Korea's Democratization

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KOREA’S DEMOCRATIZATION The Republic of Korea is regarded as a shining example of democracy in East Asia. Despite this significant achievement, Korea’s democracy in practice has been plagued by political gridlock, severe factional infighting, a lack of social capital and cooperation between civil society and political institutions, and leadership behavior that calls to mind its authoritarian past. Although the country is now a secure electoral democracy, its journey toward democratic consolidation is far from complete. In this volume, some of the best scholars on Korean politics explore and assess the complex interplay of the facilitating and inhibiting factors that have influenced and reshaped Korea’s democratic consolidation process at all levels of state and society, as well as the prospects for consolidation in the coming years. Samuel S. Kim is Adjunct Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Scholar, East Asian Institute, Columbia University. He has taught at Princeton University and served as a Fulbright Professor at the Foreign Affairs Institute in Beijing (1985–6). He is the author or editor of eighteen books, including China, the United Nations, and World Order (1979), Korea’s Globalization (ed., 2000), and East Asia and Globalization (ed., 2000).

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Books Written under the Auspices of The Center for Korean Research, East Asian Institute, Columbia University, 1998–2002 Samuel S. Kim, ed., North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Oxford University, 1998). Samuel S. Kim, ed., Korea’s Globalization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Laurel Kendall, ed., Under Construction: The Gendering of Modernity, Class, and Consumption in the Republic of Korea (Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2001). Samuel S. Kim, ed., The North Korean System in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Palgrave, 2001). Charles K. Armstrong, ed., Korean Civil Society: Social Movements, Democracy and the State (London: Routledge, 2002). Samuel S. Kim, ed., Korea’s Democratization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

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KOREA’S DEMOCRATIZATION edited by SAMUEL S. KIM Columbia University

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   Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge  , United Kingdom Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521823210 © Cambridge University Press 2003 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published in print format 2003 - isbn-13 978-0-511-07052-5 eBook (EBL) - isbn-10 0-511-07052-7 eBook (EBL) - isbn-13 978-0-521-82321-0 hardback - isbn-10 0-521-82321-8 hardback - isbn-13 978-0-521-53022-4 paperback -  paperback isbn-10 0-521-53022-9 Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of s for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

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Contents

page ix xi xv

Tables and Figures Contributors Preface Part I. A Framework of Analysis

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1 Korea’s Democratization in the Global–Local Nexus samuel s. kim

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Part II. Consolidation at the Mass Level

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2 Mass Politics, Public Opinion, and Democracy in Korea doh chull shin

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Part III. Consolidation at the Civil Society Level

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3 Civil Society in Democratizing Korea sunhyuk kim

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4 Redrafting Democratization Through Women’s Representation and Participation in the Republic of Korea seungsook moon

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5 Korean Nationalism, Anti-Americanism, and Democratic Consolidation katharine h. s. moon

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CONTENTS

Part IV. Consolidation at the State Level

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6 Regional Politics and Democratic Consolidation in Korea david c. kang

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7 Crafting and Consolidating Constitutional Democracy in Korea jeong-ho roh 8 Security and Democracy in South Korean Development victor cha

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9 The Developmental State and Democratic Consolidation in South Korea c. s. eliot kang

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Bibliography Index

245 261

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Tables and Figures

Tables 1.1 Contending Approaches to Global Democracy and World Order 2.1 The Divergent Conceptions of Democracy and the Relative Priority of Democratization and Economic Development 2.2 Contours of Democratic Support 2.3 Assessments of Political Performance and the Strong Sense of Democratic Crisis 2.4 Distribution of Support for Democracy and Positive Assessments of Its Performance 2.5 Trends in Support for Democracy and Perceptions of Its Performance 4.1 Woman Candidates and Women Elected in the National Assembly 4.2 Woman Candidates and Women Elected in the Local Assembly 4.3 Women in High Level Positions in Major Political Parties 4.4 Women in Governmental Committees 4.5 Women’s Participation in Women’s Associations 4.6 Participation in Types of Civic Organizations by Gender, 1999 6.1 Cross-Tab Results, Pre-1987 6.2 Cross-Tab Results, Post-1987 6.3 Regression of Vote for Ruling Party, 1948–2000 6.4 Ruling Party’s Results by Cholla District, 1985–8 6.5 Issues and Politics-Shifting Public Opinion

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16 51 55 66 67 70 111 113 114 115 117 118 169 170 171 174 175

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TABLES AND FIGURES

Figures 2.1 Perceptions of the Past and Present Regimes on a Ten-Point Dictatorship–Democracy Scale 2.2 Evaluations of the Performance of the Present Political System on a Ten-Point Dissatisfaction–Satisfaction Scale 2.3 Perceptions of Elected Officials and Civil Servants as “Corrupt” 2.4 Unconditional Support for Democratic Rule by Levels of Authoritarian Nostalgia

57 60 62 72

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Contributors

samuel s. kim (Ph.D., Columbia) is Adjunct Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Associate, East Asian Institute, Columbia University. He is the author or editor of eighteen books on East Asian international relations and world order studies including, most recently, North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post–Cold War Era (ed., 1998),China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium (ed., 1998), Korea’s Globalization (ed., 2000); East Asia and Globalization (ed., 2000), and The North Korean Political System in the Post–Cold War Era (ed., 2001). He has published more than 150 articles in edited volumes and leading international relations journals, including American Journal of International Law, International Interactions, International Journal, International Organization, Journal of Peace Research, World Politics, and World Policy Journal. victor cha (Ph.D., Columbia) is Associate Professor of Government in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. He is the award-winning author of Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States–Japan–Korea-Security Triangle (1999) (winner of the 2000 Ohira Book Prize) and has written articles on international relations and East Asia in journals including Survival, Foreign Affairs, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Orbis, and Asian Survey. He is a former John M. Olin National Security Fellow at Harvard University, two-time Fulbright Scholar, and Hoover National Fellow at Stanford. He is currently Director of the Project on American Alliances in Asia at Georgetown, and is writing a book manuscript on strategic culture and military modernization in Korea, Indonesia, and India. c. s. eliot kang (Ph.D., Yale) is Associate Professor of Political Science at Northern Illinois University. He has taught at the University xi

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CONTRIBUTORS

of Pennsylvania and was a research fellow at the Brookings Institution. He was also an International Affairs Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations in Japan. Specializing in security and economic issues of Northeast Asia, he has published numerous book chapters and articles in publications such as International Organization, Comparative Strategy, and World Affairs. david c. kang (Ph.D., Berkeley) is Associate Professor of Government and Adjunct Associate Professor at the Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College. Kang has published scholarly articles in academic journals such as International Organization, World Development, Journal of Development Studies, and Security Studies, and is a member of the editorial boards of Business and Politics and the Journal of International Business Education. His book, Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in Korea and the Philippines, was published by Cambridge University Press, and he has appeared on the Lehrer News Hour and written opinion pieces in the Los Angeles Times. Kang has been a visiting professor at Korea University in Seoul, and at University of California, San Diego, and in 2003 he will be a visiting Associate Professor at Yale University. sunhyuk kim (Ph.D., Stanford) is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Southern California. He is the author of The Politics of Democratization in Korea: The Role of Civil Society. His publications have appeared in various edited volumes and in journals such as Democratization, Asian Survey, Journal of Asian and African Studies, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Asian Perspective, Pacific Focus, and Korea Journal. He has served as Research Director of the Pacific Council on International Policy’s recent project on Korea, The Reshaping of Korea, and has been a MacArthur Foundation Consortium Research Fellow at the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University. His research interests include democratization, civil society, political economy, state–society relations, and social movements in Korea. He is currently working on a book-length study on economic and political reforms in Korea. katharine h. s. moon (Ph.D., Princeton) is the Jane Bishop Associate Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College. She is the author of Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.–Korea Relations (1997; Korean edition, 2002) and articles on women and gender in international relations, migrant workers, and social movements in East Asia. Currently, her book research addresses anti-Americanism in South Korea from the perspective of democratization and social movement analysis and assesses the implications for foreign policy. She was awarded a Fulbright grant and a fellowship from the Woodrow Wilson

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Center-George Washington University Asian Policy Studies Program to pursue this project. Moon has served in the Office of the Senior Coordinator for Women’s Issues in the U.S. Department of State and as a trustee of Smith College. She is a member of the editorial board of the International Studies Review, the Conversations co-editor of the International Feminist Journal of Politics, and a member of the Advisory Committee of the Women and Politics section of the American Political Science Association. seungsook moon (Ph.D., Brandeis) is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Vassar College. Her research interests include the exploration of the relationship between sociopolitical change and the remaking of gender order in contemporary East Asia. She has authored many articles on gender politics and social change in Republic of Korea, and has been teaching on women’s movements in Asia, social theory, and Asian America. Her more recent works appeared in Journal of Asian Studies and Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society. jeong-ho roh (J.D., Columbia) is Director of the Center for Korean Legal Studies at Columbia Law School. Previously, he specialized in mergers & acquisition and international law at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom (New York) and Bae, Kim & Lee (Seoul, Korea). He also served as a legal officer at the Korean Ministry of National Defense. He is currently serving as Legal Advisor to the Korean Ministry of National Unification on the North Korean light water reactor project and is a member of the Nuclear Liability Contact Group at the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Roh recently authored Fundamentals of U.S. Law (2001) and is a co-editor and contributor of Designing Korean Unification (2001). doh chull shin (Ph.D., University of Illinois) holds Korea Foundation and Middlebush Professorships at the University of Missouri at Columbia. Since 1988, he has directed the Korean Democracy Barometer program to monitor and unravel the cultural and institutional dynamics of democratization in Korea. As a member of two cross-national research programs (the Euromodule and the East Asia Barometer), he is currently conducting comparative survey research on democratization and quality of life in East Asian countries. His recent and forthcoming publications include Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea (1999), Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea (with Larry Diamond, 2000), and The Quality of Life in Korea: Comparative and Dynamic Perspectives (with Chong-Min Park and Conrad Rutkowski, 2002).

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Preface

Since the late 1980s, the Republic of Korea (ROK, or hereafter “Korea”), a formerly war-ravaged country, has acquired a scintillating dual identity as an East Asian model of economic prosperity and political democracy. Korea also became the first third-wave democracy in East Asia to transfer power peacefully to an opposition party, in early 1998. Despite the country’s brief but checkered history, with no less than nine constitutional amendments and three aborted democratic openings between 1948 and 1988, Korea has made significant progress toward establishing pluralistic governing institutions and protecting the political and civil liberties of its citizens. Although there is little doubt that Korea is now a secure electoral democracy, with electoral politics the only game in town, its journey toward democratic consolidation is far from complete. Much work and reform is still needed to consolidate Korea’s democracy. The legacy of authoritarianism, deeply entrenched Confucian values, and regional factionalism are among the variety of forces continuously testing the newly established democratic procedures and institutions. Moreover, the country’s limited experience in democracy thus far has provided little time for democratic norms and values to take root among the citizens and for necessary sociopolitical reforms to develop a more transparent, accountable, and responsive government. The focal point of this study is Korea’s democratic consolidation, defined as a multidimensional and multicausal process. Working from this definition, this project seeks to explore how Korea’s democracy has deepened in all the key dimensions of political life – cultural, behavioral, and institutional – and at various levels of state and society – mass public, intermediate civil society, and government. What specific cultural, behavioral, and institutional characteristics distinguish Korean-style xv

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democracy? What are the major challenges for a fully consolidated liberal democracy in Korea – the possibilities and limitations of normative and behavioral transformation? What are the main obstacles standing in the way of transforming Korean electoral democracy into a more responsible, representative, effective, liberal democracy? How long would it take for Korea to achieve such democratic deepening and maturing? Each contributor was asked to address some of these questions and to do so within the framework of a specific assigned topic; no particular theory or methodology was privileged in advance. The book is organized into four parts. The first part (chapter 1) considers, in broad strokes, how the turbulent and often paradoxical force of globalization has impacted and reshaped the context and condition under which Korea’s democratic consolidation could take place. The second part (chapter 2) examines how democratic reforms in the past decade have transformed the attitudes and opinions of Korean citizens toward liberal democracy and the government. The third part (chapters 3–5) looks at Korea’s civil society and how civil society groups, which had an antagonistic function during the authoritarian era, have adapted to the democratic state and have adopted a more supportive role, or have failed to do so. Finally, the fourth part (chapters 6–9) critically examines recent developments at the state/governmental level, specifically how regionalism, constitutional politics, civil–military relations, and the institutional drag of the Korean developmental state have helped or hindered the country’s democratic consolidation process. This project was born out of a major research conference under the auspices of the Center for Korean Research of Columbia University’s East Asian Institute. The event was held May 25–26, 2001, at Columbia University, where contributors and participants engaged in a fruitful exchange of ideas and opinions about the progress and prospects of Korea’s democratization. I would like to thank the chapter contributors for their originality, hard work, and patience in meeting the high demands of this project. Moreover, this project, like many previous research endeavors sponsored by the Center, would not have been possible without the continuous and generous moral and financial support of the Korea Foundation. In addition, I would also like to express my gratitude to the Center for Korean Research and the East Asian Institute, especially my graduate student research assistant – Abraham Kim – for his characteristically skillful, efficient, and multitasking work in the library and online research, and for stage-managing the preparation of the book manuscript. Finally, it was a pleasure to work with Cambridge University Press in the production of this book. In the course of the peer-review and vetting process, two anonymous readers provided very helpful and perceptive

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comments and suggestions for improving and updating the chapters to take more fully into account the changes and continuities in Korea’s democratic consolidation process. I am particularly grateful to Mary Child for her unflagging support and encouragement and for her role as an invaluable navigator throughout the publication process. Special thanks are due to Adriane Gelpi and Zachary Dorsey for their efficient steering of the manuscript through the various stages of production. The usual disclaimer still applies: the editor and chapter authors alone are responsible for any remaining errors in facts or interpretation. samuel s. kim New York, New York April 2002

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PART I

A Framework of Analysis

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CHAPTER 1

Korea’s Democratization in the Global–Local Nexus Samuel S. Kim

Of the many developments of the twentieth century that have been directly transmitted to the new millennium, three legacies of global significance stand out. The first has been dubbed the “third wave” of global democratization, which began with the overthrow of Portugal’s dictatorial regime in April 1974.1 The second and most dramatic development is the end of the Cold War, symbolized by the crumbling of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and accompanied by a rapid succession of momentous changes in world politics (e.g., the collapse of communism, the end of superpower rivalry and bipolarity, German reunification, and the demise of the Soviet Union). Finally, the third of these significant phenomena is the acceleration and intensification of globalization in the last decade of the twentieth century. All of these developments have profound but differentiated ramifications for the future of Korean democracy. Here we will address the first and third legacies, with an emphasis on the relationship between globalization and democratization, as a way of establishing a broad global–local analytical framework for Korea’s democratization process. At the beginning of the new millennium, the Republic of Korea (ROK, hereafter “Korea”) is widely regarded as one of the most remarkable and influential of the third-wave democracies. Korea’s transition to democracy began in 1987–88, and five years later, with the presidential victory of Kim Young Sam in 1992, Korea elected its first civilian leader in three decades. Equally important, a few years after this dramatic political accomplishment, Korea gained entry, as the eleventh largest economy in the world, into the exclusive country club of rich industrialized nations – the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 1

Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

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This formerly war-ravaged country acquired a new identity as “an East Asian model of prosperity and democracy.”2 But with the economic crash landing of 1997 – the greatest crisis there since the Korean War – this golden era was short-lived. Rather than stymieing the democratic transition, however, this event ironically helped pave the way for Korea to achieve another milestone in its long democratic march, as it became the first third-wave democracy in East Asia to peacefully transfer power to an opposition party. According to Freedom House’s 1999–2000 Freedom in the World survey, which divides all 192 countries into three broad categories of “free” (ratings average 1.0–2.5), “partly free” (ratings average 3.0–5.5), and “not free” (ratings average 5.5–7.0), Korea, whose average ratings have remained at 2.0 since 1993, is ranked as one of eighty-five “free” countries (liberal democracies) in the world.3 Despite all the political reforms Korea pursued during its first decade of democracy, and notwithstanding a good rating in Freedom House’s ranking (which is not unproblematic), Korea is still far from being a consolidated democracy. It has yet to experience the requisite normative, institutional, and behavioral transformations required to become a mature liberal democracy. The most significant impediment to Korea’s progress toward consolidation may be the deeply embedded politics of fragmentation. Chronically plagued by fratricidal regional factionalism, searing labor–management conflict, and right/left ideological cleavages, South Korea has yet to be geographically, socially, culturally, and politically unified within its own borders. The politics of fragmentation and confrontation does not stop at the water’s edge. In its debut as a Korean human rights “nongovernmental organization (NGO)” at the 1999 annual session of the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva,4 the opposition Grand National Party (GNP) accused the Kim Dae Jung government of torture, political surveillance, illegal wiretapping, and other civil liberties abuses.5 The depth of discontent among Korean voters is such that some have expressed their populist disgust by sending national assembly lawmakers plastic bags of human excrement!6 Korea, however, is not alone in its painful and slow development toward democratic maturity: by the latter half of the 1990s, the third-wave 2 3 4

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New York Times, 26 December 1995, A14. Freedom House, “Annual Survey of Freedom Country Ratings 1972–73 to 1999–2000,” . I know no case or incident where an opposition party showed up at the United Nations Human Rights Commission or any other UN–sponsored global conference as an “NGO,” another example of how Korea’s domestic politics of fragmentation migrated to an international arena. Samuel S. Kim, “Korea’s Segyehwa Drive: Promise versus Performance,” in Korea’s Globalization, ed. Samuel S. Kim (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 279. John Larkin, “Kim Dae Jung Comes up Short,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 May 2001, 18–24.

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expansion of global democratization had come to a halt. The divergent trends and the widening gaps between continued growth of electoral democracy and stagnation of liberal democracy, coupled with the more recent progressive “hollowing-out” of electoral democracies, demonstrate the increasing shallowness of electoral democracies in the latter part of the third wave.7 The aim of this introductory chapter is to discuss Korea’s democratic consolidation process in both global and local perspectives. The size of Korea’s population (47 million) and economy [$US448 billion or PPP $US863 billion in 2001],8 its geostrategic location, and the divided polity – to name a few of this country’s unique geopolitical and geoeconomic attributes – make examining Korea’s democratization both interesting and challenging for theory, policy, and comparative analysis. To pursue this line of inquiry, this chapter proceeds in four sections. The first section explores and depicts in broad strokes the paradoxes of contemporary democracy. The second section explores established and emerging trends in the relationship between globalization and democratization and in the impact of globalization on democratic consolidation, by focusing on the nature of globalization, its consequences for the state and identity politics, and contending perspectives on the feasibility and desirability of global democracy. The third section takes stock of the state of Korea’s democratic consolidation by previewing the major findings and arguments of the contributors to this volume. The fourth and final section sketches out the major challenges – the possibilities and limitations of normative and behavioral transformation – for a fully consolidated Korean liberal democracy. The Paradoxes of Contemporary Democratization There are several striking paradoxes in contemporary democratization. First, although democratization has experienced a truly global trend, it has also faced the opposition of various groups asserting themselves against this trend in the name of the politics of “identity/difference” – ethnic, national, linguistic, religious, and cultural. From nationalist and ethnic revivals in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, to the politics of cultural separatism in Canada, to critical social-movement politics in liberal Western democracies, the politics of negotiating identity/difference is resurgent.9 Identity politics has 7 8 9

Larry Diamond, “Is the Third Wave over?” Journal of Democracy 7, no. 3 (1996): 20–37. World Bank, World Development Report 2003 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 234. Seyla Benhabib, ed., Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).

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prevented some countries from fully instituting democratic institutions and values, and it has threatened to destabilize democratizing states. A second paradox is found in the advocacy of endism – the idea that history ended with the triumph of liberal democracy10 – at a time when the liberal democratic state is being challenged and eroded by growing deficits in “social capital”11 and steadily declining public trust in democratic politics and institutions. Although democracy per se is not at risk, citizens’ confidence in the performance of representative institutions in trilateral liberal democracies (i.e., Western Europe, North America, and Japan) has been declining apace since the mid-1970s. Ironically, this trend has coincided with the third wave of global democratization. The prime moving force in the new third-wave democracies – the enhancement of the norms of participatory democracy – has come of age at a time when the old democracies in trilateral countries have begun to suffer from growing social discontent and declining social capital.12 Third, globalization has swept across the world like a tidal wave, tearing everything asunder when liberal democracy with its fixed and demarcated borders seems to have become the near-universal ideal form of political organization and governance. Paradoxically, then, liberal democracy is being proposed as the model for global governance, especially among liberal internationalists,13 just at the historical moment when it is being transformed by the forces of globalization.14 Robert Keohane argues that globalization produces international discord and thus requires effective international governance.15 Yet the very process of governance seems to be escaping the reach of state actors – who are also the principal actors in international institutions – due to the growing disjuncture between liberal democracy in its national setting and the dynamics of contemporary globalization. The fourth paradox is that under the conditions of contemporary globalization, the nature of democratic citizenship and the enactment of 10 11

12

13 14

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Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). Putnam (p. 67) defines “social capital” as “features of social organization, such as networks, norms, and social trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.” See Robert D. Putnam, “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital,” Journal of Democracy 6, no. 1 (1995): 65–78. See Putnam, “Bowling Alone”; Michael Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam, eds., Disaffected Democracies: What’s Troubling the Trilateral Countries? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). Robert O. Keohane, “Governance in a Partially Globalized World,” American Political Science Review 95, no. 1 (2001): 1–13. Anthony McGrew, “Democracy Beyond Borders?: Globalization and the Reconstruction of Democratic Theory and Politics,” in The Transformation of Democracy? Globalization and Territorial Democracy, ed. Anthony McGrew (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1997), 245; David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 425. Keohane, “Governance in a Partially Globalized World.”

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popular sovereignty are rendered increasingly problematic. One reason is the growing disjuncture between the structures of increasingly globalized powers and the processes of participation, representation, accountability, and legitimacy that remain rooted in territorial nation-states. The revival of nationalism in the post–Cold War era coincides with the intensification of patterns of global interdependence that are eroding the very capacity of liberal democratic states to carry out some of their most important traditional functions.16 What is striking about the discourse on the state of contemporary liberal democracy is a growing convergence of views among theorists of democratic thought (republican, liberal, social democratic, socialist, and participatory) that the intensification of globalization has hollowed out democratic institutions and increased citizen discontent. Michael Sandel, a leading advocate of republican democracy, argues that a growing sense of disempowerment that afflicts the public in many liberal democratic states can be traced to the fact that the “ideal of liberal democracy and the actual organization of modern social and economic life are sharply at odds.”17 At the heart of democracy’s discontent in the United States lies “the fear that, individually and collectively, we are losing control of the forces that govern our lives.” The most fundamental obstacles to substantive democracy today are “the formidable scale on which modern economic life is organized and the difficulty of constituting the democratic political authority necessary to govern it.”18 In a similar vein, Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam explain that the cause of declines in the capacity of political agents to act on citizens’ interests and desires in trilateral liberal democracies is “internationalization, which creates a growing incongruence between the scope of territorial units and the issues raised by interdependence, reducing the output effectiveness of democratic nation-states.”19 David Held and Andrew McGrew, two leading British theorists of cosmopolitan democracy and globalization, argue that liberal democracy in a rapidly globalizing world can be sustained only in and through an expanding nucleus of democratic states and agencies throughout the world.20 Not all scholars see globalization in such constraining terms, however. For Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, leading liberal institutionalists, the nation-state is still the most important actor in global politics, but it is not the only important actor. It is “being supplemented by other 16

17 19 20

E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); David Held, Democracy and the Global Order (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995). Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent, 202. 18 Ibid., 338. Robert D. Putnam, Susan J. Pharr, and Russell J. Dalton, “Introduction: What’s Troubling the Trilateral Democracies?” in Pharr and Putnam, 25. Held, Democracy and the Global Order; McGrew, The Transformation of Democracy? Globalization and Territorial Democracy.

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actors – private and third sector – in a more complex geography.”21 Larry Diamond, a leading theorist of democratic consolidation, argues that: The most distinctive feature of the third wave is the considerable contribution that international actors have made to democratic development by enhancing the resources, skills, techniques, ideas, linkages, and legitimacy of civil society organizations, civic education efforts, the mass media, legislatures, local governments, judicial systems, political parties, and elections commissions in the developing and postcommunist worlds.22

In light of these trends, the Korean paradox is that Seoul’s drive toward globalization, which is embedded in President Kim Dae Jung’s conceptualization of participatory democracy and the market economy as mutually complementary, is being pushed forward just at the moment when globalization is contributing to the expansion of the state’s liberal democratic responsibilities and to the erosion of its capacity to deal effectively with many of the demands placed on it.23 Globalization and Democratization A point of departure for understanding the relationship between globalization and democratization is the fact that the forces of globalization are transforming both the context and the conditions under which democratic consolidation can be realized. Revising and updating Barrington Moore’s famous formula “no bourgeois, no democracy,”24 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan have advanced a new axiom as one of three minimal conditions for democratic consolidation: “no state, no democracy.”25 An appraisal of the interplay of globalization and democratization processes requires a broad framework that shies away from neoliberal assumptions about the functional demise of the state while also avoiding the neorealist and neomercantilist “globaloney” critique, which does not adequately take into account new patterns and dynamics of contemporary 21

22 23

24 25

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Introduction,” in Governance in a Globalizing World, ed. Joseph S. Nye and John D. Donahue (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 12. Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 272. Held, Democracy and the Global Order, 121; James Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 127– 32; Samuel S. Kim, “Korea and Globalization (Segyehwa): A Framework for Analysis,” in Korea’s Globalization, 2–4. Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 418. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies,” Journal of Democracy 7, no. 2 (1996): 14–33.

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globalization. I define globalization as a series of complex and independent yet interrelated processes of stretching, intensifying, and accelerating worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of human relations and transactions, such that events, decisions, and activities in one part of the world have immediate consequences for individuals, groups, and states in other parts of the world. Put succinctly, globalization is a worldwide revolution with far-reaching but varying consequences for people’s security, well-being, and identities. It is a boundary-expanding or boundary-penetrating process that intensifies the levels of interaction and interconnectedness within and among states and societies. This boundary-expanding aspect of globalization has developed in tandem with a mushrooming of communications facilities, economic and social interests, and overseas markets that in turn fosters still more globalization. For a trading state like Korea, with an extremely high trade/gross national product ratio, the extent of its openness and transparency and the degree of its global competitiveness correlate most closely with globalization in only one domain: economic globalization.26 Globalization and the State For the study of Korean democratization, the significance of contemporary globalization needs to be assessed in terms of its impact on the state or on state-building: no state, no globalization debate; no state-restructuring, no consolidation. As Rosenau put it, “the competence of states is both widening and withering with each being a function of the other as the dynamics of global life intensify both the centralizing and the decentralizing tendencies already at work.27 In other words, the impact of globalization on the state must be assessed in a situation- and country-specific manner. It varies according to actors’ respective resources, skills, and strategic choices or policies. Its impact on a state’s power or role depends not only on the type of state but also on the state’s globalization strategy. Furthermore, the impact of globalization on the state is “mediated by a state’s position in global political, military, and economic hierarchies; its domestic economic and political structures; its domestic politics; and 26

27

If we look at trade as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) – a widely used measure of a country’s integration into the global economy – in 2000 this figure stood at 73% for South Korea, compared to 11% for North Korea, 18% for Japan, 19% for India, 21% for the United States. The 2000 figures for South Korea, China, Japan, India, and the United States are based on the World Bank’s World Development Report 2002, tables 3–4, pp. 236–9; the figure for North Korea is based on the report issued by South Korea’s National Statistics Office in late December 2001 and summarized in Korea Now (29 December 2001), 8; Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2001: South Korea and North Korea, . Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics, 132.

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specific government as well as societal strategies for contesting, managing, or ameliorating globalizing imperatives.28 Contrary to the theses of hyperglobalization and “globaloney,” the state is neither obsolete, nor disappearing, nor is it as robust as it once was. Instead, globalization functions as a double-edged sword, simultaneously posing dangers and opportunities. What it takes to be a competent and effective state is constantly being redefined. Successfully coping with today’s challenges requires an effective strategy for choosing among various competing and constantly evolving options, in the correct sequence, even as the state, precariously balanced between domestic and international politics, is simultaneously constrained by what external globalization agents will accept and what domestic constituencies will ratify.29 The role of state adaptability is crucial in this respect. More than ever before in human history, the rise or fall of an effective state, even a great power, is keyed to and determined by the speed with which it can establish congruence between domestic and foreign policies amid the changing trends and requirements of globalization.30 In this respect, globalization threatens both minimalist and maximalist states while it also provides an opportunity for competent and adaptable states.31 Globalization and Identity Politics By blurring the international/domestic divide through multiple social interactions, the dynamics of globalization present radical challenges and far-reaching consequences for sustaining national identity. The forces of contemporary globalization have challenged national identity in at least four separate but mutually interactive ways. First, contemporary globalization has seriously disrupted, if not totally severed, the previously unquestioned links among identity, nation, and state. With the rise of perforated sovereignty and supraterritoriality comes a marked decrease in state capacity for effective territorial control and national identity mobilization. State leaders no longer enjoy the hegemonic 28 29

30

31

Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner, eds., Internationalization and Domestic Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Held et al., Global Transformations, 441. For analysis along these lines using the South Korean case in the 1990s as an empirical example, see Samuel S. Kim, “Korea’s Segyehwa Drive: Promise versus Performance,” in Korea’s Globalization, 242–81. Barry Gills makes this argument in explaining the rise of South Korea and the fall of North Korea in the context of the two Koreas’ politics of competitive legitimation and delegitimation. See Barry Gills, Korea versus Korea: A Case of Contested Legitimacy (London: Routledge, 1996), 257–77. World Bank, World Development Report 1997 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 1–15; World Bank, World Development Report 1998/99 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Peter B. Evans, “The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization,” World Politics 50 (1997): 62–87.

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power to remold national identity with a minimum of external interference or competition. The Maoist notion of the Chinese people as “poor and blank,” perfect candidates for identity transformation, is no longer valid in even such nondemocratic states as post–Mao China.32 Globalization has also blurred the divide between the local and the global, between “domestic” and “foreign” affairs, making political space more decentered and multidimensional.33 Further, contemporary globalization has obfuscated self/other relations, especially in the wake of the end of the Cold War and the demise of East–West conflict. If national identity has the dual national security functions of enhancing internal coherence (sameness) while simultaneously sharpening external distinctiveness (difference),34 then contemporary globalization has greatly complicated the task of identifying the external positive and negative reference groups – our friends and our enemies – in a rapidly changing world. Finally, contemporary globalization reflects and effects the rapid rise and fall of the “effective state,” as well as the rapid change in the status ranking of the state within the world system, as it waxes and wanes in its power to attract the identification of its citizenry. This phenomenon may be expected to strengthen with the increasing globalization of electronic media and the public’s growing forgetfulness of history and imagined tradition. Historically, the construction of national identity has been closely keyed to place and shaped by it; that is, who “we” are has often been defined by “where” we are in the world.35 And yet, contemporary globalization has a pluralizing impact on identity formation, detaching identities from particular times, places, and traditions.36 With “postinternational relations” increasingly characterized by borderless interactions, people’s identities are being reconstituted and renegotiated not only by the nationstate but also by the processes of substate localization and supranational globalization.37 32 33

34 35 36 37

Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, eds., China’s Quest for National Identity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993). Held, Democracy and the Global Order; James N. Rosenau, “The Dynamics of Globalization: Toward an Operational Formulation,” Security Dialogue 27, no. 3 (1996): 247–62; McGrew, “Democracy Beyond Borders?” For a searching exploration of transnational advocacy networks in the shaping of the global/local nexus of politics, see Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998). Paul Kowert, “National Identity: Inside and out,” Security Studies 8 (1999): 1–34. Jan Aart Scholte, “Globalization and Collective Identities,” in Identities in International Relations, ed. Jill Krause and Neil Renwick (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 43. Held, Democracy and the Global Order, 124. Krause and Renwick, Identities in International Relations; Scholte, “Globalization and Collective Identities.”

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Thus, globalization has brought about greater complexity and multidimensionality to self/other relations. Collective identities are simultaneously experiencing denationalization and renationalization, which gives rise to multiple identities. National identity has by no means disappeared, as some advocates of the “hyperglobalization” school would have us believe, but they are no longer as robust as many neorealist advocates of the “globaloney” school argue. Rather, national identity is only one of a number of collective identities that people can embrace. For many people in many countries, especially in multinational/multiethnic states, the dominant “national identity” is not the only identity option open to them, because their nation-state is not the only, nor even the most important, experienced reality in their psychocultural consciousness and historical time. In fact, what we encounter now is a new phenomenon of “identity surfing.” In the sea of multiple collective identities based on loyalties of ethnicity, gender, religion, culture and language, region, and even brand, individuals are able to slide from one collective identity to another.38 Multiple group memberships and multiplying social interactions sire multiple identities. Under conditions of contemporary globalization, collective identity is said to be inevitably “en route rather than rooted” [emphasis in original]. 39 One of the key factors that makes democracy in multinational states possible is “the human capacity for multiple and complementary identities.” 40 This is not to say that identity is infinitely malleable. It cannot be changed easily, completely, or frequently, and such change occurs only as a result of repeated social interactions. Yet the scope, intensity, speed, sheer numbers, modalities, and impact of human relations and transactions have radically increased regionally and globally, eroding the boundaries between hitherto separate economic, political, and sociocultural entities throughout the world. As a consequence, the speed of identity change has accelerated, even as collective identities are being constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed anew in our global neighborhood. All that said, however, there are signs everywhere that ethnonational identities remain highly salient. In the post–Cold War era, the power of national identity as an ethnonational mobilizing force is tragically manifested in the dramatic rise in local and regional ethnonational conflicts, previously overshadowed and repressed by global superpower contention. Interstate armed conflicts befitting the traditional definition of “war” have virtually disappeared, with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait standing 38 39 40

Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World (New York: Ballantine, 1995); Kowert, “National Identity.” Scholte, “Globalization and Collective Identities,” 69. Linz and Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies,” 27–8.

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out as the most conspicuous exception. Wars of ethnonational identity mobilization – internal state-making wars – have emerged as the primary species of regional conflict in the post–Cold War era and are the basis for most of the post–Cold War UN peacekeeping operations.41 There is a double irony at work here. Although globalization has created a new social space for the construction of various alternative collective identities, it has also provoked a greater sense of threat to national identity, prompting a greater determination to hold onto national/ cultural identity as a defense mechanism against the alternative collective identities that the new global space has spawned. Indeed, the more that national space has disappeared, the more people have clung to the imagined certainties and comfort of national/cultural identity. Osama bin Laden’s clarion call for jihad against the infidels in the West and the United States for their alleged attack on the fundamentalist identity of the Islamic world is a recent and extreme example of a new identity war in the post–Cold War world. For better or worse, the nation-state remains a pillar of global as well as territorial constructions of collective identity.42 Likewise, states still command the loyalty of their citizens, still have control over material resources [one-third to one-half of gross domestic product (GDP)], and still define the policies and rules for those within their jurisdictions. Although the process of European integration has been gradually strengthening, deepening, and widening the European Union (EU), there is as yet little evidence that this process has generated a growing sense of European identity and community among its citizens, even among the public in longstanding member states like Germany.43 Globalization and Global Democratization How does globalization impact and reshape the democratic politics and governance that were previously associated closely with the nation-state? There is no need to accept the theses of hyperglobalization and globaloney to recognize that contemporary globalization, as defined previously, is a multidimensional and multicausal process of intensifying worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of human relations. The very process of global interconnectedness has not only eroded the traditional boundaries between the foreign and the domestic but has also spawned a series of disjunctures in its wake. For example, the locus and exercise 41 42 43

Peter Wallensteen and Karin Axell, “Armed Conflict at the End of the Cold War, 1989– 92,” Journal of Peace Research 30 (1993): 331–46. Scholte, “Globalization and Collective Identities,” 64–5. Pippa Norris, “Global Governance and Cosmopolitan Citizens,” in Nye and Donahue (eds.), Governance in a Globalizing World, 155–77.

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of power have become increasingly distant from the subjects who experience its consequences. Consider as well the disjuncture between the basic values and norms of modern liberal democracy and the actual but unaccountable governing of the dense transnational networks of economic, political, military, cultural, and social relations in which they are now embedded. All of these disjunctures have the same effect of subverting by stealth the historical congruence between territorial democracy and the sovereign nation-state.44 As a result, even powerful states command only shared or compromised sovereignty in a system of multiple power centers and overlapping spheres of authority. Power, both formal and informal, is increasingly “shared, bartered and struggled over by diverse forces and agencies at national, regional and global levels.”45 Governance, too, both formal and informal processes and institutions, guides and restrains subnational, national, and supranational actors in three separate but overlapping domains – the private, governmental, and third (social) sectors.46 According to Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott of the Clinton administration, even the world’s lone superpower, faced with the globalization challenge of doing more and more with less and less, had to leverage scarce resources by forming coalitions with nonstate actors – multinational corporations (MNCs), NGOs, and such global intergovernmental organizations as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the IMF – because such coalitions help the United States “to work not only multilaterally, but multimultilaterally, through several organizations and institutions at the same time.”47 The rapid expansion of subnational and supranational interconnectedness has brought about an unintended consequence of accelerating symmetry-breaking and dissonance-expanding processes in democratic governance and accountability. The impact of globalization on the Westphalian statecentric order has profound implications for modern democratic theory and practice, which presuppose the territorial nation-state as the highest level and referent of citizen’s loyalty and identity. There is now growing concern that in an era of intense globalization the viability of democracy within nation-states is intimately keyed to global democratization. An additional concern is that the realization of substantive democratic consolidation, as opposed to mere procedural or electoral democracy, requires the extension of democracy beyond the 44 45 47

Anthony McGrew, “Globalization and Territorial Democracy: An Introduction,” in The Transformation of Democracy?, 11. Held et al., Global Transformations, 447. 46 Keohane and Nye, “Introduction,” 12–13. Strobe Talbott, “Globalization and Diplomacy: A Practitioner’s Perspective,” Foreign Policy (Fall 1997): 79.

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nation-state to bring to account those global and transnational forces, especially MNCs, that currently escape effective democratic control. But the discourse on global democracy provokes some important conceptual and normative questions on the feasibility and desirability of such a global democratic order. How would a global democracy be constituted? What kinds of values and norms would underpin such a democratic world order?48 As summarized in Table 1.1, there are at least four major contending approaches to global democracy and world order: system-maintaining realism, system-reforming liberal internationalism, system-transforming socialist radicalism, and Kantian cosmopolitanism. For realists, global governance is primarily a matter for the hegemonic powers of the day. They reject the feasibility and desirability of a global democratic order. As Robert Gilpin argues and concludes in The Challenge of Global Capitalism, the Westphalian international system has enjoyed only two extended periods of political stability and economic prosperity: Pax Britannica prior to World War I and Pax Americana following World War II. Developments at the onset of the new millennium, however – the decline of American leadership, fraying economic cooperation between the United States and its Cold War allies, and increasing disillusionment with economic globalization in the United States and elsewhere – seriously threaten the stability of the global economy and make it possible that “if the United States does not resume its leadership role, the Second Great Age of global capitalism, like the first, is likely to disappear.”49 Some optimistic realists flatly reject this pessimistic prognostication. William Wohlforth, for example, argues that the post–Cold War international system is unprecedentedly and unambiguously unipolar. In all the underlying economic, military, technological, and geopolitical components of power, the United States enjoys “a much larger margin of superiority over the next most powerful states or, indeed, all other great powers combined than any leading states in the last two centuries.” The current unipolarity is not only peaceful and stable but also durable, because it minimizes strategic peer competition among the other great powers while giving incentive to the second-tier powers to join with the unipolar superpower rather than balancing against it.50 Thus, Wohlforth rejects both the “unipolar moment” thesis, as profoundly mistaken and pessimistic, and the “rise of revisionist power” (such as China) thesis, as 48 49 50

McGrew, “Democracy Beyond Borders?” 232. Robert Gilpin, The Challenge of Global Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 357. William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 24 (1999): 5–41.

16

Westphalian and emerging post-Westphalian order States, IGOs, MNCs, NGOs

Westphalian order

No globalization except financial globalization Realists in academic and policy communities

Globalization – cause and effect

Main proponents

Multicausal process – generates interdependence and “zones of peace” The Commission on Global Governance (1995); Keohane and Nye (2000)

Consensus politics via reformed IGOs; enhancing the transparency of global governance Liberal Democracy

Power politics

Representative (protective) democracy

Polyarchy

Hierarchal state-centric

Democratic heritage

Vision of world order Ethic of global governance

States and IGOs and NGOs

States

Economical driven – subject to contradictions Cox (1996); Boswell and Chase-Dunn (2000)

Direct democracy

Popular governance from below

Transnational capitalist class, elites through states and MNCs Rule of global capital

Transnational capital, states, MNCs, global capitalist agencies Global capitalism

System-transforming

Socialist radicalism

Held (1995); McGrew (1997); Archibugi, Held, and Kohler (1998)

Liberal democracy; direct democracy; participatory democracy Multicausal process with transformative potential

States, peoples, IGOs, NGOs, MNCs, epistemic communities Cosmopolitan – states, peoples, reformed IGOs Cosmopolitan democratic governance

States, IGOs; , NGOs, MNCs, critical social movements Post-Westphalian order

System-transforming

Kantian cosmopolitanism

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Hegemonic states (great powers)

System-reforming

System-maintaining

Liberal-internationalism and institutionalism

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Deep structure of world order Who governs?

International system Key actors

Realism (and neorealism)

Table 1.1 Contending approaches to global democracy and world order

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profoundly mistaken and optimistic.51 One thing remains clear: there is little room in realist theory for ideational variables such as democratic values and norms in international politics or any transferability of liberal democracy to the “anarchical society of states.”52 The most authoritative exposition of liberal internationalism was published in late 1995 in the form of a high-profile international commission report, Our Global Neighborhood, produced by the Commission on Global Governance, an independent international group of twenty-eight senior statespersons from different countries (including Hongkoo Lee from Korea) with diverse academic and governmental experience. The main purpose of the commission is to address the problem of democratic governance in the new “global neighborhood” that has been created by the forces of globalization. The report takes a system-reforming approach by first acknowledging that “traditional norms of interstate relations will provide a critical source of stability,” but it also asserts: There is a need now to adopt some of these norms to new circumstances. It is fundamentally important that governance should be underpinned by democracy at all levels and ultimately by the rule of enforceable law. . . . As at the national level, so in the global neighborhood, the democratic principle must be ascendant. The need for greater democracy arises out of the close linkage between legitimacy and effectiveness. . . . Here, as the role of international institutions in global governance grows, the need to ensure that they are democratic also increases.53

Despite the superficial similarity to the Clark–Sohn world federalist model of world constitutionalism,54 this report – also known as the Carlsson and Ramphal Report, derived from the names of the cochairmen, Ingvar Carsson (Sweden) and Sheridath Ramphal (Guyana) – makes it clear at the outset that “global governance is not global government.” The report goes on to argue that it is not proposing movement toward world government, “for were we to travel in that direction we could find ourselves in an even less democratic world than we have – one more accommodating to power, more hospitable to hegemonic 51

52 53

54

For the unipolar moment thesis, see Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70 (1991): 1. For the alarmist and sensational account of the rise of China argument, see Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Monroe, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997). Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977). Our Global Neighborhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 48, 60; See also Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Democratization (New York: United Nations, 1996). For critical analysis and evaluation of the Clark and Sohn model, see Samuel S. Kim, “In Search of Global Constitutionalism,” in The Constitutional Foundations of World Peace, ed. Richard Falk, Robert Johansen, and Samuel Kim (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 55–81.

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ambition, and more reinforcing of the roles of states and governments rather than the rights of people.”55 In a similar but even more modest way, Keohane and Nye propose “networked minimalism” as an intermediate solution to the challenge of democratic global governance. Shying away from the utopian vision of world government and the Hobbesian vision of international anarchy, networked minimalism is said to be an intermediate solution of preserving national democratic processes while developing modest normative principles and practices to enhance greater transparency and accountability of not only the state actors but also the nonstate actors, such as MNCs and NGOs, that constitute global governance in a globalizing world.56 Anchored in a neo-Marxist dependencia analysis of the capitalist world system, socialist radicalism retains a strong commitment to critical discourse and to knowledge as an instrument of human emancipation from oppression of all kinds. Contemporary globalization is seen as a new phase of global capitalism characterized by the growing polarization between the rich and the poor in the world at large as well as within domestic societies.57 This capitalist new world order has profound implications for social democracy, because global capitalism is made to order for assaulting the social, economic, and political fabric of democracy. Hence, the new world order requires “a double democratization of forms of state and civil society in both global and local dimensions of political life.”58 Terry Boswell and Christopher Chase-Dunn articulate the position of socialist radicalism: Global democracy is the equivalent of social democracy at the world level. It is both the first step and the primary goal of world socialism. All other benefits for working people, from environmental protection to banning child labor, flow from their ability to contest the standards and rule of the world order. . . . For socialism to transform capitalism, it too must be a global system, one that embraces worldwide democracy.59

Inspired by Kant’s cosmopolitan thinking and commitment to republican/democratic ideals, the theory of cosmopolitan democracy is one of the few theoretical discourses that systematically explores the democratic 55

Our Global Neighborhood, xvi.

57

Robert Cox, “Globalization, Multilateralism and Democracy,” in Approaches to World Order, ed. Robert Cox (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Stephen Gill, “Globalization, Market Civilization, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism,” Millennium 24, no. 3 (1995): 399–424. Terry Boswell and Christopher Chase-Dunn, The Spiral of Capitalism and Socialism: Toward Global Democracy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 12, 16.

58 59

56

Keohane and Nye, “Introduction.”

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implications of globalization.60 It proceeds from the premise that our world is one of overlapping communities of fate, in which the fate of one national democracy and that of another are more interconnected and interdependent than ever before in human history. Yet the forces of contemporary globalization are undermining the traditional national forms and foundations of liberal democracy. In this world of accelerating interconnectedness, is global democracy possible? David Held, a leading British theorist of cosmopolitan democracy and globalization, suggests that “this is not only a real necessity but also a real possibility.”61 Central to the theory of cosmopolitan democracy is a belief that democracy can be fully sustained only in and through an expanding nucleus of democratic states and agencies throughout the world. The cosmopolitan model attempts to specify the principles and the institutional basis upon which democratic government within, between, and across states is to be expanded.62 Democracy in a rapidly globalizing world is redefined as a “double-sided process,” or a process of double democratization, “not just the deepening of democracy within a national community, involving the further democratization of states and civil societies over time, but also the extension of democratic forms and processes across territorial borders.”63 Reviewing the traditional confederate and federalist models, Daniele Archibugi argues that neither has the wherewithal to meet the requirements of cosmopolitan democracy. Hence, there is a need for a different model of political community, more unified than a confederation but less centralized than a federal state. What is proposed is a new global democratic order capable of promoting democracy on three different but mutually supporting levels: inside nations, among states, and at a global level.64 A cosmopolitan democracy would not necessarily mean a diminishment of state power or the demise of the nation-state. Rather, it would involve the creation and entrenchment of new democratic institutions at regional and global levels as a necessary complement to those at the level of the state. In short, the case for cosmopolitan democracy is based on the recognition of the continuing importance of nation-states and argues in favor of another layer of global governance to override states in clearly defined spheres where those activities have demonstrable 60

61 62 63 64

See Held, Democracy and the Global Order. Daniele Archibugi, David Held, and Martin Kohler, eds., Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). David Held, “Democracy and Globalization,” Global Governance 3 (1997): 264. Held, Democracy and the Global Order. McGrew, The Transformation of Democracy? Held et al., Global Transformations, 450. Daniele Archibugi, “Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy,” in Re-imagining Political Community, 198–228.

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transnational consequences. In addition, the constituent features of cosmopolitan democracy include not only the formal construction of new democratic institutions and procedures but also the construction of broad “access avenues” of civic participation at national and transnational levels.65 Viewed in this light, Kantian cosmopolitanism is less systemtransforming than socialist radicalism and slightly more system-reforming than liberal internationalism. Whether the future global order takes shape as a Kantian international society or as an oligarchic world dominated by capitalists or even a Pax Americana unipolar world, it is against this changing backdrop that we must begin to understand Korea’s current democratic development and the prospect for its future development. Democratic transformation of countries is undoubtedly a domestic process that must be driven by the efforts of reform-minded leaders and societal forces, but as the discussion in this introductory chapter highlights, these developments do not occur in isolation from what is occurring within other democracies and in the global arena. In a world where boundaries are increasingly perforated and states more interconnected, the future of Korea’s efforts toward democratic consolidation will be encouraged, stalled, and, at times, pushed back by international events and actors. As the subsequent chapters turn to a more domestically focused discussion on the current state of Korea’s democratization, the global context in which South Korea’s democratic consolidation process is embedded must be kept in perspective. From the Global to the Local There is little dispute among the contributors to this volume that Korea is now a secure electoral democracy. However, electoral democracy is not the same as a mature, stable, liberal democracy. If the progressive hollowing-out of recent electoral democracies is one of several defining features of the latter period of the third wave,66 can the same be said about Korea’s electoral democracy? What specific cultural, institutional, and behavioral characteristics distinguish Korean-style democracy? What are the main obstacles standing in the way of transforming Korean democracy into a more responsible, representative, effective, liberal democracy? How long would it take for Korea to achieve such democratic deepening and maturing? The chapters that follow seek to answer these and other related questions by examining the complex interplay of facilitating and inhibiting factors that influenced and reshaped Korea’s democratic consolidation 65 66

Held, “Democracy and Globalization,” 263–4. Diamond, Developing Democracy, 10, 19.

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process. It is important at the outset, however, to clear away some of the major misconceptions underlying the recent debates and practices of democratic politics in Korea. The fundamentalist notion that “ends justify any means” has no place in democratic thought and practice. The true measure of consolidation lies not so much in any specific ends or outcomes as in the unquestioned commitment to the democratic rules and methods of political contestation and governance. Because there is no such thing as perfect democracy, democratic consolidation is better seen and analyzed as a continuum rather than as an “either/or” dichotomy. Indeed, there is no one ideal type of consolidated democracy with universal validity. To further democratic consolidation is to make formal democratic structures and politics more representative, more responsive, more transparent, more accountable, and more liberal. Not to be construed as a singular condition or process of any single aspect of politics, democratic consolidation is a multidimensional and multicausal process. As such, it requires a democratic deepening of all the key dimensions of political life – cultural, behavioral, and institutional – but also at all levels of the state and society – the mass public, intermediate civil society, and government. This means that in different issue areas and at different system levels within a democracy, the degree of consolidation may vary. Consolidation is not a preprogrammed or a linear process, but rather a dialectical process generating contending forces and often subject to a series of crises and reversals.67 In the past decade, Korea has encountered the uncomfortable truth that the forces that helped to bring about democratic transition are not necessarily the same as those that would help consolidate and sustain it. Consolidation at the Mass Public Level In Chapter 2, Doh Chull Shin, in a seminal study of the relationship between mass political culture and democratic consolidation in Korea, arrives at a sobering conclusion that is more surprising and more pessimistic than any of the other chapters. In the past three years (1998–2001), the Kim Dae Jung government has suffered a double legitimation blow. This “imperial presidency” has remained grossly deficient in delivering on its promises of accountability, transparency, and respect for the rule of law, while at the same time Kim has been perceived as an ineffective leader in solving the economic crisis. With more than four out of five voters (82%) 67

Three of the best books on democratization and democratic consolidation are Huntington, The Third Wave; Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); and Diamond, Developing Democracy.

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dismissing the current Kim Dae Jung government as fully unaccountable to them, compared to a negligible proportion (2%) viewing it as fully accountable, the public sense of democratic legitimacy has steadily declined from 69% in 1997 to 45% in 2001. For a large majority (82%) of Korean citizens, the current system is in a crisis, with 30% saying that it is “definitely in a crisis” and more than half (52%) saying that it is “probably in a crisis.” Only a small minority (14%) declined to recognize the presence of a democratic crisis, and a negligible minority (1%) expressed the view that the country is “definitely not in a democratic crisis.” More disturbing, the number of people who support authoritarianism as the best way to tackle the country’s problems has almost quadrupled, from 12% in 1996 to 44% in 2001. Under the Kim Dae Jung “imperial presidency,” Shin concludes, Korea has been regressing from an influential consolidating democracy to a “broken-back democracy.” Even as one of the most successful democratic transitions in the third wave of democratization, Korea has turned into one of those new democracies with the lowest level of support from the public. Most surprisingly, for the first time since the initiation of democratic rule in 1988, a plurality of the Korean citizens rate the Kim Dae Jung government more negatively than the past military government headed by former general Chun Doo Hwan. Shin’s pessimistic prognostication is that Korea’s “long march” toward a fully consolidated democracy may require several generations rather than a single generation. The basic data for Shin’s empirical study were drawn from the Korean Democracy Barometer (KDB) public opinion surveys conducted by the Korea Gallup polling organization from 1997 to 2001. This multiyear survey assesses how the 1997 financial crisis and the performance of the Kim Dae Jung government during its first three years have affected mass public support in normative and empirical dimensions (i.e., “democracy-in-principle” and “democracy-in-practice”). Because diametrically opposed forecasts can be and often have been made by simply changing the initial assumptions of a given model, it is important to keep in mind the central premise of Shin’s study: that positive changes in formal laws and institutions at the governmental level will matter little, unless public support is expanded, deepened, and strengthened. In other words, the beliefs, values, and attitudes of ordinary citizens structure the outer possibilities and limitations for democratic consolidation.68 Mass public support is thus placed at the forefront of Korea’s democratic consolidation. 68

For a similar argument, see Ronald Inglehart, “Culture and Democracy,” in Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, ed. Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 80–97.

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Why have so many Koreans weakened in their support for “democracyin-practice,” while remaining attached to “democracy-in-principle”? Shin explains that an instrumental view of democracy (e.g., that economic democrats outnumber political democrats by a substantial margin), combined with a growing perception that the current “democratic government” is neither very democratic nor very effective, has contributed to the steady decline of support for “democracy-in-practice.” More than a decade of civilian democratic governance hardly made a dent in the old habit of equating dictatorship with effective leadership and even “good governance.” Unlike former communist states in Eastern Europe where authoritarian rule was held responsible for economic chaos and stagnation, in Korea, the outbreak of economic crisis has rekindled nostalgia for the “good old days” of the authoritarian government that contributed to economic prosperity. Moreover, the crisis has motivated an increasing number of ordinary citizens to blame democratic institutions as much as the custodians of those institutions. President Kim Dae Jung’s approval ratings plummeted from around 80% at his inauguration in February 1998 to just 18.6% in mid-2001.69 Consolidation at the Intermediate Civil Society Level When examined at the level of intermediate civil society, however, Korea’s democratic consolidation seems more complex and less troublesome. In Chapter 3, Sunhyuk Kim tracks and explains the crucial role of civil society in the processes of both transition and consolidation; neither elites nor masses “won” democracy in Korea. What differentiated the Korean case from other third-wave democracies was the protracted and intense conflicts between a combative civil society and a strong state. Unlike many third-wave democracies in Southern Europe and Latin America, what really happened in Korea in 1987 cannot be characterized as a pacted transition, or what Huntington calls “democratization by transplacement.”70 According to Sunhyuk Kim, however, it was a “mass-ascendant” mode of democratization, in which Korean civil society made a unique and decisive contribution to democratic transition. What is even more remarkable about the Korean case is that civil society groups continue to play important roles in the consolidation process. 69 70

James Brooke, “Behind South Korea’s Political Crisis, an Economy in Disarray,” New York Times, 9 September 2001, 17. According to Huntington, between 1974 and 1990, thirty-five countries shifted from authoritarian to democratic systems of government, causing “the third wave of democratization in the modern era.” In eleven countries, including South Korea, democratization came about through “transplacement” – that is, joint action by government and opposition groups. See Samuel P. Huntington, “How Countries Democratize,” Political Science Quarterly 106, no. 4 (1991–2): 579–616.

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Contrary to the general trajectory of democratic development, in which the active participation of civil society normally diminishes, the involvement of civil society in Korea’s democratic consolidation process remains strong. However, Sunhyuk Kim points out that Korea’s democratic consolidation has gone awry in the failure of the political society to develop and mature simultaneously with its civil society. Much of the political party dynamics that existed during the authoritarian government period persists today. Political party competition remains based on anachronistic Confucian ideals, regional loyalties, and party and boss politics rather than on substantive political issues and constituent interests. Political impasse and gridlock are more common than compromise and cooperation. Therefore, this vicious triangulation of dysfunctional party politics, boss politics, and regional politics explains the continuation of an active citizens movement. The trend has been for civil societal groups and the state to circumvent or even replace party politics. This development, however, may hinder rather than help the democratic process and the consolidation of democracy in Korea. Virtually all mature, liberal democracies are predicated on the balance between a vibrant civil society and functional political society, because such a balance serves as a healthy antidote to the abuse of power by the state. Sunhyuk Kim’s analysis and prognosis is that as long as the imbalance between a combative civil society and a dysfunctional political society (political parties) remains unresolved, Korea’s democratization will most likely remain “uninstitutionalized, unconsolidated, unstable and at best fragile.” A focus on the women’s movement as part of the civil society movement reveals why Korea is often called the most Confucian place in the world. Although women make up half of Korean voters, until the year 2000 their representation in the national assembly remained stagnant around a minuscule 1% to 3% (see Table 4.1). Even by East Asian standards, Korea ranks extremely low in the annual United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) ranking. Although East Asia has consistently outranked all other regions in real GDP growth and absolute poverty reduction over the years, most East Asian countries rank low in the annual GEM rankings. In 1997, for example, Korea ranked thirtieth in the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) but seventy-eighth in the GEM ranking, compared to thirty-eighth for Japan, fortieth for China, fifty-second for Malaysia, and sixty-fourth for Thailand.71 The percentage of women legislators doubled after the sixteenth national assembly elections in 2000 (from less than 3% to 5.9%), but it still falls behind the East Asian average of 14.9%. 71

See Samuel S. Kim, “East Asia and Globalization: Challenges and Responses,” in East Asia and Globalization, ed. Samuel S. Kim (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), Table 1.2, p. 14.

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In Chapter 4, Seungsook Moon problematizes the representation of women in Korea’s democratic consolidation, in terms of Confucian norms and rules of masculinist politics. As a multilayered process of sociopolitical transformation, according to Moon, Korea’s democratic consolidation must be developed in tandem with the growth of women’s participation not only in electoral politics but also in other forms of political and civil activities. Despite the growth of grassroots civil organizations among farmers, laborers, and the poor in the 1990s, there has been little progress in women’s political representation. Moon addresses the question of what specific normative, institutional, and behavioral characteristics serve as the main facilitators for or obstacles against the construction of “substantive democracy” in Korea. She explains how the primary parameters of Confucianism in general and the patrilineal family system in particular have shaped the masculinist nature of Korean politics. As an integral part of Korean civil society, the efforts of the women’s movement to revise family law, especially the family master system, deserve attention because they directly challenge the root of the familial metaphor so extensively utilized in masculinist politics, and because they expand and deepen the meaning of substantive democratization by highlighting the centrality of the transformation of social relations in the Korean state and society. The familial metaphor in Confucian governance within contemporary Korean politics fulfills an ideological function by “naturalizing” power relations between the state and the populace through hierarchical gender constructs within the family. Although there is little gender difference in electoral participation – 93% for female voters and 95% for male voters – women’s involvement in other nonelectoral political and civic activities has remained far behind men. Only 13% of the female respondents surveyed had been involved in protest and only 16% had been involved in other political activities. These percentages are higher among the male respondents, 25% and 36%, respectively. The least active of the male segments is more involved politically than the most active of the female segments, and Korean men with little or no formal education are more active politically than Korean women with a college education. The lack of women’s representation and participation is not an isolated phenomenon but a feature of the conservative dimension of democratization. Assessed in terms of women’s representation and participation in institutional politics and associational activities, Korean democracy falls short of substantive, liberal democracy. What is required is an elimination of the family master system as a first crucial step toward a conception of the democratic citizen that is more conducive to substantive democratization. The state is willing to support the elimination of the family master system if there is little resistance to it from the public, but it is also reluctant to commit itself to the

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remolding of public opinion through active education. Such reluctant realism reflects the abiding legacy of the Confucian normative system and the masculinist politics that reflect the power relations within families. The marginalization of women is a feature of conservative (illiberal) democratization shaped by deeply entrenched masculinist politics. Despite the long shadow of Confucianism, there are some positive signs suggestive of normative and institutional transformations of masculinist political culture in the long run. First, the democratizing state is compelled to respond to local and global pressure to promote gender equality in an era of globalization and a global transparency revolution. At home, women’s associations have demanded a quota of 30% for women candidates and have succeeded in making the national assembly pass a bill requiring political parties to observe the 30% quota for women candidates running for those national assembly seats reserved for proportional representation of occupational groups in the national constituency (fortysix out of 273 total assembly seats). Although this limited quota system without specific measures of enforcement is insufficient for the elimination of institutionalized sexism in party politics, it is a first major step in the long march, demonstrating the emerging negotiatory relation between the state and women’s associations in the consolidation of Korean democracy. At the global level, the United Nations and International Parliamentary Union (IPU) have exerted considerable normative pressure by giving Korea a low ranking in various measures of general equality in their periodic reports. The image factor that inevitably accompanied Korea’s greater participation in a world of international institutions and treaties has also engendered some nontrivial socialization effects. In the highly status-conscious Korean society, where ranking is often used as a way to locate any group in the social pecking order, Korean women seized upon the wide chasm between the nation’s high economic standing and its low ranking in the UNDP’s Gender-related Development Index (GDI) and the GEM. The point is not that Korean women were instantly socialized by universal human rights norms from without, but that they have grasped the opportunities of sociocultural globalization engendered by the United Nations and UN-sponsored global conferences and conventions. Korean women have been developing critical social movements, but the UN politics of human rights has also provided a legitimate platform for initiating internal political momentum toward improving Korea’s positions on a wide variety of global issues and problems, while at the same time facilitating the formation of transnational NGO networking.72 72

See also Seungsook Moon, “Overcome by Globalization: The Rise of a Women’s Policy in South Korea,” in Korea’s Globalization, 126–46.

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Gender equity matters not only for Korea’s democratic consolidation but also for enhancing Korea’s productivity, competitiveness, and transparency in corporate governance and management. Korea has the dubious distinction of never having been out of the bottom of the OECD member rankings in terms of women’s status and utilization of female resources. Indeed, gender equity in Korea may be seen as the most essential yet underappreciated and underutilized political, social, and economic resources needed to meet the twin challenges of democratic consolidation from below and within and globalization from above and without. With women now accounting for about 36% of all Korean university students and about 24% of all Koreans who obtained doctorate degrees from universities at home and abroad, women’s potential to contribute to the making of a more democratic, competitive, and corruption-free Korea cannot be gainsaid. In Chapter 5, Katharine H. S. Moon explains the striking metamorphosis of South Korea’s seemingly atavistic anti-American movement in the post-transition period. Unlike the post–Kwangju anti-American movement of the 1980s, the new anti-American movement of the late 1990s and early 2000s is developing a new identity primarily as a civil society movement focused on advancing human rights (including labor and women’s rights), environmental protection, and the rule of law. Moon’s somewhat optimistic analysis and prognosis proceeds from the premise that the new anti-American movement can be better studied as a movement of new democrats than as a movement of old nationalists. In contrast with the post–Cold War ethnonational movements in multinational states wherein political elites exploit nationalism to their own parochial political purposes without actually granting the people full democratic rights,73 Korea’s anti-American movement has in fact become an integral part of the process of democratic consolidation. The principal civic groups in this movement are not ethnonational primordialists seeking a return to an essentialist past. Unlike the anti-Americanism among radical leftist students and intellectuals in the 1980s, the new movement is not ideologically coherent or driven, as it offers no monolithic resistance to the United States in rhetoric or action. It represents various interests, political experience and ideologies, socioeconomic classes, ages, intensities of personal commitment, and movement goals. To a large extent, the movement’s agenda reflects the “big tent” under which disparate groups and interests can share information, coordinate political action, and mobilize resources to increase public impact both within and outside South Korea. This “big tent” movement includes, not only left-leaning radical students, religious activists, 73

Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), 314.

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and the more militant Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) and the National Campaign for the Eradication of Crime by U.S. Troops in Korea, but also law professionals, environmentalists, academics, peace activists, the conservative Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), leaders of mainstream NGOs, common villagers, local government officials, and even some national assembly lawmakers. The overall aim is to influence government policies (ROK and U.S.) and to address everyday issues touching common people’s lives, including environmental safety, land usage, and violence against women, which are not usually present in the bilateral ROK–U.S. discussions. Moon’s principal argument is that the rapid growth and popularization of the anti-American movement that focused on U.S. bases and bilateral relations with the United States served as a kind of force-multiplier for Korea’s democratic consolidation for at least three reasons. First, the movement has found a common, “national” purpose for cooperation over scarce resources and for overcoming divergent ideologies and political strategies. Not only are different ideological orientations, organizational interests, and norms meeting under the “nationalist” tent of anti-Americanism and learning to work together, but so are civic groups and local governments that represent the areas that house the U.S. bases, with the consequence of generating social capital and trust among disparate interest groups. The anti-American movement also builds social capital at the local level by enabling kijich’on (camptown) local government officials and citizenactivists to come together on issues related to the quality of life of kijich’on citizens. These groups have historically been marginalized politically, economically, and socially not only by the central government but also by the vast majority of the Korean people. Such developments support Larry Diamond’s arguments on the necessity of viable representative local governments in democratic consolidation, and critical factors such as citizen competence, accountability, and responsiveness to local concerns, access to power for historically marginalized groups, checks and balances in the central government, and alternative arenas for contestation by parties out of power. The third reason that the anti-American movement acts as a forcemultiplier is that it opens a new pathway for entry into the area of foreign and security policy. In the past, this has been the least democratic area in Korean civil society, and such participation was actively suppressed by the national security managers of the Park and Chun governments. The diversification and democratization of national security and foreign policy initiated by the civilian Kim Young Sam government in the early 1990s has created a political space for open debate and criticism of Korea’s foreign and security relations, including the ROK–U.S. alliance. Citizen

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activists no longer fear being thrown in jail or harassed for expressing anti-American opinions.74 Consolidation at the State Level As noted previously, we may start with this axiom: no state, no globalization debate; no state-restructuring, no consolidation. Globalization has dealt a heavy blow to both the Jeffersonian ideal of a minimal state – the best government is one that governs least – and the Stalinist conception of a superstate, which had turned the classical Marxist “withering away of the state” on its head. Globalization has in effect redefined what it takes to be a competent and effective state in an increasingly interdependent and interactive world, threatening both minimalist and maximalist states. As Linz and Stepan argue, one of the essential conditions for the democratic consolidation process is that a state be at once legitimate, stable, and effective. For a democracy to be consolidated, there are varieties of interconnected and mutually reinforcing conditions. Linz and Stepan suggest that a modern consolidated democracy is best understood not as a regime, but as an interacting system comprising five major interrelated areas (a free and lively civil society, a relatively autonomous political society, the rule of law or Rechtsstaat, a usable state bureaucracy, and an institutionalized economic society), each of which is influenced by the others.75 Chapters 6 through 9 explore select issues regarding the agent–structure nexus at the state level. Regionalism in South Korea is generally regarded as the disease of Korean politics. Although, spared from the kinds of ethnic conflict in multinational states (one of the two most widely cited obstacles and dangers to democratic consolidation), ethnically homogenous Korea has nonetheless been highly polarized and fragmented by regional rivalries, especially between the Cholla (Honam) and Kyongsang (Yongnam) provinces. This regional animus remains a destructive centrifugal force that feeds and shapes democratic and authoritarian attitudes and behaviors. The posttransition period has experienced no significant downward trend in the magnitude of regional factionalism, rivalry, and patronage politics, with each region competing against the others as a motive force that contributes to the politics of fragmentation among the Korean citizens.76 The national assembly elections in April 2000 highlighted a political map of the regional divisions in vivid colors, with more than 90% of 74 75 76

For a more pessimistic analysis and interpretation of the anti-American movement in Korea, see Sung-Joo Han, “The Koreas’ New Century,” Survival 42, no. 4 (2000–1): 85–95. Linz and Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies,” 17–23. Doh C. Shin, Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 31–2, 41; Sunhyuk Kim, “Patronage Politics as an Obstacle to Democracy in South Korea: Regional Networks and Democratic Consolidation,” in Democracy and Its

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the vote and sixty-four of the sixty-five parliamentary seats in the Yongnam region going to the opposition GNP, while in Cholla the same proportion went to President Kim Dae Jung’s ruling party. Indeed, much of the GNP’s resilience in recent years can be attributed to the regional animus that disfigures and fragments Korea’s democratic consolidation process. In Chapter 6, however, David C. Kang presents an alternative and unconventional interpretation of the effects of regional biases on Korea’s electoral process. Kang claims that regionalism in Korea is a normal part of the democratic process rather than an impediment, and that voters are expressing their preferences within institutional constraints. Using econometric analysis of comprehensive voting results for both the national assembly and presidential elections from 1948 to 2000, Kang attempts to show that before 1987 there was no relationship between regionalism and voting for the ruling party. Only after the democratic transition of 1987 did voting patterns show a strong relationship between regional identity and voting behavior. Although Kang highlights some interesting correlations, and challenges us to reconsider the conventional thought regarding Korean regionalism, we must also consider the following points:

r The genesis of regional animus and conflict dates back to the Three r

r r

r

77 78

Kingdoms (53–668 a.d.) of Koguryo, Silla (modern Kyongsang Province), and Paekchae (modern day Yongnam region) (see Chapter 7). After a decade of democratic rule, South Korean citizens remain bound by regional ties that are built primarily on particularistic regional networks and identities, forestalling any meaningful national debate on the national and global policy issues that are essential for democratic politics in an era of globalization. A large majority (70%) still identifies more closely with local communities than with the national community.77 Korean regionalism-cum-factionalism remains the functional equivalent of ethnonational conflict, and as such it is one of the major factors impeding the growth of the social capital that works like a lubricant in democratic consolidation. “It is these regional political patronage networks – formed, developed, and bequeathed by the earlier authoritarian regimes – that are currently bedeviling South Korea’s democratic consolidation.”78 Limits: Lessons from Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, ed. Howard Handelman and Mark Tessler (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), 115–29. Shin, Mass Politics and Culture, 257. Kim, “Patronage Politics as an Obstacle to Democracy in South Korea,” 120.

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To achieve a consolidated democracy is to enable citizens, with the help of the political leadership, to develop multiple and complementary political identities freed from particularistic local ties.79 One of the key indicators for measuring and assessing progress in Korea’s democratic consolidation is a shift from the rule of man to the rule of law. The creation of a Rechtsstaat is generally considered as one of the minimal conditions for democratic consolidation.80 And yet, like many politicians and civil servants, many ordinary citizens are not committed and habituated to the rule of law. More than two-fifths (44%) of Korean citizens openly expressed reluctance to commit themselves to the rule of law. “Many Koreans, especially the college-educated, whether democrats or authoritarians, show little respect for the rule of law. As they were in the authoritarian past, laws are perceived to be made only for those who are powerless and unfortunate.”81 This attitude is also reflected in the works of the courts, where more than 90% of those tried are convicted. For elites, law continues to be viewed primarily as a method of control rather than as an independent arbiter of right and wrong. One of the somewhat disquieting paradoxes is that no Korean president has left office except in political or legal disgrace. There is an emerging consensus among Korean citizens and scholars alike that Korean politics is driven by “the rule of rulers,” not by the rule of law, and that the Kim Dae Jung government is far from being a constitutional democracy based on the rule of law. Even such sympathetic observers as Jongryun Mo and Chung-in Moon, two leading political scientists in Seoul, had to conclude that “for students of democracy, the more troubling aspect of Kim Dae Jung’s reform efforts is his willingness to compromise the rule of law for the sake of consolidating his power and carrying out economic reforms.”82 In Chapter 7, Jeong-Ho Roh examines the jagged development of constitutional democracy in Korea through a rigorous legal analysis of selected issues that are reflective of deep-rooted problems in the relationship between the president and the constitution. The so-called “trial of the century” on August 26, 1996, which led the Seoul District Court to hand down the death sentence for former President Chun Doo Hwan and a 22.5-year imprisonment for former President Roh Tae Woo, illustrates with particular clarity the abiding tension between means and ends in Korea’s democratic consolidation process. As Roh argues, the often overlooked aspect of the “trial of the century” is whether history was actually 79 80 82

Linz and Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies,” 27–8. Ibid., 19. 81 Shin, Mass Politics and Culture, 263. Jongryun Mo and Chung-in Moon, “Korea After the Crash,” Journal of Democracy 10 (1999): 163.

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set right through the proper exercise of the rule of law or rather through means at odds with the rule of law that were politically expedient in response to vox populi. At issue is the enactment of a special ex post facto legislation, commonly known as the “Special Act on the May 18 Democratization Movement,” that was designed to circumvent a fifteen-year statute of limitations for offences punishable by death. Although a majority of five justices of the nine-member constitutional court found this legislative sleight of hand “inconsistent with the Constitution,” the Special Act was nonetheless upheld, as a supermajority vote of six justices is required for any ruling of unconstitutionality. The controversial law and ruling by the constitutional court may have achieved instant political success in setting history right, but it may also represent a major step backward for the establishment of a true Rechtsstaat in Korea’s democratic consolidation. In the four decades following the promulgation of the original Constitution of the Republic of Korea in 1948, there have been no fewer than nine constitutional amendments and five succeeding republics. In the forty-year period from 1948 to 1988, Korea experimented with a constitutional change once every 4.4 years on the average and one whole system change once every 6.6 years on the average. More telling, with the exception of the last constitutional revision in 1987 that created the sixth republic, this breathtaking constitutional revisionism proved to be no more than an expression and exercise of the incumbent president’s daekwon byung (“great governing power disease” or “presidential ambition disease”). Every constitutional amendment except the 1987 one was designed to give more legal running room for presidential election, power, and tenure. The cumulative effect of such frequent constitutional revisionism is to establish a precedent of misappropriating the constitution as an expedient means by which the political leaders could legitimize their daekwon byung under the guise of legality. The growth of a strong and independent system of judicial review was stunted during the first four decades of the ROK. With the democratic opening of 1987 came a heightened level of political legitimacy and a marked increase in the nature and level of activity in the newly reinstated constitutional court. Out of 2,361 cases received as of 1994, for example, the court rendered judgment on 626 cases, with fifty-nine laws declared unconstitutional either in whole or in part. Furthermore, by permitting individual parties to directly petition the constitutional court in the event that the lower courts decline a request for constitutional review, previous obstacles that had prevented challenges to constitutionality of laws or government action had been removed. Still, there remain two structural problems. The first problem, as noted previously, has to do with the constitutional requirement (Article 113) that at least six justices out of nine (a supermajority) concur before the

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court can rule a law to be unconstitutional. The second problem is the skewed composition of the court, with three justices nominated by the president, three by the national assembly, and three by the chief justice of the supreme court (who is also nominated by the president), each serving a term of six years. Although representing a major improvement over the system of the constitutional committee of the first republic, the current system is still fundamentally at odds with ensuring a truly independent judicial review system that is free from presidential unit veto power (because the president can nominate directly and indirectly six justices of the nine-member constitutional court). Roh arrives at the sobering and disquieting conclusion that although the principle of the rule of law is accepted at the highly abstract normative level, in practice this principle is, more often than not, tempered or even abandoned by the need to address time-specific, situation-specific “national reality.” The national realities that have stood in the way of fully embracing the rule of law as the guiding principle are overriding concern for maintaining stability and national security in response to the dangerous geopolitical situation on the Korean peninsula and the urgent need for economic recovery, reform, and restructuring. In the final analysis, Korea’s democratic consolidation requires nothing less than the mobilization of national consensus on the meaning of the rule of law in the Korean state and society. Coping with the legacies of the authoritarian past during the posttransition era is perhaps the most challenging task for Korea’s democratic consolidation. As we have seen in two Korean authoritarian regressions – May 16, 1961, and May 17, 1980 – the military can step in during turbulent times of the country’s transition period and reverse any progress toward democracy. As an institution that controls armed forces for the sake of “national security,” it is a bureaucracy that must be carefully managed and controlled by any civilian government to move the country toward democratic consolidation. In addition, foreign policy and security policy challenge democratic consolidation with the secretive nature of their decision-making process that exempts security issues from any public debate or scrutiny, highly elite management and oversight, often abstract concepts and debates, and formal and informal exclusion of women in the diplomatic and military corps (see Chapter 5). The literature on civil–military relations during democratic transition and consolidation is growing, but most of the recent works have focused on Latin American and East European states, and very little has been written in the Korean context. In Chapter 8, Victor Cha makes an important contribution to fill this lacuna by exploring the causal linkages between two critical variables in the modern development of the Republic of Korea: security and democracy.

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With regard to the impact of security on the democratization process, Cha arrives at a negative conclusion. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, he argues that conditions of “security-scarcity” were not the primary impediment to the consolidation process. There is no denying that South Korea’s threatening external security environment hindered Korea’s long democratic march; the North Korean threat often became the justification for authoritarian rule and empowered the military as a hegemonic political institution, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s. Yet it was during the early Kim Young Sam years that a political emasculation of the military – negative democratic consolidation – occurred without watershed changes in South Korean security thinking or substantially reduced external (North Korean) security threats. Security-scarcity therefore constrained choice and outcomes in the democratic consolidation process, but it did not wholly determine them. Nonetheless, Cha argues, there has been a mutual evolution of security thinking and democratic consolidation in Korea. Just as a receding of the military from politics has enhanced democratization, so has democratization, particularly during the Kim Dae Jung years, changed and expanded the way Koreans think about security. Democratization has, for example, enabled concepts of “mutual security” and multilateralism (as opposed to self-help security and bilateralism) to resonate in the South Korean security logic. Although the military as an institution has been rooted out of politics, to what extent does the South Korean political culture still harbor within it a residual affinity for aspects of its authoritarian past? On the critical and challenging issue of “positive democratic consolidation,” – normative, institutional, and behavioral transformations of authoritarian political culture – there remains an affinity for the “good old days.” This affinity becomes especially acute or even catalyzed when there are external shocks to the country, such as the 1997 financial crisis, and political leadership is perceived as unable or unwilling to find a quick solution. Although the 1997 financial crisis represents one extreme example, Korean reactions at both the leadership and mass levels remind us that the Korean democratic consolidation process remains far from complete; moreover, there is a potential for backsliding if there are other external shocks that test the mettle of Korean commitments to democracy. Just as there is no ideal type of consolidated democracy with universal validity, there are also a variety of interconnected and mutually reinforcing conditions for a democracy to be consolidated. In Chapter 9, C. S. Eliot Kang explores the Korean case of what Diamond identified as three generic tasks of democratic consolidation – democratic deepening and legitimation, strengthening of the institutions of governance, and regime

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performance83 – with a focus on the political leadership of Presidents Kim Young Sam (1993–97) and Kim Dae Jung (1998–2001). Although democratic consolidation involves not simply institutional change but also a fundamental transformation of the way cultural values and individual citizens interact, these shifts, Kang argues, cannot occur without the choices and actions of political leaders to destroy old authoritarian political and economic institutions and to establish new democratic ones. Korea’s democratic consolidation is having trouble because of the complex interplay of agents and structures. Taking a “modified historical institutionalist” approach that focuses on the nexus between political change and institutions, Kang addresses the impact of institutions and the problems of institutional change as a nascent democracy grapples with the challenges of economic growth and stability in the era of globalization. The institutional drag of the “developmental state,” forged during the dictatorship of Park Chung Hee, has impeded democratic consolidation. Although successful in early stages of economic development – and in a particular product-cycle phase of the global economy – state–capital collusion (chungkyong yuchaek) has made the Korean chaebol not only economically inefficient and anticompetitive but also deeply entrenched and reform-resistant. So the “stickiness” of the institutions that constitute the essence of the Korean developmental state has intersected the challenges of economic development and globalization to impede Korea’s democratic consolidation. It is this institutional monster that both Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung tried to tame without much success. Paradoxically, the attempt by Kim Young Sam to reform the developmental state was a significant contributing cause of the economic collapse in late 1997. With the political resources provided by his historic election, he tried to reform the anticompetitive and antidemocratic collusive arrangement between state and big-business elites. However, Kim Young Sam’s inability to monitor and enforce his policies caused the reform program to be channeled in unpredictable ways by existing institutions. The immediate effect of the initial democratizing and liberalizing measures on the Korean political economy was the ascendancy of the chaebol and the associated labor unions at the expense of the state. These two groups managed to thwart the democratizing reform drive of President Kim Young Sam despite the large window of opportunity for institutional reform that was provided by his election as the first democratically elected civilian president in thirty years. Free to pursue their parochial interests 83

Diamond, Developing Democracy, 73–112.

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in a liberalizing environment, the chaebol and organized labor helped to undermine Kim Young Sam’s admittedly irresolute effort to restructure the anticompetitive and antidemocratic features of the developmental state. Kim Young Sam’s failure and the ensuing economic calamity provided Kim Dae Jung with another chance to perform much needed institutional surgery. A crisis-generated national consensus gave Kim Dae Jung a chance to enact a much larger institutional reform program than the one available to Kim Young Sam. By any reckoning, the Kim Dae Jung administration had a spectacular beginning, with a series of high-profile declarations that: (1) a collusive link between the state and capital was the root cause of the economic crisis; (2) the signature identity of his administration would be the parallel pursuit of participatory democracy and a free market economy, as “two sides of a coin and two wheels of a cart” pulling Korea out of its crisis to full recovery; (3) such participatory market democracy would mean “a grand compromise through dialogue” in which the citizenry and the president would cooperate, “if only for one year when the nation is standing on the brink of disaster”; and (4) political reform must precede everything else: “a small but effective government” would launch structural reforms in almost all sectors of the economy so as to speed up the locomotive of Korea’s globalization, with a new conductor at the helm.84 Despite the promise to dismantle the developmental state and replace it with a liberal market economy, Kim Dae Jung was sidetracked by the financial crisis and the more pressing task of stabilizing an economy that was in a free fall. As he has juggled the needs of economic stabilization and fundamental institutional reform, Kim Dae Jung has more often than not resorted to measures incompatible with democratic consolidation. A series of informal, ad hoc emergency measures has taken precedence over concerns for democratic governance, such as horizontal accountability and the rule of law, furthering the pathology of “delegative democracy.” To cite another example, during the first six months of 1998, under the liberal human-rights administration of Kim Dae Jung, the prosecutor’s office, the police, and the Agency for National Security Planning (recently renamed the National Intelligence Service) made use of the dubious practice of wiretapping on 3,580 occasions, a considerable jump from the some 2,400 occasions in 1996 under Kim Young Sam. The prosecutor’s office in fact seems more politicized now than during the Kim Young Sam administration.85 84 85

See also Samuel S. Kim, “Korea’s Globalization Drive: An Assessment,” Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies 10 (2000): 19–54. Korea Herald, 19 October 1998 (Internet version).

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In actuality, as Kang argues, Kim Dae Jung did not have much choice but to rebuild state authority, given the financial panic and the prevailing balance of political power in the national assembly. He needed to deal with yeoso yadae (“small government party, large opposition party”) in the national assembly. The new president did find a “solution” to the legislative gridlock, but in a manner hardly conducive to democratic consolidation. After the opposition GNP initially defeated his legislative agenda, Kim Dae Jung launched a campaign to lure certain GNP members to join the governing coalition or to oust them altogether. The investigative powers of the state prosecutors and tax auditors were used against numerous GNP national assembly lawmakers who were suspected of violating various laws. Through such questionable measures, he was able to reduce the strength of the opposition party to 127 seats while increasing the governing coalition to 158 seats. This “manufactured majority” only made the opposition even more recalcitrant in the national assembly however, and they utilized any means to block, delay, and subvert government initiatives. Needed reform laws that had been stalled were then rammed through by the governing coalition without the parliamentary participation of the GNP. This state of affairs has hardly helped the nascent South Korean democracy to develop an autonomous legislature or to instate the rule of law. Kim Dae Jung’s approach to dealing with the national assembly further enforced the imperial power of the South Korean presidency by leaving him no other option than to rely on decrees and coercive executive powers to get his reform measures moving. In January 1999, the country was dismayed by the allegation that the National Intelligence Service was spying on the opposition party from a room inside the national assembly building. Under Kim Dae Jung, government intervention in the economy has become ubiquitous as the stabilization program essentially nationalized the banking sector. Despite promulgation of new rules and regulations concerning corporate governance and transparency, little tangible progress has been made in changing the modus operandi of the chaebol. The travail of South Korea in recent years underscores the tension that exists between democratic means and ends, as the country has worked to cope with economic crisis while attempting to carry out fundamental institutional reforms. The task of simultaneously pursuing democratic deepening, fundamental institutional reforms, and economic security has proven difficult. Despite the high price, as the memory of the economic meltdown recedes and the political resistance to restructuring increasingly hardens, it seems that the window of opportunity for fundamental structural reform of the South Korean economy is closing.

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Whither Korea’s Democratization? Since the democratic opening in 1987, Korea has encountered challenges of democratic consolidation more daunting than those of transition. Whereas democratic opening and transition required a relatively welldefined, single transitional task of moving toward electoral democracy, democratic consolidation as a more complex multilayered and multidimensional integrative process entails institutionalizing democratic values, norms, and procedures not only in the legal, political, economic, social, and cultural domains, but also at all levels of the state and society – the mass public, intermediate civil society, and government. Hence, the initial conditions that facilitate democratic transition are not necessarily the same as those that promote democratic consolidation. There is little doubt that Korea has achieved an electoral democracy, with electoral politics the only game in town. The delegitimation of military authoritarianism – “negative democratic consolidation” – has made much progress under the Kim Young Sam administration, the first civilian government in thirty years. This is evident in the dismantling of Hanahoi (a secret kingmaking military clique) and in the December 1995 prosecution and imprisonment of the two former presidents (Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo) on the charges of military mutiny, national sabotage, and political corruption, without triggering a military backlash. Despite the controversy surrounding the enabling Special Act, many claim that this action alone constitutes one of the most far-reaching efforts at ex post facto accountability of any third-wave democracy. Even by the standard of “positive democratic consolidation,” Korea has made some progress at least at the intermediate level of civil society groups. In propagating the norms of participatory democracy, these groups have increasingly become an active force for democratic consolidation. They have served as a source of leadership recruitment for both political parties and the government. To varying degrees, they have also stepped in to fill the void created by the vicious triangulation of dysfunctional party politics, boss politics, and regional politics. However, the continued activism of civil society has also exposed some major problems and weaknesses: the thinness of its active membership base (especially in regard to women); its virtual absence at the local level except in a few scattered kijich’on villages; its internal divisions, particularly between radical people’s movement groups and moderate citizens’ movement groups; and the failure to establish horizontal networks across issue areas. Civil society can contribute to democratic consolidation only if it overcomes the zero-sum thinking of state/society relations, and only to the extent that its actors behave in such a “civil” way with other

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political actors as to generate the social capital needed for democratic consolidation. For all the reforms it has pursued during its first dozen years of democracy, Korea remains far from a consolidated, liberal democracy. The legacies of the authoritarian past persist in the attitudes, beliefs, norms, and behavior of citizens and officials alike. Democratic opening has not been accompanied by the necessary normative, institutional, and behavioral transformations. As Diamond and Shin succinctly put it, “democratic consolidation will advance to the extent that the political institutions of democracy are deepened and improved to become more open, responsive, accountable and respectful of the law and to the extent that democracy is seen by the mass public to be delivering the political goods it promises: freedom, justice, transparency, participation, and a predictable, stable, constitutional order.”86 Despite, or perhaps because of, the remarkable transition to democracy in 1987, the ascendancy of a civilian government in 1993, and the first-ever victory of an opposition candidate in 1997, there have been no significant declines in such authoritarian legacies as the extreme institutional weaknesses of political parties and legislative and judicial institutions, the highly personalized and privatized nature of presidential power based more on the “rule of rulers” than the rule of law, and the lack of tolerance, compromise, transparency, and accountability. The extreme personalization of political power has also combined with abiding regional patronage politics to generate breathtaking turbulence in the Korean party system, with parties constantly changing names and identities keyed to the rise and fall of individual party leaders. Although in the short run political leaders can shape the general trajectory of political life more powerfully than the masses, democratic consolidation in the long run is not solely for the political leadership to make or unmake. The outer possibilities and limitations of democratic consolidation are defined and shaped by the political structure and culture prevailing in a given society. The failure of the two civilian presidents to make significant progress in Korea’s democratic consolidation has more to do with the lack of the requisite institutional and cultural bases to create a reform coalition than it has to do with a personal inability or unwillingness to carry out democratic reform measures. Although traditional political culture impeded democratic reorientation of citizens’ attitudes, beliefs, and behavior, vested interests of the conservative coalition coupled with the institutional drag of the developmental state prevented 86

Larry Diamond and Doh Chull Shin, “Introduction: Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea,” in Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea, ed. Larry Diamond and Doh Chull Shin (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2000), 21.

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the Kim Young Sam administration from successful institutional reform and restructuring.87 The Kim Dae Jung administration, which vowed that political reform must precede all else, clearly failed to carry out its reform promise of a small but efficient government. Despite all the noise, the first government reorganization was more concerned with the visible effects of downsizing (i.e., firing low-level government personnel) than with any fundamental structural reform that would limit or transform the developmental state of bygone eras.88 The interventionist role of government in the economy, especially in the financial sector, has risen to a level that many consider both unprecedented and alarming.89 Thus, the fault lines in Korea’s democratic consolidation must be understood in light of the deeply rooted institutional and cultural factors that give rise to them. At the same time, any diachronic analysis of Korea’s democratization must include the informal politics and cultural norms that may undermine the performance of formal democratic institutions.90 As demonstrated in a series of major corruption scandals involving the three democratically elected presidents of the Sixth Republic – Roh Tae Woo, Kim Young Sam, and Kim Dae Jung – the formal norms of accountability and constitutionalism are often short-circuited by the informal norms of clientelism, cronyism, personalism, regionalism, and money politics. As the analyses in the following chapters show, Korea today is still short of democratic normative, cultural, and behavioral consolidation at both the mass public and elite levels. Under the Kim Dae Jung “imperial presidency,” Korea has acquired the dubious distinction of being one of the third-wave democracies with the lowest level of support from the public, even as supporters of authoritarianism as the best way of tackling the country’s problems have almost quadrupled from 12% in 1996 to 44% in 2001. Despite the institutionalization of electoral competition and participation, Korea faces three interrelated, mutually reinforcing challenges for its future democratic development. The first challenge is a democratic normative transformation. The legacies of the authoritarian past have hindered the institutionalization of democratic beliefs, norms, and governing procedures and their expansion from the political to the social and economic domains. There remains the lack of widely shared and 87

88 89 90

Chung-in Moon and Jongryun Mo, “The Kim Young Sam Government: Its Legacies and Prospects for Governance in South Korea,” in Democratization and Globalization in Korea: Assessments and Prospects, ed. Chung-in Moon and Jongryun Mo (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1999), 401–8. Eun Mee Kim, “Crisis of the Developmental State in South Korea,” Asian Perspective 23 (1999): 35–55. Mo and Moon, “Korea After the Crash,” 163. See Guillermo O’Donnell, “Illusions About Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy 7 (1996): 34–51; Lowell Dittmer, Haruhiro Fukui, and Peter N. S. Lee, eds., Informal Politics in East Asia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

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practiced democratic beliefs and norms in Korean society. Nondemocratic beliefs and practices complicate the task of democratic consolidation far more than they do in democratic transition. Harry Eckstein once advanced a “theory of congruence,” according to which unless the various levels of state and society are organized in a mutually congruent manner, strains on democratization will ensue. His most telling example was that of Weimar Germany, which consisted of authoritarian family patterns, authoritarian voluntary associations, and a highly democratic formal constitution. The democratic Weimar Republic was “odd man out” in this otherwise congruent arrangement, and it indeed proved vulnerable to democratic breakdown.91 Of course, Korea’s democratic learning-by-doing is taking place in the setting of contemporary globalization-cum-transparency revolution; hence, the initial conditions and experience of the Weimar Republic may not apply in a democratizing Korea today. Nonetheless, there remains in Korea the chasm between deep authoritarian culture and formal democratic structure. Without extending democratic norms and practices to all levels of state and society, especially in the family and in the workplace, Korea, if faced with an economic or security crisis, will become vulnerable to pressure for a neoauthoritarian leader. A majority of Korean citizens still believe that for tackling the country’s most serious problems, authoritarian solutions are more effective than democratic ones. In the wake of the 1997 economic crisis, there were sharp increases in the popular belief that another Park Chung Hee is needed to bring back the Korean miracle.92 The second challenge for Korean democratic development is that the role of the state will need to be redefined. The democratic rhetoric cannot simply ignore questions of how to rethink the nature, form, and content of participatory democratic politics in the face of the complex intermeshing of local, national, and globalization processes. It is often said that Korea’s democratic endurance is greatly advantaged by its relative wealth, because its per capita income level is comfortably ahead of the threshold level of $4,000 that Adam Przeworski and his colleagues assert as the level at which “democracy is almost certain to survive.”93 However, if the rate of economic recovery is too slow to meet the rising 91 92 93

Harry Eckstein, The Natural History of Congruence Theory (Denver: University of Denver, 1980). Shin, Mass Politics and Culture, 263. Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–90 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 273. For a strong positive relationship between the economic affluence of a nation and the likelihood of democratic endurance, see also Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 67–71; Huntington, The Third Wave, 59–72.

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expectations of the people, the penalty for this failure may add more strains on legitimacy, even risking antidemocratic backlash. Relative deprivation – the discrepancy perceived by social actors between expectations and capabilities – is generally accepted as a necessary if not sufficient condition for violent civil conflict, but the likelihood of this relative deprivation and the magnitude of resulting civil violence depend on the availability of mediating societal and institutional mechanisms.94 Therefore, the issue for the Korean state is how to carry out “social concertation” successfully, because so many European social democracies abandoned it in the face of globalization challenges. In the Korean context, this social concertation (a labor–management–government trilateral commission) and the relationship between the state and women are all the more desirable, all the more necessary, and yet all the more problematic. Such social partnership – horizontal social capital – is difficult to generate due to the lack of strong top-level labor associations and the lack of institutional links between political parties and labor interests. The third challenge to Korean democratic development is to chart a new way of thinking about and responding to the twin requirements of democratic consolidation from below and within and globalization from above and without. The two clusters of pressure should be recognized as forces that bring unprecedented opportunities for growth and development but also raise new threats to national economic and political stability. With Korea’s democratization standing in the new millennium at the intersection of new globalization dynamics and entrenched traditional political culture, the role of the state, especially its effectiveness and adaptability, is becoming increasingly important. In this light, what Korea’s democratic consolidation requires is a state that is not maximalist or minimalist but rather effective, because only an effective state can demonstrate or generate transparency, accountability, and the rule of law as the conditions necessary for realizing democratic citizenship and governance and for coping with the dynamics of globalization. Legitimacy, performance, and stability all reinforce one another in the making of an effective state. Legitimacy can wax and wane in response to a shifting balance between the performance effectiveness of the government in domestic and foreign policy on the one hand and the general support, compliance, and cooperation of the people on the other. Political stability is in turn closely keyed to and shaped by the amount of surplus legitimacy at the government’s disposal.95 In rankings 94

95

See Ted Gurr, “Psychological Factors in Civil Violence,” in The War System: An Interdisciplinary Approach, ed. Richard A. Falk and Samuel S. Kim (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), 248–81. See Samuel S. Kim, “The Impact of the Division of Korea on South Korean Politics: The Challenge of Competitive Legitimation,” in Korean Democracy Toward a New Horizon (Seoul: The Korean Political Science Association, 1995), 57–90.

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of world competitiveness in the late 1990s, the fact that the United States (a lone superpower), Singapore (a ministate), and Russia (the world’s largest state) ranked, respectively, first, second, and last among the fortysix developed and emerging market economy countries96 speaks volumes about the relative importance of size versus speed (in information technology, innovations, and institutions) and about the role of state adaptability in meeting the challenge of globalization. By accelerating the rise and fall of the “effective state” and through frequent changes in the status ranking of the state in the world system, globalization has transformed the context and conditions under which Korea’s democratic consolidation can be realized. The requirements for a competent and effective state for economic growth and development are constantly being redefined in this rapidly globalizing world.97 Providing security has remained one of the basic functions of the state – indeed, the principal raison d’etat. But what does it mean to be or feel “secure” in an era of globalization? Both the agency and the scope of “threat,” as well as the sources and effects of security globalization, have become more complex and diverse than ever before. As a result, the nation-states have to deal with a much more comprehensive security agenda. For Korea, with an extremely high trade/GDP ratio of 73%, there is no escape from the payoffs and penalties of globalization, no national self-reliance exit that would not entail a major economic disaster and serious political risks. The importance of globalization for a trading state like Korea is the close correlation between the extent of its openness and transparency and the degree of its global competitiveness. Like all states, Korea now must worry not only about its military power but also about the economic and knowledge power it needs to survive and prosper in a world that is becoming increasingly globalized and competitive. Thus, the greatest challenge confronting Korea as a newly industrialized country and a newly democratizing country is how to establish congruence between domestic and foreign policies amid the rapidly changing trends and requirements of globalization and democratic consolidation. An effective state is ipso facto better prepared to provide the 96 97

See International Institute for Management Development, World Competitiveness Yearbook 1999, . The World Bank has come a long way from prescribing the classical laissez-faire model of development for universal validity and application: “ . . . certain policies that helped Japan develop in the 1950s and 1960s, generated growth in East Asia in the 1970s and 1980s, and sparked China’s economic boom in the 1980s and 1990s were specific to the time and place. They may not have worked well in other countries, nor are they likely to be appropriate in the opening decades of the 21st century.” The World Bank, World Development Report 1999/2000: Entering the 21st Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 2.

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appropriate institutional responses to the challenges and opportunities of democratic consolidation and globalization. This will also involve, in a larger sense, strategic decisions on how to redefine the role of the state as a knowledge-intensive and information-intensive partner, catalyst, and facilitator, rather than as a direct commander or provider of economic growth and prosperity, and on how to survive and prosper in an increasingly interconnected and interdependent Darwinian world with high payoffs for the fittest and high penalties for the least adaptable. The cold reality is that Korea can no longer compete internationally as the developmental state that delivered the Miracle on the Han River. However, an alternative state – a competent, efficient, knowledge-intensive, and adaptable state – one that is better equipped for coping with the democratic consolidation and globalization challenges is yet to be seen.

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PART II

Consolidation at the Mass Level

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CHAPTER 2

Mass Politics, Public Opinion, and Democracy in Korea Doh Chull Shin

The Republic of Korea (hereafter “Korea”) has been widely regarded as one of the most vigorous and analytically interesting third-wave democracies.1 During the first decade of democratic rule, Korea has successfully carried out a large number of electoral and other reforms to transform the institutions and procedures of military–authoritarian rule into those of a representative democracy. Unlike many of its counterparts in Latin America and elsewhere, Korea has fully restored civilian rule by extricating the military from power. As in established democracies of North America and Western Europe, free and competitive elections have been held regularly at all the different levels of the government. In the most recent presidential election, held on December 18, 1997, Korea also established itself as a mature electoral democracy by elevating an opposition party to political power. In Korea today, there is general agreement that electoral politics has become the only possible political game in town.2 The successful establishment of electoral democracy cannot, however, be equated with the consolidation of democratic rule. To become consolidated, a new democracy, like the one in Korea, must achieve deep, broad, and unconditional support among the mass public as well as political elites.3 Moreover, its performance must be accountable and responsive 1 2

3

Larry Diamond and Doh Chull Shin, eds., Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2000), 1. According to the latest Korea Democracy Barometer survey conducted during the month of March 2001, 79% are in agreement that “The best way of choosing our government is an election that gives every voter a choice of candidates and parties.” See also Larry Diamond and Byung-Kook Kim, eds., Consolidating Democracy in South Korea (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000). Richard Rose and Doh Chull Shin, “Democratization Backwards: The Problem of ThirdWave Democracies,” British Journal of Political Science 31(2001): 331–54; David Steinberg, “On Democratic Consolidation,” Korea Times, 6 April 2001.

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to public demands and preferences. The main objective of this chapter is to examine why and how the Korean people reacted to democracy during the course of the recent economic crisis. How do ordinary Koreans understand democracy? To what extent are they committed to democracy as a series of political ideals and practices? How and why has their democratic commitment changed in the wake of the economic crisis? How much progress do they think has been achieved in democratizing their political system? How well or poorly do they judge the performance of their democratic political system? What essential qualities do they think are missing from the current system of democratic governance? These questions are addressed in this chapter by means of four parallel public opinion surveys conducted in Korea from 1997 to 2001. Premises In addressing these questions, the current study makes two assumptions. First, the survival and prosperity of all democracies are assumed to depend principally on the support of the citizens. Popular support is not only crucial for their legitimacy but also vital to their effective performance.4 As Diamond and many others point out,5 the beliefs, values, and attitudes of ordinary citizens structure and limit the pace and possibilities for democratic change. The political customs, habits, and manners of the mass public are especially important for the process of democratic consolidation.6 In furthering democratic consolidation, various changes in the laws, institutions, and other formal rules in the political arena will not matter much unless public support for democracy is expanded, deepened, structured, amplified, and strengthened. The second premise is that democratic support, as a component of political support, is a multilevel phenomenon.7 To ordinary citizens who have lived most of their lives under authoritarian rule, democracy at one level represents political ideals or values to be fulfilled. At another level, 4

5

6

7

David Easton, A System Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965); William Mishler and Richard Rose, “Five Years After the Fall,” in Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance, ed. Pippa Norris (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 78–97. Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1999); Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam, eds., Disaffected Democracies: What’s Troubling the Trilateral Countries? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). Christopher Clague, Suzanne Gleason, and Stephen Knack, “Determinants of Lasting Democracy in Poor Countries,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 573 (2001), 16–41; James Gibson, Raymond M. Duch, and Kent L. Tedin, “Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet Union,” Journal of Politics 54 (1992): 329– 71; Lawrence Harrison and Samuel Huntington, eds., Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress (New York: Basic Books, 2000); Alexander Lukin, The Political Culture of Russian “Democrats” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Easton, op. cit.; Doh Chull Shin, Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

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democracy refers to a political regime and the actual workings of that regime, which govern people’s lives on a daily basis. Popular support for democracy must, therefore, be differentiated into two broad categories: normative and empirical. The normative level deals with democracy-inprinciple, whereas the empirical level is concerned with the various aspects of democracy-in-practice. Support for democracy at the first level, therefore, refers largely to psychologically loose attachment to the positive symbols that democracy represents in principle, and democratic support at the second level refers to favorable evaluations of the structure and behavior of the existing regime. As empirical research has recently revealed,8 there is a significant gulf between these two levels of democratic support. A full account of democratic support can thus be made only when both levels of support are considered together. The Korea Democracy Barometer Surveys The basic data for the present study were assembled from the Korean Democracy Barometer (KDB) surveys that were initiated in October 1988, the year when the democratic sixth republic was inaugurated. The KDB surveys were designed to monitor and compare the dynamics of democratization in Korea through a strategic alliance with research teams in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America. To monitor democratic changes in Korea, these surveys have been repeated over time using a number of the same items tapping attitudes on democracy and its alternatives, political and economic reforms, consequences of these reforms on the quality of life, and citizen engagement in politics and other public affairs. To compare Korea with other new democracies, the same surveys have also replicated a number of core questions asked in other democracy barometer surveys.9 To focus on the recent short-term dynamics of public orientations to democracy as political ideals and practices, the present study relied primarily on the four latest KDB surveys conducted from 1997 to 2001. These parallel surveys, designed to reflect the Korean population age twenty and older, were conducted by the Korea Gallup polling organization in May 1997 (N = 1, 117), October 1998 (N = 1, 010), November 1999 (N = 1, 007), and March and April 2001 (N = 1, 006). The first of 8

9

John Mueller, Capitalism and Ralph’s Pretty Good Grocery (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Richard Rose, Doh C. Shin, and Neil Munro, “The Tension Between the Democratic Ideal and Reality: South Korea,” in Critical Citizens, op. cit., 146–68. These include the Afrobarometer surveys, the Baltic Barometer surveys, the New Democracies Barometer surveys, the Russia Barometer surveys, and the Latinobarometer surveys. See also Roderic Ai Camp, ed., Citizen Views of Democracy in Latin America (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001); Robert Rohrschneider, Learning Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

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the surveys, conducted six months prior to the outbreak of the November 1997 economic crisis, was used as a baseline to ascertain the impact of the crisis on democratic support among the Korean mass public at the aggregate level. Popular Conceptions of Democracy Democracy means different things to different people.10 What does it mean to ordinary Koreans? Do they tend to understand it in political terms? Do they tend to think of it in economic terms? The 1993 KDB survey found that, as a whole, Koreans, like their peers in Central and Eastern Europe, tend to think of democracy in economic rather than in political terms. Koreans who chose economic values over political values outnumbered – by a margin of nearly two to one (64% vs. 34%) – those who emphasized the political over the economic. This pattern, featuring the preponderance of economic democrats over political democrats, was the opposite of what was found in Western European democracies. In these consolidated democracies, democracy was equated mostly with political values.11 To determine whether Koreans still tend to remain economic democrats, the latest 2001 KDB survey first asked respondents a simple set of questions and encouraged them to weigh two pairs of values, one political (freedom and participation) and the other economic (prosperity and equality). Then they were asked to choose the two specific values they would consider most important in a democracy. Economic prosperity was selected most frequently, by more than two-thirds (68%) of the respondents, followed by economic equality (47%), political freedom (39%), and political participation (39%). When the four values are grouped into pairs, the economic category leads the political by twenty percentage points (90% vs. 70%). So, to the Korean people, economic considerations still outweigh political considerations in defining democracy. A similar pattern of economic preponderance emerges when those choosing both values from one single pair are compared. By choosing economic prosperity and economic equality as the two most important constituents of democracy, more than one-quarter (27%) showed that they think of democracy solely in terms of economic values. On the other hand, only one-twelfth (8%) thought of it solely in political terms, choosing both political freedom and political participation. A comparison of these figures makes it clear that economic democrats outnumber 10

11

Arthur Miller, Vicki Hesli, and William Reisinger, “Conceptions of Democracy Among Mass and Elite in Post-Soviet Societies,” British Journal of Political Science 27 (1997): 157–90. See also Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes, “Africans’ Surprising Universalism,” Journal of Democracy 12 (2001): 107–21. Shin, op. cit., 62.

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Table 2.1 The divergent conceptions of democracy and the relative priority of democratization and economic development Democratic conceptions Policy priority

Political

Mixed

Economic

Democratization (A) Economic development (B) Balance (A − B)

17.3% 54.3 −37.0

10.4% 60.3 −49.9

5.4% 69.3 −63.9

Source: 2001 Korea Democracy Barometer survey.

political democrats by a substantial margin, but it is more noteworthy that mixed democrats who emphasize both economic and political values in democracy are in a large majority (61%). Does the divergent understanding of democracy as ideals or values matter in the real world of political life? The 2001 KDB survey explored this question by asking: Between the two national goals of democratization and economic development, which goal do you think is more important? 1. Economic development is more important. 2. Democratization is more important. 3. The two are equally important.

As expected, with the economic problems facing the country, economic development was given top priority: by a margin of over six to one (63% vs. 10%), the Korean people chose economic development over democratization. The magnitude of this margin, which measures priorities among national development goals, varies significantly according to the divergent conceptions of democracy. Table 2.1 shows that the percentage of Koreans choosing economic development over democratic reform increases steadily and significantly across three categories of democrats: from 54% among political democrats to 60% among mixed democrats and 69% among economic democrats. On the other hand, those choosing democratization over economic development decreases steadily and significantly across the same categories: from 17% among political democrats to 10% among mixed democrats, to only 5% among economic democrats. As a result of this inverse relationship, the magnitude of policy conflict widens across the three categories of democrats. As shown by the percentage differential index reported in the last row of Table 2.1, the relative priority of economic development over democratization varies from thirty-seven percentage points for political democrats to sixty-four percentage points for

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economic democrats. In other words, this priority is 1.7 times higher for the latter than for the former. How the Korean people define and understand democracy determines their perception of the proper role the government should play in the world of democratic politics. Support for Democracy To assess support for democracy, the Korea Barometer surveys asked two pairs of questions that have been employed in similar surveys in Western Europe, Latin America, and the former Soviet Bloc. The first pair, which focuses on democracy-in-principle, consists of two four-point verbal items that tap, respectively, general belief in the idea of democracy and personal attachment to the notion of greater democracy. The second pair, which focuses on democracy-in-action, also consists of two four-point verbal scales, to measure the general endorsement of democracy as a political regime and as a method for tackling economic and other serious problems facing society. Normative Support The 2001 KDB survey first asked: “Let us consider the idea of democracy, not its practice. In principle, how much are you for or against the idea of democracy?” Combining those who were very much for democracy (46%) with those who were somewhat for it (45%), an overwhelming majority (91%) was in favor. Less than one-tenth (9%) refused to embrace democracy even as an idea. In addition, the same survey asked: “How much do you agree or disagree with the statement that our political system should be made a lot more democratic than it is now?” Significantly, a large majority of nearly four-fifths (78%) endorsed the idea of further democratization, with 37% strongly in favor and 41% somewhat in favor. When positive responses to the two questions are summed into a three-point index, two-thirds (66%) are fully supportive of democracy-in-principle and a little over one-quarter (27%) are partially supportive of it. A very small minority (7%) is not at all supportive. When a comparison is made between percentages expressing full and no support for democracy-inprinciple, it is evident that democrats in a normative sense outnumber nondemocrats by a margin of over nine to two. Empirical Support To what extent do the Korean people support democracy-in-practice? The 2001 KDB survey first asked the question that has been asked most

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frequently in many other democracy barometer surveys to measure what is known as the legitimacy of democracy.12 With which of the following statements do you agree most? 1. Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government. 2. Under certain situations, a dictatorship is preferable. 3. For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic government or non-democratic government.

Those respondents who find democracy always preferable to its nondemocratic alternatives are deemed to endorse the legitimacy of democracy. By this widely accepted measure, a majority of the Korean people refuses to endorse democracy unconditionally as a political enterprise. A plurality (45%) expressed unconditional support, a low figure by global standards. This is, for example, significantly lower than the average figure of 58% recorded in the year 2000 for seventeen Latin American countries13 and also much lower than the average 75% recorded in 1999 and 2000 for six African countries.14 It is even lower than the 65% recorded in 1995 for six Eastern European countries.15 Equally surprising is that Korea is one of the four third-wave democracies (the others being Brazil, Mexico, and Paraguay) where a majority of the population refused to express unwavering faith in democracy as the most preferred political system. Brazil, with 39%, is the only country that registers a lower level of democratic faith than does Korea. Even with one of the most successful democratic transitions in the thirdwave of democratization, Korea has been turned into one of the new democracies with the lowest level of support from the public. What is more surprising from the latest KDB survey is that nearly twofifths (37%) of ordinary Koreans entertain the possibility that an authoritarian regime might sometimes be preferable to democracy. Even in deeply troubled Latin American countries such as Brazil, Columbia, and Venezuela, no more than a quarter of the public is willing to consider the authoritarian option. Even in the midst of an economic crisis that resembles the recent crisis in Korea, only one in four (24%) Brazilians believes 12

13 14 15

Leonardo Morlino and Jose R. Montero, “Legitimacy and Democracy in Southern Europe,” in The Politics of Democratic Consolidation, ed. Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jurgen Puhle (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 231–60. Marta Lagos, “Between Stability and Crisis in Latin America,” Journal of Democracy 12 (2001): 139. Bratton and Mattes, op. cit., 109. Cited in William Mishler and Richard Rose, “Five Years After the Fall: Trajectories in Support for Democracy in Post-Communist Europe,” Studies in Public Policy, No. 298 (Glasgow, Scotland: University of Strathclyde of Public Policy, 1998), 13.

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that the authoritarian option is sometimes preferable. In terms of such affinity for authoritarian rule, Korea ranks second only after Paraguay, where 39% are sometimes in favor of it. When these two types of regime preferences – democratic and authoritarian – are considered together, Korea emerges as the only known third-wave democracy where unconditional supporters of democratic rule lead those willing to welcome back authoritarian rule by less than ten percentage points. Support for democracy-in-action among the Korean public seems more dismal when compared with consolidated third-wave democracies such as Spain, Greece, and Portugal. In these southern European countries, more than three-quarters have unconditionally embraced democracy for many years. For the same period, only one-tenth or less of the mass public has expressed the desire to welcome back authoritarian rule. By this yardstick of democratic support, Korea is far from being a consolidated democracy. To measure accurately the level of empirical support among the Korean mass public, the 2001 KDB survey asked another question: “When comparing democracy and dictatorship, which one is better for dealing with economic problems? Is it democracy, dictatorship, or are they much the same?” Unlike the first question tapping the legitimacy of democracy, this item was intended to measure its efficacy by focusing on the capacity to fix economic problems widely known to affect the ultimate fate of new democracies.16 Once again, a majority of the Korean people refused to embrace democracy unconditionally. As the best method of managing economic problems, a small minority of nearly two-fifths (38%) were committed to democracy. More surprising is that almost as many (37%) opted for dictatorship. One-fifth (21%) were noncommittal to either method of managing economic affairs. To a majority, democracy does not constitute the best method of managing economic affairs. As was done in measuring normative support, responses affirming democratic legitimacy and efficacy are combined into a three-point index to estimate the overall level of empirical support. On this index, a score of zero indicates no support, whereas scores of one and two indicate, respectively, partial and full support for democracy as an actual system of governance. A plurality (43%) of Koreans fall into the category of no support followed by partial supporters (31%) and full supporters (26%). Among the Korean masses, nonsupporters of democracy-in-action are most numerous, and full supporters are least numerous; the higher the level of support, the fewer the number of supporters. This pattern of 16

Jon Elster, “The Necessity and Impossibility of Simultaneous Economic and Political Reform,” in Constitutional Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World, ed. D. Greenberg (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 268; Adam Przeworski et al., “What Makes Democracy Endure?” Journal of Democracy 7 (1996): 39–55.

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Table 2.2 Contours of democratic support Normative support Support type

None

Some

A Lot

(marginal)

None

5.3%

15.4%

22.3%

43.0%

Some

1.2

7.0

23.0

31.1

A lot (marginal)

.3 6.8

4.9 27.3

20.7 66.0

25.9

Empirical Support

Source: 2001 Korea Democracy Barometer Survey.

empirical democratic support contrasts sharply with that of normative democratic support, in which full supporters are most numerous and nonsupporters are least numerous. Empirical support is far more lacking among the Korean people than is normative support. Table 2.2 shows that two-thirds (66%) are fully supportive of democracy as an ideal political system, but only one-quarter (26%) are equally supportive of democracy as a real system of governance. Among those who are fully supportive of democracy-in-action, only 31% fully support democracy-in-action, 35% support it partially, and 34% do not support it at all. As a result, only one-fifth (21%) of the Korean people as a whole are genuinely committed democrats who are fully supportive of democracy both normatively and empirically. One-third (34%) remain merely normative democrats who fully support democracy as a desirable ideal but reject it as a workable, collectively attainable system. Support for democracy is evidently widespread but very shallow. This is another notable characteristic of Korean support for democracy. Opposition to Nondemocratic Alternatives Popular opposition to nondemocratic regimes is often employed as an additional measure of support for democracy-in-action.17 The 2001 KDB survey asked a set of three related questions that have been regularly used in Eastern and Central Europe. Respondents were given statements with which to agree or disagree: Our present system of government is not the only one that this country has had, and some people say that we would be better off if the country was governed differently. How much do you agree or disagree with their views in favor of 17

Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer, Democracy and Its Alternatives (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

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each of the following: 1. The army should govern the country. 2. Better to get rid of Parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide everything. 3. The most important decisions about the economy should be made by experts and not the government and Parliament.

A clear pattern of opposition to the first two nondemocratic alternatives is shown when preferences for those alternatives are approached in this way. Although the current system of electoral democracy may not offer effective solutions to the problems facing the country, Koreans as a whole desire to retain it rather than restore the military or civilian dictatorship under which they once lived. When asked about military rule, about four-fifths (79%) rejected such rule, with 53% strongly against it and 26% somewhat against it. Although one-seventh (14%) approved of it somewhat, a very small minority (3%) were strongly in favor of replacing the current democratic regime with an authoritarian regime controlled by the military. With respect to civilian dictatorship, three-quarters (61%) opposed it strongly (47%) or somewhat (29%), while one-fifth favored it strongly (4%) or somewhat (16%). The proportion (20%) supportive of rule by a civilian dictator is higher than in the Czech Republic (13%), Slovenia (13%), and Hungary (17%), but it is significantly lower than in all other postcommunist countries in Europe.18 When responses to these two nondemocratic alternatives were considered together, a clear majority of 71% rejected both alternatives to democracy. Yet it should be noted that more than one-quarter are yet to appreciate the virtues of democratic rule and embrace it as the most viable political regime. Who should make the most important decisions about the economy, experts or the government and the Parliament? When the 2001 KDB survey posed this question, a large majority (74%) preferred a system of technocratic rule in which important decisions about the economy are left to experts rather than elected officials. Even among those who are firmly committed to elected democracy, rejecting military and civilian dictatorships, 71% endorsed the technocratic rule once practiced under the authoritarian Fourth and Fifth Republics headed by Presidents Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan. In this respect, Koreans should be made aware that relying on experts to make crucial decisions is not the same thing as ceding final control over major decisions to technocrats.19 Economic policymaking, like all other policymaking, requires much more than strictly scientific knowledge. It requires ethical judgments about the ultimate results that various 18 19

Richard Rose, “A Diverging Europe,” Journal of Democracy 12 (2001): 99. Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

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policies should achieve, and it also requires judgments about trade-offs of divergent policy results. The practice of economic policymaking by technocrats can be compatible with electoral democracy only when they are made accountable to the Parliament. The Extent of Democracy and Democratic Progress How democratic do the Korean people think the current political system is? How much progress do they think has been made in democratizing the authoritarian institutions and procedures that lasted nearly three decades? To explore these questions, the 2001 KDB survey asked respondents to rate the current and the past political system on a tenpoint scale. This scale allows participants to respond according to their own understanding of democracy and dictatorship. A score of one on this scale indicates “complete dictatorship,” whereas a score of ten indicates “complete democracy.” Responses to this question, as reported in Figure 2.1, provide two important pieces of information concerning the perceived character of the old authoritarian and new democratic systems. First, Figure 2.1 provides, for the two systems, the percentage of respondents who chose each of the ten positions or steps on the ladder scale. A vast majority (85%) rated the past regime as undemocratic, 30.0% Past Regime Mean; 3.7 Current Regime Mean; 6.2 25.0%

23.9% 24.3%

22.8% 19.2%

20.0%

18.3% 17.1% 16.4% 14.5%

15.0%

10.0%

8.1%

7.8%

5.8% 5.0%

4.2%

3.4% 1.3%

4.2% 2.4%

1.1%

0.4%

1.0% 0.4%

0.0% 1 Complete dictatorship

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 Complete democracy

Figure 2.1 Perceptions of the past and present regimes on a ten-point dictatorship–democracy scale.

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placing it at five or less. In sharp contrast, a substantial majority (68%) rated the current regime as democratic, placing it at six or greater. The comparison of these percentage figures makes it clear that the military authoritarian rule of three decades has been relinquished in favor of a democracy. Figure 2.1 also gives the average ratings on this ten-point scale for the current democratic and past authoritarian systems. Like the percentage ratings, the average ratings for the current system are indicative of the extent to which the mass public embraces it as democratic. The average rating of the past regime was 3.7; for the present regime, however, the average increased to 6.2. This shift in the mean ratings confirms considerable progress in institutional democratization in the wake of the democratic regime change in 1988. The mean rating of 6.2 for the present system on a ten-point scale, however, suggests that Korean democracy is far from a complete democracy; it remains a partial democracy even after more than a decade of democratic rule. The Quality of Democracy Having established the presence of democracy in Korea, we sought to determine how well the current political regime has performed as a democracy. Based on President Lincoln’s simple and elegant notion of democracy as government by the people and government for the people, the 2001 KDB survey posed two questions, one on the empowerment of ordinary citizens and the other on the responsiveness of the political system to their preferences: How much influence do you think the votes of people like yourself have on the way our country is governed: a lot, some, a little, or none? To what extent do you think government leaders take the interests and opinion of people like yourself into account when making important decisions: a lot, some, a little, or none?

On the basis of responses to these questions, we can determine how positively respondents feel about themselves as citizens of a democratic state and how positively they feel about their own state as a democracy. A bare majority (59%) reported feeling at least some amount of empowerment under the present system of electoral democracy. This suggests that Koreans tend to feel that they have a way to express their opinions and promote their interests under the present system. Unfortunately, a larger majority (69%) reported that the system is only a little responsive or not at all. This suggests that although the people have the ability to

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express their opinions, they do not perceive the government as being responsive to them. Four different levels of democratic experiences are collapsed into two broad categories, one affirming and the other denying the experience of the two substantive qualities of democratic governance: empowerment and responsiveness. By jointly considering these two categories, four patterns were discerned to examine the deepening presence of democracy in the substance of policymaking. The first pattern refers to the absence of either quality. The second and third patterns refer to the presence of only one of those two qualities, indicating a partial achievement of substantive democratization. The fourth pattern refers to the presence of both qualities, attesting to the achievement of substantive democratization to the fullest degree. Typological analysis of the 2001 KDB survey reveals that an overwhelming majority of the Korean people experiences at least one quality of substantive democracy. Yet those who experience both qualities comprise a small minority. Although over two-thirds (68%) experience one of the two substantive qualities of democracy, less than one-quarter (24%) experience both qualities. The current system, which provides only one of the two essential qualities to a majority, is at best characterized as a partial democracy. This is in accord with the measurement of Korean democracy on a ten-point scale. To assess the overall quality of Korea’s performance as a democracy, the 2001 KDB survey asked respondents to evaluate the way democracy works in their country today. On a ten-point scale, where one indicates complete dissatisfaction and ten indicates complete satisfaction, they were asked to express the degree of their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the current practice of democratic politics. Figure 2.2 provides the mean rating on this scale and the percentages at each of its ten scale points. A minority of 47% expressed satisfaction with the present regime, placing it at six or greater on the scale. The mean score of 5.3 reinforces this qualified response. Lower than the midpoint (5.5) on the ten-point scale, the mean score indicates clearly that the Korean people as a whole are more dissatisfied than satisfied with the way the present democratic system performs. These findings testify to the fact that Korean democracy is not currently performing properly, at least in the eyes of its citizens. Missing Elements In the opinion of its citizens, Korea today does not have all the essential attributes of democracy; it is an incomplete democracy. In Korean democracy, something is obviously missing, but what is it? In an article

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30.0% Mean 5.3 24.5%

25.0%

24.8%

20.0% 14.7%

15.0%

12.7% 9.2%

10.0%

6.4% 5.0% 1.3%

2.4% 0.9%

0%

0.0% 1 Complete dissatisfaction

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 Complete satisfaction

Figure 2.2 Evaluations of the performance of the present political system on a ten-point dissatisfaction–satisfaction scale.

published in the April 2001 issue of The British Journal of Political Science,20 Richard Rose and this author pointed out that Korea, like all other thirdwave democracies, began democratization backward. The country had introduced free elections with universal suffrage before establishing the basic institutions of a modern state such as the rule of law, an accountable government, and civil society. As a result, the country has yet to complete the process of political modernization by establishing the rule of law and accountability of the government to the national assembly and its electorate. In an incomplete democracy like the one in Korea, departures from the rule of law are of three main types. Under the first, individuals are deprived of their liberties, often by arbitrary actions. Under the second, small sums of money are extracted from ordinary citizens and large sums of money are extracted from domestic and foreign corporations for allocating public property and resources. Under the third, government benefits and services are distributed unfairly, with some citizens being favored and others suffering discrimination. 20

Rose and Shin, op. cit.

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Freedom Even after more than a decade of democratic rule, Korea has not fully abolished or “deconstructed” the National Security Law and other repressive laws of the old military regime to advance what Isaiah Berlin has aptly termed “freedom from the state.”21 More often than not, the government resorts to various repressive laws and procedures to silence its critics and opposition forces, as evidenced in its recent tax audit of the news media.22 By enforcing these and other repressive laws, the government deprives citizens of political rights and civil liberties. To what extent do the Korean people live in freedom from the state? To explore this question, the 2001 KDB survey asked a pair of questions: Do you feel that individual citizens like you can express your political opinion freely in Korea today, or is it better to be careful? Do you feel individual citizens like you can freely join any kind of organization or group they want to nowadays?

To the first question, one-half (50%) affirmed freedom from the state; to the second question, three-fifths (61%) did the same. When these affirmative responses are compared, it seems that individual citizens are more vulnerable to state repression than organized groups and voluntary associations. When those responses are considered together, it is evident that less than two-fifths (38%) experience the freedoms of both speech and association. Even after more than a decade of democratic rule, a substantial majority is still haunted by the specter of a repressive state, to varying degrees. Rule of Universalism In Korea, as in many other new democracies, corruption is a more pervasive threat to the rule of law than is political repression.23 Korea’s presidents under the authoritarian and democratic regimes have been imprisoned on charges of accepting bribes and kickbacks from large conglomerates in sums of up to $900 million (U.S. million).24 According to the 2000 Corruption Perception Index prepared by Transparency International, Korea ranks forty-eighth out of the ninety countries surveyed.25 Korea maintains the dubious distinction of being one of the two most corrupt members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the exclusive club of advanced economies. 21 22

23 25

Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958). “FTC Cracks Down on Newspaper Companies,” Donga Ilbo, 17 April 2001. See also Don Kirk, “South Korea’s Conservative Press Takes Heat from the Liberals,” New York Times, 7 May 2001, A7. Diamond, op. cit., 90ff. 24 Shin, op. cit., 208. .

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30.0% Elected Officials Mean; 7.1 Civil Servants Mean; 5.0

24.8%

25.0%

20.0%

18.0% 15.5%

14.8%

14.3%

15.0% 12.6% 11.2%

11.7%

10.0% 10.0%

8.0%

7.9% 5.3%

5.0%

0% 0%

7.8%

7.6%

6.1% 4.6%

3.2% 1.9% 0.4%0.5%

0.0% 0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Number Mentioned

Figure 2.3 Perceptions of elected officials and civil servants as “corrupt” (from none to all of every ten).

The 2001 KDB survey asked two sets of questions to measure the levels of political corruption. The first set asked respondents how many of every ten elected officials and civil servants were engaged in corrupt practices. Figure 2.3 reports responses to these questions. According to the mean scores reported in the figure, the average Korean believes that seven out of ten elected officials are corrupt and that about five out of ten civil servants are corrupt. None said that every politician is unmarred by political corruption, whereas one-seventh (14%) said that every politician is marred by political corruption. More than eight out of ten Koreans (82%) rated half or more elected politicians as corrupt, whereas more than six out of ten Koreans (64%) rated half or more civil servants that way. More surprising is that only one-tenth (10%) believe that less than half of both politicians and civil servants are corrupt, whereas two-thirds (66%) believe that more than half of both politicians and civil servants are corrupt. The 2001 KDB survey asked another pair of questions concerning the overall level of corruption under the Kim Dae Jung government. On a four-point verbal scale rating overall corruption from “very high” to “very little,” a majority replied “very high” (12%) or “high” (42%).26 When 26

In November 1999, when the KDB asked the same question, 8% said “very high” and 42% said “high.”

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asked how the level of political corruption has changed since the installation of the current government three years ago, more than two-thirds (70%) said that it had changed little or increased. All of these findings, when considered together, clearly illustrate that political corruption is seen as endemic and rampant in democratic Korea. As in the authoritarian past, the political game is still being played by the old informal rules of particularism.27 To what extent are ordinary Koreans inclined to play the political game by rules of particularism rather than the universalistic rules of democratic politics? To explore this question, the 2001 KDB survey asked: “If someone tells you that a gift or a bribe can help people avoid paying taxes, how much do you agree or disagree?” Over two-fifths (44%) expressed openly the reluctance to commit themselves to the rule of law that Linz and Stepan characterize as an indisputable condition for democratic consolidation.28 Like many politicians and civil servants, many ordinary citizens are not committed to the creation of a Rechtsstaat, a law-bound state. Fairness A third type of departure from the rule of law involves unfair enforcement of laws. The military regimes headed by former Presidents Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan favored the Kyongsang provinces at the expense of the Cholla provinces. Current President Kim Dae Jung is widely believed to have favored the Cholla provinces, his home base, reversing the earlier pattern of distributing governmental benefits and services unfairly.29 Obviously, these practices of unfair treatment violate the democratic principles of justice. How fairly or unfairly are laws enforced in Korea today, after the election of the third democratic government in the past twelve years? The 2001 KDB survey asked a pair of questions to explore the level of unfairness in governmental performance. The survey first asked: “How fairly or unfairly do you think laws are enforced on someone like yourself these days?” To this question of a general nature, a vast majority of four-fifths (80%) replied “somewhat unfairly” (49%) or “very unfairly” (31%). In addition, the same survey asked: “How fairly or unfairly do you think the Kim Dae Jung government treats people from your own region as compared to those from other regions?” To this question focusing on regionbased discrimination, about three-fifths (59%) replied negatively, with 43% saying “somewhat unfairly” and 16% saying “very unfairly” (16%). 27 28 29

Guillermo O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 5 (1994): 55–69. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies,” Journal of Democracy 7, no. 2 (1996): 14–33. “An Appeal to End Favoritism,” Chosun Ilbo, 29 April 2001; Sung-Woo Park, “Kim Takes Care of Honam Folks: More Top Aides Hail from Cholla,” JoongAng Ilbo, 18 March 2001.

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When respondents from the Cholla provinces are excluded from consideration, the percentage expressing unfair treatment of people from other provinces goes up to two-thirds (66%). Clearly, these findings indicate that the current Kim Dae Jung government is seen as treating a majority of ordinary citizens more unfairly than fairly, which is what its authoritarian predecessors once did. When their perceptions of all these departures from the rule of law are considered together, there is a negative consensus among the Korean people: their new regime is far from being a constitutional democracy based on the rule of law. Accountability Democracy is a political system in which free elections create the vertical accountability of governors to their electorate, as they depend on the votes of the mass population rather than on horizontal accountability to an undemocratic assembly of notables. To what extent do the Korean people think their governors are accountable to ordinary voters like themselves? To estimate the level of vertical accountability, the 2001 KDB asked a pair of questions, one on the extent to which political leaders can be trusted and the other on governmental efforts to cover up the illegal activities of the officials of the ruling party. Public trust of political leaders and the cover-up of their illegal activities are considered positive and negative indicators, respectively, of an accountable government. The KDB survey first asked: “Generally speaking, how much do you trust our political leaders?” A little over one-tenth (11%) replied affirmatively with “some” or “a lot.” In striking contrast, over three times as many (36%) said political leaders could not be trusted at all, whereas nearly five times (52%) said that political leaders could not be trusted even somewhat. When asked how often the government covers up the involvement of ruling party officials in illegal activities, less than one-tenth (8%) confirmed the government’s accountability, saying that it “never” covers up their involvement. More than one-third (35%) said the government “always” or “often” covers up their illegal activities, whereas nearly half (45%) said it “occasionally” covers up those activities. Affirmative responses to the two questions were added into a summary index whose scores range from a low of zero to a high of two. A score of zero indicates that the government is not accountable to the Korean electorate at all, and a score of two indicates it is seen as fully accountable to the electorate. As expected, the current system of electoral democracy is found to suffer a great deal from a lack of accountability. More than four out of five voters (82%) dismiss the current democratic system as fully unaccountable to them. More notable is that a negligible

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proportion (2%) views the current democratic system as fully accountable. In the eyes of ordinary Koreans, the Korean system of democratic governance lacks accountability as much as respect for the rule of law. These findings also confirm that accountable government is another important element missing from Korean democracy. They also support the argument that Korea represents a model of democratization attempted backward, a notable characteristic of the third wave of democratization. The findings also confirm the dictum of electoralism, that is, that competitive elections cannot be equated with democracy itself.30 Because Korean democracy is perceived as grossly deficient in the rule of law as well as in accountability, this raises the issue of whether those democratic deficits have driven it into a state of crisis. To explore this possibility, the 2001 KDB survey asked: “In view of what the national assembly and political parties have been doing during the past year, do you feel our system of democratic government is or is not in a state of crisis?” Surprisingly, a large majority (82%) of those interviewed replied affirmatively, with nearly one-third (30%) saying that the current system of democracy is “definitely in a crisis,” and more than half (52%) saying that it is “probably in a crisis.” Although a small minority (14%) declined to recognize the presence of a democratic crisis, only a few Koreans (1%) expressed the view that the country is “definitely not in a democratic crisis.” The number of those recognizing a definite crisis of democratic rule in Korea is thirty times greater than those denying it to the same degree. From this finding alone, it is evident that Korean democracy is in a state of despair. Why do many Koreans see their democratic political system as in crisis? Do they do so primarily because they believe their democratically elected government is corrupt and unaccountable? Table 2.3 shows the relationships between the crisis perceptions of Korean democracy on the one hand and the assessments of democratic performance on the other. The higher the perceptions of political corruption, discrimination, and cover-up, the greater the perceptions of democratic crisis; the lower the perceptions of governmental responsiveness and trust in politicians, the greater the perceptions of the crisis. As a consequence, for example, nearly three-quarters (73%) have come to believe that their democracy is definitely in a crisis when they see their government as not only corrupt but also unresponsive to the citizenry. When they see it as relatively uncorrupt and responsive, on the other hand, less than one-fifth (18%) believe that it is in a definite crisis. Of all the qualities of democracy examined in the 2001 KDB survey, corruption and distrust in politicians were found 30

Terry Lynn Karl, “Electoralism,” in The International Encyclopedia of Democracy, ed. Richard Rose (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2000).

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Table 2.3 Assessments of political performance and the strong sense of democratic crisisa Performance assessments Scale points Corruption Discrimination Cover-up Responsiveness

Trust

Low Middle High

46.9% 22.8 20.5

20.5% 30.1 66.4

25.5% 27.6 56.9

23.4% 40.9 58.2

51.3% 27.5 24.5

a

Entries are percentages replying “democracy is definitely in a crisis.” Source: 2001 Korea Democracy Barometer Survey.

to contribute most to the prevalent sense of democratic crisis among the Korean public. Distribution of Democratic Support and Experiences For democratizing countries to consolidate and become full democracies, popular support for democracy must be distributed widely across a broad range of population subgroups.31 When supporters and opponents are concentrated into separate segments of the population, there is little chance that the new regimes can contain political differences within the peaceful channels defined by democratic norms and methods. The greater the extent to which democratic supporters and opponents are dispersed across various population subgroups, the greater the chance for the consolidation of democratizing regimes. Are favorable and unfavorable orientations toward democracy distributed widely across the various segments of the Korean population? Or are those orientations confined to a few population segments? To explore these questions of a distributional nature, we divided the 2001 KDB survey sample by gender, age, family income, educational attainment, and the region of residence. As described in Table 2.4, the original values of the last four variables were collapsed into three broad categories. For each variable, the table compares across its categories the percentages expressing normative and empirical support for democracy, and the democratic perceptions and satisfactory assessments of the existing system. As expected, normative support for democracy is widely distributed across the various population groups defined by demographic characteristics. With the exception of those with less than a high school education, the Korean people tend to remain fully supportive of democracy-in-principle, regardless of their personal characteristics and 31

William Mishler and Richard Rose, “Trajectories of Fear and Hope,” Comparative Political Studies 28 (1996): 554; Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 309.

67 61 74 81 66 71 78

83 83 88 81 84 86

56 63 70

53 65 74

49 69 75

71 65 52

Performance

42 39 48

33 45 50

31 44 55

51 39 35

44% 46

46 34 38

29 40 42

25 36 51

45 31 30

38% 39

29 24 26

15 27 30

15 23 37

31 21 19

27% 25

86 62 67

68 67 69

66 72 64

69 67 65

67% 69

65 36 48

47 43 50

49 49 42

46 45 53

48% 46

62 26 39

37 35 42

39 41 34

38 36 43

39% 37

Legitimacy Efficacy Both Democracy Satisfaction Both

Source: 2001 Korea Democracy Barometer Survey.

61 77 81

79 72 62

87 85 79

62% 71

Both

Empirical support

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78 86 89

72% 76

81% 89

Idea Change

Normative support

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Gender Male Female Age 20–39 40–59 60 & older Education < high sch. High school College Income Low Middle High Region Cholla Kyongsang Others

Demographic characteristics

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Table 2.4 Distribution of support for democracy and positive assessments of its performance

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socioeconomic and regional backgrounds. Support for democracy-inaction, in sharp contrast, is highly concentrated among a few groups. Even within these groups, much less than a majority are fully committed to democratic political practices. Full commitment to democratic practices, moreover, tends to vary from one group to another in significantly greater degree than full attachment to democratic values. Although a majority (51%) of Koreans in their twenties and thirties always support democracy as the best political system, for example, a little over one-third (35%) of those in their sixties and older do the same. Although one-quarter (25%) of Koreans with less than a high school education endorse democracy as the best method for solving economic problems, a majority (51%) of the college-educated prefer the democratic method of governance to the authoritarian one. Compared to one-third (35%) of those living in the Kyongsang provinces, nearly half (46%) of residents of the Cholla provinces embrace democracy as the best method of governance. Empirical support, unlike normative support, is concentrated among relatively few segments of the Korean population, including the young, the college-educated, and the Cholla residents. Like normative democratic support, perceptions of the current political system as a democracy tend to be distributed broadly across various segments of the Korean population. Regardless of gender and age characteristics and socioeconomic and regional backgrounds, a substantial majority perceives the current political system as a democracy. Furthermore, democratic perceptions tend to vary relatively little from one population group to another. The only exception to this tendency is the difference between residents of Cholla and other regions. In contrast to two-thirds (66%) of those in other regions, over four-fifths (86%) of Cholla residents perceive the current system as a democracy. In expressing satisfaction with democratic performance, Cholla residents also lead the rest by a substantial margin. Although about one-third (36%) of Kyongsang residents feel satisfied with the performance of the current system, nearly two-thirds (65%) of Cholla residents feel the same. On the whole, those satisfied with the system as a democracy are concentrated in the Cholla region, where democracy is viewed as the most effective method of managing economic and other serious problems. Trends in Democratic Support For new democracies to consolidate and become full democracies, their citizens must increasingly orient themselves toward the ideals and practices of democratic politics. The direction and trajectories of popular support for democracy is just as critical to their survival and

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effective functioning as the total amount of such support.32 In general, four different trajectories are conceivable for democratic support over time: positive, negative, fluctuating, or neutral. When the aggregate level of support increases on a continuing basis, the trajectory of support becomes steadily positive or upward-trending. With continuing decreases in the aggregate level, the trajectory becomes steadily negative, a downward spiral. With a combination of upward and downward changes in the support level, the trajectory becomes erratic or fluctuating. Finally, with little or no significant change to the level in either an upward or downward direction, the trajectory becomes neutral. What sort of trajectory best characterizes Koreans’ support for the ideals and practices of democratic politics during the past four years, beginning in 1997, the year when an economic crisis erupted? During this period, four KDB surveys were conducted to monitor the short-term dynamics of normative and empirical democratic support. For each of the two support levels, Table 2.5 reports two different percentages dealing with individual and combined responses supportive of democracy. Two indicators of normative support display a fluctuating pattern of movement, registering both downward and upward changes over the period. With the deepening of the economic crisis in 1998, both indicators decreased by five percentage points or more. With the economy recovering from the crisis in 1999, both increased by five percentage points. In 2001, when the economy became sour once again, they fell sharply. When the two indicators are considered together, the current overall level of normative support stays at about four-fifths of what it was before the outbreak of the economic crisis four years ago. Compared to 81% in 1997, 66% are now fully attached to democracy-in-principle. This indicates that more than one in seven Korean adults (15%) have detached themselves from the ideals of democracy in the aftermath of the economic crisis. Over the same period, 1997 to 2001, empirical support has fallen more sharply than has normative support, and it has also fallen on a steady basis. The sense of democratic legitimacy, for example, has declined from 69% in 1997 to 54% in 1998 and 55% in 1999 to 45% in 2001. Before the outbreak of the economic crisis, more than two-thirds of the Korean people subscribed to the view that democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government. Now much less than half uphold this view of democratic legitimacy. As many as one in four Koreans (25%) no longer believes that democracy is always the best for their country. The sense that democracy is the most efficacious method of sorting out societal problems has also weakened sharply and steadily, from 51% in 1998 and 52% in 1999 down to 38% in 2001. As a result, only one-quarter of Korean voters (26%) 32

Mishler and Rose, op. cit., 554; Norris, op. cit.

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Table 2.5 Trends in support for democracy and perceptions of its performance Survey year Measures of democracy Normative support Democracy Democratization Both Empirical support Legitimacy Efficacy Both Opposition to Dictatorship Military Civilian Both Regime performance Democratic Satisfactory Both Democratic quality Empowerment Responsiveness Both

1997

1998

1999

2001

90.0% 90.0 81.4

85.3% 81.1 72.7

90.9% 86.8 80.2

85.0% 74.2 66.0

68.9 — —

53.7 50.8 40.4

55.1 51.8 38.0

44.6 38.3 25.9

83.7 79.1 69.6

85.5 74.3 68.0

87.0 81.0 74.1

78.7 76.4 65.8

69.5 35.7 31.5

64.8 43.5 37.0

67.6 45.2 38.1

67.9 46.8 38.0

71.4 44.7 34.6

71.5 32.0 27.1

75.8 28.5 22.9

59.4 29.9 23.7

Source: Korea Democracy Barometer Surveys.

remain fully committed to democracy-in-practice. This statistic is fourteen percentage points lower than three years ago, even when the country was struggling with record levels of bankruptcies and unemployment. Again, one in seven Koreans (14%) no longer believes that democracy is the only game in town. This raises the issue of whether these backsliders from democracy-inaction have been increasingly in favor of abandoning the democratic constitutional structure of the existing system and restoring the authoritarian political system under which they once lived. According to the data reported in Table 2.5, most of these backsliders do not seem to favor the restoration of an authoritarian political system. Compared to 70% in 1997, 66% remain opposed to the restoration of a military or civilian dictatorship. Over the course of the economic crisis, there has been no significant increase in affinity for authoritarianism as a political system. Nonetheless, significant increases have occurred in feelings of nostalgia for authoritarianism as a method of tackling the economic and other

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serious problems facing the country. To monitor this trend, the KDB surveys repeatedly asked respondents to rate separately the extent to which they were satisfied with the way the current government and the former military government handled those problems. The separate ratings of the democratic and military governments were compared to calculate the percentages of those rating the past authoritarian government more favorably (or less unfavorably) than the current democratic government. Supporters of authoritarianism as the best method of tackling the country’s serious problems have increased steadily from 12% in 1996 to 24% in 1998, 31% in 1999, and 44% in 2001. Compared to the pre-crisis period, nearly four times as many people now express nostalgia for the way the Chun Doo Hwan government handled those problems. The Impact of the Economic Crisis on Democratic Support The sense of authoritarian nostalgia, which the economic crisis has undoubtedly reinvigorated, seems to have motivated many Koreans to reorient themselves away from democracy-in-practice. Among those who believe that the Kim Dae Jung government has handled the serious problems facing the country better than the Chun Doo Hwan government, for example, a majority (57%) endorse the legitimacy of democracy unconditionally. Among those who believe that the Chun Doo Hwan government handled those problems better than the Kim Dae Jung government, however, only one-quarter (25%) unconditionally endorse the legitimacy of democracy. As Figure 2.4 shows, there is a monotonic negative relationship between nostalgia for the Chun Doo Hwan government and the unconditional endorsement of democratic legitimacy. The higher the level of authoritarian nostalgia, the lower the level of unqualified commitment to democracy as always preferable to any other type of government. This raises the question of what has contributed to the increasing sense of authoritarian nostalgia among the Korean people. To explore this question, we examined its relationship with the relative priority of democratization as a policy, which has significantly declined in the aftermath of the economic crisis. Among those who emphasize economic development over democratization, more people expressed satisfaction with the old Chun Doo Hwan government than the current Kim Dae Jung government by a margin of 9% (48% vs. 39%). In sharp contrast, among those who emphasize democratization, 21% more expressed satisfaction with the current government than with the old one (50% vs. 29%). Among Koreans who equally emphasize these two policies, those satisfied with the current government outnumber those satisfied with the old government by a smaller margin (47% vs. 40%). The higher the perceived priority of

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50% 37%

40%

34%

30%

25%

20% 10% 0% Lowest

Low

High

Highest

Levels of Authoritarian Nostalgia

Figure 2.4 Unconditional support for democratic rule by levels of authoritarian nostalgia.

economic development over democratization, the greater the sense of nostalgia for authoritarian rule. To explore further the impact of the economic crisis on nostalgia for authoritarian rule, the 2001 KDB survey asked a series of four questions. First, the survey asked: “Having lived through an economic crisis for the past three years, how often have you, if ever, thought that democracy is not suitable to the situation in Korea?” In response, nearly half (45%) said that they have “often” or “sometimes” thought democracy is not suitable to the situation they have lived through. Next, the survey asked: “Having lived through an economic crisis, how often have you ever thought that a dictatorship still works better than democracy in the Korean situation?” Nearly one-half (48%) replied that they have “often” or “sometimes” thought that a dictatorship still works better than democracy over the course of an economic crisis. When asked whether they have ever thought that political leaders are more important than democratic institutions, over three-fifths (62%) replied affirmatively. These responses, when considered together, make it clear that the experience of the economic crisis has motivated many Koreans to question the virtues of democracy as a system of government and to reorient themselves toward the old authoritarian method of problem solving. To explore the impact of the economic crisis on democratic support more directly, the 2001 KDB survey asked: “In the wake of our recent

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economic crisis, do you now think of democracy differently from the way you did in the past?” Nearly one-fifth (19%) replied that they have become “a lot more” or “somewhat more” favorable to democracy. One-third (33%), on the other hand, said that they have become “somewhat more” or “a lot more” unfavorable to it. A majority of the Korean people (52%) has shifted their views on democracy in the wake of the economic crisis. Among Koreans whose democratic support has been affected by the economic crisis, however, those more unfavorably affected outnumber those more favorably affected by a margin of more than three to two. Contrary to what is generally found in the literature,33 economic crisis does not affect every subgroup of the population negatively; it motivates some population groups to strengthen their commitment to democratic politics, while motivating other groups to withdraw from such commitment. As with authoritarian nostalgia, the positive and negative effects of the economic crisis on democratic support also vary significantly according to the perceived relative priority of economic development and democratization as a national policy. Among the Koreans who see economic development as the greater need, those who become more unfavorably attached to democracy outnumber by sixteen percentage points those who become more favorably attached to it (36% vs. 20%). Among those who value these two policies equally, those more unfavorably attached lead those more favorably attached by thirteen percentage points (27% vs. 14%). Among the Koreans who value democratization to a greater extent, however, there is little difference between those more unfavorably and those favorably attached to democracy (29% vs. 28%). On the basis of these findings, it can be argued that the net impact of the economic crisis on democratic support is most negative among those who understand democracy in economic terms and least negative among those who see it in political terms. Sources of Democratic Attitudinal Dynamics Why, then, have many Koreans weakened in their support for democracy while others have maintained or strengthened their support for it? Have they done so because of the divergent perceptions of the national economy and their personal financial situation, or because of the conflicting assessments of the role of government in managing the economic crisis? To explore this question, the 2001 KDB survey first asked a pair of 33

Robert Dahl, “Development and Democratic Culture,” in Consolidating Third-Wave Democracies, ed. Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-Mao Tien (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1997); Karen Remmer, “Democracy and Economic Crisis,” World Politics 42 (1990): 313–35.

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questions concerning changes in economic life. Respondents were asked to compare the country’s current economic situation with what it was before the economic crisis three years ago. They were also asked to compare their own current financial situation with what it was prior to the outbreak of the crisis. Responses to these two questions are cross-tabulated with those to the question tapping favorable or unfavorable shifts in democratic support in the wake of the economic crisis. The gains or losses experienced in the private or public sphere of economic life are found to have no significant impact on the dynamics of democratic support. The percentages reporting unfavorable shifts in democratic support, for example, vary insignificantly – from 37% among those experiencing deterioration in the personal financial realm and the national economy to 36% among those whose finances improved. Likewise, the percentages reporting favorable shifts in democratic support do not vary much – from 16% among those most negatively affected by the economic crisis to 20% among those most positively affected by it. In general, in the aftermath of the economic crisis, the economic gains or losses Koreans have experienced, either privately or publicly, have neither contributed to nor detracted from their orientations toward democracy to any significant degree. On the other hand, Koreans’ democratic orientations have shifted to a significant degree in relation to the particular economic gains or losses they attribute to the government’s economic reforms. When those reforms were evaluated to have hurt the national economy and an individual’s personal financial situation, more than two-fifths (43%) reported becoming less in favor of democracy than they were before the crisis. When the same reforms were evaluated to have helped those financial situations, only a small minority of one in sixteen (6%) became less supportive of democracy. The more negatively Koreans rate the impact of governmental reforms, the less supportive they become of democracy. Conversely, the more positively they rate the impact of economic reforms, the more supportive they become of democracy. When the reforms were rated as fully negative, only one in eight (13%) reported being more in favor of democracy. When they were rated as fully positive, one in two (50%) became more supportive of democracy. In shaping the shortterm dynamics of democratic support among the Korean people, what is happening in the world of politics evidently matters more than what is happening in the economy. To date, the Korean economic crisis itself does not seem to have had a significant direct influence on democratic support among the Korean people; nor has it had a uniformly negative influence. By and large, the crisis has shaped democratic support indirectly through the evaluations

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of the economic reforms the government has pursued to manage it. Positive evaluations of those reforms have strengthened democratic support, while negative evaluations have weakened it. Summary and Conclusions All the KDB survey findings presented here make it clear that Korea has failed to make any progress in its march toward a fully consolidated democracy. The country is seen by its people merely as an electoral democracy, the same as it was five years ago. It is viewed by the people as remaining grossly deficient in delivering on its promises of freedom, accountability, responsiveness, and respect for the rule of law. The rotation of political power to an opposition party three years ago has not ended the streaks of political corruption. Nor have these changes made the executive branch any more accountable to the popularly elected legislature than it was before. Under the Kim Dae Jung government, an all-powerful, “imperial presidency” has continued to thrive with a “peripheral” legislative institution.34 As in the authoritarian past, it is the president, not the fundamental norms and rules of democratic politics, who most powerfully determines the contours and dynamics of Korean politics. Under the Kim Dae Jung presidency, Korea has recently been transformed from an influential consolidating democracy into a broken-back democracy.35 As the Chosun Ilbo noted in a recent editorial,36 what the country has today is “a government that listens to no one while ruling out of arrogance, self-righteousness, and an ‘imperial mindset.’ ” Both institutionally and substantively, therefore, Korea can no longer be considered a new democracy marching toward the consolidation of its nascent democratic rule. Korean democracy is also in a state of despair culturally, with steadily declining support from its citizens. The outbreak of the worst economic crisis in fifty years ended the rule of a long-dominant party in Korea and established a mature electoral democracy by electing Kim Dae Jung, the country’s most determined opposition figure, to its presidency. Three years of democratic politics under his presidency, however, have failed to broaden and deepen popular commitment by maintaining the rule of law and accountability to the electorate; instead, these three years have brought about steady and significant erosion of democratic support 34 35 36

Seong-Ho Lim, “A Paradox of Korean Democracy,” Korea and World Affairs 22 (1998): 522–38. See Rose and Shin, op. cit., 333, for the notion of broken-back democracy. Quoted in Don Kirk, op. cit., A7; see also John Larkin, “Kim Dae Jung Comes up Short,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 May 2001, 18–24; Ji-soo Kim, “As Time Ebbs, Woes Beset Kim,” Joongang Ilbo, 1 June 2001.

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among the Korean people. A majority of Koreans now no longer believe in the legitimacy of a democratic regime as they once did. Nor do they believe in the efficacy of democracy as a method of managing the serious problems facing the country. The proportion expressing unqualified commitment to the practices of democratic politics accounts for only one-quarter of the Korean electorate. In Korea today, the reservoir of popular support for democracy-in-action is meager. Why, then, have so many Koreans weakened in their support for the practices of democratic politics, or withdrawn from it altogether, while remaining attached to its ideals? One plausible answer to the question may be found in the way that these novices in democratic politics evaluate the performance of the current political system relative to that of the past authoritarian system under which they once lived. For the first time since the initiation of democratic rule in 1988, a plurality of the Korean people rate the current government more negatively than the past authoritarian government headed by former general Chun Doo Hwan. When the new democratic regime is seen by its people as unable to deliver what the old repressive regime did effectively, it becomes for them the greater of two evils. Retreating from a greater evil represents a rational option to those Koreans who are increasingly dissatisfied with the performance of the current democratic political system. This instrumental view of democracy, to which many Koreans still subscribe, has contributed to the erosion of their support for democratic rule. Finally, the latest Korea Democracy Barometer survey makes it clear that more than a decade of democratic rule in Korea has failed to end the old habit of equating dictatorship with effective leadership or good governance. There is little doubt that the democratization of authoritarian cultural values among Korean citizens and political leaders has turned into a “long march” that may require several generations rather than a single generation.37 It is likely to be a much longer march for new democracies like Korea whose citizens tend to hold positive memories of economic life under the previous authoritarian regimes. In former communist states where authoritarian rule was responsible for economic chaos and stagnation, citizens tend to blame political leaders, not democratic institutions, for a deteriorating economy, and consequently they want new leaders only.38 In Korea, however, the outbreak of an economic crisis has rekindled an affinity for the practices of the authoritarian government that is perceived as contributing to economic prosperity. The economic crisis has motivated an increasing number of ordinary citizens to blame democratic institutions as much as the custodians of those 37 38

Shin, op. cit., 264. Raymond Duch, “Economic Chaos and the Fragility of Democratic Transition in Former Communist Regimes,” Journal of Politics 57 (1995): 121–58.

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institutions. The nature of economic life under authoritarian rule, therefore, should be considered a significant influence on the distance that each democratic march has to travel as an intergenerational phenomenon. Acknowledgments The research reported in this paper was supported by a two-year grant from the National Science Foundation (NSF SES-9909037). A shorter version of this paper was published in the Japanese Journal of Political Science.

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PART III

Consolidation at the Civil Society Level

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CHAPTER 3

Civil Society in Democratizing Korea Sunhyuk Kim

Civil Society and Democratization in Korea: An Overview and a Puzzle Korean democratization defies easy classification and presents a unique challenge to students of comparative politics. Unlike some cases in Southern Europe and Latin America, what happened in Korea in 1987 was not really a “pacted” transition – a democratic transition that is centered around and determined by elite calculations and interactions.1 That there was a fatal tension and split between the hard-liners (e.g., Chun Doo Hwan) and the soft-liners (e.g., Roh Tae Woo) in June 1987 is a plausible but very dubious claim considering the circumstances preceding and following the democratic transition. On the other hand, democratization in Korea was not an earthshaking revolution, unlike some cases in Eastern Europe. Although the June Uprising in 1987 and the ruling party’s eight-point democratization package were in large measure a response to such an unprecedented “popular upsurge,” what happened afterward was far from a handsome victory for the insurgents. The eventual conclusion of the 1987 “revolution” was incredibly anticlimactic. The ruling party candidate, who was one of the coconspirators of the 1979–80 multistaged military coup and a key partaker in Chun’s highly authoritarian rule, was elected president in December 1987. Neither the elites nor the masses “won” democracy in Korea; rather, what fundamentally characterized Korean democratization and 1

The elitist paradigm in the literature on democratic transition and consolidation, based principally on South European and Latin American experiences, maintains that “there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally . . . between hardliners and softliners.” See Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 19.

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differentiated it from other cases of the “third wave” of global democratization was the protracted and intense conflict between a strong civil society and a strong state.2 Placed in comparative perspective, the existence of a strong and repressive state is not really unique to the case of Korean democratization, as other countries and regions had stronger and more oppressive states. What is special about the Korean situation is the existence of a strong, vibrant, and resistant civil society. In Korea, civil society, which is defined as “a set of self-organized groups and movements that are relatively autonomous from the state, basic units of production and reproduction, and political society, and are capable of political activities in the public sphere to express their concerns and advance their interests according to the principles of pluralism and self-governance,”3 has distinctively and decisively contributed to democratization. In the three democratic junctures in Korean history, diverse groups in civil society – particularly student groups, labor unions, and faith-based organizations – contributed to authoritarian breakdown and democratic transition. In the first democratic juncture (1956–61), primarily students and urban intellectuals revolted against the repression and corruption of Syngman Rhee’s authoritarian regime. Subsequently, during the phase of democratic transition under Chang Myon, student groups aligned and cooperated with progressive opposition parties in their campaigns for democracy, self-assertive diplomacy, and reunification. In the second democratic juncture (1973–80), numerous national associations of dissident intellectuals, journalists, professionals, and religious leaders played an important role in galvanizing the anti-Yusin movement against Park Chung Hee’s authoritarian regime. These national associations, called Chaeya, formed and developed a pro-democracy coalition with the opposition New Democratic Party (Sinmindang), and they waged intense prodemocracy struggles, which generated a fatal split between the hard-liners and the soft-liners within the ruling bloc and ultimately brought about an implosion of the authoritarian regime. In the third democratic juncture 2

3

Regarding the concept and theoretical framework of “conflictual engagement” between state and civil society, see Michael Bratton, “Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa,” World Politics 41, no. 3 (1989): 407–30. The intense confrontation between state and civil society is a perennial theme in the study of Korean democratization. For a framework of “strong” state vs. “contentious” civil society, see Hagen Koo, “Strong State and Contentious Society,” in State and Society in Contemporary Korea, ed. Hagen Koo (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993). For a framework of “strong” state vs. “strong” society, see Kyong Ryung Song, “Han’guk Chongch’i Minjuhwaui Sahoejok Kiwon: Sahoe Undongnonjok Chopkun” (Social origins of South Korean democratization: A social movement approach), in Han’guk chongch’i sahoeui sae hurum (New currents in South Korean politics and society), ed. Institute for Far Eastern Studies (Seoul: Nanam, 1994). Sunhyuk Kim, The Politics of Democratization in South Korea: The Role of Civil Society (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 15.

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(1984–7), the pro-democracy alliance of civil society incorporated the triple solidarity of students, workers, and churches, and furthermore encompassed the middle class. Civil society groups were effectively united and led by national associations that consisted of numerous sectoral and regional organizations, and these civil groups also closely cooperated and coordinated with the opposition party through numerous joint organizations. The concerted efforts of civil society groups and the opposition party pressured the ruling authoritarian regime to concede to the popular demand for democratization.4 The latest democratic transition in Korea thus represents an excellent example of what is called a “mass-ascendant” mode of democratization.5 What is even more distinctive about the case of Korea is that civil society groups continue to play important roles, even in the politics of democratic consolidation. Since 1988, they have helped to compel Korean governments to launch and carry out various democratic changes. For example, civil society groups persistently demanded the prosecution and punishment of those who had been involved in the past military coups, repression of the pro-democracy movements, and corruption scandals, culminating in 1996 with the high-profile imprisonment of two former generals-turned-presidents, Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo. Civil society’s activism toward a clear break with the authoritarian past contributed considerably to making democracy “the only game in town” in Korea. As will be analyzed in detail later in this chapter, civil society groups have continued their movements for various political and socioeconomic reforms during the current Kim Dae Jung government (1998–present). It is generally agreed in the existing literature on democratic transition and consolidation that civil society, if it plays any role at all in facilitating democratic transition, is rapidly demobilized after the transition and significantly marginalized in the politics of democratic consolidation.6 As the political arena becomes more institutionalized and the fledgling democracy more consolidated, the locus and focus of politics incrementally but significantly shift to political society – “the arena where various political actors compete to gain control over public power and the state apparatus”7 – and civil society becomes secondary. Korean democratization resists this general trajectory of democratic development. This chapter addresses the puzzle of the continued vibrancy and persistent activism of civil society in the politics of democratic consolidation 4 5 6 7

Kim, The Politics of Democratization in Korea. Terry Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” Comparative Politics 23 (October 1990): 1–21. Steven Fish, “Rethinking Civil Society: Russia’s Fourth Transition,” Journal of Democracy 5 (1994): 34. Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 3.

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in Korea. Focusing on the past few years under the Kim Dae Jung government, I analyze how and why civil society groups still figure prominently in the current and ongoing consolidational politics in Korea, as they have consistently campaigned for a variety of political and economic reforms.8 Before analyzing current examples of these reform campaigns, however, it is essential to examine some of the conspicuous changes within civil society after the democratic transition in 1987. The successful continuation of Korean civil activism has depended to a great extent on those prominent changes in the composition and strategies of civil society over the past decade. Changes in Korean Civil Society Since 1988 Two different but intricately interrelated trends have characterized Korean civil society since the democratic transition in 1987. The first is the emergence and expansion of new social movement groups called the “citizens’ movement groups,” and the second is the transformation of the pre-existing “people’s movement groups.” One of the most notable trends in Korean civil society since 1988 has been the proliferation of new social movement groups called “citizens’ movement groups” (Simin undong tanch’e). United nationally under the Korea Council of Citizens’ Movements (KCCM, Han’guk simin tanch’e hyobuihoe), prominent examples of these groups include the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ, Kyongje chongui silch’on simin yonhap) and the Korea Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM, Han’guk hwan’gyong undong yonhap). The KCCM was created on September 12, 1994, by thirty-eight citizens’ movement groups. The initial membership encompassed a wide variety of social groups, such as religious groups (e.g., Buddhist, Protestant, Tonghak, Won Buddhist), environmental organizations (e.g., the KFEM, church–environmental institutes, green movement associations), women’s groups, the consumer movement, the reunification movement, the movement for educational reforms, and organizations for the handicapped. In its inaugural declaration, the KCCM proclaimed that its supreme goal was to make civil society more active and strengthen solidarity and cooperation among civil society groups with a view to achieving social development. It put special emphasis 8

Regarding the role of civil society in democratic consolidation under the two preceding governments of Roh Tae Woo and Kim Young Sam, see Sunhyuk Kim, “Civic Mobilization for Democratic Reform,” in Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea, ed. Larry Diamond and Doh Chull Shin (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2000); Sunhyuk Kim, “State and Civil Society in South Korea’s Democratic Consolidation: Is the Battle Really Over?” Asian Survey 37, no. 12 (1997): 1135–44; Sunhyuk Kim, “Civil Society and Democratization,” in Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy, and the State, ed. Charles Armstrong (New York: Routledge, 2002).

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on (1) the autonomy and consolidation of citizens’ movement groups, (2) internationalization of citizen movements, (3) reinforcement of solidarity among citizens’ movement groups, and (4) augmentation of the power of civil society and maximization of participatory democracy. Some leading members of the KCCM, particularly the CCEJ and the KFEM, had consistently emphasized that they would lead a new generation of social movement in Korea, different from the class-based and confrontational movements of the past. The formation of the KCCM symbolized at last an official proclamation of the dawn of this new era. The citizens’ movement groups differ in a number of respects from the pre-existing people’s movement groups, which played an important role in the authoritarian breakdown and democratic transition of the third democratic juncture.9 First, the participants of the citizens’ movement groups principally comprise middle-class citizens, such as white-collar workers, professionals, religious leaders, and intellectuals. By contrast, the people’s movement groups have been and still are primarily composed of blue-collar laborers, peasants, the urban poor, students, and other local residents. Second, the goals of the citizens’ movement groups focus on gradual institutional reforms. They do not oppose the capitalist system per se; instead, they only underscore and try to correct the distorted and unjust aspects of its socioeconomic results. Meanwhile, the people’s movement groups pursue fundamental and structural reforms that are intended to address and eventually overcome economic inequality and political suppression. Third, the style of the citizens’ movement groups is mostly reliant on legal and nonviolent methods, such as publicity campaigns, lectures, and distribution of pamphlets. The people’s movement groups, however, do not strictly comply with legal and peaceful methods. They often resort to illegal and violent measures such as strikes, demonstrations, and sit-ins. Fourth, the issues of the citizens’ movement groups focus on a range of social issues, including fair elections, consumers’ rights, anticorruption, the environment, and gender inequality. By contrast, the people’s movement groups concentrate on overcoming various forms of political and economic inequalities – particularly the inequalities between the elite and the masses and between capital and labor. According to the people’s movement groups, rectifying such inequalities is crucial in consolidating and deepening Korean democracy. 9

The discussion here on the differences between the citizens’ movement groups and the people’s movement groups is based on T’ae Sok Chong, Ho Ki Kim, and P’al Mu Yu, “Han’gugui simin sahoewa minjujuuiui chonmang” (Civil society and prospects for democracy in Korea), in Han’guk minjujuuiui hyonjaejok kwaje: chedo, kaehyok mit sahoe undong (Current tasks for Korean democracy: Institutions, reforms, and social movements), ed. Korea Council of Academic Groups (Seoul: Ch’angjakkwa pip’yongsa, 1993), 198– 206; Su-Hoon Lee, “Transitional Politics of Korea, 1987–92: Activation of Civil Society,” Pacific Affairs 66, no. 3 (1993): 359.

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The people’s movement groups (Minjung undong tanch’e), which played a crucial role in facilitating the authoritarian breakdown and democratic transition in 1987, have been striving to find a new identity and role in the politics of democratic consolidation. Immediately after the transition, between 1988 and 1990, the people’s movement groups were reorganized into several new national associations. For example, in 1987, the National Council of University Student Representatives (Chondaehyop) was established as a national organization of student groups. In January 1989, the Korea Coalition for National Democracy Movement (Chonmillyon) was formed, succeeding the People’s Movement Coalition for Democracy and Reunification (PMCDR, Mint’ongnyon) during the democratic transition. Also in 1989, the Korean Peasant Movement Coalition (Chonnong) and the Korean Teachers’ and Educational Workers’ Union (KTEWU, Chon’gyojo) were formed. In January 1990, the Korea Trade Union Council (Chonnohyop, later expanded into the Korea Confederation of Trade Unions, Han’guk minju noch’ong) was established. These three national organizations – the Korean Peasant Movement Coalition, the KTEWU, and the Korea Trade Union Council – led movements against the existing state–corporatist groups, such as various official agricultural cooperatives, the Korea Federation of Teachers’ Associations (Kyoch’ong), and the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU, Han’guk noch’ong). Although the PMCDR played a crucial role in the authoritarian breakdown and democratic transition in 1987, both the Korea Coalition for National Democracy Movement (1989) and its 1992 successor, the National Alliance for Democracy and Unification of Korea (NADUK, Chon’guk yonhap), have been far less visible and influential in Korean politics. During Roh Tae Woo’s term (1988–93), the people’s movement groups focused on exposing the continuity between Roh’s “pseudo” democracy and Chun’s authoritarian regime, pejoratively characterizing Roh as Chun with a wig (Chun was bald). But after the inauguration of the Kim Young Sam government (1993–8), the people’s movement groups experienced a serious setback, and this situation has changed little during the Kim Dae Jung government (1998–present). Kim Young Sam stunned civil society as a whole immediately after his inauguration, preempting the opposition of the people’s movement groups, particularly carrying out a series of reforms that had been unimaginable during the previous authoritarian regimes. Under the slogans of “moral restoration” and “a new Korea,” Kim publicly disclosed his private assets, encouraged public officials and politicians to follow suit, ordered the investigation of wrongdoings perpetrated by former political and military leaders, and implemented a drastic “real-name bank account system” to cut the close

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association between business and politics.10 Shocked by the fast pace at which the Kim regime implemented democratic reforms, the people’s movement groups underwent a critical identity crisis.11 Although the groups recovered relatively quickly from this identity crisis and regained solidarity, mainly due to the failure of economic and political reforms during the later years of the Kim Young Sam government, most people’s movement groups are still trying to adjust to the political dynamics of democratic consolidation under the Kim Dae Jung regime.12 Some people’s movement groups decided to distance themselves from their old images, in which they almost reflexively and instinctively castigated the ruling regime and criticized the status quo. Groups such as the Korea Trade Union Council, the KTEWU, and the Korean Peasant Movement Coalition, whose leaders spearheaded the pro-democracy movement in 1987, announced that they would abandon the militant style of their past movements and adopt a “softer” style, promoting and sponsoring public policy debates and waging peaceful campaigns instead of violent demonstrations. Some other groups are leaving the people’s movement camp altogether, trying to repackage themselves as part of the citizens’ movement. Student groups, which were extremely instrumental in the previous authoritarian breakdowns and democratic transitions, have also experienced a crisis. In March 1993, the National Council of University Student Representatives officially announced its disintegration. Although it was succeeded by another national organization, the National Coalition of University Student Councils (NCUSC, Hanch’ongnyon) later that year, student leaders lament that they can no longer organize and mobilize students in massive demonstrations as they did in the past. The NCUSC believes that new students do not care much about such broad issues as political democracy, economic equality, or national reunification. Instead, they are becoming more interested in intracampus and practical issues. For instance, students are far more concerned about skyrocketing tuition, expensive books, poor service at campus restaurants, inaccessible 10

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Victor D. Cha, “Politics and Democracy Under the Kim Young Sam Government: Something Old, Something New,” Asian Survey 33, no. 9 (1993): 849–63; Heng Lee, “Uncertain Promise: Democratic Consolidation in Korea,” in The Politics of Democratization: Generalizing East Asian Experiences, ed. Edward Friedman (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); Chong-sik Lee and Hyuk-Sang Sohn, “South Korea in 1994,” Asian Survey 35, no. 1 (1995): 28–36. Mun Hong Song, “Munmin ch’unggyok, tae sasaege ppajin chaeya” (The civilian shock: Dissident movement in profound agony), Sin Tonga (Tonga Monthly), May 1993, 494– 505. For an analysis of why people’s movement groups regained unity and solidarity, see Kim, “State and Civil Society in South Korea’s Democratic Consolidation: Is the Battle Really Over?”

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computer facilities, and crowded soccer fields. It has been a source of heated debate inside the NCUSC whether and how to deal with these changing concerns of students.13 The NCUSC declared in 1993 that it would avoid radical and violent demonstrations, and that it would stick to a nonviolent, peaceful movement style. In 1995, the NCUSC pledged that it would faithfully respond to the concerns of “ordinary” students. There is one civil society group that has uniquely tried to bridge the gap between the citizens’ movement groups and the people’s movement groups. This organization, the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD, Ch’amyo minju sahoe simin yondae) has received much public and media attention since the economic crisis in 1997. The PSPD was established on September 10, 1994, by approximately two hundred young professionals such as professors, lawyers, and doctors. In the name of a “progressive citizens’ movement,” the PSPD has tried to combine the new citizens’ movement and the old people’s movement into a unified framework.14 Since its inauguration, the PSPD has consistently worked to remedy the bifurcation that has split Korean civil society into two different, and to some degree competing, camps. Partly owing to the efforts of the PSPD, the citizens’ movement groups and the people’s movement groups cooperated, for example, in the movement for the prosecution and imprisonment of the two former presidents between 1994 and 1995. In summary, the citizens’ movement groups and the PSPD, in its attempts to combine the two camps of civil society groups, have figured prominently in the politics of democratic consolidation in Korea. Although the people’s movement groups dominated the civil society arena during the politics of democratic transition and spearheaded the prodemocracy movements against the authoritarian regimes, moderate citizens’ movement groups, most of which emerged in the aftermath of the democratic transition of 1987, are much more influential and powerful in their contribution to democratization within the current politics of democratic consolidation. Movements for Political Reform During the Kim Dae Jung Government In the past few years under the Kim Dae Jung government, civil society groups have focused primarily on three movements for political reform. The first is a campaign to monitor the process of the national assembly inspection of government offices (Kukchong kamsa). The second is the 13 14

“Han’guk sahoe, Hanch’ongnyon, kurigo haksaeng undong (Korean Society, the NCUSC, and Student Movement),” Mal (Speech) (May 1994). Han’gyore 21 (Han’gyore Weekly), 15 September 1994.

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Nakch’on and Nakson movement to prevent the elections of “unfit” or “disqualified” candidates in the 2000 national assembly elections. The last is a campaign for judicial reform including, most importantly, the introduction of a special prosecutor system (T’ukbyol komsaje).15 Monitoring the National Assembly Inspection of the Administration On September 8, 1999, forty civil society groups, including the CCEJ, the PSPD, and the KFEM, created the Citizens’ Solidarity for Monitoring the National Assembly Inspection of Government Offices (CSMNAIGO, Kukchong kamsa monito simin yondae). This organization set two main goals for the monitoring campaign. The first goal was to record the attendance of individual lawmakers in various committees and to evaluate their performance. Civil society groups tried to enhance fairness and objectivity in the evaluation and ranking of national assemblypersons by agreeing in advance on a set of basic principles and criteria for evaluation.16 Second, the participating groups of the CSMNAIGO also agreed in advance on a list of 166 crucial “reform tasks” and decided to monitor whether these tasks were discussed and addressed adequately in respective committees.17 The reform tasks included, for example, devising policy measures to end corruption in private schools and to deal with problems resulting from the expanded implementation of the National Pension System.18 The KFEM also planned to raise, in the Construction and Transportation Committee, issues related to the removal of the “green belts,” environment-unfriendly land planning, dam construction, and drinking water policies.19 All monitoring workers were civil society activists, lawyers, professors, and accountants who had been involved in the respective issue areas for many years and were knowledgeable about related policies, which considerably increased the credibility and legitimacy of the CSMNAIGO’s movement.20 The CSMNAIGO ran a website (www.ngokorea.org), and its activities were favorably covered by newspapers. The national assembly inspection of 352 government offices officially began on September 28, 1999. In response to civil society groups’ vigorous campaign to monitor committee activities, however, some major national assembly committees decided not to admit monitors to their sessions. The Unification and International Relations and Trade Committee, the National Defense Committee, and the Construction and 15 16 17 18 19 20

This is similar to the independent counsel system in the U.S. Han’gyore sinmun (Han’gyore Daily), 28 September 1999. Han’gyore sinmun (Han’gyore Daily), 6 September 1999. Han’gyore sinmun (Han’gyore Daily), 17 September 1999. Han’gyore sinmun (Han’gyore Daily), 14 September 1999. Han’gyore sinmun (Han’gyore Daily), 17 September 1999.

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Transportation Committee, for example, all prohibited the attendance and observation of the CSMNAIGO, claiming that the monitoring activities might cause disturbances at the meetings and that the rooms would be too small to accommodate all the monitors.21 The Public Health and Welfare Committee also decided not to admit CSMNAIGO workers, arguing that evaluations by civil society groups that lack professional knowledge of and experiences with policy matters would adversely influence the investigation of the national assembly. The Finance and Economy Committee followed suit.22 But the real reason behind various committees’ decisions to block the monitoring campaign was that most members of the committees were afraid that CSMNAIGO’s critical evaluation of lawmakers would damage their reputations in their local electoral districts and would decrease their chances of reelection. Decisions by a number of national assembly committees to obstruct the CSMNAIGO monitoring campaign led to a direct confrontation between civil society groups and legislators. The CSMNAIGO waged street demonstrations in front of the involved government ministries and waged phone, fax, and e-mail campaigns in protest of the decision to block monitoring.23 On October 11, 1999, the CSMNAIGO sent a questionnaire to all nine standing committees of the national assembly to ask all lawmakers to openly clarify their position on whether to allow CSMNAIGO workers to enter their sessions. At the conclusion of their campaign, on October 20, 1999, the CSMNAIGO released a report with rankings of the legislators in terms of performance and with stinging criticisms of the decisions of various national assembly committees not to allow CSMNAIGO monitoring activities.24 Overall, CSMNAIGO’s monitoring campaign proved only partially successful because of the blockade by major standing committees. Throughout the monitoring campaign, civil society groups were greatly frustrated by the total lack of cooperation on the part of politicians, which provided a primary motive for the Nakch’on and Nakson movement in the national assembly elections in April 2000. The Nakch’on and Nakson Movement One of the movement goals of civil society groups since the democratic transition in 1987 has been to increase the overall fairness of elections.25 Led by the Citizens’ Council for Fair Elections (Kongmyong son’go silch’on simin undong hyobuihoe), the movement for fair elections has contributed 21 22 23 24 25

Han’gyore sinmun (Han’gyore Daily), 29 September 1999. Han’gyore sinmun (Han’gyore Daily), 1 October 1999. Han’gyore sinmun (Han’gyore Daily), 3 October 1999. Han’gyore sinmun (Han’gyore Daily), 20 October 1999. Kim, The Politics of Democratization in Korea, 120.

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significantly to changing the “election climate” (son’go p’ungt’o) in Korea. At the same time, however, civil society groups began to realize that guaranteeing fair elections would not really change the fundamental psychology and mentality of Korean politicians. Hence, they decided to switch to a movement to endorse and support specific policies and candidates during election times. As stated previously, many civil society groups were frustrated in late 1999 when major national assembly committees refused to cooperate with the activities of CSMNAIGO to protect their vested interests. Civil society groups concluded that for any legislative oversight to be effective, a movement must be waged during election times and must be focused on affecting the actual outcomes of the elections.26 On January 13, 2000, about three months before the national assembly elections, 412 civil society groups, including the PSPD and the KFEM, established the Citizens’ Solidarity for the General Elections (CSGE, Ch’ongson simin yondae). At its inauguration, this organization envisioned two different stages of its movement. The first was to generate a list of politicians who should not be nominated by political parties to run for the national assembly elections, and then to campaign against their nominations (the Nakch’on movement). Second, if some of those “blacklisted” candidates were nominated anyway, the movement was to campaign against their actual elections (the Nakson movement).27 From the very beginning of the movement, there were mixed signals from the Kim Dae Jung government. On the one hand, Kim Dae Jung himself seemed sympathetic to and supportive of the movement. He ordered the repeal of Article 87 of the election laws, which prohibited intervention of civil society groups into elections.28 On the other hand, the National Election Commission determined, on January 18, 2000, that the release of the list of so-called “unfit” candidates was illegal and would violate Article 87 of the election laws.29 The CSGE took the signal from Kim Dae Jung more seriously and decided to go ahead with the Nakch’on and Nakson movement, characterizing their movement as civil disobedience.30 On January 24, 2000, the CSGE disclosed a list of sixty-six politicians who should not be nominated as candidates for the April national 26 27 28

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Sin Tonga (Tonga Monthly), March 2000. Chosun ilbo (Chosun Daily), 25 January 2000. Article 87 states: “Organizations, regardless of their types and names, may not support or oppose any specific political parties or candidates. Nor may they encourage others to support or oppose any specific parties or candidates,” . In mid-February 2000, the Public Prosecutors Office summoned a number of civil society group leaders involved in the Nakch’on and Nakson movement and investigated their motivations as well as the processes of drafting the list of politicians. Chosun ilbo (Chosun Daily), 19 January 2000.

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assembly elections. The selection criteria included involvement in previous bribery and corruption scandals, violation of the election laws, lack of legislative activities (e.g., too many absences in national assembly sessions), destruction of constitutional order (e.g., cooperation with Chun Doo Hwan’s authoritarian regime in the early 1980s or involvement in military coups), failure or refusal to sign anticorruption laws, instigation of regionalism, etc.31 Reactions to this list from political parties varied greatly. The ruling National Congress for New Politics was supportive, and the opposition Grand National Party (GNP) was ambivalent. The United Liberal Democrats (ULD), which had been a partner in the ruling coalition, was enraged by the inclusion in the list of its party leader Kim Jong Pil.32 Several days later, both the GNP and the ULD alleged that there had been collusion between the Kim Dae Jung government and the participating groups of CSGE, pointing to the fact that many civil society group leaders joined the ruling party and that they also received financial support from the government. An intense debate emerged between the CSGE and the two opposition parties33 on whether collusion existed between civil society and the government.34 According to the polls taken at the time, the public was more sympathetic to the CSGE. In a survey taken in late February 2000, 54.3% of the respondents believed that civil society groups were more credible than the politicians in the two opposition parties who alleged collaboration between the ruling party and the CSGE.35 On January 24, 2000, various faith-based organizations, including Episcopal, Catholic, Protestant, and Buddhist organizations, also openly expressed their support for the CSGE’s Nakch’on and Nakson campaign, stating that they completely endorsed the movement’s objective to expel corrupt politicians from the political arena and to restore the people’s right of political participation.36 Furthermore, on January 28, 232 members of Lawyers for Democracy (Minbyon) created a legal support team 31

32 33

34 35 36

The specific process of producing the list was as follows. First, civil society groups constituted an investigative team that collected basic background materials for politicians. Second, the groups conducted surveys to generate seven principal criteria for opposing the nomination of a specific candidate. Third, a standing executive committee of civil society group leaders produced a list of 95 politicians. Fourth, a committee of 100 voters reviewed and approved the selection criteria. Last, an advisory group of professors and scholars checked the list for factual errors. The CSGE originally planned to release a list of seventy-seven politicians on January 20, 2000. But the CSGE gave a chance to those seventy-seven politicians to clarify the allegations. After reviewing the explanatory statements from those listed in the preliminary list, the CSGE ultimately disclosed a list of sixty-six politicians on January 24, 2000. Chosun ilbo (Chosun Daily), 25 January 2000. Chosun ilbo (Chosun Daily), 25 January 2000. The ULD was a coalition partner of the ruling party until this moment, but because of the CSGE’s inclusion of Kim Jong Pil in its list, Kim Dae Jung’s support for the campaign, and the launching of the new Millennium Democratic Party, ULD declared in February 2000 that it would become an opposition party. Chosun ilbo (Chosun Daily), 4 February 2000. Han’gyore 21 (Han’gyore Weekly), 24 February 2000. Han’guk kyongje sinmun (Korean Economy Daily), 24 January 2000.

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to give legal advice to the CSGE’s movement. Participating lawyers stated that the main goal of the Nakch’on and Nakson movement was to protect and enhance the people’s constitutional right of political participation.37 On February 9, 2000, revised election laws were passed in the national assembly. Article 87 of the election laws was now revised to allow civil society groups to engage in election activities (either opposing or supporting candidates) on the internet or at press conferences. Holding mass gatherings or waging signature-collection campaigns remained illegal, as did the announcement of a list of “unfit” or “disqualified” candidates before the official election campaign period started (i.e., it would be legal only during the sixteen days between the final day for candidacy registration and the actual election day).38 There was a heated internal discussion within the CSGE on whether to comply with the new election laws or to continue their civil disobedience movement. Ultimately, the CSGE decided to pursue its Nakch’on and Nakson movement within the legal boundary permitted by the new election laws, announcing the list of “unfit” candidates on April 3 during the legal election campaign period. CSGE’s initial list of unfit politicians, on January 24, did not entirely prevent political parties from nominating those problematic politicians. After parties made their nominations, the CSGE filed several lawsuits to annul or suspend nominations; these lawsuits were later rejected by the Seoul district court on the basis that voters have no legal interest in the nomination processes of political parties. The court argued that, if necessary, voters should express their political preferences through votes, not by intervening in the nomination process.39 The CSGE at last announced the final Nakson list of eighty-six unfit candidates on April 3. The final list included sixty-four candidates who had been on the original Nakch’on list but were nominated by parties and twenty-two more candidates selected according to the criteria of anti-human rights backgrounds, tax evasion, inappropriate remarks and behaviors in the national assembly, etc.. The CSGE focused particularly on twenty-two candidates and announced that it would carry out a “man-to-man” Nakson movement in local electoral districts.40 After the announcement of the final Nakson list, on April 5–6, 2000, there were several physical confrontations between the CSGE activists and the supporters of the involved candidates at several campaign sites. The CSGE announced that it would consistently adhere to the principles of nonviolence and nonresistance in response to the violent actions of National Election Commission officials and supporters of candidates.41 37 38 39 40 41

Chosun ilbo (Chosun Daily), 29 January 2000. Chosun ilbo (Chosun Daily), 10 February 2000. Han’gyore sinmun (Han’gyore Daily), 10 March 2000. Chosun ilbo (Chosun Daily), 4 April 2000. Chosun ilbo (Chosun Daily), 7 April 2000.

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The CSGE and its Nakch’on/Nakson movement were covered very sympathetically in the news media and were well received by the public in general. Most of the newspapers closely followed the CSGE’s activities and the political developments surrounding them. In a survey conducted on a sample of 1,000 people nationwide on March 8, 2000, 58.7% of the respondents said that they would not support candidates who were on CSGE’s list, 66.5% agreed that those who incited regionalism should be included on the list, and 56.5% believed that the criteria for selecting unfit candidates had been fair.42 In another survey of 2,200 people conducted by Han’gyore 21 (The Han’gyore Weekly), 79.5% of the respondents thought that the CSGE’s list should be supported and accepted.43 In a live internet poll of “netizens,” 78% of the respondents replied that they would not vote for those on the CSGE’s list, and 88% supported the inclusion of Kim Jong Pil – leader of United Liberal Democrats and a conservative politician who staged a military coup and established the Korea Central Intelligence Agency in the early 1960s – on the list.44 In the national assembly elections held on April 13, 2000, fifty-nine out of eighty-six candidates listed by the CSGE failed to be elected. In its disintegration ceremony one week after the elections, the CSGE made a self-assessment that its Nakch’on and Nakson movement, in which 975 civil society groups and 1,000 activists participated in one way or another, had significantly contributed to the increase of voters’ political consciousness and efficacy, to the emergence of a new generation of young politicians, and to the partial revision of election laws.45 Scholars and political analysts in Korea generally acclaimed the CSGE’s Nakch’on and Nakson movement, the first of its kind in Korean history. A political scientist characterized the movement as a serious “conflict between civil society and political society.”46 Another scholar argued that civil society groups served as an important actor in the “imaginary political space” (kasang chongch’i konggan) between the “old political order,” characterized by military dictatorship and chaebol economy, and the slowly-emerging “new political order.”47 There are several notable achievements of the Nakch’on and Nakson movement. First, the movement demonstrated the great potential of civil society in effecting changes in political society. It provided a strong 42 43 44 45 46

47

Han’gyore sinmun (Han’gyore Daily), 14 March 2000. Han’gyore 21 (Han’gyore Weekly), 24 February 2000. Han’gyore sinmun (Han’gyore Daily), 25 January 2000. Chosun ilbo (Chosun Daily), 21 April 2000. Jang Jip Choi, “50 nyon chongch’i tokchom punggoesik’in siminui him” (Citizens’ power that brought down 50-year-old monopoly of politics), Sin Tonga (Tonga Monthly), March 2000. Tae Hwa Chong, “Che 16-dae kukhoe uiwon ch’ongson’gowa simin undong tanch’eui chongch’i kaeip” (The 16th national assembly elections and political intervention of civil society groups). Tonghyanggwa chonmang (Trends and prospects) 45 (2000): 61.

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testimony that civil society is critical not only in bringing down an authoritarian regime and in bringing about a democratic government but also in enhancing the quality of an existing democracy by promoting the exit of incompetent and immoral politicians from the political arena. Second, the movement effectively facilitated alliance networks among civil society groups: more than 900 organizations and 1,000 citizens actively participated in the movement, under the leadership of the CSGE.48 Third, the Nakch’on and Nakson movement greatly increased a sense of political efficacy and decreased the sense of political apathy, particularly among young people in their twenties and thirties.49 However, the CSGE’s Nakch’on and Nakson movement also showed a number of limitations. First, the movement was in large part a negative campaign against those who should not be elected, rather than a positive one for those who should be elected. It successfully underscored what Korean voters had to do to avoid further deterioration of their political society but failed to develop and present an alternative vision of a better political society. Second, the movement was led primarily by the citizens’ movement groups, one of the two main movement camps in the consolidational politics of Korean democracy, to the exclusion of the people’s movement groups. As clearly indicated by the CSGE’s decision to abide by the new election laws, the participating organizations of the CSGE, in their efforts to seem moderate to the news media, consciously tried to distance themselves from the radical image of the people’s movement groups that spearheaded the movement for democratization in the 1980s. As a result, the CSGE’s Nakch’on and Nakson movement failed, to a great extent, to forge and develop alliances with labor unions, peasant groups, and other people’s movement groups. In this respect, the CSGE’s movement is reminiscent of the chaeya movement of the 1970s, headed by a number of intellectuals and religious dignitaries who were united through their personal networks and commitments.50 Last, the CSGE’s movement was unable to overcome regionalism; the movement was most effective in Seoul and its vicinity. In other regions where regionalism was strong (e.g., Yongnam or Honam), the Nakch’on and Nakson movement was not very successful. Although the public was generally supportive of the causes and the goals of the movement, most of them actually voted according to their regional allegiance when they went out to the polls. This demonstrates that there exist certain limits on civil society’s efforts to reform political society. 48 49 50

Chosun ilbo (Chosun Daily), 21 April 2000. Han’gyore 21 (Han’gyore Weekly), 20 April 2000. Chong Hwan Chu, “Hyondan’gye han’guk sahoeui songgyokkwa sahoe undongui kwaje” (The nature of Korean society at the current stage and tasks of social movement). Tonghyanggwa chonmang (Trends and prospects) 45 (2000): 110–11.

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The Movement for Judicial Reform Together with movements for monitoring, evaluating, and screening politicians, civil society groups have also worked on a campaign for judicial reform. On July 20, 1999, the Citizens’ Groups’ Solidarity Roundtable for Judicial Reforms (CGSRJR, Sabop kaehyogul wihan simin tanch’e yondae hoeui) was established by thirteen civil society groups, including the CCEJ, the PSPD, and the Association of Families of Political Prisoners (Min’gahyop). The CGSRJR pointed out that the existing “Committee for Judicial Reform” within the Ministry of Justice was too governmentdominated and had not been very effective. The CGSRJR selected fifteen reform tasks, including the introduction of a special prosecutor system, establishment of an agency in charge of investigating corruption cases of high-ranking public officials, and holding national assembly hearings on the appointments of key judicial positions such as the chief justice of the supreme court, the chief justice of the constitutional court, and the director of the public prosecutors office.51 The demand for the introduction of a special prosecutor system (t’ukbyol komsaje) lay at the center of the campaign of civil society groups for judicial reform. Kim Dae Jung’s National Congress for New Politics originally promised to adopt a special prosecutor system. After the election, however, the NCNP decided not to adopt the system, reneging on the election promise and disappointing civil society groups. In response to a corruption scandal in which a lawyer in Taejon exchanged bribes with high-ranking public prosecutors, the CCEJ called for the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate the case in January 1999. The Korea Council of Citizens’ Movements (KCCM), the national umbrella organization of citizens’ movement groups, followed suit. The PSPD demanded an inclusive judicial reform broader than the introduction of a special prosecutor system. On January 14, 1999, the PSPD, the Korea Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU, Han’guk minju noch’ong), and fifty members of various civil society groups waged a street demonstration in front of the public prosecutors office, criticizing scandals involving prosecutors and asking for the adoption of a special prosecutor system. The government’s official report of the Taejon corruption scandal only strengthened civil society’s movement for judicial reform. Numerous civil society groups, such as the PSPD, the CCEJ, the KCTU, and the KFEM, objected that the state investigation was inadequate and proposed that a special prosecutor system be introduced immediately.52 In May 1999, another scandal was disclosed: “furgate,” in which wives of the cabinet ministers allegedly received expensive clothing from a jailed 51 52

Han’gyore sinmun (Han’gyore Daily), 20 July 1999. Han’gyore sinmun (Han’gyore Daily), 10 February 1999.

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chaebol tycoon’s wife. On May 28, 1999, forty-four civil society groups called for comprehensive political reform, including the immediate introduction of a special prosecutor system. The PSPD, the YMCA, the KFEM, and the CCEJ demanded, either individually or collectively, the resignation of the minister of justice. However, the Kim Dae Jung government refused to dismiss the minister, which resulted in a solidarity campaign by 113 civil society groups for inclusive political reforms.53 The campaign of civil society groups for judicial reform dramatically escalated after another scandal erupted in June 1999. In a private hard liquor party with reporters, a high-ranking public prosecutor boastfully divulged that labor strikes at a state mint factory in November 1998 were in fact provoked and “induced” by the government to make an excuse for expeditious restructuring of the public sector. The minister of justice was dismissed in the aftermath of this scandal, and civil society groups vigorously demanded the arrest and punishment of those involved. The civil groups called for wider political reforms, including the introduction of a special prosecutor system, public hearings on appointments of high-ranking government officials, enactment of anticorruption laws, and establishment of ethical codes for public officials.54 On June 15, 1999, the ruling NCNP decided to appoint a special prosecutor to investigate the government-induced labor strike case. Civil society groups and the opposition GNP opposed the move, however, arguing that they could not accept a one-time application of the special prosecutor system. On June 24, a “People’s Action Demanding the Introduction of the Special Prosecutor System and Legislation of Anti-Corruption Bill” was formed by 195 civil society groups nationwide, including the PSPD, the CCEJ, the FKTU, and the KCTU. This group called for an end to political corruption, campaigned for political neutrality of the public prosecutors office, launched a massive campaign to collect 100,000 signatures, and held mass demonstrations.55 Yielding to this public protest and pressure, the ruling party decided in early July 1999 to adopt a special prosecutor system. Following this decision, the “furgate” scandal and the mint factory labor dispute scandal were investigated by appointed special prosecutors. Movements for Economic Reform Under the Kim Dae Jung Government In addition to various movements for political reform, civil society groups in Korea have also campaigned for economic reform. Since the late 1980s, 53 54 55

Han’gyore sinmun (Han’gyore Daily), 7 June 1999. Han’gyore sinmun (Han’gyore Daily), 8 June 1999. Han’gyore sinmun (Han’gyore Daily), 24 June 1999.

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economic reform and economic justice have been major goals for one of the leading citizens’ movement organizations, the CCEJ. More recently, since the economic crisis in 1997, many other civil society groups have also focused on economic reform. There have been two major movements for economic reform: a campaign to monitor national assembly hearings on the causes of the financial crisis, and the minority shareholders’ rights movement led principally by the PSPD. Monitoring National Assembly Hearings on the Financial Crisis Due largely to the pressure from civil society groups, the Kim Dae Jung government agreed in December 1998 to hold national assembly public hearings on the causes of the financial crisis. The PSPD, along with people’s movement groups like the NADUK and the KCTU, waged a popular movement for national assembly hearings on the crisis and for the punishment of those responsible for it. Immediately after the decision to hold public hearings, the PSPD established the “Citizens’ Monitoring Group for the National Assembly Hearings,” which was composed of twenty people. The PSPD also announced that it would publish a “daily assessment” of the hearings to be released to the press.56 On January 18, 1999, the hearings on the economic crisis officially began. Closely evaluating all sessions of the public hearings, the Citizens’ Monitoring Group critically commented on February 1, 1999: The hearings are rapidly degenerating into an enormous waste of time, primarily due to the lack of knowledge and professionalism on the part of the questioning National Assemblypersons. The public hearings look more like closing arguments by a defense attorney for those responsible for the financial crisis.57

On March 8, 1999, the national assembly concluded the public hearings, and the Special Committee on the Financial Crisis submitted an official report to Kim Dae Jung. The PSPD released an overall evaluation of the hearings, entitled “A Hearing on the National Assembly Hearings,” which concluded: The National Assembly hearings cannot receive more than 50 points out of 100. National Assemblypersons asked similar questions repetitively. Some of them asked rudimentary and commonsensical questions. National Assemblypersons completely lacked professionalism.58 56 57 58

Chosun ilbo (Chosun Daily), 19 January 1999. Chosun ilbo (Chosun Daily), 1 February 1999. Chosun ilbo (Chosun Daily), 9 March 1999.

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Minority Shareholders Movement It is a widely shared consensus among Korean civil society groups that, in contrast with the significant progress in political democratization, there has been no notable progress in economic democratization. Economic democratization has two dimensions: the first with respect to the overall market structure and the second with respect to the internal structure of companies. In terms of the overall market structure, scholars have long demanded that the enormous power and influence of chaebol groups must be reduced to level the economic playing field for all economic actors. In terms of the second dimension, it has long been pointed out that the internal structures of all major chaebol groups are too authoritarian, hindering managerial accountability and transparency.59 These two issues of economic democratization became particularly prominent after the economic crisis in 1997, because it was believed that lack of progress in economic democratization was the essential cause of the crisis.60 Civil society groups in Korea, especially the PSPD and the CCEJ, have concentrated on the minority shareholders movement as a specific method of achieving economic democratization. They have used lawsuits and physical presence at shareholders’ general meetings to promote minority shareholders rights and to fight against the dominance of chaebol owner–chairpersons and their families. On December 12, 1997, the PSPD represented 100 minority shareholders of the First Bank (Cheil Bank) in a lawsuit to contest and annul a decision passed at the March 1997 stockholders’ general meeting, The Seoul district court made a ruling in favor of the PSPD, that it was unlawful for the Bank to ignore the right of expression of the minority shareholders and to proceed with revision of the statutes and election of the board members and auditors without voting.61 On February 19, 1998, the CCEJ critically questioned the responsibility of the officers of major commercial banks during their general shareholders meetings. Furthermore, the Committee for Economic Democratization of the PSPD, led by Korea university professor Chang Ha Song, decided to align with foreign investors to protect and promote the rights and interests of minority shareholders.62 On March 4, 1998, the PSPD submitted a proposal to revise corporate statutes to appoint external 59

60 61 62

Eun Mee Kim, “Reforming the Chaebol,” in Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea, ed. Larry Diamond and Doh Chull Shin (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2000). Sunhyuk Kim, “The Political Origins of South Korea’s Economic Crisis: Is Democratization to Blame?” Democratization 7, no. 4 (2000): 81–103. Chosun ilbo (Chosun Daily), 13 December 1997. Chosun ilbo (Chosun Daily), 19 February 1998.

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auditors, strengthen the power of the board of directors, and prevent internal transfer of funds among chaebol companies of the same group.63 These requests by the PSPD closely matched the goals and core elements of the corporate restructuring of the Kim Dae Jung government. In response to the vigorous efforts by the PSPD and other civil society groups for chaebol reform and for increased transparency and accountability, some chaebol groups began to cooperate. For example, on March 26, 1998, SK Group decided to accept the PSPD’s call for transparent management, increasing the number of external auditors and allowing shareholders to review any internal transfers of funds.64 The PSPD, encouraged by SK’s cooperation, continued with its movement for chaebol reform, targeting other conglomerates. At the shareholders’ general meeting of Samsung Electronics on March 27, 1998, PSPD minority shareholders persistently scrutinized various issues for more than thirteen hours, inquiring about internal transfers of funds, problematic appointments of auditors, illegal support for Joongang ilbo (Joongang Daily), etc.65 On September 10, 1998, the PSPD launched a campaign to acquire ownership of ten shares of stock of each of the five chaebol group companies: Samsung Electronics, SK Telecom, Daewoo, Inc., LG Semiconductors, and Hyundai Heavy Industry. After acquiring the stocks, the PSPD’s plan was to inquire about the responsibility of the management and to demand effective chaebol reform.66 On September 16, 1998, the PSPD filed a lawsuit against eleven directors of Samsung Electronics, including the CEO of the company, Lee Kon Hui, for compensation for damages incurred by Samsung’s bribes to former president Roh Tae Woo.67 In the 1999 and 2000 seasons of shareholders’ general meetings, the PSPD continued with its minority shareholders movement, releasing lists of demands to the five biggest chaebol groups and campaigning for managerial transparency and accountability. In April 1999, Samsung Electronics and SK Telecom at last accepted some of the demands the PSPD had been making. In March 2000, the PSPD and Dacom reached a landmark agreement on selecting external auditors and requiring the approval of an auditory committee, composed of external auditors, for any major company decisions regarding internal fund transfer or major management changes.68 63 64 65 66 67 68

Chosun ilbo (Chosun Daily), 5 March 1998. Chosun ilbo (Chosun Daily), 27 March 1998. Chosun ilbo (Chosun Daily), 28 March 1998. Chosun ilbo (Chosun Daily), 10 September 1998. Chosun ilbo (Chosun Daily), 17 September 1998. Chosun ilbo (Chosun Daily), 8 March 2000.

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Continued Vibrancy of Civil Society: An Analysis As seen in the previous two sections, civil society groups in Korea have been playing a crucial role in the politics of democratic consolidation in recent years by calling for various political and economic reforms. This is not at all surprising considering the rich history of civil society activism during the previous democratic junctures in Korea. However, as pointed out earlier, the continued activism of civil society defies one of the important observations in the literature on democratic transition and consolidation. Unlike the politics of democratic transition, characterized by a “war of movements,” the politics of democratic consolidation is characterized by a “war of positions,” accompanied by increased degrees of institutionalization, habituation, and routinization of democratic rules and norms. In other words, as a democracy consolidates itself, a transition from a “war of movements” to a “war of positions” takes place. The issues to be discussed in the public sphere become more concrete, the interests become more articulate, and representative groups become more visible. As a consequence, the role of civil society groups, particularly that of social movement groups, decreases while the role of political parties and interest groups increases. This is not happening in Korea. In the consolidational politics of Korean democracy, civil society has not vanished and still remains very strong. Civil society groups are vigorously raising broad issues of political and economic reform, and they are actively engaging and confronting the state. What explains the anomalous continuation of an active social movement in Korea? In the comparative social movement literature, scholars generally explain the emergence and development of a social movement in terms of three factors: political opportunities, mobilizational structures, and framing processes. The first factor is the structure of political opportunities and constraints confronting the movement: differences in the political characteristics of the nation states in which they are embedded. The second relates to the forms of organization available to insurgents: collective vehicles through which people mobilize and engage in collective action. The third factor is the collective processes of interpretation, attribution, and social contestation that mediate between opportunity and action: conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action.69 The continued activism 69

Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, “Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes,” in Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2.

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of civil society groups in Korea can be analyzed according to these three factors. In terms of political opportunities, there exist multiple reasons for the continued activism of civil society groups in Korean politics. First and foremost, the democratic transition in 1987 dramatically decreased the cost – both physical and psychological – of collective action. Repressive laws, such as the Basic Press Law under the previous authoritarian regimes, no longer exist, and all democratic freedoms have significantly expanded. Many of the previously outlawed civil society organizations, e.g., the KCTU and the Korea Teachers’ and Educational Workers’ Union, are now legalized and authorized by the government. In addition, the governments of both Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung widely recruited civil society leaders to their cabinets as ministers or as other high-ranking officials. On the other hand, political parties, which are supposed to function as vital channels connecting the state and civil society in “normal” democracies, are neither able nor willing to play their role in the democratic politics of Korea.70 Politicians are generally considered untrustworthy, unreliable, dishonest, and corrupt. Under these circumstances, civil society groups are basically replacing the role of political parties. The legitimacy and credibility of civil society groups was also strengthened by the economic crisis of 1997. In a crisis situation, when the state and political society were completely discredited as responsible for the crisis and when all the existing developmental paradigms were in doubt, only civil society groups seemed credible enough to provide a new vision to many Koreans.71 Mobilizational structures were also favorable to continued civil group activism in several ways. Most importantly, as civil society groups became legitimated by the state and more influential in politics, they became more successful and effective in recruiting leaders and members to their organizations. Many young professionals have joined Korean civil society groups over the past decade, and with this influx of young professionals came organizational skills, career experiences, and professional expertise on specific policy issues. Furthermore, with daily increases in membership came a significant increase in membership dues that substantially bolstered the budget of civil society groups. Although joining a civil society group in the past sometimes meant risking one’s life (because of 70

71

On various problems of party politics in Korea, particularly under the Kim Dae Jung government, see Sunhyuk Kim, “Party Politics in South Korea,” Korea in Transition: Three Years under the Kim Dae Jung Government, ed. Chung-in Moon and David I. Steinberg (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2002). See newspaper interview with Kim Ki Sik, Chairman of the Policy Committee of the PSPD, for interesting comments on the impact of the economic crisis on the increased influence of civil society groups including his own organization, Chugan Tonga (Tonga Weekly), 27 January 2000.

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harsh state suppression), now joining a civil society group is considered a “cool” thing to do for most young people. Furthermore, as the polity was democratized and the state eased its ideological control, the government became more supportive of the activities of civil society groups, not only morally but also financially. The Kim Dae Jung government has pushed hard for legislation to support civil society groups, e.g., the Law to Support Not-for-Profit Private Organizations.72 All of these changes significantly increase the mobilizational capacity of many civil society groups. Finally, the intentional efforts of citizens’ movement groups to distance themselves from the radical images of the people’s movement groups of the past have been the most effective as a framing process. By deradicalizing their image, citizens’ movement groups such as the CCEJ, the PSPD, and the KFEM emerged as much more moderate, reasonable, and accessible to the general public. Most of civil society groups in Korea today try to adhere to the existing laws, pursuing “lawful” movements. The case of the CSGE in the 2000 national assembly elections unambiguously demonstrates how the group was able to appeal to the general public successfully because it consistently tried to adhere to legality in its activities. In addition, civil society groups have also aimed for nonviolent methods of reform. Adherence to legality and avoidance of violence appeal not only to the ordinary citizens but also to the conservative mass media. With the dominant perception of political society as a dispensable group of corrupt and partisan politicians, civil society groups in Korea, with their rationalism and nonviolence, surfaced as a reliable alternative to represent, protect, and enhance public interests. Furthermore, the strategy of civil society groups to widely recruit and utilize various professional elites in society also considerably increased their legitimacy and credibility. Incorporation of various professionals has convinced the public that civil society groups have dependable professional knowledge about the issues in question, which disseminates an image of civil society as a pool of potential national leaders and conscientious, public-minded professionals. In a Confucian political culture in which scholars have been traditionally revered and trusted, this strategy worked marvelously to reinforce the legitimacy and credibility of various civil society groups. A Vibrant Civil Society in Korea: An Unmitigated Blessing? In this chapter, focusing on the last few years under the Kim Dae Jung regime, I have analyzed how civil society groups in Korea raised various issues of political and economic reform and pressured the government to carry them out. In general, it is clearly a blessing for Koreans to have 72

Sin Tonga (Tonga Monthly), 27 January 2000.

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a vibrant civil society that can help their nascent democracy to consolidate, deepen, and enrich itself. Civil society in Korea is fulfilling many of the important roles envisioned in the existing literature on democratic consolidation – inculcation of concepts of interest and civic norms of behavior; dissemination of information and empowerment of citizens in the collective pursuit and defense of their interests and values; stabilization of expectations within social groups; structuring and provision of multiple channels for the identification, articulation, expression, and representation of interests; service to govern the behavior of its members with regard to collective commitments; reduction of the burden of governance for both public authorities and private producers; supplementation of the role of political parties; recruitment and training of new political leaders; engendering respect among citizens for the state and positive engagement with it; and containment of the power of democratic governments by providing important reservoirs of potential resistance to arbitrary or tyrannical action by rulers.73 Yet, as Schmitter cogently cautions us, a vibrant civil society is “not an unmitigated blessing for democracy,”74 especially when political society remains underinstitutionalized, dichotomized, paralyzed, and immobilized. Unfortunately, Korean democracy seems to fit this caveat. No significant changes have been registered in Korean party politics over the past decade of democratic consolidation. Most of all, the basic interparty dynamics between the ruling and opposition parties remain hostile, confrontational, uncompromising, and uncivil. During the authoritarian regimes, there was a clear-cut distinction between the authoritarian ruling party and the pro-democracy opposition party, but there exists no environmental or institutional factor today that encourages such a dichotomous outlook. The persistence of the black-and-white, Manichean political outlook in Korean party politics makes it plausible to suspect that there may be more deep-rooted cultural factors behind the conflictual relationship between the ruling and the opposition parties in contemporary Korean politics. Confucianism, which is still dominant in Korean cultural and ethical systems, appreciates and encourages theoretical orthodoxy and ideological purity.75 Such values as compromise, negotiation, bargaining, and accommodation are all alien, if not antithetical, to the Confucian Weltanschauung. 73

74 75

Philippe C. Schmitter, “Civil Society East and West,” in Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives, ed. Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 247; Larry Diamond, “Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy 5, no. 3 (1994): 4–17. Schmitter, “Civil Society East and West.” David Steinberg, “Civil Society and Human Rights in Korea: On Contemporary and Classical Orthodoxy and Ideology,” Korea Journal 37, no. 3 (1997): 145–65.

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Furthermore, party politics in Korea revolves around and gravitates toward a few key leaders; “boss politics” is still strong. Interparty relationships are based and centered on such key personalities as Kim Dae Jung, Kim Jong Pil, and Lee Hoe Chang. Even former president Kim Young Sam formally returned to politics in July 1999. The fact that Kim Young Sam still had enough influence to sway voters and legislators was a living proof of the power of personalism in Korean party politics.76 With Kim Young Sam’s return, the three Kims are all very influential, as they had been in the previous four decades. Despite repeated pleas from many politicians and pundits for an end to the era of the three Kims, it is quite certain that the legacies and effects of the politics of the three Kim’s will stalk and haunt the political future in Korea for a long time. Finally, party politics in Korea is still firmly predicated on and profoundly affected by regionalism. Various parties have emerged and expanded, based largely on regional electoral support. Despite Kim Dae Jung’s well-intended efforts to transform his party into a “national” party, the ruling party today still remains a regional party, heavily supported by Honam voters and staffed by Honam politicians. Other political parties are not very different, all vaunting and eager to protect their respective regional spheres of influence. Party politics based on regionalism reinforces the political bossism mentioned previously by greatly increasing the premium of political leaders who can mobilize regional votes and can thus determine the fate of candidates running for electoral districts in the region. However, regionalism discourages considerably the emergence and empowerment of a new generation of politicians who are more interested in and geared toward professional knowledge in policy issues and hands-on experience with policymaking processes. Admittedly, civil society is not entirely free from the problems associated with Confucianism, bossism, and regionalism. In contrast with political parties, however, civil society in Korea is generally perceived to be substantially more credible, clean, public-minded, democratic, rational, and civil. As civil society bypasses the polarized, petrified, and problemridden political society, the principal locus of politics continues to consist of the direct – sometimes conflictual, sometimes relatively cooperative – interactions between civil society and the state. In principle, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with this direct interaction and engagement between civil society and the state. However, if this direct engagement between civil society and the state continues to circumvent and ultimately replaces party politics, this may pose a grave threat to the consolidation of democracy in Korea. Key issues of politics will continue to be addressed in the midst of direct confrontation between civil society groups and the 76

Tat Yan Kong, “Power Alternation in South Korea,” Government and Opposition 35, no. 3 (2000): 370–91.

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state. When direct confrontation between the state and civil society dominates political discussion, political parties are considered peripheral at best and irrelevant at worst. However, democratic consolidation can seldom be successful without the development of a highly institutionalized and viable party system. Virtually all of the existing consolidated democracies in the contemporary world are predicated on the balance of two elements: a vibrant civil society and a functional political society. This balance between a strong civil society and a strong political society serves as an effective antidote to the abuse of power by the state. Therefore, as long as the imbalance between an energetic civil society and a lethargic political society drags on, Korean democracy will most likely remain at worst uninstitutionalized, unconsolidated, unstable, and at best fragile.

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CHAPTER 4

Redrafting Democratization Through Women’s Representation and Participation in the Republic of Korea Seungsook Moon

Our society is undergoing profound transformation. Politically, it is building democracy, promoting gender equality and human dignity, and civil society has been growing. . . . The family master system perpetuates undemocratic family, subjugating family members to the male family master. —Bae-hee Kwak1 Conventionally ignored as a dimension of the ostensibly apolitical private sphere, the power relations of reproduction fundamentally conditions who we are (and who they are), how group cultures are propagated, and how groups/nations align (identify) themselves in cooperative, competing, and complementary ways. Insofar as these reproductive processes occur within the family/household, the latter is a crucial site of politics. . . . On this view, transformations in the family/household have consequences for nation-states – and vice-versa [emphasis in original]. (p. 7) —V. Spike Peterson2

Since the political transition from authoritarian military rule to an electoral democracy in 1987, democratization in Korea has drawn much attention from activists and scholars of the “third wave” of democratization in 1

2

Bae-hee Kwak is the president of the Korea Legal Aid Center for Family Relations (kajokpˆomyulsangdamso) in Seoul, one of the oldest civic organizations in Korea, established in 1956. This quotation is translated from an in-depth interview with her conducted by the author on December 27, 2000. V. Spike Peterson, “The Politics of Identification in the Context of Globalization,” Women’s Studies International Forum 19, nos. 1/2 (1996): 5–15.

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East Asia, Latin America, and the former Eastern Bloc.3 In a positive response to this global trend, Rose Lee and Cal Clark suggest that women take advantage of democratization for the empowerment that East Asian economic development fails to provide them.4 Although the term “democratization” is likely to evoke the hope for an open and egalitarian society, particularly for formerly marginalized social groups, the reality of political transition to procedural democracy and its aftermath seem to be far from this normative ideal. According to studies of women and political transition in Latin American countries, although such transitions create a political opening, women again become marginalized in national politics as transitional regimes consolidate their own power.5 In a groundbreaking study of the experience of citizenship among urban middle-class housewives in Japan (which is considered the most stable democratic society in East Asia), Robin Leblanc reveals the limits of liberal democracy in achieving genuine political representation and participation for those, predominantly women, who are primarily responsible for “caring labor” within families.6 The marginalization of women, either in the process of democratic consolidation or in a stable liberal democracy, as documented by these studies, compels us to raise the following questions concerning the ongoing process of democratization in Korea: How representative and participatory is “Korean democracy” when assessed from the experience of women who are diverse but, nevertheless, subordinated as a social group by the structure of gender? What specific cultural, institutional, and behavioral characteristics in Korean society contribute to the lack of women’s representation and participation in political and civic activities? What are the main facilitators for or obstacles against substantive democratization in Korea? To address these general questions, this chapter will begin with an overview of women’s aggregate representation and participation in institutional politics and voluntary associations in the public sphere during the past decade or so, with a particular focus on women’s representation in major institutions of formal democracy such as legislative bodies and political parties, and in governmental committees. This will be followed by an assessment of women’s participation in national and local 3

4 5 6

Cal Clark and Rose J. Lee, eds., Democracy and the Status of Women in East Asia (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000); Sunhyuk Kim, The Politics of Democratization in South Korea (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000); Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); Doh C. Shin, Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Clark and Lee, Democracy and the Status of Women in East Asia, chapter 1. Jane S. Jackett and Sharon L. Wolchik, eds., Women and Democracy: Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). Robin Leblanc, Bicycle Citizens: The Political World of the Japanese Housewife (Berkeley/ Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1999).

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elections and in women’s organizations and other voluntary associations. These indicators are not meant to be positivistic measures of democratization; rather they are employed as interpretive tools for a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the conservative dimension of democratization in Korea. Drawing upon L. H. M. Ling’s postcolonial feminist study of the hybrid nature of masculinist politics in East Asia, the second section of this chapter will examine the interplay between Confucian governance and liberal institutions in Korean politics and society to account for a conservative democratization that maintains marginalization of women (and other feminized social groups). By masculinist politics, I refer to the common tendency in national and international politics to prioritize issues concerning the military, foreign policy, and economic growth and to ignore (or ghettoize) issues regarding power relations in privatized social relations of gender and sexuality. Masculinist politics in Korea involves the grafting of liberal political practices and institutions onto profoundly moralistic and paternalistic social relations. The Korean state appropriated the familial metaphor in Confucian governance to justify its authoritarian dominance over society in the process of rapid capitalist industrialization. It is my contention that, in the process of economic development, the state–society relation, construed through the parent– child metaphor in classical Confucian texts, is replaced by a conjugal metaphor of the modern husband and Confucian wife. This hegemonic interpretation of state–society relations has contributed to the conservative dimension of democratization, which largely reproduces marginality of women (and by implication other feminized social minorities). To illustrate a challenge to this hegemonic interpretation of state– society relations in the context of conservative democratization, the third section of this chapter will discuss a case study of the women’s movement to transform the patrilineal family, with a focus on the period since the late 1980s. Perceiving the family as the central institutional underpinning of undemocratic social relations, groups of lawyers and women have attempted to revise the so-called “family law,” which consists of parts four and five of the civil code since its proclamation in 1958.7 The initial attempt by women’s groups emerged in the mid 1970s, but it failed to achieve substantial reform of the family law. It was not until the revival of civil society in the late 1980s that a coalition of diverse women’s associations was able to achieve significant revision. After this success, the women’s movement as a whole was occupied with numerous other urgent 7

Chu-su Kim, “Kaejˆong gajobˆopˆ ui kaejˆong gyˆongwiwa kwaje” (The background of the family law revision), in Kaejong gajobˆopkwa han’guksahoe (The revised family law and Korean society), eds. KWDI/Korean Family Law Studies Association (Seoul: KWDI/ Korean Family Law Studies Association, 1990).

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or quotidian issues.8 In 1999, the second stage of the women’s movement to transform the patrilineal family formed around the abolition of the family master system (hojuje) and the creation of a democratic system of citizen identification. An examination of the efforts of the women’s movement to revise family law since the late 1980s, against the backdrop of the shifting political context, can illuminate specific facilitators and barriers to substantive democratization. Moreover, the movement to transform the family deserves attention because it directly questions the very root of the familial metaphor so extensively deployed in masculinist politics in Korea and because the movement expands and deepens the meaning of substantive democratization by highlighting the centrality of the transformation of social relations in the privatized family.

Women’s Representation and Participation in Korean Democratization Conceptualized as a multicausal and multilayered process of sociopolitical transformation (see the Preface to this work), democratization must involve the growing representation and participation of formerly marginalized social groups in all aspects of public and private life, to enhance the overall quality of their lives. This substantive view of democratization intends to expand our understanding of democracy beyond the establishment of formal institutions run by elected representatives. Given the construction of institutionalized politics as the masculine sphere in Korean society, it is useful to map the extent to which women are represented in legislative bodies, governmental committees, and major political parties throughout the period of democratization since 1987. In examining women’s representation in these core aspects of formal democracy, there is often an implicit assumption that female representatives and party members will serve women’s interests and concerns as women, and facilitate empowerment of various groups of women and other feminized social groups. Although this is not necessarily the case, especially when there are socioeconomic and ideological differences between the elected 8

The contemporary women’s movement as a whole in Korea has become diverse in terms of its activities and constituency. Its activities have included legislation of various acts to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment and revision of such acts (e.g., Equal Employment Act, Infant Care Act, Sexual Violence Special Act, Domestic Violence Prevention Act) and advocacy for women victimized by sexual or domestic violence and discrimination. Its constituency includes professional women, housewives, rural women, working-class women, and college students. See Seungsook Moon, “Carving out Space: Civil Society and the Women’s Movement in South Korea,” Journal of Asian Studies 61 (2002): 473–500.

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Table 4.1 Women candidates and women elected in the national assembly

Year of election 1988 (13th) 1992 (14th) 1996 (15th) 2000 (16th)

No. of women candidates (total)

%

No. of women elected (total)

%

27 (1,046) 35 (1,206) 41 (1,550) NA

2.6 2.9 2.7 NA

6 (224) 3 (299) 9 (299) 16 (273)

2.7 1.0 3.0 5.9

Source: Reconstructed from the 1999 Statistical Yearbook on Women (Seoul: The Korean Women’s Development Institute, 1999), 356; Information on the sixteenth national assembly election is drawn from Munhwa Ilbo, 14 April 2000.

and electors,9 women’s increasing representation in national and local politics through election increases the possibility of modifying or transforming masculinist politics. In the context of democratization, women’s representation in the Korean national assembly remained stagnant at a minuscule 1–3% until the year 2000 (see Table 4.1). It is noteworthy that although the 1988 election enabled the opposition party (Democratic Party) to gain the majority position in the legislative body and thereby facilitated the formation of grassroots national organizations of farmers, workers, and the poor, this democratizing election brought about little change in women’s representation.10 Although the total number of female legislators increased slightly during the decade of democratization and especially after the 2000 election, such quantitative improvement has not only been sluggish but also unstable; the 1992 election showed a decrease in the number and proportion of women legislators. The percentage of women legislators in Korea doubled after the sixteenth national assembly election in 2000 but it still falls behind the averages in Asia (14.9%) and in the world (13.2%).11 This lack of women’s representation in the legislative body 9

10

11

There are examples of elected female officials who do not represent the interests of women and other feminized social minorities both in Korea and elsewhere. In the mid1980s, eight female legislators of the ruling Democratic Justice Party did not endorse the family law revision bill drafted by women’s organizations. See Korean Women’s Development Institute, White Paper on Women (Seoul: KWDI, 1985), 589. Similarly, such famous women leaders in Asia as Indira Gandhi, Benazir Bhutto, Corazon Aquino, and Megawati Sukarnoputri were not particularly women-friendly. Undoubtedly capable, these women leaders established their political authority by relying on their fathers and husbands who were charismatic leaders. Mi-kyˆong Yi, “Yˆosˆongundongkwa minjuhwaundong” (The Women’s movement and the democratization movement), in Yˆollin hˆuimang: han’gukyˆosˆongdanch’eyˆonhap 10 nyˆonsa (Open hope: A 10-year history of the Korean Women’s Associations United), ed. KWAU (Seoul: Dongdˆok Women’s University, 1998), 26. These statistics are compiled by the IPU. See Taehan Daily, 9 February 2000.

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indicates the profoundly masculinist nature of politics in democratizing Korea. However, there are some positive signs suggesting the transformation of masculinist political culture in the long run. First, the democratizing state is compelled to respond to local and global pressure to promote gender equality in politics throughout the 1990s, for instance, women’s associations in Korea have demanded a quota of 30% for women candidates. At the global level, the UN and the International Parliamentary Union (IPU) have given Korea a low ranking in various measures of gender equality in their reports. On February 8, 2000, the Korean national assembly passed a bill requiring political parties to observe the 30% quota for women candidates running for the forty-six national assembly seats reserved for proportional representation of occupational groups in the national constituency (out of 273 total assembly seats).12 Although this limited quota system without specific measures of enforcement is insufficient for the elimination of institutionalized sexism in party politics, it illustrates the emerging negotiatory relation between the state and women’s associations. Another positive sign is that a coalition movement among women’s associations working to increase the proportion of women legislators generated a modicum of success in the 2000 election. Women’s organizations and their local branches were actively involved in supporting women candidates for the 2000 election.13 Moreover, the number of women candidates elected in local constituencies (as opposed to the national constituency) increased from two in 1996 to five in 2000.14 This is an encouraging sign because it is far more difficult to be elected in local constituencies than in the national constituency. The democratizing state implemented the principle of local self-rule in 1991 by establishing local assemblies at the level of urban and rural districts. Women’s representation in these local assemblies is no better than in the national assembly (see Table 4.2), despite an assumption that women politicians tend to fare relatively better in local politics than in national politics. This assumption is made because local politics is more conducive to addressing such quotidian issues as children’s education, housing, waste disposal, and water and air pollution, issues with which women as mothers and wives are familiar. After the first local election in 1991, women made up less than 1% of the total number of local assembly members. In response to this dismal landscape of local politics, the Korean Women’s Associations United (KWAU), an umbrella organization of social movement-oriented women’s associations established in February 1987, made conscious 12 14

Munhwa Ilbo, 10 February 2000. Chungang Ilbo, 14 April 2000.

13

Chungang Ilbo, 10 March 2000.

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Table 4.2 Women candidates and women elected in the local assembly

Year of election 1991 Broad unit LAa Basic unit LAb 1995 Broad unit LA Basic unit LA 1998 Broad unit LA Basic unit LA

No. of women candidates (total)

%

No. of women elected (total)

%

63 (2,885) 123 (10,159)

2.2 1.2

8 (858) 40 (4,303)

0.9 0.9

119 (2,644) 206 (11,970)

4.5 1.7

55 (972) 71 (4,541)

5.7 1.6

37 (NA) 140 (NA)

NA NA

14 (616) 56 (3,489)

2.3 1.6

a

Broad unit refers to provinces and large municipalities. Basic unit refers to urban wards and rural counties. Source: Reconstructed from the 1999 Statistical Yearbook on Women (Seoul: The Korean Women’s Development Institute, 1999), 356. Information on the 1998 local election comes from Segye Ilbo 1 June 1998; Kyˆonghyang Ilbo 6 June 1998.

b

efforts to increase women’s representation and participation in local politics. Setting this as its major agenda for 1994 and 1995, the KWAU recruited capable female candidates and supported them throughout election campaigns. In 1995, fourteen of the seventeen candidates it advocated were elected.15 This contributed to the relatively significant increase in women’s representation in the broad unit local assemblies in 1995. In the third local election in 1998, however, the proportion of women elected in broad unit local assemblies decreased by half. This downturn occurred under two conditions. First, women’s associations made serious efforts to support women candidates.16 Second, the 1997 economic crisis strengthened the conservative dimension of democratization, shaped by masculinist politics. The fluctuation in women’s representation in local assemblies reflects the instability of the modicum of progress in deeply masculinist Korean politics. The competition among multiple political parties through election has been considered a core element of democratic politics. Women’s 15 16

Yi, “Yˆosˆongundongkwa minjuhwaundong” (The Women’s movement and the democratization movement), 33. On February 6, 1998, the Korea Women Voters’ League, the Korea Women’s Political Culture Studies Center, the Korea Women’s Politics Studies Center, and the Korea Women’s Politics League established a Women’s Politics Network in preparation for the 1998 local election. The network provided training for women candidates and functioned as a pressure group to political parties and the government. See Hangyˆore Shinmun, 7 February 1998. The Korea Women’s Associations United offered various forms of support for women candidates, including election campaigns and analysis of voters orientations and training for public speech. See Kyˆonghyang Shinmun, 26 March 1998.

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Table 4.3 Women in high level positions in major political parties Ruling party

1993

1999

Total Women % Women Total Women % Women

First opposition party

Comm.a

Chairb

Comm.a

Chairb

47 2 4.3 217 13 6.0

237 2 0.8 386 5 1.3

65 3 4.6 57 2 3.5

222 1 0.5 220 2 1.0

a

Members of party affairs committees. Chairperson of a district party chapter. Source: Reconstructed from the 1999 Statistical Yearbook on Women (Seoul: The Korean Women’s Development Institute, 1999), 357.

b

representation in high-level positions in major political parties in Korea grew minutely during the decade of democratization and remains extremely low. As illustrated in Table 4.3, the changes from 1993 to 1999 in the number of women in these positions are a mixture of positive and negative signs. The number of women in party affairs committees in the ruling party grew slightly after the inauguration of Kim Dae Jung’s administration in 1998, and in the opposition party it shrank by almost 1%. The increase in the ruling party reflects Kim Dae Jung’s election pledge, as an opposition candidate, to promote gender equality in various aspects of the public sphere, and the decrease in the opposition party reflects its continued indifference to gender issues and its more conservative position as the former ruling party. In both parties, women’s representation in the leadership position of district party chapters remains minuscule. These characteristics in women’s representation in major political parties closely resemble the masculinist trend observed in the representation of women in the legislative bodies. The representation of women in governmental committees, in which national policies are discussed and determined, is another crucial indicator of ongoing democratization. Table 4.4 shows the number of women and their proportion in committees of major government ministries in 1990 and 1999. Reflecting the transitional nature of Korean politics, there were several organizational restructurings of ministries during the 1990s. As a result, some ministries were merged together and others were modified and renamed. Although women remain a numerical minority across these committees with the exception of the Presidential Commission on Women, which has become the Ministry of Gender Equality in 2001, the table shows overall increases in women’s representation in all

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Table 4.4 Women in governmental committees 1990 Government branches Presidential commission on women’s affairsa Education Labor Justice Health and Welfarea Information and Communicationsa Culture and Tourisma Finance and Economya Foreign Affairs and Tradea Commerce, Industry & Energya Science and Technology National Defense Construction and Transportationa

1999

No. of women

% of women

No. of women

% of women

12

54.5

22

61.1

713 55 2 59 0 10 6 2 2 1 1 1

23.8 16.7 1.4 8.7 0 10.6 0.8 3.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.2

48 84 17 101 13 25 22 6 28 8 4 28

25.5 19.8 18.1 15.6 14.3 11.4 8.4 6.9 5.8 3.3 1.8 0.4

a

These ministries had different names and organizational arrangements in 1990. The Presidential Commission on Women’s Affairs was the Ministry of Political Affairs; the Ministry of Health and Welfare was the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs; the Ministry of Information and Communications was formed through a merger of the Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Communications; the Ministry of Culture and Tourism expanded from the Ministry of Culture; the Ministry of Finance and Economy was also the product of a merger between the Economic Planning Board and the Ministry of Finance; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade expanded from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy was created from a merger between the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Ministry of Energy and Resources; the Ministry of Construction and Transportation was the product of a merger of the Ministry of Construction and the Ministry of Transportation. Source: Reconstructed from the 1999 Statistical Yearbook on Women (Seoul: The Korean Women’s Development Institute, 1999), 364, 368–369.

governmental committees throughout the decade. In particular, the Ministry of Information and Communication, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Finance and Economy, and the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy display relatively significant growth in women’s representation. At the same time, there is a conspicuous pattern in women’s representation in these ministerial committees, structured by gender. Women are concentrated in branches of the state’s bureaucracy that deal with issues concerning the young, family, and women workers (i.e., education, labor, and health and social welfare). In contrast, women are extremely underrepresented in branches of the state’s bureaucracy that

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deal with “hard” issues of wealth and power (i.e., commerce, industry, trade, foreign affairs, the military, science and technology, and construction and transportation). The overall increase in women’s representation in governmental committees, however, is not necessarily a positive sign of movement toward gender equality as an element of democratization. A close examination of the quantitative improvement apparent in Table 4.4 reveals a less than sanguine picture. An absolute majority of women in all governmental committees in 1999 worked in commissioned positions. This means that these women are professionals temporarily hired by the government on an ad hoc basis. Strictly speaking, they are not government officials holding permanent positions within ministries. Women represent less than 2% of permanent positions in all of these ministerial committees. Almost half of these ministries do not have any women in such positions – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Information and Communications, and the Ministry of Labor.17 This conservative pattern confirms the persistence of the masculinist nature of politics in the process of current Korean democratization. As a multilayered process of sociopolitical transformation, democratization must be accompanied by the growth of women’s participation not only in elections but also in other forms of political and civic activities, as ways to learn and practice democracy.18 According to a 1994 Korean Democratization Survey, 94% of the respondents of a national sample voted during national or local elections. There was little gender difference in electoral participation; 93% of women and 95% of men took part in national or local elections. In contrast, women’s involvement in other non-electoral political activities, such as campaigning, petitioning, protest, and membership in political organizations, was fairly low. Only 13% of the female respondents surveyed had been involved in protest and 16% had been involved in other political activities. These percentages are higher among the male respondents, 25% and 36%, respectively.19 The development of women’s associations over time, presented in Table 4.5, allows us to see the quantitative contour of women’s participation in voluntary associations registered with the central government. The number of women’s organizations increased by 17% between 1985 and 1990, a period of political transition to electoral democracy. Yet 17 18

19

Korean Women’s Development Institute, 1999 Statistical Yearbook on Women (Seoul: KWDI), 368–9. The centrality of participation in voluntary associations to the development and maintenance of democracy has been widely accepted since de Tocqueville wrote his classic work, Democracy in America (1848). See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. J. P. Mayer, translated by George Lawrence (New York: Harper & Row, 1969). Shin, Mass Politics and Culture, 102, 113.

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Table 4.5 Women’s participation in women’s associations

No. of organizations No. of branches No. of executive members No. of members

1985

1990

1994

1999

60 441 622 6,324,568

70 627 898 8,151,558

62 829 875 5,546,172

79 NA NA 7,014,623

Source: Reconstructed from the 1999 Statistical Yearbook on Women (Seoul: The Korean Women’s Development Institute, 1999), 370.

this increase does not include dissident women’s organizations, which mushroomed in the process of democratization and in turn facilitated democratization,20 because most of these organizations did not register with the state until the end of Roh Tae Woo’s administration. After the decrease between 1990 and 1994, women’s associations registered with the state grew again by 27% between 1994 and 1999. This increase reflects the integration of formerly dissident women’s organizations into mainstream politics during the period of civilian rule under Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung. Membership also grew during the second half of the 1980s and the second half of the 1990s. The total membership of over 7 million in 1999 means that approximately 42% of adult women voters (16,539,484 in 1998) belonged to women’s associations.21 The fluctuation in the aggregate numbers of organizations and their members in the 1990s may suggest that a sizable portion of these women’s organizations are unstable; they are newly formed, merged, or soon disintegrated. 20

21

These new women’s organizations were small-scale associations with a feminist consciousness, and most of them sprang up in metropolitan areas, particularly Seoul. For example, the Women’s Hot Line was established to deal with the problem of violence against women in 1983. In the same year, the Women’s Equal Friends Society was formed to focus on issues concerning women workers. This group was disintegrated by ideological differences among its members but was reestablished as the Women’s Democratic Friends Society in 1987. The Korean Women’s Studies Association was founded in 1984 to promote women’s studies courses in college education. More importantly, the KWAU, an umbrella organization of autonomous social movement-oriented organizations, was established in 1987. Women involved in these associations were predominantly collegeeducated, middle-class women who were Christians, former college student activists, or professionals. A small number of working-class women, active in labor organizing during the 1970s or in the peasants’ movement in the 1980s, also participated in the KWAU. See Korean Women’s Development Institute, White Paper on Women (Seoul: KWDI, 1991); Appendix, White Paper on Women (Seoul: KWDI, 1985); Appendix, Sˆ ung-hˆui Yi, “Han’guk hyˆondai yˆosˆongundongsa” (A history of the contemporary women’s movement in South Korea), in Yˆosˆonghakgangˆui (Women’s studies lectures), ed. Korean Women Studies Association (Seoul: Dongnyˆok, 1991), 315–16. The Central Election Management Council counted the total number of voters before the local election to be held on June 4, 1998. See Hangyˆore Shinmun, 30 May 1998.

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Table 4.6 Participation in types of civic organizations by gender, 1999 Type of organization Fraternala Religious Interestb Socialc Culturald Political

Female (%)

Male (%)

Both (%)

45.2 24.6 0.3 3.4 3.6 0.0

61.8 18.7 2.6 11.2 4.1 2.1

53.4 21.7 1.4 7.3 3.9 1.1

a

“Fraternal organizations” refer to alumni or clan associations. “Interest organizations” refer to organizations that protect economic interests like agricultural co-ops and labor unions. c Examples of “social organizations” are charity and environmental protection groups. d Examples of “cultural organizations” are art, hobby, and sports clubs. Source: The 1999 Korea Democracy Barometer survey data collected by Doh C. Shin through the Gallup-Korea; Doh C. Shin defines each type of organizations shown above in Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea, 107. b

To assess the role of women’s organizations in cultivating democratic values and practices and thereby in facilitating democratization, we need to know the types of these associations. Although there is no direct data on this, the 1999 Korean Democracy Barometer Survey provides some useful information. This national survey asks adult men and women, age twenty years or older, to list all types of voluntary associations they belong to. According to this survey (see Table 4.6), a majority of adult women belong to fraternal organizations, religious organizations, or both, whereas over a fifth of the female respondents do not belong to any associations. The predominance of voluntary associations formed around school, hometown, and religious affiliations (as opposed to economic interests and individual concerns) is characteristic not only of the participation of women in associational life but also of men.22 This implies that a majority of the women’s associations represented in Table 4.5 would be centered around school, hometown, and religious affiliations. It is also likely that women who participate in religious associations (Table 4.6) may not be members of separate women’s religious associations but rather of women’s groups within larger religious organizations. Doh C. Shin argues that fraternal and religious associations are “traditional” or “primordial,” and therefore not conducive to the promotion of 22

There are two differences here between women and men: more women are involved in religious organizations than their male counterparts, and men are far more likely than women to be involved in social or interest organizations. These differences seem to reflect the fact that far more men than women are employed in full-time, permanent positions.

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democratic values and practices.23 However, I find this position drifting toward the liberal dichotomy that tends to construct a rigid hierarchy between tradition and modernity and between the West and the nonWest. I argue instead for the recognition of a postcolonial hybrid that defies the binary opposition of the traditional and the modern, which are associated with antidemocratic and democratic values and practices, respectively. As Partha Chatterjee argues, a postcolonial society like India may develop democratizing practices from the network of agrarian communities outside the modern sphere of civil society.24 This kind of hybrid postcolonial path to democratization is observed in the Korea Church Women United (KCWU), which has attempted to address issues of social justice and equality since its establishment in 1967.25 The rise of social movement-oriented women’s associations and grassroots participation of women in these organizations has been an increasingly significant factor contributing to democratization in Korea. New autonomous women’s associations have proliferated in the context of sociopolitical democratization since 1987. In February 1987, twenty-one voluntary organizations with a feminist orientation formed the Korean Women’s Associations United (yˆosˆongdanch’eyˆonhap). Although the number of the KWAU’s member organizations has fluctuated somewhat over time, it had a total of twenty-eight member organizations in 2000. Several among these member organizations are gatherings of Christian women.26 Moreover, it is noteworthy that the Christian Academy, established in 1973, trained the first generation of contemporary Korean feminists 23

24

25

26

This binary oppositional thinking is very prevalent in the Orientalist approach to comparative politics, particularly in comparison between the West and non-West. For a review of this type of study, see L. H. M. Ling and Chih-yu Shih, “Confucianism with a Liberal Face: The Meaning of Democratic Politics in Postcolonial Taiwan,” The Review of Politics 60 (1998): 55–82. This binary oppositional thinking is somewhat contradictory to Shin’s own critical position articulated in the beginning of his informative and comprehensive study of mass politics and democratization in Korea. He rejects “the conventional view of democratic change as a dichotomy” and conceives it in “both procedural and substantive domains of political life.” (Shin, Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea, 17, 19), but he implies that fraternal and religious organizations are incapable of serving as channels of representative democracy (110). Partha Chatterjee, “Communities and the Nation” in The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories, ed. Partha Chatterjee (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). The KCWU was involved in human rights movements in the 1970s under Park Chung Hee’s authoritarian government. It protested sex tourism and worked as an advocate for women workers in their labor organizing and for the families of arrested or imprisoned dissidents. Hyo-jae Yi, Han’gukˆui yˆosˆongundong: oˆjewa onˆul (The women’s movement in Korea: Yesterday and today), enlarged ed. (Seoul: Chˆongusa, 1996), 181–2. KWAU, ed., Yˆollin hˆuimang: han’gukyˆosˆongdanch’eyˆonhap 10 nyˆonsa (Open hope: A 10year history of the Korean Women’s Associations United), Appendix 4 (Seoul: Dongdˆok Women’s University, 1998).

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through study group activities.27 These women became founding members of autonomous women’s associations that came together under the KWAU. The KWAU differed from other preexisting or emerging women’s organizations in its initial opposition to the repressive state and its feminist orientation. It has played a central role in articulating the common goal of gender equality and the specific needs and interests of such diverse groups of women as factory workers, clerical workers, urban housewives, rural women, and the urban poor.28 The other women’s organizations can be categorized as the Administered Mass Organizations (AMOs), created by the authoritarian state as an instrument of its policy, or as quasi-voluntary associations that were willing to collaborate with the repressive state.29 The AMOs served as a tool for implementing state policies of population control and economic development and for propagating state ideologies of national security, anticommunism, and nationalism. The quasi-voluntary associations can be located between the oppositional KWAU and the women’s AMOs. A majority of these middle organizations were occupational or religious associations.30 In the process of political democratization, the differences between the KWAU and other less autonomous women’s organizations have been significantly reduced. The antagonism that existed previously between the KWAU and the state has been replaced by negotiation, and the state’s 27

28

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30

Yi, Han’gukˆui yˆosˆongundong: oˆjewa onˆul (The women’s movement in Korea: Yesterday and today), 250; Yi, “Han’guk hyˆondai yˆosˆongundongsa” (A history of the contemporary women’s movement in South Korea), 313. Yˆong-suk Shin, “Yˆosˆongundongˆ ui yˆoksajˆok koch’al” (A historical study of the women’s movement), in Yˆosˆongkwa han’guksahoe (Women and the Korean society), revised, ed. Women in Korean Society Studies Association (Seoul: Sahoemunhwayˆonguso, 1995); Yi, “Han’guk hyˆondai yˆosˆongundongsa” (A history of the contemporary women’s movement in South Korea). Examples of the AMOs include the New Village Women’s Association (saemaˆul punyˆohoe), the Central Association of Housewives’ Classes (chˆonguk chubukyosil chunganghoe), and the Federation of Housewives’ Clubs (chubucˆulop yˆonhaphoe). Women’s AMOs have ample historical precedents in societies under fascist (and communist) regimes. For instance, Nazi Germany organized the German Girls League for female youth between the ages of ten and fourteen, Faith and Beauty for young women between fifteen and twenty-one, and German Women’s Enterprise for adult women. Similarly, Imperial Japan organized women into the Great Japan Federated Women’s Association, the National Defense Women’s Association, and the Patriotic Women’s Association during the 1930s. See Gregory Kasza, The Conscription Society: Administered Mass Organizations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 33, 87–8. The Korean Women’s Associations Council (KWAC) was the oldest collection of these types of organizations. Apolitical and conservative under authoritarian regimes for decades, most of these quasi-voluntary associations lacked a critical feminist consciousness or orientation in their activities. Their activities involved primarily charity work, consumer protection, job training in feminized occupations, the promotion of friendship among members, and the offering of lectures and classes for housewives and brides-tobe. See Yi, “Han’guk hyˆondai yˆosˆongundongsa” (A history of the contemporary women’s movement in South Korea), 311–12.

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dominance over women’s AMOs and other quasi-voluntary organizations has been formally eliminated. Founded as an oppositional group outside the state, the KWAU registered with the state as an incorporated body in 1995. This new status made the KWAU more acceptable to the conservative public and allowed it to secure some funds from the democratizing state. Since then, as mentioned above, the KWAU has begun to pay attention to local and national elections, in the interests of influencing lawmaking and policymaking processes. As a result, some KWAU activists have been elected to the national assembly, and its sponsored candidates have been elected to local assembly seats. Furthermore, after the inauguration of Kim Dae Jung’s government in 1998, some KWAU representatives were appointed to government offices, mainly in the women’s policy apparatuses.31 In parallel, the former AMOs and quasi-voluntary associations themselves have begun to deal with issues of gender equality and women’s empowerment in the context of democratization accompanied by the rise of the state’s policy to promote gender equality.32 Consequently, the sharp distinctions among autonomous women’s organizations, women’s AMOs, and in-between organizations have become somewhat ambiguous in the context of democratization. The KWAU has tried to build a broad grassroots base for its membership because it has pursued a democratic organizational structure without hierarchical leadership.33 This organizational structure differs from that of other existing women’s organizations, which are characterized by a few renowned “women leaders” with high visibility or mass membership organized by the state.34 Yet, the KWAU’s grassroots effort has not been very successful because of its paucity of resources to reach out to the masses of women and because of the apparent lack of public interest in social activism through membership in a civic association like the KWAU.35 Most of its member organizations have a few hundred members, and only a few organizations enjoy the size of a few thousand members. As a result, despite its symbolic and actual contribution to democratization as a civic 31

32

33

34

35

Mi-kyˆong Yi, member of the National Assembly, used to be a co-representative of the KWAU. Myˆong-suk Han, also a former co-representative of the KWAU, became the first Minister of the Women’s Ministry, established in 2001. For an analysis of the development of women’s policy, see Seungsook Moon, “Overcome by Globalization: The Rise of a Women’s Policy in South Korea,” in Korea’s Globalization, ed. Samuel S. Kim (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Yi, “Yˆosˆongundongkwa minjuhwaundong: yˆoyˆon 10 nyˆonsa” (The women’s movement and the democratization movement), 38; Yi, “Han’guk hyˆondai yˆosˆongundongsa” (A history of the contemporary women’s movement in South Korea), 317–18. Ministry of Political Affairs, Yˆosˆong paeksˆo (White paper on women) (Seoul: Ministry of Political Affairs, 1997), 240–5; and KWDI, Yˆosˆong paeksˆo (White paper on women) (Seoul: KWDI, 1991), 231–2. This problem was also addressed by Ms. Kyˆoung-suk Lee, policy director of the KWAU, whom the author interviewed in Seoul on December 28, 2000.

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umbrella women’s association, the KWAU faces the daunting challenge of building its broad grassroots base. Assessed in light of women’s representation and participation in institutional politics and associational activities, Korean democracy is not very representative or participatory beyond election day. The lack of women’s representation and participation is not an isolated phenomenon but a feature of the conservative dimension of democratization.36 In other words, women are not the only social group that remains marginalized in politics and associational activities promoting democratization. The working class, formed in the process of rapid industrialization, is still invisible in institutional politics, despite its conspicuous visibility in protests against economic conglomerates, particularly in the aftermath of the 1997 economic crisis. The urban poor are even more peripheral. The legacy of the national division and the Cold War continues to ostracize the left in politics and in the larger society. The persistent collusion between the political elite and big businesses continues to disempower ordinary citizens in politics and the economy. The focus on women’s marginalization in this chapter is an attempt to understand an ignored dimension of conservative democratization. The following section explores how Confucianism in general and the patrilineal family in particular shaped the masculinist nature of politics and thereby contributed to the conservative democratization that is illustrated in women’s representation and participation. Familial Metaphor and Masculinist Politics: Hybridity in Confucian Governance and Liberal Institutions The conservative democratization discussed above is shaped by multiple historical and cultural factors. Crucial among them is the interplay between Confucian governance and liberal institutions in interpreting state–society relations against the backdrop of capitalist industrialization. Confucian governance relies upon a familial metaphor, which constitutes the dominant system of meaning that enables contemporary Koreans, particularly the older generation, to understand social relations in both the domestic and public spheres. Before proceeding with this discussion, the stance taken here toward Confucianism requires clarification on two points. First, the focus on Confucianism is not intended to reduce it to a mere oppressive tradition 36

In Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea, Shin argues that the current democratization in Korea is conservative and uncertain. It is conservative in its failure to restructure major policy and to diversify ideological or partisan alignment (p. 19). His analysis of the conservative nature of democratization highlights that “ideologically, a new subculture of liberalism and pluralism has been merely grafted onto the dominant cultural values of authoritarian Confucianism and parochial regionalism” (p. 23).

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that blocks the liberal road to democratic modernity, nor to characterize it as the immutable essence of Korean culture that gives rise to “Korean-style democracy.” Rather, rejecting these essentialist views of Confucianism, I intend to highlight the active role that Confucianism plays in shaping masculinist politics and thereby conservative democratization in contemporary Korean society. This position is different from earlier approaches to political culture that treat Confucianism as the static essence of East Asia.37 I instead discuss Confucianism as being appropriated by the postcolonial state. The second point is that the focus on Confucianism does not mean that it is the only system of meaning in contemporary Korea. The tumultuous history of colonialism, imperialism, and capitalist industrialization has complicated the normative domains employed by different social groups. Therefore, I approach Confucianism here as a hegemonic system, not only widely internalized and accepted, but also as contested by alternative systems of meanings in the context of sociopolitical democratization. I will return to this issue in the third section. Confucian governance is characterized by the pervasive use of the familial metaphor in interpreting the state–society relation. The classic writings of Confucianism represent the act of ruling as analogous to parents protecting and feeding their dependent children. This obligation of the superordinate (the state) legitimize its privilege to rule the subordinate (people). L. H. M. Ling argues that this parental metaphor was replaced by a conjugal metaphor in the process of rapid capitalist industrialization.38 The state was transformed from “internally oriented managerial parents to externally pressured competitive patriarch.”39 She sees this change as the continuity of a “Confucian metaphor of manhood” in construing gendered state power, associated with providing for and protecting the subordinates. I would argue that this patriarchal role of the state does not reflect Confucian manhood, but rather the masculinity of the modern husband as the provider for his (nuclear) family. Economic ability was not so central to the masculinity of the Confucian scholar (sˆonbi), who embodied the normative ideal of manhood, and his distance from material production was a marker of his moral superiority. It is only with the rise of the capitalist economy that masculinity becomes tightly interwoven with the financial 37 38

39

For a representative example of this study, see Lucien Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimension of Authority (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985). L. H. M. Ling, “The Limits of Democratization for Women in East Asia,” in Democracy and the Status of Women in East Asia, ed. Rose J. Lee and Cal Clark (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 169–82, 173. Jongwoo Han and L. H. M. Ling, “Authoritarianism in the Hypermasculinized State: Hybridity, Patriarchy, and Capitalism in Korea,” International Studies Quarterly 42 (1998): 53-78, 65.

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ability to provide for his family. The developmental state in Korea during Park Chung Hee’s rule (1961–79) commanded the economy and the populace to build a strong (masculine) nation, once feminized by imperialism and colonialism, through economic development. The state demanded that the society behave like the Confucian wife, embodying such virtues as obedience (to the state), discipline (against dissent), and diligence (service to the economy). In this conjugal metaphor of the state–society relation, Han and Ling overlook the postcolonial m´elange of modern husband and Confucian wife. Rather than parental benevolence, it was the ability of the developmental state to provide for the people that was to justify its dominance over the feminized populace. This functional differentiation between the masculinized state and the feminized society closely resembles the conjugal relationship represented in the family law prior to its substantial revision in 1989. According to pre-1989 family law, the husband, who is usually the family master, was obliged to support his family members financially, and in turn he had a right to rule them. The familial metaphor of the state–society relation allowed the developmental state to refashion liberal politics in contemporary Korea. First, the developmental state in Korea (and East Asia in general) depoliticized the feminized populace in the context of capitalist industrialization, (scripted as the family saga) of responding actively to the urgency of nation building. This depoliticization was achieved through institutionalizing interest groups, in the form of trade associations and enterprise groups, for their effective mobilization. In other words, the representative nature of liberal politics was reformulated into “monopolies of representation,” resulting in technocratic management of the public sphere and of civil society.40 This legacy contributes to the extremely low participation of Koreans in civic associations, especially those formed around economic interests, as discussed above, in the process of conservative democratization. In addition, the hegemonic representation of capitalist industrialization as a national family epic suppressed the development of individual citizens as the unit of democratic politics. The individual citizen is embedded in the patrilineal family supported by the family master system (to be discussed in the next section). This results in the importance of organizational affiliations of voters in voting behavior and the insignificance of individual resources like socioeconomic status and a sense of political competence.41 This collectivistic behavior has been amply observed in regionalism in party politics and national elections. The feminized masses of citizens, however, do not have an identical degree of depoliticization. Doh C. Shin’s quantitative analysis of political 40 41

Han and Ling, “Authoritarianism in the Hypermasculinized State: Hybridity, Patriarchy, and Capitalism in Korea,” 55. Shin, Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea, 118.

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and civic participation among Koreans reveals the significance of gender in every category of public activity. Although he does not follow up on this important finding, his data reveal that men are shown to be more involved than women, with the exception of voting and campaigning, and women fall behind men by a substantial margin in all other aspects of political and civic activities. The least active of the male segments is more involved politically than the most active of the female segments. In other words, according to his analysis, Korean men with little or no formal education are more active politically than Korean women with a college education.42 The depoliticization of the feminized masses of citizens has maintained the Confucian view of politics as an activity of the “sage man.”43 This masculine subject of politics, construed as being detached from the calculation of material interests, was expected to advise the ruler with moral wisdom. According to this view, it is more important for government officials in contemporary Korea, either elected or appointed, to be able to project social harmony within the national family and redeem its masculinity through economic development than to be able to formulate and implement specific policies. This moralistic approach contributes to the absence of representation of interest groups, especially those economically based, in “Confucian democratic politics” in East Asia.44 For instance, it is not uncommon to see workers’ strikes represented in the Korean mass media as divisive and selfish.45 Familial ideology in state– society relations serves to delegitimize this type of defiant protest, articulating economic interests. Couched in the notion of loyalty to the moral ruler, social relations among Korean politicians are characterized by the exchange of unquestioned loyalty and patriarchal benevolence between a leader and his followers. For instance, political parties in Korea have revolved around a few renowned leaders who rely on Confucian moral rhetoric to justify their authority and rigid organizational hierarchy. It has been far more important for partisans to have stable personal connections to a powerful leader than to have well-informed ideas and training to formulate policies. These institutional and behavioral characteristics generate pockets 42 43

44 45

Shin, Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea, 112, 115. L. H. M. Ling, “The Limits of Democratization for Women in East Asia,” in Democracy and the Status of Women in East Asia, ed. Rose J. Lee and Cal Clark (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 169–82, Ling and Shih, “Confucianism with a Liberal Face: The Meaning of Democratic Politics in Postcolonial Taiwan,” 78. A recent manifestation of this pervasive perception can be observed in the way in which Kim Dae Jung’s government dealt with labor strikes. Despite Kim’s reputation as a former human rights activist and dissident, his administration outlawed labor strikes by subway workers, automobile workers, and airline workers in the name of national interests. See Dong-A Ilbo, 22 April 1999, 24 April 1999, 9 August 2000, 12 October 2000, 27 June 2001.

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of tightly knit networks of partisans clustered around a few leaders.46 This type of closed network is resistant to democratization. Similarly, relationships among high-ranking government officials are marked by an exchange of personal loyalty and patriarchal benevolence. Tu-ˆon Chˆong, an aide to the office of prime minister for the past 15 years, reveals in his memoir the pervasiveness of sycophancy and bribery in a subculture of high-ranking government officials. Sycophancy and bribery are construed as an expression of unyielding loyalty to the leader, and favoritism is understood as taking care of one’s men.47 What is alarming about this subculture, according to Hangyˆore 21, a liberal weekly magazine, is that these behavioral characteristics are not uncommon among the younger generation of politicians in their thirties.48 The familial metaphor in Confucian governance in contemporary Korean politics fulfills an ideological function by naturalizing power relations between the state and the populace through hierarchical gender constructs within the family. Masculinist politics in postcolonial Korea politically marginalizes not only women but also other feminized social minorities. The mushrooming, primarily in urban areas, of diverse social movements clustered around small-scale civic associations during the past decade49 indicates an emergent challenge to Confucian governance, emphasizing social harmony at the expense of social minorities through the familial metaphor. The women’s movement is an aspect of these types of democratizing social movements and is particularly significant to the understanding of masculinist politics and conservative democratization for two reasons. First, one strand of the women’s movement has focused on the transformation of the family, which has provided the prototype of gendered social relations of power central to the postcolonial appropriation of Confucian governance. In other words, because the transformation of the family undermines the very root of the postcolonial interpretation of Confucian governance, the progress of this movement allows us to assess the depth of substantive democratization. Second, the women’s movement has evolved during the past decade of democratization, and 46

47 48 49

Woon-Tai Kim, “Korean Politics: Setting and Political Culture” and Jung Bock Lee, “The Political Process in Korea,” in Understanding Korean Politics, ed., Soong Hoom Kil and Chung-in Moon (Albany: SUNY Press, 2001). Tu-ˆon Chˆong, Ch’oigoˆui ch’ongni ch’oiagˆui ch’ongni (The best prime minister the worst prime minister) (Seoul: Hanul, 2001). Hangyˆore 21, 7 June 2001. Tae-yˆop Cho, Han’gukˆui siminundong: chˆohangkwa ch’amyˆouˆ i donghak (The Korean citizens’ movement: The dynamics of resistance and participation) (Seoul: Nanam, 2000); Korean Women’s Hot Line United, ed., Han’guk yˆosˆonginkwˆon undongsa (A history of the Korean women’s rights movement) (Seoul: Han’ulacademi, 1999); KWAU, ed., Yˆollin hˆuimang: Han’guk yˆosˆongdanch’eyˆonhap 10 nyˆonsa (Open hope: A 10-year history of the KWAU).

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this continuity over time allows us to assess the facilitators of and the barriers to substantive democratization. The Evolution of the Women’s Movement to Transform the Family The contemporary form of the Korean family is characterized by the family master system (hojujedo), which permanently ties individuals to their (male) family masters from birth to death. The current family law requires this status of modern patriarch to be transmitted from one generation to the next through the first son and the first grandson of the hoju. That is, the hoju is also an heir to a lineage, and a household head is not necessarily the family master. Although after the 1989 revision the family law does not sanction the hoju’s rule over his family members in exchange for his obligation to provide for them,50 it requires all individuals to enter into the family registers of their family masters. An individual cannot choose to become her/his own family master, because there is the legal order of “succession” of family mastership.51 The family master system mediates democratic citizenship through the patrilineal family in that the individual citizen is viewed essentially as a member of the family (as opposed to the atomized individuals of Western liberal democracy). This means that the state recognizes individual citizens’ social identity only through their membership to the patrilineal family. Individual citizens are also required to submit their identification in their family registers whenever they embark on major enterprises in life, such as school enrollment, marriage, employment, and the transaction of property. The social meaning of citizenship as such in Korea is not conducive to the development of active citizens committed to the democratic values and practices necessary to the building of egalitarian and just body politics. Hence, the women’s movement to transform the family is crucial to substantive democratization. 50

51

Chu-su Kim, “Kaejˆong gajobˆopˆ ui kaejˆong gyˆongwiwa kwaje” (Issues in the revised family law), in Kaejˆong gajobˆopkwa han’guksahoe (The revised family law and Korean society) (Seoul: KWDI/Korean Family Law Studies Association, 1990); Pyˆong-ho Pak, “Kaejˆong gajobˆopˆ ui chemunje,” in Kaejˆong gajobˆopkwa han’guksahoe (The revised family law and Korean society); Sˆong-suk Kim,”Kaejˆong gajobˆopˆ ui naeyongkwa munjejˆom,” Yˆosˆongyˆongu 26 (1990): 119–48. The 1989 reform generated a series of substantial modifications in the patrilineal family. Overall, these were relatively egalitarian adjustments in terms of the range of relatives, inheritance shares, parental authority, and conjugal property ownership. Yet the current family law maintains the institution of family master (hojujedo). The “inheritance” of the family mastership was replaced by its “succession.” This rather ambiguous change maintains the compulsory “succession” of the family mastership. The order of succession is based on the principle of primogeniture and birth order: first son, first grandson, other sons in birth order, and unmarried daughters in birth order until they marry and join their husband’s family registers.

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The patrilineal concept of hoju continues to restrict the lives of women and children as well as men in connection with divorce and remarriage. For example, after divorce, a child must remain in the father’s family register even when s/he lives with the mother. Legally, they are not defined as a family but as “cohabitants.” After remarriage, a wife’s child from a previous marriage cannot join the stepfather’s family register without the former husband’s consent. These troubles are not only symbolic but also practical because family status allows wives or children access to various types of social policy benefits (e.g., national pension, national medical insurance, veterans welfare, taxation, maternity protection, and housing).52 With the dramatic increase in divorce, more individuals are affected by these kinds of difficulties.53 Moreover, the persistence of the hoju as the family heir has perpetuated the cultural significance of sons to continue patrilineage. With the introduction of the amniocentesis technique, the dubious practice of aborting female fetuses after sex screening has persisted even after the government made it illegal. The average sex ratio between female and male at birth was 100 to 110.2 in 1998, and this skewed sex ratio is even more asymmetrical as the birth order of the newborn increases.54 Since the transition to electoral democracy in 1988, there have been two phases in the women’s movement to eliminate the family master system through legal reform. The first phase developed in 1989; the second phase resumed in 1999 and is currently unfolding. The first phase of the successful women’s movement to reform family law began to foment in the mid-1980s when the escalation of popular protests forced Chun Doo Hwan’s regime (1980–87) to loosen its repressive rule. In 1984, conservative women’s associations that were registered with the state formed the Women’s Union for Revision of the Family Law after Chun’s regime signed the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in May 1983.55 The Women’s Union collected signatures from the public and forwarded a family law reform proposal 52

53

54 55

Korea Herald, 13 December 2000; Hangyˆore Shinmum, 9 October 2000; Chosun Ilbo, 22 July 2000; Chosun Ilbo, 12 July 2000; Yˆosˆong Shinmun 30 June 2000; Hangyˆore Shinmun, 16 May 2000; Kwang-soon Ko-Eun, a founding member of the Citizens’ Group to Eliminate the Household Master System, interview posted in the website of the KWAU, . The overall divorce rate has steadily increased across all age groups, and couples in their thirties show the highest rate of divorce: this group of women represented 47.4% of all divorced women in 1998, and this group of men represented 43.8% of all divorced men in the same year. The number of divorce per 100 marriages has soared from 5.8 in 1980 to 32.1 in 1998. In other words, almost one out of three marriages leads to divorce. See KWDI, 1999 Statistical Yearbook on Women (Seoul: KWDI, 1999), 67, 75. KWDI, 1999 Statistical Yearbook on Women, 55. Ok-Za Yoo, “Korean Women in the Home and Work Place: Their Status Since 1945,” Korea and World Affairs 9 (1985): 820–72 (Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Unification).

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to individual members of the national assembly. Fewer than ten legislators out of 276 signed the proposal. The dismal situation was ameliorated after the transition to electoral democracy in 1988 and the expansion of the coalition of women’s associations, which worked for family law revision. With the political transition, oppositional women’s associations, which had struggled against the authoritarian regime and therefore had political experience, joined the movement to revise family law. The KWAU played a central role in making active use of the revitalized national assembly and electoral politics. In 1988, the KWAU conducted a survey of legislative candidates to identify their positions on family law revision. According to this survey, sixty-six out of 1,000 candidates supported the reform proposal drafted by the coalition, and two additional candidates indicated partial support.56 The KWAU also lobbied national assembly members to gain support for the revision, and submitted its own reform bill, signed by 100 legislators, to the national assembly in 1988. Finally, in 1989, the KWAU and the Korean Church Women United formed the Family Law Special Council (FLSC). The FLSC collaborated with other social movementoriented organizations and women’s organizations to reach out to the public through the mass media, street campaigns, signature collection, public lectures, seminars, and discussion meetings.57 As a result, although the original reform bill drafted by the coalition was modified to appease conservative sectors among the populace, the national assembly passed a substantially revised bill in December 1989.58 The emergence of autonomous women’s organizations with experience in the political struggle for social justice was crucial to the effectiveness of the women’s movement. The transition to electoral democracy, restoring basic civil rights, also enabled different types of women’s associations to build coalitions and to use women’s electoral power as leverage over the body of legislators. This broadened organizational base facilitated the dissemination of information about family law reform as a way to build a democratic society. A group of legal professionals involved in the democratization movement assisted the women’s movement by drafting a family law reform bill. The proactive and systematic approach to family law revision in the late 1980s differed drastically from the earlier attempt in the 1970s, which had politely requested that the authoritarian government change family law, without political leverage. 56 57 58

KWDI, White Paper on Women (Seoul: KWDI, 1991), 487. Kyoung-suk Lee, “Chubuundong” (Housewives’ movement), in Yˆollin hˆuimang: Han’guk yˆosˆongdanch’eyˆonhap 10 nyˆonsa (Open hope: A 10-year history of the KWAU), 132–3. Korean Women’s Development Institute, White Paper on Women (Seoul: KWDI, 1991), 491.

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Those factors that facilitate the effectiveness of the women’s movement to reform family law are also observed in the second phase of the women’s movement. There are also some new features in this later movement that reflect the growth of civil society during the 1990s, characterized by the attention to everyday culture and the mushrooming of small-scale and issue-specific associations whose membership typically ranges from 100 to 300. The second phase of the women’s movement was rekindled in March 1997 with the adoption of bilateral family names (of both parents), which was intended to be a symbolic practice to question patrilineage. The group of 170 individuals who initiated this cultural campaign consisted of activists of diverse grassroots women’s organizations, academics, and professionals in medicine, law, the mass media, politics, and business.59 In November 1998, a new association devoted to the elimination of the family master system was formed (Citizens’ Group to Eliminate the Household Master System). It is a small group that studies problems of the family master system and disseminates its informational resources to the public through cyberspace and weekly street campaigns. Its membership has expanded from the initial group of middle-class professional women to middle-class men, housewives, and blue-collar workers.60 The Korean Family Law Counseling Center, a leading organization in the movement to eliminate the family master system, conducted a national survey of 2,500 women and men in their thirties, forties, and fifties from June to August 1999. According to this survey, 41.7% of the respondents supported the elimination of the family master system, 35.3% opposed it, and 23% were undecided. There are noteworthy differences in respondents’ positions along generation and gender lines. Respondents older than forty were more likely to oppose elimination of the family master system than their younger counterparts, and women were more likely to support it than were men.61 In response to these findings, women’s associations sponsored and coordinated a series of events to publicize the problems stemming from the family master system and to propose alternative ways of identifying citizens. They have made active use of both print and electronic media to reach out to the general public.62 The KWAU selected the elimination of the family master system as one of its five major agenda items of 1999 and as the major priority of 2000. The Korean Women’s Associations Council, another umbrella organization 59 60

61

The information on the cultural campaign comes from the web site of the KWAU, . Seoul Shinmum, 14 July 1998; Myˆong-ho Yi-Yu, a founding member of the Citizens’ Group to Eliminate the Family Master System, interview by Seungsook Moon on December 28, 2000. Chosun Ilbo, 8 December 1999. 62 Yˆosˆong Shinmun, 7 July 2000.

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of formerly nonoppositional women’s associations, also chose this issue as its major priority of 2000. In September 2000, the KWAU finally formed Citizens United for the Elimination of the Family Master System, in alliance with diverse citizens’ associations.63 Although these citizens’ associations do not play an active role in the movement, their support strengthens the women’s movement by recognizing the issue of the family master system as it pertains to societal democratization (rather than as a ghettoized women’s “special” issue). Since its formation, Citizens United led by women’s associations has pursued two levels of movement: civil society and the state. Citizens United has reached out to the public not only to disseminate knowledge and information, but also to procure human and financial resources to support various activities and staff working for the movement. Through print and cyber media, it has actively solicited donations from individuals and organizations. This practice reflects a new trend in Korean civil society to adopt the market model of operation. That is, civic associations in Korea have begun to recruit dues-paying members by marketing social issues to target groups and potential constituencies.64 Since September 2000, for instance, Citizens United has solicited donations from the public to fund the constitutional lawsuit against the family master system. The two phases of the women’s movement to transform the patrilineal family have faced a broad spectrum of conservative forces in the state and society. The democratizing state has passively responded to the women’s movement. The government is willing to support the elimination of the family master system if there is little resistance to it from the public, but it is reluctant to commit itself to the remolding of public opinion through active education.65 This passivity reflects the established boundary of masculinist politics, which tends to trivialize gender issues, especially privatized issues concerning family. The legislature has shown more resistance to the reform of the family master system than has the government, due to its direct involvement in the revision process. In the name of “national sentiment” (kungmin jˆongsˆo), legislators dealing with 63 64

65

Dong-A Ilbo, 22 September 2000. The market model is very common among “new mass-membership organizations” in the United States. Robert D. Putnam suggests that this type of association may not be very conducive to the cultivation of “social capital” in that “the only act of membership consists in writing a check for dues or perhaps occasionally reading a newsletter” and therefore members are connected to one another indirectly through “common symbols, common leaders, and perhaps common ideals.” See Robert D. Putnam, “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital,” Journal of Democracy 6, no. 1 (1995): 65–78, 71. This information is based on the author’s interviews with Bae-hee Kwak, president of the Korea Legal Aid Center for Family Relations, Kyˆoung-suk Lee, policy director of the KWAU, and Myˆong-ho Yi-Yu, a founding member of the Citizens’ Group to Eliminate the Family Master System, on December 27 and December 28, 2000.

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the issue have turned a blind eye. Since the 1989 family law revision, the national assembly has excluded this issue whenever civil code revisions are discussed.66 According to activists involved in the second phase of the women’s movement, the unwillingness of those assemblymen results from political calculation for reelection in largely conservative provincial and rural areas where older voters represent a majority of the electorate.67 Conservative voices against the elimination of the family master system in larger society have come from self-proclaimed “Confucianists,” from members of (patrilineal) clan organizations, and, rather curiously, from veterans organizations.68 Their vociferous protests have a history of almost thirty years. As early as 1972, when women’s organizations attempted for the first time to revise family law, a group of Confucianists announced their opposition to it in the name of “5 million Confucianists’ general will.” The Yudohoe, a Confucianist association, submitted 340,000 signatures and a petition against family law reform to the National Assembly. In 1975, this association finally formed the Council to Stop the Family Law Reform and collected 1 million signatures, and it forwarded a petition against the reform to the National Assembly.69 In 1984, the women’s movement to revise family law again encountered the resistance of the Confucianists, who argued that the change of family law would “shake the roots of the nation itself.”70 In 1987, when a coalition of women’s groups once more tried to forward a draft of the family law revision to the National Assembly, 5,000 Confucianists staged a street protest outside the assembly building. The military authoritarian state, which has responded to student activists militantly and effectively, was reluctant to dispel the boisterous Confucianists outside the National Assembly.71 As recently as July 2000, when the Ministry of Law cosponsored with women’s associations a public discussion in Seoul on the family master system, 600 Confucianists came to the meeting to express their visceral opposition to the elimination of the family master system. They protested by occupying most of seats in the discussion hall and by taking information brochures away from the audience. These self-proclaimed Confucianists were members of the Korean Clans United (Han’guk ssijok ch’ongyˆonhaphoe), Sˆonggyukwan Confucian Way Association Headquarters (Sˆonggyunkwan yudohoe ch’ongbonbu), All Citizens United for Protecting the Traditional Family System (Chˆont’ong kajokjedo suho 66

67 68 69 70 71

National Assembly Women’s Special Council, Yˆosˆongkwalyˆon bˆomyurˆui ippˆopkwajˆong mit hyanghu kwaje (The process of legislating laws related to women and their problems in the future) (Seoul: National Assembly Women’s Special Council, 1998), 334–54. Yˆosˆong Shinmun, 7 July 2000. I suspect that these types of organizations make up a right-wing jingoist force in Korea. Hyo-jae Lee, Han’gukˆui yˆosˆongundong: oˆjewa onˆul, 255–6. Yoo, “Korean Women in the Home and Work Place: Their Status Since 1945,” 830. John McBeth, “A Family Feud for Confucians and Women, “Far Eastern Economic Review (February 26, 1987): 38, 40.

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pˆomkungmin yˆonhaphoe), the Korean Elderly Association (Taehan noinhoe), and the Association of Bereft Families of Persons of National Independence Merit (Tongnipyugongja yujokhoe).72 It is noteworthy that although they do not represent a majority view on the family master system in Korea at the turn of the millennium, these conservative groups seem to exert significant influence over the state’s position on this issue. According to the 1999 national survey mentioned above, slightly over a third of respondents (35.3%) were opposed to the elimination of the family master system. Although this is a sizable minority that cannot be ignored, it begs the question of why the conservative groups exert that much power over the state. There seem to be two reasons behind this apparent puzzle. First, the state’s concession to these groups stems from its political calculation in setting priorities among issues. It reflects the masculinist politics in Korea, which defines issues concerning the military, foreign policy, and economic growth as directly pertaining to politics and power relations in privatized social relations as peripheral to national politics at best. To secure collaboration from social groups on such established political issues, which often involve sacrifice from the public, the state has to make concessions in other areas. Historically, family has been used for this purpose. For instance, the Japanese colonial state kept Confucian family relations intact to minimize social unrest caused by its brutal and exploitative actions in politics and the economy. The postcolonial state in Korea has demanded enormous sacrifice from the feminized populace in the name of economic development and national security. The second reason for the disproportional influence of the conservative minority is that the legacy of the Confucian normative system of meaning, although not highly discernible in urban, capitalist, and industrialized Korea, underlies this landscape of (historically Western) modernity as an integral part of Korea’s hybrid modernity. Political, economic, and cultural elites in contemporary Korea, still dominated by the older generation, share the interpretive system with those conservative social groups. Conclusion This chapter explores women’s experiences with Korean democratization at both macro and micro levels. The macro-level analysis of women and democratization consists of an overview of women’s aggregate representation and participation in institutional politics and voluntary associations during the past decade or so. This examination indicates that women as a social minority have been marginalized in the process of democratization. 72

Yˆosˆong Shinmun, 21 July 2000; The Korean Clans United was established in 1991 to “excavate hidden culture of each clan group and promote harmony among its 270-odd member clans.” See Chosun Ilbo, 21 October 1998.

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The marginalization of women is a feature of conservative democratization shaped by masculinist politics. The micro-level analysis discusses a specific example of activist women’s participation in voluntary associations and the social movement to transform the patrilineal family system in Korea. This movement has particular significance for Korean democratization in that it questions the very root of the family metaphor so pervasively used in interpreting state– society relations. The two phases of the women’s movement – in the late 1980s and in the present – to eliminate the family master system illuminate certain facilitators for and barriers against the democratizing social movement. Autonomous women’s associations experienced with political struggle and the restoration of basic civil rights are responsible for the extent to which the women’s movement has succeeded. Masculinist politics work against substantive democratization in Korea (and by implication elsewhere in East Asia), marginalizing democratization in privatized social relations within the family, and thereby contributing to the perpetuation of the familial metaphor in the interpretation of state–society relations. The current women’s movement to transform the family raises an important question about the subjectivity of the democratic citizen in Korea. Mediated by the family master system in the patrilineal family, the social meaning of citizenship in Korea relies upon the familial self (as opposed to the atomized individual self in Western democracy). The problems of the atomized self have been amply studied by critics of liberal individualism.73 The elimination of the family master system will undermine the familial self and may prepare for a conception of the democratic citizen that is an alternative to both the familial self and the atomized self. The emergent discussion of alternative citizen’s identification in Korea as part of the women’s movement can initiate a collective journey to conceive and practice a new way of being a citizen in a democratic body politic if the family master system is eliminated. Acknowledgments Research for this paper was supported by Faculty Research Grants at Vassar College. I would like to thank the women activists who agreed to share their experience of being involved in the women’s movement to transform the family. I would also like to thank Samuel S. Kim and Doh C. Shin for offering me useful information. 73

Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Feminism Without Illusions: A Critique of Individualism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); Christopher Lasch, Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations (New York: Norton, 1978).

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CHAPTER 5

Korean Nationalism, Anti-Americanism, and Democratic Consolidation Katharine H. S. Moon

In 1989, during the transition phase of Korea’s democratization, Jinwung Kim observed that Koreans were sharing “new stirrings of nationalism arising from their country’s rapid economic growth and political liberalization” and that this new nationalism had stirred antiforeign sentiments aimed mainly at “Korea’s ‘big brother,’ the United States.”1 In the 1990s, scholars, policymakers, and the media in both the United States and South Korea continued to note an upswing and “mainstreaming” of anti-Americanism that were attributed to a resurgent nationalism and a rejection of authoritarianism. For example, based on several nationwide surveys conducted in Korea in the early 1990s, Gi-Wook Shin concluded: “anti-Americanism is not confined to any particular strata, but is widespread in South Korean society.”2 However, he found that Korean anti-Americanism was neither an ideological rejection of the United States as representative of capitalism and modernity nor a rejection of American culture. Rather, “national consciousness” and “nationalist concerns” served as the primary political source of anti-Americanism.3 In Korea, unlike in Germany or Japan at that time (the mid-1990s), “the presence of American military forces [had] not provoked strong reactions from the Korean people” although “continued misconduct of American soldiers . . . [had] recently begun generating a more negative picture.”4 But by the end of the decade, over 100 Korean civic organizations had joined together to voice their criticism of Korea–U.S. relations, particularly on the 1967 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the 1 2 3 4

JinwungKim,“RecentAnti-AmericanisminSouthKorea,”AsianSurvey 29,no. 8(1989):754. Gi-Wook Shin, “South Korean Anti-Americanism: A Comparative Perspective,” Asian Survey 36, no. 8 (1996): 796. Ibid., 798–800. Ibid., 802.

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role and behavior of U.S. troops stationed in Korea. They called for a revision of the SOFA to reflect South Korea’s rise in power and stature, and to put it on a more equal footing with the United States. Representatives of the citizens’ coalition People’s Action for Reform of the Unjust SOFA (PAR-SOFA) flew to the United States in September 2000 to take their cause directly to the American public. The specific intention was to assert their presence and to exert pressure on the Korean and American negotiators resuming SOFA revisions in Washington, D.C., at the end of the month. At home, participants in the anti-American movement have engaged in independent investigations regarding alleged abuses by the U.S. military, policy debates about the role of U.S. troops in Korea, petitions, rallies against U.S. strafing exercises in Maehyang-ri, internet activism, and legal challenges to the SOFA through the Korean courts. If anti-Americanism reflects contemporary Korean nationalism, such nationalists seem to be engaging in political and organizational practices familiar to Western democracies. There is no doubt that nationalist sentiment, consciousness, pride, and hurt dignity serve as significant motivation for anti-American activism, and the late 1990s and early 2000s have provided ample occasion for such reactions. The shock and humiliation of the “IMF crisis,” the public expos´e of Nongun-ri, the murder of bar hostess Kim Songhui by U.S. Corporal Christopher McCarthy,5 the bombing accident at Koon-ni range in Maehyang-ri, environmental accidents and abuses at U.S. camps, the dizzy euphoria over the first North–South summit, public apprehension over the Bush administration’s emphasis on the National Missile Defense,6 and the inclusion of North Korea in the group of nations referred to as the “axis of evil” are just some of the highlights. But events themselves do not drive nationalism as political action. In this chapter, I take the view of Rogers Brubaker in Nationalism Reframed, that nationalism “is not a ‘force’ to be measured as resurgent or receding. It is a heterogeneous set of ‘nation’-oriented idioms, practices, and possibilities that are continuously available or ‘endemic’ in modern cultural and political life.”7 And like Brubaker, I am concerned not with the quantity or strength of nationalism, but with its types, characteristic structure, and political style.8 5

6 7 8

The McCarthy case added oil to the fire. He escaped U.S. military custody (in accordance with the SOFA in force at the time) while pending his trial in South Korean court. Citizens were outraged by the bungling and exerted more pressure to revise the SOFA. The treaty was revised in the fall/winter of 2000 so that U.S. military personnel who are arrested for heinous crimes can be turned over to and detained by Korean authorities at the time of indictment, rather than postconviction. Korea Herald, 9 April 2001. A nationwide survey by Media Research found that 56.7% of respondents opposed Bush’s plan to promote NMD. Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 10. Ibid.

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Anti-Americanism refers to a variety of critical views of the United States held by Koreans, including perceptions of U.S. policies and the behavior of individual Americans, especially those in uniform. Activists who are critical of the U.S. military presence include those who seek issue-specific changes, such as treaty revisions, institutional and behavioral reforms on the part of the U.S. bases and personnel, as well as a minority that seeks the withdrawal of the bases and an end to U.S. intervention in Korean security policy. The chapter concentrates on the views and activities of the issue-oriented majority. My specific focus is on the relationship between democratization and nationalism in the form of anti-Americanism. The anti-American movement that developed since the late 1990s is, I argue, on the surface a nationalist movement. Nationalism in this context is the least common denominator that initially helps bring disparate individuals, organizations, ideologies, and agendas together. However, there is no coherent application of nationalist ideology or sentiment for collective goals and political action. Rather, the dominant actors in the movement have staked out political space and developed a self-identity as primarily a civic movement that focuses on advancing human and labor rights, environmental protection, and the rule of law – types of civic activism that can flourish only in democracies and that are currently in vogue in Western democracies. The following explains how such anti-American activism reflects aspects of political and social development that are deemed necessary for democratic consolidation: the diversification and democratization of issue areas in public policy, particularly security; cooperation and compromise among different interest groups; and the development of social capital among these groups and with governmental bodies. In this context, anti-Americanism serves as a “big tent” under which disparate groups and interests can share organizing methods, moderate radical tendencies, bridge differences, coordinate action, draw a following, and achieve greater public impact both within and outside South Korea. Nationalism and Democratic Consolidation Although there is no consensus on whether nationalism is decisively bad for democratic consolidation, current manifestations of nationalism have been given a bad name by Samuel Huntington’s emphasis on “culture wars,” by the proliferation of ethnic nationalism and outbreaks of violence and war in post–Communist Eastern Europe, and by fears of a nationalist backlash against globalization.9 The prevailing opinion is that 9

On globalization and nationalism in Asia, see Jung-Hoon Lee, “Globalization, Nationalism, and Security Options for South Korea,” in Democratization and Globalization in Korea: Assessments and Prospects, eds. Chung-in Moon and Jongryn Mo (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1999).

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nationalism is not good for contemporary democratization and that democratizers need to be wary of it.10 In the consolidation literature, there is little discussion of the relationship between nationalism and consolidation beyond these two main warnings: (1) that consolidation in the context of “pluri-national, lingual, religious, or cultural” identities11 is difficult, and (2) that consolidation requires the participation of national minorities and the representation of their interests. Recently, Jack Snyder contributed an in-depth study of the relationship between nationalism and democracy in the context of current debates on democratic peace and causes of conflict in international relations. He explains that “nationalism remains attractive in part because elite groups seeking to harness national collective action to their own parochial purposes often find nationalism a convenient ideology for ruling in the name of the people without actually granting the people full democratic rights.”12 In the language of democratization studies, Snyder’s view is that a lack of democratic (institutional) consolidation engenders nationalism as a form of politics. Both Snyder and scholars of consolidation tend to base their observations on multi-ethnic societies undertaking democratization rather than on relatively homogeneous societies, such as South Korea with its longestablished history and identity as a nation. But students of democracy and nationalism need to discuss the challenges that nationalism might pose to democratization in both heterogeneous and homogeneous societies. One challenge is nationalism’s tendency to inhibit or hinder the development of reasoned, debated, and alternative (and opposing) views as social norms and political practice – views necessary to democratic consolidation – by evoking emotionalism and passionate rhetoric. If such rhetoric and sentiment delineate a “we–they” identity and right– wrong judgment of history and policy, they can inhibit the development of trust, compromise, and cooperation among disparate groups. A second challenge is that nationalism can overlook antidemocratic aspects of an idealized past that run counter to consolidation. Third, if nationalism emphasizes its own victimization by others (e.g., in anticolonial/antiimperialist nationalism), it can encourage a society to ignore the discriminatory, unequal, and unjust policies and practices enacted internally and 10

11

12

This is not to say that there is a uniform understanding of nationalism as a negative force in democratic life. See Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), who makes a case to the contrary and offers reasons why today’s liberals are averse to nationalism. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, chapter 2 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 29. Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), 314.

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externally by its own members.13 This can in turn deter civic and governmental accountability, responsibility, and reform, and it can discourage the generation of diverse sources and content of information, such as in historical writing and interpretation. In a different vein, we need to consider the possibility that some forms and instances of nationalism do not necessarily or inherently upset or avert progress toward democratic transition and consolidation. John Breuilly reminds us that nationalism, nationalist ideologies, and symbolism are not monolithic. He states that one may “distinguish between elite and mass nationalism, constitutional and illegal nationalism, peaceful and violent nationalism. Organisation may take the form of party or secret society; nationalist parties may be closed and undemocratic or open and democratic.”14 Moreover, he argues that nationalist “ideology/ imagery contains many different messages, and it is difficult to know which evokes a chord.”15 Therefore, such ideology/imagery “can only supply the most general orientations and that the criterion of specific objectives, forms of action, and bases of support must be understood in terms other than the appeal of the proclaimed values of the nationalist movement.”16 With respect to democratic consolidation, it is likely that closed, secretive, violent nationalist organizations pose threats to the stabilization and deepening of democratization, whereas “open and democratic” nationalist groups may contribute to the exchange of different opinions, tolerance, and cooperation among disparate nationalists and with other identity or interest groups. Breuilly’s interpretation holds out the possibility that within nationalist groups, individual participants and the movement itself can practice and assert ideas and values other than the avowed nationalism, such as democratic ideals and practice. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan emphasize the constructed and adaptable nature of political identities: [I]f nationalist politicians, by the atmosphere they create (or social scientists and census-takers with crude dichotomous categories) do not force polarization, many people prefer to self-identify themselves as having multiple and 13

14 15

United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan recently warned against making the United Nations Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance (August 2001) mainly about past colonial and human rights abuses and reparations by the perpetrator nations. At a meeting of African leaders in Lusaka on July 9, 2001 he stated, “While Africa and Africans have suffered terribly in the past few centuries from slavery and colonialism and people of African descent still suffer discrimination in many societies, we cannot hide the fact that some of our own societies are also disfigured by ethnic hatred and violence.” New York Times, 11 July 2001. John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 13–14. Ibid., 68. 16 Ibid.

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complementary identities. In fact, along with a common political “roof” of stateprotected rights for inclusive and equal citizenship, the human capacity for multiple and complementary identities is precisely one of the key factors that makes democracy in multinational states possible.17

Similarly, in relatively homogeneous states, being a nationalist and a democrat may be complementary, and identifying with both a nationalist cause and democratic values and practice may be a simultaneous political exercise. The anti-American movement in South Korea indeed makes passionate, emotional claims as grievances against the U.S. military. Activists and critics blame the military for the arrogant and blatant violation of Korean laws, human rights, and individual dignity, and for the abuse of land, the environment, and women, and they blame the U.S. government for treating Korea like a lesser ally (in comparison to Japan and Germany). They have staged weekly demonstrations in front of the Yongsan Garrison and the U.S. Embassy, calling for the revision of the SOFA, for the cessation of bombing practices in Maehyang-ri, and for “truth-telling” regarding the alleged massacre of Korean civilians by U.S. troops during the Korean War. Some protesters have also engaged in dramatic and immoderate behavior akin to that exhibited by radical anti-American student activists during the first half of the 1980s. For example, students jumped over U.S. Embassy walls on May 8, 2000, during a protest for compensation for the alleged massacre at Nogun-ri, and in February 2001, a leader of PAR-SOFA “tried to commit suicide by cutting himself with a razor, demanding that lawmakers reject the new [SOFA] agreement.”18 But unlike the anti-American activism of the 1980s, such methods of political expression are the exception rather than the rule. Additionally, the current anti-American movement, in contrast to its more radical antecedent, demonstrates Linz and Stepan’s “behavioral consolidation.”19 That is, the movement seeks to engage through democratic means – rather than to dismiss, bypass, overthrow, or challenge the legitimacy of – their own government with regard to grievances against the United States. In the 1980s, anti-Americanism increasingly transformed into patriotic nationalism, and by the mid-1980s “virtually all efforts of the student movement would concentrate on the struggle against the United States.”20 That is to say that, after the Kwangju massacre, the Chun regime 17

18 19 20

Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 35. Korea Herald, 28 February 2001. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies,” Journal of Democracy 7 (1996): 16. Jae-kyoung Lee, “Anti-Americanism in South Korea: The Media and the Politics of Signification,” unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Iowa, 1993, 131.

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even lost standing as the legitimate target of democracy activism. But the current anti-American movement is insistently looking toward their own government to represent, mediate, and lead on behalf of their expressed interests in policy negotiations with the United States. Although in much of their public rhetoric the movement activists offer this refrain – “Is the Korean government really exercising/preserving Korean sovereignty?” – the substantive demand is for the government to be accountable and responsive to its citizens.21 Anti-Americanism in South Korea is in part an effort to confront the history and legacy of authoritarianism and the nationalism that was framed and imposed by dictators to justify their rule. There is no reference to an idealized past; the focus is rather on confronting the authoritarianism of the past and the nationalism that justified the conflation of individual sacrifices with the national interest. According to Professor Hong Yunki of Dongguk University, “the dilemma about Korean sovereignty with respect to the U.S. is that governments grew accustomed to viewing the suffering of everyday residents as a gain for national security and failed to represent people’s interests.”22 The expectation was that post-authoritarian governments would act more independently of U.S. interests, in contrast to past regimes which, having forfeited legitimacy at home, had to subordinate themselves to U.S. interests to maintain U.S. backing. The frustration is that Kim Dae Jung’s administration reflects neither the desired change in leadership with respect to U.S relations nor the desired responsiveness toward citizens’ voices.23 In this light, the growth and popularization of the anti-American movement in the late 1990s and early 2000s is a consequence of democratization and marks a major stride forward in the politics of democratic deepening. Of all issue areas, national security allowed the least room for democracy in terms of competing opinions and policy prescriptions, civic activism, and influence. During four decades of authoritarian rule, independent civic assessments of the bilateral relationship and criticism of U.S. troops were actively and systematically suppressed. Jinwung Kim notes, “The governments, which came to power illegitimately, sought American support for their legitimacy” and therefore “did not permit anti-Americanism to emerge in the nation.”24 Under both Park and Chun, such criticism was tantamount to the subversion of South Korean national 21

22 23 24

For a representative piece, see Cover Story: “ ‘Sad Korea,’ Sovereignty Thrown Away” (Chukwon ul paengaechin “sulpun Hanguk”), Hankyoreh 21, 12 December 2000. Also, Special Feature: “Do You Know about SOFA” (Nohiga SOFA rul Anunga?), Saram i saram ege (People to people), October/November 2000. This is a periodical published by the Korea House for International Solidarity, one of the members of the PAR-SOFA coalition. Hankyoreh 21, 12 December 2000 (translated by Katharine H. S. Moon). Hankyoreh 21, 12 December 2000. Kim, “Recent Anti-Americanism in South Korea,” 752.

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interests: “An anti-American movement was identified with procommunism or a pro-North Korean movement.”25 Indeed, Article 7 of the 1980 National Security Law (NSL), regarding praise, encouragement, or sympathy toward an antistate organization, “has been used to imprison people who have written or disseminated material about the North Korean system of government, or which criticized the South Korean Government or the presence of U.S. armed forces in South Korea.”26 Although the 1991 revision of the NSL eliminated the more authoritarian wording in Article 7, many of the Koreans who were imprisoned for having anti-American views, criticizing the U.S. forces, or calling for their withdrawal remained on Amnesty’s list of prisoners of conscience in the early 1990s.27 With the civilian presidency of Kim Young Sam, however, political opportunities and constraints changed. On a grassroots level, citizens took over, and took their cue from the diversification and democratization of national security and foreign policy initiated early on by the new administration. According to Jung-Hoon Lee, the new government highlighted the importance of “universally accepted values such as democracy, human rights, environmental protection, and social welfare”28 in policy considerations. This was particularly so in the area of foreign and security policy: Improving the quality of life, overshadowed over the years as a result of the country’s growth-first strategy, was now to be an important part of the government’s mission. Multiple dimensions of national security from economic and ecological security . . . to communal and societal security . . . were also emphasized as forming the new and more comprehensive foreign and security policy agenda for South Korea.29

The very issues that the movement is addressing belong to these broader categories of security. In addition to the 1991 reform of the NSL under Roh Tae Woo (despite the national and international criticisms of the reforms and calls for its abolishment), policy and political measures under the two Kims have undoubtedly created and widened the political space for open debate and criticism of the ROK.–U.S. security relationship: the diversification of the foreign policy issue area and the aggressive rhetoric and drive on globalization under Kim Young Sam, and the sunshine policy and promises of further NSL reform under Kim Dae Jung. AntiAmericanism as a social movement reflects the dynamic characterized by 25 26 27 28 29

Ibid., 752. Amnesty International, “South Korea: Prisoners Held for National Security Reasons,” September 1991, 6. See individual cases in the above report. Lee, “Globalization, Nationalism, and Security Options for South Korea,” 240. Ibid.

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Sydney Tarrow, that “[w]hen institutional access opens, rifts appear within elites, allies become available, and state capacity for repression declines, challengers find opportunities to advance their claims.”30 The dynamic of social movements in democratic transitions that Anthony Oberschall has observed seems to apply also to social movements in democratic consolidation. As the number of participants increases, the probability of achieving collective goals increases whereas the costs of participation decrease (arrests, injury, etc.), in turn increasing the capacity for social mobilization.31 Activists and common citizens in Korea no longer fear being thrown into jail for criticizing the government’s foreign policy orientations or for expressing anti-American opinions. Also in contrast to the past, they are freer to complain about the personal costs connected with national security. What once was dissidence now can be framed as interest in a more democratic society. In theorizing about nationalism, Breuilly emphasizes the importance of the “changing context” in which a nationalist movement functions and acts: “Popular movements, different identity constructs, shifts in government policy, in the international situation – all these condition the way a nationalist movement develops. Above all, the changing institutional framework is closely linked to this development.”32 In Korea’s consolidation process, the liberalization of authoritarian laws and elite insularity in foreign policy have allowed citizens to engage openly in anti-American criticism. Exercising Democracy and Building Social Capital In Coalitions Across the Class Divide: Lessons from the Labor, Peace, and Environmental Movements, Fred Rose observes that “[c]oalition building between movements and community organizations is a vital process to revive our democracy,”33 and we can apply this to consolidating democracy as well. The anti-American movement in South Korea is a form of collective action through coalition politics. Its constituent groups and individual participants represent various interests, political experience and ideologies, socioeconomic classes, ages, intensities of personal commitment, and movement goals. The groups include religious activists, law professionals, environmentalists, academics, radical students, peace activists, both the progressive Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) and the conservative Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), leaders of mainstream NGOs, common villagers, local government officials, and 30 31 32 33

Sydney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), 71. Anthony Oberschall, “Social Movements and the Transition to Democracy,” Democratization 7, no. 3 (2000), 29. Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 173. Fred Rose, Coalitions Across the Class Divide: Lessons from the Labor, Peace, and Environmental Movements (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 213.

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national assembly members. The leading NGOs of the umbrella organization PAR-SOFA include the mainstream Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), Green Korea United (GKU), Korea Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM), the more “radical” KCTU and the National Campaign for the Eradication of Crime by U.S. Troops in Korea (the first watchdog group of U.S. base activities as they relate to Korean civilians), and the internationalist Korea House for International Solidarity (KHIS) (international human rights and peace). What is particularly interesting about the anti-American movement is that it has brought together groups and individuals that previously tended to identify themselves in opposition to one another. For example, Sunhyuk Kim has characterized the CCEJ as representative of “citizens’ movements” (simin undong) in civil society, organizations that consciously sought to tow a moderate line in the 1990s in contrast with the more radical “people’s movements” (minjung undong) dominant in the 1980s (from which KCTU and the National Campaign evolved). Kim states that in the first half of the 1990s, The citizens’ movement groups, such as the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice, the Korea Federation for Environmental Movement, and others, generated publicity and popularity for their campaigns for economic justice, environmentalism, fair elections, consumer rights, and gender equality. . . . [They] became dominant, exponentially proliferating and impressively outperforming the radical people’s movement groups. Emphasizing that they would lead a new generation of social movements, the citizens’ groups rejected the class-based and confrontational strategies of the past in favor of a nonviolent, peaceful, and lawful movement style and specific policy alternatives.34

In reaction, the more radical groups became “disconcerted and underwent a serious identity crisis.”35 He comments that civil society in the beginning of the 1990s seemed “fragmented and even chaotic,” torn between “ ‘petty’ interest groups and those committed to the ‘great democratic revolution.’ ”36 In the second half of the 1990s, both simin and minjung groups came together occasionally for nationwide campaigns, and organizations like People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) emphasized bridging the divide between the two types of movements.37 But as Kim points out, the two camps coexisted mostly in competition throughout the 1990s and maintained their differences in strategy and style.38 34 35 36 37 38

Sunhyuk Kim, “State and Civil Society in South Korea’s Democratic Consolidation: Is the Battle Really Over?” Asian Survey 37, no. 12 (1997): 1142. Also see Sunhyuk Kim, The Politics of Democratization in South Korea: The Role of Civil Society, chapter 6 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000). Sunhyuk Kim, “Civil Society in South Korea: From Grand Democracy Movements to Petty Interest Groups?” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 15, no. 2 (1996): 94–5. Kim, The Politics of Democratization in South Korea, 128. Ibid., 130.

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But anti-Americanism in the late 1990s and early 2000s seems to have brought the two poles closer and given them a common, “national,” purpose for cooperation and collaboration, rather than competition over scarce resources and fragmentation over ideology and political method.39 This is occurring in the larger context of recent efforts in South Korea to unify, consolidate, and deepen the involvement of civic groups in democratic consolidation. For example, in February 2001 two major coalition members of the PAR-SOFA, the CCEJ, and GKU forged a nationwide network of NGOs called the Solidarity Congress of Civic and Social Groups. Their initial agenda items – local autonomy improvement, the abolition of the National Security Law, and the enactment of the Human Rights Commission Law – are issues that coincide with the interests of the anti-American coalition.40 It seems that the anti-American coalition’s work to expose and protest the dumping of formaldehyde into the Han River (February 2000) and the consequent official apology by the USFK (U.S. Forces–Korea) – the “first-ever,” as Korean newspapers and civic groups have been quick to note – have encouraged and emboldened civic groups to forge the broader Solidarity Congress.41 By working as a coalition, activists have been engaging in the “generation of democratic habits and skills”42 and the creation of social capital. They share information and perspectives, learn methods and strategies of action from one another, agree to disagree as well as to compromise, and build trust and cooperation. For example, although the KCTU and other progressive organizations and activists have tended to treat the FKTU as ineffective and damaging to labor activism, within the anti-American movement they have joined hands with the FKTU to fight for unionizing and other rights of Korean nationals working for the U.S. military. Moreover, villagers living near U.S. bases who have been complaining about damage to private property are learning about environmental issues and values, and environmentalists, who tend to be from the educated middle-class, are exposed to people, communities, and livelihoods that have existed on the fringes of Korean society. Coalitions are particularly useful in exercising democracy because they serve to decrease the parochialism and homogeneity that plague individual movements such as labor or conventional environmentalism: Movements [as distinct from coalitions] attract self-selected segments of society who share beliefs, experiences, and assumptions and exclude people with divergent perspectives. In general participants are drawn from fairly narrow class, race, or geographic backgrounds. Community organizations and 39 40 42

Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, chapter 6 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). Korea Herald, 28 February 2001. 41 Ibid. Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 242.

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single-issue movements can reinforce the exclusion of outsiders or the protection of local privileges.43

This tendency is stronger in mass organizations that rely on dues-paying members. Putnam points out that although they are important, they play less of a role in building social capital because “[f]or the vast majority of their members, the only act of membership consists in writing a check for dues or perhaps occasionally reading a newsletter. . . . Their ties, in short, are to common symbols, common leaders, and perhaps common ideals, but not to one another.”44 The CCEJ and the main green groups are examples of such mass dues-requiring movements, and both are distinctly (urban) middle class in membership and leadership.45 But having become major coalition partners in the PAR-SOFA, the CCEJ and GKU have had to broaden their agendas to include issues external to their organizational agendas, like violence against women, human rights, and atrocities committed by U.S. and Korean troops in the Korean and Vietnam Wars.46 Their members have been going out to the “field,” to the countryside, and the kijich’on (camptowns) to investigate alleged environmental damage and economic deprivation and to demonstrate in solidarity with the locals, as the radical democracy activists of the 1980s had done in factories and on farms. Not only has the anti-American movement provided occasion and momentum to bridge different class identities and interests, but the movement also has necessitated cross-regional (e.g., Seoul/KyonggiKunsan/Cholla) exchanges of information and perspectives, as well as the coordination of activities. Diamond emphasizes that strengthening democracy requires “multiple organizational ties that cut across and complicate existing cleavages and generate moderating cross-pressures on individual preferences, attitudes, and beliefs” within civil society.47 If mainstream, middle-class movements have learned to include new issues and people, especially those in the periphery of Korean society, the radical “people’s movement” groups have had to moderate their strategies and articulate their interests more through reasoned debate than ideological rhetoric and violent protest. They seem to have adopted the citizens’ movement emphasis on procedural reform, legal activities, and formulation of policy alternatives. In contrast to the anti-American 43 44 45 46

47

Rose, Coalitions Across the Class Divide, 155. Robert D. Putnam, “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital,” Journal of Democracy 6, no. 1 (1995): 71. Kim, The Politics of Democratization in South Korea, 125–6. The Korea House for International Solidarity, one of the main coalition partners, has been active in seeking people-to-people reconciliation between Korea and Vietnam for atrocities committed by Korean troops against civilians in the Vietnam War. They have organized music festivals to raise funds to assist Vietnamese and have organized Korean medical professionals to travel to Vietnam to provide free care to Vietnamese villagers. Diamond, Developing Democracy, 223.

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movement of the 1980s, which tended to be heavy on rhetoric (nationalist and anti-imperialist) and light on empirical research and analysis, the current movement emphasizes independent, expert investigation of problems, compilation of figures from citizens, scholars, and government,48 and comparative analysis (with situations in Japan, Germany, and the Philippines). They then seek to build credibility and to persuade the government and public opinion through such methods.49 They follow in the tradition of watchdog groups familiar in the West, whose self-identified role is to check the misinformation, secrecy, and cover-ups that their governments may engage in. The fact that environmentalists and lawyers have become major players in the coalition helps explain this trend. For example, “the first such research conducted since the establishment of these bases in 1945” occurred in 1996 when environmentalists began to ally with the National Campaign for the Eradication of Crime by U.S. troops (with origins in the “people’s movement”) and local organizations around U.S. bases to assess environmental impact and damage from base activities.50 By 1999, Green Korea United had become a leading coalition partner, and in May of that year it established the Korea Environmental Litigation Center to serve as an “independent expert body” that would survey “all pollution-related cases involving U.S. military bases, like oil spills, noise pollution, and material or wastewater dumping.”51 Based on this survey, GKU released their report in December 2000.52 Later in June 2001, GKU teamed up with PAR-SOFA, Lawyers for a Democratic Society (Minbyon), and other civic groups to create a legal assistance service for residents living near U.S. bases. Kim Ta-Kyun, a GKU leader, stated the purpose and process: “In cooperation with local residents, we will first conduct a fact-finding survey of nine U.S. bases and facilities in seven areas to collect exact information on environmental problems, and this will serve as the legal basis for future lawsuits.”53 48

49

50

51 53

For example, the Civil Network for a Peaceful Korea (Hanbando P’yonghwarul wihan simin netuwoku) submitted a list of queries regarding the USFK and the bilateral relationship to the Ministry of National Defense. The Q&A report is available through their website, . An emphasis on investigation and analysis does not mean that the information these organizations gather and disseminate are necessarily correct or sound. Indeed, both Koreans and Americans dispute one another’s “facts” and fact-finding methods. It is also the case that some of the civic organizations are still learning and developing ways to access, interpret, and apply information for a public policy cause. But in self-awareness and effort, they stand in contrast to the self-avowed and intentional use of ideological rhetoric and scant investigation efforts of anti-American activists in the 1980s. Dongshim Kim, “Environmental Degradation Perpetrated by American Military Forces in Korea,” in SOFA Inducement, a report compiled by the Korea House for International Solidarity, Seoul, 2000. 52 Korea Herald, 7 December 2000. Korea Herald, 14 April 2001. Ibid.

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Rose points out that moderation in tactics and ideology (values) is both necessary for coalition work and a consequence of it. “Hybrid organizing approaches” enable formerly unconnected and opposing actors to “go beyond isolated interests or abstract values” that reproduce class and other divisions.54 He makes this clear in his study of the process by which disparate and opposing interest groups – labor, peace, and environmental movements – came together to push for military-to-civilian conversion of local economies in the United States in the late 1980s throughout the early 1990s. Those accustomed to radical and confrontational behavior through their involvement in peace activism had to modify their behavior for the sake of cooperation and consensus building in the coalition. One peace activist in the coalition admitted, “Personally, it’s hard because during the Gulf War I wanted to be out in the streets demonstrating. Parts of me want to lie down in front of busses and things like that. But I don’t think that’s the most effective way to get the job done.”55 Participants in the anti-American movement also reflect this tendency toward moderation. In a conversation about her organization’s role in the demonstrations at Maehyang-ri in June 2000, Cha Mikyung, a leader of the KHIS, spoke of her group’s efforts to “discipline” radical students.56 They admonished the younger participants for throwing rocks at the police: “Did you come here to throw rocks or to express your views?” In the winter of 2001, anti-American activists adopted a novel form of public protest, the one-person relay rally, first employed by the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy in December 2000. In front of the U.S. Embassy, they staged a one-person demonstration against the ratification of the revised SOFA. Hong Il-pyo, who helped lead the original protest by the PSPD, emphasized the value of this type of protest: lawfulness. “Members had been brainstorming for a way to express our demands without actually breaking the law, when it occurred to us that rallying with less than two people cannot be considered illegal in any way.”57 Acknowledging the organizational and tactical usefulness of the one-person relay, he said, “But most importantly, it’s legal.”58 Civic organizations and residents in Bupyong pursued similar tactics for over a year. Since May 25, 2000, they have conducted a twenty-four-hour relay sit-in in front of Camp Market.59 54 56 57

58 59

Rose, Coalitions Across the Class Divide, 205. 55 Ibid., 139–40, chapter 10. Author conversation, Seoul, June 2000. Korea Herald, 17 May 2001. It is illegal for two or more people to gather within 100 meters of government buildings and foreign government structures (e.g., embassies) to demonstrate. Ibid. In other ways, Bupyong/Inchon groups have exhibited some of the most sustained and well-organized efforts as watchdog and citizens’ self-help movements. See the “inaugural press conference information” put out by the Headquarters of the “Movement to

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The emphasis on legal norms and procedures is a salient aspect of the anti-American movement, and it is a big step toward democratic deepening in South Korea. The building of social capital can take place (in limited ways) in nondemocratic societies and for the purpose of pursuing antidemocratic politics; nationalist excesses often stem from the latter. But the work of the South Korean anti-American movement reflects the last two categories of Linz and Stepan’s definition of democratic consolidation: attitudinal and constitutional.60 The coalition has been pursuing democratic procedures and institutional channels, particularly litigation and legal opinions, to advance their agenda and adapt their strategies. For example, the CCEJ filed a legal challenge to the SOFA in South Korea’s constitutional court on July 19, 2000, alleging that the agreement “violates the Korean Constitution’s provisions on human dignity, equal rights, the right of criminal victims to testify in court, environmental rights, and the right to the pursuit of happiness.”61 Attorney Lee Sokyon, secretary-general of CCEJ, filed the claim on behalf of the parents of the murder victim Kim Songhui (Corporal McCarthy was convicted and sentenced in Korean court) and two common Seoul citizens affected by the USFK’s dumping of formaldehyde into the Han River). The claims on behalf of Kim’s parents are the more substantively compelling of the two. Lee emphasizes that the Korean constitution supercedes the SOFA as a legal treaty, and that SOFA provisions must be in accord with the constitutional rights guaranteed to Korean citizens. He charges that Article 22 of the SOFA effectively obstructs Korean citizens’ equal access to legal recourse and the right to testify in court as victims of crime. He continues that the constitutional court had already established that if citizens deem their basic rights have been violated, they could directly present their case to the constitutional court without undertaking other legal remedies. He adds that treaties must of course undergo the same judicial scrutiny.62 In the judicial review request, he is pitting the constitutionally guaranteed rights of Korean citizens with state privileges grounded in treaty law. The challenge is not only to the United States and the SOFA, but also to the Korean legal system to permit such a legal challenge and to safeguard the basic rights of Koreans first and foremost. Civic groups have also filed a legal challenge directly against USFK officials (for the fuel leak at Camp Long, Wonju) or pressured the Korean government to take legal action (e.g., against Albert McFarland for the formaldehyde dumping). 60 61 62

Declare Bupyong’s Rights” (Bupyong kwonli son’on undong ponbu paljok kija hoekyon), April 26, 2001. Linz and Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies,” 16. Los Angeles Times, 23 July 2000. Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice, “SOFA Constitutional Review/Claim Request,” July 19, 2000. Submitted by Attorney Lee Sokyon.

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Prior to these attempts at “testing” the legal system with matters concerning Korea–U.S. civil–military relations, a group of Maehyang-ri residents had filed a class action suit at the Seoul District Court in February 1998 demanding compensation for personal damages allegedly caused by U.S. bombing exercises. In April 2001, the Seoul court ruled in their favor, ordering the central government to pay 132 million won (U.S. $99,660) to fourteen Maehyang-ri residents. The ruling was the first of its kind, and camptown residents and activists took this as a precedent that would support further legal action.63 Promptly after this ruling, in June 2001, Lawyers for a Democratic Society (Minbyon) established a legal aid team to provide “more systematic, professional legal assistance” to local residents filing lawsuits related to the U.S. military. The decision to create such a legal team came from the coalition leaders. As with the environmentalists with whom this legal aid group would collaborate, the emphasis is on rationalizing the grievances through investigation and procedural clarity. Lee Suk-tae, a lawyer who heads the team, explained, “We will also collect case studies from criminal, civil and administrative proceedings in South Korean courts involving USFK, and the collected data will be used as a legal basis for our request for further SOFA revisions.”64 Although the “big tent” of anti-Americanism allows disparate groups to work together, it also fosters tensions and conflicts among member organizations and leaders because of their competing motives, grievances, goals, and tactics. In this regard, some obstacles to democratic consolidation are apparent. For example, there is the tendency among the more ideologically left and nationalist groups like Hanch’ongryon and One Korea to pursue either–or interpretations and actions regarding U.S. policies and military presence. One is either pro-Korean sovereignty and unification and against the U.S. presence or anti-Korean sovereignty and unification and for U.S. intervention. Chong Yujin, a cofounder and former leader of the National Campaign to Eradicate Crimes by U.S. Troops, is highly critical of such views because the importance and legitimacy of individual grievances and issues of contention become overlooked and the step-by-step resolution of them more difficult, if not impossible.65 Second and related is the marginalization of grievances and issues especially related to gender and women’s lives (e.g., violence against kijich’on women by U.S. servicemen) and male activists’ discrimination against 63 65

Korea Herald, 17 April 2001. 64 Korea Herald, 9 June 2001. Yujin Chong, “Pyonghwarul mandundanungot” (Creating peace), in Ilsang’ui og’abkwa sosuja ui in’kwon (Daily oppression and human rights of minorities), ed. Korea Human Rights Association (Seoul: Saramsaeng’gak Publishing Co., 2000); Yujin Chong, “ ‘Minjok’ui irum’uro sunkyolhaejin ttaldul?: Chuhan migun pomjoewa yosong” (Becoming chaste daughters in the name of the “nation?”: Women and crimes committed by U.S. troops), Tangdae Pip’yong 11 (Summer 2000).

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female leadership and voice in the coalition movement. In this respect, the nationalist sentiments and ideology of many male participants is most salient and coherent. Violence against Korean women represents degradation and humiliation of the Korean nation, which must be opposed. Again, Chong is critical of such totalizing interpretive frames, because the personal suffering of victims and their families becomes exacerbated through its “instrumentalization” and manipulation by some activists.66 This raises the question of who has access to social capital. Although he does not discuss gender at all, Jonathan Grix reminds us that class and education are key to social capital access and that the practice of building and actualizing social capital “seem[s] to operate in a virtuous circle: trust, access, and resources.”67 Those who are socially, economically, and politically marginalized from the outset tend to get left out of that “virtuous circle.” Decentralization and Anti-Americanism Anti-Americanism gathers under its “nationalist” tent not only the various ideological orientations, sources of information, organizational interests, skills, and norms of civic groups, but also those civic groups and local governments that represent the areas housing the U.S. bases. This is one of the most intellectually curious and politically novel developments arising from the anti-American movement. Without going into how the collaboration between local governments and civic groups developed, it is worth exploring the consequences of such interactions for democratic consolidation in Korea. This is an opportunity to build the social capital between local camptown governments and civic groups that had been sorely lacking in the last fifty years or so. It is a chance for the parties to assure one another that they can be on the same side of an issue rather than in hostile opposition. More substantively, the collaboration enables local governments and civic organizations to come together on issues related to the quality of life of kijich’on citizens, who historically have been marginalized politically, economically, and socially not only by the central government but also by the vast majority of the Korean people (kijich’on has been synonymous with “pariah town”68 ). A third consequence of this local collaboration is that it is a challenge to put into practice in substance the local autonomy that was granted in law through national legislation in 1991 and 1995. 66 67 68

Ibid. Jonathan Grix, “Social Capital as a Concept in the Social Sciences,” Democratization 8, no. 3 (2001): 199. See Katharine H. S. Moon, Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), Prologue.

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Until only a few years ago, those camptown officials and citizen-activists who were critics of the U.S. bases or advocated for the alleged victims of crimes or abuse related to the U.S. military tended to view one another as enemies, distrusting the others’ motives and critical of the others’ actions. In many of these areas, local governments would regularly detail plainclothes police to monitor the activities of kijich’on churches, women’s shelters, university student membership training (MT) gatherings, and other activities that could bring “intervention” from the outside world into camptown life. In general, the local governments avoided conflicts that might jeopardize relations with the nearby U.S. command. This was partly because kijich’on economies were dependent on the U.S. bases for employment and revenues. Most of these areas also harbored illegal activities, including prostitution, black-marketing, and drugs, so that local government officials did not want public attention or scrutiny that might accompany conflicts with the bases. In addition, under the authoritarian Park and Chun regimes, it was in the interest of local officials to keep a lid on local conflicts so that provincial and national bureaucrats would not be prompted to come down hard on them. Since 2000, however, local governments have been joining the antiAmerican movement coalition and cooperating with people and organizations that they might have considered the enemy just a few years earlier. For example, in May 2000, the Inchon City Council, together with NGOs, formed the “Citizens’ Congress for the return of land used by the USFK in Bupyong” to reclaim land that the U.S. military was using as a junkyard. Munhwa Ilbo (30 May 2000) reported, “This is the first time for a city council to participate in a movement for the return of land used by U.S. forces together with a civic group.” Demonstrating in front of U.S. Camp Market for its relocation out of downtown Bupyong, civic groups from Bupyong and Inchon claimed that the camp was “obstructing city plans to build a new boulevard and that the camp’s garbage dump and incinerator [were] harmful to the environment.”69 Such activities may be stimulated in part by nationalist sentiment, but they are also consequences of the decentralization policies of the 1990s. With democratization taking place at the local governmental level, citizens as individuals and in groups have been participating in local politics and influencing local governments at an increasing rate, and the governments have in turn increased their responsiveness to the concerns of residents. In comparison to the previous centralized system, local authorities are giving much more attention to resident-related policies and are more oriented toward social policies than other issues in local government.70 69 70

Korea Herald, 17 January 2001. Jong Soo Lee, “The Politics of Decentralization in Korea,” Local Government Studies 22, no. 3 (1996): 68.

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Studies on decentralization emphasize that it is a political process, characterized by power struggles between the central government and the lower-level administrative units,71 and therefore a matter not only of policy options but also of social movements.72 In this context, it is obvious that the U.S. base issue and the anti-American movement have become a means through which local governments can assert their interests vis-`a-vis the central government. Officials of the fourteen local governments that house U.S. bases within their jurisdictions met for the first time in Taegu on May 24, 2000, to establish a “nationwide consultative body” of local governments. The Daehan Maeil Sinmun (24 May 2000) reported that [the] local governments outlined the present situation of U.S. military bases in their respective areas. They also explained the status of relationships between U.S. military bases and local governments, the impact of U.S. military bases on regional development and the size of revenue losses caused by the presence of U.S. bases, as well as how the revenue losses were calculated.73

The consultative body of local camptown governments is pressing politicians and bureaucrats in Seoul for special legislation to benefit camptown residents, particularly for increased “national government grants and aid to local governments and residents” and for a government obligation “to make a thorough environmental impact assessment in and around U.S. military bases or facilities.”74 They claim that their localities suffer economic, environmental, and other losses due to U.S. military activities, and they want the central government to take their concerns seriously. A Chunchon city official stated, “The law, which will be sought in the form of legislation by assembly members, would also help raise the negotiating power and voice of local governments and their residents in future negotiations with the U.S. side.”75 This voluntary organization among camptown governments is another effort at pooling local bureaucrats, resources, interests, and representative power made possible through new decentralization policies. This first took place in 1991, when leaders of local councils created the National 71

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Ilpyong J. Kim and Eun Sung Chung refer to this dynamic as a “dialectic relationship between centralization and decentralization.” See “Establishing Democratic Rule in South Korea: Local Autonomy and Democracy,” In Depth 3, no. 1 (1993): 212. Also see KyoungRyung Seong, “Delayed Decentralization and Incomplete Democratic Consolidation,” in Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea, ed. Larry Diamond and Doh Chull Shin (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2000). For general discussions of this tension in the context of democratization and democracy, see Desmond King and Gerry Stoker, eds., Rethinking Local Democracy, chapters 1 and 2 (London: Macmillan, 1996); Dilys M. Hill, Democratic Theory and Local Government (London: Allen & Unwin, 1974), chapter 8; Diamond, Developing Democracy, chapter 4. Jong Soo Lee, “The Politics of Decentralization in Korea,” 70. U.S. Information Service (Korea) translation. 74 Korea Herald, 20 June 2001. Ibid.

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Association of Local Authorities (NALA). Jong Soo Lee argues that NALA has made important contributions to increasing the voice of local governments in central policymaking and therefore serves to further the process of checking and balancing central power.76 Similarly, Kyoung-Ryung Seong considers the establishment of the National Mayors Conference of Korea in 1996 of “epochal importance” for its collective efforts at representing county-level governments vis-`a-vis central and provincial authorities.77 Power-wielders in Seoul seem to be responding to the increased number and volume of local voices. For example, in response to the pressure from below, the Ministry of National Defense and the USFK have been negotiating the return of land used by U.S. forces, and the directorgeneral of the Ministry’s Policy Planning Bureau stated that the Ministry will consult with local governments and environmental groups on the readjustment of land use by the United States.78 Members of the National Assembly from both parties also echo many of the concerns and grievances expressed by civic groups. In his November 2000 “white paper” on the SOFA (“SOFA: An Accord of Inequality/Problems and Direction for Revisions”), Representative Kim Won-ung of the Grand National Party even brought up local governments’ complaints that U.S. service personnel have paid less than 5% of about 480 million won (U.S. $410,000) owed in parking fines.79 Scholars of democratic consolidation emphasize that civil society activism alone cannot deepen and stabilize a democracy and that political parties are necessary to mediate between citizens and governmental institutions. Both the ruling and opposition parties in Korea have been actively engaged with the anti-American movement. Although some members from both parties fear that anti-Americanism will get out of hand, others have held political forums with members of the coalition and have demonstrated in solidarity with them. Indeed, like American politicians who actively took part in protesting bombing exercises in Vieques, Puerto Rico, in spring 2001 (and were even arrested), South Korean elected officials from both parties participated in the “human chain” protest at Camp Market, Bupyong, on August 30, 2000.80 They joined in solidarity with about 500 local residents. More formally, the bipartisan “Country and Culture” caucus (Narawa munhwarul saengak hanun moim) of the National Assembly, chaired by Rep. Kim Won-ung, cosponsored with PAR-SOFA a 76 77 78 79

80

Jong Soo Lee, “The Politics of Decentralization in Korea,” 67. Seong, “Delayed Decentralization and Incomplete Democratic Consolidation,” 144. Korea Herald, 28 June 2001. Korea Herald, 8 November 2000. Also, Yongsan-ku officials made the national headlines in May 2000 for going after the U.S. military for unpaid parking fines. See Korea Herald, 24 March 2000. Yonhap News, 10 September 2000.

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debate against the ratification of the revised SOFA. The debate was held at the National Assembly on February 8, 2001. Coalition representatives from numerous organizations (e.g., GKU, Lawyers for a Democratic Society, Women for Peace, PAR-SOFA) and scholars made presentations and debated with assembly members on a range of issues related to civil–military relations between Korea and the United States.81 (The antiratification faction lost, as the revised SOFA was ratified and put into effect on April 2, 2001.) There is no guarantee that elected officials and political leaders will not stop at individualistic opportunism in their participation in the antiAmerican movement, and there is no way of knowing whether the new alliances between civic groups and local governments will endure. The hope is that their current collaboration will help build enough social capital so that cooperation on other issue areas will occur in the future. For now, the anti-American movement at the local level seems to be advancing democratic consolidation by facilitating access to power for historically marginalized groups, by developing citizen competence in democratic governance and culture, by inducing local government responsiveness to local interests and concerns, and by empowering them as a check and balance to the central government.82 Conclusion Understanding the anti-American movement as a movement of democrats rather than nationalists enables us to investigate the politics of democratization in the area of foreign and security policy in South Korea. If there is an issue area that is least conducive to democratic participation, it is foreign and security policy. Even in established democracies, tight control over information and intelligence, elite management and oversight, abstraction of concepts and debates, and formal and informal exclusion of women (and in some cases racial and ethnic minorities) in the diplomatic and military corps make democratic participation problematic. Jongryn Mo observes that “different levels of democratic consolidation can exist in different political areas within a given type of democracy. The rules of one policy area may be widely accepted while the rules of another policy area may lack such consensus.”83 In South Korea, the normative, procedural, and institutional rules of democratic practice in the foreign and security issue area are not yet clear. There is 81

82 83

See “Why Should the National Assembly Veto the Ratification of the Revised SOFA,” debate materials (SOFA kaejong’an, kukhoenun woe pijunul kobuhaeya hana? Toron charyojip). Diamond, Developing Democracy, 121–30. Jongryn Mo, “Political Learning, Democratic Consolidation, and Politics of Labor Reform in South Korea,” in Democratization and Globalization in Korea, 310.

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no guarantee that the increased participation of citizens and local governments and their claim on Korea–U.S. security matters will endure and have substantive impact on decision-making in Seoul and Washington. After all, matters of national security fall under the purview of the central government, and in Korea, any significant exacerbation of relations between the South and North could cut off citizen activism in foreign policy. Yet the anti-American movement in South Korea is helping to develop and test the rules of civic and local-level engagement in foreign policy. The issues that the movement addresses are diverse and rather novel in Korean politics (e.g., environment, human rights, and rule of law) and are themselves in the process of institutionalization as legitimate public policy issues in both government and civil society. Deploying these issues as framing devices allows the Korean government to respond to these specific terms and concerns (rather than problematize the larger issue of the presence of U.S. troops), and it allows the government to act as mediator among issues, between local governments and civic groups, and with the U.S. military. Moreover, local citizens around the bases are able to identify with the issues and voice their opinions in ways that they understand and care about, but their concerns potentially affect the entire nation and have resonance outside their borders (e.g., Okinawa or Vieques).84 Because the issues the movement raises combine personal and local welfare, national security, and global norms, policy processes and resolutions need to reflect and incorporate politics at all of these levels. This is a difficult and complex task, given that the institutionalization of the legal system, administrative decentralization, maturation of civil society, transformation of South–North relations, and globalization are all occurring simultaneously in South Korea. David Beetham characterizes the challenge with respect to democracy in this way: The formal political sphere is defined as a bounded territory, which may or may not . . . correspond to any coherent geographical entity with which people can identify. The informal political sphere, on the other hand, is now a potentially boundless space, whose associations may comprise anything from a local group 84

The PAR-SOFA and some of its constituent organizations, like GKU, have explicitly linked their cause to those in Vieques and Okinawa. They engage in the exchange of information, on-site visits, and other forms of transnational network activism and solidarity. When the PAR-SOFA representatives visited Washington, DC in September 2000 to press their case for the revision of the SOFA, they planned their trip so as to arrive in time for a major protest rally against the U.S. naval presence in Vieques. They came at the invitation of Vieques activists and were building on mutual visits to the U.S. bombing ranges (Vieques and Koon-ni/Maehyang-ri). Father Mun Jung Hyun, who headed the Korean delegation, was one of the speakers at the rally. See Saram i saram ege (People to people) (October/November 2000), 24–32, 37–40.

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of neighbours to an international group of communicators on the Internet. This disjunction between the spatial ranges of government and civil society respectively poses a serious difficulty for a project of democratisation that seeks to link the two. It also renders problematic the apparently simple concept of “local democracy” [emphasis added].85

Nationalism is a motivating sentiment for political activism, but it may also serve, however unintentionally, a strategic purpose for the various actors in South Korea who are involved in this complex task – to simplify, unify, and give coherence to their respective interests and to enable them to coexist and cooperate. 85

David Beetham, “Theorising Democracy and Local Government” in Rethinking Local Democracy, 47.

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PART IV

Consolidation at the State Level

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CHAPTER 6

Regional Politics and Democratic Consolidation in Korea David C. Kang

Introduction Democratic transitions and their sustainability have become a major theme of the theoretical literature in the social sciences. After the wave of democratic transitions in the 1980s, scholars and policymakers turned their attention to the sustainability and strength of these nascent democratic countries.1 Scholars have been exploring whether the values and wealth of citizens create preconditions for democracies, examining institutions and strategic choices made by individual voters and politicians, and assessing the role that civil society plays in democratic transitions.2 One major analytic issue that has arisen is the extent to which nascent democracies have actually become consolidated. Such a consolidated democracy, it is argued, is one in which democratic values and ideals are stable and deeply institutionalized.3 As Arend Lijphardt has written, “democratic politics is not merely a ‘superstructure’ that grows out of socio-economic and cultural bases, it has an independent life of its own.”4 Scholars taking a “maximalist” position consider democracy 1

2

3 4

Philippe C. Schmitter, “Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 5 (April 1994); Doh-Chull Shin, “On the Third Wave of Democratization,” World Politics 47 (1994): 135–70; Nancy Bermeo, “Rethinking Regime Change,” Comparative Politics 22 (April 1990); and Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Sunhyuk Kim,The Politics of Democratization in Korea: The Role of Civil Society (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000). See Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Terry Lynn Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” Comparative Politics 23 (October 1990). Lawrence Whitehead, “The Consolidation of Fragile Democracies,” in Democracy in the Americas, ed. Robert Pastor (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1989). Arend Lijphardt, “The Southern European Examples of Democratization: Six Lessons for Latin America,” Government and Opposition 25 (1990): 72.

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consolidated when an accountable civilian government guarantees basic civil rights such as expression and assembly, and when society is largely involved in the political process. Those taking a “minimalist” position focus on the existence of free competitive elections with peaceful transfers of power.5 South Korea is a notable case of a democratic transition. And although South Korea has made dramatic strides toward true democracy in a number of areas, there is still concern that democracy is not yet consolidated.6 The tendency for voting to follow regional lines has been cited in particular as evidence that Korean democracy is not well consolidated. This regional voting pattern has led observers to claim that regionalism inhibits full consolidation of democracy in Korea.7 For example, Mun-Cho Kim and Hyeoung-Sin Park write, “regional hostilities have sometimes become dangerous factors undermining the minimum consensus necessary for a democratic society to function.”8 Kyoung-Ryung Seong writes, “the degree of institutionalization of democracy is not yet very high” and that “one of the most destructive and divisive forces is regional cleavage,” which “affects almost every aspect of the social, economic, and political lives of South Korean people.”9 Doh-Chull Shin calls regionalism “primordial” and argues that “these rivalries must be eased to build a democratic political system,”10 whereas Kim Byung-kook argues that “regionalism was not . . . fertile ground for developing modern party politics . . . [because] the culture of Confucianism entrapped individuals 5

6

7

8

9

10

For these distinctions, see Larry Diamond and Byung-kook Kim, “Introduction: Consolidating Democracy in South Korea,” in Consolidating Democracy in South Korea, eds. Larry Diamond and Byung-kook Kim (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 4. As an example of a maximalist position arguing that Korean democracy is still not consolidated, see Doh-Chull Shin, Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), xxv. For a minimalist position that views Korean democracy as consolidated, see Byung-kook Kim, “Party Politics in South Korea’s Democracy: The Crisis of Success,” in Consolidating Democracy, 55. See, for example, Yong-kwan Choi, “Jiyok galdung haeso bangan-ul wiahn yonku” (Research concerning solutions to the problem of regionalism), Paper presented at the Planning Meeting for Scientific Research, Korean Political Science Association, 1997, 187–377; Nam-yong Lee, “Jongchi munhwa wa jiyokjuui: hankuk-ui jiyokjuui wa haeso bangan” (Political culture and regionalism: Solutions to the problem of regionalism), Paper presented at the Special Meeting for Scientific Research on Regionalism Korean Political Science Association, 1999, 1851–71; Bo-sik Choi, “Chungang insa wiwonhoi josa hyunjongbu gongjik insaa Unyong siltae” (Results of the investigation into the actual conditions of management of public offices), Chosun Ilbo, 17 March 2001, 8. Mun-Cho Kim and Hyung-Sin Park, “Hankuk Jiyok Juiui ui hyunsongkwa jungkwa songkyok” (Regionalism in Korea: Formation process and characteristics), Research on Korean Culture 24 (1991): 2. Kyoung-ryung Seong, “Civil Society,” in Consolidating Democracy, 98. Yong-kwan Choi argues that “it is time that we come up with a solution to overcome regional hostilities that are threatening to bring down the country.” Choi, “Jiyok galdung,” 191. Shin, Mass Politics and Culture, 31, 179.

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in an internally contradictory identity.”11 That regionalism is normal and rational is distinctly a minority view.12 This leads to the following questions: are regional biases and voting patterns a deeply rooted cultural phenomenon in Korea? Is the prevalence of regional voting patterns evidence that Korean democracy is not yet consolidated? In this chapter, I claim that regionalism in Korea is neither unique nor surprising. On the contrary, I will show that as Korean democracy has become more consolidated, regional voting patterns have increased. Regionalism in Korea is a normal part of the democratic process and voters are – and have been – expressing their preferences within institutional constraints. I will also show that regionalism is a relatively recent phenomenon arising after the democratic reforms of 1987. Using econometric analysis of comprehensive voting results for both the national assembly and presidential elections from 1948 to 2000, my research shows that before 1987 there was no relationship between region and vote for the ruling party. However, with the reforms of 1987, voting patterns do show a strong relationship between region and vote. In explaining this pattern, I provide a causal argument that explains why regionalism arose after 1987 and also why this regionalist pattern is a rational expression of voter preferences. Concern that regionalism undermines democratic consolidation is not warranted. It is true that Korea votes along regional lines; but regional voting is not necessarily undemocratic. It is undemocratic only if done for emotional reasons, rather than in rational self-interest. If done in rational self-interest, it is no different in principle from any number of other election issues on which people “vote their pocketbook.” In fact, as I will demonstrate, an analysis of results from postindependence Korean elections supports the thesis that the regional pattern follows self-interest, not emotional ties. If so, they can be better understood as a normal expression of democracy. Even in the most stable of democracies, issues always contend with personality and emotion in voter decisions. Thus, I am neither maximalist nor minimalist, but rather a positivist. I care about whether voters are expressing preferences in an effective manner, no matter what those preferences are. The substance of voter preferences should be the domain of normative political theory, not social science.13 11 12 13

Byung-kook Kim, “Party Politics in South Korea’s Democracy: The Crisis of Success,” in Consolidating Democracy, 79. Gi-sook Cho, Jiyokjuui-ui sunguwa hamlijok yoogwonja (Regional elections and rational voters) (Seoul: Nanam, 2000). There is extensive literature and debate about the relationship between electoral systems and party organization and behavior. See, for example, Gary Cox “Electoral Rules,

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In fact, results based on region are not surprising in a democracy. After all, voters in one region can be presumed to share a number of interests. Alternatively, voting based on race, ethnicity, or religious affiliation is not, in itself, a reason to fear for the viability of a democracy.14 As long as voters are electing leaders that they think will further their own interests, this is consistent with a democratic view of politics. The concern for democracy arises only if it is believed that electoral institutions are being undermined. Ultimately, democratic politics is about the aggregation of voter preferences over issues, and a central institutional question about democratic politics is whether representatives emerge as the outcome of a “competitive political process influenced in large part by the preferences of voters for particular policies.”15 Thus, the appropriate question is whether voters have definite preferences over issues and whether those preferences can be expressed through the institutions of an electoral process.16 Evidence will be presented that regionalism in Korea is not different from other forms of regional voting in other countries. Kim Byung-kook argues that regionalism in the Western European states, with underlying shared regional economic interests, differs from the more immature Korean regionalism based purely on atavistic or primordial ties.17 However, asking why people have the preferences they do is a different question than asking whether those preferences are expressed through democratic means. We do not normally ask whether a voter’s preferences are “justified” according to some criterion; rather we take them as given and see how those preferences play out. In the United States, there are often voters for whom one issue, sometimes with a religious or ethnic basis, dominates all others; abortion and immigration are two such examples. This rest of this chapter is organized in four sections. In the second section, I briefly discuss the history of regionalism. In the third section, I show that regional voting is a post–1987 phenomenon, using

14

15 16

17

Career Ambitions, and Party Structure: Comparing Factions in Japan’s Upper and Lower Houses,” American Journal of Political Science 44 (2000): 115–22. See Rein Taagepera and Matt Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); Gary Cox and Emerson Niou, “Seat Bonuses Under the Single Nontransferable Vote System: Evidence from Japan and Taiwan,” Comparative Politics 26 (1994): 221–36; David Brady and Jongryn Mo, “Electoral Systems and Institutional Choice: A Case Study of the 1988 Korean Elections,” Comparative Political Studies 24 (1992): 405–29; and Bernard Grofman, ed., Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan Under the Single Non-Transferable Vote: The Comparative Study of an Embedded Institution (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999). Melanie Manion, “The Electoral Connection in the Chinese Countryside,” The American Political Science Review 90 (1996): 736–48. Elsewhere I have examined at length the institutional patterns in Korean politics. See David Kang, “The Institutional Foundations of Korean Politics,” in Understanding Korean Politics, eds. Soong Hoom Kil and Chung-in Moon (Albany: SUNY University Press, 2001). Kim, “Party Politics,” 80.

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comprehensive election results of national assembly and presidential elections from 1948 to 2000 and a series of empirical tests that provide supporting evidence. The fourth section provides a theoretical explanation for the rapid shift in voting behavior that emphasizes the electoral connection between voters and leaders. In the final section, I consider the theoretical implications of my argument and look to the future: future directions for Korean democracy, and future directions for its study. Regionalism in Korea Regional ties have become a major source of voting behavior for the Korean polity, as has been shown in numerous studies. In the three most recent presidential elections, Kim Dae-Jung received an overwhelming majority of the vote in the Cholla provinces: 87% in 1987, 89% in 1992, and 93% in 1997. In the Kyongsang provinces, Kim Dae-Jung received only 3% of the vote in 1987, 9% in 1992, and 12% in 1997. Kim Young Sam, on the other hand, received less than 3% of the Cholla vote in 1987, whereas in 1992 he received 5% of the Cholla vote and 69% of the Kyongsang vote. Similarly, Lee Hoi Chang received 60% of the Kyongsang vote in 1997. In addition, polling data from Research and Research indicate that in 1994 “regional affiliation” was by far the best predictor of how a person would vote.18 Although the regional rivalry between Kyongsang and Cholla is the most obvious, regional sentiments are more prevalent and more complex than this. Chungchong province has consistently supported its favorite son, Kim Jong-Pil. Taegu-Kyongbuk (TK) is a bloc distinct from Pusan-Kyongnam (PK), and Seoul-Kyonggi (SK) also tends to vote as a region.19 In explaining the rise of regionalism, analysts have focused on three major factors: the historical underdevelopment of Cholla in contrast to Kyongsang, the biased recruitment of elites and the manipulation of regional sentiment by political elites, and more recent causes such as the 1980 Kwangju incident. Regional bias has deep roots in Korean culture, extending as far back as the Three Kingdoms period, when Silla (now Kyongsang province, or Yongnam) and Paekche (now Cholla province, or Honam) consistently clashed. In the seventh century, the Silla kingdom allied with China and destroyed the Paekche kingdom, unifying the entire Korean peninsula. In later centuries, the natural economic axis went from Seoul to Pusan as the two major economic centers. Pusan (Kyongsang province), as the 18 19

Unpublished poll conducted by Research and Research in July 1995. Seong, “Civil Society,” 99. See also Byung-kook Kim, “Jiyokjuuiwa jongchi gaehyuk” (Regionalism and political reform), in Segyehwarul jihyanghanun hakuk jongchi (Globalization and Korean politics), ed. Park Sang-sup (Seoul: Nanam, 1996), 40–57.

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closest port to Japan, facilitated international trade, whereas Seoul was the capital and the city closest to China. After independence from Japan, the military governments placed industrial sites at the southern end of the peninsula to protect them from a possible North Korean invasion and to encourage trade through Pusan. Cholla has remained largely agrarian, and the rapid economic development of the past fifty years has bypassed the Cholla region. Studies also note that a higher proportion of political and business elites tend to come from the Kyongsang provinces, whereas a lower proportion come from the Cholla provinces. During the Rhee administration, one-quarter of South Korea’s population lived in the Cholla (Honam) provinces, but less than 6% of elites had their origin there. Although notable under all administrations, the trend became marked during the Park Chung-Hee era of 1961–79. Park, from the Southeast Kyongsang (Yongnam) province, put his men in positions of power and also skewed economic development toward the Pusan–Seoul axis. From the Park regime through the Kim Young-Sam regime, although Cholla’s population remained roughly one-fourth of the total, elites never comprised more than 15% of the whole, and often closer to 10%.20 However, this often-adduced historical evidence is less convincing than it seems at first glance. Although, in part, this emphasis may have been prompted by prejudice, the Cholla region has historically been agricultural in focus, and we might expect that fewer elites would come from such a region in any country. In addition, there were also economic and political rationales for emphasizing development in Seoul and Pusan. Seoul as the capital, and Pusan as the major port with access to Japan, were the logical places to emphasize manufacturing and major port facilities. Perhaps the most dramatic incident that helped fuel regional passions was the Kwangju incident of 1980, when the military violently suppressed a protest movement in the Cholla provincial capital. Chun Doo Hwan, from Kyongsang, took front-line troops off the DMZ (the demilitarized zone on the border with North Korea) and violently quelled demonstrations in Cholla’s provincial capital city of Kwangju. Over two hundred citizens were killed, and there was a widespread belief in Cholla that Chun chose Kwangju as a place to show force, and that the United States supported Chun’s actions.21 Regardless of the causes, however, the effect has been slower political and economic growth in the Cholla provinces than in the Kyongsang provinces. 20 21

Choi, “Jiyok galdung”; and Choi, “Chungang insa wiwonhoi josa.” For discussions of the Kwangju incident, see Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 377–90; and John Wickham, Korea on the Brink: From the “12/12 incident” to the Kwangju Uprising, 1979–80 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1999).

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The year 1987 saw a series of dramatic political reforms in South Korea, culminating in the famous “June 29” announcement by Roh Tae-Woo. The most important of these reforms was the implementation of a direct presidential election and a new constitution, the ninth constitution since 1948. Almost as important was the lack of military intervention in 1987, which signaled that the military was determined not to interfere in the election results. Yet, despite all these obvious reasons for regionalism, it is interesting to note that regional voting in Korea is actually a fairly recent phenomenon. In 1963, 53% of the Cholla presidential vote went to Park Chung-Hee, as opposed to 38% for Yun Po-sun. Even in the 1971 national assembly election, the ruling Democratic Republican Party (DRP) received 53% of the Cholla vote, and the opposition New Korea Party, led by Kim DaeJung, received 41% of the vote in Kyongsang. In 1981, Chun’s ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP) received 38% of the Cholla vote, whereas the opposition received a roughly similar vote in Kyongsang and Cholla, 17% and 21%, respectively. Even in 1985, despite the dramatic return of Kim Dae-Jung from exile four days before the national assembly elections, the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP) received a 23% lower vote share than the ruling DJP in Cholla. Thus, stark regional voting behavior seems to be a relatively recent phenomenon, becoming prevalent only after 1987. This fact is striking and suggests an explanation other than mere regional antipathies: regional sentiment has existed for centuries, but actual voting behavior changed to strong hometown voting only in 1987. As with all deeply embedded cleavages in a society, the question is less whether one can trace it back to historical roots, and more when and why does the cleavage become expressed politically. There is a demonstrable variance in the intensity of regional bias over time in Korea. The issue is why voter sentiment changed so recently. Describing Regionalism: How Much, and When? The obvious explanation for a change in voting pattern after 1987 is that, in 1987 the rules changed. The reforms of 1987 provided the first reasonable possibility that the opposition might gain real political power without provoking a military backlash. In the 1992 presidential election, Kim Dae-Jung received over 90% of the Cholla vote and less than 10% of the Kyongsang vote, and Kim Young-Sam received 68% of the Kyongsang vote and less than 5% of the Cholla vote. This seems to show that regional voting arose in response to the 1987 reforms. To test this more rigorously, I performed a series of simple statistical calculations. I gathered the official voting results from the National

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Election Commission of South Korea from 1948 to 2000 and looked only at the Kyongsang and Cholla provinces. To see whether a regional bias had always existed, I first compared the votes for the ruling party with the votes for the major opposition party. Since 1967, the major opposition party has included or been run by Kim Dae-Jung, the favorite son of the Cholla region. In 1971, Kim almost beat Park Chung-Hee in a presidential campaign. The results indeed show that, although a regional voting disparity exists, it has been far more pronounced after democratization than before. It is possible to study the elections held under the authoritarian regimes despite the fact that the ruling party had obvious advantages in returning the vote. The elections held under Park and Chun, although manipulated, were relatively free, and the population participated extensively in both national assembly and presidential elections. As an expression of popular will, these elections are thus relatively accurate indicators. As Sunhyuk Kim notes, under Park Chung-Hee, “elections were held regularly and despite widespread corruption relatively freely. Voters felt they could influence, if not alter, the regime by participating in presidential and national assembly elections.”22 Even under Chun Doo-Hwan, the 1985 national assembly elections saw an 85% turnout rate, as voters made their preferences known. As will be explored in further detail in the following sections, the fact that the ruling party was able to provide pork and other financial incentives to voters and provide access to important government institutions is endogenous to the issue of voter preferences. That is, the fact that the ruling party had tremendous incumbent advantages helps explain why the electorate voted the way it did, and we cannot dismiss those results as meaningless just because the ruling party had an advantage. Indeed, there are two further theoretical reasons that using pre-1987 election data is a useful exercise. First, if the election results were completely random, then they would hold no information at all about voter preferences. But as long as these results are not completely random, they provide us with information about the electorate, despite the incumbent party’s demonstrable advantages. Second, the extensive efforts devoted to the elections by both ruling and opposition politicians and the high voter turnout are evidence that the elections were taken seriously by all concerned. I did remove from the dataset the elections that were held under the Yushin constitution of 1972–9; these were from voters essentially handpicked by Park, and they therefore do not genuinely reflect voter sentiment.23 22 23

Kim, The Politics of Democratization in Korea, 53. Gregory Henderson has called these election results “Pyongyang-style majorities.” See Gregory Henderson, “Constitutional Changes from the First to the Sixth Republics: 1948–87,” in Political Change in South Korea, ed. Ilpyong J. Kim and Young Whan Kihl (New York: Paragon House, 1988).

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Table 6.1 Cross-tab results, pre–1987a Vote for ruling party

Cholla

Kyongsang

Total

One SD below the mean

3 10.00 24 80.00 3 10.00 30 100.00

2 6.67 21 70.00 7 23.33 30 100.00

5 8.33 45 75.00 10 16.67 60 100.00

Within one SD of the mean One SD above the mean Total

a

Pearson chi2 (2) = 2.0000. Pr = 0.368.

I first took only the votes for the ruling party, from 1948 to 2000, and examined both the presidential and national assembly results for four provinces: north and south Kyongsang provinces and north and south Cholla provinces. I divided these data into three parts: high vote support for the ruling party, low vote support for the ruling party, and vote support that favored neither ruling nor opposition.24 This allowed me to explore whether there was any systematic relationship between region and voting for the ruling party or not. I then examined the data to test whether the votes were correlated with the 1987 reforms. The cross-tabulation proved to be revealing (Table 6.1). I accept the null hypothesis of independence: the two variables, region and vote, are independent of each other before 1987. Of sixty election results before 1987, the results from Cholla and Kyongsang look alike. The statistical test that best measures the relationship between two variables is the chi-square: the higher the chi-square, the greater the relationship between two variables. Table 6.4 has a chi-square of 2.0, which is well below the accepted level of significance.25 Now consider the results for elections held after 1987 (Table 6.2). The difference from the previous table is dramatic. After 1987, nine out of thirteen times the Cholla region voted more than one standard deviation lower for the ruling party, and at no time did it vote higher than the mean. The Kyongsang regions, on the other hand, voted four times higher than the mean and ten times at the mean, whereas at no time did the Kyongsang region vote against the ruling party, from which its 24

25

I did this by dividing the vote at one standard deviation above the mean, one standard deviation below the mean, and those votes within one standard deviation of the mean. One standard deviation is a typical measure of distance. Chi-square “is a test of the hypothesized structure against the null hypothesis” of independence between two variables. “As the chi-squared statistic increases, the more likely we are to reject the null hypothesis.” Eric Hanushek and John Jackson, Statistical Methods for Social Scientists (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), 322.

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Table 6.2 Cross-tab results, post–1987a Vote for ruling party

Cholla

Kyongsang

Total

One SD below the mean

9 69.29 5 35.71 0 0.00 14 100.00

0 0.00 10 71.43 4 28.57 14 100.00

9 32.14 15 53.57 4 14.29 28 100.00

Within one SD of the mean One SD above the mean Total

a

Pearson chi2 (2) = 14.6667. Pr = 0.001.

candidates were culled. With a high chi-square of 14.667 showing that the variables of region and vote are related, I can reject the null hypothesis of independence. To control for other factors, Table 6.3 presents the results of a regression that examines vote for the ruling party against the variables authoritarianism, region, and whether the election occurred after 1987, on all sixteen National Assembly elections and six relevant presidential elections in the two Honam and two Yongnam provinces. The regression shows the same strong results, that the shift in 1987 had a major impact on regional voting behavior. Before 1987, the difference in Cholla and Kyongsang votes for the ruling party was less than five percentage points (38.4 − 33.9 = 4.5), which is statistically significant but not substantively different. After 1987, the difference in region accounts for 38.4% of the difference in voting, which is of enormous substantive significance. Regional voting has dramatically increased since 1987, and each major election since then has been even more divided along regional lines. What can we conclude? As I will outline, the voting analysis supports the hypothesis that voters are acting strategically. This fully accounts for the dramatic shift in voting patterns after 1987, as the institutions changed and opposition parties had a realistic chance to assume power. Such voting, although regional, is not primordial or emotional, but based on a rational calculation of the differential return to their vote. Very few scholars, indeed, would argue that regionalism is irrational. This position might even be characterized as a “straw man.” Yet, if one nevertheless objects to regionalism in a democracy, this leads to a conundrum: if regionalism is rational, then voters are getting the leaders they want, and “the people have spoken.” What we care about in political science is the electoral connection: do politicians have to respond to voters, or can they ignore and manipulate the voters? The literature review at

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Table 6.3 Regression of vote for ruling party, 1948–2000a Vote

Coef.

SD

t

Kyongsang 38.42786 5.075559 7.571 Auth 25.1581 4.346449 5.788 KAuth −33.92883 6.163644 −5.505 Constant 14.09357 3.588962 3.927

P > |t|

95% Conf. interval

0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

28.33278 48.52294 16.51318 33.80301 −46.18807 −21.66959 6.955271 21.23187

F (3, 83) = 21.99, Prob > F = 0.0000, R 2 = 0.4429, Adj R 2 = 0.4227; Root MSE = 13.429; Dependent variable is vote for ruling party; Kyongsang = dummy variable for region (Cholla, Kyongsang); Auth = dummy variable for whether the vote occurred before or after 1987; Kauth = an interaction term for both Kyongsang and before or after 1987.

a

the beginning of this chapter reveals that scholars think regionalism is dangerous for Korean democracy, and I have shown that the institutions in Korea are allowing this expression of preferences. But, if regionalism is rational, and if it is a genuine expression of the popular will, it should not be the important issue that we think it is. The issue of regionalism is generally posed as an issue about preferences. Are some (issue-based) preferences “better” or “more democratic” than other (primordial) preferences? Our task here is to demonstrate that Korean regional voting is likely to be a fair reflection of the popular will, rather than something forced upon the electorate by political leaders or by institutional flaws. Korean democracy is, I submit, as we would expect it to be: rational voters make sophisticated calculations based on expected utility. How and why do people reach the preferences they have? This is a somewhat counterintuitive question. In general, we take preferences as given and ask whether the outcome is a natural response to the opportunities presented. If voters are forward looking, and if they make decisions based on expected utility, it is difficult to fault them for their actions. Why Regional Voting Was Muted Before 1987: Voter Preferences and Changing Institutions The change in voting patterns before and after 1987, as noted, is dramatic. Although regional prejudices have existed for centuries, voters preferred the ruling party until 1987. What accounts for this rapid change? There are two possibilities. The shift in voter preferences (and regionalism) might comprise nuanced assessments made by forward-looking voters based on reasonable guesses about the individual costs and

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benefits to the voter of electing various leaders.26 If so, there is no threat to democracy. On the other hand, voter preferences (and regionalism) might be determined solely on an emotional basis, as suggested by various scholars. This thesis implies a lack of consolidation of democracy in Korea. How can we discern the difference between the two in practice? One simple analysis begins with a focus on the individual benefits. Based on the simple assumption that voters want more for themselves from the government rather than less, we would expect that calculated voting would involve a choice of which leader might be most likely to provide benefits to the person voting. This would be calculated voting, or a vote in rational self-interest. Alternatively, voting might involve voting either for the hometown candidate regardless of the probability of providing selective benefits, or voting against the hated ruling party candidate regardless of the potential benefits. This would be emotional or “primordial” voting. These alternatives are represented by the following hypotheses. 1. Calculated voting: A favorite son is preferred to a government party candidate, who is in turn preferred to another opposition candidate. That is, if voting is in calculated self-interest, voters from various regions would prefer their own candidate to win the election because, at the executive or legislative level, a hometown favorite would provide better selective benefits to the hometown. However, if the favorite son is not a viable candidate, then a calculating voter would prefer the government (or strongest) party to win, because that candidate would be most likely to be part of the government and therefore able to provide legislation or pork to the region. Another opposition candidate who had effectively no chance of ruling in the capital would be the least likely to be politically able to provide selective benefits. 2. Emotional voting: A favorite son is preferred to other opposition candidate, who is in turn preferred to a government party candidate. If voting is emotional and based on regional rivalries and resentments, the regionalist bias is intense. In blind favoritism to the hometown candidate or in blind opposition to the government (or rival regional) party, there is no room for compromise. If the hometown candidate cannot win, there is still a bias against the potential ruling party if from the rival region. To determine which thesis is correct, we must look not only at the two leading candidates, or the leading candidates from the rival regions, but also at the rank-ordering of all candidates. Note that in this formulation there is not necessarily the need or even the goal of huge programmatic 26

On prospective and retrospective voting, see David Lanoue, “Retrospective and Prospective Voting in Presidential-Year Elections,” Political Research Quarterly 47 (1994): 193–205.

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differences between the competing candidates. Voters only need to be aware of minor differences to have a preference for one over the other.27 This approach presents implications for voting patterns pre– and post– 1987 reforms. First, if Hypothesis 1 is correct, it follows that we should see a shift in voting patterns after 1987. Before 1987, the threat of military intervention, incumbency advantages to the ruling party, and rapid economic growth meant that the opposition had little chance of gaining power. Thus, if a voter wanted to have benefits come his way from the central government, the best option was to vote for a member of the ruling party. Voting for the opposition party meant wasting a vote and also potentially incurring the wrath of the ruling party. Given Hypothesis 2, widespread support for the party of a favorite son would be hypothesized to dominate preferences even pre–1987, if the likely winner came from the rival region. Yet this, as our analysis shows, is not what occurred. The reforms of 1987 would naturally lead us to expect a shift in voting behavior, on the thesis that Korean voters vote in rational self-interest (i.e., Hypothesis 1 is supported). After 1987, voters in Cholla could realistically expect their candidates to win, and with elections being truly contested, we should see a shift toward regional voting behavior. Longsimmering frustrations over differential treatment by the Kyongsang military governments were no longer inevitable, and the potential existed that a Cholla-based party could win and hold power. Thus, after 1987, we should expect to see voters not voting as consistently for the government. And this is what we do, in fact, see. Voters during the military governments knew that Kim Dae-Jung had little chance of winning, nor did his party have any realistic chance of gaining power. Thus, it seems that voters preferred to get what they could from the likely victor, a “bandwagon” effect. Even in 1985, the Cholla provinces voted for the ruling party. This makes sense if viewed through the prism of voters hoping to get pork and other considerations from the ruling party. Given a genuine possibility of the opposition party gaining power, and lacking any of the other axes upon which to distinguish themselves, voters and politicians rely on hometown as an indicator of the possibility for receiving pork and other benefits from the central government. There is, as noted, a second implication for voting patterns in our two theses. Given a variety of parties and candidates (and there is never a shortage of aspiring political parties and hopeful candidates), even if the most popular candidate regionally is from that region, if voters are calculating (as opposed to emotional), the second-place candidate would normally be from the ruling party, or from the party most likely, or next 27

See Samuel Popkin, The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

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Table 6.4 Ruling party’s results by Cholla district, 1985–8

1985 National assembly election 1987 Presidential 1988 National assembly

Cholla districts placing the ruling party first

Cholla districts placing the ruling party second

Total districts

13

3

16

0 0

40 32

40 32

Source: Sindonga ( January 1988), 31.

most likely, to win. That is, a voter in Cholla-do may think: “I most want my favorite son to win. However, if that is not realistic, let me at least gain some benefits from the party most likely to take power, by voting for a likely winner.” Conversely, emotional voting would be biased against the ruling party candidate no matter what the costs. In this case, we would find the ruling party candidate running third or, if possible, worse in the rival region. In the Kyongsang provinces, that is, we would see voters prefer Kim Dae Jung (or the opposition candidate from his party) least often, no matter what the likely costs and benefits of such a vote. The party that finishes second in each region, therefore, shows the deeper preferences of the electorate as a whole. To gauge this outcome, I have taken three elections that straddle the 1987 democratic transition and looked at the vote by districts. What we see is that just before 1987, during the 1985 National Assembly election, the ruling DJP placed first even in Cholla, the home region of Kim Dae Jung (Table 6.4). This vote for the ruling party occurred despite the dramatic return of Kim DaeJung from exile just before the election, and only five years after the Kwangju riot. However, the 1987 presidential election and the 1988 National Assembly election show that, although the vote for Kim Dae Jung increased dramatically, the second-place candidate was the ruling party’s Roh Tae-Woo, even in Cholla. Other opposition candidates, such as Kim Young-Sam in 1987, placed behind the ruling party candidates. Even in 1988, the ruling party still outpolled Kim Young-Sam, the alternative to Kim Dae-Jung as opposition candidate. Thus, we can see that Korean voters acted in ways commensurate with the theoretical hypothesis of sophisticated voting. Regional voting patterns seem to reveal a nuanced calculation by voters of their expected outcomes. The main caveat to this approach is the use of aggregate-level data to infer individual preferences. This is clearly a second-best alternative to

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Table 6.5 Issues and politics-shifting public opinion Pre–1987 Economic issues Security issues

Grudging consensus as long as the pie was expanding Widespread agreement to contain and deter North Korea

1987–97

Post–1997

Transition

Stark disagreement over the pace and style of reform Two significant choices: to deter or to engage (DJ’s “sunshine” policy)

Transition

individual-level data. The problem is that individual-level data, the form of surveys, opinion polls, or voting data, is prohibitively difficult to obtain pre–1987. Conclusion: Regionalism and Democratic Consolidation in Korea Regional voting, then, is not a matter for concern for Korean democracy. It simply demonstrates that, to date, voters see the overwhelming issue as advancing their interests by a favorite-son candidate with a well-developed personal network and political machine. As time goes on, other, more substantive issues may emerge. If we broaden our definition of interests, even this question of issue voting is not as far away as we might think. To date, Korean politics has been marked by general consensus on major issues. This has led, in the first instance, to traditionally strong preferences for the incumbent government. For decades, the overwhelming goals were an end to military rule and rapid economic growth. National security, particularly due to the Cold War and the Korean War, was an issue on which there was widespread consensus that hard-line containment and competition with the North was the only feasible option. On economic issues, an emerging middle-class (although not labor) was willing to tolerate cozy government–business relations as long as their own situation was steadily improving (Table 6.5). But there is reason to believe that other issues, beyond regional loyalties, will soon emerge. Despite executive manipulation of the constitutional process, attempts to subvert the electoral process and outright coercion, civil society in Korea has always been very outspoken and active, and has had a major effect on Korean politics. Top-down control over the expression of popular sentiment has never been particularly successful in the Korean context. From the April 19, 1960, student revolts against Syngman Rhee and the 1965 protests against normalization of ties with Japan, through the student protests of the early 1970s that helped push

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Park Chung-Hee to declare martial law, the 1980 Kwangju incident, and the 1987 democracy protests, Korean society has not been quiescent and passive. As Hagen Koo writes, “despite the state’s unusual strength and pervasive presence, civil society in the South has never been completely stifled but has always demonstrated a subversive, combative, character.”28 Sunhyuk Kim places primary causal importance on civil society, arguing that “groups in civil society significantly precipitated if not directly caused authoritarian breakdowns, facilitated democratic transitions, and, to a large extent, also determined the dynamics of posttransitional politics [in Korea].”29 This history makes it unlikely that relatively minor institutional flaws will be able to suppress voter expression of concern over issues other than regionalism that they feel are important. Such struggles indeed seem now to be moving into the field of electoral politics, as they should be in a consolidating democracy. Economic maturity and the waning of the North Korean threat have made this possible, and have begun to erode the social consensus that has dominated political discourse to this point. Differences in policy have begun to emerge. With respect to economic policy, there has long been resentment against the power and corruption associated with the large conglomerates. Despite widespread rhetoric by previous administrations, in reality little was done to affect any change. In part, this resulted from backroom dealing between politicians and chaebol, but it also reflected the enormous success of Korea’s developmental policies in the previous four decades. With the sudden and severe shock of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, it was clear that two divergent choices presented themselves: reform or resistance. Although earlier attempts were made at globalization (Kim YoungSam’s famous catch phrase of segyehwa) and internationalization (gukjehwa), for the most part, Korea’s economic and business life had not tightly integrated itself into the world. Prior to the IMF crisis, globalization had meant increasing exports and investing overseas, not necessarily reforming the longstanding political economy of Korea. It was a matter of generally noncontroversial civic boosterism. When the crisis hit, however, it became clear that a choice must be made between reform and defiance. It was by no means an easy or an obvious choice, but what had been put off now demanded resolution. Consensus had given way to divergent views. Thus, finally, in 1997, voters were presented with economic policy as an issue. The late 1990s also presented South Koreans with a choice previously absent with respect to foreign policy. As long as North Korea 28 29

Hagen Koo, “Strong State and Contentious Society,” in State and Society in Contemporary Korea, ed. Hagen Koo (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 232. Kim, The Politics of Democratization in Korea, 5.

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remained a clear and present danger, falling into line behind government policies and a hard line seemed required. The weakened position of North Korea, brought about by agricultural problems and the stagnation of its command economy, combined with widespread suspicions about its nuclear program, has given South Koreans a new issue, and no clear path. A significant majority in both Korea and the United States favor hard-line containment policies, but there is a significant minority that favors engaging the North and reducing tension through warmer policies.30 Kim Dae Jung exhibited the first manifestation of this as his “sunshine” policy. Finally, in 1997, voters were presented with foreign policy as an issue. The 1997 presidential election presented both these issues, economic and foreign, as stark policy choices for the first time. It should not be surprising that these issues have taken time to emerge as an independent force in Korea. Many institutions and organizational vestiges of top-down control survived into the democratic era; they did not instantly disappear with the 1987 reforms. Therefore, gradual change is to be expected. Following 1987 and the first generally free election, 1992 saw a transition within the ruling party to a nonmilitary executive, and 1997 saw a genuine opposition candidate win. Democracy was consolidating, steadily but gradually. Reflecting this consolidation, as might have been anticipated, there has been a rapid increase in the number of civil action groups in Korea. In the 1990s, citizens’ groups expanded their focus beyond their historical function of pursuing democracy to encompass a wide array of issues. Sunhyuk Kim notes that the Citizens’ Solidarity for the National Assembly Elections (ch’ongson yondae) assessed political candidates on issues such as corruption and tax evasion, and publicly disclosed a list of eighty-six candidates who were suspect, 70% of whom were defeated in the April 2000 election.31 The People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (Ch’amyo yondae) was established in 1994 to pursue economic reform and a dismantling of the cronyistic chaebol system. Since that time, People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) has been active in pursuing minority shareholder’s rights, anticorruption, and other reform agendas, becoming a political force in its own right. In addition, environmental groups such as the Korean Anti-Pollution Movement Association, labor unions, and other groups have become active in pursuing substantive political agendas tied to various types of reform. Thus, at the beginning of the new millennium, there has been a great deal of evolution of politics in Korea, with many interest groups pursuing 30 31

For more on this, see Victor Cha, “Engagement and Containment of North Korea,” ms., Georgetown University, 1998. Kim, The Politics of Democratization in Korea, 121.

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a multiple set of agendas. As Sunhyuk Kim writes, “[By 2000] the state has incrementally become something different, something to engage, accept, affect, restrain, and control.”32 Voters still see their interests as best advanced by a favorite-son candidate with a well-developed personal network and political machine, but new issues are emerging. The real questions are: When will these more substantive issues begin to vie with regionalism as a voting criterion? How will this affect politics in Korea? The first area for further research is whether further changes in the electoral institutions would lead to different types of voting patterns. To the extent that Korean politicians and voters feel that regional voting is deleterious to their idea of democracy, further changes to the institutional system might lead to additional changes in voting behavior. Korean scholars have debated extensively whether a move to a parliamentary system based on a prime minister or an alteration in the size and number of the electoral districts would have an effect on how Korean voters see their interests best represented.33 The second area for further study involves expanding our view of institutions to include political parties and elite decision making under constraints. In this chapter, I have consciously attempted to keep a narrow focus to provide a detailed treatment of the issue of regionalism and electoral institutions. I have examined Korean politics from the bottom up, focusing on whether the electoral institutions allowed for an expression of Korean voters’ sentiments. An alternative approach is to examine politics and, in particular, the institutions of political parties, from the top down. The institutional structure as it currently exists is a mix of organized, money-based political machines that return the vote. We might ask whether and why the parties, the elites, and the leading politicians are structured in such a way as to emphasize regionalism, or to provide incentives for politicians to behave in a certain manner. The reality is that party organization and the selection of political candidates depend to a great degree on the organization of those parties. The party leadership controls candidate lists and fundraising, and has centralized control. This leads to a choice to either go along with the party leader or strike out individually; without the organization or resources of the party, there is little room for internal reform. From this perspective, Korean regionalism might be represented as a function of weakly institutionalized parties that respond to a generation of political leaders that all began their careers in the 1960s. That is, political parties are weak and provide no voter choice, with leaders of all parties 32 33

Kim, The Politics of Democratization in Korea, 131. See, for example, Chi-won Kang, “The Pros and Cons of the Political Choice Between the Presidential and Cabinet System,” Korea and World Affairs 16, no. 4 (1992): 695–713.

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still forming constituent bases of support rather than responding to them, while power and policymaking still revolve around the executive branch and its collusive ties to big business.34 Nevertheless, although such an inquiry might be valuable, it could not definitively challenge the essential thesis that democracy is consolidating. At some point, the parties will want to maximize their vote share for the National Assembly, and so they will modify their stances, moving from zero-sum to positive-sum politics. This is, ultimately, a matter of their own self-interest. Machine politics of this sort is not a uniquely Korean phenomenon, nor is it an unexpected or unnatural phase in the consolidation of democracy. Looking at Korea in a comparative context provides us with a better sense of the difficulties involved in institutionalizing political processes. Korea is not that different from other countries in similar circumstances. For example, the elimination of political machines in the United States was a decades-long process that began as early as the 1870s but only finally succeeded after World War II.35 In Japan’s historically multimember districts, there was little incentive for parties to develop policy platforms, because members of the same party would compete against each other in the same district. Japanese politics has still not gone beyond the dango system, pork barrel politics, and personal vote machines (koenkai).36 Political entrepreneurs and rational parties will find a way to respond to regional voting patterns and work with them. They will do the same in the face of other issues, as they emerge. Given the current political situation in Korea, it currently makes sense to vote for a favorite son. Thus, our focus shifts from blaming regionalism to looking at why and how it exists in the first place. Based on my analysis, it is clear that voters pursue their interests. If the analysis presented in this chapter is accurate, regionalism and other interests will continue to coexist for some time before more substantive interests take precedence. But there is no great cause for concern; this is a natural development. The outlook for Korean democracy is good; a strong civil society in Korea may be able to present its wishes and opinions far sooner than we think, and Korean democracy may be more vibrant and resilient than is popularly believed. 34 35

36

See Kang, “The Institutional Foundations of Korean Politics.” For an excellent study on American political machines, see Steve Erie, Rainbow’s End: Irish–Americans and the Dilemmas of Urban Machine Politics, 1840–1985 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). See Brian Woodall, Japan Under Construction: Corruption, Politics, and Public Works (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); and Mark Ramseyer and Frances Rosenbluth, Japan’s Political Marketplace, chapter 2 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).

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Acknowledgments Special thanks to Samuel Kim, Jeong-ho Roh, Lynn Vavreck, Dean Spiliotes, Jeff Lewis, and the participants of the Conference “Korean Democratic Consolidation,” held at Columbia University, May 24–5, 2001, for their comments on a draft.

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CHAPTER 7

Crafting and Consolidating Constitutional Democracy in Korea Jeong-Ho Roh

Introduction Korea’s road to democracy has been a rocky one and fraught with a seemingly endless succession of trial and error. Although a formal Westernized form of government began with liberation from thirty-five years of Japanese colonial rule in 1945, it was not until three years later, in May 1948, that general elections were held. This led to the organization of the national assembly of Korea and the first major nation-building milestone – promulgation of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea on July 17, 1948.1 Having had no prior experience in a Western form of democracy, the question in the minds of many at the outset was whether this foreign system would be compatible with the pressing need to construct a politically stable nation, a nation that could provide the impetus for reconstructing an economy left impoverished after Japanese colonial rule. At the same time, and perhaps more importantly, it was not clear whether there was collective recognition and acceptance that, henceforth, this newly promulgated constitution would be the supreme law of the land, to be respected and recognized by the political leaders as the foremost principle to follow in governing the country. As witnessed during the ensuing decades of struggle for democratization in Korea, uncertainty surrounding whether political leaders would respect and follow the law as laid down by this piece of paper provides a suitable characterization of the debate over the relationship between “rule of law” and governance in Korea. How best to govern has been defined by a pattern of experimentation and has, at varying times, involved 1

For a detailed history of the period preceding promulgation of the Constitution in 1948, see, Un-Tae Kim, Hankook Chongchi Ron, 3rd ed. (Treatise on Korean politics) (Seoul: Bak Young Sa, 1994).

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alternately switching between a presidential system and a parliamentary system with numerous variations to the election process and switching between direct and indirect voting with frequent changes to the term of office for the president. Although it is arguable that each change to the rules of governance was effected through amendments to the constitution, it is at best simplistic to equate the amendment process with the exercise of the “rule of law.” A renewed interest in the rule of law has been sparked in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis and the subsequent IMF bailout of Korea in 1997 where, more than ever, the need for fundamental reforms and restructuring of the economy took on a sense of urgency. The “quick, quick, quick” mentality proved to be a successful formula for the stunning economic growth during President Park Chung Hee’s authoritarian regime. Until the early 1990s, this formula along with strong state leadership managed to usher the private sector toward high growth in response to changing global economics.2 The Asian financial crisis and the ensuing IMF bailout of Korea in 1997, however, underscored the structural weakness of an economy suffering from fundamental deficiencies in efficient use of capital brought on by emphasis on growth and diversification. Although the primary focus of restructuring and reforming the very Chaebolcentered economy that had in fact been the catalyst for Korea’s economic growth during the past decades, it became clear that widespread changes would be required for key areas in the economy such as corporate governance, shareholder rights, and financial and banking sectors.3 It also became clear that reforms would not be limited to the economy but also to existing laws to address lingering problems of bribery and corruption in Korea.4 The success of any such restructuring efforts in the economy or otherwise would necessarily depend on establishment of the rule of law as a matter of course.5 The basis for this belief was that adherence to the principles of the rule of law formed the cornerstone for supporting democracy and sustainable economic growth.6 The main purpose of this chapter is to explore the theme of the rule of law and constitutional democracy in Korea by examining the exercise of structural and institutionalized powers of the president in relation to the 2 3

4

5 6

“South Korea: Quick, quick, quick,” The Economist, 3 June 1995. Hwa-Jin Kim, “Living with the IMF: A New Approach to Corporate Governance and Regulation of Financial Institutions in Korea,” Berkeley Journal of International Law 17 (1999): 6. See John Larkin, “Graft Busters Hit the Streets” Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 October 2001 (indicating that a recent polls show “Koreans viewed eliminating corruption a priority second only to economic growth”). See Thomas Carothers, “The Rule of Law Revival,” Foreign Affairs 77(2) (1998). Barry M. Hager, The Rule of Law: A Lexicon for Policy Makers (Washington, DC: The Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs, 2000), .

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constitution. To this end, four distinct but related topics that illustrate the deep-rooted, and often conflicting, characteristics of the relationship between the president and the constitution have been selected: (1) constitutionalism and political legitimacy, (2) role of the prime minister, (3) regionalism, and (4) judicial review. These topics are not intended to comprise an exhaustive list of themes in this field, but have been chosen because they tend to best illuminate the pervasive detachment of the constitution in the minds of the people as the supreme law of the land and the difficulty of socializing the rule of law concept and constitutionalism. This chapter begins first with a conceptual framework for the rule of law in the Korean context contrasted with how such a concept is generally understood in Western discourse. It will then be followed by an analysis of the debate surrounding the special bill that retroactively permitted punishment of ex-Presidents Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo. The Rule of Law in Context One assumes as a matter of course that countries adhering to Westernstyle democracy govern themselves by following a set of predetermined and institutionalized rules. The notion of being bound by a set of rules that have been determined beforehand – a concept referred to loosely as “rule of law” – is an ancient ideal and tradition and one that is fundamental to the Western democratic order. Moreover, the debate favoring the rule of law ideal above the discretion of the ruler can be traced to even the earliest discourse on democratic governance and has since formed the time-honored premise upon which Western democracies are established. This being granted as a truism, what precisely is the “rule of law?” Further, is the rule of law a singular concept to be universally applied in all circumstances – in which case, the rule of law – or can there be tolerable variations to the rule of law taking into account particular historic, legal, social, and cultural norms? Even Western scholars have been grappling with this question of exacting a universal definition of the rule of law. For example, George Fletcher observes, “In English, we are never quite sure what we mean by the ‘Rule of Law.’ Do we mean rule by laws laid down – whether the legal rules are good or bad? Or do we mean ‘rule by Law,’ by the right rules, by the rules that meet the tests of morality and justice?”7 There is no absolute and universally accepted definition of the rule of law, and considerable confusion surrounds its exact meaning. As a starting point, the rule of law at its highest level of abstraction can be characterized as one of “marking the transition from the rule of person to that of an impersonal and 7

Hager, op cit. (quoting George P. Fletcher).

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neutral order, which protects the citizen against discretionary and arbitrary power, ensures equality with others, guarantees procedural fairness, impartial administration of the law through independent courts, a democratic process of law making, the rules which both define and enforce the limits on the powers of state institutions as well as set out the scope of legitimate state intervention in the affairs of its citizens.”8 On the other hand, although these normative elements comprising the definition of the rule of law are generally accepted in Asia as principles that foster democracy and economic prosperity in a globalized world, much of the debate has centered on finding a sensible approach as how best to implement the rule of law concept. One of the arguments is that this concept is essentially a product of Western cultural and legal norms and thus cannot simply be transplanted in non-Western legal traditions without varying degrees of modification to take into account different social, cultural, and legal norms.9 For example, placing importance on social harmony by emphasizing communitarian values (interdependent nature of relationships) as opposed to individualism,10 or the importance placed on the concept of li, which is often translated as proper norms of behavior governing all social relations, or as “rites” or “decorum,”11 are deeply entrenched values finding its roots in Confucian culture that may arguably be at odds with the Western legal tradition of stressing individual rights and utilizing a formal legalistic approach.12 There does not seem to be an easy answer to how one harmonizes the task of implementation of the rule of law and at the same time pay deference to certain traditional values. The easiest approach may be to simply embrace the Western rule of law as the supreme principle. Although Korea has made significant progress on this front, many scholars still suggest a lack of rule of law in Korea.13 Moreover, as illustrated in the 8 9

10 11

12

13

Ghai, Y., “The Rule of Law, Legitimacy and Governance,” International Journal of Sociology of Law 14 (1986): 182–3. See Zhenmin Wang, “The Rule of Law in China,” Harvard Asia Quarterly 4 (Autumn 2000), ; Mason Hills, “The Rule of Law and Democracy in Hong Kong – Comparative Analysis of British Liberalism and Chinese Socialism,” E Law (1994), ; Joon-Hyung Hong, The Rule of Law and Its Acceptance in Asia: A View from Korea (Washington, DC: The Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs, 2000), 147. Wm. Theodore de Bary, Asian Values and Human Rights: A Confucian Communitarian Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998). Although it is difficult to find an exact English translation for the term li that would capture its broad meaning, it is understood as an essential form of behavior basic to relationships in all social settings. Barry M. Hager, The Rule of Law: Defining It and Defending It in the Asian Context (Washington, DC: The Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs, 2000), 2, . Chan Jin Kim, “Korean Attitudes Towards Law,” Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 10 (2000), 2–4.

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following sections, Korea’s experimentation with democracy shows that, all too often, the existence of a formal legal system and a constitution are not sufficient to guarantee the democratic process. The Special Bill: A Step Backward? October 26, 1979 remains in the memory of most Koreans as the day that the extraordinary legacy of President Park Chung Hee, who had ruled Korea for eighteen years with an iron hand, came to an abrupt end at the hands of the chief of his intelligence agency. For the countless number of pro-democracy activists who had opposed Park’s authoritarian rule in Korea in favor of a democratically elected civilian government, his death signaled hope for an end to the cycle of military dictatorships and renewed hope for a democratic form of government based on the principle of the rule of law. However, it was not until thirteen years after that fateful night, that Korea’s first democratically elected president took office.14 In late 1995, President Kim Young Sam embarked on an extraordinary journey from which he could not return by ordering the arrest of his immediate predecessor, Roh Tae Woo, on charges of corruption during his term in office.15 Scarcely before the dust had settled over the initial euphoria (or shock) in political circles, or even among ordinary Korean citizens, regarding this rather unexpected and startling turn of events, President Kim Young Sam did another quite astounding thing. He also ordered the arrest of ex-President Chun Doo Hwan on charges of treason and military mutiny for his involvement in events that took place during a power vacuum created by the assassination of President Park Chung Hee in October 1979. After the assassination of President Park Chung Hee, then-General Chun led the military investigation into the assassination. On December 14

15

In 1989, Roh’s democratic justice party failed to win the majority in the national assembly elections even though Roh had won the presidential elections that were held the previous year. Out of the 299 seats, Roh’s party took 125 seats (40.1%), whereas Kim Dae Jung’s party gained seventy seats (23.4%), Kim Young Sam’s party held fifty-nine seats (19.7%), and Kim Jong Pil’s party won thirty-five seats (10.7%), including proportional representation. To break the deadlock, Roh’s party engineered a merger in 1990 with two opposition parties, the democratic party led by Kim Young Sam and the unified republican party led by Kim Jong Pil, to form the democratic liberal party (DLP). In 1992, Kim Young Sam ran against his lifelong opposition colleague and rival Kim Dae Jung for president. Kim Young Sam won the election, receiving 41.4% of the vote compared with 33.4% for Kim Dae Jung, to become the first civilian president since 1960. Ex-President Roh was charged with accepting illegal “gifts” from major corporations amounting to approximately $633 U.S. million during his term of office from 1988 to 1993. Roh was subsequently also charged and found guilty for his involvement in treason and mutiny. See generally James M. West, “Martial Lawlessness: The Legal Aftermath of Kwangju,” Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 6 (1997), 85–168, for a detailed account of this period.

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12, 1979, Chun, Roh, and their associates forcibly arrested General Chung Seung Hwa, the Army Chief of Staff, alleging General Chung’s involvement in the assassination and obstruction of the investigation. This paved the way for Chun to seize the control of the army. After this “military mutiny” by Chun (commonly known in Korea as “December 12 mutiny”), massive demonstrations erupted all across the country demanding the return of civilian rule and democratization. In Kwangju, armed demonstrators took over the city and on May 18, 1980, paratroopers were ordered to move into Kwangju to defeat the civilian militia. In the ensuing clash between the paratroopers and the demonstrators, by official count, 250 demonstrators and bystanders were killed and thousands were injured (commonly referred to as the “Kwangju incident” or “May 18 incident”). This event allowed Chun to disgrace and jail many opposition leaders, including Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, and Kim Jong Pil. Chun and his military junta eventually forced the interim President, Choi Kyu Ha, to resign and hand over power to the military leaders. The Special Bill and Controversy over Retroactivity In what has been called the “trial of the century,”16 on August 26, 1996, the Seoul District Court handed down the death sentence for Chun, and 22-1/2 years’ imprisonment for Roh for their respective roles in the mutiny and treason. This was in addition to a fine of 226 billion won for Chun and 283 billion won for Roh, representing amounts received as illegal gifts from corporations during their respective terms of office.17 In two swift hitherto unthinkable and unprecedented moves, President Kim Young Sam not only attempted to publicly sever the lingering association he had maintained with the former authoritarian governments, but had answered the popular will of the people who were seeking more than a token stance by the government to address wrongdoing in previous governments.18 The simplistic argument was that holding Chun and Roh accountable for their past wrongdoing was a necessary process in “setting history right,” and was consistent with the popular will of the people whose goal was to firmly implant democracy in Korea. The often overlooked aspect of this argument is whether history had been set right through the exercise of the rule of law or through means at odds with the rule of 16

17 18

Much of the Western press has observed that this trial bears remarkable resemblance to the trial of the Gang of Four in China where others including Chairman Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, were condemned for crimes committed while they were in power by people who had been their victims. Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 October 1996. Ex-President Choi Kyu Hwa was fined a token 100,000 won ($120 U.S.) for ignoring a court order to testify in the appeals trial of his two successors. In 1988, President Roh was forced to send his predecessor, Chun, classmate and political ally, on a self-imposed domestic exile to a remote Buddhist temple in what is described as a characteristically Korean way of imposing extrajudicial, but face saving, punishment for “irregularities” that had occurred during Chun’s tenure as president.

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law but politically expedient in response to the overwhelming will of the people. At issue is the enactment of a special legislation, known as the “Special Act on the May 18 Democratization Movement”19 introduced shortly after the arrest of ex-President Roh Tae Woo on corruption charges. This would enable prosecutions to proceed against ex-President Chun and his cohorts on charges of mutiny and the subsequent killing of civilians during the Kwangju uprising of May 1980. A fifteen-year statute of limitations for offenses punishable by death was in existence under the law at that time,20 the fifteen year-period commencing at the completion of the criminal act.21 The special legislation was required because, by November 1995, this fifteen-year period since the events of Kwangju in May 1980 had passed by a few months.22 The special bill included a specific clause stating that the statute of limitations for those involved in “crimes destructive of constitutional order” (the December 12, 1979 mutiny and the May 18, 1980 Kwangju incident)23 would be suspended “during the period in which there existed a cause preventing the nation from exercising its prosecutorial powers,” that is, until February 24, 1993, the day that President Kim Young Sam was inaugurated as president. In response to constitutionality challenges of the special bill, on February 16, 1996, the nine justices of the constitutional court rendered its decision with four justices holding that the special bill was “not unconstitutional” as passage of the special bill by the national assembly reflected the popular will of the people for justice. Although a majority, five justices, found the special bill to be a retroactive application24 of the law and, hence, “inconsistent with the constitution,” the special bill was upheld because a supermajority vote of six justices was required for a ruling of unconstitutionality.25 19 20 21 22

23 24

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Law No. 5029, promulgated December 21, 1995. Article 249 of the code of criminal procedure. Article 252 of the code of criminal procedure. Article 84 of the constitution provides for limited immunity from criminal prosecution for incumbent presidents with the exception of insurrection or treason. As a purely legal matter, though unrealistic at the time, it is arguable that a president could have been removed from office for acts of insurrection or treason committed during their term of office. The Kwangju incident was renamed the “Kwangju Democratization Movement.” The fourth revision to the constitution in 1960, allowed for retroactive punishment of those found guilty of election irregularities, corruption, and misappropriation of public property during the previous regime. Popular pressure was responsible for passage of this constitutional exception to the principles prohibiting ex post facto penalties. A similar case arose in Bangladesh when the new prime minister was murdered along with more than a dozen members of his family. Hasina Wajed, daughter of the first prime minister of Bangladesh, was unable to prosecute her father’s murderers because, as was the case in Korea, the law stood in the way. However, unlike the case in Korea where the statute of limitations had expired, the Bangladesh government incorporated into its constitution a law protecting those involved in the murders from prosecution. Quoted in Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 October 1996.

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The controversial law and ruling by the constitutional court, which ultimately paved the way for the district court to hold two former presidents guilty of mutiny, treason, and corruption, may have achieved success in setting history right. However, at the same time, Korea’s new democracy had to face its first meaningful test of constitutionality and the rule of law. Can this be considered an extraordinary event of such enormous national magnitude that adherence to formal legalism would have undermined the very foundation of society and its legal system? Or, rather, did Korea take an irreparable step backward, paying mere lip service to the principle of the rule of law by denigrating the legal system as an instrument of those in power, to be wielded against people who are no longer in power?26 The following sections attempt to trace the historic underpinnings of how the political elites have tackled the issue of constitutionalism and the rule of law in the Korean context. The deeply entrenched political apparatus for the consolidation of presidential power will also be explored. Constitutionalism and Political Legitimacy In the aftermath of liberalization from Japanese colonial rule, the political elites of Korea faced a divided country with virtually no viable economic activity. They were faced with the daunting task of having to establish their political legitimacy as the leaders of a new country and simultaneously create a consensus among the Korean people on the form of government that the political elites would establish. It was clear that there would be a clean political break from the Confucian heritage of the past in favor of a modern system of democracy. However, neither the people of Korea, nor the political elites themselves, possessed much “capacity beyond borrowing the Anglo-American political practices, institutions, and formula with little ‘creative’ adaptation of their own.”27 In describing the circumstances surrounding the birth of the new constitution, Hahm Pyong-choon makes the following illuminating observations: Finding themselves unable to cite precedents in the nation’s own history, the modern elites have had to use the precedents in the histories of Western democracies as the only valid criterion for the legitimacy of their actions. But this kind of reliance on textbook expositions of democracy was bound to implant a seed of frustration and disappointment in the modern legitimacy. Given a totally different political culture and a populace little familiar with Western political myths, the modern elites were bound to encounter disappointment in their endeavor to live up to the standards laid down by such textbooks on democracy.28 26 27 28

Frank Ching, “Korean Trial Sets Bad Precedent: Law Is Used as Instrument to Exact Vengeance by Those in Power,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 October 1996. Pyong-choon Hahm, Korean Jurisprudence, Politics and Culture (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1986), 193. Quoted in Hahm, op. cit., 194.

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Comparable to the debate surrounding the drafting of the U.S. Constitution, prevention of tyranny and concentration of power played a major role in shaping the direction of the original constitution of Korea.29 Under circumstances similar to that of the United States, Korea had also founded a new nation upon liberation from colonial rule, and drafters of the constitution favored and, in fact, drafted the constitution as a bicameral parliamentary system.30 Despite this original intention, it was ironically the demands of the then-chairman of the national assembly, Syungman Rhee, for a unicameral legislature and a strong presidential system that eventually prevailed.31 Rather than for reasons of ideological conviction or belief, Syungman Rhee advocated this system as a means of consolidating the power of the executive around himself. In the five decades following the promulgation of the original constitution, there have been nine constitutional amendments and five succeeding republics32 . A review of constitutional amendments in Korea are testimony not only to political instability but they also clearly demonstrate how those in power attempted to extend their terms of office by revising the constitution in response to challenges to political legitimacy. The first and second revisions to the constitution were clear attempts by President Syungman Rhee to extend his term of office. During the first revision in 1952, Rhee allowed a direct popular vote for the presidency because the national assembly was controlled by political parties opposed to him. Through a campaign of terror, the amendment bill passed unanimously and Rhee was reelected president. The third revision to the constitution was occasioned by the fall of Rhee’s government by popular revolt. This revision created the second republic under a parliamentary system replacing the presidential system. The second republic,33 however, was replaced by the third republic a short time thereafter by a military coup headed by General Park Chung Hee in 1962. The major change of the fifth revision was to reinstate a presidential system with direct popular elections. A sixth revision was undertaken in 1969 to ensure a third term 29 30 31

32

33

Tscholsu Kim, Hankook Hunbob Sa (History of the Korean Constitution) (Seoul: University Press, 1988). See Dae-Kyu Yoon, “Constitutional Amendment in Korea,” Journal of Comparative Law 16 (1988), 1–13. Historical accounts of this period document support from the U.S. military government for a strong presidential system advocated by Rhee. The U.S. government was more comfortable with a political system similar to that of their own and trusted Rhee who was educated in the United States. First republic: Syungman Rhee (1948–60), second republic: Myun Chang (1960–1), third republic and fourth republic: Park Chung Hee (1962–79) and Choi Kyu Hwa (interim 1979–80), fifth republic: Chun Doo Hwan (1980–7), sixth republic: Roh Tae Woo (1988– 92), Kim Young Sam (1993–7), and Kim Dae Jung (1998–). For a discussion of the short-lived second republic (1960–1) under Chang Myun, see, generally, Un-Tae Kim, Hankuk Chongchi Ron (Treatise on Korean Politics) (Seoul: Bak Young Sa, 1994), 464.

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for President Park.34 The seventh revision in 1972 created the fourth republic. Through this revision, President Park attempted to secure unlimited extension of his presidential term. Fearing that he might lose the direct popular vote for president, President Park changed the electoral process to allow indirect vote by a special electoral body comprised of members who were elected by popular vote from handpicked candidates. The new constitution also vested the president with extraordinary powers to override the other branches of government and suspend civil rights. President Park’s assassination in 1979 brought about another constitutional revision and establishment of the fifth republic in 1980 under President Chun Doo Hwan. Under this new constitution, the president was limited to one seven-year term, with a proviso that any extension of the presidential term by constitutional revision could not apply to the president in office at the time. This explicit prohibition was an important milestone in eradicating constitutional revisions to effect an extension of the term of office. The final revision to the constitution in 1987 creating the sixth republic was significant for its relatively uninhibited cooperation between the government and the opposition for the first time in the history of Korea’s constitutional revisions. Central to the present constitution is the reinstatement of a direct popular vote for the president and reduction to a single five-year term. Regarding the nature of constitutional amendments in Korea, Hahm Pyong-Choon observes that, . . . being a piece of written document, there was no reason why the Constitution could not be amended. But the elites have also found to their dismay that the more the document was amended to comply with the exigencies of the time, the less authority the document came to possess. Although a constitutional amendment permitted legality in the instant case, legality, and therefore legitimacy, itself became less meaningful.35

The effect of the frequent amendments to the constitution was to establish a damaging precedent in the political process in Korea of denigrating the constitution as an expedient means by which the political leaders could legitimize their political power under the guise of law. 36 The ensuing political upheaval following or occasioning such changes to the constitution only confirmed the intuitively shared perception that the notion of the rule of law and constitutionalism as the underlying principle to support democracy was nothing short of rhetoric. 34 35 36

The 1962 constitution limited the presidency to two terms. Pyong-Choon Hahm, Korean Jurisprudence, Politics and Culture (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1983), 195. Pyong-Choon Hahm, The Korean Political Tradition and Law (Seoul: Seoul Computer Press, 1987), 209.

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The Prime Minister as a Buffer to the President If the presidential system of the United States can be said to represent the classic presidential system following the Montesquieu principle of checks and balances and separation of power, the Korean system is characterized by a hybrid form consisting of both the presidential system and the parliamentary system.37 Thus, the government structure is one of a strong president who is the head of state and a prime minister who functions as the head of the government under the direction and supervision of the president. Although the constitution is unambiguous in providing for clear functional subordination of the prime minister to the president,38 the role of the prime minister in a presidential system as originally envisioned was to provide a mechanism with which to disperse and decentralize the absolute power of the president. This would, in effect, provide a structural supplement to the checks and balances provided by the legislature over the abuse of power by the president.39 The genesis of this original concept of a prime minister stems not from a recognition for the need to curb the powers of the president but from a simple political compromise that was reached in 1948. The original drafters of the constitution advocated a parliamentary system and Syungman Rhee advocated a strong presidential system.40 One of the most important constitutionally mandated roles of the prime minister is to “assist” the president. This function includes participating in the formation of the cabinet by consenting to the president’s appointment of ministers, as well as recommending dismissal.41 In addition, the prime minister is also given the duty and right to countersign all official documents of the president.42 As the second highest central administrative agency, the prime minister is given powers under prescribed circumstances, subject to approval of the president, to overrule decisions of the agencies,43 and may, under certain circumstances, exercise independent jurisdiction over the scope of functions of each 37

38

39 40

41 43

The closest resemblance to this system is the fifth republic of France. See Young-Hoon Park, Daetongryung Choongsimje Ha Kukmoochongri Yokhal Kinung Daehan Yongu (A Study of the roles and functions of the prime minister under the presidential system) (Seoul: The Korea Institute of Public Administration, 1994), 5. Article 86(2) of the constitution provides that the role of the prime minister is to “assist the President and [supervise] each of the administrative agencies under the direction of the President.” Park, op. cit. In a memoir by the chairman of the constitution drafting committee, President Rhee is said to have threatened to resign the presidency and turn to a popular movement if his demand for a presidential system was not adopted. Park, op. cit., 8, 32. See also Hur Young, Hanguk Hunbub Ron (Korean constitution) (Seoul: Bak Young Sa, 1996), 936. Article 87 of the constitution. 42 Article 82 of the constitution. Article 15 of the Government Administration Act.

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agency.44 However, the prime minister is limited in his ability to issue decrees or orders that are binding on agencies outside his immediate control or those that are not consistent with presidential decrees affecting the rights and freedoms of the people.45 Historically, this hybrid system is analogous to the office of the prime minister established during the Chosun dynasty wherein one of the most important roles that the prime minister fulfilled was managing the day-to-day affairs of state. In addition to providing the king with advice, the prime minister was responsible for mediating between the Confucian scholar–officials and the king concerning matters of state affairs. Despite the constitutionally enumerated authority bestowed on the prime minister, the office of the prime minister has been largely unsuccessful in fulfilling its prescription as a structural safeguard to the abuse of power of the president. As opposed to other parliamentary systems where the prime minister is head of the government, the powers of the prime minister in Korea are derived from the president insofar as they relate to the role of assisting the president. Thus, it is important to note that within the framework of assisting the president, the prime minister is given a mandate by the president to supervise the executive branch. Consequently, the prime minister is held politically responsible to the president and assumes legal and political responsibility to the national assembly that consented to the appointment as prime minister.46 In this regard, throughout the history of modern-day Korea, the particular role of the prime minister has been closely linked to the political philosophy and administration style of the president. In finding a balance between the structural deficiency inherent in the office of the prime minister and the powers granted to the prime minister by the constitution, the prime minister’s position evolved into an expedient scapegoat for the president in times of political embarrassment or crisis. For example, the average life span of each prime minister under President Syungman Rhee was just over nine months (during the first republic, there was also a vice president), under President Chun, thirteen months (seven prime ministers from 1980 to 1987), under President Roh, twelve months (five prime ministers from 1988 to 1992), and under President Kim Young Sam, ten months (six prime ministers from 1993 to 1998). The exception was under President Park whose 44 45

46

Article 6(5) of the Government Administration Act. For example, an enforcement regulation of the prime minister, which required billiard halls to post a notice that minors were prohibited from entering, was found to be unconstitutional because there was no specific authority in the act permitting the prime minister to issue such a regulation. Constitutional Court Ruling, 1993.5.13 Hun-Ma 80. Hur, op. cit., 941. Park, op. cit., 44.

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five prime ministers lasted an average of thirty-nine months.47 Efforts to abolish the prime minister system have intensified in recent years. This particular system had perhaps fulfilled the useful function during prior authoritarian regimes of insulating the president in times of domestic crises, but the need for such a mechanism has diminished considerably in today’s modern democracy. Regionalism President Kim Young Sam’s decision to prosecute ex-Presidents Chun and Roh for their alleged involvement in the Kwangju incident may have more to do with the often-neglected facet of Korea’s regional divisions, specifically concentrating on the southwest Honam Province, than an actual desire to “right the wrongs of history.” President Kim was forced to make a sudden reversal to an earlier pledge not to indict those involved in the Kwangju incident. This was in response to widespread protests that erupted upon the announcement by the prosecution, after an initial probe into the Kwangju incident, that suppression of the protests was a “highly political action.”48 In a quick turnaround, President Kim Young Sam announced in his annual address to the nation, As the President responsible for national policy, I would like to express my heartfelt consolation for those who have had to endure untold suffering in connection with the December 12 and May 18 incidents . . . righting the wrongs of history is an effort to get on the right track for the future . . . only then will we be able to build a society where justice and truth rule and trust and cooperation are the norm in the political, economic, civic and all other sectors.49

The response of the Kim Young Sam administration toward those involved in the Kwangju incident highlighted the historical significance attached to an uprising occurring in the city of Kwangju, Honam Province, the central symbol of regional division and political rift in Korea. The genesis of regional conflict and prejudices dates back to the time of the Three Kingdoms of Koguryo, Shilla, and Paekchae (53–668 a.d.), and has dominated the political landscape of Korea up to modern times. Conflicts are brought about by indifference and neglect of the region and special privileges and favoritism bestowed on other provinces, in particular, 47 48 49

List of all former prime ministers available, . “Parliament OKs Special Law to Punish Chun & Roh,” Kyodo News International Inc. 25 December 1995. “To Build a First-Class Nation by Righting the Wrongs of the Past and Improving the Quality of Life,” Speech by President Kim Young Sam on national policies for 1996, January 9, 1996.

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Kyongsang Province, an area that has produced a majority of the government and business leaders in past and modern Korea. Even as far back as the tenth century, the first king of the Koryo Dynasty documented political divisions and bitter rivalry between the Kingdoms of Paekchae (modern day Honam Province) and Shilla (modern day Kyongsang Province) and drew a negative picture of the traits of the people from Paekchae.50 Although these perceptions had no basis in fact, but were a mere perpetuation of stereotypes and prejudices prevalent during that era, the people of the Honam Province have never managed to dispel such stereotypes: Paekchae attended neither to the arts of peace not to those of war. Her whole history is one of self-gratification and pleasure. We learn of no great acts that she performed, nor of any praiseworthy achievements. She generally gained by deceit and treachery what she wanted, but had not the courage to wage a war of conquest with either of her neighbors. There are many things which attest the high civilization which Shilla attained.51

Even during the Chosun Dynasty (1392–1910), there have been documented instances of intense factionalism between the Honam and Kyongsang Provinces and perpetuation of the stereotype that, for example, people from the Kyongsang Province are generally hot-tempered and proud, whereas people from Honam are rebellious and scheming.52 Perhaps true to its stereotype, Honam Province has had a long tradition of being the center of rebellion against authority dating back to the Tonghak Rebellion of 1892 in which demonstrators stormed the magistrate’s office in a revolt against corrupt political elites. In addition, frequent demonstrations denouncing Japanese imperialism also originated mostly from this region, as did massive student riots in 1960 against President Syungman Rhee for election fraud, which eventually led to his downfall through the “April 19” student demonstrations. The latest of these rebellions is the Kwangju uprising in 1980. Aside from the stereotypes, whether having a basis in fact or not, regional division and political strife became pronounced during the rule of President Park Chung Hee (1961–79). His industrial policies favoring the region of Kyongsang, his home base, further escalated economic disparity between Honam and rest of the country, inviting a degree of political resentment from this region never before seen in Korea.53 Park’s 50

51 52 53

David Steinberg, “The Economic Development of Korea: Sui Generis or Generic?: Reflections on the Harvard University Press Studies of the Modernization of the Republic of Korea 1974–75,” U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC, 1982, 7. Homer Hulbert, The Passing of Korea (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1969), 73. Frederica Bunge, ed., South Korea: A Country Study (Washington, DC: American University, 1982), 54. During Park’s rule, the majority of new industrial sectors in iron, steel, machinery, shipbuilding, and electronics were centered around the southeast coastal regions of Kyongsang Province.

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industrial policy and his desire to concentrate the industrial power base in the Kyongsang region does not seem to have been a function of any geographic necessity but an intentional scheme to consolidate his political power, and hence his political legitimacy, in the region where he enjoyed the most relative support.54 The foregoing historical, cultural, and economic factors spilled over to the modern political arena in the form of strict regional divisions in the voting patterns of the Korean people. What seems to matter most in Korean politics is not what politicians do or say, but where they were born.55 For example, during the presidential elections of 1971 between Kim Dae Jung, from the Honam Province and a long-time political foe of President Park, and the incumbent Park Chung Hee, Kim received 64.1% of the votes from Honam and only 28.2% of the votes from Kyongsang Province. Conversely, President Park received overwhelming support from Kyongsang Province but only 35% of the votes from Honam Province. This regional division became even more intense during the presidential elections in 1992. In that instance, although Kim Dae Jung lost to Kim Young Sam, he received 90.8% of the votes from Honam but only 10% of the votes from Kyongsang. Even more illuminating is the fact that, during this election, 95.8% of the voters from the city of Kwangju voted for Kim Dae Jung.56 This trend toward voting according to region did not change significantly during the 1997 elections when Kim Dae Jung won against Lee Hoi Chang. Although Kim Dae Jung received overwhelming support from his region of Honam (97.3% in Kwangju), he received roughly 15% of the votes cast in Kyongsang Province. This phenomenon has become an unwanted, but reluctantly accepted, dynamic of Korean politics and consequently “regionalism has been always raised as one of the most sensitive political matters in every presidential election or assembly election in Korean history.”57 Challenges to President Kim Young Sam’s true motive behind the sudden arrest of Chun and Roh and introduction of the special bill, which together touched a deeply rooted nerve of the people of Honam Province regarding the Kwangju incident, have centered around this peculiar but undeniably important aspect of the political power structure in Korea. In contrast to a conspicuous overrepresentation of Kyongsang Province 54

55 56 57

Michael Keon, Korean Phoenix: A Nation from the Ashes (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall International, 1977), 108. Park is also said to have given up a strategy to woo voters in Honam Province because they would still accuse him of stuffing ballot boxes and thus it would be preferable to concentrate on his home province of Kyongsang. Reuters, March 16, 1996. Wonmo Dong, “Regional Cleavages in South Korean Politics,” Korea Observer 26(2) (Summer 1995), 16. Wanki Park, “The Formation of the Governing Elites in Korean Society,” in A Dragon’s Progress: Development Administration in Korea, ed. Gerald Caiden and Bun-Woong Kim (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1991).

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during the third republic under President Park58 and the fifth republic under President Chun,59 representation from Honam Province in President Kim’s cabinet (ministers and vice-ministers) have reached an all-time high of 17.4% (12.9% of population). With President Kim Dae Jung’s victory in the 1997 elections, an equally conspicuous trend toward overrepresentation of Honam Province became evident. Judicial Review A strong system of judicial review, much like that of the United States, has never played a significant role in adjudicating important matters concerning constitutionality of laws in Korea.60 In view of the volatility of the political process in Korea prior to 1992, the natural inclination was for the courts to assume a passive role in reviewing constitutionality of actions taken by the other two relatively more powerful branches of the government.61 Although the system of judicial review has existed since the first constitution of 1948, as a testimony to its uncertain role in the eyes of those in power, varying types of judicial review were adopted under each constitution. During the first 12 years of the first republic under President Syungman Rhee, power to adjudicate matters relating to constitutionality rested with an ad hoc constitutional committee that ruled on only seven cases during this entire period.62 Thereafter, during the third republic (1972–80) a system of judicial review modeled after the United States was adopted in which the Supreme Court was given power to adjudicate matters of constitutionality. However, this system was short-lived, reflecting the frail nature of a system that could potentially provide an uncomfortable check on the almost unbridled powers that the president exercised during this period. The dangers of exerting judicial activism in an environment that had little tolerance for actions that would tend to weaken the legitimacy of Park’s regime quickly became apparent following two controversial decisions in 1971. The Supreme Court declared unconstitutional certain statutes that violated the equal protection clause 58

59 60 61 62

Park’s administration had been dubbed “the Kyongsang Regime” by many people due to a disproportionate number of high-level cabinet ministers from his home province. During Chun’s administration, representation from Honam Province in the cabinet reached an all time low of 9.6%. Kim, Hyo-Jeon, The American Influence on Japanese and Korean Judicial Review of Legislation (Seoul: Seoul National University, 1981). Tscholsu Kim, American Influence in the Constitutional History of Korea (Seoul: Korean Constitutional Law Research Institute, 1995). See, generally, Dae-Kyu Yoon, “New Developments in Korean Constitutionalism: Changes and Prospects,” Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 4 (1995): 395

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of the constitution.63 The following year, by constitutional amendment, President Park simply took away the powers of the Supreme Court to review matters of constitutionality. Although the constitutional committee was reinstated during the fifth republic under Chun, the committee remained completely inactive and existed only as a symbol to show that a system of judicial review existed in Korea.64 The early history of judicial review in Korea illustrates some glaring deficiencies in the political leadership in Korea. The leadership, lacking political legitimacy, would tolerate judicial review only if it could be used as a means of legitimizing their actions. But judicial review proved to be a burden that the political elites could not afford to bear in the face of their constant struggle with the people’s perception of the legitimacy of the political system. Significant changes to the entire system of judicial review came with the sixth republic under President Roh in 1987 due, in part, to an orderly transition of power for the first time in Korean history. With a heightened level of political legitimacy accompanying Roh’s presidency, came a marked increase in the level of activity of the newly reinstated constitutional court. Out of 2,361 cases received as of 1994, the court rendered judgment on 626 cases. More significantly, during this period, fifty-nine laws were declared unconstitutional, either in whole or in part.65 By permitting individual parties to directly petition the constitutional court in the event that the lower courts decline a request for constitutional review,66 previous obstacles that had prevented challenges to constitutionality of laws or government action had been effectively removed. There is no doubt that the renewed activity of the constitutional court is a welcome sign in providing a meaningful check against potential abuses by the government or legislature and a sign that the operation of the rule of law may be back on track. However, the controversial decision declaring that the special bill introduced to punish Roh and Chun is not unconstitutional has raised two important questions as to whether the court still remains vulnerable to political influences. The controversy stems from a constitutional requirement that at least six justices out of nine (supermajority) concur before the court can rule a law to be unconstitutional.67 In the case at hand, five justices (a majority) found the special bill to be unconstitutional. 63 64

65 66 67

See, generally, Hur, op. cit., and Yoon, “New Developments in Korean Constitutionalism: Changes and Prospects,” 408. One of the primary reasons for the inactivity was a structural limitation, built into the petition process for judicial review, of requiring the Supreme Court to specifically request the constitutional committee to adjudicate a constitutional matter. Because the Supreme Court never made such a request, the committee remained inactive. Yoon, “Constitutional Amendment in Korea,” 40. Article 68 of the Constitutional Law Act, Law No. 4017 (1988). Article 113(1) of the constitution.

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Valid and persuasive arguments could be made by those advocating either a supermajority vote or majority vote.68 Setting aside validity of conceptual arguments on the number requirement, the supermajority requirement contained in the constitution finds its roots in the original constitution under Rhee’s regime in 1948. It is not unreasonable to surmise that this particular requirement was designed to preserve Rhee’s interests. It provided a safeguard to make it more difficult for the constitutional committee to declare any of Rhee’s actions unconstitutional, while preserving a semblance of respect for the rule of law. It also does not seem unreasonable to further surmise that, finding no compelling reason to do otherwise, each succeeding variant of the constitutional court simply inherited the supermajority provision. The second challenge to the independence of the constitutional court is a structural one. Although justices of the constitutional court are limited to persons who qualify as judges, three are nominated by the president, three by the national assembly, and three by the chief justice of the Supreme Court (who incidentally is also nominated by the president), each serving a term of six years.69 Although this is a quantum improvement from the first republic in which the constitutional committee was comprised of the vice president, five judges, and five members of the national assembly,70 an argument could be made that the present system is fundamentally at odds with a truly independent judicial review system that is free from potential political influence. This is particularly so when viewed in the context of reappointment every six years under a political system in which the past president had traditionally exercised relatively strong control over each of the branches of government. Summary and Conclusion The concept of adhering to the principle of the rule of law as the supreme guiding principle for supporting democracy and sustained economic growth has, in the past, been viewed with amusement rather than with conviction in Korea. With each successive change of government, or in response to each pressing crisis, Korea has been obsessed with the notion of reform as the panacea. During these times, Koreans have initially tended to rally behind the leadership and direction provided by the 68

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For example, the most obvious frame of reference is the U.S. Supreme Court, which rules by majority vote. On the other hand, an analogy can be made to the requirement in most state corporate statutes requiring a supermajority vote of either the board of directors or shareholders in instances when important decisions have to be made regarding the corporation. Article 112 of the constitution. 70 Article 81 of the constitution of 1948.

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political elites in a show of solidarity, only to have the leadership resort to their old ways once the immediately visible crisis has been resolved.71 In particular, the restructuring and reform efforts undertaken after the 1997 Asian financial crisis have been widespread and deep, attacking the very engine that fueled Korea’s past remarkable economic growth. Although it may be too early to evaluate the success of the reform and restructuring efforts under President Kim Dae Jung, the sense of urgency and resolve with which the reforms were first undertaken has declined considerably. The success of any reform effort hinges on the confidence of the people in the government, and on the belief that changes are being implemented in an efficient manner, consistently and fairly, through the application of the rule of law. However, in what seems to be reminiscent of the leadership styles of past authoritarian regimes, President Kim Dae Jung’s administration has been described as “a government that listens to no one while ruling out of arrogance, self-righteousness and an ‘imperial mindset.’ ”72 Just as merely having a constitution does not satisfy the requirements of constitutionalism, formalistic existence of laws and legal institutions – irrespective of how elaborate they are – do not satisfy the requirement of adhering to the rule of law unless such principles are equally exercised by those in power. Then what exactly is this rule of law that seems to cause so much definitional confusion? As observed by Lawrence Lessig, “Its essence is simple consistency; the integrity to apply the same rule to similar cases, regardless of the political outcome; the belief that there is a limit to what you can argue, inherent in the logic of what you say”73 Throughout its modern history, Korea has grappled with this issue without fully coming to terms with what the practical application of such a definition would entail. The controversy surrounding the special bill is a direct example that tests the level of maturity of a democracy and the will of the political leadership to apply the rule of law as a matter of course. By the same token, irrespective of how universally accepted the principle of the rule of law is, this principle is often tempered by the need to address particular and specific national realities. In Korea’s case, the “national realities” that have produced reluctance in the past to fully embracing the rule of law as the guiding principle has included overriding concern for maintaining stability and national security in response to hostile geopolitical circumstances on the Korean Peninsula 71 72 73

“South Korean Restructuring: More Pain, Please,” The Economist, 17 April 1999. Don Kirk, “South Korea’s Conservative Press Takes Heat from the Liberals,” New York Times, 7 May 2001, A7. Lawrence Lessig, “The Rule of Law,” The Industry Standard, 4 December 2000.

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and the urgent need for economic revitalization and restructuring. If Korea is to fully embrace the rule of law, the debate must first focus on the question of how to assemble a national consensus on the substantive aspects of what constitutes the rule of law, before it can deal with the procedural question of how a country like Korea can successfully implement it.

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CHAPTER 8

Security and Democracy in South Korean Development Victor Cha

This chapter explores the causal linkages between two critical variables in the modern development of the Republic of Korea (ROK): security and democracy. Two questions drive this research inquiry. The first is an empirical investigation of the impact of security on the democratization process. In particular, how has the ROK’s defense thinking, practice, and institutions helped or hindered the democratization and consolidation process in the 1990s (i.e., during the Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung governments)? The second question is more conceptual in nature. How does the legacy of Korea’s military-authoritarianism affect the democratic consolidation process? Although the military as an institution has been rooted out of politics, to what extent does the South Korean political culture still harbor within it a residual affinity for aspects of its authoritarian past? I emphasize that this is a first foray into this topic. Although there has been voluminous literature on democratic consolidation and on security,1 there has been relatively little that attempts to understand the explicit causal links between the two in the Korean context.2 1

2

There is, of course, a vast theoretical literature on transitional democracy that looks in particular at how the military plays in regime transitions. See Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1996); Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); and Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). For example, in a recent high-profile volume on democratic consolidation in Korea, the collection of essays focused on virtually every aspect of democracy (e.g., media, chaebols, civil society) except security (see Larry Diamond and Doh Chull Shin, eds., Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea (Stanford, CA: Hoover Press, 2000). Other important works that look at Korea’s democratization in a larger context include Chungin Moon and Jongryn Mo, eds., Democratization and Globalization in Korea: Assessments and Prospects (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1999); Samuel Kim, ed., Korea’s Globalization (New

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The chapter reaches two sets of preliminary findings. With regard to the impact of security on the democratic consolidation, I reach a negative finding. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, conditions of “securityscarcity” were not the primary impediment to the democracy process. There is no denying that South Korea’s threatening external security environment hindered the democratization process – the North Korean threat often became the justification for authoritarian rule and empowered the military as a political institution, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s. But the Kim Young Sam years presents a powerful and puzzling empirical anomaly. It was during this time that “negative” Korean democratization practices (see Samuel S. Kim’s chapter in this work) and a political emasculation of the military occurred without watershed changes in South Korean security thinking or substantially reduced external security threats. Conditions of security-scarcity therefore constrained choice and outcomes in the democratization process, but these conditions did not wholly determine it. With regard to the second question, there is no denying that there has been a mutual evolution of security thinking and democratic consolidation in Korea. In other words, just as a receding of the military from politics has enhanced democratization, so has democratic consolidation, particularly during the Kim Dae Jung years, changed and expanded the way Koreans think about security. Democracy has, for example, enabled concepts of “mutual security” and multilateralism (rather than self-help security and bilateralism) to resonate in the traditional South Korean security logic. However, there also still remains a residual affinity within the South Korean political culture for certain aspects of the military authoritarian past. This affinity becomes especially acute when there are external shocks to the democratic consolidation process. Most notably, the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis witnessed a public yearning for a return to the “good old days.” Although this represents one extreme example, such reactions remind us that the Korean democratic consolidation process remains far from complete; moreover, the potential for “backsliding” is not impossible if given other external shocks that test the mettle of Korean commitments to democracy. South Korean Security Thinking and Practice: Impeding Democratization? A fairly simple and well-known story line emerges when one thinks about the link between security and democracy in South Korea. It begins in York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Young Whan Kihl, “Democratisation and Foreign Policy,” and Chung-in Moon and Kang Mun-gu, “Democratic Opening and Military Intervention in South Korea: Comparative Assessment and Implications,” both in Politics and Policy in the New Korean State, ed. James Cotton (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995).

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the early stages of South Korea’s postwar development when the military emerged as the most established and resource-rich institution in an otherwise underdeveloped country. The military wrested political power away from politicians in 1960 and held it in one form or another until 1987 when direct presidential elections enabled the people to choose their first civilian leader since Syngman Rhee. The military and the politically ambitious leadership it produced were therefore the primary impediments to democratization. However, the story is deeper than that. Assessing the impact of security on the democratization process in Korea requires looking beyond merely the military’s role in politics. It means looking at the deeper permissive security conditions and security thinking in South Korea that enabled the military’s privileged role in politics. The entire milieu of South Korean political culture and security thinking arguably could be seen as welcoming the military’s role in society. This might be best described – as Alastair Iain Johnston has argued with regard to China – as a “parabellum” or hard realpolitik view of security.3 Conflict and competition are unavoidable and inevitable traits of international relations. The adversary is aggressive and zero-sum oriented. And, as a result, the use of military force is an irreplaceable tool of statecraft. This view does not deny that cooperation does take place in international relations, but states must be wary for their own well-being; cooperation is only transitory and ultimately a slave to each nation’s self-interest. At the center of the paradigm that defines this type of Korean security thinking and political culture are immutable geopolitical traits. As a relatively weak state sharing borders with the region’s major powers, Korea has always 3

Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). This discussion borrows from some of the work in international relations on strategic culture. The concept is best understood as grounded in three paradigmatic assumptions about the role of war in human affairs, the nature of the adversary; and the efficacy of force. History, geostrategy, resource endowments, military experience, religion, political beliefs, and values inform these core assumptions, from which follow other preferences about security. Culture helps us understand behavior with regard to basic goals, negotiating styles, “neuralgia” points regarding security, offense/defense doctrinal proclivities, and the nature of civil–military relations. Strategic culture does not predetermine behavior, but shapes it, offering ideas on where the “grooves” are deepest and most well-trodden with regard to future behavior. For representative works, see Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture, R-2154-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1977); Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Croom Helm, 1979); Joseph Rothschild, “Culture and War,” in The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, ed. Robert Harkavy and Stephanie Neuman (Lexington, MA: DC Heath, 1987); A. Johnston, “Thinking About Strategic Culture,”International Security 19 (1995): 32–64; Stephen Rosen, “Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters,” International Security 19 (1995): 5–31; Charles Kupchan, Vulnerability of Empire, chapter 1(Ithaca: Cornell, 1994); Colin Gray, “Comparative Strategic Culture,”Parameters 14 (1984): 26– 33; P. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia, 1996); and William Tow, “Strategic Cultures in Comparative Perspective,” in Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region, ed., Ken Booth and Russell Trood (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 323–38.

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been a strategically vital component of the balance of power. Moreover, geographically, the peninsula serves as a land bridge between mainland Asia and the Pacific with two major indigenous powers (Japan and China) at either end of this bridge. Given these conditions, Korea’s 5,000-year history, according to the strategic cultural view of security, has been one of victimization to larger power competitions – the “shrimp crushed among whales.”4 The peninsula has seen over 900 small- and large-scale invasions, two major power wars fought over it at the end of the nineteenth century, the loss of sovereignty and foreign occupation for half the twentieth century, and then division by war through the twenty-first century. These definitive historical experiences and legacies of national suffering magnified the harsh effects of anarchy, and created a “fortified realist metastructure” that guides security thinking.5 The influence of China historically on Korea is also a significant factor. For centuries, the Korean “hermit” kingdom’s only external relationship of significance was with the Middle Kingdom. This meant an inordinate Chinese influence on Korean strategic thinking. Indeed, the “classics” of Korean military thought (Mukyong Ch’ilsu or Seven Books on Military Strategy) were Chineseauthored and exported to Korea.6 These continue to be used as texts in the Korean military education curriculum.7 The history of premodern and modern international relations on the peninsula also provides the lesson that only one orientation – bilateralism – works best for Korean security (as opposed to unilateralism or multilateralism). Past forms of order in the region have always centered on one of two arrangements: great power competition or concerts – both of which tended to operate in ways that exploit or exclude smaller powers. Because the peninsula often ended up being the battleground in these power configurations [e.g., during the Mongol (thirteenth century), Hideyoshi invasions (sixteenth century)], classical Korean military thought placed a premium on maintaining domestic inviolability through external diplomacy and alignments.8 Under such conditions, bilateralism with a great 4

5

6

7 8

See James William Morley, “The Dynamics of the Korean Connection,” in The U.S.–South Korean Alliance, eds. Gerald Curtis and Sung-joo Han (Lexington, MA: DC Heath, 1983), 7–30. See Chung-in Moon, “South Korea: Recasting Security Paradigms,” in Asian Security Practice, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 264. Moon defines this metastructure as a cognitive map guiding the decision-makers’ assessment of threats, policy formulation, and policy implementation (p. 265). Ministry of National Defense, Mukyong Ch’ilsu (Seven books of military strategy) (Seoul: MND Office of Military History, 1987); and Kang Choi, “Korea: A Tradition of Peace,” in Strategic Cultures, 100. Interviews, Korea National Defense University, Seoul, December 2000. Young-Oh Kang, Han’guk Kunsachonryak Saron (On the Military Strategy of Korea) (Seoul: Yunkyung, 1991), 71–84; and Choi, “Korea: A Tradition of Peace,” in Strategic Cultures, 94.

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power was the primary form of power accretion. It was the only way Korea could survive. Historically, this patron was China, giving rise to a sadaejuui (“serving the great”) mentality: “Korea pursued sadae, in which every effort was made to maintain friendly relationships, especially with China, to maintain territorial integrity and survival. . . . When this hierarchical relationship seemed to be on the right track, the Korean people believed their security was guaranteed by a superior power.”9 The contemporary incarnation of sadae is “assertive bilateralism” with the United States.10 Visions among the “post–Korean war generation” of strategic thinkers willingly equate in normative and substantive terms Korean prosperity and security in the new millennium with the American alliance.11 The standing policy of every ROK government to the present has been to support security bilateralism with the United States even after unification.12 The Impact of Security on Democratization Consonant with the conventional reading of history, there is no denying that Korea’s parabellum or hard realpolitik views on security hindered the democratization process. Among the more obvious manifestations of this dynamic was the use of the security threat posed by North Korea as justification for undemocratic forms of governing for decades. The provision of security (and economic growth) in this security-scarce environment became the Korean social contract. By providing the security, good, authoritarian regimes purchased their political legitimacy from the electorate despite acceding to power through the most illegitimate of means and draconian practices (the height of this was during the Yushin period, 1972–79).13 Security’s hindering effect on democracy was also evident institutionally in the constitution (apparently democratic but implemented in authoritarian ways) and the National Security Law. Nowhere was this peculiar social contract more apparent than in the period before the 1971 presidential elections. The Park regime sought to strike constitutional limits against a bid for a third presidential term. Nationwide student demonstrations erupted in the summer of 1969 and the political opposition tried vigorously to block the third-term amendment 9 10 11 12 13

Choi, “Korea: A Tradition of Peace,” in Strategic Cultures, 96; and Kim Un-Tae, Hankook Chongchi Ron (Soul T’ukpyolsi: Pagyongsa, 1984), 229–31. Moon, “South Korea: Recasting Security Paradigms,” 264, 270. In-Taek Hyun, “Seoul–Washington Relations in the 21st Century,” Joongang Ilbo, 29 November 1999 (in Korean). Choi, “Korea: A Tradition of Peace,” in Strategic Cultures, 103. Hak-kyu Sohn, Authoritarianism and Opposition in South Korea (London: Routledge, 1989); John K. C. Oh, Korean Politics (Ithaca: Cornell, 2000); and Jon Huer, Marching Orders: The Role of the Military in South Korea’s “Economic Miracle” 1961–71 (New York: Greenwood, 1989).

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in the national legislature. The issue eventually was put to a national referendum in October 1969 in which Park, in no uncertain terms, stated that failure of the government to win public support for the amendment would put at risk the entire country’s future in economic and security terms. Up to the very day of the referendum, the government expounded on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) security threat and the dire consequences if it could not remain in power. The “purchase” of political legitimacy through the provision of security goods was the social bargain. It was clearly one way in which security impeded the democratization process.14 The impact of security on democracy was also evident in less tangible but at the same time deeper ways. At the level of civil–military relations for virtually the entirety of Korea’s postwar existence, the formal differentiation between military establishment and civil polity was weak.15 Former military leaders ran the country for most of the twentieth century, coups were a semiregular form of regime transition (from the 1960s to 1980s), and informal institutions within the military academy ingrained in officers the “duty” to pursue future political ambitions (e.g., hanahoe faction). The physical and psychological presence of the military in Korean society is unavoidable and still resonates within overall society today. Military bases sit at the center of major cities, military conscription is part of every Korean male’s life (often during impressionable years), and social relationships from the classroom to the boardroom operate in a military culture of hierarchy, respect, and obedience. Security’s constraining effect on democracy was especially evident on one issue closely connected with Korean identity – unification. For the majority of the South Korean state’s existence, the dominance of the parabellum strategic culture narrowed the spectrum of discussion on unification to three essential tenets religiously accepted by all. First, unification must come through the independent efforts of Koreans without interference or obstruction from external powers. Implicit in this view is that the major powers are fundamentally opposed to unification and seek to keep Korea down. Second, the division of the country since 1945 is an aberration for this homogenous nation and must inevitably end. Third, there existed a direct association between “patriotism” and zero-sum attitudes toward North Korea. This foreclosed any legitimate political spectrum on views and policies related to North Korea. Zero-sum mentalities prevailed, and advocacy of positions that did not demonize the North or did not call for 14 15

Y. C. Han, “The 1969 Constitutional Revision and Party Politics in South Korea,” Pacific Affairs 44 (1971): 242–58. On the links between strategic culture and civil-military relations, see Ball, in Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific, 63–6; Tow, “Strategic Cultures in Comparative Perspective,” in Strategic Cultures, 333–5; and Muthiah Alagappa, ed., The Soldier and the State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, forthcoming).

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unification by absorption were, by definition, politically illegitimate and even treasonous. This was institutionalized in the South Korean polity in the form of the National Security Law, and was exercised countless times by previous regimes. In this regard, one of the most important accomplishments of the Kim Dae Jung government’s “sunshine policy,” despite the widespread criticisms, is that it has effectively “democratized” the discussion of unification with North Korea. One can now support a policy of engagement with North Korea or call for peaceful coexistence without being branded as politically illegitimate. Necessary but Not Sufficient – Reassessing Kim Young Sam There is no denying that security conditions and Korean security thinking and practice inhibited democracy, but the relationship between these two variables is not causally linear. Security constrained democratic choice but it did not wholly determine it. If security thinking and practice were a sufficient condition for democratic choice, then one would expect democratization efforts to be highly unsuccessful without either (1) major changes in security conditions (i.e., the level of threat from North Korea), or (2) changes in the ways Koreans thought about security (i.e., changes in zero-sum attitudes toward the North or in the parabellum paradigm). This proposition is not confirmed by the Korean case. The Kim Young Sam years saw reasonably successful efforts at democratization occurring despite similar security conditions. Although Kim Young Sam left office in 1997 amid an economic crisis, charges of corruption among his appointees, and extremely low popularity ratings, his government made significant headway in the democratization process by undertaking aggressive reforms to root the military out of politics (“negative” Korean democratic consolidation practices). At the end of his first year in office, Kim Young Sam purged more than 1,000 high-ranking military officials and undertook significant steps to remove the hanahoe as a political actor in the military.16 16

Empirics for this section come from Chong-sik Lee and Hyuk-sang Sohn, “South Korea in 1993: The Year of Great Reform,” Asian Survey 34(1) (1994), 1–9; Robert Karniol, “Democratic Change Reaches SK Military,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 17 July 1993; Jung Kwan Cho, “Taming the Military to Consolidate Democracy: The South Korean Experience,” Pacific Focus 16 (Spring 2001); Jae-Hong Kim,”Sukgun Munojinun Hanahoe wa Kugu Inmaek” (Military purge: Collapse of the Hanahoe and the 9-9), Sin Tonga, May 1993; Jae-Hong Kim, “Park Chung Hee, Chun Doo Hwan, Roh Tae Woo wa Gunbu” (Park, Chun, Roh and the Military) Sin Tonga, January 1993; “Cleaning up the Brass, Economist, 8 May 1993; Shim Jae Hoon, “Shamed at the Top,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 May 1993; David Sanger, “2 Ex-Defense Chiefs in Seoul Are Accused in US Jet Deal,” New York Times, 12 July 1993; John Oh, Korean Politics; and Victor Cha, “Politics and Democracy Under the Kim Young Sam Government: Something Old, Something New,” Asian Survey 33 (September 1993).

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The reforms generally took three forms. The first was the practice of “appointment from below.” This generally entailed choosing individuals with professional (as opposed to political aspirations) and at lower ranks than traditional practice. For example, in March 1993, President Kim appointed Kim Dong Jin as the new Army Chief of Staff (replacing Kim Jin Young). This position had been among the most politically powerful in the military (as the army is the largest branch of the armed services). Kim Dong Jin, however, was known as a military officer without political aspirations (and not from the hanahoe faction). Kim Young Sam also appointed from below for the positions of Defense Minister – all of whom were nontraditional appointees in the sense that they were lieutenant generals (e.g., Kwon Yong-hae, Lee Byung Tae) and sometimes deliberately from the other services to reduce the army’s dominant influence among the services [e.g., Lee Yang Ho (air force) as Lee Byung Tae’s successor]. The second aspect of the reforms aimed at weakening institutionally the politically powerful elements of the military. In April 1993, Kim Young Sam enacted measures to downgrade the influence of the military’s intelligence division, the Defense Security Command (DSC). In the past, the DSC had virtual autonomy in its operations, as it acted directly under instruction from the president and therefore was not answerable to any other government authority (the DSC commander traditionally had greater access to the president than the defense minister). The April measures aimed to emasculate the DSC by banning it from conducting civilian surveillance, requiring it to report to the Ministry of National Defense, and appointing a relatively low-ranking officer (Major-General Kim Do Yun) to head the division.17 Third, Kim Young Sam utilized a combination of “historical revisionism” and “clean government” ethics to engineer a major purge of military officers. This was largely aimed at politically emasculating the elite hanahoe officer faction of the Korean Military Academy whose members intruded on politics in the past (Chun and Roh were both from this faction). In May 1993, the government declared, contrary to all past official interpretations, that the “12-12” incident was a “coup-like” event in which junior officers acted against their superiors and on this basis sought the early retirement of a number of senior generals from Taegu city and Kyongsang province (TK region).18 On the pretext that the military had 17

18

The “April measures” also included the early retirement of three four-star generals and the replacement of chiefs for two key commands, the capital defense command (which is responsible for Seoul) and the special war command. This development and related events eventually led to the trial and sentencing of the two former presidents Chun and Roh. For good coverage of these events, see Oh, Korean Politics.

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generally been exempt from public scrutiny because of the sensitivity of security issues, the Kim Young Sam government undertook a wideranging investigation (by the Board of Audit and Inspection led by Lee Hoi Chang) that unearthed scandals ranging from military promotionfor-money and kickbacks from major force procurement projects. This led to the discharging of ten navy admirals and air force generals in April 1993 followed in July by punitive measures against fifty-three current and former military officials. Those charged included highly placed officials like former Defense Ministers Lee Jong Koo and Lee Sang Hoon and former National Security Advisor Kim Chong Hwi.19 Reform Despite Security Conditions Political pacification of the military was perhaps the most important and long-lasting accomplishment of the Kim Young Sam years. The numbers and results, in retrospect, are astounding. The government purged more than 1,000 military officers in its first year and in its first 100 days replaced five of eight top defense ministry officials, nine of eleven senior joint chiefs of staff officials, eleven of fourteen senior army posts, five of eleven corps commanders, nine of twenty-two division commanders, seven of eleven navy senior officers, and four of the top ten air force officers.20 The hanahoe faction was neutralized and the military effectively removed as a political actor.21 If security was the primary impediment to democratization in Korea, as the conventional story line argues, then significant steps in the democratization process witnessed during the Kim Young Sam years could not have occurred without either (1) a corresponding change in the external security environment (i.e., a greatly decreased North Korean threat), or (2) a transformation in South Korean security thinking and culture. However, no such changes in either of these two variables were evident in the years surrounding the Kim government’s rule. The backdrop to Kim’s eventual accession to power was, of course, the larger structural changes taking place in the early 1990s with the end of the Cold War, but this only highlighted how much Korean security remained static and unchanged. Although the two Koreas entered into the historic basic agreement, and Seoul’s successful nordpolitik (northern diplomacy) enabled the normalization of relations with China and the Soviet Union, meaningful change was far from apparent. The 1991 basic agreement was undoubtedly a 19

20 21

On these investigations, see Sanger, David. “2 Ex-Defense Chiefs in Seoul Are Accused in US Jet Deal,” New York Times, 12 July 1993; “Cleaning up the Brass,” Economist, 8 May 1993; and “Shamed at the Top,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 May 1993. Cho, “Taming the Military,” 142. “Another Military Coup Unthinkable,” Korea Times, 6 December 1995.

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watershed development in North–South relations; however, aside from the histrionics of the moment, no tangible reduction in tensions came as a result of it. The agreement, instead, quickly became a propaganda tool of both Seoul and Pyongyang to point out to domestic and international audiences the other’s lack of good faith. Furthermore, although the ROK’s successful northern diplomacy with communist powers seemed a new development in ROK security policy, emphasizing engagement and dialogue with adversaries, it too was motivated by classic Cold War-era motives. Normalization with the Soviet Union in 1990 and China in 1992 was of course welcomed in the language of economic interdependence, tension reduction, and engagement, yet the true benefit as seen by planners in Seoul was the diplomatic coup over the North. Nordpolitik effectively won over Pyongyang’s two primary patrons and closed the circle in terms of isolating the North (at that time). In Seoul’s eyes, this was the ultimate victory in the zero-sum diplomatic competition between the two Koreas.22 To reiterate, although many of these events took place before Kim Young Sam came into office, the point is that the overall security environment and security thinking both preceding and pursuant to his period in office were not necessarily conducive to the types of changes that Kim eventually implemented to rid the military from politics. In short, if security threats are the primary impediments to democracy (by legitimating the military’s political role), then the Kim Young Sam years are the exception to this rule. The threat from North Korea remained salient, even enhanced, in the form of nuclear threats, missile proliferation, submarine incursions, violations of armistice regulations in the Joint Security Area ( JSA), and the shooting down of American helicopters over the DMZ. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, security did not determine democratization outcomes. The rebuttal to this characterization of the security variable might point to changes in South Korean policy toward the DPRK under Kim Young Sam as evidence of changes in South Korean strategic culture and attitudes on security (enabling the reforms enacted against the military). In short, the effective dealignment of the North by its two Cold War patrons, the DPRK’s food shortages, negative growth rates, and uncertain political transition (i.e., the death of Kim Il-sung in July 1994), ended the competition between the North and South with Seoul victorious. Collapse and absorption of the North was imminent. As a result, this fostered a transformation in ROK thinking away from the parabellum paradigm toward a more liberal and nonzero-sum view of security on the peninsula. This, in turn, enabled the Kim Young Sam government 22

For further discussion on this point, see Cha, “Democracy and Unification: The Dilemma of ROK Engagement,” in The Two Koreas and the United States, ed. Wonmo Dong (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000).

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to carry out the democratic reforms that displaced the military from politics.23 This seems like a compelling argument, but it is highly questionable. First, the Kim government, at its inception in 1993, did not espouse an explicit new policy and new way of thinking vis-`a-vis North Korea. Instead, it offered a vision for unification based on three principles. The first – national consensus – stated that under a new civilian and democratically elected government, ROK policies toward North Korea would reflect the true will of the people. Second, the principle of peaceful coexistence and prosperity stated that unification would be preceded by a period of mutual recognition of two separate systems under one nation, in which nonintervention and mutual prosperity would be promoted. And the third principle – national well-being – placed the priority of integrating the two Koreas into “one nation, one system” on the people’s welfare, rather than on a particular ideology or system.24 Despite various rhetorical embellishments, these principles were essentially reworked versions of similar principles first set out in the 1972 North–South Communiqu´e, and then expounded upon in the 1991 Basic Agreement on Reconciliation.25 They did not deviate greatly from the standard boilerplate versions held by previous governments. More explicit statements of an engagement policy began to emerge from Seoul in 1994,26 with the most comprehensive and explicit of these in the Peace and Cooperation Initiative of August 1996. The Initiative stated that the ROK sought to reduce tensions with the North and seek a peaceful path to unification. Moreover, it laid out three negative 23

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Such an interpretation would privilege the security variable because it argues implicitly that YS’ military reforms would have been wholly unsuccessful if objective security conditions and strategic thinking had not experienced a change. “Together on the Road to a New Korea,” Inaugural Address, February 25, 1993; “Rebuilding the Nation into a New Korea,” One-Hundred Day Press Conference, June 3, 1993; and “Toward a Great Era of National Unity,” Liberation Day Speech, August 15, 1994, in Korea’s Quest for Reform and Globalization: Selected Speeches of President Kim Young Sam (Seoul: Presidential Secretariat, 1995), 5–10, 48–54, 208–14. Also see Han Wan-Sang, “The Kim Young Sam Government’s Unification Policy: Basic Structure and Its Three Pillars,” Korea and World Affairs 17 (1993): 213–26. The 1972 principles called for unification through the independent will of the people and without outside intervention; unification by peaceful means; and the promotion of a grand national unity that transcended ideological differences. See “7-4 Nam-puk kongdong songmyongso” (July 4 South–North joint communiqu´e), in Taehan Min’guk woegyo yonp’yo: 1972 bu juyo munhon (Diplomatic documents annual), 203–6. For the test of the Basic Agreement, see Korea Update 2 (December 1991). Also see Kim Hak-Joon, The Unification Policy of South and North Korea (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1977); and B. C. Koh, “The Inter-Korean Agreements of 1972 and 1992,” Korea and World Affairs 16 (1992): 463–82. The change took place after the death of Kim Il Sung in July 1994. For examples, see “Toward a Great Era of National Unity,” Liberation Day Speech, August 15, 1994, reprinted in Korea’s Quest for Reform; and Kim’s August 15, 1995 Liberation Day Speech reprinted in Korea and World Affairs 19 (1995): 531–4.

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assurances, or objectives that Seoul would not seek in interaction with North Korea. The first of these was that Seoul sought stability in its northern counterpart, and had neither the interest nor desire to capitalize on the North’s internal difficulties. Second, the ROK did not seek to isolate North Korea, rather it sought to help in making it a sound member of the international community. Finally, the ROK did not seek unification through absorption, but by integration. In addition, the Peace and Cooperation Initiative laid out specific means for inter-Korean cooperation including the provision of technology and machinery from the South to help solve the DPRK’s chronic food problems, expansion of trade, public and private sector investment, and tourism.27 Rhetorically, the Peace and Cooperation Initiative seemed to represent a change in security conceptions. The negative assurances against instability, isolation, and absorption were novel attempts to address the DPRK’s trepidations regarding relations with the South. The initiative spoke of establishment of economic linkages in a liberal/interdependent tradition. Through promoting people-to-people exchanges, it acknowledged the transformational effect engagement can have on the interests and preferences of the DPRK, turning it into a normal state. Tangibly, South Koreans might point to the scheduled inter-Korean summit in 1994, the Four-Party Talks, as evidence of this new change in thinking. However, the gap between rhetoric and practice was all too apparent. Although emphasizing confidence-building and negative assurances, ROK officials also accused the North of sustaining high tensions on the peninsula, and demanded that all Western powers close off contacts with Pyongyang until it first makes direct conciliatory gestures to Seoul. South Korean government statements constantly rang of phrases like: “The possibility is rising that the cornered North Korea will resort to reckless provocation . . . we do not know when or how North Korean leaders may try to find an escape hatch to avoid the collapse of their regime.”28 Similarly, although declaring the need to assist the North in its current food difficulties, Seoul saw rice and grain aid not in strictly humanitarian terms, but as linked with North Korean concessions on other political–military issues. Seoul also discouraged private sector efforts in the South to organize food aid for the North.29 In 1994, a true engagement mentality 27

28 29

See the August 15, 1996 Liberation Day Speech reprinted in the Korea Observer 27 (1996): 485–91; also see Han Sung-Joo, Korea in a Changing World (Seoul: ORUEM Publishing, 1995), 68–76; and Chung-in Moon, “Peace and Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula: A Search for Alternatives,” Korea Focus 4 (1996): 6. “S. Korea President Warns Invasion by North More Likely,” AP–Dow Jones News Service, 12 March 1997. “NSP Demands Cancellation of Department Store’s Campaign to Help North Korea,” Joongang Ilbo, 16 April 1997. Moreover, positive assurances are always couched in statements resonating with containment logic. Although Premier Lee Hong-koo reaffirmed

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might have seen the potential benefits from a token transmission of condolences for Kim Il Sung’s death as outweighing the costs, but this was not the case. Similarly, although the December 1996 submarine incursion was a provocative act by the North, Seoul made a conscious political decision to play up the incident as a military provocation, warned the country of all-out war, called for increases in military spending, and froze its participation in the agreed framework, as well as all other aid, communication, and economic activity with the North.30 The predominant security mindset during the Kim Young Sam years remained very much in the parabellum paradigm of zero-sum thinking. Security was conceived of in classic power-politics terms, and could not be achieved through accommodation, but only through relative military advantage where safety only emerges when adversaries are intimidated and overwhelmed by superior capabilities. Despite such continuities on the security side, the Kim government was still able to enact democratizing reforms on the military. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, democratic outcomes therefore varied despite no variation on the security variable. Security constrained but did not determine democratization choices. Unintended Consequences: Why the Military Remained Reticent How then was Kim Young Sam able to successfully carry out democratizing reforms against the military without a major and durable reduction of tensions in the security environment (or changes in security thinking)? Two factors can explain this. First, Kim Young Sam carried out the military purges at a time of high public popularity as well as a burgeoning economy. The latter was critical as Kim was able to authorize some of the highest procurement budgets in ROK military history at the same time that he was purging the military from politics. Although the ROK ranked thirteenth worldwide as an importer of arms and weapons systems from 1989 to 1993, under Kim Young Sam, the ROK ranked fifth from 1993 to 1994 and second from 1995 to 1996. The increased attention paid to military modernization therefore benefited the military as an institution, removing some of the incentives to resist the purges. Political attacks on officers were perceived to be threats less to the military-as-institution, than as to the individuals. Second, a permissive condition for the success of Kim’s military purges was actions taken by the previous regime under

30

the Peace and Cooperation Initiative, he also added, “A war will be only prevented through the South’s superior strength and strong countermeasures. . . . We must make North Korea realize that any attempts to disrupt peace on the Korean peninsula will carry a heavy price. . . .” See Lee’s October 1996 speech to the National Assembly as cited in Joongang Ilbo, 23 October 1996. Kevin Sullivan, “North Korea Apologizes for Submarine Incident,” Washington Post, 30 December 1996, A1.

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Roh Tae Woo to consolidate power after Chun Doo Hwan. Roh acceded to office with great concern about the personal loyalties held by many in the military to Chun (a typical problem in Korean political transitions given the military’s political prominence). Roh undertook his own purges putting personal loyalists into key positions. However, the nature of the individuals filling these positions for Roh was different from that of Chun. Chun loyalists had political ambitions and held intelligence positions and/or garrison backgrounds. Many of Roh loyalists were frontline officers, who by nature of their deployments were a more professional rather than politicized corps of officers. In this sense, Roh’s actions, while perfectly consonant with traditional Korean authoritarian practices, had the unintended consequence of enhancing democratization. The nature of Roh’s replacements was effecting a quiet, incremental transformation of the military leadership toward a more professional group. This group, in turn, when faced with expulsion by the incoming Kim Young Sam government did not resist in destabilizing ways as previous politically ambitious military officers might have.31 The Interaction of Security and Democratization Under Kim Dae Jung If the Kim Young Sam years represent a case of democratization occurring despite a continuation of South Korea’s parabellum security paradigm, then the Kim Dae Jung years represent the case of democratization and a new security paradigm moving forward in a mutual and reinforcing fashion. The election of Kim Dae Jung in 1997 marked a watershed event in the democratic consolidation process by most conventional standards (i.e., former political dissident popularly elected, no significant charges of vote tampering, and third successive direct presidential election). However, just as a receding of the military from politics under Kim Young Sam enhanced Korea’s democratization, so has democratization under Kim Dae Jung changed and expanded the way Koreans think about security. Democratization has, for example, enabled concepts of “mutual security” and multilateralism (rather than self-help security and bilateralism) to resonate in the traditional Korean parabellum mindset. Mutual Security and Democratization: The Sunshine Policy Kim Dae Jung has infused traditional South Korean security logic with the notion of mutual security. Unlike the parabellum logic described earlier, this view acknowledges the existence of nonzero-sum solutions to security problems and accepts the security dilemma as a fundamental 31

For additional details, see Pak Jong-ryol, “Roh Taet’ongnyong kwa Yukgonghwaguk Kunbu” (President Roh and the sixth republic military), Sin Tong-a, January 1990; and Oh, Korean Politics.

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obstacle in international relations. The primary symbol of this change is the sunshine policy. Unlike the Peace and Cooperation Initiative, the sunshine policy represents a true change in strategy and attitude vis-`a-vis North Korea. Reflecting Kim Dae Jung’s lifelong support of liberal postures regarding North Korea, the sunshine policy begins with the promise of full acceptance of the Peace and Cooperation Initiative’s three negative assurances of nonisolation, nondestabilization, and nonabsorption. Bolstering this policy are commitments to delink humanitarian aid from politics and to loosen government reins on private sector activity with the North. Kim called for the lifting of U.S. sanctions on the DPRK and “open-ended” engagement with the DPRK (i.e., encouraging all to engage on their own terms with the North rather than with Seoul’s specific permission). In perhaps the most unprecedented element of the policy, Kim explicitly dropped unification through absorption as a stated goal of ROK policy.32 Moreover, these changes in policy were far from rhetorical. On numerous occasions, DPRK intransigent acts tested the Kim government’s resolve, yet Seoul stayed the course despite adverse domestic criticism and in a manner atypical of past initiatives. North Korean provocations in June 1998 (submarine incursion), July 1998 (infiltration incident), and August 1998 (Taepo-dong missile test, Kumchang-ri) did not sway Seoul from economic and humanitarian overtures to Pyongyang as well as pressing the United States to lift economic sanctions against the North.33 The sunshine policy is therefore informed by nonzero-sum thinking, explicitly removes unification as the goal of North–South policy, and until recently emphasized norms of diffuse reciprocity (rather than specific reciprocity). By offering these basic tenets, the sunshine policy implicitly follows a “mutual security” framework. It acknowledges that the route to self-security requires reducing the insecurity of the other. It seeks unilateral ways of increasing transparency and conveying the South’s intentions for this purpose. “Democratization” of Unification Because of the sunshine policy, one can now speak of engaging the DPRK or calling for peaceful coexistence as politically legitimate platforms. As 32 33

Inaugural address of Kim Dae-jung, February 5, 1998, reprinted in Korea Update 9 (March 1998). “Sunshine Policy Set to Shine,” Korea Newsreview, 15 August 1998; New York Times, 17 August 1998, A1 (North Korea site an A-bomb plant, U.S. agencies say); New York Times, 1 September 1998, A6 (North Korea fires missile over Japanese territory); Managing Change on the Korean Peninsula (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 25–7. For a good overview, see Kongdan Oh, “North Korea’s Engagement: Implications for South Korea,” in North Korea’s Engagement National Intelligence Council and Federal Research Division, LOC, May 2001.

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noted earlier, regardless of the ultimate success of the sunshine policy, this may be one of its most lasting effects – a “democratization” of the unification issue. After the June 2000 summit, some analysts complained of the “new ideological divide” in Korea and its potentially destabilizing effects. The motives for calling this divide alarming had to do with externalities regarding the U.S.–ROK alliance, but from the perspective of Korea’s democratization, this divide was a positive development. There was no longer a narrow band of opinion on North Korea, everything outside of which was not only illegitimate but treasonous. In a similar fashion, additional evidence of the changing logic of Korean security is the diversification of views on unification as a normative goal. Much like the narrow band of legitimate opinion on the DPRK, views on unification took on an almost religious quality. If one were a Korean, one had to call for unification, defined only as southern dominance over the north. During Rhee, this dominance was defined as military victory (pukch’in t’ongil). During Park, it was defined as economic victory (songong t’ongil ); and in the post–Cold War era as absorption. Anything beyond this narrow spectrum was not only politically illegitimate but blasphemous. However, under Kim Dae Jung, the range of views on this issue has also widened. The dominant norm on unification is being countered by a new ambivalence toward unification. Pragmatic considerations have intruded on what was formerly a normative discourse.34 Unification is no longer an article of faith as the discourse has shifted to issues like the added tax burden it would engender and the pressures it would place on an already weak social safety net. Although it is still part of one’s Korean identity to yearn for unification, a cautious “not in my time” (NIMT) perspective has emerged. Unification is the goal, recited with a wink – everyone vows allegiance to it, but many do not want it today.35 Multilateralism During the Kim Dae Jung years, changes in Korean security logic have also been evident in the growing credibility of multilateralism. As noted earlier, traditional parabellum strategic culture sees security not only in zero-sum terms, but also as exclusive rather than inclusive. Security is achieved through tight alignment with one great power at the exclusion of all others. Traditionally, this took the form of sadaejuui; today it takes the form of an assertive bilateralism (with the United States). Arguably, democratization and conceptions of mutual security have widened the spectrum of what is conceived as acceptable ways of 34 35

In part, this is linked to generational change and also to the North’s economic difficulties. See Victor Cha, “The Continuity Behind the Change in Korea,” Orbis (Fall 2000). Doug Struck, “In the South, One Korea Is Distant Goal,” Washington Post, 18 June 2000.

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managing Korean security. Although bilateralism is still privileged, there is increasing interest in inclusive forms of multilateral and regional security. The fixation on one at the expense of others is less apparent. This new orientation is evident in the ROK’s membership in many different forms of multilateral security dialogues, UN peacekeeping operations, and other multilateral fora.36 In sum, the argument is not that the parabellum paradigm in Korean grand strategy has given way to a wholly new one. Transformations of strategic paradigms do not happen overnight. However, increasingly, the parabellum logic of self-help, zero-sum, exclusive security is being contested by mutual-help, positive sum, and inclusive notions of security. The “democratization” of security under Kim Dae Jung has been the cause for much of this change. The Future: Consolidation or Backsliding? What does the future hold for Korean security and democratization? Given the arguments laid out in the first two sections of this chapter, one might expect the prospects to be good. In other words, if zero-sum, parabellum security thinking did not impede democratization efforts (i.e., military reform) during the Kim Young Sam years, and the introduction of the Kim Dae Jung government’s sunshine policy subsequently has led to a “democratization” of South Korean security, then the stage seems to be set for a consolidation of the democratic progress made since 1993 rather than a backsliding from it. However, this optimistic assessment of the future sits uncomfortably with another characteristic of Korean democracy – the tendency of Koreans to filter democracy through economic rather than political lenses. As Doh Chull Shin’s chapter in this work argues, survey data reveals a clear Korean inclination toward defining the appeal of democracy in terms of economic prosperity. Korea Democracy Barometer surveys in 1993 and 2001 found that as high as 68% of the general public define economic prosperity as the most important element of democracy [rather than political freedom (39%)].37 Moreover, if given the choice between economic development and democratization, Koreans chose the former by a margin of six to one. In addition, their reticence at unconditionally supporting democracy is higher than that of other newly democratizing countries.38 36 37 38

See Kim, Korea’s Globalization. See Doh Chull Shin, “Mass Politics, Public Opinion, and Democracy in Korea,” in this work. According to Shin, although 45% of Koreans express unconditional support for democracy as a political enterprise, the average figure for Latin America is 58% (see Shin, “Mass Politics”).

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The implication of these findings is that when faced with severe economic shocks to the system, one cannot discount the possibility of waning South Korean enthusiasm for democratic forms of governance. This is especially true if such backsliding is perceived (falsely or not) as somehow improving economic conditions. The 1997 financial crisis, for example, offers an ominous example. Although austere economic conditions created by the crisis did not create proactive support for democratic backsliding, it did give rise to a nostalgia for the “good old days” when authoritarian regimes ruled over a robust and vibrant Korean economy. As Shin states, “Supporters of authoritarianism, as the best method of tackling the country’s serious problems have increased steadily from 12% in 1996 to 24% in 1998, and 31% in 1999 to 44% in 2001. Compared to the precrisis period, nearly four times as many people express nostalgia for the way the Chun Doo Hwan government handled those problems.”39 The key observation is not that economic hardship creates a desire among Koreans to return to authoritarianism, but that such hardship reduces the proactive support for democracy as the ideal form of government. Moreover, this weakening support grows more acute for those who associate democracy with the lack of economic opportunity. Under what circumstances might such a constellation of forces come into being? Unification. The costs of social integration, high unemployment, and hyperinflation all associated with a sudden collapse and absorption of the DPRK would put tremendous strain on the South Korean economy.40 Moreover, these problems could easily be associated with democracy, as the need to appease and attract a newly enfranchised electorate in the northern portion of the country would create political imperatives that made no economic sense. For example, unification would create a need for currency union between the ROK and DPRK currencies. The Seoul government would face crosscutting pressures in making this decision. On the one hand, one would not want to emulate the German example of uniting the currencies at parity as this would increase the value of the DPRK currency without corresponding increases in productivity (thus creating bad inflation). On the other hand, for any Korean political leader to suggest anything less than parity would risk losing the votes of a newly enfranchised northern electorate of 20 million people. There would also exist pressure to put enough money in northerners’ pockets with this currency union to stem the wave of northerners migrating south to find jobs (and potentially threaten the southern labor movement’s wage levels and interests).41 There are a variety of other scenarios one can imagine, but the 39 40 41

Shin, “Mass Politics.” For an overview of some of the costs and challenges in a sudden unification process, see Marcus Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse (Washington, DC: IIE, 2000). On the latter point, see Marcus Noland’s chapter in Korea’s Future and the Great Powers, ed. Nicholas Eberstadt and Richard Ellings (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001).

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relevant point is that sudden unification in combination with democracy sets off dynamics that potentially could worsen the economic difficulties that are already likely to occur. And if South Korean proclivities to believe in economic forms of democracy remain salient, then a backlash against democracy (e.g., as “messy”) and yearning for authoritarian strength may rule the day.

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CHAPTER 9

The Developmental State and Democratic Consolidation in South Korea C. S. Eliot Kang

Since the June 29 declaration in 1987, South Korea has passed some major milestones in its march toward becoming a liberal democracy.1 Today, South Koreans enjoy a level of political freedom that is without precedent in their country’s history. Their young democracy has endured the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and has met an important test of successfully transferring power from a ruling party to a genuine opposition party. Nonetheless, the extent to which South Korea has consolidated its democracy is open to question. South Korea has successfully institutionalized and legitimized a democratic, constitutional electoral process, but it is still struggling to establish a responsive, accountable political order and an inclusive economic system. In this chapter, I analyze how the institutional “drag” of the developmental state,2 forged during the dictatorship of Park Chung Hee, has impeded democratic consolidation.3 Effective in early stages of economic development, the collusive arrangement between the state and giant oligopolistic conglomerates, the chaebol, has proved not only economically inefficient and anticompetitive in the era of globalization,4 but also deeply entrenched and reform-resistant. 1

2

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For a discussion on what constitutes a liberal democracy, see chapter 1 of Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). On the developmental state, see Alice H. Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–75 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987); and Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). On democratic consolidation, see Diamond, Developing Democracy, chapter 3. Globalization is a complex process that is intensifying the levels of interaction and interconnectedness within and between states and societies. It is a multidimensional process that involves the intensification of economic, political, social, and cultural interconnectedness around the globe. See Samuel S. Kim’s introduction to this work.

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I contend that, among other reasons, South Korea is having trouble consolidating its democracy because of a complex interplay of agents and structures. Notably, the attempt by Kim Young Sam to reform the South Korean developmental state was a significant contributing cause of the economic collapse in late 1997. With political resources provided by his historic election, he tried to reform the anticompetitive and antidemocratic collusive arrangement between state and big business. However, Kim’s inability to monitor and enforce his policies caused the reform program to be channeled in unpredictable ways by existing institutions. Kim Young Sam’s failure and the ensuing economic calamity provided Kim Dae Jung, a longtime leading opposition figure, with another chance to perform much-needed institutional surgery. Although Kim Dae Jung’s initial goal was to dismantle the developmental state and to replace it with a liberal market economy, the financial crisis sapped Kim Dae Jung’s political capacity. As he juggled the needs of economic stabilization and fundamental institutional reform, Kim Dae Jung sometimes resorted to measures incompatible with democratic consolidation. Although the long-term consequence of this is uncertain, South Korea may well face a longer march toward democratic consolidation. Focus on Institutions To analyze the nexus between the challenges of economic development in the age of globalization and democratic consolidation in South Korea, I focus on institutions. Of course, democracy is more than a set of institutions and procedures. Among other things, democratization involves a fundamental transformation of the way cultural values and individual citizens interact, not simply institutional change. However, these shifts cannot occur without the political leaders making choices and acting to destroy old authoritarian political and economic institutions and to establish new democratic ones. Unfortunately, it is difficult to carry out institutional change, especially in a political system where key institutions of authoritarianism (imperial presidency, powerful state bureaucracies, politically privileged oligopolies, etc.) have not been fully discredited. In this chapter, I employ a variant of the historical institutionalist approach to provide a theoretically informed narrative of the attempts by Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung to reform key institutional pillars of the South Korean political economy that have authoritarian origins.5 Early institutional studies were not very precise about the political origin of 5

Discussion here follows: Andrew P. Cortell and Susan Peterson, “Altered States: Explaining Domestic Institutional Change,” British Journal of Political Science 29, no. 1 (1999): 177–203. See also C. S. Eliot Kang, “Institutionalizing the Regulation of Inward Foreign Direct Investment,” in Altered States: International Relations, Domestic Politics, and Institutional Change, ed. Andrew P. Cortell and Susan Peterson (New York: Lexington Books, 2002), 169–93.

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institutions, and they underestimated the complexity of their function.6 The historically sensitive “new institutionalist” approach employed here better captures the complexity of the interaction between political actors and their institutional environment. It focuses on the nexus between institutions and behavior and the process whereby institutions originate or change.7 For institutional change to take place, I argue that two crucial factors must come together. First, there has to be a trigger (for example, a war, an election, or an economic crisis) that opens a “window of opportunity,” which may be of varying size and duration. Further, there must be a political agent that favors change along with the institutional opportunity. It is well recognized that the type of institutional change depends on the size of the window of opportunity, but not much work has been done to explain why some windows are large whereas others are small.8 I argue that the size of the window depends on the triggering event, which has a different impact on the credibility of existing institutions. Specifically, size depends on three things: cost (for example, inflation, unemployment figures, and battle deaths) adjusted for regime type, demand (for example, strikes and election outcomes), and autonomy (for example, election outcomes and the magnitude of the national emergency). Of course, the presence of the window does not by itself lead to institutional change. Change requires an agent that wants change, a disposition that varies with political calculation. Also, the agent must have the institutional capacity to act on his or her preference: Is the agent part of the relevant policy network? Does the agent have monitoring capability? Does the agent have enforcement capability? Further, the agent must have a correct perception of the window of opportunity and its occurrence and size. If the agent lacks capacity or misperceives, unintended consequences could result; misperception and/or lack of capacity can 6

7

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A survey of the contribution of institutionalists in political science makes it evident that early institutionalist interpretations lack a coherent framework for understanding the sources of large- and small-scale changes in a country’s political institutions. An overview of the literature is found in Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political Studies 44 (1996): 936–57. Given the predisposition to identify relatively enduring structural constraints on political behavior, earlier institutionalist studies have focused on the static quality of institutions. Among the schools of new institutionalists, the one that has focused directly on the question of institutional innovation and change is the “historical institutionalist” school. To the extent that they address the issue of gradual change, they simply acknowledge that this happens without offering an explanation. See, for example, Peter A. Hall, Governing the Economy: Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 266; and Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back in: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” in Bringing the State Back in, eds. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 14. See John T. S. Keeler, “Opening the Window for Reform: Mandates, Crises and Extraordinary Policy-Making,” Comparative Political Studies 25, no. 4 (1993): 433–86; and John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, chapter 8 (New York: Harper Collins, 1984).

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lead to the activation and empowerment of new agents who may seek unforeseen goals. Indeed, although agents act strategically and rationally, their actions are mediated by existing institutions. These institutions may hinder the ability of agents to implement their desired policies effectively, because they may lack monitoring and enforcement powers. The complex interconnection among these institutions may prevent agents from acquiring adequate or clear information about the consequences of their actions and, despite sound conceptualization of policies, may interfere with the optimal sequencing of policy action. Furthermore, as it interacts with agent actions, this web of institutions may activate and empower new agents who may seek unanticipated objectives. Although many institutionalists note that an institutional change may have unintended results, few offer explanations as to why and when such deviations emerge. I argue that the “stickiness” of the institutions that constitute the South Korean developmental state has interacted with the challenges of economic development and forces of globalization to slow democratic consolidation in South Korea. Certainly, the developmental state, imperatives of economic development, and globalization have advanced as well as hindered South Korea’s march toward democracy. Indeed, South Korea is a textbook case of a developing nation led into the light of democracy by economic growth and international trade and investment.9 Nonetheless, South Korea’s recent trials and tribulations show that the institutional legacies of the developmental state could also complicate the development of democratic governance. The transition from the dictatorship of Chun Doo Hwan to the democratically elected government of Roh Tae Woo was undoubtedly facilitated by the spectacular economic success of the developmental state built by Park Chung Hee. However, unlike many countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe, the economic success of the previous nondemocratic regime meant that the democratic transition in South Korea has been comparatively slow, if more orderly. Furthermore, the nascent democratic regime as well as the domestic economy was saddled with many institutional legacies of authoritarianism.10 In fact, one of the immediate effects of the democratic transition in South Korea was the ascendancy of the chaebol and associated labor unions at the expense of other actors. These two groups managed to thwart the reform drive of President Kim Young Sam despite the large 9

10

See the concluding chapter of Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jos´e Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). During the democratic transition in South Korea, the goal was to replace an authoritarian constitutional structure with a democratic one, not to restructure the developmentoriented political economy, which had worked reasonably well for decades.

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window of opportunity for institutional change provided by his election as the first democratically elected civilian president in thirty years. Free to pursue their parochial interests from a position of privilege in a liberalizing environment, the chaebol and organized labor helped to undermine Kim’s admittedly irresolute effort to eliminate the anticompetitive and antidemocratic features of the developmental state. Their actions ultimately made South Korea vulnerable to the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Kim Dae Jung, a longtime opposition leader, was elected president during the height of the financial crisis. A watershed event in South Korea’s march toward democracy, the very first election of an “opposition president” was in part facilitated by the economic crisis, which opened a window of opportunity for institutional change that was much larger than the one available to Kim Young Sam. With the declared intention of consolidating a genuine liberal democracy, Kim Dae Jung led South Korea out of the worst economic calamity since the Korean War and began a series of ambitious institutional reforms. However, despite the democratic aims of his ultimate goal, in policy execution, the exigency of market stabilization, as well as overcoming the rearguard resistance to his institutional reform program, took precedence over concerns for democratic governance, such as horizontal accountability and the rule of law. The Authoritarian Inheritance Before analyzing in detail the reform efforts by the two Kims, I will discuss the authoritarian inheritance that is the South Korean developmental state. I will briefly describe a tangle of collusive arrangements between the state and the chaebol that has been the bane of South Korea’s nascent liberal democracy. During the 1960s, general-turned-dictator Park Chung Hee created a powerful set of interlocking state and business institutions that directly and indirectly mobilized resources to achieve one of the fastest economic growth rates in the world. By the late 1980s, however, the South Korean developmental state was a tangle of collusive arrangements between the government and big business, as organized labor, heavily repressed during the Park era, began to play the role of a junior partner. Although the trend toward economic liberalization was beginning to gain steam elsewhere in the world as part-and-parcel of globalization, the South Korean government remained deeply entrenched in a heavily export-dependent economy. Despite the democratic transition of the late 1980s, the state continued to play the central role in allocating capital, while its deepening symbiosis with the chaebol allowed their unhealthy domination of the domestic

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economy.11 The state–chaebol collusion starved small and medium-sized businesses of capital and opportunities while increasing foreign debt and fostering an inefficient banking sector saddled with problem loans. At the same time, the wage levels of chaebol workers began to climb because of increasing activism of unions and the tightening of the labor market, leading to deteriorating terms of trade. During the authoritarian and semi-authoritarian period, the government simply repressed labor to keep wage levels down. However, as political liberalization took place during the latter half of the 1980s, frequent strikes and work stoppages drove up domestic wage levels and secured job security for unionized workers.12 The chaebol , in coordination with the government, bought labor peace with rapid pay increases and implicit “lifetime” employment guarantees for those working for the conglomerates.13 However, high wages were the least of the problems caused by the domination of the South Korean economy by a handful of giant enterprises. By the early 1990s, the chaebol had become so huge that the combined revenues of the top ten conglomerates amounted to more than threequarters of the country’s gross national product.14 In globalizing marketplaces of the 1990s, marked by rapid innovations and short product cycles, this concentration of resources made the South Korean economy inflexible and inefficient. Behaving oligopolistically, they skewed the economy to favor their own interests and impeded free competition.15 Indeed, many years of cozy relations between the state bureaucracy and the chaebol politicized the investment environment and repeatedly favored the same set of insiders, with banks simply acting as cash boxes 11

12 13 14 15

For an account of the South Korean government’s control of investment capital, see Jung-en Woo (Meredith Woo-Cumings), Race to the Shift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). Robert E. Bedeski, The Transformation of South Korea: Reform and Reconstruction in the Sixth Republic Under Roh Tae Woo 1987–92 (London: Routledge, 1994), 83–84. Although major restrictions on labor rights remained even after the 1992 revision of the labor law, wages increased as much as 45% from 1987 to 1989. Ibid., 85. “The Will to Fail: South Korea Versus Its Chaebol,” Far Eastern Economic Review (henceforth FEER), 9 February 1995, 5. One specific example of the distorting effect of the chaebol on the South Korean economy can be seen in how the chaebol contributed to the increase in land price, which further eroded the competitiveness of South Korean firms in the world market. This rapid increase in price was largely driven by speculative investment by the chaebol , which could not find a more productive use of their money, mostly borrowed. Thechaebol bought land to use it as collateral and to hedge against inflation. Although such speculation frenzy benefited the chaebol in the short run, it was a great burden to the larger economy, especially to small- and medium-sized businesses. It drove up the price for office space, commercial and industrial land, etc. It also caused a credit crunch because the chaebol used borrowed money for this speculation. See Chi Tong Uk, Kankoku no Zokubatsu, Gunbatsu, Zaibatsu (South Korea’s Kin Groups, Military Groups, and Business Groups) (Tokyo: Chuo Koron, 1997), 154.

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for targeted projects. Inevitably, corruption became a serious problem, and without the discipline of market forces guiding investment decisions, much waste was created, entrepreneurship by outsiders was discouraged, and the chaebol kept piling on debt. Furthermore, by the 1980s, the South Korean state bureaucracy was no longer the autonomous creature of the Park era that could rise above particularistic interests; it was deeply implicated in the corruption and inefficiencies of the self-dealings of the advanced stage of developmental capitalism. To be sure, the loss of autonomy was positive to the extent that it contributed to democratic transition, but it also amplified the chaebol ’s adverse impact on the South Korean economy. The growing indispensability of the chaebol to the political circles that controlled the machinery of state ensured the oligopolistic power of the big conglomerates, allowing the continuation of the antidemocratic and market-distorting activities described earlier.16 This symbiosis became deeply entrenched, and it is this institutional monster that Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung tried to slay. The First Window The first meaningful opportunity to reform the developmental state came in 1993. With the inauguration of Kim Young Sam as president in February, a large window of opportunity for institutional transformation opened. Taking office, Kim Young Sam announced two tasks for his new administration. First, he pledged to revitalize an economy that in 1992 had recorded the slowest growth in twelve years. More importantly, Kim promised to eliminate the deep-rooted collusive ties between public officials and the chaebol. And, to this end, he launched three major policy initiatives: a ban on the use of false-name accounts for financial transactions, guidelines for limiting chaebol activities to a few core businesses, and the liberalization of financial markets. The reform plan was ambitious, but no doubt Kim Young Sam felt his goals were achievable. After all, he had the moral authority of an historic election victory. With a plurality of 42% of the vote cast, he had won a genuinely democratic contest against Kim Dae Jung and Chung Joo Young, the well-financed chairman of the giant Hyundai conglomerate. He did not win the majority of the votes; however, coming into office as the first truly civilian and democratically elected president since the 16

For a discussion of this government–chaebol dynamic, see Chung-in Moon, “Changing Patterns of Business–Government Relations in South Korea,” in Business and Government in Industrializing Asia, ed. Andrew MacIntyre (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 142–66.

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early 1960s, Kim Young Sam received an approval rating of as high as 80% during the first months of his administration.17 In addition to the historic moment, Kim no doubt believed he had the political capacity to carry out out his reform agenda. He had the broad executive powers of the South Korean presidency. In addition to specific constitutional powers, he had discretionary powers that allowed him to use prosecution, police, and tax authorities for political purposes.18 Furthermore, though detracting from his democratic legitimacy, by merging his political supporters with the military-dominated ruling party of the previous Roh administration, Kim Young Sam gained the backing of the majority party, the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), in the national assembly. Initiating reforms, however, proved easier than monitoring and enforcing them. As argued earlier, when a political entrepreneur attempts to change institutions, he or she may lack adequate information about the consequences of his or her actions, and those actions may activate and empower new agents who may seek other goals. Although he or she may act strategically and rationally, his or her actions are mediated by existing institutions that often hinder the ability to implement the desired goal. As Kim tried to implement his reform measures, he was stymied not only by uncontrollable exogenous factors, such as international economic conditions, but also by endogenous institutional obstacles.19

Real-Name Reform Since it had the most immediate political and economic impact, the “realname” financial transaction reform led Kim Young Sam’s attack on the developmental state. Originally instituted to encourage savings when real interest rates on bank deposits were below inflation rate, false-name financial accounts20 helped to boost domestic savings during the takeoff stage of South Korea’s economic development. However, over time, they became vehicles enabling big businesses to make secret illegal political contributions to corrupt government officials and allowing those officials 17 18

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FEER, Asia 1998 Yearbook (Hong Kong: FEER, 1998), 142. See Sung Deuk Hahm and L. Christopher Plein, After Development: The Transformation of the Korean Presidency and Bureaucracy (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1997). For details on the international economic factors, see C. S. Eliot Kang, “Segyehwa Reform of the South Korean Developmental State,” in Korea’s Globalization, ed. Samuel S. Kim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 76–101. Financial transactions under borrowed or made-up names were made possible by a law ensuring secrecy of savings and installment deposits. See Hyung-Koo Lee, The Korean Economy: Perspectives for the Twenty-First Century (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 69.

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to hide the payoffs. Over time, this mechanism became as entrenched as any formal institution in South Korea, and it consolidated a deleterious nexus between government officials and the chaebol. The previous two military-backed presidents, Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, recognized the ill effects of the false-name accounts on economic performance, but they did not seriously attack the practice because they were the principal political beneficiaries of the system. In contrast, Kim Young Sam had been a poorly funded opposition-party leader disadvantaged by the practice. Nonetheless, Kim was aware that the chaebol and the ruling party politicians were not the only ones with falsename accounts. Many ordinary citizens utilized these accounts, mostly to avoid paying taxes. Kim’s original intention was therefore to introduce the reform gradually to prevent “panic and confusion.”21 However, when the first step of his anticorruption campaign (requiring high-ranking officials of his administration to disclose their financial assets) produced a scandal, Kim Young Sam abruptly accelerated the introduction of the real-name reform to protect his reformist image.22 Unfortunately, the sudden ban on false-name accounts dried up private and market lines of credit to small and medium-sized firms that employed the great majority of the South Korean workforce. The ban introduced another element of uncertainty in the ailing economy, which in 1993 grew only 5.8%, a historically low figure.23 Predictably, many middle class people became unhappy about the reform’s apparent negative economic impact.24 Their discontent helped to mobilize and strengthen political opposition from the conservative faction of the DLP that was made up of those who traced their political origins to earlier military regimes and who had benefited from the false-name accounts. To preserve his political capital and keep the reform window open, Kim Young Sam had to take quick defensive measures. He reshuffled his cabinet and resorted to that standard cure-all remedy for a slowing economy: pump-priming. To stimulate the economy, Kim increased the 1994 national budget by 14.5% over the previous year’s level. The economy did respond. It grew 8.6% in 1994, but in retrospect the economic 21 22

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Shim Jae Hoon and Ed Paisley, “Divide and Rule,” FEER, 7 January 1993, 22. The financial disclosure requirement led to the ouster of some prominent elected officials from Kim’s party. As a result, by-elections had to be held. The ruling DLP, however, became embroiled in a vote-buying scandal on the eve of the by-election. To limit the political damage, Kim accelerated the introduction of the real-name reform. Ed Paisley, “Strength from Adversity,” FEER, 26 August 1993, 15. The growth rate represented a feeble recovery from the 5.1% GDP growth of 1992, the worst performance since 1980. For details, see Pil-sang Yi, “Defective Financial Reform Strands Economy,” Korea Times, 11 March 1994. “Going Soft on Names,” AsiaMoney, October 1993, 8; and “Too Clean for Comfort,” Economist, 11 September 1993, 36.

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turnaround was not enough to prevent the early mobilization of opposition to Kim’s reform drive. Chaebol Specialization Reform The perceived negative economic fallout of the real-name reform immediately affected the chaebol specialization reform announced in the New Five-Year Economic Plan of July 1, 1993. This reform had three interrelated goals: reduction of the chaebol ’s predominance in the economy, improvement of the international competitiveness of each chaebol by encouraging specialization in a few core business activities, and promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises. The overall objective was to correct an imbalance in the industrial structure that privileged the chaebol. However, the prevailing economic uncertainty, aggravated by the ill-timed real-name reform, took the steam out of the chaebol specialization policy. As executed, Kim Young Sam’s chaebol reform effort did not go much beyond making the top thirty conglomerates submit, by January 1994, a list of core industries they would focus on. The chaebol specialization reform actually involved less political risk than the real-name reform because it had the widespread support of the South Korean people.25 During the democratic transition period, Roh Tae Woo tried to carry out a similar set of reforms, spurred on by the prevalent public sentiment that the chaebol were getting out of control. However, Roh had to abandon his reforms because of predictable opposition from big business groups that were donating large sums of money to the ruling party.26 As a longtime opposition leader, Kim Young Sam was less beholden to the chaebol, but because of the sluggish economy he too found it difficult to move against them. Kim needed the chaebol, which constituted the main engines of the South Korean economy, to pull the country out of the slowdown. Hence, he made no serious attempt to enforce his policy with meaningful rewards and punishments. Not surprisingly, the chaebol ignored the policy.27 In fact, during Kim Young Sam’s tenure as president, the chaebol continued to expand their business lines. The average number of subsidiaries of a chaebol increased from 18.3 in 1992 to 19.1 in 1994.28 This trend continued further as the number of chaebol subsidiaries grew 10% between 1993 and 1996.29 25 26 27

28 29

Shim Jae Hoon, “The Next Step,” FEER, 20 June 1996, 42. Moon, “Changing Patterns of Business–Government Relations in South Korea.” It is indicative of the failure of the reform to get off the ground that the Kim administration approved, on December 7, 1994, Samsung’s plan to enter the automobile industry already crowded with five domestic manufacturers. FEER, Asia 1995 Yearbook (Hong Kong: FEER, 1995), 155. Catherine Keumhyun Lee, “Unfinished Business,” Business Week, 9 September 1996, 57.

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Financial Market Liberalization The financial market reforms were also affected by the listless economy and by the early mobilization of resistance against the reform drive. And Kim Young Sam himself ended up undermining the reform as he used what turned out to be a very one-sided financial liberalization as a kind of political crutch. Indeed, Kim’s financial market reforms, as they were executed, undercut his capacity to monitor and enforce his reform policies. In June 1993, the Kim Young Sam administration unveiled the Financial Liberalization and Market Opening Plan, and a year and half later it announced the Foreign Exchange Reform Plan. These plans called for liberalizing interest rates and reducing the scope of government intervention in the financial sector. They encouraged greater foreign participation in the South Korean financial and capital markets, and this led in 1994 to the abolishment of the ceiling on overseas borrowing by overseas branches of domestic firms. The administration also adopted a policy to encourage South Korean investments abroad to develop new markets. Collectively, these measures dramatically increased offshore financing as well as outgoing foreign direct investment by South Korean enterprises. Furthermore, as resistance to his reform program began to build, Kim Young Sam used the fashionable language of segyehwa (globalization) to reorganize the government pillar of the developmental state.30 He launched the segyehwa drive in November 1994 as the top priority of his administration for 1995, with one of the key goals being the extrication of the interventionist government from the economy, in accord with the liberal overtones of the globalization phenomenon.31 In December 1994, Kim carried out a crucial reorganization of the powerful economic agencies of the government. He formed a new superagency, the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE), by merging the Economic Planning Board (EPB), a key promoter of segyehwa, with the Ministry of Finance (MOF), which was reluctant to carry out rapid financial liberalization for reasons of both policy and politics.32 The apparent logic of this institutional change was to increase the impact of the liberal-minded technocrats of the EPB in the new agency. 30 31 32

By that time, Kim’s job approval rating had dropped to around 40%. Shim Jae Hoon, “Honeymoon’s End,” FEER, 10 November 1994, 15. For more details on Kim’s globalization reform, see Kang, “Segyehwa Reform of the South Korean Developmental State.” Chung-in Moon and Sang-young Rhyu, “Between Flexibility and Rigidity: Understanding Economic Hard Times in Japan and South Korea,” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, September 1999, 20.

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As an important element of the segyehwa drive, Kim Young Sam also sought South Korea’s membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). South Korea’s application, formally initiated in March 1995, further accelerated financial liberalization, because the OECD requires its members to maintain a high degree of liberalization in financial transactions. To meet this standard, the Kim administration granted domestic firms even greater direct access to foreign loans that year.33 What is all too clear is that the primary effect of the financial liberalization reform, as executed, was easier access to foreign capital. It was not accompanied by any real effort to make the financial system more transparent and internationally competitive, which could have been accomplished by opening the highly protected domestic financial markets to foreign direct investment. Further, Kim Young Sam could not foresee what actually took place in the merger between the EPB and the MOF. The move was justified as a way to reduce the power of the anti-segyehwa MOF, which wielded a disproportionate amount of influence over banking, finance, and other economic matters and which was closely linked to the chaebol. However, the merger created a bureaucratic behemoth that combined the government’s fiscal, budgetary, and other important economic functions, making accountability even more problematic. It allowed both reckless business expansion and continued intimate ties between ruling politicians and the chaebol. Collapse of the Reform Window The turning point in Kim Young Sam’s reform efforts came around the time of the ruling party’s disastrous local election defeat in June 1995. The electoral defeat itself was damaging to Kim’s reform program, but even more detrimental were the circumstances leading to this defeat. These events together effectively closed the window of opportunity for performing surgery on the developmental state. The prelude to the local election debacle was Kim’s falling-out with Kim Jong Pil, an old guard conservative and the chairman of the DLP who had nothing to gain from reform, particularly the reform of the financial system. When Kim Young Sam told Kim Jong Pil in mid-January 1995 that he would be sacked at the coming party convention in February, Kim Jong Pil left the DLP with his followers and formed the United Liberal 33

R. Barry Johnston, Salim M. Darbar, and Claudia Echeverria, “Sequencing Capital Account Liberalization: Lessons from the Experiences in Chile, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand,” IMF Working Paper, November 1997, 85.

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Democrats (ULD).34 The split was costly for the DLP in the historic first local elections. It won only 33.8% of the vote while the largest opposition party, the Democratic Party (DP), gained 30.5% and the newly established ULD 10.8%, with independent candidates winning 24.9%.35 Another major political consequence of the local election fiasco was that the strong showing of the DP in the election led to the return of Kim Dae Jung from his self-imposed retirement after his defeat in the 1992 presidential election. In September, Kim Dae Jung formed a new party, the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP), and his comeback and Kim Jong Pil’s departure from the DLP soon developed into a serious political problem for Kim Young Sam. To make the disaster complete, in late 1995, the ill-fated real-name reform unexpectedly led to a shocking revelation that former president Roh Tae Woo had accumulated a staggering sum of business contributions during his tenure.36 This started a political chain reaction that implicated Kim Young Sam himself. The question arose, how had Roh spent 330 billion won out of the 500 billion won he had amassed. A strong suspicion grew that Roh had given the bulk of the money from his secret coffers to Kim, who was the candidate of Roh’s DLP for the 1992 presidential election. Not surprisingly, Kim’s democratic and reformist credentials became severely tarnished by the time of his party’s defeat in the local elections of 1995. Indeed, by then, the window of opportunity for transforming the South Korean developmental state had collapsed and Kim’s reform measures were in full retreat. Senior members of Kim Young Sam’s own party blamed the real-name reform, among other things, for the electoral defeat. They argued that it drove away crucial middle-class voters. Lee Choon-koo, the new incoming chairman of the party, urged Kim to water down the real-name reform.37 This was a plea the president could not ignore. Faced with mounting criticism from his allies, Kim acceded to the appeal, and the reform came to “partial de facto rescission.”38 As a result, much of the underground economy based on false-name accounts remained underground39 and, even worse, expanded to almost 10% of the gross national product by 1997.40 34 35 36 37

38 39 40

Shim Jae Hoon, “Bitter Pill,” FEER, 2 February 1995, 17. Shim Jae Hoon, “Rich Men and Politicians,” FEER, 4 May 1995, 36. For details on this affair, see Shim Jae Hoon, “Dirty Money,” FEER, 9 November 1995, 16–17. Manwoo Lee, “Globalization and Korean Domestic Politics,” Paper presented at the Conference on Globalization and Korea, East Asian Institute, Columbia University, May 22–3, 1998, 9. John Kie-chiang Oh, Korean Politics: The Quest for Democratization and Economic Development (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 142. Ahn Mi-young, “Going Forth to Multiply,” Asian Business, June 1995, 28. Kang Kyung-shik, “Time for Economic Reform,” Korea Focus 5 (1997): 66.

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Unintended Consequences With so many political woes, Kim Young Sam was left struggling to preserve his political capital. With the national assembly elections scheduled for April 11, 1996, Kim once again turned to pump-priming the economy.41 His desire to prevail in this election forced Kim to accelerate financial liberalization that gave the chaebol greater access to cheap foreign capital. He was counting on the chaebol improving their export levels and thereby revitalizing the ailing economy. However, this was a recipe for disaster. In fact, as storm clouds gathered for the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Kim’s financial liberalization exposed the Achilles heel of the South Korean developmental state: the highly politicized financial system. The actual effect of liberalization was to introduce more short-term capital flows into the state and the chaebol-dominated economy by allowing easier access to the international financial system.42 This allowed even more excessive expansion and wasteful investment by the chaebol in new shipyards, semiconductor and auto production plants, and other risky projects. With the presidential election scheduled for December 1997, Kim Young Sam desperately tried to stabilize an economy that was headed for a crash landing. His most important effort was the labor law reform of December 1996 that sought to help the chaebol by allowing layoffs.43 This attempt, however, triggered the largest wave of strikes in South Korean history, which contributed to the collapse of the economy in late 1997.44 Toward the end of his presidency, the only thing Kim could do to turn the economy around was to turn to the labor market. With full employment prevailing, the average monthly wage for workers in South Korea’s manufacturing sector rose from 590,000 won in 1990 to 1.12 million won 41

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In 1996, Kim decided to allow domestic firms to borrow a total of $3.5 billion in foreign loans in the coming year. Charles S. Lee, “Performance Anxiety,” FEER, 5 December 1996, 71. In addition, he had the Bank of Korea lower the commercial bank reserve requirement ratio from 9.4% to 7.4%, the first reduction in six years, to help domestic firms raise capital more cheaply. At the end of 1991, the total portfolio investment in South Korea was $2.5 billion; by the end of 1994, it was $29.7 billion, an increase of about 1,088%. The international liabilities of South Korean banks increased by 49%, from $21.7 billion at the end of 1991 to $32.4 billion at the end of 1994. International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistic Yearbook, 1997 ed., 519. Specifically, the Kim government decided to legalize the firing of workers by the chaebol trying to reduce labor costs. Although South Korea’s employment practices differed significantly from the “lifetime” employment system associated with the Japanese conglomerates, workforce adjustment still took the form of voluntary resignation of employees. Outright layoffs required employers to demonstrate extreme business difficulties and to obtain court approval. Stephan Haggard, Richard Cooper, Susan Collins, Ro Sung-tae, and Kim Chungsoo, Macro Economic Policy and Adjustment in Korea, 1970–90 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 195. On the labor reform and the resulting strikes, see Young Cheol Kim, “Industrial Reform and Labor Backlash in South Korea,” Asian Survey 38, no. 12 (1998): 1142–60.

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in 1995. The problem was that productivity only rose by 65.5% in those five years, whereas wages rose by almost 90%.45 Unions were outraged by the revision that was so patently pro-business and by the way the government tried to revise the laws. On December 26, 1996, the government-sponsored reform bills were passed at an unscheduled early morning session of the national assembly attended only by the members of the ruling party. This secret revision of the labor laws, violating democratic procedure, unleashed a massive wave of nationwide strikes with as many as half a million workers taking to the streets.46 The strikes crippled South Korea’s economy.47 After about a month, Kim Young Sam had no choice but to send the laws back to the national assembly for re-deliberation. The new revision postponed the legalization of layoffs until 2000,48 but the damage had already been inflicted. The labor unrest was particularly devastating to already-ailing Kia Motors, the flagship company of the Kia Group. Coming on the heels of other high profile business failures, most notably the Hanbo bankruptcy and the July 1997 collapse of the Kia Group, South Korea’s eighth largest chaebol, triggered a run on the won in December 1997. With the collapse of Kia and other concerns, international investors, already jittery from the financial crisis in Southeast Asia, began to scrutinize South Korea’s economic stability. When they saw deteriorating fundamentals, their reaction was predictable: they panicked and rushed for the exit.

The Second Window With its reserves gone and on the verge of default, on December 3, 1997, South Korea had to sign a deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreeing to an austerity program to stabilize its currency and to avert defaulting on its foreign debts. The $58.35 billion (U.S.) loan organized by the IMF was the largest international bailout in history. The unprecedented crisis and the national humiliation of the IMF bailout contributed to the election of Kim Dae Jung as the fifteenth president of South Korea in December 1997. The severe economic dislocation and the unprecedented transfer of power to an opposition candidate 45 46 47

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Kayoko Kitamura and Tsuneo Tanaka, eds., Examining Asia’s Tigers: Nine Economies Challenging Common Structural Problems (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1997), 4. FEER, Asia 1998 Yearbook, 142 Not surprisingly, South Korea’s trade deficit in January 1997 recorded $3.5 billion, the highest monthly deficit in its history. Michael Chinworth, “Labor Strife Slows Korean Economy,” Automotive Engineering, April 1997, 92. Lee, “Globalization and Korean Domestic Politics,” 19.

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triggered the opening of another window of opportunity, much bigger than the earlier one, for institutional transformation. Taking center stage at a traumatic juncture in South Korean history, Kim declared his intention to dismantle the developmental state. Kim, viewed by many at home and abroad as the avatar of South Korean democracy, announced upon taking office that he would implement genuinely liberal democracy and foster free markets in parallel. Nonetheless, the interaction between Kim’s ambitious reform agenda and the sheer magnitude of the economic calamity visited on South Korea complicated democratic consolidation. To be sure, Kim Dae Jung quickly stabilized the panic-stricken South Korean economy, but he had to contend with the often-contradictory needs of economic stability and institutional reform. The difficult balancing act did not always favor democratic consolidation in South Korea. To stabilize the economy, Kim first strengthened the state, making its presence in the economy more ubiquitous than ever. As the reform measures proved painful for many, he also employed the atavistic authoritarian tools of the South Korean presidency to impose his policy will on recalcitrant elements opposing reform. These measures impeded horizontal accountability and the rule of law. Triage Kim Dae Jung’s narrowly won election, defeating Lee Hoi Chang of the ruling party, was facilitated by his pre-election alliance with Kim Jong Pil of the ULD and the defection of Rhee In Je from the ruling party, renamed the Grand National Party (GNP).49 However, once in office, Kim Dae Jung enjoyed the mandate of the people to do something about the collapsing economy.50 As the ballots were being counted, the still falling exchange rate was leading to a sharp credit crunch, and the stock market was taking a nosedive while interest rates were soaring. Massive bankruptcies began to take place, driving up unemployment. By the time of Kim’s inauguration in February 1998, the unemployment rate had climbed to 5.9% from the 1997 average of 2.6%, with worse to come. The deep fear generated by the crisis gave Kim Dae Jung a window of opportunity to perform institutional surgery that was much larger than the one available to Kim Young Sam. Despite his populist past and his skeptical comments about the proposed IMF austerity measures during the electoral campaign, Kim Dae Jung placed blame for the crisis squarely 49 50

The DLP was renamed the New Korea Party (NKP) by Kim Young Sam earlier. The name changed again to the Grand National Party (GNP) just before the presidential election. Kim Dae Jung’s approval rating was 84.8% on February 25, 1998. Cited in Korea Herald, 22 August 1998.

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on the developmental state. And, as did Kim Young Sam before him, he embraced the twin goals of liberalization and globalization (though he jettisoned the use of the term segyehwa). However, unlike Kim Young Sam, he began his reform program by building his political capacity at the Blue House, the seat of the South Korean presidency, to forestall the monitoring and enforcement problems that were the undoing of the previous administration’s reform drive. Kim Dae Jung took charge of the country’s affairs even before he was officially installed as president. On December 29, 1997, with his urging, the national assembly passed a financial sector reform package that the outgoing administration was trying to get passed to restore investor confidence in the South Korean economy. On January 13, 1998, the president-elect arm-twisted the chaebol into accepting his reform objectives: enhanced transparency in accounting and management, reduction of the mutual payment guarantees that were the heart of the chaebol system, rationalization of business lines, and enhancement of managerial accountability. Several days later, Kim launched an innovative tripartite committee of government, labor, and business to tame the veto power of organized labor. After much negotiation, he was able to get even the radical Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) to agree on more permissive rules on layoffs in return for his promise to improve labor rights and benefits. In the honeymoon period of his administration, Kim Dae Jung skillfully exploited the economic emergency to discredit the developmental state. In his February 1998 inaugural speech, the new president announced that “to cure the ailing Korean economy under the IMF bailout program, the government will introduce democracy and free competition to the domestic market.” He added, “When democracy and a market economy develop together in harmony, there can be no unsavory collusion between politics and businesses, government-directed financing, irregularities and corruption.”51 He also declared that his administration would dedicate itself to “a decisive break with the previous state-led development model” because “in the age of globalization, mercantilist notions based on the idea of an independent national economy have no place.”52 With the collapsing economy and the chorus of domestic and international condemnation, the targets of reform could not afford to be seen openly opposing reforms proposed by the new president. Kim Dae Jung also proceeded to concentrate and build political capacity around his office. Despite his campaign rhetoric about downsizing 51 52

Korea Herald, 26 February 1998. Economic Policy Division, Ministry of Finance and Economy, Republic of Korea, “Challenges and Chance: Korea’s Response to the New Economic Reality,” Seoul, June 1998, 5–6.

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the government and limiting its powers, he seemed to know better than his predecessor that policy initiation is only half the battle; enforcing compliance is the other half. One of Kim’s very first actions as president was to reorganize the state bureaucracy to do his bidding. He created a new office (the Budget and Planning Bureau) responsible for budget planning for the entire government and made it directly answerable to the Blue House. He also rearranged the government personnel system and filled key positions in every ministry or agency with officials who were from his home region or who were sympathetic to his reform program. To stabilize the panic-stricken financial sector quickly, Kim Dae Jung created the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC), which he strategically placed outside of MOFE, as the agency of choice for carrying out key reforms. With the exception of a few showcase foreign takeovers of ailing banks, he essentially nationalized the South Korean financial sector through the FSC. By giving the FSC the power to merge, liquidate, and re-capitalize financial institutions, Kim greatly enhanced the power of the Blue House over other actors (namely, the chaebol ) in the South Korean economy. This allowed the president to make or break specific chaebol groups, given their weakened financial state. To be fair, Kim Dae Jung did not have much of a choice but to rebuild state authority given the financial panic and the prevailing balance of political power in the national assembly. In terms of economic logic, the president urgently needed to restore confidence in the currency and banking systems to steady the economy. In terms of political logic, he needed to deal with yeoso yadae (“small government party, large opposition party”) in the national assembly. The political divide between the president and the legislature presented a serious problem for Kim Dae Jung’s reform program as well as a serious dilemma for democracy. The president’s NCNP had only seventy-eight seats in the 299-seat legislative body. Even with the ULD’s forty-two seats, the ruling coalition could not overcome the 161-seat majority of the GNP. With the exception of the passage of the financial sector reform measures, the GNP bottled up the enabling legislation for the bulk of Kim’s reform program in the national assembly. Indeed, Kim’s agreements with the chaebol and unions mentioned previously were thus initially “understandings” not sanctioned by law. The president did find a solution to the legislative impasse, but it was, in a way, hardly conducive to democratic consolidation. After the GNP initially defeated his legislative agenda, Kim Dae Jung launched a campaign to lure a select number of GNP members to join the governing coalition. In addition, he employed state prosecutors and tax auditors to pressure and to oust numerous GNP assemblymen who were suspected of violating various laws. Through such questionable measures,

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Kim managed to reduce the strength of the opposition party to 127 seats while increasing the governing NCNP-ULD coalition to 158 seats. This “manufactured majority,” however, made the opposition even more recalcitrant in the national assembly, and the GNP utilized every parliamentary tactic to block, delay, and subvert government initiatives. Needed reform laws that were stalled were in turn rammed through by the governing coalition without the parliamentary participation of the GNP. This state of affairs hardly helped the nascent South Korean democracy to develop an autonomous legislature or the rule of law. The deadlock and irregularities in the national assembly also aroused the disgust of many citizens, who no doubt had lost much faith in the parliamentary body, and hence in democracy itself.53 Kim’s approach to dealing with the national assembly further enforced the imperial power of the South Korean presidency by leaving him no other option than to rely on decrees and coercive executive powers to get his reform measures moving. In January 1999, the country was dismayed, if not shocked, by the allegation that the National Intelligence Service was spying on the opposition party from a room inside the national assembly building. The Bounce Back Although economic stability and institutional reforms were being pursued at the expense of democratic governance, the South Korean economy began to recover, at least in terms of key macroeconomic indicators. The stabilization effort, critical to immediate national survival, appeared to be working by 1999, even if the more important institutional reform measures were not. As indicated previously, with the urgent need to stabilize the nosediving economy, Kim first focused his administration’s energy on the panic-stricken financial sector. Reasserting the government’s presence in financial markets, the administration merged and closed troubled banks and other financial concerns, and recapitalized still viable ones. This concerted effort brought unexpected early stability, if not true health, to financial markets, and it won the approval of the international financial community, setting the stage for a surprising comeback of the South Korean economy in 1999. By the last quarter of 1998, the won was stabilized at around 1,200 to 1,400 won per dollar (U.S.), from the low of around 1,900 won per dollar earlier in the year. The current account was projected to show a surplus of $40 billion (U.S.), and usable foreign exchange reserves climbed to $48.5 billion. Although external debt barely budged from $158 billion in 53

See Doh Chull Shin’s analysis of growing doubts and cynicism about democracy in South Korea in this work.

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December 1997 to $152 billion in November 1998, the share of short-term obligations fell from 40% to about 20%. In 1999, South Korea recorded a phenomenal GDP growth rate of 10.9%. Kim was eager to take credit for this “V-shaped recovery.” He was keen to demonstrate to international investors that his reforms were working and that the new, improved liberalized and globalized South Korea was a good prospect. The international financial community was sufficiently impressed; for example, Moody’s upgraded South Korea’s credit rating for won-denominated bonds to investment grade.54 Kim Dae Jung was also anxious to show the suffering South Korean public that there was a light at the end of the tunnel. After all, the “recovery” came only after a sharp 6.7% reduction in gross domestic product (GDP) in 1998. South Korean exports that year actually fell 2.8% in dollar terms, to $132.3 billion, due to falling prices and slow demand abroad.55 The trade surplus and the resulting build-up of foreign-exchange reserves were largely attributable to the sharp decline of imports. In essence, South Korea had carried out a gut-wrenching bankruptcy sale to increase its cash flow, while buying very little from its foreign suppliers. Misery for the ordinary South Korean was reflected in the employment data. At the end of 1998, the unemployment rate shot up to 6.8%, from less than 3% in previous years.56 The inflation rate also soared to an average of 7.5% that year, adding to the hardship. Not surprisingly, by the end of 1999, Kim Dae Jung was eager to put a positive light on his management of the economic crisis. When the unemployment rate had declined to 6.3%, inflation was tamed at 0.8%, the current account was again in surplus, and the IMF graduated South Korea one year early from its rescue program, Kim saw an opportunity to take credit that no politician could resist. With his administration reeling from the “furgate” corruption scandal, he declared that the country had “completely overcome” the IMF crisis, and as the millennium celebrations approached, he tried to take as much credit as possible for the apparent recovery.57 Predictably, Kim and his aides conflated the success of economic stabilization with the success of institutional reform, given the reality that the administration was making slow progress in fixing the deeply rooted institutional causes of South Korea’s economic problems. With regard to reforms targeting the state, as discussed earlier, Kim actually took a step back to move forward on other fronts. His goal of 54 56 57

Korea Herald, 26 February 2000. 55 Korea Herald, 27 February 1999. FEER, 4 February 1999. Korea Herald, 20 November 1999. For details on the so-called “furgate” scandal, see YoungKwan Yoon, “South Korea in 1999: Overcoming Cold War Legacies,” Asian Survey 40 (2000): 169.

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limiting government intervention in the economy never got off the ground because of the emergency situation facing the South Korean economy. Although he pledged during the presidential campaign to transform the government’s role in business activities from that of meddler to that of arbiter, the sheer necessity of managing the economic crisis increased the government’s command authority in the economy. Kim Dae Jung did reduce the enormous power Kim Young Sam gave to MOFE by curtailing its responsibilities, and he abolished the post of deputy prime minister for the economy.58 However, as explained earlier, he established a number of ad hoc organizations, such as the FSC, to deal with the economic emergency and to monitor and enforce reform policies. Reporting directly to the president, these organizations were designed to bypass entrenched interests in government bureaucracies, but with their sweeping powers, these new entities further reinforced the governmental pillar of the developmental state.59 Under Kim Dae Jung, government intervention in the economy became ubiquitous as the stabilization program essentially nationalized the banking sector and as the corporate reform program selected major industries for extensive state-induced reorganization and restructuring. As for the chaebol reform, almost halfway into his one-term presidency, Kim could claim only limited success. His administration could not easily fix the problem of chaebol domination of the South Korean economy given that the economic crisis bankrupted a huge number of small and medium-sized businesses. And, as it was the case during the Kim Young Sam administration, the chaebol were central to the export-led economic turnaround. Much of the government’s reform effort went into getting the chaebol to consolidate their far-ranging and disparate operations into some coherent core business lines to increase profitability and reduce debt. After many threats and counterthreats, the Kim Dae Jung administration and the chaebol ultimately reached an agreement that the conglomerates would “voluntarily” shed and consolidate operations through “big deals,” while divesting themselves of marginal businesses, and that they would stop engaging in intersubsidiary trading and making cross-payment guarantees. With the help of organized labor and the prevalent nationalist sentiment, however, the chaebol doggedly resisted divestitures and foreign takeovers. The continued survival of “zombie” enterprises such as Daewoo Motor, once the crown jewel of the Daewoo Group, was the rule, and it was indicative of the chabol’s rearguard resistance. 58 59

The deputy prime minister status of the MOFE minister was restored in January 2001 when the coordination function of the reform was given to MOFE. Former senior ROK officials, interview by the author, Seoul, April 1998 and Tokyo, June 1998.

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Further, although the government tried to get the conglomerates to reduce their high debt-to-equity ratios, they were allowed to get away with doing so mainly on paper. The five biggest chaebol groups did lower the ratio from 470.1% in 1997 to 285.4% at the end of 1998.60 However, this was accomplished in good part through revaluing old assets to reflect current values and adding the gain to the equity base, and by engaging in intersubsidiary in-kind investments in which gains from sales of patents and other noncash assets are used to acquire equity. Also, the chaebol continued to dominate access to financial resources. Most of the 64 trillion won appropriated in May 1998 for the first round of restructuring went to the chaebol. And the nationalized banks used much of this money to keep “workout” firms on life-support by providing just enough funds to keep them going. This was a “forbearance policy” tolerated by the government, which no doubt hoped that these weak firms would grow out of their troubles. Even worse, the largest chaebol got away with using their affiliated investment trust companies (ITCs), a category of nonbanking financial institutions offering interest rates greater than bank deposit rates, as cash windows. Although the banking system was being patched up with taxpayers’ money, these ITCs lent recklessly to conglomerates in 1998 and 1999. For example, the ITCs accounted for about 40% of the financial sector’s exposure to the Daewoo Group, which ultimately went bankrupt.61 Indeed, halfway into Kim’s presidency, little tangible progress was being made in changing the modus operandi of the chaebol. Kim Dae Jung seemed to achieve more success in dealing with South Korea’s notoriously militant labor unions, as they did not engage in any large-scale, economy-crippling strike during the crunch period in 1998. In fact, the tripartite commission seemed to work reasonably well for a while. Starting out as an advisory body to the president, the quasicorporatist arrangement was given legal standing in June 1998 to deal with not only labor issues but also corporate governance and government reorganization. Nonetheless, the consultation process was constantly under the threat of a walkout by one of the parties. At one point or another, the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), the more militant KCTU, and the Korea Employers Association (KEA) all threatened to leave the arrangement. Even some government bureaucrats attempted to undermine the commission.62 By 1999, the KCTU did leave the commission, and labor 60 61

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Korea Herald, 3 March 1999. For details, see C. S. Eliot Kang, “The Information Age and the South Korean Political Economy,” Working Papers in Asian Studies #7, Center for Asian Studies, University of South Carolina, October 2000. For example, a senior labor ministry official challenged the legality of the presidential advisory panel, questioning the July 23, 1998 accord between the committee and the

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returned to its old pattern of militancy. In 1999, there were 198 labor disputes, and they increased in frequency as the midpoint of Kim Dae Jung’s tenure approached.63 Closing of the Window Although the macroeconomic recovery seemed robust enough for the IMF crisis to be declared over by the end of 1999, there were few signs that South Korea was being transformed into a genuine liberal market economy. The state bureaucracy was playing a more prominent role in the economy than ever, and the privileged position of the chaebol and organized labor was still intact, if shaken. In fact, the mandate of the people that was so clear in early 1998 had become muddled by the hollowness of the recovery, with still high unemployment, widening income gaps, and persistent economic uncertainty. By February 2000, when the government announced that, with the economy stabilized, the “real market-oriented reforms” were about to begin with the injection of an additional 40 trillion won for the second round of restructuring, the people were no doubt weary and wary of the reform efforts.64 To keep the reform window open, Kim Dae Jung needed a new mandate. The parliamentary election scheduled for April 2000 was the most obvious opportunity.65 With both those in favor of reform and those against it eyeing the election as a referendum on his reform policies, Kim had to achieve a big win in this election.66 In preparation for the election, Kim Dae Jung first tried to merge his NCNP with the ULD to create a more broad-based national party. The ULD, however, not only refused the merger offer but also bolted from the ruling coalition. With the NCNP on its own and renamed the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP), Kim tried to recruit “fresh new faces” to the party to enlarge its base. He also had his party lieutenants negotiate with the GNP to change the electoral rules to benefit the MDP in the upcoming election. However, with help from civic groups, the GNP blocked any

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nation’s two labor federations. This is not surprising given that the commission had undercut the authority of the labor ministry. Korea Herald, 4 August 1998. Data cited in Munhwa Ilbo, 7 November 2000. Specifics of the second phase reforms are outlined in Second State Reforms in the Four Sectors, Ministry of Finance and Economy, Government of Republic of Korea, . For an analysis of party politics during the Kim Dae Jung presidency, see Sunhyuk Kim, “Party Politics in South Korea,” Paper presented at the Conference on Korea in Transition: Three Years Under the Kim Dae Jung Government, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, March 26–7, 2001. In practical terms, this meant winning the majority of seats in the national assembly either for his NCNP party alone or, as the less attractive alternative, for the NCNP–ULD combination.

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attempt to transform the existing single-member district system to a multimember district system that would have been more advantageous to the MDP, and Kim’s MDP remained fundamentally a regional party. When ballots were counted in the parliamentary election, the outcome was a disappointment for Kim Dae Jung.67 Despite the pre-election announcement of the historic inter-Korean summit meeting, which was no doubt timed to increase votes for the MDP, the electorate – in the lowest turnout ever – voted strictly along regional lines. The election produced a win for the opposition GNP with 133 seats (four short of an absolute majority).68 The MDP did increase its seats to 115, but the ULD suffered a devastating loss, winning only seventeen seats. The disappointing election outcome effectively closed the window of opportunity for reform, producing no new “democracy-friendly” atmosphere for Kim Dae Jung to rejuvenate the flagging reform program that was now barely advancing only because of presidential arm-twisting and threats. To be sure, Kim Dae Jung’s historic summit meeting with Kim Jong Il of North Korea two months after the election and receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize five months later boosted the president’s personal prestige. However, although these events added to the power of an imperial presidency, they could not keep open the reform window and did very little to increase the democracy-enhancing capacity of the president. By the summer of 2000, Kim was clearly fighting an uphill battle with the developmental state. In August, he reshuffled his cabinet, mostly moving around his key economic aides to new positions.69 And in October, with much urgency, his “new economic government” announced twelve policy goals for the early completion of reforms, particularly corporate and financial reforms.70 However, this announcement and other urgent calls and resolves for action coming from Kim Dae Jung and his aides made no tangible difference in the pace of reform. Although the presidential election was still two years away, Kim had largely become a lame duck president. Conclusion The travail of South Korea in recent years underscores the tension that exists between democratic means and ends, as a developing country tries to cope with economic crises while attempting to carry out fundamental institutional reforms. It points to the difficult task of simultaneously 67 68 69 70

See the analysis in Yong-Chool Ha, “South Korea in 2000,” Asian Survey 41 (2001): 30–9. Prior to the election, the total seats in the national assembly were reduced from 299 to 273. Korea Herald, 8 August 2000 and the New York Times, 8 August 2000. Twelve Core Tasks for the Acceleration of Restructuring, Ministry of Finance and Economy, Government of Republic of Korea, .

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pursuing democratic deepening, fundamental institutional reforms, and economic security. It also points to the importance of idiosyncratic institutional legacies and of disjunctures that may facilitate or hinder political reform. Much of the writings on the connection between democracy and economic development have focused either on the tradeoff or on mutual enforcement between the two.71 I have tried, however, to highlight the “drag” of institutions and the problems of institutional change as a nascent democracy grapples with the challenges of economic growth and stability in the era of globalization. Taking a “modified historical institutionalist” approach, which focuses on the nexus between political change and institutions, I have argued that the authoritarian institutional legacies of the South Korean developmental state have interacted with challenges of economic development in the era of globalization to impede democratic consolidation in South Korea. In the case of Kim Young Sam, his effort to reform the developmental state, to deepen democracy, and make the South Korean economy more competitive actually contributed to the economic collapse in late 1997. Kim Young Sam’s inability to monitor and enforce his reform policies caused the reform effort to be distorted and channeled in unpredictable ways by existing institutions. This left Kim Dae Jung with the Herculean task of trying to stabilize a collapsing economy while trying to dismantle the developmental state. However, juggling the needs of economic stabilization and fundamental institutional reform, Kim Dae Jung resorted to measures incompatible with democratic consolidation.72 Of course, the reforms initiated by Kim may achieve full bloom at a later date, making the short-term damage to democratic consolidation worth the cost in the long run, but such a happy outcome cannot be guaranteed. 71

72

For example, see Przeworski et al. (2000). Specifically on South Korea, see Chung-in Moon and Young-cheol Kim, “A Circle of Paradox: Development, Politics, and Democracy in South Korea,” in Democracy and Development: Essays on Theory and Practice, ed. Adrian Leftwich (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1994). More recently, Jongryn Mo, “Democracy, Labor Policy, and Economic Performance,” in Democracy and the Korean Economy, eds. Jongryn Mo and Chung-in Moon (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1999), 97–134; and Chung-in Moon and Song-min Kim, “Democracy and Economic Performance in South Korea,” in Consolidating Democracy in South Korea, eds. Larry Diamond and ByungKook Kim (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 139–72. For a prescient early assessment of Kim Dae Jung’s reform program, see Jongryn Mo and Chung-in Moon, “Korea After the Crash,” Journal of Democracy 10 (1999): 150–64.

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A Administered Mass Organizations (AMOs), 120, 121 Africa, support for democracy in, 53 Alagappa, Muthiah, 206n15 Alvarez, Michael E., 41n93, 54n16, 223n9, 244n71 AMOs. see Administered Mass Organizations Amsden, Alice H., 220n2 Anan, Kofi, 139n13 anti-Americanism: and decentralization, 152–55; pervasiveness of, 135; relation to Korean nationalism, 135–36, 137; state sanctions against, 141–42 anti-American movement, 27–28, 156–57: and camptowns, 152, 153–55; constituents of, 143–44; difference between past/present, 27, 28–29, 140–43, 146–47; and gender, 150–51; growth of, 141–42; inclusiveness of, 27–28, 144–46; legal strategies of, 149–50; moderate stance of, 147–48; tensions/conflicts within, 150–51 anti-Yusin movement, 82 April measures, 208, 208n17 Archibugi, Daniele, 16t, 19, 19n60, 19n64 Asia, women legislators in, 111 Asian financial crisis, 199, 220, 224, 233 Association of Families of Political Prisoners, 96 authoritarian culture, and formal democratic structure, 39, 40–41

authoritarian regime, preference for: in Korea, 22, 33, 34, 53, 70–72 (fig), 71, 73, 76, 218; in South America, 53–54 Axell, Karin, 13n41 B Bae-hee Kwak, 107 Bangladesh, statute of limitations in, 187n25 Barber, Benjamin R., 12n38 Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, 211 Basic Press Law, 102 Bedeski, Robert E., 225n12 Beetham, David, 156–57, 157n85 behavior consolidation, 140 Benhabib, Seyla, 5n9 Berlin, Isaiah, 61, 61n21 Bermeo, Nancy, 161n1 Bernstein, Richard, 17n51 Booth, Ken, 203n3 boss politics, 105 Boswell, Terry, 16t, 18, 18n59 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 17n53 Brady, David, 164n14 Bratton, Michael, 50n10, 53n14, 82n2 Brazil, 53–54 Breuilly, John, 139, 139n14–16, 143n32 broken-back democracy, 22, 75 Brooke, James, 23n69 Brubaker, Rogers, 136, 136n7–8 Bull, Hedley, 17n52 Bunge, Frederica, 194n52 Byung-kook, Kim, 162n6, 165n19

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C calculated voting, vs. emotional voting, 172–74 Camp, Roderic Ai, 49n9 camptowns (kijich’on), 38: and anti-American movement, 28, 152, 153–55; class action suit by, 150; environmental damage at, 146; marginalization of citizens of, 151 Carlsson and Ramphal Report, 17–18 Carothers, Thomas, 182n5 Carrson, Ingvar, 17 CCEJ. see Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice Central Europe, conceptions of democracy in, 50 CGSRJR. see Citizens’ Groups’ Solidarity Roundtable for Judicial Reforms Cha, Victor D., 33–34, 87n10, 177n30, 207n16, 210n22, 216n34 chaebol (congolerates), 94: influence of, 35–36, 176, 224–26, 225n15; reform of, 37, 99–100, 177, 229, 233, 233n43, 236, 237, 240–41 chaeya movement, 82, 95 Cha Mikyung, 148 Chang Myon, 82 Chase-Dunn, Christopher, 16t, 18, 18n59 Chatterjee, Partha, 119, 119n24 Cheibub, Jose Antonio, 41n93, 54n16, 223n9, 244n71 China: economic growth in, 43n97; GEM ranking of, 24; national identity in, 11; trial of Gang of Four in, 186n16 Ching, Frank, 188n26 Chinworth, Michael, 234n47 Chi Tong Uk, 225n15 Cho, Gi-sook, 163n12 Cho, Jung Kwan, 207n16, 209n20 Cho, Tae-yˆop, 126n49 Choi, Bo-sik, 162n7, 166n20 Choi, Jang Jib, 94n46 Choi, Kang, 204nn6&8, 205nn9&12 Choi, Yong-kwan, 162nn7&9, 166n21 Choi Kyu Ha, resignation of, 186 Cholla: underdevelopment of, 166. see also regionalism; regional voting; regional voting study Chong, Tae Hwa, 94n47 Chong, T’ae Sok, 85n9 Chˆong, Tu-ˆon, 126, 126n47 Chong, Yujin, 150n65, 151, 151n66 Chosun dynasty, 192, 194 Christian Academy, 119–20 Chu, Chong Hwan, 95n50

Chun Doo Hwan: exile of, 186n18; military takeover by, 185–86; support/nostalgia for, 22, 71, 76, 218; and “trial of century,” 31, 38, 83, 185, 186, 187 Chun Doo Hwan government: electoral fairness under, 92, 168; “false-name” accounts under, 228; and Kwangju incident, 166; popular protest during, 128; prime minister under, 192; regionalism under, 63, 196 Chung, Eun Sung, 153n71 Chung-in Moon, 31n82 Chung Seung Hwa, 186 citizen movement groups, 84–85, 88, 95, 144, 146 Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), 84, 85, 149n62: and anti-American movement, 144, 145, 146, 149; deradicalization of, 103; and economic reform, 99; and political reform, 89, 96, 97 Citizens’ Council for Fair Elections, 90–91 Citizens’ Groups’ Solidarity Roundtable for Judicial Reforms (CGSRJR), 96 Citizens’ Group to Eliminate the Household Master System, 130 Citizens’ Monitoring Group, 98 Citizen’s Solidarity for Monitoring the National Assembly Inspection of Government Offices (CSMNAIGO), 89–90. see also Nakch’on/Nakson movement Citizen’s Solidarity for the National Assembly Elections, 177 Citizens United for the Elimination of the Family Master System, 131 Civil Network for a Peaceful Korea, 147n48 civil society: characteristics of, 82; deradicalizing image of, 103; diversity of groups involved in, 82–83 civil society, and political reform: government office inspection, 89–90; judicial reform, 96–97; politician screening, 90–95 Clark, Cal, 108, 108nn3–4 Cold War, post, 3, 7 Colombia, authoritarian regime support in, 53–54 Commission on Global Governance, 16t, 17 Committee for Economic Democratization, of PSPD, 99 Confucianism: and democratic values, 104; familial metaphor in, 109, 122, 123–26; influence of, 133; and marginalization of women, 24, 25–26

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INDEX Confucianism, opposition to family master system elimination, 132–33 congruence, theory of, 41 consolidated democracy, 161–62 constitutional democracy. see Constitution of the Republic of Korea; rule of law Constitution of the Republic of Korea, 181: and judicial review, 32–33, 196–98; on limited immunity, 187n22; nature of amendments to, 32, 189–90; on role of prime minister, 191–92, 191n38 Construction and Transportation Committee, 89–90 Corruption Perception Index, 61 Cortell, Andrew P., 221n5 cosmopolitan democracy, 16t, 18–20 Council to Stop the Family Law Reform, 132 Cox, Gary, 163–64n13, 164n14 Cox, Robert, 16t, 18n57 CSMNAIGO. see Citizen’s Solidarity for Monitoring the National Assembly Inspection of Government Offices Cumings, Bruce, 166n21 Czech Republic, dictator rule support in, 56 D Daewoo (chaebol ), 240, 241 Dahl, Robert, 56n19, 73n33 Dalton, Russell J., 7n19 Darbar, Salim M., 231n33 de Bary, Wm. Theodore, 184n10 December 12 mutiny, 186 Defense Security Command (DSC), 208 democracy: binary view of, 118–19, 119n23; cosmopolitan, 16t, 18–20 democracy, in Korea: challenges to, 40–43; conservative nature of, 122, 122n36; empirical support for, 22, 23, 52–55t, 68, 76; normative support for, 22, 23, 52, 55t, 66, 68, 69; popular conceptions of, 50–52, 51t; by transplacement, 23, 23n70 democracy-in-practice, 22, 23, 52–55t, 68, 76 democracy-in-principle, 22, 23, 52, 55t, 66, 68, 69 democratic consolidation: at intermediate civil society level, 23–29, 38–39; at mass public level, 21–23; negative, 38, 202, 207–9; at state level (see democratic consolidation, at state level). see also institutions, and developmental state democratic consolidation, and civil society: citizen movement groups, 84–85, 88, 95, 144, 146; and economic reform, 98–100; increase in number of groups, 177–78;

263

intermediate level (see anti-Americanism; anti-American movement; women’s movement); legitimization of, 102–3; people’s movement groups, 84, 85–88, 95, 144, 146, 147; political opportunities for, 102; and political reform (see civil society, and political reform); progressive citizen movement group, 88; roles of, 104; use of marketing by, 131 democratic consolidation, at state level: and institutional change, 34–37; and president/constitution relationship, 31–33; and security/democracy, 33–34. see also regionalism; regional voting Democratic Party (DP), 232 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. see North Korea Democratic Republican Party (DRP), 167 democratization, paradoxes of contemporary, 5–8 developmental state. see institutions, and developmental state Diamandouros, P. Nikiforos, 53n12 Diamond, Larry, 5n7, 8n22, 20n66, 21n67, 28, 34–35, 35n83, 39, 39n86, 47n1, 47n2, 48, 48n5, 61n23, 104n73, 108n3, 145n42, 146, 146n47, 153n71, 155n82, 161n5, 201n2, 220nn1&3 Di Palma, Giuseppe, 161n1 Dittmer, Lowell, 11n32, 40n90 divorce rate, 128, 128n53 Dong, Wonmo Summer, 195n56 DP. see Democratic Party DRP. see Democratic Republican Party DSC. see Defense Security Command Duch, Raymond, 76n38 E East Asia, 24, 43n97 Eastern Europe, and democracy, 50, 53 Echeverria, Claudia, 231n33 Eckstein, Harry, 41, 41n91 Economic Planning Board (EPB), 230, 231 economy. see Asian financial crisis; institutions, and developmental state; Korean financial crisis education, gender difference in, 27 election fairness. see Nakch’on/Nakson Movement election law, repeal/revision of, 91, 91n28 electoral participation, gender difference in, 24, 25 Elster, Jon, 54n16 emotional voting, vs. calculated voting, 172–74 endism, 6

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environmentalism. see Korea Federation for Environmental Movement; Korea Green United EPB. see Economic Planning Board Erie, Steve, 179n35 ethonational identity, 12–13, 27 European Union, identity in, 13 Evans, Peter B., 10n31 F factionalism, 4 familial metaphor, 109, 122, 123–26 family law: pre-revision, 124; revision of, 109, 111n9, 127, 127n50, 129–30, 132 Family Law Special Council (FLSC), 129 family master system (hojuje), 124, 127, 134: opposition to elimination of, 132–33; support for elimination of, 25–26, 110, 130–31 Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), 86, 97, 143, 145, 241 Finance and Economy Committee, 90 Financial Liberalization and Market Opening Plan, 230 Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC), 237, 240 Fish, Steven, 83n6 FKTU. see Federation of Korean Trade Unions Fletcher, George, 183 FLSC. see Family Law Special Council Foreign Exchange Reform Plan, 230 foreign policy/security, 175 [tab], 176–77. see also anti-Americanism/ anti-American movement Four-Party Talks, 212 Fox-Genovese, Elizabeth, 134n73 Freedom in the World Survey, 4 FSC. see Financial Supervisory Commission Fukui, Haruhiro, 40n90 Fukuyama, Francis, 6n10 “furgate scandal,” 96–97 G Gang of Four, 186n16 GDI. see Gender-related Development Index GEM. see Gender Empowerment Measure gender: and anti-American movement, 150–51; civic organization participation by, 118n22, 118t; and education, 27; equality ranking of Korea, 24, 26, 112; and family master system support, 130; and political activity, 24, 25, 124–25 Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), 24, 26

Gender-related Development Index (GDI), 26 Ghai, Y., 184n8 Gill, Stephen, 18n58 Gills, Barry, 10n30 Gilpin, Robert, 15, 15n49 Gi-Wook Shin, 135 GKU. see Green Korea United Gleason, Suzanne, 48n6 globalization, 220n4: definition of, 9; hyperglobalization, 10, 12; under Kim Young Sam, 176, 230–31 globalization, and democratization, 8–9: paradoxes in, 6–7; role of identity politics in, 10–11; role of state in, 9–10; third wave of, 3, 4–5, 6, 23n70, 53, 81–82 globalization, and global democratization, 13–14: approaches to, 15–20, 16t globaloney, 8–9, 10, 12 GNP. see Grand National Party Goldblatt, David, 6n14, 10n28, 14n45, 19n63 Grand National Party (GNP), 4, 37, 92, 235, 237, 242–43 Gray, Colin, 203n3 Greece, support for democracy in, 54 Green Korea United (GKU), 144, 145, 146, 147 Grix, Jonathan, 151, 151n67 Grofman, Bernard, 164n14 gross domestic product, in Korea, 9n26 Gunther, Richard, 53n12 Gurr, Ted, 42n94 H Ha, Yong-Chool, 243n67 Haerpfer, Christian, 55n17 Hagen Koo, 176 Hager, Barry M., 182n6, 183n7, 184n12 Haggard, Stephan, 161n2 Hahm, Pyong-choon, 188, 188nn27–28, 190, 190nn35–36 Hahm, Sung Deuk, 227n18 Hall, Peter A., 222n6, 222n7 Han, Jongwoo, 123n39, 124n40 Han, Sung-Joo, 29n74, 212n27 Han, Wan-Sang, 211n24 Han, Y. C., 206n14 hanahoe faction, 207, 208–9 Hanahoi, 38 Hanushek, Eric, 169n25 Harrison, Lawrence, 48n6 Held, David, 6n14, 7, 7nn16&20, 10n28, 11nn33&36, 14n45, 16t, 19, 19n60, 19n63, 19nn60–63, 20n65

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INDEX Henderson, Gregory, 168n23 Hesli, Vicki, 50n10 Hill, Dilys M., 153n71 Hills, Mason, 184n9 Hobsbawm, Eric, 7n16 hojuje. see family master system Hong, Joon-Hyung, 184n9 Hong Il-pyo, 148 Hong Yunki, 141 Huer, Jon, 205n13 Hulbert, Homer, 194n51 Human Rights Commission Law, 145 Hungary, dictator rule support in, 56 Huntington, Samuel P., 3n1, 21n67, 23, 23n70, 48n6, 137, 201n1 Hur, Young, 191n40, 192n45, 197n63 hyperglobalization, 10, 12 Hyun, In-Taek, 205n11 I identity, ethonational, 12–13, 27 identity politics, 5–6: and globalization, 10–13 identity surfing, 12 ideological cleavage, right/left, 4 IMF. see International Monetary Fund Inchon City Council, 152 India, gross domestic product of, 9n26 Inglehart, Ronald, 22n68 institutional reform, under Kim Dae Jung, 36: bureaucratic, 102, 236–37; end of, 242–43; financial, 236, 237, 238–39, 240–41; labor, 241–42; legislative, 237–38; North[en]South policy, 214–15; repercussions of, 244 institutional reform, under Kim Young Sam: bureaucratic, 102; collapse of, 231–32; consequences of, 233–34; financial, 229, 230–31, 233, 233n43; impediments to, 35–36, 39–40, 223–24; labor, 233–34; military, 207–9; North[en]South policy, 209–13; real-name, 227–29, 232 institutional reform, under Park Chung Hee, 35 institutions, and developmental state: factors in institutional change, 222–24. see also institutional reform, under Kim Dae Jung; institutional reform, under Kim Young Sam International Monetary Fund (IMF), 182, 239, 242 International Institute for Management Development, 43n96 IPU. see United Nations and International Parliamentary Union

265

J Jackett, Jane S., 108n5 Jackson, John, 169n25 Japan: economic growth in, 43n97; GEM ranking of, 24; gross domestic product in, 9n26; liberation from, 181; marginalization of women in, 108; politics in, 179 Johnson, Chalmers, 220n2 Johnston, Alastair Iain, 203, 203nn3 Johnston, Barry R., 231n33 judicial review, 32–33, 196–98 June Uprising (1987), 81 K Kang, C. S. Eliot, 34–35, 37, 221n5, 227n19, 230n31, 241n61 Kang, Chi-won, 178n33 Kang, David C., 30, 164n16, 179n34 Kang, Young-Oh, 204n8 Kantian cosmopolitanism, 16t, 18–20 Karl, Terry Lynn, 65n30, 83n5, 161n2 Karniol, Robert, 207n16 Kasza, Gregory, 120n29 Katzenstein, P., 203n3 Kaufman, Robert, 161n2 KCCM. see Korea Council of Citizen’s Movements KCTU. see Korea Confederation of Trade Unions KCWU. see Korea Church Women United KDB. see Korean Democratic Barometer KEA. see Korea Employers Association Keck, Margaret E., 11n33 Keeler, John T. S., 222n8 Keohane, Robert O., 6, 6nn13, 7–8, 8n21, 10n28, 14n47, 15, 16t, 18, 18n56 Keon, Michael, 195n54 KFEM. see Korea Federation for Environmental Movement KHIS. see Korea House for International Solidarity Kia (chaebol ), 234 Kihl, Young Whan, 202n2 kijich’on. see camptowns Kim, Byung-kook, 47n2, 161n5, 162n6, 163n11, 164n17 Kim, Chan Jin, 184n13 Kim, Chu-su, 109n7, 127n50 Kim, Dongshim, 147n50 Kim, Eun Mee, 40n88, 99n59 Kim, Hak-Joon, 211n25 Kim, Ho Ki, 85n9 Kim, Hwa-Jin, 182n3 Kim, Hyo-Jeon, 196n60 Kim, Ilpyong J., 153n71 Kim, Jae-Hong, 207n16

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Kim, Jinwung, 135, 135n1, 141, 141n24, 142n25 Kim, Ji-Soo, 75n36 Kim, Mun-Cho, 162, 192n8 Kim, Samuel S., 4n5, 8n23, 10n29, 11n32, 17n54, 24n71, 36n84, 42n95, 201n2–202n2, 217n36 Kim, Song-min, 244n71 Kim, Sˆong-suk, 127n50 Kim, Sunhyuk, 23, 24, 29n76–30n76, 30n78, 82n3, 83n4, 84n8, 87n12, 90n25, 99n60, 102n70, 108n3, 144, 144nn34–38, 146n45, 161n1, 168, 168n22, 176, 176n29, 177, 177n31, 178, 178n32, 242n65 Kim, Tscholsu, 189n29, 196n61 Kim, Un-Tae, 181n1, 189n33 Kim, Woon-Tai, 126n46 Kim, Young-Cheol, 233n44, 244n71 Kim Byung-kook, 162–63, 164 Kim Dae Jung: approval ratings at inauguration, 23; and April 2000 election, 242–43; gender equality support by, 114; as influential, 105; and Kwangju incident, 186; regional support for, 165, 167, 168, 174, 195 Kim Dae Jung government: accusations against, of civil liberties abuse, 4; economic reform under, 99–100; and 1989 election, 185n14; foreign policy/security during, 142, 177, 207; institutional reform under (see institutional reform, under Kim Dae Jung); lack of public support for, 21–23, 40; people’s movement during, 86–86; rule of man vs. rule of law in, 31; support for civil society groups by, 102, 103; U.S. influence on, 141. see also Korea Democracy Barometer (KDB) survey; Korea Democracy Barometer (KDB) survey, incompleteness of democracy Kim Dae Jung government, political reform under: candidate screening, 90–95; government office inspection, 89–90; judicial, 96–97; to rebuild state authority, 36–37; success/failure of, 40, 86, 199 Kim Dong Jin, 208 Kim Jong Il, 243 Kim Jong Pil, 231–32: and 1989 election, 185n14; and 1997 election, 235; as influential, 105; and Kwangju incident, 186; and political reform, 92, 94; regional support for, 165 Kim Songhui, 136, 149 Kim Ta-Kyun, 147 Kim Won-ung, 154

Kim Young Sam: and 1989 election, 185n14; election of, 3; globalization under, 176, 230–31; as influential, 105; prime minister under, 192; regional support for, 165, 167; and “trial of the century,” 186–87 Kim Young Sam government: economic collapse under, 221; and foreign/ security policy, 28, 34, 142, 202, 207–9; human rights under, 36; people’s movement during, 86; reform under, 86–87 (see also institutional reform, under Kim Young Sam); response to Kwangju incident by, 186, 193–94, 195 King, Desmond, 153n71 Kingdon, John W., 222n8 Kirk, Don, 61n22, 75n36, 199n72 Kitamura, Kayoko, 234n45 Knack, Stephen, 48n6 Koh, B. C., 211n25 Kohler, Martin, 16t, 19n60 Kong, Tat Yan, 105n76 Koo, Hagen, 82n2, 176n28 Korea Central Intelligence Agency, 94 Korea Church Women United (KCWU), 119, 129 Korea Coalition for National Democracy Movement, 86 Korea Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), 86, 96, 97, 102, 145, 241–42 Korea Council of Citizen’s Movements (KCCM), 84–85, 96 Korea Democracy Barometer (KDB) survey, 22, 47n2, 49–50: accountability, 64–66, 66–68, 67t; appeal of democracy in terms of economic prosperity [fit this], 217; corruption, 60–63, 62 (fig); democratic support/experience distribution, 66–68, 67t; economic crisis/democratic support, 71–73, 72 (fig); freedom from state, 61, 68–71, 70t; incompleteness of democracy, 59–60; law enforcement fairness, 63–64; opposition to nondemocratic alternatives, 55–57; performance of present democracy, 58–59, 60 (fig); popular conceptions of democracy, 50–52, 51t; rating past/ present regimes on dictatorshipdemocracy scale, 57t–58; sources of attitudes, 73–75; summary of findings, 75–77; support for democracy, 52–57, 55t; voluntary association, by gender, 118

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INDEX Korea Employers Association (KEA), 241 Korea Environmental Litigation Center, 147 Korea Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM), 84, 85, 89, 91, 96, 97, 103, 144 Korea House for International Solidarity (KHIS), 141n21, 144, 146n46 Korean Anti-Pollution Movement, 177 Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), 28, 98, 143, 144 Korean Democratization Survey, 116 Korean Family Law Counseling Center, 130 Korean financial crisis (1997–98), 4, 34, 71–73, 182, 220, 239, 242 Korean Military Academy, 208–9 Korean Peasant Movement Coalition, 86, 87 Korean Teachers’ and Educational Workers’ Union (KTEWU), 86, 87, 102 Korean War, 140, 146 Korean Women’s Associations Council (KWAC), 130 Korean Women’s Associations United (KWAU), 117n20: and family law, 129; and family master system, 130; involvement in human rights, 119, 119n25; member organizations in, 119–20, 130–31; move from oppositional group to incorporated body, 120–21; problems in building grassroots base of, 121–22; representation in government, 112–13, 113n16, 121 Korean Women’s Development Institute (KWDI), 111n9, 114t, 115t, 116n17, 117n20, 121n34, 128nn53&54, 129nn56&58 Korean Women’s Hot Line United, 126n49 Korean Women’s Studies Association, 117n20 Korea Trade Union Council, 86, 87 Kowert, Paul, 11n34, 12n38 Krauthammer, Charles, 17n51 KTEWU. see Korean Teachers’ and Educational Workers Union Kupchan, Charles, 203n3 KWAC. see Korean Women’s Associations Council Kwangju incident, 166, 176, 186, 187, 193–94, 195 Kyongsang: development of, 165–66. see also regionalism; regional voting; regional voting study Kyoung-Ryung Seong, 154, 162 Kyung-shik, Kang, 232n40

267

L Lagos, Marta, 53n12 Lanoue, David, 172n26 Larkin, John, 4n6, 75n36, 182n4 Lasch, Christopher, 134n73 Latin America: marginalization of women in, 108; support for authoritarian regime in, 53–54; support for democracy in, 53 Lawyers for a Democratic Society, 147, 150 Lawyers for Democracy, 92–93 Leblanc, Robin, 108, 108n6 Lee, Catherine Keumhyun, 229n29 Lee, Chong-sik, 87n10, 207n16 Lee, Heng, 87n10 Lee, Hyo-Jae, 132n69 Lee, Hyung-Koo, 227n20 Lee, Jae-kyoung, 140n20 Lee, Jong Soo, 152n70, 153n72, 154, 154n76 Lee, Jung Bock, 126n46 Lee, Jung-Hoon, 137n9, 142, 142nn28–29 Lee, Kyoung-suk [131n65], 129n57, 131n65 Lee, Manwoo, 232n37 Lee, Nam-yong, 162n7 Lee, Peter N. S., 40n90 Lee, Rose, 108 Lee, Rose J., 108nn3–4 Lee, Su-Hoon, 85n9 Lee Choon-koo, 232 Lee Hoe Chang, 105 Lee Hoi Chang, 165, 195, 209 Lee Suk-tae, 150 Lessig, Lawrence, 199, 199n73 liberal internationalism, view on global governance, 16t, 17–18 li, 184 Lijphardt, Arend, 161–62, 161n4 Lim, Seong-Ho, 75n34 Limongi, Fernando, 41n93, 54n16, 223n9, 244n71 Ling, L. H. M., 109, 119n23, 123, 123n38, 123n39, 124, 124n40, 125n43, 125n44 Linz, Juan J., 8, 8n25, 12n10, 21n67, 29, 29n75, 31nn79–80, 63, 63n28, 138n11, 139–40, 140nn17&19, 149, 149n60, 201n1 Lipset, Seymour Martin, 41n93 Lukin, Alexander, 48n6 M Maehyang-ri, bombing exercises at, 136, 140, 148, 150 Malaysia, GEM ranking of, 24 Manion, Melanie, 164n15 masculinist politics, 24, 25–26, 109, 124, 133, 134

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mass-membership organization, in U.S., 131n64 Mattes, Robert, 50n10, 53n14 May 18 incident. see Kwangju incident McAdam, Doug, 101n69 McBeth, John, 132n71 McCarthy, Christopher, 136, 136n5, 149 McCarthy, John D., 101n69 McGrew, Andrew, 7 McGrew, Anthony, 6n14, 7n20, 10n28, 11n33, 14n44, 14n45, 15n48, 16t, 19n62, 19n63 MDP. see Millennium Democratic Party Millennium Democratic Party (MDP), 242 Milner, Helen V., 10n28 Ministry of National Defense, and U.S. land use, 154 Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE), 230, 237, 240 Ministry of Finance (MOF), 230, 231 Ministry of National Defense, 147n48, 204n6 Ministry of Political Affairs, 115t, 121n34 minority shareholders, 99–100 Mishler, William, 48n4, 53n15, 55n17, 66n31, 69n32 Mi-young, Ahn, 232n39 Mo, Jongryn, 31n82, 40n87, 40n89, 155, 155n83, 164n14, 201n2, 244n71, 244n72 MOF. see Ministry of Finance MOFE. see Ministry of Finance and Economy Monroe, Ross H., 17n51 Montero, Jose R., 53n12 Moon, Chung-in, 31n82, 40n87, 40n89, 201n2, 202n2, 204n5, 205n10, 212n27, 226n16, 229n26, 230n32, 244n71, 244n72 Moon, Katharine H. S., 27, 28, 151n68 Moon, Seungsook, 25, 26n72, 110n8, 121n32 Moore, Barrington, Jr., 8n24 Morley, James William, 204n4 Morlino, Leonardo, 53n12 Mueller, John, 49n8 multinational corporation (MNC), 15, 18 Munro, Neil, 49n8 N NADUK. see National Alliance for Democracy and Unification of Korea Nakch’on/Nakson movement: achievements of, 94–95; inception of, 90–91; limitations of, 95; list of unfit candidates of, 91–92, 92n31, 93; political party reaction to, 92; support for, 92–93, 94

NALA. see National Association of Local Authorities National Alliance for Democracy and Unification of Korea (NADUK), 86, 98 National Assembly Women’s Special Council, 132n66 National Association of Local Authorities (NALA), 153–54 National Campaign for the Eradication of Crime by U.S. Troops in Korea, 28, 144, 147 National Coalition of University Student Councils (NCUSC), 87–88 National Congress for New Politics (NCNP), 92, 96, 97, 232, 237, 242 National Council of University Student Representatives, 86, 87 National Defense Committee, 89–90 National Election Commission, 93 National Intelligence Service, 36, 37, 238 nationalism: challenges to democratization, 138–39; definition of, according to Brubaker, 136; in multi-ethnic society, 138; open/ democratic, 139–40; proliferation in Eastern Europe, 137; revival of, 7; types of, 139. see also anti-Americanism; anti-American movement National Mayors Conference, 154 National Security Law (NSL), 61, 142, 145, 205, 207 NCNP. see National Congress for New Politics NCUSC. see National Coalition of University Student Councils negative democratization, 38, 202, 207–9 networked minimalism, 18 New Democratic Party, 82 New Five-Year Economic Plan of July 1, 1993, 229 New Korea Party, 167 Niou, Emerson, 164n14 Nobel Peace Prize, 243 Noland, Marcus, 218nn40–41 nongovernmental organization (NGO), 4, 4n4, 18, 28 Norris, Pippa, 13n43, 69n32 North[en]South Communiqu´e, 211, 211n25 North Korea [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea]: gross domestic product in, 9n26; and security, 177, 202, 205–6; and unification, 206–7, 209–13, 211n25, 218–19

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INDEX NSL. see National Security Law Nye, Joseph S. Jr., 7–8, 8n21, 14n47, 18, 16t, 18n56 O Oberschall, Anthony, 143, 143n31 O’Donnell, Guillermo, 40n90, 63n27, 81n1 OECD. see Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development Oh, John K. C., 205n13, 207n16, 208n18, 232n38 Oh, Kongdan, 215n33 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 3, 61, 231 Our Global Neighborhood, 17–18 P pacted transition, 81 Paisley, Ed, 228n22 Pak, Jong-ryol, 214n31 Pak, Pyˆong-ho, 127n50 Paraguay, as democracy, 53 Park, Hyeoung-Sin, 162 Park, Hyung-Sin, 192n8 Park, Sung-Woo, 63n29 Park, Wanki, 195n57, 196n58 Park, Young-Hoon, 191nn37&39, 192n46 Park Chung Hee, 63: assassination of, 185–86, 190; constitutional changes favoring, 189–90, 205–6; elite recruitment by, 166; military coup by, 189; movement against, 82; prime minister under, 192–93 Park Chung Hee government: economics under, 35, 182, 223, 224; elections under, 168; human rights movement under, 119n25; judicial review under, 196–97; masculinization of state under, 124; regionalism under, 63, 167, 194–95, 194n53, 195–96; relationship to U.S., 142 PAR-SOFA. see People’s Action for Reform of the Unjust SOFA Peace and Cooperation Initiative, 211–12, 215 People’s Action for Reform of the Unjust SOFA (PAR-SOFA), 136, 140, 144, 145, 146, 147, 154–55 People’s Movement Coalition for Democracy and Reunification (PMCDR), 86 people’s movements groups, 84, 85–88, 95, 144, 146, 147 People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD): deradicalization of, 103; form of public protest by, 148;

269

founding of, 88; and reform, 89, 91, 96, 97, 98, 99–100, 177 per capita income, in Korea, 41 Peterson, Susan, 221n5 Peterson, V. Spike, 107, 107n2 Pharr, Susan J., 6n12, 7, 7n19, 48n5 Plein, L. Christopher, 227n18 PMCDR. see People’s Movement Coalition for Democracy and Reunification political activism, gender difference in, 25, 38, 124–25 political legitimacy, through constitutional change, 189–90, 205–6 political representation, gender difference in, 24, 25 Popkin, Samuel, 173n27 popular support: as crucial to democracy, 48; as multilevel, 48–49 population, of Korea, 5 Portugal, 3, 54 postcolonial Korea, 181, 188 postinternational relations, 11 prime minister: constitutional role of, 191–92, 191n38; efforts to abolish system of, 193; function of, 191–92; relationship to president, 192; role of, 191–92, 191n38 primogeniture, 127n51, 128 primordial voting. see emotional voting protest: lawfulness of, 148n57; student, 175–76 Przeworski, Adam, 41, 41n93, 54n16, 66n31, 223n9, 244n71 PSPD. see People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy Public Health and Welfare Committee, 90 public opinion, shifts in, 175t Puhle, Hans-Jurgen, 53n12 Putnam, Robert D., 6n12, 6nn11–12, 7, 7n19, 48n5, 131n64, 145n39, 146, 146n44 Pye, Lucien, 123n37 R Ramphal, Sheridath, 17 Ramseyer, Mark, 179n36 rational self-interest voting. see calculated voting realism, view on global governance, 15–17, 16t real-name reform, 227–29, 232 Rechtsstaat. see rule of law regionalism, 4, 105: factors in rise of, 165–67; as inhibiting democratization, 162–63; as not inhibiting democratization, 163; roots of, 30, 165–66, 193–95

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regional voting: bases for, 163–64; further research topics for, 178–79; as inhibiting democratization, 30, 162, 170–71; post-1987, 29–30, 165, 171–72; pre-1987, 165; as recent phenomenon, 167 regional voting study: calculated vs. emotional voting, 171–75, 174t; conclusions of, 170–71; vote for ruling party, post-1987, 169–70t; vote for ruling party, pre-1987, 168, 169t; vote for ruling party, with variables, 1948–2000, 170, 171t Reisinger, William, 50n10 Remmer, Karen, 73n33 Republic of Korea (ROK). see Korea retroactive punishment, 186–88 Roh, Jeong-Ho, 31–32, 33 Rohrschneider, Robert, 49n9 Roh Tae Woo: “false-name” accounts under, 228; financial mismanagement by, 232; prime minister under, 192; punishment of Chun by, 186n18; and “trial of century,” 31, 38, 83, 185n15, 186, 187 Roh Tae Woo government: economic reform under, 229; and 1989 election, 185n14; judicial review under, 197; military reform under, 214; people’s movement during, 86; political reform under, 167; reform of NSL under, 142; regional support for, 174 ROK. see Republic of Korea Rose, Fred, 143, 143n33, 146n43, 148, 148nn54–55 Rose, Richard, 47n3, 48n4, 49n8, 53n15, 55n17, 56n18, 60, 60n20, 66n31, 69n32, 75n35 Rosen, Stephen, 203n3 Rosenau, James, 8n23, 9, 9n27, 11n33 Rosenbluth, Frances, 179n36 Rothschild, Joseph, 203n3 rule of law, 29, 39, 137: in Korean context, 184, 198–99; lack of support for, in Korea, 31; and “trial of the century,” 31–32, 185n15, 186–87; in Western context, 184–85; in years right after liberation from Japan, 181–82 rule of man, 29, 39: support for, in Korea, 31. see also authoritarian regime, preference for S sadaejuui, 205, 216 Sandel, Michael, 6n12, 7, 7n17 Sanger, David, 209n19

Schmitter, Philippe C., 81n1, 104, 104nn73&74, 161n1 Scholte, Jan Aart, 11n35, 12n39, 13n42 security: historical bases of security thinking, 202–5; impact on democratization, 34, 205–7; mutual security/multilateralism in, 34; self-help security/bilateralism in, 34, 204–5 security, and democratization: future of, 217–19 security, and democratization, under Kim Dae Jung: multilateralism/ bilateralism, 216–17; North–South policy, 214–15; views on unification, 215–16 security, and democratization, under Kim Young Sam: military reform, 207–9, 213–14, 217; North–South policy, 209–14, 211n25 segyehwa. see globalization Seong, Kyoung-Ryung, 153n71, 154n77, 162n9, 165n19 sex ratio, in Korean newborns, 128 Shih, Chih-yu, 119n23, 125n44 Shim Jae Hoon, 207n16, 229n25, 232nn34–36 Shin, Doh Chull, 21–23, 29n76, 30n77, 31n81, 39, 39n86, 41n92, 47n1, 47n3, 48n7, 49n8, 50n11, 60n20, 61n24, 75n35, 76n37, 108n3, 116n19, 118–19, 124–25, 124n41, 125n42, 161n1, 162, 162nn6&10, 201n2, 217nn37–38, 218n39 Shin, Gi-Wook, 135nn2–4 Shin, Yˆong-suk, 120n28 Shugart, Matt, 164n14 Sikkink, Kathryn, 11n33 Skocpol, Theda, 222n7 Slovenia, dictator rule support in, 56 Snyder, Jack, 27n73, 138, 138n12, 203n3 social capital, definition of, 6n11 social concertation, 42 socialist radicalism, 16t, 18 social movement, factors in emergence/development of, 101 SOFA. see Status of Forces Agreement Sohn, Hak-kyu, 205n13 Sohn, Hyuk-Sang, 87n10, 207n16 Sokyon, Lee, 149 Solidarity Congress of Civic and Social Groups, 145 Song, Kyong Ryung, 82n2 Song, Mun Hong, 87n11 South Korea. see Korea Spain, support for in democracy, 54

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INDEX Special Act on the May 18 Democratization Movement, 32, 187 special bill, 187–88, 195, 197, 199 state[en]society relation, familial metaphor in, 123–25, 134 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), 135–36, 140, 148, 149, 150, 154, 155 Steinberg, David, 47n3, 104n75, 194n50 Stepan, Alfred, 8, 8n25, 12n10, 21n67, 29, 29n75, 31nn79–80, 63, 63n28, 83n7, 138n11, 139–40, 140nn17&19, 149, 149n60, 201n1 Stoker, Gerry, 153n71 strategic culture, 203n3 Sullivan, Kevin, 213n30 Syngman Rhee, 82, 175, 189, 191: demonstrations against, 175, 194; judicial review under, 196, 198; prime minister under, 192 T Taagepera, Rein, 164n14 Talbott, Strobe, 14, 14n47 Tamir, Yael, 138n10 Tarrow, Sydney, 143, 143n30 Taylor, Rosemary C. R., 222n6 Thailand, GEM ranking of, 24 third wave of global democratization, 3: countries of, 23n70, 53; difference of Korea in, 23, 81–82; and endism, 6; end of, 4–5 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 116n18 Tonghak Rebellion, 194 Tow, William, 203n3, 206n15 transplacement, democratization by, 23, 23n70 “trial of the century,” 31–32, 185n15, 186–87 U ULD. see United Liberal Democratics UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 128 unification, of North/South Korea, 206–7, 209–13, 211n25, 218–19 Unification and International Relations and Trade Committee, 89–90 unions, 4, 28, 35–36, 98, 125, 125n45, 143, 144, 177, 234 United Liberal Democratics (ULD), 92, 94, 231–32, 237, 242, 243 United Nations, gender equality ranking of Korea by, 24, 26, 112

271

United Nations and International Parliamentary Union (IPU), 26, 112 United States: disempowerment in, 7; elimination of political machines in, 179; gross domestic product in, 9n26; mass-membership organization in, 131n64. see also anti-Americanism; anti-American movement V Venezuela, authoritarian regime support in, 53–54 Vietnam War, 146, 146n46 voting: calculated vs. emotional, 172–74. see also regional voting; regional voting study W Wade, Robert, 220n2 Wallensteen, Peter, 13n41 Wang, Zhenmin, 184n9 watchdog group, 147 West, James M., 185n15 Western Europe, regionalism in, 164 Whitehead, Lawrence, 161n3 Wickham, John, 166n21 Wohlforth, William C., 15, 15n50, 17 Wolchik, Sharon L., 108n5 woman: marginalization of, 24, 25–26, 108, 134; violence against, 117n20, 136, 149, 151. see also family law; gender; Korean Women’s Associations United (KWAU); Korean Women’s Development Institute (KWDI) woman, representation of, 122: in governmental committees, 114–16, 115t; in high-level party positions, 113–14t; in local assembly, 112–33t; in national assembly, 24, 111t–112 women’s associations: Christian, 119–20; and democratization, 118–19; increase in, 116–17t. see also Korean Women’s Associations United Women’s Democratic Friends Society, 117n20 Women’s Hot Line, 117n20 women’s movement, 24–25: diversity in contemporary, 110n8; and transformation of family, 130–32 Women’s Politics Network, 113n16 Women’s Union for Revision of the Family Law, 128–29 Woo, Jung-en, 225n11 Woodall, Brian, 179n36 World Bank, 5n8, 9n26, 10n31, 43n97

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Y Yi, Hyo-jae, 119n25, 120nn27–28&30 Yi, Mi-kyˆong, 111n10, 113n15, 121nn31&33 YMCA, 97 Yoo, Ok-Za, 128n55, 132n70 Yoon, Dae-Kyu, 189n30, 196n62, 197nn63&65

Yoon, Young-Kwan, 239n57 Yu, P’al Mu, 85n9 Yudohoe, 132 Yun Po-sun, regional support for, 167 Z Zald, Mayer N., 101n69