Koizumi and Japanese Politics: Reform Strategies and Leadership Style (Routledge University of Tokyo Series)

Koizumi and Japanese Politics Reform strategies and leadership style

This book offers an empirical and theoretical study of the Koizumi administration, covering such issues as the characteristics of its political style, its domestic and foreign policies, and its larger historical significance. The key questions that guide its approach are: what enabled Koizumi to exercise unusually strong leadership, and what structural transformations of Japanese politics did he achieve? Uchiyama looks at policy-making processes, newly created institutional arenas such as the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, Koizumi’s populist strategy, foreign policy, and neo-liberal convictions to assess the historical significance of his administration and seek out the basis for its wide public support. Finally, the book undertakes a normative evaluation of the merits and demerits of the Koizumi administration’s political style, and compares it with the Abe and Fukuda administrations that came after. This book will be of interest to scholars and students with an interest in comparative politics, administrative reform, and contemporary Japan. Yū Uchiyama is Associate Professor at the University of Tokyo Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Japan.

Routledge  / University of Tokyo Series Editorial Board Editor-in-Chief: Hiroshi Watanabe, Professor, Graduate School of Law and Politics, University of Tokyo. Associate Editors: Jun Furuya, Professor, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo. Masashi Haneda, Professor, Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo. Katsuhito Iwai, Professor, Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo. Ryōko Tsuneyoshi, Professor, Graduate School of Education, University of Tokyo. Susumu Yamakage, Professor, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo. Managing Editor and Translation Editor: Michael Burtscher, Associate Professor, Division for International Relations and Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo.

1. Koizumi and Japanese Politics    Reform strategies and leadership style    Yū Uchiyama, Translated by Carl Freire

Koizumi and Japanese Politics Reform strategies and leadership style

Yū Uchiyama Translated by Carl Freire

First published 2010 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2010. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk. © 2010 The University of Tokyo All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Uchiyama, Yu, 1966 – Koizumi and Japanese politics / Yu Uchiyama.     p. cm. – (Routledge / University of Tokyo series ; 1)   Includes bibliographical references and index.   1. Japan–Politics and government – 1989–  2. Koizumi, Jun'ichiro,   1942–   I. Title.   JQ1631.U38 2010   952.05092–dc22 2009036089 ISBN 0-203-85637-6 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN10: 0-415-55688-0 (hbk) ISBN10: 0-203-85637-6 (ebk) ISBN13: 978-0-415-55688-0 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-85637-6 (ebk)

Contents

List of illustrations Editorial note List of abbreviations

vi viii ix

Introduction

1

1 Koizumi’s management of politics

6

2 Domestic affairs: the battle over neoliberal reform

26

3 Foreign relations: closer to America, further from East Asia

79

4 The Koizumi administration in historical and theoretical perspective

118

5 Legacies of the Koizumi administration

137

6 Postscript: the Koizumi and Abe administrations

154

Afterword and acknowledgements

165

Appendix 1: Diet election results under the Koizumi administration Appendix 2: Koizumi cabinet approval rating trends in public opinion surveys Appendix 3: The Koizumi administration: a timeline Appendix 4: Glossary Appendix 5: Personal names Notes Bibliography Index

169 170 172 176 184 187 198 204

Illustrations

Photographs 0.1 1.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 3.11 5.1 

Koizumi dissolves Diet Koizumi holds rally The Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy Highway Privatization Committee Koizumi in Diet Koizumi and Takenaka smiling Suzuki Muneo and Tanaka Makiko Koizumi and Bush conclude their meeting held in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks The Ground Self-Defence Forces on duty in Iraq Koizumi’s first visit to Yasukuni shrine Koizumi’s second visit to Yasukuni shrine Koizumi’s third Yasukuni visit Koizumi’s fourth visit to Yasukuni shrine Koizumi’s fifth pilgrimage to Yasukuni Koizumi’s sixth pilgrimage to Yasukuni Koizumi in North Korea Mexico FTA Teleconference Prime minister question time on 23 July 2003

2 8 27 43 73 77 82 85 92 97 98 100 102 105 105 107 115 144

Figures 2.1 Budget changes under the Koizumi administration 2.2 Subsidy reforms and revenue source transfers under the Trinity Reform 4.1 Axes of confrontation in foreign and defence policy 5.1 Trends in the Gini coefficient 6.1 Abe and Koizumi cabinet approval rates compared

34 62 120 141 159

List of illustrations  vii

Tables 1.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 2.11

Trends in the share of major public works expenditure The new budget-formulation process Chronology of the highway reforms Outline of the final report of the Promotion Committee for the Privatization of the Four Highway-related Public Corporations Outline of the bills on the privatization of the four highway-related public corporations Chronology on nonperforming loan write-offs and financial revitalization Outline of the financial revitalization programme Chronology of healthcare system reforms Summary of fiscal 2006 healthcare system reforms Chronology of the ‘Trinity Reform’ Chronology of postal privatization Basic Policy on the Privatization of Japan Post

19 36 41 45 47 49 51 54 55 59 65 69

Editorial note

The present book is a slightly revised and expanded translation of the author’s Koizumi Seiken: ‘Patosu’ no shushō wa nani o kaeta no ka 小泉政権　「パト スの首相」は何を変えたのか, published by Chūōkōron-shinsha 中央公論新 社 as part of its Chūkō shinsho 中公新書 series in 2007. The Postscript has been newly added to the English edition. The translation of this book was funded by the University of Tokyo in the framework of its English-Language Monograph Publications Program. Japanese, Chinese and Korean names in the main text are given in their original order, that is, family name first, followed by personal names. In the case of bibliographical data for English-language publications, however, names of authors and editors are given in the English order. Korean names are rendered following AP style, that is, mixed capitals and hyphenated personal names in South Korean names (Kim Dae-jung), and all capitals, no hyphen in North Korean names (Kim Jong Il). Apostrophes indicating syllable separation after final n before vowel or y have been omitted in the main text (Koizumi Junichirō), but are retained in the Glossary and in transcriptions of Japanese (Koizumi Jun’ichirō). Macrons over vowels indicate lengthened pronunciation. In the case of terms well established in English usage, they are omitted (Tokyo instead of Tōkyō). Photo credits: The Yomiuri Shimbun (pp. 2, 8, 27, 43, 73, 77, 82, 85, 92, 97, 98, 100, 102, 105, 115 and 144) and The Mainichi Newspapers (p. 77).

Abbreviations

AFVKN Association of the Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation APSR American Political Science Review ARC Administrative Reform Council ASDF Air Self-Defence Force ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations CEFP Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy DCF Discounted cash flow DPJ Democratic Party of Japan DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) DSP Democratic Socialist Party EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone FILP Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme FSA Financial Services Agency FTA Free Trade Agreement GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GDP Gross domestic product GSDF Ground Self-Defence Force HPC Highway Privatization Committee IRC Industrial Revitalization Corporation JCP Japan Communist Party JDF Japan Dentists Federation JDR Japan Disaster Relief team JEHDRA Japan Expressway Holding and Debt Repayment Agency JHPC Japan Highway Public Corporation JMA Japan Medical Association JNN Japan News Network JNR Japan National Railways JPLU All Japan Postal Labour Union JPSA Japanese Political Science Association JPSC Japan Postal Services Corporation JPU Japan Postal Workers Union JR Japan Railways

x  List of abbreviations JRP Japan Renewal Party JSP Japan Socialist Party LDP Liberal Democratic Party of Japan METI Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry MITI Ministry of International Trade and Industry MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs MSDF Maritime Self-Defence Force NCP New Conservative Party NEET Not in employment, education or training NGO Non-governmental organization NKT New Komei(tō) Party NPN New Party Nippon PARC Policy Affairs Research Council PDC Policy Deliberation Commission PKO Peacekeeping Operations PNP People’s New Party PR Proportional representation RCC Resolution and Collection Corporation SACO Special Action Committee SCJ Security Council of Japan SDF Self-Defence Forces SDPJ Social Democratic Party of Japan SIASJ Law Law on a Situation in the Areas Surrounding Japan SMD Single-member district UFJ United Financial of Japan WTO World Trade Organization

Introduction

The ‘Galileo dissolution’ On 8 August 2005, following rejection of his postal privatization bills in the House of Councillors, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō dissolved the House of Representatives. For Koizumi, postal privatization constituted the centrepiece of his reform programme – the ‘inner citadel of reform’ (kaikaku no honmaru 改革 の本丸) as he also liked to call it – on which the fate of his administration hinged. Since the Diet had rejected his bills, he decided to dissolve its Lower House and place the question before the people. Speaking at a press conference immediately after the dissolution, Koizumi explained himself as follows: Today, I dissolved the House of Representatives. The postal privatization bills that I determined to be the inner citadel of reform have been rejected by the House of Councillors. The Diet has judged that postal privatization is unnecessary. … The present dissolution of the Lower House, then, is a postal dissolution, if you will. I would like to put the question plainly to the people – do you agree with me on postal privatization, or are you opposed to it? … I have consistently advocated this privatization ever since I stood for the LDP’s presidential election four years ago. Pleading the necessity of carrying out this privatization reviled by the LDP and the opposition parties alike, I became president of the LDP and prime minister. After becoming prime minister, I continued to say that if you don’t like postal privatization you are welcome to go ahead and replace me. But still, the Liberal Democratic Party re-elected me as its president. And yet, they keep saying, ‘We are opposed to privatization to begin with.’ Even the Democratic Party, which always used to say ‘Leave to the private sector what the private sector can do,’ now says it was better to leave it as a public corporation. Isn’t that strange? I still believe that if we are to truly carry out administrative reform, if we are to pursue the idea of throwing open the work of public offices to the private sector – simply, efficiently, and without much government participation – postal privatization is necessary. …

2  Introduction Some 400 years ago, Galileo Galilei proclaimed his theory that the earth moves around the sun in the face of the established view that it was the other way round, and was pronounced guilty on account of that. At that time, Galileo is reported to have said: ‘And yet it moves!’ … The LDP, which has clearly established itself as the party of reform, will face the Democratic Party, which opposes privatization, in battle. I would like to hear what verdict the people will return.1 In this instance, Koizumi likened himself – as a person who had not altered his faith in postal privatization regardless of the opposition it received – to Galileo, who had staked his life on the truth of the heliocentric worldview. His words brim with the conceit that history will prove him right. His dissolution of the House of Representatives continues to be spoken of as the ‘Postal Dissolution’ (Yūsei kaisan 郵政解散) or even the ‘Galileo Dissolution’ (Garireo kaisan ガ リレオ解散) today. The way he compared himself to Galileo at the time and

Photo 0.1  Koizumi dissolves Diet. Koizumi Junichirō looks out on the press conference held immediately after the dissolution of the House of Representatives (8 August 2005). Photo credit: The Yomiuri Shimbun.

Introduction  3 the circumstances under which the ensuing general elections were held are emblematic for the Koizumi administration’s political style. Koizumi Junichirō occupied the office of prime minister for exactly five years and five months, from 26 April 2001 to 26 September 2006. His administration was the third longest for a postwar prime minister after those of Satō Eisaku and Yoshida Shigeru. But compared to previous conservative governments, the Koizumi administration was a bird of an extremely different feather. This difference lay in its distinctive political style with displays of strong leadership backed up by appeals to the popular will.

Koizumi’s political style The characteristic features of Koizumi’s political style as prime minister can be divided up, broadly speaking, into two dimensions. First, there was the Koizumi who sought to win voter support by means of striking, simply phrased statements (wanfurēzu ワンフレーズ, that is ‘onephrase’) and a ‘dramatization’ of politics that cast conflicts in stark terms of good versus evil. Such techniques appeal more to people’s emotions = pathos than their reason = logos. This dimension of Koizumi may be described as that of ‘prime minister of pathos’. The other dimension to Koizumi’s political style showed in his top-down approach to policy-making, steamrolling opposition from within the ruling parties and inside the government, and his pushing through of a variety of structural reforms. While such expressions as ‘Kantei-led’ (Kantei shudō 官邸主導, Kantei being the prime minister’s official residence) and ‘prime minister rule’ (shushō shihai 首相支配) are in frequent use today, this represented a great departure from established political style with its emphasis on harmony. This was Koizumi’s side as a ‘strong prime minister’. Both of these dimensions found graphic expression in the events surrounding the ‘Galileo dissolution’. Koizumi’s pet idea of postal privatization was subject to fierce opposition within the LDP since it conflicted with the interests of the special post office masters, an important base of support for the party. But Koizumi did not give in or hesitate to label anyone opposed to his reform ‘forces of resistance’ (teikō seiryoku 抵抗勢力). He refused to endorse rebel lawmakers in the September 2005 general election, going so far as to run contesting candidates, dubbed ‘assassins’ (shikaku 刺客) by the media, in their electoral districts. This scheme was taken up sensationally by the mass media and aroused the interest of many voters. It was the epitome of ‘Koizumi theatre’ (Koizumi gekijō 小泉劇場) with its dramatization of politics. As a result, the LDP won 29 seats to score an unprecedented victory, allowing Koizumi to put his long-cherished dream of postal privatization into practice. Koizumi’s achievement of a landslide victory through use of impressionistic language and the stark contrast he drew between himself and ‘forces of resistance’ was a powerful display of his skills as the prime minister of pathos. Meanwhile, his resolute pursuit of top-down decision-making regardless of opposition from

4  Introduction within the LDP and his forcing through of the postal reforms showed the strong prime minister he was. These characteristics set Koizumi apart from any other LDP prime minister up to then. Almost no one had believed that an ‘oddball’ (henjin 変人) like Koizumi could become prime minister to begin with. But this oddball would reign as premier for a long five years and five months and leave a lasting mark on the world of Japanese politics. Koizumi, who at one point exclaimed, ‘I am going to smash the LDP!’ (Jimintō o bukkowasu 自民党をぶっ壊す), made considerable changes to an existing party structure where power had been in the hands of factions and so-called zoku lawmakers, that is, veteran LDP politicians who wielded influence over specific policy areas (zoku 族 literally meaning ‘tribe’). He changed the political decisionmaking system as well, from a bottom-up model that emphasized the government working harmoniously with bureaucrats and conciliating and coordinating (chōsei 調整)2 between competing interests in the party to a top-down model in which the Kantei took the lead. He also sharply changed course on policy fundamentals, switching from policies that emphasized protection and regulation to neoliberal policies aimed at reducing the government’s role and introducing market mechanisms. The Koizumi administration’s appearance on the scene thus indicated that a Japanese prime minister, who until then had been viewed in a passive light, was also capable of exercising strong leadership. How could the Koizumi administration have such a big impact on Japanese politics? This question is likely on the minds of everyone living in Japan at the start of the 21st century. The chief purpose of this book is to explore that mystery.

The organization of this book What was the nature of the Koizumi administration? How can we characterize his political style and the structural reforms he pushed through? What did he change about Japanese politics? Why was he able to do so? How are we to assess his management of politics? Where does he fit in the history of postwar politics? And what problems did he leave behind for subsequent administrations? These are the questions this book will tackle, in an attempt at presenting a comprehensive overview and analysis of his government. Chapter 1 broadly outlines the characteristics of the Koizumi administration’s management of politics. Taking its lead from the keywords ‘prime minister of pathos’ and ‘strong prime minister’, it analyses Koizumi’s political methods, which radically transformed the traditional structure of the LDP and existing policy-making mechanisms. Koizumi’s structural reforms are the subject of Chapter 2. Here, I analyse the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP), which played a central role in a series of structural reforms, and discuss the political processes that surrounded a number of highly contentious issues, including public finance reform, privatization of the highway public corporations, the so-called ‘Trinity Reform’ (Sanmi ittai kaikaku 三位一体改革) in local government financing, the reform of the social

Introduction  5 security system, and postal privatization. The focus of this chapter will be on the question of how Kantei-led, top-down decision-making was carried out. Chapter 3 addresses diplomacy. I look at the marked strengthening of cooperation with the USA in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the notable estrangement in relations with China and Korea, and North Korea diplomacy with its focuses on normalization of ties and the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by the North in the 1970s and 1980s. I also direct attention to the marked contrast between Koizumi’s economic policy, which was pursued strategically, and his foreign policy, which appeared to lack a strategic basis. In Chapter 4, I discuss historical and theoretical perspectives for understanding the Koizumi administration. What place does the Koizumi administration have in the history of postwar politics? I first analyze the historical context in which Koizumi made his appearance, and then switch to a theoretical perspective to investigate those factors that buttressed his leadership as prime minister. I also consider the reasons why Koizumi’s control rapidly increased after the postal election of 2005. Finally, I bring the book to a close with Chapter 5 by showing what stamp the Koizumi administration has left on Japanese politics, for better or worse.

1 Koizumi’s management of politics

Koizumi Junichirō held office for five years and five months, from the day his administration took office on 26 April 2001 to the day he stepped down on 26 September 2006. He maintained consistently high popular support ratings throughout as he fundamentally changed the face of Japanese politics in multiple respects, ranging from the structure of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to the policy-making process and the image of the prime minister. This chapter seeks to cast the way the Koizumi administration carried out its political operations into sharp relief by considering the two dimensions to his character as prime minister: the sentiment-driven ‘prime minister of pathos’, and the executive authority-wielding ‘strong prime minister’. Previous researchers have considered his administration from a variety of angles. Here, I seek to offer a comprehensive analysis of its defining features by approaching it from these two sides. The present chapter will also address the question of what the sources of Koizumi’s ‘strength’ as a prime minister were. Did he draw on his personal power for that strength, or did he benefit from changes in the institutional system since the latter half of the 1990s that made Kantei-led policy-making possible? Considering these questions should help to deepen our understanding not only of the Koizumi administration but also of how Japan’s prime minister functions.

Populist style, or the ‘prime minister of pathos’ Koizumi’s media strategy Prime Minister Koizumi gave a great deal of consideration to acutely impressing the average person with his image. He attached greater importance to making his appeals directly to the general public and winning their support than to building up his power base within the LDP. A political style aimed at gaining favour with the public in this fashion is commonly termed ‘populism’ in politics. While Koizumi was hardly the first Japanese prime minister to use this approach – one notable example being Hosokawa Morihiro, who held office from August 1993 to April 1994 – none had been as successful at it as he was.

Koizumi’s management of politics   7 The victory Koizumi achieved against almost everyone’s predictions in the spring 2001 LDP presidential contest was based on a landslide win in the party primary against the backdrop of his national popularity. His support in opinion polls immediately after taking office reached then-unheard-of highs of above 80 per cent. As prime minister, Koizumi spoke to the public in a clear-cut language dubbed ‘one-phrase’ (wanfurēzu ワンフレーズ) by the Japanese media for the curtness of his remarks. At times he would dramatize confrontations with his political enemies in a calculated effort to arouse public interest. His skilful use of such methods to keep his administration afloat successfully maintained its public support at high levels. The 50 per cent support rate his cabinets averaged was the second highest in the postwar period, bested only by the 68 per cent achieved by the Hosokawa Cabinet, which lasted for only nine months.1 This support sustained his administration’s long term in office, the third longest for a postwar prime minister. Koizumi’s populist approach was characterized by his media strategy, his penchant for casting issues as matters of good and evil, and his patterns of speech. First of all, it was only because Koizumi had a media strategy that his methods could achieve maximum efficiency. The essence of this strategy lay in making aggressive use of media that had so far stood on the fringes of the established political press corps. Under the 1955 system, newspapers formed the core of the press corps covering politics. Newspapers relied for their coverage on beat reporters, called bankisha 番記者, who collected information by forming close relationships with politicians. Television reporters remained on the outside of these insider groups comprised of politicians and reporters on the political beat.2 It was coverage of the political reforms and realignments that occurred during the early 1990s that built momentum for the role of television media to gain increased attention. An excellent example of this new awareness of television’s role is how the Hosokawa administration came to be labelled the ‘Kume-Tahara Coalition Government’ (after Kume Hiroshi, then anchorman of the popular weekday evening News Station television programme and Tahara Sōichirō, moderator of the long-running Sunday Project current affairs talk show) based on the widely held perception that television reports critical of the preceding LDP government had been a factor in its demise. This example illustrates the dramatically expanded role played by television in contemporary politics that has led some to speak of ‘telepolitics’. Koizumi saw this situation clearly and used television aggressively and to great effect. First of all, Koizumi completely changed how burasagari ぶら下がり (‘hanging in tow’) press briefings were carried out. Until this point, burasagari usually referred to the prime minister answering reporters’ questions while on the move around the Kantei (prime minister’s official residence) or the Diet. Koizumi’s method, however, was to stop where the television cameras stood and talk. Under Koizumi, such press briefings were held twice a day, once at midday and once in the evening. The midday briefing was conducted without television cameras, primarily with the newspapers in mind. The evening briefing, on the

8  Koizumi and Japanese Politics

Photo 1.1  Koizumi holds rally. Crowds throng to a speech by Koizumi after the LDP presidential election of April 2001. His striking and clear-cut way of speaking carried by the mass media captivated many and won the public to his side. Photo credit: The Yomiuri Shimbun.

other hand, held as Koizumi was about to leave the Kantei for the day, was conducted with the cameras rolling.3 Koizumi often came out with some deeply striking comment at this evening event, a scene that would then be broadcast on the evening news programmes. Koizumi’s pronouncements and public assertions were effectively diffused among the populace through this routine. Among the print media, Koizumi favoured the weekly tabloid magazines and sports newspapers, which heretofore had stood on the fringes of the political press corps, over the major newspapers (the so-called ‘quality papers’). He put a premium on appearing in such publications, would hold informal talks with the magazines’ editors and reporters, and forced the cabinet press club to admit sports newspapers. The sensational, dramatized reporting such publications favoured suited Koizumi’s populist style.4 Pitting good vs evil The term ‘populism’ generally refers to the position that popular opinion ought to be indulged or accommodated, but we can define it here with greater precision. According to political scientist Ōtake Hideo, populism is characterized by a ‘theatrical’ political style that presupposes binary oppositions between ‘the average person’ and ‘the elite’, ‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys’, or ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’. The leader is cast in the role of the ‘hero’ who, standing firmly on the average person’s side, leads them in confronting and doing battle with ‘the enemy’.5 In fact, Koizumi called the zoku lawmakers and bureaucrats who opposed such reforms as his efforts to eliminate public corporations and to privatize the

Koizumi’s management of politics   9 highway public corporations ‘forces of resistance’ (teikō seiryoku 抵抗勢力). He constructed an oppositional framework in which they were ‘bad’ and he was ‘good’. The way he dramatized the confrontation between himself and the ‘forces of resistance’ was grist to the mill of television variety programmes, which normally did not cover such topics, and attracted the attention also of those who normally had little interest in politics. Koizumi’s structural reforms picked up a strong tailwind of popular support owing to the spread of this black-and-white view of the world among the public at large. In contrast, the anti-reform faction found itself presented in a morally negative light.6 Having made postal privatization the only contested issue in the 2005 general election, Koizumi vowed to not endorse any politicians who opposed the draft of his privatization bill, and dispatched carpetbagger candidates to run in their districts as what the media dubbed ‘assassins’ (shikaku 刺客). Koizumi again painted a black-and-white picture that pitted good against evil, with rebel lawmakers in the role of the ‘bad guys’ blocking reforms and injuring the public interest, while Koizumi and his ‘assassins’ were playing the part of the ‘good guys’ pursuing reform. The strategy paid off and the LDP scored an unprecedentedly massive victory, thanks in particular to this strategy’s enormous appeal to independent voters. As Koizumi’s achievement of postal privatization by these means demonstrates, depicting issues in black-and-white terms in an effort to mobilize public support allowed him to increase his influence over the policy-making process to a marked degree. Koizumi achieved greater policy transformations than any prime minister before him thanks to his effective use of populist techniques and a string of reforms to the political system and government structure that preceded his term in office. I will return to these points. Koizumi’s patterns of speech Another characteristic of Koizumi’s methods lay in his manner of speaking. When addressing the public he relied on easily understood terms and simple assertions, a style referred to in Japanese as already noted as ‘one-phrase politics’. Such a mode of speaking is very effective in an age of telepolitics. Long, logic-driven explanations are short on highlights and therefore difficult to use on television, no matter how sensible they may be. Even more importantly, from a production point of view brief takes with a single camera are easier to use and easier for television viewers to grasp. Koizumi displayed considerable genius in delivering messages well-suited to the unique requirements of television as a medium. Consider the following examples. In his first general policy address after taking office, delivered to the Diet on 7 May 2001, Koizumi cited a historical incident involving the feudal domain of Nagaoka in northern central Japan. Its leaders decided that rather than distribute 100 sacks of rice for immediate consumption, they would sell them and use the revenue as capital for building schools. ‘Do we not today,’ Koizumi concluded his speech, ‘as we seek to move ahead with

10  Koizumi and Japanese Politics reforms, stand in need of just such a “spirit of 100 sacks of rice” (kome hyappyō no seishin 米百俵の精神), putting up with the pains of the present to make a brighter tomorrow?’ It is generally impossible to determine when an expression like ‘100 sacks of rice’ was inserted into the draft of a policy speech, which is prepared by the prime minister’s staff. We do know here, however, that Koizumi gave personal instructions to the committee in charge of the draft’s review, advising it that inclusion of an ‘explanatory section is not needed’.7 It therefore appears safe to assume that the inclusion of the above reference reflected his own intentions quite accurately. His defence of the healthcare system reforms of fiscal 2001 (the Japanese fiscal year runs from 1 April to 31 March of the following calendar year) provides another case in point. During the process of seeing the reforms through, Koizumi often spoke of apportioning the cost between healthcare providers, insurers and patients, as ‘splitting the burden three ways’ or, more literally, ‘All three lose one silver coin’ (sanbō ichiryō zon 三方一両損).8 By using such visceral expressions as ‘100 sacks of rice’ and ‘All three lose one silver coin’ to promote policies that would impose greater burdens on the people – policies that previous LDP administrations had avoided as inflicting ‘pain’ on them – Koizumi impressed their absolute necessity on the public. It required a politician of Koizumi’s calibre to do that. Two days after Koizumi’s first policy speech, Hatoyama Yukio, the leader of the main opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), asked him during prime minister’s question time in the Diet: ‘Who are these “forces of resistance”?’ Koizumi responded with the assertion: ‘Any forces who oppose my Cabinet’s policies are “forces of resistance”’, thus casting the situation as a matter of good and evil early on. In a stump speech delivered in the run-up to Upper House elections on 8 July of the same year, Koizumi proclaimed: ‘Should there be LDP lawmakers who are thinking, “Koizumi’s usefulness ends with the Upper House election. Once we have won, let’s crush his reforms,” then I, Koizumi, am going to smash the LDP. You can count on that.’ The party president’s pronouncement that he was ‘going to smash the LDP’ (Jimintō o bukkowasu 自民党をぶっ壊す) came as quite a shock to the public (as Koizumi likely had calculated) and the expression was frequently cited afterwards as a symbol of the Koizumi reforms.9 Likewise, just before the vote in the plenary session of the Upper House on the postal privatization bills, Koizumi declared at his evening press briefing on 1 August 2005: ‘People who oppose postal privatization and plan to reject it are saying “Koizumi should quit!” This equals a movement to overthrow the government.’10 Such comments that made a point of emphasizing the standoff within the party were diffused by television throughout the country.

Koizumi’s management of politics   11 The ‘prime minister of pathos’ Linguist Azuma Shōji argues that Koizumi’s speech patterns possessed the following characteristics.11 1

2

3

Koizumi spoke in a circumlocutory fashion at the same time that he relied on short and easily understood phrases rather than long and complex sentences. Occasionally, he would say exactly what he was thinking at that moment, his words following along with the flow of his thought. Such a speaking style is apt to produce a big impact on the listener. The tendency of Democratic Party leaders such as Maehara Seiji or Hatoyama Yukio, in contrast, was to add numerous explanations and include all kinds of information in an effort to render their positions legitimate and more convincing. Koizumi would spontaneously switch from a public style of speaking to a more private one (as though pouring out his personal feelings). This sort of code switching is an effective means for drawing in the listener and narrowing their psychological sense of distance. In his public addresses and comments, Koizumi referred to himself in the third person, as when he spoke of ‘the Koizumi Cabinet’ in his policy address. This worked to emphasize his sense of personal autonomy and distinctive originality.

As Azuma points out, Koizumi’s style of speaking was characterized by the use of striking expressions and by direct appeals to the emotions as opposed to logical explanation. Koizumi, in other words, stressed pathos (emotions, sentiment) over logos (rationality, well-defined language). Koizumi frequently made a public display of his own feelings as well. Even when seeking to convince the public of a point, he did not seek to rationally persuade through carefully chosen words. His method was rather to appeal to the people’s feelings by way of evocative messages. An event typifying these occasional eruptions of Koizumi’s personal pathos came on 27 May 2001, the final day of the summer sumo tournament. Takanohana, then the sport’s top-ranked and most popular wrestler, had just won the 15-day event despite a painful knee injury the day before that raised doubts about his ability to complete the tournament. During the awards ceremony, Koizumi concluded his congratulatory speech by adding in an emotion-charged voice: ‘I am deeply moved!’ (Kandō shita 感動した). Koizumi’s love of opera and the kabuki theatre also reflect his penchant for pathos. Koizumi’s attention to pathos contributed much to his populist style. His florid language was apt to echo immediately in the hearts of the people precisely because it forsook lengthy explanations. The baring of personal feelings in a prime minister who otherwise exuded an air of imperiousness allowed the people to feel close to him. But, most importantly, his technique of depicting issues in black-and-white terms appealed to people at an instinctual level. Humans derive great pleasure from regarding enemies as ‘evil’ and themselves as ‘good’. Political

12  Koizumi and Japanese Politics matters, however, are complex and do not lend themselves to facile divisions of this sort. To introduce such a simplistic dichotomy amounts to nothing less than an abandonment of rational thought. While the Koizumi administration’s media strategy may have been planned out, his populist approach achieved maximum effect through this link to pathos as a primordial force. One aspect of the Koizumi administration that made it so intriguing was this coupling of premodern pathos with distinctively modern political techniques. If Koizumi’s attitude of emphasizing sentiment had been a matter of his personal makeup alone, it might not have presented much of a problem. To the degree that it extended to the public sphere of politics, however, its consequences cannot be ignored. I will return to discuss this problem later.

Top-down policy-making, or the ‘strong prime minister’ End of the 1955 system? As the sentiment-driven ‘prime minister of pathos’, Koizumi would exclaim that he was ‘going to smash the LDP’ and win enormous support among the people. At the same time, he chipped away at the influence of the factions, attempted to exclude zoku lawmakers from the policy-making process and made major changes to fundamental policy positions. In so doing, he completely changed the traditional framework of LDP politics. In the following section, I will consider the ‘strong prime minister’ side of Koizumi that proved able to suppress the power of factions and zoku lawmakers and carry through top-down policy-making, and examine the qualitative changes in policy that resulted from this. I will clarify what the Koizumi administration changed by contrasting it with characteristic features of LDP politics prior to it, such as factions, zoku lawmakers, the party’s policy-making system and the basic tenor of LDP policies. In 1955, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) reunited its fractured left and right wings to create a single organization. The Liberal and Democratic Parties (that is, Japan’s two conservative parties) followed suit by combining into the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The LDP established itself in power as the ruling party for the next 40 years while the JSP, as the leading non-government party, played the part of opposition. Various elements that characterized subsequent Japanese politics were formed and became entrenched under this ‘1955 system’, such as the policy-making framework and the way government positions were assigned. While single-party rule by the LDP came to an end with the formation of the Hosokawa Cabinet in 1993, the features that typified the 1955 system clearly remained in place. The prime minister who tried to undo these elements and truly bring the 1955 system to an end was Koizumi.

Koizumi’s management of politics   13 Defeat of factional politics Koizumi’s first attack was directed toward the LDP’s factions. As the common description of the LDP as ‘a coalition of factions’ suggests, these informal groupings possessed a considerable degree of autonomy. The factions developed mainly because senior party politicians who sought the party’s presidency – and the prime minister’s office that came with it – needed to organize the lawmakers who gave them their support in elections. For rank-and-file parliamentarians, on the other hand, membership in a faction brought great advantages in terms of access to political financing and appointment to positions. In other words, factions fulfilled vital functions in selecting the president, dispensing funds and parcelling out appointments, which in turn served to cement the bonds keeping a faction together.12 Given the LDP’s factional nature, cabinet portfolios had to be distributed proportionally among factions in order to maintain a balance between them. In selecting his cabinet, the prime minister would base his appointments on a list of recommendations that each faction provided, after consultation with the party’s top three executives. Seniority also played a major role in LDP personnel decisions. Koizumi wasted little time in doing away with these practices after taking office. He handpicked each member of his first cabinet without consulting the factions. As a result, its composition was far from factionally balanced, sending a strong signal of ‘defactionalization’ (datsu-habatsu 脱派閥) instead. Koizumi’s first cabinet included three members of the Mori faction; two from the Hashimoto; one each from the Etō, Kamei, Horiuchi, Yamasaki, Katō and former Kōmoto factions; two LDP lawmakers unaffiliated with any faction; one lawmaker each from the New Kōmeitō and Conservative parties; and three non-lawmakers. Note that the Hashimoto faction – the party’s largest grouping – received rather few posts while parliamentarians not attached to any faction received two slots and non-politicians three. Koizumi also broke with existing seniority rules and recruited younger lawmakers with few elections under their belts. If one adds his penchant for bringing women on board (five women debuted in the first Koizumi Cabinet), the extent to which he deviated from the conventional logic of cabinet formation in Japan will hardly be missed. Koizumi thus undercut the factions’ most important function – that of distributing appointments. Their role in distributing funds had also been significantly weakened as a result of the tightening of political financing regulations that had accompanied electoral system reform during the 1990s. The factions’ ability to maintain their cohesiveness rapidly declined as the various functions that were central to holding them together were, one after the other, taken away. Koizumi’s main target in all of this was the Hashimoto faction. The longstanding animosity between former Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, the leader of the eponymous faction from which the Hashimoto faction had sprung, and former Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo, to whom Koizumi had attached himself as

14  Koizumi and Japanese Politics a supporter, may have been a factor in this, but even more important was the fact that the Hashimoto faction served as the political home for many powerful Posts and Construction zoku lawmakers. I will return to this point, but given Koizumi’s quest to exclude zoku lawmakers from policy-making once and for all, the bastion of zoku lawmakers that was the Hashimoto faction had to be overcome. To this end, he would give the Hashimoto faction the cold shoulder in making his cabinet appointments or seek to weaken its coherence by trying to drive a wedge between faction executives such as Aoki Mikio and Nonaka Hiromu. He also excluded Hashimoto faction members from key party positions such as secretary-general (commonly regarded the key figure in managing the party’s affairs) and chief of the General Affairs Bureau, a post deeply involved in handling election strategies. This led to a split between pro-Koizumi members such as Aoki and anti-Koizumi members such as Nonaka, which spurred on the weakening process further. The results of the September 2005 general election drove home the impression that the LDP’s factions had lost their cachet. While the number of seats held by Mori faction lawmakers slightly increased by 4 to 56, the Hashimoto faction lost 16 of the seats it had held prior to the dissolution, regaining only 35. The former Kamei faction was reduced by 12 to 16. The ‘faction’ that posted the greatest victory was that of the independent LDP lawmakers. The number of LDP lawmakers with no factional affiliations increased by 67 to 88. Most of them were newcomers to the Diet whom the media dubbed ‘Koizumi’s children’ (Koizumi chirudoren 小泉チルドレン).13 Zoku lawmakers and policy-making prior to Koizumi’s rise to power Under the 1955 system, zoku lawmakers and bureaucrats held the greatest influence over policy-making. ‘Zoku lawmakers’ (zoku giin 族議員) are politicians who wield extraordinary influence over specific policy areas.14 These lawmakers were grouped in ‘tribes’ (zoku 族) that, as a rule, formed vis-à-vis each ministry or government agency – the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare in the case of the Health, Labour, and Welfare zoku, for example – to work closely with their bureaucratic counterparts in setting policy. Zoku lawmakers also built close relationships with interest groups (or industry organizations) representing these various policy areas. In the case of lawmakers from the Health, Labour and Welfare zoku this would be the Japan Medical Association (JMA) as well as regional medical associations (or the Japan Doctors’ Political League as their political arm). Likewise, the Agriculture and Forestry zoku would have connections with the Japan Agricultural Cooperatives and local agricultural cooperatives (represented in the political arena by the All-Japan Agricultural Policy League), while Postal Services and Telecommunications lawmakers would foster close relations with the Special Post Office Masters’ Association. Its political arm, for all intents and purposes, is Taiju, a political action group for retired postmasters. (As civil servants, postmasters are not permitted to engage in political activities while still in public service.) These interest groups would support politicians from the corresponding zoku by helping to get out the

Koizumi’s management of politics   15 vote or making financial contributions. In return, the lawmakers would promote policies beneficial to them. Zoku lawmakers, bureaucrats and interest groups were thus joined in an alliance that played a pivotal role in nearly all policy decisions. This alliance is frequently referred to as ‘the Iron Triangle’ (tetsu no toraianguru 鉄のトライアングル). LDP administrations based on this framework were characterized by a bottomup, two-tier policy-making process. In most cases, policy decisions were initiated by the bureaucracy. Directives issued by the prime minister and his circle could also set the process in motion. But in either case, the bureaucracy had an exclusive role in drafting the policy proposal as such. Bureaucrats would draft their proposals in close consultation with the relevant zoku lawmakers and other ministries or government agencies. Once the parties involved came to an agreement on the substance of a draft, it would be moved up to the Cabinet but generally approved without further changes. After this, it would be sent to the Diet for deliberation. In other words, in the established policymaking and budget-formulation process, bureaucrats and zoku lawmakers played the pivotal roles, with decisions being built from the ground up. Neither the prime minister nor the Cabinet generally exercised leadership to any great degree in this process. Equally important was the two-tier policy-making structure according to which decisions were made by the Cabinet and the LDP in parallel. The LDP’s General Affairs Council (Sōmukai 総務会), the party’s highest decision-making organ, and the relevant subcommittees of the party’s Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) or Policy Research Council (Seichōkai 政調会) passed their own resolutions in rough parallel with the cabinet decision. All bills had to be reviewed and approved by the LDP before they could be adopted by the Cabinet and passed on to the Diet. This system is usually referred to as the ‘ruling party review’ (yotō shinsa 与党審査) or ‘pre-approval system’ (jizen shōninsei 事前承 認制) and effectively functioned to guarantee the influence zoku lawmakers could wield over policy decisions. As a consequence, Japanese prime ministers (with a few exceptions such as Tanaka Kakuei and Nakasone Yasuhiro) were mostly passive leaders who would comply with decisions generated from the bottom up rather than making active use of the authority inherent in their position.15 Exclusion of the zoku lawmakers and the transformation of the policy-making system Koizumi sought to replace the bottom-up policy-making process just described with a top-down, ‘Kantei-directed’ (Kantei shudō 官邸主導) one. He insisted on the prime minister’s authority over the central government bureaucracy and sought to exclude zoku lawmakers from the policy-making process. Many of the structural reforms he pursued, such as reduction of public works expenditures, the easing of market regulations and postal privatization, were poised to cut deeply into the vested interests of the bureaucracy and zoku lawmakers alike. Resistance

16  Koizumi and Japanese Politics from the Iron Triangle was therefore strong. Previous administrations had rarely attempted such changes, and those attempts that had been made more often than not met with little success. Restructuring and reform were difficult to achieve so long as the existing bottom-up policy-making system went unchanged. In short, Kantei direction was absolutely essential for the Koizumi reforms to be seen through. Koizumi first of all emphasized a procedure in which the prime minister or someone in his immediate circle (e.g. the chief or the assistant chief cabinet secretary) took the initiative by issuing a clear directive to a ministry or government agency that the bureaucracy had to follow through. The prime minister’s role in this process was aggressive and active as opposed to largely passive. When conflicts arose between the various ministries or government agencies, the issue would not be resolved following the established ‘split the difference’ (tashite ni de waru 足して二で割る) rule, but by verdict expressly handed down by Koizumi in person.16 Second, Koizumi tried to consolidate decision-making in the Cabinet. He frequently moved ahead on drafting policies at such venues as the CEFP without regard for debates within the LDP, simply forcing the party to accept the results. He also paid little heed to the institution of ruling party review on which the zoku lawmakers depended as a lever for their influence.17 Koizumi’s clampdown on the factions and zoku lawmakers played out against the backdrop of a series of institutional reforms affecting both party politics and the central government. Changes in the LDP’s election system had concentrated internal authority in the hands of the party leader, while the power of the Cabinet was strengthened by restructuring of the central government ministries and agencies (the so-called Hashimoto administrative reforms). I will analyse these points in further detail in Chapter 4. Two sources of power In addition to the institutional setting described above, Koizumi’s top-down approach to policy-making was made possible by his populist political style. He was able to gain the upper hand over the party’s ‘forces of resistance’ by casting his approach as a struggle between good and evil and winning the public over to his side. More precisely, with the greater power that institutional reforms had put in his hands providing the foundation, Koizumi’s adoption of a populist style that employed dualistic oppositions between good and evil was his method for exercising leadership. The power Koizumi could wield thus drew on two resources at the same time: the institutional authority invested in the prime minister’s office, which prior reforms of the political system had enhanced, and strong public support. This political method of conducting decision-making from the top-down while drawing on public opinion as a political resource was a characteristic the Koizumi administration shared with the previous administrations of Miki Takeo (1974– 6) and Nakasone Yasuhiro (1982–7). Miki and Nakasone were both leaders of

Koizumi’s management of politics   17 their own factions, but these factions were small and weak. Neither commanded a strong power base within the party. For that reason, both sought to enact the policies they envisioned by way of direct appeals to the public over the heads of the LDP and the Diet. After the cabinet of his powerful predecessor Tanaka Kakuei was forced to resign as a result of the Lockheed bribery scandal, Miki – who was seen as a marginal figure within the LDP – stressed his ‘cleanness’ in order to win the public’s support. To use Miki’s own words, he was ‘in league with public opinion’. This enabled him to push through institutional reforms that faced strong opposition within the LDP itself, such as revisions of the Political Funds Control and Anti-Monopoly Laws tightening their rules. Nakasone also lacked a strong power base within the LDP, despite the backing he had from Tanaka. He nevertheless conceived of himself as a ‘presidential-style prime minister’ and favoured decision-making from the top-down. Characteristic of his political style was his reliance in policy-making on the recommendations of advisory committees and private panels of experts bypassing internal party debate – termed ‘brain politics’ (burēn seiji ブレーン政治) in Japan. He also made aggressive use of the media, frequently appearing on television and issuing public appeals for increased imports – a hotly contested issue in bilateral relations with the USA at the time. On top of their weak power bases within the party, Miki and Nakasone had to cope with the fact that the institutional powers of a prime minister were limited. Both, in a sense, relied on the public’s support as a resource to buttress their weak authority. Koizumi shared with Miki and Nakasone a lack of internal party support. But his situation differed from theirs in that he had more prime-ministerial powers at his disposal thanks to the Hashimoto institutional reforms. His penchant for explicitly framing issues in black-and-white terms also set him apart from them. Koizumi used these two power resources – an expanded institutional authority and the public support won by reducing conflicts to struggles between good and evil – synergistically to achieve maximum effect. Generally speaking, the power resources a prime minister can draw upon are of two types. First, there are the institutional, permanent resources furnished by the system as such. These resources are available to anyone who becomes prime minister. Examples include the power to appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers, authority over party personnel matters, the power to dissolve the House of Representatives and various other powers granted by law. The prime minister also has at his disposal such institutional tools as the Cabinet Office.18 Second, there are power resources that are intimately related to a prime minister’s personality as an individual. In this case, the question of just who the prime minister is has decisive importance. The policy-specific knowledge this person has, their power of judgement, their ability to present and express themselves, and their standing with the public all become factors in this regard. By combining and skilfully using these two types of power resources in a complementary fashion, Koizumi was able to exercise leadership to an extent highly uncommon in a Japanese prime minister.19

18  Koizumi and Japanese Politics Returning to the question posed at this chapter’s start, it cannot be said that Koizumi drew his strength from either his personal powers or from the institutional system alone. To pose the question in such a fashion, presupposing an alternative that is mutually exclusive, would be untenable. The sensible answer rather is that Koizumi very judiciously combined his personal resources of power with the power resources that the system provided, thus using them to maximum effect. Koizumi’s patterns of behaviour, which were of a decidedly different stripe than those of most LDP politicians, also played a large role in this. I will further discuss this point later in this chapter. Economic policy under the 1955 system The basic direction of policy-making by LDP administrations under the 1955 system also had certain identifiable characteristics. Economic policy in particular emphasized protection of manufacturers by regulating the marketplace and redistribution through public financing over putting market mechanisms to work. The main concern of politics was profit sharing centred on the Iron Triangle composed of bureaucrats, zoku lawmakers and interest groups. The decision-making process involved in setting medical treatment fees provides an excellent example of the power of zoku lawmakers and interest groups. Formally, the Central Social Insurance Medical Council (Chūikyō) decided the cost of a given treatment, but in truth the JMA and zoku lawmakers exerted enormous influence on the decision reached. As national health care costs climbed year by year, the government (specifically, the Finance and Health Ministries) tried to bring treatment fees down, but this was difficult to achieve in the face of strong opposition from the JMA and the Health and Welfare zoku. Another quintessential case was public works projects. Public works expenditure stood at around ¥9.43 trillion in the preliminary budget for fiscal 2000 crafted before the Koizumi administration took office. That accounted for about 12 per cent of total annual expenditure, or about 20 per cent of general expenses excluding debt servicing costs and tax allocations as well as grants to local governments. Japan was facing an increasingly severe budget deficit at the time, with its bond dependency ratio reaching 38.4 per cent, but public works expenditure was the same as in fiscal 1999. The Construction, Transportation and Farm Ministries – as they were then named – accounted for the vast bulk of this, and the share of the budget that these three ministries commanded relative to the other ministries had remained unchanged for a long time. As Table 1.1 shows, the percentages that went to road maintenance and improvements, harbour and airport maintenance and improvements, and agricultural and rural development remained roughly the same from 1980 to 2000. Common sense suggests that it would not be unusual to see the volume and nature of public works projects deemed necessary fluctuate in accordance with changes in the environment and times. Nonetheless, their funding levels remained unchanged owing to the looming presence of the Iron Triangle over each area of

Koizumi’s management of politics   19 Table 1.1  Trends in the share of major public works expenditure FY1980

FY1990

FY2000

Amount

Share (%)

Amount

Share (%)

Amount

Share (%)

Road maintenance and improvement

1,910.8

30.0

1,789.2

28.3

2,776.7

29.7

Harbour and airport maintenance and improvement

528.3

8.3

515.0

8.1

724.8

7.7

Agricultural and rural maintenance and improvement

897.5

14.1

870.4

13.8

1,092.6

11.7

6,355.1

100.0

6,318.5

100

9,358.0

100

Total public works expenditure (excluding disaster relief expenditure)

*Figures in billions of yen. Source: Ministry of Finance home page, ‘Information on Budget and Accounting Documents’.

public works, and the fact that the distribution of power among them maintained an equilibrium. Under the existing consensus-based style of leadership, altering that balance to any degree was extremely difficult. Given this strong tendency of the Iron Triangle to protect its vested interests, economic policy under the 1955 system generally favoured producers while disregarding consumers. Producers in the financial and service industries formed powerful organizations resembling the agricultural cooperatives and medical associations noted above to demand market controls or financial assistance and to apply political pressure. Consumers, on the other hand, lacked organizational strength. Their voice, therefore, did not register in the political process. Another feature of economic policy under the old system was the attention paid to rural areas and the neglect of urban ones. Great importance was placed on the interests of such producers as farmers or the local construction industry, while those of the unorganized urban new middle classes were disregarded. Cordial consideration was also given to the provinces in the form of subsidies of all sorts for public works projects, as well as tax allocations and grants that distributed a specific percentage of the national tax income to local governments. Koizumi’s structural reforms and the transformation of economic policy Making prime minister-directed policy-making work, Koizumi pursued a series of changes commonly referred to as the ‘Koizumi structural reforms’ (Koizumi kōzō kaikaku 小泉構造改革). The intellectual foundation for these reforms was provided by neoliberalism, a philosophy that emphasizes market principles and

20  Koizumi and Japanese Politics minimization of government intervention. Policies that favoured market controls, protections and redistribution of profits and wealth, as had been the rule until then, were targeted for reversal. Needless to say, a prime example for neoliberal reform was the reforms implemented in Britain by Margaret Thatcher (prime minister 1979–90). Broadly referred to as ‘Thatcherism’, these reforms comprised privatizations of stateowned corporations, reductions of financial outlays especially for social welfare programmes, a monetarist economic policy and the creation of government ‘agencies’ (the prototype for Japan’s administrative ‘agencies’ as ‘independent administrative corporations’). Koizumi’s structural reforms could be described as ‘Japanese-style Thatcherism’. I will discuss the content of Koizumi’s reforms and the process by which they unfolded more closely in Chapter 2. Let me list six key reforms here and sketch out their main points. Note that each of these reforms was characterized by an endeavour to cut back on regulations and government spending (creating a ‘small government’) and to put market principles to work. (1) Financial reform and reduction of public works spending The goal was a major reduction in spending mainly on public works projects. Public works spending was cut from around ¥9.4 trillion in the fiscal 2001 budget to ¥7.2 trillion in the fiscal 2006 budget. (2) Disposition of non-performing loans and financial revitalization The ratio of bad debts held by major banks was cut in half from October 2002 to the end of fiscal 2004 thanks to the implementation of drastic debt-clearing measures. In addition, the finance and industry sectors were jointly revitalized by various means such as the infusion of public funds into the Resona banking group and support given to corporations through the Industrial Revitalization Corporation. (3) Social security system reforms: pension and healthcare systems Reform of the pension system involved the introduction of a set formulae for insurance costs placing an upper limit on future insurance rates. It also included the implementation of a ‘macroeconomic slide’ (makuro keizai suraido マクロ 経済スライド), that is, a stabilization mechanism that would curb the growth of pension benefits to account for an ageing population and falling birthrate. Healthcare reforms involved increasing the burden borne by patients, raising insurance rates and establishing a new medical treatment system for the elderly. In addition, a significant reduction of medical treatment fees was achieved. (4) Special public corporations reform Progress was made on abolishing and privatizing such special public corporations as the Japan National Oil Corporation. Privatization of the highway public corporations and of the postal services in particular captured the public’s attention.

Koizumi’s management of politics   21 (5) Reform of the local tax finance system: the so-called ‘Trinity Reform’ The Trinity Reform was a three-in-one reform package comprising the elimination of state subsidies to local authorities, transfers of tax revenue sources from the national government to local authorities and a reform of local tax allocation methods. Subsidies were reduced by about ¥4.7 trillion from fiscal 2004 to fiscal 2006, transfers of tax revenue sources were carried out to the order of about ¥3 trillion, and tax allocation grants were cut by about ¥5.1 trillion. (6) Regulatory reform The institution of special deregulation zones (kōzō kaikaku tokku 構造改革特区) opened various sectors such as healthcare, agriculture, welfare and education to private corporations. Public services were subjected to market tests through the introduction of competitive bidding between the public and private sectors; market tests were introduced even for such areas as soliciting outstanding national pension insurance premium payments. All of these reforms involved considerable chipping away at the vested interests of the Iron Triangle welding together bureaucrats and zoku lawmakers. Koizumi in fact faced stiff opposition throughout the process. And yet reforms that would unmistakably have been frustrated under previous LDP administrations succeeded under the Koizumi administration to a respectable degree (although varying by area). The biggest factor in making these reforms of economic policy possible was none other than the reform of the policy-making system that Koizumi had achieved. Thatcher, it might be noted, had also succeeded in carrying her reforms through to success by neutralizing political rivals within her own party and asserting her authority over the bureaucracy. The analogous cases of Japan and the UK suggest that a prime minister’s leadership is necessary for neoliberal reforms to succeed. My focus has been on economic policy here, but significant changes also occurred in Japan’s foreign and defence policy, and in the realm of ideology. The Self-Defense Forces were dispatched overseas, based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and the Iraq Reconstruction Assistance Special Measures Law, at the same time that Japan’s military alliance with the USA was strengthened. The issue of constitutional revision that had long been avoided was put on the table. Last but not least, sharp protests by China and Korea notwithstanding, Koizumi went ahead with his visits to Yasukuni shrine. In view of these developments, political historian Mikuriya Takashi has pointed out that under Koizumi the three ‘taboos’ of postwar politics – the Constitution, the emperor, and Yasukuni – all had fallen by the wayside.20 However, while Koizumi’s economic policies followed a relatively unified strategy based on neoliberal principles, his foreign policies displayed a marked lack of strategic coherence. I will explore this contrast further in Chapter 3.

22  Koizumi and Japanese Politics

Koizumi’s behaviour patterns: shortness of time horizon Hard-line attitude and an ‘unflinching’ posture To conclude this chapter, let me analyse the factors that distinguished Koizumi’s mode of action from that of other politicians. As we have already seen, one core ingredient of his behavioural pattern was his antagonistic attitude towards the LDP – the parent organization that had put him into office as prime minister. His talk about ‘forces of resistance’ and ‘smashing the LDP’ was emblematic of this. Towards the LDP lawmakers, his allies of old as one might think, he adopted a frosty attitude as well. During the general election of 2005, he announced ‘I am ruthless’ (Ore wa hijō da おれは非情だ) as he ran rival candidates against LDP lawmakers who had revolted against his postal privatization bills, and had the latter then expelled from the party. Once he had risen to become prime minister, he also distanced himself from former Prime Minister Mori Yoshirō, the head of the faction to which he had belonged, in sharp contrast to the loyal support he had still shown to him during the ‘Katō Rebellion’ (Katō no ran 加藤の乱) of 2000 (LDP lawmaker Katō Kōichi’s ill-fated attempt at a no-confidence vote against Mori’s highly unpopular government). Another core element in Koizumi’s behaviour pattern was that he would not flinch. Once he had committed to a specific principle or idea he would not budge. For example, once he had publicly pledged that the postal services would be privatized, he worked towards that end no matter how much opposition from within his own party he received. Koizumi steadfastly rejected accommodation or compromise over many other policy decisions in a similar fashion. These two behaviour patterns complemented each other. Generally, a person who firmly adheres to a given principle will meet strong opposition from all those who disagree with it. This is even more so in the case of an organization like the LDP, whose members entertain a variety of political positions. If one wants to commit oneself to a particular principle under such circumstances, one cannot but adopt a ‘ruthless’ attitude towards the opposing faction. Koizumi’s behaviour patterns were far removed from those of any previous LDP politician. The LDP had come to stress party-internal consensus as evidenced not least by the customary rule that decisions by the General Council, the party’s highest decision-making body, had to be unanimous (although decisions within the party were supposed to be reached on the majority principle according to party rules). Expulsions from the party were rarely carried out even against lawmakers who had breached binding party rules.21 When it came to policy decisions, therefore, accommodations and compromises were worked out with the aim of achieving the maximum consensus possible. LDP politicians thus generally acquired behaviour patterns that were oriented towards collaboration, but the precise opposite was true in Koizumi’s case. Koizumi ignored internal consensus to adamantly pursue his own beliefs, expelling lawmakers who worked against him without batting an eye. It was this rather unusual behaviour in an LDP politician that caused Tanaka Makiko, in a much-quoted remark,

Koizumi’s management of politics   23 to judge him a henjin 変人 – a word variously translated as ‘a strange man’, ‘oddball’ or even ‘weirdo’. But the very fact that Koizumi comported himself in this fashion was also what allowed him to greatly chip away at the LDP’s traditional power structure – specifically, the factions and zoku lawmakers – and to issue policy decisions over the heads of the Iron Triangle. Precisely because of his determined pursuit of postal privatization and ‘ruthless’ dissolution of the Diet, the LDP succeeded in winning the support of independent voters mainly from the urban middle classes and the younger generation, and scored a major victory in the 2005 general election. Time horizons Why was it possible for Koizumi to comport himself in this manner? Certainly his dogmatic, no-frills personality was important. His lack of affection for the LDP prior to taking office also played a significant role. Last but not least, since he had never held any of the party’s top three executive posts, which are the normal stepping-stones for a future LDP president, the bonds that shackled him to the party were few.22 To these aspects I would like to add that of length of time horizon. LDP politicians before Koizumi had comparatively long time horizons. That is, they attached much importance to give-and-take relationships with other politicians or bureaucrats, acting on the expectation that if they gave something at one time they would take something back at another. Prime ministers, for example, who gave due consideration to a faction other than their own at the time of deciding cabinet appointments and the like could not only expect this faction’s support of their governments in the time to come. They could also expect, should the head of this faction take power after they resigned, due consideration of their own faction in turn. If, on the other hand, prime ministers were receptive to requests from the bureaucracy and maintained good relations with it, they could open a door for themselves to influence policy decisions down the road. From these perspectives, there were great benefits to valuing consensus as much as possible and maintaining good relations with many people. Even if there was little to gain in the short run, big paybacks were to be expected in the mid to long term. Profit was aimed at through long-term, diversified accounting of costs, so to speak. Long time horizons of this sort resulted in collaborative patterns of behaviour that stressed consensus, accommodation and compromise. Products of this behaviour included such LDP practices as unanimity of decisions regarding the LDP party line within the General Council or proportional distribution of cabinet posts among the party’s factions. For a person with a long time horizon, a behaviour pattern such as Koizumi’s with its disregard for compromise, conciliating and coordinating (chōsei 調整), and ninjō 人情 (‘human sympathy’ or ‘social feeling’) was highly inadvisable. While behaviour that undercuts another person can generate great gain in the short run, it invites the other to respond in similar fashion in the middle to long term, with neither person standing to gain much in the end.23

24  Koizumi and Japanese Politics Certainly, in terms of their formal powers, it was feasible for prime ministers to a considerable extent to set policies as they wished. It should also be easy for prime ministers to freely choose their cabinet, or dismiss ministers who oppose their policies, given their constitutional right to appoint the Cabinet. The prime minister has furthermore the authority to dissolve the Diet, to direct and supervise government ministries and agencies, and, as LDP president, the prerogative to appoint party personnel and endorse candidates. If LDP prime ministers think that they have only one shot at making policy, it is quite possible for them to wield enormous influence within the Cabinet and the party by simply exercising these powers. The reason why prime ministers prior to Koizumi had eschewed this strategy was that it was bound to create many enemies. Prime ministers who soured relations with LDP members and the bureaucracy were likely to lose the gains they could by rights expect from mid- to long-term give-and-take relationships. Koizumi’s time horizon Koizumi had an unusually short time horizon for an LDP politician. He completely ignored the benefits to be won from consensus and give-and-take over a longer period of time. He instead made full use of his prerogatives as prime minister and party president, concentrating his energies on getting the policies to which he had committed himself enacted. Relying on his prime-ministerial prerogative to fill cabinet posts, Koizumi simply ignored any need to maintain a balance between the factions and handpicked his ministers one at a time. When Farm Minister Shimamura Yoshinobu declined to countersign his order to dissolve the Diet over the first failure of the postal privatization bills, he was dismissed. From the viewpoint of the Cabinet’s formal authority, it is possible to submit bills to the Diet unrestrained by the LDP’s institution of ruling party review. Koizumi accordingly submitted the correspondence delivery and postal privatization bills to the Diet without first gaining approval of their contents (to be discussed in Chapter 2) from the LDP. Conceiving of the ruling party review system as nothing more than a convention (an informal system), he simply chose to ignore it. As for his relations with the bureaucracy, Koizumi used his authority as the government’s top executive to replace, for example, bureaucrats at the Posts and Telecommunications Ministry who opposed postal privatization. Such a confrontational mode of action can be explained only on the basis of a short time horizon. Koizumi’s lack of protégés was connected to the shortness of his time horizon as well. Politicians with long time horizons whose aim it is to rise within the party and expand their influence seek out protégés. Conversely, if politicians have an entourage of followers, they must adopt strategies based on long time horizons. If Koizumi had led a faction or maintained a following of personal protégés, he would likely have engaged in collaborative behaviour as well, since each time he made himself enemies in the party he would have exposed his followers to attack. Koizumi was able to act confrontationally on the basis of a short time horizon

Koizumi’s management of politics   25 precisely because he did not have followers to worry about. The shortness of his time horizon was also evinced by the fact that, instead of clinging to power, he early on announced his resignation for September 2006, and by the care he took to make his exit in style. The length of a politician’s time horizon is closely linked to their procurement strategies for power resources. Politicians with a long time horizon build up their political capital through exchange of resources within a structure or organization.24 Prime ministers with a long time horizon, for example, will seek to stabilize their position by exchanging resources with other factions. More concretely, the authority a prime minister has, say, to name and dismiss cabinet ministers is an effective resource, insofar as a measure of power can be wielded on its account. Previous prime ministers had used these powers to dole out cabinet posts to factions other than their own, and these factions would then support their governments in turn. Likewise, by delegating their right to determine government policy as the head of the Cabinet to bureaucrats, they created an environment in which the Cabinet and the bureaucracy would cooperate in policy-making. By exchanging resources within a long time horizon, politicians heretofore had reaped a benefit in the form of stabilizing their own position. The reason why Koizumi, on the other hand, was able to adopt a short time horizon was that he generated political capital from outside the government in the form of public support. Put another way, politicians who cannot secure resources from the outside have no choice but to depend on the long-time-horizon-based strategy of exchanging capital within the system. Given his short time horizon, Koizumi probably would not have been very effective if he had not had the power resource of public opinion to support him. Suppose public support for Koizumi had been weak. He probably would not have been re-elected as party president. In an extreme case LDP lawmakers might even have crossed party lines to support an opposition resolution of no confidence in his cabinet. But since Koizumi did in fact command large popular support, even the anti-Koizumi faction in the LDP had to resign itself to accepting his strategies, as it could not field a candidate to replace him as party president.25 Koizumi was thus able to pursue his short time horizon-based strategies for five years, while the configuration of LDP factions and zoku lawmakers was considerably weakened. The paradox here is that decisions based on a short time horizon had a profound impact on the structure of the LDP in the mid and long term.

2 Domestic affairs The battle over neoliberal reform

The Koizumi administration put its greatest emphasis in domestic affairs on economic and financial reform. Under the slogan, ‘Structural reform with no sacred areas!’ (Seiiki naki kōzō kaikaku 聖域なき構造改革), it pressed for changes on an unprecedented scale. A fierce struggle unfolded between Prime Minister Koizumi and those he termed ‘forces of resistance’ (zoku lawmakers among others) as work on the reforms proceeded. Why was Koizumi able to achieve the reforms he did in the face of such intense opposition? How was top-down decision-making under the prime minister’s control carried out in practice? A key role in this regard was played by the so-called ‘control tower of the reforms’ (kaikaku no shireitō 改 革の司令塔), the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP). Shifting the centre of policy-making to the Council resulted in a reshuffle of the existing power structure that allowed previously unattainable policy changes to be implemented. In this chapter, I begin by analysing the role of the CEFP and then take a closer look at the contents of and processes involved in fiscal reform, the privatization of the highway public corporations, the so-called ‘Trinity Reform’ and postal privatization. My focus will be on how the CEFP was put to strategic use in Koizumi’s struggle with the ‘forces of resistance’ and on how Koizumi’s leadership as a ‘strong prime minister’ was exercised.

The function of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy A change of venue The Koizumi administration put to work the institutional mechanisms that had been introduced as a result of the Hashimoto reforms. Most deserving of attention in this regard is the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (Keizai zaisei shimon kaigi 経済財政諮問会議). The CEFP’s task is to review and discuss basic policies for economic and fiscal management, including budget formulation, and deliberate on important items of economic and fiscal policy. Presided over by the prime minister, its members include the chief cabinet secretary, the minister of state for economic

Domestic affairs   27 and fiscal policy (a post long held under Koizumi by Takenaka Heizō), the internal affairs minister, the finance minister, the trade minister, the governor of the Bank of Japan, as well as four experts from the private sector. During the Koizumi administration, these four private-sector expert members were Ushio Jirō, chairman of major industrial equipment-maker Ushio Inc.; Okuda Hiroshi, chairman of Toyota Motors Corp. and of Keidanren (the Japan Business Federation, Japan’s most important business lobbying group); Osaka University economics professor Honma Masaaki; and Yoshikawa Hiroshi, a professor of economics at the University of Tokyo. The Council’s meetings are chaired by the minister of state for economic and fiscal policy (hereafter economic and fiscal policy minister). Depending on the issues discussed, further cabinet members with pertinent portfolios attend as extraordinary members. The creation of this new body had a large part to play in changing the existing power structure. In trying to change policies that are hopelessly entangled in a web of vested interests, it is generally effective to change the institutional venue where policy debate takes place. Such a change of venue makes it possible to introduce new actors into the decision-making process and thus shake up an existing balance of power.1 Turning the CEFP into the principal arena for policy debate served six mutually interrelated functions: (1) relocation of control over setting the government’s agenda; (2) an opening up of policy communities; (3) consolidation of the government’s agenda; (4) increased transparency of the policy-making process; (5) serving as a setting for the prime minister to issue his judgements; and (6) infusion of new ideas from the outside. I will examine these six functions in greater detail below.

Photo 2.1  The Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (31 May 2001, at the Kantei). Prime Minister Koizumi and Economic and Fiscal Policy Minister Takenaka sit to the left. The private-sector members are seated to the right. From the foreground: Ushio Jirō, Okuda Hiroshi, Honma Masaaki, and Yoshikawa Hiroshi. Photo credit: The Yomiuri Shimbun.

28  Koizumi and Japanese Politics Agenda setting and the private-sector councillors First, the CEFP was successful to a large degree at wresting control from the bureaucracy over setting the government’s agenda.2 Agenda, in this case, denotes the set of issues that the government must in some way address and resolve.3 Setting the agenda refers to the political process through which items are placed on the government’s to-do list. It goes without saying that, as long as the agenda has not been set, the policy-making process cannot begin. For this reason, anyone with the institutional authority to move items onto the government’s agenda is capable of wielding enormous power, since they can ensure that only issues of advantage to themselves are entered into the policy-making process.4 Under the policy-making system in effect when Koizumi came into office, the bureaucracy had controlled the agenda-setting process. Zoku lawmakers of course also wielded enormous influence, but their influence could only be exercised within the boundaries of the agenda that the bureaucrats set. In fact, it was highly unlikely for a zoku lawmaker even to bring up an issue that interfered in some fundamental way with the will of the bureaucracy. Zoku lawmakers and bureaucrats acted on basically the same principles because they stood in a symbiotic relationship.5 Consequently, it was rare for policy shifts or institutional reforms to be proposed that would hurt the interests of bureaucrats and zoku lawmakers to any significant degree. However, once it assumed authority over setting the agenda, the CEFP – led mainly by its private-sector members – was able to produce bold proposals of a sort that bureaucrats and zoku lawmakers could not. Both government ministries and the LDP were now forced to operate within the framework of the agenda that the CEFP set. The means by which the private-sector councillors – who were not constrained by the positions taken by the ministries of Kasumigaseki (the Tokyo neighbourhood that is home to Japan’s government bureaucracy) or by the LDP – wielded their influence over setting the agenda were the so-called ‘honebuto policy’ statements (Honebuto no hōshin 骨太の方針; honebuto literally meaning ‘big-boned’), which the CEFP drew up every year, and ‘Expert Members’ Papers’ jointly issued in the names of the four private-sector councillors. The changed nature of the honebuto policy statement As its formal title ‘Structural Reform of the Japanese Economy: Basic Policies for Macroeconomic Management’ suggests, the honebuto policy statement lays down the Cabinet’s basic policy positions on economic and financial management, and on structural reform. The statement is drawn up in June every year at the CEFP and decided upon by the Cabinet. Insofar as reforms are carried out and the budget is prepared in keeping with its guidelines, this document is vastly influential in determining the general direction of policy-making during the succeeding twelvemonth period. Somewhat ironically, the term honebuto (‘big-boned’) under which this document came to be known was originally used in a sense emphasizing limits

Domestic affairs   29 to the CEFP’s role. Miyazawa Kiichi had employed it when serving as finance minister in the Mori Cabinet to suggest that the statement was not to formulate concrete policies that could restrict the Finance Ministry’s prerogative of drafting the budget, but rather should limit itself to outlining a general direction in very broad strokes.6 Miyazawa reportedly told the CEFP that nothing more was asked of it than to hold ‘casual chats over tea’. The remark suggests what little use the Mori Cabinet made of this institutional tool upon its debut. However, this situation underwent a complete turnabout after the Koizumi administration took office and Takenaka Heizō was appointed minister of state for economic and fiscal policy. At the time Takenaka took his post, a group led by ex-Finance Ministry bureaucrat and Cabinet Office Director-General for Policy Planning Saka Atsuo was in the middle of drafting the CEFP’s first honebuto policy statement. Takenaka reacted to the draft by handing Iwata Kazumasa, a University of Tokyo professor also appointed as a policy planning directorgeneral, a piece of paper crammed with points to be included, and ordered him to add a new ‘General Remarks’ (Sōron 総論) section. The second half of the resulting honebuto policy statement concerned specifics and retained the material that Saka’s group had written. But the ‘General Remarks’ section that comprised its first half, in which Koizumi’s philosophy of structural reform distinctly stood out, had been filled in by Iwata mainly with Honma’s and Yoshikawa’s positions. Most of the items on Koizumi’s structural reform agenda, including clearing nonperforming loans, public finance reform, privatization and regulatory reform, were touched upon in this first honebuto policy statement. These issues, in other words, were on the agenda from the very start. Proposals that previously would have been unthinkable in light of conventional Kasumigaseki wisdom also frequently appeared in the Expert Members’ Papers,7 such as the introduction of ‘macroeconomic management indicators’ (makuro kanri shihyō マクロ管理指標) linking medical treatment fees directly to the economic growth rate as a way of controlling treatment costs, or lowering corporate tax rates in an effort to stimulate the economy. In the past, strong opposition from the Health Ministry (now the Health and Labour Ministry) and Health zoku lawmakers to the use of macroeconomic indicators, or from the Finance Ministry and the LDP Research Commission on the Tax System to tax cuts, would have buried these proposals even before agenda setting began. That they were now taken up into the policy-making process represented a major change. Opening up of policy communities and agenda consolidation A second change that resulted from the CEFP becoming the central venue for policy debate concerned the question of participation. Previously, bureaucrats and lawmakers had formed closed policy communities (that is, communities of individuals who wield particular influence in specific policy areas) that essentially monopolized the policy-making process. The CEFP, however, opened up these communities to other actors.

30  Koizumi and Japanese Politics The paradigmatic case in this regard was budget formulation. Previously, exclusive authority over drafting the budget had rested with the Finance Ministry’s Budget Bureau, and the process by which the latter made its assessments had been opaque. Now, the CEFP was to craft a ‘Budget Overview’ (Yosan no zentaizō 予 算の全体像, literally, ‘Overall Picture of the Budget’) along with the honebuto policy statement, thus gaining the authority to pronounce on the broad outlines of the budget and major items on it. In contrast with the traditional model according to which the budget was put together from the bottom up with the Finance Ministry at the centre of the process, the CEFP worked from the top-down to place restrictions on its overall shape.8 The tax system likewise had been the province of a closed policy community made up of the Finance Ministry’s Tax Bureau, the Home Affairs Ministry’s (now the Internal Affairs Ministry) Tax Bureau, and the executive officers of the LDP Research Commission on the Tax System. Now, the CEFP, with its private-sector members to the fore, would step in to demand a lowering of corporate taxes.9 Social security issues such as health care costs and pensions similarly had up to then been the Health Ministry’s exclusive domain. But now the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, for example, was drawn into the debate over such aspects as stimulating the economy. In these ways, policy shifts were brought about by previously excluded actors entering the process and thereby shifting an established balance of powers. Third among the CEFP’s functions was what might be called ‘agenda consolidation’. Previously, policies were drafted by distinct policy communities working separately from one another, according to the lines of division that obtained between the various ministries’ jurisdictions. There were few instances in which policies related to one another would be debated in an integrative fashion, with the result that the government’s agenda as a whole remained fragmented. This made it difficult to establish clear priorities between policies and pay due regard to their consistency, or compatibility, overall. But with the prime minister, chief cabinet secretary and main cabinet ministers holding economic portfolios meeting together under the auspices of the CEFP, policies that previously would have been discussed in a scattered fashion across multiple ministries could be put on the table in a single place. The outcomes of these discussions would, furthermore, be documented, for instance in the honebuto policy statement. In this fashion, the government’s formerly fragmented agenda was consolidated, while the questions of priorities and overall consistency between policies came to be given due attention also at the level of the government as a whole. Matters that previously would have fallen by the wayside, because the issues involved came under the jurisdictions of multiple ministries or government agencies, could thus be taken up. The ‘Trinity Reform’, which called for the treating of reform of government subsidy programmes, transfers of tax revenue sources and tax allocations to local governments as all part of the same package, would seem to have made it onto the government’s agenda only on account of the CEFP’s existence. Given that the Finance Ministry, Home Affairs Ministry

Domestic affairs   31 and other government ministries and agencies all had their separate stakes in these three matters, dealing with them in an integrated fashion would have been difficult in a fragmented reform community. Transparency and the prime minister’s judgement calls Fourth, with the establishment of the CEFP, the policy-making process gained in transparency. Citizens could see who was arguing what and where the lines of battle were drawn.10 Previously, most policy drafts had been decided in debates among bureaucrats and zoku lawmakers behind closed doors. The general public got no more than a glimpse of them from reports in the media. By the time a policy became public thanks to a Cabinet decision on it, for example, the policymaking process was already completed. Because the Cabinet’s decision-making power was at heart a formality and did not on its own involve any substantive debate, even the question of what clashes of opinion had arisen remained unclear. At the CEFP, however, heated battles were fought out between cabinet ministers, and between cabinet ministers and its private-sector members, with decisions reached based on their results. Political scientist Iio Jun has likened the CEFP to cabinet committees in the UK that are attended by only a limited number of cabinet members and play an important role in policy-making there.11 The CEFP’s function was to supplement otherwise ceremonial cabinet meetings.12 Moreover, the process of the debate itself was exposed to the light of day. Summary minutes of the Council’s meetings, which recorded who had said what, as well as reference materials submitted by the various ministries or agencies involved, were immediately made public and available for viewing even on the internet. (This chapter’s analyses of the policy-making process rely heavily on these materials.) This was a great stride forward in terms of public accountability. But even more importantly, it created a need for plural policy positions to be logically justified in terms of ‘public interest’. As long as debates were conducted behind closed doors, arguments swayed by private interests such as protection of a particular industry, for example, could exert enormous political influence even if devoid of logic in themselves. The taking of such positions becomes more difficult under a more transparent decision-making process. On the other hand, ‘righteous arguments’ (seiron 正論) of the kind Koizumi liked to tout could also claim greater power of persuasion and a superior moral authority for themselves under such conditions. At the close of each CEFP meeting, the economic and fiscal policy minister would offer concluding remarks clarifying points of disagreement as well as agreement that had emerged in discussion on that particular day. The way the lines of confrontation were drawn between the various ministries on the one hand, and between the private-sector councillors and ministries and bureaucrats on the other, thus became clear to the outside.13 Fifth, in the context of such an oppositional framework the prime minister’s power to step in and make the call comes to carry enormous weight. By providing a venue for the prime minister to deliver his verdict, the CEFP facilitated the

32  Koizumi and Japanese Politics prime minister’s control over the policy-making process and impressed it on the public at the same time. During the debates over setting guidelines (ceilings) for the ministries’ budget allocations requests for the following fiscal year in summer 2001, for example, Yoshikawa and the other private-sector councillors argued for bold allocations to priority areas, while the Finance Ministry was averse to any drastic changes. The private-sector councillors’ proposal was adopted thanks to Koizumi stepping in and making the call. Similarly, in the process of drafting the honebuto policy statement for 2004, during which the ‘Trinity Reform’ concerned with the transfer of tax revenue sources to local authorities and cutting government subsidies came under debate, a tense standoff developed between the Home Affairs Ministry, which placed priority on revenue source transfers, and the Finance Ministry, which was opposed to this. This time, Koizumi settled the matter by ruling a transfer of revenue sources of ¥3 trillion. Whenever Koizumi was about to step in and issue his call, Economic and Fiscal Policy Minister Takenaka carefully prepared the scenario beforehand. Prior to the council’s meetings, Takenaka routinely briefed Koizumi on how the meeting would be conducted and what direction the discussion was expected to take, sharing his scenario for it with him.14 There was thus a performative aspect to the prime minister’s control over the policy-making process as well. Infusion of new policy ideas Sixth, the CEFP made it possible for policy ideas to be introduced from outside the government. Where policies are entrenched in vested interests, one effective means for inducing a policy shift is to introduce new ideas, generated outside the government, into the policy-making process. Their success will to a large degree depend on whether an institutional apparatus exists that can serve as a path for their diffusion. The CEFP functioned extremely effectively as just such a mechanism.15 The fact that two of the council’s private-sector members were economists was also important in this regard. They came to serve as a source of ideas from economic scholarship (here, to be sure, meaning basically neoclassical economics). Previously, Japanese economic policy had stressed allocation of resources by the state while limiting competition, as was also the case with the industrial policy traditionally pursued by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (now the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry). Such policy does not conform to neoclassical economic thought with its emphasis on market principles.16 Under the Koizumi administration, ideas based in neoclassical economics were introduced into the policy process by way of the CEFP. This was clear not least from the opening lines of the first honebuto policy statement drawn up in June 2001: The source of economic growth in this new global century is not so much the labor force as “knowledge/[innovative or pragmatic] wisdom” (chishiki

Domestic affairs   33 知識 / chie 知恵). Knowledge/wisdom generates economic growth through technological progress and ‘creative destruction’, which redirects resources from relatively inefficient sectors to growth sectors that are marked by high efficiency and correspond to social needs. Redirection of resources is achieved through the market and through competition. Market obstacles and restraints on growth will be removed. We will build a society in which individuals who put forth knowledge and make a real effort are rewarded. From this perspective, the way to further strengthen the Japanese economy’s inherent power and achieve development commensurate to its true strength will be shown. (Emphasis added.) Here, the basic concepts behind the Koizumi structural reforms have found direct expression. Since market competition produces economic growth by increasing efficiency, it is imperative to eliminate market obstacles and restraints on growth. Thus, the CEFP newly emerged as a venue for setting the agenda, and through it neoliberal ideas that emphasized market principles and called-for restraints on government intervention were injected into the policy-making process. In this fashion, neoliberal reforms were assigned a pivotal place on the administration’s agenda. But these reforms also invited strong opposition as they encroached on the vested interests of politicians and bureaucrats who had benefited from the previous economic policies in which regulation and protection had set the tone. Fierce battles thus were to recur between Koizumi and the ‘forces of resistance’. The following sections will examine some of Koizumi’s major reform drives, to provide a more concrete look at the policy-making process under Koizumi and the way in which his leadership was exercised.17

Fiscal reform: changing the budget formulation process Reduction of public works spending The fiscal 2000 budget revised just prior to the Koizumi administration’s launch included a ¥34.6 trillion issue of government bonds, leading the budget’s dependence on such bonds to approach 38.5 per cent. Fiscal reform was thus a pressing need. In particular, reductions in public works spending, which had bloated in the 1990s as a product of repeated economic stimulus efforts, were thought imperative. Public works was the area in which the three actors comprising the Iron Triangle – zoku lawmakers, bureaucrats and interest groups – possessed the greatest power. Any cuts could thus be expected to meet with fierce resistance. Koizumi, however, proclaimed ‘No sacred areas for budget cuts’ and boldly wielded the scalpel. First, the ¥9.4335 trillion set aside for public works spending (including disaster relief expenditures) in the initial fiscal 2001 budget was cut by 10.7 per cent to ¥8.4239 trillion in the budget for fiscal 2002. Through further cuts of 3 to 4 per

34  Koizumi and Japanese Politics cent in each subsequent fiscal year – 3.9 per cent for 2003, 3.5 per cent for 2004, 3.6 per cent for 2005 and 4.4 per cent for 2006 – public works expenditure was pared down to ¥7.2015 trillion by fiscal 2006, marking a ¥2.2320 trillion (23.7 per cent) reduction from the initial budget for fiscal 2001. Spending cuts moved ahead in other areas as well, with total cuts reducing the general accounting budget from ¥82.6524 trillion in the initial 2001 budget to ¥79.6860 trillion in the initial budget for fiscal 2006. Top-down budget-making Such changes became possible since the way the CEFP functioned had altered the procedure according to which the budget was prepared. Takenaka and the privatesector councillors sought to wrest control over budget-making from the Finance Ministry and shift it over to the CEFP. Their idea was to have the CEFP chart the basic course, including determination of priority areas and policies to be changed, and let the Finance Ministry draft the budget in accordance with it. In the past, the budget shares allotted to each project or ministry were based on the practice of the previous fiscal year. Major changes were not usually made. The CEFP, on the other hand, sought to achieve the drafting of a ‘well-modulated’ (merihari no tsuita メリハリのついた) budget from the top-down, concentrating resources on certain priority areas while making cuts in all others. On 27 February 2001, still under Mori Yoshirō as prime minister, the CEFP’s four private-sector members submitted a proposal for reform of the budgetformulation process. It demanded that ‘a “Budget Outline” (Yosan taikō 予算大 10,000

84,000

9,000 8,000

80,000

7,000

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6,000

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Trillion Yen

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82,000

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Fiscal Years General account total expenditure Public works expenditure

Figure 2.1  Budget changes under the Koizumi administration

Domestic affairs   35 綱) [be] drawn up in May or June listing budget items to be prioritized and their amounts across ministries, to be used as a guideline by each ministry in making budget allocation requests’. The Finance Ministry strongly opposed the proposal. Finance Minister Miyazawa argued that it made no sense to include individual expenditure items and their amounts, adding that he was looking forward to the CEFP producing something like a ‘big-boned’ (honebuto 骨太) policy statement as opposed to meddling with details.18 (As noted already, Miyazawa was using the word honebuto in a negative sense here.) But once Koizumi was in office, the CEFP was positioned as the ‘control tower’ for his reforms and the honebuto policy statement assigned an active role in the process. The first honebuto policy statement, issued in 2001, included the following stipulations: ‘In order to increase transparency of the policy-making process and ensure consistency of short- to mid-term economic and fiscal management, the financial administration system and the budget formulation process will be completely reformed’ and ‘Every year at the time the budget is drafted, a cross-sectoral review of overall economic and fiscal policy will be conducted in the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, to indicate … the basic policy direction, including areas to be prioritized and policies requiring change.’ The role assigned to the CEFP here was immediately acted out in the drafting of the fiscal 2002 budget. One of the targets set up in the 2001 honebuto policy statement was to reduce government bond issuances to under ¥30 trillion in the fiscal 2002 budget, as Koizumi had pledged before the Diet in his inaugural general policy speech.19 Crucial to meeting this goal was a bold reassessment of annual spending. The issue of establishing guidelines (ceilings) for ministries’ budget allocation requests was raised at the CEFP’s meeting of 3 August 2001. After demonstrating a need for cutting annual spending by ¥3 trillion, Hayashi Masakazu, director-general of the Finance Ministry’s Budget Bureau, outlined a plan of graduated reductions, trimming ¥1.5 trillion from the budget allocation requests and another ¥1.5 trillion when drafting the following fiscal year’s budget at year’s end. However, a stream of objections came from the privatesector councillors. Okuda argued for the ‘importance of [making cuts] that the public can easily understand’. Yoshikawa explained: ‘If the priority areas are up ¥2 trillion, the other sectors must be down ¥5 trillion in order to get a total reduction of ¥3 trillion. Minus 5 plus 2 equals minus 3.’ Ushio sounded a similar note: ‘[The budget] needs to be cut by ¥5 trillion and increased by ¥2 trillion.’ Koizumi then stepped in to render his verdict with the words: ‘Strike while the iron’s hot. A decision has been reached in the Council. It’s time to get moving.’ The plan to reduce the budget by ¥5 trillion and increase it by ¥2 trillion was adopted, resulting in a ¥5 trillion cut in public works spending and a ¥2 trillion boost for such priority areas as information technology and environmental projects. The budget allocation guidelines approved by the Cabinet on 10 August cut public works project spending and general policy outlays by 10 per cent compared to the previous fiscal year. At the same time a framework for ‘special allocation

36  Koizumi and Japanese Politics requests for structural reform’ (kōzō kaikaku tokubetsu yōkyū 構造改革特別要 求) in priority areas was permitted. This budget, dubbed the ‘30–5–2 budget’, offers a paradigmatic case of Koizumi stepping in to cast his verdict on a debate in the CEFP. It was the way the stage had been set that made bold cuts to public works spending possible.20 Changes in the budget formulation process The CEFP continued to introduce new mechanisms into the budget formulation process, including the drafting of ‘Reform and Perspectives’ and ‘Overall Picture of the Budget’ (or ‘Budget Overview’ in the CEFP’s own translation). ‘Reform and Perspectives’ (with the formal title ‘Structural Reform and Medium-Term Economic and Fiscal Perspectives’), revised in January of every year, indicated medium-term objectives for structural reform over the following five years and macroeconomic outlooks for growth and inflation. The ‘Budget Overview’ issued in late July indicated the basic course for applying the honebuto policy to budget formulation and set ceilings on ministry budget allocation requests on that basis. With the overall policy and main agenda thus established chiefly through the CEFP, a budget formulation process that had its eyes set on mid-term macroeconomic prospects was in place. (See Table 2.1.) The focus in this process once again was established by the honebuto policy statement. As it determined the policy and budget agendas for the following fiscal year, neither the bureaucracy nor the LDP could afford to ignore it. It also changed the schedule of policy deliberations in Kasumigaseki.21 Previously, reviews of new policies were conducted within each ministry during early summer. From the time budget allocation requests were submitted at the end of August until determination of the draft budget at year’s end, each ministry or agency would then conduct separate negotiations with Finance Ministry budget officers and Table 2.1  The new budget-formulation process Late January

Formulation or revision of Kaikaku to tenbō (“Structural Reform and Medium-Term Economic and Fiscal Perspectives”)

Late June

Final decision on Honebuto no hōshin (“Honebuto Policy: Basic Policies for Economic and Fiscal Management and Structural Reform”)

Late July

Final decision on Yosan no zentaizō (“Budget Overview”), followed by cabinet approval of budget allocation ceilings.

End of August

Budget allocation requests from each ministry, followed by negotiations between individual ministries and the Finance Ministry.

Early December

Final decision on Yosan hensei no kihon hōshin (“Basic Principles of Budget Formulation”).

Late December

Presentation of the Finance Ministry’s Draft, followed by finalization of the Government’s Draft Budget.

Domestic affairs   37 project managers. Since the budget was crafted in this bottom-up fashion, it was not always clear what policies the Cabinet as a whole was adopting in overseeing the budget formulation process. (The ceilings on ministry budget allocation requests approved by the Cabinet in early August are all that could be noted.) Also, while deliberations on new policies were begun within each ministry in early summer, the latter would not start their outside appeals through advisory committee proposals and official reports until close to year’s end, when the budget was already being drafted. There thus was a gap between in-house deliberations and outside negotiations. However, after the honebuto policy statement was introduced, new policies were developed and the budget drafted on its basis. Ministries now worked hard to get their own eye-catcher policies included into this statement. Their policy deliberation schedule, accordingly, was moved forward to coincide with its drafting, and the policies that each ministry prioritized were made public on its pages in a unified manner. Thanks to this ‘consolidation of the agenda’, the general public became able to inform themselves about what the Cabinet’s policies were, and the double structure in which the period of internal policy deliberation and the time when those policies were actually announced did not coincide for the most part disappeared. Response of the Finance Ministry and the LDP Making the CEFP the new venue for budget formulation certainly shook up the existing balance of power. Control over budget formulation passed from the Finance Ministry to the CEFP, at least on the surface. However, it would be overhasty to conclude that the balance of power was thereby completely upset. The CEFP’s private-sector councillors and the Finance Ministry were in perfect agreement when it came to cutting annual expenditures and balanced finances. As long as two parties are not in an adversarial relationship, the direction in which a balance of power has shifted does not manifest itself.22 In fact, given that the volume of work required in drafting the budget had actually increased, the view that the Finance Ministry did not lose power continues to have strong proponents.23 Changes in their power relationship will likely become apparent once points of contention between these two parties emerge in the future. In the case of the Council’s relations with the LDP, the CEFP likewise cannot be simply understood as having usurped the functions performed by the ‘ruling party review’ up to then. Both the bureaucrats and the LDP were at a loss at first about how to respond when the CEFP was launched. But while the control exercised by the CEFP over such matters as drawing up the honebuto policy statement was quite powerful, over time the bureaucracy and the LDP learned how to adapt to the new situation and measures to cope with it gradually took shape. Bureaucrats now concentrated their efforts on getting their ministry’s policies adopted into the all-important honebuto policy statement as the venue where the agenda was set. Placing a ‘cue’ (atamadashi 頭出し) at this stage worked to their advantage in getting the budget they sought later.

38  Koizumi and Japanese Politics The LDP also created a venue for deliberating the honebuto policy statement. In 2003, Asō Tarō, then head of the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC), established the Research Commission on the Economy, with Kamei Hisaoki as chair. Economic and Fiscal Policy minister Takenaka attended the commission’s meeting on 29 June of that year to explain the draft for ‘Honebuto Policy 2003’. The Commission responded by requesting 47 changes centring on such contentious issues as the ‘Trinity Reform’ and social security system reform, 40 of which were ultimately incorporated into the draft. The following January, newly appointed PARC chairman Nukaga Fukushirō in addition created the Committee to Promote Priority Policies, with himself as chair. Working together with the PARC’s deputy chairman Yanagisawa Hakuo, Nukaga began early on in spring to prepare a list of priority policies and budget items with the honebuto policy statement for 2004 in mind. Rather than take the passive position of merely deliberating over the CEFP’s draft, he actively went on the offensive against the latter.24 Changes in the balance of power resulted, furthermore, from personnel realignments within both the Cabinet and the LDP. In the drafting of the honebuto policy statement for 2006, the question of whether cutting expenditures or raising taxes should be prioritized as part of an ‘Integrated Reform of Revenues and Expenditures’ (Sainyū saishutsu ittai kaikaku 歳入・歳出一体改革) emerged as a bone of contention. Finance Minister Tanigaki Sadakazu and Economic and Fiscal Policy Minister Yosano Kaoru argued for considering tax increases, while Takenaka – who now held the home affairs portfolio – and PARC chairman Nakagawa Hidenao favoured cutting expenditure. The private-sector councillors (Yoshikawa in particular) were critical of the Takenaka camp with its single emphasis on expenditure cuts. In the end, a reduction of expenditure was prioritized, but it was Yosano who this time played the role of balancer. The previous picture, in which the economic and fiscal policy minister had teamed up with the CEFP’s private-sectors members against the Finance Ministry and the LDP, had changed. The reason for this was personnel shifts in the Cabinet and in the LDP. The change in the balance of power after Koizumi took office was less a complete turnabout than a change from a situation in which power was slanted in one direction to one that appeared more fluid and delicately balanced. Be that as it may, there can be no doubt that, thanks to the emergence of the CEFP as a new stage for policy-making, the budget formulation process that the Finance Ministry had monopolized was opened up and major changes, such as massive cuts in public works expenditure, became possible on account of this. This point bears repeated emphasis.

Domestic affairs   39

Privatizing the highway public corporations: conflict and compromise with the zoku lawmakers ‘Be their punching bag!’ The Koizumi administration attached great importance to the reform of ‘special public corporations’ (tokushu hōjin 特殊法人) and ‘government-authorized corporations’ (ninka hōjin 認可法人). In many cases, these semi-governmental corporations conducted their business without concern for profitability since the government poured vast sums of public money into them. Reform of these entities aimed at cutting expenditure by privatizing or abolishing them, or else by making them implement the same management methods used by private businesses to increase efficiency. At the same time, special public corporation reform was inextricably linked to Koizumi’s pet idea of postal privatization. The Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme (FILP, Zaisei tōyūshi 財政投融資) funds that flowed into the special public corporations were backed by postal savings and postal life insurance. By privatizing or abolishing those corporations, a lid could be put on the vent through which these monies escaped. Public corporation reform thus held symbolic significance for ‘structural reform with no sacred areas’. The honebuto policy statement of June 2001 contained the following formulation: ‘Under the principle “Wherever possible leave to the private sector what the private sector can do,” and from the standpoint of the people’s benefit, special public corporations etc. will be reassessed, and [their] privatization carried forward forcefully.’ As soon as Upper House elections in July were over, Koizumi energetically took on special public corporations reform. In late July, Administrative Reforms Minister Ishihara Nobuteru reviewed with Koizumi the draft of a scheme for reassessing operations at special public corporations. Koizumi was greatly angered by the fact that the draft lacked explicit mention of abolition or privatization. ‘This won’t do,’ he exclaimed, ‘Do this, ready to be their punching bag!’ (Sandobaggu ni naru tsumori de yare サ ンドバッグになるつもりでやれ). Ishihara was ordered to reassess all special public corporations on the initial assumption that they ought to be either abolished or privatized.25 Of all the public corporation reforms, Koizumi put his greatest efforts into privatization of the four highway-related public corporations (Japan Highway Public Corporation, Metropolitan Expressway Public Corporation, Hanshin Expressway Public Corporation and the Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Authority).26 The highway public corporations borrowed FILP funds accumulated chiefly through postal savings deposits to construct all of the country’s expressways and ordinary toll roads. Expressway construction proceeded based on a development plan that called for 9,342 kilometres of new roads, approximately 2,400 kilometres of which remained unbuilt at the start of the Koizumi administration. Completion of these projects would require another ¥16 trillion to ¥20 trillion. Tolls were used to recoup construction costs under adoption of a ‘pool system’ that applied funds

40  Koizumi and Japanese Politics collected not just from an individual route but from all roads to that purpose. For that reason, as critics pointed out, income from better-travelled roads such as the Tōmei and Meishin expressways was appropriated to construct roads that were unprofitable. In addition, the highway corporations had received an infusion of ¥300 billion in government spending in fiscal 2000 to reduce interest payments. Backlash from the Highway tribe and compromise Reform of the highway public corporations, however, drew fierce opposition. Highway zoku lawmakers, mostly members of the LDP Research Commission on Highways and its Land, Infrastructure, and Transport Division, took the lead. Needless to say, this was because road construction was a highly effective means for doling out pork-barrel benefits to regional constituencies. They joined up with highway engineering officials at the Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism Ministry (the former Construction Ministry) in strongly opposing any reform proposal that implied curbs on highway construction. In August 2001, Koizumi directed Transport Minister Ōgi Chikage to issue a decision on reform of the four highway public corporations ahead of other public corporations. The Transport Ministry responded in September with a proposal to combine the Japan Highway Public Corporation, the Metropolitan Expressway Public Corporation and the Hanshin Expressway Public Corporation into a new public corporation that would be privatized after about ten years as a (government-owned) ‘special company’ (tokushu kaisha 特殊会社). Koizumi ordered Ōgi to revise and resubmit this privatization plan. In this instance, the prime minister laid down the line that no tax money was to be poured in at the time of privatization and that the timeline had to be shortened. He also indicated that he was considering a freeze on expressway development. The LDP’s Highway zoku lawmakers were receptive to the idea of privatization as such, but vehemently opposed any freeze on expressway development. In October, a joint meeting of the LDP’s Land, Infrastructure and Transport Division and its Research Commission on Highways embraced privatization but rejected a freeze on development projects, passing a resolution to move ahead with construction on the basis of the existing plan. The biggest points of contention between Koizumi and the Highway zoku were whether the unfinished 2,400 kilometres of highway should be built as planned or construction be frozen and reassessed, and whether government financing was to be continued or not. Koizumi also demanded that the repayment period for the corporations’ debts was to be shortened from 50 to 30 years. The Highway lawmakers strongly opposed this since a shortening of the period implied curbs on expressway development in the future. By late November, a compromise between the prime minister’s camp and the Highway zoku lawmakers was reached. At a meeting on 22 November, Prime Minister Koizumi, New Komeitō Party chief Kanzaki Takenori, and New Conservative Party leader Noda Takeshi agreed that seven major special public corporations, including the Japan Highway Public Corporation, would be abolished

Domestic affairs   41 Table 2.2  Chronology of the highway reforms 2001 29 July 31 July

21 September

1 October 9 October

22 November 27 November

2002 21 June

24 June 30 August 30 November 3 December 6 December 2003 5 October 24 October 13 November 21 December 22 December 2004 9 March 2 June 2005 1 October

House of Councillors elections, major LDP victory Prime Minister Koizumi directs Administrative Reforms Minister Ishihara to review special public corporations on the premise of either abolishing or privatizing them Transport Ministry presents plan to create a new public corporation out of three existing ones and turn it into a special public corporation within ten years Koizumi directs Transport Minister Ōgi to review and resubmit privatization plan The LDP Research Commissions on Highways and on Housing and Land Policy, as well as its Land, Infrastructure and Transport Division approve privatization. However, they reject a freeze on construction and development, and call in their decision for implementation of the existing development plan Ruling parties’ heads meet, agree on privatization of the four highway corporations The Promotion Committee for Special Public Corporation Reform makes decision to abolish or privatize seven special public corporations, including the highway corporations Imai Takashi, Inose Naoki, and five others are announced as members of the Promotion Committee for the Privatization of the Four Highway-related Public Corporations Privatization Committee meets for the first time Committee issues interim report Committee member Matsuda moves to dismiss Chairman Imai Imai exercises authority as chair to cancel meeting planned for putting together an outline of the committee’s final report Final report agreed on as Imai resigns Transport Minister Ishihara decides to dismiss Japan Highway Public Corporation President Fujii Ishihara formally approves Fujii’s resignation, hand delivers request Ishihara appoints Kondō Takeshi as new JHPC president Koizumi and the ruling parties agree on basic framework of privatization bills Government-Ruling Parties Conference approves basic framework for privatization of the four highway-related public corporations Cabinet approves bills related to highway corporation privatization Highway corporation privatization bills passed Work begins at six new companies and the Holding and Debt Repayment Agency

42  Koizumi and Japanese Politics or privatized. The main points of the agreement were: (1) privatization of the four highway-related public corporations under a joint framework; (2) cessation of ¥300 billion in annual government financing beginning with the following fiscal year; (3) review of, as opposed to a freeze on, the existing expressway development plan; (4) maximum possible reduction of the repayment period for debts within 50 years; and (5) establishment of a third-party body to study organizational structures after privatization and conduct a review of the development plan. This was the result of compromise between the two camps. The media commented that the prime minister had been able to claim the ‘name’ of reform while the zoku lawmakers had preserved their ‘sacred area’.27 The party leaders also agreed to abolish the Government Housing Loan Corporation within five years, and essentially to abolish the Urban Development Corporation and the Japan National Oil Corporation. The Promotion Committee for Highway Privatization As a third-party body for the study of organizational structures after privatization, the administration created the ‘Promotion Committee for the Privatization of the Four Highway-related Public Corporations’ (hereafter Highway Privatization Committee, or HPC). The question of this committee’s composition, however, came under fierce dispute. In February 2002, Koga Makoto, chair of the LDP Research Commission on Highways, appears to have received firm assurances from the prime minister that, in exchange for not requiring the Diet’s approval, HPC members would be selected fairly and impartially upon prior consultation. In actual fact, Koizumi put little effort into prior conciliation and coordination and instead made the personnel decisions more or less on his own. The committee’s composition was announced on 21 June. Highway zoku lawmakers were outraged at the appointment of well-known non-fictionwriter Inose Naoki, a staunch privatization advocate. Two of the HPC’s seven members – committee chair Imai Takashi, chairman of the Board of Directors of Nippon Steel Corporation and honorary chairman of the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren), and Nakamura Hideo, a professor at the Musashi Institute of Technology and professor emeritus of the University of Tokyo – supported continuing expressway construction. Given his background as a former professor at the University of Tokyo’s Faculty of Engineering and as chair of the Japan Society of Civil Engineers, Nakamura took a position close to that of the civil engineering officials at the Transport Ministry. The committee’s five other members – Inose Naoki; Matsuda Masatake, chairman of the East Japan Railway Company; Tanaka Kazuaki, professor at Takushoku University and former director of the Management and Coordination Agency’s Administrative Inspection Bureau; commentator Ōya Eiko; and Kawamoto Yūko, a senior expert at McKinsey Japan – favoured restrictions on new construction. The Highway zoku lawmakers were also strongly opposed to the selection of Matsuda, who had managed the privatization of Japan National Railways (JNR) in 1987.

Domestic affairs   43 One of the main points of contention on the committee was whether the new organization should have a two-tiered structure or consist of a single entity. ‘Vertical separation’ would split ownership of the expressways from their operation. Under this scheme, ownership of the expressways would be assigned to a public corporation, while their management and operation would be assigned to a newly privatized one. The single-entity option, on the other hand, called for ‘vertical integration’ with a new company to be created that would both own the expressways and operate them. At first, the pro-construction faction was in favour of vertical separation, while the anti-construction faction supported vertical integration. Since with vertical separation the government would continue to be involved, the possibility for seeing through the original expressway development plan remained. In the case of vertical integration, on the other hand, it was believed that the privatized company would primarily be concerned with profitability, thus bringing construction to a halt. On 30 August 2002, after 60 hours of deliberations, the HPC presented an interim report to Koizumi recommending vertical separation. It called for the creation of the Japan Expressway Holding and Debt Repayment Agency (JEHDRA), which would assume the assets and liabilities of the four public highway corporations, as well as newly privatized corporations responsible for managing and operating the highways. The newly privatized companies would also undertake new highway construction projects, but it was clarified that they would make investment decisions independently, procure funding to cover construction costs on their

Photo 2.2  Highway Privatization Committee. Press conference following the final meeting of the Promotion Committee for the Privatization of the Four Highway-related Public Corporations (6 December 2002). From left, committee members Kawamoto Yūko, Ōya Eiko, Tanaka Kazuaki, Nakamura Hideo, Matsuda Masatake, and Inose Naoki. Committee chair Imai Takashi had just resigned and is not present. Photo credit: The Yomiuri Shimbun

44  Koizumi and Japanese Politics own, and ensure profitability. JEHDRA, meanwhile, would clear the debts by using highway leasing fees collected from the new companies as its source of funds.28 The fracturing of the HPC However, conflict between the two factions was still not resolved. Now, the question of to what extent the newly privatized companies should continue expressway construction became a bone of contention, pitting Imai and Nakamura on one side and the remaining five committee members on the other. Furthermore, Deputy Committee Chair Tanaka and Kawamoto renewed their plea for vertical integration of the organizational structure after privatization and voiced opposition to the creation of JEHDRA. At this point, Koizumi ordered the committee at the beginning of November to conclude its discussions by month’s end, thus speeding up the HPC’s deliberations. On 12 November, Tanaka and Kawamoto changed course and consented to vertical separation on the condition that JEHDRA’s work would be limited to debt repayment and that it would be dissolved in the future. The next issue to emerge was the extent to which government involvement in expressway construction was to be admitted. It was agreed that the privatized corporations would evaluate projects autonomously from the viewpoint of profitability. However, out of consideration for the Highway zoku the HPC decided to create a mechanism under which the privatized corporations could appropriate a part of their toll income in order to fund construction projects, and another mechanism for using national and local government resources to enable the construction of unprofitable highways. At the same time, Highway lawmakers organized in the Parliamentary Group for Promoting Highway Construction conducted repeated meetings to affirm that the original 9,342-kilometre development plan would be carried through to completion. The divisions between the pro- and anti-construction factions on the HPC further deepened over such issues as the timeframe for phasing out vertical separation (if JEHDRA was left in place for a long time, expressway construction could be promoted by holding down the leasing fees that the privatized corporations had to pay), the setting of leasing fees and debt repayment terms (a longer repayment period similarly could keep leasing fees down) and the lowering of tolls. As work on the final report proceeded, two versions were prepared in parallel: the Executive Office (Jimukyoku 事務局) draft reflecting Chairman Imai and Nakamura’s views, and the Matsuda draft, which contained the opinions of the other five committee members. The Matsuda draft called for a lowering of tolls by 10 per cent, a 40-year timeframe for repayment of the debts, and discontinuation of vertical separation after about ten years. The Executive Office draft left unspecified by how much tolls would be reduced, stipulated that the term for debt repayment should be ‘50 years at the upper limit and as early as possible’, and determined the discontinuation of vertical separation to be ‘a matter for future investigation’. Antagonism between the

Domestic affairs   45 two sides escalated further as a motion was submitted to dismiss Imai as committee chair, while Imai used his authority as chair to cancel a scheduled meeting. At the committee’s meeting on 6 December the final report was put together. It was based, by majority vote, on the Matsuda draft, which favoured curbs on expressway construction. Imai had proposed to adopt both the Executive Office and Matsuda drafts side by side into the final report, but the five committee members in favour of the Matsuda draft called for a decision based on the majority principle. Imai now resigned as committee chair, claiming that insistence on a majority decision equalled a motion of no confidence in his handling of committee affairs, and left the room before the vote was taken. The main points of the final report are presented in Table 2.3. Immediately after the HPC’s report was released, moves began at the Transport Ministry and the highway public corporations to reverse the committee’s conclusions. In early December, Transport Minister Ōgi declared that she took the views of the Highway zoku lawmakers opposed to curbs on expressway construction seriously and was not in favour of drafting the bills based on the HPC report’s recommendations. Ōgi furthermore joined with the LDP’s secretarygeneral and the chair of PARC in forming a ‘Council on the Privatization of the Four Highway-related Public Corporations’ and insisted that the concrete framework for privatizing the public corporations was to be decided there. In June 2003, reformists within the public corporations faced demotion, such as Katagiri Sachio, who went from serving as deputy secretary-general of the Privatization Promotion Committee to being vice-president of a subsidiary in Shikoku. In an article for the general affairs magazine Bungei shunjū on sale that July, the same Katagiri reported the existence of financial statements showing that the Japan Highway Public Corporation held debts exceeding ¥617.5 billion. JHPC President Fujii Haruho had repeatedly denied the existence of such documents, also in testimony before the Diet. Since the cover-up of these financial statements drew widespread criticism, Ōgi’s successor as transport minister Ishihara Nobuteru (appointed during a cabinet reshuffle in September) decided that Fujii should be dismissed, stating that ‘a complete renewal of public spirit Table 2.3  Outline of the final report of the Promotion Committee for the Privatization of the Four Highway-related Public Corporations (submitted 6 December 2006) (1) Discontinue vertical separation after about 10 years. New companies to purchase road assets and the Japan Expressway Holding and Debt Repayment Agency (JEHDRA) to be dissolved by around fiscal 2010. (2) Set timeframe for debt repayment at 40 years. Annual leasing fees paid by the new companies to JEHDRA to be calculated on that basis. (3) Lower tolls by 10 per cent on average. Disallow road construction reliant on tolls collected on existing routes. (4) Divide Japan into five regions and create new companies in each as follows: East Nippon Expressway, Metropolitan Expressway, Central Nippon Expressway, Hanshin Expressway, and West Nippon Expressway.

46  Koizumi and Japanese Politics was needed for privatization to move forward’. Ishihara personally delivered a resignation request to the JHPC president after holding hearings in keeping with dismissal procedures, but Fujii failed to comply and threatened a lawsuit. With Ishihara unable to straighten out the chaos by himself, Koizumi took the initiative in November in arranging for Kondō Takeshi, an Upper House lawmaker who had worked for the trading company giant Itōchū, to be appointed as Fujii’s successor. Meanwhile, highway corporation privatization bills were drafted under the aegis of the Transportation Ministry based on the HPC’s report. However, in this process the bills were subjected to substantial changes favouring road construction. In December, Koizumi and the ruling parties reached an agreement on the basic framework for privatization as follows. The newly privatized operating companies would carry out highway construction projects under commission from the Holding and Debt Repayment Agency, but raise the money on their own through loans with the tolls as collateral. The new corporations could reject requests, but a multiple consultation system would be put in place making it possible for other privatized corporations to be charged with the construction as well. Should a request be turned down by all privatized corporations, a judgement could be obtained from the Panel on Infrastructure Development as an advisory body of the Transport Ministry. If the panel decided that there was no justification for rejection, the work would have to be performed. Additionally, in the case of roads with low profitability, a ‘governmentoperated highway’ formula would be employed, under which both the central and local governments were to provide funding for construction. This formula held the possibility that all of the planned 9,342 kilometres of expressway could be built. Initial estimates held that ¥20 trillion was needed to complete the roughly 2,000 kilometres of expressway that remained. Trimming ¥6.5 trillion off that cost left ¥13.5 trillion. Given that the public corporations would have built ¥3 trillion worth of the total before privatization, calculations indicated that all remaining highways could be built with ¥3 trillion for government-operated highways and ¥7.5 trillion provided by the new privatized corporations. The Highway zoku’s leadership accordingly commented, ‘If this is the plan, there are no problems at all.’29 Tanaka Kazuaki, now the HPC’s acting chair, and HPC committee member Matsuda Masatake, on the other hand, criticized the agreement as failing to reflect the committee report’s central part. When the plan was approved by the Government-Ruling Parties Conference on 22 December both resigned.30 Inose Naoki, meanwhile, indicated that he saw the plan in a favourable light insofar as it cut costs and partly postponed construction. Implementation of privatization On 9 March 2004, the highway public corporation privatization bills were approved on the basis of this plan by the Cabinet and forwarded to the Diet. The contents of the final bills are in Table 2.4. The bills invited a spate of criticism from the mass media and HPC members, arguing that the government’s involvement would deepen through its shareholding and loan guarantees, and that there would be no effective

Domestic affairs   47 Table 2.4  Outline of the bills on the privatization of the four highway-related public corporations (passed 2 June 2004) (1) The four public corporations are to be split up into an independent organization named the Japan Holding and Debt Repayment Agency and six special companies (the East Japan, Central Japan, West Japan, Tokyo Metropolitan, Hanshin, and HonshuShikoku Bridge expressway companies) that will build, manage, and operate the highways. (2) While the special companies will pay leasing fees to the holding agency, they are to procure capital independently to build roads. The completed roads will be turned over to the holding agency together with their debts (bonds and loans). (3) The state will retain above one-third of the stocks in each of the special companies. When those companies issue bonds, a debt guarantee from the government will be attached for the time being. (4) The agency will repay the corporations’ debts in 45 years by appropriating leasing fees and will be dissolved once repayment is complete. The expressways will no longer charge tolls thereafter.

brakes on construction.31 The business daily Nihon keizai shinbun, for example, wrote in an editorial dated 31 March, ‘If these laws prioritizing expressway construction over repayment of loans pass, they may well plant the seeds of an evil for the future that can no longer be uprooted.’ Tanaka Kazuaki of the HPC stated in witness testimony to the House of Representatives Committee on Land, Infrastructure, and Transport on 13 April that this was ‘making fools of the people with a privatization in name only’. Inose, on the other hand, emphasized the value of privatization in making it possible to restrain highway construction and gave the bills a ‘passing mark’.32 The privatization bills were approved by the Diet on 2 June. Six new companies and the JEHDRA began work, in the following year on 1 October 2005. The bills came under a variety of criticisms, but the significance of the fact that privatization was achieved even though the Highway lawmakers – one of the most powerful zoku groups in the LDP – had been antagonized must not be overlooked. Nonetheless, as exemplified by the turmoil on the Highway Privatization Committee, the course taken in this process can only be described as ‘erratic’. The present case undeniably compares poorly in strategic terms to other examples of structural reform where the CEFP took the lead. In terms of actual outcomes, this privatization differed in multiple regards from the privatization of the postal services, to be discussed later. I will consider why such differences arose at the end of this chapter.

Clearing nonperforming loans and fiscal revival From Yanagisawa to Takenaka Finding a lasting resolution to the nonperforming loan problem as a first step towards economic revitalization had been declared a top priority in the 2001 honebuto policy statement. Nonperforming loans are those deemed unlikely to be recovered

48  Koizumi and Japanese Politics owing to a company’s collapse or declining financial position. Nonperforming loans held by financial institutions and excessive debt in corporate hands from the overabundant financing of the ‘bubble economy’ of the late 1980s and early 1990s were recognized as both impediments to economic recovery and encouraging a deflationary spiral. Nonetheless, no perceptible progress had been made on writing off nonperforming loans when the Koizumi administration first took office. An emergency economic plan had been announced in the Mori administration’s dying days on 6 April 2001 that discussed such matters as facilitating the ultimate disposal of nonperforming loans. The plan called for wiping from the balance sheets of major banks business loans made to companies threatened by or already in bankruptcy by reselling or waiving them within two to three years. However, any drastic loan write-offs tended to be put off as such measures would deal a major shock to the banks and corporations concerned. The way banks handled selfassessments and the Financial Services Agency (FSA) conducted investigations came under scrutiny when major supermarket chain Mycal collapsed in midSeptember, since loans to the company had been classified as ‘attention required’. Measures were taken to deal with such loans including reinforcing allowances for doubtful accounts and setting up special investigations by the FSA, but the nonperforming loan problem continued to weigh heavily on the Japanese economy. The situation abruptly changed when Economic and Fiscal Policy Minister Takenaka was assigned the additional portfolio of minister of state for financial services in the cabinet reshuffle of 30 September 2002. Yanagisawa Hakuo, Takenaka’s predecessor as financial services minister, had taken the view that Japan’s financial system was healthy and the write-off of nonperforming loans proceeding steadily. He had also been disinclined to put public funds into banks. But the delay in dealing with these loans was self-evident and drew heavy criticism both from market insiders and from the USA and elsewhere overseas. Koizumi dismissed Yanagisawa as a way of assigning responsibility. At a press conference held upon assuming his new duties, Takenaka made it clear that he intended to overhaul financial administration. ‘I will conduct an all-around review of policy,’ he declared, ‘and fix what needs fixing.’ He further announced that he regarded rigorous asset assessment, thorough accounting of equity capital in banks’ hands and the demonstration of good governance by bank management as the ‘three basic principles’ of financial administration. Takenaka’s appointment meant a change of course from a gradualist policy of writing off loans within limits defined by the strength of a bank to drastic measures whereby the overall soundness of banks would be re-examined through rigorous asset assessments, while also considering the infusion of public money.33 On 3 October, Takenaka launched the Project Team for Emergency Strategy for the Financial Sector, comprised of FSA executives and private-sector specialists, as a forum for the study of policies on writing off nonperforming loans. Former Bank of Japan official and financial consulting company president Kimura Takeshi was appointed as the team’s key member. Kimura was known to favour a bold, final settlement of all nonperforming loans and the contribution of public funds to banks that lacked adequate equity capital. Takenaka and Kimura repeatedly

Domestic affairs   49 Table 2.5  Chronology on nonperforming loan write-offs and financial revitalization 2002 30 September

Cabinet reshuffle, Economic and Fiscal Policy Minister Takenaka adds financial services portfolio

3 October

Launch of Financial Sector Emergency Response Strategy Project Team

30 October

Takenaka announces Financial Revitalization Program

2003 11 March

Benchmark Nikkei stock average closes below the 8,000 barrier

2 April

Industrial Revitalization Corporation Act passed

28 April

Benchmark Nikkei stock average closes at ¥7,607, lowest since November 1982

8 May

Industrial Revitalization Corporation of Japan begins operations

17 May

Prime Minister Koizumi convenes Financial Crisis Response Council, approves injection of public funds to Resona Bank

29 November

Koizumi convenes 2nd FCRC meeting, decides to temporarily nationalize Ashikaga Bank

1 December

Procedures for nationalizing Ashikaga Bank completed

announced that they would speed up write-offs of nonperforming loans, force problem corporations out of the marketplace, and consider infusing banks with public funds. The markets reacted to these statements, and stocks posted enormous losses. The benchmark Nikkei stock average closed on 3 October at ¥8,936, the first time in 19 years that it finished below 9,000. The ‘Takenaka Plan’ On 30 October, Takenaka announced his ‘Financial Revitalization Program: Economic Revitalization through Resolving the Nonperforming Loan Problem at Major Banks’. Dubbed the ‘Takenaka Plan’, this programme set its sights on reducing the percentage of nonperforming loans in the hands of major banks to half or less their then-current levels by the end of fiscal 2004. The measures it incorporated were wide-ranging, but the three main pillars of the plan as touched upon by Takenaka at his inaugural press conference were stricter asset assessments, adequacy of equity capital and strengthened governance at financial institutions. The measure that stirred the greatest controversy was stricter accounting standards for deferred tax assets that had been introduced as an equity improvement strategy. Deferred tax assets are assets accounted as such on the expectation that taxes paid at one point on reserves for loan losses will be refunded in the future. Many financial institutions included five years’ worth of such assets on their books, the maximum allowed under accounting procedures. They accounted for 47.2 per cent of the core equity capital held by major banks by the end of March 2002. Deferred tax assets are ‘fictitious’ capital in that no taxes are paid or

50  Koizumi and Japanese Politics refunded if taxable income is not in the black; they damage the healthiness of a company’s financial bottom line.34 For that reason, the initial draft of the plan included setting an upper limit on reckoning in deferred tax assets that would go into effect after the books for fiscal 2003 had been settled in March 2004 and be set at 10 per cent of the core equity capital, on par with the standards in effect in Europe and the USA. This plan, however, was greeted with vehement protests from the financial world and ruling parties, as it was possible that when the measure was put into effect, the equity capital ratios in the international operations of the four largest banking groups – Mitsubishi Tokyo, Mizuho, Mitsui Sumitomo and UFJ – would fall below the required 8 per cent. There was also growing uneasiness over such items as converting the preferred stocks in government hands to common stocks. The plan initially was to have been announced on 22 October, but the proclamation was postponed that day on account of PARC chairman Asō Tarō’s objection that ‘as a party we cannot approve of this’ and the wary attitude also shown by Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo. The top executives of seven financial groups and banks (the aforementioned four banks, plus Resona, Sumitomo Trust and Mitsui Trust) held an unusual joint press conference on 25 October. They issued a statement declaring: ‘Sudden rule changes neglect continuity in financial supervisory administration. They thus present a grave problem.’ Asō – acting as the LDP’s representative – now entered negotiations with Takenaka, pressing him to compromise. Takenaka expected Koizumi to adjudicate, but since the prime minister instructed him to ‘bring this to a conclusion through consultations with the ruling parties’, a compromise was worked out that accommodated the views of the latter. As a result, figures setting an upper limit for inclusion of deferred tax assets were eliminated from the final report and replaced by a section stating: ‘Upper limits on the amounts to be reckoned in will also be studied immediately.’ The conditions for converting preferred stocks held by the government were also tightened, compared with those in the initial draft. The infusion of public funds into Resona bank Stock prices continued to fall based on the observation that the acceleration in writing off nonperforming loans predicated under the plan would result in bankruptcies at corporations with excessive debts and in financial crises at banks raising deflationary pressures. The Nikkei stock average closed below the ¥8,000 barrier on 11 March 2003; its finish of ¥7,607 on 28 April matched levels not seen since November 1982. Major banks went into the red across the board thanks to losses from impairment write-offs of stock holdings and the disposal of nonperforming loans. The cumulative red ink at the seven financial groups for the fiscal year ending March 2003 reached ¥4.62 trillion. In the midst of all this, the Resona Group was revealed to be massively short on equity capital. The Financial Crisis Response Council was convened on 17 May

Domestic affairs   51 Table 2.6  Outline of the financial revitalization programme (sections related to financial administration) (30 October 2002) (1) Tightening of asset assessments *Adoption of the discounted cash flow (DCF) method for reserves (the DCF method involves calculating the current value of claimable assets, based on future cash flows such as expected profits) *Standardization of debtor classification among the banks for major debtors *Conduct of another round of special inspections (2) Enhancement of equity capital adequacy *Proper calculation of deferred tax assets (rigorous assessments of asset quality, and immediate study of upper limits on their inclusion) *Verification of justifiability of deferred tax assets (strict inspection to ensure that deferred tax assets are rigorously accounted for) (3) Strengthened governance *Conversion of preferred stocks in banks held by the government to common stock with voting privileges in all cases where conditions such as a significant downturn in business have been met (4) Other measures *Application of the ‘special support’ (tokubetsu shien 特別支援) framework to financial institutions in financial difficulties or lacking sufficient capital, and injection of public funds when necessary

and a decision made to inject public funds into the Resona Group in recognition that this state of affairs could present an enormous obstacle to maintaining orderly credit conditions. Based on Deposit Insurance Law Article 102 (crisis response article), item 1, the measure was aimed at boosting the capital of a bank in financial difficulties and getting it quickly back on its feet. The Resona Group applied for a ¥1.96 trillion infusion, the total amount of which was approved. The government wound up with 72 per cent of the group’s voting shares since it acquired ¥296.4 billion worth of common stock and ¥1.6636 trillion in preferred stock with voting privileges. Resona was de facto nationalized. It had been four years since public funds were last injected into a major bank under the Early Financial Revitalization Laws of 1999. In late November 2003, the regional Ashikaga Bank was deemed insolvent as well. It was categorized as ‘a bank under special crisis management’, under the provisions mainly of Deposit Insurance Law Article 102, item 3, and thus nationalized temporarily. Integrated revitalization of finance and industry The financial revitalization programme also included measures for revitalizing industry. Along with encouraging the sale of nonperforming loans to the Resolution and Collection Corporation (RCC), these measures called for the creation of a new organization dedicated to corporate and industrial revitalization. The Finance Ministry, which was apprehensive about the advance of deflation and the credit

52  Koizumi and Japanese Politics crunch caused by the policy to speed up the write-off of nonperforming loans, is said to have contributed several lines to the new organization’s definition.35 The bill establishing the Industrial Revitalization Corporation (IRC) was passed in April 2003 and the corporation began operations in early May. The role of the IRC was to buy corporate debt by companies deemed viable mainly from banks other than the major institutions, and then work with the major banks to rehabilitate these companies. Kyushu Industrial Transportation Co., Ltd and three other companies were agreed upon as the first batch to receive assistance from late August to early September that year. The ice thus broken, the IRC gave aid to 41 companies by the March 2005 loan purchase deadline, including such wellknown firms as cosmetics manufacturer Kanebo (aid agreed upon March 2004) and supermarket operator Daiei (aid agreed upon December 2004). The total of these loans reached ¥4.255 trillion. (The IRC was dissolved in March 2007.) The write-off of nonperforming loans based on the financial revitalization programme proceeded steadily. The share of bad debt held by major banks was reduced by more than half at the end of fiscal 2004, to 2.9 per cent from 8.7 per cent at the end of fiscal 2001. The plan’s objective had been achieved. Against this backdrop of policies aimed at an integrated revitalization of finance and industry, the economy moved onto a recovery track. The growth rate of real GDP, which stood at –0.8 per cent in fiscal 2001 when Koizumi took office, climbed to 1.1 per cent in fiscal 2002, 2.3 per cent in fiscal 2003 and 2.0 per cent in fiscal 2004, to reach 2.4 per cent in fiscal 2005.36 Naturally, the question of whether or not writing off nonperforming loans was the direct trigger for economic recovery requires careful evaluation. It may rather be the case that economic recovery caused progress to be made on the write-offs. However economists may view the situation, from a political science perspective we cannot ignore the fact that the dramatic progress made under Koizumi’s rule on policies for dealing with these loans – which had been put off during Japan’s so-called ‘lost decade’ (ushinawareta jūnen 失われた十年) – loosened the grip of entrenched interests and produced policy change.

Healthcare system reform The ‘splitting the burden three ways’ reform Social security expenses put as much pressure on the budget as did public works spending. They totalled ¥17.6 trillion in the initial fiscal 2001 budget, occupying about 21 per cent of the general account. The Koizumi administration carried out social security reforms dealing with both the public pension and the healthcare systems, but my focus here will be on the latter. This is because it presents an excellent case study for observing the prime minister’s leadership, given that the politically powerful Japan Medical Association and the Health, Welfare and Labour zoku lawmakers staunchly opposed reforms that would cut medical treatment fees.

Domestic affairs   53 Healthcare system reforms were carried out in two stages in the Koizumi administration. The first set of reforms were pursued from 2001 through the following year and passed into law in July 2002 by the Diet as the Health Care Reform Law (2002). Looking at the details, the law first of all increased the patient’s share of the treatment costs. It standardized the size of the patient’s co-payment at 30 per cent under both the employee and national health insurances (in essence, this meant an increase in the co-payment for the employee insurance, which had previously been at 20 per cent). It also abolished upper burden limits and flat rates for senior citizens aged 70 or older, setting an across-the-board fixed rate of 10 per cent. Second, it raised insurance rates. Specifically, it established a total remuneration system (sōhōshūsei 総報酬制) for employee insurance premiums (levying premiums on not just monthly salary payments but bonuses as well), and raised the premium rate for the government-administered health insurance programme in which employees at small- to medium-sized enterprises are enrolled, from 7.5 to 8.2 per cent. Third, it incorporated measures to control the growth of medical expenses for seniors, which entailed the health minister establishing guidelines and providing advice to local authorities. Also, a new healthcare system for the elderly was to be created in two fiscal years. It should be noted that the revision rate of the care provider’s portion covering therapeutic intervention and prescriptions was –1.3 per cent (the actual revision rate including medicine and medical materials being –2.7 per cent) in the treatment fee revision of fiscal 2002 carried out in parallel with this reform. This marked the first ever such reduction. Prime Minister Koizumi described this series of reforms as ‘splitting the burden three ways’ (sanbō ichiryō zon 三方一両損) between the treatment provider, the insurer and the patient. The battle over macroeconomic indicators The second round of healthcare system reforms unfolded from 2005 to 2006. The principal details are as shown in Table 2.7 and 2.8. Here I would like to focus on the debate concerning a framework for controlling medical costs. The focus of this debate was the adoption of ‘macroeconomic management indicators’ (makuro kanri shihyō マクロ管理指標) to control medical costs by yoking them to the size of the economy, as proposed by the private-sector councillors in the CEFP. At a CEFP meeting held in mid-February 2005, Honma Masaaki and the other expert members presented a paper entitled, ‘Toward Social Security Commensurate with the Scale of the Economy’. The paper argued that, ‘For the sake of a social security system that will continue stably for generations to come, the establishment of indicators of some sort with regard to benefit costs and control of their growth is indispensable.’ As such an indicator, the growth rate of the nominal GDP was deemed appropriate. What the councillors had in mind was a framework such that roughly every five years the growth in social security costs would be compared with that of the nominal GDP and a policy review considered if social security costs had grown faster than the economy.

54  Koizumi and Japanese Politics Table 2.7  Chronology of healthcare system reforms 2001 25 September

Health Ministry presents healthcare system reform proposal

29 November

Government and ruling parties convene joint conference on healthcare reform, approve broad outlines of reform

2002 1 March

Cabinet approves healthcare system reform bills and submits them to Diet

26 July

Health Care Reform Law (2002) passed

2004 14 April

Chairman and six other members of Japan Dentists Federation (JDF) arrested (the ‘Central Social Insurance Medical Council [Chūikyō] scandal’)

2 December

Tokyo District Court hands down guilty verdict against ex-Social Insurance Agency chief Shimomura Takeshi

2005 22 February

Experts committee to discuss Chūikyō reform holds first meeting

27 April

The CEFP’s private sector members present ‘ageing-adjusted GDP’ proposal

31 May

Tokyo District Court hands down guilty verdict against former JDF president Usuda Sadao

21 June

Honebuto policy statement finalized

20 July

Chūikyō reform committee submits report to Health Minister Otsuji

19 October

Health Ministry announces structural reform proposal for healthcare system

1 December

Government–Ruling Parties Conference on Healthcare Reform announces outline of healthcare system reforms

2006 10 February

Cabinet approves healthcare system reform bills

14 June

Health Care Reform Law (2006) passed

Health Minister Otsuji Hidehisa countered this on the grounds that medical benefit costs were determined by an accumulation of necessary expenses. Growth in medical costs was not necessarily linked to economic growth, he argued, expressing concern that the nation’s standard of health would deteriorate if medical benefits were controlled unreasonably. The conflict of opinion between Otsuji and the privatesector councillors was fierce at the CEFP meeting in late March, until Takenaka interceded with the words, ‘I would like to ask both the private-sector councillors and the Health Ministry to carry on the debate in a more concrete fashion.’ The private-sector councillors responded by presenting a new proposal at the meeting of 27 April that they termed ‘ageing-adjusted GDP’ (kōreika shūsei

Domestic affairs   55 Table 2.8  Summary of fiscal 2006 healthcare system reforms (1) Comprehensive effort at streamlining medical costs *Formulation of a plan for the streamlining of medical costs *Increase of co-payment for senior citizens (among those aged 70 or older, increase of co-payment for individuals with incomes on par with a regular worker from 20 per cent to 30 per cent in October 2006. Increase of co-payment from patients aged 70–74 as a rule from 10 per cent to 20 per cent beginning in fiscal 2008) (2) Establishment of a new healthcare system for the elderly (fiscal 2008) *Funded by premiums collected from seniors aged 75 or older, financial support from working generations, and public funds (3) Other measures *Measures to reorganize and consolidate insurers, etc.

GDP 高齢化修正GDP), a formula that would add to the nominal GDP growth rate a figure arrived at by dividing in half the increase in the number of senior citizens in the entire population. This indicator took into account the fact that the increase in medical costs accelerates if the number of seniors grows rapidly. Otsuji continued to voice his doubts regarding macroeconomic indicators, but at this point Koizumi issued his instructions: ‘Some sort of indicator is needed. … If there are no controls of some sort, everyone is going to say: “Big benefits, light burdens!”’ In light of the prime minister’s instructions, the course for including macro indicators in the ‘Honebuto Policy 2005’ statement was set. All the same, conflict continued over the specifics of this proposal as Otsuji renewed his objection that some factors in the growth of medical expenses were not linked to economic growth. Opposition from the Health and Welfare zoku and the JMA was also strong, ultimately forcing PARC chair Yosano Kaoru to intervene. The text of the honebuto policy statement eventually approved on 21 June read: ‘Concerning the increase of social security benefits, and with the rapid increase in medical services in mind, policy objectives aimed at substantive results in streamlining medical expenses will be set and, upon periodical review of their achievement status under all possible aspects, necessary measures to achieve this goal taken.’ Compared to the text of the draft presented at the previous council meeting, which stipulated, ‘Management methods such as setting macroeconomic indicators, comparing actual data with these indicators and reviewing system timeliness and costs will be adopted’, the new text was rather toothless. Nonetheless, the macro indicators had ‘just managed to scrape by’.37 The Health Ministry draft and the Government–Ruling Parties Conference Accepting that one object of the honebuto policy statement was to carry out healthcare system reforms in fiscal 2006, the Health and Welfare Ministry

56  Koizumi and Japanese Politics announced its ‘Draft Proposal for Structural Reform of the Health Care System’ on 19 October 2005. Medical benefit payments, the proposal stated, that were expected to reach ¥56 trillion by 2025 under the current system, would be trimmed to ¥49 trillion. When estimated based on a control indicator reflecting the privatesector councillors’ ageing-adjusted GDP, benefit payments for that same fiscal year were thought to total ¥42 trillion. The Government-Ruling Parties Conference on healthcare reform began deliberating the issue in early November. In the ‘Outline of Health Care System Reform’, which the committee finalized on 1 December, the ‘indicator’ that had denoted the GDP growth rate itself in the private-sector councillors’ initial concept was transmuted into a benefits ‘forecast’ computed from a multifaceted perspective. At the council’s January 2006 meeting, Health Minister Kawasaki Jirō produced a benefits forecast that came to ¥48 trillion by fiscal 2025. In the end, a Health Care Reform Law (2006) based on this outline was passed by the Diet on 14 June. Meanwhile, reform of the medical treatment fee system also made progress. In the wake of a scandal at the Central Social Insurance Medical Council (Chūikyō) over treatment fee revision (the chairman of the Japan Dentists Federation and the former head of the Social Insurance Agency were arrested in April 2004), an ‘Experts Committee Concerning the State of Chūikyō’ was created to review the treatment fee revision and Chūikyō’s role. The report by the experts committee issued in July 2005 affirmed that it was for the Cabinet to determine by what percentage fees would be adjusted through the budget formulation process. The report also called for a ‘Basic Policy Concerning Medical Treatment Fee Revisions’ to be set down chiefly at the Social Security Council’s Committee for Health Insurance, while deliberations conducted at Chūikyō would be confined to the actual assignment of treatment fee points based on that policy. Headway was also made in conjunction with this under the Koizumi government on lowering medical treatment fees. The revision rate of the provider’s portion had been zero in fiscal 2004. Fiscal 2006, however, also saw zoku lawmaker influence diminish rapidly due to the ‘postal election’. The provider’s portion now fell 1.36 per cent while the total figure, including medicine and other items, fell 3.16 per cent, making these the largest reductions ever. As the foregoing shows, the healthcare reforms under the Koizumi administration comprised developments that had not been seen up to that point, such as the adoption of macroeconomic indicators and lower medical fees. While the macroeconomic indicators would ultimately be watered down considerably, the fact that innovative proposals were introduced to a policy community once monopolized by the zoku lawmakers and the bureaucracy is worthy of special mention. This is an excellent example of how the infusion of new policy ideas through the CEFP functioned.

Domestic affairs   57

The Trinity Reform: elimination of subsidies and transfers of tax revenue sources The ‘Katayama proposal’ The ‘Trinity Reform’ (Sanmi ittai kaikaku 三位一体改革) was three reforms rolled into one: a reform of government subsidy contributions (funds the central government paid to local authorities for designated projects, referred to hereafter as subsidies), a reform of tax allocations to local governments (money generated by fiscal adjustments that the central government passes on to local governments) and transfers of tax revenue sources from the central government to local authorities. The subsidies, whose budgetary applications were largely determined by the government, had come under strong criticism before. Moreover, as the phrase ‘30 per cent autonomy’ (sanwari jichi 三割自治) suggests, local authorities possessed only few independent revenue sources such as local taxes. Accordingly, the Koizumi administration sought to transfer tax revenue sources to compensate for cuts in subsidies to local authorities, and to reform the system for distributing tax allocations. Insofar as these reforms were to reduce central government intervention in local affairs and emphasized the autonomy and self-responsibility of local communities, they can be understood as an attempt to introduce ‘market principles’ of a sort also into the relationship between the central and local governments. The term ‘Trinity’ established itself in general usage following a remark by Home Affairs Minister Katayama Toranosuke at a CEFP meeting in late May 2002: ‘Taxes, subsidies, and tax allocations are a trinity (sanmi ittai 三位一体); they form a three-way simultaneous equation.’38 The proposal Katayama presented at that meeting under the title ‘Structural Reform of Local Public Finance and Transfer of Tax Revenue Sources’ was the opening salvo for this series of reforms. Katayama’s proposal offered such ideas as ‘elimination or reduction of the central government contribution to local budget expenditures’ and ‘creation of a local tax-centred revenue structure’ as its basic thinking about the structural reform of local public finance. Based on that, it set achieving a one-to-one ratio between national and local tax inputs as its ultimate goal. The plan also included the proposal to first transfer ¥5.5 trillion in national treasury disbursements to local taxes (shifting ¥3 trillion from income taxes to residential taxes, and ¥2.5 trillion from consumption taxes to local consumption taxes), and then commute local government tax allocations to local taxes based on improvements to net balances in local public finance. Katayama spoke of a ‘trinity’ because he agreed with the views of Honma Masaaki and the other private-sector councillors, who had responded to his idea of a two-stage reform by insisting that subsidies, tax revenue sources and tax allocations should all be decided on at the same time. A prime minister’s directive paper was presented at the CEFP meeting of early June 2002 that called for the modalities of these three items to be considered in an integrated fashion and for a reform plan to be put together within a year.

58  Koizumi and Japanese Politics In response to this directive, a concrete reform proposal was worked into the honebuto policy statement for 2003. However, the ministries’ interests were in a tangle, and the arrangements did not go easily. The situation was such that while each ministry and agency opposed cutting subsidies in its own jurisdiction, the Finance Ministry was in favour of tax allocation reform and subsidy cuts but took a negative view on tax revenue source transfers. The Home Affairs Ministry backed revenue source transfers but was chary towards subsidy reductions. This picture resembled more a ‘three-way standoff’ than a ‘trinity’. Given this situation, Takenaka suggested at the CEFP’s meeting in early April 2003 that Honma work with the deputy home affairs and finance ministers to come up with a draft. This resulted in the creation of a venue for conducting investigations in which the above three were joined by Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Furukawa Teijirō and the administrative vice ministers from relevant ministries and agencies. The prime minister’s directive to cut subsidies At a CEFP meeting in late May, Honma proposed that – given the need to present the Trinity Reform in quantitative, macro-level terms – it would be appropriate to transfer amounts equal to around 70 to 80 per cent of the subsidies being eliminated. Takenaka then summed matters up by saying it was important to set numerical targets. A preliminary draft of the honebuto policy statement was distributed at the CEFP’s meeting of 12 June, but the sections pertaining to the Trinity Reform were left blank. That spoke volumes about how choppy were the seas the ministries sought to navigate. A directive from the prime minister was presented at the start of the meeting on 18 June. It called for three things: (1) elimination or reduction of subsidies by around ¥4 trillion in the three-year period ending in fiscal 2006; (2) tax revenue source transfers at the amount of roughly 80 per cent of the subsidies being eliminated (or the total amount in the case of mandatory operations); and (3) review and reduction of the financial source guarantee function of the local allocation taxes, in addition to scaling back the latter’s total amount. Immediately thereafter, the final draft for the honebuto policy statement for fiscal 2003 incorporating this prime ministerial directive was distributed. It appears that the text of the prime minister’s adjudication had in fact been completed already several days earlier. The possibility that this was a mere ceremony for staging his verdict for effect is therefore quite high.39 Be that as it may, it will be noted that the draft from the private-sector councillors had more or less had its way. The final version of the honebuto policy statement in substance accorded with the prime minister’s directive. Also, when it came time to cut subsidies, it was decided that a thorough review of duties and operations would be carried out on the basis of ‘Guidelines for Organizing and Rationalizing National Treasury Disbursements’ attached on a separate sheet. This settled the general framework for subsidy cuts, but with the formulation of the 2004 budget ahead, the question of which subsidies should be cut and by how much became the focus of contention. At the CEFP’s meeting on 18 November,

Domestic affairs   59 the private-sector councillors proposed subsidy cuts amounting to ¥1 trillion, and following that course the prime minister, too, explicitly directed that they be cut by ¥1 trillion in the fiscal 2004 budget. The directive delivered a major shock to Kasumigaseki. Since the Finance Ministry had assumed the reductions would be on the order of ¥600 billion, it had to come up with another ¥400 billion in cuts in the month that remained before the draft budget was compiled. As Finance Minister Tanigaki’s remark at the time suggests (‘This feels like climbing an unclimbed 8,000-metre-high peak’), in terms of conventional Kasumigaseki thinking this task was rather difficult. The cuts were apportioned to each ministry, with Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda orchestrating the work at the centre. Compulsory education and social welfare contributions drew the most debate. The Education Ministry proposed that the retirement benefit and child allowance portions included in state subsidies to compulsory education, which covered half of teaching staff salaries, be shifted to the general budget. The Health Ministry, on the other hand, proposed reducing the share of social welfare expenses covered by national treasury contributions. Table 2.9  Chronology of the ‘Trinity Reform’ 2002 21 May

Home Affairs Minister Katayama presents reform proposal to CEFP

7 June

Koizumi orders deliberations on ‘Trinity Reform’ proposal in the CEFP

2003 28 May

CEFP member Honma proposes tax revenue source transfers at the amount of 70–80 per cent of eliminated subsidies

18 June

Prime minister’s directive orders elimination of subsidies

18 November

Prime minister’s directive orders cutting subsidies in the fiscal 2004 budget

19 December

Formal agreement on cutting government financial contributions to compulsory education at Government–Ruling Parties Conference

2004 28 May

Deliberations on draft honebuto policy statement at the CEFP Exchanges between Home Affairs Minister Asō and Finance Minister Tanigaki over tax revenue source transfers

24 August

Six local government associations submit proposal to cut subsidies by ¥3.2 trillion

26 November

Government and ruling parties reach agreement on subsidy reductions

2005 26 October

Central Education Council report stipulates preservation of state subsidies to compulsory education

30 November

Agreement reached at Government–Ruling Parties Conference. ‘Overall Picture of the Trinity Reform’ (Sanmi ittai kaikaku no zentaizō) finalized

60  Koizumi and Japanese Politics Both proposals met with strong resistance from local government. Adjustments were made mainly at the Government–Ruling Parties Conference, and the broad outlines of an agreement were reached on 10 December. According to the latter, compulsory education contributions were to be cut by about ¥230 billion – corresponding chiefly to retirement allowances – and converted to grants anticipating transfer of tax revenue sources (zeigen ijō yotei kōfukin 税源移譲 予定交付金), while reductions in the share of social welfare expenses that the government covered were shelved. Based on the formal agreement reached at the CEFP meeting in mid-December, subsidies would be cut by ¥1.03 trillion in the fiscal 2004 budget, tax revenue sources transferred at the amount of ¥424.9 billion (plus ¥230.9 billion in grants anticipating transfer of tax revenue sources to serve as a stopgap revenue source), and tax allocations to local governments reduced by ¥2.8623 trillion (including the decrease in temporary financial measure bonds). Remaining issues In 2004, debate came to swirl around the question of according to what schedule the remaining ¥3 trillion in subsidies should be eliminated. Internal Affairs Minister Asō Tarō presented a paper to the CEFP in late April on how to proceed with the Trinity Reform after fiscal 2005, arguing that the size of full-scale tax revenue source transfers (about ¥3 trillion) should be ‘decided in advance’. Finance Minister Tanigaki countered that the transfer of revenue sources was premised on subsidy reductions, and that to decide on revenue source transfers first was do things in reverse order. Up to that point, the Trinity Reform had progressed with decisions being first made on the amount of subsidy cuts and then on that of tax revenue transfers, but Asō had tried to stand this on its head. Deliberations over the draft for the ‘Honebuto Policy 2004’ statement took place on 28 May. Asō used this occasion, too, to argue: ‘I would like you to scrupulously include the figure of ¥3 trillion in tax revenue transfers.’ Tanigaki objected, but here a verdict again came down from the prime minister. Koizumi said, ‘We will transfer revenue sources at the amount of ¥3 trillion in fiscal 2005 and 2006 to put the local regions at ease. In exchange, I want a proposal on subsidy reductions to be put together at the Association of Prefectural Governors.’ With these words he ordered that transfers of tax revenue sources come first. In light of Koizumi’s directive, revisions of the honebuto policy statement’s text were undertaken, but there were fierce exchanges between the Finance and the Internal Affairs Ministries over its wording. The Finance Ministry proposed language that left the figure of ¥3 trillion as unspecific as possible and emphasized reductions in subsidies as their precondition, while the Internal Affairs Ministry advocated language that put tax revenue source transfers first. The final text was a product of compromise. It read, ‘Our goal is to transfer tax revenue sources on a scale of roughly ¥3 trillion yen. On that premise, we request local public authorities to compile a concrete proposal for reform in government financial contributions as a basis for further investigation.’

Domestic affairs   61 The conflict over state subsidies to compulsory education When the Association of Prefectural Governors and five other bodies representing local governments thus began work on putting together a proposal on subsidy reductions, government financial contributions to compulsory education produced the biggest controversy. While the Ministry of Education, which opposed the cuts, sought to work on the governors, debate at the association became hopelessly entangled. In the end, an extraordinary vote was taken. The proposal that resulted was to discontinue ¥850 billion in state subsidies to middle school teaching staff salaries by fiscal 2006 and abolish all state subsidies to compulsory education, including also the government’s share of elementary school salaries, by fiscal 2007. The six local government associations submitted a proposal to Koizumi on 24 August for reducing subsidies by a total of ¥3.2 trillion. The Forum for Dialogue between Central and Local Governments was established for consultations. Comprised of representatives from the six associations and the pertinent cabinet members, the Forum saw fierce debates unfold between ministers opposed to subsidy reductions and representatives of the local regions. Amid attacks mainly from Education zoku lawmakers, efforts at conciliation and coordination of policy positions were made under the guidance of Chief Cabinet Secretary Hosoda Hiroyuki and PARC Chair Yosano until an agreement between the government and the ruling parties was reached on 26 November. The agreement was as follows: (1) discontinue or pare down around ¥3 trillion worth of subsidies from the budgets for fiscal 2004 and 2005 (¥2.838 trillion worth of specific items confirmed); (2) seek tax revenue source transfers on the order of ¥3 trillion, including the portion to be implemented in fiscal 2004 (¥2.416 trillion worth of specific items confirmed); and (3) reduce the national treasury’s contributions to compulsory education as a provisional measure by ¥850 billion, with a final conclusion on the amount to be obtained at the Central Education Council by autumn 2005. The Central Education Council deliberated over the state subsidies to compulsory education during the following year. The report that came out on 26 October 2005 expressly stipulated that the contributions be retained. However, the report was overridden in accordance with the wishes of Koizumi – who paid serious attention to the views of the localities – and contributions were cut as planned by ¥850 billion. There was a difference from the local governments’ proposal, to be sure, which sought to completely end the central government contributions to the middle schools. Instead, the share of the salary expenses at elementary and middle schools covered by the central government was reduced from one-half to one-third. Other debates arose over social security expenses and facilities-related expenses at schools and elsewhere. The Health Ministry made a case for reducing the share of national tax contributions going to cover social security costs, but the reduction failed to go through owing to local government opposition. On the matter of facilities-related expenses, the Finance Ministry opposed making public works expenditure, which was funded by government construction bonds, the

474.9 2004

230.9

585.4

846.7

301.1

Trimmed 343.0

Changed to subsidies

Public works- related grants, incentive grants, etc.

264.0

Trimmed

318.3

Changed to subsidies

Public works- related grants, incentive grants, etc.

2005 582.3

2005

1,753.9 2004 Government–Ruling Parties Agreement

444.1

221.1 686.2

Public housing improvment grants, childcare benefits, etc.

Compulsory Education

34.5

National Health Insurance

69.0

654.4 2005 Government–Ruling Parties Agreement

Figure 2.2  Subsidy reforms and revenue source transfers under the Trinity Reform Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs data.

133.0

Urban renovation subsides

423.5

Trimmed

Public worksrelated grants, incentive grants, etc.

556.5

2004

Reference: Other revised subsidies

244.0

Compulsory education (retirement and childcare benefits)

576.1

846.7

686.2

210.1

230.9

Public housing improvment grants, childcare benefits, etc.

Public school facilities, etc.

234.4

2003 reform portion

Public daycare centre operating costs, etc.

219.8

205.1

Compulsory education (retirement and childcare benefits)

Compulsory education

610.6

2005 Government–Ruling Parties Agreement

National Health Insurance

1,742.9

2004 Government–Ruling Parties Agreement

Public housing improvement grants, elder care centers, etc.

Public housing improvement grants, elder care centers, etc.

Compulsory education (Mutual aid pensions, etc.)

2003 reform portion

Public daycare centre operating costs, etc.

Compulsory education (Mutual aid pensions, etc.)

655.9

2004

Public school facilities, etc. (excluding 2003 reform portion)

4,666.1

Value of reforms to the grant burden on the national treasury for 2004–6

(Including 2003 reform portion)

Revised amount of revenue transfer-linked grants 3,117.6

Amount of tax revenue sources transferred 3,009.4

2004–6

(Units: billions of yen)

Domestic affairs   63 object of any tax revenue source transfers, but when all was said and done such transfers covered about 50 per cent of the cuts. The overall shape of the Trinity Reform was finalized with an agreement reached at a Government–Ruling Parties Conference held on 30 November. It called for reducing subsidies by ¥4.6661 trillion and transferring tax revenue sources worth ¥3.0094 trillion from fiscal 2004 to fiscal 2006. In the foregoing manner, subsidies for local governments were trimmed and tax revenue sources transferred on an unprecedented scale through the Trinity Reform. A new dimension can be said to have been brought to a relationship between local authorities and the national government that had been strongly coloured by bias towards centralized authority. A major policy transformation was achieved thanks to effective use having been made of the CEFP as a venue and the prime minister’s directive as a method. Nevertheless, when it came time to cut the subsidies for local authorities, the method adopted entailed reduction targets being parcelled out to each ministry rather than deciding in one fell stroke what to cut under the Kantei’s leadership, sidestepping the ministry–agency framework. This fact demonstrates that the traditional setup of ‘each ministry side by side’ (kakushō yokonarabi 各省横並 び) remained deeply rooted, and that certain limits on top-down decision-making continued to exist.

The ‘inner citadel of reform’: postal privatization Setback during the Hashimoto administrative reforms The logic behind arguments for privatizing the three postal services (mail delivery, postal savings and postal insurance) was, once again, based on neoliberal ideas with their stress on market principles. The following sorts of problems were pinpointed about the three services. Limiting correspondence delivery to postal mail, for example, constituted a government monopoly, causing service to be inefficient. The postal services, furthermore, received preferential treatment in that they were not charged corporate taxes, which was said to amount to ‘pressure on the private sector’ (mingyō appaku 民業圧迫), that is, on banks, insurance companies and delivery companies, impairing fair competition. Last but not least, some ¥360 trillion worth of capital was concentrated in postal savings and insurance. This capital was distributed among the special public corporations in the form of Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme (FILP) funds, giving rise to enormous inefficiencies. Accordingly, privatizing the postal service’s three areas of operation would make it possible to provide efficient service through fair competition with private-sector companies, while at the same time contributing to special public corporation and public investment reform. Postal privatization had also been studied during the course of the Hashimoto administrative reforms of the late 1990s. Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō is said to have personally backed privatization. The Administrative Reform Council’s (ARC) interim report of 3 September 1997 put forward a policy according to

64  Koizumi and Japanese Politics which state operation of mail delivery services was to be maintained, while postal insurance was to be privatized and conditions were to be created for privatizing the postal savings system. However, owing to fierce resistance from the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, Posts zoku lawmakers, the Japan Postal Workers Union (JPU), the All Japan Postal Labour Union (JPLU) and the Social Democratic Party, which was a coalition partner in the government at the time, the passage on privatization contained in the interim report was struck from the ARC’s final report. The Postal Services Agency was to take over all three postal services immediately after the new central government ministry and agency structure (a key part of Hashimoto’s administrative reform package) went into effect. The agency was to be reorganized as the Postal Services Corporation (JPSC – commonly known as Japan Post) in 2003, but as the clause ‘reconsideration of privatization will not be undertaken’ indicates, it was stipulated that state management would be maintained and that employees were guaranteed their status as national civil servants. Behind the difficulties into which postal privatization had run stood the National Association of Special Post Office Masters (Zentoku), which wielded enormous influence as one of the LDP’s most important power bases. The special post office masters – a nationwide group some 19,000 strong who oversee small post offices – were in many cases influential men in their local communities and highly effective at mobilizing voters. That former Posts Ministry official Kōso Kenji picked up 480,000 votes – the second largest amount won by any LDP candidate (and twelfth overall) – when he ran in a proportional representation district at the time of the July 2001 Upper House election speaks volumes about their ability to get out the vote.40 The Postal Advisory Council Koizumi had cherished the idea of postal privatization long before becoming prime minister.41 Postal privatization had been among his campaign promises during the LDP presidential election, and no sooner did he take office than he created the Advisory Council to Consider the Modalities of the Three Postal Businesses, (hereafter Postal Advisory Council) as a private advisory body with political commentator Tanaka Naoki as chairman. The Postal Advisory Council held its first meeting on 4 June 2001, and began deliberations with the goal of producing a report in a year’s time. However, it became difficult to unite this body behind privatization since, while Tanaka was a postal privatization advocate, about half of the committee’s ten members maintained a wary stance. After February 2002, the council could no longer hold formal meetings lest it interfere with deliberations over the Postal Services Corporation Law, and switched to holding informal meetings off the record instead. A final report appeared in September 2002. The document set out in parallel three possible management forms in the event of privatization, and the advantages and drawbacks of each. These scenarios were: (1) abolition of postal savings and

Domestic affairs   65 Table 2.10  Chronology of postal privatization 1997 3 September 21 November 3 December 2001 4 June

13 November 2002 23 April 24 July 6 September 2004 26 April

13 May 3 June 10 September 17 December 21 December 2005 4 April 26 April 27 April 26 May 28 June 4 July 5 July 5 August 8 August 17 August 21 August 11 September 6 October 11 October 14 October

Administrative Reform Council (ARC) releases interim report Policy decision at Government–Ruling Party Conference to maintain state management of postal services ARC releases final report First meeting of the Advisory Council to Consider the Modalities of the Three Postal Businesses (Tanaka Naoki, chair), a private advisory group for Prime Minister Koizumi Home Affairs Ministry presents main points of proposal for the Japan Post system LDP’s Public Management Division permits government to submit correspondence delivery bill to the Diet Diet passes four bills related to Japan Post Postal Advisory Council releases final report Preparatory Office for Postal Privatization established at the Cabinet Secretariat Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP) compiles paper, ‘Sorting Out Points of Contention Concerning the Privatization of Japan Post’ First meeting of Experts Committee on Postal Privatization CEFP explicitly declares in Honebuto Policy 2004 statement that privatization bills will be submitted in 2005 Cabinet approves ‘Basic Policy on the Privatization of Japan Post’ LDP’s joint panel on postal reform approves ‘Policy on Postal Reform’ LDP approves party resolution on ‘Policy on Postal Reform’ Outline of postal privatization bills approved LDP’s Joint Panel on Postal Reform approves bills, premised on revisions Cabinet approves privatization bills, sends it to the Diet Explanation of bills and question-and-answer session held at Lower House plenary session, followed by start of deliberations Government and LDP agree on revisions to bills Bills approved by Lower House’s Special Committee on Postal Privatization Bills passed by Lower House Bills approved by Upper House’s Special Committee Bills rejected by Upper House (108: 125), Lower House dissolved Watanuki Tamisuke et al., form People’s New Party Kobayashi Kōki et al., form New Party Nippon LDP scores landslide victory in 44th Lower House general election Explanation at Lower House, deliberations begin Bills approved by Lower House Bills passed into law

66  Koizumi and Japanese Politics insurance services and complete privatization of mail delivery, (2) preservation of mail delivery, postal savings and postal insurance services under a joint framework and complete privatization, or (3) transfer of these services to a special public corporation that the government would create and retain the authority to manage. Koizumi, too, now indicated that the privatization debate should be continued at an establishment committee set up to oversee preparations for a public corporation. The priority of postal privatization had been lowered. The struggle over the Correspondence Delivery Law Work was also progressing at this time on the draft of the Japan Postal Services Corporation Law preparing the Postal Services Corporation’s launch in 2003, and on the Correspondence Delivery Law that would open the mail delivery business to the private sector. The Correspondence Delivery Law in particular became a major focus of contention owing to clashes between the prime minister’s stance and those of the Home Affairs Ministry and zoku lawmakers. Prime Minister Koizumi demanded the complete opening of the letter delivery business to private corporations, while the Home Affairs Ministry at first would open it only part way, within certain limits based on weight and cost of correspondence. The Posts zoku lawmakers rejected even a partial opening. A proposal for the Japan Post system was announced in mid-November 2001, but owing to this conflict it did not include any concrete plan for the opening of the postal services market. Even in the LDP’s Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications Division voices critical of the Home Affairs Ministry were raised because the latter had not produced a proposal that clearly disavowed an across-the-board opening. In the end, on 14 December the prime minister and Internal Affairs Minister Katayama Toranosuke agreed on ‘an across-the-board opening proposal with conditions’ obligating private operators to provide a nationwide service. Based on this, a correspondence delivery bill was drawn up in March and April 2002 and approved by the Cabinet on 26 April. This bill distinguished between ‘general correspondence delivery businesses’ that could provide services on a par with those offered by Japan Post nationwide, and ‘special correspondence delivery businesses’ that were limited to a specific region. The conditions for private-sector participation in the former category were extremely strict. Would-be operators were obliged to set uniform rates nationwide, deliver mail at least six days a week and put mailboxes in 100,000 locations around the country. Even given these stipulations, opposition from the Posts zoku lawmakers remained strong. At the 23 April meeting of the Public Management Division, the unusual decision was reached to not approve the contents of the bill but permit the government to submit it to the Diet. Meanwhile on 26 April, the day the bill was adopted by the Cabinet, Yamato Transport President Aritomi Keiji announced at a press conference that his company – which had been expected to get into the general correspondence delivery business – would not do so. Aritomo explained: ‘We have no plans to enter this business under a “private governmentalization

Domestic affairs   67 bill”, where the Internal Affairs Ministry is to issue permits and licences on a private company’s every step and move.’ The bill passed the Diet on 24 July 2002, and acceptance of applications from private operators began the following April. Five companies, mainly motorcycle messenger services, applied to enter the special correspondence delivery business, but applications to enter the general correspondence business numbered zero. Koizumi’s re-election as LDP president and the beginning of postal reform in earnest The activity around postal privatization stagnated for some time after the Postal Advisory Council’s report. However, it was once again on the agenda in the LDP presidential election of September 2003. Koizumi competed against Kamei Shizuka, Fujii Takao and Kōmura Masahiko in the contest, but he was able to win the support of Upper House Secretary General Aoki Mikio and scored a crushing victory in the vote count on 20 September. As Koizumi had made the campaign pledge that privatization of the three postal businesses would come to pass during his next three-year term as LDP president, he now embarked on postal privatization in earnest. The main battlefield for that project unsurprisingly was the CEFP. Shifting the venue for studying postal privatization to the CEFP was done on the advice of Economic and Fiscal Policy Minister Takenaka, a move intended to promote privatization under the Kantei’s leadership. At the CEFP’s meeting of mid-February 2004, Takenaka affirmed that, while usually three postal businesses were spoken of, there were four functions – adding the counter services network to mail delivery, postal savings and postal insurance – and that ways to enable these functions to be self-sustaining would be the focus of the privatization debate. This was the first step towards the subsequent split into four companies. On 26 April, the CEFP put together a paper, ‘Sorting out Points of Contention Concerning the Privatization of Japan Post’, laying out a broad policy on privatization. Along with expressly stating that privatization would be implemented in 2007, the document called for a five-to-ten-year transitional period, and the equalizing of competitive conditions with other private companies through such steps as abolishing the government’s total guarantees for postal savings and insurance contracts taken over after privatization. On the other hand, the paper also contained elements that met the ‘forces of resistance’ halfway, such as its specific mention that the counter services network would ‘be maintained in a form that allowed all citizens to make use of it’. Preparatory work for privatization was to be carried out at a Preparatory Office for Postal Privatization established in the Cabinet Secretariat. Former Agriculture and Forestry Vice-Minister Watanabe Yoshiaki was given a dual appointment as the office’s director and assistant to the prime minister, while former Internal Affairs Assistant Vice-Minister Nabekura Shinichi and FSA chief Takagi Shōkichi were appointed as assistant directors. The break with custom in the appointment of bureaucrats at the vice-ministerial level to such positions should be noted,

68  Koizumi and Japanese Politics as well as the fact that two of these three executives were non-postal services bureaucrats. The preparatory office opened its doors on 26 April, and the size of its staff dramatically expanded to 83 persons after July, including workers on loan from such private-sector companies as Japan Railways. A six-member Experts Committee on Postal Privatization that included Keio University professor Yoshino Naoyuki was also established to hold concrete discussions. Meanwhile, the ‘Honebuto Policy 2004’ statement finalized on 3 June explicitly declared that ‘a basic policy for privatization will be drawn up in autumn 2004 and privatization bills will be submitted in 2005’. After the 11 July House of Councillors elections, heated debate at the CEFP resumed later that month. The basic policy finalized The CEFP and the Cabinet approved a ‘Basic Policy on the Privatization of Japan Post’ on 10 September 2004. The policy’s contents were as presented in Table 2.11. Koizumi then stated his intention to submit the privatization bills at the Diet’s regular session in January 2005. The LDP was extremely dissatisfied with the CEFP and the prime ministerled decision-making process. Normally, before a cabinet decision of this sort was issued a ruling party’s review would be carried out at the party’s PARC and General Council. In a highly unusual move, this time those formalities were skipped. When the Cabinet approved the policy, the LDP presented its view of the situation. The party said it would withhold judgement as a party about right and wrong since the policy raised many problems. As a party, it declared, it could not block the decision, but would process it in line with the required procedures during the drafting stage. What made it possible for Koizumi to confront the opposition in his party was his characteristically short-time-horizon strategy of relying on the formal authority invested in his office while ignoring informal institutions, and the fact that his personnel strategies had paid off. Because Koizumi openly declared that he would consider a lawmaker’s stance on privatization in the cabinet reshuffle scheduled for late September, mid-level Posts zoku lawmakers with hopes of joining the Cabinet made repeated overseas business trips and refrained from public statements when matters reached the crucial stage.42 Still, in the reshuffle Economic and Fiscal Policy Minister Takenaka came to hold the post of cabinet minister responsible for postal privatization concurrently. Turbulent discussions with the ruling parties A joint government–ruling parties study group on postal privatization convened as 2005 began, but the views of the two sides did not mesh and the situation remained deadlocked. Meanwhile, the work of drafting the bills went on at the Cabinet Secretariat’s Postal Privatization Preparatory Office and the skeletal outline of the privatization bills came together on 3 April (to be formally approved the following day).

Domestic affairs   69 The bills were in keeping for the most part with the Basic Policy approved by the Cabinet, but they conflicted with it over the question of whether the holding company should sell off all its stocks in the postal savings and insurance companies after the ten-year transitional period was over. Home Affairs Minister Asō wanted the company to hang on to a certain amount of the stocks whereas Takenaka advocated complete divestiture. In the end, thanks to a ruling from Koizumi it was decided that all the stocks would be sold. But the bills also contained compromise measures of a sort. In brief, they made establishing a nationwide network of post offices a legal requirement and stipulated the creation of a ¥1 trillion fund to support uniform nationwide postal savings and insurance services. Nonetheless, objections from the LDP did not end. The anti-privatization faction made the party’s Postal Service Forum chaired by Watanuki Tamisuke its base of operations; the forum advocated a scheme according to which Japan Post would be reformed but left intact. Watanuki also presided over an antiprivatization faction study group whose meeting in early April was attended by 96 lawmakers from the Diet’s upper and lower houses. It bears mention that, among them, the former Hashimoto faction stood out with 38 participants. Within the LDP, in the meantime, debate shifted to whether finding a response to the government proposal should be entirely left to the party’s leadership. Up to then, there had been many cases in which the expedient of ‘leaving it to the leadership’s discretion’ (shikkōbu ichinin 執行部一任) was adopted when debate bogged down at, say, the PARC. However, in this instance the anti-privatization faction strongly opposed using such means. In the end, on 19 April PARC chair Yosano Kaoru was entrusted with negotiations with the government, and a joint exploratory committee of the government and the LDP convened. The items on the wish list Yosano presented to the government included having the holding company retain stocks in and Table 2.11  Basic Policy on the Privatization of Japan Post (10 September 2004) (1) Privatization of Japan Post in 2007. Establishment of four independent companies, each administering one of the Japan Post’s four functions, that is, a counter services network company, a postal services company, a postal savings company, and a postal life insurance company. (2) Establishment of a holding company by the government as the parent of the four new subsidiaries. (3) Divestment by the holding company of all its stocks in the postal savings and postal insurance companies during a transitional period that will last no longer than 10 years. (4) The government will hold over a third of the stocks issued by the holding company. (5) Personnel in the new companies will lose the status of civil servants. (6) The postal services company will be obliged to provide universal service (uniformly across the country). Preferential measures will be established where deemed necessary to this purpose. (7) The new companies will be subject to the same regulations that apply to private financial institutions—banking laws with respect to the postal savings company, insurance business law with respect to the postal insurance company.

70  Koizumi and Japanese Politics maintaining an investment relationship with the postal savings and insurance companies, and adding another ¥1 trillion to the ¥1 trillion-strong Social and Local Contribution Funds (Chiiki shakai kōken kikin 地域・社会貢献基金). The government to a certain degree assented to these, and so an agreement was concluded on 26 April. It approved increasing the value of the funds to a maximum of ¥2 trillion and that, with respect to the investment relationship, in order to ‘not disturb continuity of possession’ the holding company would buy back stocks in the two finance-oriented splinter companies. The text was approved by the LDP’s Joint Panel on Postal Reform on 26 April, premised on revisions to the bills. The anti-privatization faction raised objections with the party’s three-man leadership and created an enormous ruckus the following day at the Policy Deliberation Commission (PDC) and the General Council. Discussions broke down at the PDC amid angry shouting. At the General Council, submission of the postal privatization bills to the Diet was somehow approved. But the bills’ contents had not been approved on that count at the same time, and the question of whether party debate was now closed remained ambiguous. In any event, the Cabinet approved the bills on 27 April and sent them to the Diet. The LDP in disarray and Diet deliberations The bills were explained and a question period was held at the House of Representatives plenary session of 26 May, and deliberations began. During that day’s questioning, Koizumi proclaimed, ‘The bills are in optimal form and there will be no revisions.’ However, given that Katayama Toranosuke and other LDP Upper House lawmakers were demanding substantial modifications, PARC chair Yosano Kaoru and his allies tried to grope their way towards a consensus. Koizumi insisted to the very last that no revisions be made, but on 28 June a compromise version was hammered out that called for revisions to be made in line with the agreement between the government and ruling parties mentioned above. Consultations over the modified bills took place once again at the LDP’s General Council. This time the bills were approved by a show of hands for the first time since the institution had been created. By party rules the Council followed a majority vote system, but by custom decisions were required to be unanimous. Whenever there had been a difference of opinions, the opposing members would absent themselves or walk off during voting. In this vote, five members of the Council including Kōmura Masahiko voted clearly against and Kamei Shizuka abstained, but the bills were approved with a majority vote and party discipline unequivocally applied. One of Koizumi’s characteristics as discussed in Chapter 1 was the way he favoured and invoked the formal authority invested in his office as prime minister over informal systems (such as custom). There is a deeply interesting congruence here in that the formal majority system rule was now followed at the LDP General Council, too. The losing anti faction, on the other hand, cemented its unity mainly around the Postal Service Forum and turned its eyes to the vote at the upcoming Lower House plenary session.

Domestic affairs   71 The bills were approved by the House of Representatives’ Special Committee on Postal Privatization on 4 July and sent on to the full assembly. In the 5 July vote at the Lower House’s plenary session, 37 lawmakers including Watanuki and Kamei cast ‘no’ votes while another 14 including Kōmura and Koga Makoto absented themselves or abstained. All told, the rebellion was a large one of 51 members, but the bills passed by a five-vote margin of 233: 228. The bills were sent on to the House of Councillors where they were approved by that body’s special committee on 5 August. The interest of both Nagatachō (the Tokyo neighbourhood that is home to the Japanese legislature) and the general public was now concentrated on the vote in the House of Councillors plenary session. On 5 August, Nakasone Hirofumi and other LDP Upper House lawmakers one after another declared their opposition, and expectations rose that the bills would be rejected. Meanwhile, Koizumi showed his readiness to dissolve the Lower House if the Upper House turned the bills down. Former Prime Minister Mori Yoshirō visited Koizumi on the evening of the 6th and with beer and cheese in hand implored him to not dissolve the Lower House, but Koizumi stubbornly refused. Toward the ‘postal dissolution’ Thanks to the rebellion of 23 LDP lawmakers, the bills were rejected at the House of Councillors plenary session on 8 August by a 17-vote margin (108 for, 125 against). Koizumi immediately dissolved the House of Representatives. At the same time, he dismissed Farm Minister Shimamura Yoshinobu for refusing to countersign the dissolution order and, after taking on that portfolio himself, ordered the dissolution in a cabinet decision. Koizumi withheld his endorsement from lawmakers who had rebelled in the vote on the law, dispatching challengers to stand for election in their districts. These were the so-called ‘assassins’. This represented a 180-degree reversal of the established practice wherein a lawmaker who had the three ban (san ban 三バン) – a support base (jiban 地盤), name recognition (kanban 看板) and campaign funds (kaban 鞄) – in his district would be endorsed even if he did not go along with the party leader’s policies. Koizumi’s penchant for running women candidates in a number of districts, such as Environment Minister Koike Yuriko (who challenged Kobayashi Kōki in Tokyo’s 10th District), Finance Ministry official Katayama Satsuki and economist Satō Yukari, also attracted attention. Candidate selection was carried out by LDP Secretary-General Takebe Tsutomu and General Affairs Bureau Director-General Nikai Toshihiro, but Koizumi also actively gave instructions. In some cases he stepped in as party president to persuade candidates to enter the race. Normally, the job of candidate coordination was left in the hands of the party headquarters; for the party president to get directly involved in the coordination process was highly unusual. Some of the rebel candidates who did not receive the party’s endorsement, such as Hiranuma Takeo and Noda Seiko ran as independents, while others formed new parties. A group including Watanuki and Kamei launched the People’s New Party

72  Koizumi and Japanese Politics (PNP) on 17 August, while Kobayashi and others unveiled New Party Nippon (NPN) on the 21st. The general election held on 11 September resulted in the LDP winning 296 seats while the DPJ won 113. The LDP’s landslide came thanks to an increase in votes from independent voters mainly in urban areas.43 The single-memberdistrict system has a tendency to overcompensate the slightest increase in the share of votes received with the number of seats it awards. In this election, that characteristic was on full display. To touch briefly on the reasons why the LDP won the support of the independents, the first factor to be noted is the way in which Koizumi skilfully made postal privatization the only issue at stake. Second, Koizumi used a classically populist electoral strategy. The situation was portrayed in the black-and-white terms of ‘good guys’ versus ‘bad guys’, with the rebel lawmakers as ‘bad guys’ blocking reform and damaging the public interest and Koizumi and the ‘assassins’ in the role of the ‘good guys’ promoting reform. Third, it should not be overlooked that voters cast ballots based on the prime minister’s image and his administration’s achievements. As has already been discussed, a certain amount of reform had come to pass under Koizumi’s rule and the economy was headed for recovery. In response to these kinds of results, the voters returned a favourable verdict. Implementing postal privatization The significance this election had for the policy-making process will be analysed in more detail in Chapter 4. Suffice it to say here that it quickly tightened the LDP’s ranks and sent those lawmakers who opposed postal privatization into hiding. The postal privatization bills were explained at a House of Representatives plenary session on 6 October and deliberations began. Questioning at the Lower House’s special committee on postal privatization lasted for two days, during which time Katayama Satsuki and Satō Yukari took questions and criticized the competing draft presented by the DPJ. A vote was held in the Lower House on the 11th, and the Law passed 338: 138, a 200-vote margin. The PNP’s Watanuki and Kamei voted against the bills, but of the 13 ex-LDP independent lawmakers who had not been endorsed by the party, only Hiranuma (who voted ‘nay’) and Norota Hōsei (absent) did not vote for the bills. That the bills got through the Lower House with speedy deliberations lasting only three days reflected the LDP’s heightened cohesion as well. The bills were approved by a House of Councillors plenary session on 14 October, thanks to the LDP–New Komeitō majority in that body. Thus the Postal Privatization Law, which had been so close to Koizumi’s heart, became a reality. Accordingly, in October 2007 the Japan Postal Services Corporation was privatized and the Japan Post Bank, Japan Post Insurance, Japan Post Network (for mail delivery) and Japan Post Service came into being. At the same time, the changes to the LDP also facilitated the opening of the postal market to the private sector. As noted earlier, no private companies had entered the general correspondence delivery business in fact, owing to the high hurdles posed by the

Domestic affairs   73

Photo 2.3  Koizumi in Diet. Prime Minister Koizumi is all smiles after the Postal Privatization Law is passed by the House of Representatives (11 October 2005). Photo credit: The Yomiuri Shimbun

Correspondence Delivery Law. The Basic Policy on the Privatization of Japan Post approved in September 2004 had stipulated that the rules on entering the correspondence delivery business would for the time being be left unchanged. However, a report compiled by Economic and Fiscal Policy Minister Takenaka’s private advisory council in June 2006 advised that the regulations for entering the correspondence delivery business should be eased considerably in practice. In other words, with a view to complete liberalization in the future, the regulations should be eased and private-sector participation promoted for the time being, with consideration paid to the Japan Post’s operations. More concretely, it should be made possible to have letters handled at convenience stores and the like, which for all intents and purposes would ease the obligation to install 100,000 mailboxes around the country. Moreover, the Japan Post’s delivery network ought to be opened up by allowing private corporations to have letters delivered by Japan Post as well, against payment of a commission. (Under the Abe Cabinet, submission of a revised Correspondence Delivery Law in the 2007 regular Diet

74  Koizumi and Japanese Politics session was shelved. Party unity presumably was weakened after the postal rebels had been allowed to return). In the above fashion, Prime Minister Koizumi turned the postal privatization he had advocated for so long into reality. The keys to his success were, alongside conducting debate mainly at the CEFP, his expulsion of the ‘forces of resistance’ from the LDP on the occasion of the ‘postal dissolution’ and the landslide victory he achieved in the general election that followed. Populist tactics made an enormous contribution to scoring this electoral victory. The fact that his skills as a ‘strong prime minister’ and as the ‘prime minister of pathos’ meshed and worked effectively together to an unheard of degree helped Koizumi to achieve his ardent wish and lifted his administration up to its zenith.

Conditions for strategic policy-making The two privatization campaigns compared The foregoing were representative examples of Koizumi’s structural reforms. These reforms shared the principles of neoliberalism, but the processes were not the same. Particularly striking are the differences between cases in which the CEFP was put to effective use and when it was not. I now want to show what sort of outcomes the differences in the policy-making processes produced, by comparing privatization of the postal services with that of the highway public corporations. Although the two privatization campaigns started with the same idea in mind, their outcomes were different. Relatively speaking, as far as the implementation of market principles was concerned, the spirit of privatization was adhered to more faithfully in the case of the postal services than that of the highways. In the case of postal privatization, the degree to which the established system was changed was significantly more pronounced. In the highway public corporation privatization, the government wound up with more than one-third of the stocks in the privatized companies. This made it possible for the government to retain a certain amount of influence. Also, thanks to the introduction of a direct highway administration formula along with such provisions as government bond guarantees, a mechanism resulted that made it possible to push for continued construction. It was not a structure such that highway construction projects would be decided based simply on profitability. This was reflected also in the fact that the leadership of the Highway zoku lawmakers thought the privatization law presented ‘no problems at all’, and that both the LDP’s internal review and Diet deliberations proceeded smoothly. In the postal privatization, on the other hand, although a certain degree of compromise with zoku lawmakers took place, market principles were introduced to a considerable extent. To be more specific, all of the stocks the government held in both the postal savings and insurance companies are to be sold off (at least once) in 2017, making complete privatization a reality.

Domestic affairs   75 Concerns remained that as enormous financial institutions the saving and insurances companies would swell and lead to ‘pressure on the private sector’, but the same banking and insurance laws that apply to other private institutions apply to these companies, too. The management principles found in the private sector were carried over into the postal business. Enormous differences from the highway case could also be found in the legislative process for that reason. The Posts zoku lawmakers firmly and doggedly maintained their opposition, and the decision-making process in the form of ruling party reviews and Diet deliberations was extremely unruly. The biggest factor in bringing about these sorts of differences was the question of venue. A strategic change of venue makes it possible to effect big changes in policies hardened by special interests through shaking up the existing balance of power. While the drafting of policies for the privatization of the highway public corporations took place at the HPC, in the case of postal privatization the CEFP played a leading role. Most HPC members were from the faction that favoured restraints on highway construction, but committee chair Imai Takashi was pro construction. The committee thus lacked a ‘handler’ (shikiriyaku 仕切り役) who could bring debates to a close. That the prime minister did not get directly involved in the highway case is important as well. As for the CEFP on the other hand, its handler Takenaka very scrupulously invited debate and brought debates to a conclusion when necessary by asking Koizumi for his verdict. The venues where the texts of bills were actually drafted and worked over were different, too. Generally, the bureaucracy has enormous influence in the drafting of bills. In the case of the highway public corporations, the fact that the bills were drafted at the Transport Ministry allowed the privatization committee’s policy to be changed in ways that suited the bureaucracy and zoku lawmakers. In the case of the postal services, the Preparatory Office for Postal Privatization established in the Cabinet Secretariat was assigned responsibility, not the Internal Affairs Ministry that properly had jurisdiction. A former Farm Ministry bureaucrat was ultimately put in charge. By making these sorts of changes in venue, it became possible to eliminate the influence of postal bureaucrats to a respectable degree. In addition, the position Koizumi took in each of these privatization drives was different. In the highway public corporation privatization process, the prime minister did not display active commitment, but was rather said to be ‘shot putting’ (marunage 丸投げ) policy ideas.44 In the case of postal privatization, on the other hand, Koizumi’s active commitment showed not least in his issuing directives at various phases, for which the CEFP had prepared the venue. These differences may have been due to the fact that by the time of postal privatization a learning effect from the highway privatization was setting in. The clever change of venue in the case of postal privatization was owed to the lesson learned from the ‘failure’ of permitting chaos at the Promotion Committee for the Privatization of the Four Highway-related Public Corporations and the modifications introduced by the Transport Ministry bureaucracy. That postal privitization had been the prime minister’s pet project was likely one factor behind it, but Koizumi’s active

76  Koizumi and Japanese Politics commitment certainly owed itself to an awareness on his part of the desirable results to be achieved from steadfastly maintaining his original stance in defiance of internal party opposition. Thus Koizumi’s influence dramatically increased in actual fact thanks to the general election following the ‘postal dissolution’, and he was able to realize privatization of the postal services as had been his fervent wish. Institutions and human resources underpinning strategic coherence As we have seen in this chapter, Prime Minister Koizumi carried out a variety of structural reforms in the area of economic and fiscal policy. While there are examples like the privatization of the highway public corporations that went ‘astray’, on the whole top-down policy-making was strategically pursued. A remarkably high degree of strategic coherence was demonstrated especially in those cases where the CEFP was put to lavish use. The postal privatization drive was probably the classic example of that. In the fiscal reform drive, too, reductions in public works spending and changes to the budget-drafting process were achieved on a scale never before seen. In the case of the healthcare system reforms ‘macroeconomic indicators’ were applied (albeit in an incomplete form), while the Trinity Reform accomplished massive cuts in government subsidies and transfers of tax revenue sources. Most of those cases followed a pattern wherein the divide between ministries and agencies on the one hand and the private-sector councillors on the other would become increasingly clear, and the prime minister would then step in to issue his ruling at the crucial point. By exploiting the special characteristics of the CEFP to the fullest, the prime minister’s leadership was effectively exercised. As a result, economic policies that stressed regulation and protection were phased out and policies with an underlying tone of neoliberalism broadly adopted in their stead. However, this is not to say that having a certain institutional apparatus was enough. Having people with sufficient ability and the will to put that apparatus to maximum use is also indispensable. In that respect, the presence of Takenaka as the person charged with managing the CEFP looms large.45 While taking on the role of the CEFP’s ‘handler’ as the prime minister’s proxy, Takenaka also played the part of the ‘tactician’ who devised the strategies for running the body. His strategic capabilities are well demonstrated in the way he put the council to effective use and the various schemes he devised to keep the structural reforms moving ahead. He stressed a set of three points in how to run the body: ‘craft strategies in behind-the-scenes meetings’, ‘joint expressions of opinion by all four private sector councillors’ and ‘one word from the prime minister’.46 Takenaka held exhaustive discussions at a ‘behind-the-scenes council’ (urakaigi 裏会議) that was comprised mainly of private secretaries and other personal staff, and based on that drafted the Expert Members’ Papers. He had Koizumi issue verdicts from his chair at the council after carefully laying out scenarios in advance. Thanks to having established this sort of style, the CEFP was able to function as a venue for strategic decision-making.47

Domestic affairs   77 The ‘Reform Schedule’ (Kaikaku kōteihyō 改革工程表), which spelled out what sort of schedule was to be followed in carrying out each policy item in the honebuto policy statement, was also Takenaka’s idea. Thanks to this contrivance, each ministry or agency was bound to implement the policies that the statement promised. With the conviction that ‘strategy lies in the details’, Takenaka involved himself directly and at length in detail work like the actual drafting of bills in the case of important policies such as postal privatization. Although this was unusual for a cabinet minister, he was able in this manner to prevent the ‘watering down’ of bills by the bureaucracy. The background Takenaka had as an economist was important as well. Takenaka perceived the economic stagnation of the 1990s as produced not by insufficient demand but rather by problems on the supply-side. That he had this kind of economic grounding was an important factor in sloughing off Keynesian-style management of public finance. The introduction of the ‘Reform and Perspectives’ report as a mechanism for coordinating macroeconomic operations and budget drafting likewise was an idea only an economist would have come up with. With his combination of economic knowledge and high level of strategic thinking, Takenaka made for an extremely uncommon human resource. In addition, independent-minded bureaucrats like Finance Ministry official Takahashi Yōichi

Photo 2.4  Koizumi and Takenaka smiling. Takenaka Heizō (right) was put in the strategically important positions of economic and fiscal policy minister, financial services minister, minister of state for privatization of the postal services, and internal affairs and communications minister, giving the prime minister continued support. Photo credit: The Mainichi Newspapers.

78  Koizumi and Japanese Politics or Trade Ministry official Kishi Hiroyuki gathered around and supported him as staff. Without these human resources, the Koizumi administration probably would not have produced the results that it did.48 By having on his side both the institutional apparatus that was the CEFP and the human resources to use it flexibly, Koizumi was able to become the strong prime minister he ultimately proved to be.

3 Foreign relations Closer to America, further from East Asia

During the Koizumi administration, the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the USA and the start of the Iraq War in March 2003 brought the question of dispatching Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) overseas to a new level. But whereas the bilateral alliance with the United States was dramatically strengthened, with Prime Minister Koizumi and US President George W. Bush enjoying an almost honeymoon-like relationship, relations with Japan’s East Asian neighbours – that is, China and South Korea – stagnated and cooled. This was owed to the enormous impact controversial developments within Japan such as Koizumi’s pilgrimages to Yasukuni shrine and the depiction of the country’s past in government-sanctioned history textbooks had on ties with these two countries. Meanwhile, in relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereafter, DPRK or North Korea) a degree of forward progress was achieved as the two countries’ heads of state held their first ever meeting and a number of Japanese who had been abducted to the DPRK during the 1970s and 1980s returned home. What characterized the foreign policy stances Koizumi adopted towards each country? What was the essence of his foreign policy? This chapter will close in on these questions by tracing a series of interconnected foreign policy processes. Special emphasis will be placed on the question of strategic coherence in Koizumi’s foreign policy. In sharp contrast to his strategically pursued economic policies, the strategic coherence of his foreign policy must be described as relatively poor. In foreign policy, it is important to arrive at decisions after accounting for all possibilities regarding the objectives to be achieved and the means to be adopted, and to then resolutely follow through on them. Under Koizumi, strategic coherence in this sense was thin on the ground. What is more, from around the time Koizumi took office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) – the lynchpin of foreign policy – was in deep disarray.1

80  Koizumi and Japanese Politics

Disarray at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Foreign Minister Tanaka Makiko and Suzuki Muneo MOFA scandals The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) had been mired in scandal before Koizumi became prime minister. On 25 January 2001, the ministry published the report of an investigation which revealed that the director of its Overseas Visit Support Division had embezzled ¥540 million from secret government funds and used it to buy racehorses, among other things. The director was dismissed from his post and charged with misappropriation of funds (he was arrested on 10 March). Sixteen other officials, including Foreign Minister Kōno Yōhei, were forced to take responsibility. With this incident having broken the ice, one new case after another came to the surface. On 16 July, the assistant director in the office of the deputy directorgeneral for general affairs at the ministry’s Economic Affairs Bureau and his subordinate were arrested for misuse of public funds in connection with the 2000 G8 Summit in Okinawa. On 26 July, the consul general in Denver, Colorado, was dismissed for inappropriate use of public funds. On 6 September, the assistant director at the ministry’s Western Europe I Division was arrested for padding hotel expenses at the time of the 1995 APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) Forum in Osaka. On 30 November, the ministry released the results of an internal investigation into public money being used to create slush funds. According to this report, the total amount of off-the-book funds that had been created from April 1995 to July 2001 had reached ¥202.38 million. The practice of creating slush funds extended to every division of the ministry; the entire institution was involved. Thirty-two people were punished, including two officials dismissed for using money for private purposes. Donations from officials at the assistant director level or higher and from retired ministry officials were used to pay back the ¥160 million already spent, and the balance was returned to the national treasury. Appointment of Tanaka Makiko as foreign minister In the midst of this, Tanaka Makiko – the daughter of former prime minister Tanaka Kakuei – was appointed to Koizumi’s Cabinet as foreign minister.2 Tanaka was tremendously popular among housewives at the time, and her support of Koizumi during the party presidential election had played a role in his victory. Thus Tanaka considered herself ‘the birth mother of the Koizumi cabinet’ (Koizumi naikaku umi no haha 小泉内閣生みの母). Koizumi’s popularity indeed owed much to the ‘Makiko boom’. Appointing Tanaka foreign minister signalled that she was being rewarded with an important post. But Koizumi also expected her to put her shrewdness to work in reforming the scandal-shaken ministry. Tanaka showed her determination early on to press reform on MOFA’s bureaucrats. On 8 May, she announced her intention to freeze all personnel transfers at the ministry for the time being and reshuffle the institution’s top

Foreign relations  81 executives in the near future on the grounds that personnel transfers had been ordered by the relevant authorities without consulting the foreign minister. Also, despite orders having already been issued to reassign the head of the ministry’s Russia section to be ambassador to the United Kingdom, she revoked this decision and reappointed him to his prior position. For a minister to intervene so blatantly in personnel matters involving the bureaucracy was an anomaly in Kasumigaseki, causing tension between Tanaka and the MOFA’s bureaucrats. What is more, Tanaka’s methods went beyond what was reasonable. When Deputy Vice-Minister Iimura Yutaka pointed out, with regard to the transfer of the Russia section chief, that ‘under the National Civil Service Law demotions of personnel are not possible’, Tanaka forbade Iimura to ever enter her office again, claiming she had been ‘threatened’. She also demanded from the Kantei that Vice-Minister Kawashima Yutaka be dismissed, only to give way after Kantei officials rejected this as ‘unacceptable while the Diet is in session’. Thus, frictions between Tanaka and the ministry’s bureaucracy continued to rise with each passing day. In another unusual incident in October, Tanaka locked herself in the office of the Personnel Division’s appointments section for more than an hour and a half as she sought to have the division’s director dismissed. There was no end to the troubles for Tanaka when it came to foreign policy matters either. Shortly after she took office, Tanaka cancelled a meeting with US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage moments before it was scheduled to take place. Worse than that, the explanations given for this move were inconsistent. Immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA, she let slip to the Japanese press classified information regarding the State Department’s emergency evacuation location. Following this, the attitude spread that she should not have access to classified information. In another incident in November, she was late to a meeting with visiting Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi while looking for a missing ring. After blaming a secretary for having stolen it, she made that aide go out and buy a replacement with his own money. The feud with Suzuki Muneo Tanaka also locked horns with Suzuki Muneo, a Hokkaido politician who wielded behind-the-scenes influence at MOFA as a kind of ‘one-man foreign policy zoku’. The trigger was the abortive transfer of the Russian section chief noted above. It was believed that the transfer had been instigated in the first place due to the section chief’s opposition to Suzuki’s stance over how to handle the territorial dispute with Moscow over four islands north of Japan seized by Russia at the end of the Second World War. (Suzuki favoured the early return of two of these islands, with discussions regarding the remaining two to follow.) At an informal press briefing, Tanaka indicated that there had been pressure from Suzuki in this personnel matter. At a 20 June meeting of the House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs Committee Suzuki pressed Tanaka to retract her charge as there were no facts to

82  Koizumi and Japanese Politics support it. When Tanaka failed to give a clear response, the matter was postponed for the committee’s next meeting two days later. On the day before this follow-up meeting, however, Tanaka called committee chairman Doi Ryūichi to demand that Suzuki’s time for asking questions be limited. This turned into a major issue at the committee as an act of government interference in the legislative branch’s affairs. Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo was forced to issue an apology to both the ruling and opposition parties. Tanaka’s spat with Suzuki dragged on into 2002. The International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan met in Tokyo that January. On the day of the conference, MOFA rejected the registrations of two non-governmental organizations (NGOs) scheduled to attend. Suspicions emerged that the rejections were the result of pressure Suzuki had put on the ministry. Questioned about this at a meeting of the House of Representatives Budget Committee on 24 January, Tanaka declared Foreign Affairs Vice-Minister Nogami Yōshiji had told her that Suzuki was involved. Suzuki and Nogami both responded by flatly denying that this had been the case, but at the Budget Committee meeting on 28 January, Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau Director-General Shigeie Toshinori clarified that Suzuki’s name had come up at the time the NGOs were refused participation. The government presented its opinion that decisions regarding the NGOs’ participation had not been made based on a particular lawmaker’s stance. But the opposition parties refused to accept this and the Diet became deadlocked. Matters having reached this point, Koizumi finally made up his mind and on 29 January dismissed both Tanaka and Nogami on the grounds that deliberations

Photo 3.1  Suzuki Muneo (left) and Tanaka Makiko. The feud between the two in the Koizumi administration’s early days played out in the media and turned politics into ‘theatre’. Photo credit: The Yomiuri Shimbun.

Foreign relations  83 in the Diet were going nowhere. Suzuki, too, resigned his position as chair of the House of Representatives’ Steering Committee. (Suspicions about Suzuki continued to be pursued, however, above all by Tsujimoto Kiyomi of the Socialist Party. Suzuki was arrested in June on suspicion of accepting bribes for influence peddling.) The Koizumi administration took a hit for the dismissal of its ‘birth mother’. The administration’s high approval ratings instantly plunged 30 per cent, falling from nearly 80 per cent to below 50. Tanaka was treated as a ‘tragic heroine’ on the so-called ‘wide shows’ – daytime television programmes mixing talk and entertainment that are particularly popular among the housewife segment of the population – while Suzuki’s office was deluged with protest phone calls. The entire incident can be seen as a symbolic illustration of the populist character of Koizumi’s administration. However, amid all the confusion at MOFA, there occurred an event that soon would develop into a major turning point for Japanese foreign and security policy. This was the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Strengthening cooperation with the USA: the dispatch of the Self-Defence Forces overseas The 9/11 attacks and Koizumi’s response Koizumi made his first visit to the USA on 30 June 2001, two months after he had taken office. His first summit meeting with a US head of state – President George W. Bush, who himself had been in office for only a few months – took place at the Camp David presidential retreat on the outskirts of Washington, DC. The two leaders issued a joint statement entitled ‘Partnership for Security and Prosperity’ that reaffirmed the Japan–US alliance’s status as the cornerstone of peace and stability for the Asia-Pacific region. They also agreed to intensify the strategic dialogue over the regional security environment and defence cooperation, and to take action on the problem of the US forces stationed in Japan by implementing the Special Action Committee (SACO) Agreement to lessen the burden on the people of Okinawa. Koizumi furthermore expressed his determination to revitalize the Japanese economy by carrying out structural reforms, which Bush welcomed.3 The meeting marked the start of Koizumi’s more than five-year close personal relationship with his American counterpart. A little more than two months later, on 11 September, passenger aircraft commandeered by terrorists flew into the World Trade Center buildings in New York City and the Pentagon near Washington, DC. Following the attacks, President Bush announced in a televised address his determination to strike back, saying, ‘We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbour them.’ The Japanese government created a crisis response centre at the Kantei, and Koizumi held discussions with Fukuda and other staffers. On the morning of 12 September, the Security Council of Japan (SCJ) met at the Kantei to decide

84  Koizumi and Japanese Politics on a six-point response. That response comprised making a close assessment of the situation, including the status of any Japanese nationals at the scene of the attacks, and studying the possibility of sending the Japan Disaster Relief Team to the USA. The fifth point called for ‘working together with the US and the other countries involved in dealing with international terrorism’. While the USA moved ahead with preparations for a retaliatory military operation, the Japanese government began considering measures to provide Washington with support. At the back of the minds of every official involved was Japan’s experience with international contributions at the time of the Persian Gulf War in 1991. That experience was a traumatic one for Japan. Although Tokyo had provided US$13 billion worth of financial support to the international coalition, Japan received low marks from the international community since the country’s contribution of personnel had been limited to the dispatch of minesweepers sent after the fighting was over. For that reason, Japanese officials strongly felt that this time a more ‘visible’ (me ni mieru 目に見える) contribution was needed, such as a dispatch of the SDF. Deputy Secretary of State Armitage, moreover, had told Japan’s Ambassador to the US Yanai Shunji to ‘show the flag’. This had been interpreted to mean ‘show the Rising Sun at the scene’ – in other words, as a request for dispatching the SDF. (Although US Ambassador to Japan Howard Baker explained the following day that Armitage’s comment had simply meant ‘show whose side you are on’.) Drafting the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law On 17 September, the government decided on seven ‘immediate measures’, which Koizumi announced at an emergency press conference. First on the list was dispatching the SDF to provide rear-area support including medical aid, transport and refuelling for US and other forces. The other measures included strengthening security around US military installations in Japan and dispatching SDF naval vessels to collect intelligence. Rear-area support would be premised on a UN Security Council resolution determining ‘a threat to international peace and security’. The direction that would be taken was to create a special law restricted to the current situation, to be submitted to an extraordinary Diet session scheduled to begin on 27 September. A proposal to look into the applicability of the Law on a Situation in the Areas Surrounding Japan (hereafter SIASJ Law), a domestic law tied to Japan– US security arrangements, was also considered. However, a more expansive interpretation of this law was thought difficult given that (1) it defines ‘a situation in the areas surrounding Japan’ as ‘a situation having a significant effect on the security of Japan’ and (2) then-Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō had told the Diet in 1999 during deliberations that ‘events arising in the Middle East or the Indian Ocean cannot be seen as constituting a real problem’ under it. It was thus decided to create a new law instead. Meanwhile, the Self-Defence Forces Law was to be revised such as to allow for a strengthening of security at US bases in Japan, while

Foreign relations  85 a dispatch of SDF forces on intelligence duties would be carried out based on the provisions for ‘investigations and research’ stipulated in the Defence Agency Act. Koizumi flew to the USA on 25 September to discuss terror responses. In talks with Bush, Koizumi said he saw the attacks as ‘a grave challenge to freedom and democracy’ and that as an ally Japan would strongly support the USA. He also noted that ‘while there are constraints on the SDF’s activities, there are many things that can be done in areas not involving the use of military force’, and promised that Japan would provide as much support as it could in such areas as medical care, refugee aid, transportation of goods and intelligence gathering.4 Thus, the enactment of a new law to provide support to the US military had become an international pledge. Work on drafting the bill proceeded under the direction of an exploratory team led by Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Ōmori Keiji, a former Defence Agency official. (The bill was said to have been put under the purview of the Cabinet Secretariat owing to a lack of confidence in Foreign Minister Tanaka’s ability to handle questions about it in the Diet.5) The secretaries general and policy chiefs of the three ruling parties met on 1 October to discuss the government’s draft of the bill. They signed off on the bill basically as written, aside from some revisions

Photo 3.2  Koizumi and Bush conclude their meeting held in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks (25 September 2001, Washington, DC). The Koizumi administration consistently supported US foreign policy. It made few attempts to chart an independent course. Photo credit: Yomiuri Shimbun.

86  Koizumi and Japanese Politics to accommodate the views of the New Komeitō Party (NKP) such as imposing a two-year time limit on the legislation. The Cabinet then approved the AntiTerrorism Special Measures Law (hereafter Anti-Terrorism Law) and the draft revision of the Self-Defence Forces Law, and submitted them to the Diet. The whole process was unusually rapid, only 24 days having passed since the 9/11 attacks and 16 days since Koizumi announced his seven-point response plan. The SDF’s activities as stipulated under the law fell into three areas: ‘cooperation and support’, ‘search and rescue’ and ‘relief activities’. Cooperation and support referred to providing goods and services, which had been enumerated in the seven-point plan as refuelling, transportation, refitting and repairs, medical care and communications. The draft revision of the Self-Defence Forces Law added ‘security operations’ as a new SDF responsibility that pertained to guarding SDF and US military facilities in Japan. On 7 October, US and British forces began military operations against Osama bin Laden’s forces and his Taliban protectors in Afghanistan. Japan’s emergency terrorism task force – comprised of the entire cabinet – met at the Kantei in the small hours of 8 October and decided on seven emergency response measures including firming up the procedures for evacuating Japanese nationals out of neighbouring countries and working to pass the Anti-Terrorism Law as quickly as possible. Koizumi then announced at an emergency press conference: ‘I strongly support the present actions to battle terrorism.’ Passage of the Anti-Terrorism Law and the SDF dispatch Deliberations moved forward at the Diet over the draft Anti-Terrorism Law. The arguments between the ruling and opposition parties focused on Diet approval of dispatching the SDF and transportation of weapons and ammunition. The government draft said the dispatch would be reported to the Diet after it had taken place, but the opposition DPJ demanded a revision such that the Diet would have to approve the dispatch in advance. Also, the DPJ demanded that carrying weapons and munitions be excluded from the SDF’s activities. The three ruling parties agreed on 13 October to revise the bill to allow for ex post facto Diet approval, that is, the government would give the Diet details about an SDF operation within 20 days of the forces being dispatched and then get the Diet’s approval. They also decided to exclude surface transportation of any weapons or materials in a foreign territory. The ruling parties approached the DPJ with this proposal at a meeting of party leaders on 15 October, but the DPJ persisted in its calls for prior approval and discussions broke down. The next day, a House of Representatives special committee approved the draft as modified by the ruling parties, and its plenary session signed off on the legislation on 18 October. The LDP’s Nonaka Hiromu and Koga Makoto were opposed to the bill and walked out, while one member of the DPJ voted in favour. A House of Councillors plenary session approved the bill on 29 October, passing it into law. The SCJ decided in an 8 November meeting to dispatch three maritime SDF vessels to the Indian Ocean. Using the Defence Agency Act as its legal

Foreign relations  87 foundation, the dispatch’s purpose was to gather intelligence prior to the start of SDF support activities. The vessels were sent on their mission the following day. The government then decided that a ‘Basic Plan’ (Kihon keikaku 基本計画) based on the Anti-Terrorism Law would lay out the details of the SDF’s activities, the area of operation and the length of the mission. The main support activities involved the dispatch of five Maritime SDF (MSDF) tankers and escort vessels in all (including the three already sent) and eight Air SDF (ASDF) transports. The MSDF’s area of operations would be the Indian Ocean, including the Persian Gulf, Australia and the route to the Indian Ocean, while the ASDF craft would operate at Guam and on the route to the Indian Ocean. No more than 1,200 sailors and 180 airmen would be sent on the mission, which was scheduled to last for six months. One naval vessel would be dispatched to provide Afghan refugees with daily necessities. On 20 November, the operational guidelines covering the details of the SDF’s activities were approved. Defence Agency chief Nakatani Gen issued the dispatch order for the two forces on the same day and on 25 November three MSDF vessels left port. The cabinet had signed off on 22 November on a bill to approve the dispatch and sent it to the Diet, where it was approved in a House of Representatives plenary session on 27 November by majority vote. The DPJ had decided to support the bill, but 21 DPJ lawmakers including party vice-president Yokomichi Takahiro either voted against or abstained. A House of Councillors plenary session passed the bill on 30 November, but again seven DPJ lawmakers dissented. The Anti-Terrorism Law: a turning point in postwar security policy The Anti-Terrorism Law significantly expanded the range of activities in which the SDF can participate overseas; for this reason, it has been described as ‘a turning point in postwar security policy’.6 Work had begun on developing legislation to broaden the sphere of SDF activities after the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations (popularly referred to as the PKO Law) was enacted and the Law Concerning Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams (hereafter the JDR Law) revised in 1992. With the SIASJ Law enacted in 1999 it became possible to provide rear-area support to US forces in the event of a situation occurring in an area near Japan. However, many points in the AntiTerrorism Law were a big step beyond these other legal measures. The activities the SDF would be undertaking were the same as those stipulated under the SIASJ Law on providing US forces with refuelling and transportation support. However, when it came to the scope of activity, in contrast to ‘areas near Japan’ as laid out in the SIASJ Law, the Anti-Terrorism Law covered not only Japanese territorial and international waters and airspace but also foreign territory provided that the respective states approved and the areas involved were not under hostilities.

88  Koizumi and Japanese Politics On the standards governing weapons use, Japanese soldiers were permitted to use them under the SIASJ and other regulations only to defend themselves and other SDF personnel, but under the Anti-Terrorism Law ‘individuals who have come under the custody of personnel in the course of executing their duties’ were added so as to be able to protect refugees or wounded American soldiers when giving aid to displaced people or providing medical care. Most of all, even if limited to areas where no combat was taking place, that the SDF was being dispatched to a country at war was a landmark event. Up to this point and particularly under the 1955 system, Japan had basically left security matters up to the USA while keeping its own defence capabilities at a minimum, to tack a basic course dedicated to the economy and social well-being instead. (This can be labelled the ‘political realist’ track, as described in more detail in Chapter 4.) But a new policy line has become prominent since the 1990s, motivated by the Gulf War, that calls for strengthening military cooperation with the USA (the ‘military realist’ track). The Anti-Terrorism Law stands as a major shift in direction towards the latter. The US attack on Iraq and Koizumi After the Taliban had been removed from power in Afghanistan, the next target President Bush had in his sights was Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Bush claimed that Hussein had hidden weapons of mass destruction and at first tried to get them exposed through a UN Security Council resolution. But Iraq refused to cooperate with inspectors and the outcome Bush had hoped for could not be obtained. At last, on the evening of 19 March 2003 (midday 20 March, Japan time), after having warned that ‘[t]he United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities so we will rise to ours’, Bush launched the attack on Iraq. The international community was divided in its response to the US attack, as doubts remained about its legitimacy under international law. France, Germany and Russia were among the countries that opposed the operation. About one hour after Bush’s televised address announcing the start of the attack, Koizumi called a press conference. He told the assembled reporters, ‘Iraq has ignored and made a mockery of a UN resolution. I understand and support the start of US military operations.’ Koizumi also called a meeting of the SCJ with all cabinet ministers. The body agreed to an emergency response plan that centred on guaranteeing the safety of Japanese nationals and increasing security at home. An emergency cabinet meeting followed, at which the ministers decided to create the Emergency Measures Headquarters for the Situation in Iraq to coordinate Japan’s response to the Iraq crisis. In its first meeting held immediately afterwards, the newly created entity decided that efforts should be made to confirm what systems were in place to evacuate Japanese nationals and preparations should be made to dispatch aircraft for the government’s use. It also agreed to consider the provision of reconstruction and humanitarian assistance to Iraq, and to look into ways to extend and beef up the support Japan could provide under the Anti-Terrorism Law.

Foreign relations  89 Towards enactment of the Iraq Special Measures Law Like the Anti-Terrorism Law, the government’s course on Iraq humanitarian and reconstruction assistance was worked out by a Cabinet Secretariat investigation team.7 In early April 2003, the team laid out a five-point plan that included economic aid, support for restoring civil government and rebuilding projects, and humanitarian assistance. It also decided that the dispatch of SDF troops based on a new law would be necessary to handle all areas of assistance other than economic aid. However, the government ostensibly adopted a cautious stance on enacting a new law. Koizumi, Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko and Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda repeatedly issued statements such as the following by Koizumi to reporters at an informal briefing on 28 April: ‘We can’t answer the question of whether or not the SDF can be dispatched without drafting a new law on reconstruction assistance as long as we have not seen the foreign situation. For the moment, we are doing what can be done under existing laws.’ Diet deliberations were under way at this time on emergency defence bills, and the government was avoiding public moves on a new Iraq law until passage of these bills was in sight. Meanwhile, with their overwhelming firepower superiority US forces took the Iraqi capital of Baghdad on 9 April, and on 1 May Bush declared an end to major combat operations in the country. On 22 May, Koizumi visited the US president at his ranch in Crawford, Texas. Only a few foreign dignitaries had been invited to stay at the ranch over the years, and now Koizumi was included in their number. He was allowed to sit in as Bush received one of his regular briefings from the CIA, the hospitality illustrating again the close relationship the pair shared. During their talks the next day on 23 May, lasting for no less than 10 hours, Koizumi told Bush that he planned to dispatch C-130 cargo planes from the ASDF to a country or countries near Iraq, and that after he returned to Japan ‘we shall study in detail what Japan can do for the reconstruction of Iraq’ in connection with the SDF’s dispatch under a new law. In fact, the investigatory team at the Cabinet Secretariat was already considering the substance of the new law, and by around 5 June it had settled on its basic framework. The law was to be based on a series of UN resolutions, including Security Council Resolution 1483 lifting economic sanctions on Iraq. The SDF’s activities would include (1) providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to the people of Iraq by helping to rebuild infrastructure and transporting daily necessities, (2) disposing of any weapons of mass destruction found to have been left behind by the Hussein regime, and (3) helping to guarantee safety by carrying out medical, transportation and refuelling operations for coalition forces engaged in operations to maintain security in Iraq. Activities would be limited to noncombat areas. Diet deliberations and DPJ opposition Koizumi met with the secretaries general of the three ruling parties on 7 June, the day after the Diet passed the emergency defence bills. He indicated his

90  Koizumi and Japanese Politics desire to submit the new law on providing support to Iraq during the current Diet session and outlined the bill’s framework. After the framework was approved, the assembled officials agreed they would aim for a temporary statute with a lifespan on the order of four years. The Cabinet Secretariat presented its draft of the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq to the ruling parties (to a joint meeting of the Ruling Parties’ Liaison Council on the Iraq and North Korea Problems and the Emergency Anti-Terrorism Headquarters) on 9 June. Ōmori Keiji, assistant to the deputy chief cabinet secretary, explained the particulars of the draft bill as outlined above and the ruling parties gave their approval. When the bill was explained the next day at a joint meeting of the National Defence, Foreign Affairs and Cabinet divisions of the LDP, questions about how ‘noncombat areas’ would be delineated and dissatisfaction over the deferral of review of the standards for using weapons arose, but the joint group approved the draft on 12 June. The clauses regarding the disposal of weapons of mass destruction were deleted from the draft at a meeting of the party’s General Council due to strong opposition from Nonaka Hiromu and former Defence Agency chief Norota Hōsei. The LDP General Council signed off on the Iraq Special Measures Law on 13 June. The bill was approved by the Cabinet the following day and submitted to the Diet. A House of Representatives plenary session heard an explanation of the bill’s main points and held a question and answer session on 24 June, after which deliberations over the legislation began. The government and ruling parties had prepared themselves for changes to the bill in anticipation of discussions over revision with the DPJ. A compromise draft had already been worked out that shortened the four-year time limit in the government’s draft to two years and changed ex post facto approval of the SDF dispatch to prior approval. But the DPJ’s stance went far beyond such anticipations. The central point of the DPJ’s amendment bill unveiled on 1 July was its deletion of the SDF dispatch. The rationale behind this was that drawing borders between combat and noncombat areas was difficult, and sending troops to a combat zone would be unconstitutional. The government and the ruling parties took this to be a de facto refusal of revision. The House of Representatives’ Special Committee on Iraq Issues approved the draft on 3 July. Despite opposition from the DPJ and three other opposition parties, the bill was approved the following day at a House of Representatives plenary session by a majority vote from the three ruling parties. As in the case of the AntiTerrorism Law, there were rebels in the ruling coalition as well. Former Home Affairs Minister Nishida Mamoru joined Nonaka and Koga in absenting himself from the body just before the vote was taken, while Inaba Yamato voted ‘no’. The scene then shifted to the House of Councillors, during which time Koizumi came out with a number of what have been called ‘absurd replies’ (chintōben 珍答弁) to questions posed by lawmakers (see Chapter 5). A House of Councillors plenary session approved the bill on 26 July, and it came into force on 1 August. Looking ahead to the International Donors’ Conference on Iraqi Reconstruction that was to take place in Madrid in late October, the government announced its

Foreign relations  91 own aid package on the 15th of that month. The core of the package was grant assistance totalling US$1.5 billion (approximately ¥165 billion) for 2004 to help in the reconstruction effort. The funds would go to helping the Iraqi people with rebuilding basic life-support infrastructure, involving such areas as electric power, water supplies and sanitation, healthcare and schools, as well as improving the security situation. The formal plan was announced at the Madrid Conference that began on 23 October. The plan called for Japan to contribute a total of US$5 billion (approximately ¥550 billion), including the aforementioned US$1.5 billion, over the four years up to 2007. This contribution amounted to around 15 per cent of the US$33 billion total aid from donor countries announced at the conference. On 17 October, President Bush visited Japan for a summit meeting. After Bush expressed his gratitude for Japan’s aid plans Koizumi declared his intent to play a positive role in the effort to provide reconstruction and humanitarian assistance. Meanwhile, it was clear that the security situation in Iraq was worsening amid a spate of suicide bombings and other events. For that reason, Koizumi maintained his cautious stance over dispatching the SDF under the Iraq Special Measures Law. On 29 November, two Foreign Ministry officials – Oku Katsuhiko, a councillor from the Japanese embassy in Britain, and Inoue Masamori, the third secretary with Japan’s embassy in Iraq – were shot dead while in Tikrit in central Iraq. The incident further heightened concerns about the country’s security situation. Opposition parties forcefully demanded that the dispatch of SDF troops be halted, but Koizumi only hardened his resolve and urged on the work of drawing up a ‘Basic Plan’ for Iraq reconstruction assistance based on the Special Measures Law. Approval of the Basic Plan and the SDF dispatch The Basic Plan’s framework was unveiled on 8 December and explained to a joint meeting of the Ruling Parties’ Liaison Council on Iraq and North Korea and the LDP’s Cabinet, National Defence and Foreign Affairs divisions, which approved it. Koizumi held discussions the following day with Kanzaki Takenori, chief representative of ruling coalition partner New Komeitō (NKP), followed by the exchange of a memorandum affirming that ‘the prime minister would carefully observe the security situation on the ground and reissue appropriate instructions on that basis’. The plan as approved by the Cabinet that day contained the following provisions. Ground SDF forces would be sent to Muthanna province in south-eastern Iraq around the town of Samawah, from which they would provide assistance such as medical aid, water supplies and rebuilding public infrastructure. Aircraft from the ASDF would transport humanitarian aid between airbases in Kuwait and Iraq while the MSDF would dispatch transport ships to deploy Ground SDF (GSDF) personnel and equipment. Given the possibility of terrorist attacks, the SDF’s equipment included recoilless rifles and light armoured vehicles. The dispatch order was issued to the three forces on 19 December. ASDF advance teams left for Qatar and Kuwait on the 26th. The GSDF deployment was held up owing to the risk-averse attitude at the NKP over the high levels of danger. It was therefore decided to send an advance team to report on the situation on the

92  Koizumi and Japanese Politics ground before a decision over deploying the main force was made. The advance team arrived in Samawah on 19 January 2004, with part of the team returning to Japan four days later. Their report stated: ‘Although there is a possibility of terrorist acts, the area is relatively stable compared to other parts of Iraq.’ The NKP accepted the report and issued its approval, thus clearing the way for deployment of the ground forces. The 560-member strong main force was deployed to Samawah in February and March to provide medical aid and begin work on the reconstruction and provision of schools, roads, and other public infrastructure. The ASDF dispatched its main force of three C-130 transport aircraft in late January and took up its task, which was mainly delivery of supplies for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. The international community was deeply divided over the legitimacy of the attack on Iraq. Irritations went to such strange lengths as US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld labelling France and other European nations critical of the USA ‘Old Europe,’ and ‘French fries’ being changed to ‘Freedom fries’ on the menu at the Congress cafeteria out of resentment toward France. Given this situation, Bush was extremely grateful for Koizumi’s pro-US attitude, and the affectionate relation between the two rose to a new level. Koizumi’s gleeful mood when he visited Elvis Presley’s Graceland mansion with Bush and his wife on a trip he took to the USA in late June 2006 shortly before leaving office was emblematic of this.

Photo 3.3  The Ground Self-Defence Forces on duty in Iraq. The Japanese and Iraqi flags fly over the camp. Photo credit: The Yomiuri Shimbun.

Foreign relations  93 A foreign policy lacking strategic coherence? In this manner, the SDF came to be dispatched overseas in the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks for the purpose of assisting the US forces. At the same time, in a development I cannot address in this chapter in the required detail, bilateral military cooperation was strengthened in conjunction with the realignment of US forces within Japan. The realignment process was expected to strengthen the connectivity and coordination capabilities of the US and Japanese militaries through a variety of measures (ultimately agreed upon in May 2006). These included moving Futenma Air Force Base in Okinawa to Camp Schwab also on the island, as agreed to in October 2005; the transfer of a new US Army Headquarters to Camp Zama in Kanagawa Prefecture where Japan was to set up the headquarters of its Ground SDF Central Readiness Force Command; and establishment of a Bilateral and Joint Operations Coordination Center at Yokota Air Base in western Tokyo in conjunction with the relocation of Japan’s Air Defence Command there. One school of thought in Japan maintains that Tokyo should as a rule leave defence matters in the hands of the USA, while an opposing school believes Japan should strengthen the alliance by making manpower and military contributions. Koizumi made clear that he stood with the latter. On this point, the Koizumi administration can be said to have held definite principles also in the areas of foreign and defence policy. However, compared with its economic policies that were advanced strategically under the guidance of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy as the ‘control tower of the reforms’, the strategic coherence of Koizumi’s foreign policy can only be described as poor. (Here, I use ‘strategy’ in the sense of setting a policy into motion after having thoroughly considered the goals to be achieved and the means to be adopted for realizing them.) This series of cooperative efforts with the USA can be thought of as an almost Pavlovian response caused by an obsessive conviction that Japan must deploy the SDF and support the USA, as well as a result of Koizumi’s close personal relationship with Bush. Of course, there are international political constraints that compel Japan to cling to its alliance with the USA for defence purposes. That Japan has limited options from which to choose is a definite fact. However, can it really be said that the Koizumi administration fully considered all the options available to it from a strategic perspective? Or to put this differently, can it be said that the government carefully deliberated over and reached its own conclusions regarding such questions as what foreign policy approach is best suited to Japan’s national interests, what is the Japanese national interest in the first place, what sort of world order would be ideal, and what kind of contribution should Japan truly make to international society? An important aspect of the 1955 system was that, since its main interest was directed towards wealth redistribution at home, Japan relinquished independent decision-making in foreign policy and defence matters to rely on the USA in those areas. What resulted was the entrenchment of a cognitive framework that perceived international relations on the basis of ties with the USA as its central

94  Koizumi and Japanese Politics concern, and of a behavioural pattern in which US demands were responded to passively. Additionally, the ‘trauma’ of not having been able to make adequate manpower contributions at the time of the 1991 Persian Gulf War firmly planted the fixed notion in the minds of relevant government officials that US requests must be met with contributions of manpower. For that reason, the Koizumi administration’s cooperative efforts with the USA strongly gave the impression of being less the result of strategic judgements based on a larger perspective than motivated by this kind of compulsive thinking. This was exemplified by an over-eagerness to send the SDF overseas it displayed on numerous occasions. That Armitage’s ‘show the flag’ comment after the 9/11 attacks was interpreted as a request to deploy the SDF also suggests the extent to which an obsession with manpower contributions ruled the thinking of government officials. During a Japan–US summit meeting held in Shanghai on 20 October 2001, President Bush indicated that his hopes for Japan had more to do with the postwar reconstruction of Afghanistan than SDF support for US forces.8 This exchange revealed the gap between the two governments’ thinking. On the Iraq War as well, while the international community was strongly critical of US unilateralism, Japan stood behind Bush almost unconditionally. Certainly, a strategic decision was involved here in the sense that this put Bush in Koizumi’s debt.9 However, this was still well in line with the traditional way of thinking that put the bilateral relationship with the United States first. UK Prime Minister Tony Blair similarly supported Bush’s unilateral approach, but Blair also sought to preserve what common ground he could with other European nations. For example, Bush thought that UN Security Council Resolution 1441 provided sufficient grounds for military action against Iraq, but in response to strong appeals from Blair the USA submitted a new resolution stating that ‘Iraq has ignored its last chance’. (It eventually failed.) Blair made this request because he did not fail to take relations with Europe and particularly France into account as well.10 Did the Koizumi administration take any actions marked by an equivalent level of strategic thinking? This lack of strategic coherence was even more striking in its foreign policy towards Asia as we shall see.

Troubled ties with China and South Korea: the Prime Minister’s pilgrimages to Yasukuni shrine Preliminary skirmish? Japan’s ties with its neighbours China and South Korea had been extraordinarily friendly during the years of the Obuchi Keizō administration (July 1998–April 2000). This changed markedly during the time Koizumi was in office, though difficulties in relations with Beijing had already begun to emerge before his administration was launched. Such issues as the content of Japanese history textbooks cast a subtle shadow on Sino-Japanese ties. Adding to this, former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui had applied for a visa to visit Japan for heart treatment. The Japanese government decided on

Foreign relations  95 20 April 2001 to issue Lee a visa on the condition that his visit was limited to receiving medical treatment and that he did not engage in political activities. The Chinese government nonetheless strongly objected. That evening, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi summoned Japanese Ambassador Anami Koreshige to the ministry to ‘lodge a strong protest against permitting this visit heedless of the Chinese government’s repeated requests to hold off’ on approving a visa for Lee. (Lee eventually arrived for his first visit to Japan in 16 years on 22 April and stayed for four days.) Owing to an incident involving a collision between USA and Chinese military aircraft, anti-American sentiment had been riding high in China at the time, but criticism of Japan now rose in a flash. The Chinese government announced on 25 April that a visit by Li Peng, chairman of the Chinese parliament’s Standing Committee, scheduled for late May was being postponed since ‘owing to recent circumstances in Sino-Japanese relations, the impending trip to Japan has become difficult’. Tensions between China and Japan were on the rise over trade issues as well. Imports of Chinese-produced Welsh onions, rushes (the straw used for making the traditional tatami flooring found in most Japanese households) and fresh shiitake mushrooms had been rapidly increasing. Since domestic producers were severely affected by this development, the farm, finance and trade ministers agreed to provisionally invoke general safeguard measures (an emergency import restriction mechanism) for these three items. A report on the plan was submitted to the World Trade Organization on 20 April, and the government provisionally invoked safeguards on the three products for a 200-day period lasting until 8 November. The Chinese government objected strongly, and announced that it was imposing a 100 per cent special tariff on Japanese automobiles including trucks and buses, cell phones and air conditioning units.11 Against this background, Koizumi’s selection as prime minister stirred great concerns in China, given that he had announced (in comments at a debate among the LDP’s candidates for party president): ‘If I assume the office of prime minister, I will definitely visit Yasukuni Shrine on 15 August [the day of Japan’s surrender in the Second World War] to commemorate those who fell in battle no matter what criticism may arise.’12 The textbook issue had also become a huge thorn in the side of relations with South Korea. South Korean Foreign and Trade Minister Han Siung-soo summoned Japan’s ambassador to Seoul Terada Terusuke on 8 May in connection with the Japanese Education Ministry’s approval of new junior high school history textbooks to request further revision on the grounds that they contained errors and distortions in no less than 35 cases. Particularly problematic was the textbook written by the revisionist Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform. The complaints concentrated on this group’s attack on textbooks then in use as representing a ‘masochistic view’ (jigyaku shikan 自虐史観) of Japanese history, and its designation of the Pacific War as ‘the Greater East Asia War’ (Dai Tō-A Sensō 大東亜戦争) whose objective would have been Asian liberation. South Korea demanded 25 revisions be made in this textbook, arguing that

96  Koizumi and Japanese Politics it demonstrated ‘a lack of repentance for colonial rule’. Koizumi immediately declared that ‘additional revisions cannot be made after approval’, but the Korean government protested and announced that a joint search-and-rescue exercise involving the MSDF and the Korean Navy scheduled for early June would be postponed. Further cancellations or postponements of bilateral exchange projects followed in close succession. Yasukuni pilgrimages and protests from China and Korea Koizumi visited Yasukuni shrine on 13 August that year. His public promise had originally been to go on the 15th, but he moved the date out of consideration for negative reactions a visit on that day would attract both at home and abroad. It was the first visit to the shrine by a prime minister since Hashimoto Ryūtarō had gone in July 1996. At the same time, Koizumi issued a statement saying that he wanted to offer his ‘feelings of profound remorse and sincere mourning to all the victims of war’. In response, China and South Korea launched strong protests. Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang summoned Ambassador Anami to lodge a formal complaint reading: ‘The Chinese government and people express their strong indignation. … Such visits damage the political basis for Sino-Japanese relations and injure the feelings of the Chinese people and other Asian peoples who fell victim [to Japan]. [This visit] will have an effect on the healthy future development of bilateral relations.’ The Korean government also protested that day in a statement from the Foreign and Trade Ministry’s spokesman saying, ‘We express great indignation that, despite repeatedly conveying our alarm, Prime Minister Koizumi visited Yasukuni Shrine, a symbol of Japanese militarism.’ South Korean Vice Foreign Minister Choi Sung-hong called in Ambassador Terada the next day to formally convey the Korean government’s sense of regret. Amid this worsening in relations with China and South Korea, the 9/11 attacks occurred. Efforts to improve relations with the two countries were hastened due to the necessity of forming an international united front in the battle against terrorism. A flurry of activity on the part of the Foreign Ministry to accomplish summit meetings with both countries’ leaders before the APEC gathering set to take place in Shanghai in late October achieved the desired results. Koizumi visited China on 8 October and, after visiting Marco Polo Bridge and the Memorial Hall of the War of Resistance (against Japanese aggression), held his first talks with Chinese President Jiang Zemin in Beijing. Koizumi noted that he had ‘seen the memorial displays with heartfelt apologies and mourning for the victims of past wars and aggression’. Jiang expressed his strong concerns that even as efforts were being made ‘toward easing tensions in the state of SinoJapanese relations. … Class A war criminals are honored at Yasukuni shrine. If Japanese leaders go there, it leads to complicated results.’ Regarding antiterrorism policies, Koizumi told Jiang that he was ‘thinking about contributions commensurate with our national capabilities, grounded in the principle that Japan

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Photo 3.4  Koizumi’s first visit to Yasukuni shrine (13 August 2001). Out of consideration for China and South Korea the date was moved forward from his original pledge to go on the anniversary of the end of the Second World War, but he was still battered by fierce criticism from these two countries and elsewhere. Photo credit: The Yomiuri Shimbun.

will not use weapons or engage in conflict’. The Chinese leader responded that it was ‘easy to understand cooperation of that sort’, but added that he wanted Koizumi to ‘also remember that there are feelings of wariness among the people of Asia’. A week later on 15 October, Koizumi visited Korea to hold his first summit meeting with President Kim Dae-jung. Ahead of the meeting, Koizumi paid the first visit by a Japanese prime minister to Sodaemun Independence Park in Seoul, the site of a prison where many anti-Japanese activists had been incarcerated in colonial times. Koizumi told Japanese and Korean reporters that he had ‘visited the site with a feeling of heartfelt remorse and sorrow over the great pain and suffering inflicted on South Koreans by Japan’s colonial rule’. Koizumi spoke of his historical awareness in similar terms during the summit meeting, emphasizing his desire to make all efforts at constructing a future-oriented relationship and

98  Koizumi and Japanese Politics calling for mutual cooperation. Kim responded, ‘I regard the words you spoke at Sodaemun highly’, but added that he hoped they would be put into practice. He also indicated his belief in the importance of joint Korean and Japanese research on the history textbook problem. Relations again turn for the worse Relations with China and South Korea appeared to have been on the mend, but in 2002 a series of events occurred that threw cold water on them. On 21 April, the first day of the shrine’s annual spring festival, Koizumi once again visited Yasukuni. As was to be expected, China and South Korea protested strongly. China’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Li Zhaoxing summoned Ambassador Anami to voice ‘strong dissatisfaction and emphatic opposition’ to Yasukuni visits by a prime minister and request that the Japanese ‘take appropriate steps so that the same sort of thing does not happen again’. South Korea’s Foreign

Photo 3.5  Koizumi’s second visit to Yasukuni shrine (21 April 2002) on the first day of the shrine’s annual spring festival. Koizumi’s visit to China linked to the 30th anniversary of diplomatic normalization was called off as a result. Photo credit: The Yomiuri Shimbun.

Foreign relations  99 Ministry likewise issued a statement expressing ‘deep regrets’ and appealing for ‘a sincere response from Prime Minister Koizumi and the Japanese government’. Jiang Zemin told New Komeitō Party president Kanzaki when he visited Beijing on 29 April, ‘This is something I absolutely cannot forgive.’ On 8 May, five North Koreans tried to rush the gate at Japan’s consulate in Shenyang in a bid to seek asylum, only to be taken away by armed Chinese security forces who entered the compound in pursuit. The following day, Vice Foreign Minister Takeuchi Yukio lodged a strong protest with China’s ambassador to Tokyo Wu Dawei, saying the security forces had violated the Vienna Convention, which stipulates the extraterritorial status of diplomatic missions. Takeuchi also demanded the handover of the five asylum seekers, but the Chinese government announced on 11 May that ‘the police made the capture after having obtained the Japanese side’s approval’. The two sides were completely at loggerheads. After a Japanese investigation, Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko announced: ‘That the Japanese side gave its approval is not the case.’ (In July, Kawaguchi would go on to discipline 13 individuals involved at the consulate and elsewhere for mishandling the incident.) Out of humanitarian concerns, the five North Koreans were eventually allowed to leave China for South Korea by way of the Philippines, completing their journey on 23 May. The year 2002 also marked the 30th anniversary of diplomatic normalization between China and Japan. The government had been looking into the possibility of Koizumi visiting China that autumn to mark the occasion, but owing to the tensions in the bilateral relationship brought about by the Yasukuni visits and the consulate incident the decision was made in August to postpone the visit. No Japanese prime minister would visit Beijing again until Abe Shinzō’s visit to China in October 2006. As for Japan’s ties with South Korea, the two countries jointly hosted the soccer World Cup in May and June 2002. Koizumi went to Seoul for the opening ceremonies, and Kim Dae-jung went to Yokohama for the closing ceremonies. The two leaders met for talks at the Kantei on 1 July, where Koizumi expressed his wholehearted support for Kim’s conciliatory ‘Sunshine Policy’ towards the DPRK. The third Yasukuni pilgrimage Koizumi made his third visit to Yasukuni early in 2003 on 14 January. He is said to have made it at this time mindful that Hu Jintao’s new administration in China was scheduled to be launched in March, and in order to avoid the anniversary of Japan’s surrender in the Second World War on 15 August as well as the shrine’s annual spring and autumn festivals out of consideration for China and South Korea. However, criticism from the governments in Seoul and Beijing did not stop. Koizumi and President Hu held their first summit meeting in St Petersburg, Russia, on 31 May. Hu said, ‘We want the issues of history and of Taiwan dealt with properly. We must not hurt the feelings of the people of the other country.’ But he did not refer directly to the prime minister’s visit to Yasukuni. Nonetheless,

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Photo 3.6  Koizumi’s third Yasukuni visit (14 January 2003). He is said to have avoided days linked to special events or festivals bearing in mind imminent changes of administration in China and South Korea. Photo credit: The Yomiuri Shimbun.

Koizumi made it clear in comments to reporters on 8 October that he intended to continue his visits in the future. China reacted to this pronouncement. In bilateral talks that took place on 20 October on the sidelines of the APEC summit meeting in Bangkok, Hu caught Koizumi by surprise, telling him, ‘Leaders of our two countries should take history as a mirror and look forward to the future, so as to push forward bilateral good-neighbourly and friendly relations from a long-term viewpoint. In particular, the issue of history should be handled carefully, and things that would harm the feelings of people of war-victim countries should never be done again.’ The administration also changed in South Korea that year. President Roh Moo-hyun made his first visit to Japan as a state guest on 5 June. As the issue of the DPRK’s nuclear programme heated up, Roh and Koizumi reaffirmed at their summit meeting the need for Japan and South Korea to work more closely together. They issued a joint statement saying they would ‘squarely face the past history

Foreign relations  101 and strive together to create a future-looking, substantive cooperative relationship for the 21st century on that basis’. Meeting on the sidelines in Bangkok on 20 October, the pair agreed that negotiations should begin before the year was out between their governments about a free trade agreement (FTA) – termed as ‘a big step forward in Korean–Japanese relations’ – with the goal of completing substantive talks by mid-2005. The East China Sea gas fields and Takeshima Koizumi ushered in 2004 with his fourth pilgrimage to Yasukuni shrine on New Year’s Day. The move as always incurred fierce protests from China and South Korea, who labelled it as ‘an act injuring the feelings of peoples whose countries were victims of war’. Numerous further problems arose during this year concerning Tokyo’s ties with its two neighbours. On 24 March, Chinese activists landed on Uotsuri Island in the Senkaku Islands group and were arrested by Okinawan Prefectural Police. The Chinese government demanded their unconditional release. Okinawan police had planned to follow normal criminal procedures, but after discussions with legal authorities the activists were deported in interests of diplomacy. Concerns also emerged over the possibility that China had established a prospecting area in Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and that it may have been extracting resources from the Japanese side underground as it proceeded with its project to develop natural gas fields in the East China Sea. Bilateral workinglevel talks took place between senior officials on 25 October, but the Chinese side presented no concrete data and the meeting ended without an agreement after the two parties did nothing but present their respective country’s position. Trade Minister Nakagawa Shōichi expressed his displeasure at the outcome, saying, ‘We have no intention of working together with them at wasting time.’ Similarly, at a bilateral summit meeting held in Chile on 21 November, Koizumi said, ‘It is critical to avoid turning the East China Sea into a sea of confrontation’, while Hu sidestepped making any direct comment. With respect to South Korea, on 16 January Korea Post issued stamps featuring pictures of the island Takeshima. Called Dokdo in Korean, the rocky outcropping has been the focus of a bilateral sovereignty dispute. The Japanese government issued a statement through the Universal Postal Union denouncing the Korean action, and the view spread among Diet lawmakers that Japanese stamps should be issued featuring Takeshima. However, the mood at a bilateral summit meeting held on 21 July on Cheju Island was relatively relaxed. The two leaders affirmed an expansion of exchanges in many areas, as seen in Koizumi’s announcement that short-term visas would be waived for visitors from Korea during the Aichi World Expo scheduled to take place the following year. For his part, speaking about the bilateral history problem at a press conference, President Roh told reporters, ‘I do not intend to make it a formal issue while I am in office.’

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Photo 3.7  Koizumi's fourth visit to Yasukuni shrine (1 January 2004). His traditional Japanese dress created the impression of a return to old ways and the scene played repeatedly in the media thereafter. Photo credit: The Yomiuri Shimbun.

Anti-Japanese demonstrations in China Thus, regular exchanges between the heads of state continued and made some progress even as Japan’s bilateral ties with China and with South Korea were ripe with tensions arising from the Yasukuni issue and other problems. However, in 2005 a series of events occurred that raised the severity of those tensions to a new level. Ties with China were strained first by massive anti-Japanese demonstrations that took place in April. At the time, Japan was waging a campaign to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Starting in early April, the Chinese began holding protests throughout the country against Japan obtaining permanent member status. The demonstration that took place on 9 April in Beijing swelled to around 10,000 people. Protestors threw rocks at the Japanese

Foreign relations  103 embassy, breaking around two dozen windows. Windows were also broken at the ambassador’s official residence and at buildings housing many offices for Japanese corporations, and a Japanese restaurant was attacked. Another massive antiJapanese demonstration with around 10,000 participants took place in Shanghai on 16 April; objects were thrown at the Japanese consulate there, again breaking several windows. The following day, Foreign Minister Machimura Nobutaka met his counterpart Li Zhaoxing in Beijing to request an official apology and compensation. However, Li refused to apologize, arguing, ‘The larger root cause of the problem lies in history-related problems caused by Japan’. On 23 April, a bilateral summit meeting was held in Jakarta. Koizumi asked that the Chinese government ‘take appropriate measures to protect Japanese diplomatic missions, businesses and citizens’ in China, and prevent the recurrence of anti-Japanese protests. For his part, Hu Jintao touched on the Yasukuni and history textbook issues, asking that Japan show remorse for having ‘hurt the feelings of the people of China and related Asian nations’. He also called for remorse for Japan’s war of aggression and for Japan to stick to its ‘one China’ policy with respect to the issue of Taiwan independence. The two leaders agreed that friendly relations between their countries were indispensable to Asian stability and development, but this turned out to be the last meeting between Chinese and Japanese heads of state while Koizumi was in office. For the next year and a half, until Abe Shinzō became prime minister, exchanges between the two countries’ leaders ground to a halt. On 23 May, the Chinese suddenly called off a meeting that had been scheduled to take place in Tokyo between Koizumi and visiting Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi. At first, the Chinese claimed a need had arisen for her to return due to urgent domestic duties, but it later became clear that the move was caused by dissatisfaction with Koizumi’s statements regarding the Yasukuni and history textbook issues. Antagonism over the East China Sea gas fields also continued. On 1 April, the Japanese government announced the results of investigations showing that the gas fields China was developing straddled the Sino-Japanese maritime border. The Chinese delegation to bilateral working-level talks that began 30 May proposed joint development to the east of the median line in Japanese waters, but the Japanese expressed reservations, saying cooperative development then should also be applied to the area on the Chinese side. The Chinese for their part refused Japanese requests for data and a halt to development. Consequently, the Japanese side indicated its intention to grant Japanese corporations rights to conduct testdrilling operations, and on 14 July it was announced that Teikoku Oil Co. had been granted concession to conduct experimental drilling. ‘Takeshima Day’ The year 2005 was designated Japan–South Korea Friendship Year to commemorate the 40th anniversary since diplomatic normalization. But on 23 February, a suprapartisan group of legislators in the Shimane Prefectural assembly submitted an ordinance that would proclaim ‘Takeshima Day’ to mark the

104  Koizumi and Japanese Politics centenary since the island’s incorporation as part of the prefecture on 22 February 1905. There was strong reaction in response to this move in South Korea, where it was characterized as an act meant to justify past aggression. With this, bilateral ties took a sudden turn for the worse. After the ordinance passed on 16 March, South Korea’s Foreign Affairs and Trade Ministry issued an official statement of protest. Criticizing the development as an act that ‘directly confronts the ROK government’s endeavours to strengthen mutual understanding and friendship … by designating the year 2005 as “Korea–Japan Friendship Year”’, the statement said that Seoul would take ‘decisive measures’ if the ordinance was not repealed. ‘Japan must accept full responsibility for every consequence from now on’, it concluded. The Korean government also announced that it would greatly ease restrictions on visiting the disputed islets – for example, by changing the old system requiring official advance approval into a new one wherein visitors only had to file a simple declaration – thus reaffirming its actual control over the territory. President Roh issued an official statement on 23 March directed at his nation’s people saying the ‘Takeshima Day’ declaration and textbook problem were matters aimed at justifying a history of aggression. When Roh met with Koizumi for talks in Seoul on 20 June, the history issue again became a focus. Roh did not directly ask Koizumi to stop making pilgrimages to Yasukuni, but he urged the prime minister to reconsider, arguing that the Yasukuni problem was at the ‘core of history-related problems between Japan and Korea’ and that ‘no matter how you explain your visit to the Yasukuni shrine, it is understood as justifying Japan’s past for me and for the people of Korea’. Koizumi, on the other hand, responded: ‘Even if there are differences in opinion … I want to put bilateral relations back on track and advance a futureoriented relationship on a broader perspective.’ The gap between the two remained unbridged. Roh also mentioned at their joint press conference that discussions had taken place over the building of an alternative memorial site to supplant Yasukuni, but Koizumi denied that any such facility had been discussed during the meeting and told reporters later that ‘the subject did not come up in our talks’. Roh said they had ‘reached an extremely low level of agreement regarding the issue of history’. The seriousness of the state of the bilateral relationship was underscored by the many irregularities during this summit, such as the differences in the explanations each government provided about the contents of the talks and the fact that the pair did not take questions from reporters afterwards. On 17 October, Koizumi made his fifth pilgrimage to Yasukuni. Roh forcefully told Koizumi in talks that took place on the sidelines of the APEC leaders’ summit in Pusan on 18 November that ‘the prime minister’s pilgrimages to Yasukuni and recent visits by numerous politicians were a challenge to Korea’. Koizumi explained that visiting the shrine ‘neither glorifies nor justifies war. That is a misunderstanding.’ But Roh retorted: ‘However hard I try to accept Prime Minister Koizumi’s remarks, our people cannot accept them.’ There would be no further summit meetings between the Japanese and South Korean heads of state while Koizumi was in office.

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Photo 3.8 and 3.9  Koizumi’s fifth (17 October 2005) and sixth (15 August 2006) pilgrimages to Yasukuni. Perhaps mindful of April’s massive anti-Japanese protests in China and the depths to which bilateral ties had sunk, on his fifth trip Koizumi neither entered the inner shrine nor signed the guest book as he had the previous four visits. The sixth trip was squeezed in a month before he stepped down from office and took place early in the morning on the surrender anniversary date. He thus effectively fulfilled the campaign pledge he made in the party presidential election of 2001. Photo credit: The Yomiuri Shimbun.

106  Koizumi and Japanese Politics Koizumi made his final pilgrimage to Yasukuni as prime minister on 15 August 2006, just before he stepped down from office. He finally fulfilled the pledge he had made at the start of his administration – perhaps symbolic of his political thinking about staying true to his convictions – to visit the shrine on the anniversary of Japan’s surrender. Underlying reasons for the stagnation in relations with China and South Korea Relations with China and South Korea could not but stagnate thanks to the emotions stirred by the prime minister’s pilgrimages to Yasukuni. Certainly, the patriotic education of the Jiang Zemin era in China aimed at heightening the centripetal force of nationalism was a factor in the worsening of anti-Japanese sentiment there. Playing the Yasukuni card, moreover, was to an extent a diplomatic strategy. But that said, it can safely be assumed that relations with these two countries would have turned out differently if the prime minister had not been so obstinate about his Yasukuni visits. In fact, the way better economic ties with East Asia were sacrificed owing to the Yasukuni problem is a significant aspect to consider here. The worsening of ties with South Korea, for example, that accompanied Yasukuni-related problems had effects felt in the foot dragging over FTA negotiations. Heightened anti-Japanese sentiment in China created obstacles for Japanese corporations seeking to enter a market that continued to experience remarkable growth. The vocal support in the business world for a candidacy of Fukuda Yasuo – an advocate of improved ties with China and South Korea – as Koizumi’s successor can be taken as evidence for this. One cannot but ask just how much strategic coherence there was to the Koizumi administration’s East Asia policy.

Visits to the DPRK and the abduction issue The Pyongyang Declaration and the foregrounding of the abduction issue On 17 September 2002, Koizumi made the first ever visit by a Japanese prime minister to Pyongyang and met with DPRK Secretary General Kim Jong Il for the first summit meeting between Japanese and North Korean heads of state. The Japan–DPRK Pyongyang Declaration the pair signed called on both sides to make every possible effort to achieve an early normalization of relations and declared that the Japanese side ‘expressed deep remorse and heartfelt apology’ over its past colonial rule. During this meeting, Kim admitted and apologized for incidents involving the abduction of Japanese nationals to the DPRK that were carried out by ‘blinded individuals at a certain agency running loose with heroism’. The individuals involved had been dealt with, he said, promising that such cases would not occur again. Information was also produced showing that of fourteen people who had been abducted eight had died, the entrance of one to the DPRK could not be confirmed, and five were still alive. The summit meeting

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Photo 3.10  Koizumi in North Korea (Official photo). Prime Minister Koizumi and Secretary General Kim attending the first ever talks between Japanese and North Korean heads of state (both sitting at the centre of their respective delegations). MOFA’s Asia Bureau chief Tanaka Hitoshi sits in the furthest seat to Koizumi’s left (17 September 2002).

had come about as a result of top-secret contacts between the chief of MOFA’s Asia bureau Tanaka Hitoshi and an individual (referred to as ‘Mister X’) close to Kim. These negotiations were known to only an extremely limited group of individuals within Japan’s government, including the prime minister and chief cabinet secretary. The government settled on its internal position on the abduction issue on 26 September. Japan’s former ambassador to Uzbekistan Nakayama Kyōko was appointed as a special adviser to the Cabinet Secretariat to liaise with the families of the abduction victims. A formal decision was further made to establish the Special Working Group on the Issue of Abduction of Japanese Nationals by North Korea to be chaired by Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe Shinzō and with participation of the Council of Ministers on the Normalization Talks between Japan and North Korea. An 11-member investigation team headed by Saiki Akitaka, deputy directorgeneral of MOFA’s Asia Bureau, was dispatched to Pyongyang from 28 September to 1 October on a fact-finding mission over the abduction incidents. The team heard the North Koreans’ accounts concerning the facts of each case and met the five living abductees. Explanations were also received from the North Korean side regarding the eight abductees who had died, but these accounts contained many questionable points that could not be confirmed such as the claim that the graves of seven had been swept away by floods.

108  Koizumi and Japanese Politics Five abductees return On 4 October, the Special Working Group decided in accordance with the wishes of the victims’ family members that Japan should demand from North Korea to promptly send the abductees back to Japan, even if they themselves had no desire to return. As a result of behind-the-scenes negotiations to force their repatriation, Hasuike Kaoru, his wife Okudo Yukiko, Chimura Yasushi, his wife Hamamoto Fukie, and Soga Hitomi boarded a jet chartered by the Japanese government on the afternoon of 15 October and flew to Tokyo’s Haneda Airport. Asia Bureau chief Tanaka had arranged with the North Korean side for the five individuals to visit for two weeks, but Abe argued that they should remain in Japan. The Association of the Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea (AFVKN), then chaired by Yokota Shigeru, whose daughter Yokota Megumi was one of the eight victims North Korea claimed had died, demanded the same. The government decided on 24 October that the five would reside permanently in Japan as of the current moment, and demanded on that basis that their family members left behind in North Korea be sent to Japan as soon as possible. As these events were unfolding, data from the US government revealed that Pyongyang was engaged in a nuclear development programme using highly enriched uranium. Concerns were also being raised about the approach being taken by MOFA’s Tanaka and others who favoured prioritizing diplomatic normalization. A confrontation developed within the government between those, like Tanaka, who favoured an appeasement policy towards the North and their more hard-line critics. Abe was one of the leaders of the hardliners. He won the backing of public opinion, and his emergence as a candidate to succeed Koizumi had its inception here. Japan and North Korea held negotiations on normalization on 29–30 October in Kuala Lumpur. The Japanese government’s envoy on normalization Suzuki Katsunari asked that the families of the five former abductees be promptly sent to Japan. He also presented a list of more than 100 questions that Tokyo had regarding North Korea’s explanations concerning the eight abductees said to be deceased and asked for a reinvestigation. North Korean envoy Jong Tae Hwa responded that Pyongyang considered the issue to ‘have largely been dealt with and resolved’. He said there were ‘a variety of other issues that should pragmatically be taken up and discussed’ and demanded that they concentrate on matters such as economic cooperation instead. Regarding the nuclear issue, the Japanese side also ‘strongly requested that North Korea come forth with details about its uranium enrichment program, eliminate it speedily in a verifiable way, freeze work on nuclear faculties based on the agreed framework, and promptly allow inspection teams’. But the North Koreans brushed off these demands, saying the issue could be resolved only through discussions with the USA. No progress was made on either the abduction or nuclear issues in the normalization talks. North Korea then announced on December 12 that it would soon restart operations and construction work at an atomic power plant and other nuclear facilities that had been frozen under a

Foreign relations  109 framework agreed to during the administration of former President Bill Clinton and resume nuclear development. Meanwhile, the Diet’s House of Representatives Committee on Health, Labour and Welfare submitted a bill on providing assistance to the abduction victims on 27 November that was approved on 4 December. Explicitly describing the abductions as ‘an unparalleled state-sponsored criminal act’, the law, which came into force 1 January 2003, provided for benefits to be paid to the abductees for five years and introduced special provisions concerning their enrolment in the national pension system, among other things. The bill furthermore obliged national and local authorities to ascertain the status of the other victims, make the utmost effort to bring them home and provide their families with information about their condition. On the basis of this law, the government then certified the five as victims of abduction. Dialogue and pressure As the Japanese government pursued a policy of ‘dialogue and pressure’ (taiwa to atsuryoku 対話と圧力) towards North Korea, pressure from the international community on Pyongyang intensified. The UN’s Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution that was strongly critical of human rights conditions in the North and called on Pyongyang to resolve the issue of Japanese and other abduction victims. The bill was submitted by the European Union and cosponsored by Japan and the USA. In talks with President Bush held on 23 May, Koizumi said ‘dialogue and pressure is needed’, and stressed a policy for drawing North Korea into the international framework by adopting a tough stance towards it.13 Leaders assembled at conclaves held that June (the annual G8 Summit in Evian, France, and the ASEAN Regional Forum) adopted declarations calling for a comprehensive resolution of North Korea’s nuclear and abduction issues. In an address to the UN General Assembly delivered in late September, Foreign Minister Kawaguchi said, ‘Upon a comprehensive resolution of [the nuclear and abduction issues], Japan is looking to effect the normalization of its diplomatic relations with North Korea’, showing Japan’s strong determination to see the abduction issue resolved as it sought the international community’s support and understanding. It was the first time Japan raised the abduction issue in the General Assembly. From 27–29 August, the first round of Six-Party Talks (involving the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the USA) to discuss Pyongyang’s nuclear development programme took place in Beijing. Japan and North Korea also held three rounds of bilateral discussions on the talks’ sidelines. Japan’s envoy, MOFA’s new Asia Bureau chief Yabunaka Mitoji, reiterated the demand that ‘the families of the five abductees should be sent to Japan’ and called for ‘the truth to be ascertained regarding the status of the other ten people [the eight Pyongyang said were deceased, along with another two – the number had increased by one since September 2002 – who allegedly never entered North Korea]’. North Korean envoy Kim Young Il responded that there had been a promise that the five would

110  Koizumi and Japanese Politics be returned after a short stay in Japan, adding, ‘Japan broke its promise.’ The bilateral talks broke down. Kim took a more flexible stance in discussions the next day, indicating that ‘we want to resolve each and every problem between Japan and North Korea including the abduction issue as called for in the Pyongyang Declaration’. However, his attitude subsequently hardened as he reiterated the North’s position that ‘the abduction issue has already been settled’. Economic sanctions and Koizumi’s second visit to the North Given the apparent lack of progress in relations with the North, calls from the abductees’ families and LDP lawmakers to step up the pressure on Pyongyang grew louder. Two bills were drafted in December, one revising the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law and the other banning the entry of certain ships to Japanese ports. Up to this point, the imposition of economic sanctions had been premised on a UN resolution or international agreement. The revised foreign exchange law made it possible for Japan to halt money transfers to North Korea by its own independent decision. The law on closing ports on the other hand – put together by a group of young activists in the LDP who had formed an informal ‘Group to Consider the Diplomacy Card Against North Korea’ – was to enable the Japanese government to bar North Korean vessels from calling at Japanese ports. The two bills were passed during the 2004 regular Diet session. Another set of bilateral discussions took place on the sidelines of the second round of Six-Party Talks on 25 February 2004. The bilateral talks focused mainly on the abduction issue. Yabunaka’s team said it regarded the fact that the two governments would continue negotiations as ‘a definite achievement’, but since the North Korean side repeated its basic stance that the matter had been settled, the discussions went nowhere. Some within the Japanese government argued that the North was ‘frittering away time in order to avoid economic sanctions’, but the situation did show some signs of progress. Tanaka Hitoshi, who had prepared Koizumi’s first visit to North Korea, joined Yabunaka in bilateral talks held in early May. The DPRK delegation indicated that it intended to send the abductees’ eight family members to Japan and the two sides exchanged views on the method and conditions for their delivery. Koizumi told reporters, ‘There were concrete discussions, but that’s because there were discussions on the entirety of the Pyongyang Declaration. I can’t say anything at this point’. Then, on 22 May, Koizumi made his second visit to North Korea. The prime minister and Kim Jong Il held talks and agreed that five of the eight family members left behind in the DPRK – the children of the Hasuikes and the Chimuras – would be sent to Japan. The five travelled to Japan that evening on a special government aircraft. The two sides also made arrangements for Soga Hitomi to be reunited with her family through a third country. Kim promised a reinvestigation into the status of the other ten abductees. Koizumi meanwhile announced that Japan would provide humanitarian aid, including 250,000 tons of food supplies, and reopen normalization negotiations in the near future. Soga reunited with her husband Charles Jenkins and their two children in Jakarta that

Foreign relations  111 July and the family then headed to Japan. Jenkins, a Vietnam War-era defector from the US Army, turned himself in at Camp Zama, where a court-martial found him guilty of desertion and aiding the enemy. He was dishonourably discharged and sentenced to a month in jail, going free in late November. Worsening of the abduction and nuclear issues However, progress towards resolving the abduction issue stalled once again after this, and the nuclear problem went from bad to worse. Japan and North Korea held working level talks in mid-August, but the twoday meeting concluded without any new information from the DPRK delegation regarding a reinvestigation into the ten abductees whose status remained unclear. The North Korean delegation presented some information regarding the timing of Yokota Megumi’s death that revised its earlier explanation, but no details were revealed that could have undermined Pyongyang’s previous claims that eight of the ten had died and two never entered the country. In talks held 9–14 November, Yabunaka’s delegation was provided by the North Koreans with materials related to six of the eight people claimed to have died, including what were said to be Yokota’s remains, and brought them back to Japan. However, DNA testing conducted in Japan found DNA only from two other sources. The DPRK refused to accept this, denouncing the results as a ‘fabrication’. Pyongyang formally repeated its denunciation in a written response to the Japanese government on 26 January 2005 and demanded that the bones be returned. Tokyo sent a counterstatement on 10 February saying the North was ‘unaware of the facts regarding the precision of testing procedures and technical level of the DNA testing’. The North Koreans then faxed a response that read, ‘The Japanese side’s arguments are unacceptable. We have no intention of discussing this issue with the Japanese government,’ and refused any further contact.14 The Japanese side next decided that it would use the venue of the Six-Party Talks to break the deadlock. In his opening remarks to the fourth round of talks held in Beijing on 26 July, Japan’s new chief envoy Sasae Kenichirō pressed the North that ‘all outstanding questions, including the abduction issue and the missile and nuclear programs, must be resolved in a comprehensive fashion’. When the fourth round resumed in September, the North Koreans adopted a more forthcoming attitude in their discussions with the Japanese. In the Joint Statement adopted at the round’s conclusion it was spelled out clearly that ‘the DPRK and Japan undertook to take steps to normalize their relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern’. In bilateral talks held that November a format was proposed for discussions to be held in parallel on three areas: the abductions issue, defence issues including the North’s nuclear and missile programmes, and ‘settling the past’. As a result, the two countries’ envoys met in Beijing on 4–8 February 2006 for the Japan– DPRK Comprehensive Talks (Hōkatsu heikō kyōgi 包括並行協議). The Japanese government tried to dangle the prospect of normalization talks as an incentive for

112  Koizumi and Japanese Politics discussion of the abductions issue, but the North Korean envoys only repeated their previous position. For the Japanese government, there was no discernible progress. Amid all these developments, North Korea launched seven missiles into the Sea of Japan on 5 July 2006. ‘Acting under its special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1695 on 15 July condemning the launches. However, the North showed no sign of backing down, and on 9 October – just weeks after Abe Shinzō had become prime minister – Pyongyang announced that it had successfully concluded testing a nuclear device. The Security Council responded by unanimously adopting Resolution 1718, which imposed sanctions on the DPRK acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Six-Party Talks resumed that December, but they ended without showing any progress. Ambiguous stance towards North Korea As noted above, the cornerstone of the Japanese government’s policy towards North Korea was ‘dialogue and pressure’. However, the possibility for these two approaches to counter each other is high. In fact, there existed two currents within the government, with one faction led by Tanaka Hitoshi at MOFA favouring dialogue and another faction led by Abe Shinzō calling for pressure. Abe, who served as deputy chief cabinet secretary at the time of Koizumi’s first visit to North Korea, made his name as a hardliner on North Korea and so got his foot in the door in the quest to become prime minister. But while Abe was consistent on this point, the same cannot be said so clearly for Koizumi. At least, it appears that earlier in his administration he had been eager for normalization and for dialogue but, as evidenced by his appointment of Abe to important posts, moved towards an emphasis on ‘pressure’ during the latter half of his term. Of course, the essence of diplomacy is knowing when to use the carrot and when to use the stick. The partial resolution of the abduction issue was, without doubt, achieved precisely because the carrot of normalization had been offered. However, to wield the carrot and stick effectively in coordination, one must first have a definite strategy in mind regarding the goals one wants to achieve and the means to be used for that end. One gets the impression that the Koizumi administration’s strategy towards North Korea remained incoherent and that the carrot and the stick were used only piecemeal. There are enormous difficulties that come from dealing with a country like North Korea that does not operate on ‘common sense’, but here, too, it seems that the problem of strategic coherence in Koizumi’s foreign policy shines through.

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Delays in free trade agreements Japan, the FTA laggard External economic policy is an important element of a country’s foreign policy. Numerous issues could be brought up such as the start of a new round of World Trade Organization (WTO) talks and the freeze on US beef imports when discussing economic diplomacy under the Koizumi administration. My focus here will be on free trade agreements (FTAs). The importance of concluding FTAs was stressed from all quarters, especially the business community, but there are no signs that the Koizumi administration approached this task in a strategic manner. Looking into this matter will help to set the problem of strategic coherence in Koizumi’s foreign policy into stark relief. The WTO launched a new round of talks (the Doha round) in November 2001. These negotiations were steering through difficult waters, as seen in the failure to get the round off the ground at the WTO Ministerial Conference of 1999 in Seattle, the breakdown of talks in the 2003 Ministerial Conference in Cancún, and the temporary suspension of negotiations in summer 2006. Given the paralysis in WTO negotiations, many countries came to stress FTAs instead, the objective of which is to eliminate tariffs and trade barriers between specific countries or regions. By December 2008, the WTO had been notified of 230 FTAs. The USA had concluded only three FTAs before George W. Bush became president in 2000, but during his administration it entered into agreements with such countries as Singapore and Chile and started negotiations with numerous others. The European Union had concluded 22 FTAs by the time of writing. FTA activity has been heating up in Asia as well. In Japan’s case, four agreements were concluded under the Koizumi administration – with Singapore (effective date November 2002), Mexico (April 2005), Malaysia (July 2006) and the Philippines (signed September 2006). Particular emphasis was placed on concluding an FTA with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and competition between Japan, China and South Korea to do so was fierce. But here Japan fell behind. China concluded a ‘comprehensive economic cooperation agreement’ with ASEAN in November 2002, while South Korea signed off on a basic agreement in December 2005. Japan did not conclude an FTA with ASEAN until 2008. Confusion over the Mexico FTA While Japan may request a partner in FTA negotiations to lower tariffs on various industrial products, there arises a necessity for Japan to reduce its own tariffs especially on agricultural products at the same time. However, with such compromises resistance from interest groups and zoku lawmakers rises. For that reason, FTA negotiations require firm political leadership to be able to proceed. Let us consider this point using the FTA with Mexico as an example. The process began with the 27 October 2002 decision of Koizumi and Mexican President Vicente Fox for the two countries to enter negotiations, the first round of

114  Koizumi and Japanese Politics which were held that 18 November. Unlike the FTA that had just been concluded with Singapore, the agreement with Mexico included the opening of Japan’s agricultural market for such items as pork and oranges. This aspect became the focus of attention. The initial plan was for an agreement to be concluded in October 2003 when President Fox was to visit Japan. Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko, Trade Minister Nakagawa Shōichi and Farm Minister Kamei Yoshiyuki entered discussions with a Mexican delegation led by Secretary of Economy Fernando Canales on the evening of 14 October. The Japanese team came to the talks having prepared a proposal to double low-tariff imports of Mexican pork from their then-current levels to 70,000–80,000 tons annually, but the Mexicans did not appreciate the offer and countered with a demand for tax-free imports of 250,000 tons. Considering the opposition from Japan’s farmers, the Farm Ministry already believed the 70,000-ton figure to be a barely acceptable concession. The Japanese side had expected to announce an ‘effective agreement’ on non-agricultural issues as part of a summit statement, but the Mexican negotiators would not accede to an agreement that did not include agricultural products. When negotiations resumed on the afternoon of the 16th, the Mexican side made a new demand for tax-free orange juice imports. The Japanese rejected this as ‘too great a demand’. Thus any agreement was definitely put off. Senior officials resumed discussions in late January 2004. The Mexican negotiators as before demanded tax-free imports for pork and beef, which the Japanese side countered by offering a proposal to establish a low-tariff framework for pork but rejected all other demands as unacceptable. The discussions stalled and again no agreement was reached. The heads of the three Japanese ministries involved held a teleconference with their Mexican counterparts on 12 March, during which they finally reached a formal agreement on an FTA. The agreement set an 80,000-ton quota on low-tariff imports of pork, with a duty of 2.2 per cent, reducing the rate then in force by half. Low-tariff imports were also allowed on 6,500 tons of orange juice, with the tariff again halved from the existing rate. Tax-free imports were also established on 10 tons each of beef, chicken and oranges for the first one to two years. Low-tariff rate quotas would be established thereafter for 6,000 tons of beef, 8,500 tons of chicken and 4,000 tons of oranges, but the agreement put off a decision on the actual tariff rate. The FTA between Japan and Mexico passed through troubled waters before an agreement was finally reached some six months behind the original schedule. The standoff over lowering tariffs on agricultural products was the biggest factor behind the delay, but there is no discernible evidence of a decision from the Kantei that cuts should be made. Japan’s negative attitude towards agriculture concessions is also apparent in the asymmetry of tariff eliminations between Japan and Mexico. While around 98 per cent of Japan’s exports to Mexico are tax free, only 87 per cent of that country’s exports to Japan are zero tariff. As this example shows, there was a lack of political leadership behind Japan’s lag in concluding FTAs. While Koizumi’s Kantei demonstrated considerable

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Photo 3.11  Mexico FTA Teleconference. The final round of FTA negotiations between Japan and Mexico was conducted via teleconference (12 March 2004). From left, Farm Minister Kamei Yoshiyuki, Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko and Trade Minister Nakagawa Shōichi. The prime minister hardly ever made his presence felt in the process. Photo credit: The Yomiuri Shimbun.

leadership on domestic economic policy as we have seen, the picture presented by its external economic policy revolving around free trade agreements was entirely different.15 The business lobby Keidanren issued an urgent proposal on 12 March 2004 calling for the establishment of an ‘Economic Coordination and Strategy Headquarters’ (Keizai renkei senryaku honbu 経済連携戦略本部) in the Cabinet and insisting that the Kantei take the lead in quickly concluding FTAs and other economic partnership agreements with the countries of Asia. That they felt compelled to make such a request speaks volumes about the Kantei’s failure to live up to the role expected of it in external economic policy. It is apparent that Koizumi did not apply the leadership skills he in principle could have to external economic policy. The CEFP – his ‘control tower’ – was not brought to bear on FTA negotiations. Moreover, the Koizumi Kantei did not have any strategy to pursue at such a venue.

The contrast between domestic politics and foreign affairs Why was there a lack of strategic coherence? As discussed in the previous chapter, when it came to economics and finance the Koizumi administration pursued structural reforms strategically based on neoliberal principles. In comparison, strategic coherence in the case of foreign policy can only be described as poor. While there may have been consistency in its efforts to strengthen Japan’s alliance with the USA, in how it responded to American demands and its ‘me-too’

116  Koizumi and Japanese Politics stance towards Washington’s policies, the Koizumi administration was passive in its conduct of diplomacy. The question thus arises of whether or not this was accompanied by any strategic judgement in the sense of independently setting one’s own objectives and working to achieve them. The absence of realistic strategies is even more evident in Koizumi’s East Asian diplomacy, which was brought to a standstill quite unavoidably thanks to the strong grip of the prime minister’s personal beliefs and feelings, and in his external economic policy, as seen by the lack of leadership concerning the FTAs. In trying to understand what brought this sort of contrast about, the level of the prime minister’s personal interest and the question of institutional venue, as well as the people to run it, are important factors to consider. Koizumi was tremendously interested in neoliberal reforms, as illustrated by his long-held views on postal privatization, but he reportedly had little interest in foreign policy.16 On the other hand, strategic coherence in economic policy was bolstered by the existence of the CEFP as the ‘control tower of the reforms’ and able personnel, such as Economic and Fiscal Policy Minister Takenaka Heizō, who shouldered the task of developing strategies and carrying them out. When it came to foreign policy, Koizumi had neither an institutional mechanism like the CEFP nor an individual like Takenaka to rely upon. Certainly, the Kantei’s foreign policy profile grew higher over time, making it possible for political scientist Shinoda Tomohito to even speak of ‘Kantei diplomacy’.17 In fact, an investigation team led by the assistant to the deputy chief cabinet secretary played a major role in the process of formulating the anti-terrorism and Iraq reconstruction laws. However, in these instances the investigations were focused on technical matters; they did not necessarily pursue a diplomatic strategy based on a broad, international perspective. The pattern of decision-making in the CEFP consisted of fierce exchanges between government ministers and private-sector councillors, Takenaka directing the course of the debate, and the prime minister stepping in to issue his verdicts. The direction that the country should take was argued about explicitly in that venue, and the methods for achieving set goals were painstakingly investigated as well. By contrast, I have come across no traces of careful deliberations of overall strategy in foreign policy, even granting that secrecy is a characteristic requirement for it. The goal – support of the USA in the form of manpower – was considered already given; policy debate was limited to the discussion of means for achieving it. The excessive extent to which Koizumi’s pathos was reflected in his foreign policy is closely related to its lack of strategic coherence. Koizumi’s pilgrimages to Yasukuni shrine cast a large shadow on relations with China and South Korea, while relations with the USA were determined to a large extent by his affectionately close relationship with President Bush. In this regard, too, the contrast with Koizumi’s handling of economic policy is conspicuous. In economic policy, he engaged in strategic policy-making at the CEFP while simultaneously garnering public support through populist methods. Here, Koizumi skilfully put the two sides of his leadership style to work in

Foreign relations  117 combination. But the ‘prime minister of pathos’ and the ‘strong prime minister’ did not mesh when it came to foreign policy. In the case of the latter, pathos impaired strategic coherence. The Negative legacy of the 1955 system The difference that strategic coherence makes becomes apparent if one asks how well the Koizumi administration proved able to overcome the negative legacies of the 1955 system. Japanese politics under the 1955 system had emphasized sharing the wealth mainly among the three actors who make up the powerful ‘Iron Triangle’ – the zoku lawmakers, bureaucrats and interest groups. For this reason, in the domestic arena policies premised on regulation and protection had become firmly entrenched. In the arena of foreign and defence policy, on the other hand, increasing reliance on the USA had produced a strong tendency for administrations to forego autonomous decisions and act passively. Even after the 1955 system broke down in 1993, this pattern persisted. Koizumi inherited this negative legacy. Koizumi sought to overcome the Iron Triangle’s politics of distributing the wealth among its members by loudly proclaiming his neoliberal views and rallying popular support behind them. And he achieved a degree of structural reform by introducing top-down decision-making. In this sense it can be said that Koizumi successfully cleared away the negative legacies of the 1955 system on the domestic (economic policy) front to a significant degree. But in foreign policy – although he dramatically shifted course in US ties in favour of bolstering the alliance (which to a degree was a departure from the 1955 system in itself) – he could not break with passive patterns of behaviour. Little progress was also made in relations with Asia. The lack of strategic coherence in his foreign policy prevented Koizumi from escaping the legacies of the past.

4 The Koizumi administration in historical and theoretical perspective

In this chapter I will analyse the Koizumi administration in historical and theoretical perspective. Towards that end, I will first take up the particular historical phase in which the Koizumi administration appeared. Was it a mere coincidence or an inevitable development that the Koizumi administration took office just as the 21st century began? While I do not subscribe to a Marxist-style determinism, when one considers the trends in postwar politics there did seem to be a historical imperative at work that called for a leader like Koizumi to appear. I shall therefore try to shed some light on the historical context of Koizumi’s entry onto the scene, and the role he played therein. Second, I will analyse why Koizumi was able to be a ‘strong prime minister’ from a theoretical perspective focused on political institutions. What were the institutions that had constrained previous prime ministers’ leadership? What sort of changes to them made it possible for Koizumi to exercise his? I want to clarify these issues, and also consider the larger significance of the ‘postal election’ of 2005 from these angles.

The Koizumi administration and postwar political history The politics of interest and the politics of ideas In political science theory (particularly the theories of American political science), the interests of political actors are usually considered the factor of central importance. This line of thought assumes that, in the political process, politicians, bureaucrats, interest groups and so forth act with the goal of realizing policies beneficial to themselves. LDP politicians work with the goals of winning votes and increasing campaign donations; to accomplish those goals, they dole out favours to interest groups and their local electoral districts. Interest groups apply pressure on the government in pursuit of the interests they represent, while the actions of bureaucrats aim at winning promotions, expanding their organizations and increasing their budgets. This way of looking at things also meshes with the popular image of politics in Japan as symbolized by the term ‘zoku lawmaker politics’ (zoku giin seiji 族議員政治). This dimension of politics can be referred to as the ‘politics of interest’.1

The Koizumi administration  119 Politics, however, is not driven by interests alone. Politicians and bureaucrats plan and act not just to satisfy such personal or material interests as winning re-election, achieving higher status or expanding their organizations, but also to realize convictions or ideas they have.2 Such ideas suggest to their holders both what ‘the public interest’ in a given case is and the means for achieving it; if one now considers that politics is by its very nature bound up with the question of public interest,3 it is hardly possible to detach ideas as a factor from it. The politics of ideas also constitutes an important dimension of politics.4 Thus, interests and ideas are both key factors to be considered in a discussion of political phenomena.5 They work in conjunction to strongly influence political phenomena. In the following, I will present an overview of politics in postwar Japan in light of their interrelationship. Taking a closer look at economic, foreign and defence policy, my focus will be on the form taken by the axes along which basic ideological confrontations developed, broadly breaking down postwar political history into three eras. I will also seek to identify the phase in the political history of postwar Japan that the Koizumi administration occupies. The main axes of ideological confrontation The main axes of ideological confrontation in economic and foreign and defence policy can be described as follows. The main axis of ideological confrontation in economic policy lies between economic liberalism on the one side and Japanese-style mercantilism on the other. Economic liberalism holds that achieving economic growth requires allowing market mechanisms to decide how resources should be allocated while reducing the government’s role as much as possible, and that markets should be open to the outside world. Japanesestyle mercantilism, on the other hand, stresses government intervention in the marketplace to influence resource allocation and corporate activity through such means as industrial policy. In foreign trade, it calls for the domestic market to be protected and nurtured. Mercantilism in modern Europe sought to achieve a surplus of trade and increase the wealth of the state through protection of domestic industry by the state against competition from abroad; the difference in the case of postwar Japan lies in the fact that the state actively intervened also in the domestic market to protect economically vulnerable sectors. For this reason I add the term ‘Japanesestyle’. Particular attention should be paid to the fact that protecting vulnerable sectors was a core element of LDP economic policy under the 1955 system. The difference between economic liberalism and Japanese-style mercantilism hinges on the question of whether or not to rely on market mechanisms – in short, whether or not to accept neoclassical economic thinking. Following the prescriptions of neoclassical economics is economic liberalism. In the case of foreign and defence policy, it useful to consider the two coordinate axes proposed by scholar of international politics Nagai Yōnosuke (see Figure 4.1).6 The first axis presents a choice between alliance with or independence

120  Koizumi and Japanese Politics Alliance (cooperation with the US)

Political realism

Military realism

Economy and welfare

Military Unarmed neutralism

Japanese-style Gaullism

Independent (autonomous foreign policy) This graph a modiflied version of the figure that appears in Nagai Yōnosuke Gendai to senryaku, p. 18. Figure 4.1 is Axes of confrontation in foreign and defence policy. This graph is a modified version of the figure that appears in Nagai Yōnosuke, Gendai to senryaku, p. 18.

from the USA. The former option favours maintaining the Japan–US Security Treaty and cooperation with the USA, while the latter aspires to a foreign and security policy that is independent of the USA. The second axis presents a choice between economy and social welfare at one end and military preparedness on the other. Here, the former choice is oriented to keeping Japan’s defensive capabilities as small as possible so as to be able to direct resources to the economy and social services instead, while the latter is directed towards the expansion of Japan’s military power and rearmament. The intersection of these two axes yields four categories under which basic political convictions can be grouped. ‘Political realism’ basically leaves security matters to the USA, attaching primary importance to the domestic economy and social welfare instead. As I will explicate below, the thinking of the conservative mainstream belongs here. ‘Military realism’ seeks to expand Japan’s military role and bolster its alliance with the USA. ‘Unarmed neutralism’ holds that Japan should eliminate all of its weapons and not enter alliances with other states. ‘Japanese-style Gaullism’, finally, is oriented towards pursuit of an autonomous foreign and defence policy based on independent military power. The first era: the development of basic policy convictions in postwar politics The historical unfolding of these ideological oppositions can be explained by dividing the postwar period into three eras.7 During the first era – that is, the

The Koizumi administration  121 decade and a half from defeat through the 1950s – conflicts over basic policy convictions in these policy areas were fierce also within the conservative camp. Moreover, they coincided with the factional and personal antagonism between the Liberal Party’s Yoshida Shigeru (prime minister 1946–7 and 1948–54) and the Democratic Party’s Hatoyama Ichirō (prime minister 1954–6). In terms of economic policy, Yoshida supported economic liberalism while Hatoyama favoured Japanese-style mercantilism. Liberalization of economic policy made progress under the second Yoshida Cabinet formed in autumn 1948 against the backdrop of the so-called Dodge Line, which postulated such liberal policy goals as balanced budgets.8 Hatoyama, who became prime minister in 1954 and possessed a strong sense of rivalry with Yoshida, meanwhile pursued mercantilist policies. Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke (1957–60) supported this mercantilist line as well. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), which conceived of its task as the nurturing and protection of domestic industry, began its rise to power during this period.9 Yoshida adhered to political realism in his foreign and defence policies. While he stressed cooperation with the USA, he sought to keep Japan’s independent military force as small as possible so that economic development could be given precedence – a policy line commonly referred to as the Yoshida Doctrine. Based on his principle of cooperation with the USA, Yoshida signed both the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Japan–US Security Treaty, but he stubbornly refused US requests for rearmament. Hatoyama, on the other hand, signed the Japan–Soviet Joint Declaration and restored diplomatic relations with the USSR in keeping with his policy stressing an independent foreign policy. Revising the constitution to allow rearmament was also first pursued by him. Hatoyama thus adopted the stance of ‘Japanese-style Gaullism’. The principle of unarmed neutralism upheld by the Socialist Party-led opposition possessed a certain amount of influence at this time as well. This caused political confrontation around the renewal of the Japan–US Security Treaty in 1960 to grow to enormous proportions. When Kishi took responsibility for the resulting chaos and stepped down, the first era of postwar politics came to a close. As the foregoing demonstrates, Yoshida and Hatoyama upheld different policy convictions. And insofar as their rivalry can be understood as rooted in political interests, ‘the politics of interest’ and ‘the politics of ideas’ are here seen to merge. The second era: dissolution of the axes of confrontation The second postwar era began in 1960 and lasted roughly into the 1980s. This period for the most part coincides with the golden age of LDP rule. Ikeda Hayato succeeded Kishi as prime minister in 1960 (serving until 1964). Reflecting on the previous administration’s failure and reversing its confrontational stance, he devised the slogan ‘tolerance and patience’ and came up with the so-called income-doubling plan. This defused the controversy over the Security Treaty issue and the fierce antagonisms that had accompanied it, shifting the focus of debate to economic policy instead.

122  Koizumi and Japanese Politics As a consequence, the LDP’s internal divisions over foreign and defence policy now for the most part disappeared and the politically realist Yoshida Doctrine entrenched itself as the political ideology of the conservative mainstream. That Japan would rely on the USA for its defence under the new Security Treaty and follow a course of cooperation with the USA in its foreign policy became selfevident. With the growth rate remaining at high levels under conservative rule, unarmed neutralism as advocated by the reformist camp lost the support of many citizens, and realistically conducted debates on foreign affairs and defence matters ceased. In economic policy, too, the ideological confrontation between economic liberalism and mercantilism disappeared. Thanks to the increasing liberalization of trade and capital and the establishment of a system under the Kishi and Hatoyama administrations wherein MITI would implement industrial policy, an ‘embedded liberalism’, meaning an open economy internationally and market intervention at home, was put into effect.10 As a result, arguments over economic policy were focused no longer on conflicts between ideas, but rather on how to divide up the ‘pie’ of economic growth. LDP politicians devoted their energies to channelling a share of the spoils back to their electoral districts and various industries, thus spurring the growth of so-called patronage politics (rieki yūdō seiji 利益誘導政 治). Under the latter, economically weak but politically strong sectors such as small to medium-sized businesses and agriculture received particularly favourable treatment, but other sectors were also given a degree of consideration. The LDP thus developed into a ‘catch-all party’ (hōkatsu seitō 包括政党) that embraced the interests of all sectors including office workers and labourers. Power within the party shifted to the zoku lawmakers as the mechanism best suited to interest distribution. The opposition parties meanwhile ceased to play an important role in policy-making and inter-party conflicts devolved into a kind of formalistic affair. The thinking of the conservative mainstream, with its tenor of political realism and Japanese-style mercantilism, held sway during this era. Ideological confrontations receded into the background and political priority came to be placed on distributing benefits among various sectors. The politics of interest overwhelmed the politics of ideas.11 The fact that the Socialist Party ­­– which advocated unarmed neutralism and regarded the SDF as unconstitutional – was unable to win broad support helps explain why the LDP could remain the single dominant party for so long. But the LDP’s success was due above all to the degree of legitimacy it had achieved through introducing a diverse range of social interests into the political process. In an era during which the country enjoyed the fruits of rapid economic growth and was able to depend on the USA under the Cold War system, the LDP skilfully prioritized the distribution of wealth as a political technique. The third era: new axes of confrontation emerge Around the latter half of the 1980s and into the early 1990s the second era came to a close and the third set in. During this period, changes in the economic and

The Koizumi administration  123 international environments occurred and new axes of confrontation began to emerge. In economic policy, the limits of patronage politics became apparent and calls for neoliberal reforms (the so-called structural reforms) were raised, demanding the easing of regulations and cuts in public expenditure. The following factors contributed to this development. First, the intensification of economic frictions between the USA and Japan in the 1980s led to ‘external pressure’ (gaiatsu 外圧) from the USA demanding structural reforms of the political and economic system so as to boost imports and increase domestic demand. A prime example for this was the conflict over revision of the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law during the Japan–US Structural Impediments Initiative talks. Second, the pump-priming measures focused on public works projects that were repeatedly implemented after the burst of the land speculation-fuelled ‘bubble economy’ in the early 1990s proved to have little discernible effect, causing fiscal red ink to accumulate. The realization spread that structural reforms were necessary for true economic recovery to occur. Third, the advance of globalization stimulated the cross-border movement of shortterm capital; for Japan to maintain its position in the international marketplace and prevent capital from fleeing overseas, structural reform came to be seen as a necessity. Fourth, with the end of the Cold War, conflicts within the conservative camp rose to the surface. Because no other political party had the wherewithal to assume the responsibilities of government during that long conflict, even the urban new middle class had no choice but to support the LDP despite dissatisfaction over the preferential treatment that certain sectors received. Socialism’s disappearance as a common enemy due to the end of the Cold War exposed the latent cracks within the LDP’s support base. Protected sectors such as agriculture, construction and the distribution industry wanted to see profit-sharing continue as before and were opposed to structural reform. Internationally competitive corporations and the new middle class, on the other hand, came to demand that such changes take place.12 Consequently, an axis of confrontation once more emerged between Japanesestyle mercantilism on the one hand, which stressed increased fiscal spending on public works and the like as well as protection of vulnerable sectors, and economic liberalism on the other, which sought to apply market principles and reduce the role of government through deregulation and other means. New conflicts also emerged over foreign and defence policy. First, once the Cold War was over, the sense of the Japan–US security arrangement, which had been premised on this conflict, was called into question. Since the constellation in which the USA protected Japan from the Soviet threat had collapsed, arguments now emerged that Japan should instead play an active part in US defence strategy. Second, Japan’s contributions to the international community came under question at the time of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the Persian Gulf War of the following year. Under these circumstances, such questions of high politics as Japan–US defence cooperation and contributions to the international

124  Koizumi and Japanese Politics community once again came to occupy the political centre stage. Third, regarding changes in the party system, the formation of a new party by Ozawa Ichirō with its call to transform Japan into a ‘normal nation’ (futsū no kuni 普通の国) also was intrinsically linked to this redrawing of the battle lines. Now that the Socialist Party had come to accept the SDF’s existence and the Security Treaty with the USA, the focus of foreign and defence policy debates shifted from the unrealistic question of whether the US–Japan Security Treaty structure ought to be maintained or not to the question of what role Japan should play within that structure. The principle of military realism is oriented towards expanding Japan’s defence capabilities and the SDF’s role overseas, taking the Security Treaty structure as its premise. With the demise of the idea of unarmed neutralism, a new axis of confrontation now formed between the political realism that had thus far held sway as the governing orthodoxy on the one hand (the line of thought that advocates international contributions through non-military means such as humanitarian and financial assistance is one strand of this) and military realism as its new counter position on the other. The Koizumi administration’s historical phase As the foregoing illustrates, during the third era new axes of confrontation came to the fore in economic as well as foreign and defence policy that revived the importance of the politics of ideas. However, the structure of the LDP, which had been formed by interest politics, could not cope well with these new axes of ideological confrontation. As a catch-all party that sought to distribute benefits across a wide range of sectors, the LDP embraced people with diverse policy orientations in its ranks. While there were lawmakers especially from urban areas who favoured economic liberalism, Japanese-style mercantilism also maintained its influence, centring on zoku lawmakers who drew on the protected sectors as their bases of support. The politics of interest structure was staunch, and the zoku lawmakers had sunk their roots deeply into it. This made it extremely difficult for the LDP to come together and espouse economic liberalist principles. The party represented a broad spectrum of ideologies also over matters of foreign and defence policies, scattered across a political realist and military realist wing. Viewed in more general terms, a politics of interest is sustained by the logic of political tradeoffs consisting in exchanges of votes and money for patronage. The zoku lawmakers and Iron Triangle structure that made this principle function efficiently lacked the techniques for coping with a politics of ideas. This is because ideas that are not accompanied by short-term interests are not easily turned into objects of a transaction. To animate a politics of ideas, policy entrepreneurs – people who energetically work towards achieving specific policies – are indispensable. The zoku lawmakers, however, who had come to nurture symbiotic relationships with bureaucrats did not easily warm to such qualities and notions. The new conservative parties such as the Japan Renewal Party, Japan New Party and New Frontier Party formed by defectors from the LDP might have

The Koizumi administration  125 emerged as the standard-bearers of neoliberalism and military realism as well, but the party situation at the time was fluid and none of them lasted long. The party widely expected to ultimately succeed the New Frontier Party as a second big party in Japanese politics was the DPJ. However, the DPJ also had the strong character of a gathering of people with a variety of policy orientations, comprised as it was of former members of the LDP, the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and the JSP, and this made it difficult to hammer out joint policy ideas. With neither the LDP nor the DPJ able to get a suitable grasp on the politics of ideas and generate a unifying force around specific convictions, the axes of confrontation between ideologies and between parties did not coincide and became skewed. For this reason, no serious competition between parties over policy ideas emerged, and the citizenry, accordingly, were not given the opportunity to choose which set of policy ideas they preferred. In essence, the politics of ideas whose importance ought to have recovered during the third postwar era bred incompatibilities with the existing political structure. The Hosokawa (1993–4) and Hashimoto (1996–8) administrations can be understood, in a sense, as attempts to deal with this problem. Hosokawa Morihiro adopted a clearly neoliberal stance, as seen by his decision to partially open the rice market during the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations for example. Hashimoto Ryūtarō launched his fiscal restructuring and administrative reforms from such a position as well. But Hosokawa had to step down midterm owing to setbacks over welfare taxes and political scandals, and Hashimoto was obliged to resign to take responsibility for a defeat in Upper House elections. As a result, these attempts did not reach successful conclusions. That Hashimoto’s successor Obuchi Keizō (1998–2000) put the fiscal structural reform bill on hold and devoted his energies to fiscal stimulus instead indicates as much. Consequently, as the 20th century drew to a close, a sense of distrust and frustration was growing among the Japanese people over a political structure that appeared increasingly incompatible with a politics of ideas. A desire surged for leadership that could overcome that structure and engage in a politics of ideas appropriately – in short, for a leadership that could offer to the people policy options based on underlying convictions. The urban new middle class in particular wanted to see leaders who upheld principles of economic liberalism that corresponded with their own policy orientations, and who could rally a political party around those ideas. It was just at this point that Koizumi took centre stage. Koizumi flew the banner of neoliberal reform and proclaimed that he would tear down the existing political structure. The Japanese had great expectations for him. Telepolitics and populism were also important factors that help explain Koizumi’s popularity. However, the fact that he appeared just as these sorts of demands were being made should not be overlooked. Koizumi sought to rally the LDP around the principles of economic liberalism and went so far as to seek to exclude people who disagreed with him as ‘forces of resistance’. In the postal election, he asked the people directly for their verdict regarding his liberal convictions and garnered enormous support thereby. In foreign and defence

126  Koizumi and Japanese Politics policy, too, he forcefully pushed a military realist stance in his enactment of the anti-terror and Iraq special measures laws and in the efforts he made towards strengthening the cooperation with the USA and dispatching the SDF overseas. Moreover, the LDP’s cohesion was heightened during the latter half of the Koizumi administration. There now appeared a noticeable trend for the axes of ideological confrontation to correspond with divisions between political parties, with the Koizumi Cabinet flying the flag of an economic liberalism that could be called principled and the DPJ coming out with a centre-left position focused on reducing a growing income gap and similar issues. Koizumi’s emphasis on a politics of ideas that exposed latent axes of confrontation and brought to light alternate positions that had not been sufficiently represented before, is a distinguishing trait of his administration when seen in historical context. The fact that Koizumi skilfully perceived the demands of the day and turned them into reality is what made it possible for his administration to maintain its extraordinarily high approval ratings.

Prime ministerial leadership and political institutions Concentration of power in the ruling parties and executive branch Japanese prime ministers until recently generally led a passive existence, relying on decisions made from the bottom up. Koizumi changed this to exercise relatively strong leadership over the bureaucracy and government parties. What made it possible for him to do so? Koizumi’s personal character and political strategies were of course important, but in the following I will take a closer look at the functions fulfilled by political institutions. I use the word ‘institution’ broadly here to refer to organizational structures and rules for decision-making. Generally, institutions of this kind constrain the power a political actor can wield.13 That is to say, certain institutions limit the strength of leadership that a prime minister is able to demonstrate; if such institutions change there will be changes in prime ministerial styles of leadership as well. The basic framework holds that a prime minister can exercise strong leadership when the concentration of power in the ruling party and the government’s executive branch is high.14 To the extent that power is centralized, the cohesive force of an organization increases and the likelihood for its other members to accept a leader’s directions rises. Conversely, if power is dispersed, resistance to a leader’s course is more likely to meet with success. Particular attention will be paid here to the degree to which power was concentrated in the ruling party and the executive branch since among those who can get in the way of a prime minister’s policies, ruling-party lawmakers and bureaucrats are the most important. As zoku lawmakers, LDP Diet members would form alliances with bureaucrats and frequently block a prime minister’s policy proposals. The question of whether or not a prime minister can overcome the resistance of such alliances and pursue his policy-making ambitions depends on the degree to which power is centralized in the ruling party and executive.

The Koizumi administration  127 Under the 1955 system, a prime minister’s leadership was under strong constraints since the concentration of power within the ruling party and the executive branch was low. Executive authority in both was increased to a certain degree due to the political and central government reforms of the 1990s. Koizumi was able to exercise strong leadership because, along with his populist methods, he made the most of the concentration of power they had brought about. In the following, I will discuss these points in more detail. The LDP in the 1955 system The LDP, the dominant party in the 1955 system, was characterized by a fragmented organizational structure. For one, since the LDP at the time was above all a coalition of factions, a prime minister’s power base rested on an alliance of factions holding the majority. In policy-making a prime minister therefore had to take the wishes of the dominant factions into consideration. Second, LDP lawmakers raised their own political finances. In other words, the money that was raised was not concentrated at the party’s centre but rather dispersed among individual lawmakers. Campaigns funds were procured by lawmakers personally in the form of political contributions from corporations or individuals and through fund-raising events. Election campaigning likewise was carried out by leaning on their private support bases, comprising candidate-level ‘support associations’ (kōenkai 後援会) and the like. Since LDP lawmakers did not depend on their party for such resources as money and votes to any great degree, the party’s leadership could not easily control the average lawmaker by using resource distribution as a lever. Third, in terms of decision rules, the LDP set great store by decision-making through consensus formation. For example, while party rules called for the General Council’s decisions to be passed by a majority vote, in practice the party operated on the principle of unanimity rule. Fourth, decision-making was two-tiered, with both the Cabinet and the ruling party having their own decision-making processes. Decisions of the party on policies and other matters were made in the PARC and the General Council independently of the Cabinet, and these venues – particularly the various committees of the PARC – were strongholds for zoku lawmakers. Consequently, it was possible for an average ruling party lawmaker, particularly a zoku Diet member, to wield influence over a prime minister. The executive branch under the 1955 system The government’s executive branch possessed the same sort of fragmented power structure under the 1955 system. The prime minister’s control over the various sections of the executive was weak, leaving the individual ministries and agencies with a high degree of autonomy. This is evident not least in the constraints the cabinet system placed on the prime minister. The prime minister’s position under the Cabinet Law was almost on a par with that of his ministers. It was not entirely clear, for example, whether the prime minister had the right to initiate

128  Koizumi and Japanese Politics policy in cabinet meetings. In addition, the Cabinet Secretariat and the Prime Minister’s Office (Sōrifu 総理府) – institutions that should have bolstered the prime minister’s power – were short on personnel and lacking in authority. Second, informal rules for decision-making – that is, patterns of bureaucratically guided decision-making – had became institutionalized. The costs for a politician of trying to change this pattern were high. Using these institutions and cooperating with the bureaucracy, on the other hand, brought great benefits (such as the ability to dole out favours to one’s support base).15 Ministers were thus favourably disposed to follow the bureaucracy’s lead, and bureaucratically guided decisionmaking increasingly gained in power. Third, the prime minister’s authority to appoint cabinet members and other officials was restricted. Given the LDP’s structure as a coalition of factions, the prime minister was bound to distribute his cabinet picks proportionally among the factions. That made it difficult for a prime minister to consolidate his cabinet with people whose views were in accord with his own or to dismiss ministers who were out of line. Also, prime ministers could not necessarily get politicians who possessed leadership ability to serve as ministers or vice ministers. Making appointments based on the principle of ‘the right person for the right job’ was difficult. Under such circumstances, ministers easily become dependent on their bureaucrats. Fourth, coherent policy programmes, like the party manifestos seen in Great Britain, did not exist. Since concentration of power in the LDP was low, when it came time to lay out an election campaign agenda, the party would cobble together a programme composed of various policies that represented the separate interests of various electoral districts and industries. The party proved unable to create a coherent policy programme in which thoughtful consideration was given to overall consistency and the setting of priorities. A programme of this sort could become the basis on which a cabinet directs the bureaucracy. But since no such coherent agenda existed, ministers had no choice but to act on the policies that the bureaucrats proposed. Fifth, the zoku lawmakers who had enormous influence under this decentralized party structure formed alliances with bureaucrats, and those alliances increased the power of both further. The power of the zoku lawmakers and the power of the bureaucrats had mutually reinforcing effects. That the LDP’s decentralized power structure produced decentralization in the government’s executive branch through faction-based cabinet appointments and related practices is important to keep in mind. As a result, ministers of state tended to function as the representatives of their ministries and to act in line with the will of their bureaucracies.16 The Cabinet came to be characterized by turf wars among multiple ministries and agencies. Prime ministers had difficulties controlling the latter, while bureaucrats were able to wield considerable power.

The Koizumi administration  129 Political reform and centralization of power in the party executive The low degree to which power had been centralized under the 1955 system made it difficult for a prime minister to exercise strong leadership. Japan’s prime ministers generally worked more to coordinate and conciliate conflicting positions between the various ministries and within the party than to take the initiative in making policy decisions. One American political scientist has suggested that the Japanese prime minister’s role was basically to ratify and arbitrate.17 Ratification is a matter of formally approving policies that have been formed from bottom up, while arbitration calls for stepping in and reconciling conflicts among ministries, within the LDP and between political parties. This framework was altered to a degree by the political and administrative reforms (reorganization of the central government ministries) of the 1990s. Due to these institutional reforms, concentration of power within the ruling party and the government’s executive branch was heightened to a considerable degree. Political reform became the most hotly debated issue in Japanese politics from the end of the 1980s to the first half of the 1990s, in the wake of the Recruit scandal of summer 1988 that caused popular distrust of politics to skyrocket. While the LDP was sent into opposition, reforms were achieved in January 1994 under the Hosokawa administration. They rested, broadly speaking, on two pillars: reform of the electoral system and reform of campaign finance rules. The reforms to the electoral system changed the Lower House election system from one based on medium-sized constituencies to one combining single-member districts (SMD) with proportional representation (PR) blocks. Their stated goal was to realize ‘elections driven by party and policy preferences’. That is to say, the reforms were intended to produce elections centred on contests between parties over policies aimed at winning power in order to enact them. The thinking behind this change was as follows. Under the old medium-sized electoral districts, candidates from the same party had been forced to compete against each other because the LDP ran multiple candidates in a single electoral district. The result was elections based on personal preference with candidates emphasizing their personal promise and achievements in their appeals to the electorate, and voters placing greater importance on who the candidates were than to which political parties they belonged when casting their ballots. Politicians thus spent great amounts of money on electoral district ‘maintenance’ and doled out favours to their constituents to sustain their appeal among them. In short, the personal preference-based elections that came with medium-sized electoral districts invited a host of problems including political corruption. Recognizing this, reformers thought that if they changed the electoral system and eliminated intraparty competition, elections focused on party and policy preferences would result and patronage politics disappear. The overhaul of controls on campaign funding took the following form. First, tighter restrictions were imposed on corporate and personal donations to political parties and individual politicians. Second, financing was rendered more transparent by allowing a politician to have only one fund-management organization to serve

130  Koizumi and Japanese Politics as a ‘collection plate’ (ukezara 受け皿) for personal donations. Third, the reforms introduced public financing for political parties. The objective and idea behind the campaign funding reforms was, in a word, to overcome money-based politics. These reforms had the effect of heightening the concentration of power within the LDP in several ways. First, the new system combining SMDs with PR blocks increased the importance of the image of the party’s leader. Under the mediumsized electoral district system, competition between individual candidates was more important than competition between parties. Because candidates would foreground their own names in their campaigns rather than the party to which they belonged, the question of who their party’s leader was had no large bearing on their success. Under the SMD system, on the other hand, intraparty competition in this sense disappeared. The relative weight of inter-party as opposed to individual competition was now higher than it had been under the medium-sized electoral district system.18 And at the PR tier, where voters had to enter the name of a party on the ballot, competition between parties naturally came to occupy the focus. When inter-party competition comes to carry the greatest weight, the image of a party’s leader, along with (or perhaps even more than) the policies a party proclaims, gains importance in swaying how people cast their votes. This is especially so in situations where the mass media play a significant role in politics. Since having a nationally popular leader increases the electability of a party’s candidates, party members will try to field the most popular leader they can. Even if the policy aspirations of a leader incite the opposition of many lawmakers, they have no choice but to continue supporting this leader if there are no other viable candidates for the position. Second, the political reforms weakened the power of the factions. Under the medium-sized electoral district system where the LDP ran multiple candidates in each district, these candidates needed to join separate factions and get their support. However, to the degree that intraparty competition ended under the SMDs, the factions lost their raison d’être. Moreover, tightened political financing regulations made it harder for faction bosses to engage in under-the-table fundraising. Third and most important of all is the effect these reforms had on strengthening the power of the party’s leadership. As political scientist Takenaka Harukata has also pointed out, the overhaul of the electoral system made the party leader’s right to endorse candidates grow in significance.19 In the medium-sized electoral district system, the threshold for winning election was lower (a candidate could win even with about 10 per cent of the vote). Even a candidate with no party affiliation had the possibility of winning an election. Consequently, there were numerous instances in which a candidate who could not get an endorsement would run as an unaffiliated conservative and be inducted into the party through a post-election endorsement if successful. The SMD system, on the other hand, made it difficult for a candidate who did not have a party’s endorsement to win an election if they lacked a strong local support base. At the PR tier, it was impossible for a candidate who was not on a specific party’s list to get elected to begin with. Consequently, party executives

The Koizumi administration  131 such as the president and the secretary general who had considerable control over party endorsements became able to control the fate of a candidate. The introduction of subsidies for political parties furthermore increased the amount of funds that a party’s executive had the authority to distribute. In general, LDP lawmakers raise most of their campaign funds on their own,20 but control of these additional funds gives the party a powerful lever to wield over candidates who are financially weak. Last but not least, although revision of the Political Funds Control Law put a stop to corporate and organizational donations to individual politicians, companies were still allowed to donate to the party chapter over which a candidate presided. In effect, then, a candidate affiliated with a party was still able to receive corporate donations. Since candidates without party affiliation were not in a position to receive funds in this fashion, getting expelled from the party could represent a significant loss of earnings. Thus the political reforms created an environment in which party leaders could exercise tremendous influence over the average lawmaker. Authority in the LDP became more concentrated at the centre in the executive, and it became more and more possible for the prime minister to dominate average lawmakers. However, we should be careful not to simply overlook the question of whether or not the party leadership would actually use its power of endorsement as a means for controlling the latter. I will show the significance of this below. The reform of government ministries and agencies and centralization of power in the executive branch Around the mid-1990s, the bureaucracy came under increasing criticism owing to the government’s mishandling of the housing loan (jūsen 住専) companies crisis and a scandal involving HIV-tainted blood products, and various other transgressions involving bureaucrats. Against this background, the Hashimoto Cabinet launched the Administrative Reform Council to have it deliberate on concrete policies for reforming the bureaucracy. The Council submitted its final report the following year in December 1997 and the subsequent reform of central government ministries and agencies was carried out on its basis. The Hashimoto reforms, as they were known, were wide ranging. They included a reorganization of the central government into one secretariat and twelve ministries (including the Defence Agency) and introduced the independent administrative agency system. I will focus here on those reforms that were meant to strengthen the Cabinet’s functions. Their main contents were as follows.21 1

2

The Cabinet Law was revised to explicitly stipulate that, as the head of the Cabinet, the prime minister could propose ‘the basic principles concerning the important policies of the cabinet’.22 The systems for assistance and support of the prime minister were strengthened. The substance of these changes covered four areas. (i) The functions of the Cabinet Secretariat (Naikaku kanbō 内閣官 房) were enhanced. The Cabinet Law now stipulated that the Cabinet

132  Koizumi and Japanese Politics

3

Secretariat would carry out planning and overall coordination of important cabinet policies. Previously, the Cabinet Law had described the secretariat’s role only as ‘overall coordination’. Now it clarified that it would engage not just in passive ‘coordination’ but also conduct active ‘planning’. Furthermore, three assistant chief cabinet secretaries were added to the Cabinet Secretariat and the number of the prime minister’s assistants was increased. (ii) A Cabinet Office (Naikakufu 内閣府) was created. This administrative institution headed by the prime minister was charged with planning and overall coordination on important issues such as economic and fiscal policy, general science and technology policy, disaster prevention and gender equality. The office was regarded as a ‘seat of wisdom’ (chie no fu 知恵の府) and accorded a status higher than that of other ministries or agencies as symbolized by the fact that it stood as an institution outside the framework of the National Government Organization Law. (iii) Special ministers of state were appointed within the Cabinet Office whose portfolios covered such areas as financial services, economic and fiscal policy; science and technology policy; disaster management; and gender equality. (iv) A number of councils were created in the Cabinet Office, including the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, the Council for Science and Technology Policy, and the Central Disaster Management Council. They were charged with carrying out investigations and deliberation on urgent matters arising in these areas. Senior vice-ministers (fukudaijin 副大臣) and parliamentary secretaries were installed at each ministry to bolster the leadership of the respective ministers.

The effect of these reforms was to centralize power in the executive branch in the following ways. First, the human and institutional resources – that is, the ‘core executive’ – that supported the prime minister were reinforced through the strengthening of the Cabinet Secretariat and the creation of the Cabinet Office.23 The special ministers of state attached to the Cabinet Office were to give support to prime minister-led policy-making in the cabinet. In Koizumi’s Cabinet, Takenaka Heizō held the economic and fiscal policy portfolio and Ishihara Nobuteru that of administrative reform, while Kōnoike Yoshitada was appointed minister of state for special zones of structural reform. These ministers were not bound to the positions of specific ministries or agencies; rather, they drew on Koizumi’s ideas and devoted their energies to promoting structural reform. As for the Cabinet Secretariat, the post of assistant chief cabinet secretary, a special civil service position, was filled with capable bureaucrats of viceministerial level. The secretariat found its authority expanded to include active ‘planning’ and in a break from the past gained jurisdiction over several laws. Moreover, the Cabinet Secretariat and Cabinet Office functioned in ways that cut across vertical divisions between ministries and agencies. Various organizations were created under the supervision of assistant chief cabinet secretaries such as

The Koizumi administration  133 the Headquarters for the Promotion of Special Zones for Structural Reform and the Headquarters for Regional Revitalization; these entities dealt with issues that cut across the boundaries among ministries and agencies. Furthermore, they made it possible to carry out policy-making while shielding it from bureaucratic interference, as seen by the creation of the Postal Privatization Preparatory Office in the Cabinet Secretariat charged with drafting the privatization bills. Thus, an institutional environment was created for issues that cut across administrative boundaries to be pursued under the lead of the Cabinet.24 Second, the CEFP – which was created in the Cabinet Office – played an especially important role in economic policy. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Council wrested the initiative for setting the agenda from the bureaucracy, opening up the debate and providing a venue where the prime minister could hand down policy-related decisions. This change of venue transformed the power structure. Third, the introduction of the senior vice-minister system expanded the number of human resources supporting the ministers in their ministries and agencies. Everything depends of course on how well the minister, senior vice-minister and parliamentary secretary work together, but as long as this condition is satisfied the degree of leadership a minister could exercise in a given ministry was thereby heightened. The staffing of bureau-level positions within a given ministry also became more likely to reflect the minister’s wishes. Fourth, a normative consciousness that ‘the prime minister and cabinet should play a stronger leadership role’ emerged. Traditionally, as the expression ‘the politicians reign and the bureaucrats rule’25 suggests, it was considered normal for party politicians including the prime minister to act in accordance with the bureaucracy’s wishes, but this now changed. This new expectation played an important part in legitimizing the authority of the prime minister and his cabinet officers. Previously, an enormous brouhaha would result if a minister intervened in personnel decisions involving the civil service, as seen in the December 1993 Naitō affair at MITI under the Hosokawa administration (JRP Trade Minister Kumagai Hiroshi’s effort to seek the resignation of the ministry’s policy bureau chief Naitō Masahisa); however, with the change in normative consciousness such interventions have come to be accepted with relative equanimity. Conversely, now a prime minister whose leadership is questionable will experience a loss of legitimacy and popular support. Fifth, in addition to the foregoing, the heightened centralization of power in the LDP that the electoral system and other reforms produced helped to bolster the centralization of power in the executive branch. As the factions were weakened to an extent by the above series of political reforms, Koizumi went over their heads and disregarded even seniority in making his cabinet and other appointments. His power to make appointments autonomously also strengthened the concentration of power in the Cabinet since it gave the prime minister a lever against the bureaucracy. Koizumi frequently ordered his cabinet ministers to ‘make decisions not as the minister of some ministry, but based on your position as a minister of state in the Koizumi Cabinet’. Such thinking reflected the new situation. It also became easier to pick ‘the right person for the right job’ and appoint politicians

134  Koizumi and Japanese Politics with considerable policy-making abilities to positions within ministries. This made it more likely that a minister would be able to exercise control over the bureaucracy. The significance of the 2005 General Election Thus, by the time Koizumi became prime minister, the centre’s control of power had been strengthened at the LDP and in the government’s executive branch, creating an environment in which the prime minister could wield considerable authority over the ruling party and the bureaucracy. In fact, Koizumi would use the Cabinet Secretariat and the CEFP to seize the initiative in creating various new policies. However, this is not to say that the strength of Koizumi’s leadership was consistently the same throughout his tenure in office. There were numerous occasions early in his administration when he was blocked by his opponents and unable to achieve desired results despite efforts to seize the reform initiative. Also, he would frequently stop paying attention to a policy after he had launched it, as suggested by the ‘shot putting’ (marunage 丸投げ) criticism noted in Chapter 2. For that reason, some observers began to express disappointment over Koizumi’s leadership in the middle stages of his administration. Major newspapers reported on critical assessments of his government. The Nihon keizai shinbun asked corporate executives, local government leaders and economists to offer their appraisals of his cabinet. The average score was 2.4 out of a possible 5, which the paper said was ‘close to a failing grade’. The same day that the Nikkei story appeared, the Mainichi shinbun said in its morning edition that the pace of reforms had ‘lost speed’ as the administration entered its second year.26 Political scientist Aurelia George Mulgan concluded around this time that Koizumi’s revolution had ‘failed’.27 Of course, as we have seen, even under these circumstances Koizumi was successful in exercising a considerable amount of leadership. This seemingly contradictory phenomenon is best understood from a perspective that regards the setting of the agenda and specification of alternatives as separate matters. Agenda setting involves positioning a certain point of dispute as an issue to be resolved, while specifying alternatives pertains to deciding on which of the alternatives proposed for its resolution should be pursued.28 Koizumi displayed a great deal of interest in setting the agenda and demonstrated considerable leadership in this regard, but he was unable (or did not try) to wield the same degree of influence when it came to specifying alternatives. But Koizumi’s ability and willingness to exercise his authority as leader grew – one might even say dramatically – after the postal election of 2005. He now also exercised considerable influence over specifying alternatives. A leader nearing the end of his or her term is generally said to become a ‘lame duck’ and experience a loss of authority, but Koizumi’s case was far from this. During this time, he achieved heretofore unthinkable policy shifts over such matters as the postal privatization issue, medical treatment fee reductions, administrative reform and cutting expenditure.

The Koizumi administration  135 The medical treatment fee revision of 2006 resulted in the largest ever such reduction at a 1.36 per cent cut, or 3.16 per cent in all once the cost of medicine and the like is included. The administrative reform promotion bill passed in May 2006 stipulated a net reduction in the number of civil servants and a reform of government-run financial institutions. The cuts called for in the civil service were to reduce the size of the public workforce by 5.7 per cent (about 19,000 employees) over a five-year period from fiscal 2006 to fiscal 2010. (‘Net reduction’ meant that the number of personnel would go down even including new hires. This marked the first time that such a target had been set.) The financial institution reform called for consolidating five institutions including the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, privatizing the Development Bank of Japan and the Shōkō Chūkin Bank, and abolishing the Japan Finance Corporation for Municipal Enterprises. As for the comprehensive expenditure and revenue reform that was the key feature of the 2006 honebuto policy statement decided on that July, its goal was to see the primary balance (balance of payments excluding debts and interest payments) of both the central and prefectural governments go into the black by fiscal 2011, with the amount of expenses to be reduced over a five-year period starting the next fiscal year set at ¥11.4 to ¥14.3 trillion. Rapid rise in the centralization of power Two things made it possible for so much change to occur in these areas where zoku lawmaker opposition had previously blocked the progress of reform. One was the great decline in the power of the ‘forces of resistance’ caused by Koizumi’s aggressive use of his authority to endorse candidates at the time of the postal election; the other was rapid strengthening of power at the LDP’s centre. As noted earlier, while the party president formally controlled endorsements, it was not at all clear that this authority would actually be used. Based on what had come to be accepted as LDP custom, incumbent candidates were hardly ever refused endorsement. Many lawmakers therefore bet that the party leadership was unlikely to apply this prerogative. That Kamei Shizuka and the other ‘postal rebels’ did not believe, as has been said, that Koizumi would in fact dissolve the Diet and made erroneous predictions about the possibility of Koizumi using his endorsement powers stands as an excellent example of such thinking. Institutions are ineffective in real terms when they are not put to use. Even if the party president’s authority to grant endorsements means that he formally holds a candidate’s fate in his hands, that power has little practical effect as a stick that can be wielded over the average lawmaker as long as the odds are low that it will actually be applied. Consequently, the rebel lawmakers were not that afraid of Koizumi at first either. But Koizumi did refuse to endorse lawmakers who revolted against the Postal Privatization Law and ran ‘assassin’ candidates against them in their electoral districts. In the face of this development, LDP lawmakers realized that the prime minister would not shrink from exercising his endorsement authority, and got a direct taste of the consequences of rebelling against him.

136  Koizumi and Japanese Politics To put it another way, the question of whether or not a lawmaker might rebel depends on the expected relative costs that an act of rebellion is expected to produce. The lawmaker who expects that rebellion will generate costs that are greater than the benefits to be achieved is likely to hold back. The expected value of a rebellion’s cost is thus calculated as the product of the costs incurred from sanctions (for example, the increased difficulties of contesting in an election without an endorsement) multiplied by the probability of sanctions being actually imposed. Expressed in terms of Bayesian probability theory, the subjective probability that the prime minister might actually exercise his authority to give endorsements was low at first, but Koizumi’s actual behaviour led to a correction, causing this probability now to be rated as high. Consequently, the expected value of the costs of rebelling against Koizumi (the product of the costs associated with not being endorsed and the probability of actually not being endorsed) now rose markedly. The result was a visible drop off in oppositional acts against the prime minister. In this fashion, after the postal election the prime minister’s control of ruling party lawmakers was remarkably strengthened and the centralization of the LDP increased by leaps and bounds. Moreover, since the degree of centralization at the ruling party moved in lockstep with that in the executive branch, the centralization of power at the latter also rose. To wit, while ministries previously had been able to stand up to a prime minister’s policies by forming alliances with zoku lawmakers, the vast reduction in the power of the zoku led to a decline in the ministries’ influence since they could no longer count on reinforcements. The growing powers of control at the LDP’s centre also made it possible to create a coherent policy programme that could provide a powerful foundation for the Cabinet to take the lead in policy-making. Japan saw its first so-called ‘manifesto elections’ in 2003. The LDP manifesto issued that year contained numerous vague statements and tended to be utterly lacking in terms of coherence and verifiability. Conversely, the manifesto issued for the 2005 general election was relatively clear, reflecting the high degree to which central authority had been strengthened in the party. Thus, the powerful leadership role that Koizumi played in the final year of his administration was supported by a simultaneous rise in the concentration of power in both the ruling party and the government’s executive branch. I pointed out in Chapter 1 that Koizumi had two sources of authority to draw upon, one being such institutional resources as the legal authority invested in his office and the other being his personal qualities. Populist strategies to mobilize public opinion, combined with getting the most out of the various institutions provided by political and administrative reform, created the ‘strong prime minister’ Koizumi Junichirō.

5 Legacies of the Koizumi administration

In conclusion, I would like to consider what stamp the Koizumi administration left on Japanese politics. This book has relied on the keywords ‘strong prime minister’ and ‘prime minister of pathos’ as terms that seem to me to capture its essence. The Koizumi administration had its peculiar strengths and shortcomings in regard to both of these aspects. As I seek to tally them up here, I also want to offer my views on the likely form that Japanese politics will take in the future.

Strengths and shortcomings of the ‘strong prime minister’ Transformation of the prime minister’s image On the one hand, Prime Minister Koizumi was a ‘strong prime minister’ who promoted top-down policy-making. First to mention among his achievements in this regard is that he overturned the established image of the Japanese prime minister. Until Koizumi, the images that clung to the Japanese premier were those of a ‘weak prime minister’ unable to stand up to LDP factions and zoku lawmakers, and a ‘political wheeler and dealer’ (seijiya 政治屋) who excelled at coordination and conciliation behind closed doors. Koizumi, however, replaced a policy-making system that had been bogged down by vested interests with top-down decisionmaking under the Kantei’s control. Promising ‘destruction of the factions’ (habatsu no daha 派閥の打破), he made his personnel decisions unencumbered by established LDP custom and sought to exclude opponents of his structural reforms by portraying them as ‘forces of resistance’. As a result, he succeeded in changing the structure of the LDP to a respectable degree. Beyond that, Koizumi favoured a political style of talking directly to the public over coordination and conciliation with politicians and bureaucrats, and asserted that he was standing on the side of the common people. He thus demonstrated that a Japanese prime minister could cast himself as a ‘strong’ and ‘popular’ (kokuminteki 国民的) leader. Koizumi’s power was based in his institutional authority as prime minister, which had been increased as a result of the political reforms and the restructuring

138  Koizumi and Japanese Politics of the central government ministries and agencies of the 1990s, and by his distinctive populist methods that attracted wide support from the public, not least political independents. Blessed though his government may have been by numerous chance developments, the Koizumi administration can claim the third longest term in office of the postwar period at five years, five months. The average term of office for a Japanese prime minister has been extremely short compared to the premiers of other countries. The United Kingdom, for example, had 12 prime ministers over the 62-year period from 1945 to 2007, with an average stay in office of about five years. Cabinets there have been long-lived particularly in recent years, with Margaret Thatcher remaining in office for 11 years and Tony Blair for 10. Japan, on the other hand, produced 21 prime ministers over the 45 years from the establishment of the 1955 system to the formation of Koizumi’s first cabinet. Reckoned simply, this translates to an average term in office of 2.1 years. While Koizumi’s term was not as long as that of recent UK prime ministers, it clearly was much longer than the average in Japan. Policy changes and the ‘politics of ideas’ Koizumi accomplished policy changes that far exceeded anything thought possible until then. Most deserving of attention among them was his implementation of neoliberal policies. These policies reflected mainly the interests of such constituencies as the urban middle class, a group whose political influence had previously tended to be ignored. In general, when the benefits of a given policy are concentrated within a narrow spectrum, the beneficiaries form powerful interest groups to put pressure on the government. The profits thereby obtained (rents generated from direct cash payouts or regulations) are then reinvested in political activity (rent-seeking behaviour). Most members of the public such as the average consumer, on the other hand, suffer losses in the form of prices that are higher than they should be, owing to market regulations and the diversion of taxes into subsidizing others. What is more, thanks to their lack of organizational strength, their interests are easily given short shrift in the political process. A situation arises in which many lose so that few may gain, so to speak.1 With its neoliberal reforms such as cuts in government spending and regulatory reform, the Koizumi administration pursued policies that favoured the interests of the average citizen over sectional interests. By employing top-down decisionmaking methods, Koizumi overrode the ‘forces of resistance’ that represented only certain interests. In this regard, note must also be made of the fact that Koizumi engaged in a ‘politics of ideas’ by upholding his neoliberal convictions. As we saw in Chapter 4, the main current in Japanese politics under the 1955 system had been a ‘politics of interests’ that turned its attention primarily to distributing the fruits of growth to the various sectors. A politics of ideas, wherein politicians and parties compete against each other in the name of specific principles, retreated into the background.

Legacies of the Koizumi administration  139 However, for neoliberal reforms to be enacted that will potentially inflict pain on the public, a politics of ideas is indispensable. Policies like subsidies and public works projects, for example, produce direct benefits for those on the receiving end. But it is not necessarily as obvious what sort of benefits neoliberal policies such as implementing market mechanisms are going to bring. It is easy to see that regions in which public works projects are slashed will suffer, but it is intuitively difficult to understand how that will benefit the nation as a whole. In such instances, a specific idea serves as an indicator of the sort of benefits to be obtained. In the case of the Koizumi administration, its idea, based on neoclassical economics, indicated that cutting the budget deficit would produce economic growth as a benefit through the expansion of privatesector activity.2 Neoliberal convictions played a major role under the Koizumi administration in conveying to the public the notion that a ‘promised land’ lay beyond the structural reforms that were momentarily causing pain. Coupled with such mantras as ‘no growth without reform’ and populist methods whose underlying tone suggested a struggle between good and evil, they produced enormous public support for Koizumi’s reform effort. In economic policy, the ‘strong prime minister’ who engaged in top-down decision-making strategically and the ‘prime minister of pathos’ who cultivated a populist style meshed well, allowing these two aspects of Koizumi’s premiership to function in synergy. (As we saw in Chapter 3, this is in stark contrast with how the ‘prime minister of pathos’ impaired strategic coherence in the case of Koizumi’s foreign policy.) The Koizumi administration revitalized the politics of ideas that had been hidden behind a politics of interest until then, moving it to the forefront again. Born at a time when the public yearned for leadership that would suitably engage in a politics of ideas, it fulfilled these expectations exquisitely. The Koizumi administration and the ‘expansion of inequalities’ The problem of social inequality is frequently pointed to as an adverse effect of Koizumi’s structural reforms. It is said that the gap between ‘the strong’ and ‘the weak’ expanded due to the far-reaching implementation of market mechanisms and the diminishment of the government’s role in redistribution. The DPJ and other opposition parties used the problem of inequality as a basis for attacking the Koizumi government at the start of the 2006 regular Diet session. DPJ President Maehara Seiji raised several issues during Diet questioning on 23 January such as increases in the numbers of households on welfare, of frīta (temporary workers) and nīto (from the British NEET, meaning ‘not in employment, education, or training’), and the growing income disparity between regular salaried employees and part-timers. ‘There are both bright and dark sides to the Koizumi reforms,’ he pointed out. The Livedoor affair surrounding an internet-startup company and a scandal involving architects and general contractors who had fabricated data on earthquake resistance in buildings to cut costs also came under scrutiny during this Diet session. All of

140  Koizumi and Japanese Politics these were regarded as evils brought about by the Koizumi administration’s neoliberalism. Livedoor president Horie Takafumi combined a relatively flamboyant lifestyle with an outspokenness that were atypical for a Japanese executive. Those characteristics had helped turn him into a symbol for the winners under Koizumi’s economic reforms. His arrest was seen by many as a warning to those who believed in the ‘omnipotence of the market’ (shijō bannō 市場万能). In the case of the fabricated earthquake resistance data scandal, entrusting privatesector companies with carrying out building inspections after ordinances had been relaxed under the Building Standards Law was considered the root problem. The DPJ’s pursuit of the LDP on these grounds ultimately foundered over an affair involving an e-mail message that allegedly showed shady dealings between Horie and the LDP. (The DPJ lawmaker who presented the message to the Diet had not vetted its authenticity, and DPJ President Maehara was forced to resign to take responsibility when it proved to be fabricated.) It is still worth paying close attention to these critiques. While market mechanisms can achieve an efficient allocation of resources (Pareto optimal), they do not guarantee fair income distribution. It has in fact been pointed out that inequalities expanded in both the USA and the UK in the wake of the Reagan and Thatcher administrations, both of which had pursued neoliberal reforms. The Koizumi administration also implemented policies that put direct curbs on redistribution. The quintessential case here is welfare benefits cuts. Koizumi’s government decided to abolish oldage supplements paid to recipients 70 or older as of April 2006, and to do away with maternity supplements paid to single-parent households in stages over a three-year period starting with the 2007 draft budget. However, the question of whether social inequalities did in fact grow as a direct result of the Koizumi reforms must be assessed carefully. The effects of a policy do not become apparent in the short term. In fact, it is believed that the rise in social inequality currently observed was already under way before the Koizumi reforms began. Consider for example the Gini coefficient, a standard index for measuring the inequality of income distribution (Figure 5.1). The larger its value the greater the inequality; when incomes are completely equal it stands at zero. The figure shows the fluctuations in the Gini coefficient since 1990 and we can see it rose throughout the 1990s. The coefficient’s value in fact declined somewhat during the middle years of the Koizumi administration (owing probably to the economy’s recovery). Viewed in this light, it would seem premature to assert a direct connection between Koizumi’s reforms and the current growth in inequality. There can be no doubt, however, that the changes in corporate employment patterns that accompanied the long economic downturn have had some impact on the rise in inequality. Companies facing fierce competition are increasing the proportion of non-regular employment in the form of part-timers and temporary workers in order to reduce labour costs. Non-regular employees made up 20.2 per cent of the workforce in 1990. That figure rose to 26.0 per cent in 2000 and to 33.2

Legacies of the Koizumi administration  141 0.20

0.19

0.18

0.17

0.16 1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

Year

Figure 5.1  Trends in the Gini coefficient Source: Government of Japan, Cabinet Office, 2006 White Paper on National Life, Sources Supplement (Kokumin seikatsu hakusho 2006 nenpan shiryō-hen). The White Paper was drafted on the basis of disposable income data drawn from the Ministry for Internal Affairs’ Family Income and Expenditure Survey (Kakei chōsa 家計調査).

per cent by 2006 (first quarter).3 Furthermore, compensation for non-regular employees is generally low compared to that of regular staff. The Cabinet Office’s 2005 White Paper on National Life cited the rising percentages of part-time or temporary employment as a factor in the marked growth of income inequality among the younger generations. Inequalities are quite likely to grow further so long as this corporate employment pattern persists and parity of compensation between regular and non-regular employees is not guaranteed. In the medium to long run, a connection between neoliberal policies and growing inequality is therefore difficult to deny.4 ‘Exclusion’ versus ‘inclusion’ There already is a lively debate under way over the causes and effects of the current rise in social inequality. Rather than focusing on the growth of inequalities here, I will turn my attention to the role played by the inherent logic of the policymaking process. The arguments of sociologist Anthony Giddens, which are said to have provided the Blair administration with its theoretical foundation, are instructive in this regard. Giddens proposed that perspectives based on equality and inequality should be replaced with one based on inclusion and exclusion. Inclusion according to Giddens, ‘refers in its broadest sense to citizenship, to the civil and political rights and obligations that all members of a society should have.’5 It also means guaranteeing participation in the public sphere and access to various opportunities such as work, education and training, and healthcare. Exclusion comes in two forms. The first type takes place among society’s lower strata and involves people being cut off from various opportunities that society provides. The second type is exclusion in the upper strata and concerns

142  Koizumi and Japanese Politics well-off classes choosing to disengage themselves from public institutions and living disconnected from other sectors of society. The two types are linked, and both are injurious to the public sphere. Viewed from this perspective, the Koizumi administration’s approach to policymaking and politics must be said to have been based on a logic of exclusion. Koizumi’s primary targets were political independents, mainly from the new middle classes, and the main beneficiaries of his policies were the middle classes and above. It would be difficult to say that adequate consideration was given to the strata situated on the ‘low’ end. Policies to provide fresh opportunities to those who had been excluded from opportunities to access education and healthcare were not on Koizumi’s menu for structural reform. On the other hand, the upper classes’ disengagement from the public sphere was also ignored, as symbolized by the Livedoor affair. Inclusion and exclusion are also connected to the question of whether greater emphasis is put on division or unity in political society. The question is whether a society should mainly be concerned with improving cohesion between those who are like-minded while excluding ‘enemies’ on the basis of existing divisions, or whether it should be concerned with accommodating diverse interests and values and pursue the consolidation of society as a whole. In this regard, too, the populist style that was Koizumi’s strength was the very essence of the logic of exclusion. Koizumi produced stark oppositions of good and evil and sought to drive the ‘evil’ out. Certainly Koizumi’s methods were quite effective in shaking up the deadlocked policy-making system. However, the pros and cons of excessively emphasizing conflict are deserving of separate interrogation. In fact, as history anywhere amply demonstrates, it has been rare for any society riven with division to continue to flourish. The role the Ikeda Cabinet played at the start of the 1960s comes to mind here. As society was thrown into turmoil over Security Treaty revision, Ikeda Hayato discontinued the confrontational stance of the Kishi Cabinet to appeal for ‘tolerance and patience’ instead and set forth a policy line that prioritized the economy. Since social tensions over foreign policy and defence matters had become excessive, he shifted the emphasis to economic issues over which there was little disagreement. The Japanese economy moved towards high-speed growth against a background of social stability and such economic policies as Ikeda’s income-doubling plan. ‘The politics of interest’ would run wild during this period, but this was not ultimately Ikeda’s responsibility. The significance of the Ikeda Cabinet in having eased the conflicts in Japanese society and shifted it in a direction of greater unity cannot be emphasized enough.

Legacies of the Koizumi administration  143

Strengths and shortcomings of the ‘prime minister of pathos’ Rousing interest in politics and the paralysis in East Asia relations Koizumi was also the ‘prime minister of pathos’, who stressed pathos (passion) over logos (reason) and with his populist style appealed to voter sentiment. His populist political methods – his simple, easy-to-understand patterns of speech, laced with expressions of personal feeling; his emphasis on oppositional frameworks that pitted good against evil; and his media strategy – stirred an interest in politics among many. While these methods have been decried as ‘wide show politics’ and ‘Koizumi theatre’, they deserve some credit for having roused, in their own way, an interest in politics among segments of the public who had shown little concern for it before, and getting them to participate, after a fashion. Changes in policy became possible precisely because Koizumi had won the support of many political independents by such means. But this political style also carried a downside. Foreign policy must be mentioned first here. Koizumi’s continued pilgrimages to Yasukuni shrine based on his personal sentiments were an obstacle to better relations with China and South Korea. The economic damage that resulted from the halt in bilateral summit meetings – FTA negotiations with South Korea came to a standstill, and the corporate investment environment in China was affected – cannot be ignored. I have already indicated the questions that can be raised regarding the strategic coherence of Koizumi’s foreign policy. The slighting of logos A still deeper reaching question deserving attention is how an attitude that favours pathos and dismisses logos relates to the proper role of ‘politics’. Needless to say, politics is an arena in which careful deliberations based in logic should be carried out. Koizumi, however, repeatedly used language and conducted himself in a way that made light of logos. Particularly striking were his responses devoid of any logical explanation to questions at the Diet, which is supposed to be ‘a citadel of discourse’ (genron no fū 言論の府). Let me give some examples. At the House of Representatives Budget Committee meeting of 23 January 2003, DPJ President Kan Naoto attacked Koizumi for going back on his campaign pledge to issue ¥30 trillion worth of new government bonds. Koizumi replied, ‘Not keeping a little promise like that is no big deal.’ On 11 June, JCP President Shii Kazuo was pressing Koizumi during parliamentary question time about the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Koizumi retorted, ‘Is it possible to say: [Saddam] Hussein has not been found, therefore he does not exist? You can’t say that, right? So, how can you assert that there are no weapons of mass destruction?’ In response to Kan’s questioning in the Diet on 23 July about the areas of deployment for the SDF, which were supposed to be noncombat areas under the Iraq Reconstruction Law, Koizumi declared, ‘Even if I keep being asked this, how

144  Koizumi and Japanese Politics am I supposed to know where the noncombat zones and where the combat zones are?’ At a meeting of the Lower House’s budget oversight committee on 2 June 2004, as politicians’ nonparticipation in the national pension scheme had come under question, Okada Katsuya of the DPJ went after Koizumi about being enrolled in the employee pension scheme despite there being no evidence of him ever having been employed. Koizumi shrugged the matter off with the words, ‘People lead all kinds of lives, there are all kinds of companies, and there all kinds of employees.’6 Naturally, all of these remarks invited backlash from the opposition parties. But matters never reached a point where Koizumi was taken to task for them. Even granting that the DPJ followed a line that considered offering alternate proposals and negotiating changes preferable to blocking deliberations, Koizumi got away with making statements that ordinarily would have halted Diet deliberations for days, as if they were self-evident. All of these are archetypal examples of how little weight he attached to logos. The word pathos has connotations of a ‘passive state’ in addition to its meanings of passion and sentiment. That is to say, an action based on pathos means behaving passively and reflexively rather than thinking and making judgements responsibly. The political method of appealing to pathos can lead people to forsake responsible judgement.

Photo 5.1 ­Prime minister question time on 23 July 2003. In response to a question from Kan Naoto (left) of the DPJ about dispatching the SDF to Iraq, Koizumi said, ‘Even if I keep being asked this, how am I supposed to know where the noncombat zones and where the combat zones are?’ He then turned defiant, quoting Confucius: ‘When you do not know a thing, allow that you do not know it. This is knowledge.’ Photo credit: The Yomiuri Shimbun.

Legacies of the Koizumi administration  145 Of interest in this regard is the observation that in contemporary politics techniques of ‘mind-brain marketing’ (shinnō māketingu 心脳マーケティング)7 are frequently employed.8 This method manipulates images associated with words and reduces issues to a simple choice between pleasure and pain. It forces people to make judgements not with the prefrontal region of the cerebral cortex that is unique to homo sapiens and governs language cognition (the ‘human brain’), but with the more primitive limbic cortex that governs pleasure and pain (the ‘animal brain’), thus driving people to stop thinking. The strategy relied upon by the LDP in the 2005 general election is said to have been based on such a method. The Koizumi LDP used the pleasure-inducing symbol of ‘reform’ and reduced the general election to a simple choice of ‘postal privatization yes or no?’ Koizumi is also said to have projected an image of trusting voters more than Diet members, thereby giving pleasure to the former.9 His style was thus well attuned to the human instinct to seek out pleasure. However, one should not sit idly by when this method forces the ‘human brain’ to go blank and deprives the world of politics of logos. A stark contrast to Koizumi’s demeanour as ‘the prime minister of pathos’ is offered by Ōhira Masayoshi, who served as prime minister from 1978 to 1980. Ōhira had a habit of frequently interjecting ‘ah’ and ‘um’ when answering questions in the Diet or like situations, giving the impression of being inarticulate. Combined with his physical appearance, this earned him the nickname dongyū 鈍牛 (‘dumb ox’). Behind the mask, however, he is said to have had a mind like a steel trap and possessed great eloquence. He spoke haltingly in public venues because he understood the importance of language and logic in politics and was choosing his words with care. In fact, according to the former director of the House of Councillors’ Stenographers Training Institute, Takahashi Masaki, Ōhira’s statements ‘turned out perfectly well-formed sentences (kirei na bunshō ni natte ita きれいな文章になっていた) as they were, when we transcribed them into written Japanese’.10 Certainly, Ōhira came nowhere near to Koizumi in terms of public popularity. After Ōhira had raised the possibility of implementing a general consumption tax, the LDP suffered a crushing defeat in the general election of 1979. That he could propose unpopular policies like this was the result of his giving serious thought to the question of what was needed for Japan’s future. During the 1980 general election campaign, he suddenly died. The heavy burden of governing may thus have shortened his life. Ōhira had stressed logos, eschewed making thoughtless remarks to court public favour, and taken the responsibilities of governing upon him at the risk of his own life; perhaps he was the politician who best represented the superior parts of postwar conservative politics. In today’s Japan, where the trend toward telepolitics is progressing with advances in communications technology and the party leader’s image has become important thanks to electoral system reform, politics stressing logos is losing its worth. Being capable of appealing directly to the electorate with impressionistic phrases is of great advantage to politicians today, and having such a politician as a party leader brings benefits to this party’s lawmakers as well. In this sense, the

146  Koizumi and Japanese Politics fact that politics are more and more driven by pathos may well be an inevitable product of the age. Rational debate and the essence of politics We cannot be indifferent to the trend towards pathos in politics. Originally, logosbased discourse, careful explanation and persuasion were supposed to be the indispensable elements in politics. In the ancient Greek polis, the progenitor of democracy, government by free and equal citizens through debate founded on logos was considered the ideal. Political scientist Bernard Crick argues that politics is ‘the activity by which differing interests within a given unit of rule are conciliated by giving them a share in power in proportion to their importance to the welfare and the survival of the whole community’.11 Premised on the idea that a given society contains diverse interests and values, the nature of politics is to coordinate and integrate these interests and values through political participation. Good governance requires rational debate in public venues and the citizenry’s autonomous participation in public affairs.12 As philosopher Hannah Arendt suggested, assuming that humans are equal to and distinct from one another, it is indispensable for people to make each other understand who they are through speech as they engage in actions that build relationships among a plurality.13 In recent years, the idea of deliberative democracy has garnered much attention in connection with this emphasis on reasoned debate. This idea posits that not only politicians and other members of the ruling elite but also average citizens are included among the actors in deliberations. One important objective of these deliberations is for each participant to listen closely to other views in the process of debate, and constantly reflect on and re-examine their own opinions and judgements.14 As German legal philosopher Jürgen Habermas has pointed out, decisions with binding force such as those that constitute laws must be rooted in social consensus in order to gain legitimacy;15 but a consensus cannot be achieved as long as each person simply attempts to force through their own opinions and concerns. This is particularly the case when emotional claims are being made. Consensus can be formed in a society precisely to the extent that each person revises their initial opinions through a process of rational debate. However, the increasing emphasis on pathos is tearing logos from the business of politics, rendering deliberations based on reason ineffective. There is an utter lack of concern for consensus building in the populist approach, which stirs up conflict to an unnecessary degree. Crick warns, ‘The populist mode of democracy is a politics of arousal more than of reason, but also a politics of diversion from serious concern.’16 Depriving the political arena of the logos indispensable for dealing with matters of serious concern is a political cardinal sin. In theatricalized politics, every matter ‘serious’ or ‘unserious’ comes to be evaluated on the same standard, namely the question ‘to what extent does it stir pathos?’ The populist style of seeing elites as the enemy and equating oneself with justice adapts easily to this standard as it appeals to the anger and jealousies of

Legacies of the Koizumi administration  147 the masses. But it stands far from the true object of politics, which is to conciliate diverse values and interests. It represents not ‘inclusion’ achieved through tenacious persuasion of others but facile ‘exclusion’ instead. In the latter days of the Koizumi administration, the costs of decision-making fell drastically thanks to synergy between the ‘strong prime minister’ and the ‘prime minister of pathos’. Very few voices were raised in opposition to the prime minister’s plans, and policy-making went extremely smoothly. To borrow the vocabulary of Italian philosopher Antonio Negri and American political philosopher Michael Hardt, not only is the world globalizing but the arena of political decision-making also is turning into a ‘smooth space’.17 Certainly, speed in policy-making is probably necessary given the conditions of fierce inter-state competition that have arisen as a result of globalization. There also can be no doubt that the decision-making process in Japanese politics prior to Koizumi had become deadlocked and that it had become difficult to carry out necessary policy reforms. But this does not make it acceptable to abandon deliberation rooted in logos and an inclusion of others. What is important is to make efforts to be as inclusive as possible while debating what sorts of reforms are needed, and to demonstrate leadership in such careful deliberations. Is it not the duty of political leaders to be tenacious in their efforts to reconcile inclusiveness with reform however impossible this may seem? Coexistence of modern and premodern traits The qualities of a ‘strong prime minister’ and of a ‘prime minister of pathos’ are not ones that normally go well together. There are fundamental contradictions between the two. As a ‘strong prime minister’, Koizumi carried out top-down decision-making and demolished factional and patronage politics. If Britishstyle politics are regarded as the ideal, this may be understood as ‘progress’ in terms of drawing closer to it. Whatever the case may be, as far as strategic topdown decision-making is concerned, such a prime minister is characterized by rationality and modernity. Meanwhile, as the ‘prime minister of pathos’ who put his own personal convictions and sensibilities first, Koizumi’s political style was characterized by irrationality and premodern qualities. In this sense, the modern and the premodern, and the rational and irrational dwelled jointly within Koizumi in a curious form. The problem of premodern elements in modern Japanese thought and politics was first spelled out in these terms by the eminent postwar intellectual historian and political theorist Maruyama Masao. Maruyama gave the label ‘faith in felt reality’ (jikkan shinkō 実感信仰) to a pattern of thinking that rejects rational thought to place emphasis on everyday experience and traditional sentiments instead.18 This thought pattern kept the Japanese from establishing their personal independence or political ‘subjectivity’ (jinkakuteki shutaisei 人格的主体性), while in politics it produced a ‘system of irresponsibility’ (musekinin no taikei 無責任の体系) that made it unclear who the decision-makers were and where responsibility lay.19

148  Koizumi and Japanese Politics A classic example of what Maruyama meant by ‘faith in felt reality’ is the statement Koizumi made after his pilgrimage to Yasukuni shrine on 15 August 2006. ‘What is so bad about making a pilgrimage to offer one’s condolences to the overwhelming majority of those who were killed in war? I am not going there for the Class-A war criminals. This is a matter of the heart and nothing else (masa ni kokoro no mondai da まさに心の問題だ).’ Throughout the course of his structural reforms, on the other hand, he played the part of the ‘decisionmaking subject’ (ketsudan shutai 決断主体) to the hilt and claimed responsibility for himself. The same prime minister who conducted himself extremely rationally in economic policy-making was equally irrational when it came to Yasukuni and foreign policy. This can only be described as strange. The question of the ethics required of a politician is connected to this as well. Max Weber divided the ethics that sets standards for conduct into two types:20 an ‘ethic of responsibility’ (Verantwortungsethik), which holds that people should accept responsibility for the consequences of their actions, and an ‘ethic of conviction’ (Gesinnungsethik), which discounts actual consequences so long as the convictions behind an act are just and pure. Those who contract with the diabolical enterprise involving power and force that is politics cannot base themselves on an ethic of conviction. However, it was clearly an ethic of conviction that Koizumi was relying upon when he stressed that his visit to Yasukuni visit was but ‘a matter of the heart’. To reach a decision after having carefully thought through what the consequences of acting on one’s sentiment are likely to be is what is called for by an ethic of responsibility, but such an ethic had been abandoned. Koizumi thought that this being ‘a matter of the heart’ cleansed him of all responsibility. The growing weight of pathos in politics has had consequences in terms of weakening the ethic of responsibility that should not be overlooked.

The future of Japanese politics Will the ‘Koizumi effect’ last? Over the course of its five years and five months, the Koizumi administration had an enormous impact on the world of Japanese politics. But did the underlying structure of Japanese politics completely change? Will there be no return to the structure as it once was? As I bring this volume to a close, I want to discuss the direction that Japanese politics is likely to take from here on. First of all, there is the traditional structure of the LDP, with its factions and zoku politicians, that Koizumi targeted for destruction. While the Koizumi administration weakened the influence of these forces to a considerable degree, they have not breathed their last. In one sense there are still reasons for them to exist. Systematic interviews of politicians conducted by political scientists Ellis Krauss and Robert Pekkanen have shown that the institutional structure of the LDP as it has existed thus far – with its personal support groups (kōenkai 後援

Legacies of the Koizumi administration  149 会), the PARC, and factions – endures while it is taking on new functions.21 That is to say, LDP candidates need to mobilize not just their supporters in the party but also political independents and other parties’ voters in order to win as many votes as possible; the personal support groups function as a kind of collection plate for drawing these voters in. The campaign support functions of the factions have been reduced, but they continue to have a certain role to play in intraparty promotions and the distribution of party posts. The PARC furthermore fulfils the role of whip – this refers to the individual in parties, in the UK and elsewhere, whose job it is to get lawmakers to cast their votes in line with their party’s policies, the original meaning of this term literally being ‘whip’ – in disciplining party lawmakers as the place where new lawmakers receive their policy training. In fact, factions played a certain role also in the first post-Koizumi presidential contest in which Abe Shinzō was elected. The Mori, Ibuki, Kōmura and Nikai factions all decided as factions to back Abe, while the Niwa-Koga faction for all practical purposes agreed to do the same. Furthermore, the mainly mid-level and young lawmakers who backed Abe formed a cross-factional group called the Diet Members’ League in Support of Challenge Again (Sai-charenji shien giin renmei 再チャレンジ支援議員連盟; the name derives from Abe’s ‘Challenge Again Support’ initiative to help the unemployed re-enter the workforce) and created their own election strategy headquarters separate from the party’s factiondominated organ of that name. The fact that the two individuals at the forefront of this alliance, Suga Yoshihide and Yamamoto Yūji, were appointed internal affairs and finance minister, respectively, suggests that for all intents and purposes this grouping functioned as an ‘Abe faction’. The Asō faction debuted at the end of 2006. The notion of merging the Koga, Tanigaki and Asō factions into a revived Kōchi-kai 宏池会 (the name of an earlier LDP faction which both the Koga and the Tanigaki factions had claimed for themselves in the meantime) was also considered as a way to solidify the party’s base, looking ahead to the next party presidential election. (The Koga and Tanigaki factions did indeed merge in May 2008.) However, the way in which factions operated had qualitatively changed compared with what prevailed before the Koizumi administration. As the ‘Challenge Again’ federation illustrates, factions could now also form around a policy. In any case, while factions certainly seem to be more unstable than they had been, faction-like entities that can organize lawmakers and solidify the party’s internal foundation remain necessary as long as the party’s presidential election system is in existence. Next to consider is the prime minister’s leadership, which was dramatically strengthened under Koizumi. As discussed in Chapter 4, the question of whether a prime minister can exercise leadership is intimately connected to the organizational structure of the ruling party and the government’s executive branch. Koizumi the ‘strong prime minister’ was supported by the heightened centralization of power within the LDP and the executive branch that had been produced by a series of institutional reforms. However, even given the same institutional structure, the amount of leadership that can be wielded will vary due to other factors. The

150  Koizumi and Japanese Politics personality of the individual who becomes prime minister, for example, is a major factor. Vast differences in their exercise of leadership are also likely to occur between individuals like Koizumi with a short time horizon who favour ‘one-shot’ decisions and individuals with a long time horizon who value mid- to long-term relationships built on reciprocity. The question of what sort of interest independents have in politics and how much support they offer to a given administration is important as well. The higher an administration’s approval rating the easier it becomes for the prime minister to carry out top-down decision-making built on ‘public opinion’. To the degree that the interest of political independents rises, the effectiveness of tactics that advocate ideas such as structural reform increases while conversely the effectiveness of tactics that emphasize organizational interests will decline. If independents on the other hand lose interest, it becomes necessary for politicians to rely on their existing support bases instead, and it is fully possible in this case that elections stressing the importance of organizational interests will become more prevalent again. In short, the degree to which power is centralized in the LDP (or the party’s ability to unite) can change depending on independents’ interest in politics. To put this differently, a prime minister’s authority is a certain type of social construct.22 When people are joined in a shared understanding of who has power and what the nature of that power is, a political power that corresponds to this understanding comes into existence. In more concrete terms, when large numbers of voters think that ‘a prime minister should have strong powers’, such powers are in fact produced. In this sense, the fact that ‘political leadership’ was advocated strongly throughout the course of the Hashimoto and other reforms changed people’s thinking about the powers a prime minister should have. This may be said to have given rise to Koizumi the ‘strong prime minister’ in the first place. It must therefore be stressed that such contingent elements are significant in defining a prime minister’s leadership as well. Future axes of political confrontation But what is conceivable for the future with regard to the prevailing axes of political confrontation and ways of decision-making? The principal axis of confrontation in economic policy under the 1955 system lay between economic neoliberalism on the one hand and Japanese-style mercantilism on the other. The Koizumi administration clearly steered towards the former in the shape of neoliberal reform. The Abe administration attempted certain adjustments such as its ‘Challenge Again Support’ (Sai-charenji shien 再チャレンジ支援) programme, but it basically took the same course. While the DPJ may have emphasized remedying inequalities, it, too, did not fundamentally question the effectiveness of market mechanisms in and of themselves. Certainly, in a situation where international competition is intensifying amid the advance of globalization, there is a tendency to think that neoliberal policies are the only choice. Also, generally when two large political parties seek to maximize their votes, the policies of the two wind up

Legacies of the Koizumi administration  151 resembling one another extremely closely since it becomes advantageous to adopt a centrist policy stance (the median voter theory). This is not to say that conflicts over economic policy have gone away. Applying market principles may produce efficiency, but the chances are high that inequalities in redistribution and opportunities remain. Fair treatment for those whom market mechanisms have left behind is likely to become a point of debate. What this requires is policies that combine ‘efficiency’ with ‘fairness’. Also, market principles basically rest on individualism, but that can result in a society where the ties between people are cut and individuals are scattered like atoms. Accordingly, axes of confrontation could emerge over the question of whether the market, the government, or the community should be emphasized as the primary institution in economic and social policy. Problems of inequality and the like cannot be settled by just leaving everything up to market mechanisms, and expanding the role of the government is accompanied by such problems as inefficiency. Consequently, one view that has been attracting great attention in recent years is the notion that problems associated with the market and the government can be avoided if the community plays a certain role. Social capital theory as advocated by political scientist Robert Putnam, among others, stands as the paradigmatic example of this.23 Social capital refers to patterns of reciprocity and networks for civic engagement; concretely, it takes the form of various voluntary associations. When there is an abundance of social capital, interpersonal activities become coordinated, voluntary cooperation comes naturally and society becomes more efficient. That is to say, the ‘public’ activities that citizens undertake spontaneously have an enormous effect on the effectiveness of policies and the community’s well-being. Viewed in this light, even as it made adjustments to some degree to market principles, the Abe administration’s ‘Challenge Again’ plan – which offered renewed opportunities even to those who had dropped out of the market rat race – appears to have basically rested on a foundation of individualism. Ideologically speaking, the orientation is towards liberalism with its emphasis on individual freedom. In contrast, the stance taken by Tanigaki Sadakazu, one of Abe’s opponents in the presidential election, was to foreground the idea of ‘renewing bonds’ and stress the local and other communities. Perhaps this could be labelled ‘conservative communitarianism’. The term ‘civic communitarianism’ can in contrast be used to describe a position emphasizing alliances with nonprofit organizations and the like. Policy lines of these sorts also offer promising alternatives. In foreign policy, too, the Abe administration followed in the Koizumi administration’s footsteps and moved further in the direction of military realism, as evidenced by its upgrading the Defence Agency to ministry status and its elevation of the SDF’s overseas activities from secondary to primary duties. This is not to say, however, that this orientation was the only inevitable alternative. The axes of confrontation in foreign and defence policy under the 1955 system, as already discussed in Chapter 4, have been changing thanks to developments such as the end of the Cold War. First, assuming that Japan must make some sort of

152  Koizumi and Japanese Politics international contribution, there is the choice of whether to contribute through the military or to do so using other, ‘soft’ means (sofuto na shudan ソフトな手段). Second, there is a choice to be made between whether to adopt bilateralism and set a premium on working with the USA, or to pursue multilateralism and stress such venues as the United Nations.24 The axes of confrontation that are likely to emerge are not limited to those outlined above, but what is important in all events is that there be deliberation surrounding a given axis not only at the level of politicians and bureaucrats but also among citizens, and that democratic policy choices are made based on that deliberation. The nature of policy-making Next are the methods for policy-making. In general, in a world where globalization is proceeding apace, the swift implementation of required reforms has become a necessity thanks to the intensification of international competition. For that reason, political systems where decisions are made by a majority and minority views are ignored are said to have an advantage, while political systems that stress consensus and are characterized by ‘inclusion’ are seen as being at a disadvantage. However, this is not necessarily a proposition verified by research in comparative politics. Comparative political scientist Arend Lijphart has offered a deeply interesting analysis.25 According to Lijphart, there are two types of democracies: the majoritarian model and the consensus model. The majoritarian model, as the name implies, settles matters by majority decision. Under the ‘winner takes all’ principle, small electoral districts are adopted as this model’s electoral system and the majority party will have a monopoly on government posts and the like. The UK is the prime example of this. (Originally, the majoritarian model was also called the ‘Westminster model’.) The consensus model, on the other hand, tries to shape agreements among as many people as possible. The proportional representation system is used in this model, and government posts are distributed proportionally among multiple parties and factions. Switzerland and Belgium are examples of this model. After statistically verifying which excel in terms of management of macroeconomic affairs, quality of life and so on, Lijphart concluded that countries operating on the consensus model post better performance. As can be seen from this, the majoritarian method – or to put it another way, the method of exclusion – by itself is not the only policy-making method that is desirable. Lijphart’s research suggests that inclusion is superior in terms of economic and social performance. Inclusion and reform are not necessarily incompatible. I stress inclusion here not out of some nostalgia for the good old days that would like to resurrect the redistributive politics of the past. Make no mistake, the ‘politics of interest’ of the 1955 system represented a type of inclusion as well. However, they foundered because unprincipled redistribution took place. What is important is not an arbitrary ‘catch-all’ approach but rather an inclusion that

Legacies of the Koizumi administration  153 hinges on specific principles. To repeat, what is needed is for deliberation founded in logos to take place over what kinds of reform principles are preferable, and for dedicated efforts to be made at combining inclusion with reform, under leaders who in fact display leadership. There is more than one option as far as the substance of policies and decisionmaking methods are concerned. We must not get swept up by Koizumi’s ‘successful experience’ and succumb to tunnel vision about the possibilities that politics contain. We are not limited by the notion that only the policy stances and decision-making methods that Koizumi employed are correct. Politics is an activity that by its very nature thrives on ‘self-fulfilling prophecies’. The knowledge and understanding that we have of politics will be reflected in the politics of the future (please recall that the perception that ‘democracy is desirable’ is a motivating force that has spurred the democratization of many countries). Accordingly, if we have only a narrow appreciation of the way politics could be in the future, then only that sort of politics is likely to result. But the present is more diverse and fertile than that, and filled with possibility. What is important is that we not lose our political powers of imagination. The future of political society hinges on the question of whether or not we can always keep our thinking open about the possibilities of what could be.

Postscript The Koizumi and Abe administrations

In September 2006, seven months before the Japanese original of this book first appeared, Abe Shinzō assumed the office of prime minister as Koizumi’s successor. The Abe administration started while the afterimage of Koizumi and his forceful personality still remained vivid in the public’s eyes. The legacy of the Koizumi administration had an enormous impact on how Abe managed his politics. However, there were striking differences in how the two men exercised leadership as prime minister. What were those differences? Why did those differences arise? Looking back now for the English edition from the vantage point of 2009, I will focus this chapter on a comparison of the Abe administration’s exercise of leadership with that of the Koizumi government in order to cast the latter’s distinctiveness and significance into further relief.

Legacies from the Koizumi administration, and shackles Despite being a youthful 52, Abe won the support of an overwhelming majority in the LDP and secured himself the seat of prime minister. This was primarily due to his enormous popularity with the public. People looked approvingly on his soft and gentle image and yet his hardline stance towards North Korea. Since the image of the prime minister had come to have a tremendous impact on the voting behaviour of the electorate in national elections, many lawmakers came around to a pro-Abe position. Backing the candidacy of one of his enemies carried the tremendous risk of being left out in the cold when it came to personnel appointments. This had the effect of getting yet more lawmakers to rush to back Abe as the winning horse. Just how powerful the impact of the Koizumi administration had been could unmistakably be seen in all this. First, being popular in the eyes of the public had become a precondition for the premiership and LDP presidency owing to the impression Koizumi’s national popularity had left in people’s minds. After an administration that boasted of such high approval ratings, the notion of selecting a party leader who lacked public support was simply inconceivable. The fact that Koizumi was believed to have had Abe in mind as his successor – a man who had supported Koizumi as LDP secretary-general and as his chief cabinet secretary – also played a significant role in Abe’s winning support. (Koizumi indeed voted for

Postscript  155 Abe in the party’s presidential election.) That Koizumi had done away with the practice of distributing cabinet appointments proportionally among the factions further heightened lawmakers’ concerns about being left out and encouraged the behaviour pattern of wanting to back a winner. Abe was able to become prime minister because of these conditions that the Koizumi administration had left behind. The trail that Koizumi blazed through the thicket of Japanese politics had prepared the ground for the Abe regime. However, this also meant that Abe could not avoid being constrained by Koizumi’s political style. Abe was required to act in line with the image of a premier that Koizumi had established – the ‘strong prime minister’ who took the initiative in policy-making. For that reason, immediately after taking office Abe appointed five special advisers to the prime minister, including Koike Yuriko and Sekō Hiroshige, to demonstrate that he was reinforcing the Kantei’s ability to take the lead, and (inspired by the US model) hammered out his concept for a Japanese version of the National Security Council. In Abe’s subsequent policy-making as well, the ‘prime minister’s initiative’ was frequently emphasized. As the 2007 budget was being drafted, for example, Abe issued orders on 11 December 2006 to reduce government bonds by the largest amount ever. On 30 November, he had personally proposed in connection with the problem of tax revenues earmarked for road construction that the gasoline excise tax be incorporated into the general revenue – a concern carried over from the Koizumi administration. And at the time of the government’s decision to offer ¥6 billion to help settle a long-running lawsuit over Tokyo air pollution, Abe highlighted his own role in it on 30 May 2007: ‘I told [Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintarō] that I will decide this based on my personal judgement.’ Another example is Abe’s remarks of 8 June concerning the discussions at the G8 summit in Heiligendamm, Germany, over measures against global warming. Emphasizing his place in the proceedings, he stated: ‘The actual discussions at the summit centred on my proposal, and the Japanese proposal was incorporated into the summit declaration.’ Finally, it was again Abe himself who extended the 2007 regular Diet session at its very end – regardless of disapproval expressed by the LDP’s House members – because he wanted to see the Public Service System Reform Law, on which he had focused his efforts, passed. Abe could not avoid constantly emphasizing the prime minister’s leadership in this way since any deviation from the image of a ‘strong prime minister’ in the Koizumi mould risked shaking the legitimacy of his administration. The many bequests that Abe had received from Koizumi came with shackles.

Stalling of the neoliberal reforms and weak leadership As noted earlier, neoliberalism – the guiding principles of which were limiting the government’s role and broadly applying market principles – set the basic tone for economic policy in the Koizumi administration. A series of structural reforms were implemented in accordance with these principles, including fiscal reform, privatization of the highway public corporations and postal services,

156  Koizumi and Japanese Politics and regulatory reform. In foreign and defence policy, his administration sought to bolster Japan’s manpower contributions and the alliance with the USA, as exemplified by the administration’s dispatch of the SDF overseas. These basic orientations did not change under the Abe administration. Neoliberal reforms were still at the core of the agenda on economic policy and, as evidenced by the elevation of the Defence Agency to full-fledged ministry status, the shift from what had become Japan’s traditional postwar defence policy likewise continued apace. When it came to neoliberal reforms, however, their pace slowed down considerably. This was because the top-down style of leadership that had been characteristic of the Koizumi administration did not work successfully for Abe. In the case of tax revenues earmarked for road construction, Abe initially sought to get them incorporated into the general budget revenue, but proved unable to achieve that goal. He had touched on this plan in his September 2006 general policy speech to the Diet, and both he and Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki Yasuhisa affirmed it in public statements later that November and early into the following month. But as Abe faced internal opposition in the LDP, he was forced to back down. (Even though Shiozaki spoke of institutional reforms beginning from fiscal 2007 on 1 December, he withdrew these comments three days later.) In the end, the government and ruling parties agreed on 7 December that tax revenues in excess of highway expenditure in a given year’s budget would be allocated to general revenues, with the aim of developing ‘those roads that are truly needed’. Owing to compromise with zoku lawmakers, the stress was placed on road maintenance and improvement, losing sight of the idea of incorporating revenues into the general budget. The honebuto policy statements, too, are a good example of this stall in reforms. Under the Koizumi administration, the honebuto policy formulated each June in the CEFP played an important role in furthering structural reform. Many important policies including social security reform and the ‘Trinity Reform’ were developed based on the policies laid out therein. For that reason, the administration’s position and philosophy regarding the reforms it planned to pursue found graphic expression in them. The Abe administration’s first honebuto policy statement was formulated in June 2007. ‘Honebuto Policy 2007’ listed a far-ranging set of items, from raising the country’s potential for growth to establishing an administrative and financial system better suited to 21st-century realities, but the impact this document had on actual reform can be judged weak compared to the days of the Koizumi administration. The textbook case for this is fiscal reform. The honebuto policy statement of 2006, the last to be issued under the Koizumi administration, incorporated numerical targets such as reducing annual expenditure by as much as ¥14.3 trillion over a five-year period starting from fiscal 2007, and cutting public works spending from the previous fiscal year by 1–3 per cent. However, even though the CEFP’s private-sector councillors expressly advocated including a 3 per cent cut in public works expenditure in the 2007 honebuto policy statement, no concrete figures were adopted in the final document. (The

Postscript  157 section was limited to the phrase: ‘Promote further prioritization and efficiency improvements.’) The editorials of the major newspapers the day after the statement was approved in the Cabinet (20 June) were consequently united in pointing out that it lacked adequate steps towards realizing the proposed reforms. The Asahi shinbun noted in an editorial titled, ‘The “structural reform” flag has disappeared’, that the 2007 honebuto policy statement did not speak of the ‘pains’ of reform any longer. The Yomiuri shinbun said the policies the statement contained were aimed at making everybody happy while no fixed order of priority for them could be seen. And the Nihon keizai shinbun remarked: ‘With House of Councillors elections around the corner, the reformist flavour of the Honebuto Policy has taken a back step.’ In this manner, even though he tried to imitate Koizumi’s use of top-down political methods to promote neoliberal reforms, Abe proved unable to make efficient use of them and reform stagnated as a result. Abe could not fill the shoes of a ‘strong prime minister’. And then, while ill winds blew over such issues as a scandal over thousands of missing pension records and the suicide of Farm Minister Matsuoka Toshikatsu, Abe suffered an enormous defeat in the July 2007 House of Councillors elections. Abe held fast to his office for a little while longer, but he threw in the towel on his administration that September. The fragility of the Abe administration’s leadership was laid bare in that instant.

Koizumi and Abe’s sources of power How can the differences in the leadership of Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe be explained? Let me analyse this question from the perspective of a prime minister’s sources of power as discussed in Chapter 1. There are two types of resources that prime ministers can draw on in exercising leadership: institutional resources and resources based on personal qualities. Institutional resources are the permanent resources provided by the political system; these include the right to appoint cabinet members, the right to fill party posts, other powers granted to a prime minister by law, and various organizations such as the Cabinet Secretariat that provide them with support. Resources based on personal qualities are bound up with the personality of the individual who fills the post; they include such factors as their policy knowledge, judgement, ability to act and personal popularity. Differences in the amount of each of these two types of resources at their disposal and in how they were put to use appear to have produced the disparity in leadership strength between the two prime ministers. First, as regards resources based on personal qualities, the most important one for Koizumi was the tremendous support he had among the public. By winning the public over to his side, he was able to pursue policies even if they ran up against strong opposition from within the LDP. Even individuals who were dissatisfied with the prime minister could not openly move to unseat his cabinet since having an enormously popular figure as party head increased their own chances at winning re-election.

158  Koizumi and Japanese Politics And in order to maintain the public’s approval, Koizumi would make the most of his populist method, going straight to the public to secure its support. Koizumi’s populist methods were characterized by such elements as his media strategy, which entailed making effective use of television and magazines, and his mode of expression, as exemplified by his use of pithy and direct (‘one-phrase’) expressions. His most effective technique, however, was to draw up and then fan the flames of conflict with dualistic oppositional frameworks in which he himself played the part of the ‘good guy’ standing firm with the public against ‘forces of resistance’, playing the part of the ‘bad guys’.1 Such methods produced what in some cases could even be called ‘fanatical’ support for Koizumi by way of stirring that instinctive element in human beings called pathos. The LDP’s crushing victory in the ‘postal election’ of 2005 amply demonstrates the efficient use to which Koizumi would put these means. Abe did not rely on these kinds of archetypal populist methods. His statements, in comparison to Koizumi’s, were wordy and more explanatory.2 His manner of speaking was meticulously polite and somewhat bland. Eruptions of Koizumistyle pathos did not occur. Furthermore, as symbolized by his push to get the postal rebels to rejoin the LDP, he had no use (at least within the party) for dualistic oppositional constructs. These differences in approach are reflected in a big difference between the approval rating trends for each prime minister’s government. Figure 6.1 superimposes the approval and disapproval rates for each cabinet for several months after their respective starts. The Koizumi Cabinet maintained a quite high level of support, even after posting a record-setting 84 per cent in the immediate aftermath of taking office. The Abe government, on the other hand, saw its rate trend downwards after peaking with 63 per cent at its very start. At the same time, its disapproval rating displayed a gradual increase. This suggests that Abe did not possess enough of the power resource that is support by public opinion. What is more, public support and leadership form a recursive relationship. Low levels of public approval as a power resource constrain the power of leadership. Conversely, approval rates fall when the public perceives a lack of leadership. Koizumi enjoyed a favourable recursive relationship between these two factors, but Abe was caught in a trap formed by the two moving in a downward spiral.

The effectiveness of institutional resources As discussed in Chapter 4, the institutional sources of power available to a prime minister were dramatically increased by the political and central government reforms of the 1990s. First, the prime minister’s power within his party had been strengthened by political reforms of the electoral system (the implementation of a system that combined single-member districts, or SMDs, with proportional representation) and of the campaign funding system (tighter regulation and the introduction of party subsidies). Under the SMD system, the prime minister’s power to endorse candidates came to carry enormous weight, while the factions, whose significance had been great under the medium-size district system, were

Postscript  159 90 80 70 60 50

Koizumi

40

Abe

㧑

30 20 10 0 0

1

2

3

4 5 6 Months in office

7

8

9

10

Figure 6.1  Abe and Koizumi cabinet approval rates compared

deprived of their raison d’être. They were dealt an additional blow by campaign financing reforms. Second, the structure that assists and supports the prime minister (the ‘core executive’) had been firmed up by the central government reforms of the Hashimoto administration through such measures as the strengthening of the Cabinet Secretariat and the creation of a Cabinet Office. In particular, the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy established in the Cabinet Office came to play a major role in ensuring the prime minister’s control over the policy-making process vis-à-vis the bureaucrats of Kasumigaseki through providing a venue for setting the agenda and infusing policy ideas. All told, these two reforms increased centralization in both the party and the executive branch, and provided the prime minister with multiple sources of power. Koizumi made the most of these institutional resources in carrying out his neoliberal reforms. Abe, in principle, had the same kind of resources at his disposal. His efforts to strengthen the Kantei’s position through the appointment of special advisers was aimed at nothing else than securing even more of this kind of power resource. However, it is important to remember that an institution’s effects can vary depending on how it is put to use. Even if an individual has formal institutional prerogatives, these are meaningless as long as they are not invoked in fact. The issue here, then, is to what degree it is possible for the prime minister’s formal prerogatives to be actually called upon. Particularly important in this regard is the power to sanction individuals who do not follow the prime minister’s line. To the extent that a prime minister is able to use this authority effectively, they are able to exercise firm control over their cabinets and party and overcome any ‘forces of resistance’. Despite the fact that Japanese prime ministers under the present constitution have always had the authority to dismiss cabinet ministers and (as presidents of the LDP) the right to fill party posts and make or withhold endorsements, it was rare

160  Koizumi and Japanese Politics for anyone to actually invoke such sanctions as, for example, relieving a minister or expelling a rebellious lawmaker. Koizumi, on the other hand, matter-of-factly took disciplinary action, as displayed by his dispatch of ‘assassin’ candidates to the electoral districts of lawmakers who rebelled against his postal legislation and by his dismissal of Farm Minister Shimamura Yoshinobu for his refusal to countersign his order dissolving the Diet. On this point, Abe’s behaviour pattern, as when he reinstated the postal rebels in the party, was more in line with that of a conventional LDP politician. What type of person, then, finds it easy to use disciplinary action as a political tool upon becoming prime minister? Whether a prime minister favours taking disciplinary action or not is related to the length of his time horizon and to how risk-friendly or risk-averse they are. An individual with a long time horizon will act in ways that stress the mid- to long-term benefits to be gained through the exchange of resources within an organization. That is, such an individual will prefer a decision-making process that emphasizes consensus and compromise in an attempt to win benefits from long-term give-and-take relationships (actions based on the expectation that paybacks will be earned in the future for any concessions made in the present). Naked displays of authority are in this case avoided since they disrupt consensus. (If a decision is rammed through, the chances rise for ‘tit for tat’ paybacks from one’s foes.) Such a pattern of behaviour represents the risk-averse type that seeks to obtain stable profits on a long-term basis. Traditional LDP politicians were basically of this type, and Abe, too, may be considered to fall under it. On the other hand, a politician with a short time horizon and a penchant for risk-taking will opt for using his authority to the greatest extent possible. Such a politician will put more weight on realizing his policy aspirations by a oneshot approach to policy-making than on mid- to long-term benefits to be gained through resource exchange. The risks incurred by such an approach are great, but so are the returns in the case of success. It almost goes without saying that Prime Minister Koizumi was the quintessential example of a politician of this stripe. It was precisely this unusual behaviour pattern in comparison with other politicians that earned him the epithet ‘oddball’ (henjin 変人). These differences in behaviour patterns produce differences in the effectiveness of institutional resources of power in that they impact the perceptions of the members of the organization concerned. To the extent that their members realize that sanctions will be readily applied, control becomes more effective and the organization’s capacity to close ranks will rise. Conversely, if the likelihood of disciplinary action is perceived to be low, it becomes difficult to maintain effective control no matter how much institutional authority one has. Consider this from a cost of rebellion perspective. Whether a given lawmaker will rebel or not is determined by the relative size of the costs rebellious action is likely to incur; the expected value of these costs rises in conjunction with any rise in the probability of sanctions being imposed (the expected costs of rebellion equals the costs of punishment multiplied by the probability of punishments being applied). The LDP’s unifying power visibly improved after the postal election

Postscript  161 because Koizumi’s ‘assassin’ tactic sharply raised the subjective probability of disciplinary action in the lawmakers’ eyes. The prime minister’s sanctions became more effective since the cost of rebellion for each lawmaker became extraordinarily high. In contrast, that subjective probability fell back down again under Abe, owing to such acts as his allowing the postal rebels to rejoin the party. The chances that Abe would invoke sanctions for rebellion were now regarded as low. Thus, the costs of rebellion fell, and with that the LDP’s cohesion likewise declined. In short, the effectiveness of its institutional power resources dropped off in the Abe administration because they were not efficaciously used. The institutional resources that appeared to have been expanded at the start of the Abe administration lacked substance in fact. For that reason, there were huge constraints on Abe’s leadership, and resistance within the party to neoliberal reforms appears since to have recovered its influence.

Why did Abe fail? Even though (or perhaps because) he tried to pattern himself in Koizumi’s political style, Abe failed to make adequate use of his leadership. I have shown in this chapter that the differences between them as regards leadership strength can be explained in terms of personal and institutional resources. That is to say, the amount of personal and institutional resources a leader has and how effectively he or she makes use of them is crucial to their ability to exercise leadership. Koizumi’s strong leadership was underpinned by the support of public opinion that he owed to his populist techniques and by his effective use of the institutional power invested in this office. On the other hand, even though Abe tried to mimic Koizumi’s method and style (or rather attempted to fortify them further), he remained bedevilled by a fragile leadership as he lost the public’s sympathy and did not make effective use of the institutional prerogatives given to him. To put this another way, the resources based on personal qualities that had been given to Koizumi in ample amounts were lacking in Abe. Institutional resources, on the other hand, both prime ministers possessed in abundance. The fact that there was no one in the Abe administration who played the part of strategist as Takenaka Heizō under Koizumi had done, however, should not to be overlooked. While the Kantei was reinforced under Abe through the appointment of close aides, it lacked a ‘handler’ who effectively orchestrated the institutional processes. The seemingly reinforced core executive did not live up to the role expected of it as the ‘control tower’ of the government as a whole. Far from it, frictions within the core executive soon came to the surface. Turf wars and imperfect coordination among the chief cabinet secretary and the prime minister’s assistants and secretaries frequently became visible.3 The lack of one personal resource in particular – the ability to effectively use personnel – can thus be said to have hampered effective use of institutional resources as well. I have discussed in this book the primary factors that underpinned leadership in the Koizumi administration such as his effective use of power resources,

162  Koizumi and Japanese Politics the presence of a strategist and so on. From the analysis in this chapter it has become evident that the Abe administration lacked these factors. The presence or absence of these factors decides the success or failure of a top-down leader. A comparison of the Koizumi and Abe administrations thus further demonstrates the general usefulness of the mode of analysis that was applied to Koizumi’s style of leadership in this book.

The Koizumi administration’s distinguishing characteristics and significance revisited Fukuda Yasuo, who became prime minister after Abe resigned, also left office after only one year and was succeeded by Asō Tarō. Since the Koizumi administration’s end, Japan has with Abe, Fukuda and Asō seen a change of administration every twelve months. This series of political developments underlines once more the Koizumi administration’s special characteristics and significance. I have characterized Koizumi in this book as a ‘strong prime minister’ and a ‘prime minister of pathos’. I have also shown how these two characteristics stood in a mutually reinforcing relationship. That is, institutional resources in which the prime minister’s power found its bases conjoined with political techniques that stirred up the pathos of the people was what made Koizumi’s forceful exercise of leadership possible. Abe’s failure impressively demonstrates once again how difficult it is to be a ‘strong prime minister’ in Japan, and how adroit Koizumi’s management of politics was as he manipulated political institutions and public opinion with remarkable skill. Abe’s successor Fukuda was a consensus-oriented leader who did not particularly like a top-down way of doing things. That Fukuda was nominated to become LDP president was indeed owed to a large degree to strong resentment inside the party against Koizumi’s and Abe’s style. This fact attests to how big an impact Koizumi had from the other side, so to speak. However, Fukuda, who struggled with poor approval ratings and had to deal with a ‘twisted Diet’ (nejire kokkai ねじれ国会) in which the opposition controlled the Upper House and produced frequent deadlocks, stepped down from office in short order. It had become difficult for a ‘non-Koizumi’ style leader to secure the support of the public. Asō was elected LDP president next precisely because he was expected to outdo all others in terms of personal public appeal. (These expectations were subsequently disappointed, to be sure.) That the ability to directly appeal to the public has come to be indispensable as a qualification for prime minister is certainly one of Koizumi’s legacies. From the foregoing, it is clear that defining the Koizumi administration in terms of the ‘strong prime minister’ and the ‘prime minister of pathos’ as his two characteristics was appropriate, and that these characteristics continued to have a huge impact on the administrations that followed. I have also shown in this book that the Koizumi administration made major changes to the prevailing state of politics in such areas as policy-making and the

Postscript  163 structure of the LDP. Top-down policy-making was established as a legitimate style. That Abe, too, pursued top-down policy-making was deeply connected to the fact that Koizumi had impressed the legitimacy of that method upon the public. Asō also seems to frequently have issued directives without sufficient consensus building from the bottom up (producing chaos and discord in the bureaucracy). To satisfy the nation’s expectations, post-Koizumi prime ministers could not but make a show of taking the lead in making policy to some degree. Turning to the LDP’s structure, on the other hand, the power of the factions is becoming more and more unsettled. Since Koizumi’s governments, the traditional practice of factional balancing in distributing cabinet positions has largely disappeared. While Fukuda followed in the footsteps of the traditional consensusoriented leadership pattern in the LDP, it became evident during the process in which he was selected that the influence of the factions was on the wane. In that presidential contest, the Tsushima faction – the party’s second largest – failed with its support for Nukaga Fukushirō as a candidate for the post. The fact that a faction with so much tradition stumbled with regard to its crucial function of selecting a party president suggests just how loose factional cohesion had become.4 While it is difficult to imagine that the factions will entirely disappear from existence, for the reasons mentioned above, this, too, is a legacy of Koizumi, and his declared aim to ‘break’ them. In terms of policy, the neoliberalism that Koizumi pursued continues to occupy a fixed place on the political agenda as before. However, the task of eliminating inequalities and poverty through redistribution has also come to be given increased importance in sharp contrast to the Koizumi reforms. As I have suggested in Chapter 5, a relation between the rise in inequality and the Koizumi reforms is not clear. But there can be little doubt that the intense impression his reforms left on the public mind is behind a cognitive disposition to see the problem of inequality as an effect of them. In foreign and defence policy, too, an orientation towards military realism as seen in the expansion of the SDF’s overseas activities continues to grow more and more pronounced. Shortly after the manuscript for the present book was submitted, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won a landslide victory in the Lower House election of 30 August 2009. In September, a coalition government led by the DPJ was formed under Hatoyama Yukio, sending the LDP into opposition after 54 years of almost uninterrupted rule. The Hatoyama administration proclaimed ‘leadership by politicians’ (seiji shudō 政治主導) and ‘an end to bureaucratic rule’ (datsu kanryō shihai 脱官僚支配) while embarking on a new attempt to claim the initiative in political decision-making for the Cabinet. At the time of writing, this attempt is showing a measure of success insofar as decision-making processes in the various ministries appear to be under the control of the ministries’ three political top ranks (ministers, senior vice ministers, and parliamentary secretaries). The end of LDP rule and the change in administration notwithstanding, the present study’s analytical framework for studying prime ministerial leadership continues to retain its usefulness. The Hatoyama government’s current exercise of a considerable amount of leadership in the policy-making process finds its

164  Koizumi and Japanese Politics explanation both in the extraordinarily high public support ratings it can claim and in its putting newly created institutions to effective use, such as the ‘National Strategy Office’ (Kokka senryaku shitsu 国家戦略室, officially translated as ‘National Policy Unit’) and the ‘Council for Reform of the Administration’ (Gyōsei sasshin kaigi 行政刷新会議, officially translated as ‘Government Revitalization Unit’ into English). Ozawa Ichirō’s heightening of the party’s degree of centralization as its general secretary furthermore functions to ward off attempts by individual lawmakers or power brokers to interfere with the political decision-making process. At the same time, the Hatoyama administration is beset by potentially destabilizing factors. In addition to questions raised by the misreporting of political contributions by the prime minister’s personal staff, the low level of ideological cohesion that is characteristic of the DPJ and the considerable distance of policy positions between the parties that make up its coalition (SDPJ and PNP) harbour the potential of putting its government under severe stress in the time to come. The question of whether the Hatoyama administration will in the long term succeed to establish leadership by politicians over the bureaucracy and whether it will produce political results surpassing those of the Koizumi administration at present cannot but attract our interest. The political developments following the Koizumi administration thus far demonstrate how big its impact on Japanese politics has been and where its historical significance must be sought. The Koizumi administration constituted an epochal break in postwar political history, and its influence lingers strongly even today. How we evaluate the Koizumi administration’s strengths and shortcomings, and how we apply its lessons to our conduct of politics in the future, will put our wisdom to the test.

Afterword and acknowledgements

I will honestly confess something. At first, I underestimated Prime Minister Koizumi. I did not think he would change the framework of Japanese politics to the extent he did. When commenting on the Koizumi administration in class, the context in which I placed it was the story of Japanese politics as told up to then. And in the papers I wrote around that time I frequently stressed the limits on his leadership. Given all the praise that was lavished on the Koizumi administration at the time, this may have been due to a contrarian streak in my personality that made me want to assert the opposite from everyone else. However, as pointed out in this book, the mass media did not rate Koizumi very highly during the first half of his administration either (even granting that criticism sells). Also among political scientists, while opinions emphasizing the shift of initiative to the Kantei were on everyone’s lips, the view that the traditional political structure was essentially unchanged remained deeply entrenched. My perception regarding the stability of the political landscape formed by the 1955 system decisively changed with the general election of 2005. Koizumi’s move to not endorse the ‘rebel’ lawmakers and dispatch assassins to run as opposing candidates in their district was something entirely unprecedented in Japan. Since Kamei Shizuka and other lawmakers did not seem to have anticipated that Koizumi would dissolve the Lower House, I may not be the only person guilty of having failed to predict such a situation. The rapid rise in the concentration of power within the LDP following this general election, and the numerous policy changes that came about on account of it, were as discussed in this book. In the final days of the Koizumi administration, at least, I thus came to acknowledge that the contexts for talking about Japanese politics had considerably changed. If I may say a word in my own defence, my analytical framework itself – which holds that the institutional structures of ruling party and executive branch define the leadership role that a prime minister can play – has remained consistent. Given that the difference in my later assessments of Koizumi’s leadership was produced by a change in the variables that make up that framework, I believe that the earlier papers have not lost that much of their validity. But while I may have come to rate Koizumi’s leadership more highly in this way, I certainly cannot brush off my discomfort over his conduct of politics.

166  Koizumi and Japanese Politics Much ink has already been spilled criticizing his ‘one-phrase’ mode of expressing himself and ‘wide-show politics’. In this book my intention was to dig deeper into the problems and implications of such means by getting at the ‘essence of politics.’ The introduction of pathos into Japanese politics had made steady headway already before Koizumi entered onto the scene, as symbolized by the ‘bureaucrat bashing’ heating up in the mid-1990s for example, but it seems to me that the appearance of the ‘prime minister of pathos’ lent a strong legitimacy to it. This trend is likely to continue in the future, but I personally hope that the world will be a place where politicians who patiently say what needs to be said while steering clear of showiness and slickness are held in proper esteem. I have also foregone in this book detailed analysis of trends among opposition parties such as the DPJ or of national elections other than the 2005 Lower House contest. That is due to my focus on the characteristics of policymaking in the Koizumi administration and the behaviour of the prime minister himself. Furthermore, while theoretical research in political science provided the groundwork for this book’s analyses, I passed on providing deeper commentary. I may take up those matters on a different occasion should an opportunity to do so present itself. I incurred debts of gratitude to many people in the course of writing this book. I want to offer thanks first to Professor Sasaki Takeshi, my adviser at the University of Tokyo Faculty of Law. It has been more than twenty years since I first took one of Professor Sasaki’s classes, but as always it feels as though there is no way that I can ever escape the influence of the ‘magnetic field’ he projects. The opportunity to write the Japanese edition of this book came about in no small part thanks to Professor Mikuriya Takashi. At the time I published my first book, Professor Mikuriya told me, ‘All that matters is whether or not you can produce another book while you’re still in your thirties.’ I reached my forties around the time this book came out, missing the mark by several months. I wish to beg his forgiveness and express my thanks. Professor Iio Jun, who preceded me among Professor Sasaki’s students, set a wonderful example for me in showing just how scholarly achievement and actual politics can be brought together. I offer him my gratitude for the many occasions he has been of help to me. My appreciation goes also to Professor Katō Junko for all the advice I got from her during my research (and also for the cake she would occasionally bring on her visits to the Komaba campus). I am also indebted to Professor Takenaka Harukata for the stimulating debate he always offered, along with the cabinet support rating data he so graciously supplied. Many other individuals commented on and discussed my work with me at various conferences and research forums in Japan and abroad, unfortunately too numerous to list by name. To all of them I extend my deepest thanks for their input. My colleagues and peers in the Department of Advanced Social and International Studies at the University of Tokyo’s Graduate School of Arts and Sciences created a truly ideal research environment. The department brings together a wide variety of disciplines, including not just political science and law, but also sociology, the history of social thought, economics, statistics and international relations. As such,

Afterword and acknowledgements  167 the atmosphere there abounds in intellectual stimulation not to be found anywhere else, and I frequently received meaningful suggestions in the course of casual conversations in the faculty lounge. My thanks on this score in particular must go to professors Tsunekawa Keiichi, Takahashi Naoki, Kotera Akira, Yamawaki Naoshi, Ōe Hiroshi, Satō Toshiki, Shimizu Takashi and the late Shibata Toshiko. I received valuable comments about the economic policy-making process during the Koizumi years from Takenaka Heizō, who served as both minister of state for economic and fiscal policy and internal affairs minister in the Koizumi administration and at present is a professor at Keio University. I must likewise extend my appreciation to other politicians, bureaucrats and journalists too numerous to mention who consented to interviews and offered to share their views with me. Seen from what it was like when I worked in Kasumigaseki myself, the state of Japanese politics and public administration really have changed. When at the university one tends to lose the feel for what it is like to be on the ground floor of policy-making. I sought to regain at least a bit of that sensation through my conversations with all these individuals. Of these people, I was assisted in many ways by everyone who joined the Ministry of International Trade and Industry when I did in 1990. In particular, the lively discussions that took place in such settings as our MITI ‘class reunions’ (dōki-kai 同期会) have been enormously useful to me in firming up my perceptions of the Koizumi government. Here, I would like to mention Kuroda Junichirō in particular, who taught me much about the structure and functions of the new Kantei, and ask this to be taken as a token of my gratitude to all members of our class. Professor Honma Nana of Local Autonomy College graciously supplied me with materials about the Trinity Reform. Ishigaki Chiaki, a doctoral student in the University of Tokyo Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, assisted me in creating the chronology (see Appendix 3) and other materials. The present work was funded in part by a Grant in Aid for Scientific Research, Junior Faculty Research (B), from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. While I may not be a politician, I do issue reckless pledges that I cannot keep. I could never have completed this book if it were not for my enormously patient editor at Chūōkōron-shinsha, Shirato Naohito. Mr Shirato and I are of the same generation, and on many occasions I drew substantial inspiration from him in our lively conversations. I extend to him my deepest gratitude. The English translation of this book was made possible by the generous support of the University of Tokyo’s English-Language Monograph Publications Program. I would like to express my deep gratitude to the Program and its chair, Professor Watanabe Hiroshi, for their kind consideration. My heartfelt thanks also go to Carl Freire, for taking upon himself the arduous task of rendering my thoughts into English and for his many suggestions along the way, and to Michael Burtscher, for his careful editing of the translation for both accuracy and style and seeing it through to completion. Finally, if I may be allowed to speak of more personal matters, I also want to give thanks from the bottom of my heart to my wife Fujita Yukiko, who ceaselessly

168  Koizumi and Japanese Politics encouraged me towards the completion of the original book. The writing of this book put an enormous burden on her as she dealt with her own university work and research while raising two children and looking after her grandmother. As for my son Tomoaki and my daughter Erika, the completion of this book was probably delayed thanks to the two of you, self-assertive children that you are. But for me, your smiling faces are the greatest compensation in the endeavour that is life. In those moments when I think we must hand down a society where those smiles will not be lost, the boundaries between our considerations for the private sphere of the family and our considerations for the public sphere of politics disappear. May the future for the little ones be bright. From a sun-filled office at the Komaba campus, July 2009 Uchiyama Yū

Appendix 1 Diet election results under the Koizumi administration

House of Representatives general elections Party

9 November 2003 Single PR LDP 168 69 DPJ 105 72 Kōmeitō 9 25 JCP 0 9 SDPJ 1 5 NCP 4 – PNP – – NPN – – Others 2 – Independents 11 – TOTALS 300 180

Total 237 177 34 9 6 4 – – 2 11 480

11 September 2005 Single PR 219 77 52 61 8 23 0 9 1 6 – – 2 2 0 1 0 1 18 – 300 180

Total 296 113 31 9 7 – 4 1 1 18 480

House of Councillors regular elections Party LDP DPJ Kōmeitō Liberal Party JCP SDPJ NCP Others Independents TOTALS

29 July 2001 Single 44 18 5 2 1 0 – 0 3 73

PR 20 8 8 4 4 3 1 0 – 48

Total 64 26 13 6 5 3 1 0 3 121

11 July 2004 Single 34 31 3 – 0 0 – 0 5 73

PR 15 19 8 – 4 2 – 0 – 48

Total 49 50 11 – 4 2 – 0 5 121

Single = Single member constituencies. PR = Proportional representation districts. LDP = Liberal Democratic Party; DPJ = Democratic Party of Japan; Kōmeitō = New Kōmei(tō) Party; JCP = Japan Communist Party; SDPJ = Social Democratic Party; NCP = New Conservative Party; PNP = People’s New Party; NPN = New Party Nippon.

Appendix 2 Koizumi cabinet approval rating trends in public opinion surveys 100

29 January 2002 Tanaka Makiko dismissed as foreign minister

90 6 December 2002 Promotion Committee for the Privatization of the Four Highwayrelated Public Corporations delivers final report

80

70

60

26 April 2001 Koizumi administration takes office

50

40

22 September 2003 First Cabinet reshuffle (Abe Shinzo appointed LDP secretary general)

17 September 2002 Koizumi makes first visit to North Korea

30

20

10

0 Apr. 2001

July

Oct.

Jan. 2002

Apr.

July

Oct.

Jan.

Apr.

July

2003

Sources: The Asahi Shinbun, The Mainichi Shinbun, Yomiuri Shinbun, Japan News Network (JNN).

Oct.

Appendix 2: Koizumi cabinet approval rating trends   171

Asahi shinbun Mainichi shinbun Yomiuri shinbun Japan News Network (JNN)

22 May 2004 Koizumi makes second visit to North Korea

8 August 2002 Postal privatization bills rejected House of Representatives dissolved

11 September 2005 General election, crushing victory for LDP

26 September 2006 Koizumi steps down as prime minister

Jan. 2004

Apr.

July

Oct.

Jan. 2005

Apr.

July

Oct.

Jan.

Apr.

July Sept.

2006

Note: The Yomiuri shinbun surveys were conducted through face-to-face interviews; all other surveys were based on telephone calls.

Appendix 3 The Koizumi administration: a timeline

Date 2001 10 March 11 April

24 April 26 April 26 June

29 July 13 August 11 September 7 October 15 October 29 October 9 November 22 November

30 November 7 December 2002 29 January 21 April 31 May

Event Prime Minister Mori proposes holding LDP presidential election early. De facto resignation announcement. The LDP gives notice for election to be held. Four members announce plans to run: Asō Tarō, Hashimoto Ryūtarō, Kamei Shizuka and Koizumi Junichirō. Koizumi wins LDP presidential election. Koizumi administration takes office. Cabinet signs off on ‘Structural Reform of the Japanese Economy: Basic Policies for Macroeconomic Management’ (the honebuto policy statement). LDP scores landslide victory in 19th House of Councillors election. Koizumi makes pilgrimage to Yasukuni shrine. Terrorist attacks take place in New York and Washington, DC. USA begins Afghanistan bombing campaign. Koizumi visits South Korea. Holds first summit meeting with President Kim Dae-jung. Passage of Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and two related bills. Three-ship Maritime Self-Defence Forces advance unit departs for the Indian Ocean. Ruling parties’ leaders reach basic agreement on consolidation and privatization of four highway public corporations and dissolution of Government Housing Loan Corporation, Urban Development Corporation, and Japan National Oil Corporation. House of Councillors plenary session passes bill authorizing overseas dispatch of SDF. Revised PKO Law passed. Koizumi dismisses Foreign Minister Tanaka Makiko and Foreign Affairs Vice-Minister Nogami Yōshiji. Koizumi makes pilgrimage to Yasukuni shrine. Japan and South Korea jointly host soccer World Cup (to 30 June).

Appendix 3: The Koizumi administration: a timeline   173 Date 19 June 24 July 26 July 30 August 17 September 29 September 30 September 15 October 3 December 6 December 10 December 2003 10 January 14 January 25 February 15 March 19 March 1 April 2 April 28 April 31 May 6 June 9 July

23 July 26 July 20 September 22 September 26 September 10 October

9 November 19 November 22 December

Event Suzuki Muneo arrested on suspicion of accepting bribes for influence peddling. Passage of four bills involving Japan Post. Health Care Reform Law (2002) passed. Promotion Committee for the Privatization of the Four Highwayrelated Public Corporations issues interim report. Koizumi visits North Korea and holds talks with General Secretary Kim Jong Il. Signing of the Japan–DPRK Pyongyang Declaration. 30th anniversary of diplomatic normalization between Japan and China. Cabinet reshuffle. Five Japanese abducted by North Korea return to Japan. DPJ President Hatoyama Yukio announces resignation over talks surrounding creation of new party. Highway Privatization Committee submits final report. Chairman Imai Takashi resigns shortly before committee approves report. DPJ elects Kan Naoto president. North Korea announces withdrawal from Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Koizumi makes pilgrimage to Yasukuni shrine. Roh Moo-hyun becomes president of South Korea. Hu Jintao becomes president of China. Iraq War begins. Japan Post inaugurated. Law establishing Industrial Revitalization Corporation passed. The benchmark Nikkei stock index closes at ¥7,607, its lowest since November 1982. Koizumi holds talks with Chinese President Hu Jintao in Russia. Three emergency defence bills passed. National University Corporation Law, Law Promoting Measures to Support the Development of the Next Generation, and Revised Code of Civil Procedure passed. Basic Law on Measures for a Society with a Declining Birthrate passed. Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq passed. LDP presidential election, Koizumi wins landslide victory. Koizumi reshuffles cabinet. DPJ and Liberal Party merge. Revised Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and revised Public Offices Election Law passed. House of Representatives dissolves. 43rd general election for House of Representatives. Second Koizumi Cabinet takes office. Council for Regulatory Reform issues final report.

174  Appendix 3: The Koizumi Administration: A Timeline   Date 2004 1 January 19 January 3 Feburary 9 February 7 April 10 May 18 May 21 May 22 May 11 July 10 September 27 September 23 October 3 November 2005 6 Feburary 29 June 5 July 8 August 17 August 21 August 11 September 12 September 17 September 21 September 14 October 17 October 26 October 31 October 1 November 2006 23 January 31 March

Event Koizumi makes pilgramage to Yasukuni shrine. Ground SDF advance units arrive in Samawah, Iraq. Ground SDF main force departs for Iraq. Dispatch of SDF to provide reconstruction assistance in Iraq formally approved in House of Councillors plenary session. Revised Law Relating to the Prevention of Child Abuse passed. Kan Naoto resigns as DPJ president over issue of National Pension insurance premiums. Okada Katsuya becomes DPJ president. Jury Law passed. Japan–North Korea summit meeting takes place, families of abductees to North Korea go to Japan. Poor performance for LDP in 20th House of Councillors election. Cabinet approves Basic Guidelines on Postal Privatization. Cabinet reshuffle. Chūetsu earthquake strikes Niigata Prefecture. George W. Bush re-elected US president. Kyoto Protocol on climate change comes into effect. Corporation Law passed (revision of Commercial Code and related laws). Postal Services bills approved by House of Representatives. Postal privatization bills rejected at House of Councillors plenary session. House of Representatives dissolved. People’s New Party formed. New Party Nippon formed. LDP scores crushing victory in 44th House of Representatives general election. Okada Katsuya resigns as DPJ president to take responsibility for general election defeat. DPJ elects Maehara Seiji to be next president. Third Koizumi Cabinet takes office. Postal privatization laws passed. Koizumi makes pilgrimage to Yasukuni shrine. Japanese and US governments reach basic agreement over Futenma Air Base in Okinawa. Services and Supports for Persons with Disabilities Act passed. Cabinet reshuffle. Elder Abuse Prevention and Caregiver Support Law passed. Livedoor President Horie Takafumi arrested on suspicion of violating the Securities Exchange Law. Maehara Seiji announces resignation as DPJ president over scandal involving fake e-mail messages.

Appendix 3: The Koizumi administration: a timeline   175 Date 7 April 26 April

14 June 5 July

15 August 20 September 26 September

Event DPJ elects Ozawa Ichirō president. Architect Aneha Hidetsugu and others arrested on suspicion of violating Architect Act and other charges (scandal over falsified earthquake resistance structural data). Health Care Reform Law (2006) passed. North Korea launches seven missiles into the Sea of Japan, and Japanese government approves a nine-item list of sanctions. UN Security Council holds emergency meeting. Japan presents draft resolution on sanctions. Koizumi makes pilgrimage to Yasukuni shrine. In LDP presidential election (ballots opened on this day), Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe Shinzō is elected 21st head of the party. Koizumi steps down as prime minister (1,980 days in office).

Appendix 4 Glossary

Political parties Democratic Party (1954–5) Nihon minshutō 日本民主党 Democratic Party of Japan (1998–) Minshutō 民主党 Democratic Socialist Party (1969-1994) Minshu shakaitō 民主社会党 (1960-69) Minshatō 民社党 (1969-1994) Japan Communist Party (1945–) Nihon kyōsantō 日本共産党 Japan New Party (1992–4) Nihon shintō 日本新党 Japan Renewal Party (1993–4) Shinseitō 新生党 Japan Socialist Party (1945–96) Nihon shakaitō 日本社会党 (Shakaitō 社会党) Kōmeitō (Clean Government Party) (1964–98) Kōmeitō 公明党 Liberal Party (1950–5) Jiyūtō 自由党 Liberal Democratic Party (1955–) Jiyū minshutō 自由民主党 (Jimintō 自民党) New Conservative Party (2000-3) Hoshutō 保守党 (2000-2) Hoshu shintō 保守 新党 (2002–3) New Frontier Party (1994–8) Shinshintō 新進党 New Kōmei(tō) Party (1998–) Kōmeitō 公明党 New Party Nippon (2005–) Shintō Nippon 新党日本 People’s New Party (2005–) Kokumin shintō 国民新党 Social Democratic Party of Japan (1996–) Shakai minshutō 社会民主党 (Shamintō 社民党)

Government ministries and agencies Air Defence Command Kūji kōkū sōtai shireibu 空自航空総隊司令部 Bilateral and Joint Operations Coordination Center Kyōdō tōgō un’yō chōseisho 共同統合運用調整所 Cabinet Office (2001–) Naikakufu 内閣府 Cabinet Secretariat Naikaku kanbō 内閣官房 Defence Agency (1954–2007) Bōeichō 防衛庁 Financial Services Agency Kinyūchō 金融庁 Ground SDF Central Readiness Force Command Rikuji chūō sokuō shūdan shireibu 陸自中央即応集団司令部

Appendix 4: Glossary  177 Management and Coordination Agency Sōmuchō 総務庁 Administrative Inspection Bureau Gyōsei kansatsu kyoku 行政監察局 Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (1978–) Nōrin suisan shō 農林 水産省 Ministry of Construction (1949–2001) Kensetsushō 建設省 Ministry of Defence (2007–) Bōeishō 防衛省 Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (2001–) Keizai sangyō shō 経済産業省 Ministry of Finance Ōkurashō 大蔵省 (1869–2001) Zaimushō 財務省 (2001–) Budget Bureau Shukeikyoku 主計局 Tax Bureau Shuzeikyoku 主税局 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Gaimushō 外務省 Asia Bureau Ajia Taiyōshū kyoku アジア大洋州局 Economic Affairs Bureau Keizai kyoku 経済局 Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau Chūtō Afurika kyoku 中東アフリ カ局 Overseas Visit Support Division Yōjin gaikoku hōmin shien shitsu 要人外国訪 問支援室 Personnel Division Jinji ka 人事課 Western Europe I Division Sei-Ō ichi ka 西欧一課 Ministry of Home Affairs (1960–2001) Jichishō 自治省 Tax Bureau Zeimukyoku 税務局 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2004–) = Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications (2001–4) Sōmushō 総務省 Local Tax Bureau Jichi zeimu kyoku 自治税務局 Ministry of International Trade and Industry (1949–2001) Tsūsho sangyō shō 通 商産業省 Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (2001–) Kokudo kōtsū shō 国土交通省 (Kokkōshō 国交省) Panel on Infrastructure Development Shakai shihon seibi shingikai 社会資本 整備審議会 Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (1949–2001) Yūseishō 郵政省 Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications (2001–4) = Ministry of Internal Affairs (2004–) Sōmushō 総務省 Postal Services Agency (2001–3) Yūsei jigyō chō 郵政事業庁 Prime Minister’s Office (1949–2001) Sōrifu 総理府

Government councils and committees Administrative Reform Council Gyōsei kaikaku kaigi 行政改革会議 Advisory Council to Consider the Modalities of the Three Postal Businesses Yūsei sanjigyō no arikata ni tsuite kangaeru kondankai 郵政三事業の在り方につ いて考える懇談会 Association of Prefectural Governors Zenkoku chijikai 全国知事会 Central Disaster Management Council Chūō bōsai kaigi 中央防災会議

178  Appendix 4: Glossary Central Education Council Chūō kyōiku shingikai 中央教育審議会 (Chūkyūshin 中教審) Central Social Insurance Medical Council Chūō shakai hoken iryō kyōgikai 中央 社会保険医療協議会 (Chūikyō 中医協) Chūikyō 中医協 (=Central Social Insurance Medical Council) Committee to Promote Priority Policies Jūten seisaku suishin iinkai 重点政策推 進委員会 Council of Ministers on the Normalization Talks between Japan and North Korea Nitchō kokkō seijōka ni kansuru kankei kanryō kaigi 日朝国交正常化に関す る関係官僚会議 Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy Keizai zaisei shimon kaigi 経済財政諮 問会議 Council for Science and Technology Policy Sōgō kagaku gijutsu kaigi 総合科学 技術会議 Emergency Measures Headquarters for the Situation in Iraq Iraku mondai taisaku honbu イラク問題対策本部 Experts Committee Concerning the State of Chūikyō Chūikyō no arikata ni kansuru yūshikisha kaigi 中医協の在り方に関する有識者会議 Experts Committee on Postal Privatization Yūsei min’eika ni kansuru yūshikisha kaigi　郵政民営化に関する有識者会議 Financial Crisis Response Council Kin’yū kiki taiō kaigi 金融危機対応会議 Forum for Dialogue between Central and Local Governments Kuni to chihō no kyōgi no ba 国と地方の協議の場 Government–Ruling Parties Conference Seifu-yotō kyōgikai 政府与党協議会 Headquarters for the Promotion of Special Zones for Structural Reform Kōzō kaikaku tokku suishin shitsu 構造改革特区推進室 Headquarters for Regional Revitalization Chiiki saisei suishin shitsu 地域再生 推進室 Highway Privatization Committee (=Promotion Committee for the Privatization of the Four Highway-related Public Corporations) Postal Advisory Council Yūsei kondankai 郵政懇談会 (=Advisory Council to Consider the Modalities of the Three Postal Businesses) Project Team for Emergency Strategy for the Financial Sector Kinyū bun’ya kinkyū taiō senryaku purojekuto chīmu 金融分野緊急対応戦略プロジェク トチーム Promotion Committee for the Privatization of the Four Highway-related Public Corporations Dōro kankei shi-kōdan min’eika suishin iinkai 道路関係四公団 民営化推進委員会 Research Commission on the Economy Sōgō keizai chōsakai 総合経済調査会 Security Council of Japan Anzen hoshō kaigi 安全保障会議 Social Security Council Shakai hoshō shingikai 社会保障審議会 Committee for Health Insurance Iryō hoken bukai 医療保険部会 Special Working Group on the Issue of Abduction of Japanese Nationals by North Korea Rachi mondai ni kansuru senmon kanjikai 拉致問題に関する専門幹 事会

Appendix 4: Glossary  179

House of Representatives committees Budget Committee Yosan iinkai 予算委員会 Committee on Health, Labour, and Welfare Kōsei rōdō iinkai 厚生労働委員会 Committee on Land, Infrastructure, and Transport Kokudō kōtsū iinkai 国道交 通委員会 Foreign Affairs Committee Gaimu iinkai 外務委員会 Steering Committee Giin un’ei iinkai 議院運営委員会

LDP or ruling parties’ organs and committees Cabinet Division Naikaku bukai 内閣部会 Council on the Privatization of the Four Highway-related Public Corporations Dōro kankei shi-kōdan min’eika ni kansuru kyōgikai 道路関係四公団民営 化に関する協議会 Election Strategy Headquarters Senkyo taisaku honbu 選挙対策本部 Foreign Affairs Division Gaikō bukai 外交部会 General Affairs Bureau Sōmukyoku 総務局 General Affairs Council Sōmukai 総務会 Infrastructure and Transport Division Kokudo kōtsū bukai 国土交通部会 Joint Panel on Postal Reform Yūsei kankei gōdō bukai 郵政関係合同部会 National Defence Division Kokubō bukai 国防部会 National Vision Project Headquarters Kokka senryaku honbu 国家戦略本部 Policy Affairs Research Council Seimu chōsakai 政務調査会 (Seichōkai 政調会) Policy Deliberation Commission Seichō shingikai 政調審議会 Policy Research Council (=Policy Affairs Research Council) Seichōkai 政調会 Postal Service Forum Yūsei jigyō konwakai 郵政事業懇話会 Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications Division Sōmu bukai 総務部会 Research Commission on Highways Dōro chōsakai 道路調査会 Research Commission on the Tax System Zeisei chōsakai 税制調査会 Ruling Parties’ Liaison Council on the Iraq and North Korea Problems Yotō Iraku Kita-Chōsen mondai renraku kyōgikai 与党イラク・北朝鮮問題連絡協議会

Private and public corporations Ashikaga Bank Ashikaga ginkō 足利銀行 Bank of Japan Nippon ginkō 日本銀行 (Nichigin 日銀) Central Nippon Expressway Company Naka Nippon kōsoku-dōro kabushiki gaisha 中日本高速道路株式会社 (NEXCO Central Japan) Daiei Daiē ダイエー Development Bank of Japan Nihon seisaku tōshi ginkō 日本政策投資銀行 East Japan Railway Company JR Higashi Nihon JR東日本 East Nippon Expressway Company Higashi Nippon kōsoku dōro kabushiki gaisha 東日本高速道路株式会社 (NEXCO East Japan)

180  Appendix 4: Glossary Government Housing Loan Corporation Jutaku kin’yū kōko 住宅金融公庫 Hanshin Expressway Public Corporation Hanshin kōsoku dōro kōdan 阪神高速 道路公団 Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Authority Honshū Shikoku renrakukyō kōdan 本州四国 連絡橋公団 Industrial Revitalization Corporation Sangyō saisei kikō 産業再生機構 Itōchū Itōchū Shōji 伊藤忠商事 Japan Bank for International Cooperation Kokusai kyōryoku ginkō 国際協力銀行 Japan Expressway Holding and Debt Repayment Agency Nihon kōsoku dōro hoyū zaimu hensai kikō 日本高速道路保有財務返済機構 Japan Finance Corporation for Municipal Enterprises Kōei kigyō kin’yū kōko 公 営企業金融公庫 Japan Highway Public Corporation Nihon dōrō kōdan 日本道路公団 Japan National Oil Corporation Sekiyu kōdan 石油公団 Japan National Railways (1949–87) Nihon kokuyū tetsudō 日本国有鉄道 (Kokutetsu 国鉄) Japan Post (=Postal Services Corporation) Japan Post Bank Yūcho ginkō ゆうちょ銀行 Japan Post Insurance Kanpo seimei かんぽ生命 Japan Post Network Yūbinkyoku gaisha 郵便局会社 Japan Post Service Yūbin jigyō gaisha 郵便事業会社 Kanebo Kanebō カネボウ Kyushu Industrial Transportation Co., Ltd Kyūshū sangyō kōtsū kabushiki gaisha 九州産業交通株式会社 Livedoor Raibudoa ライブドア Metropolitan Expressway Public Corporation Shuto kōsoku dōro kōdan 首都高 速道路公団 Mitsubishi Tokyo Mitsubishi Tōkyō 三菱東京 Mitsui Sumitomo Mitsui Sumitomo 三井住友 Mitsui Trust Mitsui shintaku 三井信託 Mizuho Mizuho みずほ Mycal Maikaru マイカル Nippon Steel Corporation Shin Nippon seitetsu kabushiki-gaisha 新日本製鐵株 式会社 (Shinnittetsu 新日鐵) Postal Services Corporation (2003–7) Yūsei kōsha 郵政公社 Resolution and Collection Corporation Seiri kaishū kikō 整理回収機構 Resona Risona りそな Shōkō Chūkin Bank Shōkō kumiai chūō kinko 商工組合中央金庫 Sumitomo Trust Sumitomo shintaku 住友信託 Teikoku Oil Co. Teikoku sekiyu 帝国石油 Toyota Motors Corp. Toyota jidōsha トヨタ自動車 Urban Development Corporation Toshi kiban seibi kōdan 都市基盤整備公団 Ushio Inc. Ushio denki ウシオ電機 West Nippon Expressway Company Nishi Nippon kōsoku-dōro kabushiki gaisha 西日本高速道路株式会社 (NEXCO West Japan) Yamato Transport Yamato un’yu ヤマト運輸

Appendix 4: Glossary  181

Political associations and interest groups Agricultural Cooperative Nōgyō kyōdō kumiai 農業協同組合 (nōkyō 農協) All-Japan Agricultural Policy League Zenkoku nōgyōsha nōsei undō soshiki renmei 全国農業者農政運動組織連盟 (Zenkoku nōseiren 全国農政連) All-Japan Postal Labor Union Zen Nihon yūsei rōdō kumiai 全日本郵政労働組 合 (Zen’yūsei 全郵政) Association of the Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea Rachi higaisha kazoku renrakukai 拉致被害者家族連絡会 (Kazokukai 家族会) Group to Consider the Diplomacy Card Against North Korea Tai Kita-Chōsen gaikō kādo wo kangaeru kai 対北朝鮮外交カードを考える会 Japan Agricultural Cooperatives Zenkoku nōgyō kyōdō kumiai chuōkai 全国農業 協同組合中央会 Japan Business Federation Nihon keizai dantai rengōkai 日本経済団体連合会 (Keidanren 経団連) Japan Dentists Federation Nihon shika ishi renmei 日本歯科医師連盟 (Nisshiren 日歯連) Japan Doctors’ Political League Nihon ishi renmei 日本医師連盟 (Iseiren 医政連) Japan Medical Association Nihon ishikai 日本医師会 Japan Postal Workers Union Zen teishin rōdō kumiai 全逓信労働組合 (Zentei 全逓) Japanese Political Science Association Nihon seiji gakkai 日本政治学会 Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform Atarashi rekishi kyōkasho o tsukuru kai 新しい歴史教科書を作る会 Keidanren 経団連 (=Japan Business Federation) National Association of Special Post Office Masters Zenkoku tokutei yūbin kyokuchō kai 全国特定郵便局長会 (Zentoku 全特) Parliamentary Group for Promoting Highway Construction Kōsoku dōro kensetsu suishin giin renmei 高速道路建設推進議員連盟 Special Post Office Masters’ Association (=National Association of Special Post Office Masters) Taiju 大樹 (political action group for retired post masters)

Policy papers Basic Plan regarding Response Measures Based on the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq Iraku jindō fukkō shien tokusohō ni motozuku taiō sochi ni kansuru kihon keikaku イ ラク人道復興支援特措法に基づく対応措置に関する基本計画 Basic Policy Concerning Medical Treatment Fee Revisions Shinryō hōshū kaitei ni kakaru kihon hōshin 診療報酬改定に掛かる基本方針 Basic Policy on the Privatization of Japan Post Yūsei min’eika no kihon hōshin 郵 政民営化の基本方針 Basic Principles of Budget Formulation Yosan hensei no kihon hōshin 予算編成 の基本方針 Budget Outline Yosan taikō 予算大綱

182  Appendix 4: Glossary Budget Overview Yosan no zentaizō 予算の全体像 (=Overall Picture of the Budget) Draft Proposal for Structural Reform of the Health Care System Iryō seido kōzō kaikaku shian 医療制度構造改革思案 Expert Member Paper Minkan giin pēpā 民間議員のペーパー Financial Revitalization Program: Economic revitalization through resolving the nonperforming loan problem at major banks Kin’yū saisei puroguramu – shuyōkō no furyō saiken mondai kaiketsu o tsūjta keizai saisei 金融再生プログ ラム－主要行のっ不良債権問題解決を通じた経済再生 Guidelines for Organizing and Rationalizing National Treasury Disbursements Kokko hojo futankin-tō seiri-gōrika hōshin 国庫補助負担金等整理合理化方 針. Honebuto Policy Statement Honebuto no hōshin 骨太の方針 (=Structural Reform of the Japanese Economy: Basic Policies for Macroeconomic Management) Outline of Health Care System Reform Iryō seido kaikaku taikō 医療制度改革大 綱 Overall Picture of the Budget Yosan no zentaizō 予算の全体像 Reform and Perspectives Kaikaku to tenbō 改革と展望 (=‘Structural Reform and Medium-Term Economic and Fiscal Perspectives’) Sorting out Points of Contention Concerning the Privatization of Japan Post Yūsei min’eika ni kansuru ronten seiri 郵政民営化に関する論点整理 Structural Reform and Medium-Term Economic and Fiscal Perspectives Kōzō kaikaku to keizai zaisei no chūki tenbō 構造改革と経済財政の中期展望 Structural Reform of Local Public Finance and Transfer of Tax Revenue Sources Chihō zaisei no kōzō kaikaku to zeigen ijō ni tsuite 地方財政の構造改革と税 源移譲について Structural Reform of the Japanese Economy: Basic Policies for Macroeconomic Management Keizai zaisei un’ei to kōzō kaikaku ni kansuru kihon hōshin 経済 財政運営と構造改革に関する基本方針 Toward Social Security Commensurate with the Scale of the Economy Keizai kibo ni miatta shakai hoshō ni mukete 経済規模に見合った社会保障に向けて

Laws Anti-Monopoly Law Dokusen kinshi hō 独占禁止法 = Law on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade Shiteki dokusen no kinshi oyobi kōsei torihiki no kakuho ni kansuru hōritsu 私的独占の禁止及び公正取 引の確保に関する法律) Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law Tero tokusohō テロ特措法 = Law on Special Measures concerning Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities towards the Anti-Terrorism Maritime Interdiction Operation Tero taisaku kaijō boshi katsudō ni taisuru hokyū shien katsudō no jisshi ni kansuru tokubetsu sochi hō テロ対策海上阻止活動に対する補給支援活動の実施に関する特別措 置法 Cabinet Law Naikaku hō 内閣法 Correspondence Delivery Law　Shinshobin hō 信書便法 = Law on Correspondence Delivery by Private Business Operators Minkan jigyōsha ni

Appendix 4: Glossary  183 yoru shinsho no sōtastu ni kansuru hōritsu 民間事業者による信書の送達に 関する法律 Defence Agency Establishment Law Bōeichō setchi hō 防衛庁設置法 Deposit Insurance Law Yokin hoken hō 預金保険法 Early Financial Revitalization Laws Kin’yū sōki kenzenka hō 金融早期健全化法 = Law on Emergency Measures for Early Strengthening of Financial Functions Kin’yū kinō no sōki kenzenka no tame no kinkyū sochi ni kansuru hōritsu 金融 機能の早期健全化のための緊急措置に関する法律 Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law Gaikoku kawase oyobi gaikoku bōeki hō 外国為替及び外国貿易法 Health Care Reform Law Iryō seido kaikaku kanren hō 医療制度改革関連法 Highway Public Corporation Privatization Law Dōro kōdan min’eika kanren hō 道 路公団民営化関連法 Iraq Special Measures Law Iraku tokuso hō イラク特措法 = Law on Special Measures concerning Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction Work and Security Assistance in Iraq Iraku ni okeru jindō fukkō shien katsudō oyobi anzen kakuho shien katsudō no jisshi ni kansuru tokubetsu sochi hō イラクにおける 人道復興支援活動及び安全確保支援活動の実施に関する特別措置法 Large-Scale Retail Stores Law = Law on the Measures by Large-Scale Retail Stores for Preservation of Living Environment Law concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations Kokuren heiwa iji katsudō (PKO) kyōryoku hō 国連平和維持 活動（ＰＫＯ）協力法 Law concerning Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams Kokusai kinkyū enjotai haken hō 国際緊急援助隊派遣法 Law on Aid to Persons Abducted by North Korean Authorities and Other Relevant Persons Kita-Chōsen tōkyoku ni yotte rachi sareta higaisha-tō no shien ni kansuru hōrit­su 北朝鮮当局によって拉致された被害者等の支援に関する 法律 Law on a Situation in the Areas Surrounding Japan Shūhen jitai ni saishite waga kuni no heiwa oyobi anzen o kakuho suru tame no sochi ni kansuru hōritsu 周辺 事態に際して我が国の平和及び安全を確保するための措置に関する法 律 (=Shūhen jitai hō 周辺事態法) Law on Special Measures Concerning Prohibition of Entry of Specified Ships into Ports Tokutei senpaku no nyūkō no kinshi ni kansuru tokubetsu sochi hō 特定船 舶の入港の禁止に関する特別措置法 Law on the Measures by Large-Scale Retail Stores for Preservation of Living Environment Dai-kibo kouri tenpo ritchi hō 大規模小売店舗立地法 National Civil Service Law Kokka kōmuin hō 国家公務員法 National Government Organization Law Kokka gyōsei soshiki hō 国家行政組織法 Political Funds Control Law Seiji shikin kisei hō 政治資金規正法 Postal Services Corporation Law Yūsei kōsha kanren hō 郵政公社関連法 Public Office Election Law Kōshoku senkyo hō 公職選挙法 Public Service System Reform Law Kōmuin seido kaikaku hō 公務員制度改革法 Self-Defence Forces Law Jieitai hō 自衛隊法

Appendix 5 Personal names

Abe Shinzō Akutsu Satoshi Anami Koreshige Aneha Hidetsugu Aoki Mikio Aritomi Keiji Asō Tarō Azuma Shōji Chimura Yasushi Choi Sung-hong Doi Ryūichi Etō Takami Fujii Haruho Fujii Takao Fujikawa Yoshinori Fukuda Takeo Fukuda Yasuo Furukawa Teijirō Hamamoto Fukie Han Siung-soo Hashimoto Ryūtarō Hasuike Kaoru Hatakeyama Noboru Hatoyama Ichirō Hatoyama Yukio Hayashi Masakazu Hirai Takushi Hiranuma Takeo Honma Masaaki Horie Takafumi Horiuchi Mitsuo Hosoda Hiroyuki Hosokawa Morihiro

阿部晋三 阿久津聡 阿南惟茂 姉歯秀次 青木幹雄 有富慶二 麻生太郎 東照二 地村保志 崔成泓 土肥隆一 江藤隆美 藤井治芳 藤井孝男 藤川佳則 福田赳夫 福田康夫 古川貞二郎 浜本富貴恵 韓昇洙 橋本龍太郎 蓮池薫 畠山襄 鳩山一郎 鳩山由紀夫 林正和 平井卓志 平沼赳夫 本間正明 堀江貴文 堀内光雄 細田博之 細川護熙

Hu Jintao Ibuki Bunmei Iijima Isao Iimura Yutaka Iio Jun Ikeda Hayato Imai Takashi Inaba Yamato Inose Naoki Inoue Masamori Ishihara Nobuteru Ishihara Shintarō Iwai Tomoaki Iwata Kazumasa Jiang Zemin Jong Tae Hwa Kamei Hisaoki Kamei Shizuka Kamei Yoshiyuki Kan Naoto Kanzaki Takenori Katagiri Sachio Katayama Satsuki Katayama Toranosuke Katō Kōichi Kawaguchi Yoriko Kawamoto Yūko Kawasaki Jirō Kawashima Yutaka Kim Dae-jung Kim Jong Il Kim Young Il Kimura Takeshi

胡錦濤 伊吹文明 飯島勲 飯村豊 飯尾潤 池田勇人 今井敬 稲葉大和 猪瀬直樹 井ノ上正盛 石原伸晃 石原慎太郎 岩井奉信 岩田一政 江沢民 鄭泰和 亀井久興 亀井静香 亀井善之 菅直人 神崎武法 片桐幸雄 片山さつき 片山虎之助 加藤紘一 川口順子 川本裕子 川崎二郎 川島裕 金大中 金正日 金永日 木村剛

Appendix 5: Personal names  185 Kishi Hiroyuki Kishi Nobusuke Kobayashi Kōki Koga Makoto Koike Yuriko Koizumi Jun’ichirō Kōmoto Toshio Kōmura Masahiko Kondō Takeshi Kōno Yōhei Kōnoike Yoshitada Kōso Kenji Kumagai Hiroshi Kume Hiroshi Lee Teng-hui Li Peng Li Zhaoxing Machimura Nobutaka Maehara Seiji Maruyama Masao Matsuda Masatake Matsuoka Toshikatsu Miki Takeo Mikuriya Takashi Miyazawa Kiichi Mori Yoshirō Nabekura Shin’ichi Nagai Yōnosuke Naitō Masahisa Nakagawa Hidenao Nakagawa Shōichi Nakasone Hirofumi Nakasone Yasuhiro Nakatani Gen Nakayama Kyōko Nikai Toshihiro Nishida Mamoru Noda Seiko Noda Takeshi Nogami Yōshiji Nonaka Hiromu Norota Hōsei Nukaga Fukushirō Obuchi Keizō Ōgi Chikage

岸博幸 岸信介 小林興起 古賀誠 小池百合子 小泉純一郎 河本敏夫 高村正彦 近藤剛 河野洋平 鴻池祥肇 高祖憲治 熊谷弘 久米宏 李登輝 李鵬 李肇星 町村信孝 前原誠司 丸山眞男 松田昌士 松岡利勝 三木武夫 御厨貴 宮澤喜一 森喜朗 鍋倉真一 永井陽之助 内藤正久 中川秀直 中川昭一 中曽根弘文 中曽根康弘 中谷元 中山恭子 二階俊博 西田司 野田聖子 野田毅 野上義二 野中広務 野呂田芳成 額賀福志郎 小渕恵三 扇千景

Ōhira Masayoshi Okada Katsuya Oku Katsuhiko Okuda Hiroshi Okudo Yukiko Ōmori Keiji Ōta Hiroko Ōtake Hideo Otsuji Hidehisa Ōya Eiko Ozawa Ichirō Roh Moo-hyun Saiki Akitaka Saka Atsuo Sasae Ken’ichirō Sasaki Takeshi Satō Eisaku Satō Toshiki Satō Yukari Sekō Hiroshige Shigeie Toshinori Shii Kazuo Shiina Etsusaburō Shimamura Yoshinobu Shimomura Takeshi Shimizu Masato Shinoda Tomohito Shiozaki Yasuhisa Soga Hitomi Suga Yoshihide Suzuki Katsunari Suzuki Muneo Tahara Sōichirō Takagi Shōkichi Takahashi Masaki Takahashi Yōichi Takanohana Takebe Tsutomu Takenaka Harukata Takenaka Heizō Takeuchi Yukio Tanaka Hitoshi Tanaka Kakuei Tanaka Kazuaki Tanaka Makiko

大平正芳 岡田克也 奥克彦 奥田碩 奥戸祐木子 大森敬治 大田弘子 大嶽秀夫 尾辻秀久 大宅映子 小沢一郎 盧武鉉 斎木昭隆 坂篤郎 佐々江賢一郎 佐々木毅 佐藤栄作 佐藤俊樹 佐藤ゆかり 世耕弘成 重家俊範 志位和夫 椎名悦三郎 島村宜伸 下村健 清水真人 信田智人 塩崎恭久 曽我ひとみ 菅義偉 鈴木勝也 鈴木宗男 田原総一郎 高木祥吉 高橋正喜 高橋洋一 貴乃花 武部勤 竹中治堅 竹中平蔵 竹内行夫 田中均 田中角栄 田中一昭 田中眞紀子

186  Appendix 5: Personal names Tanaka Naoki Tanigaki Sadakazu Terada Terusuke Tsujimoto Kiyomi Tsushima Yūji Uchiyama Yū Ushio Jirō Usuda Sadao Wang Yi Watanabe Yoshiaki Watanuki Tamisuke Wu Dawei Wu Yi Yabunaka Mitoji

田中直毅 谷垣禎一 寺田輝介 辻元清美 津島雄二 内山融 牛尾治朗 臼田貞夫 王毅 渡辺好明 綿貫民輔 武大偉 呉儀 藪中三十二

Yamaguchi Jirō Yamamoto Yūji Yamasaki Taku Yanagisawa Hakuo Yanai Shunji Yasuoka Okiharu Yokomichi Takahiro Yokota Megumi Yokota Shigeru Yosano Kaoru Yoshida Shigeru Yoshii Tomio Yoshikawa Hiroshi Yoshino Naoyuki

山口二郎 山本有二 山崎拓 柳澤伯夫 柳井俊二 保岡興治 横路孝弘 横田めぐみ 横田滋 与謝野馨 吉田茂 吉井富夫 吉川洋 吉野直行

Notes

Introduction 1 A variant English translation of this statement is found on the Kantei’s website under http://202.232.190.90/foreign/koizumispeech/2005/08/08kaiken_e.html. See also the English-language Koizumi Cabinet E-mail Magazine, 200 (11–18 Aug. 2005) under http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/m-magazine/backnumber/2005/0811. html (both accessed May 2009). English translations of policy statements given on the Kantei’s or Ministries’ websites have been consulted throughout, but all policy statements other than the foreign policy statements quoted in Ch. 3 are translated here directly from the Japanese. 2 On the multiple connotations of the term chōsei as a ‘genuine political concept’ in Japanese, see Chalmers Johnson, ‘Omote (explicit) and Ura (implicit): Translating Japanese political terms’, Journal of Japanese Studies, 6/1 (1980), 98.

1  Koizumi’s management of politics 1 Asahi shinbun, 29 Aug. 2006. 2 According to Iwai Tomoaki, the distance that television networks (as opposed to newspapers) kept from politicians, made it possible for them to engage in relatively free reporting during times of political reform. See Iwai Tomoaki, ‘55-nen taisei no hōkai to masumedia’, in Japanese Political Science Association (JPSA) (ed.), 55-nen taisei no hōkai (nenpō seijigaku), Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1996. 3 The evening briefing was discontinued after July 2006. For an account of burasagari in English, see also Ofer Feldman, Talking Politics in Japan Today, Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2005, pp. 36–9. 4 The decision to put a premium on coverage by the sports papers and weekly tabloids, and to permit television coverage with the prime minister standing in a fixed position and giving live comments (which had not been allowed in press briefings prior to then), was reputedly devised by Iijima Isao, Koizumi’s secretary for political affairs. See Sano Shin’ichi, Koizumi Jun’ichirō: Ketsumyaku no ōchō, Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 2004, p. 23; and Iijima Isao, Koizumi kantei hiroku, Tokyo: Nihon keizai shinbunsha, 2006, p. 34. 5 Ōtake Hideo, Nihon-gata popyurizumu: Seiji e no kitai to genmetsu, Tokyo: Chūōkōron-shinsha, 2003, pp. 118–19. 6 A binary construct of this sort was also prominent when political reform occupied the centre of political debate during the early 1990s. The characterization of this conflict as a struggle between a ‘reformist faction’ (kaikaku-ha 改革派) that supported electoral reform and an ‘old guard’ (shukyū-ha 守旧派) that opposed it was constructed mainly by the media, but it played a major role in bringing these reforms about. See my

188  Notes

7 8

9 10 11 12

13 14

15

16

17

18 19

article ‘Masumedia, aruiwa dai-yon no kenryoku?’, in Sasaki Takeshi, Seiji kaikaku 1800-nichi no shinjitsu, Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1999. Curiously, Koizumi was a member of the ‘old guard’ who opposed electoral system reform at that time. Asahi shinbun, 1 May 2001. The expression ‘All three lose one silver coin’ (sanbō ichiryō zon 三方一両損) in the sense of ‘splitting the burden three ways’ had been used by the Health Ministry already since 2000, i.e. before the launch of the Koizumi administration; it did not originate with Koizumi. See Asahi shinbun, 1 Dec. 2000. However, it is not difficult to imagine that the expression was exactly to Koizumi’s taste. Asahi shinbun, 9 July 2001. Asahi shinbun, 2 Aug. 2005 and 26 Sept. 2006. Azuma Shōji, Rekidai shushō no gengoryoku o shindan suru, Tokyo: Kenkyūsha, 2006, pp. 143–69. Satō Seizaburō and Matsuzaki Tetsuhisa, Jimintō seiken, Tokyo: Chūōkōron-sha, 1986, pp. 55–67. The role that the Lower House’s medium-sized, multi-member electoral district system played in the factionalization of the LDP must also not be overlooked. Under that system, the LDP had to run multiple candidates in a single electoral district in order to get a majority of the votes. Because LDP candidates had to compete against each other in the same district, they could not use the party label as a way to differentiate themselves from one another or rely on the party’s local organizations for their campaign activities. For that reason candidates grew ever more dependent on factions in their campaigns and during the endorsement process. Nihon keizai shinbun, 13 Sept. 2005. Yamaguchi Jirō, ‘Gendai Nihon no seikan kankei’, in JPSA (ed.), Gendai Nihon seikan kankei no keisei katei, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten 1995, p. 163. For a detailed discussion of zoku lawmakers, see Inoguchi Takashi and Iwai Tomoaki, ‘Zoku giin’ no kenkyū: Jimintō seiken o gyūjiru shuyaku-tachi, Tokyo: Nihon keizai shinbunsha, 1987. Tanaka Kakuei and Nakasone Yasuhiro favoured top-down policy-making and frequently issued directives to bureaucrats. However, as Nakasone’s abandonment of plans for a sales tax in the face of strong intra-party opposition shows, there were limits on the prime minister’s ability to exercise leadership in their cases as well. To be sure, Takenaka and other ministers frequently prepared the stage for Koizumi to step in and make his call. However, the fact that Takenaka and the others were dependent on the prime minister’s authority meant that top-down decisions came to possess considerable legitimacy. The correspondence delivery and postal privatization bills were pushed on to the Diet without approval by the ruling party review of their contents (the LDP had approved only the bills’ submission). Koizumi even tried to do away with the ruling party review as such, a practice that had developed over many years. Picking up on Koizumi’s wishes, a report compiled in March 2002 by the LDP’s National Vision Project Headquarters (chaired by Yasuoka Okiharu) included calls for elimination of the preapproval system by consolidating the Cabinet’s and the party’s policy-making efforts, and abolition of the vice-ministerial conference in an attempt to bring bureaucracy-led policy-making to an end. (This report met with strong internal opposition and was frustrated in the end.) In such ways, the influence of bureaucrats and zoku lawmakers on the policy-making process was reduced to a considerable degree. Shinoda Tomohito, Kantei no kenryoku, Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1996, pp. 65–102. See also Shinoda, Leading Japan: The Role of the Prime Minister, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000. This suggests to us an advantageous perspective for observing political phenomena. Political phenomena are generally viewed from one of two perspectives, either on the macro level of structures and systems (international situations, governing

Notes   189 institutions, the nature of the party system, etc.) or on the micro level of human behaviour and personality (the thought and behaviour patterns of leaders, etc.). As often as not, the observer focuses on one at the expense of the other. For example, the focus of journalistic reports frequently rests upon micro-level behaviour, such as how politicians behave or what their thinking is. On the other hand, the analyses of contemporary political science emphasize the kinds of incentives a given institution provides to rational actors. These analyses often assume that everybody will act the same way given the same macro-level structures.        However, it is not enough to look either at structures and institutions, or at a leader’s personality alone. Even given the same institutional structure, if those who establish themselves as leaders differ in their personalities or behaviour patterns, the outcomes will be different. A good example of this is the fact that policy-making had not departed from established practice under the Mori administration even though the central government reforms were already put in effect, and Mori therefore had the same institutional apparatus at his disposal as Koizumi. We can deepen our understanding of politics by looking holistically at both macro-level structures and institutions and the micro-level thought and behaviour of actors. 20 Mikuriya Takashi, Nihirizumu no saishō Koizumi Jun’ichirō ron, Tokyo: PHP kenkyūsho, 2006, pp. 12–25. 21 Until then, the LDP had only rarely struck a lawmaker’s name from its books. The first such case occurred in Jan. 1995 when House of Councillors member Hirai Takushi was expelled for disobeying party regulations. No expulsions had ever been carried out before, even when then-LDP member Ozawa Ichirō, among others, had voted in favour of a no-confidence resolution against the Cabinet of Miyazawa Kiichi in 1993. Nihon keizai shinbun, 3 Dec. 2006. 22 Mikuriya, Nihirizumu, p. 79. 23 Game theory has shown that in the game of the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ betrayal is the optimal strategy if the game is limited to one round, but when the game is played repeatedly cooperative strategies gradually achieve an equilibrium. See Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, ‘Achieving cooperation under anarchy’, World Politics, 38/1 (1985). 24 On the exercise of authority through the exchange of resources, see Martin J. Smith, The Core Executive in Britain, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999. 25 Having the public’s support as a source of power may be a necessary condition for adopting strategies based on short time horizons, but it is not a sufficient condition. One can imagine a politician with high support ratings who adopts long-time-horizonbased strategies.

2  Domestic affairs 1 Adam D. Sheingate, The Rise of the Agricultural Welfare State: Institutions and Interest Group Power in the United States, France, and Japan, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 185. 2 Shimizu Masato has also observed this. See Shimizu Masato, Kantei shudō: Koizumi Jun’ichirō no kakumei, Tokyo: Nihon keizai shinbunsha, 2005, p. 248. 3 John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd edn, New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1995, p. 4. 4 Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, ‘Two faces of power’, American Political Science Review (APSR), 56/4 (1962). 5 Political scientist Yamaguchi Jirō has described zoku lawmakers as individuals who ‘have colonized the ruling party using the bureaucratic machinery of each ministry and agency’. See Yamaguchi, Naikaku seido, Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 2007, p. 165.

190  Notes 6 Yomiuri shinbun seijibu, Jimintō o kowashita otoko: Koizumi seiken 1,500-nichi no shinjitsu, Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 2005, p. 173. 7 The ‘Expert Members’ Papers’ were crafted in close consultation with Takenaka. The drafts were written mainly by Takenaka’s staff and by Iwata Kazumasa and Ōta Hiroko, then directors-general for policy planning. Takenaka Heizō, Kōzō kaikaku no shinjitsu: Takenaka Heizō-daijin nisshi, Tokyo: Nihon keizai shinbunsha, 2006, p. 257. 8 Ōta Hiroko, Keizai zaisei shimon kaigi no tatakai, Tokyo: Tōyō keizai shinpōsha, 2006, pp. 114–21. 9 Shimizu, Kantei shudō, p. 304. 10 Ōta, Keizai zaisei, p. 125. 11 Iio Jun, ‘Keizai zaisei shimon kaigi ni yoru naikakusei no henyō’, Kōkyō seisaku kenkyū, 6 (2006), 34. 12 The CEFP could also give ‘substance’ to Cabinet decisions. Shiroyama Hideaki, ‘Seisaku katei ni okeru keizai zaisei shimon kaigi no yakuwari to tokushitsu’, Kōkyō seisaku kenkyū, 3 (2003), 40. 13 Ōta, Keizai zaisei, pp. 7–8. 14 Takenaka, Kōzō kaikaku, p. 257. 15 There is a famous historical example of this. In the 1930s, many countries confronting the Great Depression changed their economic policies to incorporate Keynesian demand-management policies. The institutions that provided the channel through which those ideas were introduced played a major role in the embrace of Keynesian economics – a revolutionary idea at the time – in the policy-making process. See Margaret Weir and Theda Skocpol, ‘State Structures and Possibilities for “Keynesian” responses to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain, and the United States’, in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds), Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 16 Uchiyama Yū, Gendai Nihon no kokka to shijō: Sekiyu kiki ikō no shijō no datsu’kōteki ryōiki’-ka, Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1998, p. 24. 17 Where no further citation is provided, I have relied on the following sources for producing the chronological narrative in this chapter and the details of the debates within the CEFP: the morning editions of the Asahi shinbun and Nihon keizai shinbun; the Yomiuri nenkan for the period under discussion; previously cited works by the Yomiuri Shimbun Politics Bureau, Ōta Hiroko and Takenaka Heizō; and meeting minutes and handouts provided at the CEFP’s internet home page. 18 Yomiuri shinbun seijibu, Jimintō, p. 171. 19 It took some time to achieve the ‘under ¥30 trillion’ target for government bond issuances. The figure stood at just ¥30 trillion in the initial fiscal 2002 budget, but grew to approximately ¥34.97 trillion in the revised budget (with the budget’s dependence on bonds standing at 41.8%); for the initial 2003 budget the amount was set at approximately ¥36.45 trillion (44.6% dependence). Helped by the rise in tax revenues that accompanied the subsequent economic recovery, government bond issuances fell to ¥29.97 trillion in the initial fiscal 2006 budget. Meeting the ¥30 trillion target subsequently became a certainty given the shift in tax revenues. 20 To be sure, the preferential redistribution of resources to priority areas does not appear to have gone all that well. This was due to every ministry stressing that their budget was a ‘priority area’ to be included within that framework. Ōta, Keizai zaisei, p. 111. 21 Ibid., p. 5. 22 If one adopts a zero-sum concept of power, a power relationship cannot in general be shown to exist in the absence of conflicts of interest between the parties involved. Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1974. 23 Yomiuri shinbun seijibu, Jimintō, p. 179. 24 Shimizu, Kantei shudō, p. 286.

Notes   191 25 Asahi shinbun, 28 Aug. 2001. 26 For details on the process of privatizing the highway public corporations, I recommend the following works by some of the individuals who were involved. Inose Naoki, Dōro no kenryoku: Dōro kōdan min’eika no kōbō 1,000-nichi, Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 2003; idem, Dōro no ketchaku, Tokyo: Shōgakkan, 2006; Sakurai Yoshiko, Kenryoku no dōke, Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 2004; and Tanaka Kazuaki, Itsuwari no min’eika: Dōro kōdan kaikaku, Tokyo: Wakku, 2004. 27 Asahi shinbun, 23 Nov. 2001. 28 For a more detailed account in English see also Fumitoshi Mizutani and Shuji Uranishi, ‘Privatization of the Japan public highway corporation: focusing on organizational structure change’, Transport Reviews, 28/4 (2008), 469–93. 29 Asahi shinbun, 21 Dec. 2003. 30 This proposal became an object of criticism from the mass media as well, drawing such remarks as ‘“The introduction of market principles” that originally was the biggest goal of privatization for all intents and purposes has been postponed.’ Nihon keizai shinbun, 22 Dec. 2003. 31 In fact, at a press conference held 18 April 2003, Transport Minister Ishihara announced, ‘[The 9,064 kilometers of highway] for which an order has already been issued will be built as ordered.’ 32 Inose, Dōro no ketchaku, p. 190. 33 Asahi shinbun, 1 Oct. 2002. 34 Uemura Toshiyuki and Tanaka Hiroki, ‘Koizumi kaikaku’ to wa nan datta no ka: Seisaku inobēshon e no tsugi naru shishin, Tokyo: Nippon hyōronsha, 2006, pp. 77–8. 35 Aera, 14 April 2003, p. 71. 36 There was an element of increased government intervention to the process of writing off nonperforming loans in that financial institutions were inspected more rigorously. While this may appear to be inconsistent with Koizumi’s reforms, which sought to put restraints on government intervention, the intended effect here should be understood instead as an attempt to create conditions that would allow market principles to function smoothly. 37 Ōta, Keizai zaisei, p. 158. 38 Ibid., p. 62. 39 Asahi shinbun, 19 June 2003. 40 Kōso resigned his post, to be sure, after a number of postmasters in the Kinki region were arrested on suspicion of violating the Public Office Election Law (abuse of status as a civil servant) by campaigning for Kōso among special post office masters. 41 In 1992 when he held the posts and telecommunications portfolio in the Miyazawa cabinet, Koizumi stood squarely opposed to an expansion of the Maruyū マル優 system of tax exemptions for small deposits that had been approved by the postal bureaucracy. This considerably soured his relationship with those bureaucrats. 42 Nihon keizai shinbun, 12 Sept. 2004. 43 Tanaka Zenichirō, ‘2005-nen 9-gatsu sōsenkyo (dai-44-kai): Jimintō no taishō’, Nihon seiji kenkyū, 3/2 (2006). 44 Asahi shinbun, 7 Dec. 2002. 45 While the CEFP was not the main stage in the financial revitalization process, the fact that progress was made on writing off the nonperforming loans after Takenaka took on the additional portfolio of minister of state for financial services is indicative of how large a role he played in the process. 46 Takenaka, Kōzō kaikaku, p. 258. 47 Takenaka’s understanding of the CEFP was that it was more a venue for formally ratifying conclusions that had already been reached than a setting for debate. 48 Takenaka points out that the underlying tone of the Expert Members’ Papers changed and became more accommodative after he became the internal affairs minister.

192  Notes This, too, suggests that the operation of the Council was underpinned by Takenaka’s strategies. Takenaka, Kōzō kaikaku, p. 304.

3  Foreign relations 1 I consulted the following sources to create the chronological narrative for this chapter, particularly for those passages for which no citation is otherwise provided. The morning editions of the Asahi shinbun and Nihon keizai shinbun; the Yomiuri nenkan for the period under discussion; and Yomiuri shinbun seijibu (ed.), Gaikō o kenka ni shita otoko: Koizumi gaikō 2,000-nichi no shinjitsu, Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 2006. 2 For the background to the feud between Tanaka Makiko and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that follows, I relied mainly on Ōtake Hideo, Nihon-gata popyurizumu, Tokyo: Chūōkōron-shinsha, 2003, pp. 169–88. 3 Translator’s note: for the foregoing and throughout this chapter, I have relied as much as possible on English-language documents available over the internet from official government organs (and in the case of China, the official Xinhua newspaper) when translating passages presenting material from press conferences, official statements, and so forth pertaining to diplomatic affairs and trade relations. Statements as reported in the English-language media were also consulted when official materials were unavailable or incomplete. 4 Asahi shinbun, 26 Sept. 2001. 5 Shinoda Tomohito, Kantei gaikō: Seiji rīdāshippu no yukue, Tokyo: Asahi shinbunsha, 2004, p. 60. See also Tomohito Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan’s Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs, Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2007, p. 96. 6 Asahi shinbun, 5 Oct. 2001. 7 I relied heavily on Shinoda, Kantei gaikō, for the background to the passage of the Iraq Special Measures Law. 8 Asahi shinbun, 21 Oct. 2001. 9 Yomiuri shinbun seijibu (ed.), Gaikō, p. 159. 10 Shinoda, Kantei gaikō, p. 95. 11 Though this came after the provisional safeguards were invoked, on the 8 Nov. deadline the Japanese government set 21 Dec. as the final cutoff date for deciding on invoking formal safeguards. On 21 Dec., the Japanese and Chinese governments reached an agreement to jointly monitor the production and trading of the three items and formal invocation of the safeguards was shelved. 12 Translator’s note: Established as Tokyo Shōkonsha 招魂社 in 1869, Yasukuni shrine (Yasukuni jinja 靖国神社) commemorates Japan’s war dead. The shrine had a central place in the pre-1945 state-sponsored cult of death in battle and service to the emperor, a legacy that has prompted many domestic and foreign critics to see it as glorifying past Japanese military aggression. The inclusion of convicted war criminals among the dead venerated there has been the main issue upon which international frictions over the shrine have turned in recent decades. Visits by Japanese politicians and prime ministers in particular have been perceived especially in China and on the Korean Peninsula as attempts to legitimize past misdeeds. Postwar prime ministers who have visited the shrine have frequently tried to forestall protests by drawing a fine line between their status as a private citizen and head of state, as Miki Takeo did in 1975 when he became the first Japanese premier to visit Yasukuni since 1945. Miki emphasized that he made the visit in a private capacity. Nakasone Yasuhiro and his cabinet became the first postwar Japanese government to pay formal tribute at the shrine on 15 August 1985. Demonstrations erupted around China in response and Beijing strongly condemned the move. The act also revived long-standing concerns among domestic critics over Yasukuni and constitutional questions regarding religion–

Notes   193

13 14

15

16 17

state separation. See Helen Hardacre, Shintō and the State, 1868–1988, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989, pp. 90–2, 143–5, 150–3, and John Breen (ed.), Yasukuni, the War Dead and the Struggle for Japan’s Past, New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. The expression ‘dialogue and pressure’ appears to have been first used at the time of this summit meeting, at least based on a search of the Asahi shinbun article database. In an article published by Nature (3 Feb. 2005), Yoshii Tomio of Teikyō University, the forensic expert who conducted the DNA tests, is quoted as saying that it was possible that the samples were contaminated: ‘The bones are like stiff sponges that can absorb anything. If sweat or oils of someone that was handling them soaked in, it would be impossible to get them out no matter how well they were prepared.’ North Korea claimed that the cremated remains, which had been heated to 1,200ºC, could not contain any surviving DNA, and pointed to the fact that the National Research Institute of Police Science in Tokyo had not been able to extract any DNA from its samples either. Yoshii, who had no previous experience with cremated remains, countered by pointing to differences in the method used and at the possibility of DNA surviving even extremely high temperatures if exposed only for a very brief time. The Japanese government, for its part, could point to the fact that North Korea had sent remains it claimed to belong to an abductee in the past, only to admit later that they in fact were from a different source. Nature concluded its article with the observation that, since Yoshii’s samples were used up in his tests, there remains ‘little prospect of the disagreement being resolved’. David Cyranoski, ‘DNA is burning issue as Japan and Korea clash over kidnaps’, Nature, 433 (3 Feb. 2005), 445. Hatakeyama Noboru, who was involved with numerous negotiations as an assistant vice-minister at the Trade Ministry, makes a similar point: ‘The Koizumi administration sang the praises of structural reform, but for some reason no FTAs came out of this. I have not come across any reports about there being an instruction when the current negotiations [the FTA talks with Mexico] were stalled to bring this matter to a conclusion even if that left the Kantei with mud on its face.’ See Hatakeyama Noboru, ‘Seiji ga kawaranai kagiri Nihon wa botsuraku suru’, Chūō kōron (Feb. 2003), 53. Ōtake, Nihon-gata popyurizumu, p. 90. Shinoda, Kantei gaikō.

4  The Koizumi administration in historical and theoretical perspective 1 This chapter is a heavily revised and expanded version of my article ‘Jimintō seiji no shisō’, Daikōkai, 40 (2001). 2 In policy-making, politicians and bureaucrats consider interests and ideas in conjunction (although the degree of attention each receives may differ depending on the occasion), looking for connections. One might say that the activities of politicians and bureaucrats are the site where interests and ideas merge. 3 Sasaki Takeshi, Seijigaku kōgi, Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1999, p. 47. 4 For further discussion on the politics of ideas, please see Peter A. Hall (ed.), The Political Power of Economic Ideas, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989; Robert Reich (ed.), The Power of Public Ideas, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990; and Mark Blyth, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 5 The English word ‘idea’ is a broad concept that can be translated by various Japanese terms such as kannen 観念, rinen 理念, hassō 発想, kangae 考え, shisō 思想, riron 理論, and kihan 規範 depending on the context. The various ideological systems that affix an orientation to individual policies such as ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’

194  Notes

6 7 8 9 10

11

12 13 14 15

16 17 18

particularly evoke the Japanese word rinen 理念, which is translated back into the English as ‘conviction’ here. The word ‘idea’ (aidia アイディア) is used in this book as a general concept that embraces everything from specific policy ideas (seisaku aidia 政策アイディア) such as postal privatization, to scholarly theoretical systems (riron taikei 理論体系) such as neoclassical economics, to cultural norms (bunkateki na kihan 文化的な規範). Nagai Yōnosuke, Gendai to senryaku, Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 1985, p. 18. I have altered the terminology used somewhat here. This temporal breakdown is based largely on ideas suggested by Sasaki Takeshi, Seiji ni nani ga dekiru ka, Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1991, p. 64. Ōtake Hideo, Adenauā to Yoshida Shigeru, Tokyo: Chūōkōron-sha, 1986. Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982. John G. Ruggie, ‘International regimes, transactions, and change: Embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order’, International Organization, 36/2 (1982), 379–415. Kume Ikuo, ‘Seiji keizai kankyō no henka to gyōsei shisutemu’, in Nishio Masaru and Muramatsu Michio (eds), Seisaku to gyōsei, Kōza gyōsei gaku, 3, Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1994. Of course, there were also politicians in the LDP during this era who were not in tune with the aforementioned policy line, advocating instead their own ideas, and some became prime minister. For instance, there was an undercurrent of modified capitalist thought that flowed through the thinking of Miki Takeo in the form of cooperativism. This was reflected in his push to revise and strengthen anti-monopoly laws during his premiership despite intraparty opposition. Meanwhile, there was a strong hint of the military realist to Nakasone Yasuhiro, as symbolized by his talk of Japan as an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ (fuchin kūbo 不沈空母). However, neither of them were in the party mainstream by any means. The Miki Cabinet was a product of the ‘Shiina decision’ (Shiina saitei 椎名裁定), so-called because then-LDP-vice-president Shiina Etsusaburō named Miki prime minister owing to the quagmire that the LDP was in due to the financial scandal surrounding Prime Minister Tanaka. For his part, Nakasone would never have become prime minister without the support of the Tanaka faction, as suggested by disparaging references to the ‘Tanaka–Nakasone Cabinet’. Moreover, no policies were actually adopted that overturned existing policy lines. T. J. Pempel, Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998, pp. 171–2. Peter A. Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of States Intervention in Britain and France, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986, p. 19. The theoretical framework used in this chapter is a simplified version of that presented in my article ‘Seisaku aidia no denpan to seido: Gyōsei soshiki kakumei no Nichi-Ei hikaku o daizai to shite’, Kōkyō seisaku kenkyū, 5 (2005). This is the problem of path dependency: once a system is established, it tends to stabilize and reinforce itself on its own. When a behaviour pattern has become institutionalized, the costs of changing direction or adopting different behaviours become high. Conversely, the relative benefits of choosing current behaviours increase. See Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990; and Paul Pierson, ‘Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics’, APSR, 94/2 (2000). Yamaguchi Jirō, ‘Gendai Nihon no seikan kankei’, in JPSA (ed.), Gendai Nihon seikan kankei no keisei katei, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten,1995, p. 158. Bradley Richardson, Japanese Democracy: Power, Coordination, and Performance, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997, pp. 105–6. Even in the SMD system, it was not inevitable that ‘elections based on personal preference’ would disappear. See my ‘‘Netsubyō’ no jidai: Seiji kaikaku, gyōsei kaikaku no ronri to kiketsu’, Kokusai shakai kagaku, 54 (2005). Given that the

Notes   195

19 20

21 22 23

24

25 26

27 28

candidates from the various parties relied on their personal support bases when campaigning, the situation did not seem to be all that different from that found in the medium-sized electoral districts. Paku Choruhī (Park Cheol-hee), Daigishi no tsukurarekata, Tokyo: Bungei shinsho, 2000. Takenaka Harukata, Shushō shihai: Nihon seiji no henbō, Tokyo: Chūōkōron-shinsha, 2006, pp. 149–53. According to the results of a national survey of campaign funding conducted jointly by political scientists and the Asahi Shimbun Company, each LDP Diet member had an average income of a little more than ¥130 million in 1996. Approximately ¥76 million of that came from contributions, while revenues from fund-raising events totalled ¥32 million. Sasaki Takeshi et al., Daigishi to kane: Seiji shikin zenkoku chōsa hōkoku, Tokyo: Asahi shinbunsha, 1999. Tanaka Kazuaki and Okada Akira, Chūō shōchō kaikaku: Hashimoto gyōkaku ga mezashita ‘Kono kuni no katachi’, Tokyo: Nippon hyōronsha, 2000. It seems reasonable to view this provision as being important more as a symbol of ‘Kantei initiative’ than for its substantive function. Core executive refers to ‘all those organizations and structures which primarily serve to pull together and integrate central government policies, or act as final arbiters within the executive of conflicts between different elements of the government machine’. Patrick Dunleavy and R. A. W. Rhodes, ‘Core executive studies in Britain’, Public Administration, 68 (1990), 4. These enhancements in the role of the Cabinet Secretariat also appear to have produced an increase in the number of bureaucrats at various ministries who wanted to be temporarily transferred to the institution since they could do work there they ordinarily could not do at their home organizations. Chalmers Johnson has described the relationship between Japanese politicians and bureaucrats in this fashion. Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle, p. 316. The Koizumi Cabinet made eight pledges at the outset: (1) a ¥30 trillion framework for government bond issues, (2) privatization of the three postal businesses, (3) elimination of special public corporations in principle and their privatization, (4) consolidation of the government’s financial institutions, (5) disposition of all nonperforming loans within two to three years, (6) removal of the full-deposit guarantee, (7) a pilgrimage to Yasukuni on 15 Aug. and (8) one cabinet minister per ministry or agency during the tenure of one cabinet. The report judged 1, 4 and 8 to be at a ‘standstill’; 2 to be ‘unchanged’; 3, 5 and 6 to be ‘losing speed’; and 7 to be ‘smoke and mirrors’. Aurelia Georgia Mulgan, Japan’s Failed Revolution: Koizumi and the Politics of Economic Reform, Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2002. John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd edn, New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1995, pp. 2–4.

5  Legacies of the Koizumi administration 1 Groups that are small and in which the benefits to be gained from government policies are concentrated (producers seeking regulation) are easier to organize and will have greater political influence than groups that are large and where benefits are dispersed (consumers seeking liberalization) since the share of the benefit going to each member is larger. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965. 2 On this point, we can say that ideas played a role in defining the nature of the benefits. 3 Government of Japan, Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, Rōdō keizai no bunseki (Rōdō keizai hakusho) 2006, p. 24. 4 Understandably, growing inequality is not something that can be categorically labelled as bad. One can see the increase in flexible employment patterns that non-regular

196  Notes

5 6

7

8 9 10 11 12 13

14 15

employment represents as able to generate growth by increasing efficiency in the economy, and the robust protection of regular employees as linked to the elimination of non-regular employees. More than anything else, the dynamics of market principles perhaps reside in the notion that today’s ‘winners’ could be tomorrow’s ‘losers’. If the opportunity to become a ‘winner’ passed around to everyone on an equitable basis, then temporary inequalities would likely not be much of a problem. Conversely, there are big problems when opportunities of that sort become static. Chances are high that inequalities will reproduce themselves, as when children of the affluent are put in advantageous positions from which even more wealth is easy to obtain. Satō Toshiki argues that the reproduction of inequality exists in Japan today, based on the decline in class mobility. Satō Toshiki, Fubyōdō shakai Nihon: Sayonara sōchūryū, Tokyo: Chūōkōron-shinsha, 2000. Anthony Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998, p. 102–3. Also, during his party leader debate with Okada of the DPJ in the Diet on 10 Nov. 2004, Koizumi remarked, ‘The area where the SDF operates is a noncombat zone.’ This was criticized as a far-fetched claim that anywhere the SDF operated was for that very reason a noncombat zone. However, this interpretation appears to be a misunderstanding. Koizumi was only explaining the gist of the Iraq Special Measures Law. Ina Hisayoshi, ‘“Ga” wa “wa” ni arazu’, Nihon keizai shinbun, 3 September 2006. Even so, in response to Okada’s question (‘What evidence is there that Samawah is a noncombat zone?’), Koizumi said only ‘Fighting is not taking place. Therefore it’s a noncombat zone.’ This was not a substantial explanation. There is no escaping the criticism that his explanation was inadequate. The term shinnō māketingu (‘mind-brain marketing’) was introduced by Fujikawa Yoshinori and Akutsu Satoshi as the title of their Japanese translation of Gerald Zaltman’s How Customers Think: Essential Insights into the Mind of the Market, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2003. See Jerarudo Zarutoman (Gerald Zaltman), Shinnō māketingu – Kokyaku no muishiki o tokiakasu, trans. Fujikawa Yoshinori and Aketsu Satoshi, Tokyo: Daiyamondo sha, 2005. The Japanese term shinnō 心脳 was coined in translation of the English ‘mind-brain’ as introduced by Patricia Smith Churchland (cf. her Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986) and relied on by Zaltman in his book. Komori Yōichi, Shinnō kontorōru shakai, Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 2006. Ibid., pp. 128–59. Asahi shinbun, 25 Sept. 2006 (evening edition). Bernard Crick, In Defense of Politics, 4th edn, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993, p. 21. Bernard Crick, Democracy: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958, pp. 175–6. According to Arendt, the political sphere is the sphere that forms the public world through the media of ‘speech’ (lexis) and ‘action’ (praxis, i.e. the autonomous patterns of behaviour carried out between individuals premised by the human condition of plurality). Ibid., pp.7–8, 24–6. See also Chiba Shin, ‘Ārento “Ningen no jōken”’, in Sasaki Takeshi (ed.), Gendai seijigaku no meicho, Tokyo: Chūōkōron-sha, 1989, p. 115. Hayakawa Makoto, ‘Shimin shakai to atarashii demokurashii-ron’, in Kawasaki Osamu and Sugita Atsushi (eds), Gendai seiji riron, Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 2006, pp. 253– 5. The leading theorist of deliberative democracy, Habermas argues that only agreements formed through rational discussion provide appropriate standards. Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Theory of Law and Democracy, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996.

Notes   197 16 Crick, Democracy: A Very Short Introduction, p. 90. 17 Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, Empire, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 89. 18 Maruyama Masao, Nihon no shisō, Tokyo: Iwanami shinsho, 1961, pp. 52–62. Regarding the relationship between Maruyama’s notion of ‘faith in felt reality’ and Koizumi’s politics, I found the Shunjū column in Nihon keizai shinbun, 16 Aug. 2006, to be particularly suggestive. The translation ‘faith felt in reality’ for jikkan shinkō 実感信仰 is Andrew Barshay’s. Andrew E. Barshay, The Social Sciences in Modern Japan: The Marxian and Modernist Traditions, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2004, p. 224. 19 Maruyama Masao, Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, trans. Ivan Morris, New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 128. 20 Max Weber, ‘The Profession and Vocation of Politics’; trans. Peter Lassman, The Profession and Vocation of Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 359. 21 Ellis S. Krauss and Robert Pekkanen, ‘Explaining party adaption to electoral reform: The discreet charm of the LDP?’, Journal of Japanese Studies, 30/1 (2004). 22 The position that certain things do not have a material existence but rather come into being through specific understandings and words being shared among individuals is called social constructionism. 23 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993. 24 On this point I found helpful Matsuzaki Daisuke, ‘The changing politics of defense in post-“1955 system” Japan’, graduation thesis, University of Tokyo, College of Arts and Sciences Senior Division, Dept of Social and International Relations, 2007. 25 Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999.

6  Postscript 1 Ōtake Hideo, Nihon-gata popyurizumu: Seiji e no kitai to genmetsu, Tokyo: Chūōkōron-shinsha, 2003. 2 Asahi shinbun, 6 Dec. 2006. Linguist Azuma Shōji points out that ‘Koizumi had an “emotion-focused” way of talking, while Abe’s was “information-focused”.’ (Ibid.) 3 Uesugi Takashi, Kantei hōkai: Abe seiken meisō no ichinen, Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 2007. 4 Yomiuri shinbun seijibu, Shinkū kokkai: Fukuda ‘hyōryū seiken’ no shinsō, Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 2008, p. 169.

Bibliography

Please refer to the Endnotes for works specifically cited in the text. The following list represents works that I believe are useful for understanding the Koizumi administration.

Further reading in English Amyx, Jennifer A., Japan’s Financial Crisis: Institutional Rigidity and Reluctant Change, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. Amyx, Jennifer and Peter Drysdale (eds), Japanese Governance: Beyond Japan Inc., London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. Boyd, J. Patrick and Richard J. Samuels, Nine Lives? The Politics of Constitutional Reform in Japan, Washington, DC: East–West Center Washington, 2005. Breen, John (ed.), Yasukuni, the War Dead and the Struggle for Japan’s Past, New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. Carpenter, Susan, Why Japan Can’t Reform: Inside the System, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Curtis, Gerald L., The Logic of Japanese Politics: Leaders, Institutions, and the Limits of Change, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. Dudden, Alexis, Troubled Apologies Among Japan, Korea, and the United States, New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. Estevez-Abe, Margarita, Welfare and Capitalism in Postwar Japan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Feldman, Ofer, Talking Politics in Japan Today, Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2005. Freeman, Laurie Anne, Closing the Shop: Information Cartels and Japan’s Mass Media, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000. Gao, Bai, Economic Ideology and Japanese Industrial Policy: Developmentalism from 1931 to 1965, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Gaunder, Alisa, Political Reform in Japan: Leadership Looming Large, London: Routledge, 2007. George Mulgan, Aurelia, Japan’s Failed Revolution: Koizumi and the Politics of Economic Reform, Asia Pacific Press at the Australian National University, 2002. George Mulgan, Aurelia, Japan’s Interventionist State: The Role of the MAFF, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005. George Mulgan, Aurelia, Japan’s Agricultural Policy Regime, London: Routledge, 2006.

Bibliography  199 Hirata, Keiko, and Yoichiro Sato, Norms, Interests, and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Hook, Glenn D. (ed.), Contested Governance in Japan: Sites and Issues, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005. Hori, Harumi, The Changing Japanese Political System: The Liberal Democratic Party and the Ministry of Finance, London: Routledge, 2005. Ikenberry, G. John and Takashi Inoguchi, The Uses of Institutions: The U.S., Japan, and Governance in East Asia, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Johnson, Stephen, Opposition Politics in Japan: Strategies under a One-Party Dominant Regime, London: Routledge, 2000. Katzenstein, Peter J., Rethinking Japanese Security: Internal and External Dimensions, London: Routledge, 2008. Kawabata, Eiji, Contemporary Government Reform in Japan: The Dual State in Flux, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Krauss, Ellis S., Broadcasting Politics in Japan: NHK and Television News, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000. Martin, Sherri L. and Gill Steel (eds), Democratic Reform in Japan: Assessing the Impact, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008. Mochida, Nobuki, Fiscal Decentralization and Local Public Finance in Japan, London: Routledge, 2008. Morita, Minoru, Curing Japan’s America Addiction: How Bush and Koizumi Destroyed Japan’s Middle Class and What we Need to Do to Fix It, trans. Bruce Rutledge and Yuko Enomoto, Seattle: Chin Music Press, 2008. Nakamura, Masao (ed.), Changing Corporate Governance Practices in China and Japan: Adaptations of Anglo-American Practices in China and Japan, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Pekkanen, Robert, Japan’s Dual Civil Society: Members without Advocates, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006. Pempel, T. J., Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998. Reed, Steven R. (ed.), Japanese Electoral Politics: Creating a New Party System, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. Richardson, Bradley, Japanese Democracy: Power, Coordination, and Performance, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997. Sakakibara, Eisuke, Structural Reform in Japan: Breaking the Iron Triangle, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004. Samuels, Richard J., Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007. Schaede, Ulrike, Cooperative Capitalism: Self-Regulation, Trade Associations, and the Antimonopoly Law in Japan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Scheiner, Ethan, Democracy without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a Oneparty Dominant State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Sheingate, Adam D., The Rise of the Agricultural Welfare State: Institutions and Interest Group Power in the United States, France, and Japan, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. Shinoda, Tomohito, Leading Japan: The Role of the Prime Minister, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000. Shinoda, Tomohito, Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan’s Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs, Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2007.

200  Bibliography Stockwin, J. A. A., Governing Japan: Divided Politics in a Resurgent Economy (4th edn), Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2008. Tiberghien, Yves, Entrepreneurial States: Reforming Corporate Governance in France, Japan, and Korea, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007. Vogel, Steven K., Japan Remodeled: How Government and Industry are Reforming Japanese Capitalism, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006.

Further reading in Japanese Adachi Toshiaki 足立利明, Koizumi Jun’ichirō to Jimintō no rīdā-tachi: Shin Jimintō jinbutsu fūun-roku 小泉純一郎と自民党のリーダーたち―新・自民党人物風雲 録 [Koizumi Junichirō and the LDP Leaders: The Tale of the New LDP Politicians], Tokyo: Tsubasa shoin, 2001. Asakawa Hirotada 浅川博忠, Ningen Koizumi Jun’ichirō: Sandai ni wataru ‘Henkaku’ no chi 人間　小泉純一郎－三代にわたる「変革」の血 [The Man Koizumi Junichirō: An Ancestry of ‘Reform’ Spanning Three Generations], Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2001. Asakawa Hirotada, Koizumi Jun’ichirō to wa nanimono datta no ka 小泉純一郎は何者だ ったのか [Who was Koizumi Junichirō?], Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2006. Azuma Shōji 東照二, Rekidai shushō no gengoryoku o shindan suru 歴代首相の原語力 を診断する [An Examination of the Successive Prime Ministers’ Linguistic Skills], Tokyo: Kenkyūsha, 2006. Eda Kenji 江田けんじ, Meikingu Koizumi Seiken 1365-nichi zen-kiroku: Watashi dake ga shitte iru メイキング小泉政権1365日全記録－私だけが知っている [A Complete Record of 1365 Days of the Koizumi Administration in the Making: An Insider’s Account], Tokyo: Kōdansha +α bunko, 2005. Iijima Isao 飯島勲, Koizumi kantei hiroku 小泉官邸秘録 [A Secret Record of Koizumi’s Prime Ministerial Office], Tokyo: Nihon keizai shinbunsha, 2006. Iio Jun 飯尾潤, Nihon no tōchi kōzō 日本の統治構造 [The Structure of Japanese Governance], Tokyo: Chūōkōron-shinsha, 2007. Inose Naoki 猪瀬直樹, Dōro no kenryoku: Dōro kōdan min’eika no kōbō 1,000-nichi 道 路の権力：道路公団民営化の攻防 [The Power of the Roads: 1,000 Days of Struggle over the Highway Public Corporation Privatization], Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 2003. Inose Naoki, Dōro no ketchaku 道路の決着 [Showdown over the Roads], Tokyo: Shōgakkan, 2006. Itagaki Eiken 板垣英憲, Tanaka Makiko ga tenka o toru hi 田中眞紀子が天下をとる 日 [The Day Tanaka Makiko Takes over the Realm], Tokyo: KK besutoserāzu, 2000. Itagaki Eiken, Naze Tanaka Makiko wa hoeru no ka: Heisei no joketsu, sono ningen-teki miryoku kaibō なぜ田中眞紀子は吼えるのか―平成の女傑、その人間的魅力解 剖 [Why does Tanaka Makiko Bark? The Valiant Woman of Heisei – a Dissection of her Human Charm], Tokyo: KK besutoserāzu, 2001. Itagaki Eiken, Koizumi-Abe vs. Kan-Ozawa no kunitori sensō 小泉・安部 vs 菅・小沢 の国盗り戦争 [Koizumi/Abe vs. Kan/Ozawa: The Battle for Control over the Land], Tokyo: Nisshin hōdō, 2003. Iwami Takao 岩見隆夫, Kokō no bōkun: Koizumi Jun’ichirō 孤高の暴君―小泉純一郎 [The Aloof Tyrant: Koizumi Junichirō], Tokyo: Daiwa shobō, 2006. Kakumoto Ryōhei 角本良平, Mitsu no min’eika: Dōro kōdan kaikaku, yūsei kaikaku to JR 三つの民営化―道路公団改革、郵政改革とJR [Three Privatizations: The Reform of the Highway Public Corporations, the Postal Reform, and Japan Railways], Ryūgasaki: Ryūtsū keizai daigaku shuppankai, 2005.

Bibliography  201 Kamata Satoshi 鎌田慧, Koizumi to iu jidai 小泉という時代 [The Koizumi Epoch], Tokyo: Asutora, 2004. Kaminogō Toshiaki 上之郷利明, Koizumi Jun’ichirō no tsūkaigo-roku 小泉純一郎の痛快 語録 [A Record of Koizumi Junichirō’s Gallant Remarks], Tokyo: Paru shuppan, 2001. Kobayashi Kichiya 小林吉弥, Koizumi Jun’ichirō to Tanaka Makiko 小泉純一郎と田中 眞紀子 [Koizumi Junichirō and Tanaka Makiko], Tokyo: Tokuma shoten, 2001. Koizumi Jun’ichirō 小泉純一郎, Kanryō ōkoku kaitai-ron: Nihon no kiki o sukuu hō 官僚 王国解体論―日本の危機を救う法 [Dissolving the Bureaucratic Kingdom: The Way to Helping Japan out of its Crisis], Tokyo: Kōbunsha, 1996. Koizumi Jun’ichirō, Koizumi Jun’ichirō no bōron, seiron 小泉純一郎の暴論・青論 [Reality in What they Call Unrealistic Debate], Tokyo: Shūeisha, 1997. Koizumi Jun’ichirō no seisaku o kenkyū suru kai 小泉純一郎の政策を研究する会 (ed.), Koizumi goroku: Seijika Koizumi Jun’ichirō no miryoku to genten o saguru 小泉語 録―政治家・小泉純一郎の魅力と原点を探る [A Record of Koizumi’s Remarks: An Investigation into the Fascination and Roots of the Politician Koizumi Junichirō], Tokyo: Nihon bungeisha, 2001. Kubota Akira 久保田明, Kenshō Koizumi seiji kaikaku: Kindai Nihon seiji hattenshi ni okeru Koizumi naikaku no chi’i 検証・小泉政治改革―近代日本政治発展史におけ る小泉内閣の地位 [An Inspection of Koizumi’s Political Reforms: The Position of the Koizumi Administration within the History of the Development of Politics in Japan], Tokyo: Hekitensha, 2004. Kurihara Takeshi 栗原猛, Kaikaku wa naze susumanai ka: Koizumi seiken hihanron 改革 はなぜ進まないか―小泉政権批判論 [Why the Reforms are Making No Progress: A Critique of the Koizumi Administration], Tokyo: NCC komyunikeishonzu, 2004. Kurimoto Shin’ichirō 栗本慎一郎, Jun-kojinteki Koizumi Jun’ichirō-ron (純個人的小泉 純一郎論 [A Purely Personal View of Koizumi Junichirō], Tokyo: Ipushiron shuppan kikaku, 2006. Matsuda Ken’ya 松田賢弥, Mujō no saishō: Koizumi Jun’ichirō 無常の宰相　小泉純一 郎 [The Iron-Hearted Chancellor Koizumi Junichirō], Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2000. Mikuriya Takashi 御厨貴, Nihirizumu no saishō Koizumi Jun’ichirō ron ニヒリズムの 宰相　小泉純一郎論 [The Nihilistic Chief Minister: A Theory of Koizumi Junichirō], Tokyo: PHP kenkyūsho, 2006. Morita Minoru 森田実, Koizumi seiji zenmen hihan 小泉政治全面批判 [An All Round Critique of Koizumi’s Politics], Tokyo: Nippon hyōronsha, 2006. Nihon keizai shinbun seijibu 日本経済新聞政治部 (The Nihon Keizai Shimbun Politics Bureau) (ed.), Seiji hakai: Koizumi kaikaku to wa nani ka 政治破壊―小泉改革とは 何か [The Destruction of Politics: What are the Koizumi Reforms?], Tokyo: Nihon keizai shinbunsha, 2001. Ōshita Eiji 大下英治, Shōsetsu - Koizumi Jun’ichirō: Shin o tsuranuite osorezu 小説・小 泉純一郎―信を貫いて恐れず [The Story of Koizumi Junichirō: Fearlessly Holding onto Belief], Tokyo: Gentōsha, 2001. Ōshita Eiji, Koizumi Jun’ichirō vs. teikō seiryoku 小泉純一郎vs抵抗勢力 [Koizumi Junichirō vs. The Forces of Resistance], Tokyo: Tokuma bunko, 2002. Ōshita Eiji, Koizumi wa Nobunaga ka: Yasashisa to wa, munō nari 小泉は信長か―優し さとは無能なり [Is Koizumi Nobunaga? Benignancy is Powerless], Tokyo: Gentōsha bunko, 2006. Ōta Hiroko 大田弘子, Keizai zaisei shimon kaigi no tatakai 経済財政諮問会議の戦い [Battles of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy], Tokyo: Tōyō keizai shinpōsha, 2006.

202  Bibliography Ōtake Hideo 大嶽秀夫, Nihon-gata popyurizumu: seiji e no kitai to genmetsu 日本型 ポピュリズム―政治への期待と幻滅 [Japanese-Style Populism: The Promises and Disillusionments of Politics], Tokyo: Chūōkōron-shinsha, 2003. Ōtake Hideo, Koizumi Jun’ichirō - Popyurizumu no kenkyū: Sono senryaku to shuhō 小 泉純一郎　ポピュリズムの研究―その戦略と手法 [Koizumi Junichirō: A Study of Populism. Its Strategy and Methods], Tokyo: Tōyō keizai shinpōsha, 2006. Saeki Keishi 佐伯啓思, Sōri no shishitsu to wa nani ka: Hōkai suru Koizumi kaikaku 総理の資質とは何か―崩壊する小泉改革 [What are the Qualifications for being Prime Minister? The Breakdown of the Koizumi Reforms], Tokyo: Shōgakkan bunko, 2002. Sakurai Yoshiko 櫻井よしこ, Kenryoku no dōke 権力の道化 [The Fooleries of Power], Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 2004. Sano Shin’ichi 佐野眞一, Koizumi seiken: Hijō no saigetsu 小泉政権―非情の歳月 [The Koizumi Administration: The Ruthless Years], Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 2006. Sataka Makoto 佐高信, Koizumi Jun’ichirō no shisō 小泉純一郎の思想 [The Thought of Koizumi Junichirō], Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2001. Shimizu Masato 清水真人, Kantei shudō: Koizumi Jun’ichirō no kakumei 官邸主導―小 泉純一郎の革命 [Kantei Leadership: Koizumi Junichirō’s Revolution], Tokyo: Nihon keizai shinbunsha, 2005. Shinoda Tomohito 信田智人, Kantei gaikō: Seiji rīdāshippu no yukue 官邸外交：政治 リーダーシップの行方 [Kantei Diplomacy: New Directions of Political Leadership], Tokyo: Asahi shinbunsha, 2004. Shinoda Tomohito, Kantei no kenryoku 官邸の権力 [The Power of the Kantei], Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1996. Suzuki Tōichi 鈴木棟一, Koizumi seiken 50 no kōzai 小泉政権５０の功罪 [The Koizumi Administration: 50 Merits and Demerits], Tokyo: Daiyamondosha, 2006. Tachibana Takashi 立花隆, ’Tanaka Makiko’ kenkyū 「田中眞紀子」研究 [A Study of ‘Tanaka Makiko’], Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 2002. Tachibana Takashi, Iraku sensō, Nihon no unmei, Koizumi no unmei イラク戦争、日 本の運命、小泉の運命 [The Iraq War: The Fate of Japan, Koizumi’s Fate], Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2004. Takayasu Kensuke 高安健将, Shushō no kenryoku 首相の権力　日英比較からみる 政権党とのダイナミズム [The Prime Minister’s Power: Ruling Party Dynamism in Japan and England Compared], Tokyo: Sōbunsha, 2009. Takenaka Harukata 竹中治堅, Shushō shihai: Nihon seiji no henbō　首相支配―日本 政治の変貌 [Prime Minister Rule: The Changing Face of Japanese Politics], Tokyo: Chūōkōron-shinsha, 2006. Takenaka Heizō 竹中平蔵, Kōzō kaikaku no shinjitsu: Takenaka Heizō Daijin nisshi 構 造改革の真実：竹中平蔵大臣日誌 [The Truth about the Structural Reforms: The Ministerial Diaries of Takenaka Heizō], Tokyo: Nihon keizai shinbunsha, 2006. Tanaka Kazuaki, Itsuwari no min’eika: Dōro kōdan kaikaku 偽りの民営化―道路公団改 革 [The Bogus Privatization: The Reform of the Highway Public Corporations], Tokyo: Wakku 2004. Tōkyō daigaku shakai kagaku kenkyūjo 東京大学社会科学研究所 (The University of Tokyo Institute of Social Science) (ed.), Ushinawareta 10-nen o koete II: Koizumi kaikaku e no jidai 失われた１０年を超えてII　小泉改革への時代 [Beyond the ‘Lost Decade’ II: The Period Leading up to the Koizumi Reforms], Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 2006.

Bibliography  203 Toshikawa Takao 歳川孝雄, Nagatachō dōran: Koizumi seiken 700-nichi no shinsō 永田 町動乱―小泉政権７００日の深層 [Nagatachō in Turmoil: The Deep Stratum of the Koizumi Administration’s First 700 Days], Tokyo: Yūraku shuppansha, 2003. Uchida Kenzō 内田健三, et al., Kono seiji kūhaku) no jidai: Hashimoto, Obuchi, Mori soshite Koizumi seiken この政治空白の時代―橋本、小渕、森、そして小泉政 権 [This Age of Political Blank Space: The Hashimoto, Obuchi, Mori, and Koizumi Administrations], Tokyo: Bokutakusha, 2001. Uemura Toshiyuki 上村敏行 and Tanaka Hiroki 田中宏樹 (eds), ‘Koizumi kaikaku’ to wa nan datta no ka: Seisaku inobēshon e no tsugi naru shishin 「小泉改革」とは何だっ たのか―政策イノベーションへの次なる指針 [What were the Koizumi Reforms: The Next Roadmap for Policy Innovation], Tokyo: Nippon hyōronsha, 2006. Uesugi Takashi 上杉隆, Tanaka Makiko no onshū 田中眞紀子の恩讐 [The Loves and Hates of Tanaka Makiko], Tokyo: Shōgakkan, 2001. Uesugi Takashi, Tanaka Makiko no shōtai 田中眞紀子の正体 [Tanaka Makiko Behind the Cover], Tokyo: Sōshisha, 2002. Uesugi Takashi, Koizumi no shōri - Media no haiboku 小泉の勝利　メディアの敗北 [Koizumi’s Victory and the Defeat of the Media], Tokyo: Sōshisha, 2006. Watanabe Osamu 渡辺治, Kōzō kaikaku seiji no jidai: Koizumi seiken-ron 構造改革 政治の時代―小泉政権論 [The Age of Structural Reform Politics: A Theory of the Koizumi Administration], Tokyo: Kadensha, 2005. Yahata Yō 矢幡洋, Aidoru seijika shōkōgun: Shintarō, Makiko, Yasuo, Jun’ichirō ni hikareru shinri アイドル政治家症候群―慎太郎、眞紀子、康夫、純一郎に惹か れる心理 [Symptomography of the Pop-Idol Politician: The Psychology of Attraction to Shintarō, Makiko, Yasuo and Junichirō], Tokyo: Chūōkōron-shinsha, 2003. Yamaguchi Jirō 山口二郎, Naikaku seido 内閣制度 [The Cabinet System], Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 2007. Yayama Tarō 矢山太郎, Dōro kōdan min’eika no uchimaku: Naze kaikaku wa shippai shita no ka 道路公団民営化の内幕―なぜ改革は失敗したのか [The Inside Story of the Highway Public Corporation Privatization: The Reasons behind the Failure of the Reform], Tokyo: PHP shinsho, 2004. Yayama Tarō, Koizumi Jun’ichirō saishō-ron: Nihon saisei e no michisuji o tsuketa otoko 小泉純一郎宰相論　日本再生への道筋をつけた男 [On Chief Minister Koizumi Junichirō: The Man Who Paved the Way to Japan’s Regeneration], Tokyo: Kairyūsha, 2004. Yomiuri shinbun seijibu 読売新聞政治部 (Yomiuri Shimbun Politics Bureau), Koizumi kakumei: Jimintō wa ikinokoru ka 小泉革命―自民党は生き残るか [The Koizumi Revolution: Will the LDP Survive?], Tokyo: Chūōkōron-shinsha, 2001. Yomiuri shinbun seijibu (ed.), Jimintō o kowashita otoko: Koizumi seiken 1,500-nichi no shinjitsu 自民党を壊した男―小泉政権１５００日の真実 [The Man Who Crushed the LDP: The Truth about the Koizumi Administration’s 1,500 Days], Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 2005. Yomiuri shinbun seijibu (ed.), Gaikō o kenka ni shita otoko: Koizumi gaikō 2,000-nichi no shinjitsu 外交を喧嘩にした男―小泉外交２０００日の真実 [The Man Who Turned Diplomacy into Quarrel: The Truth about Koizumi Diplomacy’s 2,000 Days], Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 2006.

Index

1955 system 7, 12, 14, 18–19, 88, 93–4, 117, 119, 127–9, 138, 150–2, 165 9/11 terrorist attacks 5, 79, 81, 83–6, 93–4, 96 abductions of Japanese citizens by North Korea 5, 79, 106–12 Abe administration 73, 154–62 Abe Shinzō 99, 103, 107–8, 112, 149–51, 154–63 Advisory Council to Consider the Modalities of the Three Postal Businesses 64–7 Afghanistan 82, 86, 88, 94 ageing adjusted GDP 53–6 agencies 14–16, 20, 24, 77, 127–8, 131–3, 189, 195; see also Defence Agency; Postal Services Agency agenda-setting 27–9, 30–1, 33, 36–7, 128, 133–4, 156, 159, 163 agricultural cooperatives 14, 19 anti-Japanese protests in China 102–3 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law 21, 84–90, 116, 126 Aoki Mikio 14, 67 APEC summit meetings 80, 96, 100, 104 approval ratings see support, ratings Arendt, Hannah 146 Aritomi Keiji 66 Armitage, Richard 81, 84, 94 ASEAN 109, 113 Ashikaga Bank 51 Asō Tarō 38, 50, 60, 69, 149, 162–3 ‘assassins’ see carpetbagger candidates in 2005 election Association of Prefectural Governors 60–1 Azuma Shōji 11, 197

Baker, Howard 84 Bank of Japan 27, 48 bankisha 7 Belgium 152 Blair, Tony 94, 138, 141 bubble economy 48, 123 budget allocations 32, 35–7 budget cuts 15, 20, 33–6, 38, 57–63, 76, 135, 140 budget drafting 18, 20, 26, 29–30, 33–8, 59–60, 76–7, 140, 155 bureaucracy 33, 59, 63, 75, 80–1, 118–19, 152; government control over 4–5, 15–16, 28–9, 31, 36–7, 56, 63, 75, 77, 117, 124, 126, 128, 132–4, 137, 159, 163; patterns of interactions of government with 4, 15–16, 23–5, 21, 128, 162–3; scandals 131, 157; see also Iron Triangle; policy-making process; zoku lawmakers Bush, George W. 79, 83, 85, 88–9, 91–4, 109, 113, 116 Cabinet 15–17, 23–5, 28, 31, 37–8, 115, 127–8, 131–4, 159 Cabinet Office 17, 29, 132–3, 159 Cabinet Secretariat 16, 61, 67, 82, 85, 89–90, 107, 128, 131–4, 156–7, 159, 195 campaign funding see political financing carpetbagger candidates in 2005 election 3, 9, 22, 71–2, 135, 160–1, 165 CEFP (Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy) 4, 16, 26–38, 47, 53–60, 63, 67–8, 74–8, 93, 115–16, 132–4, 156, 159, 190, 191 Central Education Council 61 Challenge Again Support initiative 149–51

Index  205 chief cabinet secretary see Cabinet Secretariat China 5, 21, 79, 94–103, 106, 109, 113, 116, 143 chōsei see conciliation and coordination Chūikyō 18, 56 Clinton, Bill 109 Committee to Promote Priority Policies 38 conciliation and coordination 4, 23, 42, 61, 129, 137, 187 Conservative Party see New Conservative Party Constitution 21, 24, 90, 121–2, 159, 192 construction industry 19, 123; see also highway construction consumers 19, 195 Correspondence Delivery Law 24, 63–7, 72–3, 188 Council on the Privatization of the Four Highway-related Public Corporations 45; see also Promotion Committee for the Privatization of the Four Highwayrelated Corporations Crick, Bernard 146 Daiei 52 decision-making see policy-making process 76, 133–4, 137, 152–3 Defence Agency 85–7, 131, 151, 156 defence policy 21, 88, 93–4, 117, 119–24, 151–2, 156, 163 deferred tax assets 49–50 deliberative democracy 146–7, 152–3, 196 Democratic Party (1954–5) 12, 121 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) (1998-) 1–2, 10–11, 72, 86–7, 89–90, 125–6, 139–40, 143–4, 150, 163 Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) 125 Deposit Insurance Law 51 Diet 1–2, 7, 15, 17, 23–4, 42, 46–7, 66–70, 74–5, 81–3, 84, 86–7, 89–90, 126–7, 143–5, 162 prime minister question time 10, 139, 143–4; see also postal election; zoku lawmakers directives, prime-ministerial 15–16, 57–60, 63, 75, 163, 188 Dodge Line 121 Dokdo see Takeshima East China Sea gas fields 101, 103 economic policy 5, 18–21, 32–3, 76, 79, 93, 113–17, 119, 121–3, 133, 139, 142, 148, 150–1, 155–6, 190

electoral system reform 13, 129–30, 133, 145, 158–9, 187–8, 194 emotions in politics 3, 11, 106, 146, 197; see also pathos emperor 21, 192 European Union 109, 113 Expert Members’ Papers 28–9, 76, 190–1 expressway construction see highway construction factions (LDP) 4, 12–14, 16–17, 23–5, 127–8, 130, 133, 137, 147–9, 155, 158–9, 163, 188 farmers 19, 113–14, 122–3 FILP (Fiscal Investment and Loan Program) 39, 63 finance reform 4, 10, 20, 26, 28, 33–8, 155, 195; see also Trinity Reform Financial Crisis Response Council 50–1 financial institutions 20, 48–52, 75, 135, 191, 195 financial revitalization 20, 47–52, 135, 156, 191 Financial Services Agency 48, 132 ‘forces of resistance’ 3, 9–10, 16, 22, 26, 33, 67, 73, 125, 135, 137–8, 158–9 foreign policy 5, 21, 79–117, 121–5, 139, 142–3, 148, 151–2, 156, 163 Fox, Vicente 113–14 France 88, 92, 94, 109 FSA (Financial Services Agency) 48, 67 FTAs 101, 106, 113–16, 143, 193 Fujii Haruho 45–6 Fukuda Takeo 13 Fukuda Yasuo 50, 59, 82–3, 89, 106, 162–3 G8 summit meetings 80, 109, 155 GATT Uruguay Round 125 GDP 52; see also ageing adjusted GDP general elections 169; of 1979 145; of 1980 145; of 2005 3, 5, 9, 14, 22–3, 72–3, 76, 118, 125, 134–6, 145, 158, 160; see also Upper House elections Germany 88, 155 Giddens, Anthony 141 Gini coefficient 140–1 globalization 123, 147, 150, 152 Government Housing Loan Corporation 42 Gulf War see Persian Gulf War Habermas, Jürgen 146, 196 Hardt, Michael 147

206  Index Hashimoto faction 13–14, 69 Hashimoto Ryūtarō 13, 63–4, 96, 125, 131 Hashimoto structural reforms 9, 16–17, 26, 63–4, 131–3, 150, 159 Hatoyama Ichirō 121–2 Hatoyama Yukio 10–11, 163–4 health insurance 18, 20, 53, 56 healthcare system reform 10, 20–1, 52–6, 76, 142 highway construction 39–47 highway public corporations 4, 8–9, 20, 26, 39–47, 74–6, 155 Hiranuma Takeo 71–2 history textbook issue 79, 94–6, 98, 103–4 ‘Honebuto Policy’ 28–9, 37, 77, 157; for 2001 32–3, 39, 47; for 2003 58; for 2004 38, 60, 68; for 2005 55; for 2006 135, 156; for 2007 157 Honma Masaaki 27, 29, 53, 57–8 Horie Takafumi 140, 174 Hosokawa Morihiro 6–7, 12, 125, 129, 133 housing loans 42, 131 Hu Jintao 99–101, 103 ideas 193; politics of 118–19, 121–2, 124–6, 132, 138–9, 150, 190, 193–5; see also policy ideas Iijima Isao 187 Iio Jun 31 Ikeda Hayato 121–2, 142 image 6, 145, 154; of prime minister 6, 72, 137–8, 154–5; of party leader 130, 145 Imai Takashi 42–5, 75 Inaba Yamato 90 inclusion 141–2, 147, 152–3 income-doubling plan 121, 142 independent voters 9, 23, 72, 138, 142–3, 149–50, Industrial Revitalization Corporation 20, 51–2 inequality 139–41, 150–1, 163, 195–6 Inose Naoki 42–3, 46–7 Inoue Masamori 91 interest groups 14–15, 18, 33, 113, 117–18, 138 international contributions 84–5, 90–1, 93–4, 96–7, 123–4, 151–2, 156 Iraq 88–92, 123 Iraq Reconstruction Assistance Special Measures Law 21, 89–91, 116, 126, 143, 196 Iraq War 79 Iron Triangle 15–16, 18–19, 21, 23, 33, 117, 124

Ishihara Nobuteru 39, 45–6, 132, 191 Ishihara Shintarō 155 Iwata Kazumasa 29, 190 Japan Agricultural Cooperatives 14 Japan Business Federation see Keidanren Japan Disaster Relief Team 84, 87 Japan Doctors’ Political League 14 Japan Medical Association 14, 18, 52, 55 Japan National Oil Corporation 20, 42 Japan New Party 124 Japan Post 64–70, 72–3 Japan Renewal Party 124 Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration 121 Japan-US alliance 21, 79, 83, 88, 93–4, 115–16, 119–24, 142, 156 Japan-US Security Treaty 120–2, 124, 142 JEHDRA (Japan Expressway Holding and Debt Repayment Agency) 43–7 Jenkins, Charles 110–11 JHPC (Japan Highway Public Corporation) 45–6 Jiang Zemin 96–7, 99, 106 JSP (Japan Socialist Party) 12, 83, 121–2, 124–5 Kamei faction 13–14 Kamei Hisoaki 38 Kamei Shizuka 70–2, 135 Kamei Yoshiyuki 114 Kan Naoto 143 Kanebo 52 Kantei 3, 7, 15, 27, 83, 86, 187 Kanzaki Takenori 40, 91, 99 Kasumigaseki 28, 59, 81; see also bureaucracy Katagiri Sachio 45 Katayama Satsuki 71–2 Katayama Toranosuke 57, 66, 70 Katō faction 13 Katō Kōichi 22 Kawaguchi Yoriko 89, 99, 109, 114 Kawamoto Yūko 42–4 Kawasaki Jirō 56 Kawashima Yutaka 81 Keidanren 27, 42, 115 Kharrazi, Kamal 81 Kim Dae-jung 97–9 Kim Jong Il 106–7, 110 Kim Young Il 109–10 Kimura Takeshi 48–9 Kishi Hiroyuki 78 Kishi Nobusuke 121–2, 142 Kobayashi Kōki 71–2

Index  207 kōenkai 127, 148–9 Koga faction 149 Koga Makoto 42, 71, 86, 90 Koike Yūriko 71, 155 ‘Koizumi’s children’ 14 Kōmeitō see New Kōmeitō Party Kōmoto faction 13 Kōmura faction 149 Kōmura Masahiko 67, 70–1, 149 Kondō Takeshi 46 Kōno Yōhei 80 Kōnoike Yoshitada 132 Korea (South) 5, 21, 79, 94–106, 109, 113, 116, 143; see also North Korea Kōso Kenji 64, 191 Krauss, Ellis 148 Kuwait 91, 123 Kyushu Industrial Transportation Co., Ltd 52 LDP 12, 121–2, 124, 127–30, 135–6, 145, 148–50, 163; and Abe, 154–5, 157–8; and Koizumi 1–4, 6–7, 9–10, 13–14, 16, 22–5, 67, 70–2, 137, 148–50; behaviour patterns of politicians 18, 22–5, 160; General Council 22–3, 70, 90; party president 1, 13, 23–5, 67, 159–60; party presidential election 1, 7, 25, 64, 67, 80, 149, 151, 155, 162–3; role in policy-making process 15, 37–8, 70–1, 74, 137; see also factions (LDP); PARC (Policy Affairs Research Council); Policy Deliberation Commission; policy-making; postal election; zoku lawmakers leadership 3, 19, 189; and populism 3, 8, 16, 127; prime-ministerial 4–5, 15–17, 21, 26, 33, 52, 63, 67, 76, 113–16, 118, 125–9, 132–7, 139, 147, 188; see also party leader Lee Teng-Hui 94–5 Li Peng 95 Li Zhaoxing 98, 103 Lijphart, Arend 152 Livedoor affair 139–40, 142 logos 3, 11, 143–7, 153 Machimura Nobutaka 103 macroeconomic management indicators 29, 53–6, 76 Maehara Seiji 11, 139–40 Malaysia 113 Marco Polo Bridge 96 Maruyama Masao 147–8

Matsuda Masatake 42–6 media 3, 6–9, 12, 14, 17, 31, 42, 46, 82, 102, 130, 143, 158, 187–8, 191 medical treatment fees 18, 20, 52–6, 134–5 Mexico 113–15 Miki faction 16–17 Miki Takeo 16–17, 192, 194 Mikuriya Takashi 21 military contributions see international contributions minister of state for economic and fiscal policy 26–7, 29, 31–2, 35, 38, 73, 116, 132, 167 Ministry of Construction 18, 40 Ministry of Defence 151, 156; see also Defence Agency Ministry of Education 59, 61, 95 Ministry of Finance 18, 29–30, 32, 34–8, 51, 58–61 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 79–83, 91, 96 Ministry of Health 14, 18, 29, 54–6, 58–9, 61 Ministry of Home Affairs 30, 32, 58, 66 Ministry of Internal Affairs 60, 67, 75 Ministry of International Trade and Industry 32, 121–2, 133 Ministry of Post and Telecommunications 24, 64 Ministry of Transportation 18, 40, 42, 45–6, 75 Miyazawa Kiichi 29, 35, 189 Mori faction 13–14, 22, 149 Mori Yoshirō 22, 29, 34, 48, 71, 189 Mulgan, Aurelia George 134 Mycal 48 Nagai Yōnosuke 119 Nagatachō 71 Nakagawa Hidenao 38 Nakagawa Shōichi 101, 114 Nakamura Hideo 42–3 Nakasone faction 16–17 Nakasone Hirofumi 71 Nakasone Yasuhiro 15–17, 188, 192, 194 Nakayama Kyōko 107 Negri, Antonio 147 neoclassical economics 32, 119, 139; see also neoliberalism neoliberalism 4, 19–21, 32–3, 63, 73, 76, 115–17, 119, 123–6, 138–9, 140–1, 155 New Conservative Party 13, 40 New Frontier Party 124–5 New Kōmei(tō) 13, 40, 72 86, 91, 99 New Party Nippon 72

208  Index newspapers 7–8, 47, 134, 157, 170–1, 187 Nikai faction 149 Nikai Toshihiro 71 Nikkei stock average 49–50 Nishida Mamoru 90 Noda Seiko 71 Noda Takeshi 40 Nogami Yōshiji 82 Nonaka Hiromu 14, 86, 90 nonperforming loans 29, 47–52, Norota Hōsei 72, 90 North Korea 5, 79, 99, 154 Nukaga Fukushirō 38, 163 Obuchi Keizō 84, 94, 125 Ōgi Chikage 40, 45 Ōhira Masayoshi 145 Okada Katsuya 144, 196 Okinawa 101 Oku Katsuhiko 91 Okuda Hiroshi 27, 35 Ōmori Keiji 85, 90 Ōtake Hideo 8 Otsuji Hidehisa 54–5 Ōya Eiko 42–3 Ozawa Ichirō 124, 164, 189 PARC (Policy Affairs Research Council) 15, 38, 45, 50, 55, 61, 68–70, 127, 149; see also LDP; Policy Deliberation Commission party leader 11, 16, 69, 71, 127, 130–1, 134–6, 145; see also LDP, party president party manifesto 128, 136 pathos 3–4, 6, 11–12, 74, 116–17, 137, 139, 143–8, 158, 162 patronage politics 122–4, 129, 147 Pekkanen, Robert 148 pensions 20–1, 30, 52, 109, 144, 157 People’s New Party 71–2 Persian Gulf War (1991) 84, 87–8, 94, 123 Philippines 99, 113 PKO (Peacekeeping Operations) 87; see also United Nations policy communities 27, 29–30 Policy Deliberation Commission 70 policy ideas 27, 32–3, 56–7, 75, 159, 194; see also ideas, politics of policy-making process 3–5, 9, 12–18, 26, 33, 76–8, 128, 132–4, 137, 142, 152–3; see also LDP: role in policymaking process; leadership; ruling party review

political financing 13, 15, 118, 127, 129–31, 158–9 populism 3, 6–9, 11–12, 16, 72, 83, 116–17, 125, 127, 130, 137–9, 142–3, 145–6, 154, 158 postal election see general election, of 2005 postal reform 1–5, 9–10, 15, 20, 22–4, 47, 63–77, 116, 134, 145, 155, 191 Postal Services Agency 64 Preparatory Office for Postal Privatization 67–8, 75, 133 press briefings (Koizumi) 1–2, 7–8, 10, 84, 86, 88, 104, 187 prime minister 13, 16, 24; formal powers 24, 68, 70, 136, 161; power resources 16–18, 25, 76–8, 132–3, 157, 158–62, 189; see also directives; image, of prime minister; Kantei; leadership, prime-ministerial Prime Minister’s Office (Sōrifu) 128 prime minister’s official residence see Kantei privatization 4–5, 8–9, 15, 10, 20, 26, 29, 74–6, 135, 155, 191, 195; see also postal privatization; public highway corporations Project Team for Emergency Strategy for the Financial Sector 48 Promotion Committee for the Privatization of the Four Highway-related Corporations 42–7, 75 public corporations 20, 39; see also privatization Public works spending 15, 18–20, 33–6, 52, 61, 76, 123, 139 Putnam, Robert 151 Pyongyang Declaration 106, 110–11 rationality 11–12, 147–8, 189, 196; see also logos Reagan, Ronald 140 ‘rebel’ lawmakers 135–6, 160–1; in 2005 election 3, 9, 71–3, 135, 158, 160 Recruit scandal 129 redistribution 18, 20, 93, 122, 139–40, 151–2, 163, 190 Resolution and Collection Corporation 51–2 Resona 20, 50–1 Roh Moo-hyun 100–1, 104 ruling party review 15–16, 24, 37, 68, 74, 188 Russia 81, 88, 99, 109

Index  209 Samawah, Iraq 91–2, 196 Satō Eisaku 3 Satō Toshiki 196 Satō Yukari 71–2 SDF (Self-Defence Forces) 79, 84–94, 96, 122, 124, 126, 143–4, 151, 156, 163, 196 security alliance see Japan-US alliance Security Council of Japan 83, 86, 88, 155 security policy see defence policy Sekō Hiroshige 155 Self-Defence Forces Law 85 Shenyang incident 99 Shii Kazuo 143 Shimamura Yoshinobu 24, 71, 160 Shinoda Tomohito 116 Shiozaki Yasuhisa 156 SIASJ Law 84, 87–8 Singapore 113–14 Six-Party Talks 109–12 Social and Local Contribution Funds 70 social exclusion 140–2, 147, 152 social inclusion see inclusion social security 4–5, 20, 30, 38, 52–5, 61, 156 Social Security Council 56 Socialist Party see JSP Sodaemun Independence Park 97 Soga Hitomi 108, 110 South Korea see Korea (South) Soviet Union 121, 123 special company (tokushu kaisha) 40 special deregulation zones 21, 132–3 special post office masters 3, 14, 64, 191 speech 146; Abe’s patterns of 158; Koizumi’s patterns of 7, 9–12, 143, 158; see also wanfurēzu strategic coherence 5, 21, 47, 73–8, 79, 93–4, 106, 112–13, 115–17, 139, 147 structural reforms 3–4, 15–16, 19–21, 26, 28–9, 33, 39, 74, 76, 83, 117, 123–5, 132, 139, 142, 148, 157; see also financial reform; healthcare reform; highway public corporations; postal privatization; privatization subsidies 19, 21, 57–63, 76, 138–9; to compulsory education 61–3; to political parties 131, 158 Suga Yoshihide 149 support: public 3, 6, 9, 12–13, 16–17, 23, 25, 71–2, 116–17, 122–3, 125, 133, 138–9, 154, 157–8, 161–2; ratings 6, 7, 158, 164, 170–1, 189 Suzuki Muneo 81–3 Switzerland 152

tabloid magazines 8, 158, 187 Tahara Sōichirō 7 Taiju 14; see also special post office masters Takahashi Yōichi 77 Takebe Tsutomu 71 Takenaka Harukata 130 Takenaka Heizō 27, 29, 32, 34, 38, 48–50, 54, 58, 67–9, 73, 75–7, 116, 132, 161, 188, 190–1 Takeshima 101–4 Tanaka faction 13, 194 Tanaka Hitoshi 107–8, 110, 112 Tanaka Kakuei 13, 15, 17, 80, 188, 194 Tanaka Kazuaki 42–4, 46–7 Tanaka Makiko 22, 80–3, 85 Tanaka Naoki 64 Tanigaki faction 149 Tanigaki Sadakazu 38, 59–60, 151 tax allocations 18–19, 21, 30, 57–8, 60 tax cuts 29–30 tax increases 38 tax revenue source transfers 21, 30, 32, 57–63, 76 television 7–10, 83, 125, 158, 187 terrorism 84–8, in Iraq 91–2; see also 9/11 terrorist attacks; Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law Thatcher, Margaret 20–1, 138, 140 Tikrit, Iraq 91 time horizon: of politicians 22–5, 68, 150, 160, 189 Toyota 27 Trinity Reform 4, 21, 26, 30, 32, 38, 57–63, 76, 156 Tsujimoto Kiyomi 83 ‘twisted Diet’ 162 UK 20–1, 31, 81, 94, 138, 140, 149, 152 United Nations 87, 152; General Assembly 109; Security Council 84, 88–9, 94, 102, 110, 112; see also PKO (Peacekeeping Operations) United States 5, 17, 21, 48, 50, 79, 81, 83–5, 88–9, 92–5, 108–9, 113, 115–17, 140, 152; see also Japan-US Alliance; Japan-US Security Treaty; US military bases Uotsuri Island 101 Upper House Elections: of 2001 64; of 2004 10, 68; of 2007 157 US military bases 84, 93 US-Japan Security Treaty see Japan-US Security Treaty

210  Index Ushio Jirō 27, 35 wanfurēzu (one-phrase) 3, 7, 9, 158, 166 Wang Yi 95–6 Watanuki Tamisuke 69, 71–2 Weber, Max 148 ‘wide show politics’ 83, 143; see also television women 13, 71, 80 WTO 95, 113 Wu Yi 103 Yabunaka Mitoji 109–10 Yamaguchi Jirō 189 Yamamoto Yūji 149 Yamato Transport 66 Yanagisawa Hakuo 38, 48 Yasukuni Shrine 21, 79, 95–106, 116, 143, 148, 192, 195

Yokomichi Takahiro 87 Yokota Megumi 108, 111 Yokota Shigeru 108 Yosano Kaoru 38, 55, 61, 69–70 Yoshida Doctrine 121–2 Yoshida Shigeru 3, 121 Yoshikawa Hiroshi 27, 29, 32, 35, 38 Yoshino Naoyuki 68 Zentoku 64; see also special post office masters zoku lawmakers 4, 8, 12, 14–16, 26, 28, 31, 56, 113, 118, 122, 124, 126–8, 136– 7, 148, 156, 188–9; and LDP factions 23, 25; Construction 14; Education 61; Foreign Policy 81; Health, Welfare and Labour 18, 29, 52, 55–6; Highway 40–2, 44, 45–7, 74–5; Posts 14, 64, 66, 68; see also Iron Triangle