects of comprehension, such as the specific understanding of words (lexical search), the formation of complex propositions (which may lead to foregrounding or backgrounding of propositions --see van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983), the establishment of local coherence (conditional or functional relations may not hold for the reader), and the formation of global macrostructures (the reader may find other facts relevant or important than the text indicates). Besides a representation of the opinions of the reader in his or her model of the situation, we may therefore also have a different, personal, or 'biased' text representation.

T.A. van Dijk

5. EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS

What are the empirical implications ofthis theoretical sketch of the role of opinions in discourse comprehension? As yet we have little experimental evidence to substantiate the various assumptions. One of the obvious expectations would be that subjects exhibit some of the opinions formed during processing in free recall protocols. Since such opinions are not integral part of the text, they may be expressed as 'meta-statements' --which of course may be expressions of opinions formed during understanding, but which may also be formed during retrieval. In our earlier experimental work (e.g. Kintsch & van Dijk, 1975; Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978; van Dijk, 1979) we indeed find many of such evaluative meta-statements in free recall protocols. Next, we expect that opinions may influence recall elements of the text 'itself'. Thus, our main theoretical assumption has always been that macropropositions will be best recalled. However, we also repeatedly found that subjects may have a more specific retention pattern about what we called 'salient details'. In the framework of the doxastic comprehension model outlined above many of such salient details would involve the actualization of opinions. This means that a proposition which is structurally or according to world knowledge not very important, may well be in the light of underlying opinions, and even become a doxastic macroproposition. In some free recall protocols collected among Amsterdam students who read the Guatemala text during a course, immediate recall would in all cases show accurate retention of the structural detail '30,000 victims'. Similarly, in another experiment, in which immediate and delayed recalls and summaries were obtained, in several countries, for a text about the murder of ten women in a Dutch concentration camp --a text which appeared in the german weekly Der Stern-similar recall for numbers which have high attitudinal function but low structural value was observed (see Note). On the basis of an analysis of the recall of macropropositions of the same text (in French), Martins (1982) found that 'affective' information was better recalled. It follows, as hypothezised above, that besides the structurally important macropropositions subjects will recall detail propositions which are linked with several, high-level, opinions, and that such detail propositions may even be accorded macro-status because of this kind of 'personal relevance'. We here touch upon theoretical and experimental results which cannot be fully accounted for in this paper. First, if opinions and attitudes, as we assumed, are related with values and norms on the one hand and with emotions or 'affect' on the other hand, the very 'affect loadings'.assigned to textual concepts or the things they denote may influence recall. Dutta & Kanungo (1975) conclude from previous research and their own experiences that, on the whole, memory is better for positively evaluated than for negatively evaluated information, according to the opinions of the subjects: subjects have better recall for the positive terms describing their own group than for the negative ones, and the reverse holds for opposed groups. Of course, such an effect reed not be an encoding result, but in our terms may well also be explained in terms of the top-down inferences drawn from (positive) self-attitudes during recall. This would also better explain why negative concepts are better recalled for opposing groups (see Martins, 1981). Another hypothesis, namely that subjects will tend to better recall the information in the text which is congruent with their own opinions and attitudes, has often been tested in the classical attitude change paradigm in social psychology (see Fishbein E Ajzen, 1975 and Himmelfarb E Eagly, 1974 for surveys) and would be a predicted outcome of traditional cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1962; Abelson et al. 1968). In terms of our model, this would not be a straightfomard conclusion. If indeed readers will use the general strategy and a goal which preferentially looks for information in a text which is a possible confirmation of the expectations derived from own opinions and attitudes, then indeed the result is predictable. If however the strategy would be to be critical of the opinions of others, as expressed by the text, then the results might even be the reverse. Note also that better recall for doxastically coherent information from a text can

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easily be explained again by a top-down retrieval strategy monitored by the own opinions and attitudes of the subject: we may assume that subjects know their own opinions better than those of others (if different), so that similar opinions will be easier to access or reconstruct during recall. That active generation of own opinions during discourse comprehension takes place especially in contexts and with texts in which the author exhibits a different opinion seems to be confirmed by a number of studies (see Sandell, 1977, for review and discussion) which found that attitude change in general is less when the position of the author is expressed in more intense stylistic terms. This finding was often contrary to expectation --according to a naive model of persuasion -but would be consistent with the view that extreme opinions will often be countered by more extreme counter-opinions as a 'defense mechanism'. Without entering into the complex issue of attitude change, we may simply assume first that comprehension and recall are essential components in any process of 'doxastic learning', that is in opinion formation and change. If stylistic surface structure, together with semantic information and general textual and contextual information about the opinions of the text/author, signals --by extreme terms-- an opinion which is different from that of the reader, we will indeed expect that the reader will infer as many opinions as possible to evaluate the opinions of the author. Secondly, we assume that this process takes place during comprehension, and that both the opposed and the larger amount of inferred own opinions will become part of the situation model. Hence, the very situation model about the communicative process will better represent the fact that reader and author have opposed opinions, which alone would explain a lower probability for subsequent acceptance of the opinions of the author and hence less persuasion. But if we remain at the level of pure recall, the predictions are less clear. If the reader actualized more own opinions and if in addition such opinions are a better retrieval cue, then own opinions and opinions coherent with them will be better recalled. But if the opinions of the author are marked by the rhetorical device of 'contrast' these would also be easily retrievable. Much will in that case depend on the strategy of the reader (e.g. to acquire information, or to criticize the author). In recent work Spiro and his associates (e.9. Spiro, Crissmore & Turner, 1982) have shown that discourse comprehension involves two kinds of processing and two kinds of representation, leading to differences in recall. Besides the usual knowledge based construction of coherent propositional text bases, they also assume an affective process to 'color' the information. They see this process as a pervasive 'overlay' of experiental information, much in the same way as we have assumed the role of beliefs and attitudes. Sometimes, a previously established affective state may simply influence the full comprehension process, and when such affective information is relevant to the information in the text (as is the case in our opinions and attitudes) it may complement the construction of a text base. In somewhat more specific terms our (sketch of a) model also assumed that on the one hand opinions and attitudes (and hence emotions) control the very comprehension process, leading to 'biased' text representations, and on the other hand that local and global opinions about the situation denoted by the text (or about the text and author themselves) are separately represented as part of the situation model. In other words, we have an (up-dated) idea what the text was about coupled with our own opinions about the things, persons, events or actions. This means that previous experiences, as represented in the episodic model, as well as initially formed macro-opinions (based on information about the author or derived from information in the title or the first sentences of the text), will indeed 'color' comprehension and further opinion formation during the actual local steps of the strategic understanding process. Bower (1980) similarly supposes that affective states will result in selective processing of information. Despite the results of some of the experimental studies briefly mentioned above, the empirical assessment of a model of discourse comprehension in which also opinions, attitudes and ideologies are taken into account still requires much further research.

T.A. van Diik 6 . CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we have argued that a model of 'real' discourse comprehension not only needs representation formats and strategic principles for the use of knowledge, but also an important 'doxastic' component, featuring opinions, attitudes, and indirectly also norms, values and ideologies and their associated 'emotions'. Such a programmatic statement implies first that we go beyond the extant models for the representation of knowledge. Some recent work on belief systems, also in AI, shows us one direction in such a complicated endeavor. Secondly, it means that cognitive psychology should finally 'go social' and develop process models, specific strategies, and memory representations which its disciplinary sister, social psychology, failed to specify despite the vast amount of work in the area of attitudes, It should indeed be realized that discourse production and comprehension is not an 'individual' affair, or a process which can be modelled only in the usual cognitive framework. On the contrary, understanding is also a component in a more complex process of communication and interaction in the social context. Texts are products of local and global speech acts performed with communicative intentions. Both in production and in comprehension, therefore, the social dimensions of knowledge, beliefs, opinions and attitudes play a role. Conversely, such social dimensions require their own cognitive modelling. Hence the necessity to go beyond the naive statements about the nature of opinions and attitudes and devise formats for their representation and use in strategies of 'subjective understanding'. Referring to some recent other work, we have specified some of the characteristics of subjective understanding. Also we have tried to briefly indicate some essential differences between knowledge, beliefs, opinions and attitudes. Apart from such cognitive properties as 'degree of certitude', we discovered that the essential differences between knowledge and beliefs should be formulated in social terms, such as consensus and socially based truth or verification criteria. Similarly, opinions --taken as evaluative beliefs-- show this distinction between more or less personal dimensions and social dimensions, the latter being based on culturally and socially shared values and norms. It also appeared that another dimension, viz. along such categories as 'particular' and 'general', is important in the representation and use of beliefs. A memorial consequence of this distinction has been sought in differential storage of such beliefs in episodic situation models or in more general 'semantic' memory, respectively. Attitudes are taken as higher level organizational packages of (socially relevant) opinions. Organizational principles are not only those familiar from frame- and script theory (or its current, more flexible, versions), but may also involve notions such as personal and contextual relevance. It may be the case, by the way, that attitudes not only organize opinions, but also other beliefs (knowledge) about attitude objects, thus 'assembling' from various sources both consensual generalizations about things and facts and personal evaluations of these. Ideologies are taken as the basic, by definition also social, organizing systems of attitudes, assigning the necessary coherence between opinions about various objects, and hence, indirectly,some coherence in interpretation, decision making and action. Obviously, this is a necessary feature for any sound model of social cognition. Against the background of our earlier work (with Kintsch) on discourse comprehension we then formulated a number of strategic processes involved in doxastic comprehension, as illustrated on the understanding of fragments of a political newsstory. We have seen that in such a process general opinions from attitudes may be activated, instantiated or inferences drawn for the formation of new opinions. Eventually these are stored in the current situation model and, as part of the Control System, macro-opinions may control more local opinion formation.

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The information for this kind of strategically derived doxastic propositions will be inferred from the communicative context, from 'previous experiences' as represented in the situation model, together with initial information from the text (title, first sentences). Local semantic structures and stylistic surface structure may confirm or disconfirm such expectations. At this local level, individual words or concepts will activate the respective attitude frames,and propositions their relevant general opinions. Their instantiations can in that case be matched with the information expressed in the text, leading to consent or dissent with the explicit or implied opinions of the text/author. Local coherence between propositions, finally, will in this model also be assigned in a subjectively biased way: underlying conditional or functional relations between facts or propositions may not hold for the reader. On the whole,the process of comprehension now has a pure interpretation component and an evaluation component. These may in a sense be rather autonomous, but will also interact. On the one hand, we may have a representation of the information conveyed by the text, or by the author, but the situation model which represents what a text is about will also feature the personal opinions of the reader of this situation, its events, actions or participants. On the other hand, we also saw that the opinions may control the interpretation process, e.g. in the selection of lexical readings, the activation of alternative knowledge and beliefs, the formation of complex proposition schemata (foregrounding and backgrounding component propositions), the establishment of local coherence, and the derivation of semantic macrostructures. Indeed, the interpretation, despite the intentions of the author, may thus become subjectively biased. General communicative principles might have some external, social control on this kind of subjective variability in understanding, especially in cases where the understanding of intentions is crucial (as in conversation, job interviews or text book learning), but to a lesser or larger degree our model of comprehension always need to account for this kind of subjectivity. The experimental evidence for our sketchy hypotheses is still skimpy. Some attention has been paid to the role of affect (a component in opinions) in recall, and some well-known results from classical work on attitude formation and cognitive dissonance can now be formulated in somewhat more satisfactory terms. Our earlier observations about the nature of personal variation in summaries and recall protocols can now partly be explained. And finally, all work done in the area of taskand goal-dependent comprehension should now be embedded in a broader framework of 'subjective' and contextually specific cognitions. Most of the experimental work, however, is still to be done, and most of our assumptions and predictions need testing. At the theoretical level too, most work is still ahead of us. Even after some promising attempts in modelling belief systems, we still know very little about the nature and representation of opinions and attitudes, let alone about their multiple links with values, norms, ideologies and emotions, which each are notions deserving booklength theoretical analysis. Then, also the strategies used in the activation and inference procedures of opinions and the precise role of opinions in short term memory processing require further attention. NOTE This paper is a preliminary report of ongoing research at the University of Amsterdam on the role of opinions, attitudes and prejudice in discourse processing. It partly resumes a number of working papers (including the article in the special issue of the B u l l e t i n d e p s y c h o l o g i e , ed. LeNy) Experimental evidence, collected in a international recall and summary task (Netherlands,Germany, France, USA) for a text in a german weekly, is now being analysed for differences due to variations in opinions and attitudes (about war crimes) in these countries. More specific data are collected in a project about prejudices in conversations about ethnic minorities in the Netherlands (see van Dijk, 1 9 8 2 ) .

.

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T.A. van Dijk REFERENCES

Abelson, Robert P. 1973. The Structure of Belief Systems. In: R.C. Schank & K.M. Colby (eds.) Computer Models of Thought and Language. San Francisco: Freeman. 287-340.

Abelson, Robert P. 1976. Script Processing in Attitude Formation and Decision Making. In: Carroll & Payne (eds.), 33-46. Abelson, Robert P. 1979. Differences between Belief and Knowledge Systems. Cognitive Science 3, 355-366. Abelson, R.P., Aronson, E., McGuire, W . J . , Newcomb, T.M., Rosenberg, M.J. & Tannenbaum, P.H. (eds.) 1968. Theories of Cognitive Dissonance. Chicago: Rand-McNally. Abelson, Robert P. & Carroll, J. 1965. Computer Simulations of Individual Belief Systems. American Behavioral Scientist 8, 24-30. Allport, Gordon W.

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Postman, Leo. 1947. The Psychology of Rumor. New York: Holt.

Bartlett, F.C. 1932. Remembering. London: Cambridge U.P. Bower, Gordon H. 1980. Mood and Memory. American Psychologist 36, 129-148. Bower, Gordon H., Black, John B. & Turner, Terence J. 1979. Scripts in Memory for Texts. Cognitive Psychology 11, 177-220. Carbonell, Jr. Jaime. 1979. Subjective Understanding. Computer Models of Belief Systems. Ph. D. Diss. Yale University. Technical Report 150. Dept. of Computer Science. Carroll, John S. & Payne, John W. (eds.) 1976. Cognition and Social Behavior. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. Cushman, Donald P. & McPhee, Robert D. (eds.) 1980.. Message Relationship. New York: Academic Press.

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Dijk, Teun A. van. 1977. Text and Context. London: Longman. Dijk, Teun A. van. 1979. Recalling and Summarizing Complex Discourse. In: W. Burghardt & K. HBlker (eds.) Text Processing. Textverarbeitung. Berlin, New York: de Gruyter. 49-118. Dijk, Teun A. van. 1980. Macrostructures. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. Dijk, Teun A. van. 1982. Towards a Model of Ethnic Prejudice in Cognition and Discourse. University of Amsterdam. Dijk, Teun A. van & Kintsch, Walter. 1983. Strategies of Discourse Comprehension. New York: Academic Press. Dutta, S.

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Kanungo, R.N. 1975. Affect and Memory. London: Pergamon Press.

Festinger, Leon. 1962. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. ( 1 9 5 7 ) . Stanford: Stanford U.P. Fishbein, Martin & Ajzen, Icek. 1975. Belief, Attitude, Intention and Behavior. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. Haberlandt, Karl & Bingham, Geoffrey. 1982. The Role of Scripts in the Comprehension and Retention of Texts. TEXT 2, nr. 1-2. Himelfarb, Samuel & Eagly, Alice H. (eds.) 1974. Readings in Attitude Change. New York: Wiley.

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Hintikka, Jaakko. 1962. Knowledge and Belief. Ithaca: Cornell U.P. Hintikka, Jaakko. 1971. Semantics for Propositional Attitudes. In: L. Linsky (ed.) Reference and Modality. London: Oxford U.P. 145-167. Hughes, G.E. Methuen.

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Cresswell, M.J. 1968. An Introduction to Modal Logic. London: Methuen.

Kintsch, Walter & Dijk, Teun A. van. 1975. Comment on se rappelle et on resume des histoires. Langages 40, 98-116. Kintsch, Walter & Dijk, Teun A. van. 1978. Toward a Model of Text Comprehension and Production. Psychological Review 85, 363-394. Martins, Daniel. 1981. Affectivite, personnalite et mdmoire verbale. L'annee psychologique 81, 485-510. Martins, Daniel. 1982. Influence of Affect on Comprehension of Text. TEXT 2, nr. 1-2.

Minsky, Marvin. 1975. A Framework for Representing Knowledge. In: P.H.Winston (ed.) The Psychology of Computer Vision. New York: McGraw-Hill. Norman, Donald A. & Rumelhart, David (eds.) 1975. Explorations in Cognition. San Francisco: Freeman. Reiser, Brian J. & Black, John B. 1982. Processing and Structural Models of Comprehension. TEXT 2, nr. 1-2. Rokeach, Milton. 1968. Beliefs, Attitudes and Values. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Rokeach, Milton. 1973. The Nature of Human Values. New York: Free Press. Sandell, Rolf. 1977. Linguistic Style and Persuasion. London: Academic Press. Schank, Roger C. & Abelson, Robert P. 1977. Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. Spiro, Rand J., Crismore, Avon & Turner, Terence J. 1982. On the Role of Pervasive Coloration in Memory. TEXT 2, nr. 1-2. Stotland, Ezra & Canon, Lance K. 1972. Social Pyschology. A Cognitive Approach. Philadelphia: Saunders. Wegman, Cornelis. 1981. Conceptual Representation of Belief Systems. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 11,3, 279-305.

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DISCOURSE CONTEXT, WORD IDENTIFICATION AND READING ABILITY

Charles A . P e r f e t t i L e a r n i n g Research and Development Center University o f Pittsburgh P i t t s b u r g h , Pennsylvania U.S.A.

I n t h i s paper, I d i s c u s s some r e l a t i o n s h i p s between c h i l d r e n ' s r e a d i n g a b i l i t y and t h e processes o f word i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h i n d i s c o u r s e c o n t e x t s . I n so doing, I w i l l discuss i n t e r a c t i v e processes i n r e a d i n g and a t t e m p t t o demonstrate how some r e l a t i v e l y weak i n t e r a c t i v e assumptions can p r o v i d e a framework f o r understanding reading a b i l i t y . I n t e r a c t i v e Processes i n Reading The e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e o f an i n t e r a c t i v e model i s t h a t m u l t i p l e sources o f i n f o r mation combine t o produce some process such as word i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . Models which a r e weakly i n t e r a c t i v e do n o t have d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e s o f one i n f o r m a t i o n source on another source, w h i l e models which a r e s t r o n g l y i n t e r a c t i v e do have such i n f l u ences. Examples o f t h e former a r e M o r t o n ' s (1969) logogen model, M c C l e l l a n d ' s (1979) Cascade model, and t h e r e a d i n g a b i l i t y model d e s c r i b e d by P e r f e t t i & Roth (1981). I n these models, t h e processes a r e i n t e r a c t i v e i n t h a t d e c i s i o n s o f word i d e n t i f i c a t i o n a r e guided by b o t h h i g h e r - l e v e l conceptual i n f o r m a t i o n and by g r a p h i c i n f o r m a t i o n . T h i s d i s c o u r s e c o n t e x t (conceptual guidance) and t h e p r i n t e d l e t t e r s a f f e c t word i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , b u t do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y d i r e c t l y i n f l u ence each o t h e r . By c o n t r a s t , models t h a t a r e p o w e r f u l l y i n t e r a c t i v e (Rumelhart, 1977; Rumelhart ! I McClelland, 1981) n o t o n l y d e s c r i b e word i d e n t i f i c a t i o n as dependent on b o t h g r a p h i c d a t a and conceptual data, b u t t h e y a l s o a l l o w d i r e c t i n fluences between c o n t e x t u a l processes and g r a p h i c processes. I t i s q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e more p o w e r f u l l y i n t e r a c t i v e models w i l l prove t o be c o r r e c t o r a t l e a s t necessary f o r some processes o f word i d e n t i f i c a t i o n (see Kumelhart ti McClelland, 1981). However, weakly i n t e r a c t i v e models a r e s u f f i c i e n t t o examine c e r t a i n i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s o f r e a d i n g a b i l i t y . I n f a c t t h e y a r e q u i t e s u f f i c i e n t t o account f o r r a t h e r i n t r i c a t e i n f l u e n c e s o f c o n t e x t on i d e n t i f i c a t i o n (Flassaro, 1980). For r e a d i n g a b i l i t y , an i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n i s t h i s : Do c h i l d r e n o f d i f f e r e n t r e a d i n g a b i l i t i e s d i f f e r i n t h e i t - l o w e r - l e v e l processes, t h e i r h i q h e r - l e v e l p r o cesses o r b o t h ? O f course, b o t h " h i g h e r - l e v e l " and " l o w e r - l e v e l ' ' i n c l u d e a l a r g e domain o f comprehension and i d e n t i f i c a t ' o n processes and i t i s i n e v i t a b l e t h a t c h i l d r e n o f d i f f e r e n t r e a d i n q a b i l i t y F 1 l d i t f e r i n many o f these processes. Here, I r e s t r i c t d i s c u s s i o n t o j u s t t h y process o f i d e n t i t y i n g p r i n t e d words and t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h i s process o f l o w e r - l e v e l word c o d i n g a b i l i t y and h i g h e r l e v e l e x p e c t a t i o n s based on sentence comprehension. F o r i n d i v i d u a l s t h e r e a r e two r e l e v a n t p r o c e s s i n g components: ( 1 ) The speed o f b a s i c word i d e n t i f i c a t i o n (blord T d e n t i t i c a t i o n Speed) and ( 2 ) The accuracy o f word p r e d i c t i o n , g i v e n a d i s course c o n t e x t (Context S e n s i t i v i t y ) . The q u e s t i o n s a r e how these two components a f f e c t a r e a d e r ' s t i m e t o i d e n t i f y a word i n c o n t e x t and, e s p e c i a l l y , i s t h e problem o f t h e low a b i l i t y reader m a i n l y i n word i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o r c o n t e x t s e n s i t i v i t y ? E q u i v a l e n t l y , i s t h e advantage o f t h e s k i l l e d r e a d e r m a i n l y i n word ident i f i c a t i o n , context s e n s i t i v i t y , o r both? The model I propose i s one o f t h e weakly i n t e r a c t i v e t y p e t h a t assumes t h e t i m e t o i d e n t i f y a word i n c o n t e x t i s an a c t i v a t i o n f u n c t i o n , where t h e t i m e t o a c t i v a t e a word i n memory beyond some c r i t e r i a 1 i d e n t i f i c a t i o n t h r e s h o l d i s a m u l t i -

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plicative function of context and a person's basic word processing ra te . The word processing r a t e function grows exponentially over time, quickly reaching asymptote. Further, b o t h the word processing rate (11) and the context component ( k ) can be considered parameters of individual differences or of texts and words. T h s a skilled reader has a f a s t e r r at e (r)t h a n an unskilled reader and a short and frequent word has a f a s t e r r at e than a long and rare word. Similarly, a s k ille d individual o f high context s en s i t i v i t y has a higher k value than a le ss s k ille d individual and a highly predictable context has a higher k value than a less predictable context. This model makes certain predictions f o r individual differences in the time t o read a word in context. I t predicts, in p ar t i cu l ar, tha t i f two individuals diff e r in basic coding r at e (r), the one with the slower ra te will be more affected by context. Relative t o a condition of no context, i . e . , isolated word i d e n t i f i cation, a f a c i l i t a t i v e context increases the word identification rate of a l l reade r s . However i t increases the r at e of the slow readers more than the f a s t readers. Interestingly, a misleading context should have the same e f f e c t , b u t in the oppos i t e direction. I t should slow the r at e of the slow reader more than the ra te of the f a s t reader. The formal basis f o r these predictions i s t h a t the word identification ra te (c) i s an exponential growth function whereas the context fa c tor (k)i s a multiplicative constant. Context does n o t d i r ect l y af f ect the process of word identification. Instead, i t adds activation t o the word's location in memory, in e ffe c t reducing the amount of data required from the graphemic level. However, identification can occur quite well without a context, b u t not without a word. Thus, the contextfree word identification r at e i s the overall rate limiting fa c tor in the activation of a word in memory. Discourse Context and Predictabi 1 i t y I t i s commonplace t o assume t h a t word identitication i s aided by discourse context. How i s t h i s accomplished? I t i s possible that. active predictive processes operate during reading. Thus, a reader [ o r , f o r t h a t matter, a l i s t e n e r ) may actively generate predictions about what will appear. Indeed, in the studies t o be summarized here, asking subjects t o predict words in texts i s the way tha t context u a l constraint i s assessed. However, i f we think about the process of skille d reading, we can imagine instead t h at active prediction, as anything more than a metaphor, i s an unlikely process. I n most contexts, predicting words takes longer than reading them. Furthermore, texts seldom contain words t h a t are completely predictable, and except f o r such complete redundancy, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o imagine any advantage t o predicting a word and then having to replace the prediction with the actually occurring word. Another p o s s i b i l i t y i s tha t context e ffe c ts are passive processes, rather than active ones. The mechanism for context e ffe c ts would be something more akin t o spreading activation (Collins & Loftus, 1975), although i t might be rather more constrained by syntactic factors than i s the case with other situations of memory activation. Furthermore, in the case of te xt reading, activation o f semantic links may be t h o u g h t o f as resulting from the general semantic content of the t ex t and the more specific semantic links a c t i vated by the sentence currently being read. Much remains t o be understood a b o u t such processes, b u t the assumptions t h at there are rapid passive activation processes as well as slower, active predictive processes are seen in the general f a c i l i t a t i o n and inhibition model of Posner and Snyder (1975). This model has been applied t o the specific case of reading words in context by Stanovich and West (1979; Stanovich, 1981). By t h i s view, i t i s the passive attention-free mechanism t h a t provides most of the context f a c i l i t a t i o n e f f e c t . This view of contextual processes i s n o t t o deny the role of active, predictive processes in comprehension. The mental a c t i v i t i e s associated with integrating te x t propositions with memory structures and anticipating te xt structures a re just

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Discourse Context, Word Identification and Reading Ability

two examples o f comprehension a c t i v i t i e s t n a t seem t o i n v o l v e some a c t i v e processes t h a t have p r e d i c t i o n - 1 i K e q u a l i t i e s . However, because such processes make demands on c e n t r a l p r o c e s s i n g resources, t h a t i s a l l t h e more reason t o suppose t h a t s i m p l e r word processes s h o u l d n o t make heavy demands on t h e s e same r e s o u r c e s . Thus a p a s s i v e " p r e d i c t i v e " system serves b e t t e r t h a n an a c t i v e one as t a r as words a r e concerned. Botn i n t h e model discussed above and t h e experiments d i s cussed below, t h e assumption i s t h a t t h e c o n t e x t f a c t o r i s one t h a t d e s c r i b e s t h e p r e d i c t a b i l i t y o f words i n t e x t s , b u t n o t n e c e s s a r i l y t h e a c t i v e p r e d i c t i o n o f words by r e a d e r s .

-

S t u d i e s o f C o n t e x t and I d e n t i f i c a t i o n The model d i s c u s s e d above i m p l i e s t h a t , compared w i t h h i g h a b i l i t y readers, low a b i l i t y r e a d e r s should have word i d e n t i f i c a t i o n r a t e s t n a t a r e slower, i n c r e a s e d more by f a c i l i t a t i v e c o n t e x t , and decreased more by m i s l e a d i n g c o n t e x t . The f i r s t o f t h e p r e d i c t i o n s i s a l r e a d y w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d (e.g., P e r f e t t i E Hogaboam, 1975). Low a b i l i t y readers nave slower t i m e s i n i d e n t i f y i n g words. I n t h e i n t e r a c t i v e framework, t h e q u e s t i o n s a r e how c o n t e x t and g r a p h i c d a t a combine i n i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and whether l o w a b i l i t y readers a r e l e s s s k i l l e d a t use o f cont e x t , g r a p h i c data, o r both. An experimental approach t o these q u e s t i o n s i s t o v a r y t n e p r e d i c t i v e q u a l i t y o f c o n t e x t , t h u s o b s e r v i n g t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n o f cont e x t , and t h e g r a p h i c q u a l i t y o f t h e word, thus o b s e r v i n g t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n o f g r a p h i c data. I n t h e f i r s t experiment t o be discussed, c h i l d r e n (average age 9 ) were p r e s e n t e d w i t h t h r e e k i n d s o f c o n t e x t s , d e f i n e d a c c o r d i n g t o whether a g i v e n word was highly p r e d i c t a b l e , u n p r e d i c t a b l e , o r anomalous i n t h e g i v e n c o n t e x t . The c o n t e x t s were two sentences i n l e n g t h . Examples o f each t y p e a r e g i v e n below t o r t h e wora

m.

P r e d i c t a b l e . The l i o n was t h e most dangerous animal we ha0 seen a t t h e zoo. guard warned us n o t t o s t i c k o u r hands through t h e bars o f h i s cage. U n p r e d i c t a b l e . We d i s c o v e r e d n a v i n g a p e t i s n ' t easy. o f t h i n g s , b u t f i r s t o f a l l , we g o t him a

x.

The

Our new p e t needed l o t s

Anomalous. There were l o t s o f t h i n g s that. John had t o do b e f o r e he c o u l d go o u t and p l a y w i t n h i s f r i e n d . He had t o wash t h e dishes, f i n i s h h i s school work, and c l e a n up h i s czgg. Fop t h e American c h i l d r e n o f o u r r e s e a r c h p o p u l a t i o n , t h e word i n the highly p r e d i c t a b l e c o n t e x t was, i n f a c t , h i g h l y p r e d i c t a b l e . We measured t h e p r e d i c t a b i l i t y o f these c o n t e x t s by a s k i n g c h i l d r e n t o p r e d i c t what word would o c c u r a t t h e end o f t h e second sentence. The average p r e d i c t a b i l i t y was 80% t o r t h e h i g h l y p r e d i c t a b l e c o n t e x t s , 3% f o r t h e u n p r e d i c t a b l e c o n t e x t s , and 0% f o r t h e anomalous c o n t e x t s . I f we compare t h e s e t h r e e c o n t e x t types t o n o r m a l l y occurr i n g t e x t s , we conclude t h a t t h e u n p r e d i c t a b l e t y p e i s r a t h e r t y p i c a l . Exact words a r e n o t o f t e n p r e d i c t a b l e . However t h e d i f t e r e n c e s between an u n p r e d i c t a b l e c o n t e x t and an anomalous one i s more i m p o r t a n t t h a n a mere 3% p r e d i c t a b i l i t y . An u n p r e d i c t a b l e c o n t e x t i s u n p r e d i c t a b l e o n l y i n t h a t t h e word t h a t occurs i s one o f many t h a t c o u l d o c c u r i n t h a t c o n t e x t . The word conforms t o t h e semantic cons t r a i n t o f t h e c o n t e x t . By c o n t r a s t , an anomalous c o n t e x t i s one which imposes semantic c o n s t r a i n t s d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e semantic p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e t a r g e t word. Thus, t h e f i n a l word i s n o t m e r e l y u n p r e d i c t a b l e , i t i s s e m a n t i c a l l y anomalous.

How w i l l r e a d e r s o f d i f f e r e n t s k i l l i d e n t i f y t h e t a r g e t words i n such c o n t e x t s ? A c c o r d i n g t o general f e a t u r e s o f t h e model, p r e d i c t a b l e c o n t e x t s s h o u l d produce s h o r t e r l a t e n c i e s t h a n u n p r e d i c t a b l e c o n t e x t s , r e g a r d l e s s o f r e a d i n g s k i l l . Howe v e r t h e t a c i l i t a t i v e e f f e c t o f p r e d i c t a b i l i t y s h o u l d be g r e a t e r f o r l e s s s k i l l e d r e a d e r s t h a n f o r s k i l l e d r e a d e r s . As f o r anomalous c o n t e x t s , t h e y m i g h t be exp e c t e d t o have some e f f e c t i n i n c r e a s i n g i d e n t i f i c a t i o n l a t e n c i e s . However, t h i s

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CA. Perfetti

n e g a t i v e e f f e c t s h o u l d be g r e a t e r f o r less s k i l l e d r e a d e r s t h a n f o r s k i l l e d reade r s , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e model. (bee P e r t e t t i & Roth, 1981, f o r i l l u s t r a t i o n s o f these predictions.) The r e s u l t s o f t h i s experiment a r e shown i n F i g u r e 1.

Relative t o unpredictable

Anornolous (0%) Unpredictable(3%) Predictable (80%) Context Type F i g . 1. I d e n t i f i c a t i o n l a t e n c i e s o f s k i l l e d and l e s s - s k i l l e d readers f o r t h r e e types o f c o n t e x t s . Data from P e r f e t t i S Roth (1981). c o n t e x t s , p r e d i c t a b l e c o n t e x t s were f a c i l i t a t e d f o r l a t e n c i e s o f b o t h s k i l l e d and l e s s s k i l l e d readers, b u t more so f o r l e s s s k i l l e d r e a d e r s . Anomalous c o n t e x t s produced l o n g e r l a t e n c i e s only f o r l e s s s k i l l e d readers, a t age 9. For s u b j e c t s one-year younger, t h e r e s u l t s ( n o t shown) were t h a t b o t h s k i l l e d and l e s s s k i l l e d r e a d e r s were n e g a t i v e l y a f f e c t e d by c o n t e x t . A p o s s i b l e age d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e e f f e c t o f anomaly i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e r e s u l t s o f S t a n o v i c h and West (1979) t h a t c h i l d r e n , b u t n o t a d u l t s , were n e g a t i v e l y a f f e c t e d by anomalous c o n t e x t s . Thus t h e r e i s s u p p o r t i n these d a t a f o r t h e p r e d i c t i o n o f d i f f e r e n t i a l c o n t e x t e f f e c t s f o r r e a d e r s o f d i f f e r e n t s k i l l . T h i s i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e general assumptions o f t h e model t h a t t h e e f f e c t s o f c o n t e x t w i l l depend on t h e b a s i c cont e x t - f r e e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n r a t e and t h a t i t i s t h i s r a t e t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s r e a d e r s of d i f f e r e n t s k i l l . S k i l l e d r e a d e r s a r e l e s s a f f e c t e d by c o n t e x t because t h e i r b a s i c word i d e n t i f i c a t i o n process executes v e r y r a p i d l y . Readers o f l o w e r s k i l l have slower b a s i c r a t e s t h a t have n o t executed b e f o r e t h e e f f e c t o f c o n t e x t i s seen. Because o f t h e general developmental d i f f e r e n c e s ( S t a n o v i c h & West, 1979) as w e l l as d i f f e r e n c e s between s k i l l l e v e l s , i t may be c o r r e c t t o suggest t h e f o l l o w i n g g e n e r a l i z a t i o n : As an i n d i v i d u a l becomes o l d e r and more s k i l l e d i n r e a d i n g , h i s r e l i a n c e on c o n t e x t i s reduced. H i s b a s i c c o n t e x t - f r e e processes become more i m p o r t a n t i n d e t e r m i n i n g h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f words i n c o n t e x t .

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57

I n t h e experiment discussed above, words were always seen i n some c o n t e x t . Thus, t h e r e was no comparison between i d e n t i f i c a t i o n times i n c o n t e x t and b a s i c i d e n t i f i c a t i o n times. By d e f i n i t i o n , t h e l a t t e r a r e based on words viewed i n i s o l a t i o n . Such comparisons a r e a v a i l a b l e f r o m t h e experiments o f P e r f e t t i , Goldman, and Hogaboam (1979), which were c a r r i e d on w i t h s u b j e c t s f r o m t h e same p o p u l a t i o n . I n these experiments, t h e c o n t e x t was a c t u a l l y an e n t i r e s h o r t s t o r y w i t h occas i o n a l t a r g e t words t o be i d e n t i f i e d on a screen. The t a r g e t words v a r i e d w i d e l y i n t h e i r p r e d i c t a b i l i t y f r o m t h e t e x t . The m a j o r r e s u l t s were s i m i l a r t o those d e s c r i b e d above. The f u n c t i o n r e l a t i n g i d e n t i f i c a t i o n t i m e t o p r e d i c t a b i l i t y showed a l a r g e r s l o p e f o r l e s s s k i l l e d readers t h a n f o r s k i l l e d r e a d e r s ( i n t e r c e p t s , o f course, were a l s o d i f f e r e n t ) . T h a t i s , an i n c r e a s e i n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y was a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a l a r g e r r e d u c t i o n i n i d e n t i f i c a t i o n t i m e f o r l e s s s k i l l e d readers. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e P e r f e t t i e t a1 (1979) experiments had a c o n d i t i o n i n which words, comparable t o those f r o m t h e s t o r y , were viewed i n i s o l a t i o n . I n t h e i s o l a t i o n c o n d i t i o n s , a b i l i t y d i f f e r e n c e s were a t t h e i r l a r g e s t . I n f a c t , t h e s k i l l e d r e a d e r s were about as f a s t i n i d e n t i f y i n g an i s o l a t e d word as t h e y were a t i d e n t i f y i n g an u n p r e d i c t a b l e word i n c o n t e x t . Less s k i l l e d r e a d e r s , by c o n t r a s t , were helped even by u n p r e d i c t a b l e words i n c o n t e x t (compared w i t h i s o l a t e d words). T h i s l a s t f a c t demonstrates t h a t c o n t e x t has e f f e c t s t h a t a r e n ' t measurable by t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t s u b j e c t s w i l l p r e d i c t a g i v e n word, a t l e a s t when t h e sample i s n o t l a r g e . The main p o i n t i s t h a t when b a s i c word i d e n t i f i c a t i o r i i s compared w i t h c o n t e n t - a i d e d word i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , t h e a b i l i t y f a c t o r i s seen most c l e a r l y i n b a s i c i d e n t i f i c a t i o n time. P r e d i c t i v e c o n t e x t s h e l p t h e l e s s s k i l l e d r e a d e r more t h a n t h e s k i l l e d r e a d e r and t h e more p r e d i c t a b l e t h e word i s , t h e more he i s helped. And when t h e word i s anomalous r a t h e r t h a n p r e d i c t a b l e t h e l e s s s k i l l e d r e a d e r i s slowed even more. S t u d i e s o f Degrading and Context The s t r a t e g y o f t h e s t u d i e s summarized above was t o observe t h e i n f l u e n c e o f cont e x t b y v a r y i n g t h e p r e d i c t a b i l i t y o f a word. This, i n e f f e c t , reduces t h e r e l i ance on b a s i c word processing, except where t h e c o n t e x t and t h e t a r g e t word a r e anomalous. W i t h i n an i n t e r a c t i v e model, t h e o t h e r s i d e o f t h e problem can be examined by m a n i p u l a t i n g t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f word processing. One way t o do t h i s i s t o v i s u a l l y degrade t h e word t a r g e t . The assumption i s t h a t d e g r a d a t i o n slows t h e r i s e o f t h e word a c t i v a t i o n f u n c t i o n , because g r a p h i c d a t a accumulates more s l o w l y . I t f o r c e s a g r e a t e r r e l i a n c e on word knowledge and decoding a b i l i t y . I t a l s o p r e s e n t s an o p p o r t u n i t y t o slow down t h e word p r o c e s s i n g o f s k i l l e d r e a d e r s t o observe whether t h e y then mimic l e s s s k i l l e d r e a d e r s . Examples o f t h e s o r t o f degrading we ( P e r f e t t i & Roth, 1981) c a r r i e d o u t a r e shown i n F i g u r e 2. These t h r e e l e v e l s o f degrading, d e f i n e d by t h e percentage o f

I

21

x

42

x

e pp t r

p L. ;'?

? :*

F i g . 2. Examples o f words o f 0, 21, and 42 p e r c e n t degrading.

C.A. Perfetti

58

f e a t u r e s d e l e t e d , were used i n one experiment and i n arlother experiment t h e r e were f o u r 1evels.beyond z e r o - 14%, 21%, 28% and 42%. I n a d d i t i o n t o v a r y i n g t h e q u a l i t y o f t h e word through degrading, we v a r i e d t h e p r e d i c t a b i l i t y o t t h e word i n d i s c o u r s e c o n t e x t . I n one experiment c o n t e x t was p r o v i d e d b y sentence p a i r s and i n a n o t h e r experiment by one o f t h e s t o r i e s o f P e r f e t t i e t a1 (1979). Since t h e experiments produced s i m i l a r r e s u l t s , I w i l l d e s c r i b e j u s t one. Cont e x t s were high, moderate, and low i n t h e c o n s t r a i n t on t a r g e t words p r o v i d e d by c o n t e n t s . I n o r d e r t o p r o v i d e a more s e n s i t i v e measure o f p r e d i c t a b i l i t y , subj e c t s were g i v e n 15 seconds t o p r e d i c t words t h a t m i g h t complete a two-sentence t e x t . High c o n s t r a i n t c o n t e x t s a l l o w e d p r e d i c t i o n o f t h e t a r g e t by n e a r l y a l l s u b j e c t s (93.5%) w h i l e t h e low c o n s t r a i n t c o n t e x t s p r a c t i c a l l y never a l l o w e d c o r r e c t p r e d i c t i o n (<1%) w i t h i n t h e 15 second p e r i o d . The moderate c o n s t r a i n t t e x t s were i n t e r m e d i a t e i n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y , and, i n t h a t sense, more t y p i c a l . A p o i n t about these t e x t s i s t h a t t h e y demonstrate t h a t c o n s t r a i n t and p r e d i c t a b i l i t y a r e n o t q u i t e t h e same. The c o n s t r a i n t produced by a t e x t can be indexed by t h e numb e r o f d i f f e r e n t words generated i n t h e 15 second p e r i o d . More c o n s t r a i n t i s fewer word types. As can be seen f r o m T a b l e 1, t h e mean number o f words (word Table 1 Context C o n s t r a i n t and T a r g e t P r e d i c t a b i l i t y f o r Three Context Types

Mean Number o f Word Types

Percentaoe of - ._ .. Target Predictions Skilled Less S k i l l e d

High C o n s t r a i n t

12.4

92.9

94.4

Moderate C o n s t r a i n t

27.8

23.7

15.2

Low C o n s t r a i n t

36.4

0.2

0.1

Note:

Number o f Word Types i s t h e t o t a l number o f unique words produced p e r Context by 30 s u b j e c t s w i t h i n 15 seconds. Data a r e f r o m T a b l e 2 of P e r f e t t i and Roth (1981).

t y p e s ) generated f o r t h e h i g h c o n s t r a i n t c o n t e x t s was much s m a l l e r t h a n f o r t h e o t h e r two c o n t e x t s . Thus t h e t a r g e t i s more p r e d i c t a b l e , i n t h a t most s u b j e c t s p r e d i c t i t , and t h e c o n t e x t i s more c o n s t r a i n i n g i n t h a t fewer words f i t . T u r n i n g now t o t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n r e s u l t s , t h e q u e s t i o n s a r e ( 1 ) whether d e g r a d i n g a f f e c t e d l e s s s k i l l e d readers more t h a n s k i l l e d readers; ( 2 ) whether c o n t e x t a f f e c t e d l e s s s k i l l e d r e a d e r s more t h a n s k i l l e d readers; ( 3 ) whether t h e e f f e c t s of degrading were reduced by c o n t e x t . As can be seen f r o m T a b l e 2, t h e r e s u l t s answer each o f these q u e s t i o n s i n t h e a f f i r m a t i v e . O f course t h e r e were a l s o t h e expected main e f f e c t s o f c o n t e x t , d e g r a d i n g and s k i l l . H i g h l y c o n s t r a i n i n g cont e x t s were p r a c t i c a l l y u n a f f e c t e d by degrading. M o d e r a t e - c o n s t r a i n t c o n t e x t s showed l i t t l e e f f e c t o f degrading except f o r severe (42%) degrading. By c o n t r a s t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f i s o l a t e d words and words i n low c o n s t r a i n t c o n t e x t s were much a f f e c t e d by degrading. The e x a c t n a t u r e o f t h i s c o n t e x t by degrading i n t e r a c t i o n i s i n f o r m a t i v e . I t s m a j o r component i s t h e c o n t r a s t between t h e h i g h c o n s t r a i n t c o n t e x t and t h e o t h e r t h r e e . Degrading e f f e c t s a r e i n f a c t observed e x c e p t when t h e word i s c o m p l e t e l y p r e d i c t a b l e . Under such c o n d i t i o n s , conceptual guidance i s so powerful t h a t minimal d a t a f r o m p r i n t i s r e q u i r e d . These s i t u a t i o n s a r e n o t t y p i c a l o f most t e x t s . As f o r r e a d i n g s k i l l , s k i l l e d r e a d e r s were l e s s a f f e c t e d by c o n t e x t t h a n l e s s s k i l l e d r e a d e r s . T h i s r e s u l t r e p l i c a t e s t h a t of t h e p r e v i o u s l y d e s c r i b e d s t u d y .

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Table 2 Two-way I n t e r a c t i o n s o f Context, S k i l l , and Degrading (Word I d e n t i f i c a t i o n L a t e n c i e s ( I t e m Means) f r o m P e r f e t t i and Roth, 1981)

Context Degrading

0 21 42

Isolation

Low

1.03 1.29 1.93

Moderate

High

.85 .99 1.33

.57 .63 .68

1.18 .94

.67 .58

.85 1.28 1.52 Context

S k i 11 Low High

Skill Low High

1.64 1.19

1.38 1.05

.o

Degrading .21

.90 .76

1.16 .93

.42 1.14 1.58

I n a d d i t i o n , t h e d i f f e r e n c e between s k i l l e d and l e s s s k i l l e d r e a d e r s decreased s y s t e m a t i c a l l y w i t h i n c r e a s i n g c o n t e x t u a l c o n s t r a i n t . The two groups were maxi m a l l y d i f f e r e n t f o r words i n i s o l a t i o n and n o n s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t when words were 94% p r e d i c t a b l e . W i t h r e s p e c t t o degrading, s k i l l e d r e a d e r s were s i g n i f i c a n t l y f a s t e r t h a n l e s s s k i l l e d readers under a l l c o n d i t i o n s , b u t t h e i r advantage was e s p e c i a l l y l a r g e a t t h e h i g h e s t l e v e l of degrading. The e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h i s e f f e c t appears t o l i e i n t h e s u p e r i o r a b i l i t y o f t h e s k i l l e d r e a d e r i n a p p l y i n g h i g h e r l e v e l o r t h o g r a p h i c c o n s t r a i n t s . These k i n d s o f c o n s t r a i n t s a r e e x a c t l y what i s needed t o h e l p i d e n t i f y l e t t e r s when i n d i v i d u a l l e t t e r s r e s i s t r e c o g n i t i o n . For example, evidence t h a t t h e second o v e r t h e hyl e t t e r i s i supports t h e hypothesis t h a t the f i r s t l e t t e r i s p o t h e s i s t h a t t h e f i r s t l e t t e r i s 5. Use o f such knowledge i s one o f t h e f a c t o r s t h a t a r e p a r t o f s k i l l e d r e a d i n g and can, i n f a c t , l e a d t o h i g h e r b a s i c word i d e n t i f i c a t i o n r a t e s .

c

Reading S k i l l and S e n s i t i v i t y t o D i s c o u r s e Context The preceding d i s c u s s i o n has emphasized t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t b a s i c p r o c e s s i n g r a t e s and n o t use o f c o n t e x t a r e t h e main f a c t o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g s k i l l e d f r o m l e s s s k i l l e d r e a d e r s . Moreover, l e s s s k i l l e d r e a d e r s a r e more dependent on c o n t e x t as a means of compensating f o r l o w r a t e s o f word i d e n t i f i c a t i o n (see a l s o S t a n o v i c h , 1981). However, t h i s should n o t i m p l y t h a t use of c o n t e x t i s something l e s s s k i l l e d r e a d e r s a r e e s p e c i a l l y good a t . I n f a c t t h e y a r e n o t as a b l e as s k i l l e d r e a d e r s t o p r e d i c t words f r o m c o n t e x t . I n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e experiments d e s c r i b e d above, c h i l d r e n o f d i f f e r e n t r e a d i n g a b i l i t y were asked t o p r e d i c t words o c c u r r i n g a t t h e end of two sentence t e x t s . The r i g h t columns o f T a b l e 1 show t h e success o f t h e s e s u b j e c t s i n t h e p r e d i c t i o n t a s k . There a r e i n t e r e s t i n g r e s u l t s i n t h e boundary c o n d i t i o n s o f t e x t u a l . c o n s t r a i n t and i n t h e normal t e x t u a l c o n s t r a i n t c o n d i t i o n s . By boundary c o n d i t i o n s , I mean those t e x t s t h a t c o m p l e t e l y c o n s t r a i n t h e f i n a l word and those t h a t p r o v i d e p r a c t i c a l l y no c o n s t r a i n t . I n t h e f o r m e r case l e s s s k i l l e d r e a d e r s as w e l l as s k i l l e d r e a d e r s can p r e d i c t t h e t a r g e t . I n t h e l a t t e r case n e i t h e r can p r e d i c t i t . However, i n t e x t s o f moderate c o n s t r a i n t , s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s emerge. S k i l l e d r e a d e r s can p r e d i c t t h e t a r g e t b e t t e r than l e s s

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s k i l l e d readers. T h i s i s u n s u r p r i s i n g when we c o n s i d e r t h a t t h e s k i l l groups a r e d e f i n e d by t h e i r scores on comprehension t e s t s . However, e x p l a n a t i o n s a r e a n o t h e r m a t t e r . I n o u r task, t h e t e x t s were v e r y s h o r t and r e q u i r e d no s p e c a i l knowledqe. One, f o r example, was t h e f o l l o w i n g : When I g o t home f r o m work, 'I wanted t o e a t a f r u i t . I went t o t h e r e f r i g e r a t o r and g o t a pear. Pear i s more o f t e n p r e d i c t -ed w i t h i n t h e 15 second i n t e r v a l by s k i l l e d readers t h a n by l e s s s k i l l e d r e a d e r s . N o t i c e t h a t t h e semantic c o n s t r a i n t i s v e r y general -- a f h i t .

R e f r i g e r a t o r i s an a d d i t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t .

I t was c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f l e s s s k i l l e d readers t h a t t h e y o f t e n i g n o r e d t h e fruit c o n s t r a i n t and named o n l y something t h a t would be found i n a r e f r i g e r a t o r , e.g., milk, cake. Whether such s u b j e c t s f o r g o t t h e f r u i t c o n s t r a i n t o r whether t h e y knew fewer f r u i t examples t o name, o r something e l s e , i s n o t c l e a r . I t i s q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e e x p l a n a t i o n w i l l i n v o l v e a tendency f o r semantic c o n s t r a i n t s from sentences b e f o r e , t h e one b e i n g processed t o be f o r g o t t e n o r , a t l e a s t , n o t honored. I t i s n o t p o s s i b l e y e t t o f u l l y d e s c r i b e t h e source o f t h i s c o n t e x t d i f f e r e n c e . I n any case i t ' s c l e a r t h a t l e s s s k i l l e d r e a d e r s f a c e problems o f c o n t e x t as w e l l as problems o f decoding.

Summary I n t h i s paper, I have d e s c r i b e d a model o f i n t e r a c t i v e p r o c e s s i n g t h a t i s u s e f u l f o r d e s c r i b i n c word i d e n t i f i c a t i o n processes i n d i s c o u r s e c o n t e x t . I t i s an example o f what I c a l l e d t h e weakly i n t e r a c t i v e t y p e , as opposed t o t h e s t r o n g l y i n t e r a c t i v e type. I t does n o t assume t h a t c o n t e x t d i r e c t l y a l t e r s b a s i c i d e n t i f i c a t i o n processes b u t r a t h e r t h a t i t a c c e l e r a t e s t h e r a t e o f word a c t i v a t i o n g i v e n l o w e r - l e v e l data. While more powerful models (e.g., Rumelhart & McClelland; 1981) may prove necessary, t h e weakly i n t e r a c t i v e model a l l o w s a s y s t e m a t i c account f o r s e v e r a l f a c t s concerning r e a d i n g a b i l i t y . Those a r e t h a t s k i l l e d r e a d e r s i d e n t i f y words more q u i c k l y , a r e l e s s a f f e c t e d by c o n t e x t , and l e s s a f f e c t e d by s t i m u l u s degrading compared w i t h l e s s s k i l l e d r e a d e r s . F i n a l l y , w h i l e l e s s s k i l l e d r e a d e r s a r e more dependent on c o n t e x t t o compensate f o r l e s s e f f i c i e n t word i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s k i l l s , t h e y a r e a l s o l e s s a b l e t o use c o n t e x t t o p r e d i c t words. These f a c t o r s o b v i o u s l y p u t l e s s s k i l l e d readers a r a double disadvantage. References C o l l i n s , A. M. and L o f t u s , E. F., A s p r e a d i n g - a c t i v a t i o n t h e o r y o f semantic processing, P s y c h o l o g i c a l Review 82 (1975) 407-428. Massaro, D. W., Phonological c o n s t r a i n t s i n speech p e r c e p t i o n , Psychonomic S o c i e t y (1980). McClelland, J. L., On t h e t i m e r e l a t i o n s o f mental processes: An examination o f systems o f processes i n cascade, P s y c h o l o g i c a l Review 86 (1979) 287-330. Morton, J., I n t e r a c t i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n i n word r e c o g n i t i o n , P s y c h o l o g i c a l Review 76 (1969) 165-178. P e r f e t t i , C. A., Goldman, S. R., and Hogaboam, T. W., Reading s k i l l and t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f words i n d i s c o u r s e c o n t e x t , Memory & C o g n i t i o n 7 (1979) 273-282. P e r f e t t i , C . A . , and Hogaboam, T. W . , The r e l a t i o n s h i p between s i n g l e word decoding and r e a d i n g comprehension s k i l l , J o u r n a l of E d u c a t i o n a l Psychology 67 (1975) 461-469. P e r f e t t i , C. A., and Roth, S., Some o f t h e i n t e r a c t i v e processes i n r e a d i n g and t h e i r r o l e i n r e a d i n g s k i l l , i n : Lesgold. A. M.,and P e r f e t t i , C. A . (eds.), I n t e r a c t i v e Processes i n Reading (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, H i l l s d a l e , 1981).

Discourse Context, Word Identification and Reading Ability

61

(8)

Posner, M. I., and Snyder, C. R. R., Facilitation and inhibi ion in the processing of signals, in: Rabbitt, P. M. A., and Dornic, S (eds . ) , Attention and Performance V (Academic Press, New York, 1975).

(9)

Rumelhart, 0.. Toward an interactive model of readins, in: ornic, S. (ed.), Attention-and-PerformanceVI (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, 1977). and McClelland, J. L., Interactive processing through spreading activation, in: Lesgold, A. M.,and Perfetti, C. A. (eds.), Interactive Processes in Reading (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale,

(10) Rumelhart, 0. E., 1981).

K. E., Attentional and automatic context effects in reading, in: Lesgold. A. M.,and Perfetti, C. A. (eds.), Interactive Processes in Reading (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, 1981).

(11) Stanovich,

K. E. and West, R. F., Mechanisms o f sentence context effects in reading: Automatic activation and conscious attention, Memory & Cognition

(12) Stanovich,

7 (1979) 77-85.

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63

THE PERCEPTUAL INTEGRATION OF SENTENCES: SYNTACTIC AND SEMANTIC ASPECTS' Juan Segui L a b o r a t o i r e de P s y c h o l o g i e Experimentale U n i v e r s i t @ Rene Descartes e t EPHE (36me s e c t i o n ) , Associe au CNRS P a r i s , France Jean-Yves Dommergues, U l i F r a u e n f e l d e r , Jacques Mehler L a b o r a t o i r e de Psychologie Centre d ' E t u d e des Processus C o g n i t i f s e t du Langage P a r i s , France

Previous work u s i n g t h e RSVP procedure has shown t h a t t h e r e p r o d u c t i o n p r o b a b i l i t y o f " n u c l e a r " elements o f a sentence was h i g h e r t h a n t h a t o f "secondary" o r " m o d i f i e r s " elements. I n o r d e r t o reduce t h e importance o f t h e p r e p a r a t i o n o f v e r b a l response on t h i s t a s k a new procedure which combines t h e RSVP method o f p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h a RT probe measure was used i n t h r e e experiments. The r e s u l t s o b t a i n e d i n these experiments suggest t h a t t h e observed d i f f e r e n c e s between n u c l e a r and secondary elements a r e n o t due t o a p r e p a r a t i o n o f v e r b a l response b u t a s e l e c t i o n process which takes p l a c e d u r i n g t h e p e r c e p t u a l i n t e g r a t i o n o f a sentence. Semantic and s y n t a c t i c parameters p l a y independent r o l e s i n t h e p e r c e p t u a l i n t e g r a t i o n process.

I t i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d i n p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c s t h a t t h e " n u c l e a r " elements o f a sentence a r e r e c a l l e d b e t t e r t h a n t h e "secondary" elements such as m o d i f i e r s (see M a r t i n and W a l t e r (1969), Wearing (1971), Segui ( 1 9 7 4 ) ) . A s i m i l a r phenomenon has a l s o been observed i n s t u d i e s o f sentence p e r c e p t i o n u s i n g t h e RSVP ( r a p i d s e r i a l v i s u a l p r e s e n t a t i o n ) procedure. T h i s t e c h n i q u e i n v o l v e s p r e s e n t i n g subjects t h e words o f a sentence one a t a t i m e a t h i g h speeds (up t o 16 o r 22 words p e r second) i n t h e f o v e a l v i s i o n . The s u b j e c t must reproduce as much o f what he has r e a d as p o s s i b l e .

Using t h i s e x p e r i m e n t a l procedure, F o r s t e r and Ryder (1971) and Holmes and F o r s t e r (1972) found t h a t t h e r e p r o d u c t i o n p r o b a b i l i t y f o r n u c l e a r elements such as nouns and verbs was h i g h e r t h a n t h a t f o r m o d i f i e r s l i k e a d j e c t i v e s and adverbs. We would l i k e t o know whether t h e r e i s a common u n d e r l y i n g mechanism t h a t accounts f o r t h e observed d i f f e r e n c e s i n p e r c e p t i o n and i n r e t e n t i o n o f n u c l e a r and second a r y elements o f a sentence. To address t h i s q u e s t i o n , a f i r s t s e r i e s o f experiments were conducted i n French u s i n g t h e RSVP paradigm (Mehler, Segui, P i t t e t and B a r r i e r e (1978)). I t was shown t h a t a d j e c t i v e s were n o t reproduced as f r e q u e n t l y as t h e nouns t h e y m o d i f i e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e i r p o s i t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e noun (preposed o r postposed). T h i s r e s u l t was o b t a i n e d n o t o n l y f o r a d j e c t i v e s such as " j o l i e " ( p r e t t y ) i n ( l ) , b u t a l s o f o r a d j e c t i v e c o n s t i t u e n t s o f compound nouns l i k e "sage" i n ( 2 ) ("sagefemme" o r l i t e r a l l y "wise woman'').

(1) Le medecin a mis l a j o l i e femme 1 l a p o r t e . (The d o c t o r t h r e w t h e p r e t t y woman o u t . ) (2)

Le M d e c i n a mis l a sage-femme 8 l a p o r t e . (The d o c t o r t h r e w t h e m i d w i f e o u t . )

J. Segui et al.

64

The s u b j e c t s ' f a i l u r e t o reproduce t h e a d j e c t i v e s under t h e extreme t i m e pressures o f RSVP was taken t o be t h e consequence o f a process i n which t h e words o f a sentence were s e l e c t e d on t h e b a s i s o f t h e i r " p o t e n t i a l r o l e " . The p o t e n t i a l r o l e o f any word was determined by i t s s y n t a c t i c c a t e g o r y and i t s s y n t a c t i c c o n t e x t . Thus, f o r example, when i n French an a d j e c t i v e i s a d j a c e n t t o a noun, t h e s u b j e c t w i l l t e n d t o a s s i g n t o i t t h e " p o t e n t i a l r o l e " o f a " m o d i f i e r " (even f o r ( 2 ) ) s i n c e t h a t i s g e n e r a l l y t h e a c t u a l r o l e o f noun a d j a c e n t a d j e c t i v e s . I t should be n o t i c e d t h a t t h e a d j e c t i v e s i n sentences used were n o t s e m a n t i c a l l y c o n s t r a i n e d by t h e s e q u e n t i a l c o n t e x t . Thus, t h e omission o f t h e a d j e c t i v e s i n t h e preceding examples does n o t r e s u l t i n an anomalous sentence. I t i s reasonable t o ask whether t h e r e p r o d u c t i o n o f t h e a d j e c t i v e depends on t h e semantic c o n t e x t o f t h e sentence. We attempted t o s t u d y t h e r e p r o d u c t i o n o f a d j e c t i v e s i n c o n t r a i n i n g semantic c o n t e x t s ( ( 3 ) and- ( 4 ) ) (Dommergues, F r a u e n f e l d e r , Segui and Mehler ( 1 9 7 9 ) ) .

(3)

Au coucher du s o l e i l , l e s chauves-souris s u r v o l e n t l e g r e n i e r . ( A t sunset t h e b a t s f l o w o v e r t h e a t t i c . )

(4)

Au coucher du s o l e i l , l e s chauves-souris envahissent l e g r e n i e r . ( A t sunset t h e b a t s invade t h e a t t i c . )

The r e s u l t s o b t a i n e d f o r t h e sentences such as ( 4 ) a r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e previous f i n d i n g s . However, f o r t h e s e m a n t i c a l l y c o n s t r a i n e d sentences such as ( 3 ) , no d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e r e p r o d u c t i o n o f t h e noun and t h e a d j e c t i v e o f t h e compound noun was observed. The h i g h r e p r o d u c t i o n o f t h e a d j e c t i v e i n sentences l i k e ( 3 ) can be e x p l a i n e d i n terms o f a response b i a s . According t o t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n , t h e r e p r o d u c t i o n p r o b a b i l i t y o f s e m a n t i c a l l y c o n s t r a i n e d a d j e c t i v e s should be independent o f t h e amount o f i n f o r m a t i o n t h e y p r o v i d e i n t h e s i g n a l . To t e s t f o r t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y , we compared t h e r e p r o d u c t i o n p r o b a b i l i t y o f semantically constrained adjectives i n three d i f f e r e n t presentation conditions. a.) i n t h e i r c o r r e c t f o r m b.) i n t h e f o r m o f an anagram c.) n o t presented a t a l l ( t h e a d j e c t i v e was absent). T h i s study showed t h a t t h e r e p r o d u c t i o n p r o b a b i l i t y was a f u n c t i o n o f t h e amount o f information contained i n the signal. I n t h e t h i r d condition, the p r o b a b i l i t y o f r e s t o r i n g t h e m i s s i n g a d j e c t i v e was c l o s e t o zero; t h e r e p r o d u c t i o n p r o b a b i l i t y was h i g h e r i n t h e second c o n d i t i o n and even h i g h e r i n t h e f i r s t c o n d i t i o n . C l e a r l y , a response b i a s can n o t e x p l a i n t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e s u b j e c t ' s performance. These r e s u l t s i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e a d j e c t i v e was a c t u a l l y "processed" d u r i n g t h e sentence p r e s e n t a t i o n and, n o t s i m p l y guessed. Although, we c o u l d r e j e c t t h e response b i a s e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h e s e m a n t i c a l l y c o n s t r a i n e d a d j e c t i v e s , i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o determine e x a c t l y what processes a r e b e i n g measured w i t h t h e c l a s s i c a l RSVP procedure i n t h i s case o r i n t h e case o f t h e s e m a n t i c a l l y unconstrained a d j e c t i v e s . I n p a r t i c u l a r , we d o n ' t know whether t h e e f f e c t s observed depend on processes o f p e r c e p t u a l i n t e g r a t i o n o f t h e sentence o r whether t h e y a r e a t t r i b u a b l e t o p o s t - p e r c e p t u a l processes o f r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f o r p r e p a r a t i o n f o r t h e v e r b a l response. Arguments f o r a p o s t - p e r c e p t u a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f r e s u l t s o b t a i n e d w i t h t h e RSVP t a s k have r e c e n t l y been g i v e n by M i t c h e l l (1979). M i t c h e l l argues t h a t t h e t i m e c o n s t r a i n t s o p e r a t i n g i n RSVP make i t u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e s u b j e c t s c o u l d process t h e s t r u c t u r a l p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e sentence i n r e a l time; t h e e f f e c t s a r e c l a i m e d t o be b a s i c a l l y post-perceptual. I n o t h e r words, t h e s y n t a c t i c v a r i a b l e s a r e

.

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65

r e l e v a n t a f t e r and n o t d u r i n g t h e v i s u a l p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e sentence. A1 though we d o n ' t agree t o t a l l y . w i t h M i t c h e l l ' s c o n c e p t i o n of "sentence p e r c e p t i o n " which he l i m i t s t o those processes which t a k e p l a c e " d u r i n g " t h e s t i m u l u s present a t i o n ( i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e processes o f i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e words i n a sequence), t h e i s s u e he r a i s e s i s v e r y much t o t h e p o i n t . I n an e a r l i e r study, we a l s o i n s i s t e d on t h e g r e a t c o m p l e x i t y o f t h e processes i n t e r v e n i n g between t h e end o f t h e sentence p r e s e n t a t i o n and t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e s u b j e c t ' s response (Dommergues e t al.). The t i m e i n t e r v a l s e p a r a t i n g these two events p r o v i d e s one i n d i c a t i o n of t h e c o m p l e x i t y o f these processes. I n t h e s t u d y by M i t c h e l l , t h i s i n t e r v a l i s about 2 t o 3 seconds. I n o r d e r t o reduce t h e e f f e c t s o f t h e processes o f r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e sentence, we used a new e x p e r i m e n t a l procedure which combines t h e RSVP method o f Presentation w i t h a RT probe measure. A f t e r h a v i n g seen a sentence i n RSVP, t h e s u b j e c t must decide whether a probe word was i n t h e sentence o r n o t . The aim o f t h e f i r s t exDeriment i s t o r e D l i c a t e . w i t h t h e new Drocedure. t h e d i f f e rences i n accessi b i 1it y observed between t h e nouns and a d j e c t i ves (as r e f 1e c t e d by RTs ) . EXPERIMENT

I2

MATER I ALS T h i r t y - t w o s i m p l e a c t i v e d e c l a r a t i v e sentences c o n t a i n i n g an a d j e c t i v e were const r u c t e d . The a d j e c t i v e was e i t h e r preposed o r postposed w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e noun i t m o d i f i e d ( e i t h e r N 1 o r N2). Thus, t h e r e were 8 d i f f e r e n t tokens o f each o f t h e 4 d i f f e r e n t sentence types. I n a l l t h e experimental sentences, t h e noun and t h e a d j a c e n t a d j e c t i v e have t h e same s y l l a b i c l e n g t h and frequency i n French. 1. A r t

+

Adj

+ N1 +

V

+

Art

+

N2

2. A r t

N 1 + Adj t V

+

N2

N1

+

V

+

Art

+ +

Art

3. A r t

+ +

Adj

+

N2

4. A r t

+

N1

+

V

+

Art

+

N2

+

Adj

Two experimental l i s t s were c o n s t r u c t e d w i t h t h e same sentences b u t w i t h d i f f e r e n t probe words. Thus, f o r a g i v e n sentence, s u b j e c t s assigned t o L i s t 1 r e c e i v e d a noun and those assigned t o L i s t 2 r e c e i v e d an a d j e c t i v e . S u b j e c t s saw 4 noun and 4 a d j e c t i v e probes f o r each o f t h e 4 b a s i c s y n t a c t i c s t r u c t u r e s . In a d d i t i o n t o t h e t e s t sentences t h e r e were 22 f i l l e r sentences and 8 warm-ups. For t h e f i l l e r sentences, t h e probes were 5 verbs, 5 nouns and 12 o t h e r words n o t i n t h e s e n t e n c e EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE The words i n t h e sentence were presented one a t a t i m e on a Hewlett-Packard screen which was c o n t r o l l e d by a computer. A 200 msec. i n t e r v a l separated t h e o f f s e t o f t h e l a s t word o f t h e sentence f r o m t h e onset o f t h e probe word. The probe word appeared i n t h e m i d d l e o f t h e screen. The f i r s t word o f t h e n e x t sentence appear e d l sec. a f t e r t h e s u b j e c t ' s response. The s u b j e c t ' s t a s k was t o decide whether t h e probe word was o r w a s n ' t i n t h e sentence and t o push t h e "yes" o r "no" RT b u t t o n as f a s t as p o s s i b l e . The "yes" response key was a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e s u b j e c t ' s dominant hand. The n a t u r e and t h e l a t e n c y o f t h e response was r e c o r d e d a u t o m a t i c a l l y by t h e computer.

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Three d i f f e r e n t r a t e s o f presen a t i o n were used: T1 = 150 msec./word, T2 = 175 Three independent groups o f s u b j e c t s were msec./word, T3 = 250 msec./word a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e t h r e e p r e s e n t a t i o n r a t e s . Each group was s u b d i v i d e d and assigned t o e i t h e r L i s t 1 o r L i s t 2.

5.

SUBJECTS F o r t y - t w o a d u l t s u b j e c t s , a l l psychology s t u d e n t s a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f P a r i s V, p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e experiment. Three groups ( w i t h 14 s u b j e c t s each) were a s s o c i a t e d w i t h each o f t h e t h r e e p r e s e n t a t i o n r a t e s . RESULTS Table 1 shows t h e RTs and t h e percentage o f e r r o r s f o r t h e noun and a d j e c t i v e probe a t the d i f f e r e n t presentation rates. Table 1 Probes Adjective

Noun

T1

779 ( 8 %)

715 (4,4 %)

T2

652 (4,2 %)

614 (6,8 %)

T3

706 ( 1 %)

696 ( 2 %)

As Table 1 shows, t h e l a r g e s t RT d i f f e r e n c e between t h e noun and t h e a d j e c t i v e probes was o b t a i n e d w i t h t h e f a s t e s t p r e s e n t a t i o n r a t e s ( 1 0 msec. f o r T3, 38 msec. f o r T2 and 64 msec. f o r T l ) . An a n a l y s i s o f v a r i a n c e (VAR3, L@pine, Rouanet and Lebeaux (1975)) i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e s y n t a c t i c c a t e g o r y o f t h e probe word i n t r o d u c e d The r a t e o f p r e s e n t a t i o n on t h e a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t (F (1,39) = 12, p <.Ol). o t h e r hand does n o t have a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t (F < l ) . The i n t e r a c t i o n between t h e two f a c t o r s i s n o t s i g n i f i c a n t . Nevertheless, s p e c i f i c comparisons show t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n c e between t h e noun and t h e a d j e c t i v e i s s i g n i f i c a n t f o r T1 and T2 (F (1,13) = 8.93, p <.02 f o r T 1 and F (1,13) = 5.04, p <.05) f o r T2, and n o t s i g n i f i c a n t f o r T3 ( F < l ) . Whereas, t h e " p o s i t i o n s " f a c t o r (preposed vs. postposed) does n o t i n t r o d u c e s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t s , t h e RTs t o words a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f sentences a r e s i g n i f i c a n t l y l o n g e r t h a n t o those a t t h e end o f t h e sentence (F (1,13) = 19, p <.01). T h i s r e s u l t i s independent o f t h e s y n t a c t i c c a t e g o r y o f t h e word and p r o b a b l y r e f l e c t s t h e e a s i e r access t o i t e m s presented l a s t (recency e f f e c t ) . DISCUSSION S i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e RTs t o nouns and a d j e c t i v e s were o b t a i n e d f o r t h e f a s t e s t presentation rates. This r e s u l t i s consistent w i t h the hypothesis t h a t t h e s e l e c t i o n o f words a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r grammatical c a t e g o r y takes p l a c e d u r i n g t h e p e r c e p t u a l i n t e g r a t i o n o f t h e sentence. Such a process o f s e l e c t i o n would be i n c r e a s i n g l y necessary as t h e t i m e a v a i l a b l e f o r t h i s i n t e g r a t i o n i s decreased.

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According t o t h e o r i g i n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e r e s u l t s (Mehler e t a l . ) t h e subj e c t s s e l e c t among t h e words i n t h e sentences o n t h e b a s i s o f t h e i r " p o t e n t i a l r o l e " i n t h e sentence. T h i s " p o t e n t i a l r o l e " o f any word i n a sentence i s d e t e r mined on t h e b a s i s of two major f a c t o r s : t h e s y n t a c t i c c a t e g o r y o f t h e word and i t s s y n t a c t i c environment. To e v a l u a t e t h e r e l a t i v e importance o f these two f a c t o r s , t h e probe l a t e n c i e s f o r nouns and a d j e c t i v e s i n normal and scrambled sentences can be compared. If the s y n t a c t i c c o n t e x t guides t h e s e l e c t i o n process, t h e n t h e d i f f e r e n c e between RTs t o noun and a d j e c t i v e probes f o r normal sentences s h o u l d be decreased o r e l i m i n a t e 3 f o r scrambled sentences. I f t h e assignment o f a p o t e n t i a l r o l e t o a l e x i c a l i t e m i s done o n l y on t h e b a s i s o f i t s grammatical category, t h e n t h e same d i f f e r e n c e s i n probe l a t e n c i e s s h o u l d be found f o r b o t h t y p e s o f sentences. EXPERIMENT I 1 The aim o f t h i s experiment i s t o examine t h e RTs t o probe words as a f u n c t i o n o f b o t h t h e i r grammatical c a t e g o r y and t h e i r s y n t a c t i c environment. MATERIALS T h i r t y - t w o normal sentences w i t h t h e same s t r u c t u r e as those i n Experiment I were c o n s t r u c t e d . An a d d i t i o n a l 32 scrambled sentences were o b t a i n e d by randomly r e a r r a n g i n g t h e 32 normal sentences. Thus, each normal sentence had a scrambled counter-part. The 16 a d j e c t i v e and 16 noun probe words occupied t h e same s e r i a l p o s i t i o n i n t h e normal and t h e scrambled sentences. Thus, f o r example, t h e a d j e c t i v e "tenace" i s t h e probe i n sentences 5 and 6. (5)

Le c o u r e u r tenace r e n o u v e l l e son e x p l o i t .

(6)

Son r e n o u v e l l e tenace l e coureur e x p l o i t .

The word "STOP" was d i s p l a y e d a t t h e end o f each sentence t o s i g n a l t h e end o f t h e sentence and t h e onset o f t h e probe. T h i s marker was e s p e c i a l l y necessary f o r t h e scrambled sentences. I n o r d e r t o counterbalance t h e l i n g u i s t i c m a t e r i a l s , 2 experimental l i s t s (1.1 and 1.2) were c o n s t r u c t e d . Each l i s t was made up o f 16 grammatical t e s t sentences, 16 scrambled t e s t sentences, 16 grammatical d i s t r a c t o r sentences and 16 scrambled d i s t r a c t o r sentences. Each s u b j e c t r e c e i v e d o n l y one v e r s i o n (grammatical o r scrambled) o f any g i v e n sentence. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE The procedure i s i d e n t i c a l t o t h a t used i n Experiment I . SUBJECTS Twenty a d u l t s u b j e c t s , a l l psychology s t u d e n t s a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f P a r i s V, p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e experiment. Two groups ( w i t h 10 s u b j e c t s each) were associated w i t h L 1 and L2. RESULTS Table 2 shows t h e RTs ( i n msec.) and t h e e r r o r percentage f o r t h e two t y p e s o f

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probes (noun and a d j e c t i v e ) as a f u n c t i o n o f t h e t y p e o f sentence (normal vs. scrambled). Table 2 Probes Adjective

Noun

X)

Normal sentence

869 (11,8

Scrambled sentence

911 (13,7 % )

798 (7,5 %) 896 (13 %)

Table 2 shows t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n c e between RTs t o noun and a d j e c t i v e probes i s much g r e a t e r f o r t h e grammatical sentences t h a n f o r t h e scrambled sequences ( 7 1 msec. vs. 15 msec.). An a n a l y s i s of v a r i a n c e r e v e a l s t h a t t h e i n t e r a c t i o n between t h e two main f a c t o r s (grammatical c a t e g o r y o f t h e probe and t h e t y p e o f sentence) i s n o t s t a t i s t i c a l l y The s p e c i f i c comparisons, on t h e o t h e r hand, s i g n i f i c a n t ( F (1,19) = 1.17). showed a s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e between t h e noun and t h e a d j e c t i v e f o r grammatical sentences ( F (1,19) = 6, p <.02) and no d i f f e r e n c e f o r t h e scrambled "sentences" (F ~ 1 ) . G l o b a l l y t h e n t h e f a c t o r t y p e o f "sentence" gave a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t (F (1,19) = 11.6, p <.01) and probe t y p e gave o n l y a s l i g h t l y s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t ( F (1,19) = 3.3, p < . l o ) . DISCUSSION

The d i f f e r e n c e i n a c c e s s i b i l i t y between t h e nouns and a d j e c t i v e s i n normal sentences c o n f i r m s t h e r e s u l t s o b t a i n e d i n Experiment I . The absence o f a d i f f e r e n c e f o r t h e scrambled "sentences"supports o u r h y p o t h e s i s t h a t t h e s e l e c t i o n (and r e t e n t i o n ) o f words depends on t h e s u r r o u n d i n g s y n t a c t i c c o n t e x t . S y n t a c t i c f a c t o r s seem t o p l a y an i m p o r t a n t r o l e i n t h e s e l e c t i o n o f t h e words i n t h e sentence. It appears t h a t t h e words i n a sequence a r e more a c c e s s i b l e t o t h e s u b j e c t s when t h e y can impose a s t r u c t u r a l o r g a n i z a t i o n on t h e sentence. I t would be i m p o r t a n t t o d i s c o v e r whether these s t r u c t u r a l e f f e c t s a r e independent o f t h e meaning o f t h e sentence o r n o t . I n t h e f o l l o w i n g experiment, we compared t h e RTs t o probe words as a f u n c t i o n o f t h e s y n t a c t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n and o f t h e semantic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e sequence.

EXPERIMENT 111 EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE The l i n g u i s t i c m a t e r i a l s f o r t h i s experiment were 2 s e t s o f 32 sentences: normal (N) and anomalous ( A ) . The A t y p e sentences c o n t a i n e d a v i o l a t i o n o f a s e l e c tional restriction: ( 7 ) La f i l l e l i q u i d e ecoute l a f l e u r . (The l i q u i d g i r l l i s t e n s t o t h e f l o w e r ) .

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The s y n t a c t i c s t r u c t u r e o f t h e sentences i n s e t s N and A were t h e same as t h o s e used i n t h e two p r e v i o u s experiments. Using these two s e t s o f sentences, we c o n s t r u c t e d 2 d i f f e r e n t experimental l i s t s : t h e normal l i s t (NL) and t h e anomalous l i s t (AL). The f o r m e r had 16 N sentences i n o r d e r and 16 N sentences scrambled, and LA had 16 A sentences i n o r d e r , and 16 scrambled A sentences. T h i s was done so t h a t each o f t h e o r i g i n a l 64 sentences was p r e s e n t e d scrambled and unscrambled. The s y n t a c t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n (scrambled o r unscrambled) was a w i t h i n s u b j e c t s v a r i a b l e , w h i l e t h e meaning was an across s u b j e c t s v a r i a b l e , w h i l e t h e meaning was an across s u b j e c t s v a r i a b l e . I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e 32 experimental sentences i n each l i s t (normal i n LN and anomalous i n NA), t h e r e were 15 warm-up and 20 d i s t r a c t o r sentences. As i n t h e f i r s t two experiments, t h e probe word occupied t h e same s e r i a l p o s i t i o n i n t h e scrambled and unscrambled sentences. I n t h i s experiment, t h e probe word c o u l d be any element o f t h e sentence; ( 6 N1, 6 N2, 6 A d j 1, 6 A d j 2, 8 V ) . This was done i n o r d e r t o i n c r e a s e t h e s u b j e c t ' s u n c e r t a i n t y c o n c e r n i n g t h e probe word. As i n t h e p r e c e d i n g experiment, t h e word "STOP" was p r e s e n t e d as t h e l a s t i t e m o f t h e sentence. The e x p e r i m e n t a l procedure was i d e n t i c a l t o t h a t used i n t h e Experiment 11. SUBJECTS

Two independent groups o f t w e n t y a d u l t s u b j e c t s , a l l psychology s t u d e n t s a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f P a r i s V, p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e experiment. These two groups were a s s o c i a t e d w i t h NL and AL. RESULTS Table 3 shows t h e RTs ( i n msec.) r i m e n t a l sequences.

and t h e e r r o r percentage f o r t h e d i f f e r e n t expe-

Table 3 Sentences Normal

Anomalous

Unscrambled

832 (9,7 % )

863 (17,5 % )

Scrambled

886 (13,4 %)

903 ( 2 0 %)

As can be seen i n T a b l e 3, t h e r e a r e more e r r o r s f o r t h e anomalous sentences t h a n f o r t h e c o r r e c t ones. The d i f f e r e n c e i s o f t h e same o r d e r o f magnitude f o r t h e unscrambled and scrambled sentences (7,8 % and 6,6 %). An a n a l y s i s o f v a r i a n c e conducted on t h e e r r o r s showed t h a t t h e r e was a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t o f t h e semantic v a r i a b l e ( F (1,18) = 6.38, p <.02). The e f f e c t o f t h e v a r i a b l e . s y n t a c t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n i s much s m a l l e r ( F (1,18) = 3.6, p < . l o ) . The i n t e r a c t i o n o f t h e s e two variables i s n o t s i g n i f i c a n t ( F ~ 1 ) . An a n a l y s i s o f v a r i a n c e o f t h e RTs shows t h a t o n l y t h e f a c t o r " s y n t a c t i c o r g a n i z a The d i f f e r e n c e t i o n " i n t r o d u c e d a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t ( F (1.38) = 16.8), p <.001). i n R t s between t h e unscrambled and scrambled o r d e r i s o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h e same

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order of magnitude f o r the normal and the anomalous sentences (53 msec. and 40 msec., respectively4). DISCUSSION

The results obtained in Experiment 111 show t h a t b o t h main factors (the syntactic organization of the sequence and i t s meaning) introduced large, b u t diffe re nt effects. Whereas the role of the semantic factor i s primarily reflected in the e r r o r r a t e , the e f f e ct of the syntactic factor i s found in the RTs. These results are compatible with those obtained by Forster and Ryder (1971) who used the classical RSVP procedure. I n t h ei r study as well as in ours, the e f f e c t of the syntactic organization i s independent of the semantic characteristics of the sentence ( i . e . correct, bizarre, and anomalous). The high e r r o r r a t e observed for the anomalous sentences (about 20 %) suggests t h a t the subjects, unable t o reach a coherent semantic interpretation, had d i f f i c u l t i e s integrating these sentences types. The syntactic organization of the sentence also has important consequences on the s u b je c t ' s performance. Subjects can easily construct a well integrated representation of a sentence presented in the correct order, b u t n o t in a scrambled order. GENERAL DISCUSSION

The central objective of Experiment I was t o determine whether the difference in reproduction of nouns and adjectives observed with classical RSVP reflected perceptual processes or post-perceptual processes involved in the preparation of the verbal response. The results obtained with a new procedure (combining RSVP presentation with a RT measure) allowed us t o r ej ec t the l a t t e r processes in favor of the former. Indeed, we found t h a t there were significant differences i n access time t o words of different syntactic categories a n d t h a t these differences increase with increasing rates of presentation. This result suggests t h a t the ef f ect s observed depend on the processes of percept u a l integration t h a t allow the subject t o assign a meaningful structure t o the stimulus sequence. We proposed the hypothesis t h a t these integrative processes involve a selection among the words in the sequence on the basis of t h e i r "potential" role. Recall t h a t the "potentia1"role a ttribute d t o a word i s determined by b o t h the syntactic category of the word and the syntactic context in which the word i s found. The main result of the Experiment I1 i s consistent with t h i s interpretation. I t was shown t h a t when the words are presented in random order, nouns and adjectives are equally accessible. This r es u l t demonstrates the importance o f the syntactic context in the process of selection of the words of a sentence. Finally, Experiment 111 demonstrated the role o f semantic factors as reflected by

the difference in number of errors f o r normal and anomalous sequences. The high

rate of errors observed in the l a t t e r sequences shows the diffic ulty subjects have in integrating them. This experiment, however, also showed t h a t the ef f e c ts due t o the syntactic organization of the sentences are independent o f these semantic e ffe c ts. Indeed, the e f f e c t of the syntactic organization o f the sentence was the same independently of the semantics of the sentence (normal o r anomalous). Such a re sult suggests t h a t the subject's analysis of the syntactic properties of the sentence i s not affected by the anomalous character of the sequence. Clearly, t h i s hypothesis does

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n o t i m p l y t h a t semantics do n o t p l a y a r o l e i n t h i s i n t e g r a t i o n process ( o u r r e s u l t s show t h a t t h e y do); i t s i m p l y i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e s y n t a c t i c a n a l y s i s o f t h e s t i m u l u s sentence can n o t be a l t e r e d by i t s anomalous aspect. Semantic and synt a c t i c parameters p l a y independent r o l e s i n t h e p e r c e p t u a l i n t e g r a t i o n process. These r e s u l t s a r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e autonomy h y p o t h e s i s proposed by G a r r e t t and I n i t s s t r o n g e s t form, t h i s h y p o t h e s i s suggests t h a t t h e F o r s t e r among o t h e r s . s y n t a c t i c p r o c e s s i n g o f a sequence l e x i c a l i t e m s i s independent o f t h e i r meaning. No c l a i m i s made about t h e temporal o r d e r i n g o f t h e s y n t a c t i c and semantic processing, j u s t about t h e i r independence. Evidence f o r t h e independence o f t h e s e two types o f p r o c e s s i n g supports a view o f language p r o c e s s i n g i n which separate sub-systems a r e o p e r a t i n g . D e s p i t e t h e d i f f i c u l t y i n v a l i d a t i n g t h e independence o f s e p a r a t e p r o c e s s i n g components, t h i s view p r o v i d e s a p r e c i s e and w e l l s t r u c t u r e d t h e o r e t i c a l framework.

FOOTNOTES R e p r i n t r e q u e s t s s h o u l d be s e n t t o D r . Juan Segui, L a b o r a t o i r e de Psychologie Experimentale, 28 r u e Serpente, 75006 - P a r i s , France. 1 The authors w i s h t o express t h e i r thanks t o Madeleine L e v e i l l e f o r h e r h e l p i n p r e p a r i n g and r u n n i n g t h e experiments. 2

T h i s experiment was conducted w i t h t h e h e l p o f S y l v i e Ledoux.

3

The p r e s e n t a t i o n r a t e o f 150 msec./word was s e l e c t e d on t h e b a s i s o f t h e r e s u l i s o f a p i l o t s t u d y i n which s u b j e c t s c o r r e c t l y responded t o 90 % o f t h e probe words i n s e m a n t i c a l l y and s y n t a c t i c a l l y a c c e p t a b l e sentences. A r e l a t i v e l y h i g h percentage o f c o r r e c t responses i s needed i f one wants t o use RTs t o probes as t h e p r i n c i p l e b e h a v i o r a l i n d e x . T h i s p r e s e n t a t i o n r a t e o f 6.6 words p e r second i s c o n s i d e r a b l y s l o w e r t h a t those r a t e s used i n t r a d i t i o n a l RSVP experiments (16-22 wps). However, i t i s unreasonable t o d i r e c t l y compare t h e s e r a t e s because t h e r e a r e l a r g e d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e q u a l i t y o f t h e v i s u a l d i s p l a y ( i . e . 16 mm f i l m s vs. computer screen d i s p l a y s ) .

4

The r e l a t i v e importance of t h e s y n t a c t i c and semantic f a c t o r s on t h e s u b j e c t s ' performance must be i n t e r p r e t e d w i t h c a u t i o n s i n c e two independent groups d i d n o t r e c e i v e t h e same l i n g u i s t i c m a t e r i a l s i n t h e case o f t h e semantic v a r i a b l e .

REFERENCES DOMMERGUES (J.Y.), FRAUENFELDER (U), MEHLER ( J . ) , SEGUI (J.) - L ' i n t e g r a t i o n p e r c e p t i v e des phrases, B u l l e t i n de Psychologie, 1979, no 341, 893-902. RYDER (L.A.) - P e r c e i v i n g t h e s t r u c t u r e and meaning o f sentences. FORSTER ( K . I . ) , J o u r n a l o f Verbal L e a r n i n g and Verbal Behavior, 1971, 10, 285-296. HOLMES (V.M.), FORSTER (K.I.) - Perceptual c o m p l e x i t y and u n d e r l y i n g sentence s t r u c t u r e . J o u r n a l o f Verbal L e a r n i n g and Verbal Behavior, 1972, 11, 148-156. LEPINE (D.), ROUANET (H.), VAR3 Mimeo 1975.

-

LEBEAUX (M.O.)

-

Analyse des comparaisons. Programme

MARTIN (E.), WALTER (D.A.) - S u b j e c t u n c e r t a i n t y and word-class e f f e c t s i n s h o r t t e r m memory f o r sentences. J o u r n a l o f Experimental Psychology, 1969, 80, 47-51.

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MITCHELL (D.C.) The l o c u s o f t h e experimental e f f e c t s i n t h e r a p i d s e r i a l v i s u a l p r e s e n t a t i o n (RSVP) task. P e r c e p t i o n and Psychophysics, 1979, 25, 143-149.

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MEHLER (J.), SEGUI ( J . ) , PITTET (M.), BARRIERE (M.) S t r a t e g i e s f o r sentence p e r c e p t i o n . J o u r n a l o f P s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c Research, 1978, 1, 3-16. SEGUI ( J . ) - La r e t e n t i o n d i f f e r e n t i e l l e des composants de l a phrase: r 6 l e f o n c t i o n n e l ou c a t e g o r i e syntaxique? L'Annee Psychologique, 1974, 74, 171-178.

WEARING (A.J.)- Word c l a s s and s e r i a l p o s i t i o n i n t h e immediate r e c a l l o f sentences. Psychonomic Science, 1971, 25, 338-340.

LANGUAGE AND COMPREHENSION J.-F. Le Ny, W. Kintsch (editors) 0 North-HollandPublishing Company, 1982

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FOCUS OF INFORMATION AND GENERAL KNOWLEDGE I N SENTENCE UNDERSTANDING Robert J. J a r v e l l a Max Planck I n s t i t u t e f o r P s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c s Nijmegen, The Netherlands and T. R u s s e l l Nelson

Veterans A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Center Bay Pines, F l o r i d a U.S.A.

From a p a i r o f s t u d i e s on sentence p e r c e p t i o n and q u e s t i o n answering i n E n g l i s h , i t i s argued t h a t l i s t e n e r s ' expectat i o n s evoked l e x i c a l l y f r o m general knowledge and s t r u c t u r a l l y by c o n t r a s t i v e n e s s conveyed t y p i c a l l y work i n a c o o r d i n a t e d f a s h i o n . When i n f o r m a t i o n o f t h e two k i n d s i s b r o u g h t i n t o o p p o s i t i o n , p e r c e p t u a l c o n f u s i o n may a r i s e i n i d e n t i f y i n g what i s heard, and, i n t h e absence o f pragmatic c o n s t r a i n t s , i n i n t e r p r e t i n g what a sentence a q u e s t i o n asks about means. Language u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s u s u a l l y a p r o d u c t o f s e v e r a l c o g n i t i v e subsystems worki n g t o g e t h e r i n a harmonious way. Even i n s i t u a t i o n s i n which s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n may be h i g h l y r e s t r i c t e d (as i s u s u a l l y t h e case i n s t u d i e s o f p e r c e p t i o n ) , t h e c o g n i t i v e mechanisms i n v o l v e d i n p e r f o r m i n g v e r b a l t a s k s n o r m a l l y w i l l i n c l u d e n o t o n l y t h e 'language p r o c e s s o r ' p e r se, b u t a l s o t h e sensory and m o t o r systems used i n m e d i a t i n g o u r c o n t a c t w i t h t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d i n general ( o u r hands, eyes, e a r s , e t c . ) and t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l forms i n which o u r o r d i n a r y l i f e experiences a r e preserved: o u r e n c y c l o p e d i c knowledge, e p i s o d i c memory, s e t o f e x p e c t a t i o n s a b o u t people and events, and t h e c o n t e x t o f immediate p e r c e p t i o n . To e x p l o r e and c h a r t t h e s e t o f i n t e r r e l a t i o n s and dependencies o b t a i n i n g i n language u n d e r s t a n d i n g between these systems' o p e r a t i o n m i g h t be regarded as one u s e f u l goal o f b a s i c p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c research. A t p r e s e n t , t h e n a t u r e and domain o f f u n c t i o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n s between l i n g u i s t i c s t r u c t u r e and e x t r a l i n g u i s t i c knowledge i n sentence p e r c e p t i o n i s s t i l l l a r g e l y u n s p e c i f i e d . I n t h e p r e s e n t paper, we a t t e m p t t o c o n s i d e r a s i n g l e case o f i n terdependency: t h e r e l a t i o n between general knowledge o f p r o t y p i c a l s i t u a t i o n s and l i s t e n e r s ' immediate e x p e c t a t i o n s b r o u g h t about by s y n t a c t i c and p r o s o d i c prominence (and nonprominence) i n heard sentences. I n t h e two s t u d i e s r e p o r t e d , we were i n t e r e s t e d i n p a r t i c u l a r i n t h e j o i n t e f f e c t s o f these two f a c t o r s on t h e i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f speech, and on l i s t e n e r s ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f semantic r o l e s and r e 1a t ions

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Perceptual e f f e c t s o f t h e two f a c t o r s whose r e l a t i o n i s under s c r u t i n y h e r e -general knowledge o f s i t u a t i o n s and l i n g u i s t i c d e v i c e s f o r i n d i c a t i n g r e l a t i v e i n f o r m a t i v e n e s s -- have been demonstrated i n d e p e n d e n t l y i n a v a r i e t y o f p r e v i o u s s t u d i e s . We w i l l c o n f i n e o u r d i s c u s s i o n t o a few r e p r e s e n t a t i v e groups o f examples. We b e g i n by c o n s i d e r i n g s i t u a t i o n a l knowledge. Normal language users m i g h t be t h o u g h t o f as h a v i n g a r a t h e r e x t e n s i v e s e t o f b e l i e f s o r e x p e c t a t i o n s about t h e world. I t i s reasonable t o t h i n k t h a t these i d e a s a r e shaped i n t o , and r o u g h l y

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define, standard or prototypical events a n d behaviors ( o r c l u s t e r s thereof), i.e. in reference t o actual o r potential situations ( c f . Schank and Abelson, 1977). Whether the knowledge incorporated by t h i s system should be thought of as being l i n g u i s t i c or (more probably) extra1 inguistic i s n o t particularly crucial f o r present purposes. The plausibility of utterances can perhaps be related b o t h theoretically and emp i r i c a l l y t o t h i s kind of knowledge. If one thinks, f o r example, of sentences l i k e The nurse took the temperature or The dog barked, what s t r i k e s us about them i s t h a t t e r e e T n d o f general c o K n F w h i c h one might make about the types of individuals mentioned in t h e i r subjects. Rosenberg and Jarvella (1970) indirectly and Forster (1976) e x p l i c i t l y argue t h a t p l a u s i b i l i t y of t h i s kind a r i s e s from internal representations of situations. The operational definition given by Forster (1976, p. 278) of sentence p l a u s i b i l i t y , t h a t individual words generally be predictable from the r e s t of a sentence, has been the most useful one f o r defining textual and within-sentence contextual constraints in experimental research. Thus, Rosenberg and Jarvella showed t h a t subject noun-verb-object noun sequences whose predicates were the most frequent responses given in a sentence completion ed the -. ) were more i n t e l l i g i b l e when shadowed in task (e.g., The horse a noise background than sentences whose predicates were not s o associated with the subject nouns given. Similarly, Marslen-Wilson and Welsh (1978) demonstrated t h a t highly predictable words in text tended t o be phonetically restored by shadowers i f they were heard s l i g h t l y mispronounced. Large and r e l i a b l e e f f e c t s of general plausibility of what i s described in sentences on t h e i r visual perception have also been reported ( e . g . , Forster and Ryder, 1971; Forster and Olbrei, 1973, Experiment 1 ). With the exception of t h i s l a s t study, the investigators mentioned above a l l e l i c i t ed these e f f e c t s of situational knowledge using a somewhat degraded, or s e l f masking, stimulus. However, other consequences of semantic-pragmatic f a c t o r s f o r , f o r example, the understanding of sentence-interrlal relations are also known (Herriot, 1969; for brain-injured subjects, Heeschen, 1980). The interpretation of a sentence or text sometimes seems t o benefit greatly from access t o a relevant domain of experience. This k i n d of argument thus has been advanced by Bransford a n d Johnson (1973), who observe t h a t sentences which are h a r d t o understand (e.g., The notes were sour because the seam was s p l i t ) , and may even seem anomalous, gain a p p r e c i a b l y i n c m n s i m 3-sE'h-Z connection i s drawn (here, t o someone playing a bagpipes). Bransford and Johnson p o i n t out further t h a t i f an appropria t e reference domain i s n o t given, the perceiver may seek t o i n t e r p r e t an otherwise puzzling sentence by imagining a hypothetical situation f i t t i n g i t . Both they and other investigators (e.g., Dooling and Lachman, 1971; Garrod and Sanford, 1982) have shown that providing topical information before certain kinds of texts a r e processed can easily serve t o locate domains of-knowledge against which the l i n g u i s t i c message being taken u p can be interpreted.

In addition t o referring t o actual or potential s i t u a t i o n s , and having a functional structure representing t h e i r lexical items, predicate-argument relations, e t c . , sentence utterances conventionally r e f l e c t certain pragmatic assumptions concerning knowable (or ' g i v e n ' ) and new information. W e will l i m i t our discussion here t o focus constructions, which have received b o t h a wide and long discussion in the f i e l d of l i n g u i s t i c s and are among the grammatical structures most discussed in psycholinguistics with respect t o given-new s t r a t e g i e s in speaking and l i s t e n i n g . (The clearest discussion of 1 inguistic structures and knowledge s t a t e s in the l i t e r a t u r e may be t h a t given by Chafe ( e . g . , 1976). For other, more empirically oriented reviews, see Clark and Haviland, 1977; Jarvella and Engelkamp, 1982.) Cleft-type sentences (we use the term f a i r l y non-technically) a r e the most prime example of focus constructions. Often, they are conceived of as having two complementary parts: a phrase which receives l i n g u i s t i c prominence, or focus, and the r e s t of the sentence, or presupposition. Roughly speaking, the assertion made in (declarative) use of such sentences i s t h a t the focus i s an e n t i t y satisfying

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t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n . T h i s i s t h u s t h e case b o t h f o r c l e f t sentences l i k e ( 1 ) and p s e u d o - c l e f t sentences l i k e ( 2 ) . (We use A k m a j i a n ' s o r i g i n a l (1969) concept o f ' p s e u d o - c l e f t sentence' here.) ( 1 ) I t was James Bond who d i d away w i t h G o l d f i n g e r . ( 2 ) The way t o b e a t 007 i s w i t h a b e a u t i f u l Russian, The focus i n ( 1 ) i s h e r o James Bond, t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n i s t h a t h i s a n t a g o n i s t G o l d f i n g e r has s u f f e r e d some i n g l o r i o u s end, and t h e a s s e r t i o n i s t h a t Bond was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r G o l d f i n g e r ' s demise. S i m i l a r l y , i n ( 2 ) t h e f o c u s i s ' w i t h a b e a u t i f u l R u s s i a n ' , t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n i s t h a t 0 0 7 (6ond) can be d e f e a t e d somehow, and t h e a s s e r t i o n i s t h a t a b e a u t i f u l woman i s t h e r i g h t k i n d o f i n s t r u m e n t . L i n g u i s t i c a l l y speaking, focus can be d e s c r i b e d i n c l e f t - s e n t e n c e c o n s t r u c t i o n s I t i s a t t h e same t i m e t h e p r e d i c a t e o f t h e domsuch as ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) i n two ways. inant o r highest proposition i n the underlying ( o r functional) structure o f the sentence and, i n i t s s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e , t h e word i n which t h e s e n t e n c e ' s i n t o n a t i o n c e n t e r i s presumed t o r e s i d e . F o r o t h e r k i n d s o f sentences, however, where p r o s o d i c f e a t u r e s may t e n d t o be t h e p r i m a r y i n d i c a t i o n o f what i n f o r m a t i o n can be c o n s i d e r e d i n focus, t h e l a t t e r e x p l a n a t i o n i s more c o n v e n i e n t , and i n t o n a t i o n a l prominence i s u s u a l l y i n t e r p r e t e d as t h e grammatical f a c t o r b e s t c o r r e l a t i n g w i t h focus (see, e.g., Chomsky, 1971; Jackendoff, 1972, Chapter 6 ) . P h o n e t i c a l l y , t h i s may be r e f l e c t e d by a c o m b i n a t i o n o f p i t c h , i n t e n s i t y , and d u r a t i o n ( c f . Allwood, 1974). Formally, t h e account o f focus and p r e s u p p o s i t i o n g i v e n by g e n e r a t i v e l i n g u i s t s resembles t h e statement above: t h e focused phrase ( o r c o n s t i t u e n t ) i s r e p l a c e d by a v a r i a b l e t o determine t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n ( o r p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a l s e t o r f u n c t i o n ) , and t h e a s s e r t i o n made i s t h a t t h e focus s a t i s f i e s t h i s presupposit i o n . Chafe (1976) i n t e r p r e t s c l e f t - t y p e sentences as d i s p l a y i n g c o n t r a s t i v e n e s s , evoking awareness o f background knowledge ( t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n ) , i m p l y i n g a l i m i t e d s e t o f c a n d i d a t e s ( t h e v a r i a b l e i n t h e o t h e r a c c o u n t ) , and a s s e r t i n g t h e c o r r e c t candidate ( t h e focus o f the contrast). L i s t e n e r s and r e a d e r s appear t o devote more a t t e n t i o n t o p e r c e i v i n g o r remembering t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i n a sentence which i s conveyed as b e i n g i n f o c u s than t o what i s presupposed. I n a s e n t e n c e - p i c t u r e v e r i f i c a t i o n task, Hornby (1974) t h u s showed t h a t s u b j e c t s were l e s s a p t t o n o t i c e t h a t a b r i e f l y d i s p l a y e d p i c t u r e m i s r e p r e sented t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n i n a sentence t h a n t h e o b j e c t o f i t s focus. Using a phoneme-monitoring s i t u a t i o n , C u t l e r (1976) f o u n d t h a t l i s t e n e r s were f a s t e r i n r e g i s t e r i n g d e c i s i o n s when t h e p h o n e t i c t a r g e t b e i n g sought was l o c a t e d i n focussed than i n non-focussed words, The l a t t e r e f f e c t e v i d e n t l y does n o t depend on phone t i c a c c e n t u a t i o n . I t was a l s o produced by C u t l e r and Fodor (1979) by a s k i n g subj e c t s a p r i o r question t o center t h e i r attention. After a question l i k e (31, the / k / phoneme i n ( 5 ) ( i n c o r n e r ) was i d e n t i f i e d f a s t e r t h a n t h e /b/ ( i n &), but t h e r e v e r s e was t r u e w h n p r e c e d i n g q u e s t i o n asked was ( 4 ) . ( 3 ) Which man was wearing t h e h a t ? ( 4 ) Which h a t was t h e man wearing? ( 5 ) The man on t h e c o r n e r was wearing a b l u e h a t . I n o t h e r s t u d i e s , Carpenter and J u s t (1977) demonstrated t h a t sentences i n t e x t which presupposed i n f o r m a t i o n n o t a l r e a d y g i v e n tended t o be understood more s l o w l y than one which presupposed o n l y g i v e n i n f o r m a t i o n ; Zimmer and Engelkamp (1981) showed t h a t s u b j e c t s w i l l t e n d t o examine p i c t u r e s o f i n f o r m a t i o n presented as b e i n g i n focus l o n g e r t h a n t h e y view p i c t u r e s o f o b j e c t s mentioned i n presupposed constituents.

As mentioned above, t h e general aim o f t h e p r e s e n t s t u d i e s was t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e __ j o i n t e f f e c t o f s i t u a t i o n a l p l a u s i b i l i t y d e s c r i b e d i n sentences and pragmatic

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assumptions conveyed in them on recognition of the words present in the sentences and understanding of their functional roles. The method adopted was a questionanswering task, in which constituent (wh-) questions were asked about spoken sentences. Before presenting this resear%, we briefly formulate the studies' main hypothesis and consider how the method chosen might and might not reflect basic understanding. Our specific hypothesis here was that pragmatic constraints conveyed via focus constructions would modulate listeners' use of general (situational) knowledge in perceiving sentences. More generally, we assume that the efficient perception of sentences depends on the coordinated use of knowledge from different cognitive sources. The balanced use of information from pragmatic sources may be taken to relate to and perhaps stem from the fact that linguistic messages considered as sequences vary during the course of perception in their basic informativeness. At some points, they may be reconstructed largely with respect to contextual and more general knowledge, while at other points, new information presented will dominate processing. The result might be regarded as a kind of cognitive equilibrium, or leveling of differences over time. The equative use of cleft sentences appears to represent such a balance. In terms of proximity to what the perceiver can be assumed to know, the information such a sentence normally provides i s not equally distributed. But part of the information -- that which the listener or reader is taken not to know in relation to the rest -- is given more grammatical (syntactic and phonetic) weight, which marks and serves to compensate for this inequality. One prediction following from this hypothesis is that perception will not be insensitive to violations of the assumptions conveyed about what information is and is not accessible to a listener. If everything said in a cleft sentence is already highly predictable, this might have the consequence of making the sentence's focus appear rather anomalous. And conversely, if the sentence's presuppositional part fails to make contact with existing knowledge, it may be perceived as strange. In the present studies, the plausibility of sentence content was made orthogonal to presupposition and focus rather than non-orthogonal, or in opposition to their presumed natural correspondence. In such a design, one expects a statistical interaction between the two factors. The exact nature of the interaction predicted depends further on the conditions under which subjects' perception is tested. In the present studies, a rather long list of practice and test sentences was presented to listeners one at a time, and the subjects were asked to answer one question about each sentence. In Experiment 1 , the sentences presented were sometimes made difficult to hear by superimposing a noise signal on them as they were played,back for listeners; for half of the subjects, the questions were asked before the relevant sentences (cf. Cutler and Fodor, 1979; Smith and McMahon, 1970; Wright and Kahneman, 1971). For the other half of the subjects, and in Experiment 2, the questions were asked after the corresponding sentences. Such a task need not be taken to reflect normal, conventional, or ordinary perception of utterances, and could itself influence the way in which subjects understand what they hear. They might, for example, be led to attend more carefully than normal to what is said, or to be more alert to a particular kind, or level, of linguistic information. In fact, the questions that were asked here were intended to test both listeners' perception of sentences' primary lexical items, and their understanding of the sentences' functional relations, both of which are usually considered to be essential to good language comprehension, though serving primarily as a means for understanding on other levels. Another conceivable difficulty with the present task is that subjects may come to adopt special strategies to solve it. The detection of behavioral strategies per se cannot be taken as evidence of task-dependent effects, since perceptual

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h e u r i s t i c s may make u p a s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t of t h e normal understanding process. P a r t i c u l a r response b i a s e s which develop in the course of an experiment should not be ignored, however. I n t h e present c a s e , f o r example, we w i l l need t o cons i d e r whether s u b j e c t s sometimes only i n f e r an answer on t h e b a s i s of event plausi b i l i t y , and whether they e x h i b i t a bias t o respond with focused information when understanding depends t o a g r e a t e r e x t e n t on grammatical s t r u c t u r e per s e . Third, explaining performance in a question-answering task i s made somewhat more d i f f i c u l t by the f a c t t h a t a sentence ( o r t e x t , e t c . ) and a question need t o be processed, and t h e two r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s formed need t o K i n t e r r e l a t e d . In t h e present s i t u a t i o n , s u b j e c t s thus were requested t o l i s t e n t o a t e s t sentence and decide which of two noun phrases in i t was t h e a p p r o p r i a t e answer t o a question asked about t h e sentence. An e r r o r in responding t h e r e f o r e might r e f l e c t misunderstanding of t h e meaning of e i t h e r , o r some problem in t h e process of comparing them. The range of e r r o r s which s u b j e c t s might commit i n t h e present question-answering t a s k i s r a t h e r l i m i t e d , but might be expected t o vary e s p e c i a l l y with the average i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of t h e speech signal presented. Let us consider one example. Suppose t h a t hearers a r e given sentence ( 6 ) and asked t o answer question ( 7 ) .

(6) The person who helped t h e a c t r e s s was t h e comedian. ( 7 ) Who was t h e person t h a t someone helped?

The appropriate answer t o ( 7 ) i s " t h e a c t r e s s " and i f t h i s answer was dominantly given by s u b j e c t s , we would be led t o think t h a t both ( 6 ) and ( 7 ) usually were understood, and t h e i r correspondence s u c c e s s f u l l y mapped. On t h e o t h e r hand, i f a s u b j e c t responded "the comedian", something would have, so t o speak, gone wrong. "Comedian" here would not be a proper response, although i t i s t h e focus of (6) and perhaps under normal circumstances a more s u i t a b l e candidate t o question. Since t h e r e i s no obvious pragmatically conditioned choice f o r who would be t h e person helped ( o r t h e h e l p e r ) in an average interchange of t h i s kind between an a c t r e s s and a comedian, t o understand ( 6 ) and ( 7 ) one would need t o r e l y c h i e f l y on s y n t a c t i c information. An i n e f f e c t i v e parsing s t r a t e g y might leave a s u b j e c t uncertain, and t h e focused c o n s t i t u e n t might assume the r o l e of a d e f a u l t option. Suppose now t h a t ( 6 ) i s presented a g a i n s t a noise background. I f one e f f e c t of t h e masking signal i s t o d i s t o r t t h e recognition of individual words, l i s t e n e r s under such conditions might be expected t o give a s answers some words which a r e not a c t u a l l y present in ( 6 ) . Such p a r t i a l o r mis-perceptions of words a r e , f o r example, known t o occur in perception of casual speech (e.g., Garnes and Bond, 1975; Browman, 1978; s e e a l s o Fromkin, 1980); they a l s o occur in reading under non-ideal conditions ( F o r s t e r and Ryder, 1971). In the present c a s e , an answer t o ( 7 ) such a s " w a i t r e s s " , which i s phonetically s i m i l a r t o " a c t r e s s " , might sugg e s t t h a t t h e functional s t r u c t u r e of ( 6 ) was ( a t l e a s t p a r t l y ) understood, while an answer l i k e "commiteeman" would again suggest a deeper problem. The above considerations permit t h e formulation of two more p r e c i s e hypotheses f o r t h e perception of c l e f t sentence c o n s t r u c t i o n s whose propositional c o n t e n t i s equally p l a u s i b l e o r equally implausible. F i r s t , one might expect t h e focused NP in such sentences with high-plausible content t o be harder t o i d e n t i f y , b u t t h e non-focused NP in sentences with low-plausible content. This means t h a t more e r r o r s i n recognition would be expected f o r "patrolman" i n ( 8 ) than f o r "mugger". (8) T h e person t h a t a r r e s t e d t h e mugger was the patrolman.

And, on t h e o t h e r hand, i d e n t i f y i n g " a c t r e s s " i n ( 6 ) should be more d i f f i c u l t in a noise background than i d e n t i f y i n g "comedian". Secondly, s i n c e pragmatic plausi b i l i t y may be expected t o bear on the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of both a sentence l i k e ( 8 )

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and i n j u d g i n g a q u e s t i o n asked about it, i n such cases where speech-to-noise r a t i o i s a l s o f a v o r a b l e s u b j e c t s may have no need t o r e s o r t t o u s i n g focus conveyed as a b a s i s f o r responding. EXPERIMENT 1: SOME PRAGMATIC EFFECTS ON SENTENCE INTELLIGIBILITY F o r both experiments performed, a master l i s t o f s t a t e m e n t - q u e s t i o n p a i r s (N = 192) was f i r s t c o n s t r u c t e d . H a l f o f these p a i r s c o n t a i n e d statements which were judged t o d e s c r i b e g e n e r a l l y p l a u s i b l e events o r s i t u a t i o n s on t h e b a s i s o f e x i s t i n g sent e n c e c o m p l e t i o n norms (e.g., Rosenberg and Koen, 1968) and t h e a u t h o r s ' i n t u i t i o n s . The o t h e r h a l f were formed u s i n g t h e same l e x i c a l m a t e r i a l as a whole, b u t permuted i n p r o p o s i t i o n s t a k e n t o d e s c r i b e f a i r l y l o w p l a u s i b i l i t y s i t u a t i o n s and events. The b a s i c c o n t e n t words i n a l l statements were two c o u n t nouns and a main verb. Examples o f h i g h - p l a u s i b l e p r o p o s i t i o n s used a r e POSE (MODEL, ( f o r ) ARTIST) and Examples o f 1ow-plausi b l e p r o p o s i t i o n s formed w i t h t h e WORK (COWBOY, ( o n ) RANCH). same verbs a r e POSE (SHERIFF, ( f o r ) GUEST) and WORK (HOUSEWIFE, ( a t ) HOSPITAL). The t e s t sentences used were formed by i n s e r t i n g t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s i n t o c l e f t sentence formats. I n these sentences, t h e BE a u x i l i a r y and l e x i c a l v e r b were made p a s t tense, NPs based on b o t h noun arguments were made d e f i n i t e , and one NP was c l e f t , whereby t h e o t h e r NP and v e r b made up p a r t o f a presupposed r e l a t i v e c l a u s e w i t h t h e head noun person, place, o r thing. The q u e s t i o n s used were formed by r e p l a c i n g one o f t h e s t a t e m e n t ' s NPs w i t h a whword and t h e o t h e r w i t h an i n d e f i n i t e pronoun, and by e i t h e r r e s e l e c t i n g o r s h 7 t i n g t h e c o n s t i t u e n t focused. H a l f o f t h e statements and, independently, h a l f o f t h e q u e s t i o n s began and ended w i t h t h e focused NP. I n p r i n c i p l e , e i t h e r NP c o u l d be made prominent i n e i t h e r p o s i t i o n . Schematically, t h e r e s u l t i n g sentences were t h u s o f t h e forms ( i ) - ( i v ) : (i)

NP1 was t h e p e r s o n / p l a c e / t h i n g Pronrel

(e.g., (ii)

(iii)

... NP1 ... was

... Pronindef ... ?

What was t h e p l a c e t h a t someone worked?)

The p e r s o n / p l a c e / t h i n g Pronrel (e.g.,

NP2

The p l a c e where t h e coyboy worked was t h e ranch.)

WH was t h e p e r s o n / p l a c e / t h i n g Pronrel

(e.g., (iv)

The a r t i s t was t h e person t h a t t h e model posed f o r . )

The p e r s o n / p l a c e / t h i n g Pronrel (e.g.,

... NP2 ...

... Pronindef ... was

WH?

The person t h a t posed f o r someone was who?)

(The d o t s shown i n ( i ) - ( i v ) concern t h e p o s i t i o n o f t h e v e r b and p o s s i b l e prepos i t i o n i n t h e s u b o r d i n a t e clause, which depend on t h e f u n c t i o n o f t h e presupposed NP.) I n h a l f o f t h e t e s t items, f o c u s was m a i n t a i n e d on t h e 'same' noun argument a c r o s s t h e statement and q u e s t i o n ( t h e focused NP i n t h e statement was t h e one probed), and i n t h e o t h e r h a l f , i t was s h i f t e d ( t h e nonfocused NP was probed). Items were assigned t o t h e e i g h t c o n d i t i o n s d e f i n e d by c o n s t i t u e n t focused and i t s p o s i t i o n i n t h e two sentences on a random b a s i s . A p r e s e n t a t i o n o r d e r for t h e t e s t i t e m s was s e l e c t e d and t h e t e s t l i s t r e c o r d e d t w i c e , once w i t h t h e statement i n each i t e m l e a d i n g and once w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n l e a d i n g . The sentences were spoken w i t h c a r e n o t t o p h o n e t i c a l l y s t r e s s t h e focused c o n s t i t u e n t s , w i t h a pause o f f i v e seconds between each corresponding statement and question. Speech a m p l i t u d e was

Focus of Information

79

c o n t r o l l e d t o w i t h i n 5 dB o f a r e f e r e n c e tone u s i n g a VU meter. On a second chann e l , w h i t e n o i s e was recorded f u l l y o v e r l a p p i n g each t e s t statement. S u b j e c t s t e s t e d were 44 s t u d e n t s from i n t r o d u c t o r y psychology courses a t an Ameri c a n u n i v e r s i t y who had no h i s t o r y o f speech o r h e a r i n g d i s o r d e r s . The t e s t m a t e r i a l s were presented o v e r headphones, and s u b j e c t s were assigned i n equal numbers t o f o u r groups d e f i n e d b y speech-to-noise r a t i o and s t a t e m e n t - q u e s t i o n o r d e r w i t h i n t e s t items. The speech channel was p l a y e d back a t 75 dB SPL, t h e s / n r a t i o f o r s u b j e c t s h e a r i n g t h e sentences i n n o i s e reduced t o t h e experimental l e v e l used o f -6 dB o v e r a s e r i e s o f e i g h t p r a c t i c e items. S u b j e c t s were t o l d t h a t t h e y were t a k i n g p a r t i n a s t u d y o f sentence comprehension and t h a t t h e y would h e a r a l i s t o f s t a t e m e n t - q u e s t i o n p a i r s . I t was emphasized t h a t b o t h sentences d e f i n i n g a t e s t i t e m should be understood b e f o r e an answer was g i v e n , b u t s u b j e c t s were a l l o w e d t o guess i n cases o f u n c e r t a i n t y . S u b j e c t s ' answers were g i v e n i n t e s t b o o k l e t s i n which each t e s t i t e m had an a s s o c i a t e d code. O f t h e 8,448 responses obtained, 1,014, o r about 12% were f a u l t y , d i s c o u n t i n g about 50 cases where t h e answer g i v e n d i f f e r e d o n l y i n number f r o m t h e answer sought. The noun n o t b e i n g probed was g i v e n as an answer 349 t i m e s ( i n 4.1% o f a l l cases), a l e x i c a l i n t r u s i o n , o r word n o t i n c l u d e d i n t h e statement, 424 times ( 5 . 0 % ) , and no response 241 t i m e s (2.9%).

The e r r o r s o f i n t r u s i o n made w i t h background masking were f u r t h e r examined t o det e r m i n e t h e i r p h o n e t i c resemblance t o t h e t a r g e t and non-probed nouns i n sentences. Since t h e responses g i v e n were w r i t t e n , t h e i r p h o n e t i c s p e l l i n g s were t a k e n f r o m a p h o n e t i c d i c t i o n a r y t o do t h i s . Each i n t r u s i o n was compared segment by segment f r o m l e f t t o r i g h t w i t h t h e two a c t u a l nouns i n t h e sentence heard ( t h o s e besides p e r s o n / p l a c e / t h i n g , i f p r e s e n t ) . Two hundred seventy two o f 408 such e r r o r s were found t o be more c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o t h e t a r g e t , vs. o n l y 59 which were c l o s e r t o t h e n o n - t a r g e t . As a whole, these i n t r u s i o n s c o n t a i n e d 32% o f t a r g e t word segments i n t h e same s e r i a l o r d e r , vs. 11% o f n o n - t a r g e t word segments (p-.001). To o b t a i n some a p p r o x i m a t i o n o f how c l o s e l y i n t r u s i o n s resembled t h e p h o n e t i c shape o f t h e t a r g e t and n o n - t a r g e t nouns g e n e r a l l y , t h e p h o n e t i c segments i n a1 t h r e e were r e c l a s s i f i e d ( f o r manner of a r t i c u l a t i o n f o r consonants, and s i m p l e vs. d i p t h o n g i z e d a r t i c u l a t i o n f o r vowels). The r e s u l t s c o n f i r m e d t h e more f i n e g r a i n e d a n a l y s i s . Again, t h e i n t r u s i o n s were found t o more c l o s e l y resemble t h e t a r g e t t h a n t h e n o n - t a r g e t nouns, s h a r i n g 67% vs. 45% o f t h e i r segment types r e T h i s r e s u l t suggests t h a t t h e l o c u s of s p e c t i v e l y from l e f t t o r i g h t (p c.001). many o f t h e e r r o r s o f i n t r u s i o n made was p r i m a r i l y l e x i c a l . I n such cases, t h e f u n c t i o n a l r o l e o f t h e p a r t l y m i s p e r c e i v e d word may s t i l l o f t e n have been l a r g e l y understood. Both pragmatic f a c t o r s b e i n g v a r i e d -- general p l a u s i b i l i t y i n sentences and focused vs presupposed i n f o r m a t i o n i n them b e i n g probed -- e x h i b i t e d r e l i a b l e main effects. About t w i c e as many e r r o r s were made when p l a u s i b i l i t y was low as were made when i t was h i g h (Min F ' (1,130) = 19.93, p c.001). T h i s e f f e c t was l i m i t e d m a i n l y t o e r r o r s of i n t r u s i o n and no-responses V h i c h o c c u r r e d p r e d o m i n a n t l y w i t h t h e n o i s e background. (The i n t e r a c t i o n o f s / n r a t i o and p l a u s i b i l i t y was a l s o h i g h l y s i g n i f i c a n t . ) Secondly, about 40% more e r r o r s were made when t h e answer sought w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n was t h e presupposed r a t h e r t h a n t h e focused NP i n a t e s t sentence (Min F ' (1,127) = 5.03, p c . 0 5 ) . I n g e n e r a l , t h i s e f f e c t was l i m i t e d t o responses where t h e focused noun from t h e sentence heard was g i v e n m i s t a k e n l y as an answer. Focus-presupposition and general p l a u s i b i l i t y i n t e r a c t e d b o t h w i t h one another (Min F ' (1,123) = 4.55, 11 c . 0 5 ) and t o g e t h e r w i t h speech-to-noise r a t i o (Min F ' (1,126) = 5.63, p < . 0 2 5 ) . Q u a n t i t a t i v e l y , t h e n a t u r e o f t h i s i n t e r a c t i o n can be seen from Table T. Q u a l i t a t i v e l y ( p a r t i t i o n e d by t h e t h r e e e r r o r types f o r t h e l o w s i g n a l - t o - n o i s e r a t i o c o n d i t i o n ) , i t can be seen i n F i g u r e 1. As t h e t a b l e shows, averaged o v e r q u i e t and n o i s e backgrounds, i t was o n l y f o r low p l a u s i b i l i t y sentences t h a t an e f f e c t o f " f o c u s " was obtained. F o r h i g h p l a u s i b i l i t y sentences, t h e r e was a s l i g h t cross-over a g a i n s t t h i s main e f f e c t when t h e sentences were

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TABLE 1 Percent E r r o r s made i n Experiment 1 by S i t u a t i o n a l P l a u s i b i l i t y , Focused vs. Presupposed Noun Probed f r o m T e s t Sentence, and S/N R a t i o

Situational P l a u s i b i l i t y Listening Condition

Q u i e t background Noise background Overall

High Word Probed

Low

Focus

Pres

Focus

Pres

2.1

4.6

3.1

5.4

14.1

12.1

21.2

33.4

-

-

-

-

8.1

8.3

12.2

19.4

masked. P o s t hoc t e s t s showed t h a t , f o r low p l a u s i b i l i t y sentences, t h e r e were s i g n i f i c a n t l y l e s s e r r o r s made i n t h e n o i s e background and o v e r a l l when t h e quest i o n asked f o r t h e NP b r o u g h t i n t o focus. When t h e e r r o r s made i n t h e n o i s e background a r e p a r t i t i o n e d by category, t h e n a t u r e o f t h e i n t e r a c t i o n p r e s e n t becomes s t i l l more c l e a r . I t can be seen i n F i g u r e 1 t h a t f o r two o f t h e t h r e e types o f e r r o r s scored, t h e e f f e c t o f focused vs. presupposed NP probed d i v e r g e s a t t h e two l e v e l s o f p l a u s i b i l i t y d e f i n e d . F o r h i g h p l a u s i b i l i t y items, t h e r e were more t h a n t w i c e as many l e x i c a l i n t r u s i o n s made and no-responses when focus was m a i n t a i n e d i n t h e q u e s t i o n asked, whereas f o r low p l a u s i b i l i t y sentences t h e r e were about t w r c e as many no-responses and i n t r u s i o n s when focus was s h i f t e d . I n t h e t h i r d category o f e r r o r s , t h e r e was a d i f f e r ence between p l a u s i b i l i t y v e l s o n l y when focus s h i f t e d .

NO ANSWER

,

/

, ,

,

FOCUS

WES

WORD FROM STATEMENT PROBED IN QUESTION

F i g u r e 1. The i n t e r a c t i o n o f sentence p l a u s i b i l i t y w i t h focus and p r e s u p p o s i t i o n i n Experiment 1 p a r t i t i o n e d by e r r o r t y p e ( s / n r a t i o = -6 dB). S o l i d l i n e = h i g h pragmatic p l a u s i b i l i t y sentence; hashed l i n e = low p r a g m a t i c p l a u s i b i l i t y sentence. Two f u r t h e r minor f i n d i n g s concern s t a t e m e n t - q u e s t i o n o r d e r . F i r s t , t h e r e was no i n d i c a t i o n i n t h e d a t a c o l l e c t e d t h a t comprehension o f t h e t e s t sentences was espe c i a l l y promoted by h e a r i n g t h e q u e s t i o n s f i r s t . I n f a c t , t h e r e were about t h r e e t i m e s as many answers g i v i n g t h e o p p o s i t e noun f r o m t h e sentence as t h e one b e i n g probed when t h e q u e s t i o n was p r e s e n t e d beforehand. The o v e r a l l e f f e c t o f t h i s

Focus of Information

81

factor did n o t reach s t a t i s t i c a l significance only because in the noise background there were fewer intrusions and no-responses made with question-first order. This cross-over suggests t h a t hearing a prior question may help in identifying words heard in a sentence, and perhaps in monitoring f o r possible answers, b u t probably n o t in deciding what i t s functional relations are ( c f . Cutler and Fodor, 1979). There was, incidentally, also no very convincing evidence found t h a t the e ffe c ts of sentence p l a u si b il i t y on l i s t e n e r s ' perception were especially strong a t the end of sentences ( c f . other studies of phoneme monitoring (e .g., Foss and Jenkins, 1973; Morton and Long, 1976) where such ef f ect s seem t o have occurred). The only evidence of t h i s kind obtained here was a tendency for subjects t o give the second ( b e tt e r perceived?) noun in a sentence incorrectly as an answer, and for there t o be fewer no-responses on high plausible sentences when t h e i r l a t t e r noun was the correct answer. Second, there was a coherent s e t of further interactions found. For the statementf i r s t data alone, significant Min F ' values were obtained for the two-way interaction between focus-presupposition ( l e f t - t o - r i g h t ) order in statements and questio n s , the three-way interaction including s/n r a t i o , the three-way interaction including p l a u si b i l i t y , and the four-way interaction including both. For the question-first d a t a , none of the corresponding interactions was signific a nt; for the data as a whole, the next higher interaction including sentence order as a variable was i n each case s i g n i f i can t . The most s a lie nt interpretation of these interactions i s t h a t traces of gross surface structure (including partial phonetic representations of some words) affected performance when questions were asked following low p l a u si b i l i t y sentences t h a t had been masked by noise. 'Similar' syntax (focus-presupposition order) in these sentences and questions led t o many mor: (about twice as many) intrusions and no-responses as superficially ' diffe re nt syntax ( d i f f e r e n t focus-presupposition order). Processing the syntax of the question asked thus may have masked the residual representation of low pla usibility sentences, or superficial comparisons attempted, even where they would have worked (where order and constituent focused were the same), gave worse re sults t h a n more abstract ones. There i s no suggestion of t h i s kind of e ffe c t for sentences of higher situational pl ausi bi 1 i ty. The main current bearing of t h i s f i r s t experiment on sentence perception comes, however, from the interaction observed d i r ect l y between sentence pla usibility and focus and presupposition. This interaction reinforces the hypothesis t h a t these factors are n o t functionally independent in ordinary language use. The e ffe c t seemed t o cut across l i n g u i s t i c l ev el s , and especially t o be manifested independently of a s l i g h t l i s t en er predisposition t o f a l l back on the focused constituent in a sentence as an answer when i t s functional structure was not apprehended. Involving sentences of both high and low general p la usibility, t h i s main finding thus suggests a controlled modulation of pragmatic knowledge in hearing what i s said. O f course, we do n o t always perceive j u s t what i s said.

Since language perceivers probably often need t o make sense o u t of utterantes which are n o t perfectly inte ll i g i b l e , studies l i k e the present one can provide insight into how t h i s happens. Our findings, l i k e some previous ones, suggest t h at situational knowledge enters into the process of understanding and t h a t , in the absence of usable pragmatic constraints, word and sentence perception sometimes are less t h a n fully successf u l , resulting, f o r example, in the identification of some words or phrases not actually uttered by the speaker. Beyond speeding word recognition ( c f . MarslenWilson and Tyler, 1980), however, use of contextual constraints also seems t o reduce uncertainty in a way which even allows correct identification of some lexical items. The present r e s u l t s do not suggest t h a t divergent syntactic structures are often assigned t o sentences heard a t a r el at i v el y poor s/n r a t i o ( c f . Mehler and Carey, 1967), b u t do imply (perhaps hardly surprisingly) t h a t one natural consequence of f u l l e r perception of words heard i s the formation and possible use of a deeper

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o r more a b s t r a c t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e sentences. One o f t h e t e n e t s o f MarslenWilson and T y l e r ' s (1976, 1980) proposal concerning human sentence u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s t h a t p r o c e s s i n g w i l l go n a t u r a l l y t o t h e deepest l e v e l f o r a sentence which i s p o s s i b l e i n t h e circumstances o f i t s p e r c e p t i o n . T h i s i d e a h a r d l y seems c o n t r o v e r s i a l , b u t i t s main support comes from s t u d i e s o f l i s t e n e r performance on Esentences, i . e . sequences i n which normal l i n g u i s t i c c o n s t r a i n t s were g r o s s l y v i o l a t e d . The h y p o t h e s i s does seem, however, t o r e c e i v e some s u p p o r t from t h e p r e s e n t r e s u l t s on r e a l sentences heard i n noise. Framing t h e i s s u e o f p r o c e s s i n g l e v e l reached i n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l terms, t h e l e s s s u c c e s s f u l i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g done on a sentence i s , t h e more s u p e r f i c i a l i t s c o g n i t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s h o u l d be. I n t h e p r e s e n t case, a s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n appeared t o p l a y some r o l e d i r e c t l y i n answering q u e s t i o n s about heard sentences o n l y when ( a ) t h e sentences had been presented i n a n o i s e background, ( b ) t h e y d i d n o t d e s c r i b e what would n o r m a l l y be taken t o be p l a u s i b l e events, and ( c ) t h e answers g i v e n d e v i a t e d from b e i n g c o r r e c t i n a way suggesting t h a t p r o c e s s i n g had been incomplete. EXPERIMENT 2: AN INTERACTION BETWEEN FOCUS AND PLAUSIBILITY WITHOUT STIMULUS DEGRADATION I n t h e p r e v i o u s s t u d y , main e f f e c t s were o b t a i n e d f o r b o t h o f t h e p r a g m a t i c f a c t o r s b e i n g i n v e s t i g a t e d . Response accuracy was h i g h e r when t h e focus i n a t e s t sentence and i n t h e q u e s t i o n asked about i t was t h e same t h a n when i t was d i f f e r e n t . And responses were more a c c u r a t e when t h e sentences concerned s i t u a t i o n s o f h i g h t h a n l o w p l a u s i b i l i t y i n general. These two f a c t o r s i n t e r a c t e d i n such a way t h a t t h e focused noun i n l o w - p l a u s i b l e sentences b u t t h e presupposed noun i n h i g h - p l a u s i b l e sentences appeared t o be b e t t e r understood a g a i n s t a n o i s e background. The i n t e r a c t i o n was e s p e c i a l l y s a l i e n t f o r two k i n d s o f e r r o r s : l e x i c a l i n t r u s i o n s and noresponses. When we f u r t h e r examined t h e third t y p e o f e r r o r s made, o r choices o f a wrong word from w i t h i n t h e t e s t sentence, another s l i g h t tendency towards i n t e r a c t i o n between t h e s e - E Z E r s c o u l d be observed. Averaged across t h e two s / n r a t i o s t e s t e d , t h e r e were s l i g h t l y more e r r o r s made on h i g h - p l a u s i b l e sentences t h a n l o w - p l a u s i b l e ones when focus was m a i n t a i n e d (2.3% vs. 2.1%), whereas t h e r e were more e r r o r s on lowp l a u s i b l e sentences t h a n h i g h - p l a u s i b l e ones when focus was s h i f t e d (6.7% vs 5.5%). (Note t h a t t h e r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h o f t h e two f a c t o r s i s a l s o reversed.) The c r o s s o v e r was v e r y s m a l l , b u t i f s y s t e m a t i c , m i g h t suggest t h a t s h i f t o f focus i s most l i k e l y t o add t o a s u b j e c t ' s c o n f u s i o n when t h e s i t u a t i o n d e s c r i b e d i n a sentence i s a l r e a d y somewhat d i f f i c u l t t o construe. To b r i n g o u t such an e f f e c t more c l e a r l y , s e v e r a l t h i n g s m i g h t be t r i e d . F o r one t h i n g , sentences m i g h t be presented t o s u b j e c t s i n such a way t h a t i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e i r s y n t a c t i c a l l y - m a r k e d focus i s a l s o t h e i r i n t o n a t i o n c e n t e r . (As ment i o n e d , we t r i e d i n Experiment 1 t o a v o i d o v e r - s t r e s s i n g t h e focused p h r a s e ) . Secondly, i n s t e a d o f u s i n g s u b j e c t s h i g h l y experienced i n v e r b a l problem s o l v i n g (as most s t u d e n t s a t u n i v e r s i t i e s a r e ) , one m i g h t t h i n k o f r e c r u i t i n g l i s t e n e r s more from t h e general a d u l t p o p u l a t i o n . I n a s e p a r a t e study, we happened t o r e p l i c a t e p a r t o f Experiment 1 w i t h t h e s e m o d i f i c a t i o n s . I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e two changes mentioned, t h e sentences b e g i n n i n g w i t h a focused NP were r e p l a c e d by s t a n d a r d c l e f t sentences such as ( 1 ) . The t e s t m a t e r i a l s were t h u s recorded w i t h f a i r l y c l e a r p h o n e t i c a c c e n t u a t i o n o f t h e i r focused c o n s t i t u e n t , t h e l i s t e n e r s ( 1 0 normal a d u l t s from t h e general p o p u l a t i o n used as a c o n t r o l group f o r a s t u d y i n neuro1i n g u i s t i c s ) heard t h e sentences f r e e - f i e 1 d, and, t e s t e d i n d i v i d u a l l y , t h e y gave t h e i r answers t o t h e experimenter o r a l l y . Only ' s e n t e n c e , , t h e n q u e s t i o n ' o r d e r was s t u d i e d . These general p o p u l a t i o n s u b j e c t s made e r r o r s on 8.3% o f t h e t e s t i t e m s . A l l o f t h e question-answering e r r o r s made were w i t h i n - s e n t e n c e confusions, i.e., t h e r e were no l e x i c a l i n t r u s i o n s o r no-responses recorded. The range o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g f a i l u r e s , o r types o f misunderstanding o c c u r r i n g , was t h u s even more l i m i t e d t h a n

83

Focus of Information

i n Experiment 1. The p a t t e r n o f e r r o r responses o b t a i n e d f o r focus and presuppos i t i o n and h i g h vs. low p l a u s i b i l i t y i s shown i n F i g u r e 2. F o r p l a u s i b i l i t y , t h e r e was no o v e r a l l e f f e c t : 8.3% o f t h e items i n b o t h c o n d i t i o n s were n o t responded t o c o r r e c t l y . On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e e f f e c t o f m a i n t a i n e d vs. s h i f t e d focus was s i g n i f i c a n t (Min F ' (1,60) = 4.53, p C . 0 5 ) and s o was t h e i n t e r a c t i o n between t h e A t o t a l o f 6.2% e r r o r s were two p r a g m a t i c f a c t o r s (Min F ' (1,62) = 5.00, p c.05). made when t h e q u e s t i o n asked probed t h e noun Tocused i n t h e t e s t sentence, vs. 10.4% e r r o r s when i t probed t h e presupposed noun. T h i s e f f e c t had about t h e same magnitude i n Experiment 1

m 20-

I I-

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0

10-

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0

P 0

0

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I

I

WORD PROBED FROM TEST SENTENCE

F i g u r e 2. E r r o r s made i n question-answering by general p o p u l a t i o n s u b j e c t s i n Experiment 2. A l l e r r o r s r e p r e s e n t a c t u a l words presented and heard. S o l i d l i n e = h i g h p r a g m a t i c p l a u s i b i l i t y sentence; hashed l i n e = low p r a g m a t i c p l a u s ib i l it y sentence. Secondly, t h e i n t e r a c t i o n a l s o shows l a r g e l y t h e same p a t t e r n as i n Experiment 1, b u t now i s c o n s i d e r a b l y b e t t e r marked. I n Experiment 2, focus s h i f t had n o e f f e c t when t h e s i t u a t i o n d e s c r i b e d i n a sentence was h i g h l y p l a u s i b l e : t h e e r r o r r a t e i n t h e two comparison c o n d i t i o n s was t h e same 8.3% as t h e e r r o r r a t e o v e r a l l . When t h e s i t u a t i o n d e s c r i b e d was n o t o f h i g h general p l a u s i b i l i t y , however, t h e r a t e o f f a u l t y responses r o s e f r o m . O % where t h e focused noun was probed t o 12.5% where t h e presupposed noun was. By t h e Tukey ( a ) procedure, t h i s d i f f e r e n c e was highly significant.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION To summarize: we have seen h e r e two examples o f i n t e r - i n v o l v e m e n t o f a l i s t e n e r ' s p r o t o t y p i c a l knowledge o f s i t u a t i o n s and h i s e x p e c t a t i o n s invoked by focus constr u c t i o n s on sentence understanding. The s t a t i s t i c a l independence o f t h e e f f e c t s o f these pragmatic f a c t o r s c o u l d i n each case be r e j e c t e d . N e i t h e r l a r g e l y s t e r e o t y p i c events n o r c o m p l e t e l y u n p r e d i c t a b l e ones seem t o be n a t u r a l l y d e s c r i b e d by sentences which convey s t r o n g assumptions about what l i s t e n e r s a l r e a d y s h o u l d know and what t h e y do n o t know. D e s c r i p t i o n s o f such events i n c l e f t - t y p e sentences can l e a d t o m i s p e r c e p t i o n s o f i n f o r m a t i o n conveyed as b e i n g unexpected and g i v e n on t h e one hand (Experiment l ) ,and a tendency t o i g n o r e o r pay undue a t t e n t i o n t o t h e 'given-new' s t r u c t u r e b e i n g conveyed on t h e o t h e r (Experiment 2 ) .

I n t h e f i r s t s t u d y r e p o r t e d , t h e l o c u s o f t h e i n t e r a c t i o n found appears t o be a t t h e l e v e l o f word (and w i t h i t sentence) i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i t s e l f , t h a t i s a t a p o i n t

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i n processing where p h o n e t i c i n f o r m a t i o n p e r c e i v e d i s i n t e r p r e t e d l e x i c a l l y (and perhaps s y n t a c t i c a l l y ) . T h i s seems c l e a r enough from t h e p a t t e r n o f e r r o r s observed i n F i g u r e 1, e s p e c i a l l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o l e x i c a l i n t r u s i o n s made, which o f t e n r e l a t e d p h o n e t i c a l l y t o t h e t a r g e t s b e i n g probed, b u t a l s o f o r no-responses. I n most normal l i s t e n i n g , word r e c o g n i t i o n may u s u a l l y occur w i t h o u t p e r c e p t i b l e d e l a y . From t h e p r e s e n t t a s k , one can o n l y surmise what was t h e temporal course o f t h e process l e a d i n g t o t h e ' p h o n e t i c m i s p e r c e p t i o n s ' found. I f these word ( m i s - ) i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s were made as t h e speech s i g n a l h e a r d was presented, t h e y would p r o v i d e evidence a g a i n s t t h e h y p o t h e s i s (e.g., F o r s t e r , 1976, 1979) t h a t l e x i c a l access occurs autonomously o f , f o r examole, n o n - l i n g u i s t i c knowledge, and m i g h t be taken t o s u p p o r t a view i n which b o t h s t r u c t u r a l l y and l e x i c a l l y evoked pragmatic processes a f f e c t word r e c o g n i t i o n . However, i f one assumes t h a t i n l i n g u i s t i c p r o c e s s i n g o f t h e sentences presented i n n o i s e , o n l y a degraded o r i n complete p h o n e t i c (and f u r t h e r l i n g u i s t i c ) r e p r e s e n t a t i o n was i n these c r i t i c a l cases passed on t o a d e c i s i o n process which a l s o had access t o a general knowledge source o r semantically-based i n f e r e n c e s , some f o r m o f i n i t i a l autonomy m i g h t s t i l l be claimed. I n t h a t case, t h e i n t e r p l a y suggested c o u l d be regarded as t h e consequence o f delayed i n t e r p r e t a t i o n guided by l i n g u i s t i c o r n o n - l i n g u i s t i c h e u r i s t i c s . There may be something t o say i n f a v o r o f such a process, g i v e n t h e r e s i dual r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f l o w p l a u s i b i l i t y sentences which seemed suggested. I n Experiment 2, on t h e o t h e r hand, t h e l o c u s o f t h e i n t e r a c t i o n found appears t o be p o s t - l e x i c a l ( i . e . , n o t r e l a t e d t o i d e n t i f y i n g what words occur i n a sentence) and perhaps a l s o p o s t - p e r c e p t u a l , and seems t o come down t o t h e f u n c t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s i n h i g h p l a u s i b l e sentences b e i n g more t r a n s p a r e n t t h a n those i n sentences o f r a t h e r low p l a u s i b i l i t y i n n u l l c o n t e x t s . A p p a r e n t l y , i n t h e l a t t e r case, i n f o r m a t i o n s t r u c t u r e conveyed sometimes p r o v i d e d a s u f f i c i e n t l y d i s t r a c t i n g i n f l u e n c e t h a t sentences' f u n c t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e was e i t h e r n o t perceived, o r was o c c a s i o n a l l y outweighed. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , one m i g h t argue t h a t two p r a g m a t i c a l l y o r i e n t e d s t r a t e g i e s were i n o p e r a t i o n a t once: one t o use s i t u a t i o n a l knowledge t o h e l p reach a deeper l e v e l o f understanding, and p e r m i t t i n g independence o f pragmatic assumptions conveyed by sentence s t r u c t u r e , and t h e o t h e r u s i n g i n f o r mation s t r u c t u r e conveyed when t h i s deeper l e v e l o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s n o t reached by ' s t a n d a r d ' s y n t a c t i c a n a l y s i s t o reach a d e c i s i o n . I n cases o f doubt, t h e word presented as b e i n g most s a l i e n t and w o r t h y o f a t t e n t i o n would t h e n be most l i k e l y t o be chosen as an answer. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The present v e r s i o n o f t h i s paper was w r i t t e n w h i l e t h e s e n i o r a u t h o r was a v i s i t o r a t t h e Department of Communication Studies, L i n k o p i n g U n i v e r s i t y , Sweden. We would l i k e t o thank E l i s a b e t Engdahl, Susan F i s c h e r , I n o F l o r e s d ' A r c a i s , Yuki Kuroda, Claus Heeschen, W i l l i a m Marslen-Wilson, Hartmut Oldenburger, and L o r r a i n e T y l e r f o r comments on p r e v i o u s d r a f t s . REFERENCES Akmajian, A. On d e r i v i n g c l e f t sentences from p s e u d o - c l e f t sentences. ton, I n d i a n a : I n d i a n a U n i v e r s i t y L i n g u i s t i c s Club, 1969.

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LEXICON AND REPRESENTATIONS IN SENTENCE COMPREHENSION DaniPle Dubois Laboratoire de Psychologie Universite de P a r i s VIII Saint-Denis, France

Sentence comprehension i s assumed t o involve a l a r g e s e t of i n t e g r a t e d processes ranging from the input of the signal ( a c o u s t i c o r v i s u a l ) t o the r e c e i v e r ' s f e e l i n g of "understanding". This s u b j e c t i v e i n s i g h t of t h i s phenomenon occurs a t a remarkably rapid pace which c o n t r a s t s w i t h t h e complexity of the processes involved and w h i c h c o g n i t i v e psychologists have t o i d e n t i f y . Most of the researchers to-day agree t h a t a r e l i a b l e model of language understanding should be an i n t e r a c t i v e one : a model which e x p l i c i t l y d e a l s with t h e i n t e r a c t i o n between data-driven information (given by the a c t u a l l i n g u i s t i c i n p u t ) and s u b j e c t ' s previous knowledge in memory. ( F o r a discussion of modularist vs i n t e r a c t i v e approach of language understanding, see Swinney, 1981). However, a complete d e s c r i p t i o n of language comprehension has not y e t been o u t l i n e d . On t h e c o n t r a r y , empirical research s t i l l has i t s inner c o n f l i c t s according t o p a r t i a l o r modular a n a l y s i s of the phenomenon, excluding ( o r ignoring) any o t h e r complementary approaches. T h i s s p l i t i n empirical arguments can be observed on ( a t l e a s t ) two main a s p e c t s of the comprehension process : f i r s t l y , on t h e temporal dimension, and secondly, on language v a r i a b l e s . On the temporal dimension, two d i s j o i n e d types of research e x i s t without i n t e r a c t i n g : the f i r s t type of research i s concerned with the very f i r s t s t a g e s of new incoming information processing by t h e l i s t e n e r / r e a d e r . The second type i s concerned w i t h the l i s t e r n e r ' s knowledge in i e n o r y , temporally previous t o t h e new inTormation processing. 'iesearch of the f i r s t t y r e r e f e r s t o y o c e s s e s l a b e l l e d a s perception, speech segmentation, word recognition a n d identi'ication (see f o r exenple : Fodor, Bever E G a r r e t t , 1974 ; Levelt & Flores d ' A r c a i s , 1978 ; Frauenfelder, Dommergues, Mehler E Seguy, 1979 ; Swinney, 1979 ; Yarslen-blilson & Tyler, 1980). S p e c i f i c experimental paradigms a r e usually attached t o these various types of "perceptive" research (such a s masking, priming, phoneme monitoring, rapid sequential visual p r e s e n t a t i o n , e t c . ) and rapid phenomenons a r e described - a t 150 - 200 ms, a f t e r the l i n g u i s t i c i n p u t . In such a l i n e of research the d e s c r i p t i o n of the comprehension processes does not go " f u r t h e r " than t h e word recognition s t a g e . I t i s worth noting t h a t the second d i s t i n c t i o n concerning language dimensions i s t h u s superposed t o t h e d i f f e r e n c i a t i o n on the time-course o f t h e comprehension process. Actually, the f i r s t s t a g e s of processing operate on the f i r s t l i n g u i s t i c l e v e l s ( c f Carroll 8 Bever, 1a c o u s t i c , phonological, s y l l a b i c , morphemic a n d i n a l l y , l e x i c a l l e v e l s . In t h e most i n t e r a c t i o n n i s t models t h e semantic l e v e l ( s ) is ( a r e ) simply c a r a c t e r i z e d as " i n t e r n a l l y generated top down const r a i n t s " (Marslen-Wilson & Welsh, 1978 ; p . 61) which allows the s e l e c t i o n of a word candidate f o r recognition. In o t h e r words, a t these f i r s t s t a g e s of processing the semantic l e v e l ( s ) may be involved only f o r t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o r access t o a word i n t h e ( a ) mental lexicon. We would argue t h a t these l a s t l a b e l l i n g s such a s "word" o r "lexicon" embody a t h e o r e t i c a l ambiguity which mainly c o n s i s t s i n ignoring t h e saussurian l i n g u i s t i c d i s t i n c t i o n between s i g n i f i e r and s i g n i f i e d

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(meaning). I f such a c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n i s r e i n t e r p r e t e d i n a p s y c h o l o g i c a l framework, i t can be h y p o t h e t i z e d t h a t , even as a mental phenomenon, t h e l e x i c o n r e f e r s t o two types o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l o b j e c t s i n human memory : a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n correspond i n g t o t h e s i g n i f i e r - i . e . t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e grapho-phonic and a r t i c u l a t o r y c a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f words -, on one hand, and a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n corresponding t o t h e s i q n i f i e d - i . e . t h e word meaning on t h e o t h e r hand. Most research on sentence p e r c e p t i o n does n o t c l e a r l y e x p l i c i t which one o f these two phenomenons i s a c t u a l l y recognized o r i d e n t i f i e d when t h e " l e x i c a l access" o c c u r s . Even when meaning s e l e c t i o n processes a r e s t u d i e d (as i s t h e case when an ambiguous word i s present e d ) ( c f Swinney, 1980,for ex.), ( a ) i t i s g e n e r a l l y assumed t h a t more t h a n one meaning o r r e a d i n g i s s i m p l y a t t a c h e d t o t h e ambicjuous l a b e l , w i t h o u t q u e s t i o n n i n g whether t h e s e g m e n t a t i o n o f meaning o v e r l a p s o r matches t h e l a b e l segmentation ; ( b ) t h e a n a l y s i s o f t h e comprehension processes i s l i m i t e d t o t h e s e l e c t i o n o f one o f these readings, t h e processes o f compounding and i n t e g r a t i n ? word meaning i n t o sentence meaning t h u s n o t b e i n g taken i n t o account. Our work p r e c i s e l y focuses on these l a t t e r q u e s t i o n s . Our purpose i s t h u s t o i n v e s t i g a t e " p o s t l e x i c a l access" processes - i . e . meaninq compounding, i n t e g r a t i o n and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n f o r sentences ; t h i s problem n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l i e s t h e a n a l y s i s o f t h e i n t e r a c t i v e processes between knowledge sources and semantic i n f o r m a t i o n g i v e n by t h e i n p u t message. T h i s l i n e o f r e s e a r c h c o n t r a s t s w i t h t h e preceeding ones on the following points :

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I t has t o e x p l i c i t l y r e f e r t o a semantic memory model - even i f i t remains f u z z y and i f i t i s t e s t a b l e o n l y throuqh complementary assumptions ( c f E h r l i c h & T u l v i n g , 1976 ; Le Ny, 1979).

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Experimental paradigms a r e d i f f e r e n t , whether t h e y a r e d i r e c t ( c f o n - l i n e t e c h n i c s ) o r i n d i r e c t ( i n v o l v i n g e i t h e r memorization - l e a r n i n o , r e c a l l , r e c o g n i t i o n , o r jugment and comparison).

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phenomenons t h u s recorded d i f f e r r e g a r d i n g t h e i r t i m i n g : f i r s t l y t h e y occur l a t e r t h a n t h e s t i m u l u s i n p u t and a r e t h u s o f t e n c o n s i d e r e d as post l e x i c a l processes. Secondly, t h e y l a s t l o n g e r .

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The research d e a l s w i t h t a s k s e n s i t i v e processes i n which t h e q u e s t i o n s o f l e v e l s o f processina, l i t t e r a l vs i n t e n d e d meaning, i n f e r e n t i a l processes a r e t o be considered.

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F i n a l l y , t h i s r e s e a r c h focuses on p r e v i o u s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s and top-down processes c o n t r a s t i v e l y w i t h d a t a - d r i v e n and bottom-up processes m a i n l y s t u d i e d i n sentence - p e r c e p t i o n experiments ( c f C l a r k & C l a r k , 1977 ; H a r r i s , 1974 ; Rumelhart E Ortony, 1976, f o r ex.).

One o f o u r f i r s t aims was thus t o i n v e s t i a a t e t h e n a t u r e and t h e s t r u c t u r e o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s i n memory and more p r e c i s e l y t h e semantic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f words i n sentences. From t h e preceeding arguments, t h e word seems t o be t h e c r i t i c a l segmentation u n i t f o r s t u d y i n g t h e i n t e r a c t i o n between t h e s i g n i f i e r ( l a b e l ) and t h e s i g n i f i e d (meaning) and between top/down and bottom/up processes. More r e s t r i c t i v e l y , t h e work we s h a l l p r e s e n t i n t h i s paper r e f e r s t o t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f names f o r o b j e c t s evoked i n sentences. F o l l o w i n g t h e h y p o t h e s i s ( p a r t i c u l a r l y developed by Rosch (1978)) t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s i n memory f o r r e a l w o r l d o b j e c t s depend upon general p s y c h o l o g i c a l processes, such as c a t e o o r i z a t i o n , we arcjued t h a t c o g n i t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f o r such o b j e c t s would o p e r a t e q u i t e autonomously f r o m t h e l i n g u i s t i c ( l e x i c a l ) segmentation ( c f C o r d i e r & Dubois, 1981 ; Oubois, 1980 a ) . Such an hypothesis emphasizes t h e r e f e r e n t i a l aspect o f word meanina and t h u s would e x t e n d beyond t h e scope o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c "meaning", i n c l u d i n q elements o f c o q n i t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n which would n o t n e c e s s e r a l y be l a b e l l e d such as, f o r ex, s e n s o r i c i n f o r m a t i o n o f about o b j e c t s (Denis E Dubois, 1976, n o t e ( 1 ) ) . A c t u a l l y , p r o d u c t i o n t a s k s o f exemplars f r o m c a t e g o r y l a b e l s ( c f c a t e g o r y norms :

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B a t t i g & Montague, 1969 ; T o u r r e t t e , 1979 ; Dubois, 1982 a ) , as f r o m p r e d i c a t e s ( v e r b s as i n d u c t i v e words : Dubois e t C o r d i e r , 1 g 8 2 ) as w e l l as p r o p e r t y responses t o members o f c a t e g o r i e s ( A s h c r a f t , 1975 ; Dubois, 1981 b ) have a l r e a d y drawn a r guments as t o t h e h y p o t h e s i s o f such an o r q a n i z a t i o n o f o b j e c t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n memory. H o w e v e r , i f i t i s g e n e r a l l y accepted t h a t such t y p i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s c o u l d be o p e r a t i v e i n word p r o d u c t i o n t a s k s , t h e q u e s t i o n remains o f i t s r e l e v a n c e i n t h e process o f sentence comprehension. I n o t h e r words, can these r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s be c o n s i d e r e d as one k i n d o f knowledge source which may be i n v o l v e d i n t o p down processes durin! comprehension ? F o l l o w i n g t h i s l i n e o f argument, t h e p r e s e n t oaper summarizes e x p e r i m e n t s designed t o answer t h e two f o l l o w i n q q u e s t i o n s : ( 1 ) How c o u l d ere c a r a c t e r i z e t h e hypothet i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s i n v o l v e d i n t h e semantic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f sentences ? ( 2 ) How c o u l d we c a r a c t e r i z e t h e t o p down processes of i n t e g r a t i n a these r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s d u r i n g sentence comprehension ? IJhen do such processes o c c u r i n t h e course t i m e o f t h e whole comprehension p r o c e s s e F ! J h a t i s t h e i r d u r a t i o n ? The general e x p e r i m e n t a l paradiqm we used i s t h e f o l l o w i n a :

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S u b j e c t s were p r e s e n t e d w i t h sentences i n s e r t e d w i t h i n a s h o r t paraaraph. They were i n s t r u c t e d t o r e a d t h e paragraph a t t h e i r own pace, w i t h o u t t r y i n a t o memorize i t .

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Reading times f o r each sentence o f each paraqraph were r e c o r d e d .

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I n o r d e r t o i d e n t i f y t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s i n v o l v e d i n t h e sentence comprehension process, a comparison t a s k i s proposed t o t h e s u b j e c t s a f t e r w a r d s : t h e y have t o j u d g e t h e c o m p a t i b i l i t y between t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e sentence ( s e n t e n c e meaning) and a t e s t i t e m : we assume t h a t t h e c l o s e s t t h e t e s t i t e m i s t o t h e sentence r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , t h e f a s t e r t h e d e c i s i o n t i m e s h o u l d be.

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The l i n g u i s t i c m a t e r i a l we s e l e c t e d as r e l e v a n t r e g a r d i n g o u r h y p o t h e s i s was t a r q e t sentences i n c l u d i n q a r e s t r i c t i v e v e r h ( p r e d i c a t e ) which induces a s e l e c t i o n r e s t r i c t i o n on a c a t e g o r i a l aroument ( s u b j e c t o r o b j e c t ) .

EXPERIVENT 1 : I n a f i r s t experiment, we r e c o r d e d r e a d i n g t i m e s f o r sentences such as :

1 G : Gatopant tibkciment [ ' a n i m a l .CPbhLec oX4hu'U* un bpectacee b i e n Emouvnnt. ( f r e e l y g a l l o p i n a , t h e f e v e r i s h animal was indeed a s t i r r i n g s i g h t t o s e e ) .

H p o t h e s i s 1 : 1 G t y p e sentence would e l i c i t an i n s t a n t i a t i o n process ( c f -5---An e r s o n & HcGaw, 1973) which would i n t e g r a t e p r e v i o u s l y memorized s p e c i f i c knowledge t o t h e sentence meaning. C o n t r a s t i v e l y , such a process would n o t o c c u r when r e a d i n g sentences such as 1 S :

1 S : G d o p a n t eibkement l e c h e v a t (CbhiPe cdihCLit un b p e c t a c t e b i e n PmouvanR. ( f r e e l y g a l l o p i n g , t h e f e v e r i s h h o r s e was indeed a s t i r r i n g s i g h t t o s e e ) . We h y p o t h e t i z e d t h a t i f t h e i n s t a n t i a t i o n process does o c c u r a t r e a d i n g t i m e , general sentences G would t a k e l o n q e r t o be r e a d and understood t h a n a l r e a d y s p e c i f i e d S sentences. The d i f f e r e n c e i n r e a d i n g t i m e s would be a s c r i b e d t o memory search and r e t r i e v a l f o r s p e c i f i c i n f o r m a t i o n . Hypothesis 2 : The c a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h a t s p e c i f i e d i n f o r m a t i o n can be reached through t h e a n a l y s i s o f t h e comparison t i m e s f o r a t e s t i t e m p r e s e n t e d a f t e r t h e s u b j e c t reads t h e sentence. Ele f u r t h e r assume t h a t i f t h e i n s t a n t i a t i o n process occurs a l o n g t h e t y p i c a l i t y dimension ( s e l e c t i n g t h e t y p i c a l exemplar w i t h i n t h e h o r s e " i n exemple l ) , response c a t e g o r y d e l i m i t e d by t h e v e r b r e s t r i c t i o n s - i . e . times would be s h o r t e r f o r t y p i c a l i t e m s t h a n f o r any o t h e r i t e m b e l o n g i n g t o t h e

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same category b u t corresponding t o a less typical representation. Results :

A ) Time and duration of instantiation process: G sentences are longer t o read than S sentences (respectively 4 790 ms and 4 540 ms ( F ( 1,142) = 4,15 p < .05), an additional time of a b o u t 250 ms). B ) Nature of previous representations: Verification times for typical items ( A items, such as "horse" in exemple 1) are sicnificantly shorter t h a n f o r l e s s typical ones (which s t i l l s a t i s f y the verb r e s t r i c t i o n s ( B items such as "gazelle" in ex. 1 ) ) : 1 260 ms and 1 670 ms respectively ; response times f o r A items are also shorter t h a n for C ones, the negative incompatible items (such as "seal" in the ex. 1). EXPERIMENT 2 :

I n a second experiment, the same paradigm was used b u t two major modifications were introduced :

a ) Critical sentences such as 1 G were no longer contrasted with already specified S sentences b u t with sentences in which the r e s t r i c t i v e verb has been substituted by a general one. This general verb would no lonoer induce the instantiation process. An exemple of t h i s second type of sentence pair i s given in 2 : 2 R : Les
This r e s t r i c t i v e sentence ( R ) contrasts with the corresponding non-restrictive sentence :

(P)

2 p : La @ui& h t a i e n t mainfenant thihs miicaniouement. (Fruits were now mechanically sorted)

Hypothesis 3 : During sentence reading a n d understanding, the instantiation process on the category name ("Fruits" in ex. 2 ) would only operate on r e s t r i c t i v e verb sentences ( 2 R ) . Reading time f o r R sentences would therefore be longer than f o r p sentences. longer tested on a s i n a l e word. I t was evaluated through the on-line reading time f o r a following sentence in which the t a r a e t item had been included. For exemple, following one of the sentences ( 2 ) the subjects were presented e i t h e r with a "typical" sentence i . e . sentence including a typical exemplar of the category defined by the selectional r e s t r i c t i o n ( T sentences) or with a "non typical" sentence ( t ) , i . e . a sentence including a less typical exemplar of the same category. b ) Secondly, the specified representation was no

ex. 2 ' T : Len ohanpen ne hepandaient pew l s u h nuave pahdum. (The oranges no longer gave off t h e i r sweet smell) 2 ' t : Les haininn ne hepandaient pew L e u nuave pah4um. (The grapes no longer gave off t h e i r sweet smell) Hypothesis 4 : Followinq the same l i n e of argument as in experiment 1 ; we predicted t h a t , i f a typical representation of the catenory had been elaborated a t reading time of the R sentence, the following T sentences including the typical instance would be more rapidly read t h a n t sentences which included a l e s s ( b u t s t i l l compatible) instance. The results show t h a t R sentences with selectional r e s t r i c t i o n s take longer t o be read t h a n l e s s r e s t r i c t i v e P sentences, although the difference i s highly reduced,

Lexicon and Representations

c o m p a r a t i v e l y t o exp. I : r e s p e c t i v e l y 2 920 ms and 2 790 ms f o r R & 1,58 p < .20).

91

p (F(1,529)

=

T y p i c a l T second sentences a r e g e n e r a l l y r e a d f a s t e r t h a n t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g t sentences, b u t t h e d i f f e r e n c e i s no l o n g e r s i g n i f i c a n t , and i t i s t h e r e f o r e much s m a l l e r t h a n t h e d i f f e r e n c e observed i n Experiment I i n which t h e r e q u i r e d j u d q e ments o p e r a t e d on a s i n g l e word ( r e a d i n g t i m e was 3 990 ms and 3 060 ms f o r T and t, r e s p e c t i v e l y ) . From t h e s e two experiments, we a r e l e d t o conclude t h a t : a ) D u r i n g sentence r e a d i n g , an i n s t a n t i a t i o n process does o c c u r . T h i s process i s t i m e consuming ( = 250 ms) and t h e s e 250 ms can be i n t e r p r e t e d as r e t r i e v a l t i m e o f t h e r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m memory - s e l e c t e d f r o m a c t u a l l e x i c a l i t e m s o f t h e sentence - and i n t e g r a t i o n o f t h i s semantic i n f o r m a t i o n i n t o t h e sentence meani ng . b ) T h i s phenomenon a l r e a d y o c c u r s a t r e a d i n g t i m e and n o t n e c e s s a r i l y when t h e sentence meaning i s questionned. c ) T h i s process would be c o n t r o l l e d by t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e o f p r e v i o u s knowledge i n memory. Our r e s u l t s a r e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e h y p o t h e s i s o f t y p i c a l i t y as one aspect o f t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n . However, f r o m t h e s e experiments i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o make any c l a i m r e g a r d i n g t h e e x a c t n a t u r e o f those knowledge sources. A r e t h e y l e x i c a l ? l i n g u i s t i c ? semantic ? c o g n i t i v e ? I t may be s t a t e d t h a t r e t r i e v a l o f t y p i c a l i t e m s ( s u c h as " h o r s e " i n 1 ) o c c u r s because o f t r a n s i t i o n p r o b a b i l i t i e s , o r h i g h a s s o c i a t i v e f r e q u e n c i e s between t h e two c r i t i c a l words ( t h e v e r b and t h e t v p i c a l i n s t a n c e ) . I f i t was t h e case o u r r e s u l t s would s i m p l y r e v e a l t h e l e x i c a l ( a s word l a b e l s ) o r g a n i z a t i o n and would n o t r e q u i r e any supplementary inferc o g n i t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n underl y i n g t h e l i n g u i s t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n . F u r t h e r experiments were designed t o q u e s t i o n these l a s t hypotheses : t h e t e s t i t e m s were no l o n g e r words ( a s i n exp. I ) , n e i t h e r sentences ( a s i n exp. 2) b u t d r a w i n g s . Experiment 3 (conducted w i t h M. D e n i s ) i s g i v e n as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h i s s e r i e s . EXPERIMENT 3 : S u b j e c t s were f i r s t p r e s e n t e d w i t h sentences s i m i l a r t o t h o s e o f exp. 1 & 2, such as

3 : L ' a n i m d abuiiait ic P'atvLiv5c du Xacteuh (The animal used t o b a r k e v e r y t i m e t h e postman came) 4 : l b dPbuucha be h$c.ipienR e t w e u a be. win d a m t e n v4me5 (He uncorked t h e c o n t a i n e r and poured t h e wine i n t o t h e g l a s s e s ) S u b j e c t s had t o r e a d each sentence and d e c i d e whether o r n o t a d r a w i n g which immed i a t e l y f o l l o w s t h e sentence, was a r a t m o d i l l u s t r a t i o n o f one element ( o b j e c t , animal, person) r e f e r r e d i n t h e sentence. T h i s d r a w i n g c o u l d be one o f the following :

A - a f i g u r a t i o n o f a t y p i c a l instance s a t i s f y i n g the selectional r e s t r i c t i o n s A 3 : t h e d r a w i n g o f a t y p i c a l doq A 4 : t h e d r a w i n g o f a t y p i c a l ( f r e n c h ) b o t t l e o f wine ( t h e d r a w i n g o f a b o t t l e o f burgundy) B - a f i g u r a t i o n o f a n o t h e r i n s t a n c e which s a t i s f y t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s b u t l e s s typical .

92

D. Dubois B 3 : The drawing o f a poodle do? B 4 : The drawing o f an i t a l i a n b o t t l e o f wine ( c h i a n t i )

I t must be n o t i c e d t h a t b o t h drawings A & (DOG, BOTTLE o f WINE).

B c o u l d be l a b e l l e d by t h e same w o r d i n g

Furthermore, t h e use o f drawing as t e s t i t e m a l l o w s two k i n d s o f n e g a t i v e i t e m s : C - F i g u r a t i o n s o f i n s t a n c e s which v i o l a t e s e l e c t i o n a l r e s t r i c t i o n s s e n t a s i m i l a r i t y i n shape w i t h drawings A.

but which

pre-

C 3 : The drawing o f a f o x C 4 : The drawing o f a f e e d i n g b o t t l e

D - F i n a l l y , f i g u r a t i o n s o f o b j e c t s which v i o l a t e t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s and whose o u t l i n e s were d i s s i m i l a r t o t h e f o r m o f drawings A.

D 3 : The drawing o f a sheep D 4 : The drawing o f a bowl

Hypothesis 5 : I f , i n such an e x p e r i m e n t a l paradigm, t h e judgement and t h e d e c i s i on a r e founded upon f i g u r a t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n memory, t h e s i m i l a r i t y between A drawing and t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n would r e s u l t i n s h o r t e r p o s i t i v e response t i m e f o r drawing A t h a n f o r d r a w i n g B . Furthermore, t h e s i m i l a r i t y o f n e q a t i v e C i t e m s w i t h t h e p r o t o t y p e s would l e a d t o p r e d i c t l o n g e r n e g a t i v e answers f o r drawinqs C t h a n f o r d r a w i n g D. I t must be emphasized t h a t t h i s l a s t p r e d i c t i o n can be made w i t h o u t r e f e r i n q t o any l i n g u i s t i c competence i n such a semantic d e c i s i o n t a s k . The e x p e r i m e n t a l procedure was s i m i l a r t o those o f Experiments I b I 1 : s u b j e c t s had t o read a sentence such as 3 o r 4 g i v e n as exemplars, a t t h e i r own pace and a f t e r having r e a d i t , one o f t h e 4 ( A , B, C o r D ) drawings was p r e s e n t e d t o them. The s u b j e c t s had t o d e c i d e whether o r n o t t h e drawino was an adequate i l l u s t r a t i o n f o r one element r e f e r e d t o i n t h e p r e v i o u s sentence. The r e s u l t s show t h a t a ) judgements t o drawing A a r e f a s t e r t h a n t o drawings B, r e s p e c t i v e l y 1 020 and 1 180 ms ( F ( 1 , 3 5 ) = 20,29 p < . O l ) , a r e s u l t s i m i l a r t o those o b t a i n e d w i t h words i n exp. 1. b ) i t can be observed t h a t drawings C , s i m i l a r t o t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l t y p i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , l e a d t o l o n o e r response t i m e s t h a n ( d i s s i m i 1 a r ) drawings ( r e s p e c t i v e l y 1 460 and 1 080 ms) ( F (1,35) = 27,67 p < .01). These l a s t two r e s u l t s suggest t h a t t h e i n s t a n t i a t i o n process may n o t be necessar i l y a l i n g u i s t i c a l l y d r i v e n process, depending on a l e x i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n i n l o n g t e r m memory. It would r a t h e r be i d e n t i f i e d as a deeper c o a n i t i v e phenomenon : t h e l e x i c a l i t e m s o f a sentence would l e a d t o t h e r e t r i e v a l o f semantic i n f o r m a t i o n and w i t h h i g h p r i o r i t y t o t h e t y p i c a l i n s t a n c e s which would c o n c e n t r a t e s u b j e c t s ' k n o w l e d g e f r o m b o t h h i s l i n g u i s t i c l e x i c a l competence and o t h e r c o g n i t i v e c a p a c i t i e s such as imagery. The r e s u l t s f r o m t h e t h r e e experiments we r e p o r t e d h e r e a r e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e f o l l o w i n g model o f sentence comprehension : A f t e r t h e f i r s t s t e p s o f sentence p r o c e s s i n g ( p e r c e p t i o n , i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f words ( m a i n l y i d e n t i f i e d as s i g n i f i e r ) ) , semantic i n t e g r a t i v e processes would o c c u r . These l a s t processes would i n v o l v e b o t h semantic c o m p o s i t i o n o f l e x i c a l meaning ( s i g n i f i e d ) f r o m t h e e x p l i c i t w o r d i n g o f t h e sentence b u t a l s o i n t e g r a t i o n o f p r e v i o u s knowledge r e t r i e v e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e c o g n i t i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n i n memory. I f a l i n g u i s t i c a n a l y s i s o f l e x i c a l meaning

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can account f o r t h e f i r s t t y p e o f semantic Drocessino, t h e second t y p e o f i n t e g r a t i v e processes r e q u i r e s t h e semantic o r g a n i z a t i o n t o be extended t o non s p e c i f i c a l l y l i n g u i s t i c knowledge sources. T y p i c a l i t v can be viewed as one p o s s i b l e dimens i o n o f t h i s c o g n i t i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n t h u s i n c l u d i n g b o t h l i n g u i s t i c and f i g u r a t i v e elements of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Furthermore, i t has been shown t h a t t h i s n s t a n t i a t i o n process o f r e t r i e v e d semantic i n f o r m a t i o n would o c c u r a t r e a d i n g t i m e and would t h u s be c o n s i d e r e d as one o f t h e processes i n v o l v e d i n sentence comprehension. As a c o n c l u s i o n , we would l i k e t o r a i s e t h r e e q u e s t i o n s t o be answered e m p i r i c a l l y t h r o u g h new i n v e s t i g a t i o n s : a ) i t has been shown t h a t d i f f e r e n c e s i n response t i m e s t o A & B i t e m s ( t y p i c a l v s l e s s t y p i c a l i t e m s ) was m a i n l y s i g n i f i c a n t i n t a s k s r e q u i r i n g a judgement. T h i s d i f f e r e n c e became s m a l l e r when s u b j e c t s were o n l y r e q u i r e d f o r an o n - l i n e r e a d i n g o f a whole sentence i n which t h e c r i t i c a l i t e m s were i n s e r t e d . The q u e s t i o n i s whether o r n o t t h e observed d i f f e r e n c e i n exp. I depends on d e c i be a E n e c e s s a r y process o f sentence c o m p r m -

s i o n p r o c e s s i n g , and would t h u s sion w h i l e reading.

b ) Our arguments r e l y upon r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f o r r e a l w o r l d o b j e c t s , a may be p r o p i c i o u s case which emphasizes t h e r e f e r e n t i a l a s p e c t o f word meaninq. Can we t h u s g e n e r a l i z e f o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f a b s t r a c t nouns o r v e r b s ? c ) F i n a l l y , we assumed, as most o f comprehension models do, t h a t semantic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o c c u r s a f t e r l e x i c a l access p r o c e s s i n g . The q u e s t i o n remains whether t o p down p r o c e s s e x n o t a l r e a d y i n t e r a c t w i t h new incoming i n f o r m a t i o n p r e v i o u s l y t o l e x i c a l access i n sentence comprehension. One way o f answering such a q u e s t i o n c o u l d be t o t r a n s f e r e x p e r i m e n t a l procedures commonly used f o r a n a l y s i s o f t h e f i r s t stages o f p r o c e s s i n g t o t h e semantic p r o c e s s i n a i t s e l f . The r e s e a r c h r e p o r t e d h e r e was s u p p o r t e d by t h e Psychology L a b o r a t o r y , r e s e a r c h u n i t no 235 a s s o c i a t e d t o t h e N a t i o n a l Center f o r S c i e n t i f i c Research (C.N.R.S.) A u t h o r ' s address : L a b o r a t o i r e de Psychologie, ERA-CNRS no 235, U n i v e r s i t e de P a r i s V I I I , 2 r u e de l a L i b e r t e , 93526 S a i n t - D e n i s Cedex 02, France. NOTE 1. I t i s n o t a b l e t h a t such an h y p o t h e s i s suoqests t h e a n a l y t i c i t y o f meaninq b u t does n o t impose any f u r t h e r c o n s t r a i n t upon a s p e c i f i c componential model o f semantic memory ( L e Yy, 1980). REFERENCES Anderson, R.C., McGaw, B., On t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f meanings o f g e n e r a l terms, J o u r n a l o f e x p e r i m e n t a l Psychology, 1973, 101, 301-306. A s h c r a f t , M.H., P r o p e r t y dominance and t y p i c a l i t y e f f e c t s i n p r o p e r t y s t a t e m e n t v e r i f i c a t i o n . J o u r n a l o f Verbal L e a r n i n g and v e r b a l B e h a v i o r , 1978, 17, 155-164. B a t t i g , U.F., Montague, V.E., Category norms f o r v e r b a l i t e m s i n 56 c a t e g o r i e s : a r e p l i c a t i o n and e x t e n s i o n o f t h e C o n n e c t i c u t c a t e g o r y norms, J o u r n a l o f e x p e r i m e n t a l Psychology, 1969, 80, 1-46. C a r r o l l , J.M., Bever, T.G., Sentence comprehension : a s t u d y i n t h e r e l a t i o n o f knowledge t o p e r c e p t i o n i n E.C. C a r t e r e t t e e t Y.P. Friedman ( e d s ) . The handbook o f p e r c e p t i o n , v o l . 7 : Language and speech, New York : Academic Press, 1976.

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Marslen-Wilson, W.D., T y l e r , L.K., The temporal s t r u c t u r e o f spoken languaqe comprehension, C o g n i t i o n , 1980, 8, 1-71. Ivrarslen-Wilson, W.D., Welsh, A., P r o c e s s i n g i n t e r a c t i o n s and l e x i c a l access d u r i n g word r e c o g n i t i o n i n c o n t i n u o u s speech, C o g n i t i v e Psychology, 1978, 10, 29-63. Rosch, E., P r i n c i p l e s of c a t e g o r i z a t i o n i n E . Rosch e t B.B. L l o y d ( e d s ) , Cognit i o n and c a t e g o r i z a t i o n , H i l l s d a l e , New Jersey, Laurence Erlbaum Ass., 1978. Rumelhart, D . E . , Ortony, A., The r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f knowledge i n memory, i n R.C. Anderson e t R.T. S p i r o e t W.C. Montague ( e d s ) S c h o o l i n o and t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f knowledge, H i l l s d a l e , New Jersey, L . Erlbaum, 1976. Swinney, D.A., L e x i c a l access d u r i n g sentence comprehension : ( R e ) c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f c o n t e x t e f f e c t s . J o u r n a l o f v e r b a l L e a r n i n g and v e r b a l Behavior, 1979, 18, 645-659. Swinney, D.A.,

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FOCUSING AND PRESUPPOSITION I N THE UNDERSTANDING OF SENTENCES Johannes Engelkamp, Hubert D.Zimmer and P i e r r e L e c l e r e F a c h r i c h t u n g Psychologie U n i v e r s i t a t des Saarlandes 6600 Saarbrucken, West-Germany

U n t i l now, t h e f u n c t i o n o f grammatical s u b j e c t i v i z a t i o n and t h e c l e f t i n g o f concepts have o n l y been discussed and examined s e p a r a t e l y . T h i s i s p r o b a b l y due t o t h e f a c t t h a t s u b j e c t i v i z a t i o n has p r i n c i p a l l y been seen from t h e p o i n t o f view o f f o c u s i n g OF a t t e n t i o n , whereas t h e s t u d y o f c l e f t sentences has c e n t r e d on t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e o f t h e clauses, together w i t h the processing o f given information. I n t h i s paper, however, s u b j e c t i v i z a t i o n and c l e f t i n g w i l l be examined from t h e p o i n t o f view b o t h o f f o c u s i n g and o f p r e s u p p o s i t i o n . The i n t e r a c t i o n o f s u b j e c t i v i z a t i o n and c l e f t i n g w i t h r e g a r d t o b o t h f u n c t i o n s w i l l t h u s be g i v e n s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n . We conclude t h a t s u b j e c t i v i z a t i o n i n t h e c o n t e x t o f c l e f t sentences has o n l y a f o c u s i n g f u n c t i o n , and n o t a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a l one. With r e g a r d t o f o c u s i n g , s u b j e c t i v i z a t i o n and c l e f t i n g serve m a i n l y t o r e i n f o r c e each o t h e r . INTRODUCTION T h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n i s concerned w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n o f what r o l e s u b j e c t i v i z a t i o n and c l e f t i n g o f a concept p l a y i n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f sentences. B a s i c a l l y , we s t a r t from t h e assumption t h a t i n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f sentences, i t i s p r o p o s i t i o n a l knowledge which i s a c t i v a t e d ( C l a r k & C l a r k 1977, Engelkamp 1976, K i n t s c h 1974). We f u r t h e r assume t h a t , among o t h e r t h i n g s , t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e sentence d e t e r mines which knowledge i s a c t i v a t e d , and how i t i s a c t i v a t e d ; i n o t h e r words, what s t r u c t u r e t h e a c t i v a t e d knowledge has. I n o u r o p i n i o n , t h e s t y l i s t i c f e a t u r e s o f a sentence p l a y a p a r t i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e method of a c t i v a t i n g knowledge, and t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e knowledge a c t i v a t e d . Two such f e a t u r e s , and t h e i r r o l e i n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f sentences w i l l be a n a l y s e d more c l o s e l y ; t h e r o l e o f s u b j e c t i v i z a t i o n , and t h a t o f c l e f t i n g o f concepts. By a s u b j e c t i v i z e d concept, we mean t h e nominal concept which f u n c t i o n s as t h e grammatical s u b j e c t i n a sentence. By a c l e f t e d concept, we understand t h e nominal concept which i s f r o n t e d i n t h e form "Es i s t X " ( I t i s X ) i n a sentence l i k e ( 1 ) :

( 1 ) I t i s P e t e r who p r a i s e d Charles. U n t i l now, t h e f u n c t i o n o f s u b j e c t i v i z a t i o n and c l e f t i n g o f concepts have o n l y been examined and discussed s e p a r a t e l y (e.9. Carpenter & J u s t 1977a, b; C l a r k 1977; C l a r k & H a v i l a n d 1977; L a n g f o r d & Holmes 1980; S i n g e r 1976). A p a r t f r o m Engelkamp (1979) and Engelkamp & Krumnacker (19781, a p o s s i b l e i n t e r a c t i o n b e t ween t h e s e two varia.bles has n o t been considered. Here i t i s p l a c e d i n t h e foreground. The aim o f t h i s paper i s t o c o n t r i b u t e towards i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e f u n c t i o n o f t h e s e two sentence f e a t u r e s , by s t u d y i n g them t o g e t h e r . We w i l l conc e n t r a t e on t h e i r r o l e i n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f sentences, p a y i n g o n l y m a r g i n a l a t t e n t i o n t o t h e c o n d i t i o n s which c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n ( c . f . Engelkamp & Zimmer 1982, on p r o d u c t i o n ) .

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J. Enplkamp eta/.

We w i l l analyse t h e f o l l o w i n g two f u n c t i o n s s u c c e s s i v e l y f o r b o t h f e a t u r e s ; t h e f u n c t i o n o f d i r e c t i n g a t t e n t i o n o r f o c u s i n g , and t h e f u n c t i o n o f marking a c e r t a i n p i e c e of i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e sentence as g i v e n o r new; t h a t i s , t h e f u n c t i o n of p r e s u p p o s i t i o n . We assume t h a t t h e two f e a t u r e s can be used i n e i t h e r f u n c t i o n , which does n o t p r e c l u d e t h a t t h e s e f e a t u r e s can have o t h e r f u n c t i o n s , o r t h a t t h e y have o u r p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n s i n e v e r y case. THE FOCUSING FUNCTION OF SUBJECTIVIZATION According t o a h y p o t h e s i s about t h e f u n c t i o n o f s u b j e c t i v i z a t i o n f o r t h e h e a r e r , t h e s u b j e c t o f a sentence a t t r a c t s t h e a t t e n t i o n o f t h e h e a r e r ; i n o t h e r words, he c e n t r e s t h e p r o p o s i t i o n which i s communicated and a c t i v a t e d by t h e sentence around t h e subject-concept. According t o E r t e l (1974, 1977), concepts which a r e i n t h e c e n t r e of a t t e n t i o n a r e more accentuated, more contoured, and more l i k e l y t o be c o n c e p t u a l i z e d as f i g u r e s t h a n concepts which a r e n o t . Thus, i f t h e grammati c a l s u b j e c t a t t r a c t s t h e a t t e n t i o n o f t h e hearer, t h e n t h e s u b j e c t i v i z e d concept should be p e r c e i v e d as more accentuated and more " d e f i n i t e " t h a n t h e o b j e c t - c o n cept. Johnson-Laird (1969) has a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t s u b j e c t - c o n c e p t s a r e more "def i n i t e " than object-concepts. According t o Johnson-Laird, t h e meaning o f t h e q u a n t i f i e r "some" depends on t h e s y n t a c t i c p o s i t i o n o f t h e q u a n t i f i e d concept: "Some" i n t h e s u b j e c t nominal group w i l l be i n t e r p r e t e d as "more d e f i n i t e " t h a n "some" i n t h e o b j e c t nominal group. ( 2 ) Some boys l o v e a l l g i r l s . ( 3 ) A l l g i r l s l o v e some boys.

Sentence ( 2 ) i s understood by most h e a r e r s t o mean t h a t t h e r e i s a d e f i n i t e s e t o f boys, o f whom each l o v e s a l l g i r l s . The meaning o f "some boys" i n ( 3 ) i s , on t h e o t h e r hand, d i f f e r e n t l y i n t e r p r e t e d . The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which suggests i t s e l f f o r sentence ( 3 ) i s t h a t each o f t h e g i r l s l o v e s a c e r t a i n sub-set o f boys f r o m t h e s e t o f a l l boys, and t h a t t h i s sub-set i s d i f f e r e n t f o r each g i r l . I f sentence ( 3 ) i s p a s s i v i z e d , t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n becomes analogous t o t h a t o f ( 2 ) . Now t h e r e i s a c e r t a i n s e t o f boys who a r e l o v e d by a l l g i r l s .

E r t e l (1974) adds f u r t h e r t o t h i s o b s e r v a t i o n by Johnson-Laird (1969). He shows t h a t , o t h e r c o n d i t i o n s b e i n g equal, a " d e f i n i t e " noun i s more e a s i l y understood t h a n an " i n d e f i n i t e " noun. ( 4 ) I r g e n d e i n e Frau w i r d Hans schon zum Tanz a u f f o r d e r n . (Some woman w i l l ask Hans t o dance. /Hans w i l l ask some woman t o dance.) ( 5 ) Hans w i r d schon i r g e n d e i n e Frau zum Tanz a u f f o r d e r n . (Hans w i l l ask some woman t o dance.) Whereas i n sentence (41, b o t h " i r g e n d e i n e Frau" and "Hans" may be p e r c e i v e d as e i t h e r s u b j e c t o r o b j e c t , sentence ( 5 ) r e a l l y o n l y a l l o w s t h e p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f "Hans" as t h e s u b j e c t . Johnson-Laird (1968) a l s o demonstrated t h a t t h e a c c e n t u a t i o n o f t h e s u b j e c t - c o n c e p t i s t o be found w i t h t h e c o g n i t i o n o f non-verbal r e f e r e n c e . Using t h e hypot h e s i s t h a t s u b j e c t i v i z a t i o n serves t o accentuate t h e concept i n question, Johnson-Laird presented h i s s u b j e c t s w i t h sentences o f t h e f o l l o w i n g t y p e :

( 6 ) Blue f o l l o w s ( o r precedes) Red. ( 7 ) Red i s f o l l o w e d ( o r preceded) by Blue. I t was t h e t a s k o f t h e s u b j e c t s t o a s s i g n c o l o u r e d squares t o t h e s e sentences; i n o t h e r words, t o express them by means o f c o l o u r e d squares.

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The r e s u l t s show t h a t t h e grammatical s u b j e c t s "Blue" i n sentence ( 6 ) and "Red" i n sentence ( 7 ) were a s s i g n e d l a r g e r squares t h a n t h e grammatical o b j e c t . The d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e r e d and b l u e squares were b i g g e r w i t h p a s s i v e sentences t h a n w i t h a c t i v e ones. To summarize: B o t h t h e f i n d i n g s o f Johnson-Laird (1968, 1969) and E r t e l (1974, 19771, as w e l l as those o f o t h e r a u t h o r s (e.g. F l o r e s d ' A r c a i s , 1973; Olson & F i l b y 1972; Tannenbaum & W i l l i a m , 1968; Turner & Rommetveit, 1968) t e n d t o show t h a t t h e s u b j e c t i v i z a t i o n o f a concept draws t h e l i s t e n e r ' s a t t e n t i o n t o t h i s concept, and t h a t t h i s i s more marked f o r p a s s i v e sentences than f o r a c t i v e ones.

I n t h i s connection, Johnson-Laird w r i t e s (1968), t h a t " t h e p a s s i v e i m p l i e s t h a t t h e l o g i c a l o b j e c t i s more i m p o r t a n t t h a n t h e l o g i c a l s u b j e c t , whereas t h e a c t i v e i m p l i e s t h a t t h e r e i s a minimal d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e importance o f t h e s e two e n t i t i e s , o r t h a t t h e l o g i c a l s u b j e c t s l i g h t l y predominates" (p.7). THE FOCUSING FUNCTION OF CLEFTING

I f one accepts t h a t t h e s u b j e c t i s u s u a l l y found i n i n i t i a l p o s i t i o n i n a sentence, t h e n t h e f o c u s i n g e f f e c t o f s u b j e c t i v i z a t i o n may a l s o p a r t i a l l y be a r e s u l t o f p o s i t i o n . Hence, t h e s u b j e c t i v i z e d p a t i e n t - c o n c e p t i s moved i n t o i n i t i a l p o s i t i o n i n German p a s s i v e sentences. T h e r e f o r e i t would n o t be s u r p r i z i n g t h a t i n a c l e f t sentence such as ( I ) , i n which t h e c l e f t e d concept i s moved t o i n i t i a l p o s i t i o n and i s f u r t h e r emphasized by t h e f o r m u l a "It i s an X " , t h a t t h i s c l e f t e d concept s h o u l d a t t r a c t t h e p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n o f t h e l i s t e n e r , t h a t i s , t h a t i t s h o u l d become t h e f o c u s o f the listener's attention. We a t t e m p t e d t o v e r i f y t h i s h y p o t h e s i s i n v a r i o u s experiments (Zimmer & Engelkamp 1981). The b a s i c idea o f o u r experiments was t o use t h e c l e f t i n g o f a concept t o make i t t h e c e n t r e o f t h e knowledge a c t i v a t e d by t h e whole sentence; t o demons t r a t e t h a t t h e knowledge corresponding t o t h e c l e f t e d concept i s f o c a l i s e d we chose a s e t t i n g which a l l o w e d t o show t h a t a p i c t u r e o f t h i s concept o f f e r e d d i r e c t l y a f t e r t h e sentence, i s s c r u t i n i s e d more c l o s e l y , and a t g r e a t e r l e n g t h , than a p i c t u r e o f an u n c l e f t e d concept. Corresponding t o t h e l a r g e r s u r f a c e area accorded t o t h e s u b j e c t - c o n c e p t i n t h e experiment o f Johnson-Laird (19681, o u r c l e f t e d concept s h o u l d be accorded a l o n g e r i n s p e c t i o n time. To t e s t t h i s h y p o t h e s i s , we o f f e r e d o u r s u b j e c t s German c l e f t sentences which had been prepared b y an adequate c o n t e x t , and immediately a f t e r w a r d s we gave them t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f p r o j e c t i n g a l t e r n a t i v e v i s u a l images (on s l i d e s ) o f t h e two nomina l concepts. The t i m e t h e v o l u n t e e r s spent l o o k i n g a t t h e two concepts d u r i n g t h e f i r s t showing was measured i n micro-seconds. A r e s u l t o f t h i s s e r i e s o f e x p e r i ments was t h a t i n s p e c t i o n t i m e was l o n g e r f o r t h e images o f a c l e f t e d concept t h a n f o r an u n c l e f t e d concept.

I n summarizing, we can s t a t e t h a t c l e f t e d concepts, too, a t r a c t t h e a t t e n t i o n o f the hearer. THE INTERACTION OF FOCUSING THROUGH SUBJECTIVIZATION AND CLEFTING The f a c t t h a t b o t h t h e s u b j e c t i v i z a t i o n and t h e c l e f t i n g o f a concept can a t t r a c t t h e a t t e n t i o n o f t h e h e a r e r , r a i s e s t h e i n t e r e s t i n g q u e s t i o n o f what happens i f s u b j e c t i v i z a t i o n and c l e f t i n g f o c u s t h e a t t e n t i o n on two d i f f e r e n t concepts, i n o t h e r words, i f a sentence induces two f o c i o f a t t e n t i o n . To answer t h i s q u e s t i o n , l e t us analyse t h e f o l l o w i n g f o u r sentences i n d e t a i l : ( 8 ) Es i s t d e r P o l i z i s t , d e r den P f a r r e r g r u B t . ( I t i s t h e policeman who g r e e t s the vicar. ( 9 ) Es i s t d e r P f a r r e r , den d e r P o l i z i s t g r u B t . ( I t i s t h e v i c a r whom t h e

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p o l iceman g r e e t s .

( l o ) Es i s t d e r P o l i z i s t , von dem d e r P f a r r e r g e g r u b t w i r d . ( I t i s t h e p o l i c e (11)

man by whom t h e v i c a r i s greeted.) Es i s t d e r P f a r r e r , d e r von dem P o l i z i s t e n gegruRt w i r d . ( t i s t h e v i c a r who i s g r e e t e d by t h e p o l iceman.)

Whereas i n sentences ( 8 ) and ( 1 1 ) s u b j e c t i v i z a t i o n and c l e f t i n g d i r e c t t h e a t t e n t i o n o f t h e h e a r e r t o one and t h e same concept, and we would t h e r e f o r e e x p e c t t o observe a c l e a r focus on t h i s concept compared w i t h t h e a l t e r n a t i v e concept, t h e a t t e n t i o n o f t h e h e a r e r i s d i r e c t e d t o two d i f f e r e n t concepts i n sentences ( 9 ) and ( l o ) . T h i s should l e a d t o a d i v i s i o n o f a t t e n t i o n . From what we have a l r e a d y s t a t e d , namely t h a t t h e s u b j e c i t i v i z a t i o n e f f e c t i s more marked i n t h e p a s s i v e than i n t h e a c t i v e , we can expect t h e e f f e c t o f d i v i s i o n o f a t t e n t i o n t o be g r e a t e r i n passive agent c l e f t sentences l i k e ( l o ) than i n a c t i v e p a t i e n t c l e f t sentences l i k e ( 9 ) . Although t h e a c t i v e p a t i e n t c l e f t sentence a l s o a c t i v a t e s two f o c i , t h e focus o f s u b j e c t i v i z a t i o n s h o u l d be weaker here, because an a c t i v e sentence i s involved. With r e g a r d t o t h e i n s p e c t i o n t i m e o f t h e p i c t u r e s r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e two arguments, i t f o l l o w s t h a t t h e i n s p e c t i o n t i m e s f o r concepts i n sentences w i t h two f o c i should be more s i m i l a r t h a n those f o r sentences w i t h one focus. We t e s t e d t h i s i n experiments w i t h t h e p r e v i o u s l y d e s c r i b e d s e t t i n g . S u b j e c t s do, i n f a c t , spend almost t h e same i n s p e c t i o n t i m e on t h e two s l i d e s o f t h e two concepts i n c l e f t sentences w i t h two f o c i o f a t t e n t i o n , whereas i n t h e case o f c l e f t sentences w i t h one focus, t h e i n s p e c t i o n t i m e f o r t h e s l i d e showing t h e focused concept i s l o n g e r than t h a t o f t h e a l t e r n a t i v e concept (Engelkamp & Zimmer 1982). L e t us now c o n s i d e r an experiment i n which each sentence was f o l l o w e d by a p i c t u r e showing, s i d e by side, t h e agent and t h e p a t i e n t mentioned i n t h e sentence. Here we would expect more eye movements between t h e two f i g u r e s when t h e sentence i n q u e s t i o n has two f o c i than when i t has o n l y one focus. I n t h i s experiment we recorded t h e f r e q u e n c i e s o f eye movements between t h e two f i g u r e s of t h e a g e n t and t h e p a t i e n t a f t e r having heard sentences i n t h e v a r i o u s types (8) t o ( 1 1 ) . Eye movements were more f r e q u e n t between t h e two concept images when s u b j e c t s heard a c l e f t sentence w i t h two f o c i t h a n when t h e sentence o n l y c o n t a i n e d one focus (Engelkamp & Zimmer 1982). We were f u r t h e r a b l e t o show i n b o t h k i n d s o f experimental s e t t i n g s t h a t t h e e f f e c t s o f two d i v e r g i n g f o c i i n p a s s i v e agent c l e f t sentences l i k e ( l o ) a r e more marked than i n a c t i v e p a t i e n t c l e f t sentences l i k e ( 9 ) . T h i s c o n f i r m s t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t t h e s u b j e c t i v i z a t i o n e f f e c t i s weaker i n a c t i v e sentences than i n p a s s i v e ones. Moreover, t h e e f f e c t o f s u b j e c t i v i z a t i o n i s , on t h e whole, weaker t h a n t h e e f f e c t of c l e f t i n g . The f a c t t h a t t h e s u b j e c t i v i z a t i o n e f f e c t occurs a t a l l , a l s o shows, however, t h a t i t i s n o t c o m p l e t e l y reduceable t o an e f f e c t o f p o s i t i o n , s i n c e i n t h e sentences w i t h two f o c i ( 9 ) and ( l o ) , t h e s u b j e c t i s n o t i n sentence i n i t i a l p o s i t i o n , b u t must compete w i t h t h e c l e f t e d concept which g i n t h i s p o s i t i o n . We can summarize by s a y i n g t h a t f o r b o t h s u b j e c t i v i z e d and c l e f t e d concepts, t h e focusing e f f e c t s on t h e l i s t e n e r a r e demonstrable; t h a t t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e two f e a t u r e s o n t o two concepts has t h e e f f e c t o f d i v i d i n g t h e a t t e n t i o n ; t h a t s u b j e c t i v i z a t i o n has a weaker e f f e c t i n a c t i v e sentences t h a n i n p a s s i v e ones; and f i n a l l y , t h a t c l e f t i n g has a more marked e f f e c t t h a n s u b j e c t i v i z a t i o n . One aspect o f these f i n d i n g s w i l l be more c l o s e l y analysed and discussed i n t h e f o l l o w i n g pages, and t h a t i s : How should a sentence w i t h two f o c i o f a t t e n t i o n be e v a l u a t e d ? To answer t h i s q u e s t i o n we w i l l use f i n d i n g s c o n c e r n i n g t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f such sentences. It would seem n a t u r a l t o assume t h a t t h e speaker does n o t spontaneously t e n d t o . c o n s t r u c t sentences w i t h two f o c i o f a t t e n t i o n , and t h a t t h e l i s t e n e r does n o t t e n d t o c o n s i d e r them adequate. Indeed, b o t h o f t h e s e hypotheses can be v e r i f i e d by experiment. I n t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f t h e f o u r c l e f t

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sentences ( 8 ) t o ( 1 1 1 , t h e p a s s i v e a g e n t c l e f t sentence i s c l e a r l y t h e one most s t r e n u o u s l y avoided, i t h a r d l y e v e r occurs (Engelkamp & Zimmer 1982). I n a c h o i c e experiment r e l a t i n g c l e f t sentences t o t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f a c o r r e s p o n d i n g p i c t u r e , i t was chosen n o more t h a n 17 t i m e s o u t o f 252 (6.7%). Whereas t h e p a s s i v e p a t i e n t c l e f t sentence w i t h one focus was chosen 57 t i m e s (22.6%). I t should be n o t e d t h a t t h e a c t i v e p a t i e n t c l e f t sentence w i t h one s t r o n g and one weak f o c u s was chosen 24 t i m e s (9.5%). The r e s u l t s o f an a c c e p t a b i l i t y r a t i n g were s i m i l a r . Here, too, t h e p a s s i v e agent c l e f t sentence was g i v e n t h e l o w e s t v a l u e (Engelkamp & Zimmer 1982). Our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f these r e s u l t s i s t h a t o n l y sentences w i t h one f o c u s a r e n o r m a l l y used i n communication. The p a s s i v e agent c l e f t sentence i s c o n s t r u c t a b l e , b u t i s v i r t u a l l y never used. THE PRESUPPOSITIONAL FUNCTION OF SUBJECTIVIZATION Whereas some of t h e aforementioned a u t h o r s such as E r t e l (1974, 1977) o r JohnsonL a i r d (1968) see i t as t h e c e n t r a l f u n c t i o n o f s u b j e c t i v i z a t i o n t o c o n c e n t r a t e t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e h e a r e r on t h e s u b j e c t i v i z e d concept, o t h e r s , such as A n i s f e l d K l e n b o r t (1973), r e g a r d t h e s u b j e c t - p r e d i c a t e s t r u c t u r e as a mechanism t o i n d i c a t e t o t h e h e a r e r which i n f o r m a t i o n i n a sentence i s t o be regarded as given, and which as new. K l e n b o r t & A n i s f e l d (1974, p.190) s t a t e : ' s e n t e n t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n can be p r e s e n t e d i n such a way as t o i n d i c a t e which p a r t o f i t i s t o be t a k e n as g i v e n and presupposed, and which p a r t o f i t i s t o be c o n s i d e r e d new and t h e f o c a l The grammatical s u b j e c t i s i m p o r t a n t as t h e theme o f p o i n t of t h e a s s e r t i o n t h e sentences and t h e grammatical o b j e c t as t h e focus o f t h e s e n t e n t i a l a s s e r t i o n . '

...

As w i t h t h e f o c u s i n g f u n c t i o n , t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a l f u n c t i o n i s h e r e e i t h e r comp l e t e l y o r l a r g e l y l i m i t e d t o t h e p a s s i v e . According t o K l e n b o r t & A n i s f e l d (1974, p.190), t h e above statement i s o n l y v a l i d f o r p a s s i v e sentences: 'The a c t i v e i s expected t o have a r e l a t i v e l y " f l a t " p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e a s s e r t i o n a l f o c u s b e i n g d i s t r i b u t e d o v e r t h e e n t i r e sentence, w i t h no i n f o r m a t i o n d e s i g n a t e d as presupposed background' ( c f . a l s o G r i e v e & Wales 1973). L e t us i l l u s t r a t e by means o f an example f r o m A n i s f e l d & K l e n b o r t (1973), what such a u t h o r s understand by g i v e n and new i n f o r m a t i o n :

(12) The p r i n c i p a l had been angered b y one p a r e n t . They s t a t e : "The p r e s u p p o s i t i o n , then, i s t h a t t h e p r i n c i p a l had been angered by someone. I n o t h e r words, t h i s sentence presupposes as known o r g i v e n t h a t t h e p r i n c i p a l had been angered, and i t p r o v i d e s t h e new i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t i t was t h e p a r e n t who was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h i s " (p.124). K l e n b o r t & A n i s f e l d (1974) attempted t o c o r r o b o r a t e t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e , by means o f t h e s o - c a l l e d n e g a t i o n t e s t . They assume i s interpreted t h a t i n a sentence, t h e general n e g a t i o n "It i s n o t t r u e t h a t by t h e speaker t o r e l a t e t o t h e " a s s e r t i o n a l f o c u s r a t h e r than t o t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n " ( c f . Langendoen & Savin 1971). They were a b l e t o show e x p e r i m e n t a l l y t h a t t h e i r s u b j e c t s r e l a t e d t h e general n e g a t i o n o f p a s s i v e sentences t o t h e agents o f t h e a c t i o n s i g n i f i c a n t l y more o f t e n t h a n t o t h e p a t i e n t . No such d i f f e r e n c e was observed f o r a c t i v e sentences. G r i e v e & Wales (1973) and Hupet & Bouedec (1975) r e p o r t s i m i l a r f i n d i n g s ( c f . Engelkamp 1981).

..."

We may conclude t h a t i n p a s s i v e sentences t h e a g e n t - p r e d i c a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p i s negated, r a t h e r t h a n t h e p a t i e n t - p r e d i c a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p . T h i s f i n d i n g i s i n t e r p r e t e d by some a u t h o r s as i n d i c a t i n g t h a t i n p a s s i v e sentences, t h e p a t i e n t p r e d i c a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p i s seen as t h e known i n f o r m a t i o n , and t h e a g e n t - p r e d i c a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p a s t h e new i n f o r m a t i o n . THE PRESUPPOSITIONAL FUNCTION OF CLEFTING It i s g e n e r a l l y accepted ( c f . e.g.

Carpenter & J u s t 1977a, b; C l a r k 1977; C l a r k &

102

J. Engelkarnp et a/.

H a v i l a n d 1977; Hornby 1972, 1974; S i n g e r 1976) t h a t c l e f t i n g i n d i c a t e s a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e , and t h a t t h e c l e f t e d p a r t o f a c l e f t sentence c o n t a i n s t h e i n f o r m a t i o n seen as new, and t h e r e s t t h e g i v e n i n f o r m a t i o n . The n e g a t i o n t e s t i s seen as t h e most i m p o r t a n t s u p p o r t f o r t h i s assumption. I f one negates a c l e f t sentence, as i n (13), t h e n o n l y t h e new i n f o r m a t i o n i s negated; t h e t r u t h v a l u e o f t h e g i v e n o r presupposed i n f o r m a t i o n remains unchanged. ( 1 3 ) Es i s t n i c h t wahr, dab es d e r P o l i z i s t gewesen i s t , d e r den P f a r r e r geg r u B t h a t . ( I t i s n o t t r u e t h a t i t was t h e policeman who g r e e t e d t h e vicar.) Even a f t e r n e g a t i o n i t remains t h e case, i n sentence (13), t h a t someone g r e e t e d t h e v i c a r . A l l t h a t i s denied t h a t t h i s someone was t h e policeman. The a g e n t - p r e d i c a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p i s marked as new by t h e c l e f t i n g o f t h e agent, and t h e p a t i e n t - p r e d i c a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p by t h e c l e f t i n g o f t h e p a t i e n t . INTERACTION BETWEEN THE PRESUPPOSITIONAL FUNCTION OF SUBJECTIVIZATION AND OF CLEFTING

I f one c o n s i d e r s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s i g n a l l e d b y p a s s i v i z a t i o n and c l e f t i n g , i t i s c l e a r t h a t , i n a p a s s i v e p a t i e n t c l e f t sentence l i k e ( I I ) , t h e same i n f o r m a t i o n i s marked as b o t h g i v e n and new. According t o t h e f i n d i n g s o f K l e n b o r t & A n i s f e l d (19741, among o t h e r s , t h e p a s s i v e s t r u c t u r e suggests t o t h e h e a r e r t h a t t h e speaker takes i t as known t h a t t h e v i c a r was greeted, and t h a t t h e h e a r e r s h o u l d c o n s i d e r as new i n f o r m a t i o n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e policeman was t h e person d o i n g t h e g r e e t i n g . On t h e b a s i s o f t h e c l e f t sentence s t r u c t u r e o f (111, however, t h e hearer i s t o c o n s i d e r as known i n f o r m a t i o n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e policeman i s g r e e t i n g someone, and what i s new h e r e i s t h a t t h a t someone i s t h e v i c a r . How i s t h i s c o n t r a d i c t i o n t o be r e s o l v e d ? L e t us c o n s i d e r t h e p a s s i v e sentences again. Although s u b j e c t s asked t o negate one argument-predicate r e l a t i o n s h i p i n p a s s i v e sentences presented i n i s o l a t i o n , negate t h e a g e n t - p r e d i c a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p more o f t e n t h a n t h e p a t i e n t - p r e d i c a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p , i t s h o u l d be s t r e s s e d t h a t t h i s i n o n l y a dominant tendency. I s o l a t e d p a s s i v e sentences a r e g e n e r a l l y i n t e r p r e t e d i n t h i s way, b u t t h e y may a l s o be i n t e r p r e t e d d i f f e r e n t l y , as shown, f o r example, i n t h e n e g a t i o n t e s t . Although t h e m a j o r i t y o f s u b j e c t s i n a n e g a t i o n experiment w i t h sentences l i k e ( 1 2 ) do n o t understand t h e p a t i e n t - p r e d i c a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p t o be negated ( i n sentence (121, t h a t t h e p r i n c i p a l had been angered), a m i n o r i t y do so - and i t i s p o s s i b l e t o do so. I t i s p e r f e c t l y a d m i s s i b l e t o f o r m a p a s s i v e sentence l i k e (14): ( 1 4 ) N i c h t d e r P f a r r e r wurde von dem P o l i z i s t e n gegrubt. ( I t was n o t t h e v i c a r who was g r e e t e d by t h e policeman.) From t h i s , we draw t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t p a s s i v e sentences a r e ambiguous w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e i r p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e . They may be i n t e r p r e t e d i n d i f f e r e n t ways, a c c o r d i n g t o what t h e y s i g n a l as g i v e n o r new. Passive sentences o f f e r e d i n i s o l a t i o n and o u t o f c o n t e x t a r e u s u a l l y i n t e r p r e t e d b y t h e h e a r e r as though t h e p a t i e n t - p r e d i c a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p were known; t h i s tendency can, however, be a l t e r e d c o m p l e t e l y by t h e i n f l u e n c e o f a d d i t i o n a l f a c t o r s . One such a d d i t i o n a l f a c t o r o f i n f l u e n c e i s , i n o u r o p i n i o n , t h e simultaneous e x i s t e n c e o f a c l e f t sentence s t r u c t u r e . C l e f t sentences, i n c o n t r a s t t o p a s s i v e sentences a l l o w o f o n l y one given-new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . A c l e f t sentence s t r u c t u r e c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e c l e f t e d i n f o r m a t i o n i s t o be i n t e r p r e t e d as new, and t h e u n c l e f t e d as given. Sentence (11) should, i n our o p i n i o n , be i n t e r p r e t e d b y t h e h e a r e r as though t h e known i n f o r m a t i o n i s t h a t t h e policeman i s g r e e t i n g someone, and t h e new i n f o r m a t i o n i s t h a t t h e person b e i n g g r e e t e d i s t h e v i c a r . A n e g a t i o n such as t h a t i n sentence (15) should t h e r e f o r e be regarded as i n -

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adequate, u n l e s s t h e n e g a t i o n i s seen as an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n , and n o t as a r e s u l t o f t h e g l o b a l n e g a t i o n . (15) Es i s t d e r P f a r r e r , d e r n i c h t von dem P o l i z i s t e n gegruBt w i r d . ( I t is t h e v i c a r who i s n o t b e i n g g r e e t e d b y t h e policeman.) CONCLUDING REMARKS The t h e o r e t i c a l arguments and e m p i r i c a l f i n d i n g s presented i n t h i s paper l e a d us t o suppose t h a t t h e s u b j e c i t i v i z a t i o n o f concepts i n t h e c o n t e x t o f c l e f t sentences has o n l y a f o c u s i n g f u n c t i o n , whereas t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a l f u n c t i o n i s suspended. I n c l e f t sentences, t h e r e f o r e , t h e c l e f t e d p a r t s h o u l d always c o n t a i n t h e i n f o r m a t i o n marked as new, and t h e u n c l e f t e d p a r t s h o u l d always c o n t a i n t h e i n f o r m a t i o n marked as g i v e n , independend o f t h e v o i c e o f t h e v e r b . The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is supported by t h e f a c t t h a t i t does n o t make sense e i t h e r t o i n d i c a t e t w i c e which i n f o r m a t i o n i s given, and which i s new, o r t o i n d i c a t e t h e same i n f o r m a t i o n as g i v e n and new s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . Whereas i t does make sense t o f o c u s more o r l e s s s t r o n g F o n a concept o f a p r o p o s i t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e , i t seems t o us senseless t o l a b e l an argument-predicate r e l a t i o n s h i p as more o r l e s s known. The speaker e i t h e r assumes t h a t t h e h e a r e r knows t h a t t h e agent o r t h e p a t i e n t i s i n v o l v e d i n an a c t i o n , o r he assumes t h a t t h e h e a r e r does n o t know t h i s . The a m b i g u i t y o f t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e o f a p a s s i v e sentence means t h a t t h e p a s s i v e s t r u c t u r e o f a sentence o f f e r e d i n i s o l a t i o n does n o t s i g n a l c l e a r l y enough which given-new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s h o u l d be p r e f e r r e d by t h e h e a r e r . T h i s does n o t mean t h a t t h e h e a r e r a c c e p t s more o r l e s s s t r o n g l y a c e r t a i n given-new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I n normal communication, t h e given-new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f p a s s i v e sentences i s p r o b a b l y made c l e a r by a d d i t i o n a l s i g n a l s . Hence, i n t h e c o n t e x t o f c l e f t sentences, o n l y t h e f o c u s i n g f u n c t i o n o f s u b j e c t i v i z a t i o n is a f f e c t i v e . T h i s causes a s t r o n g e r f o c u s i n t h e passive, and a weaker focus i n t h e a c t i v e . The r e s u l t o f i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h c l e f t i n g i n b o t h p a s s i v e p a t i e n t and a c t i v e - a g e n t sentences i s t h a t a marked f o c u s o f a t t e n t i o n a r i s e s , because c l e f t i n g and s u b j e c t i v i z a t i o n work t o g e t h e r here. I n a c t i v e - p a t i e n t c l e f t sentences and i n passive-agent c l e f t sentences on t h e o t h e r hand t h e r e a r e two competing f o c i . Whereas, i n t h e a c t i v e - p a t i e n t c l e f t sentence t h e f o c u s o f s u b j e c t i v i z a t i o n i s weak, t h a t i s , a s t r o n g p r i m a r y f o c u s and a weak secondary focus a r i s e , i n t h e passive-agent c l e f t sentences, two s t r o n g , competing f o c i a r e found. T h i s l a t t e r t y p e o f sentence is e v i d e n t l y a v o i d e d by speakers, and i s p e r c e i v e d b y h e a r e r s as c o n f u s i n g . REFERENCES:

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I21 Carpenter, P.A. and J u s t , M.A., Reading comprehension as eyes see it, i n : J u s t , M.A. and Carpenter, P.A. (eds.), C o g n i t i v e processes i n comprehension (Erlbaum, H i l l s d a l e , N.J., 1977a). [3] Carpenter, P.A. and J u s t , M.A., I n t e g r a t i v e processes i n comprehension, i n : LaBerge, D. and Samuels, S.J. (eds.), B a s i c processes i n r e a d i n g : P e r c e p t i o n and comprehension (Erlbaum, H i l l s d a l e , N.J., 1977b).

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1121 E r t e l , S., Where do t h e s u b j e c t s o f sentences come from? i n : Rosenberg, S. (ed.), Sentence p r o d u c t i o n . Developments i n r e s e a r c h and t h e o r y (Erlbaum, H i l l s d a l e , N.J., 1977). [I31 E r t e l , S. ,Satzsubjekt und I c h - P e r s p e k t i v e , i n : Eckensberger, L. (ed.), Ber i c h t uber den 28. KongreB d e r Deutschen G e s e l l s c h a f t f u r Psychologie i n Saarbrucken 1972. Bd.1 (Hogrefe, Gottingen, 1974). 1141 F l o r e s d ' A r c a i s , G.B., Some p e r c e p t u a l d e t e r m i n a n t s o f sentence c o n s t r u c t i o n , u n v e r o f f e n t l i c h t e s Manuskript, Psychologisches I n s t i t u t d e r U n i v e r s i t a t Leiden (Leiden, 1973). [I51 Grieve, R. and Wales, R., (1973) 173-182. [16] Hornby, P., 632-642.

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[201 Johnson-Laird, P.N., 60 (1969) 17-23.

Reasoning w i t h ambiguous sentences, B r i t . J. Psychol

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[21] Kintsch, W., The r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f meaning i n memory (Erlbaum, H i l l s d a l e , N.J., 1974). [22] K l e n b o r t , J. and A n i s f e l d , M., Markedness and p e r s p e c t i v e i n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a c t i v e and p a s s i v e v o i c e , Q u a r t . J. exp. Psychol. 27 (1974) 189-195. [23] Langendoen, D.T. and Savin, H.B., The p r o j e c t i o n problem f o r p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , i n : F i l l m o r e , C.J. and Langendoen, D.T. (eds.), S t u d i e s i n l i n g u i s t i c semant i c s ( H o l t , R i n e h a r t & Winston, New York, 1971). [24] Lanford, J. and Holmes, V.M., S y n t a c t i c p r e s u p p o s i t i o n i n sentence comprehension, C o g n i t i o n 7 (1979) 363-383).

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1251 Olson, D.R.

and F i l b y , N., On t h e comprehension o f a c t i v e and p a s s i v e sentences, Cogn. Psycho1 . 3 ( 1 972) 361 -381.

[26] S i n g e r , M., Thematic s t r u c t u r e and t h e i n t e g r a t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c i n f o r m a t i o n , J . Verb. Learn. Verb. Behav. 15 (1976) 549-558 [27] Tannenbaum,

P.H. and W i l l i a m s , F., Generation o f a c t i v e and p a s s i v e sentences as a f u n c t i o n o f s u b j e c t o r s u b j e c t focus, J . Verb. Learn. Verb. Behav. 7 ( 1 968) 246-250.

[281 Turner, E.A. and Rornrnetveit, R . , Focus o f a t t e n t i o n i n r e c a l l o f a c t i v e and p a s s i v e sentences, J. Verb. Learn. Verb. Behav. 7 (1968) 543-548. [291 Zirnmer, H.D. and Engelkamp, J . , The given-new s t r u c t u r e o f c l e f t sentences and t h e i r i n f l u e n c e on p i c t u r e viewing, Psych. Res. 43 (1981) 375-389.

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OPERATIVE ACTIVITY DURING SENTENCE READING Georges N o i z e t L a b o r a t o i r e de Psychologie Experimentale U n i v e r s i t e Rene Descartes e t EPHE ( 3 W e s e c t i o n ) Associe au CNRS Paris France

The c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e meaning o f a complex sentence r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e combination o f s e v e r a l b a s i c c l a u s e s r e q u i r e s an operative type o f a c t i v i t y . I n a reading task, t h e p e r f o r mance depends on t h e n a t u r e and t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e operat i o n s r e q u i r e d f o r t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e meaning. S u b j e c t s were g i v e n 30 s h o r t t e x t s t o read, d i s p l a y e d on a screen segment-by-segment by p r e s s i n g a pushbutton ("segmented s e l f Reading exposure t i m e s were recorded. presentation"). R e s u l t s show (1) an e f f e c t o f o r d e r o f p r e s e n t a t i o n ( a l l o t h e r t h i n g s b e i n g equal, t h e c l a u s e r e a d second r e q u i r e s a l o n g e r r e a d i n g t i m e t h a n t h e one r e a d f i r s t , because o f a double p r o c e s s i n g o f w i t h i n - and between- c l a u s e s r e l a t i o n s h i p s ) ; ( 2 ) an e f f e c t o f o r d e r o f p r o c e s s i n g between t h e main and t h e depend e n t c l a u s e ( t h e sentence i s r e a d s l o w l e r when t h e dependent c l a u s e precedes t h e main c l a u s e ) ; ( 3 ) an e f f e c t o f t h e s t r u c t u r e o f o p e r a t i o n s ( t h e r e a d i n g t i m e o f t h e same c l a u s e depends on whether t h i s c l a u s e i s s i t u a t e d a t depth 1 and i s c o o r d i n a t e d w i t h t h e main c l a u s e - s t r u c t u r e t h e n i n c l u d i n g two o p e r a t i o n s - o r whether i t i s s i t u a t e d a t d e p t h 2 and i s c o o r d i n a t e d w i t h t h e dependent c l a u s e - s t r u c t u r e t h e n i n c l u d i n g three operations-) CONTEXT OF THE SUBJECT Reading a sentence and a t t e m p t i n g t o understand i t i s t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f meaning, r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e r e a d i n g c o n d i t i o n s and r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e sentence. I n formal terms, t h e meaning o f a sentence i s d e f i n e d as t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between a g r a p h i c o b j e c t and a mental s t r u c t u r e . The l a t t e r i s t h e r e s u l t o f complex i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g a c t i v i t y by t h e reader. T h i s mental s t r u c t u r e has been q u a l i f i e d as a " c o g i t a t u m " ( N o i z e t (1980)), i n o r d e r t o i n d i c a t e t h a t i t i s t h e p r o d u c t o f a c o g n i t i v e a c t i v i t y e x e r t e d on an o b j e c t . I n a broad and r a t h e r nons p e c i f i c sense, t h e t e r m r e p r e s e n t a t i o n may be a t t r i b u t e d t o t h i s a c t i v i t y , a l t h o u g h t h i s t e r m s i g n i f i e s b o t h t h e process and t h e p r o d u c t o f a mental construction activity. Saussure f o r m u l a t e d t h e r e l a t i o n a l dimension o f t h e n o t i o n o f meaning: meaning u n i t e s t h e g r a p h i c o b j e c t and t h e mental s t r u c t u r e t o which i t g i v e s access, t h u s c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e g r a p h i c o b j e c t as a s i g n . As a r e s u l t o f an i n e v i t a b l e t r a n s p o s i t i o n , i n s c r i b e d i n t h e n a t u r e o f t h i n g s , i t has become common t o a t t r i b u t e meaning n o t o n l y t o t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e o b j e c t and t h e mental s t r u c t u r e , b u t t o t h e mental s t r u c t u r e i t s e l f . The c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e meaning o f a sentence i s t h e use o f v a r i o u s p r o c e s s i n g o p e r a t i o n s ( i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and c a t e g o r i z a t i o n o f u n i t s , r e l a t i n g u n i t s , e t c . ) t o e x t r a c t a complex system o f r e l a t i o n s : a s t r u c t u r e which we may q u a l i f y as a c o g n i t i v o - s e m a n t i c s t r u c t u r e 1 t o i n d i c a t e t h a t t h i s s t r u c t u r e r e s u l t s from f o r m a l l y d e f i n a b l e o p e r a t i o n s ( p r e d i c t i o n , i m p l i c a t i o n , temporal

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sequencing,etc.) and f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t terms b e a r i n g on these o p e r a t i o n s can be analyzed i n u n i t s o f meaning (Le Ny (1979)). One o f t h e o b j e c t i v e s o f p r e s e n t day p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c s i s t o i d e n t i f y t h e s t e p s i n v o l v e d i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e meaning o f a sentence, u s i n g o n - l i n e procedure whenever p o s s i b l e . A w i d e l y accepted w o r k i n g h y p o t h e s i s i n v o l v e s t h e d i s t i n c t i o n o f s e v e r a l types o f processing: t h a t l e a d i n g t o t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f l e x i c a l u n i t s , t h a t i n v o l v i n g t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a s t r u c t u r a l scheme o f t h e sentence, t h a t which combines t h e f i r s t two, c u l m i n a t i n g i n t h e c a l c u l a t i o n o f t h e meaning, c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e s t e p o f comprehension i n t h e f u l l sense o f t h e term. Two q u e s t i o n s may be asked i n connection w i t h a h y p o t h e s i s o f t h i s type. The f i r s t i n v o l v e s t h e autonomy o f t h e procedure o f l e x i c a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and o f t h a t which processes t h e s y n t a c t i c s t r u c t u r e . T h i s autonomy i s supported by e m p i r i c a l d a t a ( F o r s t e r and Ryder (1971)). The second i s concerned w i t h t h e i n t e r a c t i o n o f t h e procedures, which i s n o t excluded by t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e i r autonomy. For example, t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f a l e x i c a l u n i t , e.g. t h a t o f a connector a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f a sequence, may induce a s t r u c t u r a l h y p o t h e s i s , w h i l e , r e c i p r o c a l l y , p r o c e s s i n g t h e s t r u c t u r e may f a c i l i t a t e o r h i n d e r t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f l e x i c a l u n i t s i n such o r such category2. Our working h y p o t h e s i s i s t h a t t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e meaning o f complex sentences, r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e combination o f s e v e r a l b a s i c clauses, r e q u i r e s an o p e r a t i v e t y p e o f a c t i v i t y . T h i s a c t i v i t y c o n s t i t u t e s an autonomous and necessary s t e p i n t h e process o f comprehension. T h i s o p e r a t i v e a c t i v i t y o b v i o u s l y r e f l e c t s t h e general c o g n i t i v e c a p a c i t i e s o f t h e reader, b u t a l s o p r e s e n t s s p e c i f i c p r o p e r t i e s which l e d us t o speak o f p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c o p e r a t i o n s ( N o i z e t (1980))3. The s t u d y o f t h e mechanisms i n v o l v e d i n r e a d i n g appears t o be a h i g h l y a p p r o p r i a t e means o f demonstrating t h i s t y p e o f o p e r a t i o n s . The r e a d e r i s i n d e e d t h e master o f h i s r a t e and rhythm o f r e a d i n g , so t h a t changes i n r e a d i n g t i m e s may f u r n i s h i n d i c a t i o n s o f t h e o p e r a t i v e process i n v o l v e d . I n o r d e r t o do t h i s , t h e observed d i f f e r ences concerning t h e temporal v a r i a b l e s h o u l d be c l e a r l y a t t r i b u t a b l e t o t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e ongoing o p e r a t i o n : t h e l e x i c a l ( c h o i c e o f meaning u n i t s ) and t h e m a t i c parameters (general meaning o f t h e t e x t ) must be n e u t r a l i z e d t o t h e g r e a t e s t e x t e n t p o s s i b l e . Under these c o n d i t i o n s , i t becomes p o s s i b l e t o demonstrate t h e e f f e c t on performance o f t h e n a t u r e and s t r u c t u r e o f t h e o p e r a t i o n s r e q u i r e d f o r t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f meaning o f t h e t e x t . I t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e t o measure t h e consequences on p r o c e s s i n g o f t h e manner i n which t h e s t e p s o f t h e o p e r a t i o n s may be accomplished, t a k i n g i n t o account t h e o r d e r o f i n f o r m a t i o n c a p t u r e imposed by t h e l i n e a r i t y o f t h e t e x t .

a.

The experime t d e s c r i b e d below i s an a t t e m p t t o respond t o some o f t h e o b j e c t i v e s s t a t e d above

ORGANIZATION OF THE EXPERIMENT The s u b j e c t s were g i v e n a r e a d i n g t a s k . They were s i m p l y t o l d t h a t t h e y had t o r e c o n s t i t u t e t h e general meaning o f a t e x t a f t e r each reading. The equipment i n c l u d e d a Hewlett-Packard t e r m i n a l connected t o a T1600 computer. Each s u b j e c t had a hand-held pushbutton which enabled t h e t e x t t o be r e a d t o be d i s p l a y e d i n a window on t h e screen, segment-by-segment. The t e x t was d i s p l a y e d i n l o w e r case c h a r a c t e r s w i t h accent marks ( i n French) w i t h o u t p u n c t u a t i o n . Each t i m e t h e b u t t o n was pressed, a new segment o f t h e sentence appeared i n i t s c o r r e c t p l a c e and t h e p r e v i o u s segment disappeared. T h i s had been c a l l e d " a u t o p r i s e n t a t i o n segmentee" (APS) ( = segmented s e l f - p r e s e n t a t i o n ) by Pynte (1975). F o r each segment, t h e experimenter c o u l d r e c o r d t h e r e a d i n g exposure t i m e (RET), measured by t h e computer's c l o c k as t h e i n t e r v a l between two successive presses on t h e pushbutton. T h i s RET c o n s t i t u t e d t h e p r i m a r y dependent v a r i a b l e .

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Each s u b j e c t had 30 s h o r t t e x t s t o read. Among them, 16 were e x p e r i m e n t a l t e x t s and t h e remainder were e i t h e r f o r f a m i l i a r i z a t i o n w i t h t h e system o r were r u p t u r e t e x t s , designed t o p r e v e n t t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n o f a s y s t e m a t i c s t r a t e g y f o r i n f o r m a t i o n processing. The e x p e r i m e n t a l t e x t s a l l i n c l u d e d f o u r clauses. The f i r s t , F1, was an i n t r o d u c t o r y sentence which s i t u a t e d t h e c o n t e x t ( i n c e r t a i n cases, F1 was reduced t o a p r e p o s i t i o n a l phrase) and t h e t h r e e o t h e r s (F2, F3 and F4 i n surface o r d e r ) formed a t h i r d degree complex sentence. The l a t t e r c o n t a i n e d e i t h e r a t e m p o r a l i t y o p e r a t o r , e.g. b e f o r e , f o r 0 1 items, o r a c a u s a l i t y o p e r a t o r , e.g. because, f o r 02 items. As an example, t h e two t e x t s ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) below i l l u s t r a t e l e v e l s 0 1 and 02; (1)

l e s magasins v o n t b i e n t s t f e r m e r l a c l i e n t e met ses gants a v a n t que l e passant a l l u m e sa p i p e e t l a p l u i e commence 1 tomber ( t h e s t o r e s a r e g o i n g t o c l o s e soon t h e shopper p u t s on h e r g l o v e s b e f o r e t h e passerby l i g h t s h i s p i p e and t h e r a i n begins t o f a l l )

(2)

l e c h a p i t e a u se dresse majestueusement l e clown f a i t des grimaces a f i n que l e s e n f a n t s se d i v e r t i s s e n t e t que l e t r o r n p e t t i s t e j o u e f a u x (the t e n t i s majestically erected t h e clown makes h i s faces i n o r d e r t h a t t h e c h i l d r e n amuse themselves and t h e t r u m p e t e r p l a y s f a l s e )

I n each o f t h e two o p e r a t o r f a c t o r l e v e l s , we have chosen two l e v e l s o f a subo p e r a t o r f a c t o r R, w i t h R b e i n g embedded i n f a c t o r 0: RlOl R201 R102 R202

a v a n t que ( b e f o r e ) apres que ( a f t e r ) a f i n que ( i n o r d e r t h a t ) p a r c e que (because)

The two experimental f a c t o r s e n a b l i n g t h e hypotheses t o be o p e r a t i o n a l y z e d f o r t h e r u n n i n g o f t h e experiment a r e t h e p r o c e s s i n g (T) and o p e r a t i o n s t r u c t u r e ( P ) factors. The same t e x t s were presented e i t h e r i n l e v e l T1, i n which t h e main c l a u s e o f t h e sentence preceded t h e dependent c o n t i n u a t i o n ( t e x t ( 2 ) i s an example o f T1) o r i n t h e i n v e r s e l e v e l T2, i n which t h e dependent c o n t i n u a t i o n preceded t h e main c l a u s e ( t e x t ( 3 ) i s an example):

(3)

l e c h a p i t e a u se dresse majestueusement a f i n que l e s e n f a n t s se d i v e r t i s s e n t e t que l e t r o m p e t t i s t e j o u e f a u x l e clown f a i t des grimaces (the t e n t i s majestically erected i n o r d e r t h a t t h e c h i l d r e n amuse themselves and t h e t r u m p e t e r p l a y s f a l s e t h e clown makes h i s f a c e s )

F a c t o r P places two o p e r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e s i n o p p o s i t i o n . I n t h e f i r s t , c o n s t i t u t i n g l e v e l P1, t h e t h r e e c l a u s e s f o r m i n g t h e complex sentence a r e connected by two clauses. The main c l a u s e M and t h e dependent c l a u s e D a r e connected by a s u b o r d i n a t i o n o p e r a t i o n , w h i l e t h e t h i r d c l a u s e MD i s r e l a t e d t o M by a c o o r d i n a t i o n o p e r a t i o n . I n t h e second o p e r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e , c o n s t i t u t i n g l e v e l P2, t h e t h r e e clauses f o r m i n g t h e complex sentence a r e r e l a t e d by t h r e e o p e r a t i o n s : D and MD a r e r e l a t e d by a c o o r d i n a t i o n o p e r a t i o n and a r e b o t h r e l a t e d t o t h e main c l a u s e by a s u b o r d i n a t i o n o p e r a t i o n . The depth o f t h e s t r u c t u r e remains t h e same i n both l e v e l s , o n l y t h e c o m p l e x i t y d i f f e r s ( f o r a d e f i n i t i o n o f i n d i c e s o f complexity, see N o i z e t (1980, p. 167)).The two o p e r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e s a r e shown i n F i g u r e 1,

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rM depth 1

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I

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Figure 1 O p e r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e o f complex sentences L e f t : two o p e r a t i o n s ( l e v e l P l ) . R i g h t : t h r e e o p e r a t i o n s ( l e v e l P2) Depth (h=2)and degree (d=3) o f t h e s t r u c t u r e s a r e m a i n t a i n e d constant. S i n g l e arrow: s u b o r d i n a t i o n o p e r a t i o n . Double arrow: c o o r d i n a t i o n o p e r a t i o n .

a c c o r d i n g t o t h e scheme p r e v i o u s l y proposed ( B a s t i e n and N o i z e t ( 1 9 7 6 ) ) . T e x t (1) i s an example o f l e v e l P1, w h i l e ( 2 ) i s an example o f l e v e l P2. The experimental p l a n may t h u s be w r i t t e n : S x F4 x T2 x P2 x R2 < 02 > CHOICE AND PREPARATION OF THE TEXTS Each s u b j e c t had t o r e a d t h e 16 experimental t e x t s r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f f a c t o r s T, P , R and 0. We t h u s had t o use 16 b a s i c t e x t s , each c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a theme, and each s u b j e c t r e a d one b a s i c t e x t combined w i t h one and o n l y one l e v e l f o r f a c t o r c r o s s i n g . Each s u b j e c t t h e r e f o r e had t h e 16 experimental process i n g s and 16 b a s i c t e x t s proposed t o h i m (see Caverni and N o i z e t (1981) f o r a d i s c u s s i o n on t h e methodological problems r a i s e d by experiments o f t h i s t y p e ) . I n more d e t a i l , two b l o c k s o f 8 b a s i c t e x t s were used. The f i r s t i n v o l v e d events i n c l u d i n g temporal r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f a n t e r i o r i t y , p o s t e r i o r i t y o r s i m u l t a n e i t y . The second b l o c k i n v o l v e d events w i t h a causal r e l a t i o n s h i p ( i n t h e broad sense), e i t h e r cause and e f f e c t (antecedent cause) o r means t o an end ( f i n a l cause). It i s c l e a r t h a t t h e s e two b l o c k s c o u l d o n l y be embedded i n t h e o p e r a t o r f a c t o r and n o t be crossed w i t h i t . The p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e two b a s i c t e x t b l o c k s and t h u s t h e two l e v e l s o f t h e o p e r a t o r f a c t o r was d i s t i n g u i s h e d i n t h e experiment and was s y s t e m a t i c a l l y counterbalanced. The a s s o c i a t i o n o f e x p e r i m e n t a l p r o c e s s i n g s and b a s i c t e x t s , as t h e o r d e r o f p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l t e x t s w i t h i n each b l o c k , however, was randomly chosen f o r each s u b j e c t w i t h a randomizing s u b r o u t i n e . I n t h e t e x t b l o c k s i n c l u d i n g a temporal r e l a t i o n s h i p , t h e t h r e e events d e s c r i b e d

111

OperativeActivity during Sentence Reading

by t h e t h r e e clauses o f t h e complex sentence were t o t a l l y independent i n t h e same c o n t e x t , s i t u a t e d by t h e i n t r o d u c t o r y sentence (see ( 1 ) ) . T h i s c o n d i t i o n o f i n d e pendence must be r e s p e c t e d i n o r d e r t h a t no o t h e r t y p e o f i m p u t a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y o f a causal n a t u r e , c o u l d be performed by t h e r e a d e r . It f o l l o w s t h a t t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e f a c t o r P c r e a t e s no d i f f i c u l t y i n p r e p a r i n g t h e t e x t s o f t h i s f i r s t b l o c k , as shown by comparing ( 1 ) and ( 4 ) .

(4) l e s magasins v o n t b i e n t s t f e r m e r

l a c l i e n t e met ses gants avant que l e passant allume sa p i p e e t que l a p l u i e commence

a

tomber

( t h e s t o r e s a r e g o i n g t o c l o s e soon t h e shopper p u t s on h e r gloves b e f o r e t h e passerby l i g h t s h i s p i p e and t h e r a i n begins t o f a l l ) The same i s o b v i o u s l y n o t t r u e f o r t h e b l o c k o f t e x t s i n which t h e r e i s a causal r e l a t i o n s h i p between events. I n t h i s case, a r e l a t i o n s h i p o f antecedent and consequence i s e s t a b l i s h e d between e v e n t E l " l e clown f a i t des grimaces" ( t h e clown makes h i s f a c e s ) and e v e n t E2 " l e s e n f a n t s se d i v e r t i s s e n t " ( t h e c h i l d r e n amuse themselves) i n example ( 2 ) . I n o r d e r t o be a b l e t o oppose t h e two o p e r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e s P 1 and P2, however, e v e n t E3 must be e i t h e r independent o f E l and E2 i n l e v e l P1 o r c a u s a l l y r e l a t e d t o E l and E2 i n l e v e l P2, causing us t o m o d i f y i t somewhat. Thus, e v e n t E3 " l e t r o m p e t t i s t e j o u e f o r t " ( t h e t r u m p e t e r p l a y s l o u d l y ) i n l e v e l M1 becomes " l e t r o m p e t t i s t e j o u e f a u x " ( t h e t r u m p e t e r p l a y s f a l s e ) i n l e v e l P2. Furthermore, e v e n t E3 must be chosen i n l e v e l P2 i n such way t h a t i t i s e i t h e r dependent on E l w i t h t h e o p e r a t o r " a f i n que" ( i n o r d e r t h a t ) , as i n ( 3 ) , o r as t h e antecedent o f E2 w i t h t h e o p e r a t o r "parce que" (because), as i n ( 5 ) .

(5)

l e c h a p i t e a u se dresse majestueusement l e s e n f a n t s se d i v e r t i s s e n t parce que l e clown f a i t des grimaces e t que l e t r o m p e t t i s t e j o u e f a u x ( t h e t e n t i s majestically erected t h e c h i 1d r e n amuse themsel ves because t h e clown makes h i s faces and t h e t r u m p e t e r p l a y s f a l s e )

DATA COLLECTING AND PROCESSING As s t a t e d , each experimental t e x t c o n t a i n e d f o u r clauses, and t h e segmentation proposed t o t h e s u b j e c t was one by clause. Clauses were arranged on t h r e e l i n e s on t h e screen. Before c l a u s e F1 appeared on t h e f i r s t l i n e , a symbol i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e n e x t press on t h e pushbutton would make i t appear. When t h e complex sentence i n c l u d e d two clauses ( P l ) , t h e main and dependent c l a u s e s appeared s u c c e s s i v e l y on t h e same l i n e s i d e by s i d e , w h i l e t h e c l a u s e c o o r d i n a t e d w i t h t h e main c l a u s e was on a n o t h e r l i n e (one s u b s c r i p t s i g n i n d i c a t e d e n d - o f - l i n e and another end-of-sentence). When t h e complex sentence i n c l u d e d t h r e e o p e r a t i o n s ( P Z ) , t h e main c l a u s e was on one l i n e and t h e two c o o r d i n a t e d dependent c l a u s e s were s i d e by s i d e on a n o t h e r l i n e . Reading exposure t i m e s (RET) were measured f o r t h e t h r e e clauses o f t h e complex sentence. The means p r e s e n t e d below a r e t h e geometric means; d a t a were g a t h e r e d from 3 8 U n i v e r s i t y l e v e l a d u l t s whose n a t i v e language was French. Data were s u b j e c t e d t o an a n a l y s i s o f v a r i a n c e w i t h t h e VAR 3 program (Rouanet and Lepine

(1977)).

I n t h i s t y p e o f experiment, i t i s d i f f i c u l t f o r reasons o f semantic p l a u s i b i l i t y and i m p o s s i b l e f o r reasons o f c r o s s i n g e x p e r i m e n t a l f a c t o r s , t o m a i n t a i n c l a u s e l e n g t h s a b s o l u t e l y c o n s t a n t . Table 1 shows t h e means (m) and s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n s ( s ) o f these l e n g t h s . The d i f f e r e n c e s between M and D r e s u l t f r o m t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e o p e r a t o r i n D and t h e same i s t r u e f o r MD d i f f e r e n c e s between P 1 and

G. Noizet

112

Table 1 Lengths of clauses (number of c h a r a c t e r s , including spaces) Temporal operator (01)

m M D MD/P1 MO/P2

S

26.3 37.6

3.0 3.5

28.0 33.6

3.4 3.4

Causal o p e r a t o r (02)

m 28.8 38.6 26.8 29.8

S

2.6 3.1

7.7 4.5

P2. Other d i f f e r e n c e s a r e explained by changes of verb tense imposed by syntax. The d i f f e r e n c e s due t o t h e sub-operator ( a n t e r i o r i t y vs. p o s t e r i o r i t y , f i n a l cause vs. antecedent c a u s e ) , however, remain low: R2 c l a u s e s were g l o b a l l y longer than R 1 by 1.1 l e t t e r when a temporal r e l a t i o n s h i p was involved and by 0.6 l e t t e r when a c a u s a l i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p was involved. The mean RETs per treatment a r e shown i n appendix 1.

EFFECT OF ORDER OF PRESENTATION The data c o l l e c t e d f u r n i s h an element f o r responding t o an i n i t i a l q u e s t i o n , t h a t of t h e development of t h e a c t i v i t y of comprehension during the reading of a complex sentence. Let us take t h e case of complex sentences with two operations e can c a l c u l a t e t h e RETs of clauses read f i r s t o r second and compare them, (Pl). W s i n c e they a r e the same kernel sentences, which a r e equally d i s t r i b u t e d between

Table 2 E f f e c t of order of presentation of P 1 clauses r e l a t e d by a subordination operation (geometric means i n ms)

First ( F 2 ) Avant que ( b e f o r e ) PlRlOl Apres que ( a f t e r ) PlR201 Afin que ( i n o r d e r t h a t ) PlR102 Parce que (because) PlR202

Second (F3)

Difference

1411

1667

+258

1456

1719

+263

1343

, r n r

13LO

+lU3

1358

1671

+313

. 3 n_l

Operative Activity during Sentence Reading

113

f i r s t and second appearance; t h e same i s t r u e o f t h e s y n t a c t i c s t a t u s o f t h e clauses (main vs. dependent) and t h e i r l e n g t h . It can be seen i n Table 2 t h a t , a l l o t h e r t h i n g s b e i n g e q u a l , t h e c l a u s e r e a d second r e q u i r e s a l o n g e r r e a d i n g t i m e t h a n t h a t r e a d f i r s t , w i t h a mean i n c r e a s e o f 254 ms ( F ' (1,37) = 68.13, p < .001). A s i m p l e e x p l a n a t i o n coming t o mind i s t h a t when t h e r e a d e r reads t h e second clause, he must n o t o n l y process t h e i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , b u t a l s o t h e o p e r a t i o n u n i t i n g t h i s c l a u s e t o t h e f i r s t . Reading t i m e i s t h u s prolonged b y t h e double p r o c e s s i n g , which i s i n d i s p e n s a b l e f o r const r u c t i n g t h e meaning o f t h e sentence.

T h i s r e s u l t c o n f i r m s p r e v i o u s l y observed d i f f e r e n c e s , e.g. a 360 ms o r d e r e f f e c t w i t h second degree sentences ( i . e . two-clause sentences) w i t h a temporal o r causal s u b o r d i n a t i o n r e l a t i o n , b u t presented o u t o f any c o n t e x t and w i t h a phrase segment a t i o n , t h u s f i n e r t h a n t h a t i n t h e p r e s e n t e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n ( N o i z e t (1980), pp. 208-210). S i m i l a r l y , a 238 ms o r d e r e f f e c t was observed f o r second degree sentences w i t h a temporal o p e r a t o r b u t i n s e r t e d i n l a r g e t e x t s ( N o i z e t and Pynte (1981)). I n a d d i t i o n t o t h i s c o n f i r m a t i o n , t h e p r e s e n t experiment f u r n i s h e s o r i g i n a l data: t h e sentences a r e t h i r d degree and t h e p a i r o f clauses r e l a t e d by a s u b o r d i n a t i o n o p e r a t o r i n c o n d i t i o n P1, t h e o n l y one a l l o w i n g s i m p l e comparisons, i s always f o l l o w e d by a t h i r d c l a u s e c o o r d i n a t e d t o t h e main clause. The r e s u l t o f t h i s f e a t u r e i s t h a t t h e e f f e c t o f o r d e r cannot be i n t e r p r e t e d as a s i m p l e "end o f sentence" e f f e c t , s i n c e i t i s m a n i f e s t e d f o r t h e second c l a u s e i n a sentence c o n t a i n i n g t h r e e clauses. Using an experimental paradigm s i m i l a r t o o u r s , b u t w i t h word-by-word segmentation, Aaronson and Scarborough (1976) a l s o observed l o n g e r r e a d i n g t i m e s a t phrase boundaries w i t h an accentuated e f f e c t w i t h s e r i a l p o s i t i o n o f t h e boundary w i t h i n t h e sentence. They a t t r i b u t e d t h i s e l o n g a t i o n t o t h e memory t a s k imposed on t h e i r s u b j e c t s : h i g h values would r e s u l t f r o m a recapi t u l a t i o n , f a c i l i t a t i n g memory s t o r a g e ( t h i s e f f e c t disappeared i n a c o n t r o l s i t u a t i o n o f s i m p l e comprehension). The r e s u l t s analyzed above show t h a t t h e e f f e c t o f o r d e r c o n s t i t u t e s an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t phenomenon t h a n t h a t observed by Aaronson and Scarborough, b o t h h a v i n g a d i f f e r e n t type o f explanation. EFFECT OF ORDER OF PROCESSING M A I N AND DEPENDENT CLAUSES

A decisive t e s t f o r demonstrating operative a c t i v i t y i n reading i s the examination o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s i n which a s u b o r d i n a t i o n o p e r a t i o n i s processed. T h i s o p e r a t i o n i s c l e a r l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a grammatical d e s c r i p t i o n i n t h e case o f sentences. T h i s t y p e o f d e s c r i p t i o n , however, i s necessary b u t n o t s u f f i c i e n t . The o b j e c t i v e i s t o determine how t h e r e a d e r o r g a n i z e s two s u b - s t r u c t u r e s , each c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a system o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s , i n t o a g l o b a l c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e and, f o r example, i n t o t h e c a t e g o r y o f t e m p o r a l i t y o r c a u s a l i t y . He does t h i s by u t i l i z i n g an o p e r a t i o n which i s n o t comnutative, i n t h e sense t h a t t h e two terms o f t h e o p e r a t i o n , 1.e. A t the syntactic level, t h i s t h e two s u b - s t r u c t u r e s i n v o l v e d , a r e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d . . non-commutativity i s r e f l e c t e d by a d i f f e r e n t i a l s t a t u s between c l a u s e s (main and dependent) which s a t i s f a c t o r i l y summarizes t h e s u b o r d i n a t i o n term. I f an o p e r a t i v e a c t i v i t y i s indeed i n v o l v e d i n r e a d i n g , we must t a k e i n t o account t h e c o n d i t i o n s i n which t h e terms o f t h e o p e r a t i o n a r e a v a i l a b l e d u r i n g temporal processing. These c o n d i t i o n s may w e l l a f f e c t t h e speed w i t h which t h e o p e r a t i o n may be executed. N a t u r a l l y , t h i s consequence i s meaningful o n l y i f t h e r e i s a r e l e v a n t d i s t i n c t i o n o f t h e terms o f t h e o p e r a t i o n , which i s t h e case o f noncommutative o p e r a t i o n s . I t may be asked why t h a t which i s observed i n t h e domain o f logico-mathematics would n o t be observed i n t h a t o f t h e p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c operative.

G. Noizet

114

Our hypothesis i n v o l v e s t h e importance o f t h e o r d e r o f t r e a t i n g t h e main and depend e n t clauses, imposed by t h e l i n e a r i t y o f t h e t e x t , t h e s e c l a u s e s b e i n g t h e terms o f an o p e r a t i o n e s t a b l i s h i n g a temporal o r causal r e l a t i o n s h i p . The r e a l i z a t i o n o f t h e o p e r a t i o n w i l l be a c c e l e r a t e d o r d e c e l e r a t e d by t h i s o r d e r . Thus, when t h e r e a d e r can process t h e s u b - s t r u c t u r e which i s t h e p i v o t e n t i t y o f t h e s t r u c t u r e , t h e main c l a u s e i n t h i s case, b e f o r e p r o c e s s i n g t h e s u b - s t r u c t u r e which m o d i f i e s i t , t h e n o v e r a l l p r o c e s s i n g w i l l be more r a p i d t h a n i n t h e o p p o s i t e case. T h i s m o d i f i c a t i o n i n v o l v e s d e f i n i n g t h e w i t h i n - c l a u s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s , e.g. a c t a n t / a c t i o n / i n s t r u m e n t , o f t h e p i v o t s t r u c t u r e by i n t e g r a t i n g them i n t o a between-clause tempor a l o r causal r e l a t i o n s h i p . Table 3 presents t h e mean i n d i c e s e n a b l i n g us t o t e s t t h e e f f e c t o f t h e o r d e r o f p r o c e s s i n g terms o f t h e o p e r a t i o n . When t h e complex sentence i n c l u d e d two operat i o n s ( P l ) , we c a l c u l a t e d t h e t o t a l r e a d i n g t i m e o f t h e main and dependent clauses. The r e s u l t i s seen t o be unequivocal. Thus, when p r o c e s s i n g occurs i n t h e o r d e r M+D, i t s mean t i m e i s 275 ms l e s s t h a n when p r o c e s s i n g i s i n t h e o r d e r D+M

Table 3 E f f e c t o f o r d e r o f p r o c e s s i n g main and dependent clauses ( g e o m e t r i c means i n ms)

Order

Avant que (before)

Apres que (after)

Difference

M+D ( T l )

D t M (T2)

P1

2898

3257

+359

P2*

2717

3017

+300

P2

4486

4710

+224

P1

2958

3391

+433

P2*

2834

2911

+ 77

P2

4781

4540

-241

P1 A f i n que P2* ( i n order that) P2

2815

2923

+lo8

2552

3070

+518

4276

4695

+419

P1

2929

3127

+198

P2*

2694

2912

+218

P2

4481

4716

+235

Parce que (because)

P1:

sum o f RETs M+O

PZ*:

sum o f RETS M + D ~

P2:

sum o f RETs MtDl+D2

(F' (1,37) = 54.04, p < .001). The observed d i f f e r e n c e i s c l o s e t o t h a t o f 290 ms p r e v i o u s l y observed when second degree sentences were p r e s e n t e d s e p a r a t e l y ( N o i z e t (1978)). As a r e s u l t o f t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e p r e s e n t experiment, i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o

Operative Activity during Sentence Reading

115

n o t e t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n c e due t o t h e o r d e r o f p r o c e s s i n g i s n o t m a n i f e s t e d f o r t h e t h i r d clause, t h a t c o o r d i n a t e d w i t h t h e main c l a u s e and which, i n t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n i n q u e s t i o n , i s always i n t h i r d place. The mean p r o c e s s i n g t i m e o f t h i s c l a u s e i s 1461 ms when c l a u s e s 1 and 2 a r e i n t h e o r d e r M+D and i s 1446 ms when t h e o r d e r i s D+M. These values a r e s t a t i s t i c a l l y i d e n t i c a l . When t h e complex sentences i n c l u d e t h r e e o p e r a t i o n s (PP), d a t a a n a l y s i s p r e s e n t s a d i f f i c u l t y a r i s i n g from the f a c t t h a t the three clauses are inserted i n the same s u b o r d i n a t i o n s t r u c t u r e . The experimental d e s i g n enables us t o compare two o r d e r s o f processing, M+D+MD and D+MO+M ( i n t h i s s t r u c t u r e , MD has t h e s t a t u s o f a dependent c l a u s e and we may w r i t e M+DltD2 and Dl+D2+M). I t appears t o be c o n s i s t e n t t o c a l c u l a t e a t o t a l RET f o r M and D i n o r d e r t o generate a comparison between c o n d i t i o n P1, o f which we have j u s t spoken, and t h i s c o n d i t i o n P2 (remember t h a t t h e k e r n e l sentences a r e t h e same). T h i s choice, however, l e a d s t o a summation o f t h e RETs o f clauses i n d i f f e r e n t p l a c e s ( 1 and 2 i n one o r d e r , 1 and 3 i n t h e o t h e r ) . Another s o l u t i o n i n v o l v e s c a l c u l a t i n g t h e t o t a l RET f o r t h e t h r e e clauses, b u t t h e disadvantage here i s t h a t t h e p r o c e s s i n g o n t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n between t h e two dependent clauses a l s o p a r t i c i p a t e s . We c a l c u l a t e d t h e two i n d i c e s ( T a b l e 3), t h e f i r s t d e s i g n a t e d by P2*, t h e second by P2. With one e x c e p t i o n (P2R201), t h e observed d i f f e r e n c e s a l l i n v o l v e an e l o n g a t i o n o f p r o c e s s i n g when t h e main c l a u s e i s processed l a s t . The d i f f e r e n c e w i t h P2* i s 278 ms ( F ' (1.37) = 11.51, p <.01) a value which i s equal t o t h e 275 ms observed w i t h P1. The c o r r e s p o n d i n g v a l u e f o r P2 i s 159 ms ( F ' (1,37) = 16.00, p <.001). One c o n c l u s i o n t o be drawn i s t h a t t h e e f f e c t o f o r d e r o f p r o c e s s i n g t h e terms o f t h e o p e r a t i o n i s n o t g l o b a l l y a f f e c t e d b y i n c r e a s i n g t h e w e i g h t o f t h e m o d i f y i n g s t r u c t u r e ( t w o c o o r d i n a t e d dependent c l a u s e s r a t h e r t h a n one dependent c l a u s e ) . As w i l l be seen below, however, t h i s c o n c l u s i o n i s f a l l a c i o u s , s i n c e t h e r e i s a s t r o n g i n t e r a c t i o n between t h e o r d e r o f p r o c e s s i n g and t h e n a t u r e o f t h e o p e r a t o r . We i n t e r p r e t t h e e f f e c t o f o r d e r o f p r o c e s s i n g as a r e s u l t o f t h e p r o p e r t y o f non-commutativity o f t h e o p e r a t i o n t h a t t h e r e a d e r must perform. It i s t h u s a p p r o p r i a t e t o examine i f t h i s p r o p e r t y p a r t i c i p a t e s i n t h e same way a c c o r d i n g t o whether t h e o p e r a t i o n l e a d s t o t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t e m p o r a l i t y o r c a u s a l i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p s . The f i r s t o b s e r v a t i o n i s t h a t t h e e f f e c t p a r t i c i p a t e s i n b o t h cases. The mean e f f e c t (Pl+P2*) i s 292 ms w i t h t h e t e m p o r a l i t y o p e r a t i o n ( F ' (1,37) = 18.34, p <.001) and i s 261 ms w i t h t h e c a u s a l i t y o p e r a t i o n The key f a c t i s t h a t t h i s e f f e c t v a r i e s i n v e r s e l y ( F ' (1,37) = 21.24, p c.001). a c c o r d i n g t o t h e n a t u r e o f t h e o p e r a t i o n ( F i g u r e 2) when t h e w e i g h t o f t h e modifying s t r u c t u r e i s increased.

Some s u b j e c t s o f f e r e d spontaneous comments on t h e t e x t s t h e y were g i v e n t o read, and t h i s i n c i t e d us t o advance t h e f o l l o w i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I n o r d e r f o r t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between two events t o be p u r e l y temporal, i t i s necessary t h a t these events be independent, t h u s i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e . Even i f t h e s e events a r e s i t u a t e d i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e same s i t u a t i o n , t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f o n l y temporal r e l a t i o n s h i p s between them may g i v e t h e i m p r e s s i o n o f d i s c u r s i v e u n r e a l i t y , i n c i t i n g t h e r e a d e r t o n o t process t h e o p e r a t i o n , a l l t h e more so when t h e s t r u c t u r e i s o f g r e a t e r c o m p l e x i t y . I n t h e case o f a causal r e l a t i o n s h i p , on t h e o t h e r hand, t h e i n t e g r a t i o n o f events r e q u i r e s t h e p r o c e s s i n g o f t h e o p e r a t i o n and t h i s p r o c e s s i n g i s rendered more d i f f i c u l t as t h e m o d i f y i n g t e r m (antecedent o r f i n a l cause) i s i t s e l f more complex. The observed d i f f e r e n c e i s t h u s w e l l r e l a t e d t o t h e c o g n i t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f each sub-operation. Our experiment d i d n o t f u r n i s h a response t o t h e q u e s t i o n i f t h e same k e r n e l sentence r e q u i r e s a d i f f e r e n t p r o c e s s i n g t i m e a c c o r d i n g t o whether i t has t h e s t a t u s o f main o r dependent clause. Operator r e a d i n a t i m e was n o t i s o l a t e d and so t h e o v e r a l l 224 ms d i f f e r e n c e ( T a b l e 4 ) i s a t t n ' b u t t b l e t o a d i f f e r e n c e i n l e n g t h (see T a b l e l ) , even i f t h e p r o p o r t i o n a l i n c r e a s e o f dependent c l a u s e r e a d i n g t i m e (16.5%) i s much l o w e r t h a n t h e i n c r e a s e i n l e n g t h (38.3%). The important consideration i s not a t t h a t level, rather the f a c t t h a t t h i s difference

G. Noizet

116

- - - - ----

causal

operator 02

Figure 2 Effect of order of processing according t o the nature of the operation Ordinate: increase of reading time as a function of the order of processing the main clause and the dependent clause(s) structure with two operations ( P l ) or three operations (P2) Abcissa: P101: F ' ( 1 , 3 7 ) = 71.43, p <.001 ( F " (1,2331) = 4.39, p c.05) P201: F ' (1,37) = 3.71, N.S. P102: F ' (1,37) = 76.45, p <.001 P202: F ' (1,37) = 12.55, p <.001

Table 4 Processing of clauses according t o t h e i r syntactic sta tus (geometris means in ms) Order M+D ( T l ) D t M ( T 2 )

Two operations (PI)

Three operations (P2) Total

Difference

Mean

M D

1162 1739

1552 1622

+391 -117

1358 1680

M

1206 1494

1508 1470

+302 - 24

1357 1482

1184 1616

1531 1546

+347 70

1357 1581

D M D

-

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117

i s s e n s i t i v e t o t h e o r d e r o f p r o c e s s i n g t h e main and dependent clauses. G l o b a l l y , i t i s 432 ms i n t h e o r d e r M+D ( F ' (1,37) = 140.96, p <.001 f o r sentences w i t h two o p e r a t i o n s and F' (1,37) = 42.58, p c.001 f o r sentences w i t h t h r e e o p e r a t i o n s ) and i s 15 ms i n t h e o r d e r D+M ( F ' (1,37) = 0.01, N.S., F ' (1,37) = 0.31, N.S. respect i v e l y ) . T h i s r e s u l t s f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t t h e e f f e c t o f o r d e r o f p r e s e n t a t i o n and o r d e r o f p r o c e s s i n g a r e more pronounced f o r t h e main c l a u s e t h a n f o r t h e dependent clause: t h e y i n t r o d u c e a 347 ms d i f f e r e n c e f o r t h e main c l a u s e and a 70 ms d i f f e rence f o r t h e dependent clause. I n t h i s p r e s e n t a t i o n , i t s h o u l d be remembered

Table 5 I n t e r a c t i o n o f clause factors Place 1

Place 2

M+ D

main

dependent

D+M

dependent

main

I n column: I n row: I n boxes:

order o f presentation f a c t o r order o f processing f a c t o r syntactic status factor

t h a t the syntactic status factor o f the clause i s integrated i n t o the i n t e r a c t i o n o f t h e f a c t o r s o r d e r o f p r e s e n t a t i o n and o r d e r o f p r o c e s s i n g ( T a b l e 5). I t i s e q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t t o demonstrate t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n t i a l e f f e c t s o f o p e r a t i v e a c t i v i t y a r e p r i m a r i l y m a n i f e s t e d on t h e s u b - s t r u c t u r e which i s t h e p i v o t o f t h e sentence. The r e a d e r t h u s c o n s t r u c t s t h e meaning o f t h e ensemble by c o n c e n t r a t i n g on t h i s s u b - s t r u c t u r e .

EFFECT OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE OPERATIONS Three f a c t o r s o f o p e r a t i v e c o m p l e x i t y may be d i s t i n g u i s h e d ( N o i z e t (1980, p . 1 6 7 ) ) : t h e number o f c l a u s e s i n v o l v e d (degree o f t h e s t r u c t u r e ) , t h e number o f l e v e l s (depth o f t h e s t r u c t u r e ) and t h e number o f o p e r a t i o n s (completeness o f t h e s t r u c t u r e ) . The degree o f t h e s t r u c t u r e has o n l y a t r i v i a l e f f e c t . We have p r e v i o u s l y demonstrated t h e e f f e c t o f t h e number o f l e v e l s w i t h equal i n d i c e s o f degree and completeness ( N o i z e t ( 1 9 7 8 ) ) . One o f t h e purposes o f t h e p r e s e n t experiment was t h u s t o show t h e e f f e c t o f t h e t h i r d c o m p l e x i t y f a c t o r , t h e number o f o p e r a t i o n s . F i g u r e 1 shows how t h i s f a c t o r can assume two l e v e l s w i t h equal i n d i c e s o f degree and depth. The mean RETs ( T a b l e 6) show t h a t t h e r e i s o n l y a s l i g h t e f f e c t o f t h e number o f o p e r a t i o n s on t h e g l o b a l r e a d i n g t i m e o f t h e sentence. The mean p r o c e s s i n g t i m e o f a s t r u c t u r e w i t h t h r e e o p e r a t i o n s i s 95 ms l o n g e r t h a n t h a t w i t h two operations, It i s noteworthy b u t t h i s d i f f e r e n c e i s n o t s i g n i f i c a n t ( F ' (1,37) = 0.41, N.S.). t h a t t h i s i n c r e a s e d p r o c e s s i n g t i m e due t o t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e o p e r a t i o n s seems t o be g r e a t e r when p r o c e s s i n g occurs i n t h e o r d e r M+D t h a n i n t h e o r d e r D+M (145 vs. 45 ms), b u t a g a i n t h i s d i f f e r e n c e i s n o n - s i g n i f i c a n t (F' (1,37) = 0.17, N.S., VS. F ' (1,37) = 1.60, N.S.). The s t r u c t u r e o f t h e o p e r a t i o n s , on t h e o t h e r hand, a c c o r d i n g t o t h e l e v e l s we chose f o r f a c t o r P, has a d i r e c t e f f e c t on t h e c l a u s e MD. T h i s c l a u s e i s s i t u a t e d a t depth 1 and i s c o o r d i n a t e d w i t h t h e main c l a u s e when t h e s t r u c t u r e i n c l u d e s two o p e r a t i o n s . I n t h e case o f t h r e e o p e r a t i o n s , i t i s s i t u a t e d a t depth 2, i s c o o r d i n a t e d w i t h D and i s s u b o r d i n a t e d t o M. Given t h i s s i t u a t i o n , MD i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y r e a d more r a p i d l y i n t h e f i r s t case t h a n i n t h e second

G. Noizet

118

Table 6 Effect of the structure of operations (geometric means in ms) Structure involving two operations three operations

Difference

(PI)

(P2)

Avant que (before)

4484

4598

+114

Apres que (after)

4670

4661

9

Afin que ( i n order t h a t )

4339

4486

+147

Parce que (because)

4471

4599

+128

(1454 ms vs. 1749 ms f o r a difference of 295 ms ( F ' (1,37) = 25.40, p c.001). When processing occurs in the order M+D, t h i s difference i s 346 ms ( F ' (1,37) = 21.71, p <.001) and in the order D+M i s 244 ms ( F ' (1,37) = 16.14, p c.001). I t should be noted, however, t h a t in T2P2 processing, clause MD i s situated second and n o t t h i r d , which limits the validity of a comparison according t o the processing order. The difference in MD reading time has two possible explanations. Clause MD i s n o t situated a t the same depth, or i s the term o f one operation in one case and the term of two in the other case. Our re sults do not enable us to d if f e r e n t i a t e between these two explanations, b u t we do observe t h a t b o t h are of an operative nature.

The experimental design enabled no comparison t o be made between the processing o f texts with a temporal relationship a n d the processing of those with a causal relationship, since the basic sentences were n o t the same in each block of te xts. The comparison between sub-operators, however, was possible. We could observe no differences between "avant que" (before) and "apres-que" ( a f t e r ) (2973 vs. 3024 ms, F ' (1,37) = 2.06, N.S.) nor between "afin que (in order t h a t ) and "parce que" (because) (2841 vs. 2916 ms, F ' (1,37) = 0.24, N.S.). I n addition, in the case o f a temporal relationship, no difference appeared according t o whether the operations did or did n o t respect the order of events (2980 vs. 3017 ms); similarly, in the case of a causal relationship, there was no diffe rence according t o whether t h i s order did or did not respect the logical order of causes a n d e f f e c t s (2852 vs. 2905 ms). CONCLUSIONS The very general i n i t i a l idea of t h i s work was t h a t the comprehension of a sentence or a t e x t involves the construction of the transitory cognitive structure which constitutes the e n t i t y of knowledge t h at t h i s sentence o r te xt furnishes. The experimental material we used belonged t o the class of descriptive te xts and in t h i s c l a ss , t h i s knowledge involves the situation or events, real o r imaginary, which are the referent of the t ex t . The experimental paradigm of verifying sentences on images, often used since i t s introduction by Gough (1965), i s exemplary

Operative Activity during Sentence Reading

119

i n t h i s c o n t e x t : what i s t h e a c t u a l t a s k o f t h e s u b j e c t , i f n o t m e r e l y t h e cornpar+ son of t h e knowledge o f t h e s i t u a t i o n caused by comprehension o f t h e sentence w i t h t h e knowledge o f t h e s i t u a t i o n r e s u l t i n g from p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e image? The d e s c r i p t i o n o f t r a n s i t o r y c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e s i s n o t a m a j o r concern o f psyc h o l i n g u i s t i c s ; r a t h e r , i t f a l l s i n t h e domain o f c o g n i t i v e psychology. I t i s n o t u s e l e s s t o r e c a l l t h i s , i n o r d e r t o a v o i d u n f o r t u n a t e c o n f u s i o n s between t h e word i t s e l f and t h e mental r e a l i t i e s i t evokes, t r a n s l a t e s o r b r i n g s i n t o b e i n g . No g r e a t advances w i l l be made by d e c l a r i n g t h a t t h e s e s t r u c t u r e s can be d e s c r i b e d i n terms o f elements and o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s on these elements, even i f each element i s u l t i m a t e l y r e s o l v e d i n t o a c o m p o s i t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s . L e t us suppose t h a t we e s t a b l i s h , b y a g i v e n means -whether i t be l o g i c a l f o r m a l i z a t i o n , a r t i f i c i a l i n t e l l i g e n c e , semantic a n a l y s i s , case grammar o r any o t h e r means- t h e r e p e r t o r y , r a t h e r t h e system o f t h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s ; what w i l l we have accomplished i n a d d i t i o n t o c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e p o r t r a i t o f what p h i l o s o p h y used t o c a l l c a t e g o r i e s o f t h o u g h t and what we t o d a y c a l l c o g n i t i v e o p e r a t i o n s ? The o n l y purpose o f these elementary remarks i s t o c l a r i f y t h e o r i e n t a t i o n o f c u r r e n t research, an i l l u s t r a t i o n o f which i s f u r n i s h e d b y t h i s a r t i c l e . I f t h e comprehension o f a sentence o r a t e x t i s t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e t h e o r e t i c a l l y r e p r e s e n t a b l e by a graph w i t h p o i n t s and l i n e s , terms and r e l a t i o n s , t h e n an o p e r a t i v e a c t i v i t y i s n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e d i n comprehension. I t i s t h i s a c t i v i t y which enables us t o process r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h e u n i t s i d e n t i f i e d by l e x i c a l a n a l y s i s . The most e s s e n t i a l o f these r e l a t i o n s h i p s - e s s e n t i a l from t h e p o i n t o f view o f t h e s t r u c t u r e t o be c o n s t r u c t e d - a r e supported by t h e w i t h i n c l a u s e and between-clause s y n t a c t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e t e x t , as i t i s r e f l e c t e d by t h e word o r d e r , t h e use o f grammatical morphems as t h e v e r b a l and casual t e r m i n a t i o n s , a f f i x e s , connectors and so on. T h i s r e n d e r s t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n o f a f o r m o f s y n t a c t i c a n a l y s i s necessary i n t h e process o f comprehension, except i n t h e extreme case i n which t h i s t y p e o f a n a l y s i s i s s h o r t - c i r c u i t e d i n f a v o r o f a l e x i c o - p r a g m a t i c t y p e o f i n t e r p r e t i v e s t r a t e g y . When we speak o f s y n t a c t i c a n a l y s i s , we c o n s i d e r t h e t e r m w i t h a p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c meaning, a c o n s t r u c t i o n based on p e r t i n e n t i n d i c e s o f t h e r e l a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e o f t h e u t t e r a n c e . T h i s i s e v i d e n t l y n o t grammatical a n a l y s i s . S y n t a c t i c a n a l y s i s , however, i s o n l y a means and n o t an end. With l e x i c a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , i t i s one o f t h e means e n a b l i n g t h e meaning o f t h e u t t e r a n c e t o be c o n s t r u c t e d . It i s t h e i n t e r m e d i a r y t h r o u g h which c o g n i t i v e work may be e f f e c t e d . L e t us t a k e t h e case o f one o f t h e o p e r a t o r s used i n o u r experiment, e.g. " a f i n que" ( i n o r d e r t h a t ) . The p r o c e s s i n g o f such an o p e r a t o r occurs a t two l e v e l s : The f i r s t l e v e l , i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e o p e r a t o r , c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e sentence by b r i n g i n g i n t o p l a y t h e a n t i c i p a t i o n o f two h i e r a r c h i c a l l y o r g a n i z e d s u b - s t r u c t u r e s , one o f which a c t s as t h e p i v o t and t h e o t h e r as m o d i f i e r . The second l e v e l , p r o c e s s i n g o f t h e o p e r a t o r , evokes and t r i g g e r s t h e t r u l y c o g n i t i v e o p e r a t i o n s which suppose a competence o f an o r d e r o t h e r t h a n t h a t o f language: t h e c a p a c i t y o f d i s t i n g u i s h i n g a p a s t from a f u t u r e e v e n t , a r e a l f r o m a p o s s i b l e e v e n t and t o r e p r e s e n t a purpose as t h e o r g a n i z e r o f t h e a c t i o n . The s t a r t - u p o f t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s i s e v e n t u a l l y a i d e d by t h e presence o f i n d i c e s o t h e r t h a n t h e o p e r a t o r i n t h e sentence: " a f i n q u ' i l f i n i s s e demain son t r a v a i l " ( i n o r d e r t h a t he f i n i s h h i s work tomorrow). We hope t o have shown t h a t an o p e r a t i v e a c t i v i t y p a r t i c i p a t e s i n r e a d i n g , a p a r t i c i p a t i o n a t t e s t e d t o by changes i n t h e d u r a t i o n s t h a t t h e r e a d e r p r e s e n t s t h e t e x t t o h i m s e l f . A l l o t h e r f a c t o r s b e i n g equal, r e a d i n g i s more r a p i d i f t h e s t r u c t u r e t o process i s l e s s complex o r i f t h e terms o f t h e o p e r a t i o n can be processed cons i s t e n t w i t h t h e s t r u c t u r a l h i e r a r c h y . Can we f i n a l l y say t h a t t h i s o p e r a t i v e a c t i v i t y i s s y n t a c t i c o r semantic? U s i n g t h e example o f an o p e r a t o r such as " a f i n que" ( i n o r d e r t h a t ) , we have shown t h a t t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and c o n s i d e r -

120

G. Noizet

ation o f s y n t a c t i c i n d i c e s p a r t i c i p a t e e a r l y i n t h e process o f comprehension. T h i s i s undoubtedly an autonomous process, as an o n - l i n e a n a l y s i s has a l r e a d y demons t r a t e d . T h i s i s t h e c o n d i t i o n f o r c o n s t r u c t i n g an i n i t i a l approach t o t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s c h a r a c t e r i z i n g t h e sentence. The c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h i s s t r u c t u r e , however, t e r m i n a t e s o n l y by a t r u l y c o g n i t i v e a c t i v i t y b y i n t e g r a t i n g a l l t h e terms i d e n t i f i e d and t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s a c t i v a t e d d u r i n g t h e process.

FOOTNOTES Requests f o r r e p r i n t s should be s e n t t o Georges N o i z e t , L a b o r a t o i r e de Paris. Psychologie Experimentale, 28 r u e Serpente, F - 75006

-

1 See a r t i c l e by M.F. E h r l i c h i n t h i s p u b l i c a t i o n . 2

See t h e a r t i c l e by J. Segui, J.Y. Dommergues, U. F r a u e n f e l d e r and J. Mehler i n t h i s pub1i c a t i o n .

3

J.B.

4

The t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e o f C a t h e r i n e L o r i d a n t , CNRS t e c h n i c i a n , i s acknow1edged.

G r i z e speaks o f l o g i c o - d i s c u r s i v e o p e r a t i o n s .

REFERENCES

-

AARONSON (D.), SCARBOROUGH (H.) Performance t h e o r i e s f o r sentence c o d i n g : some q u a n t i t a t i v e evidence, J o u r n a l o f Experimental Psychology: Human P e r c e p t i o n and Performance, 1976, 2, 56-70.

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P r o p o s i t i o n s pour une f o r m a l i s a t i o n du t r a i t e m e n t BASTIEN (C.), NOIZET (G.) p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i q u e des phrases, Mathematiques e t Sciences Humaines, 1976, 14, no 53, 31-62.

CAVERN1 (J.P.), NOIZET (G.) - Problemes methodologiques l i e s ti l a n a t u r e p r e experimentale des m a t e r i e l s ou des s i t u a t i o n s , L'Annee Psychologique, 1981, 81, 131-138. FORSTER (K.), RYDER (L.) - P e r c e i v i n g t h e s t r u c t u r e and meaning o f sentences, J o u r n a l o f Verbal L e a r n i n g and Verbal Behavior, 1971, 10, 285-296.

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GOUGH (P.) Grammatical t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s and speed o f understanding, J o u r n a l o f Verbal L e a r n i n g and Verbal Behavior, 1965, 4, 107-111. LE NY (J.F.) - La semantique psychologique, P a r i s : Presses U n i v e r s i t a i r e s de France, 1979, 257 p.

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Le t r a i t e m e n t s y n t a x i q u e au cours de l a l e c t u r e , i n Processus NOIZET (G.) psychologiques dans l a l e c t u r e , Psychologie e t Education, numero s p e c i a l , 1978, 209-220. NOIZET (G.) - De l a p e r c e p t i o n a l a comprehension du langage, P a r i s : Presses U n i v e r s i t a i r e s de France, 1980, 248 p.

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NOIZET (G.), PYNTE (J.) M o d i f i e - t - o n l a v i t e s s e de l e c t u r e en imposant au l e c t w des u n i t e s de t r a i tement? Donnees r e c u e i 11 i e s s u r des t e x t e s , Psychologie Francaise, 1981, 26, 124-132.

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Operative Activity during Sentence Reading

PYNTE (J.) - Programmation d'une experience de psycholinguistique, Cahiers de Psychologie, 1975, 18, 65-74. ROUANET (H.), LLPINE (D.) - I n t r o d u c t i o n a l ' a n a l y s e des comparaisons pour l e t r a i t e m e n t des donnees experintentales, Informatique e t Sciences Humaines, 1977, no 33, 9-123.

Appendix 1:

Mean RETs p e r treatment (geometric means i n ms)

Temporal subordination (01) Avant que (before) ( R l )

Two operations (PI) ~

Apres que ( a f t e r )

(R2)

Order M+D (TI)

Order C+M (T2)

Order M+D (TI)

Order D+M (T2)

M

1143 (F2)

1579 (F3)

1192 (F2)

1672 (F3)

D

1755 (F3)

1678 (F2)

1766 (F3)

1719 (F2)

MD

1388 (F4)

1425 (F4)

1514 (F4)

1476 (F4)

~

Three operations (P2)

M

1199 (F2)

1497 (F4)

1172 (F2)

1476 (F4)

D1

1518 (F3)

1520 (F2)

1662 (F3)

1435 (F2)

02

1769 (F4)

1693 (F3)

1947 (F4)

1629 (F3)

Causal subordination (02) A f i n que ( i n order t h a t ) ( R l )

Parce que (because)(R2)

M

1145 (F2)

1382 (F3)

1166 (F2)

1578 (F3)

D

1670 (F3)

1541 (F2)

1763 (F3)

1549 (F2)

(PI)

MD

1413 (F4)

1527 (F4)

1529 (F4)

1356 (F4)

Three operations

M D1 02

1192 (F2)

1617 (F4)

1259 (F2)

1441 (F4)

1360 (F3)

1453 (F2)

1435 (F3)

1471 (F2)

1724 (F4)

1625 (F3)

1787 (F4)

1804 (F3)

Two operations

(P2)

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LANGUAGE A N D COMPREHENSION J:F. Le Ny, W. Kintsch (editors) 0 North-Holland Publishing Company. 1982

123

ACCESSIBILITY FROM WORKING MEMORY AND ROLE OF REPROCESSING IN SENTENCE COMPREHENSION Jean-Francois Le Ny, Maryvonne Carfantan and Jean-Claude Verstiggel Laboratoire de Psychologie Universite de Paris VIII Saint-Denis, France

Among general processes supposed t o take place in comprehension, those regarded as central, i . e . construction of meaning by predication and conservation in working memory, are chiefly considered. Use of the probe technique for investigating b o t h processing and conservation in working memory i s discussed from previous r es u l t s on recency ef f ect s. New data obtained with t h i s technique are presented : they support the hypotheses t h a t recency ef f ect s actually concern meaning, and tha t extra time a l l o t t ed t o subjects a f t e r sentence reading leads t o semantic reprocessing. INTRODUCTION

I t i s likely t h a t a large agreement ex i s t s in cognitive psychology about the most general categories of processes t h at take place in comprehension, in particular during reading, which will be our main point of discussion in t h i s paper. Several recent models (Ehrlich and Florin, 1981 ; Just and Carpenter, 1980 ; Kieras, 1981; Kintsch and van Dijk, 1978 ; Miller, 1981 ; Noizet, 1980) take these categories into account in more or less similar forms. These general categories of processes comprise : a ) active grasping of perceptual information, b ) identification of words or morphemes, and of surface relationships present in the message, c ) parsing, d ) retrieval of relevant meanings from long term memory, e ) construction of the currently processed chunk's meaning, for instance of the current c la use ' s meaning, f ) integration of t h i s local meaning t o larger meaningful structures of texts or discourses. "Meaning" in t h i s context s i g nifie s a kind of cognitive e n t i t y , having only mental existence, and possessing both a structure and a content. F i r s t , meaning i s an event, which takes place in working memory. Later, i t may bring a b o u t another type of cognitive e n t i t y , which will subsist in the comprehend e r ' s long term memory, in the form of a knowledge or a be lie f, having a more or less good conformity with the original meaning (Le Ny, 1978, 1979, 1982 a ; Le Ny and Denhiere, 1982). I n t h i s a r t i c l e we shall be concerned mainly with meaning as a short term event in working memory, and with some problems regarding i t s duration. Some authors, rather than talking of sentence or clause meaning, use expressions such as sentence or clause or t ex t representations, which are supposed t o be somewhere in the subject. We thing t h a t these expressions are puzzling a n d may be misleading

.

I n our concept, the output of the comprehension process i s by no means a representation of a sentence,'or of any l i n g u i s t i c unit or structure ; i t i s an outcome.of the receiver's cognitive a c t i v i t y , brought about by the sentence, o r , more precisely, caused by the speaker or the writer in using the sentence a s a delicate instrument, according t o the meaning he intends t o produce. If we want to say tha t meaning, in the comprehender's mind, i s a representation of something -- and we

J.-F. Le Ny et al.

124

may say so under determined conditions -- then t h i s representation i s o f t h e r e a l o r f i c t i t i o u s world the speaker i s t a l k i n g about, o r , more p r e c i s e l y , o f a p a r t o f it. I f somebody w r i t e s t h a t ( a t place p and a t t i m e t ) "the sky was blue", then the meaning o f t h i s sentence cannot be f r u i t f u l l y considered as a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h i s sentence, b u t as a representation o f the f a c t t h a t the sky was blue. As a by-product, i t may become a representation o f a b l u e sky. So, comprehending such a sentence w i l l be considered as producing a mental event very s i m i l a r t o the outcome o f a corresponding perceptual process, i n t h i s case o f seeing a blue sky. This i s presumably the primary f u n c t i o n o f language, and t h i s i s what c o g n i t i v e psychology has t o account f o r .

A1 though these d i s t i n c t i o n s between "meaning" and "representation" o f sentences may seem somewhat speculative, we b e l i e v e them t o be important f o r a r i g h t o r i e n t a t i o n o f c o g n i t i v e research. A l l processes l i s t e d above must c e r t a i n l y be viewed as co-operating one w i t h another t o c o n s t r u c t meaning ; however, category ( e ) may be considered as t h e core orocess o f t h i s whole a c t i v i t v . The main hvoothesis t h a t has been adopted f o r i t s study i s t h a t r e d i c a t i o n i s t h e basic operation, the r e p e t i t i o n which meaning e l a b o r a t i o n si*. With such a hypothesis, p r e d i c a t i o n i s viewed as a s u i generis aggregation o f a given piece o f meaning -- i n most cases o f a word meaning -- and o f t h e c u r r e n t meaning already present i n working memory. This c u r r e n t meaning i s , as a r u l e , a p a r t i a l l y constructed chunk's meaning, i . e . the outcome o f previous p r e d i c a t i o n operations. Thus, any meaningful element w o f the physical message i s supposed t o be p e r c e p t u a l l y i d e n t i f i e d , t o b r i n g about access t o t h e r e l e v a n t piece o f content i n long term memory, and t o simultaneously work as conveying an i n s t r u c t i o n , o f which the developped form would be something as : "do p r e d i c a t e o f w -- o r do predicate w o f -- the r e l e v a n t piece(s) o f meaning already present i n the processor". Some more d e t a i l e d hypotheses regarding t h i s s u i e n e r i s aggregation have been presented elsewhere (Le Ny, 1982 a ) . I n b r i e f , h t h e s e s amount t o saying t h a t the operation " t o predicate" i s both t h e opposite and t h e complement a r y of t h e a c t i v i t y " t o perform a b s t r a c t i v e l e a r n i n g " t h a t has taken place d u r i n g t h e s u b j e c t ' s previous l i f e . WORKING MEMORY I N COMPREHENSION

I n t h e following, we s h a l l n o t deal w i t h a l l the processes supposed t o concur t o produce comprehension, b u t o n l y w i t h two o f them, which ape viewed as i n t e r r e l a t e d components o f category ( e ) . "Working memory", as opposed t o simple short-term memory (Baddeley and Hitch, 1974 ; Greeno, 1973), i s p r e c i s e l y viewed as i n v o l v i n g two such i n t e r r e l a t e d functions : processing -- t h a t i s b a s i c a l l y , under the above mentioned hypothesis, p r e d i c a t i n g -- and s t o r i n g needed i n f o r m a t i o n f o r a given time. Thus, data r e l a t i n g t o conservation may be expected t o lead t o conclusions r e l a t i n g t o processing, v i a v e r i f i c a t i o n o f appropriate assumptions, d e r i v i n g from previous r e s u l t s .

--

--

a r e the f o l l o w i n g : f u r t h e r d e t a i l s w i l l be discussed below These r e s u l t s 1) conservation o f semantic i n f o r m a t i o n i n working memory i s by no means p e r f e c t , and undergoes some k i n d o f decay ; 2) t h i s decay does n o t e q u a l l y concern a l l pieces o f meaning. The l a t t e r r e s u l t i s taken as expressing d i f f e r e n c e s p r o p e r l y r e l a t e d t o processing i n data t h a t , a t f i r s t s i g h t , regards conservation. The basic assumption i s thus t h a t conservation i n working memory depends on semant i c "importance" o f the meaning pieces (Le Ny, 1979 ; Denhiere and Le Ny,1980). and on r e l a t e d processing.

Accessibility from WorkingMemory

125

Conservation depending on p r o c e s s i n g i s a v e r y general assumption, which may be c o n s i d e r e d as comnon t o comprehension and t o n o t so d i f f e r e n t o t h e r forms o f COg n i t i v e a c t i v i t y such as problem s o l v i n g , mental computation (Richard, 1981), e t c . However, i t i s m o s t l y i n t e r p r e t e d as f o l l o w s : comprehension i n v o l v e s d i s c o n t i nuous processing, i . e . c o n s e r v a t i o n of some fragment o f d i s c o u r s e i n w o r k i n g memor y w h i l e p r o c e s s i n g i t . Such a fragment may be viewed as a s y n t a c t i c a l u n i t ; as a m a t t e r of f a c t , a number of r e s u l t s s u p p o r t t h e i d e a t h a t end o f clauses ( o r o f " s e n t o i d s " ) b r i n g s about some k i n d o f change i n p r o c e s s i n g (Caplan, 1972 ; Fodor and Bever, 1965 ; Fodor, Bever and G a r r e t t , 1974 ; J a r v e l l a , 1971 ; N o i z e t , 1980). B u t i t may be p r e f e r r e d -- as we do -- t h a t s y n t a c t i c a l boundaries such as c l a u ses' a r e o n l y one p o s s i b l e f a c t o r of a c t i v e segmentation i n comprehension, and t h a t d i s c o u r s e p r o c e s s i n g i s based on semantic chunking ( K i n t s c h and van D i j k , 1978 ; Kintsch, t h i s volume). I n t h i s model, c a p a c i t y o f w o r k i n g memory i s supposed t o be l i m i t e d . M i l l e r and K i n t s c h (1980) have e s t i m a t e d i t s mean v a l u e t o about 19 words, u s i n g t h e r e l e v a n t parameter I of t h e i r model. Daneman and Carpenter (1980) have shown t h a t l a r g e i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s e x i s t i n working memory's c a p a c i t y , and t h a t t h e y a r e h i g h l y c o r r e l a t e d t o r e a d i n g , and p a r t i c u l a r l y comprehension, performances ; s i n c e t h e y measure r e a d i n g span by a number o f words r e c a l l e d ( w i t h a maximum o f 5 ) besides t h e c u r r e n t sentence (13 t o 16 words i n l e n g t h ) , t h e i r e s t i m a t i o n may be judged n o t t o be s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t from M i l l e r and K i n t s c h ' s . I n some views o f w o r k i n g memory's r o l e i n comprehension, t h e o n l y change t h a t i s considered f o r c o n s e r v a t i o n o f meanings i s t h e i r t r a n s f e r i n t o a n o t h e r k i n d o f memory, f o r i n s t a n c e i n t o t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l long-term memory, o r , maybe, i n t o something as a semantic e p i s o d i c memory -- o f course a d i s c o n c e r t i n g concept. The r e s u l t s we obtained, and we mentioned above, suggest a d i f f e r e n t view, s i n c e t h e y p r o v i d e evidence f o r a decay o f a c c e s s i b i l i t y i n s i d e w o r k i n g memory -- i f we t a k e about 20 words as corresponding t o i t s c a p a c i t y . Moreover t h i s decay i s e l e c t i v e . The d a t a were c o l l e c t e d by t h e p r o b i n g technique. F i r s t use o f t h i s concerned t h e s o - c a l l e d " s h o r t - t e r m memory", and t h e o n l y f o r m o f p r o c e s s i n g t h a t was f i r s t cons i d e r e d was r e h e a r s a l ( A t k i n s o n and J u o l a , 1974 ; Baddeley and Ecob, 1973 ; Sternberg, 1966, 1969, 1975). L a t e r on, probe words h a v i n g a s i m p l e semantic r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h some word o f t h e memorized s e t were used (Burrows and Okada, 1973, 1976 ; C l i f t o n and Sorce, 1977 ; J u o l a and Atkinson, 1971 ; J u o l a and Mc Dermott, 1976 ; Seamon, 1976 ; Seamon and W r i g h t , 1976). The p r o b i n g t e c h n i q u e may be used t o s t u d y t h e outcome o f t h e comprehension a c t i v i t y (Dubois, 1981 ; Le Ny, 1978, 1981 ; Le Ny, Achour, C a r f a n t a n and V e r s t i g g e l , 1982 ; Mc Koon and R a t c l i f f , 1980). The procedure c o n s i s t s i n p r e s e n t i n g f i r s t a sentence t h e s u b j e c t has t o comprehend, t h e n a probe word he has t o j u d g e whether i t has, o r n o t , a g i v e n semantic r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e sentence. I n o u r f i r s t experiments, t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p was l e x i c a l i d e n t i t y : t h e probe word was t h e same as one word i n t h e sentence. Two main c o n c l u s i o n s c o u l d be drawn : f i r s t a c o n s i s t e n t recency e f f e c t was found i n "yes" response t i m e s : when t h e t a r g e t w o r d ' s l o c a t i o n i n t h e sentence was e a r l y , i . e . was more d i s t a n t f r o m t h e probe word, t h e mean response t i m e was l o n g e r t h a n when t h e t a r g e t word was l a t e , i . e . was c l o s e r . T h i s e f f e c t was found when same sentences were used ( s o c o n t r o l l i n g o t h e r f a c t o r s ) , and o n l y word o r d e r changed, i n a way t o be d e s c r i b e d i n more d e t a i l s below. These sentences comprised 20 words, and t h e d i f f e r e n c e between t h e l o n g e r and t h e s h o r t e r d i s t a n c e f r o m t h e t a r g e t word t o t h e probe word was o f 10 words. T h i s recency e f f e c t was i n t e r p r e t e d as a decay i n a c c e s s i b i l i t y t o t h e u n i t s p r e s e n t i n w o r k i n g memory, decay which t o o k p l a c e as a f u n c t i o n of time. The second i m p o r t a n t r e s u l t was t h a t t h i s recency e f f e c t d i d n o t e q u a l l y concern

J.-f.Le Ny etal.

a l l words, b u t was e l e c t i v e , i . e . i t concerned more some c a t e g o r i e s o f words t h a n o t h e r s . I n t h e i n v e s t i g a t e d cases, decay was g r e a t e r f o r nouns t h a t had, i n t h e sentence, a case r o l e o f t i m e o r o f p l a c e a d j u n c t s t h a n f o r verbs (Le Ny, 1978), o r f o r nouns t h a t were subjects-agents o r o b j e c t s - p a t i e n t s i n t h e sentence (Le Ny e t a l . , 1982). U n t i l now, s y n t a c t i c and semantic r o l e s have n o t been d i s s o c i a t e d ; b u t we s h a l l p r e s e n t below evidence t h a t t h e e f f e c t i s b a s i c a l l y semantic. Two p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f these r e s u l t s were proposed :one a c c o r d i n g t o which t h e meanings, generated i n t h e comprehender's mind by a d j u n c t nouns, were i d e n t i f i e d as l e s s i m p o r t a n t t h a n meanings o f verbs, o f s u b j e c t s - a g e n t s o r o f o b j e c t s - p a t i e n t s , and another a c c o r d i n g t o which some word meanings were more s a l i e n t than o t h e r s i n t h e s u b j e c t ' s minds due t o t h e i r r o l e i n t h e sentence meaning as a whole. Some arguments were o f f e r e d i n f a v o r o f t h e second a l t e r n a t i ve (Le Ny e t a l . , 1982). SEMANTIC PROBING However,before t r y i n g t o decide between these two i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , a q u e s t i o n o r i g i n a t i n g f r o m two o t h e r c a t e g o r i e s o f d a t a must be d e a l t w i t h . T h i s q u e s t i o n concerns t h e r e s p e c t i v e w e i g h t o f s u r f a c e and semantic i n f o r m a t i o n i n c o n s e r v a t i o n d u r i n g comprehension.

A f i r s t c a t e g o r y o f d a t a comes f r o m s t u d i e s on r e c e n t memory : many evidences (Baddeley, 1976), i n c l u d i n g r e s u l t s d i r e c t l y r e l e v a n t t o recency e f f e c t s (Broadb e n t and Broadbent, 1981) support t h e view t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s a s p e c i f i c v i s u a l memory s t o r e . I n a second c a t e g o r y o f s t u d i e s r e g a r d i n g l o n g t e r m memory, a d i s s o c i a t i o n between s u r f a c e and semantic c o n s e r v a t i o n has been shown t o t a k e p l a c e i n t i m e (Plas, Segui and K a i l , 1977 ; Sachs, 1967, 1974 ; V e r s t i g g e l and Le Ny, 1977). Thus, i t m i g h t be argued t h a t recency e f f e c t s we observed were o n l y due t o decay o f s u r f a c e i n f o r m a t i o n . T h i s argument has a b e a r i n g on t h e use o f probe words h a v i n g l e x i c a l i d e n t i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t a r g e t words i n t h e sentence. What about probe words having a semantic r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e sentence o r w i t h a part o f it ? L e t us suppose t h a t t h e p r e v i o u s argument h o l d s . I n such a case, 1) s u r f a c e i n f o r m a t i o n i s supposed t o r a p i d l y decay, t h u s p r o v i d i n g a recency e f f e c t on probe words w i t h l e x i c a l i d e n t i t y , whereas 2) meaningful i n f o r m a t i o n , i . e . p r o d u c t o f t h e comprehension processes i s supposed n o t t o decay ; l e t us c a l l H 1 . l . t h e c o n j u n c t i o n o f t h e two p r e v i o u s hypotheses. With H.1.1., i f probe words h a v i n g a semantic r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e sentence were used, no recency e f f e c t should be observed, s i n c e no p a r t i c u l a r s u r f a c e i n f o r m a t i o n would be i n v o l v e d i n t h e compar i s o n and i n t h e f o l l o w i n g response. I n t h e o p p o s i t e , we can suppose t h a t decay a l s o concerns semantic i n f o r m a t i o n , i . e . t h e products o f t h e comprehension processes, i r r e s p e c t i v e o f whether s u r f a c e decay i s added, o r n o t , t o t h i s semantic decay ; l e t us c a l l . H.1.2. t h i s c o n j u n c t i o n o f hypotheses. With H.1.2., recency e f f e c t should be observed as w e l l on probe words h a v i n g a semantic r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e sentence. I n t h e experiment t o be d e s c r i b e d now,we used such probe words. One d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e semantic r e l a t i o n s h i p we used m i g h t be c a l l e d " t i t l e o f " , t h e probe word b e i n g used as a k i n d o f t i t l e f o r t h e sentence. One more d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n c o n s i s t s i n s a y i n g t h a t t h e probe word conveys t h e main i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t a i n e d i n t h e k e r n e l o f t h e sentence, o r , more p r e c i s e l y , i n i t s c o r e p r o p o s i t i o n . One example o f a sentence i s :

(1) Dispersed on t h e h i l l s i d e under t h e autumn sun, t h e boys p i c k e d t h e grapes

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w i t h d e x t e r i t y i n a good mood. The c o r e elementary p r o p o s i t i o n o f t h i s sentence may be w r i t t e n as : PICK boys, grapes. I t may be considered t h a t " v i n t a g e " summarizes i t s meaning, o r denotes t h e c l a s s of e v e n t s o f which t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n d e s c r i b e s an occurrence, o r e l s e , p r o v i des a c o r r e c t t i t l e f o r t h e sentence ; these v a r i o u s types o f d e s c r i p t i o n a r e e q u i v a l e n t as f a r as t h i s semantic r e l a t i o n s h i p i s used. A more d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n w i l l be presented below. The second purpose of t h e experiment was t o s t u d y t h e e f f e c t r e p r o c e s s i n o f t h e sentence m i g h t have on a p o s s i b l e recency e f f e c t . I n t h e m e n t d ( L e Ny e t a l , 1982) a n a n a l y s i s and d a t a were presented, r e g a r d i n g t h e h y p o t h e s i s t h a t r e p r o c e s s i n g of some word meanings takes p l a c e d u r i n g comprehension, and has an i m p o r t a n t r o l e i n i t . By " r e p r o c e s s i n g " i s here meant o p e r a t i o n s t h a t a l s o belong t o t h e c a t e g o r y ( e ) mentioned above, and c h i e f l y two o f them : r e f e r r i n t o a p r e v i o u s l y processed i n d i v i d u a l meaning -- i n a sense o f "refer&artic u l a r l y s t r e s s e s t h e p r e f i x " r e - " , i.e. r e t r i e v i n g an i n d i v i d u a l meaning t h a t has been p r e v i o u s l y p u t i n t o memory a f t e r b e i n g processed - - and r e - p r e d i c a t i n g t h i s meaning. I n t h e experiment t o be described, i t was d e a l t w i t h a r a t h e r s i m p l e case o f r e p r o c e s s i n g : t h e s u b j e c t s were presented w i t h a sentence, and t h e y c o u l d spare on i t t h e t i m e r e q u i r e d by them t o comprehend i t ; then, t h e y were g i v e n some e x t r a time, and were presented w i t h a probe word. Thus, d u r i n g t h i s e x t r a time, t h e s u b j e c t s were supposed t o d e v o t e t h e i r c o g n i t i v e a c t i v i t y t o prepare b e t t e r f o r responding t o t h e probe word ; so, t h e y were supposed t o reprocess t h e sentence, though having a l r e a d y comprehended i t . On t h i s b a s i s two a l t e r n a t i v e hypotheses may be s t a t e d about how t h e y would p e r form t h i s r e p r o c e s s i n g a c t i v i t y . According t o t h e f i r s t hypothesis, H2.1., a ) what remains w i t h t h e h i g h e r s a l i e n c e i n t h e working memory o f a s u b j e c t a f t e r comprehension o f t h e sentence s h o u l d be t h e end o f t h i s sentence, b) what s h o u l d be reprocessed i s , then, t h i s end o f sentence ; i n b r i e f , t h e s u b j e c t s h o u l d m a i n l y p e r f o r m s u r f a c e r e p r o c e s s i n g ; H2.1. does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l y t h a t t h i s s h o u l d be p u r e r e h e a r s a l , b u t predomin a n t l y r e h e a r s a l . The d e r i v e d p r e d i c t i o n i s t h a t , g i v e n e x t r a t i m e a f t e r comprehension, a s t e e p e r recency e f f e c t should be observed t h a n w i t h o u t e x t r a t i m e . According t o H2.2., on t h e c o n t r a r y , r e p r o c e s s i n g should be m a i n l y o f a semantic n a t u r e ; t h a t i s a) what would have t h e h i g h e r s a l i e n c e i n t h e w o r k i n g memory o f a s u b j e c t a f t e r comprehension s h o u l d be t h e c o r e meaning o f t h e sentence ( i . e . p r e c i s e l y what t h e probe word probes) ; b) what should be reprocessed b y t h e s u b j e c t i s , then, t h i s c o r e meaning ; i n b r i e f , t h e s u b j e c t s h o u l d m a i n l y perform semantic reprocessing. The d e r i v e d p r e d i c t i o n i s t h a t , g i v e n e x t r a time, a l e s s steep recency e f f e c t should be observed t h a n w i t h o u t e x t r a time, o r , may be= recency e f f e c t a t a l l . L e t us observe t h a t , w i t h H2.1., s a l i e n c e c o i n c i d e s w i t h a c c e s s i b i l i t y , whereas, w i t h H2.2., s a l i e n c e i s d i s t i n c t f r o m a c c e s s i b i l i t y . The f o l l o w i n g experiment was designed t o t e s t H 1 . l . versus H1.2., and H2.1. versus H.2.2., i.e., as a whole, s u r f a c e c o n s e r v a t i o n and p r o c e s s i n g versus semantic cons e r v a t i o n and p r o c e s s i n g . MATERIAL The i t e m s were a l l s i m i l a r t o t h e above mentioned example ( 1 ) and more p r e c i s e l y t o t h e f o l l o w i n g examples ( 2 ) and ( 3 ) :

(2) Roaring snow rushed down b e h i n d roped mountain c l i m b e r s , by t h e t r a c k o v e r t h e t h r e e b r o t h e r s ' o l d farmhouse AVALANCHE

...

A-F. Le Ny et al.

128

( 3 ) By the t r a c k over t h e three b r o t h e r s ' o l d farmhouse, r o a r i n g snow rushed down behind roped mountain climbers AVALANCHE.

...

Each sentence ( i n French) was composed o f 20 words, and d i v i s i b l e i n t o two p a r t s , o f 10 words each. 1. What w i l l be c a l l e d t h e "main p a r t " was formed from two subp a r t s o f 5 words ; one comprised t h e core proposition, i . e . a subject-agent and a verb, o r a subject-agent, a verb and an o b j e c t - p a t i e n t , w i t h an adverb o r a gerundive, so as t o o b t a i n a minimal meaningful 5-word clause ; the other sub-part was a 5-word adjunct, having a close relatedness w i t h t h e f i r s t sub-part. 2. What w i l l be c a l l e d the "expansion" was an adjunct t o o ; i t described t h e time o r place sett i n g o f the event presented i n the core p r o p o s i t i o n i n 10 words. As may be seen i n examples ( 2 ) and (3), the main and expansion p a r t s could be reversed ; t h i s r e v e r sal, semantically neutral, brought about t h e change i n distance from t h e r e l e v a n t t a r g e t elements i n t h e sentence (forming t h e core p r o p o s i t i o n ) t o the probe word presented a f t e r . The core propositions had been constructed as f o l l o w s : a s e t o f nouns denoting events had been looked f o r , so t h a t a verb could be found o u t t h a t expressed the same semantic content, provided t h i s verb was l i n k e d w i t h the appropriate argument, as subject-agent o r as o b j e c t - p a t i e n t . This procedure l e d t o a l i s t o f nouns-propositions p a i r s ; then, f o r every noun o f these p a i r s , a super-ordinate was searched f o r ; as examples corresponding t o sentences 1 and 2-3, and t o t h e i r t i t l e nouns "vintage" and "avalanche", r e s p e c t i v e l y , the super-ordinates "crop" and " f a l l " may be presented. I n doing so, we do n o t c l a i m t o have completed a p e r f e c t l y close semantic a n a l y s i s o f the used meanings. However, we may hope t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g formulas reasonably stand f o r the semantic r e l a t i o n s h i p s e x i s t i n g between t h e basic l e x i c a l u n i t s o f t h i s material :

(4) A t V-C E (5) A t V +

E +

E

or

V + P - E

or

V

t

P

+

E-+

E

Where A = subject-agent noun ; P = o b j e c t - p a t i e n t noun ; V = verb ; E = event designer ; E = complementary l e x i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n ;'+ = e n t a i l s . By " e n t a i l s " i s meant a psychological contingency, supposed t o b r i n g about an i n ference, which may be w r i t t e n l e s s f o r m a l l y : "any event e, described by a sentence, i n which an A ( o r an x t h a t i s an A ) does V , o r i n which someone o r something does V t o a P ( o r t o an y t h a t i s a P ) , can be judged t o be, and then c a l l e d , an El' ; E denotes some e x t r a i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t may be r e q u i r e d o r useful -- as "roar i n g " i n ( 2 ) and ( 3 ) t o completely disambiguate AV o r VP ; i n the mentioned example,"roaring snow" e n t a i l s "a l o t o f snow", which i s i t s e l f r e q u i r e d t o ent a i 1 "avalanche".

--

Now, t h e other r e l a t i o n s h i p i s

(6) E

+

G

where G stands f o r the superordinate t i t l e noun. Provided t r a n s i t i v i t y i s j u s t i f i e d i t f o l l o w s from t h i s t h a t . ( 7 ) A + V + G

;

V + P + G

;

--

and, o f course, we managed t o do i t so

A t V t € + G

;

--,

V + P + E + G

Given the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the m a t e r i a l according t o these r e l a t i o n s h i p s , we may p r e d i c t t h a t the subjects w i l l accept the matching o f the sentence and i t s E o r G t i t l e , and then g i v e the r i g h t "yes" response i n t h e task. On t h i s basis, a l i s t o f 22 main p a r t s o f sentences was constructed, h a l f o f t h e

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AV, and h a l f of t h e VP type. 22 expansion p a r t s were constructed separately ; then, the main p a r t s and the expansions were l i n k e d , according t o meaning c r i t e r i a . Although n o t any expansion could be meaningfully l i n k e d w i t h any main p a r t , some could be l i n k e d w i t h several o r many ; random l i n k a g e was c a r r i e d o u t every time possible, i n order t o reduce semantic relatedness between main p a r t s and expansions ; t h i s was done f o r another purpose (see Le Ny e t a l . , 1982). A l l sentences SO constructed were r e v e r s i b l e w i t h o u t semantic o r s t y l i s t i c t r o u b l e . These 22 sentences were presented t o a group o f 20 subjects, belonging t o the same population than those t o be used i n the main procedure. They were r e q u i r e d t o provide a t i t l e f o r each sentence. 18 o u t o f the 22 sentences received as t h e i r most frequent t i t l e the a r i o r i t i t l e coming from t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n procedure ; f o r t h e 4 others, there was& r e l a t i o n s h i p o f synonymy o r simple conversion -- f o r instance " c h i l d b i r t h " instead o f " d e l i v e r y " -- between t h e most frequent and the a p r i o r i t i t l e s , so t h a t no change turned out t o be necessary i n the m a t e r i a l . I n examples ( 2 ) and (3), the probe word was shown w i t h i t s f i r s t l e t t e r separated by 3 dots from t h e l a s t l e t t e r o f the sentence : t h i s was the standard c o n d i t i o n . A second c o n d i t i o n was introduced i n t h i s experiment : a f u l l l i n e o f a d d i t i o n a l space i . e . 32 blanks, f i l l e d by dots, was added between the sentence's end and the probe's f i r s t l e t t e r , t h e r e f o r e extending the empty space t o 35 dots. So, t h e experimental m a t e r i a l had 3 sources o f v a r i a t i o n , w i t h 2 values i n each : a ) order o f main p a r t and expansion, b) nature o f the probe word, d i r e c t o r supero r d i n a t e t i t l e , c) empty space o f 3 o r 35 dots. This produced 8 l i s t s o f 22 exper i m e n t a l items ; they were interspersed a t random among 18 more f i l l i n g items, the sentence o f which had the same c o n s t r u c t i o n than the ones p r e v i o u s l y d e s c r i bed ; b u t t h e i r probe word had another semantic r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the sentence than " t i t l e o f " , namely "superordinate o f a l e x i c a l element o f " (Le Ny, 1982 b). This was intended t o prevent the subjects o f d i s c o v e r i n g and using a s t r a t e g y o f t i t l e anticipation. These 40 o s i t i v e items -- r e q u i r i n g a "yes" response -- were mixed w i t h 40 ne a t i v e i t e m h h e corresponding sentences had the same general appearance t h e o t h e r s ; b u t the probe word had no d i s c e r n i b l e semantic r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the sentence, o r w i t h any word i n t h e sentence.

&-

So, 8 l i s t s o f 80 items, ranged i n a c m o n f i x e d random order, were c o n s t i t u t e d ; the subjects were assigned t o each o f them a t random. PROCEDURE Each l i s t was entered, i n a d i g i t a l i z e d form, on a tape i n the Portable Micro-computer System f o r Psychological Experimentation (SIPEP), constructed i n our l a b o r a t o r y by C a r i t @ , Mazeau and Poitrenaud (1980). I t permits t o d i s p l a y t e x t on a TV screen, by means o f a program c a l l e d ALADIN. Displaying i s c a r r i e d o u t page per page, i n t h i s case i t e m per i t e m ; but not a whole page i s presented on the screen ; presentation i s made on a mobile window, which both f o l l o w s and comnands the s u b j e c t ' s eye movements, from l e f t t o r i g h t and then t o n e x t l i n e , a t a given speed. The w i d t h o f t h e window i s adjustable, b u t i n a l l t h e mentioned experiments, and i n t h i s one as w e l 1 , i t was f i x e d t o 20 characters o r blank spaces. Speed o f the window's move was a l s o a d j u s t a b l e ; i n a l l experiments and i n t h i s one, i t was adjusted by the subjects themselves d u r i n g a pre-experimental phase, which was a l s o used t o adapt the subjects t o the apparatus, m a t e r i a l and procedure. T h i s pre-experimental phase comprised 12 p r e l i m i n a r y items o v e r a l l . I n t h i s phase, t h e subjects could accelerate o r slow down the window's speed a f t e r any i t e m by manip u l a t i n g a knob, so as t o o b t a i n a comfortable speed ; i n the end, t h i s speed was f i x e d and held constant f o r t h e whole experimental phase. This general procedure was intended, f i r s t . t o take i n t o account the s u b j e c t s ' i n d i v i d u a l reading speeds i n an a d j u s t a b l e way, second t o prevent them from reading o r e x p l o r i n g backwards, so c o n s o l i d a t i n g t h e o b j e c t i v e basis o f the d e s c r i p t i o n s i n v o l v i n g recency (from perception on).

130

J.-F. Le Ny eral.

The subjects were i n s t r u c t e d t o read the sentence and t!e probe word, and t o g i v e t h e i r response by pressing the appropriate "yes" o r no button. The "yes" response always corresponded t o t h e i r p r e f e r r e d hand. General explanations were given and several examples provided about the existence, o r absence, o f a semantic r e l a t i o n s h i p between sentences and probe words. Then the pre-experimental phase began, during which some more explanations could be given, i f needed. The system r e g i s t e r e d types and times o f response as from t h e a p p a r i t i o n o f t h e probe word's f i r s t l e t t e r i n the window. SUBJECTS

32 students, male o r female, from the Department o f Psychology, U n i v e r s i t y o f P a r i s V I I I , served as volunteers i n t h i s experiment ; i t was looked upon t h a t they were French mother tongue, o r t r u e b i l i n g u a l s . RESULTS Mean response times r e l e v a n t t o the asked questions are presented i n t a b l e 1. They concern the 22 experimental p o s i t i v e items. TABLE I Mean response times t o probe words ( i n msec) as a f u n c t i o n o f t a r g e t p r o p o s i t i o n ' s p o s i t i o n i n t h e sentence and o f e x t r a processing t i m e ' s absence o r presence.

Without extra time

Direct t i t l e s Superordinates

With extra time

Early

Late

Early

Late

1 482

1 239

1 346

1 358

1 598

1 341

1 481

1 368

A p r e l i m i n a r y general analysis o f variance showed t h e d i f f e r e n c e s i n response t i mes t o d i r e c t t i t l e s and superordinates n o t t o be s i g n i f i c a n t . I t may be presumed t h a t they might have been so w i t h more data ; t h i s problem remains open. The over a l l recency e f f e c t was s i g n i f i c a n t , b u t w i t h an i n t e r a c t i o n between t h i s f a c t o r and possible i n t e r p o s i t i o n o f an e x t r a processing time. Besides, no main o r i n t e r agent-verb a c t i v e e f f e c t a t t r i b u t a b l e t o d i f f e r e n c e s i n sentence composition vs verb p a t i e n t -- was observed.

--

We can now t r y t o decide between hypotheses 1.1. and 1.2., by l o o k i n g f o r a recency e f f e c t i n the standard s i t u a t i o n ( w i t h imnediate presentation o f t h e probe word) : i n t h i s case, we do f i n d a s i g n i f i c a n t recency e f f e c t (F1,21 = 14,41 ; p < .001), which t u r n s i n favour o f H1.2. I n order t o s e t t l e between H2.1. and H2.2., we have t o consider response times i n the s i t u a t i o n t h a t involves an e x t r a time. I n t h i s case, i t t u r n s out t h a t t h e observed d i f f e r e n c e i n response times i s weak and i n s i g n i f i c a n t (F1,21 = .35) ; thus, no recency e f f e c t subsists i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , which favours hypothesis 2.2.

--

Differences o f response times i n t h e two s i t u a t i o n s w i t h o u t vs w i t h e x t r a processing time -- a l s o proved i n s i g n i f i c a n t , o v e r a l l and i n each p a r t i c u l a r position.

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DISCUSSION These p a r t i c u l a r r e s u l t s l e a d t o s e v e r a l c o n c l u s i o n s . F i r s t , t h e y c l e a r l y show t h a t t h e recency e f f e c t t h a t has been c o n s i s t e n t l y observed i n t h i s t y p e o f exper i m e n t s a c t u a l l y concerns c o n s e r v a t i o n o f t h e s e n t e n c e ' s semantic c o n t e n t , p a r t i c u l a r l y o f i t s c o r e p r o p o s i t i o n , and n o t o n l y c o n s e r v a t i o n o f t h e l e x i c a l u n i t s ' surface. I n o t h e r words, t h i s phenomenon has t o do w i t h comprehension. The p r e v i o u s r e s u l t s we had c o l l e c t e d were indeed more c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e semantic hypot h e s i s t h a n w i t h any o t h e r , b u t a d i r e c t d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f i t s v a l i d i t y was l a c k i n g . R e s u l t s o b t a i n e d from t i t l e s a f f o r d t h i s d i r e c t demonstration. What i s t h e e x a c t decay m a n i f e s t e d i n t h i s recency e f f e c t , and consequently, how does w o r k i n g memory work i n comprehension. T h i s i s a q u e s t i o n t h a t needs t o be more c o m p l e t e l y i n v e s t i g a t e d . We have, p r e v i o u s l y and i n t h i s paper, i n c l i n e d t o wards a view p o s t u l a t i n g t h a t decay o f a c c e s s i b i l i t y takes p l a c e i n s i d e w o r k i n g memory i t s e l f , and i s n o t due t o t r a n s f e r o f i n f o r m a t i o n from w o r k i n g memory t o some o t h e r memory s t o r e . T h i s was based on t h e f a c t t h a t t h e recency e f f e c t we observed concerns one-clause sentences o f 20 words. There i s t h u s no reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t one p a r t o f t h e i r meaning has been t r a n s f e r r e d i n a n o t h e r memory s t o r e b e f o r e r e a d i n g and comprehension o f such sentences i s completed. However, t h i s q u e s t i o n cannot be c o n v i n c i n g l y s e t t l e d as l o n g as o n l y two values o f d i s t a n c e between t h e probe words and t h e i r t a r g e t c o u n t e r - p a r t s (words o r p r o p o s i t i o n s ) i n t h e sentence a r e used. B u t r e c e n t (unpublished) d a t a have been c o l l e c t e d i n o u r l a b o r a t o r y w i t h 4 v a l u e s o f d i s t a n c e : t h e y c l e a r l y showed a p r o g r e s s i v e decay. T h i s r e s u l t i s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a decay-inside-working-memory hypothesis, b u t hardly w i t h a transfer-into-another-memory-store hypothesis. Our second r e s u l t concerns t h e r o l e o f an e x t r a t i m e on t h e recency e f f e c t : such an e f f e c t t h e n disappears. T h i s i s more o f an argument f o r t h e semantic c h a r a c t e r o f t h e phenomenon, and f o r t h e i d e a t h a t a s e l e c t i v e r e p r o c e s s i n g o f t h e sentenc e ' s c o r e p r o p o s i t i o n has been c a r r i e d o u t d u r i n g t h e e x t r a t i m e a l l o w e d t o t h e subjects. CONCLUSIONS If considered t o g e t h e r , these two r e s u l t s s u p p o r t a r a t h e r dynamic and i n t e r a c t i ve view o f t h e processes t h a t t a k e p l a c e i n comprehension, i n p a r t i c u l a r o f t h o s e we c o n s i d e r e d as b e l o n g i n g t o c a t e g o r y ( e ) . I n t h i s view, c o n s e r v a t i o n and process i n g a r e c l o s e l y i n t e r - r e l a t e d , and b o t h seem t o be s u b m i t t e d t o what m i g h t be c a l l e d a p r i n c i p l e o f semantic importance, i n v o l v i n g v a r i o u s degrees o f importance and t h e i r successive m o d i f i c a t i o n s i n r e p r o c e s s i n g ; t h i s view may be p r e f e r r e d t o one based on a process o f t h e t y p e " t a k e i t and keep it", a p p l i e d t o l e x i c a l elements o r c o n s t e l l a t i o n s o f elements.

F i n a l l y , we may n o t e t h a t t h i s experiment a l s o e x a m p l i f i e s t h e phenomenon o f semantic s y n t h e s i s p o s t u l a t e d elsewhere (Le Ny, 1982 a ) . T h i s means t h a t t h e s u b j e c t i s supposed t o aggregate t o g e t h e r p i e c e s o f meaning i n t o meaningful u n i t s . Such p i e c e s o f meaning a r e o b v i o u s l y conveyed by l e x i c a l u n i t s , b u t i t i s n o t necessary t o b e l i e v e t h a t any p i e c e o f meaning has i t s c o r r e s p o n d i n g l e x i c a l u n i t . Such a view i s commonly considered as b e l o n g i n g t o t h e semantic f e a t u r e s t h e o r y o f meaning, o r , more p r e c i s e l y , t o t h e a c t u a l l y v e r y l a r g e f a m i l y o f semantic f e a t u r e s t h e o r i e s , sometimes c a l l e d as w e l l com o n e n t i a l t h e o r i e s . As a m a t t e r o f f a c t , most i n s t a n c e s we know o f t h i s c l a s s o k t r e s s componential a n a l y s i s , i.e. semantic decomposition r a t h e r t h a n semantic c o m p o s i t i o n . We t h i n k t h a t t h e s u b j e c t s ' c o g n i t i v e a c t i v i t y , i n t h e t a s k we have d e s c r i b e d , w e l l e x a m p l i f i e s com o s i t i o n o f p i e c e s o f meaning i n t o a new semantic u n i t . T h i s t u r n s o u t t o be compara l e , i n t h i s case, t o a l e x i c a l u n i t , t h e t i t l e word, v i a an e q u i v a l e n c e we d e s c r i b e d i n f o r m u l a s ( 4 ) , ( 5 ) and ( 7 ) above. B u t t h i s equivalence was p u t i n t o t h e m a t e r i a l by c o n s t r u c t i o n ; i t may be c o n s i d e r e d t h a t c o m p o s i t i o n o f meanings,

+

J.-F. Le Nv et at.

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o r semantic synthesis, takes place i n o t h e r cases as w e l l and i s a very general and important process i n comprehension.

NOTE The preparation o f t h i s paper was supported by t h e Psychological Laboratory, Research U n i t no 235, associated w i t h the National Center o f S c i e n t i f i c Research (C.N.R.S., France). Authors' adress : Laboratoire de Psychologie, E.R.A. 235, UniversitC de P a r i s V I I I , 2 rue de l a L i b e r t e , 93526 Saint-Denis Cedex 2, France. REFERENCES Atkinson, R.C., Juola, J.F., Search and decision processes i n r e c o g n i t i o n memory, i n D. Krantz, R. Atkinson, R. Luce and P. Suppes (Eds), Contemporary developments i n mathematical psychology, San Francisco : W.H. Freeman, 1974. Baddeley, A.D.,

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Le Ny, J.F., Knowledge, meaning, r e p r e s e n t a t i o n : some c u r r e n t problems, i n F. K l i x , J . Hoffmann and E. van d e r Meer (Eds), C o g n i t i v e Research i n Psychology, Johann Ambrosius E a r t h and E l s e v i e r N o r t h - H o l l a n d Company, i n press, 1982 a. Le Ny, J.F., L e temps de reponse 3 des mots sondes c o n s i d @ r e comme un i n d i c a t e u r des processus de comprehension, Le T r a v a i l Humain, 1982 b, 45, 109-118. Le Ny, J.F., Achour, L., C a r f a n t a n , M.Y., V e r s t i g g e l , J.C., D i s c o u r s e comprehens i o n and e l e c t i v e decay o f meaning's a c c e s s i b i l i t y i n r e c e n t memory, i n G. R i c k h e i t and M. Bock (Eds), P s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c S t u d i e s i n Language Processing, B e r l i n , New York, de G r u y t e r , i n press. Le Ny, J.F., Denhiere, G., P r o f i l e o f C I N N A : C o n s t r u c t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l i z e d t e x t s , Text, i n press, 1982. McKoon, G., R a t c l i f f . R., The ComDrehension Drocesses and memory s t r u c t u r e s i n v o l ved i n anaphoric r e f e r e n c e , J o u r n a l o f Verbai L e a r n i n g and Verbal Behavior, 1980, 19, 668-682. M i l l e r , J.R., C o n s t r u c t i v e p r o c e s s i n g o f sentences : a s i m u l a t i o n model o f encoding and r e t r i e v a l , Journal o f Verbal L e a r n i n g and Verbal Behavior, 1981, 20, 24-45. M i l l e r , J.R., Kintsch, W . , R e a d a b i l i t y and r e c a l l o f s h o r t prose passages : a t h e o r e t i c a l a n a l y s i s , J o u r n a l o f Experimental Psychology : Human L e a r n i n g and Memory, 1980, 6, 335-354. Noizet, G.,

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P h i l o s o p h i e de l a l o g i q u e , P a r i s , Aubier, 1975.

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Sternberg, S., Memory-Scanning : mental processes r e v e a l e d by r e a c t i o n - t i m e exper i m e n t s , American S c i e n t i s t , 1969, 57, 421-457. Sternberg, S., New f i n d i n g s and c u r r e n t c o n t r o v e r s i e s , Q u a r t e r l y J o u r n a l o f Exper i m e n t a l Psychology, 1975, 27, 1-32. V e r s t i g g e l , J.C., Kekenbosch, C., I d e n t i f i c a t i o n s l i t t e r a l e s e t semantiques en memoire 1 c o u r t terme : l e cas des s u b s t a n t i f s e t des verbes, document no 166 de 1'ERA 235, U n i v e r s i t e de P a r i s V I I I , Saint-Denis, 1981. V e r s t i g g e l , J.C., Le Ny, J.F., I n f o r m a t i o n semantique e t memoire a c o u r t terme : l ' a c t i v i t e de comparaison de phrases, Annee psychologique, 1977, 77, 63-78.

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COMPREHENSION OF SENTENCES DESCRIBING UNFAMILIAR EVENTS I N 4-TO-8-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN Genevieve Bramaud du Boucheron L a b o r a t o i r e de Psychologie (E.R.A. 797 du C.N.R.S.) U n i v e r s i t e de P o i t i e r s Poi t i e r s . FRANCE

Tasks o f judgment o n t h e c h a r a c t e r , p o s s i b l e o r n o t p o s s i b l e , o f d e s c r i b e d events a r e u t i l i z e d t o s t u d y sentence comprehension i n c h i l d r e n between t h e ages o f 5 and 8. U n t i l t h e age o f 7 y e a r s , u n f a m i l i a r events a r e c o n s i d e r e d " i m p o s s i b l e " . Beyond t h a t age, c h i l d r e n d i s t i n g u i s h what i s r e a l i z a b l e from what i s n o t . The r e s u l t s o f s e v e r a l experiments a r e presented and d i s c u s sed w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e processes o f sentence comprehension p r e c e d i n g t h e judgments.

Sentence comprehension can be s t u d i e d a t d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s . Beyond a c o u s t i c , l e x i c a l , s y n t a c t i c a l l e v e l s , we can d e f i n e two o r even t h r e e l e v e l s as P e r f e t t i (1976): semantic, i n t e r p r e t a t i v e and t h e m a t i c . L e t us a c c u r a t e l y d e f i n e t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e f i r s t two mentioned. The semantic l e v e l i s t h e one a t which one i d e n t i f i e s concepts and t h e fundamental semantic r e l a t i o n s . A t t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i v e l e v e l concepts a r e w e l l d e f i n e d - t h e p r e c i s e r e f e r e n t s a r e i d e n t i f i e d - as w e l l as t h e m o d a l i t i e s o f t h e r e l a t i o n s which connect them; these d e t e r m i n a n t s a r e p a r t l y based upon i n f e r e n c e s . Most s t u d i e s d e a l i n g w i t h sentence comprehension i n c h i l d r e n have n o t gone beyond t h e semantic l e v e l : Bever (1970), S i n c l a i r and B r o n c k a r t (1972), V i o n (1980), e t c . The method g e n e r a l l y used i s a c t i n g o u t : t h e c h i l d a c t s o u t w i t h t o y s t h e a c t i o n which i s d e s c r i b e d v e r b a l l y . I n t h a t case, t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i v e sentence i s v e r y w i d e l y determined by o b j e c t s themselves and t h e c h i l d ' s m a n i p u l a t o r y a b i l i t i e s , so t h a t t h i s method, a p p r o p r i a t e f o r t h e s t u d y o f comprehension a t t h e semantic l e v e l , i s n o t much i f one i s i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i v e l e v e l as we a r e . Then i t i s necessary t o s t u d y sentence comprehension w i t h o u t t h e i r r e f e r e n t s . I t would p r o b a b l y be p o s s i b l e t o d e s c r i b e a continuum between t h e semantic and i n t e r p r e t a t i v e l e v e l s s i n c e t h e y a r e d i s t i n g u i s h e d by t h e s p e c i f i c i t y o f concepts and t h e r e l a t i o n s between concepts, b u t t h i s problem i s n o t concerned here.

The sentence comprehension t h e o r i e s developed f o r about t e n y e a r s , d e s c r i b e t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i v e l e v e l as a p r e c i s e a r t i c u l a t i o n o f concepts a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r components: Schank (1973), Winograd (1973), Dubois (1976), E h r l i c h (1979), Le Ny (1979), e t c . We a r e c a l l i n g t h i s "conceptual a r t i c u l a t i o n " . However i t seems t h a t t h i s a r t i c u l a t i o n i s n o t always necessary; when two i n t e r l o c u t o r s speak o f a f a m i l i a r s i t u a t i o n , t h e y do n o t need t o r e c o n s t r u c t i t by " a r t i c u l a t i n g " concepts: t h e s i t u a t i o n i s evoked as a whole. We speak t h e n o f comprehension by " g l o b a l a s s o c i a tion". T h i s second process i s p r o b a b l y q u i c k e r , s i m p l e r ' a p p e a r s e a r l i e r t h a n t h e p r e v i o u s one. Our purpose i s t o s t u d y t o what e x t e n t 5 - t o - 8 - y e a r - o l d c h i l d r e n comprehend i s o l a t e d sentences by "conceptual a r t i c u l a t i o n " .

136

G. Bramaud du Boucheron

I t follows from what precedes t h a t "conceptual a r t i c u l a t i o n " i s necessary i n order t o understand sentences describing u n f a m i l i a r events. For those sentences d e s c r i b i n g f a m i l i a r events,global a s s o c i a t i o n can be s u f f i c i e n t . What index can one use i n order t o determine t h a t concept a r t i c u l a t i o n has occured? We have used the d i s t i n c t i o n between possible and impossible events. Thus we have sentences d e s c r i b i n g u n f a m i l i a r events:

( 1 ) I d i g the e a r t h w i t h a thimble ( 2 ) I crush a stone w i t h a f o r k To judge t h a t (1) describes a p o s s i b l e event whereas ( 2 ) describes an impossible event, i t i s necessary t h a t t h e events i n question be represented o r a t l e a s t t o attempt t h e i r representation. This i m p l i e s the connection o f t h e components o f the o b j e t s : the thimble i s hard and hollow, which makes i t p o s s i b l e t o d i g i n t o s o f t e a r t h and thereby take o u t a l i t t l e earth; on the o t h e r hand, the f o r k , t h i n and not as strong as t h e stone, w i l l be t w i s t e d on i t and w i l l break instead o f crushing the stone. I s the judgment o f p o s s i b i l i t y - o r b e t t e r f e a s i b i l i t y (one can do t h a t ) t o the sentence ( 1 ) a good index o f "conceptual a r t i c u l a t i o n " ?

-

applied

I n order t h a t i t be, i t i s necessary t h a t t h e s u b j e c t ' s answer be accurate and not o n l y a r e s u l t o f chance and i n a d d i t i o n i t must n o t be a systematic s t r a t e g y (ex.: always answer "possible"). I t i s p o s s i b l e t o avoid t h i s k i n d o f s t r a t e g y by asking the subject t o j u s t i f y h i s judgments; i n o t h e r respects, t h e comparison between t h e responses t o sentences o f type (1) and those t o sentences o f type ( 2 ) allows t o f i n d possible s t r a t e g i e s o f t h i s kind. On the other hand, one must be c a r e f u l t h a t the s u b j e c t considers as impossible an awkward a c t i o n o r the r e s u l t o f which i s imperfect, thereby g i v i n g h i m s e l f c r i t e r i a which are o v e r l y severe. That p o i n t s o u t the necessity o f a second index t h a t i s t o know the a n a l y t i c a l characters o f the arguments. We shan say t h a t the c h i l d j u s t i f i e s a n a l y t i c a l l y when he i n d i c a t e s t h e components o f t h e o b j e c t o r the instrument, even o f the r e s u l t o f the a c t i o n o r more o f the m o d a l i t i e s o f t h e a c t i o n , as we have done i n the above example. The a n a l y t i c a l argumentation i s indeed an index o f conceptual a r t i c u l a t i o n ; however i t can o n l y be used as a complement t o f e a s i b i l i t y judgments, some c h i l d r e n showing l i t t l e a b i l i t y t o j u s t i f y t h e i r judgments. Must we b e l i e v e then t h a t c h i l d r e n judge t o be p o s s i b l e o n l y what they know through experience, i d e n t i f y i n g i n t h i s way the possible t o t h e r e a l (Piaget (1976)) ? This i s the main question o f our study. I f the child. succeeds i n forming an accurate representation o f an a c t i o n he has never seen nor performed before, t h i s a c t i o n then becomes f o r him possible. The n o t i o n o f "possible" appears i n t h i s way subord i n a t e t o the e l a b o r a t i o n o f new representations by conceptual a r t i c u l a t i o n . Inversely, i f the c h i l d has no representation o f the action, i t can p o s s i b l y be due t o t h e f a c t t h a t he does n o t possess the n o t i o n o f p o s s i b l e and consequently does n o t t r y t o " a r t i c u l a t e " concepts because he judges t h e a c t i o n t o be impossible. I n t h i s example therefore, conceptual a r t i c u l a t i o n appears subordinate t o the n o t i o n o f possible. T r a i n i n g i n conceptual a r t i c u l a t i o n , c a r r i e d o u t i n t h e 4 t h experiment reported below, allows, we t h i n k , l i g h t t o be shed on t h i s problem. Before describing the experiments we have c a r r i e d o u t on conceptual a r t i c u l a t i o n , l e t us sum up the method used. The task i s as f o l l o w s : The s u b j e c t i s asked t o make a judgment on t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f performing an a c t i o n described by a sentence. Three types o f sentences have been u t i l i z e d : Sentences F d e s c r i b i n g a f a m i l i a r event. Ex.: "Iopen the door w i t h a key". Sentences i d e s c r i b i n g an impossible event. Ex.: "Iopen the door w i t h a t i n opener".

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Comprehension of Sentences Describing Unfamiliar Events

- Sentences S d e s c r i b i n g a p o s s i b l e though unusual event. Ex.: w i t h a key".

137

" I open t h e l e t t e r

Two techniques o f response a r e used. D o l l s technique: t h e c h i l d has i n f r o n t o f him 2 o r 3 d o l l s d i f f e r i n g f r o m one another o n l y i n t h e c o l o u r o f t h e r i b b o n s t h e y wear. They a r e r e s p e c t i v e l y d e s c r i bed as always t e l l i n g f a m i l i a r t h i n g s ( d o l l F), i m p o s s i b l e t h i n g s ( d o l l i). things t h a t a r e p o s s i b l e a l t h o u g h unusual ( d o l l S ) . The c h i l d ' s t a s k c o n s i s t s i n a s c r i b i n g each o f t h e sentences presented t o him t o one o f t h e t h r e e d o l l s and j u s t i f y i n g h i s response. I n some experiments, o n l y t h e d o l l s S and i a r e p r o v i d e d . D i r e c t technique: t h e c h i l d must say i f t h e e v e n t d e s c r i b e d by t h e sentence i s p o s s i b l e " o r " n o t p o s s i b l e " ; he must j u s t i f y h i s response. The v a r i a b l e s we a r e i n t e r e s t e d i n a r e : a ) The c o r r e c t judgments ( C J ) . They c o n s i s t i n j u d g i n g t o be u s u a l t h e e v e n t s o f t h e sentences F, p o s s i b l e (a1 though unusual ) those o f t h e sentences S, i m p o s s i b l e those o f sentences i.We a r e m a i n l y i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e c o r r e c t judgments o f sentences S (SCJ) which a r e based on a conceptual a r t i c u l a t i o n . b ) The arguments. The emphasis i s p l a c e d on t h e f o l l o w i n g c a t e g o r i e s : A n a l y t i c a l arguments (An): t h e c h i l d i n d i c a t e s t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e o b j e c t o r o f t h e i n s t r u m e n t ( u s e f u l p r o p e r t i e s o r p r o p e r t i e s making t h e a c t i o n i m p o s s i b l e ) spec i f i e s t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e a c t i o n o r e l s e some aspects o f t h e r e s u l t o f t h e a c t i o n . Ex.: " I draw a s t i c k f i g u r e w i t h a p i e c e o f c o a l " . Answer: p o s s i b l e Argument:"you t a k e a piy,ce o f c o a l , you r u b and you draw a s t i c k f i g u r e , t h e c o l o u r appears i n b l a c k . - Arguments by s u b s t i t u t i o n ( S ) : t h e c h i l d i n d i c a t e s e i t h e r t h e i n s t r u m e n t i t would be necessary t o use t o p e r f o r m t h e a c t i o n , o r t h e customary use o f t h e named i n s t r u ment. Ex.: " I c r u s h t h e banana w i t h a l a d l e " . Answer: " i m p o s s i b l e " Argument: "because t h e l a d l e i s f o r soup" o t h e r arguments ( O A ) : these a r e more p a r t i c u l a r l y r e f e r e n c e s t o e x p e r i e n c e (Ex.: "a mother would n o t do i t l i k e t h a t " ) and f a l s e arguments which a r e r a t h e r comments about t h e a c t i o n . Ex.: " I c a r r y notebooks i n a wheelbarrow" "Yes, when one i s t i r e d , one can g e t i n t o a wheelbarrow".

-

-

FIRST EXPERIMENT (Bramaud du Boucheron and Perez (1979)) L e t us r e c a l l t h e r e s u l t s o f t h a t experiment Subjects: 15 5 t o 6 y e a r o l d s , mean age: 5;9 15 6 t o 7 y e a r o l d s , mean age: 6;lO 15 7 t o 8 y e a r o l d s , mean age: 7;8 Material : 8 sentences

F, 8 sentences i, 8 sentences S.

Technique: 3 dolls The c l e a r e s t r e s u l t i s a v e r y i m p o r t a n t i n c r e a s e o f t h e percentage o f SCJ as a f u n c t i o n o f age and t h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y t r u e ( T a b l e 1) between t h e 6 t o 7 y e a r o l d s and t h e 7-to-8 y e a r o l d s . T h i s i s accompanied b y an i n c r e a s e o f t h e number of a n a l y t i c a l arguments, a l t h o u g h t h e y a l r e a d y appear i n t h e 5-to-6 y e a r o l d s , w i t h a n o t i c e a b l e frequency .

G. Bramaud du Boucheron

138

Table 1 Percentage o f c o r r e c t judgments (C.J.).

F i r s t experiment.

Type o f sentence Age

S

F

i

5-6

19.13

75.00

84.13

6-7

34.13

91.62

90.00

7-8

82.50

85.87

90.00

According t o these r e s u l t s , i t would seem t h a t b e f o r e t h e age o f 7, c h i l d r e n do n o t imagine i n any p r e c i s e way t h e events d e s c r i b e d by t h e sentences S . SECOND EXPERIMENT (Bramaud du Boucheron and Konrad-Kasso (1980) )

T h i s second experiment had two purposes: a) check t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e f i r s t experiment i n a s i t u a t i o n b o t h s i m p l e r and more e x p l i c i t f o r t h e c h i l d r e n ( c f . method below). b ) study t h e r o l e o f a f a c t o r “Strangeness o f t h e e v e n t ” i n t h e judgment o f t h e sentences S Subjects: 2 1 5-to-6 y e a r o l d p u p i l s ; mean age: 5;9 2 1 6-to-7 y e a r o l d p u p i l s ; mean age: 6;7 2 1 7-to-8 y e a r o l d p u p i l s ; mean age: 7;9 Material : 1 15 sentences i and 15 sentences S The sentences S have been s u b m i t t e d t o 16 a d u l t j u ,es who have assesse strangeness on a 3 - p o i n t s c a l e ( 1 t o 3 ) . Each c h i l d i s presented: 5 sentences S 1 n o t v e r y strange; mean judgment: 1,53 - 5 sentences S2 moderately strange; mean judgment: 2,03 - 5 sentences S3 v e r y strange; mean judgment: 2,50

their

-

Technique: 2 d o l l s one o f whom says i m p o s s i b l e t h i n g s ( i ) and t h e o t h e r s t r a n g e t h i n g s ( S ) . B e f o r e b e g i n n i n g t h e judgment t a s k , i t i s a c c u r a t e l y e x p l a i n e d what these two d o l l s r e s p e c t i v e l y say. Three examples o f sentences i and t h r e e examples o f sentences S a r e g i v e n and commented. Results: I n t h a t experiment, some s u b j e c t s have assigned no sentences t o t h e d o l l S . The CJ r a t e s have been c a l c u l a t e d o n l y on t h e s u b j e c t s who have made a t l e a s t t h r e e judgments S. T h i s l e d t o t h e e x c l u s i o n o f 8 s u b j e c t s o f 5 - t o - 6 years, 8 o f 6-to-7 y e a r s and 3 o f 7-to-8 y e a r s . The number o f SCJ i n c r e a s e s w i t h age (F(2,41) = 10,29; p < . O l ) ; i t i s l o w e r f o r t h e 9,16; p < - 0 1 ) ; t h e i n t e sentences S3 t h a n f o r t h e sentences S2-and S 1 (F(2,02) r a c t i o n between these two f a c t o r s i s n o t s i g n i f i c a n t ( T a b l e 2).Thus, t h e r e s u l t s a r e v e r y s i m i l a r t o t h o s e o f t h e f i r s t experiment. The f a c t t h a t o n l y two k i n d s of sentences a r e used and two p o s s i b l e responses e l i c i t e d w h i l e

139

Comprehensionof Sentences Describing Unfamiliar Events

g i v i n g v e r y d e t a i l e d and e x p l i c i t i n s t r u c t i o n s f a c i l i t a t e s t h e t a s k o n l y s l i g h t l y f o r t h e c h i l d r e n o f 5-6 y e a r s o f age. Table 2 Percentage o f c o r r e c t judgments (C.J.).

Second experiment.

Type o f sentence Age

s1

i

s2

s3

S

5-6 ( 1 3 )

80.00

41.60

35.38

29.24

35.38

6-7 ( 1 3 )

88.67

36.12

47.70

32.30

38.98

7-8 (18)

90.33

76.66

72.22

47.78

65.56

I t can b e noted i n o t h e r r e s p e c t s t h a t t h e s t r a n g e s t (S3) sentences a r e l e s s o f t e n j u d g e d c o r r e c t l y t h a n those which a r e l e s s s t r a n g e (S1 and S2). Now i t i s n o t a p r i o r i more d i f f i c u l t t o imagine "Is t i r t h e m i l k w i t h a s c r e w - d r i v e r ' ' ( 5 3 ) t h a n " I s t i r t h e m i l k w i t h a k n i f e ( S l ) " o r " I d i g t h e e a r t h w i t h a t h i m b l e " (S3) r a t h e r t h a n "Id i g t h e e a r t h w i t h a t i l e ( S l ) " .

The most i m p o r t a n t f a i l u r e w i t h t h e sentences S3 seems t o be due n o t t o t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f t h e mental r e p r e s e n t a t i o n b u t r a t h e r w i t h a k i n d o f i n h i b i t i o n o r mental b l o c k coming f r o m t h e c o n n e c t i o n o f two terms d e s i g n a t i n g o b j e c t s h a r d l y e v e r seen t o g e t h e r : m i l k and a s c r e w - d r i v e r , e a r t h and a t h i m b l e , e t c . T h i s mental b l o c k i s e s p e c i a l l y i l l u s t r a t e d by t h e importance o f s u b s t i t u t i o n arguments ( S ) , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e youngest c h i l d r e n ( T a b l e 3 ) . Table 3 T o t a l number o f a n a l y t i c a l arguments (An), by s u b s t i t u t i o n ( S ) . by o t h e r arguments o r by absence o f arguments (OA & 0). Second experiment. Argumen t s An

S

5-6

71

140

104

6-7

53

120

142

7-8

99

94

122

OA &

0

THIRD EXPERIMENT (Moret, 1980) T h i s experiment examines: a f a c t o r which i s supposed t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e c o n n e c t i o n o f concepts: t h e present a t i o n o f the properties o f the instrument useful i n performing t h e a c t i o n described by t h e sentence S; - a f a c t o r which i s supposed t o h i n d e r t h e comprehension o f t h e sentence S: t h e knowledge o f an i n s t r u m e n t commonly used i n p e r f o r m i n g t h e a c t i o n .

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140

G. Bramaud du Boucheron

Material : 8 sentences S, 4 (SiH) o f which describe an a c t i o n u s u a l l y performed w i t h a specif i c instrument (Ex.: "Iwipe the dishes w i t h paper"; usual instrument: d i s h - c l o t h ) , and 4 other sentences (SiO) ;hich describe an a c t i o n which can be performed w i t h d i f f e r e n t instruments (Ex,: I break an egg w i t h a bone"). Task: I n a d d i t i o n t o the judgment o f sentences S made according t o t h e d o l l technique ( S and i)described above, subjects c a r r y o u t two kinds o f tasks: tasks QI: questions about the instrument: one question r e l a t e s t o the instrument u s u a l l y used t o perform an a c t i o n (Ex.: "what a r e the dishes wiped with?"), t h e other i s about the use o f the unusual instrument (Ex. : "what i s the use o f paper?"). These two questions are supposed t o induce the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f usual s i t u a t i o n which might hinder the comprehension o f t h e sentence S . Moreover t h e f i r s t o f thes questions a l l o w us t o v a l i d a t e t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between the sentences S i H and SiO tasks JP: judgments o f sentences r e l a t i v e t o the p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e instrument. For each instrument, 3 sentences are presented: one r e l a t i n g t o a d e s c r i p t i v e prop e r t y (Ex.: "paper i s Ilard"), two r e l a t i n g t o a c t i o n s which can be performed w i t h the instrument (Ex. : one can r u b something w i t h paper; one can wipe something w i t h paper"). The c h i l d must assign each sentence t o one o f the two d o l l s S and i ( t h e d o l l S i s here presented as t e l l i n g t r u e t h i n g s which are sometimes somewhat unexpected). I n t h e three sentences presented one i s f a l s e and both others r i g h t .

-

-

B

The presentation of a sentence S i s preceded by e i t h e r questions Qi o r judgments This determines t h r e e orders o f presentation o f the tasks.

JP, o r Qi and JP.

Subjects: 30 5-to-6-year-old c h i l d r e n and 30 6-to-7-year-old c h i l d r e n ; i n each school grade, c h i l d r e n are d i v i d e d i n t o groups o f 10 per order o f presentation. Results: Table 4 gives the percentages o f c o r r e c t judgments f o r the d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s . Table 4 Percentages o f c o r r e c t judgments (C.J.).

T h i r d Experiment.

Order o f p r e s e n t a t i o n J .P .-Jug, SiH SiO

Qi -J .P. -Jug. SiO SiH

Type o f sentence

Qi-Jug. SiO SiH

Age 5-6

7.50

30.00

10.00

45.00

10.00

55.00

Age 6-7

10.00

42.50

7.50

52.50

25.00

47.50

The analysis o f variance shows t h a t o n l y t h e f a c t o r type o f sentences i s s i g n i f i cant ( F (1,57) = 151; p c .001): the sentences which imply a usual instrument l e a d t o l e s 3 c o r r e c t judgments than those which do n o t induce such an instrument. On the contrary the questions o r judgments which have preceded the judgment o f t h e c r i t i c a l sentence S had no n o t i c e a b l e e f f e c t on i t . 0 0 0

The second and t h i r d experiments show t h a t the strangeness o f a sentence S i s a reason f o r being r e j e c t e d by c h i l d r e n o f 7 years o f age o r less. This strangeness may come e i t h e r from t h e f a c t t h a t an o b j e c t and an instrument r e l a t i n g t o very d i f f e r e n t areas o f a c t i v i t y a r e connected i n the sentence o r from t h e existence o f an instrument very c o m o n l y used i n order t o perform t h e a c t i o n described by t h e sentence S.

141

Comprehensionof Sentences Describing Unfamiliar Events

T h i s l e a d s us t o t h i n k t h a t u n t i l 7 y e a r s o f age, c h i l d r e n do n o t r e j e c t t h e sentences S because t h e y would be i n c a p a b l e o f concept a r t i c u l a t i o n b u t because t h i s a r t i c u l a t i o n happens t o be i n h i b i t e d i n a p a r t i c u l a r way, e i t h e r b y t h e c o n n e c t i o n o f an i n s t r u m e n t and an o b j e c t evoked by t h e sentence S and r e l a t i n g t o v e r y d i f f e r e n t areas o f a c t i v i t y o r by t h e e v o c a t i o n o f a v e r y f a m i l i a r e v e n t : t h e a c t i o n o n t h e o b j e c t performed w i t h a usual i n s t r u m e n t , which i s n o t mentioned i n t h e sentence S. To s t u d y t h i s h y p o t h e s i s , we use a t r a i n i n g experiment. I f a s h o r t t r a i n i n g i n "understanding t h e sentences S" by endeavouring t o remove t h e i n h i b i t i o n s provoked by some s t r a n g e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i s s u f f i c i e n t t o b r i n g 5 - t o - 7 y e a r o l d s t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h e sentences S f r o m t h e sentences i, t h e h y p o t h e s i s above w i l l be c o n f i r m e d . I f not, i t would appear t h a t t h e c h i l d r e n a r e i n c a p a b l e o f conceptual a r t i c u l a t i o n . FOURTH EXPERIMENT ( G u i l h o t (1980)) The experiment comprises 3 p a r t s :

1. P r e t e s t : a judgment t a s k b e a r i n g on 12 sentences S and 12 sentences i, c a r r i e d o u t a c c o r d i n g t o t h e d i r e c t technique. 2. T r a i n i n g b e a r i n g on t h e 12 sentences S o f t h e p r e t e s t . F o r each sentence, t h e experimenter asks t h e c h i l d a g a i n i f he d o e s n ' t b e l i e v e t h e a c t i o n i s p o s s i b l e . He e x p l a i n s t o him how r e a l i z a b l e i t i s and s p e c i f i e s t h a t even i f t h e r e s u l t i s n o t as s a t i s f a c t o r y as i n u s i n g t h e usual i n s t r u m e n t , t h e a c t i o n i s however p o s s i b l e .

We a l s o i n c l u d e i n t h i s t r a i n i n g l i s t 4 sentences i f o r which a r e s p e c i f i e d t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e o b j e c t and o f t h e i n s t r u m e n t which make t h e a c t i o n u n r e a l i z a b l e . T r a i n i n g takes p l a c e i m n e d i a t e l y a f t e r ' t h e p r e t e s t . 3. P o s t - t e s t : t a s k o f judgment c a r r i e d o u t ' i n t h e same c o n d i t i o n as t h e p r e t e s t , 3 days a f t e r t h e t r a i n i n g . I t i n v o l v e s 12 sentences S; 6 o f which a r e c o m p l e t e l y new (SN). 6 of which a r e s i m i l a r two by two t o 6 sentences o f t h e p r e t e s t ( S A ) ; t h e s i m i l a r i t y comes f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t t h e same v e r b i s used i n b o t h sentences, b u t w i t h d i f f e r e n t o b j e c t s and i n s t r u m e n t s . Ex.: " I c a r r y notebooks w i t h a p a i l " ( p r e t e s t and t r a i n i n g ) ; " I c a r r y books w i t h a wheelbarrow". Subjects: 16 5-to-6-year 16 6-to-7-year

o l d c h i l d r e n , mean age: 5;8 o l d c h i l d r e n , mean age: 6;9

Results: Table 5 Percentages o f c o r r e c t judgments (C.J.). Pretest

Post-test

S

i

5-6

11.98

97.92

6-7

16.67

Sentences

F o u r t h experiment.

100

SN

SA

S

i

65.62

84.37

75.00

96.35

70.83

83.33

77.00

96.88

The t a b l e shows (Table 5 ) t h a t t r a i n i n g had a v e r y i m p o r t a n t p o s i t i v e e f f e c t on t h e c o r r e c t judgment o f t h e sentences S (F (1,30) = 348,8; p < .001), and t h a t t h i s improvement i s t r u e a t b o t h ages, w i t l i o u t any d i f f e r e n c e between t h e 2 groups. A t t h e p o s t - t e s t , t h e sentences SA a r e c o r r e c t l y judged a l i t t l e more o f t e n t h a n

G. Eramaud du Eoocheron

142

t h e sentences SN; as f o r i n t e r a c t i o n : t y p e o f sentences S x p r e t e s t / p o s t - t e s t we g e t : F(1,30) = 8,91; p < .01. I t a l s o demonstrates t h a t t r a i n i n g has an e f f e c t on arguments (Table 6 ) . A j u d g ment i s considered as b e i n g j u s t i f i e d whatever t h e t y p e o f argument p r o v i d e d may be. be. More arguments a r e p r o v i d e d f o r t h e judgments o f t h e sentences S a t t h e p o s t = 75,9; p < .Ol). The r e s u l t s a r e t h e same f o r t e s t than a t t h e p r e t e s t (!(1,30) t h e sentences i ( T a b l e 7). Table 6 Percentages o f j u s t i f i e d sentences S; S+ d e s i g n a t e s t h e sentences S c o r r e c t l y judged; S- t h e sentences S i n c o r r e c t l y judged. Pretest Sentences

st

Pos t - t e s t

S-

S

S+

S-

S

5-6

47.83

23.08

26.04

83.33

22.92

68.23

6-7

68.75

13.12

22.39

78.38

38.64

69.27

Table 7 Percentages o f sentences i j u s t i f i e d . Pretest

Post-test

5-6

24.48

55.73

6-7

38.54

65.10

-

T h i s i n c r e a s e o f arguments occurs a t t h e l e v e l o f a n a l y t i c a l arguments (An) as shown i n Tables 8 and 9. Table 8 T o t a l number o f arguments r e l a t i v e t o t h e sentences S (An: a n a l y t i c a l arguments; S: argument o f s u b s t i t u t i o n ; OA: o t h e r arguments). Pretest

Post-test

Types o f arguments

An

S

OA

An

S

OA

5-6

20

31

4

145

14

11

6-7

38

10

4

120

18

27

Comprehensionof Sentences Describing Unfamiliar Events

143

Table 9 T o t a l number o f arguments r e l a t i v e t o sentences i . Pretest

Post-tes t

Types o f arguments

An

S

OA

An

S

OA

5-6

27

7

5

114

2

2

6-7

69

4

4

114

11

10

DISCUSSION The r e s u l t s o f t h e f o u r experiments summarized above a r e c o n s i s t e n t : b e f o r e 8 y e a r s , c h i l d r e n r a r e l y t h i n k t h a t t h e sentences d e s c r i b i n g unusual events d e s c r i b e p o s s i b l e events. We i n s i s t on t h e f a c t t h a t t h e judgment a r e made on sentences; we s h a l l discuss below t h e q u e s t i o n of what t h e c h i l d r e n a c t u a l l y judge, t h a t i s on which r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a r e h i s judgments formed. I t can a l s o be seen t h a t , u n t i l about 8 y e a r s , c h i l d r e n j u s t i f y t h e i r judgments r a r e l y , and when t h e y do, they t e n d t o r e f e r t o t h e usual uses o f t h e i n s t r u m e n t o r t o t h e i n s t r u m e n t which would s u i t t o p e r f o r m t h e a c t i o n , more than t o t h e r e s p e c t i v e p r o p e r t i e s of t h e o b j e c t and o f t h e i n s t r u m e n t .

Schemata 1, 2 and 3 sum up t h e d i f f e r e n t processes which can be c o n s i d e r e d when a s u b j e c t has t o make a judgment o n t h e r e a l i z a b l e c h a r a c t e r o f an unusual e v e n t which i s d e s c r i b e d t o him. According t o schema 2, t h e comprehension by a s s o c i a t i o n y i e l d s t h e response " i m p o s s i b l e " because t h e statement i s n o t congruent w i t h what t h e c h i l d knows (RA). According t o schema 3, a r t i c u l a t i o n and a s s o c i a t i o n b o t h occur: t h e response " i m p o s s i b l e " means t h e n t h a t t h e unusual e v e n t , a l t h o u g h b e i n g represented, i s judged n o t t o be congruent w i t h what happens u s u a l l y . Schema 2 seems t o square b e t t e r t h a n schema 3 w i t h what most c h i l d r e n l e s s t h a n 8 y e a r s - o l d do. The r e s u l t s o f t h e f o u r t h experiment p r o v i d e an argument f a v o u r a b l e t o t h i s t h e s i s . Indeed l e t us suppose t h a t a t t h e p r e t e s t , c h i l d r e n understand sentences b y a r t i c u l a t i o n and a s s o c i a t i o n (schema 3 ) ; i n t h a t case t r a i n i n g which, as we know, y i e l d s a much g r e a t e r number of judgments " p o s s i b l e " , would c o n s t i t u t e a t r a i n i n g t o j u d g ment: t h e c h i l d l e a r n s t h e n t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h e p o s s i b l e f r o m t h e u s u a l . One can understand if necessary, t h a t t h i s l e a d s t h e c h i l d r e n t o g i v e more a n a l y t i c a l a r g u ments f o r t h e sentences S; going from r e j e c t i n g t o a c c e p t i n g t h e s e sentences, t h e c h i l d must o b v i o u s l y change h i s system o f argumentation and he chooses t h e a n a l y t i c a l arguments. B u t t h a t i s n o t t r u e f o r t h e sentences i which a r e always r e j e c t e d The v e r y s t r o n g i n c r e a s e of a n a l y t i c a l arguments r e l a t i n g t o t h e sentences i, a f t e r t h e t r a i n i n g session, appears t h e r e f o r e i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h schema 3 whereas i t i s p e r f e c t l y c o n s i s t e n t i f one goes f r o m schema 2 t o schema 1. However t h a t may be, t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s o f t h e t a s k appear i n h e r e n t i n t h e o p p o s i t i o n which e x i s t s between a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n g l o b a l l y a s s o c i a t e d t o t h e s t a t e m e n t (RA) and a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n b u i l t from t h e statement by a r t i c u l a t i o n o f concepts (RC). Accord i n g t o schema 2, t h e f i r s t a l o n e e x i s t s and i n h i b i t s t h e second; a c c o r d i n g t o schema 3, t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n r e l a t e d t o t h e statement c o n s t i t u t e s a k i n d o f norm t o which t h e c o n s t r u c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s compared and i n comparison w i t h which t h e l a t t e r i s judged. The second and t h i r d experiments g i v e us f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e o p p o s i t i o n between b o t h k i n d s o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n : t h e f a c t o f b e i n g a b l e t o a s s o c i a t e t o t h e

(1) Statement

( 2 ) Statement

Comprehension by articulation

Comprehension by association

<

Comprehension

( 3 ) Statement

-

Attempt a t repres e n t a t i o n RC o f an u n f a m i l i a r event

Representation RA o f a f a m i l i a r event corresponding o n l y p a r t l y t o the s t a t ernent

-

Attempt a t repreRC o f an -sentation u n f a m i l i a r event

articFtion

Comprehension association

Representation RA o f a f a m i l i a r event corresponding o n l y p a r t l y t o the s tatement

-

<

Judgment o f coherence brought on RC

)POSSIBLE

Judgment o f incoherence brought on RC: t h i s one -IMPOSSIBLE i s impossible

9 m

-

Judgment o f incongruency o f t h e statement w i t h -IMPOSSIBLE t h e RA

a

3

$ F m

E

5

Judgment o f incongruency between RC and RA

IMPOSSIBLE

Comprehension of Sentems Describing Unfamiliar Events

145

statement the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f an event which i s both f a m i l i a r and s p e c i f i c , b u t d i f f e r e n t from t h a t described by the statement i s a reason f o r r e j e c t i n g the sentence (judgment "impossible"). I n o t h e r respects, t h e g r e a t e r t h e d i f f e r e n c e between the usual event associated t o t h e statement and t h e unusual event t h e r e presentation o f which has t o be constructed,the more l i k e l y t h e s u b j e c t i s t o make t h e judgment "impossible". There remains, however, and t h a t i s t h e most important r e s u l t o f the f o u r t h e x p e r i ment, t h a t the conceptual a r t i c u l a t i o n i s possible from t h e age o f 5 years since c h i l d r e n use i t a f t e r a s h o r t t r a i n i n g session. Indeed t h e p o s s i b l e appears here subordinate t o t h e conceptual a r t i c u l a t i o n , and n o t the inverse. Indeed t h e t r a i n i n g c a r r i e d o u t i n the f o u r t h experiment i s e s s e n t i a l l y a t r a i n i n g t o conceptual a r t i c u l a t i o n and cannot i n any case be considered as a teaching o f the n o t i o n o f t h e possible. The f a c t t h a t i t leads the c h i l d r e n t o judge p o s s i b l e unusual events confirms t h e r e f o r e t h e d i r e c t i o n o f the r e l a t i o n : the p o s s i b l e i s subordinate t o the conceptual a r t i c u l a t i o n , a t l e a s t i n t h a t type o f task. A t l a s t , i t i s necessary t o answer one l a s t question : why does t h e judgment o f sentences d e s c r i b i n g unusual events present p r a c t i c a l l y no more d i f f i c u l t i e s from the age o f about 8 years? May be, f i r s t o f a l l , i t i s due t o a change o f s t r a t e g y . The c h i l d understands t h a t comprehension by global a s s o c i a t i o n i s n o t s u i t a b l e f o r the task and consequently he begins t o u t i l i z e a more demanding s t r a t e g y which i s t h a t o f concept a r t i c u l a t i o n . We cannot however s e t aside the idea t h a t conceptual a r t i c u l a t i o n becomes much e a s i e r as t h e concepts are more a n a l y t i c a l a t 7-8 years o f age than they are before (Bramaud du Boucheron and C o t i l l o n (1978); Bramaud du Boucheron (1981)). FOOTNOTES:

(1) On a l l , 45 sentences were constructed from 15 r o o t s "Action+Object" t o which were afded instruments t h a t are n o t t o o uncommom, f a i r l y unusual, very unusual, (Ex.: I d i g t h e e a r t h w i t h a t i l e (Sl), w i t h a c l o t h e s - p i n ( S 2 ) , a thimble ( S 3 ) . Each s u b j e c t has received 5 S1, 5 S2 and 5 S3 corresponding t o d i f f e r e n t r o o t s .

(2) 4 instruments corresponding t o 4 d i f f e r e n t sentences have been given r e s p e c t i v e l y by 75 %, 88 %, 93 % and 98 % o f the subjects; these sentences have c o n s t i t u t e d the sentences S i H ; f o r t h e o t h e r sentences, the most frequent instrument was given by l e s s than 50 % o f the c h i l d r e n .

G. Bramaud du Boucheron

146

REFERENCES: Bever, T.G., The c o g n i t i v e b a s i s f o r l i n g u i s t i c s t r u c t u r e s , i n : Hayes, J.R. (ed.), C o g n i t i o n and t h e Development o f Language (Wiley, New York, 1970). Bramaud du Boucheron, G.,

La Memoire Semantique de 1 ' E n f a n t (P.U.F.,

P a r i s , 1981).

Bramaud du Boucheron, G. and C o t i l l o n , J.M., Les e n f a n t s o r g a n i s e n t - i l s h i e r a r c h i quement l e s concepts d ' o b j e t s ~? Cahiers Psychol. 2 1 (1978) 17-35. Bramaud du Boucheron, G. and Perez, C., Les e n f a n t s comprennent-ils des phrases d e c r i v a n t des evenements inconnus ? B u l l . Psychol. 341 (1979) 757-761. Bramaud du Boucheron, G. and Konrad-Kasso, C., L'incompr@hension des phrases b i z a r r e s p a r l e s e n f a n t s . Labo. Psychol., Univ. P o i t i e r s (1980). Dubois, D., Quelques aspects de l a comprehension du langage: memoire s6mantique e t comprehension. B u l l , Psychol no s p e c i a l (1976), La Memoire Semantique, 307-313.

.

E h r l i c h , S.,

La m o b i l i t e c o g n i t i v e . B u l l . Psychol. X X X I I n"340 (1979) 413-423.

G u i l h o t , J.M., Entrainement 3. l a comprehension de phrases chez des e n f a n t s de 5 .3 7 ans, Labo. Psychol., Univ. P o i t i e r s , MCm. M a i t r i s e (1980). Le Ny, J.F., De l a s t r u c t u r e de l a s i g n i f i c a t i o n d'une phrase. B u l l . Psychol. X X X I I n0341 (1979) 833-843. Moret, L., Theories i n t e r p r e t a t i v e s du r e j e t , p a r l e s e n f a n t s de CM e t de CP, de phrases d e c r i v a n t des evenements i n h a b i t u e l s , Labo. Psychol., Univ. P o i t i e r s Mem. M a i t r i s e (1980). P e r f e t t i , C.A., Niveaux de comprehension des phrases. B u l l . Psychol. no spec. an. ( 1976) 346-355. P i a g e t , J., Le p o s s i b l e , l ' i m p o s s i b l e e t l e necessaire. A r c . Psychol. XLIV 172 (1976) 281-299. Schank, R.C., I d e n t i f i c a t i o n and c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n u n d e r l y i n g n a t u r a l language, i n : Schank, R.C. and Colby, K.M. (eds.) Computers Models o f Thought and Language (Freeman & Cie, San F r a n c i s c o , 1973). S i n c l a i r , H. and B r o n c k a r t , J.P., S.V.O. a l i n g u i s t i c u n i v e r s a l ? A s t u d y i n developmental p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c s , J. exp. C h i l d Psychol. 14, 3 (1972) 329-348. Vion, M., La comprehension des phrases simples chez l e j e u n e e n f a n t , Dept. Psychol., Univ. Provence, Th. 3e Cycle (1980).

LANGUAGE AND COMPREHENSION J.-F. Le Ny, W. Kintrch (editors) 0 North-HollandPublishing Company, 1982

TOWARDS A PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL OF WRITTEN DISCOURSE COMPREHENSION

A. J. Sanford & S. C. Garrod Department of Psychology University of Glasgow Glasgow

The general problem of the mental representation of discourse can be construed a s one of mapping discourse onto a s e t of mental variables. Two such mapping principles a r e considered (1) the text-mapping principle i n which it is suggested t h a t elements i n the t e x t a r e mapped onto a propositional structure stored i n memory and (2) the model mapping principle i n which elements i n the t e x t a r e mapped onto variables i n a mental model which derives from the readers knowledge of the topic under discussion. A number of arguments a r e p u t forward t o indicate the inadequacy of t e x t mapping a s a theory of comprehension i n contrast t o model mapping. Finally it is suggested t h a t a t the most general level it might be more useful t o consider a discourse a s a s e t of instructions t o the reader t o derive a message from the text i n which case a general message mapping principle should be formulated which would capture. the variety of d i f f e r e n t functions a piece of discourse may serve.

INTRODUCTION The psychologist concerned with developing a process model f o r discourse comprehension faces a d i f f i c u l t task. Not only does the s t r u c t u r e and form of discourse itself show extreme v a r i a b i l i t y , but the variety of cognitive operations entering i n t o the understanding of any particular discourse w i l l be extremely wide-ranging. And yet the ubiquity of discourse amongst the human race makes an understanding of i t s mechanisms a perfect psychological The aim of t h i s paper is t o review some of the problems microcosm. encountered by theories of discourse comprehension, and t o r a i s e the question of whether a u n i t a r y theory is a viable, or even sensible, proposition. One of the c l a s s i c concerns of discourse psycholinguistics is t h a t of mental Obviously a minimal requirement for having %mderstoodft representation. discourse is t h a t some representation of it has been produced i n mind of the reader. The representation problem has been made somewhat more t r a c t a b l e than it was by developments i n a r t i f i c i a l intelligence. Here, some success with various forms of representation has a t l e a s t fostered the hope of describing the mental processes i n t o which language-specific discourse might be translated (e.g. &hank's (1972) conceptual dependency system; Winograd's (1972) procedural semantics).

147

A.J. Sanford and S.C. Garrod

148

SOME GENERAL PROBLEMS OF REPRESENTATION

The general problem may be construed a s one of mapping discourse onto a set of mental variables. A s p e c i f i c question which a r i s e s is what s o r t of mapping W e would l i k e t o suggest t h a t psychologists have been guided t h i s might be. (consciously or otherwise) by what we shall c a l l t h e text mapping principle. A much-used technique of text Let us begin by considering text-descriptions. With t h i s description is tlpropositional analysis1, (e.g. Kintsch, 1974). method, a written discourse is t r a n s l a t e d i n t o propositions, each consisting of a predicator and one o r more arguments. Complete text s t r u c t u r e s can be constructed using t h i s method i n conjunction with a few r u l e s , such as an embedding principle, and assuming anaphora through argument o r predicator The a t t r a c t i o n of such an approach is t h a t t h e time taken t o repetition. read a text is roughly l i n e a r l y r e l a t e d t o the number of propositions i n it, and which propositions a r e remembered depends upon t h e i r level i n t h e propositional hierarchy. Thus the propositional s t r u c t u r e of a text is thought of a s a kind of mental representation of t h e text c e r t a i n l y it may be incomplete, but it is argued t o be a psychologically meaningful way of representing a text. The advantage behind such a formulation is reputed t o be t h a t it captures meaning i n a way which is independent of surface structure. For instance, the sentence "They a r e working students" has two d i s t i n c t meanings which have e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t propositional s t r u c t u r e s , one s t a t i v e and one actional.

-

However, problems arise when t h e propositional a n a l y s i s is examined i n d e t a i l . Consider the atoms of the proposition itself, the predicator and t h e Kintsch and van Dijk (1978) suggest t h a t t h e atoms of a arguments; proposition denote complete concepts. So, f o r instance, 'The man buys a present" is written i n propositional format as (BUYS, MAN, PRESENT), t h e upper This raises two questions: what case reminding us t h a t these a r e concepts. is t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e concepts, how do t h e propositions themselves r e l a t e Take the following sentence: t o mental representation.

(3) The housewife cooked t h e chips. A s a proposition, one may write: (4) (COOK, HOUSEWIFE, CHIPS) Now, Alan Garnham (1980) has shown which is an almost perfect text-mapping. t h a t i n cued-recall experiments, "friedn is a b e t t e r recall cue f o r t h i s Why is t h i s ? sentence than is GQS&&. It a r i s e s because t h e English expression "cooked the chips" is normally used f o r "prepared potatoes by W e could, of course, say that (3) gives rise t o t h e proposition: frying".

(5)

(FRY, HOUSEWIFE, CHIPS)

However, t h i s implies that propositions are not text-mappings but map i n t o Johnson-Laird (1980) world knowlege, and t h a t they summarise makes a s i m i l a r point with the example "If A is t o t h e r i g h t of 8, and B is t o While most people believe it is t h e t h e r i g h t of C is A t o t h e r i g h t of C"?. case a t first s i g h t , i n f a c t it is undecidable, s i n c e A, B and C may be s i t t i n g a t a c i r c u l a r table1 Most people's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n must r e s u l t from a p a r t i c u l a r mental model of t h e s i t u a t i o n , which is only one of the set of

a.

Psychological Model of Written Discourse Comprehension

149

Such arguments lead one t o conclude t h a t i f propositions a r e possibilities. r e a l i s t i c mental currency, then they a r e not merely text-mapped, b u t a r e model-mapped. (See Johnson-Laird, 1980; Sanford and Garrod, 1981(a), for other examples). Now consider the r e l a t i o n of propositions t o mental representation. I f each atom of a proposition points t o a concept, with "A is t o the r i g h t of BII it is necessary t o acknowledge t h a t there is more than one variety of %o t h e r i g h t opt, and t h a t t h i s is dependent upon a s i t u a t i o n a l model. While t h i s puts models prior t o propositions, it does a t l e a s t preserve the modularity of ltA1l, l'Bll, and "right opt. But T h e housewife cooked the chips" does not even do this. Here one of the concepts underlying cooking (making f r i e d potatoes) influences the choice of concept for the predicator, and s p e c i f i e s it i n detail. I n short, many knowledge representations have t o be u t i l i s e d i n order t o s e t up a proposition which points t o concepts, and it might be j u s t i f i a b l y argued t h a t assuming t h a t propositions a r e mental currency misses out the major points of the mental economy. Such arguments have a long history i n philosophy (c.f. Wittgenstein, 1968). So f a r a s process-models a r e concerned, there a r e other problems concerning I f a current the r e l a t i o n of the proposition t o mental representation. proposition occupies some of working or short-term memory, then does t h i s mean t h a t the concepts denoted by a proposition occupy memory, or a r e the propositional atoms merely pointers t o concepts which a r e only accessed when needed? This question is clearly related t o the issue of l e x i c a l decomposition (c.f. Garrod & Sanford, 1981 (a); Gentner, 1981; Kintsch, We shall c a l l t h e problem t h a t of the 1974 and Sanford & Garrod, 1981.

,

reference LQIlain.

THE PROBLEM OF REFRENCE DOMAIN Any analysis of t e x t comprehension quickly encounters the problem of We may construe a domain of reference a s being the set of reference domain. A things which can be d i r e c t l y referred t o a t any point i n a discourse. straightforward example of the problem is (4)

Marvin dug a hole.

(4,)

His shovel was heavy.

Sentence (4') contains a reference t o Marvin's M,although no shovel has been e x p l i c i t l y mentioned i n the preceding sentence. Clearly, readers make the connection through the v e r b Itdugtl which presumably has a meaning s t r u c t u r e specifying h a k e a hole with a shovel1,. I n t h i s way the reference domain set up by sentence (4) must include information about making a hole, including Thus we may replace ( 4 9 with (5)

The shovel was heavy.

which uses the d e f i n i t e a r t i c l e t o indicate t h a t the shovel is l i n g u i s t i c a l l y Wvenlf (Halliday, 1967). Such examples a r e commonplace: if we w r i t e about i f we write a law court, then it is not a problem t o introduceand so on. about skiing, we may introduce m ,

Even such commonplace cases a s these r a i s e important questions concerning the

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mental representation of discourse and the processes applied t o those Indeed, there appear t o be two quite d i s t i n c t ways i n which representations. t h i s particular form of reference could be realised in a processor. The f i r s t would assume a minimal representation of a sentence i n which each concept is simply stored as a l ab el and perhaps each of t h e concepts bound A memory search for relevant aspects of together a s a simple proposition. the meaning of concepts would be implemented only i f it was required by the So, on t h i s account, the information tha t &g means & 1 subsequent text. w i l l be accessed only on reading (49. The a lte rna tive &Q& & & 1 processing theory would assume t h at when a sentence is encountered, a mental representation is s e t up which contains a t l e a s t enough information about the meanings of the concepts t o capture a particular and complete interpretation I f t h i s information is refered t o i n a subsequent sentence, of the sentence. then it w i l l be a simple matter t o find a reference for it a t the time the reference was encountered. The r e l a t i v e merit of each t y p e of system depends upon two d i f f e r e n t conceptions of parsimony. For the f i r s t system, it seems parsimonious not t o anticipate which s p eci f i c interpretation and, hence, aspects of meaning w i l l be required on the grounds tha t any particular aspect of meaning may be required. After a l l , it might be argued t h a t any given sentence is a poor predictor of a sentence which may follow. With respect t o the second system, it may be argued t h a t comprehension is going t o be f a s t e r and easier i f a particular sentence r ef er s back t o something which is already part of an extant representation, a l b e i t implicit. Before elaborating upon the broader implications of the two points of view, we s h a ll describe an experimental procedure which can discriminate between them. Consider the following sentence pair: ( 6 ) Keith drove t o London. ( 6 ' ) The car kept breaking down.

I n t h i s case, there is no ex p l i ci t antecedent f o r & w. with the pair below, where there is a d i r ect antecedent:

This contrasts

(7) Keith went t o London by car. ( 6 ' ) The car kept breaking down.

Using materials of t h i s kind, Garrod & Sanford (1981) compared the times it took subjects t o read ( 6 9 a f t e r ei t h er ( 6 ) or (7). The prediction was tha t if subjects had t o search through the meanings of the concepts underlying (6) t o resolve the reference t o a e i n ( 6 9 , but d i d not have t o do so w i t h (7), then it would t a k e longer t o read ( 6 ' ) a f t e r ( 6 ) . As t h e r e was no difference i n reading time, it was concluded t h at some s o r t of extended meaning representation is s e t up by (61, and t h at it includes de finitiona l information relating t o mr. Other observations a r e consistent with t h e view t h a t sentences have quite complex mental representations. Consider the following example, taken from Sanford and Garrod (1980, 1981): (8)

John was on h i s way t o school.

( a 1 ) He was

worried about the maths lesson.

Psychological Model of Written Discourse Comprehension

151

Up t o (81) a l l is well. But problems begin for many r e a d e r s when t h e y encounter a t h i r d sentence: (8It) He was a f r a i d h e would be unable t o c o n t r o l t h e c l a s s . T h i s c a u s e s problems f o r many r e a d e r s , because they feel t h a t c o n t r o l l i n g t h e c l a s s should n o t be one of John's concerns, because it is assumed t h a t he is a schoolboy, and n o t a t e a c h e r . There would be no such problem i f (8) were r e p l a c e d by (9)

The t e a c h e r was on h i s way t o s c h o o l .

Quite a p a r t from t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e anecdote i t s e l f , Sanford and Garrod, (1980) demonstrated t h a t t h e t i m e taken t o comprehend a s e n t e n c e when it demands a r o l e - s h i f t is r e l i a b l y g r e a t e r than when it does not. One very a t t r a c t i v e way of i n t e r p r e t i n g f i n d i n g s o f t h i s kind is t o assume t h a t when a s e n t e n c e is encountered it i s o l a t e s a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n memory o f an e v e n t of which it is a p a r t i a l d s c r i p t i o n . I n t h i s way, e n t i t i e s mentioned i n a s e n t e n c e become mapped i n t o c e r t a i n roles w i t h i n t h e i s o l a t e d representation. For t h e s a k e o f s i m p l i c i t y , we refer t o t h e s e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a s scenarios. Sanford and Garrod (1981) d i s c u s s t h e view and a r g u e t h a t much o f memory i s made up o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of whole s i t u a t i o n s , l i k e "being a t t h e cinema" o r " d r i v i n g a cart1. Within t h e s e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a r e d e s c r i p t i o n s o f t y p i c a l t h i n g s t o watch o u t for or which happen i n t h e s i t u a t i o n s which they d e p i c t . O f necessity, therefore, they i n t h e e n t i r e structure. Such c o n t a i n d e s c r i p t i o n s of pntities p l a y i n g a view is c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o Minsky's (1975) concept o f t h e frame, and Schank and Abelson's (1977) s c r i p t . We a r g u e t h a t on e n c o u n t e r i n g a d i s c o u r s e , t h e p r o c e s s o r tries t o f i n d a s c e n a r i o i n memory t o which t h e d i s c o u r s e a p p e a r s t o be r e f e r r i n g . If one is found, then t h e d i s c o u r s e fragment is mapped d i r e c t l y i n t o t h e s c e n a r i o , and an a t t e m p t is made t o map subsequent f r a g m e n t s i n t o t h e same s c e n a r i o u n t i l t h e p r o c e s s b r e a k s down. Such a view of d i s c o u r s e p r o c e s s i n g c a r r i e s a l a r g e number o f i m p l i c a t i o n s . It a l l o w s & QQYQ r e f e r e n c e s t o be made and t o be r e s o l v e d r a p i d l y when a p p r o p r i a t e ; it c o n s t r a i n s t h e p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l s t o t h e roles w i t h i n a s c e n a r i o , and it p r o v i d e s a p o s s i b l e b a s i s for t h e phenomenology of understanding. For i n s t a n c e , i f people t h i n k t h a t t h e y know t o what a d i s c o u r s e refers, then t h e y feel t h a t t h e y understand it b e t t e r . F i n a l l y , it seems t o be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e f i n d i n g t h a t p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s e x e r t a powerful effect o v e r v e r b a l problem s o l v i n g (e.g. Noordman, 1978; Sanford and Garrod, 1980). I n summary, evidence p r e s e n t e d l e a d s t o a v i e w i n which d i s c o u r s e s e r v e s t o c a l l up knowledge s t r u c t u r e s i n t o which it is t h e n mapped. The mental r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a d i s c o u r s e c o n s i s t s o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of e x p l i c i t l y mentioned t h i n g s mapped i n t o a knowledge s t r u c t u r e .

Another major problem of t e x t comprehension r e v o l v e s around t h e f a c t t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n and e n t i t i e s which a r e of c e n t r a l importance a t one p o i n t d u r i n g We can d e s c r i b e t h i s i n r e a d i n g may be r e p l a c e d by o t h e r s a t a l a t e r point. Changes i n e p i s o d e , l i n e of terms of changes i n c u r r e n t f o c u s of a t t e n t i o n .

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argument, or s i t u a t i o n must naturally be reflected i n changes o f t h e attentional focus of the reader. One technique for tackling at t en t i o n al focus empirically is t o use the reference resolution procedure described in connection with the reference It is a simple matter t o demonstrate how the d i f f i c u l t y of domain problem. reference changes. The donkey kicked its master on the leg. Then it ran i n t o the village and hid. It wanted t o avoid carrying the heavy wood.

& was annoyed by t h i s aggressive behaviour. (noun phrase) i n (10) rather It would seem more natural t o use && than &. A s t u d y carried out by Purkiss (c.f. Sanford & Garrod, 1981), established t h a t subjects spend longer reading sentences which contain an anaphoric reference back across several sentences than across few. Furthermore, under some circumstances, a noun-phrase reference is more rapidly Similar e f f e c t s have been observed by resolved than a pronoun reference. other investigators and support the view t h a t as a te xt unfolds, e n t i t i e s which have not been mentioned recently become more d i f f i c u l t t o re fe r to, even by the noun phrase identical t o the one used t o introduce them (c.f. Garrod & Sanford, 1982, f o r a f u l l e r discussion).

Results such a s these suggest t h a t what is i n focus a t one point i n reading goes out of focus a s the t ex t moves on, and t h i s i n t u r n leads t o the idea th a t these properties r e s u l t from short-term or working memory limitations. For instance, Kintsch and van Dijk (1978) have argued tha t during reading, a parser breaks up the incoming t ex t i n t o propositions, and t h a t only a limited They suggest tha t number of propositions may be held i n a short-term buffer. i f reference is made t o a concept or proposition which is no longer i n the buffer, then a time-consuming search of long term memory has t o take place i n order t o attempt r e f er en t i al resolution. Within the Kintsch-van D i j k account, the problem becomes one of determining the rule s through which certain propositions remain i n the buffer, while others a r e l o s t , and remain only a s representations which may have been transferred t o long-term memory. Sanford and Garrod (1981) approached focus from a diffe re nt viewpoint, attempting t o see how t ex t content a l t e r s r ef er en tia l a va ila bility, and, by implication, the s t a t e of focus. It appears t o be possible t o break down many pieces of discourse into d i s cr et e episodes (narratives) or topic foc i (expository or argumentative discourse). A simple example might b e a story i n which p a r t of the action takes place i n a hairdresser, and then s h i f t s t o a I n discourse, there ar e many ways t o introduce such changes nightclub. through expressions such as "after thattt, "when he had finished", "and now t u r n i n g t o t h e i s s u e of XI, et c. One might argue t h a t when a d ef i n i t e s h i f t i n s et t ing, action, or topic focus occurs, then there has t o be a change i n background scenario in order t o make new reference resolutions possible. For instance, while it makes sense t o r e f e r & m t o Ifan assistanttt i n a hairdressing scene, it does not make so much sense when the action has moved on t o a nightclub scene, where & n e y ~ references t o Ita croupier" are possible. I f t h i s argument is correct, then ease of reference resolution measured by reading times should provide a Garrod and Sanford ( I n suitable technique t o explore its implications.

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Press) and Henderson, Sanford & Garrod (1980) have shown t h a t reference resolution f o r scenario-dependent e n t i t i e s is indeed slower when an episode s h i f t occurs. An episode s h i f t is represented mentally a s a change i n current focus, w i t h a new scenario the i n t er p re te r establishes mappings a s soon a s they a r e available. Since the scenario is not e xplic itly mentioned, the s h i f t is one of imDlicit m. A f u l l e r account (Sanford & Garrod, 1981) is beyond the scope of t h i s review, b u t it should be obvious t h a t we a r e viewing discourse as a s e r i e s of instructions t o seek scenarios, and seek referents. The mappings of references must not only encompass text-anaphors, b u t a l so references t o situations, which seems t o u s t o mean tha t significance is discovered early on i n t h e process of t e x t comprehension. PURPOSE AND REPRESENTATION Our argument t o date has led u s away from the view t h a t text-mapping is c e n t r a l t o an explanation of t ex t comprehension. Rather, we have come t o view comprehension a s a problem i n u t i l i s i n g language a s a s e r i e s of instructions t o address, reconfigure, and modify information stored i n memory. According t o such an orientation, t h e representation of a discourse w i l l be the memory t r a c e of the reconfigurations and modifications of memory, coded i n accordance w i t h the constraints operating on the focus system a t the time of reading. Such a view is en t i r el y compatible with the notion tha t language is e ss e n t i a l l y e l l i p t i c a l , and t h at t h e problem of how t o communicate is solved only when a referent discourse domain is established by the reader.

Let u s st e p back t o our i n i t i a l question about how we might think of the I f we are expected t o read and remember mental representation of discourse. a discourse verbatim, so t h at it can be reproduced word by word, then the process is very d i f f i c u l t and slow, and what is recalled, even i f incomplete, Normally subjects r e c a l l g i s t rarely r e l a t e s t o meaning (c.f. Cofer, 1941). and forget d e t a i l on being given instructions t o 'remember what they can' ( B a r t l e t t , 1932; Sanford & Garrod, 1981). T h i s underlines the fa c t t h a t written discourse is normally meant t o do something t o a reader change h i s views, put over a general idea, or provide a set of instructions t o ge t him t o do something. I f we want t o capture t h i s side of discourse processing i n a psychological representation, then it might be more appropriate t o look a t messaaemaoDlna ' rather than t ex t mapping.

-

Consider f o r a moment the e f f e c t of s t r es s i n g ce rta in written instructions by using terms such as "It is imperative t h at you respond quickly',, careful t o look o u t f o r .If, "We want t o emp h as i ze /stre ss t h a t 'I e t c . A t e x t mapping approach might cature these things a s propositions:- e.g.

..

...

(IMPERATIVE, RESPOND, YOU) & (QUICKLY, RESPOND) On the other hand, a message-mapping approach could accommodate such stress d i f f e r e n t l y , perhaps by simply assigning w h a t is t o be responded t o quickly t o a position of high p r i o r i t y i n a l i s t of what is t o be remembered. This would be q u i t e di f f er en t from a s t a t i v e representation of the kind shown

above. Perhaps, i f the task during reading the instructions was t o memorise them, then a s t a t i v e formulation would be more appropriate. I n t h i s way, representation would depend upon the reader's intentions.

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CONCLUSIONS In t h i s paper we have emphasized t h e importance of r e f e r e n c e i n a theory o f We claim t h a t reference mapping is c e n t r a l t o d i s c o u r s e comprehension. Thus understanding, and t h a t t h e s c e n a r i o provides a b a s i s f o r such mapping. t h e mental r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of d i s c o u r s e l i e s i n t h e r e l a t i o n s between t h e e x p l i c i t l i n g u i s t i c expressions o f a text and t h e s c e n a r i o s underlying t h e Hopefully, it has been shown t h a t such problems can be tackled text. experimentally. A f u l l e r theory of reference can be b u i l t on such a b a s i s (c.f. Sanford & Garrod, 19811, a s can a theory of emphasis i n writing. So f a r a s t h e l a t t e r is concerned, it would seem t o open t h e way towards a psychological theory of r h e t o r i c and s t y l e , something which an account based on stative representatons would perhaps f i n d d i f f i c u l t t o accommodate. REFERENCES

Bartlet, F.C.,

Remembering, Cambridge University Press, 1932.

Cofer, C . , A comparison of l o g i c a l and verbatim learning of prose passages of d i f f e r e n t lengths, Amer. J . Psychol., 1941, 54, 1-20. Garnham, A . , I n s t a n t i a t i o n of verbs, Q u a r t e r l y Journal of Experimental Psycho1 ogy , 1979, 31, 207-214. Garrod, S.C. and Sanford, A.J., Bridging inferences and t h e extended domain of reference, i n : Long, J . and Baddeley, A . ( e d s . ) , Attention and Performance IX, H i l l s d a l e , N.J., Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1981. Garrod, S.C. and Sanford, A.J., The mental representation of discourse i n a focussed memory system: implications f o r t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of anaphoric noun phrases, Journal of Semantics, 1982, 1, 21-41. Garrod, S.C. and Sanford, A.J., Topic dependent e f f e c t s i n language processing, i n : d'Arcais and J a r v e l l a ( e d s . ) , The process of Language Understanding, Chichester, Wiley & Sons ( I n P r e s s ) . Gentner, O . , Verb semantic s t r u c t u r e s i n memory f o r componential r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , Cognitive Psychology, 1981. Halliday, M . A . K . , Notes on t r a n s i t i v i t y and theme i n English, P a r t s 1 and 2 , Journal o f L i n g u i s t i c s , 1967, 3, 37-81 and 199-214. Henderson, R.J., Sanford, A.J. and Garrod, S.C., Topic s h i f t a s a v a r i a b l e in t e x t cohesion: experimental evidence from s t u d i e s i n reading time, Paper presented t o t h e Experimental Psychology Society, J u l y , 1980. Johnson-Laird, P.N., 1980, 4, 71-115.

Mental Models i n Cognitive Science, Cognitive Science,

Kintsch, W. and van D i j k , T.A., Toward a model of text production, Psychological Review, 1978, 85, 363-394.

omprehension and

Minsky, M . , A framework f o r representing knowledge, i n : Winston, P.H. The Psychology of Computer Vision, New York, McGraw-Hi1 , 1975.

(ed.),

Noordman, L . G . M . , Foreground and background information i n reasoning, i n : Campbell, R . N . and S m i t h , P.T. ( e d s . ) , Recent advances n t h e psychology o f language, L,ondon, Plenum Press, 1978.

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Sanford, A.J. and Garrod, S.C., Understanding Written Language: Explorations in Comprehension Beyond the Sentence, Chichester, Wiley and Sons, 1981. Sanford, A.J. and Garrod, S.C., The r o l e of background knowledge in psycholog i c a l accounts o f t e x t comprehension, Paper presented a t a meeting o f the European Psycholinguistics Association, Goteborg, Sweden, October, 1980. ( T o be published). Schank, R.C., Conceptual dependency: a theory of natural language understanding, Cognitive Psychology, 1972, 3, 552-631. Schank, R . C . and Abelson, R . P . , S c r i p t s , Plans, Goals a n d Understanding, H i l l s d a l e , N.J., Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1977. Winograd, T., Understanding Natural Language, New York, Academic P r e s s , 1972. Wittgenstein, L . ,

Philosophical I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , Oxford, Blackwell, 1968.

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LANGUAGE AND COMPREHENSION J:F. Le Ny, W. Kintsch (editors) 0 North.Holland PublishingCompany, 1982

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AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPREHENSION AND MEMORIZATION OF A TEXT

Marie-France E h r l i c h L a b o r a t o i r e de Psychologie Experimentale U n i v e r s i t e Rene Descartes e t EPHE (3eme s e c t i o n ) Associe au CNRS Paris France

The purpose o f t h i s s t u d y i s t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between comprehension and memorization o f a t e x t . I n t h e t e x t c r i t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s were i n s e r t e d f r o m which i n f e r r e d propos i t i o n s and o r d e r s t r u c t u r e s c o u l d be generated. The v a r i a b l e was t h e l e v e l o f t e x t p r o c e s s i n g : f o u r groups were asked t o judge sentences i n v o l v i n g d i f f e r e n t types o f o p e r a t i o n s . The s u b j e c t s were t e s t e d f o r comprehension and r e c a l l immediately a f t e r r e a d i n g t h e t e x t and a week l a t e r . A p a r t i c u l a r method was used f o r d i f f e r e n c i a t i n g t h e l e v e l o f p r o c e s s i n g and t h e "degree" o f comprehension. The r e s u l t s showed t h a t t h e r e c a l l performances i n c r e a s e d as a f u n c t i o n o f t h e "degree" o f comprehension o f t h e t e x t . INTRODUCTION

I n a t t e m p t i n g t o c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e memorization o f complex m a t e r i a l such as t e x t s , t h e s t u d y o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between comprehension and memorization i n e v i t a b l y comes up. And t h a t i s where s e r i o u s t h e o r e t i c a l and methodological problems a r i s e : i t i s necessary t o make c e r t a i n choices i n o r d e r t o d e f i n e what comprehens i o n and memorization a r e , and s p e c i f i c i n d i c a t o r s need t o be g i v e n . Concerning comprehension, d i f f e r e n t t h e o r e t i c a l approaches have guided t h e numerous Weimer and Palermo (1974), J u s t and Carpenter s t u d i e s done on t h i s t o p i c ( e (1977), Laberge and Samuels 3 7 7 ) , L e v e l t and F l o r e s d ' A r C a i s (1978), Le Ny (1978, 1979), N o i z e t ( 1 9 8 0 ) ) . To make a s y n t h e s i s o f a l l these w r i t i n g s would be p a r t i c u l a r l y d i f f i c u l t ; however, u n d e r l y i n g t h e i r d i v e r s i t y , a general d e f i n i t i o n can be discerned: t o understand v e r b a l i n f o r m a t i o n i s t o c o n s t r u c t a c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e i n which meaning p l a y s a dominant r o l e . We w i l l c a l l t h i s s t r u c t u r e a c o g n i t i v o - s e m a n t i c s t r u c t u r e (C-S S . ) . I n a t e x t , these C-S S. a r e embedded and o r g a n i z e d i n t o a " m a c r o s t r u c t u r e " (Mandler and Johnson (1977), K i n t s c h and Van D i j k (1978), Van D i j k ( 1 9 8 0 ) ) .

.,

Indeed t h e n o t i o n o f comprehension r e f e r s b o t h t o t h e a c t i v i t y i n which t h e s u b j e c t i s i n v o l v e d w h i l e p r o c e s s i n g i n f o r m a t i o n and t o t h e p r o d u c t o f t h i s a c t i v i t y . T h i s p r o d u c t may be analyzed e i t h e r as a mental s t r u c t u r e o r s t u d i e d through t h e s u b j e c t ' s b e h a v i o r observed i n d i f f e r e n t t a s k s . T h i s p r o b a b l y e x p l a i n s why such a d i v e r s i t y o f paradigms have been used t o s t u d y comprehension: r e a c t i o n time, d i f f i c u l t y s c a l e , f e e l i n g - o f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g , statement v e r i f i c a t i o n , b u i l d i n g a summary, t r a n s l a t i n g an i n f o r m a t i o n i n t o an a c t i o n . U s u a l l y t h e s e methods do n o t enable t h e c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f t h e C-S S. i t s e l f . They show i n s t e a d how a C-S S. works i n a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n . As t o t h e memorization o f t e x t s , r e c e n t a u t h o r s do n o t emphasize s t o r a g e and r e t r i e v a l o f d i s c r e t e items, as much as t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f c o n s t r u c t i n g c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e s . These s t r u c t u r e s a r e u s u a l l y t r a n s i t o r y b u t can become permanent as a r e s u l t o f adequate l e a r n i n g . I t seems t h e r e f o r e t h a t , on a t h e o r e t i c a l l e v e l , comprehension and memorization

I 58

M.-F. Ehrlich

a r e q u i t e s i m i l a r processes a s both imply building cognitive s t r u c t u r e s . Memorization however demands t h a t these s t r u c t u r e s be s t o r e d and r e c a l l e d a f t e r varying periods of time. I n both processes the C-S S. a r e constructed during t h e stimulus presentation with a p a r t i c u l a r goal i n mind. When dealing w i t h w r i t t e n t e x t s , the s p e c i f i c reading conditions and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h comprehension and memorization must be taken i n t o account. In t h e present experiment, the v a r i a b l e was t h e level of text processing. This v a r i a b l e was made operational by asking d i f f e r e n t groups of s u b j e c t s t o c a r r y o u t d i f f e r e n t operations while reading. I t i s assumed t h a t t h i s v a r i a b l e will lead the subjects t o build d i f f e r e n t types of C-S S. and consequently t o reach increasing "degrees" of t e x t comprehension. The C-S S. were characterized by means of a s p e c i f i c t e s t ; this t e s t was used a s an i n d i c a t o r of the "degree" of t e x t comprehension. Then i t was possible t o study t h e memorization performances a s a function of t h e level of processing on t h e one hand and of t h e "degree" of comprehension on the o t h e r . METHOD

Materi a1 A 475-word text about a boat race was constructed. There were four boats named "Excitable" ( A ) , "Unbridled" ( B ) , "Outrageous" ( C ) , "Fiery" ( D ) , a l l a d j e c t i v e s

w i t h s i m i l a r meanings. The t e x t had a general t i t l e and was made up of four paragraphs: t h e f i r s t was an i n t r o d u c t i o n , t h e f o u r t h was about the f i n i s h of the race. In the second paragraph, t h r e e sentences giving t h e r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n s of the boats a t a f i r s t moment of t h e race ( M l ) were i n s e r t e d among sentences d e s c r i bing the boats. In t h e t h i r d paragraph, t h r e e sentences gave t h e new p o s i t i o n s of t h e boats a t a second moment of the race (M2) and o t h e r unimportant information

Since the t e x t t e l l s the s t o r y of a boat r a c e , t h e sentences giving t h e p o s i t i o n s of t h e boats in paragraphs two and t h r e e were considered a s c r i t ' c a l sentences playing a c e n t r a l r o l e i n the C-S S. constructed by t h e s u b j e c t s

1.

These c r i t i c a l sentences were propositions w i t h t h e boat names as arguments and "TO BE I N FRONT OF" (symbolized by r ) as the only predicate. This p r e d i c a t e however, never appeared as such but was t r a n s l a t e d i n t o terms semantically c l o s e : " t o overtake", " t o outdistance", " t o come before". . For instance: "Unbridled outdistanced Outrageous".

..

Because "TO BE IN FRONT OF!' i s a t r a n s i t i v e r e l a t i o n , the following i n f e r r e d propositions and order s t r u c t u r e s could be considered: 1. Inferred propositions can be generated from c r i t i c a l propositions. These i n f e r r e d propositions can be of i n f e r e n t i a l level 1 ( I L 1 ) or 2 ( I L 2 ) depending on t h e number of mediating boats. The c r i t i c a l propositions a r e c a l l e d i n f e r e n t i a l level 0 propositions ( I L O ) . 2. The positions of the boats a t moments M 1 and M2 a r e represented by an order s t r u c t u r e . We w i l l c a l l cognitivo-semantic s t r u c t u r e , each of these two o F a e r s t r u c t u r e s a s represented c o r r e c t l y o r i n c o r r e c t l y , completely o r incompletely i n t h e s u b j e c t ' s mental system. 3 . Matching these two order s t r u c t u r e s leads t o new i n f e r r e d propositions which express the changes ( r e g r e s s i o n o r progression) of t h e b o a t s ' r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n s between M 1 and M2.

1 59

Relationship between Comprehensionand Memorization of a Text

Table 1 shows a l l o f these p r o p o s i t i o n s Table 1 C r i t i c a l propositions, i n f e r r e d propositions and o r d e r s t r u c t u r e s d e f i n y i n g t h e r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n s o f t h e boats a t t h e moments M 1 and M2 o f t h e r a c e

critical propositions

ILO

1 x 1

I , , , ] moment M2

moment M 1 Boats

A

B

C

D

S u b j e c t s and Experimental Procedure The s u b j e c t s were unpaid s t u d e n t s i n t h e i r l a s t y e a r o f h i g h school (mean age 18). The experiment c o n s i s t e d o f t h r e e successive phases: r e a d i n g t h e t e x t w h i c h i n v o l v e d t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l v a r i a b l e l e v e l o f processing, t h e comprehension t a s k s , and t h e memorization t a s k s .

The t e x t was t y p e w r i t t e n on two sheets o f a b o o k l e t . A l l t h e s u b j e c t s were asked t o r e a d t h e t e x t i n o r d e r t o understand i t . They were a l s o t o l d t h a t a f t e r w a r d s t h e y would answer q u e s t i o n s on t h e t e x t .

Processins-while-readlns A l l t h e s u b j e c t s were asked t o judge " t a k i n g i n t o account a l l t h e i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t a i n e d i n t h e t e x t " whether a sentence w r i t t e n i n t h e t o p margin o f t h e f r o n t page was t r u e o r f a l s e . Four groups o f s u b j e c t s judged d i f f e r e n t sentences i n v o l v i n g m f e r e m p e s o f o p e r a t i o n s . So t h e r e was a between-subjects v a r i a b l e : l e v e l o f p r o c e s s i n g (P4).

h-3-up-Pi. Ss judged two sentences s t a t e d e x p l i c i t l y i n t h e t e x t b u t n o t c o n c e r n i n g t h e p o s i t i o n s o f t h e boats.

Grt-up-Pz. Ss judged two c r i t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s ( I L D ) : A t moment M1:

"Outrageous i s i n f r o n t o f F i e r y " (CrD).

M.-F. Ehrlich

160

A t moment M2: " F i e r y i s i n f r o n t o f U n b r i d l e d " (DrB).

Gyhuee-PQ.

Ss judged two i n f e r e n t i a l l e v e l 1 p r o p o s i t i o n s ( I L 1 ) :

A t moment M1: " U n b r i d l e d i s i n f r o n t o f F i e r y " (BrD).

A t moment M2: " E x c i t a b l e i s i n f r o n t o f U n b r i d l e d " (ArB). Ss judged t h e same two sentences as group P3 p l u s a t h i r d p r o p o s i t i o n concerning t h e change i n t h e b o a t s ' p o s i t i o n s between M 1 and M2:

Grguee-P4.

"Between M 1 and M2, U n b r i d l e d regressed". I n a l l f o u r groups, these sentences were t r u e . The s u b j e c t s had as much t i m e as t h e y wanted t o r e a d t h e t e x t and t o judge t h e sentences. T h i s t i m e was recorded. I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e f o u r groups were d i f f e r e n c i a t e d by t h e o p e r a t i o n s t h a t t h e s u b j e c t s c a r r i e d o u t on t h e t e x t . I n group P 1 , a s i m p l e comparison between t h e t e x t and t h e t o be judged sentences i s s u f f i c i e n t t o d e c i d e whether t h e sentences were t r u e o r f a l s e . T h i s p r o c e s s i n g c o u l d be c a l l e d s u p e r f i c i a l as i t concerns o n l y e x p l i c i t y s t a t e d sentences i n t h e t e x t . I n group P2, t h e p r o c e s s i n g i s s i m i l a r t o t h e one i n P1, b u t t h e s u b j e c t ' s a t t e n t i o n i s drawn t o t h e p o s i t i o n s o f t h e boats a t M 1 and M2. I n group P3, comparing e x p l i c i t sentences i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t ; t h e s u b j e c t s had t o a p p l y an i n f e r e n t i a l reasoning. I n d o i n g so, t h e y were l e a d t o c o n s t r u c t two C-S S. congruent w i t h t h e two o r d e r s t r u c t u r e s s p e c i f i c t o M 1 and M2. I t must be taking into n o t e d t h a t t h e C-S S. corresponding t o p a r t i a l o r d e r s t r u c t u r e s c o n s i d e r a t i o n o n l y t h r e e b o a t s ) a r e s u f f i c i e n t t o do t h e proposed t a s k c o r r e c t l y . T h i s i s n o t t h e case f o r t h e s u b j e c t s i n group P4. They must n e c e s s a r i l y const r u c t a l l t h e C-S S. corresponding t o t h e two o r d e r s t r u c t u r e s a t M 1 and M2 and match s s e two s t r u c t u r e s b e f o r e d e c i d i n g whether " U n b r i d l e d regressed" i s t r u e o r f a l s e . I f t h e p r o c e s s i n g i n P1 and P2 can be q u a l i f i e d as s u p e r f i c i a l , processi n g i n P3 and P4 can be q u a l i f i e d as deeper.

(k.,

Our h y p o t h e s i s i s t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s o f p r o c e s s i n g l e a d t o d i f f e r e n t C-S S. and t h a t t h e y w i l l b r i n g t h e s u b j e c t s t o i n c r e a s i n g "degrees" o f comprehension o f t h e t e x t ; t h e deeper t h e processing, t h e h i g h e r t h e "degree" o f comprehension. A f t e r r e a d i n g t h e t e x t and w i t h o u t b e i n g a l l o w e d t o r e f e r t o t h e t e x t , t h e s u b j e c t s were submitted t o f o u r tasks i n i d e n t i c a l c o n d i t i o n s :

1. O r d e r i n thebbgJ2: t h e s u b j e c t s i n d i c a t e d t h e r a n k o f each o f t h e f o u r boats (1, 2:-3;-4y- a t moment M 1 o f t h e r a c e and a t moment M2. I t i s t h i s t a s k which w i l l g i v e an i n d i c a t o r o f , t h e s t a t e o f t h e C-S S. 2. verif~lng_thn_eroeosiJ~on~: t h e s u b j e c t s v e r i f i e d t w e l v e p r o p o s i t i o n s concerni n g t h e p o s i t i o n s o f - t h e boats. Four v a r i a b l e s were balanced: t h e p r e d i c a t e " i n f r o n t o f " ( r ) o r " i s behind" ( r ' ) ; t h e i n f e r e n t i a l l e v e l ILO, I L l o r IL2; whether t h e p r o p o s i t i o n was t r u e o r f a l s e ; t h e moment o f t h e r a c e M 1 o r M2. Each p r o p o s i t i o n t o be v e r i f i e d was w r i t t e n on t h e page o f a b o o k l e t i n random o r d e r . The s u b j e c t s proceeded as f o l l o w s : t h e y v e r i f i e d s i x p r o p o s i t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g M1, o r d e r e d t h e boats a t M1, v e r i f i e d s i x p r o p o s i t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g M2, o r d e r e d t h e boats a t M2. Then t h e s u b j e c t s v e r i f i e d f o u r p r o p o s i t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e change i n p o s i t i o n o f each b o a t between M 1 and M2 ( p r o g r e s s i o n o r r e g r e s s i o n ) .

3.

Eecnll_of_the_eharncte~~~J~c~-~e~c~~~~~g-J~~-fo~~-~ogt2.

Eecs!l-of-the-text-gs_a_whole: t h e s u b j e c t s were asked t o r e c a l l i n w r i t t i n g a1 1 t h e y c o u l d remember about t h e t e x t . 4.

Relationship between Comprehensionand Memorization of a Text

161

There was no time l i m i t p u t on these four tasks. All the subjects did the tasks in the same order: 2, 1, 3, 4, immediately a f t e r reading the t e x t and once again a week l a t e r (without rereading.the t e x t ) . The passation took place in small groups of ten subjects. RESULTS

The r e s u l t s of 97 subjects who accomplished a l l the tasks a n d who correctly carried o u t the judgment task while reading were analyzed ( 2 2 subjects in group P1, 25 in P2, 27 in P3 and 23 in P4). Only the reading time and the r e s u l t s f o r the ordering task and the recall task ( 1 and 4) carried o u t immediately a f t e r reading the t e x t and a week l a t e r will be presented in t h i s paper. I mmedi a t e t e s t s

A.

The role o f the level of t e x t processing, variable P.

A l . Fjepdlt~g-Ijmg (R.T.)

The mean reading times of the four groups are shown in Figure 1 (dotted l i n e s ) . The reading time increases with the level o f processing, F (3,93) = 9.99, p<.0005. A2.

Orderina the Boats (0.B.I

Each s u b j e c t ' s answer t o the ordering of the boats a t moments M 1 and M2 was compared t o the expected ordering by using the Kendall T. After the scores were transformed, which was possible as the t o t a l number of possible congruences was always the same, the scores went from -3 t o +3; by adding the scores f o r M 1 and M2, the global scores potentially varied from - 6 t o t6. Figure 1 shows the mean scores (dotted l i n e s ) . On the whole, the ordering scores increased s i g n i f i c a n t l y , F (3,93) = 3.74, pc.025. As expected, the constructions of C-S S. more or less congruent with the order structures expressed in the t e x t , a r e dependent on the level of t e x t processing. A?.

T e x t Rprilll

According t o the propositional analysis method (Kintsch ( 1 9 7 4 ) ) , the t e x t was segmented into 192 propositions. The s i x c r i t i c a l propositions expressing the order of the boats a t moments M1 and M2 were included among them. A7 1

Rernll n f the Order n f t h e Boats (R.0.)

The number o f c r i t i c a l propositions recalled was low. This score however i s not a good indicator because i t i s based on the e x p l i c i t propositions of the t e x t only. Another method must be used in order to take into account the p o s s i b i l i t y of reconstructing the order o f the boats. For example, i f a subject r e c a l l s the propositions CrB, Ar'B, Dr'A, i t i s possible t o reconstruct the order CrBrArD. This method however could only be used i f the subjects recalled a minimum o f three propositions f o r M 1 o r M2. There were 12 subjects in P I , 1 2 in P2, 16 in P3, a n d 2 1 in P4. As in the ordering task, the order expressed in the t e x t recall was compared t o the order presented in the t e x t by using the Kendall T. Figure 1 (dottedlines) shows the mean scores ( R . O . )

of the four groups. The scores

162

M. -F. Ehrlich

mean r e a d i n g t i m e (R.T.) ( i n min.) 10

t5

8

6

P1

c1

P2 c2

P3 c3

T?T-T-?

P4 c4

c1

c2

c3

c4

P3 c3

P4 c4

mean number o f recalled

44 mean scores (R.O.)

t3

,---tl

-1

,;

I: 1

P2 P3 c1 c2 c3 ---- v a r i a b l e P P1

---

P4

c4

'

P1 c1

P2 c2

'

variable C Figure 1 Mean values o f t h e r e a d i n g t i m e s (R.T.), t h e o r d e r i n g scores (O.B.), t h e r e c a l l o f t h e b o a t o r d e r (R.O.) and t h e r e c a l l e d p r o p o s i t i o n s (R.P.) as a f u n c t i o n o f t h e l e v e l o f processing: P ( d o t t e d l i n e s ) and t h e "degree"of comprehension: C ( c o n t i n u o u s l i n e s ) f o r t h e immediate t e s t s .

Relationship between Comprehensionand Memorization of a Text

o f groups P1, P2 and P3 a r e v e r y s i m i l a r .

163

Only P4 i s h i g h e r .

The number o f c o r r e c t l y r e c a l l e d p r o p o s i t i o n s (max.: 1 9 2 ) by each s u b j e c t was counted. F i g u r e 1 shows t h e mean scores ( d o t t e d l i n e s ) . Group P 3 ' s performance i s h a l f way between P l ' s and P 2 ' s . The o v e r a l l d i f f e r e n c e between t h e groups i s s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t : F (3,93) = 3.64, pc.025. G e n e r a l l y speaking, t h e number o f r e c a l l e d p r o p o s i t i o n s was low. T h i s c o u l d be due t o t h e experimental procedure which l e f t a l o n g t i m e between t h e r e a d i n g o f t h e t e x t and t h e r e c a l l t a s k .

B. The r o l e o f t h e "degree" o f comprehension reached a t t h e end o f t h e r e a d i n g o f t h e t e x t , v a r i a b l e C. B1.

conitructlon-of_varlabl"-c

The s t r o n g d i f f e r e n c e s observed i n t h e scores o f b o a t o r d e r i n g c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e s u b j e c t s i n a same group p u t t o use i n v e r y d i f f e r e n t ways t h e experiment a l v a r i a b l e : l e v e l o f t e x t processing. The s u b j e c t s d i d n o t a l l use t h e operat i o n s suggested by t h e judgment t a s k w h i l e reading. Some s u b j e c t s i n groups P 1 and P2 went way beyond what t h e y were asked f o r and c o n s t r u c t e d C-S S. s i m i l a r t o t h o s e c o n s t r u c t e d by s u b j e c t s i n groups P3 and P4. As o u r goal i s t o e s t a b l i s h a r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e r e c a l l performances and comprehension ( i . e . , t h e s t a t e o f t h e C-S S.) i t seems r e l e v a n t t o r e d i s t r i b u t e t h e s u b j e c t s acco-ng t o the comprehension performances a c t u a l l y achieved. The b o a t o r d e r produced by each s u b j e c t a t M1 and M2 and t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g s c o r e were considered. The p r o d u c t i o n s were c l a s s i f i e d i n t o f o u r c a t e g o r i e s :

-

p e r f e c t s t r u c t u r e ( P ) : score 3 (ABCD a t M1) p a r t i a l s t r u c t u r e ( p ) : scores 2 o r 1 (ex: ACBD a t M1)

-

non s t r u c t u r e (N.S.):

-

r e v e r s e s t r u c t u r e (R.S.):

score 0 (ex: CBAD a t M1) scores -1, - 2 o r - 3 (ex: DBCA a t M l ) .

The Table 2 was drawn up w i t h t h e f o u r c a t e g o r i e s o f s t r u c t u r e s f o r M1 and M2. Each one o f t h e 97 s u b j e c t s was p l a c e d i n one o f t h e 1 6 p o s s i b l e p o s i t i o n s . From t h i s t a b l e , f o u r groups c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o f o u r i n c r e a s i n g "degrees" o f comprehension were d i s t i n g u i s h e d :

- group C 1 : 24 s u b j e c t s who produced non s t r u c t u r e s (N.S.) t u r e s (R.S.)

and/or r e v e r s e s t r u c -

f o r M1 and M2.

-

group C2: 3 5 s u b j e c t s who produced p e r f e c t s t r u c t u r e s (P o r p a r t i a l s t r u c t u r e s ( p ) f o r M1 and non s t r u c t u r e s (N.S.) o r r e v e r s e s t r u c t u r e s (R.S.) f o r M2 o r v i c e versa.

-

group C3: 22 s u b j e c t s who produced p e r f e c t s t r u c t u r e s (P r e s ( p ) f o r M1 and M2.

-

and p a r t i a l s t r u c t u -

group C4: 16 s u b j e c t s who produced p e r f e c t s t r u c t u r e s ( P ) f o r M1 and M2.

V a r i a b l e C has t h u s been e s t a b l i s h e d w i t h f o u r m o d a l i t i e s and f o u r new groups o f s u b j e c t s made up a p o s t e r i o r i a c c o r d i n g t o t h e s t a t e o f t h e C-S S . , whatever t h e s u b j e c t s ' i n i t i a l b e l o n g i n g t o a p a r t i c u l a r experimental group.

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Table 2 Subject d i s t r i b u t i o n according t o t h e categories o f produced s t r u c t u r e s i n t h e o r d e r i n g t a s k : 24 Ss i n group C1, 35 i n C2, 22 i n C3, 16 i n C4 Moment M2 p

P

N.S.

R.S.

P P

Moment M 1 N.S R.S

R7.

R p l a t i n n z h i n between v n r i a h l e z P and

r

Table 3 shows t h e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f s u b j e c t s from groups P1, P2, P3 and P4 i n t o f o u r new C groups.

Table 3 R e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f s u b j e c t s f r o m groups P1, P2, P3 and P4 i n t o groups C1, C2, C3, and C4 (number o f s u b j e c t s and corresponding p r o p o r t i o n s )

c1

c2 8

p1

40.9%

p2

36.0%

p3

18.5%

3 36.3%

8

35

4

27

5

9

18.5% 5

39.1% 22

25 16.0%

22.2%

34.8%

22 9.1%

16.0% 6

8 24

2

4

40.7%

4.3%

c4

13.6%

32.0%

11

P4

c3

23 21.7%

16

Relationship between Comprehensionand Memorization of a Text

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V a r i a b l e C i s r e l a t e d t o v a r i a b l e P: t h e l e v e l o f p r o c e s s i n g c a r r i e d o u t by t h e s u b j e c t w h i l e r e a d i n g determines,but o n l y t o a c e r t a i n e x t e n t , what C group t h e subject w i l l belong to.

F i g u r e 1 ( c o n t i n u o u s l i n e s ) shows t h e mean values of t h e r e a d i n g t i m e s (R.T.), o r d e r i n q scores (O.B.), t h e r e c a l l o f t h e b o a t o r d e r (R.O.)? and t h e r e c a l l e d p r o p o s i t i o n s (R.P.) f o r groups C 1 , C2, C3 and C4. Periormances i n c r e a s e d w i t h v a r i a b l e C. F o r R.T.: F (3,93) = 6.02, p < .005; f o r O.B.: F (3,93) = 227.52, p < .0005; f o r R.P.: F (3;93) 11.07, p'<.0005.

the

A comparison between t h e r o l e o f v a r i a b l e C and t h e r o l e o f experimental v a r i a b l e P i n t h e d i f f e r e n t t a s k s would be most f r u i t f u l :

-

t h e r e a d i n g t i m e s (R.T.)

v a r y i n s i m i l a r ways as a f u n c t i o n o f v a r i a b l e s P and C.

t h e mean o r d e r i n g scores (O.B.) i n c r e a s e s t e a d i l y w i t h v a r i a b l e C. T h i s r e s u l t i s due m a i n l y t o t h e f a c t t h a t v a r i a b l e C was c o n s t r u c t e d f r o m t h e o r d e r i n g t a s k .

-

b o t h t h e b o a t o r d e r r e c a l l (R.O.) and t h e r e c a l l o f t h e t e x t as whole (R.P.) i n c r e a s e s h a r p l y and s t e a d i l y as v a r i a b l e C i n c r e a s e s . T h i s was n o t t h e case f o r v a r i a b l e P.

V a r i a b l e C which s p e c i f i e s t h e s t a t e o f t h e C-S S., i s b e t t e r a t d i f f e r e n c i a t i n g t h e memorization performances t h a n t h e i n i t i a l experimental v a r i a b l e : l e v e l o f processing. Delayed t e s t s The same a n a l y s i s was used f o r t h e t a s k s c a r r i e d o u t a week l a t e r . A. The r o l e o f v a r i a b l e P F i g u r e 2 ( d o t t e d l i n e s ) shows t h e r e s u l t s . The o r d e r i n g scores (O.B.) tended t o i n c r e a s e : F (3,91) = 2.61, p < . l o . The b o a t o r d e r r e c a l l (O.B.) h a r d l y v a r i e d f o r t h e d i f f e r e n t P groups. The number o f r e c a l l e d p r o p o s i t i o n s (R.P.) d i d n o t i n c r e a s e s t e a d i l y between P 1 and P2; P4's score however was h i g h e r . The o v e r a l l d i f f e r e n c e was s i g n i f i c a n t : F (3,91) = 3.54, p < .025. B. The r o l e o f v a r i a b l e C The same s u b j e c t c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i n t o f o u r groups C1, C2, C3, C4 was used. So we s t u d i e d how t h e C-S S., as t h e y appeared i n t h e o r d e r i n g t a s k accomplished immediately a f t e r r e a d i n g , i n f l u e n c e t h e performances i n t h e o r d e r i n g and r e c a l l t a s k s done a week l a t e r . F i g u r e 2 ( c o n t i n u o u s l i n e s ) shows t h e r e s u l t s . The scores o f t h e t h r e e dependent v a r i a b l e s R.T., R.O.3 and R.P. i n c r e a s e d as a f u n c t i o n o f v a r i a b l e C; f o r O.B.: F (3,91) = 23.38, p < .005; f o r P.R.: F (3,91) = 7.13, p < .0005. I t seems l i k e v a r i a b l e C i s t h e o n l y one t o have a d e c i s i v e i n f l u e n c e on t h e i n c r e a s e i n t h e performances o f o r d e r i n g and r e c a l l t a s k s .

CONCLUSION There e x i s t s a c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e comprehension and t h e memorization o f a t e x t . T h i s experiment c l e a r l y shows t h a t i f v a r y i n g "degrees" o f comprehens i o n can be e s t a b l i s h e d , v a r i a t i o n s i n t h e memorization performances o f immediate

166

M.-F. Ehrlich

T +5

mean scores (O.B.)

.

+3

.

tl

.

PI c1

P2 c2

P3 c3

mean scores (R.O.) +5

36

+3

28

+1

20

-1

12

P4 c4

mean number o f recalled p r o p o s i t i o n s (R.P. )

~~

P1

c1

P2 c2

P3 c3

P4

c4

---___-v a r i a b l e

P

P1 c1

P2 c2

P3 c3

P4 c4

'

variable C

Figure 2 Mean values o f t h e r e a d i n g t i m e s (R.T.), t h e o r d e r i n g scores ( O . B . ) , t h e r e c a l l of t h e b o a t o r d e r (R.O.) and t h e r e c a l l e d p r o p o s i t i o n s (R.P.) as a f u n c t i o n of t h e l e v e l of p r o c e s s i n g : P ( d o t t e d l i n e s ) and t h e "degree" o f comprehension: C ( c o n t i n u o u s l i n e s ) f o r t h e delayed t e s t s .

Relationship between Comprehensionand Memorization of a Text

167

and delayed r e c a l l a r e c o r r e l a t i v e l y observed. T h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i s due t o t h e s t r u c t u r a l and f u n c t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e C-S S. which t h e s u b j e c t b u i l d s w h i l e r e a d i n g t h e t e x t , and which l a t e r w i l l serve as a b a s i s f o r memorizing. To b u i l d these C-S S. t h e s u b j e c t s a p p l y d i f f e r e n t o p e r a t i o n s t o t h e i n f o r m a t i o n which t h e t e x t g i v e s them. I n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case, t h e s u b j e c t s have t o c o n s t r u c t two C-S S. congruent w i t h t h e two o r d e r s t r u c t u r e s which d e f i n e t h e r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n s o f f o u r d i s t i n c t i t e m s ( b o a t s ) a t two moments. T h i s c o n s t r u c t i o n i s c a r r i e d o u t w h i l e processing t h e text. The e x p e r i m e n t a l v a r i a b l e l e v e l o f p r o c e s s i n g does have a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t on t h e comprehension and t h e memorization performances. However t h e s e e f f e c t s a r e n o t s y s t e m a t i c a l l y observed and t h e y a r e s l i g h t e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e delayed t a s k s . T h i s can be e x p l a i n e d by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e p r o c e s s i n g a c t u a l l y c a r r i e d o u t by t h e s u b j e c t w h i l e r e a d i n g t h e t e x t does n o t always f i t t h e p r o c e s s i n g e x p e r i m e n t a l l y induced; some s u b j e c t s go f u r t h e r t h a n what t h e y a r e asked f o r . However i f t h e s u b j e c t s a r e r e d i s t r i b u t e d a p o s t e r i o r i i n t o f o u r groups a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r performance i n t h e comprehension t a s k , a c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p i s observed between comprehension and memorization i n b o t h immediate and delayed r e c a l l . I n o t h e r words, t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between comprehension and memorization cannot be precisely established unless t h e actual s t a t e o f the cognitivo-semantic structures and t h e i n t e r - s u b j e c t s ' v a r i a t i o n s can be d e f i n e d .

FOOTNOTES: Requests f o r r e p r i n t s s h o u l d be s e n t t o Marie-France E h r l i c h , L a b o r a t o i r e de Psychologie Experimentale, 28 r u e Serpente, 75006 - P a r i s , France. The s u b j e c t s p r o b a b l y do c o n s t r u c t o t h e r C-S S. f r o m o t h e r sentences i n t h e t e x t . But t h e sentences c o n c e r n i n g t h e p o s i t i o n s o f t h e b o a t s have a s p e c i a l s t a t u s because o f t h e i r formal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and because o f t h e theme o f t h e text.

As f o r v a r i a b l e P, R.O. scores a p p l y o n l y t o some s u b j e c t s : 8 s u b j e c t s i n C1, 22 i n C2, 16 i n C3 and 15 i n C4. These d a t a concerned 11 s u b j e c t s i n C 1 , 2 1 i n C2, 16 i n C3, 15 i n C4.

REFERENCES: JUST, M.A., CARPENTER, P.A., Eds. - C o g n i t i v e processes i n comprehension, H i l l s d a l e , L. Erlbaum, 1977. KINTSCH, W. Sons, 1974.

-

The r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f meaning i n memory, New-York, J. W i l e y and

- Toward a model o f t e x t comprehension and KINTSCH, W. , VAN DIJK, T.A. p r o d u c t i o n , P s y c h o l o g i c a l Review, 1978, 85, 363-394. LABERGE, 0. , SAMUELS, S.J., Eds. - B a s i c processes i n r e a d i n g : p e r c e p t i o n and comprehension, H i l l s d a l e , L. Erlbaum, 1977.

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LE NY, J.F. - Vers un modele de 1'activitC s h a n t i q u e au cours de l a lecture, Psychologie e t Education, 1978, 4, 145-161. LE N Y , J.F. - La semantique psychologique, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1979. LEVELT, W.J.M. , FLORES D'ARCAIS, G.B., Eds. - Studies i n the perception of language, New-York, J . Wiley and Sons, 1978.

MANDLER, J.M. , JOHNSON, N.S. - Remembrance o f things parsed: story structure and recall, Cognitive Psychology, 1977, 1, 111-151.

-

De l a perception a l a comprChension d u langage, Paris, Presses NOIZET, G. Universitaires de France, 1980. VAN DIJK, T.A. - Story comprehension: an introduction, Poetics, special issue: Story comprehension, 1980, 9, 1-21.

WEIMER, W.B. , PALERMO, D.S. J. Wiley and Sons, 1974.

-

Cognition and the symbolic processes, New-York,

LANGUAGE AND COMPREHENSION J.-F. Le Ny, W. Kintsch (editors) 0 North.Holland PublishingCompany, 1982

169

CONSTRUCTION OF TEXT REPRESENTATION I N SEMANTIC MEMORY

Stephane E h r l i c h L a b o r a t o i r e de Psychologie (E.R.A. 797 du C.N.R.S.) U n i v e r s i t P de P o i t i e r s P o i t i e r s , France

I n a f i r s t p a r t , t h e o r e t i c a l , we proposed a g e n e r a t i v e model o f t h e semantic memory f u n c t i o n i n g and t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f sentences and t e x t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . That c o n s t r u c t i o n i n v o l ves a general process o f d e t e r m i n a t i o n - a c t i v a t i o n - c o n s t r u c t i o n (D.A.C.). T h i s process i s e x e r c i s e d on t h e p o t e n t i a l u n i t s o f permanent memory ( c o n c e p t s ) : i t a c t i v a t e s concepts, determines t h e i r i n f o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t ; f i x e s t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n and t r a n s f o r m s them i n t o r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . I n a l a s t p a r t , e m p i r i c a l , we have s t u d i e d t h e D.A.C. process i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a t e x t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n t h e form o f a h i e r a r c h y o f concepts. SEMANTIC REPRESENTATION AND COMPREHENSION To understand a sentence, a t e x t , a speech, t h e s u b j e c t has t o f o r m a semantic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f r o m i n f o r m a t i o n g i v e n t o him. Then he must be a b l e t o make a "mental second r e a d i n g " o f t h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n so as t o e i t h e r make c l e a r i t s c o n t e n t , i n a r e c a l l t a s k f o r example, or t o answer q u e s t i o n s o f comprehension. A f i r s t series o f questions r e l a t e s t o the construction o f representations: w i t h what? how? i n what c o n d i t i o n s ? i s t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f speech or o f text? A second s e r i e s o f q u e s t i o n s r e l a t e s t o t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f u t i l i z a t i o n o f t h e r e p r e sentations a f t e r t h e i r c o n s t r u c t i o n ; how does t h e s u b j e c t come t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t he understands? How does he make e x p l i c i t a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ? i t s i n f o r m a t i v e content? i t s i n t e r n a l organization? The f i r s t s e r i e s o f q u e s t i o n s i s s e l y t h e f u n c t i o n i n g o f semantic i n what c o n d i t i o n s and a c c o r d i n g t o a representation? That i s the

d e a l i n g w i t h t h e mental f u n c t i o n i n g and more p r e c i memory. The c e n t r a l q u e s t i o n i s t h e f o l l o w i n g one: t o which m o d a l i t i e s can semantic memory g i v e r i s e main q u e s t i o n o f o u r study.

SEMANTIC MEMORY: A FREE-ELEMENTS GENERATIVE SYSTEM Semantic memory i s understood t o be a s e t o f permanent c o g n i t i v e u n i t s which can be d e f i n e d as f o l l o w s :

1. I t i s knolwledge a c q u i r e d by t h e s u b j e c t , r e l a t i v e t o events, o b j e c t s , a c t i o n s , s t a t e s , e t c . T h i s knowledge i s marked i n memory i n t h e f o r m o f d i s c r e t e f u n c t i o n a l elements c a l l e d concepts o r (and) mental images as a f i r s t a p p r o x i m a t i o n a t l e a s t . 2. We speak o f semantic memory when t h e s e concepts can be made e x p l i c i t v e r b a l l y . On t h e c o n t r a r y , when t h e concepts cannot be made e x p l i c i t v e r b a l l y , t h e y belong t o t h e general c o g n i t i v e memory which i n c l u d e s semantic memory.

3. Each concept possesses an i n f o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t .

A s s o c i a t e d w i t h o t h e r concepts,

S.Ehrlich

170

i t performs two main f u n c t i o n s i n t h e combination so performed: an i n f o r m a t i v e f u n c t i o n and a r e l a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n .

3.1. The p o s s i b l e i n f o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t o f a concept i s m u l t i p l e . I t i n v o l v e s t h e whole o f p r o p e r t i e s o f a l l k i n d s , known by t h e s u b j e c t , and c h a r a c t e r i z i n g t h e corresponding r e f e r e n t . F o r example, t h e i n f o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t o f t h e concept " t r e e " g a t h e r s i n f o r m a t i o n as d i v e r s e as " i t has branches, r o o t s , leaves, ... ; i t can be ; i t i s u s e f u l f o r g i v i n g f r u i t , o r shade found i n a meadow, a garden, a f o r e s t , o r providing firewood"; etc.

...

I t i s obvious t h a t t h e i n f o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t can o n l y be d e f i n e d by o t h e r concepts, t h e c o n t e n t o f which i s i t s e l f d e f i n e d by o t h e r concepts; and so on. I n o t h e r words we c o n s i d e r here t h a t t h e minimal u n i t o f meaning i s t h e concept and n o t t h e semant i c f e a t u r e as i n some componential t h e o r i e s ; b u t t h e r e e x i s t concepts o f d i f f e r e n t o r d e r s o f c o m p l e x i t y as we w i l l see f u r t h e r on.

The i n f o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t o f a concept b e i n g m u l t i p l e , i t s i n f o r m a t i v e f u n c t i o n v a r i e s q u a l i t a t i v e l y according t o t h e c o m b i n a t i o n i n which i t i s i n s e r t e d : t h e i n f o r m a t i v e f u n c t i o n o f t h e concept " t r e e " i s v e r y d i f f e r e n t i n t h e two f o l l o w i n g combinations: "he has c u t down a t r e e i n o r d e r t o plough h i s f i e l d more e a s i l y " ; i t i s p r o b a b l y a farmer who g e t s r i d o f an i s o l a t e d t r e e which b o t h e r s him"; "he has c u t a t r e e t o make f i r e w o o d " ; we a r e speaking o f a woodcutter w o r k i n g i n a f o r e s t . 3.2. We c a l l r e l a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n t h e combinatory c a p a c i t y o f concepts; t h a t i s t h e i r c a p a c i t y t o form w i t h o t h e r concepts groups m a i n t a i n i n g s p e c i f i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s . I n t h e p r e v i o u s example " t h e woodcutter c u t s t h e t r e e " , i t i s obvious t h a t a r e l a t i o n i s e s t a b l i s h e d between t h e concepts "woodcutter" and " t r e e " through a s p e c i f i c act i o n : " c u t " . I n t h a t combination, t h e r e l a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n performed by t h e concept " c u t " can be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as f o l l o w s :

-

t h e woodcutter can c u t something: i n f o r m a t i v e f u n c t i o n performed by t h e concept "woodcutter " ;

-

t h e t r e e can be c u t : i n f o r m a t i v e f u n c t i o n performed by t h e concept " t r e e " ;

-

t h e r e l a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n o f " c u t " i s t h e s y n t h e s i s o f t h e s e two complementary i n f o r m a t i v e f u n c t i o n s : "can c u t " , "can be c u t " .

The r e l a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n o f a concept p r e s e n t s two d i f f e r e n t aspects: an o p e r a t i v e aspect and an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l aspect. When t h e c a p a c i t y o f r e l a t i n g i s c o n s i d e r e d a t t h e moment when t h e s u b j e c t makes a conceptual combination, we w i l l speak o f an o p e r a t i v e r e l a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n . When we c o n s i d e r t h e p r o d u c t o f t h e r e l a t i o n , t h a t i s , t h e combination a c t u a l l y performed, we s h a l l speak o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n . T h i s p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e conceptual c o m b i n a t i o n does n o t o n l y possess a d e f i n i t e informative content b u t also a s p e c i f i c organization. I n t h e preceding discussion, t h e emphasis i s p l a c e d on t h e f o l l o w i n g p o i n t s . We d e f i n e c o g n i t i v e u n i t s (concepts) a b l e o f p e r f o r m i n g a t t h e same t i m e s p e c i f i c i n f o r m a t i v e f u n c t i o n s and r e l a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n s . Each concept i s a b l e t o p e r f o r m m u l t i p l e i n f o r m a t i v e and r e l a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n s . I n f o r m a t i v e f u n c t i o n s and r e l a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n s a r e l i n k e d ; t h e y b o t h come f r o m the i n f o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t o f concepts, t h a t i s , f r o m t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g r e f e r e n t known by t h e s u b j e c t . T h i s emphasizes t h e importance o f t h e knowledge o f t h e r e f e r e n t i a l p r o p e r t i e s and t h e importance o f t r a i n i n g s which develop t h i s t y p e o f knowledge, m u l t i p l y concepts i n t h e s u b j e c t ' s memory and e n r i c h t h e i r i n f o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t (G. Bramaud du Boucheron (1981); Fraysse e t Desprels-Fraysse (1978)).

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I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e i n f o r m a t i v e and combinatory a b i l i t i e s o f memory t h a t i s , as we s h a l l see f u r t h e r , t h e a b i l i t y t o f o r m r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , b a s i s o f comprehension o r speech p r o d u c t i o n depend d i r e c t l y o n t h e number and t h e i n f o r m a t i v e r i c h n e s s o f t h e concepts a c q u i r e d by t h e i n d i v i d u a l .

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4. Permanent memory and working memory. Concepts and conceptual combinations cann o t be d e f i n e d i n t h e same way a t t h e l e v e l o f permanent memory and a t t h e l e v e l o f w o r k i n g memory. I n permanent memory, we can o n l y d e f i n e p o t e n t i a l u n i t s which p o i n t t o what i s c o g n i t i v e l y p o s s i b l e a t a g i v e n s t a g e o f t h e development and l e a r n i n g o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l . I n working memory, we d e f i n e u n i t s and e f f e c t i v e combinations b u i l t up by t h e s u b j e c t i n t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t o f an a c t i v i t y o f comprehension o r p r o d u c t i o n . I n t h e f i r s t case, t h e y a r e i n a c t i v e u n i t s l a r g e l y undetermined i n t h e i r i n f o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t and t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n p r i m a r i l y on account o f t h e i r v a r i o u s i n f o r m a t i v e and combinatory a b i l i t i e s . I n t h e second case, t h e y a r e momentarily a c t i v a t e d u n i t s , w e l l determined, u s a b l e as t h e b a s i s o f an e x p l i c i t behaviour. The former a r e c a l l e d permanent and permanent memory as a whole d e f i n e s t h e c o g n i t i v e p o t e n t i a l t h e s u b j e c t possesses. The l a t t e r a r e c a l l e d c i r c u m s t a n t i a l : t h e y a r e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s b u i l t up i n a c o n t e x t , i n a task, and w i t h a p r e s e n t material. Two p o i n t s have t o be emphasized.

4.1. The m a t t e r under c o n s i d e r a t i o n here i s t h e a d u l t ' s permanent semantic memory and more p r e c i s e l y one o f t h e i m p o r t a n t p a r t s o f t h i s memory which o p e r a t e s on t h e c o n s t r u c t i v e mode and n o t on t h e a s s o c i a t i v e mode. I t i s t h o u g h t t h a t , i n t h i s p a r t , c o g n i t i v e u n i t s a r e n o t o r g a n i z e d i n a permanent way i n t h e form o f networks,taxonomic h i e r a r c h i e s , s t a b i l i z e d r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f semant i c p r o x i m i t y . The memory i n q u e s t i o n h e r e i s a free-elements system which works on a g e n e r a t i v e mode. T h i s g e n e r a t i v e c a p a b i l i t y i s i n s c r i b e d i n t h e elements themselves o f t h e system ( t h e concepts) i n t h e form o f m u l t i p l e i n f o r m a t i v e and r e l a t i o n a l c a p a c i t i e s . I t i s on t h e b a s i s of these c a p a b i l i t i e s and by means o f a process o f d e t e r m i n a t i o n - a c t i v a t i o n - c o n s t r u c t i o n (D.A.C.), which w i l l be examined l a t e r on, t h a t t h e s u b j e c t succeeds i n f o r m i n g e f f e c t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , w e l l s p e c i f i e d i n t h e i r i n f o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t and t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n ( E h r l i c h ( 1 9 7 9 ) ) .

4.2. T h a t b e i n g t h e case, t h e d i f f e r e n t p o s s i b l e combinations i n permanent memory a r e n o t e q u a l l y probable, a l l t h i n g s b e i n g equal as t o t h e a c t u a l c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e i r r e a l i z a t i o n . F o r example, a combination such as " t h e h a i r d r e s s e r c u t s h a i r " i s much more p r o b a b l e t h a n " t h e h a i r d r e s s e r p i c k s c h e r r i e s " . T h i s i s due a l s o t o t h e s u b j e c t ' s l e a r n i n g s . And i t i s shown t h a t t h e h i g h l y p r o b a b l e combinations a r e much more a v a i l a b l e , e a s i e r t o r e c o n s t i t u t e and more e f f e c t i v e t h a n t h e l e a s t p r o b a b l e combinations. T h i s f a c t o r i s v e r y i m p o r t a n t i n t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f comprehension and memorizing. ( c f . Bert-Erboul ( 1 9 7 8 ) ) . VERBO-COGNITIVE TRANSLATION AND PROCESS OF DETERMINATION-ACTIVATION-CONSTRUCTION The problem we t a k e up h e r e i s t h a t o f t h e f o r m a t i o n o f semantic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s when t h e s u b j e c t becomes acquainted w i t h a speech o r a t e x t . Two general hypotheses a r e h e r e p u t f o r w a r d :

1. The v e r b o - c o g n i t i v e t r a n s l a t i o n . There i s no isomorphism between t h e v e r b a l message and t h e corresponding r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s and so t h e r e i s n e c e s s a r i l y t r a n s l a t i o n when g o i n g from t h e f i r s t t o t h e second ( i n comprehension) o r from t h e second t o t h e f i r s t ( p r o d u c t i o n ) . T h i s t r a n s l a t i o n bears on t h e f o r m a t o f t h e correspond i n g u n i t s and o n t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n . 1.1. Format. Some concepts a r e l e x i c a l , o t h e r s a r e n o t ; i n t h e f i r s t case, one word i s s u f f i c i e n t t o make them e x p l i c i t ; i n t h e second, a sentence i s necessary, even a paragraph o r a whole t e x t . Conversely, i f some words r e f e r t o concepts f a i r l y w e l l s p e c i f i e d t h e r e a r e o t h e r s which correspond t o groups o f s e v e r a l concepts.

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S. Ehrlich

Moreover, as a general r u l e , concepts p r e s e n t t h e f o r m o f complex g e n e r i c s t r u c t u r e s r e g r o u p i n g o t h e r concepts. F o r example, "buy" can be d e f i n e d as " g i v e money" and " t a k e a p r o d u c t " . Now i t i s c l e a r t h a t according t o t h e messages and t h e s i t u a t i o n s t h e i n f o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t o f a concept w i l l be s p e c i f i e d sometimes a t an e x t r e m e l y general l e v e l : "he must go Shopping", and sometimes a t t h e l e v e l o f one o r t h e o t h e r o f i t s components: "on t h e p o i n t o f making some purchases, he r e a l i z e d he had f o r g o t t e n h i s w a l l e t " (he cannot g i v e any money); o r e l s e " i n coming back f r o m shopping, he r e a l i z e d he had f o r g o t t e n t h e meat a t t h e b u t c h e r ' s ' ' (he has n o t t a k e n the product). I n s h o r t , on t h e one hand, t h e r e a r e concepts and conceptual groups which v a r y i n t h e i r form, i n f o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t , and t h e i r l e v e l o f s p e c i f i c i t y ; on t h e o t h e r hand, t h e r e a r e l i n g u i s t i c u n i t s which serve t o make t h e concepts e x p l i c i t , o f which t h e f o r m a l s o v a r i e s . But as t h e r e i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a correspondance between t h e form o f t h e conceptual groups and t h a t o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c u n i t s , i t i s necessary t o draw two c o n c l u s i o n s : - t h e s u b j e c t must p e r f o r m a t r a n s l a t i o n i n g o i n g f r o m concepts t o l i n g u i s t i c u n i t s , o r conversely; one cannot r e l y on t h e l i n g u i s t i c a n a l y s i s o f t h e message however t h e s e u n i t s may be analyzed: words, clauses, sentences, paragraphs, i n order t o character i z e i n a u n i v o c a l way t h e concepts (permanent u n i t s ) o r t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ( c i r cumstantial u n i t s ) .

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...

1.2. The o r g a n i z a t i o n . The l i n g u i s t i c u n i t s which f o r m t h e message a r e o r d e r e d on a temporal a x i s a c c o r d i n g t o a l i n e a r o r g a n i z a t i o n . I t i s assumed now t h a t i t i s d i f f e r e n t f o r concepts and r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f which seems t o p r e s e n t as a general r u l e a r a d i a t i v e and "arrowed" form. L e t us p r e s e n t t o s u b j e c t s r e l a t i v e sentences such as: "Paul who has been bumped by Sophie f a l l s on James". L e t us ask t h e n i n a comprehension t a s k : who? does what? t o whom? B u t b e f o r e , a t t h e moment o f t h e o r a l p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e sentence, l e t us ask t h e s u b j e c t s t o make a g r a p h i c coding by drawing arrows between t h e p r o t a g o n i s t s p r o v i d e d (A and B below), Group 1; t o segment t h e sentence i n t o two clauses, Group 2. B e t t e r comprehension performances a r e o b t a i n e d w i t h Group 1. Moreover t h e coding o f Form A appears more e f f e c t i v e t h a n t h e coding o f Form B ( Ehr 1ich ( 1980) )

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A / Removal o f t h e l i n e a r r e 1a t i o n s h i p.

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Although t h e experiment has n o t y e t been performed, s i m i l a r r e s u l t s s h o u l d be found i n t h e case o f t e x t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o r g a n i z e d on t h e b a s i s o f a s e t o f causal r e l a t i o n s . F o r example:

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because ( t h e r o a d wts s l i p p e r y ) because ( o f d i n ) and because (he has been o b l i g e d t o s t o p ) i n o r d e r t o (change'a t y r e ) . Figure 1 I t i s assumed h e r e t h a t semantic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n has r a t h e r t h e f o r m A ( r a d i a t i v e ) t h a n t h e form 8 ( l i n e a r ) .

I n s h o r t , i t i s assumed t h a t t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c u n i t s f o r m i n g t h e message i s one t h i n g ; t h a t o f concepts f o r m i n g a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s a n o t h e r t h i n g . To go from t h e f i r s t one t o t h e second one, i t i s necessary t o make a v e r b o - c o g n i t i v e t r a n s l a t i o n which i m p l i e s , a t l e a s t i n some cases, o p e r a t i o n s o f d e l i n e a r i z a t i o n and o f " a r r o w i ng" . 2. The process o f d e t e r m i n a t i o n - a c t i v a t i o n - c o n s t r u c t i o n (D.A.C.). Neither the i n f o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t o f concepts n o r t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n a r e determined i n t h e s u b j e c t ' s permanent memory. As i t has been mentioned above, each concept i s d e f i ned as a p o t e n t i a l u n i t having m u l t i p l e i n f o r m a t i v e and c o m b i n a t o r i a l c a p a b i l i t i e s . The process D.A.C. p e r m i t s t h e c o n v e r s i o n o f p o t e n t i a l u n i t s ( c o n c e p t s ) i n t o e f f e c t i v e u n i t s ( r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ) ; o n l y t h e l a t t e r a r e determined i n t h e i r i n f o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t and t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n and can be d i r e c t l y used by t h e s u b j e c t as t h e b a s i s o f behaviours o f comprehension o r p r o d u c t i o n . 2.1. A c t i v a t i o n , means f i r s t t h e access t o some concepts, t h e i r s e l e c t i o n i n t h e whole o f t h e memory s t o c k and t h e i r a v a i l a b i l i t y ( c f . a l s o M i l l e r ( 1 9 7 8 ) ) . I n a s i t u a t i o n o f comprehension, a c t i v a t i o n i s f i r s t l i n k e d t o t h e u t t e r a n c e o f t h e But a c t i message which g i v e s access d i r e c t l y t o concepts o f d i f f e r e n t k i n d s v a t i o n r e s u l t s a l s o f r o m t h e o t h e r v e r b a l o r non v e r b a l elements o f t h e a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n , t h a t i s , f r o m t h e c o n t e x t o f u t t e r a n c e b r o a d l y speaking.

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2.2. A c t i v a t i o n n o t o n l y causes t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f a concept i n i t s most geneI t a l s o produces an e f f e c t o f d e t e r m i n a t i o n : t h a t i s , t h e s e l e c t i o n r a l form. o f one o f t h e i n f o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t s o f t h e concept among t h e whole o f i t s p o s s i b l e c o n t e n t s ( E h r l i c h (1981, 1982)). Now t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f a c o n t e n t cannot be performed by t h e a c t i v a t i o n o f one i s o l a t e d concept; i t comes n e c e s s a r i l y f r o m t h e simultaneous a c t i v a t i o n o f s e v e r a l concepts having mutual e f f e c t s one on t h e o t h e r . F o r example, t h e i m f o r m a t i v e

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The session began w i t h a 20minutes j o g t o warm-up t h e muscles and t o prepare more d i f f i c u l t exercises.

I t ended w i t h t h e usual chat-Jur coach who was more pract e r and w i t h t h i s declarat i c a l r e c a l l e d t o us t h a t t i o n o f our good President: t h e ground would be s l i p p e r y “You are q u i c k e r and b e t t e r and we should t h e r e f o r e organized than t h e others; a v o i d t e n n i s shoes and you have every chance o f t h i n k about r e p l a c i n g worn winning n e x t sunday”. spikes.

Figure 2 A t h l e t i c Competition

To take care o f p o s s i b l e i n j u r i e s , he entrusted B i g Maurice w i t h f i l l i n g up the Mercurochrome b o t t l e and w i t h buying a tube o f ointment.

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c o n t e n t o f t h e word "horse" i s n o t s p e c i f i e d by t h e u t t e r a n c e o f t h i s word; a n o t h e r word a t l e a s t i s necessary, f o r example " s t u d - f a r m i n o r d e r t o s p e c i f y t h a t i t i s a race-horse o r " b u t c h e r " i n o r d e r t o suggest t h a t i t i s horse meat. T h a t i s w e l l known. 2.3. C o n s t r u c t i o n r e f e r s e s p e c i a l l y t o t h e whole o f t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f a n a l y s i s and s y n t h e s i s (see a l s o K i n t s c h and Van D i j k (1978)) which a r t i c u l a t e concepts and f i x them i n a s p e c i f i c o r g a n i z a t i o n . The o p e r a t i o n o f a r r o w i n g a l r e a d y mentioned, i s one o f them. To sum up t h e r e f o r e , semantic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s a p a r t i c u l a r c o m b i n a t i o n o f some concepts t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f which i s l i n k e d t o a complex process (D.A.C.). The l a t t e r e x e r c i s e d on t h e concepts b e l o n g i n g t o t h e s u b j e c t ' s permanent memory and p r e s e n t s a g e n e r a t i v e and c o n s t r u c t i v e c h a r a c t e r : simultaneous a c t i v a t i o n o f sever a l concepts l e a d i n g t o t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e i n f o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t s ; o p e r a t i o n s o f r e l a t i n g f i x i n g t h e a c t i v a t e d concepts i n a w e l l d e f i n e d o r g a n i z a t i on. A C T I V A T I O N OF CONCEPTS AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF A TEXT REPRESENTATION

I n o u r p r e s e n t s t u d i e s about t e x t comprehension we were e s p e c i a l l y i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s which correspond t o s c r i p t s . One s c r i p t i s o r g a n i z e d around a t h e m a t i c c e n t r a l concept f r o m which o t h e r concepts a r e d e r i v e d by a n a l y s i s . The l a t t e r a r e a l s o s u b j e c t e d t o an a n a l y t i c a l d e r i v a t i o n ; and so f o r t h u n t i l we a r r i ve a t base concepts which a r e e x p l i c i t i n t h e t e x t (Schank and Abelson ( 1 9 7 7 ) ) . F o r example, from t h e c e n t r a l concept " a t h l e t i c c o m p e t i t i o n " , we can imagine among others t h e f o l l o w i n g derivations (Figure 2 ) . I n t h e e m p i r i c a l s t u d y t h a t f o l l o w s , t h r e e main q u e s t i o n s have been asked

I

1. Which concepts, r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s h y p o t h e t i c a l h i e r a r c h y a r e a c t u a l l y i n c l u ded i n t h e t e x t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n formed by t h e s u b j e c t s ? 2. A t what moment o f t h e storage, i s each o f these concepts a c t i v a t e d ? Is some a n t i c i p a t i o n p o s s i b l e ? and i f so, a t what l e v e l ? 3. I s a c t i v a t i o n o f t h e concepts made e x p l i c i t f u r t h e r on i n t h e t e x t f a c i l i t a t e d by these a n t i c i p a t i o n s ? Procedure and experimental c o n d i t i o n s . 300 s u b j e c t s , 1 s t - y e a r s t u d e n t s i n Psychology and s o l d i e r s o f t h e c o n t i n g e n t have worked on t h e t e x t : " a t h l e t i c c o m p e t i t i o n " . H a l f o f t h e s u b j e c t s r e a d i t . The o t h e r l i s t e n e d t o i t . As f a r as r e s u l t s a r e concerned t h e r e i s no d i f f e r e n c e between s o l d i e r s and s t u d e n t s n o r between t h e o r a l v e r s i o n and t h e w r i t t e n v e r s i o n . So we have mixed t h e r e s u l t s o f these f o u r groups. The t e x t was s u b d i v i d e d i n t o 4 paragraphs (see F i g u r e 2 ) . The s u b j e c t s were f i r s t s u b d i v i d e d i n t o 4 groups. Group 1 works w i t h paragraph 1 o n l y ; Group 2 l o o k s a t paragraphs 1 and 2 o n l y ; Group 3: paragraphs 1 + 2 + 3 ; Group 4: t h e whole t e x t . Each group has been s u b d i v i d e d i n t o 4 sub-groups. Two q u e s t i o n s were asked t o each sub-group i n o r d e r t o make e x p l i c i t two o f t h e 7 concepts r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l h i e r a r c h y , b e g i n n i n g w i t h t h e N + l l e v e l , t h a t i s , j u s t above t h e base concepts o f t h e t e x t (N l e v e l ) . The q u e s t i o n s were o f t h e f o l l o w i n g type: i s t h e X concept d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y p r e s e n t i n t h e p a r t o f t h e t e x t y o u have j u s t read o r l i s t e n e d t o . I f t h e y answer "yes", we c o n s i d e r t h a t t h e X concept has been a c t i v a t e d ; i f t h e y answer "no", we c o n s i d e r t h a t i t i s n o t a c t i v a t e d . The q u e s t i o n s were asked i n w r i t i n g , i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e paragraph o r paragraphs. The responses were g i v e n i n w r i t i n g .

A

I

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-

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Reading o f paragraphs 1 and 2

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U Q)

9

2 5

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Figure 3 " A t h l e t i c C o m p e t i t i o n " : Frequencies o f p o s i t i v e answers

Construction of Text Representation in Semantic Memory

177

R e s u l t s . f o r each o f t h e 16 sub-groups o f s u b j e c t s ( t h e r e a r e 15 t o 20 s u b j e c t s p e r group) and f o r each of t h e 7 concepts o f t h e h i e r a r c h y , we recorded t h e f r e quency o f p o s i t i v e responses. The r e s u l t s o b t a i n e d a r e presented i n F i g u r e 3. The concepts which y i e l d a p o s i t i v e response w i t h a frequency h i g h e r t h a n chance a r e r e p r e s e n t e d i n b l a c k . T h i s frequency, on an average, v a r i e s between .91 and .93; t h e concepts y i e l d i n g a p o s i t i v e r e s ponse w i t h a frequency l e s s o r equal t o chance a r e f i g u r e d i n w h i t e ; t h i s one v a r i e s on an average between .23 and .2G. The r e s u l t s a r e i m p r e s s i v e .

1. As t h e f i r s t c o n t a c t w i t h t h e f i r s t paragraph, t h e r e i s a c t i v a t i o n f r o m a l l t h e s u p e r o r d i n a t e concepts t o t h e base concepts o f t h e t e x t and a t a l l t h e l e v e l s o f t h e h i e r a r c h y : N+1, N+2, Nt3. 2. There i s no a n t i c i p a t i o n . The f a c t o f accessing as e a r l y as t h e 1 s t p a r a graph, t h e t h e m a t i c N+3 concept does n o t p e r m i t t o f o r e c a s t t h e concepts N+2 n o r N + l corresponding t o t h e t e x t i n f o r m a t i o n o f t h e l a t e r paragraphs. However many experiments show t h a t t h e comprehension and t h e r e c a l l o f a t e x t a r e f a c i l i t a t e d when t h e s u b j e c t has i d e n t i f i e d t h e g e n e r a l theme (see f o r example, S p i l i c h , Vesonder, C h i e s i , Voss ( 1 9 7 9 ) ) . The f a c i l i t a t i n g e f f e c t o f t h e theme knowledge cannot t h e r e f o r e be denied. What i s e x a c t l y t h i s e f f e c t ? I n a second experiment ( E h r l i c h , P a s s e r a u l t and P e r s o n n i e r (1982)) conducted w i t h a d i f f e r e n t t e x t , two s i t u a t i o n s have been compared : t h e t h e m a t i c concept (N+3) i s e i t h e r i n s e r t e d (A) o r n o t ( B ) a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e t e x t . I t i s shown t h a t t h e mean r a t e o f a c t i v a t i o n o f t h e concept (N-rl) i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y s u p e r i o r i n (A) t h a n i n (B). So t h e knowledge o f t h e theme has a c t u a l l y a p o s i t i v e e f f e c t on t h e N + l concepts a c t i v a t e d l a t e r . T h i s e f f e c t o c c u r s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w i t h t h e a c t i v a t i o n o f concepts (N), t h a t i s a t t h e t i m e (and n o t b e f o r e ) when t e x t i n f o r m a t i o n c o r r e s ponding t o t h e N + l concepts i s p r o v i d e d t o t h e s u b j e c t . FOOTNOTES:

( 1 ) Both researches presented h e r e have been c a r r i e d o u t i n c o l l a b o r a t i o n o f A l a i n B e r t - E r b o u l and Agnes F l o r i n whose c o l l a b o r a t i o n i s g r e a t l y a p p r e c i a t e d .

178

S.Ehrlich

REFERENCES:

Adams, M.J. and Collins, A . , A schema theoretic view of reading, in: Freedle, R . O . , ( e d . ) , New Directions in Discourse Processing (Norwood, New Jersey, 1979). Bert-Erboul, A., Le rdle de la permanence e t des niveaux hierarchiques de groupes conceptuels dans l'apprentissage des phrases, Ann@e Psychol. 78 (1978) 79-92.

Bramaud du Boucheron, G . , La mirnoire semantique de l' e nfa nt ( P . U . F . , Paris, 1981). Ehrlich, S . , Semantic Memory: a f r ee elements system, in: Puff, C.R., nization and structure (Academic Press, New York, 1979).

Memory Orga-

Ehrlich, S., Flechage cognitif e t processus de traduction dans la comprehension des phrases r e l a t i v es , Lab0 Psychol., Univ. Poitiers (1980). Ehrlich, S . , Les representations semantiques: fonctionnement e t genese, Aprendizagem desenvolvimiento 2 (1982) ( i n p r es s ) . Ehrlich, S., Construction d'une representation de texte e t fonctionnement de la memoire semantique, Bull. Psychol., n'special, Langage e t Comprehension (1982) ( i n p r e ss ) . Ehrlich, S . , Passerault, J.M., and Personnier, G . , Levels of functioning in semant i c memory and levels of comprehension of t e x t s , in: Flamer, D. and Kintsch, W , ( e d s . ) , Tutorials in Text Processing (North Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1982) ( i n press). Fraysse, J.C. and Desprels-Fraysse, A . , Induction des structures logiques chez l e s enfants d'fige pr@scolaire, Cahiers de Psychol., 2 1 (1978) 163-182. Kintsch, W. and van Dijk, T . A . , Toward a model of te xt comprehension and production, Psychol. Rev. 85 (1978) 363-394. Miller, G . A . , Construction and selection in the mental representation of t e x t . Cahiers Inst. Ling. Louvain 5 1-2 (1978) 185-197. Schank, R . C . and Abelson, J.R., S cr i p t s , Plans, Goals and Understanding ( L . E . A . , Hillsdale, New Jersey, 1977). Spilich, G.J., Vesonder, G.T., Chiesi, H . L . and Voss, J . F . , Text processing of domain-related information for individuals with high and low domain knowledge, J . verb. Learn. verb. Behav. 18 (1979) 275-290.

LANGUAGE AND COMPREHENSION J:F. Le Ny, W. Kintsch (editors) 0 North-HollandPublishingCompany, 1982

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GENERAL CONSTRAINTS ON PROCESS MODELS OF LANGUAGE COMPREHENSION Robert de Beaugrande E n g l i s h Department University o f Florida Gainesvi 11e, F l o r i d a U.S.A. I t i s suggested t h a t p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e s e a r c h on language has adopted p e c u l i a r p r i o r i t i e s by e x t r a p o l a t i n g from s t r u c t u r a l l i n g u i s t i c s , r a t h e r than s p e c i f y i n g general t h e o r i e s o f c o g n i t i o n and communication t o f i t t h e i s s u e s o f language processing. A framework i s presented t h a t s i t u a t e s t e x t p r o c e s s i n g i n such general human c o n s t r a i n t s as resources, memory, and l i n e a r c a p a c i t i e s . A s e t of q u e s t i o n s f o r f u t u r e r e s e a r c h i s drawn f r o m t h i s f o u n d a t i o n .

1. THE SENTENCE COMPREHENSION PARADIGM 1 . 1 To date, t h e most e x t e n s i v e and e n d u r i n g achievement o f l i n g u i s t i c s has been t h e development of methodologies f o r 6-thuCtuml a n d y i d : t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f items o r of r e l a t i o n s between items i n t o a s o r t i n g scheme o f t e n c a l l e d a &taxonomy. The means f o r doing t h i s t a s k v a r i e d c o n s i d e r a b l y f r o m one l i n g u i s t i c approach t o another; b u t t h e t a s k i t s e l f has remained t h e c e n t r a l concern :throughout. I t was assumed t h a t t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n procedures were o b j e c t i v e and formal, so t h a t a l l l i n g u i s t s would n e c e s s a r i l y a r r i v e a t t h e same r e s u l t s f o r a g i v e n s e t of samples (e.9. B l o o m f i e l d , 1933; H a r r i s , 1951; F r i e s 1952; Chomsky, 1957) -- a t l e a s t w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r approach. 1.2 For many years, t h e m a j o r concern o f " p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c s " was d e f i n e d as: t o t e s t t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e a l i t y o f c u r r e n t l i n g u i s t i c t h e o r i e s o r models. T h i s o u t l o o k encouraged r e s e a r c h e r s t o c o n s t r u e s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s ( a s performed by p r o f e s s i o n a l l i n g u i s t s ) as t h e model o f language comprehension ( a s performed by human language u s e r s ) . T h i s t a c t i c was adopted v a r i o u s l y for immediate c o n s t i t u e n t a n a l y s i s (e.g. Johnson, 1965) and t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l grammar (e.9. Mehler, 1963), w h i l e some r e s e a r c h e r s (e.9. C l a r k and C l a r k , 1977) experimented w i t h e c l e c t i c combinations o f many k i n d s o f approaches. The u s u a l assumption was t h a t people comprehend language by s o r t i n g words and phrases a c c o r d i n g t o much t h e same c r i t e r i a as those used by l i n g u i s t i c s i t s e l f . 1.3 Given t h e p r i o r i t i e s o f 1 i n g u i . s t i c s and p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c s , t h i s assumption was o n l y t o be expected. B u t I s h a l l argue t h a t t h e assumption i s a t b e s t unproven, and a t w o r s t , i n c o h e r e n t . I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , t h e s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s performed by l i n g u i s t i c s c h o l a r s i s a s p e c i a l i z e d a c t i v i t y based on t r a i n i n g t h a t normal language users do n o t r e c e i v e . I n t h e second p l a c e , t h e taxonomies developed f o r language, as S a p i r (1921) a l r e a d y p o i n t e d out, w i l l never be t o t a l l y complete o r f o r m a l i z e d , even f o r t h e s p e c i a l i s t . How, f o r example, i s t h e normal language u s e r t o decide i f ' b r i g h t ' i s an a d j e c t i v e o r an adverb i n (1) The moon shone b r i g h t . when even l i n g u i s t s do n o t a l l agree? Research shows t h a t people a r e n o t u n i f o r m l y a b l e t o decide what does o r does n o t c o n s t i t u t e a p e r m i s s a b l e sentence o f t h e i r language (Greenbaum [ed.], 1977); y e t i n a l l l i n g u i s t i c approaches so f a r , t h e sentence i s t h e b a s i c c a t e g o r y f r o m which a l l o t h e r a n a l y s i s proceeds.

1.4 Consequently, s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s o f l i n g u i s t s i n s p i r e s a h i g h l y i m p l a u s i b l e p i c t u r e o f language Comprehension. Q u a n t i t a t i v d y , i t suggests an unduly l e n g t h y t r e a t m e n t o f s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e , whereas normal language u s e r s may w e l l be d o i n g o n l y a p a r t i a l , a p p r o x i m a t i v e a n a l y s i s ( c f . Burton, 1976; Schank, L i e b o w i t z , and

180

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Birnbaum, 1978; Masson, 1979). qtmL&&iu&y, i t i n c o r p o r a t e s d i s t i n c t i o n s and f o r m a l i t i e s normal language users c o u l d s c a r c e l y meet. People o b v i o u s l y do n o t d e l a y a l l comprehension processes u n t i l t h e y have been g i v e n a complete sentence; t h e y s t a r t as soon as t h e y have a few words (Schank e t a l . , 1975). Moreover, t h e boundaries of sentences a r e o f t e n i n d i s t i n c t i n speech, as i n t h i s r e c o r d e d sample ( a " / " i n d i c a t e s a pause): ( 2 ) t h i s t i m e everyone was r e a l l y p a r a n o i d because everyone was p r e t t y wasted / and / l u c k i l y / we a l l made i t through w i t h o u t g e t t i n g checked / g o t on t h e bus and s t a r t e d p a r t y i n g and j u s t k e p t m i x i n g d r i n k s and d r i n k i n g and d r i n k i n g / and some people were t a k i n g drugs and t h i n g s / urn Even i f t h e l i s t e n e r s w a i t e d f o r a sentence boundary, t h e y o f t e n would be u n a b l e t o i d e n t i f y i t . There i s a s u b s t a n t i a l l i t e r a t u r e (reviewed i n Beaugrande, 1982a) showing t h a t pauses do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y i n d i c a t e t h e boundaries o f c o n s t i t u e n t s o r sentences. Yet l i n g u i s t i c a n a l y s i s , whether based on immediate c o n s t i t u e n t s o r on t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s , always begivLs w i t h t h e complete sentence. Though t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l grammar a t l e a s t has d e t a i l e d r u l e s , i t s t i l l ulzdyzes a sentence o n l y by r u n n i n g through a l l t h e ways i t c o u l d genehaRe ( s t r u c t u r a l l y d e s c r i b e ) t h e sentence, a method t h a t i s enormously e x p l o s i v e and i n e f f i c i e n t (Woods, 1970). 1.5 F u r t h e r q u a l i t a t i v e problems a r i s e i n r e g a r d t o i n t e g m t i l z g t h e s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s i n t o t h e t o t a l a c t i v i t y o f language comprehension. Most approaches f o r e s e e a r e l a t i v e l y independent s y n t a c t i c stage t h a t i s i n t e r n a l l y w e l l - o r d e r e d , b u t e x t e r n a l l y p o o r l y i n t e g r a t e d w i t h meaning and purpose i n r e a l communicative s i t u a t i o n s . The general t r e n d had been t o t r y f o r c i n g semantics and pragmatics i n t o t h e same c a t e g o r i e s o f a n a l y s i s as those f o r syntax. B u t t h e l i m i t e d success o f those t r e n d s suggests t h a t t h e c a t e g o r i e s o f d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s a r e p r o b a b l y n o t o f t h e same c h a r a c t e r . For example, t h e r e i s no good evidence t h a t a p r o p o s i t i o n f i l l t h e boundaries o f a sentence. o r a speech a c t must 1.6 I n r e c e n t years, p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c s has moved away from a l i t e r a l t r a n s p o s i t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c s o n t o comprehension. B u t t h e sentence c o n t i n u e s t o be viewed as t h e b a s i c u n i t . The f o l l o w i n g q u o t a t i o n s a r e symptomatic: The problem o f when and how a sentence i s understood i s , i n my view, t h e c e n t r a l problem o f experimental p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c s . (Gough, 1971: 109) The fundamental problem i n p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c s i s happens when we understand sentences? (Johnson-Laird,

s i m p l e t o f o r m u l a t e : What 1974: 143)

How do we understand t h e r e l e v a n t meaning o f sentences used i n o r d i n a r y c o n t e x t s ? T h i s i s a c e n t r a l problem i n psychology and a p r i m a r y p r e o c c u p a t i o n o f t h e p s y c h o l i n g u i s t . (Tanenhaus, C a r r o l l , and Bever, 1976: 244) The agreement h e r e i s a l l t h e more s t r i k i n g because these r e s e a r c h e r s r e p r e s e n t t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t approaches t o language research. I t i s a l s o r a t h e r ominous, because normal language users do n o t have a w e l l - d e f i n e d n o t i o n o f t h e sentence o r o f i t s c o n s t i t u e n t word c l a s s e s ( 1 . 8 f ) . What i n duct compkehended 0 not ~entenced, bLLt conceptual c o n t e n t ; a t most, t h e sentence i s one s u r f a c e u n i t among many t h a t can be used as an a i d f o r t h a t t a s k (O'Connell, 1977). B u t t o presuppose t h e c e n t r a l i t y of t h e sentence i n everyday comprehension i s t o c o n s t r u e a s p e c i a l case as t h e general one. 1.7

I n a n e u t r a l p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e sentence m i g h t be viewed as f o l l o w s . I t i s a which i s imposed on m h e h h e d 06 -en d i s c o m e t o suggest s e v e r a l s o r t s o f processing i n s t r u c t i o n s . F i r s t , t h e i n n e r o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e sentence s i g n a l s t h e conceptual te.htedne6d o f t h e c o n t e n t u n d e r l y i n g i t s bouhded c o n s t i t u e n t s (cf. M i l l e r and K i n t s c h , 1980). I n one common sentence type, t h e s u b j e c t i s mapped o n t o an agent, and t h e v e r b o n t o an a c t i o n ; i t i s t h e n expected t h a t a l l p a r t s o f t h e s u b j e c t a r e c o n c e p t u a l l y r e l a t e d t o t h e agent, and a l l p a r t s o f t h e p r e d i c a t e t o the action. But t h i s k i n d o f expectation i s only a preferred hypothesis t h a t w i l l be m o d i f i e d i n many c o n t e x t s . 60nmat

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chmacteh 0 6 a ncene, o b j e c t , eu&, e t c . being mentioned o r described (Osgood and Bock, 1977). Charles E . Osgood and h i s a s s o c i a t e s have c o n s i s t e n t l y argued t h e order i n which things a r e perceived influences the order i n which words a r e arranged in s y n t a c t i c formats. One reason t h a t the agent i s a common candidate f o r the s u b j e c t s l o t i n English sentences i s t h a t agents a r e perceived r e a d i l y a s t h e " f i g u r e " before the "ground," i . e . a s t h e most a c t i v e element i n an enviLonment; thus t h e s u b j e c t s l o t , being toward t h e s t a r t of E n g l i s h sentences, i s a n a t u r a l " pos i t i on. 1.9 Third, the inner organization of the sentence s i g n a l s the i n 6 o h m a t i u n d k i w c h y of the underlying content. For the famous examples: ( 3 ) I smeared p a i n t on the wall. ( 4 ) I smeared t h e wall with paint. Fillmore (1977) showed t h a t the item placed in t h e d i r e c t o b j e c t s l o t i s taken a s more important t o t h e event; only i n ( 4 ) do people assume t h a t t h e e n t i r e wall was covered. For the sequence: ( 5 ) Witness A : Before the accused emptied the s a f e , he shot the watchman. Witness 6: That's not true! Posner (1980) points out t h a t the denial of Witness B only a t t a c k s t h e content underlying t h e main clause (the " s h o o t i n g " ) , while t h a t underlying the subordinate clause ("emptying t h e s a f e " ) remains uncontested, because i t i s assumed t o be o u t s i d e the main focus. 1.10 Fourth, t h e boundaries of sentences help t o control t h e h a t e a t which c h u n k of discourse content g e t constructed, and a l s o t h e nize. of those chunks. The end of a sentence i s a usual, though not o b l i g a t o r y point t o c o n s o l i d a t e building blocks. Of course, conceptual r e l a t e d n e s s extends beyond sentence boundaries, i f the discourse i s t o be coherent. B u t normally, a reader can afford t o pause b r i e f l y a t t h e end of the sentence i n order t o i n t e g r a t e t h e c u r r e n t chunk with the content t h a t has accrued so f a r . This procedure i s sometimes described i n terms of " c l e a r i n g a buffer" t h a t has been f i l l e d by the c u r r e n t sentence ( c f . Miller and Kintsch, 1980). 1.11 These f o u r functions of the sentence in discourse seem reasonably secure. f t h e r s might be added, f o r i n s t a n c e , t h a t sentence formats respond t o degree of ego involvement" ( E r t e l , 1977). B u t the point here i s t h a t in each f u n c t i o n , t h e sentence i s never t h e oaLy e n t i t y capable of being so used. T h u s , i t hardly seems j u s t i f i e d t o uphold t h e sentence ( o r a taxonomy o r sentence s t r u c t u r e s ) a s a t h e o r e t i c a l framework f o r comprehension research. For example, though numerous experiments have been designed t o c o n t r a s t a c t i v e sentence a g a i n s t passives ( c f . surveysin Osgood and Bock, 1977: 99-102; Levelt, 1978: 24-25), the human decision t o use an a c t i v e o r a passives depend on non-syntactic f a c t o r s such a s s a l i e n c e , imagery, vividness, a c t i v e n e s s , e t c . in t h e conceptual content. A purely s y n t a c t i c d e s c r i b e s no e m p i r i c a l l y u n i f i e d d e f i n i t i o n of "passive sentence" thus phenomenon. 1 . 1 2 The s t r a t e g y should r a t h e r be t o group experiments according t o phucenning t y p e n . The sentence would then be d i s t r i b u t e d over i t s various f u n c t i o n s , such a s the f o u r enumerated in 1.7-10. I n s e c t i o n 2 , I propose a framework f o r one such approach, grouping t o g e t h e r samples from the experimental 1it:rature as a way of i l l u s t r a t i o n . This framework is'ntmeant as a t e s t a b l e " t h e o r y , b u t a s an o u t l i n e model t o coordinate i s s u e s and d e f i n e their mutual relevance. 2. LANGUAGE WITHIN COGNITION AND ACTION 2.1 Abandoning the t r a d i t i o n a l contention of l i n g u i s t s t h a t language i s an i s o l a t e d f a c u l t y , l e t us d e f i n e language processes a s npeoiaRizatLuMn of more general process types. Syntax would then be a s p e c i a l case of f i e a t r iutte>eMce ( c f . Beaugrande, 1981b, 1981c, 1982a); semantics a s p e c i a l case of the a c q u d f i o n and L L t i e i z a t i o ~ u6 hno&edge (Hormann, 1976; Kintsch, 1977; Beaugrande, 1980a) ;

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and p r a m a t i c s a s p e c i a l case o f t h e con5.thuDtion and implementation 06 p&m and go& YSchank and Abelson, 1977; Cohen, 1978; McCalla, 1978; A l l e n , 1979; Beaugrande, 1979, 1980b). We can e a s i l y see t h a t these t h r e e domains a r e themselves h i g h l y interdependent. For example, l i n e a r i t y a p p l i e s t o sequences o f Thus, events i n s t o r e d knowledge, and t o t h e arrangement o f s t e p s i n a p l a n . domains l i k e syntax, semantics, and pragmatics a r e themselves d i s t i n c t i v e o n l y as s p e d z a C L o m 06 oZhthehLllise a n d o g o u pmcesskg capacities. I n t h i s sense, we c o u l d e n v i s i o n a p a r t i c u l a r process b e i n g assigned t o a s p e c i a e i n t , e.g., a "semantic s p e c i a l i s t " t h a t keeps t r a c k o f r e f e r e n t s i n t h e w o r l d o f a d i s c o u r s e ( c f . Winograd, 1972). The processor would be an agglomerate o f holLtines ph-4 o p e W t communities: these two components i n t e r a c t f o r t h e performance o f a g i v e n task. 2.2 I t f o l l o w s t h a t t h e o r i e s o f language comprehension should be s t a t e d w i t h i n those c o n s t r a i n t s which a r e known t o a p p l y t o human processes i n general. A t h e o r y t h a t d e l i b e r a t e l y excludes l i m i t a t i o n s upon resources and memory (e.9. Chomsky, 1965) m e r i t s no f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n , because i t i s humanly unreasonable. O f course, general p r o c e s s i n g c o n s t r a i n t s w i l l n o t u n i q u e l y determine one t h e o r y as " c o r r e c t " above a l l o t h e r s -- t h e y w i l l o n l y narrow down t h e c l a s s o f t h e o r i e s t h a t a r e w o r t h pursuing, and w i l l i n d i c a t e how language i s s i t u a t e d w i t h i n l a r g e r human c o n t e x t s . 2.3 To b e g i n w i t h , t h e ou,kdace t e x t i s by n e c e s s i t y LLniMeatLey auizdened, e i t h e r as a stream o f sound o r as a succession o f p r i n t e d images. L i n m i n t U 5 e n c e would be t h e c a p a c i t y t o process language, o r any o t h e r t a s k depending upon a l i n e a r mode. A t l e a s t seven p r i n c i p l e s s h o u l d a p p l y t o any l i n e a r a c t i v i t y ( c f . Beaugrande, 1981b, 1982a). The coke-and-adjunot p r i n c i p l e d i s t i n g u i s h e s between c e n t r a l versus p e r i p h e r a l e n t i t i e s ; t h e c e n t r a l ones a r e o p e r a t i o n a l l y d e f i n e d as t h e c o n t r o l c e n t e r s i n ongoing processing. The pause p r i n c i p l e a l l o w s f o r suspending t h e l i n e a r sequence i n accord w i t h l i m i t a t i o n s o r demarcations o f processing. The c o r r e l a t i o n o f t h e c u r r e n t i t e m s i n t h e sequence w i t h p r e v i o u s o r subsequent ones i s managed by t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f look-back and look-ahead, r e s p e c t i v e l y . The heauinens p r i n c i p l e concerns t h e g r a d a t i o n s o f importance, involvement, i n f o r m a t i v i t y , focus, emphasis, and s a l i e n c e -- a l l o f which aspects seem t o c r e a t e a " h e a v i e r l o a d " on processing as t h e y r i s e . The d i s a m b i g u a t i o n p r i n c i p l e i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r r e s o l v i n g any cases where two o r more p a t t e r n s , formats, i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , e t c . , compete. The LL5L&g p r i n c i p l e a p p l i e s whenever comparable items o r p a t t e r n s a r e enumerated i n a s e r i e s . 2.4 These p r i n c i p l e s would a p p l y t o any Leuel o r s c d e o f processing, o r t o any combination o f these. For example, t h e core-and-adjunct p r i n c i p l e would a p p l y t o s y n t a c t i c d i s t i n c t i o n s l i k e c o n t e n t words vs. f u n c t i o n words, heads vs. m o d i f i e r s , o r main clauses vs. dependent clauses; t o semantic d i s t i n c t i o n s l i k e p r i m a r y concepts (event, a c t i o n , o b j e c t , s i t u a t i o n ) vs. secondary concepts ( l o c a t i o n , time, cause, q u a n t i t y , e t c . ) (cf. Beaugrande, 1980a: 79-84); t o pragmatic d i s t i n c t i o n s l i k e main goal vs. sub-goal; and so f o r t h . The pause p r i n c i p l e would respond t o v a r i o u s pressures f o r i n t e r r u p t i n g o r a t l e a s t r e t a r d i n g t h e p r o c e s s i n g o f a sequence: b r e a t h i n g , marking boundaries between s u r f a c e u n i t s , c o n s o l i d a t i n g so on (cf. r e t r o s p e c t i v e o p e r a t i o n s , p l a n n i n g p r e d i c t e d o p e r a t i o n s , and Goldman-Eisler, 1968; Rosenberg, 1977; Beaugrande, 1982a: s e c t i o n I V . 2 ) . 2.5 The f u n c t i o n s o f t h e sentence d e s c r i b e d i n 1.7-10 f a l l under these p r i n c i p l e s as w e l l . The use o f sentence c o n s t i t u e n t s as i n d i c a t o r s o f conceptual r e l a t e d n e s s (1.7) i s c h i e f l y an a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f core-and-adjunct, look-back, and look-ahead. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e sentence f o r m a t s and p e r c e p t i o n i l l u s t r a t e s m a i n l y t h e heaviness and d i s a m b i g u a t i o n p r i n c i p l e s . The correspondence between sentence f o r m a t s and i n f o r m a t i v i t y f a l l s m o s t l y under t h e heaviness and core-and-adjunct p r i n c i p l e s . The c o r r e l a t i o n between sentences o r sentence c o n s t i t u e n t s and t h e r a t e o r s i z e o f processing chunks f a l l s l a r g e l y under t h e core-and-adjunct, pause, and heaviness p r i n c i p l e s . O f course, t h e dominance o f any one p r i n c i p l e over o t h e r s w i l l be s e n s i t i v e t o c o n t e x t s , and w i l l r e f l e c t o t h e r processing needs besides b u i l d i n g sentences.

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2.6 L i n e a r p r o c e s s i n g i s f u r t h e r d e f i n e d by t h e n a t u r e o f c o g n i t i v e r e s o u r c e s l i k e a t t e n t i o n and memory. Language i s s u f f i c i e n t l y complex t h a t a p r o c e s s o r c a n ' t hope hope t o a t t e n d t o a l l l e v e l s o r f e a t u r e s a t once. Older models assumed t h a t p r o c e s s i n g was done i n n e q u e W stages, l i k e a r e l a y from one b l a c k box t o t h e n e x t stages (e.g., Fromkin, 1971; Gibson, 1971). The c u r r e n t t r e n d i s t o f a v o r pu.h&el t h a t r u n i n c o n c u r r e n t o r o v e r l a p p i n g ways, c o n s u l t i n g each o t h e r f r e e l y as needed (e.g. Marslen-Wilson, 1975; Rumelhart, 1977; Woods, 1978), e.g. u s i n g semantics to eliminate syntactic ambiguities. However, t h e n o t i o n o f " s p e c i a l i s t communities" ( 2 . 1 ) a l l o w s f o r f l e x i b l e s c h e d u l i n g t o meet v a r y i n g c o n t i n g e n c i e s , and t h e r e b y suspends t h e o p p o s i t i o n between s e r i a l vs. p a r a l l e l models. 2.7

Resource

l i m i t a t i o n s suggest t h a t p a r a l l e l p r o c e s s i n g i n v o l v e s a s h i f t i n g o f

domhznce from l e v e l t o l e v e l . Dominance would e n t a i l an assignment o f r e s o u r c e s above a ~ u h t h a t i s~ s e t a c c o r d i n g t o t h e o v e r a l l resources a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e occasion. I f p r o c e s s i n g must be done a t g r e a t speed, these t h r e s h o l d s would be lowered a l l t h r o u g h o u t t h e system's o p e r a t i o n s , producing what Norman and Bobrow (1975) c a l l a " g r a c e f u l d e g r a d a t i o n " o f performance ( c f . 2.15). The same would a p p l y t o t h e t h r e s h o l d s o f initiafion ( t h e c r i t e r i a where a process i s s e l e c t e d and run) and o f t ~ ~ ( t hoe c rni t e r i a where r e s u l t s a r e c o n s i d e r e d s a t i s f a c t o r y and p r o c e s s i n g s t o p s ) . The l o w e r t h e a v a i l a b l e resources, t h e more i n c l i n e d t h e p r o c e s s o r would be t o accept f u z z y , p r o v i s i o n a l c r i t e r i a f o r these t h r e s h o l d s . Even so,.processing does reasonably w e l l , as shown f o r i n s t a n c e i n s t u d i e s o f skim-reading (Masson, 1979). 2.8 One i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r i n ongoing p r o c e s s i n g i s o f course mmo4y. The p r i n c i p l e s o f look-back and look-ahead r e q u i r e both a 4&anpectiue and a phedictive r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e t e x t . The scheme I have worked o u t (Beaugrande, 1981c, 1982a) i s g i v e n i n F i g u r e 1. The v a r i o u s l e v e l s o f p r o c e s s i n g a r e shown w i t h t h e " s h a l l o w e r l e v e l s on t h e t o p and t h e "deeper" ones on t h e bottom. The l e v e l s a r e f a c t o r e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e m a t e r i a l s t h e y process, e i t h e r from t h e t e x t or the processor's memory: sounds/letters, words, s y n t a c t i c phrasing, c o n c e p t s / r e l a t i o n s , ideas, and g o a l s . The t e x t i s f a c t o r e d ( l e f t t o r i g h t ) i n t o : r e t r o s p e c t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f p r i o r t e x t , p e r c e p t i o n o f c u r r e n t t e x t , and p r e d i c t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f subsequent t e x t . The d i r e c t c o n t r a c t w i t h t h e s u r f a c e t e x t , a c c o r d i n g t o t h i s scheme, i s o n l y a v e r y b r i e f i n t e r v a l o f p e r c e p t i o n ; e v e r y t h i n g e l s e depends upon mental r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t h a t d i f f e r frm t h e s u r f a c e t e x t (though i n c l u d i n g some s u r f a c e t r a c e s ) i n b e i n g a complex, m u l t i - d i m e n s i o n a l a r r a y , n o t a s i m p l e word-sequence ( c f . 2.12). 2.9 The e x a c t t i m e p o i n t o f p e r c e p t i o n i s i n d i c a t e d by t h e zero on t h e t i m e continuum. The v a r i o u s memahy n t o t e ~can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d along t h i s continuum by r e f e r e n c e t o t h e i r opan ( t i m e o f perseverence): n h o h t - t m oemohy ntohage (one o r two seconds), nhoht-teton mmotly (some twenty seconds), and l o g - t e h m memohy ( u n l i m i t e d ) ( c f . A t k i n s o n and S h i f f r i n , 1968; Keele, 1973; L o f t u s and L o f t u s , 1976; K i n t s c h , 1977; Posner, 1978; S h a l l i c e , 1979). I n e a r l y work, i t was i m p l i e d t h a t each s t o r e was e x c l u s i v e l y devoted t o one s o r t o f m a t e r i a l s , e.g. s h o r t - t e r m memory t o s y n t a x and long-term memory t o conceptual meaning, because t h e s e m a t e r i a l s decay a t d i f f e r e n t r a t e s ( c f . Sachs, 1967; Begg, 1971; Garrod and Trabasso, 1973; Anderson, 1974). However, i n t h e approach I am o u t l i n i n g , t h e s e tendencies a r e viewed as a f u r t h e r i n s t a n c e o f npcc&zcctian. S h o r t - t e r m sensory s t o r a g e i s s p e c i a l i z e d f o r sounds and l e t t e r s ; s h o r t - t e r m memory f o r s y n t a c t i c p h r a s i n g s and l o c a l chunks o f concepts and r e l a t i o n s ; and l o n g - t e r m memory f o r ideas and goals. However, sensory p e r c e p t i o n can have a t l e a s t some access t o deeper l e v e l s such as conceptual meaning (Raser, 1972; Shulman, 1972). And long-term memory can r e t a i n some t r a c e s o f t h e surface, e.g. t h e r e c o l l e c t i o n o f whether an i t e m was presented v i s u a l l y o r a c o u s t i c a l l y ( B r a y and Batchelder, 1972; Hintzman, Block, and Inskeep, 1972). I n t r i g u i n g l y , t h e l a t t e r two papers i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e t r a c e o f v i s u a l vs. a c o u s t i c mode has no p r o f o u n d e f f e c t on long-term r e t e n t i o n o f content. 2.10 F i n a l l y , t h e r e i s a s t o r e o f working memory d e f i n e d n o t a c c o r d i n g t o i t s range o f decay, b u t a c c o r d i n g t o i t s c a p a c i t y o f about seven chunks ( c f . M i l l e r ,

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1956; K i n t s c h and Polson, 1979). Often, working memory has been s i m p l y equated w i t h s h o r t term memory, perhaps due t o t h e tendency t o t h i n k o f memory s t o r e s as d i s t i n c t " l o c a t i o n s " where m a t e r i a l s were " s e n t . " T h i s s t a t i c , s p a t i a l v i e w p o i n t now seems i n a p p r o p r i a t e ( K i n t s c h , 1977). I f t h e s t o r e s a r e i n s t e a d d i f f e r e n t i a l modes of a c t i v a t i o n and s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , t h e n working memory can t a k e i t s m a t e r i a l s from any of t h e t h r e e s t o r e s d e f i n e d by t h e i r spans. 2.11 The s p e c i a l i z a t i o n s of t h e memory s t o r e s a r e suggested by d o t shadings i n F i g u r e 1. The d i f f e r e n t spans o f t h e s t o r e s a r e i n d i c a t e d by squeezing t h e graph toward i t s m i d d l e . So f a r , t h e r e i s l i t t l e experimental support f o r t h e r i g h t - h a n d s i d e o f p r e d i c t i v e memory. I am p r o v i s i o n a l l y assuming t h a t p r e d i c t i v e memory should be more o r l e s s symmetrical t o r e t r o s p e c t i v e memory, though p r o b a b l y s h o r t e r i n spans. I n t u i t i v e l y , t h i s assumption seems reasonable. A language processor can l o o k ahead t o main i d e a s o r g o a l s much f u r t h e r t h a n t o d e t a i l e d concepts o r s y n t a c t i c phrasings; a n t i c i p a t i o n o f e x a c t words o r l e t t e r s i s possible o n l y over very s l i g h t distances. 2.12 The n a t u r e of t h e mental r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t serves i n p l a c e o f t h e t e x t i n r e t r o s p e c t i v e and p r e d i c t i v e o p e r a t i o n s i s as y e t h a r d l y e x p l o r e d . I t s h o u l d have a f o r m a t s u i t a b l e f o r t h e t a s k s performed upon i t . I t c o u l d s c a r c e l y be a l i n e a r s t r i n g o f words, s i m p l y because t h a t f o r m a t i s n o t e f f i c i e n t : i t would u n r e a l i s t i c a l l y demand t r a c e s o f e v e r y word ( o u t o f t h e q u e s t i o n i n view o f t h e experimental l i t e r a t u r e ) ; i t would g i v e undue prominence t o t h e s u r f a c e and t h e r e b y n e g l e c t t h e u n d e r l y i n g meaning and purpose o f d i s c o u r s e ; i t would m e d i a t e a g a i n s t those processes t h a t r e q u i r e a h i e r a r c h i c a l arrangement t o o r g a n i z e t e x t c o n t e n t on a l a r g e s c a l e ( c f . Meyer, 1975; Mandler and Johnson, 1977; Thorndyke, 1977; K i n t s c h and van D i j k , 1978; K i n t s c h and Vipond, 1979). On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n must be h i g h l y c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e s u r f a c e t e x t , because i t e v i d e n t l y guides t h e i m p r e s s i v e a b i l i t y o f understanders t o a n t i c i p a t e f u t u r e events. For example, eye movement s t u d i e s r e v e a l h i g h s k i l l s i n f i x a t i n g those words t h a t w i l l c o n t r i b u t e b e s t t o t h e g i s t , e s p e c i a l l y d u r i n g skim-reading (Just, 1981). I t would seem r e a s o n a b l e t o e n v i s i o n t h e mental r e p r e s e n t a t i o n as a m u l t i - d i r e c t i o n a l network c o n s t r u c t e d and annotated t o s e r v e a l l t h e l e v e l s o f processing, i n c l u d i n g words and phases (Beaugrande, 1 9 8 1 ~ ) . T h i s f o r m a t would b e economical i n e n a b l i n g o p e r a t i o n s o f same o r s i m i l a r p a t t e r n i n g t o be c o n s o l i d a t e d i n o p e r a t i o n (Woods, 1978). One i l l u s t r a t i o n c o u l d be a g e n e r a l look-back t h a t searches f o r m a t e r i a l s r e q u i r e d by t h e v a r i o u s l e v e l s (e.g. a c o - r e f e r e n t f o r a pronoun, a s u b j e c t f o r a p r e d i c a t e , a concept f o r a r e l a t i o n , e t c . ) a t t h e same time, r a t h e r l i k e a bus whose passengers a r e watching f o r t h e i r personal d e s t i n a t i o n s (compare t h e search procedures i n Fahlman, 1979). 2.13 The f a c t o r s o u t l i n e d so f a r -- l i n e a r i t y , p r o c e s s i n g l e v e l , memory s t o r e s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , d i s t r i b u t i o n o f r e s o u r c e s -- cannot s t i p u l a t e e x a c t l y what must happen a t a g i v e n i n s t a n t o f processing. The i n t e r a c t i o n between k a u f i e n and ~ p e W (2.1, h 8 ) allows f l e x i b l e , adaptive processing f o r s p e c i f i c contexts, occasions and human beings. F o r example, t h e amount o f p r o c e s s i n g expended on an u n f a m i l i a r word i s l o w e r i f t h e word appears i n a f a m i l i a r s t o r y ( W i t t r o c k , Marks, and Doctorow, 1975). Therefore, t h e r e cannot be one u n i f o r m procedure t h a t t r e a t s a l l words i n a l l s e t t i n g s . 2.14 F i g u r e 2 i n d i c a t e s how r e s o u r c e l o a d s would r e a c t t o demands o f c o n t e x t . We assume a complex, i n t e r a c t i v e package o f p r o c e s s i n g r o u t i n e s moving a l o n g t h r o u g h the task ( l e f t - t o - r i g h t ) . T h i s package i s accompanied by ( o r has access t o ) a community o f p r o c e s s i n g s p e c i a l i s t s , many o f which need n o t be concerned w i t h each o t h e r . The package t r a v e r s e s a c o n s t e l l a t i o n o f parameters t h a t a f f e c t what t h e s p e c i a l i s t s w i l l do t o i n f l u e n c e , complement, o r r e a r r a n g e t h e r o u t i n e s . These parameters i n c l u d e : ( a ) m V t V h con2.tol (e.g. t h e f o r m a t i o n o f sensory t r a c e s o f v i s u a l p a t t e r n s ) ; ( b ) @dback heqLLitlementn ( t h e p r o c e s s o r ' s need t o m o n i t o r what i t ' s d o i n g ) ; ( c ) a(ttention ( r e s o u r c e e x p e n d i t u r e on one t a s k t h a t i n t e r f e r e s w i t h o t h e r s ) ; ( d ) n v a e (competing, extraneous e v e n t s ) ; ( e ) Rhfienhalds ad i n i t i a t i o ~ and tetonination ( c f . 2.7); ( f ) pehcep.tuul .immediacy ( e x t e n t t o which a language

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higher

+

lesser

FEEDBACK REQUIREMENTS

+

lower

NOISE

I

greater

more

more

+ lesser

+greater

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+worse

PERCEPTUAL IMMEDIACY

+

higher

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less +

COMPLEXITY

greater +

FAMILIARITY

lesser +

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higher

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Figure 2. Processing variables i n task operations

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c o r r e l a t e s w i t h i n p u t from sensory m o d a l i t i e s ) ; ( 9 ) complexity ( c o n f i g u r a t i o n part-whole r e l a t i o n s h i p s ) ; ( h ) 6am-y (degree t o which t a s k s have been in~omation&y encountered and performed by t h e same r o c e s s o r b e f o r e ) ; (i) ( p r o p o r t i o n o f u n p r e d i c t a b l e t o predictable!; (j) goodnebs 06 6 i - t ( e x t e n t t o which e n t i t i e s should match a f e a t u r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n i n o r d e r t o be accepted as meeting c u r r e n t s p e c i f i c a t i o n s ) ; ( k ) moLivation (why t h e t e x t i s being processed, e.g. t o l e a r n t h e c o n t e n t , t o r e c e i v e a command, t o advance a g o a l , e t c . ) ; and ( 1 ) .time &ofment (how l o n g t h e processor has t o g e t t h r o u g h t h e t a s k ) . 2.15 These t w e l v e parameters can e a s i l y be r e l a t e d t o each o t h e r , b u t t h e r e w i l l be cases where t h e y a r e a l s o d i s t i n c t . The F i g u r e suggests t h a t whenever one o f these parameters r i s e s , these should be some s o r t o f compensation a l o n g one o r more o t h e r parameters. I d e a l l y , a s t r a i n from one parameter would be s t r a t e g i c a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e system, i n t h e manner o f c y b e r n e t i c r e g u l a t i o n . There would t h e n be no i m p o r t a n t d e g r a d a t i o n s c o n c e n t r a t e d i n one area. However, t h e wide d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e q u a l i t y o f t h e r e s u l t s i n b o t h production and comprehension o f t e x t s i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h i s i d e a l i s o f t e n n o t upheld. F o r example, i f n o i s e o b t r u d e s t o o much one may n o t even g e t t h e g i s t o f a d i s c o u r s e , b u t o n l y a few i n c o h e r e n t fragments. E d u c a t i o n a l t r a i n i n g m i g h t be developed t o enable more balanced r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p r o c e s s i n g l o a d (Beaugrande, 1982a). 2.16 These parameters m i g h t have some c o m p a r a t i v e l y n e u t r a l degree t h a t c r e a t e s no s t r a i n w i t h i n t h e system. However, anything but the most practised, c o n v e n t i o n a l i z e d d i s c o u r s e s p r o b a b l y c a l l f o r some a d a p t a t i o n o f l o a d s . Yet r o u t i n e d i s c o u r s e i s l i k e l y t o lower i n t e r e s t and t h e r e b y decrease t h e o v e r a l l a l l o t m e n t o f r e s o u r c e s t h r o u g h o u t t h e system, so t h a t t a s k performance i s degraded. Very l i t t l e c o n t e n t g e t s remembered from a b o r i n g l e c t u r e ; workmanship d e c l i n e s on t e d i o u s motor a c t i v i t i e s ; and so f o r t h . Thus, discourse processing i s d r i v e n by t h e dynamic t e n s i o n t o reduce l o a d and t o i n c r e a s e i t again, t o overcome c h a l l e n g e s and y e t t o seek them out. 2.17 Whatever t a s k s a r e imposed i n language experiments may l o a d these parameters i n d i v e r s e ways. U s u a l l y , r e s e a r c h e r s p r e f e r t o assume t h a t any f a c t o r besides t h e experimental v a r i a b l e ( s ) i s f r o z e n a t i t s most n e u t r a l degree. F o r example, most "sentence comprehension" s t u d i e s d o n ' t d e a l w i t h t h e m o t i v a t i o n s p e o p l e n o r m a l l y have when comprehending d i s c o u r s e , n o r w i t h t h e many c r i t e r i a s e t o u t s i d e t h e experimental s e t t i n g ( f a m i l i a r i t y , goodness o f f i t , e t c . ) . Hence, we c a n ' t t e l l i f l a b o r a t o r y t a s k s a r e shimpletl t h a n n a t u r a l ones (because f a c t o r s a r e excluded) o r motle compeex (because people d o n ' t have s k i l l e d r o u t i n e s t o a p p l y ) . The thorough p r o c e s s i n g o f syntax t h a t many experiments i n d i c a t e may m e r e l y r e s u l t f r o m r e - c h a n n e l i n g r e s o u r c e s t h a t a r e n o r m a l l y devoted t o t h e meaning and purpose o f discourse. I n n a t u r a l s e t t i n g s t h e u s e o f s y n t a x c o u l d be q u i t e f u z z y and non-essential. C l e a r l y , broader experiments a r e needed t o m a n i p u l a t e r e s o u r c e a l l o t m e n t s and compare t h e r e l a t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f t h e s e v e r a l l e v e l s of p r o c e s s i n g (cf. 3.5.14). 3. QUESTIONS, QUESTIONS 3.1 Theories and models o f language p r o c e s s i n g have had a l o n g and d i f f u s e h i s t o r y , r a n g i n g from " a s s o c i a t i v e c h a i n i n g " (e.g. Washburn, 1916) t o " b e h a v i o r a l c o n d i t i o n i n g " (e.g. S k i n n e r , 1957) t o "grammatical t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s " (e.g. Mehler, 1963). A t p r e s e n t , new d i r e c t i o n s a r e emerging, b u t t h e r e i s l i t t l e agreement about what r e s e a r c h s h o u l d be done f o r what motives. A t most, t h e r e i s a consensus t h a t t h e a n a l y s i s o f s t r i n g s o f words, t h e f a v o r i t e approach o f p a s t decades i s no l o n g e r v e r y rewarding. 3.2 The n o t i o n o f dchema had s u r f a c e d as a framework f o r o r g a n i z i n g memory ( B a r t l e t t , 1932), word o r d e r (Lashley, 1951), and a c t i o n s (e.g. O l d f i e l d , 1954; Evans, 1967). I t remained on t h e p e r i p h e r y o f experimental psychology, however, because i t c o m p l i c a t e s t h e d e s i g n and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f experiments. Recent r e s e a r c h has r e t u r n e d t o t h e schema w i t h new emphasis, e s p e c i a l l y as a memory p a t t e r n ( K i n t s c h , 1977; Rumelhart, 1980). Language p r o c e s s i n g i s seen as t h e

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a p p l i c a t i o n o f i n t e r a c t i v e schemas on Ortony, 1977; Adams and C o l l i n s , 1979).

the

v a r i o u s l e v e l s (e.g. Rumelhart and

3.3 As y e t , t h e n o t i o n o f s c h m a i s s t i l l t o o vague (Thorndyke and Yekovich, 1980) t o be much more t h a n a .f.ubel f o r o r g a n i z e d p a t t e r n s o f a c t i o n o r knowledge, r a t h e r t h a n an exp.f.ueanation.We need t o know more about how schemas a r e formed; how t h e y e v o l v e d u r i n g use; how s t r i c t l y t h e y c o n t r o l processing; what c o n d i t i o n s t r i g g e r t h e i r s e l e c t i o n ; and how t h e y can i n t e r a c t o r compete w i t h each o t h e r . T h e i r ~ L t u c t w l ei s l e s s c r u c i a l than t h e i r a c t i v e u4e. 3.4 The issues r a i s e d i n s e c t i o n 2 c o n s t i t u t e a c h a l l e n g e t o schema t h e o r i e s . No doubt schemas a r e v i t a l f o r l i n e a r a c t i v i t i e s , as Lashley (1951) proposed. B u t t h e y must a l s o serve i n a multitude of operations such as search, pattern-matching, scheduling, c l a s s i f y i n , and so f o r t h . I f t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between r o u t i n e s and s p e c i a l i s t s i s v a l i d f2.1), t h e n schemas may be c r e a t e d on t h e spot, n o t j u s t summoned from s t o r a g e as f i x e d frames ( c f . K i n t s c h , 1980). A l s o , a schema m i g h t i t s e l f be q u i t e f l e x i b l e about t h e m a t e r i a l s t h a t would t r i g g e r i t and fill i t s v a r i a b l e s ( c f . Rumelhart, 1980). A l l these p o s s i b i l i t i e s need e x p l o r a t i o n i f we a r e t o overcome t h e l i m i t a t i o n s imposed by a l i t e r a l adherence t o s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s . 3.5 I would a c c o r d i n g l y l i k e t o conclude n o t w i t h a s e t o f data, b u t w i t h a s e t o f questions. U n t i l t h e r e a r e a t l e a s t some p r o v i s i o n a l answers, i t w i l l be h a r d t o know how o u r d a t a s h o u l d be i n t e r p r e t e d i n t h e l a r g e r p i c t u r e o f language w i t h i n c o g n i t i o n and a c t i o n . 3.5.1 How and when me a c t d o p e n a t i o ~ nAchedlLeed? Given t h e l a r g e numbers o f m a t h e m a t i c a l l y p o s s i b l e combinations o f steps, how and when does a processor d e c i d e which ones t o use i n r e a l l i f e ? Can p r o v i s i o n a l s e l e c t i o n s be r e v i s e d a t t h e l a s t m i n u t e ? Is t h e r e a d i s t i n c t group o f " s c h e d u l i n g s p e c i a l i s t s " c a l l e d i n when r o u t i n e s f a i l t o a p p l y ? O r does s c h e d u l i n g r e s u l t as a consequence o f t h e s p e c i a l i s t s t h a t watch over r e s o u r c e a l l o t m e n t among t h e c o n c u r r e n t l y o p e r a t i v e processing l e v e l s ? 3.5.2 How ane LimiXed he60utce6 a W q dLoLted? Does a processor have r o u t i n e s f o r a l l o t t i n g resources? Can t h e y be o v e r r i d d e n by c o n t e x t , and when? How a r e d e c i s i o n s about t e x t , type, audience, purpose, e t c . , translated i n t o resource allotments? 3.5.3 How Lb o v e ~ L o u r i ctreated, noticed, oh mduced? I f t h e r e i s a r i s e along s e v e r a l parameters o f t h e k i n d i n d i c a t e d i n F i g u r e 2 ( c o m p l e x i t y , i n f o r m a t i v i t y , e t c . ) , o v e r l o a d would be expected. Is t h e processor a b l e t o a n t i c i p a t e such cases and r e a c t b e f o r e d e g r a d a t i o n becomes obvious? What i n d i c a t o r s c o u l d be c o n s u l t e d , and what counter-measures taken? Options m i g h t i n c l u d e : s l o w i n g p r o c e s s i n g down; i n c r e a s i n g redundancy; r e s c h e d u l i n g simultaneous o p e r a t i o n s i n t o successive ones; and so f o r t h (Beaugrande, 1982a, 1982b). 3.5.4 T o &at extent can p W e R ptocedbing combine t h e t a h b 06 diddehent lev&? I t would be economical i f redundant o r s i m i l a r l y p a t t e r n e d o p e r a t i o n s c o u l d be done i n a s i n g l e run-through (2.12), b u t such may n o t be t h e case. Perhaps t h i s economy would o v e r t a x t h e s p e c i a l i s t s needed t o e n a c t it. P o s s i b l y , too, t h e system i s t o o d i f f u s e f o r o p t i m a l c o - o r d i n a t i o n among a l l its subsystems. To w h a t extent Lb each act 06 compkehevuion unique, and t o what extent A 2 companabLe t o o t h m ? Uniqueness o f processing events i s a t r o u b l i n g p r o s p e c t when r e s e a r c h e r s s e t o u t i n search o f general f i n d i n g s . However, t h e e s s e n t i a l 3.5.5

commonalities among c l a s s e s o f p r o c e s s i n g events may be on a much h i g h e r p l a n e o f o p e r a t i o n a l power t h a n t h a t o f "noun phrases," " r e l a t i v e clauses," and t h e o t h e r popular e n t i t i e s o f e a r l y p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c s . High-powered processes c o u l d e a s i l y d e a l w i t h a unique e v e n t as a complex i n t e r s e c t i o n o f t h e subprocesses i t c o n t r o l s w i t h i n a s t i p u l a t e d context. 3.5.6

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l i m i t a t i o n s o r o v e r l o a d i n g should a r i s e , a r e t h e r e t y p i c a l p o i n t s i n t h e o v e r a l l system where d e g r a d a t i o n should be expected? Can i n c r e a s e d resources o r conscious t r a i n i n g o f f s e t such cases? 3.5.7 How ahe chitehia LLghtened on nQeaxed? d e f i n i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r an a c t i o n (e.g., goodness of f i t ) , how can such d e f i n i t i o n s i n s t r u c t e d t o t a k e l e s s thorough samples, o r c a n d i d a t e s ? Would such i n s t r u c t i o n s be t h r o u g h o u t t h e whole system?

I f so many processes depend upon those f o r i n i t i a t i o n , t e r m i n a t i o n , o r be a d j u s t e d ? Can search procedures be t o be s a t i s f i e d w i t h approximate specific, o r generally distributed

3.5.8 HOW m e aLLtomatic phocennen comofidated? Automatic s u b - r o u t i n e packages would be an e f f i c i e n t way t o operate. They m i g h t i n t e r s e c t one a n o t h e r and t h e r e b y c r e a t e l a r g e complexes of a c t i v i t y w i t h o u t c o n t r o l s from t h e c e n t r a l feedback mechanism. These packages m i g h t make no demands on a t t e n t i o n u n l e s s t h e y had t o be changed o r suppressed. B u t i f a t t e n t i o n i s a t i m e - s h a r i n g mechanism, t h e packages would e v e n t u a l l y i n t e r f e r e when enough o f them were r u n n i n g a t once t o o v e r l o a d t h e system. Can a t t e n t i o n be i n j e c t e d a t t r o u b l e spots w i t h o u t degrading operations? 3.5.9 How hig-id me .the contingenoien among pnocennen? A t l e a s t some processes should r e q u i r e the r e s u l t s o f others i n order t o function. But i t i s absolutely necessary t o o b t a i n those r e s u l t s , o r i t i s s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t i m a t e o r p r e d i c t them? Are t h e c o n t i n g e n c i e s themselves r o u t i n e , o r do t h e y a r i s e s p o r a d i c a l l y ? I s t h e r e some d e l i c a t e t i m i n g o f c o n t i n g e n c i e s t h a t m i g h t become d i s r u p t e d , f o r example, if p e o p l e had t o d r a s t i c a l l y a l t e r t h e i r r a t e o f a c t i o n ? 3.5.10 How d o e s a pnocenbing nyntem ahine i n a child, and how doen it evoLve M c u d muLmen and devdopn? The human p r o c e s s i n g system must t r a v e r s e stages i n o r d e r t o d e a l w i t h i n c r e a s e d c o m p l e x i t y . Steady a c c r u a l o f e x p e r i e n c e s h o u l d a l l o w f o r r e f i n e m e n t o f b o t h r o u t i n e s and s p e c i a l i s t s , and f o r g e n e r a l i z i n g across l a r g e r c l a s s e s o f events. B u t a n o n - s t r a t e g i c o r g a n i z a t i o n m i g h t p r e v e n t t h e e v o l u t i o n of t h e system and c r e a t e l e a r n i n g b l o c k s , e.g. t h e f u n c t i o n a l i l l i t e r a c y some s t u d e n t s r e t a i n t h r o u g h o u t 1 2 y e a r s o f p u b l i c s c h o o l i n g i n America (cf. Beaugrande, 1982a).

the

3.5.11 Can pnopehly dehigned M n g h d p t o optimize pnocennning? More e l a b o r a t e d p r o c e s s i n g models m i g h t make i t apparent how s c h o o l i n g c o u l d promote comprehension s k i l l s i n a more d e t a i l e d , circumspect, and e f f e c t i v e f a s h i o n t h a n h i t h e r t o . Much language t r a i n i n g i s c u r r e n t l y based upon v e r y s i m p l i f i e d o r i m p l a u s i b l e models, encouraging such w a s t e f u l techniques as r o t e l e a r n i n g -- a brute f o r c e attempt t o b u i l d surface traces without regard f o r c o g n i t i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n . I n consequence, c h i l d r e n a r e u s u a l l y l e f t a l o n e t o d e v i s e t h e i r own methods o f comprehending o r l e a r n i n g t e x t s . I t would be a s t r i k i n g c o i n c i d e n c e i f many o f them d i d n o t develop l e s s t h a n o p t i m a l systems ( c f . Beaugrande, 1982b). 3.5.12 How bhould meamabte time di6dehencen i n expehhentae data ivLtapne&d? The c l a s s i c a l e x p e r i m e n t a l paradigm i s t o d e v i s e c o n d i t i o n s , one

be

of which i n c l u d e s some p o s t u l a t e d process, and one t h a t excludes i t ; i f t h e i n c l u s i v e t a s k consumes more time, t h e n t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h a t process appears supported o r confirmed. Recent overviews (e.g. C l a r k a n d C l a r k , 1977; L e v e l t , 1978) i n d i c a t e t h a t t h i s method has been e x t e n s i v e l y employed i n t h e s t u d y of language comprehension as w e l l . B u t i f comprehension i s composed o f complex i n t e r a c t i o n s of l e v e l s i n p a r a l l e l , and o f d e t a i l e d s c h e d u l i n g s and c o n t i n g e n c i e s , t h e r e i s no c l e a r reason t o assume t h a t a l l processes should be d e t e c t e d v i a i n c r e a s e s i n p r o c e s s i n g times. Automatized packages o f s u b - r o u t i n e s (3.5.8) would n o t show up i f t h e y r u n s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w i t h o t h e r o p e r a t i o n s . Time would b e l i n e a r l y a d d i t i v e o n l y f o r t h o s e processes demanding a t t e n t i o n above a c e r t a i n t h r e s h o l d . Moreover, t i m e i n c r e m e n t s m i g h t i n d i c a t e any o f a g r e a t number o f processes t h a t p a r t i c i p a t e i n comprehension. 3.5.13 How c m heneahch d e a l uLith fithe m W p L e i n t e n p h e A a b U y 06 d a t a ? The t i m e q u e s t i o n (3.5.12) i s j u s t one i l l u s t r a t i o n o f a more general d i f f i c u l t y : t h e l a c k

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of a univocal c a u s a l i t y between a processing event and an observable, measurable action. The t r a d i t i o n a l method has been t o design and t e s t s i m p l i s t i c t h e o r i e s based upon such s i n g l e c a u s a l i t i e s : i f the variance was accounted f o r , a l l was well. Such a method i s not s u f f i c i e n t f o r pursuing complex process models. Instead, we need t o incorporate a l l p l a u s i b l e causes i n t o a single model. W e can then t r y t o manipulate each f a c t o r independently and watch f o r variances i n observed data. We can show t h a t t h e several causes p o t e m y a f f e c t processing; but we w i l l not normally be a b l e t o prove which cause a c , t ~ ~ ~a~f flelcyt e d an event occurring spontaneously i n a natural s e t t i n g (e.9. an observed pause i n everyday reading). A t b e s t , complex process models can be c o r r e l a t e d with t h e i r empirical domains through a steady elaboration of d i s t r i b u t e d p r o b a b i l i t i e s . 3.6 The questions r a i s e d under 3.5.1-13 cannot be e a s i l y answered, y e t they cannot be ignored e i t h e r . They c a l l f o r a fundamental reorganization both i n theory design and i n s c i e n t i f i c methodology. We w i l l have t o l e a r n t o l i v e with complexity not by f a c t o r i n g i t o u t , but by enriching our t h e o r e t i c a l models. I n this paper, I have argued t h a t progress will be more d e c i s i v e i f we concentrate l e s s upon t h e s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s of b r i e f a r t i f a c t s , and more upon t h e exigencies of maintaining operations within complex, i n t e r a c t i v e systems. REFERENCES Adams, M., and Collins A. A schema-theoretic view o f reading. In R . Freedle ( e d . ) , New d i r e c t i o n s in discourse processing Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, 1979, 1-22. Toronto: Univ. of Allen, J. A plan-based approach t o speech a c t recognition. Toronto diss, 1979. Atkinson, R . and S h i f f r i n , R . Human memory: A proposed system and i t s control processes. In K. Spence and J . Spence ( e d s . ) , The psychology of learning and motivation. New York: Academic, 1968, 89-195. B a r t l e t t , F. Remembering. Cambridge, England: C U P , 1932. Beaugrande, R. Text and sentence in discourse planning. In J.S. Petofi ( e d . ) , Text vs. sentence. Hamburg: Buske, 1979, 467-494. Beaugrande, R. de. Text, discourse, and process. Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, 1980. ( a ) Beaugrande, R. de. The pragmatics of discourse planning. Journal o f Pragmatics, 1980, 4, 15-42. ( b ) Beaugrande, R . de. Design c r i t e r i a f o r process models of reading. Reading Research Quarterly, 1981, 16, 261-315. ( a ) Fact, f i c t i o n , f r o n t i e r ? In J . Beaugrande, R . de. The l i n e a r i t y of reading: Flood ( e d . ) , Issues i n reading comprehension. Newark: I R A , 1981. ( b ) Beaugrande, R. de. Text, a t t e n t i o n , and memory i n reading research. In R. J . Tierney, J . Mitchell, and P. Anders (eds.), Understanding reader's understanding. H i l l s d a l e , N.J.: Erlbaum, 1981. ( c ) Beaugrande, R . de. Text production. Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, 1982. ( a ) Beaugrande, R. de. Learning t o read and reading t o l e a r n in t h e cognitive science approach. In H. Mandl, N . S t e i n , and T. Trabasso ( e d s . ) , Learning from t e x t . H i l l s d a l e , N.J.: Erlbaum;1982. ( b ) Begg, I . Recognition memory f o r sentence meaning and wording. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 1971, 10, 176-181. Bloomfield, L. Language. New York: Holt, 1933. Bray, N . , and Batchelder, W. E f f e c t s of i n s t r u c t i o n s and r e t e n t i o n i n t e r v a l on memory of presentation mode. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 1972, 11, 367-374. Burton, R. Semantic grammar. Cambridge: BBN, 1976. Chomsky, N. S y n t a c t i c s t r u c t u r e s . The Hague: Mouton, 1957. Chomsky, N. Aspects of t h e theory of syntax. Cambridge: MIT, 1965. Clark, H . , and Clark, E . Psychology and language. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, 1977. Cohen, P. On knowing what t o say: Planning speech a c t s . Toronto: Univ. of Toronto d i s s , 1978. E r t e l , S. Where do the s u b j e c t s of sentences come from? In Rosenberg ( e d . ) , 1977, 141-1 67.

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MODELS OF READING1 M a r i l y n Jager Adams B o l t Beranek and Newman I n c . 50 Moulton S t r e e t Cambridge, Massachusetts U.S.A

SchemaTtheoretic models o f r e a d i n q , as t h e y propose l i m i t e d a t t e n t i o n , i n t e r a c t i v e processing, and an extended knowledge base, a r e shown t o have f a r g r e a t e r d e s c r i p t i v e f l e x i b i l i t y than t h e i r s i m p l e r t h e o r e t i c a l predecessors. However, i t i s argued t h a t t h i s f l e x i b i l i t y i s purchased a t t h e c o s t o f e x p l a n a t o r y power. The problems t h i s must p r e s e n t t o r e s e a r c h e r s a r e discussed. I n t h e l a s t decade o r so, a tremendous amount o f e m p i r i c a l work has been d i r e c t e d toward d i s e n t a n g l i n g t h e knowledge and processes i n v o l v e d i n s k i l l e d r e a d i n g . The purpose o f t h i s paper i s t o r e v i e w b r i e f l y how o u r t h e o r e t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e s have s h i f t e d as a consequence o f t h i s work and t h e n t o examine some o f t h e problems and paradoxes we have y e t t o s o l v e . I f we view w r i t t e n language as n o t h i n g more t h a n c i p h e r e d speech, then we m i g h t d e f i n e r e a d i n g as t h e a b i l i t y t o decode o r t r a n s l a t e t h e s c r i p t i n t o i t s spoken e q u i v a l e n t . While i t may seem c o n v e n i e n t t o d e l i m i t t h e scope o f t h e problem so n a r r o w l y , i t i s n o t c o n v i n c i n g . What we r e a l l y mean by r e a d i n g i s t h e a b i l i t y t o comprehend w r i t t e n t e x t , and i t i s c l e a r t h a t r e a d i n g comprehension i s dependent on more than j u s t v i s u a l word r e c o g n i t i o n and o r a l language s k i l l s . I f , i n s t e a d , we d e f i n e r e a d i n g as t h e a b i l i t y t o e x t r a c t t h e t e x t , then we i m p l i c i t l y acknowledge t h e r e l e v a n c e o f a h o s t and conceptual s k i l l s . To understand i t , we must f i n d a way again i n t o a s e t o f more t r a c t a b l e s u b s k i l l s and t o i d e n t i f y

meaning f r o m w r i t t e n o f visual, l i n g u i s t i c , t o break i t down their interrelations.

BOTTOM-UP MODELS OF READING The t r a d i t i o n a l approach t o t h i s problem has been t o b e g i n w i t h t h e u l t i m a t e g o a l o f t h e v e a d e r and then s u c c e s s i v e l y i d e n t i f y i t s p r e r e q u i s i t e s . For example, t o have e x t r a c t e d t h e f u l l meaning o f a w r i t t e n t e x t , t h e r e a d e r must have processed each o f i t s i n d i v i d u a l sentences. T h i s , i n t u r n , depends upon h a v i n g c o r r e c t l y analyzed t h e clauses and phrases o f those sentences, which depends upon having recognized t h e component words o f those u n i t s , which depends upon having recogn i zed t h e i r component 1e t t e r s . When analyzed i n t h i s way, t h e processes i n v o l v e d i n r e a d i n g appear t o be organi z e d , h i e r a r c h i c a l l y . The a t t a i n m e n t o f any g i v e n l e v e l presumes t h e e x e c u t i o n o f a l l s u b o r d i n a t e o r l e s s complex l e v e l s ; moreover, t h e converse i s n o t s t r i c t l y t r u e . Whereas t h e r e a d i n g o f a w r i t t e n passage depends on t h e r e a d i n g o f i t s sentences, words, and l e t t e r s , t h e dependency i s , i n some sense, u n i d i r e c t i o n a l . An i n d i v i d u a l l e t t e r may be p e r f e c t l y l e g i b l e whether o r n o t i t i s embedded i n a word, a sentence, o r a passage. S i m i l a r l y , we a r e f u l l y capable o f r e a d i n g i n d i v i d u a l words and sentences i n t h e absence o f a l a r g e r c o n t e x t .

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I t was t h i s s o r t of h i e r a r c h i c a l a n a l y s i s t h a t shaped o u r models o f t h e r e a d i n g process f o r many y e a r s . For teachers, i t p r o v i d e d a r a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e f o r i n s t r u c t i o n a l programs: s t a r t a t t h e bottom, w i t h s i n g l e l e t t e r r e c o g n i t i o n , and s u c c e s s i v e l y work up through t h e h i g h e r l e v e l s k i l l s . F o r r e s e a r c h e r s , i t o f f e r e d a means of e m p i r i c a l l y i s o l a t i n g t h e processes i n v o l v e d a t any g i v e n l e v e l i n t h e s t r u c t u r e : t h e e f f e c t s o f h i g h e r o r d e r processes on t h e l e v e l i n q u e s t i o n a r e supposed t o be n u l l , and t h e e f f e c t s o f lower processes can be e m p i r i c a l l y i d e n t i f i e d and s u b t r a c t e d o u t . Although i t i s t r u e t h a t , a t f i n e r l e v e l s o f a n a l y s i s , t h e r e l a t i v e c o m p l e x i t y o f t e x t u a l components becomes f a r l e s s obvious, we were i n c l i n e d t o a s c r i b e such d e s c r i p t i v e inadequacies t o surmountable d i f f i c u l t i e s i n i d e n t i f y i n g and o r d e r i n g t h e a s s o c i a t e d s u b s k i l l s .

But t h i s view has s h i f t e d . I t now seems t h a t t h e p r i n c i p a l shortcomings o f t h e h i e r a r c h i c a l o r bottom-up models d e r i v e n o t from i n c o m p l e t e o r misconceived analyses o f t e x t so much as f r o m t h e assumption t h a t r e a d i n g i s t h e process o f e x t r a c t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m t e x t . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , i t i s argued t h a t i n t h e r e a d i n g s i t u a t i o n , as i n any e f f e c t i v e communication s i t u a t i o n , t h e message o r The r e s t must come t e x t p r o v i d e s b u t one o f t h e c r i t i c a l sources o f i n f o r m a t i o n . from t h e r e a d e r ' s own p r i o r knowledge, and here l i e s t h e problem: A l t h o u g h t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t t h e t e x t presents t o t h e reader i s packaged i n a h i e r a r c h i c a l s t r u c t u r e , t h e i n f o r m a t i o n which t h e r e a d e r b r i n g s t o t h e t e x t can be d i r e c t l y accessed a t any l e v e l and processed i n p a r a l l e l . I n p a r t i c u l a r , readers can and do a c t i v a t e t h e i r knowledge i n top-down f a s h i o n t o complement o r a n t i c i p a t e t h e upward f l o w o f i n f o r m a t i o n from t h e page. Thus, when one reads a meaningful passage, one does n o t r e a d i t s component l e t t e r s , words, and sentences i n t h e same way as when t h e y a r e presented i n i s o l a t i o n . Rather, p r o c e s s i n g a t each l e v e l i s i n f l u e n c e d by h i g h e r as w e l l as lower o r d e r i n f o r m a t i o n . I n d i v i d u a l l e t t e r s become more p e r c e p t i b l e when t h e y a r e embedded i n words (Reicher, 1969; Wheeler, 1970). I n d i v i d u a l words a r e recognized more e a s i l y when t h e y a r e embedded i n meaningful sentences (Schuberth & Eimas, 1977; T u l v i n g & Gold, 1963) o r f a m i l i a r s t o r i e s ( W i t t r o c k , Marks, & Doctorow, 1975). Sentences t h a t c o h e r e n t l y i n t e g r a t e t h e u n d e r l y i n g semantic r e l a t i o n s may be a s s i m i l a t e d more e a s i l y t h a n those t h a t do n o t , i r r e s p e c t i v e o f t h e i r s y n t a c t i c c o m p l e x i t y ( H a v i l a n d & C l a r k , 1974; Huggins & Adams, 1980; Pearson, 1974). And t h e speed w i t h which a sentence i s r e a d depends on t h e n a t u r e o f t h e s u r r o u n d i n g t e x t (Sanford & Garrod, 1981). Such top-down p r o c e s s i n g i s a necessary component o f s k i l l e d reading. I t a l l o w s t h e reader t o r e s o l v e a m b i g u i t i e s and s e l e c t among a l t e r n a t e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f t h e t e x t . More g e n e r a l l y , i t p r o v i d e s a means by which t h e r e a d e r can use h i s o r h e r own knowledge as a source o f redundancy--as a means o f r e d u c i n g t h e amount o f e f f o r t t h a t must be i n v e s t e d i n e x t r a c t i n g v i s u a l d e t a i l f r o m t h e t e x t . B u t i t a l s o means t h a t t h e c o u r s e , o f comprehension cannot be d e s c r i b e d by bottom-up models. TOP-DOWN THEORIES I t i s from t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e t h a t top-down t h e o r i e s such as those advocated by Smith (1971, 1973) and Goodman (1976) gained t h e i r appeal. These t h e o r i e s a r e based on t h e premise t h a t p r o f i c i e n t r e a d i n g c o n s i s t s i n " c o n s t r u c t i n g meaning from t e x t w i t h t h e l e a s t amount o f t i m e and e f f o r t , s e l e c t i v e l y u s i n g t h e f e w e s t and most p r o d u c t i v e cues t o c o n s t r u c t meaning" (Goodman & Gollasch, 1980, p. 10). S k i l l e d readers, i t i s argued, should r e l y as l i t t l e as p o s s i b l e on graphemic d e t a i l s (Smith, 1971, 1973, 1975). I n s t e a d , t h e y should e x p l o i t t h e semantic and syntactic constraints o f a text. The s t r o n g e s t s u p p o r t f o r top-down t h e o r i e s may be o u r own i n t r o s p e c t i o n s . As s k i l l e d readers, we a r e q u i t e o f t e n aware of working and even w r e s t l i n g w i t h t h e h i g h e r o r d e r c o n s t r a i n t s o f a t e x t ; we a r e r a r e l y aware o f p r o c e s s i n g i n a l e t t e r

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by l e t t e r manner. Beyond such i n t r o s p e c t i o n , t h e r e i s a widespread e m p i r i c a l s u p p o r t f o r t h e c o n t e n t i o n t h a t more s k i l l e d r e a d e r s a r e c h a r a c t e r i z e d by g r e a t e r s e n s i t i v i t y t o a v a r i e t y of more and l e s s s u b t l e h i g h e r o r d e r cues (e.g., Cromer, 1970; Meyer, Brandt, & B l u t h , 1980; P e r f e t t i & Roth, 1981; Smiley, Oakley, Worthen, Campione, & Brown, 1977; Weinstein & R a b i n o v i t c h , 1971). On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e d a t a have n o t supported t h e c l a i m t h a t s k i l l e d r e a d e r s do n o t t h o r o u g h l y process graphemic i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e course o f r e c o g n i z i n g words. To t h e c o n t r a r y , r e s e a r c h on t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f i s o l a t e d words i n d i c a t e s t h a t s k i l l e d r e a d e r s process words down t o t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l l e t t e r s (Adams, 1979a). Although t h e y e v i d e n t l y do n o t n o r m a l l y r e l y on s p e l l i n g - t o - s o u n d correspondences f o r purposes o f r e c o g n i z i n g words, when i t i s u s e f u l f o r them t o do so, t h e y do s o a c c u r a t e l y and e f f o r t l e s s l y (Spoehr, 1980). As Smith (1973) has argued, t h e y do indeed have a thorough knowledge o f o r t h o g r a p h i c redundancy. B u t t h e y e v i d e n t l y do n o t use i t t o a v o i d p r o c e s s i n g i n d i v i d u a l l e t t e r s . They use i t t o f a c i l i t a t e l e t t e r r e c o g n i t i o n (Adams, 1979a; Broadbent, 1967; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1980), t o c o r r o b o r a t e f a l l i b l e p e r c e p t u a l i n f o r m a t i o n on l e t t e r o r d e r (Adams, 1979b; Estes, 1975a,b), and p r o b a b l y t o d e t e c t s y l l a b l e boundaries (Adams, 1981). I n defense o f t h e top-down t h e o r i e s , i t m i g h t be argues t h a t t h e knowledge and processes t h a t s k i l l e d r e a d e r s use i n r e c o g n i z i n g i s o l a t e d words w i l l n o t necess a r i l y be used i n r e a d i n g coherent t e x t . Inasmuch as c o h e r e n t t e x t o f f e r s many more sources o f redundancy, i t f o l l o w s t h a t t h e n e c e s s i t y , i n i n f o r m a t i o n t h e o r e t i c terms, o f t h e r e a d e r s ' p r o c e s s i n g c e r t a i n graphemic d e t a i l must be g r e a t l y reduced. The argument i s sound b u t , again, i t i s n o t supported by t h e data. Eye movement analyses i n d i c a t e t h a t when s k i l l e d r e a d e r s a r e i n s t r u c t e d t o r e a d c o h e r e n t t e x t f o r meaning, they f i x a t e v i r t u a l l y e v e r y c o n t e n t word, r e g a r d l e s s o f i t s c o n t e x t u a l p r e d i c t a b i l i t y ( J u s t & Carpenter, 1980). Moreover, t h e y q u i t e r e l i a b l y n o t i c e t h e s l i g h t e s t m i s s p e l l i n g of a c o n t e n t word--regardless o f t h e v i s u a l s i m i l a r i t y o f t h e m i s s p e l l i n g , o f where i n t h e word i t occurs, o r o f how h i g h l y c o n s t r a i n e d t h e w o r d ' s i d e n t i t y may be i n c o n t e x t (McConkie & Zola, 1981). I n s h o r t , i t seems t h a t s k i l l e d readers know l o t s about t h e graphemic i n t r i c a c i e s o f o u r w r i t t e n language and t h a t t h e y r e g u l a r l y use t h i s knowledge i n t h e course o f r e a d i n g . I f t h e y do n o t appear t o , i t i s o n l y because t h e r e l e v a n t knowledge and processes a r e so w e l l l e a r n e d arld i n t e g r a t e d t h a t t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n i s v i r t u a l l y a u t o m a t i c and e f f o r t l e s s . When t h e focus s h i f t s f r o m s k i l l e d t o b e g i n n i n g readers, debates o v e r t h e m e r i t s o f top-down t h e o r i e s s h i f t from academic t o p r a c t i c a l concern. Beginning r e a d e r s a r e a l s o f a m i l i a r w i t h many components o f t h e r e a d i n g t a s k . Through o r a l language experience, t h e y have a l r e a d y a c q u i r e d a s u b s t a n t i a l vocabulary and b a s i c synt a c t i c competence. They a r e used t o making sense o f language and have a w e a l t h o f r e a l - w o r l d experience t o draw on i n t h i s e f f o r t . Even preschool c h i l d r e n have been shown t o possess c o n s i d e r a b l e knowledge about t h e s t r u c t u r e and c o n n e c t i v i t y o f s t o r i e s ( K i n t s c h , 1977). What t h e b e g i n n i n g reader i s most f l a g r a n t l y l a c k i n g are t h e lowest l e v e l s k i l l s i n the hierarchy: t h e s k i l l s involved i n recognizing p r i n t e d words. L i k e s k i l l e d readers, b e g i n n i n g r e a d e r s tend t o a p p l y t h e i r r e l e v a n t knowledge i n top-down f a s h i o n as t h e y read. However, t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t necessary l o w e r o r d e r s k i l l s a r e l a c k i n g , t h e r o l e o f t h e top-down processes changes. I n s t e a d o f complementing t h e bottom-up processes, t h e y may s u b s t i t u t e f o r them. I n p a r t i c u l a r , u n t i l t h e processes i n v o l v e d i n word r e c o g n i t i o n a r e f a i r l y w e l l developed, many readers a p p a r e n t l y f i n d t h a t t h e y can o f t e n guess t h e i d e n t i t y o f a word as acc u r a t e l y and more e a s i l y t h a n t h e y can a c t u a l l y decode i t . Thus i t i s found t h a t among younger and p o o r e r readers, s e m a n t i c a l l y a p p r o p r i a t e s u b s t i t u t i o n e r r o r s a r e e s p e c i a l l y f r e q u e n t (e.g., A l l i n g t o n & Strange, 1977; B i e m i l l e r , 1970; J u e l , 1980; K o l e r s , 1975; S t a n o v i c h & West, 1979; Weber, 1970) and word r e c o g n i t i o n

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performance i s e s p e c i a l l y s e n s i t i v e t o t h e presence and c o m p a t i b i l i t y o f meaningf u l c o n t e x t (e.g., B i e m i l l e r , 1977, 1978; P e r f e t t i , Goldman, & Hogaboam, 1979; Samuels, Begy, & Chen, 1975, 1976; Schvaneveldt, Ackerman, & Semlear, 1977; West & Stanovich, 1978). Again, a c c o r d i n g t o top-down t h e o r i s t s , heavy r e l i a n c e on c o n t e x t i s a s t r e n g t h , n o t a weakness. Thus, t h e y argue t h a t c o n t e x t u a l l y a p p r o p r i a t e r e a d i n g e r r o r s s h o u l d n o t be discouraged--and c e r t a i n l y n o t i n t h e i n t e r e s t o f w o r d - p e r f e c t r e a d i n g . Indeed, Smith (1973) has gone so f a r as t o suggest t h a t r e a d i n g t e a c h e r s s h o u l d n o t t r y t o ensure t h a t p h o n i c s s k i l l s a r e l e a r n e d o r used, t h e y s h o u l d n o t d r i l l c h i l d r e n on t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f p a r t i c u l a r words, t h e y s h o u l d n e i t h e r encourage c h i l d r e n t o r e a d c a r e f u l l y o r t o a v o i d e r r o r s n o r d i s c o u r a g e them f r o m guessing, and t h e y s h o u l d r e s i s t i d e n t i f y i n g a c h i l d as a problem r e a d e r j u s t because she o r he p e r s i s t s i n making c a r e l e s s e r r o r s i n r e a d i n g i n d i v i d u a l words. Although we can o n l y agree t h a t younger and p o o r e r r e a d e r s ' s e n s i t i v i t y t o c o n t e x t i s a good s i g n , we would argue t h a t t h e v i s i b i l i t y o f t h i s s e n s i t i v i t y i s a bad s i g n . The semantic cogency o f t h e e r r o r s can o n l y be t a k e n as evidence o f p r o d u c t i v e comprehension s t r a t e g i e s . But, t h e f a c t t h a t such e r r o r s o c c u r i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e young r e a d e r s a r e n o t p r o c e s s i n g t h e graphemic i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e t e x t i n t h e way a s k i l l e d r e a d e r would. Nor, i f t h e i r t e a c h e r s adhered t o S m i t h ' s (1973) s t r i c t u r e s , would t h e y be l i k e l y t o l e a r n t o do so. The s e r i o u s n e s s o f t h i s concern i s underscored by t h e r e p e a t e d f i n d i n g s t h a t d i f f e r e n c e s i n a b i l i t i e s a t t h e l e v e l o f l e t t e r and word p r o c e s s i n g a r e t h e s i n g l e b e s t c l a s s o f d i s c r i m i n a t o r s between good and poor r e a d e r s (e.g., Barron, 1978; B i e m i l l e r , 1977, 1978; Frederiksen, 1978; Graesser, Hoffman, & C l a r k , 1980; Jorm, 1979; P e r f e t t i & Lesgold, 1977; P e r f e t t i , F i n g e r , & Hogaboam, 1978, R o z i n & Gleitman, 1977; Shankweiler & Liberman, 1972; Stanovich, 1980). I n summary, then, t h e fundamental problem w i t h bottom-up and top-down models a l i k e i s t h e i r v e r y one-sidedness. The bottom-up o r h i e r a r c h i c a l s k i l l s models have f a i l e d t o r e c o g n i z e t h e r o l e o f h i g h e r o r d e r knowledge t h a t even young r e a d e r s b r i n g t o t h e t e x t . I n c o n t r a s t , t h e top-down models have f a i l e d t o acknowledge t h e importance of l o w e r l e v e l processes which t h e t e x t r e q u i r e s o f t h e r e a d e r . SCHEMA-THEORETIC MODELS Schema t h e o r y o r , more g e n e r a l l y , t h e c l a s s o f i n t e r a c t i v e models t h a t have been emerging i n r e c e n t y e a r s (e.g., Adam & C o l l i n s , 1979; P e r f e t t i & Lesgold, 1977; Rumelhart, 1980; Stanovich, 1980) has p r o v i d e d a framework f o r r e c o n c i l i n g t h e s e differences. There i s a sense i n which schema t h e o r y i s b u t a h y b r i d o f i t s more u n i d i r e c t i o n a l predecessors. However, i n t h e e f f o r t t o e x p l a i n t h e p o s s i b l e i n t e r a c t i o n s between top-down and bottom-up processes, i t has t a k e n on c e r t a i n assumptions o f i t s own.

A t t h e c o r e of schema-theoretic approaches t o r e a d i n g i s t h e c o n s t r u c t i v i s t assumption t h a t p e r c e p t i o n c o n s i s t s i n r e p r e s e n t i n g o r o r g a n i z i n g i n f o r m a t i o n i n terms o f o n e ' s own, p r e v i o u s l y a c q u i r e d knowledge. T h i s assumption i s h e l d t o be e q u a l l y a p p l i c a b l e a t a l l l e v e l s o f a n a l y s i s , f r o m e l e m e n t a r y sensory f e a t u r e s t o complex s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n s . I m p o r t a n t l y , i t i s a l s o assumed t h a t a s i n g l e complex of knowledge and processes u n d e r l i e s a l l c o g n i t i v e a c t i v i t i e s . T h a t i s , knowledge i s compartmentalized o n l y as a consequence o f p e r t i n e n c e such t h a t t h e o n l y knowledge u n i q u e t o r e a d i n g i s t h a t which i s s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l a t e d t o t h e p r i n t e d medium. The r e a d e r ' s knowledge i s h e l d t o be o r g a n i z e d such t h a t t h e o u t p u t o f any l e v e l of p r o c e s s i n g i s t h e i n p u t f o r t h e n e x t . I n t h i s way t h e i n f o r m a t i o n e x t r a c t e d f r o m t h e page i s a u t o m a t i c a l l y propagated upward from v i s u a l d e t a i l t h r o u g h i n c r e a s i n g l y comprehensive l e v e l s o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . T h i s f l o w o f i n f o r m a t i o n corresponds t o bottom-up processing. Top-down p r o c e s s i n g o c c u r s as t h e system

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more o r l e s s c o m p u l s i v e l y searches f o r i n f o r m a t i o n t o s a t i s f y p a r t i a l l y a c t i v a t e d h i g h e r - o r d e r knowledge complexes, thus p r i m i n g t h e l o w e r l e v e l complexes c o r r e s ponding t o t h e i r components. Through t h e i n t e r a c t i o n s between top-down and bottom-up processes, t h e f l o w o f i n f o r m a t i o n through t h e system w i l l be c o n s i d e r a b l y c o n s t r a i n e d . Nevertheless, g i v e n a knowledge base as r i c h and p o t e n t i a l l y d i f f u s e as t h e human mind, these processes a r e n o t , i n themselves, enough t o ensure comprehension. I n view o f t h i s , schema-theoretic models have adopted t h e n o t i o n o f a c e n t r a l , l i m i t e d c a p a c i t y processor from t h e o r i e s o f human i n f o r m a t i o n - p r o c e s s i n g . T h i s c e n t r a l processor i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r s e t t i n g t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i v e g o a l s o f t h e system. I t s a l l o c a t i o n o f a t t e n t i o n t o problem areas i n t h e system determines whether and how t h e y w i l l be overcome. I t s a l l o c a t i o n o f a t t e n t i o n t o h i g h e r - o r d e r dimensions determines whether and how t h e t e x t w i l l be understood. I n t h i s way, problems t h a t plagued e a r l i e r models o f r e a d i n g a r e e a s i l y r e c o n c i l e d w i t h i n a schema-theoretic approach. I t makes sense t h a t d i f f i c u l t i e s a t t h e l e v e l o f l e t t e r and word r e c o g n i t i o n w i l l be p r e v a l e n t among young r e a d e r s . The knowledge and processes r e q u i r e d a t t h i s l e v e l a r e unique t o t h e p r i n t e d medium and, t h e r e f o r e , u n i q u e l y f o r e i g n t o t h e beginner. I t makes sense t h a t d i f f i c u l t i e s a t t h e l e v e l o f l e t t e r and word r e c o g n i t i o n should stand as such p e r v a s i v e impediments t o f l u e n t r e a d i n g . The system i s , a f t e r a l l , d a t a d r i v e n , o r " f e e d - f o r w a r d ' ' i n P e r f e t t i and R o t h ' s (1981) t e r m i n o l o g y and, i n t h e r e a d i n g s i t u a t i o n , l e t t e r s and words a r e t h e b a s i c data. I f , a t t h i s l e v e l , t h e upwards f l o w o f i n f o r m a t i o n i s o b s t r u c t e d o r r e q u i r e s much a c t i v e a t t e n t i o n , comprehension must s u f f e r . F i n a l l y , i t makes sense t h a t t h e younger o r p o o r e r r e a d e r should r e l y more h e a v i l y on top-down processes. !t i s t o be expected t h a t f a m i l i a r modes o f p r o c e s s i n g w i l l o p e r a t e more e a s i l y than newer, incomplete ones. On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e c a p a c i t y o f a t h e o r y t o accommodate a v a r i e t y o f e m p i r i c a l phenomena i n r e t r o s p e c t i s a minimal t e s t o f i t s u t i l i t y . A p r o d u c t i v e t h e o r y should a l l o w one n o t o n l y t o r e c o n c i l e b u t t o understand t h e phenomena a t i s s u e . I t should s u p p o r t i n s i g h t s i n t o t h e s p e c i f i c causes and p o s s i b l e ways o f remediat i n g e m p i r i c a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d d i f f i c u l t i e s . And i t should s u p p o r t i n s i g h t s i n t o t h e k i n d s o f d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t a r e l i k e l y t o occur b u t have n o t y e t been uncovered through empirical investigations. T h e o r e t i c a l sources o f i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s . W i t h i n schema t h e o r y , p o t e n t i a l sources o f i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s f a l l i n t o two c a t e q o r i e s : Thev mav be due t o d i f f e r e n c e s i n e i t h e r t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f a t t e n t i o n or t h e amount o f - r e l e v a n t background knowledge w i t h which readers meet t h e t e x t . I f schema t h e o r y i s t o be usef u l i n s t e a d o f j u s t p r o m i s i n g , t h e n t h e t a s k b e f o r e us i s t h e one o f d i s c o v e r i n g e x a c t l y what t h e r e l e v a n t v a r i a b l e s a r e i n each o f these domains and how t h e y operate. L e t us begin by c o n s i d e r i n g d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e ways i n which r e a d e r s a l l o c a t e t h e i r a t t e n t i o n . A l l o f us have heard s t o r i e s about c h i l d r e n who see r e a d i n g as an e x e r c i s e i n sounding o u t words. They meet t h e c h a l l e n g e w i t h u n d i v i d e d a t t e n t i o n , m e t h o d i c a l l y w o r k i n g t h r o u g h t h e t e x t i n t o t a l o b l i v i o n t o i t s meaning. Such c h i l d r e n may i n r e a l i t y be r a r e . Nevertheless, t h e f a m i l i a r s t o r y encapsul a t e s an extreme example o f what i s p r o b a b l y a v e r y common c l a s s o f problems. Given t h a t t h e human mind i s a l i m i t e d c a p a c i t y processor, t h e r e a d e r can s e l e c t i v e l y d i r e c t e x t r a a t t e n t i o n t o any p a r t i c u l a r subprocess o n l y by t a k i n g i t away from deeper l e v e l s o f a n a l y s i s . Such p r o c e s s i n g l i m i t a t i o n s a r e e s p e c i a l l y c r i t i c a l f o r t h e young r e a d e r . F i r s t , many o f t h e necessary s u b s k i l l s a r e n o t w e l l l e a r n e d and, t h e r e f o r e , demand c o n s i d e r a b l e a t t e n t i o n . Second, t h e f u n c t i o n a l memory c a p a c i t y o f t h e young c h i l d tends t o be l e s s t h a n t h a t o f t h e a d u l t . I t i s n o t e n t i r e l y c l e a r why t h i s i s so; some have argued t h a t t h e span i t s e l f i n c r e a s e s w i t h age (e.g., Farnham-Diggory, 1972); some have a t t r i b u t e d i t t o young c h i l d r e n ' s f a i l u r e t o "chunk" o r o r g a n i z e t h e m a t e r i a l f o r e f f i c i e n t s t o r a g e (e.g., F l a v e l l ,

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1970; Olson, 1973; Simon, 1974); s t i l l o t h e r s have argued t h a t i t o n l y r e f l e c t s t h e d i f f e r e n t i a l e f f o r t t h a t c h i l d r e n must i n v e s t i n t h e encoding o f to-beremembered i t e m s (e.g., Chi, 1976; H u t t e n l o c h e r & Burke, 1976). Regardless o f which e x p l a n a t i o n i s c o r r e c t , t h e i m p o r t a n t i m p l i c a t i o n f o r t h e p r e s e n t d i s c u s s i o n i s t h a t processing c a p a c i t y i s l e a s t y i e l d i n g a t t h e p o i n t when t a s k demands a r e highest . Several t h e o r i s t s have r e c e n t l y emphasized t h a t t h e e f f e c t i v e c a p a c i t y o f a c t i v e memory i s a major d e t e r m i n a n t o f r e a d i n g p r o f i c i e n c y (e.g., J u s t & Carpenter, 1980; M i l l e r & K i n t s c h , 1980; LaBerge & Samuels, 1974; Lesgold & P e r f e t t i , 1978). I n t e r e s t i n g l y , a l t h o u g h t r a d i t i o n a l memory span measures, such as t h e d i g i t span t e s t , g e n e r a l l y do n o t d i f f e r e n t i a t e good from poor r e a d e r s (e.g., Guyer & Friedman, 1975; Hunt, Lunneborg, & Lewis, 1975; P e r f e t t i & Goldman, 1976), t e s t s t h a t measure t h e e f f i c i e n c y o r management o f v e r b a l p r o c e s s i n g do (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; P e r f e t t i & Lesgold, 1977). I n keeping w i t h t h e o l d s t o r y about t h e young w o r d - c a l l e r s , i t seems t h a t much o f t h i s i n e f f i c i e n c y can be t r a c e d t o d i f f i c u l t i e s and i n o r d i n a t e p r o c e s s i n g requirements a t t h e l e v e l o f word recogn i t i o n ( P e r f e t t i & Lesgold, 1977). However, t h e whole e x p l a n a t i o n i s n o t t o be found amidst v i s u a l word r e c o g n i t i o n d i f f i c u l t i e s , f o r Daneman and Carpenter (1980) have shown t h a t good and poor readers can be separated on t h e b a s i s o f t h e i r v e r b a l processing e f f i c i e n c y i n l i s t e n i n g as w e l l as r e a d i n g . But s k i l l f u l r e a d i n g depends no more on t h e a t t e n t i o n a r e a d e r has t o a l l o t t h a n on t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s w i t h which she o r he a l l o t s i t . I n G. S t a n l e y H a l l ' s words (1911) t r u e r e a d i n g occurs o n l y "when t h e a r t has become so s e c o n d a r i l y a u t o m a t i c t h a t i t can be f o r g o t t e n and a t t e n t i o n g i v e n s o l e l y t o t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r . I t s a s s i m i l a t i o n i s t r u e r e a d i n g and a l l e l s e i s o n l y t h e w h i r o f t h e machinery and n o t t h e work i t does [p. 1341." There may indeed be readers who c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y a l l o c a t e t h e i r a t t e n t i o n i n a suboptimal manner. However, we suspect t h a t a l l o c a t i o n problems a r e more o f t e n t h e consequence o f f a u l t y "machinery"--subprocesses whose o p e r a t i o n has n o t become " S e c o n d a r i l y automatic" b u t i n s t e a d r e q u i r e s p r i m a r y a t t e n t i o n . And t h i s b r i n g s us t o t h e second t h e o r e t i c a l c a t e g o r y o f i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s . The r e l e v a n t knowledge and s k i l l s w i t h which readers approach a t e x t a r e c r i t i c a l determinants o f t h e i r p r o f i c i e n c y . To t h e e x t e n t t h a t a r e a d e r i s l a c k i n g any fragment o f t h e knowledge o r s k i l l s presumed by t h e t e x t , t h e f l o w o f i n f o r m a t i o n through t h e system w i l l be o b s t r u c t e d . I n t h i s case, t h e r e a d e r has t h r e e o p t i o n s . F i r s t , as mentioned above, she o r he can d i r e c t e x t r a p r o c e s s i n g c a p a c i t y t o t h e d i f f i c u l t y i n t h e e f f o r t t o r e s o l v e i t ; second, she o r he can r e l y on top-down processes i n t h e e f f o r t t o f i n e s s e i t ; t h i r d , she o r he can s k i p i t . C l e a r l y , t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t any o f these o p t i o n s i s e x e r c i s e d , comprehension w i l l s u f f e r . Reading research has t r a d i t i o n a l l y and, as we have argued, j u s t i f i a b l y focused on t h e knowledge and s k i l l s i n v o l v e d i n word r e c o g n i t i o n . However, schema t h e o r y , as i t proposes t h a t a l l components o f t h e r e a d i n g complex must o p e r a t e i n synergism, admits t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t any f l a w , a t any l e v e l i n t h e system can d i s r u p t o r d i s t o r t t h e e n t i r e process. I n t h i s way t h e t h e o r y o b l i g e s us t o extend o u r s c r u t i n y t o components o f t h e r e a d i n g process t h a t m i g h t once have been regarded as f i n e p o i n t s . From a c o n s t r u c t i v i s t p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e p e r c e i v e r ' s background knowledge i s c r i t i c a l r e g a r d l e s s of what she o r he i s p e r c e i v i n g . P e r c e i v e r s a r e capable o f understanding t h e i r phenomenal w o r l d s o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t they. can a s s i m i l a t e o r r e p r e s e n t them i n terms o f t h e i r own p r i o r knowledge. The t a s k o f understandi n g language b r i n g s a new t w i s t , i n t h a t understanding c o n s i s t s i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g someone e l s e ' s coded understanding o f t h e world. I n view o f t h i s , t h e t a s k o f understanding language r e q u i r e s t h a t p e r c e i v e r s have a p p r o p r i a t e knowledge n o t o n l y of the world, b u t o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c code, o f t h e p r o d u c e r ' s knowledge o f t h e

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world, and of t h e p r o d u c e r ' s knowledge o r presumptions about h i s o r h e r a u d i e n c e ' s knowledge (see Adam & Bruce, 1982). Moreover, language, as a communication medium, has c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t c o m p l i c a t e these requirements even f u r t h e r . The f i r s t i s t h a t t h e o b j e c t s o f o u r communications, whether arguments, sentiments, e x p l a n a t i o n s , o r p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s and events, a r e o f t e n complex and m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l . Through language we can o n l y d e s c r i b e them p a r t by p a r t , i n s e r i e s . To communicate t h e t r u e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s among t h e elements o f a d e s c r i p t i o n , t h e speaker o r w r i t e r must use o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r a t e g i e s , r h e t o r i c a l s t r u c t u r e s and conventions, syntax, and v a r i o u s a l l u s i v e devices such as metaphor and analogy; b u t , most o f a l l , t h e speaker o r w r i t e r must r e l y on t h e knowledge and i n f e r e n t i a l a b i l i t i e s o f t h e l i s t e n e r o r reader. The second c o m p l i c a t i o n i s t h a t t h e meaning o f any g i v e n l i n g u i s t i c u n i t i s n o t f i x e d but context-sensitive. T h i s phenomenon has been discussed most o f t e n w i t h r e s p e c t t n s i n g l e words (e.g., Anderson & Ortony, 1975; Anderson, P i c h e r t , Goetz, M c C a r r e l l , & N i t s c h , 1974; W i t t g e n s t e i n , 1968). However, r e s e a r c h has shown t h a t i t a p p l i e s e q u a l l y t o whole sentences ( e . g . , Bruce, 1980; Carey, Mehler, E Bever. 1970; Foss, Bever, & S i l v e r , 1968; S c h w e l l e r , Brewer, & Dahl, 1976), and even whole passages (e.g., Anderson, Reynolds, S c h a l l e r t , & Goetz, 1977; B r a n s f o r d E Johnson, 1973; D o o l i n g & Lachman, 1971). The source o f t h i s problem i s t h a t any p a r t i c u l a r l i n g u i s t i c u n i t corresponds t o a whole d i s t r i b u t i o n o f meanings. Such one-to-many r e l a t i o n s h i p s enable us t o communicate many ideas t h r o u g h combinations and p e r m u t a t i o n s o f r e l a t i v e l y few words, b u t o n l y i f o u r i n t e r p r e t e r s possess and a p p l y t h e a p p r o p r i a t e knowledge f o r c o r r e c t l y s e l e c t i n g among p o t e n t i a l meanings. These problems a r e i n t r i n s i c t o language, whether o r a l o r w r i t t e n . The d i f f e r e n c e between t h e two m o d a l i t i e s i s t h a t i n o r a l language s i t u a t i o n s t h e r e a r e t y p i c a l l y many more c l u e s , a s i d e f r o m t h e words themselves, which t h e l i s t e n e r can use t o c o n s t r u c t o r c o r r o b o r a t e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . I n most o r a l language s i t u a t i o n s t h e c h i l d experiences, he o r she shares a s i n g l e frame o f t i m e and space w i t h t h e speaker; t h i s a l l o w s f o r much o f t h e s p e a k e r ' s meaning t o be i n f e r r e d from o r a t l e a s t r e i n f o r c e d by t h e e x t r a - l i n g u i s t i c c o n t e x t . The speaker a l s o uses gestures, f a c i a l expressions, and t h e tone and s t r e s s p a t t e r n s o f h i s o r h e r v o i c e t o m o d i f y t h e meanings o f u t t e r a n c e s and t o c l a r i f y t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o t h e message as a whole. A t t h e same t i m e t h e p h r a s a l and c l a u s a l s t r u c t u r e s o f t h e message a r e s i g n a l e d t h r o u g h p r o s o d i c s . F u r t h e r , t h e c h i l d t y p i c a l l y knows t h e speaker, and, perhaps more i m p o r t a n t l y , t h e speaker knows t h e c h i l d ; t h u s , t h e l i n g u i s t i c exchange i s o f t e n c u s t o m - t a i l o r e d . The t o p i c s o f c o n v e r s a t i o n tend t o be c o n c r e t e o r a t l e a s t about r e f e r e n t s t h a t a r e a l r e a d y f a m i l i a r t o t h e c h i l d . F i n a l l y , t h e s i t u a t i o n i s i n t e r a c t i v e , and t h i s q u a l i t y i s s i g n i f i c a n t i n a t l e a s t two ways. F i r s t , i t means t h a t b o t h p a r t i e s have t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o shape t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e d i s c o u r s e - - t o b r i n g i t i n t o terms o r domains o f t h e i r own choosing. Second, i t a l l o w s f o r t h e speaker and l i s t e n e r t o c o n t i n u o u s l y m o n i t o r each o t h e r ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e d i s c o u r s e ; t h e speaker w i l l o f t e n know when t h e l i s t e n e r does n o t understand and w i l l then t r y t o c l a r i f y t h e passage; a l t e r n a t i v e l y , t h e l i s t e n e r can ask q u e s t i o n s o f t h e speaker. By c o n t r a s t , w r i t t e n t e x t t y p i c a l l y c a r r i e s none o f these c l u e s . The frame o f r e f e r e n c e f o r t h e t e x t i s removed from r e a d e r s i n b o t h space and t i m e ; thus, readers must c o n s t r u c t t h e c o n t e x t i t s e l f . Except f o r p u n c t u a t i o n , t h e r e a d e r ' s o n l y b a s i s f o r s e g r e g a t i n g phrases and clauses i s her o r h i s own s y n t a c t i c competence. The a u t h o r i s n e i t h e r p r e s e n t n o r known; t h e t e x t i s impersonal. And, a l t h o u g h t h e m a t e r i a l i n p r i m e r s i s g e n e r a l l y based on s i m p l e s t e r e o t y p e d schemata, when c h i l d r e n a r e f a c e d w i t h more advanced texts--when t h e y a r e supposed t o be r e a d i n g t o l e a r n r a t h e r t h a n l e a r n i n g t o read--even t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r tends t o be new. F i n a l l y , because t h e a u t h o r i s u n a v a i l a b l e , readers must have s t r a t e g i e s f o r r e c o g n i z i n g and overcoming comprehension d i f f i c u l t i e s on t h e i r own.

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Thus, i n c o n t r a s t t o t h e speaker and l i s t e n e r , t h e w r i t e r and reader o n l y have words t o work w i t h , and t h i s r e q u i r e s t h a t c e r t a i n adjustments be made by each. The w r i t e r must be much more thorough and p r e c i s e t h a n would be necessary i n conv e r s a t i o n . She o r he must c o n s t a n t l y bear i n mind t h a t i f t h e reader i s m i s s i n g o r o t h e r w i s e f a i l s t o c o n s i d e r whatever i n f o r m a t i o n i s r e l e v a n t t o t h e message, i t s i n t e n d e d meaning may be l o s t . Given t h e l a c k o f e x t r a - l i n g u i s t i c s u p p o r t and t h e f a c t t h a t t h e w r i t e r can presume v e r y l i t t l e about t h e knowledge o f t h e reader, he o r she must e x p l i c i t l y d e s c r i b e many d e t a i l s t h a t would p r o b a b l y be taken f o r g r a n t e d i n a f a c e - t o - f a c e i n t e r a c t i o n . B u t as t h e number o f e x p l i c i t l y i n t r o d u c e d concepts increases, so t o o must t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f keeping them s t r a i g h t . Thus, t h e w r i t e r must t a k e p a i n s t o communicate t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s among d e t a i l s and t h e i r r e l a t i v e importance t o t h e o v e r a l l theme. I n w r i t t e n t e x t , t h e o n l y means o f so doing c o n s i s t s i n being m e t i c u l o u s l y r e s o u r c e f u l i n t h e use o f syntax and o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l conventions and d e v i c e s . I n s h o r t , t h e m o t i v e f o r each o f t h e w r i t e r ' s adjustments i s one of t r y i n g t o ensure t h a t t h e i n t e n d e d conceptual s t r u c t u r e o f t h e message w i l l be understood by t h e r e a d e r . However, t h e consequence o f each must be one o f i n c r e a s i n g t h e l i n g u i s t i c c o m p l e x i t y o f t h e message. Thus, i n t u r n i n g f r o m t h e t y p i c a l o r a l s i t u a t i o n t o f o r m a l w r i t t e n t e x t , t h e c h i l d w i l l be f a c e d w i t h a t a s k t h a t i s n o t j u s t q u a n t i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t i n terms o f t h e conceptual p r o c e s s i n g r e q u i r e d . I t w i l l , i n a d d i t i o n , be b o t h q u a n t i t a t i v e l y and q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t i n terms o f t h e s y n t a c t i c and s t r u c t u r a l p r o c e s s i n g r e q u i r e d . Formal w r i t t e n t e x t w i l l p r e s e n t s y n t a c t i c s t r u c t u r e s and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l d e v i c e s t h a t r a r e l y , i f e v e r , occur i n c o n v e r s a t i o n a l language. Moreover, i t w i l l do so e x a c t l y as i t removes t h e s u p e r f i c i a l means by which such s t r u c t u r e s a r e cued i n spoken language: w i t h o u t t h e a i d o f prosodics, t h e r e a d e r i s l e f t t o c o n s t r u c t r a t h e r than r e c e i v e even those s t r u c t u r e s t h a t would have been f a m i l i a r . Diagnosing i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s . The d e s c r i p t i v e f l e x i b i l i t y o f schema-theory d e r i v e s p r i m a r i l y f r o m i t s assumptions t h a t : ( 1 ) p r o c e s s i n g i s i n t e r a c t i v e - - i t proceeds from b o t h top-down and bottom-up across t h e v a r i o u s l e v e l s w i t h i n t h e system, and ( 2 ) t h a t a c t i v e a t t e n t i o n i s l i m i t e d . Because o f these two assumpt i o n s , schema-theory i s a b l e t o accommodate a v a r i e t y o f e m p i r i c a l f i n d i n g s t h a t c o u l d o n l y d e f y e x p l a n a t i o n by i t s t h e o r e t i c a l predecessors. While we applaud t h i s d e s c r i p t i v e advantage, we must a l s o contend w i t h t h e problems i t i n t r o d u c e s t o researchers i n t e r e s t e d i n d i a g n o s i n g t h e l o c u s and n a t u r e o f r e a d i n g d i f f i cul t i e s . To i l l u s t r a t e , l e t us c o n s i d e r some o f t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n v o l v e d i n p i n p o i n t i n g problems a t t h e l e v e l o f word r e c o g n i t i o n . One m i g h t t h i n k t h a t t h e f a c t t h a t word r e c o g n i t i o n l i e s a t t h e bottommost l e v e l o f t h e r e a d i n g complex ought t o be an advantage f o r purposes o f assessment. A f t e r a l l , a c h i l d ' s competence w i t h syntax o r semantics cannot be measured w i t h o u t d e v i s i n g means o f d i s m i s s i n g any confounding e f f e c t s o f r e q u i s i t e l o w e r l e v e l processes, such as word r e c o g n i t i o n . I n c o n t r a s t , one can assess c h i l d r e n ' s a b i l i t y t o r e a d l i s t s o f words o r pseudowords w i t h o u t w o r r y i n g about h i g h e r l e v e l processes. From t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f schema t h e o r y , t h e p i t f a l l i n t h i s approach d e r i v e s f r o m t h e assumption t h a t a t t e n t i o n i s f i n i t e and m o t i l e . By d i r e c t i n g a l l o f h i s o r h e r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e t a s k o f r e a d i n g i n d i v i d u a l words, a c h i l d w i t h m a r g i n a l word r e c o g n i t i o n s k i l l s m i g h t w e l l be a b l e t o g e t through a t e s t l i s t q u i c k l y and a c c u r a t e l y . There may be no s i g n s o f d i f f i c u l t y . However, t h e same problems t h a t t h e c h i l d was so s u c c e s s f u l l y a b l e t o overcome i n t h e l i s t - r e a d i n g t a s k may cause c o n s i d e r a b l e d i f f i c u l t y when she o r he t u r n s t o c o h e r e n t t e x t . To t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e c h i l d now t r i e s t o overcome word l e v e l d i f f i c u l t i e s by d e v o t i n g e x t r a a t t e n t i o n t o them, h e r o r h i s c a p a c i t y f o r comprehending w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y be reduced. To t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e c h i l d a l t e r n a t i v e l y o p t s t o s k i p o v e r t r o u b l e some words, t h e i n f o r m a t i o n she o r he w i l l e x t r a c t from t h e t e x t w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y be impoverished.

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A l t h o u g h d i f f i c u l t i e s may become more a p p a r e n t when c h i l d r e n a r e asked t o r e a d c o h e r e n t t e x t , t h e t a s k o f i d e n t i f y i n g t h e i r source becomes more c o m p l i c a t e d . As an example, c o n s i d e r t h e i n t e r p l a y between l e x i c a l and s y n t a c t i c p r o c e s s i n g . I f an u n s t r u c t u r e d s t r i n g o f words were p r e s e n t e d t o an i n d i v i d u a l a t t h e r a t e o f normal r e a d i n g , he would p r o b a b l y l o s e t r a c k a f t e r f o u r o r f i v e words: h i s a c t i v e memory c a p a c i t y would be exceeded ( M i l l e r , 1956). J a r v e l l a (1971) and Kleiman (1975) have t h e o r i z e d t h a t when r e a d i n g o r l i s t e n i n g t o connected d i s c o u r s e , people g e t around t h i s problem by r e c o d i n g t h e i n f o r m a t i o n , o r c o l l a p s i n g i t i n t o composite meaning complexes, a t s y n t a c t i c b o u n d a r i e s . I f t h i s t h e o r y i s c o r r e c t , t h e n i t underscores t h e importance o f c o r r e c t l y i s o l a t i n g s y n t a c t i c c o n s t i t u e n t s d u r i n g i n p u t . I f t h e l i s t e n e r o r r e a d e r recodes a f t e r each i n d i v i d u a l word, t h e n he w i l l miss t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s and, consequently, t h e meaning o f t h e sentence as a whole. I f he does n o t segment t h e sentence a t a l l , t h e n he i s l i a b l e t o o v e r l o a d h i s a c t i v e memory. As a r e s u l t , some o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n w i l l be l o s t , and comprehension w i l l s u f f e r . I f he i n c o r r e c t l y analyzes t h e sentence, t h e n t h e recoded meaning complexes w i l l m i s r e p r e s e n t t h e t e x t and may even be a noma 1ou s . W i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e l i s t e n e r , such concerns a r e more o r l e s s academic. A f t e r a l l , as d i s c u s s e d i n t h e p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n o f t h i s paper, t h e a p p r o p r i a t e p o i n t s f o r r e c o d i n g a r e e f f e c t i v e l y g i v e n t o t h e l i s t e n e r by t h e t o n a l and temporal c o n t o u r s o f t h e s p e a k e r ' s v o i c e . However, e x c e p t i n g p u n c t u a t i o n , t h e r e a d e r e n j o y s no such s u p e r f i c i a l guidance. The p o i n t s a t w h i c h t h e r e a d e r recodes must depend p r i m a r i l y on h i s own s y n t a c t i c competence, h i s a v a i l a b l e p r o c e s s i n g c a p a c i t y , and h i s Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , a number awareness and management o f h i s p r o c e s s i n g c a p a c i t y . o f s t u d i e s have shown t h a t good r e a d e r s a r e more r e s p o n s i v e t o s y n t a c t i c cues t h a n poor r e a d e r s (e.g., Cohen & Freeman, 1979; Cromer, 1970; L e v i n & Kaplan, 1970). The q u e s t i o n which a r i s e s i s , o f course, t o what e x t e n t do such f i n d i n g s r e f l e c t d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e c h i l d r e n ' s s y n t a c t i c competence as opposed t o d i f f e r e n c e s i n c a p a c i t y i n v e s t e d i n p r o c e s s i n g i n d i v i d u a l words. As one c o n s i d e r s more and more dimensions o f t h e t e x t , t h e s e s o r t s o f a m b i g u i t i e s o n l y m u l t i p l y . Again, l e t us i l l u s t r a t e by way o f an example. To examine c h i l d r e n ' s s e n s i t i v i t y t o c o n t e x t u a l cues, P e r f e t t i and Roth (1981) asked good and p o o r r e a d e r s t o complete sentences such as "John wanted some f r u i t , so he l o o k e d i n t h e r e f r i g e r a t o r and found a . " The performance o f t h e poor readers d i f f e r e d f r o m t h a t o f t h e good r e a d e r s , f i r s t , i n t h a t t h e y succeeded i n naming fewer i t e m s w i t h which t h e sentence m i g h t be completed and, second, i n t h a t t h e y tended t o suggest i t e m s such as cake and p i z z a - - i t e m s t h a t were n o t f r u i t s a t a l l . Taken t o g e t h e r , these r e s u l t s suggest t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n c e between good and poor r e a d e r s may have d e r i v e d f r o m t h e r e l a t i v e degree o f e l a b o r a t i o n o f t h e s u p p o r t i n g semantic s t r u c t u r e s . However, t h e tendency f o r poor r e a d e r s t o l o s e t h e c o n s t r a i n i n g i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e f i r s t c l a u s e o f t h e sentence c o u l d a l t e r n a t i v e l y be a t t r i b u t e d t o s y n t a c t i c o r word r e c o g n i t i o n d i f f i c u l t i e s . Indeed, i t i s p l a u s i b l e t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n c e between good and p o o r r e a d e r s was t h e combined e f f e c t o f a l l three factors. ~

Perhaps t h e o n l y way around such problems o f i d e n t i f y i n g d e f i c i t s f r o m r e a d i n g performance i s t o f o r m u l a t e and t e s t s p e c i f i c hypotheses as t o what t h e d e f i c i t s m i g h t be. T h i s procedure i s a l s o c o m p l i c a t e d f r o m a schema-theoretic p e r s p e c t i v e , b u t t h i s t i m e t h e m a j o r troublemaker i s t h e i n t e r a c t i v e processes assumption. As an example, c o n s i d e r t h e h y p o t h e s i s t h a t t h e word r e c o g n i t i o n performance o f good r e a d e r s o u g h t t o be more s e n s i t i v e t h a n t h a t o f p o o r r e a d e r s t o h i g h e r o r d e r c o n t e x t u a l cues. T h i s h y p o t h e s i s l a y a t t h e c o r e o f top-down t h e o r i e s o f r e a d i n g comprehension. I t a l s o f o l l o w s f r o m a s c h e m a - t h e o r e t i c approach. I n p a r t i c u l a r , c o n t e x t u a l c l u e s d e r i v e f r o m t h e s t r u c t u r a l and semantic i n t e r r e l a t i o n s f r o m w h i c h t h e t e x t i s c o n s t r u c t e d and, w i t h i n schema t h e o r y , t h e r e a d e r ' s knowledge w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e s e dimensions i s p o s i t e d as a m a j o r source o f i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s . Thus, because t h e i r r e l e v a n t knowledge i s l i k e l y t o be more e l a b o r a t e and more

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f i r m l y i n g r a i n e d and because t h e y a r e expected t o have more a v a i l a b l e p r o c e s s i n g c a p a c i t y f o r accessing t h a t knowledge, good readers a r e expected t o make b e t t e r use o f c o n t e x t u a l cues t h a n a r e poor r e a d e r s .

On t h e o t h e r hand, by f o r c e o f i t s i n t e r a c t i v e processes assumption, schema t h e o r y a l s o promotes t h e o p p o s i t e h y p o t h e s i s . Given t h a t so many poor readers a r e a l s o poor decoders, one m i g h t expect them, as a group, t o p r o f i t more t h a n good readers from c o n t e x t . Context, a f t e r a l l , p r o v i d e s an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r poor readers t o circumvent decoding d i f f i c u l t i e s . Poor r e a d e r s can use t h e h i g h e r o r d e r dimensions o f a t e x t t o complement t h a t which t h e y a r e a b l e t o encode o n l y w i t h d i f f i c u l t y o r u n c e r t a i n t y from t h e v i s u a l dimensions. I n c o n t r a s t , t h e performance o f good readers may be s u f f i c i e n t l y f a c i l e w i t h o u t c o n t e x t t h a t t h e r e i s l i t t l e room f o r measurable improvement. I n s h o r t , from schema t h e o r y we can generate t h r e e c l e a r p r e d i c t i o n s about t h e way i n which c o n t e x t u a l f a c i l i t a t i o n s h o u l d v a r y w i t h r e a d i n g a b i l i t y : ( 1 ) t h e performance o f good readers should improve more w i t h c o n t e x t t h a n t h a t o f poor readers; ( 2 ) t h e performance o f poor readers should improve more w i t h c o n t e x t t h a n t h a t o f good readers; and ( 3 ) on average o r under t h e a p p r o p r i a t e e x p e r i mental c o n d i t i o n s , t h e r e l a t i v e improvement o f good and poor readers w i t h c o n t e x t may be i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . Moreover, a q u i c k scan o f t h e l i t e r a t u r e t u r n s up s u p p o r t f o r a l l t h r e e o f these p r e d i c t i o n s . Yet, i t i s h a r d l y s a t i s f y i n g t o be a b l e t o p r e d i c t and c o n f i r m a m b i g u i t y . The p o i n t o f these examples i s , again, t h a t t h e v e r y assumptions t h a t make i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s e a s i e r t o " e x p l a i n " w i t h i n schema t h e o r y , make them l e s s amenable t o experimental v e r i f i c a t i o n . While t h e i n t e r a c t i v e processes assumpt i o n s o f t h e t h e o r y make i t d i f f i c u l t t o f o r m u l a t e d i s t i n c t e x p e r i m e n t a l p r e d i c t i o n s , t h e a t t e n t i o n a l assumptions make i t d i f f i c u l t t o a s s i g n d e f i n i t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s t o experimental r e s u l t s . SUMMARY I t m i g h t be argued t h a t schema t h e o r y i s g e n e r a l l y l a c k i n g i n t h e way o f a e s t h e t i c s . Beyond t h e concerns o u t l i n e d above, we d o u b t t h a t one c o u l d p r o v e t h e t h e o r y f a l s e , even i f i t were. On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e general s t r u c t u r e and assumptions o f t h e t h e o r y a r e n o t r e a l l y a t i s s u e : t h e y have evolved f r o m s i m p l e r t h e o r i e s on e i t h e r s i d e . What i s a t i s s u e i s t h e f i n e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e t h e o r y , and i n t h i s v e i n t h e message o f t h i s paper i s t h a t c a u t i o n i s i n o r d e r . The t h e o r y ' s assumptions about t h e knowledge base on which r e a d i n g depends, explode t h e sources o f v a r i a t i o n t h a t t h e r e s e a r c h e r must c o n s i d e r i n e x p l o r i n g any p a r t i c u l a r h y p o t h e s i s . A t t h e same t i m e , t h e t h e o r y ' s p r o c e s s i n g assumptions w i l l render i t e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t t o s o r t these p o s s i b i l i t i e s out.

FOOTNOTE 1.

T h i s work was supported by t h e N a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e o f Education under C o n t r a c t No. US-NIE-C-400-76-0116. The a u t h o r would l i k e t o thank Florence Maurer f o r h e r h e l p i n i t s p r e p a r a t i o n .

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[691 Simon, H. A., How b i g i s a chunk? Science 183 (1974) 482-488. C701 Smiley, S. S., Oakley, D. D., Worthen, D., Campione, J. C., and Brown, A. L., R e c a l l o f t h e m a t i c a l l y r e l e v a n t m a t e r i a l by adolescent good and poor readers as a f u n c t i o n o f w r i t t e n versus o r a l p r e s e n t a t i o n , J o u r n a l o f E d u c a t i o n a l Psychology 69 (1977) 381-387. Smith, F., Understanding Reading ( H o l t , R i n e h a r t & Winston, New York, 1971). Smith, F., P s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c s and Reading ( H o l t , R i n e h a r t & Winston, New York, 1973). C731 Smith, F., The r o l e o f p r e d i c t i o n i n reading, Elementary E n g l i s h 52 (1975) 305-31 1. C741 Spoehr, K. T., Word r e c o g n i t i o n i n speech and r e a d i n g : Toward a s i n g l e t h e o r y o f language processing, i n : Eimas, P. D. and M i l l e r , J. L. ( e d s . ) , P e r s p e c t i v e s on t h e Study o f Speech (Lawrence E r l baum Associates , H i l l s d a l e , N. J . , 1980). C751 Stanovich, K. E., Toward an i n t e r a c t i v e - c o m p e n s a t o r y model o f i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e development o f r e a d i n g f l u e n c y , Reading Research Q u a r t e r l y 16 (1980) 32-71. C761 Stanovich, K. E. and West, R. F . , Mechanisms o f sentence c o n t e x t e f f e c t s i n r e a d i n g : Automatic a c t i v a t i o n and conscious a t t e n t i o n , Memory and C o g n i t i o n 7 (1979) 77-85. T u l v i n g , E. and Gold, C., S t i m u l u s i n f o r m a t i o n and c o n t e x t u a l i n f o r m a t i o n as determinants o f t a c h i s t o s c o p i c r e c o g n i t i o n o f words, J o u r n a l o f Experimental Psychology 66 (1963) 319-327. C781 Weber, R. M., A l i n g u i s t i c a n a l y s i s o f f i r s t - g r a d e r e a d i n g e r r o r s , Reading Research Q u a r t e r l y 5 (1970) 427-451. C791 Weinstein, P. and Rabinovitch, M. S., Sentence s t r u c t u r e and r e t e n t i o n i n good and p o o r readers, J o u r n a l o f E d u c a t i o n a l Psychology 62 (1971) 25- 30. West, R. F. and Stanovich, K. E., Automated c o n t e x t u a l f a c i l i t a t i o n i n readers o f t h r e e ages, C h i l d Development 49 (1978) 717-727. Wheeler, 0. D., Processes i n word r e c o g n i t i o n , C o g n i t i v e Psychology 1 ( 1970) 59-85. W i t t g e n s t e i n , L., P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s ( t h i r d e d i t i o n ) , t r a n s l a t e d by Anscombe, G. E. M. (MacMillan, New York, 1968). W i t t r o c k , M. C., Marks, C., and Doctorow, M., Reading as a g e n e r a t i v e process, J o u r n a l o f E d u c a t i o n a l Psychology 67 (1975) 484-489.

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RECENT RESEARCH ON STORY GRAMMARS Jean M. Mandler U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a , San Diego La J o l l a , C a l i f o r n i a U.S.A.

One o f t h e powerful r e s e a r c h t o o l s developed i n t h e l a s t decade f o r t h e s t u d y o f comprehension has been t h e use of s t o r y grammars t o a n a l y z e t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t e x t s and t o e x p l o r e t h e s t o r y schemata t h a t a r e d e r i v e d f r o m s t o r y s t r u c t u r e . F o l l o w i n g e a r l i e r work by Col by (1973) and Propp (1968), Rumel h a r t (1975) proposed a schema f o r s t o r i e s . T h i s work was l a t e r expanded b y Johnson and Mandler (1980), Mandler The success o f and Johnson ( 1 9 7 7 ) , S t e i n and Glenn (1979), and Thorndyke (1977). t h i s work, which has come t o be known as t h e story-grammar approach, s t e m s i n l a r g e p a r t from t h e c a p a b i l i t y o f a s t o r y grammar t o p a r s e s t o r i e s i n t o c o n s i s t e n t l y occ u r r i n g , m e a n i n g f u l p a r t s . T h i s t y p e o f a n a l y s i s has been a boon t o s t u d i e s o f comprehension and memory because i t a l l o w s a p r i n c i p l e d way o f comparing d i f f e r e n t s t o r i e s and d i f f e r e n t p o p u l a t i o n s . U n t i l such methods were developed few a n a l y t i c t o o l s were a v a i l a b l e . F o r example, s t o r i e s were sometimes broken down i n t o p a r t s a c c o r d i n g t o s u b j e c t s ' judgments o f p l a c e s i n a t e x t where i t would be a c c e p t a b l e t o pause. These analyses were s p e c i f i c t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l s t o r i e s b e i n g used, and so i t was d i f f i c u l t t o g e n e r a l i z e f r o m s t u d y t o s t u d y o r t o uncover r e g u l a r i t i e s i n processing across d i f f e r e n t stimulus m a t e r i a l s . When t e x t s and s u b j e c t p r o t o c o l s were a n a l y z e d by means o f a s t o r y grammar, s u r p r i s i n g r e g u l a r i t i e s i n p s y c h o l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n i n g were uncovered. F u r t h e r , t h i s work showed a c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p t o o t h e r s t u d i e s on a v a r i e t y o f t y p e s o f schemata t h a t r e g u l a t e human p r o c e s s i n g . I n t h i s paper I w i s h t o summarize some o f t h e e a r l y r e s e a r c h based on t h e story-grammar approach, and t o c l a r i f y some c o n f u s i o n s t h a t a t t e n d e d i t . I n p a r t i c u l a r , people have n o t always u n d e r s t o o d t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between a s t o r y grammar and a s t o r y schema, n o r have t h e y d i s t i n g u i s h e d c l e a r l y between a schema as e x p l i c i t knowledge and as i m p l i c i t knowledge. F i n a l l y , I w i l l d e s c r i b e some more r e c e n t work t h a t i s i m p o r t a n t f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e s e distinctions . F i r s t , i t should be n o t e d t h a t a s t o r y gramnar and a s t o r y schema a r e n o t t h e same t h i n g . A s t o r y grammar i s a f o r m a l r u l e system used t o d e s c r i b e r e g u l a r i t i e s i n t h e s t r u c t u r e o f s t o r i e s . A s t o r y schema i s a k i n d o f mental s t r u c t u r e and p r o c e s s i n g mechanism. The two concepts a r e r e l a t e d , however, because one o f t h e t e n e t s o f schema t h e o r y i s t h a t schemata c o n s i s t o f e x p e c t a t i o n s b u i l t up from exp e r i e n c i n g r e g u l a r i t i e s i n t h e environment. One such r e g u l a r i t y i s t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t r a d i t i o n a l s t o r i e s , such as f o l k t a l e s , f a b l e s , and myths. I t i s assumed t h a t people i n c o r p o r a t e knowledge about t h e t y p i c a l s t r u c t u r e s o f t r a d i t i o n a l s t o r i e s t h r o u g h l i s t e n i n g t o and r e a d i n g them. The i n t e r e s t i n a s t o r y grammar l i e s i n t h e b e l i e f t h a t a c a r e f u l s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f r e g u l a r i t i e s i n s t o r i e s p r o v i d e s an i n f o r m a t i v e way t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f a s t o r y schema and how t h i s k i n d o f p r o c e s s i n g mechanism m i g h t work. A t t h e s i m p l e s t l e v e l , t h e r u l e s d e s c r i b i n g t h e r e g u l a r i t i e s i n t e x t s can be assumed t o be r e f l e c t e d i n t h e s t o r y schema. However, a l i t e r a l t r a n s l a t i o n o f those r u l e s i n t o t h e l i s t e n e r ' s mental s t r u c t u r e s i s n e i t h e r necessary n o r i s i t assumed. One of t h e c r i t i c i s m s o f s t o r y grammar work has been t h a t because i t uses a s e t o f formalisms t a k e n from l i n g u i s t i c s i t i m p l i e s o r r e q u i r e s a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d of l i n g u i s t i c p r o c e s s i n g . When t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between a s t o r y gramnar and a s t o r y

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schema i s emphasized such a notion can be e a s i l y r e f u t e d , I t i s not necessary t o assume a d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p between psychology a n d l i n g u i s t i c s in order t o account f o r t h e e f f e c t s of s t o r y s t r u c t u r e on processing. A grammar i s merely a p a r t i c u h r type of r u l e system w i t h many a t t r a c t i v e f e a t u r e s as a notational system and a l o n g h i s t o r y of productive use. By i t s e l f , t h e choice of r e w r i t e r u l e s o r o t h e r notat i o n a l system does not imply any p a r t i c u l a r kind of processing mechanism. For example, i n Johnson a n d Mandler (1980) we proposed a small s e t of transformat i o n a l r u l e s t o d e s c r i b e the conditions under which c e r t a i n s t o r y c o n s t i t u e n t s a r e deleted or moved. We believe t h a t these r u l e s have some claim t o observational adequacy, a s measured by an examination of t r a d i t i o n a l t e x t s . We a l s o believe t h a t they have some claim t o d e s c r i p t i v e adequacy in t h a t v i o l a t i o n of these r u l e s i n s t o r y - t e l l i n g d i s r u p t s story-processing. This point i s discussed f u r t h e r below. Here I want only t o note t h a t t h e choice of a transformational r u l e system t o desc r i b e well-formed s t o r i e s does not imply t h a t people understand s t r u c t u r a l v a r i a t i o n merely by invoking t h e r u l e s of transformations. People a r e s e n s i t i v e t o transformations of canonical form and processing slows down when such transformat i o n s occur. However, the time t h a t i s taken i n t h i s kind of processing does not r e f l e c t time t o run through a transformational cycle o r t h e l i k e ; r a t h e r , i t ref l e c t s t h e need t o make appropriate inferences t o bridge t h e gaps formed when something i s deleted or moved. T h u s , a s t o r y grammar i s a r u l e system which s p e c i f i e s canonical sequences of u n i t s in s t o r i e s and t h e conditions under which they can be deleted o r moved. A s t o r y schema i s a mechanism which has incorporated some o r a l l of these r e g u l a r i t i e s and makes use of them during processing. I t i s a t t h i s p o i n t t h a t the true psychological study begins. We must i n v e s t i g a t e those r e g u l a r i t i e s and discover which of them have been incorporated a n d used by t h e l i s t e n e r . I t i s not obvious t h a t the r e g u l a r i t i e s t h a t occur in s t o r i e s w i l l be incorporated. Indeed, research with young children i n d i c a t e s t h a t although simple s t o r y schemata develop e a r l y , only gradually a r e t h e forms of complex s t o r i e s discovered ( e . g . , Botvin & Sutton-Smith, 1977; Stein & Glenn, in p r e s s ) .

The i n i t i a l step in the e x p l i c a t i o n of a s t o r y schema was t o specify i t s u n i t s . The advantage of s t o r i e s from the oral t r a d i t i o n , t h a t i s , f o l k t a l e s and f a b l e s , i s t h a t they have a r e l a t i v e l y small number of s u r f a c e formats (as opposed t o the modern s h o r t s t o r y o r novel), T h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c made t h e i r underlying s t r u c t u r e s amenable t o a n a l y s i s , and thus offered a guide t o t h e kind of s t r u c t u r a l knowledge t h a t can be e x t r a c t e d t o form a schema. I n f a c t , only when such r e g u l a r i t i e s occur i s i t possible t o form a s t o r y schema a t a l l . I f t h e r e a r e no obvious r e g u l a r i t i e s , o r i f they a r e extremely complex, a s i n many modern l i t e r a r y genres, people a r e unl i k e l y t o be able t o form t h e kind of schema we have been studying. (Sometimes u n i v e r s i t y courses a r e devoted t o uncovering complex s t r u c t u r a l forms). Hence, t h e story-grammar approach cannot be the high road t o understanding a l l of t e x t comprehension. People can and do understand discourse t h a t follows unfamiliar r o u t e s . However, when f a m i l i a r s t r u c t u r e i s found in t h e text i t can be shown t o be used during comprehension. The chief value of story-grammar analyses i s t h a t they provide a unique opportunity i n a t r a c t a b l e domain t o observe t h e e f f e c t s of s t r u c t u r a l knowledge on processing, The emphasis on s t r u c t u r e suggests t h a t the s p e c i f i c content of s t o r i e s has been somewhat neglected in t h e story-grammar analyses. To some e x t e n t t h i s i s t r u e . Story-grammar analyses have emphasized t h e basic s t r u c t u r e , o r p l o t o u t l i n e s , of s t o r i e s . This s p e c i f i c a t i o n of s t r u c t u r e i s not devoid of c o n t e n t , however. On the contrary, s t o r y c o n s t i t u e n t s a r e f i r m l y rooted i n c o n t e n t , a l b e i t of a somewhat a b s t r a c t nature. A s t o r y grammar expresses the rudiments of p l o t s i n terms of i d e k t i f y i n g p r o t a g o n i s t s , t h e i r goals and p l a n s , t h e i r attempts t o reach t h e i r g o a l s , and the outcomes of those attempts, I t describes how t h e s e types of u n i t a r e gathered together t o form l a r g e r s t r u c t u r e s , o r episodes, and how episodes i n turn a r e connected t o form whole s t o r i e s . T h u s , a s t o r y grammar considers s t o r i e s a t a level a t which a l l s t o r i e s can be s a i d t o have elements in common. I t has n o t , t o

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date, i n c l u d e d analyses o f p a r t i c u l a r k i n d s o f g o a l s , p l a n s , a t t e m p t s , and so forth. Before t u r n i n g t o a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e r e s e a r c h generated by t h e s t o r y grammar approach, another source o f confusion about s t o r y schemata should be mentioned. T h a t i s t h e e x t e n t t o which a s t o r y schema should be considered as a c o n s c i o u s l y access i b l e d a t a s t r u c t u r e ( e x p l i c i t knowledge), o r as a p r o c e s s i n g mechanism which may be i n a c c e s s i b l e ( i m p l i c i t knowledge). Some workers i n t h e f i e l d have a p p a r e n t l y assumed t h a t a schema must c o n s i s t o f e x p l i c i t knowledge. For example, i n a r e c e n t book r e v i e w Schank comments: Because one can w r i t e r u l e s t o d e s c r i b e what people do, i t does n o t t o l l o w t h a t people use those r u l e s . T h i s c r i t i c i s m i s o f t e n l e v e l e d a t people i n a r t i f i c i a l i n t e l l i g e n c e o u t i s a c t u a l l y more a p p r o p r i a t e when t a l k of grammars appears. S t e i n and Glenn's r e s u l t s say n o t h i n g about t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y o f s t o r y grammars. F u r t h e r , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e view t h a t what people know e x p l i c i t l y corresponds t o t h e knowledge t h e y can a p p l y i m p l i c i t l y when understanding, s t o r y grammars cannot be cons i d e r e d t o be any k i n d o f schema a t a l l (Schank, 1980, p. 815). According t o t h i s view, a schema must be e x p l i c i t knowledge. (The q u o t a t i o n a l s o e x e m p l i f i e s t h e p o i n t o f view j u s t r e j e c t e d t h a t f o r a grammar t o be u s e f u l i t must be t h e same as t h e r u l e system t h a t people use d u r i n g p r o c e s s i n g ) . I n cont r a s t t o t h i s view o f schemata, I b e l i e v e we must make a c a r e f u l d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e knowledge t h a t people can e x p l i c i t l y access and t h e knowledge t h e y i m p l i c i t l y use i n many k i n d s o f processing. These a r e two q u i t e d i s t i n c t n o t i o n s , p r o v i d i n g d i f f e r e n t avenues f o r e x p l o r i n g t h e mind. F o l l o w i n g L e v e l t (1974), we can extend t h e concepts o f t h e " p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e a l i t y " and t h e " p s y c h o l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y " o f sentence s t r u c t u r e t o s t o r y s t r u c t u r e . I n t h e s t o r y realm, p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e a l i t y r e f e r s t o t h e e x t e n t t o which people can access and express knowledge about s t o r y s t r u c t u r e . P s y c h o l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y r e f e r s t o t h e e x t e n t t o which s t o r y cons t i t u e n t s i n f l u e n c e processing, r e g a r d l e s s o f p e o p l e ' s a b i l i t y t o b r i n g such know1edge t o awareness. The d i s t i n c t i o n i s necessary i n o r d e r t o account f o r some d i s c r e p a n c i e s i n r e s u l t s between experiments which study comprehension and r e t r i e v a l and those which s t u d y judgments o f importance o f s t o r y c o n s t i t u e n t s , sumnarization, s t o r y g e n e r a t i o n , and so f o r t h . A l t h o u g h d i s c r e p a n c i e s i n t h e use o f s t o r y schema can be found i n t h e a d u l t l i t e r a t u r e on these t o p i c s , i t i s most obvious i n developmental r e s e a r c h . For example, even v e r y young c h i l d r e n have been shown t o use a s t o r y schema t o guide t h e i r r e c a l l , and f o r t h e most p a r t t h e i r r e t r i e v a l processes i n t h i s domain a r e q u a l i t a t i v e l y s i m i l a r t o those o f a d u l t s . The use o f a schema i n r e t r i e v a l seems t o be an a u t o m a t i c f u n c t i o n , o p e r a t i n g l a r g e l y o u t o f t h e r e a l m o f awareness. However, t o judge whether one u n i t o f a s t o r y i s more i m p o r t a n t t h a n ano t h e r , t o s u m a r i z e a s t o r y i n a c o n c i s e y e t i n t e l l i g i b l e way, and t o use o n e ' s knowledge o f s t o r y s t r u c t u r e t o i n v e n t a new s t o r y , a l l seem t o r e q u i r e conscious r e f l e c t i o n on and m a n i p u l a t i o n o f s t o r y s t r u c t u r e . I n these realms young c h i l d r e n ' s performance l a g s f a r behind t h a t o f a d u l t s and i s o f t e n q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t as w e l l (Brown & Smiley, 1977; Denhihre & Le Ny, 1980; Johnson, i n press; S t e i n & Glenn, i n press; Yussen, Mathews, Bus & Kane, 1980). Comprehension and r e t r i e v a l can a l s o be i n f l u e n c e d by t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f d e l i b e r a t e s t r a t e g i e s , b u t i t i s n o t r e q u i r e d f o r t h e e s s e n t i a l s o f these processes t o t a k e p l a c e . I n any case, because t h e s t r u c t u r a l knowledge i n v o l v e d i n a s t o r y schema i s f a i r l y a b s t r a c t , we can expect d i f f e r e n c e s , even among a d u l t s , i n a b i l i t y t o b r i n g t h a t knowledge t o awareness and t o use i t c o n s i s t e n t l y i n t a s k s r e q u i r i n g conscious r e f l e c t i o n . On t h e o t h e r hand, as we w i l l see below, t h e r e i s a good d e a l o f evidence t h a t t h e use o f a s t o r y schema t o c o n t r o l r e t r i e v a l i s a u n i v e r s a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f human f u n c t i o n i n g .

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A.

Recall

The early studies on story processing concentrated on r e c a l l . They were guided by some very general predictions derived from the story grammars and from intuitions a b o u t those aspects of story structure t h a t people could be expected t o have acquired from t h e i r experiences with s t o r i e s . Some of the predictions (described more fully in Mandler & Johnson, 1977) are l i s t ed here, followed in each case by references t o a few of the studies t h at have confirmed them. Many of these s t u d ies tested children as well as adults. 1. Stories in canonical form ( i . e . , containing a l l prescribed constituents in a specified sequence) will be more accurately recalled t h a n s t o r i e s in noncanonical form (Glenn, 1978; Mandler, 1978; Mandler & DeForest, 1979; Stein & G1 enn, 1977; Thorndyke, 1977).

Stories following a canonical sequence will re sult in few inversions in the sequence of r ecal l ; conversely s t o r i es told in noncanonical sequence will tend t o be recalled in canonical order. Finally, inversions of phrases or sentences within a basic constituent will occur more frequently i n recall than inversions of the basic constituents themselves (Glenn, 1978; Mandler, 1978; Mandler & DeForest, 1979; Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Stein & Nezworski, 1978; Thorndyke, 1977; Wimmer, 1980). 2.

3.

Elaborations of basic constituents will be poorly recalled (Black & Bower, 1979; Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Omanson, in press; Stein & Glenn, 1979).

Constituents which are optionally deletable from the surface structure (notably statements a b o u t goals a n d other internal responses) will be more poorly recalled t h a n constituents which must be expressed (Glenn, 1978; Haberlandt, 1980; Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Omanson, in press; Stein & Glenn, 1979; Whaley, in press; Yussen e t a l . , 1980). 4.

Additions of new material in recall (other than elaborations) will supply basic constituents missing from the surface structure, and confabulations will tend t o preserve the form of the constituent which i s being incorrectly recalled (Glenn, 1978; Mandler, 1978; Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Stein & Glenn, 1977; Whaley, in press). 5.

This brief summary does not do j u s t i c e t o the d et ails of these findings, nor t o the complexities of the predictions and t h e i r relationships t o other ways of accounting f o r the observed r es u l t s . Nevertheless, the success of a l l these predictions, which have been confirmed in a variety of s t o r i e s and populations, and the r e la ti v e absence of disconfirmatory evidence t e s t i f y t o the soundness of the general approach. Of equal i n t er es t i s a robust finding t h a t was n o t predicted by the original formulations of story-gramnar theory. I n the studies liste d above, and in a number of others as well, the overall pattern of r e c a l l , in terms of the cons t itu e n t s most likely t o appear or t o be omitted from protocols, has been highly consistent. A particularly dramatic example of t h i s consistency was found in a cross-cultural study conducted in Liberia (Mandler, Scribner, Cole & DeForest, 1980). Groups of Liberian subjects ranging in age from s i x to f i f t y , schooled and unschooled, l i t e r a t e and nonliterate, a l l produced the same patterns of recall as did American university students hearing the same storie s.

On the basis of these data we suggested t h at the kind of story schema developed from hearing s t o r i e s from the oral tradition may be a cognitive universal. Such a statement needs further evidence, o t course, b u t i t has since been supplemented by similar recall data from several divergent populations, such as dyslexic readers, learning disabled adults, language-impaired children, and lipreading deaf readers (Gaines, Mandler & Bryant, 1981; Graybeal, 1981; Weaver & Dickinson, in press; Worden, Malmgren & Gabourie, in press), These data are particularly impressive given the more typical findings in cross-cultural, developmental, and other

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comparative memory r e s e a r c h of m a j o r d i f f e r e n c e s among p o p u l a t i o n s i n t h e i r methods o f recall. The e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h i s c o n s i s t e n c y i n r e c a l l may be due o n l y i n p a r t t o t h e u s e o f a s t o r y schema t o c o n t r o l r e t r i e v a l . P a r t o f t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c p a t t e r n o f r e c a l l o f s t o r y c o n s t i t u e n t s may stem f r o m a general tendency t o o m i t statements concerni n g i n t e r n a l s t a t e s (such as emotional responses and g o a l s ) and redundant m a t e r i a l (Kareev, 1981). The i m p o r t a n t p o i n t i s t h a t t h e story-grammar analyses s p e c i f y t h a t i n t e r n a l s t a t e s and p a r t i a l l y redundant m a t e r i a l w i l l o c c u r i n s t o r i e s and f u r t h e r m o r e s p e c i f y where these k i n d s o f statements w i l l occur (e.g., i n t h e endi n g s o f episodes). Thus, a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c and s t a b l e p a t t e r n o f r e c a l l i s associat e d w i t h t h i s p a r t i c u l a r c l a s s o f m a t e r i a l s . The same p a t t e r n s a r e n o t found i n l i s t s o f unconnected i t e m s o r i n m a t e r i a l s o r g a n i z e d a c c o r d i n g t o d i f f e r e n t p r i n c i p l e s , such as c a t e g o r i z e d l i s t s , d e s c r i p t i v e passages, and so f o r t h (Mandler, 1979). T h i s i s an i m p o r t a n t accomplishment. Even a few y e a r s ago we would n o t have been a b l e t o p r e d i c t w i t h any degree o f accuracy which aspects o f s t o r i e s would o r w o u l d n o t t e n d t o be r e c a l l e d . There i s s t i l l much t o be accomplished i n t h i s area, i n particular, prediction o f the d e t a i l s o f r e c a l l a t the l e v e l o f the individual phrase o r sentence. Nevertheless, I b e l i e v e t h a t t h e broad o u t l i n e s o f s t o r y r e c a l l have been e s t a b l i s h e d . I n a few y e a r s o f r e s e a r c h we have l e a r n e d as much o r more about t h e way i n which t h e temporal-causal o r g a n i z a t i o n o f s t o r i e s determines r e c a l l as we had l e a r n e d p r e v i o u s l y about t h e way i n which a c a t e g o r i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n determines t h e r e c a l l o f l i s t s o f words.

B.

Comprehension

The s t u d y o f s t o r y r e c a l l was i m p o r t a n t because i t r e v e a l e d aspects o f a schem a t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t m i g h t n o t be apparent f r o m s t u d i e s o f comprehension. Because r e t r i e v a l takes p l a c e i n t h e absence o f t h e m a t e r i a l s t o be remembered i t must r e l y on an a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ; i n t h a t sense i t i s more purel y a top-down process t h a n comprehension. Some o f t h e many i n f e r e n c e s formed d u r i n g t h e course o f comprehension a r e l o s t . The r e p r e s e n t a t i o n used f o r r e c a l l i s n e c e s s a r i l y a s i m p l i f i e d v e r s i o n o f what was o r i g i n a l l y processed, and as we have seen, i r r e g u l a r s t o r i e s , even though comprehensible as presented, t e n d t o t a k e on a schematic f o r m i n memory. Nevertheless, i t s h o u l d be p o s s i b l e t o t r a c e t h e i n f l u e n c e o f a s t o r y schema o n t h e course o f comprehension, and r e c e n t l y a few " o n - l i n e " s t u d i e s have been c a r r i e d o u t . The f i r s t o f these were two s t u d i e s by H a b e r l a n d t and c o l l e a g u e s (Haberlandt, 1980; Haberlandt, B e r i a n & Sandson, 1981). These s t u d i e s measured t i m e t o r e a d sentences i n a s t o r y as a f u n c t i o n o f i t s e p i s o d i c s t r u c t u r e . I t was found t h a t r e a d i n g times i n episodes showed a U-shaped curve; s u b j e c t s were slower t o r e a d t h e beginn i n g and t h e e n d i n g o f a n episode t h a n t h e p o r t i o n s i n between. H a b e r l a n d t suggested t h a t an episode-boundary s t r a t e g y was a t work, a k i n t o t h e c l a u s a l - b o u n d a r y s t r a t e g y proposed f o r sentence p r o c e s s i n g . More r e c e n t l y i n o u r l a b o r a t o r y we have s t u d i e d t h e e f f e c t s o f t h e c o n s t i t u e n t s t r u c t u r e o f s t o r i e s on r e a d i n g times (and a l s o r e c a l l t i m e s ) i n more d e t a i l (Mand l e r & Goodman, i n p r e s s ) . S p e c i f i c a l l y , we hypothesized t h a t t h e same k i n d s o f e f f e c t s H a b e r l a n d t found a t t h e boundaries o f episodes s h o u l d a l s o be found f o r each o f t h e c o n s t i t u e n t s w i t h i n episodes. F i v e o f these b a s i c c o n s t i t u e n t s were t e s t e d ( d e s c r i b e d i n f u l l i n Mandler & Johnson, 1977). B r i e f l y , an episode s t a r t s w i t h a be i n n i n ( i n i t i a t i n g ) event, which arouses a complex r e a c t i o n i n t h e p r o tagonisc o n s t i t u e n t c o n s i s t s o f two p a r t s : an emotional o r c o g n i t i v e r e sponse and a g o a l ) . These c o n s t i t u e n t s a r e f o l l o w e d by an a t t e m p t t o r e a c h t h e goal, t h e outcome o f t h e a t t e m p t , and an ending, which concludes t h e episode by a statement o f one o r more c h a r a c t e r s ' r e a c t i o n s t o t h e events which have t a k e n p l a c e , o r o f t h e long-range consequences o f t h o s e events. I t was hypothesized t h a t each o f these l o c a l t o p i c u n i t s should be s u b j e c t t o a

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constituent-boundary ef f ect ; reading should be slow a t the beginning of a constitue n t, speed up as the local topic continues, then slow down again when crossing the constituent boundary and beginning the next constituent. Each sentence in the story i s closely connected t o i t s neighbors; t h at i s , the discourse i s continuous and the overall topic i s maintained. B u t as a story moves, for example, from a character's formulation of a goal to an attempt t o reach t h a t g o a l , a s h i f t in subtopic occurs. These s h i f t s are p a r t of the definition of the constituent units; i f the units are psychologically valid, there should be processing differences associated with them. To t e s t t h i s constituent-boundary hypothesis, we wrote twelve two-episode s t o r i e s . I n a l l s t o r i e s , each basic constituent contained two sentences. I n t h i s case, a zig-zag e f f e c t on reading times was expected: slower reading of the f i r s t sentence f a s te r reading of the second, followed by slower reading of the next, and so forth. Each sentence in a story had the same number of words and also the same number of l e t t e r s (plus or minus one). Introduction of new nouns, noun repetition, and word frequency were a l l approximately the same f o r b o t h lines in each constituent and the occurrence of pronouns and proper names was equalized. In addition, ratings of the relative importance of the two sentences within each unit indicated t h a t about half of the time the f i r s t sentence and half the time the second sentence was considered more important. These controls and t e s t s were conducted t o insure t h a t the s t o r i e s were not biased by nonstructural factors toward f a s t e r reading of the f i r s t o r second sentences of constituents. The s t o r i e s were presented l i n e by l i n e on a computer screen. Subjects pressed a b u t t o n as soon as they had finished each l i n e. Each story was read twice in succession. Then a study period was given, followed by a cued-recall t e s t . I n t h i s t e s t , a sentence was presented on a screen and the subject was asked t o recall the immediately following sentence as rapidly as possible. In each story half of the cues consisted of the f i r s t sentence of one of the units and half of the second sentence. Thus, when the f i r s t sentence was used as a cue the target sentence was in the same constituent; when the second sentence was the cue, the ta rge t sentence was in the following unit. I t was hypothesized t h a t the same e ffe c t as for reading times should occur; i t should be f a s t e r t o recall the second sentence of a cons t itu e n t given the f i r s t sentence as a cue t h a n t o recall a sentence whose cue i s in the previous constituent. Both the reading and recall time predictions were borne o u t . People read t h e f i r s t l in e of a constituent relatively slowly, then speeded up when reading the second line,thenslowed down again when reading the f i r s t line of the next constituent. This result was general across a l l types of constituents, w i t h one exception. I n the second outcome of the s t r u ct u r al l y most complex storie s (those in which the s e cond episode was embedded within the f i r s t ) the second line was slower t o read. Subjects may have needed time t o integrate the two episodes a t this point in the two s t o r i e s. Similar ef f ect s of constituent structure were found f o r re c a ll. People were consistently f as t er in recalling a sentence when i t s cue was in the same constituent t h a n when i t s cue was in the immediately preceding constituent. I t might be t h o u g h t t h at these reading and recall e ffe c ts were due to differences in semantic relatedness rather than t o story structure. To some extent, two sentences within a constituent must be more closely related in meaning t o each other t h a n t o sentences in other constituents i f our definitions of constituents are corr e c t . B u t t h i s coherence i s a structural factor t ha t cannot be accounted for mere ly in terms of argument repetition or semantic relatedness. To demonstrate t h i s point a control experiment was carried o u t . Subjects were given the samesentences in l i s t s ; each l i s t consisted of twenty-four pairs of sentences, b u t each paircame from a different story episode. Half of these pairs were within-constituent pairs of sentences and half were adjacent sentences which crossed a unit boundary. Each subject f i r s t read one of these l i s t s and then took a cued-recall t e s t similar t o t h a t of the previous experiment. The r es u l t of t h i s experiment was t h a t therewere no differences in reading and recall times f o r pairs of sentences t h a t were within

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a c o n s t i t u e n t compared t o p a i r s t h a t crossed a c o n s t i t u e n t boundary. Thus, t h e d i f f e r e n c e s i n r e a d i n g and r e c a l l times found i n t h e p r e v i o u s experiment were due t o t h e e f f e c t s of s t o r y s t r u c t u r e ; when t h e s t r u c t u r e was absent t h e d i f f e r e n c e s disappeared.

In another experiment i n t h i s s e r i e s , we t e s t e d t h e h y p o t h e s i s t h a t t h e r e i s a

" b e s t " sequence i n a s t o r y . The h y p o t h e s i s was o r i g i n a l l y f o r m u l a t e d and t e s t e d i n terms of r e c a l l (see S e c t i o n A ) . However, t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t a s t o r y schemaguides comprehension, p r o c e s s i n g speed should a l s o be a f f e c t e d by d e v i a t i o n s f r o m canonic a l form. T h i s i s n o t a q u e s t i o n o f c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y p e r se. I f d e v i a t i o n s i n s t o r y sequence a r e g i v e n temporal markers, r e a d e r s should be a b l e t o uncover t h e u n d e r l y i n g sequences and f o r m a c o h e r e n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Rather, i t i s a q u e s t i o n of t h e t i m e r e q u i r e d f o r comprehension t o t a k e p l a c e . The story-schema h y p o t h e s i s i s t h a t t h e r e a d e r w i l l use knowledge o f s t o r y s t r u c t u r e as an a i d toconiprehension, t h e r e f o r e , t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e s t o r y as t o l d matches t h e r e a d e r ' s schema, comprehension should t a k e p l a c e more r a p i d l y . We w r o t e s t o r i e s c o n s i s t i n g of a s i n g l e episode, each o f whose b a s i c c o n s t i t u e n t s c o n s i s t e d o f a s i n g l e sentence. Then we w r o t e f i v e v e r s i o n s o f these c a n o n i c a l s t o r i e s , i n each o f which a s i n g l e sentence was moved one sentence away f r o m i t s normal p o s i t i o n . A d i f f e r e n t c o n s t i t u e n t was moved i n each v e r s i o n . The moved c o n s t i t u e n t was g i v e n a temporal marker, such as " s i n c e " o r "because", so t h a t t h e reader c o u l d unambiguously determine t h e i n t e n d e d causal -temporal sequence. As i n t h e p r e v i o u s experiments, s u b j e c t s read one v e r s i o n o f each s t o r y , then s t u d i e d it, and f i n a l l y t o o k a c u e d - r e c a l l t e s t . I t took s i g n i f i c a n t l y l o n g e r t o r e a d a sentence when i t had been moved, and t h i s f i n d i n g was general across a l l types of cons t i t u e n t s . I n a d d i t i o n , s u b j e c t s made s i g n i f i c a n t l y more e r r o r s i n t h e r e c a l l t e s t when t h e t a r g e t was a moved sentence. The most common e r r o r under these circumstances was t o r e c a l l t h e sentence which would n o r m a l l y f o l l o w t h e t a r g e t , r a t h e r than t h e a c t u a l sentence which had o c c u r r e d . B e f o r e t u r n i n g t o s t u d i e s r e q u i r i n g s u b j e c t s t o access c o n s c i o u s l y t h e i r knowledge o f s t o r y s t r u c t u r e , I w i l l summarize some i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e r e c a l l and comprehens i o n s t u d i e s t o date. I n some ways t h e r e c a l l s t u d i e s , e s p e c i a l l y those t h a t show d i s t o r t i o n s i n r e c a l l toward c a n o n i c a l form, a r e more c r u c i a l i n s u p p o r t of t h e not i o n o f a s t o r y schema. I t seems f a i r l y obvious t h a t people a r e f l e x i b l e i n readi n g t e x t s and t h a t t h e y can f o r m u l a t e a coherent r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h o u t r e l y i n g on preformed i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e t e x t ' s s t r u c t u r e . Indeed, i n many k i n d s o f exposit o r y t e x t s , t h e amount o f s t r u c t u r a l knowledge i s p r o b a b l y q u i t e l i m i t e d . Nevert h e l e s s , when m a t e r i a l conforms t o a known s t r u c t u r e , making use o f t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n should speed p r o c e s s i n g . T h i s i s what o u r r e c e n t work on r e a d i n g t i m e s sugges t s . The d a t a by themselves do n o t t e l l us about t h e mechanisms m e d i a t i n g t h e s e e f f e c t s . I t i s n o t necessary t o assume t h a t t h e y a r e due t o pure top-down processing, a s h a s been a s c r i b e d t o story-grammar t h e o r y by some. I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , t h e t h e o r y d o e s n o t t a k e such a form, b u t r a t h e r assumes t h a t p r o c e s s i n g i n v o l v e s an i n t e r a c t i o n between p r e e x i s t i n g mental s t r u c t u r e s and t h e p a r t i c u l a r s t i m u l u s m a t e r i a l s a t hand (see Mandler & Johnson, 1980; Rumelhart, 1980). Second, a s t o r y schema does n o t need t o work on t h e b a s i s o f e x p e c t a t i o n s t h a t f o r c e incoming m a t e r i a l i n t o a p a r t i c u l a r mold. Indeed, such a mechanism c o u l d n o t work even w i t h i n story-schema theory, s i n c e t h e schema c a r r i e s no i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e degree o f e l a b o r a t i o n o f c o n s t i t u e n t s t h a t a g i v e n s t o r y w i l l express. Therefore, t h e r e would be no way t o p r e d i c t whether t h e n e x t sentence would c o n t i n u e t h e c u r r e n t c o n s t i t u e n t o r b e g i n t h e n e x t . Rather, a schema can be u s e f u l as a h y p o t h e s i s - f o r m i n g mechanism and a source o f i n f o r m a t i o n f o r making t h e i n f e r e n c e s necessary t o f o r m a c o h e r e n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (see Uyl & Oostendorp, 1980). C.

S u b j e c t i v e judgments The f i n d i n g s j u s t d e s c r i b e d on t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y o f s t o r y s t r u c t u r e

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a r e independent of t h e i r psychological r e a l i t y , t h a t i s , the e x t e n t t o which people can consciously access information about t h e s t o r y s t r u c t u r e and make judgments based on i t . As discussed e a r l i e r , conscious judgments (including those i n t u i t i o n s we a r e fond of making in our arm c h a i r s ) a r e probably not good t e s t s of s t o r y schema theory. Nevertheless, i t i s of i n t e r e s t t o see t h e e x t e n t t o which people's i n t u i t i o n s about s t o r y s t r u c t u r e match t h e s t r u c t u r e posited by the s t o r y grammars. The f i r s t study along these l i n e s was by Pollard-Gott, McClosky, and Todres (1979). They had s u b j e c t s read s t o r i e s taken from Mandler and Johnson (1977) and Glenn (1978). The s u b j e c t s ' task was t o s o r t t h e individual sentences of each s t o r y i n t o groups t h a t they thought made "coherent u n i t s " . These groupings were then submitted t o hierarchical c l u s t e r i n g analyses, and the r e s u l t i n g t r e e s t r u c t u r e s were compared t o those of the s t o r y grammars. On the whole, t h e f i t between the t r e e s t r u c t u r e s derived from t h e s u b j e c t s ' judgments and t h e story-grammar t r e e s was very good. In several instances where disagreements did occur, some uncertainty had been expressed about the parsings of t h e s t o r i e s . For one s t o r y , however, a s u b s t a n t i a l subset o f the s u b j e c t s did not group the sentences according t o t h e story-grammar sequence. The s t o r y in question c o n s i s t s of two successive episodes which a r e very s i m i l a r in s t r u c t u r e and content. Whereas most of the s u b j e c t s grouped the two episodes s e p a r a t e l y , and then subdivided each episode i n t o the story-grammar c o n s t i t u e n t s , one group of s u b j e c t s adopted a semantic s t r a t e g y in conjunction with a kind of s t r u c t u r a l s t r a t e g y . They grouped together c o n s t i t u e n t s from t h e two episodes t h a t had s i m i l a r content and served s i m i l a r f u n c t i o n s ; t h a t i s , they interleaved t h e two episodes by putting together both beginnings, both a t tempts, and so f o r t h . This finding i l l u s t r a t e s the point t h a t conscious manipulation of s t o r y knowledge i s a l e s s p r e d i c t a b l e process than i t s use in comprehension and r e t r i e v a l . I t ind i c a t e s v a r i a b i l i t y both in people's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i n s t r u c t i o n s and in t h e poss i b l e ways t o express t h e many r e l a t i o n s h i p s found i n s t o r i e s . I t i s highly unl i k e l y t h a t these s u b j e c t s did not have t h e same r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e s t o r y a s the o t h e r s ; r a t h e r , they chose t o make judgments about t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in a d i f f e r e n t way. We know from previous work t h a t people have g r e a t d i f f i c u l t y in remem bering a s t o r y t h a t i s t o l d in t h e same interleaved form a s the groups madebythese s u b j e c t s . Even when i n s t r u c t e d t o r e t e l l a s t o r y with interleaved episodes exactly a s presented, people have d i f f i c u l t y in doing so; they tend t o r e v e r t t o the canonical form of s e p a r a t e episodes (Mandler & DeForest, 1979). We have found s i m i l a r r e s u l t s t o those reported by Pollard-Gott e t a l . i n o u r l a b o r a t o r y . The meaning of "coherent u n i t " i s i n t e r p r e t e d d i f f e r e n t l y by d i f f e r e n t subj e c t s . In general, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o i n s t r u c t s u b j e c t s about s t r u c t u r a l judgments s i n c e with the exception of "paragraph" t h e r e - i s no vocabulary f o r t e x t u n i t s in t h e common language. This s i t u t a t i o n can be contrasted with t h e somewhat l a r g e r vocabulary t h a t e x i s t s f o r describing sentence s t r u c t u r e ( e . g . , c l a u s e , noun, verb, e t c . ) . Typically we f i n d t h a t about a q u a r t e r of our u n i v e r s i t y s u b j e c t s i n t e r p r e t our i n s t r u c t i o n s t o mean t h a t they should p u t together sentences t h a t have words in common - a l e x i c a l s t r a t e g y . We even had one s u b j e c t who i n t e r p r e t e d our i n s t r u c t i o n s about s t r u c t u r a l judgments t o mean t h a t he should p u t together sentences which had the same number of words!

To avoid these problems we turned t o asking s u b j e c t s t o make t h e i r judgments by drawing l i n e s between t h e sentences t h a t they think form t h e boundaries of u n i t s . This technique e f f e c t i v e l y eliminates l e x i c a l s t r a t e g i e s and f o r c e s a judgment along more s t r u c t u r a l l i n e s . I t s t i l l allows s u b j e c t s freedom t o choose t h e bound a r i e s of t h e u n i t s a s they see f i t . I n one recent study we used versions of t h e twelve s t o r i e s used in t h e reading time s t u d i e s . These s t o r i e s had been chosen t o have systematically varying s t r u c t u r e s . Four of them consisted of two temporally connected episodes. Four were ending-embedded; t h a t i s , the second episode was causally connected t o the f i r s t by having t h e ending of t h e f i r s t episode a l s o serve as the beginning of t h e second. The remaining f o u r s t o r i e s were outcomeembedded; t h a t i s , the second episode was embedded within the f i r s t , by having t h e

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outcome o f t h e f i r s t episode a l s o serve as t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e second. S u b j e c t s ' judgments were s u b m i t t e d t o h i e r a r c h i c a l c l u s t e r i n g analyses and t h e r e s u l t i n g t r e e s were compared t o t h e i d e a l story-grammar t r e e s . We found t h a t subj e c t s almost i n v a r i a b l y grouped t h e sentences from t h e b a s i c c o n s t i t u e n t s t o g e t h e r ; thus, these u n i t s appeared i n t h e i r c o r r e c t p o s i t i o n s a t t h e b o t t o m o f t h e t r e e s . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e t h r e e types of e p i s o d i c connections matched t h e story-grammar ana l y s e s . I n t h e case of t h e t e m p o r a l l y connected episodes t h e r e was a c l e a n d i v i s i o n between t h e f i r s t and second episode. I n t h e case o f t h e ending-embedded e p i sodes, s u b j e c t s a g a i n separated t h e two episodes, t y p i c a l l y p l a c i n g t h e common unit, which served as t h e e n d i n g o f t h e f i r s t episode and t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e second, w i t h t h e second episode ( t h u s p l a c i n g more w e i g h t on i t s f u n c t i o n as a b e g i n n i n g ) . I n t h e case of t h e outcome-embedded episodes, s u b j e c t s again matched t h e s t o r y grammar s t r u c t u r e , embedding t h e second episode w i t h i n t h e f i r s t one. I n a d d i t i o n , f o r a l l types o f s t o r i e s , t h e s e t t i n g c o n s t i t u e n t , i n which t h e p r o t a g o n i s t i s i n troduced, was separated from t h e two episodes, as r e q u i r e d by t h e story-grammar analyses. These judgments show a h e a l t h y a p p r e c i a t i o n o f t h e m a j o r aspects o f t h e s t o r y g r a m mar. There was one place, however, i n which t h e judgments d i d n o t match t h e grammar; t h a t was a t t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e l e v e l s o f t h e t r e e s t r u c t u r e , below t h e l e v e l o f t h e episode and above t h e l e v e l o f t h e t e r m i n a l u n i t s . The grammar s t a t e s t h a t v a r i o u s c o n s t i t u e n t s a r e grouped t o g e t h e r t o f o r m i n t e r m e d i a t e c o n s t i t u e n t s o f an episode. For example, t h e a t t e m p t and outcome form a u n i t c a l l e d a goal p a t h ; t h e goal p a t h and t h e complex r e a c t i o n form a development, and so f o r t h . These i n t e r m e d i a t e - l e v e l c o n s t i t u e n t s r a r e l y appeared i n t h e s u b j e c t i v e judgments. There c o u l d be s e v e r a l reasons f o r t h i s f a i l u r e . For one, o u r s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f t h i s l e v e l c o u l d be i n c o r r e c t . I t may be t h a t episodes have a more l i n e a r , l e s s h i e r a r c h i c a l , c h a r a c t e r than we have suggested. I t c o u l d a l s o be t h a t , as found f o r judgments o f sentence s t r u c t u r e (e.g., L e v e l t , 1974), t h e t a s k o f s e p a r a t i n g s u r face f r o m u n d e r l y i n g s t r u c t u r e i s e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t f o r most s u b j e c t s . F o r example, t h e s t o r i e s v a r i e d haphazardly i n how g e n e r a l l y t h e goal was s t a t e d . I n some cases t h e goal was expressed i n v e r y general f a s h i o n ; i n t h e s e cases t h e r e appeared a tendency t o group t h e complex r e a c t i o n (which i n c l u d e s t h e g o a l ) w i t h t h e b e g i n n i n g e v e n t , w h i c h caused i t . I n o t h e r cases t h e goal was expressed i n more det a i l e d f a s h i o n , which seemed t o a l l y i t w i t h t h e subsequent a t t e m p t . T h i s a n a l y s i s i s p o s t hoc and s i n c e we d i d n o t s y s t e m a t i c a l l y v a r y t h i s aspect o f t h e s t o r i e s i t i s s p e c u l a t i v e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t suggests t h a t s e p a r a t i n g judgments about und e r l y i n g s t r u c t u r e from t h e d e t a i l s o f c o n t e n t i n t h e s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e i s a complex task. D.

Conclusions

I have reviewed t h r e e c l a s s e s o f d a t a t h a t have been used t o s u p p o r t s t o r y grammars as an approach t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g s t o r y s t r u c t u r e and t o e x p l i c a t i n g t h e concept o f a s t o r y schema. For t h e most p a r t t h e r e s u l t s have been q u i t e support i v e . I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e r e c a l l s t u d i e s and t h e r e a d i n g and r e t r i e v a l t i m e s t u d i e s gave evidence t h a t people i n c o r p o r a t e i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e t y p i c a l s t r u c t u r e s o f t r a d i t i o n a l s t o r i e s which t h e y use d u r i n g t h e course o f p r o c e s s i n g . Thus, there i s substantial support f o r the psychological v a l i d i t y o f the s t r u c t u r e posited by story-grammar analyses. I n t e r e s t i n g l y , t h e most n e g a t i v e evidence came f r o m t h e s t u d i e s o f s u b j e c t i v e judgments about s t o r i e s , t h a t i s , from a t a s k which r e q u i r e s conscious r e f l e c t i e n on knowledge about s t o r y s t r u c t u r e . Although these d a t a a l s o supported t h e story-grammar analyses i n t h e main, some o f t h e d e t a i l s d i d n o t match t h e t h e o r y . I t may be t h a t these s t u d i e s p r o v i d e d more s e n s i t i v e t e s t s , t h u s a l l o w i n g d i s c o n f i r m i n g evidence t o s u r f a c e . However, e q u a l l y l i k e l y i s t h e c o n t e n t i o n made i n t h i s paper t h a t s t u d i e s o f e x p l i c i t knowledge and i t s m a n i p u l a t i o n n e c e s s a r i l y g i v e us impure t e s t s o f b a s i c p s y c h o l o g i c a l mechanisms. Consciousness and i t s uses a r e complex f u n c t i o n s , b e a r i n g i n d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p s t o more fundamental o p e r a t i o n s (Marcel, i n p r e s s ) . On t h e same grounds we should perhaps a l s o be c a u t i o u s about c o n c l u s i o n s drawn from s t u d i e s o f summarization,

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DO WE REALLY MEAN SCHEMATA ?

Guy DENHIERE L a b o r a t o i r e de Psychologie U n i v e r s i t e de P a r i s VIII Saint-Oenis, France

F i v e groups o f 25 c h i l d r e n - r a n g i n g from 7 t o 1 1 - y e a r o l d had t o r e c a l l a two u n l i n k e d episodes s t o r y a f t e r a f i r s t and a second r e a d i n g . The r e s u l t s which were computed t h r o u g h an aut o m a t i c h i e r a r c h i c a l a n a l y s i s l e a d us t o q u e s t i o n t h e c o g n i t i v e story-schemata h y p o t h e s i s . Research on comprehension and memorization o f t e x t s , and more s p e c i f i c a l l y n a r r a t i v e s , can be s c h e m a t i c a l l y d i v i d e d i n t o two broad c a t e g o r i e s : The f i r s t one r e f e r s t o s t o r y grammar c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n (Rumelhart, 1975 ; Mandler e t Johnson, 1977) and t h e second r e f e r s t o t h e m a c r o s t r u c t u r e framework ( K i n t s c h , 1974 ; van D i j k , 1980). Although t h e y d i f f e r i n t h e i r t h e o r e t i c a l background, t h e y b o t h assume t h a t c o g n i t i v e a c t i v i t i e s have t o reduce and condense meaningful u n i t s 'which a r e b u i l t up d u r i n g t h e t e x t p r e s e n t a t i o n ; these l a r g e meaningful u n i t s , which may correspond t o phrases, clauses o r even sentences a r e d e f i n e d as grammatical e l e ments i n t h e f i r s t case, and as m a c r o p r o p o s i t i o n s o r m a c r o f a c t s i n t h e second case. These l a r g e u n i t s a r e supposed t o p l a y a c r u c i a l r o l e i n comprehension, conservat i o n , r e t r i e v a l and ( r e - ) p r o d u c t i o n o f p r e v i o u s l y presented t e x t : t h e y would f i l l t h e s l o t s o f a s t o r y schema t h a t t h e s u b j e c t s have b u i l t . We would l i k e t o emphasize t h a t a schema i s a h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t f o r which t h e e m p i r i c a l v a l i d a t i o n can o n l y b e i n d i r e c t and which is t h e r e f o r e always q u e s t i o n a b l e . Up t o t h e p r e s e n t date, t h e p r e d i c a t i v e a n a l y s i s (Le Ny,1979) i s t h e most and maybe t h e o n l y s a t i s f y i n g i n s t r u m e n t a v a i l a b l e f o r t e x t meaning a n a l y s i s b u t p r e d i cate-argument(s) p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e s t i l l f a r a p a r t from " c o n s t i t u e n t s " o r macrop r o p o s i t i o n s . In f a c t , t r a i n e d r e s e a r c h e r s a r e i n good agreement when t h e s c o r i n g o f s u b j e c t s ' p r o t o c o l s i n t o ( m i c r o - ) p r o p o s i t i o n s i s concerned, however t h e p i c t u r e i s d i f f e r e n t when l a r g e r meaningful u n i t s a r e used (see M a r t i n s , 1982) : i n most cases m a c r o - p r o p o s i t i o n s have t o be i n f e r r e d f r o m a c t u a l l y r e c a l l e d p r o p o s i t i o n s . Furthermore, o b j e c t i o n s can a l s o be presented as regards t h e commonly used procedure which c o n s i s t s o f t a k i n g i n t o account o n l y t h o s e o f t h e r e c a l l e d p r o p o s i t i o n s which have been g i v e n by more t h a n f i f t y p e r c e n t o f s u b j e c t s i n o r d e r t o decide whether a s t o r y schema i s p r e s e n t o r n o t :

- p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e c o n s i d e r e d as d i s c r e t e u n i t s o f an amorphous s e t whereas a s t r u c t u r e i s supposed t o be e v a l u a t e d ;

-

t h e summation o f p r o p o s i t i o n s across s u b j e c t s can l e a d t o a group r e c a l l p a t t e r n which does n o t r e a l l y match any i n d i v i d u a l p r o t o c o l ;

-

o n l y one schema, o n l y one m a c r o - s t r u c t u r e can t h u s emerge.

These problems a l e enhanced by t h e r e l a t i v e l y small number o f s u b j e c t s i n v o l v e d i n such experiments

.

Developmental s t u d i e s i n t e r e s t e d i n "when" and "how" such schemata a r e c o n s t r u c t e d a r e s t i l l scarce and have n o t as y e t produced c o n v i n c i n g answers. I f we know t h a t

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s t o r y r e c a l l increases with age, t h a t i t v a r i e s a c c o r d i n g , t o the l e x i c a l knowledge of children (Ehrlich and F l o r i n , 1981), t h a t the c h i l d r e n r e c a l l frequency of c o n s t i t u e n t s ("beginning, r e a c t i o n , g o a l , attempt, i s s u e , end) does d i f f e r from the a d u l t s r e c a l l frequency (Mandler and Johnson, 1977 ; S t e i n and Glenn, 1979), t h a t t h e most frequently r e c a l l e d information belongs t o meaningful u n i t s which were judged a s t h e most important by a d u l t s (Denhiere, 1978, a ; Denhiere and Le Ny, 1980 ; Petros and Hovig, 1980), t h e r e s t i l l remain many unsolved problems. We observe t h a t the a v a i l a b i l i t y o r the use of a cognitive schema (more o r l e s s ) s i m i l a r t o t h e canonical s t r u c t u r e of s t o r y depends a t l e a s t on t h r e e f a c t o r s :

1. Kind of task

-

1.1. If 8, 9 and 10 year old children do r e c a l l t h e information judged a s the most important by o l d e r children and a d u l t s , they do not j u d g e - c o n t r a s t i v e l y with older children - t h i s same information a s important in a s o r t i n g - t a s k (Denhiere 1978, a , b ; Pecho, 1981). 1 . 2 . I t seems t h a t 4 , 6 and 6 , 4 - year old children used more frequently a s t o r y schema t o describe p i c t u r e s t e l l i n g s t o r i e s t h a n i n t h e subsequent r e c a l l of t h e same s t o r i e s (Poulsen, Kintsch, Kintsch and Premack, 1979 ; Lambinet, 1981). 2. Kind of presentation

For t h e same age groups, s t o r i e s presented in p i c t u r e form led t o b e t t e r r e c a l l than the verbal version of t h e same s t o r i e s (Langevin, 1981 ; Denhiere and Langevi n , 1982).

3. Content of s t o r i e s 3.1. The minimal macrostructure of some s t o r i e s can be considered a s r e c a l l e d by 7-year old children whereas t h e macrostructure of o t h e r s t o r i e s a r e n o t , even i f t h e i r s t r u c t u r e i s more o r l e s s s i m i l a r and t h e i r number of underlying proposit i o n s i d e n t i c a l (Denhiere, 1980, a ) . 3.2. A s i m i l a r r e s u l t was obtained w i t h 7 , and 9-year o l d children from a s t o r y composed of two unlinked episodes a f t e r e i t h e r one o r two presentations (Denhiere, 1979).

Regarding the cognitive schema hypothesis, these r e s u l t s lead t o t h e t h r e e f o l l o wing remarks :

1. Such a schema can be involved e i t h e r during comprehension, during conservation, o r even during r e t r i e v a l and production (Arnaud, Esperet, Gaonac'h and T o u r r e t t e , 1981). 2 . Such a schema cannot be d i r e c t l y ascribed t o a given s t a g e of development ( T o u r r e t t e , 1981). 3. Such a schema must include two components : t h e f i r s t one corresponding t o t h e representation of t h e canonical s t r u c t u r e of s t o r i e s , t h e second one r e f e r r i n g t o knowledge sources required t o e l i c i t t h e representation of states, a c t i o n s o r events evoked by t h e s t o r y (Denhiere,l981, a , b ) . From a methodological point of view, the developmental study of such a schema must take i n t o account numerous requirements among which : 1. several d i f f e r e n t age groups w i t h a r e l a t i v e l y high number of s u b j e c t s per groups have t o be compared, 2 . several s t o r i e s o r s t o r i e s composed of several unlinked episodes must be used,

Do We Really Mean Schemata?

22 1

3. t h e same s u b j e c t s have t o memorize d i f f e r e n t s t o r i e s , a c q u i s i t i o n and f o r g e t t i n g processes have t o be j o i n t l y s t u d i e d ,

6.

5. s c o r i n g must n o t be i d i o s y n c r a t i c and should t a k e account i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n ces. To f u l f i l these requirements, t h e r e s u l t s o b t a i n e d by 125 and 110 c h i l d r e n o f d i f f e r e n t ages i n immediate and delayed r e c a l l experiments were s u b m i t t e d t o a t y p o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s . T h i s a u t o m a t i c h i e r a r c h i c a l a n a l y s i s (see B. and M . P . Lecoutre, 1979 ; M.P. Lecoutre, 1980) m a i n l y c o n s i s t s o f e x e c u t i n g successive p a r t i t i o n s , as many as asked f o r by t h e r e s e a r c h e r , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e s i m i l a r i t y o f t h e d a t a which have been o r g a n i z e d i n t o a m a t r i x formed by s u b j e c t s , f o r one e n t r y , and by r e c a l l e d p r o p o s i t i o n s , f o r t h e o t h e r . T h i s a n a l y s i s gave two t y p o l o g i e s : one r e f e r r i n g t o s u b j e c t s , and t h e o t h e r t o r e c a l l e d p r o p o s i t i o n s . T h e r e f o r e , on t h e one hand, we a r e a b l e t o l o c a t e t h e semantic c o n t e n t correspond i n g t o t h e r e c a l l o f t h e d i f f e r e n t groups, and on t h e o t h e r hand, we a r e a b l e t o analyze t o which s t o r y s t r u c t u r e s t h e d i f f e r e n t c l a s s e s o f p r o p o s i t i o n s r e f e r . Only t h e r e s u l t s from t h e immediate r e c a l l experiment w i l l be r e p o r t e d here. I n t h i s experiment, 125 c h i l d r e n - d i v i d e d i n t o f i v e age groups o f 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 r e s p e c t i v e l y - were asked t o immediately r e c a l l a s t o r y i n two episodes about a g i a n t , named Gargantua, who was an u n l u c k y c h a r a c t e r . The two u n r e l a t e d e p i s o des, l a b e l l e d h e r e " b o a t " and "house" f o r convenience, were r e a d t w i c e t o t h e f i v e groups o f s u b j e c t s and each r e a d i n g was f o l l o w e d by a r e c a l l . T a b l e 1 p r e sents b o t h t h e n a r r a t i v e and t h e p r e d i c a t i v e a n a l y s i s o f i t s s e t t i n g and o f t h e two episodes, " b o a t " and "house", t h i s b e i n g t h e o r d e r i n which t h e y were presented t o the subjects. T a b l e 1 : T e x t and p r e d i c a t i v e a n a l y s i s o f " G i a n t " s t o r y . Once (upon a ( v e r y l o n g ) t i m e ) t h e r e was a good g i a n t named Gargantua. He was good and he l i k e d t o h e l p p o o r people. "boat" ~

One day, he was seated on a c l i f f . He soaked h i s f e e t i n t h e w a t e r t o wash them. The sun shone and he was h o t . I n h i s ( t w o ) cupped hands, he t o o k some w a t e r t o r e f r e s h h i m s e l f . A t t h e same t i m e he grasped a l s o a s a i l b o a t s a i l i n g ( n e a r b y ) . When he drank t h e masts t i c k l e d h i s t h r o a t . He t o l d h i m s e l f t h a t he had s w a l l o wed a speck o f d u s t . "

house "

~

Another day, when he walked i n t h e f o r e s t , he saw a poor o l d woman who was g a t h e r i n g (dead) firewood.He decided t o h e l p h e r . I n a moment he u p r o o t e d some o f t h e most b e a u t i f u l oaks o f t h e f o r e s t and t i e d them w i t h a rope. He t o o k t h e f a g g o t and balanced i t on h i s s h o u l d e r . The r o a d was l o n g and he was v e r y happy t o l a y h i s faggot down a g a i n s t t h e w a l l o f t h e ( o l d ) woman's house. Alas ! The house f e l l i n . The poor o l d woman had wood t o warm h e r s e l f now b u t she no l o n g e i had a house t o s h e l t e r h e r .

1. TO BE ( x l ) 2. GOOD ( x l ) 3. A LONG T I M E ( 1 ) 4. VERY ( 3 ) 5. N A M E D ' ( ~ x, i ) 6. GOOD ( x l ) 7. TO HELP ( x i , X Z ) 8. POOR ( x 2 )

1. TO WALK ( x l ) 2. IN ( 1 , x l l ) 3. TO SEE ( x l .- x12), 4. POOR ( x i 2 ) 5. TO GATHER (XU,x13) 6. (DEAD) ( x l 3 ) 7. WHEN (1, 3 ) 8. A DAY ( 7 )

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Table 1 ( c o n t i n u e d ) . 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

TO LIKE ( x l , 7) AND (6, 7 ) TO SEAT ( x l ) ON (11, x 3 ) ' ONE DAY ( 1 1 ) TO SOAK ( x l , x 4 ) PART OF ( x l , x 4 ) I n (14, x 5 ) TO WASH ( x l , x4) (FOR) (14, 17) TO SHINE ( a l ) 20. HOT ( x l ) 21. AND (19, 20) 22. TO TAKE ( x i ; ~ 5 ) 23. SOME ( x 5 ) 24. I N (22, x 6 ) 25. PART OF (x6, x l ) 26. (TWO) ( x 6 ) 27. CUPPED ( x 6 ) 28. TO REFRESH HIMSELF ( x l ) 29. (FOR) (22, 28) 30. TO SAIL ( x 7 ) 31. SAME TIME (22, 30) 32. TO GRASP ( x l , x 7 ) 33. (ALSO) ( x 5 , x 7 ) 34. TO D R I N K ( x l , x 5 ) 35. TO TICKLE ( x 8 , 3 ) 36. PART OF I x 8 , x7 37. PART OF (x9; x l 38. WHEN (34, 35) 39. TO SWALLOW ( x l , K10) 40. TO TELL HINSELF ( x l , 39)

xl X1 x2 x3 x4 x5

=

giant

= Gargantua = people

cliff = feet = water =

a1 = S o l e i l

x6 = x7 = x8 = x9 = x10=

hands sailboat masts throat speck o f d u s t

ANOTHER (8) TO HELP ( x l , x l l ) TO DECIDE ( x l , 10) TO UPROOT ( x l , x14) BEAUTIFUL 1x14) THE MOST ( i 3 ) ' SOME ( x 1 4 ) PART OF ( i 5 , 1 3 ) PART OF (x14, x l l ) IN A MOMENT ( 1 2 ) TO TIE ( x i , X i 4 j 20. WITH ( 1 9 , x15) 21. AND (12,19) ' 22. TO TAKE ( x l , x16) 23. TO BALANCE ( x l . x16) 24. ON (23, x i 7 j . 25. PART OF ( x 1 7 , x l ) 26. AND (22, 23) 27. LONG ( x 1 8 ) 28. HAPPY'(x1) 29. VERY ( x l ) 30. TO LAY DOWN ( x l , x16) 31. AGAINST (30, ' x19) 32. PART OF (x19, x20) 33. TO POSSESS (x12, x20) 34. OLD ( x 1 2 ) 35. CAUSE (28, 30) 36. RND (27, 28) 37. ALAS 38. TO FALL I r l ( ~ 2 0 ) 39. TO HAVE (x12, x20) 40. TO WARM HERSELF (X12) 41. (FOR) (39, 40) 42. NOW ( 3 9 ) 43. TO HAVE (x12, x 2 0 ) 44. NO LONGER ( 4 3 ) 45. TO S H E L T E R ' ( X ~ Z ) 46. (FOR) (43, 45) 47. BUT (39, 43)

9. 10. 11* 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

xll x12 x13 x14 x15

=

forest

= woman =

firewood

= oaks = rope

x16 x17 x18 x19 x20

faggot shoulder road wall = house

= = = =

The 250 r e c a l l p r o t o c o l s were s u b m i t t e d t o a p r e d i c a t i v e a n a l y s i s : t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s b e l o n g i n g t o t h e t e x t - b a s e f r o m b o t h s e t t i n g and episodes which were r e c a l l e d - e i t h e r l i t e r a l l y o r i n synonymic o r p a r a p h r a s t i c f o r m - were coded l whereas u n r e c a l l e d p r o p o s i t i o n s were coded 0. Such a c o d i n g a l l o w e d t h e a u t o m a t i c process i n g o f the subjects' r e c a l l s through the Hierarchical Automatical Analysis program p r e v i o u s l y mentioned z. The d i f f e r e n t i n t e r v a l s between t h e p a r t i t i o n s and t h e number o f s u b j e c t s analyzed l e d us t o c o n s i d e r t h a t f i v e c l a s s e s was an o p t i mal number f o r b o t h s u b j e c t s and p r o p o s i t i o n s . We should l i k e t o emphasize t h a t u n l i k e t h e more commonly used procedure, t h e p e r formances r e p o r t e d here a r e n o t averaged across s u b j e c t s o f each age-group and

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t h a t o u r r e s u l t s a r e n o t t o be compared t o a p r i o r i p r e d i c t i o n s ; o u r approach i s a d e s c r i p t i v e one and a l l o w s o n l y a p o s t e r i o r i c o n c l u s i o n s . From t h e two r e c a l l s o f t h e two episodes two k i n d s o f r e s u l t s a r e g i v e n r e f e r r i n g t o ( 1 ) t h e s u b j e c t s and ( 2 ) t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s : 1. S u b j e c t s 1.1. 125 s u b j e c t s ' r e c a l l s d i s t r i b u t e d o v e r 5 c l a s s e s ; 1.2. S u b j e c t s ' d i s t r i b u t i o n w i t h i n each c l a s s ; 1.3. S u b j e c t s ' d i s t r i b u t i o n w i t h i n each c l a s s f r o m t h e 2nd r e c a l l a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r classification a f t e r the 1st recall. 2. P r o p o s i t i o n s 2.1. P r o p o s i t i o n d i s t r i b u t i o n i n t o 5 c l a s s e s ; 2.2. H i e r a r c h y between these 5 c l a s s e s . A s t u d y o f s u b j e c t s ' t y p o l o g y would a l l o w us t o : 1. Observe t h e p r o g r e s s i v e b u i l d i n g o f t h e story-schema i f , on one hand, c l a s s e s can be ordered on a p r o g r e s s i v e c o m p l e x i t y s c a l e and i f , on t h e o t h e r hand, age and c o m p l e x i t y v a r i a b l e s a r e p o s i t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d ; 2. Record t h e e v o l u t i o n i n r e c a l l a f t e r a second r e a d i n g o f t h e s t o r y ; 3. A p p r e c i a t e t h e s t a b i l i t y o f t h e story-schema through t h e comparison o f c l a s s e s o b t a i n e d from t h e " b o a t " and "house" episodes. A s t u d y o f p r o p o s i t i o n s ' t y p o l o g y would - a c c o r d i n g t o t h e story-schema hypothes i s - l e a d us t o observe : 1. a c l a s s o f never ( o r seldom) r e c a l l e d p r o p o s i t i o n s ; 2. a c l a s s o f p r o p o s i t i o n s which express t h e s t o r y schema and t h r o u g h which t h e minimal semantic m a c r o s t r u c t u r e can be i d e n t i f i e d ; 3. t h r e e c l a s s e s o f p r o p o s i t i o n s which correspond t o expansions which would char a c t e r i z e t h e p r o g r e s s i v e c o m p l e x i f i c a t i o n o f t h e story-schema. I. "BOAT" EPIS@DE 1. S u b j e c t s ' t y p o l o g y

1.1. Class c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : R e c a l l e d p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e r e p r e s e n t e d on F i g u r e 1 by b l a c k d o t s j. The number o f s u b j e c t s and t h e mean number o f r e c a l l e d p r o p o s i t i o n s f o r each c l a s s a r e a l s o g i v e n . Thus t h e p a t t e r n o f performances o f o u r 125 subj e c t s f o r b o t h r e c a l l s can be grasped a t a q u i c k glimpse. 1.1.1. F i r s t r e c a l l : I t can be n o t e d t h a t t h e 5 c l a s s e s can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d n o t o n l y by t h e number b u t a l s o by t h e n a t u r e o f t h e r e c a l l e d p r o p o s i t i o n s : f o r i n s tance, s u b j e c t s w i t h i n c l a s s e s 3 e t 4 b o t h r e c a l l an average o f 16 p r o p o s i t i o n s (15,9 and 16,O r e s p e c t i v e l y ) .

c l a ~ :~ T-h i~s c l a s s has been d i v i d e d i n t o two subsets i n o r d e r t o o b t a i n a group o f 19 Ss who d i d n o t r e c a l l a n y t h i n g f r o m t h e episode a p a r t f r o m i t be about a "giantT4. The o t h e r 24 Ss r e c a l l e d a c l u s t e r o f 3 p r o p o s i t i o n s : "The g i a n t soaked hT5 f e e t i n t h e w a t e r " (14-15-16). clgii-'

: The m a j o r i t y o f t h e 19 Ss f r o m t h i s c l a s s r e c a l l e d 4 p r o p o s i t i o n s : "a s a i l b o a t t i c k l e d t h e g i a n F s t h r o a t " (35-37) " t h e g i a n t t o l d h i m s e l f t h a t he had swallowed a speck o f d u s t " (39-40).

cla_s$-!:

The r e c a l l f r o m t h e 20 % o f

t h i s group sum up t h e r e c a l l s made i n t h e

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.,a.

.h

................... ..................... ....... ........ ................. ................. ........................ .................... .................... .................. .................... ...................... ::::::":: y:': :: :::.:: ................... .............. ............... .................... ................ ........... ..... .......:. :.:::: ..... ...................... .... .................... ......................... ..................... .................... ................... ................ ................. ....................... ..................... ....................... ..................... ..................... ................... ...................... .................... .......... .................. ..:. ..................... ..................... ........................ ........................ ....................... ....................... .......................... ... ........................... ........................... ....................... ....................... ..................... ..........................

1 i; 1

1 I:. Figure 1

*.,

",.2..

: S u b j e c t s ' typology f o r t h e "boat" episode. The numbers from 1 t o 125

r e f e r t o t h e subjects ranged from 7 ( 1 t o 25) t o 11-year old (101 t o 125) and t h e numbers from 1 t o 40 r e f e r t o the propositions of the text-base ( s e e t e x t ) .

225

Do We Really Mean Schemata?

two p r e v i o u s c l a s s e s : " t h e g i a n t soaked h i s f e e t " (15-15) "a s a i l b o a t t i c k l e d t h e g i a n t ' s t h r o a t " (35-37) " t h e g i a n t t o l d h i m s e l f t h a t he had swallowed a speck o f d u s t " (39-40)

2

cla_s_s_-+ : The f o l l o w i n g 8 p r o p o s i t i o n s were r e c a l l e d by t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e 16 o f t h i s class : "one day, t h e g i a n t soaked h i s f e e t " (13-14-15) " t h e g i a n t t o o k some w a t e r i n h i s hands t o r e f r e s h h i m s e l f " (22-24-25-28-29).

C_la_is_-5_ : The r e c a l l made by t h e 27 Ss o f t h i s group can be considered as complete as 20 o f t h e 30 p r o p o s i t i o n s i n t h e e p i s o d e were r e c a l l e d by t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e c h i l d r e n and because t h e main components o f t h e c o m p l i c a t i o n a r e p r e s e n t ( " a t t h e same t i m e he grasped a s a i l b o a t s a i l i n g n e a r b y " ) . Conclusions : I f we a s s i g n t h e r e c a l l e d p r o p o s i t i o n s t o t h e main n a r r a t i v e categor i e s , t h e 5 c l a s s e s can be p l a c e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g o r d e r :

flihz-i

: recall o f the i n i t i a l situation

C'lai1-2 clahs-3 clais_-l clahs-5

: r e c a l l o f t h e r e s o l u t i o n and t h e e v a l u a t i o n

1.1.2.

: r e c a l l o f t h e i n i t i a l s i t u a t i o n , t h e r e s o l u t i o n and t h e e v a l u a t i o n : r e c a l l o f t h e i n i t i a l s i t u a t i o n and t h e main p o i n t s o f t h e c o m p l i c a t i o n : complete r e c a l l .

Second r e c a l l

cla_s_s_-l : The

23 Ss can be d i v i d e d i n t o two subgroups : t h e f i r s t one r e c a l l e d two p r o p o s i t i o n s F o m t h e i n i t i a l s i t u a t i o n (14-15), t h e second one r e c a l l e d two propositions from the r e s o l u t i o n .

Clgzs-2

: T h i s c l a s s i s s i m i l a r t o t h e c l a s s 3 f r o m t h e lSt r e c a l l . The p r o p o s i t i o n s r e c a l l e d by t h e 22 2 o f t h i s c l a s s belong t o t h e i n i t i a l s i t u a t i o n and t h e evaluation.

class-j : The 24 Ss o f t h i s c l a s s r e c a l l e d : - t h e i n i t i a l s i t z t i o n i n i t s t o t a l i t y ( 1 1 t o 16 p l u s 20) - most p r o p o s i t i o n s f r o m t h e c o m p l i c a t i o n ( " t h e g i a n t t o o k

;

some water t o r e f r e s h h i m s e l f (22-25-28-29), " a t t h e same t i m e a b o a t was s a i l i n g ( n e a r b y ) " (30-31) ; - a p a r t o f t h e r e s o l u t i o n ( " t h e boat t i c k l e d t h e g i a n t ' s t h r o a t " ( 3 5 ) ) ; - and t h e e v a l u a t i o n ( " h e t o l d h i m s e l f t h a t he had swallowed a speck o f d u s t " , (39-40).

cla$ses-4-ad-5 : W i t h i n each o f these 2 l a s t c l a s s e s ( w h i c h r e s p e c t i v e l y group 25 and 31 S s ) , t h e r e c a l l i s complete : o n l y 8 and 4 p r o p o s i t i o n s o u t o f a t o t a l o f 30 w e r e o m i t t e d by a m a j o r i t y o f s u b j e c t s . Conclusions

clg31-1 : can be considered as a combination o f c l a s s e s 1 and 2 f r o m t h e f i r s t recall ,

c l g ~ s - 2:

clazs-3

corresponds t o t h e ISt r e c a l l c l a s s 3,

: cannot be matched w i t h any c l a s s f r o m t h e lSt recall. It differentiates

from c l a s s e s 4 and 5 by a more p a r t i a l r e c a l l o f each n a r r a t i v e category, s p e c i a l l y f o r t h e c o m p l i c a t i o n ,

C j g z z g ~ - 4 - a p d - 5 : Which account f o r about h a l f o f t h e s u b j e c t s (56/125) a r e v e r y recall. s i m i l a r t o c l a s s 5 f r o m t h e lSt It can be n o t e d t h a t c i a s s 4 f r o m t h e l S t r e c a l l , c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e n o n - r e c a l l o f t h e e v a l u a t i o n , has no corresponding c l a s s f r o m t h e second r e c a l l .

226

G. D e n h i h

1 . 2 . Subjects' d i s t r i b u t i o n within c l a s s e s

1.2.1. F i r s t r e c a l l : s u b j e c t s ' d i s t r i b u t i o n within each of t h e 5 c l a s s e s i s given in t a b l e 2. Table 2 : Subjects' d i s t r i b u t i o n according t o age ( 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 and 11-year o l d )

Columns labeled 1, 2 , 3, 4 and 5 r e f e r t o t h e s u b j e c t s ' typology obtained f o r 1st and 2nd r e c a l l s of "boat" and "house" episodes ( s e e f i g u r e s 1 and 3 ) . boat 1 7

1

2 6

3 4

4 3

5 1

1

10

11 house

2

8

5

9

5

10

C_la_s_s_-l : accounts

: 33 c h i l d r e n of 7 and 8 years o u t f o r most of t h e youngest of 43. and 5 : account f o r 9 , 10, 11-year old ; only two 7-year old and two -Classes - -- - -- - 4- - 8-rear old out o f 43 a r e noticeable. Clpifef-4-and-3 : present an equal number of s u b j e c t s from t h e f i v e age groups.

1 . 2 . 2 . Second r e c a l l : A " p o l a r i s a t i o n e f f e c t " can be noted : the main t r e n d s observed a t r e c a l l 1 become more accurate a t r e c a l l 2 . The second reading of t h e t e x t leads t o a s t r o n g e r d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of the 5 age groups : a t r e c a l l 1, 7 and 8-year old s u b j e c t s were in c l a s s 1 whereas a t r e c a l l 2 , 7-year old a r e s t i l l mainly in c l a s s 1 but 8-year old children a r e equally d i s t r i b u t e d across c l a s s e s 1, 2 and 3. The same phenomena con be observed f o r t h e three o l d e r groups : a t r e c a l l 2 , 9year old children a r e d i s t r i b u t e d across c l a s s e s 3, 4 and 5 but 21 o u t 25 11-year old children f a l l mainly in c l a s s e s 4 and 5. 1.3. Correlation between r e c a l l 1 and r e c a l l 2 The d i s t r i b u t i o n of the s u b j e c t s within 5 c l a s s e s a t r e c a l l 2 according t o t h e i r

227

Do We Really Mean Schemata?

performance a t r e c a l l 1 i s presented in t a b l e 3. Table 3 : Correlation between r e c a l l 1 ( R l ) and r e c a l l 2 (R2) f o r "boat" and "house" episodes.

I

1 I

boat

1

2

4

3

5

3

3

7

4

2

5

1

7

I

house

y R2

1

2

2

8

1

1

13

2

3

12

4

2

4

6

12

12

5

3

5

3

4

5 1

1

4 5

1

2

1

16

13

1

5

Most of the Ss from c l a s s e s ( 1 - 2 ) and ( 4 - 5 ) a t r e c a l l 1 can be located within the c o r r e s p o a i n g c l a s s e s a t r e c a l l 2 ( 7 3 out 125). I n c l a s s 3 a t r e c a l l 2 2 from each of t h e 5 c l a s s e s from r e c a l l 1 can be found. 2. Proposition typology

2.1. Class hierarchy : The hierarchy of t h e 5 c l a s s e s of propositions i s presented

in f i g u r e 2. boat

I

house 1

1

4

5

4 5

i ure 2 : Class hierarchy of propositions f o r "boat" and "house" episodes ( 1 h n l e f t p a r t and 2nd r e c a l l on r i g h t p a r t of t h e f i g u r e ) .

G. Denhi&

228

2.2. Class c o n t e n t : The p r o p o s i t i o n s f o r each o f t h e f i v e c l a s s e s a r e i d e n t f i e d by t h e i r number i n t h e t e x t - b a s e (see t a b l e 1 ) . Table 4 : P r o p o s i t i o n t y p o l o g y f o r " b o a t " and "house" episodes ( l S t r e c a l l on l e f t p a r t and 2nd r e c a l l on r i g h t p a r t o f t h e t a b l e ) .

1 39-40

5

2

4

I

I

1

6-10-19-21-23-26-27-33-34-38 -4-8-11-12-17-18-20-22-24-25-28 g9-30-31-32-36

16-17-18-21-22-26-27-28-29-31-3536-37-42-45-46

2.2.1.

2

39-40 I

6-10-21-23-26-28-29-33-38 2-4-8-17-18-19-27-32-34-36

7-15-16-17-18-21-22-26-28-29-35-3637-42

First recall

C1ghi-l comprises two p r o p o s i t i o n s o f t h e e v a l u a t i o n (39-40)

Clais_-?i s

d i s t i n c t i v e i n t h a t i t c o n t a i n s v e r y few r e c a l l e d p r o p o s i t i o n s c o r r e s ponding t o c o n n e c t i v e s (10, 2 1 and 23), t o s p e c i f i c a t i o n s (23,26,27) o r t o repet i t i o n s (6,19,34).

C_ias_i-3_ contains - specifications

-

-

three kinds o f propositions : (2, 4 and 8) ; s t a t e s and a c t i o n s o f secondary importance when compared t o more i m p o r t a n t p r o p o s i t i o n s ( f o r i n s t a n c e 11, 12 and 17, 18 compared t o 14,15 ( " t h e g i a n d soaked h i s f e e t " ) which was r e c a l l e d by t h e m a j o r i t y o f Ss ; and a b l o c k o f e i g h t p r o p o s i t i o n s which belong t o t h e c o m p l i c a t i o n (22,24,25,28,29 and 30,31,32).

Ug%i-4, complementary t o c l a s s 5 as shown i n t a b l e 4, i s composed o f two p r o p o s i t i o n s o f t h e s e t t i n g (7-9) and two p r o p o s i t i o n s o f t h e i n i t i a l s i t u a t i o n (14,16).

C1.xi-5 c o n t a i n s - s e t t i n g (1,3,5),

propositions belonging t o three n a r r a t i v e categories : i n i t i a l s i t u a t i o n (13,15) and r e s o l u t i o n (35,37).

Conclusions : The most i n t e r e s t i n g - and may be t h e most s t r i k i n g - r e s u l t i s t h e f o l l o w i n g : NONE o f t h e 5 c l a s s e s o f p r o p o s i t i o n s expresses t h e MINIMAL SEMANTIC MACROSTRUCTURE o f t h e episode, n o r corresponds t o an a c c e p t a b l e summary. 2.2.2.

C1chh-s

Second r e c a l l i s i d e n t i c a l t o c l a s s 1 f r o m t h e lSt r e c a l l (39-40).

U n i 5 - i i s s i m i l a r t o c l a s s 2 from t h e ISt recall mon t o b o t h c l a s s e s .

: 7 o u t 9 p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e com-

229

Do We Really Mean Schemata?

-Class - - - - - 3- c o n t a i n s p r o p o s i t i o n s b e l o n g i n g t o c l a s s e s 3 and 4 f r o m t h e

st r e c a l l

such as : - s e t t i n g : " t h e r e was a g i a n t named Gargantua" ( 5 ) , - i n i t i a l s i t u a t i o n : " t h e g i a n t soaked ( h i s f e e t ) i n t h e w a t e r " ( 1 4 , "he was seated on a c l i f f " (11,12), he was hot - c o m p l i c a t i o n : "he t o o k some w a t e r i n h i s hand" (22,24,25).

C_ia_s_s_-l c o n t a i n s t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s o f c l a s s 5 f r o m t h e lSt r e c a l l as w e l l as propos i t i o n s (7,9,30), i n o t h e r words : "Once t h e r e was a g i a n t " (1,3) "He l i k e d t o h e l p people" (7,9) "One day" (13), "The G i a n t has f e e t " ( 1 5 ) " A b o a t was s a i l i n g nearby" ( 3 0 ) "The b o a t t i c k l e d t h e g i a n t ' s t h r o a t " (35-37). Conclusions : R e s u l t s o b t a i n e d f r o m t h e 2nd r e c a l l do n o t change t h e c o n c l u s i o n drawn a f t e r t h e lSt r e c a l l : NONE o f t h e 5 c l a s s e s o f p r o p o s i t i o n s expresses t h e MINIMAL SEMANTIC MACROSTRUCTURE o f t h e episode n o r corresponds t o an a c c e p t a b l e summary. 11. "HOUSE"

EPISODE

1. S u b j e c t s ' t y p o l o g y

1.1. Class c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : R e c a l l e d p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e r e p r e s e n t e d on f i g u r e 3 by black dots. 1.1.1. F i r s t r e c a l l

clgs_s_-l :

The 42 Ss o f t h i s c l a s s o n l y r e c a l l e d a small number o f p r o p o s i t i o n s which correspond t h e " o l d woman" (34) and t o t h e main e v e n t ( " h e r house f e l l in" ( 3 3 - 3 8 ) ) . About one t h i r d o f t h e Ss r e c a l l e d t h e main e v e n t o f t h e i n i t i a l s i t u a t i o n ("The g i a n t saw a woman who w a s g a t h e r i n g f i r e w o o d " ( 3 , 5 ) .

Clgzs_-z

: 15 p r o p o s i t i o n s were r e c a l l e d by more than h a l f o f t h e 24 "The g i a n t saw an o l d woman who was g a t h e r i n g f i r e w o o d " (3,5,34), "He h e l p h e r " ( l o ) , "he u p r o o t e d some t r e e s " ( 1 2 ) , "He l a i d h i s f a g g o t down a g a i n s t t h e woman's house" (30,32,33), "The house f e l l i n " ( 3 8 ) "The o l d woman had wood t o warm h e r s e l f " (39,40,41), "But she no l o n g e r had a house" (43,44,47).

2:

We can c o n s i d e r t h a t t h i s s e r i e s o f p r o p o s i t i o n s expresses t h e minimal semantic m a c r o s t r u c t u r e o f t h e episode i f we accept t h a t t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s which d e s c r i b e t h e t r a n s p o r t o f t h e t r e e s a r e n o t necessary.

Ss

clas_s_-s: The p r o p o s i t i o n s r e c a l l e d by t h e 10 o f t h i s c l a s s d i f f e r f r o m those o b t a i n e d i n c l a s s 2 i n two ways : - a d j o n c t i o n o f a group o f 3 p r o p o s i t i o n s ( " t h e g i a n t balanced t h e f a g g o t on h i s s h o u l d e r " (23,24,25), and - n o n - r e c a l l o f p a r t o f t h e e v a l u a t i o n (39,40,41). Clgs_s-4

: The p a t t e r n o f r e c a l l o f these 30 Ss i s s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f c l a s s 2 subjects, w i t h the d i f f e r e n c e t h a t a block o f 7 propositions, a l l belonging t o t h e i n i t i a l s i t u a t i o n , has been added (1,2,4,8,9,11,15).

G&s_s_-5

: The p a t t e r n o f r e c a l l o f t h e s e 19 i s s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f class 3 s u b j e c t s . We can n o t e t h a t : a group o f 3 p r o p o s i t i o n s (23,24,25), which i s u n r e c a l l e d by o f c l a s s e s 2 and 4, i s p r e s e n t here, and t h a t - 6 p r o p o s i t i o n s o f t h e e v a l u a t i o n (39,40,41,43,44,47) were added.

-

2

Conclusions : The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e s e 5 c l a s s e s l e a d t o t h r e e main c o n c l u -

G. Denhidre

230

"HOUSE"

Second Recall

F i r s t Recall

v. ! '*..... ' ... c *

.. ........ .... ... ....... ... ... ....... ............. ..... .......... .. ... .o

I

1. .I I*

1I

..

...... . ,, ...

jr

. .. . ......... ....... .. ... ...... ... ..... ... .... . ..... .... ..

1 1 o . . c q

. ........ ...... .. .. . .. ... ... ........... ... ...... ....... .... ... ... ... ..... . .......... ........ ......... ........... .. .. .. .. . ........... ....... .......... ........... ......... ............... ........ . .. ... . .. . . . .... . ,I

. . . U

9

..

*.*a

I.

.

.

*.,a ~

11.1

*.I0

-46

I, >.

:: I:.

*--

.:

*:

I

.............. ..........

.......... ........... ........... .............

. ........... .............

Figuro 3

: S u b j e c t s ' t y p o l o g y f o r t h e "house" episode. The numbers ( i n t h e l e f t column) f r o m 1 t o 125 r e f e r t o t h e s u b j e c t s ranged from 7 ( 1 t o 25) t o 11-year o l d ( 1 0 1 t o 125) and t h e numbers f r o m 1 t o 47 r e f e r t o t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s o f t h e t e x t - b a s e (see t e x t ) .

Do We Really Mean Schemata?

231

sions :

- A t h i r d o f t h e Ss (42/125) o n l y r e c a l l t h e main c h a r a c t e r from t h e episode ( " t h e o l d woman7 and t h e major e v e n t o f t h e r e s o l u t i o n ( " t h e house f e l l i n " ) .

- The main n a r r a t i v e c a t e g o r i e s a r e r e p r e s e n t e d by a t l e a s t one p r o p o s i t i o n within the recalls o f

from t h e f o u r o t h e r c l a s s e s .

-

There a r e s i m i l a r i t i e s between c l a s s e s 2 e t 4 on t h e one hand, and between c l a s s e s 3 and 5 on t h e o t h e r ; however t h e r e c a l l ( o r n o n - r e c a l l ) o f t h e comp l i c a t i o n - a c t i o n s t h a t i n t e r v e n e between t h e u p r o o t i n g o f t h e t r e e s and t h e i r b e i n g stood a g a i n s t t h e house d i f f e r e n c i a t e s these two groups o f c l a s s e s . A r i c h e r r e c a l l o f the i n i t i a l s i t u a t i o n d i f f e r e n c i a t e s the class 4 from the class 2 whereas a r i c h e r r e c a l l o f t h e e v a l u a t i o n d i f f e r e n c i a t e s t h e c l a s s 5 f r o m t h e c l a s s 3. 1.1.2. Second r e c a l l

Clais_-i :

The 16 Ss o f t h i s group r e c a l l e d t h e main events o f t h e c o m p l i c a t i o n (30,32,33,34) a n d T f t h e r e s o l u t i o n ( " t h e house f e l l i n " , ( 3 8 ) ) , and t h e b a s i c p o i n t s o f t h e e v a l u a t i o n (39,40,41,43,44,47).

cias_s-z :

c l a s s were " t h e woman "the giant "the giant

The f i v e p r o p o s i t i o n s r e c a l l e d by t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e 10 the following : was g a t h e r i n g f i r e w o o d " ( 3 , 5 ) , decided t o h e l p h e r " ( l O , l l ) , u p r o o t e d some t r e e s " ( 1 2 ) .

% of

this

clas2-j

: 17 p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e r e c a l l e d by a t l e a s t 9 o u t 19 Ss o f t h i s c l a s s : " t h e g i a n t saw an o l d woman who was g a t h e r i n g f i r e w o o d " (3,5,34), "he helped h e r " ( l o ) , "he uprooted t h e most b e a u t i f u l t r e e s " (12,13,14), "he t i e d t h e t r e e s w i t h a rope" ( 1 9 , 2 0 ) , " t h e woman's house f e l l down" ( 3 8 ) , " t h e woman had wood t o warm h e r s e l f " (39,40,41) " b u t she no l o n g e r had a house"

(43,44,47). A n o t i c e a b l e f a c t here i s t h a t o n l y one c h i l d ( o u t o f 1 9 ) r e c a l l e d t h e main a c t i o n o f the complication : " t h e g i a n t l a i d h i s f a g g o t down a g a i n s t t h e woman's house".

Cla_s_s_-$ : This

c l a s s i s composed o f 51 Ss f o r whom t h e mean r e c a l l was equal t o 26 p r o p o s i t i o n s . The a d d i t i o n a l p r o p o s i E o n s as compared t o t h e p r e v i o u s c l a s s

belong t o a l l n a r r a t i v e c a t e g o r i e s : i n i t i a l s i t u a t i o n ( 1 , 2 , 6 , 8 , 9 , 1 1 ) , c o m p l i c a t i o n (27,30,32), r e s o l u t i o n ( 3 7 ) and evaluation (43,46). Two p r o p o s i t i o n s (19,ZO) r e c a l l e d by t h e 2 o f c l a s s 3 were n o t r e c a l l e d here.

-

C_la_s_s_-s : The number o f p r o p o s i t i o n s r e c a l l e d by t h e 29 Ss o f t h i s c l a s s exceeds those r e c a l l e d i n t h e p r e v i o u s c l a s s by 5 , a l l o f which c a n be assigned t o t h e c o m p l i c a t i o n (19,20,23,24,25). Conclusions : Two t h i r d s o f t h e Ss (80/125) a r e c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n two c l a s s e s , a p i c t u r e which was n o t observed a t t h e lS r e c a l l . I f t h e r e c a l l o f t h e 2 o f t h e s e two c l a s s e s can be c o n s i d e r e d as complete ( a l l t h e main n a r r a t i v e c a t e g o r i e s a r e p r e s e n t ) , i t i s n o t t h e case f o r t h e o t h e r t h r e e c l a s s e s :

-

t h e i n i t i a l s i t u a t i o n was n o t r e c a l l e d by t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e s u b j e c t s o f class 1 ;

- n e i t h e r r e s o l u t i o n n o r t h e e v a l u a t i o n were p r e s e n t i n t h e r e c a l l p r o t o c o l s o f t h e 10 & o f c l a s s 2 ;

-

t h e main a c t i o n o f t h e c o m p l i c a t i o n ( " t o l a y down t h e t r e e s a g a i n s t t h e house") was n o t r e c a l l e d by t h e & o f c l a s s 3 .

1.2. Subjects' d i s t r i b u t i o n w i t h i n classes

1.2.1. F i r s t r e c a l l : n e a r l y a l l 7-year-olds a r e i n c l a s s 1 (21/25) and most o f

232

G. Denhi6re

t h e 8-year-olds i n c l a s s 2 (19/25), as i t can be seen on t a b l e 2. However, 9 (n=9) and 10 (n=12) and 11 ( n = 5 ) - y e a r - o l d c h i l d r e n a r e p r e s e n t i n c l a s s e s 1 and 2. Classes 3,4 and 5 a r e m a i n l y formed o f 9, 10 and 11, y e a r - o l d - c h i l d r e n (n=16, 13 and 20 r e s p e c t i v e l y ) . r e c a l l , t h e c l a s s e s 1 and 2 1.2.2. Second r e c a l l : As i t was observed f o r t h e lSt a r e almost e x c l u s i v e l y composed o f t h e youngest c h i l d r e n (n=12 and n=10 ( o u t o f a t o t a l o f 26) f o r 7 and 8 - y e a r - o l d s r e s p e c t i v e l y ) . C o n t r a r y t o t h e p i c t u r e observed a t t h e 1 s t r e c a l l , we n o t e t h a t t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e 7 and 8 - y e a r - o l d s u b j e c t s were t o be found i n c l a s s e s 3, 4 and 5 whereas, i n these t h r e e same classes, we f i n d r e s p e c t i v e l y 24, 22 and 25 9, 10 and 11-year-old s u b j e c t s . Conclusions : Two r e a d i n g s l e a d t o a d i v i s i o n o f t h e youngest groups o f c h i l d r e n i n t o two n e a r l y equal subgroups : i n t h e f i r s t one t h e performances a r e p o o r e r t h a n f o r t h e o l d e r groups whereas i n t h e second one t h e y do n o t d i f f e r f r o m those o f t h e i r olders. 1.3. C o r r e l a t i o n between r e c a l l 1 and r e c a l l 2. There a r e two main o b s e r v a t i o n s t o be made concerning t a b l e 3 :

-

h a l f o f t h e Ss o f c l a s s 1 (21/42) and t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e Ss o f c l a s from t h e l S t ~ e c a l l approach s u b j e c t s i n c l a s s e s 3,4 and 5 T t t h e 2n

2

2 (21/24) recall,

54/59 Ss o f c l a s s e s 4 and 5 o f t h e lSt r e c a l l a r e t o be found i n t h e same c l a s ses d 4i % 5 i n t h e 2nd r e c a l l .

2. P r o p o s i t i o n t y p o l o g y : 2.1. Class h i e r a r c h y : I t i s t o be n o t e d t h a t , i n t h e lSt r e c a l l , c l a s s e s 1 and 2 a r e t h e o p p o s i t e o f c l a s s e s 3, 4 and 5, whereas, i n t h e pnd r e c a l l , t h e dichotomy i s between t h e c l a s s e s 1,2,3 and 4,5 (see f i g u r e 2 ) . 2.2.

Class c o n t e n t :

2.2.1 F i r s t r e c a l l :

clah2-l : c o n t a i n s 7 p r o p o s i t i o n s which can - t h e i n i t i a l s i t u a t i o n : " t h e g i a n t saw an

-

be assigned t o : o l d woman who was g a t h e r i n g f i r e w o o d "

( 3 35 $34) t h e c o m p l i c a t i o n : " t h e g i a n t helped t h e woman" ( l o ) , "he uprooted t r e e s " (12), t h e r e s o l u t i o n : " t h e woman's house f e l l i n " (34-38).

We c o n s i d e r t h a t these 7 p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e INSUFFICIENT f o r e x p r e s s i n g t h e minimal semantic m a c r o s t r u c t u r e o f t h e episode.

clak2-g

: t h e 6 p r o p o s i t i o n s o f t h i s c l a s s a l l belong t o t h e e v a l u a t i o n (39,40,41,

43,44,47).

c]ghr-J : c o n t a i n s 13 p r o p o s i t i o n s which can be c l a s s i f i e d i n t o two main categories : s t a t e s (4,6,8,9), a c t i o n s : " t h e g i a n t t i e d t h e f a g g o t w i t h a rope" (19,20), " t h e g i a n t balanced t h e f a g g o t on h i s s h o u l d e r " (23,24,25), " t h e g i a n t l a i d t h e f a g g o t down a g a i n s t t h e house" (30,32).

-

glgss-$

: i s composed o f 5 p r o p o s i t i o n s : " t h e g i a n t walked i n t h e f o r e s t " (1-2) "when (x,y)" " t h e most b e a u t i f u l t r e e s " (13,14).

(7),

class-5 : t h e 16 p r o p o s i t i o n s o f t h i s c l a s s cannot be c o n s i d e r e d s e p a r a t e l y f r o m t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s t o which t h e y a r e subordinated. F o r i n s t a n c e , t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s 16,17,18 make i t c l e a r t h a t t h e u p r o o t i n g " l a s t e d no t i m e a t a l l " ( 1 8 ) and t h a t i t was o n l y q u e s t i o n o f "a few" (16) o f t h e "most b e a u t i f u l t r e e s o f t h e f o r e s t " (17). Conclusions : NONE o f t h e 5 c l a s s e s o f p r o p o s i t i o n s p e r m i t t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e

233

Do We Really Mean Schemata?

MINIMAL SEMANTIC MACROSTRUCTURE o f t h e e p i s o d e ( s e e t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e c l a s s 1 ) ; even i f we c o n s i d e r c l a s s e s 1 and 2 t o g e t h e r ( a s t h e y b o t h d i f f e r f r o m t h e t h r e e o t h e r c l a s s e s ) we do n o t o b t a i n an a c c e p t a b l e summary : one o f t h e most i m p o r t a n t p r o p o s i t i o n s o f t h e c o m p l i c a t i o n ( " t h e g i a n t l a i d t h e f a g g o t down a g a i n s t t h e house") i s absent. 2 . 2 . 2 . Second r e c a l l : The main r e s u l t concerns t h e c l a s s e s 4 and 5 :

C_la_s_s 4 :

i s formed by t h e u n i o n o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s o f t h e c l a s s e s 1 and 2 f r o m t h e lSt r e c a l l ( w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f p r o p o s i t i o n s 34 and 47) and

&lais_-? : contains

o n l y one p r o p o s i t i o n ( 4 7 ) .

Thus t h e c l a s s 4 f a i l s t o express t h e minimal semantic m a c r o s t r u c t u r e o f t h e e p i sode because t h e m a j o r a c t i o n o f t h e c o m p l i c a t i o n ( " t h e g i a n t l a i d t h e f a g g o t down a g a i n s t t h e woman's house", ( 3 0 ) ) i s a b s e n t . Conclusions : A f t e r s t u d y o f t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e c l a s s e s o f p r o p o s i t i o n s f r o m r e c a l l s 1 and 2 we a r e a b l e t o draw two main c o n c l u s i o n s :

- r e l a t i v e l y speaking, few changes a r e observed between t h e two r e c a l l s . F o r i n s tance, c l a s es 4 and 5 f r o m t h e pnd r e c a l l correspond c l o s e l y t o c l a s s e s 1 and 2 from t h e lss r e c a l l , - none o f t h e f i v e c l a s s e s p e r m i t t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e minimal semantic macros t r u c t u r e o f the episode. 111. COMPARISON BETWEEN PERFORMANCES FOR THE TWO EPISODES We w i l l b r i e f l y t r y t o answer t h e f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n : i s i t p o s s i b l e t o observe t h e same c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n t h e r e c a l l f o r b o t h episodes ? I n o t h e r words, a r e t h e r e c a l l s f o r t h e " b o a t " and "house" episodes made by t h e same s u b j e c t s u f f i c i e n t l y s i m i l a r so as t o be r e c o g n i z e d as h a v i n g been o r g a n i z e d by t h e same s t o r y schema ? The answer can be found t h r o u g h t h e a n a l y s i s o f t a b l e 5 which p r e s e n t s t h e j o i n t d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e Ss i n t o t h e 5 c l a s s e s o f r e c a l l ( r e c a l l 1 and r e c a l l 2 ) f o r " b o a t " and i n t o t h e 5 c l a s s e s f o r "house".

___ Table 5 :

S u b j e c t s ' d i s t r i b u t i o n i n t h e 5 c l a s s e s o f r e c a l l f o r " b o a t " and "house"

episodes. Second R e c a l l

F i r s t Recall

I

1

8 ~~

I

I

I

I

8 I

I

I

1. F i r s t r e c a l l : more t h a n h a l f o f t h e s u b j e c t s o f c l a s s e s 1 and 2 (23/42 and 13/ 24 r e s p e c t i v e l y ) f o r t h e episode "house" p r e v i o u s l y belonged t o c l a s s e s 1 and 2 f r o m t h e " b o a t " episode. F o r t h e o t h e r c l a s s e s , 2 a r e d i s t r i b u t e d across a l l t h e squares o f t h e t a b l e ( e x c e p t i n g one s q u a r e ) . Conclusions : o f view :

2

performances appear t o be i n c r e d i b l y f l e x i b l e f r o m a double p o i n t

234

G. Denhitke

-

on one hand, i t i s e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t t o p r e d i c t t h e r e c a l l s t r u c t u r e o f an episode when t h e r e c a l l s t r u c t u r e o f an another episode i s known,

-

on t h e o t h e r hand, i n t h e cases where a p r e d i c t i o n i s p o s s i b l e , t h e s t r u c t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e r e c a l l e d c o n t e n t s v a r y w i d e l y . F o r i n s t a n c e , t h e 23 w i t h i n c l a s s 1 f o r b o t h episodes r e c a l l e d : i n t h e "boat" episode, t h r e e p r o p o s i t i o n s from t h e i n i t i a l s i t u a t i o n and, i n t h e "house" episode, t h e most s a l i e n t e v e n t o f t h e r e s o l u t i o n and/or some propos i t i o n s o f t h e e v a l u a t i o n . The 20 o t h e r Ss o f c l a s s 1 f o r t h e "boat" episode, who were s c a t t e r e d through c l a s s e s 2 t o T f o r t h e "house" episode, had r e c a l l e d some elements o f t h e i n i t i a l s i t u a t i o n f o r t h e f i r s t episode b u t r e c a l l t h e c o r e meaning (and even more) f o r t h e second one.

Another exemple i s g i v e n by t h e 19 Ss them were c a t e g o r i z e d i n t o c l a s s e s they r e c a l l e d parts o f the r e s o l u t i o n t h e y r e c a l l e d what we have considered m a c r o s t r u c t u r e and more s t i l l .

f r o m c l a s s 2 f o r t h e " b o a t " episode, 11 o f and 5 f o r t h e "house" episode. I n one case and o f t h e e v a l u a t i o n , i n t h e o t h e r case, as t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e minimal semantic

Z4

2. Second r e c a l l : S c h e m a t i c a l l y , t h e r e i s a g r e a t e r c o r r e l a t i o n between p e r f o r mances a f t e r t h e second r e a d i n g . I t i s w o r t h n o t i n g t h a t c o r r e l a t i o n does n o t mean s t r u c t u r a l s i m i l a r i t y : thus, f o r i n s t a n c e , c l a s s 1 o f t h e "boat" episode can be c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e r e c a l l o f some p r o p o s i t i o n s f r o m t h e i n i t i a l s i t u a t i o n o r f r o m t h e e v a l u a t i o n , whereas c l a s s 1 o f t h e "house" episode corresponded t o t h e r e c a l l o f t h e r e s o l u t i o n and o f p a r t s o f t h e e v a l u a t i o n . GENERAL CONCLUSIONS The main r e s u l t s which can be drawn from t h e H i e r a r c h i c a l Automatical A n a l y s i s performed on t h e r e c a l l p r o t o c o l s a r e t h e f o l l o w i n g : 1. Typology o f s u b j e c t s

1.1. The c l a s s e s o f

o b t a i n e d do n o t match t h e d i f f e r e n t age groups.

1.2. A second r e c a l l ( f o l l o w i n g a second r e a d i n g ) l e a d s t o a b e t t e r d i s c r i m i n a t i o n between c l a s s e s o f s u b j e c t s i n r e l a t i o n w i t h age, and t h i s i s t h e case f o r b o t h e p i sodes. 1.3. Classes o f cannot be adequately d e s c r i b e d r e f e r r i n g t o a c o m p l e x i f i c a t i o n process which would o p e r a t e on an i n i t i a l " k e r n e l " . As i t has been p r e v i o u s l y noted, classes a r e c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n d i f f e r e n t ways : one b e i n g c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e r e c a l l o f p a r t s o f t h e i n i t i a l s i t u a t i o n , another c l a s s b e i n g c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e r e c a l l o f elements o f t h e r e s o l u t i o n and t h e e v a l u a t i o n , a t h i r d one by t h e c r u c i a l p a r t s o f t h e i n i t i a l s i t u a t i o n and o f t h e c o m p l i c a t i o n . 1.4. Comparison o f c l a s s e s f r o m r e c a l l 1 and r e c a l l 2 does n o t p e r m i t us t o c o n s i d e r t h a t a second r e a d i n g leads t o an e l a b o r a t i o n o f t h e p o o r e s t r e c a l l s i n t h e way suggested by t h e h i e r a r c h y o f c l a s s e s from r e c a l l 1.

1.5. Although t h e same Ss were i n v o l v e d i n t h e r e c a l l o f b o t h episodes, t h e char a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e s u b j F c t s ' c l a s s e s a r e n o t c o n s t a n t f r o m one episode t o t h e o t h e r . Thus, f o r t h e b o a t "episode" o n l y 27 Ss o f c l a s s 5 gave a complete r e c a l l which comprised p r o p o s i t i o n s f r o m t h e main n a r r a t i v e c a t e g o r i e s whereas f o r t h e "house" episode, 83 ( f r o m c l a s s e s 2 t o 5 ) met t h i s c r i t e r i a . 2. P r o p o s i t i o n t y p o l o g y

2.1. No c l a s s of p r o p o s i t i o n s was found t o express by i t s e l f t h e minimal semantic m a c r o s t r u c t u r e , o r even an a c c e p t a b l e summary,

Do We Really Mean Schemata?

235

2.2. T h i s i s t r u e f o r each episode, 2.3. A f t e r one as w e l l as two r e a d i n g s . Can we t h u s s t i l l c o n s i d e r t h e concept o f story-schema as r e l e v a n t ? I f t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f schemata a s c r i b e d by Thorndyke and Yekovich (1980) : concept a b s t r a c t i o n , h i e r a r c h i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , i n s t a n t i a t i o n , p r e d i c t i o n , and i n d u c t i o n , a r e t o be taken i n t o account, t h e n we may no l o n g e r use t h i s term. I f we accept w i t h these a u t h o r s t h a t a schema i s a " p r o t o t y p i c a l a b s t r a c t i o n o f t h e concept i t r e p r e s e n t s " (1980, p. 27), t h e m a j o r i t y o f o u r 125 c h i l d r e n d i d n o t b u i l d such an a b s t r a c t i o n . We a r e t h u s l e a d t o q u e s t i o n t h e i d e a t h a t t h e s u b j e c t s possess a s t o r y schema which can be d e s c r i b e d as a story-grammar (Johnson and Mandler, 1977 ; S t e i n and Glenn, 1979) which would s p e c i f y b o t h t h e concepts d e f i n i n g t h e schema and t h e combination r u l e s o f these concepts. Are t h e y i n f a c t capable of b u i l d i n g a s t o r y s u p e r s t r u c t u r e , as i s supposed by van D i j k (1980) ? I f we admit, as a second p r o p e r t y , t h a t schemata can be h i e r a r c h i c a l l y o r g a n i z e d i n memory, o u r r e s u l t s no l o n g e r c o n f i r m t h i s l a s t p r e d i c t i o n . No c o n s t i t u e n t h i e r a r c h i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n can be found i n o u r r e s u l t s . The t h r e e o t h e r p r o p e r t i e s o f schemata can be c o n s i d e r e d as i r r e l e v a n t here. I f we a r e t h u s l e d t o r e j e c t as inadequate t h e concept o f story-schema, by what concept would i t be s u b s t i t u t e d ? Black and Bower (1980) proposed a H i e r a r c h i c a l S t a t e T r a n s i t i o n Theory. A c c o r d i n g t o these authors : ( 1 ) " t h e b e s t remembered p a r t o f a s t o r y i s t h e c r i t i c a l p a t h t h a t p r o v i d e s t h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g s t a t e t o t h e ending s t a t e o f t h e s t o r y " ; ( 2 ) "If the s t o r y describes the c r i t i c a l path a t various l e v e l s o f d e t a i l , then t h e h i g h e r ( i . e . , t h e more g e n e r a l , l e s s d e t a i l e d ) t h e l e v e l o f a statement, t h e b e t t e r remenbered i t w i l l be" (1980, p. 238). The n o t i o n o f " r e l a t i v e importance o f semantic i n f o r m a t i o n " which p r e s e n t s some s i m i l a r i t i e s w i t h t h i s l a t t e r c o n c e p t i o n has abready been proposed by us elsewhere (Denhiere and Le Ny, 1980). R e s u l t s o b t a i n e d f r o m 8 t o 1 1 - y e a r - o l d c h i l d r e n and from a d u l t s i n judgment t a s k s o f t h e r e l a t i v e importance o f semantic i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t a i n e d i n s t o r i e s , and t h e comparison o f t h e s e r e s u l t s w i t h t h e r e c a l l o f t h e same s t o r i e s , l e d us t o assume t h a t Ss p r o g r e s s i v e l y b u i l d systems o f h i e r a r c h i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i v e importance o f i n f o r e t i o n . The r e c a l l o r g a n i z a t i o n would t h u s p a r t l y - r e l y upon t h e h i e r a r c h i z a t i o n r u l e s t h e s u b j e c t uses ; i t would a l s o r e l y upon t h e s u b j e c t ' s knowledge o f e x p l i c i t cues which p o i n t o u t t h e i m p o r t a n t i n f o r mation as w e l l as t h e s y n t a c t i c s t a t u s o f clauses (see Pynte and Denhiere, 1982) and o f course upon t h e s u b j e c t ' s c o g n i t i v e resources ( K i n t s c h and van D i j k , 1978 ; M i l l e r and K i n t s c h , 1980). But, i n any case, we had t o t a k e i n t o account r e a d e r v a r i a b l e s ( s t r u c t u r e s and processes) as w e l l as t e x t v a r i a b l e s ( s y n t a c t i c and semantic) i n o r d e r t o = l a i n t h e i n t e r a c t i o n o f these two k i n d s o f v a r i a b l e s , i . e . comprehension and memorization. Moreover, i t i s necessary t o use c e r t a i n u n i t s o f measure which would c l e a r l y demonstrate t h e d i f f e r e n c e s as w e l l as p r o c e s s i n g methods which would make allowance f o r them. Our r e s e a r c h was c a r r i e d o u t along t h e s e 1 ines . The r e s e a r c h r e p o r t e d above and t h e p r e p a r a t i o n o f t h i s a r t i c l e were supported by t h e L a b o r a t o r y o f Psychology, Research Team Associated t o t h e N a t i o n a l Center o f S c i e n t i f i c Research, no 235. A u t h o r ' s adress : L a b o r a t o i r e de Psychologie, ERA du C.N.R.S. no 235, U n i v e r s i t e de P a r i s V I I I , 2, r u e de l a L i b e r t e , 93526 Saint-Denis Cedex 2, France.

G. Denhi&e

236 NOTES

(1) M i l l e r and K i n t s c h (1980) s t u d y i s a noteworthy e x c e p t i o n . ( 2 ) We a r e i n d e b t e d t o Bruno L e c o u t r e and Luc C a r i t 6 f o r t h e i r h e l p i n t h e r e a l i z a t i o n of t h i s work.

( 3 ) We thank W i l l e m i e n V i s s e r who executed f i g u r e s 1 and 2. ( 4 ) Numbers i n c i r c l e r e f e r t o p r o p o s i t i o n s o f t h e t e x t - b a s e showed i n t a b l e 1. REFERENCES

( 1 ) Arnaud, P., Esperet, E., Gaonac'h, D., T o u r r e t t e , G., Genese de l a c o n d u i t e de r e c i t , Rapport n o 1, 1981, U n i v e r s i t e de P o i t i e r s . ( 2 ) Black, J.B., Bower, G.H., S t o r y Understanding as Problem-Solving, P o e t i c s , 1980, 9 , 223-250. ( 3 ) Denhiere, G., Comprehension e t memorisation de r e c i t s : etude genetique, Document E.R.A. 235, n o 105, U n i v e r s i t e de P a r i s V I I I , 1978, a. ( 4 ) Denhiere, G., I n f l u e n c e de l ' o r d r e de p r e s e n t a t i o n des episodes d ' u n r e c i t s u r l e u r memorisation 1 long-terme, Document E.R.A. 235, no 123, U n i v e r s i t e de P a r i s V I I I , 1978, b. ( 5 ) Denhiere, G., Comprehension e t r a p p e l d ' u n r e c i t p a r des e n f a n t s de 6 B u l l e t i n de Psychologie, 1979, X X X I I , no 341, 803-819.

a

12 ans,

( 6 ) Denhiere, G.,

N a r r a t i v e r e c a l l and r e c o g n i t i o n by c h i l d r e n , i n : C o g n i t i o n and Memory, K l i x , F., Hoffmann, S., (Eds), VEB Deutscher V e r l a g d e r Wissenschaften B e r l i n , 1980, a, 226-236.

( 7 ) Denhiere, G.,

R e l a t i v e importance o f semantic i n f o r m a t i o n i n comprehension and r e c a l l , i n : Coding and knowledge r e p r e s e n t a t i o n : Processes and S t r u c t u r e s i n human memory, K l i x , F., Hoffmann, J., and van d e r Meer, E., (Eds), B e r l i n , 1980, b. (A p a r a i t r e ) .

( 8 ) Denhiere, G., S i g n i f i e s , schCmas, s c r i p t s , e t c . e t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Communicat i o n aux journees de l a S o c i e t e F r a n c a i s e de Psychologie s u r l e s "Representat i o n s " , P o i t i e r s , Mars 1981, a.

( 9 ) Denhiere, G.,

Quelques remarques 1 propos des grannnaires de r e c i t , Expose au Groupe d ' E t u d e des Processus P e r c e p t i f s e t C o g n i t i f s , P a r i s , Mai 1981, b.

( 1 0 ) Denhiere, G.,

Le Ny, J.F., R e l a t i v e importance o f meaningful u n i t s i n comprehension and r e c a l l of n a r r a t i v e s by c h i l d r e n and a d u l t s , P o e t i c s , 1980, 9 ,

147-161. (11) Denhiere, G.,

Langevin, J., La comprehension e t l a memorisation de r e c i t s : Aspects genetiques e t c o m p a r a t i f s , i n : P s y c h o l i n g u i s t i q u e e t handicap mental ; Rondal, J.A.,Lambert, J.L.and Chipman, H.H., (Eds), Mardaga, Liege, 1Y81.

(12) van D i j k , T.A., Semantic M a c r o s t r u c t u r e s , New York, Lawrence Erlbaum, 1980. (13) E h r l i c h , S . , F l o r i n , A., Niveaux de comprehension e t p r o d u c t i o n d ' u n r e c i t p a r des e n f a n t s de 3 3 11 ans, E d i t i o n s du C.N.R.S., Bordeaux, 1981. ( 1 4 ) Jambu, M., C l a s s i f i c a t i o n automatique pour 1 ' a n a l y s e des donnees. 1. Methodes e t a l g o r i t h m e s , Ounod, P a r i s , 1978. (15) Jambu, M., Lebeaux, M.O., C l a s s i f i c a t i o n automatique pour l ' a n a l y s e des donnees. 2. L o g i c i e l s . Dunod, P a r i s , 1978. (16) Johnson, N.S., Mandler, J.M., A t a l e o f two s t r u c t u r e s : U n d e r l y i n g and surface forms i n s t o r i e s , P o e t i c s , 1980, 9 , 51-86. (17) Kintsch, W.,

The r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f meaning i n memory, H i l l s d a l e , N.J., ce Erlbaum, 1974.

Lawren-

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(18) Langevin, J., La memorisation des v e r s i o n s v e r b a l e e t f i g u r a t i v e de r e c i t s p a r des d e f i c i e n t s mentaux e t p a r de jeunes e n f a n t s , These de D o c t o r a t de 3e Cyc l e , U n i v e r s i t e de P a r i s V I I I , 1980. ( 1 9 ) L e c o u t r e , B . , L e c o u t r e , M.P., Comparaison d e t a i l l e e des paradigmes de r@cept i o n e t de s e l e c t i o n dans une s i t u a t i o n d ' i d e n t i f i c a t i o n de concepts. B u l l e t i n de Psychologie, 1979, X X X I I , 675-681. ( 2 0 ) Lecoutre, M.P., Etude des d i f f e r e n c e s i n d i v i d u e l l e s dans une s i t u a t i o n d ' i d e n t i f i c a t i o n de concepts, J o u r n a l de Psychologie, 1980, 4, 417-432. (21) Le Ny, J.F.,

La semantique psychologique, P a r i s , P.U.F.,

1979.

(22) Mandler, J.M., Johnson, N.S., Remembrance o f t h i n g s parsed : S t o r y s t r u c t u r e and r e c a l l , C o g n i t i v e Psychology, 1977, 9, 111-151. (23) M a r t i n s , D., press.

I n f l u e n c e o f e f f e c t o f comprehension o f a t e x t , Text, 1982, i n

(24) M i l l e r , J.R., K i n t s c h , W., R e a d a b i l i t y and r e c a l l o f s h o r t prose passages : A t h e o r e t i c a l a n a l y s i s , J. e x p e r . Psychol. : Human L e a r n i n g and Memory, 1980, 6, 335-354. ( 2 5 ) Pecho, W., Etude genetique de l a c a p a c i t e d ' e v a l u a t i o n de l ' i m p o r t a n c e r e l a t i ve des i n f o r m a t i o n s evoquees p a r des r e c i t s , U n i v e r s i t e de P a r i s V I I I , Memoi1981. r e de D.E.A., (26) Petros, T., Hoving, K . , The e f f e c t s o f r e v i e w on young c h i l d r e n ' s memory f o r prose, J. exp. C h i l d Psychology, 1980, 30, 33-43. (27) Poulsen, D., K i n t s c h , E., K i n t s c h , W . e t Premack, D., C h i l d r e n ' s comprehension and memory f o r s t o r i e s , J. exp. C h i l d Psychology, 1979, 28, 379-403. ( 2 8 ) Rumelhart, D.E., Notes on a schema f o r s t o r i e s , i n : R e p r e s e n t a t i o n and Unders t a n d i n g : S t u d i e s i n C o g n i t i v e Science, Bobrow, D.G., e t C o l l i n s , A.M., (Eds), New York, Academic Press, 1975. (29) S t e i n , N.L., Glenn, C.G., An a n a l y s i s o f s t o r y comprehension i n elementary school c h i l d r e n , i n : New D i r e c t i o n s i n Discourse Processing, Volume 2, F r e e d l e , R.O., (Ed.), Ablex, Norwood, N.J., 1979, 53-120. (30) Thorndyke, P.W., Yekovich, F.R., A c r i t i q u e o f schemata as a t h e o r y o f human s t o r y memory, P o e t i c s , 1980, 9, 32-50. (31) T o u r r e t t e , G., Competence c o g n i t i v e e t performance l i n g u i s t i q u e , B u l l e t i n de Psychologie, 1981, X X X I Y , 348, 167-175.

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LANGUAGE 4ND COMPREHENSION J.-F. Le Ny, W. Kintsch (editors) 0 North-Holland Publishing Company. 1982

239

READER EXPECTATIONS I N TEXT COMPREHENSION

K a r l Haberlandt Department o f Psychology T r i n i t y College H a r t f o r d , CT 06106 U.S.A.

T e x t comprehension i s considered t o be t h e p r o d u c t o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e t e x t and o f t h e r e a d e r ' s knowledge sources. These sources enable t h e r e a d e r t o generate e x p e c t a t i o n s about t h e i n f o r m a t i o n u n f o l d i n g i n a t e x t . The p r e s e n t r e s e a r c h d e a l s w i t h expectat i o n s supported by r e a d e r knowledge o f causal coherence, of common r e a l - w o r l d events, and o f n a r r a t i v e problem s o l v i n g episodes. The r e s e a r c h suggests t h a t comprehension measured by sentence r e a d i n g times i s f a c i l i t a t e d when r e a d e r e x p e c t a t i o n s match t h e e v o l v i n g t e x t . During t h e l a s t decade t h e a t t e n t i o n o f p s y c h o l i n g u i s t s has i n c r e a s i n g l y t u r n e d from an a n a l y s i s o f sentence comprehension t o an a n a l y s i s o f t e x t comprehension. T e x t comprehension, l i k e sentence comprehension, i s w i d e l y understood as a j o i n t f u n c t i o n of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e t e x t and o f t h e r e a d e r ' s knowledge sources (e.g:, Runielhart & Ortony, 1977). These sources i n c l u d e f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h word meanings and w i t h s y n t a x , and a knowledge o f t h e p h y s i c a l w o r l d and o f s o c i a l conventions, t h e l a t t e r subsuming t h e conventions o f w r i t i n g . Because r e a d e r s know o f t h e conventions o f w r i t i n g , i t has been argued t h a t o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f r e a d i n g comprehension depends t o some e x t e n t on o u r understanding o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between w r i t i n g and r e a d i n g (see a l s o B r i t t o n , 1978; Olson, D u f f y , & Mack, i n p r e s s ) . T h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p , a l t h o u g h r a t h e r s i m p l i f i e d , may be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as f o l l o w s : I n a t e x t a w r i t e r addresses t o t h e reader a message c o n s i s t i n g o f a s e t o f r e l a t e d i d e a s . From t h e w r i t e r ' s p o i n t o f view these i d e a s have some u n i t y o r coherence. I t i s the task o f the reader t o i n t e g r a t e the ideas o f the t e x t i n t o t h e u n i f i e d message i n t e n d e d by t h e w r i t e r . The q u e s t i o n f o r t h e psycholog i s t i s how does t h e r e a d e r a c t u a l l y i n t e g r a t e t h e i d e a s i n view o f t h e f a c t t h a t h i s working memory i s r a t h e r l i m i t e d ( e . g . , K i n t s c h & van D i j k , 1978). The memory l o a d on t h e r e a d e r can be eased and i n t e g r a t i o n be f a c i l i t a t e d when t h e i n f o r m a t i o n e v o l v i n g i n t h e t e x t i s synchronous w i t h t h e r e a d e r ' s e x p e c t a t i o n s . Such synchrony can be achieved i f t h e t e x t i s l o c a l l y and g l o b a l l y c o h e r e n t , where t h e term local coherence r e f e r s t o t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between a d j a c e n t sentences and t h e term g l o b a l coherence r e f e r s t o t h e o v e r a l l f l o w o f ideas i n t h e t e x t . A r e a d e r ' s knowledge sources enable t h e r e a d e r t o generate e x p e c t a t i o n s , a l b e i t unconscious ones, o f how a sequence o f sentences and l o n g e r s e c t i o n s o f a t e x t w i l l u n f o l d . The r e s e a r c h i n my l a b o r a t o r y has been concerned w i t h such r e a d e r e x p e c t a t i o n s . S p e c i f i c a l l y , my c o l l e a g u e s and I have conducted experiments i n v e s t i g a t i n g reader e x p e c t a t i o n s of i n f o r m a t i o n across a d j a c e n t sentences and e x p e c t a t i o n s supported by schematic knowledge s t r u c t u r e s such as t h e n a r r a t i v e episode schema. I b e l i e v e t h a t comprehension i s based on l o c a l as w e l l as on more g l o b a l r e a d e r e x p e c t a t i o n s . Thus, i t i s n o t f o r s u b s t a n t i v e t h e o r e t i c a l reasons, b u t f o r purposes o f e x p e r i mental methodology, t h a t we i n v e s t i g a t e d r e a d e r e x p e c t a t i o n s i n s e p a r a t e e x p e r i ments. The p r e s e n t paper summarizes f o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e experiments, t h r e e on aspects o f l o c a l coherence and one d e a l i n g w i t h g l o b a l coherence i n n a r r a t i v e s . The t h r e e aspects o f l o c a l coherence examined below a r e causal coherence, t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n o f i n t e r - s e n t e n c e c o n n e c t i v e s t o coherence, and t h e r o l e o f s c r i p t s i n t h e comprehension o f a d j a c e n t sentences.

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The s t u d i e s used a r e a l - t i m e methodology j u s t i f i e d by t h e assumption t h a t a r e a d e r takes i n t h e t e x t u a l i n f o r m a t i o n " a t a pace t h a t matches t h e i n t e r n a l comprehension process" and t h a t t h e n a t u r e o f these processes may be i n f e r r e d by examining t h e r e a d i n g t i m e p a t t e r n s ( J u s t & Carpenter, 1980). I n t h e s t u d i e s a r e a d e r was s e a t e d i n f r o n t o f a v i d e o - t e r m i n a l and a keyboard. Passages were presented on t h e v i d e o - t e r m i n a l one sentence o r one phrase a t a time. A l l words were presented i n c a p i t a l l e t t e r s . When t h e s u b j e c t tapped t h e space b a r , t h e sentence disappeared and was r e p l a c e d by t h e n e x t . The i n t e r v a l between a d j a c e n t t a p s o f t h e space b a r was d e f i n e d as t h e r e a d i n g t i m e f o r t h e sentence. S t i m u l u s p r e s e n t a t i o n and r e c o r d i n g o f sentence r e a d i n g t i m e s were c o n t r o l l e d b y a m i n i computer. Causal coherence The minimum c o n d i t i o n f o r t e x t u a l coherence, whether l o c a l o r g l o b a l , i s t h a t t h e t e x t be c a u s a l l y c o h e r e n t (Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Schank & Abelson, 1977). Schank (1975a, p. 241) c l a i m e d t h a t causal coherence i s " t h e m e a n s f o r c o n n e c t i n g " sentences i n a t e x t (emphasis i s m i n e ) . He d i s t i n g u i s h e d s e v e r a l t y p e s o f causa l i t y (e.g., Schank & Abelson, 1977, Ch. 2 ) and p r e d i c t e d t h a t c a u s a l l y r e l a t e d sentences s h o u l d be r e c a l l e d b e t t e r t h a n sentences n o t so connected, a p r e d i c t i o n supported by r e s u l t s o f B l a c k & Bern (1981). Together w i t h G e o f f Bingham, I examined t h e r o l e o f causal coherence i n r e a d i n g comprehension (see H a b e r l a n d t & Bingham, 1978) by comparing r e a d i n g t i m e s o f c a u s a l l y r e l a t e d passages as i n ( l a ) and o f l e s s r e l a t e d o r u n r e l a t e d passages as i n ( l b ) . (la)

1:

B r i a n punched George.

2:

George c a l l e d t h e d o c t o r .

T a r g e t : The d o c t o r a r r i v e d . (lb)

1:

B r i a n punched George.

2:

George l i k e d t h e d o c t o r .

T a r g e t : The d o c t o r a r r i v e d . A l t h o u g h t h e p a t t e r n o f r e p e a t e d arguments i s t h e same i n passages ( l a ) and ( l b ) , t h e r e b y s a t i s f y i n g a key c o n d i t i o n o f t e x t u a l coherence ( K i n t s c h & van D i j k , 1978), a r e a d e r understands t h e c o n n e c t i o n s between t h e sentences o f ( l a ) b e t t e r because t h e y a r e c a u s a l l y r e l a t e d . By v i r t u e o f t h e i r causal r e l a t e d n e s s these sentences agree w i t h a r e a d e r ' s e x p e c t a t i o n s o f t h e way i n which c e r t a i n events, i n t h i s case a punching i n c i d e n t , develop. The causal r e l a t i o n s h i p among t h e sentences o f ( l a ) i s r e a l i z e d by t h e sequence o f arguments such as George and d o c t o r and by t h e sequence o f c o r r e s p o n d i n g verbs and t h e i r u n d e r l y i n g represent a t i o n s . According t o Schank (1975b), t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a v e r b i n c l u d e s t h e meaning components o f t h e v e r b and an e n t i r e s c e n a r i o o f t h e l i k e l y c i r c u m s t a n c e s where t h e a c t i o n m i g h t t a k e p l a c e and o f t h e l i k e l y consequences o f t h e a c t i o n (Schank, 1975b). For example, "punch" means f o r c e f u l l y a p p l y i n g a f i s t t o somet h i n g , e.g., a person. The r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f "punch" a l s o i n c l u d e s some o f t h e l i k e l y consequences o f punching such as p o s s i b l e i n j u r i e s and p a i n , t h e d e s i r e t o g e t r e l i e f , e t c . On r e a d i n g sentence 1 o f ( l a ) o r ( l b ) t h e r e a d e r " a c t i v a t e s " t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f punch i n h i s w o r k i n g memory and g e n e r a t e s e x p e c t a t i o n s as t o what m i g h t happen n e x t . When t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i n sentence 2 i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h such e x p e c t a t i o n s as i n passage ( l a ) , sentence 2 i s i n t e g r a t e d r e l a t i v e l y e a s i l y i n t o t h e s c e n a r i o i n i t i a t e d by sentence 1. I f t h e r e i s no such match as between sentences 1 and 2, and 2 and t h e t a r g e t o f ( l b ) , t h e n t h e r e a d e r a t t e m p t s t o f o r m a " b r i d g e " between t h e sentences ( c f . H a v i l a n d & C l a r k , 1974). T h i s a t t e m p t r e q u i r e s more c o g n i t i v e p r o c e s s i n g t h a n matching e x p e c t a t i o n s w i t h subsequent i n f o r m a t i o n and hence i t should t a k e a l o n g e r t i m e . I n summary, w h i l e sentence ( l a . 2 ) f o l l o w s f r o m sentence ( l a . l ) , ( l b . 2 ) does n o t f o l l o w f r o m ( l b . 1 ) . A s i m p l e t e s t t o j u d g e whether a sentence f o l l o w s f r o m t h e

Reader Expectations in Text Comprehension

24 1

preceding one i s t h e "Connective T e s t " : While sentence ( l a . 2 ) c o u l d w e l l b e g i n w i t h a c o n n e c t i v e such as t h e r e f o r e o r s o i n t h e c o n t e x t o f ( l a ) , sentence ( l b . 2 ) would n o t r e a d w e l l i n t h e c o n t e x t o f i f i t were t o b e g i n w i t h t h e r e f o r e o r so. -

(x)

I n t h e H a b e r l a n d t & Bingham (1978) s t u d y , twenty p a i r s o f passages s i m i l a r t o ( l a ) and ( l b ) were used. The r e l a t e d member o f a p a i r was a n a r r a t i v e d e s c r i b i n g a sequence o f c a u s a l l y r e l a t e d events. The u n r e l a t e d member was i d e n t i c a l t o t h e r e l a t e d member except t h a t t h e v e r b i n t h e second sentence d i f f e r e d . A norming s t u d y e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y r a t i n g s and r e a d i n g t i m e s o f r e l a t e d and u n r e l a t e d second sentences, when presented w i t h o u t t h e c o n t e x t o f a passage, d i d n o t d i f f e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y w i t h type. I n a counterbalanced design, each o f 48 s u b j e c t s saw t e n r e l a t e d and t e n u n r e l a t e d t r i p l e s , b u t never members o f t h e same p a i r . I n t h e s t u d y , t h e r e a d i n g t i m e methodology d e s c r i b e d above was used w i t h s u b j e c t s b e i n g i n s t r u c t e d t o r e a d t h e sentences f o r comprehension. Mean r e a d i n g t i m e s as a f u n c t i o n o f passage t y p e and sentence p o s i t i o n a r e d i s played i n Table 1. Table 1 Sentence Reading Times i n t h e Causal Coherence Experiment Type Position

Re1a t e d

Unrelated 1986

1

2013

2

1816

1982

Target

1650

2133

The f a c i l i t a t i n g e f f e c t s o f causal coherence on comprehension were evidenced i n t h r e e ways: F i r s t , t a r g e t sentences were r e a d s i g n i f i c a n t l y f a s t e r i n r e l a t e d than i n u n r e l a t e d passages (p < . 0 1 ) . Second, mean r e a d i n g t i m e s o f sentences i n p o s i t i o n 1 c o n d i t i o c a l i z e d on t h e t y p e o f t h e p r e v i o u s passage were-faster f o l l o w i n g r e l a t e d , X = 1946 msec, than f o l l o w i n g u n r e l a t e d passages X = 2052 msec (p < .OL). T h i r d , mean i n t e r - p a s s a g e i n t e r v a l s were a l s o - f a s t e r f o l l o w i n g r e l a t e d , X = 1502 msec, t h a n f o l l o w i n g u n r e l a t e d passages, X = 1840 msec (p < .01). T h i s p a t t e r n o f r e a d i n g times and o f i n t e r - p a s s a g e i n t e r v a l s c o n f i r m e d t h e i n t u i t i o n t h a t c a u s a l l y r e l a t e d sentences were comprehended more q u i c k l y t h a n unrel a t e d sentences c o n t a i n i n g t h e same s e t o f arguments. Expressed i n a d i f f e r e n t way, expected events a r e comprehended f a s t e r t h a n unexpected e v e n t s . The events i n passage ( l a ) a r e f a m i l i a r t o most rearfers f r o m d e t e c t i v e and o t h e r a c t i o n shows on t e l e v i s i o n . They c o n s t i t u t e a f i s t f i g h t " s c e n a r i o . Scenarios o f events t y p i c a l l y o c c u r i n g t o g e t h e r have been c a l l e d " v i g n e t t e s " , " f a c t s " , o r " s c r i p t s " (Schank & Abelson, 1977). According t o Schank (1980, p. 253) s c r i p t s a r e "prepackaged sequences o f causal c h a i n s . " T h e i r r o l e i n r e a d i n g comprehens i o n w i l l be e x p l o r e d more f u l l y i n t h e s e c t i o n on s c r i p t s below. Connectives c o n t r i b u t e t o coherence Students o f r h e t o r i c have known f o r a l o n g t i m e t h a t even i f t e x t s a r e c a u s a l l y coherent, s u r f a c e markers d i r e c t t h e r e a d e r ' s e x p e c t a t i o n s and h e l p him t o i n t e g r a t e a d j a c e n t sentences. Such s u r f a c e markers i n c l u d e t h e s e r i a l o r d e r of o l d and new i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e t e x t ( e . g . , Carpenter & J u s t , 1977), anaphora such as pronouns and d e f i n i t e noun phrases, r e p e t i t i o n o f key words i n t h e t e x t ( b u t

242

K. Haberlandt

see Shuy & L a r k i n , 1978) and i n t e r s e n t e n c e connectives (Carpenter i 3 J u s t , 1977). M a r s h a l l Kennard and I conducted s e v e r a l experiments on t h e way one o f these s u r f a c e markers, namely i n t e r s e n t e n c e connectives, f a c i l i t a t e comprehension. I n t e r s e n t e n c e c o n n e c t i v e s i n c l u d e such words as t h e r e f o r e , however, by c o n t r a s t , and so on. Consider t h e f o l l o w i n g passage. The j e t had j u s t taken o f f .

(2a)

The l e f t engine caught f i r e . The passengers were t e r r i f i e d . They t h o u g h t t h e p l a n e would crash. Target:

However t h e p i l o t made a s a f e l a n d i n g .

The b u r n i n g o f t h e engine, t h e t e r r o r experienced by t h e passengers and t h e i r f e a r t h a t t h e p l a n e would c r a s h t r i g g e r s t h e e x p e c t a t i o n o f an imminent p l a n e c r a s h i n t h e r e a d e r as w e l l . The c o n n e c t i v e however a l e r t s t h e reader t o an e v e n t n o t matching t h e e x p e c t a t i o n o f a crash. Thus, however i s a c o n n e c t i v e i n t r o d u c i n g i n f o r m a t i o n which c o n t r a d i c t s an e a r l i e r e x p e c t a t i o n . H a l l i d a y & Hasan (1976, p. 242-243) have c a l l e d such connectives a d v e r s a t i v e c o n n e c t i v e s . I f t h e c o n n e c t i v e were absent as i n ( 2 b ) below, t h e passage would f l o w l e s s smoothly because t h e r e a d e r has n o t been prepared f o r t h e unexpected safe l a n d i n g .

............

(2b) Target:

The p i l o t made a s a f e l a n d i n g .

on

The c l a s s o f a d v e r s a t i v e c o n n e c t i v e s a l s o i n c l u d e s c o n n e c t i v e s such as but, I n a d d i t i o n t o a d v e r s a t i v e connectives, H a l l i d a y & H a s a n m d e s c r i b e causal connectives. Causal c o n n e c t i v e s i n t r o duce a consequence o f o r a reason f o r what has j u s t been s a i d , and t h u s e x p l i c a t e t h e causal l i n k i n v e s t i g a t e d by Haberlandt & Bingham (1978). T h i s c l a s s i n c l u d e s such words as a c c o r d i n g l y , thus, t h e r e f o r e , then, as a r e s u l t , hence, consequently, and

t h e o t h e rhand, i n~ s t e a d , and yet.

so.

I n s t r u c t o r s o f w r i t i n g emphasize t h e i n t e g r a t i v e f u n c t i o n o f c o n n e c t i v e s . For example, H i r s c h (1977, p . 128) argued i n h i s Philosophy of Composition t h a t conn e c t i v e s a s s i s t i n i n t e g r a t i n g a d j a c e n t sentences o f a t e x t by " f o r e c a s t i n g " t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e c u r r e n t sentence and t h e n e x t one. According t o H i r s c h , t h e c o n n e c t i v e i s a " p r o s p e c t i v e d e v i c e " which "shows i n advance" t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e n e x t c l a u s e o r sentence. H i r s c h suggests f u r t h e r t h a t because c o n n e c t i v e s h e l p us t o i n t e g r a t e a d j a c e n t sentences and because t h e y "reduce u n c e r t a i n t y " t h e y "serve t o speed up t h e p r o c e s s i n g o f i n d i v i d u a l c l a u s e s " and sentences. Our experiment c o n f i r m e d t h i s p r e d i c t i o n u s i n g "good" passages i n which a c o n n e c t i v e was i n t h e t a r g e t sentence and "poor" passages where no c o n n e c t i v e was p r e s e n t . F o r t y passage p a i r s l i k e (2a) and ( 2 b ) were used i n t h e experiment, t w e n t y o f each tvoe: a d v e r s a t i v e and c a u s a l . The a d v e r s a t i v e c o n n e c t i v e s were b u t , v e t , _ i n s_ t e d_ ', _ however, _ _ and n e v e r t h e l e s s . The causal c o n n e c t i v e s were so, consequently, and t h e r e f o r e . A l l c o n n e c t i v e s were presented as t h e f i r s t word o f t h e t a r g e t sentence. I n one o f t h e s t u d i e s sentences were d i v i d e d i n t o phrases most o f which c o i n c i d e d w i t h s y n t a c t i c clauses. I n well-connected t a r g e t sentences, t h e c o n n e c t i v e formed an i n d i v i d u a l phrase, t h e f i r s t one, o f t h e sentence. F o r example, t h e t a r g e t sentence o f ( 2 a ) was presented i n t h r e e successive phrases as marked by slashes below. _

HOWEVER / THE PILOT / MADE

L

A SAFE LANDING.

The number o f phrases i n t a r g e t sentences ranged f r o m 1 t o 3. From each s e t of 20 passages two subsets were formed, each c o n t a i n i n g 10 good and 10 poor passages,

243

Reader Expectations in Text Comprehension

such t h a t t h e good and poor v e r s i o n s o f a g i v e n passage belonged t o d i f f e r e n t subsets. Each subset o f experimental passages was assigned t o a d i f f e r e n t group o f s u b j e c t s so t h a t t h e good and poor members o f a p a i r o f passages were p r e s e n t e d t o d i f f e r e n t s u b j e c t s . The experiment used t h e subject-paced r e a d i n g t e c h n i q u e (see above). Readers were i n s t r u c t e d t o r e a d passages f o r t h e purpose o f answering q u e s t i o n s about each passage. A f t e r t h e person f i n i s h e d r e a d i n g a passage, t h e experimenter handed t h e person two short-answer q u e s t i o n s about t h e passage j u s t read. Each o f 48 r e a d e r s r e c e i v e d a randomized sequence o f 49 passages, 9 pract i c e and 40 experimental passages. Sentence r e a d i n g times o f t a r g e t sentences were computed by summing t h e phrase r e a d i n g times e x c l u d i n g t h e r e a d i n g t i m e o f t h e c o n n e c t i v e . The means o f these t a r g e t sentence r e a d i n g times a r e shown as a f u n c t i o n o f c o n n e c t i v e t y p e and conn e c t i v e presence o r absence i n t h e l e f t m o s t panel o f T a b l e 2. Table 2 Sentence and Phrase Reading Times i n t h e Connective Experiment T a r g e t Sentences Type

A d v e r s a t i v e Causal

F i r s t Phrases A d v e r s a t i v e Causal

Second Phrases A d v e r s a t i v e Causal

Condition With Without

1442 1582

1422 1551

690 746

652 748

732 814

758 780

As p r e d i c t e d by s t u d e n t s o f r h e t o r i c (e.g., H i r s c h , 1977) and r e a d i n g r e s e a r c h e r s (e.g., Carpenter & J u s t , 1977), t a r g e t phrases w i t h c o n n e c t i v e s were r e a d s i g n i f i c a n t l y f a s t e r than those w i t h o u t connectives, r'(1,62) = 5.67, p < .05. The m i d d l e and r i g h t m o s t panels d i s p l a y t h e r e a d i n g t i m e s o f t h e f i r s t and second phrases f o l l o w i n g t h e c o n n e c t i v e , r e s p e c t i v e l y . I n f i r s t phrases which f o l l o w immediately upon t h e c o n n e c t i v e t h e r e was a s i g n i f i c a n t c o n n e c t i v e e f f e c t , F"(1,67) = 5.24, p < .05. However, i n second phrases, which a r e f u r t h e r removed from t h e c o n n e c t i v e , t h e e f f e c t was no l o n g e r s i g n i f i c a n t ( r i g h t p a n e l ) , F(1,52) = 1.70. The r e s u l t s i n T a b l e 2 suggest t h a t r e a d i n g comprehension i s f a c i l i t a t e d when t h e r e a d e r ' s e x p e c t a t i o n s a r e g u i d e d by t h e presence o f a s u r face marker which e x p l i c a t e s t h e semantic r e l a t i o n s h i p between a d j a c e n t sentences. When markers a r e absent a reader can connect a d j a c e n t sentences a l s o , b u t he must use compensatory i n f e r e n c e s t o do so. As t h e comparison o f f i r s t - p h r a s e and second-phrase r e a d i n g t i m e s i n d i c a t e s , t h e m a j o r i n f e r e n c i n g e f f o r t appears t o t a k e p l a c e i n t h e b e g i n n i n g p a r t o f t h e sentence l a c k i n g t h e c o n n e c t i v e . Scripts

A s c r i p t i s a schematic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a f a m i l i a r s i t u a t i o n , f o r example, e a t i n g i n a r e s t a u r a n t , r i d i n g a b u s , v i s i t i n g a d o c t o r , and so on. I t i s a top-down mechanism g u i d i n g e x p e c t a t i o n s and t h e r e b y f a c i l i t a t i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t e x t s . I t i s assumed t o a c t as a p r e d i c t i v e c o n t e x t f o r p r o c e s s i n g sentences i n r e a l t i m e (see Bower, B l a c k , & T u r n e r , 1979; b u t see Schank, 1980, f o r a r e v i s e d v e r s i o n o f s c r i p t s ) . S c r i p t t h e o r y assumes t h a t a s c r i p t , once invoked, f a c i l i t a t e s t h e comprehension o f s c r i p t - r e l a t e d sentences. The p u t a t i v e mechanism o f such f a c i l i t a t i o n i s " a c t i v a t i o n " emanating from concepts mentioned i n a t e x t and "spreading" t o o t h e r concepts i n t h e u n d e r l y i n g s c r i p t s t r u c t u r e . Consider t h e p a i r o f sentences i n ( 3 ) which stem f r o m t h e same s c r i p t , t h e r e s t a u r a n t scriot.

244

K. Haberlandt

(3)

Priming:

He looked a t t h e menu.

Target:

The w a i t e r b r o u g h t t h e check.

According t o spreading a c t i v a t i o n t h e o r y , t h e f i r s t sentence, e s p e c i a l l y t h e conc e p t =,a c t i v a t e s t h e u n d e r l y i n g s c r i p t and such concepts as hostess, w a i t e r , food, and check. As a r e s u l t , t h e t a r g e t sentence s h o u l d be comprehended f a s t e r than when n o t primed as i n ( 4 ) below. (4)

Priming:

He l i s t e n e d t o t h e p r o f e s s o r ' s l e c t u r e .

Target:

The w a i t e r b r o u g h t t h e check.

We examined t h e i d e a o f a c t i v a t i o n e x p e r i m e n t a l l y u s i n g a p r i m i n g t e c h n i q u e s i m i l a r t o t h a t employed by Meyer (e.g., 1976). S p e c i f i c a l l y , we used t h e p r i m i n g technique i n t h e c o n t e x t o f a sentence judgment t a s k ( F o r s t e r & O l b r e i , 1974) i n which s u b j e c t s r e c e i v e d a sequence o f s e n s i b l e and anomalous sentences w i t h t h e i n s t r u c t i o n t o judge each sentence as s e n s i b l e o r n o t . P a i r s o f c r i t i c a l sentences d e r i v e d from s c r i p t s were embedded i n t h e sequence o f such s e n s i b l e and anomalous f i l l e r sentences. The f i r s t sentence o f a c r i t i c a l p a i r was t h e p r i m i n g sentence, t h e second a t a r g e t sentence. There were two types o f p a i r s : "same"p a i r s and " d i f f e r e n t " - p a i r s . The sentences o f same-pairs such as ( 3 ) stemmed from t h e same s c r i p t . Sentences o f d i f f e r e n t - p a i r s were d e r i v e d from d i f f e r e n t s c r i p t s . The p r i m i n g sentence i n ( 4 ) , f o r example, was taken from a l e c t u r e s c r i p t , w h i l e t h e t a r g e t sentence was taken from a r e s t a u r a n t s c r i p t . Two s e t s o f 18 same-pairs and 18 d i f f e r e n t - p a i r s were formed. Sets o f c r i t i c a l p a i r s were assigned t o two groups o f s u b j e c t s so t h a t no s u b j e c t saw a g i v e n t a r g e t sentence t w i c e . As n o t e d above, c r i t i c a l p a i r s were embedded i n a sequence o f s e n s i b l e and anomalous f i l l e r sentences. Readers r e a d sentences i n a s u b j e c t paced c o m p u t e r - c o n t r o l l e d experiment. Mean r e a d i n g t i m e s o f p r i m i n g and t a r g e t sentences computed f o r those t e s t p a i r s where b o t h sentences were c o r r e c t l y judged as s e n s i b l e as a f u n c t i o n o f p a i r t y p e a r e d i s p l a y e d i n Table 3. Table 3 Sentence Reading Times i n S c r i p t Experiment P a i r Type Position

Same

Priming

2457

Different 2449

Target

2275

2433

As p r e d i c t e d by spreading a c t i v a t i o n t h e o r y , comprehension o f t a r g e t sentences was f a c i l i t a t e d when t h e y f o l l o w e d a sentence from t h e same s c r i p t as compared t o a sentence f r o m a d i f f e r e n t s c r i p t . T h i s c o n c l u s i o n was supported by a s i g n i f i c a n t sentence t y p e x p a i r t y p e i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h s u b j e c t s and passages as r a n dom f a c t o r s , 5 ( 1 , 5 8 ) = 4.42, .05, E ( 1 , 3 5 ) = 4.46, E < .05, r e s p e c t i v e l y , and by s i g n i f i c a n t Newman-Keuls t e s t s < .05).

e<

(e

A n a r r a t i v e schema These r e s u l t s i n d i c a t e t h a t r e a d e r s have e x p e c t a t i o n s o f how c o n c r e t e everyday s i t u a t i o n s develop and t h a t t h e e x p e c t a t i o n s f a c i l i t a t e t h e comprehension o f sentences synchronous w i t h those e x p e c t a t i o n s . Schank & Abelson (1977) r e a l i z e d , of course, t h a t people do n o t have s c r i p t s f o r a l l new s i t u a t i o n s d e s c r i b e d i n a g i v e n t e x t such as a c a r f a i l i n g t o s t a r t , o r a f r i e n d g e t t i n g s i c k o r o t h e r

Reader Expectations in Text Comprehension

245

i n c i d e n t s . However, r e a d e r s do have general e x p e c t a t i o n s as t o how a c h a r a c t e r w i l l d e a l w i t h new and p r o b l e m a t i c s i t u a t i o n s . Readers e x p e c t c h a r a c t e r s t o deal w i t h problems by a t t e m p t i n g t o overcome them. The a b s t r a c t s t r u c t u r e s s u p p o r t i n g such e x p e c t a t i o n s a r e c a l l e d " p l a n s " (Schank & Abelson, 1977, p. 70), "problem s o l v i n g m o t i f s " , "episode s t r u c t u r e s " (Mandler & Johnson, 1977), o r "episode schemata" (Haberlandt, B e r i a n , & Sandson, 1980). I n M a n d l e r ' s t h e o r y an episode i s d e f i n e d from t h e p o i n t o f view o f a p r o t a g o n i s t . A w e l l - f o r m e d episode cons i s t s , i n somewhat s i m p l i f i e d terms, o f t h e f o l l o w i n g s i x nodes: B e g i n n i n g ( B ) , Reaction (R), Goal (G), Attempt ( A ) , Outcome (0), and Ending ( E ) . The Beginning of t h e episode r e c o u n t s t h e problem c o n f r o n t i n g t h e p r o t a g o n i s t . The Reaction d e s c r i b e s t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l response o f t h e p r o t a g o n i s t . Hence t h e Reaction i d e n t i f i e s t h e p r o t a g o n i s t t o t h e r e a d e r . I t i s f o l l o w e d by t h e Goal and t h e Attempt t o achieve t h e Goal. The Outcome r e c o u n t s success o r f a i l u r e o f t h e p r o t a g o n i s t ' s a c t i o n s . The Ending i s a comment on t h e Outcome o r a n o t h e r event i n t h e episode. ( F o r sample s t o r i e s p l e a s e c o n s u l t Mandler & Johnson, 1977, and Haberlandt e t a l . , 1980). S t o r y schema t h e o r i s t s (e.g., Mandler & Johnson, 1977) c l a i m t h a t such a s t o r y schema d e s c r i b e s most e x t a n t s i n g l e - p r o t a g o n i s t s t o r i e s and t h a t t h e schema i s p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y " r e a l " i n t h a t i t expresses a r e a d e r ' s e x p e c t a t i o n about t h e way t h e s t o r y w i l l u n f o l d . The r e a l i t y o f t h e episode schema has been shown i n r e c a l l s t u d i e s which demons t r a t e d t h a t s u b j e c t s r e c a l l and r e t r i e v e t h e i n f o r m a t i o n o f an episode as an i n t e g r a l u n i t ( c f . Mandler, 1980). Experiments by Haberlandt e t a l . (1980) demonstrated t h a t r e a d e r s use t h e episode as a p r o c e s s i n g u n i t i n comprehension. T h i s was evidenced by a boundary e f f e c t such t h a t r e a d e r s took a l o n g e r t i m e t o process boundary sentences o f an episode t h a n t h e remaining sentences o f t h e episode. The boundary e f f e c t was i n v e s t i g a t e d i n s e v e r a l experiments one o f which i s d e s c r i b e d here. I n t h e experiment t w e l v e two-episode s t o r i e s were p r e sented t o 32 r e a d e r s i n a subject-paced r e a d i n g s i t u a t i o n . Readers were i n s t r u c t e d t o r e c a l l a s t o r y when g i v e n a r e c a l l prompt which was presented immed i a t e l y a f t e r t h e l a s t sentence o f t h e s t o r y . The boundary e f f e c t was e v a l u a t e d i n two s t e p s : 1. Reading t i m e r e s i d u a l s were used as t h e dependent v a r i a b l e . The observed sentence r e a d i n g t i m e s themselves were n o t used as t h e dependent v a r i a b l e because t h e y a r e a f f e c t e d by f a c t o r s o t h e r t h a n t h e episode s t r u c t u r e o f t h e s t o r i e s . I n s t e a d , such o t h e r f a c t o r s were used t o p r e d i c t r e a d i n g t i m e s i n a m u l t i p l e r e g r e s s i o n a n a l y s i s . The p a t t e r n o f t h e r e s i d u a l s , which a r e t h e components o f t h e r e a d i n g t i m e n o t p r e d i c t e d , were a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e episode s t r u c t u r e f a c t o r . Residuals were o b t a i n e d f o r each o f t h e 12 nodes (=sentences) o f a two-episode s t o r y by computing m u l t i p l e r e q r e s s i o n analyses on t h e observed r e a d i n q t i m e o f t h e node, f a c t o r i n q o u t t h e e f f e c t s o f t h e i'ollowing s i x v a r i a b l e s : N k b e r o f words, number o f p r o p o s i t i o n s and number o f new a r uments, mean f r e uenc o f c o n t e n t words, r a t e d i m o r t a n c e -~ and s e r i a l o s i t i o n :f a node(for th: e f f i c t s o f e x a b l e s o n r E a d i n g t i m e see researc: by G r a e E e r , H o f f m a n , & C l a r k , 1980; K i e r a s , 1981). Mean r e a d i n g times and r e s i d u a l s f o r t h e s i x nodes o f each o f t h e two episodes averaged across 12 s t o r i e s a r e t a b u l a t e d i n T a b l e 4, w i t h p o s i t i v e r e s i d u a l s i n d i c a t i n g t h a t observed r e a d i n g times were l o n g e r than p r e d i c t e d r e a d i n g times. The r e s i d u a l p a t t e r n e x h i b i t s t h e boundary e f f e c t i n t h a t r e s i d u a l s a r e l o n g e r a t t h e boundary nodes t h a n a t t h e remaining nodes (see Aaronson & Scarborough, 1976, f o r a bound a r y e f f e c t i n sentence comprehension). 2. A planned comparison was performed w e i g h t i n g t h e mean r e s i d u a l s o f t h e 12 nodes w i t h w e i g h t s chosen t o r e f l e c t t h e p u t a t i v e r e a d i n g s t r a t e g y o f t h e r e a d e r . The w e i g h t s were +1, 0, -1, -1, 0, +1, +I, 0, -1, -1, 0, +1 f o r t h e 12 means, r e s p e c t i v e l y . These w e i g h t s a r e based on t h e assumption t h a t t h e p o i n t a t which t h e r e a d e r engages i n t h e encoding process depends on h i s e x p e c t a t i o n o f t h e way t h e episode develops. I n most cases t h e reader w i l l c o r r e c t l y view t h e Beginning as t h e s t a r t o f a new episode. So t h e reader encodes new memory l o c a t i o n s f o r t h e c h a r a c t e r s and t h e a c t i o n s expected l a t e r on. He b u i l d s a " s c a f f o l d , " so t o speak, which w i l l c o n t a i n subsequent i n f o r m a t i o n . T h i s adds t o t h e p r o c e s s i n g l o a d which i s r e f l e c t e d by a w e i g h t o f

246

K. Haberlandt

+ l . I n some cases t h e Reaction may be viewed as t h e s t a r t o f t h e new episode because t h e p r o t a g o n i s t i s i d e n t i f i e d o n l y i n t h e Reaction. So we assigned t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e w e i g h t o f 0 t o t h e Reaction. F o l l o w i n g t h e Reaction, t h e r e a d e r expects t h e p r o t a g o n i s t t o e s t a b l i s h a goal and h i s a t t e m p t t o achieve i t . As a r e s u l t , p r o c e s s i n g should be r e l a t i v e l y easy which i s r e f l e c t e d by w e i g h t s o f -1 f o r t h e Goal and t h e Attempt. I n some cases readers may view t h e Outcome ( w e i g h t = 0 ) as t h e end o f t h e episode, because by d e f i n i t i o n , t h e Outcome i n forms t h e reader o f t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e p r o t a g o n i s t ' s a c t i o n . A t t h e Ending ( w e i g h t = 1) t h e r e a d e r expects no f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e c u r r e n t problem. So he uses t h i s occasion t o condense t h e i n f o r m a t i o n o f t h e c u r r e n t episode. Using these w e i g h t s t h e planned comparison y i e l d e d a s i g n i f i c a n t boundary e f f e c t u s i n g b o t h passages and s u b j e c t s as random f a c t o r s ( f o r f u r t h e r d e t a i l s see Haberlandt e t a l . , 1980). Table 4 Node Reading Times and Residuals i n Schema Experiment

Node

Observed Reading Time (msec)

Residuals

B

4062

R

2964

71 47

G

2656

-15

A

2657

-185

0

2706

15

E

2521

-9

B

3124

50

R

2557

56

G

2320

-11

A

2557

-13

0

2691

-98

E

2868

93

The boundary e f f e c t i s i m p o r t a n t because i t i n d i c a t e s t h a t readers use a s p e c i f i c schema, namely t h e episode schema, as a t e x t - u n i t i n comprehension. The episode schema i s a f o r m a l i z a t i o n o f t h e r e a d e r ' s e x p e c t a t i o n o f how a n a r r a t i v e paragraph u n f o l d s . Readers a l s o have e x p e c t a t i o n s about t h e f l o w o f i d e a s i n o t h e r types o f paragraphs, e.g., newspaper paragraphs, p o l i t i c a l b u l l e t i n s ( F l a m e r & H i n d e r , 1979), and e x p o s i t o r y s c i e n c e paragraphs ( J u s t & Carpenter, 1980; K i n t s c h & van D i j k , 1978). Students of r h e t o r i c have recommended t h a t w r i t e r s s t r u c t u r e e x p o s i t o r y and o t h e r t e x t s i n terms o f paragraphs because t h e y f a c i l i t a t e comprehension. Rodgers, a r h e t o r i t i c i a n , w r i t e s about paragraphs " t h a t t h e i r a u t h o r s have marked them o f f f o r s p e c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n as s t a d i a o f d i s c o u r s e . . ' a t t h i s point', the w r i t e r t e l l s us w i t h h i s i n d e n t a t i o n , ' a m a j o r stadium o f d i s c o u r s e has j u s t been comp l e t e d . Rest f o r a moment, r e c o l l e c t , and c o n s i d e r . . . " I ( u n d e r s c o r i n g s a r e m i n e ) . S i m i l a r l y , Becker (1965) and D o q m i e w paragraphs as u n i t s which

.

24 7

Reader Expectations in Text Comprehension

f a c i l i t a t e p r o c e s s i n g by evoking and f u l f i l l i n g r e a d e r s ' e x p e c t a t i o n s . Donly r e f e r s t o J . B. C a r r o l l (1958) and w r i t e s t h a t "a good w r i t e r e s t a b l i s h e s and f u l f i l l s a t e v e r y stage some expectancy o f what i s t o come n e x t , o r i n a concludi n g s e c t i o n , t h e expectancy t h a t n o t h i n g w i l l come n e x t . " I m p l i c i t i n B e c k e r ' s and C a r r o l l ' s view i s t h e i d e a t h a t t h e r e a r e "paragraph schemata" r e f l e c t i n g the reader's expectations. Conclusion The assumption o f t h e p r e s e n t r e s e a r c h program i s t h a t t e x t u a l f e a t u r e s , b o t h c o n t e n t r e l a t e d and s t r u c t u r a l ones, i n t e r a c t w i t h r e a d e r e x p e c t a t i o n s and t h a t comprehension i s t h e r e s u l t o f t h i s i n t e r a c t i o n . Reader e x p e c t a t i o n s t a k e p l a c e a t t h e l e v e l o f sentences, between a d j a c e n t sentences, and over l o n g e r s e c t i o n s o f a t e x t . F u t u r e r e s e a r c h must address t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s : F i r s t , how do reader e x p e c t a t i o n s a t t h e sentence, l o c a l , and g l o b a l l e v e l s mesh? Second, what a r e t h e schematic s t r u c t u r e s t h a t s u p p o r t these r e a d e r e x p e c t a t i o n s and how a r e t h e y a c q u i r e d d u r i n g a p e r s o n ' s r e a d i n g h i s t o r y ? F i n a l l y , can we l e a r n f r o m such r e s e a r c h how w r i t i n g p r o d u c t i o n and r e a d i n g comprehension can be improved? The l a s t q u e s t i o n i s o f more than t h e o r e t i c a l i n t e r e s t . Answers t o i t w i l l have g r e a t i m p o r t f o r t h e improved development o f t h e s k i l l s o f l i t e r a c y a t a t i m e when t h e amount o f i n f o r m a t i o n t o be processed becomes evermore abundant. Note T h i s r e s e a r c h was supported by g r a n t s f r o m t h e M e l l o n Foundation t o T r i n i t y In College, by t h e T r i n i t y College r e s e a r c h fund, and by NSF Grant 77-10246. p r e p a r i n g t h i s paper, I b e n e f i t e d v e r y much from t h e comments o f my c o l l e a g u e s , e s p e c i a l l y C l a i r B e r i a n , G e o f f Bingham, and J e n n i f e r Sandson. I g r a t e f u l l y acknowledge t h e i r h e l p . Please send r e p r i n t r e q u e s t s t o K a r l Haberlandt, Department o f Psychology, T r i n i t y College, H a r t f o r d , CT 06106, U.S.A. References Aaronson, 0.and Scarborough, S. S., Performance t h e o r i e s f o r sentence c o d i n g : Some q u a n t i t a t i v e evidence, J o u r n a l o f Experimental Psychology: Human Performance and P e r c e p t i o n 2 (1976) 56-70. Becker, A. L., A tagmemic approach t o paragraph a n a l y s i s , s i t i o n and Communications 16 (1965) 237-254.

C o l l e g e Compo-

Black, J . B. and Bern, H . , Causal coherence and memory f o r events i n n a r r a t i v e s , J o u r n a l o f Verbal L e a r n i n g and Verbal Behavior 20 (1981) 267-275. Bower, G. H., Black, J . B., and Turner, T. J . , S c r i p t s i n memory f o r t e x t , C o g n i t i v e Psychology 11 (1979) 177-220. B r i t t o n , J . , The composing process and t h e f u n c t i o n s o f w r i t i n g , i n : Cooper, C. R. and O d e l l , L. ( e d s . ) , Research on Composing: P o i n t s o f Departure (Urbana, I l l i n o i s : N a t i o n a l Council f o r Teachers o f E n g l i s h , 1978). Carpenter, P. A. and J u s t , M. A., Reading comprehension as eyes see i t , i n : J u s t , M. A. and Carpenter, P. A. ( e d s . ) , C o g n i t i v e Processes i n Comprehens i o n ( H i l l s d a l e , New Jersey, Erlbaum, 1977). C a r r o l l , B. B., P s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c s and t h e t e a c h i n g o f composition, i n : A l l e n , H. B. ( e d . ) , Reading i n A p p l i e d E n g l i s h L i n g u i s t i c s (AppletonC e n t u r y - C r o f t s , 1958). Den Uyl, M. and Von Oostendorp, N . , The use o f s c r i p t s i n t e x t comprehension, P o e t i c s 9 (1980) 275-294.

K. Haberlandt

Donly, M., The paragraph i n advanced composition: A h e u r i s t i c approach, E n g l i s h Language Teaching J o u r n a l 30 (1976) 42-47. F l a m e r , A. and Hinder, H., A T e x t Grammar f o r Pol t i c a l Communiques, Tech. Rep. 1979, Department o f Psychology, U n i v e r s i t y o f F r i b o r g (1979). F o r s t e r , K. I.and O l b r e i , I.,Semantic h e u r i s t i c s and s y n t a c t i c a n a l y s i s , C o g n i t i o n 2 (1974) 319-347. Graesser, A. C . , Hoffman, N. L., and C l a r k , L. F., S t r u c t u r a l components o f r e a d i n g time, J o u r n a l o f Verbal L e a r n i n g and Verbal Behavior 19 (1980)

135-151. Haberlandt, K. and Bingham, G., Verbs c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e coherence o f b r i e f n a r r a t i v e s : Reading r e l a t e d and u n r e l a t e d sentence t r i p l e s , J o u r n a l of Verbal L e a r n i n g and Verbal Behavior 17 (1978) 419-425. Haberlandt, K., Berian, C.. and Sandson, J., The episode and schema i n s t o r y processing, Journal o f Verbal L e a r n i n g and Verbal Behavior 19 (1980)

635-650. H a l l i d a y , M. A. K. and Hasan, R.,

Cohesion i n E n g l i s h (London, Longman,

1976). Haviland, S. E. and C l a r k , H. H., A c q u i r i n g new i n f o r m a t i o n as a process i n comprehension, J o u r n a l o f Verbal L e a r n i n g and Verbal Behavior 13 (1974)

512-521. H i r s c h , E . , The Philosophy o f Composition (Chicago, Chicago U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1977). J u s t , M. A. and Carpenter, P. A., A t h e o r y o f r e a d i n g : From e y e - f i x a t i o n s t o comprehension, P s y c h o l o g i c a l Review 87 (1980) 329-354. K i e r a s , 0. E., Component processes i n t h e comprehension o f s i m p l e prose, Journal o f Verbal L e a r n i n g and Verbal Behavior ( i n p r e s s ) . Kintsch, W. and van D i j k , T. A., Toward a model o f t e x t comprehension and p r o d u c t i o n , P s y c h o l o g i c a l Review 85 (1978) 363-394. Mandler, J. M., An a n a l y s i s o f s t o r y grammars, Paper presented a t t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Congress o f Psychology, L e i p z i g ( J u l y , 1980). Mandler, J. M. and Johnson, N. S., Remembrance o f t h i n g s parsed: s t r u c t u r e and r e c a l l , C o g n i t i v e Psychology 9 (1977) 111-151.

Story

Meyer, 0. E., Memoire semantique, comprehensio de phrases e t temps de r e a c t i o n , B u l l e t i n de Psychologie, Special Annuel (1976) 102-115. Olson, G. M., D u f f y , S. A., and Mack, R. L., Knowledge o f w r i t i n g conventions i n prose comprehension, i n : McKeachie, W. J. and Eble, K. (eds.), New D i r e c t i o n s i n L e a r n i n g and Teaching (San Francisco, JosseyBass, i n p r e s s ) . Rumelhart, D. E. and Ortony, A., The r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f knowledge i n memory, i n : Anderson, R. C . , S p i r o , R. J., and Montague, W. E. (eds.), S c h o o l i n g and t h e A c q u i s i t i o n o f Knowledge ( H i l l s d a l e , New Jersey, Erlbaum, 1977). Schank, R. C . , The s t r u c t u r e o f episodes i n memory, i n : Bobrow, D. G. and C o l l i n s , A. ( e d s . ) , R e p r e s e n t a t i o n and Understanding (New York, Academic Press, 1975a).

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(271

Schank, R. C . , Conceptual I n f o r m a t i o n Processing, (New York, American E l s e v i e r , 1975b).

[28]

Schank, R. C . ,

249

Language and memory, C o g n i t i v e Science 4 (1980) 243-284.

[291 Schank, R. C . and Abelson, R. P . , S c r i p t s , p l a n s , g o a l s , and u n d e r s t a n d i n g ( H i l l s d a l e , New J e r s e y , Erlbaum, 1977). [301

Shuy, R. W . and L a r k i n , D. L . , L i n g u i s t i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n t h e s i m p l i f i c a t i o n / c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y language, D i s c o u r s e Processes 1 (1978) 305-321.

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LANGUAGE AND COMPREHENSION

J.-F. Le Ny, W. Kintsch (editors) 0 North-HollandPublishingCompany, 1982

251

HIDDEN DETERMINANTS OF UNDERSTANDING Hans Hormann Psychologisches Institut der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum Bochum Fed. Rep. Germany

What is the relationship between the meaning of a single lexical element and that of the utterance as a whole? Empirical findings are reported concerning the effect of implicit quantification on the meaning of indefinite quantifiers ("a few" ) and of verbal labeling one part of a picture understanding an utterance is a wholistic process often involving most constituents of the utterance-in-situation.

...

INTRODUCTION The relationship between the meaning of the single word or, more precisely, of the single lexical element and the meaning of the utterance as a whole, in which this word appears, has been problematic for the linguist as well as for the psycholinguist for quite a time. Our way of teaching grammar in schools as well as the seemingly simple notions of the lexicon and of the coding of utterances, suggest that at some time in the course of processing an utterance, the listener retrieves, modifies and organizes the meanings of the component words. Accordingly, although the meaning of the utterance as a whole might not equal the E n of the word meanings, word and r sentence meanings are assumed to have a definite (or at least, in principle, definable) relation to each other. The range of this relationship, i.e., the sphere of influence of a given word on the remaining words of the sentence, is mainly determined by syntactic and, to a lesser extent, by semantic or even pragmatic factors. In the utterance ( 1 ) There are a few cups on the wooden table the adjective "wooden" unambigously refers to the noun "table" to which it is directly related syntactically. "Wooden" here functions as an operator (as for example defined by SCHNELLE, 1 9 7 3 ) , whose modifying effect is directed towards and confined to "table", its noun; the meaning which "table" otherwise has,that is: isolated, in the lexicon, is modifjed by this operator. However, "wooden" does not modify the meaning of "a few cups" nor is it itself modified by this constituent. The assumption that.meaning is somehow modified in the utterance, sets certain constraints on the device the listener is supposed to use in comprehending. In any case, an "internal lexicon" must be involved, which contains the words (lexems, sems . . . ) of a language together with one meaning each. In processing an utterance these word meanings are retrieved and modified. Modification presupposes something to be modified.

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Of course, we can - following FREGE and others - call the one "meaning", the other "sense", but thereby nothing is gained for the solution of the main problem, as to how the structure of the lexicon is related to the function of the lexicon. We are, therefore, quite aware of the imprecision of the expression "modification of meaning". In what follows it stands for the change of meaning which results when a word is transfered from the isolation (of the lexicon) into the context (of an utterance) or when, on the other hand, the meaning of a single word is detached from the context of the utterance. The direct relationships between pairs of words or constituents of an utterance which are responsible for a modification of meaning are treated in the grammar of the specific language: these are mainly syntactical relationships. The adverb modifies the (lexical) meaning of the corresponding verb, the adjective modifies its noun etc. Research findings have, however, demonstrated other kinds of modification of meaning which are not based on such direct syntactic relationships. Such modifications become most obvious when the listener after comprehending an utterance knows something which he did not know before but which was not specifically encoded in the utterance either. WEINREICH ( 1 9 6 6 ) introduces the notion of transfer features to describe the fact that the listener of ( 2 ) Our pretty busdriver learns that the driver is a woman. A noun (busdriver) which is unspecified on the dimension of gender is modified in this respect by an adjective, which - at least in the usual dictionary entry does not include any information about gender. Admittedly, in this example, the sphere of influence of the adjective is still confined to the noun to which it is syntactically related. GARVEY & CARAMAZZA ( 1 9 7 4 , 1 9 7 5 ) investigated the implicit causal attribution by verbs: ( 3 ) George telephoned Walter because he wanted sympathy. ( 4 ) George criticised Walter because he wanted sympathy. "A semantic property that selects one or the other of the available candidate nouns as primarily responsible for instigating the action or state denoted by the antecedent clause" ( 1 9 7 5 , p. 240). In this example, the reference of the pronoun (he) is not determined by syntactic means, but by the specific verb: therefore, the lexicon entry of the verb must contain a suitable semantic property. One aspect of the problematic relationship between the meaning of an isolated word and the meaning of this word in the context of an utterance is also discussed under the heading of "Vagueness". The isolated words are said to be vague, but their vagueness is often reduced when they appear in the context of an utterance (and/or a situation). The classical experimental investigation of vagueness was carried out by LXBOV ( 1 9 7 3 ) . The meaning (the denotation) of the word "cup" changes together with the form of the vessel as well as, for example, with the substance which it is imagined to contain. The various factors responsible for the labeling of an object such as "cup" interact in a way which is nowadays much discussed in the so-called fuzzy set theory (ZADEH, 1 9 7 5 ) . Contrary to the "wooden table" and the "pretty busdriver", in LABOV's example the linguistic component which modifies the meaning of "cup" cannot be specified syntactically. We are forced to draw upon psychological or pragmatic categories to describe the conditions which interact in determining the denotation of "cup". KANOUSE's ( 1 9 7 2 ) investigations of verbs as implicit quantifiers represent an important next step. Being asked to indicate the number of paperclips involved, listeners of the utterance ( 5 ) John bends paperclips

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state with high agreement that he bends about three or four of them. We cannot establish which lexical entry (the entry of "to bend", of "paperclips") contains this information. Obviously, this specific information only comes about in the complete field of the utterance without being recognizably bound to the semantic features of any of the component words. "The complete field of the utterance" - this suggests the activity of forces in a holistic field, as they were introduced by the Gestaltists as "explanation". The introduction of the field concept into our discussion requires some special precautions: It should be clear from the beginning that here the term "field" does not stand for semantic (or lexical) fields as introduced by TRIER, PORZIG, FILLENBAUM 8, RAPAPORT or MILLER & JOHNSON-LAIRD. The term "field" is used here to refer to the fact that a complex system (as for example visual perception or the processing of a verbal utterance) cannot be regarded as an aggregate of isolated elements (stimuli), because the fate of these "elements" is determined by the constellation as a whole. The new information (that John bends three or four paperclips) is generated on the spot, i.e., in the specific utterance. But let's beware of the short-circuit recommended by some linguists and psycholinguists: This information is not inferred by the listener on the basis of the utterance and his world knowledge. The hearer of the utterance ( 6 ) Yesterday I met two people. The woman was a doctor. infers that the second person whom the speaker met was a woman or a child (CLARK, 1 9 7 8 ) . But in KANOUSE's example the listener could as well "infer" that John bends 1 or 2 or 8 to 1 0 paperclips. (Unless someone goes as far as to say that 3 or 4 is the empirical mean for the bending of paperclips ) . In understanding an utterance the listener sometimes gains a "surplus meaning", or shifts or fixations of meaning compared to the information actually coded in the utterance. The hearer then disposes of information (or can at least dispose of it when asked to do so) which he did not have before, but which was not encoded in the utterance as such either. The rules governing these processes cannot be properly described if we dismiss them as idiosyncratic interpretations, bestowed upon specific utterances by specific listeners. The effects of such indirect determinants of understanding can only be demonstrated, if it is shown that they operate according to interindividually valid rules. We will make a first move towards this goal by describing the conditions of the implicit quantification mentioned by KANOUSE.

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SOME EMPIRICAL FINDINGS OF INTEREST We do this by investigating the effect of implicit quantifications on so-called indefinite quantifiers (e.g. "a few", "some", "several") A group of subjects is asked, if they would talk about a few people to refer to one, two, three, four, ten to twelve, ... twenty to fifty persons (examples translated from German). In this way, subjects are asked to define the meaning of the utterance more precisely than it is specified "linguistically" in the assumption that those specific forces which differentiate the quantifying effect of "a few" on people from the quantifying effect on mountains or crumbs manifest themselves. We obtain different frequency distributions for different objects: Many people still talk of a dozen crumbs as "a few",but hardly anyone calls a dozen mountains "a few". In what follows we characterize these frequency distributions only by their medians. Ranking these medians we find that the greater the number of objects

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meant by "a few" the smaller these objects are; the corresponding correlation is significant, but not very strong. We obtained, among others, the following medians: a few mountains 4.58 a few shrubs 4.92 a few cars 5.45 a few pills 5.61 a few people 5.72 a few paperclips 7.32 a few crumbs 8.23 While in these examples the quantification is still solely determined by the configuration of "a few" and the specific objects, more complex relationships manifest themselves in a comparison between the following utterances: 4.55 (7) A few people are standing in front of the hut. 5.33 ( 8 ) A few people are standing in front of the house. 6.34 (9) A few people are standing in front of the city hall. 6.69 ( 1 0 ) A few people are standing in front of the building. This is amazing, though intuitively somehow "correct". But there exists no grammar in the world which describes the corresponding rules. Obviously the determination of what is understood by "a few" in these examples cannot result additively from the effect of "a few" plus the effect of "people" plus some effect of "hut", "house" or "building". If we start to imagine the necessary orthodox lexical entries for the component words, we are soon lost. It is as if in each example the quantifier "a few" refers to an undivided whole - "People are standing in front of a hut", "people are standing in front of a house", "people are standing in'front of the city hall" - and that these different wholes have different potentials in case of a connection with "a few". But even this first interpretation is at once rendered questionable by the fact that apart from the determinants described so far there exist others which participate in establishing the meaning of "a few" in a given context. The size of the section of the visual field in which the objects are seen is, for example, of some importance. While "a few cars seen through the window" does not provoke any shift of the median compared to "a few" cars" alone, ( 1 1 ) a few cars seen through a loophole are distinctly less. Furthermore: While the utterances used so far all contained quite static predicates (to stand, can be seen), predicates like "to work", "to quarrel" produce a considerable shift of the profile to the left, i.e., a diminuation of the meaning of "a few". Evidently, in utterances like ( 1 2 ) Through the loophole a few people can be seen quarreling in front of the hut all constituents of the sentence cooperate in determining the quantitative meaning of "a few". The meaning of the utterance partakes of something holistic, whose realization (and mode of action) cannot be described by the terms of "encoding" and "decoding", because these always suggest a sign-by-sign translation. Once more we have to draw upon the vague and unsatisfactory field concept: The hearer derives more information from a sentence than corresponds to the sum of its elements and to the effect of the syntactic instructions for their combination. So far we have demonstrated the forces which directly and indirectly modify meaning in the course of understanding by asking our subjects to define exactly the effect of certain indefinite quantifiers. We found that the subjects understood something holistic, which cannot be explained by the verbal elements alone. We can, however, show similar processes in a rather different context, namely when the

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hearer processes a verbal message together with a visually given situation. Such picture-sentence ensembles often show a distinguishing attribute of wholes: A small change in a certain place provokes an alteration of the whole. We will now illustrate this effect by some examples. It is a well-known effect that the verbal label attributed to a visually given figure influences the memorial representation of this figure (CARMICHAEL, HOGAN & WALTERS, 1 9 3 2 ) . JORG ( 1 9 7 8 ) investigated a somehow different question, namely how the use of a general ("flower") or a specific label ("tulip") influences the precision with which the labeled picture can later be recognized among several similar representations. She found that the use of a general label was less helpful for the discrimination between several similar representations than the use of a specific label. This result was interpreted as showing that the hearer is sort of "attuned" by the verbal label to function on a certain level of differentiation (see also JORG & HORMANN, 1 9 7 8 ) . JbRG therefore postulates a far-reaching effect of the verbal utterance, which is not confined to this picture and this label. This interpretation is supported by the result that the level of differentiation "set" by the verbal label likewise determines the processing of another representation which is seen together with the first one, but which is neither mentioned nor labeled. The "whole" is affected; we call this effect "transmission effect". BRANSFORD & NITSCH ( 1 9 7 8 ) would here point out that the object of verbal understanding was never the (verbal) input (alone), but always a situation-plus-input. We state quite similarly: The "transmission effect" is rendered plausible by the fact that understanding is a holistic process: It is a characteristic mark of such processes that alterations also operate on parts which are not directly affected. The term "transmission effect" stands for the fact that something is valid in the whole field of understanding which is "properly" only to be expected for a certain part of this field. An effect which is quite similar to the attunement to a general or specific level of processing in the experiments just described manifests itself, if subjects are shown a picture of two objects, a steeple and a crane, with the steeple being verbally labeled az.'high" If the subjects are later asked to rate the hight of the crane seen before from memory, they choose higher values than the subjects of a control group. The statement about one object (the steeple) irradiates to the other object (the crane) in the common field. (JORG & HbRMANN, 1 9 8 1 ) . The input, which consists of the verbal utterance plus the visually given situation, allows the comprehender to understand more "holistically" than would be expected from the consideration of the input elements. This does not only become evident in shifts of judgements, but also in the more perceptual process of visual recognition: If subjects are simultaneously shown a cat and a pigeon, both of "normal" weight, and if the cat is labeled as "fat", they then falsely "recognize" a pigeon (out of five alternatives) fatter than the standard pigeon (JbRG & HORMANN, 1 9 8 2 , in prep.). Loosely speaking, in the recognition test the listener does not seem to remember the original target and range of application of the propositional judgement. Similarly, there are indications that the listener of an utterance cannot discriminate which part of what he understands is connotatively due to the wording of the utterance and which part is due to the visual impression of the visible speaker. HORMANN & TERBUYKEN ( 1 9 7 4 ) had their subjects rate short utterances like ( 1 3 ) I trust you on the semantic differential. A second group of subjects rated cartoons of persons on the semantic differential. Finally a third

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group of subjects was presented with cartoons which for example showed a person who had been rated as very high in potency ( P + ) saying to a person who had been rated low in potency (P-) ( 1 3 ) I trust you. Like the subjects of the first group, those of the third group were asked to rate the utterance on the semantic differential. It was found that these ratings often corresponded much more closely to the view imparted by the drawing of the speaker than to the understanding of utterance "as such" - although the subjects were expressly asked to rate the utterance on the semantic differential. Obviously, the utterance and the situation create a more or less coherent state of consciousness in the hearer - a holistic state of understanding which he or she draws upon even when only interviewed about the effect of the input received last. Returning once more to the investigation of indefinite quantifiers, we can and must extend the statement just made to include a rather important nuance: The situation, which is together with the utterance the "object" of understanding (BRANSFORD & NITSCH, 1.978), is obviously, at least in part only, "created" in and by the utterance. The listener (and comprehender) of "In front of the hut there were constructs a semantic description of a hut which then functions itself as determinant for the meaning of "a few people".There are not only the meanings which the isolated words carry along from the lexicon which are pertinent to the factors of understanding, but also that which is only produced in the first states of processing. What has already been understood acts upon what comes in later. As we have just seen, separable effects with a limited sphere of influence often cannot be identified in understanding, at least not in a way that the listener could label them individually. But even then, perhaps the dynamics can be explained, which the partial and separable forces in the field of an utterance exert to sort of reach an internal compromise. Long ago F. HEIDER ( 1 9 4 6 ) pointed to the dynamic tensions which can arise from discrepancies between a person's attitudes and his or her actions. (Freddy loves animals. Freddy slaughters the kitten.) In the context of the constitution of meaning in the course of understanding, which interests us, such tensions were investigated by MERDIAN ( 1 9 7 7 ) . He presented his subjects with pairs of short sentences such as ( 1 4 ) Xey is a pleasant person. I often visit him. ( 1 5 ) Xey is a pleasant person. I rarely visit him. ( 1 6 ) Xey is an unpleasant person. I often visit him. ( 1 7 ) Xey is an unpleasant person. I rarely visit him. Evidently, ( 1 4 ) and ( 1 7 ) are sort of balanced internally, attitude and action are compatible with each other. This is not true for ( 1 5 ) and ( 1 6 1 . MERDIAN investigated the supposition, that this imbalance, which can be noticed in ( 1 5 ) and ( 1 6 ) , might be a dynamic factor, i.e., a factor leading to shifts in the whole field. He had his subjects rate on a numerical scale how often "rarely" and "often" actually were. It was found that "often" received a smaller value in ( 1 6 ) than in ( 1 4 ) , and that "rarely" was given a higher value in ( 1 5 ) than in ( 1 7 ) . This means, in the hearer's field of understanding, autochthonal forces, i.e., forces which only become effective in and with this field, urge for a settlement of imbalance. HbRMANN ( 1 9 7 6 , 1 9 8 1 ) regards this as an example of the concept of "sense constancy" he had introduced.

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DISCUSSION Let us return once more to the starting-point of our reflections. We first asked, how the meaning of an utterance was related to the meanings of the individual words, of which it consisted. The inquiry into the isolated word meanings, into the lexical entries of the words, still expressed the widely accepted notion that a theoretical explanation of the usage of language had to draw upon two essential components, namely a syntax, which governed the admissable combinations of the signs, and a lexicon, where the meanings of the individual words were listed. This notion necessarily generates the problem of how and by what means the lexical entries of the individual words are modified to form the meaning of the utterance as a whole. But what, if we had saddled ourselves with a fictitious problem? - What if there were no lexicon, whose entries always needed modification, but only meanings already? Corresponding reflections or at least approaches which regard the utterance as the essential in language, and a lexicon with unmodified meanings as something of, at best, secondary importance have been discussed in psychology, linguistics and philosophy for some time. AUSTIN asserts "to say a word or a phrase has a meaning, is to say that there are sentences in which it occurs which "have meanings" .... All the dictionary can do when we 'look up the meaning of a word' is to suggest aids to the understanding of sentences in which it occurs" ( 1 9 6 1 , p. 2 4 ) . We wish - with MARGOLIS ( 1 9 7 8 ) - to go still beyond this, because "the theory of language is a specialised part of the theory of human action and behavior and therefore, the meaning of given words and sentences is a function of larger regularities obtained in the full context of human existence" ( 1 9 7 8 , p. 2 6 8 ) . We must now repeat the question as to how understanding is to be defined in this "full context of human existence". It is necessary to refine the conception we held so far. Up to now, we have regarded understanding as a constructive process - as proposed by BRANSFORD and others - which occurs in and with the incoming (verbal) input, in boundary cases a process which happens "on the occasion of" a given input. Now, apart from this, the assumption of a state becomes necessary, a state which prevails in the listener and which is at the most changed by a (verbal, situative ) input. The state of understanding is the awareness of "I-in-the-world", when this awareness gains a minimal amount of distinctness, namely of that distinctness which is accompanied by the feeling of ability to act appropriately if necessary (cf. DEESE, 1 9 6 9 ) . This feeling arises, if and because the relation I-in-the-world is intelligible and sensible. What we have so far loosely called the process of understanding, is therefore, on closer inspection, the step by step modification of a holistic state of understanding, an alteration from one cross section through the stream of consciousness to the next. Between two such moments everything stands still, because the individual just looks on. W. JAMES symptomatically talks about the flights and perchings of consciousness. If an input is received, a whole group of quite different (and usually not conscious) processes are involved, for example the evaluation of prosodic signals, of pauses, of syntactic signals and visual cues. What is taken in can only prevail against a certain inertness as a modification of the largely holistic state of understanding. The modification has to overcome difficulties - the result of the processes of understanding is determined by the prevailing state of understanding. Sometimes more is changed than expected, sometimes less. If it is always the complete state of understanding which can be modified more or less holistically by the input, then this state of understanding is the only foundation for the behavior of the addressee - the listener has no other basis for

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reaction. Do the findings reported above become more intelligible from this point of view? JURG & HURMANN's so-called transmission effect the effect that labeling one part of a picture influences the processing of the remaining parts - must be viewed in a much less particularized way: The judgement adds a colour to the whole which manifests itself even if the subject is later interviewed about another part. The same applies to the investigation by HURMANN & TERBUYKEN: The listener cannot react once only on the basis of the visual, and once exclusively on the basis of the verbal information, but always only on the basis of what he has understood and this is a more or less holistic state. This also holds for the implicit quantification: The listener cannot possibly add such immensely complicated lexical entries (a few - referring to people, seen through a loophole, quarreling) as it first seems. But as it is always the listener's holistic state of understanding that functions as the foundation when he is asked how many a few are in a given context, we get such a differentiated answer. This answer does not mirror the complexity of the corresponding lexical entries - it only seems to do so, if we believe in a lexicon and ask accordingly. We now see the problem, how the lexical meanings of individual words are modified to form the meaning of the utterance as a whole from a rather different point of view. The fact that certain aspects of language can quite well be described linguistically by means of the concept of the lexicon, does not suffice to base the corresponding psychological theories on this concept. We have no store of meanings in which everything that is not being used just now is fixed, in a sort of zero position. We always use the whole lexicon as long as we are awake and understand the world, in which we live. If we divide an utterance into pieces, these are always adapted to the whole. And only if we deliberately try to disregard the effect of this and all former wholes, we can answer questions about the "meanings of isolated words". And even then we don't always succeed: How many are "a few" then? We saddled ourselves with the problem what the words of an utterance carry along from the lexicon and how their meanings are modified to form the meaning of the utterance as a whole, because we presupposed that the use of language starts with isolated words. This presupposition is wrong. But this does not solve our initial problem: What kind of "semantic stock" must the listener dispose of to understand verbal inputs? We must know something (or be capable to do something) to understand, but does this necessarily mean that grasping the meaning of an utterance always involves a recourse to a pre-stored representation of this meaning? We saw that an answer to this question presupposes a solution of the problem of how understanding is related to the grasping of (word) meanings. And this problem still awaits a solution.

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REFERENCES AUSTIN (J.L.). - Philosophical Papers, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1 9 6 1 . BRANSFORD (J.D.), NITSCH (K.E.). - Coming to understand things we could not previously understand, 2 6 7 - 3 0 7 , in KAVANAGH (J.F.), STRANGE (W.), Speech and language in the laboratory, school, and clinic, 1 9 7 8 , Cambridge/Mass., MIT Press. CARMICHAEL (L.), HOGAN (H.P.), WALTER (A.A.). - An experimental study of the effect of language on the reproduction of visually perceived form, J. exp. Psychol., 1 9 3 2 , 15, 73-86. CLARK (H.H.). - Inferring what is meant, 2 9 5 - 3 2 1 , in LEVELT (W.J.M.), FLORES D'ARCAIS (G.B.), Studies in the Perception of Language, 1978.

DEESE (J.).

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FILLENBAUM ( S . ) , RAPAPORT (A.). - Structures in the Subjective Lexicon, New York, 1 9 7 1 . FREGE (G.). - Begriffsschrift, Nebert, Halle, 1 8 7 9 . GARVEY (C.), CARAMAZZA (A.). - Implicit Causality in Verbs, Linguistic Inquiry, 1 9 7 4 , 5, 459-4654. GARVEY (C.), CARAMAZZA (A.), YATES (J.) , Factors influencing assignment of pronoun antecedents. Cognition 1 9 7 5 , 3, 2 2 7 - 2 4 3 . HEIDER ( F . ) . - Attitudes and cognitive organization, J. Psychol., 1946,

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HORMANN (H.). - Meinen und Verstehen, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp-Verlag, 1 9 7 6 . Transl. To mean - to understand. New York, Springer, 1981. HOIRMANN (H.). - Einfiihrung in die Psycholinguistik, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftl. Buchgesellsch., 1 9 8 1 . HORMANN (H.), TERBUYKEN (G.). - Situational factors in Meaning, Psychol. Forschung, 1 9 7 4 , 3 6 , 2 9 7 - 3 1 0 . JAMES (W.). - Principles of Psychology, New York, 1 8 9 0 , Vol. 1. JORG ( S . ) . - Der EinfluB sprachlicher Bezeichnungen auf das Wiedererkennen von Bildern, Bern, Huber, 1 9 7 8 . JORG ( S . ) , HURMANN (H.). The influence of general and specific labels on the recognition of labeled and unlabeled parts of pictures. J. verb. learn. verb. behav., 1 9 7 8 , 1 7 , 4 4 5 - 4 5 4 . JbRG ( S . ) , HORMANN (H.). The influence of verbal specifications on ratings of relative properties of pictures, Psychol. Research, 1 9 8 1 , 4 3 , 361-374. J6RG ( S . ) , HORMANN (H.). Sentences before and after pictures: How do verbal specifications influence picture recognition? in prep. KANOUSE (D.E.). - Verbs as implicit quantifiers, J. verb. learn. verb. behav., 1 9 7 2 , 11, 1 4 1 - 1 4 7 . The boundaries of words and their meanings, in BAILY LABOV (W.). (C.), SHUY (R.), New ways of analysing variation in English, 1 9 7 3 , Washington D.C., Georgetown University Press. MARGOLIS (J.). - The meaning of a word, Metaphilosophy, 1 9 7 8 , 9,

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MERDIAN (F.). Kommunikation uber Personen. Zur Verarbeitung evaluativer XuBerungen durch den Horer, Bochum, Studienverlag Brockmeyer, 1 9 7 7 . MILLER (G.A.), JOHNSON-LAIRD (P.N.). - Language and Perception, Cambridge etc., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1 9 7 6 . PORZIG (W.). - Wesenhafte Bedeutungsbeziehungen, Beitrxge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur, 1 9 3 4 , 5 8 , 7 0 - 9 7 . SCHNELLE (H.). - Meaning constraints, Synthese, 1 9 7 3 , 26, 1 3 - 3 7 . TRIER (J.). Das sprachliche Feld, Neue Jahrbucher f. Wissensch. u . Jugendbildung, 1 9 3 4 , 1 0 , 4 2 8 - 4 4 9 . WEINREICH (V.). - Explorations in semantic theory, 3 9 5 - 4 7 7 , in SEBEOK (T.A.), Current trends in psycholinguistics 1 9 6 6 , The Hague, Mouton. ZADEH (L.A.). - Calculations of fuzzy restrictions, 1 - 3 9 , in ZADEH (L.A.), KING-SUN (F.), KOKICHI (T.), MASAMICHI ( S . ) , Fuzzy Sets and their Applications to Cognitive and Decision Process, 1 9 7 5 , New York, Academic Press Inc.

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THE PROBLEM OF COMPREHENSION AND RECALL OF BROADCAST NEWS

O l l e F i n d a h l and B i r g i t t a H o i j e r Audience and Programme Research Department Swedish B r o a d c a s t i n g C o r p o r a t i o n Stockholm Sweden

Comprehension of b r o a d c a s t news l i k e a l l language comprehension i s a r e s u l t o f an i n t e r a c t i o n between t h e r e a d e r o r l i s t e n e r and t h e c o n t e n t , i t s p r e s e n t a t i o n , f o r m and c o n t e x t . Several o f t h e many o b s t a c l e s t o comprehension a r e discussed i n t h i s paper w i t h i t s p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e i n a l o n g - t e r m p r o j e c t d e a l i n g w i t h t h e comprehension o f news. The p r o j e c t i n c l u d e s b o t h experimental r e s e a r c h w i t h f i c t i t i o u s b u t r e a l i s t i c news programs and a thorough a n a l y s i s of t h e d a i l y news broadcasts. INTRODUCTION Not so l o n g ago t h e o r i e s and r e s e a r c h on language comprehension d e a l t w i t h " l a Langue" i n Saussures's meaning. Researchers' i n t e r e s t l a y i n language as a system and t h e y s t u d i e d i t i n c l a u s e s t h a t were s e p a r a t e and o u t o f c o n t e x t . T h i s l e d t o consequences r e g a r d i n g b o t h t h e i r view o f language and t h e i r d e c i s i o n s as t o which f a c t o r s were most i m p o r t a n t i n t h e process o f comprehension. They t r i e d t o e x p l a i n language comprehension s o l e l y w i t h t h e a i d o f i n t e r n a l 1 i n g u i s t i c components. D u r i n g r e c e n t years,however,the f i e l d o f r e s e a r c h has widened. Now c o h e r e n t t e x t s i n s e r t e d i n t o a more n a t u r a l c o n t e x t a r e s t u d i e d , and t h i s has n e c e s s a r i l y e x t r a c t e d new models of e x p l a n a t i o n and a renewed view b o t h o f language and of what a r e t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e s o f t h e process o f comprehension. The development has come a b o u t c o n c u r r e n t l y w i t h i n s e v e r a l c o n t i g u o u s areas. "Discourse p r o c e s s i n g " i s s t u d i e d w i t h i n c o g n i t i v e psychology and l i n g u i s t i c s (Chafe (1972), K i n t s c h and van D i j k (1975), Rummelhart (19751, Grimes (1975), e t a l . ) , and one t a l k s about "communicative t e x t t h e o r i e s " (Schmidt ( 1 9 7 7 ) ) . The widened f i e l d o f r e s e a r c h has r e s u l t e d i n new problems whose s o l u t i o n s can n o l o n g e r be found o n l y w i t h i n language i t s e l v , b u t a l s o i n t h e i n t e r a c t i o n between t h e t e x t and t h e r e a d e r , and t h e c o n t e x t o f which t h e t e x t i s p a r t . I t i s t h u s i m p o r t a n t t o keep c o n s t a n t l y i n mind t h e f a c t t h a t language comprehension always has a content. Comprehension i s always about something. T h i s c o n t e n t a s p e c t o f language i s e a s i l y f o r g o t t e n i n f a v o u r o f t h e f o r m a l and s t r u c t u r a l p r o p e r t i e s o f language. And i t i s perhaps here, when i t i s a q u e s t i o n of t h e c o n t e n t and i n t e r p r e t a t i v e aspects o f language, t h a t p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c s and c o g n i t i v e t h e o r y a r e most underdeveloped. T h i s i s n o t a c c i d e n t a l , b u t r e f l e c t s t h e c o n d i t i o n which e x i s t s c o n c e r n i n g t h e concept o f meaning w i t h i n t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f language. Ogden and Richards (1923) t r i e d i n t h e i r t i m e t o c r e a t e o r d e r o u t o f t h e m u l t i p l i c i t y and c o n f u s i o n which e x i s t e d then. They found about twenty d i f f e r e n t d e f i n i t i o n s o f 'meaning', s e v e r a l o f which were q u i t e d i v e r s e . I n t h e n e a r l y 60 y e a r s which have passed s i n c e t h e n t h e number o f d e f i n i t i o n s has s c a r c e l y d i m i n i s h e d , and t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e l e v a n c e o f t h e d e f i n i t i o n s i s many t i m e s s t i l l debatable. What i s more, a s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e i s o f t e n m i s s i n g i n t h e Anglo-Saxon t r a d i t i o n .

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Departing from a social perspective, language necessarily becomes a social phenomenon and a theory on the meaning of words must accordingly also be complex. "There are specific relationships between all the components of the sign situation: between people communicating with one another, between people and reality, between people and signs, between signs and other signs within the system" (Schaff (1967)). Such a complex view of the meaning of a word is unusual in the history of the philosophy of language. If we look back we find abrupt changes between two extremes - between the linguistic 'picture theory' and 'language as a game'. We can see this about-turn most clearly in Wittgenstein. The early Wittgenstein (1922) saw language as a picture of reality. He built his picture theory on the old conception thdt everything which i s composed can be broken down into simple, indivisible och invariable components. These components in language are words, or names as Wittgenstein called them. If we just know what the words refer to, than we understand the proposition or the sentence immediately, for it shows its sense, just like a picture does. In picture theory, as Malcolm (1967) has pointed out, propositions have a definitive sense. The late Wittgenstein (1953) denied that we always understand a sentence, even if it is a grammatical correct sentence whose words we do understand. A sentence have a sense only in special circumstances, in other circumstances we do not understand them - that i s , we do not know what to do with them. Wittgenstein abandoned his earlier linguistic picture theory and instead emphasized language as a convention, as a game, where meaning was what one had determined - according to the convention - that the language should mean. The meanings of the words which had earlier been seen as being objectively generally applicable and invariable, became with the theory of the language game fortuitous and determined only by the language games they were part of. But the meaning of a word is not indefinite and fortuitous, something constantly varying and being changed. Here Wittgenstein went too far. Nor is the meaning of word as advocated by the picture theory, invariable and given and only a manifestation of a declarative content. Every word has a meaning within a limited area o f application, every word is an inneritance from the past and its limitations are determined by that part of reality beyond language to which the word refers. If we look at a whole sentence, not only the single words but also the grammatical construction of the clauses set up limitations for what they can mean. Within these limitations a single word or a particular clause gets its meaning from the context of which it is a part (Gardiner (1932)). EXAMINATION OF THE NEWS How, then, should comprehension of language be characterized and how should it be studied? Well, if we assume that language when used is a social phenomenon and that one of its main functions i s to communicate something, to inform somebody about something, then we must, in order to grasp what it is that is understood, study language in the concrete situation of its usage. We must study the comprehension of a certain content in a certain context, and we must seek to find out as much as possible about this linguistic content and the context o f which it i s a part. Suitable for a study of this kind is the comprehension of the news on radio and television. There are several reasons for this:

- The comprehension process takes place within a well-defined situation, well known t o everyone and recurring daily.

- Most people have a genuine interest in trying to understand what the news is about, even if that interest can be mixed with other motives.

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The news t e x t s f o l l o w f i x e d r u l e s i n t h e i r c o n s t r u c t i o n and c o n s t i t u t e a c l e a r l y d i s c e r n i b l e n a r r a t i v e genre.

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For t h e most f r e q u e n t l y o c c u r r i n g news events t h e r e a r e p r o b a b l y w e l l developed sc hemas o f Comprehension.

I n a d d i t i o n t o t h i s , some s p e c i a l c o n d i t i o n s c r e a t e p a r t i c u l a r problems. I t has been known f o r a l o n g t i m e t h a t t h e new and unknown o n l y can be understood a g a i n s t t h e background o f and i n r e l a t i o n t o what i s a l r e a d y known. Therefore, he who wishes t o communicate a message t o a n o t h e r person must connect i t s y s t e m a t i c a l l y w i t h what makes up t h e o t h e r p e r s o n ' s e s t a b l i s h e d and experienced world. The p r e r e q u i s i t e s f o r communicating a message a r e t h a t t h e speaker speaks on t h e l i s t e n e r ' s premises and t h a t t h e l i s t e n e r l i s t e n s on t h e s p e a k e r ' s premises (Rommetv e i t (1974)). T h i s i s a major problem f o r news comprehension, where a h o s t o f new i n f o r m a t i o n , on new c o n d i t i o n s o r new r e l a t i o n s h i p s between such t h i n g s as a r e a l r e a d y known, a r e presented r a p i d l y t o a v e r y deverse audience w i t h d i f f e r i n g background, exp e r i e n c e and knowledge. Technical p r o g r e s s has made i t p o s s i b l e t o overcome d i s tances i n t i m e and space, b u t t h e q u e s t i o n i s whether one has a l s o succeeded i n overcoming p s y c h o l o g i c a l d i s t a n c e and t h e t r a d i t i o n a l b a r r i e r s t o comprehension. News producers r e g r e t t a b l y r a r e l y know about t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e i r audience, t h e i r e x p e c t a t i o n s , experiences and knowledge. THE PROBLEMS

OF NEWS

COMPREHENSION

T h i s s t a t e o f a f f a i r s i s r e f l e c t e d i n many i n t e r v i e w s w i t h t h e audiences o f news programmes. An o l d i s h woman w i t h l i t t l e formal e d u c a t i o n who p a r t i c i p a t e d i n one o f o u r i n v e s t i g a t i o n s expressed h e r s e l f i n t h i s way: " I t ' s odd, s i t t i n g t h e r e watching news on TV. I t ' s as though I somehow w a s n ' t l i s t e n i n g though I ' m s i t t i n g t h e r e l i s t e n i n g , a l l t h e same." T h i s f e e l i n g o f n o t understanding, o f n o t p e n e t r a t i n g t h e s u r f a c e o f a l l t h e words and p i c t u r e s seemed t o h e r l i k e she must n o t r e a l l y be l i s t e n i n g , a l t h o u g h she i n f a c t s a t t h e r e t r y i n g h e r b e s t t o understand. One c o u l d say t h a t i n t h i s case t h e r e e x i s t e d an i n v i s i b l e b a r r i e r between what happened w h i t i n t h e language and t h e person l i s t e n i n g t o i t . Someone has c a l l e d i t " t h e o p a c i t y o f language", language b e i n g b u t a s u r f a c e , a s e r i e s o f words, i n which t h e l i s t e n e r i s unable t o d e v i n e any meaning. The words r e f e r t o t h i n g s beyond t h e r e a l m o f t h e l i s t e n e r ' s knowledge and experience, and t h u s t h e b a s i c p r e c o n d i t i o n s f o r communication a r e l a c k i n g . I t i s t h i s k i n d o f f i n d i n g t h a t has c o n s t i t u t e d one o f o u r p o i n t s o f d e p a r t u r e i n o u r long-range p r o j e c t around news and comprehension. Why a r e t h e problems o f comprehension so g r e a t ? What a r e t h e reasons? We must on t h e one hand t a k e i n t o account here t h e l i n g u i s t i c c o n t e n t and how i t i s presented, and on t h e o t h e r hand t h e e x p e c t a t i o n s o f t h e l i s t e n e r s and t h e i r knowledge, and t h e i n t e r a c t i o n between these. I n comprehension t h e r e i s something t h a t happens as a ' t h o u g h t - w i s e movement' a t t h e p o i n t o f i n t e r s e c t i o n between o u r c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e w o r l d and t h e w o r l d we encounter. It i s a m a t t e r o f a mutual i n t e r a c t i o n and i n accordance w i t h t h e h e r m e n e u t i s t s we should h e r e be a b l e t o say t h a t t h e t e x t , m e t a p h o r i c a l l y speaking, i s as a c t i v e a p a r t i c i p a n t as t h e r e a d e r / l i s t e n e r . The process o f comprehension i s n o t a p a s s i v e process, n o r i s t h e t e x t an i n a n i m a t e o b j e c t . I n stead, t h e t e x t makes demands, opening t h e way f o r i d e a s and p r e s e n t i n g a l i m i t e d number o f i n t e r p r e t a t i v e a l t e r n a t i v e s . The r e a d e r / l i s t e n e r f o r h i s p a r t i s l i m i t ed by p r e v i o u s knowledge and experience, by e x p e c t a t i o n s and t h e s o c i a l e n v i r o n ment i n which h e l i v e s . The c o n t e n t o f t h e t e x t can t h u s be s a i d t o e x i s t " o n l y i n t h e i n t e r a c t i o n between t h e communicative s t r u c t u r e o f t h e t e x t and t h e r e a d e r " (Jauss ( 1 9 7 0 ) ) .

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B u t before we move on t o a closer analysis o f thes complex process, l e t us f i r s t briefly give some general ch ar act er i s t i cs of news comprehension as they proved t o be in retention studies. THE FIRST CHARACTERISTIC FEATURE OF NEWS COMPREHENSION

The r e s u l t s are based in the f i r s t instance on a s erie s of experimental investigations where we had people watch or l i s t e n t o short (roughly 7 min. long) radio o r TV news programmes. The programmes were professionally produced, with the same structure as one of the news programmes transmitted daily, composed of true-tol i f e b u t f i c t i t i o u s news in the form of telegrams - news which could have happened on the days during which the investigations were carried o u t . After having l i s tened t o or watched a programme, the audience, in a l l nearly one thousand men a n d women of a l l ages were asked t o answer questions in writing on the content of the various news items. The f i r s t thing one notices when studying what people remember, i s the great wealth of variety. Some people remember things here and there in the programmes, some remember only a few separate items, others remember only fragments, while a few recall a great deal from most of the news. This wealth of variety can be ascribed t o the great differences in people's experiences, t h e i r knowledge and conditions of l i f e . The unemployed man who has been forced to move from the north of Sweden t o Stockholm has no problems retaining a news item about a large order t o a company in the northern parts of the country. Those who know about and who follow events in Latin America remember a news item about a s t a t e of emergency having been proclaimed in Peru, while t h i s particular news telegram may be t o t a l l y overlooked by most of the others.

B u t in sp i t e of the differences between what individual people grasp, we can discern c l e a r patterns when we compile the answers. We see then t h a t a majority of the individual variations are socially conditioned. The reasons for t h i s a re t o be found f a r a f i e l d of language. I n one o f our investigations (Findahl and Hoijer ( 1 9 7 4 ) ) , apart from l e t t i n g the subjects watch a news programme, we had them answer a number of general knowledge questions, a s o r t of t e s t on t h e i r knowledge of current a f f a i r s . The re sults showed t h a t those who were well u p in t h e i r knowledge of current a f f a i r s and who were well informed recalled twice as much of the news as those who knew l i t t e l about current events, in s p i t e of the f act that the l a t t e r participated in the programmes equally attentively. This kind of quantitative measure however t e l l s f a r from the whole truth. The greatest differences in recall were found f o r news on industry and the labour market and f o r news from 'unusual' countries such as Latin America and Eastern Europe. On the other hand the differences are small a n d even somewhat reversed f o r news concerning subjects close t o real l i f e , such as a news item on increased postal r a te s, on a new method t o trace hereditary disposition t o hearing defects, and a news item on mother-care insurance in the United States. The l a t t e r shows tha t i t i s a matter of psychological proximity rather t h a n a geographical one. The reasons f o r the differences in recollection ar e t o be found in the circumstance th a t the group with poor knowledge of current a f f a i r s in particular was made u p o f women of a l l ages with a low level of education. They have few opportunities t o read the newspaper in peace and quite or t o keep u p with what i s happening via the news. By tradition they look a f t e r t h e i r homes and children and often also have an outside job, as well. I n the group a t the other extreme, those with good general knowledge and good knowledge of current a f f a i r s , we find many highly-educated middle-aged men. Here, higher education with a l l t h a t involves of habitual reading and the habit of deal-

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i n g w i t h v e r b a l i n f o r m a t i o n i s n o t t h e o n l y f a c t o r which comes i n t o p l a y . A l s o o f importance i s t h e s o c i a l p o s i t i o n and r o l e o f t h e h i g h l y educated person: i n t e l l e c t u a l l y s t i m u l a t i n g work, work which i s n o t p h y s i c a l l y t r y i n g , w i t h many o p p o r t u n i t i e s o f keeping up w i t h t h e stream o f i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e newspapers, on r a d i o and TV. COMPREHENSION AND KNOWLEDGE Common f o r a l l comprehension i s i t s dependence on o u r p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e and knowledge. We can see o u r comprehension as a r e s u l t o f a r e c o l l e c t i o n i n conn e c t i o n w i t h t h e i m p l i c i t , subconscious q u e s t i o n : " I s t h e r e any i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h i s message t h a t w i l l make i t meaningful i n terms o f what I a l r e a d y know?" ( C o l l i n s and Q u i l l i a n ( 1 9 7 2 ) ) Thus, o u r comprehension o f t h e message i n v o l v e s t h e subconscious p r o c e s s i n g o f an enormus amount o f knowledge t h a t does n o t occupy t h e c e n t e r o f o u r a t t e n t i o n a t t h e moment. The p r o c e s s i n g o r a c t i v a t i o n o f t h i s knowledge o c c u r s i n t h e p e r i p h e r y o f o u r consciousness and c o n s t i t u t e s t h e i m p l i c i t b u t subconscious p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r o u r a s s i m i l a t i o n o f new i n f o r m a t i o n . T h i s i s " t a c i t " knowledge, we a r e unaware o f t h e f a c t t h a t we possess i t o r t h a t i t has been a c t i v a t e d ( P o l a n y i ( 1 9 6 7 ) ) . The process i s u s u a l l y so q u i c k and a u t o m a t i c t h a t we become aware o f i t o n l y when we f a i l t o comprehend something. Not o n l y i s l i n g u i s t i c competence r e q u i r e d f o r language comprehension b u t a l s o subj e c t competence, something o f t e n f o r g o t t e n when i n v e s t i g a t i n g language comprehens i o n and o f t e n n o t d i s c o v e r e d when homogeneous groups o f h i g h l y - e d u c a t e d s u b j e c t s a r e used i n i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , such as, f o r example, s t u d e n t s o f psychology. One c l e a r example o f t h e d e t e r m i n i n g importance o f knowledge i s t o be found i n one o f o u r news b u l l e t i n s about t h e p r o c l a m a t i o n o f a s t a t e o f emergency i n Peru. Many had d i f f i c u l t y i n r e c a l l i n g t h i s news i t e m . But i t was most d i f f i c u l t o f a l l f o r those who knew n o t h i n g about Peru and who c o u l d n o t p l a c e t h e c o u n t r y on t h e map g e o g r a p h i c a l l y . None o f those f o r whom Peru was o n l y an empty word c o u l d r e c o l l e c t t h e news telegram. Only t h o s e w i t h a c e r t a i n amount o f elementary knowledge about Peru c o u l d r e c a l l something o f t h e telegram. Comprehension can o f c o u r s e o c c u r on many d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s , f r o m comprehension o f i n d i v i d u a l words t o comprehension o f c o h e r e n t n a r r a t i o n s , from s u p e r f i c i a l comprehension o f t h e c o n t e n t t o a comprehension o f t h e more profound meaning o f a message, f r o m comprehension o f i n d i v i d u a l fragments t o comprehension o f o v e r l a p p i n g wholes. U s u a l l y these l e v e l s i n t e r a c t i n a complex manner. The processes proceed b o t h from l o w e r t o h i g h e r l e v e l s and v i c e versa. It i s not a question o f a sequential s e r i e s o f analyses, where one l e v e l must be d e a l t w i t h b e f o r e t h e process reaches t h e n e x t stage. (Most comprehension models have t h i s c h a r a c t e r . ) The process o f comprehension works s i m u l t a n e o u s l y f r o m o v e r l a p p i n g p e r s p e c t i v e s o f t h e whole t o a n a l y s i s o f fragments, and f r o m fragments t o s y n t h e s i s o f t h e whole. I n o r d e r t o understand a n a r r a t i o n , i t i s t h u s n o t enough t o understand t h e meaning o f i n d i v i d u a l words and sentences. Besides t h i s , one must be a b l e t o h o l d t o an o v e r l a p p i n g scheme o f events. I n t h e w o r l d o f news, where s i m i l a r news events a r e c o n s t a n t l y b e i n g repeated, t h e r e a r e good o p p o r t u n i t i e s o f d e v e l o p i n g schemes bound t o a s i t u a t i o n , which can be h e l p f u l t o comprehension. I t i s a q u e s t i o n of g r o u p i n g knowledge, concepts, a s s o c i a t i o n s which on an o v e r l a p p i n g a b s t r a c t plane c o n s t i t u t e a s o r t o f prototype f o r the s i t u a t i o n . Most o f us have a t l e a s t p a r t i a l s c e n a r i o s c o n c e r n i n g a c c i d e n t s , such as boat a c c i d e n t s and t r a i n c a t a s t r o p h e s , s c e n a r i o s c o n c e r n i n g m e d i a t o r y peace expedit i o n s , press conferences, i n d u s t r i a l c r i s e s and e l e c t i o n campaigns; events which r e c u r and a r e repeated i n news r e p o r t i n g . T h i s ought t o f a c i l i t a t e comprehension,

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a t l e a s t o f what k i n d o f news e v e n t t h e r e p o r t i s about. B u t f o r more p r o f o u n d comprehension, f o r o u r a b i l i t y t o g i v e t h e news events a meaning, we must be a b l e t o p l a c e t h e events i n t o a c o n t e x t , g e t t o know something about i t s causes and background, we must grasp t h e meaning o f t h e events, i t s r e s u l t s and consequences. THE SECOND CHARACTERISTIC FEATURE OF NEWS COMPREHENSION What, then, a r e news programmes l i k e ? Are we g i v e n t h e s e o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r a more profound understanding? B e f o r e we t r y t o answer t h i s q u e s t i o n l e t us f i r s t l o o k a l i t t l e more c l o s e l y a t what we m i g h t c a l l t h e q u a l i t y o f news comprehension. We have p r e v i o u s l y d e s c r i b e d t h e d i f f e r e n c e s between how people r e c o l l e c t d i f f e r e n t news t o p i c s , and we have a l s o d e s c r i b e d t h e d i f f e r e n c e s between h i g h l y educated w i t h good general knowledge and those w i t h poor knowledge o f c u r r e n t a f f a i r s . We a s c r i b e t h i s w e a l t h o f v a r i e t y t h e f i r s t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e o f news comprehension - t o s o c i a l f a c t o r s . B u t i n s p i t e o f t h e g r e a t q u a n t i t a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e s , something i n t h e news t e x t s causes s i m i l a r r e c o l l e c t i o n p a t t e r n s t o r e c u r f r o m person t o person and f r o m one news e v e n t t o t h e o t h e r . The most c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e o f t h i s r e c o l l e c t i o n p a t t e r n i s t h a t i t c o n s i s t s o f events t a k e n o u t o f c o n t e x t and appended t o something a l r e a d y w e l l known, u s u a l l y a well-known person o r a well-known geographic place, f o r example: "Such-and-such happened i n P a r i s " , o r " P r e s i d e n t Reagan has s a i d such-and-such'' o r "The t e x t i l e i n d u s t r y has a c e r tain difficulty". Sometimes t h e s e mental p i c t u r e s a r e somewhat more complete: "There were demonstrations i n P a r i s " , " P r e s i d e n t Reagan promised l o w e r taxes", "The Government has h e l p e d t h e t e x t i l e i n d u s t r y , which i s i n d i f f i c u l t y " .

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Thus, besides an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e t y p e o f news e v e n t i n q u e s t i o n , m a i n l y more o r l e s s well-known persons a r e remembered f r o m t h e news telegrams. M a i n l y answers t o t h e q u e s t i o n s "who" and "where" a r e remembered. On t h e o t h e r hand t h e r e a r e few who can r e c o l l e c t t h e background t o t h e event o r "why" t h e event t o o k p l a c e , o r which r e s u l t s i t can be expected t o have. THE THIRD CHARACTERISTIC FEATURE OF NEWS COMPREHENSION Another c h a r a c t e r s t i c f e a t u r e o f what people r e c o l l e c t o f t h e news i s t h e many misunderstandings and d i s t o r t i o n s o f t h e o r i g i n a l news c o n t e n t which occur. These misunderstandings a r e r a r e l y a c c i d e n t a l , i t i s r a t h e r so, as i n B a r t l e t t ' s (1932) c l a s s i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , t h a t t h e l i s t e n e r f i l l s i n h i s l a p s e s o f memory, o r r e c o n s t r u c t s 'new' events by b l e n d i n g t o g e t h e r p a r t s f r o m d i f f e r e n t news i t e m s o r by a d d i n g d e t a i l s f r o m h i s own p r e v i o u s knowledge and schemes o f events. As an example can be mentioned t h e c o n f u s i o n o f two d i f f e r e n t news i t e m s on demons t r a t i o n s . The one i t e m d e a l t w i t h encounters between p o l i c e and demonstrators i n P a r i s , and t h e o t h e r w i t h a b y c y c l e demonstration a g a i n s t a u t o m o b i l e exhaust fumes i n a Swedish town. I n c o n t r a s t t o t h e demonstration i n P a r i s t h i s l a t t e r demons t r a t i o n was v e r y q u i e t and no p o l i c e were i n v o l v e d . Many l i s t e n e r s confused t h e news items. Some, f o r example, had g o t t h e impression t h a t t h e b y c y c l e demonstrat i o n had r e s u l t e d i n an encounter w i t h t h e p o l i c e , i n which s e v e r a l Swedish demons t r a t o r s had been s e r i o u s l y i n j u r e d . There a r e many f a c t o r s a t work here, some t o u c h i n g on t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e news and i t s p r e s e n t a t i o n , and some t o u c h i n g on t h e personal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e l i s t e n e r . When s i m i l a r news events a r e p l a c e d n e x t t o each o t h e r i n a news programme t h i s i n v i t e s confusion, i n t h e same way t h a t b a d l y s t r u c t u r e d and u n c l e a r l y formul a t e d news telegrams i n v i t e misunderstanding.

I n one o f o u r i n v e s t i g a t i o n s ( F i n d a h l and H o i j e r (1973)) i t t u r n e d o u t t h a t b o t h t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e news and t h e t y p e o f news event had an e f f e c t on t h e number o f misunderstandings. Here, knowledge about t h e scheme o f e v e n t s and knowledge about

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t h e i n d i v i d u a l components o f t h e c o n t e n t b o t h make a d i f f e r e n c e . U n f a m i l i a r cont e n t i n s e r t e d i n t o an unusual t y p e o f news e v e n t l e d t o few misunderstandings, w h i l e few p e o p l e r e c a l l e d t h e e v e n t i t s e l f . There was q u i t e s i m p l y n o t h i n g t o f i l l o u t t h e i r l a p s e s o f memory w i t h and no s k e l e t o n (scheme o f e v e n t s ) t o p u t f l e s h on. U n f a m i l i a r c o n t e n t p l a c e d w i t h i n a well-known scheme o f events ( a usual t y p e o f news e v e n t ) l e d , on t h e o t h e r hand, t o many misunderstandings. I n most cases, however, i t i s a f a r more c o m p l i c a t e d t a s k t o e x p l a i n misunderstandings and changes i n t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e news.

So f a r we have discussed knowledge and t h e scheme o f events as a fundamental p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r comprehension, b u t we should f o r t h a t m a t t e r n o t f o r g e t how t h e news i s presented and how news i t e m s a r e p u t t o g e t h e r . We must a l s o ask o u r s e l v e s how much o f t h e comprehension problems can be r e f e r r e d t o t h e a c t u a l wordings, t h e c h o i c e o f words and t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e news telegram. CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

I n a c o u p l e o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n s we e x p e r i m e n t a l l y v a r i e d t h e s t r u c t u r e o f news t e l e grams. We have t h e r e e x p l o i t e d t h e f a c t t h a t news t e x t s a r e produced w i t h i n a j o u r n a l i s t i c t r a d i t i o n , which f o l l o w s s e t s t a n d a r d models. News i s a b o u t events. Events o c c u r i n p l a c e s ( s i t e s ) . Someone i s a l s o i n v o l v e d , o r s e v e r a l p e o p l e a r e . There a r e reasons f o r t h e event t a k i n g p l a c e , and t h e y have produced o r w i l l p r o duce consequences. These b a s i c components, which a t t h e same t i m e c o n s t i t u t e answers t o t h e j o u r n a l i s t i c standard q u e s t i o n s - What? Who? Why? What consequence? - a r e i n t e r r e l a t e d . Together t h e y f o r m a s t r u c t u r e which can be d e s c r i b e d g r a p h i c a l l y a c c o r d i n g t o F i g u r e 1.

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Principals Figure 1 S t r u c t u r e o f Events The m a j o r i t y o f t h e news i t e m s are, however, much more c o m p l i c a t e d t h a n a s shown i n t h e f i g u r e . They may i n c l u d e c h a i n s o f events, s e v e r a l main personages, i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e cause can be m i s s i n g , and so on. Thus, b a s i c components can be combined i n many ways. W i t h i n t h e framework o f a s h o r t e r news programme we changed t h e l a y o u t o f 5 o u t o f 13 news items ( F i n d a h l and H o i j e r (1972)). We used r e p e t i t i o n , f o r m u l a t e d as r e f o r m u l a t i o n s and woven i n t o t h e news t e x t s i n a n a t u r a l f a s h i o n . We compared t h e mental p i c t u r e s f r o m t h e o r i g i n a l compact news b u l l e t i n s w i t h what was r e c a l l e d o f t h e i t e m s t e x t s when t h e p l a c e and t h o s e i n v o l v e d ( t h e p r i n c i p a l s ) were repeated, o r when t h e causes o f t h e events o r t h e i r consequences were repeated, r e s p e c t i v e l y . (See F i g u r e 2.)

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Figure 2 Audience R e c a l l o f News Items Presented i n B r i e f w i t h no R e p e t i t i o n s , Compared w i t h D i f f e r e n t Kinds o f R e p e t i t i o n s (The p l u s equals improvement i n 1i s t e n e r r e c a l l ) The r e s u l t s ( F i g u r e 2 ) showed t h a t m a i n l y t h e s i t e where t h e e v e n t occured and t h e p r i n c i p a l s i n v o l v e d i n t h e e v e n t were remembered when t h e news was p r e s e n t e d i n a c o n c i s e and compact b u l l e t i n . When, l a t e r on, t h e l o c a t i o n and those i n v o l v e d were r e i t e r a t e d , t h i s skew mental p i c t u r e was i n t e n s i f i e d . C o n c i d e r a b l y f e w e r people r e c a l l e d t h e causes and consequences o f t h e events. When, on t h e o t h e r hand, t h e cause o r t h e consequence was repeated, t h e i r mental p i c t u r e was a l t e r e d i n a more r a d i c a l manner. P a r t l y t h e y r e c a l l e d t h e t h i n g s repeated b e t t e r b u t even t h e r e s t o f t h e c o n t e n t , t h a t which had n o t been repeated, was a l s o b e t t e r r e c a l l e d . Improvements o f 10% o r more i n l i s t e n e r r e c a l l a r e s i g n i f i c a n t , p <.01. The i m p o r t a n t t h i n g i s , as i t t u r n e d o u t , n o t t h e amount o f r e p e t i t i o n s ( i n one v e r s i o n we repeated b o t h l o c a t i o n , t h e p r i n c i p l e s i n v o l v e d , cause and consequence, which gave a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h e same r e s u l t as when o n l y t h e consequence was repeated), b u t what i t i s t h a t i s repeated. The i m p o r t a n t t h i n g i s t o emphasize t h o s e t h i n g s t h a t x e t h e l i s t e n e r a framework, a c o n t e x t , an o p p o r t u n i t y o f b i n d i n g t o g e t h e r t h e d i f f e r e n t p a r t s o f t h e event. F o r news comprehension t h e casual r e l a t i o n s p l a y t h i s k i n d o f c o n n e c t i n g r o l e . The same goes f o r much o t h e r comprehension, which has been known f o r a l o n g time. Kant (1787) even h e l d t h e o p i n i o n t h a t causal r e l a t i o n s h i p s were so fundamental t o o u r way o f t h i n k i n g t h a t they, a p r i o r i , must be assumed t o e x i s t as a p r e d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h e human c o n s t i t u t i o n . Schank (1975), Schank and Abelson (1977) and Mandler and Johnson (1977) have i n o t h e r c o n t e x t s a l s o p o i n t e d o u t t h e s i g n i f i cance o f causal r e l a t i o n s h i p s and t h e i r c e n t r a l p o s i t i o n i n t h e process o f comprehension. Thus, as t h e r e s u l t s above show w i t h g r e a t c l a r i t y , causal r e l a t i o n s h i p s must be g i v e n a prominent r o l e i n news t e x t s , o t h e r w i s e t h e r i s k i s g r e a t t h a t t h e l i s t e n -

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e r s will n o t succeed in picturing a situation into which they can f i t the news event a n d see how everything f i t s together.

In a l a t e r follow-up study (Findahl a n d Hoijer ( 1 9 7 6 ) ) with television news programmes we used b o t h verbal repetitions and visual aids ( s t i l l pictures, drawings, superimposed captions) in order t o bring o u t and emphasize different parts of the structure of events. (See figure 3 . ) %

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Figure 3 Audience Recall of News Items Presented in Brief with No Other Visual I l l u s t r a t i o n t h a n the On-Camera News-Caster, Compared with Different Kinds of Presentation (The plus equals improvement in viewer r e c a l l ) All versions gave the same r e s u l t : the emphasis must l i e on the connecting causal relationships. I t makes no difference, then, whether one uses verbal r e p e t i t i o n s , drawings, s t i l l pictures, e t c . f o r t h i s purpose. Improvements of 10% or more in viewer recall a r e s i g n i f i c a n t , p <.01. The important thing i s not the techinque, b u t the content of the pictures and the repetition. (There are of course also differences between different types of i l l u s t r a t i o n s . Every technique has i t s particular problems. B u t that i s another story.) NEWS PROGRAMMES TRANSMITTED DAILY

We have now gained a clue as t o some of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c features of news comprehension. The question i s in what manner the news events a r e placed i n context in the news programmes transmitted every day. The answer t o t h a t question i s t o be found in the news programmes themselves, a n d a careful examination shows t h a t in many cases there i s a lack o f background and causal description of the news events. I n those cases where any such descriptions e x i s t they a r e only given in passing, often in a subordinate clause (Findahl a n d Hoijer (1979, 1980)).

On examination of the news programmes transmitted every day via Swedish radio and television we have combined two analyses. Partly, we have made a structural ana-

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l y s i s where t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n elements a r e t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f events which we des c r i b e d e a r l i e r ( f i g u r e 1 ) and t h e c o n n e c t i n g l i n k s a r e composed o f l o g i c a l , i n p a r t i c u l a r causal, r e l a t i o n s h i p s . One can say t h a t we have analysed what k i n d s o f i n f o r m a t i o n a r e g i v e n and how t h e s e a r e r e l a t e d t o one another. To t h i s we have added an a n a l y s i s o f c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y , an a n a l y s i s where t h e news items a r e examined s t e p by s t e p as sentence i s added t o sentence, p i c t u r e t o p i c t u r e , and w h i l e meanings and s i g n i f i c a n c e a r e c r e a t e d . Here, p i c t u r e compos i t i o n , tempo, breaks, v e r b a l c l a r i t y , t a c i t i n t i m a t i o n s , etc., etc., a r e t a k e n i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n , w h i l e we a n a l y s e what i s emphasized and what comes t o t h e f o r e . A g u i d e l i n e f o r t h e a n a l y s i s i s t h a t every a s p e c t o r d e t a i l must be seen i n i t s c o n t e x t and be placed i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e s p e c i f i c c o n t e n t o f t h e news item. Such a c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y a n a l y s i s shows t h a t t h e r e a r e many more problems o f comprehension t h a n t h o s e p r e v i o u s l y mentioned i n h e r e n t i n t h e news programmes. The news i t e m s o f t e n c o n t a i n e d t a c i t i n t i m a t i o n s and r e f e r e n c e s , and t h e p u b l i c had t o know i n advance what i t was a l l about. The news i t e m s c o n t a i n e d l i n g u i s t i c o b s c u r i t i e s : e.g. c o n t r a d i c t o r y i n f o r m a t i o n o r key concepts o f which no one e v e r e x p l a i n e d t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e , B u t t h e language i t s e l f was n e a r l y always grammatical c o r r e c t w i t h complete sentences, as Svensson (1981) has showed. The t e l e v i s i o n news programmes o f t e n c o n t a i n e d i r r e l e v a n t and d i s t r a c t i n g p i c t u r e compositions. The p i c t u r e c o m p o s i t i o n had v e r y l i t t l e c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e v e r b a l c o n t e n t and c o n t i n u o u s c u t s , movements, zoom-ins and pans occurred. The r i s k i s t h e n g r e a t t h a t t h e a t t e n t i o n o f t h e v i e w e r i s so caught up w i t h t h e p i c t u r e s t h a t i t becomes d i f f i c u l t t o grasp t h e v e r b a l i n f o m a t i o n . Many news i t e m s were a l s o b a d l y c o n s t r u c t e d . They l a c k e d a main theme, and t h e i t e m s c o u l d d i s i n t e g r a t e i n t o d i f f e r e n t p a r t s whose connections e r e never accounted f o r . We mentioned e a r l i e r t h e t a c i t agreement t h a t must e x i s t between t h e speaker and t h e l i s t e n e r . He who wishes t o be understood adapts h i s way o f speaking t o t h e l i s t e n e r , and as l o n g a s he/she does so, s e t t i n g o u t f r o m t h e common knowledge t h a t t h e y b o t h share, t h e l i s t e n e r t r i e s t o understand. I n terms o f t h e news i t e m s we have analysed i t i s obvious t h a t t h e t a c i t agreement h e l d i s t h a t between t h e news r e p o r t e r and t h e small s e c t i o n o f t h e audience which i s f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e s u b j e c t and which belongs t o t h e i n i t i a t e d . Most o f t e n i t i s a q u e s t i o n o f h i g h l y educated, a c t i v e people o f h i g h s o c i a l s t a n d i n g . The agreement w i t h t h e r e s t o f t h e audience i s broken t i m e and a g a i n . CONCLUSION

We can now summarize: Comprehension o f news i s dependent on many f a c t o r s . We have t o t a k e i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n f a c t o r s o f c o n t e n t , and t h e i n t e r a c t i o n between t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e t e x t and t h e l i s t e n e r ' s knowledge and experience. We must a l s o pay r e g a r d t o f a c t o r s o f p r e s e n t a t i o n , i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e t o those h a v i n g t o do w i t h t h e c o m p o s i t i o n o f t h e t e x t and i t s s t r u c t u r e , which have a p r i n c i p a l s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r what i n t h e c o n t e n t w i l l come i n t o t h e foreground.

To conclude, we w i s h t o emphasize t h a t we b e l i e v e t h a t

i t i s necessary i n o r d e r t o g e t a t t h e most i m p o r t a n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e s o f t h e comprehension process t h a t t h e y be s t u d i e d i n a c o n c r e t e s i t u a t i o n i n t h e manner i n which t h e y o c c u r i n t h e d a i l y l i f e o f people. The r e s u l t s t h a t we have p o i n t e d o u t here show c e r t a i n g e n e r a l l y a p p l i c a b l e f e a t u r e s which p r o b a b l y d i s t i n g u i s h a l l comprehension, b u t t h e r e s u l t s must a t t h e same t i m e be e v a l u a t e d f r o m t h e s p e c i a l c o n d i t i o n s which e x i s t f o r t h e comprehension o f news on r a d i o and t e l e v i s i o n . The h i g h tempo, t h e amount o f new i n f o r m a t i o n on s u b j e c t s u n f a m i l i a r t o many, even though embedded i n well-known schemes o f events, p l a c e g r e a t demands on t h e l i s t e n e r , w h i l e he has no chance t o go back i n t h e t e x t , and small chance o f f o r m i n g h i s own d e d u c t i o n s and s p e c u l a t i o n s . T h i s most l i k e l y g i v e s an i n c r e a s e d importance t o s t r u c t u r a l

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q u a l i t i e s i n t h e news t e x t s .

APPENDIX An Example o f How One Message Was A m p l i f i e d I n t h e TV-News Program ( F i g u r e 3 ) : Basic message w i t h no repet it i o n s

Several persons were s e r i o u s l y i n j u r e d today d u r i n g a demonstrat i o n i n a suburb o f P a r i s , where a p p r o x i m a t e l y one-hundred A l g e r i a n immigrants demonstrated i n p r o t e s t o f t h e m i s e r a b l e housing c o n d i t i o n s i n t h e c i t y ' s slums. P o l i c e used b o t h t e a r gas and water-cannon t o d i s p e r s e t h e crowd.

Repetition o f causes and consequences

Several persons were s e r i o u s l y i n j u r e d today d u r i n g a demonstrat i o n i n a suburb o f P a r i s , where a p p r o x i m a t e l y one-hundred A l g e r i a n immigrants demonstrated i n p r o t e s t o f t h e m i s e r a b l e housing c o n d i t i o n i n t h e c i t y ' s slums. P o l i c e used t e a r gas and water-cannon t o d i s p e r s e t h e crowd. Several o f t h e demonstrat o r s , who demanded b e t t e r housing, were r e p o r t e d t o be i n c r i t i c a l c o n d i t i o n t h i s evening.

REFERENCES: B a r t l e t t , F.C.,

Remembering (1932) (Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, London, 1967)

Chafe, W.L., Discourse s t r u c t u r e and human knowledge, i n : C a r r o l l , J. and Freedle, R. (eds.), Language Comprehension and t h e A c q u i s i t i o n o f Knowledge (Winston, Washington, 1972). C o l l i n s , A.M. and Q u i l l i a n , M.R., How t o make a language u s e r , i n : T u l v i n g , E. and Donaldson, W. (eds.), O r g a n i z a t i o n o f Memory (Academic Press, New York, 1972) F i n d a h l , 0. and H o i j e r , B., R e p e t i t i o n s and R e f o r m u l a t i o n s i n a News Proqram: A study i n r e t e n t i o n and audience p e r c e p t i o n ( S v e r i g e s Radio/PUB, Stockholm, No 154, 1972) F i n d a h l , 0. and H o i j e r , B., An A n a l y s i s o f E r r o r s i n t h e R e c o l l e c t i o n o f a News Program ( S v e r i g e s Radio/PUB, No 150, 1973) F i n d a h l , 0. and H o i j e r , B., On Knowledge, S o c i a l P r i v i l e d g e and t h e News ( S v e r i g e s Radio/PUB, Stockholm, No 201, 1974) F i n d a h l , 0. and H o i j e r , B., Fragments o f R e a l i t y : An experiment w i t h news and T V - v i s u a l s ( S v e r i g e s Radio/PUB, Stockholm, No 53, 1976) F i n d a h l , 0. and H o i j e r , B., What do t h e News T e l l Us? P a r t 1. ( S v e r i g e s Radio/PUB, Stockholm, No 5, 1979) F i n d a h l , 0. and H o i j e r , B., What do t h e News T e l l Us? P a r t 2. ( S v e r i g e s Radio/PUB, Stockholm, No 8, 1980) (10) F i n d a h l , 0. and H o i j e r , B., Media c o n t e n t and human comprehension, i n : Rosengren, K.E. (ed.), Advances i n Content A n a l y s i s (Sage, B e v e r l y H i l l s , 1981) (11) Gardiner, A., The Theory o f Speech and Language (1932) ( O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, London, 1963) (12) Grimes, J.E., (13) Jauss, H.R.,

The Thread o f Discourse (Mouton, The Hague, 1975) L i t t e r a t u r g e s c h i c h t e a l s P r o v o k a t i o n (Suhrkamp, F r a n k f u r t , 1970)

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(14) Kant, E., Kritik der Reinen Vernuft (1787) (MacMillan, London, 1933) (15) Kintsch, W. and van Dijk, T.A., Comment on se rapelle et on resume des histoires, Langages, 40 (1975) 90-116 (16) Malcolm, N., Wittgenstein, Ludvig Josef Johann, in Edwards, P. (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 8, 327-340 (MacMillan, New York, 1967) (17) Mandler, J.M. and Johnson, N.S., Remembrance of things parsed: story structure and recall, Cognitive Psychology, 9 (1977) 111-151 (18) Polanyi, M., The Tacit Dimension (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1967) (19) Rommetveit, R.,

On Message Structure (Wiley, London, 1974)

(20) Schaff, A., Introduktion till Semantiken (Introduction to Semantics) (Cavefors, Lund, 1967) (21) Schank, R., The structure of episodes in memory, in: Bobrow, D.G. and (22) (23) (24) (25) (26)

Collins, A. (eds.), Representation and understanding (Academic Press, New York, 1975) Schank, R. and Abelson, R., Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding (LEA, Hillsdale N.J., 1977) Schmidt, S.J., Some problems of communicative text theories, in: Dressler, W. (ed.), Current Trends in Textlinguistics (de Gruyter, Berlin, 1977) Svensson, J., Etermediernas Nyhetssprdk 2 (News Language o f 'the Media 2 ) (Lundastudier i nordisk sprbkvetenskap, serie C nr 11, Lund, 1981) Wittgenstein, L., Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922) (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1961) Wittgenstein, L, Philosophical Investigations (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1953)

LANGUAGE AND COMPREHENSION J.-F. Le Ny, W. Kintsch (editors) 0 North-HollandPublishing Company, 1982

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TOWARDS A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH OF LANGUAGE PROCESSING I N CONTEXT M i c h e l Hupet e t Jean Costermans

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U n i v e r s i t y o f Louvain Louvain-La-Neuve Belgium

According t o t h e f u n c t i o n a l approach t o language, emphasis should be p l a c e d on semantic, p r a g m a t i c and general c o g n i t i v e processes t h a t i n f l u e n c e s y n t a c t i c p r o c e s s i n g i n sentence p r o d u c t i o n and comprehension. The main o u t l i n e s o f t h i s approach a r e f i r s t considered a l o n g w i t h a p p r o p r i a t e d a t a so as t o h i g h l i g h t t h e communicative f u n c t i o n s p o s t u l a t e d t o answer t h e two q u e s t i o n s o f what t o t a l k about and how t o t a l k about i t . P a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n i s devoted t o passive and i t - c l e f t sentences i n a c c o u n t i n g f o r t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n o f syntax t o communicative f l e x i b i l i t y . F o l l o w i n g a proposal r e c e n t l y made by Bock (1982), i t i s a l s o argued t h a t s y n t a c t i c o p t i o n s may serve v e r y general p r o c e s s i n g f u n c t i o n s i n a d d i t i o n t o comm u n i c a t i v e ones. Data a r e r e p o r t e d i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e pass i v e f o r m u l a t i o n may n o t o n l y p r o v i d e communicative f l e x i b i l i t y b u t a l s o p r o v i d e f l e x i b i l i t y and i n c r e a s e e f f i c i e n c y i n processing.

INTRODUCTION I n search o f a model t h a t c o u l d account f o r how we produce and understand gramm a t i c a l devices, p s y c h o l o g i s t s i n t h e 1960s d i d n o t spare t h e i r e f f o r t s i n t e m p t i n g t o i n c o r p o r a t e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l grammar i n t o a p r o c e s s i n g model. Indeed, a c e n t r a l goal o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e s e a r c h was t o assess t h e s o - c a l l e d Theory o f d e r i v a t i o n a l c o m p l e x i t y ( f o r a r e v i e w , see Foss & Hakes, 1978; Costermans, 1980), a c c o r d i n g t o which t h e p r o c e s s i n g c o m p l e x i t y o f a sentence depends on t h e number o f s y n t a c t i c t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s t h a t a s e n t e n c e ' s deep s t r u c t u r e has t o undergo t o g e t i t s s u r f a c e f o r m u l a t i o n . T h i s approach d e r i v e d from Chomsky's view a c c o r d i n g t o which syntax i s seen as o r i g i n a t i n g w i t h i n an autonomous s y n t a c t i c component s t u f f e d w i t h l i n g u i s t i c u n i v e r s a l s and d i r e c t l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e s u r f a c e synt a c t i c f o r m u l a t i o n o f a sentence. As i t has been f r e q u e n t l y p o i n t e d o u t , psychol o g i c a l r e s e a r c h aimed t o assess t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e a l i t y o f t h e s e l i n g u i s t i c p o s t u l a t e s was almost e x c l u s i v e l y based on i s o l a t e d sentences presented as i n p u t i n comprehension o r memory t a s k s . Because o f t h i s , t h e q u e s t i o n o f how sentent i a l d e v i c e s a r e processed c o m p l e t e l y smothered t h e q u e s t i o n s o f when and why a p a r t i c u l a r s e n t e n t i a l d e v i c e i s t o be s e l e c t e d by t h e language Interest i n t h e s e problems, however, l e d subsequent r e s e a r c h e r s t o p o i n t o u t t h e i n c o n s i s t e n c y o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e hypothesized d e r i v a t i o n a l h i s t o r y o f a sentence and i t s p r o c e s s i n g d i f f i c u l t y .

user.

I n t h e l a s t few years, t h e general r e p u d i a t i o n o f t h e Theory o f d e r i v a t i o n a l c o m p l e x i t y , a l o n g w i t h new t h e o r e t i c a l p r o p o s a l s about t h e n a t u r e o f deep s t r u c -

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t u r e s , has g i v e n r i s e t o a s h i f t o f emphasis from grammar t o semantic, pragm a t i c and general c o g n i t i v e processes t h a t i n f l u e n c e s y n t a c t i c p r o c e s s i n g i n sentence p r o d u c t i o n o r comprehension. An i m p o r t a n t c l a i m t h a t f o l l o w s f r o m t h i s s h i f t i s t h a t grammatical s t r u c t u r e cannot be understood o u t s i d e a semanticpragmatic framework. L a r g e l y based on some o f t h e assumptions o f l i n g u i s t i c F u n c t i o n a l i s m ( F i r b a s , 1964; H a l l i d a y , 1967; see a l s o MacWhinney & Bates, 1978; Bates & MacWhinney, 1982), such an approach aims a t a c c o u n t i n g f o r t h e many ways i n which c o n t e x t e n t e r s i n t o t h e f o r m u l a t i o n and u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e i n t e n d e d messages u n d e r l y i n g sentences i n d i f f e r e n t communicative s e t t i n g s . A g a i n s t t h e view o f an autonomous syntax, t h e proponents o f a f u n c t i o n a l approach c l a i m t h a t grammatical o p t i o n s a r e t o be regarded as c o n t r o l l e d by communicative f u n c t i o n s and t h e i r c o n t e x t u a l shaping. The main o u t l i n e s o f t h i s approach w i l l be b r i e f l y sketched a l o n g w i t h a p p r o p r i a t e data so as t o h i g h l i g h t t h e communicative f u n c t i o n s p o s t u l a t e d t o answer t h e two q u e s t i o n s o f what t o t a l k about and how t o t a l k about i t . I n a d d i t i o n , however, some a t t e n t i o n w i l l be p a i d t o t h e i d e a r e c e n t l y f o r m u l a t e d by Bock (1982) who c l a i m s t h a t s y n t a c t i c o p t i o n s may serve v e r y general p r o c e s s i n g f u n c t i o n s i n a d d i t i o n t o communicative ones: i . e . , r a t h e r t h a n e x i s t i n g s o l e l y f o r t h e purpose o f p r o v i d i n g communicative f l e x i b i l i t y , s y n t a c t i c o p t i o n s may a l s o p r o v i d e f l e x i b i l i t y and i n c r e a s e e f f i c i e n c y i n p r o c e s s i n g (Bock, 1982, p. 13). O r i g i n a l d a t a w i l l be r e p o r t e d i n s u p p o r t o f t h i s hypothesis.

WHY PEOPLE SAY WHAT THEY SAY

A key concept i n pragmatic approaches t o language i s " c o n t e x t " . As Ochs (1980) c l e a r l y p o i n t s o u t , t h e scope o f c o n t e x t i s n o t easy t o assess and d e f i n e ; we s h a l l here c o n s i d e r t h a t i t m i n i m a l l y i n c l u d e s a c o g n i t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e p h y s i c a l and s o c i a l dimensions o f t h e communicational s e t t i n g . I n t h i s respect, pragmatic c o n t e x t can be regarded as what m o t i v e s t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f what t o t a l k about and how t o t a l k about i t . To c h a r a c t e r i z e a communicational s e t t i n g , i t seems t h a t t h e r e a r e a t l e a s t f o u r components which a r e t o be considered: (a) (b) (c) (d)

A s t a t e o f t h e w o r l d which i s being r e f e r r e d t o . The s p e a k e r ' s p o s i t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o ( a ) . The p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e speaker a t t r i b u t e s t o h i s p a r t n e r ( s ) . A u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n t h a t t h e speaker a s s i g n s t o t h e m o d i f i c a t i o n o f one o f t h e t h r e e preceeding v a r i a b l e s .

R e f e r r i n g t o t h i s general schema, a s i m p l e d e c l a r a t i v e sentence as The t r a i n i s l a t e c o u l d t h u s be regarded as a r i s i n g from t h e f a c t t h a t : (a) (b) (c) (d)

The t r a i n i s a c t u a l l y l a t e . The speaker knows i t . He t h i n k s h i s p a r t n e r does n o t know i t . He f i n d s i t u s e f u l t o m o d i f y ( c ) .

A " m i r r o r - t y p e ' ' s i t u a t i o n would be found i n t h e case o f a q u e s t i o n such as t i m e i s i t ? , which c o u l d be c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e f o l l o w i n g elements: (a) (b) (c) (d)

What

We a r e a t a p a r t i c u l a r t i m e o f t h e day. The speaker does n o t know t h i s time. He t h i n k s h i s p a r t n e r knows i t . He f i n d s i t u s e f u l t o m o d i f y ( b ) .

I n t h e case o f a r e q u e s t , t h e s i t u a t i o n i s s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t , b u t can n e v e r t h e -

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l e s s be analyzed in terms of our schema. A sentence like Please, close the window, f o r instance, would be analyzed as: ( a ) The window i s open. ( b ) The speaker knows i t . ( c ) He thinks his partner i s able t o modify ( a ) . ( d ) He finds i t useful t o modify ( a ) .

I t i s not necessary t o specify here the various aspects of the components ( b ) and ( c ) ; i t must be kept in mind, however, t h a t the "positions" we are re fe rring t o should not be limited t o s t at es of knowledge. Emphasis should be placed on t h i s game of doubly subjective beliefs; a game which makes i t t h a t utterances are motivated both by w h a t the speaker thinks and by what he believes his partner to be thinking. This mode of functioning may be understood in the l i g h t of previous proposals concerned with the presupposition (given information) - assertion (new information) ar t i cu l at i o n in utterances. The speaker who utte rs a dec la r a t i v e statement, f o r instance, takes i t f o r granted tha t b o t h parties share common knowledge a b o u t w h a t i s referred t o ; with t h i s information as background, the utterance puts forward one orseveral propositions t h a t the speaker accepts as true b u t t h a t he believes his partner has no knowledge of. Expression i s thus motivated by the f a c t t h a t the speaker wants his partner t o accept these propos i tio n s as well. Declarative type of communication ( t h i s holds a s well f o r questio n s ) thus tends t o increase the world of propositions shared by the interlocuto r s . This has been demonstrated in a s er i es of experiments by Costermans & Hupet (1977), where Subjects were required t o r ef er sentences which involved a c le a r distinction between given and new information t o d iffe re nt types of coloured figures. I n one experiment, Subjects were shown two matrices of 12x12 red and green dots, one containing 132 red dots and 1 2 green dots randomly distributed, and the other 12 red and 132 green. Some Subjects were presented with sentence (1) and some others with sentence ( 2 ) , a l l being required t o indicate which figure was best described by the sentence. (1) As well as the red dots, there are green d o t s . ( 2 ) As well as the green dots, there are red d o t s . I t seems clear t h a t in these particular sentences, the color f i r s t mentionned will come out a s the presupposed, the other taking on assertive value. Pattern of responses clearly showed t h at Subjects were more like ly t o re fe r a particul a r sentence t o the figure in which the colour stressed i n the assertional focus of the sentence i s physically the less important. I n another experiment, perhaps even more convincing, Subjects were presented w i t h the two above described mat r i c e s , and asked t o indicate f o r which of these two figures the statement There are.green dois was the most suitable. Nearly a l l Subjects chose the figure a minority o green dots. If the Subjects chose t o s t a t e t h a t there was green when in actual f a c t there was only a r el at i v el y small amount of green, i t can be reasonably assumed t h a t t h i s i s because they believed t h i s colour to have r e la ti v e l y more chance of escaping the i n t er l o cu t o r' s attention. Roughly speaking, when the Subjects have the choice between two assertions, they are more likely t o choose the one which brings forth the most information. If one takes the l i s t e n e r ' s point of view, these considerations lead t o the following view: the given-new ar t i cu l at i o n allows him n o t only t o integrate the meaning of the utterance, b u t also t o identify what the speaker thinks t h a t he, l i s t e n e r , already knows. A particularly interesting case a rise s when w h a t the speaker assumes his l i s t e n e r t o already know does not coincide with what t h i s l i s t e n e r actually knows; in t h i s case, the l i s t e n e r i s led t o make inferences t o bring his own s t a t e of knowledge in accordance with what i s required f o r allowing the integration of the message (see Haviland & Clark, 1974).

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To i l l u s t r a t e t h i s b r i e f l y , l e t us consider some f i n d i n g s obtained i n an experiment s i m i l a r t o the ones reported by Costermans & Hupet (1977). Subjects were given a strip of white paper on which a 10x1 cm r e c t a n g l e had been drawn, and were only required t o colour t h i s surface so a s t o make i t a p p r o p r i a t e l y d e s c r i bed by one of t h e following two sentences: "In t h i s f i g u r e , t h e r e i s a l s o red" o r " I n t h i s f i g u r e , t h e r e i s even red". The Subjects were allowed t o use a s many d i f f e r e n t colours a s they wanted, b u t were given no p a r t i c u l a r i n s t r u c t i o n in t h i s respect. For t h e "also" sentence, t h e average number of d i f f e r e n t colours was 2.3, and t h e average proportion of red-coloured s u r f a c e was 15%; f o r t h e "even" sentence, t h e average number of d i f f e r e n t colours was 4.6, and t h e average proportion of red-coloured surface was l e s s than 5%. This corroborates t h e f i n d ings reported by Costermans & Hupet. Furthermore, t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n s t h a t the Subjects were asked t o give t o explain t h e i r choice a r e i n agreement w i t h the above-mentioned proposals. Indeed, nearly a l l Subjects reported j u s t i f i c a t i o n s l i k e : "There must be o t h e r colours i n t h i s f i g u r e which I am supposed t o have been aware o f ; i f one says " a l s o red", i t i s t o t e l l t h a t t h e s e other colours do not f i l l u p t h e whole f i g u r e ; i f one says "even r e d " , i t means t h a t t h e red colour might seem u n l i k e l y t o appear in t h e f i g u r e . . . " .

WHY PEOPLE SAY IT THE WAY THEY DO The contribution of syntax t o communicative f l e x i b i l i t y In attempt t o explain why we say what we do and how we do i t , pragmatic v a r i a b l e s must be c a l l e d upon t o understand why a l l languages appear t o permit some f r e e dom i n t h e expression of thought. Pragmatic v a r i a b l e s indeed may help t o c l a r i f y t h e functional d i f f e r e n c e s between various possible paraphrases. Paraphrases w i l l be defined here a s s u r f a c e l i n g u i s t i c forms allowing f o r various l e x i c a l and/or s y n t a c t i c expression of a p a r t i c u l a r propositional content. By t h i s d e f i n i t i o n , t h e following u t t e r a n c e s a r e paraphrases: My f r i e n d has bought t h i s bicycle. This bicycle has been bought by my f r i e n d . I t i s my f r i e n d who has bought this bicycle. This b i c y c l e , my f r i e n d bought i t . This bike has been bought by my chum. Etc. I t i s thus postulated here t h a t , taken a s a whole, t h e various paraphrases of a statement convey an i n v a r i a b l e component which i s of semantic nature. What v a r i e s a r e the l i n g u i s t i c forms u t i l i z e d , be they l e x i c a l o r s y n t a c t i c forms. We will argue, however, t h a t t h e paraphrases, although semantically e q u i v a l e n t , a r e not interchangeable once i n s e r t e d i n t o a p a r t i c u l a r context, s i n c e , a l l - t h e while bearing the same meaning, t h e i r communicative purpose w i l l d i f f e r . Pragmatic v a r i a b l e s in t h i s case will be regarded a s t h e verbal and/or non-verbal contextual v a r i a b l e s which favor t h e use of one paraphrase r a t h e r than another. Since a p a r t i c u l a r semantic content can receive l a r g e l y d i f f e r e n t formulations from the same speaker in d i f f e r e n t circumstances, we a r e led t o p o s t u l a t e a twoleveled cognitive system of information processing. F i r s t , t h e r e would be a longterm memory data base w i t h information s t o r e d in a context-free propositional format, i . e . independent of pragmatic c o n s t r a i n t s . Secondly, a s soon a s such a propositional content i s r e t r i e v e d and brought t o use, i t w i l l i n e v i t a b l y be placed in a p a r t i c u l a r context, and thus take a p a r t i c u l a r l e x i c o - s y n t a c t i c form. How a r e these two possible l e v e l s t o be characterized? Previous psycholinguistic research, s t r o n g l y influenced by transformational grammar, favoured an approach which postulated a double-leveled system a s well,

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claiming t h e psychological r e a l i t y o f deep s t r u c t u r e s underlying s u r f a c e s t r u c tures. However, a s defined in transformational grammar, t h e deep s t r u c t u r e level i s not compatible with an a-pragmatic propositional content l e v e l . Deep s t r u c t u r e s indeed a r e meant t o receive a p a r t i c u l a r l e x i c o - s y n t a c t i c format, and t h i s r e s u l t s in deep s t r u c t u r e t o be c l o s e r t o a simple a c t i v e a f f i r m a t i v e d e c l a r a t i v e sentence than t o a negative, a passive, o r a c l e f t - s e n t e n c e , o r even s t i l l t o an i n t e r r o g a t i v e o r imperative one. This view has not been spared of c r i t i c i s m by subsequent researchers who provided arguments a n d evidence which l e d t o the r e j e c t i o n of hypotheses p o s t u l a t i n g a r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e number of transformations in a s e n t e n c e ' s d e r i v a t i o n and i t s processing d i f f i c u l t y . Indeed, i t i s now c l e a r from various experiments t h a t a negative, a passive o r a c l e f t sentence can ke more r e a d i l y produced, more e a s i l y understood o r memorized than a so-called simple" sentence, and t h a t t h i s i s p r e c i s e l y mainly dependent on t h e context. In s p i t e of t h e s e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , however, several o t h e r s t u d i e s ( e . 9 . Segui E Kail, 1971) provide evidence i n favour of a d i s t i n c t i o n between a deep s t r u c t u r e l e v e l and a s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e level in language processing.

An apparent paradox a r i s e s from t h i s , s i n c e one i s led t o r e j e c t t h e transformat i o n s a s mental operations b u t t o accept t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between a deep and a s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e l e v e l . Yet, t h i s paradox vanishes i f t h e deep s t r u c t u r e level i s viewed a s r a t h e r removed from any s u r f a c e l e x i c o - s y n t a c t i c form. This means t h a t i f a 2-leveled system of language processing i s t o be p o s t u l a t e d , t h e s t a t u s and s p e c i f i c a t i o n of t h e s e l e v e l s w i l l have t o be reexamined. In t h i s r e s p e c t , one must keep i n mind t h e experimental evidence showing t h a t short-term memory tends t o preserve verbatim content, whereas long-term memory tends t o preserve meaning. A s t r i k i n g demonstration of t h i s has been provided by Sachs (1967) who i n v e s t i g a t e d t h e p a t t e r n of r e t e n t i o n o f s y n t a c t i c and semantic information in a recognition paradigm w i t h t e s t sentences which were semantically changed, o r formally changed in a way t h a t did not a f f e c t the meaning. When t h e t e s t sentence was presented immediately a f t e r t h e o r i g i n a l , Subjects were q u i t e accurate on a l l t e s t sentences. B u t when the t e s t sentences were presented a s h o r t while a f t e r t h e o r i g i n a l , recognition f o r s y n t a c t i c changes dropped t o near chance l e v e l s w h i l s t remaining high f o r semantic changes. Sachs' f i n d i n g s strongl y suggest t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l form of a sentence i s stored only f o r t h e s h o r t time necessary t o build an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ; when t h i s semantic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n has been made, Subjects g e t r i d of t h e verbatim wording, s t o r i n g only t h e meaning. The general conclusion from Sachs' evidence, a s well a s from o t h e r subsequent experimental evidence ( s e e Clark E Clark, 1977), i s t h a t normally only semantic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a r e r e t a i n e d i n long-term memory. This leads us t o p o s t u l a t e t h a t when t h e t e x t i s stored in long-term memory, i t takes a propositional format which i s no c l o s e r t o one l e x i c o - s y n t a c t i c formaulation than t o another ( f o r f u r t h e r discussion, see Costermans, 1980). In t h i s perspective, pragmatic v a r i a b l e s would play an important r o l e a t two s t a g e s of t h e system: ( a ) in the generation of a deep semantic s t r u c t u r e elaborated from t h e propositional data base, and ( b ) in both the l e x i c a l i s a t i o n and l i n e a r i z a t i o n of t h i s semantic s t r u c t u r e . This i s roughly depicted in Figure 1. These t h e o r e t i c a l considerations provide a general framework which helps t o del i n e a t e the research area of various psychological i n v e s t i g a t i o n s designed i n two stages: (1) gathering a s e t of sentences t h a t would be judged a s having t h e "same" meaning out of c o n t e x t , and could thus be regarded a s s u r f a c e paraphrases of t h e same underlying proposition; and ( 2 ) varying the verbal and/or non verbal context in order t o s p e c i f y t h e reasons why t h e s e paraphrases a r e n o t regarded a s interchangeable i n any context.

M. Hupet and J. Costermans

A-pragmatic Propositional Data Base

t Retrieval

d e t e r m i n i n g what one

Semantic deep structure

Pragmatic v a r i a b l e s d e t e r m i n i n g how one i s g o i n g t o t a l k about i t

Surface Structure

F i g u r e 1. A general p r o c e s s i n g model f o r sentences p r o d u c t i o n

I n o r d e r t o h i g h l i g h t t h e pragmatic s t a t u s o f v a r i o u s s e n t e n t i a l devices, psyc h o l o g i s t s were t h u s l e d t o pay a t t e n t i o n t o t h e i r r e l a t i v e usage. T h i s o r i e n t a t i o n i s r e f l e c t e d i n e m p i r i c a l works aiming t o assess t h e d e t e r m i n a n t s o f sentence s t r u c t u r e t h r o u g h an a n a l y s i s o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t make i t a p p r o p r i a t e t o use a p a r t i c u l a r s u r f a c e f o r m u l a t i o n . I n what f o l l o w s , p a s s i v e and i t - c l e f t const r u c t i o n s w i l l be examined.

PASSIVE SENTENCES Due t o i t s s t a t u s o f p r o t o t y p i c a l paraphrase, t h e p a s s i v e c o n s t r u c t i o n has been r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a l a r g e number o f experiments t h a t have examined t h e e f f e c t s of v a r i a b l e s assumed t o i n f l u e n c e t h e c h o i c e o f an a l t e r n a t i v e word-order. Roughly speaking, a l a r g e number o f experiments can be i n t e r p r e t e d as p r o v i d i n g s u p p o r t f o r t h e proposal t h a t t h e use of t h e p a s s i v e may be m o t i v a t e d by t h e m a t i c c o n s i -

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d e r a t i o n s : when t h e acted-upon element o f a s i t u a t i o n i s under d i s c u s s i o n , use o f t h e p a s s i v e a l l o w s i t t o become t h e theme o f t h e sentence and t o assume sentence i n i t i a l p o s i t i o n . Several s t u d i e s indeed (Hupet & Le Bouedec, 1975; Bock, 1977; Yekovitch, Walker & Blackman, 1979) have demonstrated i n a d u l t speaker a general p r e f e r e n c e f o r o r d e r i n g t h e g i v e n b e f o r e t h e new i n f o r m a t i o n ; t h u s , one e s s e n t i a l f u n c t i o n o f t h e p a s s i v e may be t o a l l o w t h e i n i t i a l i z a t i o n o f g i v e n m a t e r i a l w i t h i n a d i s c o u r s e c o n t e x t . On t h e o t h e r hand, s e v e r a l experiments have r e p o r t e d evidence t h a t a c t i v e s and p a s s i v e s d i f f e r e n t i a l l y mark t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e elements o f a sentence which convey a l r e a d y known i n f o r m a t i o n and those elements which convey new i n f o r m a t i o n t o t h e d i s c o u r s e . The general conc l u s i o n from t h i s r e s e a r c h area i s t h a t t h e given-new d i s t i n c t i o n i s more p r o nounced i n p a s s i v e s t h a n i n a c t i v e s (e.g. K l e n b o r t & A n i s f e l d , 1974). Because t h i s l i t e r a t u r e has been reviewed i n s e v e r a l papers i n r e c e n t y e a r s ( A n i s f e l d & K l e n b o r t , 1973; Hupet & Costermans, 1975), we s h a l l n o t come back t o i t . However, t h e r e i s one aspect o f passives t h a t seems t o have been neglected: t h i s aspect i s concerned w i t h t h e t i m e s e t t i n g o f t h e a c t i o n t h a t i s b e i n g r e f e r r e d t o . F i r s t , i t i s h i g h l y remarkable t h a t numerous experiments w i t h a d u l t Subj e c t s have used as experimental m a t e r i a l sentences o f t h e form SN has been was V by SN (e.g. I t h o u g h t t h a t t h e P r i n c i p a l had been angered by m o t h e r hand, when one examines a c t u a l p a s s i v e sentences i n n a t u r a l w r i t t e n speech, one i s s t r u c k by t h e v e r y h i g h p r o p o r t i o n o f p a s s i v e s i n t h e p a s t tense. I n a d d i t i o n , i n a s h o r t experiment, a d u l t S u b j e c t s were q i v e n p a i r s o f p a s s i v e sentences, one b e i n g i n t h e p r e s e n t t e n s e (The p o l i c e m a n - i s i n j u r e d by a g a n g s t e r ) and t h e o t h e r i n t h e p a s t tense (The policeman has been i n j u r e d by a g a n g s t e r ) ; t h e S u b j e c t s were r e q u i r e d t o choose f r o m t h e two forms o f each D a i r t h e one t h e y would p r e f e r t o use. 'The r e s u l t s s t r o n g l y s u p p o r t t h e h y p o t h e s i s ' t h a t t h e r e i s ar e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e p a s t tense o f t h e v e r b ( i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e r e p o r t e d a c t i o n t o o k p l a c e i n t h e p a s t ) and t h e p a s s i v e v o i c e : t h e S u b j e c t s indeed showed a s t r o n g p r e f e r e n c e f o r t h e passives i n t h e p a s t tense. These f i n d i n g s c o r r o b o r a t e i n a p a r t i c u l a r way t h e p r e v i o u s proposal t h a t t h e f u n c t i o n a l d i s t i n c t i o n between a c t i v e s and p a s s i v e s a r i s e s f r o m d i f f e r e n t demand c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e encoding situation.

&

The c o n f i r m a t i o n o f a p o s s i b l e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e p a s s i v e and t h e p a s t s e t t i n g o f t h e r e p o r t e d e v e n t would l e a d t o s p e c i f y i n t o f u r t h e r d e t a i l s t h e r e l a t i v e usage o f t h i s s y n t a c t i c form. A c t u a l l y , t h e above-mentioned o b s e r v a t i o n s send us back t o t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e p a s s i v e i n terms o f p r e s u p p o s i t i o n . I t must be r e c o g n i z e d t h a t such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s l i m p i n g as l o n g as t h e presupposed i n f o r m a t i o n cannot be c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m t h e a s s e r t e d new informat i o n . To i l l u s t r a t e t h i s , l e t us c o n s i d e r t h e f o l l o w i n g sentence: The v i o l i n i s t has been denounced by an usher. Is i t about t h e v i o l i n i s t ( g i v e n i n f o r m a t i o n ) o f whom i t i s s a i d t h a t an usher denounced him (new i n f o r m a t i o n ) , o r i s i t about t h e v i o l i n i s t who has been denounced ( g i v e n i n f o r m a t i o n ) and o f which i t i s s a i d t h a t i t i s by an usher (new i n f o r m a t i o n ) ? A c t u a l l y , t h e r e i s experimental e v i d e n c e i n support o f t h e l a t t e r view ( K l e n b o r t & A n i s f e l d , 1975; Hupet & Le Bouedec, 1977). F o r t h e p a s s i v e t o be used, t h e speaker would t h u s have t o t a k e f o r a l r e a d y known and a c c e s s i b l e n o t o n l y t h e p a t i e n t ' s i d e n t i t y b u t a l s o what happened t o him; t h e a s s e r t i o n o f new i n f o r m a t i o n b e i n g t h e n r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e m e n t i o n i n g o f t h e r e s p o n s i b l e agent. I n these c o n d i t i o n s , i t i s easy t o imagine t h a t a speaker f e e l s more a u t h o r i z e d t o t r e a t as g i v e n i n f o r m a t i o n t h e p a t i e n t and what happened t o him i f t h i s o c c u r r e d b e f o r e . I n o t h e r words, something i s more l i k e l y t o be presupposed as i t has a l r e a d y o c c u r r e d . T h i s would n i c e l y e x p l a i n t h e p r e f e r e n c e f o r passives i n t h e p a s t tense. Furthermore, t h i s may suggest some i d e a s t o account f o r t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f p a s s i v e s comprehension o r p r o d u c t i o n by young c h i l d r e n (see Hupet, 1982a,b).

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IT-CLEFT SENTENCES C l e f t sentences have a l s o been s t u d i e d w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e i r p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e (e.g., Hornby, 1974; Engelkamp & Zimmer, 1981). Indeed, t h e c l e f t sentence s t r u c t u r e i s regarded as announcing t h a t c e r t a i n p a r t s o f a p r o p o s i t i o n a r e t o be t a k e n as presupposed, i . e . known and t r u e , and t h a t t h e o t h e r p a r t s a r e t o be t a k e n as new and f o c a l i n f o r m a t i o n ; f u r t h e r m o r e , a t l e a s t i n psycholog i c a l researchs, i t i s f r e q u e n t l y proposed t h a t t h e new i n f o r m a t i o n i s t o be found i n t h e main c l a u s e and t h e presupposed i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e s u b o r d i n a t e clause. I n sentence ( 3 ) f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e f a c t t h a t someone r e v i s e d t h e manus c r i p t i s presupposed and a t t e n t i o n i s drawn o n t o t h e new i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t t h i s someone i s Debbie.

( 3 ) I t i s Debbie who r e v i s e d t h e manuscript. It should be noted, however, t h a t t h e r e i s an e n t i r e c l a s s o f i t - c l e f t sentences i n which new i n f o r m a t i o n occurs w i t h i n t h e l o g i c a l l y presupposed s u b o r d i n a t e clause, as i n sentence ( 4 ) : ( 4 ) I t i s f o r t h i s reason t h a t H a l l e ' s argument a g a i n s t autonomous phone(Chomsky, 1972, m i c s i s o f such importance: i t demonstrates t h a t p. 127).

...

T h i s c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e i t - c l e f t c o n s t r u c t i o n may have q u i t e a few d i f f e r e n t f u n c t i o n s i n d i s c o u r s e (see P r i n c e , 1978), and one should a t l e a s t d i s t i n g u i s h t h e emphatic f u n c t i o n ( a s i n sentence 3 ) f r o m t h e anaphoric f u n c t i o n as i n sentence ( 5 ) : ( 5 ) I am g o i n g t o read you an e x c e r p t from Snow's l a s t n o v e l . I t i s an e x c e r p t which c l e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e s

...

Considering what m i g h t be regarded as t h e s i m p l e s t case i n which t h e f o c a l p a r t r e p r e s e n t s new i n f o r m a t i o n and t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a l p a r t g i v e n i n f o r m a t i o n , a c l e a r understanding o f t h e communicative f u n c t i o n o f c l e f t sentences r e q u i r e s an answer t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f why a speaker wishes t o emphasize t h e c l e f t concept. I n t h i s regard, an i m p o r t a n t d e t e r m i n a n t o f c l e f t s t r u c t u r e seems t o d e r i v e from a s u b t l e o p p o s i t i o n o r c o n t r a s t t h a t t h e speaker i n t e n d s t o s i g n a l : i n u s i n g a c l e f t s t r u c t u r e , t h e speaker's i n t e n t i o n i s t o c o n t r a s t h i s message w i t h any o t h e r p r o p o s i t i o n which would i n v a l i d a t e i t . To i l l u s t r a t e t h i s mode o f f u n c t i o n Ing, l e t us c o n s i d e r t h e two f o l l o w i n g u t t e r a n c e s ( 6 ) and ( 7 ) , and l e t us ask i n which circumstances a speaker w i l l choose t o emphasize " r e c o r d " as i n ( 7 ) : ( 6 ) He wants a r e c o r d ( 7 ) I t i s a r e c o r d t h a t he wants H i s d e c i s i o n a c t u a l l y depends on t h e c o n v i c t i o n s o r b e l i e f s t h a t he a t t r i b u t e s t o h i s p a r t n e r . T h i s can be seen i n t h e f o l l o w i n g two e x c e r p t s t a k e n f r o m hypot h e t i c a l dialogs: D i a l o g X: A . I wonder what he wants f o r h i s b i r t h d a y B. He wants a r e c o r d

D i a l o g Y:

A. D o n ' t f o r g e t t o buy him a novel f o r h i s b i r t h d a y B. I t i s a r e c o r d t h a t he wants. I f one r e f e r s t o t h e d i s t i n c t i o n made between t h e elements t h a t t h e speaker assumes t o be shared by h i s l i s t e n e r and t h e elements which a r e not, i t i s easy t o see what d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e two s i t u a t i o n s X and Y . I n f a c t , t h e a s s e r t i o n a l p a r t i s more l i k e l y t o be emphasized as t h e speaker has some reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t

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h i s l i s t e n e r i s n o t disposed t o t a k e i t f o r g r a n t e d . S i t u a t i o n Y i s p a r t i c u l a r l y c l e a r i n t h i s r e s o e c t : A expresses h i s b e l i e f t h a t "He wants a novel"; B c l a i m s t o express a d i f f e r e n t c o n v i c t i o n , and does i t i n a way t h a t s i g n a l s h i s desagreement ( p o s s i b l y r e i n f o r c e d by a "But ..." o r a "No, i t ' s . . . ' ' ) w i t h A. I n terms o f t h e above-mentioned pragmatic components, i t - c l e f t sentences can t h u s be regarded as m o t i v a t e d by t h e discordance assumed t o e x i s t between t h e s p e a k e r ' s p o s i t i o n and t h e p o s i t i o n he f e e l s a u t h o r i z e d t o a t t r i b u t e t o h i s l i s t e ner. Sentence ( 8 ) f o r i n s t a n c e would be analyzed as f o l l o w s : ( 8 ) I t i s a b i c y c l e t h a t my f r i e n d won a t t h e tombola ( a ) One o f t h e speaker's f r i e n d a c t u a l l y won a b i c y c l e . ( b ) The speaker knows i t . ( c ) The speaker t h i n k s t h a t t h e l i s t e n e r b e l i e v e s t h e f r i e n d won something e l s e . ( d ) The speaker f i n d s i t u s e f u l t o m o d i f y ( c ) . Comparatively, f o r sentence ( 9 ) , t h e ( a ) , ( b ) and ( d ) components would be s i m i l a r as those i n sentence ( 8 ) , b u t t h e component ( c ) would be d i f f e r e n t : ( 9 ) I t i s my f r i e n d who won a b i c y c l e a t t h e tombola ( c ) The speaker t h i n k s t h a t t h e l i s t e n e r b e l i e v e s t h a t someone e l s e won a b i c y c l e . I n an experiment designed t o t e s t t h e p e r t i n e n c e o f t h i s a n a l y s i s , S u b j e c t s were presented w i t h a 2000-word-excerpt o f w r i t t e n c o n v e r s a t i o n . F o r s e v e r a l r e j o i n ders, t h e S u b j e c t s had t h e c h o i c e between two f o r m u l a t i o n s o f t h e same i d e a , and were o n l y r e q u i r e d t o s e l e c t t h e one t h e y f e l t t o be t h e most a p p r o p r i a t e . Among these t e s t r e j o i n d e r s , s i x o c c u r r e d i n a c o n t e x t o f t y p e ( l ) , w h i l e s i x o t h e r s occurred i n a context o f type ( 2 ) : Contextual t y p e (1)

A. - I t h o u g h t t h a t C h a r l o t t e d i d n ' t want t o see you anymore. B.

-

I t ' s h e r mother who d i d n ' t want h e r t o see me. Her mother d i d n ' t want h e r t o see me.

Contextual t y p e ( 2 ) A.

-

B. -

-

I t ' s t e r r i b l y c o l d here. I f I were you, I would go elsewhere t o study. I t ' s t o P e t e r ' s house t h a t I'll go i f I am c o l d . I'll go t o P e t e r ' s house i f I am c o l d .

For r e j o i n d e r s o c c u r r i n g i n c o n t e x t u a l t y p e ( l ) , 90% o f t h e S u b j e c t s s e l e c t e d t h e i t - c l e f t f o r m u l a t i o n , w h i l e t h e r e v e r s e was observed f o r r e j o i n d e r s occurr i n g i n c o n t e x t s o f t y p e ( 2 ) , t h u s c o n f i r m i n g t h e above-mentioned proposal about t h e communicative f u n c t i o n o f i t - c l e f t c o n s t r u c t i o n s . F u r t h e r experiments w i l l examine t h e comprehension t i m e o f each s u r f a c e f o r m u l a t i o n w i t h i n b o t h t y p e s o f c o n t e x t , as w e l l as memory f o r each s u r f a c e f o r m u l a t i o n w i t h and w i t h o u t cont e x t u a l cues (Hupet, Costermans & Tilman, i n p r e p a r a t i o n ) . One p o i n t s h o u l d be s t r e s s e d about t h e f u n c t i o n i n g c o n d i t i o n s o f i t - c l e f t const r u c t i o n s . As i t appears f r o m t h e a n a l y s i s i n f o u r components, t h e main p o i n t i s n o t t h e a c t u a l p o s i t i o n o f t h e l i s t e n e r , b u t t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e speaker a t t r i b u t e s t o h i s p a r t n e r . I t i s t h e r e f o r e n o t necessary f o r t h i s p a r t n e r t o make h i s own b e l i e f s e x p l i c i t i n o r d e r t o e l i c i t a c l e f t c o n s t r u c t i o n : what i s r e a l l y d e t e n i n a n t a r e t h e b e l i e f s t h a t t h e speaker r i g h t l y o r wrongly a t t r i b u t e s

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to his partner. To illustrate this, let us consider the following headlines of a judicial report in a belgian newspaper: A divorce-dispute coming to a bad end

It is the father-in-law who is the killer

The inferences that everyone is likely to draw from the first line will most probably be based on the representation of the prototypical love tragedy, and will thus be of the type: "She (he) killed him (her)". These inferences are precisely what the the writer attributes to his readers, and what he contests in the second line. Finally, it is interesting to note cases in which a cleft sentence does not emphasize an element that would have been regarded as not shared by the listener, but an element that the speaker himself did not take for granted a few moments before. This is the case when the speaker is in a way talking to himself, as in sentence (10) :

I thought that the Principal had been angered by the President, but it was a student who.. . A very common natural setting which elicits such cleft construction is when one tries to reconstruct a puzzle; after several wrong trials, one discovers the adequate piece and says : "Ah, it is this one which goes there" or "That i s where it goes" or "It is there it goes" or "It is there it belongs". (10)

WHY PEOPLE SAY IT THE WAY THEY DO The contribution of syntax to cognitive processing flexibility Contrary to the autonomous syntax aoproach, functional analyses of language regard syntax as the product of various communicative factors influencing the linearization of the intended messages. The variety of syntactic options available to the speaker for tailoring an utterance is thus viewed as arising from the variety of communicative demands of various situations. For most current approaches to sentence production, this functionalist view has been taken as implying a hierarchical processing in the production of a particular surface structure, with a controlled or strategic processing of syntax operating on the products of the lexicalization processes. However, there exists empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis of an interaction between syntactic and lexical processing, thus suggesting that the utterance formulation system is not strictly hierarchical. Referring to this evidence (for a review, see Bock, 1982), Bock (1982) recently proposed one possible alternative to transcend the conflict between the autonomous and the functionalist views of syntax. This a1 ternative approach suggests that syntactic options may serve very general processing functions in addition to communicative functions: "Rather than existing solely for the purpose of providing communicative flexibility, they may also provide flexibility and increase efficiency in processing" (Bock, 1982, p. 13). To assess the possibility of lexical (semantic and/or phonological) effects on syntax, Bock reexamines empirical studies mainly concerned with reconstructive recall of linguistic materials. Specifically, constituent ordering5 in recall performances is assumed t o indicate that ease of lexical-semantic coding may play a role in determining the sequence of constituents in sentences. A general conclusion from these studies is that utterances appear to be sensitive to the accessibility of lexical information, phrases containing more accessible information thus occurring earlier in sentences.

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I n o r d e r t o h i g h l i g h t t h e f o u n d a t i o n s o f such an i n t e r a c t i o n between t h e l e x i c a l s e l e c t i o n processes and t h e s y n t a c t i c l i n e a r i z a t i o n processes, two p o i n t s a r e t o be reminded: ( 1 ) l e x i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m d i f f e r e n t c o n s t i t u e n t s i n a planned u t t e r a n c e may be s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a c t i v a t e d i n memory (e.g., G a r r e t t , l 9 7 5 ) ; ( 2 ) on t h e o t h e r hand, t h e speech e x e c u t i o n program appears t o d e a l s e r i a l l y w i t h u n i t s r o u g h l y t h e s i z e o f a phrase (e.g., Grosjean, Grosjean & Lane, 1979). As Bock c l e a r l y p o i n t s o u t , i f words a r e r e t r i e v e d b e f o r e t h e c o n s t i t u e n t i n which t h e y a r e t o appear i s scheduled t o be produced, performance m i g h t be i m p a i r e d by t h e r e s u l t i n g d r a i n on p r o c e s s i n g resources; i f , however, t h e formul a t i o n system has some f l e x i b i l i t y i n a r r a n g i n g c o n s t i t u e n t s w i t h o u t d i s t o r t i n g t h e communicative i n t e n t i o n , i t may be p o s s i b l e f o r c o n s t i t u e n t s t o be scheduled f o r p r o d u c t i o n i n a way t h a t p e r m i t s some accomodation o f a c t i v a t e d l e x i c a l i n formation. The freedom a l l o w e d i n t h e s y n t a c t i c e x p r e s s i o n o f t h o u g h t may serve t h i s purpose, and ease b o t h t h e p r o d u c t i o n and t h e comprehension o f u t t e r a n c e s . Considering t h e p e r t i n e n c e o f t h i s approach, i t seems reasonable t o assume t h a t v a r i a b l e s which g e n e r a l l y a f f e c t access t o l e x i c a l i t e m s should a f f e c t sentence p r o d u c t i o n i n some way. I n what f o l l o w s , evidence w i l l be presented t h a t s u p p o r t s t h i s assumption i n showing how t h e p a s s i v e c o n s t r u c t i o n may a r i s e from f a c i l i t a tion o f the lexical accessibility. I n a s e r i e s o f experiments, connected sentences o f t h e f o l l o w i n g two t y p e s were used: Type 1:

SN1

+

Vi

t

and/but

+

(SN1) t V t

+

SN2

Les j o u r n a l i s t e s o n t accouru e t i l s o n t bouscul@ l e s c u r i e u x The r e p o r t e r s rushed up and t h e y h u s t l e d t h e s i g h t - s e e r s Type 2:

SN1 + Vi

+

and/but t SN2

+

Vt + (SN1)

Le c a m b r i o l e u r e t e r n u a e t l a c o n c i e r g e l e d e c o u v r i t The b u r g l a r sneezed and t h e j a n i t o r d i s c o v e r e d him As i t appears f r o m t h e s e examples, i t i s sometimes t h e s u b j e c t ( t y p e 1) and sometimes t h e o b j e c t ( t y p e 2 ) o f t h e second c l a u s e which i s i n t r o d u c e d i n t h e f i r s t clause. S u b j e c t s were p r e s e n t e d w i t h an a c t i v e and a p a s s i v e f o r m u l a t i o n o f sentences f r o m b o t h types, and were r e q u i r e d t o i n d i c a t e which one t h e y would p r e f e r t o use. The f i n d i n g s were t h a t t h e p a s s i v e was p r e f e r r e d by 14.5% o f t h e S u b j e c t s f o r sentences o f t y p e 1, and b y 55.8% o f t h e S u b j e c t s f o r sentences o f t y p e 2. The p a s s i v e f o r m u l a t i o n i s t h u s favoured f o r sentences o f t h e l a t t e r type, as i n "The b u r g l a r sneezed and he was d i s c o v e r e d b y t h e j a n i t o r " . T h i s i s i n agreement w i t h p r e v i o u s s t u d i e s which l e d t o r e g a r d t h e p a s s i v e c o n s t r u c t i o n as a means t o p r o v i d e d i s c o u r s e c o n t i n u i t y ; indeed, i n t y p e 2 sentences, t h e p a s s i v e a l l o w s t o p u t i n f r o n t o f t h e second c l a u s e t h e head noun t h a t has been mentioned i n t h e preceding c l a u s e . I n t h i s case, however, t h e p a s s i v e m i g h t a l s o be regarded as a s y n t a c t i c o p t i o n p a r t i c u l a r l y w e l l s u i t e d t o ease t h e p r o d u c t i o n process i t s e l f . T h i s view i s f u r t h e r supported by o t h e r d a t a o b t a i n e d w i t h sentences o f t h e f o l l o w i n g form: SN1 + Vi

+

and/but t SN2

+

V t + SN3

F o r some sentences ( h e r e a f t e r t y p e A ) , SN1 had been judged s e m a n t i c a l l y c l o s e r t o SN t h a n t o SN , as i n sentence ( 1 1 ) . F o r some o t h e r sentences ( t y p e B ) , SN1 had bzen j u d g e d c?oser, t o SN3 t h a n t o SN2, as i n sentence ( 1 2 ) .

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Type A : SN1 c l o s e r t o SN2 than t o SN3 L'apprenti regarde e t l a patronne c o i f f e l a c l i e n t e The apprentice watches and t h e h a i r d r e s s e r brushes t h e c l i e n t ' s hair Type B : SN1 c l o s e r t o SN3 than t o SN2

Le l o c a t a i r e e s t p a r t i e t l a concierge a prevenu l e p r o p r i e t a i r e The lodger went away and t h e j a n i t o r informed the owner P a t t e r n of responses i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e passive i s more l i k e l y t o be chosen f o r sentences of type B ( a s in The lodger went away and t h e owner has been i n f o r med by the j a n i t o r ) : in f a c t , 35..3% of t h e Subjects chose t h e passive formulat i o n when presented with sentences of type B, while only 17.8% o f t h e Subjects chose the passive formulation f o r sentences of type A. This i n d i c a t e s a l e x i c a l e f f e c t on syntax: indeed, f o r sentences of type B, t h e Subjects a c t u a l l y showed a preference f o r t h e sequence of c o n s t i t u e n t s t h a t allows t h e e a r l i e r p o s i t i o n i n t h e sentence of an element (SN3) which i s semantically r e l a t e d t o a p r i o r a c t i v a t e d element (SN1). In this r e s p e c t , t h e above-mentioned sentences of types 1 and 2 could be regarded a s a p a r t i c u l a r case w i t h t h e same element (SN1) occurring twice in t h e two connected c l a u s e s . If SN1 i s semantically c l o s e r t o SN3 than t o SN2 , i t may be reasonably assumed t h a t t h e lexical-semantic coding o f SN3 will be f a c i l i t a t e d by t h e p r i o r processing of SN1. I t i s here suggested t h a t t h i s f a c i l i t a t i o n of lexical-semantic coding may play a r o l e in e l i c i t i n g a p a r t i c u l a r ordering of c o n s t i t u e n t s . As concerns the g e n e r a l i z a t i o n of t h e present d a t a , we must point out some limit a t i o n s s i m i l a r t o those pointed out by Bock (1982) regarding t h e possible gener a l i z a t i o n from r e c a l l data t o t h e actual production processes. Indeed, indicat i n g o n e ' s preference f o r a sentence formulation i n a choice experiment i s cert a i n l y d i f f e r e n t from producing i t n a t u r a l l y . Nevertheless, i t seems reasonable t o consider such a g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s i n c e t h e present data a r e i n agreement with previous findings obtained i n o t h e r experimental s i t u a t i o n s . However, in order t o a s s e s s t h i s hypothesized i n t e r a c t i o n between the l e x i c a l i z a t i o n processes and the l i n e a r i z a t i o n ones, f u r t h e r experiments w i l l be needed which should a l low t o d i s t i n g u i s h more c l e a r l y l e x i c a l e f f e c t s a s those reported here from ref e r e n t i a l e f f e c t s a s perspective o r focus of a t t e n t i o n . On the o t h e r hand, f u r t h e r experiments w i l l a l s o have t o a s s e s s the possible e f f e c t s of such an i n t e r a c t i o n on comprehension s t r a t e g i e s . F i n a l l y , i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note the rel a t i o n s h i p between t h i s view of the r e l a t i v e freedom permitted i n t h e s y n t a c t i c expression of thought and some of t h e ideas f i r s t proposed by Yngve (1960) t o account f o r v a r i a t i o n s i o t h e surface ordering of s e n t e n t i a l c o n s t i t u e n t s .

The authors wish t o thank Deborah Barter f o r her helpful a s s i s t a n c e i n the preparation of t h e manuscript.

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AUDIENCE DESIGN I N MEANING AND REFERENCE H e r b e r t H. C l a r k and Gregory L. llurphy Department o f Psychology Stanford University Stanford, C a l i f o r n i a U.S.A.

We argue t h a t t h e speaker designs each u t t e r a n c e f o r s p e c i f i c l i s t e n e r s , and they, i n t u r n , make e s s e n t i a l use o f t h i s f a c t i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t u t t e r a n c e . We c a l l t h i s p r o p e r t y of u t t e r a n c e s audience design. O f t e n l i s t e n e r s can come t o a unique i n t e r p r e t a t i o n f o r an u t t e r a n c e o n l y i f t h e y assume t h a t t h e speaker designed i t j u s t so t h a t t h e y c o u l d come t o t h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n u n i q u e l y . !,le i l l u s t r a t e r e a s o n i n g f r o m audience d e s i g n i n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f d e f i n i t e r e f e r e n c e , anaphora, and word meaning, and we o f f e r evidence t h a t l i s t e n e r s a c t u a l l y reason t h i s way. Isle conclude t h a t audience d e s i g n must p l a y a c e n t r a l r o l e i n any adequate t h e o r y o f understanding. INTRODUCTION I n o r d i n a r y c o n v e r s a t i o n s , we t a i l o r what we say t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r p e o p l e we a r e t a l k i n g t o . We have a good i d e a o f t h e knowledge and b e l i e f s t h e y share w i t h us a t t h e moment and what t h e y a r e t h i n k i n g o f , and we d e s i g n our u t t e r a n c e s a c c o r d i n g l y . Evidence o f t h i s t a i l o r i n g i s everywhere. Idhen w t h i n k o u r addressees share w i t h us t h e knowledge t h a t a man i s named A l o y s i u s , we may r e f e r t o him as A l o y s i u s c o n f i d e n t t h a t t h e y w i l l understand who we a r e r e f e r r i n g t o . When someone i n a c o n v e r s a t i o n says I ' m g e t t i n g t i r e d , we may r e p l y w i t h t h e h i g h l y e l l i p t i c a l So am I , c o n f i d e n t t h a t t h e o t h e r s i n t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n w i l l understand us. When we t h i n k o u r addressees share knowledge t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r woman had j u s t been s i t t i n g i n a c h a i r , we may p o i n t a t t h e empty c h a i r and say That woman i s~ named Veronica and be c o n f i d e n t t h a t t h e y~ w i l l understand who we a r e r e f e r r i n g t o . ble r e a l i z e t h a t anyone who d i d n ' t share o u r knowledge o f A l o y s i u s ' s name, o r o f t h e p r e v i o u s u t t e r a n c e , o r o f t h e person who was j u s t s i t t i n g i n t h e c h a i r w o u l d n ' t n e c e s s a r i l y understand us. We d o n ' t expect o u r u t t e r a n c e s t o be understandable by j u s t anyone. They a r e i n t e n d e d f o r p a r t i c u l a r l i s t e n e r s w i t h p a r t i c u l a r momentary thoughts and b e l i e f s . L e t us c a l l t h i s f e a t u r e o f u t t e r a n c e s audience d e s i g n (see C l a r k and Carlson, 1982a). A l t h o u g h audience design i s an obvious f e a t u r e o f language i n use, i t has r a r e l y p l a y e d a r o l e i n p s y c h o l o g i c a l models o f language use. For y e a r s , t h e dominant model o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g has focused on how we analyze s e n t e n c e s - - t h a t i s , how we i d e n t i f y phonemes, words, s y n t a c t i c c o n s t r u c t i o n s , and word meanings (see, f o r example, C a r r o l l & Bever, 1976; F o r s t e r , l Q 7 9 ; G a r r e t t , 1978; Marslen-ldilson & T y l e r , 1980; Swinney, 1979). B u t when we l i s t e n t o people i n c o n v e r s a t i o n s , o u r aim i s n ' t s i m p l y t o i d e n t i f y t h e phonemes, words, and sentences t h e y used. Ide t r y t o understand what t h e y meant i n s a y i n g what t h e y d i d on t h a t occasion. F o r t h a t , we must c o n s i d e r n o t o n l y t h e a c o u s t i c s i g n a l and o u r knowledge o f t h e language, b u t a l s o t h e p a r t i c u l a r b e l i e f s and thoughts we t h i n k t h e speaker shares w i t h us a t t h a t moment. The dominant model, i n e f f e c t , excludes t h e thoughts and b e l i e f s o f i n d i v i d u a l speakers and l i s t e n e r s . I t i s a model o f understanding t h a t excludes t h e understanders.

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The dominant model o f understanding would be w o r t h p u r s u i n g ifwe c o u l d assume t h a t people i d e n t i f y phonemes, words, and sentences w i t h o u t r e g a r d f o r audience design. B u t we cannot. Although some processes i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g may n o t be g r e a t l y a f f e c t e d by audience design (see Marslen-Nilson & T y l e r , 1980; Swinney, 1 9 7 9 ) , many o t h e r s p r o b a b l y are. These i n c l u d e processes t h a t have o f t e n been assumed t o r u n o f f w i t h o u t r e g a r d f o r audience design. I n t h i s paper, we w i l l r e v i e w t h e r o l e o f audience design, e s p e c i a l l y as i t has a r i s e n i n o u r own research, i n t h r e e areas o f comprehension--definite r e f e r e n c e , anaphora, and word meaning. DEFINITE REFERENCE D e f i n i t e r e f e r e n c e has l o n g been an o b j e c t o f study i n p h i l o s o p h y and l i n g u i s t i c s . I n 1905, B e r t r a n d R u s s e l l analyzed The k i n g o f France i s w i s e as meaning: ( a ) t h e r e i s a k i n g o f France; (b) t h e r e i s n o t more t h a n one k i n g o f France; and ( c ) t h e r e i s n o t h i n g which i s k i n g o f France and i s n o t wise. Does t h i s a n a l y s i s do j u s t i c e t o p e o p l e ' s uses o f d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s ? Strawson (1950) argued t h a t i t d i d n ' t and proposed i n s t e a d t h a t when a petson u t t e r s The k i n g o f France i s wise, he presupposes ( a ) and ( b ) and a s s e r t s o n l y ( c ) . These two views and t h e i r o f f s p r i n g have been examined i n d e t a i l by l i n g u i s t s and p h i l o s o p h e r s o v e r t h e y e a r s (see Hawkins, 1978; Kempson, 1975; Wilson, 1 9 7 5 ) , and t h e debate s t i l l goes on. F o r p s y c h o l o g i s t s , t h e debate has an added dimension, s i n c e any model o f understanding must say how d e f i n i t e r e f e r e n c e i s processed. I n one i n f l u e n t i a l model, Olson (1970) claimed t h a t people view t h e o b j e c t t h e y a r e t r y i n g t o r e f e r t o - - t h e r e f e r e n t - - a s b e l o n g i n g t o a " r e f e r e n t array," which may be e i t h e r e x p l i c i t and v i s i b l e , o r i m p l i c i t . The s p e a k e r ' s r e f e r e n c e t o an o b j e c t i s successful if i t d e s c r i b e s t h e o b j e c t so t h a t i t can be u n i q u e l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d from a l l t h e o t h e r o b j e c t s i n t h e r e f e r e n t a r r a y . I f a speaker wants t o r e f e r t o one o f f i v e men a t a bar, he cannot use s i m p l y t h e man a t t h e bar. He must g i v e a unique d e s c r i p t i o n f o r t h i s a r r a y , l i k e t h e t a l l e s t man a t t h e bar. O l s o n ' s model, however, i s e i t h e r i n c o m p l e t e o r i n c o r r e c t . F i r s t , f o r c e r t a i n a r r a v s , people q i v e more s p e c i f i c d e s c r i p t i o n s than t h e model p r e d i c t s . F o r an a r r a y w i t h a dog and a r o c k i n i t , people a r e more l i k e l y t o say Look a t t h e than Look a t t h e animal, o r a t t h e l i v i n g t h i n g , as O l s o n ' s m o d e l T o m p r e d i c t c r u s e , 1977; Rosch, 1 9 7 8 r Second, r e f e r e n c e s i n c o n v e r s a t i o n s a r e dynamic. A person m i g h t f i r s t r e f e r t o someone as t h e woman who s o l d me a b o t t l e _ of _ Chanel _ _No. 5 t h i s morning, b u t a f t e r w a r d s r e f e r t o h e r s i m p l y as t h e erfume 3, w i t h onTy an a l l u s i o n t o t h e e v e n t d e s c r i b e d i n t h e f i r s t ref=$= Krauss A Weinheimer, 1966, 1967). And t h i r d , t h e model d o e s n ' t say how r e f e r e n t a r r a y s g e t defined. T h i s i s an e s p e c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t i s s u e when t h e a r r a y i s i m p l i c i t i n t h e c o n t e x t , as i t u s u a l l y i s i n d e f i n i t e r e f e r e n c e . When a w i f e t e l l s h e r husband The doo'r i s open, what r e f e r e n t a r r a y i s she assuming, and how does he know? F o r these and o t h e r gaps i n O l s o n ' s account, t h e r e a r e no easy remedies. From o u r p o i n t of view, t h e main problem i s t h a t O l s o n ' s model d o e s n ' t make f u l l use o f t h e audience design o f a d e f i n i t e reference. As C l a r k and H a r s h a l l (1981) have argued, an e s s e n t i a l p a r t o f audience design i n d e f i n i t e r e f e r e n c e i s t h e use o f t h e speaker's and addressee's mutual knowledge, b e l i e f s , and s u p p o s i t i o n s , o r what we w i l l c a l l common ground (see C l a r k i3 Carlson, 1981, 1982b). Imagine Anne t a l k i n g t o P i e r r e . To use t h e d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n t h e man you met y e s t e r d a y , she has t o have good reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t P i e r r e can r e a d i l y i d e n t i f y t h e r e f e r e n t u n i q u e l y on t h e b a s i s o f t h e i r comnon ground. Furthermore, P i e r r e should b e l i e v e t h a t Anne b e l i e v e s t h i s . P i e r r e m i g h t have met many people t h e day before, b u t he knows t h a t Anne d o e s n ' t know about most o f these people. The o n l y person t h e y share knowledge of h i s meeting t h e day b e f o r e i s , say, Jacques, and so, h i s t a c i t reasoning goes, she must be r e f e r r i n g t o Jacques.

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One premise i n P i e r r e ' s t a c i t r e a s o n i n g i s e s p e c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t t o t h a t process. He knows t h e r e a r e many people who f i t Anne's d e s c r i p t i o n o f b e i n g a man t h a t he had met t h e day b e f o r e and, indeed, t h a t Anne must assume t h e r e a r e too. But s i n c e he can assume t h a t Anne has good reason f o r b e l i e v i n g t h a t he can r e a d i l y i d e n t i f y t h e r i g h t person u n i q u e l y on t h e b a s i s of t h e i r common ground, he can reason: "Ifshe t h i n k s I can r e a d i l y i d e n t i f y h e r r e f e r e n t u n i q u e l y , she must be r e f e r r i n g t o t h e o n l y person we m u t u a l l y know t h a t I met y e s t e r d a y , namely I t i s as if Anne's d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n w e r e n ' t siirlply t h e man you met Jacques." y e s t e r d a y , b u t t h e man you met y e s t e r d a y t h a t I have good reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t you can r e a d i l y i d e n t i f . y u n i q u e l y on t h e b a s i s of o u r common ground. I m p l i c i t l y , Anne's d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n i n c l u d e s an i n s t r u c t i o n t o P i e r r e about how t o reason through t o t h e r e f e r e n t . L e t us c a l l t h i s added premise t h e d e s i g n assumption. As we w i l l argue, i n many cases a l i s t e n e r cannot i d e n t i f y t h e r e f e r e n t w i t h o u t making e s s e n t i a l use o f t h e d e s i g n assumption. How do speakers and addressees decode what i s p a r t of t h e i r common ground and what i s n ' t ? Since people c a n ' t l o o k i n t o each o t h e r ' s heads, t h e y must use c e r t a i n h e u r i s t i c s ( C l a r k & M a r s h a l l , 1981). The h e u r i s t i c s t h e y r e l y on work from t h r e e main sources o f i n f o r m a t i o n and t h e i r combinations: ( a ) Community membership. Once Anne and P i e r r e m u t u a l l y r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e y a r e b o t h P a r i s i a n s , t h e y can t a k e as common ground a n y t h i n g t h a t i s u n i v e r s a l l y known, b e l i e v e d , o r supposed b y P a r i s i a n s . Anne and P i e r r e , o f course, may j o i n t l y belong t o many o t h e r communities and subcommunities too, ranging, f o r example, from t h e community o f a l l humans t o t h e community of e x p e r i m e n t a l p s y c h o l o g i s t s who had s t u d i e d w i t h P i a g e t i n 1959. Each of these communities and subcommunities has a body o f knowledge, b e l i e f s , and s u p p o s i t i o n s t h a t everyone i n t h e community takes t o be u n i v e r s a l i n t h a t community. ( b ) P h y s i c a l %-presence. Once Anne and P i e r r e have b o t h experienced something t o g e t h e r , l i k e t h e s e e i n g o f a movie, o r person, o r scene, t h e y can a l s o each t a k e what t h e y experienced t o be p a r t o f t h e i r common ground. Once Anne and P i e r r e have b o t h p a r t i c i p a t e d i n a ( c ) L i n g u i s t i c =-presence. c o n v e r s a t i o n i n which a f a c t has been a s s e r t e d o r an o b j e c t mentioned, t h e y can each t a k e knowledge o f t h e f a c t o r t h e o b j e c t t o be p a r t o f t h e i r common ground. So t o design and understand r e f e r e n c e s c o r r e c t l y , people need t o c o n s u l t t h e personal d i a r y they keep i n memory o f t h e events i n which t h e y and o t h e r s have taken p a r t . F o r Anne t o be a b l e t o use t h e man you met l a s t n i g h t t o r e f e r t o Jacques, she must assure h e r s e l f , f o r example, t h a t she and P i e r r e had been t o g e t k r when she had seen him meet Jacques. W i t h o u t such a remembered e v e n t o r some o t h e r b a s i s f o r common ground, she c a n ' t be sure he w i l l r e a l i z e t h a t Jacques i s p a r t o f t h e i r common ground.

A

s t r i k i n g example o f reasoning f r o m t h e d e s i g n assumption can be found i n d e m o n s t r a t i v e r e f e r e n c e . Imagine Anne p o i n t i n g a t two men and s a y i n g t o P i e r r e : (1) Look a t t h a t man. Under O l s o n ' s model, t h i s r e f e r e n c e s h o u l d always be i n a p p r o p r i a t e , s i n c e l i s t e n e r s can never r e s o l v e t h e a m b i g u i t y : t h a t man can always r e f e r t o e i t h e r man. But imagine t h a t one o f t h e two men was d i s t i n c t i v e i n some way--say, he was dressed l i k e Napoleon. Then Anne's r e f e r e n c e would be q u i t e a p p r o p r i a t e , and P i e r r e would t a k e h e r as r e f e r r i n g t o t h e man dressed l i k e Napoleon. How? Reasoning f r o m t h e d e s i g n assumption, he would n o t e t h a t s i n c e she expected him t o r e c o g n i z e which man she was r e f e r r i n g t o , t h e r e must be something d i s t i n c t i v e about t h e r e f e r e n t t o a l l o w him t o do t h a t , and so she must be r e f e r r i n g t o t h e Napoleon l o o k - a l i ke.

The e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f such reasoning was demonstrated i n an experiment by C l a r k ,

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Schreuder, and B u t t r i c k ( i n p r e p a r a t i o n ) . B u t t r i c k walked up t o s t u d e n t s on t h e S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y campus and handed them a photograph o f P r e s i d e n t Ronald Reagan s t a n d i n g n e x t t o h i s d i r e c t o r o f t h e budget David Stockman. People i n an independent survey had s a i d t h a t t h e y assumed t h a t Reagan was w e l l known t o everyone b u t Stockman was not. B u t t r i c k t h e n asked each s t u d e n t one o f two questions:

( 2 ) You know who t h i s man i s , d o n ' t you? ( 3 ) Do you have any i d e a a t a l l who t h i s man i s ?

Note t h a t he used t h e same d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n , t h i s man, i n b o t h u t t e r a n c e s . Nevertheless, f o r 2, people o f f e r e d r e p l i e s such as "Yes, t h a t ' s Reagan," n o t once t h i n k i n g t h a t he had r e f e r r e d t o Stockman. For 3, p e o p l e s a i d such t h i n g s as "Yes, I b e l i e v e t h a t ' s stockman"; o n l y two o f 20 people assumed B u t t r i c k was r e f e r r i n g t o Reagan. The reasoning people used r e l i e d on t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s expressed i n 2 and 3. I n 2, B u t t r i c k presupposed t h a t t h e y ought t o know who he was r e f e r r i n g to, b u t i n 3, t h a t he doubted they would. I t was these p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , and t h e comnunity knowledge t h a t Reagan i s b e t t e r known, t h a t enabled them t o come t o a unique r e f e r e n t v i a t h e d e s i g n assumption. Audience design a l s o p l a y s a r o l e i n t h e l e v e l o f d e s c r i p t i o n i n d e f i n i t e reference. R e c a l l t h a t one o f t h e f a c t s O l s o n ' s model c o u l d n ' t account f o r was t h a t when people r e f e r t o o b j e c t s i n n e u t r a l contexts, t h e y t e n d t o d e s c r i b e them a t a m i d d l e l e v e l o f a b s t r a c t i o n . When people r e f e r t o a dog, a b i r d , o r a c h a i r , t h e y g e n e r a l l y use t h e dog, t h e b i r d , and t h e c h a i r i n p r e f e r e n c e t o more s p e c i f i c d e s c r i p t i o n s l i k e t h e s p a n i e l , t h e Sparrow, and t h e armchair, and i n preference t o more general d e s c r i p t i o n s l i k e t h e o b j e c t , t h e animal, and t h e p i e c e o f f u r n i t u r e . T h i s l e v e l o f p r e f e r r e d naming has g e n e r a l l y been c a l l e d t h e b a s i c l e v e l o f a b s t r a c t i o n (Rosch e t a l . , 1976). Why should t h e b a s i c l e v e l be t h e p r e f e r r e d l e v e l o f d e s c r i p t i o n ? One e x p l a n a t i o n i s t h a t -, bird, and chair denote b a s i c c a t e g o r i e s , and t h e s e c a t e g o r i e s a r e b a s i c because t h e y maximize two f a c t o r s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y : ( a ) t h e y a r e s p e c i f i c ; and ( b ) they a r e d i s s i m i l a r t o o t h e r c a t e g o r i e s . The most general c a t e g o r i e s , l i k e o b j e c t s , o r even animal and f u r n i t u r e , a r e t o o l o w on t h e f i r s t f a c t o r : t h e y a r e n ' t s p e c i f i c enough t o be u s e f u l . Very s p e c i f i c c a t e g o r i e s , l i k e s p a n i e l , sparrow, and armchair a r e t o o s i m i l a r t o o t h e r n e i g h b o r i n g c a t e g o r i e s , l i k e t e r r i e r , r o b i n , and h i g h c h a i r . They a r e t o o low on t h e second f a c t o r . The i d e a t h a t t h e b a s i c l e v e l maximizes these two f a c t o r s has been supported i n s e v e r a l experiments by Murphy and Smith (1982). When people were t a u g h t h i e r a r c h i e s o f c a t e g o r i e s t h a t v a r i e d on o n l y these two f a c t o r s ( w i t h o t h e r f a c t o r s h e l d constant, which r a r e l y happens i n n a t u r e ) , t h e y c a t e g o r i z e d o b j e c t s f a s t e s t f o r t h e b a s i c l e v e l names. These two f a c t o r s a r e i m p o r t a n t because of audience design. F o r t h e f i r s t f a c t o r t h i s i s c l e a r : t h e more s p e c i f i c a l l y an o b j e c t i s described, t h e e a s i e r i t can be i d e n t i f i e d unambiguously. But i f t h i s i s so, why i s n ' t i t always b e t t e r t o c a l l something a t e r r i e r , sparrow, o r armchair r a t h e r t h a n a bird, o r chair? Why should t h e second f a c t o r make a d i f f e r e n c e ? The reason i s t h a t u s i n g a s p e c i f i c name would i m p l y , by G r i c e ' s (1975) maxim of q u a n t i t y , t h a t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between t e r r i e r s and o t h e r dogs, o r between sparrows and o t h e r b i r d s , o r between armchairs and o t h e r types o f c h a i r s , was i m p o r t a n t i n t h a t s i t u a t i o n . F o r Anne t o t e l l P i e r r e , S i t i n t h e desk c h a i r , she must be d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t h e desk c h a i r f r o m o t h e r types o f c h a i r s i n t h e s i t u a t i o n . If t h e r e i s no o t h e r c h a i r p r e s e n t , t h e n h e r reference seems odd. Why i s she emphasizing t h a t i t i s n o t j u s t any t y p e o f c h a i r , b u t a desk c h a i r ? When a woman who owns o n l y one c a r says, Ply F e r r a r i i s -o u t f r o n t , we t a k e h e r as t r y i n g t o impress us by d i s t i n g u i s h i n g h e r F e r r a r i f r o m more o r d i n a r y cars. Because b a s i c l e v e l terms do n o t make such f i n e d i s t i n c t i o n s y e t are s t i l l r e l a t i v e l y informative, they are the neutral description.

u,

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But as Flurphy and Brownell ( u n p u b l i s h e d ) have argued, when t h e r e f e r e n t i s a t y p i c a l o f t h e c a t e g o r y t o which i t belongs, i t g e n e r a l l y needs a more s p e c i f i c d e s c r i p t i o n . People s h o u l d r e f e r t o a penguin as t h e penguin and n o t as t h e b i r d , even though bird i s t h e b a s i c l e v e l term. Why? Penguins a r e n o t v e r y s i m i l a r t o o t h e r b i r d s , and so d i s t i n g u i s h i n g penguins f r o m o t h e r b i r d s w i l l be i m p o r t a n t f o r i d e n t i f y i n g them i n most s i t u a t i o n s . To r e f e r t o a penguin as t h e b i r d m i g h t i m p l y t h a t i t c o u l d f l y , sing, and b u i l d nests, as most t y p i c a l b i r d s do. Indeed, people i n Nurphy and B r o w n e l l ' s experiments were a b l e t o c a t e g o r i z e a t y p i c a l o b j e c t s f a s t e r w i t h more s p e c i f i c names ( l i k e penguin) t h a n w i t h b a s i c l e v e l names ( l i k e bird), even though f o r t y p i c a l o b j e c t s t h e y were f a s t e s t f o r t h e b a s i c l e v e l names. These r e s u l t s show t h a t a p r e f e r r e d l e v e l o f naming i s n o t s i m p l y a r e s u l t o f g r e a t e r f a m i l i a r i t y o r i n f o r m a t i v e n e s s o f names. Speakers d e s i g n t h e i r d e s c r i p t i o n s t o convey as much i n f o r m a t i o n as p o s s i b l e , y e t n o t t o make unnecessary o r i n a p p r o p r i a t e d i s t i n c t i o n s i n t h a t s i t u a t i o n . AHAPHORA Although speech g e n e r a l l y sounds complete, i t i s n ' t . Much i s l e f t o u t i n b o t h t h e l o g i c and t h e syntax. Anaphora i s t h e name f o r t h e s e t o f phenomena i n which l i n g u i s t i c elements a r e missing, sometimes w i t h o t h e r elements s u b s t i t u t e d f o r t h e m i s s i n g ones (see Hankamer & Sag, 1976; Sag & Hankamer, 1981). The b e s t known t y p e of anaphora i s p r o n o m i n a l i z a t i o n , i n which a pronoun ( l i k e he) i s used i n s t e a d o f a f u l l e r d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e r e f e r e n t ( l i k e t h e handsome gentleman C l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o p r o n o m i n a l i z a t i o n i s nominal anaphora, as i n t h i s there). example: ( 4 ) The b l u e r a c i n g c a r crashed i n t o a w a l l . The v e h i c l e was destroyed. I n 4, a second d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n ( t h e v e h i c l e ) r e f e r s t o t h e same o b j e c t as an e a r l i e r , l o n g e r d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n ( t h e b l u e r a c i n g c a r ) . Since fi c o u l d have been used i n 4 j u s t as w e l l as t h e v e h i c l e , p r o n o m i n a l i z a t i o n and nominal anaphora a r e p r o b a b l y understood by s i m i l a r processes. The p r i n c i p l e s we discussed under d e f i n i t e r e f e r e n c e a l s o a p p l y t o p r o n o m i n a l i z a t i o n and nominal anaphora when t h e y are definite. I n u n d e r s t a n d i n g nominal and pronominal anaphora, l i s t e n e r s r e l y d i r e c t l y on t h e design assumption i n drawinq what C l a r k and H a v i l a n d (1977; H a v i l a n d and C l a r k . 1974; Clark,' 1977a, b ) h a v e - c a l l e d b r i d g i n g i n f e r e n c e s . Consider t h i s two-sentence segment o f d i s c o u r s e : ( 5 ) Elarie t o o k some p i c n i c s u p p l i e s o u t o f t h e c a r .

The beer was warm.

The problem h e r e i s t h a t t h e speaker r e f e r s t o some beer i n t h e second sentence even though t h e r e i s none i n t h e d i s c o u r s e model so f a r . The l i s t e n e r , however, assumes t h a t t h e r e ought t o be some beer t h e r e i f t h e speaker designed t h e u t t e r a n c e so t h a t he c o u l d f i n d such a r e f e r e n t u n i q u e l y . So he adds some beer t o t h e d i s c o u r s e model v i a t h e f o l l o w i n g b r i d g i n g i n f e r e n c e : ( 5 ' ) There must be some beer among t h e p i c n i c s u p p l i e s , and t h i s i s t h e b e e r referred to. S i m i l a r l y , c o n s i d e r these segments: ( 6 ) Anne:

Pierre:

Look a t t h a t f e l l o w dance! Yes, t h e mayor i s an e x c e l l e n t dancer.

( 7 ) Jean had a b r u i s e on h i s cheek.

Marie d i d it.

For t h e mayor i n 6 and f o r d i d i t i n 7, l i s t e n e r s would make t h e f o l l o w i n g

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bridging

nferences :

( 6 ' 1 The f e l l o w Anne r e f e r r e d t o must be a mayor; he must be t h e mayor o f t h e c i t y Anne and P i e r r e a r e i n a t t h e moment; and he i s t h e r e f e r e n t o f t h e mayor. ( 7 ' ) Jean must have g o t a b r u i s e on h i s cheek because someone d i d something t o him, and what t h a t someone d i d i s t h e r e f e r e n t o f d i d i t . The l i s t e n e r knows what b r i d g i n g i n f e r e n c e t o add o n l y by a p p e a l i n g t o t h e d e s i g n assumption (see C l a r k , 1977a,b). I n 5 P i e r r e reasons t h i s way: " I f Anne had good reason t o t h i n k t h a t I c o u l d i n f e r t h e presence o f some beer u n i q u e l y , she must have thought t h e i n f e r e n c e i s t h e most obvious one a v a i l a b l e f r o m o u r common ground. The beer cannot be i n H a r i e ' s handbag o r near t h e c a r o r i n t h e branch o f a t r e e . I t must be among t h e p i c n i c s u p p l i e s , t h e m u t u a l l y obvious p l a c e f o r t h e beer t o be." There i s good evidence t h a t l i s t e n e r s do make such b r i d g i n g i n f e r e n c e s (see C l a r k and Haviland, 1977). F i r s t , t h e y say t h e y do. Second, t h e y t a k e t i m e i n drawing b r i d g i n g inferences. H a v i l a n d and C l a r k (1974) compared t h e t i m e p e o p l e t o o k i n t r y i n g t o understand t h e second sentences i n 5 and 8: ( 8 ) H a r i e t o o k some beer o u t o f t h e c a r .

The beer was warm.

I n 5, l i s t e n e r s have t o draw t h e b r i d g i n g i n f e r e n c e s i n 5 ' , b u t i n 8, t h e y need t o i n f e r only 8': ( 8 ' ) The beer mentioned i n t h e f i r s t sentence i s t h e beer b e i n g r e f e r r e d t o i n t h e second. The more complicated b r i d g e i n 5 ' t o o k about a f i f t h o f a second l o n g e r t o c o n s t r u c t than t h e s i m p l e r b r i d g e i n 8 ' (see a l s o C l a r k and Sengul, 1979; Carpenter and J u s t , 1977; J u s t and Carpenter, 1978; L e s g o l d e t a l . , 1979). And f i n a l l y , l i s t e n e r s o f t e n misremember h a v i n g heard a b r i d g i n g i n f e r e n c e when i t d i d n ' t i n f a c t o c c u r ( K i n t s c h , 1974, Chapter 8). Audience design a l s o p l a y s a r o l e i n understanding more complicated types o f anaphora, as we can i l l u s t r a t e w i t h t h e f o r m c a l l e d " s l u i c i n g " i n 9: ( 9 ) Anne: Claude climbed t h e o l d c l o c k tower and t h e n w a i t e d f o r someone t o rescue him. P i e r r e : I wonder whj/-. Examples l i k e t h i s have g e n e r a l l y been analyzed as cases o f d e l e t i o n o f a v e r b phrase o r c l a u s e through a s i m p l e s y n t a c t i c mechanism (Sag e Hankamer, 1981). I n t h i s system, Anne would i n t e r p r e t P i e r r e ' s b l a n k by c o n s u l t i n g t h e p r e v i o u s u t t e r a n c e f o r a s y n t a c t i c a l l y s u i t a b l e replacement, h e r e p r o b a b l y t h e whole p r e v i o u s sentence, namely "Claude c l i m b e d t h e o l d c l o c k tower and then w a i t e d f o r someone t o rescue him." But suppose t h a t she and P i e r r e m u t u a l l y knew t h a t Claude climbed up and down t h e o l d c l o c k tower once a week. Now she would assume i n s t e a d t h a t t h e b l a n k r e f e r r e d t o o n l y h e r second c l a u s e - - " I wonder why Claude w a i t e d f o r someone t o rescue him.'' O r suppose t h a t t h e y m u t u a l l y knew t h a t Claude was a p a r a c h u t i s t who l i k e d t o drop o n t o t a l l b u i l d i n g s and w a i t t o be rescued. T h i s t i m e she would assume t h a t t h e b l a n k r e f e r r e d t o t h e f i r s t c l a u s e a l o n e - - " I wonder why Claude CLIMBED t h e o l d c l o c k tower." The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f anaphora o f t h i s and r e l a t e d types, then, a l s o demands t h a t l i s t e n e r s reason f r o m t h e i r common ground about what t h e speaker c o u l d have expected t h e addressees t o i n t e r p r e t uniquely.

So, audience design i s c r u c i a l t o many, and perhaps a l l , types o f anaphora.

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Without it, l i s t e n e r s c o u l d n ' t resolve ambiguities o r b u i l d the bridging i n f e r e n c e s r e q u i r e d by many types o f anaphora. S y n t a c t i c i n f o r m a t i o n i s almost never enough. WORD MEANINGS

I n many s t a n d a r d views o f meaning (e.g., Katz, 1972), a word l i k e bank appears i n t h e l e x i c o n w i t h one o r more l e x i c a l e n t r i e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h i t . Each e n t r y c o n t a i n s , among o t h e r t h i n g s , a l i s t o f t h e p o s s i b l e senses w i t h which t h a t word can be used. Bank would have two l e x i c a l e n t r i e s , one f o r t h e senses c l u s t e r i n g aroung "steep n a t u r a l i n c l i n e " and a n o t h e r f o r t h e senses aroung " f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n , " such as " f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n , " " b u i l d i n g housing a f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n , " and " t h e r e s e r v e c h i p s i n c e r t a i n b e t t i n g games." Bank i s c o n s i d e r e d a homonym s i n c e i t s two l e x i c a l e n t r i e s a r e t h o u g h t t o be independent o f each other. T h i s view o f meaning i s t h e one t h a t p s y c h o l o g i s t s have g e n e r a l l y adopted i n t h e i r models o f word understanding. I n most d i s c u s s i o n s o f l e x i c a l access ( F o r s t e r , 1979; G a r r e t t , 1978; Swinney, 1979), f o r example, l i s t e n e r s a r e assumed t o access, o r a c t i v a t e , more than one sense o f each word t h e y hear and t h e n s e l e c t among these senses on t h e b a s i s o f c o n t e x t . F l e t a p h o r i c a l l y , l i s t e n e r s thumb t h r o u g h t h e i r mental l e x i c o n s f o r t h e r i g h t l e x i c a l e n t r y and t h e n t r y o u t each l i s t e d meaning f o r i t s p l a u s i b i l i t y i n c o n t e x t , e v e n t u a l l y s e l e c t i n g t h e r i g h t one. P r e c i s e l y how t h i s i s done d i f f e r s from model t o model, b u t o t h e r w i s e t h e r e i s c o n s i d e r a b l e agreement. Most o f t h e f i n d i n g s i n l e x i c a l access have been i n t e r p r e t e d from t h i s p o i n t o f view. Audience d e s i g n would p l a y a r o l e i n t h e s e models, b u t i t s r o l e would be l i m i t e d . Speakers would have a p a r t i c u l a r s e m e o f a word i n mind, l i k e " b u i l d i n g housing a f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n " f o r bank, and t h e y would p r o v i d e enough c o n t e x t t o enable t h e i r addressees t o s e l e c t t h e i n t e n d e d sense r a t h e r t h a n some o t h e r . O r d i n a r i l y , t h i s would be easy, s i n c e t h e r e a r e o n l y a few p o s s i b l e senses f o r each word, and t h e i n t e n d e d one i s c o n t r a i n e d by many f a c t o r s a t once. But audience d e s i g n i s more c e n t r a l t o word meaning t h a n t h i s . The v o c a b u l a r y o f a language i s open ended, and novel coinages, o r word i n n o v a t i o n s , can be added a t any time. Imagine Anne s a y i n g t o P i e r r e : (10) Was y o u r newspaper p r o p e r l y porched t h i s morning? Although porch e x i s t s i n E n g l i s h as a noun, i t d o e s n ' t e x i s t as a verb. B u t i f i t d o e s n ' t , how can P i e r r e i n t e r p r e t i t ? He cannot c o n s u l t h i s mental l e x i c o n , w h i c h has no l e x i c a l e n t r y f o r t h i s novel coinage. He i s f o r c e d t o c r e a t e a meaning f o r t h e word on t h e spot. The same problem a r i s e s i n t h i s small sample o f i n n o v a t i v e expressions (under1 ined) : ( 1 1 ) My s i s t e r managed t o Houdini h e r way i n t o h e r o f f i c e t h i s morning. ( 1 2 ) The p o l i c e c a r s i r e n e d up t o t h e a c c i d e n t . (13) I p o s t c a r d e d a l l my f r i e d s t h a t I was having a good t i m e i n A i x .

As C l a r k and C l a r k (1979) argued, c e r t a i n types o f n o v e l coinages a r e n o t m e r e l y ambiguous. They have, i n p r i n c i p l e , an i n d e f i n i t e l y l a r g e number of p o s s i b l e senses. I n d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s , t o p o r c h can be taken t o mean " t u r n i n t o a porch," " s u p p l y w i t h a porch," "disarm w i t h a drawing o f a porch," and so on i n d e f i n i t e l y . I t s p o s s i b l e senses a r e n o t enumerable. There i s no a l g o r i t h m t h a t can enumerate j u s t t h o s e senses i t c o u l d have and no o t h e r senses. C l a r k and C l a r k c a l l e d words whose senses a r e n o t enumerable c o n t e x t u a l expressions.

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Contextual expressions a r e i n t e r p r e t a b l e only because of their audience design. As Clark and Clark argued, a speaker uses such an expression only when he has good reason t o believe t h a t his addressees can r e a d i l y i d e n t i f y t h e intended denotation uniquely on t h e basis of t h e i r cornon ground. When Anne uses t o Houdini, she i s confident t h a t Houdini and h i s a b i l i t y t o go through locked doors a r e common ground t o her and P i e r r e and t h a t he can use this knowledge t o come quickly a;d In uniquely t o the intended denotation "go t h r o u g h a locked door a s i f by magic. many s i t u a t i o n s , the design assumption would be c r u c i a l t o P i e r r e ' s reasoning. Without i t , he may be a b l e t o i d e n t i f y many possible i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , y e t not decide which one had been intended. I f contextual expressions were on t h e periphery of language, they would be l i t t l e cause f o r concern. B u t they a r e ubiquitous, and they a r e understood quickly and r e a d i l y in the normal course of conversations. There a r e many types of contextual expressions, including novel coinages in these constructions (Clark, 1982).

-+

i n d i r e c t nouns, as in I saw a Henry Moore toda c ock noun compounds, as i n T j u S t - b m g e n i t i v e s , a s i n My bus today was crowded denominal nouns, a s i n &ie& C h u r c h i l l i t e denominal verbs, a s i n The newsboy porched the newspaper eponymous verbs, as i n I did a Napoleon f o r t h e camera pro-act verbs, as i n Alice did the lawn denominal a d j e c t i v e s , as in He's very Churchillian ter'est non-predicating a d j e c t i v e s , a s in This atomic book i s fieponymous a d j e c t i v e s , as i n She's very San Francisco Contextual expressions a r e an ordinary p a r t of language ( s e e Clark & Clark, 1979; Clark, 1982; Nunberg, 1979). They a r e usually understood quickly and without special e f f o r t o r disruption. I n experiments by Gerrig and Clark, novel denominal verbs took only a f r a c t i o n of a second longer, i f t h a t , t o understand than analogous well e s t a b l i s h e d words. Host of t h e time, l i s t e n e r s d o n ' t even n o t i c e they a r e i n t e r p r e t i n g novel coinages, and when they do, they d o n ' t find them odd o r unnatural. For a theory of understanding t o be c o r r e c t , t h e r e f o r e , i t must deal with contextual expressions in the normal course of processing. Current theories of understanding, however, d o n ' t ( s e e Clark, 1982). All of them assume, in one way o r another, t h a t l i s t e n e r s s e l e c t among senses already i n the mental lexicon o r , f a i l i n g t h a t , among senses t h a t can be created by a " l e x i c a l r u l e . " Neither of these s o l u t i o n s can cope with the i n d e f i n i t e l y l a r g e number of senses of contextual expressions nor w i t h t h e f a c t t h a t t h e s e senses cannot be constructed by r u l e . I f these arguments a r e c o r r e c t , audience design should play an e s s e n t i a l r o l e i n t h e process of understanding words, and i t does. In several experiments (Clark, unpublished), people were asked t o i n t e r p r e t novel expressions such a s these: (14) The photographer asked the man t o do a Napoleon f o r the camera. (15) I have always wanted t o do a Nancy King t o the s a l a d . To i n t e r p r e t these, people have t o know who Napoleon and Nancy K i n g a r e , t o

know a c t s they have done, and s p e c i f i c a l l y t o know some a c t t h a t f i t s t h e s e utterances uniquely--an a c t t h a t t h e speaker would have good reason t o t h i n k they could i d e n t i f y r e a d i l y and uniquely. For cases l i k e 14, t h i s proce;s can Napoleon a s tuck succeed, and most people in the experiment i n t e r p r e t e d t h e hand i n s i d e the coat 2 l a Napoleon." For cases like 15, the process can only f a i l - - u n l e s s people a r e t o l d something about Nancy King, which is a

Audience Design in Meaning and Reference

made-up name n o t p a r t o f common ground. When p e o p l e i n t h i s experiment were t o l d a s t o r y about Nancy King f r o m which t h e y c o u l d c r e a t e a c o h e r e n t unique i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , they accepted 15 and i n t e r p r e t e d i t as p r e d i c t e d . When t h e y were t o l d a s t o r y t h a t p r e c l u d e d such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h e y r e j e c t e d t h e u t t e r a n c e and gave no i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . So people made d i r e c t use o f t h e d e s i g n assumption i n d e c i d i n g what t h e s e words meant. Since n o v e l coinages depend c r u c i a l l y on audience design f o r t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h e y s h o u l d be understood q u i c k l y when t h e c o n t e x t i s a p p r o p r i a t e and n o t so q u i c k l y when i t i s n ' t . O f course, an a p p r o p r i a t e c o n t e x t should speed t h e p r o c e s s i n g o f any word, b u t i t s h o u l d be even more h e l p f u l f o r n o v e l coinages. To t e s t t h i s p r e d i c t i o n , G e r r i g and C l a r k ( u n p u b l i s h e d ) had people read sentences such as t h e f o l l o w i n g : ( 1 6 ) She had a s p e c i a l way of s p i c i n g omelettes. ( 1 7 ) She had a s p e c i a l way o f h e r b i n g omelettes. Although b o t h spice and herb a r e verbs c r e a t e d f r o m nouns, t h e v e r b spice i s a l r e a d y w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h e l e x i c o n , w h i l e t h e verb herb i s n o v e l . Consider what s h o u l d happen when 16 o r 17 i s preceded by 18 o r 19: ( 1 8 ) Eve was v e r y good a t u s i n g t h e r i g h t seasoning i n h e r cooking. ( 1 9 ) Eve was v e r y good a t cooking a v a r i e t y o f dishes. With 18 b u t n o t 19, t h e speaker mentions seasoning, which makes t h e meaning o f t h e v e r b herb easy t o c r e a t e . The mention o f seasoning, however, should g i v e l e s s h e l p t o t h e verb s p i c e , whose meaning d o e s n ' t need t o be c r e a t e d i n t h e same way: i t s meaning i s e l r e a d y i n t h e mental l e x i c o n . These p r e d i c t i o n s were c o n f i r m e d i n t h e r e a d i n g t i m e of t h e two types o f sentences. L i s t e n e r s can never know, when t h e y hear a word, whether i t i s b e i n g used i n one o f i t s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d senses, i f i t has one, o r i n an i n n o v a t i v e sense (see C l a r k , 1982). They may be c e r t a i n t h a t words l i k e t o Houdini and hammer-pocket a r e i n n o v a t i v e and r e q u i r e t h e c r e a t i o n of a new sense, s i n c e these a r e n o t i n t h e mental l e x i c o n . They cannot be c e r t a i n f o r t h e r e s t . U l t i m a t e l y , t h e y must always r e l y on t h e design assumption i n d e c i d i n g what t h e speaker meant. CONCLUSIONS We have argued as f o l l o w s . When people t a l k , t h e y t a i l o r what t h e y say t o t h e i r audience. They expect t h e i r audience t o use t h a t f a c t i n f i g u r i n g o u t what t h e y meant. Since l i s t e n e r s can assume t h a t t h e speaker had good reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e addressees c o u l d f u l l y understand what he meant on t h e b a s i s o f t h e i r common g r o u n d - - t h i s i s t h e d e s i g n assumption--they can reason through t o t h e s p e a k e r ' s meaning a c c o r d i n g l y . We have i l l u s t r a t e d t h i s f o r m o f r e a s o n i n g f o r d e f i n i t e r e f e r e n c e , anaphora, and word i n n o v a t i o n s . Audience design, t h e r e f o r e , must p l a y an e s s e n t i a l r o l e i n t h e o r i e s o f understanding. But t h e models o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g most prominent today make l i t t l e o r no use of audience design. They work p r i m a r i l y f r o m p e r c e p t u a l d a t a - - t h e speech sounds--applying v a r i o u s s t r a t e g i e s t o i d e n t i f y p h o n e t i c sequences, words, s y n t a c t i c c o n s t r u c t i o n s , and sentence meanings. When c o n t e x t i s b r o u g h t i n , i t i s b r o u g h t i n t o a r b i t r a t e among t h e p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s c r e a t e d by t h e s t r a t e g i e s w o r k i n g f r o m t h e p e r c e p t u a l data. T h i s w i l l n o t do.

People have t o reason f r o m t h e d e s i g n assumption even t o

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get syntax and word meanings right. For example, the syntax of t o porch depends on which of the indefinitely large number of possible meanings i t i s intended t o have on t h i s occasion: Does i t take a dire c t or an indirect object, an animate or inanimate subject, or any oblique objects? Listeners cannot decide without reference t o audience design. Further, there i s evidence in the Gerrig and Clark experiments t h a t people trying t o understand an utterance make use of the design assumption i n parallel with i t s syntactic and semantic properties (see also Harslen-Wilson & Tyler, 1980). Audience design comes into play any time l i s t en er s make choices, and these occur a t a l l levels of language, from the phonetic level up. Why has audience design played so l i t t l e part in psychological models of understanding? I t i s probably because there has been so much research on understanding of isolated sentences and so l i t t l e research on conversations and other genuine communication. I n research on isolated sentences, the beliefs and background o f particular l i s t en er s are almost impossible t o study. For psychological models t o become truly psychological, they m u s t bring in the thoughts of individual speakers and l i s t en er s . They must be more t h a n models of language use. They must be models of language users. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The preparation o f t hi s paper was supported in part by g r a n t HH-20021 from the National I n s t i t u t e of Mental Health. We t h a n k Eve V. Clark for her comments on e a r l i e r d r a f t s of the paper.

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LANGUAGE AND COMPREHENSION

J.-F. Le Ny, W. Kintsch (editors)

0 North-HollandPublishing Company, 1982

30 1

ASPECTS OF TEXT COMPRtHENSION

Walter Kintsch U n i v e r s i t y o f Colorado Goulder, Colorado U.S.A.

I n t h i s paper I would l i k e t o d i s c u s s some work t h a t we have r e c e n t l y done on m o d e l l i n g t e x t comprehension. T h i s work was done i n c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h Teun van D i j k a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f Amsterdam and James M i l l e r a t Colorado, Van D i j k and I have t r i e d t o d e v e l o p a g e n e r a l t h e o r y o f t e x t comprehension, o r a t l e a s t some a s p e c t s t h e r e o f . M i l l e r has a t t e m p t e d t o r e a l i z e t h i s t h e o r y as a computer s i m u l a t i o n model. I s h a l l t r y i n t h i s paper t o g i v e a f l a v o r o f how t h i s s i m u l a t i o n model works, w i t h o u t g o i n g i n t o t h e t e c h n i c a l d e t a i l s . To do so, I s h a l l have t o o u t l i n e f i r s t some o f t h e d e s i g n p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e general t h e o r y and some of i t s b a s i c assumptions. There a r e t h r e e b a s i c n o t i o n s t h a t need t o be d i s c u s s e d here. The f i r s t i s t h e b e l i e f t h a t t h e b e s t way t o s t u d y complex systems i s by decomposing them i n t o s i m p l e r subsystems. The second i s o u r assumption t h a t human comprehension i s a s t r a t e g y based process. And f i n a l l y , t h e importance o f knowledge use i n comprehension must be discussed. The p r i n c i p l e o f decomposition i n m o d e l l i n g complex systems i s d i s c u s s e d most I t s advantage i s t h a t i t p e r m i t s c o n c e n t r a t i n g on t h e f u l l y i n Simon (1969). development o f a model f o r some subsystem w i t h o u t h a v i n g t o be concerned w i t h t h e Only t h e o u t p u t s o f t h e v a r i o u s subt o t a l c o m p l e x i t y i n t h e system as a whole. systems i n t e r a c t . Thus, i t i s p o s s i b l e t o model f u l l y some components o f a system w h i l e o t h e r s a r e n e g l e c t e d . We t a k e f u l l advantage o f t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y . We do n o t t r y t o f u l l y model comprehension, b u t c o n c e n t r a t e on some subprocesses. S p e c i f i c a l l y , we a r e i n t e r e s t e d i n how p e o p l e c o n s t r u c t a c o h e r e n t t e x t base f r o m t h e elementary meaning u n i t s t h a t t h e y p i c k up f r o m t h e t e x t . How do t h e y use t h e i r knowledge i n t h i s process, and how does t h i s t e x t base become i n t e g r a t e d w i t h t h e i r knowledge? O f s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t t o us has a l s o been t h e q u e s t i o n how readers develop a n o t i o n about t h e g i s t o f t h e t e x t , t h a t i s , i t s m a c r o s t r u c t u r e . Our model d e a l s w i t h t h e s e h i g h e r - l e v e l processes, w h i l e n e g l e c t i n g c e r t a i n o t h e r components o f t h e comprehension process. What we l e a v e o u t , so f a r , i s p r i m a r i l y t h e i n i t i a l p a r s i n g o f t h e t e x t t h a t produces t h e elementary meaning u n i t s upon which a l l t h e o t h e r processes a r e b u i l d i n g , as w e l l as some problems a b o u t knowl e d g e use. S p e c i f i c a l l y , we s i m p l y g i v e t h e system t h e knowledge t h a t i t must use, t h e r e b y bypassing t h e v e r y complex problem o f r e t r i e v a l o f r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m a l a r g e d a t a base. Comprehension i s a s t r a t e g y based process. The d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t we a r e making h e r e i s one between a l g o r i t h m i c , r u l e governed processes and h e u r i s t i c , s t r a t e g i c processes. An example o f a r u l e governed process would be a p a r s e r t h a t i n c o r p o r a t e s t h e r u l e s o f some l i n g u i s t i c t h e o r y , say t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l grammar, and t h a t parses a t e x t by a p p l y i n g t h e s e r u l e s t o t h e t e x t , t h e r e b y computing a parsed r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e t e x t . These computations may be l o n g and t e d i o u s , b u t t h e r i g h t r e s u l t would e v e n t u a l l y be guaranteed, as l o n g as t h e r u l e s o f t h e grammar a r e c o r r e c t . Human comprehension, we c l a i m , does n o t work l i k e t h i s . Instead o f r u l e s t h a t g r i n d t o a p r e d e s i g n a t e d g o a l , i t works w i t h s t r a t e g i e s i n a much more open ended manner. S t r a t e g i e s h e l p p e o p l e i n f e r t h e meaning o f a t e x t , b u t t h e y

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do n o t guarantee a p a r t i c u l a r end r e s u l t . They a r e t h i n g s people do i n o r d e r t o i n f e r f r o m t h e w r i t t e n page o r spoken word what t h e sender o f t h e message had i n t e n d e d w i t h i t . They a r e used because t h e y have been s u c c e s s f u l i n t h e p a s t i n s i m i l a r c o n t e x t s - b u t t h e y may f a i l now. S t r a t e g i e s a r e preprogrammed o p e r a t i o n s t h a t r e a d e r s p e r f o r m i f t h e y n o t i c e c e r t a i n cues i n t h e t e x t . These o p e r a t i o n s may o c c u r a t many d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s , f r o m t h e l e v e l o f word i d e n t i f i c a t i o n up t h r o u g h phrase and sentence comprehens i o n , t o knowledge i n t e g r a t i o n and macroprocessing. A main purpose o f o u r work i s t o show e x a c t l y what these s t r a t e g i e s a r e , how t h e y operate, how people use them, and how a computer program t h a t i n c l u d e s t h e s e s t r a t e g i e s can understand text. No u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s p o s s i b l e w i t h o u t knowledge. I n o u r p r e v i o u s work ( K i n t s c h & van D i j k , 1978) t h e use o f knowledge was n o t m o d e l l e d e x p l i c i t l y . I n s t e a d , we have r e l i e d on some f o r m a l a p p r o x i m a t i o n s and s t a t i s t i c a l t e c h n i q u e s t o s i m u l a t e t h e end r e s u l t s o f p e o p l e s ' knowledge use i n comprehension. However, t h e success o f such an approach i s l i m i t e d ; e v e n t u a l l y , t h e d i f f i c u l t problem o f knowledge use must be t a c k l e d d i r e c t l y . I n t h e p r e s e n t paper, I want t o show how we a r e t r y i n g t o do so. Again, we a r e o n l y t r y i n g t o deal w i t h p a r t o f t h e problem, as i n d i c a t e d e a r l i e r : how t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t i s necessary f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g a t e x t i s r e t r i e v e d f r o m t h e r e a d e r ' s l o n g - t e r m memory i s a q u e s t i o n we a r e n e g l e c t i n g f o r t h e moment. I n s t e a d o f a general d e s c r i p t i o n o f how t h e model works, I s h a l l g i v e h e r e a worked-out example. I s h a l l t a k e a t e x t and hand s i m u l a t e t h e o p e r a t i o n s p e r formed by o u r computer program ( M i l l e r , i n p r e s s ) . W i t h i n t h e l i m i t s o f t h e p r e s e n t paper t h i s i s p r o b a b l y t h e b e s t way t o communicate how t h e program works and what t h e t h e o r y b e h i n d i t i s . T h i s , o f course, f a l l s f a r s h o r t o f a f o r m a l p r e s e n t a t i o n , b u t i s about a l l t h a t can be achieved here. THE ANNOTATED TEXT AS INPUT. The f i r s t s t e p i n t h e comprehension process i n v o l v e s t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f semantic u n i t s o r atomic p r o p o s i t i o n s f r o m t h e v e r b a l i n p u t . As I have a l r e a d y mentioned, t h e model l a c k s a p a r s i n g mechanism, and hence we have t o a n n o t a t e t h e t e x t i n such a way t h a t i t resembles t h e o u t p u t o f a p a r s e r . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , we break up t h e t e x t i n t o TEXT EXPRESSIONS as shown i n T a b l e 1, and a n n o t a t e t h e s e t e x t e x p r e s s i o n s w i t h a p p r o p r i a t e s y n t a c t i c and semantic i n f o r m a t i o n . A t e x t e x p r e s s i o n i s a word o r small group o f words t h a t f o r o u r purposes a r e b e s t t r e a t e d as a s i n g l e u n i t . Thus, f u n c t i o n words i n d i c a t i n g semantic cases a r e b e s t combined w i t h t h e a p p r o p r i a t e c o n t e n t words i n t o a s i n g l e t e x t expression. Some o f t h e t e x t e x p r e s s i o n s i n T a b l e 1 a r e u n i t s such as " o f P h i l a d e l p h i a " , "were a t t r i b u t e d " , and " t o him". The a n n o t a t i o n s i d e n t i f y semantic cases ( " J o h n Newman" i s t h e R e c i p i e n t b e l o n g i n g t o E x p r e s s i o n ( 2 ) ), M o d i f i e r s , Time, o r L o c a t i o n s ( " p r i e s t " m o d i f i e s E x p r e s s i o n ( 3 ) , "dramatically" m o d i f i e s E x p r e s s i o n (19), " i n t h i s c e n t u r y " i s t h e Time f o r E x p r e s s i o n ( 1 1 ) ), o r connections among d i f f e r e n t t e x t e x p r e s s i o n s ("when" connects Expressions ( 1 9 ) and ( 2 3 ) ). I n a d d i t i o n , t h e a n n o t a t i o n s c o n t a i n s y n t a c t i c i n f o r m a t i o n such as t h a t "Eva Benassi" i s a sentence s u b j e c t , i n t e r e s t t a g s (e.g., f o r "miracles"), and pronoun d i s a m b i g u a t i o n ( " h i m " i n E x p r e s s i o n ( 1 2 ) , r e f e r s t o "John Newman"). The t e x t expressions, even w i t h t h e a n n o t a t i o n s t h a t we have s u p p l i e d f o r them, a r e s t i l l i n s u f f i c i e n t t o b e g i n t h e process o f understanding. What i s needed i s knowledge about t h e meaning o f t h e words used i n t h e t e x t expressions. T h i s knowledge i s s u p p l i e d t o t h e system i n Column 3 of T a b l e 1. Note t h a t t h e knowl e d g e we g i v e t o t h e system a t t h i s p o i n t i s m i n i m a l : we know a g r e a t d e a l more about "nurse" t h a n t h a t i t i s a person - b u t i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e t e x t t h a t i s b e i n g read here, t h a t i s t h e minimum knowledge r e q u i r e d f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e t e x t as a whole. S i m i l a r l y , we need t o know t h a t "canonize" r e q u i r e s a r e c i p i e n t who i s a r e l i g i o u s person (we d o n ' t r e a l l y have t o w o r r y about t h e a g e n t h e r e ) , t h a t " a t t r i b u t e " has a person as R e c i p i e n t , and may t a k e a n y t h i n g as an O b j e c t

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( w h i c h i s n o t q u i t e t r u e , b u t t h a t i s a l l we have t o know f o r p r e s e n t purposes). " P r i e s t " i s i d e n t i f i e d as a r e l i g i o u s , male person, and " b i s h o p " m e r e l y as some s o r t of p r i e s t . O b v i o u s l y , t h e r e i s more t o t h e s e concepts t h a n what we a r e u s i n g here, and f o r a f u l l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e t e x t one would have t o know more about bishops and nurses t h a n what o u r program i s a l l o w e d t o know. However, we a r e n o t so much i n t e r e s t e d h e r e i n t h e word concepts themselves, and i n t h e i n f e r e n c e s people make from these concepts, b u t i n how p e o p l e p u t t o g e t h e r t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i n a t e x t , and t h e i n f e r e n c e s t h a t r e s u l t f r o m t h i s process. T h e r e f o r e , we p r o v i d e t h e program w i t h o n l y as much knowledge a b o u t t h e words i t reads as i s necessary f o r t h i s purpose. THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEMANTIC UNITS. The process o f b u i l d i n g and f i l l i n g t h e atomic semantic u n i t s o u t o f which t h e meaning r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e t e x t i s t o be c o n s t r u c t e d i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n Table 2. Whenever a new t e x t element i s encountered f o r which a s l o t does n o t a l r e a d y e x i s t i n an a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d semantic u n i t , a new u n i t i s c o n s t r u c t e d w i t h t h a t e x p r e s s i o n i n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e r o l e , as i n d i c a t e d by t h e a n n o t a t i o n . Thus, when t h e f i r s t t e x t e x p r e s s i o n i s processed, S ( 1 ) i s s e t up w i t h INORDERTO as t h e p r e d i c a t e ( f o r t h e e x p r e s s i o n " i n t h e r e q u e s t t o " ) and two argument s l o t s which a r e h e l d p r o v i s i o n a l l y by E ( 2 ) and E(11), respectively, according t o the i n s t r u c t i o n s contained i n t h e annotation f o r E(1). When E ( 2 ) a r r i v e s , two t h i n g s happen: f i r s t a new semantic u n i t i s c o n s t r u c t e d w i t h CANONIZE as t h e p r e d i c a t e (and as y e t n o t h i n g f o r any o f t h e argument s l o t s ) and secondly S ( 1 ) i s updated, i n t h a t S ( 2 ) can now be i n s e r t e d as an argument i n t o S(1) i n p l a c e o f t h e dummy v a r i a b l e E(2). T e x t e x p r e s s i o n E(3) r e q u i r e s t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f an e x i s t e n t i a l semantic u n i t , S ( 3 ) , t o i n t r o d u c e t h e argument JOHN NEWMAN and r e s u l t s i n more u n i t f i l l i n g : JOHN NEWMAN i s i n s e r t e d as an argument i n t o S(2). E(4) l e a d s t o t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a new semantic u n i t ( a g a i n w i t h a t e x t e x p r e s s i o n as a p l a c e h o l d e r f o r an argument). Thus, t h e process c o n t i n u e s t o b u i l d and f i l l semantic u n i t s , as i n s t r u c t e d by t h e annotat i o n s t o t h e t e x t expressions. I t s h o u l d be an easy e x e r c i s e f o r t h e r e a d e r t o f o l l o w t h e process o f semantic u n i t c o n s t r u c t i o n f o r t h e remainder o f t h e two sample sentences g i v e n here. There a r e f i v e arguments t o be i n t r o d u c e d v i a e x i s t e n t i a l u n i t s , which a r e t h e n used t o f o r m a t o t a l o f 19 semantic u n i t s . THE KNOWLEDGE CHECK AT THE LEVEL OF SEE.1ANTIC UNITS. C o n s t r u c t i n g a t o m i c semantic u n i t s i s , however, n o t t h e o n l y process t h a t goes on a t t h i s l e v e l . I t i s n o t enough t o c o n s t r u c t a t o m i c p r o p o s i t i o n s t o s e r v e as semantic u n i t s , t h e y a l s o need t o be checked a g a i n s t t h e knowledge base t o d e t e r m i n e whether o r n o t t h e y a r e s e m a n t i c a l l y acceptable. Whenever a semantic u n i t i s completed ( t h a t i s , whenever t h e r e a r e no more p l a c e h o l d e r t e x t e x p r e s s i o n s i n a u n i t - i t i s q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t an u n a n t i c i p a t e d argument may be added l a t e r , as happens w i t h S ( 9 ) ) i t i s checked a g a i n s t whatever r e l e v a n t knowledge t h e system has a v a i l a b l e . Thus, t h e f i r s t semantic u n i t t o be completed i s S ( 2 ) , (CANONIZE,REC:NEWMAN) (someone) canonized Newman - , i n v o l v i n g t h e knowledge sources f o r CANONIZE and NEWMAN. CANONIZE r e q u i r e s a r e l i g i o u s person as a r e c i p i e n t , w h i l e a l l we know a t t h i s p o i n t a b o u t Newman i s t h a t i t i s a male person. The match, t h e r e f o r e , i s incomplete, and t h e system s e t s up an e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t Newman i s , indeed, r e l i g i o u s , as r e q u i r e d . I n o t h e r words, i f t h e system does n o t know, i t g i v e s t h e t e x t t h e b e n e f i t o f doubt. A s i t happens, i n t h i s case t h e u n c e r t a i n t y about Newman's r e l i g i o s i t y i s q u i c k l y removed when he i s i d e n t i f i e d as a p r i e s t , which t h e system knows has t h e r e q u i r e d p r o p e r t y o f b e i n g r e l i g i o u s .

A l l t h e o t h e r knowledge checks a r e s u c c e s s f u l i n t h e p r e s e n t example: as f a r as t h i s system knows, i t i s a l r i g h t t o be a b i s h o p i n P h i l a d e l p h i a , o r f o r someone t o a t t r i b u t e m i r a c l e s t o Newman, f o r a female person t o d i e , as w e l l as f o r h e r t o r e c o v e r d r a m a t i c a l l y . T h i s , o f course, m e r e l y r e f l e c F s t h e f a c t t h a t t h e knowledge we have p r o v i d e d does n o t r e s t r i c t t h e use o f d r a m a t i c a l l y " a t a l l , and p e r m i t s anyone t o d i e o f e i t h e r i l l n e s s or a c c i d e n t .

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What we have a t t h i s p o i n t i s a sequence o f semantic u n i t s ( a t o m i c p r o p o s i t i o n s ) which r e p r e s e n t t h e b a s i c meaning o f t h e t e x t . To d e r i v e t h e s e semantic u n i t s from t h e t e x t was no g r e a t achievement, because we s e t up t h e t e x t e x p r e s s i o n s w i t h t h e i r a n n o t a t i o n s and knowledge sources i n such a way as t o make t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f such u n i t s p o s s i b l e . Nevertheless, i t i s perhaps a s m a l l p r o g r e s s beyond o u r p r e v i o u s p r a c t i c e o f handcoding t h i s e n t i r e process. I n t u i t i o n s are s t i l l involved i n generating the material f o r Table 1 - b u t from t h a t p o i n t on t h e processes a r e f u l l y s p e c i f i e d and o b j e c t i v e . A t l e a s t we can now see more c l e a r l y what i s needed f o r a t r u l y complete model o f comprehension: somehow, processes w i l l have t o be d e v i s e d t h a t g e n e r a t e t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i n Columns 2 and 3 o f T a b l e 1, which we have s u p p l i e d i n t u i t i v e l y . TEXT PROPOSITIONS. Our main t h e o r e t i c a l e f f o r t has been d i r e c t e d towards e l u c i d a t i n g t h e processes which g e n e r a t e t h e o u t p u t shown i n Tables 3 and 4, t h a t i s , w i t h t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e t e x t and w i t h i t s macrostructure. A complex p r o p o s i t i o n , o r t e x t p r o p o s i t i o n , o r g a n i z e s and t i e s t o g e t h e r a number o f r e l a t e d semantic u n i t s . I t s e x a c t f o r m i s i n p a r t determined by t h e r e a d e r ' s knowledge s t r u c t u r e , and i n p a r t by t h e f o r m i n which t h e meaning u n i t s o f t h e t e x t have been expressed. The knowledge s t r u c t u r e s u p p l i e s t h e p o s s i b l e s l o t s f o r a p r o p o s i t i o n ; The t e x t u a l i n f o r m a t i o n s e l e c t s some o f t h e s e s l o t s and f i l l s them w i t h new i n f o r m a t i o n . The p r o p o s i t i o n a l s l o t s a r e determined by t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e l e x i c o n . The l e x i c o n we a r e assuming h e r e i s one c o n s t r u c t e d a l o n g t h e l i n e s suggested by M i l l e r & Johnson-Laird (1976). Thus, f o r verbs, t h e l e x i c a l s l o t s correspond m o s t l y t o l e x i c a l cases w i t h a p p r o p r i a t e r e s t r i c t i o n s and semantic f i e l d i n f o r mation. The v e r b D I E , f o r i n s t a n c e , would be s p e c i f i e d i n terms o f i t s r o l e i n t h e semantic f i e l d LIVE (as "become-not-alive"), by t h e k i n d o f P a t i e n t i t t a k e s (people, animals, o r p l a n t s ) , and p o s s i b l e Sources (e.g., illness, accident). I n a d d i t i o n , i t may have Time, L o c a t i o n and o t h e r Manner s l o t s ( P r e c o n d i t i o n , Cause, Consequence). A l l o f t h e s e s l o t s may be m o d i f i e d v i a s u b o r d i n a t e semantic u n i t s . Thus, t h e sentence "Eva, a young I t a l i a n g i r l , was d y i n g s l o w l y o f p e r i t o n i t i e s , a f a t a l d i s e a s e " m i g h t be r e p r e s e n t e d as a s i n g l e p r o p o s i t i o n w i t h D I E as i t s p r e d i c a t e , Eva and p e r i t o n i t i e s as arguments and s e v e r a l m o d i f i e r s : (1)

DIE:

Patient: Source: Mod:

EVA-----Mod:

(GIRL,EVA)--(YOUNG,GIRL)

PERITONITES----Mod:

- - ( ITALIAN,GIRL) (DISEASE, PERIT0NITES)--(FATAL, D ISEASE )

SLOW

On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e same semantic u n i t s may be o r g a n i z e d q u i t e d i f f e r e n t l y g i v e n t h e sentence "Eva was a young I t a l i a n g i r l who was d y i n g s l o w l y o f t h e f a t a l d i s e a s e p e r i t o n i t e s " . We t a k e t h i s sentence t o express a p r o p o s i t i o n about EVA (whom o u r l e x i c o n i d e n t i f i e s as a female p e r s o n ) : (2)

(YOUNG, G IRL) (GIRL ,EVA) ---Mod: Mod: (ITALIAN,GIRL) Mod: (DIE,EVA, PERITONITES ) Mod: (DISEASE,PERITONITES) Mod : ( FATAL,DISEASE) Mod : SLOW

EVA(person)---Sex:

Only t h e c a t e g o r y f o r Sex i s used here, w h i l e o t h e r c a t e g o r i e s t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e a person ( o c c u p a t i o n , age, p a r e n t s , l o c a t i o n , t o name a few) a r e l e f t vacant, though t h e y may, perhaps, be f i l l e d i n f r o m t h e n e x t sentence.

Aspects of Tex r Comprehension

305

Thus, p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e c o n s t r u c t e d v i a a d e l i c a t e i n t e r p l a y between what i s g i v e n i n t h e t e x t and how t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n i s expressed on t h e one hand and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s r e t r i e v e d f r o m t h e r e a d e r s knowledge sources on t h e o t h e r . T h i s process i s guided b y t h e r e a d e r ' s comprehension s t r a t e g i e s . The s t r a t e g y we have used i n c o n s t r u c t i n g ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) was s i m p l y a s y n t a c t i c one: c o n s t r u c t t h e main p r o p o s i t i o n from t h e s u b j e c t and p r e d i c a t e o f t h e sentence and subo r d i n a t e o t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n as i n d i c a t e d by t h e syntax. W h i l e t h i s i s c l e a r l y an i m p o r t a n t and f r e q u e n t l y used s t r a t e g y , i t i s by no means t h e o n l y one c o n c e i v able. Imagine a r e a d e r w i t h m e d i c a l i n t e r e s t s c o l l e c t i n g m a t e r i a l on p e r i t o n i t e s . He o r she may v e r y w e l l o v e r l o o k t h e sentence s y n t a x (and w i t h i t , presumably, t h e a u t h o r ' s i n t e n t i o n s ) and c o n s t r u c t a p r o p o s i t i o n around t h e concept o f p e r i t o n i t e s . We cannot d e s c r i b e t h e o p e r a t i o n o f l o c a l comprehension s t r a t e g i e s i n d e t a i l here. However, t h e i n t e r e s t e d r e a d e r i s r e f e r r e d t o a f o r t h c o m i n g book by van D i j k & K i n t s c h on t h i s s u b j e c t . I n s t e a d , what I s h a l l do h e r e i s t o r e t u r n t o o u r example about t h e good b i s h o p and h i s m i r a c l e s , and show what s o r t o f t e x t p r o p o s i t i o n s m i g h t be c o n s t r u c t e d by a comprehender r e a d i n g t h i s t e x t . Note t h a t t h e comprehender must o p e r a t e i n r e a l time. He cannot w a i t u n t i l a l l t h e r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e and then c a r e f u l l y a n a l y z e i t t o determine t h e c o r r e c t t e x t s t r u c t u r e , l i k e a l i n g u i s t would do w o r k i n g a t h i s desk. He has n e i t h e r t h e c o g n i t i v e r e s o u r c e s (e.g., I n s t e a d , he must make h i s b e s t s h o r t - t e r m memory) n o r t h e i n c l i n a t i o n t o do so. guesses as t o t h e o p t i m a l ( f o r h i s own p u r p o s e s ! ) o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e t e x t as he goes a l o n g r e a d i n g i t . To do so, he r e l i e s on s t r a t e g i e s t h a t have proven u s e f u l i n h i s p r e v i o u s experience. Our p r o t o t y p i c a l reader, we assume, has f i r s t o f a l l a s t r a t e g y n o t t o jump t o c o n c l u s i o n s t o o e a r l y and n o t t o do a n y t h i n g u n t i l a t l e a s t one semantic u n i t has been completed ( t h a t i s , a l l t h e temporary dummy v a r i a b l e s i n i t have been r e p l a c e d ) . I n o u r example, t h i s occurs f i r s t on l i n e 3 ( T a b l e 3 ) , when S ( 3 ) and S ( 2 ) a r e b o t h a v a i l a b l e : we now have a JOHN NEWMAN t o d e a l w i t h and we know he was CANONIZED. E i t h e r o f t h e s e concepts c o u l d be chosen t o f o r m a p r o p o s i t i o n , b u t l e t us assume t h a t o u r r e a d e r has a b i a s t o w a r d p r o p e r names (one o f h i s s t r a t e g i e s ! ) and s e t t l e s on JOHN NEWMAN i s a PERSON. T h i s proves t o be a good choice, because t h e t e x t c o n t i n u e s t o f i l l i n s e v e r a l more s l o t s i n t h i s personschema, as shown i n Table 3: we h e a r about Occupation, Time, and L o c a t i o n , and a l l t h e t i m e t h e comprehender can s i m p l y go on f i l l i n g i n t h i s new i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l r e a d y s e t up. L i n e 10 b r i n g s a change: an i n p u t (semantic u n i t S ( 9 ) and S ( 1 0 ) ) i s encountered t h a t does n o t f i t i n any o f t h e s l o t s i n t h e e x i s t i n g p r o p o s i t i o n . We assume t h a t o u r r e a d e r i s e s p e c i a l l y i n t e r e s t e d i n t h i n g s m y s t e r i o u s and m i r a c u l o u s (we have tagged t h e word " m i r a c l e " i n t h e i n p u t as i n t e r e s t i n g ) , and hence he w i l l now abandon t h e JOHN NEWMAN p r o p o s i t i o n and a t t e m p t t o c o n s t r u c t a MIRACLE p r o p o s i t i o n , as shown i n Table 3. T h i s works w e l l , because t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e r e s t o f t h e sentence can r e a d i l y be subsumed under t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n . The c o n s t r u c t i o n o f p r o p o s i t i o n s i n v o l v e s c o n t i n u o u s knowledge checks, j u s t as i n t h e case o f semantic u n i t s . However, t h e knowledge checks a t t h i s l e v e l r e q u i r e a c o n s i d e r a b l y g r e a t e r i n f e r e n t i a l c a p a c i t y . I n t h e l a s t column o f Table 3, I have i n d i c a t e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y what t h e r e a d e r ' s knowledge sources w h i c h a r e r e l e v a n t a t t h i s p o i n t i n t h e comprehension process. To keep t h e t a b l e s i m p l e , I have o n l y i n d i c a t e d t h e s l o t s o f each knowledge-schema, b u t n o t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t a i n e d i n t h a t s l o t . Thus, PERSON may have a name, o c c u p a t i o n , t i m e l o c a t i o n , l a t e r on a person may d i e and r e c o v e r , e t c . MIRACLES have Agents, t h e r e may be some number o f them, t h e r e a r e p r e - s t a t e s which i n v i t e a m i r a c l e , t h e m i r a c u l o u s events themselves, causes, e t c . Note t h a t i n a p e r s o n ' s l o n g - t e r m memory a l l t h i s knowledge (and much e l s e ) e x i s t s i n one huge network. However, f o r t h e purpose o f t e x t comprehension o n l y t h a t p a r t o f t h e network i s a c t i v a t e d t h a t i s d i r e c t l y r e l e v a n t t o t h e t e x t b e i n g comprehended. Thus, i f t h e t e x t t a l k s about

W. Kintsch

who d i d t h e m i r a c l e and how many, o n l y t h e knowledge t h a t m i r a c l e s have c e r t a i n k i n d s o f agents and t h a t t h e y a r e c o u n t nouns i s a c t i v a t e d ; i f t h e t e x t t a l k s about q u i t e d i f f e r e n t aspects o f a m i r a c l e (as i t happens i n t h e second sentence o f o u r example), d i f f e r e n t p a r t s o f t h e knowledge s t r u c t u r e a r e a c t i v a t e d (e.g., t h a t m i r a c l e s o f t e n happen when people a r e s i c k , and t h a t t h e y make people g e t w e l l again, and t h a t p r a y e r may be t h e cause o f such m i r a c l e s ) . But l e t me r e t u r n t o t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e sample t e x t . We s t a r t by s e t t i n g up a p r o p o s i t i o n JOHN NEWMAN and match s u c c e s s f u l l y t h e i n f o r m a t i o n about him p r o v i d e d by t h e t e x t w i t h what we know about persons: t h e y have names, occupations ( p r i e s t and bishop among them), t i m e and l o c a t i o n s l o t s . L a t e r , a r e s t r i c t i o n on t h e Agent o f m i r a c l e must be checked: a r e l i g i o u s person i s r e q u i r e d , which matches John Newman, whom we have a l r e a d y i d e n t i f i e d as such when he became t h e R e c i p i e n t o f canonize. Thus, a l l t h e matches r e q u i r e d by t h e knowledge check a r e p o s i t i v e a t t h i s p o i n t , and t h e process can proceed t o t h e n e x t sentence. On L i n e 16, once more, we have a s i t u a t i o n where t h e i n p u t does n o t f i t i n t o t h e t e x t p r o p o s i t i o n c u r r e n t l y under c o n s t r u c t i o n . The o l d p r o p o s i t i o n i s , t h e r e f o r e , r e j e c t e d and t h e same s t r a t e g y which l e d t o t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e JohnNewman p r o p o s i t i o n on L i n e 3 now leads t o t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f an Eva-Benassi p r o p o s i t i o n . So we now have Eva d y i n g and r e c o v e r i n g , which we know i s permissi b l e (indeed, o u r knowledge t e l l s us t h a t one i s t h e p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r t h e o t h e r ) . However, a problem a r i s e s when we want t o add t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t t h e r e c o v e r y occurred as a consequence o f t h e n u r s e ' s p r a y e r : t h e knowledge source we s u p p l i e d t o t h e program has no p r o v i s i o n f o r r e c o v e r y from i l l n e s s as a r e s u l t o f p r a y e r ( i t knows o n l y about d o c t o r s and medical t r e a t m e n t ) . There a r e two p o s s i b l e r e s o l u t i o n s t o t h i s c o n f l i c t . F i r s t , t h e r e a d e r may t r y t o search randomly i n h i s knowledge base f o r some e x p l a n a t i o n o f how one can r e c o v e r from near-death v i a p r a y e r , e v e n t u a l l y coming up w i t h t h e e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t i t was a m i r a c l e ( o r s i m p l y g i v i n g up, and a c c e p t i n g t h e t e x t as - a t t h e moment- i n e x p l i c a b l e ) . T h i s i s , however, n o t what happens here. When t h e p r o p o s i t i o n - c o n s t r u c t i o n process g e t s i n t o t r o u b l e i t w i l l n o t a t t e m p t t e d i o u s resource consuming searches and i n f e r e n c e chains, b u t asks f o r guidance from o t h e r components o f t h e system. I have n o t discussed macroprocesses i n d e t a i l as y e t , b u t as I s h a l l show below, a t t h i s p o i n t i n t h e comprehension process t h e system h o l d s i n i t s working memory t h e m a c r o p r o p o s i t i o n "John Newman d i d two m i r a c l e s " . The system w i l l now a t t e m p t t o c o r r e c t i t s mismatch v i a t h i s macrop r o p o s i t i o n , and be immediately d i r e c t e d towards " m i r a c l e " as t h e s o l u t i o n o f i t s problems. Needless t o say, t h e a c t u a l matching processes a r e n o t t r i v i a l t o program, and t h e r e a d e r i s r e f e r r e d t o M i l l e r ( f o r t h c o m i n g ) f o r d e t a i l s . The mismatch and i t s r e s o l u t i o n r e q u i r e a r e s t r u c t u r i n g o f t h e t e x t : " m i r a c l e " r a t h e r than "Eva" must be used as t h e c e n t r a l concept f o r t h e t e x t p r o p o s i t i o n , as shown i n Table 3. The knowledge checks go through s u c c e s s f u l l y now, because t h e t e x t c o n f i r m s what we know t o be t h e p r e c o n d i t i o n s and consequences o f a m i r a c l e.

I have n o t y e t been e x p l i c i t about t h e memory assumption o f t h e model. We assume t h a t a l l c o g n i t i v e work occurs i n w o r k i n g memory which has d i r e c t access t o t h e c u r r e n t i n p u t and t o s h o r t - t e r m memory. S h o r t - t e r m memory a t any p o i n t i n t i m e may c o n t a i n o n l y a s i n g l e t e x t p r o p o s i t i o n , which, however, c o n s i s t s o f a chunk o f s e v e r a l atomic i n p u t u n i t s . I n a d d i t i o n , as we s h a l l see, s h o r t - t e r m memory a l s o c o n t a i n s t h e c u r r e n t l y dominant m a c r o p r o p o s i t i o n . The assumption t h a t s h o r t - t e r m memory i s r e s t r i c t e d t o a s i n g l e t e x t p r o p o s i t i o n i s n o t y e t supported by s e r i o u s evidence, b u t i s m e r e l y a b e s t guess a t p r e s e n t , on t h e b a s i s o f o u r p r e v i o u s work on s h o r t - t e r m memory i n r e a d i n g ( M i l l e r & K i n t s c h , 1980, F l e t c h e r , 1981). When a new p r o p o s i t i o n i s formed i n w o r k i n g memory, t h e o l d one remains a v a i l a b l e i n e p i s o d i c t e x t memory. D u r i n g t h e course o f r e a d i n g a l o n g t e x t , a sequence o f i n t e r r e l a t e d t e x t p r o p o s i t i o n s i s b u i l t up i n e p i s o d i c t e x t memory.

307

Aspects of Text Comprehension

T h i s sequence c o n s t i t u t e s t h e l o n g - t e r m memorial r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e meaning o f I t i s a c c e s s i b l e f r o m w o r k i n g memory, t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t i t i s w e l l the text. s t r u c t u r e d and i n t e r c o n n e c t e d . T e x t p r o p o s i t i o n s i n e p i s o d i c memory a r e , however, n o t o n l y s e q u e n t i a l l y connected, they are also h i e r a r c h i c a l l y organized v i a t h e macrostructure o f the t e x t .

MACROPROCESSES. Once more, we have a s e t o f s t r a t e g i e s f o r i n f e r r i n g t h e macroWe s h a l l n o t p r e s e n t a g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e o f a t e x t i n r e a l - t i m e comprehension. d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e s e m a c r o s t r a t e g i e s b u t m e r e l y i l l u s t r a t e how t h e s e s t r a t e g i e s work by means o f o u r example. Macro-operations a p p l y i n c y c l e s , which f o r p r e s e n t purposes we assume t o be sentences. A f t e r t h e f i r s t sentence, t h e r e a r e two p r o p o s i t i o n s , P ( 1 ) and P(2), JOHNNEWMAN and MIRACLE. Several s t r a t e g i e s c o u l d now be used t o d e c i d e w h i c h o f these s h o u l d be used as t h e b a s i s f o r a m a c r o p r o p o s i t i o n . F i r s t , s e l e c t t h e most s u p e r o r d i n a t e p r o p o s i t i o n , i.e., t h e one which c o n t a i n s t h e o t h e r . MIRACLE c o n t a i n s JOHNNEWMAN a l r e a d y , b u t JOHNNEWMAN c o u l d be made t o c o n t a i n MIRACLE e q u a l l y w e l l , so t h a t s t r a t e g y does n o t h e l p here. Secondly, t h e r e i s t h e s t r a t e g y t o f a v o r p r s p o s i t i o n s w i t h i m p o r t a n c e t a g s , and s i n c e MIRACLE has i n h e r i t e d t a g s ( f r o m E10) i n d i c a t i n g b o t h s y n t a c t i c importance ( i t was e l e v a t e d t o sentence s u b j e c t by p a s s i v i z a t i o n ) and i n h e r e n t i n t e r e s t , FIIRACLE i s s e l e c t e d as I t has two f i l l e d s l o t s : about t h e number o f m i r a c l e s , and about macrorelevant. who d i d them. The l a t t e r i s , however, n o t s t a t e d d i r e c t l y . I t i s merely said t h a t m i r a c l e s were a t t r i b u t e d t o JOHN NEWFTAN. " A t t r i b u t e " i s a v e r b of saying, s o a d e l e t i o n s t r a t e g y a p p l i e s t h a t drops verbs o f s a y i n g i n f a v o r o f what i s b e i n g s a i d when f o r m i n g a m a c r o p r o p o s i t i o n . Hence we o b t a i n t h e f o l l o w i n g two m a c r o p r o p o s i t i o n s : M1: (TW0,MIRACLES) and M2: (DO,JOHNNEWMAN,MIRACLE).

A t t h e end o f t h e second sentence a s t r a t e g y i s t r i g g e r e d which can be c l a s s i f i e d as one o f t h e " s u r p r i s e " s t r a t e g i e s : i f y o u f i n d something s u r p r i s i n g , i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g and hence m a c r o r e l e v a n t . I n t h i s case, t h e s u r p r i s e i s i n t h e f o r m o f a r e s o l v e d mismatch. BENASSI had t o be r e o r g a n i z e d as MIRACLE. The c r u c i a l i n f e r e n c e which made t h a t p o s s i b l e was (ISA,MIRACLE,(RECOVER,BENASSI,FROM ILLNESS), which i s now e l e v a t e d t o t h e r o l e o f m a c r o p r o p o s i t i o n s El3 and M4. Our sample t e x t goes on now t o d e s c r i b e Newman's second m i r a c l e - t h i s t i m e an I r i s h m a n was saved a f t e r a near f a t a l a c c i d e n t . The f o r m a t i o n o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s i s q u i t e s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d , and need n o t be shown here. B u t i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g what happens a t t h e m a c r o l e v e l . One c o u l d assume t h a t t h e t h i r d sentence i s processed i n e x a c t l y t h e way t h e second sentence was - a PERSON p r o p o s i t i o n i s f i l l e d up w i t h t h e a c c i d e n t s t o r y , and t h i s i s t h e n r e v i s e d t o MIRACLE when t h e p r a y e r comes i n as t h e cause of t h e recovery. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , one c o u l d a s s i g n a more a c t i v e r o l e t o top-down macroprocesses here. L e t us assume t h a t t h e system has as one of i t s macroframes knowledge about t h e r h e t o r i c a l schema " I l l u s t r a t i o n " : e.g., t h a t t h e r e a r e k phenomena X, such as X Xk. and t h a t each X i i s an example o f X. A f t e r t h e second sentence, t h e i l l u s t r a t i o n schema p a r t i a l l y matches t h e m a c r o p r o p o s i t i o n s M1-4: t h e r e a r e two m i r a c l e s , and one was d e s c r i b e d . The r h e t o r i c a l schema now guides f u r t h e r p r o c e s s i n g b y s e t t i n g up t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t t h e n e x t sentence w i l l be a n o t h e r d e s c r i p t i o n o f a m i r a c l e . (Note t h a t a f t e r t h e f i r s t sentence, we would n o t want t o jump t o t h a t c o n c l u s i o n - t h e r e i s n o t enough i n f o r m a t i o n t o match any one r h e t o r i c a l schema b e t t e r t h a n s e v e r a l o t h e r s ) . Thus, a t t h e end o f t h e second sentence a f u r t h e r s t e p occurs: t h e r h e t o r i c a l schema " I l l u s t r a t i o n " i s t r i g g e r e d t o s e r v e as an o r g a n i z i n g p r i n c i p l e f o r t h e m a c r o p r o p o s i t i o n s . As p a r t o f t h a t , a s l o t i s c r e a t e d f o r t h e second m i r a c l e , so t h a t t h e t h i r d sentence w i l l be r e a d as a m i r a c l e f r o m t h e v e r y beginning.

...

The e v e n t u a l m a c r o s t r u c t u r e f o r SAINT i s t h e r e f o r e a s t a t e m e n t (JOHN NEWMAN d i d t o m i r a c l e s ) w i t h two i l l u s t r a t i o n s (Benassi r e c o v e r e d f r o m i l l n e s s and Lenahan

308

W . Kintsch

f r o m an a c c i d e n t ) . (The a c t u a l m a c r o s t r u c t u r e would a l s o c o n t a i n t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t these two e v e n t s were m i r a c l e s , b u t i f i t i s expressed i n a summary, t h e p r o d u c t i o n r u l e s as discussed i n K i n t s c h & van D i j k (1978) would suppress t h i s redundant i n f o r m a t i o n ) . Conclusion. W i t h i n t h e l i m i t s o f t h i s p r e s e n t a t i o n i t i s n o t p o s s i b l e t o d i s c u s s o u r model i n I n s t e a d , I have t r i e d t o show how i t works on hand o f a s i m p l e example. depth. I n c o n c l u s i o n , I would l i k e t o say a few words a b o u t t h e g o a l s o f t h i s e n t e r p r i s e . The main g o a l s a r e o f course s c i e n t i f i c ones: we want t o d e v e l o p an e x p l i c i t t h e o r y o f human t e x t comprehension. F o r t h i s purpose, we a r e t r y i n g t o express t h i s t h e o r y as a computer model, t o t e s t whether t h e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s t h a t we have i n f e r r e d f r o m b o t h l i n g u i s t i c a n a l y s i s and p s y c h o l o g i c a l e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n (van D i j k & K i n t s c h , i n p r e s s ) a r e indeed a b l e t o a c t u a l l y s u p p o r t t h e computational work t h a t must be done ( M i l l e r , i n p r e s s ) . So f a r , we have been a b l e t o work o n l y w i t h v e r y few sample t e x t s . However, o u r goal i s t o be a b l e t o accept any a r b i t r a r y t e x t , s u p p l y i t w i t h t h e needed a n n o t a t i o n s and an a p p r o p r i a t e knowledge base, and have i t understood by o u r program. "Understood" h e r e means t h a t t h e program w i l l b u i l d t h e k i n d o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e meaning o f t h e t e x t t h a t was i l l u s t r a t e d i n Tables 3 and 4. V a r i o u s o t h e r c o g n i t i v e processes t h e n can o p e r a t e on t h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f o r d i f f e r e n t purposes. F o r i n s t a n c e , we i n t e n d t o use t h i s model t o p r e d i c t t h e d a t a f r o m r e c a l l and summarization experiments, as was done i n M i l l e r & K i n t s c h (1980). However, one c o u l d , i n p r i n c i p l e use t h e model i n q u i t e d i f f e r e n t ways. One c o u l d , f o r i n s t a n c e , c o n s t r u c t a q u e s t i o n answering program on t h e b a s i s o f t h i s model by adding a q u e s t i o n answering module. O f course such a module would be by no means t r i v i a l t o c o n s t r u c t , b u t t h e k i n d o f t e x t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t t h e model generates would p r o b a b l y p r o v i d e a good b a s i s f o r i t . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , one c o u l d c o n s t r u c t a t r a n s l a t i o n program w i t h o u r model as i t s core. Again, i t would be a f a r from t r i v i a l e n t e r p r i s e t o s p e c i f y t h e s t r a t e g i e s needed t o d e r i v e a language t e x t f r o m t h e t e x t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s we c o n s t r u c t , b u t t h i s would be no harder, i n p r i n c i p l e , f o r E n g l i s h t e x t t h a n f o r t e x t s i n some o t h e r language. F i n a l l y , we have been u s i n g o u r model t o measure t h e r e a d a b i l i t y o f t e x t s , t o f i n d o u t p r e c i s e l y which f e a t u r e s o f a t e x t make i t easy o r h a r d t o read, and what r e a d e r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a r e needed f o r comprehending p a r t i c u l a r t e x t s . T e x t comprehension i s a c e n t r a l component o f many c o g n i t i v e processes and t h u s a s u c c e s s f u l model would have a v a r i e t y o f uses. The i m p o r t a n t p o i n t i s t h a t o u r model g i v e s us a good conceptual r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f what t h e t e x t i s about, b o t h a t t h e l o c a l and g l o b a l l e v e l s ; t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s a necessary p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r m o d e l l i n g many o t h e r i n t e r e s t i n g c o g n i t i v e processes. REFERENCES [11

121 L31 [41 r51 r61

van D i j k , T.A. and K i n t s c h , W. S t r a t e g i e s o f Comprehension. New York: Academic Press, i n press. Kintsch, W. and van D i j k , T.A. Towards a model o f t e x t comprehension and p r o d u c t i o n . P s y c h o l o g i c a l Review, 1978, 85, 363-394. M i l l e r , G.A. and Johnson-Laird, P.N. Language and P e r c e p t i o n . Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1976. M i l l e r , J.R. and K i n t s c h , W. R e a d a b i l i t y and R e c a l l o f s h o r t p r o s e passages: A t h e o r e t i c a l a n a l y s i s . J o u r n a l o f Experimental Psychology: Human L e a r n i n g and Memory, 1980, 6, 335-354. M i l l e r , J.R. A s i m u l a t i o n o f t e x t comprehension. I n p r e p a r a t i o n . Simon, H.A. The sciences o f t h e a r t i f i c i a l . Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1969.

309

Aspects of Text Comprehension

Table 1 S i m u l a t i o n o f two-sentence t e x t : I Input TEXT EXPRESSION

ANNOTATION

KNOWLEDGE SOURCE

1

I n the request t o

Connective ( E 2 , E l l )

INORDERTO($,$)

2

canonize

3

John Newrnan

R e c i p i e n t ( E2)

JN(ma1e p e r s o n )

4

the f r o n t i e r

Mod( E5)

FRONTIER($)

5

priest

Mod(E3)

PRIEST(re1 .male person)

6

bishop

Mod(E3)

BISHOP ( p r i es t )

7

o f Philadelphia

Loc( E6)

PHILA(1ocation)

8

i n the 19th century

Time( E6)

NCENT( t i m e )

9

two

Mod ( E l 0 )

TWO(countnoun)

10

miracles

Object( E l l

11

were a t t r i b u t e d

12

t o him

Recipient(Ell)=JN

13

i n t h i s century

Time(El1)

TCENT ( t i me)

75

Eva Benassi

Agent(E16,E19)+Subject

EB(fema1eperson)

16

dying

Mod( E l 5 )

D I E (Ag :person ,Sc: i11ness ) a c c i d e n t

17

o f peritonites

Source( E16)

PERT( I 1 1ness)

18

dramatically

Mod ( E l 9 )

DRAM($)

19

recovered

20

when

Connective( E l 9,E22)

WHEN( $ ,$I

21

her nurse

Agent( E22)

NURSE( person)

22

prayed

23

t o the bishop

CANONIZE( Rc: r e 1 i g i o u s person)

~

~

~ MIRACLE(countnoun) ~ $ ~ ATTRIBUTE( Ob: $,Rc: person)

14

RECOVER(Ag: p e r s ,SC: i l l n e s s accident

PRAY(Ag:pers,Gl: rel.per-s) Goal (E22)=JN

~

t

310

W. Kintsch

Table 2 A s i m u l a t i o n o f a two-sentence t e x t :

I1

Semantic Units TE

BUILD

1

Sl(INORDERTO,EP,Ell)

FILL

CHECK

MATCH

2

SZ(CANONIZE,$)

Sl(INORDERTO,S2,Ell)

3

S 3 ( JOHNNEWMAN)

S 2 ( CANONIZE, J N )

KS2, KS3

$(REL,JN)

4

S4(FRONTIER,E5)

5

S5(PRIEST,JN)

S 4 ( FRONTIER,PRIEST)

KS3,KS5, KS4, KS5

t

6

S6(BISHOP,JN)

S5,KS6

t

7

S7(LOC:IN,PHILA)

KS6, KS7

t

8

S8(T:IN,S5,NCENT)

KS6, KS8

-I

9

S9(TWO,E10)

10

SlO(M1RACLE) Sll(E11,MIR)

S9 (TWO, M I RACLE )

KS9, K S 1 0

+

11

Sl(lOT,S2,S9) S 1 1 (ATTRIBUTE,MIR)

KS1 ,S2,S9 KS11

12

S 1 1 (ATT,MIR, J N )

KS3,KSll

t

S 1 2 ( T : I N , S 1 1 ,TCENT)

KS13

+ + +

S 1 3 ( EVABEWASS I) S14(E16.EB) S15iE19;EB)

KS15

t

S14(DIE,EB)

KS15, K S 1 6

t

S 1 4 ( D I E , EB, PER1 )

KS16

+

S 1 5 ( RECOVER,EB) S 1 7 (DRAM, S 1 5 )

KS15,KS19,S13 KS13, KS18

f

22

S18(CSO,S15,S20) S 2 0 ( PRAY ,NURSE)

KS14,S15,S19 KS15,KS22

+

23

S2O(PRAY ,NURSE,BISHOP)

KS5,KS22

+

13

14 15

16 17

S 1 6 ( PERITONITES)

18

S 1 7 ( DRAM,E19)

19

20

S 1 8 ( CSQ,Sl5,E23)

21

S19(NURSE) S 2 0 ( E23,NURSE) t

(REL, JN)

Aspects of Text Comprehension

3

t

P1 (JOHNNEWMAN) *NAMC:S3-S2

31 1

(PERSON) -NAME

4 5

-OCCUPATION:S5-S4 I

6

S6

t

-0CCUP.

t

7

-LOCATION: S7

+

-LOC.

8

-TIMES8

t

-TIME

11

t

AGENT:Sll-Sl

12

13

15

t

PP(M1RACLE)SlO rNUMBER: S 9

+

LTIME:S12

+

P3(EVABENASSI) *NAME:S13

-S 1 4

16

(MIRACLE) rNUMBER AGENT

TIME (PERSONcNAME >) -NAME

+

-DIE

t

-RECOVER

\

17

S16

18

-S 1 5 - S 1 7

19 20

21

S18 I

S17

22 23

24

P4(MIRACLE)

- S19

-CONSEQU

rPRESTATE S13-Sl4-Sl6

t

t

t t

EVENT:S15-S17 CAUSE:S18-S19

(MIRACLE) rPRE-STATE

312

W. Kintsch

Table 4 Simulation of a two-sentence text: IV Macros tructure TE 1

SELECTION STRATEGY

FORMATION STRATEGY

+Subject,+Interest

Drop

Inference

Reduce by deletion

MACROPROPOSITION

2 3 4

5

~

9 10

verb-of-saying

(DO,

JN, (TWO,MIRACLE)) M1 ,M2

11 12 13 14

17 18 19

20 21 22 23 24

( ISA ,MIR (RECOVER,BEN ,

ILLN)) M3,M4

LANGUAGE AND COMPREHENSION

J.-F. Le Ny, W. Kinoch (editors)

0 North-HollandPublishing Company, 1982

31 3

A NATURAL LANGUAGE COMPREHENSION SYSTEM

G . Sabah I n s t i t u t de Programmation U n i v e r s i t g P i e r r e e t Marie C u r i e 4 , P l a c e J u s s i e u , 75230 P a r i s Cedex 05, F r a n c e .

INTRODUCTION Our s u b j e c t i s t h e a u t o m a t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f s t o r i e s i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r c a s e , w r i t t e n i n F r e n c h . By " u n d e r s t a n d i n g " w e mean a s u c c e s s i o n o f two s t e p s : s e n t e n c e u n d e r s t a n d i n g and t e x t c o h e r e n c e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . The f i r s t s t e p i s t h e c o n v e r s i o n of e a c h s e n t e n c e i n t o a n i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e which l i e s upon t h e n o t i o n s o f case frame (FILLMORE 1 4 1 ) (SIMMONS r121) and s e m a n t i c n e t . A t t h i s s t e p , o u r programs have s o l v e d some l e x i c a l and s t r u c t u r a l a m b i g u i t i e s , a l o n g w i t h t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f some pronoun r e f e r e n c e s .

The s e c o n d s t e p , t e x t c o h e r e n c e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , is t h e s e a r c h f o r i n t e r - s e n t e n c e c o n n e x i o n s . G e n e r a l l y , we l o o k f o r c a u s a l l i n k s ; b u t t h e s e a r e of many k i n d s , a n d , l i m i t i n g t h e c o m b i n a t o r i e s o f t h e problem, s o t h a t we d e c i d e d f o r a s t r a t e g y o f "multiple s i m p l i f i c a t i o n s " . T h i s means t h a t t h e c o h e r e n c e of a s t o r y i s examined from s i m p l i f i e d forms o f s e n t e n c e s : t o compensate f o r t h e l o s s o f i n f o r m a t i o n i m p l i e d by t h i s method, w e have v a r i o u s p r i n c i p l e s of s i m p l i f i c a t i o n , which a p p l y i n a n i n d e p e n d e n t way, f o r t h e same s t o r y . A s a r e s u l t , o n e d e t a i l o v e r l o o k e d by one " c o h e r e n c e u n d e r s t a n d i n g s p e c i a l i s t " w i l l sometime " i n t e r e s t " one o f h i s " c o l l e a gues". T h i s s t r a t e g y was i n s p i r e d by a s t u d y Roland BARTHES p u b l i s h e d a b o u t a s t o r y by BALZAC ( S / Z , R . BARTHES 11). I t h a s f i v e "codes o f e x p l a n a t i o n " , o r " r e a d i n g viewpoints "

.

r

- ACTIONS: t h e development of e a c h a c t i o n i s e x p l a i n e d , u s u a l l y s t a r t i n g w i t h a DESIRE o f some c h a r a c t e r . - CHARACTERS: one of t h e aims o f t h e s t o r y - t e l l i n g i s t o e s t a b l i s h c h a r a c t e r t r a i t s e i t h e r d i r e c t l y ( n o t a t i o n ) o r by i n f e r e n c e ( c o n n o t a t i o n ) (BERTHELIN [Zl) - CULTURE: some a c t i o n s o r e v e n t s have a c u l t u r a l e x p l a n a t i o n ( s e e t h e "frame" ) movement: (MINSKY C51, SCHANK 1111, CHARNIAK T8l - SYMBOLS: n o n - r e a l i s t i c use o f an o b j e c t t o s t a n d f o r a n o t h e r one (ORTHONY 161). - AUTHOR'S DISCOURSE: one h a s t o i n t e r p r e t t h e e x p l i c i t c a u s a l i t y marks g i v e n by the author.

.

...

L e t us s e e how some o t h e r s a c t u a l r e a l i s a t i o n s t a k e p l a c e i n t h i s model: some o f them ( d e d u c t i v e s y s t e m s ) u s e t h e f o r m a l l o g i c o f t h e p r e d i c a t c a l c u l u s (COLES c 1 2 1 , WOODS C371, COLMERAUER 1 1 3 1 ) . T h e i r l i m i t a t i o n s were shown by WINOGRAD'S program r341: i t was on t h e f r i n g e o f d e d u c t i v e and non d e d u c t i v e s y s t e m s ; i t a l l o w e d o n l y l i m i t e d c o n v e r s a t i o n s a b o u t a v e r y l i m i t e d world governed by s t r i c t r u l e s .

A new t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h h a s p e r m i t t e d t o d e v e l o p o t h e r k i n d s o f s y s t e m s u s i n g more g e n e r a l i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e w o r l d . Works on p a t t e r n r e c o g n i t i o n b y MINSKY s e t up t h e "frame a p p r o a c h " [ I 9 1 f o r t h e o r i e s where t h e memorised o r g a n i s a t i o n o f knowledge p l a y s an i m p o r t a n t r o l e . Many s t r u c t u r e s d e r i v e d from i t a l t h o u g h sometimes r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t h a v e b e e n s u g g e s t e d ("schemata" (BOBROW L61) ( " s c r i p t s "

314

G. Sabah

SCHANK 1301), ("demons" CHARNlAK I 1 I ] ) ,

( " p l a n s " ABELSON [ 1 1 ) .

..

They a l l c a n be c o n s i d e r e d t o b e r e l a t e d t o t h e c u l t u r a l r e f e r e n c e s t a n d p o i n t and a c t u a l l y p e o p l e seem t o f o r g e t t h a t a l t h o u g h f u n d a m e n t a l , o t h e r u s e f u l s t a n d p o i n t s do e x i s t .

In t h e system w e are a c t u a l l y working on, which i s b a s e d on t h e d i v i s i o n between f i v e p o s s i b l e k i n d s of e x p l a n a t i o n s p r e s e n t e d above, w e s t a r t e d from t h e a c t i o n s t a n d p o i n t (SABAH [25] and "261): We wanted t o show t h a t it w a s p o s s i b l e t o e x p l a i n most of t h e f a c t s o c c u r r i n g i n a s t o r y from t h i s p o i n t o f view ( s e e 9 11). Then, we h a n d l e t h e c h a r a c t e r s t a n d p o i n t (BERTHELIN I S l , SABAH & BERTHELIN 1 2 7 1 ) . The n e x t p a r a g r a p h w i l l show what w e d i d w i t h t h e "SYMBOL s p e c i a l i s t " program. I t a n a l y s e s C h i n e s e q u a d r i s y l l a b i c e x p r e s s i o n s wh;ch a r e z o t t o be t a k e n : i t s r a l l y : t h e CHEWO YU. I n h e r t h e s i s , SOQUIER r321 h a s shown t h a t t h e y a r e a k i n t o metaphor i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s i n F r e n c h , h e n c e t h e g e n e r a l i t y o f h e r s o l u t i o n s t o t h e Chines e problem; moreover, h e r work i l l u s t r a t e s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f i n t e r a c t i o n between o u r s p e c i a l i s t s , l e a d i n g t o a more complex model of u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Another p r o b l e m i t has been c a n be t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t i n o r d e r t o c l a s s i f y a c t u a l r e a l i z a t i o n s : r a i s e d by CHARNIAK [ I l l : when does t h e i n f e r e n c e have t o b e made ? On t h i s problem t h e p o i n t o f view o f RIEGER 1 2 4 1 which p r o p o s e s i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r r e a d i n g t h e maximum of i n f e r e n c e s ( " d a t a d r i v e n " ) i s opposed t o WILKS's r 3 6 1 who s t a n d s i n f a v o u r of i n f e r e n c e s when needed ("Problem d r i v e n " ) . I n the system we propose, as t h e goal i s d i f f e r e n t according t o t h e s t a n d p o i n t t h e manner o f o b t a i n i n g i n f e r e n c e i s i n t e r m e d i a t e between R I E G E R ' s and WILKS: t h e program assumes t h e maximum number o f i n f e r e n c e s i n . o n e of t h e f i v e b r a n c h e s b u t i t h a s t o d e t e r m i n e f i r s t when a n e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h i s t y p e i s n e e d e d . The i n t e r e s t o f t h i s i s t w o f o l d : f i r s t a s i t i s d i v i d e d i n t o f i v e , i n one g i v e n b r a n c h t h e i n f e r e n c e s t h e program h a s t o do a r e l e s s numerous; second as i t c h o o s e s a b r a n c h when needed i t makes e s p e c i a l l y n e c e s s a r y i n f e r e n c e s . INTERNAL STRUCTURES USED BY THE SYSTEM 1.- The s e n t e n c e s : The deep s t r u c t u r e o f a s e n t e n c e i s a r e l a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e w e b u i l d from t h e model of case-grammars (FILLMORE 1151, CHAFE 1191, CELCE-MURCIA r 8 l ) I n t h i s model, a s e n t e n c e i s viewed as a s e t of noun p h r a s e s , e a c h o f them b e i n g r e l a t e d t o t h e v e r b by a p a r t i c u l a r c o n n e x i o n which e x p r e s s e s t h e s e m a n t i c r e l a t i o n i t has t o the verb. (We s a y "verb", b u t more g e n e r a l l y i t can b e , a t s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e l e v e l a n a d j e c t i v e ( t h e s k y is b Z u e ) , a l o c a t i v e p r e p o s i t i o n ( t h e d i s h is the t a b l e ) o r e v e n a noun ( J o h n is =student). The s e t of v e r b s w a s b r o k e n down i n t o c a t e g o r i e s : STATE, MENTAL-PROCESS, PHYSICALPROCESS, ACTION, LOCATIVE. The d e e p c a s e s w e c h o s e were: SOURCE, PRINCIPAL-AGENT, SECONDARY-AGENT, THEME, GOAL, LOCUS ( i n which we f p l l o w a p p r o x i m a t e l y SIMMONS 1311).

on

I n o r d e r t o d e a l w i t h c e r t a i n s y n t a c t i c f a c t s l i k e a c t i v e / p a s s i v e forms, t h i s s t r u c t u r e was merged w i t h a n o t h e r o n e , r e p r e s e n t i n g e a c h s e n t e n c e a s a p r e d i c a t e a p p l i e d t o a t o p i c ( a p r i v i l e g i e d noun-phrase) . The r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a noun p h r a s e t a k e s i n t o a c c o u n t t h e embeding s t r u c t u r e of t h e l a n g u a g e , a noun p h r a s e b e i n g a s i n g l e c o n c e p t on a c o n c e p t m o d i f i e d by one or several sentences.

2.- The words: Our knowledge a b o u t a l a n g u a g e u n i t i s r e p r e s e n t e d i n two d i s t i n c t s e t s : WORDS and CONCEPTS, which i n v o l v e two-way r e f e r e n c e s t o e a c h o t h e r . WORDS are language u n i t s t o b e combined a t t h e s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e l e v e l , and CONCEPTS a r e l a n g u a g e u n i t s f o r m i n g t h e s e m a n t i c s t r u c t u r e which r e s u l t s from p a r s i n g .

31 5

A Natural Language Comprehension System

a) WORDS: Let us o n l y s a y t h a t t h i s s e t i n v o l v e s knowledge a b o u t morphology ( p l u r a l , c o n j u g a t i o n ...) and s y n t a x ( l e x i c a l c a t e g o r y , a u x i l i a r y used )

...

b ) CONCEPTS: Because o f homonymy and polysemy, t h e s e m a n t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a WORD may n o t be immediate: s e v e r a l " s e n s e s " must be t e s t e d by "b" o p e r a t i o n s , s o we s t o r e s e m a n t i c a l knowledge i n a n o t h e r f i l e , CONCEPT, and g i v e , f o r e a c h word, a r e f e r e n c e t o one o r s e v e r a l CONCEPTS. Semantic knowledge i s s t o r e d as a s e m a n t i c n e t , w i t h some improvements, a l l o w i n g n o t t o e x p r e s s e v e r y e x i s t i n g r e l a t i o n b u t Combined w i t h t h e c a s e s t r u c t u r e , used t o c a l c u l a t e i t i f necessary (see [25]). f o r s e n t e n c e s , t h i s a l l o w s us t o t o r e p r e s e n t e a s i l y t h e meaning o f w o r d s . C ) WORD CONSTRUCTION: We p r e f e r t o i n s i s t on t h i s p o i n t (which we c o n s i d e r t h e newest) sometimes, homonyms c a n be r e c o g n i z e d through s y n t a c t i c means: f o r i n s t a n c e , " p r i e r = t o p r a y " c a n b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d from " p r i e r q u e l q u ' u n de f a i r e q u e l q u e c h o s e = t o b e g someone t o do something" b e c a u s e i n t h e one c a s e , t h e r e i s j u s t one d i r e c t o b j e c t , and i n t h e o t h e r , a n i n d i r e c t o b j e c t , h a v i n g t h e form of a n i n f i n i t i v e c l a u s e , must be added. T h e r e f o r e we do n o t go d i r e c t l y from WORD t o CONCEPT, b u t from WORD-CONSTRUCTION t o CONCEPT. P a r t o f t h e knowledge a b o u t a word i s a b o u t i t s c o m b i n a t i o n w i t h o t h e r w o r d s . The c o m b i n a t i o n i s c o n s t r a i n e d b o t h by s e m a n t i c s and s y n t a x . I n many c a s e s , knowning t h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e between s y n t a c t i c and s e m a n t i c c o n s t r a i n t s o f f e r s a c l e a r v i s i o n o f synonymy. L e t ' s s t a r t from a c o n c e p t : ( F r e n c h : g u G r i r , ( a p p r o x i m a t e l y ) t o c u r e ) . Synonyms g i v e n by t h e d i c t i o n a r y a r e ( I ) " f a i r e p a r t i r " ( t o t a k e away) and ( 2 ) " r G t a b l i r " ( t o make w e l l a g a i n ) . The synonymy between ( I ) and ( 2 ) does n o t a p p e a r u n l e s s we see t h a t t h e i r c o n s t r u c t i o n s d i f f e r . And t o s e e i t , one h a s t o formal i z e t h o s e c o n s t r u c t i o n s . The which we s h a l l t r y and d o . CONSTRUCTION I , common t o " g u 6 r i r " and " f a i r e p a r t i r " AGENT-VERB-THEME LE DOCTEUR GURRIT LA GRIPPE The d o c t o r ( c u r e s , e r a d i c a t e s ) f l u . CONSTRUCTION 2 , common t o "guGrir" and " r G t a b l i r " AGENT-VERB-AIM L E DOCTEUR GUBRIT LA GRAND-&RE The d o c t o r ( c u r e s , + g e t s r i d , * e r a d i c a t e s ) t h e g r a n d m o t h e r .

d) THE PARSER: Our own s y s t e m is b a s e d on i d e a s a n a l o g o u s t o MARCUS'S. Some d i f f i c u l t i e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r t o t h e French l a n g u a g e and c a n ' t b e found i n E n g l i s h , n o t t o mention s o l u t i o n s t o t h e s e s p e c i f i c p r o b l e m s , we p r o p o s e some s o l u t i o n s t o s o f a r u n s o l v e d problems ( s i g n a l l e d by MARCUS h i m s e l f ) s u c h a s :

. conjunctions . prepositional

.

groups a t t a c h m e n t l e x i c a l ambiguity

Owing t o t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between __ words and c o n c e p t s , we d e a l t w i t h p o l y s e m i e s a n d synonymies w i t h o u t u s i n g a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n n a l component ( U s e f u l 1 f o r example t o d e a l w i t h a c t i o n s r e p r e s e n t i n g names l i k e " p u r c h a s e " = " t h e a c t i o n o f b u y i n g " . The grammar r u l e s a r e f o r m u l a t e d i n t e r m s o f " p r o d u c t i o n r u l e s " . They a r e o r g a n i zed i n p a c k e t s s o as t o q u i c k e n t h e p a r s i n g p r o c e s s ( t h i s t y p e o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s an e x t e n s i o n o f t h e "ATN"). The p a r s e r t h e n i n t e r p r e t s t h i s grammar; i t r e p l a c e s t h e b a c t r a c k and t h e p a r a l l e l i s m ( u s e d i n most o f t h e o t h e r p a r s e r s t o d e a l w i t h a m b i g u i t i e s ) by t h e look-ahead p o s s i b i l i t y . T h i s a l l o w s us t o have a d e t e r m i n i s t i c p r o c e s s ( i . e . which n e v e r c r e a t e s s o m e t h i n g t h a t s h o u l d be d e s t r o y e d a f t e r ) . The look-ahead p o s s i b i l i t y o c c u r s i n t h e p a r t o f a grammar r u l e c o n c e r n e d w i t h i t s a p p l i c a t i o n p o s s i b i l i t i e s : c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s a r e c h e c k e d , they b e a r upon s y n t a c t i c o r s e m a n t i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f t h e a n a l y s e d word, o r of words t h a t f o l l o w s t h e a n a l y s e d word. When a r u l e may be a p p l i e d , i t s a c t i o n p a r t i s i n i t i a t e d : i t

316

G. Sabah

i s mainly concerned with the c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e semantic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e sentence. THE STRUCTURE OF A STORY.

I ) THE ABRIDGEMENT: Our s t r u c t u r e has t o express connections between t h e s e n t e n c e s concerning c h a r a c t e r s . To do so t h e program o p e r a t e s a c e r t a i n r e d u c t i o n of t h e information each sentence c o n t a i n s : i t c r e a t e s one o r more abridgement which a r e meant t o d e s c r i b e t h e fundamental r e l a t i o n s between c h a r a c t e r s . This agrees with GREIMAS C61 who e x h i b i t s , when b u i l d i n g models f o r s e n s e , the two phases he c a l l s reduction and s t r u c t u r a t i o n . We have chosen f i v e kinds of abridgement: Desire, I n t e n t i o n , Action, Perception, The o r d e r i n which the c h a r a c t e r s appear i n a n abr6g6 depends on t h e r o l e they p l a y i n t h e s i t u a t i o n described.

Relation.

The following n o t a t i o n i s used t o r e p r e s e n t and abridgment: (Type; - C I , C2) o r

(Type; C I ,

C2,

C3)

where type i s one of t h e f i v e above mentionned and i n d i c a t e s the kind of s e n t e n c e , and C1, C2, C3 a r e , i n general t h e c h a r a c t e r s involved i n the d e s c r i b e d s i t u a t i o n ; C i can a l s o be a semantic f e a t u r e t h a t r e q u i r e s a c h a r a c t e r a t t h i s place ( a s t a r p r e c i s e s then t h i s s i t u a t i o n ) . I t i s c l e a r then t h a t many d i f f e r e n t sentences correspond t o a given abridgement, even i f they have n o t p r e c i s e l y t h e same meaning.

This i s n o t a r e s t r i c t i o n : on the c o n t r a r y i t i s the main i n t e r e s t of t h i s n o t i o n of abridgement we i n t r o d u c e d ; the f i r s t goal being t o reduce t h e information conveyed by sentences i n t o a very small number of kinds of e v e n t s . This allows us t o c l a s s i f y sentences from which. I " ) t o n e g l e c t sentences t h a t have connection with t h e type of c a u s a l i t y w e a r e interested i n 2 " ) t o r e l y only upon a few simple r u l e s i n order t o e x p r e s s c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h e s e c l a s s e s . The examples t h a t were t r e a t e d by the program (we give one of them i n the f o u r t h paragraph) show t h a t t h i s process i s s u f f i c i e n t t o understand r e l a t i v e l y complex s i t u a t i o n s and t o i n f e r numerous f a c t s not e x p l i c i t e l y s t a t e d i n the s t o r y .

In o r d e r t o set up an abridgement from t h e deep s t r u c t u r e of t h e sentence, we examine the semantic f e a t u r e s of t h e verb, which g i v e s u s t h e kind of abridgement, and then, according t o t h i s r e s u l t and t o t h e semantic r e l a t i o n s expressed ( o r n o t ) i n t h e deep s t r u c t u r e , w e find o u t which c h a r a c t e r s a r e involved. 2O/- the c h a r a c t e r behaviour r u l e s : seven behaviour r u l e s a r e a p r i o r i given t o t h e program; each of them c o n s i s t s of two members, the l e f t one being a p o s s i b l e cause of the r i g h t one. Their e l a b o r a t i o n involved a mainly i n t u i t i v e process now under s t u d y . These r u l e s a r e : (naming x, y , z . . . c h a r a c t e r v a r i a b l e s , Q a semantic f e a t u r e v a r i a b l e ) .

1.

(besire; x, &I (Perception; x, y, &I

2.

(Desire; x, y l (Relation; x, y)

3.

(Desire; x, y l

4.

(Desire; x, y) (Relation; z, y l

+

+

+

+

(Desire; x, y ) (Action; x, y ) ( I n t e n t i o n ; x, x, y l (Intantion; x, z , y)

A Natural Language ComprehensionSystem

5.

( I n t e n t i o n ; x, y, z/

6.

( I n t e n t i o n ; x, y, zl

7.

(Action; x, y l

317

( A c t i o n ; x, y l

+

( A c t i o n ; x, zl

-+

( I n t e n t i o n ; y, y, xl

+

The f i r s t and t h e f o u r t h , f o r i n s t a n c e , may be p a r a p h r a s e d a s below:

y

I:-

i f an 5 c h a r a c t e r w a n t s s o m e t h i n g w i t h t h e q u a l i t y w i t h t h i s q u a l i t y , 5 may d e s i r e y.

2:-

i f an 5 c h a r a c t e r wants a n 21 o b j e c t and i f a z c h a r a c t e r i s r e l a t e d t o t h i s x may i n t e n d t o a c t upon t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n 5 and y. object, -

and i f h e p e r c e i v e s

3O/- B U I L D I N G CAUSAL RELATIONSHIPS The r u l e s b e i n g g i v e n , w e want t h e s y s t e m t o f i n d a n e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h e new a b r i d g e m e n t s t h a t a p p e a r as t h e s t u d y r u n s . By e x p l a n a t i o n of a n a b r i d g e m e n t A we mean a n a b r i d g e m e n t A I a l r e a d y m e t i n t h e s t o r y , and a c o n s t r u c t i o n s u c h t h a ? Al

i;.

A2

Zj ...

<

A0

R

,

being a behaviour r u l e

The d i f f e r e n t s t e p s o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g p r o c e s s of a s e n t e n c e are:

-

i d e n t i f y t h e a b r i d g e m e n t t o b e e x p l a i n e d w i t h t h e r i g h t member o f a r u l e i . e . c o n s i d e r t h e c h a r a c t e r s o f t h e a b r i d g e m e n t as v a l u e s o f t h e v a r i a b l e s . - g e n e r a t e t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g l e f t member ( i n f e r e n c e of a n a b r i d g e m e n t ) . - s e a r c h among t h e a b r i d g e m e n t s a l r e a d y u n d e r s t o o d : i f t h e i n f e r r e d one i s f o u n d , t h e p r o c e s s e n d s up and t h e s e q u e n c e o f c a u s e s is stored. i f n o t we r e p e a t t h e p r o c e s s w i t h d i f f e r e n t r u l e s , and i f i t s t i l l f a i l s , w e t r y t o u n d e r s t a n d e a c h of t h e i n f e r r e d a b r i d g e m e n t s by t h e same o p e r a t i o n s , S O b u i l d i n g a t r e e o f p o s s i b l e c a u s e s (which by c o n s t r u c t i o n i s f i n i t e ) . t h e n t h e program sees t h a t 3 r u l e s c a n b e a p p l i e d t o g i v e a n e x p l a n a t i o n : r u l e 2 shows t h a t a p o s s i b l e c a u s e o f ( d ) may b e : (e) ( D e s i r e ; %, r a v e n ) give: and r u l e s 5 and 6 ( I n t e n t i o n ; fox, raven, x) (f) ( I n t e n t i o n , fox, y , raven) (9) no one of t h e s e p o s s i b l e c a u s e s ( ( e ) , ( f ) , ( 8 ) ) i s a l r e a d y known ( o r c a n b e u n i f i e d w i t h a n a l r e a d y known a b r i d g e m e n t ) . The s y s t e m t h e r e f o r e c o n t i n u e s to search causes f o r these. f o l l o w i n g r u l e 1 , ( e ) may i s s u e from ( D e s i r e , fox,*Q) i f r a v e n h a s t h e Q q u a l i t y . T h i s l a s t abridgement c a n b e u n i f i e d w i t h ( a ) a l r e a d y known, w i t h Q e d i b l e . Q , T h e program v e r i f i e s t h a t r a v e n h a s the quality, so the e x p l a n a t i o n i g b r u s h e d away. Then i t s e a r c h e s a n e x p l a n a t i o n o f ( f ) . The o n l y p o s s i b l e c a u s e o f i t ( f r o m o u r r u 1 e s ) i s ( r u l e 4 ) : ( D e s i r e ; f o x , X) ( R e l a t i o n ; r a v e n , X) And now, we a r e l e a d to r e p l a c e 5 by c h e e s e s o t h a t (9) i d e n t i f i e s w i t h ( c ) and ( f ) comes from (a) by r u l e 1 , a s c h e e s e h a s t h e f e a t u r e e d i b l e . We c o n s i d e r t h a t t h e s e c o n d s e n t e n c e i s e x p l a i n e d hv t h e c o n j u n c t i o n o f s e n t e n c e ( I ) , r u l e 1 , r u l e 4 and r u l e 5 .

. . .

.

.

Two a b r i d g e m e n t s have b e e n i n f e r r e d by t h e program and t h e e x p l a n a t i o n c a n b e p a r a p h r a s e d a s (where t h e u n d e r l i n e d s e n t e n c e s have b e e n i n f e r r e d ) . The f o x i s h u n g r y .

Then h e wants t h e c h e e s e .

A s t h e which i s h e l d by t h e r a v e n , h e w a n t s t o modify t h i s r e l a t i o n between r a v e n and c h e e s e . To do s o h e s p e a k e s t o t h e r a v e n .

318

G. Sabah

THE CHARACTER FIELD: DETAILS ON OUR REPRESENTATION The aim o f r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e c h a r a c t e r s i n t h e s t o r y i n o u r s y s t e m i s t o u n d e r s t a n d what i s s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l a t e d t o t h o s e b e i n g s , f o r i n s t a n c e t h e f e a t u r e s a t t r i b u t e d t o them by t h e s t o r y , b u t a l s o by some e l e m e n t a r y r e a s o n i n g a b o u t t h e d a t a connect e d w i t h t h e i r names on t h e s e m a n t i c d a t a b a s i s . Another i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n i s t h e m u l t i p l i c i t y o f d i s c o u r s e s due t o t h e f a c t t h a t p a r t o f t h e t e x t o f a s t q r y i s t o l d us t o have been pronounced, t h o u g h t o r b e l i e v e d by some c o n s c i o u s c h a r a c t e r s . F i n a l l y , w e wish t o e x p l o i t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of " c o n n o t a t i o n s " : t h e t e x t may g i v e u s , r a t h e r t h a n an e x p l i c i t s t a t e m e n t a s " t h e f o x l i e d t o t h e raven" ( i n LA FONTAINE), an i n d i r e c t i n d i c a t i o n o f i t , l i k e : "he s a i d 'how p r e t t y you a r e , M r . Raven!"'. One t a s k o f o u r program w i l l be t o r e s t i t u t e t h e s t a t e m e n t " t h e f o x i s l y i n g " , and i f p o s s i b l e motivate i t . But t h e mere e x i s t e n c e o f c o n t r a d i c t o r y d a t a , such a s " r a v e n s a r e u g l y " ( s e m a n t i c d a t a b a s i s ) and " t h e r a v e n i s s a i d t o be p r e t t y " ( s t o r y ) n e e d s some e f f o r t towards c o n c e i v i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . T h i s p o i n t w i l l be d e t a i l e d f i r s t .

lo/-

THE CHARACTER E D I T O R AND THE NATURE OF A CHARACTER

I f w e want t o r e p r e s e n t a c h a r a c t e r a s d e s c r i b e d i n a t e x t a t t r i b u t e d t o a n o t h e r c h a r a c t e r of t h e s t o r y , we have t o keep an i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h i s s i t u a t i o n o f o b l i q u e s p e e c h . We chose t o p r o v i d e t h e s t r u c t u r e r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e c h a r a c t e r w i t h a p o i n t e r towards i t s " e d i t o r " , i . e . t h e c h a r a c t e r whose s p e e c h , b e l i e f o r i n t e n t i o n made t h i s s t r u c t u r e a p p e a r . The EDITOR e n a b l e s us t o d i s t i n g u i s h between f o u r d e s c r i p t i o n s of t h e wolf i n LA FONTAINE's "Le l o u p e t l ' a g n e a u " .

. t h e wolf . t h e wolf . .

as viewed i n t h e s t o r y (EDITOR: LA FONTAINE) i n i t s own s p e e c h (EDITOR: t h e w o l f ) t h e wolf i n t h e s p e e c h of t h e lamb (EDITOR: t h e lamb) t h e wolf i n t h e g o s s i p i t c l a i m s t h e lams h a s made (EDITOR: t h e lamb a s viewed by t h e w o l f ) .

Each of t h e s t r u c t u r e s r e l a t e d t o a c e r t a i n EDITOR w i l l be c a l l e d a DESCRIPTION of t h e c h a r a c t e r , and t h e s y s t e m w i l l c o n s i d e r e a c h c h a r a c t e r a s a l i s t o f d e s c r i p t i o n s , the f i r s t element of t h e l i s t b e i n g a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e r e a d e r ' s p o i n t o f view about t h e c h a r a c t e r . S i n c e i t i s n o t t h e same t o d e r i v e a d e s c r i p t i o n from s p e e c h , t h o u g h t o r any d i f f e r e n t "mental a c t i v i t y " a p p e a r i n g i n s t o r i e s , we u s e a s p e c i a l v a r i a b l e t o d e n o t e the type of d i s c o u r s e a given d e s c r i p t i o n i s o r i g i n a t e d i n : t h a t v a r i a b l e i s t h e NATURE of a d e s c r i p t i o n . I t i s now p o s s i b l e t o f i l l t h e d e s c r i p t i o n w i t h a s many v a r i a b l e s as needed by t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a c h a r a c t e r .

We s h a l l n o t l i n g e n upon t h e s e v a r i a b l e s . L e t o n l y c i t e NAME, QUALITY ( a n a t t e m p t t o d e s c r i b e t h e c h a r a c t e r " i n a s i n g l e word") and a QUANTIFIER (which d e n o t e s w h e t h e r t h e c h a r a c t e r i s an i n d i v i d u a l , a group o r any o t h e r q u a n t i t y ) . Z0/-

STORY UNDERSTANDING I N THE CHARACTER FIELD: NOTATIONS.

I n o u r example, which i s q u i t e s i m p l e , t h e s y s t e m f i n d s a NOTATION a b o u t t h e f o x , t h e s e m a n t i c d a t a b a s i s p r o v i d e s a l i n k from " t r i c k y " saying that i t is tricky: t o " l y i n g " and t h e f i n a l r e s u l t o f o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g p r o c e d u r e i s a CONNOTATION e x p r e s s i n g t h a t " t h e f o x , which i s t r i c k y , i s t e l l i n g a l i e " . Note t h a t i f w e t e l l i t a s t o r y a b o u t a mole d e c l a r i n g t o a r a v e n t h a t i t i s p r e t t y , o u r s y s t e m w i l l i n t h e same s i m p l e way c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e mole, b e i n g s h o r t s i g h t e d , i s making a m i s t a k e . Now i t i s p o s s i b l e t o meet less s i m p l e s i t u a t i o n s , e . g . t h e c a s e where t h e l i a r

A Natural Language ComprehensionSystem

319

spoke f i r s t , making somebody e l s e seem t o be wrong: t h i s i s what happens i n "Le l o u p e t l ' a g n e a u " . The lamb b e i n g a c c u s i n g o f t r o u b l i n g w a t e r answers t h a t i t does n o t ; o u r s y s t e m , h a v i n g e x p l o r e d t h e f e a t u r e s o f t h e lamb, f i n d no way of j u s t i f y i n g i t s b e i n g r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h a t c o n t r a d i c t i o n . I t t h e n does back t o t h e NOTATION e x p r e s s i n g t h e f a c t t h a t t h e lamb i s t r o u b l i n g t h e w a t e r , and by way of t h e EDITOR of t h i s w a t e r - t r o u b l e r , examines t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e w o l f ; the d a t a b a s i s m e n t i o n s t h a t wolves a r e w i c k e d , i . e . c a p a b l e of u n r e g u l a r a c t i o n s which s o o n b r i n g us back t o l y i n g . We a r e c u r r e n t l y c r e a t i n g s t i l l l e s s t r i v i a l c o n n o t a t i o n r u l e s , k e e p i n g aware t h a t they a l l have t o p r o v e t h e i r g e n e r a l i t y . This i s implemented as f o l l o w s : e a c h time a g i v e n c h a r a c t e r i s c o n c e r n e d by a s e n t e n c e , t h e s y s t e m e l a b o r a t e s a s p e c i a l form o f t h e s e n t e n c e c o n s i d e r e d as desc r i b i n g t h i s c h a r a c t e r ; t h i s form i s c a l l e d a NOTATION. The new NOTATION w i l l b e p l a c e d i n t o a l i s t p e r t a i n i n g t o a l l d e s c r i p t i o n s of t h e c h a r a c t e r ; b u t b e f o r e d o i n g s o , t h e s y s t e m compares t h e NOTATION w i t h t h o s e a l r e a d y p r e s e n t i n t h e l i s t . A t e a c h s t e p of t h e c o m p a r i s o n , t h r e e r e s u l t s a r e p o s s i b l e :

. t h e meaning o f t h e two compared n o t a t i o n s a r e u n r e l a t e d : no o p e r a t i o n n e e d e d . . t h e new n o t a t i o n r e p e a t s t h e one i t i s compared t o : d e l e t e t h e new n o t a t i o n . . a c o n t r a d i c t i o n appears: deal with i t . How i s one t o f a c e up t o a c o n t r a d i c t i o n ? Our s y s t e m w i l l f o l l o w a v e r y s i m p l e r u l e : t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n j u s t h a s t o be n o t e d , i n a form v e r y c l o s e t o t h a t used t o encode o r d i n a r y s e n t e n c e s . However, we wish t o choose between t h e v a r i e t y o f s t a t e m e n t s d e s c r i b i n g a c o n t r a d i c t o r y s i t u a t i o n , and a l s o t o f i n d a c a u s e t o t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n . So NOTATION i s n o t e x a c t l y o f u s e t o u s : we s h a l l u s e a more i n t r i c a t e s t r u c t u r e , c a l l e d CONNOTATION. Once e s t a b l i s h e d a CONNOTATION w i l l m e r e l y c o n t a i n s u c h i n f o r m a t i o n as " t h e r e i s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n due t o , s a y , t h e s p e e c h o f t h e f o x " , p l u s t h e i n d i c a t i o n of which two n o t a t i o n s l e d t o i t s c o n s t r u c t i o n ( e . g . " r a v e n s a r e ugly" and "How p r e t t y y o u a r e , M i s t e r Raven"). The r u l e a p p l i e d i n t h i s c a s e i s : when a c h a r a c t e r p r o d u c e s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n when s p e a k i n g , i t may be l y i n g , o r making a m i s t a k e , o r a j o k e , e t c . . . We c a n t h e n t u r n t o g e t a n o t h e r way o f d e s c r i b i n g o u r p r o b l e m a t i c s , i . e . : THE CHENG YU SPECIALIST. l o / - What a r e Cheng Yu ? V a r i o u s s t u d i e s ( e . g . SABBAN 1 2 9 1 show them t o be v e r y common, b o t h i n spoken and w r i t t e n forms of C h i n e s e . They number around t h r e e thousand; t h e i r o r i g i n s a r e p a s t e v e n t s , m y t h o l o g i c a l s t o r i e s o r f a b l e s . Synt a c t i c a l l y , t h e y behave v e r y o f t e n l i k e a d v e r b s . S e m a n t i c a l l y , we s e p a r a t e them i n t o t h r e e c a t e g o r i e s , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e k i n d o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n p r o c e d u r e we a p p l y t o them. 1

.-

l e x i c a l i z e d , u n a n a l y s a b l e Cheng Y u : t h e i r meaning c a n n o t e a s i l y be d e r i v e d from t h e i r components. F o r i n s t a n c e : HORSE-HORSE-TIGER-TIGER, meaning " v a g u e l y , a p p r o x i m a t e l y , n o t s o w e l l "

2 . - c u l t u r a l Cheng Yu: i n t e r p r e t e d by m a t c h i n g c o n v e n t i o n a l f e a t u r e s : e.g.

TIGER('s) HEAD SNAKE('s) TAIL meaning "a good b e g i n n i n g , a p o o r ending':

3.- Cheng Yu r e f e r r i n g t o a s t o r y : what i s t o b e matched h e r e a r e t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f t h e c u r r e n t s t o r y and of t h e one t h e Cheng Yu r e f e r s t o : we c a n match t h e i r c h a r a c t e r s and a c t i o n s .

320

G. Sabah

The f i r s t c a t e g o r y r e q u i r e s no " i n t e l l i g e n t " p r o c e s s i n g , s i n c e one h a s t o know by h e a r t t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f e v e r y s i n g l e Cheng Yu i n i t . So o u r p r o c e d u r e s c o n c e r n t h e s e c o n d c a t e g o r y , i . e . t h e " c u l t u r a l " , and t h e t h i r d , i . e . t h e " h i s t o r i c a l " Cheng Yu. To r e d u c e t h e s i z e o f o u r model, we c o n s i d e o n l y t h e Cheng Yu w i t h a r e f e r e n c e t o t h e animal w o r l d ; t h i s d o e s n o t seem t o o g r e a t an a l t e r a t i o n o f t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n p r o b l e m .

2O/- Programs t o u n d e r s t a n d c u l t u r a l Cheng Yu. The o r g a n i s a t i o n o f t h e l e x i c o n p e r m i t s t o d e s c r i b e e v e r y c o n c e p t a s e m a n t i c way ( s u p e r o r d i n a t e , s e m a n t i c f e a t u r e s ) , b u t a l s o t o mention s y n t a c t i c a l f e a t u r e s o f i t s s u r f a c e f o r m s , and, f o r t h i s a p p l i c a t i o n , c u l t u r a l o r "symbolic" f e a t u r e s a s a s p e c i a l c a s e o f s e m a n t i c f e a t u r e s . The s y s t e m w i l l u s e a l l t h a t know l e d g e t o f i n d o u t b o t h t h e s y n t a x and t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a c u l t u r a l Cheng Yu. 2.1.- S y n t a x o f t h e c u l t u r a l Cheng Yu. Even i f t h e r e are many cases o f u n a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f t h e n o t i o n o f "grammatical c a t e g o r y " t o Chinese morphemes, we a r e i n a c a s e where i t a p p l i e s r a t h e r w e l l . I n p a r t i c u l a r , a r e f e r e n c e t o a n a n i m a l w i l l b a s i c a l l y h a v e t h e marker "NOUN", e v e n i f i t can f u n c t i o n as adverb o r a d j e c t i v e . A noun m o d i f i e r ( v e r b o r a d j e c t i v e ) w i l l b e a "QUALIFIER"; a c l a u s e m o d i f i e r w i l l be a "PREPOSITION" a q u a l i f i e r t h a t t a k e s a noun a s o b j e c t w i l l b e a "VERB". Given t h o s e fier, P for parallel Cheng Yu PP Cheng Yu i n sentence form

NP

c a t e g o r i e s , we preposition, V ( 1 ) : (NQ)(NQ), ( 2 ) : (QN) (QN) , ( 3 ) : P(N(VN)), ( 4 ) : (QN) (VN),

f i n d f o l l o w i n g c o n s t r u c t i o n s (N f o r n o u n s , Q f o r q u a l i f o r verb): l i k e "wolf-to d e v o u r - t i g e r - t o swallow" ( g l u t t o n y ) l i k e "nine-ox-two-tiger" (great strength) l i k e "be l i k e - f i s h - t o get-water'' ( s a t i s f a c t i o n ) l i k e " o l d - h o r s e - t o know-road'' ( a n o l d hand)

(5) : N((adverb V)N) . ( 6 ) : (VN(NQ o r QN), l i k e " t o d i s t u r b - h e r d - q u i c k - h o r s e "

There are a few o t h e r s , s i m i l a r c o n s t r u c t i o n s which w e do meet when c o n s i d e r i n g o n l y t h e Cheng Yu w i t h a n animal r e f e r e n c e .

2.2.- Semantic matches i n t h e c u l t u r a l Cheng Yu. There are t h r e e k i n d s o f matches between c o n c e p t s i n o u r system: synonymy, c o r r e l a t i o n and antonymy. Synonyms a r e d i f f e r e n t s u r f a c e r e a l i s a t i o n s o f what o u r p r o gram knows a s one c o n c e p t : e . g . " t o swallow", " t o devour". C o r r e l a t i o n means t h a t t h e r e a r e some s h a r e d f e a t u r e s . I t i s an a p p r o x i m a t e synonymy. An example i s t h e c o u p l e ( " t i g e r " , "wolf"). Antonymy means t h a t some f e a t u r e s a r e i n o p p o s i t i o n , l i k e i n ("head", " t a i l " ) . The c h o i c e o f items t o be matched depends on t h e s y n t a c t i c form o f t h e Cheng Yu. I n a p a r a l l e l o n e , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e f i r s t morpheme i s compared t o t h e t h i r d and t h e s e c o n d t o t h e f o u r t h . The s y s t e m f i n d s e i t h e r two synonymies, t r u e o r a p p r o x i m a t e , o r one synonymy w i t h one antonomy. When t h e r e a r e two synonymies t h e Cheng Yu merely r e p e a t s what i s e x p r e s s e d by t h e f i r s t and s e c o n d words. When t h e r e a r e b o t h a synonym p a i r and a n antonym p a i r , t h e s y s t e m l o o k s f o r a s i g n i f i c a n t o p p o s i t i o n . L e t ' s c o n s i d e r an example: " t i g e r - h e a d - s n a k e - t a i l " . The c o n s t r u c t i o n i s p a r a l l e l ; t h e r e i s a c o r r e l a t e d p a i r ( t i g e r , s n a k e ) and a n antonymy p a i r ( h e a r , t a i l ) . The o p p o s i t i o n i s i n t e r p r e t e d , knowing t h a t "a t i g e r t a i l " ( c u l t u r a l i n f o r m a t i o n ) and t h a t "head h a s a large h e a d , a s n a k e h a s a s t a n d s f o r b e g i n n i n g , t a i l f o r ending" ( s y m b o l i c i n f o r m a t i o n ) . F i n d i n g t h e c o r rect forms of " l a r g e " and " t h i n " which may q u a l i f y " b e g i n n i n g " and "ending", t h e s y s t e m w i l l code t h e Cheng Yu as meaning "a g r e a t b e g i n n i n g , a p o o r e n d i n g " .

thin

3"/- H i s t o r i c a l Cheng Yu. p a r e n t s . H e w a n t s money.

"John l i v e s w i t h h i s Consider the following s t o r y : Every week h e buys a l o t t o t i c k e t . He (WATCH-TREE-

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WAIT-FOR-RABBIT)

"

.

The l a s t s e n t e n c e h a s as p r e d i c a t e a Cheng Yu t h a t r e f e r s t o an a n c i e n t s t o r y by HAN FEI 21: "Once a p e a s a n t o f t h e c o u n t r y Song saw a r a b b i t h i t t i n g a t r e e which f a i l e d t o n o t i c e . 'Ibis r a b b i t b r o k e i t s neck and d i e d . The man took i t i n t h e e v e n i n g . Being l a z z y , h e d e c i d e d t o s t a n d by t h a t t r e e a l l w a i t i n g f o r o t h e r r a b b i t s . He d i d n o t g e t a n o t h e r r a b b i t i n t h a t way, derision".

i t had i t and a t e day l o n g , b u t only

Our s y s t e m g i v e s t h e l o t t o s t o r y t o i t s ACTION and CHARACTER s p e c i a l i s t s , which understand i t r e s p e c t i v e l y as:

(ACTION) : ( 1 ) R e l a t i o n between "John" and " p a r e n t s " ; ( 2 ) D e s i r e o f "John" f o r "money"; (3) A c t i o n o f "John" upon " l o t t o t i c k e t s " ; ( 4 ) (INFERRED) R e l a t i o n between " l o t t o t i c k e t s " and "money". (CHARACTERS) ( I ) John ( l i v e s w i t h p a r e n t s , w a n t s money, buys l o t t o t i c k e t s ) ; ( 2 ) P a r e n t s ( J o h n l i v e s w i t h them); (3) Money ( J o h n w a n t s some); ( 4 ) L o t t o t i c k e t s ( J o h n b u y s some) (NO INFERENCES). The same s p e c i a l i s t s l o o k a t t h e HENFEI 2 1 s t o r y .

-

(ACTION) ( 1 ) P e r c e p t i o n o f " r a b b i t l " by " p e a s a n t " ; ( 2 ) R e l a t i o n between " r a b b i t " ( 4 ) Desire o f " p e a s a n t " f o r and " t r e e " ; (3) A c t i o n o f " p e a s a n t " upon " r a b , t t t " ; 6 ) (INFERRED) R e l a t i o n between " r a b b i t ' I ; ( 5 ) A c t i o n o f " p e a s a n t " upon "tree " r a b b i t ; " and "tree";( 7 ) N e g a t i o n o f a c t i o n o f p e a s a n t " upon " r a b b i t ' I . (8) From t h e s t r u c t u r e ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 ) , t h e s y s t e m i n f e r s FAILURE OF A PzAN o f t h e peasant. -(CHARACTERS) ( 1 ) p e a s a n t ( o f t h e c o u n t r y "Song"; saw a r a b b i t , e t c . . . ; took t h e r a b b i t and a t e i t ; i s l a z y ; d e c i d e d , e t c w a i t s f o r o t h e r r a b b i t s ; does n o t g e t any; g e t s d e r i s i o n ) ( 2 ) r a b b i t s ( f a i l e d t o n o t i c e a t r e e ; h i t t h e tree; b r o k e i t s n e c k ; d i e d ; w a s t a k e n and e a t e n ) ; (3) tree ( h i t by t h e r a b b i t ; watched by t h e peasant; f a i l s t o procure o t h e r r a b b i t s ) . "John" and " t h e p e a s a n t " are a match, Then "money" a s s u b j e c t s o f t h e p r e d i c a t e "watching a t r e e , w a i t i n g f o r r a b b i t s " . i d e n t i f i e s w i t h " r a b b i t " b e c a u s e o f t h e p a r a l l e l d e s i r e s of John f o r money, and o f t h e p e a s a n t f o r r a b b i t s . S i m i l a r l y , t h e a c t i o n s o f John and t h e p e a s a n t are i n t e r p r e t e d t o match " l o t t o " w i t h " t r e e " . Having no c h a r a c t e r s l e f t t o i n t e r p r e t i n t h e a n c i e n t s t o r y , t h e program now p r o j e c t s t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e t r e e , r a b b i t and p e a s a n t u n t o " t h e l o t t o " , " t h e money" and "John".

...;

(INFERENCESOF THE CHENG YU SPECIALIST) ( I ) John ( i s l a z y ; h a s a p l a n which i s a f a i l u r e ) [from " p e a s a n t " ] ( 2 ) l o t t o t i c k e t s ( i n r e l a t i o n w i t h money; f a i l t o p r o c u r e i t ) [ f r o m " t r e n " 1 Those i n f e r e n c e s a r e made by a program t h a t d o e s n o t know what l o t t o i s . CONCLUSION The s y s t e m upon which w e worked i s o b v i o u s l y module-based s o a s t o a l l o w d i f f e r e n t and i n d e p e n d e n t r e a d i n g s ( s u c h as from " a c t i o n " and " c h a r a c t e r " ) . The t h i r d t y p e o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n undevelopped s t o o d t o p r o v e t h e i n t e r e s t of comparing such modules. I n t h e l o n g r u n we would t e n d t o c o n s i d e r t h a t t h e main I t would be n e c e s s a problem i s t h e u n i f y i n g t h e d i f f e r e n t models h e r e s u g g e s t e d . ry a f t e r e x p l a i n i n g t h e v a r i o u s p r o b l e r n a t i c s t o a s s e r t p r e c i s e l y t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s and t h o s e s i t u a t i o n s i n which s u c h and such a p r o c e s s c a n be s e t a t work. In p a r t i c u l a r , p r o c e s s e s f o u n d i n g v e r b a l a c t i v i t i e s and image r e a s o n i n g a r e

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n e c e s s a r i l y complemented; t h e r e f o r e a g i v e n method w i l l answer a s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n a t a g i v e n moment. A f t e r w a r d s , t h e same problem w i l l b e s o l v e d through another process. We t h e n come t o t h e problem of t r a i n i n g : how i s one t o o v e r l a p c e r t a i n s t a g e s i n r e a s o n i n g o r r e p l a c e them by o t h e r p r o c e s s e s s o a s t o r e a c h more and more e f f i c i e n t methods ? From t h i s p o i n t of view, we f e e l t h a t r e s e a r c h s h o u l d c o n c e n t r a t e on t h e comparat i v e s t u d y of t h e v a r i o u s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , b o t h of o b j e c t s and p r o c e s s e s , s o a s t o show t h e i r common p r o p e r t i e s and t h e i r b e s t p o s s i b l e u s e . BIBLIOGRAPHY

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UNDERSTANDING : A VARIABLE-DEPTH PROCESS Daniel COULON Centre d e Recherche en Informatique de Nancy Campus Scientifique B.P.239 54506VandoeuvreLes Nancy Cedex

Daniel KAYSER Laboratoire de Recherche en Informatique Universite Paris - Sud Bat. 490 91405 Orsay Cedex

Logical representations compel t o solve problems which,have l i t t l e influence, i f any, on t h e process of t e x t understanding; conversely, they provide l i t t l e help t o solve most of t h e common problems. Conceptual representations f r e e z e Comprehension t o a level of d e t a i l which i s sometimes exaggerated. The remedy we propose c o n s i s t s i n working a t variable depths. Variable depth i s characterized by t h e three following features : gradual desc r i p t i o n , p l u r a l i t y of s t r a t e g i e s , evaluation checking on demand. We describe an experiment i n natural language question answering using t h i s concept, and conclude t h a t variable depth i s typical of human-human c o m n i c a t i o n processes.

Foreword : Informatics and Psychology If we, as computer people, publish our views in a book oriented towards Psychology, t h i s means t h a t we consider they might af f ect Psychologists, the way the

opinion of Psychologists d ef i n i t el y concerns us. However, we ought to s t a t e clearly t h a t the objectives of the two d i s ci p l i n s do not merge together. Our goal is t o build simple and e f f i c i e n t procedures which would be capable, when provided with a t e x t , of doing operations which ar e analogous with those performed by a human being who i s said t o have understood the t ex t. I f , f o r instance, orders are present in the t ex t , we want the computer t o with them ; i f there ar e questions about the text,we want the computer t o them. W e also want our understanding of t h e continuation of the t e x t a t a point t o be influenced by what we have read of the text u p t o t h a t point,

comply answer given and so

on. B u t we do not postulate t h a t our procedures should more o r less r e f l e c t human mental operations ; moreover, the fact t h at our system does not provide the same answers as a human being under the same circumstances should not be considered as a f a il u r e , as long as i t s answers are meaningful and useful. However, we do n o t forget t h a t language i s a tool developed by humans, in order t o enable communication between humans ; i t i s thus reasonable t o believe tha t some knowledge about human understanding methods would really be helpful in order t o achieve our goal, b u t t h i s i s purely conjectural. T h a t explains why we look f o r analogy, n o t f o r identity between the behaviour of humans and the intended behaviour o f computers. Basically, our role consists in developing techniques adapted f o r computers, i n displaying the r es u l t s they might yield, and in using the comments raised by these r es u l t s i n order t o suggest improvements fe a sible on computers ; b u t our r o l e i s n o t t o build models claiming to emulate human information processing.

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D. Coulon and D. Kayser

I. THE PROBLEM OF INTERNAL REPRESENTATION To understund means t o grasp t h e meiininy. Is a meaning r e p r e s e n t a b l e ? Most o f t h e work on u n d e r s t a n d i n g answers t h e q u e s t i o n p o s i t i v e l y . P r e s e n t l y we s h a l l d i s c u s s t h e formalisms under which meaning r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s g e n e r a l l y attempted ( l o g i c a l ) , b u t f i r s t we would l i k e t o i n s i s t on t h e expressions, diagrams, networks, f a c t t h a t one can p e r f e c t l y w e l l answer n e g a t i v e l y , and s t i l l deem i t p o s s i b l e t o s i m u l a t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g on computers.

...

The a l l e g e d i m p o s s i b i l i t y t o r e p r e s e n t meaning i s n o t , i n o u r mind, as s t r o n g as t h e g r e a t t h e o r e t i c a l i m p o s s i b i l i t i e s (e.g. Carnot, Heisenberg, GGdel, ) ; we s i m p l y c o n s i d e r t h a t e v e r y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i l l be e i t h e r i n e x a c t , o r u s e l e s s .

...

T h i s becomes c l e a r w i t h one o f Y o r i c k W i l k s ' metaphors ( 2 2 ) : when we t r a v e l by car, we g e n e r a l l y need r o a d maps ; now, i f t h e y a r e s m a l l - s c a l e d ( 1 i n 1 m i l l i o n ) , t h e y d o n ' t show e v e r y secondary road : t h e y a r e t h u s n o t f a i t h f u l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f r e a l i t y , and t h i s indeed can p r o v e t o be a n u i s a n c e i n case o f d i f f i c u l t y ; i f t h e y a r e l a r g e s c a l e d ( 1 i n lO,OOO), we s h a l l be o v e r l o a d e d by heaps o f paper, which we p r o b a b l y w o n ' t use, and among which we s h a l l have a h a r d t i m e f i n d i n g what we need, s h o u l d t h e o c c a s i o n a r i s e . I n t h e case o f a f u l l - s c a l e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ( 1 i n I ) , we have t o t r a v e l as much on t h e paper as on t h e ground! The same h o l d s f o r language : i f a meaning r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s t o o coarse ( i . e . i f i t i n c l u d e s l i t t l e i n f o r m a t i o n f o r each word), much o f t h e s i g n i f i c a n t nuances w i l l n o t be p e r c e i v e d ; i f i t goes i n t o t o o many d e t a i l s , we w i l l use i t w i t h great d i f f i c u l t y . D e s p i t e t h i s paradox, road maps e x i s t and a r e most u s e f u l ! S i m i l a r l y , t h e r e e x i s t meaning r e p r e s e n t a t i o n methods which a r e u s e f u l , b u t i t s h o u l d be c l e a r t h a t -except f o r a r t i f i c i a l languages, o r n a t u r a l languages used under a r t i f i c i a l circumstances- t h e s e methods a r e i n t r i n s i c a l l y approximate ones.

A. L o g i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s We s h a l l c o n s i d e r h e r e s t a n d a r d l o g i c s , b u t o u r a r g u m e n t a t i o n seems t o h o l d even f o r non-standard ( i . e . modal, many-valued, fuzzy, ) l o g i c s . L e t us examine t h e f o l l o w i n g , r a t h e r commonplace, sentence :

...

( S ) Symphony n040 is one of t h E finest symphonies Mozart ever wrote.

Moreover, l e t us ( j u s t f o r a m i n u t e ) suppose t h a t ( S ) e n t a i l s t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h r e e p r e d i c a t e s : FINERlz,y), SYMPHONY(x), AUTHOR(x,y) whose values a r e e i t h e r t m e o r fuZse ( a d d i n g indeteminute o r i n t e r m e d i a t e v a l u e s does n o t change much). An i d e a l t r a n s l a t o r would p r o b a b l y r e p r e s e n t ( S ) as : j SYMPHONYly) A AUTHOR(Mozart,y) A curd{x I SYMFHONY(x) A AUTHOR(Mozurt,x) A FINER(x,y)1 < card{x I SYMFHONYix) A AUTHOR(Mozart,r) A FINERly,x)}}

Symph n C 4 0 E { y

I n p l a i n language : symphony n"40 belongs t o t h e s e t o f M o z a r t ' s symphonies which have t h e p r o p e r t y t h a t t h e amount o f t h o s e which a r e f i n e r t h a n them i s s m a l l e r t h a n t h e amount o f t h o s e which a r e n o t as good. T h i s l i t e r a l t r a n s l a t i o n r a i s e s many q u e s t i o n s ; f o r i n s t a n c e t h i s one : symphony n"40 i s h e r e t a k e n as an element o f a s e t ; b u t what e x a c t l y does t h a t element denote ?

Understanding :A Variable-DepthProcess

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e l : an a b s t r a c t event ( t h e l i s t e n i n g of t h e s c o r e ) e2 : an o b j e c t ( t h e o r i g i n a l s c o r e ? an e d i t i o n o f i t ? a copy o f t h i s e d i t i o n ? ) e3 : a s e t ( a l l t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s which have been played). In sound l o g i c , one and only one of t h e s e ought t o be chosen ; now sentence ( S ) could be followed by : ( T 1 ) : ( S ) , and I love l i s t e n i n g t o i t ( s e n s e e l ) ( T 2 ) : ( S ) , and I went t o buy it (sense e2) (T3) : ( S ) , but BBhm used t o conduct i t much b e t t e r than Maazel does ( s e n s e e 3 ) . Another problem, i r r e l e v a n t i n t h i s case : time ; i f ( S ) was s a i d during Mozart's l i f e t i m e , how should we represent t h a t ( S ) concerns t h e symphonies w r i t t e n u p t o now, but t h a t t h i s a s s e r t i o n could be revised i f Mozart's f u r t h e r production deserves i t ! These a r e thorny m a t t e r s , which have t o be solved i f Logic i s t o become t h e support of meaning r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ; now none of them has any relevance f o r most o f t h e usual i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f ( S ) : a s m a t t e r o f f a c t , ( S ) when p u t in c o n t e x t , can convey : - a s t y l i s t i c v a r i a n t f o r I l i k e symphony n040 (11). - a token of the s p e a k e r ' s self-complacency How e r u d i t e am I ! I have recognized i t a t once (12). - a concealed demand You know i t i s performed t o n i g h t ; p l e a s e i n v i t e me t o t h e concert ( 13).

-

...

Logical t r a n s l a t i o n helps in no way t o understand ( S ) along any o f those l i n e s . Even i f we s t i c k t o t h e proper meaning, ( S ) i s l i k e l y t o have been u t t e r e d as a paraphrase f o r : I f i n d symphony n040 v e r y b e a u t i f u l , and t h e r e are some o t h e r s symphonies by Mozart which I a l s o f i n d very b e a u t i f u l ( 1 4 ) .

Notice t h a t t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n I4 does not presuppose t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e same logical predicates as t h e l o g i c a l t r a n s l a t i o n (e.9. t h e o r d e r r e l a t i o n FIDER disappears, as well as t h e need f o r an accurate d e f i n i t i o n of SYMPHONY). We have j u s t shown t h a t a l o g i c a l representation of language f o r c e s us t o resolve t r i c k y q u e s t i o n s , which a r e generally i r r e l e v a n t t o e f f e c t i v e understanding of the e would l i k e t o conclude t h i s p a r t of t h e discussion by pointing o u t t h a t text. W t h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n moreover i s very d i f f i c u l t t o obtain automatically : a s f a r a s we know, no e x i s t i n g computer program i s a b l e t o t r a n s l a t e (S) c o r r e c t l y , without using purely ad-hoc processes. Only d e t a i l e d information on t h e context enables a program t o f i n d the proper t r a n s l a t i o n o f an element as common a s , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e French d e f i n i t e a r t i c l e l e ; t h r e e examples i l l u s t r a t e t h i s : Ze chien e s t duns Ze j a r d i n ( t h e dog is i n t h e garden) 3x Zy, DOGlxl A GARDEN(y) A LOCATION(x,y) l e chien e s t un mommifsre (dogs a r e mammals)

Vx, C'OG(x)

3 MAMMAL(xl

l e chien aime la viande (dogs love meat)

This i s a statement of t y p i c a l i t y , which i s nearly impossible t o translate logically.

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B. Other r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s We focus m o s t l y o n g r a p h i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s (networks, diagrams) which have r e c e n t l y been proposed by computer s c i e n t i s t s . a. Some o f t h e s o - c a l l e d semantic networks a r e mere t r a n s l a t i o n s , perhaps more l e g i b l e , o f f i r s t - o r d e r p r e d i c a t e l o g i c formulas. L o g i c i a n s sometimes grow angry a g a i n s t t h e p r e t e n s i o n o f t h e authors o f such networks, whenever t h e y c l a i m t o i n t r o d u c e something new when i n f a c t t h e y a r e m e r e l y r e d i s c o v e r i n g c l a s s i c a l r e s u l t s ( o f t e n q u i t e awkwardly : see c r i t i c i s m i n (23)). Even i f t h e argument i s n o t f a i r ( g r a p h i c a l p r e s e n t a t i o n i n s p i r e s e f f i c i e n t h e u r i s t i c s , which a r e n o t obvious i n standard n o t a t i o n ) , i t i s t r u e t h a t such networks have about t h e same e x p r e s s i v e power as L o g i c , and t h u s possess t h e same f l a w s as t h o s e mentioned i n 5 A. (2),(9),(20). b. Other systems n o t o n l y a l l o w t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f l o g i c a l a s s e r t i o n s (which indeed have t o be represented, s i n c e l o g i c a l d e d u c t i o n s u n d e r l i e some n a t u r a l language i n f e r e n c e s ) , b u t have i m p o r t a n t a d d i t i o n a l f e a t u r e s . I n o u r o p i n i o n , t h e most o r i g i n a l one i s S c o t t Fahlman's NETL ( 6 ) : r e l a t i o n s have e x c e p t i o n s , and c o n t e x t s o f v a l i d i t y which may o r may n o t be a c t i v a t e d ; i t i s easy t o d i s t i n g u i s h between s e t p r o p e r t i e s (e.g. roads form a dense network) and i n d i v i d u a l p r o p e r t i e s (roads are covered with t a r ) . Nevertheless, even such a system has l i t t l e u s e f u l n e s s i n o r d e r t o understand a sentence l i k e ( S ) , because t h e i n f e r e n c e mechanisms which i t s u p p o r t s a r e e s s e n t i a l l y deductive. c. A l a s t c l a s s o f g r a p h i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , Schank's conceptual dependency ( 1 7 ) i s n o t l i a b l e t o t h i s k i n d o f c r i t i c i s m . As t h i s t h e o r y i s g e n e r a l l y w e l l known t o P s y c h o l o g i s t s , i t i s unnecessary t o p r e s e n t i t t h o r o u g h l y . L e t us o n l y r e c a l l t h a t t h e elementary i n f e r e n c e mechanisms (16) r e l y o n conceptuaZ p r i m i t i v e s , and t h a t t h e y work under t h e c o n t r o l o f more g l o b a l d e v i c e s : s c r i p t s ( 5 ) , (18) and p l a n s (21), which a r e p r a c t i c a l l y t h e o n l y t o o l s c u r r e n t l y a v a i l a b l e i n o r d e r t o get, by computer, i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s (11) t h r o u g h (14) from sentence (S). D e s p i t e t h i s u n d e n i a b l e advantage, Schank's system s t i l l has t h e inadequacy o f every r e p r e s e n t a t i o n system, v i z . i t c a r i c a t u r e s r e a l i t y i n a way which i s sometimes a w f u l : o u r commonplace sentence ( S ) w i l l p r o b a b l y be t r a n s l a t e d by t h e f a c t t h a t Mozart PTRANSed on some physical object ( t h e score) t h e r e s u l t of what he MBUILT ( t h e conception of h i s symphony), and t h a t hearing symphony n040 increases t h e hearer's EMOTIONAL-STATE by a given quantity (say 5 1 , while many other symphonies increase it by a quantity l e s s than 5 ! Why should one decompose so s t r a n g e l y i n f o r m a t i o n w h i c h i s l i n g u i s t i c s t a t e ? Some i n f e r e n c e s m i g h t w e l l be e a s i e r t o happy when I hear symphony n o 4 0 ) , b u t o t h e r s a r e l i k e l y t o instance, i n o u r o p i n i o n , ( S ) assumes t h a t t h e speaker has a p p r e c i a t i o n o n M o z a r t ' s symphonies ; as a m a t t e r o f f a c t , be n e u t r a l about them, he/she c o u l d have s a i d : ( S ' ) Mozart's n040 i s one o f t h e f i n e s t

quite clear i n i t s conduct (e.g. I am be blocked ; f o r an o v e r a l l p o s i t i v e i f he/she wanted t o

symphonies I know,

and i f he/she had a r a t h e r n e g a t i v e o p i n i o n , he/she would u t t e r something l i k e : ( S " ) n040 i s one of the feu symphonies by Mozart which I r e a l l y l i k e .

Now t h e nuances between ( S ) , ( S o ) and ( S " ) a r e h a r d l y t r a n s l a t a b l e i n conceptual dependency.

Understanding : A Variable-Depth Process

The f o l l o w i n g statements sum up t h e - l o g i c a l representations (formulas have l i t t l e i n f l u e n c e , i f any, on they provide l i t t l e help t o solve

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329

above d i s c u s s i o n : o r n e t w o r k s ) compel t o s o l v e problems which t h e process o f t e x t u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; c o n v e r s e l y , most o f t h e common problems.

~ o n c e p t m 2r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s f r e e z e comprehension t o a l e v e l o f d e t a i l which i s

sometimes exaggerated ( r e p r e s e n t i n g M o z a r t ' s hand r u n n i n g on t h e paper i s b e s i d e t h e p o i n t i n 999X, o f c o n t e x t s ) , and o f t e n d e f i c i e n t ( s e e S, S ' , S" above). The remedy we propose, as f a r as r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s s u e s a r e concerned, c o n s i s t s i n w o r k i n g a t v a r i a b l e depths.

11. VARIABLE DEPTH PROCESSING To be a b l e t o i n t e r p r e t sentences a t a v a r i a b l e d e p t h l e v e l , knowledge r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s h o u l d comply w i t h t h r e e c r i t e r i a : gradual d e s c r i p t i o n , p l u r a l i t y o f s t r a t e g i e s , e v a l u a t i o n c h e c k i n g on demand. I n t h i s s e c t i o n we s h a l l examine t h e s e t h r e e c r i t e r i a , and we s h a l l c o n s i d e r i m p l e m e n t a t i o n i s s u e s i n s e c t i o n 111.

A. Gradual d e s c r i p t i o n The degree o f r e f i n e m e n t o f an a n a l y s i s depends on what t h e r e s u l t o f t h i s a n a l y s i s i s expected t o be used f o r . I t i s n o t easy t o d e t e r m i n e i t a p r i o r i . An economic way o f p r o c e s s i n g would c o n s i s t i n b e g i n n i n g w i t h a r o u g h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a n what i s a c t u a l l y r e q u i r e d , and t o r e f i n e i t g r a d u a l l y u n t i l t h e l e v e l o f a c c u r a c y reached i s enough t o make t h e r e s u l t c r e d i b l e . That procedure i s s i m i l a r f r o m a c e r t a i n p o i n t o f view t o t h e method used t o e x p l a i n t h e meaning o f a word i n an encyclopaedic d i c t i o n a r y . F i r s t we f i n d i t s general use. The o t h e r s f o l l o w ; and t h e e x p l a n a t i o n s p r o v i d e d f o r them a r e a l l t h e more d e t a i l e d because t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s less obvious. Gradual d e s c r i p t i o n c o n s i s t s i n l i n k i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t o a concept ( i n t h e f o r m o f f e a t u r e s , r e l a t i o n s h i p s , p r e d i c a t e s , ... ) i n an o r d e r which agrees w i t h a more and more a c c u r a t e d e s c r i p t i o n . There i s no s i n g l e o r d e r , c o n t r a r y t o what i s common i n h i e r a r c h i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n s o f nomenclatures. A same o b j e c t can be c o n s i dered f r o m d i s t i n c t p o i n t s o f view. A w o r k e r on an assembly l i n e i n an a u t o m o b i l e f a c t o r y w i l l p r o b a b l y c o n s i d e r a c a r as so many p a r t s t h a t he has t o assemble. A d r i v e r on t h e o t h e r hand sees t h e c a r a t once f r o m an u t i l i t a r i a n p o i n t o f v i e w : speed, number o f passengers, e t c . F i n a l l y , gradual d e s c r i p t i o n d e a l s as much w i t h f a c t r e t r i e v a l as w i t h i n f e r e n c e s . There i s no w a t e r t i g h t s e p a r a t i o n between t h e s e two procedures. I n o r d e r t o f i n d o u t what t h e weather i s g o i n g t o be l i k e t h i s a f t e r n o o n , you can r e a d t h e newspaper weather f o r e c a s t ( f a c t r e t r i e v a l ) , o r g l a n c e t h r o u g h t h e window, o r l o o k a t t h e thermometer and t h e barometer and make a f o r e c a s t y o u r s e l f ( i n f e r e n c e s ) . These two procedures can be r u n c o n c u r r e n t l y , and t h e r e s u l t s compared i n o r d e r t o r e i n f o r c e their plausibility.

B. P l u r a l i t y o f s t r a t e g i e s The superabundance o f s t o r e d i n f o r m a t i o n i n a gradual d e s c r i p t i o n system w i l l i n e v i t a b l y l e a d t o a c o m b i n a t o r i a l e x p l o s i o n . Which q u a l i t i e s o f i n f e r e n c e s s h o u l d we p r e s e r v e : u n i v e r s a l i t y , v a l i d i t y , e f f i c i e n c y ? There i s no s i n g l e answer.

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P r o f e s s i o n a l o r o c c a s i o n a l l o g i c i a n s do n o t want t o tamper w i t h t h e v a l i d i t y o f an i n f e r e n c e . General r u l e s a r e useless, u n l e s s we r e s o r t t o a t r i v i a l d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e w o r l d ( c f . t h e t r a n s c r i p t i o n o f t h e problem o f t h e monkey and t h e bananas u s i n g p r e d i c a t e c a l c u l u s ( 9 ) ) . E f f i c i e n c y r e q u i r e s t h e use o f s p e c i f i c procedures p r o grammed i n a language such as PLANNER (10). These procedures h e l p t o s p e c i f y t h e v a l i d i t y c o n t e x t o f an i n f e r e n c e , and t o d e s c r i b e t h e l o c a l s t r a t e g y t o be f o l l o w e d i n o r d e r t o achieve i t s u c c e s s f u l l y . However, because we cannot f o r e s e e a l l t h e u s e f u l s p e c i f i c r u l e s , i t i s a l s o necessary t o have a t o u r d i s p o s a l more u n i v e r s a l i n f e r e n c e procedures. I n o r d e r t o a v o i d b e i n g c o n f r o n t e d w i t h a huge c o m b i n a t o r i a l development, we may need t o approximate v a l i d i t y , f o r example by s h o r t - c u t t i n g some o f t h e a p p l i c a t i o n c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e i n f e r e n c e r u l e s . I t i s p r e f e r a b l e t o e l i m i n a t e t h e s e checkings which seem t o be l e s s i m p o r t a n t a t f i r s t s i g h t . And why n o t use reasoning procedures which would be l e s s demanding t h a n d e d u c t i o n o r s t r i c t analogy ? F o r example, an i n f e r e n c e procedure, used p r e v i o u s l y , can be adapted t o a s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n by t a k i n g i n t o account d i f f e r e n c e s t h a t have been d i s c o v e r e d ; o r a c a l c u l u s can be made on an easy example t o r e t r i e v e a r e s u l t which i s supposed t o be a p p l i c a b l e t o o t h e r cases... The s e l e c t i o n o f t h e s t r a t e g y t o be a p p l i e d depends on t h e goal, and on t h e a v a i l a b l e resources t h a t we a r e prepared t o use i n o r d e r t o r e a c h it. There i s no s i n g l e way o f checking t h a t a Zion i s a vertebrate. (7) p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n c o u l d have been stored, o r be found i n s i d e a h i e r a r c h y (Zion ->feZine -> carnivore ->mumrnaZ ->vertebrate) ; o r t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e t o compare t h e d e s c r i p t i o n s o f Zions and vertebrates a t o u r d i s p o s a l , o r t o accept t h e t r u t h o f t h a t p r o p o s i t i o n u n t i l i t i s n o t i n v a l i d a t e d by o t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n . These d i f f e r e n t s t r a t e g i e s r e q u i r e more o r l e s s s t o r a g e and/or computing time.

..

The q u e s t i o n t h e n i s how t o s u p e r v i s e t h e s t r a t e g i e s by t a k i n g i n t o account t h e s i z e and t h e k i n d o f a v a i l a b l e resources.

C. E v a l u a t i o n checking on demand

U s u a l l y i t i s n e i t h e r p o s s i b l e t o f o r e s e e t h e c o s t o f each s t r a t e g y , n o r t o ensure t h a t i t would p r o v i d e an i n t e r e s t i n g r e s u l t . So, i t i s u s e f u l t o be a b l e t o i n t e r r u p t i n f e r e n c e s on demand. An i n t e r r u p t i o n p r o v i d e s t h e o p p o r t u n i t y o f e v a l u a t i n g t h e q u a l i t y o f incomplete and/or approximate r e s u l t s . Then, we can e i t h e r choose which procedure t o resume, o r use t h e s e p a r t i a l r e s u l t s t o p u t f o r w a r d a p r o p o s a l . Computers l e n d themselves t o numerical e v a l u a t i o n s . However, even i f we have t o accept t h a t t h e model we use i s s i m p l i s t i c , i t must c o n f o r m t o t h e g o a l weareaimirgat. We have suggested t h e use o f two f u n c t i o n s , r e s p e c t i v e l y S ( s e r i a l ) and // ( p a r a l l e l ) , f o r combining t h e p l a u s i b i l i t i e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h two a s s e r t i o n s so t h a t t h e p l a u s i b i l i t y o f t h e consequent a s s e r t i o n s h o u l d e i t h e r be weakened o r r e i n f o r c e d . S i s used when t h e c o n c l u s i o n proceeds from a sequence o f two premises, and / / when t h e r e a r e two d i f f e r e n t means o f r e a c h i n g t h e same r e s u l t . The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e numerical values o f p l a u s i b i l i t y i s o u t s i d e t h e model, t h u s l e a v i n g t h e way open f o r making d e c i s i o n s when checking i n f e r e n c e s . The d e s c r i p t i o n and t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f t h i s model i s g i v e n i n (12). Here we s h a l l o n l y sum up o u r p o s i t i o n . P r o b a b i l i s t i c models, a l t h o u g h f o r m a l l y more s a t i s f y i n g , a r e p r o v i n g i n a p p l i c a b l e o r a r t i f i c i a l i n p r a c t i c e because t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f an event i s n o t always w e l l defined, n o r computable. There must e x i s t d e v i c e s o t h e r than p r o b a b i l i s t i c calculus i n consideration o f t h e psychologically observable d i f f e r e n c e s i n e v a l u a t i o n between t h e computed p r o b a b i l i t y and t h e s u b j e c t i v e one, (11). Several t h e o r i e s have i n f a c t been elaborated. The b e s t known ones a r e t h e t h e o r y o f evidence (19), and f u z z y s e t s . The use o f t h e l a t t e r however i n t h e case o f n a t u r a l languages (24) i n v o l v e s many unwarranted d e c i s i o n s .

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Many o t h e r measurements have been used f o r a p p l i c a t i o n s . The debate t o f i n d t h e best ones w i l l not be closed u n t i l t h e o t h e r problems concerning knowledge repres e n t a t i o n have been solved.

I 1I. EXPERIMENTAL D E V I C E We have shown t h a t t h e concept o f v a r i a b l e depth comprises several features which are not always easy t o i d e n t i f y , and even less t o implement on a computer. However we cannot stop here. Even i f we have introduced s i m p l i f i c a t i o n s t h a t may seem naive, we have t r i e d t o design a t e n t a t i v e system i n o r d e r t o experiment t h e basic mechanisms. The experimental device i s a question-answering system. The area o f a p p l i c a t i o n chosen, i.e. t h e growth o f very young c h i l d r e n , i s i n e x p l i c i t and ambiguous enough f o r a formal knowledge r e p r e s e n t a t i o n model not t o be s u i t a b l e .

A. Mechanisms we have Rejecting the use o f a canonical knowledge representation ( c f . I), chosen t o s t o r e i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e shape i t has been supplied i n , i . e . an excerpt from "QUID", t h e popular encyclopaedia. However, we introduced a s l i g h t modificat i o n by s p l i t t i n g up t h e t e x t i n t o t o t a l l y independant sentences ( 1 ) .

ex2rnele

: excerpt from "QUID" : 3 rnois : g a z o u i l l e spontane'ment, t i e n t l e hochet, l e regarde. independent sentences obtained : A 2'8qe ne'rnent. hochet. hochet (Every reference has been made e x p l i c i t , duplicated i n s i d e each sentence).

.

de t r o i s rnois, Z'enfant g a z o u i l l e spontaA l'cige de t r o i s rnois, Z'enfant t i e n t l e A l ' d g e de trois rnois, Z'enfant regarde l e

and adverbial complements have been

The "QUID", as i n t h e case o f every encyclopaedia, and more g e n e r a l l y every w r i t t e n t e x t , mentions o n l y p a r t o f t h e reader's presupposed knowledge. We add t h i s i m p l i c i t knowledge i n t h e form o f contextual production r u l e s .

exalllele

:

A l ' 8 g e de # 1 , un enfant # 2 ->A 1 'bqe d e # 3 . un e n f a n t # 2 encore $98 (~AGEORIG(# 1 I I $70 & (*AGE(#3)) $50 & (&LIFEGAL(# 3,# 1 1 ) $50 & (un a d u l t e ne # Z p a s ) $70

This r u l e s p e c i f i e s t h a t a c h i l d who can accomplish # Z when he i s # I o l d can s t i l l do t h e same t h i n g when he i s aged # 3 . To be v a l i d , t h i s inference requires t h e checking o f f o u r conditions : t h e a b i l i t y t o do # 2 should vanish when t h e c h i l d grows ; an a d u l t should n o t do # 2 , f o r example wet h i s / h e r bed ; # 3 and # I a r e respectively. t h e age o f the c h i l d and t h e age e x p l i c i t e l y associated t o t h i s a c t i v i t y by QUID ; and # 3 i s equal t o o r s l i g h t l y g r e a t e r than # 1. Functions, such as *AGEORIG i n t h e previous example are used t o provide a proce-

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d u r a l d e s c r i p t i o n o f how t o check a c o n d i t i o n . We can t h e r e b y implement s p e c i f i c strategies.

A t p r e s e n t , we have about 70 sentences and 200 r u l e s . The f u n c t i o n s a r e used above a l l t o d e s c r i b e l i n g u i s t i c p r o p e r t i e s r a t h e r t h a n semantic knowledge c o n c e r n i n g t h e area o f a p p l i c a t i o n . The t h r e e f e a t u r e s o f v a r i a b l e d e p t h p r o c e s s i n g can be found i n s i d e t h e c o n t e x t u a l p r o d u c t i o n r u l e s : gradual d e s c r i p t i o n by checking t h e d i f f e r e n t c o n d i t i o n s one a f t e r t h e o t h e r and by s t o p p i n g on demand ; l o c a l s t r a t e g i e s implemented by f u n c t i o n s , and general ones by t h e i n f e r e n c e module, c a l l e d RAISONNEUR ( c f . f i g . 2 ) ; e v a l u a t i o n c h e c k i n g on demand thanks t o t h e p l a u s i b i l i t y c a l c u l u s .

B. Modules o f t h e system Among t h e d i f f e r e n t modules, t h e i n f e r e n c e one i s by f a r t h e most i m p o r t a n t . I t i s one which uses c o n t e x t u a l p r o d u c t i o n r u l e s t o c o n v e r t t h e q u e s t i o n i n t o one o r s e v e r a l sentences, u n t i l t h e y can be r e t r i e v e d among t h o s e t h a t were s t o r e d i n i t i a l l y ( c f . example o f f i g . 1 ) . The f i r s t v e r s i o n o f t h e i n f e r e n c e module a p p l i e d a s i n g l e p r o c e d u r a l s t r a t e g y . We have extended i t t o i n t r o d u c e s e v e r a l o t h e r f a c i l i t i e s ( t o p down a n d / o r bottomup i n f e r e n c e , p r o v i d i n g a second chance by e r r o r d e t e c t i o n and c o r r e c t i o n , ) ; t h a t i s n o t enough. We i n t e n d t o implement more s t r a t e g i e s such as non r e s t r i c t i v e a n a l o g i c a l r e a s o n i n g : use o f a s s o c i a t i v e processes as i n t h e case o f semantic networks ( 6 ) ( 1 5 ) , a d a p t i n g a p r e v i o u s i n f e r e n c e used f o r a s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n ( 3 ) , etc.

...

The o t h e r modules i n t h e system ( c f . f i g . 2 ) p l a y a more l i n g u i s t i c r o l e : b u i l d i n g an i n c r e m e n t a l l e x i c o n , m o r p h o l o g i c a l p a r s i n g ; o r t a k i n g on a c o m p i l i n g t a s k . The v a r i a b l e d e p t h concept i s a l s o a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e s e processes. F o r example, t h e grammatical c a t e g o r y o f a word i n French can be approximated by examining i t s i n f l e c t i o n . I f we w i s h t o i n c r e a s e t h e p l a u s i b i l i t y o f t h e r e s u l t we can t h e n check i f t h e r o o t i s r e c o g n i z a b l e i n s i d e o t h e r words o f t h e l e x i c o n . T h i s proced u r e i s an o r i g i n a l one,that i s n o t found i n programs w h i c h s y s t e m a t i c a l l y use a l e x i c o n o f r o o t s , because t h e y work a t a f i x e d d e p t h ( 1 4 ) . Also, by i n t r o d u c i n g t h e concept o f v a r i a b l e d e p t h i n t o l i n g u i s t i c p r o c e s s i n g , t h e system becomes more homogeneous ; t h i s i s a l s o t r u e a t t h e s t r a t e g y l e v e l , i n o r d e r t o s e l e c t t h e aspects o f knowledge t h a t have t o be analysed more t h o r o u g h l y (e.g. s y n t a c t i c and semantic ones). I n c i d e n t a l l y , v a r i o u s p a r t s o f knowledge have n o t been p a r t i t i o n e d h e r e : a p p l i c a t i o n s - o r i e n t e d knowledge can be used i n s i d e a f u n c t i o n ; semantic o r s y n t a c t i c c o n d i t i o n s may be found i n s i d e t h e r e w r i t i n g r u l e s ; t h e mechanism o f t h e p r o d u c t i o n r u l e s can account f o r a grammatical t r a n s f o r m a t i o n as w e l l as f o r a d e d u c t i o n o r an analogy ; e t c .

C. Prospects

The p r e s e n t i n f e r e n c e module c u r r e n t l y runs on t h e b a s i s o f about f i f t e e n i t e m s : t h e q u e s t i o n , some sentences, some r u l e s . The s t r a t e g i e s we a r e d e v e l o p i n g s h o u l d improve i t s e f f i c i e n c y , i n p a r t i c u l a r we s h o u l d be a b l e t o process a l l sentences and r u l e s w i t h i n a l i m i t e d r u n t i m e ( a b o u t 10 seconds on an I B M 370/168). Another q u e s t i o n i s t h e c a p a c i t y o f e x t e n s i b i l i t y and p o r t a b i l i t y o f t h e system. We began w i t h a t e s t s e t o f 56 r u l e s , and t h i s number i s g r a d u a l l y extended t o about 200, i n o r d e r t o improve l i n g u i s t i c coverage ( 1 3 ) . Among these r u l e s , some a r e general enough t o be used f o r o t h e r a p p l i c a t i o n s . We b e l i e v e t h e e x p e r i e n c e

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A quel Ege un enfant tient ses jouets ? (How old i s a child when he s t a r t s holdinq his toys ?)

A # l un enfant tient ses jouets ( A # 1 old child holds his toys) *AGE(#l

*NOM(enfant)

( A # 1 o l d child holds his toy)

*PLUB(jouets,jouet! V

( A two month old child holds his r a t t l e )

Un enfant possbde p l u s i e u r s jouets

( A child has several toys)

Un hochet est un jouet ( A rattle is a toy)

Rl : A # 1 # Z

R2 : Un # I

->

A quel cige # 2 ? (*AGE(# 2) ) $50

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ses # 4

6 1 #Z

( *NOM(# 1I

(This rule transforms an affirmative sentence into an interrogative one)

$100

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$90

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&(*VERB(# 2 ) )

$SO

&(“PLUR(# 4 , # 3 ) )

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&(Un # 1 possbde p l u s i e u rs #4) R3 : # I

w #2

$80

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(Un # l est un # 2 )

(This r u l e generalises actions concerning an object owned by somebody t o other objects, should the individual owns several of these objects

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fig.1 : Example of an inference

(This rule s u b s t i t u t e s a class t o an element of i t . The p l a u s i b i l i t y i s low because t h i s transformation i s bold)

0 W P

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internal rules

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Understanding : A Variable-Depth Process

335

we have a c q u i r e d w i l l be f r u i t f u l when we r e w r i t e r u l e s f o r a n o t h e r f i e l d o f a p p l i c a t i o n , b u t t h e b e s t t h i n g t o do would be t o have a methodology. T h i s i s f a r from obvious : r u l e s and f u n c t i o n s a r e n o t as independent as we would l i k e them t o be ( 4 ) .

I V . CONCLUSION We f i r s t r e c a l l what we s a i d i n t h e foreword : t h e work d e s c r i b e d h e r e has no c l a i m t o be a model, n o t even a p a r t i a l one, o f human r e a s o n i n g a b i l i t i e s . What i s i t s significance ? F i r s t o f a l l - b u t t h i s i s r a t h e r commonplace- computers a r e a b l e t o p e r f o r m t r e a t ments o f n a t u r a l language which a r e n o t based o n dichoto;ies, whether s y n t a c t i c ( a c c e p t a b l e o r n o t ) o r semantic ( c o n s i s t e n t o r n o t w i t h t r u t h " ) . Then -and t h i s seems t o be more i m p o r t a n t f o r P s y c h o l o g i s t s - , t h e i d e a o f v a r i a b l e d e p t h p r o c e s s i n g excludes t h e n o t i o n o f canonical form, e i t h e r o f a sentence o r o f a t e x t . T h i s i s t h e fundamental i d e a : we b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s f e a t u r e i s t y p i c a l o f human-human communication processes, and t h a t any a t t e m p t o f human-machine i n t e r a c t i o n which i g n o r e s i t ( i . e . w h i c h o p e r a t e s a t f i x e d d e p t h ) i s doomed t o l e a v e t h e u s e r w i t h a t a s t e o f a r t e f a c t . I n o t h e r words, variable depth c o m n i c a t i o n i s i n o u r o p i n i o n a synonym f o r n a t u m l communication, and a r t i f i c i a l languages d i f f e r from n a t u r a l ones, because t h e y o n l y t o l e r a t e a s i n g l e l e v e l o f i n t e r p r e tation. L a s t l y - b u t t h i s i s o f l e s s importance t o P s y c h o l o g i s t s - , v a r i a b l e d e p t h can c e r t a i n l y be implemented t h r o u g h v a r i o u s ways on a computer. The t r i l o g y : c o n t e x t u a l p r o d u c t i o n r u l e s , n a t u r a l language t e x t s , f u n c t i o n s , i s t h e represent a t i o n s t r u c t u r e which f o r c e d i t s e l f upon us, once we had determined o u r const r a i n t s ( g r a d u a l d e s c r i p t i o n , p l u r a l i t y o f s t r a t e g i e s , e v a l u a t i o n o f approximat i o n s ) . No d o u b t t h a t , i n t h e f u t u r e , o t h e r d a t a s t r u c t u r e s w i l l appear t o be b e t t e r adapted t o t h e problem, and t h e r e a r e t h r e e reasons f o r t h i s : - t h e c u r r e n t experiment w i l l suggest improvements ; - t h e work i n t h e o r e t i c a l computer s c i e n c e w i l l open t h e range o f a v a i l a b l e d a t a s t r u c t u r e s , and w i l l a l l o w us t o p i c k something c l o s e r t o t h e requirements o f o u r model ; - t h e advances i n hardware ( p a r t o f t h e t r e a t m e n t becoming w i r e d ) w i l l m o d i f y t h e a n g l e under which t h e computational aspect o f t h e problem i s c u r r e n t l y considered. That i s t h e reason why n e i t h e r a success n o r a f a i l u r e i n o u r c u r r e n t experiment w i l l f i n a l l y a f f e c t t h e i d e a of v a r i a b l e d e p t h : t h e s i z e o f o u r t e s t i s small enough t o e s t a b l i s h , a t l e a s t v i r t u a l l y , a l i s t o f every"reasonab1e" q u e s t i o n and t o s t o r e t h i s l i s t w i t h t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g answers ; a success t h u s does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l y an advance towards comprehension ; c o n v e r s e l y , a f a i l u r e c o u l d happen owing t o a wrong c h o i c e among computer t o o l s , n o t t o t h e i d e a which has guided us. These thoughts m i g h t l o o k p a r a d o x i c a l : we have an idea, i t i s e m p i r i c a l l y t e s t a b l e , and however we c l a i m t h a t t h e r e s u l t o f t h e experiment, whether p o s i t i v e o r n e g a t i v e , w i l l n e i t h e r c o n f i r m n o r d i s c o n f i r m t h e i n i t i a l idea. F i r s t , l e t us n o t i c e t h a t t h i s paradox belongs t o e v e r y computational experiment c a r r i e d o u t u n t i l now : what m a t t e r s is t h e r e a d e r ' s i n t u i t i o n which l e a d s him o r h e r t o guess ( r i g h t l y o r w r o n g l y ) which experiments seem t o have general s i g n i f i c a n c e , because t h e y t a c k l e t h e r i g h t probZems. Our hope t h e n i s t h a t t h a t i s t h e r e a d e r ' s impression, and t h a t t h i s i m p r e s s i o n w i l l s t r e n g t h e n when we w i l l be a b l e t o show t h e f i n a l r e s u l t s o f t h e c u r r e n t experiment.

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(18) SCHANK R.C.

& ABELSON R.P. : S c r i p t s , goaZs, pZans and understanding. Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc. H i l l s d a l e , N.J. 1977.

(19) SHAFER G. : A mathematicat theory o f evidence. P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, New Jersey. 1976. (20) SHAPIRO S.C. : The MIND system : a data s t m c t u r e f o r semantic information processing. Report R-837-PR, Rand C o r p o r a t i o n . August 1971. (21) WILENSKY R. : Understanding goal-based s t o r i e s . Ph. D., Computer Science Dept. Yale U n i v e r s i t y , 1978. (22) WILKS Y. (23) WOODS W.A.

Tech. Rept. # 140,

: Parsing engilish. i n "Computational Semantic"(E.Charniak & Y.Wilks, eds.) N o r t h - H o l l a n x 1976. : What i s i n a l i n k : foundations f o r semantic networks. "Representation and Understanding" (D.Bobrow & A.Collins Academic Press I n c . , 1975.

, eds.)

(24) ZADEH L. : The concept of t i n g u i s t i c variabte and i t s apptication t o approximate reasononi. I n f o r m a t i o n Sciences. v o l . 8 : pp, 199-249 & 301-357 ; V O ~ . 9 : pp. 43-80. 1975.

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LANGUAGE AND COMPREHENSION

J.-F. Le Ny, W. Kintsch (editors) 0 North.Holland Publishing Company, 1982

339

QUESTION ANSWERING FOR NARRATIVE MEMORY Michael C. Dyer and Wendy G. L e h n e r t Computer Science Department Yale U n i v e r s i t y New Haven, C o n n e c t i c u t U.S.A.

BORIS r e p r e s e n t s t h e f i r s t system t o i n t e g r a t e t h e knowledge-based i n f e r e n c e t e c h n i q u e s of s c r i p t s . p l a n s , g o a l s , and themes, u i t h i n a s i n g l e n a r r a t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g program. T h i s paper d i s c u s s e s t e c h n i q u e s used by BORIS f o r memory r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and memory r e t r i e v a l . Emphasis i s p l a c e d on human q u e s t i o n answering a b i l i t i e s , An example and t h e h e u r i s t i c s needed t o s i m u l a t e t h e s e phenomena. n a r r a t i v e processed by BORIS i s d i s c u s s e d i n d e t a i l and used t o i l l u s t r a t e design features.

1. Introduction BORIS i s a language p r o c e s s i n g system designed to read n a r r a t i v e t e x t s and answer q u e s t i o n s a b o u t i t s i n p u t [Dyer. 1981al [Dyer. 1981bl [Dyer. 1 9 8 1 ~ 1[ L e h n e r t . Dyer, e t a l . . 19821 [Dyer and L e h n e r t . 19801 [Dyer. 19821. T h i s paper d i s c u s s e s Examples t e c h n i q u e s o f memory o r g a n i z a t i o n and r e t r i e v a l implemented i n BORIS. p r e s e n t e d h e r e w i l l be t a k e n from t h e f o l l o w i n g s t o r y : Kidnap S t o r y John l e f t h i s o f f i c e e a r l y F r i d a y a f t e r n o o n so he c o u l d a t t e n d a going-away p a r t y f o r h i s f r i e n d B i l l . B i l l had been t r a n s f e r r e d t o C a l i f o r n i a . When he a r r i v e d t h e r e were lots of people and p l e n t y o f beer. Three y e a r s ago B i l l had borrowed $50 from John u h i c h John He was a b o u t to remind B i l l hoped t o g e t back b e f o r e B i l l l e f t . a b o u t i t uhen he was c a l l e d t o t h e phone. I t was h i s w i f e . Mary. and she was h y s t e r i c a l . Mary had j u s t r e c e i v e d a c a l l from a s t r a n g e r who c l a i m e d t o have kidnapped t h e i r d a u g h t e r Susan. He s a i d he u o u l d c a l l a g a i n . John t o l d Mary t o s t a y a t home, keep o f f t h e phone. and w a i t u n t i l he got t h e r e . John d r o v e home immediately. J u s t a s he walked i n t h e d o o r . t h e phone rang. John p i c k e d i t up. B u t it was o n l y Karen, one o f Mary’s friends. John t o l d h e r Mary was o u t and hung up. Mary wanted t o c a l l t h e p o l i c e b u t John t h o u g h t t h e y s h o u l d w a i t . They were d i s c u s s i n g t h i s when Susan walked i n t h e d o o r . She had s t a y e d a f t e r school f o r a g y m n a s t i c s meet and t a k e n a l a t e bus home. N o t h i n g had happened t o h e r . I t was a l l a hoax. Some r e p r e s e n t a t i v e BORIS i n p u t / o u t p u t appears below. The q u e s t i o n s a r e v e r b a t i m i n p u t t o BORIS and t h e answers a r e v e r b a t i m computer o u t p u t .

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M.G. Dyer and W.G. Lehnert

91 : A1:

92 : A2 :

Why d i d John go t o t h e p a r t y ? He wanted t o have a good t i m e and he was B i l l ' s f r i e n d and he wanted t o g e t 50 d o l l a r s back from him. Why d i d John leave t h e p a r t y ? He was w o r r i e d about Susan.

93 : Why? A3 :

Susan was kidnapped.

94 : A4 :

What happened t o John a t t h e p a r t y ? He got a c a l l from Mary.

95 : Why d i d Mary c a l l John a t t h e p a r t y ? A5 :

She wanted to t e l l him a b o u t Susan's k i d n a p p i n g .

96 : Why d i d John want money from B i l l ? A6 :

He borrowed 50 do1 l a r s from him.

97 : Why d i d n ' t John t a l k t o B i l l ? A7 :

He was more w o r r i e d a b o u t Susan.

98 : A8 :

Who c a l l e d John a t home? Karen.

99 : A9 :

Why? She wanted t o t a l k t o Mary.

910:

Was Karen upset?

A10:

No, She d i d n o t know about Susan's k i d n a p p i n g

all:

D i d John k i d n a p Susan?

All:

No. He was h e r f a t h e r .

912: A12:

Where was Susan? She was a t t e n d i n g a gymnastics meet

913: A13:

What happened when Susan came home? John was r e l i e v e d t h a t she was s a f e .

2. Understanding Questions B e f o r e a q u e s t i o n can be answered. i t must f i r s t be understood. However. what ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g a q u e s t i o n ' means i s open t o i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Previous questionanswering systems developed a t Yale [Lehnert. 19781 adopted t h e g e n e r a l flow o f c o n t r o l shown i n diagram 0.1. Here, t h e conceptual a n a l y z e r has access t o semantic p r i m i t i v e s and e x p e c t a t i o n s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h words i n t h e l e x i c o n . These s t r u c t u r e s and processes a r e used t o b u i I d a language independent Conceptual Dependency (CD) s t r u c t u r e [Schank and Abelson. 19771 of t h e q u e s t i o n . Once t h e q u e s t i o n i s r e p r e s e n t e d , a search p r o c e s s examines memory f o r a c o n c e p t t h a t matches t h e c o n c e p t i n q u e s t i o n (diagram D . 2 ) . I f a match can be found, t h i s s t r u c t u r e i s d e s i g n a t e d as t h e answer key. Once t h e answer key has been l o c a t e d , r e t r i e v a l h e u r i s t i c s a p p r o p r i a t e f o r t h e conceptual q u e s t i o n t y p e a l l o w u s t o f i n d t h e conceptual answer. The conceptual answer can t h e n be passed o n t o a c o n c e p t u a l g e n e r a t o r t o e x p r e s s t h e answer i n some n a t u r a l language ( u s u a l l y E n g l i s h ) .

Question Answering for Narrative Memory

34 1

Phase I:

> ( i n English)

CD (question concept i n Conceptual Dependency)

LEXICON : g e n e r a l uord-based semantic e x p e c t a t i o n s

Diagram D.l Phase 11:

(question concept) EPISODIC MEMORY:

Diagram D.2 As o u t l i n e d above. p r e v i o u s systems r e l i e d o n a h i g h l y modular d i v i s i o n betueen t h e processes t h a t understand t h e q u e s t i o n and t h e processes t h a t f i n d an ansuer. T h i s d e s i g n s u g g e s t s t h a t q u e s t i o n s a r e understood w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o t h e m a t e r i a l o v e r which t h e y a r e b e i n g asked. B u t t h e f o l l o u i n g o b s e r v a t i o n s argue t h a t t h i s i s n o t t h e case. F i r s t , ue asked people t h e f o l l o u i n g q u e s t i o n a b o u t t h e k i d n a p story :

Q: Who c a l l e d John a b o u t t h e s t r a n g e r ' s k i d n a p p i n g ? A:

Mary d i d .

Then ue asked: Q: A:

Who c a l l e d John a b o u t Susan's k i d n a p p i n g ? Mary d i d .

Even uhen b o t h q u e s t i o n s a r e p r e s e n t e d 'back t o back" people f a i l t o n o t i c e t h e potential ambiguities. I n f a c t , ue had t o p o i n t o u t t o them t h a t ' s t r a n g e r ' s k i d n a p p i n g ' c o u l d mean e i t h e r t h a t t h e s t r a n g e r had been kidnapped, or t h a t t h e s t r a n g e r uas t h e k i d n a p p e r . L i k e u i s e , 'Susan's kidnapping' m i g h t mean Susan's k i d n a p p i n g of someone, or i t m i g h t mean Susan's k i d n a p p i n g by someone. Since people f a i l t o n o t i c e any p r e s u p p o s i t i o n v i o l a t i o n s i n t h e s e q u e s t i o n s , they uere e v i d e n t l y r e s o l v i n g t h e ambiguity as they uere understanding t h e question. B u t t h e r e i s n o s y n t a c t i c o r semantic knouledge u h i c h c o u l d disambiguate e i t h e r case. Only t h e e p i s o d i c i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e i n t h e s t o r y representation could achieve t h i s . S u b j e c t s uho r e a d t h e s t o r y kneu t h a t Susan uas t h e v i c t i m and t h e s t r a n g e r uas t h e c r i m i n a l . B u t i f s u b j e c t s access t h i s knowledge i n o r d e r t o disambiguate t h e q u e s t i o n , t h e n t h e y must be s e a r c h i n g

M.G. Dyer and W.G. Lehnert

342

episodic memory during question-understanding answering time).

time

(in

addition to question-

follows t h a t the parsing processes t h a t analyze the question should be integrated w i t h memory processes t h a t search the story representation. Consequently, BORIS takes the approach depicted i n diagram 0.3: It

Q u e s t i o n ---> ( i n English)

CONCEPTUAL ANALYZER and MEMORY SEARCH

LEXICON: genera I uord-based semantic e x p e c t a t i o n s

Phase 11: memory ---> p o i nt e r s

--->

CD (uith pointers to episodic

EPISODIC MEMORY: instantiated scripts, plans, goals ...

u F u r t h e r SEARCH i f needed)

--->

conceptual ansuer ( u h i c h references e p i s o d i c memory)

Diagram D.3 The most d r a m a t i c consequence of t h i s novel approach is: I n BORIS, the anewer to a question i s often known before the entire queetion hoe been understood. T h i s consequence i s a c t u a l l y q u i t e n a t u r a l . F o r i n s t a n c e . uhen people a r e asked the f o l loving question ( i n the context of the kidnapping story): Q: Who d i d Mary c a l l a t t h e p a r t y F r i d a y a f t e r n o o n ? t h e y commonly c l a i m t h a t t h e ansuer @John' came t o them t h e moment t h e y e i t h e r heard 'Who d i d Mary c a l l . . . ' . or by t h e t i m e t h e y heard '... a t t h e p a r t y ' . In f a c t , i t u o u l d be r a t h e r s t r a n g e for people t o r e f r a i n from s e a r c h i n g t h e i r s p e c i f i c memory of t h e e v e n t s i n q u e s t i o n u n t i l t h e e n t i r e q u e s t i o n had been @understood'. and o n l y t h e n s t a r t to u o r k on a n s u e r i n g it. T h i s more i n t e g r a t e d scheme has an advantage i n s o f a r as once an episode i n memory has been found. t h e i n f o r m a t i o n u i t h i n it can become a v a i l a b l e to a i d t h e understanding process. I n t h i s uay. 'Susan's k i d n a p p i n g ' i s disambiguated a t q u e s t i o n - u n d e r s t a n d i n g t i m e by n o t i c i n g t h a t Susan uas t h e v i c t i m of a k i d n a p p i n g as soon as t h e k i d n a p episode has been f o u n d .

3. Narrative Memory The process o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g a s t o r y r e s u l t s i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f an i n t e r n a l , conceptual r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f o r t h a t s t o r y . T h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n c o n s i s t s of tuo major components: 1) an e p i s o d i c memory f o r t h e n a r r a t i v e , u h i c h i n c l u d e s i n s t a n t i a t e d s c r i p t s , p l a n s , and g o a l s i n v o l v i n g t h e v a r i o u s c h a r a c t e r s and e v e n t s i n t h e s t o r y . and 2) i n d e x i n g s t r u c t u r e s u h i c h a l l o u r e t r i e v a l processes

Question Answering far Narrative Memory

343

access t o n a r r a t i v e memory. The s y s t e m ' s knowledge o f t h e n a r r a t i v e i s encoded as a c o n c e p t u a l graph composed o f memory nodes connected t o one a n o t h e r by a s e t of i n t e n t i o n a l l i n k s ( I - l i n k s ) . Each node r e p r e s e n t s t h e i n s t a n t i a t i o n of a s c r i p t ( i . e . e v e n t ) , p l a n , g o a l or CD s t r u c t u r e . 1-1i n k s (developed by Dyer) a r e u n i - d i r e c t i o n a l and c o n s t r a i n e d by t h e k i n d of nodes each may connect. These c o n s t r a i n t s a r e summarized i n diagram D . 4 . I - l i n k s a r e grouped i n t o p a i r s -- t h a t is. for each I - l i n k 'L. from node N1 t o N2, t h e r e i s a c o r r e s p o n d i n g I - l i n k 'L-by' from N2 t o N1. (E = e v e n t , G = g o a l ,

P

plan)

E

forces f o r c e d - by

E

G motivated-by E t hw a r t e d - by achieved-by

P realizes

E

E

motivates thwarts achieves

G

G suspends C suspended-by

P intended-by

C

E

r e a l ized-by P

G intends enab I es

p

enabled-by

p

------_- P

Diagram D.4 While t h e u l t i m a t e defense of any system o f semantic c a t e g o r i z a t i o n must depend on i t s u s e f u l n e s s i n p r o c e s s i n g , t h e i n t u i t i v e meaning t h a t each l i n k - p a i r i s i n t e n d e d t o c a p t u r e i s d e s c r i b e d below:

Goal Motivation -- S i n c e e v e n t s a r e a c t i o n s t h a t cause changes i n t h e s t a t e of t h e w o r l d . and s i n c e g o a l s a r e d e s c r i p t i o n s of d e s i r e d s t a t e s , t h e o c c u r r e n c e of an e v e n t may cause t h e c r e a t i o n o f goals i n t h e c h a r a c t e r s a f f e c t e d or i n v o l v e d i n t h a t e v e n t . F o r example, t h e k i d n a p p i n g o f Susan by t h e s t r a n g e r causes John t o want t o save Susan. T h i s i s r e p r e s e n t e d as: $KIDNAP0 -----motivates-----> <--motivated-by----

P-HEALTH0

Where P-HEALTH0 r e f e r s t o John's g o a l of p r e s e r v i n g Susan's h e a l t h .

Goal Failure -- J u s t as e v e n t s can m o t i v a t e g o a l s , t h e y can a l s o t h w a r t t h c achievement o f a g o a l . F o r example. when John t e l I s , K a r e n t h a t Mary i s n o t home, t h i s t h w a r t s K a r e n ' s g o a l o f communicating w i t h Mary: SPHONE2-TERM -----thwarts-----> <--thwa rted-by---

D-KNOW2

where 0-KNOW2 r e p r e s e n t s Karen's g o a l o f t e l l i n g something to Mary.

Goal Satisfaction

--

E v e n t s can a l s o b r i n g a b o u t s t a t e s t h a t a r e d e s i r e d by one i n the story. I n such cases, t h e e v e n t i s s a i d to have 'achieved. t h e g o a l . For example, once Mary f i n d s o u t a b o u t Susan's k i d n a p p i n g , she wants t o i n f o r m John. Mary c a l l s John a t t h e p a r t y and t e l l s him. Her g o a l i s achieved by t h e s u c c e s s f u l c o m p l e t i o n of a phone c a l l :

or more c h a r a c t e r s

344

M.G. Dyer and W.G. Lehnert

$PHONE0 ----achieves----> c--achieved-by--

0-KNOW0

-- Whenever a c r i s i s g o a l o r h i g h p r i o r i t y g o a l i s m o t i v a t e d by g o a l - h o l d e r may t e m p o r a r i l y d r o p h i s c u r r e n t l y a c t i v e g o a l s i n t o t h e more i m p o r t a n t g o a l . When John f i n d s o u t t h a t Susan has he q u i t s t h i n k i n g about e n j o y i n g t h e p a r t y or g e t t i n g h i s money T h i s s i t u a t i o n i s r e p r e s e n t e d by m a r k i n g each g o a l as b e i n g c r i s i s goal:

GoalSuepension some event, t h e order to attend been kidnapped, back from B i l l . suspended by t h e

P-HEALTH0 ----suspends----> {E-ENTERTAIN0 ,D-CONTO) <--suspended-by--

--

Event Realization

When p l a n s a r e a c t u a l l y executed t h e y b r i n g a b o u t (or h e l p

t o b r i n g about) t h e o c c u r r e n c e of e v e n t s . F o r example, t h e phone c a l l t h a t John r e c e i v e s a t t h e p a r t y i s t h e d i r e c t r e s u l t o f Mary's p l a n to phone him:

PLAY-CALLER0 ----realizes----> <--realized-by--

$PHONE0

PLAY-CALLER0 i n s t a n t i a t e s a p l a n u h i c h c o n t a i n s i n f o r m a t i o n about hou t o make a phone c a l l , such as: f i n d i n g t h e number to d i a l , d i a l i n g , l i s t e n i n g t o t h e d i a l tone, saying 'hello', a s k i n g f o r t h e person b e i n g c a l l e d , e t c . Many of t h e s e 'plans' a r e i n f a c t e v e n t sequences d e f i n e d by s c r i p t r o l e s . T h i s i s a l u a y s t h e case uhen t h e e v e n t r e a l i z e d i s a s c r i p t i n s t a n t i a t i o n .

-- Once a c h a r a c t e r has an a c t i v e g o a l , t h a t c h a r a c t e r may a t t e m p t t o s a t i s f y t h a t g o a l by means o f a p l a n uhose e x e c u t i o n i s i n t e n d e d t o a c h i e v e i t . For example, a t one p o i n t Mary has a goal of n o t i f y i n g t h e p o l i c e . Her intended p l a n i s t o c a l l them:

Plan Intention

D-KNOW4 ----intends----> PLAY-CALLER4 <--intended-by-I t d o e s n ' t m a t t e r t h a t Mary never a c t u a l l y executes t h i s p l a n .

I n f a c t , it i s i m p o r t a n t t o be a b l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h p l a n s as i n t e n t i o n s - t o - a c t from p l a n s a s t h e e x e c u t i o n - o f - a c t i o n s i n t h e s e r v i c e of a g o a l . I f Mary had a c t u a l l y c a l l e d t h e p o l i c e , t h e n D-KNOW4 u o u l d a l s o have achievement l i n k s c o n n e c t i n g i t to a $phone i n s t a n t i a t i o n and t h e r e u o u l d be a r e a l i z a t i o n s l i n k from PLAY-CALLER to t h e i n s t a n t i a t e d $PHONE s c r i p t .

-- Many t i m e s , b e f o r e a p l a n can be executed, t h e r e a r e enablement c o n d i t i o n s u h i c h must be s a t i s f i e d . F o r example. John can n o t e n j o y t h e p a r t y s i m p l y by h a v i n g been i n v i t e d to it. John has to a c t u a l l y be a t t h e This p a r t y . ( O t h e r v i s e he c o u l d s t a y a t t h e o f f i c e and e n j o y t h e p a r t y t h e r e . ) p r e c o n d i t i o n on E-ENTERTAIN [ p a r t y ] s e t s up a sub-goal of 0-PROX. uhich r e p r e s e n t s John's g o a l o f b e i n g a t t h e p a r t y . T h i s ' d e l t a prox' ( i . e . change i n p r o x i m i t y ) w i l l i t s e l f s e t up some intended p l a n b . g . PLAY-DRIVER) uhose execution u i l l s a t i s f y t h i s precondition:

Plan Enablement

D-PROXO ----enables----> E-ENTERTAIN0 c--enabled-by-0-PROXO ----intends----> UNSPECIFIED PTRANS <--intended-by-Notice,

in this

representational

system,

t h a t plans do n o t d i r e c t l y achieve

Question Answering for Narrative Memory

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goals. R a t h e r , t h e e x e c u t i o n o f an i n t e n d e d p l a n may b r i n g a b o u t (or h e l p t o b r i n g a b o u t ) t h e o c c u r r e n c e o f an e v e n t . The f a c t t h a t an e v e n t h a s o c c u r r e d may t h e n r e s u l t i n s a t i s f y i n g some c h a r a c t e r ’ s g o a l . T h e r e a r e s e v e r a l r e a s o n s for s e t t i n g t h i n g s up i n t h i s way:

1. Memory c a n k e e p t r a c k o f t h e s t a t u s o f any g o a l or p l a n s i m p l y by c h e c k i n g these intentional l i n k s . I f a g o a l h a s been marked m o t i v a t e d , su sp e n d e d , a n d a c h i e v e d , t h e n memory knows t h e ’ l i f e ’ of t h a t g o a l . F o r e xa m p l e , Jo h n ’ s g o a l of g e t t i n g $ 5 0 from B i l l i s f i r s t m o t i v a t e d and t h e n l e f t i n a s t a t e o f s u s p e n s i o n , w h i l e M a r y ’ s p l a n t o c a l l t h e p o l i c e n e v e r g e t s p a s t t h e s t a t e of an i n t e n t i o n . 2. Memory c a n d i s t i n g u i s h t h e i n t e n t i o n t o a c h i e v e a g o a l from t h e i n t e n t i o n t o execute a p l a n t o achieve a g o a l . T h i s i s i m p o r t a n t i n t h e case o f f o r t u i t o u s l y achieved g o a l s . I n such cases t h e e v e n t which achieves a goal i s n o t r e a l i z e d by t h e p l a n t h a t was i n t e n d e d by t h e g o a l h o l d e r . F o r example, Jo h n h a s t h e g o a l of a c q u i e s i n g t o t h e s t r a n g e r ’ s e x p e c t e d ransom demands. However. Susan w a l k s i n and and J o h n ’ s g o a l t o s a v e Susan h a s been a c h i e v e d . B u t Jo h n i s s u r p r i s e d . Why? The a n s w e r seems o b v i o u s enough, b u t how d o we c a p t u r e o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h i s situation? J o h n ’ s g o a l h a s been a c h i e v e d by Su sa n ’ s a r r i v a l , w h i c h ue r e p r e s e n t as: $ARRIVE-HOME1 ----achieves----> <--ach ieved-by--

P-HEALTH0

However. J o h n ’ s p l a n , t h a t was i n t e n d e d t o s a t i s f y h i s P-HEALTH0 g o a l , h a d n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f S u s a n ’ s a r r i v a l home. T h a t i s why Jo h n i s surprised. By u s i n g t h e scheme p r e s e n t e d h e r e , w e c a n r e p r e s e n t t h i s s t a t e of affairs.

Natural Events -- F i n a l l y , some c a u s e - e f f e c t reasoning. F o r example, represented as:

r e l a t i o n s do n o t i n v o l v e mental i f a n e a r t h q u a k e makes a b u i l d i n g f a l l down. it i s

$EARTHQUAKE0 -----forces-----> <--forced-by-----

$COLLAPSE0

These 1-1i n k s a r e d e s i g n e d t o c a p t u r e t h e c a u s e - e f f e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t a r i s e when n a t u r a l f o r c e s o p e r a t e i n t h e w o r l d w h i c h a r e n o t m e d i a t e d by p l a n s or goals. Since natural forces do n o t occur i n t h e kidnap story, they w i l l n o t be mentioned f u r t h e r . D i a g r a m D . 5 c o n t a i n s a s i m p l i f i e d g r a p h i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f e p i s o d i c memory f o r t h e f i r s t f e w s e n t e n c e s of t h e k i d n a p s t o r y . Some p o i n t s of i n t e r e s t r e g a r d i n g diagram D . 5 a r e d i s c u s s e d below:

- J o h n ’ s d - p r o x g o a l of b e i n g n e a r B i l l ( i n o r d e r to s a y ‘goodbye’ t o B i l l and t o ask B i I I f o r t h e $50). and o f b e i n g a t t h e p a r t y , a r e o n e and t h e same g o a l . T h i s c a n o n l y be r e a l i z e d by h a v i n g b u i l t a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of B i 11’s g o a l structure. John knows t h a t B i I I w i l l a l s o w a n t t o be a t t h e p a r t y i n o r d e r t o e n j o y h i m s e l f . O t h e r w i s e . i t w o u l d make n o s e n s e f o r Jo h n t o go to t h e p a r t y i n o r d e r t o o b t a i n t h e money owed.

- The c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n B i l l ’ s g o i n g t o C a l i f o r n i a and t h e e x i s t e n c e of a p a r t y l i e s w i t h t h e r e a s o n s f o r why B i l l ’ s f r i e n d s h a v e d e c i d e d t o t h r o w t h e p a r t y . T h i s i s r e p r e s e n t e d h e r e a s a P-FRIENDSHIP g o a l ( p r e s e r v e o n e ’ s f r i e n d s h i p w i t h someone) o n t h e p a r t o f B i l l ’ s f r i e n d s . Thus, some ( u n m e n ti o n e d ) f r i e n d s of B i l l have t h r o w n a p a r t y f o r B i l l i n o r d e r to e x p r e s s t h e i r f r i e n d s h i p for him. g i v e n

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M.G. Dyer and W.G. Lehnert

E p i s o d i c Memory tuo-uay I i n k abbreviations:

i I P: PLAY-HOST <send G : P-FRIENDSHIP i n v i t a t i o n s , etc.> f r i e n d s of B i l l

r

--

t

--

realization thuarting s suspension m -- m o t i v a t i o n i -- i n t e n t i o n r e V a r i o u s e v e n t s have happened to John: enablement __________________------------------___________________-----------------a achievement

ml

I

--

---

I

E: $PARTY0 John i n v i t e d

E: $JOB-TRANSFER

E: SBORROUO

C : E-ENTERTAIN0

C: P-FRIENDSHIP0

C : D-CONTO [$501 I

ml

.I

P: PLAY-GUEST0 ( l o c John = toc p a r t 1 B i l l i n v i t e d also: ------------------

Dl

S

P: INFORM-REASON0 (loc John = loc B i l l )

I

ARTY

G: E-ENTERTAIN m

B

C : P-FRIENDS

I

I eLC:

P-HEALTH0 (John u o r r i e d a b o u t Susan)

DTPROX

il

C:

k Bill]

J 2

P: PTRANS

rl

E : $ARRIVE-PARTY 1

P: PLAY-ARRIVE-PARTYO (ptrans)

rl

B

-

E: $ARRIVE-PARTY0 < l o c John = l o c p a r t y >

Diagram D.6 t h a t t h e y u o n ’ t be s e e i n g him as o f t e n i n t h e f u t u r e . P l a y i n g t h e r o l e of h o s t ( s ) i n a $PARTY s c r i p t i s r e p r e s e n t e d by e x e c u t i n g a PLAY-HOST p l a n , u h i c h c o n t a i n s i n f o r m a t i o n about hou one r e a l i z e s a p a r t y . One a c t i o n i n t h i s p l a n i n v o l v e s s e n d i n g o u t i n v i t a t i o n s to g u e s t s . T h i s a c t i o n r e a l i z e s t h e e v e n t of John’s b e i n g i n v i t e d to t h e p a r t y , u h i c h i s r e p r e s e n t e d as $PARTY0 u i t h John bound t o t h e r o l e of GUEST.

-

S i n c e t h e s t o r y does n o t s p e c i f y hou John got t o t h e p a r t y . h i s p l a n for g e t t i n g t h e r e i s r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e p r i m i t i v e CD a c t of PTRANS. u h i c h c a p t u r e s t h e n o t i o n of change i n l o c a t i o n u i t h o u t s p e c i f y i n g hou t h i s was accomplished.

4. Memory Retrieval I n t h e p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n ue sou hou I - l i n k s a r e used to r e p r e s e n t c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n s i n n a r r a t i v e memory. I - l i n k s also p e r f o r m a fundamental r o l e i n d i r e c t i n g memory s e a r c h and r e t r i e v a l . BORIS makes use of 14 p r i m i t i v e r e t r i e v a l f u n c t i o n s , each based on t r a v e r s i n g an I - l i n k . These r e t r i e v a l f u n c t i o n s a r e

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l i s t e d i n diagram D.6. and a r e used by BORIS t o answer q u e s t i o n s a b o u t n a r r a t i v e s . What follows i s a d i s c u s s i o n of each r e t r i e v a l f u n c t i o n , a l o n g w i t h examples o f i t s use i n t h e k i d n a p s t o r y :

RETRIEVAL FUNCTION

INPUT event goa I plan goa I plan goa I goa I goa I event goa I event plan event goa I

M o t i v a t e d Coal Event Motivation Coal I n t e n t i o n Intended Plan Coal P r e c o n d i t i o n Enabled P l a n Suspending Coal Suspended Coal Ach i eved Coa I Event Achievement Plan Realization Rea I i zed Event Thwarted Coa I T h w a r t i n g Event

OUTPUT

LINK TRAVERSED

goa I event goa I plan goa I plan goe I goa 1 goa I event plan event goa I event

motivates motivated-by i ntended-by intends enabled-by enables suspended-by suspends achieves achieved-by rea 1 ized-by re8 I izes thwarts thwarted-by

Diagram D.6

-- Given an e v e n t and a c h a r a c t e r i n v o l v e d i n t h a t event, people a r e a b l e t o r e c a l l t h e g o a l s t h a t were i n i t i a t e d by t h e e v e n t .

Motivated Goal Retrieval Q: A: Q: A:

How d i d t h e k i d n a p p i n g a f f e c t John? I t made him worry a b o u t h i s daughter’s s a f e t y . How d i d B i l l ’ s loan a f f e c t John? I t made him want h i s money back.

-- Given a goal on t h e p a r t o f a s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r , people can remember t h e e v e n t which gave r i s e t o t h a t g o a l .

Event MotivationRetrieval

0: A:

Why was John concerned a b o u t Susan? Because she had been kidnapped.

Q: A:

Why d i d John want $50 f r o m B i l l ? Because B i l l had borrowed $50 from John.

-- Given a c h a r a c t e r ’ s p l a n of a c t i o n , memory can r e t r i e v e t h e g o a l which t h i s p l a n i s intended t o a c h i e v e . F o r example:

Goal Intention Retrieval

0: Why d i d Susan t a k e a bus? A:

To g e t home.

-- Given a c h a r a c t e r ’ s g o a l . memory can r e t r i e v e t h e p l a n of a c t i o n intended by t h e c h a r a c t e r to achieve t h a t g o a l . F o r example, once we r e c a l l John’s goal t o be a t home, we a r e t h e n i n a p o s i t i o n t o t r y t o remember t h e p l a n John used to g e t home:

Intended Plan Retrieval

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0: A:

p: A:

How d i d John g e t home? He d r o v e . How was t h e s t r a n g e r g o i n g to g e t money? By k i d n a p p i n g Susan.

The l a s t q u e s t i o n above concerns r e t r i e v i n g a p l a n t h a t was i n t e n d e d t o accomplish a g o a l , b u t which was never a c t u a l l y invoked (or completed). The " g o i n g t o D i n t h e q u e s t i o n i n f o r m s u s t h a t t h e g o a l was never achieved. This i n f o r m a t i o n i s used by processes t r y i n g t o i n s t a n t i a t e a g o a l of t h e s t r a n g e r ' s . Once t h i s g o a l has been i n s t a n t i a t e d , intended p l a n r e t r i e v a l can be invoked t o r e c a l l t h e p l a n t h a t was b e i n g used by t h e s t r a n g e r . Many Dhowm t y p e q u e s t i o n s a r e ambiguous. "HowD may r e q u e s t e i t h e r a) t h e manner i n which an a c t was performed, or b) t h e p l a n t h a t was used t o r e a l i z e some e v e n t b r o u g h t a b o u t by t h e a c t i n q u e s t i o n . The way i n which a .howm q u e s t i o n i s answered. t h e r e f o r e , depends on t h e access r o u t e used. F o r example, when p e o p l e were asked: Q: How d i d Karen t a l k t o John? A : By phone.

t h e y tended t o answer by s u p p l y i n g t h e p l a n a t t e m p t e d by Karen t o a c h i e v e h e r goal o f t a l k i n g t o Mary. However, when people were asked:

9: How d i d John t a l k

t o Karen?

A: Abruptly.

t h e y tended t o answer by s u p p l y i n g t h e manner i n which John spoke to Karen t o g e t h e r o f f t h e phone. What i s c a u s i n g t h i s d i f f e r e n c e i n response? The answer l i e s w i t h who i n i t i a t e d t h e e v e n t i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e . Since the f i r s t question f o c u s e s on Karen, and s i n c e Karen had t h e goal t h a t i n i t i a t e d h e r c a l l , it i s r e l a t i v e l y s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d t o access t h e p l a n she used t o a t t e m p t to a c h i e v e h e r g o a l . On t h e o t h e r hand, when t h e f o c u s i s on John, s e a r c h processes d o n o t f i n d t h a t John had t h e g o a l of t a l k i n g t o Karen. Thus, t h e manner i n which John t a l k s t o Karen i s r e t r i e v e d .

Goal Precondition Retrieval -- Given a p l a n , memory can r e t r i e v e a sub-goal whose achievement i s necessary b e f o r e t h e p l a n can be executed. p: What d i d John have to d o b e f o r e he c o u l d remind B i l l A:

a b o u t t h e money? John had t o g e t t o t h e p a r t y .

Enabled Plan Retrieval -- Given a g o a l , memory can r e t r i e v e t h e p l a n t h a t s e r v e s the goal.

Q:

Why d i d John want t o be a t home?

A:

To be a b l e to r e c e i v e t h e s t r a n g e r ' s demands.

Q: Why d i d Mary want A:

to l e t John know a b o u t t h e k i d n a p p i n g ?

To g e t John's h e l p .

Suspending Goal Retrieval

-- When people remember a suspended g o a l , t h e y can r e c a l l t h e h i g h e r p r i o r i t y g o a l which caused t h e suspension t o o c c u r .

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0: A:

349

Why d i d n ’ t John remind B i l l about t h e $50? Because John was w o r r i e d a b o u t Susan.

Suspended Goal Retrieval -- When p e o p l e r e c a l l a c r i s i s g o a l . t h e y can o f t e n r e c a l l t h o s e g o a l s which had p r e v i o u s l y been a c t i v e b e f o r e t h e i r suspension by the c r i s i s .

0: A:

How d i d t h e k i d n a p p i n g i n t e r f e r e w i t h John? John d i d n ’ t remind B i l l a b o u t t h e $50.

Achieved Goal Retrieval

--

Given an e v e n t , memory can r e t r i e v e t h e goat which

t h a t e v e n t achieved.

0: A:

What happened when t h e phone r a n g at t h e p a r t y ? John found o u t a b o u t Susan’s k i d n a p p i n g .

Here t h e phone c a l l a t t h e p a r t y a c h i e v e s n a r y ’ s g o a l of t e l l i n g John a b o u t t h e kidnapping.

-- When people r e c a l I an achieved g o a l , t h e y a r e a b l e t o r e c a l l t h e e v e n t t h a t achieved t h a t g o a l .

Event Achievement Retrieval

0: A:

Why was John r e l i e v e d ? Because Susan came home.

N o t i c e t h a t t h i s e v e n t can be r e c a l l e d even though it was n o t caused by any p l a n of John’s. T h i s s u g g e s t s t h a t e v e n t s a c h i e v i n g g o a l s have d i r e c t a s s o c i a t i o n s w i t h those goals.

Plan Realization Retrieval -- I f an e v e n t was caused by a c h a r a c t e r e x e c u t i n g some p l a n . t h e n people a r e a b l e t o r e c a l l t h e p l a n which r e a l i z e d t h a t e v e n t .

0: A:

How come t h e phone r a n g a t t h e p a r t y ? Mary was c a l l i n g John.

Realired Event Retrieval -- When p e o p l e remember t h e p l a n t h a t some c h a r a c t e r used i n t h e s t o r y . t h e y a r e a b l e to t h e n r e c a l l any e v e n t which came a b o u t as a consequence of t h a t p l a n ’ s r e a l i z a t i o n .

0: A:

What happened when Mary c a l l e d t h e p a r t y ? John r e c e i v e d t h e c a l l .

-- I f p e o p l e r e c a l I an e v e n t which t h w a r t e d some c h a r a c t e r ’ s g o a l , t h e y w i l l be a b l e to r e c a l l t h a t f a i l e d g o a l .

Thwarted Goal Retrieval

0: How d i d John’s l i e a f f e c t Karen? A:

Karen was n o t a b l e to t a l k to Mary.

-- I f people r e c a l l a g o a l t h a t f a i l e d , t h e n t h e y w i l l remember t h e e v e n t which caused t h i s g o a l to be t h w a r t e d .

Thwarting Event Retrieval

0: A:

Why d i d n ’ t Karen g e t to t a l k t o Mary? Because John t o l d Karen t h a t n a r y wasn’t home.

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M.G. Dver and W.G. Lehnert

More c o m p l i c a t e d r e t r i e v a l f u n c t i o n s i n BORIS a r e made up by c o m b i n i n g t h e s t a n d a r d r e t r i e v a l f u n c t i o n s mentioned above. F o r a d i s c u s s i o n of these. see [Dyer and L e h n e r t . 19801 [Dyer. 19821. I n a d d i t i o n t o s e a r c h h e u r i s t i c s based on I - l i n k t r a v e r s a l , BORIS makes use of o t h e r memory s t r u c t u r e s . Some of t h e s e are discussed i n the next section.

6. Access Structures The n a r r a t i v e memory d i s c u s s e d above i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t a l o n e . I n a d d i t i o n t h e r e must e x i s t access s t r u c t u r e s which allow processes i n i t i a l e n t r y i n t o n a r r a t i v e memory. One o b v i o u s c a n d i d a t e f o r use as an access s t r u c t u r e i s t h e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n n e t (d-net) [Feigenbaum and Feldman. 19631. F o r i n s t a n c e , one c o u l d s e t up a d - n e t each of whose 'leaves' would p o i n t t o some node i n e p i s o d i c memory. Answer k e y s t o q u e s t i o n s would t h e n be found s i m p l y by u s i n g t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i n each q u e s t i o n t o t r a c e a p a t h t h r o u g h t h e n e t to a leaf. An example of one such d - n e t i s presented i n Diagram D.7. SCRIPT ?

//I / .. I .. \ $party

/

$phone

I I

Skidnap

\

ACTOR ?

/ I \ . . Mary . . . Karen /

jlohn

\

pol ice

\ $PHONE0

$PHONE3

$PHONE2

Diagram D.7 The way t h i s d - n e t m i g h t work i s as follows: Suppose we a r e asked:

Q: D i d Mary c a l l John a t t h e p a r t y ? Once we have parsed t h i s q u e s t i o n i n t o i t s semantic c o n s t i t u e n t s : < s c r i p t = $phone.

a c t o r = Mary,

o b j e c t = John>

we c o u l d t h e n use t h e d-net above to r e t r i e v e $PHONE0 as an answer key. Thus. a d-net c o u l d s e r v e as a s t r u c t u r e which ' s i t s on t o p o f ' e p i s o d i c memory and a c t s as a g e n e r a l access mechanism. Since, a t f i r s t g l a n c e , t h i s g e n e r a l mechanism seems t o work so well. we must e x p l a i n why it i s n o t used by BORIS.

6.1 Why Discrimination Nets Are Inadequate There a r e s e v e r a l answering:

reasons why d-nets

The Cafcgorirafion Problem:

a r e inadequate i n t h e a r e a of q u e s t i o n -

I f we use a d-net. we must t h e n d e c i d e which d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s w i l l be made f i r s t (for these, by d e f i n i t i o n , w i l l be t h e most important). F o r instance. i n Diagram 0.7 we chose s c r i p t s as t h e i n i t i a l c a t e g o r y for d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . The n e x t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s i n v o l v e d t h e a c t o r , and

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t h e n t h e o b j e c t . Houever ue gave no reason uhy t h e d - n e t c o u l d n ' t have been s e t up t o d i s c r i m i n a t e i n i t i a l l y on t h e b a s i s of some o t h e r c a t e g o r y (e.g. t h e a c t o r , t h e o b j e c t , t h e a c t o r ' s g o a l , e m o t i o n a l s t a t e . on s c e n a r i o ) . Simply stated, t h e ' C a t e g o r i z a t i o n Problem' u i t h r e s p e c t to d - n e t s c o n s i s t s of t h e f o l l o u i n g observation : Whichever c a t e g o r y ue choose for t h e i n i t i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , t h e r e s u l t i n g d - n e t n i l 1 f a i l to u o r k f o r those q u e s t i o n s s e e k i n g an ansuer i n v o l v i n g t h a t v e r y same c a t e g o r y . T h i s problem n i l 1 o c c u r a t e v e r y l e v e l u i t h i n t h e d-net. F o r i n s t a n c e , i f t h e d - n e t uses s c r i p t s as a d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c a t e g o r y , n i l 1 f a i l t o h a n d l e such q u e s t i o n s as:

then it

What uas Susan d o i n g ? What happened betueen John and B i l l t h r e e y e a r s ago? T h i s f a i l u r e o c c u r s because t h e d-net i s r e l y i n g on h a v i n g a SCRIPT as a means of pathing i n t o the story. I t can n o t v e r y u e l l be expected to h a n d l e q u e s t i o n s u h i c h leave o u t any m e n t i o n of a s c r i p t . Alternatively, i f ue s e t up a d-net to use t h e ACTOR as a d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c a t e g o r y , t h e n i t n i l 1 be i n c a p a b l e o f h a n d l i n g t h e s e k i n d s of q u e s t i o n s : Who c a l l e d John a t t h e p a r t y ? Who d r o v e home? Who b o r r o u e d $50 from B i I I? u h i c h seek t h e a c t o r i n v o l v e d . Again, i f ue choose to d i s c r i m i n a t e o f f of t h e OBJECT or SCENARIO, t h e n ue u o n ' t be a b l e to use t h i s n e t on t h e f o l l o u i n g k i n d s of q u e s t i o n s : Who d i d Karen c a l l ? Where was Susan? Consequently, d - n e t s f a i l as a g e n e r a l access mechanism.

The Combinatorie Problem:

One approach to t h e C a t e g o r i z a t i o n Problem i n v o l v e s u s i n g many d i s c r i m i n a t i o n n e t s to c r e a t e m u l t i p l e i n d e x i n g . The p r o b l e m u i t h t h i s approach a r i s e s from t h e c o m b i n a t o r i c e x p l o s i o n of p a t h s i n t h e d - n e t s . A p a t h u h i c h d i s c r i m i n a t e s o v e r . say. SCRIPTS and t h e n ACTORS must, i n some o t h e r p l a c e , be making e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s , e x c e p t t h i s t i m e o v e r actors before d i s c r i m i n a t i n g over s c r i p t s . I n g e n e r a l . f o r any p a t h we g e t a redundancy of n ! f o r a t r e e of d e p t h n. as d e p i c t e d i n Diagram D.8 f o r n = 2. SCRIPT

ACTOR

/

/ SCRPIT

/ sl

a1

I I

a2

SCRIPT

\

a3

\

SCRP IT

/

/ sl

/ \

\

s2

ACTOR

/ \ / I \ s3 sl s3 sl s3 a1 a2 a3 Diagram D.8 \

I

s3 \ ACTOR

/ I

a1

a2

\

a3

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M.G. Dyer and W.G. Lehnert

As can be seen i n t h i s diagram, i n o r d e r t o be a b l e to d i s c r i m i n a t e o v e r e i t h e r t h e a c t o r or t h e s c r i p t , we have t o double t h e number of e q u i v a l e n t p a t h s i n t h e nets.

The Closure Problem: F i n a l l y . d-nets s i m p l y f a i I

to t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t c e r t a i n k i n d s of q u e s t i o n s . T h i s i s because d-nets assume t h a t each episode i n t h e s t o r y w i l l e x i s t somewhere i n t h e n e t as a l e a f . T h i s ' c l o s u r e ' assumption, however. i s v i o l a t e d by t h e f o l l o w i n g t y p e s of q u e s t i o n s :

-

Q u e s t i o n s which ask about e v e n t s t h a t never happened i n t h e s t o r y : Why d i d n ' t John t a l k to B i l l ? Why wasn't Karen w o r r i e d ?

People can answer t h e s e k i n d s of q u e s t i o n s w i t h no t r o u b l e , y e t how can we s e t up c a t e g o r i e s for d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s which i n v o l v e n o n - e x i s t e n t e v e n t s ?

- Q u e s t i o n s whose

presuppositions v i o l a t e the story:

Why d i d Karen want to t a l k to John? Why d i d John c a l l t h e p o l i c e ? Again, people a r e p r e t t y good a t n o t i c i n g when a q u e s t i o n ' s assumptions a r e i n v i o l a t i o n w i t h what happened i n t h e s t o r y . Yet they are able t o r e c a l l a p p r o p r i a t e e v e n t s so as t o be a b l e to c o r r e c t and comment on t h e s e presupposition v i o l a t i o n s . U i t h a d - n e t , however. such q u e s t i o n s w i l l s i m p l y f a i l t o p a t h t o any l e a f i n t h e n e t .

-

V e r i f i c a t i o n q u e s t i o n s which have n e g a t i v e answers: D i d Mary c a l l Karen? D i d John k i d n a p Susan?

These k i n d s of q u e s t i o n s a r e s i m i l a r to p r e s u p p o s i t i o n v i o l a t i o n q u e s t i o n s . However, t h e y pose a problem for a g e n e r a l d-net mechanism. Given t h e q u e s t i o n , 'Did John k i d n a p Susan?'. w i t h which d - n e t (or where i n a s i n g l e d-net) d o we s t a r t ? As we have c u r r e n t l y d e f i n e d t h e d-net mechanism, we would o n l y be a b l e t o answer 'NO.' by f a i l i n g to f i n d a p a t h t o a l e a f i n a l l of t h e n e t s . But people a r e u s u a l l y good a t augmenting a n e g a t i v e answer w i t h an e l a b o r a t i o n which i n d i c a t e s WHY t h e y know t h e answer to be n e g a t i v e . The Q/A example below shows a common answer people g i v e to t h i s q u e s t i o n :

0: A:

D i d John k i d n a p Susan? No. F a t h e r s d o n ' t k i d n a p t h e i r own d a u g h t e r s .

T h i s answer does n o t seem to i n v o l v e a g e n e r a l d-net,mechanism i n o p e r a t i o n . T h i s i s n o t to say t h a t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s a r e u s e l e s s . I n f a c t , many forms of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a r e a necessary p a r t of any model i n v o l v i n g c o g n i t i v e processes. The p r o l i f e r a t i o n of t h e LISP COND ( i t s e l f a d-net!) i s p r o o f enough of t h i s . We a r e s i m p l y s a y i n g t h a t d-nets f a i l , as a g e n e r a l mechanism. i n h a n d l i n g memory s e a r c h processes. So what i s t h e a l t e r n a t i v e ?

To f i n d t h e answer. we have been s t u d y i n g what p e o p l e do, how people s e a r c h t h e i r memory i n a n s w e r i n g d i f f e r e n t q u e s t i o n s a b o u t v a r i o u s e v e n t s i n a s t o r y . We hope to d i s c o v e r t h e o r g a n i z i n g p r i n c i p l e s t h a t p e o p l e use and t h e n model s e a r c h / r e t r i e v a l h e u r i s t i c s based on t h o s e s t r a t e g i e s . There a r e some i m p o r t a n t

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consequences to t h i s approach:

- Such a program w i l l e x h i b i t t h e same r e c a l l t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e way p e o p l e r e c a l I s t o r i e s t h e y have r e a d . T h i s means t h a t t h e program w i I I produce answers which a r e sometimes i n c o r r e c t o r incomplete.

- Such a program w i l l o c c a s i o n a l l y g i v e c o n f l i c t i n g responses, people change t h e i r minds, by f i r s t s a y i n g 'Yes'. same q u e s t i o n . F o r i n s t a n c e :

Q: A:

and t h e n 'NO'

such a s when i n answer to t h e

Who kidnapped Susan? The s t r a n g e r d i d . . . No. W a i t . . . She never was kidnapped. I t was a hoax.

What i s i m p o r t a n t , t h e n , i s n o t some g e n e r a l mechanism expected t o work i n a l I cases, b u t a p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y reasonable s e t of s e a r c h h e u r i s t i c s and memory o r g a n i z a t i o n p r i n c i p l e s which c l o s e l y model p e o p l e ' s performance i n t h e s e t a s k s .

6.2 Relationship Map I n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s a r e i m p o r t a n t o r g a n i z i n g p r i n c i p l e s i n t h e s t o r y . and t h e i r i n f l u e n c e can be seen i n s e v e r a l ways. F i r s t , people tend t o f o r g e t t h e c h a r a c t e r s ' names, and r e c a l l , i n s t e a d , t h e i r s t a t u s w i t h i n some i n t e r p e r s o n a l relation. John i s o f t e n r e f e r r e d t o a s ' t h e f a t h e r ' or .the husband'; B i l l i s "John's friend.. etc. I n a d d i t i o n , p e o p l e seem to t r a v e r s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n o r d e r t o r e c a l I t h e c h a r a c t e r s i n t h e s t o r y . They u s u a l l y r e c a l I John's fami l y and f r i e n d , t h e n Mary's f r i e n d . Many t i m e s t h e s t r a n g e r i s l e f t o u t . This o v e r s i g h t can be e x p l a i n e d by o b s e r v i n g t h a t t h e s t r a n g e r i s n o t i n v o l v e d i n any i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , and by assuming t h a t t h o s e processes which a t t e m p t t o r e c a l I c h a r a c t e r s make use of some map of i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . The BORIS r e l a t i o n s h i p map f o r t h e k i d n a p s t o r y appears i n Diagram D.9. R e l a t i o n s h i p Map R-FRIENDSHIP0

v friend friend /

/

Bi I10

I I 1

\

I

R-FAMILY0

husband dau h t e r

/ I \ / I John0 I

goa Is

goa Is

I

I

P-FRIENDSHIP0 D-CONTO

7I

Susan0

P-HEALTH0

-

R-FRIENDSHIP1

n

wife

friend

/ I \ I \ / 1 Mary0

friend

\

\

Karen0

goa Is

I

P-HEALTH1

Diagram D.Q Experiments have been performed on t h e t a s k of c h a r a c t e r l i s t i n g which i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e R e l a t i o n s h i p Map i s a c e n t r a l mechanism i n d e r i v i n g a l i s t o f c h a r a c t e r s from a n a r r a t i v e [Minton, 19801. Two g r o u p s of s u b j e c t s were asked t o read two v e r s i o n s o f a n a r r a t i v e , where one v e r s i o n s p e c i f i e d two c h a r a c t e r s as b r o t h e r s , and t h e o t h e r v e r s i o n s p e c i f i e d t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e same two c h a r a c t e r s as one of f r i e n d s h i p . The two v e r s i o n s were i d e n t i c a l i n a l l o t h e r r e s p e c t s . The r e s u l t i n g c h a r a c t e r l i s t s showed a s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e d i s t a n c e between t h e s e two c h a r a c t e r s a c r o s s t h e two groups. L i s t s r e s u l t i n g from t h e ' b r o t h e r ' v e r s i o n p l a c e d t h e s e two c h a r a c t e r s c l o s e r t o each o t h e r t h a n t h e l i s t s r e s u l t i n g from t h e ' f r i e n d ' version. T h i s phenomena was t h e n d u p l i c a t e d w i t h a second n a r r a t i v e designed to c o n t r o l for o t h e r c o n t r i b u t i n g

M.G. Dyer and W.G. Lehnert

354

factors. T h i s r e s u l t suggests t h a t c h a r a c t e r l i s t s a r e g e n e r a t e d by an o r d e r e d expansion from t h e main c h a r a c t e r v i a t r a v e r s a l of t h e R e l a t i o n s h i p Hap. The R e l a t i o n s h i p Map i s a l s o used i n answering such q u e s t i o n s as:

93: 911:

Why [was John w o r r i e d a b o u t Susan]? D i d John k i d n a p Susan?

I n p r o c e s s i n g each of t h e s e q u e s t i o n s memory c a n ' t h e l p b u t t h i n k of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between John and Susan. I n t h e case of 93 t h e R e l a t i o n s h i p Map i s used to r e c a l l John's g o a l of s a v i n g Susan from t h e k i d n a p p e r . w h i l e i n 911. t h e R e l a t i o n s h i p Hap i s used to i n f e r a l o v e theme which i s v i o l a t e d by t h e presupposed a c t of k i d n a p p i n g mentioned i n t h e q u e s t i o n . A People's responses t o 911 d i d n o t conform w i t h o u r i n i t i a l e x p e c t a t i o n s . prev tous t h e o r y of q u e s t i o n answering [Lehnert. 19781 p r e d i c t e d t h a t s u b j e c t s would answer 911 i n one of t h e f o l l o w i n g ways:

911: Alla: Allb:

D i d John k i d n a p Susan? No. The s t r a n g e r kidnapped Susan. No. There never was a k i d n a p p i n g .

However. people overwhelmingly responded w i t h i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between John and Susan. Allc:

a

specification

of

the

No. A f a t h e r d o e s n ' t k i d n a p h i s own d a u g h t e r .

I n s t e a d o f s i m p l y a c c e s s i n g t h e k i d n a p p i n g e v e n t and c h e c k i n g t h e r o l e b i n d i n g s , people appear to use t h e i r knowledge c o n c e r n i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between John and Susan to reason how l i k e l y such an e v e n t would be. I f t h e s t o r y had been a b o u t a f a t h e r r h o kidnapped h i s own d a u g h t e r , t h e n people would have remembered i t as ' t h a t s t r a n g e s t o r y a b o u t a f a t h e r who kidnapped h i s v e r y own daughter.' Since t h i s i s so unusual, t h e memory r e p r e s e n t a t i o n would have t r e a t e d such an e v e n t s p e c i a l l y ( i f it had o c c u r r e d ) . When we a r e c o n f r o n t e d w i t h 911, we immediately r e t r i e v a l t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between John and Susan. Once it i s determined t h a t a f a t h e r k i d n a p p i n g h i s own d a u g h t e r would be h i g h l y unusual, we can check t o see i f t h e memory r e p r e s e n t a t i o n has f l a g g e d t h e k i d n a p p i n g episode as b e i n g unusual w i t h r e s p e c t to i t s p a r t i c i p a n t s . When n o such f l a g i s found. we can c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n h a r b o r s a f a l s e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n . .So when a s e a r c h f o r such a v i o l a t i o n does n o t succeed, memory concludes t h a t t h e e v e n t must n o t have o c c u r r e d . Thus memory can be very c e r t a i n of why i t s response to t h e q u e s t i o n i s t h e c o r r e c t response. T h i s k i n d of ' r a t i o n a l r e c a l l ' i s v e r y d i f f e r e n t from t h e ' n a i v e r e c a l l ' o f : a) f i n d i n g t h e e v e n t and b) c h e c k i n g t h e r o l e b i n d i n g s of t h e e v e n t a g a i n s t t h e presumed r o l e b i n d i n g s i n t h e q u e s t i o n . If such h e u r i s t i c s were used by people, A l l a and A l l b would be common responses.

6.3 Scenario Participant M a p Another access map i n BORIS i s t h e S c e n a r i o P a r t i c i p a n t Hap (see Diagram 0.10) whose e x i s t e n c e was p o s t u l a t e d to handle such q u e s t i o n s as:

91: 95: 912:

Why d i d John go to t h e p a r t y ? Why d i d Mary c a l l John a t t h e p a r t y ? Where was Susan?

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We can n o t b e g i n to answer q u e s t i o n Q5 u n l e s s we can g e t f r o m tt: ' q g l i s h words 'Mary'. and 'John' to t h e c h a r a c t e r s JOHN0 and MARY0 i n t h e s t o r y . and f r o m t h e words ' c a l l ' and 'party' to t h e a p p r o p r i a t e $PHONE e v e n t w i t h i n t h e p a r t y s c e n a r i o . L i k e w i s e . we cannot answer Q l u n l e s s we can g e t f r o m 'go' and ' p a r t y ' to John's g o a l .

The conceptual r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f 'go' i s PTRANS [Schank and Abelson. 19771. B u t which PTRANS? There a r e numerous PTRANSs i n t h e s t o r y . b o t h e x p l i c i t and inferred. F o r example. John PTRANSed to two phones, to a c a r . to t h e numerous doors. e t c . To f i n d t h e a p p r o p r i a t e D-PROX g o a l b e i n g r e f e r e n c e d i n t h e q u e s t i o n , we must make use of t h e s c e n a r i o i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e i n t h e q u e s t i o n . By f i r s t ' l o c a t i n g ' John a t t h e p a r t y and t h e n ' r e c a l l i n g ' where John was n e x t . we can r e t r i e v a l John's d-prox g o a l i n e p i s o d i c memory. Once we have t h i s e n t r y p o i n t , o t h e r search processes can r e t r i e v e t h e h i g h e r g o a l s (or events) which cause John to want to be home. B u t how i s t h i s ' l o c a t i n g ' and ' r e c a l l i n g ' accomp I ished? The s c e n a r i o p a r t i c i p a n t map accomplishes t h i s t a s k by c o n t a i n i n g i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e movement of c h a r a c t e r s i n t h e s t o r y , and t h e s i t u a t i o n s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e c o n t a c t s which o c c u r r e d between c h a r a c t e r s . We b e l i e v e t h e s c e n a r i o (such as t h e p a r t y , home, s c h o o l ) s e r v e s as an i m p o r t a n t o r g a n i z i n g p r i n c i p l e i n memory. Events a r e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e s c e n a r i o s w i t h i n which t h e y o c c u r r e d , and g o a l s a r e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e s c e n a r i o s w i t h i n which t h e s e g o a l s were m o t i v a t e d or achieved. Furthermore, a t s t o r y - u n d e r s t a n d i n g t i m e , changes i n s c e n a r i o a r e i m p o r t a n t f o r r e c o g n i z i n g such t h i n g s as changes i n c h a r a c t e r p e r s p e c t i v e and t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of events. Whenever a c h a r a c t e r s u i t c h e s from one s c e n a r i o t o a n o t h e r , or whenever a c h a r a c t e r t r i e s t o c o n t a c t a n o t h e r c h a r a c t e r a c r o s s s c e n a r i o s , t h e reason f o r t h i s can be formed a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e a p p r o p r i a t e d e l t a - g o a l i n t h e s c e n a r i o map. As can be seen i n diagram D.10, t h e S c e n a r i o P a r t i c i p a n t Map summarizes t h e general a c t i o n s which o c c u r r e d i n t h e s t o r y : John u e n t t o a p a r t y . A t t h e p a r t y he attempted to c o n t a c t B i l l . Mary c o n t a c t e d John. A t home, a s t r a n g e r c o n t a c t e d Mary. John came home. Mary wanted to c o n t a c t t h e p o l i c e . Susan was a t s c h o o l . Then Susan came home. Furthermore, each s c e n a r i o has events a s s o c i a t e d u i t h it. and t h e i n t e r f a c e s F i n a l l y t h e r e a r e search between t h e s c e n a r i o s c o n t a i n h o l d access t o g o a l s . processes o p e r a t i n g on s c e n a r i o s to r e c a l l t h e s e a s s o c i a t e d g o a l s and e v e n t s . These processes a r e use to answer such q u e s t i o n s as 'What happened at home?' which a r e d i s c u s s e d below.

-- Peop Ie common l y r e t r i e v e e v e n t s by f i r s t r e c a l l i n g a s c e n a r i o i n t h e s t o r y , and t h e n by u s i n g t h i s s c e n a r i o to r e c a l l t h e events which o c c u r r e d w i t h i n i t .

Event Containment Retrieval

Q: A:

What happened a t home? Mary g o t a c a l l f r o m a s t r a n g e r .

Q: A:

What happened a t t h e p a r t y ? John g o t a c a l l from Mary.

-- C h a r a c t e r i s t i c l o c a t i o n s which s e r v e as s e t t i n g s for one or more e v e n t s a r e i n s t a n t i a t e d i n e p i s o d i c memory w i t h scenarios. Whenever people hear o? an e v e n t o c c u r r i n g w i t h i n a g i v e n s e t t i n g , they t e n d to a s s o c i a t e t h a t s e t t i n e w i t h t h e e v e n t . I n such cases, t h e s e t t i n g Scenario Containment Retrieval

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M.G. Dyer and W.G. Lehnert

S c e n a r i o P a r t i c i p a n t Map

q' L-OFFICE0

JohnO

L-CALIFORNIA0

(d-proxO) 1 ; & ) 4xo r p - d (

L-LOCO stranger0

1

L-HOME0

/

I

__ __

//

'\ \

(?I

/

\

JohnO,

SusanO

(d-know 1)

/I

Mar 0

\ d i l 3w4)

/

SusanO

(d-prox3) \

\ IL-PoLICEo I

(d-know3) (d-know21

/ IL-HOME2 Karen0

I

po I i ceO

Diagram D.10 can be r e t r i e v e d f r o m t h e e v e n t .

0: A:

Uhere was t h e gym meet h e l d ? A t school.

0: Uhere was t h e p a r t y ? A: I d o n ' t know. For Scenarios may or may n o t have l o c a t i o n e l i n f o r m a t i o n a s s o c i a t e d w i t h them. example, t h e p a r t y s e r v e s as a s c e n a r i o f o r b o t h t h e p a r t y e v e n t and Mary's phone c a l l . However. t h e a c t u a l l o c a t i o n of t h e p a r t y i s n o t known. Some events, such as phone c a l l s , s e r v e t o connect one s c e n a r i o to a n o t h e r . I n such cases, a d e c i s i o n has t o be made as to which s c e n a r i o t o r e t r i e v e . T h i s w i l l depend on which c h a r a c t e r i s i n f o c u s . F o r example,

0:

Uhere was Mary when she c a l l e d John? A : A t home.

0: Uhere

was John when Mary c a l l e d him? A: A t t h e p a r t y .

Question Answering for Narrative Memory

357

I n t h e above examples, each s c e n a r i o i s r e t r i e v e d a c c o r d i n g to t h e c h a r a c t e r i t conta i n s .

Delta Goal Scenario Retrieval

-- I t i s i m p o r t a n t to understand why a c h a r a c t e r changes s e t t i n g s . A t t h e l o w e s t l e v e l , a c h a r a c t e r ' s reason must r e f e r e n c e a DPROX g o a l which u s u a l l y s e r v e s to s a t i s f y some p r e c o n d i t i o n w i t h i n a c h a r a c t e r ' s F o r example, John can n o t p l a y h i s r o l e of plan for achieving a higher g o a l . p a r t y g u e s t u n t i l he i s a c t u a l l y a t t h e p a r t y . So D-PROX [ p a r t y ] e n a b l e s PLAYGUEST [John]. I f t h e h i g h e r l e v e l goal i s n o t known. t h e n o n l y t h e d-prox g o a l w i l l be r e c a l l e d . S i n c e t h i s does n o t u s u a l l y convey much i n f o r m a t i o n , it may sound odd and i s t h e b a s i s for t h e humor i n : Q: Yhy d i d t h e c h i c k e n cross t h e road? A:

He wanted to be on t h e o t h e r s i d e .

D-prox g o a l s a r e o r g a n i z e d by t h e S c e n a r i o P a r t i c i p a n t Map and indexed by c h a r a c t e r and s e t t i n g . Given a c h a r a c t e r and a source or d e s t i n a t i o n s c e n a r i o , people can access t h e a s s o c i a t e d d-prox g o a l and use t h i s to r e c a l l h i g h e r l e v e l p l a n s and g o a l s .

0: A:

Yhy d i d John go to t h e p a r t y ? Because John wanted to g e t to t h e p a r t y .

Q: Yhy d i d John leave t h e p a r t y ? A:

Because he wanted to g e t home

The answers above a r e s i m i l a r to t h e answer i n t h e c h i c k e n j o k e i n s o f a r as t h e y I t i s up t o o t h e r search h e u r i s t i c s (see [Dyer, 19821) t o a r e too low l e v e l . r e a l i z e when an answer i s too low l e v e l .

Scenario Contact Retrieval

--

Yhen a c h a r a c t e r i n one s c e n a r i o communicates w i t h a c h a r a c t e r i n a n o t h e r s c e n a r i o , t h e l i n k across t h e s e two s c e n a r i o s i s maintained i n t h e S c e n a r i o P a r t i c i p a n t Map as a D-KNOY g o a l for t h e c h a r a c t e r who i n i t i a t e d t h e communication. T h i s D-KNOY g o a l can t h e n be r e c a l l e d by means of t h e S c e n a r i o C o n t a c t R e t r i e v a l , which searches t h e s c e n a r i o p a r t i c i p a n t map.

Q: Yhy d i d Mary c a l l a t t h e p a r t y ? A:

She wanted John to know a b o u t t h e k i d n a p p i n g .

Q: Yhy d i d t h e s t r a n g e r c a l l John's home? A:

He wanted John and Mary to know a b o u t t h e i r d a u g h t e r ' s kidnapping.

Consequently, another.

s c e n a r i o s a c t a s one way of d i s c r i m i n a t i n g one phone c a l l from

6. Conclusion I n t h i s paper we have p r e s e n t e d a s e t of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n end p r o c e s s i n g c o n s t r u c t s I n developing used to o r g a n i z e and r e t r i e v e i n f o r m a t i o n from n a r r a t i v e memory. t h e s e c o n s t r u c t s we have r e l i e d h e a v i l y on human p r o t o c o l b e h a v i o r . The m i s t a k e s t h a t people make and t h e p r e f e r r e d responses t h e y s u p p l y s h o u l d r e v e a l something So we have s t u d i e d and emphasized a c t u a l about u n d e r l y i n g c o g n i t i v e processes. human responses i n o r d e r to b e t t e r understand t h e i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g needed. The n o t i o n of 'computer memory'

i s t y p i c a l l y p r a i s e d f o r i t s s u p e r i o r speed and

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M.G. Dyerand W.G. Lehneri

accuracy o v e r human memory. T h i s assessment w i l l p e r s i s t as l o n g a s memory r e t r i e v a l i s c o n f i n e d to t a s k of r e t r i e v i n g i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t i s t y p i c a l l y f o u n d i n computers. No person can match a computer for i n f o r m a t i o n r e t r i e v a l when t h e i n f o r m a t i o n c o n s i s t s of p a y r o l l d a t a or s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s e s . B u t i n f a c t , human e p i s o d i c memory i s v a s t l y s u p e r i o r to t h e database d e s i g n of a computer. This superiority i s especially apparent i n a task o r i e n t a t i o n like story u n d e r s t a n d i n g , where t h e c o m p l e x i t y of e p i s o d i c i n f o r m a t i o n must be t a c k l e d by t e c h n i q u e s t h a t c o n s t r u c t i n f o r m a t i o n by processes of c o n c e p t u a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and i n f e r e n c e . Acknowledgements: T h i s work was s u p p o r t e d i n p a r t by t h e Advanced Research P r o j e c t s Agency under c o n t r a c t N00014-75-C-1111 and i n p a r t by t h e N a t i o n a l S c i e n c e F o u n d a t i o n under c o n t r a c t IST7918463.

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L e h n e r t . U. C . , Dyer, M. G . . Johnson, P. N . , Yang. C. J. and S. H a r l e y . BORIS -- An In-Depth Understander of N a r r a t i v e s . Artificial Intelligence, 1982. ( i n press). R e t r i e v a l Mechanisms and Memory M i n t o n . Steven. Recal I i n g S t o r y C h a r a c t e r s : O r g a n i z a t i o n . I n Fifteenth Annual Undergraduate Psychology Conference. B u f f a l o C o l l e g e , NY: 1980. Schank, Roger and Abelson, Robert. sm’pts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding. H i l l s d a l e . NJ: Lawrence E r l b a u i . 1977. The A r t i f i c i a l I n t e l l i g e n c e S e r i e s .