Landing Craft Infantry and Fire Support

INFANTRY A N D FIRE SUPPORT

GORDON L ROTTMAN

LLUSTRATED BY PETER BULL

ABOUT THE AUTHOR AND ILLUSTRATOR GORDON L ROTTMAN entered the US Army in 1967, volunteered for

Special Forces and completed training as a weapons specialist. He served in the 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam in 1969-70 and subsequently in airborne infantry, long-range patrol and intelligence assignments until retiring after 26 years. He was a Special Operations Forces scenario writer at the Joint Readiness Training Center for 12 years and is now a freelance writer, living in Texas.

PETER BULL graduated from art college in 1979 and has worked as a freelance illustrator for over 25 years. He has created both traditional and digital art for publishers worldwide, and also runs the Peter Bull Art Studio, based in Kent, UK, which he founded in 1975.

NEW VANGUARD • 157

LANDING CRAFT, INFANTRY AND FIRE SUPPORT

GORDON L ROTTMAN

ILLUSTRATED BY PETER BULL

First published in Great Britain in 2009 by Osprey Publishing, Midland House, West Way, Botley, Oxford, 0X2 OPH, UK 443 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10016, USA E-mail: [email protected] © 2009 Osprey Publishing Ltd. All rights reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner. Inquiries should be addressed to the Publishers. A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library Print ISBN: 978 1 84603 435 0 PDF e-book ISBN: 978 1 84603 902 7 Page layout by Melissa Orrom Swan, Oxford Index by Alan Thatcher Typeset in Sabon and Myriad Pro Originated by United Graphic Pte Ltd, Singapore Printed in China through Wordprint Ltd 09 10 11 12 13 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

FOR A CATALOG OF ALL BOOKS PUBLISHED BY OSPREY MILITARY AND AVIATION PLEASE CONTACT: NORTH AMERICA Osprey Direct, c/o Random House Distribution Center, 400 Hahn Road, Westminster, MD 21157 E-mail: [email protected] ALL OTHER REGIONS Osprey Direct, The Book Service Ltd, Distribution Centre, Colchester Road, Frating Green, Colchester, Essex, C07 7DW E-mail: [email protected] Osprey Publishing is supporting the Woodland Trust, the UK's leading woodland conservation charity, by funding the dedication of trees.

RELATED TITLES FROM OSPREY PUBLISHING

ELI 80: The US Navy in World War II

ELI 117: US World War II Amphibious Tactics: Pacific Theater EL1144: US World War II Amphibious Tactics: European & Mediterranean Theaters NVG 30: Amtracs: US Amphibious Assault Vehicles NVG 115: Landing Ship, Tank (LST) 1942-2002

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author wishes to thank Denis Huff for providing LSM photographs and Jimmy Prime, a former LCI(R) crewman, for his insight.

ABBREVIATIONS

amtrac

amphibious tractor (see LVT)

BuShips

Bureau of Ships

DUKW

"Duck" amphibious truck

HM

His Majesty's

hp

horsepower

kW

kilowatt

LCA

Landing Craft, Assault (RN)

LC(FF)

Landing Craft (Flotilla Flagship)

LCI(A)

Landing Craft, Infantry (Ammunition)

LCI(D)

Landing Craft, Infantry (Diver)

LCI(FS)

Landing Craft, Infantry (Fire Support)

LCI(G)

Landing Craft, Infantry (Gun)

LCI(H)

Landing Craft, Infantry (Headquarters)

LCI(L)

Landing Craft, Infantry (Large)

LCI(M)

Landing Craft, Infantry (Mortar)

LCI(R)

Landing Craft, Infantry (Rocket)

LCS(L)

Landing Craft, Support (Large)

LCT

Landing Craft, Tank

LCVP

Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel

LSI

Landing Ship, Infantry (RN)

LSM

Landing Ship, Medium

LSM(R)

Landing Ship, Medium (Rocket)

LSS(L)

Landing Ship, Support (Large)

LST

Landing Ship, Tank

LVT

Landing Vehicle, Tracked (amtrac)

RN

Royal Navy

STS

special treatment steel (armor)

EDITOR'S NOTE For ease of comparison between types, Imperial/American measurements are used almost exclusively throughout this book. The following data will help in converting the Imperial/American measurements to metric: 1 mile = 1.6km 1 lb = 0.45kg 1 yd = 0.9m 1ft = 0.3m 1 in. = 2.54cm/25.4mm

www.ospreypublishing.com

1 gal = 4.5 liters 1 ton (US) = 0.9 tonnes

CONTENTS INTRODUCTION LANDING CRAFT, INFANTRY - DEVELOPMENT LCI(L) C O N S T R U C T I O N •

Armament

LCI(L) D E S C R I P T I O N Propulsion Below decks Main deck Deckhouse Forecastle and ramps

LCI V A R I A N T S •

Landing Craft, Infantry (Gun)

•

Landing Craft, Infantry (Rocket)

•

Landing Craft, Infantry (Mortar)

•

Landing Craft, S u p p o r t (Large) Mk 3

L A N D I N G S H I P , MEDIUM •

Landing Ship, M e d i u m (Rocket)

OPERATIONAL HISTORY LCI a n d LSM u n i t s Fire s u p p o r t m i s s i o n s Landing missions The crews Early use i n t h e P a c i f i c LCIs a s s a u l t S i c i l y Rocket boats at K w a j a l e i n LSMs a t O r m o c LCI(M)s a t O k i n a w a

THE VESSELS REMEMBERED BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX

LANDING CRAFT, INFANTRY AND FIRE SUPPORT "Protect me oh Lord for my boat is so small and your sea is so great." From the Breton Fisherman's

Prayer

INTRODUCTION T h e Landing Craft, Infantry (Large) - L C I ( L ) - w a s a large beaching craft intended to transport and deliver an infantry rifle company to a hostile shore once the beachhead w a s secured, or as one soldier claimed: " T h e L C I was a metal b o x designed by a sadist t o move soldiers across the water." T h e L C I and its larger vehicle-delivery counterpart, the Landing Ship, Medium ( L S M ) , were important and widely used World W a r II amphibious-warfare ships. They were intermediate-size beaching craft, filling the gap between the much larger Landing Ship, T a n k ( L S T ) and the m a n y types o f smaller, bow-ramped, open cargo compartment landing craft. 1

T h e L C I was strictly a passenger carrier and could not transport vehicles. Lacking b o w doors or a ramp, cargo had to be hand-carried off the ship. T h e L C M , by contrast, could carry up t o five tanks and other large vehicles as well as bulk c a r g o . It lacked the a c c o m m o d a t i o n and sanitary facilities for large numbers o f t r o o p s , other than for a short ship-to-shore haul. (Passenger accommodations were only for transported vehicle crews.) T h e matter o f designations as " c r a f t " and " s h i p " must be addressed. Seagoing amphibious beaching vessels over 2 0 0 f t in length were designated ships. T h e L S M w a s 2 0 3 f t 6in long while the L C I ( L ) w a s 1 6 0 f t . T h e L C I , nevertheless, was a seagoing vessel given moderate conditions and reasonable ranges. T h e type was redesignated Landing Ship, Infantry (LSI) on February 2 8 , 1 9 4 9 , although few were still operational. T h e L C I and L S M were the smallest landing vessels assigned Bureau o f Ships (BuShips) hull numbers rather than names. Official names, for example, would be USS L C I ( L ) - 3 5 1 or USS L S M - 3 6 . Those provided to the Royal Navy retained the US BuShips hull numbers, but were designated H M L C I ( L ) - 2 , for example ( H M = H i s Majesty's). T h e Soviet N a v y designated them " D S " (desantnoye sudno - assault ship) and assigned n e w numbers (e.g. D S . 1 0 ) , though they retained US hull numbers up until December 1 9 4 5 . T o the sailors manning these a w k w a r d craft, they were k n o w n as the "Elsie I t e m " - " E l s i e " representing " L C " and " I t e m " being the phonetic alphabet word for " I . " Their boxy shape also led t o their being called the "Floating B e d p a n , " perhaps influenced by the close troop quarters and limited toilet facilities, while destroyer crews working with them as radar pickets called them "small b o y s . " In 1 9 4 3 / 4 4 , the L C I a n d L S M b o t h provided the hulls for n e w types o f rocket-firing g u n b o a t s , k n o w n as " b a z o o k a b o a t s . " A n o t h e r type based on 1 See Osprey New Vanguard 115, Landing Ship, Tank (LST)

1942-2002

the LCI's hull was the Landing Craft, Support (Large) M k 3 , the L C S ( L ) ( 3 ) . T h e L C S ( L ) was variously k n o w n as the " W h o o f u s " and " M i g h t y M i d g e t . " These were all specialized fire support craft intended to place suppressive fire on landing beaches using guns, automatic c a n n o n s , rockets, and m o r t a r s . T h e principal conversions discussed in this b o o k are: Landing Landing Landing Landing Landing Landing

Craft, Infantry (Gun) LCI(G) Craft, Infantry ( M o r t a r ) LCI(M) Craft, Infantry ( R o c k e t ) LCI(R) Ship, M e d i u m ( R o c k e t ) LSM(R) Craft, Support (Large) M k 3 L C S ( L ) ( 3 ) Craft (Flotilla Flagship) LC(FF)

LANDING CRAFT, INFANTRY - DEVELOPMENT In late 1 9 4 1 and early 1 9 4 2 , development was u n d e r w a y for t w o large beaching vessels vastly different in size and capabilities, but designed as companion amphibious vessels. T h e L S T and Landing Craft, Tank ( L C T ) were both based on British requirements and versions were built on both sides o f the Atlantic. T h e L S T was a big ship, almost 3 3 0 f t in length and capable o f carrying 2 0 medium tanks, while the 1 1 4 f t L C T possessed a b o w ramp and an open c a r g o c o m p a r t m e n t c a p a b l e o f carrying five medium t a n k s . L S T vessels were c a p a b l e o f t r a n s - o c e a n i c m o v e m e n t , but the L C T was n o t so seaworthy and one of the LST's m a n y roles was to transport L C T s overseas either as deck cargo or disassembled and carried in the copious tank deck. T h e British had a n o t h e r r e q u i r e m e n t , w h a t they initially referred t o as a " g i a n t raiding c r a f t " ( G R C ) . T o keep the G e r m a n s in o c c u p i e d E u r o p e o f f balance, and to c o n d u c t some f o r m o f offensive o p e r a t i o n s , the British were executing m i n o r c o a s t a l raids. Small landing c r a f t were used in this r o l e , such as the Landing C r a f t , Assault ( L C A ) , a 4 1 f t b o a t carrying 3 5 t r o o p s . T h e s e l a c k e d the c a p a c i t y f o r t r a n s p o r t i n g m o r e t h a n just small d e t a c h m e n t s , and their e n d u r a n c e , speed, r a n g e , a n d c r o s s - C h a n n e l capabilities w e r e poor. W h a t w a s desired w a s a 1 5 0 f t b e a c h i n g vessel

LCS(L)(3)-3 clad in a navy green and pale green camouflage scheme. All LCSs were fitted with radar for surface search, air warning, and also positioning in order to fire their rockets accurately.

The pilothouse of LSM-34 was similar in design to that on LCI(L)-31 class boats, with "castle bridges" but taller, the height necessary in order to provide vision over the high forecastle and elevated bow ramp. The canvas awning over the conn was removed in combat zones to provide full overhead observation to detect aircraft.

c a p a b l y o f carrying 2 0 0 t r o o p s - a rifle c o m p a n y - at 2 0 k n o t s with a range of 2 3 0 m i l e s . T h e l o w - s i l h o u e t t e d vessel needed adequate air defense features and p r o t e c t i o n f r o m small a r m s fire, as it w a s e x p e c t e d t o discharge its raiders directly a s h o r e a n d n o t have to wait o f f s h o r e and c a r r y smaller landing craft t o deliver and retrieve the t r o o p s . It w o u l d also provide a c c o m m o d a t i o n for t r o o p s for up to t w o days. L o o k i n g into the f u t u r e , it w a s realized t h a t such a vessel w o u l d be valuable for the planned invasion o f the C o n t i n e n t .

LCI(L)-412 under construction at the George Lawley & Sons Shipbuilding Corp., Neponset, MA, in January 1944. The LCI's box-like hull design can readily be seen.

The stern of LCI(L)-443 provides a view of the large foot-like skegs protecting the props forward of the rudders. The kedge anchor and rack are on the transom and the engine exhaust and coolant water ports, emitting spray, can be seen on the side just above the waterline. To the right of the three stacked fog oil drums is the Besler smoke generator.

6

As an interim m e a s u r e , the British h a d c o n v e r t e d c r o s s - C h a n n e l ferries, m i n e s w e e p e r s , and o t h e r vessels into L a n d i n g Ships, Infantry, M e d i u m and Small - L S I ( M ) and L S I ( S ) . T h e s e vessels were a l m o s t 4 0 0 f t long a n d carried between 2 0 0 and 4 0 0 t r o o p s , depending on the particular ship. T h e y typically carried eight L C A s or similar landing craft - they were n o t beaching vessels. B y the time the d e v e l o p m e n t o f w h a t w o u l d b e c o m e the L C I was underway, the British h a d begun to c o n d u c t fewer c o a s t a l raids as the G e r m a n s strengthened the Atlantic Wall. Development continued, though, as the L C I w o u l d be an ideal c r a f t to deliver f o l l o w - o n infantry during the projected summer 1 9 4 3 invasion of France. It was not conceived as an initialw a v e assault c r a f t . T h e British c o m m i s s i o n hoping t o find a builder in A m e r i c a discovered that private builders such as Higgins were not only fully c o m m i t t e d t o c o n t r a c t s , but were running behind. British building capacity w a s unable to handle any additional projects. T h e US N a v y was none t o o interested in such a raiding craft and had little faith in larger landing craft, feeling they were t o o vulnerable to air a t t a c k . As with the LST, the British a p p r o a c h e d the US Army. In order for the US to construct Lend-Lease ships for the British, the design also had to be intended for use by the US armed forces. T h e US A r m y was indeed interested in the L C I , realizing the need to land larger f o l l o w - o n units t h a n w a s feasible by Landing C r a f t , Personnel ( L C P ) or Landing C r a f t , Vehicle ( L C V ) carrying a p l a t o o n - m i n u s . T h e British needed 3 0 0 craft by April 1 9 4 3 , a year away, and the design was little m o r e than a sketch. T h e r e were no shipping capabilities for vessels this size, so it had to be capable o f trans-oceanic crossings. It needed a 5 0 0 n m (575-mile) endurance and required a speed of at least 1 5 knots, 2 0 preferred. To save space and weight, and speed up production, a b o w r a m p and doors were forfeited. Instead the troops would disembark using three or four 2 f t 6in-wide g a n g w a y ramps f r o m weather-deck level. T h e r e was no capability to deliver even light vehicles,

wheeled crew-served weapons such as antitank guns, or bulk c a r g o . BuShips revised the design in M a y . It was hoped to be capable o f better than 1 5 k n o t s , beach on a 1 : 5 0 ratio gradient, and provide limited small arms fire protection. A r m a m e n t w o u l d be four 2 0 m m guns. Early p r o p o s a l s f o r e s a w it being unarmed when carrying troops, instead relying on the passengers' a r m a m e n t s , with 2 0 m m guns m o u n t e d w h e n n o t r o o p s were e m b a r k e d , t o prevent overloading. T h i s set-up, o f c o u r s e , w a s i m p r a c t i c a l as o n c e the t r o o p s debarked the vessel, in the forefront o f the action, the vessel was unable to protect itself from aircraft attacking the beachhead and shipping. T h e final design emerged as 1 6 0 f t long with a 2 3 f t b e a m , and h a d a forward beaching draft o f 2 f t 6in and 4 f t 5in at the stern. It could carry three weeks' stores for a crew of three officers and 2 1 enlisted men and six t r o o p officers and 1 8 2 enlisted men. Instead o f t r o o p s it could also carry 7 5 tons of cargo, but only in containers that a single stevedore could carry. It w o u l d be propelled by eight General M o t o r s engines, four per shaft. T h e design was kept simple, with as few curves as possible to speed up production. T h e result was a b o x y - l o o k i n g c r a f t with a blunt bow, flat b o t t o m , and a l o w rectangular deckhouse with an u n h a n d s o m e " s q u a r e b r i d g e " f o r w a r d o f the d e c k h o u s e . T h i s design w a s initially called the T r o o p T r a n s p o r t (ShortRadius) ( A P Y ) . P r o d u c t i o n began in J u l y 1 9 4 2 and the design w a s s o o n redesignated the Landing Craft, Infantry (Large) - L C I ( L ) . In this b o o k the " ( L ) " is not always included and does n o t refer to a different craft.

LCI(L) CONSTRUCTION T h e first A P Y c o n t r a c t w a s signed on J u n e 3 , 1 9 4 2 . T h e first c o n t r a c t e d yards were G e o r g e Lawley 8c Sons Shipbuilding C o r p . , N e p o n s e t , M A , and N e w Y o r k Shipbuilding C o r p . , C a m d e n , N J . N e w Jersey Shipbuilding C o r p . , Barber, N J , would be the m o s t prolific o f the ten builders. T w o p r o t o t y p e LCI(L)s were launched, L C I - 1 and L C I - 2 0 9 (the latter actually the first t o be completed), and were tested in September and O c t o b e r 1 9 4 2 , respectively. It was found that they could beach and retract very well, but they c o u l d n o t maneuver in reverse. O n e b o a t had been built without prop skegs, the guards protecting the propellers, and turned in a 7 5 y d radius. T h e b o a t with skegs required a 1 0 0 y d radius. Regardless, since the props were so vulnerable t o beaching d a m a g e it was directed that all b o a t s have skegs. T r a n s - A t l a n t i c crossing w a s c r i t i c a l , and eight L C I s a c c o m p a n i e d by three tugs sailed from N o r f o l k , VA, to B e r m u d a in late 1 9 4 2 . T h e y w e a t h e r e d F o r c e 4 winds ( 1 3 - 1 8 m p h ) and 8ft seas, proving they were c a p a b l e o f such a passage in m o d e r a t e weather. T h e b o a t s m a d e 1 1 k n o t s , but rolled and yawed badly, and heavy b o w - o n w a v e s a c t u a l l y rippled the hull p l a t e s . A redesign increased the d i s p l a c e m e n t , however, so t h a t they drew s o m e 6 f t o f w a t e r when fully loaded for o c e a n t r a n s i t , with a speed just shy o f 1 4 k n o t s in fair weather. T h e y were t o o s l o w t o accompany attack transport groups and h a d t o depart p o r t a h e a d o f the faster ships along with the L S T s .

LCKU-351, the lead ship of the 351 class, was commissioned in May 1943. It was converted to an LCI(G) in December 1944 and to an LCI(M) in April 1945. The boat was struck from the Naval Register in 1946 and sold for scrap in 1948. Such was the typical life of an LCI.

7

T h e 2 9 9 L C I ( L ) - 1 class boats ( 1 - 4 8 , 6 1 - 1 3 6 , 1 6 1 - 1 9 6 , 2 0 9 - 3 5 0 ) were built largely according to British plans owing to Britain's urgent need. Various changes were m a d e to the original British design to a c c o m m o d a t e American c o n s t r u c t i o n m e t h o d s . O t h e r changes eliminated the bench-type main deck t r o o p seats (behind the b u l w a r k and alongside the deckhouse), changed the bicycle ( x l 2 ) stowage c o m p a r t m e n t to general storage, and added a level to the bridge to provide the c o n n with better vision over the bow. Construction time varied and improved with experience, but on average c o n s t r u c t i o n t o o k 5 - 6 weeks f r o m laying d o w n the keel to launching and a b o u t another 5 - 6 weeks for fitting before the vessel was commissioned. T h e craft were constructed in sections, essentially end-to-end b o x e s , which were simply welded together on the slip. At the height of construction, in some yards a new L C I was sliding down the ways at the rate of one every day or t w o . Although the L C I was considered a f o l l o w - o n landing craft, it was still provided with some armor. T h i s was 1 5 l b per square foot special treatment steel (STS) protecting the bridge and c o n n . T h e forward third of the hull sides a n d the b u l w a r k f o r w a r d o f the d e c k h o u s e were 101b S T S . T h e b u l w a r k , t w o parallel l o w steel walls on the f o r w a r d w e a t h e r deck, protected t r o o p s preparing t o d e b a r k as well as the egress hatches f r o m the t r o o p c o m p a r t m e n t s . T h e bridge, c o n n , and gun tubs were additionally protected by 2 % i n plastic armor. Lessons were learned and flaws were uncovered in the L C I - 1 class and it w a s n o t long before a redesign was underway. Forty-five L C I - I s were canceled so that an improved design could be built sooner. T h e deckhouse o f the n e w L C I - 3 5 1 class was extended f o r w a r d and widened to the hull sides. T h e egress hatches f r o m t r o o p c o m p a r t m e n t s N o . 2 - 4 were n o w enclosed by the deckhouse, reducing problems troops had coming topside in foul weather; only N o . 3 was so protected on the L C I - 1 class. T h e hatches were enlarged t o a c c e p t litters. Previously there was deck space on either side o f the d e c k h o u s e allowing free p a s s a g e . N o w one had to pass through the deckhouse when moving fore and aft. T h e enlarged deckhouse provided more messing, troop officer a c c o m m o d a t i o n , and crew w o r k areas necessary for the v o y a g e s , w h i c h were longer t h a n originally envisioned. Galley space, r e f r i g e r a t i o n units a n d the n u m b e r s o f toilets and w a s h r o o m s were also

LCKU-1 CLASS AND LCKD-351 CLASS 1: LCI(L)-1 CLASS This early production boat retains the seldom-used steadying sail mast on the aft end of the deckhouse. These masts were later removed. It also features the "park bench" seats along the port inboard side of the bulwark, but similar seats on the outside of the bulkheads of the deckhouse were deleted. The early boats were armed with four 20mm guns. This boat is painted haze gray, but once in the Pacific was repainted in a green camouflage scheme. Gray was often retained in the Mediterranean and the English Channel. Small white hull numbers were used to limit the vessels' visibility. It was soon found that larger numbers were necessary for control purposes and this necessity overruled low visibility. 2: LCKD-351 CLASS The much redesigned and improved 351 class offered accommodations for lengthier cruises and added a fifth 20mm gun. The hull did not change, but the deckhouse was enlarged and there was some internal compartment redesign. The Pacific dapple camouflage scheme was designed to blend into the vegetated shoreline of islands in the background (from water level). This scheme was especially effective in the Solomons, with its many closely gathered islands. In daylight the vessels would moor at the shore's edge to blend into the trees. The round "castle bridge" is apparent as opposed to the "square bridge" on the earlier class.

LCI(L), LSM, and LCS(L) builders

Albina Engine & Machine Works, Portland, OR: LCI-1013-1033 (1034-1051cancelled) LCS-48-78

Bethlehem Steel, Hingham Yard, Hingham, MA: LCI-97-136 (137-160 cancelled) Brown Shipbuilding Co., Houston, TX: LCI-319-350 LSM-1-125,354-388, 459-552 Charleston Navy Yard, North Charleston, SC: LSM-126-200, 295-309, 389-413,553-558 Commercial Iron Works, Portland, OR: LCI-725-780 (781 cancelled) LCS-26-47, 79-108

Consolidated Steel Corp., Orange, TX: LCI-61-96,943-1012 Defoe Shipbuilding Co., Bay City, Ml: LCI-1052-1098 (1099-1139 cancelled) Dravo Corp., Wilmington, DE: LSM-201-232,414-446 Federal Shipbuilding & Dry dock, Kearny, NJ: LCI-161-196 (197-208 cancelled)

LSM-253-294 George Lawley & Sons Shipbuilding Corp., Neponset, MA: LCI-209-238, 351-422, 658-716 (717-724 cancelled) LCS-1-25,109-130 New Jersey Shipbuilding Corp., Barber, NJ: LCI-239-318,423-657, 782-821,866-884 (822865,885-942 cancelled) New York Shipbuilding Corp., Camden, NJ: LCI-1-48 (49-60 cancelled) Pullman Standard Car Manufacturing Co., Chicago, IL: LSM-310-353 Western Pipe & Steel Corp., San Pedro, CA: LSM-233-252,447-458

10

i n c r e a s e d . I m p r o v e d heating a n d ventilation were provided and bunks installed in the t r o o p c o m p a r t m e n t s . P o w e r connections were fitted to allow c r e w a n d passengers t o r e m a i n a b o a r d w h e n d o c k e d . U n d e r w a y refueling facilities were also installed. T h e n e w class could carry nine t r o o p officers and 2 0 6 enlisted men and had a c r e w o f four officers and 2 5 men. A taller r o u n d " c a s t l e b r i d g e " replaced the " s q u a r e b r i d g e " and four 2 0 m m guns were m o u n t e d on the deckhouse's corners. A fifth gun was on the bow. T h e t w o gangway ramps were lengthened by 4 f t to provide a m o r e gradual incline and were n o w lowered and retracted by the a n c h o r windlass rather than by h a n d - r u n b l o c k - a n d - t a c k l e . T h e first L C I ( L ) - 3 5 1 class w a s laid d o w n on M a r c h 5 , 1 9 4 3 , launched on April 8 , and c o m m i s s i o n e d on M a y 1 4 . This lead ship and others w o u l d be converted to g u n b o a t s and then m o r t a r boats. A t o t a l o f 5 9 5 L C I ( L ) - 3 5 1 class were built: 3 5 1 - 7 1 6 , 7 3 1 - 7 8 0 , 7 8 4 - 8 2 1 , 8 6 6 - 8 8 4 , 9 4 3 - 1 0 3 3 , and 1 0 5 2 - 1 0 9 8 (inclusive o f the L C I - 4 0 2 subclass). M a n y o f the users called for a centerline b o w r a m p and doors similar to those on an LST. Such features w o u l d allow troops to debark faster and at b e a c h level rather than being e x p o s e d while descending the n a r r o w ramps. B u l k i e r c a r g o c o u l d also be o f f l o a d e d faster by h a n d . T h e p r o t o t y p e was L C I ( L ) - 4 0 2 . B o w doors were installed on craft built after J u n e 1 , 1 9 4 4 , to include: 4 0 2 , 6 4 1 - 6 5 7 , 6 9 1 - 7 1 6 , 7 6 2 - 7 8 0 , 7 8 2 - 8 2 1 , 8 6 6 - 8 8 4 , 1 0 2 4 - 1 0 3 3 , and 1 0 6 8 - 1 0 9 8 . O t h e r changes to this subclass were minor. A total o f 2 1 1 L C I ( L ) s were transferred to the R o y a l N a v y under LendLease f r o m 1 9 4 3 , with the crews trained in the States. In early 1 9 4 5 , 2 5 more were transferred to the U S S R , with the crews trained by C o a s t Guardsmen at C o l d Bay, A l a s k a . N o fire support types were transferred to either navy.

Armament LCIs were provided with only light anti-aircraft armament, four or five 2 0 m m guns. Later versions substituted a 4 0 m m for the b o w 2 0 m m . T h e various fire support craft had a much varied armament, with combinations of 2 0 m m and 4 0 m m cannons, 3in or 5in guns, 4.2in mortars, and 4.5in or 5in barrage rockets. T h e O e r l i k o n 2 0 m m M k 4 a u t o m a t i c c a n n o n was the standard armament o f L C I s and L S M s . Fed by 6 0 - r o u n d snail drum m a g a z i n e s , it rattled out shells at 5 5 0 r p m with a 2 , 0 0 0 y d range and was m a n n e d by a crew of five. M k 2 4 twin m o u n t s w e r e fitted on later L S M ( R ) s and added t w o men. N u m b e r s o f . 5 0 c a l M 2 B r o w n i n g air-cooled m a c h i n e guns were mounted on L C I g u n b o a t s and L S M ( R ) s , mostly on the fantail, as were Browning . 3 0 c a l M 1 9 1 9 A 4 m a c h i n e guns on L S M ( R ) s . T h e s e served as last-resort weapons against air a t t a c k , but were also useful against small attack boats. T h e British usually m o u n t e d t w o . 3 0 3 i n Lewis M k I m a c h i n e guns for air defense on their L C I ( L ) s . Heavier anti-aircraft w e a p o n s were provided in the form o f 4 0 m m Bofors guns on the g u n b o a t s . T h e s e were also used against targets ashore. T h e dual M k 1 m o u n t was usually on the stern and/or b o w and consisted of a M k 1 right gun a n d M k 2 left gun. T h e s e were US N a v y w e a p o n s employing p o w e r e d m o u n t s a n d were w a t e r - c o o l e d , m a k i n g t h e m c a p a b l e o f a high sustained rate o f fire. T h e single-barrel 4 0 m m M k 3 gun was a US Army M l on a US N a v y M k 3 m o u n t ; often A r m y M l m o u n t s were simply welded to the deck in the rush to convert L C I s to g u n b o a t s , plus the m o u n t was smaller and lighter. T h e s e were air-cooled and manually trained. Single and dual guns had four- and seven-man crews, respectively. T h e " f o r t y - m i k e - m i k e " was fed by four-round clips and fired at 1 2 0 - 1 8 0 r p m to 5 , 0 0 0 y d .

T h e L S M ( R ) boasted the heaviest a r m a m e n t in the f o r m o f the 5in ( 3 8 c a l ) M k 1 2 gun in a fully enclosed M k 3 0 turret, as used on destroyers. T h i s gun threw a 5 5 l b shell to a range o f 1 7 , 0 0 0 y d . T h e 1 2 - m a n crew, using ready rounds in the turret, could h a m m e r out 2 5 r p m . W i t h a steady supply o f a m m u n i t i o n f r o m the m a g a z i n e , they c o u l d m a i n t a i n 1 5 r p m . W h i l e the vessel's rocket a r m a m e n t (see below) saturated the target area, the 5in was an accurate and potent w e a p o n against point targets with high-explosive (called " c o m m o n " by the N a v y ) , a n t i - a i r c r a f t , a r m o r - p i e r c i n g , a n d i l l u m i n a t i o n (called " s t a r " by the N a v y ) shells.

The 20mm Mk 4 cannon atop the deck of an LCI(L)-1 class boat. The odd pipe arrangement to the gun tub's left is the folded stovepipe. The gun is mounted over the galley.

A little-used w e a p o n found on some g u n b o a t s and L C S ( R ) s was the 3in (50cal) M k 2 2 dual-purpose gun. T h i s was often m o u n t e d in lieu o f a twin 4 0 m m . T h e outdated M k 2 2 was moderately effective against aircraft but t o o light for surface targets, and the high rate o f 4 0 m m fire w a s m u c h preferred over the 3in's 1 8 r p m . It had a 1 4 , 0 0 0 y d r a n g e , w a s m a n n e d by seven men, and used the same type o f a m m u n i t i o n as the 5in gun. L C I ( M ) s and L S M ( R ) s also m o u n t e d four US A r m y 4 . 2 i n M 2 m o r t a r s . These w e a p o n s , relatively small c o m p a r e d to other naval a r m a m e n t , had a 6 0 0 - 3 , 2 0 0 y d range - further than the 4 . 5 i n r o c k e t - but they could n o t be fired to their full 4 , 4 0 0 y d range because o f the stress inflicted on the deck. While the barrage-launch o f 4 8 0 rockets was an impressive display, reload time was considerable and demanding on manpower. A 4 . 2 i n m o r t a r could fire 4 0 rounds in the first t w o minutes and 1 0 0 rounds in the first 2 0 minutes. T h e four mortars together could each keep up a steady barrage o f 6 0 rounds an hour indefinitely. Ammunition included high-explosive, white phosphorus, and illumination. T h r e e types o f b a r r a g e r o c k e t s w e r e l a u n c h e d f r o m fire s u p p o r t c r a f t . These rockets were developed and fielded in a r e m a r k a b l y short time. T h e 11

4 . 5 i n " O l d F a i t h f u l " beach barrage r o c k e t was quickly designed using the m o t o r o f the 2 . 2 5 i n M o u s e t r a p anti-submarine rocket fitted with a 201b general-purpose b o m b . It was first fired in late J u n e a n d t h o u s a n d s were launched during the N o r t h Africa invasion in N o v e m b e r 1 9 4 2 , but f r o m L C T s , not L C I s . T h e 4 . 5 i n r o c k e t was fin-stabilized with only a 1 , 1 0 0 y d range, and was none t o o accurate. Both high-explosive and white phosphorus warheads were provided. A slightly longer-ranged model with a longer rocket m o t o r was provided in 1 9 4 4 . T h e barrage rockets ( B R ) were fired f r o m several types o f launcher racks: M k 1 - 1 2 rockets in four layers, elevatable, but non-trainable. M k 7 - 1 2 - r o c k e t gravity-fed r a c k s . Preset elevations, but nontrainable. Fired 1 2 rockets in four seconds. M k 8 - 1 2 r o c k e t s , modified M k 1 with fixed elevation, nontrainable. M k 11 - Improved M k 7 capable o f jettisoning misfires. M k 2 2 - 1 2 r o c k e t s . Elevatable, fixed train. 2

Because o f the inadequate range and accuracy o f the 4 . 5 i n , development o f a new r o c k e t began in M a y 1 9 4 3 . T h e 5in high-velocity spinner rocket ( H V S R ) began to be fitted on r o c k e t boats in late 1 9 4 4 . T w o m o t o r variants w e r e available offering 5 , 0 0 0 y d and 1 0 , 0 0 0 y d ranges with various highexplosive, semi-armor-piercing, and white phosphorus warheads. T h e M k 5 1 was a single rail launcher similar to the M k 7 capable o f automatically firing 1 2 rockets in 4 . 5 seconds. T h e M k 1 0 2 was a trainable, automatically loaded (from below deck) twin-tube launcher capable of firing 3 0 rockets per minute. 3

As an interim measure owing the non-availability of the new 5in H V S R , the first L S M ( R ) s were fitted with racks for the much longer fin-stabilized 5in forward-firing aircraft r o c k e t ( F F A C ) . Fitted with high-explosive and white phosphorus warheads, it had only a 1 , 7 0 0 y d range. T h e late-war launchers required long rails: the M k 3 0 had six rails and the M k 3 6 four. Both were fixed in train, but the M k 3 0 was elevatable while the M k 3 6 was fixed at 4 5 degrees. A Type C r a c k for a single 3001b M k 6 depth charge was fitted on either side o f the fantail on the L C I ( L ) - 1 class, the idea being that the L C I s could 2 M k 1 M o d 0 was port, M k 1 M o d 1 was starboard. 3 These are often identified as " S S " rockets, which means "spin-stabilized," but are sometimes misidentified as "ship-to-shore."

LCKD-402 CLASS AND LCS(L)(3) 1: LCKD-402 CLASS From June 1944, LCIs began to be built with a bow ramp and doors and a redesigned forecastle. Some vessels of this LCI(L)-402 class were converted to LCI(R)s, with rocket launchers on the forward deck and a 40mm gun on the forecastle, and LC(FF)s. The pale blue upper hull and deckhouse and navy blue lower hull scheme were often used in the English Channel. 2: LCS(L)(3) While the hull was the same, with some modification of the bow, and the "castle bridge" was used, the LCS(L) bore little resemblance to the LCI(L) on which it was based. Ten rocket launchers were fitted just forward of the deckhouse and No. 2 gun tube, but it was foremost a gunboat, with twin 40mms forward of the pilothouse and on the fantail. The bow featured a 3in or single 40mm gun, or a twin 40mm. A common camouflage scheme was for the hull to be painted black from the stern to a point at the forward gun and angled to appear as a vessel's bow. The forward position of the hull, deckhouse, gun tubes, other fittings, and the bulwark from the No. 2 gun mount (3in gun in this case) forward to the bow were haze gray. Some vessels had a broad black waterline band and red hull bottom.

LCI(L) characteristics LCKU-1 class

LCKD-351 class

Dimensions Length:

158ft 5V2in

160ft 4in

Beam:

23ft 3in

23ft 3in

Displacement Loaded:

387 tons

385 tons

Landing:

238 tons

257% tons

Light:

194 tons

209 tons

Loaded:

5ft 4in forward, 5ft 11 in aft

5ft 8in forward &aft

Landing:

2ft 8in forward, 5ft aft

2ft 10in forward, 5ft 3in aft

Light:

3ft 3in mean

3ft 6in mean

Draft

Speed Maximum:

15 / knots 1

2

Endurance 12 knots:

8,700 miles

help protect convoys from submarines. These were often later removed and were n o t installed on the L C I ( L ) - 3 5 1 class. M o s t L C I s had a Besler fog oil smoke generator on the fantail and were also provided with M 3 or M k 2 smoke pots, which could be burned in o n b o a r d racks, or M 4 A 2 floating pots dropped over the side.

LCI(L) DESCRIPTION T h e L C I ( L ) was the third-largest o f the beaching craft, being outsized by the L S T and L S M . While not intended as an assault c r a f t , it w a s a c o m b a t a n t built to beach itself on a hostile shore where it could be under artillery, m o r t a r , a n d small a r m s fire as well as e x p o s e d to air attack. In the fire support role, while operating offshore, it was also exposed to and drew heavy fire.

F r o m the keel up, an L C I had four or five levels. T h e hold w a s divided into dozens o f c o m p a r t m e n t s including ballast t a n k s , fuel oil tanks, fresh water tanks, 8,000 miles and voids. T h e L C I ( L ) - 1 class held 1 2 0 t o n s o f fuel, 2 4 0 g a l o f lubricating oil, and 3 6 t o n s o f fresh water, while the L C I ( L ) - 3 5 1 class carried 1 0 tons less fuel and one ton m o r e water. T h e first p l a t f o r m contained four t r o o p c o m p a r t m e n t s , engine r o o m , crew quarters, storage, and steering gear. T h e main or weather deck forward o f the d e c k h o u s e c o n t a i n e d only the b u l w a r k sheltering t r o o p s on deck. F o r w a r d w a s the forecastle (fo'c's'le - p r o n o u n c e d " f o l k ' - s ' l " ) , a raised p l a t f o r m m o u n t i n g a 2 0 m m gun and flanked by the gangway ramps. Aft of the d e c k h o u s e w a s the fantail. T h e deckhouse was divided into numerous c o m p a r t m e n t s to a c c o m m o d a t e the crew, passengers, and vessel operations. T h e bridge was at the deckhouse's f o r w a r d end and included the raised conn. O n e or four guns, depending on the class, were atop the deckhouse. 15 / knots 1

2

Propulsion

An LCI(L)-1 class vessel makes a sharp turn during its shakedown cruise. They could turn in a 100yd radius.

14

T h e engine r o o m was b e l o w the aft end of the deckhouse. Propulsion was provided by eight G e n e r a l M o t o r s D e t r o i t 6 - 7 1 t w o - s t r o k e , six-cylinder, 2 2 5 h p diesel engines. T h e s e collectively developed l , 8 0 0 h p . M o s t ships had one large engine per shaft, but a suitably sized and powered engine did not exist f o r the L C I . It w o u l d have required far t o o long to develop such an engine and engine factories were already overloaded. An ingenious solution w a s f o u n d by linking four engines together t o p o w e r each shaft. T h e G M 6 - 7 1 was a tried and proven design used for buses, t r u c k s , t a n k s , t u g b o a t s , and g e n e r a t o r s . N o r m a l l y , linking four engines to a c o m m o n r e d u c t i o n gear w o u l d develop h a r m o n i c oscillations capable o f breaking crankshafts. T h i s p r o b l e m w a s o v e r c o m e by using dry disc clutches with just enough plate tension t o a l l o w the clutch t o slip w h e n a b n o r m a l vibrations o c c u r r e d . T h e oscillations would then go out o f phase with one another. Individual engines could be taken offline

while underway (with a slight speed reduction) for servicing. T h e r e were instances when L C I s limped into p o r t on one t o three engines that were kept running on parts cannibalized f r o m the others. Each engine had an exhaust line with a small port just above the waterline, four on each side. Seawater b o t h c o o l e d the engines' heat exchangers and quietened the wet-type M a x i m silencers. H o t coolant water and exhaust fumes were discharged through the same exhaust p o r t s . T h i s system enabled an L C I t o a p p r o a c h a hostile shore in comparative silence. T w o G M 2 - 7 1 two-cylinder versions o f the main engines powered the t w o 2 0 k W p o w e r generators for the 1 2 0 - v o l t D C electrical system. T h e r e were dozens o f small electric m o t o r s to operate water, fuel, and bilge pumps, fire fighting systems, etc. T h e engines were n o t c a p a b l e o f running in reverse, w h i c h w a s o f c o u r s e essential for d o c k i n g m a n e u v e r s a n d e x t r a c t i n g f r o m a b e a c h . T w o b r o n z e 4ft-diameter variable-pitch propellers were provided for this p u r p o s e . T h e y were always turning in the same direction, but w h e n reverse w a s required an electric servo m o t o r , l o c a t e d b e t w e e n the f o r w a r d t w o engines, reversed the angle o f the t h r e e b l a d e s t o the a s t e r n p i t c h . T h e p r o p e l l e r s t u r n e d constantly, even w h e n the ship c a m e to a rest, w h e n the blades were pitched t o the f e a t h e r i n g p o s i t i o n w h e r e they i m p a r t e d n o m o v e m e n t . T h e p i t c h m o t o r o p e r a t e d f r o m 2 4 - v o l t b a t t e r i e s in the event t h a t b o t h p o w e r generators were lost. T w o additional electric m o t o r s p o w e r e d the steering, which was p e r f o r m e d by t w o rudders. If the p o w e r g e n e r a t o r s were lost, there was a m a n u a l steering s t a t i o n o n the f a n t a i l . A s o u n d - p o w e r e d telephone provided steering instructions f r o m the c o n n t o the wheel station, which was blind f o r w a r d .

LCI(L)sand LCS(L)swere powered by eight of these reliable General Motors Detroit 6-71 two-stroke, six-cylinder, 225hp diesel engines, four per propeller shaft.

Below decks In the narrow b o w beneath the forecastle were voids and stores compartments. T h e layout was similar on both the L C I ( L ) - 1 and 3 5 1 classes. T r o o p compartment capacity for each compartment is parenthesized, the first number for the LCI(L)-1 class, second for the 3 5 1 class, and the third for the 4 0 2 class: troop compartment N o . 1 (46/48/47); N o . 2 (58/62/62); and N o . 3 (67/67/63). Doghouse hatches to the main deck for N o . 1 and 2 were within the f o r w a r d b u l w a r k , while N o . 3 exited into the d e c k h o u s e on the L C I ( L ) - 1 . O n the L C I ( L ) - 3 5 1 b o t h N o . 2 and 3 gave access into the d e c k h o u s e . T h e c r e w quarters a c c o m m o d a t i n g all enlisted m e n was aft o f t r o o p c o m p a r t m e n t N o . 3 and forward of the engine r o o m , while the engine r o o m was below the aft end o f the deckhouse and also housed the p o w e r generators. N o . 4 t r o o p c o m p a r t m e n t (28/23/26) was aft of the engine r o o m with a ladder leading to a c o m p a n i o n w a y nnected to the deckhouse on the 3 5 1 and 4 0 2 classes. O n the L C I ( L ) - 1 class it was protected only by a d o g h o u s e hatch on the fantail. T w o provisions compartments were to the aft o f the N o . 4 t r o o p c o m p a r t m e n t with a c o m p a n i o n w a y separating them and connecting the t r o o p c o m p a r t m e n t and the steering gear compartment in the lazarette (aft-most compartment).

LCKD-419 beached on Utah Beach, Normandy. Engine coolant intakes were on the hull bottom on most ships, but since the LCI was by nature frequently run aground, they were on the sides where they would not suck up sand. In the English Channel, US vessels bore a large "US" while British vessels lacked identifying letters.

On* m .

15

Q ANATOMY OF AN LCI(L)-351 CLASS

The LCI(L) consisted of three levels. The "first platform" contained various storage spaces, four troop compartments, crew quarters, and engine room. Beneath this was the "hold," divided into many small compartments for ballast, fuel, water and serving as voids. The "main deck" included the forward deck with the bulwark and the fantail aft of the deckhouse. The "deckhouse" contained a surprising number of compartments and facilities to serve the crew and passengers and operate the vessel. The "forecastle and deckhouse" topside mounted the armament and the pilothouse.

KEY 1 20mm Mk 4 automatic cannon (x5) 2 Forecastle 3 Anchor room, troops'head 4 Troop gangway ramps 5 Bulwarks 6 Pilot house 7 Conn 8 Troops officers' quarters 9 Enlisted mess 10 Ship's officers'quarters 11 Officers' mess 12 Ward room 13 Galley 14 Refrigerators 15 Life rafts 16 Chart & radio room 17 Captain's quarters 18 Officers'head 19 Crew's head 20 Stern anchor winch 21 Stores 22 No. 1 troop compartment 23 No. 2 troop compartment 24 No. 3 troop compartment 25 Crews'quarters 26 Engine room 27 General Motors Detroit 6-71, 225hp diesel engines (x8) 28 No. 4 troop compartment 29 Magazines & stores 30 Lazarette & steering gear

16

T h e t r o o p and c r e w c o m p a r t m e n t s were c r o w d e d with quadruple-stacked b u n k s with very n a r r o w spaces between t h e m . T h e r e were n o lockers for t r o o p s (they lived out o f their b a c k p a c k s ) and only limited lockers for c r e w m e n . Lighting and ventilation were poor, but were improved somewhat in the 3 5 1 class.

Main deck

BELOW RIGHT The aft portion of the pilothouse on LCI(G)-428. To the right of the chart table is a gooseneck microphone for the public address system and the controls for the telephone system. To the left are a soundpower telephone and the voice tube to the engine room. BELOW LEFT The forward portion of LCI(G)-428's radio room. The multiple radios were on the command, fire control, and administrative nets. Yellow-painted battle lanterns can be seen on the deck beyond the typewriter desk.

18

T h e m a i n f o r w a r d deck b e t w e e n the forecastle and the d e c k h o u s e held the b u l w a r k . T h i s w a s simply t w o l o w b u l k h e a d s inset f r o m the hull sides and r u n n i n g f r o m the f o r e c a s t l e a l m o s t b a c k t o the d e c k h o u s e . It provided a degree o f small arms fire and f r a g m e n t a t i o n p r o t e c t i o n to t r o o p s c o m i n g on d e c k . D o g h o u s e a n d e m e r g e n c y t r u n k h a t c h e s w e r e behind the b u l w a r k . T o gain access t o the r a m p s , the t r o o p s c o u l d g o a r o u n d the aft end o f the b u l w a r k or t h r o u g h a steel side gate on each side. T h e fantails o f the L C I ( L ) - 1 a n d 3 5 1 classes w e r e m u c h d i f f e r e n t . B o t h h a d large p o w e r w i n c h e s to r e t r a c t the stern a n c h o r and the kedge a n c h o r w a s m o u n t e d on a r a c k on the stern. T h e 1 class h a d t w o 2 0 m m gun tubs on the fantail, the p o r t side gun being slightly m o r e aft t h a n the s t a r b o a r d , and there was a single depth charge r a c k on either side. T r o o p c o m p a r t m e n t N o . 4 doghouse h a t c h w a s just f o r w a r d o f the p o r t gun. T w o life rafts and a 1 2 f t skiff were s t o w e d here on the 3 5 1 class. O n the 1 class its t w o rafts were stowed on either side o f the d e c k h o u s e . T h e rafts were only sufficient for the crew, the passengers having t o rely on life j a c k e t s .

Deckhouse T h e m a j o r difference between the 1 class and 3 5 1 class was the deckhouse. T h e 1 class had a comparatively small rectangular deckhouse with the bridge f o r w a r d . O f t e n called the " s q u a r e b r i d g e , " it was actually trapezoid in shape with a radio m a s t positioned a b a f t . T h e antenna wire ran forward to a short m a s t a b a f t the forecastle gun. T h e l o w e r p o r t i o n o f the bridge was the

pilothouse and the upper the c o n n . O n m o s t b o a t s in A m e r i c a n service, the c o n n w a s elevated a n o t h e r level t o provide better vision f o r w a r d . T h e deckhouse proper held crew and passenger officer quarters, w a r d r o o m , radio r o o m , galley, head, and w a s h r o o m . T h e 1 class w a s designed only for a 4 8 - h o u r transit with t r o o p s , and mess and sanitation facilities were barely adequate. A 2 0 m m tub w a s a b a f t the c o n n a l o n g with v e n t i l a t o r s . T h e r e were hatches on b o t h sides o f the bridge a n d the a f t w a r d sides o f the deckhouse. T w o portholes pierced the sides and front o f the bridge. T h e c o n n was o p e n - t o p p e d . Originally a tall m a s t w a s fitted a b a f t the d e c k h o u s e , intended to rig a triangular steadying sail. T h i s was to reduce rolling in rough seas, but did little to steady the ship, and was usually removed.

ABOVE LEFT Details of an LCI's 2ft 6in-wide troop ramp. On the LCI(L)-1 class it was 28ft long and 32ft on the LCKD-351 class. The longer ramp provided a less steep incline for equipmentladen troops. Cable handrails and tread slats aided the troops on a wet ramp. The I-beam cathead supporting the ramp's block-and-tackle was pivoted inboard when not in use.

T h e 3 5 1 class deckhouse was considerably larger in length and breadth. It extended further forward and aft and occupied the full width o f the deck. R a t h e r than being rectangular, its corners were rounded with a 2 0 m m tub on each. T h e m o s t notable feature was the high r o u n d bridge called a " c a s t l e bridge" set one-third o f the w a y b a c k a t o p the deckhouse. T h e r e w a s a h a t c h on both sides, with ports all r o u n d , and a ladder to the aft for access to the conn, beside which was a radio and signal mast. Ladders on the f o r w a r d and aft ends o f the deckhouse accessed its topside. A central passageway ran the length of the deckhouse. O n the starboard side was a mess, small w a r d r o o m , galley, and refrigerator r o o m s . O n the port side were t r o o p and ship's officer quarters, chart and radio r o o m , captain's cabin, officer's head and w a s h r o o m , and crew head and w a s h r o o m .

ABOVE RIGHT Here we can see the design differences between the LCI(L)-351 class with two troop ramps (right) and the LCI(L) 402-subclass with bow doors and a 4ft 6in-wide single ramp (left).

Forecastle and ramps T h e raised forecastle platform housed toilets and a w a s h r o o m for the troops plus the b o w anchor winch. M o r e facilities were added to the 3 5 1 class, which also had a slightly raised overhead platform. A t o p the forecastle was a 2 0 m m tub and a spare anchor was stowed there. T h e main anchor was housed on the forepeak. A very few 3 5 1 class lacked the b o w 2 0 m m . A 2 f t 6in-wide r a m p was fitted on either side of the forecastle, 2 8 f t long for the 1 class and 3 2 f t for the 3 5 1 class. Stanchions with cable handrails were fitted on both sides o f the ramps. Retractable catheads (arms supporting block-and-tackle) were fitted to the forepeak to support the tackle lowering and raising the r a m p s . T h e y were lowered by hand on the 1 class and by the a n c h o r winch on the 3 5 1 class. 19

Some boats had alternate debarkation ladders stowed on the o u t b o a r d bulwark sides. These were placed almost vertically on either side of the forepeak forward of the ramp catheads. T h e ramps, w h a t the British called " b r o w s , " were sometimes torn off by heavy surf or fouled in w r e c k a g e . T h e 4 0 2 class, with an internal b o w r a m p , had a m u c h rearranged f o r e c a s t l e . T h e single centerline g a n g w a y r a m p angled d o w n w a r d to the drop r a m p . T h e r a m p was accessed from the weather deck and not the f o r w a r d t r o o p c o m p a r t m e n t . A wide d o u b l e h a t c h was provided in the forecastle's aft bulkhead to access the r a m p . T h e b o w r a m p only extended 4 f t and was 4 f t 6in wide. A 2 0 f t extension ramp o f the same width could be slid out to reach 1 6 f t beyond the ramp's end. T h e b o w doors were secured by turnbuckle dogs. D o o r s and r a m p were operated by cables via a heavy winch fitted in the center o f the main deck. T h e bulwarks were moved outboard t o the side o f the hull t o provide m o r e unrestricted deck c a r g o s p a c e . T h e interior o f the forecastle n o w served as storage with the head and w a s h r o o m in the deckhouse. The closed bow doors of LCI(L)-402. This craft is painted haze gray, as were most LCIs destined for the Mediterranean and Europe. Those for the Pacific were usually colored green in the yard and sometimes even painted in a camouflage scheme. This also provides details of the bow anchor.

LCI VARIANTS T o serve as c o m m a n d ships for landing craft flotillas, 4 9 LCIs were converted in late 1 9 4 4 to Landing Craft (Flotilla Flagship) - L C ( F F ) . These served as flotilla leaders not only for L C I units, but L S M and L S T units also. (It was impractical to convert these larger landing ships to c o m m a n d ships due to the loss o f cargo capacity.) Externally the L C ( F F ) appeared no different than a standard L C I other than having a small radar dome atop the mast and a long whip antenna aft of the pilothouse. T h e troop compartments were converted to a c c o m m o d a t e the increased complement, with N o . 1 compartment becoming the enlisted staff quarters, N o . 2 the staff w o r k s p a c e , N o . 3 being divided into t w o - m a n cabins for up to eight staff officers, and N o . 4 serving as 4

4 Flotilla staff officers included communications and engineering officers, paymaster, and doctor.

LCI FIRE SUPPORT CRAFT The various fire support craft based on the LCI(L) were converted from LCI(L)-1 class, LCI(L)-351 class, and even the LCI(L)-402 class with a bow door and ramp. As well as being converted while under construction in US yards, they were also converted overseas in advance naval bases. Armament configurations varied between craft of the same type, sometimes drastically. 1: LCI(G)-397 was converted to a Type B gunboat in June 1943. Besides the early Pacific theater gunboat conversions, those converted in the United States had one of six battery configurations. The types A, B, and E were built on LCI(L)-351 and 402 class vessels and the Types C, D, and F on the LCI(L)-1 class. Only the 20mm, 40mm, and 3in guns are depicted on the plan diagrams for the LCI(G)-351 class gunboats. The rocket launchers were mounted in place of the troop ramps. Full armament is described in the text. 2: LCI(R)-73 was a 1 class boat outfitted with 12 x 4.5in Mk 1 rocket launchers. 3: LCI(M)-265 mounted a 40mm on the bow, 4 x 20mm in the usual LCI(L)-351 class manner on the deckhouse, and three 4.2in mortars, one on the centerline between the bulwarks and two immediately forward, either side of the deckhouse.

20

21

provisions storage. T h e former t r o o p officers' quarters was converted into the flotilla commander's cabin. There were t w o 3 0 k W generators instead of 2 0 k W and a water evaporator was installed as well as additional radios. Besides c o m m a n d , operational planning, and coordination, the flotilla relied on the L C ( F F ) to guide the other craft to their destination. Some of these craft were in action at O k i n a w a and proved to be too slow and small to provide the necessary a c c o m m o d a t i o n s and workspace and they were retired at the war's end. Conversions to L C ( F F ) were: 3 6 7 - 3 7 0 , 3 9 9 , 4 2 3 - 4 2 7 , 4 8 4 - 4 8 6 , 503, 504, 531-533, 535, 536, 569, 571, 572, 575, 627, 628, 656, 657, 679, 775, 782, 783, 788-793, 9 8 8 , 9 9 4 , 9 9 5 , 9 9 8 , 1 0 3 1 , and 1 0 7 9 - 1 0 8 3 .

The forecastle of LCI(G)-561 with its 40mm Mk 3 and two 20mm Mk 4 anti-aircraft guns. To the right can be seen 4.5in Mk 7 rocket racks. The lightcolored (gray) rectangular containers in front of the 40mm are ammunition cans. Its ready ammunition box is open to the right. Beneath the 20mm platform wooden ammunition crates are visible.

Earlier s o m e L C I s were converted locally to flagships in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n and k n o w n unofficially as L C I ( H ) H e a d q u a r t e r s . T h e s e were also used at N o r m a n d y and in late 1 9 4 4 a d d i t i o n a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n s capabilities were added to 1 1 L C I s as L C I ( L ) ( C ) s - C o m m a n d - to support the southern F r a n c e landing. T h e r e were t w o other unofficial conversions, produced with only m i n o r internal m o d i f i c a t i o n s m a d e in-theater. T h e L C I ( A ) s - A m m u n i t i o n - were standard L C I s with the N o . 2 t r o o p c o m p a r t m e n t bunks removed to store 1 , 2 0 0 rounds o f 4 . 2 i n m o r t a r ammunition. These craft supported L C I ( M ) s , with an enlarged c r e w to pass ammunition. T h e L C I ( D ) s - Diver - t r a n s p o r t e d a n d served as m o t h e r ships for 1 0 0 - m a n u n d e r w a t e r d e m o l i t i o n t e a m s ( U D T s ) . T h e L C I ( D ) vessels were numbered 2 9 , 4 4 , 2 2 7 , and 4 4 8 . W h e n the c o n c e p t o f the fire support craft was developed, the L C I ( L ) was considered ideal f o r c o n v e r s i o n . It was large enough to m o u n t substantial a r m a m e n t , h a d sufficient space for a m m u n i t i o n and a larger crew, could operate in shallow inshore w a t e r s , was capable o f seagoing operations (thus allowing it t o self-deploy t o objective islands), and c o n v e r s i o n w a s at a relatively l o w cost. In addition, there was a surplus o f L C I s being built, so conversion w o u l d n o t limit the availability o f dedicated troop-carrying L C I s . T h e gun-, r o c k e t - , and m o r t a r - a r m e d craft were o f similar layout, but with different m i x e s o f a r m a m e n t . T h e y were n o t armed purely with the stated a r m a m e n t : m o r t a r and r o c k e t b o a t s had guns and m o s t of the gunboats also had r o c k e t s . T h e internal c o m p a r t m e n t arrangement was changed, with N o . 1 f o r w a r d t r o o p c o m p a r t m e n t b e c o m i n g a stores c o m p a r t m e n t , N o . 2 troop c o m p a r t m e n t converted t o a m a g a z i n e , the amidships t r o o p c o m p a r t m e n t n o w being for the additional crew, and the aft t r o o p c o m p a r t m e n t serving as a n o t h e r magazine. T h e superstructure changed little (both square and round bridge classes were used), except for the addition o f fire-control systems. T h e t r o o p r a m p s were usually r e m o v e d , as often were the bulwarks. A r m a m e n t a r r a n g e m e n t varied greatly, even between craft o f the same type.

Landing Craft, Infantry (Gun) T h e L C I ( G ) g u n b o a t s w e r e c o n v e r t e d in the largest n u m b e r s f r o m 1 class and 3 5 1 class b o a t s , 8 6 in t o t a l , and had the largest crews: five officers and 6 5 m e n . L C I ( G ) - 2 2 , 2 4 , 6 8 , a n d 6 9 were c o n v e r t e d at N e w C a l e d o n i a in August 1 9 4 3 , m o u n t i n g l x 3in, 1 x 4 0 m m aft, 4 x 2 0 m m , and 6 x . 5 0 c a l 22

The crew loads 4.5in barrage rockets into 12-round Mk 7 racks aboard a Type D LCI(G) gunboat, Peleliu, September 1944. The pipe framework aft of the bow 40mm prevents the gun from being fired into the deckhouse when tracking aircraft.

Standard LCI(G) battery armament variations

weapon systems. T w o were used at Treasury Island in O c t o b e r and proved successful. Also converted in-theater were L C I ( G ) - 2 1 , 2 3 , 6 1 , 6 4 - 6 7 , and 7 0 , with the addition o f a n o t h e r 4 0 m m f o r w a r d . T h e s e w e r e used in the M a r s h a l l s at the beginning o f 1 9 4 4 . L C I s c o n v e r t e d in the States h a d six different battery c o n f i g u r a t i o n s (see s i d e b a r ) . Stateside-converted L C I ( G ) s were: 2 , 1 7 - 1 9 , 3 1 % 3 4 * , 3 9 , 4 1 - 4 3 , 4 6 , 6 1 , 6 8 - 7 0 , 7 3 % 7 7 - 8 2 , 1 8 9 , 1 9 0 , 192, 195, 196, 2 3 3 - 2 3 7 , 3 4 5 - 3 4 8 , 365, 366, 372, 373, 3 9 6 - 3 9 8 , 4 0 3 - 4 0 8 , 412-415, 417-422, 428, 449-475, 484, 506, 514, 516, 517, 528, 530, 534, 5 3 8 - 5 4 2 , 5 5 6 , 5 5 8 - 5 6 1 , 5 6 3 , 565-56S, 5 7 0 , 5 7 4 (cancelled), 5 7 6 , 5 7 7 , 5 8 0 , 5 9 4 - 5 9 6 , 6 3 0 - 6 3 3 + , 638+, 6 5 8 - 6 6 0 + , 6 6 1 , 7 2 5 - 7 3 0 , 7 3 9 - 7 4 2 + , 7 5 1 , 7 5 2 , 7 5 4 - 7 5 7 + , 760+, 8 0 1 - 8 1 0 + , 9 4 8 , 9 7 5 + , 1 0 1 0 - 1 0 1 2 + , 1 0 2 3 + , 1 0 5 5 - 1 0 5 9 + , 1088+, and 1 0 8 9 + . Some o f these craft were in turn converted to L C I ( M ) s . 5

Landing Craft, Infantry (Rocket) In April 1 9 4 4 , L C I ( G ) - 3 1 , 3 4 , and 7 3 were converted in-theater to r o c k e t boats with 2 4 x 4 . 5 i n M k 1 or M k 8 launcher racks with 6 0 0 rockets and 5 * = Later converted to LCI(R). t = Later converted to LCI(M).

Hull No. greater than 351: Type A 2 x 40mm, 3 x20mm, 6x.50cal, 10x4.5in Mk 7 launchers TypeB 3 x 40mm, 2 x 20mm, 5x.50cal, 6or8x4.5in Mk 1 launchers TypeE 1 x 3in, 1 x40mm, 4 x 20mm, 10x.50cal Hull No. less than 351: TypeC 2 x 40mm, 4 x 20mm, 6 x .50cal, 10x4.5inMk7and 2 x 4.5in Mk 22 launchers TypeD 3 x 40mm, 4 x 20mm, 10 x 4.5in Mk 7 launchers TypeF 1 x 40mm, 3 x 20mm, 24x4.5in Mk 1 or Mk 8 launchers

LCI(G)-346 and 348 were Type A gunboats armed with 2 x 40mm, 3 x 20mm, and 6 x .50cal guns and 10 x 4.5in Mk 7 rocket launchers. The troop ramps were removed from gunboats. While there were standardized camouflage schemes, it was not uncommon for crews to apply their own - note the differences in the two boats' patterns. 23

storage for 1 , 0 0 0 m o r e . A 4 0 m m gun was mounted on the forecastle and two 2 0 m m guns on the fantail. Additional boats were temporarily converted in time t o be used in the M a r s h a l l s at the beginning of 1 9 4 4 and unofficially designated L C I ( F S ) - Fire Support: L C I ( F S ) - 7 7 - 8 0 , 3 6 5 , 3 6 6 , and 4 3 7 - 4 4 2 . T h e s e boats were armed with 6 x 4 . 5 i n r o c k e t racks each firing 7 2 rockets plus 3 x 4 0 m m , 2 x 2 0 m m , and 5 x . 5 0 c a l guns. Stateside, rocket boats were converted f r o m L C I ( L ) - 3 5 1 class boats and from three L C I ( G ) s , with 3 6 built in t o t a l . A r m a m e n t was the same as the L C I ( M ) , but 6 x 5in rocket launchers replaced the three mortars. T h e craft were fitted with a modified aircraft H 2 C r a d a r to a l l o w t h e m to position themselves precisely. T h e y were also used as radar pickets outside the main fleet area to w a r n o f approaching aircraft. T h e L C I ( R ) had the smallest c r e w o f the fire support L C I s : three officers and 3 1 men. L C I ( R ) s included: 3 1 * , 3 4 % 7 1 * - 7 4 , 2 2 3 - 2 2 6 , 2 3 0 , 3 3 1 , 3 3 7 , 3 3 8 , 340-342, 6 4 2 - 6 5 1 , 704-708, 762-767, 769-772, 1024, 1026, 1028-1030, 1 0 6 8 - 1 0 7 0 , 1 0 7 7 , and 1 0 7 8 . 6

Landing Craft, Infantry (Mortar) In 1 9 4 2 , the US Army Chemical Warfare Service experimented with mounting 4 . 2 i n chemical m o r t a r s on L C I s and L C T s at Amphibious Training Center, Carabelle, F L . T h e " f o u r - d e u c e " m o r t a r was intended to deliver chemical and s m o k e r o u n d s , but since chemical rounds would not be used, high-explosive shells were approved. Able to fire close to shore, the mortars would be able t o continue suppressive fire w h e n the naval and aerial b o m b a r d m e n t s ceased and right up to m o m e n t the assault troops c a m e ashore. T h e m o r t a r induced a heavy recoil and a robust timber frame filled with sand and sawdust was developed to hold the baseplate. T h e first c o m b a t of seaborne mortars saw them mounted on L C T s during the J u l y 1 9 4 3 Sicily landing. It was then decided to modify some LCIs specifically as m o r t a r b o a t s , and they saw their first action during the September 1 9 4 4 Peleliu assault. L C I ( M ) s were subsequently employed in most other landings in the Pacific, as well at N o r m a n d y in J u n e 1 9 4 4 . Forty-two L C I ( M ) s were built, with m a n y being converted from L C I ( G ) s . They possessed a single 4 0 m m gun, four 2 0 m m guns, and three 4.2in mortars (two immediately f o r w a r d o f the deckhouse near the gunwales and another on the centerline further forward. A total of 1 , 2 0 0 x 4 . 2 i n rounds were carried in what had been the N o . 2 troop c o m p a r t m e n t . T h e crew was four officers and 4 9 men. T h e mortar crews were usually trained by US Army chemical mortar battalions and on some boats the mortars were manned by similarly trained Marines. 6 * = Converted from LCI(G).

The three 4.2in M2 mortar crews on an LCI(M) prepare to fire ranging rounds as they approach shore. The open hatch on the right side of the deckhouse ladder leads to the ammunition magazine, the former No. 2 troop compartment.

T h o s e vessels designated as L C I ( M ) were as follows: 3 5 1 - 3 5 6 * , 3 5 9 , 3 6 2 , 431, 437-442, 582, 588, 6 3 0 - 6 3 3 % 6 3 8 % 6 5 8 - 6 6 0 % 664, 669, 670, 673, 674, 7 3 9 - 7 4 2 % 7 5 4 - 7 5 7 % 7 6 0 % 951, 952, 9 7 5 % 1 0 1 0 - 1 0 1 2 % 1 0 2 3 % 1 0 5 5 - 1 0 5 9 % 1 0 8 8 % and 1 0 8 9 * . 7

Landing Craft, Support (Large) Mk 3

T h e final type based on the L C I w a s the L C S ( L ) ( 3 ) , n u m b e r e d 1 - 1 3 0 , k n o w n as " M i g h t y M i d g e t s " and built by three firms after development by the lead company, G e o r g e Lawley. C o n s t r u c t i o n started at the end o f April 1 9 4 4 and ran through the end of the year. Vessels were built in a r e m a r k a b l y short t i m e , s o m e t i m e s in three w e e k s plus a n o t h e r 2 - 4 w e e k s f o r pre-commission fitting. T h e 1 5 8 f t L C S ( L ) w a s based on the L C I hull, but was greatly reconfigured internally, with an entirely different superstructure and deck a r r a n g e m e n t . Its L C I origins were barely r e c o g n i z a b l e , although it retained the " c a s t l e b r i d g e , " but the d e c k h o u s e w a s further f o r w a r d . T h i s was basically a gunboat designed for near-shore fire support and interdicting inter-island barge traffic. T h e r e were n o g a n g w a y s or b o w d o o r s , but the craft c o u l d be b e a c h e d t o provide a stable firing p l a t f o r m for inland targets, s o m e t h i n g s e l d o m d o n e . Inside were s t o r a g e c o m p a r t m e n t s , magazines, crew quarters, officers' q u a r t e r s , o f f i c e r s ' m e s s , c r e w mess and m o r e c r e w q u a r t e r s , g e n e r a t o r r o o m , refrigerators, engine r o o m with eight General M o t o r s diesels (four per shaft), ordnance stores, w o r k s h o p , magazines, storage, and steering gear. O n the b o w w a s a tub f o r a 3 i n o r 8

A stern quarter view of an LCS(L)(3). The small elevated tub forward of the aft 40mm is for the fire control director, but these were never installed owing to shortages. The steam clouds are caused by the discharge of hot engine coolant water into cold seawater.

7 * = Converted from LCI(G)s. 8 The LCS(L) M k 1 and 2 were British 47ft and 105ft fire support craft. The LCS(R) was a 145ft British rocket-firing craft of an entirely different design.

25

ABOVE Haze gray-painted LCS(L)(3)-22, with a banged-up bow. Such damage was common owing to inexperienced crews and the solid resistance of docks. The running-light mast fitted on the front of the twin 40mm tub was removed when in action. ABOVE RIGHT LCS(L)(3)-12 painted haze gray. This is a post-war photo. The four 20mm guns have been removed, although the mounts remain. RIGHT LCS(L)(3)-129 is fitted with twin 40mm guns on the bow, forward of the pilothouse, and on the fantail. The projecting tub on the front of the bridge is for an uninstalled 40mm gun director.

LCS(L)(3) characteristics Dimensions Length: 158ft y in Beam: 23ft 3in 2

Displacement Loaded: 387 tons Landing: 312 tons Light: 250 tons Draft Loaded:

Landing: Light:

4ft 9in forward, 6ft 6in aft 3ft lOin forward, 5ft 8in aft 4ft mean

Speed Maximum: 15 / knots Endurance 12 knots: 5,500 miles 1

2

single 4 0 m m or twin 4 0 m m g u n s . M o s t had 1 0 x 4 . 5 i n M k 7 launcher racks ( t w o sets o f five) on the f o r w a r d d e c k . O n the f o r w a r d p o r t i o n o f the deckhouse was a twin 4 0 m m and there was another on the fantail. Inside the d e c k h o u s e w e r e h e a d s , w a s h r o o m , c h a r t a n d r a d i o r o o m , a n d galley. C e n t e r e d w a s the p i l o t h o u s e with the c o n n and gun directors a b o v e this. A 2 0 m m gun w a s m o u n t e d on either side o f the pilothouse with t w o m o r e just aft o f the d e c k h o u s e . C o m p l e m e n t was five officers and 6 5 men. W h i l e this version w a s based on the L C I ( L ) , the significant design changes altered its characteristics m u c h m o r e t h a n the other L C I fire support variants. O n F e b r u a r y 2 8 , 1 9 4 9 , the remaining L S C ( L ) ( 3 ) s were reclassified as Landing Ship, S u p p o r t (Large) - L S S ( L ) . Fifty-three were transferred to the J a p a n e s e M a r i t i m e Self-Defense F o r c e in 1 9 5 2 . 9

LANDING SHIP, MEDIUM T o provide a vehicle-carrying landing ship with seagoing capabilities similar t o the L C I , the L S M w a s developed in 1 9 4 4 and built in six different yards. L S M s w e r e typically l a u n c h e d in three w e e k s , with a n o t h e r three weeks necessary for fitting. T h e type used features o f the L S T and L C T ( 6 ) , and while under development was called L C T ( 7 ) . T h e first vessels were ordered as such

9 Vessels armed with 3in g u n : LCS(L)-1-10, 26-30, 4 1 - 5 0 , 58-60, 79, and 80; single 4 0 m m g u n : 11-25, 31-40, 51-57, 61-66, 81-89, and 109-124; twin 4 0 m m guns: 67-78, 92-108, and 125-130.

26

and assigned hull numbers in the 1 5 0 0 1 8 0 0 L C T series, but were renumbered when reclassified as L S M s . T h e L S M w a s 4 0 f t longer t h a n its LCI troop-carrying counterpart and l i f t broader - 2 0 3 f t 6in long, 3 4 f t 6in beam. Speed though was 2 - 3 knots less than an L C I . It could carry five light or three medium t a n k s , or six amphibious Landing Vehicle, Tracked (LVT) vehicles (better k n o w n as " a m t r a c s " ) , or nine D U K W ( " D u c k " ) a m p h i b i o u s trucks plus 5 4 passengers; later a c c o m m o d a t i o n was for 4 8 passengers. Alternatively, it could carry 1 5 0 tons o f bulk cargo. T h e LVTs and D u c k s could be launched and retrieved at sea via the b o w r a m p . T h e complement was four officers and 4 8 men, later increased to 5 4 m e n . A vehicle well deck ran the entire length, f r o m the double b o w doors and 16ft 2in long r a m p to the stern plate, which could be r e m o v e d . T h i s facility allowed any n u m b e r o f L S M s to be m o o r e d e n d - t o - e n d t o serve as a causeway, allowing vehicles to be driven f r o m LSTs to the b e a c h . T h e deck's width varied. T h e opening to the r a m p was 1 4 f t wide, but then widened out to 2 2 f t 8in for a b o u t a third o f the deck's length and then n a r r o w e d again t o 18ft for almost 9 0 f t . T h e aft-most portion w a s 1 2 f t wide for 1 7 f t . O n either side were high c o m p a r t m e n t e d b u l k h e a d s . O n the p o r t side, f r o m b o w t o stern, were machinery, storage, hospital, galley, engine access hatches, and w o r k s h o p c o m p a r t m e n t s ; the c o m p a r t m e n t s were only 5 - 7 f t wide. O n the well deck's port side in the immediate stern was the stern a n c h o r winch under a platform. T h e b o w a n c h o r was on the f o r w a r d p o r t side. O n the s t a r b o a r d side were machinery, head, w a s h r o o m , heating boiler, and o r d n a n c e stores c o m p a r t m e n t s . Beneath the t a n k deck were ballast t a n k s ; crew, officer and troop quarters; storage, refrigerator and m a c h i n e r y c o m p a r t m e n t s ; engine r o o m , fuel t a n k s , and m o r e t r o o p and storage c o m p a r t m e n t s , with steering

ABOVE LSM(R)-194 in the South Pacific camouflage scheme. While the colors were predominately green shades, on the stern quarters there was usually a large black splotch, as here. BELOW LEFT The forward side of LSM-275's pilothouse. It was not uncommon for vessels to display colorful insignia. LSM-275 was converted to a cable-laying and repair ship, USS Portunus (ARC-1), in 1952. BELOW RIGHT The deck levels, main compartments, armament, and features of an LSM as depicted on a Navy chart.

LSM characteristics Dimensions Length: 203ft 6in Beam: 34ft 6in Displacement Loaded: 1,095 tons Landing: 743 tons Light: 520 tons Draft Loaded:

Landing:

6ft 4V2in forward, 8ft 3V in aft 3ft 6in forward, 2

7ft /2inaft 1

Speed Maximum: 13.2 knots

Endurance 12 knots: 4,900 miles

gear in t h e l a z a r e t t e . T h e t w o F a i r b a n k s - M o r s e M o d e l 3 8 D 8 or General M o t o r s Cleveland M o d e l 1 6 - 2 7 8 A diesel engines each gave l , 4 4 0 h p . Early ships h a d a 7 , 0 0 0 - m i l e range a n d later 4 , 9 0 0 miles at 1 2 k n o t s . A t o p the side b u l k h e a d structures were three pairs o f 2 0 m m gun tubs, three per side: t w o just aft o f the b o w r a m p c o m p a r t m e n t (later replaced by a single o r twin 4 0 m m t u b o n the forecastle platform bridging over the b o w r a m p c o m p a r t m e n t ) , t w o just f o r w a r d o f amidships, and t w o m o r e near the fantail. J u s t a b a f t o f the amidships starboard 2 0 m m w a s the deckhouse with c h a r t r o o m and radio r o o m , topped by the pilothouse, and that by the c o n n . J u s t aft o f the bridge w a s a c c o m m o d a t i o n for a 3ft-wide removable catwalk allowing access t o the port side bulkhead deck. In total, 5 2 5 L S M s were built, with all serving in the Pacific: L S M - 1 - 1 8 7 , 2 0 0 - 4 0 0 , 4 1 3 - 5 0 0 , and 5 3 7 - 5 8 8 . Seven were lost. L S M - 1 6 1 , 2 2 6 , 4 1 9 , a n d 5 4 6 served in the K o r e a n War. L S M - 1 6 1 w a s the last o f the type in service, finishing its days in 1 9 6 5 as a logistics support ship in the Aleutians: U S S Kodiak. L S M - 5 4 9 a n d 5 5 0 - 5 5 2 w e r e reclassified as salvage lifting vessels ( A R S D - 1 - 4 ) before they were laid down at the war's end. M u c h redesignated, they were c o m m i s s i o n e d in D e c e m b e r 1 9 4 5 as USS Gypsy, Mender, Salvager, and Windlass, respectively. T h e y were decommissioned in the 1 9 4 0 s through the 1 9 6 0 s . M a n y L S M s were transferred or sold t o D e n m a r k , Greece, South K o r e a , N o r w a y , R e p u b l i c o f C h i n a , Spain, T h a i l a n d , Turkey, South Vietnam, Venezuela, a n d other Latin A m e r i c a n countries through the 1 9 4 0 s , 1 9 5 0 s , and 1 9 6 0 s . T h e y m a y have served as landing ships or have been converted to coastal minelayers ( M M C ) o r t o other auxiliaries.

Landing Ship, Medium (Rocket) T h e r e were t w o classes o f L S M ( R o c k e t ) , b o t h k n o w n as a " W h o o f u s " - U S A r m y t r o o p s were said t o a s k : " W h o o f u s this b o a t supposed t o b e ? " T h e t a n k deck w a s provided with an overhead f o r a n e w main deck o n which the r o c k e t l a u n c h e r s w e r e m o u n t e d . T h e side b u l k h e a d c o m p a r t m e n t s r e m a i n e d m u c h the same as o n the L S M , as did the f o r m e r lower deck with the t r o o p c o m p a r t m e n t s a c c o m m o d a t i n g the enlarged crew. T h e former tank d e c k w a s c o m p a r t m e n t a l i z e d w i t h r o c k e t m o t o r a n d r o c k e t b o d y (with w a r h e a d ) magazines a n d r o c k e t assembly r o o m s . L S M ( R ) vessels were also LSM AND LSM(R) 1 : All LSMs served in the Pacific and while usually painted haze gray with blue decks, including the well deck, they were often painted in green camouflage schemes. While the ideal bow armament was twin 40mm guns, many were armed with a single 40mm on a platform over the ramp compartment and even more had a 20mm tub just abaft the forecastle (see insert). Regardless of the forward armament, all LSMs had two more 20mm guns amidships and two on the fantail. 2: The LSM(R)-188 class was a relatively quick conversion of an LSM to a rocket and gunboat vessel accomplished by decking over the well deck and dividing the interior into numerous compartments. There were two variations of 5in rocket armament. LSM(R)-188-195 had 75 x Mk 36 and 30 x Mk 30 rocket launchers, while LSM(R)-196-199 had 85 x Mk 51 launchers, shown here. Both types had a bow 40mm gun, another forward of the pilothouse, a 5in gun on the fantail, and three 20mm guns. The small elevated tub forward of the 5in gun mounts the fire director. 3: Most 401 class rocket boats were painted a dark gray with a black bottom side. This was a complete redesign, still based on the LSM hull, but it had a completely different superstructure on the stern, with the 5in gun just forward and 10 x twin 5in Mk 102 rocket launchers forward. Other armament included twin 40mms on the bow and fantail, 4 x twin 20mms and 4 x 4.2in mortars, plus two .50cal and two .30cal machine guns. Pacific Fleet 1944 directives stated that the bow and stern quarter hull number of large landing craft and landing ships would be 4ft high. On LCIs and LSMs the stern quarter number height was 4ft, often extending to 6ft. 28

This picture of LSM-32 moored alongside LCI(L)-992 provides an idea of the size difference between the two vessels. They are moored inside ABSD-6, a large auxiliary floating dry dock (ten-section, non-selfpropelled) at Guam.

BELOW LEFT LSM(R)-193 rocket ship with its six-rail Mk 36 and four-rail Mk 30 5in rocket launchers empty. It required 216 hours to reload the second barrage and 4 /2 hours for a subsequent barrage owing to the less convenient stowage, as rockets had to be manhandled to deck through multiple compartments further aft. 1

BELOW RIGHT The differences between the LSM(R)-401 class and the LSM(R)-188 class are apparent. The deckhouse was on the fantail with the 5in gun turret forward and it mounted 10 x 5in automatic-feed Mk 103 twin rocket launchers.

equipped with r a d a r a n d used as r a d a r pickets. T h e y were considered the ultimate fire support vessels and w o u l d replace all L C I - b a s e d fire support c r a f t after the war. T h e L S M ( R ) - 1 8 8 class retained the L C M ' s s t a r b o a r d superstructure. T h e s e were built b e t w e e n August and O c t o b e r 1 9 4 4 . T h e r e was a single 4 0 m m on the bow, an elevated 4 0 m m tub forward of the pilothouse, a 2 0 m m a b e a m the superstructure on the port side and t w o 2 0 m m s near the stern. A 5 i n ( 3 8 c a l ) gun in a destroyer-type turret w a s m o u n t e d on the fantail. L S M ( R ) - 1 8 8 - 1 9 5 m o u n t e d 7 5 four-rail M k 3 6 and 3 0 six-rail M k 3 0 5in r o c k e t r a c k s . L S M ( R ) - 1 9 6 - 1 9 9 m o u n t e d automatic-feed 5in M k 5 1 rocket launchers and were 4 0 tons heavier. T h e c r e w was five officers and 7 6 men. F o u r o f the 1 2 L S M ( R ) - 1 8 8 class were lost at O k i n a w a . T h e 4 8 L S M ( R ) - 4 0 1 class ships were of a m u c h different arrangement, with the lower deck reconfigured with r o c k e t magazines and a different crew q u a r t e r s l a y o u t . T h i s class included L S M ( R ) - 4 0 1 - 4 1 2 and 5 0 1 - 5 3 6 built b e t w e e n early 1 9 4 5 a n d the summer. T h e last 3 6 o f the 5 0 1 subclass had m i n o r differences f r o m the 4 0 1 class. T h e second deck was also rearranged, with r o c k e t assembly and handling r o o m s and additional crew quarters for the six officers and 1 3 7 m e n . A s o m e w h a t larger centerline deckhouse was

LSM(R)-195 being launched in October 1944 at the Charleston Navy Yard, SC. As can be seen, a great deal of work remained to be accomplished before completion and commissioning a few weeks later.

built just f o r w a r d o f the fantail. It held a r a d a r and r o c k e t c o n t r o l r o o m , w a r d r o o m , galley, and mess at main deck level. A b o v e these w a s the radio and chart r o o m , over which was situated the bridge, on t o p o f w h i c h was a tub for a 2 . 5 m optical rangefinder and r o c k e t director. A r m a m e n t was m u c h changed as well, with a twin 4 0 m m on the bow, twin 2 0 m m tubs just t o the aft on either side, plus t w o m o r e o n either side o f the d e c k h o u s e . A 5 i n turreted gun was immediately f o r w a r d of the deckhouse. T h e fantail 5in gun o f the L S M ( R ) - 1 8 8 class required the ship t o turn broadside to shore to fire and so presented a broadside target. M o u n t i n g a 5in forward o f the deckhouse on the L S M ( R ) - 4 0 1 class allowed this to be fired as the vessel advanced t o w a r d shore. M o u n t e d a t o p the w i n c h r o o m o n the fantail was a twin 4 0 m m t u b . F o u r 4 . 2 i n m o r t a r s were provided, t w o forward of the deckhouse and one on either side. T w o . 5 0 c a l m a c h i n e guns were m o u n t e d on the forecastle and t w o . 3 0 c a l m a c h i n e guns on bridge wings. Ten 5in M k 1 0 2 twin a u t o m a t i c r o c k e t launchers were m o u n t e d on the forward deck. T h e goal was to provide an all-purpose fire support vessel with rockets, guns, and m o r t a r s . N o n e saw action in W o r l d W a r II, but they would have been employed for the invasion o f J a p a n . After the war, some L S M ( R ) s were rearmed with twin-tube continuous-feed 5in M k 1 0 5 launchers. T h e s e were fed by a u t o m a t i c hoists with a load o f 3 8 0 improved r o c k e t s , and the m o r t a r s were removed f r o m all the vessels. These modifications allowed the c r e w to be reduced to five officers and 7 6 men. After the w a r m o s t were mothballed. Eight saw service in the K o r e a n War with R o c k e t Division 3 2 - L S M ( R ) - 4 0 1 , 4 0 3 , 4 0 4 , 4 0 9 , 4 1 2 , 5 2 5 , 5 2 7 , and 5 3 6 - and were returned to mothballs after the war. O n O c t o b e r 1 , 1 9 5 5 , the 4 8 remaining ships were named after rivers (exclusive of rivers bearing state names, to prevent confusion with battleships). In 1 9 6 5 L S M ( R ) - 4 0 9 , 5 2 5 , and

5 3 6 were recommissioned - USS Clarion River, Saint Francis River, and White River, respectively - for Vietnam service with Inshore Fire Support Division 9 3 . L S M ( R ) - 4 0 1 , 4 0 4 , 4 0 5 , 4 0 9 , 4 1 2 , 5 1 2 , 5 1 3 , 5 1 5 , 5 2 2 , 5 2 5 , 5 3 1 , and 5 3 6 were reclassified as inshore fire support ships ( L F R ) on J a n u a r y 1 , 1 9 6 9 - a m o o t point as all had been decommissioned by 1 9 7 0 , never to serve again. 31

OPERATIONAL HISTORY L C I s , L S M s , and their fire support variants played important but often unheralded roles in the new form of large-scale amphibious w a r f a r e . LCIs of all types fought in all major theaters. In the Pacific they served from the Aleutian Islands to the Netherlands East Indies, and were prepared to strike at Japan. T h e y operated in far northern waters with the R e d Fleet and in the Mediterranean and English Channel with the US Navy and Royal Navy. Their missions were varied and often dangerous, as can be seen in the summary below. 10

LCI and LSM units

LSM-14 wearing dapplepattern camouflage. Most LSMs had a pair of 20mm guns on the bow. Later ships had a bridged-over forecastle mounting a 40mm gun. With the ramp raised and the doors closed, the space between the ramp and the V-shaped space of the outer doors could be flooded to waterline level and used by the crew for bathing.

Landing vessel units were organized into flotillas, groups, and divisions in descending e c h e l o n s usually c o m m a n d e d by a c a p t a i n , c o m m a n d e r , and lieutenant-commander, respectively. (It was n o t u n c o m m o n for the various c o m m a n d e r s t o be a r a n k l o w e r t h a n t h o s e here given.) An L C I F l o t of 2 4 boats was organized into t w o groups of t w o divisions, each with six boats. As an e x a m p l e , L C I F l o t 4 with L C I ( L ) s 8 3 - 9 6 , 3 1 9 - 3 2 6 , 3 4 9 , and 3 5 0 consisted o f L C I G r p s 7 and 8 with L C I D i v s 1 3 - 1 6 . T h e L C I F l o t 4 flagship was L C I - 8 7 and the t w o L C I G r p flagships were L C I - 8 9 and 3 2 1 . T h e division c o m m a n d e r was simply the senior L C I skipper in each division and had no additional staff. L S M flotillas were organized the same. L C I ( G ) , L C I ( M ) , and L C S ( L ) flotillas had three groups of t w o divisions each, six boats per division for a total o f 3 6 in the flotilla. T h e L C I ( R ) flotilla could be under this organization or have only t w o groups for a total o f 2 4 r o c k e t b o a t s . T h e y usually operated as groups or divisions when conducting fire missions and even in pairs or single ships w h e n patrolling or providing post-landing fire support. H o w L C I s were i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the landing force varied f r o m o p e r a t i o n to o p e r a t i o n . T h e flotilla organization was mainly administrative in n a t u r e . W h e n a landing force w a s o r g a n i z e d , L C I flotillas were b r o k e n up and the ships assigned to task groups and task units. Flotilla, group, and division c o m m a n d e r s might be assigned as task group and unit 10 See Osprey Elite 117: US World War II Amphibious Tactics: Pacific Theater and Elite 144: US World War II Amphibious Tactics: European and Mediterranean Theaters.

LCI(R) ROCKET FIRING LCI(G)-73 was first converted to a gunboat and then a rocket boat along with LCI-31 and 34 in the Pacific. She participated in 14 operations, first as a troop-carrier and then as a fire support boat. Here she bears a locally created camouflage scheme. In her early Type F LCI(G) gunboat configuration she mounted more rocket launchers than most rocket boats: 24 x 4.5in Mk 1 racks, each holding 12 rockets. The aft six launchers on each side are being fired in the first barrage about 1,000yd from shore and the forward launchers will be fired a few hundred yards closer to the beach to impact in the same area just behind the dune line. Additional armament included a bow 40mm and three 20mm guns. 32

LCI(L)-1 class boats en route to Normandy with very-lowaltitude (VLA) barrage balloons tethered. After they were moved ashore upon landing, it was found that the Germans used the balloons as artillery aiming points and they were all eventually cut loose.

/I LCIs were notorious for rolling and yawing in even moderate seas, which made them no friend of their passengers. This view is looking forward on an LCI(L)-1 class boat.

c o m m a n d e r s as well as c o m m a n d elements a n d divisions within the task organization, w h i c h might m e a n c o m m a n d i n g other types o f landing craft in the m i x e d o r g a n i z a t i o n , including L S M s , L C T s , and L C M s . Such organizations might be called attack groups, landing and control craft groups, landing craft groups, beach groups (preceded by the beach color designation), assault groups, or reserve groups. As an e x a m p l e , for the Sicily landing, the L i c a t a A t t a c k F o r c e ( T F 8 0 ) c o n t a i n e d the G a f f i A t t a c k G r o u p ( T G 8 6 . 2 ) with 7 x L S T s , 1 5 x L C I s , and 2 1 x L C T s , plus the F a l c o n a r a A t t a c k G r o u p ( T G 8 6 . 5 ) with 1 0 x LSTs, 1 6 x L C I s , and 9 x L C T s . T h e r e were also four other task groups assigned to T F 8 0 with additional LSTs, landing craft, fire support ships, transports, etc. Such groups were divided into waves, with L C I s coming in after the i m m e d i a t e b e a c h h e a d w a s secure to deliver reserve battalions and c o m b a t support units. N o t all missions were c o m b a t assaults. L C I s and L S M s w e r e c o m m o n l y used for various m u n d a n e tasks: shuttling passengers, vehicles, and cargo from base to base; lightering personnel, cargo and vehicles a s h o r e f r o m t r o o p and c a r g o ships; resupplying units as they advanced along the c o a s t ; and simply providing ferry services.

Fire support missions T h e primary mission of L C I gunboats, mortar boats and r o c k e t b o a t s , L C S gunboats, and L S M rocket boats was to provide preparatory and suppressive fire support to amphibious tractor and landing boat groups making the initial assault. T h e y would continue to provide fire support throughout the later phases of an amphibious operation. 34

T h e o p e r a t i o n a l duties o f the fire s u p p o r t vessels during an a m p h i b i o u s landing included: •

•

Protecting the a m t r a c or b o a t group f r o m enemy a u t o m a t i c w e a p o n s fire from the beach and from enemy aircraft while in the rendezvous area, en route to the landing zone, and at the line o f departure. Supporting the landing o f the assault waves with rocket, mortar, and/or automatic weapons fire in order to neutralize the enemy beach defenses. Supporting the troops after landing and during the b o a t shuttle m o v e m e n t by directing fire against e n e m y p o s i t i o n s o n the b e a c h and against enemy aircraft. Laying such smoke screens as may be ordered to hinder enemy observation and fire control, by means of s m o k e rockets and fog generators. Assisting U D T s by covering t h e m with supporting fire or s m o k e (when ordered) in order t o p e r m i t the a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f r e c o n n a i s s a n c e and demolitions. M a k i n g false demonstrations when ordered, using gunfire, rocket fire, and smoke in order to divert the enemy a w a y f r o m the main landing or m a k e him suspect another landing will occur elsewhere. Performing direct support and harassing missions in support o f the troops after the landing and until the completion o f the operation. This included direct fire support for troops operating along the shore. Providing antiaircraft screens for radar pickets.

• •

Providing " f l y c a t c h e r " screens against suicide boats and swimmers. Performing radar countermeasures, when ordered (when so equipped).

• •

• •

•

•

Other missions c o m m o n l y assigned to fire support craft included: search and interdiction patrols for enemy barge traffic attempting resupply, counterlandings, and casualty evacuation; rescuing crews from sinking landing vessels and ships; recovering d o w n e d a i r m e n , b o t h friendly and e n e m y ; patrolling the perimeter o f ship anchorages; conducting reconnaissance patrols up navigable rivers and along remote coastlines; and other odd missions. T h e tactics employed by fire support craft depended on multiple factors: the width of the landing beach; available craft and their types (rocket, gun, m o r t a r ) ; types and dispersion of enemy fortifications; expected enemy

A kamikaze slammed into this LCI(R), but the explosion failed to detonate the hundreds of 5in spin-stabilized rocket warheads. LCIs were not known for their ability to sustain and survive such catastrophic damage. This one was fortunate. 35

Rocket Boat Fire Plan This example of a firing plan for4.5in rocket-armed boats depicts six LCI(R or G) or LSM(R) commencing fire at 2,000yd with 40mm guns, firing ranging rockets at 1,800yd, launching the first salvo set at 45 degrees, elevation at 1,600-1,800yd, the second salvo set at 30 degrees at 1,130yd, and turning to the flanks at 960yd. The Line of Departure is where the amtracs/assault boats assembled. M.P.I. = Mean Point of Impact.

LCI (L)

Gunoaars Assault Firmg

npi. of eocJtet docket SSot,.*

Run

E ^-^*-4P

H

A

i £ j i f

m

TJT

I

&an$e for 4.$" Projectors of 3o

#*/?f* for Projects
Commence 4*S m pocket &ong*ny Salvos

Boot Group or LVT Group 1 I joo

1

(

\joo A/oo aJoo

(_ r/opj

I

- r - h - j -

Commence 4-0 mm

3

LCI CD Tracks

Gunfire

Support

line

of

Departure Mot r

0

Scvte

firepower; terrain and vegetation; timing o f air support; whether smoke would be employed; wind and current conditions; composition o f the assault waves; and other conditions. In the Mediterranean and European theaters, the assault landing w a s conducted by several waves o f L C V P s , with L C M s and L C T s in the follow-on waves. In the Pacific, after the N o v e m b e r 1 9 4 3 Tarawa assault, most landing assault waves were delivered by amphibious tractors, often led by amphibious tanks. Later waves o f support elements, tanks, and artillery would land by L C V P , L C M , L C T , a n d D u c k s . S o m e landings in the Philippines, however, were made without amtracs if little or n o resistance was expected. Typically the fire support craft would form line abreast 1 0 0 y d ahead o f the amtrac/assault boat line o f departure, being positioned at 100yd intervals. Four t o eight vessels could be assigned t o each landing beach - six a was c o m m o n number. T h e y then proceeded t o w a r d the beach, covering the assault waves with 4 0 m m and 2 0 m m a u t o m a t i c weapons fire. This purely suppressive fire actually hit little, but created a great deal o f noise, dust, and rapid explosions, plus a spectacular tracer display. T h e fire helped keep the enemy's heads down, created c o n f u s i o n , added t o the s h o c k effects o f the general b o m b a r d m e n t , and degraded morale while greatly improving the assault t r o o p s ' confidence. At 1 , 0 0 0 y d range, the fire support craft armed with the shorter-ranged 36

4.5in rockets commenced their rocket barrage and ceased at 5 0 0 y d or m o r e , dependent on the width of the fringing reef if in the Pacific. (Some reefs were further offshore, but landing beaches were usually selected in areas with narrower reefs.) T h e craft armed with the longer-ranged 5in rocket first fired individual ranging rockets further f r o m shore as they closed in. W h e n the rockets began impacting in the designated target area the craft then fired mass ripple barrages. T h e range of the 5in rockets was also useful if wide reefs were present.

The US Navy's rendition of the loss of LCI(L)-93 on deadly Omaha Beach, Normandy, June 1944. Grounded, the boat was battered by German artillery.

Groups o f r o c k e t launchers on a given b o a t were usually set at t w o different elevations, and were fired in t w o separate barrages at specific ranges to allow both barrages to impact in the same area. Timing was everything. T h e fire plan called for the rocket and m o r t a r fire to be laid down as the naval gunfire lifted. M o r t a r boats also fired ranging rounds until they ranged in on the target area. T h e m o r t a r boats might be given m o r e specific targets than rocket boats, but they were still only marginally accurate area fire w e a p o n s . At the 5 0 0 y d (or m o r e ) ceasefire line, the fire support vessels w o u l d sometimes turn to the flanks to clear the w a y for the assault craft, while at other times they would lie dead in the water to continue providing a u t o m a t i c w e a p o n s fire. T h i s latter o p t i o n required them to c o n s t a n t l y adjust their propeller thrust to c o u n t e r w a v e , c u r r e n t , and wind a c t i o n t o r e m a i n in position. It was a dangerous, stationary tactic. W h i l e L C I s and L S M s were not in the initial assault w a v e s , they were e x p o s e d t o fire f r o m s h o r e , including c o a s t defense guns, artillery, m o r t a r s , and a u t o m a t i c c a n n o n s as well as air a t t a c k . In the Pacific they e x p e r i e n c e d kamikaze a t t a c k s , even though larger vessels m a d e m o r e tempting targets for the e n e m y a i r c r a f t . D a m a g e - c o n t r o l training was crucial. T h e amtrac or landing craft waves would soon pass through. Usually, after the amtrac/boat waves passed and before they hit the beach, the fire support craft vacated the assault lanes by proceeding in c o l u m n to the flanks so that follow-on waves had a clear a p p r o a c h . T h e y t o o k up station and fired on 37

The first ripple of 5in forwardfiring aircraft rockets are launched from a LSM(R)-188 class rocket ship. The deck, including gun positions, was completely cleared when rocket firing commenced. This was due to the blast and flame effects of the scores of rockets launching, rocket-blast thrown debris and possible rocket motors detonating on the launchers.

areas flanking the landing beach and sometimes deeper targets. C r e w drill and fire procedures were i m p o r t a n t for fire support craft to ensure accurate and timely fire. A m a j o r danger was engaging friendly troops when providing post-landing fire support. T o prevent friendly fire casualties, the gunships avoided overhead fire after the troops landed and had to be aware o f the land advance along the shore to the flanks. T h e 3in and 5in guns were not used for general area fire as a u t o m a t i c w e a p o n s were - they were reserved for identifiable point targets. It did little g o o d merely to fire slow-rate weapons blindly at an island; they had t o fire at specific point targets (pillboxes, gun positions, etc) t o do any g o o d . F o r the m a n y other f o l l o w - o n missions assigned t h e m , the fire support ships usually operated in units o f 2 - 4 craft. T h e fire support group would rotate units to allow them to refuel, rearm, and reposition. This rotation also a l l o w e d crews t o get s o m e rest, as w h e n in the firing line all hands were continuously at general quarters (manning battle stations on full alert). T h e y typically visited destroyers and transports, " b u m m i n g " rations, fresh water, fuel, and 2 0 m m and 4 0 m m a m m u n i t i o n . O n radar picket anti-aircraft screen duty, f o u r b o a t s usually f o r m e d a station and m a n e u v e r e d a r o u n d a tight s q u a r e offering e a c h o t h e r m a x i m u m a n t i - a i r c r a f t cover. " F l y c a t c h e r " screening missions p r o t e c t e d t r a n s p o r t a n c h o r a g e s f r o m nighttime suicide b o a t s and s w i m m e r s . T h e y patrolled the perimeters in irregular patterns and at all times, maintaining a high degree o f vigilance and always prepared to open fire with a u t o m a t i c w e a p o n s and star shells.

Landing missions Life was different for LCIs and L S M s . T h e y practiced landing and debarkation operations under flotilla c o n t r o l . Beaching required skill to prevent broaching - when the vessel turned broadside to waves, current, and winds, resulting in 38

LCS(L)(3)-50 fire support craft. She mounts a 3in gun on the bow, twin 40mm cannon on the forward end of the deckhouse and the fantail, two 20mm cannon on either side of the bridge, two more just aft of the deckhouse, and two groups of five 4.5in Mk 7 launchers forward of the deckhouse, here covered by canvas shrouds.

unretractable beaching. O t h e r demands included identifying landmarks and beach markers in order to beach in the correct area, timing when to drop the stern anchor, preventing collisions with other beaching craft, and avoiding obstacles and wreckage. Self-retraction was also a c o m p l e x affair. Tension had to be maintained on the stern a n c h o r t o keep it taut, varying the t w o propellers' speeds separately to " w i g g l e " off the beach, all the while avoiding breaching and collisions with other vessels and obstacles. Ship c o m m a n d e r s might also drag the b o w anchor as they backed off to prevent the b o w from swinging into adjacent craft as the b o w found water. After depositing follow-on troops, the landing craft conducted endless support missions, bringing in m o r e t r o o p s , vehicles, and c a r g o , as well as escorting and navigating for convoys of smaller landing craft. Crews were spared unloading cargo. T h a t was the responsibility o f shore party stevedores and vehicle crews, although the boat's crew had to clean up any mess left behind. A rule of thumb for unloading an L C I was that 2 5 stevedores were needed.

Troops debark as they emerge from the No. 2 troop compartment on a 351 class boat. Other troops had previously debarked from No. 1 compartment, emerging from beneath the forecastle platform. The beach gradient is such that the troops have to wade some distance to shore. 39

LCIs on Rendova Island in the New Georgia Group, July 1943. LCI-24 and 65 are listing due to splinter damage from a Japanese bomb that detonated between them. Troops are still unloading cargo.

As already n o t e d , the L C I ( L ) - 1 class c o u l d realistically a c c o m m o d a t e t r o o p s f o r only 4 8 h o u r s o w i n g t o limited mess, s a n i t a t i o n , and berthing facilities. T h e L C I ( L ) - 3 5 1 class had a longer endurance. If the troops were to be on b o a r d for only 2 4 h o u r s , it could carry 2 2 3 men. F o r no more than 4 8 h o u r s , it could handle 1 8 5 m e n . F o r extended operations for between six and eight days it could a c c o m m o d a t e 1 7 3 men. In all three cases, nine troop officers c o u l d be a c c o m m o d a t e d . T h e r e were u n o p p o s e d short runs o f a few hours duration, when up to 3 5 0 men were transported on a single L C I . T r a i n i n g on r a d i o and o t h e r m e a n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n s was emphasized, as c o o r d i n a t i o n and c o m m u n i c a t i o n o f orders and changes were essential. Anti-aircraft gunnery was also critical and practiced often.

The crews L C I and L S M crews, including those o f the fire support variants, first received their specialty training at various US N a v y schools across the country. T h e y were assembled at A m p h i b i o u s Training Base, Little Creek, VA. T h e r e they w e r e assigned to c r e w and u n d e r t o o k c o m b i n e d training, w h i c h included gunnery training and training in other specialties' duties. A b o a t had at least three officers: the c o m m a n d e r - typically a lieutenant (junior grade) - and an executive officer and engineer officer, both ensigns. A d d i t i o n a l officers on fire s u p p o r t b o a t s were usually billeted as c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , gunnery or w a t c h officers, but they typically had multiple duties. T h e enlisted c r e w varied in strength and ratings. T h e r e were petty officers in charge o f the different departments (deck, engineering, gunnery,

LCI DEBARKING TROOPS The LCI was a troop landing vessel intended for deploying follow-on waves after the initial beachhead was secured by assault troops that had been landed by small landing craft or amphibious tractors. Both the LCI(L)-1 class and 351 class boats, the former depicted here, relied on 2ft 6in-wide gangway ramps, 28ft long for the 1 class and 32ft for the 351 class. Troops had to descend single file and were rather exposed. The I-beam catheads supporting the raising and lowering block-and-tackle were pivoted inboard when not in use. Ramps were lost to heavy surf, damaged by gunfire or collisions, and tangled in wreckage. There were alternative means of debarking. Two scaling ladders were stowed horizontally on the outboard side of the bulwark. These could be placed over the bow forward of the ramp catheads or anywhere over the sides. They might be "borrowed" by infantrymen to climb seawalls or low cliffs fronting the beach, or to bridge barbed wire barriers. Landing nets could also be dropped over the sides of the bow to allow troops to climb down. 40

An LCI flotilla docked at Bizerte, Tunisia, in July 1943 embarks troops for the Sicily invasion. There was a shortage of troop transports and small landing craft for the invasion. The LCIs performed valuable service by lifting follow-on reserve units. The main assault troops were mostly carried aboard LSTs, each equipped with six small landing craft.

signals, supply, e t c . ) . Ratings included m o t o r machinist's mates, pharmacist's m a t e s , steward's m a t e s , boatswain's m a t e s , r a d i o m e n , radarmen, c o x s w a i n s , quartermasters, and seamen. T h e latter did the deck w o r k and manned the a r m a m e n t . If a b o a t had a full crew, however, it was considered fortunate. T h e s h a k e d o w n cruise o f a n e w b o a t c o n d u c t e d by the c o m m i s s i o n i n g c r e w served t o put the b o a t through its paces and train the crew as well as bind t h e m into a close-knit t e a m . O n c e assigned to a b o a t , crew members m o r e often remained with it through their service. Crews typically developed a firm b o n d and w o u l d r e m a i n lifelong s h i p m a t e s . M o s t o f these vessels w e r e m a n n e d by N a v y R e s e r v i s t s , t h a t is, m o s t l y c o n s c r i p t e d sailors, but 2 8 L C I ( L ) s were m a n n e d by C o a s t G u a r d s m e n . T h e officers t o o were Navy R e s e r v i s t s ; graduates o f A n n a p o l i s ( h o m e o f the United States N a v a l A c a d e m y ) were seldom assigned to small craft. 11

11 Coast Guard LCIs were assigned to LCIFlot 4, later redesignated LCIFlot 10 then 35. The Coast Guard was under Navy jurisdiction from November 1941 to January 1946.

Combat-loaded troops debark from LCI(L)-326 in the Mediterranean, either at Sicily or Salerno. The hull plates soon took on a rippled appearance from wave pounding. Thinner hull plating was used on LCIs than on LSTs. 42

Early use in the Pacific T h e first use o f L C I s in the Pacific was during the J u n e 1 9 4 3 N e w Georgia G r o u p landings. O w i n g to c o n s t r u c t i o n and training delays, it w a s a near thing that L C I F l o t 5's 2 6 boats arrived in time to participate in planning and rehearsals. T h e y first required t w o w e e k s o f m a i n t e n a n c e a n d repairs. En route to the objective, a severe storm forced the L C I s to reduce their speed from 1 2 to 8 . 5 k n o t s in the h e a d - o n seas. T h e landings were successfully executed and the L C I s delivered t r o o p s o f the second and fourth echelons. T h e y had a hard time, t h o u g h , with a twisting a p p r o a c h route a m o n g the small scattered islands, difficult c u r r e n t s , a n d m u d b e a c h e s . It w a s later learned that five J a p a n e s e destroyers had tried to intercept them in the dark. T w o L C I s collided during c o u r s e c h a n g e s , a l t h o u g h with little d a m a g e . Aircraft strafing a t t a c k s were endured by the s e c o n d - e c h e l o n b o a t s , but 1 6 bombers attacked the fourth echelon and three L C I s were d a m a g e d , but still sailable. T h e L C I s had the satisfaction o f downing a few o f the attackers with anti-aircraft guns. W h i l e L S T s w e r e e m p l o y e d in the o p e r a t i o n , the smaller L C I s were able t o get into m o r e inaccessible beaches to discharge their troops and cargo. T h e y also proved valuable for delivering small landing forces in remote island areas.

LCIs assault Sicily There were serious landing craft shortages for the J u l y 1 9 4 3 Sicily landings. Only L C I ( L ) - 1 class boats intended for short passages were available. T h e assault battalion o f each o f the infantry regiments was landed by Landing C r a f t , Vehicle and Personnel ( L C V P ) l a u n c h e d f r o m L S T s . T h e s e c o n d battalion may have been landed by L C V P s or L C T s and in some instances by L C I s , a mission for which they were n o t intended. T h e third battalions m a y have been landed by L C I s or L C T s . This first use o f L C I s in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n so early in the assault violated their envisioned employment, but it was a m a t t e r o f necessity. T h e landings were c o n d u c t e d at several widely separated p o i n t s . L C I s at L i c a t a on the US left flank h a d a particularly h a r d t i m e . T h e p r e - d a w n landing o f the initial assault waves alerted the defenders a n d it w a s n o t long b e f o r e G e r m a n b o m b e r s arrived to pummel the f o l l o w - o n waves. T h e landing craft

LSM-152 in the Pacific dappled camouflage scheme, in predominately green shades. The well deck was most likely painted deck green, a dark green color. 43

h a d already endured heavy w e a t h e r and barely arrived on t i m e . R u n n i n g the gauntlet o f bursting b o m b s , they s o o n e n c o u n t e r e d artillery and machine-gun fire. Several L C I s were damaged and suffered casualties. O n e grounded on a false beach (an offshore sandbar) and had to transfer its troops to a n o t h e r vessel. A beaching L C I gunned down an Italian soldier a b o u t to t h r o w a grenade o n t o its deck just yards away. O t h e r L C I s h a m m e r e d pillboxes with 2 0 m m fire t o have the occupants rush out to surrender. O n e L C I with a regimental c o m m a n d e r a b o a r d beached in an area of concentrated fire - one r a m p was ripped off by the surf and the other fouled with another L C I . T h e skipper intentionally b r o a c h e d his craft and the troops were forced to drop over the side. S o m e d r o w n e d in the pounding surf. Regardless of the o p p o s i t i o n and surf c o n d i t i o n s , the L C I crews m a n a g e d to get the troops ashore in the dark, with very limited fire support.

Rocket boats at Kwajalein T h e 7 t h I n f a n t r y Division's J a n u a r y 1 9 4 4 assault on K w a j a l e i n in the M a r s h a l l Islands was led by 1 2 rocket-firing L C I ( F S ) s . These were standard L C I s temporarily fitted out as r o c k e t boats with six racks firing a total of 6 0 0 x 4 . 5 i n r o c k e t s . Assigned to Fire Support G r o u p 4 (Task G r o u p 5 2 . 8 ) along with four battleships, three heavy cruisers, and ten destroyers, they w e r e additionally assigned to Fire S u p p o r t Unit 4 (Task Unit 5 2 . 8 . 4 ) and divided equally between L C I ( F S ) Divisions 13 and 1 5 . T h e first phase of the operation was to seize t w o small islands northwest o f the m a i n o b j e c t i v e , K w a j a l e i n . T h e s e were E n n y l a b e g a n ( c o d e n a m e d C A R L O S ) and E n u b u j ( C A R L S O N ) . E a c h o f the t w o L C I ( F S ) divisions was assigned an island and w e n t in a h e a d of the a m t r a c s , ripping loose with 3 , 6 0 0 rockets o n t o each island. O f particular note after the devastating rocket barrage w a s the 4 0 m m , 2 0 m m , and . 5 0 c a l fire provided by the L C I s , which w e n t close in to the b e a c h e s after the a t t a c k w a v e s . T h i s support was frequently m e n t i o n e d in the after-action reports o f the assault t r o o p s . T h e n e x t day the main assault was unleashed on Kwajalein and the same LCI(FS)s provided support, firing their first barrage at 1 , 1 0 0 y d f r o m shore and the second at 8 0 0 y d . T h e y then opened fire with their a u t o m a t i c w e a p o n s right

LSM-20 was struck by a kamikaze in Surigao Strait between Leyte and Mindanao on December 5,1944. Two crewmen can be seen about to jump. LCI(G)-1017 is standing by to rescue the crew. The plane struck aft of the pilothouse on the starboard side just above the waterline. The bombs exploded in the engine room. Eight crew were killed and nine wounded. 44

up to seconds before the assault troops leapt f r o m their a m t r a c s . T h e success o f these r o c k e t b o a t s , a n d 1 2 m o r e supporting t h e M a r i n e assault o n R o i - N a m u r t o the north at the same time, were instrumental in prompting the go-ahead for the conversion o f m a n y m o r e fire support boats in the States. T h e procedures they developed were used t h r o u g h o u t the rest o f the war.

LSMs at Ormoc In early D e c e m b e r 1 9 4 4 , US Eighth A r m y forces on Leyte were landing units in O r m o c Bay on the island's west side as other units fought their w a y over the mountains from the east. T h e J a p a n e s e were using O r m o c B a y t o reinforce and resupply their battered forces. L S M s rather than LSTs were employed t o land supplies and heavy equipment, due t o the shallow waters, plus the " L a r g e Slow T a r g e t s " were more tempting targets for the relentless kamikazes. T h e suicide fighters attacked in waves and the first victim was L S M - 2 0 as the group of eight L S M s and three L C I s , shielded by destroyers and air cover, made its dash for the landing site. Despite the crew's best efforts t o save her, L S M - 2 0 went down. L S M - 3 4 and 2 3 were damaged by other attackers and L S M - 1 8 took the latter under t o w and departed the area. T h e remaining four L S M s and the LCIs continued t o w a r d their destination. T h e kamikazes shifted t o attacking the destroyers. O n e w a s damaged and taken in t o w by an L S M .

LSM-24 and 135 beached on e Shima off Okinawa, April 1945. LST-1326 can be seen further down the beach. It was not uncommon for soldiers transported in an LSM to later say they had been aboard an LST, the latter becoming almost a generic name for large landing vessels.

T w o days after this grueling m i s s i o n , a second landing w a s m a d e employing 1 1 L S M s , 2 7 L C I s , four L S T s , and eight destroyer-transports. T h e c o n v o y m a d e it t o its objective b e a c h w i t h o u t a n y a t t a c k s . T h e first t w o waves were delivered by L C V P s followed by t w o waves o f L C I s , and then one o f L S M s . Kamikazes a p p e a r e d a n d s o o n s a n k an L S M , a n d repeated bombing attacks were made on t w o m o r e landing craft, but these m a n a g e d to take effective evasive maneuvers. It w a s a rough four days, but the L S M s and LCIs were instrumental in outflanking the J a p a n e s e and securing the first island to be liberated in the Philippines. 45

l_CI(G)-67 beached at Okinawa after a typhoon. This was a Southwest Pacific gunboat conversion mounting a 40mm, a 3in and four 20mm guns, and six .50cal machine guns.

LCI(M)s at Okinawa F o r t y - t w o L C I ( M ) s were employed to support the initial assault landing on O k i n a w a on April 1 , 1 9 4 5 , along with L C I rocket ships and gunboats. T h e 1 2 6 mortars laid down a barrage of 2 8 , 0 0 0 rounds over a strip 5Vi miles wide by 3 0 0 y d deep in less than an hour. T h r o u g h the remainder of the three-month operation, the m o r t a r boats provided counterbattery and harassing fires along both of the large island's lengthy coasts. In other operations, the m o r t a r boats had n o t " s h o t i n " the assault waves as did rocket boats, but were on-call in reserve for special missions. Since L C I ( M ) s lacked radar and had only minimal navigation e q u i p m e n t , they steamed in an elliptical track around a radar-equipped reference ship, a destroyer for example, that kept station by

radar. W h e n on the path o f the ellipse and headed t o w a r d the island, the reference ship would radio range and azimuth (direction) to the m o r t a r boats and they would fire when aligned with the target. T h e 4 . 2 i n m o r t a r rounds generated a heavy blast effect - a 4 . 2 i n ( 1 0 7 m m ) high-explosive projectile contained 81b o f T N T , while a 1 0 5 m m howitzer projectile held 4.81b. T h e 4.2in also provided m o r e , though smaller, fragments than the 1 0 5 m m .

THE VESSELS REMEMBERED LCIs and L S M s were largely phased out after W o r l d W a r II by b o t h the US N a v y and R o y a l Navy. F e w were used in the K o r e a n War, but s o m e fire support craft remained in operation through the Vietnam W a r and some were converted to specialized auxiliaries. O n l y one each L C I ( L ) - 3 5 1 class a n d L S M are displayed as m e m o r i a l s today - no fire support craft or other versions survive. T h e r e are a very few former L C I s still in c o m m e r c i a l use, but they have been m u c h altered. M o s t were scrapped over the years, including the m a j o r i t y o f those turned over to other navies. S o m e were privately purchased and used as lighters, inshore cargo vessels, vehicle and passenger ferries, sightseeing b o a t s , a n d even a floating restaurant. L C I ( L ) - 7 1 3 is displayed at the Amphibious Forces M e m o r i a l M u s e u m , Vancouver, W A , and is maintained by the USS Landing Craft Infantry Association (http://www.usslci.com/index.html). L S M - 4 5 is undergoing further renovation at C a m p Lejeune's M i l e H a m m o c k Bay, Jacksonville, N C , by the M u s e u m o f the M a r i n e (http://www.museumofthemarine.org/mcl.php) and the L S M / L S M R Association (http://lsmlsmr.org). Funding is not available and the ship is looking for a new home.

The stern of LSM(R)-401, the lead ship of the much redesigned and improved rocket ship. The stern kedge anchor and its rack are similar to those found on the LCI(L). This class did not see action in World War II, but eight were operational during the Korean War and three saw Vietnam service.

*>

BIBLIOGRAPHY Anon, LSM-LSMR World War II Amphibious Forces, Turner Publishing, Paducah, KY (1994) Anon, USS LCI, Turner Publishing, Paducah, KY (1997 Baker II, A. D., Allied Landing Craft of World War Two, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, M D (1985). (Originally published as Allied Landing Craft and Ships, ONI 2 2 6 , 1944, with Supplement No. 1, 1945.) Bruce, Colin J . , Invaders: British and American Experience of Seaborne Landings 1939-1945, Chatham Publishing, London (1999) Camp, Dick. Iwo Jima Recon: The U.S. Navy at War, February 17, 1945, Zenith Press, St Paul, M N (2007) Friedman, Norman, US Amphibious Ships and Craft: An Illustrated Design History, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, M D (2002) Rielly, Robin L., Mighty Midgets at War: The Saga of the LCS(L) Ships from Iwo Jima to Vietnam, Hellgate Press, Central Point, O R (2000)

I

47

INDEX References to illustrations are shown in bold. Amphibious Forces Memorial Museum, Vancouver, WA 4 7 armament 7, 1 0 - 1 2 , 14 anti-aircraft guns, Bofors40mm 1 0 , 2 2 cannon, Oerlikon 2 0 m m M k 4 automatic 10, 11, 2 2 dual-purpose gun, M k 2 2 3in 11 gun, M k 12 5in 11 LCI(G) 2 2 , 2 2 - 2 3 , 2 3 LCI(R) 1 2 , 2 3 - 2 4 , 2 4 LCS(L)(3) 2 5 - 2 6 , 3 9 LSM 2 8 LSM(R) 30, 31, 38 machine guns Browning M 1 9 1 9 A 4 .30cal 10 Browning M 2 .50cal 10 Lewis M k I .303in 10 mortars, US Army M 2 4.2in 11, 24, 25 rockets 1 1 - 1 2 , 14 4.5in " O l d Faithful" beach barrage 1 1 - 1 2 , 22, 23, 24 5in forward-firing aircraft (FFAC) 12, 12, 3 8 5in high-velocity spinner (HVSR) 12 armor, LCI(L) 8 barrage balloons, very-low altitude (VLA) 3 4 Bizerte, Tunisia 4 2 builders, LCI(L) 6, 7, 10 Clarion River, USS 31 construction, LCI(L) 7 - 8 , 10 crews 4 0 , 4 2 deck, main, LCI(L) 8 deckhouse, LCI(L) 1 8 - 1 9 decks, below, LCI(L) 1 5 , 16, 1 8 , 18 description, LCI(L) 1 4 - 1 5 , 18-20 below decks 1 5 , 16, 1 8 , 18 deckhouse 1 8 - 1 9 forecastle 1 9 , 2 2 main deck 18 propulsion 7, 1 4 - 1 5 , 15 ramps 19, 1 9 - 2 0 , 4 0 design and development, LCI(L) 5-7 dry dock, ABSD-6 auxiliary floating 3 0 D U K W ( " D u c k " ) amphibious trucks 2 7 Falconara Attack Group (TG 86.5) 3 4 fire plan, rocket boat 3 6 , 3 6 - 3 7 fire support craft 2 0 , 2 2 - 2 5

48

fire support missions 3 4 - 3 8 operational duties 3 5 tactics 3 5 - 3 8 , 3 6 flotillas 32 forecastle, LCI(L) 19, 2 2 Gaffi Attack Group (TG 86.2) 34 groups 3 4 Gypsy, USS 2 8 kamikaze attacks 3 5 , 37, 4 4 , 4 5 Kodiak, USS 2 8 Kwajalein, rocket boats at 44^15 Landing Craft, Assault (LCA) 5 Landing Craft (Flotilla Flagship) (LC(FF)) 2 0 , 2 2 Landing Craft, Infantry (Ammunition) (LCI(A)) 2 2 Landing Craft, Infantry (Diver) (LCI(D)) 2 2 Landing Craft, Infantry (Fire Support) (LCI(FS)) 24,44-45 Landing Craft, Infantry (Gun) (LCI(G)) 1 8 , 2 0 , 2 2 , 2 2 - 2 3 , 23, 32, 44 fire plan 3 6 , 3 6 - 3 7 Type A 23 T y p e D 23 Landing Craft, Infantry (Headquarters) (LCI(H)) 22 Landing Craft, Infantry (Large)(Command) ( L C I ( L ) ( Q ) 22 Landing Craft, Infantry (Mortar) (LCI(M)) 1 1 , 2 0 , 2 4 - 2 5 , 25 at Okinawa 4 6 - 4 7 Landing Craft, Infantry (Rocket) (LCI(R)) 2 0 , 2 3 - 2 4 fire plan 3 6 , 3 6 - 3 7 kamikaze attack 35 rocket firing 32 Landing Craft, Support (Large) M k 3 (LCS(L)(3)) 4 - 5 , 5 , 12, 25, 25-26, 26, 39 armament 2 5 - 2 6 , 3 9 characteristics 2 6 propulsion 15 Landing Craft, Tank (LCT) 5 landing missions 3 8 - 4 0 , 3 9 , 4 0 Landing Ship, Infantry (LSI) 4 Landing Ship, Infantry, Medium (LSI(M)) 6 Landing Ship, Infantry, Small (LSI(S)) 6 Landing Ship, Medium (LSM) 4 , 5, 2 6 - 2 8 , 2 7 , 2 8 , 3 0 , 3 2 , 43, 44, 45, 47 armament 2 8 characteristics 28 features 2 7 at Ormoc Bay 4 5 well deck 2 7 Landing Ship, Medium (Rocket) (LSM(R)) 1 1 , 1 2 , 2 7 , 2 8 , 2 8 ,

30, 3 0 - 3 1 , 3 1 , 4 7 armament 3 0 , 3 1 , 3 8 fire plan 3 6 , 3 6 - 3 7 Landing Ship, Tank (LST) 5, 45 Landing Vehicle, Tracked (LVT or 'amtrac') 2 7 Lawley, George, & Sons Shipbuilding Corp. 6, 7, 10, 2 5 LCI(G)-23 4 6 LCI(G)-67 4 6 LCI(G)-73 32 LCI(G)-307 20 LCI(G)-346 23 LCI(G)-348 2 3 LCI(G)-351 2 2 LCI(G)-428 18 LCI(G)-1017 44 LCI(L)-1 7 LCI(L)-1 class 8, 8, 10, 14, 3 4 , 40, 40, 43 characteristics 14 deckhouse 1 8 - 1 9 LCI(L)-24 4 0 LCI(L)-65 4 0 LCI(L)-93 3 7 LCI(L)-209 7 LCI(L)-326 42 LCI(L)-351 7 LCI(L)-351 class 7, 8, 8, 10, 19, 3 9 , 4 0 , 4 7 anatomy 16 characteristics 14 deckhouse 19 LCI(L)-402 2 0 LCI(L)-402 subclass 10, 12, 19, 2 0 LCI(L)-412 6 LCI(L)-419 15 LCI(L)-443 6 LCI(L)-713 4 7 LCI(L)-992 3 0 LCI(M)-265 20 LCI(R)-31 2 4 LCI(R)-73 2 0 LCS(L)(3)-3 5 LCS(L)(3)-12 2 6 LCS(L)(3)-22 2 6 LCS(L)(3)-50 3 9 LCS(L)(3)-129 2 6 Leyte, Ormoc Bay 2 4 , 4 5 Licata Attack Force (TF 80) 3 4 L S M - 1 4 32 LSM-20 4 4 , 4 5 L S M - 2 4 45 LSM-32 30 LSM-34 5 LSM-45 47 L S M - 1 3 5 45 L S M - 1 5 2 43 LSM-275 27 LSM/LSMR Association 4 7 L S M ( R ) - 1 8 8 class 2 8 , 3 0 , 3 0 , 31, 31, 38 LSM(R)-193 30 LSM(R)-194 27 L S M ( R ) - 1 9 5 31

LSM(R)-401 4 7 LSM(R)-401 class 2 8 , 3 0 , 30 LSM(R)-501 subclass 3 0 - 3 1 LST-1326 45 Marshall Islands 2 3 , 2 4 , 4 4 - 4 5 Mender, USS 28 Museum of the Marine, Jacksonville, NC 4 7 museums 4 7 New Georgia Group 4 0 , 43 New Jersey Shipbuilding Corp. 7, 10 New York Shipbuilding Corp. 7, 10 Normandy 3 4 Omaha Beach 3 7 Okinawa 3 0 , 4 6 , 4 6 - 4 7 Shima 45 operational history 32, 3 4 - 4 0 , 42-47 crews 4 0 , 42 fire support missions 3 4 - 3 8 operational duties 35 tactics 3 5 - 3 8 , 3 6 Kwajalein, rocket boats at 44-45 landing missions 3 8 ^ 0 , 39, 4 0 Okinawa, LCI(M)s at 4 6 - 4 7 Ormoc Bay, LSMs at 45 Pacific, early use in 43 Sicily 3 4 , 4 2 , 4 3 - 4 4 units 32, 34 Pacific, early use in 43 Peleliu 2 3 , 2 4 Philippines 36 pilothouse, LCI(G) 18 pilothouse, LSM 2 7 Portunus, USS 2 7 propulsion, LCI(L) 7, 1 4 - 1 5 , 15 radio room, LCI(G) 18 ramps, LCI(L) 19, 1 9 - 2 0 , 4 0 Rendova Island, New Georgia Group 4 0 Saint Francis River, USS 31 Salvager, USS 28 Sicily 3 4 , 4 2 , 4 3 - 4 4 units 32, 34 US Army 6 7th Infantry Division 4 4 Amphibious Training Base, Little Creek, VA 4 0 Eighth Army 45 USS Landing Craft Infantry Association 4 7 variants 2 0 , 2 2 - 2 6 vessels remembered 47 White River, USS 31 Windlass, USS 28

RELATED TITLES M3 Infantry Half-Track 1940-73

M3 & M5 Stuart Light Tank 1 9 4 0 - 4 5

Landing Ship, Tank (LST) 1 9 4 2 - 2 0 0 2

NVG011 • 978 1 85532 467 1

NVG 033 • 978 1 85532 911 9

NVG115 • 978 1 84176 923 3

CAM 096 - 978 1 85532 607 1

CAM 100 • 978 1 84176 367 5

CAM 104 - 978 1 84176 365 1

CAM110 - 978 1 841765129

ELI 117 - 9781 84176 841 0

ELI144 • 978 1 84176 954 7

VISIT THE OSPREY WEBSITE Information about forthcoming books • Author information • Read extracts and see sample pages • Sign up for our free newsletters • Competitions and prizes • Osprey blog

www.ospreypublishing.com

To order any of these titles, or for more information on Osprey Publishing, contact: North America: [email protected] UK & Rest o f World: [email protected]

The design, development, operation and history of the machinery of warfare through the ages

LANDING CRAFT, INFANTRY AND FIRE S U P P O R T Described by o n e soldier as "a metal box designed by a sadist to m o v e soldiers across the water,"the Landing Craft, Infantry was a large beaching craft intended to deliver an infantry c o m p a n y to a hostile shore, once the beachhead was secured. The LCI and its vehicle-delivery counterpart, the Landing Ship, M e d i u m were widely used by the Allies during World War II, a n d later, the hulls of these ships were used as the basis for fire s u p p o r t ships. While the landing ships were phased out after the Korean War, s o m e fire support craft remained in use throughout the Vietnam War. This b o o k tells the developmental and operational history of this important tool of American a m p h i b i o u s military strategy that s p a n n e d three wars.

Full color artwork •

Illustrations •

Unrivaled detail •

Cutaway artwork

US $17.95 UK £9.99 C A N $19.95 ISBN 978-1-84603-435-0

OSPREY PUBLISHING