Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution: 1979-1991 and New Challenges (St. Antony's)

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Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution 1979–1991 and New Challenges

Lori Plotkin Boghardt

“Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution is a signiﬁcant contribution to the study of Gulf security in the Islamist era. Based on extensive new information obtained from Kuwait’s Interior Ministry, Lori Plotkin Boghardt traces the changing strategies adopted and adapted by this small state to protect itself against revolutionary transnational movements and their domestic adherents. She shows how making a narrow deﬁnition of security interests an absolute national priority both undermines civil society and increases existential vulnerability. This book offers a unique perspective on an ensemble of issues critical to students of the Gulf and the Middle East more broadly, and it deserves a wide readership.” – Mary Ann Tétreault, Una Chapman Cox Distinguished Professor of International Affairs, Trinity University “In this ground-breaking study, Plotkin Boghardt addresses one of the most controversial issues in one of the most secretive regions in the world: regional security in the Arab Gulf states. Through extensive contacts with Kuwaiti ofﬁcials and citizens, the author has compiled remarkable and compelling documentation on Kuwait through three regional crises: The 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Iran–Iraq Gulf War of the 1980s, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Essential reading for all who wish to understand the strengths and stresses of Gulf monarchies in surviving internal and external challenges.” – Eugene Rogan, Director, Middle East Centre, St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford “This major new work…allows a number of conﬁdent and compelling conclusions, adding very signiﬁcantly to our understanding of Kuwaiti politics in particular and to the wider study of Third World Security. Highly lucid in organisation and expression, the work demonstrates a thorough grasp of developments both in Kuwait and the region.” – Gerd Nonneman, Professor of International Relations and Middle East Politics, Lancaster University “Based on extensive original empirical research, Lori Plotkin Boghardt explores with analytical vigour and scholarly methodology the domestic and international security challenges to Kuwait and its response to them. This rich piece of research represents an important contribution to the study of international relations and security issues in a small-scale and vulnerable state. A compelling read.” – Ahmed Al-Shahi, Research Fellow, St Antony’s College, University of Oxford “A focused and in-depth analysis of Kuwaiti social dynamics. Never before has the phenomenon of Kuwaiti internal security been covered in such an informative and revealing manner.” – Ghanim Alnajjar, Professor of Political Science, Kuwait University “This study is an excellent account of security challenges to the Kuwaiti regime from the Iranian revolution to the aftermath of the 1991 liberation. The book is both comprehensive and thoroughly readable, and should be of interest to those concerned with security issues in the Gulf, as well as with the politics of Kuwait generally.” – Michael Herb, Associate Professor of Political Science, Georgia State University

St Antony’s Series General Editor: Jan Zielonka (2004–), Fellow of St Antony’s College, Oxford Recent titles include: Lori Plotkin Boghardt KUWAIT AMID WAR, PEACE AND REVOLUTION Paul Chaisty LEGISLATIVE POLITICS AND ECONOMIC POWER IN RUSSIA Valpy FitzGerald, Frances Stewart and Rajesh Venugopal (editors) GLOBALIZATION, VIOLENT CONFLICT AND SELF-DETERMINATION Håkan Thörn ANTI-APARTHEID AND THE EMERGENCE OF A GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY Lotte Hughes MOVING THE MAASAI A Colonial Misadventure Fiona Macaulay GENDER POLITICS IN BRAZIL AND CHILE The Role of Parties in National and Local Policymaking Stephen Whiteﬁeld (editor) POLITICAL CULTURE AND POST-COMMUNISM José Esteban Castro WATER, POWER AND CITIZENSHIP Social Struggle in the Basin of Mexico Valpy FitzGerald and Rosemary Thorpe (editors) ECONOMIC DOCTRINES IN LATIN AMERICA Origins, Embedding and Evolution Victoria D. Alexander and Marilyn Rueschemeyer ART AND THE STATE The Visual Arts in Comparative Perspective Ailish Johnson EUROPEAN WELFARE STATES AND SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF SOCIAL POLICY Archie Brown (editor) THE DEMISE OF MARXISM-LENINISM IN RUSSIA St Antony’s Series Series Standing Order ISBN 0–333–71109–2 (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difﬁculty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England

Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution 1979–1991 and New Challenges Lori Plotkin Boghardt

in association with St Antony’s College, Oxford

© Lori Plotkin Boghardt 2006 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted her right to be identiﬁed as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2006 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 13: 978–1–4039–9405–9 hardback ISBN 10: 1–4039–9405–6 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Boghardt, Lori Plotkin, 1970– Kuwait amid war, peace and revolution : 1979–1991 and new challenges / Lori Plotkin Boghardt. p. cm. – (St. Antony’s series) Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 1–4039–9405–6 1. Kuwait–Politics and government – 20th century. 2. National security–Kuwait. 3. Kuwait–Ethnic relations. I. Title. II. Series. DS247.K88B56 2006 953.67–dc22

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for my husband, who is my light, and my parents, who are my inspiration

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Contents List of Figures, Tables and Graphs

x

Acknowledgments

xii

Note on Transliteration

xiii

Introduction Kuwaiti internal security dynamics Researching internal security in Kuwait

1 3 12

1 History and Government of Internal Security in Kuwait The impact of oil Development of the state security apparatus Contemporary internal security organs Summary

17 17 20 25 27

2 The Immediate Impact of Neighboring Revolution and War, February 1979–January 1981 The “Shiite-ization” of the revolutionary challenge The revolution and Kuwaiti Shia The revolution, Iranian expats and other foreign residents Attacks against Iranian interests The bombing of al-Rai al-Amm Restoring the National Assembly Summary

28

3 New Political Forums and Ongoing Regional Tremors, February 1981–November 1983 The new Assembly and other domestic forums The Gulf Cooperation Council Return of “spring surprises” Battleﬁeld reverberations Palestinian attacks and the Palestinian community New trends regarding expatriates Summary 4 Major Terror Attacks and National Transformation, December 1983–January 1986 Immediate responses to the December 1983 bombings Political convictions behind pursuing and purging Shia vii

29 31 35 39 42 44 47 49 50 52 54 57 59 63 68 70 71 73

viii Contents

Pursuing and purging Shia Limitations on foreign population size Limitations on foreign population character Physical barriers “Strict” measures The 1984 hijacking and assassination attempt on Amir Jabir The cafe bombings and new strategies Proliferation of state security trials Decline of the appeal of religious fundamentalism and the 1985 Assembly Summary 5 Criticism and Extremism from Kuwaiti Citizens, February 1986–August 1988 The internationalization of the war Restricting venues for domestic dissent The June 1986 attacks, public opinion and terrorism trials The citizen-bomber development Explaining citizen-bombers Responding to citizen extremism De-emphasis on the threat from foreign residents Summary 6 Old and New Antagonisms after the Ceaseﬁre, September 1988–July 1990 Post-war subversion The post-war politics of foreign residents The parliamentary movement The National Council plan Summary

76 79 81 85 86 87 92 97 99 101 103 104 106 110 114 119 122 124 127 129 130 134 137 141 145

7 Loyalty, Opposition and the Iraqi Invasion, August 1990–August 1991 Military and security personnel Civilian resisters and other Kuwaiti “insiders” The parliamentary movement revisited Expatriate collaboration Population reinvention Summary

147 148 153 155 162 166 170

8 Period Trends and New Challenges Key ﬁndings New and looming challenges

172 172 176

Contents ix

Appendix A: Number of Administrative Deportations per Month According to Nationality, 1978–89

182

Appendix B: Number of First-time Residence Permits Issued per Year, 1978–89

186

Appendix C: Kuwaiti Daily Newspapers and Their Orientations Circa 1986

187

Notes and References

188

Bibliography

215

Index

229

List of Figures, Tables and Graphs Figures 1.1 Kuwait Public Security Department, 1954 1.2 Organizational Structure of the Kuwait Ministry of Interior, 1962

23 24

Tables 1.1 National Legislative Assemblies, 1938–39 2.1 Number of Administrative Deportations of Iranians, June 1979–January 1980 3.1 Annual Number of First-time Work and Residence Permits Issued, 1978–83 3.2 Annual Number of First-time Residence Permits Issued According to Nationality, 1979–83 3.3 Annual Number of First-time Work Permits Issued According to Nationality, 1979–83 4.1 Annual Number of Administrative Deportations of Expatriates for Residence Law Violations, 1978–84 4.2 Annual Number of Administrative Deportations for Residence Law Violations According to Nationality, 1978–84 4.3 Annual Number of First-time Residence Permits and First-time Work Permits Issued, 1981–85 4.4 Number of State Security Cases Registered with the Justice Ministry During 1978–85 that Eventually Ended in Trial 4.5 Nature of State Security Cases Registered with the Justice Ministry During 1979–85 that Eventually Ended in Trial 5.1 Annual Number of First-time Residence Permits Issued, 1983–86 5.2 Number and Percentage of Kuwaiti Citizens Convicted for Involvement in Major Attacks Against Kuwaiti Targets that Took Place Inside the Country, 1979–85 5.3 Terrorist Bombs and Fires Inside Kuwait, 1986–88 5.4 State Security Cases Registered with the Justice Ministry During February 1986–August 1988 that Eventually Ended in Trial x

18 38 64 65 66 81 81 82 98 99 112 114

120 123

List of Figures, Tables and Graphs xi

5.5 Numerical and Proportional Changes in Administrative Deportations of Expatriates, 1984–88 5.6 Annual Number of Administrative Deportations of Expatriates According to Reason Given for Expulsion, 1981–88 6.1 State Security Trials Held After the Iran-Iraq Ceaseﬁre for Pre-ceaseﬁre Crimes 6.2 Annual Number of First-time Residence Permits Issued, 1983–89 7.1 Post-war Portfolio Changes of the Top Shaykhs 7.2 Annual Ranking of Foreign Immigrant Nationalities According to the Number of First-time Residence Permits They Received for Government Work, 1988–89, 1992 7.3 Annual Ranking of Foreign Immigrant Nationalities According to the Number of First-time Residence Permits They Received for Commercial and Other Non-Government Activity, 1988–89, 1992 7.4 Annual Number of Administrative Deportations of Expatriates, 1988–89, 1992

125 125

131 135 158 167

168

169

Graphs 2.1 Number of Administrative Deportations of Iranians per Month with Linear Trendline, November 1978–October 1979 3.1 Annual Number of Administrative Deportations of Expatriates, 1979–83 3.2 Annual Number of First-time Residence Permits Issued to Arab and Asian Nationalities, 1978–83 4.1 Annual Number of First-time Residence Permits Issued to Arab and Asian Nationalities, 1978–84 4.2 Number of Administrative Deportations of Iraqis and Iranians per Month, 1979–85 4.3 Number of Administrative Deportations of Lebanese and Syrians per Month, 1979–85 4.4 Number of Administrative Deportations of Pakistanis and Indians per Month, 1979–85 4.5 Annual Number of First-time Residence Permits Issued to Arab and Asian Nationalities, 1978–86 6.1 Annual Number of First-time Residence Permits Issued to Arab and Asian Nationalities, 1978–89

36

63 66 82 95 96 96 98 135

Acknowledgments My residence in and subsequent travel to Kuwait provided the spark and fuel for this project, and I am grateful to the many Kuwaiti government ofﬁcials, professionals, academics and students, and expatriates residing in the country, who generously provided their expertise and time, shared their experiences, and opened up their world in Kuwait to me. Many individuals requested that their name not be cited in conjunction with particular information, and therefore I would like to thank in general terms the Kuwait Ministry of Information, Kuwait Ministry of Interior, Kuwait Ministry of Justice, Kuwait Ministry of Planning, Kuwait Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, Kuwait National Assembly, University of Kuwait, Centre for Research and Studies on Kuwait, the Kuwaiti embassies and Kuwait information ofﬁces in Washington, DC and London, Islam Presentation Committee, and The Arab Times, al-Qabas, al-Watan and Kuwait News Agency. I also would like to extend my deep gratitude to Dr Philip Robins and Professor Avi Shlaim, for their unwavering support and encouragement of this project from start to ﬁnish; to Dr Eugene Rogan, for his generous support in many areas as Director of St Antony’s Middle East Centre; and to Dr Ahmed Al-Shahi and Professor Gerd Nonneman, for their valuable suggestions and for inspiring me to publish this study. My thanks also go to St Antony’s Middle East Centre and the Shell Foundation for providing the means for me to return to Kuwait for additional research, and to the University of Exeter, Chatham House and the British Library for extensive use of their collections. The Brookings Institution provided a stimulating environment to conduct research and write during the 2000–01 year, and the RAND Corporation provided a similar setting during the summer of 1999; thank you to both. I would like to express my gratitude to my managers and colleagues at SAIC who generously provided me with the time to complete this project and encouragement every step of the way. Finally, thank you to my husband, for making my dreams come true, and my parents, for being a source of strength and inspiration in this endeavor and in life. It is to them that this book is dedicated.

xii

Note on Transliteration To enhance the “user-friendliness” of Arabic terms in this study for non-specialists, Arabic is transliterated according to typical press usage (e.g. Shiite rather than Shi’i) and without diacritical marks (e.g. Shia rather than Shi’a). In this vein, most singular Arabic words are made plural by adding “s” rather than using the transliterated Arabic plural (e.g. diwaniyyas rather than diwaniyyat). Kuwaiti proper names are transliterated as they are by the individuals themselves, Kuwaiti Englishlanguage newspapers, or other local sources.

xiii

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Introduction

The ﬁrst British political agent in Kuwait, Lieutenant-Colonel H.R.P. Dickson, often is said to have authored the best Kuwaiti history book. Published in 1956, Kuwait and Her Neighbours details major political movements and events, key leaders and negotiators, local tribes and families, and even the area’s plant and animal life.1 The book betrays Dickson’s deep knowledge of and appreciation for Kuwait; he spent 30 years in the shaykhdom, ﬁrst as a diplomat and then as a representative of the Kuwait Oil Company, and his revered status there almost made him a Kuwaiti institution in his own right. The unpretentious title of Dickson’s book must be credited as being just as informative as his narrative. The story of Kuwait always has included the stories of its neighbors: Iraq to the north, Saudi Arabia to the south, and Iran only a short distance across the sea to the east. This is no less the case in the twenty-ﬁrst century, as the spillover effects of the Iraq war and al-Qaeda activities in Saudi Arabia have illustrated so vividly. Now as in the past, few political or social studies of Kuwait can be conducted seriously without considering the events, politics, and social and religious trends across its borders. This book also addresses the relationship between Kuwait and her neighbors, but from the perspective of Kuwaiti internal security. The overarching theme of the study is that the political and social dynamics of the states neighboring Kuwait play a fundamental role in shaping Kuwait’s internal security situation. In this regard, the book gives special consideration to the deeply-rooted ethnic, religious, national and other afﬁliations between populations in Kuwait and neighboring states. The study focuses on two aspects of internal security in Kuwait. One is challenges to internal security, and the other is Kuwaiti policies to 1

2 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

counter these challenges. Reasons why particular threats arose in Kuwait, the extent to which the various kinds of challenges actually threatened security, and the speciﬁc policy tools employed by the authorities to counter the threats, represent the primary areas of investigation. The book concentrates on the period 1979–91, which is marked in the Gulf region by the Iranian revolution, Iran-Iraq war, and Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and draws parallels and applies lessons learned from this period to new, twenty-ﬁrst century challenges in Kuwait, including Islamic radicalism. It is important to note that security in this book refers to “regime” security or the political security of the Kuwaiti leadership, as opposed to “national” or “state” security which is typically conceived of in military terms. The body of Third World security literature that espouses this concept of security provides a suitable framework for studying Kuwaiti politics because it provides for an analysis of the special interests and problems of less democratic, less accountable Third World leaderships whose principal goal is regime survival.2 Third World security literature also departs from traditional international relations ideas on security by underscoring the volatile nature of Third World regions where turmoil is frequent and infectious across state borders, as well as the particular societal vulnerabilities of Third World states which provide a porous foundation from which intrastate conﬂicts stem, which exacerbate the impact of turbulence in neighboring countries, and which invite outside meddling in internal affairs.3 The study adheres to the deﬁnition of security advanced by one of the foremost scholars of Third World security concepts, Mohammed Ayoob: the general invulnerability of a ruling regime and its political system and structures to threats against it that seek to weaken or demolish it.4 The Kuwaiti regime of al-Sabah family members who have formed the core leadership of the shaykhdom since the mid-eighteenth century is referred to in this book interchangeably as the Kuwaiti “leadership,” the “authorities” and the like for simplicity purposes. Generally, since independence from Britain in 1961 this has included at least the head of state and deputy head of state (amir and crown prince) and key ministers in the government (Council of Ministers or Cabinet), such as the interior, defense and foreign ministers and of course the prime minister (who until recently always had been the crown prince). As alSabahs consistently have held the major security-related ministerial posts mentioned above and have represented the chief decisionmakers on matters of security (see Chapter 1), the study refers to regime security policies in the same breath as government security policies.

Introduction 3

In an effort to qualify the different kinds of security challenges to the Kuwaiti leadership, the study differentiates between “radical” threats and “non-radical” threats. Radical threats refer to those seeking to undermine, and in some cases ultimately upset, the existing political system, typically through violence. Non-radical threats refer to those seeking to moderate the special role of the al-Sabah leadership within the conﬁnes of the traditional system, most often through non-violent political action. The study shows that during the primary period under investigation, radical threats to internal security stemmed primarily from political events and circumstances in neighboring states, and non-radical challenges related essentially to distinctively national issues of concern such as the Kuwaiti parliament’s status. In both cases, however, regional and national pressures on internal security interacted to a signiﬁcant degree. A related ﬁnding is that the radical threats involved predominantly foreign residents and inﬁltrators from the Middle East in Kuwait, while the non-radical challenges mainly involved Kuwaiti citizens (with certain exceptions). In fact, sometimes the so-called nonradical challenges took on greater security signiﬁcance for the Kuwaiti leadership than radical threats because of the very involvement of Kuwaiti citizens, whose support for the al-Sabahs remained critical to their rule unlike that of foreign immigrants. As for Kuwaiti policies to counter the threats, different sets of policy tools were used to counter radical threats on the one hand and nonradical threats on the other hand. For radical-type threats, policies generally included mass deportations and changes in immigration practices. As for non-radical challenges, policies essentially involved the granting and revoking of civil-political privileges. Finally, the book discusses similarities between the challenges of the primary period under review and new challenges in Kuwait, including the threat from Islamic militant activity in the country. Applying lessons learned from the period under study, the discussion identiﬁes both effective and non-effective policies to combat the threat. Key internal security issues on the horizon for the al-Sabah leadership also are considered, with special attention given to important regional trends likely to impact Kuwaiti politics.

Kuwaiti internal security dynamics From a domestic standpoint, Kuwait has proved politically stable and secure relative to many other Third World states. Civil war has

4 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

remained unknown. That the ruling al-Sabah family should hold a leadership position in the country has not been disputed by most Kuwaiti citizens. Popular discontent over various policies and national issues has not been accompanied by calls to completely overturn the existing political system, except by a small minority of individuals. At the same time, Kuwait has experienced domestic turmoil in ways similar to other Third World countries. Despite the ruling family’s relatively strong political legitimacy among its citizen population, the essentially undemocratic and often unaccountable nature of al-Sabah leadership has made it vulnerable to internal (and external) challenges. The country’s extraordinarily hierarchical and asymmetrical social structure, which includes diverse national and ethnic populations with often divergent interests, has provided fertile ground for conﬂict. Recurrent political turbulence in neighboring states and across the region has reverberated inside Kuwait on a remarkably frequent basis. These three dynamics—political legitimacy and vulnerability issues, societal ﬁssures, and regional volatility—prove critical to understanding Kuwait’s internal security environment. The interaction and interdependence of these three dynamics most comprehensively explain Kuwait’s internal security predicament. The three sections below introduce the basic elements of each of these dynamics in Kuwait, and how they interact with each other in a security context. Political legitimacy The ruling al-Sabah family has enjoyed a high level of political legitimacy among Kuwaiti citizens, particularly in contrast to many other Arab and Third World governments. Three major factors contribute to this popular support for the al-Sabahs. One is the family’s historical and traditional role as the political leadership of the country. The ﬁrst al-Sabah ruler assumed power in the mid-1750s, and an uninterrupted line of al-Sabahs has continued to rule Kuwait since then. Most other rulers of the Gulf peninsula states, as well as Jordan, share this source of legitimacy to varying degrees, unlike the Egyptian, Syrian and former Iraqi regimes, for example, which came to power as a result of more recent revolutions and military coups. A second factor is the ruling family’s long-established, interdependent relationship with the Kuwaiti people. During pre-oil times, the relationship involved a mutually beneﬁcial “division of labor” with the local merchants: the latter earned the wealth, a portion of which was funneled to the ruling family via taxes, while the al-Sabahs protected the security of the area, maintaining a favorable business environment

Introduction 5

for the merchants. After the discovery of oil, the special relationship between the merchants and the shaykhs—who no longer needed to rely on the merchants for ﬁnancial support as oil contract wealth poured into government coffers—metamorphosed into the special arrangement in place today between all Kuwaitis and the shaykhs: the al-Sabahs provide a host of ﬁnancial and welfare beneﬁts to Kuwaiti citizens, who in turn support the ruling family as their political leadership. Certainly, the political manipulation of oil wealth can conceal fundamental insecurities of a government, and result in a superﬁcial level of stability. The extent of political support for the Kuwaiti and other oil-rich Gulf peninsula rulers can be tested when the leaderships no longer possess the resources to purchase support, or in the event of a popular revolution despite government largesse. To some degree, the Hashemites in Jordan represent a success story in the Arab world of tradition-based political legitimacy withstanding internal challenges without the aid of oil wealth. A third source of legitimacy derives from the multitude of civilpolitical “privileges” for Kuwaitis agreed to by the al-Sabah rulers following Kuwaiti independence in 1961 and rooted in the Kuwaiti Constitution. They include a democratic-style system of government (Article 6), a directly elected parliament (Article 80), press freedoms (Article 37), and freedom of association, assembly and expression (Articles 36 and 44). While other Gulf peninsula leaderships duplicated Kuwait’s welfare policies following their own accumulation of oil wealth, many of the liberties above remained unique to Kuwait in the Arab Gulf—and to much of the Arab world in general—for some time, and some still do. Two kinds of limits have been imposed on civil-political liberties in Kuwait. One kind involves limits stipulated in the Constitution and national laws, including the ruler’s right to dissolve parliament in certain circumstances, a ban on political parties, and various forms of governmental oversight of associations. The second type involves unconstitutional restrictions, such as the suspension of parliament for longer than two months. In these ways, freedoms provided for in the Constitution and national laws have not usurped the ruling family’s overriding authority and control over political debate and political life in the country. The issue of civil-political liberties has proved the most precarious of the three legitimizing forces during the post-oil period. The leadership’s periodic manipulation of citizen rights at times has triggered

6 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

strong popular opposition, including restrictions on parliament, the press and associations. In fact, the intermittent restrictions on and suspensions of civil liberties in Kuwait suggest that the ruling family has not been sufﬁciently conﬁdent in the strength of its position to comfortably allow for formal opposition channels on a consistent basis. Essentially, the leadership’s manipulation of civil-political liberties and constitutional rights has revealed areas and periods of political insecurity. In the ﬁnal analysis, an inherent vulnerability of al-Sabah rule has been that it is not formally or regularly tested and conﬁrmed by elections, national referendums or the like. Kuwait’s neighbors have taken advantage of this vulnerability for the sake of their own power, prestige and interests, often with the help of sympathetic, largely non-Kuwaiti, elements inside Kuwait. Some have loudly encouraged and even militarily supported overthrowing the alSabahs, including Iran during the early days of the revolution, and Iraq in conjunction with its invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Kuwaiti citizens have not responded to these kinds of efforts, although Kuwaiti citizens have been inspired to press for change at home by events and trends in the region. Mainstream political discourse among Kuwaitis has focused on reforming, not revolutionizing, the existing political system with the al-Sabahs at the helm in some fashion. In fact, the issue of political legitimacy for the al-Sabahs among Kuwaiti citizens has proved to be the least thorny of the three major dynamics contributing to the internal security predicament in Kuwait, and the primary factor accounting for the relative security of al-Sabah rule. Societal divisions While Kuwaiti citizens have been the ones to judge the political legitimacy of their leadership, since the early 1960s non-Kuwaitis have made up the majority of the country’s population and played a signiﬁcant role in the country’s internal security dynamics.5 Kuwait’s foreign population has proved remarkably diverse, including Middle Easterners from all Arab countries and Iran, Asians primarily from South and Southeast Asia, and other Easterners as well as Westerners. National, ethnic and religious diversity is not necessarily a recipe for internal security problems, nor is the phenomenon of societal diversity limited to Third World states. However, the combination of powerful ties to groups outside the polity, political discontent, and penetrating outside inﬂuences, can prove a potent formula for domestic unrest, and in the Third World such combinations commonly exist. In the Middle East, Lebanon provides a classic example of the dangerous mix

Introduction 7

of sectarianism, political disgruntlement, and foreign meddling by states like Syria, Israel and Iran. The reason for Kuwait’s population diversity and that of other oilrich Gulf peninsula states like Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates proves different from that for most Levantine countries as well as many African states. In the latter cases, much of the intrastate diversity stems from circumstances surrounding the origins of the state and the determination of national boundaries by international imperial powers rather than regional leaders or populaces. Even for Kuwait, the British delineated Kuwait’s boundaries with Saudi Arabia and Iraq in 1913 using a protractor, and in 1922 with a red pencil.6 However, much of Kuwait and other Gulf peninsula states’ modern population diversity is not an accident of history, but a result of foreign immigration encouraged by the local leadership and people. Consequently, Kuwait has exercised a degree of control over its population diversity, and in turn, over related internal security matters. Essentially, the Kuwaiti leadership has struck the same kind of social contract with foreign residents as it has with Kuwaiti citizens: certain “beneﬁts”—primarily employment—in exchange for not challenging the leadership. The authorities have provided foreign immigrants, to varying degrees and during different time periods, a number of welfare services and civil liberties, including education, healthcare, local press rights, and (non-voting) membership in labor unions. At the same time, foreign immigrants have been deprived of political rights, economic advantages (via low wages) and social status—an important factor for improving personal circumstances in Kuwait. In practice, these limitations have been applied more rigorously to Asian immigrants than to most Arab immigrants, however the latter also have suffered many limitations. Generally, Kuwait has perceived its immigrants as foreign elements to employ in work, not nurture. This study details how real or perceived non-compliance with the social contract often has resulted simply in expulsion from the country. A highly stratiﬁed social structure with ﬁxed and essentially impenetrable dividing lines between national and ethnic groups has been maintained in parallel with this social contract. The strict structure has been advanced in part to deprive non-Kuwaitis of the status (let alone the legal opportunity) to effectively protest the Kuwaiti leadership, and to discourage disparate social groups from joining together in antiregime activity.7 The extensive political, social and economic beneﬁts of Kuwaiti citizenship, and the modest standing of most expatriates who concede various civil-political liberties upon immigration as

8 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

described above, contribute to the major divide between Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis in the country. A simple pyramid reﬂecting the social status of the three major population groups in contemporary Kuwait would include Kuwaiti citizens in the top tier, non-Kuwaiti Arabs in the middle tier, and Asians in the bottom tier. Those nationalities failing to ﬁt neatly in the pyramid would include Western and other professional expatriates who transcend their lowly foreigner status as a result of the technical or other skills they bring to Kuwait, as well as Kuwaitis’ personal sentiments toward and respect for them. Another would be Iranians whose non-Arab status places them below the Arab tier, but whose Middle Eastern origin makes them less “foreign”—and more of a security liability—than Asians. Each of the three major groups can be divided further into tiered subgroups. For example, the status of various non-Kuwaiti Arab nationalities has differed principally according to their skills and type of employment in Kuwait. Prior to the second Gulf war (1990–91), Palestinians ﬁlled important positions in the Kuwaiti bureaucracy, and occupied the highest rung on the non-Kuwaiti Arab ladder. However, as a result of Palestinians’ reputation as collaborators with the Iraqi occupiers during the war, Egyptians have since replaced Palestinians in Kuwait’s bureaucracy and, correspondingly, on the highest rung of the ladder of this sector. Yemenis, on the other hand, typically have represented some of the least skilled Arab immigrants in Kuwait, and consequentially have occupied one of the lower positions in the Arab tier. Arab immigrants have posed a security liability in contemporary Kuwait as the result of a combination of several factors: their often politicized nature, the ease and comfort in which they share ideas on politics with Kuwaitis, their signiﬁcant numbers in the country, and Kuwait’s comparatively tolerant political environment. Through Arab immigrants, anti-establishment politics in the Arab world have been imported into Kuwait with relative ease. This includes regional trends like Arab nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s, as well as popular opposition groups. For example, the perception that dangerous ties were developing between foreign opposition groups linked to Lebanese and Palestinians in Kuwait and domestic groups during Lebanon’s civil war contributed to the closing of parliament by the Kuwaiti authorities in 1976. The cooperation of some Palestinians in Kuwait with the Iraqi occupiers in 1990–91 was perceived by the al-Sabahs and Kuwaitis in general as the ultimate betrayal “proving” the security liability of even the “best treated” Arab immigrant group in Kuwait.

Introduction 9

In the same manner as the non-Kuwaiti Arab tier, the Asian tier at the bottom of the pyramid can be divided into subgroups by the status marker of nationality. Pakistanis and Indians—nationalities that were among the ﬁrst non-Middle Eastern immigrants to Kuwait—in some cases have been able to obtain more favorable employment conditions relative to other nationalities in this tier, such as Filipinos, Thais, Sri Lankans and Bangladeshis. Historically, Asian immigrants have posed the most limited political security challenge in Kuwait, and relatedly, have been the least susceptible to regional inﬂuences, primarily because they are non-Arabs and non-Middle Easterners and hence less concerned with Arab and Middle Eastern politics and trends. To date, their periodic participation in labor strikes and public rioting relating to grievances in Kuwait generally has represented only a minor security problem. This may change as elements of this major population group, which has tense relations with Kuwaitis and Arab immigrants, press publicly for better work conditions under the growing international spotlight on immigrant treatment in oil-rich Gulf states. Like Arab and Asian immigrants, the Kuwaiti citizen sector can be divided into subgroups along the lines of regional and ethnic origin (Najdi, Persian, Iraqi), religious group (Sunni, Shiite), class, gender and even family name. More than any other major population group, Kuwaitis hold the potential to constitute an existential threat to al-Sabah rule, which would be unable to survive politically without their support. While Kuwaitis generally view the ruling family as their legitimate leadership as discussed above, they have been inﬂuenced to a signiﬁcant degree by a combination of immigrant groups inside Kuwait, particularly Arabs and Iranians, popular anti-establishment trends in the region, and regional revolutionary leaders, to publicly challenge al-Sabah rule. Kuwait’s tens of thousands of biduns, from the Arabic bidun jinsiyya meaning “without nationality,” do not ﬁt easily into the social pyramid because of their disputed origins. While most biduns claim Kuwaiti ancestry, many are believed by Kuwaitis to be of Iraqi, Iranian, Saudi and Syrian origin. Most biduns are Arabs and beneﬁt from being native Arabic speakers for the purposes of employment and social interaction, and some have limitedly overcome their lowly status by joining the Kuwaiti military as a result of special offers from the authorities. However, even categorizing biduns in the foreign Arab sector of the pyramid—let alone the more prestigious Kuwaiti sector— would be inappropriate due to their general inferior political, social

10 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

and economic position as ofﬁcially non-nationals of any country. Nonetheless, members of this poorly positioned population group have worked with Arab immigrants and Kuwaitis as well as regional actors like Iraq in anti-regime activity; often cells perpetrating violent political acts in Kuwait have included biduns. In summary, the Kuwaiti leadership has retained security control over its diverse population via a special social contract with foreign immigrants similar in form to that with Kuwaitis, and by maintaining strong divisions between population groups to minimize the possibility of anti-establishment cooperation among them. Nonetheless, various sectors of society with political grievances have interacted with each other and outside actors to create complex security challenges for the al-Sabahs. Regional turmoil Political turbulence in the Gulf region and across the Middle East in general has impacted Kuwait’s internal security arena to a signiﬁcant degree, as regional actors, events and trends have played off Kuwait’s intricate social and political dynamics described above. In fact, the interplay between regional politics on the one hand, and social and political dynamics in Kuwait on the other hand, has been a key contributor to the most acute internal security challenges for the Kuwaiti leadership during the modern history of the country. Neighboring regimes have directly supported sympathetic population elements in Kuwait to stir up domestic political problems for Kuwait’s rulers. Often the motivations of the revolutionary, insecure or vulnerable neighboring regimes have related to efforts to enhance their legitimacy at home or to expand their position and power in the region. Examples particularly relevant to the period under review in this book include Iranian supported Shiite attacks in the country, and Iraq’s tapping of bidun and Palestinian populations to facilitate its occupation of Kuwait. Typically, the driving factor that has allowed outside actors to successfully recruit Kuwaiti population elements for nefarious activity in the country has been these population elements’ preexisting grievances against Kuwait. This book approaches this kind of activity as an internal threat rather than an external threat because it involves attacks or other activity inside Kuwait, on Kuwaiti structures, and almost always to some degree, inside actors of Kuwait. In the same way, al-Qaeda’s attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 have been viewed as an infringement on US internal security rather than external security.

Introduction 11

Regional events, regimes and trends also have signiﬁcantly “inspired” particular communities in Kuwait to challenge the Kuwaiti rulers’ policies, practices and legitimacy. This includes revolutionary ideologies originating in other Arab and Middle Eastern states that resonated in Kuwait due to the country’s special political vulnerabilities and social divisions. Classic examples of sweeping anti-establishment trends that challenged governments throughout the Arab world including the al-Sabahs are Arab nationalism, which was popular among Kuwait’s Arab expatriate communities as well as Kuwaitis and an irritant to the ruling family around the time of Kuwait’s independence, and fundamental Islam following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and Iran’s Islamic revolution, also popular among particular foreign communities in Kuwait and Kuwaitis themselves. Like the more direct threats from neighboring regimes discussed above, these indirect threats played upon already existing grievances in Kuwait against the leadership. With its diverse population including nationals from across the region, Kuwait has served as a battleﬁeld for Middle Eastern governments and groups to pursue their own interests and battles against each other. While typically this kind of activity has not posed a direct threat to Kuwait’s rulers, certainly it has had implications for Kuwait’s internal security arena. During the period under review, for example, Kuwait remained a prominent location for Palestinian and Iraqi inﬁghting, including assassination, as well as Iraqi activities against Iranian interests. In these situations like the others above, Kuwait proved fertile ground for the recruitment of sympathetic residents by external actors to carry out such activities. While by and large Kuwait’s rulers have not been victim to aggression by international powers but have made use of the latters’ services for their own security interests, the presence of international powers on Kuwaiti soil or in Kuwaiti waters has created internal security complications for the leadership. Historically, these complications have been related to Arab nationalist and anti-Western sentiments opposing close cooperation with certain foreign governments and businesses. More recently, Islamist groups have represented the major force criticizing the leadership’s allowance of a Western military presence in Kuwait. Although the United States and others have been invited by Kuwait’s rulers to Kuwait to launch and sustain their war against Iraq, the experience represents an anomaly in that the foreigners’ primary purpose is not to protect Kuwait. This contrasts with previous experiences like the

12 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

Americans and Soviets deterring Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti oil tankers and those serving Kuwaiti ports in Gulf waters during the late 1980s; international coalition forces liberating Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in 1991; and UNIKOM monitoring the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border to prevent Iraqi aggression against Kuwait following liberation. The new circumstances surrounding the foreign presence have exacerbated traditional problems regarding such a presence.

Researching internal security in Kuwait Certain assumptions about researching and writing a comprehensive, longitudinal study on the delicate topic of internal security in the conservative, oil-rich Gulf peninsula states have existed for some time. A key assumption has been that few primary sources are available on the details of internal security incidents and issues in these countries, primarily because of local restraints on the press and publications, and of internal security policies, because of the secrecy in which these policies have been conducted in the region by Gulf rulers. Concern about government reprisals for commenting publicly on politically sensitive topics has further limited some native Gulf scholars from writing on the subject.8 The dynamics of researching security and other subjects in the Gulf peninsula are changing rapidly. This is due to the dramatic proliferation of non-traditional Arab media outlets inside and outside the region, and the intense international interest in and scrutiny of these countries’ terrorism problems and counterterrorism policies following the 11 September 2001 attacks and the Iraq war. These factors are pressuring Gulf peninsula states directly and indirectly to open up their doors to journalists, scholars and allied governments alike about current problems and policies. Yet even before this change in environment, the key assumption about researching internal security in the region was generally not true in the case of Kuwait. The extensive statistical and informational yearbooks and other publications produced by Kuwaiti ministries for decades, the openness of Kuwaiti ofﬁcials from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Justice to releasing previously “closed” records, and the Kuwaiti press’ relatively long history of sophisticated, detailed content all contribute to making Kuwait an engaging case study of internal security in the oilrich Gulf peninsula states. Extensive statistical and informational material from Kuwaiti government ministries in Arabic and English represents an important source

Introduction 13

of information for this study. This includes the Ministry of Planning’s annual yearbooks and the vast number of Ministry of Information publications, particularly regarding the Iraqi occupation. While other ministries’ yearbooks and publications have not been widely available in public libraries inside or outside Kuwait, visits to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor and Ministry of Justice, for example, unearthed multiple yearbooks available for research as well. One of the most important factors contributing to the distinctiveness of this study in terms of source material is both the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Justice’s willingness to release a select amount of previously “closed” historical data for the primary period under review in this book. This detailed information was provided in Arabic in the form of copies of internal ministry publications as well as short reports compiled speciﬁcally for the author. The fact that both ministries were willing to provide such information indi-cates a general openness on the part of Kuwaiti ofﬁcials to releasing unpublished material under certain circumstances. Kuwait’s Arabic- and English-language press also served as an important source of information for this study. For much of the period under examination in this book, Kuwait’s essentially private daily press demonstrated a degree of diversity and openness that placed it in a separate category from other Arab presses from North Africa to the Gulf.9 In fact, by the mid-1980s, all of Kuwait’s dailies were known outside the country, and many proved popular in other Gulf states as well as in the Arab world in general.10 Each daily displayed a distinctive orientation, varying from liberal to conservative, capitalist to Marxist, and pro-government to government critic (see Appendix C). Despite Kuwait’s comparatively liberal press environment, there are some issues for which the authorities have traditionally set the agenda in the national press, and which the press itself has been reluctant to discuss critically for various reasons.11 One of these issues has been internal security, and at times during the turbulent period under examination in this book, the Kuwaiti leadership guided press discussion of this subject as well as others.12 There are both advantages and disadvantages to this situation in terms of researching local internal security issues in the Kuwaiti press. On the one hand, in this environment the press remains an incomplete source for information and debate within the country on internal security issues. On the other hand, the press can be a rather enlightening source of information on government positions regarding internal security issues, internal security

14 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

policies, and in some cases, ofﬁcials’ perceptions of internal security problems in the country. Finally, a critical source for information, context and “ﬂavor” was Kuwaiti citizens and foreign residents living in Kuwait. Whereas Kuwaiti ofﬁcials demonstrated their openness to releasing important data, generally there was little interest in discussing internal security “problems” with a researcher. On the other hand, Kuwaiti citizens and residents proved very interested in discussing this subject, particularly with regard to gaping social divisions and discrepancies in the country. In fact, sometimes broaching this subject resembled opening a ﬂood gate. Kuwaiti Shia, both professionals and students, were particularly interested in sharing their stories. The experience distinguishes Kuwait from many places in the Middle East, where discussing sensitive subjects with a stranger, as was sometimes the case, would be too risky. There are three main qualiﬁcations to the study. The ﬁrst regards debate within policymaking circles on how to respond to internal security problems. Although the issue is both important and interesting, sources on the subject prove limited. Unsurprisingly, Interior Ministry records on internal discussions are unavailable for research, as of course are substantive accounts of Council of Ministers meetings. Furthermore, social customs in the Gulf make interviewing Kuwaiti ofﬁcials on intra-governmental disagreements and national cleavages in general difﬁcult, as alluded to above. For these reasons, the internal security policy component of this study is primarily an examination of the policies themselves. The second qualiﬁcation regards opposition groups, including Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti, organized and unstructured, moderate and revolutionary. This is not a study of the various groups in opposition to the Kuwaiti leadership or even Kuwaiti policies. The general makeup, activities and goals of the groups are discussed to the extent that they relate to the real and perceived challenges they posed to security inside Kuwait and the policy responses they elicited. The third qualiﬁcation regards Kuwaiti government ﬁgures for deportations, work permits and resident permits from publicly available Social Affairs and Labor Ministry and Planning Ministry yearbooks, and from non-public yearbooks of the Interior Ministry whose information was provided to the author. The wealth of data in these yearbooks represents the most speciﬁc information on these subjects available for any Gulf peninsula state, and clearly illuminates national trends relating to these issues. However, the data suffers from validity and reliability problems not uncommon among government publications.

Introduction 15

The yearbooks sometimes provide slightly different or contradictory ﬁgures for the same information. This is true among the various ministerial yearbooks, as well as within individual yearbooks. For example, the Interior and Planning publications at times cite different ﬁgures for the number of new residence permits issued during a particular year. As for contradictory ﬁgures within the same yearbook, occasionally the “total” ﬁgure does not exactly equal the sum of the ﬁgures it claims to represent, as seen when the ﬁgures are added independently. To help overcome the inter- and intra-yearbook discrepancies, three strategies have been adopted for the study. First, when the data differs between ministry yearbooks, ﬁgures from the yearbook whose ministry represents the original source of the data are used. For example, for deportations the Interior Ministry’s data is used rather than the Planning Ministry’s data because the Interior Ministry is responsible for deportations. Second, “totals” are calculated independently and from the most speciﬁc data available, rather than using “total” ﬁgures provided by the yearbook. For example, in determining the total number of Lebanese deported from Kuwait in 1985, the monthly ﬁgures for the number of Lebanese deported that year are added independently rather than simply citing the total annual ﬁgure provided in the yearbook. Third, the study compares yearbook data to other ﬁgures communicated by Kuwaiti ofﬁcials at the time, and calculations by independent sources, whenever possible. It is important to note that Kuwaiti deportation ﬁgures for the primary period under study distinguish between two types of deportation—“administrative” and “judicial”—and that this book cites and discusses only administrative deportation statistics and trends. Administrative deportations were carried out by decision of the Interior Ministry and without a court order, and best reﬂected the political security climate at the time. Judicial deportations on the other hand occurred in conjunction with a Kuwaiti court order and did not necessarily reﬂect Kuwaiti internal security politics.13 Annual population ﬁgures for the various national populations in Kuwait that most concern this study, such as Iranians, Iraqis, Lebanese and Syrians, as well as others, are not publicly available for the primary years under study in this book from the Ministry of Planning, which conducts national censuses every ﬁve years, or the Ministry of Interior, which does not publicly release the informa-tion; from international non-governmental organizations and international agencies such as the ILO and UN ofﬁces; or from foreign government ofﬁces such as the US Census Bureau, US State Department, or US Central Intelligence

16 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

Agency. As a result, the study assesses the yearbooks’ deportation ﬁgures in light of the general rises and falls in the populations of speciﬁc nationalities in Kuwait during the period under examination, which are reﬂected by work and residence permit ﬁgures.

1 History and Government of Internal Security in Kuwait

The al-Sabah rulers’ distribution of Kuwait’s oil wealth to the Kuwaiti population has been a principal method for maintaining stability inside the shaykhdom since the mid-twentieth century. However, the same oil resources that have contributed to stability in Kuwait also have generated distinct internal security problems. This chapter traces Kuwait’s contemporary internal security predicament, and the national security apparatus set up to address it, back to the 1930s, when the Kuwaiti ruler, Shaykh Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah, began to proﬁt from oil concessions.

The impact of oil Oil income, which Shaykh Ahmad ﬁrst received in 1935 from a concession to a British-American oil company, dramatically altered Kuwait’s political landscape in two important ways. First, it impacted the relationship between the ruling family and the shaykhdom’s prominent and inﬂuential residents, Kuwaiti merchants. Before the discovery of oil, the merchants represented a primary source of income for the ruling family by way of taxes on their pearling and trading business. The merchants, in turn, used the ruling family’s ﬁnancial dependence as leverage in lobbying for favorable economic and political policies, including no new taxes in 1909, and merchant participation in the political administration and succession decisions in 1921. Oil income replaced merchant revenues as the ruling family’s primary source of income, as well as the ruling family’s need to respond to merchant demands.14 In an effort to retain their political leverage—and increase personal fortunes—the merchants led a movement in 1938 to create a formal 17

18 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

majlis, or assembly, which would participate in policymaking. Shaykh Ahmad reluctantly allowed the establishment of a 14-member National Legislative Assembly (Majlis al-Umma al-Tashrii) elected by merchants (see Table 1.1).15 The assembly liberalized the Kuwaiti market by canceling certain export and import taxes, constructed and opened new schools and administrative ofﬁces, and dismissed corrupt ofﬁcials.16 It also challenged the al-Sabahs directly by banning discounts and trade monopolies for ruling family members, and the family’s use of forced, unpaid labor. However, it was the nascent parliamentary body’s request for control over the distribution of oil income that ultimately led the ruler to dissolve it six months after its establishment.17 Shaykh Ahmad ordered elections for a new parliament, but dissolved that one three months after its opening when it failed to ratify the ruler’s constitution, which identiﬁed the assembly as consultative rather than legislative and restricted regulation of the ruler’s ﬁnances (see Table 1.1). The assembly initiatives had developed into a threat to al-Sabah authority and control. On top of the merchants’ growing demands, an outside challenge to the ruler’s authority emerged in the context of the parliamentary experiment: Iraq. Baghdad promoted the idea of Kuwait as an historical part of Iraq since Ottoman times via provocative broadcasts and press reports that proved popular with Kuwaiti residents, and by way of contacts with assembly members who had political and economic ties to Iraq. Iraq’s campaign was linked to its own resource needs, and aided by the growing popular appeal of Arab nationalist ideas at the time.18 Back home in Kuwait, a violent row ensued over the arrest of a Kuwaiti resident of Basra who had publicly claimed that the al-Sabahs were unﬁt to rule and that the Iraqi army’s arrival in Kuwait was imminent. Table 1.1

National Legislative Assemblies, 1938–39 Election Date

Electorate Composition

Assembly Composition

Opening Date

Closing Date

First Assembly

June 1938

150 heads of leading families selected by merchants

14 Najdi, Sunni merchants

July 1938

December 1938

Second Assembly

December 1938

400 selected by merchants and ruler

20, including 12 in ﬁrst assembly

December 1938

March 1939

Source: See Crystal, Oil and Politics, pp. 47–56; Zahlan, The Making of the Modern Gulf States, pp. 33–59.

History and Government of Internal Security in Kuwait 19

To make matters worse, the ruler acquired a letter signed by assembly members requesting Kuwait’s immediate incorporation into Iraq. These two events led to the imprisonment of assembly members in March 1939, and the end of Kuwaiti parliamentary politics for more than two decades. The parliamentary experiment of the late 1930s set the standard for the contemporary National Assembly experience in Kuwait. The ﬁrst assembly in 1938 operated as a formal, institutionalized, public check on al-Sabah government; it addressed political, economic and social issues of import to Kuwaiti residents; and its members were elected in a partially democratic manner. The issues of contention regarding the experiment also set the standard for future ruling family-assembly relations and confrontations. The experiment showed that the ruling family would tolerate public participation in political decisionmaking in the form of a democratic-style legislature, as long as the assembly did not threaten to usurp the ruling family’s ultimate authority, and as long as parliamentary challenges and outside inﬂuences did not play off each other or join together to threaten the al-Sabahs. In sum, the introduction of oil wealth to Kuwait served as a major catalyst for the development of the parliamentary institution in that country, and the challenges for the al-Sabahs that parliamentary life engendered. The second change in Kuwait’s political landscape that stemmed from the new oil income was massive foreign immigration. Foreigners began arriving in large numbers in Kuwait after World War II to build and maintain the shaykhdom physically, economically and administratively.19 Immigration surged in the 1950s, and by the time of Kuwait’s ﬁrst census in 1957, foreigners (primarily Arabs and South Asians) made up approximately 45 percent of the population.20 As early as the 1950s, Arab immigrants—primarily Palestinians, Iraqis and Egyptians—inﬂuenced by the strong Arab nationalist current at the time were playing leading roles in disturbing events in Kuwait.21 In the heat of the 1956 Suez crisis, such events included a 4,000-strong gathering in support of Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser, a series of “anti-imperialism” demonstrations, and a labor strike. Increasingly politicized Kuwaitis, many returning from their studies in Cairo and Beirut, also led and participated in these events. The Kuwaiti ruler at the time, Shaykh Abdallah al-Salem al-Sabah, met the challenge of hosting large numbers of potentially destabilizing expatriates in the country by distinguishing Kuwaitis from nonKuwaitis via uneven ﬁnancial advantages, political privileges, employment opportunities and labor regulations. Restrictive naturalization

20 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

laws cemented this division. Furthermore, immigration, which initially had taken place unrestrictedly, was regulated in 1954, and deportations of expatriates were conducted on an as-needed basis.22 Shaykh Abdallah also used repressive tools such as censorship, prohibitions and mass arrests to limit and control opposition. His measures proved relatively effective, and calm began to be restored to Kuwait by the turn of the decade. Nonetheless, the experience of the 1950s in which expatriates, particularly Arabs, helped foment domestic unrest, would reoccur repeatedly in contemporary Kuwait. Two of the most serious internal security crises during the period between Kuwaiti independence in 1961, and the year preceding the primary period under study in this book, 1978, related to the two new post-oil trends identiﬁed above: Kuwaiti citizen demands for participation in political decisionmaking, and destabilizing political activities in Kuwait by foreign immigrants that included citizen collaboration. The ﬁrst crisis involved a series of bombings of government ofﬁces in Kuwait in 1968 and 1969, perpetrated by members of a radical Arab nationalist group that included a mix of Kuwaiti and foreign students, expatriate workers, and other Arab nationalists. The second crisis concerned increasing opposition to government policies among National Assembly deputies, and the sense that inter-Arab conﬂicts—in Lebanon, for example—were “infecting” assembly politics.23 Government responses to the two episodes above also echoed earlier post-oil policies. In the case of the bombings, the government arrested agitators, tried the bombing suspects in a newly created security court, and deported expatriates. As for the assembly crisis in 1976, then-Amir Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah dissolved the assembly and, following protests by parliamentary activists demanding its re-opening, closed various professional associations, disbanded their boards of directors, and arrested the activists.24 Arrests, special security trials and expulsions would continue to represent the hallmark of al-Sabah leadership policy responses to bombings and other attacks by expatriates and Kuwaitis. The closure of parliament and other venues for public expression as a result of criticism against the government would be repeated in 1986 and 1999, as would the arrest of parliamentary activists in 1989.

Development of the state security apparatus A substantial state security apparatus developed in conjunction with the growing oil business and the associated changes and new challenges discussed above. The forerunner to Kuwait’s contemporary

History and Government of Internal Security in Kuwait 21

security apparatus is described in an unsigned British report dated 8 July 1938 in Kuwait, and an account by the British political agent, Harold R.P. Dickson. In the late 1930s, Kuwait’s security apparatus was composed of two units, and minimal formal distinction was made between internal and external security.25 One of the divisions included the ruler’s personal bodyguards or servants and foot soldiers, and consisted of about 300 men.26 Several of the servants also served the second-in command, and “some of the less intelligent” of the others were employed as policemen and night watchmen.27 Finally, some were sent on an as-needed basis to investigate disputes among the bedouin around the town of Kuwait. After the oil concession agreement, the ruler also provided guards for the oil company from among this group, who were then paid for by the company.28 The second unit consisted of “devotees,” or certain tribesmen who served as a reserve force.29 In a crisis, this force could expand to include 2,000 bedouin and 3,000 settled residents.30 The devotees received ﬁnancial and other assistance in exchange for remaining nearby and available if called upon by the ruler to serve. No standing force outside Kuwait town or along Kuwait’s undemarcated borders existed through the mid-1930s.31 Concern over the 1938 majlis movement and Iraqi interference, the development of the oil sector, and increasing immigration, fueled the expansion of the security services in the late 1930s.32 In 1938, the ruling family established the Police Force and Public Security Department. The Police Force, founded under the authority of Shaykh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah (who would rule Kuwait from 1965–77) and assisted by Shaykh Saad Abdallah al-Salim al-Sabah (who would become crown prince in 1978) and their allies among the merchants, patrolled the town of Kuwait.33 The Public Security Department controlled areas surrounding the town.34 Both forces expanded in the 1940s and 1950s as a result of oil business developments and massive immigration. The personal ambition of one of the early heads of the Public Security Department, Shaykh Abdallah al-Mubarak al-Sabah, was another driving force behind that department’s continued growth. A British report in 1954 attributed the department’s tremendous expansion in the mid-1950s to Shaykh Abdallah’s effort “to appear to be the real kingpin in Kuwait by means of escorts, parades through the town, etc.”35 In early 1953, the major unit of the Public Security Department which had been called the Kuwait Force since 1948, was renamed the Kuwait Army.36 In mid-1953, the Kuwait Army was divided into two

22 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

main units, the Security Force and the Frontier Force.37 Both units were responsible for various aspects of internal security. The Security Force’s responsibilities included guarding the town gates, special posts outside the town walls, and important government buildings such as the British political agency and the American consulate, and serving as the ruler’s personal bodyguard.38 The Frontier Force’s duties included patrolling areas surrounding the town to prevent smuggling and illegal immigration, monitoring Kuwait’s frontiers, providing anti-riot forces if needed, and personally guarding Shaykh Abdallah al-Mubarak and important visitors to Kuwait.39 A British ofﬁcer maintained “unofﬁcial command” over the mobile part of the force.40 Between 1953 and 1956, the Kuwait Army doubled in size to include 3,000 men, apparently with the Security Force outnumbering the more elite Frontier Force by approximately three to one.41 Bedouin made up most of the rank and ﬁle of the Kuwait Army.42 Ofﬁcially, only Kuwaiti nationals could be recruited, including bedouin who could prove that they resided in Kuwaiti territory.43 However, foreign bedouin could buy Kuwaiti nationality for a few rupees and then serve, and many did so for the relatively good pay.44 The Frontier Force, however, was ofﬁcially permitted to recruit foreign machine gunners and drivers, including Iraqis and former Arab Legion soldiers.45 Nearly 80 percent of the ofﬁcer corps was Palestinian, and most of the remaining 20 percent were bedouin from trusted tribes.46 Iraqis, Kurds and some Lebanese worked as technical specialists, while Palestinians also worked on a civilian basis as clerks, mechanics and cooks.47 While the Kuwait Army represented the primary branch of the Public Security Department, the department also included a British police ofﬁcer corps that performed duties within Britain’s jurisdiction, the Criminal Investigations Department, and the Passports Ofﬁce (see Figure 1.1).49 Although the Public Security Department and the Police Force remained distinct organizations, the responsibilities of the Police Force and the Kuwait Army overlapped and rivalry existed between them.50 In 1959, the Public Security Department and the Police Force merged, and it is this amalgamation that became the Ministry of Interior in 1962, ﬁrst headed by Shaykh Saad (see Figure 1.2). The Interior Ministry was restructured in 1968, 1974 and 1983 by ministerial decrees that essentially allowed for new departments to respond to the growing population and new security challenges. Apparently as a result of the destabilizing impact of the Iranian revolu-

History and Government of Internal Security in Kuwait 23

Head: Shaykh Abdallah al-Mubarak al-Sabah Deputy Head: Shaykh Abdallah al-Ahmad al-Sabah Head of Public Security-Ahmadi: Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah

Kuwait Army Head: Shaykh Mubarak al-Abdallah al-Sabah

Security Force Commander: Jabra Shahaibai (Palestinian) Figure 1.1

British Police Officers Corps

Criminal Investigations Department

Frontier Force Commander: Captain Yaqub Sultan (Kuwaiti)

Medical Department

Passports Office

Workshops

Kuwait Public Security Department, 195448

tion, a ruler’s decree in 1979 explicitly articulated the ministry’s duties to include “maintaining peace” inside the country and “protecting the people” as its primary functions.52 Prominent members of the ruling family monopolized the chief posts of the security services in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, and have continued to do so in post-independence Kuwait. Of all Kuwait’s various ministries, only the strictly security-related ministries—Interior, Defense, and Foreign Affairs—always have been headed by ruling family members.

Figure 1.2

Equipm., Mainten. & Warehouse Sec.

Department of General Detectives Department of Prisons

Department of Civil Defense

Department of Traffic

Depart. of Coastal and Border Guards

Rescue Police Section

Detective Department

General Department and Secretariat

Department of Public Affairs

Office of Legal and Administrative Affairs

Department of Financial Affairs

Supervisory of Personal Affairs

Police College

Medical Services Section

Districts and Police Stations in Governates

Assistant Undersecretary

Undersecretary

Organizational Structure of the Kuwait Ministry of Interior, 196251

Wireless Section

Department of Transportation and Maintenance

Department of Inspection

Department of Passports and Nationality

Department of Crime and Forensics

Department of Discipline

Department of Investigations

Department of Identity Investigation

Department of Detection

Minister

24

History and Government of Internal Security in Kuwait 25

Contemporary internal security organs Since its establishment in 1962, the Interior Ministry has represented Kuwait’s primary bureau for managing internal security affairs. Among other departments, the ministry includes the Criminal Investigations Department responsible for ordinary criminal cases, and the State Security Department that addresses political security-related offenses. Both units are active in terrorism investigations, and both work in collaboration with the uniformed police.53 Several Interior Ministry departments also closely track citizen travel and foreign immigration. The State Security Department operates as an intelligence service, gathering and analyzing information on other countries, engaging in counterintelligence activities, and monitoring potentially subversive groups in Kuwait. The department remains under the umbrella of the Interior Ministry—always headed by a member of the ruling family— but has direct liaisons with the amir and the crown prince, as its director also is always a member of the ruling family.54 The State Security Department’s primary function is to protect Kuwait from internal subversion.55 The department and other ministry ofﬁces cooperate with other regional and international countries on this matter. For example, in 1976, the ministry began receiving increased support from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE as part of a broad effort among Gulf peninsula states to improve communication among them regarding the activities of various radical groups, including religious ones, and foreign labor problems.56 Cooperation with Gulf peninsula states increased again in the early 1980s with the development and establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and again in the early 2000s in the ﬁght against al-Qaeda-linked groups. The Interior Ministry also includes coast and border guard units that monitor territorial waters and border areas for smugglers and inﬁltrators. The National Guard, established in 1967, remains independent from the ministry, but serves as an auxiliary force in cases of emergency to guard important public facilities and roads. The National Guard also serves as a reserve force for the armed forces in times of war and emergency.57 Three ministries cooperate with the Interior Ministry on internal security-related matters: the Justice Ministry, Information Ministry, and Social Affairs and Labor Ministry. The Justice Ministry administered Kuwait’s state security court prior to the court’s dissolution in 1995. During its period of operation, the security court convened on

26 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

an as-needed basis to try cases of a political security nature. During the four-month period of martial law following Kuwait’s liberation from Iraq in 1991, a military court replaced the security court and tried suspects for collaborating with the Iraqi occupiers and other security crimes. The substitution of the military court for the security court complied with Kuwait’s Constitution regarding periods of martial law. Otherwise, Kuwaiti military courts have held jurisdiction only over military offenses committed by members of the armed and security forces.58 At the Information Ministry, the Censorship Department reviews all commercial and otherwise mass-produced books, ﬁlms, videotapes, periodicals and publications imported into the country. The ministry’s Printing and Publishing Ofﬁce controls the printing, publishing and distribution of domestic material.59 Although censored material generally has included “immoral” and otherwise offensive items to the conservative state, the ministry also has employed political censorship. Many news publications, academic writers and others have engaged in self-censorship regarding sensitive subjects so as not to cross the government.60 The government imposed direct censorship on newspapers, periodicals and other publications during the late 1970s, late 1980s and early 1990s. During this period, the Information Ministry posted at least one representative to each of the nation’s newspapers and magazines to appropriately “edit” the publications. Expurgated material primarily included criticism of domestic politics and allied foreign leaders and states. Finally, the Social Affairs and Labor Ministry works in conjunction with the Interior Ministry in admitting and managing foreign immigrants. In order to reside legally in Kuwait, an expatriate employee must be registered with both ministries. The registration process involves general procedures intended to ﬁlter out potential security threats or otherwise undesirable immigrants. First, a Kuwaiti sponsor in the private or public sector, who guarantees the foreigner an employment position, must be secured. If the Kuwaiti sponsor works in the private sector, a non-objection certiﬁcate (NOC) must be obtained from the Interior Ministry. In order to receive a NOC, the foreigner must pass a security clearance. Next, an application for a work permit is made by the private or government sponsor to the Social Affairs and Labor Ministry. A certiﬁcate of good conduct from the foreigner’s current country of residence often is required for certain nationalities. Upon arrival in Kuwait, the foreigner must apply for a residence visa (iqama) at the Interior Ministry’s Department of Immigration and

History and Government of Internal Security in Kuwait 27

Passports. Finally, after residence status has been secured, the foreigner must obtain a civil identiﬁcation card (bitaqa) from the Interior Ministry’s Public Authority for Civil Information.61

Summary Oil income led to two major developments in Kuwait that signiﬁcantly impacted its internal security arena. One was domestic opposition to the al-Sabahs’ political monopoly in the form of a nascent parliament in the late 1930s, and the other was massive foreign immigration beginning in the 1950s that included individuals politicized by strong regional currents who, in conjunction with Kuwaiti elements, complicated and caused disruption to Kuwait’s political environment. External players including Iraq and Egypt exacerbated these challenges. The new challenges as well as the need to protect the developing oil business fueled the expansive growth of Kuwait’s internal (and external) security apparatus. Following Kuwait’s independence in 1961, much of this apparatus was incorporated into the new Interior Ministry, which together with departments in the Justice Ministry, Social Affairs and Labor Ministry, and Information Ministry are charged with maintaining domestic peace and responding to threats in contemporary Kuwait. The early challenges to internal security and the government tools developed to respond to them prove surprisingly similar to those discussed in the following chapters.

2 The Immediate Impact of Neighboring Revolution and War, February 1979–January 1981

Three events dominated Kuwait’s internal security arena in 1978: leadership consolidation on the part of the new ruler, Amir Jabir alAhmad al-Sabah, who had replaced his cousin, Shaykh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah, upon the latter’s death on 31 December 1977; a summer strike by 2,000 Indian laborers that culminated in public rioting and property damage; and Palestinian-dominated political activities, including street demonstrations in September protesting the Camp David Accords signed by Egypt, Israel and the United States. These events joined outstanding internal security issues “leftover” from previous years, including the suspension of parliament and certain articles of the Constitution as well as strict press censorship and limitations on professional and social associations in place since 1976. While these issues revealed areas of political vulnerability, not one could be identiﬁed as a signiﬁcant disruption to, or critical undermining of, the security of al-Sabah rule. The ruling family was not being seriously challenged by a national group, foreign resident community or combination of the two, and proved adept at managing the new security incidents and problems that arose. The internal security challenges associated with the Islamic revolution in Iran in February 1979, and the growing hostilities between Iran and Iraq which developed into all-out war in September 1980, were of an entirely different magnitude. The popular nature of the revolution, and the hostile rhetoric emanating from the new Iranian regime toward neighboring Arab Gulf monarchies, challenged the very legitimacy of the al-Sabahs. The public demonstrations and other displays of support for the revolution and its leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, which took place in Kuwait and across the region fueled concerns that revolution would spread to the Arab side of the Gulf. The Iran-Iraq war that 28

The Immediate Impact of Neighboring Revolution and War 29

unfolded as a result of the revolution and the ambitions of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, exacerbated tensions in Kuwait and generated new pressures in its domestic arena. According to one Kuwaiti scholar on the changes in Kuwait as a result of the revolution and war, “after a long period of internal security…, Kuwait reached the threshold of turmoil.”62 This chapter examines the powerful impact of the revolution next door on Kuwait’s internal security arena. This includes how the revolution affected activities by and perceptions about Kuwait’s Shiite citizens and Iranian expatriates, as well as how it contributed to the al-Sabah leadership’s controlled liberalization of various Kuwaiti political forums to help prevent a revolution at home. Finally, the chapter shows how Kuwait’s physical, political, social and economic vulnerability to the warring parties of Iraq and Iran transformed Kuwait into a battleﬁeld in its own right.

The “Shiite-ization” of the revolutionary challenge The Islamic revolution in Iran was cheered at the popular level not only at home by Iranians, but across the Muslim Middle East in general.63 The “people’s” victory over the shah’s tyrannical regime, the fall of a government sustained in part by the United States, and the triumph of Islam over secular forces, all were important elements of the revolution that elicited this triumphant response.64 In Kuwait, the public’s reaction to the revolution was “joyous” and “supportive.”65 To a certain degree, the positive sentiments transcended the political, religious, ethnic and other divisions among Kuwaitis, who generally “admired” and “felt proud” of the Iranian people for their success.66 In contrast, Kuwait’s leadership reacted cautiously to the revolution, and identiﬁed it as a domestic issue for Iran.67 The popular revolution posed an immediate challenge to the al-Sabahs, whose leadership role had not been chosen directly by the Kuwaiti population in modern times, whose US ties were criticized, and whose religious tendency was not “popular” Islam.68 Khomeini himself described Kuwait’s ruler and those of the other Gulf peninsula states as “mini shahs,” equating their leaderships with the former Iranian ruler’s oppressive and corrupt regime. Publicly denouncing popular revolution, Islamic governance, or less US inﬂuence in the region was not feasible for the Kuwaiti leadership because of the widespread support these ideas held among the population. The authorities obviously were concerned about repercussions of the revolution at home, particularly as the extent of

30 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

support in Kuwait for the revolution and Khomeini was not entirely clear at ﬁrst. In late February 1979, Kuwait’s interior minister warned that the government would “strike with an iron ﬁst anyone trying to undermine security” in Kuwait.69 The nature of support in Kuwait for the new Iranian leader and the revolution itself rather quickly metamorphosed into a Shiite phenomenon rather than a more general Islamic one. Three dynamics contributed to the transformation. One was the limited attraction of Sunnis to the new Islamic state’s brand of Islamic governance. Initially, Iran tried to interest native Sunni populations in the Arab Gulf, including religious fundamentalists as well as leftists, in the cause of the revolution by emphasizing its generally Islamic, as opposed to speciﬁcally Shiite, nature.70 However, for various reasons involving the different religious doctrines, experiences and world views of the two Islamic traditions, in addition to local and regional politics, Sunnis did not respond to this effort.71 The ultimate alienation of the Sunni majority in Kuwait from Iran’s version of Islamic governance mitigated the internal threat posed by the revolution. The second, related dynamic was the emergence of two speciﬁc groups in Kuwait as active public supporters of the revolution and Khomeini: Kuwaiti Shia and Iranian expatriates. These groups dominated the street demonstrations in Kuwait reveling in the success of the revolution and expressing support for the new Iranian leader.72 Delegations of Kuwaiti Shia traveled to Iran to personally congratulate the ayatollah on his success.73 Kuwait’s Iranian residents heeded Khomeini’s calls to action in their host country. In February, Iranian merchants in Kuwait closed their businesses in response to the ayatollah’s request for a general strike.74 In March, 10,000 Iranians voted at their embassy on a referendum concerning the Islamic republic. The event resulted in clashes with the Kuwaiti police that led to several deaths and dozens of injuries.75 The active support for the new Iran by Kuwaiti Shia and Iranian residents immediately distinguished these groups for the Kuwaiti authorities as the most threatening elements of society in relation to the revolution. The third dynamic was the “Shiite-ization” of the revolutionary challenge by various elements of the Kuwaiti establishment itself. As early as February 1979, some appeared to foment tension between Kuwaiti Sunnis and Shia so that the two groups would not join forces against the al-Sabahs. For example, following demonstrations in Kuwait in support of the new Iranian regime, al-Rai al-Amm, the Kuwaiti daily newspaper most closely aligned with government positions, ques-

The Immediate Impact of Neighboring Revolution and War 31

tioned the true motives of the Kuwaiti Shiite demonstrators, suggesting that their conduct was “not entirely free of deﬁance” to Kuwait.76 In one stroke, the comment identiﬁed Kuwaiti Shia as a possible ﬁfth column, and implicitly encouraged Kuwaiti Sunnis to question their loyalty to Kuwait.77 By November, Arab Gulf information ministers had formally agreed upon national media guidelines that encouraged demoting the Iranian revolution from the status of a general Islamic one, to a speciﬁcally Shiite one. Later it would be downgraded to a purely Iranian one.78 The Shiite-ization, and hence marginalization, of the revolutionary challenge in Kuwait served the leadership well. The alienation of the Kuwaiti Sunni majority from the revolution meant that the core support for the al-Sabahs was not disrupted. Correspondingly, policy responses to counter the challenge could target speciﬁc, and in most cases, lower status communities of Kuwait’s population, limiting the political cost of repressive policies. Although the danger associated with Kuwaiti Shia and resident Iranians revolved around the same issue of support for the revolution and the new Iranian regime, from the beginning, support from Kuwaiti citizens on the one hand, and foreign residents on the other hand, represented two distinct challenges for the authorities. The following two sections address the challenges that each community posed, and the policy responses they elicited.

The revolution and Kuwaiti Shia For Shiite citizens of the Arab Gulf peninsula states, many of whom are of Iranian ancestry and live in communities concentrated along the western littoral of the Gulf, the Iranian revolution held special meaning. It served as evidence of the signiﬁcance and strength of Shiite Muslims in the Sunni-ruled Muslim Middle East where local Shia typically suffered political, economic and social discrimination to varying degrees.79 For the Shiite Muslims of Iranian origin, it also served as evidence of the strength of the Persian character. Although generally Arab Gulf peninsula Shia did not actively pursue similar, total revolutions in their home states, widespread support for the cause of the revolution existed. The prevalence in Shiite communities of ﬁnancial contributions to Iranian efforts to export the revolution, pictures of Khomeini in homes and workplaces, and the general feeling of joy in the revolution’s success, indicated this.80 In Kuwait, Shiite citizens, who represented approximately 25 percent of the citizen population and 10 percent of the total population at the

32 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

time, had fared better than in any other Arab Gulf country.81 In fact, the case of the Kuwaiti Shia represented “the one success story” of Shiite communities in the region.82 This related in part to the longheld al-Sabah tradition of allowing Shiite families to engage in prosperous economic activity in the country.83 In turn, during times of need, the al-Sabahs would turn to this community for ﬁnancial and political support.84 Middle-class Kuwaiti Shia also beneﬁted from extensive opportunities in education and public employment in the country. Furthermore, Kuwaiti Shia enjoyed religious freedom unparalleled in any other state of the Arab world except Lebanon.85 At the same time, Kuwaiti Shia, like other Shiite citizens of Arab Gulf countries, were essentially excluded from positions of political inﬂuence.86 Typically one “token” Shiite minister occupied a position in the Kuwaiti Council of Ministers, and Shia were not promoted beyond certain levels in the military, oil industry and other sensitive sectors. In addition, a common grievance among Kuwaiti Shia was the lack of funding for Shiite mosques, as opposed to Sunni mosques which were state-funded along with their clergymen.87 To varying degrees, political and social discrimination fueled resentment among Kuwaiti Shia toward the authorities. The economic success, government ties and status of the old Shiite merchant families in Kuwait meant that there was little desire in the top echelon of the Kuwaiti Shiite community to press for signiﬁcant change at home. This erased an important, potential challenge to the al-Sabahs in relation to the revolution. However, this generally did not apply to Kuwait’s middle-class Shiite citizens, particularly those of the younger generation. These Kuwaiti Shia were typically well-educated by the state, yet experienced discrimination in the workplace. This inclined them to take a divergent path from their elders, who generally had accepted the status quo, and to contest their “second-class” status in the country.88 The revolution inspired this restive section of the Kuwaiti Shiite community to draw attention to Shiite grievances and press for change at home.89 Kuwaiti Shia’s support for change was not only inspired by the Iranian experience; it was directly incited by the new Iranian leadership as well. In fact, many of the demonstrations and related activities in Kuwait were linked to Iranian efforts to stir revolution in the country. Circulating cassette tapes of Khomeini’s speeches, radio broadcasts from Iran and Libya, and political leaﬂets attacking the Kuwaiti leadership for subordinating the country’s Shia, fueled antial-Sabah sentiments.90 Kuwaiti religious leaders with links to the

The Immediate Impact of Neighboring Revolution and War 33

Iranian regime preached the cause of the revolution in Iran and reform in Kuwait in Shiite mosques and husayniyyas. The latter activity, coupled with ominous reports of new revolutionary threats in the Arab Gulf, led to a crackdown by the Kuwaiti authorities beginning in the summer of 1979. That August, Kuwait began to suspect that Abbas al-Murhi, a Kuwaiti citizen, cleric and relative of the ayatollah calling for Kuwaiti reforms in his sermons, had been appointed by Khomeini to be his personal and spiritual representative (wakil) in Kuwait.91 A Khomeini representative in Bahrain, Hadi al-Mudarrisi, already had sparked two public demonstrations in the Gulf archipelago state that month. On 6 September, Kuwaiti security ofﬁcials met with Abbas al-Muhri’s son, Ahmad, regarding his own politicized sermons, and warned the family against such activity.92 Also in early September, Kuwait reportedly became privy to information that Iran was organizing protests and the distribution of subversive literature in the region in cooperation with local residents, with the aim of destabilizing the Arab Gulf rulers.93 Allegedly a speciﬁc date, 10 September, had been set for demonstrations in several of the countries.94 As a result of this information, Arab Gulf leaders considered holding a prime ministers or foreign ministers meeting to address the threat.95 Such a meeting failed to take place, but apparently Kuwaiti Interior Minister Shaykh Nawwaf al-Sabah, Saudi Crown Prince Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz al-Saud, and a senior Iraqi ofﬁcial met that week to coordinate a security agenda.96 With fears escalating, the Kuwaiti Council of Ministers instructed the Interior Ministry to take ﬁrm action against troublesome elements in the country, and the government announced that it was toughening policies toward seditious individuals.97 On 10 September, the day of the reported planned demonstrations, Kuwait’s al-Watan daily newspaper published a declaration by Kuwaiti Crown Prince and Prime Minister Shaykh Saad that “the government will no longer be lenient toward and will strike hard at anyone who tries to disturb the country’s security and stability.”98 Shaykh Saad also warned that the government knew the identity of the troublemakers, and that they would be disciplined if their disruptive activities continued.99 The following day, the Interior Ministry announced the arrest of Ahmad al-Muhri.100 The charges against al-Muhri included holding political gatherings without prior authorization. The Interior Ministry placed the entire al-Muhri family under strict surveillance, and within three weeks of Ahmad’s arrest, stripped Ahmad, his father, and 17 other family members of their Kuwaiti citizenship and deported them to Iran.101 In

34 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

conjunction with the measures taken against the al-Muhris, the government withdrew the citizenship of and deported three other prominent Kuwaiti Shia, including a doctor and a lawyer, for holding “provocative” political gatherings in a mosque.102 Interior Minister Nawwaf explained the government’s actions by stating that a small group of people who “wanted to break away from the Kuwaiti family cohesion…[had] used mosques as a shelter and springboard for the realization of narrow, selﬁsh aims,” and that this required “deterrent measures to bring matters back to normal.”103 In addition to removing from the country several prominent Shiite activists, the measures served as a warning to Kuwaiti Shia of the dire consequences of political agitation, and to Iran of Kuwaiti fortitude in dealing with perceivably subversive threats linked to that regime. The fact that the al-Muhris’ relation to Khomeini was both political and familial probably rendered them an ideal example from the Kuwaiti leadership’s point of view. Kuwait’s actions against the al-Muhris caused a diplomatic crisis in Kuwaiti-Iranian relations. Iranian Ayatollah Husayn Ali Montazeri sent a letter to Amir Jabir protesting the initial restrictions that had prevented al-Muhri from preaching in a Kuwaiti mosque, and suggesting that the Kuwaiti rulers learn a lesson from the overthrow of the shah or risk suffering the same fate. Kuwait’s ofﬁcial response to the letter was simply that its citizen affairs and foreign affairs were addressed separately.104 However, the ayatollah’s remarks fueled anger in Kuwait, and the local press lambasted the Iranian leadership. Al-Anba, for example, wished the fate of the shah to be a lesson “for those who through his overthrow gained the right to inherit his imperial mentality but without his throne and medals.”105 Al-Rai al-Amm warned against the establishment of “political papacy” in Iran to subjugate Arab Muslims.106 Two weeks after the deportation of the al-Muhri family, the government passed a new law regarding public assembly. The decree signed on 10 October by Amir Jabir in conjunction with the Interior Ministry forbade private meetings of more than 20 people without prior approval from the appropriate area governor. The target of the new law was clear: Shiite political gatherings. Although the law explicitly excluded religious meetings held in houses of worship as well as traditional diwaniyyas, politically provocative assemblies held in either locale undoubtedly could be declared illegal. The law provided the authorities with the means of tracking those who wished to hold meetings, as well as the legal right to prevent them. For the rest of the

The Immediate Impact of Neighboring Revolution and War 35

period under study in this chapter, not one group was granted permission to hold a public meeting. Refusals were issued on security grounds to certain religious leaders and accused Iranian and Iraqi “sympathizers.”107 The revolution in Iran contributed to bringing to the surface genuine sociopolitical grievances among Kuwaiti Shia against the Kuwaiti leadership. Yet Kuwaiti Shia generally did not respond to Iran’s call for revolution, and no mass movement among Kuwaiti Shia to completely overturn the existing political system occurred. The challenges stemming from the revolution and involving Kuwait’s Shiite citizen community did not emerge as a serious threat during this period. This appears to have resulted both from a calculation by Kuwaiti Shia that they had too much to lose by instigating political battles with the alSabahs, and from the relatively strict measures taken by the authorities with regard to potential and perceived agitators. The policies contributed to suppressing large public displays of enthusiasm for reform by the end of the year. As a result, government attention shifted to expatriate-dominated activities.

The revolution, Iranian expats and other foreign residents Kuwait immediately perceived its Iranian community, which represented approximately 5 percent of the country’s total population at the time, as a security liability in relation to events in Iran.108 Iranian demonstrations in support of the revolution and Khomeini on Kuwait’s streets, and participation in strikes ordered by the Iranian leader as mentioned above, fueled concern among some in Kuwait that Iranian residents could create havoc in the country. One journalist even suggested that Iranian immigrants revolutionized by Khomeini could starve Kuwaitis because of their control over the country’s food markets.109 The threat associated with Iranian residents was not limited to political demonstrations and strikes. Although existing literature focuses on the turn to violent revolutionary activities abroad by Iran and Iranian surrogates in 1981, the military component of exporting revolution was as young as the revolution itself.110 At least two discoveries of Shiite militants’ arms caches in Kuwait’s expatriate neighborhoods were made in the months leading up to the installation of the new Iranian regime.111 Weapons were found inside a husayniyya in an Iranian residential neighborhood downtown, and an arms depot was discovered in another Shiite neighborhood. In the latter case, more than a dozen suspects believed to be part of an extensive arms

36 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

smuggling network throughout the Gulf peninsula were secretly arrested and interrogated.112 Criminal pursuits reportedly continued throughout the summer: in September more than a dozen Iranians carrying automatic riﬂes, pistols, hand grenades and provocative political leaﬂets, en route to an unidentiﬁed Arab Gulf state, were seized in Iraqi waters and arrested by Iraqi authorities.113 Some Iranians appeared to be preparing for a confrontation in the Arab Gulf. The Kuwaiti authorities addressed the potential threat from Iranians in a limited manner throughout most of 1979. For example, the average number of deportations even declined somewhat between the time Khomeini was expelled from Iraq by Saddam upon request of the shah in October 1978, and October 1979 (see Graph 2.1). (The spike in May likely related to worrisome increased activism on the part of Shiite groups in Iraq and disruptive Jerusalem Day celebrations in several Arab Gulf states that month.114) Reasons for the government’s limited measures probably included a desire not to escalate tensions with the new regime in Iran, and a preoccupation with the perceived challenges associated with Kuwaiti Shia, a much more important constituency for the al-Sabahs. The political climate surrounding Iranian residents changed in late autumn 1979. In November, a series of public demonstrations and news reports highlighted Iranian activism in the Gulf peninsula. Two demonstrations took place in Kuwait that month. During the ﬁrst on 16 November, several hundred Iranians gathered in front of the Iranian Graph 2.1 Number of Administrative Deportations of Iranians per Month with Linear Trendline, November 1978–October 1979 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 Oct- Nov- Dec- Jan- Feb- Mar- Apr- May- Jun78 78 78 79 79 79 79 79 79

Jul- Aug- Sep- Oct79 79 79 79

Source: Author’s graph of data from Kuwait Ministry of Interior internal yearbook information provided to the author by the ministry, Spring 2000.

The Immediate Impact of Neighboring Revolution and War 37

embassy to support the seizure of American hostages and occupation of the US embassy in Tehran 12 days earlier. Demonstrators burned the American ﬂag and an efﬁgy of US President Jimmy Carter. Leaﬂets circulating demanded the extradition and trial of the shah, and condemned the US freeze on Iranian assets.115 Two weeks later, during the Ashura holiday, a larger demonstration took place near the US embassy in Kuwait. On 30 November, several thousand protesters demonstrated their support for the seizure of the American hostages.116 The protesters attempted to enter the embassy, but were prevented from doing so by Kuwaiti security forces using tear gas and clubs to disperse the crowd.117 Following the protest, Kuwaiti national guardsmen armed with machine guns took positions outside the embassy to protect it and its personnel.118 There were three important security-related aspects to the latter demonstration in particular. First was the demonstration’s instigation by a non-Kuwaiti—an Iranian resident. The protesters had been roused by a sermon delivered earlier in the day by the Iranian religious leader, Muhammad al-Shirazi, who had physically led the crowd to the US embassy. The event highlighted the ease with which Iranians could stir unrest in Kuwait in the highly charged political climate surrounding the revolution. The second issue concerned the involvement of Kuwaiti Shia in the protest. Ofﬁcial statements played down the notion that Kuwaitis indeed had participated. An interior ministry representative described the demonstrators as “non-Kuwaiti elements of the Iranian community.”119 No mention was made of Kuwaiti citizens being investigated or prosecuted for participating in the protests, although the event had taken place a month and a half after the new public assembly law was issued. However press reports about Kuwaiti court convictions in December and January for participation in the protest were very vague regarding who was sentenced, with references to Iranians and others of unknown nationality.120 Nonetheless, the demonstration drew attention to the troublesome notion of Kuwaiti Shia and Iranians, and more generally citizens and foreign residents, joining forces in political protest. The third issue was that the protest did not relate merely to Iranian domestic politics or anti-US sentiments. The demonstration followed mass Shiite rioting in eastern Saudi Arabia beginning 28 November in conjunction with Ashura ceremonies. Those demonstrations, in turn, had been sparked by the takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca eight days earlier by Sunni fundamentalists, including four Kuwaitis, during

38 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

the annual hajj ceremonies.121 The discovery of Kuwaiti Sunnis’ involvement in the mosque seizure, and the fact that many of the oppositionist leaﬂets circulating during the takeover had been printed in Kuwait, preceded the Shiite demonstration in Kuwait by a matter of days.122 The protest in Kuwait appeared to be not only emboldened by events in the Saudi kingdom, but part of a mounting threat to Arab Gulf regimes by Shiite and Sunni communities.123 During this same short time period, at least two reports surfaced that concerned threats to internal security in Arab Gulf states, presumably involving Iranian nationals. In late November, the Jordanian newspaper, al-Rai, reported on sabotage activities and arms smuggling operations in Arab Gulf countries.124 Although the report did not specify the nationality of the saboteurs, suspicion might have fallen on Iranians in light of Kuwait’s experiences earlier in the year with the discovery of Iranian weapons caches (see above). Also, in early December it was reported that an explosive device had detonated in the vicinity of the ruler’s palace of an unidentiﬁed Gulf state, and that the subsequent investigation had revealed the bomb-planter was Iranian.125 By midDecember, Interior Minister Shaykh Nawwaf was again calling upon Arab Gulf states to enhance security cooperation.126 Thus, by December 1979, the authorities had reasons to believe that some Iranian residents represented a menace. While Gulf peninsula states moved toward establishing bilateral security agreements, Kuwait also took its own measures at home. One was deporting Iranians in higher numbers. The number of expulsions carried out during December and January each represented approximately 300 percent of the monthly average conducted during the previous six months, June–November (see Table 2.1 and Appendix A). In fact, the increase in deportations during this period was not limited to Iranians. The Interior Ministry expelled other non-Kuwaitis in the country in signiﬁcantly higher numbers as well. In January 1980, an interior ministry ofﬁcial disclosed that during the previous Table 2.1 Number of Administrative Deportations of Iranians, June 1979–January 1980 Jun 79

Jul 79

Aug 79

Sep 79

Oct 79

Nov 79

Dec 79

Jan 80

197

153

105

100

108

183

416

421

Source: Kuwait Ministry of Interior internal yearbook information provided to the author by the ministry, Spring 2000.

The Immediate Impact of Neighboring Revolution and War 39

three months, the ministry had deported approximately 18,000 foreign residents.127 The ﬁgure of 18,000 proves four to ﬁve times higher than that calculated from Interior Ministry yearbook statistics for those months.128 However, the yearbook ﬁgures do show that the total number of deportations of expatriates for the month of December 1979 was higher than that of any other month between January 1978 and May 1985, inclusive.129 Individual reports about police rounding up foreign residents further support the deportation campaign. For example, in a single incident police rounded up approximately 1,000 primarily Indian and Pakistani immigrants to conﬁrm that their residence in Kuwait was legal.130 The extensive round-ups proved so unusual that the Indian embassy complained to Kuwait’s Foreign Ministry about harassing its nationals.131 The ofﬁcial explanation for the deportation campaign was that it was a response to a rising crime rate, particularly violations in labor and residence laws, and not related to political issues.132 However, the timing of the campaign cannot be separated from Kuwait’s greater sense of vulnerability at the end of 1979. The notion of “cleaning house” by ridding the country of illegal and undesirable foreign residents would have been appealing for this reason. New property ownership laws further limiting non-Kuwaitis’ ability to acquire land and new regulations for visit visas, all issued during the last two months of the year, complemented the deportations. In sum, although Iranians residing in Kuwait had been considered a security nuisance from the start of the revolution, by late 1979 they had come to be viewed as a potential threat to stability. This was due to their involvement in non-violent as well as violent political activities in Kuwait and the wider Arab Gulf region. Their activities increased the overall sense of vulnerability in Kuwait to foreigners in general, which led to the implementation of a number of government measures to minimize the threat, particularly deportation. The emergence of violent attacks against particular communities and foreign interests in Kuwait in connection with the growing regional hostilities is discussed next.

Attacks against Iranian interests Relations between Iraq and Iran deteriorated quickly following the Iranian revolution. There were two primary issues of contention. First, each country charged the other with meddling in its internal affairs and seeking to overthrow its government. Second, clashes along the

40 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

countries’ shared border began to occur.133 The escalation of hostilities threatened Kuwait’s internal security arena as well as it border areas: Kuwait’s physical, political, social and economic vulnerability to its neighbors made it a convenient theater for the warring parties to ﬁght their battles, and increased the authorities’ susceptibility to coercion from both sides. As tensions deepened between Iraq and Iran, relations between Sunnis and Shia in Kuwait also deteriorated. Not only did Sunnis not respond favorably to Iran’s efforts to interest them in the cause of the revolution (see above), but the revolutionary fervor from Iran and activist Shia in the region appeared to temporarily radicalize a small segment of Gulf Sunnis.134 The Grand Mosque seizure in Mecca in November 1979 represented one violent outburst. The attack targeted an Arab Gulf government, Saudi Arabia, but some believed that other targets of Sunni militants included Shiite interests.135 In the spring of 1980, three violent attacks were committed against Iranian diplomatic and commercial interests in Kuwait. On 29 April, gunmen ﬁred bullets from their vehicles at the motorcade of Iranian Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, who was en route to a meeting with Amir Jabir. Ghotbzadeh, who emerged from the attack unharmed, had been conducting a foreign relations tour that included several Arab Gulf states. One month later, on 26 May, two bombs partially destroyed the downtown ofﬁces of Iran Air, Iran’s national airline. Finally, on 4 June, a bomb was thrown at the Iranian embassy. Although the attacks were mentioned in the Kuwaiti press, the lack of reaction they elicited from the authorities was conspicuous, and contrasted with the response to the Iranian-associated demonstrations approximately six months earlier. There was little showering of blame on any group for the attacks. Virtually no public discussion took place regarding new security measures that would be implemented as a result of the incidents. Interior Ministry statistics indicate that there was no rise in the number of deportations of expatriates following the assaults, either generally or with regard to suspect nationalities such as Iraqis.136 Finally, apparently no state security trials in connection with the incidents were held.137 Problems with the investigations into all three attacks, for which the Kuwaiti press chastised the Interior Ministry, might have explained the muted response to the incidents.138 However, it also seemed that the authorities chose not to publicly address the issue of the attacks’ perpetrators. The reason for this might have related to complicating circumstances surrounding the two most obvious suspects: the Iraqi

The Immediate Impact of Neighboring Revolution and War 41

regime (ﬁghting Iran on Kuwaiti soil), and Kuwaiti Sunnis (acting out against the revolutionary Iranian Shiite regime). If Kuwait believed Baghdad to be the mastermind of one or more of the attacks, it would have feared retribution from its Arab neighbor for its accusations. Additionally in this scenario, the attacks likely would have been interpreted by Kuwait not only as anti-Iranian, but also as a warning to Kuwait against efforts to smooth over relations with Tehran. On the other hand, identifying the criminals as Kuwaiti Sunnis would have further undermined Kuwait’s charged domestic environment at the time. That Baghdad had engineered at least one of the attacks would have been a fair assumption.139 The assaults on Iranian targets in Kuwait took place at the same time as Iraqi actions against Iranian and Shiite interests that spring connected to organized Shiite opposition activity in Iraq. In March, Baghdad had executed 97 military men and civilians, half of whom were members of the Iranian-supported, Iraqi Shiite opposition group, al-Dawa (Call).140 An assassination attempt in April against Iraq’s deputy prime minister, Tariq Aziz, by Iranian-supported Shia roused Saddam to pursue a series of anti-Iranian activities: he bombed an Iranian border town; expelled thousands of suspect Shia from Iraq; and called upon Iran to vacate the contested Gulf islands of Abu Musa, Lesser Tunb and Greater Tunb.141 On 8 April, Baghdad executed the venerated Iraqi Shiite leader, Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr, who headed al-Dawa, and his sister. The attacks in Kuwait easily could have been presumed to be part of this onslaught of anti-Iranian and anti-Shiite assaults by Baghdad. Certainly Tehran believed Baghdad to be responsible for the two diplomatic attacks. The Iranian foreign minister himself insinuated that the attempt on his life was orchestrated by Iraq, although he refused to be explicit before the Kuwaiti judiciary had ﬁnished examining the case.142 In addition, the Iranian press reported that one of the cars used in the assassination attempt had been located outside the Iraqi embassy in Kuwait, and that the passengers of the car had entered the embassy.143 As for the embassy bombing, Iranian radio reported an Iranian foreign ministry spokesman as stating that it had been ordered by “the mad Saddam.”144 While the attack on Ghotbzadeh remained unsolved, the press eventually relayed that the Iran Air and Iranian embassy attacks had been perpetrated by Kuwaiti Sunnis.145 The spring months of 1980 represented the only concentrated period of anti-Iranian attacks in Kuwait through the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988. This could be explained

42 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

partly by the political re-engagement of Kuwaiti Sunni Islamists in national organizations in the early 1980s (see below), as well as Kuwait’s increasingly pro-Iraq leanings throughout the war period. Nonetheless, the three attacks that spring highlighted Kuwait’s vulnerability to being a battleﬁeld for various regional tensions and conﬂicts in the charged Gulf environment. The case of the Ghotbzadeh assault also hinted at the leadership’s susceptibility to coercion in this same environment, which would increase as the war progressed.

The bombing of al-Rai al-Amm Iranian interests were not the only target of political violence in Kuwait in mid-1980. On 12 July, two bombs exploded at the ofﬁces of the Kuwaiti newspaper, al-Rai al-Amm. The explosions killed two employees, caused damage to the printing press and ofﬁces estimated at approximately 12 million dollars, and resulted in the temporary closure of the newspaper after 20 years of publication. The likely motivation for the bombing was the newspaper’s publication of a certain viewpoint, or its failure to print one. At the same time, the incident was widely perceived as an attack against the Kuwaiti establishment in general, as al-Rai al-Amm was the national daily newspaper most closely aligned with government views.146 The bombing of al-Rai al-Amm represented an important turning point. The attack did not target Kuwaiti interests outside the country, as did the hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner and the bombing of Kuwait Oil Company ofﬁces in London in the spring of 1980. The assault was not one against primarily foreign interests in Kuwait, like the assassination attempt against the PLO ofﬁce director in June 1980 and probably that against the Iranian foreign minister in April of that year, as well as the attacks against Iran Air and the Iranian embassy that spring. Finally, the incident was not a non-violent political protest like the pro-Khomeini demonstrations in early 1979, the anti-Egypt protests surrounding the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in March 1979, and the Shiite demonstrations in November 1979. Instead, the event was the ﬁrst since the Iranian revolution to highlight Kuwait’s vulnerability to its own resources being explicitly targeted for attack. Perhaps because of this, ofﬁcial comment regarding the perpetrators of the attack demonstrated a new approach to the challenge of political violence. Government leaders emphasized that the criminals were neither local citizens nor foreign residents, but inﬁltrators operating on behalf of foreign parties. For example, four days after the attack,

The Immediate Impact of Neighboring Revolution and War 43

the state minister for cabinet affairs ruled out the possibility that the bombs had been planted by any of Kuwait’s residents.147 A week later, the interior minister even linked the “big” powers—presumably the superpowers—to the bombing, maintaining that they were “seeking to create an atmosphere of disturbance and anarchy” in the country.148 Even though no arrests in connection with the bombing had been made 11 days after the attack according to ofﬁcial statements, certainly initial investigations might have borne out that non-resident foreigners were primarily responsible for the bombing and that a foreign party had directed the attack.149 However, the exclusion of the possibility that the perpetrators were members of Kuwaiti society seemed contrived. While Kuwaiti Shia’s loyalty could be pronounced suspect for their support of Khomeini’s revolution, and Iranian residents could be reprimanded for attempting to import Iranian politics into the Kuwaiti arena through strikes and demonstrations, the authorities’ public position with regard to the newspaper bombing perpetrators appeared to be that no Kuwaiti resident could be involved in a violent, anti-Kuwait attack. A suggestion of this kind would point to a more serious internal security predicament in the country, and a failure on the part of the country’s security services. Public frustration over the slow pace of the Interior Ministry’s investigations into the anti-Iranian attacks in the spring and the bombing of al-Rai al-Amm helped persuade authorities that the country’s security services needed to be improved.150 Furthermore, there was concern among the leadership that attacks of this nature would continue: Shaykh Saad stated that security crimes would “take various shapes and forms as long as the elements who are committing these crimes are in Kuwait.”151 As a result, the crown prince began to personally supervise the Interior Ministry.152 He focused efforts on preventing inﬁltration and the smuggling of weapons, explosives and political pamphlets across the country’s borders.153 In addition, the Interior Ministry was reorganized to eliminate “apathy” and “negligence” among the staff.154 This included the forced retirement of approximately 35 ofﬁcers in July and August.155 Three weeks after the bombing, the Interior Ministry reported the arrest of one of the organizers of the attack and announced some information about the bomber. Although the bomber’s nationality was not identiﬁed at the time, he was said to be a mechanic, essentially eliminating the possibility that he was a Kuwaiti.156 The ministry also reported that the bomber had been working for three other individuals, all of whom were members of a militant group. Furthermore, it was announced that the three individuals had not acted on orders from

44 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

their own military organization, but on behalf of a foreign party.157 Again, the report focused on the foreign roots of the crime. However, the ministry did not divulge details about whether the three organizers were foreign residents or foreign inﬁltrators, to which organization they belonged, and for which foreign party they had been working. Three and a half months later, two Jordanians were sentenced by Kuwait’s security court for involvement in the bombing: one was sentenced to death, although the sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment, and the other to life imprisonment.158 Another individual was tried and acquitted.159 There was no indication of whether the Jordanians were legal foreign residents or inﬁltrators, although the fact that this was not announced might suggest that they were the former. Furthermore, the trial did not substantiate the authorities’ suspicion that the bombers had acted on instructions from Iran or another foreign party.160 In fact, the incident ultimately was believed to have been connected to Shia in Kuwait.161 Despite the unclear circumstances surrounding the bombing and its perpetrators, the incident helped cement the leadership’s view that foreign elements in Kuwaiti society posed a serious security risk. In part to help widen the social and political gap between Kuwaitis and foreigners so that the two groups would not join forces against the al-Sabahs, the ruling family reinstituted Kuwait’s parliament, the National Assembly.

Restoring the National Assembly In January 1979, the ruling family began to pursue a public agenda to reinstitute parliamentary life in Kuwait. Traditionally, three related explanations are cited for the timing of this pursuit. One, advanced by ofﬁcials at the time, is that the ruling family had been consistently pursuing reopening the National Assembly since its dissolution in 1976, and that its restoration represented the culmination of these efforts and the fulﬁllment of the ruling family’s promise to restore parliament within four years of its dissolution.162 Indeed, the previous amir, Shaykh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah, had been an advocate of restoring the assembly even though it was under his rule that parliament was dissolved.163 A second explanation points to growing demands by the Kuwaiti public for the reopening of the assembly.164 Among Kuwait’s elite in particular, criticism was mounting against the ruling family over the absence of a proper forum for political debate and inﬂuence in national policies. An organized group of former assembly deputies and

The Immediate Impact of Neighboring Revolution and War 45

Kuwaiti intellectuals formally called for the restoration of the parliamentary system.165 The Kuwaiti press put forth similar demands, and the fact that the demands were allowed to be printed itself attested to the leadership’s amenability to the idea.166 A third explanation regards the ruling family’s concern over the impact of the popular revolution in Iran and the potential for similar rebellion in Kuwait.167 This line of reasoning maintains that the ruling family deemed it important to broaden and formalize venues for popular political expression to help prevent public discontent from bottlenecking and eventually exploding into full-ﬂedged rebellion. Open political debate also would alert the ruling family to developing issues of contention between the public and the leadership, and would allow authorities to address problematic areas before they grew unmanageable. Finally, reopening the assembly would help drive a deeper wedge between Kuwaiti citizens and foreign residents, some of the latter of which were key disseminators of revolutionary ideas in Kuwait.168 As preparations for the restoration of the assembly were made, ofﬁcials repeatedly denied that the efforts were linked to the revolution in Iran.169 At the same time, as early as February 1979, ofﬁcials publicly recognized the stabilizing effect of parliamentary life on Kuwaiti society. In an interview with the Paris-based al-Mustaqbal magazine, Crown Prince Saad stated that the reopening of the assembly would “consolidate our national unity, the cohesion of our society… and take into consideration the circumstances and interests at home and abroad.”170 A week later, Interior Minister Shaykh Nawwaf echoed the crown prince’s view when he argued in a National Day speech that Kuwait was interested in instituting a democratic-style system to “strengthen the principle of consultation, unite us, and strengthen us.”171 Although all three explanations cited above appear to have contributed to the reopening of parliament, the strong inﬂuence of events in Iran cannot be underestimated. In the ﬁnal analysis, the reopening of the assembly represented, at least in part, an effort to boost the political position of the ruling family in the wake of internal and external challenges to it stemming from the revolution next door. Under the direction of Amir Jabir, Shaykh Saad initiated contacts in January 1979 with a number of Kuwait’s elite to discuss the establishment of a committee whose mandate would be to identify various options for opening parliament and revising the Constitution.172 Signiﬁcant debate on the issue of parliamentary life also took place within the ruling family itself: ideas included combining elected

46 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

and appointed deputies in a single body, and additional legislative houses.173 The leadership’s public efforts stalled somewhat during the tumultuous events of 1979, and Shaykh Saad’s medical treatment in London late that year.174 The committee was ﬁnally named in February 1980, and included Kuwaiti journalists, lawyers and businessmen, as well as 11 former assembly deputies, for a total of 35 members.175 New voters were invited to register that month.176 Public debate over the committee’s mandate and the shape that parliamentary life would take appeared to impact al-Sabah decisionmaking on these issues. The committee’s consultations led to a nationwide discussion in the press, student associations and diwaniyyas regarding the legitimacy of the committee. Many Kuwaitis questioned its constitutionality, and believed that the National Assembly should be automatically returned to its original, pre-1976 status.177 A government proposal in June to increase the number of assembly seats by ten, and to appoint a proportion of the new deputies, provoked public uproar. On 24 August, Amir Jabir decreed a return to the original parliamentary system, with a 50-member assembly to be fully elected in February 1981. In December, the date 23 February 1981 was set for the general election.178 The ruling family’s positive response to public sentiments again indicate that it was eager to appease Kuwaiti citizens and boost its political security. In the end, the authorities sought to minimize the election success of citizen groups deemed politically troublesome, and maximize that of groups deemed supportive, or at least not in opposition to the government, by way of a gerrymandering project and an increase in voting districts. These efforts were intended, for one, to deprive Kuwaiti Shia of voting strength.179 They also were meant to undermine the candidacies of Arab nationalists, who had represented the primary opposition in the previous assembly, as well as representatives of the elite families of Kuwait, who typically took a more reformist approach than the generally conservative citizen population.180 The winners of the gerrymandering project were meant to be the loyal bedouin, and to a lesser extent, Sunni Islamists, who would oppose the Arab nationalists. The scheme represented an important political security tool for the leadership in connection with the parliamentary restoration process, with unexpected results as discussed in the next chapter. In conjunction with the reopening of the National Assembly, the authorities revived another civil-political liberty in Kuwait: relative freedom of the local press. Speciﬁcally, the government eased the strict censorship of journalists and editors that had been in place since 1976.

The Immediate Impact of Neighboring Revolution and War 47

The timing of the liberalization left little doubt as to the inﬂuence of the revolution: broader perspectives began to re-emerge in Kuwaiti newspapers during the ﬁrst months of 1979.181 The measure was pursued in the same vein as the parliamentary restoration process: it widened a valve for popular political expression to prevent bottlenecking and explosion into full-ﬂedged rebellion, and provided a means for the ruling family to track public attitudes toward political events as they unfolded. More speciﬁcally, a freer press helped give the leadership advance warning if troubles similar to those in the shah’s Iran were beginning to brew in Kuwait.182 During the liberalization period, a two-pronged approach toward the Kuwaiti press emerged. On the one hand, journalists were given more freedom to express their views. At the same time, the government did not hesitate to suspend a publication if it crossed a rather nebulous line with regard to harming “national interests.” Kuwaiti authorities met with the chief editors of ten daily and weekly publications in early January, and persuaded them to sign a press ethics charter that delineated new rules. The charter stressed the need to protect the independence and freedom of the press, but also to safeguard state secrets and refrain from damaging national interests.183 In 1979, suspensioninducing articles related to Iranian-Kuwaiti relations, as well as criticism of Council of Ministers members, reﬂecting the prevailing security concerns at the time.184 As the growing hostilities between Iraq and Iran increasingly engulfed Kuwait in 1980, suspensions related to not appropriately supporting the “Arab side” in the conﬂict, and criticism of other Arab leaderships.185

Summary The Iranian Islamic revolution ushered in a period of internal security complications for the al-Sabah leadership unparalleled in previous years, as the new regime in Iran challenged the very legitimacy of al-Sabah rule. Although the revolution next door did not inspire any signiﬁcant movement to oust the ruling family, it did inspire some Kuwaiti Shia and Iranian residents to engage in various forms of political agitation. In response, the authorities plucked particular Kuwaiti Shia from the country and deported them to Iran, but generally sought to contain political restiveness in the community via warnings and by forbidding political gatherings. The eventual reopening of parliament and liberalization of press regulations offered Kuwaitis, including Kuwaiti Shia, acceptable formal venues to voice their political

48 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

grievances. Many Iranians and other expatriates considered troublesome were simply expelled from the country during this period. The onset of major Iran-Iraq hostilities compounded security problems for the leadership in Kuwait, as both inside and outside parties used the country as a battleﬁeld to ﬁght essentially regional conﬂicts. By early 1981, security conditions in Kuwait appeared to improve somewhat. The initial revolutionary fervor of particular national and foreign Shiite communities had subsided. Citizens expressed pleasure with the restoration of the National Assembly and press freedoms.186 While parliamentary activity would now begin to absorb signiﬁcant national attention, new threats relating to the revolution and war as well as other regional developments would afﬂict Kuwait’s internal security arena.

3 New Political Forums and Ongoing Regional Tremors, February 1981–November 1983

Two major political forums took shape in and around Kuwait in early 1981 to help address and mitigate internal security challenges relating to the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war. The ﬁrst and most signiﬁcant was the National Assembly, which opened in March. The second was the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), formally agreed upon in Riyadh by the six oil-rich, Arab Gulf peninsula states of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Oman and Saudi Arabia in February. Both institutions sought to defend Kuwait (and other member states, in the case of the GCC) against the morass of internal and external security threats linked primarily to the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war. This chapter discusses the relative success of the National Assembly in mitigating the effects of destabilizing regional politics at home among Kuwaiti citizens, and of the GCC in formalizing internal security cooperation between member states. Although the initial revolutionary fervor in Kuwait had subsided by the time of the revolution’s second anniversary, Kuwait remained a vulnerable playing ﬁeld for Iran to continue to try to spread its revolution, for Iraq to ﬁght its war against Iran, as well as for other independent Arab interests. This chapter demonstrates that the stream of internal security challenges for Kuwait during this period were rooted in regional political turbulence that played off Kuwait’s own diverse and divided communities, and primarily involved foreign residents and foreign inﬁltrators in Kuwait. In this regard, the chapter also illuminates the government’s increasingly nuanced policies toward foreign national and ethnic groups in the country, including Iranians and Palestinians, Arabs and Asians, and expatriates in general. 49

50 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

The new Assembly and other domestic forums The reopening of the National Assembly in March 1981 was greeted initially even by some foreign diplomats in the country with reservation about its stabilizing effects, as clashes between the government and assembly opposition during the previous parliamentary session ﬁve years prior were recalled with concern.187 However, the election of an essentially pro-government assembly, including 23 bedouin and 18 moderates, was regarded as a sign of support for the ruling family during a period of domestic and regional strife.188 This view was held despite the fact that the makeup of the parliament also reﬂected the authorities’ strategic redistricting project (see Chapter 2). Reinstituting parliament contributed to domestic stability in several ways. Most of all, the ruling family was credited with reviving formal public participation in Kuwaiti political life. The wide range of issues debated in the new parliament included domestic policies such as foreign immigration and naturalization, and foreign policies toward the GCC countries and the United States. Assembly deputies also vigorously contested a number of government proposals regarding press laws and constitutional amendments. Even the ruling family seemed to view the parliamentary debate as healthy, chastising the press for characterizing the assembly’s desire to study governmental proposals as a dispute between the legislative and executive branches, and instead describing it as an effort to cooperate.189 Reopening the assembly also appeared to avert new security challenges from two groups in Kuwait that had been particularly invigorated by the revolution and the war. One was Kuwaiti Shia. Recent regional events had driven a wedge between Kuwaiti Sunnis and Shia, with Sunnis generally supporting Iraq in the war, and Shia expressing their support for the revolution and typically backing Iran in the conﬂict.190 The parliament served as a proper forum in which national policies surrounding these events could be debated. Among the most hotly contested issues in this regard was the extension of ﬁnancial assistance during the war to Iraq, to which the Shiite deputies strongly objected.191 The revolution had inspired some in the Kuwaiti Shiite community to seek redress of Shia’s second-class status in the country, and although the assembly did not speciﬁcally address various forms of discrimination against Shia, it did provide the four elected Shiite deputies political space to express their views and contribute to national debates. In fact, to a certain extent Shiite activity in the parliament highlighted Shia’s

New Political Forums and Ongoing Regional Tremors 51

“Kuwaitiness,” even in the context of the divisive rhetoric of the postrevolution period when there were calls for Shiite deputies’ dismissal from parliament.192 In addition, in an effort to appease the Shiite community Shaykh Saad had appointed an elected Shiite assembly deputy, Isa Muhammad Ibrahim al-Mazidi, to the position of communications minister, replacing the “token” Shiite minister dropped from the previous Council of Ministers along with several other ministers in February. The second group from which the reopening of parliament appeared to avert political challenges was Kuwaiti Sunni Islamists. Although the Iranian brand of Islamic revolution in the end did not appeal to Arab Gulf Sunnis, the revolution had helped to spawn a religious resurgence not only among Shia but also Sunnis.193 This was evident, in part, from the election of ﬁve Sunni Islamists to the assembly, including three from the moderate Social Reform Society allied with the Muslim Brotherhood, and two from the strictly orthodox salaﬁ (“ancestral”) trend. Sunni Islamists also eventually took over the executive committee of the Kuwaiti Teachers Society, half of the cooperative council seats, three of ten municipality seats, and many of Kuwait’s social clubs.194 The parliament provided the opportunity for Sunni Islamists to pursue their agendas in a regulated political forum. The deputies succeeded in outlawing public celebrations of the Christmas and New Year holidays as well as alcohol imports to foreign embassies, and unsuccessfully strove to restrict Kuwaiti citizenship to Muslims, and to deﬁne sharia (Islamic law) as the sole source of Kuwaiti law rather than a primary source. The Sunni Islamist deputies represented the primary opposition element in the new assembly. However, their parliamentary successes were limited to issues of minor importance to Kuwaitis, and by themselves, the Islamists failed to present a serious challenge to the government leadership. Instead, their criticism of other Arab states and their conservative agenda posed somewhat of an embarrassment for the authorities.195 The Islamist deputies did not advocate revolution in Kuwait to transform the country into a strictly Islamic state overnight, but worked toward a steady and gradual incorporation of fundamentalist principles into Kuwaiti life. The greatest liability that the Islamists represented from the leadership’s point of view was their joining forces with other deputies to defeat government proposals, not their role as Islamists per se. In addition to the National Assembly, other Kuwaiti institutions provided opportunities for citizens to express their views and pursue social and political agendas. The crackdown on professional associations,

52 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

labor unions and other organizations in conjunction with the dissolution of parliament in 1976 had focused on nationalist and leftist groups; the religious groups, such as the Sunni Heritage Society and Social Reform Society, as well as the Shiite Cultural and Social Society, had been allowed to ﬂourish, and were well-positioned to take advantage of the Islamic resurgence across Kuwaiti society in the early 1980s.196 The Social Reform Society, for example, formed a number of special committees to advance religious education and social and charitable activities.197 Several women’s groups with a religious orientation emerged, such as the Thresholds of Peace and the Islamic Care Society established by Shaykh Saad’s wife to promote women working in the interest of family and society.198 As in the case of parliament, the groups provided opportunities for Kuwaitis to pursue speciﬁc agendas within the traditional Kuwaiti system and with government oversight. The successful absorption of Islamist politics in this way into Kuwaiti society mitigated the potential security challenge represented by the fundamentalist trend. The initial success of the assembly and other national forums in alleviating security pressures stemming from the citizen community was obvious. Parliamentary and other associational life absorbed much of the political energies and pursuits of citizens within the established system. Furthermore, security incidents and concerns involving Kuwaiti citizens, including Sunnis and Shia alike, receded during this time after a difﬁcult two-year period immediately after the Iranian revolution. However, those involving foreigners in Kuwait did not, and it is this subject that the remainder of the chapter addresses.

The Gulf Cooperation Council Prior to the independence of the small states on the western littoral of the Gulf, Britain had guarded their external security, and to varying degrees their internal security, since the nineteenth century.199 It was in the wake of Britain’s departure from the region in the 1960s and 1970s that the GCC framework developed. The al-Sabahs of Kuwait in particular were concerned about security after the English exit left a power vacuum.200 As a result, during the late 1960s and 1970s, the al-Sabahs promoted political and economic afﬁliations among the smaller Gulf shaykhdoms to enhance their position in relation to the three larger regional powers.201 The formation of the UAE among seven southern emirates in 1971 represented an early success of this effort. As late as

New Political Forums and Ongoing Regional Tremors 53

May 1979, Amir Jabir stated that Kuwait was considering joining the UAE to protect itself against security threats.202 A larger, cooperative framework that included Saudi Arabia began to take shape in 1978. That year, Iraq’s growing prominence in the Arab world as a result of Egypt’s temporary removal from the Arab fold after the Camp David Accords, and the weakening of the shah, prompted a new closeness between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.203 Kuwait accelerated its drive for increased cooperation among the Gulf emirates with a foreign relations tour by Shaykh Saad in December 1978.204 The new internal security threats posed by the Iranian revolution to the peninsula states along the Gulf shore, as well as the commencement of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980, provided the ﬁnal impetuses for the formation of a joint emirates-kingdom organization. The GCC was ofﬁcially established in May 1981. Kuwait initially touted the organization as an economic and cultural rather than security-related grouping, primarily to avoid provoking Iraq and Iran.205 However, internal security issues represented an important albeit quiet focus of the group from the start, and domestic security concerns regarding Iranian-inspired subversion initially overwhelmed traditional defense-related issues linked to the Iran-Iraq war in the forum.206 During a February 1981 meeting, it was reported that every delegate was primarily concerned about internal political problems.207 The main focus of Saudi Arabia, for example, was the growth of a national opposition movement.208 The focus on internal security persisted beyond the initial meetings, as the draft of a security agreement reviewed at the third GCC summit in Bahrain in November 1982 attests.209 While almost two-thirds of the text was devoted to extradition issues in an effort to recognize the differences and ﬁnd common ground between the varying laws of the GCC countries, primary attention was given to the issues of smuggling and inﬁltration into member states.210 The establishment of the GCC essentially formalized internal security consultation between member states. Chief ofﬁcials of the six countries had been meeting and exchanging security information on a relatively frequent basis since 1979, in connection with the Iranian revolution and subsequent events. Meetings had taken place in conjunction with Iranian provocations and threats in November 1979, and with the bombing of al-Rai al-Amm in July 1980. The attempted coup d’état in Bahrain in December 1981 represented a turning point for GCC states. On 13 December, Bahraini authorities announced the uncovering of a plot to overthrow its regime.211 The

54 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

plot was said to be led by the Iranian-supported group, Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, and to involve 73 individuals including 60 Bahrainis, 11 Saudis, one Omani and one Kuwaiti—all Shia who had been trained and equipped in Iran.212 The event alarmed Kuwait and other member states about the possibility of a similar incident in their own countries.213 In Kuwait, foreign ministry ofﬁcials explicitly accused Tehran of training terrorists for inﬁltration into the Arab Gulf, and Interior Minister Shaykh Nawwaf called for plans to crush the sabotage networks in the region.214 Kuwaiti security services took special precautions and secured various government and diplomatic installations in the country.215 The attempted coup eventually drove Bahrain, Qatar, UAE and Oman each to sign independent bilateral security agreements with Saudi Arabia. However, Kuwait did not do so: the National Assembly refused to approve such an agreement, and the government desired a less restrictive security relationship with Saudi Arabia because of Kuwait’s special vulnerability to the warring parties of Iraq and Iran.216 The technical issues on the table were reciprocal extradition arrangements and extending to Saudi Arabia the right to pursue criminals deep into Kuwait’s territory.217 However, Kuwaiti assembly and government leaders also probably feared that through such an agreement Saudi Arabia would step up efforts to curb Kuwait’s relatively progressive social and political practices. Reportedly, Saudi Arabia had blamed Kuwait and other emirates for providing the “liberal” atmosphere in which regime oppositionists could organize, and had planned for the assassination of Kuwait’s leading nationalist parliamentary candidate, Ahmad al-Khatib.218 Thus, the GCC formalized internal security consultation among member states including Kuwait, but various political, social and geographic concerns deterred Kuwait from pursuing more extensive integration. Particularly for Kuwait, the GCC served primarily as an arena for information exchange and discussion of responses to internal security threats. This enhanced cooperation would prove useful as Kuwait became a major enter for Shiite militant and war-related attacks.

Return of “spring surprises” As the National Assembly reopened and Kuwait formalized an alliance with other Arab Gulf peninsula states, additional violent attacks took place on Kuwaiti soil. Just as the spring of 1980 had witnessed an assassination attempt and two bombing incidents in Kuwait, the ﬁrst half of

New Political Forums and Ongoing Regional Tremors 55

1981 saw one assassination and two bombing episodes in the country. The assassination targeted a man carrying a Syrian diplomatic passport near a Syrian Airlines ofﬁce on 7 February. The second incident involved the bombing of an Iranian shipping company on 28 March that resulted in one death and extensive damage to the company’s facilities. The third event included a series of ﬁve bombings on 25 June throughout Kuwait targeting a trash can near the Foreign Ministry, a park adjacent to an Interior Ministry post, a tourist area, a gas station and a national electricity installation. Like the attacks against Iranian targets in Kuwait during the previous spring, at least some of the crimes appeared to be linked to Baghdad. For example, the Syrian embassy denied knowing the assassinated man carrying the Syrian diplomatic passport.219 Within days of the attack, the man was identiﬁed as an Iraqi and member of the Iraqi Shiite opposition movement, Islamic National Liberation Front.220 Although no information regarding the crime’s perpetrators was brought to the public’s attention by Kuwaiti security authorities, the most obvious candidate with a motive for assassinating an Iraqi Shiite oppositionist to the Iraqi regime was Baghdad. Superﬁcially, the second and third incidents seemed to be separate operations with distinct motives: the second was an attack on Iranian commercial interests in Kuwait (like the bombing of Iran Air during the previous spring), and the third essentially targeted Kuwaiti government interests. However, Kuwaiti investigations soon bore out that both attacks had been perpetrated by Palestinians (with Jordanian citizenship) belonging to a Palestinian organization connected to Iraq. The ﬁndings did not conﬂict with the fact that Saddam sheltered various militant Palestinian groups and used them to carry out his own political objectives. Pursuing and prosecuting the terrorists of these two crimes took the following course. Only days after the March bombing, the Kuwaiti press reported the arrest of individuals of the same Arab nationality for the attack.221 Two and a half months later—and ﬁve days before the June attacks—it was reported that six persons “holding Jordanian nationality” had been charged for involvement in the bombing, and that they belonged to a “foreign military organization.”222 The report added that they had appeared in front of Kuwait’s state security court that day.223 After the June bombings, it was determined that some of the perpetrators of those attacks were Palestinians, and that they had inﬁltrated into Kuwait from Iraq and then ﬂed to Iraq immediately after the

56 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

attacks.224 Within days of the June attacks, the Kuwaiti interior ministry undersecretary traveled to Iraq and solicited Saddam to extradite two Palestinian fugitives.225 Saddam conﬁrmed that the two Palestinians in question were in Iraq and belonged to an unidentiﬁed Palestinian organization, but did not grant Kuwait’s extradition request.226 The case for those charged in the June attacks was sent to the state security court in July.227 Justice Ministry information shows that six individuals were tried in connection with the March attack, and eight for the June bombings.228 In August, KUNA reported that nine of the suspects in the two cases had been found guilty, of which seven had been sentenced to life imprisonment (including four in absentia), one to a two-year prison term, and another to seven years in prison.229 The simultaneous announcement of all the verdicts in the two cases seemed to conﬁrm a link between them.230 While an Iraqi media report insinuated that the attacks, as well as the bombing of Kuwait’s embassy in Beirut on 26 June (one day after the series of ﬁve explosions in Kuwait) were conducted by the Iranians, other accounts of the crimes pointed to Iraqi involvement.231 According to an Arab-Asian Affairs intelligence digest, unidentiﬁed reports that July suggested the March and June attacks had been intended to increase pressure on Kuwait to lease Bubiyan Island to Baghdad, as Saddam had requested in February.232 Another hypothesis was that the attacks were meant to pressure Kuwait to funnel larger sums of money into Iraq’s war chest.233 When Kuwait had been preparing a ﬁnancial loan package for Baghdad that spring, Kuwaiti proposals had fallen substantially short of Iraq’s reported demands. Whatever the motive, the attacks seemed to be further testament to regional politics translating into security problems inside Kuwait. The attention devoted to security in the wake of the attacks attested to the government leadership and assembly’s concern. In the wake of the June attacks, which al-Rai al-Amm identiﬁed as “a new phase in the ﬁlthy plot” against Kuwait, the National Assembly held a special closed session to plan for new security measures.234 In the meantime, restrictions were temporarily imposed on visit visas to the country.235 Two weeks after the assembly session, Shaykh Nawwaf announced the new measures as: employing new modern surveillance equipment, improving police ofﬁcer training, and strengthening Kuwait’s coast guard to protect against inﬁltration.236 A report prepared in the wake of the bombings by the assembly’s National Affairs and Defense Committee also recommended enlarging security staffs, increasing the mobility of security

New Political Forums and Ongoing Regional Tremors 57

units, and restricting immigration.237 Months later, the Interior Ministry was enlarged, and a bureau was established to conduct research and recommend training programs and operational improvements.238 Shaykh Nawwaf commented after the June bombings that there would be no mass deportations.239 However, Interior Ministry statistics show a higher than usual number of deportations of Jordanian nationals carried out between March (the month of the attack on the Iranian shipping company) and September (one month after the security trials for the March and June crimes concluded).240 The number of expulsions of Jordanian nationals during this seven-month period nearly equaled the number carried out during the previous 13 months (138 and 139 expulsions, respectively).241 In fact, the total number of expatriate deportations had increased in the month of April. The deportation campaign was announced by the Interior Ministry at that time, and paralleled a similar campaign in late 1979 (see Chapter 2).242 Although the campaign followed the bombing of the Iranian shipping company in March, the pattern of the deportations suggests that the expulsions did not relate precisely to that bombing. For example, although an increase in deportations was evident for several expatriate nationalities as compared to previous months, Iranians were affected more severely by the campaign; deportations of Iranians in April jumped to their highest level in more than two years.243 Like the mass deportations of late 1979, the campaign in April seemed to reﬂect an increase in the sense of vulnerability in the country to foreigners in relation to the neighboring revolution and war. Indeed, the Interior Ministry ofﬁcial who announced the campaign explained it broadly as a response to “recent explosions and kidnappings.”244 The spring 1981 episodes again highlighted Kuwait’s vulnerability to being a battleﬁeld for regional conﬂicts and coercive political violence.

Battleﬁeld reverberations While the ﬁrst year and a half of the Iran-Iraq war saw primarily Iraqi successes on the battleﬁeld, the situation changed dramatically in the spring of 1982. By May of that year, Iran had recaptured Khorramshahr from its neighbor after also having forced Iraq to withdraw from the strategically important area of Dezful two months earlier. The changes on the Iran-Iraq battleﬁeld reverberated in Kuwait. To help compensate for its military losses, Baghdad sought various forms of support from Kuwait with regard to the war effort. For one,

58 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

the press attaché at the Iraqi embassy in Kuwait reportedly pressed one of Kuwait’s daily newspapers to “correct” its accounts of developments on the front. The Arab Times suddenly switched from objective reporting on the war to a series of front page articles describing Iraq’s military successes, when in fact Iraq was suffering heavy losses. Ironically, the newspaper’s correspondent in Khorramshahr reported Iraqi victories on the same day that Iraq announced it had been withdrawing its troops from the city for the past 24 hours.245 During the same time period, apparently Baghdad was making preparations to request that Kuwait extradite Iraqi oppositionists living in Kuwait, as Kuwaiti authorities warned oppositionists that it would be required to honor Baghdad’s requests in this regard.246 Obviously, neither Iraq nor Kuwait believed extradition protocol to be reciprocal (see above). In addition, in June Kuwait Airways resumed on a limited basis its Kuwait City-Baghdad route which had been suspended 21 months earlier due to the commencement of the war.247 The timing of the move despite the intensiﬁcation of the war suggested Baghdad had played a role in the decision to restore the route. While Baghdad did not pose a serious threat to internal security in Kuwait in these instances, the incidents pointed to the leadership’s vulnerability to Iraqi encroachment in national affairs particularly during difﬁcult periods. The reverberations from the Iranian side as a result of the war’s developments in the spring proved more acute, and resulted in domestic tensions not seen in Kuwait since the ﬁrst year of the revolution. Iranian military successes in May prompted large Iranian victory celebrations in Kuwait. The Iranian embassy itself directed some of the festivities: embassy ofﬁcials led evening crowds in the compound’s courtyard in chants calling for the death of the United States, the Soviet Union, Israel and anti-clergy elements.248 The Kuwaiti police arrested a dozen or so Iranians who were celebrating the military victories at their work places in the suq, destroyed radios that were playing broadcasts from Iran, and seized photographs of Ayatollah Khomeini.249 The tense atmosphere extended into the autumn. Although the Shiite holiday of Ashura had passed relatively quietly in 1980 and 1981, heightened tensions resulting from the events of the spring carried over to the holiday festivities in late October. The Kuwaiti authorities imposed restrictions on Ashura ceremonies, and eventually canceled some of them.250 The police also made a number of arrests during the Ashura ceremonies that took place; Iranian sources stated that 150 mourners had been detained beyond the holiday season.251

New Political Forums and Ongoing Regional Tremors 59

Kuwait explained the restrictions and arrests as necessary measures for dealing with troublemakers who were inﬁltrating the ceremonies.252 The security measures taken by the authorities in 1982 attested to their concern about political agitation by Iranian expatriates. But an equal if not greater concern remained the possibility of involvement in such activities by Kuwaiti nationals. As the Kuwaiti and Iranian foreign ministries traded accusations over security issues during Ashura, Kuwait criticized Tehran for the “exploitation of religious occasions to create unrest and political feuds among citizens.”253 The example of the Iraniansupported, Bahraini citizen-dominated attempted coup in Bahrain less than a year earlier likely drove the authorities to take more serious preventative measures. Concern about Shiite agitation resurfaced in the spring of 1983 following a several month lull. Again, the perceived threat was linked to Tehran’s more aggressive policies toward Kuwait stemming from Iran’s successes on the battleﬁeld and Kuwait’s increasing support for Iraq. On 16 March, Kuwait expelled an Iranian clergyman.254 In April, the Information Ministry barred all radio and television stations from broadcasting Friday sermons unless the texts were ofﬁcially approved beforehand.255 During Ashura ceremonies in October, Kuwaiti security forces took up positions on the city’s streets, but that year the holiday passed more quietly than the previous one.256

Palestinian attacks and the Palestinian community In addition to reverberations from the war, a spate of terrorist assaults on Kuwaiti diplomats abroad shook Kuwaitis in 1982. The attacks included the assassination of the ﬁrst secretary of Kuwait’s embassy in New Delhi on 4 June; the assassination of the ﬁrst secretary of its embassy in Madrid on 16 September; and the attempted assassination of the Kuwaiti consul-general in Karachi also on 16 September. The two September attacks were claimed by and widely attributed to the militant Palestinian organization, Abu Nidal (also the name of the group’s leader), an opponent of Arafat’s Fatah and based in Iraq at the time. The Palestinian gunman (with Lebanese citizenship) who confessed to the Madrid crime identiﬁed himself as a member of the group, and expressed disappointment that he did not kill the Kuwaiti ambassador instead of the ﬁrst secretary.257 The ﬁrst attack in New Delhi, however, was not attributed publicly to any organization. The Indian government even pointed to personal enmity as the possible cause of the crime, but India’s investigation

60 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

never resulted in conclusive evidence for this or any other theory.258 Kuwaiti authorities, however, appeared to believe that Abu Nidal was connected to the crime. In addition to the organization’s general reputation for carrying out assaults against Arab targets, as well as the fact that an assassination attempt against Israel’s ambassador to Britain widely attributed to Abu Nidal had been committed one day prior to the attack on the Kuwaiti diplomat, several theories regarding Abu Nidal’s culpability existed at the time. All of the theories could be applied to the subsequent attacks in September as well. One set of theories connected Baghdad to the root of the offenses. Some believed that Saddam was using Abu Nidal to carry out his own political objectives, as he had in the 1970s. The attacks might have been intended to increase pressure on Kuwait to grant Baghdad additional ﬁnancial assistance, in line with similar theories surrounding the ﬁve bombings in Kuwait only a year earlier.259 The September attacks also might have been an attempt to warn Kuwait against its peace overtures toward Iran at the time. Another theory, espoused by some in the National Assembly, pointed to Damascus’ inﬂuence in the organization, and connected the attacks to parliament’s decision in February to cancel aid for Syrian forces in Lebanon.260 A third theory recognized possible independent motives of the Palestinian organization. Abu Nidal had solicited funds in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia on occasion by threatening attacks, and perhaps it was punishing Kuwait for failing to channel money to the group.261 In the end, the generally accepted explanation, put forth in an October 1982 issue of The Economist with regard to the September attacks, and in Patrick Seale’s Abu Nidal, was that the assaults were intended to secure the release of Palestinian prisoners in Kuwait linked to Abu Nidal.262 The Economist maintained that the two September attacks were connected to the case of two Palestinians imprisoned in Kuwait for shooting the UAE chargé d’affaires in August.263 In the same vein, Seale suggests that all three attacks were linked to Kuwait’s arrest of two Palestinian members of Abu Nidal who had inﬁltrated from Iraq with large quantities of explosives.264 In fact, the Kuwaiti press had reported in early July the arrest in midMay (three weeks before the June attack) of three Palestinians believed to be connected to a Palestinian organization in Iraq for importing explosives from that country.265 Kuwait’s state security court eventually tried the Palestinians, whose claim that the explosives were intended for conducting sabotage in Israel was dismissed, and sentenced all three defendants to ten to 15 years imprisonment, ﬁnes and deportation.266

New Political Forums and Ongoing Regional Tremors 61

The perpetration of violent attacks against Kuwaiti targets with the aim of securing the release of criminals in its prisons would become a reoccurring nightmare for Kuwait involving other militant groups (see Chapter 4). In the ﬁnal analysis, it seems as though the Kuwaiti authorities suspected Abu Nidal of committing the June attack as well as the September incidents. Two statements from the leadership indicate this. In an address to the National Assembly in early October, Shaykh Saad discreetly pointed the ﬁnger at an Arab group as the perpetrator: “Kuwaiti diplomats escaped assassination and others were martyred as though the Arabs and Muslims are not suffering enough at the hands of their enemies and have decided to add inter-wars, conspiracies and assassinations.”267 In a press interview published the next day, Kuwait’s state minister for cabinet affairs maintained that the three assaults were probably committed by the same Palestinian faction.268 Seale also suggests that the Kuwaiti leadership knew the Abu Nidal group to be responsible for the crimes, arguing that “to spare themselves such headaches” they engaged in a secret dialogue with Abu Nidal and agreed to provide him with a monthly stipend.269 A series of new security measures apparently linked to the attacks as well as other developments during this period targeted Kuwait’s own Palestinian expatriate community. Reportedly the ruling family was growing increasingly troubled by the new relationship between the PLO and Tehran, which it feared could lead to Palestinian-Iranian collaboration in political agitation in the country.270 Additionally, deep concern must have existed that the start of the war in Lebanon would dangerously politicize the Palestinian community (and others) in Kuwait, as had Levantine politics in the 1970s. Following the ﬁrst assassination, a friendly meeting between Palestinian residents and the Iranian ambassador to Kuwait, and the start of the Lebanon war—all during the beginning of June—the ruling family embarked on a series of special “appeasement” measures toward its Palestinian community beyond the traditional framework of its usual support for Palestinian concerns.271 The ﬁrst was the amir’s pardoning of 88 Palestinian detainees on the condition that they depart for Lebanon to ﬁght in the war against Israel, which Israel had initiated to root out Palestinian militants operating against it from Lebanese territory.272 Like the mandatory tax imposed on Palestinians’ salaries in Kuwait and diverted to the cause of Palestine, sending Palestinian detainees to battle Israel demonstrated tangible Kuwaiti support for this cause. Moreover, ﬁghting the Israeli invasion was a cause that all Palestinians could support.

62 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

Additionally, in July the Amiri Diwan (“Ofﬁce of the Amir”) announced a one-hour strike in all government ministries and institutions, and the cancellation of Id al-Fitr ceremonies, “in solidarity” with the Palestinians and Lebanese ﬁghting Israel.273 During the following month of August, the government not only permitted but participated in a protest denouncing the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, sponsored by the Kuwaiti People’s Committee of the Patriotic Movement for Solidarity with the Palestinian Revolution and Lebanon.274 At the demonstration, ministers and assembly deputies delivered speeches to a crowd of tens of thousands of people.275 Later that month, the authorities permitted a demonstration near the American embassy in which US ﬂags were burned in protest against US assistance to Israel.276 The leadership’s position toward the two demonstrations in August contrasted with its approach to a Palestinian student demonstration against Israeli actions in the West Bank only ﬁve months earlier.277 During the March protest, Kuwaiti police had clashed violently with demonstrators and ultimately dispersed the gathering, injuring several people and arresting dozens. Certainly, Israel’s intensive bombing of Beirut during the summer months of 1982 proved even more distressing to Palestinians and others in Kuwait than Israeli actions in the West Bank in March, and therefore demanded a greater public response from the Kuwaiti leadership in support of the Palestinians. However, the change in positions on Palestinian-linked demonstrations cannot be viewed independently of Kuwait’s increased sensitivity to the security factors mentioned above in relation to its Palestinian community. Following the September assaults on Kuwaiti diplomats abroad, the authorities took pains to minimize the resulting increased KuwaitiPalestinian tensions. The state minister for cabinet affairs, for example, maintained that Kuwaiti-Palestinian relations were “as strong as ever and were not affected by incidents committed by disenchanted individuals.”278 In the context of comments regarding Kuwait’s large Palestinian community, Foreign Minister Shaykh Sabah stated that Arab expatriates were unproblematic for Kuwait, as opposed to nonArabs (i.e. Asians) who committed more crimes in the country.279 (This stated preference contradicted Kuwaiti practices in foreign labor immigration, discussed below.) Furthermore, ﬁgures from the Interior Ministry do not indicate a backlash against Palestinian residents in terms of expulsions, which would have been common for similar circumstances involving other expatriate communities.280 Kuwaiti efforts to appease Palestinians at home with special political measures, and to downplay tensions, attested to the perceived importance for domestic

New Political Forums and Ongoing Regional Tremors 63

stability of Palestinians’ relative contentment in Kuwait. For the time being, these efforts proved successful.

New trends regarding expatriates While the special security challenges of the Iranian and Palestinian expatriate communities demanded community-speciﬁc responses in 1982, three general trends characterized the leadership’s management of the country’s foreign population during the years 1981–83. These trends illuminate the leadership’s perception of the extent to which certain kinds of foreign residents, and foreign residents in general, posed security risks during this period. The ﬁrst trend indicated by Interior Ministry statistics is an overall decrease in the number of expulsions of foreigners during the years 1981–83, particularly as compared to 1979’s high (see Graph 3.1). The trend suggests a decline in the perception of foreign residents in general as acute security threats. The second, related trend is an increase in the overall number of foreigners granted entry into Kuwait during the years 1982 and 1983. The number of ﬁrst-time labor permits issued during each of these years generally increased at signiﬁcantly higher rates than during the previous several years (see Table 3.1). This occurred despite Kuwait’s stock market crash in September 1982 that wounded its economy. Graph 3.1 1979–83

Annual Number of Administrative Deportations of Expatriates,

18,000 16,000 14,000 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 0 1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

Source: Kuwait Ministry of Interior internal yearbook information provided to the author by the ministry, Spring 2000.

64 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution Table 3.1 1978–83

Annual Number of First-time Work and Residence Permits Issued,

1978

1979

48,270

First-time 116,806 Residence Permits

First-time Work Permits

1980

1981

1982

1983

44,474

56,178

50,554

68,934

86,075

102,109

99,162

90,767

145,841

184,238

Source: Kuwait Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, Social Statistics 1980, p. 143; Social Statistics 1981, p. 143; Social Statistics 1982, p. 143; Social Statistics 1983, p. 124; Social Statistics 1984, p. 122; Kuwait Ministry of Interior internal yearbook information provided to the author by the ministry, Spring 2000.

Correspondingly, the number of ﬁrst-time residence permits issued in 1982 and 1983 rose signiﬁcantly, after having decreased annually during the three previous years (see Table 3.1). The ﬁgures suggest that as the initial turmoil of the revolution and war receded somewhat in the early 1980s, economic and other needs and ambitions with regard to inexpensive foreign labor superseded political pressures to decrease the number of new foreigners entering the country. The third trend regards the uneven admittance to the country of different foreign nationalities, including residents in general and working residents in particular, during the years 1981–83. Government statistics show that the number of ﬁrst-time residence permits and work permits granted to many Middle Eastern nationalities decreased during this period, as compared to the previous two years, while the number of ﬁrst-time permits granted to Asian nationalities generally rose (see Tables 3.2 and 3.3). Middle Eastern groups that suffered a decline primarily included Iranians, Iraqis and Levantine Arabs, while Egyptians and most North Africans did not suffer a decline. The trend contributed to a new development in 1982 regarding the admittance of Arab and Asian expatriates in general. Government statistics for ﬁrst-time residence permits granted by nationality group show a divergence in the number of expatriate Arabs provided residence permits, and the number of Asians given residence permits, in 1982 and again in 1983 (see Graph 3.2). Many factors contribute to decisions about admitting new foreign labor including public sector needs as well as private business and familial needs. But the fact that Arabs with less of a connection to the Shiite revolution in Iran, the Iran-Iraq war and the war in Lebanon did

New Political Forums and Ongoing Regional Tremors 65 Table 3.2 Annual Number of First-time Residence Permits Issued According to Nationality, 1979–83

Jordanian Lebanese Syrian Iraqi Egyptian Palestinian Saudi Arabian Sudanese South Yemeni North Yemeni Bahraini Qatari Tunisian Algerian Libyan Moroccan Omani Emiris Mauritanian Somali Iranian Pakistani Indian Yugoslav Bangladeshi American Sri Lankan Japanese British Korean Other

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

10,305 3,604 4,724 5,164 16,205 1,044 16 676 840 221 60 9 119 25 4 33 191 19 1 43 5,363 10,917 17,862 373 1,958 682 5,015 525 1,680 8,972 5,459

9,897 2,890 5,028 6,286 17,392 1,068 15 867 577 209 21 7 129 30 12 86 154 8 0 226 4,521 9,135 15,405 274 2,271 587 6,666 364 1,531 8,138 5,368

9,905 2,567 4,353 4,540 14,761 1,250 29 969 669 192 17 5 119 26 25 37 181 6 0 0 2,971 7,651 14,804 93 3,423 549 9,703 536 1,174 7,477 2,735

10,691 2,520 5,561 3,433 25,236 988 12 1,420 839 242 12 3 362 13 15 81 145 0 21 341 3,771 14,918 31,622 243 6,899 699 16,946 1,009 2,103 2,922 12,774

8,304 2,069 3,524 1,995 32,339 615 18 1,899 534 169 4 6 418 13 12 79 124 2 106 679 3,855 19,325 42,124 469 10,659 1,013 19,689 1,795 2,730 3,017 26,653

Source: Kuwait Ministry of Interior internal yearbook information provided to the author by the ministry, Spring 2000.

not experience a decline in admittance numbers does suggest an increase in the perception that certain Middle Eastern groups represented more serious security liabilities. The different trends for various groups that typically ﬁlled similar positions in the Kuwaiti workforce, like Palestinians and Egyptians who served in the skilled workforce at the time, further point to a political explanation for the change in foreign admissions. The Arab-Asian development likewise reﬂected a

66 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution Table 3.3 Annual Number of First-time Work Permits Issued According to Nationality, 1979–83

Yemeni Iraqi Jordanian Palestinian Syrian Lebanese Egyptian Other Arab Pakistani Bangladeshi Indian Iranian Korean Filipino Japanese East European West European Amer. & Canad. Other Non-Arab

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

273 2,248 1,988 46 1,706 1,281 8,909 483 5,092 975 6,563 1,501 8,016 987 392 358 1,481 249 1,926

327 2,781 1,996 42 2,085 949 13,669 681 5,628 2,043 7,289 2,592 9,629 842 307 430 1,283 216 3,389

266 1,833 1,647 75 1,687 955 10,720 501 4,400 3,097 7,051 2,086 7,511 1,582 712 349 1,433 268 4,381

314 1,024 1,736 40 2,574 1,084 21,504 1,224 6,480 5,053 12,234 1,708 3,447 2,433 620 578 1,582 347 4,952

83 64 330 3 327 217 29,202 1,153 12,970 8,784 12,987 193 2,083 4,981 1,148 437 1,828 259 9,026

Source: Kuwait Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, Social Statistics 1980, p. 143; Kuwait Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, Social Statistics 1981, p. 143; Kuwait Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, Social Statistics 1982, p. 143; Kuwait Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, Social Statistics 1983, p. 124; Kuwait Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, Social Statistics 1984, p. 122.

Graph 3.2 Annual Number of First-time Residence Permits Issued to Arab and Asian Nationalities, 1978–83 120,000 100,000 80,000 Arab Asian

60,000 40,000 20,000 0 1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

Source: Author’s graph of data from Kuwait Ministry of Planning, Annual Statistical Abstract 1989, p. 65.

New Political Forums and Ongoing Regional Tremors 67

general preference for Asian over Arab immigrants during the last two years under study in this chapter—one that would endure well into the mid-1980s. In fact, a preference for non-Arab immigrants predates the period under study in this book. Arab expatriates, who began to immigrate to Kuwait in increasing numbers in the 1940s, had represented a serious political liability for the ruling family as early as the 1950s and 1960s when they nourished Arab nationalism in the country (see Chapter 1). In conjunction with a series of political events in the Arab world in the 1970s, including the oil boycott and the Lebanese war, that negatively impacted the security environment in Kuwait, Asian workers began to arrive in Kuwait en masse.281 Reasons unrelated to Kuwaiti politics also explained the Asian immigration at the time, including a shrinkage of the Arab migrant pool, an increasing interest in immigration to Kuwait on the part of Asian workers themselves, and aggressive policies by Asian states to promote their labor resources.282 Market forces also encouraged Asian immigration to Kuwait, as Asian workers typically have been less expensive to employ than non-Kuwaiti Arabs in Kuwait. The preference for Asian over Arab expatriate residents in general, and over certain Arab groups in particular, undoubtedly was buoyed by the destabilizing impact of the Iran-Iraq war, and the inﬂux of Iraqi refugees and other Arab residents of Iraq to Kuwait. In addition, Israel’s war against Lebanon in 1982 caused deep concern about possible negative reverberations among the population in Kuwait. A government report on Arab expatriate student associations at Kuwait University reﬂected the anxiety about politically active foreign Arabs. The report argued that the associations, including Iraqi, Syrian and Palestinian groups, had evaded mandatory regulation by the University Students Association, and “bore the imprint of their national identity and took their political cues from their home countries rather than from the university they attended or the state hosting them.”283 During this period of tumult in the Middle East, the political liability of Arab expatriates had grown. At this time, instead of meeting security needs by limiting the number of new foreigners entering the country, the government invested in a series of “tracking” measures to better manage its population. The tracking measures, announced in the wake of the attempted coup in Bahrain, were politically signiﬁcant.284 With such a system in place, labor and residence law violations could be easily determined. Also, if a security problem arose with a speciﬁc individual or community of foreign workers, the suspect(s) could be more readily located and penalized as appropriate.

68 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

One far-reaching effort to track Kuwait’s population was the civil data system, signed into law by Amir Jabir on 25 April 1982. Under the terms of the system, all residents, both Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti, would carry an identiﬁcation card. The fact that the scheme would be incorporated into the Interior Ministry’s area of responsibility pointed to the true intention of the law: internal security control. Also that summer, two new laws required the annual renewal of labor identiﬁcation cards for foreign residents. Another law tightened regulations over visitors’ stays and those of residents whose employment had been terminated.285 To complement the new tracking measures, the Interior Ministry embarked on an ambitious effort to rid the country of illegal residents in September 1982 that proved several times the intensity of similar efforts in late 1979 and April 1981. Illegal residents were given until November (the deadline was later extended to the end of the calendar year) to legalize their papers or leave the country.286 In November, an Interior Ministry ofﬁcial noted that approximately 25,000 illegal residents had been ordered to depart for residence law violations, and that the status of another 10,000 or so had been resolved with the issuance of legal residence permits.287 The ministry urged Kuwait’s business community to expedite the process by reporting cases of illegal residents working for them, or applying for their visas.288 Five months later, approximately 50,000 to 100,000 illegal workers had departed.289 The impact of their departure was reﬂected rapidly in new unskilled and semi-skilled wage levels, which in some cases tripled.290 The main conclusion that can be drawn from the patterns of deportation, admission and tracking of foreigners in Kuwait during the period 1981–83 is that while the presence of certain groups continued to represent a security liability for the leadership, the perception that foreigners in general posed an immediate security threat receded somewhat during these years. Although Kuwait modiﬁed its practices toward foreign labor, both by favoring certain groups over others in admission and by more closely tracking expatriates, it did not appear ready or willing to pursue serious reductions in the overall number of foreigners in the country.

Summary During February 1981 to November 1983, Kuwait’s domestic arena recovered somewhat from the tumult of the ﬁrst years following the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war. The al-Sabahs’ reopening of

New Political Forums and Ongoing Regional Tremors 69

the National Assembly provided a forum for Kuwaiti Shia, Sunni Islamists and others to pursue their political agendas within the conﬁnes of the traditional Kuwaiti system. Periodic security disturbances that almost exclusively related to foreign residents, inﬁltrators and regional conﬂicts occurred, yet the government felt conﬁdent enough to carry out fewer deportations and permit an overall increase in foreign immigration during this period as compared to the previous two years. The leadership also implemented longer-term policies to address areas of vulnerability, such as an extensive civil data system to track foreign residents as well as Kuwaiti citizens; a reduction in the number of new immigrants whose nationalities were associated with irritating political trends in the region; and formal security cooperation with regional states via the newly established GCC. Nonetheless, Iranian-backed Shiite disturbances during 1982 and in the spring of 1983 foretold what loomed ahead for Kuwait: the dramatic events of 12 December 1983 that would overwhelm the leadership and lead to an intense security crackdown across the country.

4 Major Terror Attacks and National Transformation, December 1983–January 1986

A series of high proﬁle terrorist attacks in Kuwait in December 1983 and during the spring and summer of 1985 resulted in about two dozen civilian deaths, more than 100 injured, and included an attempt on the life of the Kuwaiti ruler, Amir Jabir. The attacks obviously were intended to undermine the al-Sabah leadership. They transformed the leadership into one obsessed with security and efforts to maintain it. As with the ﬁrst major attack against a Kuwaiti target in the country during the post-Iranian revolution period—the al-Rai al-Amm bombing in 1980—the authorities emphasized the “external” nature of the hostilities that led to the attacks, and their foreign organization. Interior ministry ofﬁcials stated repeatedly that the assaults had resulted from political and ideological conﬂicts over regional and international affairs, not conﬂicts within Kuwait. The government leadership charged foreign capitals, especially Tehran and in some cases Damascus, with being the inspirational and organizational force behind the incidents, as well as other seditious activities inside Kuwait during this period.291 In fact, links between the assailants, regional political and military organizations, and Tehran were established during the course of the investigations into the attacks. Apparently, a combination of factors contributed to the incidents, including a strategic shift in Iran’s foreign policy toward the Arab Gulf, the growth of radical Shiite groups in Lebanon following the Israeli invasion in June 1982, and organizational and personal connections between Tehran and the revolutionary groups in and around Beirut.292 Kuwait’s ﬁnancial, material, logistical and other support for Iraq in the war against Iran, and its ﬁrm stance from 1984 onward regarding those convicted in the state security court for the December 1983 attacks, made the country a key target. 70

Major Terror Attacks and National Transformation 71

Despite the “foreign roots” of the terrorism, many of the individuals involved in some of the attacks were eventually identiﬁed as Shiite expatriate residents of Kuwait. This elevated the perceived threat of Shia in the country to a level unparalleled since 1979. Arrests and deportations of Shiite expatriates, as well as other foreign residents and some Shiite citizens, were stepped up signiﬁcantly. The government sought to overhaul Kuwait’s foreign labor practices, and cooperated with parliament in developing new laws and procedures for punishing and deterring terrorists. The attacks deeply affected the Kuwaiti public as well, including perceptions of Kuwaiti Shia, foreign residents and religious groups, all of which were linked to the crimes in different ways in the minds of various elements of the Kuwaiti population. Tensions between Kuwaiti Sunni and Shiite citizens ﬂared. Foreign residents in general grew to be perceived as serious security liabilities. A reversal in public attitudes toward religious elements in the country took place: the attacks— which generally were blamed on religious extremism—deﬂated the popularity of both Sunni and Shiite religious groups, and diminished the appeal of fundamentalist principles in society in general. The ﬁnal casualty of the attacks in terms of public perceptions was Kuwait’s leadership. Although in some respects it was regarded as a victim of the terrorism, as time passed without a decline in violent incidents it was increasingly faulted for insufﬁciently protecting the country. As a result, the authorities were required to engage ever more in two battles for security: one with regard to terrorism and sedition, and the other with regard to public support among Kuwaitis. By the winter of 1985–86, public criticism had peaked, with serious repercussions for the authorities’ security endeavors and the government’s relations with parliament.

Immediate responses to the December 1983 bombings On the morning of 12 December 1983, bombs targeting seven sites rocked Kuwait in a period of two hours. The ﬁrst and most destructive attack occurred at the US embassy near the Gulf shore. At 9:30 a.m., a truck carrying explosives crashed through the gate of the embassy complex and sped toward the administrative annex. The vehicle exploded on impact, ripping a large hole through the building and setting it aﬁre. The explosion was so powerful that it shattered the windows of structures hundreds of meters away from the embassy.293 The attack caused four deaths, not including the suicide bomber, and

72 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

tens of injuries. It was later determined that only a quarter of the explosives in the vehicle actually had ignited.294 The second attack took place less than a half-hour after the ﬁrst, when an explosives-laden car detonated under the control tower of the Kuwaiti airport. The explosion killed one person, damaged the tower, and scattered debris over a 20-meter radius. Within the next hour, three other bombs exploded around the city. A car bomb detonated at the French embassy complex, extensively damaging the consular building and the French language institute which had been holding classes at the time. Almost simultaneously, two explosions occurred in residential complexes housing Americans working for private American companies in Kuwait.295 Finally, the sixth and seventh bombings targeted a Kuwaiti oil facility in Shuwayba, and an electricity control center on Fifth Ring Road. Kuwaiti security forces foiled an eighth bomb by defusing an explosive device in a vehicle parked outside an ofﬁce of the Interior Ministry. In all, the explosions resulted in ﬁve innocent deaths and nearly 90 injuries, with the attack on the US embassy accounting for most of the victims. Interior ministry investigators immediately tried to determine and locate those involved in the attacks, and within a few hours of the ﬁrst bombing, investigators had identiﬁed the single owner of all of the vehicles used in the explosions, and detained several people believed to be connected to the incidents.296 By the end of the day, the police had determined the identity of the only suicide bomber in the attacks: the driver of the truck that had crashed into the US embassy.297 Security forces apprehended the men who shared a residence with him, and from their disclosures, over time arrested a total of 25 suspected accomplices.298 Other potential targets for attack in the country were secured. The Defense Ministry deployed armored army units to protect the US and other Western embassies. Kuwaiti soldiers equipped with machine guns and riﬂes, and tanks and armored troop vehicles, took positions around major public buildings and industrial facilities. Many of these defensive positions were held for several months.299 The government deliberated over what measures should be taken to enhance security in the near and long term. Within hours of the ﬁrst attack, the Council of Ministers convened a secret, emergency session to discuss the subject. The assembly speaker, Muhammad al-Adsani, also attended the meeting. Emerging from the conference, Crown Prince Shaykh Saad announced that the government would pursue three avenues in response to the attacks: 1) purge all suspicious people from the country, 2) undertake (unspeciﬁed) other deterrent measures, and 3)

Major Terror Attacks and National Transformation 73

act strictly against the perpetrators of the crimes. These efforts were to be led by the Interior Ministry.300 On the following day, the National Assembly also convened for a threehour, closed, emergency session. The assembly’s determinations echoed those of the Cabinet. A statement issued after the meeting stressed that strict measures would be taken against anyone intending to harm the stability of the country, and called on Kuwaitis to “close ranks to foil foreign plots of inﬁltrators and hostile elements.”301 The parliament quickly cooperated with the government over a decree by the amir toughening punishments for security-related crimes. The ﬁnal decree was based on a draft law submitted by the Islamist salaﬁ deputies, punishing perpetrators of terrorism with the death penalty or amputation of hands and feet. The immediacy and extent of cooperation between the government and assembly reﬂected two important phenomena. One was the solidarity among the political leadership and lawmakers directly following a national tragedy of this nature. The second was the resolute disassociation on the part of the Kuwaiti Islamist deputies from the kind of religious radicalism that endorsed the attacks. The government also achieved cooperation with national organizations immediately following the attacks. One detailed arrangement between the Social Affairs and Labor Ministry and the Cooperative Societies Union limited the sale of gas cylinders, which had been used to hold the explosives in each of the bombing incidents. The agreement required all retail branches of the union to note the name and address of each person wishing to buy or exchange gas cylinders, the date of sale, and the number of cylinders purchased. No more than four cylinders could be sold at one time.302 The government’s immediate post-attack responses proved focused and comprehensive: it pursued the perpetrators, secured other potential targets, and worked with national bodies to develop policies to help prevent other attacks. Yet the bombings on the morning of 12 December 1983 had taken the leadership by complete surprise. Only a month earlier, the US embassy had requested tighter security around its block of diplomatic buildings after receiving intelligence information regarding security threats.303 Kuwait had turned down the request, conﬁdent that everything was under control.304

Political convictions behind pursuing and purging Shia The ﬁrst component of the Council of Ministers’ plan entailed ridding the country of individuals who posed security threats. Three

74 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

convictions guided the government’s mission in this regard. The ﬁrst was that the attacks were designed by Tehran (as would be indicated in the course of the bombings investigation). The second was that radical Shiite expatriates had committed the crime (as also would be established during the investigation). The third was that other members of Shiite communities in Kuwait were inclined to cooperate or participate in similar radical activities. As a result, the mission involved a concentrated period of detentions, arrests, restrictions and deportations targeting primarily Shiite expatriates. Although the measures resembled previous actions taken against Kuwait’s Shiite communities over the previous years during difﬁcult periods, the more comprehensive implementation of these traditional measures in the winter of 1983–84 reﬂected the greater concern by the authorities about the extent of the security threat. Within days of the 12 December attacks, US administration ofﬁcials expressed the belief that Shiite revolutionaries aided by Tehran and possibly Damascus were responsible for the bombings.305 Eventually, Western sources would charge that the ﬁnal approval for the operation came directly from Iran by way of a courier to Kuwait.306 As for the motivation for the bombings, the attacks on the US and French embassies and the American residential compounds were connected to American and French policies in Lebanon and toward the Iran-Iraq war, according to Western sources.307 Indeed, the two embassy bombings proved the most materially destructive of all the attacks that December morning, and the US embassy bombing the most fatal. Kuwait made similar assumptions about Tehran’s culpability from the outset as well. However, from the leadership’s perspective, the bombings were less an attack on Western interests than a warning to Kuwait about the damage the perpetrators could cause in Kuwait to explicitly Kuwaiti targets.308 This reasoning was supported by differences in the bombings and bombing tactics against the various targets. The three Kuwaiti targets, i.e. the airport control tower, the oil installation and the electrical power station, suffered visibly less damage than the American and French targets. Apparently, the car bombs were placed in particular positions near the Kuwaiti facilities so that they would not result in signiﬁcant damage to them.309 Kuwaiti ofﬁcials believed that Tehran was warning the authorities against lending ﬁnancial, material or other support to Baghdad for the war.310 Although Iran denied involvement in the attacks, some statements from Tehran seemed to contradict this denial.311 In a commentary denouncing Kuwaiti arrests and deportations after the bombings,

Major Terror Attacks and National Transformation 75

Iranian radio advised the Kuwaiti leadership to “ﬁrst think of its interests before embarking on a losing gamble in which the only winners are [the United States and] Saddam.”312 And in an interview reported by Radio Tehran one day following the bombings, the Iranian oil minister not so cryptically noted that if two states were engaged in a war, and a third state placed resources and equipment at the disposal of one of the states, the other could seize “all those resources in the sea, on land, and in all other places.”313 The important factor with regard to Kuwait’s pursue and purge policy was that the authorities believed Tehran to be at the heart of the attacks. During the immediate aftermath of the bombings, some of the targeting of Shiite residents was connected to Interior Ministry efforts to apprehend the bombers. Due to successes early on in the investigation, the ministry was able to pinpoint particular people and places likely to be linked to the crimes and their perpetrators. Furthermore, as the number of identiﬁed suspects grew in the days and weeks following the attacks, so did the suspicion that revolutionary Shiite groups were responsible for the bombings. Each new ﬁnding seemed to conﬁrm earlier ones that pointed to radical Shiite expatriates representing the primary perpetrators of the attacks. One of the ﬁrst pieces of evidence in this regard was the identity of the only suicide bomber in the attack. The US embassy bomber’s thumb had been among the bodily remains at the crime scene, and as the ﬁngerprints of all legal immigrants and long term visitors in Kuwait were registered with the police, the Interior Ministry was able to determine his identity. He was an Iraqi Shiite linked to the Iraqi Shiite underground movement, al-Dawa. In fact, another revolutionary Shiite organization based in Lebanon, Islamic Jihad, which had carried out attacks on American and French targets in Beirut only two months earlier, had claimed responsibility for the attacks in Kuwait by way of an anonymous phone call to Agence France Presse (AFP) in Beirut on the day of the attacks.314 Initially, the claim was considered credible because the caller had warned about an eighth bomb before it had been defused by Kuwaiti security forces.315 However, with the identiﬁcation and apprehension of co-conspirators of the suicide bomber, it became clear that the attacks had been conducted by al-Dawa. In fact, the suicide driver and some of those arrested were wanted in Iraq for previous activities against Iraqi interests.316 Nonetheless, Islamic Jihad’s detailed knowledge of the course of the attacks seemed to conﬁrm the close links between the two Iraniansupported groups with regard to the anti-Kuwait activities.

76 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

By 18 December, Kuwait had identiﬁed 12 suspects and held ten in custody, among them seven Iraqis and three Lebanese.317 The state minister for cabinet affairs announced that all of the arrested suspects were members of al-Dawa.318 By 27 December, Kuwait had apprehended 19 suspects.319 By 10 January, 21 had been arrested.320 The ﬁnal count in late January included 25 individuals: 17 Iraqis, three Lebanese, three Kuwaitis and two biduns.321 All of the Iraqis were Shia, and most admitted belonging to al-Dawa. At least two of the Lebanese were Shia. The third Lebanese held a passport identifying him as a Christian Maronite, though generally it was believed that his passport was forged and that he was also a Shiite.322 Two had direct family connections to prominent Shiite revolutionary leaders in Lebanon.323 Kuwait’s vulnerability to violent actions by radical, primarily expatriate, Shia in the country seemed clear.

Pursuing and purging Shia In order to apprehend those involved in the attacks, identify others who posed security risks, and apparently deter residents who to the authorities represented potential threats, the Interior Ministry detained and in some cases harassed various Shiite residents in Kuwait. The targeted individuals were not only Iraqi and Lebanese Shia, but included Kuwaiti and other Arab Shia, as well as Pakistanis and especially Iranians.324 For example, Radio Tehran reported several days following the attacks that Kuwaiti security ofﬁcials had arrested the director and three employees of the ofﬁce supervising Iranian schools in Kuwait.325 Kuwaiti policemen also roughed up several Iranian and Pakistani clergymen, and arrested two Iranian clerics.326 Police forcibly entered the residence of an Iranian political attaché one week after the bombings, in violation of diplomatic immunity.327 Kuwait’s foreign ministry undersecretary later apologized to Tehran for the incident, insisting it was a mistake.328 The focus on individuals such as a school director, diplomat and clergymen suggest that the police were targeting Shiite community leaders not only for investigative purposes but also as a warning to them to avoid involvement in and lending support to antiregime activities. Ordinary Shiite residents were also targeted. Interior Minister Nawwaf conﬁrmed that speciﬁc areas of the country were being combed for security violators.329 Presumably, this included primarily Shiite communities. Radio Tehran reported that Kuwaiti police detained Iranian workers in the suq and at their residences. One such incident on

Major Terror Attacks and National Transformation 77

23 December involved the arrest of 70 Iranian workers in an Iranian residential district following ceremonies in a mosque. Those arrested were released after six hours of investigation.330 While the Kuwaiti police linked the round-ups to the on-going investigation, it appeared that many of the detainees were also victims of a kind of “group liability” phenomenon. The Interior Ministry seemed to be operating on the basis that Shiite residents were inherently suspicious and potentially threatening. Another example of this was the restrictions issued for approximately 24 hours following the bombings on the airport departure of all Iranians, Iraqis, Syrians, Lebanese, Jordanians and Palestinians.331 These nationalities were signiﬁcantly represented by Shia in Kuwait, and/or known to have been party to terrorist crimes in the past. Although the ofﬁcial Kuwaiti number of arrests made in December 1983 was 100, non-ofﬁcial reports suggest that 3,000–4,000 arrests were made.332 Many of the arrests and detentions that month included Kuwaitis as well as Iraqis and Iranians, according to various sources, with the Kuwaitis and Iraqis being overwhelmingly Shia like the Iranians.333 Correspondingly, Interior Ministry statistics show a concentration of deportations on Shiite populations for the months of December 1983, and January and February 1984 (see below). Indeed, the Interior Ministry was operating at that point with a broad mandate regarding deportations; Shaykh Nawwaf maintained that Kuwait would deport all those who undermined the country’s security.334 The interior ministry undersecretary conﬁrmed the government’s policy of deporting individuals for political reasons when he stated in an April 1984 interview that hundreds of individuals had been expelled since the December 1983 attacks on political grounds and for belonging to unauthorized organizations (presumably al-Dawa and similar groups).335 For several months following the bombings, Interior Ministry ﬁgures indicate that deportations of Iranian, Lebanese and Syrian residents jumped to their highest levels since the ﬁrst turbulent years of the revolution, and particularly since the Ashura holiday of April 1981 with regard to Iranians and Lebanese.336 Deportations of GCC country expatriates (typically represented in Kuwait by Shia) echoed this trend, although the total number of GCC expatriates, and deportations of them, was small at the time relative to other foreign nationalities.337 Expulsions of Iraqi residents exploded after the bombings, reaching their highest levels during all of the previous periods examined in this study.338 Although deportation ﬁgures for most nationalities show at least some rise after the bombings, ﬁgures for nationalities represented by Shia in Kuwait contrast with those for Indians, which

78 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

show a generally even rise between 1978 and 1984, and for Jordanians (mostly individuals of Palestinian origin), which show generally stable rises and declines between 1978 and 1984.339 Radio Tehran made Kuwait’s deportation of Iranians as well as Iraqi Shia a cause célèbre, tracking their numbers and providing a second set of data for examination. Although surprisingly Iranian ﬁgures prove low compared to the Kuwaiti ﬁgures, nonetheless they point to signiﬁcant rises in relation to the bombings.340 The wave of detentions, arrests and expulsions of Shia following the bombings was fueled by new discoveries of subversive activities by radical Shia in the country. The most publicized episode concerned Iranians and a Kuwaiti planning new attacks. In June 1984, Shaykh Nawwaf announced the arrest of four Iranians, eventually identiﬁed as a shop owner, two tailors and a truck driver, all employed in Kuwait.341 The four had been arrested while preparing to transfer approximately 25 time bombs to the Information Ministry complex.342 The Fahahil residence of two of the Iranians was searched, and additional equipment including tubes and gas cylinders for making explosives was discovered.343 A ﬁfth Iranian and one Kuwaiti later were charged in connection with the affair, and all were brought to the state security court in January 1985 to be tried.344 All six defendants were believed to be members of al-Dawa.345 One month later, the court found one of the Iranians and the Kuwaiti guilty, and sentenced them each to ten years imprisonment; the four other Iranians were acquitted.346 Other issues during this period fueling the cycle of suspicion and reprisal on the part of the authorities included pamphlets circulating at Kuwait University calling for the overthrow of Arab Gulf regimes, and the discovery of illegal trade in ammunition at an Iranian-owned grocery store in Farwaniya.347 In some instances, the Kuwaiti press helped perpetuate the distrust of Shia in the country. An al-Anba editorial the day after the bombings fed Sunni-Shiite tensions when it commented that Kuwait’s pan-Arab and pro-Iraq position in the war aroused “satanic tendencies” in some people—a play on Iran’s accusations that the regimes of the Arab Gulf were satanic.348 Remarking in March 1984 on the privilege of Kuwaiti nationality, Kuwait’s former ambassador to Morocco in a press editorial proposed limiting it to Arabs, and stopping “the organized conquest” of the Arab Gulf by Iranian immigrants.349 However, also sometimes during this period the Kuwaiti press distinguished between the general Shiite population and subversive radicals by identifying the threatening elements as small in number. Immediately after the bombings,

Major Terror Attacks and National Transformation 79

al-Anba, for example, pointed to the small, criminal organizations “hiding out in corners” of Kuwait, while al-Qabas referred to the “microbe of terrorism” in the country.350 Following the December 1983 attacks, being Shiite in Kuwait had become synonymous with being considered suspicious and subject to various forms of restrictions and harassment. This was true for both Kuwaiti and expatriate Shia. However, the leadership continued to perceive the fundamental problem for internal security to be linked to “foreign” problems in general, with the couriers of “foreign” threats to Kuwait being the country’s foreigners. As a result, the presence of not only expatriate Shia, but also of foreign residents in general came to be viewed increasingly as a serious security liability requiring stricter deportation, immigration and other regulatory policies.

Limitations on foreign population size In addition to purging the country of particularly suspicious national and ethnic groups, the government concerned itself with the more general implications of non-Kuwaitis residing in Kuwait. The December explosions generated the view among the Kuwaiti leadership and the citizen population in general that the country’s relative openness to foreigners had been exploited. Only one week after the bombings, security ofﬁcials announced that the 12 suspects being investigated for the attacks had entered Kuwait during the previous three years on visit visas, and then had found work in the private sector.351 In the end, most of the 25 individuals charged in connection with the December bombings had been long term immigrants in the country. Shaykh Nawwaf maintained that Kuwait had been the target of the attacks because of its “open door” policy, and that this policy needed to be reconsidered.352 A major study of the foreign population was initiated by a government-appointed committee headed by the interior ministry undersecretary and including representatives of the Social Affairs and Labor Ministry, Planning Ministry, and the Municipal Council. The committee’s mandate was to assess the necessity of foreign employees to their employers.353 In the meantime, the government embarked on two major efforts with regard to foreigners in Kuwait. First, it refused admission to new foreigners to the country until a more efﬁcient system for screening them could be established. Second, it began to pursue a longer-term strategy of imposing limits on both the number and character of foreign residents in the country.

80 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

The issuance of visit visas to Kuwait was discontinued with minor exceptions. The issuing of work permits to private sector employees was suspended, with exceptions for private contractors working on government projects. Visas also were suspended for housemaids, drivers and other personal attendants.354 Foreign diplomats were not exempt from new restrictions, and the Foreign Ministry issued new rules requiring all diplomatic bags to be x-rayed at the airport. It also requested that embassies inform Kuwaiti authorities of the identities of local employees, including housemaids, give advance notice of new diplomats, and list the home addresses of all diplomatic staff. In some cases, diplomatic staff members were denied access to the airport. Airport passes guaranteeing special privileges were conﬁscated.355 Following the conclusion of the trial of the bombers at the end of March, restrictions on visas began to be eased.356 However, the ﬁndings in a new case being tried in Kuwait’s criminal court appeared to reverse this trend only weeks later. The case concerned 70 individuals—the largest number of defendants ever to have appeared at that time in front of a Kuwaiti court at once—charged in connection with a bribery and forgery scandal involving work permits. All suspects were employees of the Social Affairs and Labor Ministry. The principal defendant was an Egyptian alleged to have accepted KD 20,000 in bribes to steal work permits. He would give them to an Iraqi typist, who would change the names on the permits.357 In late April, the issuance of all visit visas and non-objection certiﬁcates was suspended again, except for those approved by the Council of Ministers.358 In the months following the bombings, the government embarked on a major effort to limit the overall number of foreigners in Kuwait. In January, the interior ministry undersecretary explained that his ministry intended to cut Kuwait’s foreign population by 50 percent over the next ﬁve years.359 Residence law violators were the ﬁrst to be targeted, as they had been during tense periods in previous years. In April, the Interior Ministry announced its decision to offer a sixmonth amnesty to all offenders, allowing them to either legalize their status or leave the country.360 The number of police patrols was doubled, and ofﬁcers were ordered to round up domestic attendants who had absconded from their legal employers.361 Interior Ministry statistics show a large increase for 1984 in the number of deportations for residence law violations (see Table 4.1). Although the sharp increase was not limited to certain nationalities, Iranians were affected particularly severely (see Table 4.2).

Major Terror Attacks and National Transformation 81 Table 4.1 Annual Number of Administrative Deportations of Expatriates for Residence Law Violations, 1978–84 1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1,006

1,175

1,758

2,186

1,851

1,280

4,909

Source: Kuwait Ministry of Interior internal yearbook information provided to the author by the ministry, Spring 2000.

Table 4.2 Annual Number of Administrative Deportations for Residence Law Violations According to Nationality, 1978–84

Iranian Iraqi Lebanese Syrian Egyptian Jordanian Pakistani Indian Gulf Other

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

32 37 10 30 453 7 131 180 5 121

33 22 7 29 484 21 130 214 5 230

120 25 10 66 761 10 190 258 3 315

148 53 9 64 1,322 22 149 182 4 233

57 35 3 59 1,079 13 141 130 9 325

328 156 7 70 265 18 103 126 3 204

1,679 353 10 194 1,046 33 412 579 6 597

Source: Kuwait Ministry of Interior internal yearbook information provided to the author by the ministry, Spring 2000.

Another effort was made to limit the number of new legal residents, thereby reversing a two-year trend in which legal immigrants entered Kuwait in growing numbers.362 The number of ﬁrst-time residence permits issued dropped signiﬁcantly in 1984, and continued to decrease in 1985 (see Table 4.3 and Appendix B). Social Affairs and Labor Ministry ﬁgures also show a signiﬁcant drop in the issuance of ﬁrst-time labor permits in particular in 1984 (see Table 4.3). The small increase in the number of ﬁrst-time work permits issued in 1985 as compared to 1984 indicates the policy was not enforced quite as strictly as the year immediately after the bombings.

Limitations on foreign population character In addition to limiting the number of foreigners in the country, the government sought to continue to restructure the character of its

82 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution Table 4.3 Annual Number of First-time Residence Permits and First-time Work Permits Issued, 1981–85 1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

First-time Residence Permits

90,767

145,841

184,238

129,007

111,058

First-time Work Permits

50,554

68,934

86,075

39,322

46,676

Sources: Kuwait Ministry of Interior internal yearbook information provided to the author by the ministry, Spring 2000; Kuwait Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, Social Statistics 1982, p. 143; Kuwait Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, Social Statistics 1983, p. 124; Kuwait Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, Social Statistics 1984, p. 122; Kuwait Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, Social Statistics 1985, p. 124; Kuwait Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, Social Statistics 1986, p. 142.

foreign population. The trend established in 1982 whereby Asians began receiving signiﬁcantly more ﬁrst-time residence permits than Arabs compared to earlier years under study (see Chapter 3) deepened in 1983, and intensiﬁed dramatically in 1984 (see Graph 4.1). A look at the issuance of ﬁrst-time residence permits by nationality indicates that the relative decline with regard to Arabs occurred for Iranians as well.363 Arabs, as well as Iranians, had become a political security liability.364 Asian workers, on the other hand, who remained detached from

Graph 4.1 Annual Number of First-time Residence Permits Issued to Arab and Asian Nationalities, 1978–84 120,000 100,000 80,000 Arab Asian

60,000 40,000 20,000 0 1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

Source: Author’s graph of data from Kuwait Ministry of Planning, Annual Statistical Abstract 1989, p. 65.

Major Terror Attacks and National Transformation 83

politics in Kuwait and the region, were perceived as posing signiﬁcantly less risk. The National Assembly generally supported efforts to transform Kuwait’s population demographics in favor of Kuwaitis, and recognized the need to develop Kuwaiti citizen manpower if the country were to function with fewer foreign workers.365 A draft law submitted by ﬁve Islamist deputies to the assembly in May 1985 proposed a set of goals for reducing the percentage of foreigners in Kuwait over the next 20 years: 60 percent by the end of 1985, 56 percent by 1990, 53 percent by 1995, 50 percent by 2000, and 45 percent by 2005.366 However, some in the assembly disagreed with the government over speciﬁc proposals regarding a reduction in foreign labor. For example, while the government favored limiting Arab manpower in certain cases, some in the assembly including both Islamists and nationalists supported decreasing Asian labor, which they believed brought “alien problems” to Kuwait’s Arab homeland.367 This reﬂected the desire to preserve Kuwait’s Arab character as well as the popular belief in Kuwait that Asians took part in criminal and sexually promiscuous activities. The naturalization of long term Arab residents represented another contested issue between the government and some assembly deputies. Naturalization would increase the percentage of Kuwaiti nationals in the country, and presumably foster Kuwaiti loyalty among the recipients as a result of the ﬁnancial, welfare and other advantages of citizenship that they would receive. Some in the assembly believed this to be an effective and appropriate method for helping to solve Kuwait’s population imbalance; the assembly’s discussion of the government’s ﬁve-year development plan in May 1985 emphasized the need to incorporate it into long term population planning.368 The government was not convinced that granting citizenship to non-Kuwaiti Arabs would increase loyalty among the recipients, and remained troubled over the potential political threat this option posed, as well as the ﬁnancial burdens it would carry. A “publisher’s column” in the pro-government daily, al-Rai al-Amm, reﬂected these concerns.369 Also, an editorial in the similarly leaning al-Anba, which appeared during debate over a new citizenship law, conveyed concern about the potential political ramiﬁcations of broad naturalization policies: “Choosing an Arab is not sufﬁcient. The choice should be made on good inclinations and in keeping away from anti-Arabism currents. We must put our ﬁnger on people whose stand and faithfulness we trust.”370 The editorial appeared to be warning against naturalizing Arab Shia.

84 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

Although efforts to reduce the number and character of foreigners in the country generally did not impact Palestinian residents differently from other Arabs, the position of Palestinian workers and their families already resident in Kuwait was singled out as an issue for special consideration. During the security crackdown following the December bombings, Palestinian groups in Kuwait and abroad complained about difﬁculties in obtaining visit visas for Palestinian workers’ children who were studying outside Kuwait, as well as residence visas for those who wished to return to Kuwait for employment after their studies. In the spring of 1984, the government promised it would help the students obtain “guardian’s reunion” residence permits during their studies, and replace them with work permits if they found employment in Kuwait after graduation.371 An opinion column in al-Rai al-Amm even called for making the residence status of Palestinians permanent.372 Some of the discussion over Palestinians’ position in Kuwait took place in conjunction with the new naturalization laws being considered in 1984, from which Palestinians would beneﬁt. However, some of the government’s special consideration for Palestinians likely constituted an effort to appease an important constituency in Kuwait that could pose a threat to political stability (especially vis-à-vis events in Lebanon, see Chapter 3) during a particular time when Kuwait could not afford it. Within Kuwaiti government circles as well as those of other Sunni-ruled GCC states, a degree of resignation appeared to exist regarding targeting Shiite communities with austere security policies. This stemmed from complications with Shia in these countries since the revolution, as well as from traditional discriminatory policies by these states toward their Shiite citizens. However, a similar attitude toward Palestinians would have proved unacceptable nationally and regionally at the time because of the important Arab symbol that the Palestinians and the cause of Palestine represented. The change in restrictions, deportations and immigration practices regarding foreign residents in the wake of the December 1983 bombings underscores what the government perceived to be a primary internal security threat: “foreign” elements and inﬂuences in the country. Special policies toward speciﬁc communities such as Palestinians, Shia, Arabs in general, and Asians were guided by a combination of security, political and economic concerns and traditions. Kuwaiti citizens greeted the new foreign resident policies with some anxiety. In general, Kuwaitis believed that their political security as well as their economic health in the long term demanded a reduction in foreign labor.

Major Terror Attacks and National Transformation 85

However, these views were complicated by the fact that the reduction hurt in the short term Kuwaiti businesses, which had been accustomed to relying on inexpensive skilled and unskilled foreign labor for decades, and required Kuwaitis to reconsider their dependence on foreign help in the home. By mid-1984, calls to rethink security regulations regarding visas were being issued in the press and elsewhere in the public arena. In July, the editor of The Arab Times, Ahmad al-Jarallah, called for easing visa restrictions due to the economic repercussions for Kuwaiti businesses.373 The Kuwaiti chamber of commerce chairman argued that the security measures seemed “too emotional” and had a negative impact.374 The implication was that the government’s responses proved too broad, and that only the small minority of foreigners representing “genuine” threats should be deported and regulated. This marked the beginning of a period of public criticism over government security polices that would intensify over the next year and a half.

Physical barriers Another component of the government’s program to deter future attacks was enhancing protection of the country’s borders from foreign inﬁltrators. Three means of entry into Kuwait needed to be addressed: land, sea and air. As for the ﬁrst two, the Council of Ministers plan agreed upon on the day of the bombings envisioned a physical barrier along Kuwait’s shores and land borders.375 In late January, Shaykh Nawwaf, whose mandate included inﬁltration issues, commented that the comprehensive security system would come into effect shortly.376 In the end, however, it was not implemented. The fact that Kuwait’s land border with Iraq had not yet been agreed upon by the two parties would have made it a difﬁcult task with regard to the country’s northern border in any case. Instead, land entry points were secured with the help of modern equipment such as radar and special binoculars for night patrols.377 Kuwait proved successful in impeding some inﬁltration by sea. The coastline from Fintas to Zawr had become a popular area for inﬁltration, and the Kuwaiti Coast Guard concentrated its efforts there.378 In May, the Interior Ministry announced that 90 individuals recently had been arrested for inﬁltrating by sea.379 Again in June, it reported that 18 inﬁltrators of non-Arab nationality, presumably Iranians, had been arrested.380 Although it was initially stated that during interrogations the inﬁltrators had confessed to arriving with 200 others who

86 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

had landed in small boats near Fintas, by the end of the month Shaykh Nawwaf noted that the total number had been only 30, and that they had all been arrested.381 The growing number of inﬁltrators worried the authorities, who promised even more new measures would be taken to tighten control over Kuwaiti shores and territorial waters during the following months, including the installation of ﬁve coast guard posts.382 Whether the inﬁltrators represented genuine security threats or were merely economic and political refugees was not discussed publicly. Radio Tehran, for one, suggested that the Iraqi inﬁltrators were primarily Iraqi army defectors.383 Certainly, inﬁltrators from Iraq also could have been Iraqi Shia and others who had been persecuted there or who were seeking economic opportunities in Kuwait, or alternatively, who were attempting to enter the country to engage in subversive activity. Similarly, the motivation of Iranian inﬁltrators could have been political, economic or criminal. The government’s answer to securing Kuwait’s commercial airport rested in equipping it with modern technology.384 Under the direction of the Interior Ministry, special computer databases that listed the names of those restricted from traveling were installed at departure counters.385 The new screens proved so effective that a senior interior ministry ofﬁcial was prevented from leaving the country because his name proved similar to a suspicious individual subject to a travel ban. Despite his protests that not only was he not the wanted man, but that he had been in charge of compiling the list of those restricted from traveling, he was refused permission to leave the country and forced to return home from the airport. Following the incident, arrangements were made for the list to include the name of the suspect’s mother as well.386

“Strict” measures The ﬁnal component of the Council’s security plan was to take “strict” measures against the terrorists. The state security trial of the bombing suspects began on 11 February 1984, and involved 25 individuals, four of whom were still at large and tried in absentia. A month and a half later, the court handed down six death sentences for ﬁve of the Iraqis (including three in absentia) and one Lebanese. Fourteen others were sentenced to prison terms, including seven to life imprisonment (ﬁve Iraqis, one Lebanese and one Kuwaiti); four to 15-year prison terms (three Iraqis and one Lebanese); one to ten years hard labor followed

Major Terror Attacks and National Transformation 87

by deportation (an Iraqi); and two to ﬁve years hard labor followed by deportation (one Iraqi and one bidun). Five suspects were acquitted, including two Iraqis, two Kuwaitis and one bidun.387 The trial began amid threats from al-Dawa.388 That the government was concerned about acting in a way that might bring about retribution from militant Shiite groups or Tehran was indicated in two ways. For one, although the trial was conducted in the state security court as opposed to a criminal court, the government de-emphasized the political aspect of the trial, and tried all suspects as ordinary criminals. The charges against the suspects did not include belonging to a subversive group, and the judgments did not mention al-Dawa.389 Secondly, Amir Jabir did not give ﬁnal authorization for the execution of those sentenced to death, which was required for the sentences to be enforced. The entire trial except for the opening and closing sessions was held in camera, and the details of the case and trial were not disclosed. Thus, it remains difﬁcult to evaluate the “strictness” of the measures toward those tried for involvement in the attacks. However, some members of the government and the general public increasingly criticized over time Amir Jabir’s decision not to authorize the executions (see below). This was primarily due to the fact that terrorist attacks were committed subsequently against Kuwaiti targets inside and outside the country in an effort to pressure the leadership to release those imprisoned for the bombings. At the same time, the authorities refused to give in to US pressure to negotiate the fate of the prisoners in exchange for the release of Western hostages being held in Beirut by associated Shiite militant groups.

The 1984 hijacking and assassination attempt on Amir Jabir Throughout the mid-1980s, a series of major attacks against Kuwaiti targets were committed by Iranian-linked organizations in an effort to secure the release of the December 1983 bombing prisoners from Kuwaiti jail. The fact that a couple of the prisoners were relatives of top leaders in the Shiite groups likely contributed to this. The ﬁrst attack in this regard occurred in December 1984, when a Kuwaiti airbus en route to Karachi via Dubai was hijacked in Dubai and landed in Tehran. The crisis endured for six days, initially involved more than 150 hostages on the plane, and resulted in the murder of two Americans on board. On the sixth day of the takeover, Tehran announced that a special elite unit of the Iranian military had stormed the aircraft and overpowered the hijackers, without loss of life among the hostages.

88 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

Throughout the crisis, the Kuwaiti leadership assumed that Tehran was colluding with the hijackers. In addition to conducting bilateral negotiations with Tehran during the hijacking, Kuwait’s leaders contacted Iran’s allies, Damascus and Algiers, to press Tehran on Kuwait’s behalf.390 Indeed, several indicators pointed to Iranian collusion with the hijackers at the time of the incident. One concerned the hijackers’ reason for the crime. The stated goal of the hijackers was the release of prisoners belonging to Iranian-supported organizations. Furthermore, reportedly submachine guns and explosives had been delivered to the hijackers on the ground in Tehran during the crisis.391 A third factor was the suspicious Iranian rescue operation. The fact that there were no casualties contrasted with the experiences of other, well-trained hijack rescue teams from other countries. It appeared that the operation had been pre-arranged. Iran prohibited a group of technicians who worked for Kuwait Airways from entering the country to examine the plane, and refused to return the aircraft to Kuwait until a year and a half after the hijacking.392 The hijackers were never brought to trial, and allowed to leave Iran, presumably to Beirut.393 Some Kuwaiti press articles expressed suspicion that Damascus had colluded with the hijackers (and Tehran) as well. During the crisis, alAnba insinuated that another Arab country—most likely a reference to Syria—could end the hijacking affair but was choosing not to do so: [The hijacking] is a murderous, sorrowful drama perpetrated by more than one country, and in which more than one party has been involved. Some of those involved in it are considered our friends… They try to prove that [Arab] blood is thicker than water, after they have sold out the blood, history, and chivalry. We know that some who proclaim fraternity and love…hold the reins and control the destiny of the terrorists and can get rid of them in a moment. They could have exerted pressure on them to release the plane and its passengers.394 Suspicion also was voiced in an al-Qabas report after the affair that Damascus had promptly interceded to end the hijacking when it learned that a US special operations unit had arrived in the Gulf for potential use in a rescue operation against the hijacked airliner.395 At home, no particular backlash occurred against Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese or other foreign residents as a result of the hijacking. New security measures were not enacted, and deportations for these nationality groups during the months of December 1984 and January 1985

Major Terror Attacks and National Transformation 89

remained at previous levels.396 This can be explained by the fact that the terrorists had not been residing in Kuwait, and the event did not take place inside the country. However, the hijacking served as another reminder for the Kuwaiti leadership of the involvement of Tehran, perhaps Damascus, and revolutionary Shiite associates in anti-Kuwait attacks. Ultimately the hijacking was linked to Iranian-backed Hizballah which had planned the attack in conjunction with highlevel Iranian diplomats from a base in eastern Lebanon in November 1984.397 While the hijacking in Dubai shook the Kuwaiti leadership, the assassination attempt against Kuwait’s amir ﬁve months later on one of the country’s major thoroughfares hit Kuwait like a tornado. On the morning of 25 May 1985, an explosive-laden car sped toward Amir Jabir’s motorcade on Gulf Road near Sayf Palace. The car exploded upon impact with the motorcade. Amir Jabir was wounded in the explosion by ﬂying glass, while several others including two bodyguards, passersby and the bomber were killed. During previous months, Islamic Jihad had issued warnings to Kuwait to release those imprisoned for the December 1983 bombings. A “last warning” had been issued ten days prior to the assassination attempt.398 On the day of the attack, a caller to a news agency in Beirut claimed responsibility on behalf of Islamic Jihad, and demanded the release of the December bombings prisoners. The caller congratulated the amir on surviving the attack, and stated that he hoped his message had been understood.399 Meanwhile, the Kuwaiti press pointed the ﬁnger at Tehran. Al-Rai al-Amm implicated its neighbor explicitly: “It is strange that through the Iranian chargé d’affaires Iran has denounced this incident, sent a bouquet of ﬂowers to the amir, and extended ‘congratulations’ to him on his escape. That is how they kill somebody and participate in his funeral.”400 The attack generated enormous sympathy for Amir Jabir at home. On the evening of the assault, the amir delivered a two-minute, televised address to the Kuwaiti people, assuring them of his health and denouncing the incident. Cuts on his face from ﬂying glass during the explosion were visible on television. His marked strength in the face of great personal danger invigorated support for the leadership among the Kuwaiti public. Kuwaitis also interpreted the attack on their ruler as a personal assault against them. Kuwaiti newspapers including al-Anba and al-Rai al-Amm described the attack as one on all of Kuwait.401 A statement released by the National Assembly following the attack named the

90 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

assassination attempt an offense against all of Kuwait’s citizens and residents, as well as democratic freedom and Islamic virtues.402 The assembly cooperated with the government in developing new anti-terrorism laws, echoing the process following the December 1983 bombings. The parliament passed another government bill that called for hanging or life imprisonment for criminals involved in bomb attacks. The bill also mandated stiff prison sentences for illegal possession of explosives, and for failing to disclose information on the whereabouts of terrorists. Al-Rai al-Amm argued that no one in Kuwait would oppose laws or measures whose aim was to guarantee security.403 However, criticism over the leadership’s security policies soon emanated from the public, press and parliament. The major focus of the criticism was the government’s failure to take appropriate preventive measures. An Arab Times editorial argued that “certain nationalities have come into their own as expect terrorists,” and that because Kuwait was “not well-versed in the ﬁeld of early detection,” the least it could do was “shut the door on the face of the villains.”404 Al-Siyasa maintained that the sources of terrorism were known, and that it would not be difﬁcult to control the movements of potential terrorists and restrict their access to the country, if the government decided to do so.405 The assembly speaker, Ahmad al-Sadun, called for expelling non-working as well as illegal expatriates. He also suggested that security personnel be screened more carefully because some employees belonged to subversive organizations, and that a special study be conducted on soldiers and policemen who were biduns.406 National Assembly Deputy Nasir Sarkhuh complained that security measures were merely reactions to incidents.407 The domestic criticism put the leadership on the defensive. It deﬂected the blame by citing foreign politics as the reason for Kuwait’s predicament. In a recorded speech released one day after the attack on the amir, Shaykh Saad argued that the political, social and religious conﬂicts taking place around Kuwait had “created a spirit of unlimited evil.”408 He promised that security policies would be overhauled: “the government intends, with relentless insistence, on opening a new book. We will alter…our laws, we will put the supreme interests of society, which are related to security and stability, before any individual limited interest.”409 A new Supreme Committee for Security Affairs headed by Foreign Minister Shaykh Sabah and including the defense and interior ministers, met for the ﬁrst time on 1 June. Shaykh Sabah’s leadership of the committee appeared to represent another effort by the ruling family to

Major Terror Attacks and National Transformation 91

supervise Shaykh Nawwaf’s directorship of Interior Ministry affairs, as Shaykh Saad had done following the bombing of al-Rai al-Amm in July 1980 (see Chapter 2). In an address to parliament, Shaykh Sabah announced that the committee would adopt certain strategies to secure the country, including deporting security violators and residence law offenders; amending residence laws; examining the residence ﬁles of all expatriate employees in the private sector; guarding important government installations using army and National Guard units; closing all front shops for foreign labor; studying the possibility of voluntary military service; employing military conscripts in the Interior Ministry; and amending laws regulating civic life.410 The major themes closely resembled those of the Council of Ministers plan outlined in December 1983. In fact, the government pursued security measures nearly identical to those following the December 1983 bombings, including temporarily suspending the issuance of visit visas, labor permits and residence permits; combing the country for security violators and detaining suspects; and carrying out a wave of deportations against those perceived to pose security threats. Iranians were the prime targets for deportation again, and represented more than 50 percent of those expelled in the month of June.411 Iranian, Iraqi and Lebanese residents were deported at their highest levels yet, and at multiple times their average number over previous months (see Graphs 4.2 and 4.3 below).412 Syrian residents were deported at their highest levels since the ﬁrst years of the revolution (see Graph 4.3 below).413 Shaykh Nawwaf conﬁrmed during this period that deportation would be based in some cases on political afﬁliation.414 The extraordinary rise in the number of deportations and the antiforeigner environment brought criticism from two of Kuwait’s regional neighbors. Not surprisingly, one was Iran. In addition to condemning the high number of expulsions, Tehran reported that Kuwait was torturing Iranian detainees. Shaykh Sabah denied the accusation, and reiterated that Kuwait would not abandon its right to deport any person who constituted a danger to national security.415 Another critic of Kuwait’s deportations was Syria. Syria apparently orchestrated a protest outside the Kuwaiti embassy in Damascus. According to an al-Rai al-Amm editorial, the demonstration was intended as a warning to Kuwaiti authorities to stop supporting Iraq in the war and to release the prisoners of the December 1983 bombings, or risk Syria’s wrath.416 The slow pace of the investigation into the assault on the amir provoked additional criticism from the Kuwaiti public. The course of the

92 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

investigation differed sharply from that surrounding the December 1983 bombings, when suspects were apprehended within days of the attacks and the Interior Ministry prepared the case for trial in less than two months. One of the problems regarding the current investigation was that determining the full identity of the bomber was apparently difﬁcult. Within two days of the assault, the Interior Ministry identiﬁed him as an Iraqi Shiite holding a false Pakistani passport with forged legal residence and sponsorship by a Kuwaiti company.417 Within ﬁve days of the attack, it was reported that 20 people had been arrested in connection with it and three had admitted involvement.418 By July, however, Shaykh Nawwaf admitted that the government did not have the bomber’s ﬁngerprints on record, and that he must have entered Kuwait illegally or on a visit visa, neither of which involved recording ﬁngerprints.419 The authorities circulated detailed photographs of his ﬁngerprints among the GCC states and other Arab countries, seeking information about him, his activities and his associates.420 In August, security ofﬁcials arrested a person for possessing 60 forged Pakistani passports similar to that used by the attacker, but there was no further information on the bomber’s identity.421 Despite the psychological effect on the leadership and the public of the assassination attempt and the subsequent public criticism of security policies, the al-Sabah leadership’s fundamental internal security position was not altered in any signiﬁcant way by the event. The attack was believed to be connected to the same circle of foreign Shiite revolutionaries as previous attacks, and their supporters in Kuwait also appeared to be primarily foreign. Unsurprisingly, however, the leadership’s sense of vulnerability deepened as a result of the assault. In the end, the combination of the assassination attempt, the new highproﬁle attacks less than two months later, discussed below, and the security responses they elicited, ultimately did contribute to altering the leadership’s political security equation.

The cafe bombings and new strategies Only six weeks after the attempt on the amir’s life, two seaside cafes commonly frequented by Kuwaiti citizens were bombed. The attacks took place on a Thursday evening, the ﬁrst night of the Islamic weekend when restaurants are typically crowded with families. Police defused a third bomb at the Abu Hulayfa cafe. The attacks left 11 dead, including ten Kuwaitis and one Egyptian, and wounded nearly 100 people. The eateries were known to be especially popular among

Major Terror Attacks and National Transformation 93

Kuwaiti security personnel, and one of the deceased was Colonel Khalil Ghayth Abdallah, a manager in the Interior Ministry’s Criminal Investigations Department. The most credible claim of responsibility was made by a caller to AFP after the attack alleging that he represented the Arab Revolutionary Brigades, a name used by Abu Nidal’s organization.422 There were three major theories regarding the mastermind of the cafe bombings. One was that the Abu Nidal group had conducted the attacks in an effort to encourage the Kuwaitis to release certain Palestinian prisoners belonging to it.423 Another theory linked Tehran to the attack. During the previous year, the group reportedly had been encouraged by Iran to stir Shiite unrest in the region.424 The caller to AFP indeed stated that the Kuwaiti colonel’s death was in retaliation for the deportation, torture and harassment of “revolutionary combatants” conducted by the colonel, seemingly linking the bombings to Shiite interests.425 Other factors connected the attacks to Damascus. The bombings occurred during debate in the National Assembly over decreasing aid to Syria, Jordan and the PLO.426 Some Kuwaitis believed that the recommendation by the Financial and Economic Affairs Committee to cancel aid to Damascus led to the bombings.427 Indeed, the caller to AFP had demanded that the Kuwaitis “give up their policies hostile to Arab and Palestinian nationals,” indicating that the group’s goals extended beyond those of revolutionary Iran.428 Furthermore, Damascus’ use of violence to achieve its political objectives remained well-known at the time in conjunction with its 1983–85 campaign to discourage Jordan’s King Hussein from pursuing a separate peace with Israel.429 The Arab Revolutionary Brigades also had claimed responsibility for the assassination attempt on the chief editor of the Kuwaiti daily al-Siyasa, Ahmad al-Jarallah, three months earlier, an attack thought to be related to the newspaper’s critical stance toward Syria. A September article in the Paris-based magazine, al-Talia al-Arabiyya, also pointed to Syrian responsibility. The magazine reported that Kuwait’s investigation into the July bombings had determined that Damascus was directly responsible for the attacks, and that Tehran’s role was secondary. According to the article, the operation had been directed by Syrian intelligence and the Syrian embassy in Kuwait. The magazine reported that Kuwait and Syria were suffering a diplomatic crisis as a result of the affair, and that a “large oil country” was trying to obtain a pledge from Damascus and Tehran not to meddle in Kuwait in the future. In return, Kuwait would overlook the attacks, not try the case publicly, and eventually release or deport the defendants.430

94 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

While Kuwait debated the extent of the revolutionary Shiite connection to the attacks, if any, the cafe bombings and subsequent government crackdown on Shia in the country provoked a ﬂood of national self-examination in the press regarding Sunni-Shiite relations. One of the most widely discussed articles appeared in al-Watan in early August. There, Abdul-Reda Assiri, a professor of political science at Kuwait University, criticized the disparaging generalizations about Shia in the country: These people [certain segments of the Kuwaiti community] habitually blame this section of the community as if [it] were responsible for every crime and terrorist action in the country. They should remember that the more dissension and hatred, the more are the chances of terrorism being exported to our land. These people are now wondering if Kuwait is becoming the Lebanon of the Gulf. This hypothesis could become a reality—it depends on our behavior.431 The article received wide condemnation in the press, and Assiri later stated that he experienced social and political ostracization as a result of his comments.432 Concerned over growing tensions between Kuwaiti Sunnis and Shia, the government sought to cool the debate. The information minister instructed newspaper editors to restrain their columnists on the subject of Sunni-Shiite relations, and to emphasize national unity.433 Mosque speakers were ordered to keep to governmentapproved texts.434 The government intensiﬁed some of its by now traditional security procedures probably because the attack on the amir had taken place only a month and a half earlier, and because of the relatively high death toll in the cafe bombings as compared to previous incidents.435 Security ofﬁcers routinely searched people entering hotels, government ofﬁces and shopping complexes. Children’s entertainment centers were closed. Kuwaitis themselves feared gathering in public places, and crowds thinned at parks and even the stock exchange.436 The hunt for security violators included daily road blocks and house-to-house searches.437 Shiite Arabs in particular were subjected to nighttime police raids of their residences, as well as arbitrary detentions and arrests, which sometimes resulted in deportation.438 At the road blocks, the ﬁrst question to expatriates reportedly was, “what is your nationality?” and if they were from a Muslim country, the second was, “are you Sunni or Shiite?”439

Major Terror Attacks and National Transformation 95

The number of deportations of expatriates increased signiﬁcantly again after the cafe attacks, reaching another new high in the month of July 1985 (see Appendix A). The number of deportations of Iraqis exploded during the months following the cafe bombings, as after the attack on the amir (see Graph 4.2 and Appendix A). The numbers of expelled Iranians and Lebanese were not far from their June 1985 highs (see Graphs 4.2 and 4.3 and Appendix A). Syrians were deported at their highest levels since the ﬁrst years of the revolution (see Graph 4.3 and Appendix A). A second wave of expulsions focused on non-Arabs for residence law violations, and peaked in December 1985 (for example, see ﬁgures for Pakistanis and Indians in Graph 4.4 and Appendix A).440 This time around, the government changed its tactics regarding postbombing deportations in two ways. First, authorities embarked on an unusual information campaign regarding its expulsion of foreign residents. Periodically, Kuwaiti ofﬁcials would announce the number of foreigners who had been deported since the attacks. At the end of July, the interior ministry undersecretary announced that nearly 4,000 expatriates had been deported.441 Two months later, newspapers were reporting that the total number of deportations had reached more than 6,000, presumably according to information from government ofﬁcials.442 The social affairs and labor minister announced in late

Graph 4.2 Number of Administrative Deportations of Iraqis and Iranians per Month, 1979–85 1,400 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200

Iraqi

Sep-85

Jan-85

May-85

Sep-84

Jan-84

May-84

Sep-83

Jan-83

May-83

Sep-82

Jan-82

May-82

Sep-81

Jan-81

May-81

Sep-80

Jan-80

May-80

Sep-79

Jan-79

May-79

0

Iranian

Source: Author’s graph of data from Kuwait Ministry of Interior internal yearbook information provided to the author by the ministry, Spring 2000.

96 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution Graph 4.3 Number of Administrative Deportations of Lebanese and Syrians per Month, 1979–85 600 500 400 300 200 100

Lebanese

Sep-85

Jan-85

May-85

Sep-84

Jan-84

May-84

Sep-83

Jan-83

May-83

Sep-82

Jan-82

May-82

Sep-81

Jan-81

May-81

Sep-80

Jan-80

May-80

Sep-79

Jan-79

May-79

0

Syrian

Source: Author’s graph of data from Kuwait Ministry of Interior internal yearbook information provided to the author by the ministry, Spring 2000.

Graph 4.4 Number of Administrative Deportations of Pakistanis and Indians per Month, 1979–85 350 300 250 200 150 100

Pakistani

Sep-85

May-85

Jan-85

Sep-84

May-84

Jan-84

Sep-83

May-83

Jan-83

Sep-82

May-82

Jan-82

Sep-81

May-81

Jan-81

Sep-80

May-80

Jan-80

Sep-79

Jan-79

0

May-79

50

Indian

Source: Author’s graph of data from Kuwait Ministry of Interior internal yearbook information provided to the author by the ministry, Spring 2000.

October that 15,000 expatriates had been expelled.443 In April 1984, he stated that a total of no more than 18,000 foreign residents had been deported during the post-bombing period.444

Major Terror Attacks and National Transformation 97

The government always had defended its right, and announced its intention, to expel foreigners who represented security liabilities in its view, who were residing in the country illegally, or who had committed criminal acts.445 Prior to the July 1985 attacks, however, it had not provided numerical tallies of deportations on a regular basis. This information could stoke anger and fuel opposition in the country from the Kuwaiti business community and expatriates, and make Kuwait vulnerable to outside criticism.446 Indeed, the social affairs and labor minister insinuated on several occasions that one of the reasons for the ofﬁcial announcements was to correct rumors of “exaggerated” ﬁgures circulating inside and outside the country.447 Yet the information campaign served another purpose as well. The public criticism that had mounted against the leadership after the attack on the ruler in May for failing to secure the country from foreigner-perpetrated attacks was unprecedented. The new openness regarding the number of targeted deportations would help to deﬂect public criticism about a lack of security action at home, and demonstrate that the government was taking considerable “preventive” measures. The campaign proved particularly important in the absence of any public evidence regarding the identity of the perpetrators of the attacks, and the slow pace of the investigations. The authorities were eager enough for tips to offer a KD 50,000 reward for information leading to the attackers.448 The second change in tactics concerned the general approach to the foreign labor issue. Deportation over restructuring the number and character of foreign residents in the country through immigration practices emerged as the preferred method for addressing security with regard to foreigners. For the most part, discussions about revamping current immigration practices did not take place. Patterns established after the December 1983 bombings, such as signiﬁcant decreases in the number of ﬁrst-time labor permits issued were not repeated after the 1985 bombings. In addition, the number of Arabs and Asians granted residence permits began to reconverge in 1985, and even more so in 1986, after a three-year period of divergence (see Graph 4.5 and Appendix B).

Proliferation of state security trials During the remaining months of 1985 after the attack on Amir Jabir in May, signiﬁcantly more cases that eventually ended in trial in the state security court were registered with the Justice Ministry than during any

98 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution Graph 4.5 Annual Number of First-time Residence Permits Issued to Arab and Asian Nationalities, 1978–86 120,000 100,000 80,000 Arab Asian

60,000 40,000 20,000 0 1978

1979 1980

1981 1982 1983

1984 1985

1986

Source: Author’s graph of data from Kuwait Ministry of Planning, Annual Statistical Abstract 1989, p. 65.

of the previous seven years (see Table 4.4).449 During the two months after the assault on the amir’s motorcade and before the cafe bombings alone, two state security cases were registered with the Justice Ministry that eventually ended in trial (not including the amir’s assault case): one regarded the spreading of negative propaganda about the amir, and the other, the distribution of subversive literature. Each case involved only one individual, and the court found both defendants guilty. (Four additional cases were registered during this period, but the Justice Ministry did not try these cases in the state security court.) In the six months following the cafe bombings, seven state security cases were registered with the Justice Ministry that eventually ended in trial, not including the cafe bombings case itself. Three of the cases concerned the publication or distribution of subversive literature, two cases involved membership in a group with subversive goals, one regarded bombmaking and terrorist planning, and one concerned a Table 4.4 Number of State Security Cases Registered with the Justice Ministry During 1978–85 that Eventually Ended in Trial450 1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

0

2

4

2

1

1

2

11

Source: Author’s calculations based on information provided to her by Kuwait Ministry of Justice, Spring 2000.

Major Terror Attacks and National Transformation 99 Table 4.5 Nature of State Security Cases Registered with the Justice Ministry During 1979–85 that Eventually Ended in Trial454 1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

No. of Non-violenceRelated Cases

0

1

0

0

0

0

7

No. of ViolenceRelated Cases

2

3

2

1

1

2

4

Total Number of Cases

2

4

2

1

1

2

11

Source: Author’s calculations based on information provided to her by Kuwait Ministry of Justice, Spring 2000.

bomb threat.451 The cases included both Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti defendants. At least one independent source identiﬁed one of the literature distributors—a Kuwaiti whom the court sentenced to ﬁve years imprisonment—as a possible political prisoner.452 At least three other cases were registered with the Justice Ministry during this period but never brought to trial in the state security court.453 Interestingly, the nature of the crimes tried in the state security court during this period changed from primarily violence-related crimes (almost all linked to explosives), to political crimes of a non-violent nature such as publicizing anti-regime literature (see Table 4.5). This fact, and the huge rise in the number of cases registered and eventually brought to trial in the state security court, likely reﬂected increased efforts on the part of both the Interior Ministry and the Justice Ministry at that time to pursue and try, respectively, individuals believed to be undermining in any way the Kuwaiti leadership, as well as the authorities’ increased concern about threats to stability at home.

Decline of the appeal of religious fundamentalism and the 1985 Assembly Even before the December 1983 bombings, some of parliament’s Islamist deputies, whose election the Kuwaiti authorities had encouraged in 1981 to counter Shiite and nationalist candidates (see Chapter 2), had grown to be perceived as a political security liability by the leadership. This was not due to the Islamists’ conservative legislation, their sometimes embarrassing remarks regarding Arab politics and leaders, or

100 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

their cooperation with other assembly deputies in blocking constitutional reform and new press laws that would have given greater power to the government. Instead, it related to the perceived near and long term threat of the impact of religious fundamentalist ideas on Kuwait’s pluralistic society. The intolerant positions of fundamentalists were blamed for contributing directly to the new rift between Kuwaiti Sunnis and Shia.455 The popular appeal of Islamic fundamentalist ideas in Kuwaiti society also had begun to experience a decline before the major bombings. The election outcomes of national groups such as the Graduate Society and Kuwait University’s student government, where Islamic fundamentalists suffered losses in 1983, were important indicators. The politics and societal regulations of the fundamentalist platforms apparently proved too radical for the general Kuwaiti population at that time. Islamists’ call for the institution of sharia as the sole source of law in Kuwait failed to mesh with the cosmopolitan nature of Kuwaitis, who generally cherished their social and other liberties. In addition, Islamists’ efforts in the National Assembly to ban public celebrations of Christmas and forbid alcohol among foreign diplomats seemed irrelevant to the critical issues of the day. Furthermore, resentment had developed over the special privileges Islamists had gained in public life, including permission to deal in real estate and trade through Kuwait Finance House, the state’s Islamic banking institution, while conventional banks were excluded from these activities. The December 1983 bombings further contributed to the decline in Islamist politicians’ popular appeal. Although the Islamist deputies publicly disassociated themselves from the attacks, the public perceived both Sunni and Shiite fundamentalists to be ideologically related to the militant extremists perpetrating the bombings. By 1984, some Kuwaiti press articles were calling for a return to Arabism as the basis for Kuwaiti society, and directly challenged the Sunni fundamentalist program.456 As the February 1985 parliamentary elections approached, the authorities again hoped to alter the makeup of the National Assembly by shrinking the number and inﬂuence of religious elements. The public’s disenchantment with the fundamentalist groups suggested that Kuwaiti voters would respond positively to this. The scheme echoed the one implemented in 1981, when the authorities sought to inﬂuence the election outcome via redistricting. This time, the plan involved encouraging the return of the nationalist leader, Ahmad al-Khatib, and his political associates to the assembly. The authorities

Major Terror Attacks and National Transformation 101

initially stimulated his campaign by permitting—perhaps encouraging—his appearance on Kuwaiti television to expound on his political platform. On 21 April 1984, he gave an extensive television interview about his political views, denying that he and his followers were communists or more concerned with general Arab issues than local Kuwaiti ones. The Kuwaiti press carried the contents of the interview throughout the following week. Just as important in invigorating the nationalists’ campaign was an ofﬁcial remark by the director of the Amiri Diwan (Ofﬁce of the Amir), Ibrahim al-Shatti, several days after the television interview. In a newspaper interview, al-Shatti stated that the fundamentalist groups were behaving like de facto political parties (which are illegal in Kuwait). This was interpreted as a green light to al-Khatib and his associates to counter the fundamentalists with their own alliance. The director’s comment inexplicitly lent ofﬁcial support to the nationalist leader to build the Democratic League, which included six candidates from various districts.457 The character of the new parliament elected in February 1985 reﬂected popular support for the nationalists and their promises of economic and social reform, as well as disillusionment with the religious fundamentalists. However, in the ﬁnal analysis the leadership’s discreet support for nationalists’ candidacies allowed them to gain leverage during the campaign. Its plan to balance Islamists with leftists in the assembly, thereby diffusing the perceived security threat of religious fundamentalism, appeared to have succeeded.

Summary For the most part, the major attacks of 1983 and 1985 that characterized the period under study in this chapter were perpetrated by Middle Eastern residents in Kuwait and linked to outside actors like Tehran and Damascus. The security policies pursued by the authorities in the wake of the attacks generally represented intensiﬁed versions of traditional security measures: restrictions, detentions, arrests, deportations, new immigration practices and security trials for individuals and groups in some way linked, or perceived to be connected, to the security incidents. The cycle of attacks and government responses contributed to two new security predicaments in the country. The ﬁrst was criticism of the authorities by Kuwaiti citizens for failing to adequately protect the country. This criticism increased most signiﬁcantly following the

102 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

attempted assassination of Amir Jabir in May 1985. As a result, the government altered some security procedures following the cafe bombings in July of that year, including publicizing the high number of deportations and lifting some unpopular restrictions on immigration. Nevertheless, the fundamental internal security position of the alSabah leadership did not change in any signiﬁcant way during this period as a result of the attacks or the criticism they elicited, primarily due to the “foreign roots” of the most serious security problems. The second new predicament resulting from the attacks, some of which proved to be or were believed to have been perpetrated by Shia, and the subsequent security crackdowns that focused heavily on Shiite elements in the country, concerned the extraordinary tension between Kuwaiti Sunnis and the Kuwaiti leadership on the one hand, and Kuwaiti Shia on the other hand. Heated press debates, particularly during the summer of 1985, over the loyalty of Kuwaiti Shia to Kuwait underscored the strain. This environment appears to have contributed, in part, to the emergence of the new phenomenon of Kuwaiti nationals playing leading roles in subversive activities, including terrorism, in Kuwait, which is discussed in the next chapter.

5 Criticism and Extremism from Kuwaiti Citizens, February 1986–August 1988

The Kuwaiti leadership emerged from the dramatic events of 1985 with greater vigor for ending the Iran-Iraq war, which it believed was creating a conducive environment for the internal security disturbances and problems the country was experiencing. In 1986, Iranian military successes near the Kuwaiti coast, and an increasing number of attacks on vessels serving Kuwait’s ports, made ending the war seem even more pressing. As a result, al-Sabah foreign policy underwent a stunning transformation that year as the authorities invited international powers into Gulf waters to help stop the war’s devastating effects. This chapter traces how the increasingly threatening regional environment, and consequential shifts in foreign policy, contributed to changes in internal security policies in 1986, including new restrictions on civil-political privileges for citizens like parliament and the press. The chapter also discusses how changes in the regional and domestic security environment and policies during the mid- to late 1980s altered the face of subversion in the country. During 1986–88, Kuwaiti nationals joined foreigners in seditious activities at greater rates than previous years, and the nature of terrorist targets changed from civil to primarily commercial interests. The new dynamics of subversive activities represented a more profound challenge to al-Sabah security than those during previous periods. At least superﬁcially, they undermined the basic foundations of political stability in Kuwait. Attacks on Kuwait’s oil industry and other commercial interests threatened the country’s economic lifeline—a central pillar of al-Sabah rule. Most of all, the phenomenon of Kuwaiti citizens leading terrorist attacks against national interests represented the most serious breech of the fundamental social contract between citizens and the ruling family. 103

104 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

The internationalization of the war The psychological impact on Kuwait of Iran’s capture of the Faw peninsula in February 1986 was signiﬁcant.458 The new front brought the battleﬁeld within ten miles of Kuwaiti territory (Bubiyan Island), and the war now could be heard more easily in Kuwait City. After Faw fell under Iranian control, Amir Jabir visited Bubiyan as a sign of Kuwait’s sovereignty there. The Defense Ministry made preparations for possible war, and the Interior Ministry warned residents against traveling to certain areas especially vulnerable to Iranian attack.459 Finally, plans were made for special forces to protect the country’s oil installations from direct Iranian assault.460 Two issues contributed to the view in Kuwait that Iran would involve the country directly in the war. The ﬁrst was that Iran continued to accuse Kuwait of allowing Iraq to use Kuwaiti airspace and territory, speciﬁcally ports for the transfer of military hardware, for its war against Iran.461 The second was that the number of Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti merchant ships and other ships serving Kuwaiti ports was increasing.462 The combination of the capture of Faw and growing verbal and physical threats by Iran lent urgency to the Kuwaiti leadership’s desire to reduce its overall vulnerability to physical attack. Its attempt to secure protection from the GCC during a November 1986 summit failed. As a result, in late 1986 and early 1987, Kuwaiti ofﬁcials approached the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)—the Soviet Union, United States, Britain, France and China, in that order—about chartering and reﬂagging its oil tankers.463 The move marked a striking foreign policy shift with regard to the role of the superpowers and other international powers in Gulf waters in conjunction with the Iran-Iraq war. Traditionally, al-Sabah foreign policy had been marked by ﬂexibility, and in the past included a willingness to turn to international powers for security protection.464 Furthermore, ofﬁcials argued that the new policy was a commercial arrangement, and not a military one. However, the leadership’s consistent and vociferous opposition to foreign intervention in the region during the war, prior to the reﬂagging initiative, made the policy shift a dramatic one. During the initial years of the war, Kuwaiti ofﬁcials repeatedly had expressed their wish to keep the superpowers out of regional affairs.465 This policy paralleled that of the GCC, whose members jointly communicated that one of their main priorities was keeping international powers out of the region.466

Criticism and Extremism from Kuwaiti Citizens 105

There were precedents in Kuwait to approaching the UN body and individual permanent members of the Security Council for diplomatic assistance with regard to the war. In the autumn of 1981, Minister of Foreign Affairs Shaykh Sabah requested help from the council’s president in halting Iranian air raids on Kuwaiti territory near the border with Iraq.467 In April 1983, Kuwait sent top-level envoys to the permanent members of the council for help in ending the war.468 In November 1984, a GCC foreign ministers conference recommended continuing contacts with the superpowers over diplomatic initiatives for peace.469 In response to the growing number of ship seizures in the Gulf in 1985, Kuwait again requested assistance from the United Nations in June of that year. However, the possibility of international powers building a physical presence in the Gulf was not openly discussed during this period. The Kuwaiti approach to foreign intervention had begun to show signs of change in March 1984—around the time of the visit to Kuwait by a US presidential envoy, Donald Rumsfeld—when the leadership called for greater American diplomatic involvement in the war.470 In an address to the National Assembly prior to the diplomat’s visit, Shaykh Sabah commented that the world’s strongest powers, “which have special interests and global responsibilities, should abandon their passive stands and take every step within their power to halt the war.”471 The assembly speaker also called for intervention.472 The belief that the United States could bring an end to the war was voiced even in al-Qabas during the visit.473 In mid-April, Defense Minister Shaykh Salim reportedly discussed with American ofﬁcials in Washington how the United States might assist Kuwait in an emergency, such as an Iranian blockade of the Straits of Hormuz or a major Iranian military success near Basra.474 Some of these issues also were discussed during US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy’s visit to Kuwait in late April.475 The “tanker war” in the Gulf that began in May 1984 increased the leadership’s sense of vulnerability and desire for outside assistance. The Council of Ministers emerged from several emergency meetings that month with a more aggressive position regarding American involvement. The oil minister, Shaykh Ali al-Khalifa, complained about US aloofness to the conﬂict, while Shaykh Sabah turned Kuwaiti foreign policy 180 degrees by stating that Gulf waters were neither Kuwaiti, Qatari, Omani or Arab but international, and that responsibility for the security of the Gulf was international.476 Kuwait’s request to the UNSC permanent members in 1986–87 for foreign chartering and reﬂagging of its ships represented the culmination of this position.

106 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

The growing regional threats, and consequential foreign policy changes, contributed to parallel shifts in the leadership’s internal security policies. An important issue in this regard was the strong opposition by assembly deputies and the Kuwaiti press to American involvement in the Gulf region. This proved particularly true after the nationalists’ gains in the 1985 assembly elections. In general, the nationalists criticized the government for developing close ties with “the prime supporter of Israel.”477 The press denounced US military assistance to Kuwait, often in connection with US policy toward Libya and Israeli operations against the PLO.478 Al-Qabas even linked a terrorist explosion in downtown Kuwait to the superpowers’ efforts to demonstrate to Kuwait that it needed their security protection.479 Secret American weapons deals with Iran, disclosed in 1986, fueled public criticism in Kuwait of the United States.480 Restricting venues for political dissent, such as the National Assembly and the press, would make pursuing new, controversial foreign policies less problematic for the al-Sabahs. In an interview with an Egyptian newspaper in the autumn of 1986, nationalist leader Ahmad al-Khatib indeed suggested that one of the reasons that the National Assembly was ultimately suspended that year was to stymie criticism of unpopular foreign policy pursuits.481 Coincidentally or not, three days after the assembly’s closure, Amir Jabir hosted General George Crist, Commander in Chief of US Central Command, in Kuwait, and the two agreed on American assistance in establishing and training a Kuwaiti force to guard the country’s oil facilities.482 Limiting avenues for popular political expression would allow the authorities not only to pursue controversial foreign policies more easily, but also to concentrate attention on developments abroad and terrorism at home without having to address the “distracting” public criticism. The implementation of new domestic policies to help minimize the number of battlefronts the leadership needed to ﬁght while addressing its most serious security issues is addressed next.

Restricting venues for domestic dissent In March 1986, shortly after the fall of Faw to Iran, rumors circulated that the government planned to dissolve the National Assembly.483 Shaykh Saad met with a number of deputies including the assembly speaker, Ahmad al-Sadun, and parliamentary committee chairmen at the Council of Ministers ofﬁces for four hours to dispel the rumors.484 However, some actions indicated that the leadership indeed was inter-

Criticism and Extremism from Kuwaiti Citizens 107

ested in containing the inﬂuence of the assembly deputies in public discourse. For example, within days of the meeting, the government banned deputies from participating in seminars and lectures at Kuwait University, leading to an outcry in parliament.485 The prominent parliamentarian, Abdallah al-Naﬁsi, stated that in issuing the ban, the government was “preparing people for something big.”486 The reintroduction of Arab nationalists to the parliamentary fold in 1985, encouraged by the authorities to check the inﬂuence of the Islamist deputies, had taken an unexpected course: instead of balancing each other in the assembly, the two political groups joined forces in their efforts to oppose government policies. Although the new assembly did not challenge the ruling family’s ultimate leadership of the country, it supported limiting the al-Sabahs’ domination of various governmental posts and bodies. Two issues of contention in this regard included the automatic appointment of the crown prince to the position of prime minister, and limitations on the number of elected parliamentary deputies in the Council of Ministers. Some of the most vociferous debate in the assembly during 1985 and the ﬁrst half of 1986 concerned the competence of members of the Council of Ministers appointed by the crown prince. In May 1985, parliament essentially forced Justice Minister Shaykh Salman al-Duaij al-Sabah to resign over corruption charges relating to the 1982 stock market debacle. In 1986, assembly criticism focused on the education minister, Hasan Ali al-Ibrahim. Islamic fundamentalists in the assembly fumed over his efforts to introduce liberal reforms at Kuwait University. He offered his resignation in May, but was persuaded by Amir Jabir to rescind it.487 Al-Anba noted prophetically that the campaign to remove the education minister would not be the ﬁnal item on certain deputies’ agendas.488 The al-Sabah leadership reportedly considered reshufﬂing the Council of Ministers, and adding new appointments capable of confronting the outspoken assembly.489 By the summer of 1986, it appeared that other ministers might be forced to follow in the path of the justice and education ministers. The assembly questioned Oil and Industry Minister Shaykh Ali al-Khalifa on his personal ﬁnances and the security of the country’s oil installations; Communications Minister Isa al-Mazidi for not collecting telephone debts from members of the ruling family; Finance Minister Jassim al-Khuraﬁ for not resolving the debt crisis caused by the stock market crash; and Interior Minister Shaykh Nawwaf over insufﬁcient internal security measures. One week before some of the ministers were scheduled to face questioning in the assembly, the entire Council of

108 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

Ministers resigned. Two days following the resignation, Amir Jabir dissolved the assembly. Kuwaitis did not react uniformly to the dissolution. Some deputies of the dissolved assembly, including both Islamists and nationalists, joined with academics and intellectuals to press for the reopening of the parliamentary body.490 At the same time, Kuwait’s business community welcomed the closure and the new sense of stability it created as seen by the subsequent surge in the local stock market.491 Indeed, the Kuwaiti public in general appeared to be somewhat relieved by the assembly’s closure. Reportedly, most believed that the assembly had gone too far in its attacks on government ministers, and that the intense acrimony between the two branches of government negatively impacted Kuwaiti politics and society.492 However, most Kuwaitis stated that eventually they would like parliament to be reopened.493 Although the amir did not provide a speciﬁc reason for suspending the assembly in July 1986, the timing of the dissolution left little doubt as to the immediate cause: the assembly’s intense criticism of government ministers, and in particular, members of the ruling family.494 In fact, parliamentary criticism of certain al-Sabah ministers was linked to tensions within the ruling family itself, elements of which had been encouraging their allies in the assembly to publicly rebuke ministers associated with Shaykh Saad’s branch of the family. This proved unacceptable to Amir Jabir.495 Other security issues at home, such as terrorist activity (see below), also seemed to play a role in the decision. The amir’s comments on the assembly closure focused on two major security themes. The ﬁrst was that the current security situation in the country proved highly unusual, as the country faced severe internal and external security threats at one time. In his decree dissolving the assembly, Amir Jabir stated: “The country has faced many ordeals and harsh conditions that it has never experienced all at once before.”496 The amir identiﬁed domestic terrorism and direct threats from the war as the primary challenges. An editorial in The Arab Times, which expressed strong support for Amir Jabir’s decision to dissolve the assembly, argued that “a small country such as ours, and a Third World society such as ours, cannot carry on its political life without considering the special circumstances.”497 The extraordinary security situation at the time, it was believed, demanded a special approach to parliamentary activity. The second issue concerned the need to conserve national energy to ﬁght genuine enemies, and to maintain a strong, cooperative and undivided national front. Conserved energy then could be directed

Criticism and Extremism from Kuwaiti Citizens 109

against terrorism and the war, rather than personal adversaries within the government. Again, in his decree dissolving the assembly, Amir Jabir stated: “Since the criminal plots to which the homeland is being exposed can be halted only by total alertness and complete readiness…, the continuation of parliamentary life in this spirit and in these circumstances…poses an unexpected danger to the supreme interests of the country.”498 The amir presented a choice between “the supreme objectives of the homeland and peripheral behavior which soaks up efforts.”499 Additional measures were taken against representative government in Kuwait in the summer of 1986. For one, the assembly was suspended for an indeﬁnite period, contradicting constitutional guarantees that in the event of the assembly’s dissolution by the ruler, special elections would be held for a new parliament within two months. Instead, the amir and the Council of Ministers assumed the assembly’s responsibilities for an undeﬁned period.500 Another measure was the dismissal of the Municipal Council in August. A new decree provided for the formation of a 16-member committee, headed by the state minister for municipal affairs, to assume temporary jurisdiction over the affairs formerly attended to by the council.501 The authorities also tightened control over the local press and publications. New press laws protected publications from “foreign inﬂuence.” According to the terms of a ruler’s decree on publications, the Council of Ministers could suspend a publication for up to two years or cancel its license altogether if it were found to be serving another state or organization, contradicting the national interest, or receiving aid from another state or group without the approval of the Information Ministry.502 Penalties for violators such as publishers, editors and journalists would include prison sentences of up to three years and ﬁnes of up to KD 5,000.503 The decree additionally subjected all periodicals to direct censorship.504 The government stationed at least one censor near the editor of every major newspaper with the apparent responsibility of excising offensive items about Kuwaiti politics and controversial news about Kuwait’s neighbors, including other GCC states.505 The GCCrelated news restriction likely stemmed from al-Sabah efforts to draw closer to these states in conjunction with its new foreign policy agenda. Furthermore, undesirable media employees were ﬁred and deported. In the summer of 1986, 49 editors and journalists—all expatriates, including many longtime residents of Palestinian descent—were dismissed from their jobs.506 Approximately 35 were deported,

110 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

primarily to Jordan.507 Shaykh Nawwaf explained the ﬁrings and deportations by stating that the newsmen had been identiﬁed closely with political causes outside Kuwait, and had wanted to transport regional disputes into the country.508 Although the new measures and restrictions imposed during the summer of 1986 on various venues for political expression affected foreign residents, including those ﬁred from media jobs, they primarily impacted Kuwaiti citizens. Amid the regional and domestic turmoil that marked the ﬁrst half of 1986, citizen voices whether in parliament or other representative bodies or the press, increasingly were perceived as a threat to security on both fronts. The restrictions of 1986 echoed those implemented in 1976, and represented traditional methods of maintaining security by the leadership. The imposition of the measures did not immediately diminish the political position of the al-Sabah rulers in any signiﬁcant way.

The June 1986 attacks, public opinion and terrorism trials The targeting of oil installations and other commercial interests in the country for terrorist attack began on a consistent basis in mid-1986. The ﬁrst major assault of this nature involved bombings of four national oil installations on 17 June, including the northern and southern Ahmadi oil collection centers, an oil well in Maqwa, and a connecting pipe.509 Fires resulted from three of the explosions, including one at the northern collection station which took 30 hours to extinguish.510 In the days following the attacks, it was reported that the suspected perpetrators were non-Kuwaiti Shia, like many past attackers. According to the Abu Dhabi weekly, al-Ittihad, Kuwait arrested some of the perpetrators—mostly Lebanese—while they were waiting to board a plane at Kuwait’s airport.511 Within days, another 27 people of various nationalities were arrested in connection with the explosions.512 The information minister publicly blamed foreign nationals for the terrorist incidents.513 An anonymous caller to a Western news agency in Amman claimed that a previously unknown group, United Arab Revolution—which was “committed to Arab unity and boycotting the United States and its Arab allies,” according to the caller—was responsible for the attacks.514 Al-Anba linked the explosions to Tehran, and condemned Damascus for not encouraging the former to cease its policy of terrorism.515 On the defensive over public criticism of its security policies, the leadership played down the impact of the attacks on the nation’s oil

Criticism and Extremism from Kuwaiti Citizens 111

business. Immediately following the incidents, Oil and Industry Minister Shaykh Ali al-Khalifa declared that the explosions would not affect the country’s oil production, oil exports or oil policies.516 While brieﬁng the National Assembly on the incidents several days later, he stated that oil production and exports had been delayed only by hours.517 Other sources suggested, however, that the attacks had incurred heavy damage.518 Minimizing the material damage failed to thwart public criticism. The parliament’s ﬁery accusations against the government in general, and Shaykh Ali al-Khalifa in particular, for failing to adequately protect national oil facilities was one of the ﬁnal confrontations that preceded the assembly’s closure.519 The press joined assembly deputies in denouncing the authorities for insufﬁciently guarding against terrorist attacks, and for maintaining a perceivably weak stance toward Iranian complicity in the assaults. An editorial in al-Anba argued that it was futile for Kuwait to “bury one’s head in the sand and refrain from leveling accusations against the country which activates acts of sabotage and exports terrorism to the region.”520 During the summer of 1986, as the parliament was dissolved and the national press restricted, the Interior Ministry pursued the usual procedures following bombings including increasing the number of deportations of expatriates.521 However, during all of 1986, the ministry deported only 63 percent of the total number of expatriates it expelled during the previous year.522 The signiﬁcant decrease in deportations despite the continuing security problems indicated that the authorities were seeking other ways to address the challenge of foreign residents. One way was to further limit Kuwaiti citizenship opportunities for immigrants and other foreigners. Only days after the bombings, the information minister conﬁrmed that the naturalization process had been suspended, and that Kuwaiti citizenship would be offered to no more than 50 individuals annually.523 In addition, three weeks after the bombings Amir Jabir decreed a new law restricting marriage between Kuwaiti men and non-Kuwaiti women.524 The decree stipulated that a Kuwaiti man could not marry a foreign woman if she was more than 20 years his junior, if he was older than 60 years, or if he earned less than KD 500 per month. Violators would be ﬁned, their newborn children would not be issued birth certiﬁcates, and the foreign wives would not gain Kuwaiti citizenship until their oldest child was of adult age.525 Engaged mixed couples would be called upon to undergo physical exams before being allowed to marry, in effect requiring ofﬁcial approval of the marriage.

112 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

The primary intention of the new marriage law remained economic. The rate of marriages between Kuwaiti men and foreign women had grown in recent years, apparently in part because of the high cost of marrying Kuwaiti women, including dowry, “maintenance” responsibilities, and the like. The trend had detrimental economic effects on the state: Kuwaiti men often left the country with their foreign wives, taking their ﬁnancial resources with them, and at the same time, the number of foreign wives and their children receiving state welfare beneﬁts increased. However, an important secondary purpose of the law was security-related. The leadership’s desire to boost the percentage of “pure” Kuwaitis in the country, and the perceived threat of “halfKuwaitis,” proved evident in its concern about the shortage of the former type in the government bureaucracy.526 Clearly absent from post-bombing procedures were promises to wean the country from its reliance on foreign workers. Two and a half months following the June attacks, Shaykh Nawwaf stated explicitly that there had been no recent decree limiting foreign labor.527 This marked a continuation of the approach established only one year earlier following the cafe bombings, when the authorities sought to avoid unpopular policies restricting foreign labor. According to Social Affairs and Labor Ministry ﬁgures, the number of ﬁrst-time work permits issued in 1986 nearly equaled that in 1985.528 According to Interior Ministry statistics, the number of ﬁrst-time residence permits actually rose in 1986, after having dropped during the previous two years (see Table 5.1). Both trends occurred despite deteriorating economic conditions linked to the recent oil shock.529 Finally, the discrepancy between the number of Arabs and Asians granted ﬁrst-time residence permits—seen increasingly in the early 1980s in part as a result of the greater threat perceived to be posed by Arab immigrants (see Chapter 4)—continued to shrink in 1986 (see Graph 4.5).530 Another effort to deﬂect public criticism in the wake of the oil installation attacks and parliamentary tensions involved showering attention on the progress of the investigations into the high-proﬁle attacks Table 5.1

Annual Number of First-time Residence Permits Issued, 1983–86

1983

1984

1985

1986

184,238

129,007

111,058

134,935

Source: Kuwait Ministry of Interior internal yearbook information provided to the author by the ministry, Spring 2000.

Criticism and Extremism from Kuwaiti Citizens 113

of 1985. Announcements of new developments in the Ahmad alJarallah, Amir Jabir and cafe assault cases coincided with the closure of the assembly. On the same day as the Council of Ministers’ resignation, Shaykh Nawwaf reported the arrest of suspects involved in all three cases.531 One day after Amir Jabir announced the makeup of the new Council of Ministers, the Interior Ministry reported that the suicide bomber in the attack on the amir had been fully identiﬁed: an Iraqi national formerly employed as a lecturer in the science faculty at Kuwait University.532 The ministry also announced the arrest of a second Iraqi suspect—a pharmacist—and its ongoing search for ﬁve of his accomplices.533 Although the state security prosecution subsequently banned publication of news about the investigations, the short public information campaign contrasted with the leadership’s unforthcoming posture prior to the assembly closure regarding the identity and aims of the perpetrators.534 Three months after the ﬁrst announcement about the suicide bomber, the state security court tried ﬁve Iraqis, including the pharmacist, for the attack on the amir.535 Only one defendant was physically present in court; four were tried in absentia.536 State lawyers in the case initially refused on principle to defend suspects accused of harming the amir.537 Unlike those tried for the December 1983 bombings, the defendants in this case were charged with belonging to a subversive group, presumably al-Dawa, and hence tried not as criminals but as terrorists.538 The trial ended in late November, and the defendant present at the trial, Husayn Muhammad Hasan al-Atrash, was sentenced to death.539 One defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment, and the three others acquitted.540 The state security trial for those suspected of involvement in the cafe bombings and attempted assassination of Ahmad al-Jarallah immediately followed the trial of the amir’s attackers. Five Jordanian passportholders of Palestinian origin were charged in connection with the two attacks, including three of them in absentia.541 Three of the ﬁve were accused of participating in the assault on al-Jarallah, and all ﬁve were charged with involvement in the cafe attacks.542 The trial ended in January 1987 when the court sentenced two of the defendants to death, one to life imprisonment, one to three years imprisonment, and acquitted one.543 Kuwaiti parliamentary sources earlier had linked at least some of the Palestinians to Abu Nidal.544 The conclusion of the trials for the high-proﬁle terrorist attacks of 1985 did not placate the Kuwaiti public. The large percentage of defendants tried in absentia—seven of the ten tried—as well as the small

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number of suspects tried at all, fed the existing view that the Kuwaiti security services were incompetent. The persistence of attacks on Kuwait and their increased frequency during the following two years would bolster this perception.

The citizen-bomber development Between 1979 and 1985, major participation by Kuwaiti citizens in violent, physical attacks against Kuwaiti targets proved a rare phenomenon. Of the four major attacks directed at Kuwaiti targets during this period that took place inside Kuwait, only one involved Kuwaiti defendants tried in court: the December 1983 bombings. Even in this case, Kuwaitis represented a small percentage of the total number of defendants (12%), and an even smaller percentage of those convicted (5%), (see Table 5.2). This calculation does not include the hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner in December 1984, or assaults against Kuwaiti diplomats in 1982, all of which constituted anti-regime attacks outside the country, and none of which apparently were led in part by Kuwaiti citizens. As discussed previously, during this period security responses and ofﬁcial statements suggested the authorities largely believed that radical, foreign Shia represented the greatest threat in this regard.

Table 5.2 Number and Percentage of Kuwaiti Citizens Convicted for Involvement in Major Attacks Against Kuwaiti Targets that Took Place Inside the Country, 1979–85

Date

Event

Nationalities Convicted in Security Court

12 July 1980

Bombing of al-Rai al-Amm ofﬁces

2 foreign nationals

0

12 Dec. 1983

Multiple explosions in Kuwait

18 foreign nationals, 1 bidun, 1 Kuwaiti

5

25 May 1985

Assassination attempt against Amir Jabir

2 foreign nationals

0

11 July 1985

Seaside cafe bombings

4 foreign nationals

0

Source: Author’s calculations.

Percentage of Kuwaitis Convicted

Criticism and Extremism from Kuwaiti Citizens 115

The involvement of Kuwaiti citizens in non-violent, subversive activities during this period is more difﬁcult to assess. This is due partly to the different ideas about what constituted subversion according to the al-Sabah leadership on the one hand and independent sources on the other hand. Certainly from the leadership’s point of view, Kuwaiti citizens did engage in anti-regime activities during this period. The case of Abbas al-Muhri, the Kuwaiti citizen linked to Ayatollah Khomeini whose politicized sermons in Kuwait in the autumn of 1979 were perceived as provocative, represented a prime example (see Chapter 2). As late as the spring of 1984, pamphlets circulating at Kuwait University calling for the overthrow of Arab Gulf regimes were believed to have been distributed by Kuwaiti citizens.545 During the latter half of 1985, signiﬁcantly more individuals and groups, including both Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis, were ofﬁcially cited for non-violent, seditious activities than during previous years (see Chapter 4). Like the Kuwaiti convicted in the December 1983 bombings case, at least most Kuwaitis involved in non-violent anti-regime activities were believed to be Shia, inspired and in many cases directly organized by Tehran and Iranian-linked groups. During the mid-1980s, some estimate that thousands of Kuwaiti Shia were stripped of their citizenship and deported for security reasons, primarily to Iran.546 Concern about citizen subversion rose with the investigation into the activities of a Kuwaiti Shiite army ofﬁcer in 1985. The 38-year-old ofﬁcer had called publicly for the overthrow of the al-Sabahs, and had recruited two Lebanese and an Egyptian woman to help prepare leaﬂets on the subject. Following a month-long trial that began in March 1986, the state security court sentenced the ofﬁcer to ten years imprisonment, and acquitted his three accomplices.547 The trial took place around the time of a sit-in and protest march by cadets in the national police college, contributing to general apprehension about the reliability of members of the nation’s various security units.548 It was the bombing of Kuwaiti oil facilities in January 1987, in which Kuwaiti citizens immediately proved to be the leading perpetrators, that initiated a particularly troubling cycle of action and reaction on the part of some Kuwaiti (and non-Kuwaiti) Shia on the one hand, and the authorities on the other hand. The January attacks, which occurred just prior to the international Islamic conference in Kuwait that month, seemed to conﬁrm for the leadership that at least some militant Kuwaiti Shia were colluding with Tehran. Iran had made its objection to the conference known, expressing in a letter to the conference’s secretary-general its belief that Kuwait would use the conference

116 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

as a forum for Iraqi propaganda and political goals.549 Warnings to Kuwait about holding the conference were issued by Iranian-supported revolutionary organizations, including Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Revolutionary Organization, which threatened to transform Kuwait into a “tomb.”550 Aware of the security risk in holding the conference, the Kuwaitis took extensive measures to guard against terrorism during the summit. Three months prior to the meeting, the government ceased issuing visit visas.551 Kuwait imported modern security equipment to safeguard the conference site.552 The meeting venue—a $385 million marble fortress named the Palace of Congress—was surrounded by a high wall, bugged by electronic devices, and protected by concrete anti-aircraft nests. Kuwaiti army helicopters surveyed the complex 24 hours per day.553 Despite the security precautions, three explosions occurred at Kuwaiti oil facilities on 19 January, including a well in the Maqwa area, an offshore oil terminal in Ahmadi, and an oil collection center north of Maqwa.554 The resulting ﬁres were extinguished within two hours, but one of the bombs caused extensive damage to an offshore oil loading platform. None of the groups that had issued warnings claimed responsibility for the attacks. Instead, a previously unknown group, Revolutionary Organization of the Forces of the Prophet Muhammad in Kuwait, took responsibility from Beirut.555 The group also claimed a bombing in downtown Kuwait several days later, and threatened to shoot down planes carrying conference participants.556 The attacks by the obscure organization apparently were committed with the support of Iran or organizations linked to it.557 Following the bombings, the Interior Ministry took more steps to secure national oil installations. In February, the ministry restricted entry to petroleum-related areas to those with special passes. Only the ministry in conjunction with the state-owned Kuwait Petroleum Corporation could grant the special permission. Additionally, the public road between Maqwa and Ahmadi was closed.558 The ministry also brought attention to its investigation of the attacks. In an unusual move, it distributed the photographs along with the names of ﬁve elusive suspects in early February, following the arrest of 11 suspects during the end of January.559 Obviously, the primary intention of the move was to assist the security services in locating the remaining suspects. In addition to wanting to bring the criminals to justice and prevent future attacks, the Interior Ministry probably hoped to avoid further embarrassment and public criticism

Criticism and Extremism from Kuwaiti Citizens 117

for large numbers of defendants tried in absentia because the ministry was unable to apprehend them. Within days of the announcements, one of the individuals was arrested.560 The publication of the photographs and names of the wanted men served another purpose as well. It viliﬁed the men—and tainted the name of their families—in a society where public condemnation is abnormal and avoided. In this way, the move also was meant to deter other potential Kuwaiti criminals. Security ofﬁcials displayed on television the weapons and explosives seized at the homes of some of the Kuwaiti suspects and linked them to Iran, further tarnishing their reputation. Shaykh Nawwaf declared that the arms had come from “a quarter that wanted to undermine Kuwait’s stability,” and that the Kuwaiti saboteurs “obey[ed]” this quarter.561 The message was that the individuals were not “true” Kuwaitis. The attacks and subsequent investigation further aggravated tensions between Kuwaiti Sunnis and Shia. By early February, a total of 15 Kuwaiti Shia (and one Shiite bidun) had become associated with the bombings, including two from long-established and well-reputed Kuwaiti Shiite families, Bahbahani and al-Dashti.562 While undoubtedly concerned about the implications of these ﬁndings, the al-Sabah leadership fought the social strain at home. In an extensive interview with al-Qabas, Shaykh Saad warned against judging entire communities by the acts of a few of their misguided members.563 He also took the opportunity to remind Kuwaitis that opposition groups seeking reform in Kuwait remained acceptable “under agreed upon standards and concepts.”564 In addition, the leadership and the local press continued to direct blame toward the suspected root of the terrorism: Tehran. Al-Rai al-Amm commented on the changes in the Muslim world following the Iranian revolution: originally in Kuwait there were “no differences among members of one big family,” but then “the spark of sedition was triggered by Iran and the signs of sectarianism began to appear, manipulated and nourished by Iranian hands.”565 Shaykh Nawwaf accused “foreign quarters” of responsibility for the recent operations in Kuwait.566 The delicate nature of the investigation was illustrated by the violent protest and subsequent detention of more than two-dozen Kuwaitis who had gathered near the home of one of the suspects, Habib Shaban Ghadanfari, and the Bayan police station to prevent his arrest in late January. The protesters threw stones and other objects at police ofﬁcers and their patrol cars, preventing the police from detaining the suspect.567 Twenty-six protesters were apprehended for their actions,

118 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

including 25 Kuwaitis (of whom 15 were juveniles) and one Saudi national.568 Although many were later released without charge, eight were tried in the state security court in June.569 Charges included gathering with the intention to commit crimes, resisting authorities, and causing public disorder.570 One individual was accused of instigating the protest with a speech.571 In the end, the court only convicted four defendants.572 The fact that such a trial was held in the state security court attested to the authorities’ sense of vulnerability to an increasingly vocal, troublesome and threatening group of citizens. Two weeks after the announcement of a trial date for the defendants in the January oil facilities bombings, two warning statements came from Beirut. One reportedly signed by Kuwaiti Hizballah accused the authorities of malicious intent toward Islam, and denounced Kuwait’s support for Iraq in the war. Another signed by Abbas al-Muhri accused the authorities of engaging in terrorism and detaining innocent people. Both statements threatened violence against Kuwait in retaliation for measures taken against the defendants.573 The trial of the suspected saboteurs opened on 4 April. The court charged the 15 Kuwaiti Shia and one Shiite bidun (four of whom were still at large) with operating a subversive underground network from August 1984 to February 1987.574 The court learned that most of the suspects had been employed in the national oil sector or by the Education Ministry, and two were students.575 In addition to the 19 January attacks, some of the suspects were accused of perpetrating the bombing downtown a few days later, participating in the protests against the police in late January, and committing the June 1986 oil installation bombings, of which foreigners initially had been accused (see above).576 Charges also included possessing explosives, ﬁrearms and ammunition.577 On 6 June, the court sentenced six of the defendants to death, including two in absentia; eight to life, two-, three-, seven- or ten-year prison terms as well as ﬁnes; and acquitted two.578 Habib Ghadanfari was among those sentenced to death in absentia; it was suspected that he had sought refuge at the Iranian embassy.579 In fact, one of the Kuwaiti Shia at large reportedly was discovered by Kuwaiti authorities alive in a cofﬁn box which Iranian embassy ofﬁcials were attempting to transport out of Kuwait by plane in the early spring. It appears that the authorities allowed the suspect, and perhaps the three other defendants at large who were believed to have sought refuge in the Iranian embassy, to “disappear,” rather than further strain deteriorating relations with Tehran at the time.580

Criticism and Extremism from Kuwaiti Citizens 119

The court rulings elicited additional threats to Kuwait. One day after the verdicts were issued, the formerly mentioned Forces of the Prophet Muhammad threatened to assassinate Kuwaiti leaders if the death sentences were carried out: “our bullets will rip the chests of Kuwaiti leaders who are oppressors and hired mercenaries,” the statement read.581 The Lebanese semi-ofﬁcial daily, al-Nahar, which published the threat, also reported a declaration issued from Tehran by the unknown organization, Sons of Hizballah on the Arabian Peninsula, which described the court’s decision as a crime against Muslims.582 These threats, as well as the ones issued earlier in March, indicated close links between the perpetrating organization and other Iranian-linked revolutionary groups in Tehran and Beirut. The June 1986 and January 1987 oil installation bombings and the bombing downtown on 24 January 1987 represented the ﬁrst, second and third attacks in a longer series of bombings in the country in which Kuwaiti Shia proved to be primary perpetrators; during the last year or so of the Iran-Iraq war, Kuwaiti Shia were implicated in numerous other acts of domestic terrorism (see Table 5.3). In May 1987, a Kuwaiti Shiite was killed while planting a bomb at a natural gas storage tank in Ahmadi.583 Two months later, two Kuwaiti Shia died while preparing a car bomb outside the downtown ofﬁces of Air France.584 Two other Kuwaiti Shia died while preparing a bomb near a Kuwait Airways ofﬁce in May 1988.585 The group that claimed responsibility for the May 1987 bombing, Organization for the Liberation of Muslims in Kuwait, also took credit for two other attacks in October and November of that year, suggesting that Kuwaiti Shia were involved in those incidents as well.586 Thus, by 1987 and 1988, bombings by Kuwaiti Shia had become a rather normal phenomenon in the country. The following section explores the reasons for and implications of this phenomenon.

Explaining citizen-bombers One of the most intriguing aspects of the bombing perpetrators’ identities, besides the fact that they were Kuwaiti citizens, was that several hailed from the well-respected Shiite families of Kuwait’s business elite. Already mentioned was that members of the Bahbahani and al-Dashti families were among those implicated in the January 1987 oil installation bombings. The July 1987 bombers also came from a wealthy Kuwaiti Shiite family: al-Attar. The May 1987 bomber himself had been employed as an executive at KPC.594

120 Table 5.3

Terrorist Bombs and Fires in Kuwait, 1986–88

Date

Event (Claims, Perpetrators)

17 June 1986

Multiple explosions at national oil facilities. (Kuwaiti Shia tried for these crimes in the state security court in connection with the 19 January 1987 bombings, see below.)

19 Jan. 1987

Multiple explosions at national oil facilities. (FPMK claims responsibility. Thirteen Kuwaiti Shia and one Shiite bidun convicted in the state security court.)

24 Jan. 1987

Package bomb explodes under car downtown. (FPMK claims responsibility. Kuwaiti Shia tried for this crime in the state security court in connection with the 19 January 1987 bombings, see above.)

26 Apr. 1987

Car bomb explodes in front of KPC headquarters in Ahmadi.

11 May 1987

Time bomb explodes in downtown TWA ofﬁce. One killed.

22 May 1987

Gas storage tank explodes in Ahmadi. (OLMK claims responsibility.587 One Kuwaiti Shiite bomber killed in explosion.)

15 July 1987

Car bomb explodes near Air France ofﬁce downtown. (Two Kuwaiti Shiite bombers killed in explosion.)

4 Sept. 1987

Three separate ﬁres damage buildings at the science school campus of Kuwait University.

9 Sept. 1987

Fire at Shamiya secondary school for boys.

24 Oct. 1987

Explosion at downtown Pan American Airways ofﬁce. (OLMK claims responsibility.588 Attack occurs one day after Islamic Jihad threatens to strike at US and European targets in the Gulf.589)

3 Nov. 1987

Car bomb explodes near Interior Ministry ofﬁces in Shamiya.

25 Nov. 1987

Bomb explodes inside American Life Insurance Company downtown. (OLMK claims responsibility.590)

9 Apr. 1988

Car bomb explodes in Interior Ministry parking lot in Sharq.

27 Apr. 1988

Time bomb explodes near Saudi Airlines ofﬁces downtown.591 (One Iranian and two unidentiﬁed Arabs apprehended in connection with the bombing.592)

7 May 1988

Bomb explodes in Avis Rent-a-Car ofﬁce downtown. (One Iranian and two unidentiﬁed Arabs apprehended in connection with the bombing.593)

18 May 1988

Car bomb explodes near Kuwait Airways ofﬁce. (Two Kuwaiti Shiite bombers killed in explosion.)

Abbreviations: FPMK – Revolutionary Organization of the Forces of the Prophet Muhammad in Kuwait OLMK – Organization for the Liberation of Muslims in Kuwait

Criticism and Extremism from Kuwaiti Citizens 121

At ﬁrst glance, the bombers could be categorized largely as disaffected youth. Young, alienated individuals also had dominated Gulf Shiite citizen groups involved in the nefarious activities in Bahrain in December 1981 (see Chapter 3).595 While much of the Kuwaiti Shiite community felt frustrated by the discrimination they suffered, for the most part the Kuwaiti bombers’ actions did not draw broad support from the Kuwaiti Shiite community, including the prominent Shiite families. A number of the latter, including relatives of the bombers, purchased newspaper advertisements denouncing the attacks and expressing loyalty to Kuwait and the amir.596 In addition, Kuwaiti Shiite husayniyyas published statements in the local press condemning terrorist assaults, and assuring doubters of their loyalty to Kuwait.597 Nonetheless, the number of attacks and the number of individuals likely involved in their planning, preparation and execution, suggest that other explanations besides troubled youth account for the phenomenon of Kuwaiti citizen terrorism during this period. In fact, the phenomenon appears related to three additional circumstances. One is the extensive security crackdowns following the major attacks of 1983 and 1985 that focused heavily on Shia. Apparently, the harsh and sometimes indiscriminate security measures contributed to radicalizing a small segment of the Kuwaiti Shiite population. Even Interior Minister Shaykh Nawwaf seemed to recognize this when he commented in a newspaper interview: “Probably the security measures taken by Kuwait… have some residual impact.”598 The Kuwaiti Shiite community, like other Shiite communities living in the country, had been faced with concentrated periods of detentions, arrests and expulsions, and close surveillance of their neighborhoods, mosques and husayniyyas.599 These measures accompanied increasing discrimination in public life, including at the university and workplace.600 In the military and security services, Kuwaiti Shia had been eased out of sensitive and high posts, and at petroleum docks and reﬁneries, purged from key positions.601 These measures built strong resentment among the Kuwaiti Shiite community at large.602 Another issue contributing to the phenomenon of citizen terrorism during this period appears related to Kuwait’s evolving position vis-àvis the Iran-Iraq war. Kuwait’s political, ﬁnancial, media and other support for Iraq always had alienated much of the Kuwaiti Shiite community, which generally sided with Iran in the war.603 However, Kuwait’s invitation in 1986–87 to international powers including the United States to protect Kuwaiti tankers against Iranian attack was perceived as particularly provocative by Iran and its supporters.604

122 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

Kuwait’s increasing support for Iraq, worsening relations with Iran, and internationalization of the conﬂict during this period represent a second set of factors that contributed to the radicalization of a small section of the Kuwaiti Shiite community. Finally, the growing involvement of Kuwaiti citizens in activities against the Kuwaiti leadership related to Tehran’s long term strategy at the time. Iran had been trying to engage Kuwaiti Shia in anti-ruling family activities since 1979, and nurtured the development of revolutionaries among Kuwait’s citizenry in the early and mid-1980s.605 Iranian-backed Shiite activists in the Gulf recognized early on the need to recruit Arab Gulf youth in particular to their organizations.606 Two prominent Iranian-linked shaykhs, Abbas al-Muhri and Muhammad al-Shirazi—ultimately expelled from Kuwait in 1979 and 1980, respectively—developed a small nucleus of followers in the country: young men individually chosen for religious and political indoctrination. Al-Muhri in particular held information on individuals who could be used in Kuwait for political purposes.607 Indeed, the January 1987 bombers had been charged in the state security court with belonging to a subversive network for years prior to the bombings.608 Apparently, Kuwaiti citizen involvement in terrorism became increasingly achievable for Tehran-linked groups in the midand late 1980s, likely as a result of the particularly trying domestic climate for Shia during that period. Tehran’s inspirational and organizational support for the radical cells that committed the crimes, as well as its inﬂuence in the targeting of commercial rather than civil interests—in line with Iran’s direct attacks on Kuwaiti oil facilities during the ﬁnal years of the war—cannot be underestimated.

Responding to citizen extremism Citizen terrorism against Kuwaiti targets represented a fundamental challenge to the social contract between Kuwaitis and the ruling family upon which the leadership’s political security hinged. That several of the bombers came from well-established families—prime beneﬁciaries of al-Sabah rule—must have deepened concern. The increasing threat from some Kuwaiti Shiite quarters was met by heightened resolve to apprehend and prosecute citizens involved in spreading anti-regime ideas and plotting terrorist crimes. Kuwaiti Shia’s roles as key participants in attacks obviously convinced the authorities that punishing and deterring current and potential criminal perpetrators was worth the risk of the social and political impact of harsh crackdowns. In

Criticism and Extremism from Kuwaiti Citizens 123 Table 5.4 State Security Cases Registered with the Justice Ministry During February 1986–August 1988 that Eventually Ended in Trial Year of MoJ Registration

Charges

Nationality of Defendants

1986

“Spreading rumors” about the security services

1 Kuwaiti

1987

Bombings

15 Kuwaitis, 1 bidun

1987

Rioting

8 Kuwaitis

1987

Publishing anti-government material

7 Kuwaitis, 1 bidun

1987

Spreading propaganda against the amir

1 Kuwaiti

1988

Bombings

5 Kuwaitis

1988

Bombing

3 Kuwaitis

Source: Author’s calculations based on information provided to her by Kuwait Ministry of Justice, Spring 2000.

sharp contrast to previous years, of all the state security cases registered with the Justice Ministry between February 1986 and August 1988 that eventually ended in trial, all of the defendants were Kuwaitis citizens— overwhelmingly Shia—except for two, who were biduns (see Table 5.4). Furthermore, the trial of a larger number and rate of security cases not involving violent attacks—a pattern established in 1985 (see Chapter 4)—continued. Following the trials of the January bombers and rioters, between June 1987 and the Iran-Iraq ceaseﬁre in August 1988, the state security court tried three cases.609 Two cases concerned the distribution of anti-regime literature. The ﬁrst, tried in June, involved a Kuwaiti Shiite employed as a telephone operator at a Kuwaiti secondary school. The court charged the defendant with organizing students to prepare and distribute leaﬂets calling for the overthrow of the leadership and attacks on the amir. The prosecution named seven high school students as accessories, including six Kuwaitis and one bidun.610 All eight were found guilty.611 The second case involved another Kuwaiti Shiite accused of publicly calling for the overthrow of the leadership and slandering the amir.612 In February 1988, the court sentenced him to three years imprisonment.613 The third case, tried in June 1988, involved Kuwaitis charged with terrorist activities. Five Kuwaitis, including one in absentia, were accused of plotting assassinations of state security staff members and planting bombs.614 The court sentenced one to ten years imprisonment, released

124 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

another on bail and dismissed him from his government job, placed a third on parole, and acquitted two.615 Some of the debate regarding the phenomenon of citizen-perpetrated terrorism focused on the extent to which radical individuals were operating in conjunction with each other.616 The authorities sought to minimize the organized nature of subversive activities just as information about such networks was growing. Shaykh Saad referred to the January 1987 bombers as a few deviants, and stated that the government was eager to keep the threat in perspective.617 An interior ministry ofﬁcial insisted that no deep-rooted terrorist networks existed in Kuwait, unlike in the Western world.618 An awqaf and Islamic affairs ministry ofﬁcial argued that only extremist individuals, not groups, existed in Kuwait.619 The state security trials for bombings, which typically involved groups of individuals working together, suggested otherwise. The security services failed to apprehend many individuals involved in violent terrorist activities in Kuwait during the period under examination. During the two years between the Iran-Iraq ceaseﬁre and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the security services continued to pursue Kuwaiti and foreign saboteurs, including one group of 33 individuals charged with terrorist-related crimes (see Chapter 6). However, a signiﬁcant decrease in the number of terrorist attacks by Kuwaiti citizens and foreigners alike in the country coincided with the end of the war, thus concluding a difﬁcult chapter in Kuwait’s history. Shaykh Nawwaf’s continuing charges as late as 1988 that the sabotage acts in Kuwait “were a result of the Gulf war” seemed appropriate.620

De-emphasis on the threat from foreign residents Non-Kuwaiti Shia continued to be prosecuted for involvement in security crimes in Kuwait during 1986–88. In March 1986, the state security court convicted four Lebanese for preparing to bomb the water desalinization plant and power stations just north of Kuwait City.621 The police found bomb equipment among the suspects’ possessions, including explosives, Molotov cocktails, gas cylinders and detonators, and a letter from a relative instructing the suspects how to bomb the stations.622 One Iranian and two non-Kuwaiti Arabs of unspeciﬁed nationality also were accused of involvement in bombings in late April and early May 1988.623 However, the new predominance of Kuwaiti citizens in security incidents, particularly during the last year and a half of the war, diverted attention from the country’s immigrant communities. Security meas-

Criticism and Extremism from Kuwaiti Citizens 125 Table 5.5 Numerical and Proportional Changes in Administrative Deportations of Expatriates, 1984–88

Number of Deportations

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

6,701

10,920

17,805

11,227

9,702

5,771

–

162%

163%

63%

86%

59%

Percentage of Previous Year

Source: Author’s calculations based on information provided to her by Kuwait Ministry of Interior, Spring 2000.

ures targeting foreigners were relaxed during this period. For example, while the authorities continued to defend their right to deport foreigners who represented security risks, the total number of administrative deportations of expatriates declined in 1986 from 1985’s high, and then again in 1987, and once again in 1988 (see Table 5.5).624 The 1988 decrease apparently did not reﬂect the change in the rate of deportations after the Iran-Iraq ceaseﬁre in August: the rate of expatriate deportations actually increased during the latter months of the year, despite a decrease in security crimes (see Chapter 6). Moreover, deportations of expatriates conducted during the last year and a half of the war were linked to non-security-related concerns. For example, while the number of expulsions of individuals categorized by the Interior Ministry as “undesirable” declined during this period, the Table 5.6 Annual Number of Administrative Deportations of Expatriates According to Reason Given for Expulsion, 1981–88 Reason Cited for Expulsion

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

Undesirable

341

352

1,053

2,181

3,283

7,583

188

0

Theft

2

9

0

2

0

25

90

38

Assault

0

0

0

0

0

3

22

14

165

216

304

336

217

363

502

391

Drug Addiction

48

29

23

16

33

52

95

61

Forgery and Counterfeit

68

168

265

538

156

238

400

254

Intoxication

3

10

6

19

25

20

96

42

Solicitation

1988

Source: Kuwait Ministry of Interior internal yearbook information provided to the author by the ministry, Spring 2000.

126 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

number of deportations relating to non-political crimes such as theft and solicitation generally rose (see Table 5.6). In addition, the rate of deportations for nationalities typically perceived as security risks at that time—particularly Iranians and Iraqis—generally did not exceed the rate of deportations for perceivably less threatening nationalities during this period (see Appendix A). Although for many of the bombing incidents that took place in Kuwait in 1987 and 1988 it was unknown whether foreigners or citizens committed the crimes, the attacks whose perpetrators were not accounted for proved less sensational than the other incidents. For one, many of the unclaimed or unsolved crimes involved comparatively small, commercial targets, rather than civil ones (like the seaside cafes) or prominent individuals (such as Amir Jabir and Ahmad al-Jarallah), (see Table 5.3). Also, they resulted in fewer innocent casualties. Of the 15 violent security crimes committed during 1987 and 1988, only one involved an innocent death: the TWA ofﬁce bombing in May 1987 that killed a Yemeni employee (see Table 5.3). None matched the dramatic attacks of 1983 or 1985 committed almost entirely by non-Kuwaitis. The main exception to the string of relatively undramatic attacks committed in some cases by foreigners near the end of the war was the 16-day hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner en route to Kuwait from Thailand on 5 April 1988. Here again, the terrorists demanded the release of the individuals imprisoned for the December 1983 bombings.625 Thirty of the 97 passengers on board the aircraft were Kuwaiti, including two members of the ruling family, and two Kuwaitis were murdered during the crisis.626 The hijacking quickly was linked to Imad Mughniyya, a key Hizballah ﬁgure widely believed to have been responsible for the December 1984 hijacking against Kuwait as well.627 The hijackers held forged Bahraini, Iraqi and Colombian passports, and spoke the Lebanese dialect of Arabic.628 On the third day of the hijacking, Hizballah warned Kuwait in a written statement not to take measures against the hijackers, and threatened to attack Kuwaiti interests abroad.629 As in the case of the 1984 hijacking, several incidents during the crisis linked the hijacking to Tehran. According to some of the passengers on the plane, the Iranians provided new weapons to the hijackers when they were on the ground in Mashhad for three days.630 Also, additional hijackers appeared to board the plane there.631 Later, this was determined to have included Mughniyya himself.632 By the eighth day of the hijacking, the Kuwaiti press had explicitly charged Iran with

Criticism and Extremism from Kuwaiti Citizens 127

complicity in the hijacking.633 In the end, Algiers negotiated with the hijackers to free the hostages, and Kuwait agreed to allow the hijackers to board an Algerian air force plane to Damascus. Mughniyya reappeared in Beirut several weeks later.634 In Kuwait, blame for the hijacking was directed in part against the leadership for its policy regarding the December 1983 bombings prisoners. Some attributed the hijacking and other terrorist crimes to Kuwait’s leniency in not executing those condemned to death. Reportedly, some senior political and security ofﬁcials favored asking Amir Jabir to authorize the executions.635 Public criticism also arose over the authorities allowing visiting privileges for relatives of the convicts, and for housing the relatives in hotels at the Interior Ministry’s expense.636 Rumors also circulated that Kuwait had paid money to or otherwise struck a deal with the hijackers to secure the release of the passengers, although the authorities denied this.637 The April 1988 hijacking proved the last major attack involving foreign Shiite revolutionaries striving to secure the release of the December 1983 bombers. The bombers’ escape from Kuwaiti prison during the Iraqi invasion in August 1990 eradicated the cause célèbre. Iraqi ofﬁcials took them into custody and then released them to Iran.638 The assault also marked the last major security incident against Kuwaiti interests led by foreign Shia in the pre-Iraqi invasion period, again linking these kinds of attacks on Kuwait to Tehran’s war effort.

Summary The combination of profound external and internal security challenges to the al-Sabah leadership during 1986, including physical threats from Iran, intense parliamentary criticism of government ministers, and terrorist attacks against national oil installations, contributed to the leadership’s decision to close representative institutions and place restrictions on other venues for political dissent in Kuwait. The leadership sought to maintain public support by ﬁnally prosecuting those involved in the dramatic attacks of mid-1985, and by easing to varying degrees its strict expatriate deportation and immigration practices, appeasing domestic and regional audiences. The internal security predicament that markedly distinguished 1986–88 from earlier periods under examination was the primary involvement of Kuwaiti citizens in violent attacks against Kuwaiti targets, particularly commercial interests. The phenomenon of Shiite citizen bombers appeared to relate to the austere security environment

128 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

in Kuwait in which Shia were especially targeted, the leadership’s increasingly pro-Iraq stance and internationalization of the Iran-Iraq war, and inspirational and organizational support from Tehran and Iranian-backed revolutionary groups. The authorities responded by pursuing and prosecuting radical elements as well as non-violent dissenters in the Shiite community in the state security court. The Iran-Iraq ceaseﬁre in August 1988, the independent interests of revolutionary groups and terrorist organizations, and the Kuwaiti crackdowns, all contributed to a respite from violent citizen and foreigner attacks. Shiite citizen oppositionist activities continued, however, and these activities, as well as new political challenges from the general citizen population that emerged in the context of the ceaseﬁre, are discussed in the following chapter.

6 Old and New Antagonisms after the Ceaseﬁre, September 1988–July 1990

The Kuwaiti public greeted the Iran-Iraq ceasefire in the summer of 1988, following the return of Faw to Iraq in the spring, with optimism on all fronts. Economically, Kuwaitis looked forward to higher oil revenues linked to new regional stability, and to restored trade with Iran and Iraq which would be invigorated by the countries’ reconstruction efforts.639 Politically, Kuwaitis believed that the end of the war, and the siege mentality that accompanied it at home, would spur the al-Sabah leadership to restore civil-political privileges such as parliamentary life, a freer press and a less strict, security-obsessed environment. Socially, Kuwaitis hoped that tensions between Sunni and Shiite citizens would be eased. In essence, Kuwaitis anticipated a return to “normalcy.” The leadership’s perception of the ceasefire environment and the opportunities it presented differed from that of the public. Part of its hesitancy in celebrating the ceasefire stemmed from the fact that Iran and Iraq had not signed a full peace treaty.640 Both countries continued to reinforce their military positions, Iran appeared to be continuing its efforts to destabilize neighboring Gulf states including Kuwait, and Kuwaiti-Iranian diplomatic relations remained strained. At home, suspect activities on the part of some Kuwaiti Shia continued to plague the authorities, who believed they needed to be as vigilant as ever with regard to the Shiite population. Finally, although the leadership expressed optimism about the country’s economic future, its discussion focused on improving Kuwait’s security situation via socioeconomic development plans rather than renewing old and exploiting new economic opportunities. The public and leadership’s discordant viewpoints regarding the country’s security situation contributed to the popular movement to reinstitute parliamentary life on the one hand, and the ruling family’s 129

130 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

perception that the movement represented a formidable security challenge on the other hand. Despite persistent problems with some defiant Shiite citizens, by the end of 1989 the parliamentary movement had overwhelmed Kuwait’s domestic arena and dominated al-Sabah security concerns until the Iraqi invasion in August 1990.

Post-war subversion During the two-year period between the Iran-Iraq ceasefire and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Kuwait was not targeted by bombings or other similar acts of sabotage on its soil. The reason for the change from the previous two-year period appears related not to a substantive shift in Kuwaiti domestic policy toward its Shiite citizens or Shiite prisoners held in Kuwaiti jails, or Kuwaiti foreign policy toward Iraq and Iran, but largely to new strategies by Iranian-related groups and ﬁgures. In fact, a decline in terrorist activity perpetrated by Iranian-linked elements was evident not only in Kuwait but internationally during this period: Iranian-connected elements were held responsible for 36 international terrorist attacks in 1989, compared to 40 in 1988 and 66 in 1987.641 Nonetheless, the leadership’s concern about Iranian-directed Shiite subversion did not diminish following the ceasefire.642 Kuwait’s security forces were kept on maximum alert for subversive activities, and Amir Jabir promised that they would maintain a “protective shield” against those threatening security.643 In the spring of 1989, following the arrest of 47 Iranians who had attempted to enter Kuwait from Gulf waters, the Interior Ministry proposed improving its coast guard with better speedboats, radar equipment and specially trained frogmen to prevent “outside assistance to internal subversion.”644 Also, state security trials continued to be held after the ceasefire for bombings that had occurred during the last year or so of the war.645 One case concerned an explosion near Air France’s downtown ofﬁce in July 1987, and the other, an explosion near a Kuwait Airways office in May 1988 and other post-ceasefire crimes (see below). Each of the explosions had killed two Kuwaiti Shiite bomb-planters, and both trials involved Kuwaiti Shiite defendants, in some cases bomb-planters’ family members believed to be involved in subversive activity as well (see Table 6.1).646 Additionally, two new episodes involving Kuwaiti Shia during 1989 and the first half of 1990 concerned the authorities. The first was the case of 33 accused security offenders under investigation since late

Old and New Antagonisms after the Ceaseﬁre 131 Table 6.1 State Security Trials Held After the Iran-Iraq Ceaseﬁre for Pre-ceaseﬁre Crimes Trial Date

Crime

Defendants

No. Convicted

December 1988 –January 1989

Involvement in explosion near Air France ofﬁce in July 1987

3 Kuwaiti Shia

2

May–June 1990

Involvement in explosion near Kuwait Airways ofﬁce in May 1988. (Also bombings in Saudi Arabia in July 1989, and publishing subversive material.)

4 Kuwaiti Shia

0

Source: Author’s calculations based on information provided to her by Kuwait Ministry of Justice, Spring 2000.

1988. All defendants except for one were suspected of organizing, joining and/or collaborating with groups aimed at spreading subversive ideas between 1979 and December 1988.647 The starting date obviously connected the beginning of the seditious activities to the Iranian revolution. Other suspected activities included conspiracy to overthrow the leadership and assassinate public figures—reportedly among them Foreign Minister Shaykh Sabah—and their children, divulging state secrets, and extorting public funds.648 Their trial in the state security court was held in the spring of 1989. The sizable number of accused, the Kuwaiti nationality of a majority of them, and their respectable government jobs was reminiscent of the July 1986 and January 1987 oil installation bombings case. Of the 33 accused, 18 were Kuwaiti nationals, all Shia. The Kuwaitis included a doctor at a public hospital, a former policeman, and oil refinery and communication ministry employees. Two were from the Bahbahani family. The non-Kuwaitis also were all Shia, and included nine Iraqis, two Iranians, two Lebanese, one Briton of Lebanese descent and one bidun.649 Only 20 of the accused were present at the trial, including 14 of the Kuwaitis; the court tried the remaining 13 individuals in absentia. In June, the court sentenced 22 of the defendants, including 13 of the Kuwaitis, to prison terms of five to 15 years and eight also to deportation after they completed their sentences.650 The absence of detailed information about the charges and the trial, conducted almost

132 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

entirely in camera, complicates any assessment from this case in particular of the extent to which a not so small network of Kuwaiti Shiite nationals conspiring with foreign residents in subversive activities against the leadership existed. At the very least, the trial suggested that the government believed this to be so. The second worrying episode surrounded the bombings in Mecca, Saudi Arabia during hajj festivities in July 1989. The Saudis accused more than two-dozen Kuwaiti Shia of involvement in the bombings, and publicly beheaded 16 of them in September for the offense.651 Two days prior to the executions, Saudi television broadcast the Kuwaitis admitting to their participation in the bombings, and to receiving training and explosives from the Iranian embassy in Kuwait (which the Iranian embassy subsequently denied).652 The executions themselves and the Kuwaiti leadership’s position on them attracted extraordinary attention in the Kuwaiti Shiite community.653 Initially, the authorities remained silent on the issue of the Saudi punishments, which could be attributed to their need to consider their relations with Saudi Arabia, Iran and Kuwaiti Shia all at the same time.654 In the meantime, rumors circulated that a secret agreement had been reached between the al-Sabahs and the al-Sauds concerning the execution of the Kuwaitis and the release of a number of other Kuwaiti suspects to Kuwait.655 This reported agreement essentially implicated the leadership in the 16 deaths. Finally, a week after the beheadings, the leadership voiced support for the Saudi position. The initial silence, the rumored agreement, and the eventual support for the Saudis infuriated the Kuwaiti Shiite community, and initiated a months-long cycle of protests and arrests on the part of members of the Kuwaiti Shiite community and the authorities, respectively. Amnesty International’s annual reports documenting the years 1989 and 1990 track three series of Kuwaiti arrests of Kuwaiti Shia following the Saudi executions. The arrests, which in total numbered more than two-dozen and involved repeated arrests and releases of some detainees, included prominent religious leaders, former members of parliament, merchants, and family members of the bombing suspects.656 The first series of arrests took place immediately after the beheadings. On the day of the executions, police arrested Salih Jawhar, the imam of the Imam al-Husayn mosque, apparently to prevent him from delivering a potentially critical sermon the next day.657 Two days later, the police briefly detained four sisters of one of the beheaded; they had called outside the Saudi embassy for the bodies of those executed to be delivered to Kuwait for burial.658 Also that day, police arrested a prominent religious

Old and New Antagonisms after the Ceaseﬁre 133

scholar and imam of the Imam Ali mosque, Muhammad Baqir alMusawi, who had denounced the executions in a Friday sermon.659 Al-Musawi had been identified as a leader of Kuwaiti Hizballah and a key organizer of the Mecca bombings by at least one of the 16 Kuwaiti suspects on Saudi television.660 The second series of arrests appeared to be connected to statements and activities following the 40-day anniversary of the executions in late October which marked the end of the mourning period. On the anniversary itself, some Kuwaiti religious leaders gathered in Beirut to denounce the Saudi executions as well as the arrests in Kuwait.661 Fourteen Kuwaiti Shia were arrested over the following month, including Faisal Abd al-Hadi al-Mahmid, a businessman whose cousin was among the 16 executed and who had delivered sermons in the Imam al-Husayn mosque after Salih Jawhar’s arrest, and Khalil Musa al-Musa, a teacher and former deputy director of the Shiite Cultural and Social Society.662 Finally, a third set of arrests involving 13 Kuwaiti Shia took place in February 1990. The detained included two former Shiite deputies of the National Assembly. Some of those arrested in February also had been detained in September and November of the previous year.663 All 13 detainees were released on bail in March, along with another detainee held since November, without ever being formally charged.664 Despite the three series of arrests and some individuals being arrested on multiple occasions, the Justice Ministry held only one state security trial in connection with the hajj affair.665 In fact, it was the only case tried in the state security court during the year-and-a-half period preceding the Iraqi invasion.666 Although the four defendants in the case had been arrested in September and November 1989 in connection with the hajj bombings, only one was implicated in the attack in court.667 Other charges included belonging to an organization whose aim was to overthrow the leadership, smuggling and possessing explosives, inciting the public against the government, and perpetrating terrorist attacks such as the bombing in May 1988.668 The trial began in May 1990, and in June, the court acquitted each of the four defendants on all charges.669 Saudi influence over Kuwait’s repeated arrests and trial of Kuwaiti Shia either suspected of involvement in the hajj bombings or who denounced the executions was likely. The al-Sabahs and al-Sauds had met to discuss the handling of bombing suspects prior to the executions, and almost certainly continued to communicate about the remaining suspects and related individuals after the executions.670

134 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

Iranian circles, for one, attributed Kuwait’s arrests and reported torture of Kuwaiti Shia to Saudi influence.671 In any case, it was in the Kuwaiti leadership’s interest to arrest, charge and prosecute individuals suspected of involvement in the affair, as similar plots also could be carried out on Kuwaiti soil, and to keep criticism of the executions, which the leadership had supported publicly, under control. However, there would be a political cost for the leadership if the severity of the measures did not match the severity of the suspect activities. And clearly, the authorities continued to be gravely concerned about the threat of Shiite subversion, particularly with regard to its own Shiite citizens, despite the absence of bombings and other acts of sabotage on Kuwaiti soil during this period. The authorities’ ultimate dissolution of the board of directors of the Shiite Cultural and Social Society epitomized efforts to hinder any opposition organization within the Shiite community. Certainly Kuwaiti Shia were enraged by Kuwaiti (and Saudi) positions on the hajj bombing suspects, which mobilized them to protest against the two governments in late 1989 and 1990, yet the fact that no individuals were convicted in Kuwait’s state security court in connection with the hajj affair suggests an absence of provable security crimes relating to events in Kuwait surrounding it.672

The post-war politics of foreign residents With sustained focus on the Kuwaiti Shiite threat, the trend established during the last two years of the war with regard to expulsions of expatriates continued for the most part into late 1988 and 1989: the number of deportations stabilized after having increased sharply during the periods surrounding the Iranian revolution and the dramatic terrorist attacks of the mid-1980s.673 This applied to both Asian and Arab nationalities, including those significantly represented by Shia in Kuwait, and appeared connected to a diminishing perception that foreigners in general posed immediate security threats.674 Although the Interior Ministry did not compile an internal statistical yearbook including deportation ﬁgures for the year 1990 because of the Iraqi invasion and occupation (just as other ministries did not produce yearbooks for this period), the trend likely continued in 1990 until the invasion. After the ceasefire, the government continued to develop and promote a new socioeconomic structure for the country that would be sustainable in the long-term. A significant component involved reducing

Old and New Antagonisms after the Ceaseﬁre 135

the number of foreign residents in the workforce, and replacing them with Kuwaiti nationals. Obviously, the scheme held important security implications as well as economic ones; it sought to help the leadership avoid the sort of problems and vulnerabilities it had faced during previous years in relation to subversive activities by foreign residents. Government interests in this regard were reflected not in an increase in deportations of expatriates, which usually were linked to emergency procedures, but in a decrease in the number of first-time residence permits granted to foreigners in 1988 and 1989 (see Table 6.2 and Appendix B). The decrease echoed a similar trend following the December 1983 attacks, before public criticism erupted over undiscriminating security measures against foreign residents (see Chapter 4). While some of the decline in permits issued during 1988–89 was probably linked to economic conditions in the country, over the years permit figures had not strictly reflected economic conditions, and likely they did not during this period either. Although Table 6.2

Annual Number of First-time Residence Permits Issued, 1983–89

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

184,238

129,007

111,058

134,935

175,995

145,286

127,082

Source: Kuwait Ministry of Interior internal yearbook information provided to the author by the ministry, Spring 2000.

Graph 6.1 Annual Number of First-time Residence Permits Issued to Arab and Asian Nationalities, 1978–89 120,000 100,000 80,000 Arab Asian

60,000 40,000 20,000 0 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

Source: Author’s graph of data from Kuwait Ministry of Planning, Annual Statistical Abstract 1989, p. 65

136 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

Interior Ministry data regarding residence permits is not available for 1990 because of the Iraqi invasion and occupation, non-Kuwaiti sources point to a decline that year in the number of expatriates employed in the public sector.675 Furthermore, the number of first-time residence permits granted to foreign Arabs and Asians began to diverge significantly once again in 1988 and even more so in 1989, as they had in the mid-1980s, with Asians receiving an increasing number of permits and Arabs receiving fewer permits (see Graph 6.1). The two traditional explanations for favoring Asian over Arab employees—that the former posed less of a security risk because of their general disinterest in Arab and Middle Eastern politics, and proved less expensive to employ—both applied to Kuwait’s long-term socioeconomic agenda. Another indication of the government’s intentions was a new labor law signed by the social affairs and labor minister in January 1989, effective in March of that year. The law’s dual aims were to further regulate and limit the foreign workforce by restricting the mobility of foreign workers in the national labor market, and to replace foreign workers with Kuwaiti employees. The new law stipulated that private employers must import new foreigners or hire resident foreigners for a minimum of three years. The foreign employees could not transfer employers or hold more than one job without permission from the ministry. Only foreign workers who had resided in Kuwait for ten consecutive years would be exempted from the new measures. Finally, private employers would not be permitted to recruit workers from abroad for positions that could be filled by Kuwaitis or other Gulf citizens.676 Kuwait’s business community greeted the new rules with reservation, as it had previous efforts to limit the foreign workforce. Businessmen had hoped that labor regulations would be eased following the ceaseﬁre to encourage business activity.677 However, the government leadership presented the new law as consistent with Kuwait’s new economic reality. Shaykh Nasir, for example, attributed the new rules to the drop in oil revenues, the completion of infrastructure projects, and the increasing number of Kuwaiti university graduates.678 At the same time, after years of planning to correct the population imbalance regarding citizens and non-citizens, the law and other efforts to reduce the number of foreign residents could not be viewed without their security implications. Another option for correcting the population imbalance was extending citizenship to some of the country’s resident biduns, who officially

Old and New Antagonisms after the Ceaseﬁre 137

numbered approximately 250,000 in 1989.679 However, around the time of the Iran-Iraq ceasefire, the government appeared to be moving toward formally abandoning this idea for good. In late 1988, Kuwait began reporting biduns as “foreign residents” in its statistical yearbooks, whereas biduns and citizens previously had been lumped together in various tallies of the “citizen” population. The decision followed efforts since mid-1985 to disown biduns by depriving them of unrestricted travel rights and the beneﬁts of legal residence.680 In many ways, biduns represented good candidates for naturalization: they were of Arab, if not Kuwaiti, origin, which would help Kuwait maintain its Arab character; many had demonstrated their loyalty to the ruling family by dedicated service in the army and police force; and many biduns’ personal futures were tied to that of the ruling family by way of their government employment.681 Furthermore, the financial disadvantages of naturalizing foreigners due to the cost of citizen welfare benefits might have been less in some cases for biduns than for other “nationality” groups. This is because some biduns, including more than 10,000 in the military, already received such benefits as security service employees.682 The concern remained, however, that the loyalty of biduns might shift if a more lucrative offer, potentially from Iraq, were to emerge. This concern was linked to Kuwait’s belief that most biduns were of Iraqi origin, and would have been particularly pronounced after the Iran-Iraq ceasefire and the presumable end to Iraq’s special war-related partnership with Kuwait.683 The suspicion over the issue would prove well-grounded in some cases in the context of the Iraqi invasion, as discussed in Chapter 7.

The parliamentary movement While the leadership concerned itself with Shiite citizen opposition and long-term restructuring of the workforce, a new challenge was brewing among Kuwait’s former parliamentarians. Following the amir’s dissolution of the National Assembly in July 1986, more than twodozen former deputies had met regularly, often in former Assembly Speaker Ahmad al-Sadun’s home, to discuss the restoration of parliament and the reinstatement of suspended articles of the Constitution.684 In 1989, however, the former deputies shifted tactics from arranging non-confrontational elite conferences, to organizing popular appeals to the ruling family. Perceptions about the state of domestic affairs, especially in relation to the national economy, partly accounted

138 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

for the change in strategy. Frustration had grown among Kuwaitis over officials’ perceived ineptitude, corruption and unresponsiveness to public concerns.685 External events, such as the democracy movements in Eastern Europe and the Palestinian intifada, also encouraged the development of the movement.686 One factor responsible for the movement’s evolution and not given signiﬁcant attention in existing literature was the psychological impact of the Iran-Iraq ceasefire on Kuwaitis, including the perceived increase in regional stability, and consequentially, stability at home.687 While events in Eastern Europe and the Palestinian intifada inspired the leaders of the parliamentary movement and their supporters to press for popular participation in government policymaking, the ceasefire helped to create a less turbulent domestic climate in which the drive could be pursued, sustained, and hopefully proved successful.688 Importantly, one of the primary reasons that the amir provided for closing the assembly in 1986—that the domestic and regional strife relating to the war demanded a unified internal front which the confrontational assembly threatened—no longer seemed relevant after the ceasefire.689 In this regard, the post-ceasefire period appeared to be an appropriate time as any for restoring the National Assembly. The security challenge that the parliamentary movement posed to the al-Sabah leadership is not indicated by any bellicose public statements by the authorities with regard to the movement during the course of events in 1988–90. Obviously, the leadership could not publicly discuss the movement in similar terms as, for example, the phenomenon of Kuwaiti citizen-perpetrated terrorism. In this case, the issue of concern was popular participation in political decisionmaking on which both the leadership and the people of Kuwait historically prided themselves, not bombings which could be condemned more easily. Instead, the extent of the challenge was made evident by the exceptional internal security procedures implemented by the leadership, first to temper and then to eradicate the movement. These measures are discussed below in relation to the parliamentary movement’s own strategic maneuvering. One of the first manifestations of the movement’s new strategy was an effort in the autumn of 1988 by 32 former parliamentary deputies to collect Kuwaiti signatures for a petition to reinstitute the assembly.690 Thirteen leaders of Kuwaiti associations and other social and political groups in the country formally joined in this effort so that the resulting group of 45 parliamentary movement leaders represented a broad spectrum of the Kuwaiti community.691 In July 1989, the leaders

Old and New Antagonisms after the Ceaseﬁre 139

submitted to the amir’s executive office one in a series of such petitions, including 30,000 signatures of Kuwaiti citizens (from an electorate of approximately 60,000 at the time of the 1985 election).692 The amir refused the petition, and declined to meet the movement leaders at that time.693 During the petition drive, Kuwait’s information minister even questioned the legality of the petitions, maintaining that they “could be contrary to the law.”694 The ruling family’s public disregard for the concerns of the parliamentary movement leaders—many of whom represented the elite of Kuwait’s various political and social groupings whose support remained important to al-Sabah security—as well as many members of the broader Kuwaiti public who signed the petitions, proved surprising. This unresponsiveness remained uncharacteristic of the al-Sabahs, who generally strove to appease their citizen population if not by deed then by consultation and promises of consideration and deliberation. In fact, the petition affair in the summer of 1989 proved a harbinger of unusual responses to the parliamentary movement during the following months. Amir Jabir’s resistance to the idea of restoring parliament would be stated later as relating to concerns about continued non-cooperation between the legislative and executive branches, which would produce instability in the country.695 Shaykh Saad expanded on this view: the government wished to avoid reviving ethnic, sectarian and class divisions that the former assembly had fueled.696 At the same time, the ruling family likely perceived the push toward the restoration of parliament as an acute challenge. The al-Sabahs remained well aware of the toppling of Eastern European dictators at the time, as well as the popular revolution against the Iranian shah a decade earlier; even the local press intimated that the fate of other oppressive rulers might parallel that of Eastern European regimes.697 At the same time, the goals of the parliamentary movement remained far from revolutionary: they included returning to the traditional system outlined in the Constitution—not a parliament with enhanced powers, not more comprehensive democracy, nor other reforms.698 Finally, reported pressure from Saudi Arabia not to restore the assembly might have contributed to the amir’s stance on the issue.699 After the amir refused to accept another petition in November that included 25,000 Kuwaiti signatures, parliamentary movement leaders began organizing weekly diwaniyyas to which the Kuwaiti public was invited to express support for the assembly’s restoration.700 Mary Ann Tétreault comprehensively traces the series of “mass mobilization”

140 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

meetings held on Monday nights in December 1989 and January 1990.701 Seven such meetings took place, on 4 December, 11 December, 18 December, 1 January, 8 January, 15 January and 22 January, and some meetings included several thousand citizen participants.702 Although three of the first four meetings proceeded without interruption by the authorities, Kuwaiti police attempted to disperse the second and all three of the last meetings in an unusually harsh manner. For example, the Interior Ministry sent riot police and police dogs to break up the 11 December meeting. For the 8 January and 15 January meetings, police sealed the respective diwaniyya hosts in their homes and surrounded their residences with troops (on 8 January) and barbed wire (on 15 January). At the final meeting on 22 January, regular police, riot police and the National Guard used chemical foam, stun grenades and tear gas to disperse the crowd.703 Several arrests were made of meeting hosts, participants and observers in conjunction with the gatherings on 8 January and 22 January. A turning point with regard to the consistent use of police force to disperse the weekly gatherings and in some cases to arrest participants apparently was the new governmental ban on certain types of diwaniyyas issued ten days after the third meeting. On 28 December, the Interior Ministry outlawed the convening of diwaniyyas to discuss “concrete national issues,” arguing that they contradicted the “positive traditional concept” of the diwaniyya.704 The government maintained that the ban was an extension of the 1979 public assembly law that prohibited public gatherings of more than 20 individuals without ofﬁcial permission (see Chapter 2).705 Possibly, the authorities believed that movement leaders’ temporary suspension of regular Monday night meetings for the Christmas holiday provided a suitable opportunity to issue the ban. Police stayed away from the meeting held two days after the ban was issued in what appeared to be a sort of grace period. The ban did not resonate well with the Kuwaiti public; in fact, Kuwaitis perceived the new rule as preposterous. Diwaniyyas not only represented a centuries-old mainstay of Kuwaiti social and political life, but also had been encouraged by the authorities as a forum for political consultation in the absence of an elected assembly.706 Additionally, the physical force used by the police to break up the diwaniyyas which took place primarily at the private homes of individuals who were wellrespected members of Kuwaiti society, was regarded as offensive. Citizens sent telegrams to Amir Jabir protesting the police action, and demonstrated against the arrest of a diwaniyya host.707 In the end,

Old and New Antagonisms after the Ceaseﬁre 141

according to Tétreault, the violence, desecration of a mosque used for shelter during a confrontation with the police, and detention of a movement leader, participants and bystanders, ultimately led the movement leaders to suspend the Monday night meetings.708 In the ﬁnal analysis, three unusual actions on the part of the authorities in 1989 and early 1990 attested to the significant challenge that the parliamentary movement represented to the al-Sabah leadership: the amir’s public disregard for the petitions; the legal restrictions imposed on diwaniyyas; and the police tactics employed to halt the weekly gatherings at the homes of prominent citizens. However, efforts to discourage the movement did not prove effective, and instead aggravated the situation by provoking additional popular frustration.709 As a result, the authorities changed tactics. Following the altercation between police and protesters at the 8 January gathering in Jahra, a less resistant attitude toward the restoration of parliamentary life emerged on the part of the leadership.710 The shift in strategy marked the return to a traditional mode of addressing citizen discontent in Kuwait: promising to consider and deliberate the issue of concern through respectful consultation. This is discussed in the following section.

The National Council plan Jill Crystal tracks the evolution of the leadership’s position on popular participation in political decisionmaking in January 1990, including statements by the information minister on 9 January, Shaykh Saad on 11 January and 16 January, and ﬁnally, Amir Jabir in a televised speech on 20 January. The comments of each leader reflected a new willingness to engage the public on ways to promote popular participation while avoiding the troubles associated with the 1985 assembly. The common position among the leaders was that popular participation was permissible in a framework other than the previous one. The information minister stated that the government was open to suggestions from the public about new approaches to popular participation. Shaykh Saad maintained that the government remained committed in principle to popular participation, but that the appropriate formula for it had yet to be determined. Finally, Amir Jabir expressed his support for popular participation and, in principle, for parliamentary life. He then delegated to Shaykh Saad the responsibility of opening negotiations with parliamentary movement leaders and the public at large.711

142 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

Shaykh Saad began meeting with former assembly deputies and other citizen group leaders in late January 1990. Initially, he stated that he planned to meet all members of the 1962 Constituent Assembly, and all of the former speakers and deputies of National Assemblies since then.712 By mid-April, he announced that his national dialogue had included or very soon would include representatives from nonprofit societies, cooperative societies, labor unions and syndicates, private businessmen, the Commerce Chamber, shareholding companies, the Olympic committee and sports federations and clubs.713 According to Ahmad al-Khatib, 90 percent of those who participated in the dialogue communicated to Shaykh Saad that they wished to restore the system outlined in the 1962 Constitution.714 Meeting representatives of the various citizen groups helped the leadership gauge the extent of reform sentiments across Kuwait’s sociopolitical spectrum, as well as display a traditional form of respect via consultation to various segments of society. Furthermore, during the meetings Shaykh Saad could promote his own opinion on the subject: that the assembly should be restored, but with additional controls to prevent the deterioration of executive-legislative relations. Finally, the consultations bought time.715 During this period, parliamentary movement leaders and government officials circulated at diwaniyyas to express their views, without the police confrontations and volatile atmosphere of the earlier gatherings.716 On 22 April, Amir Jabir announced the practical outcome of Shaykh Saad’s national dialogue. He decreed the establishment of a transitional National Council (Majlis al-Watani) to consist of 50 citizen-elected members and 25 government-appointed members. The council’s two primary tasks would include studying in closed sessions the reasons for the deterioration in relations between the government and assembly in 1986, and discussing legislation proposed by the government. The council’s mandate would be for four years, just like that of the National Assembly.717 This type of political body had been proposed by the al-Sabahs in 1939, when then-ruler Shaykh Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah sought to replace the short-lived National Legislative Council with an appointed, consultative body, and as recently as 1980, but had never been implemented (see Chapters 1 and 2). The proposed four-year term of the National Council threw into question the temporary nature of the body. In a recorded statement introducing the decree, Amir Jabir pointed to (unidentified) special regional circumstances and “waves of change” in the Middle East that required solidarity in the country at the time.718

Old and New Antagonisms after the Ceaseﬁre 143

The comments were reminiscent of the amir’s explanation for dissolving the assembly in 1986. At this point, it seemed difﬁcult to imagine a time when regional circumstances would not require “national solidarity” because of Kuwait’s particular vulnerability to external events. The majority of the former deputies heading the parliamentary movement, as well as the nationalist and Islamist association leaderships and other sections of Kuwaiti society, objected to the proposed council.719 A public demonstration against the plan was held after Id al-Fitr prayers several days after it was announced, when mosque-goers marched toward the home of Ahmad al-Sadun.720 The police attempted to disband the gathering, as well as a protest near the home of Salih alFadalah, the former assembly deputy speaker.721 In early May, 26 former deputies called for a boycott of the National Council elections, and set out to discourage the public from running for seats and voting in the elections scheduled for 10 June.722 The boycott announcement and related activity triggered a campaign of arrests of parliamentary movement leaders. Police made the first arrests on 8 May while dispersing a crowd trying to stage a demonstration at the diwaniyya of Abd al-Muhsin al-Farhan. There, police detained nationalist leader, Ahmad al-Khatib, for addressing the gathering, and six others for resisting security ofﬁcers.723 The former assembly deputy, Ahmad al-Baqir, and a colleague also were detained for distributing leaflets denouncing the proposed council.724 One week later, police arrested the former assembly deputy, Ahmad al-Rabai, for addressing a diwaniyya, and also detained the diwaniyya host.725 One dozen former deputies were detained in all during this period, including other prominent former deputies like Jasim al-Qatami, Abdallah Nibari and Abdallah al-Naﬁsi.726 The arrests and the use of forced entry into the homes of Kuwait’s most prominent citizens represented high-handed methods usually reserved for criminals and terrorists in Kuwait.727 The police actions represented another in a series of exceptional government procedures to contain the movement. The arrests proved extremely unpopular, and served to rally support for the movement. On 20 May, the president of the Kuwaiti Commerce Chamber, Abd al-Aziz al-Saqr, presented Amir Jabir with a written declaration signed by 200 merchants, professionals and former deputies opposing the idea of the National Council.728 Movement leaders called for the removal from office of the newly appointed interior minister, Shaykh Salim al-Sabah (previously the defense minister), and other officials for harassing former deputies.729

144 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

Shafeeq Ghabra distinguishes the political crisis surrounding the parliamentary movement from earlier problems in Kuwait, maintaining that the 1989–90 experience “reshap[ed] established political foundations” within the state.730 For one, the country’s business elite, which traditionally represented one of the leadership’s support bases, was sympathetic to the movement and embraced its position on the National Council plan. Furthermore, the leadership’s reliance on Kuwaiti bedouin for support for the council alienated other citizen groups, including opposition groups, the intelligentsia and merchants.731 In the end, the parliamentary movement, and the public and leadership responses it elicited, undermined the al-Sabahs’ political position across citizen sectors. According to the Interior Ministry 62 percent of registered Kuwaitis voted in the National Council elections held on 10 June 1990.732 Because the opposition generally boycotted the event, government supporters won virtually all of the 50 citizen-elected seats. Although the election participation rate proved lower than the average 80 percent or so in previous National Assembly elections, the election could be viewed as a successful referendum in support of the al-Sabahs’ plan. The success could be attributed partly to heavy campaigning by officials in diwaniyyas, the press and government offices in favor of the council.733 Reportedly government employees had been warned of reprisals if they did not vote in the elections.734 Furthermore, the parliamentary movement had formally announced the election boycott immediately prior to the closing date for filing to run for a council seat—perhaps too late to insure widespread compliance, as by then several hundred candidates already had registered to enter the race.735 Most of all, however, the success could be attributed to general public support for the installation of some form of parliamentary body. The al-Sabah leadership appeared to have headed off the immediate challenge from the parliamentary movement with the elections on 10 June, the installation of a new Council of Ministers on 20 June, and the convening of the first session of the National Council on 9 July. During this period, the heavy-handed approach with regard to dissenters continued, and included clamping down on the press as the council was preparing to convene; banning the nationalist monthly, al-Yasar, in circulation since 1986, for criticizing government arrests and election measures; and arresting parliamentary movement leader, Muhammad Qadiri, for sending a statement critical of the election results to a foreign news organization.736 Although the Iraqi invasion on 2 August cut short its work, during the three weeks of its existence

Old and New Antagonisms after the Ceaseﬁre 145

the National Council functioned primarily as a body distributing tangible beneﬁts to constituents.737 Security concerns about the parliamentary movement overwhelmed the leadership. Not only did the Interior Ministry devote much of its attention and resources to addressing the movement, but Kuwait’s highest officials were involved intimately in the issue on an extraordinarily frequent basis.738 The unusual attention devoted to the parliamentary movement by the top echelons of the Kuwaiti leadership suggested that little attention was being given by these same officials to the developing Iraqi threat, which is discussed in the next chapter.

Summary The post-Iran-Iraq war period saw a significant decrease in violent attacks against Kuwaiti targets by Shiite extremists. However, suspected sabotage planning and opposition activity on the part of some Kuwaiti Shia, including that surrounding the Saudi beheading of Kuwaiti Shia accused of involvement in the 1989 hajj bombings in Mecca, continued to fuel concern by the authorities about Kuwait’s Shiite citizen community. This resulted in restrictions, arrests and state security trials for suspect individuals. With Kuwaiti Shia representing the primary threat during this period, the leadership carried out fewer deportations of expatriates and concentrated on long-term policies that would alter Kuwait’s demographic character in favor of citizens over foreign residents. The Iran-Iraq ceasefire and the increase perceived by the Kuwaiti public in regional and domestic stability that accompanied it, as well as other internal and external factors, contributed to the evolution of a popular campaign to reinstitute Kuwaiti parliamentary life. The signiﬁcant challenge that the movement represented for the leadership was indicated by the unusually heavy-handed approach to control it, including banning certain types of diwaniyyas; using force to suppress non-violent citizen demonstrations at the homes of private individuals; and arresting prominent parliamentary movement leaders and well-respected members of Kuwaiti society for hosting and speaking at pro-parliament gatherings. The parliamentary movement continued to dominate al-Sabah security concerns until the Iraqi invasion on 2 August 1990, apparently preoccupying the leadership to the detriment of its foreign policy vis-à-vis the Iraqi military threat. The invasion did not spell the death of

146 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

the movement, however; it emerged as a powerful challenge to the al-Sabah leadership particularly during the immediate post-liberation period, along with other domestic groups, as discussed in the following chapter.

7 Loyalty, Opposition and the Iraqi Invasion, August 1990–August 1991

The Iraqi invasion and subsequent occupation of Kuwait between 2 August 1990 and 26 February 1991 posed the most serious challenge to al-Sabah governance since the ruling family assumed leadership in Kuwait in the mid-eighteenth century. The seven-month occupation marked the only period in Kuwaiti history in which the leadership operated in exile for political and personal safety. Although technically the threat was an “external” one (from Iraq), the occupation obviously held broad implications for security issues internal to the Kuwaiti polity. In fact, in some ways the Iraqi occupation served as an ultimate test of internal security in the case of extreme external insecurity for the al-Sabah leadership. In contrast to earlier periods discussed in the study, a wealth of literature exists on Kuwaiti politics during the occupation and immediate post-liberation period. This is due to a signiﬁcant degree to the international attention that Iraq’s war on Kuwait, and the international Coalition’s liberation of the country, attracted. “Western” studies focus heavily on democracy issues and Kuwaiti actions against known and suspected collaborators with Iraq.739 Both subjects reﬂect Western interests and those of international and non-governmental human rights-oriented organizations. The Kuwaiti government also has published and sponsored a vast amount of material relating to the occupation via the Information Ministry and the Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait. Generally, these studies comprehensively document the political, social, economic and environmental atrocities committed by Iraq, their impact on Kuwait, and the extent of Kuwait’s recovery from them. At the same time, the spectrum of political security challenges to the al-Sabahs that emerged within Kuwaiti society during this period has 147

148 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

been given limited attention. Perhaps this also reﬂects the interests of Western and Kuwaiti parties—particularly at the government level—at that time. Following the liberation of Kuwait, some Coalition partners viewed the authoritarian-style rule that arose in post-war Kuwait as somewhat of an embarrassment. Obviously, the Kuwaiti leadership as well was not interested in showering attention on opposition to it. This chapter seeks to ﬁll the gap. In fact, security challenges for the alSabah leadership arose from four domestic constituencies, particularly after liberation: military and security personnel; civilian “resisters” to the occupation and other “insiders;” parliamentary movement leaders and their supporters; and expatriate residents. This chapter discusses the loyalty of these four groups to the ruling family and to the principle of Kuwaiti independence during the occupation period, and examines the opposition that unfolded and al-Sabah leadership responses during the occupation and immediate post-liberation period.

Military and security personnel Prior to Iraq’s invasion, Kuwaiti military and security forces generally represented a loyal bastion of support for the ruling family. This could be explained largely by their makeup. Typically, the most “trustworthy” Kuwaiti citizens ﬁlled the top management positions; skilled expatriates including Palestinians and Pakistanis provided technical and other professional expertise; and biduns dominated the most populous lower ranks. On the eve of the invasion, biduns made up approximately threefourths of Kuwait’s total army force.740 Although the tribal and martial roots of many biduns made the military and security services a natural occupation for them, such employment proved particularly attractive because it offered one of the only means of political, social and economic stability available to biduns in Kuwait. As military and security personnel, biduns received some of the welfare beneﬁts of citizenship, while other employment prospects for them in Kuwait remained bleak.741 In fact, the social contract binding the al-Sabahs and bidun security employees represented another form of that between the alSabahs and Kuwaiti citizens: certain welfare guarantees in exchange for political support. During the occupation, doubts about the loyalty of bidun personnel to the ruling family generated concern. While many biduns participated in resistance activities, and many were killed and thousands taken prisoner by the Iraqi army, some joined the Iraqi Popular Army supporting Iraqi undertakings in occupied Kuwait.742 A Human Rights

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Watch report explores in depth the reasons for biduns joining the Iraq army, including fear of imprisonment or death for failing to do so, need for employment, and “revenge” against Kuwait’s political position toward biduns.743 Although the phenomenon of military and security personnel joining the Iraqi army understandably would have been disturbing, the activities of disloyal bidun employees probably failed to pose a more substantive threat to al-Sabah leadership of Kuwait on the ground during the occupation than it already faced from Iraqi forces. The dynamics of Iraq’s occupation would not have proved signiﬁcantly different without the support of some bidun personnel. At most bidun collaborators provided logistical support and manpower to the Iraqi army, which in turn might have been somewhat more efﬁcient in carrying out the occupation. Alternatively, more bidun personnel ﬁghting the Iraqi army would have made little difference in Kuwaiti military efforts against the Iraqi army. The threat associated with biduns in post-war Kuwait represented a different issue, and the al-Sabah leadership met the challenge by restructuring its military and security services. During the occupation, the government-in-exile formally dismissed all bidun military and security personnel, and in the immediate post-war years, rehired less than one-third of them.744 Following liberation, the authorities also left thousands of biduns—both military personnel and civilians—languishing in the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border area, including those who had been taken prisoner during the occupation by Baghdad and those who had sought refuge from the war with family members in Iraq.745 Biduns’ low status in Kuwait helped seal their fate as population elements that could be dismissed and disregarded. The major problem for the leadership resulting from their dismissal was that the security services lacked personnel during a critical period.746 To compensate, the government recruited Kuwaitis of bedouin origin in large numbers, temporarily assigning them to unofﬁcial checkpoints throughout the city.747 Paradoxically, military and security personnel who were Kuwaiti citizens and who remained in Kuwait during the occupation posed the most acute threat from the security sector following liberation. Highranking Kuwaiti ofﬁcers and conscripts represented less than one-fourth of Kuwait’s army force on the eve of the invasion.748 The invasion had led many senior ofﬁcers to ﬂee Kuwait with the ruling family, and Iraq’s targeting of Kuwaiti military personnel for detention during the occupation likely prompted additional ofﬁcers to leave the country.749 Many of those who remained in Kuwait led and participated in military

150 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

resistance activities against the Iraqi occupiers. Senior military, police and state security ofﬁcials organized armed resistance, and many resistance cells were made up of military or police ofﬁcers and their friends.750 On the ﬁrst day of the invasion, military and police personnel distributed weapons to those wanting to ﬁght the Iraqis.751 After some Iraqi troops left Kuwait City for the Saudi border area, Kuwaiti army, air force and police personnel raided their own armories and hid the weapons throughout the city for later use.752 Reports about Kuwaiti citizen personnel supporting the Iraqi forces did not surface. Nonetheless, a deep sense of resentment existed among some Kuwaiti ofﬁcers over the conduct of Kuwaiti political and military leaders with regard to the invasion. In the days before 2 August, then-Defense Minister Shaykh Nawwaf had ordered Kuwaiti tanks to pull back from the border and not to ﬁre on advancing Iraqis so as not to “provoke” them.753 During the initial hours of the invasion itself, top Kuwaiti leaders had failed to instruct the military how to contend with the new circumstances; as Iraqi troops advanced down Jahra Road toward Kuwait City, no orders were issued by Shaykh Nawwaf or then-Interior Minister Shaykh Salim to oppose the Iraqi troops.754 Finally, all but a few members of the top political leadership ﬂed the country almost immediately upon learning of the invasion, leaving those behind to fend for themselves.755 The government-in-exile’s compromising of clandestine military resistance activities during the occupation compounded resentment over the leadership’s behavior in August 1990.756 The invasion also highlighted the general lack of communication at the time between the political and military leadership on the one hand, and ofﬁcers on the other hand who were shocked by the Iraqi advance because the military threat from Iraq had not been communicated to them.757 After liberation, ofﬁcer resentment grew as a result of policies that sought to abort potential challenges from Kuwaiti security personnel who had remained in Kuwait during the occupation. This included not recognizing or rewarding ofﬁcers who had participated in resistance activities; preventing about 600 discontent army ofﬁcers from rejoining the armed services; shunning those who had been imprisoned by the Iraqis; and shrinking the military to one-fourth of its pre-invasion size primarily by dismissing thousands of biduns.758 Some ofﬁcers funneled their discontent into political action. After the war, a “shadowy” and “clandestine” political grouping of Kuwaiti ofﬁcers formed.759 The name of the group, the 2 August Movement, stressed the Iraqi invasion as an important turning point for them.760

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The group was led loosely by General Muhammad Badr, the most senior Kuwaiti military ofﬁcer to have remained in Kuwait during the occupation, and an important resistance leader.761 The majority of the group’s members were Shia.762 The military personnels’ politicization, and their deﬁant posture (discussed below) marked an extraordinary departure from historical precedent. The group’s majority Shiite composition despite Shia’s minority representation in the Kuwaiti military likely related to several factors.763 First, Shiite military personnel (as well as Shiite civilians) likely spent their 1990 summer vacations in Kuwait rather than abroad at higher rates than their Sunni counterparts—and thus were in Kuwait at the time of the invasion—and ﬂed the country after the August invasion at lower rates, because of their generally less afﬂuent economic circumstances. As a result, Shia were over-represented among military personnel who remained inside the country during the occupation as compared to their usual representation in the Kuwaiti military. Second, Shiite ofﬁcers gained popular stature in Kuwait as a result of their participation in resistance activities, and likely acquired more conﬁdence to press openly for political reforms in post-war Kuwait. Third, Shia would have been more likely than Sunnis to resist a return to the old Kuwaiti system that discriminated against them in the military and in society at large, particularly during the past decade.764 Within weeks of liberation, the 2 August Movement joined the halfdozen more open political groupings in Kuwait pressing for reform. Unlike the other groups, however, the 2 August Movement threatened rebellion if their demands were not met. In late March, the group warned that ofﬁcers might not surrender their weapons if the alSabahs did not implement promised democratic reforms.765 General Muhammad Badr indicated to Amir Jabir that without the reforms, the resistance ofﬁcers might be “difﬁcult to control.”766 In May, the dissident ofﬁcers formally petitioned the amir to dismiss Shaykhs Nawwaf and Salim, who they believed were most responsible for allowing the Iraqi invasion to succeed, and demanded a formal investigation into the ministers’ conduct. Another petition concerned more than 1,200 ofﬁcers threatening to resign if Amir Jabir failed to discharge 100 senior military ﬁgures, including 20 generals, most of whom were members of the ruling family, for abandoning the military during the invasion and occupation.767 Acts of civil disobedience accompanied the group’s statements and petitions. Hundreds of ofﬁcers did indeed resign, or refused to appear for assignments, and many grew beards and declined to wear uniforms as a sign of deﬁance.768

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The ofﬁcers’ complaints about the conduct of Kuwait’s leaders were not limited to circumstances surrounding the Iraqi invasion. Some ofﬁcers who had witnessed the participation of resident Palestinians in resistance activities were particularly outraged by senior Kuwaiti commanders’ toleration of beatings, torture and executions of Palestinians and other suspected expatriate collaborators following the war.769 Calls for the commanders’ resignations also related to this issue.770 The group’s demands, along with international pressure, appeared to inﬂuence the authorities. In early June, the Interior Ministry called for the resignation of approximately 80 senior police ofﬁcials.771 An ofﬁcial at the Justice Ministry’s Chief Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce stated that his department was investigating several cases of abuse and brutality committed by the police, and that several ofﬁcers had been arrested and were awaiting formal charges.772 Furthermore, 14 senior military commanders, ranging from colonels to major generals, were being forced to retire.773 The dissident ofﬁcers group represented an unusual challenge for the al-Sabah leadership. For one, the challenge emerged from a sector of Kuwaiti society that previously had displayed little interest in confronting the authorities on political issues. The formation of the ofﬁcers group suggested that opposition could arise unexpectedly in other social sectors as well. Secondly, the group’s formation underscored the potentially threatening power shifts taking place in Kuwait as a result of the occupation, toward formerly non-existent social groups (e.g. resisters and insiders) as well as lower status groups (e.g. Shia). Thirdly, the Kuwaiti group threatened to operate outside the traditional framework of non-violent political opposition, and to turn its guns against the establishment. At the same time, the movement engaged the leadership directly when making demands for reform. It did not work actively to overthrow the government; it did not seek to ultimately replace the ruling family; and it did not use violence against the authorities even though it threatened to do so. In the ﬁnal analysis, the dissident ofﬁcers group represented a reform group and not a revolutionary group. This was particularly signiﬁcant in light of the absence of security control immediately after the war, and the wide availability of weapons, which provided a suitable environment for all-out rebellion. The phenomenon of ofﬁcer dissidence proved short-lived. By the autumn of 1991, several new circumstances had diluted the strength of the 2 August Movement. For one, the central demand for the resignation of senior commanders had been met to some degree. Other inﬂuential events included the return from Iraq of Kuwaiti prisoners of war,

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many of whom were security personnel; a reduction in the torture and beatings of expatriates permitted by senior commanders; the return to the country of “outsider” ofﬁcers less interested in challenging the leadership; the government distribution of ﬁnancial and other beneﬁts to all Kuwaiti citizens, including ofﬁcers; and al-Sabah guarantees to restore the democratic-style parliament. The meeting of some of the ofﬁcers’ demands and other appeasement measures reinvigorated the traditional social contract between Kuwaiti citizens, including the dissident ofﬁcers, and the al-Sabahs.

Civilian resisters and other Kuwaiti “insiders” Like Kuwaiti military and security personnel who remained in the country during the occupation, Kuwaiti civilian insiders participated in military and civil resistance against the Iraqi occupiers in support of the Kuwaiti leadership.774 They held demonstrations, plastered posters of the amir and crown prince throughout the city, and distributed protest leaﬂets.775 Most refused to appear for government jobs, except essential public services, in order to frustrate Iraqi efforts to establish a local administration.776 They gathered intelligence, and sent it abroad. They used the media to promote their cause, including “This is Kuwait” radio and underground publications such as Popular Steadfastness (Samud alShaab) and Kuwaiti Women (Kuwaytayn).777 Like the security personnel, in the absence of government leadership they became somewhat selfsufﬁcient. They organized the collection and burning of garbage, the distribution of food and money, and medical care.778 From the leadership’s point of view, a complicating element surrounding this united stance was the resultant formation of a new national social grouping: Kuwaiti insiders.779 To a certain degree, the experience of occupation echoed that for Palestinians after 1967; insiders bore the brunt of occupation, which in turn bred resentment toward their external leadership.780 The experience demonstrated that Kuwaitis, like Palestinians, could manage many local affairs quite capably without the government. One of the most interesting aspects of the new grouping was the alliance between members of discrete— and often antagonistic—Kuwaiti social groups.781 One foreign observer captured the new reality by describing the occupation as a “powerful equalizing and socially liberating force.”782 Resistance activities helped elevate the status of Shia in relation to Sunnis, women in relation to men, and Kuwaitis who originated from Iran and southern Iraq in relation to those from central Arabia.

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Resentment over the Kuwaiti leadership’s conduct at the time of the invasion, as well as frustration over incompetent government restoration efforts, proved prevalent among Kuwaiti civilian insiders during the immediate post-liberation period as with security personnel. During the ﬁrst weeks after liberation, guns, ammunition and other weaponry were widely owned by and easily available to Kuwaiti civilians. The prospect of armed civilian rebellion against the leadership would not have been inconceivable. The essential explanation for why frustrated civilian insiders did not mobilize into a militarily threatening force following liberation rests in the ultimate support Kuwaiti citizens shared for the ruling family, despite their disappointment over certain issues. Though their cooperation during the occupation was signiﬁcant, insiders did not mobilize into an autonomous political unit in the immediate post-war period to press the leadership for reforms. One traditional explanation is that the diverse background of civilian insiders precluded united action against the authorities. Another is that the returning leadership refused to allow the civilian resistance to aid in restoration efforts such as the distribution of food and other necessities, for fear of competition, and thus robbed insiders of their role as the national caretakers. In the ﬁnal analysis, these arguments feed into a more fundamental explanation: the liberation of Kuwait and the return of the al-Sabah leadership emasculated this potential opposition group because the group was essentially a product of the occupation. Civilian insiders shared no established organization outside the experience of occupation. In contrast, the two other chief Kuwaiti opposition groupings—the dissident ofﬁcers group and the parliamentary movement discussed below—could express their frustration and demands from within the pre-existing structures of the military and security services, and the political space traditionally conceded to parliamentarians, respectively. Instead of mobilizing as an independent political force, civilian insiders played roles in national post-war politics by supporting various political groupings that made up the parliamentary movement. Insiders typically proved more critical than outsiders of the conduct of the ruling family, and more insistent that civil-political privileges be restored.783 Their voices were heard particularly loudly in the Islamist groupings, which had gained popular support as a result of their widely acclaimed activities during the occupation. In the end, Kuwaiti insiders’ broad support for Islamists contributed to much of the latter’s success in the 1992 National Assembly elections.784

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The parliamentary movement revisited Apparently, the al-Sabahs believed that the perception of parliamentary opposition support for the ruling family during the Iraqi occupation remained crucial for garnering international assistance to liberate Kuwait. The “national unity” conference convened by the al-Sabahs in mid-October 1990 in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia achieved this goal.785 The convention, which included approximately 1,200 Kuwaiti elite such as ruling family members, Council of Ministers members, former assembly deputies, businessmen, religious leaders and other prominent citizens, demonstrated to the world Kuwait’s united front and the support of Kuwait’s citizenry for the al-Sabah leadership. At the conference, the parliamentary opposition formally pledged its support to the ruling family, and in turn the ruling family promised to restore parliamentary life and the suspended articles of the Constitution after liberation.786 The exiled leadership also agreed to establish a 35-member consultative committee, to include 30 private citizens and opposition elements, and to be chaired by Shaykh Saad. In spite of the confrontational relationship between the leadership and parliamentary movement leaders on the eve of the invasion, and although the latter extensively criticized policies that had led to the occupation, providing support to the ruling family at the Jeddah conference was not an ideological stretch for the opposition. Throughout the parliamentary campaign of 1989–90, movement leaders had advocated the restoration of the traditional constitutional system with the al-Sabahs at the helm. Moreover, the parliamentary opposition already had afﬁrmed in Taif and London their endorsement of al-Sabah leadership two weeks after the invasion. Their goal of restoration, not revolution, remained.787 As it became apparent during the months following the Jeddah conference that the leadership did not intend to abide by the letter or spirit of the agreements in the near-term, the parliamentary opposition grew increasingly critical of the ruling family’s monopolization of political decisionmaking in exile. Uncharacteristically derogatory comments were made about the decisions and competency of speciﬁc individuals.788 Opposition leaders demanded the resignation of the Council of Ministers and the establishment of a new government that would include secular nationalists and Islamists.789 Nonetheless, even though the authorities failed to abide by the promises made at the Jeddah conference immediately after the war, obtaining the Jeddah “guarantees” represented an important achievement of the parliamentary opposition

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during the occupation period. The guarantees served as a basis for the legitimacy of the opposition’s demands for reform after liberation in both national and international arenas. Two decisions by the al-Sabah leadership as the war drew to an end indicated to the opposition that the ruling family intended to consolidate power rather than share it in post-war Kuwait. One was to institute martial law, with Shaykh Saad as governor.790 This would mark the ﬁrst time in Kuwaiti history that martial law would govern the country. More importantly, Kuwait’s Constitution stipulated that martial law could be implemented only with the approval of parliament. The second decision was to establish a Supreme Security Committee, to be chaired by Shaykh Saad and to include the foreign, defense and interior ministers—all al-Sabahs. The committee would be charged with formulating internal security policy. After liberation, reportedly a faction within the ruling family blocked the government from opening a dialogue with parliamentary leaders. Moreover, accusations surfaced that some ruling family members (six members, according to one critic) had hired private “death squads” to assassinate a number of opponents to the al-Sabahs.791 The rumored militias consisted of devoted military and security personnel. Parliamentary leaders did not trust the security services to guard one survivor of an apparent attack of this sort—the lawyer and parliamentary leader, Hamad al-Juwan—and instead placed resistance members outside his hospital room following the assassination attempt.792 Al-Juwan conﬁrmed that his assailant was Kuwaiti.793 In this thorny atmosphere, parliamentary movement leaders emerged as critical appraisers of the ruling family’s restoration of leadership in the country. The attempted assassination of al-Juwan helped prompt the ﬁrst public declaration by movement leaders in post-war Kuwait in this regard. On 11 March, a small group of movement leaders held a press conference calling for the National Assembly’s restoration and freedom of the press, expression and assembly, among other reforms.794 Public allegations at the conference about the ruling family’s rumored death squads again marked unusual condemnation of the al-Sabahs.795 This and the public’s growing discontent with the authorities’ failure to restore basic services after the war triggered a conciliatory government move.796 On 20 March, the Council of Ministers in place at the time of the Iraqi invasion resigned.797 However, Shaykh Saad’s automatic appointment to head a new government infuriated the opposition.798 To protest the decision, several prominent technocrats refused Shaykh Saad’s invitation to join the new council.799 In fact, Shaykh

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Saad’s appointment invigorated the parliamentary movement, and its ranks grew. On 3 April, in a show of unprecedented co-operation between diverse political groupings, nearly 100 movement leaders and prominent sympathizers representing a half-dozen political factions petitioned Amir Jabir in a nine-page document to institute reforms.800 Demands included the setting of a parliamentary election date, an independent judiciary, anti-corruption measures, legalization of political parties, the restoration of press and expression liberties, and a “unity” government not dominated by the al-Sabahs. Four days later, Amir Jabir announced in his ﬁrst speech in liberated Kuwait that National Assembly elections would be held in 1992.801 Parliamentary movement leaders cautiously welcomed the announcement.802 The composition of the new Council of Ministers, decreed on 20 April following four weeks of consultation, seemed to erase any good will the leadership had gained as a result of its announcement about elections. Parliamentary movement leaders named it a “blatant challenge that cannot be accepted.”803 A reduction in the number of ruling family members in the new council, from seven to ﬁve, was a minor concession to the movement. Two of the three most powerful shaykhs on the eve of the invasion (excluding the amir and crown prince) remained on the council: the former defense and interior ministers criticized heavily for their conduct in relation to the invasion. Furthermore, while 11 of the 20 council members were new to the body, not one was an opposition or resistance leader. The change in portfolios of the two principal shaykhs who remained in the council, and the exclusion of the third from the new council altogether, apparently related to disputes within the ruling family over blame for the invasion, rather than to opposition demands.804 A shift in power took place from the al-Jabir branch, to which the amir belonged, to the al-Salim branch, to which the crown prince belonged. Of the top shaykhs from the amir’s line, Shaykh Nawwaf was demoted from defense minister to social affairs and labor minister, and Shaykh Sabah was excluded altogether; from the crown prince’s line, Shaykh Salim was promoted from interior minister to deputy prime minister and foreign minister (see Table 7.1). The promotion of Shaykh Salim, who had cracked down harshly on the 1989–90 parliamentary movement as interior minister, could only be greeted with outrage by parliamentary leaders. Statements by the new interior minister, Shaykh Ahmad al-Sabah, over his objection to diwaniyyas going “beyond the framework of security and the authority of internal security,” suggested his approach would not be different.805

158 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution Table 7.1

Post-war Portfolio Changes of the Top Shaykhs

The al-Jabir Branch (Amir Jabir’s line)

The al-Salim Branch (Crown Prince Saad’s line)

Former Minister of Defense Shaykh Nawwaf demoted to Minister of Social Affairs and Labor

Former Minister of Interior Shaykh Salim promoted to Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs

Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Shaykh Sabah excluded altogether

The movement decided to capitalize on the interest of the foreign press and Coalition partners in Kuwaiti democracy issues, as the alSabahs had during the occupation to bolster international perceptions of their political legitimacy. Leaders of the political groupings planned a foreign press conference to denounce the makeup of the new Council of Ministers which was to be held only hours before US Secretary of State James Baker met with Amir Jabir in Kuwait. However, government efforts to cancel the conference captured as much media attention as the brief statements issued by parliamentary movement leaders at the meeting, thus doubly serving the movement. In addition to conﬁscating posted announcements of the meeting and trying to lock movement leaders out of the hotel ballroom in which the conference was to take place, the Information Ministry ordered the hotel to turn off the ballroom’s lights when the leaders proceeded with the conference.806 Reportedly, the order was issued by Shaykh Saad’s daughter, an Information Ministry ofﬁcial.807 The foreign press captured the event with headlines such as “Darkness falls on critics of the emir” in The Daily Telegraph and “Reporters left in the dark at Kuwaiti hotel” in The Guardian.808 Opposition leaders made a short statement to the effect that the Council of Ministers had been appointed without serious consultation with those outside the ruling family, and that the postliberation government largely consisted of the same individuals as the one that had led Kuwait to invasion and occupation.809 The fact that the authorities did not take disciplinary measures against the parliamentary movement leaders as a result of the conference appeared in part to attest to the importance and inﬂuence of international attention on Kuwait at the time. Certainly it contrasted with pre-invasion measures such as the arrest of Muhammad Qadim in July 1990 for his contacts with a foreign news organization criticizing

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the National Council elections. Since liberation movement leaders also had resumed public meetings in diwaniyyas, yet the authorities did not try to disperse the meetings or arrest diwaniyya hosts and participants as they had in 1989–90. The following month, the movement again exploited foreign interest by issuing a communiqué in tandem with a European Parliament threat on 16 May to delay aid to Kuwait if human rights violations there continued. The parliamentary movement’s statement, issued only hours after the European announcement, accused the authorities of widespread torture, executions, arbitrary arrests and kidnappings of Kuwaitis and foreigners; demanded the restoration of the National Assembly as a guarantee that human rights would be respected; and requested that those awaiting trial on charges of collaboration with Iraq be allowed access to their families, lawyers and representatives of international organizations.810 The opposition communiqué not only showed the movement taking advantage of international interest in Kuwait in order to boost its position vis-à-vis the Kuwaiti leadership, but also its taking on of a host of domestic reform issues in addition to the parliamentary movement’s pre-invasion platform. In this way the parliamentary movement emerged as the chief representative of citizen grievances against the leadership in the immediate post-liberation period. The movement absorbed insider causes such as the cessation of abuses against suspected collaborators and the prisoners of war still held in Iraq. By the end of May, parliamentary movement leaders were granted their ﬁrst joint audience with Amir Jabir, and protested the slow pace of political reform, martial law and human rights violations.811 The meeting took place one day after Shaykh Saad called for a crackdown on lawlessness in Kuwait, and shortly after the amir extended martial law for another month. The movement held its ﬁrst major demonstration one week after the meeting with Amir Jabir: a solemn gathering at the Fatima Mosque on 4 June. Despite the leadership’s issuing of a series of reform-related announcements two days before the demonstration (see below), 1,000 people participated in the gathering. A prayer session lasted 35 minutes, after which participants milled about the courtyard.812 The nature of the demonstration reﬂected altered tactics and new post-war dynamics since the 1989–90 parliamentary campaign. First, the meeting was planned to avoid government allegations about violating the public assembly law: the demonstration took place in a mosque and involved silent prayer. Second, organizers recognized the new

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public role of Kuwaiti women in society stemming from their important activities in the resistance: both men and women were invited to attend the demonstration. Third, the demonstration was held in support of a host of grievances against the authorities, not only the traditional parliamentary platform.813 In the end, Kuwait’s parliamentary movement posed the most serious internal security challenge to al-Sabah governance during the immediate post-liberation period. The movement beneﬁted from an established organizational framework on the one hand, and past experience in politically confronting the leadership on the other hand. The movement appealed to a broad spectrum of Kuwait’s citizenry. Its more than a half-dozen political groupings, including nationalists, democrats, and Sunni and Shiite Islamists, attracted diverse elements of Kuwaiti society.814 During the post-liberation period, it proved the only opposition movement to attract signiﬁcant numbers of both insiders and outsiders.815 The root of the parliamentary movement’s relative strength rested in its position as the only major Kuwaiti opposition grouping linked to the “old” Kuwait of pre-invasion years. During the ﬁrst months following liberation, the movement grew to become the primary legitimate representative of citizen grievances against the Kuwaiti leadership by incorporating new reform goals associated with the invasion, occupation and martial law into the traditional, unrevolutionary, parliamentary movement platform. It operated within the generally accepted framework of political activism in Kuwait: diwaniyyas, peaceful demonstrations and petitions. It also utilized an important new venue for expressing and garnering support for its demands and maximizing its inﬂuence: the foreign media. As it restored leadership at home, the authorities engaged in a prudent campaign to deﬂate the parliamentary movement by responding positively from time to time and in a limited manner to the opposition’s demands. In response to the movement’s request for National Assembly elections, Amir Jabir promised elections by the end of the following year.816 In response to demands that al-Sabah control over political decisionmaking be diluted, a net sum of two ruling family members were removed from the Council of Ministers. Twin leadership concessions on 2 June ultimately contributed to the weakening of the parliamentary movement by the ﬁrst anniversary of the invasion. The ﬁrst was the announcement that National Assembly elections would be held speciﬁcally in October 1992.817 Delaying the elections to late in the following year would give the authorities time

Loyalty, Opposition and the Iraqi Invasion 161

to boost public support by fully reestablishing basic services, distributing ﬁnancial bonuses, and supporting the return of most of the 400,000 citizens in exile—who generally remained less critical of the leadership than insiders—to vote in the elections. The second announcement was that the National Council formed in the summer of 1990 would be reconvened on 9 July 1991 to serve during the pre-election period. The authorities stated that this time the council would not investigate the reasons leading to the dissolution of the 1985 assembly, which had been part of its original mandate in 1990, but instead discuss issues such as the extension of the vote to women and long-term foreign immigrants, which were issues of concern to the opposition. The twin announcements coincided with the organization of the Fatima Mosque demonstration, and probably represented an attempt to derail it. Additionally, the concessions likely were intended to ease the public’s reception to the forthcoming announcement that martial law would be extended by an extra month beyond the original three-month mandate. The announcements weakened the parliamentary movement in several ways. First, they dampened citizen support for the movement.818 Sixty-two percent of Kuwaitis had voted in the National Council elections in June 1990, generally reﬂecting the council’s legitimacy in the opinion of most citizens—at least prior to the invasion. Second, the prospect of elections affected the parliamentary leaders themselves. To be sure, the parliamentary opposition strongly objected to the long delay of elections, as well as the restoration of the National Council, which in their opinion remained illegitimate. In fact, on the day of the ﬁrst meeting of the reconvened council, a demonstration that included hundreds of participants took place at the residence of Ahmad al-Sadun. In a joint statement after the rally, the principal opposition groups condemned the council as unconstitutional, and demanded the immediate reinstatement of the dissolved National Assembly.819 However, the 2 June elections announcement, coupled with the change in mood of the electorate, ultimately energized the parliamentary groups themselves to institutionalize their organizations and otherwise prepare for their campaigns, thus fragmenting the movement as a whole. Other measures and events in July and August further deﬂated the movement. They included co-opting parliamentary Islamists to split the movement by allowing Sunni fundamentalists to lead a “promotion of virtue and prevention of vice” committee—similar to the organization that managed the religious police in Saudi Arabia; an international

162 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

campaign for the return of prisoners of war to Kuwait; the return of Kuwaiti exiles to the country after martial law ended; and a plethora of government ﬁnancial packages for Kuwaitis for such things as enduring the occupation, back pay and debt cancellation.820 One press report published a day before the ﬁrst anniversary of the Iraqi invasion identiﬁed a palpable change in Kuwaiti attitudes toward their government, including a lessening of a clamor for change.821

Expatriate collaboration There are no reliable ﬁgures for the number of foreign residents in Kuwait who assisted Iraq in its occupation, or percentages of particular nationalities that collaborated with the Iraqis. However, the majority of expatriate residents who remained in Kuwait during the occupation—including Palestinian immigrants—did not actively support the Iraqi army.822 In fact, many non-Kuwaiti residents served important roles in resisting Iraqi troops.823 At the same time, most expatriates were ultimately concerned about their safety, and the fate of sometimes years of hard-earned savings in Kuwaiti banks.824 The many Palestinian expatriates who remained in Kuwait during the occupation apparently did so neither to ﬁght for or against Kuwaiti independence but out of a desire not to be uprooted, or because of a perceived lack of alternative.825 Although expatriates’ activities on behalf of the Iraqi occupiers most likely failed to alter the basic dynamics of the Iraqi occupation, or to improve signiﬁcantly Iraq’s ability to manage and administrate occupied Kuwait, in some cases they determined the fate of individual Kuwaitis, and they included bombings in and around the city.826 The Iraqi invasion provided a special opportunity for foreign residents who believed that they had been treated unjustly in Kuwait (e.g. some Palestinians and biduns) or who otherwise felt compelled to contribute to the Iraqi effort. The very term “collaborator”—used by Kuwaitis to refer to those who worked with Iraq during the occupation—highlights the importance of the outside actor in the anti-Kuwait activities. The word is used most commonly in the Arab world by Palestinians to refer to other Palestinians who work with the Israeli government. Without outside support, interested individuals and groups in Kuwait remained ungalvanized and/or too vulnerable to engage in such activities. A high proportion of those tried after liberation for security crimes during the occupation were expatriates: of the 164 defendants tried by Kuwait’s military court between April and June 1991, nearly all were

Loyalty, Opposition and the Iraqi Invasion 163

foreign residents.827 Out of an ofﬁcial number of 546 other detainees suspected of collaborating with Iraqi forces, only 12 were Kuwaitis.828 The true number of detainees was suspected of being near 1,000.829 Most of those tried for collaboration were Palestinian.830 Palestinians were a primary target for both ofﬁcial and unofﬁcial acts of punishment and revenge immediately after liberation for obvious or suspected acts of collaboration.831 In fact, the exiled Kuwaiti leadership had begun planning its Palestinian policy before the war’s end. In midFebruary 1990, plans involved rounding up Palestinians into camps until their individual fates were determined to be deportation, or trial and possible execution.832 In addition to the fact that some Palestinians in Kuwait did collaborate with Iraq, the explanation for the special targeting of Palestinians rests in the unique, long relationship between Kuwait and its Palestinian community that was complicated by the occupation experience. Essentially, both the Kuwaiti leadership and private Kuwaiti citizens believed that Kuwait had provided Palestinians with a temporary home, gainful employment, social status, welfare beneﬁts and political opportunities beyond those of other expatriates for half of a century.833 As a result, the betrayal by some Palestinians caused greater offense to a certain degree than that by other expatriates with a shorter and more trite history in Kuwait.834 PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat’s support for Saddam’s invasion exacerbated Kuwaiti resentment toward the Palestinian community in general, particularly in light of Kuwait’s ﬁnancial aid to the PLO and the Palestinian cause. Finally, Palestinian collaboration likely appeared more prevalent than that by other expatriate communities due to Palestinians’ sheer number in Kuwait (nearly onefourth of Kuwait’s total population on the eve of the invasion), even though the percentage of collaborators among Palestinians might have been slight. This sense of betrayal was evident in Kuwaiti comments during the days following liberation which scornfully called upon Palestinians to ﬁnd employment in Iraq or countries that had supported Iraq in the war. As Palestinians gathered outside the Kuwaiti embassy in Amman, Jordan in early March 1991 to ask for jobs, the Kuwaiti ambassador to Jordan stated, “Why don’t the Palestinians go to Iraq or Libya? Qadhaﬁ has said he’ll take them.”835 The chief of preventive medicine at the Health Ministry stated: “As a Kuwaiti, I think Sudan, Algeria, Jordan and Iraq have plenty of room for them.”836 During the ﬁrst weeks following liberation, Kuwaiti ofﬁcers and civilians punished and took revenge against known and suspected collab-

164 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

orators by way of torture, detention, deportation and execution. Uniformed police ofﬁcers reportedly collected hundreds of Palestinians, Jordanians and North Africans and left them at the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border.837 Amnesty International reported that Kuwaiti armed forces and resistance ﬁghters were responsible for scores of murders. Some activities were believed to be led or tacitly approved by the Kuwaiti authorities.838 However, because of the chaos during this period, it was difﬁcult to determine the precise makeup of the perpetrators (e.g. security personnel carrying out government instructions, security personnel acting independently, or civilians) and the reasons for their activities (e.g. general retribution, personal feuds, etc.). Also because of the chaos, it was difﬁcult to determine the number and nationality of those affected by these actions. Outside interest groups and other parties provided the most reliable data in this regard at the time. In a report published on 11 March 1991, Human Rights Watch estimated that between 400 and 500 people, mostly Palestinians, had been tortured and beaten by Kuwaiti soldiers and citizens, and that 30–40 people had died as a result of this treatment.839 On 22 March, PLO advisor Basam Abu Sharif announced that a total of 210 Palestinians had been killed by torture, shooting or hanging by Kuwaitis, and buried in mass graves. He also stated that hundreds of other Palestinians had been taken to Kuwaiti police stations where they were tortured and deprived of water, food and medical treatment.840 An Amnesty International statement issued on 19 April following a two-week investigation in Kuwait conﬁrmed that “hundreds” of expatriate residents had been beaten, tortured and killed.841 The Kuwaiti authorities’ complicity in these activities was widely suspected.842 In March, ofﬁcials apparently warned senior military ofﬁcers against abuse, but stated that the lack of functioning telephones and other means of communication might have prevented the orders from being disseminated.843 Shaykh Saad authorized army searches in the Palestinian neighborhood of Hawali in March ostensibly for hidden weapons, but they were aborted at the last moment after the US ambassador and senior military ofﬁcers intervened.844 To be sure, complicity in abuse was not spread evenly throughout the leadership, and there appeared to be differences among ruling family members about what was acceptable. For example, relief ofﬁcials claimed that a handful of ruling family members had participated in various abuses, and that Shaykh Saad had privately reprimanded them.845 The situation on the ground changed somewhat for expatriates in April due to progress in the restoration of authority and accountability,

Loyalty, Opposition and the Iraqi Invasion 165

and rule by law, encouraged by international observers. At this time, the authorities explicitly warned security personnel and citizens against committing abuse; improved detention center conditions; and cooperated with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in carrying out deportations in a more humane manner. The frequency and severity of retribution against expatriates declined, and reports of murders subsided. However, serious problems remained, particularly with regard to the mistreatment of detainees, the detention of individuals without charge, lack of due process, and delay in bringing to trial those suspected of committing human rights atrocities.846 A televised address by Shaykh Saad on 26 May warning that those responsible for human rights violations would be severely punished, prompted another period of decline in such abuses.847 International pressure contributed to the development of more discriminating internal security practices, especially with regard to the military trials of suspected collaborators in May and June. In April, the Justice Ministry had begun investigating more than 600 people for war crimes, treason, espionage and collaboration. Court proceedings commenced on 19 May, with the presiding tribunal consisting of three civilian judges and two military judges. On the ﬁrst day of the proceedings, the court convicted and sentenced ﬁve expatriate Iraqis and one Jordanian for collaboration, acquitted four other expatriates, and opened several other cases. By 26 June, when the military court was disbanded along with martial law, 118 of the 164 suspected collaborators tried had been convicted, including 34 in absentia, and 29 sentenced to death.848 From the Kuwaiti perspective, the trials served two purposes in addition to the cause of justice. First, they assisted in restoring the authority of the police and legal system over unsupervised elements of the population. Second, they dispensed punishment, often harsh in relation to the severity of the crime, under the cover of law.849 One individual was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for wearing a t-shirt with a picture of Saddam Hussein on it.850 Initially, the trials lacked the legal procedures followed in Kuwait before the war, let alone those advocated by international human rights organizations.851 Defendants could not meet their attorneys before the proceedings; some defendants were forced under torture to confess to charges against them; the tribunal refused to disclose in the courtroom the charges against the defendants; the court refused to hear witnesses; and the court provided no evidence to support its charges.852

166 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

However, immediate international condemnation over the procedures brought about changes in the legal processes.853 During the second round of trials on 21 May—two days after the ﬁrst round—the Kuwaiti tribunal detailed the charges against defendants and allowed some of the accused to explain their actions to the court. Later, court proceedings were postponed until June to allow the accused time to prepare their defense. The court also decided to permit appeals. Finally, on 26 June, Amir Jabir announced his decision to commute all 29 death sentences to life imprisonment during a meeting with British Prime Minister John Major.854 Thus, foreign attention on Kuwait not only helped the leadership garner international support during the occupation, and the parliamentary movement maximize pressure on the authorities, but also operated as a check on unusual internal security practices toward foreign residents. The leadership had an easier time resorting to traditional expatriate management policies of deportation and immigration regulation to ﬁght the challenge of foreign “traitors” among the population. The new face of these policies in post-war Kuwait is discussed in the following section.

Population reinvention The phenomenon of expatriate collaboration with Iraq during the occupation resulted in new population policies after liberation. The policies paralleled those implemented during the previous decade, although this time targeted the new groups perceived as threatening through the lens of the 1990–91 war. Such policies represented a mainstay of the leadership’s internal security strategy as they had during the pre-war period; the government persisted in arguing that domestic security depended upon the rejection and removal of threatening— usually foreign—elements from the country. The new interior minister captured this sentiment when he argued in an interview with the Lebanese press that the mission of a ﬁfth column left behind by the Iraqi army consisting of some Iraqis and presumably other foreigners was to “disseminate rumors” to destabilize internal security.855 Those newly perceived as threats in the immediate post-war period essentially included nationalities whose members and/or leaderships had supported Iraq in the war, such as Palestinians, Jordanians, some North Africans, and Iraqis themselves. For example, Kuwait’s ambassador to the United States stated in June 1991 that the Kuwaiti government would not renew work and residence permits for most Palestinians remaining in the country because they posed a security

Loyalty, Opposition and the Iraqi Invasion 167

threat.856 Preferred nationalities now included those whose leaderships had supported Kuwait in the war, such as Egyptians and Syrians, and various Asian communities.857 Nineteen-ninety-two is the ﬁrst calendar year after the invasion for which data on expatriate residence permits is available. The data generally corresponds to the preferences noted above. Nationalities whose leaderships had supported Kuwait in the war, such as Syrians and Lebanese, or whose leaderships at least did not support Iraq, as in the case of Iranians, increased their post-war ranking in terms of the number of ﬁrst-time residence permits issued for public sector work relative to other nationalities (see Table 7.2). Egyptians maintained their

Table 7.2 Annual Ranking of Foreign Immigrant Nationalities According to the Number of First-time Residence Permits They Received for Government Work, 1988–89, 1992* Nationality

1988

1989

1992**

1 9 8 10

1 7 10 9

1 4 6 7

5 2 7

2 4 8

10 5 9

Middle Eastern Nationalities Whose Government Leaders Supported Kuwait (Or Did Not Support Iraq) Egyptian Syrian Lebanese Iranian Middle Eastern Nationalities Whose Government Leaders Supported Iraq Iraqi Jordanian & Palestinian*** Yemeni**** Major Asian Nationalities Indian

3

5

2

Pakistani

4

3

3

*

Nationalities are ranked in relation to those listed above, not all nationalities, because data is not available for all nationalities. ** Calculation excludes ﬁgures for December 1992. *** “Jordanian and Palestinian” is listed as a single category in the original source for the data. **** Includes North and South Yemen. Source: Author’s calculations based on information provided by Kuwait Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, Social Statistics 1989, p. 191; Kuwait Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, Social Statistics 1990, p. 195; Kuwait Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, Social Statistics 1992, p. 207.

168 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

number one standing. The ranking of nationalities whose leaderships had supported Iraq in the war, such as Iraqis themselves, Jordanians and Palestinians, and Yemenis, decreased after the war relative to other nationalities for the same type of permit. The data also shows rises in the ranking of major Asian nationalities represented in Kuwait like Indians and Pakistanis.858 Ofﬁcial ﬁgures for ﬁrst-time residence permits issued to expatriates in 1992 for private sector work generally illustrate the same trend. Egyptians, Syrians, Lebanese and Iranians all increased their post-war ranking relative to other nationalities, while Iraqis and Jordanians essentially maintained or slightly decreased their ranking relative to other nationalities (see Table 7.3). The increase in the ranking of Palestinians in this category remains an interesting exception, and possibly relates to different attitudes among government leaders on the one hand and the Kuwaiti business sector on the other hand with regard to employing members of the traditionally hardworking, smart and capable Palestinian community. Table 7.3 Annual Ranking of Foreign Immigrant Nationalities According to the Number of First-time Residence Permits They Received for Commercial and Other Non-Government Activity, 1988–89, 1992 Nationality

1988

1989

1992

Middle Eastern Nationalities Whose Government Leaders Supported Kuwait (Or Did Not Support Iraq) Egyptian Syrian Lebanese Iranian

2 8 12 17

2 11 17 15

1 7 10 8

Middle Eastern Nationalities Whose Government Leaders Supported Iraq Iraqi Jordanian Palestinian

11 7 16

10 8 23

11 9 13

Major Asian Nationalities Indian Pakistani

3

3

2

10

9

6

Source: Author’s calculations based on information provided to her by Kuwait Ministry of Interior, Spring 2000.

Loyalty, Opposition and the Iraqi Invasion 169

While immigration regulation represented part of the leadership’s long-term solution to internal security vulnerabilities linked to foreign residents after liberation, expulsion remained a “quick ﬁx” as it had following bombings and other acute security threats during previous years. During the immediate post-liberation period, thousands of foreign nationals, including large concentrations of Iraqis and biduns, were forcibly deported from Kuwait.859 In the chaos that characterized this period, deportations were not carried out in the same manner as previously. Soldiers abandoned foreign nationals in the Iraqi demilitarized zone.860 Foreigners, particularly Iraqis, biduns and Palestinians, were held in refugee camps along the border.861 The authorities also refused in some cases to repatriate those who had taken refuge in Iraq during the occupation, including primarily biduns.862 Ofﬁcial annual data compilations on deportations are not available for the years 1990 and 1991 because of the war, making comparisons between immediate pre-war and post-war expulsions between speciﬁc nationalities difﬁcult. Even if the data were available, comparing deportation ﬁgures among nationalities before and after the war would prove complicated due to substantial changes in the size of various foreign national communities in Kuwait as a result of the invasion. The Interior Ministry’s ﬁgures for 1992 prove useful to the extent that they indicate a signiﬁcantly higher deportation rate for foreign nationals during the post-war period as compared to the pre-war period: while on average one out of every 200 expatriates was deported during each of the two calendar years prior to the invasion, approximately one out of every 100 expatriates was deported during the ﬁrst full calendar year following the war (see Table 7.4).

Table 7.4 Annual Number of Administrative Deportations of Expatriates, 1988–89, 1992 1988 Number of Deportations of Expatriates Total Expatriate Population* Percentage of Expatriates Deported**

1989

1992

5,771

8,073

7,841

1,430,926

1,495,223

796,049

0.5%

1.0%

0.4%

*Estimated mid-year population. **Rounded to the nearest tenth. Source: For deportation ﬁgures, author’s calculations based on information provided to her by Kuwait Ministry of Interior, Spring 2000; for population ﬁgures, Kuwait Ministry of Planning, Annual Statistical Abstract 1993, p. 25.

170 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

The immigration regulation and deportation programs remained part of a broader effort to reduce the overall number of expatriates in the country after the war so that Kuwaiti nationals would make up a majority of the country’s population. This endeavor was highly reminiscent of like-minded efforts in the 1980s. Ofﬁcial statements after the war optimistically pointed to a target population size of 1 million to 1.2 million people, including 800,000 Kuwaitis and less than 200,000 foreigners.863 According to one journalist, the need to increase the percentage of Kuwaitis in the population represented one issue on which all Kuwaitis seemed to agree.864 By mid-1992, however, ofﬁcial Kuwaiti ﬁgures pointed to a return to the situation in which foreigners made up the majority of the population: estimates indicated that foreign nationals represented 57 percent of the population.865 Apparently, the population plan was abandoned as Kuwaitis returned to their government jobs, hired foreign help for the home, and contracted foreign workers for manual labor.866

Summary While Kuwaitis supported the return of the ruling family to Kuwait throughout the occupation period, signiﬁcant resentment toward the al-Sabah leadership existed as a result of its failure to prevent or respond in a timely manner to the invasion, as well as its continued monopolization of political decision-making. During the immediate post-war period, this resentment and desire for reform metamorphosed into explicit security challenges for the leadership from the Kuwaiti community. Three Kuwaiti social groups posed a challenge in this regard: dissident military and security personnel who had remained in the country during the occupation, often resisting the Iraqi occupiers; civilian insiders who had borne the brunt of the occupation, often participating in resistance activities and becoming somewhat self-sufﬁcient; and pro-parliament activists. While the wide ownership and availability of weapons among Kuwaiti security personnel and private citizens made real the possibility of armed rebellion by the ﬁrst two insider groups, in the end the parliamentary movement posed the most substantial challenge to the leadership. The movement attracted broad popular support by operating under an established organizational framework and absorbing new reform demands into the traditional parliamentary movement platform. The lack of armed opposition to the leadership upon its return from exile, as well as the fact that all major opposition groups sup-

Loyalty, Opposition and the Iraqi Invasion 171

ported reforming the traditional political system rather than revolution, pointed to the fundamental support Kuwaitis shared for the Kuwaiti constitutional system. The leadership’s positive response to some citizen demands, as well as its wide distribution of ﬁnancial beneﬁts, contributed to this support. The fourth group representing a security threat during 1990–91 was foreign nationals who had collaborated with the Iraqi occupiers. International pressure as well as some domestic criticism ultimately tempered unusual internal security practices toward suspected collaborators such as torture, beatings and executions. In the end, the government primarily resorted to traditional, pre-war policies such as deportation and immigration regulation to ﬁght the threat posed by immigrant “traitors.” The post-war policies targeted new groups perceived as dangerous in the context of the Iraqi aggression, such as Iraqis, biduns and Palestinians.

8 Period Trends and New Challenges

Many of the internal security challenges facing the Kuwaiti leadership today and on the horizon are more than vaguely reminiscent of those during the trying period under review in this book. They range from terrorist targeting of local and foreign interests in the country, to demands for the dilution of al-Sabah power. This ﬁnal chapter reviews the primary ﬁndings, trends and conclusions for the period under examination in the study, and then discusses how lessons from that period can inform some of the new challenges for the Kuwaiti leadership in the twenty-ﬁrst century.

Key ﬁndings A number of key ﬁndings regarding the nature of internal security challenges to the Kuwaiti leadership can be drawn from the study of the period under review. One is that radical-type threats, i.e. those that sought to seriously undermine and in some cases ultimately upset the existing political system, most often through violence, were linked primarily to tumultuous politics, events and actors in the region. Kuwait’s complex domestic environment, including deep-seated national, ethnic and religious chasms, played a secondary yet important role in forming these kinds of challenges. Key examples during the period under review include threats from Shiite militants linked to Tehran and other outside revolutionary Shiite entities during the 1980s, and collaboration with the Iraqi army by foreign residents in Kuwait during Iraq’s occupation of the country in 1990–91. A second key ﬁnding is that non-radical challenges, i.e. those that sought to moderate the special role of the al-Sabahs within the conﬁnes of the traditional political system, most often through non-violent 172

Period Trends and New Challenges 173

political action, were linked primarily to national issues of concern, including the status of the National Assembly, diwaniyyas, Kuwaiti Shia and other issues particular to the Kuwaiti polity. Here, regional and international events such as revolution, war and regime change often contributed to the development of these kinds of challenges in Kuwait, but ultimately played a secondary role. The 1989–90 parliamentary movement, which was invigorated by the Iran-Iraq ceaseﬁre, the collapse of Eastern European dictatorships, and the Palestinian intifada, but initiated and directed by Kuwaitis interested in re-opening a traditional Kuwaiti institution, is a primary example from the period under review. Closely related to these two ﬁndings is a third, which is that foreign elements in the country, including expatriate residents and inﬁltrators, most often dominated the radical threats, while Kuwaiti citizens most often dominated the non-radical challenges. This is true in the examples cited above. In the end it seems non-Kuwaitis were more likely to participate in activities to seriously undermine or upset the political system because they had little stake in that system. Kuwaitis, on the other hand, generally felt they had a stake in the system and were not interested in critically undercutting it. Another reason for Kuwaitis’ more prominent role in challenges relating to national issues of concern is that Kuwaiti citizens were (and still are) the only real players in much of the country’s political life, e.g. the National Assembly. An important exception to the pattern of Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti participation in the different types of threats was the primary involvement of some Kuwaiti Shia in radical activities during the late 1980s. This phenomenon is explained in part by the special position of the Kuwaiti Shiite community at the time relating to domestic, regional and international circumstances. The fourth and ﬁnal key ﬁnding relating to the nature of internal security threats is that non-radical challenges typically from Kuwaiti citizens sometimes took on greater signiﬁcance for the leadership than would be expected of non-radical threats. This is because of the greater importance for the al-Sabahs of maintaining general citizen support for their leadership of Kuwait over support from foreign immigrants, who could be more easily deported and replaced. The diwaniyya meetings held by the 1989–90 parliamentary movement, which alarmed the leadership and prompted an unusually strong response from the authorities, is a chief example of this phenomenon. As for internal security policies during the period under review, the authorities generally pursued two sets of responses to challenges. Responses to radical threats included mass deportation, widespread

174 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

arrests, changes in immigration practices and prosecution in the state security court. Except for immigration management, these measures targeted offending foreigners in the country and Kuwaiti citizens alike. Expulsion from the country marked the cornerstone of policy toward violent political activity such as bombings. Deportations were sometimes discriminate and sometimes indiscriminate: those targeted for expulsion included speciﬁc individuals linked directly to subversive activity; individuals belonging to certain citizen or immigrant groups deemed threatening, such as Kuwaiti Shia and Iranians during the Iran-Iraq war, and Iraqis and Palestinians during the immediate postliberation period; and foreign residents in general. Signiﬁcant increases and decreases in the number of monthly and annual deportations generally corresponded with periods of increased and decreased threat perception, respectively. Widespread arrests often were conducted in conjunction with deportations. During security crackdowns, Kuwaiti police combed particular neighborhoods and areas in the country and rounded up members of certain groups deemed threatening. The detentions apparently helped determine who should be expelled; intimidated individuals believed to be potentially dangerous; and served as a warning against certain political activity. Security arrests also were conducted independently of deportations, when non-radical challenges were perceived to be growing more acute. During these periods, police often arrested prominent community leaders of groups deemed threatening to help bring about an end to their political activities. Examples include the arrest of Kuwaiti Shiite religious leaders as well as parliamentary movement leaders in 1989–90. Altering foreign immigration practices also was a common security response. Particularly during periods of heightened threat, the authorities sought to limit the overall size of the country’s foreign population, as well as alter its makeup. The latter pursuit involved reducing the proportion of foreign residents who belonged to national or ethnic groups believed to be threatening, such as Iranians, Arab Shia and Palestinians at various times during the period under study, and increasing the proportion of foreign residents who belonged to national or ethnic groups believed to be non-threatening, such as South and Southeast Asians. Finally, responses to acute internal security challenges included prosecuting individuals suspected of security crimes in the state security court. Prosecuted crimes included bombings as well as the distribution of anti-regime literature during the 1980s, and collaboration with the Iraqi occupying forces in 1990–91. During periods of heightened threat,

Period Trends and New Challenges 175

more cases were tried in court, and a greater proportion of them involved crimes of a non-violent nature, apparently reﬂecting increased efforts on the part of the Interior Ministry and Justice Ministry to pursue and try security-related cases. The primary policy response to non-radical challenges on the other hand generally involved granting and revoking special civil-political liberties, such as public assembly, political representation and expression. This kind of response, which essentially was applicable only to Kuwaiti citizens, remained possible because those who posed the non-radicaltype challenges were almost exclusively Kuwaiti citizens. Speciﬁc measures included the restrictive public assembly law in 1979; restoring the National Assembly and a freer press during the years 1979–81; the closure of the assembly and the institution of new press restrictions in 1986; the ban on certain types of diwaniyyas in 1989; the dissolution of the Shiite Cultural and Social Society board that same year; the establishment of the National Council in 1990; and planning for parliamentary elections after the 1991 liberation. An important caveat to grouping policy responses according to the nature of the threat is that sometimes responses to non-radical challenges by foreign residents resembled typical responses to more acute threats like deportations. This is explained by the perception in Kuwaiti society of individual foreign residents as “dispensable” and easily replaceable. As a result, non-radical security challenges involving foreign residents did not always require delicate responses, while nonradical security challenges involving Kuwaiti citizens demanded sensitive approaches and longer-term solutions. Policy responses to internal security problems were viewed, at times, by the Kuwaiti population as unnecessarily harsh. This in turn exacerbated existing threats, and helped nurture new ones. Examples of this include the impact on the parliamentary movement of the ban on certain kinds of diwaniyyas and arrest of parliamentary leaders in 1989–90, and the impact on some Kuwaiti Shia of the harsh crackdowns on their community during the mid-1980s. Nonetheless, from a strictly managerial point of view, responses to internal security threats remained generally “successful;” the al-Sabah leadership ultimately maintained its political position at home, and survived arguably the most challenging period in the history of the state. The reason for this rested in the strongest dynamic of al-Sabah internal political security: the political legitimacy of the ruling family in the eyes of Kuwaitis gained as a result of the family’s historical leadership role, distribution of beneﬁts, and extension of key civil-political liberties.

176 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

New and looming challenges Like the years under examination in this book, radical-type internal security challenges for the Kuwaiti leadership in the early twenty-ﬁrst century have been linked to turbulent politics, events and revolutionary actors in the Arab and Muslim world playing upon Kuwait’s special sociopolitical makeup and character. Certainly this is true for one of the most immediate and conspicuous threats in twenty-ﬁrst century Kuwait, and one that attracts signiﬁcant international attention: terrorist activity in the country targeting Kuwaiti and foreign interests. During the ﬁrst months of 2005, nearly half-a-dozen gun battles between Kuwaiti police and Islamic militants raged across the country. The terrorists had been preparing to bomb Western targets in the country like American residential complexes and US military bases, as well as Kuwaiti targets like shopping malls and government buildings. Strong connections between the terrorists in Kuwait and events and individuals outside the country included the Iraq war and al-Qaeda leaders and activities there, Saudi Arabia’s own struggle against al-Qaeda militants in its homeland, and earlier al-Qaeda pursuits in Afghanistan. In fact, many of the militants involved in plotting the attacks in Kuwait in 2004–05—as well as those who carried out anti-American attacks there in 2002 and 2003—had fought with al-Qaeda elements in Iraq or Afghanistan, or had links to people who did.867 Some of the plotting militants were acting on instructions from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq.868 Some were being ﬁnanced by private elements in Saudi Arabia.869 Connections between the alQaeda-linked Saudi militants attacking Saudi government facilities and Western targets in that country, and the Kuwaiti militants, also existed. As early as 1996, Usama bin Ladin had publicly threatened attacks in Gulf peninsula states, and in 2000, Kuwaiti authorities had arrested a bin Ladin-linked international terrorist cell plotting to attack Kuwaiti ofﬁcials and US targets in the country and region.870 Also like the radical-type threats of the past, non-Kuwaitis have proved critical components of the threat, representing at least some of the leadership of and signiﬁcant participants in the terrorist plots. The militants directly involved in the various attacks and plots of 2002–05 included Saudis, Jordanians, biduns and other non-Kuwaitis. About a half-dozen Saudis were arrested or killed during the early 2005 shootouts in Kuwait. However, while many of the militants have been nonKuwaitis, the majority of them have been Kuwaiti nationals, and some have played leadership roles in the plots. The successful recruitment of

Period Trends and New Challenges 177

Kuwaitis to participate in plots for attacks inside the country conﬁrms that there exists at least some degree of fertile ground for this kind of radicalism among pockets of Kuwait’s nationals, just as in other Arab Gulf peninsula countries and Levantine and North African states. The diverse locations of the gun battles that raged across the country in early 2005 also give some indication of the breadth of the threat; the cells are not neighborhood-speciﬁc groupings. In fact, various sources indicate that Kuwait has been home to a multifaceted terrorist network of Kuwaiti recruiters, ﬁghters and ﬁnanciers working with al-Qaeda.871 The phenomenon of Kuwaiti citizen involvement in al-Qaeda activities is not new. Long before the 11 September 2001 attacks, more than a handful of Kuwaitis had traveled to Afghanistan to work or ﬁght with al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and by the time US air strikes attacked alQaeda infrastructure there in October 2001, about 150 Kuwaitis were in al-Qaeda-related training camps.872 Among the 100 or so who survived the strikes, most returned to Kuwait or ﬂed to neighboring Pakistan or Iran and then on to Iraq after the war began there.873 “Kuwaiti Afghans,” i.e. Kuwaitis who fought with al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, have been linked to two of the three early attacks against US forces in Kuwait preparing for war in Iraq. Some have pronounced the 2005 plots the ﬁrst of their kind in Kuwait because of the majority of Kuwaiti participants. But while this marks a departure from the dominant trends of the 1980s, in many ways it is reminiscent of the attacks by Kuwaiti Shia against national oil infrastructure and other targets in the latter part of that decade. Even key grievances of both today’s Kuwaiti Sunni militants and yesterday’s Kuwaiti Shiite militants relate signiﬁcantly to al-Sabah policy positions, the former to support for the United States in Iraq, and the latter to support for Iraq in the Iraq-Iran war. One of the most important lessons from the past regarding the future of the Sunni Islamic militant threat in Kuwait is that what happens beyond Kuwait’s borders will contribute signiﬁcantly to the growth or decline of this threat at home. Kuwait’s extremist problem has been exacerbated by its proximity to the Iraq war as well as to Saudi Arabia’s struggle against al-Qaeda terrorists. It is likely that as long as terrorist activities connected to foreign occupation and political instability in Iraq continue, so will Kuwait’s terrorist challenge. Likewise, as long as al-Qaeda-linked elements continue to battle the Saudi state and the al-Saud regime remains in hot pursuit, so will Kuwaiti border guards need to be on the defensive. Major relief for Kuwait will come only with a break from acute regional turbulence.

178 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

In the meantime, Kuwaitis making their way to Iraq to participate in the jihad and then returning home re-enter Kuwait even more radicalized, and ready to use the tradecraft they learned in Iraq at home against US forces and the Kuwaiti authorities who host them. For example, the brother and deputy of a key Kuwaiti terrorist leader reportedly intended to apply the “tactic” in Kuwait of kidnapping Westerners and ﬁlming their beheadings, which he had learned while ﬁghting with terrorists in Iraq.874 Kuwaiti ofﬁcials investigating the early 2005 incidents also discovered that a number of the suspects had learned how to make explosives in Iraq. Kuwaiti history reveals political strategies that can bolster and hinder the battle against extremists as regional turmoil rages on. Underscoring the innocent murder and injury, as well as physical and economic damage, caused by the terrorists, or their deadly plans if captured before their plots are carried out, can signiﬁcantly help decrease both passive and active support for attacks where it exists in Kuwaiti society. Such efforts can be pursued in all forms of media, including television, radio, newspapers, magazines and the Internet as well as by personal contact in diwaniyyas and mosques. This kind of campaign capitalizes on the “boomerang” effect of terrorist attacks, whereby attacks often result in decreased support for terrorists and their tactics in the countries where they occur, and greater support for regime counterterrorism policies.875 During the mid-1980s, terrorist attacks in Kuwait not only contributed to citizen criticism of the terrorists and calls for better counterterrorism measures, but also to a decline in support for fundamentalist platforms in general because the Kuwaiti public linked the attacks to the Islamic resurgence at that time. In this regard, the very experience of gun battles raging across the country in early 2005 likely invigorated the public’s revulsion toward radical activity. Furthermore, the negative impact of the gunﬁghts was probably compounded by the fact that they resulted in Kuwaiti police casualties, and not exclusively American or other foreign deaths. The Kuwaiti public’s general aversion to violence at home particularly following the experience of the Iraqi occupation gives the authorities signiﬁcant latitude in cracking down on the militants and their partners in crime.876 However, another lesson from the period under review is that the authorities must avoid succumbing to a “group liability” phenomenon, to include steering clear of mass arrests and general police actions against innocent salaﬁ Islamists which would only serve to radicalize some and create a more signiﬁcant threat. The radicalization of some Kuwaiti Shia in the 1980s in part as a result of the harsh

Period Trends and New Challenges 179

security environment targeting them during the 1980s serves as a reminder of the danger broad, indiscriminate security crackdowns pose. To some degree this kind of effect may be occurring already: former friends of a key participant in the 2005 plots maintained that the treatment he received from the authorities contributed his radicalization.877 The situation requires a pinpointed approach to detentions, arrests and criminal trials. This is not to say that there isn’t room for broad, non-police-oriented security policies concerning aspects of Islamic fundamentalism in Kuwait. An important new element in policy toward the terrorist threat has been a multifaceted, nationwide education program targeting jihadis as well as the general public. During 2004 and 2005, this included an “orientation” program for jihadis returning from Iraq; reforming school textbooks to reﬂect more moderate viewpoints, including deleting text encouraging intolerance; and an anti-terrorism media campaign.878 The authorities recognize that the terrorist challenge is compounded by relative support in Kuwait for bin Ladin, alQaeda, and the rigid salaﬁ brand of Islam. The promotion of moderate viewpoints and positions marks a departure from the defensive posture authorities took with regard to Kuwaiti Shia in the 1980s, and if pursued sensibly and consistently, is likely to reap rewards. Finally, the ﬁght against extremists will rely on good intelligence collection by the Kuwaiti Interior Ministry, in cooperation with regional partners like Saudi Arabia and international partners like the United States, and on a political willingness to act on it. During the period under review, intelligence capabilities were deﬁcient, likely contributing to both attacks and public criticism of the leadership. More recently, the Kuwaiti security forces have done an admirable job of aborting plots and wrapping up perpetrators: in early 2005, police ofﬁcers captured several dozen extremists before they carried out their plans. The resurgence of terrorist activity inside Kuwait targeting local and foreign interests there has been one of the most immediate and conspicuous fallouts from the Iraq war and related regional and international developments. A less sensational consequence of the war but with considerable potential for shaping Kuwaiti political dynamics will be the impact of Iraq’s new domestic political reality, in which Iraqi Shia hold extensive power, on Kuwaiti Shia as well as other groups interested in pushing for political and social reform. Whether Iraq maintains its territorial integrity with a centralized government or tripartite federation, or slips into civil war and essentially devolves into

180 Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution

three rather independent mini-states, Iraqi Shia will hold signiﬁcantly more inﬂuence and power than under Saddam. As the neighboring Shiite Islamic revolution in Iran emboldened Kuwaiti Shia to press for changes at home, so will Shiite successes in Iraq—with probable support this time as well from Tehran. Shiite achievements since the Iraq war in other Gulf states—for example, the success of Shiite candidates in municipal elections in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province and limited public displays of longbanned Ashura celebrations there in early 2005—point to both an opening of opportunities for Shia and a reawakening of Shiite identity in the new regional climate.879 However, signiﬁcant differences remain between the position of Kuwaiti Shia and their Saudi and other Gulf peninsula counterparts, who suffer greater political, social and religious discrimination, and the impact of Shiite successes in Iraq will take a different shape in Kuwait than other countries. In the end, the most critical challenge for the al-Sabahs likely to emerge from Kuwaiti Shia in the wake of events in Iraq will not be an independent drive by Kuwaiti Shia to push for changes at home but joint efforts with other national groups to press the al-Sabahs for political reform. At its most basic level, this phenomenon will be reminiscent of the opposition Sunni Islamist deputies in the 1981 National Assembly joining forces with other deputies to oppose al-Sabah and government proposals, as well as the broad-based campaign for political reform involving more than a halfdozen political groupings immediately following Kuwait’s liberation from Iraq in 1991. Like some of the non-violent, non-radical challenges discussed in this study, this challenge holds the potential to take on greater signiﬁcance than would be expected of non-revolutionary threats because of the primary and broad involvement of Kuwaiti citizens. This leads to another major political security challenge for the alSabahs on the horizon. Recent democratic elections in Iraq and the Palestinian territories, the explosion of semi-private and private Arab news media spreading information and raising controversial political issues for debate across the Arab world, and the international spotlight on the region connected to concerns about terrorism, all have helped prompt Arab elites and non-elites to more openly and aggressively challenge their undemocratic regimes. This same environment has compelled Middle Eastern leaderships to at least appear to be more responsive to demands for democratic processes and greater accountability than in the past, and to take small steps in that direction. The al-Sabah leadership will not be immune to increasing pressures from

Period Trends and New Challenges 181

various elements of its citizenry for these kinds of changes, nor to the need to respond to them. While the al-Sabahs traditionally have proved more “progressive” than the National Assembly and likely the population at large on such issues as women’s suffrage, naturally the leadership’s attitude toward measures that limit its authority on key national issues has been a different story, often resulting in policy responses that combine addressing issues of concern to a limited extent with the delivery of new welfare beneﬁts. This kind of response was epitomized in 1991 by the ruling family’s restoration of the partly appointed National Council in place of a National Assembly following liberation (with promises for traditional assembly elections in 1992), mixed with the delivery of ﬁnancial beneﬁts to citizens including back pay and debt cancellation, to dampen calls for wide-ranging political and social reforms following the leadership’s failure to prevent, prepare for or immediately respond to the Iraqi invasion. Like after liberation, there is some sense in Kuwait that substantial changes to traditional political arrangements are required to support the kind of reform needed. High-proﬁle issues such as the permanent separation of the posts of crown prince and prime minister, and the dilution of al-Sabah power in the Council of Ministers, or Cabinet, echo calls in 1991 by politically active Kuwaitis. Other issues include proper separation of the three branches of government and reforming electoral processes and laws, thereby weakening their manipulation by al-Sabah authorities. Of the three legs on which the political legitimacy of the al-Sabahs stands among Kuwaitis discussed in the introduction to this book—their traditional, historical role as the leadership of Kuwait, their distribution of welfare beneﬁts, and their extension of key civil-political liberties—ideas about what the third leg should include are changing. The ruling family’s political security will depend on policies of the aging al-Sabah leadership and ﬁgures replacing them effectively responding to new demands for reform linked to sweeping changes in the regional climate. Kuwaiti history teaches that, despite missteps, al-Sabah leaders are skillful preservers of their political position when faced with challenges at home.

Appendix A Number of Administrative Deportations per Month According to Nationality, 1978–89

Jan-78 Feb-78 Mar-78 Apr-78 May-78 Jun-78 Jul-78 Aug-78 Sep-78 Oct-78 Nov-78 Dec-78 Jan-79 Feb-79 Mar-79 Apr-79 May-79 Jun-79 Jul-79 Aug-79 Sep-79 Oct-79 Nov-79 Dec-79 Jan-80 Feb-80 Mar-80 Apr-80 May-80 Jun-80 Jul-80 Aug-80 Sep-80 Oct-80

GCC

Iraqi

Leban.

Syrian

Egypt.

Jordan.

7 1 1 1 1 2 7 5 16 6 3 2 13 4 3 16 12 5 3 8 4 1 2 3 5 2 5 6 0 2 2 3 9 0

92 31 68 47 44 50 57 33 60 47 86 61 54 68 71 46 73 63 61 63 131 106 84 93 78 75 55 6 36 65 44 43 19 9

6 1 3 1 0 1 3 2 2 9 7 9 1 4 9 6 7 3 1 3 2 0 0 4 5 2 5 2 3 6 2 0 5 6

8 16 17 10 24 42 12 12 21 54 820 630 491 449 278 305 312 225 158 236 535 0 530 503 225 154 253 144 161 67 62 57 5 23

149 91 139 152 175 336 445 316 320 282 498 245 479 471 477 461 425 372 619 588 556 39 632 970

6 5 1 5 3 3 7 17 18 10 9 19 7 3 17 6 5 6 5 22 10 1 4 12 11 3 8 3 4 4 4 8 7 4

889 354 707 353 142 169 381 282 198

182

Iranian Pakist. 32 20 63 148 120 79 43 196 165 188 131 166 294 103 23 187 576 182 129 92 84 83 161 391 401 89 131 156 20 27 94 148 89 37

5 5 10 15 44 12 46 22 63 88 39 23 21 37 36 37 33 30 21 26 19 12 17 22 44 27 43 52 47 22 24 41 15 23

Indian Other 15 5 13 10 17 12 15 16 18 35 7 53 34 22 24 48 29 30 28 13 19 50 53 31 38 31 62 51 37 30 24 14 29 15

12 13 14 15 18 44 68 59 41 64 74 124 99 103 123 134 162 108 75 93 102 17 72 108 53 57 46 66 53 44 58 57 56 39

Appendix A 183

Nov-80 Dec-80 Jan-81 Feb-81 Mar-81 Apr-81 May-81 Jun-81 Jul-81 Aug-81 Sep-81 Oct-81 Nov-81 Dec-81 Jan-82 Feb-82 Mar-82 Apr-82 May-82 Jun-82 Jul-82 Aug-82 Sep-82 Oct-82 Nov-82 Dec-82 Jan-83 Feb-83 Mar-83 Apr-83 May-83 Jun-83 Jul-83 Aug-83 Sep-83 Oct-83 Nov-83 Dec-83 Jan-84 Feb-84 Mar-84 Apr-84 May-84 Jun-84 Jul-84 Aug-84 Sep-84 Oct-84 Nov-84 Dec-84 Jan-85 Feb-85

GCC

Iraqi

Leban.

1 1 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 4 1 1 2 2 3 0 2 2 0 1 2 1 3 0 1 1 0 0 3 2 3 0 3 10 1 0 1 7 4 2 2 3 1 2 3 0 0 1 0 0 3

8 9 11 5 2 66 52 24 20 39 27 18 17 8 24 13 8 15 19 18 9 5 14 2 3 25 15 0 9 6 4 6 13 17 15 32 28 175 176 137 52 30 62 37 43 51 35 117 121 15 37 47

1 0 1 0 0 2 3 1 3 0 4 2 2 5 1 3 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 5 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 5 3 11 1 4 7 2 2 1 0 2 0 1 0 0

Syrian 12 5 2 14 6 48 63 18 27 35 59 21 20 33 47 27 8 14 16 23 6 27 24 5 6 1 2 1 5 0 3 26 7 15 4 24 12 64 97 76 64 30 44 23 32 18 18 28 16 13 14 18

Egypt.

Jordan.

61 67 55 63 80 365 315 163 101 320 307 385 319 417 574 445 231 215 235 284 248 265 223 176 181 60 61 16 17 7 32 28 19 23 113 169 145 117 297 174 152 109 89 62 155 139 92 133 203 94 144 70

1 5 3 3 2 12 7 11 18 9 22 8 4 5 6 10 7 11 4 5 7 6 6 3 4 3 2 3 2 0 3 3 2 0 12 4 14 22 21 13 7 6 12 18 7 7 8 8 0 3 6 4

Iranian Pakist. 73 16 50 17 64 465 119 166 125 262 217 88 79 189 136 83 53 46 38 74 18 81 30 22 13 7 12 4 4 2 22 7 2 37 69 214 220 472 390 364 261 207 175 281 276 297 237 233 378 273 223 140

19 15 17 15 15 75 50 53 24 25 46 36 55 27 40 55 36 38 46 33 28 26 31 25 16 10 34 10 12 4 8 7 7 5 4 36 25 39 101 106 72 82 38 27 29 41 39 40 64 53 76 51

Indian Other 6 19 15 14 18 37 79 38 29 26 67 50 46 32 52 68 53 59 61 42 36 48 44 72 46 33 44 25 35 39 31 50 32 41 24 78 38 106 84 108 63 96 65 47 77 114 68 140 100 50 111 62

21 23 29 23 40 40 58 70 55 43 56 57 49 45 76 72 70 88 74 77 80 107 99 115 235 95 157 49 48 52 50 48 52 51 67 131 94 135 208 152 127 157 115 64 157 165 95 165 131 82 124 149

184 Appendices

Mar-85 Apr-85 May-85 Jun-85 Jul-85 Aug-85 Sep-85 Oct-85 Nov-85 Dec-85 Jan-86 Feb-86 Mar-86 Apr-86 May-86 Jun-86 Jul-86 Aug-86 Sep-86 Oct-86 Nov-86 Dec-86 Jan-87 Feb-87 Mar-87 Apr-87 May-87 Jun-87 Jul-87 Aug-87 Sep-87 Oct-87 Nov-87 Dec-87 Jan-88 Feb-88 Mar-88 Apr-88 May-88 Jun-88 Jul-88 Aug-88 Sep-88 Oct-88 Nov-88 Dec-88 Jan-89 Feb-89 Mar-89 Apr-89 May-89 Jun-89

GCC

Iraqi

Leban.

Syrian

Egypt.

Jordan.

1 2 4 3 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 2 1 5 3 0 2 2 0 1 2 3 1 0 4 10 2 1 3 3 1 3 0 2 4 4 3 2 3 4 5 3 2 1 0 0 2 1 1 0

48 15 102 220 313 404 982 65 54 27 31 29 20 28 28 33 40 272 39 47 43 41 52 48 39 47 28 63 40 43 50 25 18 39 22 28 41 19 14 32 37 65 21 16 19 56 9 20 20 182 38 47

0 3 1 70 66 20 10 2 2 4 4 3 4 3 4 1 0 0 6 5 3 3 2 6 7 1 3 3 1 4 11 4 16 2 2 9 6 2 10 1 9 0 0 2 1 27 3 2 6 2 0 1

23 27 33 147 319 152 68 62 36 37 35 21 16 25 28 9 33 25 23 12 43 28 16 24 40 14 15 16 20 40 19 5 10 11 56 34 38 26 6 16 11 5 10 37 21 10 8 10 37 43 38 36

121 109 228 129 206 201 127 318 298 264 189 157 107 110 139 104 183 143 99 58 70 90 109 128 104 100 76 86 119 122 88 34 40 48 21 19 54 24 21 49 26 27 66 53 48 37 56 49 43 37 34 36

5 14 6 9 24 14 12 10 3 13 2 9 3 10 9 15 31 18 14 9 26 9 12 15 13 13 19 15 11 8 20 13 10 7 9 13 10 5 11 21 11 9 11 5 5 9 3 5 2 15 20 4

Iranian Pakist.

Indian Other

142 262 357 1230 847 326 273 267 223 208 129 76 69 107 78 67 198 59 45 78 109 120 120 84 78 58 34 65 75 70 102 63 43 48 30 18 15 5 9 10 9 27 13 39 39 63 31 63 45 39 39 97

70 67 90 75 211 121 125 222 258 315 234 161 141 127 121 124 156 135 126 138 107 150 146 162 118 113 67 83 143 121 81 39 50 60 26 37 40 33 32 37 36 46 40 62 59 45 36 42 67 914 28 56

108 75 143 132 254 159 220 249 241 292 187 156 188 158 141 111 165 161 127 152 157 167 150 157 221 267 120 103 196 229 303 47 40 93 16 29 28 17 41 31 43 35 29 76 87 80 69 93 61 58 76 39

133 90 168 199 445 285 289 248 234 230 306 180 246 198 290 151 294 246 216 205 218 217 264 238 285 275 210 280 299 225 232 186 197 373 226 137 128 120 116 212 174 175 181 213 302 515 293 216 208 291 202 239

Appendix A 185

GCC Jul-89 Aug-89 Sep-89 Oct-89 Nov-89 Dec-89

0 1 0 0 3 1

Iraqi 20 30 72 19 26 29

Leban. 4 0 0 0 1 1

Syrian 42 56 20 31 25 10

Egypt. 21 34 35 57 25 36

Jordan. 9 5 6 6 4 4

Iranian Pakist. 32 19 43 62 100 36

53 44 68 95 74 53

Indian Other 84 60 43 54 43 58

216 223 182 339 234 198

Source: Kuwait Ministry of Interior internal yearbook information provided to the author by the ministry, Spring 2000.

Appendix B Number of First-time Residence Permits Issued per Year, 1978–89

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1992

Arab

Asian

European

American

Other

71,895 43,303 44,902 39,561 51,935 52,912 24,781 30,782 48,288 88,465 49,057 37,441 167,699

63,051 50,612 46,500 46,565 78,087 100,464 99,604 67,266 71,454 75,450 79,881 87,207 332,611

4,156 2,053 1,805 1,267 2,346 3,199 2,812 3,181 4,884 1,980 1,121 704 1,931

900 682 587 549 699 1,013 1,953 903 1,140 1,082 585 538 2,405

689 5,459 5,368 6,735 12,774 26,650 24,638 8,866 9,169 9,018 14,642 5,218 10,549

Source: Ministry of Planning, Annual Statistical Abstract 1989, p. 65; Kuwait Ministry of Planning, Annual Statistical Abstract 1993, p. 25.

186

Appendix C Kuwaiti Daily Newspapers and Their Orientations Circa 1986

Newspaper

Circulation (estim. 1986)

First Published

Orientation circa 1986

al-Qabas

55,000

1972

Non-partisan; free enterprise; Kuwaiti nationalist; pro-Arab nationalism; emphasis on Arab and international issues.

al-Watan

43,000

1974

Liberal; critical of government; mouthpiece of democrats and left-wing Kuwaitis.

al-Anba

33,000

1976

Conservative pro-government; mouthpiece for commercial groups.

al-Siyasa

33,000

1965

Moderate pro-government; pro-Egypt and other moderate Arab states.

al-Rai al-Amm

20,000

1961

Conservative; supportive of government on almost all issues; anti-Left and pro-West.

The Kuwait Times 10,000

1961

Published by al-Rai al-Amm for non-Arabic-speaking foreigners.

The Arab Times

1977

Liberal; popular; focus on regional issues.

8,000

Source: See Hassan al-Qayed, “Press and Authorities in the Arab World: The Case of Kuwait,” Arab Affairs, I, 9, Summer 1989, 94–108.

187

Notes and References 1 H.R.P. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours (London: Allen & Unwin, 1956). 2 For discussion on the appropriateness of classifying Kuwait as a Third World state, see Lori Plotkin, “Kuwait, 1979–1991: Problems and Policies for Internal Security,” Ph.D. dissertation, International Relations, University of Oxford, 2003, pp. 27–8. 3 For discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of applying Third World security concepts to a study of Kuwait, see Plotkin, “Kuwait, 1979–1991,” pp. 22–8. 4 See Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conﬂict, and the International System (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995). 5 Kuwaiti census ﬁgures show Kuwaitis made up 50.3 percent of the country’s population in 1961, and 47.1 percent in 1965. Kuwait Ministry of Planning, Annual Statistical Abstract 1986 (Kuwait: Kuwait Ministry of Planning, 1986), p. 25. 6 Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, pp. 147, 274. 7 See Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1990), pp. 62–111. 8 Discussion with Kuwaiti scholar and social commentator, Kuwait, Spring 2000. 9 William Rugh, The Arab Press: News Media and Political Process in the Arab World, Second Edition (Syracuse: Syracuse University, 1987), p. 101. The Kuwaiti press replaced the Lebanese as the premier press in the Arab world during this period as Lebanon was engulfed in civil war. 10 Ibid. 11 See Hasan Qayed, “Press and Authorities in the Arab World: The Case of Kuwait,” Arab Affairs, 1, 9 (Summer 1989) 103–5. 12 Ibid. 13 Personal interviews with Kuwait Ministry of Interior ofﬁcial, Kuwait, Spring 2000. 14 Jill Crystal, “Coalitions in Oil Monarchies: Kuwait and Qatar,” Comparative Politics, 21, 4 (July 1989) p. 430. 15 The 1921 Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura) is an older ancestor of Kuwait’s contemporary parliament. However, the council was informal, its tenure short-lived (two months), and its substantive accomplishments few relative to the National Legislative Assembly. Therefore, the Legislative Assembly is discussed here as the major predecessor to today’s National Assembly. 16 For the assembly’s legislative accomplishments, see Crystal, Oil and Politics, pp. 48–9. 17 See ibid., pp. 47–56, and Rosemarie Zahlan, The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman, Updated Edition (Reading: Ithaca, 1998), pp. 33–59. 188

Notes and References 189 18 For Iraq’s connection to the parliamentary experiment, see Crystal, Oil and Politics, pp. 52–4. 19 Abdo Baaklini, “Legislatures in the Gulf Area: The Experience of Kuwait: 1961–1976,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 14, 3 (1982) p. 360. 20 Kuwait Ministry of Social Affairs, Taadad Sukan al-Kuwayt li Sanat 1957, p. 57. 21 See Miriam Joyce, Kuwait, 1945–1996: An Anglo-American Perspective (London: Frank Cass, 1998), pp. 38, 40. 22 Jacqueline Ismael, Kuwait: Social Change in Historical Perspective (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982), p. 119; Crystal, Oil and Politics, p. 80. 23 See Baaklini, “Legislatures in the Gulf Area,” p. 373. 24 Upon independence, Shaykh Sabah took the title of amir, also used by subsequent rulers of Kuwait. 25 Crystal, Oil and Politics, p. 59. 26 Dickson, no date, British India Ofﬁce (IO) R/15/5/179; unsigned, 8 July 1938, IO R/15/5/205. 27 Unsigned, 8 July 1938, IO R/15/5/205. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, p. 42. 31 Unsigned, 8 July 1938, IO R/15/5/205. 32 Crystal, Oil and Politics, p. 59. 33 Ibid. 34 Pelly, 31 May 1954, British Foreign Ofﬁce (FO) 1016/367. 35 Ibid. 36 Unsigned, 12 April 1954, FO 1016/367. 37 Ibid. 38 Pelly, 10 May 1954, FO 371/109884. 39 Ibid.; unsigned, 12 April 1954, FO 1016/367. 40 Burrows, 20 March 1954, FO 1016/367. 41 Riches report, 7 June 1956, FO 371/120623; unsigned, 12 April 1954, FO 1016/367; Pelly, 10 May 1954, FO 371/109884; Pelly, 31 May 1954, FO 1016/367. 42 Pelly, 10 May 1954, FO 371/109884. 43 Unsigned, 12 April 1954, FO 1016/367. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid.; Pelly, 10 May 1954, FO 371/109884. 47 Unsigned, no date, FO 1016/367; unsigned, 12 April 1954, FO 1016/367. 48 Pelly, 10 May 1954, FO 371/109884. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 See Adel al-Ebrahim, “Perceptions of the People in Kuwait about the Performance of Kuwaiti Police and Mass Media Coverage of Police Activities,” Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Sociology, Birmingham University, 1992, pp. 441–2. 52 Amir’s Decree, in ibid., p. 219. 53 US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1999 (Washington: US Department of State, 2000).

190 Notes and References 54 Abdulaziz al-Fayez, The National Security of Kuwait: External and Internal Dimensions, Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Massachusetts, 1984, p. 170. 55 Ibid., p. 175. 56 Anthony Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability: Saudi Arabia, the Military Balance in the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military Balance (Boulder: Westview, 1988), p. 579. 57 al-Fayez, “The National Security of Kuwait,” p. 177. 58 Ibid. 59 Anthony Cordesman, Kuwait: Recovery and Security After the Gulf War (Boulder: Westview, 1997), p. 119. 60 Qayed, “Press and Authorities in the Arab World,” pp. 103–6. 61 See Mane Obaid Al-Durae, ed., Kuwait Pocket Guide 2000, 15th Edition (Kuwait: Kuwait Publishing House), pp. 53–80. 62 Abdul-Reda Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy: City-State in World Politics (Boulder: Westview, 1990), p. 64. 63 Adeed Dawisha, “Iran’s Mullahs and the Arab Masses,” The Washington Quarterly, 6, 31 (Summer 1983), pp. 162–8. 64 See ibid; James Bill, “Resurgent Islam in the Persian Gulf,” Foreign Affairs, 63, 1 (Fall 1984), pp. 113, 117. 65 Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, p. 65. 66 Ibid. 67 al-Qabas, 17 January 1979. 68 For discussion on establishment Islam vs. popular Islam, see Bill, “Resurgent Islam,” pp. 108–27. 69 KUNA, 25 February 1979. 70 Joseph Kostiner, “Shi’i Unrest in the Gulf,” in Martin Kramer, ed., Shi’ism, Resistance and Revolution (Tel Aviv, Boulder: Westview, 1987), p. 183; Joseph Kostiner, “Kuwait and Bahrain,” in Shireen Hunter, ed., The Politics of Islamic Revivalism: Diversity and Unity (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 124; Joseph Kostiner, “War, Terror, Revolution: The IranIraq Conﬂict,” in Barry Rubin, ed., The Politics of Terrorism: Terror as a State and Revolutionary Strategy (Washington: Johns Hopkins University Foreign Policy Institute, 1988), p. 105. 71 Ibid. 72 See Guardian, 26 July 1979. 73 Ibid.; Eli Flint and Ira Hoffman, “Kuwait,” in Colin Legum and Haim Shaked, Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1978–79 (New York, London: Holmes and Meier, 1980), p. 450. 74 Crystal, Oil and Politics, p. 100. 75 Ibid. 76 al-Rai al-Amm, 13 February 1979, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 16 February 1979. 77 This reﬂected the al-Sabah tradition of promoting societal divisions and creating a climate for co-opting one citizen group over another. See Crystal, Oil and Politics, pp. 100–9. 78 Dilip Hiro, Islamic Fundamentalism (London: Paladin Grafton, 1988), p. 210.

Notes and References 191 79 Regarding discrimination against Shia in Arab Gulf states, see Graham Fuller and Rand Rahim Francke, The Arab Shi’a: The Forgotten Muslims (New York: St. Martin’s, 1999); Kostiner, “Shi’i Unrest in the Gulf,” pp. 178–9. 80 See Robin Wright, Sacred Rage (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), pp. 128–9. 81 Author’s estimate based on Shafeeq Ghabra, “Kuwait and the Dynamics of Socio-Economic Change,” Middle East Journal, 51, 3 (Summer 1997), p. 367–8; Shafeeq Ghabra, “Voluntary Associations in Kuwait: The Foundation of a New System?,” Middle East Journal, 45, 2 (Spring 1991), p. 208; and Bill, “Resurgent Islam,” p. 120. 82 Fuller and Francke, The Arab Shi’a, p. 155. 83 For prominent Shiite families in Kuwait, see J.R.L. Carter, Merchant Families of Kuwait (London: Scorpian, 1984). 84 Two historical examples include Sunnis demanding participation in political decisionmaking in the 1930s and during the height of Arab nationalist sentiment in Kuwait in the 1960s. 85 See Fuller and Francke, The Arab Shi’a, p. 161. 86 See Kostiner, “Shi’ism, Resistance, and Revolution,” p. 175; Fuller and Francke, The Arab Shi’a, pp. 167–8. 87 See Fuller and Francke, The Arab Shi’a, p. 168. 88 See ibid., p. 158; Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, p. 66. 89 See International Herald Tribune (IHT), 7 July 1982; Christian Science Monitor (CSM), 20 February 1980; The Middle East, 12 July 1980. 90 Kostiner, “War, Terror, Revolution,” p. 101; CSM, 26 January 1979; Guardian, 26 July 1979. 91 Kostiner, “Shi’i Unrest in the Gulf,” p. 127. 92 Kuwait News Agency (KUNA), 11 September 1979, in FBIS, 11 September 1979. 93 Gulf News Agency (WAKH), 12 September 1979, in FBIS, 13 September 1979 and British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 14 September 1979. 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid. 96 KUNA, 20 September 1979, in FBIS, 21 September 1979. The Kuwait Information Ministry denied this report (ibid.). 97 Flint and Hoffman, “Kuwait,” p. 451. 98 KUNA, 10 September 1979, in FBIS, 10 September 1979. 99 Ibid. 100 KUNA, 11 September 1979, in BBC, 12 September 1979. 101 Qatar News Agency (QNA), 25 September 1979, in BBC, 27 September 1979. 102 Ibid.; al-Nahar, 26 September 1979; Facts on File, 5 October 1979. 103 Kuwait Domestic Service, 27 October 1979, in BBC, 30 October 1979. 104 KUNA, 10 September 1979; Associated Press (AP), 11 September 1979; Voice of Lebanon, 11 September 1979; Daily Telegraph, 21 September 1979. 105 KUNA, 17 September 1979, in FBIS, 18 September 1979. 106 KUNA, 27 September 1979. 107 US Department of State, US Department of State Human Rights Report 1980 (Washington: US Department of State, 1980), p. 1205.

192 Notes and References 108 See Nabeel Khoury, “The Politics of Intra-Regional Migration in the Arab World,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, VI, 2 (Winter 1982), p. 11; R.K. Ramazani, “Iran’s Islamic Revolution and the Persian Gulf,” Current History, 84, 498 (January 1985), p. 8; Crystal, Oil and Politics, p. 100; Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability, p. 571. 109 al-Hawadith, 26 October 1979. 110 For existing literature on the threat, see Kostiner, “Shi’ism, Resistance, and Revolution,” p. 180. 111 See CSM, 26 January 1980. 112 Ibid. 113 KUNA, 28 September 1979, in BBC, 29 September 1979. 114 See Hiro, Islamic Fundamentalism, p. 209. 115 Agence France Presse (AFP), 16 November 1979. 116 Non-Kuwaiti estimates regarding the number of demonstrators ranged from 3,000 to 5,000. For example, see New York Times (NYT), 11 January 1980; The Dawn, 4 December 1979. 117 al-Siyasa, 1 December 1979, in BBC, 3 December 1979; Iraq News Agency (INA), 30 November 1979, in FBIS, 30 November 1979; KUNA, 1 December 1979, in FBIS, 3 December 1979. 118 The Dawn, 4 December 1979. 119 KUNA, 1 December 1979, in FBIS, 3 December 1979; Kuwait Domestic Service, 30 November 1979, in FBIS, 3 December 1979. 120 KUNA, 18 December 1979, in FBIS, 19 December 1979; Tehran International Service, 11 January 1980, in FBIS, 14 January 1980; NYT, 11 January 1980. 121 For an account of the mosque seizure, see David Holden and Richard Johns, The House of Saud (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1981), pp. 511–26. 122 See CSM, 29 January 1981. 123 See Kostiner, “War, Terror, Revolution,” p. 101. 124 al-Rai, 26 November 1979, in FBIS, 26 November 1979. 125 Voice of Lebanon, 3 December 1979, in FBIS, 4 December 1979. 126 KUNA, 18 December 1979, in BBC, 19 December 1979. 127 KUNA, 17 January 1980, in FBIS, 17 January 1980; United Press International (UPI), 19 January 1980; IHT, 20 January 1980. 128 See Appendix A. 129 Ibid. 130 The Hindu, 26 February 1980; The Hindu, 16 March 1980. 131 Ibid. 132 UPI, 19 January 1980; IHT, 20 January 1980. 133 Stephen Grummon, The Iran-Iraq War: Islam Embattled (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1982), pp. 12–14. 134 Kostiner, “Shi’i Unrest in the Gulf,” p. 183; Kostiner, “Kuwait and Bahrain,” p. 124–5; Kostiner, “War, Terror, Revolution,” p. 105. 135 See ibid. 136 See Appendix A. 137 Author’s calculations based on information provided to her by the Ministry of Justice, Spring 2000. 138 See AP, 27 July 1980. 139 For example, see US News & World Report, 12 May 1980, p. 24. 140 Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conﬂict (New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 35.

Notes and References 193 141 See Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 229. 142 See KUNA, 30 April 1980, in FBIS, 30 April 1980. 143 AP, 29 April 1980. 144 KUNA, no date, in BBC, 6 June 1980. 145 IHT, 13 July 1980; Kostiner, “War, Terror, Revolution,” p. 105; Kostiner, “Kuwait and Bahrain,” p. 125. 146 See Qayed, “Press and Authorities in the Arab World,” p. 98. 147 KUNA, 16 July 1980, in FBIS, 17 July 1980. 148 KUNA, 23 July 1980, in FBIS, 24 July 1980. 149 Regarding the absence of arrests, see KUNA, 23 July 1980, in FBIS, 24 July 1980. 150 AP, 27 July 1980. 151 KUNA, 23 July 1980, in FBIS, 24 July 1980. The crown prince reportedly was also concerned about the circulation of political leaﬂets presumably with subversive content. See ibid.; Kuwait Domestic Service, 23 July 1980, in BBC, 25 July 1980; QNA, 25 July 1980, in FBIS, 28 July 1980. 152 QNA, 25 July 1980, in FBIS, 28 July 1980 and BBC, 29 July 1980. 153 Ibid. 154 KUNA, 16 July 1980, in FBIS, 17 July 1980; KUNA, 2 August 1980, in BBC, 4 August 1980. 155 al-Rai al-Amm, 27 July 1980, in FBIS, 31 July 1980; AP, 27 July 1980; KUNA, 2 August 1980, in BBC, 4 August 1980. 156 Kuwaiti nationals typically have not pursued work as mechanics. 157 KUNA, 29 July 1980, in BBC, 30 July 1980, KUNA, 31 July 1980, in FBIS, 5 August 1980. 158 KUNA, 21 July 1980, in BBC, 22 July 1980; KUNA, 15 November 1980, in BBC, 18 November 1980. 159 Information provided to author by Ministry of Justice, Spring 2000. 160 KUNA, 21 July 1980, in BBC, 22 July 1980, KUNA, 15 November 1980, in BBC, 18 November 1980. 161 Kostiner, “Kuwait and Bahrain,” p. 125. 162 KUNA, 4 February 1979, in FBIS, 4 February 1979; Kuwait Domestic Service, 26 April 1979, in FBIS, 27 April 1979. 163 Economic Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review of Kuwait: 2rd Quarter 1979 (London: Economic Intelligence Unit, 1979), p. 16; Economic Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review of Kuwait: 1st Quarter 1980 (London: Economic Intelligence Unit, 1980), p. 15. 164 See Crystal, Oil and Politics, p. 102; Keesing’s Record of World Events, “Kuwait: Decree on the Holding of Parliamentary Elections – Internal Security Developments – Cabinet Changes,” February 1981. 165 Flint and Hoffman, “Kuwait,” p. 449. 166 See Keesing’s Record of World Events, “Kuwait,” February 1981. 167 For example, see Jill Crystal, Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State (Boulder: Westview, 1992), pp. 97–8; Baaklini, “Legislatures in the Gulf Area,” pp. 375–77; Crystal, Oil and Politics, pp. 100–3. 168 See Crystal, Oil and Politics, p. 102. 169 For example, see KUNA, 4 February 1979, in FBIS, 6 February 1979; Kuwait Domestic Service, 26 April 1979, in FBIS, 27 April 1979. 170 Kuwait Domestic Service, 17 February 1979, in FBIS, 23 February 1979.

194 Notes and References 171 KUNA, 25 February 1979. 172 KUNA, 4 February 1979, in FBIS, 6 February 1979. 173 Economic Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review of Kuwait: 3rd Quarter 1979 (London: Economic Intelligence Unit, 1979), p. 10. 174 KUNA, 24 January 1980, in FBIS, 24 January 1980. 175 KUNA, 10 February 1980, in FBIS, 14 February 1980. 176 KUNA, 18 February 1980, in FBIS, 21 February 1980. 177 NYT, 1 April 1980. 178 KUNA, 28 December 1980, in FBIS, 30 December 1980. 179 Although Shia represented 30 percent of the candidates in the general election, only four Shia won seats in the new assembly, down from ten in the 1975 assembly. See AP, 15 February 1981; Crystal, Oil and Politics, p. 103. 180 Reportedly, Saudi Arabia lobbied Kuwait to minimize the nationalist candidates’ chances for success in the assembly elections. See CSM, 29 January 1981. 181 Business Week, 12 March 1979; Financial Times (FT), 27 March 1979. 182 Business Week, 12 March 1979. 183 WAKH, 3 January 1979, in FBIS, 3 January 1979. 184 Press suspensions included al-Talia for one month on 14 June; al-Hadaf for three months on 16 June; al-Mujtama for one month and a half on 6 September; al-Siyasa for three days on 10 September; and al-Mujtama for two weeks in December. See QNA, 14 June 1979; QNA, 17 June 1979; al-Rai al-Amm, 20 August 1979; Reuters, 6 September 1979; Flint and Hoffman, “Kuwait,” p. 450. 185 Al-Mujtama was suspended for two weeks in April for criticism of Syria; alRai al-Amm for three days in April for unsubstantiated reports about Oman hosting US aircraft; and al-Talia for two weeks in June and again in November for criticizing Saudi Arabia. See KUNA, no date reported, in BBC, 29 April 1980; KUNA, 24 November 1980, in BBC, 25 November 1980. 186 UPI, 22 February 1981. 187 Economic Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review of Kuwait: 1st Quarter 1981 (London: Economic Intelligence Unit, 1981). 188 See ibid.; Esther Webman and Adam King, “Kuwait,” in Colin Legum, Haim Shaked and D. Dishon, eds, Middle East Contemporary Survey 1980–81 (New York, London: Holmes and Meier, 1983), pp. 474–5. 189 al-Rai al-Amm, 6 May 1982. 190 See Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, p. 73. 191 Personal discussion with Kuwaiti Shiite professionals, Kuwait, Spring 2000. 192 Personal discussion with Kuwait National Assembly deputy, Kuwait, Spring 2000. 193 See Bill, “Resurgent Islam,” pp. 108–37. 184 Crystal, Oil and Politics, p. 103. 195 Dore Gold, “Kuwait,” in Haim Shaked and D. Dishon, eds, Middle East Contemporary Survey 1983–84 (Boulder: Westview, 1986), pp. 403–4. 196 See Neil Hicks and Ghanim al-Najjar, “The Utility of Tradition: Civil Society in Kuwait,” in Augustus Richard Norton, ed., Civil Society in the Middle East (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), pp. 196–7. 197 See Ghabra, “Voluntary Associations in Kuwait,” p. 207. 198 Haya al-Mughni, “Women’s Organizations in Kuwait,” Middle East Report, 198 (January-February 1996), p. 32.

Notes and References 195 199 See Ahmad Mustafa Abu-Hakima, The Modern History of Kuwait, 1750–1965 (London: Luzac, 1983). 200 Hassan al-Ebraheem, Kuwait and the Gulf: Small States and the International System (Washington, Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1984), p. 68. 201 Crystal, Kuwait, p. 135. 202 QNA, 3 May 1979; al-Anba, 17 May 1979. 203 Crystal, Kuwait, p. 135. 204 See Keesings Record of World Events, “Kuwait: Visit of Prime Minister to Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Oman – Agreements on Economic Unity with Bahrain and United Arab Emirates,” March 1979. 205 See R.K. Ramazani, The Gulf Cooperation Council: Record and Analysis (Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1988), pp. 33–60. 206 See ibid. 207 Radio Moscow in Arabic, 6 February 1981, in BBC, 9 February 1981. 208 Ibid. 209 Ramazani, The Gulf Cooperation Council, pp. 33–60. 210 See al-Anba, 17 November 1982, in FBIS, 22 November 1982. 211 See R. K. Ramazani, “Shi’ism in the Persian Gulf,” in Juan Cole and Nikkie Keddie, eds, Shi’ism and Social Protest (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), p. 49. 212 Ibid. Also see KUNA, 14 January 1982, in FBIS, 15 January 1982. 213 FT, 24 February 1982. 214 FT, 21 January 1982; KUNA, 3 January 1982, in FBIS, 4 January 1982; KUNA, 20 January 1981, in FBIS, 22 January 1981. 215 al-Khalij, 27 December 1981, in FBIS, 28 December 1981. Also see FT, 21 January 1982. 216 Esther Webman and Yitzhak Gal, “Kuwait,” in Colin Legum, Haim Shaked and D. Dishon, eds, Middle East Contemporary Survey 1981–82 (New York, London: Holmes and Meier, 1984), p. 502. 217 The other bilateral agreements included this right. 218 See CSM, 29 January 1981. 219 KUNA, 8 February 1981, in FBIS, 9 February 1981. 220 Damascus Domestic Service, 10 February 1981, in BBC, 11 February 1981; UPI, 10 February 1981. 221 KUNA, 31 March 1981, in BBC, 1 April 1981. 222 KUNA, 20 June 1981, in BBC, 23 June 1981. 223 Ibid. 224 Iraq News Agency, 29 June 1981, in BBC, 1 July 1981; KUNA, 12 July 1981, in BBC, 14 July 1981. 225 Iraq News Agency, 29 June 1981, in BBC, 1 July 1981. 226 KUNA, 5 July 1981, in BBC, 7 July 1981; KUNA, 4 July 1981, in BBC, 6 July 1981. 227 KUNA, 12 July 1981, in BBC, 14 July 1981. 228 Author’s calculations based on information provided to her by Kuwait Ministry of Justice, Spring 2000. 229 KUNA, 15 August 1981, in FBIS, 17 August 1981. Justice Ministry information indicates that ten rather than nine of the suspects were found guilty (ibid.). 230 Also see Webman and Gal, “Kuwait,” p. 501.

196 Notes and References 231 Radio Baghdad, 27 June 1981. 232 See Christopher Story, “Kuwait’s Evolving Links with the Soviets,” ArabAsian Affairs, 110 (May 1982) p. 4. 233 See ibid., p. 3. 234 See Keesings Record of World Events, “Kuwait: Internal Security Developments,” April 1983. 235 KUNA, 15 July 1981, in BBC, 17 July 1981. 236 Ibid. 237 al-Anba, 1 November 1981; al-Watan, 4 November 1981. 238 KUNA, 13 March 1982, in FBIS, 15 March 1982; al-Siyasa, 20 April 1982. 239 KUNA, 15 July 1981, in BBC, 17 July 1981. 240 See Appendix A. 241 Ibid. 242 KUNA, 13 April 1981, in BBC, 14 April 1981. 243 See Appendix A. 244 Ibid. 245 FT, 29 May 1982. 246 Ibid. 247 KUNA, 22 June 1982, in FBIS, 23 June 1982. 248 FT, 29 May 1982. 249 Ibid.; Tehran Domestic Service, 13 May 1982, in BBC, 17 May 1982. 250 Ilan Karmi and Yitzhak Gal, “Kuwait,” in Colin Legum, H. Shaked and D. Dishon, Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1982–83 (New York, London: Holmes and Meier, 1985), p. 476. 251 Radio Tehran, 5 November 1982, in BBC, 6 November 1982. For Kuwaiti reporting on some of the arrests, see KUNA, 30 October 1982, in BBC, 1 November 1982. 252 KUNA, 30 October 1982, in FBIS, 2 November 1982. 253 KUNA, 30 October 1982, in BBC, 1 November 1982. 254 Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), 8 March 1983, by Keesings Record of World Events, “Kuwait: Security Measures against Iranian Shias, March 1983–January 1984,” February 1984. 255 QNA, 4 April 1983, in FBIS, 5 April 1983. 256 US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1983 (Washington, US Department of State, 1983), p. 1036. 257 Ibid.; Radio Kuwait, no date reported, in BBC, 21 September 1982. 258 See Keesings Record of World Events, “Kuwait: Attacks on Diplomats,” April 1983. 259 See Washington Post (WP), 9 November 1982. 260 See FT, 23 February 1983. 261 See Patrick Seale, Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire (New York: Random House, 1992), p. 130. 262 See ibid.; AFP, 8 October 1982, in FBIS, 12 October 1982. 263 Ibid. 264 See Seale, Abu Nidal, p. 130. 265 Arab Times, 5 July 1982, in FBIS, 7 July 1982. 266 Ibid.; author’s calculations based on information provided to her by Kuwait Ministry of Justice, Spring 2000. 267 KUNA, 5 October 1982, in FBIS, 6 October 1982.

Notes and References 197 268 KUNA, 6 October 1982, in FBIS, 7 October 1982. 269 See Seale, Abu Nidal, p. 130. 270 Andrzej Kapiszewski, Nationals and Expatriates: Population and Labor Dilemmas of the Gulf Cooperation Council States (Reading: Ithaca, 2001), pp. 37–40. 271 Regarding the Palestinian-Iranian meeting, see Tehran International Service, 15 June 1982, in FBIS, 16 June 1982. 272 KUNA, 21 June 1982, in FBIS, 22 June 1982. 273 Arab Times, 15 July 1982, in FBIS, 16 July 1982. 274 Xinhua, 9 August 1982. 275 KUNA, 8 August 1982, in FBIS, 9 August 1982, (100,000 people); US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1983, p. 1003, (50,000 people). 276 KUNA, 17 August 1982, in FBIS, 17 August 1982; al-Qabas, 17 August 1982, in FBIS, 17 August 1982. 277 Kuwait did participate, however, in a region-wide general strike on 14 April, organized by Saudi Arabia’s King Khalid, to protest the actions of an Israeli who ﬁred upon worshippers at Jerusalem’s al-Aqsa mosque. See KUNA, 12 April 1982, in FBIS, 13 April 1982; KUNA, 14 April 1982, in FBIS, 15 April 1982. 278 KUNA, 6 October 1982. 279 KUNA, 3 January 1983, in FBIS, 7 January 1983. 280 Interior Ministry yearbook ﬁgures show no difference in the number of monthly deportations of “Jordanians”—primarily Palestinians with Jordanian citizenship—immediately before, during or after the September attacks. The ﬁgures for August, September, October and November are: 14, 9, 7 and 12, respectively (see Appendix A). 281 Anh Longva, Walls Built on Sand: Migration, Exclusion and Society in Kuwait (Boulder: Westview, 1997), p. 29. 282 Ibid. 283 Flint and Hoffman, “Kuwait” (MECS 1978–79), p. 450. 284 KUNA, 14 January 1982, in FBIS, 15 January 1982. 285 Law No. 55 of July 1982, as reported in Kuwait al-Yawm Digest, Issue 1414, pp. 12–14. 286 Arab Times, 16 November 1982, in FBIS, 24 November 1982. 287 al-Siyasa, 18 November 1982, in FBIS, 24 November 1982. 288 Arab Times, 16 November 1982, in FBIS, 24 November 1982. 289 FT, 23 February 1983. 290 Ibid. 291 See KUNA, 2 February 1984, in FBIS, 3 February 1984; Arab Times, 18 March 1984, in FBIS, 21 March 1984; KUNA and Kuwait Domestic Service, 26 January 1985, in BBC, 28 January 1985; Arab Times, 27 January 1985, in FBIS, 29 January 1985; KUNA, 21 December 1985, in FBIS, 23 December 1985; al-Tadamun, 27 July–2 August 1985, in FBIS, 30 July 1985. 292 See Shahram Chubin, “The Islamic Republic’s Foreign Policy in the Gulf;” in Martin Kramer, ed., Shi’ism, Resistance and Revolution (Boulder: Westview, 1987), pp. 159–71; Kostiner, “Shi’i Unrest in the Gulf,” pp. 173–86; Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis (New York: St. Martin’s, 1998), pp. 91–3.

198 Notes and References 293 KUNA, 12 December 1983 (07:03 GMT, 0733 GMT), in FBIS, 12 December 1983. 294 Wright, Sacred Rage, p. 112. 295 KUNA, 12 December 1983 (15:30 GMT), in FBIS, 12 December 1983. 296 KUNA, 12 December 1983 (10:12 GMT), in FBIS, 12 December 1983. The owner of the vehicles was a Kuwaiti government employee (al-Rai al-Amm, 13 December 1983, in FBIS, 15 December 1983; KUNA, 12 December 1983, in FBIS, 12 December 1983. 297 Some accounts stated that two individuals occupied the explosive-laden truck, but the investigation concluded that there was only the driver (see KUNA, 12 December 1983 (15:30 GMT), in FBIS, 12 December 1983). 298 QNA, 13 December 1983, in FBIS, 13 December 1983. 299 See Wright, Sacred Rage, pp. 12–24. 300 KUNA, 12 December 1983 (15: 59 GMT), in FBIS, 12 December 1983. 301 UPI, 13 December 1983; KUNA, 13 December 1983, in FBIS, 13 December 1983. 302 al-Siyasa, 16 December 1983, in FBIS, 19 December 1983. 303 Wright, Sacred Rage, p. 113. 304 Ibid. 305 UPI, 13 December 1983; NYT, 17 December 1983. 306 Ramazani, “Iran’s Islamic Revolution,” p. 7. 307 WP, 12 December 1983. 308 See KUNA, 29 December 1983, in FBIS, 30 December 1983; Radio Monte Carlo, 16 December 1983, in FBIS, 19 December 1983. Also see KUNA, 13 December 1983, in FBIS, 13 December 1983. 309 Wright, Sacred Rage, pp. 110–13. 310 WP, 14 December 1983. 311 Regarding Iran’s denial of responsibility for the attacks, see Tehran Domestic Service, 13 December 1983, in BBC, 15 December 1983. 312 Radio Tehran, 29 December 1983, in BBC, 31 December 1983. 313 FBIS Daily Summary, 14 December 1983. 314 AFP, 12 December 1983. 315 Ibid. 316 NYT, 17 December 1983; Kostiner, “Shi’i Unrest in the Gulf,” pp. 180–1. 317 KUNA, 18 December 1983, in FBIS, 19 December 1983. 318 Ibid. 319 KUNA, 27 December 1983, in FBIS, 27 December 1983. 320 KUNA, 10 January 1984, in FBIS, 11 January 1984. 321 KUNA, 23 January 1984, KUNA, 24 January 1984. 322 IHT, 22 February 1984; NYT, 27 September 1985; Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon, p. 91. 323 FT, 7 August 1985; Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon, p. 91. 324 AP, 15 December 1983. 325 FBIS Daily Summary, 19 December 1983. 326 Radio Tehran, 18 December 1983, in BBC, 20 December 1983. 327 See Tehran International Service, 22 December 1983, in FBIS, 23 December 1983. 328 Ibid. 329 WAKH, 26 December 1983, in FBIS, 28 December 1983. 330 Radio Tehran, 26 December 1983, in BBC, 28 December 1983.

Notes and References 199 331 QNA, 12 December 1983; al-Qabas, 14 December 1983, in FBIS, 16 December 1983; Radio Monte Carlo, 16 December 1983, in FBIS, 19 December 1983. 332 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 1984, London, p. 345. 333 Ibid. 334 QNA, 19 January 1984, in BBC, 21 January 1984. 335 al-Qabas, 28 April 1984, in FBIS, 1 March 1984. 336 See Appendix A. 337 Ibid. 338 Ibid. 339 Ibid. 340 Radio Tehran reported that 630 Iranians had been deported from Kuwait during the two-month period from mid-December to mid-February (IRNA, 13 February 1984, in BBC, 15 February 1984). 341 KUNA, 7 June 1984, in FBIS, 7 June 1984, KUNA, 7 June 1984, in BBC, 8 June 1984. 342 al-Siyasa, 15 June 1984, in FBIS, 18 June 1984. 343 Ibid. 344 The 22-year-old Kuwaiti was charged with joining a subversive group, distributing subversive literature, and participating in an attempt to bomb the Information Ministry complex. INA, 26 January 1985, in BBC, 28 January 1985; KUNA, 26 January 1985, in BBC, 29 January 1985; Arab Times, 12 January 1985, in FBIS, 14 January 1985. 345 Gulf Daily News, 27 January 1985, in FBIS, 28 January 1985. 346 KUNA, 13 February 1985, in FBIS, 13 February 1985; KUNA, 13 February 1985, in BBC, 14 February 1985. 347 al-Anba, 22 April 1984, in FBIS, 24 April 1984; al-Siyasa, 10 July 1984, in FBIS, 12 July 1984. 348 KUNA, 13 December 1983, in FBIS, 14 December 1983. 349 al-Anba, 18 March 1984, in FBIS, 22 March 1984. 350 KUNA, 13 December 1983, in FBIS, 14 December 1983. 351 Arab Times, 20 December 1983, in FBIS, 22 December 1983. 352 Arab Times, 8 January 1984, in FBIS, 10 January 1984. 353 Arab Times, 24 April 1984, in FBIS, 26 April 1984. 354 FT, 22 February 1984; KUNA, 26 January 1984, in FBIS, 26 January 1984. 355 FT, 19 January 1984. 356 al-Watan, 30 March 1984, in FBIS, 3 April 1984. 357 Arab Times, 14 April 1984, in FBIS, 16 April 1984. 358 Arab Times, 26 April 1984, in FBIS, 26 April 1984. 359 FT, 13 January 1984. 360 al-Qabas, 9 April 1984, in FBIS, 12 April 1984. 361 Arab Times, 24 April 1984, in FBIS, 26 April 1984. 362 The deterioration in Kuwait’s economic situation due to the 1982 Suq alManakh crash and resultant decline in private sector activities beginning in 1983 might also account for some of the drop in the number of the labor and residence permits issued. See Ala’a al-Yousuf, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia: From Prosperity to Retrenchment (Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, May 1980), pp. 62–81. 363 Kuwait Ministry of Interior internal yearbook information provided to the author by the ministry, Spring 2000.

200 Notes and References 364 Two economic factors that might have impacted this trend included the trimming of the government bureaucracy in 1984 and in the process hiring fewer public administrators which typically included Arabs such as Palestinians and Egyptians, and Kuwait’s changing economic environment that favored less expensive Asians over expatriate Arabs (see chapter three). 365 KUNA, 4 May 1985, in FBIS, 6 May 1985; al-Watan, 5 May 1985, in FBIS, 7 May 1985. 366 Arab Times, 7 May 1985, in FBIS, 10 May 1985. 367 Ibid.; KUNA, 4 May 1985, in FBIS, 6 May 1985; Arab Times, 20 March 1985, in FBIS, 22 March 1985. 368 KUNA, 4 May 1985, in FBIS, 6 May 1985. 369 al-Rai al-Amm, 28 October 1984, in FBIS, 30 October 1984. 370 al-Anba, 5 July 1984, in FBIS, 6 July 1984. 371 al-Qabas, 17 April 1984, in FBIS, 19 April 1984. 372 al-Rai al-Amm, 28 October 1984, in FBIS, 30 October 1984. 373 Arab Times, 29 July 1984, in FBIS, 31 July 1984. 374 al-Anba, 28 July 1984, in FBIS, 30 July 1984. 375 KUNA, 2 February 1984, in FBIS, 3 February 1984; KUNA, 26 January 1984, in BBC, 27 January 1984. 376 KUNA, 26 January 1984, in BBC, 27 January 1984. 377 Radio Tehran, 10 March 1985, in BBC, 13 March 1985. 378 al-Anba, 13 June 1984, in FBIS, 15 June 1984. 379 Arab Times, 17–18 May 1984, in FBIS, 22 May 1984. 380 al-Anba, 13 June 1984, in FBIS, 15 June 1984. 381 Regarding the interrogation of the inﬁltrators, see al-Anba, 13 June 1984, in FBIS, 15 June 1984. For Shaykh Nawwaf on arrests, see KUNA, 24 June 1984, in FBIS, 25 June 1984. 382 KUNA and Tehran Domestic Service, 24 June 1984, in BBC, 26 June 1984; WAKH, 26 June 1984, in FBIS, 27 June 1984. 383 Radio Tehran, 10 March 1985, in BBC, 13 March 1985. 384 al-Siyasa, 21 May 1985, in FBIS, 23 May 1985. 385 al-Qabas, 6 June 1984, in FBIS, 7 June 1984. 386 Arab Times, 15 July 1984, in FBIS, 17 July 1984. 387 KUNA, 27 March 1984, in FBIS, 27 March 1984. 388 FT, 13 January 1984. 389 FT, 28 March 1984. 390 Kuwait Domestic Service, 6 December 1984, in FBIS, 7 December 1984. 391 James Bruce, “In Search of Imad Mughniyeh, Part Two,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 12, 3 (March 2000), p. 23. 392 al-Qabas, 19 December 1984, in FBIS, 21 December 1984; al-Qabas, 2 June 1985, in FBIS, 4 June 1985; KUNA, 7 May 1986, in FBIS, 8 May 1986. 393 Bruce, “In Search of Imad Mughniyeh,” p. 23. 394 al-Anba, 9 December 1984, in FBIS, 11 December 1984. 395 al-Qabas, 14 December 1984, in FBIS, 17 December 1984. 396 See Appendix A. 397 See WP, 10 March 1986. 398 AFP, 25 May 1985. 399 Voice of Lebanon, 26 May 1985, in FBIS, 28 May 1985. 400 al-Rai al-Amm, 27 May 1985, in FBIS, 29 May 1985.

Notes and References 201 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411

412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422

423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440

al-Anba, 26 May 1985; al-Rai al-Amm, 26 May 1985. Xinhua, 25 May 1985. WAKH, 29 May 1985, in FBIS, 30 May 1985. Arab Times, 28 May 1985, in FBIS, 30 May 1985. WAKH, 30 May 1985, in FBIS, 31 May 1985. Arab Times, 26 June 1985, in FBIS, 28 June 1985. Arab Times, 3 July 1985, in FBIS, 5 July 1985. Kuwait Domestic Service, 27 May 1985, in FBIS, 28 May 1985. Ibid. al-Anba, 5 June 1985, in FBIS, 7 June 1985. Gulf Daily News, 29 May 1985; al-Watan, 2 June 1985, in FBIS, 4 June 1984; QNA, 4 June 1985, in FBIS, 5 June 1984; AP, 26 May 1985; Hiro, Islamic Fundamentalism, p. 215; see Appendix A. See Appendix A. Ibid. KUNA, 30 June 1985, in FBIS, 1 July 1984. KUNA, 2 July 1985, in BBC, 4 July 1985. al-Rai al-Amm, 13 June 1985, in FBIS, 18 June 1985. al-Anba, 27 May 1985, in FBIS, 28 May 1985; al-Khalij, 27–28 May 1985, in FBIS, 29 May 1985. Abu Dhabi Domestic Service, 30 May 1985, in FBIS, 31 May 1985. al-Tadamun, 27 July–2 August 1985, in FBIS, 30 July 1985. al-Khalij, 5 June 1985, in FBIS, 5 June 1985. QNA, 2 August 1985, in FBIS, 5 August 1985. Another caller claimed responsibility on behalf of Islamic Jihad, and a third caller claimed Islamic Jihad was not responsible (see Gulf Daily News, 30 July 1985, in FBIS, 30 July 1985). See Seale, Abu Nidal, p. 130. Kostiner, “Shi’i Unrest in the Gulf,” p. 181. AFP, 12 July 1985. FT, 7 August 1985. UPI, 17 July 1985; LAT, 12 August 1985. Ibid. See Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 461–6. See Middle East News Agency (MENA), 7 September 1985, in FBIS, 9 September 1985. FT, 7 August 1985. Ibid. Ibid.; LAT, 12 August 1985. FT, 7 August 1985. KUNA and Kuwait Domestic Service, 15 July 1985, in BBC, 17 July 1985. FT, 7 August 1985; Arab Times, 18 July 1985, in FBIS, 22 July 1985. LAT, 12 August 1985. San Diego Union Tribune, 12 July 1985. FT, 7 August 1985. Although some Pakistanis in Kuwait are Shia, generally they were perceived as less threatening at the time than Arab Shia because of the lack of evidence of Pakistani Shiite extremist activity in Kuwait.

202 Notes and References 441 442 443 444 445 446

447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454

455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464

465 466 467 468 469 470

Gulf Daily News, 30 July 1985, in FBIS, 30 July 1985. Guardian, 6 September 1985. QNA, 20 October 1985, in FBIS, 22 October 1985. WAKH, 14 April 1986, in FBIS, 18 April 1986. For example, see QNA, 19 January 1984, in BBC, 21 January 1984; KUNA, 2 July 1985, in BBC, 4 July 1985. Criticism emanating from Damascus and Tehran over Kuwaiti deportations following the attack on the amir had expanded to include Nabih Birri in Lebanon (see Beirut Domestic Service, 31 August 1985, in BBC, 2 September 1985). QNA, 20 October 1985, in FBIS, 22 October 1985; WAKH, 14 April 1986, in FBIS, 18 April 1986. Radio Kuwait, 13 July 1985, in BBC, 15 July 1985. Author’s calculations based on information provided to her by Kuwait Ministry of Justice, Spring 2000. Court trials did not necessarily take place in the same year that the cases were ﬁrst registered with the Justice Ministry. Ibid. Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 1986 (London: Amnesty International, 1986), p. 341. Author’s calculations based on information provided to her by Kuwait Ministry of Justice, Spring 2000. Some trials involved individuals charged with violent crimes and individuals charged with knowledge of or indirect relation to violent crimes. The trials generally connected to violent crimes are categorized here as violence-related cases. Dore Gold, “Kuwait,” (MECS 1983–84), p. 404. Ibid., p. 405, citing al-Anba, 18 March 1984 and al-Watan, 11, 14, 16 and 18 June 1984. Arab Times, 25 April 1984, in FBIS, 27 April 1984. Hiro, Islamic Fundamentalism, p. 215. KUNA, 12 February 1986, in FBIS, 13 February 1986. Emirates News Agency (WAM), 14 March 1986, in FBIS, 14 March 1986. For example, see Radio Tehran, 8 April 1986, in BBC, 10 April 1986. See Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, p. 100. Ibid., p. 102. For example, Kuwait approached Britain for security protection against Saudi Arabia and Iraq in 1921 and 1961, respectively. See Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, pp. 19–29; Crystal, Kuwait, pp. 7–30; Joyce, Kuwait, pp. 93–118. See AP, 16 January 1980; Kuwait Domestic Service, 4 April 1981, in BBC, 6 April 1981. Riyadh Domestic Service, 11 November 1981, in BBC, 13 November 1981. KUNA, no date reported, in BBC, 8 October 1981. KUNA, 5 April 1983, in BBC, 6 April 1983. WAKH, 26 November 1984, in FBIS, 28 November 1984. Gold, “Kuwait” (MECS 1983–84), p. 409. Given the timing of the change, the new approach likely was linked to security plans following the December 1983 bombings.

Notes and References 203 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481

482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499

500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509

AP, 20 March 1984. KUNA, no date reported, in BBC, 23 March 1984. KUNA, 27 March 1984, in FBIS, 28 March 1984. KUNA, 2 May 1984, in FBIS, 3 May 1984; KUNA, 12 April 1984, in FBIS, 14 April 1984. KUNA, 17 April 1984, in FBIS, 17 April 1984; KUNA, 18 April 1984, in FBIS, 19 April 1984. IHT, 22 May 1984; FT, 22 May 1984. FT, 22 February 1988. KUNA, 7 April 1986, in FBIS, 7 April 1986. See Gold, “Kuwait” (MECS 1986), p. 309. al-Qabas, 13 May 1987, in FBIS, 14 May 1987. KUNA, 8 November 1986, in FBIS, 10 November 1986; KUNA, 23–24 November 1986, in BBC, 26 November 1986. al-Wafd, 30 October 1986. Ahmad al-Khatib speciﬁcally referred to Kuwait’s desire to coordinate more closely with the GCC before pursuing international involvement in the Gulf. Ibid. Arab Times, 28 March 1986, in FBIS, 31 March 1986. Ibid. Arab Times, 2 April 1986, in FBIS, 4 April 1986. Ibid. FT, 3 July 1986; The Economist, 12 July 1986. KUNA, 11 May 1986, in FBIS, 13 May 1986. al-Siyasa, 19 May 1986, in FBIS, 21 May 1986 and BBC, 19 May 1986. FT, 8 July 1986; CSM, 11 February 1987. FT, 8 July 1986. CSM, 11 February 1987; Toronto Star, 22 February 1987; Crystal, Oil and Politics, p. 106. FT, 18 December 1986. See Crystal, Kuwait, p. 99. See Crystal, Oil and Politics, p. 105. Kuwait Domestic Service, 3 July 1986, in FBIS, 7 July 1986. Arab Times, 5 July 1986, in FBIS, 7 July 1986. Kuwait Domestic Service, 3 July 1986, in FBIS, 7 July 1986. al-Watan, 4 July 1986, in FBIS, 7 July 1986. Also see Kuwait Domestic Service, 13 July 1986, in FBIS, 14 July 1986; Kuwait Domestic Service, 29 July 1986, in FBIS, 30 July 1986. Kuwait Domestic Service, 3 July 1986, in FBIS, 7 July 1986. Kuwait Domestic Service, 31 August 1986, in BBC, 4 September 1986. Kuwait Domestic Service, 3 July 1986, in FBIS, 7 July 1986. Ibid. Prior to the new laws, content prohibitions were selectively enforced, and violators usually were only issued warnings. Ibid. Toronto Star, 22 February 1987. CSM, 11 February 1987. Toronto Star, 22 February 1987; LAT, 26 December 1988. Toronto Star, 22 February 1987; Xinhua, 23 May 1987. Xinhua, 19 June 1986.

204 Notes and References 510 KUNA, 19 June 1986, in FBIS, 19 June 1986. 511 al-Ittihad, 19 June 1986. Also see Baghdad Domestic Service, 18 June 1986, in FBIS, 18 June 1986. 512 Jerusalem Post, 20 June 1986; KUNA, 21 June 1986, in BBC, 24 June 1986. 513 Ukaz, 23 June 1986, in FBIS, 27 June 1986. 514 Radio Monte Carlo, 25 June 1986, in FBIS, 26 June 1986. 515 al-Anba, 22 June 1986, in FBIS, 24 June 1986. 516 KUNA, 17 June 1986, in FBIS, 18 June 1986. 517 Xinhua, 22 June 1986; KUNA, 20 June 1986, in FBIS, 20 June 1986. 518 See Xinhua, 19 June 1986; al-Ittihad, 19 June 1986. 519 See KUNA, 21 June 1986, in FBIS, 23 June 1986; al-Siyasa, 22 June 1986, in FBIS, 24 June 1986. 520 al-Anba, 22 June 1986, in FBIS, 24 June 1986. 521 See Appendix A. 522 In 1985, 17,805 expatriates were deported from Kuwait, and 11,227 in 1986 (ibid.). 523 Ukaz, 23 June 1986, in FBIS, 27 June 1986. The move echoed an amendment earlier in the year to the 1966 nationality law that delayed for ten years the granting of voting privileges to Kuwait’s second-category citizens. The law was amended further in 1987 to extend the waiting period for naturalized Kuwaitis to attain voting rights. 524 Xinhua, 27 July 1986. 525 The new law paralleled existing laws stipulating that non-Kuwaiti husbands and children of Kuwaiti women were not entitled to Kuwaiti citizenship. 526 Xinhua, 27 July 1986. 527 al-Siyasa, 3 September 1986, by Xinhua, 3 September 1986. 528 The number of new labor permits issued in 1985 and 1986 were 41,623 and 42,227, respectively (Kuwait Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, Social Statistics 1986, p. 136; Kuwait Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, Social Statistics 1987, p. 138). Neither the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor’s Social Statistics yearbook series, nor the Ministry of Planning’s Annual Statistical Abstract yearbook series, provides information for the post-1985 period regarding the number of new labor permits issued annually according to nationality. This exclusion likely resulted from the increasing political sensitivity of the issue at the time. 529 See al-Yousuf, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, pp. 62–81. 530 See Appendix B. 531 KUNA, 1 July 1986, in FBIS, 2 July 1986. 532 KUNA, 13 July 1986, in FBIS, 14 July 1986. 533 Ibid.; AFP, 11 October 1986, in FBIS, 14 October 1986. 534 KUNA, 13 July 1986, in FBIS, 14 July 1986. See Kostiner, “Shi’i Unrest in the Gulf,” p. 181. 535 KUNA, 23 September 1986, in FBIS, 24 September 1986. 536 AFP, 11 October 1986, in FBIS, 14 October 1986. 537 AFP, 4 October 1986, in FBIS, 6 October 1986. 538 KUNA, 23 September 1986, in FBIS, 24 September 1986. The Iraqis reported arrested in July were members of al-Dawa (The Times, 5 July 1986; FT, 14 July 1986; IHT, 5–6 July 1986).

Notes and References 205 539 KUNA, 29 November 1986, in FBIS, 2 December 1986. See also al-Hawadith, 22 May 1987, in FBIS, 3 June 1987. 540 KUNA, 29 November 1986, in FBIS, 2 December 1986 and BBC, 1 December 1986. 541 UPI, 8 December 1986; KUNA, 7 January 1987, in FBIS, 7 January 1987. 542 KUNA, 8 December 1986, in FBIS, 8 December 1986; KUNA, 23 September 1986, in FBIS, 24 September 1986. 543 KUNA, 7 January 1987, in FBIS, 7 January 1987; UPI, 7 January 1987. 544 The Times, 5 July 1986; FT, 14 July 1986; IHT, 5 July 1986; IHT, 6 July 1986. 545 al-Anba, 22 April 1984, in FBIS, 24 April 1984. 546 See al-Anba, 8 November 1986, in FBIS, 12 November 1986; Crystal, Oil and Politics, pp. 106–7. 547 WAKH, 13 April 1986, in FBIS, 18 April 1986 and BBC, 23 April 1986. 548 al-Qabas, 12 April 1986, in FBIS, 18 April 1986. 549 BBC, 8 January 1987. 550 BBC, 14 January 1987. 551 WAKH, 13 September 1986, in FBIS, 14 October 1986; al-Rai al-Amm, 14 October 1986, in FBIS, 17 October 1986. 552 IRNA, 13 October 1986, in BBC, 15 October 1986. 553 UPI, 25 January 1987. 554 UPI, 20 January 1987. 555 AFP, 7 June 1987. 556 Ibid. 557 Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, p. 72. 558 UPI, 18 February 1987. 559 KUNA, 3 February 1987, in FBIS, 4 February 1987; KUNA, 31 January 1987, in BBC, 5 February 1987. 560 KUNA, 8 February 1987, in FBIS, 9 February 1987. 561 al-Hawadith, 22 May 1987, in FBIS, 3 June 1987. 562 KUNA, 31 January 1987, in BBC, 5 February 1987; KUNA, 3 February 1987, in BBC, 5 February 1987; KUNA, 9 March 1987, in FBIS, 10 March 1987. 563 al-Qabas, 8 June 1987, in FBIS, 10 June 1987. 564 Ibid. 565 al-Rai al-Amm, 3 May 1987, in FBIS, 5 May 1987. 566 KUNA, 24 August 1987, in FBIS, 24 August 1987. 567 KUNA, 5 May 1987, in FBIS, 6 May 1987; KUNA, 14 June 1987, in FBIS, 15 June 1987; KUNA, 27 June 1987, in FBIS, 29 June 1987; AP, 4 November 1987. 568 KUNA, 9 March 1987, in FBIS, 10 March 1987; KUNA, 14 June 1987, in FBIS, 15 June 1987. 569 The initial indictment reported in the press identiﬁed 26 individuals to be tried. However, it appears only eight individuals ultimately were tried. See KUNA, 5 May 1987, in FBIS, 6 May 1987; KUNA, 14 June 1987, in FBIS, 15 June 1987; KUNA, 27 June 1987, in FBIS, 29 June 1987; AP, 4 November 1987. 570 KUNA, 5 May 1987, in FBIS, 6 May 1987. 571 Ibid.; KUNA, 14 June 1987, in FBIS, 15 June 1987; KUNA, 27 June 1987, in FBIS, 29 June 1987.

206 Notes and References 572 Author’s calculations based on information provided to her by Kuwait Ministry of Justice, Spring 2000. 573 Radio Free Lebanon, 25 March 1987, in FBIS, 25 March 1987. 574 KUNA, 4 April 1987, in FBIS, 6 April 1987. 575 KUNA, 9 March 1987, in FBIS, 10 March 1987. 576 KUNA, 9 March 1987, in FBIS, 10 March 1987; KUNA, 4 April 1987, in FBIS, 6 April 1987. 577 Ibid.; KUNA, 6 June 1987, in FBIS, 8 June 1987. 578 KUNA, 6 June 1987, in FBIS, 8 June 1987. 579 KUNA, 9 March 1987, in FBIS, 10 March 1987; NYT, 16 September 1987. 580 NYT, 16 September 1987. 581 AFP, 7 June 1987, in FBIS, 8 June 1987; Tanjug, 8 June 1987, in FBIS, 9 June 1987. 582 Tanjug, 8 June 1987, in FBIS, 9 June 1987. 583 al-Qabas, 10 June 1987, in FBIS, 11 June 1987. 584 KUNA, 16 July 1987, in FBIS, 17 July 1987. 585 KUNA, 18 May 1988, in FBIS, 19 May 1988. 586 Voice of Lebanon, 6 December 1987, in FBIS, 7 December 1987. 587 Ibid. 588 Ibid. 589 AP, 24 October 1987. 590 Voice of Lebanon, 6 December 1987, in FBIS, 7 December 1987. 591 This attack was believed to be connected to problems during the hajj in Saudi Arabia and the kingdom’s decision to break relations with Iran (al-Qabas, 29 April 1988, in FBIS, 2 May 1988; Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, p. 166). 592 al-Watan, 10 May 1989. 593 Ibid. 594 US News and World Report, 3 August 1987. 595 Ramazani, “Shi’ism in the Persian Gulf,” p. 51. 596 NYT, 27 July 1987. 597 Arab Times, 17 April 1988, in FBIS, 21 April 1988. 598 al-Hawadith, 22 May 1987, in FBIS, 3 June 1987. 599 Crystal, Oil and Politics, p. 107; Wright, Sacred Rage, pp. 125–33. 600 Personal discussions with Kuwait University students and professionals, Kuwait, 1997–98. 601 Hiro, Islamic Fundamentalism, p. 213; Crystal, Oil and Politics, p. 106; LAT, 12 August 1985; Wright, Sacred Rage, p. 129; AP, 4 November 1987. 602 Personal discussions with Kuwaiti Shia, Kuwait, Spring 2000. 603 Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, p. 71; Wright, Sacred Rage, pp. 128–30. 604 Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy, p. 72. 605 See Kostiner, “Shi’i Unrest in the Gulf,” p. 177–83. 606 Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, al-Thawra al-Risaliya, March 1982, 7, as cited in Kostiner, “Shi’i Unrest in the Gulf,” p. 184. 607 Wright, Sacred Rage, p. 127. 608 KUNA, 4 April 1987, in FBIS, 6 April 1987. 609 Author’s calculations based on information provided to her by Kuwait Ministry of Justice, Spring 2000. 610 Information provided to author by Kuwait Ministry of Justice, Spring 2000.

Notes and References 207 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640

641

642

643 644 645

Ibid. KUNA, 22 February 1988, in FBIS, 22 February 1988. Ibid. KUNA, 10 May 1988, in FBIS, 11 May 1988; KUNA, 4 June 1988, in FBIS, 6 June 1988. Ibid.; KUNA, 28 June 1988, in FBIS, 29 June 1988. For example, see al-Dustur, 5 February 1987, in FBIS, 5 February 1987. Ibid. al-Qabas, 26 January 1988. al-Siyasa, 20 July 1988. al-Sharq al-Awsat, 21 January 1988, in FBIS, 5 February 1988. WAKH, 16 March 1986, in FBIS, 17 March 1986. AP, 31 December 1985. al-Watan, 10 May 1988. Regarding the authorities’ defense, see al-Qabas, 10 October 1988; alSiyasa, 9 January 1988. Cairo Domestic Service, 7 April 1988, in FBIS, 8 April 1988. Also see Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon, p. 101. AFP, 5 April 1988, in FBIS, 6 April 1988. KUNA, 20 April 1988. KUNA, 11 April 1988, in FBIS, 12 April 1988; Voice of Lebanon, 14 April 1988, in FBIS, 15 April 1988. Cairo Domestic Service, 7 April 1988, in FBIS, 8 April 1988. KUNA, 12 April 1988, in FBIS, 14 April 1988. NYT, 14 April 1988. Bruce, “In Search of Imad Mughniyeh,” p. 23. See KUNA, 12 April 1988, in FBIS, 12 April 1988. Bruce, “In Search of Imad Mughniyeh,” p. 23. Radio Free Lebanon, 14 April 1988, in FBIS, 14 April 1988. al-Sharq al-Awsat, 1 May 1988, in FBIS, 10 May 1988. KUNA, 25 April 1988, in FBIS, 25 April 1988. Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon, p. 105. For example, see FT, 23 February 1989. The Kuwaiti defense minister, for one, stated that as long as Iraq and Iran had not signed a peace treaty, Kuwait would remain on “maximum alert and vigilance,” (See Arab Times, 8 January 1989; Arab Times, 2 March 1989; KUNA, 29 March 1989, in FBIS, 30 March 1989). Anat Kurz, “Shi’ite International Terrorism and the Iranian Connection,” in Joseph Alpher, ed., The Middle East Military Balance, 1989–1990 (Boulder: Westview, 1990), p. 175. See US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990, April 1991, p. 29; Joseph Kostiner, “Kuwait,” in Itamar Rabinovich, Haim Shaked and Ami Ayalon, eds, Middle East Contemporary Survey 1989 (Boulder: Westview, 1990), p. 485. Arab Times, 2 March 1989. al-Anba, 21 May 1989; al-Qabas, 23 May 1989; Arab Times, 23 May 1989; al-Watan, 11 June 1989. Author’s calculations based on information provided to her by Kuwait Ministry of Justice, Spring 2000.

208 Notes and References 646 See US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989, April 1990, p. 14. 647 Arab Times, 14 May 1989, in FBIS, 16 May 1989; information provided to author by Kuwait Ministry of Justice, Spring 2000. 648 KUNA, 15 March 1989, in FBIS, 16 March 1989; KUNA, 12 April 1989, in FBIS, 13 April 1989; Arab Times, 14 May 1989, in FBIS, 16 May 1989; KUNA, no date reported, in BBC, 15 May 1989. 649 KUNA, 15 March 1989, in BBC, 17 March 1989; Arab Times, 14 May 1989, in FBIS, 16 May 1989; al-Majalla, 3 October 1989, in FBIS, 2 October 1989. 650 Arab Times, 25 June 1989, in FBIS, 27 June 1989. 651 See FT, 21 September 1989; NYT, 22 September 1989. 652 For Saudi broadcast, see Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Television, 21 September 1989, in BBC, 23 September 1989. For Iranian denial, see IRNA, 23 September 1989, in FBIS, 25 September 1989. 653 In fact, the executions attracted attention from Shia throughout the region, including Iranians, Lebanese and Pakistanis (see Kayhan, 25 September 1989, in FBIS, 20 October 1989). 654 See Kostiner, “Kuwait” (MECS 1989), p. 486. 655 IRNA, 27 September 1989, in FBIS, 27 September 1989; Kayhan, 25 September 1989, in FBIS, 20 October 1989. 656 Amnesty International News Release, 1 March 1990. 657 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 1990 (London: Amnesty International, 1990), p. 145. 658 Ibid.; Jerusalem in Arabic, 24 September 1989, in FBIS, 25 September 1989; IRNA, 27 September 1989, in FBIS, 27 September 1989. 659 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 1990, p. 145; Amnesty International News Release, 17 May 1990; Voice of National Resistance, 28 October 1989, in FBIS, 1 November 1989. 660 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Television, 21 September 1989, in BBC, 23 September 1989. 661 Voice of the Oppressed, 28 October 1989, in FBIS, 1 November 1989; Voice of National Resistance, 28 October 1989, in FBIS, 28 October 1989. 662 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 1990, p. 145; Amnesty International News Release, 17 May 1990. 663 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 1991 (London: Amnesty International, 1991), p. 153. 664 Ibid. 665 Author’s calculations based on information provided to her by Kuwait Ministry of Justice, Spring 2000. 666 Ibid. 667 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 1991, p. 153; US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990, p. 29. 668 KUNA, 21 April 1990, in FBIS, 24 April 1990; Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 1991, p. 153; information provided to author by Kuwait Ministry of Justice, Spring 2000. 669 KUNA, 18 June 1990, in FBIS, 20 June 1990; Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 1991, p. 153. 670 For example, see KUNA, 6 August 1989, in BBC, 10 August 1989; al-Bayadir al-Siyasi, 16 September 1989.

Notes and References 209 671 672 673 674 675 676

677 678 679

680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698

699 700 701 702

For example, see Tehran Times, 5 March 1990, in FBIS, 15 March 1990. Amnesty International News Release, 17 May 1990. See Appendix A. Ibid. US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1990, p. 1176. Arab Times, 23 January 1989, in FBIS, 25 January 1989; Arab Times, 16 January 1989, in FBIS, 18 January 1989; Arab Times, 22 March 1989, in FBIS, 31 March 1989. Arab Times, 22 March 1989, in FBIS, 24 March 1989. Arab Times, 8 March 1989, in FBIS, 10 March 1989. Ofﬁcial documents of the Kuwait Ministry of Planning, as cited by Human Rights Watch, The Bedoons of Kuwait: “Citizens without Citizenship” (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995), p. 11. See ibid., pp. 11–12. See ibid., p. 29. Figure is author’s estimate (see chapter seven). Personal discussions with Kuwait citizens, Kuwait, 1997–98. Tétreault, Stories of Democracy: Politics and Society in Contemporary Kuwait (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 69. Crystal, Kuwait, pp. 120–21; Ghabra, “Voluntary Associations in Kuwait,” p. 214; Tétreault, Stories of Democracy, pp. 68–69. Tétreault, Stories of Democracy, p. 256, footnote 37. See Facts on File, 9 February 1990. See Tétreault, Stories of Democracy, p. 256, footnote 37. For example, see popular sentiments reported in FT, 28 November 1989. Ghabra, “Voluntary Associations in Kuwait,” p. 212; Hicks and al-Najjar, “The Utility of Tradition,” p. 198. Ibid.; Tétreault, Stories of Democracy, p. 69; Crystal, Oil and Politics, p. 179. Ibid.; UPI, 21 February 1985. Hicks and al-Najjar, “The Utility of Tradition,” p. 198. AFP, 28 February 1989, in FBIS, 2 March 1989. See Kuwait Domestic Service, 22 April 1990, in FBIS, 23 April 1990. Arab Times, 17 January 1990. For example, see al-Rai al-Amm, 12 January 1990, in FBIS, 17 January 1990; FT, 16 January 1990; Arab Times, 26 December 1989. Fred Halliday, “Ahmad al-Khatib: A Military Solution Will Destroy Kuwait,” in Middle East Report, 168 (January–February 1991), p. 8. It was generally the conservative, traditional elite who set this tone for the movement. The nationalists and Sunni Islamists joined the traditional elite for the purposes of the 1988–90 movement. See Jacob Goldberg and Joseph Kostiner, “Kuwait,” in Ami Ayalon, ed., Middle East Contemporary Survey 1990 (Boulder: Westview, 1992), pp. 502–3. See Said Aburish, The Rise, Corruption and Coming Fall of the House of Saud (London: Bloomsbury, 1994), p. 142; Crystal, Kuwait, p. 99. FT, 28 November 1989. Tétreault, Stories of Democracy, pp. 70–1. Crystal, Oil and Politics, p. 179; MEED, 19 December 1989, p. 25; MEED, 19 January 1990, p. 24.

210 Notes and References 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716

717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742

Tétreault, Stories of Democracy, pp. 70–1; Facts on File, 9 February 1990. KUNA, 9 January 1990, in FBIS, 10 January 1990 and BBC, 12 January 1990. Ibid. See Crystal, Oil and Politics, p. 106. Tétreault, Stories of Democracy, p. 71. Ibid., p. 72. See Crystal, Kuwait, p. 118. See ibid. Ibid. al-Qabas, 14 February 1990, in FBIS, 16 February 1990. KUNA, 10 April 1990, in FBIS, 11 April 1990. Halliday, “Ahmad al-Khatib,” p. 8. Crystal, Kuwait, p. 119. For example, see KUNA, 5 March 1990, in FBIS, 5 March 1990; KUNA, 19 March 1990, in FBIS, 20 March 1990; Arab Times, 9 April 1990, in FBIS, 11 April 1990. Kuwait Domestic Service, 22 April 1990, in FBIS, 23 April 1990. Ibid. Ghabra, “Voluntary Associations in Kuwait,” p. 212. Tehran International Service, 26 April 1990, in FBIS, 27 April 1990. Ibid. AFP, 5 May 1990, in FBIS, 7 May 1990. KUNA, 9 May 1990, in FBIS, 9 May 1990; AFP, 13 May 1990, in FBIS, 14 May 1990. AFP, 13 May 1990, in FBIS, 14 May 1990. al-Qabas, 15 May 1990, in FBIS, 17 May 1990. NYT, 20 May 1990. Ibid. Tétreault, Stories of Democracy, p. 73. Goldberg and Kostiner, “Kuwait” (MECS 1990), p. 505. Ghabra, “Voluntary Associations in Kuwait,” pp. 212–13; also see CSM, 23 April 1991. Ibid. KUNA, 11 June 1990, in FBIS, 12 June 1990. See KUNA, 15 May 1990, in FBIS, 17 May 1990. AFP, 31 May 1991. AFP, 5 May 1990, in FBIS, 7 May 1990; KUNA, 9 May 1990, in FBIS, 10 May 1990. AFP, 16 July 1990, in FBIS, 17 July 1990. Tétreault, Stories of Democracy, p. 73. Personal discussion with Kuwaiti elite, Kuwait, Spring 2000. For example, see Amnesty International annual reports; Human Rights Watch, The Bedoons of Kuwait; Tétreault, Stories of Democracy. Human Rights Watch, The Bedoons of Kuwait, p. 29. For example, see ibid. For biduns’ participation in resistance activities, see Guardian, 17 March 1991. Data collection on the number or percentage of biduns who joined the Iraqi Popular Army is difﬁcult because of biduns’ hesitancy to discuss this issue for fear of Kuwaiti retribution.

Notes and References 211 743 Human Rights Watch, The Bedoons of Kuwait, p. 23. 744 One Kuwaiti ﬁgure indicates that the number of biduns in the military was cut by two-thirds, and one independent source suggests one-third (Human Rights Watch, The Bedoons of Kuwait, p. 29; WP, 25 May 1995). 745 See Human Rights Watch, The Bedoons of Kuwait, pp. 26–8. 746 See Sunday Telegraph, 4 August 1991. 747 Jerusalem Report, 25 July 1991. 748 Human Rights Watch, The Bedoons of Kuwait, p. 29. 749 See Amnesty International, Iraq/Occupied Kuwait: Human Rights Violations Since 2 August (London: Amnesty International, December 1990), p. 10. Amnesty International reports that 6,000–7,000 military and security detainees had been transferred to Iraq by December according to Kuwaiti sources (ibid.). 750 WP, 7 April 1991. 751 Ibid. 752 Ibid. 753 NYT, 24 May 1991; USA Today, 29 March 1991. 754 NYT, 24 May 1991. 755 WP, 19 February 1991. Fahd al-Jabir al-Sabah, one of the few ruling family members to remain in Kuwait after the invasion, became a hero following his death while trying to save a Kuwaiti palace from the Iraqis. 756 Reportedly in one case, a Kuwaiti ofﬁcial’s public announcement of Iraqi plans to bomb Kuwaiti oil wells—information that originally had been provided to the resistance by three captured, high-ranking Iraqi military men—spoiled resisters’ efforts to defuse the bombs (WP, 7 April 1991). 757 See WP, 19 February 1991; Ghabra, “The Iraqi Occupation of Kuwait,” pp. 112–13. 758 US News and World Report, 17 June 1991; Tétreault, Stories of Democracy, pp. 76–100; James Bruce, “Kuwait’s Defence Dilemma,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 14 December 1991. 759 FT, 8 July 1991; Jerusalem Report, 25 July 1991. 760 Jerusalem Report, 25 July 1991. 761 WP, 13 March 1991. 762 USA Today, 29 March 1991. 763 Shiite representation in the military shrunk from approximately 30 percent before the Iranian revolution to approximately 10 percent in the 1980s (interview with Kuwaiti scholar, Kuwait, Spring 2000). 764 FT, 8 July 1991; USA Today, 29 March 1991; WP, 5 March 1991. 765 USA Today, 29 March 1991. 766 NYT, 4 April 1991. 767 Jane’s Defense Weekly, 14 December 1991; NYT, 24 May 1991; AFP, 9 June, 1991; US News and World Report, 17 June 1991. 768 Jerusalem Report, 25 July 1991; US News and World Report, 17 June 1991. 769 US News and World Report, 17 June 1991. 770 Facts on File, 20 June 1990. 771 Ibid. 772 Ibid. 773 Jane’s Defense Weekly, 14 December 1991. 774 See WP, 22 August 1990.

212 Notes and References 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785

786 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804

805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813

See WP, 10 August 1990. See WP, 22 August 1990; WP, 13 March 1991. See WP, 22 August 1990. See ibid.; WP, 13 March 1991; Observer, 17 March 1991. FT, 21 March 1991. See Boston Globe, 14 March 1991; Observer, 17 March 1991. WP, 7 April 1991. FT, 21 March 1991. FT, 21 March 1991. See Tétreault, Stories of Democracy, pp. 101–31. For discusion on the Jeddah conference, see Milton Viorst, Sandcastles: The Arabs in Search of the Modern World (New York: Knopf, 1994), pp. 261–2; Economic Intelligence Unit, Kuwait Country Report, 4, 1990 (London: Economic Intelligence Unit, 1990), pp. 7–8; Mary Ann Tétreault, The Kuwait Petroleum Corporation and the Economics of the New World Order (Westport: Quorum, 1995), pp. 140–2. For excerpts from Shaykh Saad’s conference address, see Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Television, 13 October 1990, in BBC, 16 October 1990. See Guardian, 13 February 1991. Economic Intelligence Unit, Kuwait Country Report, 1, 1991 (London: Economic Intelligence Unit, 1991), pp. 7–8. Tétreault, Stories of Democracy, p. 86. See Guardian, 13 February 1991. WP, 5 March 1991; AP, 11 March 1991; LAT, 14 April 1991. See WP, 5 March 1991. Ibid. AP, 11 March 1991. See ibid. See Guardian, 21 March 1991; FT, 21 March 1991; NYT, 4 April 1991. Guardian, 21 March 1991. Ibid. NYT, 4 April 1991. Ibid.; Atlanta Constitution, 2 April 1991; Toronto Star, 3 April 1991. Orange County Register, 8 April 1991. Ibid. Independent, 22 April 1991. See ibid.; Joseph Kostiner, “Kuwait,” in Haim Shaked and Ami Ayalon, eds, Middle East Contemporary Survey 1991 (Boulder: Westview, 1992), p. 530; NYT, 24 May 1991. See KUNA, 17 July 1991, in BBC, 20 July 1991. Facts on File, 25 April 1991; AP, 22 April 1991. AP, 22 April 1991. Daily Telegraph, 23 April 1991; Guardian, 23 April 1991. AFP, 31 May 1991. AFP, 16 May 1991. AP, 27 May 1991. UPI, 4 June 1991. See The Times, 3 June 1991; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 3 June 1991.

Notes and References 213 814 The seven political groups included the Islamic Constitution Movement, Islamic League, National Islamic Coalition, Democratic Forum, Constitutional Union, United Parliamentarians, and independents. 815 See Tétreault, Stories of Democracy, pp. 101–31. 816 See Orange County Register, 8 April 1991. 817 AP, 2 June 1991. 818 FT, 1 August 1991. 819 See Facts on File, 18 July 1991. 820 See Jerusalem Report, 25 July 1991. 821 FT, 1 August 1991. Also see FT, 8 July 1991; FT, 31 July 1991. 822 See Shafeeq Ghabra, “The Iraqi Occupation of Kuwait: An Eyewitness Account,” Journal of Palestine Studies, XX, 2 (Winter 1991) 122–4. 823 See FT, 21 March 1991. 824 See WP, 10 August 1990; WP, 22 August 1990. 825 Ghabra, “The Iraqi Occupation of Kuwait,” p. 116. 826 See LAT, 26 June 1991; WP, 21 May 1991. 827 See Amnesty International, Kuwait: Cases of “disappearances,” incommunicado detention, torture and extrajudicial execution under martial law (London: Amnesty International, 1992); Amnesty International, Kuwait: Three years of unfair trials (London: Amnesty International, 1994). 828 Amnesty International, Kuwait: Cases of “disappearances,” p. 1; Amnesty International, Kuwait: Three years of unfair trials, p. 7. 829 Amnesty International, Kuwait: Three years of unfair trials, pp. 1–2. 830 FT, 8 July 1991. Also see Orange County Register, 8 April 1991. 831 See Guardian, 1 June 1991; FT, 8 July 1991; Amnesty International News Release, 18 March 1991; Amnesty International News Release, 19 April 1991. 832 Jerusalem Report, 14 March 1991. 833 See FT, 8 July 1991. 834 Ibid. 835 Independent, 5 March 1991. 836 FT, 9 March 1991. 837 St. Petersburg Times, 14 March 1991. 838 LAT, 14 April 1991; Amnesty International, Kuwait: Five years of impunity: human rights concerns since the withdrawal of Iraqi forces (London: Amnesty International, 1996), pp. 3, 5; Amnesty International, Kuwait: Cases of “disappearances,” p. 1; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 23 April 1991. 839 Facts on File, 28 March 1991. 840 Republic of Tunisia Radio, 22 March 1991, in BBC, 23 March 1991. 841 Amnesty International News Release, 19 April 1991. 842 LAT, 14 April 1991; Amnesty International, Kuwait: Five years of impunity, pp. 3, 5; Amnesty International, Kuwait: Cases of “disappearances,” p. 1; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 23 April 1991. 843 St. Petersburg Times, 14 March 1991. 844 Observer, 7 April 1991. 845 Facts on File, 28 March 1991. Also see WP, 21 March 1991. 846 For example, see Facts on File, 18 April 1991. 847 AP, 27 May 1991.

214 Notes and References 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858

859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876

877 878 879

Amnesty International, Kuwait: Three years of unfair trials, p. 2. Amnesty International News Release, 11 June 1991. See WP, 21 May 1991; Facts on File, 25 May 1991. See Amnesty International, Kuwait: Three years of unfair trials, pp. 1–37. Ibid. For example, see WP, 21 May 1991. Facts on File, 11 July 1991. KUNA, 17 July 1991, in BBC, 20 July 1991. See Jerusalem Report, 27 June 1991. Ibid. Also see FT, 8 July 1991; FT, 31 July 1991, CSM, 31 July 1991. Kuwait Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, Social Statistics 1989, p. 191; Kuwait Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, Social Statistics 1990, p. 195; Kuwait Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, Social Statistics 1992, p. 207. Amnesty International, Kuwait: Cases of “disappearances,” p. 1. Facts on File, 20 June 1991. Facts on File, 11 July 1991; interview with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ofﬁcial, Kuwait, Spring 2000. Jerusalem Post, 16 May 1991. FT, 15 March 1991; FT, 22 May 1991. FT, 9 March 1991. This includes 796,049 non-Kuwaitis and 602,010 Kuwaitis (Kuwait Ministry of Planning, Annual Statistical Abstract 1993, p. 25). FT, 8 July 1991. For example, see ArabicNews.com, 24 January 2005. See al-Qabas, 7 February 2005. AP, 19 February 2005. US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, April 2002; WP, 24 December 2000. See ArabicNews.com, 23 July 2004; al-Siyasa, 23 July 2004, by ArabicNews.com; AP, 15 February 2005. B. Raman, “Jihadi Terrorism: From Iraq to Kuwait,” South Asia Analysis Group, New Delhi, Paper No. 1261, 21 February 2005. Ibid. CSM, 11 February 2005. The Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics,” The Pew Research Center, 14 July 2005. See Gilles Kepel, Jihad: Expansion et Déclin de l’Islamisme (Paris: Gallimand, Revised Edition 2003) regarding aversion to violence following troubling events in other Middle Eastern states including Algeria and Egypt. CSM, 16 February 2005. ArabicNews.com, 18 August 2004; AP, 19 February 2005; NYT, 20 February 2005. NYT, 2 March 2005.

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Newspapers, Magazines, Periodicals, Radio and Television (Includes only publications referenced in the study)

Regional Publications (Arab world, Iran, Israel) Abu Dhabi Domestic Service al-Anba Arab Times ArabicNews.com Baghdad Domestic Service al-Bayadir al-Siyasi Beirut Domestic Service Bushehr Radio Cairo Domestic Service Damascus Domestic Service al-Dustur Emirates News Agency (WAM) Gulf Daily News Gulf News Agency (WAKH) al-Hawadith Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) Iraq News Agency (INA) al-Ittihad Jerusalem in Arabic to the Arab World Jerusalem Post Jerusalem Report Kayhan Keyhan al-Khalij Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Television

226 Bibliography Kuwait Domestic Service Kuwait News Agency (KUNA) Kuwait al-Yawm Middle East News Agency (MENA) al-Nahar al-Qabas Qatar News Agency (QNA) al-Rai al-Rai al-Amm Radio Baghdad Radio Free Lebanon Radio Kuwait Radio Tehran Riyadh Domestic Service Republic of Tunis Radio al-Siyasa al-Tadamun Tehran Domestic Service Tehran International Service The Tehran Times Ukaz Voice of Lebanon Voice of National Resistance Voice of the Oppressed al-Wafd al-Watan

International Publications (United States, Europe, Russia, Asia) Agence France Presse (AFP) Associated Press (AP) Atlanta Constitution Boston Globe British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, The Middle East and Africa Business Week Christian Science Monitor (CSM) Daily Telegraph Dawn Economic Intelligence Unit Economist Facts on File World News Digest Financial Times (FT) Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Near East and South Asia Guardian Hindu Independent International Herald Tribune (IHT)

Bibliography 227 Jane’s Defence Weekly Jane’s Intelligence Review Keesing’s Record of World Events Los Angeles Times (LAT) al-Majalla al-Mustaqbal Middle East Middle East Economic Digest (MEED) Middle East Report (MERIP) New York Times (NYT) Observer Orange County Register Radio Monte Carlo Radio Moscow Reuters St. Louis Post-Dispatch St. Petersburg Times San Diego Union-Tribune al-Sharq al-Awsat Sunday Telegraph Tanjug Times Toronto Star USA Today US News and World Report United Press International (UPI) Washington Post (WP) Xinhua News Agency

Government Documents, Publications and Other Material Kuwaiti Kuwait Constitution Kuwait Ministry of Information, Kuwait Facts and Figures, 1992, 1996. Kuwait Ministry of Interior, statistics and information provided to author on expatriate deportations, 1978–89, 1992; residence permits, 1978–89, 1992; and ministry organization. Kuwait Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Interior webpage, http://www.moi.gov.kw. Kuwait Ministry of Justice, information provided to author on state security court cases, 1978–92, and ministry organization. Kuwait Ministry of Planning, Annual Statistical Abstract, 1979–93. Kuwait Ministry of Planning and the Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait, Kuwait and Social Development: Leadership, Planning, Popular Participation and Humanitarian Orientation, 1995. Kuwait Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, Social Statistics, 1986–89. Kuwait News Agency (KUNA), A Twenty-Five Year Era of Kuwait’s Modern Advancement, February 1986.

228 Bibliography

British British Foreign Office, Public Record Office, Pew, 371/109884, 371/120623 and 1016/367. British India Ofﬁce, British Library, London, R/15/5/179 and R/15/5/205.

US US Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, 1979–92. US Department of Commerce, International Database, http://www.census.gov/ cgi-bin/lpc/ldbsprd. US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 1978–91. US Department of State, Country Background Notes, 1999, 2000, http://www.state.gov. US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1983–92. US Library of Congress, Kuwait—A Country Study 2000, http://www.loc.gov.

Index Abu Nidal 59–61, 93, 113 Arab expatriates, see also Iraqi expatriates, etc. 6–10, 11, 19, 20, 22, 32, 33, 49, 62, 64–7, 76, 82–3, 94, 97–8, 112, 134–7, 174, 186 Arab nationalists 8, 11, 18, 19, 20, 46, 52, 54, 67, 83, 99, 100, 101, 106, 107, 108, 143, 155, 160, 187 Arab Times 58, 85, 90, 108, 187 Arafat, Yasser 59, 63 arrests 18, 20, 33, 36, 43, 55, 58, 59, 60, 62, 71, 72, 74, 75, 76–8, 85–6, 92, 101, 110, 113, 116–17, 121, 130, 132–4, 140, 143, 144, 145, 152, 158, 159, 174–5, 176, 178, 179 Ashura 37, 58, 59, 77, 180 Asian expatriates, see also Indian expatriates, etc. 6, 7, 8, 9, 19, 49, 62, 64–7, 82–3, 84, 97–8, 112, 134–6, 167, 168, 174, 186 assassination 11, 41, 42, 54, 55, 59–61, 89–90, 92, 93, 102, 113, 114, 123, 156 Bahrain 7, 25, 33, 49, 53–4, 59, 65, 67, 121, 126 bidun 9–10, 76, 87, 90, 114, 117, 118, 120, 123, 131, 136–7, 148–50, 162, 169, 171, 176 Britain 2, 22, 52, 60, 104 Cabinet, see also Council of Ministers 2, 43, 61, 62, 73, 76, 181 collaborators 8, 147, 149, 152, 159, 162–6, 171 Council of Ministers, see also Cabinet 2, 14, 32, 33, 47, 51, 72, 73, 80, 85, 91, 105, 106, 107–8, 109, 113, 144, 155, 156–8, 160, 181

al-Dawa 41, 75–6, 77, 78, 87, 113 Defense Ministry, see Ministry of Defense democracy, see also elections, National Assembly, National Council, National Legislative Assembly 138, 139, 147, 158 deportation 3, 7, 14–16, 20, 34, 36, 38–9, 40, 48, 57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 68, 69, 71, 74, 77–8, 79, 80–1, 84, 87, 88, 90, 91, 93, 94–7, 101–2, 111, 121, 122, 125–6, 127, 131, 134, 135, 145, 163, 164, 165, 166, 169–70, 71, 173–4, 175, 182–5 Dickson, Harold R.P. 1, 21 diplomats, attacks on 40–1, 59–62, 76, 114 diwaniyya 34, 46, 139–41, 142, 143, 144, 145, 157, 159, 160, 173, 175, 178 Egypt 4, 19, 27, 28, 42, 53 Egyptian expatriates 8, 19, 64, 65, 80, 81, 92, 115, 167–8 elections, see also democracy, National Assembly, National Council, National Legislative Assembly 6, 18, 46, 50, 51, 99, 100, 106, 109, 139, 143–4, 154, 157, 159, 160, 161, 175, 180, 181 expatriates, see Iraqi expatriates, Indian expatriates, etc. Foreign Affairs Ministry, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs France 72, 74, 75, 104 Ghotbzadeh, Sadegh 40, 41, 42 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 25, 49, 50, 52–4, 67, 84, 92, 104, 105, 109 Gulf expatriates 77, 182–5 229

230 Index Gulf War, see Iran–Iraq war, invasion of Kuwait, occupation of Kuwait, liberation of Kuwait, Iraq war (2003–) hajj 38, 132–4, 145 hijacking 42, 87–9, 114, 126–7 Hizballah 89, 118, 126, 133 Hussein, Saddam 29, 36, 41, 55, 56, 60, 75, 163, 165, 180 immigration 3, 7, 19–20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 50, 57, 62, 67, 69, 79, 84, 97, 101, 102, 127, 166, 169, 170, 171, 174 Indian expatriates 9, 28, 39, 65, 66, 77, 81, 95–6, 167–8, 182–5 inﬁltrators 3, 25, 42, 44, 49, 69, 73, 85–6, 173 Information Ministry, see Ministry of Information “insiders”, during the Iraqi occupation 148, 152, 153–4, 159, 160, 161, 170 Interior Ministry, see Ministry of Interior intifada 138, 173 invasion of Kuwait 2, 6, 124, 127, 130, 133, 134, 136, 137, 144, 147–71 Iran, see Khomeini, Iranian revolution, Iran–Iraq war, Iranian expatriates, diplomats (attacks on), etc. Iran–Iraq war 2, 28, 41, 48, 49, 53, 57, 58, 64, 67, 68, 74, 103, 104, 119, 121, 123, 125, 128, 129, 174 Iranian expatriates 8, 9, 15, 29–31, 35–9, 43, 48, 49, 57, 58, 59, 63–6, 76–7, 78, 80–2, 85–6, 88, 91, 95, 120, 124, 126, 131, 167–8, 174, 182–5 Iranian revolution 2, 11, 28, 29, 31, 33, 35, 39, 42, 45, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 64, 68, 70, 117, 131, 134, 180 Iraq, see Saddam Hussein, Iran–Iraq war, invasion of Kuwait,

occupation of Kuwait, Iraq war (2003–), Iraqi expatriates, diplomats (attacks on), etc. Iraq war (2003–) 1, 12, 176, 177, 179, 180 Iraqi expatriates 15, 19, 22, 40, 64, 65, 66, 67, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 86, 87, 91, 92, 95, 113, 126, 131, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 171, 174 Islamic Jihad 75, 89, 116, 120 Islamists 11, 42, 46, 51, 52, 69, 73, 83, 99, 100, 101, 107, 108, 143, 154, 155, 160, 161, 178, 180 Israel 7, 11, 28, 42, 58, 60, 61, 62, 67, 70, 93, 106, 162 al-Jarallah, Ahmad 85, 93, 113, 126 Jordan 4, 5, 93, 110, 163 Jordanian expatriates 44, 55, 57, 65, 66, 77, 78, 81, 113, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 176, 182–5 Justice Ministry, see Ministry of Justice al-Khatib, Ahmad 54, 100–1, 106, 142, 143 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 42, 43, 58, 155 Kuwait University 67, 78, 94, 100, 107, 113, 115, 120, 121, 136 labor permits 14, 26, 63, 64, 66, 80–2, 84, 91, 97, 112 Lebanese expatriates 8, 15, 22, 59, 65, 66, 76, 77, 81, 86, 88, 91, 95–6, 110, 115, 124, 131, 167–8, Lebanon 6, 8, 20, 32, 60, 61, 62, 65, 67, 70, 74, 75, 76, 84, 89, 94 liberation of Kuwait 12, 26, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 154, 155, 156, 158, 159, 160, 162, 163, 166, 169, 174, 175, 180 Libya 32, 106, 163 Majlis al-Shura, see National Assembly Majlis al-Umma al-Tashrii, see National Legislative Assembly Majlis al-Watani, see National Council

Index 231 merchants 4, 5, 17–18, 21, 32, 132, 143, 144 military, Kuwaiti 9, 21–3, 26, 32, 72, 91, 106, 115, 116, 121, 137, 148–53, 154, 156, 162, 164, 165, 170 Ministry of Defense, Kuwaiti 2, 23, 72, 90, 104, 105, 150, 156, 157–8 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kuwaiti 2, 23, 62, 90, 105, 131, 157–8 Ministry of Information, Kuwaiti 13, 25, 26, 27, 31, 59, 78, 94, 109, 110, 111, 139, 141, 147, 158 Ministry of Interior, Kuwaiti, see also police, arrests 2, 12, 13, 14, 15, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 30, 33, 34, 37, 38, 39, 40, 43, 45, 54, 55, 56, 57, 62, 63, 68, 70, 72, 73, 75, 76, 77, 79, 80, 85, 86, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 99, 104, 107, 111, 112, 113, 116, 120, 121, 124, 125, 127, 130, 134, 136, 140, 143, 144, 145, 150, 152, 156, 157–8, 166, 169, 175, 179 Ministry of Justice, Kuwaiti 12, 14, 25, 27, 56, 97, 98, 99, 107, 123, 133, 152, 175 Ministry of Oil, Kuwaiti 105, 107 Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, Kuwaiti 13, 14, 25, 26, 27, 73, 79, 80, 81, 95, 97, 112, 136, 157–8 al-Murhi, Abbas 33, 34, 115, 118, 122 National Assembly, see also democracy, elections, National Legislative Assembly, National Council 3, 5, 6, 8, 19, 20, 28, 44–7, 48, 49, 50–2, 54, 56, 60, 61, 69, 71, 73, 83, 89, 90, 91, 93, 100–1, 105, 106–10, 111, 112, 113, 127, 129–30, 133, 137–41, 142, 144, 153, 154, 155–62, 173, 175, 180 National Council, see also National Assembly, National Legislative Assembly 142–5, 159, 161, 175, 181

National Legislative Assembly, see also National Assembly, National Council 18 nationalism, see Arab nationalism occupation of Kuwait 5, 10, 12, 134, 136, 147–71, 172 oil 1, 4, 5, 9, 12, 17–20, 21, 27, 32, 42, 49, 67, 72, 74, 103, 104, 106, 110–11, 112, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 122, 127, 129, 131, 136, 177 Oil Ministry, see Ministry of Oil “outsiders”, during the Iraqi occupation 153, 154, 160 Pakistani expatriates 9, 39, 65, 66, 76, 81, 95, 96, 148, 167, 168 Palestinian expatriates 8, 10, 11, 22, 23, 28, 49, 55–6, 61–3, 65, 66, 67, 77, 78, 84, 109, 113, 148, 152, 153, 162–4, 166–9, 171, 173, 174 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 42, 61, 93, 106, 163, 164 parliament, see National Assembly, National Council, National Legislative Assembly police, Kuwaiti, see also Ministry of Interior, arrests 21, 22, 23, 25, 30, 39, 56, 58, 62, 72, 75, 76, 77, 80, 85, 90, 92, 94, 115, 117, 118, 124, 131, 132, 137, 140–1, 142, 143, 150, 152, 164, 165, 174, 176, 178, 179 press, Kuwait, see also individual publications 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 18, 28, 34, 37, 40, 41, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 55, 60, 61, 78, 85, 88, 89, 90, 94, 100, 101, 102, 103, 106, 109, 110, 111, 117, 121, 126, 129, 139, 144, 156, 157, 175, 187 associations, professional and student 5, 6, 20, 28, 46, 51, 67, 138 al-Rai al-Amm 30, 34, 42–4, 53, 56, 70, 83, 84, 89, 90, 91, 117, 187 residence permits 1, 64, 65, 66, 68, 81, 82, 84, 91, 97, 98, 112, 135, 136, 166, 167, 168, 186

232 Index al-Sadun, Ahmad 90, 106, 137, 143, 161 al-Sabah, Abdallah al-Mubarak 21, 22, 23 al-Sabah, Abdallah al-Salim 19, 20 al-Sabah, Ahmad al-Jabir 17, 18, 142 al-Sabah, Ali al-Khalifa 105, 107, 111 al-Sabah, Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir 23, 28, 34, 40, 45, 46, 53, 61, 68, 73, 87, 89–90, 91, 92, 94, 95, 97, 98, 101–2, 104, 106–9, 111, 113, 114, 121, 123, 126, 127, 130, 137–43, 151, 153, 157–8, 159, 160, 166 al-Sabah, Nawwaf al-Ahmad al-Jabir, see also Ministry of Interior 33, 34, 38, 45, 54, 56, 57, 76, 77, 78, 79, 85, 86, 91, 92, 107, 110, 112, 113, 117, 121, 124, 150, 151, 157–8 al-Sabah, Saad al-Abdallah al-Salim 21, 22, 33, 43, 45, 46, 51, 52, 53, 61, 72, 90, 91, 106, 108, 117, 124, 139, 141–2, 155, 156, 157–8, 159, 164, 165 al-Sabah, Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir 62, 90, 91, 105, 131, 157–8 al-Sabah, Sabah al-Salim 21, 28, 44 al-Sabah, Salim al-Sabah al-Salim 105, 143, 150, 157–8 Saudi Arabia 1, 7, 25, 33, 37, 38, 49, 53, 54, 60, 131, 132–4, 139, 145, 150, 155, 161, 176, 177, 179, 180 Saudi expatriates 54, 65, 118

security trials, see state security trials Shah Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza 29, 24, 36, 37, 47, 53, 139 Shia, Kuwaiti 14, 29, 30, 31–5, 36, 37, 43, 46, 47, 50, 69, 71, 84, 102, 114–22, 123, 124, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 137, 145, 173, 174, 175, 177, 178, 179–80 Social Affairs and Labor Ministry, see Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor Soviet Union 58, 104 state security trials 25, 40, 55, 56, 60, 71, 78, 86, 87, 97–9, 113, 115, 118, 120, 122, 123, 124, 128, 130, 131, 133, 134, 145, 174 Sunnis, Kuwaiti 30, 31, 38, 41, 50, 71, 94, 100, 102, 117, 177 Syria 4, 7, 60, 88, 91, 93 Syrian expatriates 15, 65, 66, 67, 77, 81, 88, 91, 95–6, 167–8, 182–85 United Kingdom, see Britain United Nations 12, 15, 104, 105 United States 10, 11, 15, 28, 29, 37, 50, 58, 62, 71, 73, 74, 75, 87, 88, 104, 105, 106, 110, 120, 121, 158, 164, 166, 176, 177, 178, 179 USSR, see Soviet Union welfare beneﬁts 5, 7, 83, 112, 137, 148, 163, 171, 181 work permits, see labor permits

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