KINGS OR
PEOPLE Power and the Mandate
to
Rule
REINHARD BENDIX
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS Berkeley
Los Angeles
London
University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University of California Press, Ltd. London, England Copyright ©
1978 by
The Regents of the University of California
1980 978-0-520-04090-8
First Paperback Prin ting ISBN
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number:
72-85525
Printed in the United States of America
For life to be large and full, it must con tain ihe care 0/ the past and of the future in every passzng moment of the present.
Joseph Conrad, Nostromo
Contents
x
LIST OF MAPS
Xl
PREFACE
1.
3
INTRODUCTION
Part I: THE AUTHORITY OF KINGS 2.
SACRED AND SECULAR FOUNDATIONS OF KINGSHIP
21
Germanic t raditions and Christian consecration Nomadic tribes , religious prophecy, and the patriarchal Cal i phate in Islam Ancestors, k i n gs, and officials i n ancie n t China Conclusion
3.
JAPAN
61 Rival clans and i mperial au thority Hou sehold and military government as the bas i s of aristocracy
4.
RUSSIA
88 The rise of the Muscovite dynasty Princes, boya rs, and tsarist servi tors
5.
IMPERIAL GERMANY AND PRUSSIA Emperors, Ge rma n princes , and papal authority VII
128
VllI
CONTENTS From the B ra ndenburg electorate to the kingdom of Prus si a From independent knights to landed army o fficers
6.
ENGLAND
176 Tribes, conquests, and kings From the king's companions to pa rliament
7.
KINGSHIP AND ARISTOCRACY AS A TYPE OF RULE
218
The authority of kings
Aristocratic society Re prese ntation
Part II: TOWARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE 8.
TRANSFORMATIONS OF WESTERN EUROPEAN SOCIETIES IN T HE SIXTEENTH CENTURY
247
Mobilization Preconditions Overseas e x pan sion and its domestic correlates Intellectual mobilization in England Authority reconsti tuted: A framework for study
9.
KINGS AND PEOPLE IN ENGLAND
273
The E n glish Reformation a nd the re ign of Queen Elizabeth Re ference societies : S panish dominance a nd Catholic danger Puritans, lawye rs, and "the co u ntry" Consent, equality, and law
lO. TOWARD THE NATION-STATE: FRANCE Absol utist rule and entrenched privilege Fre nch reactions to En gland and America Write rs,
parlementaires,
An equality of rights
and Freemasons
321
CONTENTS
IX
378
11. NATION-BUILDING: GERMANY T h e Holy Roman Empir e : Provincialism and intellectual mobilization
Cou rt soc iet y and the cultural id e ntity of commoners A revolution from above? Liberty at the kin g s co m mand '
12. NAT I ON BUI LD IN G : JAPAN
431
-
T he Toku ga wa s hogu n ate Reference societies and national i den ti t y
The restoration movement: The em e rgen c e of pu blic deba t e
A r evolutio n under oligarchic leadersh i p
13. NATION- B UI L DIN G : RUSSIA
491
Autocratic traditions, We st e rn models, and nalive
resp on ses The reign of Peter I and its legacies Peter III and Catherine II
Fo rei gn policy, milita r is m , and education
Autocratic reforms and civil society Intellectual opposition
as
social responsibility
Revol u t io n and the mandate to rule
14. FROM ROYAL AUTHORITY TO POPULAR MANDATE: TWENTIETH-CENTURY PERSPECTIVES
582
The Chinese revolution Arab nationalism and socialism A summary Concluding reflections
NOTES
605
GLOSSARY
669
INDEX
677
Maps 1.
Barbarian I n vasions o f the Fifth Century A.D. 2. Ex pansion o f Islam, 630-732 3. Japan in 900 A.D. 4 . Russia in the Kievan Period 5 . Russia, Lithuania, and the Mongols in t h e Fifteenth Centu ry 6 . Europe , 800-900: Political Divisions and Invasions 7. The H anseatic League and the Teutonic Knights Brandenburg-Prussia, 1440-1806 8. 9. Dominions of Henry I I , 1154-1189 France from the Eleventh to the Fourteenth Century 10. Tokugawa, Satsuma, Choshu, and Tosa Domains II. in 1664 12. Expansion of Russia, 1462-1796
x
24 42 64 91 109
13 2 148 159 190
32 2 434 510
Preface The world in which we live has its roots far back in history, and as a world power America must come to terms with countries which were formed in their present mold long before the American. revolution . All those to whom an explo ration of this historical backgro u n d will appeal probably share with me an i mmed iate empathy with the anguish of nation -building around the world . This book is a study of what that an guish meant in times past when countries were first developing their political institutions and w hen they turned more recently from royal authority to a popular mandate. The problems of develo pi n g such in stitutions are formidable, then as well as now . A scholarly concern with these problems must touch on man y subjects in social strati fication , re ligion , political sociology, and the history of ideas , and the book treats these and related themes in their s pecific historical contexts. This interpretive work is addressed not only to studen ts of political development but also to the general reader who is inte re sted in a large view of history. T hat reader is provided with sufficient detail and an notation so that the man y diverse contexts with which this study deals can be understood. A thematic outline o f the book is presented on the first pages of the intro duction, which deals as well with t he reasons for my approach to historical sociology. I acknowledge with thanks the research assistance of Theodore Bogacz, Audrey Ichinose, a nd Neda Tomasovich . The maps were pre pared by my wife, Jane Bendix. The long process of revision and editing was much facilitated by my wife, my sons Joh n and Erik Bendix, and by Dr. James Hughes who hel ped pre pare the final draft. In addition, I thank several colleagues for their critique of parts of this study: Professor Robert Darnton, Princeton University; the late Professor Lloyd Fallers, University of Chicago; Professor Toru Haga, University of Tokyo; Pro fessors Elbaki Hermassi, David Keightley, and Martin Malia, University of California, Berkeley; Professor David Riesman , Harvard University; Professor S. Frederick Starr, Executive Director, Kennan Institute of Xl
PREFACE
Xli
Russian Studies, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washi n gton , D. C . ; and Pro fessor Lawrence Stone, Princeton Unive r s ity. T h e seco n d part of t h e book w a s first sketched d u ri n g a leave o f absence (1972/73) a t t h e I n stitute for Advanced Study, Princeton, under G rant GS -31370X
of t h e
N atio nal Science Fou n d atio n . The
m a n u s c r i pt
was com pleted at the Wood row Wilso n Inte rnational Ce nte r for Schol ars, S mith son ian I n stitutio n, Washi n gton, D.C. T h i s wor k was facilitated by
a
fellowshi p from the Center and a Gugge n h e i m fellowsh i p fOT 19751
76. The s u p port received ove r m a n y years from the Un iversity of Cal i fornia , Be rkeley,
and
speci fically fro m the I n stitutes of I n d ustrial Re
been of great a ssi sta n c e A few technical details may be added. W he n k in gs or oth e r rulers are mentioned, the years stated in paren these s refer to their reigns, un less b (or n) a nd d( i ed) have been added . (Some re ig ns be ga n during t h e minority of the ruler.) The years added t o the names of persons other than rulers indicate their l i fe spa n . Where it seemed appropriate, I h ave repeated dates mentioned earlier in order to avoid con fusion and aid the reader's sense of chronology. A glossary of terms, maps and illus trations, and a detailed name- and subject-index should facilitate the use of this book . In a work of this kind, footnotes present a p roble m. My debt to the scholarly work of others has been acknowledged wher ever a ppropriate, but I have not footnoted general information. Some explanatory notes have been inserted in the text, but all footnotes and specialized comments ( for example, o n terminology) are placed at the end of the book. In this way, the general reader has an uncluttered page while the student can find specialized information without difficulty. Concerning the larger design of the study, my footnotes probably err on the side of parsimony, since I have learned much more from the works of Max Weber, Otto H intze , and other com parativists than my sparse re ferences indicate. Occasionally, I h ave added references to fur ther readin gs. The footnotes to each chapter contain full publication refe rences for every book or article cited in that chapter. Accordingly, in the in terest of saving space, a bibliography of all references cited has not been added to the volume. Finally, I thank my many colleagues at the University of Cali fornia, Berkeley, who have provided me with their intellectual fellowship and friendship for over a quarter of a century. lation s and o f I nte rnation al Studies at Berkeley, has .
Goldern-Hasliberg August 1976
Reinhard Bendix
KINGS or
PEOPLE
INTRODUCTION
THIS Its
first part deals
with the
BOOK is about
authority
.
for m atio n of structu res of authority i n me
the transformation of these begi nning i n the sixteenth centu ry. A concludin g c h apter d eals more br ie fl y with the p rob le ms of state-buildin g in the twen tieth century.* This stud y of the historical foundations of authority begins in Part 1 with a discussion of the religious bases of royal authority in Western , Islamic, and Chinese civilizations. Subsequent chapters deal with king ship and aristocracy i n Japan, Russia, Im perial Germany and Prussia, and England, from roughly 500 A.D. to the sixteenth century. Kin gs have ruled h u man communities from the beginning of re corded history. Through the rule of kingship, political traditions were established which have i nfluenced mankind to the present. The English parliament, German political fragmentation , or Russian autocracy long antedate the development of modern societies. Every country develops its own culture and social structure, but once the basic pattern of insti tutions is formed under the circumstances of early kingship, it is difficult to change. In order to u nderstand the modern world, one must take into account the traditional practices of a nation and their unique elab orations. Japan, Russia, Germany, and England have always been very di fferent societies, and the formation of their political traditions helps to ex plain these differences. At the same time, tech nical innovations (such as printing or th e modern com puter) can spread to every cou ntry, just as social and eco nomic developments (such as European overseas ex pansion in the six teent h century or the i ndustrial revolutions of the eighteenth and nine teenth centuries) cut across national lines. However, as each country encounters swee ping developments of technology and social change, it must ada pt them to its own history and long-established practices. dieval history. Its seco n d p a rt deals with structu res
*
An early version of this chapter was first published under the tide "The Mandate
to Rule: An Introduction," Social Forces 55 (December, 1976): 242-56.
3
INTRODUCTION
4
This study combines an u n derstanding o f a country's h i storica l p a r t i c ul ari ty with its partic i pation in a ge n e ral movement of h i s tory
.
T he principle of hered itary monarchy was challenged o n l y so m e two centuries ago. Since the n , gover n m ents in one country a fter another have ru led their comm u n ities i n the n a m e of the peo p l e . Part
2
o f this
study deals w i th the transformation of a u t ho rity as the rule o f ki n gs was re placed by gove rnments o f the peo ple . I n o u r time , not only democra cies but m i l itary regi mes, d ictatorshi ps, and e ve n co nstitu tional m o n arch ies a re legi tim ized b y clai m s of po pular m andate. Indee d , othe r ways o f j us t i fy i n g a u t hority have beco me i nconceivable. T h e lead e rs a n d ideas o f t h i s great movement t o wa r d a po p u l a r mand ate as it h a s de velo ped fro m the E n glish and French revolutio n s of the seve n tee n t h and eighteenth centuries t o t h e prese n t a re the subject o f Pa rt 2.
En gland France, Ge rma n y , J a pan, and Russia a r e tod a y a m o n g the ,
most i nd ust r i a li z ed nation s of the wo r l d . Hi stor i c a ll y , these countries
re present successive t u rn i ng poi nt s fro m the medieval to the modern world. Each d e velopm ent -th e revolutio ns of se venteenth c ent u r y En gla n d , t he Fre n c h rev o l u tion the E n g li s h industria l revo lutio n , the re -
,
form movements in Germany and Japan during the nin e tee nt h century , a n d the Bolshevik revolutio n in the twe ntieth centu ry-had an effect on the ne xt d e ve lo p m e n t and on the r e s t of the world. To ge t he r they
pr ov i d e a scenario of the "modern revol ution."
My study advances five main themes:
1. The autho rity of kings d e pended o n re li gio u s sanction as well as on internal and extern al struggles for power. In the course of long and varied histories, royal authority was c e nt ralize d , ex p and ed and even tu ally d e stroye d. From ancient ti m es, k i n gs h i p was constituted in dive r ,
ge n t ways, and the unity or integration of traditional societies see m s la rge l y mythical. Altho u g h kingship w a s sacrosanct a n d e nd ured fo r l o n g periods, the authority of any one kin g was always in j eo p ardy and had to be manifested contin uously to remain effective . 2. Kin gs governed their realm with the aid of magnates or notables to whom they delegated auth ority Aristocratic govern ance depended .
on the terms and circumstances o f that delegation , whic h over time
helped to form the character of the aristoc racy. Though royal su prem acy and aristocratic dependence was the norm, the centralization and decentralization of authority varied i n practice. If it was true o f kings that th e y delegated authority but w ished to control its exercise, it was tr ue of aristocrats that they acce pted such au tho r i ty but sough t to make it autonomous. This tension between central authority and local gov ernment m ust
be continually managed
but is never resolved. Part I of
this book co n t ains four case studies of this "manage ment" over time.
3. A uthority in the name of the peo ple only gradually became an alternative to the authority of kin gs. Established practices of royal au-
INTROD UCTION
5
thority were u ndermined by the commercialization of land and govern ment offices, and by the i ncreasing role of ed ucated commoners in high places. The countries considered here already had fully formed political structures by the time they advanced to popular sovereignty Each of the countries had several educated elites which hoped to catch u p with developments abroad t h rough state action and intellectual mobilization. Under these conditions, specific ed ucated elites advanced ideas con cerning the reconstitution of authority in the name of the people 4. The countries examined here undertook the reconstitution of authority i n their early modern periods . Authority i n the name of the people has proven as varied in practice as the authority of kings I n each case, the institutionalization of popular sovereignty showed the effects of the way in wh ich the authority of kings was left beh ind. In tu rn, each institutionalization created a model which other countries adapted for their own ends. 5. England, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, and China have par ticipated in a worldwide movement of nationalism and of government by popular mandate, though each country has done so in its own way . My account attempts to show that nationalis m has become a universal condition in our world because the sense of backwardness in one's own country has led to ever new encounters with the "advanced model" or development of another country. I wish to show that the problems faced by each modernizing country were largely unique. Even the countries which had been buildin g their political institutions for centu ries had to cope with unprecedented problems in the process of modernization. Today, new states looking for analogues or precedents in other coun tries have more models to choose from than ever before, but their his tories and the earlier development of other countries have hardly pre pared them for the tasks o f state building 1 As the concluding chapter suggests, this process of historical models and their demonstration ef fects continues to the present, and I cannot see an end to its further ramifications. .
.
.
-
THE
.
AUTHOR ITY OF KINGS
The major societies of the world before the era of Euro pean ex pansion overseas (roughly before 1500) had some features in common. More than 80 percent of the people lived on the land, close to the sub sistence level. Population was checked by frequent wars and e pidemics but nevertheless increased slowly. There was some development of tech nology, of urban centers with specialized crafts, and of a con siderable military establishment. The population generally produced at a level which allowed rulers to maintain relatively large political units by means of ex ploitation and taxation.2 These societies were marked by a concen-
Frederick I Barbarossa, Henry VI, and Frederick of Swabia in
1185
The central figu re, Freder ick I, Holy Roman Em peror o f the Ger man Nation from 1152 to 1190, holds the im perial staff and globe.
The globe or orb is surmounted by a cross whic h symbolizes the domination of Christianity over the world. These insignia were used by the German e m pe rors from 936 until t he dissolution of the em pire in 1806. Frederick's son Hen ry, who succeeded him in 1 190, wears an unadorned crown but is placed to the emperor's right. A second son, Frederick Duke o f Swa bia, who was not in the line of succession, wears only a n embroidered cap. (Forschungsin
stitut
fUr Kunstgeschichte, Bildarchiv Photo Marburg)
INTRODUCTION
7
tration of wealth, status,. and authority in the hands of the governing class, which comprised between .1 or 2 percent of the population but appropriated at least o ne-half of the society's income above bare sub sistence . 3 To us, widesp read inequality may suggest unremitting coer cion and continuous, l atent rebellion. But for many centuries , the vast mass of people acquiesced in the established order out of religious awe , a desire for peace and secu rity, and the inability to unite in a com mon political action.4 In those earlier times, the rule of the privileged few appeared to the many as if it were a force of natu re; it was to be enjoyed when it was benign and endured when it was not. And where wars and feuds were common, rulers could protect and thus benefit the people over whom they ruled. For millennia, rule rs rested their claims on divine sanction; other grounds of rule such as tradition or law also required and received their warrant from the divine. A deity or spirit was believed to sanctify rule, and the rights of the ruler could not be questioned, lest sacrilege jeop ardize the welfare of all. B ut since the authority of kings required holy sanction, based on the prevailing religious institutions, consecration of rule entailed political liabilities in the relations between the king and the religious functionaries . The exercise of royal authority also depended on the balance of power among the membe rs and most important retainers of the royal house. In theory, the ruler owned the whole realm, but in practice the territorial possessions of the royal house were the main source of rev enue and of favors in peace and war. These possessions were scattered, and the realm as a whole was governed through various forms of del egated authority. Rulers were typically torn between the need to dele gate authority and the desire not to lose it. They were frequently driven to a ppeal to the personal loyalty or consecrated obligation of those to whom they had delegated authority in order to buttress their own po sition. The internal balance o f forces was also influenced by alliances or conflicts with outside powers, a condition greatly a ffected in early times by the absence of stable, clearly defined frontiers . All three factors-religious sanction of royal authority, internal contentions over the distribution of authority, and intrusion of outside powers-helped to shape medieval governance. Until the revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Euro pean rulers assum ed that the general population would quietly al low itself to be ruled. Popular u prisings were regarded as violating the divine order and were suppressed by force. Kings, aristocrats, and mag nates of the church made claims against one another. In these conflicts, each manipulated appeals to the transcendent powers without fear of seriously underm ining the exclusive hold on authority they all enjoyed. The general populace was excluded from the political arena. If some
INTRODUCTION
8
questioned this practice, it was without m uch e ffect. However, thi s ques tioning spread in the early modern pe riod, first in the religious sphere during the Re formation and subsequently in the political sphere in the seventeenth and eighteenth ce ntu ries. The good fortune of the few be came a matter of controversy. In The Social Contract, Rousseau wrote that "the strongest are still never sufficiently strong to ensure them continual mastership un less they find means o f transformin g force into right, and obedience into duty. 5 In France during the eighteenth century, it be came more and more difficult for people to distingu ish authority from oppression , or right from might. The old religious appeals lost their force; secular appeals on behal f of the status quo we re of little avail. The right to rule by and for the few had come into doubt. Thro u ghout history, the weak had appealed to the deities or other higher powers to bear witness to their suffering On occasion they had challenged the strong to l ive up to their own pronou ncements. But with the Reformation, the persuasiveness of the ruler's old appeal to divine sanction was irreparably weakened. And since the French revolution, " the right to rule has come to de pend increasingly on a mandate of the people. ,
"
.
AUTHORITY I N THE N A ME O F T HE PEOPLE The French revolution marked the end of an era in which the ruling few monopolized political life. Since 1789, political transactions have become increasingly public. In modern society, unless measures are taken to preve nt it, rulers and ruled alike must advance their claims in public and hence with an eye to the public reactions that are likely to follow. Vox populi, vox dei. The Western idea of authority in the name of the people owes something to classical Greek and Roman ideas of what it means to be a citizen in the community. At one time, the Greek city-state and the Ro man republic practiced a type of governance in which all male heads of households actively participated in political decision-making for the en tire community. This has appealed strongly to the Western imagination . Despite its known association with oligarchic rule, slavery, a n d conquest, and despite the many centuries during which it lost all political signifi cance, the classical idea of citizenship helped to inspire the leaders of the French revol ution. The idea of popular sovereignty also has roots in the role which consent played in Germanic tribes. This role became known to Roman observers in the first century A.D. The tribes were governed by chieftains who ruled with the aid of a council of elders. Such chieftains succeeded one another on the basis of hered itary claims, provided that their acces sion to the throne was confirmed through an act of acclamation by the leading warriors of the tribe . Durin g the fourth and fifth centuries A.D.,
INTRODUCTION
9
these practices affected the Roman em pire directly: Successive em perors were elevated to the im perial throne by the acclamation of frontier ar mies largely composed of Germanic warriors. As the settlement of Ger manic tribes in the Western p£l.rts of the Roman em pire became stabi lized, the relation between the ruler and his warriors was transformed into the contractual obligations between lord and vassal. Hence, the idea of a contract between rulers and ruled has very early antecedents . The idea of popular mandate owes something to the Christian belie f that all men are equal before God . This idea makes rulers and ruled alike part of one co m m u n ity As baptized members of the churc h , all have access to the sacraments, and all are subject to divine law . Such eq uality prevailed in the early Christian com m u n ities but declined dur ing the long supremacy of the Catholic church, .for the pope and through him the whole hierarchy of the priesthood stood in the direct line of a postolic successio n. The church alone was the consecrated vessel of d ivine grace. With the coming of the Reformation , the beliefs of early Christianity were revived, and emphasis shifted from the hierarchic con ception of the church to one centering on the B ible as the repository of the divine word . Thus, the Protestant idea emerged that every bel iever stands in direct relation to God . Some Protestant denominations came to redefine the Christian community as a "brotherhood of all believers," in which responsibility for spiritual welfare was shared alike by all bap tized members of the congregation . Authority in the name of the people also came t o the fore in the municipal communities of Western Europe in the twel fth and thirteenth centuries. However, the m ajor modern development of pop ular man date dates from the English and French revolutions i n the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The idea of popular sovereignty has had its greatest impact since that time. Participation by the public in national affairs has widened ; the earlier dichotomy between rulers and ruled has become blurred. Noble birth and inherited wealth have ceased to guar antee authority. At the same time, nation-states have emerged with fron tiers that are clearly defi ned and relatively stable. .
THE GREAT SOCIAL AND INTELLECTUAL TRANSFORMATION The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries witne ssed a great transfor mation of European societies . Preconditions of this transformation date back to the growth of towns in the tenth to twelfth centuries, when urban communities developed their economies rapidly and achieved political autonomy. But the turn from the authority of k ings to government by popular mandate had its more immediate social and intellectual ante cedents in the decades around 1500.
10
INTRODUCTION
The history of population provides a sim ple index. In the period between 1000 and 1340 A.D., the population of Europe more than dou bled, reaching at least 80 million. During the next century and a half wars, famines, and especially e pidemics struck intermittently with such severity that by 1500 the total European population was still 80 million . Thereafter, the causes of catastrophic death remained but became less virulent, with the worst type of epidemic , the plague , disappearing in the seventeenth century. By 1600 Europe probably had 105 miIIion and by 1700 about 115 miIIion people . The growth of population was a main factor in the commercialization of land, labor, and capital, the rapid develo pment of towns , and European expansion overseas . Be fore 1500, authority and inequality were lin ked . Men of wealth and noble birth exercised the functions of government. They had a monopoly over political matters which was challenged in Western Eu rope only by the church . The people provided services, and if they re belled they were put in their place. After 1500, however, this rigid bond between authority and inequality loosened. Commoners made inroads on the bastions of privilege through trade, the secularization of learning, and the rise of secular professions in government employment. It be came more difficult to contain these social and economic changes in the old political framework after the great reformers challenged the spiri tual monopoly of the Catholic church, for that challenge em phasized the spiritual worth of the individual and hence made it easier to q uestion political monopolies which denied the rights of man. The decades around 1500 witnessed not only economic growth, European expansion overseas, and the Reformation; they also witnessed the rise of Humanism, the invention of printing, and the early devel opment of modern science. The number of ed ucated people increased, as did the number of those whose livelihood depended on teaching, writing, or some other intellectual vocation. The stage was set for a rapid diffusion of ideas. In one country after another, intellectual elites formulated ideas in conscious response to what they learned from abroad. The belief in gov ernment in the name of the people spread during and after the sev e nteenth century. As countries achieved a breakthrough to authority by po pular mandate, they provided models which were imitated, trans formed, or rejected by the latecomers to the process of nation-building. WHAT IS MODERN I ZATION? It is easiest to de fine modernization as a breakdown of the ideal typical traditional order: Authority loses its sanctity, monarch y declines, hierarchical social order is disrupted . Secular authority, rule in the name of the people, and an equalitarian ethos are typical attributes of modern
INTRODUCTION
1 1
socie t y. The eigh teent h -c e n t u r y writers who re flected o n this transfor mation were among the first to a rt icu l ate the co n tra st between tradition and modern it y . 6 To the t heorists of t he day , the division of labor appe a red a s a ke y factor in this transformation. I n his Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767), Adam Fer gu son attribu ted the progress of a people to the sub division of tasks; his d i s cussio n form ulated a way of looking a t modern societ y which has since beco me co mmon place. The d ivision of labor in creases the pro d uctiv i ty o f those who speci a lize , and hence the wealth of their country. Private ends and l ack of consc io u s concern for public we l fare i ronic ally yield public benefits. Ferguson portrayed society as divided i n to a leis ured r uli n g m i nor ity a n d a working majo r it y . Members of the higher class are bound to no task and are free to follow their whims. At the s a me t i me , Fe rguso n s u ggeste d that t h ose w h o eke out a mere subsistence are degraded by the "obj e cts the y pursue , and by the means t h e y e m pl oy t o a ttai n " th ose o bjec ts . Production, he said, is increased as a result of such degrad a t io n . In hi s view, the economic ends of so c iet y are be s t promo ted b y m e c h a n ica l a rts req ui ri n g l ittle capac i ty and t h ri v i ng best "under a total suppression of se n ti m e n t and reason . "7 Karl Marx used the in sigh ts of Ferguson's work as a gu i de for action . Marx believed he had discovered the "laws of capitalist devel o pment" ; k n owledge of these laws would help r eorga n ize society to bet ter meet human needs. He· also be l ie v ed th a t the time wa s r i pe for rad i cal reo r gan izat io n . C a pit alism would s prea d everywhere and c re a te the preconditions for its own o verthrow. Max Weber wanted to preserve what men valued in the Western cultural tradition. This was o ne reason w h y he looked to the re l i gio us and ethical beliefs bound up with the ca pi ta l i st mode of prod u c t io n . His discovery that purely materialistic str iv ing a l s o h ad s p ir i t u al roots made him ske ptical of i n ter pr e tatio ns of the modern transfo rmation which em phasized the division of labor alone. B ut he was also convin ced that the i mperatives of capitalist production and bu reaucratic organization would s uppress the individual and obliterate m uch cu l tu ral d ive rsi ty. Mo re rec e ntl y, theories of modernization h a ve focused on the nec essary and sufficient conditions for this great transformation. Once the prerequ isites of modernization are acquired , the chan ge toward a mod e rn society a ppears inevitable. This categorizi n g
a pproach has te n d ed
to re place both Marx's and Weber's concern with historical factors, prob ably in
the hope th a t
a causal analysis based on the isolation of
dent and independent variables would facilitate the
d epe n management o f so
cial change.8 In my view, Marx was right to antici pate worldwide re percussions of cap ital is m and to see a revolutionary potential in its s p read. But he
12
INTRODUCTION
was wrong in confining this potential to the economic sphere and to the increasi ng class struggle in developed ca pitalist societies. I believe that the chances of revolution increase wherever the new industrial way of life and ideas of popular sovereignty disrupt an old social orde r. Th us, society is ripe for revolution in the early phase of industrialization and democratization, however protracted that phase may be . The term mod ernization is applied best where nonind ustrial ways of life and hierarchic social orders are threatened by industrial ways and egalitarian social norms.9 UNEVEN DEVE LO PM E N T
The division of labor i s a cause of change especially in economically developi n g societies, but it is not the only cause in all societies. Histor ically, many agricultural societies have had little division of labor ye t have proved open to change, for example, through the infusion or de velopment of religious ideas. Naturally, observers were impressed-and rightly so-by the role the division of labor played in the economic development of all Western Euro pean societies, especially of England . Since the modern industrial revol ution had begun in England, other countries followed the English model when they began to develop their own industry. But they wanted to follow the latest English development to which they could gain access, not the English practices of the 1760s with which English industrializa tion began. Countries were, therefore, less and less able or willing to re peat each other's development. Nor were they likely to become the same kind of society as a result of successful industrialization. Conti n ued political and cultural differ entiation is the more likely outcome. The "demonstration effect" itself prevents societies from repeating one another's development, and so tends to prevent industrial societies from converging culturally and in stitutionally. I n Medieval Cities, Henri Pirenne showed how this dem onstration effect worked in the past. The merchant and craft guilds of a few cities used force (in the eleventh century) to win recognition of their inde pendent j urisdiction from feudal overlords. A good many other rulers took the hint and negotiated a settlement with their own town s before armed conflict occurred. But these events took place prior to the modern revolution in com munications. With the invention of printing in the fifteenth century, ideas spread more quickly. The growth of an educated public provided an audience for writers and artists. This development coincided in turn with the rise of modern science. In each country, the "great transfor mation " encou raged the growth o f an elite which was sensitive to the
INTRODUCTION
new ideas developed elsewhere and ready to a pply them at home. Coun tries became exa mples to one another. Nevertheless, what appeared highly desirable from the point of view of progress often appeared as a danger to national i nde pendence or sel f-respect. Every idea taken from elsewhe re can be both an asset to the development of a country and a reminder of its com parative backwardness-both a challenge to be emulated and, whatever its utility, a threat to national identity. The period since 1 500 has also bee n the period o f rising nationalism. The contem porary world has made us familiar with the tension be tween progress and national identity. Each country must cope socially and politically with the disruptive im pact of ideas and industrial prac tices taken from abroad . Its ability or inability to do so depends on its own history, on the cumulative peculiarities of each affected civilization. Old societies that become new states look back on centuries of historical experience involving a mixture of languages, economic patterns, and religious belie fs. This is the base from which they must master the im pact of the "advanced world." The advanced countries of today have had their own periods of underdevelo pment and of responding to the "advanced world" of their day, and they still struggle (as all countries m ust) with the unresolved legacies of their several histories. PRESENTATION AND TYPES OF EVIDENCE To bring the large themes set forth in this introduction together in one book , I have divided the discussion into two parts-the authority of kings and movements toward a mandate of the people . The cultural formation of political institutions dates back to an early time, since the religious consecration o f royal authority took place in the distant past. This early formation of political institutions foreshadowed the emer gence of government in the name of the people, and this long-run e ffect can be studied by following the development of each country's aristo cratic culture forward i nto the early modern period. The countries considered here are arranged in a triple sequence from West to East (in Chapter 2), from East to West (in C hapters 3 through 6), and again from West to East (in Chapters 9 through 13), though in the interest of chronology I have placed the discussion of Ja pan before Russia in Part 2. One reason for the arrangement is to begin with what Western readers will find relatively familiar. A second reason is that I wish to present the "modern revolution" in its chronological sequence. A concludin g chapter deals briefly with twentieth-century problems of building n ation-states. This study draws much of its evidence from social and political his tory. It diffe rs from inquiries in economics, sociology, and psychology,
INTRODUCTION
which frequently exa mine the record of human behavior for the hidden forces which cause that behavior. Such inqu iry i n to underlying struc tu res has been a dominant theme in recent intellectual history. Marxists and Freudians are at one in thei r atte m pt to disce rn the underlying cause o f manifest discontents, even if they diffe r in what they purport to find. Some anthropologists and psychologists have tu rned their at tention from behavioral stu dies to the analysis of myths i n searchi n g for the underlying constants of the human con dition . And some sociologists and political scientists engage in a search for un iversals when they ana lyze the functional prereq uisites of all social and political structu res. Such a search for structu ral forces can yield insights into motivation , ideological assum ptions, and hidden interrelations. I am indebted to this in tellectual tendency. But with so many sc hola rs engaged in searching for underlying structu res, there is space for an i nquiry which focuses attention on structu res that lie more open to view . The roots of h istor ically developed structures, of the cultu re and political institu tions of any present-day society, reach far i nto the past. I n studying thes� roots, I am striving to free our unde rstandi n g of the stereotyped contrast be tween tradition and modernity. The ideas and actions of those in positions of power or authority are the best documented part of the h uman record. By com paring so cieties over long spans of time , and by choosing to look at social struc tures from the top down, one can take advantage of this extensive ma terial. Major aspects of the social structure can be revealed i f those in a uthority are studied i n terms of the disunity and dilemmas they face as they advance their claims to legitimacy. LI M ITAT IONS The countries i ncluded in this book are those which 1 have studied for a number of years. They are among the most industrialized countries of the world and are also those in which the great revol utions and res toration movements have occurred since the seventeenth century. Inev itably there are omissions, and some o f these deserve comment. Small countries like Switzerland and the Netherlands have achieved stable authority structures through federation and the delegation of au thority rather than through royalty and conquest. They also provide im portant models. Modern nation-states like the Americas, Australia, or New Zealand present problem s of their own. Unlike England or Russia in their early development, the political institutions of the modern state were available at the time of European settlement; thus these institutions (or parts of them) could be adapted at will under the new conditions.10 Other states like Italy or Spain were omitted sim ply because I have not
INTRODUCTION
mastered the i r historical experience. Pe rha ps the most serious omissions are those n umero u s societies in which state- a nd nation -bu ild in g m ust occur under twe nti eth -c e n tury conditions. Some countries of Asia and A frica have had s ta te institutions in the past but today m ust rebuild them on new foundations. Other countries have emerged from cen tur ie s of c ultura l cross-cu rrents and recent colonial s ubject io n and must begin the task of b uilding an in de pe nde n t state centuries after the task has been com ple ted by all the m ajor powers o f the world. I touch o n this qu e stio n in the con c lu d i ng chapter but am more acutely aware n o w than when I beg a n that the "new states" of the twentieth century re present novel conditions of political d e v elop m ent . THE PURPOSES OF COMPARISON In any
schola rly d i sci pl i ne, the advance of knowledge de pen ds on
s pecialization. Hence, over the years there has been a drift toward con fining overall prese n t atio n s to introductory cou rses in the u n i ve rs ities . At the same time, mos t teaching and research has been devoted to spe c ialized to pi c s . The burden o f i n te g rat ing the knowled ge received in different s pe c ia l t ie s often falls on the student. Even if he is willing, he has little assistance in his efforts to enco m pass d iffe rent fields of study . The risks of
such in tegra tio n are great, but one must not expect of stu
dents what one is unwilling to undertake oneself.
Com pa ra tiv e analysis should s h a r pe n ou r unde rst and in g of the con texts i n which more detailed causal infe rences can be d r aw n . Without a knowledge of contexts , causal infe rence m ay p re tend to a level of gen com parative studies should not attempt to replace causal analysis, because they can deal only with a few cases a n d cannot easily isolate the variables (as causal an alysis
era l ity to which it is not entitled. On the other hand,
must).
orde r to prese r ve a sense of historical particularity w hile com I ask the same or at least similar que s tion s of very different contexts and thus allow for diverge nt answers. Struc tures of aut h ority in different countries d o vary; societies have re sponded d i ffe ren t l y to challenges prom pted by advances from ab road . The value of this study depend s on the illumination obtained from the In
paring d i ffe rent countries ,
questions asked and from a sustained com parative pe rs pective. Chapters
2, 7, 8,
and 14 elaborate the principal questions; these chapters intro
duce and conclude the two parts of this book.
My approach to social history di ffe rs from mere reportage as wel l as from the more theoretical approaches to co m parati ve studies. To com pare, for example, kingshi p in Western and Chinese civilization, or intellectual mobilization in si x teenth - centu ry E n gla nd and eighteenth-
16
INTRODUCTION
century Germany, one must ask questions broad enough for com parison to be possible. Such questions rest on concepts absent from mere re portage . But the co nce pts su itable for comparisons which preserve a sense of historical particularity are also less com prehensive than the more abstract and systematic conce pts of social theory. For purposes of the com parisons here envisaged, a solution is not found by making the conce pts either more precise or more comprehensive. On the one hand, conce pts become inapplicable to a number of diverse cases as they be come more strictly applicable to any one of them. On the other, concepts become inapplicable to an y specific case as they become applicable to all cases. Logically, all concepts begi n with universals . But once these a re stated, it becomes necessary to provide links between such universals and the case materials to be studied, as I try to do in Chapters 2, 7, 8 , and 1 4. Com parative studies depend on qualitative j udgments and illustra tive uses of the evidence. I h ave relied on the judgments of h istorians but primarily on my own sense of how much illustrative material is needed to give the reader a vivid impression of the point to be made . In practice, I h ave found it necessary to make the best j udgments I can and then warn the reader, as I do here, that these j ud gments remain tentative and may have to be modi fied by further sc holarly work or by the judgments of scholars more ex pert in a given field than I can ho pe to be . POWER A N D T H E MAN DATE T O RULE
Authority and inequality are basic dimensions of all social struc tures. Societies are governed by the few, because the few can reach an understanding among themselves and use that understanding to facili tate decision-making . This is a universal condition of all complex soci eties; only tribal societies are not governed in this manner. Whether a society is under the authority of a king or under a government in the name of the people , the few will be distinguished from the many. Thus, where authority is present, inequality between rulers and ruled will occur. This book deals with power and the mandate to rule, that is, the use of force as an attribute of authority and the j ustifications which at tempt to make the use of force legitimate. I t may be objected that con cern with the purposes of rule and the legitimation of power merely assuage the conscience of the powerful and that force alone really mat ters. I think this view is mistaken. Power needs ideas and legitimation the way a conventional bank needs investment policies and the confidence of its depositors. Rulers
INTROD UCTION
are always few in number and co uld never obtain com pliance i f each command were purely random -and had to be backed by force sufficient to com pel obedience. Likewise, banks rely on the con fidence of their depositors, which allows them to retain only a small fraction of their assets in liquid funds in order to meet the ex pected rate of withdrawal by de positors. All is well as long as depositors believe that the bank will cash their checks on demand, and part of that trust depends on a vague knowledge about the bank's adherence to certain acce pted business stan dards. In the nation-state, all is well as long as citize ns believe that the government knows what it is about, has the ability to deliver on some of its promises, and has sufficient force to bac k up its command s when necessary. Psychologically, ban k credit and governmental legitimacy rest on an amalgam of convenient commonplaces, inarticulate assum ptions, and a willingness to let others take the lead and to leave well enough alone. But once the trust based on such feelings is disturbed, conditions can change quickly. A run on the bank is like a m assive c hallenge to state au thority, for each may demonstrate that the bank's and the state's resources are insufficient to withstand such a loss of confidence. Legit imation achieves what power alone cannot, for it establishes the belief in the rightness of rule wh ich, as long as it endures, precludes massive challenges. Thus, the e mphasis of this study is on power and the man date to rule, not on one to the exclusion of the other. Like the polarities so frequently used in Max Weber's work, one ph rase combines the use of force with the belief in legitimacy. As Otto Hintze has stated, All human activity, poli tical and religious, stems from a n undivided root. As a rule, the first im pu l se for . . . social action comes from tangible interests, political or economic . . . . I deal interests elevate and a n i mate these tangible interests and lend them j ustification. Man does not live by bread alone ; he wants to have a good conscience when he p u rsues his vital inte rests ; and in pu rsu i ng t hem he develo p s h is powers fully o n l y i f he is conscious of s imu l taneously serving purposes higher than p u rely egotistical ones . I n terests without such spi ritual e leva tion are lame; on the other hand, ideas can suc ceed i n history only w hen and to the exten t that they at tach themselves to tan gible interests. u
Thus, wherever power is vigorously pursued and exercised, ideas of le gitimacy tend to develop to give meaning, reinforcement, and j ustifi cation to that power. Con versely, wherever a mandate to rule is to sway the minds and hearts o f men, it requires the exercise of force or the awareness that those w ho rule are able , and will not hesitate, to use force if that is needed to assert their will. The authority of kings-their power and mandate to rule-often weaken. When that occurs ,
INTROD UCTION
18
Critic ism and pro paganda ex pose the
arcana imperii
to the light of com
mon day. Subjects ask if they shou ld obey, and whom, and w h y . A uthority is con strained to plead its case w ith reasons or impose itself by violence. I n either instance
it
has lost its virtue : for while authority remains itself, it nei
ther argues nor coerces, but m e rel y s peaks and is plex scene alread y charged w ith tives su perv e n e . 1 2
accepted . U pon the com tense uncertain ties, u nex pected fres h i n itia
These initiatives accom pany the decline of royal authority and often anticipate its actual down fall. B u t sac red authority is more easily de stroyed than reconstructed, or perha ps one should say that critics of royal authority have seldom been conscious that the new authority they propose requires a sacred foundation as well. These comments antic i pate the prominence of inviolate symbols like "the people" or "the na tion" i n all efforts to reconstitute authority since the decline of kingshi p.
Part I THE AUTHORITY OF KINGS
The heavens themselves, the planets, and this centre, Observe degree, priority, and place . . . . . . but when
the planets, disorder wander . What raging of the sea, shaking of earth, . . .
In evil mixture, to
.
.
Divert and crack, . . .
The unity and married calm of states Quite from th eir fixture! . How could communities, Degrees in schools, and brotherhoods in cities, . . The primogen ity and due of birth, Preroga tive of age, crowns, sceptres, laurels, But by degree, stand in authentic place ? Take but degree away, untune th at string, A nd, hark, what discord follows! .
.
.
S HAKESPEARE,
Troilus and
Cressida, I, iii
2 SAC RE D AND SE C ULAR FO UNDATIONS O F KINGS H I P
IN
T H E PAST, one ruler stood at the summit of the social hierarchy. Rulers possessed s u preme status, great wealth , and command ing authority. For the exercise of rule, they depe nded on retainers , personal confidants, and magnates of more in dependent position. Collectively, sovere ign rule rs and their agents con stituted an oligarchy or govern ment by the fe w . Such govern men t pro vides one of the best documented records of inequality. ! Kings do not necessarily wield effective authority. I n some Asian societies, kingship consisted of pom p and circumstance rather than gov ernance, while actual authority was exercised at local or regional levels. 2 Eve n when kings and oligarchs have ruled at the outset, the rise of pro vincial governors and military forces may erode that central authority later.3 Nevertheless, royal authority has endured for the greater part of human history. This would not have been the case if kings, officials, and the mass of the people had not to some degree believed the authority of kings to be inviolate. We do not know how the belief in kings hip originated. Weber sugge sts, K i n gs h i p is preceded by all those charismatic fo rms w h ich assure relief in the face o f extraordinary e xternal or internal distress or w h ich pro m ise success i n risk y undertaki ngs. In early h istory, the precursor o f the kin g, the ch ief tain, often h as a double func tion : he is the patriarch of the fa mily or sib, but also the charismatic leader in hunt and war, the magician, ra i n m aker, med icine m a n - hence priest and docto r-and finall y , the arbiter. Freq uentl y , each o f these kinds of charisma has a s pecial beare r.4
People have a strong desire to perpetuate a leader's s uccess in deal ing with extraordinary misfortunes or great risks. The leader himself feels inspired by his success. H is followers and the community at large 21
22
THE A UTHORITY OF
KINGS
naturally want to be nefit from the wonders they have attributed to his charismatic powe rs. As lon g as his undertakings are successful, his actions legitimate the social and political establis hment he heads. Con versely, doubts arise concern ing his legitimacy when poor harvests or defeat i n war suggest that his mis sion has failed and that he has lost his charisma. A rudime n tary or continge nt exchan ge, therefore, is built i n to the function of leadersh i p. The ruler's su preme authority and endorse men t of the hie rarchy of rank are acce pted as lon g as the people believe in the charismatic gi fts of the ki n g and in the social order as divinely established . The success of a ruler may be as u ncertain as the people' s satisfac tion. The leader often has little control over the vicissitudes that be fall him and his people. Since he wan ts to stay in power, his magical or di vinatory practice may incorporate ambiguity or uncertainty concern i n g the future, thus sa feguarding his own position while adhering t o the beliefs of those involved in state affairs. The people themselves �re per haps aware of contingencies and may credit their ruler for atte m pting to contact the spirits, even if these spirits prove malevolent. As lon g as the ruler and his people share the belief in the ruler' s intercession with the s pirits on behalf of the community, the exchange relation of au thority is sustained . Such a belief would be weak indeed were it to cru m ble the moment the ruler is uncertain or adversity be falls his realm. But beliefs of this kind are seldom so strong that they can not be discredited when m i s fortune becomes too massive and doubts concerning the ruler's capacity cumulate. 5 Des pite these hazards, a ruler can re present the whole society and conjoin the greatest physical and spiritual powers available to man. Since every community desires to pe rpetuate the benefits attributed to such powers, a king's claim to su preme authority will be acknowledged by the people's belief in his god-descended powers. Patterns of royal authority have varied from civilization to civilization depending on the way in which the royal person has been designated, consecrated, and acknowledged . The religious authentication of the king usually has depended on expe rts in esoteric knowledge, that is, knowledge of the mysteries and ritual which are believed ca pable of validating the act of consecration . Such experts are the guardians of a cou ntry's cultural heritage which rulers disregard at their peril. But ex perts in esote ric knowledge also have much secular influence and participate-along with the members of the governing class-in the internal contentions for power. Thus, royal authority is often constrained by its own religious and secular foundations.
SACRED AND SEC ULAR FO UNDA TIONS OF KINGSHIP
23
GERM A N IC TRADITIONS A N D CH RIST I A N CO NSECRATION I n t he West, kings h i p a rose in two diffe rent patterns, both under the in fluence of Chri s t i a n it y. In the eastern part of the Roman em pire, Hellenistic and Oriental influences merged, giving rise to a conce ption of the e m peror as the Expected One of Christian prophecy, represent ing God on earth , the symbol of the Kingdom o f Heaven. By invoking the authentic power o f C hrist's name, the king or autocrat cou l d en sure prospe rity and v i c to r y in war. This Byzantine conce ption of king ship became a dominant i n fluence in Russia and will be discussed in C h a pter 4. I n t he western part of the Ro man em pire, kin gship arose from a conjunction of Ge rmanic tribal traditions and the expanding in fluence of th e Catholic church. The Ge rma nic tribal chie fs re presented the prin ciple o f inherited charisma and election by acclamation . The C at h o lic church rep r es ented t h e p ri nc i ple of hi e rarc h y and law. The two pr i n ciples m erged when the Caro l in gian kin gs were consecrated by the Po pe in Rome . These pr i nc i ples will be examined in their h is to ric al con t e x t. A s poradic mig ra tion o f Germanic tribesmen into the western part of the Roman e mpi re began during the fi rst century of our era. The migration took on a massive c haracter two and a half centuries later when whole tri be s so ug ht r e fuge before the o n s laug ht of the Huns. At that time, th e Roman e m pi re s need to defend its e x te n ded fro n t i e rs grea tl y strained the available manpower. Epidem ics and war casualties red uced the ag ricult ural p o pulatio n further. The pressure on slave la borers to p rod uce more food increased, rural u nrest became endemic, and land wen t out of cultivation. In rural areas and in the Roman ar
'
mies the demand for manpower mounted j ust when Germanic tribes ,
arrived in search of la n d and food. These tribesmen settled on dese rted properties, filled the ranks of the Roman legions, and proceeded to elect and unseat empe rors. In the century between 1 80 and 285 A.D. , t h i r ty different em perors were put on the throne, and few of them died a natural death. By 376 A . D . these scattered movements had turned into full-scale invas ions M a n y of the remaini n g native settlers were dis .
placed, a nd Ge rmanic kin g doms were established in lieu of imperial Roman authority.6 All o f Europe , es pec i a l ly its western part, was affected. The Visi goths swept from the northern B alkan a rea into I tal y where their
M ace d o nia Greece, an d k i n g, Alaric, c onq u e red Rome in 4 1 0 A. D . From Italy, ,
the Visi go th s returned north to southern Gaul w here they established a kin gd o m
from 4 1 8 to 507 . Finally, they moved into S p ai n w h e re t hey 7 1 1 . The V an dals started fro m th e midd le o f
ruled between 507 a nd
- - - - - F r o n t i e r of t h e R o m a n E m p i re --
- - Bo u n d a ry b e t w e en Ea s t e r n a n d Western Roman Emp ire
.i� 1.
Barbarian Invasions of the Fifth Century
A.D.
SACRED AND SEC ULAR FO UNDA TIONS OF KINGSHIP
25
Ger ma n y ,
went into cen tral France, moved in to S pai n and North Africa, then to Sardinia and Rome, and .finally back to a more perm anent set tlement in N orth Africa-all in less than a century . By c onq ue ri n g N orth A fr ica , the Vandals occu pied the area which supplied the bulk o f food s ta p l es such a s g r ain and oil for major c it i es o f the e m pi re. They al s o o c c u pi ed some h a rbors along the Mediterranean coastline, thus bre ak in g the By zan ti n e m o n o p oly o f the s ea far i n g trade . The Vandals ruled in North A frica (429-534) and the Ostrogo th s i n I ta ly (493 -553) u n t i l both were co n qu e red and made part of the B y zanti ne e m pire u n d er J us ti n i a n (527 -565 ). Through the Germania o f T ac i t u s (98 A.D.), w e have an early re po rt on the Germanic t r i be s and their m ilita ry leaders and war bands (comi tatus ) . The problem fo r th e Romans was how to co nt ai n t he s e ro v i n g German bands. The Romans h o ped that the co uatryside could be s ta bilized by negot ia tion The Germanic war-leaders were thou g ht to be kings with whom the Ro mans co uld negotiate , for thes e leaders ap peared able to speak for their fe l low tribesme n . However , the Germanic leaders were much more d i verse than the Romans assumed i n terms o f ti tle au tho ri ty , a nd the s cop e o f t he i r mi litary ac ti vi ti e s . So me w a�ba nd s were merely inten t on ven de tt as and loot. Others involved w hole t r ibe s (in clud ing women and chi ldre n , de pende n t s , and slaves) which desired to conquer new lands and settle them. In a pe r iod of migration, the
.
,
many leaders and heirs of a charismatic lineage gro u p were more useful than a
single king wo u l d have been , whatever might be true under m ore
settled conditions.7 The Ge rmanic wor d for king d eve lo ped from the word for kindred. Kingship emerged as the s u preme authority o f a clan
rather t ha n of an
individual ruler. Ancient pantheistic beliefs attributed supernatural powers to n a t u re and w it h i n soc iety to a kin grou p or clan (Sippe ) en dow e d w i th s pec ial capacities that were a ttribute d to blo o d re lation s hi ps . The whole clan was thought to possess a god-descended power or mana which ensured good crops , victory in battle, and the power to heal cer tain d iseases. Chie ftain s or rulers we re d istinguish e d by the singular luck associated with their clan .8 As
in the Homeric e pic , the early Germanic ho w "gods o ften walked the earth a n d mingled in th e af fairs of rulers."g The d ivine descent o f a clan therefore s u ggested itself readily. All descendants of that clan could be charismatic mediators with
sagas told of
the divine and thus repo sitories of the tribal "luck." This religious idea of " kin-right" or "blood- right" gave a sacral character to t he
ri ght fu l
incumbent e ven when h i s power w a s greatly reduced . 1 o A ruler's fu nction was a t once m i lita ry , political, and religious :
He
was expected to lead i n war, settle dis p u te s and make sacrifices for vic tory, good c rops , and peac e . The " pe o p le , but more s pecifically the ,
"
THE A UTHOR IIT OF KINGS
heads o f the clans co m po s i ng the tribe , looked to the charisma of the ruler's clan for i n tercession with the go d s . The belie fs which attri b u ted s u pe rn atu r a l gifts to an e n t i re clan presu mably depended on the hope or e x pectation o f p r es e rvin g the bene fits which these gifts bestowed o n t h e people . When u s u r pe rs came to pow e r , their rule would endure only i f b y success and a p propriate ge nealogical constructions th ey we re fou n d to b e " re lated" t o the c harismatic k i n d red . P ractices w hi c h
were
advanta geou s u n der conditions o f m ig ra t io n
mem bers o f a c l a n w e re bel i e ved to be endowed with c h a ri s m a , succession to the throne prese n ted s pe c ial probl e m s. Successio n was d e cid e d by in he ritance w h e n a n i n c u m be n t r u le r divided the rea l m among his legit imate heirs. The l i ne a ge was preserved, but at the p rice of dis p er s i ng the resources of the realm a n d fostering internal strife. The Fran kish rule o f the Merovingian (482-7 1 4 ) a n d Caro l i n gian (7 1 4-9 1 1 ) houses was marked by these divisive characteristics. u On the other hand, a choice could be made among the many legitimate d escen d an t_s of the charismatic clan . Such a choice was usu ally based on the recognition of su perior mi l i t ar y leadership, thus c o mb i n i ng hereditary c harisma with the p rinciple of election by acclamatio n . The incumbent ruler would p ub l icl y c hoose the most promising successor among his heirs, and the notables o f other clans would con firm the choice by acclamation . a P rob l e ms a rose w h e n legi t i m a te heirs were unsuitable, when more than one suitable heir had legitimate claims, or when the c lan a ppeared bereft of i ts c harismatic powe r , its "tribal luck ." The god-descended claims of the clan with t he i r e m p has is on the right of i nher i ta n ce would clash with the pragmatic p ol i t i cal interests of other clans and th e i r em phasis on the r igh t o f "e lect io n " or consent. In these uncertain situations, the Catholic church began to assert its in fl uence . For Germanic chieftains in England and on the Continent, the in flue nce o f the church had certain ad van tages . Their main task was t o stabilize the i r auth ori ty in recently conquered territories in w h i c h the church w as al read y established. From a pagan pe r s pec tive , conversion meant that another especia l ly powerful god was added to the native pan theo n . Tribal chieftains saw in this a further buttress to t h e i r au th o ri ty, es pe c i al ly if their title was insecure in the eyes of the " peo ple ." The d an ger of dependence on the church did not yet loom large : power still seemed largely a matter of mi l i t a r y prowess and "luck ." Where rule was insecure, "consecration could stren gthen t he claims of here d it y , sanction a usu rp ati o n , incli ne God to make queens fruitful, and bind the cl er gy became d isad vantageo u s u n d e r mo re settled co n d i t io n s . When all
"Acclamation and election are used i nterchangeably because the act of acclamation was probably preceded by some kind of delibe ration a mon g the notables. It would be m is lead i n g , however, to cal l such delibe ration and acclamation an election in o u r sense.
SA CRED AND SEC ULAR FO UNDA TIONS OF KINGSHIP
27
to a king . . . . " Indeed , consecration may have seemed to "distracted and threatened churc h me n " much the same as it did to the chieftains themselves-as a way of "enhancing the power of the ki n g" and thereby stabilizing the social order . 1 2 C h ri stianity had been a religious move m e n t i n all parts o f the Ro man em pire long befo re the Germanic invasions. Missions had s p read to towns and settle ments but reached the vast co un tryside only after con siderable delay . Many Germanic tribes had been converted before thei r migrations began, but they o ften contin ued to adhere to pagan beliefs and practices. Moreo v e r , the missionaries were generally converts to the Arian doctrine, espousing the deity of the Father but not of the So n , and as a result many German tribesmen became Arians . T h e C h u rch Council of Nicaea declared the Arian doctri ne heretical i n 325 A . D . , but it was some time before the orthodox Catholic creed became do minant in the Christian West . 1 3 I n 330 A.D. , Constantinople was consecrated as the capital of the Roman e m pire , and by the end o f the fourth century Ch ristianity was declared the state religio n . However , pagan beliefs a n d practices continued in the Germanic kingdoms . Christianity grad ually became a force i n the defense of the empire , because the organiz atio n o f the ch u rc h was strengthening local govern ment while the institutions of Roman government were foundering. The church was organized i nto dioceses (under patriarchs ) , provinces (under metro politans), and cities (under bishops), pa r a lle li n g the adminis t rat i ve subdivisions of the em pire. Emperor Con stantine's (306-3 3 7 ) secular control of religion permitted the church a p rivile ged position in several respects. The Christian clergy was exempted from certain taxes on the basis of their charity and pro fe s sion a l contribution . The church was treated as a corporation capable of receiving donations and bequests. As early as 3 1 4 A.D. , an i m pe rial decree declared that judicial sentences of bishops were to be regarded like the judgments of Christ himself. Epis copal cou rts (handling cases that touched on the consecrated functions of the church) were recogn i zed as part o f the judicial system , and the civil authority en forced their decisions. The right of inte rcession on be half of clients passed from wealthy patrons or h i red pleaders into the hands of bishops. Closely connected with this e piscopal intercession was the church's right of asylum , which allowed fugitives to seek the pro tection of bishops instead of the old pagan temples of Rome. 1 4 These rights o f the church were compatible with civil government, though with rather differe n t results in the eastern and western parts o f the empire. I n the East, the imperial government was headed by an em peror who reigned supreme in both secular and re ligious affairs. The institutions of the church were safeguarded in the sense that the em peror protected the church politically, although he was not a member
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
of the hie rarc h y . As C o n st a n t i n e told the bishops at Nicaea , they were in cha rge o f " i n ternal c h u rc h m a tters" w h i le h e , the e m peror, had the legal a n d ad m i n istrative manage m e n t of C h ristianity i n his s a fekeepin g. In t hese "external m atters" there w a s no limit to the e m pe ror's a uthority over the c h u rc h . M o reover, the eastern part o f the e m p i re re m a i n ed m i l i tarily a n d pol itically i n tact. The H u n s , w h o had c a u sed the Germ a n ic m igrations toward t h e West, fai led i n t h e i r attacks on the fro n t ie rs o f the eastern e m pire (Th race , A r m e n i a , S y ria) a n d t h e Visigo t h s were d e feated by Byza n t i u m in 3 7 8 A . D . I n t h e cou rse o f the fi fth century, t h e po sition of the Byzantine e m pe ror beca m e formalize d : H e w a s c row ned by the patria rc h o f Consta n t i n o ple , a cere m o n y w h i c h i n t h e E astern c h u rc h s y m bol i zed the d i vine derivation o f the em peror's authority. 1 5 I n the West, on the other h a n d , Ro m a n pol itical authority d i s i n te-
Christ Crowning the Byzantine Emperor The concentration of both spiritual author ity and temporal power in the pe rson o f the East Roman e m pe ror is symbolized i n this Byzantine ivory ( from about
944)
showing
Christ crowning Em peror Constantine V I I Porphyrogenitus
(91 2-959).
The ruler is
thus the direct successor to C hrist o n earth .
( M useum of Fine
Arts. Moscow)
St. Peter Conferring Spiritual Authority and Temporal Power This restored eighth-century mosaic in the C h u rch of St. John Lateran , Rom e , shows St. Peter conferrin g spiritual au thority on Pope Leo I l l , symbol ized by the pallium o r stole, and tem poral power on Ch a rlem agne . symbolized by the i m pe rial banner. Catholicism derives its a uthority from the a postle, not from C hrist directly as in the Greek Orthodox conceptio n . According to th is belie f in the apostolic succession o f the papacy, St. Peter ele vates the spiritual pope over the tem poral king. Later representations, as in the Sach senspiege l o f 1 2 30. show St. Peter handing the keys o f the kingdom of heaven to the pope w h ile the k i n g with the insignia of tem poral power me rely looks on. (The Granger Collection ; Sachsenspiegel)
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS grated as I ta l y , G a u l , a n d Spain w e re con q u e red by successive w a ve s o f
Ge r m a n ic t r i be s . U nder t h e e m pire, l o c a l a d m i n istration had been en trusted to m agistrates a n d cou ld s u rvi ve c h a nges a t the c e n ter of pow e r . B u t d u ri n g t h e great m igratio n s , l o c a l a u t h o r i t y was not able t o co pe w i t h the con fl icts res u l t i n g from t h e Ge r m a n ic settle m e n t of la n d s be lon gi n g to the n a t i ve po p u lation
The a u t ho rity of the local bis h o p ,
.
th e re fo re , t e n d e d t o take the p l ace of sec u lar go ve r n m e n t , in p a r t beca use the c h u rc h a t t racted a b l e r men than the R o m a n pro v i n c i a l gov e rn m e n t . A s �Iom igliano has state d , � I u c h ca n b e s a i d a bo u t t h e i n t e rn a l c o n fl ic t s , t h e wo r ld l y a m b i t i o n s , t h e i n t ole r a n c e o f th e C h u rc h . Y e t t h e c o n c l u s io n re m a i n s t h a t w h i le t h e po l i ti c a l o rgan i z a t ion o f t h e e m p i r e bec a m e i n c re a s i ng l y ri g i d , u n i m a g i n a t i v e , a n d
u n s uc c e s s fu l , t h e C h u rch w a s m o b i l e a n d re s i l i e n t a n d p ro v i d ed s pace fo r t h ose w h o m t h e State was u n a ble
to
a bs o r b . T h e b i s h o p s were t h e c e n t r e s o f
l a r ge m l u n t a r y o rgan i z a t io n s . They fo u n d e d a n d co n t rol led c h a r i t a ble i n st i t u t io n s . T h e y d e fe nded t h e i r fl o c k s a ga i n s t t h e s t a t e o ffi c i al s . W h e n the m i l itary s i t u a t ion o f t h e e m p i re gre w w o rse , t h e y o ft e n o rga n i z e d a r m e d
re s i s
ta n c e aga i n s t t h e barbar i a n s . . . . Pe o pl e es c a ped fro m t h e state - i n to t h e C h u rc h a n d weakened t h e state by gi v i n g t h e i r be s t t o t h e C h u r c h . . . . T h e
best m e n were w o r k i n g for t h e C h u rc h , n o t fo r t h e state . 1 6
A t t h e local l e ve l , the c h u rc h had
a
mission a s civil o ffic ials did n o t . B u t
these local o r prov i ncial fu nctions d i d n o t h i n g to bolster t h e c e n t ral h i e rarc h y o f t h e c h u rc h . How then d i d t h e papacy establis h i ts ecclesias tical s u p re m ac y ?
T h e bishops o f R o m e possessed co n siderable w ea l t h i n lan d . I n t h e W e s t t h e y were co n fronted w i t h pagans a n d he retics w h o h a d ove r r u n t h e e m pi re , w hile i n t h e E a s t they fac ed the r i v a l s p iritua l clai m s o f a n
emergi n g E a s t e r n C h rist i anity w h ich w as b ac ked by t h e great p o w e r o f the B yz a n tine e m pire . I n this fi fth cen t u r y se tti n g , t he Rom a n b i s h o p s -
had n o political a u t ho rity to s u p po rt t he m . Ye t , by a co mbination o f poli tical a n d doct r i n a l strategies , the bi s h o ps achieved ascendancy i n the ch urch h i e ra rc h y a n d establ i s h ed t h e medi eval papac y . Ro m e e l a bo rated i ts doct r i n a l position agai nst the Eastern ch u rc h , e ve n tho ugh i t could n o t c h a l l e n ge the sec u l a r autho rity of B yzanti u m . A nd i n western a n d no rthern E u rope , t h e Ro m a n bis hops s ponso red m issionary activi ties w h ic h s ucceeded i n part because t h e B y z a n t i n e e m p i re could not i n ter fere effective l y . The Rom a n papal claims res ted i n t h e fi r s t place o n t h e c u l t o f S t . Pet e r , t h e fi r s t bisho p o f Rom e , a martyr t o h is fa i t h , a n d t h e apostle to w h o m C h rist had given "the keys to the kin gdo m of heave n " ( Matthew
1 6 : 1 8 - 1 9) . T h e po pes made the most o f their p ri m ac y as the d i rect T he y cited a letter i n w h ic h Po pe Cle ment described how Peter i n the p resence of the Ro m a n co m m u n i t y had ha nded h is
s uccessors o f Pete r .
SA CRED AND SEC ULAR FOUNDATIONS OF KINGSHIP
31
power over to the bisho p .o f Rome and his succe ss o r s. T h i s testamen tary d e posi tion became ava i l able i n a Lat i n translation a ro u nd 400 A . D . It was a fo rgery , but the Epistola Clementis was cited t h ro u g h o u t the Middle Ages because it a ppeared to a u t h entic ate t h e doctrine of pa pal mon arc h y . The im plication s o f t h i s doct r i n e were s pe l l ed o u t by Pope Leo I (440-46 1 ) and Pope Ge la s i us (492 -496) . Leo d i s ti n g u i s hed between the u n iq ue merit o f Pe ter , w h ich C h rist had reco g n i zed , and t h e Pe t r i n e powers w h i c h co u l d be tra n s m i tted . Go d h ad gi v e n H is g i ft o f grace to the pope as the direct s uccessor of Pete r ; therefo re , t h e po pe co u l d not be j u d ged or deposed b y a n yo n e . But the person holdi ng t h at o ffice was d i s t i n g u i shed fro m the powers o f
the office . The u n wo rt h i ness of t h e aut horit y e i t h e r o f God 's gift
i n c u m be n t co uld not i n v a l i d a te t h e b i nd i n g
o f t h e po pe's gi fts of grace to h i s flock. A l l powers me mbers of the c h u rc h ( the po pe, a rc h b i s hops , bis h o p s , mon ks, p r i e st s ) were not based o n ri ght, b u t possessed as a matter o f grace , as i n t h e Pau line doctri n e , "What I am , I am by t h e g race o f God ." Such favor o f grace co uld not be c o m pel le d ; i t c o uld o n l y be free l y given. Every o ffice o f the church was a beneficiu m i n t h i s s e n se . I t could be taken away as freely as i t h ad been given. This p apal inte r p re t ati o n cha l le n ged the c l a ims o f i m p eri al author ity over the church, es po us ed i n B yza n tium. Ac cordi n g to St. Ambrose (340 ? -3 9 7 ) , bishop of Milan , "the emperor is within t he c h u rc h , not above it" : he does not possess aut o n o m o u s powe r s . In t h i s ea rl y Catholic view , the king had been called by God to his h i g h office , but as a C h ris tian he was t h e son of the ch urch , not its master. In th e view of Pop e Gelasius I , the kin g s duty was to carry out the divi ne p lan B u t wh o was to have a u t h o ri t y to l ay down faith and doctrine and hence to give the law to the entire corporate body of C hris t ia n i t y ? Gelasius answered that of grace to the pope or
exercised by
'
.
only the pope as the successor of St. Peter possesses authority or
auc
(moral influence) ; only he has the fac u l ty o f sha p in g thi ngs in a man ner that is binding o n all. By contras t , the e m peror possessed a regia potestas (royal executive power) the power to execute what h ad been laid down as binding authority under God . 1 7 Au thority and power had already been disting�ished in Roman law, and the pope s in the West u sed the distinction for their own purposes. I n the East, the Byz an tine emperors pre vailed over the church because they had defeated the Germanic invaders and were i n full po l it ic al con trol. By contrast, conditions were so unsettled in the West that secular rulers o ften welcomed the added s t re n g th derived from church su pport. The difference in the relative p o s iti on s of secular rulers and the church was re flected in the forms of address used by the pope in Rome. A cen tury a fter Gelasius I , Pope G re gory I (590-603 ) co n t i n ued to add ress the ruler i n Co ns t an t inople as "Lord Em p ero r, whereas he addressed toritas
-
"
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS the k i n gs of western a n d northern E u ro pe as " Dearest son s . " The papal doctrine that k i n gs were so n s of the c h u rc h became part of the C h r i stian m issio n only i n weste rn E u ro pe, e s pecially a m o n g the Fran ks . Con version o f the Fra n ks had begu n at the e n d o f the fi fth century . By the e n d o f the sixth ce n t u r y , they had beco me in t u rn C h ri stian m i s sionarie s , convert i n g the Germanic tribes east o f the R h i ne and south of t h e Loi re a s t h e y co n q u e red t h e m . A t the same t i m e , the Franks ad h e red to their t ri bal traditio n s . The ru le rs di vided territories equally among their legi tim ate heirs, t h u s i n c reasing pol i t ical instabi lity at al most e ve ry successio n . 1 8 M e ro vifl gian and Carol i n gian rulersh i p was p recario u s des pite m i l i tary successes , and the c h u rc h u t i l i ze d t h i s op po r t u n ity to play a greater role i n dete r m i n i n g the s u ccessio n . The Merovi n gian house con t i n ued to rei gn , but i n n a me o n l y . Ac tual power had pas sed to the c h i e f m i n isters o f the court, who were il legi t i m a te desce nda n ts o f earlier Merovin gian rulers. These rege n ts were th e first re p resentatives o f the Carol i ngian dynasty, but t h e y lac ked
legi timacy. In 75 1 -752, howe ve r , the C a rol i n gian rege n t P� p i n was
elected k i ng by a n asse mbly o f nobles and then anointed by Bishop Boni faciu s . I n this way, the Merovi ngian house was deposed w i t h the formal a p p roval of t h e c h u rc h . The ac t o f consecrating the king added a new d i me n si o n o f authority to the earlier, co n ve n tional method o f s p read i n g t h e Go spel by converti n g kings to the C h ristian faith. The Western c h u rc h h ad assumed the fu nction of consec rating, and hence of au then ticatin g, the royal s uccession i n con t rast to the Eastern c h u rc h which by c ro w n i n g the e m pe ror sy mbol i zed t h e d i v i n e o r i g i n o f his authority. The Western c h urch put the k i n g u nder God's law as i n t e rpre ted by the c h u rch ; the Eastern ch u rch accepted the e m peror as re p res e n t i n g C h rist on earth . 1 9 Con secration endowed k i n gs with a new sac ra l c haracter w h ic h hel ped t o weaken the o l d paga n bel i e f in c h arismatic blood -righ t . The unction t h ro ug h w h ic h the king beca m e " God's A n o i n ted" on earth was a vi sible s y m bol o f divine sanctio n w h ic h re p lac e d the earlier belief i n t h e d i v i n e o r igi n of t h e charis matic l i n eage. T o this sy mbo l , Charle magne ( 768-8 1 4) added the fo rm u la " b y the Grace of God" (Dei gratia ) , t h u s appearing to give the monarch a p os i t ion based o n divine i n s p i ra tion. At the tim e , the c h u rc h see med to g ive u n eq ui vo ca l suppo rt to this conce ptio n of kingsh i p , w h ic h at t h e very least i m pl i e d the king's d i rect
re l at
i o n to
God . 2 0
I n p ractice , t h e ch urc h was n o t co nsiste n t . Fro m t h e Catholic stand poi n t , the pagan idea o f a God -desce nded , sac red l i n e a ge was a n a th e m a , y e t clai m s t o legit imacy based o n he r e d it ary success ion were general ly accepted because t h e y s u p po rted the sac red in v iola bi l i ty o f m arr i a g e . Howeve r , though minors might h a ve an h eredi tary right to the th rone ,
SACRED AND SECULA R FO UNDATIONS OF KINGSHIP
33
the church combated their clai ms, presumably because of t h e danger o f dynastic instability. Even adult heirs w i t h a le gitimate claim were op posed i f they belonged to dynasties hostile to the ch urch . Similarly, the church opposed bastards beca use they made a mockery o f the sanctity of marriage, but it also favored them when this see med to further the interests of the churc h . I n these vario us pos itions , the main doctri nal point was that kings h i p is an office and d uty (ministeriu m ) , not a pro prietary righ t . Hence , the s uitability of an individual candidate was more important than the preservation o f a dynastic lineage , or a consistent policy. To the church, its act of consec ration authenticated the k ing's mandate from God. In this way, political stability was i n c reased . Rulers were independent of the " popular will" (the consent o f t he notables of the realm ) , but to a degree depende nt on the c h u rch . 2 1 B u t absolute royal control also became a hazard against which the church had to be o n guard . Once political stability was achieved , the main mission of the ch urch would come to the fore . Then ch urchmen would reemphasize what they had always sai d , namely, that the king was under God and subject to His law. As Archbishop Hincmar told his king in 860, "You have not c reated me archbishop of Rhei ms, but I, together with my colleagues, have elected you to the government of the kingdom , on condition that you observe the laws." 22 From the perspecti ve of the papacy, the consecration of kings meant that the ru ler was a member of the congregation and m ust fulfill the singular mandate he had re ceived as "God's Anointed . " Kings on earth reflected the H eavenly King, and secular authority was legitimate to the extent that i t im plemen ted God's purposes. Accordi ngly, a main part of the king's task was to u p- hold the Ch ristian religion by protecting priests and monks, encourag ing their work , and exhort i ng the faithful thro ugh his personal example. Moreover, kings were d uty-bound to carry the message of the Gospel to the heathens, by fire and sword if necessary. Kings and people were under God . Only if kings walked the ways of the righteous, as the church interpre ted those ways , could they obtain felicity, good harvests , and victory over their enemies .23 The monarchies o f Western E urope amalga mated divine right ac quired through consecra tion with hereditary right acq uired through birth. That amalgamation helped to authenticate the legiti macy of a ruler, in h is own eyes as well as in those of the people. At the same time, the church increased its sec ular role . Personal links with the clergy in creased as members o f royal houses and aristocratic fa mi lies took mon astic vows . Through pious gifts, rulers and magnates sought solace for their troubled souls even as they advanced more m undane ambition s. Such acts enlarged the land and resources under ecclesiastical jurisdic tion . In the great councils of the realm, church s po kes men could i n flu-
34
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
Ecclesiastical and Secular Hierarchies In the ideal conception of the medieval world the institutions of church and state should parallel each other, the church in the sphere of s piritual authority and government in the sphere of temporal power. In this fourteenth-century fresco (attributed to Andrea d i Firenze) the two hierarchies are ranged on opposite sides: pope a n d emperor, cardinal and king, archbishop and coun t , clerics and clerks. (Alina rilSca la)
ence the exercise of authority and even give weight to their choice of a royal successor by claiming inspiration from divine authority i n the name of His law , to which all mortals were subject. The church was transformed , though not in a straight forward man ner, from speaking only i n the name of God to championing electoral rights as well. 2 4 In its struggle against paganism, the church had sup ported theocracy. Eve n after the success of the C h ristian izing mission and the stabilization of secular rule , kings re mained im portant as pro tectors and patrons of the church . Kin gs also were potential allies in balancing the competing claims not only of feudal lords but also of church dignitaries whose local or national interests might deviate from
SACRED AND SEC ULAR FOUNDATIONS OF KINGSHIP
35
the interests o f the Roman church. B ut at the same ti me, the church was bou nd to com pete with kings whenever the exercise of sec ular au t hority touched the realm of t he sacred , and few matters were e n tirely outside this real m . The churc h insisted on i ts exclusive cla i m to inter p ret the word of God . I t op pos e d the sac ral i zation of k i n g s h i p w h ic h was st ro n gl y susta i ned by pagan bel i e fs and popular sentimen t . 2 5 Wester n E uro p e a n k i ngsh i p t h u s owed i ts pattern to the con fluence among pagan practic e s o f a German i c origi n the legal herit a ge of Rome (as in conce pts like auctoritas and ministerium ) , and t h e in te rpre t atio n s and institutional interests of the Catholic church . ,
NOMADIC T R I B E S , RE L I G I OUS P RO P H E C Y , AND THE PATR I A RC H A L CALI PHATE I N I S LA M In the Arabic wo rld, kingship arose from a conj unction of pre Islamic tribal traditions , the religious message of Muhammad the Prophet (c. 5 70-632 A.D.), a nd the traditions of rule established under M u hammad and his immediate successors. The Arabian peni n sula was ro ughly divided into a sedent a ry, eco nomically thriving area in the south and a vast , arid or semi-arid interior to the north , con tai ni n g nomadic Bedo uins and a few settlements in oases and along caravan routes . Kingship existed only i n the south. The only recogni z ed social units among t he Bedo uins were the tribe and its clans; survival depe nded on a high degree of social solidarity The lex talionis or blood-revenge is the best known practice of this tribal culture .
.
[If the member of a k i n s h i p group] is killed , the others will at o n c e take steps to ave nge h i m ; i f he i s attacked, they will s pring to his s u ppo rt without asking
about the r i g h ts or w ro n gs of the m atter. I t was a sacred duty for each mem ber of the group to give "help" to another mem ber of the group and, i f nec essary , to avenge his deat h . Si nce there cou l d be no po l ic e force in the con
d i tions of the Arabian d e s ert , public sec ur i t y req uired the h i ghest regard for the [sacred and imperative] d uty o f re venge a n d " he l p . " 2 1
Late r, it became acceptable to sett l e blood-feuds by payment of compensation (a hundred camels for an adult male was customary in Muhammad's time), though a strict interpretation of the code of honor scorned this substitution of "milk for blood." B lood-fe uds sometimes continued for generations, during which tribes would avenge w rongs committed against them , feud over access to grazing and water, raid the herds of others, and prey on cara vans One safeguard against constant depredations were the holy months and holy places which provided pro tection by tacit consent. When a kin-group was weak , it m ight seek hel p .
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS from a s t ro n ge r o n e ; when an i nd i v i d u a l req u i red p rotectio n , he might become the c l i e n t of a res pected elde r . Likewise, pledges o f alliance be tw ee n k i n -gro u p s or tribe s , based o n m ut ual obligations , might prov ide protectio n . The tribal com m u n ity (gawm or umma ) was clearly o f m ajor signi fica nce, a n d the idea o f a fed eration o f tribes has re mained a p ri n c i pa l tenet o f I s la mic civi lizatio n . 2 7 I n t h e nomadic tribe s , each a d u l t m a l e w a s co ns idered a n equal ; the c h i e ftain (sayy id) , there fo re , had l i m ited powers. Leade rship in w a r , soothsayin g, and the arbitration o f d i s p u tes m i g h t b e i n the h a n d s o f others than the c h i e ftai n ; hence , t h e y co uld c u rtail h is powers . The n o b l e q u a l i ties req uired fo r t hese several fu nctions o f leader s h i p were be l ieved to be hered i tary , so the choice of leaders was restricted to c h ar ismatic a l l y q u a l i fied li neages . Since lavi s h ge neros i t y was expected o f a chieftai n , only a m a n fro m a rich clan q u a l i fied . C h i e ftai n s were chosen fro m the heads of clans but depended o n the co unsel o f the tri bal elders. Even though c h i e ftai n s h i p was heredita r y , i t req uired a conti n ua l p roof o f cou rage and c u n n i n g, prude nce a n d discretion i n counci l , and a highly developed sense of honor. W h i le an i n c u mbent cou ld design ate his successor, he would do so o n l y with d ue regard to the j udgment o f the council o f elders . 2 8 The w hole Arabian pen i n s u la w as a n isol ated a n d in hospitable a rea which w as con nected with the outside world t h ro ugh trade rou tes lead i n g fro m the southern k i n gdoms adjoi n i n g the I nd i a n Oce a n along the western coast t h rough Mecca to Syria a n d B y zanti u m i n the north and t o the Pe rsi an e m p i re i n t h e nort heas t . Fo r
a
lo n g t i m e , i nce n s e , s p ices ,
a n d prec ious artifacts h ad bee n carried a lo n g these ro utes . The southern k i n gdoms where the ro utes originated o r where good s were trans s h i p ped became a n object o f contention among rival powers. Politic s , conquest, a n d religion were s o i ntertwi ned that the pen i ns ula also be ca me the scene o f several compe ti n g creeds , a m o n g them J u daism a n d t h e C h ristian mission . T h e situation was co mpounded further by t h e great struggles i n t h e seco nd half o f t h e s i x t h century between t h e B y z a n t i n e a n d Persian e m pi res. I n this setti n g of mounti n g con fl icts , the prime i n te rest of Arab traders w as to preserve their n e u trality . N o t h i n g in the si tuation s uggested that a ge n e ration later A rab tribes would be u n i fied u nder M u h a m mad a nd i n i tiate wars o f conquest. Mecca w as the birthplace o f M u hammad . Though it lay in a n i n fertile valle y , the c i ty was located at the c rossroads o f fou r major trade route s , a n d m a n y h o l y places were within its w a l l s and i m mediate surro u n d i n gs . Mecca w a s settled by the Q u raysh, a s i ngle tribe w h ic h was relatively free of feu d s , d espite its division i n to clans. Comm u n ity affairs were regu lated by an assembly com posed of re presen tatives o f the rich and aris tocratic c l a n s . The relative peace co nt rasted with other settled a reas like
SA CRED AND SEC ULAR FO UNDA TIONS OF KINGSHIP
37
Medina, the oasis to the north where many tribes competed for domi nance. Trade interests, the peace ensured b y h o l y place s (the Ka'ba , a Meccan s a n c t u ar y devoted to the God H ubal, p ro t e ct e d the whole city) , and the a bs en ce of bloo d - fe u d s combined to make the city a haven o f tr a n q ui li t y in a world o f co n fli ct s. The whole life of the city re v o lv ed aro u n d i t s markets. Tow nsp eo ple , p i l grims vi s i t i n g t h e holy p l ace s , and tribes m e n from the s urro u nd i n g areas d epe n de d on these markets . The city's merchants i n vested i n t h e great carava n s which s u ppl i e d a l l t h e needs o f t h e i n habitan ts and tr an s po rt ed precious cargoes o f native a n d forei g n prod ucts to the em p ire s i n the north. The great wealth o f the city testi fied to t h e succes s with w h ic h lea d i n g Mecca merchants n eg o t iate d with B e d o u i n tribes and with fo re i g n powers fo r the sa fe cond uct o f their caravans. A commer cial mentality was fostered whic h gave d ue res pect to the hol y places and ancient p ractices since they were good fo r business. What Irfan Shahid said of Southern Arabi a a p plies to Mecca as well : Theirs was a busi ness c u l t u re , and their ideal was materialistic , the acq uisi tion of wealth , w hich they relentlessly pursue d , a s the Carthagi nians did, with sim ilar results. The re ma i n s of their material cultu re are u n inspiring, more interesting archeologically t han artistically , lacking that signi ficant form whic h d i fferen tiates an artefact from a work of art. . . . B ut the very same isolation which possibly o perate d to their disadvantage i n the cultu ral s phere was their salvation politically .
.
.
.
29
The peace of Mecca made it a crossroad of spiritual i n fl uences as well as of trade. To understand the character of royal a uth o r i t y i n Islamic civilization, w e m u s t understand the manner in which Mu ham mad's p ro ph ecy eme rged and became the u n i fy i n g force over the w h o le peninsula and be yo nd Max Weber has said that great rel i gious inno vations tend to occur not in "culturally satiated areas" where people are preoccupied wit h the routines o f a complex society, but in areas adjacent t o these cen ters where men still preserve "the capacity to be astonished about the course of events ."30 Something like this was probably tru e o f Mecca a n d M ed i na i n relation t o the Persian a n d B y zantin e e mp i res . Among the Qurays h within Mecca, social and cultural divisions had developed between successful merchants who had become rather indif ferent to the religious and moral traditions of their tribe and those who did not share in the wealth and power of the dominant groups. The Umayyad clan belonged to the merchants of the first ran k , but Muhammad's clan, the Hashim , did n ot Com pared with the stark life of Bedouin tribesmen , the m isfortunes of Mecca citizens were probably moderate . But Muham mad's clan headed a league of families opposed to the most successful merc h a nts of the ci t y . .
.
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS Abo u t 6 1 0 A.D. , M u h a m mad be ga n tell i n g o f his rel i gi o u s e x pe ri ences . A few fel low-citizens of Mecca were con verted by his message . M u h a m mad a n d h i s initial floc k o f believers were certainly ove rcom e by a rel igio us e x perience . B u t it is sign i fica n t nonetheless t h at the earliest pa rts o f the Qur'an warn o f a n a l l - powerful God who not only will j u d ge each m a n a n d com m u n i t y on the Last Da y , b u t who also ex pects m e n o f wealth t o hel p t h e poo r a n d t h e u n fortunate. A m o n g t h e p rophet's first fol lowers were disad va ntaged yo u n ger brothers a n d so n s , leaders o f k i n - g ro u ps that had lost out i n the com petitive struggl e , a n d fo r eigners who h ad fa i led to obta i n p rotection fro m the powerfu l . 3 1 M u h a m m a d 's message bega n by reca ll i n g the people to the p u r i t y o f a ncie n t trad ition s i n poi n ted c o n trast t o the goo d l i vi n g a n d conven tional re ligiosity common in Mecca. B u t the p ro phet' S monotheistic creed also led to contentio n s with the polytheistic , nomadic tribes of the peni n s ula, and w i th the mo not heistic J e w i s h co m m u n ities o f Medi n a . M u h am mad h a d i n i tially fo u n d p rotection fro m h i s adversaries t h ro ugh his own clan i n Mecca, but eventually h e fled to Medina. Ther� he won new adhere n ts a n d grad ually b u i lt u p a m ilitary fo rce with which he raided the herds and caravans ven t u r i n g too close to his base o f operatio n s . M u h ammad's message w a s a n ex traordin ary blend o f charismatic p ro phecy w i t h elemen ts fro m the nomadic traditio n . H is great break with that tradition consisted i n the idea of one God , Allah, who had sent His messenger, M u h a m m ad , to warn the people o f the j udgment to com e . In addition , he enj oined o n all believers a n e w form of worship which m us t be observed with p u nctilious regularity. I n the Constitution o f Med i n a , however, M u h a m mad also d rew on tribal traditions. T h e re M u h a m mad is d e picted as the Mess e n ge r
of God , as
the chief of Meccan
emigra nts , a n d as an arbiter ( hakam) o f d i s p utes . Prophecy, chieftain s h i p , a n d arbitration were a l l fa miliar as pects of t h e pre- Islamic tribes , a n d the constitutio n portrays othe r traditio n s c haracteristic of a tri bal com m u n ity. In Medina, the e m igrants fro m t h e Meccan tribe o f Qu raysh were regarded as o ne of n i ne tribes , so i n itially M uhammad did not outra n k t h e chiefs o f t h e other tribes . B u t a s t h e prophet gained ad herents to the new faith, the traditional , tribal solidarity was broade ned to all t hose "who follow them [the believers] and are attac h ed to the m and who cru sade alo ng with them . They are a s i n gle com m u n ity (umma) d istinct from [other] people ."32 This appeal to faith rather than k i ns h i p as the basis o f the com m u ni ty re p resents the other great break with tradition . B u t again , t h i s n e w precep t was e mbedded i n ancient p ractices. T h e believ ers
were
e x ho rted
to
the
same
standards
of
conduct
as
the
members o f tribes had bee n , incl u d i n g bloo d - re ve n ge , m utual ass is-
SACRED AND SEC ULA R FO UNDA TIONS OF KINGSHIP
39
tance , p rotection of the · poor, and pa t ro n cl i e n t relations. I n this way, M u ha m mad extended tr i bal beliefs and pract i ce s to the e n tire com -
m u nity o f believers.
The
doctrine
of the
u m ma, the co m m u n i ty
o f M usl i m s , is
t h e basic
po l itical co nce pt of I s l a m . A l l me mbers o f that co m m u n ity a re b o u n d toge ther by ties
of rel i g i o n
r a t h e r than race o r k i ns h i p , s i n ce all p ro fess
their bel i e f in Allah and i n the miss i o n of
fu nction within
of His p rop he t
.
W h i le d i fferences
the umma are recognize d , all m e m be r s are eq ual in
their relation to God . T h e y are ch a rged
with t he d ut y to be a r wi tness the tr ue faith , and to i n s tr u c t pe o ple in the ways o f God . A l l a h alone i s the head of t h e u m m a . H i s com ma n d s , a s re vealed to M u h a m mad , embo d y the Holy Law . I n t h i s conce p tio n , God H i mse l f is t h e sole legislator; t h e r e fo re , th e Shari'a exis ts be fore the state, and th e sole purpose of the state i s to maintain Go d ' s law . The Qu r'a n and the sayings o f the pro phet are the sole constitutional a uthority within the M u slim c o mm u n ity , yet t h ey co ntain n o precise i n s tructions con cerning the political o rg a n izatio n of the u m ma. H is tori cal p reced en ts associated with the pro phet and h is s u cces s ors provi de d what the direct expression of God's will failed to provide-guidelines for the political constitution of the M u sli m com m u n ity . It is for this reason that knowl edge of the ea rly h i s to ry of Islam is essential for an u n de r sta n d i n g of its concept of roy al a u tho r i ty With hindsight one can read into the Constitutio n o f Medina the basic poli t ical precepts of Islam as they we re for m u lated la te r : that the purpose o f man is the service of God, that this service re q u ire s an or ganized community o f true believers, and that it is im possible for a n o n Muslim to be a full member o f the c o m mu n ity 33 D u r ing the last years of his life , Muhammad lau nched a success ful mili ta r y cam pai gn a gai n st Mecca, his hometown . O nce established there, he proceeded t o range across the peninsula, combin i n g religious conversion with m i l itary pres sure and inducin g one tribe after another to acknowledge him as the me ss e n ger of God" and sole ruler over the Arab people. The Germanic and the Arab experience may be seen in parallel and contrasting terms. The m igration and conquests o f Germanic tr i bes , comin g to a head late in the fourth centu r y A.D. , he l p e d to precipi tate the down fall o f the Roman empire in the West. The migr a tio n and con quests of Arab tribes, following the death of M u hammad in 632 A. D . , made great inroads on t h e By zanti n e empire a n d helped to establish a n Islamic empire reaching at its he i g ht from the I ndian subcontinent to Spain. The battle at Tou rs and Poitiers (732 A. D . ) fi n all y halted the Mus lim advance in France , j u st a century after the death o f the prophet. By way of contrast , the Germanic tribes were converted to Chris tianity before t h ey co n quered and settled agric ultural lan d , whereas the to Allah,
to u ph o l d
.
.
"
THE AUTHORITY OF KINGS
Arab tribes spread their faith as they conquered vast terri tories, exacted tribute from the native populations and settled in urban areas. To a degree, the Germanic tribes were unified and pacified by their com mon religious conversion; by contrast, the tribes of the A rabian peninsula were pacified and unified among themselves only by joining in a holy war (jihad) against the infidel. For the Germanic tribes, migration to ward the wes t was a respo nse to the in vasions of E u ro pe by the H u n s fro m t h e east; for the tribes of t h e Arabian penins ula migration and conquest toward the nort h , the east , and the west resulted from initial conquests and conversions under the leadership of Muhammad, the prophet, followed by a holy war u nder his s uccessors beyond the con fines of the peninsula . I n western E urope , kingship arose fr om a blendin g o f Germanic and Christian e lements. Charismatic lineage, with its belie f in blood right and acclamation by the com munity Rom an legal conceptions, and consecration by the churc h as the repository o f divine grace all blended into a single tradition. Of these elements, only acclamation by the com mu nity played a role in the emergence of Islam . I deas o f blood-right had existed also, but d id not prevail against the call to a new faith by a c harismatic pro phet. Nor was this faith compatible with the organiza tion of a c h u rch. C harismatic prophecy was bou nd up with one man, M u hammad , the messenge r o f God. When he died, no one else could step into his place as a p r ophet Since he left no male descendants, we do not know whether his heirs could have established a dyn a sty o f ,
,
,
.
prophets. After Muhammad's death there was a revolt of several tribes;
other prophets appeared. Abu Bakr (632-634), M uhammad's successor by acc l amatio n , had to first subdue these rebellious tribes before he or dered them to carry war beyond the borders o f the realm the prophet had founded. Muhammad's rule was followed by the patriarchal caliphate , con sisting o f Abu Bakr, Umar (634-644) , Uthman (644-656) , and Ali (656-66 1 ) ; all four were in-laws of the prophet, members of the Qur aysh tribe, and com panions of his rise as a religio us and political leader. Abu Bakr had been chosen because Umar paid him homage in an as sembly . Abu Bakr designated Umar. When Umar lay dying he ap pointed a committee of electors whose choice fell on Uthman (an early convert, but a me mber of the U mayyad clan) . And when Uthman was murdered, the choice fell on Ali, the prophet's cousin, the husband of Muhammad's favorite daughter Fatima, but unlike the other three also a descendant of Muham mad's own clan, the Hashim. In Islam there is no agreement on the religious significance o f this account and perhaps there can not be. For the true believer, access to the truth of God's word can be h a d only through the Qur'an and the
SACRED AND SECULAR FOUNDATIONS OF
KINGSHIP
41
sayings o f the prophet. Although these sou rces provide no gu idance concerning the successio n , the true faith and man's fate de pend abso lute ly on preserving Muhammad's prophetic c harisma by finding the one right line o f successio n . I n a strictly spirit u al se nse, M u hammad could have n o successors.34 This is the reason why an "objective" history o f the caliphate (caliph means lieutenant, com pan ion , or successor, at least originally) cannot be written . There are two main branches of the Islamic tradition which began a fter Muhammad's death and continue to the present. The ma jority group (Sunni), w h ic h calls itself "the people o f the tradition," gives preferen ce to Abu B akr, Umar, U thman , the fi ve electors chosen by Umar, and those who fought alongside the prophet at the battle of Badr. Emphasis is placed on the companionship with Muhammad as the crite rion best suited to preserve his c harisma for the benefit of the com munity. Hence, successors were chosen by acclamation of the compan ions. This principle o f acclamation was inherited from the pre-I slamic tribal traditions . But the companion s o f the prophet included U thman, who belonged to the Umayyad clan which was suspect in the eyes o f believers. For this clan h a d o p posed the prophet during his lifetime and accepted the new faith only belatedly and u nder military pressure. The minority group (Shi'ites) is the Shi'at Ali or the party of Ali. Shi'ite Muslims feel that members o f the prophet's clan , the Hashim, possess special powers which set them above other men; hence, the leader of the community should be chosen from among the descendants of that clan . Among the patriarchal caliphs, only Ali possessed this qual ification, and there are various versions how and why Ali was passed over when the first three caliphs were chosen. Here the emphasis is placed on the inheritance of charisma as the criterion best suited to pre serve its benefit for the community. This a pproach accentuates the prin ciple o f blood-right also derived from pre-I slamic tribal traditions. But it quietly ignores the controversial role o f Ali himself. The early history o f t he caliphate is marked by two struggles for power. I n the first, Ali associated himself with opposition to Uth man, the descendant of the merchant Umayyad clan and therefore suspect to those who upheld the tribal traditions. Uth ma n was murdered, and this murder probably reflected conflicts between merchants and nomadic tribesmen . ( Merchants were sedentary and interested primarily i n the safety of trading; By contrast, the nomadic tribes stood in the forefront of Islamic conquests, inspired by traditions of milita ncy.) There is no evidence of Ali's direct involvement in the murder of Uthman, but his enemies attributed to him guilt by association . The second struggle for power w as precipitated when Ali as the newly chosen caliph pressed his claim against MU'awiya, the Umayyad governor of Syria. M U'awiya re-
KHAZARS MAGYARS
III �
Islam under Mohammed and Abu Bakr (to 634) Islam under Umayyad Caliphate
(to 732)
Byzantine Empire
SACRED AND SECULAR FOUNDATIONS OF KINGSHIP
43
sisted Ali and demanded vengeance for the m u rder o f Uth man . Both parties believed the Sac re d Law to be on their side and agreed to arbi tration. Tradi t ional l y, s uch arbitration was considered binding, but Ali protested when the verdict went against h i m . The standoff between the two contenders e nded w h e n Ali was m urdered in 66l.b In the same year, Mu'awiya was recogn ized as cali p h , begin n ing the U mayyad dynasty (66 1 -749).
Under this dynasty, I slam ic conq uests reached from the Indus to the Pyrenees, and on the surface the Umayyad caliphs possessed an abundance o f authority . B ut problems o f government mounted with expansion , demanding new administrative measures and the application of the Sacre d Law (Shari'a) to e ver-changing circumstances. Gradually, the task o f interpreti n g the principles laid down by the Prophet passed into the hands of spec ial ists. By 700 A.D., formal teaching had emerged, and in the circles of t h e le arned (ulema, or teachers o f the Shari'a ) , the Umayyad dynasts were percei ved increasingly as autocrats. Eventually , opposition to the Umayyad dynasty mounted, and a revolution u nder Abbasid leadership occ u rred . Under the Abbasid dynasty (750-1258), the center o f power shifted from the Umayyad capital o f D am ascus to Baghdad. In the new capital , the cali phate came un d e r the in telle c tua l a nd political influence o f the Persian imperial tradition. The Abbasids h ired Persian secretaries who advocated an au tocratic exercise of power. At the same time, the "con stitutionalist" Islamic school u nder the leadership o f the ulema had the support of the Muslim co m m unity . The Abbasid caliphate was stabilized for a time . The caliph and his deputies exe rcised political and (to an exte n t) judicial authority , w hile all religious matters were put under the scri ptural authorit y of the ul e m a . Yet Abbasid rule remained stable only briefly. Early in the ninth cen tury, warlords appeared in various parts o f t he e m pi re w hose sub ordination to the calipha te became nominal. By the early tenth cen tury, the Abbasid caliphate had weakened even in Baghdad . Turkish mer cenaries were hired in lie u of Arab tribesmen and civilians. By 935 the caliphs were forced to accept the warlo rd d ynasty of the B uwayhids (935-1058) in Bagh dad . The Abbasid caliphate lost m uch of its tem poral power when these m ilitary leaders came to rule in its name or even without its sanction and when Turkish forces replaced the Arabs as the politically dominant grou p in Islam. These events had far - reachi n g im plications for the Islam ic interpretation of royal a uthority .35 I n practice, the caliphs bec ame increasingly preoccu pied with relihSome of Ali's supporters rejected the idea of arbitration si nce according to the Qur'an rebels must be fough� until they ret urn to obedience. The so-called Khariji tes (from the verb meanin g 10 go oul) withdrew their alle giance to Ali and when they refused to listen to his appeals, he massacred them. I n 66 1 , Ali was stabbed to d ea t h by a Kha rijite fa natic.
44
THE AUTHORITY OF KINGS
gious matters while real power passed into the hands o f warlords Under the rule of these warlords, Persian secretaries su ppo rted autocracy a n d attacked t h e ort hodox Islamic insistence o n th e su premacy of t h e Sacred Law . By t he tenth ce ntury, the Abbasid caliphs had to accept the e ffec tive ru le of successive warlords; Islamic jurists were th us con fronted in practice with a system in which m i l i ta ry rulers were acc e p ted by the ca liph and exercised all authority. Under these conditions, secular go v ernment concerned w i t h mundane affairs was severe d from the cal i ph ate conce rned with upholding the religious practices o f the people. Thi s s eparation is e v iden t in a passage from Ibn Kh aldun (d. 1406). .
Natural ki ngs h ip
kingship of the warlords] forces the people to ambitions and uncontrolled desires of the ruler. Po litical government induces the people to conform to the dictates of rea son for the pro motion of worl d l y interests and the w ardi n g off o f evils. [By con trast,] the Ca lipha te lea d s the people to conform to the insigh ts of the Re (i.e., the
conform to the priva te
vea l ed Law in regard to their interests bot h in the world to come and those
in this world w h ich relate to it, s i nce all th e affairs of this world are a ss e sse d in the light of th eir relation to the interests of the future life.36
I n this formulation the caliphate is concerned only with those wo rldl y inte rests which relate to the futu re life . B y contrast, the military rulers were not concerned wit h the preservation of the Shari'a. Gibb documents that Islamic jurists increasin gly ten ded to interpret rule seized by force as legitimat e and that religio u s scholars so u gh t to pre serve intact the spir itual heritage and hence the ideal of a community ,
of believers, even if this meant a more or less com plete separation be
tween tem poral affairs and spiritual concerns. This separation had itself a religious foundation .37 The differences between the Islamic and Ch ristian traditions should be noted . Both were characterized by factionalism in their early periods. But in Christianity, conflicts between the Western Catholic and the East ern Orthodox church occurred over the proper theological interpretatio n of t h e n ature of Christ a n d over t h e pro per relation between kings and the church as successors to Christ's m ission on earth. B y contrast, the conflicts within Islam referred to a legitimation of royal authority de rived from historical events. The caliph was an absol ute ruler whose duty it was to watch over the people and, if necessary, com pel them to obey the Law . Islamic ju rists enjoined on the people the duty of complete obedience to the ruler . The Prophet said, "Do not abuse those who bear rule. If t h ey act up rig h t l y , t h ey s h a l l h ave their re ward , and your duty is to show gra titude . If t h ey do evil, they s h a l l bear the bu rden , and your duty is to endure patiently.
SACRED AND SECULAR FOUNDATIONS OF KINGSHIP
45
They are a c hastiseme n t which God infl i cts upon those w ho m He will; t here
fore accept the chastise m e n t of Go.d, not with indignation and w rath, but with hum ility and meekness."38
There was little dispute concerning the necess ity of absolute rule under God. People are weak , and Sac red Law m ust li mit their liberty o f action. A governor i s needed to restrai n the m a n d p rotect the faith I n theory, the caliph was subject to the Sac red Law a n d had to rule i n ac cord with it, for the Law e x isted indepe nde ntly of him . As succes so rs to the prophet, their authority was derived directly from God , "who as sole Head of the Community has alone the power to con fer autho rity of any kind; and this authori t y rests primarily on religio u s obligation . . . in accordance with the verse : 'Oh God, the possesso r of the kingly rule, Thou givest the rule to whom Thou wilt and withd rawest the rule from whom Thou wilt' (Q. I I I , 25-27)."39 Thus, o rthodox doctrine justified the caliph's actions, whatever they might be , as automatically in accord with the Law laid down in the Qur'an. As long as the caliphs u pheld the faith , their actual wrongdoing was a chastisement from God which no religious institution or human agency s hould atte m pt to control. The Umayyad dynasty followed the precedents established in Mu hammad's lifetime. Muhammad had acted as arbiter of disputes . The Umayyads continued this p ractice, and under their aegis the special of fice of j udge (qadi) developed. The caliphs controlled the public treasury and performed certain religious functions, s uch as leading public wor ship and delivering the Friday sermon. In these ways , the caliphs ful filled their sacred duty of u pholding the faith and thus legitimized their absolute rule in accord with the Shari'a. These accepted princi ples were nevertheless subject to d ivergent interpretations because contending parties cited one or a no th er histor ical precedent to support their cause. A legitim atio n of royal authority that depended on the actual successors to the prophet (rather than on theological argument a s in Christianity) had only precedent to rely on. For example, the Sunni doctrine o f the caliphate em phasized that ca liphs m u st be descended from Muhammad's tribe , the Q u ra ysh, and must be chosen by consensus, but the caliphate cannot be passed to a successor through inheritance . This was an argument directed against the Shi'ites by emphasizing the conditions under which Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman (but not Ali) had s ucceeded the prophet, thus up holding the princi ple of com panionship at the e x pense of charismatic inheritance .4o On an imperial scale , the Islamic community of believers replaced the solidary community of the pre-Islamic tribe . In the e mpire as in the tribe, the community (umma) e mbodied the values which the individual cherished and enjoyed solely by virtue of his membership. The word o f .
THE AUTHORITY OF KINGS
The Revelation Brought to Muhammad by the Archangel Gabriel
The depiction of the prophet and the archangel is contrary to Islamic tradition and sug gests the great tasks of religious conversion and cultural assimilation confronting the reli gious teachers, j urists, scholars, and dignitaries (ulema) of the Abbasid caliphate after the Mongol conquest. This miniature is taken Ii-om Rashid al-Din's World History. The author (c. 1247-1317) was a Persian J ew who converted to Islam and rose to great wealth and power under Mongol overlordship, fo llowi ng the Mongol capture of Baghdad in 1258. (Edinburgh University Library)
God as vo uchsafed in the Qur'an and the teachings of M uhammad pro vided the bond of brotherhood w hich allowed the Abbasids to destroy invidious distinctions between Arab and non-Arab M uslims, albeit at the price of loosening (if not losing) the unity between ethnic and religious identification . The preservation of the Sacred Law as the foundation of that brotherhood was the purpose o f the u le ma and the basis of their central, spiritual position in Islamic society, even though in the later Abbasid caliphate they lost what influence on temporal authority they had possessed before . In turn, the caliphs began as protectors of the Sacred Law and for a time enjoyed the spiritual support of the believers, as interpreted by the ulema. But no caliph was a prophet himself, and none was believed able to receive further revelations. The tradition es tablished by M uhammad was considered perfect and final. One root of the contrast between the Islamic and early C hristian
SACRED AND SECULAR FOUNDATIONS OF KINGSHIP
47
conceptions of kingship lies in the di fference between the charismatic prophecy of M u hammad and the c_h arisma of Christ as the Son of God. Muhammad was the inspired messenger of God , w hose utterances rep resented God's word and m ust be preserved in their purity. Hence , the Islamic emphasis was on the finality of this written and oral traditio n i n accord with which the com m u nity o f believers h a d to b e governed . Therefore , the task of p rotecting the Sacred Law was the supre me ob ligation of the ruler. I n the early Christian tradition, the sayings o f C hrist did not have a com parable significance . The suffering of Christ provided a more compelling symbol than his word s : through His death the Son of God suffered for our sins. Believers were purified by partaking of H is body through the sacrament. Thro ugh the a postolic s uccession , the chu rch was empowered to administer this sacrament and interpret the Scrip tures. The church fathers were, therefore, not as bound by the written word as were their Muslim counterparts .c Western European kingship and the church were greater counter weights to each other than was the case of the Islamic caliphate and the ulema. Western Europe a n kings were bound by a customary law whose interpretation was not in the sole keeping o f the ch urch . The sacral char acter of Western kingship was also ensured by the charisma o f blood right and hereditary succession. At the same time, the kings did not stand in a direct line of succession to Christ. Only the church made that claim and as the sole interpreter of Scriptures declared God's law to which even kings as mere mortals were subjec t. Yet this claim was also limited by the secular dependence of the church on the Western kings and especially on the success o f their military de fense against invasions from the East. By contrast, the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs were un able to de(end their e mpire against Turkish and Mongol inv a sions Their secular power quickly declined, but they were successors of Mu hammad to whom God had s poken directly and were thus literally the repre sentatives of God o n earth. The caliphs had the task of defending the faith in its charismatic p urity, yet they hlJd little secular power with which to discharge that sacred trust. Under these conditions, they used what influence remaine d to them on be half of Islam and its leading .
·In the Protestant tradition of Christianity, the word of th e Bible i s clearly more im portant than in the Cathol ic and thus t here is a superficial similarity between Prot est antism and Islam. But for Protestantism, the word of the Bible is the rock upon which the indi
vidual
believer bases his faith, whereas for Islam the word of the Qur'an is the utterance of God which is the Law that is binding on th e community of Muslim believers. The Prot estant em ph asis on the Bible al lo ws the individual to find and express his faith; the Islamic emphasi s on the Qu r' an makes God's word the lit era l obligation of all tr ue believers.
Mongol Conquest of a Town
The commander of the conquering forces carries a scepter and appears together with a warrior on a bridge crossing the river. Groups of warriors appear on the walls of the town (Baghdad?); two catapults are shown, as well as three female figures witnessing the scene
from walled enclosures. No enemy is shown and the sense of catastrophe is strangely absent. Perhaps this reflects the Mongol's own sense of divine vengeance. The historian J uvaini
tells that after the conquest of Bokhara Genghiz Khan rode his horse into the mosque and said to the people of the city, "I am the punishment of God. If you had not committed great
sins, God would not have sen t a punishment like me upon you. " J uvaini mentions the figure of 1 ,300,000 dead after the capture of Merv; even allowing for much exaggeration the Mongol campaigns were of the utmost savagery, using terror and devastation to achieve their ends. (Staatsbibliothek, Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin. Juvaini is qUOIed in Times LileTary Supplemenl, April 15, 1977, p. 465.)
SACRED AND SECULAR FOUNDATIONS OF KINGSHIP
49
teachers and functionaries. The purity of the faith was preserved , but at the p rice of abandonin g e fforts to make secular rulers abide by the Sacred Law. ANCESTORS, KINGS, AND OFFICIALS IN ANCIENT CHINA
The forma tion of Chinese kings h i p goes back to the Shang dyn asty, conventionally dated from 1766 to 1122 B.C., a period coinciding with the later Egyptian dynasties . This major B ronze Age civilization of North China was based on specialized agriculture . Nature and ancestor worship were dominant p ractices and have remained important in Chinese culture throughout his to ry They have had a bearing o n the legitimation of royal authority, because they signify an interdependence between the cosmos and the world of man . .
. . . Humanity is consta n tly under the i n flue nce
of forces e manatin g from the
directio ns of the com p ass and from stars and planets. These forces may pro
d uce welfare and pros p erit y or work havoc, according to whether or not in dividuals and social groups, above all the state, succeed in bringin g their lives
and activit ies in harmony with the universe. I ndivid u als
may attain s uch har
mony by following the indications offered by ast rolo gy, the lore of lucky and
u nluc k y and the
latter, as
days, and many ot her minor rules. Harmony between the empire
u niverse
a
is achieved by
organizing
the former as an image of the
universe on a smaller SCale.41
Cities were built in accord with the design of the unive rse . This cos mological parallelism was not only an inte r p re ta t io n of how things are ; it was a call to action to ensure the desired har m o n y .
The need to maintain
h armony
between the world of the gods and the
world of men req uired that man s hould
partici pa te
in cos mic eve nts by ac
companying them with ap p ro priate rituals. Such ce r e monies, either actual or
idealized, are well d oc u m ented in China from Shang times onward, being
e pitomized in the saying of Li-Chi that "in ceremonies of the
there is the same
h i e rarchica l
grandest
form
relationship as t h a t whic h exists between
Heaven and Earth."f2
The favorable outcome of human a ffa i r s de pended on whether men pe r fo rme d the proper ceremonies and made the req uired sac ri fices to the higher spiritual forces. Warfare, alliances, tribute payments, the selection of personnel, agriculture, the weather, hu nti n g sickness, dreams, child-bearing, travel plans , and other matters were subject to divination . Much a tte n t i o n was devoted to the propitiation of the an cestral spirits . The dead were believed to co nti n u e their existence in the form of the soul, and all existence was marked by the m utual depen dence between the dead and the Iiving.43 ,
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
Since all aspects of life were believed to posses s spiritual signifi cance , s pecial importa nce was attributed to the religious functions of the king. In Shang China, the king's ancestors were believed able to in tercede with the H igh God (Ti) whose blessings co uld bring prosperity and s uccess. B y means of rituals, sacrifices , and di vination, the king was believed capable of influe ncing his ancestral s pirits . Hence, the king em bodied authority because he alone could "appeal fo r the ancestral bless ing, or dissipate the ancestral cu rses , which a ffected the commonality."44 In ancient China, a tacit exchange was believed to exist between the king and his ancestors. The king depended on his ancesto rs to legitim ize his rule; the strength of the ancestors de pended in the eyes of the people on the rituals and sacrifices which the king offered . The powers of the ancestors increased in proportion to the sacrifices o ffered them, j ust as in the secular world the power of the king increased in proportion to the tribute and taxes which his agents collected from the peo ple .45 Though this function of kingshi p tends to occur wherever the wor s hip o f ancestors and o f nature prevails, the practices o f Shat1g China were distinctive . A diviner addressed a prediction, wish, or intention to a turtle shell or cattle bone, in which hollows had been bored or chiseled and in which cracks appeared when heat was applied. By interpreting the ensuing cracks, the diviner j ud ged whether or not the projected event or action had the ancestral blessi ng. As d iviner, the king served as intermediary between the people and the powerfu l spirits of his a ncestors. H is divinations were bel ie ved to increase the likelihood that crops wo uld be plentifu l and military cam paigns victorious. His proper attention to ceremonies at least showed him to be worthy of the favorable regard o f his ancestral spirits. Good crops and victories in battle were th us s piritually significant and served to strengthen the legitimacy of the king. But the inscriptions on the s hells and bones typically a ppeared in complementary fashion, allowing for a positive as well as a negative out come . Positive predictions served as a ritual incan tation because em phasis on the d esirable course of eve nts was thought to help bring it about. But negative predictions were made in the interest of realism. As Keightley explains, Only b y facing both possibilities. b y giving each possibility, a s i t were. a fair chance. could the divination itself be fair. in accord w i th reality, and thus
valid. The inscribed divinations documented the fact that fair chance had
been given, that the divination itself had been metaphysically realistic. Divi nation. and hence legitimation. was effective to the degree that it accorded with the nature of reality. The divining king had to immerse himself, as it were. in the forces of the universe. before he could emerge, triumphant. as the validated king. And by "risking" the outcome in this way. the king made
SACRED AND SECULAR FO UNDATIONS OF KINGSHIP
51
the eventual validation,-such as abundant harvest, or victory in battle,-all the greater, because all the more founded in reality.46
Adversity by itself p robably did not undermin e the king's authority, as long as he observed the pro per rituals . Nevertheless, times o f h uman or natural misfortune m ight eve ntually be considered evidence that the Mandate of Heaven had been withdrawn and that the king had forfeited his righ t to rule. This Mandate theory seems to have developed during the Western Chou empire (1122-771 B.C.), when the overthrow o f the ruling Shang dynasty was justified o n the ground that "heaven . . . sent down this ruin" on the last Shang king, so that the conquering "Chou merely assisted by carryin g o ut [the Heavenly] Mandate . "47 Here the sel f-contained syste m o f Shang beliefs see ms to h ave been used as the sim ple justification o f conquest. But the Mandate theo ry co uld be used in the same manner to j ustify subsequent conq uests or revolts. It could also be used to apply. a theory o f res ponsible government to the rule of Chinese emperors generally. Evidence for autocracy can be cited from all periods of Chinese history and finds ready assent among experts in the field .48 Nor is there much doubt that Chinese e mperors were as autocratic as they could manage to be in practice. But Creel has assembled evidence for the Western Chou dynasty w hich suggests that the theory of supreme im perial rule was at times difficult to implement. Conquering as large a territory as the Chou did was one thing, governing it another. The West ern Chou kings employed the w hole arsenal of political controls through imperial supremacy, the delegation of authority, and quasi-feudal re lations. As many as one thousand feudal "states" may have existed be tween 1122 and 221 B.C., a nd many of these vassal states were only nom inally subordinate t o the e m p eror . 49 Extremes o f autocratic centralism and near anarchy apparently existed side by side. As in other times and places, the struggles of the powerful were "sustained" by a mass o f ex ploited peasants w ho suffered the ravages o f w a r a n d gained little fro m t h e tem porary victories of their rulers.50 Amid this nearly unive rsal i nsecurity, d escendants of aristocratic fami lies (like younger brothers, sons of concubines , distant kin) came to form a motley , impoverished class o f mercen aries , scribes for hire , and itin erant teachers in search of e m ployment. Confucius (551-479 B.C.) be longed to this class. Du rin g his lifetime , he was a man o f prominence only among his disciples . He s pent m uch o f his life wandering from one noble household to anothe r , returning to h is native state of Lu in his later years . He was apparently red uced to the role of a freelance teacher and philosopher by his failure to secure an official position for any length of time .�l A good many scribes a n d teachers were com peting for employment .
.
.
52
THE AUTHORITY OF KINGS
and prod uced a welter of conflicting doctrines which a later literary con vention referred to as the hundred schools." The ti mes were out of joint. Then as now scholars had t hre e ty pic a l al tern atives for comin g to terms with such condition s . They co uld withdraw from all worldly af fairs, as did the fo under of Tao is m Lao Tzu, whose object was "the re gu lation of one's own person ... in accord with the nat u ral order o f things," ad m i tti n g n o s e l fish consideration.52 This m ys tic a l sen se o f one ness with nature had enormous a p peal , fo r it was in accord with the fundamental belief in a parallelism between the uni vers e and the world of man . Taoi sm influenced the adherents of many other doctrines, per h a p s also beca u se it glossed over the modest opport un ities of men from pro m i ne nt families who had lost out in the com pe tit i on fo r fam e and office . A second alternative was for scholars to i n g ra ti ate themselves with a local r uler, the more pow e rful the better, because power promised rich rewards and some security a gainst ill fo rtune . Scholars could offer such rulers their skills as scribes and teachers, their knowledge o f ancient texts , and their advice (although by defi nition scholars were men with out administrative ex perience). Rulers were beset by the insecurity of anarchic conditions, and every failure in peace or war jeopardized their title to rule . Hence , scholars had a certain utility if by appropriate cer emonies , by interpre tations, and by emphasis on rules and penalties they helped to legitimize a ruler. Scholars performing these functions came to be called Legalists or Realists. There was also a third alternative, albeit the most difficult o f the three. Scholars could attempt the way of reform. One can speculate that it was difficult for them to gain access to the rulers, especially those of larger states who would accept a sch olar's services only on their own terms. Access to the heads of noble households may have been more promising. Scholars themse lves were often descendants of such houses, and their services as scribes, teachers, and would-be administrators were in some demand at the level of o fficialdom . Eve n here, however , re forms were difficult to make, as Confucius and his followers discovered . But teaching and reform at this level appeared possible , since the more successfu l d ynastic rulers of the time needed skilled men to govern large territories. I n the long run, "Confucianism" affected Chinese rulership to the degree that the many doctrines which went under the name o f the great teacher became the ideology of C hinese dynastic bureaucracies. But in the first instance, Confucius addressed himself to o fficials and to those w ho aspired to government o ffice. H is attitude toward the religious be lie fs of his time had special im portance for his teaching. U nder the Western and Eastern C hou dynasty (1 122-256 B.C . ), tra"
,
S ACRED AND SECULAR FOUNDATIONS OF KINGSHIP
53
d itional religious practices-the sacrifices to Heaven and the ancestral s pirits-had done nothing to ensu re peace and prosperity. One conse q uence was a rise of s ke pticism among the Chinese aristocracy along with the proliferation of omens and spirits w hich people ho ped would ensure good fortune. In this setting, Con fucius aimed at a decrease in pol itical anarchy and the restoration o f social norms. H e su pported the conventional religious practices of the day; to h ave challenged them would h ave jeopardize d basic belie fs of his time and thus added to in stability. But Confucius refrained from raising religious issues. He would serve people and understand life rather than serve the spirits and be concerned with death . O ne sho u ld do for the ancestral spirits all that was proper, but Confucius did not recommend either sacrifices or any o ther religious practice in o rder to deal with the world's ills. Con fucius was no t a n irreligious man. I n his view, Heaven sanc tioned his great mission. Heaven was the source of trut h , of protection against enemies, and o f comfort in adversity. But Con fucius' own atti tude was detached . Making sacrifices was only pro per, but to expect Heaven's reward in ret u rn was not. The proper attitude was the practice of virtue without thought of reward. Confucius instructed by example and by appeals to the understanding, not by charismatic appeals as the messenger of God, let alone of a single God. Later generations attrib uted charis matic powers to him and to his teaching, but he himsel f dis claimed them.53 His ethical teachin g called for a fundamental reorientation. Indi rectly, at least, it challenged the ancient notion that religious observances would be conducive to well-being and a long life in this world. Though he permitted such beliefs among the com mon people, Confucius told the rulers of his time in effect that fitness to rule depended on. vi"rtue and ability.d This advic e was offered to warring nobles who though t the fortunes of their house depended on the military arts; it was offered to men of humble origin who conquered power and tried to rule by force alone. Such men vied with one another in a war o f all against all in which life was indeed nasty, brutish, and short. In this setting, it made sense to emphasize self-control and tell the rulers that good ministers could secure prosperity and keep the people content. dThe elitism of the doctrine was expressed by Hsiin Tzu, about the middle of the third century B.C.: "Sacrificial rites are the expression of man's affectionate longings. They represent the height of altruism, faithfulness, love, and reverence. They represent the completion of propriety and refinement. If there were no Sages, no one could understand this. The Sage plainly understands it; the scholar and superior man accordingly performs it; the official observes it; and among the people it becomes an established custom. Among Superior Men it is considered to be a human practice; among the common people it is considered to be a serving of the spirits . . . . " (Quoted in C. K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society, p.48).
THE
54
A UTHORITY
OF KINGS
If one is able to correct himself, what difficulty will he find in carrying on government? But if a man cannot govern himself, what has he to do with governing others?
But these ad monitions to the powerful co uld be ignored . For years Con fucius failed to secu re an appointment. Th is experience may be re flected in the teaching he addressed to aspiring o fficials: Do not be concerned that you are not in office, but only about making
yourself fit for one. Do not be concerned if you win no recognition; only seek to make yourself worthy of it.
That advice was es pecially suitable for men who enjoyed a genteel way of life . H owever , it emph asized virtue rather than hereditary status o r wealth, a n d i t mini mized ritual observa nces designed to e nlist Heavenly blessings in matters that were beyond o ne's control .54 Co nfuci us attached a com prehensive mean ing to the single princi ple or Way (Tao) whic h should govern the cond uct of a gentle man or person o f high character: Death and life are as decreed, wealth and rank depend upon Heaven; the gentleman is serious and does not fail in his duties, he beh aves cour teously to others and accords with
Ii.
Originally, li referred to religious ritual. As Creel observes, the decorum observed in ritual became the ideal standard of conduct. Con fucius ex tended the meaning of the term by em phasizing the spirit i n which sac rifices were made. As he said, "I cannot bear to see the forms of Ii gone thro u gh by those who have no reverence in their hearts ." The proper forms of conduct animated by a sincere spirit were a pplied beyond ritual to other spheres o f behavior: Courtesy, if not regulated by
Ii,
becomes labored effort; caution, if not
regulated by ii, becomes mere timidity; courage, if not regulated by ii, be
comes mere unruliness; frankness, if not regulated by
Ii,
becomes mere
effrontery.55
This principle of decorum or pro priety (Ii) was a guide to action . Con fucius called not only for sincerity, but for the virtues of an aristocrat w ithout the vices. Poise and flexibility were to come from self-reliance and independence. Self-cultivation was to ind uce peace of mind. These qualities allowed one to ad mit his mistakes and correct them openly ; it also allowed him to say, " I f upon looking into my heart I find that I am right , I will go forward though those that oppose me number thousands and tens of thousands ."56 Nothin g in the career of Con fucius or the circumstances of his day suggests that some three centuries after his death Con fucianism would
SACRED AND SECULAR FO UNDA TIONS OF KINGSHIP
55
begin its ascendance as a -m ajor belief-system in Chinese civili zation . We m ust not con fuse Con fucianism with the original t eachings o f the mas ter, nor impute to the Con fucian interpretat ion of kingshi p a consistency it did not possess . I n a n e ra of great political fragmentation and almost continuous vendettas, it was u nlike ly that itinerant teachers in search of em ploy m e n t wou ld have much influe n ce . A main condition for the rise o f Con fu cianism as a state doctrine was an alliance o f its disciples with the vic torious contenders in o ne of the many dynastic struggles of the period . For centuries after the death o f Con fucius, that prospect seemed dim . However, one should not underestimate the incons p icuous but wide s pread influence o f moral teaching itself, for when China was u n i fied for the first time unde r the C h 'in d ynasty (221-206 B.C.) the emperor Shih H uang-ti in part adhered to Con fucian principles . M orality was by that time conceived in Con fucian terms, and no ruler wo u ld forego ap peals to morality. In p ractice, Shih Huang-ti favored the teachers and scribes disposed to support his despotic rule. Pro minent among his officia ls were follow ers of the School of Law (Fa-chia), w h ic h dated back to the fourth cen tury B.C. The Legali sts identified with the ruler and h is p roblems. They taught that laws were binding not for reasons of justice , but solely because violations would d i mi n is h when they were punished q uickly and with utmost severity. The people did not understand p ublic affairs and could only be expected to fear the ruler and the state. Legalist doctrine was strictly utilitarian: many crimes and punishments were costly and could be avoided if punish ments were so severe that only a few crimes were com mi tted. Many laws and severe punishments were the main method to uni fy the country and benefit it as a w hole . These methods must have appeared useful for the consolidation of power, but it is doubtfu l w hether the first empe ror completely agreed with Legalist doctrine. Though Shih H uang-ti is notorious for orde ring the burning o f Confucian books and the execution o f scholars, he also sponsore d the collectio n o f books and their study by Confu cians and others. His despotic rule help ed to create a unified empire, and he uti lized all the ideas of his age to legitimize his regime. He sponsored the Legalists when they served his purposes but probably rejected their pu re ly utilitarian attitude toward governance and d id not forego the moral support of Confucian teaching.57 In practice, Shih Huang-ti's rule was e xtremely punitive and e ventually pr ovo ked widespread rebellions leading to the overthrow o f the Ch'in dynasty. Confucian scholars were associated with the rebels, the founders of the Han dynasty. The posi tion of Con fucianism was o fficially consolidated through sponsorship by the Han em peror, Wu Ti ( 1 40-87 B.C. ) .58
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
This ou tward ascendance of Con fucianism did not terminate the "battle o f the books" among rival schools of thought and contenders for office. By the first century B.C., " Co n fucianism" had become an amal gam of many elements derived from interpretations of ancient texts and the ideas of Con fucius. Modern scholars m ust try to unscramble the texts to discove r the probable date o f composition and the most likely intent behind the apparent textual manipulation .59 These manipu lations had their root not only in the ambitions of rival scholars , but in the con flicting im peratives of imperial rule . I n a unified China, the em peror sought to concentrate authority in his hands and enhance it by exploiting the people and resou rces o f the cou ntry. But the emperor also sought to avert rebellion and retain the throne for himself and his descendants. Thus, he m ight tem per his am bition and exploitation by responding to popular grievances. U nder the Han dynasty, both alternatives found their scholarly champ ions within Con fu cia nism, which by then had melded ine xt r ica bl y the va r io u s tra ditions of Lao Tzu , Confucius, and the Lega list sc h oo l . T he ea rly Han dyn as t y was founded i n 2 0 6 B.C. and th e first two rulers see m ed to a b i d e b y th e origin al prece pts of Confucius. Han Kao tzu (202-195 B.C.), w ho was the son of a farmer, so u gh t counsel from elders and officials and even yielded to their advice o n the question of succession. His eldest son, Em peror Wen, is de pic te d in the A n n al s as the ideal Confucian ruler. Whatever the facts may have been, the pur poses of a new d y nast y , w hich originated in rebellion, as we ll as of Con fucian scholars were served by praising We n's e x e m p l a ry conduct , which did not arise from laws or punishment. Confuci u s said, "Lead the people with gove rnmental meas u re s and reg u late them by law and punish ment, and they will avoid w rongdoing bu t will have no sense of honor and shame. Lead the m with virtue and regulate the m b y t h e rules o f propriety (li), and th ey w i ll have a sense of shame and, more ove r , set the mselves right"
[Analects 2:3].60
However, Confucianism in its more Le g a list modes also contained the o p po s ite precepts, formulated in the Han Fei Tzu. This collectio n of wr i t in gs shared the Master's distrust of supe r stition, but not his benign view of human nature . In the op i n i o n of those who followed the teach ings of the Han Fei Tzu, behavior must be regulated by law . The ruler must have at his disposal a "succinct, easily understood, and consistent" la ng uage so that his statutes will be acce p te d by the people as right and true . Scholars are always tellin g us that punish ments sho uld be li ght. This i s
t h e way t o bring abo ut confus ion and r uin. Th e object o f re wards i s to en
co u rage; that of punish me n t , to prevent. If re wards are h i gh . th en what t h e
SACRED AND SEC ULAR FO UNDA TIONS OF KINGSHIP rul e r w an ts w i l l be
q uickly
57
effected; i f pun is hments are h ea v y , w h a t h e does
not wa n t w i l l be swiftly pre ven ted..' 1
Governme nt by virtuous example and government by rules and punish ment were the two ideologies corres ponding to the con flicti ng im pera t ives of im perial ru l e . The government o f the Han emperor Wu Ti illus trates that in p rac tice it was easy to combine what seemed logically distinct, and indeed contradictory. In view of the anti-Confucian tendencies o f the Ch'in dynasty , Wu made a great show o f sup porting Confucian precepts , but in practice he em ployed men who defe nded or assisted his autocratic rule . In t h i s way, Co n fu cianism became the state-subsidi zed doctri ne of the empire , while ambitious o fficials assisted autocratic rule . Much of the government was run on Legalist princi ples , including the exami nation system , but the teac h ing o f Confucianism con tinued to allow for some influence of the o riginal teachings with their eth ical and anti-statist tendencies.62 Whenever the one princi ple res ulted in cumulative diffi culties, the other could p rovide the needed ideological corrective . C ONC LUS ION The Western, Islamic, and C hinese tradition s have in common an appeal to a higher power to legitimize secular rulers. They differ in their conceptio n o f the believe r's o bligations, in their idea of the higher power, and in the specialists w ho interpreted the meaning of transcen dent forces in relation to royal authority. Earlier I noted the contrast between the C hristian belief in the Son of God as the sole redeemer of mankind and the Islamic belief in Muhamm ad the Prophet as the sole transm itter o f God's word to man kind. For the early C hristian believer, the most significant means of identification with God is to partake of the sac raments, the transsub stantiated representation o f Christ's flesh and blood. For the M uslim believe r, the most significant means o f identification with God is each individu al's strict o bservance of prescribed prayer and of adherence to the Sacred Law, as the Prophet transmitted it directly from God. For the Con fucian believer (if that is quite the word), the m ost sign i ficant means of identification with the ancestral spirits and the cosmological order they inhabit is to observe the rules of proper conduct. These rules bear on the "five relationships" o f ruler to subject, father to son, hus band to wife, elder to you n ger brother, and friend to friend. Religion has its own logic. Special acts o f worship or prescribed con duct relate the believer to a transcendent power. Knowledge of this power is sacred. It is by reference to this knowledge of the sacred that people have attempted to c urtail claims to unlimited royal authority.
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
In the early Christian tradit i on , the be lie ver worships the C reator as H is works have revealed Him and as He h as shown H is special mercy to mankind through the coming, the message , and the sacrificial death of H is own Son. This conception of one omnipotent and omniscient God re presents an ultimate myste ry which the believe r a pproaches through an act of faith, subsequently mediated by the church. In the Western tradition , the church came to o p pose royal succession on the basis of blood-right because belief in the d ivine descent of kings was incom pat i ble with belief in the Son of God as the sole redeemer of mankind. The po pes claimed, and were believed, to be the direct successors of C hrist's m ission on earth . I n this ca pacity the y claimed ultimate jurisdiction in all matters pertaining to the salvation of souls. I n practice, these m atters im pinged on secular a ffairs at many po ints; hence, the papal claim i m par ted a tension between the sacred and the pro fane to all aspects o f life . N o t only the family, but state affairs and royal authority were af fected by this tension. The king was i ndeed the supreme ruler subject to none, but still he was a man and as such subject to God's Law as in terpreted by the church. That Law was itself part of the divine mystery, and royal violation o f it condemned the king to eternal damnation. This ultimate subjection of the royal will to God's Law rested on the spiritual claim of the church as the sole repository of divine grace and the only authentic interpreter of the divine word. But in a more practical sense, the royal will was limited as well by the wealth and in fluence of the church hierarchy, at least when o p portunity arose to bring that in flu e nce to bear. I n the I slamic tradition, the believer worships the Creator as H is words have revealed H im through M u hammad, the messenger o f God. In contrast to C atholicism, Islamic religion knows no u ltimate mystery because God has revealed himself through the Qur'an and the sayings o f the Prophet. Hence, the believe r's task is to worship as he has been taught, for God's truth is known , at least to those learned in the Sacred Law. K ings stand in the same relation to God's revealed truth as all other Muslim believers , even though their high position im poses special ob ligations on them. They must use their secular power to protect God's truth as embodied in Sacred Law, and they must be a model to the Mus lim community in e ndowing and adorning the places of worship sanc tified by traditio n . Ultimately, rulers are subject to God's law, but onl y in the sense that as successors to the Prophet their authority is directly derived from God. This direct authentication has failed to impart to I slamic k i ngship a tension similar to that of the Western tradition. K in gs worship like other M uslim believers. And in practice the ulema are in dividual interpreters o f the sacred texts, often at odds with one another, and without the hierarchic organization, secular strength, and monop olistic claims of the Catholic church. The caliphs have had to cope only
SACRED AND SECULA R FOUNDATIONS OF KINGSHIP
59
with the spiritual hazards common to all M uslim believers , because thei r rule was a mere instrument o f God w h o was the sole head of the I slam ic co m m u nity . I n the Con fucian traditio n , the head of the family perform s the re ligious rites on behal f of all me mbers much as the e m peror as the Son of Heaven performs the rites on behalf of the w hole society . The object of these rites at all social levels is to " ma i ntain harmony between the world of the gods and the world of men" ( Wheatley) . I n this system , there are no i nstitutional c hecks on the su preme autho rity o f the he redi tary monarch. Nevertheless, his actions can be circ u mscribed not only by social precede n ts , b ut by the suggestions and advice of officials whose p rimary allegian ce is to the preservation o f the Way . D u ring the early Han dynasty, the Con fucian literati ' develo ped as a status group distinguished from p r iests p r eci s ely because their expertise concerning ritual observances cast them in the role o f advisors to heads of families from the emperor on down, not in the role of religious functionaries marked off by an act of ordination. In the Con fucian i nt e rpretation of Hsiin Tzu, the em peror's authority is unquest io n ed as long as the state prospers. But loss of social harmony is prima facie e vid e nc e that the mon arch has not been an effective mediator between heaven and earth , and a ruler who does not fol low the Way may be replaced by one who does . In this interpretation, i n flue nce and political power m ust be wielded by those who know how to conduct themselves so as to preserve the desired harmony between the world of man and the cosmos. Wealth and birth are irrelevant considerations. All those who possess the requisite knowl edge are entitled to rule.63 Thus, in Chinese civilization, the ideal of ki n gs hip is not formulated by an elite of experts in holy writ who circumscribe royal authority-at least theoretically-th ro ugh an a p p e a l to d ivine re velatio n . Theo reti cally again, Chi nese royal authority is circumscribed by an elite of schol ars and officials learned in the Way, who conduct the affairs o f govern ment or a spi re to do so. Skepticis m is certainly in ord er concerning the efficacy of such teaching b y , and largely for, government officials. But I doubt that complete cynicis m i s realistic . Even though scholars agree that China has been ch arac terized by two tho usand years of autocracy, they can hardly mean that all autocrats were eq ually e ffective . Nor is it wise to n e glect the opportunities of in fluence ope n to s ubordinates even under effective imperial rule. The ideal Chinese emperor was a projec tion of his own subordi na tes, and I believe that e ven strong rulers had moments of weakness o r indecision when the wh ispered counsel of an aide could make a difference , even aside from the more overt political functions of astronomers.64 These aides and advisors of Chinese em perors were influenced greatly by a hallowed cultural tradition o f ri c h texture and ancient origin. Rarely, if ever, have the rulers o f great em-
60
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
pires been confronted for two millen nia by a class of s ubordinates so stee ped in a cultural mode of expression that it could a ffect every bit o f court intrigue a n d even t h e most sel f-possessed autocrat. This comparative study o f k i ngship has bee n concerned with a uni versal aspect of the h uman condition . Legitimation calls for reasons. Even in ages of fai th , reasons provoke arguments , and appeals to a higher power can be used by the weak as well as the strong. There fore , authority relations are bilateral, i nvolving an "exchange" between ruler and ruled that creates dilem mas and contradictions for the rulers. This chapter has shown that the authority of kings became d i ffer entiated in an early age o f religious creativity, when the kinship-based sources of tribal authority were supplemented or replaced by types o f charisma tic authentication unrelated t o kinship. T h e early patterns of royal authority necessarily develo ped in the context o f i nternal political struggles and relations with foreign powers. At the same time, kings always rule with the assistance of their entourages, and their _consecra tion and social supre macy buttress the rank-order of society. For this reason I re fer to kingship and oligarchy as a type o f rule , and the fol lowing chapters (3-6) are roughly divided into a discussion o f royal au thority on the one hand and aristocratic (oligarchic) governance o n the other.
3 JAPAN
RIVAL
CLANS AN D
I M PE RI A L AUTHORITY
T
H E EARLI EST Japanese ch ron icles were com posed i n the eighth century A. D . The Record of Ancient Matters (Kojiki) and the C h ronicles o f Japan ( Nihon-shoki o r Nihongi) con tain legends or myths describing the genesis of the J a panese islands , the life of the gods, the foundation o f the imperial house, and the history of the Japanese empire u p to 697 A. D . The legends are mingled with historical accounts describin g contentions a mo n g rival clans. Fo rtu nately , Chinese chronicles concerning Japan composed before the eighth century provide additional information which allows us to examine the gradual transformation both of clan organization into an i mperial state and of nature and ancestor worship into a dynas tic cult. Early Japanese society was divided into three classes . An upper or ruling class consisted o f large clans of families (Uji) related in fact or fiction to main-descent lineages . 1 A second class of com mo n workers (be) was grouped by locale o r occu patio n . A third class o f slaves (nuhi) -approxi ma tely 5 p e rce n t of the po p u lation -was attached to the households of the upper class . Each ruling clan was u nited by a com mon ancestor cult and ances tral myths, and its leaders claimed descen t fro m an ancestral god . Hence , the political unification among clans depended on a mergin g of cults. Such mergers were probably pro moted by the necessity of or ganizing for defense against native tribes and against the possibility of a Chinese invasion . It was chiefly through t h e s pread of an exte nded k i n s h i p syste m and the tighte n i n g of marriage and fictive k i n s h i p bon d s with a n i n c reas i n gly la rge bod y of subservient fa m i l y l i n e s that the a uth ority of t h e Ya mato chie ftain was ext ended . . . . One of the strongest co n t i n u i n g methods of ce m e n t i n g close but s ubservient ties was the taking of w i ves a n d "tribu te" men and women fro m the fa m i l ies of s ub o rd i n ate chiefs. Tribute fe males freq uently fo und their way i n to the
61
THE AUTHORITY OF KINGS
Haniwa Warrior
People buried their eminen t dead in huge earthen mounds (tumuli) which con tained colored pottery an d clay figures o f an imals an d people known as haniwa. This fi gure o f a warrior from a late tumulus (c. sixth
century A . D . ) comes from Fuj ioka. Gumma Pre fecture. These tumuli and their con tents represent part of the evidence for the ex istence of rival clans during the third to sixth centuries A.D. (Asian A r t M useum o f San francisco. T h e Avery Brundage Collection) gro up of recognized w i ves of the Yamato chie ftains. Tribute males served as
guards and servan ts of the sovereign . W hile in the ser vice of the soverei gn. s uch indi vid uals must also have remai ne d as h ostage s on behal f of the i r own family.2
Familial consolidation through real or fictive kinship ties was sup ported at an early time by the popu lar nature worshi p (Shinto). All as pects of life . including inanimate objects, were seen as harboring a spir itual presence and were worshiped accordingly. I n Japanese, this presence was designated by the word kami . T he great ancestors a n d the great heroe s have it. So have certain objects. like rocks and t ree s, and certain places like grove s and sprin gs, an d certain im portant t h i n gs like tools and weapons and boun dary stones betwee n fields. The quality may be confe rred by rarity, or by beauty , or by exce ptional s hape
JAPAN or size, or by great utility worshippe r . 3
or
by past h istory, or only by the fee ling o f t h e
To ward off calamities an d ensure the good life , it was im portant to make the kami favorably inclined and thereby avoid the contam ina tion or pollu tion that wou ld arise from its ill will. The earliest records refe r to an "abstainer" whose d uty was to m a i n t a in ceremonial pu rity on behalf of the comm u nity. I n a world in w hich that pu rity was con sidered the m a in condition of h u man welfare, all ceremonies which re moved impu rities gave e xtraordinary importance to a ruler capable of intercedin g with the spirits on behalf o f the peo ple . 4 These Shinto be lie fs retained an unbroken hold on J a panese culture for centuries. They were anonymous in the sense that they were not associated with the name of an early religiou s leader. Their c ontinuity with fol k beliefs stands i n marked con trast to Christian ity, I slam and Con fucianism , since these other belief sys tems a rose through a revolution of ethical ideas w hether inspired by the Son of God, the messenger of God, or a great teacher o f m o r als. The Japanese chronicles o f the eighth century relate the rise o f kingship t o contention s among the gods. I n these con te ntions the Sun Goddess (A materasu-omikami ) was victorious. The legendary first em peror of Japan, Ji m m u (660 B.C.), w as said to be o f divi n e descent. This idea of divine d es ce nt contrasts with the charismatic perso na lity and mes sage of C hrist and Muhammad, whose claims of divine inspiration un dermined the old gods The continuity of the Japanese imperi a l tradi tion with earlier beliefs is stri king e ven when co m pared with the Chinese experience. Con fucius e m phas i zed the practice o f virtue while merely t o le rating folk-beliefs, a nd h is disc iples t a ught that such beliefs were for the m asses, while virtue was for the ru l ers Among the countries con sidered in this study, J apan is the only one in which politic a l u nity and royal authority were justified by ancestor-worshi p in times prior to re corded history. The Japanese emperor was believed to be the descen dant of deities and to be a deity hi m se l f The Chronicles record that the Sun Goddess sent the God-child Jimmu to rule Japan and that he descended to the island of Kyushu. It is also stated that this fi rst emperor started from Kyushu, and proceeded to conquer the east. After much fighting, he established his rule in Ya mato, which became the center of Japan . T hereafter , the earliest rulers o f Japan were grouped together under the Yamato dynasty, and while much remains nebulous a few details emerge which shed light on the rise of Japanese kingship. The pol itical consolidation under the Yamato consisted o f struggles with other clans, sporad ic fighting against tribes on th e expanding fron,
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THE
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P R O V I N C E S
A.D.
JAPA N
tiers o f the realm , and expansion to the Korean peninsula.a Priestly functions were performed by the head of each cla n ; thus, eac h claimed access to the ancestral s pirits of his house. If a divinely descended, im perial lineage was to e merge from among many rival clans, it had to make s pecial claims based not only on its esoteric knowledge of cere mony , like the "abstain ers" of old, but also on its wealth and recognition by others . In the early period, the house of the Yamato was only one great clan among man y , and the other clans also possessed hereditary, priestly fu nctions . Claims to divine descent were presu mably a factor in the rise of one clan over others, but with all clans practicing ancestor worship the descent of any one could be rather insignificant. I n the case of t h e Yamato dynasty, the e m peror possessed the sa cred regalia and represented the people in Japan's relatio ns with China, where m uch importance was attached to d y nastic claims. The Yamato house also increased its wealth by sponsoring the establishment of he reditary occu pations. M a ny of the workers were skilled artisans, scribes, and scholars from Korea whose work was highly val ued . But neither the regalia, nor foreign rec o gnitio n , nor increasi ng wealth were sufficient. The position of the Yamato throne depended in the long run on rec ognition by the great territorial chieftains who were leaders of other clans, ruled their own do m ains , had their own corporations of heredi tary workers, and comm anded the loyalt y of all those united with them in a common worship. In the provinces, these clan-chieftains were the effective local rulers. Gradually they accepted the mythological and cer emonial supremacy of the Yamato house , which i ncreasi ngly had func tioned as an arbiter among the c lans. Real or fictive kinship ties with the d y nasty facilitated acceptance of imperial rule.5 At the court of the Yamato dynasty, formal s ubservience to the em peror by the heads of o t her clans did little to m itigate the murderous rivalries among them. They wanted power for themselves even though they recognized the pri macy of the Yamato house . They sought power by acting as the senior ministers or protectors of the throne. As in the early history of mon a rchies e lsewhere , earl y Japanese history is a story of rivalries, intrigues, assassinations, and military cam paigns among the aThe Japanese established an e nclave in Korea in the middle of the fourth century but were fi nally ousted from Korea by the C h in ese in 622. The sixt eenth cent u ry witn essed
another Japanese attempt to gai n a foothold in Korea w h ich a l so ended in military defeat. A third expansion on the mainland was the Japanese " co-prosperity sphere" in 1 9391 945. I n fifteen hundred years, there were only three direct threat s against Japan from abroa d : the unsu ccessfu l Mongol i nvasions of the thi rteenth century, Western tradi n g and missionary i ntrusions which en ded in th e seventeenth and onl y resume d in th e nineteenth century, and the American oc c u pati on after World War I I . Japa n probably enjoyed longer periods of i mmu n ity from ou tsi de in terference tha n any other civili zation.
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
66
great nobles , who desired access to positions close to the throne . Dis putes over succession were used to en hance the cause of one clan over another. I n these stru ggles s u r ro u n d i n g the t h ro ne t h e Soga family was the first to achieve asc e ndan c e ,
.
m u ltipl e h ier archy of gove r n m e n t is ch arac ter is t i c of all monar c h ical rule . Even a k i n g who rules as w e l l as reig ns relies o n men who are strong-willed an d powerfu l i n their o w n right. Such men usurp some function s of management and th us multiply th e h ierarchies of auth o r i t y . Traditional Japanese s o ci e t y s ho w s t h i s phenomenon i n a marked de gree, for where the ruler is be lieved to be a god , i t is easy to so exalt the i n c u m be n t that h e cannot concern h i m se l f w i t h the management o f af fa i rs in the country. The e m p e ror either retains decision-making powers and c o n t rols the c h i e f mi nisters who manage in his b e h a l f, or h e w i l l become a mere fi g ure h ead in whose name the min isters make all im portant decisions. I m perial rule in Japan was divided into two hierarchies. One h ier arc hy consisted of the imperial family with its largely ceremonial func tions, attended by a court nobility. Maintenance of these noble families and of the imperial household de pended o n extensive estates. Although government was conducted in the name of the emperor, neither he nor his court was directly involved with public a ffairs-except in two re spects. Since all elevations in ran k formally depended on the imperial sanction, there was much manipulation of etiquette and rank . Inevitably, the court was also involved in disputes over the succession. The second hierarchy consisted of a regent (sessho ) and various high offices of gove rnment under him. I n 830 A . D . , the position of civil d ic tator (kampaku) was created in place o f the office of regent and made hereditary i n the Fujiwara fam ily. The creation of this office marked the ascendance o f a governing executive over the emperor. The man appointed as dictator acted as head of his clan, as manager of govern mental affairs, and as chief "advisor" to the throne . In the first capacity, leaders of the Soga and then of the Fujiwara families managed the ex tensive lands and hereditary corporations of workers which belon ged to their respective clans. At court, they buttressed their commanding po sitions by marrying their daughters or other closely related women to the em peror or descendants of the imperial family. As the effective head of government and recognized "advisor" to the throne, the kampaku exercised dictatorial powers. Thus, the fusion of wealth and authority was largely located in this paragovernment, while the fusion of wealth and status remained with the imperial house . The rising prominence of the i m perial institution and the ascen dance of a go ve r ning clan , the Soga, at the side of the imperial family A
JAPAN
in the sixth and early seventh centuries seem-at least for a time-to have been two aspects of the same develo pment. Both were part of a political consolidation marked by the increase of estates (miyake) held under direct o w nership of the Yamato rulers and ma naged by the head of the Soga fam i l y . 6 B u t at the same time, disun ity among the leading clans was rife and di s lo y alt y to the rei g ning e m peror quite com mon . The struggles for hegemony within J a pan may acco unt for the early occu p ation of Korea, since foreign conquests co uld tip the ba lance o f fo rces at home. Ja pan 's military i nvol vement in Korea required a cen tr al or ganization and considerable resou rces at the dis posal of the Yamato rulers. The introduction o f B uddhism aided the consolidation o f Yamato rule . Monks traveli n g with foreign merchants from I ndia had bro ught Buddhism to China in the later Han d y n ast y (25-220 A . D . ) . Con fucian scholars and members of the Chinese gentry regarded these monks with contempt as belonging to the lower class . But B uddhism came to have a popular appeal. I ts doctrine of reincarnation s uggested that the offi cials opp ressing the people would receive their j ust p unishment, for they would be reborn disfigured and in a lowly position. And the deprived who suffered unjustly in this life could be reborn in a high position in the next. The temples were relatively secure from attack because of their religious mission, and this sec urity prompted poor peasants to settle nearby. However, Buddhism appealed not only to the co mmon people of China; it also appealed to merchants who used the B uddhist mon asteries as banks, warehouses , and places of exchange and therefore donated money and land to Buddhist temples. 7 By the sixth century A.D. Buddhism had spread to J apan , and between 6 2 4 and 692 the number of Buddhist monasterie s and shrines increased from 46 to 545 . The most p r o m i ne nt Buddhist shrine was located in Nara, where the im perial court established its capital in 7 1 0. b In Japan , certain prominent clans sponsored Buddhist tem ples much as they did Shinto sh rines. In these temples , various scriptures (sutras) were recited for their supposed power to bring health, good for tune, and long life . Buddhism acq UI r ed a universal appeal with its debJ a pane se his to r y is di v i d e d into named periods . O ur knowledge of the ea rly history
is largely based on the a r ti fac t s found in earthen mounds erected over the tombs of Uji chieftains. This pe riod is, there fore, called Shizoku, or sometimes Vji , and ex tende d from about 50 B . C . to 552 A. D. The Yamato state (ca. 300-645 ) overlaps w i t h this period. Su b sequent pe r iod s are named after the Tai ka re forms (552 - 7 1 0) , the c a.p ita l of Nara (7 1 0-7 84) , a n d the second ca pital of Heian ( K y ot o) , which is divided into an early ( 7 84857) and later ( 85 7- 1 1 60) H e i a n pe riod. The later Heian period is a ls o called F ujiwa ra
after the fa mi l y of regents (la t er civil dictators) who ruled t h e cou ntry in the name of the emperor.
68
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
veloped art, rituals, and vol umino us scri ptural literature . Buddhism as a co mmon faith could help overco me the political and religious divisions among the clans because it was not bound u p with ancesto r worship. Under the leadership o f Shoto ku Tais hi ( 574 -622) , B uddhism received its patronage increasingly from the i m perial co urt, and the i m portance o f clan-sponsored Buddhist tem ples decli ned .c Accordingly, the Bud d h ist establishment focused its attention on the performance of o fficial ce remonies in the i m perial capital, while in the provi nces the B uddhist clergy and B uddhist temples were subjected to govern mental controls .8 Whereas Sh into was related to the authority structu re o f the clans, B u ddhism helped turn the attention o f the people toward the capital and the im perial court.9 It should be added , of course , that the increase of land controlled by Buddhist monasteries and their close ties with court a ffai rs i ncreased the secular involveme nts o f B uddhis m . With drawal into a monastery even at an early age became a h ighly esteemed form of retireme nt for the court nobility. The initial rise o f imperial power was also aided by the adaptation of Chinese principles of ad ministration to Japanese conditions : Through the Taika reforms o f 646 and subsequent codifications, the imperial government claimed sovere ignty over all privately held land. Based on a national survey, i ncomplete population and tax registers were d rawn up and laws enacted which would d istribute rice lands and tax liabilities accordingly. Let men o f s k i l l and i n t e l l i gence w i t h a b i l i ty a t w ri t i n g an d a r i t h metic b e se
lected as a d m i n istrative c h i e fs a n d record keepers . ' o
Here was a concerted effort t o strengthen the central government by the appointment o f government officials , the ado ption of codes of law , and the central organization of local govern ment, taxation , and military recruitment. H istorians are unanimous that these reforms failed to establish an effecti ve, nationwide administrative syste m . Such a system did not exist in China either, but the ideal imperial bureaucracy of China was used as the model for Japan. In practice, the Taika reforms fused a central administrative system with the locally dominant clans. The eThere were p robably other reasons why B uddhism was received differently in China and Japan. On the surface, the main differe nce was that the Chi nese gentry rejected Buddh ism , wh ile in Ja pan the high soc iet y at cou rt and the heads of lead ing clans accepted it. One reason may be that in China, Buddhism challenged the Con fucian monopoly of learn i ng, whereas in Japan Budd hist teach ing was added to the Shi nto cults and the elab orate ceremon ial life at court. Buddhist teac h i n g did not discou rage a un ion of d i fferent beliefs and practices, and Ja panese high culture favored such union. Most im portant pe r ha ps, there was no status gro u p in J a pan eq uivalent to the Con fucian scholars in China. Lea rn i n g and the arts were culti vated by all adult members of the a ristocratic society.
JAPAN
69
Yamato rulers had overwhelming power to e n force the new govern mental structure, and local leaders could not resist this power. At the same time, these local leaders did not lose m uch of their wealth o r in fluence . Their local preeminence was now guaranteed not so much by the trad i tional, familial a uthority, as by i mperial rule ; henceforw ard, they would ad minister i n the name of the empe ro r. l l The reforms of the seventh and eighth centuries initiated one o f j apan 's most im pressive cultu ral p eriod s . The cou rt a t N ara became a center o f fashion and e tiquette, o f re ligious and artistic c u l tivatio n . I n Nara, the po sitio n of B uddhism was especially privileged. B u t while a high aristocratic culture continued to flou rish, the military power o f the em pe ror waned . Buddhism taught that all life is in violate . There seemed no need to maintain a regular army, for frien d ly re latio n s with C hina diminished the danger of foreign in vasion . With the reclamation o f new land and increasing productio n , city life and especially imperial court society became luxurious, the Buddhist tem ples flou rished, and for a time the new administrative system under the Taiho Cod e (702 ) ap p eared to work. In 7 0 1 the possession of weapons by private persons had bee n for bidden , the u niform of o fficers of state included no deadly implements to symbolize their powers, and the profession of arms was not respected. I n the capital the only military person nel were membe rs o f the I mperial Guard, commanded by o fficers principally interested in ceremony and appointed to their posts o n the basis of family connection s , wealth, and court rank. No capital p u n ishment was meted ·o ut to courtiers or o ffi cials, although the codes made treason and similar crimes pun ishable by death . 12 The culture o f the im perial court under the Fuj iwara regents (858- 1 1 84) thus flourished for some three centuries. However, the imperial house found it necessary to extricate itself from the influences of B uddhism and moved the capital from Nara to Heian (Kyoto) in 794. There were sporadic disturbances i n the new cap ital and in the provinces, and paradoxically B uddhism contributed to these disturbances. Secu lar ties meant that the important B uddhist mon asteries used political devices and armed monks to defend their great wealth-despite the Buddhist belief in the inviolabili ty of l i fe . Buddhism had been important for the consolidation o f Yamato rule , but by the Heian period (794-1 I 60) some Buddhist monasteries h ad become a military threat to the imperial court itself. To cope with these religious as well as other civilian disturbances, the Fujiwara established a special metropol itan police force in 8 1 0, and eventually this force became per manent and acquired additional judicial and military functions.1 3 This and other expedients served to maintain the cou rt society of the Heian emperors and the Fujiwara d ictators until the m iddle of the twelfth cen-
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
tury , despite the steady decline of imperial authority. This decline and the replace ment o f the i m perial co urt by a m ilitary government (sho gunate) as the center of power must be described if we are to understand the ascendance of a feudal society i n the provinces . The Yamato rulers had not paci fied the whole o f Japa n , and raids by aboriginal tribes (Ain u) contin ued on the frontiers . There were s po radic peasa nt revolts and , perh a ps most im portant , competing clan s o f the same lineage group engaged in n u merous armed clashes over the distribution and in heritance of land- righ ts. The government proved it self ill-eq uipped to cope with these d isorders. The Taika reform s (646) had established a national recruitment system which i m posed a tremen dous burden o n the smaIl cultivators. Conscri ption d rai ned away m uch of the agricultural work force , and the addition al services and goods req uired by the military proved ruinous. While well-to-do peasants and the aristocracy evaded conscription or were given various exem ptions, ord inary peasants could best evade govern mental req uisitions by enter ing the service of a locally powe rful clan . The syste m of national re cruitment proved unworkable and was revoked in 792 . Various substi tutes for this system were tried but did not wo rk either. In the provinces, civilian officials were incapable o f o rganizing a police force and hence unable to curb local outbreaks of violence . The need for local military forces remained acute. In practice, the imperial government came to rel y on military forces organized by heads of locally dominant clans who had both the resources and the man power to keep the peace . Th us, armed clashes were considered a local affair, unless their escalation be came a threat to the established order. Then the i m perial government relied on the extralegal police force (Kebiishi) organized by the Fujiwara d ictators or on provincial leaders who were given an ex plicit mandate to organize a s pecial military campaign on behalf of the emperor. Under the Taika reforms, the i m perial authority to collect taxes had never been fully i m plemented. 1 4 A n e ffective regulation of tax assess ments and collection depended on period ic audits and foreclosures when taxes were unpaid. Such a system called for administrative skills and personnel which did not exist. Moreover, the imperial government allowed seve ral exem ptions from the taxes it had formally i m posed. Many religious establishments were exem pted from the grain tax. Tax exemptions were used as an incentive to o pen up new tracts of land for cultivation and to settle fron tier areas exposed to raids by aboriginal tribes. Thus, the earlier and partial appropriation of land by the im perial government was gradu ally replaced by private appropriations. I S The landholdings of local clans increased in size, and private authority relations re placed the imperial claim to governmental authority over the
JAPAN
l and . The atte m p t of th e Taika reforms to assert the em peror's local a uthority d e spite the wealth an d status of local clans had fai led. Japanese landed estates were governed b y t he seve ral ran ks of own ers, managers, cultivators, and tenants i n accord with rules based on personal agreements . The Fuj iwara regents, the cou rt aristocracy , and loc ally powerful clans used such agreements to organize their hou sehol d management. I n the provinces, the Fuj iwara, especially, administered t heir extensive holdings a u tonomously. Thus, the large landholdings of t he leading clans became exem pt from governmental regu latio n , with the result that admin istrati ve, military , and fiscal fu nctions devolved upon household management . The central direction of local affai rs by the imperial government became superfluous. E ven tually, this p rocess reached the i m perial house itself. Beh i n d the gradual a bandon m e n t of the S i n i fied bu reaucratic m ac h i n e ry and o f t he idea of the state a s a n e xte n s ion o f the i m perial perso n , we fi n d t h e im pe rial
uji
(lineage gro u p) work i n g to sec u re a pri v ate h old o ver the ele
ments of political i n fl uence a n d wealth wh ich had once bee n i ts b y d e fi n itio n . I ncreasingl y , t h e impe rial house w a s obliged t o protect i t s position a s a fa milial power bloc in com petition with the Fuj i w a ra . M i n a moto , and other cou rt interests .
...
16
This is the explanation of t he "c l oiste red e m perors" o f the eleve nth and twe lfth centuries. Incumbent em perors abdicated in favor o f a chosen successor, both to esc a pe from the cauldron of ri valries s u rrounding the th rone and to e xe rci se real authority from the protected pos it i on of a monastery. By d i sca rd i n g the m ac h iner y of government and converting large pieces of public d o m ain into landholdings o f the i m perial fami l y
admin istered by its own household o ffices. the cloiste red emperors en
tered i n to competition against the Fuj iwara. In this way, they obtained a foundation for the c ontinued preeminence of the i m peri al h o u se d e spite the emergence o f Japan's feudal order. During t he later Heian peri o d from 857 to 1 1 60, the expansion o f private rights a t the expense o f imperial rights occurred together with the p ri vate o r gani za tio n of armed forc es and hence the emergence o f a class o f pro fe s s io n al mercenaries. Confusion a n d insecurity were so extrem e that small and e ven well-to-do owners often found it ad van tageous to commend their land to a family of notables, wh i ch was strong enough to defend them against both the civil a u t ho r i t y and ot her pow erfu l clans. As a result, disputes over rights to the land and over the obligation to pay taxes i n goo d s and servic es freq u e n t l y c h a nge d from a legal c ase invol v in g the government into a private ven de tt a in volving the inte rests of rival landow ning fa m ilies.
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
A mong these families, the Fuj iwara dictators played the leading role , at least for a time. They "maintained the peace" in the provinces by calling on local notables to organize m ilitary forces to defend the frontiers and en force the law . Since relatives of the Fujiwara were prom inent local notables in many parts o f the country, the d istinction i nev itably blurred between the military force o f the im perial government u nder the direction o f the Fuj iwara dictators and privately organ ized bands of warriors under other Fuj iwara clans. 1 7 In addition , the wealth ie r provincial notable s also established private armed forces to defend the frontier, organize de fensive or o ffensive operations against rival clans , and last but not least "en force the law"-so metimes at the behest of the government and sometimes not. By the middle of the Heian
era
(say
950)
the Court could no longer keep the
peace in the capital, nor co uld the ari stoc ratic absentee lan dlords, w hether n obles or abbots, protect
their
own property wi thout the assistance of a rmed
forces m a intai ned by local magnates who did not fa il to exact a price for their
services. I S
I n 946 a go vernment constable , after su ppressing a local revolt, reported as follows: M a ny make l awless use o f power a n d auth ori ty ; form confederations ; engage daily in military exercises ; collect and maintain men and h orses under pretext of h unting game; menace district governors ; plunder the common people; violate th eir wives and daughters; a nd s teal their beasts of burden and employ
t h e m for their o w n p u r poses . T h u s i nterrupting a g ricultu ral operations .
. . . My a ppeal is that, w ith the exception of prov i ncial governors' envo y s, any
who enter the provi nce at
the
shall
commo n
be
recognized
as
head of parties ca rryi n g bows a nd arrows . . . bandits
a nd
th rown
into
p ri son
on
apprehensi on. 1 9
These deve lopments occurred quite gradually, b u t o n e c a n date t he def inite ascendance o f the warrior class (out o f scattered groups o f pro fes sional mercenaries) from the H ogen disturbance of 1 1 56. For the first time since the Taika reforms an issue of dynastic pol icy involving the im perial succession was resolved by warriors playing a leading role in the cente r o f affairs.20 To summarize, Japanese im perial authority emerged directly from a tribal society com posed of lineage-groups. The origin-myth of direct descent from the Sun-God dess signified the importance of the reigning e m peror's religious and ceremonial functions. It also established the principle that the historical continuity of the god-descended imperial house m ust be preserved, lest the well-being o f the whole community be endangered. Through the introduction of the Taika reforms (646) and the Taiho Code (702 ), the e m perors achieved considerable power
JAPAN
73
a s w ell. But this imperia l r ule w a s re l atively short-lived, and t h e re i gning e mp eror was i ncreas i ngly confined to his ce remonia l a n d re lig io u s func tions The ascendance o f the Fuj iwara regents by the m idd le of the n inth century was direc t ly connected with the i n c apac i ty of the cou rt to func tion administratively so that real power was exercised throug h the household m anagemen t o f the regent. By the end o f the twel fth century , the Fujiwara regents were re placed in turn by the formal establis hment of the Kamak ura shogunate ( 1 1 85 - 1 3 33) . From. t hat time on , the i m perial institution and the court nobil i ty surrounding t he throne i n Kyoto were separated permanently from the e ffective militar y government (shog u nat e ) in Kamakura and, later on , in Edo ( Tok y o) S h og u nal authority was authenticated by an i m perial mandate . The sh o g u nate derived its power from its command over the warrior class or mil i tary gentry i n the prov i n ces T h i s c l ass had e m e rged from the p ri va ti z a tio n of land and of mil i tar y fo rce b y the great landowning families. From t he time of the Kamakura s h o gunate until the middle of t h e nineteenth century, the Japanese aristocracy remained divided between a nobility associated with the ceremonious life of the i m pe rial court and a military aristocracy involved in the government and warfare of the sho gunate.21 But by the beginning of the se ve n te enth century, with the fo u n da tio n of t he Tokugawa shog unate, the po l itical and social structure of Japan would be transfo rmed for the next two hundred and fi fty years . I w ill consider the Tokugawa s h ogu n ate and the M e ij i res to ration i n C h ap te r 1 2. .
.
.
HOUSEHOLD AND M I L I TARY GOVERNMENT AS THE BASIS OF ARISTOCRACY
The seventh and ei g h t h centuries may be co n side re d the for m ative p e rio d of th e Jap anese aris tocracy The a nc ie nt lineage-groups of the island constituted the ru l i n g class . The Taiho Code (702) established fo u r su perior orders reserved for pri nce s of the blood and ten court ranks with various subdivisions, resulting in some thirty grades alto gether. H igh cou rt nobles (kugyo) , appoi nted by the e m peror, co m prised the top three ranks u nder the members of t he imperial family. The fourth and fi ft h ranks co ns ti t uted a seco n d s ubdivision o f c o urt n ob le s al so a p poin ted by the e m peror. All re m a i n i n g ranks were considered inferior. M em be rs of these relatively inferior ran ks were a ppoi n te d by the Great Council of State rather than the e mperor, and they were de barred fro m m a n y im p o r tant privileges. Access to the ranks of the co u rt no b il i ty depended on fam i ly con nections. The highest court nobles were derived from the ju n ior branches of the im perial fam i ly and the great clans o f the Yamato reg io n . The .
,
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
74
fou rth and fifth rank s drew their me m be rs h i p from the lesser clans and from d i st i n gui shed families that had imm igrated d u ri n g the pre vi ous centuries. The remaining ranks were recruited from prominent provin cial clans. Family origi n , court rank, government po s i t ion , and wealth were close ly re lated. Th e pr i v ile ges ac c r u i n g t o the to p ranks were substantial. Each court noble recei ved a grant of r ic e land, and members of the first fi ve ranks rece ived especially generous grants. The n umber and size o f peas ant h o u se h o l d s a l lotted to the no ble , and the taxes in kind due from them, likewise varied w i t h h i s rank. Other privileges co n s i s te d of exclu sive access to e du ca t i on , the inheritance o f rank when children came of age , r i gidl y differentiated ceremonial dress, and perm ission to be pres ent a t the i m pe rial audience, as well as such humbler accoutrements as having g u ard s and messengers, burial privileges, and s p e c ia l e xe m p t ion s from p en al ti e s , taxes, forced labor, a n d co n scri pt i o n A t the top o f the ran k-hierarchy, privileges w ere sumptuous indeed ; but at the same time, patrician life was r igid l y circumscribed down to the type of fan appro priate for each of th e main r ank catego r i e s Natural ly pr eocc u pat ion with rank governed e ve ry move in this closed world o f a tiny segment of Japanese socie ty . Promotion de pended almost entirely on fa mil y con nections with the i m pe ri al house and the favors d i spe nse d by th e dom inant faction of the Fuj iwaras. For a short period, this rank-conscious and inbred court no b i li ty was also the administrative center o f Heian Japan .22 The Taika reforms had adopted the administrative structure of China, but not the Ch inese examination system. Critics o f the Chinese system have commented on its sel f s e r v in g inefficiencies and the cultivation of decorous le ar ni n g for its own sake. B u t in Japan, the su bstitution o f birth for learning as a condition of a ppointmen t quickly turned the central administration at the imperial court into a qu ag mire of overla pping o ffices and circuitous procedures. The political function of the i m peri al cou rt was shortlived, but its cultural preem inence proved l asti n g . In his World of the Shining Prince, Professor Ivan Morris has described this cultural achievement in detail. The refinement o f esthetic sensib ili ty in music and poetry and the discriminating appreciation o f painting, ceramics, dress, and other decorative arts by the court nobility of He ian Japan set as distinctive a pattern for the country's culture as the divine descent of its emperors did for the legitimation of authority. For it im parted to nature-worship and to the cultivation o f esthetic sensibility the very highest social pres tige , a fact that has le ft its mark on J a panese culture to the present day. Such cultural achievements exact their price. Esthetic sensibility and an e laborate stylization of man ne rs became attributes of aristocratic con duct that were i ncompat ible with the mi lit a ry skill and prowess usually .
-
-
.
,
JAPAN
75
associated with aristocracy. First in N ara and then in Kyoto m i litary du ties at court were turned i n to decorous ceremonies so that the capital and the court became an e asy prey to m ilitary depredations emanating from the cou ntryside (or from the Buddhist monasteries adjacent to the capital). I ndeed, the demilitarization of the court was one reason why the exe rcise o f authority slipped so quickly out o f the hands of the em peror and h is entourage . However, some allowance m ust be made for the fact that much i n formation about Heian Japan is de rived from the writings of court ladies who were not only remote from the countryside an d its frequent uphe a vals but even from the administrative affairs at the cou rt itself. For this reaso n , one may have a somewhat exaggerated picture of the political weakness of the im perial cou rt at the height o f its power. In any case, the emperor failed to establish a patri monial bureau-
Minamoto Yoritomo
This wood sculpture dates from the thirteenth century, shortly a fter Yoritomo's forces defeated the Fuj iwara regents and the Taira cIan o Yoritomo's victory also marked the a scendance of provincial warriors w ho came to be organized u n der the Kamakura shoo gunate. The legitimacy of this m ilitary government was secu red by its formal subordina tion to the emperor. (National M useum, Tokyo)
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
cracy after the Chinese model. I nstead . the Japanese aristocracy was formed by the feudal syste m established under the Fujiwara regen ts a nd the Kamakura shogunate . As the i m perial house weakene d . provincial society became increasingly warlike. At first. military bands were orga nized by local notables and they were nomi nally subordinate to the e m peror. Then they became subject to strong shogunal authority u nder the Kamakura . Later they develo ped considerable local autonomy from the shogunate as well so that these provincial forces became as nominally subordinate to the shogun as they had earlier been to the emperor. Under the Fujiwara regents. the new m ilitary leaders in the prov inces were often men descen ded from prominent families of the court nobility. As the unrest in the country increased, members o f the nobility had moved into the provi nces to protect their lands, and the combina tion of formal authority and social prestige was naturally attractive to the men who had become professional fighters (bushi) . As military forces grew in size . a new di mension was added to the traditional Japanese reliance on kinship relations: personal military service was rendered in return for a grant o f land .23 Hall adds a characteristic example of the priva tization o f governmental authority. W hen in 1 088 Minamoto Yo-
JAPAN
77
The Burning of the Sanjo Palace during the Heiji Rising of 1 1 59
A celebrated episode from the power struggle between the Fujiwara. Tai ra, and Minam oto clans taken from the picture scroll called the Heiji Monogatari. painted in the mid-thirteenth century. The Fujiwara and Taira families had vied with one another for acqu i sition of high posts in the central government a nd intermarriage with the imperial family. The Taira ascendancy lasted only twenty years and came to an end in the Gempei war ( 1 180- 1 1 85) in whic h the Minamoto forces were victorious. This c h apter ofJapanese h istory also marked th e ascendance of provincial warriors (bushi) and the establishment under the Minamoto of a nation a l military hegemony ( K amakura shogunate) . (M useum of Fine Arts. Boston)
shiie found himself un rewarded by the court , he used some of his own landholdings to reward his fol lowers. This action induced other bushi to commend their land to him for protection, a development w hich prompted the court to prohibit such com mendations ( 1 09 1 ) , albeit with Out success. On this basis, some fa milies like the Taira and the Minamoto were able to build up both large landholdings in many provinces and a large following of fighting men bound to the m by ties of loyalty as com pensation for grants of land .24 The second half o f the twelfth century was marked by almost con tinuous fighting in many parts of Japan, but the eventual mil itary suc cess of the Minamoto clan still had to be transformed into a legitimate
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
pol itical order. Mi namoto Yorito mo's establis hment of Ka makura as his govern mental headquarters signified the clan's ascendance and inde pendence from Kyoto. His gestu re of asking the th rone's approval for his actions signified his formal s ubmission to the e m peror, which did not preclude the mani pulation or defiance of the throne on s ubstantive points. Submission served to secure the legiti macy of the shogunal order at Kamakura , while the emperor lac ked the military force to withhold the imperial sanctio n . In turn, the military gentry in the provinces were loyal vassals of the shogu n at Kama k u ra and had to obtai n his permis sion in all matters affectin g their social and economic position . I n the model of "traditional society" used here, I have assu med that wealth, status, and authority are fused in the hands of powerful heads of households. Kingship is the most conspicuous exam ple of such fusion . B u t there are societies without kingship a n d societies i n which the king's supreme privileges are made nominal by the burdens and restrictions placed on him. When kings reign but do not rule, anarchic tendencies will militate against strong govern ment, for it is difficult for I�ndowning aristocracies to create a stable political order in the absence of an e ffec tive and consecrated leader. Poland and the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation are examples , but Japan is an exception . Here we have the case of a feudal aristocracy which developed an e ffective govern ment th rough prolonged military campaigns, resulting in the establ ish ment of the Kamakura shogunate. As the authority o f the im perial house and the power of the Fuj iwara regents declined , a warrio r class ste pped into the breach and was led to fi nal success by the Minamoto clan under the leaders hip of Minamoto Yoritomo ( 1 1 47 - 1 1 99 ) . Specific measures were taken to guard against the divisive tenden cies o f a feudal regi me . The c h i e ftain of the M i n a moto dan was to be t h e ruler o f the eastern prov
inces, the leader of all warriors w h erever s i tuated , and a t the same time the
guard i a n of t he Throne a n d t he protecto r of the s tate. For these reasons Yoritomo was ca re fu l to l i m i t h is relations with the a ristocratic Co urt to for m al interc h a n ges. He was fi r m
in
his determi nation to make K a m a k u ra t he
pe r m a n e n t seat of feudal gove r n m e n t . His vassals were strictly forbidden to e n te r Court society or take a n y office fro m the C rown w i thout h i s a pprova l ; a n d he h i ms e l f would acce pt no a ppoint ment o r title other than t h a t o f Com mander-in-Chief
(Sei-i-Tai-Shogun) ,
apart from honorary military ra n ks . 1 S
Other measures were taken to provide for a strict enforcement of au thority. U nder the Kamakura shogunate three s pecial offices were cre ated : one supervised all the affairs of the military (samurai-dokoro) ; a sec ond handled disputes between vassals (monchujo) ; and a third was an enlarged replica of a great noble's household o ffice (mandokoro) handling
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79
the p rivate and public business of the Mi namoto. These o ffices were put into the hands of civilian o fficials and run in accordance with strict of ficial procedu res ; thus, even i n this early phase, Japanese feudalism took over a measure of the b u reaucratization which had been i ntrod uced by the Taika re forms of the seve nth centu ry. More effectively than in feu dal Eu rope, the Kama k u ra s hogunate exercised very close control over the personal life of the vassal , his privileges and obligations, his property a nd ran k , and h is family affairs , including marriages and friendships. This administrative consolidation shows the s uccess with which Yor itom o " always contended that loyalty to himself was loyalty to the Th rone , and he would not tolerate any direct relation o f service to the Th rone by his vassals."26 To a degree not fo und elsewhere, this policy reflected a social and political order in which, unde r tit u lar i mperial authority, the inequali ties among peo ple were organized and ad min istered by a governor who supposed that persons of all social ran ks were the depen dents o f his own s u pre me ho usehold . To be sure , personal ties to the shogun became more nominal as his authority extended over the w hole country. Nevertheless , the shogun's authority retained its patriarchal character , and the offices o f his household at Kamakura provided the administrative means to enforce the shog u nal will . At the top of the shogunal dependents, the honorific rank of house men (kenin) was g rant e d to leading vassals of the Minamoto . Much at tention was given to their property interests. Many a pplicants were re fused, and the rank co uld be revoked easily for behavior subversive of feudal d iscipli ne. Figh t i n g men (samurai) ra n ked below the kenin in whose service they stood . Here again rank was bestowed carefully; mere fighting ability did not s u ffice , and the right to grant this rank belon ged to the sh o gu n rather than the i mme di ate lord. Below the sam urai , the followers or attendants were ranked by various grades , and below them were several ran ks of c ultivators, s kil led and unskilled w o r kers, a r tists, and Buddhist cle rgy. Re lative ly little is known of these people except that they were distinguished as freemen (ryomin o r good people) from the "base people " (semmin) consis t i ng of servants , slaves , and workers in despised occupations.27 Thus, by the thirteenth century the Kamak u ra shogunate had es tablished a feudal regime noteworthy for the stren gth of its central gov ernment and the tight organization of fe u dal dependencies, an unusual case since feudal regim e s are generally more decentralized . ' The sho gunate governed under im perial sanction . Seldom were wealth , status, and effective authority fused as com pletely as they were in this period of Japanese history. Yet this concentration o f military and sy mbolic power proved frag ile.28 Where all legitimacy was concentrated in the e mpe r o r and all m il -
80
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
itary and a d m i nis t rative power i n the sho gun , every s ucce ss io n d isp u t e placed the whole structure in jeo pard y . d Between 1 2 72 and 1 3 1 8 , two court factions continued a disp ute over succession to t he im perial throne w h ich the shogun was unable to settle . The accession of E mp ero r Go Daigo ( 1 3 1 8) brought no relief, since he attem pted to res to re i m perial a uth or i t y , cul min at in g in the Kemmu restoration of 1 3 3 4 - 1 3 3 6 . In 1 3 37 a re newed succession dispute turned i n to civi l war which conti nued u ntil 1 392, whe n a settle ment was finally achieved. Meanwhile, some fi fty years of o rganizing the co untry ag a in s t the Mongol invasion th rea t had d e pl e t e d the resou rces of the Kamakura shoguns , who were replaced by the Ashi kaga in 1 338. But order was not restored . A fter ending the civil wars over the s uccession in 1 392, the Ashikaga were con fronted with insubordi nate warlords from on e end of the country to the o the r . I n a ll, J a p a n witnessed rec urrent civil war from the 1 3 3 0 s until national unification was achieved late in the sixteenth century, a period o f over two centu ries .29 Little is known of the size of Ja panese figh t in g forces before the sixteenth century. I n over fi fty years of civil war between contending clai mants to the imperial th ro n e ( 1 3 37- 1 392), large bodies o f men moved to and fro across the co untry. Circu mstantial evidence suggests that in Japan , medieval warfare, though greatly disrupting the politic a l structure , was not overly destructive . The warriors were supplied with food and arms, and there is evide nce of a relatively flo urishing economy . M a rke t p lac es developed , ma rk e t days were h eld more freq uently, peas ants who sold their surplus prod u ce for cash i m proved their p o s i ti on , and the diversity and q uality o f c rops increased . Towns grew and traffic along the highways became more frequent . This growth o f the economy was linked with the changi ng character o f the provincial aristoc racy . Speci fically, the inheritance of land was changed and local government was restr uctured . The strength of the Kamak ura s hogunate had been based in part on the practice of primogeniture . When the oldest son alone had title to the land, families could preserve their inheritance . As a result, rela tions beca me stabilized between these families and the headq uarters of the shogun (bakufti) . But from the late thirteenth and during the four teenth centuries, the practice of sole inheritance was abandoned grad ually, and estates were divided eq ually among the sons of the family. As the size of single hol d ings declined, the number o f yeoman peasants (ji-samurai) increased as well as effo rts to increase the prod uctivity of dA s t r i k i n g exam ple is t h e pe r io d follo w i n g M i na m oto Yo ritomo's death, w he n a ti t
u lar s hogun and regents acti ng f o r h i m a ppeared in Kama k u ra ju s t as earlier a titular
e m pero r , a regen t , and a "cloistered e m pe ro r" had appeared sim u l taneously i n Kyoto.
JAPAN agriculture. These yeo men were o f war rior descent . They did not owe alle g iance to a great lord and hence were conscious of their indepen den ce in contrast to an earlier ti me when many peasan ts had "com me nded " their services to obtain protection . I tinerant military forces depended on local su pplies to keep mov i n g In speci fic situations , warriors might force the peasants to do their biddi ng. But the a gra ria n u prisings of the period testify to the self-con fidence o f the yeomen , who were determined to defend their interests by force of arms if necessary. For a time , yeomen c om b i ne d in mutual defense l e agu e s ( ikki) and attacked landlords, moneylenders, and even local governors to obtai n relief from specific debts and taxes . Neve rthe less , these burdens freq uen tly became too h eavy to bear, and sel f-de fense proved insu fficie n t . Peasants would then escape by taking up mil itary service. This in tu rn would add to the destructiveness of the civil wars by increasi ng the n umber of foot soldiers and red ucing the agri cultural labor force. In the late fi fteenth and early sixteenth centuries, neighboring territorial rulers (daimyo) agreed to surre nder fugitive peas ants in an effort to arrest this militarization of the peasantry. On the other hand, warriors tu rned increasingly to the conscription of peasants as the struggle for political consolidation of the country intensified . Dur ing the Ashikaga shogunate ( 1 338- 1 573), peasants appear to have re gained-at least temporarily-some of their earlier inde pendence . To understand these changing fortunes of the peas ants, we must turn to the restructuring of local government and the trans formatio n of the aristocracy. At the summit, the i mperial throne and its court nobility in Kyoto had existed side by side with the shogunal es tablis hment a nd its service aristocracy at Kamakura . The shogunal system was capable of assu � ing the whole bu rden of local government. Specifically, the Kamakura sho gunate stabilized its rule by appoi nting Minamoto h o usemen to posi tions as m ilitary go ve r nors (shugo) and land stewards (jito) throughout the country. For a time , this network of military de puties existed along side the local authority which was appointed by the im perial court. But gradually the military governors and land stewards o f the Kamakura shogun made inroads o n imperial civil authority and the proprietary rights nominally protected by t hat authority. By the beginning of the fourteenth century, this develo pment had become irreversible. An at tem pt to restore the old i mperial authority precipitated fifty years of civil war, in the course of whic h both the imperial civil authority and the power of the Kamakura shogunate decli ned . Eve ntually a new balance of power developed in which the weight of influence shifted once more, this time away from the center of shogunal power toward the provinces. The local deputies o f the Kamakura and, after 1 338, of the Ashi.
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
kaga shogunates usur ped the authority previousl y exercised by t he sho guns on behal f of the em peror, by combi ning civil with military func tions in the provinces. These local "de p uties" weakened the shogunate , because they retained local reven ues and obliged the Ashigaka to de pend entirely on the i ncome and military forces drawn from the sho gun's own territories . The shogunate, therefore , was con fronted with a varied assortment o f provincial military governors (shugo-daimyo ) , each with his own base of income and military fo rce and only nominally un der the a uthority of the shogunate . Still , the sho gun ate was the only countrywide authority remaining, though it was now often forced to establish precarious alliances with powerfu l provincial families. The move of the Ashikaga shoguns from Kamakura to Kyoto was symbol ic of the new dispensation. In Kyoto, shogunal rule was u nquestioned how ever weak it had become in the provinces, because the shogun had re ceived the emperor' s mandate . But with much of the taxing power in the hands o f the provincial governors, financial resources were now dwindling rapidly for the shogun and the imperial court. The provi ncial rulers exercised military and civil authority in their area on the basis of their own extensive la ndholdings. When the need arose, they would make military alliances with their own branch families and various military vassals. B ut their wealth , status, and authority were not consolidated . Though their territories were extensive , they were also scattered . Their rights over the land varied from one location to an other, often falling short o f full ownership. Natu rally, these provincial rulers (sh ugo-daimyo) sough t to enlarge their wealth and power by us ing military pressu re, marriage alliances, and grants of land in return for loyal service. They were often successful at the ex pense o f absentee proprietors , such as members of the cou rt nobility and even of the im perial family. But these efforts at ex pansion and consolidation of pro vincial power frequently collided with the com peting interests of other provincial rulers. Since now the shogunate and the i m perial court re sided in Kyoto, one after another of the provincial governors sought to strengthen his position by establishing his own residence there as wel l . Provincial vendettas and armed clashes, therefore , were supplemented by a competition for favors at the shogunal headq uarters. The imperial house, the court nobility, and the Kamakura shoguns had earlier sent their sons, deputies, or ho usemen to do minate local af fairs in the interest of their respective centers. Now a provincial gentry sought to strengthen i ts position at the local level by manifesting its newly won local preeminence through its presence in the capital.30 These developments took place in an era of unceasing civil stri fe in which the shugo-daimyo were a rising power, though not in secure com mand. Once they had acquired legitimate title from the shogun, they _
JAPAN still had to e n force that sa nc t ion e d authority locally in recu rrent strug gles with competing claimants. I n an era of conflicting rights and di vi ded loyalties , with their scattered holdi n gs in the hands of rear-vass als o r other agents and with th e scene o f the struggle o ften shifting to K yoto, the shugo-dai myo fo u n d themselves i n c reas i n gly at t h e mercy of th eir own subordinates . Schola rs o f Jap a n ese histo r y disting u ish betwee n the shugo-daimyo w ho rose to p romi n e n c e r oughly i n the c e ntury fo llo w ing the K e m m u resto r at i o n ( 1 3 3 4 - 1 3 3 6 ) and the sengoku-daimyo , their former subordi nates, who rose to p ro m i n e n c e du r i n g the pe r iod fro m the On i n war ( 1 467- 1 47 7 ) to Nobunaga's e ntry into Kyoto in 1 56 8 . Typically, the new claimants to power (se n goku-daimyo) a dva n c e d the ir positi o n by ruth less exploitation of the peasants and by treacherous interven tion in the successio n d isputes among their own maste rs . The two strategies were closely related. By exacti n g more from the peasants, these deputies and vassals i nc rease d thei r own fortunes, o ften to the point where peasants j oined military bands to e scape oppressio n . On the basis of increased wealt h , the former subord i nates could i ntervene more e ffectively in the disputes among their masters , the shugo-dai myo. "Every g reat feudal house w as plagued by s uccession quarrels, often i ns tigate d and plan ned by subordinates who sought to improve their own con d i tion . " 3 1 Medieval Japan th us witnessed periodic tu rnovers in the com p osi tion and administrative fu n ct io n s o f its ar is tocracy. In a crude approx imation one can spea k of s uccessive p h ases o f t h is go vern i n g class and stat us group: ( 1) a con glomerate of cla n s ; (2) the Yama to state with i ts first unification of Japan's central provi nces ; (3) th e early d ivision among imperial fam i ly , court nob i l i t y , the Soga o r Fuj iwara regents, and the attempted bureaucratization of im perial rule u nde r the Taika reforms ; (4) the Kamakura shogunate with its centrally controlled restoration of local clan authority; and (5) the two phases o f Ashikaga rule under the s h u go -d a i m yo and the sengoku-dai myo. Such a reg ro u pi n g is a cont i n uous process which the social h is torian di vides into phases and cate gories for the sake of convenience and comprehension . Nonetheless , some changes of the historical context ca n be at least approximatel y dated . Refere nce has been m ade to the evidence of economic advance dur ing the fourteenth and. fi fteenth cent uries, a development which Sa n so m attributes to the d ecl in e o f i nheritance by the oldest son ( p r imoge ni ture ) , the rise o f yeomen peasants o f warrior descent, and the relatively low level of destruction in J apanese medieval warfare. How else, he asks, could the country ha v e sustained the incessant strife of rival claimants to the throne and the continual ve ndettas for local supremacy among families of the provincial aristocracy? Nevertheless, a time came w hen
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
the bu rdens of warfare began to exceed what the peasants were willing to acce pt as an i nevitable fate . Sansom cites a major peasant u prising of 1 42 8 i n Omi, and Hall re fe rs to another d u ring the following yea r in Harima.32 The n umber of such u prisings mounted d u ring this period , and it is certain that many local incidents were u n recorded. Thus, some time be fo re the pe riod of 1 46 7 to 1 5 6 8 , whic h Ja panese historians des ignate as "the cou ntry at war" ( sengoku) , th e earlier com patibility of civil strife w i th econo mic growth was dim i n ishing. I n the later fi fteenth cen tury, civil war i nterfered with the economy, tho ugh the incidence o f war rem ained local and sporadic so that in many places trade, the arts , and agriculture con tin ued to flo urish . B y this time , meas ures had been taken to counteract the destructi ve effects o f the fighting. The sen goku-daimyo fo und ti me to devote to the management of their estates, despite their rec u rrent preoccu pation with vendettas and wars. Consolidated la nd holdings replaced the old admin istrative subdi visions. The simpli fication o f land rights during the fif teenth century was the conscious policy of these new landlords, and while it was often accomplished by force , the policy eliminated the "long chain of privileges and claims" which had left little "for the man who tilled the soil . "33 In an effort to protect the countryside , the nu mber of forts a n d castles increased rapidl y . Where t h e s h ugo da im y o had begun with a formal title to certain lands and righ ts w h ich they then endea vored to free from shogunal control , the sengoku-dai myo appare ntly began with the forced occupation of the land and then endeavored to obtain an ex post facto legitimation of their holdings by shogunal edict .34 I n the late fifteenth centu ry, the sengoku-daimyo began to expand their local control from fortified headq uarters, resulting in struggles for regional hegemony in many parts of Japan . Grad ually, leagues of daimyo formed locally. New fa milies rose to power whose leaders turned their vassals into a military command system , held together by oaths of alle giance . The most successful sengoku-dai myo ind uced their warriors to leave the land and take up residence in o r around their own main estate and st ronghold . Here they were read y for instant service and all the more easily controlled . As this warrior aristocracy of sa murai was ur banized , peasant com munities became free to develo p organizations of their own and to increase their productivity. Taxes were put on a regular basis ; thus , villages had an ind ucement to develop irrigation systems and programs o f land reclamation , sometimes with and sometimes without the assistance o f the local daimyo.35 The whole develo pment may be sum marized . In their castle-towns, the sengoku-daimyo developed a superior organization based on the strategic military placement of their strongholds . Simultaneously, the samurai were transformed fro m landed and dispersed warriors i nto an -
JAPAN
85
u rbanized force of retainers, de pe nd e nt on a rentier e xistence based on rice s t ipe n ds , and thus i n st an t ly a vail a ble for milita r y action . Fi nally, the se n goku-da imyo stren gth e n e d their own direct authority over the pea s a nts by means of l and surveys which restabilized the righ ts to th e lan d . This local consolidation of power led to a prolonged pe riod of fu r ther fighting, but by the middl e of the sixte e nth century the methods of consolidation were a p p l i e d on a la rge r a n d e ve nt u al l y on a national scale . Und e r th e le ad er ship of Oda Nobu naga ( 1 559- 1 582) , Toyo to mi H i de yo s hi ( 1 5 82- 1 5 98), and To k u gaw a I e y as u ( 1 603- 1 6 1 6) , the coun try be cam e poli ti c al l y u nified .e The ch ronology of unification and of ch a nges in mi l ita ry tec h nology should be kept in mind. Firearms were introduced in Ja pa n in 1 54 3 . By 1 55 6 some 300,000 g u n s were a vai la bl e . Nob u n aga became master o f Owari p ro v in ce in 1 559. B y 1 560 eight great fam ilies controlled one-third of the co untry. By 1 5 72 thirteen war rior families controlled two-thi rds of the co untry. By 1 5 82 o n e -thir d of the soldiers of th e l ea d ing military contenders were gunners, and th e destructiveness of long-range weapons had led to the in assive construc tion of stone castles in locations that too k a dva n ta g e of the terrain . No bu n a ga was assassinated in 1 5 82, and H ideyoshi assumed power, begin ning his re ig n with land surveys (which lasted for sixteen years) and with the great castle construction in Osaka.36 For the second time since the Taika reforms a thousand years ear lier, all the land of Japan was pl aced under the direct a u thority of the government. O vercom in g considerable resistance and evasion, Hid e yosh i increased the taxed land area (ro ug h ly from 2 . 5 to 3 . 75 million acres) , but also benefited the peasants by eliminating m u ltiple ri g hts to the s a m e land and u n p redictable exactions . Moreove r , agric ultural p ro ductivity w as gre atl y increased by the grad ual pacification of the coun try, as Hideyoshi systematically demolished the forti fications of his ene mies and reward e d his fol lowers. By shifting local ruling clans away from t h ei r ori gi n a l areas of dominance , he prevented the rise of new centers of op positi on to his government . f To this must be added the famous sword hunt of 1 588 which disarmed the soldier-monks and the "In Japanese, the family name c;:omes first and the given name second. Usually it is sufficient to give only the fa mily name to identify the person concerned , but in the case of large ruling houses it is often more practical to provide only the given name, or both names, for purposes o f identification . Thus, Oda Nobunaga , Toyotomi H ideyoshi, and To kugawa Ieyasu are customarily referred to as Nobunaga, H ideyoshi, and leyasll. ' The assignment of the Ka nto region to Tok ugawa Ieyasu, away from his home base in Mi kawa and Totomi, was one such move. I ts e ffect was contrary to H ideyoshi's inten tion, since it enabled leyasu to perfect the organization of his domains and the cohesion of his followe rs in an entirely new area. This was t he basis for his later ascendance to su preme power.
86
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
the latter firmly to the land, and henceforth distin gui s he d c l e a r l y betwee n the civilian po pu lation o f peasants, merchants, and craftsmen a n d th e military aristocrac y which alone had the p rivilege to bear arms.3 7 A l l t hese res u l ts were a chi e v e d w i t h m uch bloods h e d , t re a c h e r y a n d m u rd e r , th o u g h l i k e ma n y vic to r i o u s w a r rio rs be fo re th e m th e s e p o w e r fu l leaders were ca r e fu l to preserve th e sembla nce of legiti mate succession u nder the i m pe ri a l t h ron e Th r ough grand d i s pla ys and the patronage of the a r ts , t he y re prod uce d a s th e i r own the re fi n e m e n t o f taste a n d m a n n e r s which h a d be e n cultiva ted for so lo n g b y t he i m pe r i a l house and the court n o b ili t y N o b u n a ga and Hideyosh i w e re fol l owed by I e y a s u as the t h i rd great u n i fi e r o f J a pa n , w h o not on l y compl e t ed their work but also established a system of governance which e n d u re d u ntil the Meiji Restoration of 1 86 8 . I n Cha p te r 12, I return to this era of internal peace u nder the To k ugawa shogunate . For the moment, I shall summarize the preceding s u rvey of the J apanese aristocracy i n preparation for the disc ussion o f aristocratic culture-patter:ns i n Russia, Germany, and E n gland . Japanese history appears to have followed periodic phases o f cen tralization and devolution of power. The early Ya mato, Nara, and Heian periods had their phases of centralized rule under successive e m perors who were soon overshadowed by the household power of the Soga and then the Fujiwara regential fa milies . With the rise of the Kamakura sho gunate in the late twelfth century, an end uring division emerged be tween shogunal rule a n d the re l i g io us and cere monial c u l t u re of the imperial house. Effective govern ment was centralized as it had not been even under the Taika reforms , since the vassals of the Kamakura s ho guns were not granted seigno rial rights to the land. Nevertheless, the power o f these provincial vassals increased at the expense o f the Ka makura shogunate. U nder the Ashikaga, local authority was preempted first by the shugo-daimyo and s ubseq uently by their own subvassals, the sengoku-daimyo. One puzzle is that as shogunal authority and hence personal fealty weakened, the quest for shogunal s upport continued . Contests for local or regional hegemony turned ti me and again into a com petition for favors and sanctions at the Ashikaga headquarters in Kyoto-despite their red uced power. Perhaps the explanation is that throughout the history of the shogunate these military governors had been punctilious in observing the formal legitimation of their position through the emperor, and so the new provincial leaders may likewise have continued to observe the old forms of legitimation . A second puzzle is that the society did not disintegrate. The long standing separation between the legiti mate authority o f the emperor and the effective authority of the shogun, the proliferation o f authoripeasa n t s , bo u n d
,
.
.
JAPAN
tative figures like "cloistered emperors" and regents at the cen ter, and finally the recurring contests for military power in the provinces cer tai nly increased the n umber of feuds. It co uld be that the very mu lti plicity of such feuds at so many levels helped to blunt the i m pact of any one of them . At an y rate , tolerance for violence h ad a high threshold in a society in which not only aristocrats , but monks, peasants, and mer chants fought to enhance their collective interests. Many ranks of the social h ierarch y engaged in massive fencing matches and prevented any group from gaining the u pper hand for long, exce pt locall y . Above all , there was no outside press u re which migh t have forced the issue or pre sented opportu nities for forcing the iss ue . Japan's freedo m from foreign intervention enabled the society to endure prolo nged periods o f ci vil strife just as the Tokugawa policy of exclusion (to be discussed in Chap ter 12) made the political uni fication by force of arms i n to an enduring social order. The cultivation of arts and manners by the court nobility was a sym bol of the h ighest status from the earliest period . Recou rse to arms was confined to the aristocracy in the provinces and at shogunal headquar ters. H igh culture and militancy were two sides of the aristocratic way of life , much as empe ror and shogun were two aspects of authority. The link between these two sides was maintained throughout: the shugo daimyo established lavish residences in Kyoto, and the neglect o f their home base facilitated the rise of the sengoku-daimyo who also cultivated the arts. In addition to i mperial authority, shogunal sanction, and court rank, h igh culture legitimized aristocratic privilege thro ugh the identi fication of c ulture with the imperial court. Warfare repeatedly engulfed this cultural center of Japanese society, but each time rebuildin g was resumed promptly on a more lavish scale. In the provinces, the local asce ndancy of l e ading families was marked regularly by patronage o f arts, learning, and religious establishments , des pite t h e treachery and bloodshed which marked each road to power; indeed, s uch action was probably a means of atoning for these ways of the world . In Japan cul tural refinement clearly did nothing to limi t aggression, perhaps because the imperial center of culture was divorced from the s hogunal center of authority.
4 RUS S I A
T H E R I S E O F T H E M U SC O V I T E D Y N ASTY
T
H E F I RS T Russian histo rical source , the Primary Chronicle, was compiled in 1 1 1 0 or 1 1 1 2 . The first date mentioned in the Chronicle is 8 5 2 , and the few pages precedi ng this date refer to the Biblical division of the earth , the Tower of Babel , an d the reputed settlement o f tribes related to the early Slavs. Historical events before the ninth century must be reconstructed from scattered foreign sources and from archeological evidence. By contrast, the fi rst chronicles of Japan were compiled in 7 1 2 and 720. I n addition to a leg endary history going bac k to 660 B . C . , t hese J a pan ese accounts refer to historical events dating from about 600 A . D . Geographically, the area of what i s n o w modern Euro pean Russia was divided between a densely forested and rather primitive region in the north and an economically more developed region i n the south w here agriculture and various han dicrafts were practiced and remained virtually unchanged until the later medieval period . There is archeo logical evidence that towns of the ninth century like Tver', Novgorod, or Kiev go back to earlier and smaller settlements . The most important o f these settlements were located on the main rivers and were also m ar kets for overland trade. The bulk of the population was rural , divided into settled , agricultural and nomadic , pas toral peoples who lived uneas ily side by side. There was no discernible political structure for the whole area; rather, there were instances of tributary dependence of cer tain peoples on a more powerful state , s uch as the K hazar Khanate in the area northeast of the Black Sea. The Primary Chronicle refers to s uch tributary dependence in its ac count of the e stablishment of the Russian state. Scandinavian traders had been active along the Russian rivers, and by 862 these Varangians were well-established in the trading and military com munities which had s prung up. The Chronicle tells a half-legendary story that Slavic and other tribes aro u nd No vgorod managed to expel the Varagians to whom they h ad bee n pay ing tribute. But when internal discord ensued , the
88
R USSIA
89
tribe s invited new rulers . from Scandinavia. I n 8 62 Ruri k , the fo under o f t he new d ynasty, became prince of Novgorod . A s tate controlled by these Norsemen seems to h ave existed in no rthwestern Russia fo r some time prior to 862 . A missio n rep resenting a people who cal led the mselves Rhos appeared i n Constantinople i n 83 9 , but members of t h e mission described themselves as Swedes . The em issaries o ffered the Byzantine emperor a treaty of friendship but asked for protection on t heir way home, w h ic h suggests that they re presented a state to the north but had not yet subd ued the south . By 860 a Russian army under Scandinavian leadership appeared at the gates o f Constan tinople. In the interva l be tween t he two dates , the Norsemen see m to have overcome the resistance of Slavic tribes and other peo ples dwelling alo ng the Dnieper. The account of the Chronicle and even the existence of Rurik have been questioned. but part of the acco unt has a factual basis. In the early Russian prin c ipa l ities . commercial and mi l i t a ry cities
. .
. controlled t he adj o i n i n g territories . . . .
The Norsemen playe d a n i m portant part both i n the promotion o f trade a n d
i n the creation of the city-states . Si nce t h e slave trade a n d the collection o f
tribute were among th e fu nctions of t h e n e w ru lin g gro u p , it was o n l y n a tural that
relat
i ons with the
po p u la t i ons u n der its con trol s h o u ld lead to con flict .
The leadership of the me rch a n t soldiers in the struggle against the ne i gh
borin g tribes and the n o m a d s of t h e s te p pes m i g h t . . . h a ve made their harsh
rule more pal atable . Moreover, the Varangians not i n freque ntl y made their fi rst a p pearance as hi red d e fe n ders aga i n s t the outside e n e m y . N e vertheles s ,
the abuse o f powe r
. .
.
co uld not b u t res u lt in occ as ional po p u l a r u p r is i n gs
aga i n s t the oppressors . It is probable that it was one of t h ese occu rrences that led to the e x p ulsion of the Varangians fro m N ovgo rod a n d to the s ubseq uent
arrival of
a
new gro u p o f Norsemen .
. . .1
I n this interpretation , the main function of the Scandinavian overlords was the promotion of trade and the defe nse of territories from their base in the main towns . Both functions p roba b l y account for the rising importance of K iev . from w here trade to the south could be defe nded again s t v arious As iatic t ribe s . The protection of trade and the exaction of tribute from the subject po pu l at i on were probably indistinguishable from un provoked raids and the distribution of booty as a means of organizi n g ca m paigns . There is little doubt that the early Kievan prince s engage d in concerted military expeditions to extend t h eir domain, which reached for a time from the Khazars in the east to t he B ulgars in the we s t and the Patzi nacs in the south . M u rd e ro u s str u g gles over the s uccession together with almost constant cam paigning made pri ncely authority precarious. The testa me nt of Vladimir II ( Monomak h . 1 1 1 3- 1 1 25) re fers to a grand total of
THE AUTHORITY OF KINGS
go
e ighty-three m ajor ca m pa igns in wh ich he partic i pated during h i s life. And accord ing to one calculation, wars occurred during eighty o ut of one h und red and seventy years following the deat h of Yaroslav the Wise in 1 054.2 The Kievan princ i pa l i ty lasted roughly from the late ninth to the m iddle of the t h i rtee n th centu ry. It was
a
p recario us pol i t i cal st ructure
not only for the reasons cited, but also bec ause t radition called for the division of the realm a mong m e m bers of the R u rik dynasty unde r the nom inal leade rsh i p of the Grand Prince of Kiev. K i e van Russia as a who le incl uded such towns and te rritories as Polotsk , Pskov, Novgorod, Suzdal , Sm olens k, and Vladimir. The rather la rge number of to wns re flects the significance of long-distance trade . The route went from the north along the rivers to Kie v , and be yond to the Byzant ine e m p i re a t Constantinople and other areas o f the Midd le East. The t reaties between Kiev and B yzantium attest to the i m portance of t h i s trading relationshi p. There is also inde pendent evidence of pasturage and agriculture as we l l as o f t rade i n agric ultural prod ucts. By the eleventh century, t he pros per i ty of Kievan R u s sia began to decline, in part beca use the international trade routes from Euro pe to Byzanti u m shifted away from the Rus s i an rivers toward the Ita lian cities and t h e Mediterranean. To t h is m ust be added the wholesale dest r uction of Kievan Russia at the hands of the Mongol s d u r ing the thirteent h cen t u ry and the prolonged subjection of t he area to Mongo l overlo r dshi p thereafter. The Russian territories became a physical ly re mote and eco nomically backward area, as some of the towns lost their earlier eco nom ic prom inence. Only No vgorod remained an i m po rtant princ i pal ity under an u rban patriciate. These m ajor transfo rmations bear on the eventu a l emergence of the Musco v ite dynasty. But befo re exp l aining that e mergence, something m ore needs to be said concerning princely aut hority and social rank in Kievan Russia as a forerunne r of later in stitutional developments. One speak s of K ievan Rus s i a and Kievan society, but not of a Kievan state . The co untry consisted of some ten principalities (including the patrician city-state of Novgorod) na med after t heir m ajor towns which became princely residences . In each of the se territories of Kievan Rus sia, a prince exercised personal rule, he was t he c hief judge and mi lita ry leader, and he col lected tribute to maintain order and defend his realm . The princely domains were managed by h i s servants , while retainers of high status adm inistered the princi pal i ty. The army o rganization of K i evan Russia shows
a
soc ial div ision among t hese retainers . One g ro u p
consisted of ind ividual wa rriors w h o were princely ser vitors, another of landed notables of considerable influence who brought their own a rmed fol lowing with t hem w hen they joined the prince in his m il itary ca m paign s . Bot h g roups consisted of men enjoying h igh statu s , but there was already some difference between t he service obligations of the first
_ Boundary of Kievan Russia Towns
1237 A.D.
controlling
principol
areas
•
Novgorod
•
Tver
....v ... 0 L G A ,/'....-#--' .. BULGARS
4. Russia in the Kievan Period
and the greater inde pende nce of the second gro up, a difference which became much more marked later o n. The second ran k of Kievan societ y
(liudi) was fo r m ed by the pro minent merch ants and artis ans of the towns. These peo ple we re i m po rt an t for the t rade w i t h Byza n t i u m and the Middle East, and thei r numbe r was conside rable. The bulk of the population consisted of pe as a n ts (smerd)'). Most of the m were origina lly free men, b u t many beca me clients bec a u se the y needed prote c tion or ,
slaves due to inde btedness. Political inst itutions corres ponded to this rank-hierarchy of K ievan socie ty. The reta i ners of the prince sened h i m in a n official ca pac i t y; t h e i r functions included d i s p u te set tle m e n t, ad m inistrat ion , and m il i tary cam paign s. But prince ly go vern ment a lso had to come to terms with local poli t ical institutio n s, s uch as co unc ils of notables w h ich rese mb l ed the co unc ils of elders or he ad s of households we have enco untered in the case of Ge rmanic tribes a n d of Arab nomads. In practice, such coun
c i ls (veche) assembled mostl y in t h e towns, their importance increasing pri m a r i l y w hen prince ly r u l e wea kened. The later counc i l s of landed notables
(boyar duma)
probably also develo ped o ut of t he tribal councils .
The p rinc e co uld cal l o n the veche o r boyar dum a for aid a n d a dvice when he considered such action ex pedient Like other autocratic r ulers , .
Russian Town Assemblies Town assemblies or veche played an im por tam role in Kievan R ussia and a fter 1 2 40 in the city-republic of Novgorod. This four teenth-century
woodcut
shows
the
sub
stantial citizens being s u m m oned by be l l to a meeting of the veche. The im portance of these town assemblies declined with the rise
o f M uscovite
Public Library)
a u tocracy.
(New York
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93
a Kievan prince had ways o f assuring that the good will of the assembled notables was forthco mi ng, but he still de pended on them for assistance in raids, military c a m pai gns, and special contribu tions. This de pendence is reflected in the Primary Chronicle, w hich praises good and d en oun c es bad princes : The good prince reveres law and justice and establishes his administra tion along these lines. The bad prince ... neglects the administration and lets his agents plunder the people. To prevent misrule the prince must rely on the advice of experienced "councillors"-that is, on the council, or Duma, of the boyars .... This amounts to a m il d approval of the aristocratic element in government. 3
C usto mary pract ices rather than formal righ ts we re the basis of coop eration among prince, boyars , and merchants. It may be added that the town meetings (veche) o f freemen came to play an i m portant role in the later h istory of Novgorod. The conversion of Kievan society to Greek Orthodox Christianity was a gradual process that is i m poss i ble to se parate from the foreign relations and the political ideas of the period . Georgia and Armenia had been among the first Christian states, and Christian m issions were active in th e Crimea and the Khazar Khanate from an early time. We also have a record of a Greek O rthodox m ission to Kievan Russia in the ninth century. The area was subject to many religious i nfluences, and pagan ism was clearly on the wane. I n t h e nine - eigh ties Russia was surrounded b y nations o f Christian, J e wis h ,
865; 922. Simultaneously, Christianity made rapi d progress among Russia's wes ter n neighbors. I n the pe riod between 942 and 968 several tribes of the Baltic Slavs we re convened; i n 966 Prince: Mieszko of Poland was baptized and in 974 King Harold Blotand of Denmark. Olaf Trygvasson, ki n g of NOt'way since 955, had become a Ch ristian in 976. In 986 D u k e Geza of Hu n g ar y a c cept e d the
and Moslem faith. The K h azars h ad been conve r te d to Judaism around
the Volga Bulgars accepted Islam in
faith .4
I n the mid d le of the te nth century, the Kievan princess Olga (945-964) converted to the Greek Orthodox faith, though only after she had ceased to be regent. Be fore her con version, however, she had sen t re quests for missionaries not only to Constantinople but also to the Ger man emperor, OUo I (93 6-97 3 ) . Apparently she sought terms from Constantinople or Rome that would favor an autonomous Russian church. Later exploratory m issions examined both Islam and the Ju daism of the Khazars. The fi nal conversion of K i e v an Russia to the Greek Orthodox faith occurred under the rule of Vladimir (978- 1 0 1 5). At the time, the By-
zant i n e e m peror Basile ios (976-1025) appe a led for Ki e v a n aid in his sim ultaneous s tru g gle aga ins t the Bulgars in the west and the cla i m s of B o r das Phokas, a rival emperor wi th i n By z a n ti u m V lad i m ir agreed to hel p o n condit ion that Anna, the s i s te r of the By z a ntine e m pe ror, would becom e his wife This c on d it i o n was grant e d , provi ded t hat Vladi m i r would convert t o the Greek Orthodox faith. Vladim i r was ba p t i ze d in 988. Fo r K i e van Russia, the marriage a l l i a n c e w ith Byzanti u m m eant an i m portan t gain in i ts fore ign relations a n d henceforth Greek O rt hodox influence was establ ished in R ussia. The tow n s of Ki e v a n Russi a we re the firs t to conve rt to the Or t h odox fa i th, wh ile for some centuries the peo p l e in the countrysi de rema ine d pagan. Nevertheless, the spre ad of the faith and a certain am a l ga m a tio n o f Christian and pagan practices we re favored by t h e c i r c u mstances of C h r istian ization. Cyril (826-869) and Methodius (815?885), the first By z an t ine m issionar i es to the Slavs, had translated the Bible and the ch urch service into C h u rc h Slavon ic. Unlike the We stern c h u rc h with i ts insistence on Lat i n , the O rthodox church prese n ted the Slavs with a gospel and litu rgy w hich m any peo ple could understan d . More i m portantly, t he conversion o f the Slavs began at a t i m e w h e n the pe riod o f the great controvers ies had ended.a Thus, the m ain C h ristian doctrines came to Russia in their d e fi nitive for m . As a result, the Or thodox c h urch and its me mbers took on the obligation of preserving unchan ge d the original Doctrine o f the Lord as a spiritual treasure which must not be blem ished or d i m i n ished in any way; Ort hodoxy did not e nco urage preaching, doctrinal disputes, or theological spe c ulatio n Illiteracy as well as ignorance of doctrine were wides pread amo ng the clergy, especially in its lower ran ks; but this did not matter because the proper ritual of worsh i p by itse l f was at the heart o f Russia n religiosity. SiiICe church and people bel ieved that they possessed the only true faith, it was s u fficient to practice that fait h as the ritual of the church pre scribed. In this sense, the orthodox faith became identified as the culture �f the whole people. What bearing did Greek Orthodox i nfluence have on princely (and later tsarist) authority? Francis Dvornik has exam ined the documentary evidence regarding the Byzantine conce ption of kingship whic h was part of the Greek Orthodox faith and its doctrinal elaboration s . .
.
.
"The reference i s t o the great ch urch councils o f the early Middle Ages. The council (If Nkaea of 325 was mentioned in Chapter 2, and seven councils followed (Constanti llople. 38 1 ; Ephesus, 43 1 ; Chalcedon. 451; Co nsta ntinople, 553, 680-681; Nicaea. 787; Constantinople, 869-870). At these co uncils major doctrinal issues were resolved dealing wit h the nature o f Christ. the divi nity of the Hol y Spirit. and t he proper worship of images. Such heresies as Arianism, N estorianism, and ot hers were condemned . Though other councils fol lowed which dealt with issues of doctrine and ch urch organization , t hese eight
early cou ncils defined the basic tenets o f Christianity.
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The main ideas of Byzan tine poli tic al philoso p hy are clearly set out ... by the re presentatives of t he Byzantin e Church : The Em peror is a ppointed by God as m aster of the U n i vers e , he represents Christ on earth, h i s d u ty is not
only to t a k e care of eart h l y th ings, but above a l l, of heave n ly things. Like Christ, he has to go after the strayed
s h e ep - th e
heretics and sin nel·s-and
bring t he m back to t he fold of the C h u r ch .... As
a
representative of God,
he has to take care of t h e Church, convoke the cou n c i ls of bis h ops, confirm their decrees and enforce their application to t h e life of the faithful. 5
T he doc uments con tai n i n g these and rela ted ideas became availa ble in Slavon ic translations, b e g i n n ing in the n inth centu ry. They extolled the divi ne natu re, if not the d i v i n ity, of the all-powerfu l ruler, enjoined utter obed ience on all his s ubjects, and explained tyran n ic al rule as j ust p u n ishment sent by the Lord God who was a n ge red by the people's sins . T h e K ie van clergy (man y of them Greek monks) espo used t h e i d e a that the Byzanti ne empe ro r (not t he pa tr ia r c h of Constantinople) was the representative of God on earth-that is, t he supreme legislator for the Christian commonwealth and the p ro tecto r of the ch urch. Members of the clergy also wrote idolizing biographies of the Kievan pri nce s . The
admonition that "the true ruler is one who governs himself and
is
not
a slave of his passio n s " even had an oddly Con fucian rin g.6
The Kievan princes accepted the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Byzantine emperor and allowed the adoption o f Orthodox canon law , actions which satisfied th e Byzantine rulers . There is also some indication of co m p ro m ise concerning church affairs betwee n Kiev and Byza n t i u m . Occasionally, a native Russian priest rather than a Gre e k prelate wo u ld be appointed to the office of metro politan , as the chief dignitary of the Kievan church was called , though all appointees re qui re d final approval from Constantinople. But this arrangement was not a token of political or even ecclesiastical submission. The Kievan princes were not the vas sals of the By za nt i ne e m pe ror, and even though they acknowledged his religious supremacy, Byzantium allowed for considerable ecclesiastical decentralization. The Byzantine and Orthodox outlook of the Kievan cle r gy made them partisans of ecclesiastical and poli tical unity, while the equal divi sion o f inheritance adhered to by the Kievan princes m ade for territorial fragmentation. From the beginning, the Russian Orthodox church lacked that institutional independence which m ade the Catholic ch urch such a formidable counterweight to secular rule rs h i p in Western Europe. I n keeping with Byzantine exam ple, though contrary t o Kievan practice, Russia's Orthodox church gave id e ologic al support to autocratic rule over a unified realm, and Orthodox doctrine demanded the subordi nation of all clerics to the prince as the secular ruler. B ut Kievan prac tices of i nheritance e nco u rage d political fragmentation. T he cl erica l
96
THE AUTHORITY OF KINGS
spokesmen of the Orthodox ch urch probably played no political role i n Kievan Russia.7 I n the thirteen th cen tury, s porad ic raids from the ste ppes became a concerted d rive. The Russian te rritor ies were conque red by the Mon gols, central Asian t ribesmen who had initiate d their transcontinental conquests in 1215 w i th the seizure of Pe k ing. A mere eight years later, the Mon gols defeated a Russian force at the Battle of Kal ka (1223), n ortheas t o f the Crimea. This battle appeared as just anothe r engage men t with the nomads of t he ste p pe; the re had been many s uch en gage ments in the past. The rise of the Mongo l e m pire was u n known in Russia. Fo u rteen years later (1237/38), however, t he Mon gols conq uered all the Russian princi palities, beginn ing in the northeast and fann ing out toward the west and south . Kiev was sacked in 1 240, and its prom inence declined therea fter. The westw ard march of the Mongols came to a halt in H ungary in 124 1 , not because s u perior forces o pposed the m , but because the Great Khan had died a n d the Mon gol com m a n ders broke off their cam paign . He nceforth, all Russia n princes were obliged to pay obeisance and trib u te to the Khan o f the Golden Horde, i n his ca pital of Sarai. M o ngol overlord s h i p over the Russi an princ i palities meant the col lectio n of tribute and the use o f these territories as a b u ffer zone against Lithuania and the Teuto n ic Orde r i n the West. This political situation is ill ustrated by refere nce to the princi pali ties of Vladim i r and N ovgo rod , loca ted in the center of Euro pean Russia. In 1 240, w he n Kiev fell to the Mongols, Pri nce Alexander o f Vladimir defe ated the Swedes at the Neva in the north and came to be known as A lexander Nevski . Two years later, the leadi n g fam ilies (boyars ) of No vgorod asked Alexander's aid, a n d he s uccessful ly defended the city against the Livon i a n K nights of the Sword, an affiliate o f the Teu to n ic Order. (The embattled con d ition of the Russian princ i palities o n the ir western frontiers i s i n d icated by a calculation of two Sov iet s pecialists: betwee n 1142 and 1466 No v gorod fo ught the Swedes twe n ty-six times, the Lith uanians fo urteen times, the German knights eleven times, and the Norwegians five times. 8 ) This vic tory over the Cat holic crusaders from the West was achieved at t he price o f submissio n to the Mongol i n fidels in the East. Alexander seems to have j ustified this choice as necessary for the preservation of Russian Orthodoxy, which had less to fea r from the Mon gols than from the Catholicism of the Te utonic Order. Alexa nder's defense of his in herited territories against attacks from the West served Mon gol interests as well, and in 1252 the Mongol overlord conferred the title o f Grand Prince of Vladi m i r on Alexander Nevsk i . (That title had bee n used for centu ries to designate s u premacy over other Russian princes) . The po-
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97
l i tica l p rice of th i s ascendance and o f de fendin g t he Orthodox church a ga inst Cat holicism was great. When Alexander was installed as Grand Prince, his brothers rose aga i n st him and were defeated with the hel p of M ongol tro op s Novgorod occ up ied a special positio n Th ro ugho ut t h e M o ngol pe riod, th e city contro l led five provinces in northwestern Russia. Its au tonomy as a major commercial center was pr ote cted by the Mongols, because the ci ty served them not o nly with its own tribu te but as a col lector of taxes from the s ubject p opulat ion Ye t in 1257, fifteen years a fter he had successfully defended the city aga i n s t incursions f rom the West, Alexander Nevski forced the boy ars, at the req uest of the khan, to acce pt the tax survey drawn u p by Mongol officials. This measure o bvio u s l y was de sig ned to curb tax evasion and red uce the po cke tin g of taxes by Nov gorod n otables. The local autonomy of Russia's mo st im portant city-state was c u rtailed at a time w hen Western E u rop ean towns were s ucces sfully expanding their local jurisd ictio n . A lexander Nevski's position w a s typic al o f the Russi a n princes u n de r Mongol rule. All their territories were caught between the contend ing powers of East and West. Economic decline was aggr avated by the payment of tribute to the Mongol overlords w h ic h m ade money scarce and by sporadic raids from the ste ppe which threatened the trade routes. 9 Territorial aggrandizement and struggles over in heritance ex isted in Russia as they did everywhere else. But in Russia such conflicts among princely fam ilies were especially hazardous, because foreign powers like the Mongols in the East and Poland and Lithuania in the West used the conquest of Russian territories to resolve their own i n ternal conflicts. The resulting political situation was precarious for the Russian princes. Inte rnal peace in a territory was only as secure as a ruler could make it by utilizing his military forces a nd political opportunities. Initial success would attract people in search of security; they would add to the sparse rural labor force, increase the ruler's resources, and thus indi rectly help him provide more security for his people. Marriage alliances among the ru l i n g fam ilies also could exte nd peace over a large r terri tory. On the other hand, d isputes over inhe ritance among the heirs o f a ruling house increased the likelihood o f armed conflict. Inheritance might be governed by the rule of "lateral succession," according to which the title of grand prince (instead o f passing to the son) passed from the incumbent to his oldest brother, or if he w as deceased to the second oldest brother, and so o n . A lternatively, the in heritance might be d i vided amon g the sons, as in Moscow w here the title of pr ince and au thority over the princ i pality went to one son, while the other sons re.
.
.
THE A UTHOR ITY OF KINGS
98
ceived only land to maintain t hem and no authority (appanage). Rival claimants proli ferated under both systems and aggravated divisive ten denc ies unchecked by fa m ily so lida rity lo Geo gra phically, the ope n-steppe fro n tie r in the east and so uth also made strong princely rule d i ffi c u l t. Where settlement was s parse, trans porta tio n d i fficult, and the border areas subject to ma rauding nomads, the he reditary owners of land had to be sel f-su fficient to s urvive, and o n ly emergencie s ind uced them to band togethe r. Early doc ume ntation is fr agm e nt a ry but by the e leventh century the ruling p rinces and lead ing no tables of Kievan Russia posse ssed large lan d hold i n gs. Their rights of h u nting, grazin g, and fi s hin g as well as their rights to the land were h e re d i tary (votchina). (The R u s si an term for pa trimon y, votchina, means the same as allodial holdin gs in Western Europe. M arc B loch defines the latter term as "a holding abso l u tely free, ove r w h ic h no s u pe rior had rights, w h ich owed d ues or se rvices to no o ne, the possession of whic h i n volved no loyalty or obedience to any individ ual.")!1 There were also estates granted on condition o f service (later called pomestie). The d i s t i nction between the two ty pes of holdin gs was to play a large role i n t he develop ment of the Russian aristocracy, but neither o f these titles to land was tied to t he exe rcise o f a ut hori ty on behal f of the ruler. T he hered i tar y landowners under a ruling prince co u ld terminate their service without loss of property, in part because their local power was entire ly pe rsonal rather than political. As the n um ber o f appanage princes in creased , so d id the num ber o f hereditary notables (boyars) who left the service of one p r ince fOl' t h at of another. In t h e period of a p panage princ ipalities a fter 1240, the d ivision of pro perty among the legitimate heirs of ruling princes prevailed over e fforts at territorial and political .
,
consolidation. b The ease with which boyar s could change their a llegiance was re flected lower down in the social h i e ra rc h y by the relative freedom of the peasantry. Large n umbers of freeholders lived i n village commun ities of their own , beholden only to the princely ruler. Aristocratic landown -
"The division of propertr by prim;eiy fa m i l i e s and the freedom of hereditary land
owners went hand-in-hand, j ust as later on political consolidation de pended in good part on increasing the number of pomestie estates. BlIt the heirs of \'otchina estates, original ly
belonging to princes, appanage pdn ces . and boyars, continued their claims to superior status compared with the hei rs of servitors who at one time had held pomestie estates, long after the fo rm e r had losl theil' earliel' i nd ependenc e and freedom of movement by having come under the protection of the rising M usco vite dynasty, The prestige d istinction between the owners of v()\china and pomestie estates con tin u ed to divide the R us s i an ar istocracy u ntil the late seventeenth celllul'y. although by then that distinction had often become a genea logical fiction,
RUSSIA
99
e r s relied on a work force of slaves or of persons who h ad become d e pen de n t due to debts or t he ne.e d for protection . Peasants could bette r th eir condition by s eeki n g their fortunes elsewhe re, althou gh usually the y could do so only with the aid of a nother land lord, who would offer easier term s and/or pay o ff the pe asa n t s obl igations .12 This relative free dom of m o ve m e nt by m a n y pea sa n ts was facilitated by the scarcity of ag ricu lt u ra l labor in the remoter areas and he n ce by the chance to es cape there, or by the inte rest of landowners in a tt r act i n g peasants to their estates.C While th e details of this pi ctu re are unclear, there is some evidence that during the Kievan period and for some time a fter the thir teenth centu ry, both landlords and peasants e njoyed a degree of inde pendence which was t he counterpart of weak prince l y rule. I n later ye ars , that freedom acq u ired a powerful symbolic appeal. The o r gani za tio n , but not the ideology, of the Orthodox church also increased the d i fficulties of political consolidation. I n all clerical affairs, the church de pe n ded on decisions by t he he ad of the c h urch, the pa t riarch of Constanti n o ple He alone could con firm the metropol itan, t he highest single dig n itary of the Russian c hurch. But in a co untry fr agmented by rival pr i ncely families, the appointment of the metro poli tan became an issue of political im portance. E very Russ i a n ruler was interested in having a pries t from his realm a p pointed head of t he Rus sian church so that the religious authority of the metropolitan would be physically and sy mbo lica l ly present in his domain. For exam ple , Lithu anian and other west Russian ru lers sou ght to promote their political aims by urging the a p po int men t of a metropolitan from their areas, sometimes under the threat of converting to Catholicism if their de mands were rejected . Under these conditions, almost every new a p pointment o f a metropolitan accentuated the political divisions o f the country.13 At the sam e t im e, the Russian church was ideological ly the foremost advocate of political unity under one dynasty. The c h urch was the repository of Russia's religious culture . It w as also a promoter of trade: a statute of Grand Pri nce Vladi mir (9 80- 1 0 1 5) regula rized the tithes to be paid to the church and made the bishops res ponsible for the superv ision of wei ghts and measu res. 14 How , then, did the Muscovite rulers grad ually achieve a po litical and mi li t ary ascendance over rival principal ities and e vent u ally succeed in esta b lish ing a u n ifie d state? Under Mongol leadershi p, s u pe riority of rank among the Russian p rinces depended on the title of gra n d prince, '
.
100
THE AUTHORITY
OF KINGS
confe rred by the Mongol khans at Sarai. On t he death of an incumbent, a charter (yarlyk) had to be obtained at the Mongol court by the prince who was next in the line of s uccession. Eve ry grand prince return ing from Sarai with the khan's confirmation d id so in the company of a Mongol plenipotentiary and of Mongol troops which guaranteed his in vestiture and helped to su pport the new incumbent against his Russian enem ies . Accord ingly, the relative pos ition of Russian rulers de pe n ded on the success with which they maneu vered against each other at the Mongol cou rt. The Russian word pchelobitie which means both petition and "forehead beating" gives an apt desc ri ption of Russian efforts to obtain favors from their Mon gol overlords. The later M uscovite e m pire a pplied sim ilar practices to conquered territories of its own. Like other conquerors, the Mongols fostered internal d ivisions a mong the Russian princes, but the Mongols also had some interest in poli tical stability. They wanted at least eno ugh stability to secu re pay ments of tribute to themselves and to preserve t he defensive ca pability of the Russian princes against attacks from the West. The Mongol rulers did not have "a policy": they had to contend with their o wn internal divisions. But the effect of their actions was to allow the Russians to pursue their own political practices, even when these led to territorial consolidation, as in the case of Moscow. I n the later thirteenth century, Mongol rulers perm itted the con solidation of territories and a measure of prospe rity in two princi pal ities: Moscow and Tver' . Both cities we re located near trade routes and water ways, w hile forests, marshes, and rivers protected them against enemy attacks . Since m uch trade had shifted to the Med iterranean and raids on Russian territories increased , many people migrated into the s parsely settled areas around Moscow and Tver' in search of more security and their presence contributed to the prosperity of the two areas. In the fo urteenth century, Tver' was in the ascendance and the Mongol rulers tended to su pport Moscow, probably to maintain a balance between the two. \:; That support was increased when the princes of Tver' appeared to lean toward an alliance with Lithuania. In 1 327 I van Kal ita of Moscow gained support at Sarai by denouncing Tver' and retu rned with a Mon gol army that razed the cities of Tver' to the ground . Thereu pon the Mongols began to sponsor the Russian principality of Suzdal' as a ne w counterweight to Moscow. But the mounting threat of eastward expan sion on the part of Lithuania made it appear important to s upport Mos cow's defense against the West. While Ivan Kal ita's reign ( 1325- 1 34 1 ) was marked by subservience to the Mongol rulers, shortly before his death Ivan secured the khan's endorsement of his will, which reserved the title of grand prince to Moscow. From then on, only the heirs of the M uscovite rulers could claim the grand-princely title.16 Ivan had turn ed ,
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101
his opportunities as princ i pal collector of tribute for the Mongols into permanent political gain. Moscow's rise and Mongol sponsorship o f the Russian church were also close ly connected. The Mongol overlords exem pted the Orthodox ch urch from taxation, protected its property , and avoided religious per sec ution, policies whic h allowed the church to support autoc racy and po litical consolid ation . Mongol charters (yarlyki) were granted to the me tropolitan of the church, and the wealth of the church increased enormously a fter the 1270s. Since pious gi fts of te rritorial holdings to the church were legally protected , church lands were at peace , and this attracted agricultural laborers . Secular landowners lost peasants because they lacked com parable privileges. One can i n fer that the Mongols sought to obtain the support of the church so as to counteract anti-Mon gol sentiments and to l imit the political and economic power of the sec ula r rulers. It is possible that the church a ppeared as a safe ally since it co m manded no military forces of its own. Yet by enriching and pro tecting the church, the Mongols aided an organization that was invio lable in th e eyes of the Russian people. The church transcended political boundaries and by its spiritual sanctions was capable of aiding the political unification of the country . After the Mongols had razed Kiev once more in 1299, Maximus, the metropolitan of the Russian church, removed his supreme office from Kiev to Perejaslavl in the north. Perejaslavl then came into the possession of the princes of Moscow through in heritance. This accidental identi fication of the church with Moscow was followed during the early four teenth century by maneu ve rs which involved the princes of Moscow , Tver', and Volhynia, their rival nominees for the position of metropol itan , several patriarchs at Constantinople, and the Mon gol rulers.17 By 1328 the head of the Russian Orthodox church had firmly sided with
the Muscovite rulers, and this identi fication of the church with Moscow was sanctioned by the Mon go l khans at Sarai. The late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries witnessed a tem porary decline of Mongol power, a major Lithuanian expansion toward the east, then a new consolidation of Mongol rule. At the same time, there were mounting internal struggles within Moscow , Tve r', and several other Russian principalities. With these com plex developments, the political and military fortunes of the Muscovite rulers were repeatedly at a low ebb. In 1368, 1 370, 1 372 , 1382, and 1 408, Moscow itself was belea guered or conquered. B ut the fifteenth century saw the ascendance of Moscow. The city'S advantageous location, I van Kalita's maneuvers at the Mongol court, and the identification of the Orthodox church with Muscovite rule contributed to Moscow's success. Lithuanian expansion toward the east drew to a close and Mongol interference in Russian af-
THE AUTHOR ITY OF KINGS
102
fairs declined. d
the w ork
Th e ex p lo itat io n of these i n te rnat i ona l op por t u n i t ies was
of Ivan III (1462-1505).
Pe rha ps it is easiest to contrast p r i nc ely a u t ho r ity in Kievan Russia w i t h the i m pe r ial in s t itu t i o n in Ja pan. The J apa ne s e emperor was in i t i a l ly the first among several heads of maj or clans, all of whom pe r form ed the ritual cere monies and sacrifices of ancestor wor s h ip. This native religious c u l t u re co ntinued un interru pted for ce nt u ri es A l th ough t h e em pero r lo st h i s go v er n me n t a l powe rs rathe r early, native l ege n d ascribed divine descent to him and his successors, and he co nti nu ed to reta in his r el i gio u s func tions. This fun damental c o n t inu i ty may be one reason w hy t h e Ja panes e im pe ri a l court could pro vide the country with cultu ral l ea de rsh i p of a h igh order, e ven when the Yamato d ynasty ad apte d the ancient a n d h i gh l y s o ph i st ica t ed model of China. The cultural influence of Japanese k i ngs h i p re m a i ne d v e ry gr e at t hroug h o u t, alth ou gh the e m peror's s ec ular a uthority vi rtually d i sa ppe a red Contrast this pos it io n with t h a t of the Rus s i a n p r i n ces be fore the ascendance of the M uscovite dynasty. O r ig i n a lly they were conquerors from Sc an d i n a v i a who vanquished Slavic and other tribes and rose to p rom i n ence as traders an d d e fende r s ag a in s t nomadic attacks from the east and south. Even t ho u gh the permanent settlement of these and its successor principa lities un d er the Mo n gols
.
.
,
r\orse conquerors led to their assimilation, the contrast to
rul e rsh i p
Ja pa nese
remains. In the Rus s i a n ca se , p r i n c ely aut ho r i ty was based
a time there w as l itt le cu lt u r al a ffi n ity between rul ers and ruled, since the Norsemen came from a di ffer e n t native tradi t ion . In Russia as in the West, the chronicles recounting early historical e v e nt s are clearly se p ar ated from the c r ea tion m yt hs and legends which reflect tribal c u l tural conditions. By co n t rast , the earliest Japa nese records blend the creation myths of the i r tribal past with the c h ro n icle of h istorical events so that the Japanese e m pe ro r s seem to emerge from among the native clans. This continuity of the Japanese tradi-
on conquest and for
dMongol raid s into Russian territories con tinued during the fifteen t h centu r y and
later, but by then t he powe r of the origin;11 Mongol conquerors was d i m i n ished. Com petin g successor-states of the Mongols developed in the sou t hern and easter n fron t ier
reg i o n s of the R u s s ian territories. T hese were compo se d of remnants of the Golden Horde
and of R uss i an peasants who sou g ht theil' fClI·tunes away from their homeland beca use of
i t s condiIions of m o u n tin g servitude. Accordingly, Mongol o v erlo rd ship was su pe r seded
by several M on gol and Cossack borde!" s t ate s , w hich posed a t h rea t from time to time but
were too divided to dominate the Russian rulers as the M o n gol khans had done. (See
Gunther Stiikl, RUs.fische Geschichtf, pp. 173-4, and the same autho r' s Die ElItstehung des
Ko.wkenillms [vol. 3 of Verofrentiich ungen des Osteu ro painstituts; Munich: Isar Verlag , 1953). The la t t er work contains an a n alysis of the soc ia l structure of these "frontier societies. ")
RUSSIA
tion differs from the adoption of Christianity by Grand Prince V ladi mir of Kiev in 987 or 988, w h ic h represe nted a break with native traditions. Preaching the Christian doctrine in Kievan Russia was so difficult that the C hristian faith itself was transformed. As elsewhere, the people had their own pagan belie fs and no background for understanding the new message. I n addition , all t he higher clergy and som e of the lower clergy were Greeks whose com mand of Ru ssian was i m perfect. Vladimir a nd his successors embarked on cam paign s to s pread the new faith. They destroyed pagan images and proceeded to build churches . When pers uasion did not wor k, the mission was accom plished by fire and swo rd, which occasiona l ly led to popular uprisings but more often to a quiet submission. Among the m asses, paganism and C hristianity existed side by side for centuries. Illi terate village priests e ncouraged this blend ing o f different creeds , since their income derived i n good part from offerings to miracle-worki ng icons and to the charismatic remnants of Christian saints. The worship of holy images hel ps to account for the fact that the Russian church became the repository of popular feeling and culture despite forced conversions , the influence o f alien cle rics, an d the great wealth of ecclesiastical institutions.e Relations between royal authority and the church in Russia differed strikingly from those in Western Europe. The head of the Russian church, the metropolita n , was nom inated and consecrated by the patri arch of Constantinople. All the Russian principalities constituted a single church domain, subdivided into a number of dioceses, each headed by a bishop. Each diocese exten ded into several princi palities and was con sequently large. Each bishopric was a highly prized o ffice within the gift ofthe princes, though req uiring confirmation by the metro politan . Bish ops were entitled to a s pecial tax from the population and to a variety of fees which the lower clergy had to pay in return for their privileged functions. In addition, jud ic ial fees accrued from the church's jurisdic tion not only in ecclesiastical matters but in all cases involving people residing on ch urch estates. Some metropolitans and bishops even sup plemented their income by lending money at high interest. The church became very wealthy, espec ially when Mongol protection made it a ha ven of peace amid devastation, but the c hurc h remained s ubordinate to secular rule. This subordination was symbolized by a fairly common practice going back to t he twelfth century. Princes and wealthy boyars wou ld seek eternal peace by taking monastic vows toward the end of ,
"To a n observer ou tside the Greek Ort h odox tradition. the wors h i p of images may appear as
a
survival of pagan practices. However. in the Greek Orthodox view. images
are literally believed to represent t he holy.
RUSSIA
their lives, often only a few hours be fore death. Clerical w riters then em be llished the practice in their. accounts, provid ing the most notable Russian rulers with a retrospective sanctification of their secular au th or ity . 1 8 The princely rulers of Russia th u s derived their authority di rectly from God and did not look elsewhere for their mandate to rule. But they and their entourages were Christians who were well aware o f the discre pancy between a u to cra ti c practice and the Te n Com mand me n ts. Monastk vows a fe w hours be fore death pro vided Russian rulers with spi ritual legi timation as an after th o u g ht. This was not the pattern in Western E u ro pe I n the early ce nturies of th e Ch ristian era, the bishops of Rome had favored theocracy in order to strengthen political o rder in a distu rbed period. Converted Germanic chieftains needed support against followers who still adhered to pagan belie fs of blood-right and charismatic line age . But after the consecration of th e Carolingian ruler Pe pin in 75 1 , the church began to elaborate its doct rine of the kin g as a C hristian prince w ho was under the law and obliged to protect the ch urch and abide by its edicts in ecclesiastical matters. Though in later years the line dividing secular from clerical jurisdiction was much disputed , there was no ambiguity abo ut the am bitions o f the church. As Pope Gelasius stated in his letter of 496 to Empero r Anaslasius I, .
There are two things, most august em peror, b y which this wo r ld is chiefly ruled: the sacred authority of the pries thood, and the royal power. Of these
two, the priests carry the greater wei ght, because they will have to render
account in the d ivi n e judgment even for the k i n gs of men. IS
This doctrine differed from the Orthodox emphasis on t he supremacy of the emperor, as did t he political circumstances of the Christian mis sion in the West and in Russia. When Vladimir co nverted to Orthodoxy late in the tenth century, Byzantium was beset by enemies, and the se paration (in 1054) between the patriarchate in Constantinople a nd the papacy in Rome was at hand. In the preceding centu ries, the Roman popes had been a spiritual and organizational force, but until the eighth century there was no im perial force to back them up. The papacy in Rome favored royal authority in order to combat paganism and attempted to politically circumscribe that authority primarily through alliance with its o pponents. By contrast, the
Patriarch blesses the Tsar
on
a Dais before SL Basil's Cathedral
This ceremony m arks the begin n ing of a holiday in the R ussian Orthodox church. Though
the tsar is shown bending down before the patriarch, the tsar was in practice su perior to the hierarchy of the church. Only a patriarch acceptable to the tsar could become head o f the Orthodox c h u rch. (Olearius. Voyages (1662»
1 06
THE A UTHOR ITY OF KINGS
B yzantine state and the Greek Orthodox ch urch had been united under the leadersh ip of the em peror. To the Byzantine em pire, Russia was i m portant as a potential ally against its many enem ies, and to the patri archate of Constantinople Russia was part of its religio u s domain and a source of revenue. B yzantine political and clerical interests converged as they had not in the West. State an d c h urch favored Russian un ity . After the conversion of V lad imir in t he tenth centu ry, t h e Russian church remained formally s ubordinate to the patriarchate of the Greek Orthodox church in Constantinople. The metropolitan of the Ru ssian church had to be confir m ed by the Byzantine patriarch, and Greeks rather than Russians predomi nated a mong the metropolitan s appointed in this manner. The Byzantine em pi re weakened under the onslaught of the Ouoman Turks, and by the early fifteenth century the em pire was reduced to the environs of Constantinople and the Pelepon nesian peninsula of Greece . The predominance of the patriarchate also de clined. The final breach between the Russian church and the patriarch ate in Con stantinople occurred in 1 44 8 w hen a synod of Russian bishops elected a new metropolitan of the Russian church. Efforts to obtain pa triarchal con firmation were delayed and came to nothing after Con stantinople was conquered by the Turks in 145 3 . Thereafter, heads of the Russian church were elected by a synod of Russian bishops provided the candidate was acce ptable to the grand prince of Moscow. The in de pe ndence of the Russian church from the patriarchate and the u n ity of church and state under the overlordship of the Muscovite rulers were accomplished facts by the middle of the fifteenth century. PRI NCES, BOY ARS, AN D TSAR I ST SERVITORS Aristocrats have usually possessed prestige and wealth. Their priv ileges con sist in a title of nobility , freedom from taxation, and special rights associated with the control of land . Aristocrats also constitute a h ierarchy of honor in which different degrees or ranks are marked by special insignia, the right to bear arms, and the preem ption of activities that are believed to confer prestige. A good many of these marks of prestige (though not all) remain valid-at least in the eyes of other aris tocrats-even when a family loses its wealth. The reason is that aristo cratic privileges and conventions help to define the circle of those con sidered eligible for marriage and social intercourse. One way of avoiding a misconce ption of "aristocracy," and of the Russian aristocracy in partic ular, is to em ploy a twofold definition of authority . Authority may be exercised either by perem ptory commands or by grants of rights in return for services. Taken as the extremes of a contin uum, the two categories cover the range from a tyrant whose
R USSIA
) (}7
gra n ts o f delegated aut hority a re tem porary, w i l l fu l, and closely su per vised , to a k ing w ho re i g n s but dQes not rule because he has sanctioned a de l e gat ion of r ights t hat remain his in n am e o n ly. There is a p a rallel range among the subord i n a te s who, on the one hand , may be su bj ec t to e x ac t i ng demands and pers on a l h u m iliation or, on t he other, enjoy an a u to n o m y which is not d i m i n ished b y formal acts of ho m age . In the case of Russia, t s a rist rule inc reasingly te n d e d toward per e m ptory com mands a n d hence the Russian aristocrats came to derive their presti ge and wealth fro m proximity to the ruler. Their loc al power over the serfs went toge the r with an ofte n d eg ra d in g subjection to the arb itrary will of the au tocrat . The terms Russian aristocracy or R ussian gentry des i gnate this gro u p because its members served the rul i ng tsar a n d had p riv ileg ed acce ss to posit ion s o f government. 2 0 But the term nobility is best avoided , because distinctions of b i rth derived from a fam ily's i n de pendent status d ec l ine d in i m po rta nce w i th t he r i se o f Mosc ow . As the M uscovite dynasty rose to preeminence in the fourteenth and fi fteenth centu ries, Russia's tsarist rule and aristocracy came closer to the first of these alternatives, though the st r u g gle against the inher ited privileges of boyar and princely familie s contin ued until the sev e n teenth century. Muscovite ascendance was related to Russia's inter natio n al posi tio n . In contr a st to Japan , which was almost immune to outside attacks, Russia was exposed to foreig n invasions or maraudi n g raids for the better part of its recorded hi s tory. I n Russia, recurrent warfare led to the concentration of M uscovite a u t hority , t he incre a sin g subordi nation of all social ranks , a n d the pe rsisten t ne g lect of local gov ernment and estate manage ment. B y contrast, Japa n's g re ater immun ity to attack was accom pan ied (d ur i ng the Ashikaga period) by the gradual decline of shogunal, and a cor respond i n g gro w th of l ocal, authority as well as the rise of a class of small, inde pendent landowne rs. Russia's em battled condition le d to more, not less, centralized power, and time and again the country was like an armed cam p . The following discussion examines an aristocratic governance which was s haped by this militari zation of society. The developme nt of the Russian aristocracy is dis cussed in terms of ( 1 ) the i nitial freedom of princes and boyars in the Kievan and appanage per iods, (2) the m ilitary aspects o f Moscow's rise to power, and (3) the effects of this rise on the aristocracy . I shall further describe (4) the mestnichestvo system (see glossary) as it developed in the fifteenth century, and (5) the result i ng composition and functions of the Russian ar i stocracy. The chapter concludes with (6) a descript ion of Russia' s "aristocratic culture pattern" and its reaffirmation in the legal codes of the seventeenth century. 1 . In Kievan Russia and the subsequent period of a ppanage pri n c ipalities, central authority was rather nominal. Russia was sparsely pop-
1 08
THE A UTHOR ITY OF KINGS
ulated, and trade was a more im portant source of wealth than land. I n the frontier areas of the open ste ppe, peasants retained their freedom o f movement, and large landowners were free to change their allegiance from one prince to another without losing the ir patrimony. One sho uld bear in mind that the princes and boyars of the time were indepe ndent, sel f-eq u ipped warriors w ho m ade up the fighting forces of the several princ i pal ities, a condition wh ich changed only as t he Muscovite dynasty grad ually subdued one after another of the Russian princ i palities. The abse nce of primogeniture made for the frequent division of estates and the re peated weakening of aristocratic domi nance at the local level, so that landed aristocrats became more willing to enter the services of a strong rulerY As the Gra nd Duchy o f Muscovy achieved ascendance during the fou rtee nth century, the freedom of boyars to change their allegiance from one ruler to another was curtailed . 2 . Moscow's initial rise to power occurred under Ivan Kalita ( 1 3251 34 1 ). Still another century of subordination to the Mongol overlords was to pass before the weakening of Mo n gol power in t he_ east and of Lith uanian power in the west resulted in the rise of the M uscovite dy nasty under Ivan I I I ( 1 462 - 1 505 ) . At the beginning of t he fou rteenth century, Muscovy extended over only 47 , 000 square kilometers. By the mid-fifteenth century, the state's territories had increased to 430,000 square kilometers, and by 1 600 they had reached 5 , 400,000 square kil ometers.22 Yet the decline of Mongol and the rise of Moscow's power only meant the end of Russia's direct subservience , not the secu rity of its domain . Even though the Khanates o f Kazan and Astrakhan were annexed to Moscow by Ivan I V (The Terrible, 1 53 3- 1 5 84) in the 1 550s, the Crimean Tartars contin ued to harass Russian borderlands through o ut the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, ofte n with the support of Polan d or the Ottoman em pire. Every raid exacted its toll in looting and burning. Men , women, and children were captured and sold as slave laborers or held for ransom . One estimate puts the n umber of ca ptives in the period 1 600- 1 650 at 200,000, but the actual total was probably m uch higher. During this period , total income from the slave trade and related transactions probably amo unted to several million rubles, and Moscow's ex penditures solely for the conduct of its "di plomatic" rela tions with the Crimea have been estimated at some 900 ,000 rubles. I f expenditures for fortified defe nse lines and t he annual conscription of recruits are added, it is clear that under Ivan IV and his s uccessors Rus sia underwe nt an almost contin uous mobilization for war.2 3 The record of Moscow's ascendancy must be put alongside a survey of its military activity. One com pilatio n records that in the 2 34 years between 1 2 2 8 and 1 462 , northern Russia witnessed a total of 1 3 3 foreign invasions and 90 feuds among rival princ ipalities .24 These repeated on-
N O V G OR O D R E P U B L I C
.00 ( .,
\' L I T H '" '" () "
\
of R u s s i a
{:\'"
of L i l h u o n i a
5 . Russia , Lithuania, a n d t h e Mongols in t h e Fifteen t h Century
1 1 0
THE A LTHORITY OF KINGS
Ivan the Terrible I \'an is depicted on h i s t h rone flan ked b)' c h u rchmen and boy a r s . T he c h u rc h men are t u rned away from the tsar engrossed in prayers and the conte m p lation
of
icon s . Offi
c i a l l y , neither c h u rchmen nor boyars a re co u n se l lors of the ru ler. (New York Publ ic Library)
slaughts and feuds were pan of the struggle against the Tanars and other nomads of the ste ppe , while Russia's later militarization was pan of a E u ropeanwide phenomenon. During the two centuries between 1 500 and 1 700, the m ajor E u ropean powers were at war for more than hal f the period . In the com parison in Table 1 , Russia ranks very high exce pt in the fi rst hal f of the seventeenth century-a period during which the better pan of Siberia was explored and conquered from Tomsk in the west ( 1 604) to the coastal regions of eastern Siberia ( 1 6471 64 8) .25 One hundred and thirty-t hree invasions u p to 1 462 and one h undred and thirty-six years of war in the two centu ries a fter 1 500 ob vio usly represented an e normous strain on Russia's undeveloped econ omy, probably more so than the eve n greater military efforts of more developed co untries like Spain and A ustria. After 1 689 the strain in creased fu rther: during the thirty-five years of Peter the Great's active reign, Russia was at peace for only two years.26 3 . During the Mongol overiordsh.p, Moscow had initially been one
R USSIA
1 1 1
TAB LE I N U M B E R O F YEARS IN W H I C H EUROPEAN POWERS WERE AT WAR, B Y FI FTY-YEAR PERIODS CountlY
1 500 - 1 5 49
1 550- / 5 9 9
1 600 - 1 649
1 6 5 0 - 1 6 99
Total
Fr an ce
29.5
3 1 .0
24.0
22.5
1 07
A ustria G reat Britain Spain Turkey Russia
36.0
39 . 5
40.5
33.0
1 49
SO U RCE: Q u i nc y 1 965), p. 65 3 .
1 6. 0
38.5
1 7.5
26.0
27.5
45.5
48. 0
34.0
98 1 55
33.0
47.5 36.0
47.0
42.0
1 69 . 5
1 8.0
39.5
1 36 . 0
42.5 Wright, A
Study of Wa r
( C h icago : U n ivers i t y
of
C h icago Press,
principality among others. Its ascendancy de pended i n part on the al le giance of princes, boyars, and court servitors to the grand dukes of M oscow . Di fferences o f interest emerged early among the several ran ks of the aristocracy. When the descendants of princely and boyar fa milies from other principalities entered the Muscovite service, the y sought to preserve the prestige o f their lineage and the hereditary cla i m to their lan d s (votc h i na) . S i m i l a r l y , as borde rlands w e re a n nexed to Mosco w , t h e resident princes and boyars sought to exchange their pledge of loyalty for tsarist guarantees of property rights and status. N aturally, aristo cratic families from the older Russian territories claimed priority of sta tus o ve r fam ilies from more recently acq u i red land s. I n addition, the gran d d u ke of Moscow had i m po r tant retainers whose families had risen to high statu s in his service and who now saw their claims to precedence challenged by aristocratic families of formerly independent status, that is, families which had been i n Moscow's service for generations now pit ted the ir c l ai m s based on long service against the claims of p r i n c ely de scent and hereditary rights. From the early fourteenth until the mid fifteenth century, the M us covite grand dukes could not free themselves of these conflicti ng claims. Their rise depended on the collaboration of princes and boyars from other principalities who had been induced to t hrow in thei r lot with Moscow.27 The strength of these notables lay in their patrimonial estates and the proximity of their lands to centers of power other than Moscow. There were many such centers, though with the exception of Suzdal and Lith uania, they had become rather weak . The right of boyars to shi ft allegiance from one ruler to another was traditional, but conditions had
1 1 2
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
cha n ged . For the most part, the Moscow ru lers respected that right only as lon g as they could u se it to Moscow's advan tage. Appanage princi palities were con fiscated whenever a case of "treason" could be m ade, and not m uch e v i d e nce w a s needed to do so. Grad ually, Moscow's wealth and au thority increased . T h e w i d e l y sca t te r ed terr i tories of t he e m e r g i ng state had to be ad m i n i ste red . Princes a n d bo ),ars who s u p ported the grand d u ke hel ped h im rule his realm t h r oug h a state co u n c i l (boya r d u ma) . The bulk of t he o fficer corps co n s i s te d o f the so ns o f Moscow boyars and court se r yitors (dvoria ne) , s u p pl e m e n ted d u ring ca m paigns by princes, boyars , and Mon gol no t a b l e s fro m else w h e re w h o declared their allegiance to Moscow. At the local level , j ud ge s were appointed as ad m i n istrators a n d tax col lectors, without salary ; t h e y were enti tled to receive maintenance cost and a share o f the taxes from the peo ple of their district (ko rmlenie). I n this way, an early division developed betwee n a cou rt and a provinc ia l aristocracy, the fi rst consisting o f several ranks of notables at t h e tsarist court, the second com posed o f local ad m i n istrators appointed by the tsar or reinstated by him a fter appro priate declarations of loyalty. I n the borderlands of the growing state, these local notables had to fend for t hemselves, com pounding the i n secu rity of Moscow's boundaries by t heir own uncertain loyalty and m i l i tary position. U nder the circumstances, conquest o f new territories appeared the safest way of adding to the strength of t he e merging state. In conquered territories , the Muscovite rulers could ignore the hereditary rights of aris toc ratic landowners and local rulers w i t h relative impun ity. Earlie r , the Mongols had sec u red invaded areas not only by looting a n d burnin g, but by t he de portation of people to sparsely populated areas in order to increase the work force and ta p new sources of reven ue. M uscovite practices of this kind date back to the reign of I van Kalita in the fo u r teenth century; they became of m ajor im portance under I van I I I , es pecially with the conquest o f Novgorod in t he 1 480s and 1 490s. One estimate states that by 1 500 I van II I h ad conq uered and con fisc ated over 2.5 mill ion acres of boyar a nd ch urch land. The conquered territory was treated as state land . The original owners were dispossessed and de ported , enrolled in the Muscovite army, and given lands in the vicinity of Moscow . At the same time, t he conquered lands of Novgorod were distributed to deserving servitors of I van I I I . B ut neither the Novgo rodian settlers in the Moscow area nor the M uscovite settlers in the Nov gorod area were ful l owne rs of the land . A l l were army o fficers whose title to the land depended on their se rvice to the state. By conquest and forced resettlement, the Moscow ruler undermined the claims of old fam ilies to their patrimony. The conq uest of Novgorod was the fi rst fully doc u mented case i n
R USSIA
1 13
w h ic h , by a c om bi n a t i o n o f forcible o f m i l i tar y fiefs in the conquered
expro priation and the establ i s h ment terri tory, the Moscow ruler great l y his power a n d h i s independence from pri nces a nd boya rs w it h d ncrease i hereditary claims to t h e i r land . 2 8 The conquest of Pskov ( 1 509), o f Smo lensk ( 1 5 1 4 ), and of Ri a s a n ( 1 520) fol lowed a s i m ilar pattern , as did a generation late r the conq uest of the Khanate o f Kazan ( 1 552) an d a n umber o f Livonian cities in the late sixteenth and early s e ve n t e e n th cen tu ries. The an ne xa tion o f borderlands was fac i l i ta te d b y givi n g fa m ilies fro m these areas a p re fe r red position at the tsarist court. The ethnic com posi tion of the a r is tocracy reflects this policy. In 1 682 a new regi st er of aristocratic fam ilies was p re pa re d w h ic h showed that less than 1 0 per cent of the top ranks of Moscow's servitor-a ristocracy we re of purely Russian des c e nt w h i le some 80 pe rce nt were of Polish-Lithuanian, Western Eu rop ea n o r Tartar extraction.29 An nexations o f t h e borde rlands o f M uscovy shaded off im pe rce p ,
,
tibly i nto strategies of inte r n a l politics designed to s h i ft the balance o f power away from princes and boyars whose h e red i t ar y c l a i m s l i m ited the
power of the tsar. In
t he cou rse o f the sixtee n t h
portance o f u ne nc u m bered
hereditary possession
century,
the im
o f land (vo tchina)
declined. U p t o the latter part o f the fi ftee n t h cen t u ry, i t h a d bee n by fa r t h e most common way by w h i ch m e m be rs of the u p pe r classes held the i l' land . Then starting in the reign o f I v a n I I I it be gan to yield p ree m i n e nce to t h e po meJtye, h i t he r to a r e la ti v el y e x ce pt iona l form of te n u re . T h e ex p lanation for th is s h i ft
l a y i n t h e state-maki n g polic ies o f t h e M uscovite tsars. I van a n d h i s successors were i n te n t u po n b u i l d i n g u p t h e m il itary forces they needed to conque r their brother p rinces , to crush t h e oligarc h ic a m b i t i o n s of t h e i r own boyars, to stave off foreign invasions, a nd to e x pa nd thei l' rea l m . They n eeded a n army t h a t w a s as depend e n t a s
possi b l e
upon
t h e m,
and u pon whose l oya l t y , the refore,
they co uld the mselves depend , B u t they lacked the money to buy the men
t h e allegiance the y req ui red . So they decided to use land, Th e i r con ques ts and the i r con fi scations o f aloidal p ro perties, begin n i n g w i t h Novgorod a nd
in I van I l l's reign a n d c u lm i n a t i n g in I van I V ' s
Oprichnina,
p r ov i ded them
with t he neces sary resou rces and brou g h t a bout a decrease i n the nu mber o f votchin as . For the y d i s t r ibuted the l a n d t h e y seized a s pomeJtyes, and not as votchilla� ,30
This shift
in tsarist poli c y toward landhold ing e nt a i l ed majo r con flicts.
Moscow was often e n gaged i n wars to the south a gainst the Crimean Tartars a nd in the west against
Poland
and Lit h ua n ia . In t he se w a rs on
(pomeshchiki). watched the growi n g n umber a p pre hensio n . Boyars, fearfu l for the i r
two fronts, the state relied on the new m il itary fiefh olders
The ol d
,
established fam ilies of boyars
and power o f these
with
established
fu rt her guara ntee s . Pomes hch iki , envious o f
men status, sou g h t
1 14
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
boyar claim s, attem pted to obtain more secu rity for their families than a revokable grant provided . In disputed border areas, bargaining for advantage verged on blac kmail and treason. In addition , the country's reso urces were strained to the utmost, and I van IV showed markedly paranoid features. To co pe with these mounting internal struggles , the strain of freq uent wars , and not least his own fears, real and imagined , the tsar established a personal police fo rce and military guard "of No bility and Gentry" ( oprichnina ) , directly loyal to himse l f and based on landholdi n gs in districts around Moscow, fro m which other "Noblemen and Gentlemen" had been evicted. Although I van eventually abolished this " general schism, and public division among the subjects of his realm ," Giles Fletcher's re port of 1 59 1 makes clear that the policy had resulted from the tsar's "extreme doubt and des perate fear, w h ich he had conceived of most of his Nobility and Gentlemen -in his wars with Poland and the Crim Tartar."3 1 Given the desperate need of the rising state for a reliable corps of officers and ad ministrators, these fears had some foundation. Descen dants of princes and boyars, while pledging their loyalty , still wanted to retain their privileges. The claims of ancient lineage and the obligation to serve did pull in opposite directions. Those landowners who held both votchina and pomestie lands were in a dee p quandary , and much the same came to be true o f the pomeshchiki. The granting o f military fie fs in conquered territories was a means of increasing the n umber o f de pendent servitors without hereditary rights. Or so it seemed. But the pomeshch iki we re free to own or purchase other lands as well and wanted to will their benefices to their heirs. This was allowed sporad ically , probably in part to ensure the contin ued loyalty of these servitors; but to the extent that it was allowed , pomeshchiki became hereditary landowners. This also oq:urred with regard to Ivan the Terrible's special military guard. In the 1 560s, Ivan made the landholdings of these oprichniki heredi ta ry , pres umably i n an effort to ensure that this per sonal police force would remain loyal to him. Thus, the legal distinction between military fiefs (pomestie) and hereditary lands (votchina) became blurred, as boyars came t.o hold service lands while servitors held he reditary properties.32 The status distinctions among princes, boyars, and m ilitary fiefholders were jeopardized , as all ranks of the aristocracy pledged their loyal service to the tsar and the obligation to serve him became universal. To summarize , the families of princes and boyars had enjoyed con siderable independence in Kievan Russia and the appanage period that followed. Under the reign of I van I I I ( 1 4 6 2 - 1 5 0 5 ) , this inde pendence declined , and the status and wealth of Russia's aristocrats came to de pend increasingly on service to the tsar as officers and high-ranking
1 15
R USSIA
administrators .33 W he n a member of t h i s class exercised authority, he so a t the behest of the tsar, not on t h e basis of r ig h ts w h ic h he pos sesse d or which had been g ranted to h im Eve ntually , m il i ta r y or ad m i n i st r at i ve serv ice bec ame t h e Russian aristocrat's way o f life. For lea d in g se gm en t s of the Russian ar istoc rac y , that way of life remained c h a r acte r i stic u n til well into the n ineteenth cent u ry Honor came to de pe nd on ser v ic e at a h igh r an k . 4 . Families v ied w i t h one another for h i g he r pre s t i ge , bas i n g their cla im s on having served the tsar for a longer per io d and at a h igher rank t h an ot h ers E v en t uall y this competition h ar d e n e d i nto a system
did
.
.
.
,
o f preferment based o n t he relative pos ition o f fam ilies of serv itor ar i s toc r ats ( mestn ic hestvo) .
The fu ndamental principle o f the system was t h a t n o o ne ne e d serve u nder another pe rson i f he co uld s h o w that o n e of h i s a ncestors had held a higher pos i t ion than had the a ncestors of his pm posed s u pe r ior. Mo reover, each servitor was res po n sible for the honor of all h i s l i v i n g kinsmen a n d of all his descendants, for if he accepted a ra n k i n ferior to t h a t warranted by his pe digree he set a precede n t t h at would d a m a ge the careers of a l l h is pres ent and future relative s . 3 4
Infightin g a m o ng noble fam ilies was an o b v io u s consequence o f this sys honor, m uch energy was ex pen ded on "mest nichestvo ar i t h met i c (Kluchevsky), li t i ga t io n feuds, an d pe rs ona l co m bat. According t o t h e the n p re va i l i n g v iew, deat h itse l f w a s p re fe r a b le to the u n spea kabl e di s gr a ce of be i n g pl aced "below" a man whose ances tors' record did not entitle h i m to t he high e r po s iti o n e ither at court or in the a r my. 3 5 Such intense co m pe ti tio n for preferment added to the prestige of t h e court by its i m pl i c i t ack no w led g men t that aristocratic ho no r d e pended on service to the tsar. No co nce rt e d opposition to au tocratic encroachments could be organized on th i s basis. B ut the mest nichestvo system also im posed lim its on the a utocrat, w ho had to abide by genealogical precedence if he wished to u p h ol d the established rank order o f soci e ty And since co m pe tition for status and we alth turned on questions of ge n e a lo g y servitors of m id d le ran k were ever anxious to convert their pomes tie ho l d i n gs i n to h e r e d it a ry grants for the benefit of their descendants. 5 . By the sixteenth century, Russia's aristoc rats were d ivided into three broad service cadres . There was an u ppe r service class, concen trated in Moscow and s u p po r te d by h ered i tar y lands and se rvice land grants from the govern ment. This Moscow power elite served as j u d ges, he ad s o f gover n me n tal chancelleries, g e ner a ls in the army, a mbass a d ors and pro vincia l governors. Most of these men were descendants of the ancient princely houses and boyar families (whether of Ru ss i a n or fortem. To u phold the fa m ily "
,
.
,
,
eign descent) . They were members of the boyar d uma, some were very wealthy, and most had substantial holdin gs, including lavish reside nces in the capital. I n addition there was a second echelon of this u pper ser vice class, men who ranked lower in wealth and service but stil l derive d mostly from the old aristocratic fam ilies. The two gro u ps of the u pper service class together com prised some 6 , 4 00 i ndiv iduals by the end of the seventeen th century, more tha n hal f of them officers in regiments o f the provincial gentry and the remainder officers in the tsar's regi ment. The position of this upper-service class was protected by the mest n ichestvo syste m . A m iddle service class com prised a second rank of servitors , who were based in the provinces and lived on land grants ( pomestie) from the government and some irregularly paid sti pends. In its period of major infl uence (ca. 1 5 50 - 1 65 0 ) , this class com prised some 2 5 , 0 0 0 men , many of whom constituted a cavalry force of great im portance in de fending the rising M uscovite state against attacks from the ste ppe . Every pomestie holder was responsible for a contingent of equ i p_ped fighting men, who were charged with garrison or field duty, but w hose o bligation ceased with the end of each military cam pa ign . The lower service class was com prised o f professional soldiers (strelt.�)' ) , who were paid a small an n ual salary and denied the right to exploit peasant labor. The streltsy were usually garrisoned outside the towns. They were recruited from townsmen and peasants and in times of peace supplemented their meagre (and o ften irregular) salary as trad e rs and cra fts m en. But in the seventeenth ce ntury, this standing arm y of professional soldiers became hereditary, developed a strong esprit de corps, and for a time constituted a crucial physical power in Moscow de spite the overall decline of its m ilitary im portance.36 A characteristic aristocratic culture-pattern had formed in the course of Moscow's rise to preeminence.37 The tsarist ca pital and the provinces had become separate worlds in a manner that is characteristic of pre dominantly agricultural societies. This cleavage had already appeared in the early phase of Muscovite ascendancy. Appanage princes, who pledged their allegiance to the grand d u ke of Moscow, lost touch with the region they had ruled, in part because Moscow had an interest in loosening their patrimonial ties. As the principle of a service aristocracy gained ground, the Moscow rulers saw to it that the fortunes of o ld aristocratic families declined if they evaded their obligations to serve. The cleavage between the capital and provinces was also manifested in the kormlenie system o f local administration by centrally appointed of ficials, for it appeared to the local population as little different from a foreign occu pation since the o fficials had short ten ure and tended to exploit the people . 3 8 True, many provincial nobles remained on their
esta tes i f they were al lo w.ed to per fo rm their l i felo n g ser v ice o b liga tion o n a sea sonal basis. But u p to the en d o f the se venteenth cen tury, most o f th ese nobles were il l i te rat e , the l i fe of the small provincial towns ex tre m e l y dull, and chances for a d v ance me n t nonexiste nt . If p ro v in c ia l nob les wanted to do better, they had to go to Moscow where they could d o re gular garrison d u ty and serve permanently at the court. Moscow service men were a pr iv i lege d group. Chances for advancement de pe nd ed on t he d i s t rib u t io n of fa v or s by the tsar (or through his inti mates) , and many of these favors took the form of land gran ts . B ut the men so favored could visit their e sta tes o n l y on rare occasions, and their ho l di ngs were apt to be widely dis pers ed , de pendi n g on the a v a i l a b i lity o f l and a nd t he tsar ' s c o n v e n i ence . Since the mestnichestvo system tied a man's status a t court to the se rvice record of his ancestors, i n fi g h ti n g for prece d e n c e at court often decided a fam ily's fortune and could be more i m porta n t than the ser v ic e actu a l ly rendered.39 Moreover, the claims to p re fe r m ent were inflated by the absence of pr i m o ge n it u re, for each inheritance tended to inc rease both the d ispersa l of l a nd h o l dings and the n u m ber of servitors with a p ri ma fac ie claim on the t s a r ' s l a rgesse . With service either at cou rt or in a ce n t ra l l y orga n ized army as the basis of aristocratic sta t u s , armed m igh t based o n he re dita ry landown ership did not provide a fo u nd a t ion of local power that endured. De velopments in this diret:tion in Kievan Russia we re p robab ly cut short by declining economic conditions during the period of Mongo l o ve r lord ship and by Moscow's a s ce nda ncy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Estate assemblies (boyar du m a) de veloped , as they did in Western Europe. Tsarist rule was not sheer autocracy, w ithout consul tation or concessions. Like all rulers, the Russian tsars requ ired assis tance to hel p the m govern the whole real m . Aristocratic rank depended on service to the tsar, but service also provided access to his person. Every tsar had his favorites whose counsel he sought when it suited him and who in turn could induce him to m a k e s pecial grants to themselves ;md thei r friends. Neither the functions of the boyar duma ( w hich was o n l y gradually replaced by a bureaucracy) nor the strong defense of rank th ro u gh mestnichestvo would have bee n possi b le without this un certain b u t i m p ortan t i n fluence on the r u le r. The "estate assemblies" ( zemskie soOOry), which met d u ring the six teenth and seventeenth centuries, also had some im portance and i nflu ence. Com posed of "d e l e ga tes " coopted from the vario us strata of so ciety , these assemblies were convoked from time to time to ra l l y the w hole co m mun it y behind m omentous m i l ita ry decisions, to vo te the re qu ired taxes, and on occasion to endorse the legiti mac y o f a successor to the throne by acclamatio n . 4 0 Such asse mblies provided opportunities
1 18
THE A UTHOR ITY
to present
OF kiNGS
pe t i t i o ns to the ts ar, t ho ug h req uests fo r
rel ief or s pec ia l con s pec i a l occasion s. The p atriar c h a l c l a i m o f t h e tsa r as the fat he r of h i s peo ple p rom pted t h e peo p l e as " h i s c h i l d re n " to a ppea l t o h is pa te r n a l be n e volence a n d pro te c t i o n. S uch a p pe a ls w e re freq u e n t l y re p u d i a te d ; t h e n g r ie va nces wo u ld fe s t e r , re s u l t i n g in ri o ts or revo lts. But w h i l e asse m b l ies co u l d be d i s m i s sed , pe t i tio n s d e n ied , a n d re v o l t s s u p p re ss e d the y were also e v i d e nce o f u n si d e r a t io n did
not
have
to
a w a i t t hese
,
resolved pro ble m s a n d o f c a l l s fo r re med i a l actio n .
In
t h i s d i a lectic of
an a u toc ra t ic
w i l l a bove a n d a n g u is h ed voices
fro m be l o w , the tsa r d i d n o t a l wa y s pre v a i l e v e n t ho u gh h i s s u pre m acy was ra r e l y
in
doubt. On
oc ca s i o n
,
the tsa r i s t gov e rn m e n t had to m a ke
conce ssions to the boyars , the m id d le se rvice cla s s , a n d t h e
s t r e l ts y i f i t co o pe r a t i o n ra t h e r t h a n r i s k s u l l e n w it h d rawal o r tac it resistance. Even under the tsarist reg i m e some t h in g l ike " o p po s i t io n " was p o s s i b l e through formal asse m b l ie s , pe t i t io n s , and thi s "with d rawal of efficiency" ( Veble n ) , t h o ug h m uc h d e pe n d e d on circum stance and infighting at court. One ce r ta in ly m u s t not think of opposition in constitutional terms. The tsarist co urt was the main institutional basis for the d istri b utio n o f wealth and status. Pleas for fav o r s or pe t i t ions containing grievances had to be put forward at court. C a p ital and co urt were the state and society of Russia, combining the work o f ad ministrators, the outlook and man ners of an o fficers' club, and a l ux u rious ro und of festive gatherings for the members of Russia's high s oc ie ty Provincial society was a pa le
d e s i red com pl i a nce or
.
re flection of these activities in Moscow a n d , later on , Petersburg. I n ef
fec t , the bulk of the co untry was "merely" a sou rce o f taxes and recruits that could s ustain the social and m i litary activities of the center. 6. Th is culture pattern o f the Russian aristocracy was affected, though not basically altered, by develo pments of the seventeenth cen tury . To understand these developments, some acco unt m ust be taken of the events fol lowing the reign of I van IV ( 1 53 3 - 1 5 84) which are known as the "Time of Troubles." With the reign of Fedor I ( 1 584- 1 5 98), the Rurik dynasty died out. In the absence of a law of succession, many claimants to the throne ap peared, giving rise to fantastic intrigues. This u ncertainty at the very center of autocratic rule was exploited by Poland and Sweden . Their m i litary cam paigns led to the occu pation of large parts of Western Rus sia, the conquest of Moscow, and their partici pation in the struggles over the succession . Droughts, famines, and epidem ics scourged the country from 1 60 1 to 1 60 3 , further com pounding the political and military de bacle. All these setbacks came on the heels of the terrorist methods (oprichnina) with which Ivan I V had expanded h is state and made the aristocracy subservient to his will. The country had been forced to un-
R USSIA
der take military cam paign s wh ich greatly outstri p ped its available re so urc es. The mounting demands . on the aristocracy to pro vi de peasants who would perform military se rvice h ad m e a n t that fewer peasants were a v ail able to work the land , and the pressure for prod uctio n on the peas a nts wh o re m a i n e d inc rea sed accordi n gly . As a res ult, m a n y peasants e sc a pe d the burden s of serfdom , m i l i tary recruitment, and req u i s i t i o n s by ille gally m igratin g to the ste ppe . This dra i n o f m a n po w e r hel ped to u nde rm ine the econom ic fo undations of the landed gentry. The period o f g reat u p heaval extended from Boris God unov's accession to the th ro ne in 1 5 9 8 to the establ ishment of the Romanov dynasty in 1 6 1 3 . In the fi rst decades o f the Romanov dynas t y , fu rther threats de lop ve ed to the positi o n o f the u p pe r- and middle-service classes. C a v a l r y officers from these classes had bee n v ital l y important in defending the cou ntry against raids and concerted attacks from the south and the west ; they were essential in reconquering the territories lost to the Poles dur ing the Time of Troubles. Their high social position at court was an expression o f this vital role. At the end of the sixteenth century, Russia's armed forces had consisted o f about l l O ,OOO men, of whom about half were serfs. Twenty-nine thousand belonged to the u pper- and middle se rvice class (among them 4,000 foreigners), and varied military u n its made up the rest. The streltsy around Moscow we re the most important of these other units ; they served as a n internal security force rather than in a military capacity. B y the end of the seventeenth centu ry, the coun try's military forces were greatly increased and their com position al te red. In 1 68 1 , Russia' s arm ies totaled some 2 1 5,000 men. O fficers from the u pper- and m iddle-service class had been cut to 1 0 percent of the total force. The streltsy and other lower class servitors now comprised an internal security force of well over 1 00,000 men . At the same time , o ve r e igh ty n i n e new regiments had been formed , eq u i pped with fire arms and trained by foreign officers or their Russian students. These new regiments com prised more than half of the total m ilitary force and com pletely overshadowed the remnants of the old army. The techniques of warfare had changed with the i ntrod uction of gunpowder in Russia in the 1 620s and 1 6305. As Hellie interprets his findings, -
[In
the m i d - seve n teen t h century] the gun powder revolutio n fi n ally overtook
M uscovy almost co m pl e t e l y .
By
this time the Tartars had ceased to be the
m aj or t h rea t to the Muscovite state. The result was t h a t , in
w arfa re
for the
control o f huge fort resse s, the mid d le service class cavalryman with his bow
and arrow
was
fi rearms .
.
.
.
tec h n ologically obsolete in th e face of i n fa n t r y out fi tted with
Be gin n in g in the reig n of
Boris
G oduno v
( 1 598- 1 605),
the ser
vice men too k advantage of the Tsar's weak positio n to get the gove rnment to rest rict access to th eir i nc rea singly privileged po s i t i o n . . . . They we re a
gro u p w i t h no tec h n i c a l s k i l l or ge n u ine s pe c i a l i za t i o n to su p port c l a i m s to excl u s i ve ness , so t h e }' b u i l t on t he i r h i storica l l y legi t i m ate base to achieve priv i l ege . . . . [ Faced with
a
tech n ic a l l y s u pe rior, but lo w e r c l a s s i n fantry) t h i s caste
had to r u l e o u t co m pe t i t i o n a rt i fi c i a l l y , by h,"" i n g t h e gove r n m e n t cod i fy t h e caste ' s p r i v i l eged po sition i n t h e l a w . � 1
I t certai nly makes sen se that a p r i v ilege d class whose services beco me obsolete for tech nical reasons looks fo r ne\"\/ reasons to s u p port its priv i leged position . B u t it is e q u a l ly releva n t to point out that a newly formed army recruited from the lowe r classes and eq u i pped with firearms wo uld be considered a potential threat to soc ial stability by any conservative go vernment. Larger sec urity forces were needed because the wide spread u nrest of the succession struggles and m ilitary cam paigns d u ring the Time of Troubles could have spilled ove r into far more dangerous u prisings, if the newly a rmed ,riflemen had joined that unrest. Hence, the tsarist legislation reasse rti ng aristocratic privileges in 1 649 was prob ably as m uch protection against this potential threat as it was" a res ponse to aristocratic demands for more concessions . Legislative developments o f the seventeenth century re flect this en tire political and m ilitary background. Almost a century of u pheaval had resulted i n great disarray. S pec i ficall y , the u pper- and m iddle-se rvice classes had been u ndermined first by mo unting service obligations, sec ond by arbitrary elevations in ran k due to emergency needs of the ruling tsar, third by dimin ution of income from estates because peasant escapes had decreased the available work force, and fo urth by the obsolescence of their m ilitary function. With the return of some stability, leading re p rese ntatives of the aristocracy pressed for restoration and con firmation of their privileges , and the early years of Alexis' reign ( 1 645- 1 676) pro \"ided them with a welcome opportunity. Com prehen sive legislation of a n)' kind ran cou nter to the supremacy of the ruler's will. Even when it occurred (as it had in 1 550) , it had not been printed, thus encouraging abuses of all kinds. Now order was to be substi tuted for arbitrariness, and in the process the government and the servitor aristocracy were strengthened at the ex pense of the churc h , the boyars, and the peasants. Two pieces o f legislation in the seve nteenth centu ry represented attempts at a complete legal ordering of Russian society from the top dow n : the Code of Law of 1 649 ( U lozhe nie) and the formal abolition of the mestnichestvo syste m in 1 682. The code of 1 649 reflected the long standing struggle o f the tsar and his servitors against all those landed aristocrats who were descended from the old princely and boyar fam ilies and who on that account retained some of their inherited privileges. Among these were special rights to proceed against peasants who ran
1 2 1
R USSIA
a way a n d t h us weakened. the work force available to till the soi '" The tsar' s servitors did not possess such ri gh ts The old princely an d b o ya r fam ili es al so e nj o y ed e x e m p t io n fro m taxes while residing on e states j us t o utsi d e t h e tow n s ; t h u s , the prod ucts o f their se rf eco n o m y h a d a co m pe titi v e ad v a n t a ge ove r t h e prod u cts of t h e tax-bu rd e ned town res i .
de nt s . T h e U lo z h e n ie a b o l i s hed s uc h p r i v i le ges by bi n d i n g t h e peas a n t s an d the i r fa m ilies y e t more fi r m l y t o t h e l a n d , a n d b y a bo l i shi n g tax
p ri v i l e ge s of bo y a r fa m ilies in the s u b u rbs. T h i s time two th o u sa n d cop ies of the new le g a l code were p ri n ted -a ge stu re o f l e ga l i ty in co n n ec tion with a code o f law that e mbod ied t h e m os t s yste ma t ic depriva t io n of privileges ( rights) e n a c t e d so far. I m p l e m e n tatio n m i g h t fall short of w hat the la w called for, b u t the princ i pl e was clea r . Pe asa n ts were l o s i n g what little freedom had re m ai n e d to them, wh ile bo yars w ere also losi n g their rem a i n i n g privileges.42 T h e Ulozhenie also established a special office in c harge of overseeing claims and liti gat io n involvin g the church. All land acquired by t he church between 1 580 and 1 64 8 was s u rve yed , despite the protests of church leaders . Further land acquisitions by the church were prohibite d , and the church was subjected to m inisterial co ntrol. Aristocratic servitors o f the tsar (pomeshchiki) act u a l l y gained more status than benefits by the new code, for the destruction of re maining boyar privileges did not lighten their own burdens. There h ad been mo u n ting oppositio n to these privileges during the seven teenth century, especially o ppos ition to the mestnichestvo system. Claims to ge nealogical preferment were incom patible with military pro motions based on per formance in battle, and i ndeed that preferment interfered with the tsar's own prerogative of p romoting the most deserving. Finally, when the gentry militia was formally re placed by a standing army, a rank-order based on hereditary privileges became altogether obsolete, and in 1 682 the old mestnichestvo records were destroyed. B ut while the tsar or dered the destruction of the registers through whic h the ge ne a l o gic a l seniority of the old aristocratic fam ilies could be traced , he also ordered f The earlier discussion of Kievan Russia ind icated that hereditary l a n do wners had personal rather than political rights over the i r estates. That is, in m a naging t hese estates and ruling o\'er t he peasants they were act i n g as personal owners of the land, not as ad ministrators appointed by the prince a n d acting on his behal f. These personal rights over the peasants were extensi ve, i nc l u d i n g not o n l y the right to settle di s putes and collect taxes but also far-reach ing police powers wh ich included cor po ra l pun is h ment, the right to ban ish peasants fo r wrongdoi ng, and i ndeed the ri ght to execute them for crimes. The pro vincia l governors of the pri nces a n d later of the tsars did not i n terfere wi t h t his private jurisdiction as long as "peace" was ma i n tained and taxes were collected . E ven where revolts b roke out and m ilitary lorce was needed to collect taxes, that i n terference was not systematic.
Election of Mikhail Romanov as Russia' s Tsar in 1 6 1 3 T h i s m i n i a t u re f/"Om t h e cOlllcm pora r>" Book o/ Iite Ell'cliOI/
of Mikhail
FedlJf!roicli shows
a
large circular enclos u re where a priest a n n o u nces the unanimous e lection of the new tsar by the zem sky sobor to the large crowd gat hered o u tside the walls of the K remlin . Coming at the end of the Time o f Troubles, the "election" was an act o f acclamation by a body of representatives w hose main concern was the stability o f a u tocratic rule. Participation by dign itaries of the c h u rch consec rated the new d y nasty in the eyes of the people.
R USSIA
1 23
th e p re p a ra tion of new reco rds based o n th e u n i versal obligation of all aris toc rats to serve the tsar. 4 3 A ma i n task o f the Code o f 1 649 w a s to create order wh e re fo re i g n occ u pa tio n a n d pe as a n t re volts d u r i n g t h e Time of Tro u b l e s had cre a ted c haos . G ra n ts of l a n d made d u ri n g t h i s pe r io d of u pheaval we re co n fi r me d w h e n e ve r t h e be ne fi c i a ries had s u p po r te d the new R o m a n o \' d yn a s t y which be ga n w i t h the re i g n o f M ic h a e l ( 1 6 1 3 - 1 64 5 ) . The Ulozh e n i e fac i l i t a ted the i n he r i ta nce o f l a nd w h e re the ti tleholders had be e n co n fi r me d a nd i t p ro v i d e d the pomestie holder's fa m i l y with con si d e ra ble se c ur i t y a fter h i s de a t h The res ult was that the rem a i n i n g d i s ti n c t ion s between boya rs and ser vito rs were obliterate d , w h i l e co n t r o l o ve r al l l a n d s re mained i n the hand s o f the go ve rn m e n t and t h e obli ga tion of mil itar y service conti n ued . No priva t e o w n e r s h i p of l a nd e x is te d in Siberi a , w he re t he whole t e r r i to r y belon ged to t h e go v e rn m en t . From th e s ta n d po i n t o f u pholdi n g a u t hor i t y a n d t h e ran k -order o f soc iety t h e stabiliza tio n of t h e labor supply o n the land wa s t h e m os t i m por t a n t part of t he code. G u a rantee s o f land r ig h ts to the a ris toc ra c y a l read y dated bac k to the re ign of I van I V, b u t they mean t little without control over the mobility of the rural labor force. Earlier, the movements of peas a n t s had been c u rbed o n l y i n certain years, whereas the U lozhe nie met the d e s i res o f the a r i s tocr a cy b y a total abolition of pe a sa n t movements. H e nce fort h , the pea s a n t w a s pe rma n e n tl y bound to the es tate, and while he retained som e resid u a l r ights d istinguish ing him fr� m a slave, t h e m a i n p o i n t is that perm anent serfdom was in st i tu te d j ust at the time when the old fa m ili e s o f pr ince s and boyars l o s t the last v e s t i ges of their he r edita r y pri v i leges ,
,
.
,
.
and c ont r as t the Russian and t h e J a pane se hi story o f Russia s h ows a d e fi n ite break between the late twe l fth ce n t u ry when foreign trade shifted away fro m the Russian river towns a n d the m i d fi fteenth century when Russ i a n tribute pay ments to the Mongols became i r reg u l a r and the ascend a ncy of th e M us cov ite state was wel l on its way. The his to ry of Japa n shows no com pa rable discon tinuity, for even the establishment of the Tokug-clw a shogunate in t he e a rl y 1 600s has only supe rfi c i al similarities with the Muscovite rise to s u pre m acy a ce n t u ry earlie r . The different fates of the two aristocracies appear to be dire ct l y associated with this m aj o r contrast. The re was some con ti n u ity between the K ievan aristocracy a n d its tribal past. The early boyar d uma, the freedom of bo ya rs to c ha n ge their allegiance with i m pu n ity, and the town assem blies ( veche) se e m like echoes of an earlier condition in w h ich t ribal chieftains were assisted by the heads of households. I n theory, the se freedoms were a l ready incom patible with the pr i ncely a u t ho r ity How can one com pare
aristocracies ? The
,
1 24
THE A UTHORITY O F KINGS
established by the Varangian ru lers and with the theocratic doctrines of Byzantiu m . I n practice, freedom was crushed by economic decline, Mongol conquest, and Muscovite asce nda ncy. In Japan, the central a u t ho ri t y of em pe ror and regential fam ily e merged out of the warl ike contentions among armed lineage grou ps. These gro u ps may have bee n sim ilar to the Slavic and Ge rmanic tribes of Easte rn Europe. In any case, Ja pan's cel1 l ral authority res ulted from wars among tribes or extended ki nshi p gro u ps and not from foreign conq uest, as in nint h-centu ry Russia. Once this central im perial and re gential authority was established, its continuity was preserved in fact and in myth thro u gh all the vicissitudes that fol lowed. Such a major change as t he destruction of the Fuji wara regency and the establishment of the Kamakura shogunate ( 1 1 85) was accom plished with the i m perial su premacy in religio us and ceremonial matters formally intact. Under the cultu ral shelter of that su premacy, a highly centralized political order li ke the Kamakura or a greatly decentralized one like the Ashikaga sho gunates could be established, appa rently with equal facility. One may call the two kinds of regimes centralized and decentralize d feudalism , respectively. Both depended on the reci procal obligations between the shogunal ruler and his landed and armed vassals in the provinces, tho ugh under the Kamak u ra, the shoguns and under the Ash ikaga, the \'assals dominated this relationship. Thro ughout the centu ries of inter nal conflict in Japan, the armed might of local rulers remained un im paired, even though their identity and social com position changed from time to time. I n Russia, by con trast, it was above all this armed m ight at the local level w hich was crushed first by t he Mongol conquest and subseq uently by the systematic de portation and resettlement policies of the M uscovite rulers from I van Kalita to Ivan the Terrible. This preservation or destruction of armed might at the local level is the clue to the difference between the Tokugawa shogunate, on the one hand, and the rise of M u scovy , on the other. In seventeenth-century Japa n , t he Tokugawa established a type o f centralized rule which di vided the coun try into some two h undred and fi fty domains ( han ) . Each of these domains was under a vassal (daimyo) who de pended on the shogun for the wel fare of his fam ily and himsel f, but who at the same time exe rcised absolute authority over h is domain . (The details of this sociopolitical structure are disc ussed in Cha pter 1 2 . ) Centralized as To kugawa rule was , it preserved to a remarkable degree the autonomy of local rule which had been characteristic o f the Japanese social structure for centuries past. To be sure , the Tok ugawa shoguns enlarged or de creased the size of a dai m yo's hold ings de pending on his family'S initia l relation to the founder of the To kugawa shogunate. They also reas signed domains at will when they saw signs of disloyalty to their house.
R USSIA
B ut none of these methods of ensuri n g Tokugawa supremacy can be like ne d to the Russian case, because such redistribu tion or reassign ment of l an d holdings never challenged the underlyi n g princi ple that loyalty to th e shogu n would be rewarded by nearly com plete autonomy within each daimyo domain. This d iffers striki ngly from Russia, w here a com pa rab le centralization of a u thority under I va n IV de pe nded o n de por t ation and resettle ment policies which were designed to destroy the re main in g vestiges of local independence . The difference in m ilitary and political organization shows one im tan por t conseq uence of this contrast in structures of authority . In Japan , the Tokugawa military forces were organized on a regional basis. To kugawa supremacy de pended on political organ ization as m uch as o n armed might, for the s u periority of Tokugawa forces was based on the imperial mandate and the relatively greater wealth of the Tokugawa do m ains. The Tokugawa shogunate could have been destro yed easily if the major daimyo domains had banded together in opposing the sho gunate. The shogun saw to it that they did not, and this policy of "divide and rule" was effective for over two h undred years . The same policy showed its great weakness in the 1 850s when the Tokugawa were unable to deal m ilitarily with the threat of Western i ntrusion. Now they needed but could not command the political and military su p port of t he major daimyo domains. This changed balance of power led to the fall of the Tokugawa ho use and the emergence of a political arena in the Meiji Restoration. By contrast, tsarist military forces were organized o n a centralized basis. Tsarist supremacy depended on armed might in the sense that all provincial government was under centrally a p pointed officials whose tax collection and m ilitary recruitment were backed u p by military force. The superiority of this force was based on the prior destructio n of local independence and, con ve rsely, on the centralization of social and polit ical opportunities and o f economic favors (land grants) in the hands of the autocrat. The tsarist regime did not de pend on a d ivide-and -rule policy. After Moscow's su premacy had been established, the highest cir cles of the Russian aristocracy came to com pete for place and favors at court. In a good many cases, Russian aristocrats competed for handouts instead of paying attention to the management of their estates. We shall see (in Chapter 1 3) tha t the great crisis of tsarist rule came when the military forces based o n this structure of authority met de feat in the Crimean War ( 1 856), only a few years a fter the arrival of an American flotilla in Japan ( 1 85 3 ) had underm ined the poli tical structu re of the Tokugawa shogunate. In both countries , defeat or the threat of invasion occasioned major political reassessments. Since in Russia all authority was concentrated in
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS the pe rson o f t h e autoc rat, h e alone could se t re fo r m s in m o t i o n , an d a ft e r 1 8 5 6 he a d d ressed the c ru c i a l iss ue o f se r fdo m . I n J a pa n , the To
k u gawa regime h a d e nc o u ra ge d c o n s i d e rable i n i tiative at the local level si nce t he e i g h te e n t h c e n t u r y . When the r e g i me p rov e d u n a ble to co pe w i t h the threat of i n t r u s ion , t h e b u rea ucratic po l i t ics of t he To ku g a w a we re re placed by an e m e r gi n g p o l i t ic a l pa rt ic i pa t i o n fro m the pro v ince s . I n t h e e n d , ts a r i s t au toc rac y
was
o ve r t h ro w n beca use n e i ther t h e t s a r
nor h i s o ffic ials knew w he t h e r or not to re press i n d e pe n de n t i n i t i a t i \'e e n t i re l y o r , i f t h e y pe r m i t ted i t , how to co m b i n e the c e n t r a l exerc ise o f
author i t y with t h e de \'e l o p m e n t o f such i n i t iative . Nor d id they a p p re
c i ate t h e urge nc y o f t h i s tas k fo r t he i r o w n s u rv i val.
O n e ca n con s i de r other d i m e n s ions o f t h is com par i so n . The bu lk o f t h e ar i s toc r a cy re sided i n t he pro v i nc es i n b o t h countries. In J a pa n , the sa m u rai were r e m o v ed fro m t h e land and became urban rent i e r s
and ad m i n i strators i n t h e c astle tow ns of t h e han. I n Russia, most landed
gentry remained o n the i r estates , w h ile the l e a d i n g m i n ority flocked to Moscow an d , late r , to Petersbu rg. S i nce in bo t h coun tries _the whole ar i s to c r ac y consisted of servito rs , the two aristoc rac ies have i m port a n t sim i larities in contrast to the greater i n de pe n dence o f the English or Fre nch aristocracies considere d in the fo llo win g cha pters. B ut the J apanese and Russian servitor a ristoc rats were not alike. In J a pa n , the Tok u gawa re g i m e d i stingu ished the landed notables in terms of the ir relative a ffi n i t y and re liability in relation to the ruling ho use. I n Russia, the tsarist re g i m e ev e ntu al l y s u pp r e sse d the old d i ffe r e n c es in ran k be tween votchina and po mestie holde rs so t h a t all aristoc rats were obliged to serve . W hen
that u n iversal se rvice-obligation was re moved, all Russian aristocrats we re give n their freedo m , but it was a freedom from service rather than a right. We shall see in C h a pter 1 3 that freedom wi thout rights is not a pro pitio us basis for the d e v e lop m e n t o f se l f go ve rnm e n t and i n d ivid ual ini tiative . I n the course of i ts r ise to su premacy, M uscovite autocracy proved i n i m ical to local autonomy and to the public institution ( boyar d u ma) in which such initiative co uld ex press itse lf polit ically. The oprichnina of I van I V (in t he 1 560s), t he abolition of mestnichestvo in 1 682, an d Pe ter the Great's i m po sition o f service as the sole criterion of rank show that m uch resistance had to be overcome. The great severity of Peter's r ule was relaxed u nder his s uccessors, but individual in itiative on a broader scale developed only after Alexander I I's proposal of serf emancipation i n 1 856. I t is sym ptomatic of a re gime whic h concentrated all authority in one ruler and h is ad m i nistrative and military staff that the de feats i n the Crimean War ( 1 856) , the Russo-J a panese War ( 1 905 ), and World War I ( 1 9 1 7 ) e nded in inadeq uate re forms and partial or total revolution . -
R USSIA
1 27
I n the preceding sum mation I have run far ahead of my "story" in ord er to outline the social and political differences between Russia and J a pa n over the m aj or part of the i r history.44 I n t u rn ing now to Ge rmany a n d Prussia, I begin once again in the med ieval period when i n t h e se territories o f Central E u ro pe the authority of ki ngs was establ i s hed on an end uring t h o ugh i n sec u re basis.
5 I MPE RI AL GE RMANY AND PRUSS I A
Il':
J A PA N , i m perial autho rity e m e rged from a past dom i n ated by rival l i n eage gro u ps . H isto rically. , authority under t he e m pe ro r fl uctu ated fro m the strong Kama k u ra to t h e weak A s h i kaga and then bac k to the st rong Tokugawa s hogunates. S t r u ggles over the i m pe rial and shogunal succession as well as lon g in ternal wars gave Ja panese history a sangu inary aspect. bu t the endless vendettas also le ft room fo r the i n d e pendence of local rulers and even o f peasants. One reaso n w h y a m id civil strife local rulers could re main i n d e pe n d e n t was the absence of fo re ign i n vasions for fo u rtee n h u nd red years . In Russia. prince l y authority e me rged w h e n armed trade rs fro m the nort h . intent on defendi n g thei r areas of settlement. had to come to terms with inde pende n t local notables and town asse mblies. Their i n d e pe ndence was grad ually los t as a ce n t ra l i zed au to c r ac y was estab lished at Moscow. The rulers of bot h J a pa n and Russia faced the delicate proble m o f assert ing ce ntral authority w h ile allo wing lead ing aristoc rats to inc rease their status and power. As see n fro m a very lon g time per spective. central authority prevailed in bot h Ja pan and Russia. but only in J a pa n did it remain com pa tible with a high degree o f local inde pen dence. The relation be tween central and local authority was the issue on w hich the internal pol i t ics of the two co un tries tu rned for m uch of their h isto ries. I n the case of the Cent ral E u ro pean co un tries. w hich subseq uently beca me Germa n y . t he record of rulers h i p is considerably more com plex . For that reason I will fi rst re fe r to I m perial Germ any and then deal with the eme rge nce o f rulers h i p in B rande n b u rg and Prussia and with the develo pmen t o f the Prussian aristocrac y . a I c hoose this format because in Central E u rope. royal aut hority did not prevail over the centrifugal "/mprria/ Genna l/)' i s an u n a \"oidable t e,"m i nologka l shurt c l I ! ' The Rom a n E m pire of t h e Ge r m a n !\; a r ion ( I,tter r he H u l ) Ro m a n E m p i re) i s t h e design a t ion co m mon l y given [ ( J it t: h a n g i n g co m p l e x uf l a n d s , r u led me'" b y Fra n k i s h and late r by Ge rman k i n gs from
IMPERIAL GER MANY AND PR USSIA
129
authorities o f princes, d u.kes, margraves, and others at the regional 0 1provincial level. Some o f the provinces ( Lander) o f the present Federal Re public of Germ any have a ve ry long prehistory. In order to examine k i ngs h i p and a ristocrac y at this regional level it seems useful to focus attention on rulership i n Prussia, the most im portant constituent state of earl y modern Ge r m a n y (seventeenth centu ry) , rather than discuss the i ncre asi n gly shado wy presence of the Roman E m p i r e o f the Ge rman Nation, or the H ol y Ro man E m pire as it was called b y the Hohensta u fen e m pe ror, Frede ri c k I ( Barba ro s s a ) in 1 I 57. E M PERORS, G E R M A N
PRI NCES,
A N D PA PA L A U T H O R I TY
I m pe rial Ge r m a ny had its be ginning in the Frankish e m pire . I n 75 1 or 7 5 2 , the pope, or bishop of Ro me, gave his consent to the discontin uation of the Merovingi an house and authorized Bishop Bon i facius to an oint the Carolingian ruler, Pe pin, king of the Franks. At that time, the pope was a subject of the Byzantine em pire, confirmed in his j u ris dictio n , like other bishops, by the B yzantine em peror. This control of Rome and of Italy weakened when the Byzantine emperor turned to the East to combat the ris i ng power of Islam. The Lom bards, one of the Germanic tribes that had earlier settled in Italy, used this opportunity to invade the lands belonging to Byzantium, and Pope Stephen I I ap pealed to Pe pin I I I to h e l p sto p their encroachment. The Fran kish king defeated the Lombards i n 754 and bestowed the I talian possessions of Byzantiu m on the papac y, thus establishing the tem poral powe r of the papacy and its close alliance with the Frankish kingdo m. This first ex tension of Frankish ruIt; into Italy proved to be an antecedent of later con flicts between the Roman E m pire of the German N ation and the pa pacy. But these consequences could not be foreseen in the eighth century. the coronation o f Charlemagne i n 800 until i ts fo rmal d i sso l ution by N a poleon i n 1 806. The extem as we l l as the desi gnation of t h i s e m pire cha n ged from t i m e to time. I shall refer
to
I m pe rial Germany w h en t he d i sc ussion deals w i t h the Ge rman em pire ."a t h c r than
its constituent un its, and to t he e m pe ro r as t he ru ler of t h a t em pire rega rd less of whet her or not he was formally designated "em pe ror" at t h e given ti me. Some e m pe ro rs o f Ger many were not consecrated by the po pe and hence not e m pe ro rs in t he strict se nse, but it became the Ge rman custom to refer to the ki n g of Germa n y as e m pe ro r (Kaiser) . The absence of pa pa l consecration did not change the e m pe ror's ow n claim to e xercise a u thority u n d e r God . Al l " the Fra n kish and Ge rman e m pe ro rs were chosen from a m o n g the ru lers of thc constituent part s o f I m pe rial Ge r m a n y and also ."c m a i ned .-u le rs o f t hcir in herited lands, like the duke o f Saxony or the co u n t of Habsb u rg . The title o f Ma rgrave referred to the military ruler of a Ge rman border province, appo i n ted to that position by the e m pe ro r . The rulers of B randenburg and later o f Prussia were ma rg."aves and electors ( Ku rfii rsten) of the emperor be fo re t h e y became k i n gs of Prussia i n 1 7 0 1 . T he election of the e m pe ror and the cha n g i n g mean i n g o f "Prussia" a re d i sc ussed furthe r o n .
THE A UTHOR ITY OF KINGS The Fr a nkish defe n d e r of t h e pa pacy could become as dan gero us to the po pe as t h e Lom bards had bee n . B y 7 7 4 Pe pin ' s s uccessor, Char lemagne ( 7 6 8- 8 1 4) , h a d d e feated the l a s t i n de pe ndent k i n g of the Lom bard s . This cam pa ign in I t a l y w a s part o f Fra n kish e x p ans i o n on many fronts. A fter h i s accession to the t h ro n e , t he c o n q u e s t o f the S ax o n s oc c u p ie d C h a rl e m a gne , o n a n d o ff, fo r t h irt y ye ars. I n 7 7 8 and again i n 7 9 5 he cam pa i gned i n S pa i n . I n 7 9 1 a n d a gai n i n 7 96 he c a m pa i g n e d a gai n s t the Ava rs on the Da n u be , a n d in 8 0 0 a g a inst t he B y z a n t i n e fo rces so u t h o f Ro me. B y the e n d o f h i s re ign i n 8 1 4 m o s t o f E u ro pe west o f the E lbe had be e n u n ited u nder Fra n k i s h rule . T h i s record o f ex pa nsi o n is the context o f C h a rlemagne ' s coro n a t ion as e m pe ror.
W h e n Po pe Leo I I I ( 7 95 - 8 1 6) c a m e in co nfli c t with t he Rom an n o bili t y i n 800, he cal led o n C ha rl e m a g ne to i nt e r v ene . C harle mag ne t raveled to Rom e to j u d ge the d is p u te and also witness the consecration of his son . At the ce remon y , Po pe Leo s uddenl y placed a crown o n Char l e magne ' s head and abased himse l f be fo re the king, w h ile the assembl y o f Roman notables acclaimed h i m e m pero r . S ince the pope had no legal right to con fe r the title, the action was a ppare ntly d e s i g ned to sec u re t h e po pe ' s positi o n aga in s t his adversaries. The new title o f e m pe ror added te nsions to the rela tions be tween the Ca ro l i n gi a n dynasty and the B yz a n t i n e e m pe rors. Fra n k i s h ru le over Lombardy and acce ptance of the t itle o f e m pe ro r th u s i m·ol v ed Charlemagne a n d his s uccessors ir r e v oc ably in the tem por a l and eccles iastical interests of the papacy. These interests w e re d i re c t ly l i n ke d to t h e le g i t i m a t i o n o f rule. The co n secrat i on of the Caro l i n g i a n d y n a s t y may h a v e originated in political e xi ge nc i es w h ic h i n d uced t he popes to seek Frankish assistanc e a gainst the Lombards and other I t a l i a n a d v e rsaries; but according to pa pa l the ory , the em pire was t he sec u lar arm of the ch u rch , c har ged with the task of p rotecti n g and e n h anci n g its m ission, and hence ultimately acco unt a ble for i ts actions to the pope . N at u ra l l y , the Fra nkish or i m pe r i a l the ory of k i ngs h i p placed greater e m p h a s i s o n the e m pe ror' s direct man date fro m God as the u l t i m a te j usti fication of his au th o rity and of his ri g ht to desig n a te his successor. The two positio n s were destined to come into open con flict in the in vesti t u re controversy of the ele v e n t h century. Charlemagne ruled a d i v i d e d e m p ire . l In the West, t he Franks had inherited t he pro vi nc i al orga n i za t ion of Rome. Authority was con c en trated above and devolved downward t h rou g h re gional or p ro v i n ci al co u n ts to the individual localities. No such provincia l o r gan i zation ex isted in the East, w h ich we now call Ce n tral E u ro pe , but which was then fro n tier terr i tor y barely reached by religious m issions and po l i tical au thority. For a time, the Fra n k i s h e m p ire was stro n g e no ugh to i m pose its rule on h un d reds o f l o c al rulers, but s uch im po si tio n was ach ieved only a fter p rot r ac t ed stru g gle. Eve n then most local co m m u n it i es and estates retained m uch of the ir indepe n d e n c e .
IMPER IAL GERMA N Y AND PR USSIA
Charl e mag n e d ied in 8 1 4 , and under the T r ea t y of Verd u n (84 3) , th e e m pi re w a s pea ce fu l l y div ided i n to a we st e r n , m iddle, and eastern part, eac h ru l ed by a son o f t h e d ece a se d ruler. T h i s co m p ro mise was of s h o rt d u ra t io n . The ro y a l doma i n s , w h ic h we re the p r i n c i pa l ma t e r ia l basis of gov e rn me n t h ad been red uced ; he nce , t he a u t hority o f the three k i n gs was we a ke n e d . B y 887 o ne of C h a r l e m a g n e 's s u ccessors w a s a l r ead y payi n g tribute to t he V i k i n g s who were be s i eg i n g Pa ris. I n 9 1 1 the C a ro li n gi a n l i ne d i e d o u t , and d u ri n g t he n i n t h a n d t e n t h centu ries V i k i n g , M a gya r a n d S a rac e n i nv a s io n s devastated m u c h of E u ro p e Lan d u n de r c u ltivation d ecre a s e d as po p u l a t io n dec l i n e d , and fa m i n e and disease s p re a d . E ve ry w h e re pe o p l e loo ked fo r local r u l ers w h o w e re stron g e n o ug h to pro tec t t h e m In w h a t had been t he East Fr a n ki s h e m pi re fi v e g rea t d uc h ie s ( S axo n y Franco n i a , Lo rra ine, Swabia, and B a varia) e merged. They w e re or ga n ize d o n a m i l i t a r y b a s i s i n a n e ffort to halt in v asio n s fro m the n o rth and east. The m e n w h o rose to powe r i n these d u c h ies we re desc e n da n ts o f Caroli n gian ad m i n i strators, co u n ts, and margraves ( Markgrafen) , w h o had n o tribal or other m andate to ru l e but became pow e rful as m il i ta r y leade r s . I n pa r t because of their lack of legitimatio n , these leaders chose Du ke Co n rad of F ran co n ia in 9 1 1 to i n he r i t the crown from t h e e x t i n c t Caro l i n g i a n l i n e . Conrad I w a s the fi rst r u l e r o f this eastern fron tier a rea t o be anointed, a tok e n of his alliance wi t h the ch urc h . He sou g h t to strengthen his i n te r n a l pos itio n a ga i n s t t he ari s toc racy by his cam pai gn s against Lorraine in the west and the M a gya rs in the east. H is main s u p port came from great m agnates o f the c h u rch who w e re a lso wealt h y landed pro p rietors. However, Con r ad failed in his c a m paign s against the Magyars and d ied in 9 1 8. Du ri n g h i s reign, the leaders in the several d uch ies consolida ted their own a u t hority b y assuring themselves o f s u pport from the local aristocracy and asse rting the i r co ntrol o ver the local ch urches. As yet, k ings h i p was b a sed o n l ittle more than the agreement by the rulers of the d uchies to have one of t h e i r n um ber lead them in war. The crown passed to the du k es of Saxo n y w ho we r e m o re s uccessful militarily than Co nrad had b een M i l i ta r y success was i m portant for conso li dat i n g the ru le o f a d ynasty. B y a combination of meet i n g this test and receiving the acclamation o f other ducal leaders , the S axon d y n asty became here d ita r y The Saxon ki n gs (9 1 9 - 1 024) a ttem pt ed to reassert the au t hority of the cro w n At critical junctures they appoin ted members o f t he royal fam i ly to leading positions in t he duchie s ; they i n sisted o n no m i n a ting successors to the ducal title w here the y co u ld ; a n d they u n dermined con trol of the church by t h e secu lar rulers i n the duch ies . B u t in ach i e v ing greater po li t ical authority, the S axon kings h ad to rely on allies that were relatively indepe ndent of the part i cu l ar interests in eac h d uc hy. The church, w i t h its extensive o r gani zation i n many lands, was the most s uit,
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K i n g d o m of t h e F r a n k s s h ow i n g d i v i s i o n b y T r e a t y of V e r d u n 8 4 3 B y z a n t i ne
E mpire
K H A Z ARS
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M O S LE M S
6.
Europe.
800-.909 : .PQliJical Divisions and In vasions
IMPERIAL GERMAN Y AND PR USSIA
1 33
able ally in t h i s und e rt a k i n g a nd be ca me t he m ai n s ta y of i m pe r i a l gov e rnment. A s uc ce ss i on of S a x on rulers exem pted t he c h u rches from t h e o rd i n a r y a u t h o r i t y of local r u le rs and place d th e m d i re c t ly u nder the crown. At t h e same time, t he c h u rches we re made into an i n stru ment of government by i n ves t i n g thei r b i sho p s and abbots with secular au t h o r i t y over the areas under t he i r j u risd ictio n . On the eastern frontiers th e ch u rches acted as agents of government and centers o f m issi o n a r y work among the S lavs, tho ugh not without p ro v o k i n g occasional rebel lions a ga i n s t themselve s . In 937 the S ax o n k i n g Otto I (936-97 3 ) en l a rge d his d o m ai n by e s ta b l i s h i n g his overlord s h i p in B urgu ndy a n d provence. I n h is I ta li a n c a m pa i g n of 95 1 -952, he then sec ured the Mar ks o f Verona, Friu l i , a n d Istria (roughly t h e areas of northeastern I ta l y and Trieste) for h i s s o n H e nr y , Duke o f B avaria. I n 955 Ott o de feated the Magyars at Lec h feld, and i n 960 he defended the pa pacy against an atte m pt to seize its lands. Pope John XI I bestowed on Otto t he title lmperator et Augustus i n 962, co n fi r m i n g the reestablishment of the em p i re which had been i n a b e y anc e for more than a century. The successors of Otto I contin ued his work of e x p a n s i o n and consolidation i n alliance with the churc h . For exam ple, i n Ot to I I's (973-983) I t a li a n campaign of 98 1 , t h ree quarters of his fo rc es w e re p ro v id e d by German abbe y s and bi s h oprics, only o n e quarter by l a y magnates. But this alli ance did not last. When Otto I died in 973, all the Germa n monaste ries (over 1 00) we re attached to the c rown . But by the be gi n n i n g of the e lev enth cen tur y , eccle s i as t ica l j uri sdi c t io n s h ad p ro l i fe ra te d (there were over 700 monasteries) u n d e r the s po n so rs h i p o f t he aristocracy, and from that time on the c h urch tended to acce ntuate the political fra g mentation of the empire . Neve rtheless, b y t h e eleventh century, the principle o f an hereditary monarchy was accepted for the whole Roman E m pire of the German Nation -that is, the ri g h t of the re ig n i n g e m peror to nominate �is son for the succession was considered a x io matic , alt h o ugh his choice had to be co n firmed th ro u gh an e l ec tio n by the p r i nces . The whole Roman em pire i n 1 000 e x te nd ed from the North Sea coast to the Mediterra nean , i nc l u d i n g present-day Germany, Holland , Czechoslovakia, S wit zerland, Austria, eastern France, and most of Italy. For a time, eve n the consec rat i o n by t he po pe became a formality ; thus, the ruling dynasty's supremacy counte red most tendencies toward decentralized rule . How ever, the e mpero r's supremacy d e pe n d e d on his personal presence, and t h i s lim ited the d u ra bili ty of his rule . In h i s absence, the admin istration either o f I t al y or of the Ge rma n territories would weake n , re s u lt i n g in the reassertio n of the authority of the princes or of the ch urc h . E mpero rs from the Sal i a n Franks ( hence the Salian dy nasty , 1 0241 1 2 5) fo l low e d the Saxo n k i n gs and attem pted to cope with the u n re sol ve d p ro b lem of the mandate to rule. T he new dynasty turned to t he
Otto III (983-1 002) Receiving the Homage of the Nations This painting from the Reiche nau gospels of the tenth centu.-y shows (on the left) the Slavs , Germans, Franks, and Roman s b.-inging prese nts to em pero.- Otto I I I , who is seated o n th e right. Wea ring a Roman i m perial costu m e , t h e e m pe ror is represen ted a s h e i .- of t h e Caesars, s urrounded b y a.-chbishops and no bles carryi n g the stole a n d swo.-d sign i fying spiritual and tem poral autho .-ity. The e m peror h i m self holds the im pe.-ial staff and globe. The scene emphasizes the s y m bolic contin u ity between the Rom a n e m p i re and the Holy Roman E m pire o f the Ge r m a n N ation . (elm 445 3 , fol . 23v and fol . 24r. Bayerische Staatsbi blio thek . M u nich )
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
u pper ran ks of de pe n d e n t rctainers and k n i gh ts for the support whic h the princes a n d t h e ma g n a tes of the church wi t h held. In this frontier area of East Cen L ral E u rope, t i es of v a s s a l a ge we re as weak as they were in K ievan R u s s i a a n d fo r m a n y of t he same re a so n s A dm i n istrative of ficers a n d armed k n i gh ts were drawn fro m s oc i a l ra n ks below the a ris toc racy , because s l lch m e l l d e pen de d d i rec t l y on the ruler fo r a d va n c e men t . W i t h t he a i d o f t h i s class o f m ill isleria les, t h e S a l i a n e m pe ro rs e m ba r k e d on t he i r c a m pa i g n of recove r i n g c ro w n lan d s which had be e n u s u r p e d by l o c a l rulers. The re i g n o f H e n r y I V ( 1 0 56- 1 106) i s most nOLa ble i n t h i s res pect . He b u i l t ro yal fo rt resse s in Saxon y and T h ur i n gia and w a n ted Lo establish a pe rmanclll c a pit a l i n Goslar. By res t o ri n g the eco n o m y of t h e ro yal doma i n s w i t h the a id o f the minisleriales, he hoped to C 1"ea te a m ate r i a l base t h a t wo u l d be s u ff i c i e nt to make royal a u t h ori ty i n d e pendent of the Gel"man p r i nce s " Yet the s t r en gt h o f t h e S a l i a n d y n a s t) proved brittle. The m inority of Henr y I V lasted fo r fo u rtee n years (l 056- 1 070) , and d u ring th is i n tenal the pa pacy so u g h t to emanci pate itself from its de pendence on i m pe rial authority ." Many monasteries were re formed in order to assert .
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pa pal a u t h o r i ty : si nce 9 1 0, the Clun iac re form movement had prepared gro und for a re,·ival o f the c h u rch by freei ng all monastic ho u se s of feu d a l control and pl ac in g them d i rect ly under the pa pacy. In additio n , C l u n iac re f o rm s strengthe ned the c h u rch by insisting on the celibacy of the c l e r gy and by condemning la y investitu re of ch urch o ffices and the sale o f s uch offices and of ecclesiastical pa r do n s (simony). The La teran Cou ncil of 1 059 then abolished bot h lay i nvesti ture and s i m o n y The counc i l partic ularly condem ned the i m pe rial practice of appointing se lected bishops to local j u risdictions i n o r d e r to obtain their aid in com bat i n g t he autonomy of local rulers. Th us , the reform movements en cO U l"aged re presentatives of the c h u rch to make common cause with ant iroyalist aristocrats in lieu o f the earlier alliance between the e m peror and the church against princes and o t h e r local secular rulers . Although the Saxon and Salian emperors had strengthened royal authority, they t he
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hT h e t e r m /J /·illre i s used t h roughout in ils ge n e r k se nse as t he sovereign ru le r o f a t e r ri tor y not as a j ullior m e m he r of a roy.1 I h o u se . Cha pler 2 referred to pa pa l s u p port of t he e lectoral p ri n c i p le for po l i t i c a l and t heolo gica l re a so ns and to the Germ a n ic ITa ,
d i t io n oj "eleCl i n g" an h e i r to t he chie ftai n s h i p by a cc l a m a t i o n . The i m po rta nce of t h i s p.-i n c i ple i n t he h i story o f I m perial Ge rm a n y was d l le i n pan t o t he freq uency wit h which G e r m a n k i ngs d i ed w i t h o ut he i r o r le l i .. m i n o r 1 0 su c<:ecd t hem . As t h e fo llow i n g dis
c u s s io n i n d i c a t e s , t h i s c i rc u m slance Wits pow e r fu l l } re i n forced by t h e contest wit h t he pa
pacy w h ich gave fu rr hcr i m pe t u s to e x i s t i n g d i \· i s i o n s a m o n g the Ger m a n pri nccs . < T h a t de pendence h a d i n cr e a sed u n d e r 01 1 0 I , who at first h a d been I"f� fu sed the i m pe r i a l coro n a t i o n by t he po pe, but w ho h a d given m i l i tary a s s i st a n c e to the pa pacy sub se q u c n t l)". A liI.''' be i n g crowned i n 962 . Ol i O de posed o ne po pe , n om i n a ted a n ot her, and com pel led t he pope t o recogn ize t he c m pc.· ror's right t o approve or reject papal nom i nations.
1 37
IMPERIAL GERMANY AND PR USSIA
ha d no t crushed the a u to n o m y o f t he d uchies or t h e t r ad i t i o n a l freedom wh ich l a n d o w n e rs claimed a s t.hei r a ncient i n h e r i ta n c e . In some areas , t he l a nded a r i s toc r a c y a n d t h e monasteries n o w fo rmed an a l l iance and cam e to oppose roy a l a u t h o r i t y . d The issue of i m perial and papal ju r i sdiction came to a head when riot s broke o u t i n Milan in a con fl ict betwe e n a n e pi sc opa l a n d a n im p e r i a l candidate for t h e o ffice o f t h e M i l a n e se bis h o p. H e n r y IV q u e l l ed th ese riots a n d in stalled his ow n c a n d i d a te by fo rc e o f a r m s . Moves a n d
co u n te rmoves followed , a n d i n 1 0 7 5 Po pe Gr e go ry V I I c h a l l e n ge d t he ve ry a u t h o r i ty of the G e r m a n e m p e r o r b y exco m m u n icat i n g h i m . I n the e n su i n g controversy, the e m peror s o u g h t support. a gainst t he p o pe his own e cc l e sia s ti c a l a p p o i n t ee s , whi le the pope i n t u rn t r i ed to
an alli ance w i th the m a n y G e r m a n e n e m ies of H e n r y I V .
from form Both a l l i a n ce s
were u n s ta b le. A n umber o f Henry's eccles iastical s u p porters we re di
vided in t h e i r l o y a l t y betwe e n the e m pe r o r a n d the pope . A n umber
of t he po pe ' s Ge r m a n s u p po r t e rs j o i ne d h i m o n ly b eca u se th e y oppo s ed the e m pe ror, but meanw h il e they d e priv e d Ge rman c h u rc h es a n d mon a ster i e s o f their lands wherever the y had the uppe r h a nd . I t. wa s i n t h e ea rl y ph a ses of this great controversy t h a t H en ry IV was fo rce d to free h im sel f from the p a pa l ba n of excommunication by making h i s fa mous j o u r n e y to I taly, w here he did penance and received absolution at Can ossa in 1 077. But the e m pe ror did not thereby re l i n q u i s h his claims to le gi t im a t e ro y a l a u t h o r i t y ; rather he p u rged h i mse l f of t h e pa pa l ba n i n o rd e r t o e n s u re the support o f h i s German fol lowers . H e nr y' s subm ission to, a n d reconc il iation with, the c h u rc h d is a p po i n ted t h e Ge r m a n p r i n c e s who h a d al lied themselves w it h the po pe. They h ad w a n ted to d e po se the e m pe ror , a n d t h e pope's absolution deprived them of a con ve n i e n t pretext. Now , fo llowing the journey to Canossa, a faction of German p r ince s e lected a rival k i n g, Rudo l f of R h e i n fel d e n . The c h u rch t o ok an a m bi g uo u s po s itio n , w i t. h Po pe Gre gory's l e ga tes approving this e l ec t i o n but in t he absence of p a pa l con fir ma t io n , p re s u m a b ly because the ch urch o p po se d and feared the em peror's re s u r ge n ce of a u t h o r i t y . A civil w a l" e n s ued i n w h ic h H e n ry , s up por ted by t h e tow n s , d e fe a t ed Rudolf ( d . 1 080) . The p o p e again ex com m u n icated a n d " d e po s ed " the em pe ror, but a sy n o d o f Ge r m a n an d I ta l i a n bi s h o p s t h e n d e po s e d Po pe Gre gory. Still, G re go ry d i d n o t y i el d , Henry u n d e rtoo k a series of e x pe d i ti on s to I t a l y ( 1 08 ) - ] 082), the pope called in h i s No rman a l l ies ( fro m S ic ily ) , a n d the co n flict con t i n ued . The papa l t h e o r y maintained that an e v i l r u le r w h o v i ol a t es th e c o n t r ac t w i t h d I n other a reas rival ries develo p ed between t h e m . T hus the Saxon d u kes wen: op pose d by the archbishop of B re m e n favored hy t he S a l i a n h o u s e . Eve n t u a l l y . the Saxons re be l led a ga i nst t he r u l i n g d y n a st y . b u t they were defea ted by Henry I V i l l 1 07 5 .
THE A UTHOR ITY OF KINGS
Henry IV and Countess Mathilda at Canossa This m iniature from the Vita Math ildis by the M o n k Den i s ( 1 1 1 4) s hows the German em pe ro r in the garments of a pe n itent h u m bly asking Countess Math ilda of Tuscany and St. Hugh, the abbott of Clun y and the e m pe ror's god father, to i n tercede for him with Pope Gregory V I I . They did so , and Henry was a d m itted into the presence of the pope on Jan · u ary 28 , 1 077. (Biblioleca Aposlolica Valicana. Rome)
his subjects may be de posed by the po pe, who is res ponsible for the sal vation of mankind. On this basis, Gregory's successors contin ue d their o p position to Henry IV by su pporting the revolts of Hen ry's sons against their father. B ut when Henry V ( 1 1 06 - 1 1 25 ) succeeded his father, he cont i n ued the policies of lay i n vestiture , o p position to papal i nterference in Ge rmany, and reliance on the towns and ministeriales w hile pretend-
IMPER IAL GERMANY AND PR USSIA
The Aftennath of Canossa The pope's triu m ph over Henry I V was only an episode in the struggle between the Ger man em perors and the papacy. This conte m porary miniature s hows Pope Gregory in flight while t he e m pe ror sits side by side w it h G u ibe r t , arc h bishop of Rave n na , w h om Henry IV had installed as the anti-pope Clementis I I 1. I n 1 084 the Norma n s freed Gregory and conducted him to Salerno , w he re he died in exile the next year. Henry IV was crowned
emperor in Rome by Clementis I I I in 1 084. (Chronicum libri, V I I I ab origine mundi ( 1 1 56) by
Otto von Freising)
ing to de pend on the princes. By 1 1 22 the Synod at Worms sought to settle the great conflict t h ro u gh a concordat between pope and e m pe ror, but in practice the rivalry between the two contin ued . The journey to Canossa was but one incident in a controversy that resulted in further political fragmentation which subsequent intervals of imperial centralization could interru pt but not u ndo. To some extent, th e "investiture controversy" is a misnomer. Pope Gregory V I I had at tacked the claim of the Salian d ynasty to rule over the German ch urch by divine righ t. In the interpretation of the Roman Curia, the empe ror, like any other king, was a removable official if he violated God's law as
THE AUTHORITY OF KINGS
interpreted by the chu rch. Suitability alo ne was the test of kingship. At this time in the history of the church, the popes c hose to emphasize the principle of an elective monarchy; hence, the princes who elected th e empe ro r we re the real source of authority, a fact whic h revitalized old Germanic traditions of election. The result was further political particularis m and anarchic condi tions which could be exploited by the German aristoc racy. The aristocracy, a c l a ss of loc a l ly powerful land owners, too k ad van tage of the
stress of ci\·il war and t he d is so lut io n of old social classes to str e n gth e n its hold by red ucin g large e le m e n t s of t h e po p u lation to depend ence . It multi plied its c l ie n t s and affirmed its
c o n tr o l
by deft exploitatio n of the bo n d s of
fe ud alis m . It used t h e pretext th at for t h irty years, fr om 1076 to 1106, there was no lawful un iversally recognized German kin g as an excuse for exercisin g powers of governme n t without royal asse n t and f o r e xte n d i n g the powers it was already exercis in g.2
Castles sprang up everywhere, and formerly free peasants who had been uprooted by civil war flocked to them for protection. Poor freemen be came serfs and rich ones became knights and ministeriales . Weak nobles sought o ut stro n ge r o nes. Generally, then, men of lower rank came to be boun d to those of h igher rank by ties of vassalage and homage. As civil wars repeatedly swept the co untry, the de mand for armed kn ights increased rapidly, and even bisho ps or abbots were recruiting trained warriors to de fend their estates. Minor nobles and man y free men es caped ruin or the degradation of ser fdom by abandonin g their liberty and entering the ranks of the ministeriales. In that position they were maintained and armed at the lord's expense. Since the de mand for such men was great, the conditions of the ministeriales became attractive; they were free of personal bondage, free to leave their lord, and able to tran sform their lands fro m ser vile te n u res into manorial estates. The most successful of them built castles on their land and em ployed armed knights in turn, a case of u pward mobility sim ilar to the case of the Jap anese warriors who eve n tually re placed their own masters. Th us, in the course of the civil wars following the investiture controversy, German society was transformed. Old noble families died out, while a new class o f armed knights and ministeriale s allied itse l f t hrough marriage with older dynastic fam ilies, in heriting their estates and franc h ises and oc c u pying t he h igh offices in church and state which had once been the prerogative of ancient lineage. The rise of the Hohensta u fen em pire (1152-12 72 ) achieved a de gree of political un ity sim ilar to that of the Saxon and Salian dynasties. Royal domains again were consolid ated with the hel p of the m i nisteri ales, and for a time the many secular and ecclesiastical rulers together with the ir local landed aristocrac ies submitted to imperial authority . But
IMPERIAL GERMANY AND PRUSSIA
even gi fted rulers foundered on the adm inistrative and poli tical prob lems arising from the size and heterogeneity of a realm extending dur in g its greatest expansion from the North Sea and the Baltic to the Mediterranea n . The Ho hen stau fen emperors were concerned with reasserting their dom inion in Italy, which through i ntermarriage and inheritance came to include the Norman kingdom of Sicily (after 1189). But the very suc ces s of e n forcing and enlarging their authority in I taly brought on a new con flict with the papacy as well as i n directly strengthening the Ger man princes. I n the eigh th century, the popes had called on Pepin and Charlemagne for protection against the Lombards. Now, in the twelfth cent ury, the popes allied themselves with Lombard com m unities in a com mon opposition to the H ohenstaufen. When the H ohenstaufe n em peror Henry V I 0190-1197) left a three-year-old son as his heir, the Ger man princes split in to two factions, each with its own candidate for the throne . The popes sided with one faction against the other and thus again became °a party to the electoral stru ggles among the German princes. The contest be twe e n the Hohenstau fe n rulers and the papacy con tinued under Frederick II (1215-1250).e E m pe ror Frederick was preoccu pied with the effort to exercise h is do minion over Italy, and this left the German princes and archbishops free to fight one another for territorial gain. In his charters of 1220 and 1232, he gave ecclesiastical and secular rulers written guarantees against the activities of royal do main officials and limited the expansio n of i mperial towns at the ex pense of territories belo n gi n g to the church (that is, archbishoprics, bish oprics, and monasteries). In the short run, stabilization was ach ieved despite the two anti-ki n gs sponsored by the pa pacy. B ut the emperor died in 1250, and his son Conrad IV died in 1254. T heir passing gave rise to the same feudal fragmentation and proliferation of local wars which had followed the investiture controvers y in 1076-1077. With the demise of Hohenstau fen rule, central au thority disap peared from Germany a lto gether. The o ffice of dukes, margraves, and others had been indivisible under imperial rule because they were at the disposal of the emperor. Now, the political integrity of these offices was in jeopardy . Between the close o f the Hohe nstaufen dynasty and the ince ption of Habsburg rule (1254-1273), princes we re free to increase their domains and often threatened the possessions of the churc h . The papacy had hastened the dow n fall o f the Hohenstau fen, but now that the c hurch was threate ned , Po pe Gregory X interve n ed to restore im perial authority. In 1273 the e lectors raised t he Swabian co unt Ru dolf of Habsburg (1273-1291) to the throne. eThe year of Frederick (['s imperial coronation ( 1215) coincided both with Magna Carta and with the Mongols' conquest of Peking and the start of their mo v e m en t westward.
THE ALTHORITI' OF A/XGS Rudolf of H abs bu rg q uick l y added to his realm by defending the
emp ire agai ns t the aggressive pol i c i es of t he king of B ohe mia and by
annexing the king's territories out s ide Bohemia. Rudolf also obtained
the consent of the German princ e s when he gra nte d Austria, Sty ria, and
Western S[O\'enia (Carnio[a) to his two sons, But when Ru dol f died in 1291, the electors feared t he power he had amassed and chose Adolf (1291-1298), count of Nassau, as t he next k i n g Adolfs po l i cies aroused much o pposi tion He was de posed in 1298, and A[bert of Ha bsbur g 0298-1308) was elected in his stead, When Albert was m urdere d, the electors c h ose Coun t H e nry of Luxemburg (1308-1313), a brother of the archbishop of T rier, one of th e electors, Henry's reign was followed by a d o ub le election in which one group of ele cto rs chose Louis of Wit t e ls bach (1314-1347), duke of Cpper Bavaria, while another chose F reder ick of H absbur g (1314-1325), duk e of Austria. E ight years o f war foll owed which ended in t he defeat of F re de r ick and the ascendance of t he Wittelsbach house. But a feud between the two houses had begun which would las t until the se ve nt ee nt h centun'. On Louis' death in 1347, ' the German crown was bestowed once mOl'e on the Lu xe m burg house. The electors chose Charles IV (1349-1378), wh o was Margra\'e ofMo ravia and King of Bohemia. Charles was e normously successful in in c rea si n g his royal domain at the e x pe nse of the Wittelsbach and Habs bu rg houses. In the end, he wore the crown s of the Empire Bohemia, Lombardy, and Burgundy, and in addition to other acquisitions he se ,
,
-
,
cured the Ma r graviate of Brandenburg for his son Wenceslas in 1373.
When Charles died in 1378, h is son Wenceslas was unopposed as heir to the throne, a succession from father to son that had not occurred in
two hundred years, Cnder the Saxon, Salian, and Hohenstaufen dynasties, the emperor
had possessed royal authority in the coll\'emional sense of that day. The
empire's principalities had been fiefs m-er which dukes, counts,
mar
gra\'es, and others could not rule without imperial consent. The most important functions of the emperor were the defense of the eastern frontiers against the Magyars (and later the Turks), the adjudication of disputes among territorial wiers, and, when he required funds for com mon defense beyond the resources of his own domains, the imposition of extraordinary levies. There were weak as well as strong emperors, and changing political conditions inevitably affected what anyone em peror could accomplish. But the principle of imperial sovereigntybased
on election was universally recognized and still further enhanced by
papal consecration. The fact that H en ry IV could assume that his po sition as emperor would be intact once he had purged himself of the ban of excommunication testifies to this general acceptance of imperial so\'ereigntyand the revered authority of papal consecration.
IMPERIAL GERMANY AND PRUSSIA These ge n eral ass umptio ns became i n v ali d d uri n g the t h i rt ee n th
ce ntu ry Th ree dif fe r e nt d yn asties (H a bsburg Wittelsbach, Luxemburg) occupied the Ge r m a n throne between 1273 and 1356 , when a new set .
.
,
tlement was reached. D es pi te the brief period of poli t i cal consolidation which was achieved by Ch arl es IV. im peri al rule had seriously weak e ned. B e fo re 1250, t h e emperor had possessed the ri gh t to exercise his
imperial authority with or without the consent o f t h e princes. After 1 250, an era of princely rule began w h ich extended from that time to
th e u n ification of Ger man y in 1871. Al t h o ugh i m p erial rule did not d isa p pe ar the emperor now depended both de facto a n d de j ure on the wil l i n g coope rat i on of the p rinc es Hereditary su ccess i o n was u n equinKa IIy recognized onl y at t h e ter ritorial level, whereas the e lec to r al pri nc ipl e gO\ e r ned the selection of th e em peror. The c ompositi o n of the electoral bod y was at fi rst uncer tain, but during the twelfth ce n tu r y the three Rhenish archbishops (of Mainz, C ologne, and Trier) a n d the ru lers o f the great duchies emerged as the e l e cto rs (Kurfiirsten) to whose choice the other rule rs ga,·e their assent. B u t elections continued to be con tested , and t he papacy inter ven ed from ti me to time. Legally, the Go lden B u l l of C h a r l es IV (1356) mar ked the turning poi nt. By this edict, the emperor determined that the three archbishops, t he ruler of the Pa la ti n a t e the d u ke of Saxon y , the margrave (later elector) of B ra n denbu rg, and t he king of B o he m ia would d eci d e by majority vote the successor to the imperial crown. The Golden Bull added the proviso that the can d i date r ecei v i n g a maj o r i ty should be rega rded as u n a ni mo usl y elected . Once electe d , the king and emperor was i m m edia t e l y entitled to exercise his royal p re ro ga tiv es Both provisions put a stop to earlier claims of the pope that he had the righ t to examine rival candi da tes and then choose the one on who m he would bestow imperial authority by an a ct of consecration. With these and related pro vision s the Golden Bull effectively terminated disputed ,
.
'
,
.
,
elections and papal interventions. But this unity in the face of the papacy
was achieve d only by according full recognition to the prerogatives of
the princes. From this time forward, dynasties might change, but the electors would remain, for the partition of electoral territories was pro
hibited. The electors were also gran ted righ ts of coinage and the monop oly o f precio u s metals, which gave them a quasi-regal po sit i on
.
Fur
thermore, crown lands could not be transferred without the conse n t of the electors. The emperor became in effect the m ou th p iec e of the elec
tors and the representative of the consensus which the electors had or
ganized among the princes. Henceforth, the principalities were an chored in the Golden Bull, which legally prec l u d ed a revival of the imperial mo narchy at the expense of the princes.
The elections i n the period after 1250 showed that the princes had
THE ALTHORIT'¥' OF I.:JXGS
Charles IV and the Seven Electors Thi� manuscript illustration depicts the selllemelll lUlder the Golden Bull of 1356. It shows Charles 1\' wearing the c!"Own, sword, and i m pe ria l scepter with the archbishops of :\Iainz, Col ogne , and T r ier to his right, and the kin g of Bohemia, the duke of Saxom, t he margra\'e of Brandenburg, and the colin of Palatinate to his left. Although the Gold�n Bull regularil.ed the succession to the imperial throne, it also ma rke d the decline of the emperor'� effeni\'e amhority. (Biblimhe'lue Royale Albert I", Brussels)
only a qualified interest in the imperial institution, The electors probably
reflected the opinions of other territorial rulers when they changed their preferences. Rudolf of Habsburg's initial popularity was due to his suc
cess against Bohemia, and his skill in dealing with the princes accounts
for their consent to the territorial grants to his sons. But the emperor could perform only the imperial functions on which the princes agreed,
prO\'ided that he possessed sufficiently extensi\'e territories so that he
himself could finance the costs of the imperial government. He could
then induce the princes to grant the additional funds and materiel
needed for recognized emergencies, such as the struggle against the
Turks. Some part of the em peror's authority was still due to that mixture
of awe and hope for peace which attached itself to the imperial throne
even in the midst of family feuds and ruthless bids for power. But as
soon as an emperor had amassed sufficient resources to give weight to his formal authority, he was also seen by many princes as endangering
their autonomy-a dilemma which helps to account for the chronic in stability of imperial rule.3
In the aftermath of Hohenstaufen rule, two of the four houses com
peting for the crown, Wittelsbach and Luxemburg, had ruled over the
IMPERIAL GERMANY AND PRUSSIA
1 45
Margraviate o f Brande n burg (a mon g their many other domains). I turn noW to t his frontier area o f med.i eva l Germany, t he terri torial n ucleus of the future k i n gdom of Prussia.
FROM THE BRANDENBURG ELECTORATE TO THE KINGDOM OF PRUSSIA
The Saxon emperor, Ot to I, fo unded the bisho prics of H a\'e1berg d an B ran den burg in 948 i n an a ttempt to sup port Christian m issio n s to the Slavic tribes li ving t hese areas. As w i t h previous atte m pts at German se ttleme nt, this one was u n s uccess ful , and it was not u n t i l t he twelft h century t hat German rule rs d e feated the S lavs a n d established perma nen t se ttlements. Lotha ir, d u ke of Saxo n y , and Albert I (t he Bear), co u nt of Ballerstadt and fo un der o f the Ascanian ho use, re newed the attac k on the Slavs i n 1106. When Lothair was elected em peror in 1133, he i nvested Albert as margrave of t he North Mark, a major are a of B ran den burg east of the Elbe River. A lbert fo llowed his c a m pa ign against the Slav s by bringi ng Frisian, Saxo n, and Rhe n i s h settlers to the a rea. In this work of colonizatio n he h ad t he assistance of two m issionary or ders , the Cistercians a n d Premo nstrate nsians. Albert a n d his succ essors entrusted these orders w ith large tracts of territory, w h ic h were farmed by lay brethren and subsequently by te nants. T he clearing of forests, swamp drainage, and the development of agriculture went h and in han d. Though the firs t moves of colo n ization had been m i l i tary. the major ex pansion of Ge r m a n settlement in t he twelfth and early thir teenth centu ries was peaceful . Slav settleme nts were sparse, and the de velopment of the land allowed Slav residents and German settlers to prosper together, the two peo ples grad ua lly me rging. During the twelfth a n d thirteenth cent u ries, conditions in western Germany and the Low Co u n tries furthered m igratio n t o the east, for with the decline of the H o he nstau fen dynasty the fragme ntation of princely rule was accom pan ie d by m uch armed con flict. Beyond the Elbe River, vast and thinly populated areas not o n ly req u i red pioneering ac tivities of settling and cultivation, but also enco u raged-once the area was pacified-a peasantry free of onero u s burdens . Vil lages a nd towns enjo yed considerable auto n o m y. The weakness of territorial princes and of the la nded nobility res u lted in good part from their de pe n dence on peasants and town-dwel lers , created by cond i t ions of labor scarcity and relative economic pros perity. 4 B u t while condition s o f settleme nt were favorable, the poli tical and military situation was high l y u n stable. The same freedom which at tracted settlers to develop the lan d co uld a lso e ncourage local rulers and landowners to enlarge their possessions and o p pose restrictions by h igher authority. Yet the involve m e n t of German princes in the dynastic strug-
THE AUTHORITY OF KI.l\/GS gles of the em pire dre w their resources away fro m t he d uchies , mar gravia tes, and other po li ties over which they ruled. Th us, the princes were stro nger at th e i m perial level than on their home gro u n d . For w hile the e m pe ror depended on th e con se n t of the princes obtained by ne gotiation , in the frontier re gions of the em pire pri n c ely au tho rity itsel f was not stro n g either. An example f ro m t h irteenth-ce nt u ry Branden burg illustrates t h i s weakn es s In 1280 the incumben t ru l er of B randenbu rg, the Asc an ian mar gra ve Otto IV, was i m prisoned in a clash with the a r ch b is h o p of M agd e burg.f To obtain Ot to's re l ea se, a ransom was collected by spe cia l levy on h i s vassals as well as on the to wn s in his domain. Such a l e vy was a conventional part of the feudal contract which made the payme n t of ransom mone y fo r the im prisoned ruler a legal obligatio n of h i s vassals . B ut in this case , t he town s and a ristoc ratic estates of Brandenburg wo uld agree to t he ransom pay me n t only after prolonged negotiatio n s . Even tually, a settlement was reached (1280-1283) w h ic h obliged the mar grave to swear under oath that in the future he would call for s pecial levies o n ly when the co u n try was e ndange red. For the m a rgrave, s uch an agree me n t greatly curtailed his e ffectiveness as a ruler, since s pecial levies to meet po li tical or military emergencies were a n esse n tial part of princely authority at a time when even t he we althiest rule rs often found the costs o f gove rnment beyond their financial c a pacity. In addi tio n , the margrave was forced to concede to his vassals the right of armed resis tance if this oath were bro ken. That concession gave retroactive le g al force to the resistance of the town s a n d estates. Hence forth, the mar grave had to live within the means w h ich his ow n dom ains pro vided for the s u pport of governmen t. These means were of course subs tantial; but his political moves would be greatly hampered if he had tQ anticipate armed resistance from h i s own notables whenever h is po licies led to ex penses beyon d his means. Final l y , the m argrave's right to im pose s pecial levies was made a part of his vassals' ju risdictio n over their peasants; that is, the vassals were entitled to pass s pecial burde ns on to their own d e pende nts, thus stren gthen i n g the vassals financially at t he e x pe n se of both the margrave and the peasants.5 The story characterizes poli tical c ond itions from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries , not only i n Brandenburg b u t in many pa rts of t he emp i re.6 Duchies, m argraviates, and other forma lly subordinate ter ritories had earl ie r consolidated their rule at the expense of the em peror. Now , a similar transfere nce of power was occurring at the ter.
r The terJ"itory of the archbishopric Magdeburg I()J-med a si za b le wedge in the south western part of Brandenburg. At the time. Magdeburg was a power in its own right because six other bishoprics were subordinate to it.
IMPERIAL GERMANY AND PR USSIA
147
ritorial level, from the d�kes, counts, and margraves to t he towns and estate assemblies of aristoc ratic lal1downe rs. In the case of Bra ndenbu rg, this ascendance of loc a l over terri torial rulersh i p was h aste ned b y the d ynastic struggle between the Wittelsbach a nd Lu x emb u r g houses. Cen tral ru le o v er t h e m arg r aviate weakened, in pa rt be c a u se the Luxemburg rulers fo u nd it necessa r y to sel l or pawn por tio n s of Bra n denburg and its ad jacent possessions, a po lic y facilitated by the extinction of the As cania n line. Between 1320 a nd 1415, the ma r gr avi ate lost approximately half of i ts te r ritories to the T e u t oni c Order in t he eas t to Sa x o n y and B oh e m i a in the south , a nd to various o the r po l i tie s in t he west and sout hwe s t. 7 Wh en ce ntra l a u th o ri ty weakens and local rul e becomes fragmented amo ng an increasi ng numbe r of relat i ve l y small competi tors, a vacuum of authority is created . Dur in g the thirteenth and fou rtee nth centu ries , many towns i n B randen burg and elsewhere in northern Ge r m a ny suc ce eded in havi n g the castles of formerly powe rfu l , landed aristocrats razed to the ground. Formal settle me nts often guaran teed the towns their local autonomy, a nd various territorial magnates declared under oath that they would not reco nstruct castles in or near the tow ns . To p rotect this newly won autonomy, t he towns of Bra ndenburg and also of Pome rania to the north allied themselves w ith the H a nseatic League, and for a time t his defensive alliance protected the urban j u risdictions against encroachments by lo c al rulers and membe rs o f the landed ar istocracy . The Hanseatic Le ague was an association of north German and Baltic towns with agents a nd branch offices in ma ny other cou ntries . The league had develo ped in the twelfth and flourished from the thir teenth to the fifteenth cen tury. Its monopoly of the Baltic trade made it p owerful e nough during the fou rteenth centu ry to aid the towns' op po sit ion to local rulers and the s pecial exactio ns res u lting from dynastic struggles. At the same time, towns a nd mercantile associations sup ported the empire in the hope that a strong e mperor co uld defe nd them against the territorial princes. However, in t he fifteenth century, the economic i mportance of the H anseatic League decline d , a nd so did the polit ical s u pport w h ich the league had given to the towns allied with it A more e nd uring rise to power was characteristic o f the knightly class. The dependent min isteria les origina lly had aided the consolida tion of i mperial and of princel y rule, each in its own domains. But the social status of these d e pen d e nt men rose quickly w it h the demand for their administrative services. They received o ffices, lands, an d r igh ts. The d istinction between the old aristocracy, w hich had been com posed of free vassals of the prince (or the e mpe ror), and these n ew men" gradually d im inished as the latter became warriors and landlords (Ritter) in their own right. ,
.
"
•
Hon se Towns
a
Towns with Honse Trading Privil e ges
�
Possessions of the Teutonic Knight s
SWEDEN
LITHUANIA v"s/.
V/q
15>.
...
POLAND
IMPERIAL GERMANY AND PRUSSIA
149
This mean t a greater freedom , and all the ad va n tage s accr u i n g from a place in t he fe udal h ierarchy includi ng the right to e n feoff vas sals of their ow n, to ho l d courts, and even i n certain d i st ricts-fo r exa mple , Mecklenburg, Hol
st ein and the m arc h of Brandenburg-to tax their dependents. Thus the rise o f the mini,teriales, which in its early stages was sponsored by the princes, finally came to endanger the cohes ion of t h e Germ a n te r r i tor ies .. Procee ding in exac tly t he same wa y as the princes themselves, who had made feudalism
a n i n str u men t
for weake n ing the crown and securing th e ir own rise to power,
t he kn ightly class within the ter r i t orial states set out to u nderm ine the strict feudal rules governing felony, escheat, divisio n and aliena tion of fi efs , to shake off pe rsonal obliga tions, and to stabilize a n d con sol i d a te their own hold over t heir fie fs and offices.S
Thus, landed warriors rose to aristoc ratic status and develo ped common inte rests in opposing the special levies whic h territorial princes period ically made to finance the i r dynastic struggles in the empire. To p ress thes e interests on the ruler, they formed estate assemblies which re mained a formid able challenge to sove reign authority until the seven teenth century. The corporate state (Stiindestaat) of B randenburg was very different from a constitutional state. The people were subjects, not citizens, and hence without any political rights. The mass of the peasants were he reditary serfs renderin g com pulsory services on the estates of their lords, wh ile the townspeople-though formally free-were excluded from all political rights. Representation was the exclusive privilege o f the landed squirearchy a n d an oligarchy o f tow n m agistrates. The ruler's authority as well as that o f the landed squires consisted in patrimonial domination over the land and its people. Hence, all govern me ntal func tions were usable rights which could be sold or leased at will. For ex ample,judicial authority was a type of property. The person who bought or leased that property was entitled to adjudicate disputes and receive the fees and penalties incident to such adjudication. In the corporate principality, the estates represented their own interests and privileges. They we re lite rally the owners of local government in town and co untry. Landowners owned the power to police their estates and to settle dis putes among their tenants, just as the members of the town patriciate governed their commun ities as if these were private property . Thus, the ruling class of the corporate state in the margraviate (later electorate) of Brandenburg consisted of two parts. All owners of local pa trimonial authority on the land and in the towns re presented the "country," w hile the elector with his cou rt and government was the hereditary overlord. The so-called era o f princely rule began, then, with a period o f so cial trans formation in which not only the emperor but also the territorial rulers lost much of their former power. Dynastic stru ggles and the for tunes of the house of Luxe mburg, however, co ntin ued to a ffect the fate
of Brandenburg. In 1373 Emperor Charles IV had strengthened im
perial rule and secured Brandenburg for his son Wenceslas. When
Charles died in 1378, Wenceslas (1378-1400) was elected emPeror and Brandenburg passed to Wenceslas' half-brother Sigismund. In 1410 Sig
ismund (1410-1437) was elected emperor in turn. Under these sons of Charles IV, imperial rule weakened once more, and in Brandenburg
internal disputes became endemic. Feuding aristocratic families made
the area so unsafe that
an
e sta te assembly in Berlin petitioned Emperor
Sigismund for relief. In 1411 he appointed Frederick of Hohenzollern,
imperial burgrave of Nuremberg, to represent the Luxemburg house
as ruler of Brandenburg.9 Four years later, Sigismund invested Fred
erick (1415-1440) and his heirs with Brandenburg and the electoral
privilege in return for a payment of 400,000 gold gulden. Given the
anarchic conditions of Brandenburg, it is not surprising that cash seemed
more important to the emperor than a retention of the Luxemburg claim.
The right of sovereign auth ority over the electorate of Branden
burg seemed a dubious gain. Frederick I "found the princely estate prac
tically denuded of its goods and rights and all the castles, with the sole
exception of Spandau, in the possession of his subjects."lo Nevertheless,
the new elector had considerable means at his disposal. He used diplo
macy and strategic force in order to assert his authority. But his attempt
to claim all the rights of the Ascanian house provoked resistance, which
led to his defeat by local lords in alliance with the Pomeranians in 1425.
Frederick left Brandenburg in the hands of his sons, who en ga ged in protracted struggles with the towns, which were not effectively subdued
until the mid-fifteenth century. Against the estate assemblies of the
landed aristocracy, Frederick's successors were much less successful, and highway robbery by armed knights as well as periodic invasions by
neighboring powers left the country in almost perpetual turmoil. Time
and again, the Hohenzollern were obliged to pawn or sell their posses
sions and prerogatives in order to buy arms and men with whose help they .could establish a semblance of order. I
I
Thir; great strength of the local aristocracy was due in part to the
chcnginb position of the peasants. Under the exigencies of colonization,
landOl\(nt'rs had vied with one another to attract peasants -by offering them fa\-orable conditions. However, during the fifteenth century the
peasantry suffered major reverses as wars, plagues, and famines depop ulated the area and brought widespread poverty. Gradually, the land
lords enlarged their domains, a ppropriating peasant freeholds by evic tion
or
purchase.
Where
peasants
were
prevented from moving
elsewhere, they saw their proprietary rights revoked and their freedom
curtailed until they were bound to the soil, forced to render increasingly burdensome services and completely subjected to the jurisdiction of
IMPERIAL GERMANY AND·PRUSSIA th e ir lords .12 These mea s u res pa rtly made u p for the d i fficul ties ari si n g fro m the s parse settle m e n t of the lan d . At the same time, the price of co rn rose and the export o f grains i nc reased so that the landowners i m p ro ved their economic positio n . The landed aris tocr ac y o f northeastern Germany had been formidable warriors earlier. Now the y became grain ex p o r t in g landown e r s , the Junkers, w h o combined local administrative p ow er with a businesslike manage m e n t of the ir estat es . This combina ti on of i ncreasi n g wealth a n d local power buttressed t heir o pp os it io n to the Hohenzollern ru lers . Th rou g h their estate assemblies, these landed notables circum scribed the power of t h e e lectors of Brandenburg, j us t as the towns had limi ted the po wers o f loca l rul e rs during the p e a k o f the H an seatic Lea gue's influence.13 As the wealth derived from agri c ul ture gr adua lly increased, the landed aris tocracy also bega n to i ntervene in urban a f fairs; the Hohenzollern e lectors d id the same w hen they supported the sm all u rban patriciate i n its struggles with the m id d le-class or lower-class urban population. By the end o f the fifteen t h century , t he e lectors with the aid o f the squirearc h y s ucceeded in curbing the privile ges of taxatio n and j u risdi ctio n which the towns of Brandenburg and Pom erani a had enjoyed.14 Yet d u ring t h e sixteenth centu ry, t he Hohe nzol lern rulers fought unsuccess fully a ga i n s t the dom inant pos i tion of the landed a r istocracy. These large la ndowners pree m pted all local a uthority and en joyed a growi n g econ o m ic prosperity, ofte n won at the e x pense of the peasantry and of the econom ic and political position of t he town s . I S To be sure , the Hohenzollern rulers profited from their own extensive hold ings as conditions improve d , and they were as wil l i n g to gain a t the expense of peasan ts and towns as the other landowners o f the electorate . But the latter had won s u c h a strong posit ion economically, and through thei r estate assemblies politically, that u n til the begi n n i n g of the sev enteen th cen tury the Hoh e n zo l lern dynasty could ach ieve o n ly negoti ated settlements w ith t hese local magn ates . During the sixteen t h a n d seventee n t h centu ries , the Hohenzollern rulers were the large s t landowners in their realm and m anaged their domains like all other e state-owners. The wor ki ng ass u m ption was tha t the prince finances his co u rt from t h e yield of his d om a i ns a n d from the income accruing through governmental functions such as coinage, customs dues, and related prince ly prerogative s . Under ordinary cir cumstances, the court bud ge t and the "state b u d get" were indistinguish able. Only in emergencies or on special s tate occassio n s was it c ustomary that the "country" (the e state assemblies and the town s) would grant the ruler special levies, suc h as t hose requ ired by the e m pire to fight the Turks, or those occasioned by the marriage of a princess. The theoret ical bal ance between rulers a n d estates did not fu nction smoothly, and in the early sixteenth century i t hard l y functioned at all. U nder Joachim
Emperor Sigismund Invests Burgrave Frederick of Niimberg Emperor Sigismund is surrounded by Duke Ludwig of Saxony with a scepter, Duke Lud
wig of Bavaria-Heidelberg with a sword, and Duke Henry of Bavaria with the imperial
globe. Burgrave Frederick of Numberg, flag in hand, kneels opposite the emperor, at the head of his entourage. Below, the forces of the burgrave with their horses and stan
dards are shown. This formal act of in\"estit II re with the elec to r at e of Brandenburg occurred
in 1417 in Konstanz. (Chronicle of Ulrich von R ichc mh a l , Rosgartcnmuseum. Konstanz)
154
THE AUTHORITY OF KINGS
I I (1535-1571), the ruling house was near ba n k r u ptcy, and the estates agreed to ass ume its debts on co n d i tion that they would be en titled to ad min ister the tax s ystem; the ruler retai ned the ad m i n istration of his do main s. Under these circ u m stances, B randenb u rg, l i k e most other Ge rman territories, was incapable o f political action on the i n ternational sce ne. I nstead, these corporate principa l i ties were preocc upied wi th fa m i l y alli ances and fe uds, d i s pute settlement s , a n d the m a i n te n a nce of a hie rarc h ic socia l order.16 I n t he history o f B ra n denburg a n d the other Ho henzollern posses s i o n s , the Re fo rm a t ion and the T h irty Yea rs' War (1618-1648) proved to be the d ivid in g line be tween the part icularism o f a petty princ ipality and the emergence of the co untry as a E u ropean power. The Re fo r mation had special signi ficance for the concept o f a uthority in the Ho henzol lern dom ains. B y the end o f the fifteenth cent u ry , the rulers and the es tates of B randenburg had ac hieved a precario us bala nce of forces, but the e m pi re was in com plete d i sarray. Freq uent political crises and armed con flicts as well as widespread poverty thro u ghout the em pi re engendered attacks on the pa pacy, the great archbishops, and the high e r social classes whether they we re princes , aristocrats, or rich m e rchan ts. Since political conditions had approached a narchy for more than a century, men yea rned for s pi ritual com fort as wel l as civil peace. These desires as well as increasing poverty hel ped to foc us gen eral hostili ty on the Rom a n ch u rch and its wealth . This sentiment reve rberated t h ro ugho ut the empire despite its territorial divisions, a first intimation of national
feeli n g. L uther challenged Ro me i n the Witte nberg theses of 1517. His own concerns origi nated in a profo u nd religious e x pe rience. At the same time , Luther a p pealed to every man , fro m the princes to the co mmon peo ple, by espousing a religion of inward ex pe rience against s uch merely h u m a n i n stitutions as t he papacy, c h u rch cou ncils , and canon law. By translating the B ible from Latin i n to ve rnacular German, he bro ught religion close to the peo ple , and his program of religio us reform was a pplicable to all parts of the e mpire. Luther's manifesto of 1520, "To the Ch ristian nobility o f the German Nation o n the im prove me n t of the C h ristian cond ition ," called for a return to religious fundamentals and transcended s pecial political intel·ests. The re ign i n g emperor, however, was in no position to respond to these a ppeals . As head of the house of Habsburg based in Austria and as king of S pai n , C harles V (1519-1558) wo u ld have had to com promise h i s position o utside Germany i f he had placed himse l f at the head of a German opposition to Rome. Hence, the e m peror was determ ined to s u p press the reform movement. In 1521 Lut her was placed under an i mperial ban, wh ich provoked the protest of some very i n fl uential te rritorial rulers. E fforts to restore
IMPERIAL GERMANY AND PRUSSIA
155
u n ity failed, and a League of Pr otes t ant Princes was fo r med I n 1526 the Diet in S peyer declared that every principality in t he e m p i re sho uld follow its co ns c i ence on the eccles i as t ic al issue; th us d ec is ions c once rn i ng the reli gio us questi o n were t u r n e d over to each sepa rate t e r r itor y This re so l u t ion of 1526 was acce pted as the b a s is of the co mpro m ise of 1555 i n the Peace of A u gsbu r g Henceforth, each p rince was gi ven the r igh t to d ec id e the re l igion of h i s principal i ty; onl y heads of ecclesiastical s tates were not pe r mitted to cha n ge to the refo r m ed fa i th The pr i nc i pl e that each subject m us t a do pt the re l i gi o n of his pr i nce (cuius regio, eius religio) tr an sfo r m e d the old conce ption of k i ngship. Lu ther p robabl y had n o t i n tended to s u bordinate the c h u rch to sec u la r power, bu t the oppo si t io n o f C h a rles V and the social u n rest of the pe as a nts forced him to see k the help of the pri n ces. By o p p o sin g the j u rid i ca l institutions of Rome a n d p rea chi n g a pure l y spiri tual church, he con ceded that under God's will the sta te is th e form i n which the world exists. The great ma gn a tes of the church were great territorial rulers as well, and princes freq uent l y had enlisted the resources of the church in support of th eir territorial power. But while the relations between princes and the church had always been close, Luther now e n dowed the aut h o ri ty of the state with a rel igious h a lo i t h ad prev i o u sly lacked. By hol di n g the s ec ul a r ruler respo nsibl e for the or ganizatio n of the ch u rc h Luther mad e th e i nd i v idual s s u b mi ss ion to aut h o rit y into a re ligi o us obliga tion and thus added an aura of sancti ty to th e a uthori ty of the prince. In its own way, however, the Lu ther a n position was as equivocal as the Catholic. Pope Gelasius had arg ued for the suprem acy of the ch urch over all secular powe r and that clai m had been given a spiritua l basis by d o c umen tin g th e apostolic succession from St. Peter to the bish o p of Rome. Thereafter, the problem had been how ki n g s could be con secrated as God's Anointed and yet su bordi nate their supreme author i ty in all matters affecting the sacred (such as baptism, marriage, a nd dea th ) to the j urisd ictio n of the church. P ro testan t kingship posed a different di lemma All affairs of this world exist under God's will, incl udin g the state un de r th e a ut ho rity of kings. Yet Luther was no more w ill i n g tha n the papacy to abandon spirit u al matters to a me rely s ecula r j u r isd i ction In his view there were two kingdoms, one of mercy and love, the other of anger and punishment. .
,
.
.
.
,
'
,
"
"
.
.
But since they were both willed by God, a Christian had to fulfill his duty in both realms. The contrast was eased by knowledge that the secular order was not only a penalty for sin, but also contained promise of ultimat e mercy. Since government made dissemination of the Word possible, and thereby access to salvation, this instrument of God's world rule was surrounded by a certain Christian aura after all. The whole conception led to a characteristic dichot omy in ethics. A true Christian was bound by his conscience to an ethics of
THE AUTHORITY
Martin Luther and the Wittenberg Reformers
OF
KINGS
in the foreground (from left to Melanchton. The most prominent figure
This 1543 painting by Lucas Cranach the Younger shows
right) Luther, the elector of
Saxony,
is that of the elector John Frederick,
Zwingli, and
an apt symbol of the Reformer's dependence on secu lar power. John Frederic k and his family protected Luther personally, sheltering him in their castles after he refused to recant his heretic-al Wittenberg theses. (Gift of Edward Drum
mond
Libbey,
Toledo Museum of
love, but as
a
Art)
prince or o r dina r y officeholder he had to adhere to the secular
law. The e n s u i n g conflict o f heart was harmonized by the assurance that pres enation of the natural order was ordained by God, and consequently ad hering to the secular o r de r
was a
service to Him and to one's neighbor. In
this perspective Luther could call strict ex ec u t io n of the la w by relentless fighting on the part of
a
a
prince,
soldier, true worship of God. t 7
or
IMPERIAL GERMANY AND PRUSSIA
1 57
T he k i ng or soldier was enjoi ned to do God' s work by facilitating t he ch urc h's e fforts to guide a n d sustain eac h i n d i vid ual's abidi n g faith in h is G od .g The Lutheran fai t h of the people p rovided the H o h e nzo l lern rulers wi th a religious j usti fication o f their a u t hority, but the actual assertion of th at au thority was the i n d i rect res u l t o f wa r. I m pe rial Ge rma n y had be en e ngul fed by re l i gious and poli tical co n t roversies d u ring the six teent h cen t u ry, and by 1 618 a w a r broke o u t that was to last for thi rty years and involve the m ajor E u ro pean powers . The eco no m ic and po litical d isloca tion s caused by t he war greatly weakened all segme nts of the pop ulation , and the w hole period was marked by eco nomic d e pres sion. B randenbu rg was alternatel y occ u pied by I m pe r i a l Ge rm an or by Swedish mercenaries as the fortunes of war fl uctuate d . In many towns, one-hal f to one-third of the ho uses were destro ye d . Destruction i n m uch of the Electorate was so se ve re that it took a century for t he po p u l a t io n to regai n its prewar size . I s E co n o m ical ly , the most da magi n g as pect o f this destruction was t h e w id e s p re ad devastation o f peasa n t ho l d in g s . Many peasant families d i s a ppeare d , and after the war t he i r u n occupi ed ho l din gs were a bs o r b ed by the large estates . I 9 Th e s e u phea vals inadvertently fa v o r ed ad m in i strative centraliza tion. The Hohenzollern te rritories we re scatte red (except for B randen bu r g) , but d u rin g the sixteenth centu ry the Hohenzollern rulers had a d ded to their holdings by a series of d yn astic marria ges wh ic h in volved them in relations wit h t he m � o r powers . E ve n then, they d id n ot assume an act i ve role in Euro pean powe r po l i t ics as long as the Thirty Years' War e n g u l fe d their territories . The elector George William ( 1 6 1 9- 1 640) re s id ed i n faraway (East) Prussia, while h is home province o f B ran den burg was occu pied by Swedish troo ps from 1 627 on w a r d . h He actual l y "In 1 6 1 3 one of the Hohenzolle rn rulers o f B randenburg converted t o the Re formed (Calvinist) faith, while the population of his domains remained predominantl y Luthera n . When Elector Johann Sigism und of B randenburg ( 1608-1619) made h i s Calvinist faith public, his step aroused considerable discontent and the elector conceded religious liberty to his subjects by abandoning the atte m pt to proselytize. For an a n a lysis of the political and religious ramifications o f Johann Sigism und's conversion, see Otto Hintze, "Calvinism an d Raison d'Etat in Early Seventeenth Century Brandenburg," in Historical Essays. pp. 88-154.
hThe term Prussia was originally the name of a tribal country on t he sou theastern coast of the Baltic Sea , rou ghl y between the Vistula and the Memel. Prussians were the pagan settlers in this area who resisted Christian ization u n til the thi rteenth century, when the kn ights of the Teutonic Order were invited to assist the Christian mission and were authorized by the Hohenstau fen em peror to settle the cou ntry. As noted earlie r. the order, based on the discipli ned development and organ ization o f its territories, became a majo r contender for power with M uscovy. The order su ffered a major defeat in 14 1 O and de clined thereafter; it was formally dissolved in 1 525 . As the order declined, parts of Prussia came under Polish sovereignty, while other pa rts were held as a fief of the Polish crown
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
bene fi ted from th is mil itary occu pa tion, because the po l i t ical and eco nomic position of the lan ded aristocracy decl ined and its power to o p pose h i m weakened. The elector a lso i n c reased h i s m il itary pre parations, and h i s s uccessor Frede rick William ( 1 640- 1 688) u sed h is e m e rgency powers d u e to participatio n in t he war be tween Swed e n and Pol a nd fro m 1 655 to 1 660 to raise the reve n ues needed for the m i l i tary establ i s h ment . 2 0 These st rategies we re e m i ne n t l y succes s fu l . In 1 640 , w h e n t h e " G reat Elector" Frederick William came t o power, total reve n ue amo u n ted to one m i l lion Tale r ; by the time o f h is death in 1 688 it had tri ple d . Duri n g the same period the s i ze o f h i s stan d i n g army increased fro m 4,500 to 30,000.2 t P r ior to these develo pments, armies had bee n rec ruited o n l y in wartime and d isbanded when hostilities ceased. Fred e r ick W i l l iam introd uced the p r i nc i ple of a standing army i n peace time. To meet t he cost o f that army and other increased ex pe nses , a regular tax was im posed -in place of the �pecial lev ies for the maintenance of troops w h ic h had s u fficed prior to the seventee nth cen t u ry . i By these changes, t h e Hohenzollern rulers initiated -the creation of a u n i fied state w h ich was accom plished against the will o f the estate as semblies.22 The Thirty Years' War had undermined the ability of the estates to resist this "revol ution from abo ve . " Eve n tual ly, the estate as semblies condoned the elector's unilate ral actions in the m i litary and fi scal fields, and " i n return" Frederick Willia m reco n fi rmed a n d in c reased the status privileges and local authority o f the sq u i rearchy at the e x pense of the towns. At the same time, he fi rmly excl uded t he estates from the i r previous preem ption of such sovereign functions as control of the tax syste m , partic i pation in fore i gn a ffairs , and others. In 170 1 Prussia became a k i n gdom, and by 1 704 the new political system was com plete. That year marked the last meeting in which a Prussian assemby t he Telllon ic Order under its gra n d master, A l bert o f H o h e n zo l lern . I n 1 6 1 8 Ducal P r ussia pa ss ed t h ro u g h in heritance to the H o h e n zo l lern e lector o f Bra ndenbu rg, con t rib
lIl i n g to t he r ise o f the H ohenzo l lern m o n a rc h y as a g reat E u ro pean power. By m i l i tary
i n terven tion in the Swed i s h - Polish war of 1 65 5 - 1 660, Fre de r i c William of B randenburg
( "The G reat E lector") ended Po lish soverei gnt y over Ducal Prussia at the Peaee o f Oliva. In th is w a y , the H o h enzollern rulers beca me sove re igns o f Ducal Prussia, w h ich forma l l y re m a i ned o u tside the Ge rman e m pire. P m ssia su bse q ue ntly became the name o f a l l t h e H o henzo l le rn posse ssions t h ro u ghout Ge r m a n y . I s h a l l u s e t he t e r m i n t h is l as t extended
se nse fOl" t h e pe riod a fter 1 6 1 8.
iA few details w i l l h e l p to unde rscore the s i g n i ficance of fOI·e i gn rela tions fo r t hese
m ajor c h a n ges in the i n ternal dist ribu tion of powe r . D u r i n g the 1 640s a n d 1 65 0s , the e�tates of Cleve - M a r k still retai ned t h e i r right to e n t e r i n to d i rect d i plomatic negotiations w i t h fo reign powers. This right was fo rma l l y abo l i s hed i n 1 66 1 . S i m i l a r l y , the right o f the
estates to con voke asse m blies on t h e i r own i n itiat i ve was abo l i s he d at various times d uring
t h i s pe riod . The G reat Elector lI sed the st a n d i n g arm y as a major weapon to ach ieve t h is victor)' o ve r the estates, b u t in doi n g so he d e pe n ded on fi nancial s u bsidies from foreign powers in order to m a i n t a i n t h a t a rm y . See Otto H i n t ze,
Hohellzollem Ulld ihr
Werk, p . 22 1 .
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THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
1 60
bly (Landtag) gave its fo rmal co n se n t 10 t he !'eve n ue to be assessed in t he ru ral areas, There a fte r, taxes were assessed and col lected witho ut for mal con se n t . Subseq uent meas u res of ad m i n i strative reorga n ization and cent ralization consolidated monarchical rule, The sta n d i n g army had beco me the prime instrume n t of t he r u ler's a ut ho r i ty , 2 3 This new m ilitarism le ft an e n d ur i n g i m pri n t o n Prussian society, � I ost c i t ies became ga r rison tow n s ; t he cava l ry was o ften q u a rt e red in the co u n t ryside Co m pu lso r y b i l l e t i n g o f m i l i t a ry perso n nel bec a m e a pe r m a n e n t b u rden. A stan d i n g a r m y mea n t re gular taxatio n , a major fac t o r i n underm i n i ng the e a rl ier i n d e pendence of estate assem blie s wh i c h had bee n based o n t h e i r abi l i ty to grant or wi t h hold s pecial lev ies . In t h e town s as we l l as the co u n t r y side, the local ad m i n istration of tax co llection and of the police was re placed b y ce ntrally organ ized war com m issariats. On royal in itiative, the old - fashio ned regional patriar chalism was re placed by a cen tral b u reaucracy and its age nts, who abru ptly disregarded local traditions. The res ult was a growing antag o n i sm between the old sq u i rearc h y a n d the new monarc h y , lasting t h ro u gh the fi rst decades of the eigh teent h ce ntury. In his po litical tes tament of 1 72 2 , Frederick W i l l iam I stil l cal led the J u n ke rs the most d a n ge ro u s foes of the monarc h y , but by the accession of Frederick I I i n 1 7 40 a n acco m modation had bee n reac hed. The estate assemblies no longe r asserted an independent po l i t ical positio n , a n d members of the aristocracy entered state se rvice in increasi n g n u m bers . At the same time, the monarchy supported the pri\'ileged position of the aristocracy in state and society . The com pa tibility of that su pport with royal pre ro gative increased because the Prussia n rulers a s well as their aristocratic fol lowers acce pted t he personal obligation to serve the state . T his acco m modation be tween monarc h y and aristocracy was as sisted by t he Re formed faith, whic h inc u lcated a sen se of duty. The Prus sian territories we re predo m i nantly Lutheran, and the Hohenzo l lern r ulers u pheld the princ i ple of religious toleration . An u ndogmatic, in w a rd piety became popular and ens ured that religious q uestion s would remain non political, while the idea o f service to a H ighe r Power but tressed the soc ial order. Pe rhaps not h i n g shows t his political q u iescence as well as the lite ratu re of the eightee n t h century in w h ic h the ideali zation of pious feeling and moral rectitude precluded all assertion of individ uality, even a gainst the most blatan t inj ustice . 2 4 Under Frederick William I ( 1 7 1 3 - 1 740), the build- u p of Prussia's mil ita �y m i ght, adm i nistrative organ izatio n , and b ud ge tary surplus were im pressive, tho ugh the co untry's policies remained peaceful. I n 1 740 this situation changed abru ptly when Frederick I I ( 1 740- 1 786) occu pied S ilesia and preci pitated the fi rst Silesian war ( 1 740- 1 742). The al l iances between Prussia and France aga i n st Austria and England indi cated that Prussia had beco me a major E u ro pean power. Subseq uently , .
161
IMPERIA L GERMANY A ND PR USSIA
A us tri a, France, and Russia formed a de fensive all iance agai nst Prussia, bu t Frederick retained the i n it iative by i n va d i n g Saxo n y a n d th u s pre c i p i ta ted t he Seven Years' War ( 1 756- 1 7 63 ) . The peace of H u bertu s burg ( 1 763) con fi r m ed Pru s s ia's possession o f S i le s i a but not o f Saxo n y Although this assured it s new position a s a great power, the p ro l o n ged war ha d impoveris h ed the co u n tr y . Hence fo rt h , Prussia's p o sit i o n de pe n de d o n i ts stan d i n g a r m y o f 200 , 000 me n , a n d a l l e f fo rts to inc rease th e prosperity of the c o u n try were de s i gned to s u pport t h i s m i l i tar y es tablishment. Fre d e r ick I I i n t ro d u ced meas ures of reconstruction . He se ttled 300,000 colo n i sts i n t h e s parse l y po p u lated easte rn par t s of his territorie s . He sought to fu rth e r the m a n u factu re o f text i les, pottery , and glass ; he promoted tra d e and banking, t i ghte n ed u p taxa t io n , and regular i z ed the j udi c iary by fore go i n g all pe rso n a l i nt e rfere nce with it. He also sought to reco ncile co n flict i n g i n terests be twe e n rich and poor by regulations d e s i gne d to kee p the price o f gra i n s at a middle leve l . Under Frederick's reign , t he Prussian state w a s based o n a legally de fined division of labor :
.
The aristocracy furnished t h e officers fo r t he army ; t herefo re it was allowed
e xclusive possession o f kn i g h t l y estates t he foo t so l di e rs and paid t h e land tax
(R ittergii ler) . The peasantry (Konlribution) ; t h erefo re the
fu rn ished e nc losure
of peas an t holdi n gs was pro hibited a n d care was taken to give adm inistra t i ve protection to the peas a n ts. Tow n -reside n ts h a d t h e e xc l u s i v e right to e n gage in t ra de a n d man u fact u re : t h is was the fore all trade and m a n u fact u re
was
sou rce
of t he sales tax
(A kzise) ;
t h e re
restricted to t he tow ns and competi tion
in the countrysi de was p ro h i bi ted. 2 S
Under the reign o f Frederick William II ( 1 7 86- 1 7 9 7 ) , this s p i ri t o f a fully regulated social order was articulated i n a com pre he n s i v e legal code (A llgemeine Landrecht , 1 794). But the s uccessors of Frederick I I were un able to maintai n the momentum h e had i m parted to the c um bersome mac hinery of the state . Witho ut this cen tral im pulse, Prussia stagnated until it collapsed u nder the o n sla u gh t of N a po leon's arm ies in 1 806. These antecedents o f I m pe rial Germany and the Hohenzoller n do mains can be com pared with the develo pments considered th us far. I. The legitimation o f a uthority offers the most striki ng contrasts, both within C h ristianity and between the Western and Japanese con ceptions o f kingship. The rulers of the Holy Rom an E m pire acq u ired their im perial title thro ugh consecration by the po pe . By this act, the church claimed and the em peror acknowled ged the s upremacy of the pope in all matters pertain i n g to God ' s law . Since the c h u rch was a great sec ular power, it could press this claim in po l i tical a ffairs whe neve r its institutional interests were in vo lved . The Re fo r m ation rejected this Catholic claim to supremacy by putting the orga n i zation of God' s m in-
THE AUTHORITY
OF KINGS
istry i nto the hands of t he sec u la r rul er. All rulers o f the Re formed fa i th were st i I I u n der God' s law and obl i ged to abide by H is word , but now their own sec u l a r r u l e was i tsel f evidence of fai t h . They were ch arged w ith pro tectio l l o f the m in i st ry b u t t he Protesta nt c h u rch d id not claim a spiritual su premac y over the sec u l a r ruler. The Greek Ort hodox fai t h resembles the Protesta nt in some res pects , f o r it a l so put t h e orga n i za tion o f God 's m i n istry i n to the ha n d s of the sec ul a r r u ler. But the Prot estant e m ph as i s o n t he Bible, the i n d i vid ual's fa it h , and the com m u n i t y of be l ievers was closer to ea rl y C h risti a n i t y and i ts con t rovers ies. By con trast , the Gree k Orthod o x em phasis on t he rece i ved fai t h underscored t h e blessi n gs o f holi ness and the sac red ness of trad i t i o n , w h i c h d isco ur aged theolo gical argu ment. Bot h i n ter pretations allowed for a religio us j u st i fi c a t i o n of u nchecked sec ular rule, but German Protestant rulers also allowed for the eme rge nce o f re ligio u s toleratio n . A l l three C h ristian inte rpretations are quite d i fferent fro m the re l i gion of J a pan . S h intoism so ught m a n ' s harmony with nature t h rough the med iation of a ncestral spirits. In J a pa n , t he starting- poi nt of rul ersh i p was the a p peal to these s pi rits on be ha l f of the clan a nd the com m u n ity as a whole . I n Western C h r istian i t y , t he start ing-po i n t of rul ershi p was the claim to be the sec ular re prese ntative of C h r ist o n earth, however d i fferently that claim was a u t hen ticated . Ja panese religio u s be l i e fs permitted the idea of one d i v i ne im perial l ineage t h ro ugho u t the co u n try's history ; the C h r istian trad i t ion precluded this fiction , s i nce a co n t i n uous prese nce througho u t n a tu re a n d h istory is sole l y an attribu te of God. Finall y . the Ja panese e m pe ror remained the s ymbol o f wors h i p and a rtis tic excellence even a fter he lost all secular authority; by contrast, the German em peror became a s hadowy fi g u re as he lost a u t hority, fo r the center o f Catholic c u l t u re re mained i n Rome while German culture beca me as fragmen ted and derivative from fore ign models as its political order. 2. The German e m pire never ach ieved pol i t ical u n ity. I m perial Ger m a n y lacked the forces that promoted poli tical u n i fication in Russia. The Mo n gols had an i n terest i n a Russian capability of defendin g the western frontiers against Te uto n ic a n d Lithuanian attacks. The Mongols also favored the Orthodox ch u rc h , w h ich gave its ideological and even t u ally its i nstitutional su pport to u n i fied rule. These forces co unte racted the tendency toward political fragmen tation which had been present in the ste ppe areas of Kievan Russia. Political fragmentation was e ndemic in feudalism, especially in underpo pu lated frontier areas, an d I m perial Germany was no exce ption . For six ce n t u ries, fro m Pe pin's anointment in 7 5 1 to the Golde n B ull of 1 3 56, t he pa pacy e nco u raged divisive forces in German society, wh ile t he German e m pe rors divided their attention between their Italian and German possession s. These pa pal and i m pe rial policies m il itated against the unity of the H ol y Roman e m pire. ,
IMPERIAL GERMANY AND PR-USSIA 3. B y the begi n n i n g. o f the eighteenth cen t u ry, the Hohenzollern had eliminated t he estate assem blies o f the aristocracy, while safe rs le ru gu a rd ing its local preem i n ence I n Prussia, aristocratic landlords re ma ine d m asters over t h e i r own domains . To some exte nt, this devel op ment paralleled the Russi a n , where the boyar duma had p l ayed a m ajor ro le in the K i evan pe riod but w he re this asse mbly and the i n d e pendence of p rinc es and bo yars had declined with the fi n a l asce n d ance o f M us covi te rule. I n both co u n tries , a servitor aris tocracy deve l o ped . B u t whe reas i n Russia, local a u t ho r i t y i nc reas i n gl y c a me into t h e ha nds o f mili ta ry com manders, p rov incial go vernors, or the i r corru pt age nts, Pru ssian local govern m e n t retained a greater degree of autonom y . In the early u n i fication of the H o h e n zo l l ern do m a i n s , the d u ties of local ad m in istration had been assigned to wa r com m is sars . But as these d u ties were ex panded by royal ed ict, a new office of Landrat was inaugu rated to which such duties were assigned. The Lan d rat de pended on i nstruc tions from the cen tral go vernment, but h e was also a lo.:: a l notable elected by the estate ass e m b l y of the county (Kreis) a n d t hen appo i n ted by the k i n g. Moreover, in the fields of c redit policy and justice, local estate assemblies (Kreistage) contin ued to have influence, e ven after au tocratic power had dest royed their ea rlier political functio n s . 2 6 4. T h e Hohe n zolle rn rulers favored the aristocracy at the ex pe nse of the towns and the peasants, but i m posed considerable bu rden s of military service on the aristocracy as well . I n the seventeen t h and eigh teenth centuries, the Prussian rule rs also im posed austerity on their own household which legitimated the service d emanded o f the aristoc racy -an attitude derived in part from the Calvinism o f the H ohenzollern. Such austerity stood in striki n g contras t to the con s picuous luxuries characteristic of court li fe in other co untries. In Prussia, austerity at the co urt was for a time as m uc h a symbol of national identity as the c ulti vation o f art and manners had been at Kyoto. 5. By the beginning of the eighteenth centu ry, the Prussian rulers had developed a new corps of officials of heterogeneous origins. They were pr i m arily de pendent on the king and assisted him i n harnessing the count ry's resou rces for military purposes , including the personal and financial contributions of the arbtocracy . As a result, Pruss ian so ciety was characterized by institutional ized opposition between auto cratic, monarchical government and the locally dominant, landed aris tocracy. In Russia; by contrast, all m ajor govern mental pos i tio n s were staffed by aristocratic placemen, whose social a n d political position ( i f not also t heir wealth) depe nded on their hereditary service-ra n k i n the governmen t . I n this case there was less institution al ized opposition be tween monarchical government and aristoc racy, because in the co u rse of its rise the Muscovite state had destroyed the hereditary i nde pen dence of princes and boyars. .
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
Central authority e merged i n Prussia o n ly i n the seventee nth cen tury, a development lo n g de layed by autonomous estate assemblies . For a t i m e , the s ubord i nation of to w ns and aristocrats to their pri ncel y ruler was largely n o m i n a l . In a second phase, the Hohenzo l lern dynasty es tab l i s hed m i l itary and po l i t ical s u premacy ove r the estates by ex ploitin g i n ternatio nal invo lvements, especially the devastation of the T hirty Years' Wa r. Hencefo r t h , the landed aristoc racy enj oyed locaL a u t hority, b u t was strictly excluded from national a ffa i rs . Moreover, aristoc ratic status came to be assoc iated d i rect l y w i t h ser vice in the officer corps of a large and powerfu l m i l itary estab l i s h m e n t . U n t il abo u t 1 74 0 , aristocratic sta t u s was not tied to positions in the c i v i l se rvice, since o ffic ials under the Hohe n zo l lern ru lers were freq uentl y rec ruited fro m bou rgeois fa m i l ies , o fte n from areas o u tside Prussia and with spec ia l em phasis on the i r Cal vin ist fai t h i n co n trast to the Lu theran pers u asio n of the Pruss ian po p u lation ge neral ly.2 7 FRO M I N D E P E N DENT K N I G HTS TO LANDED ARMY O FFICERS The H o he n zol lern rule of B randenburg had begun i n 1 4 1 5 when t h e new rulers were con fronted with a country dominated by armed warriors who made the co un try u n safe fo r towns and merchants and who were q u ite unwill i ng to submit to hi ghe r au t hority Po litical disor der co ntin ued for m uch of the fi fteenth and s i x teenth centuries u ntil c ha n ges i n econo m ic conditions, the Re formatio n , and the i m pact of the Thi rty Years' War weakened the aristoc racy and facil itated Hohenzol lern s u premacy. Thereafter, the Pruss i an mil i tary establis h m e n t became the mainstay of monarch ical rule and a m aj or instrument in making d yn astic in te re s t pre v ail over the i n terest of the provin cial a r i s tocracy. The army increased fro m 40,000 i n 1 7 1 3 to 235,000 in 1 8 0 6 , when it co m prised some 1 6 percent o f t he el i gi ble m ale po pula t ion . In 1 740 the army included every twenty fi fth pe rson in the po pula t io n in co n trast to France w hose army includ e d one of eve r y one h u n d red and fi fty. In terms of the size of its army, Prussia ran ked third or fou rt h a mong the E u ro pean powe rs, but ten t h in t erms o f territory and thirteenth in terms o f po p ulatio n . 2 8 With a s ta n d ing army as a p r i m e instr u me n t of dynastic policy, the Hohen zo l lern ruler saw to it that the o fficers we re large l y rec ruited from aristocratic fam ilies. In the early e i ghteenth century, when elsewhere in E u rope an aristocratic ed ucation included the "grand tou r" of E uropean capitals, the sons of the Prussian aristoc racy we re denied the righ t to travel abroad, let alone to e n te r the service of a foreign ruler. Violators we re threate ned with confiscation of thei r pro pe rty and s t i gma t ized as deserters Even retired army office rs were barred from fore i gn trave l .
-
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,
,
IMPERIAL GERMANY AND PR USSIA pe ti t ions fo r exe m p t io n from se rvice by young aristocrats were re s u m m aril y . 2 9 Attendance at fore ign u n ive rs ities was pro h ibited o n pe n alty o f bein g den ied e m ploym e n t in Prussia, and parents of so n s e li gib le for m il i t a ry se rvice, who were abroad be fore the p ro h ib ition , we r e instructed to req uest their ret u r n . The m o n a rch y w as symbo l ical ly id e n tified with the i d e a l o f m i l itary ser vice. The king pe rson a l l y d e ter m in ed w h ich yo u n g aristoc rats were to be called up fro m lists o f e l i gible o fficer candidates pre pare d for each a rea . The Hohe n zo l lern r u le rs also made i t their practice to d o n a m i litary u n i form a n d e n ter personally in to m a n y details o f m il i ta r y o r ga n izatio n . The co nseq uences o f these policies fo r t h e aristoc rac y are re flected in t he changing size and co m positi o n of the Prussian officer c o r p s. From 1 ,030 in 1 6 8 8 , the n um ber of o fficers i n c reased to 3 , 1 1 6 i n 1 740, 5 ,5 1 1 in 1 786 , a nd between 7 ,000 a n d 8 , 000 in the first decade o f the n i n e tee n th c e n t u r y . I n 1 739 a l l ge nerals were fro m a r is tocratic fa m ilies, and out o f 2 1 1 staff o ffice rs only I I were co m mo ne r s . A t a time when the mili t ar y forces o f Euro pe were largely m erc e n a r y a n d o f m o t le y co m a nd
j ec te d
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Prussian Militarism Personified Frederick William I ( 1 7 1 3- 1 740) gave h is special attention to a guard regiment of 2,400 men w ho had to be at least six feet tall. Young peasants meeting this quali fication we re often
recruited by force and t he annual cost of maintaining the guard regiment eq ualed the cost of 1 0,000 ordinary soldiers. When the king was i I I or depressed, he would have two or t hree hundred of these grenadiers march through his bed room to cheer him u p . (Archiv De utscher Militarverlag)
1 66
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
positio n , Frederick William I ( 1 7 1 3 - 1 74 0 ) had succeeded in making th e o fficer cor ps exclusively Prussian a n d aristocratic. By 1 740 even tw o th irds of the e n l i sted men we re native Prussia n s , wh ile the rest we re foreign merce n a ries. The fact that h a l f the staff o fficers of the cor ps of e n gi n eers we re o f bo u rgeo is origi n only re flected the aristocratic d i sda i n fo r learn i n g and tec h n ical wo r k . O ffice rs o f n o n aristoc ratic backgro u n d re mained in se parate , " lower class" u n its even when their n um be r in creased te m porarily, as i t did d u ri n g the Seve n Yea rs' War ( 1 756- 1 763).
B y t h e begi n n i n g o f the n i ne teenth century, there were only 695 n on a r is toc ratic o fficers i n a corps o f ove r 7 ,000. 3 0 T he aris toc rac y of the o fficer co r ps re presented the to p ra n k o f Prussian society, symbol ized b y t h e u n i fo r m worn b y o fficers a n d ruler a l i k e . O fficers were favored over civilians in m atters of preced e nce, even low-ra n k i n g o fficers w ho were aristoc rats over high-ran k i n g civilian o f ficials who were also aristocrats. Moreover, o fficers were express l y fo r bid d e n to have soc ial relatio n s with persons of lower status than them sel ve s . O fficers enjoyed the privilege that they would be judge d only by their peers; a righ t which se parated them fro m the population at large . Moreover , u n der Frederick I I ( 1 74 0 - 1 786), special edic ts forbade aris toc rats to establish a business in the tow n s or enter a pro fessio n ; thus, the only careers available to them were i n t he officer cor ps , t he civil se rvice, and landowners h i p. Service in the m ilitary was the most tem pt i n g, in part because distinguished service in wartime was considered a basis for promotion i n ran k , and indeed for eievation to t he aristocracy in the case of nonco m m i ssioned o fficers from m iddle-class fam ilies. An ideology of " honor" m ade the o fficer cor ps the s u preme e m bodiment of an aristocratic way o f l i fe . T h e m i l i tary establishment i m posed a great burden o n t h e soc iety as a w hole. In the seventeenth century, the Prussian territories with a po p ulation of one million people pa id nearly twice as m uch per head to s u pport the military establishment as their more prosperous French conte m poraries . 3 1 I n the co urse of the eighteenth century , these expen ditures rose to two-th irds of total public reve n ue . 32 To hel p meet the cost of h i s policies, Frederick William I greatly extended the royal do mains and increased the ir prod uctivity. Royal purchases of encumbered estates d i m i n i shed the total holdings o f the aristocracy , and tenancy on the royal domains specifically excluded aristocrats in favor of common e rs , both mea s u res con ti n u i n g that monarchical encroac h ment o n aris tocratic priv i lege w h ic h had c h aracterized the seven teenth ce ntury. By 1 740 the royal domains consti tuted one-third of the arable lands and fo rested areas of the state ; i ncome from them had almost do ubled since 1 7 1 3 . I n come from the royal domains con tribu ted about one-hal f of to tal public reven ue , but the re maining burden on the population was se vere , amounting to some 40 pe rce n t of the net i nco me of pe asant hol d-
IMPER IAL GERMAN Y AND PR USSIA
ings. To avoid internal debts o r external po litical liabilities, a con side rable p ortion of this income was save d . B y 1 74 0 some ei g h t mill ion Taler had accu m ulated, more than one m i l lion in excess of the total a n n u al b u dget o f the state . 3 3 T h e m ilita ry es t abl i s h me nt i m po sed he av y direct a n d ind i rect bur on the aristocrac y To be s u re , k n ightly e states (Riuergilter) w e re ns de pted fro m t he land tax, e x c e pt in a p rovi nc e l i ke East Prussia w h e re m e ex Frederick William 1 con solid ate d various d irect taxes a n d e l i m i nated the tax e xe m ptions of the aristocracy. In B ra n d e n b u r g a n d Ma gdeburg, d es pite su bstan ti a l resistance, he m a nag e d to en force a new tax which was c alcu l ated in terms of the n u m be r of ho rses d ue fro m each es t a t e Whe n aris tocrats had ad ded i n debted or d ese rted peasant lan d s to their ow n esta tes, t hese lands w e re taxabl e . Per h aps more i m portant were the ind irect burdens which the aristocracy co uld not evade . Landowners we re hel d liable for the req u ired contribu tio n s o f their peasan ts if the latter de faulted. A heav y sales tax i m po sed on the cities greatly i ncreased the price of goods bo ught by the aristoc rac y . Payments to o fficers on active d uty were so m i n imal that they requ i red con siderable su p ple mentation from their families i f they were to co m pete s ucc e ssfu l l y in advancing their m ilitary c areers . Finally, the heavy demands made on the peasants became a major economic liability fo r the econom y of landed e s tates. Large n um be rs of peasants were recruite d for m il i tary service, and the peasan ts w h o remained on the land were required to perform a great many personal services in con nection with military s u p plies and t h e billeting of soldiers . Both practices diminished the availa b le work force, es pecially in times of war. It is not surprising t hat these pol icies caused resistance or evasio n , pro m pting Frederick William I to de nounce the thickheaded recalcitrance of the aristocracy i n h is pol i t ic a l testament of 1 72 2 . The cultu ral impact o f militarism was far reach i n g Yo u n g aristo crats who we re called to the colors co uld ex pect to re main on military duty for decades. To advance in rank req uired so m a n y years that a captain or colonel would return to his estate o n l y at the age o f fifty. I n times of war, even retired o fficers had to serve with the m ilitia. In 1 724 the landed aristocracy of Pomerania consisted with few exce ption s of officers or former officers, a n d in two counties (Kreise) of East Prussia, office rs and former officers re presented 57 and 63 percen t of the total numbe r of a ris tocrats.34 In E ngland, as we shall see , the squ i rea rchy became u rbanized to a certain exte n t with the developme n t of a London "season" and the establi s h m e n t of town residences by lead ing families of the ru ral gentry. In Prussia so me u rbanization also occ u rred, but without comparable effects on manners and outloo k . A ristoc rats who spent part or all of thei r l ives as u rban residents did so as o fficers or civil servants. In the Prussian towns, the economy de pe nded to suc h an .
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1 68
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
extent on the presence of m i l itary pe rson nel stationed in garrisons that publ ic reve n ue derived fro m a tax on con s u me r goods (A kzise) dec l i ned by one-th ird w he never the a r m y was on the march . A m o n g the po pu lation o f Berli n d u ri n g the eightee n t h ce n t u ry , the proportio n of m i l i t a ry pe rson nel was never less than 20 pe rce nt. A n d i f rec ruits and of ficers on leave are i nc l uded , the m i l itary constit u ted over 40 pe rce nt of t h e B e r l i n res idents. a s U n der these circ u m st a nces, t he u rban res idence of Prussian aris tocrats did l i ttle to encou rage the u rbane manne rs w h ich characterized t h e co u rt soc iety of E n gland a n d France. Not that i n trigues, i n flue nce pedd l i n g , a n d fie rce co m pe titio n were wanting. B u t in the Pru ss ian tow n s , aristocratic officers e ncou raged a m i l i tary be aring, a n a u t hori tarian manner, and at best an idea l i zation o f service which would have bee n o u t of place in the pol i te soc iety of Lo ndon or Versailles. The u r ba n izatio n o f the Pr ussian and the E n glish ar istocracies d i ffered as m uch as d ynastic m ilitarism and ad m i n i strative ce ntralization d i ffered from parl iame ntary su pre m acy and o l i garch ic place-h unting at �ou rt. I n the course o f the eigh tee n th century, Prussian militarism un derm ined the econom ic fortunes o f m a n y aristocratic landowners , even when d y nastic policies came to their aid as u nder the re ign o f Frederick I I ( 1 740- 1 7 86 ) . The economic dec l i ne o f the landed aristocracy would res u l t in a c ha n gi n g soc ial com pos ition o f the army, the bureaucracy, and the class of landowners. By the m id d le o f the n i neteenth ce n tu ry, the Prussian gove rn i n g class would be tra n s formed socially, but u n i fied
ideologically.
The economic fortunes o f landowners we re i n jeopardy as a result o f po l ic ies desi gne d to pay for a ra pid ly growi n g m il i tary establishment. L'nder Frederick William I, the crown e nc roached o n earlier a ristoc ratic prerogative s . The purchase of encumbe red manorial estates, short-term leases of royal lands to bo u rgeois estate -m anagers, and an edict pro hib iting the sale of royal do mains are instances of this kin d . By con trast, Frederick I I i n structed his o ffic ials not to press legal clai m s in d isputes with aristocratic landowners . He cu rtailed the sale of m anorial estates to com moners , restricted the n u mber of hered itary claims against t hese estates, and encouraged rural c re d i t institutions that would gran t aris tocratic landowners lon g-term loa n s at low i n terest rates. Yet these pol icies d id not ac h ieve their p u rpose. M a n y aristocratic fa milies had been dec imated and the ir estates laid waste or rendered u n p ro fitable d u ring the Seve n Years' War ( 1 756- 1 763 ) and the economic crisis that fol lowed. J ust at this t i me new tech n i q ues for i m prov i n g a gricultural productivity had beco me available, but the cost of these new methods was h igh and i nc reased the need for lo n g-te rm c red i t . Even with governmental assis tance m a n y i m poverished aristocratic landow ners were unable to im prove their estate s .
IMPERIAL GER MANY AND PR USSIA
1 69
Moreove r, the Prussian aristoc racy often proved unwilling to take n tage of the fac i l ities the gove rnment placed at its d i s posal. The dva a fidei commissum waS a legal instrument for co n fi n i n g the inherita nce of m an or ial estates to a s i n gle he i r and restric t i n g the sa le, though not nec es sa ril y t he mortgagi n g, of the fam ily e s tate . B u t th is i n strume n t d id not p ro ve a n effective veh icle for the preservation o f u n e n c u m be red e states . Th e la nded squires wante d t o maintain their estate s i n tact, but they also wa nted to preserve the right o f all male heirs to a n equal share in the p roperty . To real ize bot h goa ls ofte n meant encu mbe r i n g the estate by raising loans , which req u i red the prior co nse n t of al l male descend ants . Such consent was diffic u l t to obtain, es pec ially in period s of economic recessio n . Hence, loan s were hard to rai se and e x pensive and legal dis p u tes n u merous. Freq uently, t he very princi ple of eq ual inhe r i tance re sulted in fam ily disun i t y . The c rown sought to rel ieve these d i fficulties by fac ilitating the con ve rs ion o f esta tes i n to fidei co m m issa, b u t the Prus sian aristocracy made l i m ited use o f t h is device because they prefe rred equal in heri tance . Du r i n g the last decades of the eighteenth ce ntury, econom ic conditions worse ned and the need for cred it increased. Le nd ers exploited these diffic u l t ies, and with the rise of land values man y aris tocra tic families liq uid ated parts o f their l anded property . 3 6 A proportion of the aristocrac y w a s in actual need d u ring the last part of t he eighteenth cen t u ry . We noted earl ie r that the low pay of officers made t hem d e pen d ent on fi nanc ial assistance from their fami lies. A ro ugh estimate from one study s uggests that some 10 perce n t of the o fficer corps d id not receive s uch assistance and there fore foun d it impossible to pay for the ed ucation of their children . 3 7 Moreover, Fred erick's officers were pro h i bi ted from m arrying without the con sent of higher m il itary authority. I t was fea re d t hat m arriages would lead to large, ind i ge n t fam ilies with pe ns ion claims on the state and large n u m bers of children with hered i tary rights. Also, m arriages without a proper econom ic fo undation m ight p ro m pt o fficers to petition for release from military serv ice. S pecial assistance was given to the needy widows and daughters of o fficers and to i m po verished me mbers o f old, a ristoc ratic fam ilies, for whom quite menia l publ ic o ffices we re fo u n d . Com m ents on t h e indige nce and o utright begging of aristoc rats suggest that such measures did not relieve the situ ation . I ndee d , a good many a ristocrats relinquished the ir title to esca pe the pro hibition against e n tering a trade or profession. As com moners, they would be able to reco u p their fortu ne.3 8 The prestige and economic fortunes of the aristocracy decl ined . Deaths in battle as well as economic adversity had t h i n ned the ran k s of titled families at a time whe n the Pru ssian rulers req u i red more officers and civil serva nts . Accord i n gly, it became royal policy to con fer new titles and to renew titles that had been allowed to la pse . Frede rick I I
1 70
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
co n fe rred twice as m a n y titles as h i s fa the r , a n d Frede rick William I I ( 1 7 86- 1 7 97) five t i m es a s m a n y a s Frede rick 1 1 . I n the te n years between 1 7 9 7 and 1 80 7 , Frederic k William I I I ( 1 79 7 - 1 840) co n fe r r ed two -and a - ha l f t i m e s a s many t itles a s Fred erick I I h ad c o n fe r red i n fo rty- si x years . T h e rapid i n c rea s e o f titles q u i c k l y deva l ued t h e i r p restige . A lso, many t i tles we re based o n re cog n i t io n o f con s p i c u o u s service a n d con fe rred w i tho u t re feren c e to the o w n e rs h i p of l a n d . F i n a l l y , s i nce m a n y n o b l e i m m i g ra n ts sought se r v ice i n t he a r m y a n d t h e b u re a ucra c y , t h e re la t io n s h i p o f t i t le s to landowners h i p beca me atte n uated . Clearl y , n a t i ,oe a r is tocrats i n straitened c i r c u m s ta n c e s faced inc reas i n g com pe t iti o n des p i te t h e p o li c i e s designed to ass i s t t h e m . 3 9 A c as e stud y o f t h e E l e c tor a l M ark (Ku rma rk ) B ra n d e n b u r g allows i n s i ght i n to t h e con d i ti o n s o f the a ri s toc r a c y a ro u n d 1 800. I n that year t h e re we re 409 arist o c rati c landow n e rs in the p ro v ince , w h ile t h e i r 1 3 3 brot hers and 1 1 6 sons did not own la n d . More than one-t h i rd of t hese 6 5 8 men were in m ilitary se rvice in 1 800, and a l ittle less than o n e-third had seen se rv ice earlier. A l t o ge t he r , almost 60 pe rce n t of �he lan d o w n e rs had see n m ilitary service, w h i le o f their b rothers and so n s who d id not own land more than 80 perce n t had served in the army.40 Tak ing the 409 landowners by them selve s, we fi n d that i n 1 800 290 ( 7 1 percent) resided o n their estate s , but that 1 78 o f them had previously lived i n the tow n s as o fficers o r civil se rvants fo r an average o f e i gh teen years . S i nce t h e re maining 1 1 9 landowners lived i n the tow n s e i t her as o fficers or simply as abse ntee landowners , more than 70 pe rce n t of the landed ar i s tocracy in B randenburg were or had bee n u rban resid e n ts fo r co n s id e rable periods . O n l y 27.4 percen t o f t h is Prussian sq uirea rch y lived on the land t h ro u g ho u t . 4 1 Th is overwh e l m i n g record of service to the state was itse l f a cause o f the deteriorating position o f th e a r i s toc racy . Frederick William I had favored natives over fo rei gners in h i s recruitment o f o fficers and men . When their ran ks were decimated d u ri n g t he Seven Years' War, Prus sian aristocrats lost their excl u s ive priority as officer candidate s . Fred eric k I I resorted to the recruitment of titled foreign e rs in order to main tain t he aristocratic o fficer corps at its pro pe r strength. B y 1 804- 1 806 over o n e thousand Prussian o fficers had Frenc h or Polish names in a corps of over seven thousand men . B u t the ed ucation of these o fficers was poor and a significant pro portion of the highe r officers were be twee n fi fty and eighty years old -two d e fects related to the restrictive recru itment policie s of the H o he n zollern r u le rs . (At a time when the pro portion of no n a ristoc ratic o fficers in the Pruss ian army was less than 10 percent, the proportion o f m id d le-class officers i n the British army a m o u n te d to 60 perce n t . ) 4 2 Frederick I I also dete r m i ne d that native a r m y recruits should not exceed 3 percen t of the male po pulatio n , since
IMPERIAL GERMAN Y AND PR USSIA a la r ge n umber of rec r u its im pai red t he prod uctive c a pacity of the es ta te s . Co nse q uently, e ntire regi m e n ts came to consist of foreign mer ce n a ries. A t the sa me time, exe m ptions from m il itary se r vice were gra nt ed as a n i n d uce m e n t to i m m ig r a nts and t o the people i n c o n q u e re d te rr i tori e s . Such mea s u res, alo n g w i t h t h e l i be ra l i z a tio n of fu rlo u g h s , so u gh t to prese rve the agric u l t u ra l work for c e a n d i ts tax - payi n g ca pac ity . I n so m e cases, t h i s boo s t t o the estates o f t h e l a n d ed a r is toc rac y may ha ve been effective, b ut it w a s obta i ne d at the pr ice of m i l i tary 4 we akn ess . 3
T h e P ru s s i a n army was de feated by N a po le o n in t h e Battle o r J e n a A and ue rbac h in 1806. T h i s de fe a t bro u ght o n a po p u l a r o u tc r y against m ilitaris m w h ich had e m b ittered human re latio n s and now h ad proved futile as we l l . T h e p r i n c i pa l official warra n t of a r istoc ra tic priv i lege was underm i ned . The i n flatio n of titles had a l read y lessened the p resti ge of soc ial ran k , and pol icie s i n te n ded to s u p port the landed ari s t o c rac y had often been i n e ffective . During the decades aro u n d 1 800, Pr u ss i a s a r ist ocr ac y lost status and wealth i n addition to the d e m ise of the estate asse m blies in the si xtee n th and seventeenth centu ries. However , the aristocracy eventually recovered fro m this dec l ine, tho ugh its character was tra n s formed in t h e process. During the n i ne teen th centu ry, aristoc ratic status rose once more by identification with the army and the bureaucracy as the main s u p ports o f the state. The military debacle o f 1 806 was fol lowed by re form legislatio n w h ich failed in ma n y respects . B ut some of the s uccessfu l reforms hel ped to restore the pree m ine n t position of the aristocracy on a new b as i s The Prussian Junkers of the nineteen t h cen t u ry became successfu l as ca pital ists, w h ile a good many wealthy merchants and ind ustrialists purchased estates east of the Elbe a n d became pse udo-aristoc rats . 4 4 This transformation o f the Prussian governing clas s had far-reac hing ideological i m p l icatio n s w h ich were related to the soc ial red istribu tio n of the o fficer cor ps , the bu reaucrac y , and the class of landowners. I n 1 8 1 3 the Prussian army stood at 280,000 men . In 1 808 a new syste m o f selection had ope ned o ffice r candidac y to all y o u n g men of seventee n , with admission and promotion d e pe n d e n t o n regimental ex am inations. In the same year, new articles of war were pro m u l ga ted , designed to red uce the civilian re pugnance toward m ilitary life . The war of liberation against Na poleon kindled wides pread e n t h us iasm. By 1 8 1 9 there were as man y m iddle-class as aristocratic o fficers. Despite some fluctuation s, this proportion of m iddle-class officers increased during the nineteen t h cen tury, reac h i n g 70 percent before World War I. How is it that under these circ u mstances the o fficer corps remained a bastion of aristocratic in fluence ? Pa rt o f the answer is suggested by an analysis of o fficer candidates '
.
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS for the years 1 862- 1 864 and 1 866- 1 867 . A m o n g 2 ,5 1 6 candid ates , 4 9 pe rce n t we re aristoc rats, a nd 5 1 pe rce n t co m moners , but 79 pe rce n t w er e the son s of o fficers , h i ghe r civil serva nts, and landowners -that is , a l m o s t 80 pe rce n t came fro m fa m il ies whose occ u pa t io n s stro n gl y iden t i fied t h e m w i t h the preva i l i n g monarc h ic re gi me, whether t he y we re a r i s tocra t ic or m id d le-class. A fte r 1 8 1 9 t he ed ucation of o fficers was d i s p a raged once again ; e m phasi s was placed on tec h n ical trai n i n g w h i le pa rt ic i pation in p ub l i c a ffa i rs was co n side red a so u rce of cor ru ptio n . Accord i n gl y . o fficers fro m m id d le-class fa m i l ies l i ke t heir aristocratic colle agues we re d rawn i n to a warrior estate " req u iring its own hono r, its o w n j ustice . and its own wa y o f t h i n k i n g . . . . This conce ption of t he m i l i t a r y vocation [ was] reco gnized as a h igher form of l i fe that is su perior to bo u rgeois customs" and acce pted as such by m ajor sections of soc iet r · � 5 T h e c h a n g i n g character of t h e Prussian ari stoc racy i s also evide nt fro m the history of the Prussia n civil service . Since the se ve nteen t h cen t u r y , t h e social backgro u n d o f o fficials had bee n d iverse . There were ind ige n o u s n obles, legall y trai ned com moners, forei gn-bo rn career bu reaucrats , ad m i n istrators elevated to aristocratic ran k , and others . Un der Frede rick Wil l iam I, the n um be rs o f j u rists and "civilian" aristocrats decl i ned , w h i le merchants, petty offic ials, and aristocratic arm y o fficers i ncrease d . At the cen ter of gove rnment commoners we re favored, bec ause the y were d e pendent on the ruler and de pendable i n con fl icts w i t h the aristocracy. Even Frederic k I I , w ho favored t he nobility, al lo wed o n l y m e n of low birth d irect access to himself. 4 6 Th is m ixed social bac k gro u n d of the civil service showed the d ivers i ty of d y nastic pe rson nel " policie s . " A ristocrats were o ft e n favored , but their as pirations and i nd e pe n de n t status might p rove d a n ge rou s a n d therefore cal led for vig i lance. Commoners and foreigners were probably more d e pe ndable, but they also carried less we i gh t wi t h native aris toc rats which could i m pair their e ffectiveness. Ex pertise o f some kind was needed , but it was iII defi ned , and au tocra tic rulers were unco m fo rtable with book-learning and pre fe rred com pliance as proo f of loyalty. Yet com pl iant co u rtiers we re s u s pect also, because their motives and accom plishments were in doubt. I n a n era of govern m e n t throu gh court poli tics , royal servants wo u l d pres u mably use their i n fl ue nce for personal gai n . That assump tion i m pa rted an a tmos phere of suspicion to the cond uct of ad m inistra tion , be gi n n i n g with the ruler himself. W h i l e government o ffice might open great opportun ities to men of a m bitio n , the risks were great and personal i n secu rity endemic. Eventually, a b u reaucratic c u l t u re pattern formed i n res po nse to these cond itions. Though Fred e rick I I favored o ffic ials from the J u n ker sq u i rearchy, he also con ferred m a n y new titles in reco gn ition of long se rv ice. A new se rvice aristoc racy formed which acq u i red a degree of
IMPERIAL GERMA NY AND PR USSIA
1 73
solid a rity in its struggles against royal arbitrariness. As the size of the govern me nt increased , so d id the de pe n dence o f the ruler on the advice o f le ad i n g o fficials. As the latter grad ually acquired control ove r ad m is si ons and promotio n s , they achieved the m utual protection of a col l e agia l interest grou p . 4 7 When i n terests are vigorousl y pursued , a n ide olo gy tends to develo p , and in the l ate eighteenth cen t u ry Prussian o fficials fused the ide a l o f service to the Prussian state with the ideal o f sel f-c ultivation o r Bildung . Criteria of h um a n wor t h com peted w i t h the c r ite ria of m ilitarism and aristocratic p rivilege . 4 8 B i l d u n g became a prestigio us attribu te of o fficials at o n c e lo yal to ule r and co ncerned w i t h their own rights , cr itical of inherited priv r he t ilege wi t hout co mme n s u ra te service an d also of sel fis h co m m e rcial deal ings. Praise o f cul tivated sen sitivity and moral perfection became l i n ked with attacks on the u nearned pretensions of "the aristocrat" and the demea n i ng money-making of "the bou rgeois . " Those who cham pioned t his "a ris tocracy of mind and heart" promoted a fraternal feel i n g among the ed ucated which claimed to transce nd all ran k d i fferences based on birth , status, office, or wealth . This spirit came to i n fluence leading seg ments of the Prussian bureaucracy during the later eigh teenth century, aidin g their moral and i n tellectual emanc i pation from royal au toc racy and fro m the class-egotism of the landed aristocracy.49 Changes in land owners h i p also provide clues to the ch aracter of the Prussian ar is tocrac y . Prior to 1 805 , the sale o f m anorial estates had been greatly restricted . Com moners were forbidden to pu rchase s uch estates, and even when exceptions were mad e , aristoc rats retained their exclusive rights of private j u risdictio n.J In 1 800 only 1 8 percent o f the aris tocratic landowners of B rande n bu rg had bo ught or sold lan d , and in a five-year period the ir total landholdi n g decli ned by onl y 1 1 percent. Commo ners owned 13 percen t o f t he estates, b u t these were relatively small holdin gs since they re prese n ted only abo u t 5 percent o f the value of landed pro perty in the provi nce. 50 The edict o f 1 807 and subseq uent reform legisla tion pro d uced major changes . Hence forth , aristocrats were al lowed to enter trade and the professions without thereby relin quish ing their titles, w hile com moners were permitted to purchase man orial 'estates e ven though this did not i n vo l ve the acq u isition of a title. The e ffects of these changes were immed iate. In East Prussia, be tween 1 806 and 1 829, 5 1 0 of 888 e states changed hands, and more than hal f o f the new owne rs acq uired their pro perty thro u gh fo reclos ure. IR i gh ts of p riva t e jurisdiction refer to the privi lege o f part i c i patin g in p rovinc i a l o r county asse mblies. o f patri m o n i a l j u r isd i ction of h u nting. and s o fo rth, Sti l l othe r rights invol ved tax exe m ptions as well as c l a i m s to extensive COTvee services, often req u i r i ng man ual labor and tea ms of horses. The abolition of these privileges occ u r red o n l y i n piece meal fash i o n : it was delayed until t he second ha l f of the nineteenth ce n t u ry. and peasants were req u ired to pay l arge amounts or prov i de extensive services to acquire title to t h ei r land. .
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS Though less ra pid in other p rovi nces, the tra n s fer of landed properties wa s s ubstantial everywhere. M a n y aristoc rats q u ickly too k ad vantage o f the new opportuniti es byb u y i n g land w h ic h now came o n the market . T hese were a ffluent fa m i l ies capable of hard headed ma nageme n t a nd of i m pro v i n g t heir estates. Others did not su rvive this pe riod of co m m e rcialization for fa milial and ideological reaso ns. B y 1 857 a maj o r re d i stribu t ion of landowners h i p had occ u rred : of 1 2,399 manorial estates, 7 ,023 ( 5 7 .3 pe rcent) re m a i n ed i n the hands of aristocrats, w h i l e 5 ,29 6 ( 4 2 . 7 percent) belonged to m id d le-class owners . 5 1 Data fo r 1 8 8 5 i n d ic ate t hat the p roportion of m i ddle-class owners (53 pe rce nt) was larger than that o f aristocratic own e rs (47 perce n t ) . Nevertheless, t he aristocratic d o m i n a nce rem a i ned. Th ree - fo u rths o f the aristocratic but only one fo urth o f the bo u rge o i s owne rs had estates o f over fo rty acres . 5 2 The re fo re, the com mercialization of land led i n e ffect to an "aristocratizatio n" o f the Pruss ian bo u rgeoisie in m uch the same way as had para l lel c h a n ges in the co m position of the officer cor ps. Com mo ners w h o pur chased manorial estates also acqu ired the more intangible habits and attitudes of the landed aristocrac y , hoping to obta i n so m e o f the most cheris hed privileges o f the aristocrac y . ( B o u rgeois landowners peti tioned the king to con se n t to the establishment of their pro perty as a fidei co m m issum , a designation o f aristocratic status as we l l as a legal in stru ment. By 1 898 onlyn i n e ty bo u rgeo is landowners had s ucceeded i n this respect. 53 ) By the m id - n inetee n t h ce n t u ry, the d istinction between aristocrat and bo u rgeois had lost m uc h o f its e arlier s i gn i fi c a n ce . Midd le-class fa m ' i l ies h a d become landed proprietors and h a d ada pted themselves ideo logical ly to their quasi-aristocratic status, while landed aristoc rats had beco m e rural ca pitalists once agai n . Betwee n aristocrats a n d " perso ns of hi gher or more ed ucated estate," the legal e n forcement o f d i fferences in ran k stead ily diminished. With regard to civil or crim inal pe nalties, the law of libel, tax exe m ptio n , and m arital eligibility, t he aristocracy and the h igher bo urgeo isie came to be treated as social equals . The spe c ia l legal privileges of public officials m ade it clear that their higher ran ks also belon ged to this newly a m alga m ated elite . To be sure, invid io us d istinctio n s within t h i s elite re mained , but they cannot com pare w i th the legal e n forcement of class di ffere nces existing in the eighteenth cen t u ry . U nder the monarch y, m ilitary ran k , o ffice, ed ucation , and wealth had become re lated attributes of u p pe r-class status, t ho u gh in t h is altered setting the a ristocracy co n t i n ued to enjoy the advan tages of a ge nerally recogni zed distinct ion. 54 I n conclusion , the com mon ideology of this gove r n i n g class s hould be note d . In the early n i netee n t h ce ntury , liberal reform legi slation had bee n inspired by an e n l ightened ideal of se l f-cul tivation ( B ildung) ,
IMPERIAL GERMANY AND PR USSIA
1 75
w h ic h c ut across soc ial distinctio n s. Howeve r , t he reforms the mselves w e re co n fi ned to establ i s h i n g th e freedom o f the market and the prin c i pl e of s e l f gove rn m e n t i n m u n ic ip a l ad m i n istration. N ext to n o t h in g h ad bee n ac co m pl ish e d in the field of constitutio nal re form, and in the co un tr yside the bastio n of aristocrat ic privilege remained as e n tr e nched as e v e r For decades public officials inspired by liberal ideals had to co pe -
.
with the determ i ned resistance of la nded interests a t the local level. One
can speculate that this frustr atio n i n the political realm intens i fi ed t he idealization of gover n m e n tal a ut hor i ty as the embodi m e n t o f reason a n d n a tio nal pur pose aga ins t t h e sel fishness o f class a n d loca l i ty
.
Bildung
an d ser vi ce coul d beco m e a prized possession of a n elite of o ffic ials m uc h as the idea li zati o n of h o n or and service h a d beco m e the id eology of t h e
offi cer c or ps Em p ha sis o n loyal service in a h ierarc h ical o r ga n i zatio n un der the aegis o f royal a u t hority was co mbined w i t h a cu ltivation o f inward ness that recalled t h e h uman istic ins piration of the Enli ghte n me n t Nevertheless, the context of E n light e n m e n t values had cha n ge d The libertarian protest against the pre te ns ion s of ran k had become a n idealization of service as a m e a n s of sel f-cultivatio n . T h e ideal of in wardness was place d at the d isposal o f m i l itary d isc i p li n e and govern mental powe r. As Ernst T roel tsch e x p re sse d it, .
.
.
The po l i t ical thought o f Germany i s m a r ked by a c u rio u s d i le m m a . . . . Look at one o f its sides, and you will see an abu ndance of re m n a n t s of Ro m a n ticism and lofty ideal ism ; look at the other, and you w i l l see a rea l i s m which goes to the ve rge of cynicism and of utter i n d i fference to all ideals and all moral i t y . B ut w h a t y o u w i l l see above a l l is an incl i n a t ion t o m ake a n asto n i s h i n g com bination of the two e l e m e n t s - i n a wo rd t o brutal ize rom ance, a n d t o
ro
mantic ize c y n icism . 5 5 I t w a s i n t h i s co mbination o f vario u s idealisms w i t h service i n the a r m y
and th e b u re a uc racy that aristocrats and well-to-do com mo ners (whether the y were landowners , i ndustrialists, or professiona ls) ach ieved a ge n eral un ity of outlook as the "go vern i n g class" o f a n e merging industrial soci e t y .
6 E N GLAN D
ENGLAN D
I S p h y s i c ally re l a ted t o the E u ro p ea n co n t i n e n t m u c h as J a pan is related to the Asian m a i n l a n d . I n ancie n t times, the na tive B r i t ish po pu l a t io n w a s Celtic , t he na t ive Jap a n e se , A i n u . In J a pa n , r u ler s h i p a ro se thro u gh the gradual em e rge n ce o f a do m i n a n t line age , t he Yam ato , which e v entually won s upremacy in st rugg le s ag a i n st rival clans and hostile nat i v e tribes. T herea fter, J a p anese ru lers h i p de v e lo ped through m a n y i n ternal strug gle s , but w i t ho ut m ilitary co nq uest by o u t s ide forces. At t he same ti m e , C h i nese civilization became an ideal model w h ich the Japanese ad a p t e d i n de v elopi ng their ow n c u l t u re . I n E n gland, cen tral r u le r s h i p a ro se t h ro u gh forei g n conquest of the Ce l t ic p o p ul ation . The islands were a ttac k ed and then occupied by Ro man le g i o n s from 55 B . C . to 450 A . D . The Rom an occ up a t ion was fol lowed by successive waves of Ge rmanic set tlers who fo u n ded a n u mbe r o f An glo-Saxon k i n gdom1> . Begi n ni n g in the late eig h t h century , Scan
d i na \' i a n raids i n i ti ated a third period o f i n vasions. The N o r man con q uest of 1 066 co m p l eted the se t t lement of the En gl i s h Isles and estab l ished u n i fied rule where n o ne had existed s i nce the Roman oc c u p atio n . T h e Ro mans called the co u n try B ritan nia, the Anglo-Saxon settlers called th e ir s e vera l kin gdo m s by names re fle cti n g t h e i r c o n t inental o r igin s , a n d the Danes and No r ma n s le ft t hei r OW11 l i n g u is ti c i m p r i n t . The pro l i fe r at ion of terms fo r t he country and its several regions as well as the m a n y place names ori g i n a t i n g i n di fferent l a n gu a ge s attest to a thou s an d - yea r h is tor y of co nqu est and a correspondin g d i ve r s i ty of cul tural i n fl uenc e s . ! T R I BES, CONQU ESTS, A N D K I N GS T he Roman oc cu pa tio n of E n gland d ates from 43 A. D . , tho u gh Ro man raids of t he islands be g an a ce n t u ry earlier. The conquest occurred in res pon se to an a p peal by a na tive c h ie ftain , and the Roman army lan ded in Kent with forty thousand men . The m i l i t a r y a dvance of the Ro m a n legi o ns enco u n tered fierce res istance from the native po pu la-
ENGLAND
t io n, an d sporadic revolts d isrupted the Roman occupation for another tW O ce ntu ries . Nevertheless, the . Romans succeeded in s tabilizing their aut ho rity through an e laborate system of fortifications extending in the n o rth to Hadrian's wall (ca. 1 2 2 A . D.) , which stretched fro m modern N e wc astle on the North Sea to the I rish Sea near Carlisle. Outside the areas o f Roman m i l itary occupatio n u n rest fl a red u p pe riodically, but south of Hadrian's wall the country became Roman ized. To wns were founded and settled by d ischarged Ro m a n legio n aries ; these towns were endowed with franc hises a n d constitutions similar to th e m u n ic i palities in I taly . U nder their own tribal l e ad e rs the native Celtic popula t io n came to acce pt Roman ci v ili z ation a process which can be partially traced through the remains of tow n settlements li k e Col chester, Lincoln, and others. I n a m ajor, though unsuccessful, Celtic revolt against foreign rule ( 6 1 A . D. ) , many Ro manized natives were mas sacred along with the Romans themselves. Roman civilization was widely, though unevenly, spread over England, and by the fourth century there was evidence of conside rable prosperity as exe m plified in the remains of country houses and the work of s killed artisans. The ad m inistration of the occu pied part of the island was subject to a Roman gove rnor, but in practice entrusted to local authorities. Each mun icipality ruled itself as well as its surrounding territory. Some dis tricts were set aside as part o f the imperial domains, but the larger por tion of the country was d ivided among ten or twelve tribes, each grouped around a town where t he tribal council met to conduct the business of the district. This type o f decentralized rule was known from Ro man Gaul, and it was compatible with tribal practice which em phasized joint government by a chieftain and a council of elders . Many additional forti fications built in the fourth century testify to increased barbarian assaults from the north and west, and early in the fifth century the Germanic conquests of Gau l cut the island off from Rome. Roman troops were withdrawn , and the Romanized Celtic pop ulation found itsel f under increasing attack not only from the north and west where Roman fortifications were located, but also from A nglo Saxon invaders in the un forti fied east and south. These Anglo-Saxon invaders eventually succeeded in occupying England, in re pelling the attacks of Scots and Picts in the north, and in pacifying the rest of the country by establishing a n um ber of kingdoms. One of these kingdoms, Kent, was unified under one ruler; another, Northumbria, was ruled by four leaders ; still others, like Wessex and Mercia, consisted of an over lord and lesser kings who were local rulers with their own de pendents. These lesser kings were frequently only nominally subordinate to the overlord. The difference between u n i fied and decentralized ki ngdoms prob,
,
THE A L'THORITY OF KINGS ably a ro se from t h e m a n ne r of se t t le m e n t . E n g l a nd was som etimes i n vaded b y a t r i b e u n d e r o n e k i n g, b u t m o re o ft e n by gro u ps o f c o n q u e ro r s w h o b ro u gh t w i t h t h e m t h e idea o f c h i e ft a i n s h i p based o n c h a ris m a t i c l i n e a ge a n d " e l e c t i o n " by the tribal notables. A l e a d e r c l a i m i n g s uc h desce n t co u l d establ i s h h i m se l f a s t he k i n g o f a n a r e a i f he wa s s uccessfu l i n h is u nd e r t a k i n gs a n d provi d ed se c u ri t y to t hose w h o fo l lowed h i m . T h e re w a s n o t ra d i t i o n t h a t a lesser king h a d to give a l le gi a nc e to t h e d e ad o ve rl o r d ' s s o n , or a d h e re to a r u le r w h ose l uc k h ad d ese rted h i m . 2 A "co n federacy" o f l es se r k i n gs u n d e r a n ove rlord was o fte n for m e d , w h ic h was s i m i l a r to t r i b a l p ra c t i c e s on the co n t i n e n t as well as to those fo u n d a m o n g t h e n a ti v e peo p l e s of the B r i t i s h I s les. The c i rcu m stances o f A n g l o - S a x o n occ u pa t i on ( be gi n n i n g i n t he fi ft h c e n t u r y ) re i n force d t h e e a rl ier Ro m a n te ndenc y to establish l o os e a u t h o ri t y w hich a l l o w ed f()r c o n s id e rab le re gi o n al a n d local a u to n o m y . C n d e r t he Ro m a n oc c u p a t ion , t h i s had bee n the i m perial p rac t i c e i n t he fi rs t a n d secon d centu ries . I n t h e case of the A n glo-Saxo n k i n gd o m s of the seve n t h cen t u ry, dece n t ralized rule was most l i kely � t ri ba l legacy. The M e rcian k i n g Pend a ( 6 3 3 - 654?) . . . co u l d c l a i m a nces tral right , b u t . to be wOI-ked o u t .
_
_
.
. .
t h e m ec h a n i c s o f govern m e n t h a d ye t
Li ke an hish k i n g . he exacted h os t a ges a n d e n force d
t r i b u t e ; he i m pressed B ri t i s h [ me a n i n g nat i ,-c Celtic] t r a d i t i o n by
a
d istri
bution of g i ft s to h i s s u bo rd i n a t e r u l e rs . . . . H e d i d not d e t h ro n e co nq uered
k i n gs a n d a n ne x t h e i r k i n gd o m s . . . . He ex pe l led Ce n w a l h from Wesse x , b u t h e l e ft the regi onal k i n gs alo n e ; .
. .
a n d t hou g h he twice k i l led rebellious
k i n gs o f the East A n g les, h e perm i t ted t h e i r h e i rs to s u cceed t h e m as h i s
s u bo r d i n a t e a l l ies .
.
_
_
T h e M e rc i a n m o n a rc h s reta i ned t he i r s u bj ec t s' l oy a l t y a n d i n c reased
t h e i r m ajes t y because they con t i n ued the fo r m s o f go ve rn m e n t th e y i n he r i ted fro m the pas t , to lera t i n g a nd e n c o u ragi n g t h e a u t o n o m y of d e pen d e n t rulers, a n d l e a v i n g large areas o f a d m i n ist rat ive a n d j ud icial and pol i t ical dec i s ion
in the hands of pe r i o d i ca l l oca l re p re s e n tat i ve asse m bl i es . 3
T h e Ro mans and seve ral A n glo-Saxon k i n g s established p recedents w h ic h eventually hardened into the E n gl ish tradition of balancing mo narc h ical w i th local authority. That trad ition was to be rein forced b y the Norman conquest. But the d o m i n a n t fac t of An glo-Saxon rule was po litical fragm e n t at i o n a nd freq ue nt fight.ing among Northumbrians, Mer dans, East Angles , the se veral Saxon k i n gdoms, a n d Kent. A n glo-Saxon ki ngshi p re p l icated the Ge rmanic c ustoms o f the con t i n e nt . The k i n g was at te nded by a bod yguard o f well-born com pan ions, w h o h ad the d u ty to d e fe n d a n d a ve n ge their lord, and were d i s g ra ced if t he y s u rvived him in ba ttle. (These c o m pan i o ns o ften i nc l u ded men o f ro yal desce nt . ) The most ad m i red virtue of a k i n g was h i s ge n e r os i t y ,
ENGLAND
1 79
a vi ew n o do u bt diligen tly cultivated by h i s fol lowers . At an early ti me, a fol lower was endowed with ·l a nd in newly co nq uered territorie s ; he an d h is house hold were maintained b y the food rents and services o f th e nati ve po p u l at i o n Later, the k i n g's gi ft o ft e n took the form of e n ti tli ng th e rec i p ie n t not t o the l a n d i tse l f, but t o t h e good s and se rvic es d u e fro m the c u l tivators . In t h i s w a y , t he k i n g re tained t i t le to the l a n d , wh ile h i s com pa n ions r e c e i v e d pan or all o f t h e tribu te t ha t was a ss e s s e d These were matters o f politic al o p po r t u n i ty a n d c a l c u l a t i o n Th e An glo Sa xo n ki n gs could e nlarge their dom ains and a u t hor i ty o n l y w i t h the hel p of followers a n d hence at the price of reward i n g t h e m . La nd and th e trib u te de rived from the land we re the m a i n sou rces of wealt h and po wer. K i n gs t ried to m a ke s u re that the ga ins t h e y m ade thro u gh the se rvices of their fol lowers we re worth t h e loss of weal t h a n d powe r w h ich gra nts to them re presen te d . T h e power of t h e An glo-Saxon kings often fal tered, altho u gh t h e princi ple of royal authority w a s generally u p he ld 4 The lesse r kings a n d earls ( o r ealdormen) w e re t h e e ffective rulers o v e r t h e constituent un its (the shires) of England, governing in the n ame of the king. The y and the diocesan bis hops (who were installed t h ro u gho ut the co untry in the late seventh century) would si t as joint presidents o f the shire court, and in times of war the earls would c ommand the s h ire m i l it i a The primary function of the earls was poli t ical , and since this was a period of m uc h internal strife, these great provinc ial rulers wo uld often b e away on cam paigns However, the i r presence was req u i red in all co n t rovers ial cases before the shire co urt, fo r o n l y the ful l authority of t he state co uld deal with recalcitrant local magnates. Much ro utine business was nevertheless transacted i n their absence, an d as affairs became more com plex , the king (with t he consent o f the earls) created the new office of she riff to take cha rge of local government, local finance, and the e xecution o fj us tice. The earl was a great lord with whom the ordinary man had few contacts , but the sheriff was t he man known to be in touch with local affairs as the re presentative of the king. For the king's rule to be e ffective, he also had to h a ve t he coo per ation of local leaders of o p i n io n who held no o ffic ial posi t io n These were the freemen, the k i ng's thegns , on whose services and taxes i n kind the wealth and power o f t he A nglo-Saxon kingdoms d e pe n ded. Their obligatio n included military service, the food rent (feorm) levied for the maintenance of the king's household, cartage services and p ro v ision of labor for the king' s works, a n d c harges for the entertainment o f strangers coming to court. In t h e e a rly Anglo-Saxon period, the freemen owed th ese se rvices di rectly to the king, tho ugh by the seve n t h cen t u ry they were rendering t heir d ues to a lord who was the k i n g's vassa l . Some of th ese freemen were substantial landholders w ho might obtain positions .
.
.
.
.
.
.
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
180
at court or be \ a i s ed to a n earldom by s pe c ial favor, but who woul d ord i narily come in contact with public affairs only through the ir duty of attending the great co u nc i l o f the rea l m (witena gemot) . The ea r l y co u nc ils a ppea r to have bee n com po se d o f t h e k i n g s i m mediate follow e rs and o ffic ials , bo th l a y and ecclesiastic a l ; by t h e tenth c e n t u r y , t h i s co u n c i l was com posed o f earl s , c h u rc h m e n , a n d i m p o r ta nt t h e g n s , a l l o w i n g d i rect allegi a nce to t he k i n g . O u r k no wle d ge o f these co u n c il s co m e s l a rge l y from t h e ro ya l c h a r t e r s i n w h ic h t h e k i n g' s gra nts we re w i tn esse d by m e m be r s o f the co u n ci l '
'
.
T h e re we re \'e r y fe w m at t e rs of i m po r t a n c e
to
the s t ate on w h ich a n An glo
Saxon k i n g c a n n o t be s h o w n to h a \'e co n s u l t ed h i s co u nc i l . D u rin g t h e cen t u ry b e fore t h e Co n q uest i t s asse n t is re cor d ed to t h e issue of laws a n d the
i m po s i ti o n of taxes, t o n e g otiat ions w i t h fo re i g n powe r s , a n d t o m e as u re s u n de r t aken fo r t h e d e fe n se of the l a nd . I t was in h i s council t h at a k i n g would
prosec u te suspected traitors a ga i n st w h o m h e fe l t s t ro n gl y e no u gh to tak e
l e gal action . T h a t he was e x pected
[0
sec u re its a s sen t be fore cre a t i n g priv
i l e ge d e sta te s in l a n d is made c l e a r by t h e i n n u merable charters w h i c h assert
t h a t a royal g i ft of such an estate has been a p p rove d by the magnates of the
k i n gd o m s .
T h e i n s t a bil ity
of royal succession also strengthened the ki n g s co uncil, its elective function. Of the e i g h t ki ngs who reigned between 8 99 and 1 0 1 6 , only three were i m med i a te heirs to an uncontested king do m ; in the o t he r cases, the d e c ease d ki n g's c o unc i l took the initiative in th e choice of a su cce sso r. One m ust guard against the modern notion '
s ti m u l a t i ng
that the attestation o f royal writs or even del iberations concern i n g the
succession represented acts of voting. Bishops, abbots, and earls at te nded the council because o f the offices they held by a royal g ran t w h i le t h e gn s attended i n obedience to a royal summons. Few individuals w o u l d d i rec t l y oppose the king's declared w ill, but at the same time many earls and thegns were men who possessed m uch local influence and were not easily coerced. 6 The authority of An glo-Saxon kin gs h i p depended in practice on at least inte r m it te n t n e go tiat i on with the great m a gn ates of the realm whose power had increased thro u gh ad mi n istr at i v e con solidation in the shires. Am id the p reva i l i ng political fra g me n tat io n one can see the process by which ro y a l au t hor i t y w as per iod ic all y co nsolid ated . Such consoli dation de pended on b r i n g i ng lesser ki n gs into allegiance with their ,
overlord . The neation of t he gre a t M e rc i a n k i n gdom of the e i g h t h ce n t u ry meant that t h e h e i rs o f many lesse r d y n ast i es were bro u gh t to seek t h e co u n o f the Mer
c ian k i n g. to take gi fts li'o m h i m . and to prom ise h i m fid el ity . I t is sometimes po ss ible to t r a c e t h e ac t u a l co u rse of t h e i r dec l i n e i n to s u bord i natio n . Sigered .
ENGLAND
181
t he last king of Essex, attests m a n y c h a r t e rs o f Ce n w u l f, king o f the Mercian s : at fi rs t as 1'ex, then a s .mbregulus , a n d fi n a l l y as d ux o r ealdorman . a M e n o f t h i s
ty pe m a y o ften h a ve b e e n al lowed to rule t h e i r own peo ple u n d e r the i r lo rd ' s u l ti m ate a u t h o r i t y . B u t a ki n g who was stro n g e n o u gh could always i g n o re
the c l a i m s o f a loc al d y n a s t y , and in the co u rse o ft i me m e n w i t h no here d i tary title to rule a p pe a r as ealdormen o f pro v i n ce s w h i c h had o nce bee n k i n gd o m s . 7
Overlord s would assert t he i r au t ho r i t y w he n e v e r d i s loya l t y or local re vo l t p ut t he he re d i ta r y s uccession of an earldom in q u e s t i on Moreover, an a p pe a l to se nti ment a n d faith was invoked by the claims of d i v ine descent wh i ch s ugges te d the sacred fo u n d ation an d po t e n t ia l e x p a ns i o n of Anglo-Saxon k i ngshi p . (The early reference to Rretwalda or ruler over B rita in probably e x p re sse d t h e pol i t i ca l a s p i ra t i o n s of Ce ltic and I rish kings, since otherwise such a n i m pe r ial title was only u s ed w i t h re ference .
to the Roman em pire. ) 8 The C h ris t i a n iza t io n o f
England co n tr i bute d t o the sta bi l i z a t i o n of ro yal authority, though not at first and not always d i rec t ly. K i ng Aethelberht of Kent (560-6 1 6) married the daugh ter o f the king of Paris, presumably in order t o strengt hen the Kentis h posi tio n in relation to the other An glo S axon k i n gd o ms In 596 Aethelberht gave a fr i e n d ly rece ption to a Christian m ission, which Po pe Gre go r y I sent to E n gl a n d Neither the king's marr i a ge nor his pro tect io n of the m ission ac t u ally stre n gthene d Aethelberht's rule. Kentish su premacy did not even last d u r i ng the king's lifetime ; i ndeed, Stenton states that "no con fe der ac y of this period survived the king who had brou gh t it into bei ng."9 E n gland was still a pagan country, and C hristian m issions req u ire d ro ya l support. In this context, grants to the church had s pecial significance for the consolidation of royal authority. The church bene fited from the protection of the k i ng and tended to support his authority. The king could also benefit from the co untrywide o rgan ization of dioceses which the church introd uced under Archbishop Theodore (668-690). This stabilizing influence of the c h urch coincided with the regularization of land ten ures on the basis o f c harters writte n by derics . Since clerical appointments remained i n the j urisdiction of An g l o S a xon k i n gs, t he -
.
.
-
"The Mercian kingdom rose to preeminence in t he early eighth century and decli ned a centu ry later. Its two outsta n d i n g rule rs we re Aethelbald (7 1 6 - 7 5 7 ) and O ffa ( 7 5 7 - 796), who influenced the cont�mporary Carolingian rulers on the continent. Rex and .Iubregu lu.l are the Latin eq u ivalen ts of overlord and lesser (or under-) king. Dux o r ealdorman a re the Latin and Old English eq u iv a len t s of earl. The term gesith a n d its later eq u ivalent thegn originally meant "one who se rves another"; t he s tan d ing of these men was largely deter mi ned by the rank of the man they served , t ho u gh such service i t s el f was a m a rk o f aris tocratic status. Titles and terms like these ch a n ged their meaning i n the cou rse of time, an indication that the delegation o f a u t h or i t y was a co nt i n u o u s process.
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS c h u rc h was n ot o n l y a n a l l y , b u t at t i m e s a w i l l i n g s ubord i na te of ro ya l a u thority. T h i s po s i tion o f t h e c h u rch was re flected i n the cle rical i n te r p re
t a t i o n of sec u l a r r u l e Fo r so m e fo u r ce n t u ri e s t he cle rics w h o w rote t h e .
,
l a n d c h a rters re i t e r a t e d t h e i d ea t h a t t h e k i n g rei g n s by t h e grace of God . A n gl o S a x o n ch urch m en insisted t h a t t h e C h r ist i a n king i s t h e re p -
rese n ta t i ve of C h r i s t
a
mo n g a C h r i s t i a n peo ple , a v i e w m o re in accord
w i t h t he B yza n t i n e t h a n t he l a te r p a pa l co nce pt io n o f k i n gs h i p In t he i r .
l aw s t he k i n gs t h e m selves o f t e n add ressed t h e i r peo pl e n ot o n l y a s t h e ,
sec u l a r r u l e r , b u t as t h e s p i r i t ual lead e r . E n g l i sh ch u rc h m e n d id n ot
c h a l l e n ge t h e k i n g s eccles i a s t i c a l patro n age : if t he k i n g p rotected t he '
c h u rch
,
h e had t h e rig h t to a p po i n t i t s c h ie f m i n i sters . B o t h l a y a nd
ecclesias tical powe rs
we re
s u bo rd i n a t e d to th e a u t hority o f t he A n glo
Saxon k i n gs o n l y decad e s be fo re t he N o r m a n co nq uest of
1 066 .
Th is
was o n l y a short t i m e be fore t h e i n ve s t i tu re co n t roversy between t he H o l y Ro m a n e m pero r and t h e pope . B u t E n gland was very d i sta n t fro m con t i n e n ta l a ffa i rs , and u n d e r fro n ti e r co n d i tio n s t h e c h u rch n a t u rally favored stro n g k i ngs w h o would s u p port its m issio n . The a u t hority o f En glish k i n gs h i p w a s a lso stre n gt he n ed i n t he co u rse o f protracted fi g h t i n g w i t h t he Da nes a n d e ve ntually t h ro u gh the u n i t y i m posed by t he N o r m a n conq uest. I t is s u fficient here to gi ve a
bare o ut l i n e of t h e Da n is h i n vasio n s w h ic h began i n earnest i n 835 and res u l ted i n Da n is h overlord s h i p o f m uch
of e as te r n
E n gland . A l t h o u gh
t h e A n glo-S a xo n k i n gs w e re nearl y d e feated a n u m b e r of times, they
Th ree An g lo-Saxon Kin gs Fo l l o wi n g five h u n d red yea rs of Ro man occ u p a t ion , Anglo-Saxon E n gla n d ach ieved a h ig h level o f c i v i lization d e sp i t e its po l i t ic a l fragm e n t a t i o n . These t h ree coins show stages of A nglo-Saxon polit ic al development. Offa (757-796), king of Mercia, at least claimed dominion over the whole of England. Alfred (87 1 -899) wo n back territories w h ich had
bee n conquered by the Vikings. Edgar (959-975) achieved considerable stability and was a patron of the arts and learning. ( B ritish Museum)
ENGLA ND gai n e d t he u ppe r ha n d w hen A l fre d , K i n g of Wessex (87 1 -899), a n d h is son , Edwa rd the E l d e r (899-924) , effe c ted a v i rtual u n io n between Wessex and Me rcia . Ae t h e lsta n (924 -939) fu rth e r u n i fied t he E n gli s h
real m an d was s ucce s s fu l i n h i s c a m pa i gn s a g a i n s t t h e Da n e s a nd N o r we gi an s north of the H u mbe r estu a r y . U n d e r A e t h e l s ta n ' s successor, t he Dan is h s e tt l e rs acce pted the k in g of Wesse x as t h e i r sovere i gn . By t he m id d le of t h e tent h ce n t u ry, the We s t Saxo n royal ho use ruled En gla n d . The en t i re settled po p u l a ti o n , i nc l u d i n g the d e sce n d a n ts o f Dan i s h co n q u e r o rs , h a d been c o n ve rted t o Ch ristia n i ty , a n d fu rther N o r se i n va si on s fro m I reland had fa iled. En gland was a u n i fied k i n gd o m , b u t i n t ern al rule rema i n ed wea k a n d the t h reat o f i n v a s i o ns d i d not abate. K i n g Athel red (978- 1 0 1 6) took i n to h i s serv ice a l a r ge fo rce o f V i kin g m e rce na r ie s who re m a i ned l o y a l t o the Da n i s h k i n g. Tha t l o ya l t y fac i l itated the Da nish i n vasion o f E n g land i n 1 0 1 3 . A s t h e Dan ish k i n g con s ol i d ate d his E n gl i s h c o nq u e st , At helred went i n t o exil e at the co u rt of his brother-in-law , Richard , d uke of N o r m a n d y . The Danish ki n g died in 1 0 1 4 , a n d a ltho u gh Athelred w a s recal led t o E n gland, h e i n t u r n d ied in 1 0 1 6. Th e rea ft er, E n gland was r u l e d b y Cn u t ( 1 0 1 6- 1 035), who was si m ulta ne o u sl y k i n g of E n gland and Den mark. A few years after the death of Cn ut, the E n gl i s h a ristocrac y rec a l led the West Saxon d y n a s ty in the person o f Edward t h e Confessor ( 1 0421 066). E d wa r d had gro w n up at the Norma n co u rt d u ri n g h is father's (King Athel red's) exile. A fte r s ucceed i n g to the En g lish thron e , E d ward s po n sored t h e s p re ad o f N or m an i n fl uences in England by gran ti n g es tates to Nor m a n kn i ght s and p a t ron i z i ng Norman c h u rch m e n . H is r ei g n also saw the ascendance to grea t powe r o f a n u m be r of we al th y a r is to cratic fa milies who had bee n i n fl uen tial in rec a l li n g t he West S ax o n d y nasty and w h o now ch allenged the wil l , an d sometimes the au thority, of t h e king. T h e th reat of n e w Scand inavian in v a s ions m a d e these chal le n ge s seem treasono u s and Edward res po nded b y d e s i gnating as his succ e ssor h is cousin , Willia m o f Normand y. B ut the great i n fl uence of the E n gl i sh a ri s toc ra c y did not d i m i n i s h , and when E d w a rd d ied some yea rs later the s u cce s s i o n to the t h rone was i n m uch d i s p u te . The kings of D en m a r k and of Norway, two m e m be rs of the English roya l fa mily (one a minor, the other an e x ile d is t a n t l y related to Edward ) , as well as two or t h ree po w erfu l E n gl ish earls co u ld m a ke so m e claim to t h e En glish su ccessio n . The Norman conquest o f 1 066 s e tt le d t h e question by force of a r m s, and Wil l iam the C o nq ue ror ( 1 066- 1 087) became k i n g of E n gl and . The conq u est res u l ted i n t he s ubord i n ation o f the Engli s h aristoc racy . By 1 086 only abo u t 8 p e rce n t of the land re m a i ned in E n gl i sh ha n d s, al t ho u gh ma n y nat i ve aristoc ratic fam ilies s u rvi ved as s u bt e n a nts on their former property. H o w e ve r , t he h ig h e st ran k s o f the En glish
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
Dan ish Rule in Eng land
king Sweyn I raided En gland Subsequendy he was de clared king o f England and forced Ethel red (978- 1 0 1 6) to flee the country . This eleventh-century man u script ill u s t ration shows the crowning of Sweyn 's son Kin g Can ute (Cn ut) and his queen Aelgifu , as the king grasps the cross and his sword while one angel bestows the crown of tem poral rule and another tile palli u m of spir itual au thority. Above, the scene is sancti fied by Ch rist's image in the com pany of Mary and St. Peter with the key to the kingdom of heaven. Below, monks are witnesses in an attitude of adoration . Dan ish rule lasted from Canute's reign ( 1 0 1 6- 1 035) to 1 042, when the Saxon ruler Edward the Con fessor was restored to t he throne . (British Museum) The
Dan ish
in 982 and 994.
aristocracy, t he men who had held positio n s of great res ponsibility u n d e r Edward , were pu rged and re placed by Norman notables . 1 0 About o n e-fi ft h of the land was held by the king, about one-q uarter by the ch u rc h , and nearly one-hal f by the Norman fol lowers of the king. (Two o f these fol lowers we re the k i n g's half-brothers, I f we add these last possessio n s to those of the k i n g, then the roya l fam ily owned abo ut half the land of E n gla n d , although any disputes within the royal fam ily di m i n is hed t h is royal conce n t ration o f power. ) l l In a native population well i n e xcess of one m i l l io n , total i m m igration as a res u l t of t he conq uest probably did not exceed ten t h o usa n d , w h ic h may be com pared with the fo rty thousand men the Roma n s had used a thousand yea rs earlier to conq uer and occ u py E n gla n d . The n um ber of Norman k n i gh ts who were gran ted land d u ri n g W i l l i a m ' s re ign was probably less than two t h o usand . l 2 These figures s u ggest that E n glis h institu tio ns could pre sene t h e i r con t i n u ity despi te the replacem e n t of a native by a foreign ruling class.
ENGLAND
A main res ult o f the conquest was t h e d ivision of E n glish landed
pro pe rty among a No r m a n aris toc rac y orga n i zed fo r war. In the fi rs t ye ars a ft er t h e co nq uest, W i l l i a m req u i red m il i tary service from h is Nor man ba ron s and ten a n t s - i n - c h i e f, and a m aj o r tas k o f govern m e n t con s isted i n assessi n g t h e se r v ice o bl i gat i o n s o f e a c h fie f. T h e Do mesd a y Book of 1 086 assessed eac h la nded es tate u p t o t h e l i m it o f, a n d fre
quentl y wel l beyo n d , its eco n o m ic ca pac i ty . Fo r the t i m e , t hese assess me n ts were an e x traord i n a ry pol i t ical ach ieve m e n t , i ndicati ng t h e sub ord i n atio n e ven o f the grea t lords to Will iam t h e Conq ueror i n co n t rast to the re lative a u to n o m y o f local rulers and l a n ded notables not o n ly i n An glo -Saxon Engl a n d but a l s o in N o rmandy, Fra nce, a n d o t h e r co n ti nen tal co u n tries . 1 3 T h e e ffectiveness o f t h e N o rman r u l e was d ue less to the Domesda y reco rd o f lan d h o l d i n g te n u res ( re m a r ka ble as a c e n s u s , e v e n i f not too e ffecti ve as a bas i s of ad m i n i stration) t h a n t o t h e so lidarity of a conqueri n g gro u p of foreign warriors wh o co u l d ta ke over an ex isting govern me n t a n d leave its s u bord i n a te positi on s i n n a tive hands. However, this i n i tial conce n t ration of power soon gave way to fu rt her stru ggl e s between the E n gl i s h k i n gs and the ma gn ates o f t heir rea l m . The Norm a n occ u pation contributed t o t h e E n glish trad i t ion o f bal anc i n g monarchical w i t h local a ut hority. Con d i t io n s o f organ ization and transport did not favor cen tralized govern me n t even by an occu pying force a s ruthless as t h a t o f Wil l i a m the Conq ueror. Roma n i m perial p ractice , t h e A n glo-Sax o n tribal trad itio n s , and the practicalities of gove rning a conq u e red co untry with only two tho usand Norman knigh ts obliged the s uccessive r u lers of E n gl a nd to rely o n the authority and u ncerta i n collaboratio n o f local n otables. Norman rule req u i red that the· ba ro n s and ten a n ts-in-c h ie f s u p ply the king with armed k n i gh ts o n horsebac k . This mil ita ry se rvice obl i gation provided t h e magna tes of t he rea l m w i t h several options. The y could serve their king loya l l y as he req u i red , the y co uld use t h e i r m il itary might to oppose him a t their own ris k , or they could pass the b u rden of m i li tary service o n to others . This last alternati ve meant that either they could maintain ho use hold kn igh ts from their ow n re ven ue , or the y could give these knights fiefs in return for the req u i red m i l itary service to the king. From the stand poi n t o f the English king, th e m i l i ta ry service obligation o f his magn ates had certa i n d isad vanta ges . These a u tono mous rural lords were a potential threat to the king, and in cam pa igns on the Continent man y soldiering tasks co uld be beller performed by mercenaries than by armed k n ights. The great wealth of the ro yal fam i l y made it poss ible t o hire these mercenaries. H e nce, the ki n g wo uld often acce pt payment (scutage) i n lieu of se rvice, a s ubstitu tion which was at
h is d iscretion and not a baro n ia l privi lege. The k i n g co uld use such fees
to pay for mercenaries . and he co uld fu rther add to his trea s u ry by i m -
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
1 86
pos i n g a fi n e fo r pe r m i s s i o n to s u bst i t u te pa y m e n t fo r service . He co u l d also fa vor his s u p porters by lo w e r i n g t h e m il i t a r y s e r v i c e or scutage re
q u i re d o f t h e i r estates w h i le i n c re a s i n g s u ch asse s s m e n t s w h e re he s us pected oppos i t io n .
O b l i ga t i o n s o th e r t h a n m i l i ta r y se rv ice were s i g n i fi c a n t be c a u se t h e y a l lowed t h e k i n g to i n c rease h is reve n ue a n d e x e rc ise pe rs on a l con t rol
O\'e r h i s lea d i n g subj ects . Fa m i l y fort u n es were a ffected w h e ne ve r a fie f w as le ft t o
a m i n o r , fo r t h e c r o w n e nj oy ed t h e reve n ues u n t i l t h e h e i r came o f a ge , a n d it co u ld se l l t h e custod y of t h e he i r o r t h e use o f h i s l a n d s i n o rder t o reward loya l fo l l o we rs . T h e va l ue o f t he k i n g' s ri g h t of w a rd s h i p was grea t , s i nce reve n ue s d u ri n g t he m i no r i t y o f an h e i r de ri\-ed d i re c t l y fro m the l a n d . Wa rd s h i p re m a i n e d a n i m p o rt a n t part of roya l re ve n u e u n t i l t he se v e n t e e n t h ce n t u r y . T he k i n g a l so rese rved t h e righ t o f c o n sen t when t he d a u g h t e rs o f his te n a n ts - i n -c h i e f m a rr i e d ,
or w h e n t h e widow o f
a
t en a n t - i n -c h i e f w i s hed to re m a rry or re m a i n
s i n gle : The po l i t ical a s pects o r t h e right o r m a rriage were e x t re me l y s i g n i fica n t . I t
e n a b led t h e c ro w n t o co n t ro l t h e fa m i l y a l l ia nces for m ed a mo n g t h e b a ro n s .
T h e n e\'ery m a rr iage i n voh'ed t h e tran s fe r o r
go \'e r ned t he fu t u re possession o f co u l d m a ke the fo rt u ne o f
a
a
a
marriage port io n , a n d m a n y
ba ro n y or pa rt o f one . . . . T h e c rowlI
fe u da l h o u se b y pe r m i tt i n g i t to make good
m a r r i ages . . . . On the o t h e r h a n d , great baro n ies co u l d be broken i n to i n s i g
n i fi ca n t fra g m e n t s by ma rr y i n g hei resses t o m e n of l i l lie pos ition . I n short, t h ro u gh i ts right o f m a rr i age t h e c ro w n co u ld
to a
acc u m u la t i o n a nd d i s persion o f greal fe udal e states.
great extent co m m l the I.
Fi n a l l y , w he n a ki n g's ten a n t d ied , his heir would pay " relie f " to the
c row n so that he w as " relieved" from the obligation ( incident to most
royal grants o f land) to return the fie f to the k i ng. Such pay m e n ts o ften i m'olved as m uc h as a n e n tire year's i ncome from an estate . Since these pay m e n ts were at the c row n's discretio n , the king could " reward the loyal w ith low relie f and punish the disaffected with h i gh o n e s ." 1 5 N at u rally, the grea t barons o f Norman En gla n d e n deavored to c i rc u m scribe the king's d iscretion a n d thus stabilize their own position in the social h ie rarchy. In theory, the relation sh i p between William the Conqueror and his vassals was based on m utual agreement and trust; in practice , it was characterized by considerable tension . The
Norman aristocrats ex
ploited their new opportunities and prepared to defend themselves against renewed opposition from the native population and the com peting claims of rival m agnates. Over five thousand castle s h ad been built in E ngland a gene ration a fte r the conquest. Though the king had
e ncou raged the build i n g o f private stron ghol d s as a defense against the
ENGLAND n at i ve pop ul ation he w a n te d h is vassals to h e l p h i m r u le the land with o u t enc ro achin g u po n h i s own r i g h ts T hat dan ger a r ose part l y fr o m t he prac tic e o f subin fe ud a t io n . The magnates wou ld meet the ir o b l i ,
.
ga tion s to the king th rou gh gra n ti n g fie fs to rear-vassals w ho wo u ld th e n s u bs ti t u te for the m a gn a tes a n d ren d e r t h e service req u ired by the ki n g.
I n t h i s a r rangemen t , it w as n o t clear whether the rea r-vassals w o u l d be
loyal to the lord from w h o m t hey h e l d t h e i r fi e f or to t he k i n g for w h o m
they ren d e red serv ice o n be h a l f o f t h e i r l o r d . I n h i s co u n c i l o f 1 0 86, a t Salisbury, t h e k i n g m ad e the rear-vassals d o hom age t o himself i n order
to fores tal l the grow t h of p ower ce n ters i n d e pe n d e n t of h i s wil l . 1 6 The oa th a t Sa lisbury d e m o n strated W il l i a m ' s am ple a u t ho ri ty in E n gla n d , bu t h i s con t rol o f N o rm a n d y wa s m o re prec a rious
.
He cou ld demand
a far grea ter n u m be r of k n igh ts from his vassals i n E ngland than he cou ld i n N o r ma n dy Fo r a time, the E n glish m agnates cou ld bare l y meet .
their o bligations to the ki n g while William's Norman vassals were easi ly ,
able to maintain private m i l ita ry forces i n addition to the n u m ber o f k nigh ts they owed to t h e i r rulerP T he reign of W illiam the Conque ror exem pli fied the stre n gth of
E nglish kingsh i p. W illia m died in 1 08 7 , and the succession crisis w h ich followed led to a re assessm en t of the relations betwee n k ing and vassal s . The crisis a lso re vealed s ome o f the u n de r lying issues o f med ieval ki n g ship i n E nglan d Inherita nce conce rned every landowne r a n d especia lly
.
the notables of th e realm w ho wanted to p reserve the wealth and status
o f their houses T h e re h ad been o pen o p position between W illiam and .
his oldest son , Robert, fo r more than two decades, but o n his dea t h bed
William gave him the d u c h y of Normandy, rea l i zing that he cou ld not
dep r i ve Robert of his heredita r y r i ght without jeopardizing the pol itical
s u pport of h is vassals a n d hence the continued rule of his house. At the same time, William considered the E n glish crown at his disposal because
he had conquered it. He bequeathed England to his second son , Wil
liam Ru fus, who was c rowned as W i lli am
I I ( 1 087- 1 1 00) and given an oath of allegiance . Nevertheless, m a n y E ngli s h barons sympat hized w i t h Robert for being de prived o f t h e English c row n . Baro n s with h o ldings
in both E ngland and Normandy were placed s i m ultaneo u sly under the
harsh rule of W illiam a n d the m ild rule o f R obert. On his deathbed William had also ordered t hat roya l fu nds be distributed to the English
chu rches and tha t poli t ical prisoners be freed. When William II fo llowed
these i nstructions , he probably sought to strengthen his pol itical su pport
in England, but he a lso i m poverished the royal treasu ry and facili tated a rebel l i on a gainst
his own rule William I I was able to put down the rebellion w h ich his u ncle Odo organ i zed against him , and he established a regi me noted for its rig orous control of the vassals. .
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
1 88 Pri vate war
v a s sa l
of a
an d
a l lo
disturbance were not
wed .
. . . The fi nancial obligations
we re rigorously e n forced . R u fu s e m ph a s i ze d the original precar
iousness a n d re voc ability o f t h e fie f.
.
.
.
On t h e death o f a baro n h e se lecte d
the s uccesso r - n o t a l w a y s t h e e l d e s t son - and made h i m buy back the land . H e i n s i s t ed on h i s rig h t t o t h e fi e f a n d the
w a rd s h i p
o f t h e c hildren w h e n a
" assa l d i e d w i t h o u t le a v i n g a m a t u re he i r , a n d he d isposed of the m a rriag e s o f t he widow a n d of t h e c h i l d re n to h i s p r o fi t . H e restricted the r i g h t o f the la i t y
to
le a v e money by w ill , a n d con fi sc a t e d the cha tt e l s o f dead pre late s . ' 8
I n t h i s w ay , the new k i n g l i m ited the tran s form ation o f fiefs a n d o ffices i n to he re d i t ar y ho l d i n gs t ho u gh the seve rity of his rule a lso pre pared ,
the gro u n d for later o p p os it i o n
.
N o r m a n r u le sta bi lized c o n d i t i o n s in England at a time w h e n
an
a rc h ic te n d e n c ies prev ai led i n I m pe ri a l G e r m a n y a n d e lsewhere on the
Contine n t . But in addition to the m a n y stre ngths of E n glish k i n gsh i p, t h e re w e re a lso condition s w h ic h weakened it. The domains of the En g l i s h kin gs were very large , b u t still n o t large e n o u gh to s i m ultaneou sly mee t the d e m a n d s o f household e x pe n ses, the financing o f government, and the costs o f m i l itar y c a m p aign s The i nce ssant com petit io n fo r royal .
fa vor s was a fu rther d rain o n the king's resou rces. Nor d i d the k i n g h ave
t he org a n i zation or resou rce s needed for the work o f local gove rnment; h e h ad to leave h i s te n a n ts- i n -chief free to make their own arrange m e n ts I n additio n , the pa pacy e xerted continu i n g pressure for the rec .
o g n itio n a n d exte n sion o f eccle siastical r i ght s . Finally , the English royal h o u se and many E n gl i s h m ag n a te s held fiefs i n N o r m a n d y and e lse
w h e re as va s sa l s of the king of France . I ndeed, the kings of E n gland were Fre nc h men in lan guage, c u l t u r e , a n d pol i t i c a l i n terests, and a n um
ber of them spent the greater part of their reign o f the Continent. The res u lt was t hat E n g l is h d o m es t ic d is p u te s w i t h i n the royal fa m il y and betwee n t he English ki n g s and their ba ro n s were freq uently aggravated by d i s p u t e s i n vo l vi n g E n glish i n te rests in " Fre nch" te rritories .
l: n d e r these con dition s , t he c h ie f ba ro n s of E n gland atte m pted
to
c i rc u m s c r ibe ro y a l prero ga tives even as they acce pted the king's legiti m ate authority . I n par t , thi s o p p o s it i o n i n vo lved the
executive power of
the king. The great magnates of the re a l m acte d a s o fficial agents of the
crown in the king's name. The k i n g pl-e ferred to c hoose his o ffic ials o u ts ide the ran ks of these great lo rds, but o fte n found h i m se l f obliged to as k their assistance . I n t he l o n g r u n , the king's executive power de
c l i ned in ad m i n istrative and j u d i cial m atters whe never h i s personally d e pe n d e n t o fficials were re placed by these more independent notables
Opposition to ro yal prerogat ives also i n vo lved the
issue of representation
in t he k i n g ' s co uncil a n d even t u a l l y i n other deliberative bodies of gov
e r n m e n t . Did t he barons have the d uty of atte n d i n g the council at the k i n g ' s pleas ure, or did t he y have the rig h t to attend by v irtue of their
ENGLAND
1 89
pos i t io n ? Was the crow n obliged to call a mee tin g of the council, and if so at what i n tervals? When the co u nc i l met, could the k i n g simply de m an d the assent of those asse mbled to t h e meas ures put be fo re them ? W as he o b l i ge d to liste n to the co u n sel o f those assemble d , a n d only with re fer ence to i ss u e s he had raised, o r also to t hose raised by some of the
asse mbled notables? The answe rs to t hese and related q ue stio n s i n e ffect constitute the history of royal a u thority in relation to t h e En glis h par liament. Pro blems like these can be for m u lated o'n ly i n retrospect; t here fore , to s peak o f o pposition to royal p rerogatives is o n l y a conve n ient shorthand for the p i ece mea l p rocess of d e l i m it i n g the a u thority o f the Eng li s h king. In p r acti c e, the re l a t i o n sh i p be twee n k i n gs and baro ns altern ated between pe r i o ds of cen t ral control and pe r io d s of tacit res istance o r out right o ppo s i t io n These were di ffere nt pha se s not of right a ga ins t wrong, but of t he king' s r i ghts again st the ri ghts of his vassals, and i t is i m por tant to realize that e ac h side u pheld the rights o f the other-in pr i nc i pl e . Vassals often began as personal retainers of h igh status who had become independent notables as their services led to a cumulation of ro yal fa vors. They were obl iged to use t heir resources at the behe st of the k i n g in return for grants o f l a n d and of ri gh t s , an d they derived pa rt of their own upkeep from the performance o f administrative and j u d ic ial func .
tions. Such notables could become a threat to the king' s powe r even if they did not challenge his authority. B ut then t he king could favor a new echelon of vassals who d e pe nded more on him than his e rstwh ile followers -at least until t he re placement of vassals was re peated. For twenty years a fter the death of William the Conqueror, the duchy of Normandy under Robert and the En glish k i n gd om under William II fol lowed their independent ways, but in 1 1 06 the Con queror's third son , Henry I ( 1 1 00- 1 1 35 ) , w as involved in a war against his brother Robert. Henry conquered Normandy and reestablished the Anglo-Norman state which endured for a centu ry thereafter. In 1 1 2 8 Matilda, the only s urviving c hild o f the last Norman king, married Geof frey Plantagenet, son o f the Count of Anjou. After years of civil war and disputes over the s uccession to the Norman dynasty , stability was achieved in 1 1 3 5 under the e arly Plantagenets . Matilda's son , Henry I I ( 1 1 54- 1 1 89), achieved t he greatest extension o f English rule , co m b ini n g the kingdom of En gland with sovereignty over Scotland and I reland and with control of the fiefs w h ich he held as vassal to the king of France. These fiefs com prised not only Normandy and B rittany, bu t the king dom of Aquitaine. Thus , En glish continental possessions extended from the channel coast to the Pyrenees . This great realm disintegrated under Henry's s uccessors, lead i n g to the loss not only of the Angevin fiefs but also of Normandy. However, claims to this in heritance, espec i al l y tho se
alai
f
--
HOLY
'------.,\ , ,
\
KING DOM of FRANCE
------ --------�
Lands under direct rule
of
Henry
II
Lands held as fiefs by
inheritance
Angevin
fiefs
through
cl aim ed
marriage to
Eleanor of Aquitaine
Lands claimed by Henry lias fiefs held of him
9. Dominions o f Henry II, 1 1 54- 1 1 89
ROMAN EMPI R E
southern part o f Aq ui ta i ne , remained a maj or the s i xteen t h ce n tu ry . The rule of Henry II was a high point o f royal authorit y , simi lar in thi s respect to the earlie r reig n of Wil l ia m the Co n quero r and to the lalter part of the reign of He n r y I I I (1216-1272). All three reigns were marked by le ga l reco gn i t io n of t he royal c lai m tha t each man owed his main l oya lt y to the king rather tha n to h i s i mmediate lord.19 It was a re l a t. i n g issue o f
to
G asco n y, the
A n glo - Fre n c h
relations u n til
clear sign of s tre ngth that during t heir frequent absence s from En gla nd , th e Norman and Pl a n t age ne t kings delegated their authority to high
offi c ia l s (justiciars) a s their perso n a l ap po i ntee s who were able to con s oli d ate the financial and judicia l business of t he crow n. The delimitation of
r o ya l
aut hority mar be set aga ins t these cases
o f pow er ful monarchical rule. T he coro nation c harte rs issued by t he successors o f Wil liam the C o n que ro r provide us with examples. When the re ig n of William I I was followed by that o f hi s youngest b ro t her Hen ry I, t he new king w as c h a l l e n ge d by his oldest brot her Robert , duke
Norm an d y . To str e n gth en hi s po si t io n in the war against Norm andy, Henry I ga ve solemn p ro m ises o f pro tec t i n g t he r igh t s of his barons, which were laid down in a charter authenticated by the ki ng' s gre a t seal . S teph e n ' s ( 1 135-1154) succession was ch a l l enged by Henr y I's d au g h ter, Matilda, and a new charter (1136) con ta i ni n g pro m i ses o f goo d gov ernment was issued . In 1 1 54 Matilda's so n , H e n ry I I, also began his reign w i t h a charter pro m i s i n g to re s t o re and con firm the liberties which his grandfather, Hen ry I, had g ra n t ed to the c h u rch and the baro nage . These coronation oaths became a tradition d u ri n g the twelfth ce n t u ry : e ve r y re i gn had to be gi n with the n e w ki n g ' s sol e m n affirmation of es tablished righ ts . In the reign of John I ( 1 1 99- 1 2 1 6), the kin g's p osit io n was further weakened, partly through rival claims to the throne, partl y thro ugh conflicts with Pope I n n oce n t II I, a nd partly t h rough t he de ter m ina t i o n of the French ki n g , P h il i p II ( 1 1 80-1223) , to end English possession of N or m a ndy . As earl y as 1 201 , English earls re fused to cross the sea in the king's service unless he promised them "the i r righ ts ." After the loss of Normandy i n 1 204, the king had to rely on E ngl is h reso urces alone in d e fe nding h is rea l m against a t hreatened French in vasion. The text of Magna Carla ( 1 215) , which eventuated from this con flict, enu merates the righ ts the king promi ses to u phold and sets up p roce d u re s by whic h the ba rons could force th e k i n g to co m p ly . The spe cific t hrea t to take the king's "castles , lands, and possessions" i f he violated th e te r m s o f t h e c h arte r may have been the wo r k o f e x tre m ists , but the assertion of ba ro n i al and ecclesiastical rights was well wit hin the established fra m e w o r k . K i ng Jo h n died in 1 2 1 6. H is son H e n r y , the heir apparent, w as a boy of ni n e , and a group o f rebel lious baro n s allied itself with Lou is of of
The Nonnan Kings
Willia m the Conqueror, William Rufu s, He nry I, and Stephen are s hown as benefactors
of We st m i n ster Abbey in this thirteenth-century illu stration from the Historia of Matthew .
(British Museum)
ENGLAND
Fra nce who was preparing to in vade England . Effective au tho r ity over Eng la nd passed to the Regent William the Marshall and his cou ncil, w ho rea ffi rmed Magna Carta bu t were a lso determ ined to maintain the po sition of the king and the realm. Baronial opposition to King John in de fen se of their own established rights was th us combined with the pro tec tio n of the k ing' s estate by leading magnates in the in terest of repel lin g e nemies of the co untry and maintaining good order.20 By the ti me of M agna Carta, the rights of the king were matched by the rights of th e baron s under the king, and the two were linked by mutual recognition. Convincing evidence o f such reciprocity comes from the reign of Edward I (1272-1307), in the course o f which over £40 0,000 were raised from subsidies which the barons provided in su pport o f Edward's wars against Wales and Scotland and in de fense of his interests as duke of Aquitaine. There was strikingly little local opposition to these subsi dies, since Edward was an exce ptionally strong and adroit ruler who pursued a policy of taxation by consent. Without surrendering his r i g ht to i m pose a tal lage b on his boroughs and de mesne, he merged it in a request for general subsidies wh ich required con sent. He made the subsidy on movables a normal source of revenue, and so prepared the way for pa rliam ent ary taxation gran ted by lords and commons.
This is . . .
no t to say that he and his competent advisers created parl iament .
[Rather] in a tim e of need t hey adjus ted circumstances to existi n g meth
ods by
a
series of expedients. They exploited, on t h e one hand, the negotiab le
element in t he compulsory tallage and on the other hand invested the ancient right of the magnates to consent to or refuse taxation with the dignity of an obl i gation , common to all, to serve the common good by prov iding the means for the defense of the realm.21
To be s ure, this policy of enlisting consent thro u gh proto parliamentary assemblies existed elsewhere in Europe. But by the beginning of the fourteenth century, the English polity had become singular in the de gree to which even strong kings shared the tasks of national and local administration with the estates. On the Continent, strong royal authority or political fragmentation seemed the only available alternatives. B ut in England, traveling judges o f the king's council came into close touch with the knights of the county courts, while local churches and the shires and boroughs of the land sent their elected representatives to parlia ment. Grad ually; the E n glish kings had come to accept "the necessity of taking the nation into partnership in [the] administration" of the country .22 Moreover, a coun trywide jurisdiction had developed (in addition to local adj udication) as the king's judges hand led an increasing n umber b"falJage is a charge levied by a lord on his tenams.
Parliament of Edward I, probably 1279 Edward I in parliament with Alexa nder, k i ng of Scots, and Llewellyn, prince of Wales. The bishops are seated on benches at the left and in the foregrou nd, the barons o n the right. I n the center, the judiciary sits on woolsacks, w hile at the bottom, behind two clerk s holdi ng scrol ls, are roya l officials and representatives of boroughs. (British Museum)
ENGLAND
195
o f cases brought before them. Such an ex tended j u risdi c tion o f the k i ng' s co urts depersonali zed the relation s between lord and vassal. Also, as wars came to be fo u g h t by arm ies paid from the r oya l t rea sur y , the Englis h kings stressed the d u ty of all to defend the rea l m ; th us , the ob ligation of military service transcended its earlier basis in a pe rso n a l re l a t ion s h i p. At the highe st level of soc i e t y , the tran sacti o n s be twee n the ki ng and the ba ro n s came to de pend on politi cal and e conom ic condi t i ons affecting th e whole coun t r y rather than on a feudal ba rgain or con tract in the narrow sen se. Ma n y sc holars h a ve beco me skeptic al a b o u t the u tility of t he term feudalism because the connection between grants of rig h ts and the obli ga ti on to serve became a legal fiction at an ea rl y time; howeve r, the idea o f a "national contract" between rulers an d r uled retained its psychological importance for a long pe riod . A com pa ri son with japan under the Ashikaga s hog u nate sugges t s t he impo rta nce o f the na t io nal comm unity in medieval E n g la nd . Be tween the early fourteenth and the late si x teen t h cent u ry, civil s trife became so endemic in japa n that the power of t he shogunate was at a low ebb. At the same ti m e , j a pan ' s landed gentry had enormous v itality which expressed itself in the rise of new clans as old ones declined. That v itality was evident in the marked i nde pendence of many daimyo fa m ilies even under the police contro l s of the late Tokugaw a shogunate . In this case , a national pol ity was created onl y by the enforced coordination of the great daimyo dom ains and the e x p ul sio n of the Christian mis sions . The case of E ngland is d i fferent. The per io d from Magna Carta ( 1 2 1 5) to the end of the fifteenth century may be described as an uneven seesaw between baronial intere s ts as represented in parliament a n d the au thority and power of the E n glish kings. This " balanced " develop m en t in England contrasts wi t h the re peated ri se o f local a u thority in japan and its lasting su pp res sio n in Russia.23 The v ita lity of the English barons certainly com pares with that of the japa ne se gentry, but there are two ma rked contrast s betwee n Englan d and japan. First, in E n g land there was an early e mergence of a quasi-parliamentary i nstitution, a collective forum in which the notables of t he realm assembled to co unsel the king and event u al ly to oppose h im. Th is pro v ided the E ngl is h a r is tocracy with a national forum w h ich wa s l acking in japan. Second, E nglish kin gs intermarried with the French royal fa m i l y and thro ugh inheritance of territorial possessions also became vassals of the king of France. These political ties with the Continent involved the whole country in the natienal d e fense, es pec iall y since Fr a n c e made periodic attempts to gain a foot hold in Scotland. By cont rast , japan retaine d its isolation from the Asia n mainland so t h a t neither a common representa t ive bod y nor a common poli tical i n volve m e n t ove rsea s rest r ained inte rn al st r i fe. To sum up, English possess i ons and claims on the continent had a
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
1 96
marked e ffect on the developing relatio n ship be tween En glish kings and the E ngl ish aris tocracy. That e ffect was d ue , among other things, to the freq uent absence of the kings from E n gla n d , their i ntermarriages with the French royal house, he nce the divisio n of their interests between E n g la n d and France, an d t h e o p po r t u ni tie s of barga inin g or o utright oppo s i t io n which these contine n tal ties o f the ki n g s (and some magnates) provided t o the great baro n s of E n g l a n d By utilizin g the se oppo rtu n i ties, the En glish ba ronage ma naged to inuease i ts powe r positio n vis-a \'is the En glish monarchy, though for a lo n g time this was hardly a de libe rate process. Events du ring the fo u rteenth and fiftee nth ce nturies illustrate how the re latio nship betwee n the E n glish kings and the bar o n a ge developed. I n t he medieval wor ld, public order was maintained by the e n force m e n t of the ki n g s rights. The E n glish king's rights i ncluded his claims as d uke o f Aquitaine and vassal to the king o f France as well as his claims to a u t hority ove r Wales, Scotlan d, and I reland. A fter 1 290, all partner s h i p i n the ad min istration of the country and all bal ance between the ki ng's rights and the rights of the barons became instead a struggle of contend i n g forces over rights acknowled ged in principle but con tested i n practice. The barons had supported King Edward I's conquest of Wales and the assertion of his rights in Gascony. But Edward's attem pt to extend his authority over Scotla nd involved him in a war with France when the Scottish barons allied themselves with t he Fre nc h king. Edward thus had to co n te nd with the king of France in Scotland a n d in Gascon y , and the economic burdens res u lt i n g from t hese u ndertakings provoked a re bellion of the English baronage. When Edward II (1 307- 1 3 27) i nherited the throne, he also i n herited the large debt left by h is fat her as well as t h e baro n ial opposition which the son now managed to exacerbate fur ther by the favors he bestowed on Piers Gavesto n , a courtier from Gas co n y . The barons opposing the king we re magnates w ho were suspicious of one a nother but able to unite a gai n s t a fore ign interloper like Gav esto n . The Ordinances o f 1311 sought to placate baronial opposition , which was especially directed a g a i n st the king's advisors. Nevertheless, civil war followed, and when the barons were d e feated , the Statute of York (13 2 2) codi fied the king's rights, tho ugh it also promulgated the principle that royal gove rnme n t req uired the conse n t of the "prelates, earls , barons, and of the com mun ity of the realm." But the Statute of 1322 did not settle the matter, fo r the Sco ttish war was resumed , as was the dispute with France. Edward 11 sent his wife , Queen Isabella, to in tercede on his behal f with her brother, the French king. S he did so suc cessfully, but in the end the queen cons pired with her h u sband's ene mies , returned to England with an army commanded by her lover .
'
ENGLAND
197
( Roger Mortimer of W igm o re ) , and with baro n ial help de posed Edward I I in favor of the he ir a p parent , Edward I II (1327-1377). The new king's r eign witnessed t h e i n c e p tio n (1337) of the " H u n d red Years' War" with France (originat ing i n d is p u te s over Gasc o n y and Scotland) , the B l ack De a t h , a n d a lo n g - ru n eco n o mic decli ne wi t h ef fects t hat lasted un til the l a t e fifteen t h ce n t ury. E n glis h k i n gs h i p dec l i ned wit h t h e m o u nt i n g stru ggl es among the b a r o n a ge , whi c h ce n tered o n the rival houses of York and La ncaster and cul min ated in the War of the Roses (1455-1485).
d yna st i c str u g gles, le a d i n g a r i st oc r at i c fam il i es asser te d agai n s t one a n o t her. Ti me and a ga i n , one o f t hese families wo uld u se the weakened pos itio n of a king to e nlarge its own claims, onl y to go down to de feat with the revival of t he king's fo r t u ne s and the mounti n g e n vy of other baron ial fam ilies. However, two i m portant di mensions of domestic stability pe rsiste d t hroug h out these cent uries of foreign enta n gleme nts and internal s t ri fe : local gove r n ment was one; the steady develop me n t o f royal adj ud ication and ad ministration was the other. At bot h levels, legal and ad m in i s trati ve affairs were indistin guishable because the s a feguard i n g of rights was tantamount to the col lection o f payments ( fees, fines, d ues) as the material equ ivalents of those r igh ts . Royal a s well a s a r is toc r ati c governance de pended essen tially on these rights a n d t hat col le ctio n . The formative condit ions of royal authority are of enduri n g im portance. For exa m ple , I m pe r i al Ge r man kings hi p began with the le gitimation o f the Caro l i n g i a n dy n a s ty by an act of consecration and t he subsequent i n v olve m e n t o f the Frankish k i n gs wi t h pa pa l political in terests in Italy. Prussian kingship e me r ged m uch later, a n outgrowth o f efforts t o ove rcome pol i tical fragmentation in a frontier province and a by - produc t of dynastic pol icies w hic h utilized the devastations of the Th i r ty Years' War . Russia n ki n g s hi p began in two disconnected phases . Princely authority in Kieva n Russia was established by armed merchants from Scandinavia, who chose certain tow ns as t rading posts and at tracted followers seeking p rotection and m aterial advantage by organ izing the defense again st ste ppe nomads. I n a second phase, the Mus covite tsars rose to preeminence under Mongol ove rlordship as co ll ecto rs of tribute from other princ i pal i ties and as a de fe nse force against Lith uania; eve ntu all y t hey con solidated powe r by means of a systematic re settling of landed aristocrats from conquered territories l i ke Novgorod . What then of Englan d ? E n glish kingship began with Anglo-Saxon war bands (comilales) in v ad i ng and settling the British Isles . This i nit ial condition was un usually favorable to an eventual balance between ce ntral and local powe r. The conditio n s of conquest a n d oc cu pation by bands of armed tribesmen In t hese
t he i r ri gh t s
THE
AUTHORITY OF I\INGS
made for a solid arity of ne a r eq uals. The Germanic tradition of eq ual inheritance a mong royal descendants q u ickly circ u m scribed whatever concentration of power ha d resulted fro m the conquest itse l f. By the time of the No r m an conquest, more than a th ou s a n d years of Ro man rule and A nglo - Sa xon kingdoms had given great impetus to a s t ru c t u re of local rule which p rovided co n ti nuity despite much internal p o li ti c a l strife and centuries of struggle a g a i n st f() r e i g n i n vasio n s . Of the cases examined here, the foundations of En gl ish kingship probably have their closest analogue in the Varangian oc c up a t i on of early K i eva n Russia. But V a r a n gi a n forces were used in the interest of merchants and trade , not i n the interest of warriors and the se ttlement of land. This mercantile or ien t a t i on facilitated the accepta nce by Kievan princes o f native customs s uch as the town asse mbly (veche) an d boyar freedom. The V a rangi an rulers probably acce pted the notables o f the Slavic tribes in habiting the conquered areas because they wanted the collaboration of the native po pulation in th e promotio n of trade and the organ ization of defense. By c o n t r ast, the An glo-Saxon settlers com peted for land with the native Celtic population a n d hence imposed their own institutions. Fro m the NOt-man conquest u n til the seve nteenth century, English history moved back and forth between strong assertions of royal au thori ty and strong countervailing tendencies of local autonom y and po litical re presentatio n . From the perspective of kin gship, E n glish medi eval history since the Roman occu pation is a record of discontinuity due to centu ries of i n v asion s and later to volatile political alliances with Eu ropean powers. En glish political involvement with France was particu larly im portant, beginning with the special link between E n gland and l'\ormandy, fostered for cen turies by intermarriage between the two royal houses , and continuing with d isputes over Gascony until well into " th e fi fteenth centu ry. From the pe rs pective o f local institutions, how e\"er, the sa me history shows m uch contin uity. Here the com parison with Japan is most instructive. Whe reas En gland was u n i fied by fm·eign conquest, first by the Romans and then by the Normans, Japan was uni fied by indigenous forces, first by t he Yamato dynasty. later under the Taika reforms (at least formally) , and then by the Kamakura shogunate. Chronologically, the Roman pol itical unifi cation o f England coincided with the Uji period of ancient clan conflicts in Japa n , whereas the decentralized Anglo-Saxon kingdoms coincided with Japanese e fforts at centralizing government institutions un der the Taika re forms. Five centuries of Roman rule over England as well as the regional and local govern ment of the Anglo-Saxon and Norman in \'aders h ad established a balance be tween local and cen tral rule that was absent from the Japanese experience. This may be t he reason why En-
199
ENGLAND
gl i s h local institutions cou l d deve lo p gra dua l l y whereas in Ja pa n local insti tu tions w e re altered a n u m ber of times by i n ternal co n fli c ts by the Ta ik a re forms and later by the re pea t ed turnover of local eli te s w h i c h fo l lo w ed the dis m a n t l i n g o f i m pe r ia l control over the co untryside. The sta bili ty and g radua l d e ve lo pme nt of English local government were due to the long-e s tabl i s hed i n dependence of l o cal autho rities , go in g back to Roman t i mes . O lig arc hi c rule came to p r e v ail i n the coun ties , in parl iament, an d at court; t hus, l o c a l i n flu e nc e a nd pa r t i c ipa t i o n in national a ffai rs w e re c l o sely related . In addi tion , many so n s o f aris t oc r a ti c fam ilies were appoi n ted to administrative offices t h ro u g h pa tro n c l i e n t relations wit h i n this oligarch y . One ca n spe ak , the n, of a "nationalization" of lo ca l po l i t i c s . Political fa ctio ns within the oligarchy were form ed w hi l e t h e c row n m atc h e d o l igarch ic i n fl ue nce by us i n g its prerogatives in making local a ppoi n t m e n t s an d develo p i ng the j u ris d ic tion of the royal courts. One can com pa re this deve l o p me n t with the Prussia n , which witnessed the con solidation of princely rule over the provincial estates during the seven tee nth centu ry. In this period , the Hohenzollern rulers built a civi l and military es tablishment which en ,
-
-
sured their own dom inance over the squirearchy. In the co untryside, aristocratic landowners in troduced t h e m il i tary and autho ritarian man ner which characterized their own careers i n the army. This domination of the countryside had complete royal s uppor t An ideology of honor and service enhanced this l oc al dom inance as well as the priv ileged po sition of the . aristocracy in the army and the civil service . At the same time, "national" affairs were the prerogative o f the cro w n ; regular par ticipation by the aristocracy was excl uded . Prussia knew little of that combination of local dominance and preponderance in n ational a ffairs which characterized E n gl i s h oligarchic rule. The contrast is reflected in the practice of local government. Both the Prussian rural councillor (Landral) and t he English j u sti ce of the peace represented the local a ristocratic oligarchies. In Prussia, the Land rat was nominated by the local estates and then appo in ted b y the king, although as a disciplin ary measure Frederick W il l i am I occasionally ap pointed Land rate by himself. The La nd ra t was paid, partly by the Trea sury and partly by the local estate , but he had no judicial authority. Many duties of the Landrat reflected the militarization of Prussian societ y He was charged with the s u pervision of recruitment, the capture of desert ers, the provision- and p roper care of the req uired n u mber of horses, the reimbursement of peasan ts for services rendered, and the ha ndli ng of military administration a n d supplies while an army unit was in transit through his district. These duties and the pre vale nce o f former officers among the Landrate reveal the intrusion of d y na s tic and m ilitary inter ests i n the cond uct of local a ffairs . I n England ,justices of the peace were .
.
200
THE AUTHORITY OF KINGS
a l so a p po i n ted by t h e crown from a m o n g the local n o t ables, bu t t h e y s e r ve d w i t h o u t s al a r y These loca l j u s t i ce s were co ncerned with work ho uses, p r iso n s, roads, b ri dge s vagra nts, a n d other com m u nal d ut ies alo n g w i t h their se veralju d ic i a l fu n ct i o n s . Active le ad e rs h ip was a m a tter o f pe rso na l i nclination on the part o f ge n tle men-a mateurs who t rea t ed .
,
these m atte rs i n m uch t h e same way as they did the m an agement of
the i r own
c i als
,
estates. The justices of
the peace we re a bove all c i vi.J i a n offi
a n d alt h o u gh t h e ir con d uct of office was fo rm a l l y coordina ted by
t h e govern m e n t , their admin i strative a n d j u d i ci al activi ties ex p re ss ed the
rul e o f the local 0Ii garc h y.2� T h e i m pli c a t i o n s of this contrast for t he
ch a r ac t e r of the E n gl i s h a ri s to c rac y are d iscussed i n t h e next section.
F ROM THE KING'S C O M PANIONS TO PA RLIA M ENT A n glo-Saxon law recorded the soc ial disti nctio n s of t he time by as s ign in g
different amounts of co m pe n satio n (wergild) owed to the rela of a slai n man: 30,000 shil l i n g s fo r a k i n g s li fe, 1,200 s h i l l i n gs for the l i fe of an e arl or a ki n g s c o m pa n io n (gesilh), 200 s h i l l i n gs for the l i fe o f a freem a n . T he k i n g wi t h h i s c o m pa n i o ns t he earls in t h e sh ires, the more s ubstan tial t h e gn s and t h e magnates of the c h u rch co nstituted the An glo-Saxon a r is toc ra c y . A n d since t here we re several A n g l o -Saxo n kin gdo m s, each overlord and lesser k i n g had his own aris toc ratic
tions
'
'
,
,
ento u rage.25
A fte r 1 066, the authority o f one k i n g was the realm. W illiam the Co nq ueror
s u cce s s io n to
recogn ized
t h r o ug h o ut
emphasized the l e gi timacy of his
the English throne, and within a decade a fter the con quest most l a n d ho ldi n g s had bee n ex p ro p riated and redistributed . William d i vided England into great fiefs or "honours." The laymen to w hom
he granted them were his va ss al s,
OJ'
as they came to be called in England.
h i s barons. Th ese men, w h en they rewarded th ei r o w n vassals. likewise g r a nt e d them fie fs. In pract ice within a rel at i v e ly short t i m e c ert ain ly by the ,
time of Domesday B o o k
(1086],
,
there had arisen every tenu rial com plexity
which can be imagined: barons holding fiefs of each other, and of the ir own or of anot h er's vassal; tenants holdi n g fiefs of se v e r al lords and of each other.
Each o f these rel atio nships was establi shed by homage and fealty . There was a bel ief that all links would u l t im a t e l y reach the king. but i n p rac tice a t an g l e o f rights and o b l iga t i o n s ga ve r i se to d i s putes which ha d to be set tled . The law had t o be declared; and through judgments made by the suitors in the ho no r ial couns the law of the ho n o ur
was
f o r m ed . There were innu
me r a ble matters which had to be decided: the exact services d ue from a vassal
to his lord, on what terms could a fief or part of it be alienated, who had the
ENGLAND
201
wardship of a vassal's children under age, when could a lord claim an aid o r relief, and s o on. The influence o f the king's court and the interlocking of
the honours hindered extreme individuality of custom in the several baro One of the great effects of the Conquest, nies; but diversity there was .
therefore,
was
the creation of
.
.
a
.
new body of law in the kingdom.26
Ne w social bonds emerged out o f this process of litigation by wh ich the pa rt ies to a d ispute we re i nvolved in a developi n g network of com mon rule s . Marc B loch has distinguished betwee n two phases o f fe udalism i n Wes tern Europe. I n the first, po pulation is sparse, com m u n ication dif ficult, and aristocratic society i n tensely local; the status of a fam ily is directly proportional to its local wealth and authority . This formulation ro ug hly describes the conditions of An glo-Saxon E ngland. I n the sec ond , po pulation increases, and there is a growth of towns and com merce; the fragmentation of political authority gives way to stronger mon archical rule. This process is well exe m plified by the Norman and Plantage net dynasties in E n gla n d . B loch describes a society based on the reciprocal bond s betwe e n a lord who grants a fief and a vassal who owes loyalty and service in retu rn. This seemingly simple pri nciple was un dermined as soon as a fief granted fo r service became hereditary , for then the grant would no lo n ge r be conditional; in fact, in heritance be came a fertile source of disp u tes. The king claimed a right to all the land and hence would demand payment for per m it t ing the heirs to assume leg al title to an in herited fief, even when they were quite wil li ng to as sume the service obligations incumbent upon it. The king's insistence on his rights was periodically limited by his financial needs; thus, he might consent to sell some part of h is rights i n partic ular cases. In turn, the heirs would typically seek out ways of legally construing their pay ments as entitling them to a n in heritance free o f additional obligations. Such conflicting constructions we re a pplied not only by the kin g and his tenants-in -chie f, but by other lords and vassals . As the complex ities of inheritance increased, the connection became atten uated be tween grants and the services or payments re ndered in return .27 After 1 066, there was only one ki ng's cou rt at which t he king's ten ants-in-chief mingled with magnates o f the c h urch and earls from the shires. Royal supremacy was unchallenged . U nder the protection of the king. however, an aristocracy was formed for whic h the quasi-parlia mentary councils of the medieval period provided a meeting place and eventually a forum for asserting baron ial rights. The Norman aristoc racy remained organized for war, but the Norman kings we re rich and relaxed their in herited claim to the military serv ice of their vassals by acce pting a fine (scutage) in lieu of se rvice. By the end o f the twelfth century, feudal levies based on q uotas o f armed knights were becoming
202
THE
AUTHORITY OF J\./XGS
obsolete.c The i nadeq u a cy of t he old system of armed knights and t he
n e ed for paid professional soldie rs became
a p p a re nt when countrywide royal aut ho ri ty brou gh t wi t h it m i l it a ry engagem ents i n vo l v in g lar ge and
coordinated forces. F�r wars o n the C ontine nt it
was
uneconomical to
use knights recruited in England, and when the danger from invasions
subsided, a stand i ng force of armed knights was dispensable. Fro m the of a rm ed knights which the king's vassals owed to the crown was re d uc e d from about 6,500 to 375.2H As a mo un ted warrior, the armed knight was be s t adapted to local engagements and i ndivid ua l combat. but il l suited as an officer coordi nating the m ot l ey units recruited from the shir e s a n d tow n s From a military standpoint, discipline was n e e d e d in place o f the heterogeneolts feudal warriors from man y di ffe re n t areas. From an adm inistrative st and po i nt, it was more effi c ie n t for the crown to a ppo int commissioners w h o s u r\'eyed t h e able-bodied men of e a c h s hire and selected t h e best of the m to serve at the king's wages, w i t h t he cost of t he i n i t i a l equ i p m e nt borne hy the l o c a lit ies From a pol i t ical standpoint, this so�cal led Com m is s i o n of AlTay m e a n t t h at a mi lit a ry se rvice part l y fi n a nc ed by the elc\enth to the t hirteenth centuries, the total number
-
.
.
royal t reasury made even the greatest m ag n ates mo r e d e p e nden t o n the king, although t he y
army.
remained im portant military leaders of the king's
The d a i l y stipends paid to t he knights recruited in this way reflected t h e statu s distinctions made in the fou n e ent h century. Edward Ballinl, titular k i n g of the Scots, drew 30 shillings sh i l l i ng s in wartime. A d u ke
pa id 13s.
was
a
day in peacetime and 50
4d. per day, while an
carl
d re w 8s . B a n n e re ts, who were general staff officers re s p onsible for com m and i n g units in the fie ld an d ga rr iso nin g castles, ranked below this
a r a te of 4 sh i ll i n g s a d a y The lowest rank of t he s e warriors all t hose e n t i tled and we al t h y e n o ugh to se r ve as he a vil y a r med k n i gh ts on h orseback-were the knights bachelor pa id at a ra te of 2s. a d ay All these m e n from diff e ren t r a n k s o f the aristocracy had to p o sse s s suffi cient l a nd so t ha t t hey could af ford the expenses fo r armor and horses, w hich often exceeded t h e pay t he y recei\'ed. But t hese expe n ses m i g h t be worthw h i le, b e c au se the rewards from foreign w a rs could be sub st a n t i a l due to requisi tion s, looting, and the ad d i tio n al grants of land and r ig h ts wh ich the ki n g would have at his disposal in ca se of sllccess. 29
leyel at
.
.
No medieval ki n g was ri ch e n ough to fi na n c e an a rm y of mercenaries by himsel f; the refo re m u ch de pen d ed on t h e consent of t he magn ates to gr a n t t he k i n g t he special levies he reque s te d for h is m i l i tary cam,
was
called
Ollt
hy Ridlard /I (I:n7-1399) lilr the Scottish
cam·
ENGLAND
pai g n s. Th o u gh t he merce nary fo rce began wit h the substitution of sc u ta ge fo r personal service , t h e ki n g' s m i l i t ar y establish ment de pended not o nly on t he royal treasury b u t on t he fin a n c ia l a n d pe rso n a l coo peration o f t he m a gnates. One can date the s e c h an ge s in military organization from the reign of E d wa r d I ( 1 272-1307), who r egu l a ri zed m ilitary serv ice fo r pay, and from the 1330s when Edw a rd III first employed a rc hers in his Scot tish cam pa i gn s. From that time till the middle of the fiftee n t h ce ntury, o n e can s pe a k o f a "m ilitary-co m m e rcial c o m pl ex ," fo r at t h e be hest o f th e
ki ng the great m agnate s a n d the lesser ge ntry orga n i zed arm ies sup pl ie d by c on tr a c to r s and sus ta i n e d by the rich rewards to be obtained through t he wars i n France. As the power o f these magn ates i ncreased, t hat of the ki ng declined. By the end of the fifteenth cent u r y , the magn ates were embroiled i n a s t r u g g l e for t he c on t ro l of t he gove r n m e n t. That c i vi l war (the War of the Roses) e n ded in the v ic to r y o f the Tudors . He nry VII ( 1 485-1509) not only d i s m issed the m e rcenaries wh o h ad
he lpe d him
wi n the
throne, b u t also reverted to the old ins ti t utio n of no w o r ga n i ze d by the k i n g's own offic ers ( she r i ffs, j ustices of the pe ace ) rather than by local magnates. With only a few ex cept i o n s , this was the basis on w h i c h the Tudor and Stuart k ings go ver ned a very turbulent country. The re l ati ve l y i nde pen den t role of t he gre at ma gn ate s i n h e l p i n g to finance and or g a n i z e t he t h e shire militia. However, this wa s
kin g' s army had beco�e incompatible with the co n t i n uation of k i n gship
now that the war in France no lo n ge r pro vi de d o u tl e ts fo r d o m e s t ic st rife . C ha n ge s o f mili ta r y te c h n i q ue and organization were res po n s i ble for t h e transformation of the aristocratic way of l i fe . The re adine s s of warriors to serve their king had be e n one rationale of the i r privileged posi t i o n , but th i s uncoordinated recruitme n t of armed kn i g h ts was su pe r se d ed by countrywide levies financed by the k i n g and the barons.d Still, trai n i n g in t h e arts of war remained esse ntial to the aristocratic way of life . Militancy was associated with an acute consciousness of rank, a jealous re ga rd for the honor o f the family n am e , and t h e p ro te c tio n of the ri g h ts of family po s se s s i o n s . Moreover, a noble lord was typically surrounded by retainers , pe rs onal servants, and te n a n t s who e n h a n ced his stan di n g by ma r ks o f d e fe re n c e , by pe rson al service, by military ser vice in ti mes of wa r , and occasionally by armed s u p po r t i n priv ate q uar rels. In this se tt i ng, men trained in the arts of war were quick to re s o r t to force in re s pon se to p rovocations, re al or i m a gin ed , and armed fe uds dThe following survey is limited to the chan gin g aristocralic life style in England since
the sixteenth century. The changin g historical setti n g of the period is presented in Chap ter 9.
THE AUTHORITY OF KINGS
204
over righ ts in t i mes of peace were a re g u l ar feat ure o f feudal law . Fe uds had a legal a spect inso fa r as they grew out of the jealo u s i n sistence by baronial fa milies on ma in tain i n g their rights. But fe uds were a n obvi o u s threat t o t he kin g's peace. King Edward I sha re d the passion for tour naments, and a l t h o u gh he was aware t ha t to urna me n t s en co ura ged the barons' d a ngero us i m p u l s e s of s e lf h e l p he was unable to regulate these -
,
jousting contests and to forbid i l lic it asse mbl ies o f
me n
at arms.30
This cult of personal combat by mounted warriors as a mark of the
aristoc rat declined in i m por t a n c e as arrows and longbo ws were intro
duced in the fourteenth and firearms in the fi ftee n t h a n d sixtee nth ce n
turies. The size of t he armies increased from about seven thousand men at the ba ttle of H as t i n gs (1066) to about t hi rt y fiv e thousand men i n the -
sixtee nth century, b u t in the later per i o d t he En g li s h forces were notably sm aller than t he contem porary arm ies on the Co ntinent. A s the task of com m a n di n g d i s c i pl i ned troops of foot soldiers i n c reased, the i m por tance of the fe udal cava lry dec l i ned . Ever since t he s ubstitutio n of pay m e n t for pe rsonal service , armie s had been o r ga n i z ed by c o m m issio n ,
the king pa y i n g a gentlema n to raise , e q ui p o fficer, and lead h i s force o f soldie rs. The wa rs fo ught with such ar m i es w e re a ffected by c hanges i n m i l i tary or ga n i za tion a s well a s te ch n ol og y In the centu ry between 1550 a n d 1650, m i l itary c am pa i gns became increasi n gl y a problem in logisti c s , ord i n a nce, tra n s port, and e n ginee r i n g. On the Co n ti n ent , these c hanges bro u gh t abo ut the establ i s h m e n t of sta n d i n g armies com pose d of fo reign m ercen aries and na tive troops; Englan d , however, aban ,
.
don ed the s yste m o f co m m issioned troops and i ns te ad of a stan di n g arm y relied on the s h i re m il i tia, occasional mercenary forces , and a b uil d u p of i ts navy.31 In the co urse of t hese trans form ation s , d u e l s bega n to re place tour n a m e n t s or i ndividual combat i n battle as as the ty pe of m i l itanc y most s u ited to a ge ntle m an By the m id d le of t h e seve n teenth century, the old warlike ideal s and practices of the aristocracy had virtual ly disap pea red. Force s of private re ta i ne rs were red uced, and the armories of the aristocracy became obsole te . Personal ex per ienc e i n war waned, -
.
though deaths from duels i n creased rapid ly, especially among the young magnates of the realm .32 (By the n i netee n t h c ent u r y, ph y s ica l violence itse l f came to be con sidered a form of vulgarity characteristic of the lowe r c lasses.)
A ris i n g i n terest i n h igher ed ucation may be co m pa red wit h t his dec l i n e o f combat as the ideal of aristocratic cond uct. From the m idd le o f the s i xtee nth to the mid dle of t h e seventeenth ce ntu r y , the old dia tribes against clerkly book-lear n i n g as unbec o m i n g to a ge ntleman we re s u pe rseded by tracts de plori n g the aristocrats' ig no r anc e and their in di ffe rence toward ed ucation. By 1630 the pro portion of en trants into
ENGLAND
205
th e un i versity or the I nns o f Court had reached a level of 2.48 pe rce nt o f the ann ual cohort o f males aged se venteen; sons of the gentry re p resen ted abo ut one-third of the e nteri n g students. 3 3 The educational back gro und of members of parl iament indicates that this develo pment had s pecial sign ifi c anc e for the peerage and the s quirearch y . I n 1563 the p r o portion of the 420 members who had bee n at the u n iv e rs ity or at t he In ns of Court stood at 38 percent; by 1640-1642 the mem bershi p of parl iamen t had incr·eased to 552, and the pro portio n of tho se who ha d recei ved some higher education had risen to 70 percent.34 This expansion o f E n glish h igh er education helped to destroy the old clerical monopoly o f cu lture. The teachings of sixteenth- and sev enteenth-century hum a n i sts, the Puritan zeal to s pread the word o f God, a n d t h e increas i n g a p peal of the Baco n i a n view o f science com bined to persuade the landed classes of the i m portance o f learning. I n add ition , t he m o unt ing religio us and political con trove rs ies i n the House of Com mons put a pre m i u m on eloq uence a n d lear n i n g as effective weapons in the struggle for i nfluence .35 Moreover, the adm i nistrative class ex panded and opportu n ities for placement at the d isposal of the king were concentrated at the cou rt. The old aristocratic virtues of valor, loyalty, and ch ivalry as well as the old aristocratic co nte m pt for letters were out of place in this settin g.36 By 1700 ed ucation had done its share in transforming the aristocratic way of life. The exp an sion of government in the sixteenth and seventeenth cen turies put a premium on educational qualifications for those who as pired to public office. As greate r demands were made on t he organizing capacity of governme n t (in part by a changed pattern of warfare) , m o narchical govern ment became more bureaucratic and the demand for literary skills increased . E n glish and Ja panese aris tocrats came to term s with ed ucation along parallel lines. At a fa i rl y earl y stage both societies freed education from th e m onopo ly of priests
,
Engl an d in th e sixteen t h ce n tury, Japan in t h e seventeenth. Both
de ve l o ped schools for t hei l elite in which the c h i ldren could be t au gh t firstly ·
-
and mo st important ly-t he virtue of o bed ience to su pe riors in order to
prese rve social stability; secondly, the a rt of wa r , which was t h e o riginal jus
t i fication of their p rivileged status; thirdly, the tec h n iques and skills which
would equip them for a d m i n istrative chores in an increasingly bu reaucratic
soc ie ty; fo u rthl y , scholarly a ppr ec i at ion of the c l ass ic s, in which all wisdom
was bel ieved to reside; and fifthly, the manners, skills, and ae s t h etic interests
t h a t dis tingu i s hed them from the rest of socie t y .37
Menial clerical jobs contin ued to be performed by h irel i n gs, but now aris tocrats ada pted themselves to play a role in the cond uct of a ffairs. Strict d iscipline and esoteric learning provided these men with the nec-
2 06
THE AUTHORITY OF KINGS
essary "domestication" o f manners and with a new in vidious d istinction which set them apart from com moners. The Russian and the Prussia n dev elopments we re d i fferent. I n t hese co untries, clerics and com mo ners contin ued to fill prom inent public o ffices, w h i le the Russian and Prus sian autocrats of the e ighteenth cent ury regarded the education of yo ung a ristocrats as a matte r o f dynastic policy . Hence, some members o f aristocratic fam ilies tu rned p ri m a r i l y to legal ed ucation a s a mean s o f com peting for public ca reers in contras t to Ja pan a n d E n gla nd, w here esthetic or classical ed ucation retained its im portance . The aristocratic ideals o f m ilitary serv ice or combative ness on points o f honor were not aba n doned , but the purs u it o f these ideals was r e di rected . During the sixtee nth and se venteenth centuries, the age of exploration called for pe rsonal valor and national service of a high or der. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centu ries, colonial conquests and rule provided new challen ges for the ada ptation of aristoc ratic ide als . Moreover, service as an officer in the English navy became a mark of aristocratic distinction even be fore En gland resumed its military en gagements on la nd in the later seventeenth century. But while En gland equalled or exceeded the foreign military exploits o f continental coun t ries, the retention of the shire militia as the main domestic military force set England apart. This force re presen ted the landed aristocracy and its tenants at the local level. England's m ilitia system arose from the com mon law obligation of all. citizens to defend the country ; the system put m inimal bu rdens on the population . For the n ation as a w hole, however, even eigh teen thousand "fighti n g e ffectives" were considered danger ous. The seventeenth-century parliamen t introduced a nnual budgetary controls over the military establishment in order to forestall the accu m ulation of military power in the hands of the monarchy. 3 8 The aristocracy of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century E n gland, then, underwent a change through educatio n , government service, and a partial de militarization which accentuated the importance of manners at court and in high society . London became the center o f that society, as ties of fear and hope bound peers and gentry to the court.e During the period 1 590- 1730 , London was the only city of consequence, pos" Lawrence Stone wr i tes , " I n the eyes of the s i xt ee n t h cen t u ry [ t he peers] were a dis
tinct gro u p of the nobi l i ty ,
nobililas major,
as distinct from the
nobililas minor,
of k nights,
esq u i res , and a nn i gerous gentry . . . . The criterion o f an E n glish peer of the real m was the right to sit i n the House of Lords, a right o btai ned eithe r by letters patent [ see Glos..� aryJ or by recei pt o f a writ o f s u m mons. Since in the six teenth century most peers were created by patent, male suc cessio n took on an inc reased importa nce. A l read y in t he fo u rteen th
centu ry writs of s u m mo n s were issued not in res pect to legal tenu re, but o f wealth and political i n fl ue nce, the ten urial baro n y being ancient, vague, and outdated. . . . Those who
could no longer maintain status because o f poverty were qu ietly d ropped from the Iist."39
ENGLAND
sessing over 300,000 residen ts wh ile no other city had m o re than 25,000. The London " season" became a regular practice o f the landed aristoc racy, facilitated after 1 590 by the increased use of the private coach. By 1 630 at least three-quarters of the peerage had acq u i re d a pe rmanent residence in London i n addition to the residence o n t h e i r country es tates, a pract ice which was widely i m ita ted by lowe r - ra n k i n g gentry fam ilies . The att ractions of the city were m a n y . Me n of ran k could esca pe the boredom o f the count ryside and m ix t h e i r business, lawsuits, pe r sonal i n trigues, and a tte nda nce at cou rt with the pleas u res o f the c i ty . So many peers and gentry ca me to Lo ndo n d uring t he soc ial " seaso n " that the crown issued proclam ations against t h i s practice and even ini tiated legal procee d i n gs ( i n t he 1630s) in order to d rive pee rs and gentry back to their estates in t he country . 4 0 Such measures proved to no avail. The "domestication" of the aristocracy wa s a l so a conseq uence of the increasing wealth of the Tudors and o f increasi ng co m pet ition at court. Henry V I I ( 1 485- 1 5 09) was the first English k i n g in over a cen tury whose wealth and influence we re greater than the total resources available to the magnates surrounding him, and under the chanceJlor shi p of Thomas CromweII ( l 485 ?- 1 540) the reve n ue of Henry VI I I ( 1509- 1 547) tripled .4 1 The reorganization and streamlining o f monar chical government under Cromwell's in fluence , the break with the Ro man ch urch ( 1 534), and the resources accruing to the m onarchy follow ing the dissolution of the monasteries are related indications of this rise of monarchical authority . 4 2 I n t h e English setting, however, t h i s rise was equivocal. For exam ple, prevailing o pinion held that the king "mus t live on his own" and finance the ordinary o perations of government, exce pt in tim es o f war. Accordingly, to maintain the king's position at home and abroad, the search for additional reven ue was a constant preoccu pation . The k i ng and his advisors resorted to all kinds of expedie nts.43 By d istributing titles, grants, and other favors the Tudors used their wealth to foster com petition at court and thus ensure the personal dependence even o f . the great magnates. B u t t h i s policy also increased the need for funds, and the means used to obtai n them increased the liabilities of the crown, often leading to acute financial difficulty. As a res ult, E lizabeth I ( 1 558- 1 603) became very parsimonious in handing out g i fts and titles. But the early Stuarts returned again to largesse.4 4 As the court became the major center for the d istribution o f op portun ities, its scale of expe nditu res became lavish , and every new g rant of royal favors further stim u lated the demand for prefe rment. From 1 603 to 1 64 1 , the gifts and favors distributed by the crown totaled about £ 3 million. During the same period, the profusion of titles and favors led to an "in flation of honors," cheapening each honor or bene fit be-
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
Co untry and Townhou ses Great fam ilies built both townhouses i n London . nea r the cen ter of a ffairs at court and in parliame n t , and mansions on thei r co u n t ry estates. They moved back and fo rth between them i n accord with the "season ." The h istory o f these houses has been associated with m a n y famous n a mes o f the English a ristocracy. In the seven teen t h cent u ry Cornbu ry Pa rk and C l a rendon house. Lon do n . belo n ged to Edward H y d e . e a rl of C la rendon . (COlt".
I 'y Life; Brilish Museum)
SlOwed wh ile provid ing a precedent for still more largesse. Notorious intrigues. moun ting corru ption . and cons picuo us luxu ries acco m panied this in flatio n . The wealt hiest membe rs o f the aristocracy e njoyed a very large i n d i rect income thro ugh tax exem ptions and gi fts or bribes in re t u rn for using their i n fl uence at court. Largesse in hospitality and a lux urious style of life became attributes of arislOcracy with its easygoin g or stud ied con tem pt for base. material considerations. The monarch y set the pace in this respect, in part as a cultural affirmation of its legitimate su premacy and in pa rt as a means of encoura gi n g com petition that often resulted in e normous debts by aristocrats to the crown or to money lenders. Debts we re incu rred by the com petition for favors and by con spicuous consum ption as a mark of high status. Debts were encouraged by moneylenders willing to s peculate on the prospective gains of cour tiers.45 These mounting fi nancial obligatio n s could jeopard i ze the eco no m ic foun dations of aristocratic wealth and on occasion led to aristo cratic revolts s parked by the loss of power and i n fluence . B u t w here one fam ily decl i ned. another rose in its place . The cou rt and parliament we re at the center of a ffairs ; what happened t here had become of su preme i m po rtance and increasi n gly absorbed the attention o f the sq uire archy. As pe rsonal combat declined while higher ed ucatio n . u rban in terests, a nd com petition for place at the capital increased . the Engl ish aristocracy was brough t to ack nowled ge the su premac y of national over local concerns.46
ENGLAND
2 09
Attention m ust also be given to the social m o b i l ity of the E n glish aristocracy. For all its e xclusiveness, this go ver nin g class was not a dosed group, nor had it been as far back as the t we l ft h century. A fter 1 066, pri mogen iture had bee n introd uced with specific reference to the l a nd holdings of knights, but grad ually the princ ipl e w a s a pplie d more gen erally. By preventing the d ivision of est
of
to b r i n g fu l l powe rs from t h ose w h om should be o rd a i ned by common co u n se l . A
the co m m o n s a re
they re p rese n t to execu te w h a t
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
2 1 0
bod )' const i t u ted in t h i s m a n n e r is t h e co n se nt o f s u c h
a
bod )' is
a
a
pa r l i a m c n t ; w h a t the king e n acts w i t h
st a t ll l c
.
.
.
.
T h u s be fo re t h e e n d o f t he t h i r
t ee n t h ce n tu r y t h e n a t i o n a l asse m b l y is ce a s i n g
to
co m i n g an asse m hl y of t h e c s t a t e s of t he re a l m
c l e r g y , ba ro n s , and
co m m o n s ,
w o r k ; t h is s e e m s to h;I \'e bee n
.
a
be .
.
.
fe u d a l co u r t ; i t i s be
T h e th ree e s t a t e s
are
t h o s e w ho p r a y , t h o se w ho figh t , t h o se w h o
c o n s id e r e d a n
e x h a u st i ve c1assi tic a t io n o f t h e
d i verse cond i t i o n s o f m e n . H
The Lor d s were an exc l u s i v e class a s se m b l y but a l a r ge n u m ber o f bar ons who be l o n g ed to the same class as the Lords were excl uded fro m that asse mbly . 4 8 And i n l a te r years the H o u se of Lords was co m po s ed not o n l y of b a ro n s b u t also o f b ish o ps who had rece ived a spec i al ,
s u m mo n s . Whe n aristocrats i n te ract w i t h o ther s t ra t a
at co u rt , when many of sons become com moners while other com moners are ra i s e d i n r a n k , when ran k i tse l f is g i v e n no fi rm institutional fo und a t io n , o n e may ex pect m a n y overl a ppin g grades of gen t i lity. In the fo urteenth and fi f teenth centu ries, t he great majority o f l a n do w n i n g squ ire s had very modest estates; th us, wealth did n ot mark them o ff from their no n aris tocratic neigh bors. Nor was there any other single criter io n of aristocratic status. Rather, ge n tili t y was rec og n ized by des c e n t as well as b y "achieve men t , " by types o f ho use hold or m il i t a r y service, and nega t ive ly b y dis dain for m a n ual l a bor b o o k l e a rn i n g and retail t rade. In fact criteria o f ra n k varied at the di ffe ren t levels of the soc i al h i e rarchy. For the peerage a n d great, no nbaronial landed fam ilies, gentility meant a n u n q u e st i o n e d e1tioyment o f status a nd power based on wealth derived from land. B u t i n the service o f the ro yal co u rt or the great magnates, g e n t i lity was also d e r i ve d fro m the respo nsibl e fu nc tio n s pe r f o rmed on be half of a g reat lord . In t he case of the landed ge ntry of moderate or small means, gen t i l ity imp l ie d freedom fro m m an ual labor and the respect d ue to su c h ran k s of gove rnmenta l or m i lita r y service as were within their reach . The lesser ge n try still modeled i ts l i fe st yle on the patterns established by t he gre a t lords-eve n if it d id not serve the ki n g or b a ro n s d i rectl y In the course of time, crite ria o f ach i eve m e n t i m pe rce ptibly ble n ded with t hose of a sc r i ptio n at this m iddle level. Skill and k nowledge had been considered m e n ia l q u a l i t ies u n t il rou g hly the fi fteenth ce ntury. But d uri ng the sixteenth c entury sons of noble fam ilies found classical education (like ph ilosophy, rhetoric) serviceable i n their careers at court , i n p a rl ia me n t or in the pe r fo r m a n c e o f ad m i n istr ative functions. Ac cord i n gl y , skiII a n d know led ge came to gi ve new overtones to t he co n c ept i o n o f gen til i ty 4 9 So many o ve rlapp i ng criteria o f ran k suggest that the English soc i al h ie r a rc h y was relatively flexible. I n add i t io n , the co m positio n of th e ar i s t o c r ac y cha n ge d due to po l it i c al and economic upheavals. Of the fifty th e i r
,
-
,
,
.
,
.
-
ENGLAND
2 1 1
t hr ee lay lo rds who had been s u m moned to p ar l ia m e nt be fo re the War o f th e Ro s es , o n ly t w e n t y n i ne rece ived a s u m m o n s to the fi r s t parlia m e nt of He n r y V I I , i n 1485.50 More i m portant we re sub seq ue n t c ha n ges : as t h e terr i to ri a l po sse s s i o n s of t h e grea t fa m il i e s d e c l i n e d , so d i d t hei r in flu ence . I n 1 559 eighte e n o ut o f si x t y t w o fa m i l ie s owned se venty m a n o rs or mo r e ; by 1 641 o n l y six o ut o f one h u ndred twe n t y -one fa m i l i e s had hold ings o f t h a t s i ze . 5 1 Persec u tion o f i n d i v i d u a l fa m i l ies b y t h e ea rl y Tudor ki ngs, i n fe r t i l i t y , exile, and t h e fai l u re o f t h e Tudors t o create n ew la nded fam i l i e s , m e a n t t h a t by 162 0 o n l y o ne fa m i l y o f peers was left o f those who had dom inated s oc ie ty a n d po litic s in t h e late fi f tee nt h ce ntu ry. B ut t h i s d ec l i ne of old fa m i l ies w as more t h an m a tched by t he rise o f n e w ones. When the Stua rts came to powe r , they sought to bolster their political and fi n ancial p o s i t i o n by a p ro fu s i o n of honors bestowed o n a l a r ge n umber of new fa m il ies. At lowe r levels , the sa me flexibil ity l ed to re lative ly c lose e co n o m ic and social relations o f the gentry w i th merch a n t fa m i lies, Lo ndon law ye rs , and city officials. Membe rs of the gen try s howed co n siderable in terest in who lesale trade, tho ugh that inte rest re m ained i n termittent and did not become a regular occ u patio n . But the gentry d re w a line at fa m i l y relations. Eve n aristocrats of lower ran k were ev i de n t l y rel uctant to acce pt pro m i ne n t com moners as guard ians for their children or to give their daugh ters in marriage to mercha nt families without land. 5 2 Such prac ti ce s re veal a n intere s t i n g sense o f priorities. The ge n try would forego t he adv a n ta ges of birth m o r e rea d i l y than those o f la ndowne r ship, and in turn prominent London commone rs aspired above a l l to the gre a t prestige of a li fe style associated with land o w n e r s h i p and a co un try residence . 5 3 T h i s discussion of t h e English aristocracy h a s e m phasized i t s con siderable internal mobility. I h ave not a tte m p te d a j u d gment on the is s u es raised by the "gentry controve rsy" in which sc h ol a rs have assessed the changing eco nomic fo rtunes of the aristocracy as causes of th e En glish revolution. I t is p robable t h a t t h e economic fo rtu n e s o f t he ge ntry rose from the late sixtee n t h to the m iddle of the seventeen t h ce ntury , while those o f t h e peerage declined. B u t it i s ce rta i n that this cha nge did not seriously d isturb the ruling ideas of t he age which j u d ged peo ple in te rms of the honor or dign ity attached to their po s i t io n in soc ie ty. Social commentators from the time of Henry V I I I to the early e igh teenth ce ntu ry divided E n gli s h m e n i nto nobility, burge sses , yeomen, and laborers. The nobility was divided, in turn , i nto t he kin g and the peerage, on the one hand, and the l es ser ran k s o f k n i gh t s esq u i res, and gentlemen, o n the other. U n like the peerage , these lesser ra n ks o f the gentry did not e njoy legally sanctioned privileges . B u t although peerage an d gen try constituted se parate ran ks, bot h t o ge the r com prised an ar-
-
,
212
THE AUTHORITY OF KINGS
istocracy that was internally diffe ren tiated by age of title, family emi nence, size of landed income, o pulence of life style, dignity of office, and regional or neighborhood i m portance. Le gal enactments and com mon parlance alike labeled men by their recogn ized soc ial ran k and vig orously enforced the e lementary d istinction between those who were gentlemen and those who were not. The disti nction was crucial, for the great majority o f the peo ple were not gentlemen and were conseq uently excluded from all exercise of authority. In 1 565 Sir Thomas S m ith de fined them as having "no voice nor authoritie in our common wealth, and no accoun t is made of them but onelie to be ruled , and not to rule other," a sentiment echoed more than two ce ntu ries later when Edm und Burke declared that the state suffers oppression i f persons in servil e em plo yment are permitted to rule. 54 England is our fourt h exam ple o f a society in which poli tical lead ership was restricted to a ruling minority of the population. Political leaders h i p pres upposed economic a ffluence and the econom ic and so cial exploitation of large numbe rs of peo ple . Only those who could af ford not to work had access to court or parliament or the decision-mak ing bodies of local governm ent. But wealth alone was not enough, since many econom ically successful men from modest family backgrounds were excluded from active political partici pation. Only gentlemen were recognized as eligible for public functions, though one could ad vance into that ran k through the purchase of land and ada ptation to the life style of the gentry. When these cond itions were met, a modest family background did not bar a man for long from playing a political role if he wished, and i t certainly did not bar his son . Accordingly, we must attend to this combination of status attributes, landed wealth, and local authority which together account for the political predominance of the En glish aristocracy. The authority of government was divided between the crown and its court society, on the one hand, and the counties, on the other. In a predominantly agricultural economy, land was t he chief source of wealth and the shire was the most effective unit of government. At this local level, the E n glish government of the sixteenth century was com para tively active and efficient. R. H . Tawney states that "the ordinary rela tionships between social classes [at the local level were made] the ma chinery for executing the mandates of the State, b y entrust ing ad ministration . . . to persons who already possessed local authority, and who were con firmed in it, rather than given it, by the Crown. "55 Ine v itably, local politics mirrored the class inte rests of this group, given the overwhelming predom inance o f justices o f the peace, sheriffs, and lord
213
ENGLAND
li eu te na nt s recruited from th e l e ad i n g gentry families. At the l oc a l level th e cr own did not exe rt press u re to alter this s tate o f affairs, t hou g h i t was c a pa bl e o f i n t er ve n t i o n i n o rd e r to mi t i ga te the hardships o f local rule . 5 6
T h i s j u xtaposition o f c o u n t y po l i tics a n d ro yal gove rn m e n t i s
a
char
ac te ristic feature o f En g l is h soc ie t y from the sixtee n t h ce n t u ry o n wa rd . T h e c ro w n ' s powe rs o f a p po i n t m e n t t o local o ffice were u n c h a l l e n ged ,
and a l l a ppoi n tm e n t s went to local
n o ta bl e s
on
the
ass u m ptio n that pub
lic a ffa i rs would be i n t h e hands of those who " ha ve s o m e co n n ec t io n
w i t h the inte rests and fort u n e s o f t he co u n t r y. "5 7 N o d o ub t it w a s sel fi s h p r id e t o assume t h a t wea l t h a n d status w e re i n ti m a te l y l i n ked w i t h a c a p ac i t y to j udge pu b l i c a ffa i r s . B ut the sa m e prid e was a l so co m b i ned w i t h a w i l l i n gne s s to se r ve w i t h o ut salary and l a t e r to s pe n d la rge s u m s in election c a m pa i gn s
w it h o ut
we re count ies i n w h ich
p ro m i s e o f i m mediate
re w a r d .
There
a sin gle fam i l y ' s wea l t h a n d status we r e u n c h al len ged . M e m bers of s u c h fam i l ies would c o m pe t e for preced e nce and favors o n l y at t he r o ya l court. I n m a n y c o u n t i e s , however, rural s o c i ety was rife w ith con te n tion a m o n g fa m i l i e s s e e k i n g the honor of u nsal a ried office in local affa i r s . Som e times t he r e pe r c u s s i o n from these local ri val ries would reach the co u rt a nd pa r l i a m ent . By the power of a p poi nt ment and by new d istributions o f ro y a l favors, the c ro w n " reso l ved" those disputes among l o c a l ge n try fa m i l ies w h ic h reac h e d its atte n tio n . Th us, in the ab se nc e o f n a t i o n w i d e and conti n uo u s ad m i n i st ratio n , the ro y a l govern ment was l i n ked with loc a l ad m i n istrat i o n i n t he s h ire s a n d h u n d reds ( see G l o s s ar y ) .
The soc ial s tan d ing o f fa m i l i e s was e x p re ssed in part by the n u m be r of l i ve rie d retainers w h o se rved their lord in his co untry residence and in London . These re ta i n e rs wo uld also serve the role o f h e nc h m e n wh o occasionally fo ug h t pi tc he d ba ttles to settle a pe rs on a l q u a rr e l in t h eir mas ter's be h a l f. B ut the sixtee n t h and e a r l y se ve n tee nth cen t u r ies saw a d ec l i n e in the n u m be r of reta i ne rs. I n part, economic c ha n ges w e re res p o ns i b l e for the com m u tation o f service obl i gations into re nt. The m o un ti n g com petit ion for p l ac e at court precl uded overt a ggre s s io n . Also, in an e ffort to curb violence t he c ro w n meted o u t c o n s pi c uo us p u n i s h m e n t to reta iners who had committed cri mes at the be hest of a great lo rd. These pe n alt ie s toge ther with the i n c rease of abse n tee o w n ership he l ped to u n de r m i n e the traditional role o f retainersY' B u t i f a rmed retain e rs were o n the d e c l i n e , the p r ac t i c e o f clientage wa s not. I n the co u n ti es , m o st of t he ge ntry fa milies g ro u pe d the mselves around a few great m e n , t he yo unger sons often t a k i ng serv ice in the patron 's household.59 The patron-cl ien t re lat i o n s h i p was not con fi ned to such
service.
214
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
I n a world o f d e pe n d e n t s , i n d e pe n d e n c e was
a
q u ixotic l u x u r y . The s m a l ler
man fou n d frie n d s h i p , pa t m n age , a n d protection i n t h e syste m . The great m a n ga i n ed re p u tation a n d powe r : he made m a n i fest h i s g reat ne s s b y t he n u m be r o f ge n t l e m e n w h o m he c o u l d on occ a s i o n s u m mo n to fol lo w h i m
.
. . . I n e v i ta b l y , t h i s t e n d e n c y of t he ge n t r y to mo \'e w i t h i n t h e orbit o f so m e
m a g n a t e provoked or i n t e n s i fied r i v a l r y , w h i c h pe rco lated t h ro u g h fro m t h e h i ghest to t he l o w e s t ran k s o f t h e ge rw"y a n d e v e n
to
t h e i r tenan t r y . 6 0
He re is another rea son w h y in t h is pe r iod sons from aristocratic fa m ilie s i n c reas i ngl y flocked to the I n n s of Co u rt . As d i rect a ggre ss io n decl i ned, litiga tio n c a m e to be used to a n noy o n e s e n e m ies and pe rh a ps im pov e r is h the m . Du r i n g El izabet h ' s re i g n a l o n e t h e n u m be r of bills l o d ged '
in the Star C h a m be r a n d in t h e C o u rt of R eq ue s ts in c re a se d te n fo l d T he enlarge m e n t o f the Ho use o f Com mo n s is another i nd i ca t ion o f m o u n t i n g co n te n t io us ne ss a r i si n g as i t did from local i n itia tive a n d i n volving a large n um be r o f bitte rl y fo u g h t e lectoral co n tes ts . Dur i ng the sixtee n th ce n t u ry t he H o u se i n c reased from 296 to 462 members, .
,
to w h ich another 45 members were added under the early Stuarts . G 1 W i th a l l freeholders w ort h fo rt y s h i l l i n gs a year e n titled t o vote, county elections were a "m ustering o f t he com m u n ity . . . [wh ich] furnished an o pportunity . . . of tes t i ng the social standing o f an individual or the relative st rengt h o f r iva l gro u ps and pa rtie s . T h o ug h Elizabethan stat utes enco u ra ge d the parliame ntary re presentation of cities and bor o u gh s over "co u n try gentl e me n , in p ra c ti c e the latter were favored four to one.62 Landed fa m ilies contin ued to fu rnish a substantial majority of the Ho use o f Com mons until 1 868 and still a sl ig h t m �or it y in the par liament o f 1 8 80. 63 Lasting dom inance did not ensure i nternal tranquility . From the liti gati on s and electoral contests of the Elizabethan period to the twelve fiercely fought general elections between 1 689 and 1 7 1 5 , rivalries of long standing made for political controversy. The convulsions of the CromweIlian revol ution resulted in a rapidly i ncreasing n umber of free holders entitled to vote at the local level . Aristocratic dom inance was part l y res ponsible for this increase i n the electorate, because it put a premi u m o n the m ultiplication o f freeholds, com missions, and be nefices that were considered property. "
"
E n gland was li tte red w i t h t hem , m y riad m a rks of status, of possession , of pro fi t : stewards of h u n d reds. precentors of cathedrals. bead les of corpora tions. Usually these o ffices we re h e l d for l i fe a nd t he y all enjoyed standing and status within the co m m u n i t y the y adorned ; most of them carried a vote. S u c h free holds bred i n d e pendence, truculence. a w i l l i n gness to fi ght and lit i gate that bordered on n e u rosis, and yet when they co nglome rated . as i n t he u n i versities. the cathedral cities. and the Pa r l i a me n tary boroughs. they could bu ild u p i n to fo r m idable h e a ps of poli t ical i n fluence. Di ffic u l t to d isci pline.
ENGLAND se c u re in their sel l� i m port ance , their holde rs, with t he ge n t r y , beca m e the lea de rs of p u bl ic o pi n ion o ll lside . London and the great tow n s , an o pinion t ha t p ro v e d easy to i n fl uence - t h ro ugh newspa pe rs, pam phlets, and ballads -but h a rd to m anage . 5 4
e m p h a si z e s the co ntrast be tween this contentiousness and the litical stability o f a r u l i n g o li ga rc h y wh i c h c har a c t e ri zed th e l a t e r e i g h po
Pl u mb
teenth and in lesser degree parts o f the nineteenth century . Landown ership was the key to bot h a r i stoc r a t ic i n figh t i ng and the overall stability o f the E n gl i s h aristocracy as a governing cl a ss . T h e fa m i l y estate was the basis of aristocratic governance. The fi ia l se c u ri ty a n d soc i a l s t a t u s a sso c ia ted w i t h la n do wne r s hi p facili a nc n ta ted the control of ten an ts i n l oc al a n d par l i a me nta r y elections as well as the dom inance and deference t y p ic a l o f pat r on - c l i e n t relations . In addition , land was made a "vehicle of fam ily pu r pos e " through the " st r ic t settlement" wh ich came into p ro m i n e nc e in t h e late seventeenth
centu ry. The se a rrangemen ts were most com monly m ade a t the marriage o f the heir, an d they secured that the estate, or the greater part o f it, descended i n tact to him , but descended o n te rms w h ich greatly lim ited his power to sell and mortgage it. Once the deed o f settleme n t was signed , the descent o f the estate was settled for a gene ration a head. Except by promoting a private Act of Parliament to break the settlemen t, there was no way by w h ich the owner could obta i n com plete con trol o f the estate u n til the eldest son o f the m ar riage came of age . As a corol l ary, the settle ment pro vided that the yo u n ger c hildren of the marriage should receive a n n u i ties or capital sums cha rged u pon the e state . .
.
.
In the longterm interests of the fa mily [ the st rict settle
ment th usl limited the im mediate in terests of its re pre se ntative for the time being.65
With every ge n e r at i o n the need to form ulate the te rms of the settlement arose anew and thus provi d ed an op po rtu n i t y to define and i mpl eme n t the will o f the fa m i l y as a u n i t . A lt h o u g h this l e ga l device wa s used rather flexibly, i t s effect was to i m ped e the sale or dispersion of estates and hence to buttress the con t i n u i ty and do mina nce of old and new aristo c ra ti c fa m il i e s . The c ountr y reside nces o f the landed gentry were the social centers of t h e locality; the enormo us number of room s accommodated large households and the many guests who came freq uen tl y . Many prom ine nt families also main tained a London residence t o which they would move dur i n g the " se as on . " As t h e new wealth of prominent merchants and lawyers flowed into coun try residence and landed estates , the old wealth of t he landed gentry flowed i n to the es ta b li shmen t o f e l abora t e urban residences. The Lo ndon residences facilitated co m peti t ion for influence
216
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
at co urt and the claims to h i gh status mani fest in conspicuous hospitality and consum ption . The great houses o f seventee nth- and eighteenth century London were the tow n reside nces o f the landed gentry rather than o f an urban patriciate , as i n Holland or I taly.66 For the English ge ntry , u rban soph ist ication and the pursuit o f pre fe rme n t a t the center of affa i rs existed side by side with a socially and econom ica l l y active l i fe i n the cou n try. At the end of the " seaso n , " the fa mil y returned to its co untry residence, where even the great m a gnates spent the bulk of the i r time. W h i le hospitality, h unting, and other di versions absorbed a good deal of t heir leis u re , the head of t he ho use and h is w i fe also devoted time to estate and household manage ment. These landed ge ntry were re ntiers depending on tenants to fa rm their lands. U n like many re ntiers, however, they took an active interest in t heir esta tes, because the payments o f thei r tenants provided the most im portant source o f their i ncome. By 1800 income from urban and mining property also becam e an im porta nt so urce o f reven ue fo r the gentry, and i ncome from o fficeholding had become a sizable s upple ment to their land rents.67 Prominent writers linked landed property with the right to an active s hare in gove rnment. 68 Since the seventeenth century some landowners had built canals, engaged in wholesale trade , or taken an i n te rest in m i n i n g and real estate. With land the main source of t heir wealth, how ever, the gentry were predom inantly consumers and borrowers.69 Nevertheless, in their public role these men showed a lively awareness of economic a ffairs as a whole. During the eigh teenth century, parlia mentary debates tu rned large l y on financial and commercial q uestions, i ndicatin g an orientatio n "we should rather have expected in a middle c lass Parliament than in a Parliament consisting in a very large measure o f the nominees of great families."70 A n umbe r of aristocratic political leaders of the eighteenth century stud ied trade and finance because they considered co m petence in these fields a prereq uisite of poli tical lead ership. The classical learn ing o f the time d id not prevent the English gentry from becom ing cham pion s of com merce . 7 1 Give n t h e customary aristocratic disdain o f menial a n d clerkly oc cupations, some ex planation of this anomaly is required. The in terest of some English landowners in w holesale trade can be documented as far bac k as the fo urteenth century. English commerce was clo sely linked with overseas trade, which benefi ted from the national prestige of sea faring, ex ploration , and piracy in past centu ries and from the s pecial im portance o f the navy for the defense of an island nation . 72 At the sa me time, the English gentry hard ly di m i n ished its disdain for trade and contin ued to use government offices as a soc ial prerogative until wel l into the nineteenth century. Hence, it is at least plausible to attribute
217
ENGLAND
the gentry's cham pions h i p o f commerce to its lon gstandi n g sel f-identi fication as the E n glish ruling class and to its pragmatic identification with the national interest. Landed gentlemen might pro fit from t rade a nd m i n i n g but they advanced commerce a n d i n d u s t ry as a national i nte rest i n t he sa me w a y in w h ich t hey performed the fu nctions o f local gov ern ment without salary . 73 The po l i t ica l dom i n a nce of the E n gl ish ge n try came to be increas a t od d s with t he de c li n i n g eco n o m ic s i gn i fi ca n c e of l a n d o w n e rsh i p y gl in course o f the n ineteenth c ent u ry 74 B u t a s t h e co m bin a t io n o f n the i w ea l t h based on l a n d was weakene d , other mea ns w e re fo und tus and a st t ain the gen try' s poli t i c al prestige. An aristocratic way of l i fe i n ma i n to creasingl y i l l-ada pted t o the values a n d p ra c tices of a busi ness c ivi l izati o n was tra n s m itte d and re i n fo rced thro u g h t he p u b l ic sc hoo l sy stem w h ich gained s pecial prominence d u ri n g t he n i netee nth ce ntury . 7 5 A privi leged ed ucation now buttressed the con ti n ued domi nance of the gentry in English public life, and the s pirit inculcated by the public schoo ls fa cilitated the acce ptance o f this gove rning class by a "deferential society." Fo llowing the Reform Act o f 1 86 7 , Walter Bagehot pointed o ut that the mass of householders who were entitled to vote acce pted as a matter o f course that they would be represented b y their su periors in ran k and wealth, whom a good many also considered their superiors "in the more intangible qualities of sen se and knowledge . " Five yea rs later H ippolyte Taine re ported one o f the greatest E n glish industrialists as saying that men of the middle class were read y to leave the govern ment and high offices in the hands of the aris tocracy, because these men were "born and bred to the work for ge nerations." But there s hould be no medi ocrities and no ne potism : " Let them govern , but let them be fit to gov ern. "76 I f such acknowled g m e n t was g rud gi n g or hostile, the a ris toc racy met it with a disdain and indifference which have left re percussions in English society to this d ay. ,
.
7 K I N GS H I P AND ARI STOC RACY AS A TYPE O F RULE
THE A UTHOR I TY O F K I NGS
T
H E COUNTRIES ruled by kings may have been slow to cha n ge socially and economically, but politically they were scenes of tu rmoil and bloodshed . Protracted feuds fill the an nals of royal history. Why was this so? What explains the almost uni versal poli tical instability o f these co un tries? What chronic uncertainties pla gued the relations between ki ngs and aristocrats or lay at the bottom of royal attempts to assert effective rule? Consider the king's predicamen t. H is aim is to rule his land ac cord ing to his will by relying on others to do his bidding. To this end, he has various means at his disposal, but each o f them is flawed and none is ultimately depen dable . The king may see k to enforce his will by awin g his subjects with d isplays of m�esty and reminders o f his consecrated position. In his defeat, Shakespeare's King Richard ex presses these aspects of royalty: . . . thus long have we stood To watc h the fea r fu l be n d i n g of thy knee , Because we thought o u rse l f t h y law ful k i n g :
A n d i f we be , how dare t h y j oints forget
To pa y their a w fu l d u t y to o u r prese nce? If we be n O l , show u s t h e hand o f God That h a th d i s m ist u s from o u r steward s h i p ;
Fo r wel l w e k n o w , n o h a n d o f blood a n d bo n e C a n gripe t h e sac red h a n d le o f ou r sceptre, U n less he do pro fa n e , steal, or u s u r p . A n d t ho ugh y o u t h i n k t h at al l , as you have d o n e ,
Have t o r n t h e i r so u ls by t u rn i n g them fro m
218
us,
KINGSHIP AND A R IS TOCRA C Y And
we a re
219
·ba rren a n d bere ft o f fi-ie n d s ;
Y e t know, m y m as ter, God o m n i poten t ,
I s m us te r i n g i n h i s d o u d s , o n o u r be h a l f,
A r m ies of pe s t i l e nce ; and t h e )' s h a l l s t r i k e
Yo u r c h i l d ,-e n r e t u n bo r n a n d u n bego t ,
T h a t li lt yo u r v a s s a l h a n d s a ga i n s t m y h e a d , A n d t h re a t t he gl o r y o f m y p recioll s c rown R I C H A R D I I , ACT I I I , s c �: s t: i I i
The grandeu r of t h e s u preme ruler a n d the a p peal to ra n k , to God's grace, and to the a ppalli n g co nseq uences of usu rpa t ion have political utility- The t h rea t of fo rce p l ay s a large role in any type o f rule, and the king's m aj esty and con secration s y m bo li z e this threat and help p reserve po li t ical order. A p pe a ls, of cou rse , may be e m pty , as K i n g Richard ' s are, an d even effective di s p l a y s o f m aj e st y may d rain a k i n g 's coffers and put him in n eed of more substa ntial aids to his rule_ M o r e o v e r, a ki ng's more wealthy and powerful s u bj e cts may so co n t r i v e to exalt th e majest y of th e i r ruler that he becomes immobilized . Majesty a lo n e is too fickle a servant o f a k i n g's will to e n s u re his e ffe c t iv e rule, and neithe r will con secration d e pe n d a b ly serve h i m . O n e i s t em pte d t o s a y that what a king rea l ly needs t o carry o u t h i s rule i s fo rce by w hic h he c a n bac k u p hi s com mands a n d sec u re his needed res o u rces. But fo rce , while always needed, is not sufficient, fo r there is n e ve r eno ugh o f it to make the k i n g 's will p r e v a i l i n the lon g run . Nevertheless, k ings have resorted to violence so often because the other means of r u l e are also i ne ffect i ve or cou nterprod uctive . The bestowal of ro yal favors has al w a ys been a p re fe rred method of luring s u bj e cts into obedience. These favors co uld range from mas sive grants of l a n d and rights to a mere token of regard , sometimes no mo re t h an fle e t i ng access to the roya l presence. K i ng s have had a n in te re st in i nc re as i ng these pe rso n a l i ze d assets , tho ugh o n l y up to a point. For s inc e the king must have re a l benefits to dis tr ib ute i f access to his person is to mean anything, he must be s pa r i n g with his gra n t s and even with the distribution of honors, lest with p ro l i fe ra t i o n each award be reduced in value. Of the favors a k i n g has to distribute, those of rank and office are perhaps most in ti ma te l y con nected with the ac hi ev e m e n t of his p u r poses. I d e a l l y for a king, t he attainment of r a n k or o ffice within his realm is a p ri vil e ge , not s o m e thing to which anyone can acq u i re a legal
claim. The king a l o n e is the arbiter of social ran k , and his supremacy is s u s t a i n ed by the ove rwh e lm ing consen t of all those w h o s e pos it ion would be i m p a ire d if royal s u p re m ac y w e re q u e st i o n e d . We are today u n acc u sto m e d to such a clear or de r ing of social s t a tus, but under ro yal au th or i ty status was de te r m in ed auth or i t at i v e ly. The ruler co ul d c han ge
220
THE A UTHO RITY O F KINGS
the po si ti o n of i n d ivid uals i n t h e ra n k order to suit his p u r pos e s Ideally, the n , t he k i n g is able to demote as well as pro mote, and he m ust not be co m e bo u n d by o b li ga t io n s a r i s i n g from h i s p re v i ou s favors . K i n g s e m plo y servan t s to exec u te their will. Such service is a p r i n c i pal a v e n ue of social a nd eco n om ic a d va n ce m e n t , both t h ro u gh speci al rew a r d s and t h ro u gh a port ion of th e reve n ue col lected i n re tu rn for t h e service pe r for med on be h a l f o f the k i n g . A k i n g s rule is probabl y most sec u re where t h e o ffic ia ls a p p o i n te d by him co m e fro m lower and educated social strata . T h i s is o ne reason w h y the Ottoman e m p i re s t a ffe d i t s armies and adm inistrative corps with slaves of foreign orig in w h o we re ed ucated in spec ial sc hools and c o n v e rt ed to Islam . For m uch the same reasons, tsarist governments chose to recruit i n c re asi n g num bers o f o fficials from the r a n k s of educated a ris tocrats a n d co m m o ne rs , t h us freeing the regime from the o b li g a t i o n t o em p l o y aristocrats with out r eg a rd to ab i l i t y . By such methods, it is possible to reject in he rited p r i v ilege s and make soc ial rank and the distribu tion o f wealth (through officeholdi ng) de pend p r i ma r il y on merit. .
'
Thus, a king seeks to maxim ize his control ove r the c a reers of all s ubordinate officials . Their ten ure of o ffice is typically short, de pending as i t does on a favor granted or withdrawn at will. The ruler can max im ize his power only i f he can com pel incumbent officials to pass on to him a large share of the taxes they collect. Yet tem porary o ffice holding also means t ha t the inc umbents will try to enrich the mselves as qu ickly as the y can and man ipulate the office so as to adva nce their subseq uent caree rs. They w i I I act toward the po pulat ion as a rbit ra r i l y as the ruler acts toward the m . Arbi trariness is an instrument of rule, for it provides t h e ruler with a n e ffective test of instant obedience by large n umbers of subordinates, even if it fails to accom plish any other end . Arbitrariness cre ates fear of royal dis pleasure and may be cond ucive to obed ience . A d ictatorial re gime cannot ach ieve stability, because to do so would require that it re frain from being arbitrary. But extreme arbitrariness as a main device o f governing is sel f-defeating, for sooner or later it will provoke either assassinations or the surreptitious mani pulation of the ruler by those who purport to do h i s bidd i n g. · Eve n if the lead i n g subjects of a despotic ruler are unable to do anything against his tyran n y , they are s u re to seek reven ge against his successor. Every ruler m ust delegate some of his authority, but he will try to kee p such d elega ti o n as revocable or provisional as he can. To this end, a king may visit the di fferent parts of h is realm and by his re peated presence rei n force his au thority over his subjects. H e may send j udges or admin istrators on circuit to act in his be half and m ake the presence of royal au t hor i t y felt even in the abse nce of his perso n . Or the king
22 1
KINGSHIP AND ARISTOCRA C Y
m a y e m ploy various devices to e n s u re that h i s will is obeye d . Delegation o f au thority may be of short d u ratio n ; officials may be excluded from a re as in w h ic h they have pe rso n a l ties ; their so ns or other relatives may be c alled on to serve as co u rtie rs , reta iners, o r hostages a t co u rt so that t h e o fficial m us t fear fo r t he i r sa fe t y . N evertheless, t he vassals, re ta i n e r s and o fficials o f t h e k i n g can use th e i r statu s and resources to develop t h e i r own po we r S u bi n fe u d a tion pa rti a l ly removes their own de pendents from the con tro l o f the c rown and adds to their i nco me t he pay ments o f their subvassals . At court, succes s fu l com pe t i tion fo r the king's favor can lead to red uctions i n the se rvic es or pay men ts owed , as we l l as to a d va n tageo us m a rriages . Royal go ve rn men t is e x po se d to e ffo rts by subord i n a tes to a p p ro p r i a t e the a ut hor ity delegated or gra n ted to the m . J ust a s under ro yal gove r n m e n t all rank and office ideally de pend on t he king's will, so, ideal l y , no one possesses a n i n vio l able righ t to ,
.
prope rty . The king own s a l l the l a n d . The poor m ust give their labor, the land and its prod uce m us t yield taxes, the rich m ust se rve an d pass on a portion of their reven ue, and the movable wealth o f commerce and industry m ust be at the govern ment's d is posa l . W h e n land a nd com merce show h i gh yields, gove r n m e n t co n fiscation o ften fo l lo w s . Officials search constantly for o p portun ities of taxation w h ic h pro m ise h i gh yields to t h e royal house and its serva n ts. Such rule is as i n i m ical to the free merchant class as it is to an inde pendent aristoc racy and for m uch the same reason : both gro u ps claim private rights. Royal aut hority de pe n d s i n t h e first place o n the k i n g ' s own re sou rces. Typical ly, a ruler will t r y to a u gment these reso urces by ex pan d i n g his doma i n wit hout wea ke n i n g co n trol ovel' it. But this do uble object.ive beco mes more d i ffic ult to acco m pl i s h w i t h eve ry successfu l ex pansion of the real m . More vassals or retainers are needed to ad m i n i ster the new a reas , and con trol may weaken where these n otables have in depende n t standing. To be s u re , even t he grea t magn ates of the realm accept some l i m itation of their powe r by virtue of the obligation t hey have assumed toward their ruler. Moreover, bot h sides couch the i r re lations in a la n gu a ge of sa nctified com m a n d a n d loyal obed ience , and these symbols have their own material conseq uences . B ut the expansion of a territory, or its inte ns i fied e x ploitation, m a y not i n the end lead to an enduring i ncrease of t h e ruler's pe rsonal a u t hority. For the balance of power between a ki n g and his gra n tees d e pe n d s on t he re so u rces available to each side and the strategic use they m a ke of the m . The poli tics of med ieva l h i sto ry osc il lated w i t h e fforts to d e fend the righ ts of t h e house hold o r e state. Such defense was o ften of a piece wi t h e fforts at aggrandizement. K i n gs and princes loo ked o n co nq uests of te � ritories, or on the ir acq u is i t io n through marriage a l l i a nces, as a means
THE A UTHORI1Y OF KINGS
222
of increasing their reso u rces and hence of obtaining additional services. At the lower end of the social hie rarchy, this defensive-o ffensive posture of the ruler was re flected i n the efforts of weaker men , fam ilies, or co m m u n ities to obtain the protection of a m aste r, no doubt frequentl y a m i xtu re o f the desire for secu rity and subm ission to brute force. As Marc B loc h put it with refere nce to the Merov ing i an per iod , E ve ryw h e re, t h e weak
l lI a n
powe r fu l . T he powe r fu l
h i s fo r t u n e o r eve n h i s
fe lt t h e need to be s h e ltered by s o meo n e
man , O W II
i n h is
tu rn ,
m o re
co u l d not m a i n t a i n h i s pres t i ge
or
s a f e t y e x c e p t by sec U l'i n g for h i m s e l f by pe r ,
s u a s i o n or coe rcion , t h e s u p po rt o f s u b o rd i n a t es bo u nd to h i s se rvice. On t h e a p roteC l o r ; o n t h e o t h e r , t h e re we re u s u rpat i o n s o f a u t ho r i t y , o ften by v io l e n t m e a n s . A n d as n o t i o n s o f
on e h a n d , t h e re was t he u rge n t q ue s t f o r
w e a k n e s s a n d stren g t h a re a l w a y s re la t ive , i n m a n y c a s e s t h e sa m e m a n oc c u pied a d u a l ro le-as a d e pe n d e n t of a m o re po we rful m a n a n d a protector of h u mbler ones . Thus t he r e be ga n to be bu i l t up a vast system of personal relatio n s h i ps w hose in te rsec t i n g t h reads ran fro m one leve l of the soc ial t u re to
struc
anothe r . 2
A ruler's authority de pends on i m ple mentation of his orders by sub ord inate j u risdictions. By the same token , s uch j urisd ictions m ust have their own ca pacity for action . To an extent, the ruler m ust accept the autonomy of his de pendents. B u t since his own position requires the collec tion of taxes in money and kind, he m ust also control their juris d iction s. The extent and limits of royal authority are thus uncertain , and this u ncertainty lies at the root of the protracted feuds w h ic h fill the annals o f medieval history . A traditional society w hich is rent by such feuds is often weakened by u ncertain bo undaries as well. Frontiers are not easily determined w here territorial holdings are at the same time more or less autonomous j u risdictions. The border areas of a kingdom are also a tem pting prize for the king' s rivals. As a result, the king's rule over t hese areas may be precarious. Moreover, the ki ng's own lands as well as the territorial and j urisdictional u nits of his grantees are often widely scattered owing to t he vagaries of inheritance, grants, and alliances, so that not only adja cent areas but even the same area may enjoy a variety of rights and owe allegiance to different rulers. U nder these conditions it is o ften possible for lerritorial j urisdictions to break away when this appears politically prom ising. T here are many instances in which t he division between two 1 ealm s is not marked by a frontier, but by a disputed jurisdiction like Aqu i taine and Scotland between England and France , or certain border areas between M uscovy and Lithuania. Where the fortunes o f me n wax and wane with t he fortunes of the house to which they belo n g, victory or defeat in j urisdictional feuds bears d irectly on the well-bein g of the in dividual. That well-being de-
KINGSHIP AND ARISTOCRA C Y
2 23
pen ds on the size and prod uctivity o f landholdings a n d on t he degree to w hich poli tical authorities can exact tribute in money or kind. Patri arc hal j u risd ictions are e n gaged , t he re fore, in e fforts to better the i r ho l din gs vis-a -vis t h e i r n e ighbors and t o lesse n the tribute p a i d t o their
r u le r. I n the abse nce o f stable frontiers , t hi s are n a o f i n te r n a l conflict s ta n ds ex posed to intrusions from the o u tside .
The result is bloody tu rmoil w h ich has re gu larly acco m pa n ied the
e ffor ts o f k i ngs to esta b l i s h t he i r a u thority over a countr y . Witness the rise o f the M uscovite d y nasty under M o n golian overlord s h i p , the pa i n
ful assertio n of Hohen zolle rn rule i n the eme r gi n g state o f Pruss i a , or
the role of the Norman conquest i n English history. J a pa n seems to be an exce pt ion o n l y because, as fa r as is know n , its early history was free of external threats ; neve r t heless, t he Yamato state was e stabli s hed through prolon ged stru ggl e s a gainst n ative tribe s and rival clans. In the fou r societies surveyed , external conditio n s o f early a u t hority formation as wel l as internal struggles for dominance h ave had lasting re percus sions for the d istinctive institutional structure of each co untry. It has always proved d ifficult to stabilize the a u thority o f kings. Monarchical rule does not have a good solutio n to the problem of succes sion . I n heritance of the crown is easily u pset by biological failure or by rival claims among members of the royal family. Uncertainty is also pro duced by the necessity to delegate authority , as well as the vagaries of foreign entan glements by means of which the king and his gran tees seek
to tip the inte rnal balance of power. These and related reasons of po litical i nstability undoubtedly im pose great burd e n s on t he population
at large , and o n occasion these burdens lead to popular revolts . Never theless, internal political instability mostly a ffects the ruling grou ps di
rectly co ncerned with the a ffairs of the kingdom , and poli tical instability probably has coexisted with a marked degree of social stability . The bulk
of the popu lation lived i n isolated com m u n ities and house holds. Peo ple could do little to change the ir condition . Most of the time , life near the level of subsistence discou raged even the most courageous from actions
that wou ld jeopard ize s uc h secu rity as they e njoye d . Ki ngs a nd their notables could fight their protracted battles for do m i na nce at home and abroad only on the basi s of this politically submerged but economically active populatio n . Chronic u nce rtainty and protracted feuds a r e pervasive features of royal authority , yet patria rchal rule has been fou n d compatible with household government, the delegation of authority, and world e m pires, as well as various forms o f tribal political orders in w h ich authority re sides in the heads of lineage grou pS . 3 The authority o f kings m ay be unstable , but it gives rise to d i fferent political structures.
Hereditary K ingship In Weste rn Europe accord i n g to the medieval ideal o f hereditary success ion. the e ldest son would fol low his father as the head o f the house . a n d t h i s il lustration s hows the eldest son assoc iated w i t h the king in power. In France. the C a petian dynasty
(987 - 1 328) w h ich 350 years. Each
fol l owed the Carolin gia n . had an u n bro ken line o f male desce n d a n ts for
Capetian king was care fu l to have h i s son c rowned k i n g be fore his ow n deat h . (British
Museum)
225
KINGSHIP AND ARISTOCRA C Y
During the early development of royal authority, ki n gshi p has fretl y a ppeared in two forms, ali Mac hiavelli noted in The Prince : en u q K i n gd o m s k n o w n to h i story h a ve be e n gover n e d i n two w a y s :
e i t h e .·
by a
princ e a n d h i s se rv a n t s , w h o , as m i n i ste rs by h i s grace a n d pe r m i s sio n , a s s i s t i n gove rn i ng t h e real m ; or by a p ri nce a n d by ba ro n s, w h o h o l d t h e i r posi t i o n s
not by favor of t he r u l e r b u t by a n tiq u i t y o f blood . 4
The distinction points to the patrimonial (autocratic) and the feudal pr inc iple of organizatio n . The first em phasizes rule through pere m p to ry com mands by the k i n g and his servants i n the royal house hold. The seco nd e m phasizes the association be tween the k i n g and notables whose families possess standin g in the com m u n ity on the basis of ancient lin eage, wealth, and the authority which acco m panies these attributes. The king recogn izes the positio n of these grea t families and he nce rules th ro u gh gran ts o f rights in return for service. In practice, the two forms of kin gship have coe xisted ; thus, the servants and the magnates of the realm constitute the "governing ng's ki class." 5 Patrimonialism is the kind o f autocratic rule the king and his great vassals exercise over their households and domains. The e mphasis is on the exercise of authority within a household. Feudalism means a "type of government . . . which [is] marked by the division o f political po wer among many lords and by the tendency to treat political power as a private possession . "6 Here the em phasis is on the exercise of au thority ( however tenuo us) by the king's cou rt over many patrimonial households, and hence o n the relations between the cou rt and these many households. Transitions between these two aspects of kingship occur frequently because servants obeying the king's command may acq uire rights and turn into feudal vassals, wh ile magnates o f high standing may lose their rights despite their ancient lineage. Howe ve r , the patrimonial and feudal aspects of kin gshi p may be e mphasized sepa rately. In Russia, the tsar treated the entire real m and its peo ple as h is personally owned domain (autocracy). Under this rule, officials were granted authority only to enable them to i mplement the will of the tsar. In England, by contrast, the Plan tagenet d ynasty e m phasized feudal rule allowing for much local autonomy. The kings were frequently absen t from the coun try and left the conduct of a ffairs i n the hands of high officials whom they authorized to act in the name o f the king. The patrimonial or autocratic as pect of kingshi p typically presup poses the exaltation of the ruler, whose majesty stands above mortal law because he is believed to be divine or in privileged contact with the higher powers venerated by the people. The most ord i n a r y m a n b ec o me s awe - i n s p i r i n g when e ncased in th e riches
of a h u ge rea l m and all the pom p huma n s ca n devise ; s u r ro u n d e d by gli tter
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS a nd jeweled t r a p pi n gs , w i t h color a n d page a n t r y i n fi n i t e l y beyond ord i n a r y m e n , t h e hallowed a utocrat seem s su pe rh u m a n to the s i m ple , and t i n gles the nerves even of the educated . . . . Power, no m a tter how co me by, is almo st eq u i v a l e n t to great ne s s in the
o r d i n a ry
es timation ; when it is made m a n i fest
by a b r i l l i a n t d i s play, few c a n avoid b ei n g a t least a little dazzled . The h i g h e r
one stands over the m a n y , t h e m o re e a s i l y a re m ysterio u s powe rs attribu ted to h i m C e rt a i nly the power of the r u l e r over t h e i r l i ves is a p pa re n t a nd .
.
.
.
conducive to d ee p res pec t . 7
I t was believed that at the sum m it o f the soc ial order, royal authority reflects cosmic forces. When the realm is in harmony with the u niver se, peace and prosperity will prevail ; when this harmony is lost, ill fate will be fall the peo ple. I n this pe rspec tive, the s plendor of kings h i p serves to propi tiate the supe rnatural forces by symbolic re presentation . A con secrated rule r is regarded m uch as one regards the Su preme Bei ng: an au thority that can not be questioned but to whom one can a ppeal for grace or indulge nce. In this rel igious contex t there is a direct relation between kings and their peo ple. Under feudalism , the king's great vassals who hel p hi ni adm in ister the realm accept the princ iple that their own powe r is limited by virtue of the obligation they have assumed toward their ruler. Since the ruler embodies the symbols of highest authority, he alone can legitimize the h igh rank and privileges of the aristocracy. I n the words o f An tonio Marongi u ,
[The king)
stood o u t because o f
his
sacerdotal
a
t t r ib ut es ; because he was the
first of the great vassals ; because he was reco gnized as head of the st a t e by
t he po pe , the e m peror and other fore ign powers ; beca use he co n t i n ued to adm i n ister di rect l y large areas w i t h i n the bounda ries of the state, a nd was in posses sion of h i s own force of a rmed m e n ; beca use he was the s u preme rep resentative of j udicial a u thority, as guarantor of j ustice and
peace, and
because fiefs wit h o u t hei rs reverted to h i m . 8
But we h ave seen that the vassals o f the king could use their status and resources to develop their own power, sometimes to such an extent that kings and aristocrats became bitter ene m ies despite all outward signs of m.yesty and obedience. In Weste rn Europe, the indepe ndence of the great lords could develop until t h e y were no l on ge r o rdi nary subjects , b ut possessed eco n o m ic a n d legal priv
ileges , gran ted o r accepted by the sovereign . . . . They were considered out s ide the "gen eral subordi n a t i o n " of s u bjects by cu sto m and by t h e very terms o f t h e i r i n ves t i t u re . T he y owed fea l t y , co u nsel and a i d , but i n retu r n were exe m pt fro m a l l other obl igations a n d i m positions. They represented and
pe rson i fied bot h the po p u la t i o n of t he i r territories in their relations with the sovere i g n , a nd public
a u th ori t y
w i t h i n t h e i r territories . 9
KINGSHIP
AND ARIS TOCRA CY
227
I n practice, the king a n d . h is vassals attem pted to bu ttress their res pec tive righ t s ; a ppare ntl y they sim ul.ta neo usly needed a nd fo u g ht one an other. G regory o f Tou rs co m me n ted in the seve n t h century that i n the re la tio ns of the Mero v i n gi a n ruler Clovis with his k i n d r e d , he " n eeds t h e m and yet they are i n his way. " I O There was n o reason t o ass u me t h a t so me ba l a nce wo uld b e achieved be twe en these co u n t e rva i l i n g te nde ncies . A w a r rior a r i s tocr a c y m i g h t a pp ro p r ia te all sove re i g n (or s e i gn o r i a l ) rights a n d c o n se q u e n t l y e l im i na te th e co ntractual rec i proc ity betwee n the k i n g a n d h i s vas sals , as i n Pola nd. Or t h e cond i t i o n s o f c o n q ue s t m i g h t fac ilitate t h e c oe x i ste n c e o f mo narch ical r u le w i t h a h i gh d e g ree o f l oc a l a u to n o m y , as i n E n glan d . 1 1 Conquest co uld a l s o l e a d to a n absol utist regi m e , i n w h i c h land gra n ts were not given on a hered itary basis, vassals were obli g e d to live at the ro ya l co urt, and t he i r hold i n gs we re s u pe rvised by ro yal a gents and subject to co n fisca t io n , as i n H a n C h ina. I n other words, d i ffe re n t au tho rity structures can arise in an a grarian economy with poorly de v e lo p e d techniques of transport and co m m u n icatio n , rangi ng from fed eral ist or eve n anarchic to absol utist or des potic te ndencies. Rule thro ugh a grant o f rights i n return for serv ice varies greatly with the co nditions of the grant and the social status of the gran tees . Max Weber d istinguishes a mong t h ree main types a nd seven subtypes of feudalism, b u t h is m a i n d istinctio n is be tween a u tocratic and free feu dalism. Under autocratic feudalism , a principal device o f go verning is the creation of assoc iations like corporatio n s , m u nici palities , and the like w hich are col lectively liable for spec ific serv ices but w hic h also have the righ t to exact these services from their members. For exa m ple, residents of border areas, manorial de pendents, or heredita r y clients m a y be grouped in compulsory assoc iations which are c h a r ged with a collective responsibility fo r m ilita ry service, the b u ildi n g o f roads and forti fica tions, the payment of s pec i al taxes, or any other task the ruler assi gn s . Underfreefeudalism , a princ i pal device o f governing i s the grant of rights to land in return for a service to whic h the parties have agreed . Here the rights granted vary with the status of the grantee , a matter of great political sign i ficance w he never the gra nt to land i nc l u des the right to exercise governmental authority . 1 2 A feudal aristoc racy arises o n ly where personal loyalty (fealty) is combined with t he royal recogn itio n of social privileges and here d i tar y succession , the de pendence o n the labor of others , the profession o f arms, and the exercise o f local a u t hority. This combination o f the honor o f the w arrior with the loyalty o f the se rvant was a distinctive feature of Western Euro pean and Ja panese feudalism . 1 3 Government through com pulsory associations a n d th rough the grant of rights is c a pable of e nd less elaborations, nor are the two fo rms of governing clearly se pa r ab l e A m u n ic i pa l corporation may be gi ven the ,
.
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS righ t to collec t brid ge to lls in ret u rn for the pa y m e n t of an a n n ual fe e, while membe rsh i p i n that corporation and payme n t of d ues to it are com pulso r y . A gra n t of rights to l a n d in ret u r n fo r m il i t a r y service ma y have bee n an o riginal for m of fe u d a l i s m , but this princi ple of obtain in g se n'ice s fo r the p u r poses o f r u le is not co n fi ned to land rights or m i l i ta ry serv ice . H Both princi ples o f go v ern i n g can be a p plied to a n y tas k w h ich k i n gs want to acco m pl i s h but do n ot h a ve the re so u rces or the w i l l to acco m pli s h under their ow n d i rectio n . I n most cases, it is a m a tter of t u rn i n g s uc h tasks i nto rights or priv i l e ge s ( a l so c alled " l iberties") ' w hic h c a n be obta i ned i n ret u r n for services or pa y m e n t s rende red to the king and h i s treas u ry , In this w a y , the tasks o f govern i n g a co untry can be d i vided i n to se parate fu nctions like m ilitary rec ruitme n t , tax co l lectio n , trade or craft mono polies, a n d t h e constr uction o f fo r t i ficatio n s or pub lic works . I ndeed , any fu nctio n of gove m m e n t is a "right" w hic h the king can bestow as a reward fo r a serv ice , or in re t u r n for a payment . T h e i nce n tive o f obtai n i n g s uc h bu rde nsome rights o r pri v i le ges is that i ncome from taxes, tol ls , or services, as well as the rights and status of sel f-go vemment, are assoc iated with t hese privileges . When r u le through com pulsory association s a n d t h ro u gh gra nts of rights are elaborated i n t h i s m a n n e r , ho use ho l d go ve m m e n t a n d " fie f, " a n d he nce the te rms patrimon ialism and feu da lism , lose t hei r or i g i nal mea n i n g .
A R I STOC RAT IC SOCI ETY In the past, the exerc ise of gove r n m e nt al authority was an aspect of fa m ily and property. The vario u s fu nc tions of gove r n m e n t were a p p ro p riated on a heredi tary ba sis by a gove r n i n g class con sistin g o f a king, his h igh o fficials, the m agnates o f the real m , a nd privileged corporations w h ic h controlled their res pective territories and t h us r u led the co untry . T y pical l y , states u nder the a u t hority o f k i n gs consisted o f com peting j u risdictions e n gaged i n e fforts to d e fe n d t he rights of the h o u se hold or estate. Rights that were not asserted would lapse, re ve r t to the d is pos:!1 of the king, and e ve n t u a l l y be claime d by other grantee s ; hence , j u risdictional fe uds were d i rectly rela ted to the h i e r a rchy of soc ieties i n w h ic h fam i l ies a n d corporations were d i s t i n gu is hed by the rights they e njoyed. I n co u n tries r u led by k i n gs , it is reasonable to ask what e ffect the co n t i n ual fe uds had on the societies in which they took place . Violence, it see m s , was built i n to the " e ry text ure o f a r is t oc rat ic life. W hile it threatened the i n d ividual's sa fe ty at eve ry t u r n , it pro pped u p a re mar kably rigid system of soc ial i n e q u a l i tie s The great controversies .
a m o n g k i n gs, priests, and notables eve n t ually establis hed s table patterns of d o m i nation and submissio n . B y the t i m e we learn of these contro-
KINGSHIP AND A RISTOCRA CY
229
ve rs ie s, t he d istinctions be t w ee n r ulers a n d r u le d , between rich a n d poo r , are al re a d y well establishe�. B u t it i s reasonable t o s u p pose that th ese distinc tions arose from the struggles s urro u n d ing the e m e rge n ce o f ki n g s h i p . I neq uality in t he early pe r i o d was p robably d ue to the e x treme i n security o f life , w hich gave an in itial advantage to t hose who co u ld pro tect t he m se l v e s a n d others . By t h e tenth a n d e leve n t h ce n t u ries, a n e laborate co u rt l i fe e x i ste d at the center of s oc ie t i e s gover ne d by ki ngs. The warli ke c u l t u re o f an aristocracy, with its stress on high status, au t o n o m y , a n d i n di vi d u al s trengt h , w as com bi n e d with an e m phasis o n almost filial s ub m ission of th e vassal to his k i n g . A l tho u g h this pa r ticula r co m b i n ation was ful ly
Feudal Homage In medieval times, a personally performed ritual was essential to confirm formal rights and obli ga tions . T he illustration shows the citizens of Perpignan pre senting themse lves to King Al fonso. One citizen performs the act of homage, three vassals a re preparing to do so, and one is standing an d about to receive investiture. (Arch ivo de la Corona de Arago n, Barcelona)
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS deve loped o n l y in Weste rn E u ro pe and J a pan , the culture associated with th is type of feudalism , cha racterized by Weber, co n ta i n s e l e m e nts fou n d elsew h e re. I n fe u d a l i d e o l o gy t he m o s t
so n a l i zed t ie s , in
co n t rast
i m port a n t
re l a t i o n s i n l i fe are pe r va d ed by pe r
to a l l fact u a l a n d i m pers o na l rel a t i o ns h i ps, w h ich
a re re ga r d ed as p l e be i a n and s pec i fic a l l y devoi d o f d i g n i t y . T h i s co n t r a st has se \'e ral a s pects.
Origi n a t i n g
tween i n d i\' i d u a l s
was
in an a r m }' of wa rriors for w h o m the ba ttle be
d ec i s i v e , fe u d a l is m m ad e s k i l l fu l h a n d l i n g of weapons
t h e object o f its m i l i t a r y ed ucat io n ; i t h ad l i t t l e use fo r mass d i sc i pl i n e to a co l l e c t i ve l y o r ga n i zed m i l i t a r y e ffo r t . As a res u l t t h e fe u d a l sty l e o f l i fe i nco r po ra t e d t h e ga m e a s a n i m po rta n t m e a n s of t ra i n i n g t h a t i n c u lca ted
pe r fect
use fu l a b i l i t ies and q u a l i t ies of c h a r ac te r. The g a m e was not a " past i m e" bu t t h e n a t u ra l med i u m in w hi c h the p h y s ic a l a n d psyc h o lo gical c a p a c i t i e s of t h e h u ma n orga n is m c a m e a l i ve a n d beGl ine s u p pl e . I n t h i s f() rm of t ra i n i n g "
"
t h e s po nt a n eo u s d rives of m a n fo u n d t h e i r o u t le t , i r res pec t i ve of a n y d i v ision
between " bod y " a n d " so u l " a n d re ga rd l e ss of how co n v e m i o n a l i zed t h e g a m es
o fte n be c a m e Th e k n i g h l l y s u·ata of m e d ie v a l E u ro pe a n d J a pan re gar ded .
the g'd m e as a serio u s and i m portam a s pect of li fe t hat had a s pe c i a l a ffi n ity
with s p ont a n eo u s artistic imerests a n d helped ba r th e way to al l forms of u t i l i ta rian ratio n a l i t y . The aristocratic sent i me m of these feudal strata fo und
i ts e x p r es si o n i n po m p a n d c i rc u m s ta nce, i n u t e n si ls a n d eq u i pmem that dis p l a yed t h e splend o u r of the hou seh ol d
a s u pe r fl u o u s fri l l b u t
a
.
From t h is st a n d po i m l u x u ry is not
means of se l f-a ssert ion a n d
a
wea po n in the s tru gg le
for power. T h i s a n t i u ti l i ta r i a n a tt i t u de tow a r d s con s u m ption was of a piece
w i t h t h e eq u a l l y a m i u ti l itaria n orie n ta t i o n toward o n e ' s l i fe . A ristoc ratic strata
any su ggestion t h a t a man rea l i ze a n i d e al ; t he value of a ris tocratic
s pe c i fical l y rejected any idea of a " m i s s i o n in l i fe s h o u l d have a p u r pose or seek
La
,"
e x i ste n ce was se l f-co n ta i n e d . Thus feudal i d eo l o gy was con t e m p t uo u s of a b u s i n es s l i ke a p proach to ec o no m ic a ffairs, w h ich it sa w as so rdid greed. Aristocrats de l i be ratel y c u l ti vated
a
no nchalance t h a t ste m med from the
co n
ve n ti o ns o f c h i v a l r y, a pride of statu s a n d a sense of honor. T he i r o r ie nta t io n was m o re worl d l y t h a n the idea l ization of t he charismatic wa rrio r , more he
mic and be l l ige re n t than a l i terary ed ucatio n , and m o re playfu l and artistic t h a n professional tra i n i n g. 1 5
The feudal ideology em phasizes personal ties and a n antiutilitarian attitude toward life : both have contributed to that bearing under stress whic h is an enduring element of aristoc ratic cultu re. In Western Europe and Japan, admiration for noble sacrifice was so strong that even mag nates of the realm could s ubm it to the ro yal will without damage to their pride, in their own eyes and in those of others. Such conditions did not exist in Russia, where s ubm ission often we nt together with personal hu miliation . The balance between pride and submission was also in jeop a rdy in seventeenth-century Prussia, where the Great Elector disciplined a recalcitrant nobility, and in Tok ugawa Japan, where daimyos and sa-
'
KINGSHIP AND ARIS TOCRA C Y
m urai were put under s u rveillance and often suffered the debilities of m ea gre rentier existence. Still, status pride is a main attribute o f aris toc ra tic culture, and efforts to preserve it are made even under the most disa d vantageous conditions . Warfare was a pro m i ne nt feature of aristoc ratic cultu re un til wel l in to the sixteenth centu ry. T h i s is o n e reason wh y traditional societies ap pe ar so muc h alike despite the d i ffere nces among them. Each lord je alo usly guarded his rights, ready to defend the m at a moment's notice an d to enlarge them when opportunity presented itsel f. I n stan t willing ness to engage in personal combat req uired a high level o f pe rsonal aggression and an abse nce o f normative restraints in the highest strata o f society. Not only was personal valo r idealized , but blood letting, mu til atio n , and the whole ferocity o f battle were as well. Some restraint was sh ow n toward social equals, because they could be held for ransom. But ordinar y captives were a liability : if retained, the y had to be fed ; i f re tu rned, they would bolster the stren gth of the e nemy. Very often they we re killed or sent back m utilated. For similar reasons, the attacker wo uld destroy his enem y's fields, fill his wells, and cut down his trees. These features of war h ave existed for a long time, but in the societies here considered they were specifically the work and the norm of aris tocratic warriors. 1 6 What are the psychological con seq uences o f this "violent tenor of life" ( H uizinga)? I n a Christian contex t , violence was see n as evidence of divine wrath, provoked by the sinfulness of man. Yet the fighting vigor prized by aristocratic warriors d id not pro m pt them to put fate in the hereafter u p pe rmost in their minds .. They would enjoy life to the full while there was time, but they valued honor more than li fe . "Death is certain," runs a st ate ment of the fi fteenth century, "but one does not know one's future . . . . [Therefore] be of good cheer and don't fear death too much, for if you do , you will have no joy in life ."1 7 Along with piety, the fear of hell, and contrition there were o utbreaks of gaiety and intense enjoyment; arrant pride, outbursts of hatred, and an o ften pro longed demand for vengeance were commonplace among the upper strata. People acted impulsively and i n public and ex pected others to do the same, in contrast, say, to the Puritan tradition which has taught us to moderate our feelings and guard our privacy. "All thin gs in life were of a proud and cruel publicity" ( H u izi nga) . H ierarchic notions such as honor, loyalty, and ven geance received public display. l s The most cruel punishments were a source of popular entertainment and edification, dramatizing the sinfulness of man, the mutability of fortunes, and the terribl e pains awaiting the sin ner. Men were d rawn and quartered , and the torture of animals c o u l d be amusing. In Paris on St. John's day un der Charles IX ( 1 560- 1 5 74 ) , the public incineration of two dozen cats a
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
brought the ki n g , his court, and the people together for a gay fest iv al with m usic, the king himse l f tak i n g a p ro m ine nt part in the proceed i n gs. 1 9 Frequent ex perience w i t h v io l e n ce a n d sudden reversals of for tune were l i ke l y to evoke p assi o na t e reactions, and there is reason to e x pect p e o p l e to have been e x ces s i v e l y irritable, un less they fo u n d so me p r iva te or i n s t i tu t ional h a ve n w h e re t h e y co u l d escape from the wo rld. I n structions o n pro per cond uct give some i n t i m a t i o n o f h ow pe o p l e te n ded i n fact to be h a v e . In a se ries of doc u m e n t s on manners at the t a b l e , in the bed ro om, a n d in pe r form i n g v a r i o u s bodi l y func tion s , Elias shows t h a t in early med ieval times peop l e had l i t tle co ncern w i t h the control of i m p u l se a n d a p pare n t l y fe l t l i tt le s ha me . Me n and women ba t hed to ge the r in t he n u de , h o us i n g acco m m o d a t i o n s allowed for l i ttle o r no p ri vac y , and bodily fu nctions were performed i n pu b l i c . Man uals o n table manners advised a g a i ns t noisy e a t i n g , s pi t t ing , and direct ph ys ical threats against neighbors, which suggests that sel f-restraint had to be learned. Si nce aristocratic marriages involved important pro perty transactions, it was considered advisable to make the fi rst copulation of bride and groom an act witnessed by the interested parties.20 The early manuals were often addressed to peo ple of st anding . As the concern with the control of impulse inc reased and the reactions of others were taken into account, the manuals became more specifically instructions for the young. Types o f behavior previously considered natural came to be tabooed as shame ful. An earlier d i sc ussio n ( C ha p te r 6) dealt with changes in aristocratic l i fe st y les in E n gla n d : the dec l i n e of pe rso nal combativeness, a turn to
higher ed ucation , the establishment of a "London seaso n , " an d t he con centration of real and imagined opportunities a t court. The behavior a ppro priate in the early phase o f feudalism had come to be out of place in t he soc iety o f the court. One should note that for the safety o f royalty and the preservation of peace among the magnates acts of violence at court were q u ickly pun ished. Patterns o f interde pendence among peo ple had changed d ue to the more effective centralization o f monarchical authority .2 1 B y the sixteenth centu ry, court society had become t he center of opportunity and fashion. Aristocrats floc ked the re to make their for tune. A residence near the court had become indispensable to the pur suit o f g a i n and status. For a man at court, im pulsiveness and irritabili ty would be inj urious and the public display o f passion im proper. On the other hand, feelings of shame or guilt would stand him in good stead , since they would facilitate the control o f im pulse. Such a man could maximize his chances by artfu l maneuvers rather than by physical aggression. "A man who knows the Court," sa ys St. Simon, "is master of his gestures, his ey�s, and his ex pression . . . . He restrains his humor, d isguises his passions, speaks and acts against his sentime nts." 2 2
KINGSHIP AND ARISTOCRA CY
Tournament with Lances b y Lucas Cranach The Elder . This engraving of the early sixteenth centu ry dates from a time when the conditions of medie val warfare had changed. At one time, tou rnaments had been serious tests of strength and skill and training for them was train ing for war as well. By the time of Cranach, these tournaments were fought with blu nted spears and lances and had become a principal recreationa l pursu it of the a ristocracy. (Metropolitan Museum of Art, Harris Brisbane Dick Fund, 1 927)
In his famous Hand Orac le of 1 64 7 , t he S panish Jesuit Baltasar Gra cian provided a code of con d uct for the courtier. One should not reveal one's real intentions. A bad manner spoils everything, including justice, reason , and truth. He should learn the weakness of whomever he deals with so that he may put that person under pressure. Think first and deeply and only then act, because some peo ple are like fac;ades with nothing behind the m, w hile with others their inner thoughts exceed their appearance many times over. He should learn to blame others for mistakes and failures, w hile putting his best foot forward . The circum spect man never acts in a state o f passion. Even w hen alone, he acts as if the eyes of the whole world were u po n him. 2 3 Not all men at court acted in this manner, but by the eighteenth centu ry , after an interval of
2 34
THE A UTHOR ITY OF KINGS
five hundred years , the culture of European aristocracies had cha nged d ue to the influe nces o f co urt society. With the concentration of monarch ical power and the emergence of court societies, a transition in manne rs had occurred. Expressive be havior that was impulsive, aggressive and had a high tolerance for pub lic ex posure was superseded very grad ually by an orientation which th rough shame and related fo rms of se l f-restraint enabled people to control their im pulses and thereby manage the ir relations with others. "Civilized behavior" emerged at the time when monarchies consolidated their position during the sixteenth and seventeenth centu ries. We have be fore us now a pict ure o f an initially unstable royal a u thority and of an aristocratic culture which was at first violent and thrived on instability but became more mannered and courtly with the stabilization and centralization o f monarchy. This change in style gen erally accom panied a political change. In early times, the king had strug gled to un ite a scattering of feudal baronies through asserting his au thority, whereas in the later period uni fication had largely succeeded and the age-old contest between king and aristocrats was conducted in a more centralized fashion. It is i n this context that representative bodies like councils, parliaments, or estate asse mblies first came into promi nence. These institutions eventually were to pave the way for public participation i n government on a broader scale. The picture ju s t ske tched is ge neral and calls for specific exa mples. For we must look at the differen t developments of local autonomy and representative assemblies in various countries if we are to make sense of the vastly different developments toward a popular mandate which oc curred later. It is true that a king's council and a modern parl iament are at o pposite ends of a very long development, but there is some affinity between such different institutions in the sense that an implicit "exchange" u nderlies all exercise o f autho r i ty Even in the case of extremely auto cratic rule, one may assume the existence o f some pressure on the ruler. The authority of kings is subject to the personal influence of subordi nates . Petitions to the ruler are typically based on rights he has already granted . To insist on this give and take does not mean that it is equitable, only t hat it occurs everyw here and provides a useful basis for com par ison . Subjects always make "re presentations" to their masters, although representative institutions are a Western European phenomenon. ,
.
REPRESEN T ATION I t is easiest to trace the developmen t of re presentative institutio ns i n the case o f England, w here such institutions have had a continuous history since Anglo-Saxon times. In their earliest form, proto represen -
KINGSHIP AND A RISTOCRA C Y
2 35
t at ive bodies consisted o f the k i n g ' s co urt with its household retainers a n d a few se cul a r and ecclesiastical di g nitar i e s who offered their co u n se l o n l y at the ki n g ' s com m a n d . When the king s ou g h t the w e i g htie r counsel o f th e gr eat men of h i s realm, he co uld do so con veniently at the re gul a r ga th e r i n gs for Christmas, Easter, and Whitsun day. O n these occasions
he wo uld wear his ce re m o n ial c rown fo r the celebralion of m ass and the ea tin g of a great fea s t . No magnate could absent h imsel f from these crown -wearings witho u t affr o nt i n g the king, but the magnates were not ea ge r to counsel, much less to i n fluence, h i m . For summons by the kin g or eve n re q u e s ts for advice freq uently res ul t e d in a d e m a n d for add i tional se r v ic es or fi n a n cial assista nce. T h us , atte n da n c e was an onero us d uty. T he ph r ase general or unanimous consent (commune consilium) w a s not the name of a distinct institution , but a re ference to the advice or counsel which the k i ng elicited . The Constitution of C l a re n d o n ( 1 1 64) states ex plic it ly that in the ki n g' s view ecclesiastics , like eve ryone e lse w ho held a b aro n y of the king , were d u ty- bo u n d to t ak e pa rt i n t h e j ud gm en t s of the court and were excused only in cases i nvo lvi n g death or mutilation . ( Note that the ki n g' s court w a s a court i n the j ud icial a s well as the c er emonial sense a nd that t he counsel and aid asked for by the kin g were as yet not di s t i n g uis h e d from the adj u d ica t io n of di spu tes or the man agement o f the ki n g ' s household. ) By the t hi r tee nth century, t he re is evidence of an a s sembl y o f barons w h ich was occasionally summoned, which had no regular fu n ct io n or constitution, but th ro u g h which the barons were asked to counsel t he k in g on a d m ini s tr at i v e a n d po l i tical issues, on taxation, and on judgments to be rendered by h i s co u rt . At first an a no m a lous institution, these s pe c i al a s se m b lie s e v e nt ual ly de ve l o pe d i nto the En gl i s h parliame nt.24 Documentation on the early co un ci ls reveals little about the n a tu re of this consultation betwee n the ki n g and his barons. The barons may have unanimously consented to the king's wishes, perhaps b y an act of acclamation ; they may have o ffered in formal advice on req uest; o r they may have st i pu la t ed cond i t i o ns be fo re co n s e n tin g to t he k ing' s imposi tion of an ex t r ao rd i n a r y t a x . Magn a Carta ( 1 2 1 5) is u n iq ue in part because it put such conditions of consent in w r i ting. In 1 258 the Pro visions of Oxford called for pe r io d i c m ee tin gs of parliament, a n d in 1 3 1 1 the Lord Ordainers demanded that the ki n g consult and reach agreement with his barons "in matters of co n s e q ue nce . " By the early fourteenth century, the members h i p of pa rlia me n t n o lo n ger d e pe n d ed on t he king's discretion , and h e nce fo rt h t h e co n c e pt "co mm unity of the realm" referred to parliament as the institution which re presented the country as a whole.z5 Representation is t o be dist ing u is h e d fro m go vernmen t. En g lis h med ie val par l i am en ts worked slo w ly , met irregularly, and were of s ho rt
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
duration. They never questioned the king's right marily met in order to ad vise and assist.
to
govern and pri
M a n y assemblies . . . w i t n essed t h e exch a n ge o f m u tual pledges between k i n g a nd s u bjects on the accession of a new sove re ign to t h e throne. Oth e r a ssem blie s . . . j udged co ntrove r s i a l q ue s t i o n s o f a var ied n a t u re, and were prese n t n e w statutes by t h e k i n g ; t h e y took pa rt in the a p port io n i n g o f fe udal aids, or co n fi rm ed the legi t i m acy of a n alogous req ue sts
at the p ro m ulgat i o n o f
for e x t raord i n a ry subs idi e s -o r in exce pt i o n al cases ev en de n ied t h e m or gran ted t h e m on conditio n s . . . ; t h e y put forward req uests and grieva nces to the k i n g on be h a l f o f g rou ps or i n d i v iduals a gai n st abuses and e r ro rs of t h e adm i n istration or o f the k i n g h i m self, and de m anded their red ress . . . . A l t hou g h the per manen t officials o f th e co u rt n o r m a l l y ex erc ised s uch fu nc tions, occas iona l l y these asse mblies also too k pa rt i n gi v i n g j udg me n t i n tri als . . . aga i n st exto rtionate officials . . . or over dis p u te d fe u dal s u ccessions. 2 6
The king was not obli ged to abide by the j udgments o f the assem blies . B u t it became unwise for him to i gnore the m , because he de pended on his tenants-in-chief and other subjects to provide the fun ds necessary for the assertion of his rights, even though that assertion would be at their expense. The size of royal expenditures increased and aroused opposition , and out of that opposition representative institu tions eventually emerged . I f we now shift our attention from the 1 200s to the· seventeenth and eigh teenth centuries, we fi nd a greatly altered situation . The peers, gen try, and higher clergy who hel ped the king rule o ften disputed his ex ercise o f authority, even though they acce pted his title to re i gn On their lands , aristocrats and magnates of the church enjoyed a fusion of wealth, status, and authority which at times was almost equal to that o f the king and hence allowed them to en gage in the struggle for power. Long be fore the perio d of the E n glish revolution ( 1 640- 1 660) , Francis Bacon ( 1 56 1 - 1 626) described the dynamics of this relationship between king and aristocracy. .
A great and po te n t nob ili t y ad d e t h m aj est y to a monarch , but d i m i n i sheth
power; and putteth li fe a n d s pi rit into the people, but presseth their fo rtune. It i s
we l
l
when nobles are not too great for so v e re i g n t y nor for j ustice ; and
yet mai ntained i n that h e i g h t , as the in solency of i n feriors may be broken u pon them be fore it come on too fa s t u po n the majesty of ki n gs. A n u merous
nobi lit y causeth povert y and i nconven ience in a state ; for it is a surcharge of expense ; and bes i de s it be i n g o f necessi ty that many of the n ob i l i t y fel l in ,
l i me to be w ea k i n fo rtune, it maketh a kind o f dis p ro po r tio n betwee n honor a nd means. 2 7
Here, with exem plary brevity, is a generalized comment on the English political structure wh ich contained a balance of forces and a social mo bility lacking i n Prussia, Russia, and J a pan .
KINGSHIP AND ARISTOCRA C Y
237
By the end of the seventeenth century, the "king-in-pa rliament" had become the sovereign legislative power in the state, w hile the c rown w as acce pted as the head o f the executive without q uestion . The members o f pa rliament re presented the whole real m ; there was close interaction a n d ri valry, but no dee p cleavage between these re presentatives and the crow n . The expression "king-in-parliament" referred both to the crown as an independent part of parl iament and to the kin g's friends or court pa rty , a loosely allied g ro u p of prominent men who held powerfu l po sit io ns in the Commons and the Ho use of Lords, and contributed to the co llaboration between legislature and executive. The balance achieved is suggested by the fact that three prime ministers (Wal pole, Pelham , and North) served twe nty-one , eleven, and twelve years respectively, enjoying the con fidence o f both king and Com mons. That this balance was precarious is evident from the fact that during theSe three ministries th ere were fourteen different First Lords of the Treasury.28 The king's authority to rule declined as parliament's authority grew, though the co urt remained the a pex of the aristocratic prestige hierarchy and a main cen ter for the distribution o f privileges . 2 9 By the eighteenth cen tury , meetings of parliament had become regular, legal e nactments and taxation were decided by the Commons, and parliamentary budge tary controls, even over the crown's expenditures , were gradually expanded. Bot h the electorate and its parliamentary re presentatives were a relatively homogeneous gro u p, consisting for the most part of members o f the gentry, in addition to com moners whose economic success and social aspirations made the m acce ptable to the gentry. In the m iddle of the eighteenth century, the e lectorate o f the shires amounted to some 1 60,000 and that of the boroughs to about 8 5 ,000 in a population of roughly 7 m illio n . In the six general elections from 1 7 54 to 1 78 4 , e lec tions with more than one candidate seeking office occurred in only 452 out of 1 , 800 possible cases.30 Parliamentary power was used for private aggrandizement through the e nclosure of common pasture land . Gov ernment offices were used for personal enrichment or the provisioning of younger sons of the gentry. A parliament so e lected and conducted was certainly not likely to take measures that would effectively cope with the problems brought on by industrialization . But on the positive side, this homogeneous ruling group was based on ample practical experience in local sel f-government. T here was a consensus on basic constitutional issues which promoted bot h the effectiveness of central govern ment and its responsiveness to local concerns. I n one sense, English parliamentary rule during the eighteenth cen tury was similar to the rule of re presentative bodies in other countries. A survey of such institut ions in about 1 760 s hows that, apart from Rus sia, oligarchic and hereditary rule of counties and com m u n ities by small groups of aristocratic fa milies was the prevailing practice -if "a risto-
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS c ratie" is u n d e rstood to i n c l u d e n ot on l y the titled but also wea l thy pa tric ia n fa m i l ie s a n d o ccas ion a l l y l ead i n g members of u rban gu i l ds . 3 t Whether t he re prese n t ative as s e m b l y o r the abso l ute r u l e r p re v a i l e d in a give n instance de pe n ded o n many !ac t o rs , i nc l ud i ng p roble m s of s uccessi o n , the perso n a l a b i l i t y o f r u lers , the co hesion and c a pa b i l i t y of re p rese n ta t i ,'e s , and d e g re e s of c o r ru pt i on and e x t ravagance. S t i l l m ore i m po rt a n t was w he t h e r
the r u l e r de m a n d e d fi nancial s u p port for a
st a n d i n g a r m y , pe r h a ps t h e pr i n c i pa l so urce of con flict w i th t h e est a te
is no t the m e re exi stence of a ristocra s se m b l i e s , b u t t he d i ffere nces a mo n g them w h i c h a re o f
asse m b l ies of t h e period . :! 2 B u t i t
c i e s a n d estate
a
i n te rest here. In t h e case o f Pruss i a , co m pa r i s o n i s made d i ffic u l t by the scatte r i n g o f i t s te rritorie s , e a c h o f w h i c h had a c o m p l i c a t ed h i s t ory of i ts ow n . For convenie nce I w i l l co n s i d e r o n l y t he Electoral M a rk B r a n de n b u r g (Kw' mark ) . B e fore the asce nda nce o f t h e H o hen z o l l e r n d ynasty i n the fif teen th ce n t u ry , t h i s terri tory was d i vided a mong n u mero u s j u ri s d i c ti o n s in t h e hands of l anded n ob l e s , bishopri c s , and tow n s . On occasion these ' pe tty ru lers wo uld be cal led o n by their local overlords to as se m ble for a re newal of the i r pled ge , or for adv ice and co nse n t , or in a j u r idic a l ca pacity . B ut in t h e abse nce o f u n i fie d ru l e s uc h occasions were in fre q u e nt , t hey wo u l d i n vo l ve d i ffe rent ove rlords, and t hey d id not p ro v i d e a basis for the developmen t of re prese n tative i n stit utions. The accession of the H ohenzol lern rulers i n 14 1 1 u n i tled the co untr y u n d e r their sov e re i gn ty , though in t h e fi ftee n t h and sixtee n t h c en t u ries govern a nce in B ra n d e n b u r g sti l l m ea n t to
l o rd over his dom ain .
a
l a r ge e xte n t the
local a u to n o m y o f each
W h i l e H o he nzollern r u l e bec a m e g r a d u a l l y more e ffe c t i v e , the local lo rds a n d m u n ic i pa l i ties j ea l o u s l y guarded the ir prerogatives, and the
power of t hese l oc al j u risdic t io n s m i l i tated against the so l id a r ity of the estate s . As a res ult, the estate as s e m b l ies m et r are l y and were po l i tica ll y weak. T his con d i tion was n ot even alte red i n the sixteenth ce n t u ry fol l o w i n g the Re fo rmation , w he n J oach im I I ( 1 53 5- 1 57 1 ) was h ea v ily in debt w h i le the landed ge ntry were re l at iv e l y prospe rous, pro fiting from the di ssolution of the monaste r ie s . I n the abse nce of regular estate as se m blies , c u rre n t bus i ness wa s hand led t h ro u g h com m ission s whose com positio n was gre a t l y in fluenced by the elector (Ku rjiirsl ). And while the estates retained an i m portant posi tio n in fiscal a d m i n i stratio n , they were also obliged to assume re s ponsibi l ity for the debts of the ru l i n g house . I n the seventeenth centu r)" the G reat Elector com pleted the sub ord i n ation of the l anded a r i s toc rac y . The Prussian r u l ers e m p h asi zed t he s u premacy of their own positio n . For e x a m p l e , t he Hohe n zollern ( be fo re Frederick I I ) a l lo w e d bo u rgeo is o w ne rsh i p of landed " k n ight l y "
KINGSHIP A ND ARISTOCRA CY
2 39
es ta tes (R ittergUter) , a l t h o ugh the p ractice had been to rese r ve such es tates for mem bers of the a r is to c racy In additio n , h igh ly p laced coun se lo rs of bo u rge o is o r igi n w e re freq u en t ly e n nobled on the ex plicit g ro un d t hat faithful servan�s of the ruler dese rved suc h distinction th at is, deserved t o be long to the first estate of the real m . 3 3 I n these and rela ted ways t he Hohe nzo l lern established t he p r i o r it y o f s ervi c e to the i r ho use a n d t o t h e state o v e r i n heritance as t h e basis o f aristoc ratic status . T h e contras t should b e noted between such soc ial mobi l i ty a t the king's com mand and t he s po ntan e o u s inter m i n gl ing of co m mone rs and gentry in E ngl a n d, where m e rc h a n t wealth was fre e l y invested i n land and younger so ns o f t he ge n t r y w e n t into trade and the p ro fe ss i o n s without so m uch as a nod from the ki n g I n h i s po l it i ca l testament ( 1 66 7 ) , the G rea t E lecto r w a r n ed his s uccessor that his a u tho r ity wo uld be d i m in ished the more he conve ned estate a s se mbli e s , since s uch assemblies were always encroaching o n the will of the so vereign Frederick Wi l lia m's sus p icio n s had prom pted the earlier organization of war com missariat s which were put i n charge of the st a nding army and of a new system of taxation. Henceforth, t he sel f go verning com m issions of the esta te s were a llo wed only to i m plement directives ; they had lost not only the righ t to consent to new taxati o n but also the r ight to h ave a voice in the determination of e x pe nditure s In the admin istration o f p u blic affairs, aristocrats were restricted to the counties (Kreise) of the several regions where t hey resided .34 But .
.
.
,
-
.
ideologically, the H o he n zolle r n rulers s upported the high status of the ar is tocrats The local ba s is of ari stoc ra t ic status was left intact, and by his support of established p riv ileges Frederick I I laid the gro u ndwo r k for the pol i tica l role of this ruling class during the nineteenth cen t ur y It has often been said that in Pr u s s i a the ho l d o f the autocracy was never broken because a bo u r geois revolution did not materialize, but in our co n te x t it seems m o re accu rate to speak of the failure of aristocratic protest. The failure of the Prussian gentry to establish permanent urban residences is a mark o f its poli t ical subordi nation , as are the irregular meetings of t he estate assemblies a n d their eve ntual a bo l ition I n En gland, an u ppe r class of peers, gentry and wealthy com mo ners achieved a part n ership i n r u le with the monarchy. Such a partners h i p was m iss ing in Pru s s i a, where the protest of landed estates as in East Prussia and elsewhere came to no t h i n g Under the Hohenzollern dynasty, the aris tocracy was allowed a voice in ruling only at the local level and u nder ci rcu mscr ibed co ndi tio n s . In po l itic a l affairs , aristocrats served the king and the king claimed to be the first servant of his country Yet i f the compar i son with Eng l and s hows the weakness of the Prus sian a ri'itocracy the com parison wi t h Russia shows its stren gt h . In Prus sia aristocrats had signi ficant liberties of person and prope rty, and they .
.
.
,
-
-
.
.
,
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS po ss e s s e d i m po r tan t r i ght s of local a u t h o r i ty a The Hohe nzollern rulers n e ve r e n c roached u po n t h e se individ ual and local liberties o r p r i v il ege s .
even when t h e y s u p p ress e d the
blies . By at all,
c
o r p or a te l i berties of t h e estate assem
c o n t r a s t , t he M uscovite r u l e rs did not accept t h e idea of r ig hts
once their own
p r ee m i ne n ce was a s s u red
.
d i ffe re n c e marks th e d i s t i nc t i o n be twee n Prussian abso lutism and Russian a u to c rac y However arbitrary t h e y w e re i n practice , West ern E u ro pean r u l er s acknowledged t h at t he y gove rned u n d e r d i vi n e l a w , t h a t i n p rin c i p l e t h e i r a u t h o r it y a n d t h e i r righ ts were l i m i te d , al t h o u g h t h e y a l o n e were e n t i t l e d to s p e c i fy t hose l i m i t s . Such s e l f- l i m i tation looks like an e m pt y fo r m u l a u n t i l one t u r n s to I v a n I V ( 1 5 3 01 5 84 ) , who d e n i e d it on p r i n c i p l e For I va n , t he tsar was directly i ns pi red by God, his every action an e m a n a t i on o f t he d i v i ne w i l l ; t h u s , the tsar wa s free to pa rd o n or p u n i s h as h e saw fi t . The re was no re co g n i t i o n of righ ts . I t is t r u e that by the ei g h tee n t h century the i d e o l o g y o f tsarist r u l e h ad c h a n ge d I n kee pi n g w it h t he e n l i g h te ne d a bsol utism o f his time, Pete r the Great s po ke o f the d u t y w h ic h God's d e l e ga t i o n of power had i m pose d on him. B u t b y t h e n it had already beco me esta bl ished t ha t s u bje c t s o f all ranks have d u t i e s b u t not r igh t s. This view is reflected in the headtax i m pose d o n every m ale, reg a r d l ess o f a ge, in 1 72 4 . B y be ing taxed at birt h , h e i m m e d i a te l y entcl'ed the ser v i c e of the state.35 I n the R u s s ia n case , t h e conditions o f e a rly monarch ical a u t hor ity m i l i tat e d a gain s t the idea of righ ts even for the aristocrac y . As the M us cO\'ite d y n a s t y ro s e , pre v i o u s l y i n d e pen de n t bo y ars and p r i n c e s became This
.
.
.
h i gh l y
placed serv itors .
Other powe r ce nters b eca me less attractive and
t he Moscow rulers were able to a bol i s h the old aristocratic rig h t of m i l itary and po l i t ical al legiance . As a r e s u l t
c h a n g i n g one's
,
t h e p ro b l e m s of t h e o l d a r istoc racy [ we re c o m po u n de d ]
,
fo r fo r m e r ru l e rs
of t h e a n nexed re g io n s a n d t h e i r s e n i tors bega n to c l a m o r for s i g n i fic a n t
m i l i t a ry a n d ad m i n istrat i \'e pos i t io n s i n t he e n l a rged rea l m . Desce n d ants of
t he o l d u n t i t led M u sco v i t e a r i s toc rac y a n d t he p rinces w ho had r ec e n t ly en ro l led i n service fou n d the mse lves in co m pe t i t io n fo r t h e in fl u e n t i a l posts at c o u rt a n d i n the a r m y . T h e a n i m o s i t ies t h a t d e ve l o ped over fam i l y se niority
and pe rso n a l position ca u sed con s t a n t s t r i f e and t h e reby preve n ted any pos
s i b i l i t y of
a
co a l e sc e n c e of i n terest
to
re s i s t the grow i n g powers of the crown .36
In t he fi fteen t h and sixteenth c e n tu ri e s the size of aristocratic families increased . In ke e p i n g with trad i t io n , pro perty con t i n ued to be d i vided among al l male heirs , a n d with i nc rea s i n g n u mbers of heirs the eco nom ic basis of aristocratic fa m i l ies was weakene d . For m a n y of these ,
" I n We stern E u wpe the pl'i \'ileges gl'a llled by a sove reign ruler we re termed lihfrlin
or "ighl,', a u sage w h ic h term i n a ted wi t h t h e Frenc h re vo l u t i o n , For if all m e n h a ve rights by \' i r t ue of be i n g bo rn , the te r m
/JI'i l.ilegp
a(:q u i res a pejOJ-ative mean i n g w h ich i t d i d not
h,l \'e e a r l i e l' when a n ineq u a l i t y o f co n d i t i o n was the pl'e\'a i l i n g ass u m ption ,
KINGSHIP AND ARISTOCRA CY
fa m ilies landow nership became a dwindling resou rce, and since very few aristocrats would or co uld enter trade or the church, the y had no alte r n at ive to serving eithe r in the army or at court. B y contrast , the princes of M oscow tended to resist the d ivision of their dom ai n s ; for e x a m p l e , in the fi fteenth century the y bequeathed more than hal f of their hold ings to the oldest son ( I van I I I , 1 46 2 - 1 5 0 5 ) . The re forms of Pe ter I in the early eigh teenth ce ntu ry fu rthe r ac cen tu ated the subservience of the a ristoc racy. When boyars , gene ra ls, and officers , as well as m e rchants, craftsmen, and Tartars, co uld be for c ibly resettled to serve the convenience of a utocrati c government, a l l social strata were "equ al in their lack of rights " ( Platonov) . Nor we re aristocrats exem pt from physi c al punishment or from censors hip o f a l l re ligio us and pol i t ic al m atters. I deological s pokesme n for the a ristocracy responded by placing their strongest em p hasis on the honor and dignity of a rank brued on service and on the need to protect that rank from con tam ination through intermarriage with com moners . 3 7 Peter's reforms were facilitated by this abse nce of an inde pendent aristocracy such as existed even in Prussia. A fter the reign of Ivan IV, there was no need to overcome the resistance (or obtain the coo peration) of the estates or of a p a rliament . The status of the Russian aristocracy was based on court ran k and ran k in the officer corp s of the army. I ts members ra rely p urs u ed their social and ec on omic interests at the local level with any determ inatio n . When Peter instit u ted a col legi al form of local govern ment, it became necessa r y to force local aristocrats at g u n poin t to partici pate in the de creed elections. The major objectives o f aristocrats d u ring the eigh teenth century consisted o f demands for reduced service obligations, le ga l security , tax exem ptions, an d protection against con fiscation s and cor po ra l pu nis hm en t. Some of t hem were also interested in agric ul t ural i m provements . The decree of 1 762 freed the a ri s toc r acy from com pul sory service but failed to provide an alternative to state service. In fact, the legal emancipation of the aristocracy from their former obligations served the interests of the tsarist government and did not create an in dependent ari stocrac y . In the eighteenth and ni neteenth cent u ries, s uc cessive reform efforts of the tsarist government revealed just how little Russian culture had pre pa red the aristocracy to act on its own initiative, and j ust how difficult it was for tsarist officials to allow local initiatives that were not controlled by the center. In contrast to Russia, the J a panese ari s tocracy u nder the Tokugawa shogunate ( 1 600- 1 868) was quite able to play an e ffective role in local self-government. Without strength in local government there could be no e ffective oppositio n to absolute rule, as the Russian experience s how s, though the Prussian case also makes clear that local strengt h alo ne was not s uffi ci en t for s uch o pposition . The reasons for the relative
242
THE A UTHORITY OF KINGS
stren gth of the Japanese aristocracy go back to the early phases of the country's history. Periods such as the Taika reforms, the Fujiwara re ge nts, and the Kamakura s hogu nate show a certain sim ilarity. Typically, each period began with a violen t stru ggle over succession from which one clan emerged victorious. The result of that stru ggle was a notable concentration of power, usually acco m pan ied by a remodeled ad minis trative structure. (The Ashikaga shogu nate is a partial exce ption in this respect.) In time, s uch centralized authority would weaken as tax col lection , dispute settlement, the task of polic ing, and the orga nization of defense were in practice taken over by regionally powerfu l clans. This transfer of a uthority varied with the prevailing administrative structure. For example, the early phase of the Fuj iwara regency was marked by the s ubstitution o f household for govern mental manage ment. The Fu jiwara ex panded their landholdings and became for a time the most powerfu l clan in the country ; th us, their central "household" authority increased, even though the organization of the central government was enfeebled. As rival clans eventually i ncreased their own holdings, the authority of the Fujiwara regents weakened . A new centra lization oc curred under Minamoto Yoritomo when the office o f the regent was transformed into a se parate shogunate at Kamakura, and household management was re placed by centrally organized feudal rule. I n this way, the authority o f government was contingent on the landed wealth of one preeminent family. If one looks at the several periods of Japanese history from the standpoint of local rule, as John Hall has done, one observes a succession of regionally powerfu l clans whose rise parallels the localization of authority and whose fall is accom panied by its recen tralization. As discussed in more detail in Chapter 1 2, the Tokugawa shogunate re presents a stabilization in the relation between central rule and a local aristocracy. For some two h undred and fifty years the Tokugawa he gemony was overwhelming. The territory of the shogunate represented about one-quarter of the entire country . It was located in the central region (Kanto) and included the princi pal cities. Tokugawa supremacy was ensured in part through pledges o f loyalty by the daimyos to the shogun . These involved the d uty of assistance when called on, and the obligation of each daimyo to ad minister his realm peacefully and effi ciently . The requirement of alternate residence (sankin-kota; ) ensured personal control over t he daimyo and involved expenditures which fur ther increased the great discre pancy in wealth between the Tokugawa shogun and even the wealthiest daimyo. I n the period 1 6 00- 1 65 1 , one h undred and eleven daimyo houses were eliminated . Con fiscations and transfers were common practice d u ring the Tokugawa regime, and o n ly a few of the most powerful houses retained their hereditary territories throughout the period. The aristocracy of daimyos and their bands of
KINGS HIP AND ARIS TOCRA CY
2 43
r e ta i ners we re moved fro m d o m a i n to domain and grad ually became a
pro fessional corps of ad m in i st rators i m pleme n t i n g a u n i for m set o f ru l es u nder Tokugawa l a w . I n t his w a y . t he Tok u gawa ac h ieved an un c h a l le nge ab l e supremac y . Howeve r . the local auto n o m y o f t h e dai myo m ust n o t be forgotte n . E ach d ai m y o was charged w i t h t h e ful l rights o f gove rn ance over h i s d o m a i n , and he exercised h i s authority t h ro u gh his ba n d o f retainers. M ost im p ortan t a mong t he se were vassals of i nd e pe n d e n t status cal led "e l d e rs" (ham ) w ho fo rmed a co uncil of ad v i sors to the d a i myo, ac ted as his de puties and j ud ges , and served as h i s ge nerals in the field . The next l ev el was co m posed o f h i g h - ra n ki n g retainers who headed t he m aj o r
divisions o f the daimyo ' s gove r n me n t a n d m i li ta ry fo rce . Ot he r levels w ere i n c harge of more s pecific tasks from a variety o f ad m i n istrative funct ions down to men ial or rou t i n e work . U n d e r the s u pe rvision o f the daimyo's government, loca l a d m i n i strators co ntrol led e ac h v i l lage and the seve ral wards of th e tow n s , but their control was i n d i rect bec ause the rural and urban po p ul a t ion lived in se l f- gove r n i n g u n its under t he a u t hor i ty o f t heir own h e a d m e n . b j a pa n ' s ar istoc rac y is a nother case of s ubo rd i n a t e p ree m i ne nc e . All d a i m y o were d e finite l y s u bj ec t to detailed control by ' t he shogun , and o nl y t he direct retainer s of the shogun , w hose domains were typically small, we re ad mitted to h i s councils. By care ful atte ntion to the strategic location of daimyo doma i n s -the large r and les s reliable dai m yo were ke pt "outside " the central Tok u gawa doma i n -their subord i nation was ensured. But w i t h i n t he se c a re ful l y de fi ned li mits, t he d ai m yo and their major retainers enjoyed we a l t h , stat u s , a n d a u t hority . The To k u g a w a s ho gu nate treated the large r daimyo with c i rc u m s p e c t io n . The a r is t o c racy was co ntrolled but n o t crushed, and the obligation of loyalty a nd service to t h e s ho g u n p ro ve d co m pa t ible with considerable initiative at the local leve l . The le a d e r s h i p of t h e Meiji restoration was recru ited from seve ral outside domains located on
the periphery of Tokugawa
domination. I h ave concluded
Par t 1 o n the a utho r i ty of k i n gs with t h is com parative d i scussion of a ri stoc ratic re pre se nt at io n . O n l y landed aristo crats, clerics, and pat r i c i a n tow n s m e n were re prese n ted in the estate assemblies and pa r l i a m e n ts o f the time. Part 2 w i l l deal with the mandate of the peo ple i n a broader se nse. The i d e a o f an i ncreased po p u lar par tic i pat io n in c h u rc h services and e ve n t u all y in the po l i t ic a l process was a result of the wide intellectual mobilization which occu rred in t he fif tee n t h and sixteenth centuries. I s h a l l describe t h i s mobili zation in the next c h a p te r , w h ich introd uces the c o u ntr y - b y -co u n t ry d i sc ussion of
Part 2 .
b Fuller discussion re ard i n Tokugawa J a pan is reserved for Chapter 1 2 . g g
" The people,
Dra,,·ing b)· Richler; <; 1 977
The Xew Yorker Magazine. (nc.
flO . "
· Part II TOWARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE . . . I think th at the poo rest he that is in England
hath a life t o live, as the grea tes t he;
and therefore . . . that e very man that is to live
under a government o ugh t JiTSI by his own conse nt
to put himself under that government . . . . - C A PT. RA I N BO R O U G H ,
Th e Putney Debates ( 1 647)
When the inhabitan t oj a democratic country compaus himself individua lly with all those about him, he
Jeels with pride that he is the equal oj any one oj them; bllt when he comes
to survey the totality oj h is Jellows he is
instantly overwhelmed by the sense oj h is own
insignificance and weakness. -The same equality th a t
renders him independent oj each oj his Jellow c itizens,
taken se verally exposes him alone and unp1'Otected to the ,
influen c e oj the greater n u m ber . . . . FOT it would seem probable that,
as
they aTe all endo wed with equal means of
judging, the greater truth should go with the grea ter numbn'. -ALE X I S
DE TOCQUEVILLE , Democracy in A merica
8 TRAN S FORMA T I O N S O F WE STE RN E UROPEAN SOC IETIE S I N T HE SIXTEE NTH CE NTURY
MONARCH ICAL AUTHORITY and its i m pact on aristocratic culture had re percussions which were felt until wel l into the nineteenth century. The societies over which a king ruled comprised shires and boro ughs, guilds and other corporations, provinces and estates, all possessing different kinds of j udicial and ex ecutive authority. The further one goes back in history , t he more these units of government consisted o f com m u nities of households , in which each household was ruled by a master seeki ng to protect his domain against trespass. When unable to do so, the head of a household would commend himself and his dependents to' the protection o f a more pow erful house. Each of t he aristocratic fam ilies had to assert its rights for failure to do so, even by force of arms when necessary, was tantamount to relinquishing those rights. Feuds of the more powerful houses be came integral parts of the legal order. This concluded a very com p lex development from a condition in which feuds were de facto e fforts to assert or maintain rights to a later condition in which such feuds had become institutionalized by sti pulations marking them as justified (de jure) . l The crown eventually succeeded in controlling these feuds b y set tli n g disputes through the authority o f its military an d civilian officials. h i s development occu rred in m pe r ia l German y as early as the thir teenth century, when Emperor Frederick ( 1 2 1 5- 1 2 50) prohibited feuds and established the royal monopoly of legitimate force through a police and bureaucracy. B ut Frederick's achievement did not last.2 In England, powerful kings sporadically achieved the same monopoly, but centralized rule became an accom plished fact only under the Tudor ,
T
I
II
247
TO WA RD A MA NDA TE OF THE PEOPLE m o n a rc h y in the sixtee n t h ce n tu ry . In R u s s i a , t he d e v e l o p me n t
oc c u rre d J a pa n w i t h the rise seve n tee n t h c e n t u r y .
t h e �sc e n d a n c e o f t he � I usc o v i te d y nasty and i n
wit
h
of
the
To k u ga w a
s h o g u n a t e in t h e e a rl y
We h a \'e d i s c us s ed l\-l a rc B loc h ' s d is t i n c t i o n be tween an e a r ly p h a s e
o f fe u d a l i s m like t h a t
o f the
A n glo - S a xo n k i n gd o m s i n w h i c h
a r is t oc rat i c
soc i e t y was l o c a l i z ed a n d ro y a l a u t h o r i t y wea k , a n d a later pha se in w h ic h
p o p u l at i on a n d co m m e rce i n c re a s e d w h i le p ol i t i c a l fr ag me n t a t i o n g av e w a y to s t ro nge r m o n a rc h ica l r u le . F o l l o w i n g M a c h i a ve l l i a n d Webe r , I
h a \"e fu rt h e r d is t i ngu ished i n t h at se c o n d p hase be tw e e n a n autoc ratic
and a free fe u d a l i s m . T h e se t w o t e r m s re fe r to two i n t e r d e pe n d e n t but
c o u n te n" a ili n g t e n de n c i e s o f m a nd s to c o m p u l s o ry
be twee n a k i n g
r u l e , one
e m p h a s i z i n g pe re m ptory c o m
association s a n d t he o t h e r c o n t r ac t u a l agree men ts
and his
vassa l s . U n d e r fa vorable co n d i t i o n s the se ten
d e nc ie s o f B loc h ' s seco n d p h a se
may g i ve rise to re p re se n t a t i ve i n s t i t u un d e r mon a rc h ic a l a u t ho r i ty , a social structu re that is n o l o n ger fe u d a l i n th e pro p e r se n se and h a s be e n d e s i g n a te d as a n "estate (or c o r po r a te ) s o c i et y " (Stiill destaat ) i n t he Ge rman l iterature . T hese Cor po rat e soc ieties de\" e l o pe d in m a n y E u ro pea n countries after the t h i r t ee n t h c e n tu r y, a n d m o s t s uc ce s s fu l l y in En gland, w here by the end of the seventeemh century the idea of a sovereign "ki ng-in-parliament" a c h i e \ 'e d a ba l a n ce be t w e e n c e n t r a l m o n a rc h i ca l a u t ho r ity and the rep resemation of t h e coun t ry i n par l i a m e n t . Elsewhere in Europe and in c o u n t r ies li ke Russia and J a pa n , absolutist regi me s emerged in w h ic h monarc h ical au t h o r i t y m o n o po l i z ed the use of legitimate force and p a\ ' e d the way for the deve l o p m e n t of t h e mode rn state w i t h i ts mo nopolization o f fu n c t i o n s l i ke taxation and defense in the hands of the c en t r a l governmem. These patte rns of a u t h o r ity overla pped for long pe r i od s , a n d i t is be s t t o c o n s i d e r c h r o n o l og i c a l d i v i sions among t hem n ud e a p p r o x i m a t i o n s . I n t he early medinal pe r io d , a ki ng governed h i s country l ike a gian t ho u se h o l d . T h e r e was l i t t l e d i s t i n c t i o n b e twee n p u b l i c reven ue and income derived from the ro y a l domains, tho ugh with the expansion of gO\'ernment an i n c reas i ng p ro po r t i o n of revenue was derived from tax ation .3 Members of t he royal fam i l y pa rtic i pa ted in affairs of state as a matter o f h ere d i t ar y ri g h t . T he k i ng was e n t i t l e d to h i s throne and the a ri s to n ac y to t he i r pro pert y by s i m ilar h e r e d i t a r y claims. Titles to prop e rty were a l s o held b y m u n i c i pa l co r po ra t i o n s , c h u rches, and monaster ies. Such t i t l e s typical ly inc luded n o t o n l y t he o w n e rship of land , but also the e xe rcise of j u d ici a l and admin istrative ri g h ts . These r i g h ts or l i be r tie s we re re co g ni z e d as j ust a n d valid by v i r t u e o f their a n t i q u i ty . This v i ew ga\"e rise to n u merous fo r ge r ies see k i n g to prove the anti q u i ty of l i n e a ge a n d titles. R i g h t s w e re re c o g nize d as valid be cau s e t hey were o l d , not beca use the y had bee n e n acted by h i g he r authority .4 I n t his way , pro perty o wn e rshi p , soc ial sta t u s , and partici pation i n p u b l ic a ffa i rs ti on s
TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTUR Y we re
c lo se ly
l i n ked . The m a n o f hig h
status
possessed
2 49
rights o f au t ho r ity
by vi rtue of ancient lineage or title, and his vario us p r ivi l ege s (or lib
ert ies ) w e re im p o rt ant sources o f inco me . The seco n d part o f t h i s study is concerned w i t h t he b rea k u p o f t h e fu s i o n a m o ng fam i l y , p ro pert y , and a u th o r ity . T h e traditi o n a l struc t u re o f au thority w as u n d e r m i n ed w h e n land lost its i m p orta n c e as the p r i n ci p al so u rce o f wealth a n d u nder the la w s of i n h e rita n ce individ uals be ca m e mo re a u tonomous. I t was u n d e r m i ne d as w e l l w h e n the abso l ute a u t h o r i t y of the ki n g w a s g r ad u all y re p la c e d in pr ac t ic e by the aut ho r i ty of hi s officials . This b u rea uc ratization o f go v e r n m e n t gr a d ua l l y se pa rate d t he exercise of a u t hor i ty fro m its earlier li n k w i t h a family's prop e rty . A n d as the t i e s be twee n pro pe rty and aut ho r i t y weake n e d , so did the idea that t he king perso n a l l y owned all the re so u rce s of h i s co u n t ry an d i n d e e d h i s peo ple's pr o d u cti ve ca pacit y as well. The d e l e g i t i m iz ati o n of k i n g s hi p has varied from country to country . B u t w he r e the claim th a t the k i n g protects the welfare of h is peop le was j u xt a pos e d agai n a nd a g ai n w i t h a b u se s o f auth o r ity and widespread misery, that claim i ts e l f could be turned into an argument again s t ki n gs h i p . I f t he wel fare of the peo ple was to be u ppe r m o st, then k i n g s who did not m a in t a i n that we l fa re lost some of thei r earlier a u th o r ity . E vent ual l y , the a u t ho r it y of kings w a s rep l ace d by government in the n am e of the people. The changes which foreshadowed t he nation-state, with its conco m itan t legal reco gn ition o f i nd ividual rights, go back as far as the t h i r teenth ce ntury. I shall deal i n this cha pte r w i t h s om e of the ea r l y ch a n ge s w hich culminated in the breakup of th e " t r aditi o na l so cia l o rde r " du r ing the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. That brea k u p became irre versible when even the head of the house hold lost his p r eemine n t civil status, as social and economic de pende n t s ( li ke wives, c hildren abov e minimum age, and servants) acq ui red a civil status o f their own. Con stituted a u t ho ri ty came to be le gi ti m ized by appeals to his to r y , nature, and rea son rather than to the sy m bol i c in v i ol a b i l ity of the king's au th o r i ty . Under a po p ular mandate, pe r sua si on was added t o the te n uous symbo l i c sanctity of high office. Today, representative bodies base their legitimacy on a mixture of intellectual constructions, po p u l a r mandate, and appeals to s pec i fic constituencies. The fo l lowing c ha p te rs will ex amine the po l i tic a l and intellectual conditions u nder which t hese new bases of a u t ho r ity were formulated. MOBI LIZATION
T h e soc i eti e s exam ined in this book have become the most ind us trialized countries of the wor ld ; as nation-states t h e y a re a m o n g t he most developed po li t ic a l l y . Each of these co untries underwent a re v o l u t io n or res tora t ion , and each o f these transformations influenced the ne x t . In
TO WARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE
the sixteenth and seventeenth centu ries , England began these great up heavals with the Henrician Re formation and the revolution of 1 6401 660. Th is was followed by the ind ustrial and the Fre nch revolutions of the eighteenth ce ntury, the Prussian re forms ( 1 807- 1 8 1 4 ) and the uni fication o f Germany under Bism arck ( 1 8 70- 1 8 7 1 ) , the Meiji restoration of Japan in 1 868, and the tra n s formation of Russia from the emanci pation of the serfs in 1 86 1 to the Bolshevik revol ution of 1 9 1 7 and the Stalinist revolution of 1 92 8 . Each of these revolutions or restorations was a collective respons e to both i nternal conditions and external sti m uli. Each had repercussion s beyond the frontiers of the country i n which it occurred. A fter each transformatio n , the world had changed in Heracl itus' sense that yo u cannot step into the same river twice . Once the English king had been overthrown and parliame nt was s u preme , other monarchies became in secure and the idea of parliamentary govern ment was launc hed . O nce industrialization was initiated, other economies became backward . Once the ideal of equality had been proclaimed before a worldwide audience, inequality became a burden too heavy to bear. I nequality had been an acce pted condition of life. I n the household, masters ruled over their servants as the king ruled over his subjects . In Tocqueville's view , the "w hole course o f society" since the eleventh cen tury had been marked by an increasing equality of condition. The hold o f family in heritance weakened . The clergy acquired power and opened its ranks to all classes. Com moners acquired high positions at court, en riched the mselves thro u g h co m me rce, a n d acq u ired title by p u rchase.
Every i m provement in trade and man ufacture, every acquisition of property , and every discovery i n the arts created "new elements of equality," as did the great histo rical even ts of this long pe riod. The Cr usades and the E n glish wars dec i m ated the nobles a n d divided their possessio n s ; the m u n ici pal co rporations i n troduced de mocratic liberty i n to the bosom of fe udal monarc h y ; t he i n ve n tion of fi rearms eq ualized the vassal and the noble on the field of ba ttle ; the art of printin g opened the same resou rces to the m i nd s of al l classe s ; the post bro u ght knowledge alike to the door of the cottage and to the gate of the palac e ; and Protestantism pro claimed that all men are eq ually a ble to fi nd the road to heaven . The dis cove ry of Ame rica o pe n ed a thousand new paths to fortu n e and led obscure adve n ture rs to wealth a n d powe r . 5
The elements Tocqueville en umerates are clearly important. B ut if equality had been like a risin g tide for centuries, then it is hard to un derstand why revolutions we re necessary to establish it. The reason is that with each rise of equality soc ial distinctions were reasserted . Those who gained nell-' wealth and influence sought to secu re it for their fam-
251
TRANSFORMA TIONS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTUR Y
ili es by the acq uisition o f title, and titles were linked to monarchical au thori ty. With luck, o n l y a generation or two we re needed for a r i s ing fa m il y to take its pl ace among the m a gnate s of the realm and obscu re t he fact that this rise had o nce overcome e x i s tin g p r ivile ge s To q u e v i l l e was r i g h t in em p h a si z i n g the s p re a d o f eq ualitaria n id e a s b u t he failed to exam ine the process by which such ideas s pread fro m co u n try to co u n t r y The pe rs pe c ti v e ad o p t e d in the fo l lo w i n g c h a pte rs comb i n e s a s t r u ctura l i s t with a d i ffus i o n ist a p pro ac h but gi ves spec ial e m p h a s i s to the demonstration effects t h ro u gh which advances in o ne part o f t h e world p ro v ide i m p ulses fo r c ha n ge i n o t her s Since the fi fte e n t h cen t u r y , the tra n s fo r m a ti o n of soc ieties has be en ac c e le r ated by an o verall m o bi l i z a tion which eventuated in the transition fro m the authority of kings to the mandate of the pe o p l e . T h e fol lowin g dis c u s s i on describes the m obilization of reso urces i n the fi fteenth and six teenth centuries, with particular attention to "intellectual mobilization. " However, the changes to whic h I refer had remote antecedents. .
,
.
.
PRECON DITIONS6
One of these antecedents is the changing role of towns. Greco- Ro man civilization had prosperous towns, but the decline of the Roman e m pire left many of t hem in ruins. Population in Europe was s parse . Even in 1 000 A . D . it probably did not exceed thirty to thirty- five million people (including Rus sia and the Balkans). Ed ucation , trade, and pro duction were red uced to a minimal leve l , and people withdrew into largely self-sufficient m anors and monasteries. These conditions changed between 1 000 and 1 3 3 0 . By the latter date, E u ro pe's population had increased to eighty million. Urban centers developed rapidly as people migrated from the countr y side. The towns o ffered many attractio ns :
freedom from the personal servitude of the manor, econom ic oppor tunities, and an autonomous jurisdiction which provided protection against the armed might of landed magnates. The urban merchants, artisans, and professionals created a culture based on the cooperation of guilds within the m u n icipality. During the eleventh and twelfth cen turies, t he towns introd uced new types of production and exchan ge and an education and adm inistration which differed from feudal p ract i ce Municipal independence o ften led to armed conflict with the rulers, whose main source of wealth was based on the rural areas and whose cultural outlook was shaped by hierarchical rather than e galitarian con ceptions. In some cases , as in Italy, this conflict led to the dominance of towns over the surrounding countryside; elsewhere it led to an uneasy acco mmodation with the landed aristocracy. The urban revolution o f Wes tern Europe greatly increased the economic a n d social prominence of m erchants and artisans in contrast to Russia, Japan, and many other .
TO WA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
countries where mercha nts ran ked low and were despised des pite their increasing wealth. The Western European town s were centers o f edu cation as well as commerce before 1300. Then a lon g pe riod of stagnation occu rred in Western Euro pe due to e pidem ic diseases. The B lack Death kil led about 25 millio n peo ple be tween 1348 and 1350, and from that time epidem ics (ofte n greatly aggravatin g the effects of wa rs and fa mines) were endemic in Europe for three centu ries. In 1500 t he total E u ropean popu lation was 80 mil lion, the sa me as i n 13 3 0 . However, the sixtee nth and seve nteenth cen tu ries witnessed a resumption of growth . Euro pe's po pulation totale d about 105 m illion in 1600 a nd l I S m i llion in 1 700. T his renewed pop ulation growth was a necessary condition for the mobilization of eco nom ic and intellectual resou rces in the sixteenth century. A third precondition of the grea t transformation was technological. The water mill, the heavy plow, the horseshoe , and new methods of harnessing originated elsewhere, but by the ninth century they were bei n g adapted to prod uctive uses by Euro peans. B y the thirteenth cen tury wate r m il ls were used for the prod uction of iron, t he sawi ng of wood, and the man u facture of pa per. This harnessing of water power to re place man ual labor was seen a s a great tech nological chan ge. The great i n ventions facilitating transport date from the same period : the com pass , naval charts , t he stern rudder, trigonometric tables for navi gation , and the waterclock to measure the movement of a shi p. Clocks and fi rearms came in t he early fou rteenth centu ry. New com mercial tec h n iques were also deve loped . Fai rs were organ ized , man uals of com merce became available, and insurance, the check, new methods of ac counting, and bills of excha n ge were invented . No fi nancial mechanism had bee n available between the fifth and the eleventh centuries for the transformation of savings into investment. But after the eleventh cen tury, sales credit, forms of panne rs h i p (commenda , sea loans, mutual agency partnerships) , and ot her devices made it possible for all members o f society to invest their savings, thus diminishing the chronic shortage of ca pital. These and related preconditions had a subjective dimension which we can recogn ize as important even when we do not have adeq uate ex pla nations for them. Christianity was probably the most im portant sub jective factor which made its influence felt throughout. Religion had special im pact in the urban areas , for the medieval towns developed co operative ca pabilities which were absent from the feudal e m phasis on h ierarchy. All Ch ristian believe rs were eq ual under God, and this prin ci ple put the associations of town residents on the same footing. Reli gious equality may hel p to explain the oath-bound associations of Eu ropean towns, which did not exist outside Euro pe . Population growth was slow partly because a large number did not marry. others typically
TRANSFORMA TIONS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTUR Y
253
married late, and Christ ian doctrine helped to idealize celibacy in con trast to the belief systems o f Oriental societies which condemned it. In tech nolo gy, E urope was distinguished less by its originality than by its rece ptivity and c a pacity for creative ada ptatio n . Western E u ro pe was disti n gu ished by a " m ec ha n i za t i o n of t he world pic t u re" w h i c h greatl y fac il itated technological dev e l o p m e n t s that co uld be p u t to use. Ca rlo C i po lla mak e s the inge nious po int that [ e v e n t h e C h rist i a n ) s a i nts d i d not take their ease i n t h e h i e ra tic i m m o b i l i t y o f t h e o r i e n t a l h o l y me n , n o r d i d t h e y a m u se t h e m s e l ves l i k e t h e G reek god s
by pu n i s h i n g m e n for t h e i r a u d a c i t y . On t h e co n t ra r y , t h e y were a l w a ys a t work t o overco me t h e a d v e rse forces o f n a t u re : t h e y d e feated d i s e ase s ,
calm ed sto r m y seas, saved the h a r ve s t s fro m s t o r m s a n d loc u st s , softe ned the fal l for w hoever lea pt i n to a rav i ne, sto p ped fi res, made t h e d ro w n i n g floa t ,
a n d gu ided shi ps in d a n ge r
.
T h e sa i n ts practiced w h a t t h e c o m mo ne r s
d r e a m e d : t h e y harnes sed nat u re a n d , fa r fro m b e i n g co n d e m ned lor d o i n g
so , t h e y lived p l easa n t l y in Pa r a d i s e in t h e com pa n y o f God . H a rnessi n g
na
t u re w a s not rega rded a s a s i n ; i t was a m i racle. A be l i e f i n m i r a c l e s is the fi r s t step toward m a k i n g t h e m possible . 7
Finally, the whole structure of com mercial credit could not have devel without a spirit o f m u tual trust and standards of honesty which again had a cultural as wel l as an economic foundatio n . These and other preconditions had the cumulative e ffect o f pro duci n g a world econom y during the sixteenth century . I n tellectual mo bilization was an aspect · of this great sixteenth-century transformation , and neither the causes nor t he conseq uences of that mobilization are adeq uately explained by economic and political interests alone . 8 I n the twentieth century, it has become easy to recognize that the develo pment of science has an economic foundation, that it is a force of prod uction , but that it ca nnot prospe r without a community of scientists at work . This should make it easier to see the social structure which facilitated "intellectual mobilization " at an earlier time and to recognize the i n flu ence of ideas on social change as well. For this reason , the present chap ter gives special attention to those aspects of sixteenth-century Euro pean societies which hel p to account for "intellectual mobil ization." Such mo bilization had the eventual e ffect of creating in many societies an edu cated public and intellectual leaders who were sensitive to the pos i t ion of their country in the world and eager to see it en hanced , an attitude that had im portant repercussions on the successive revolutions and res torations which are exa m ined in Part 2 of this study.
o pe d
OVERSEAS E X PANSION A N D ITs DOMESTIC CORRE LATES
Exploration, trade, printing, un iversities, early modern science, and the Re formation develo ped concurrently in the fi fteenth and sixteenth
2 54
TO WARD A MA NDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
centuries. All these transformations are instances of "mobilization." In creasing con tacts a m o n g peo ple a n d a r a p i d diffusion of ideas overca me the earlier isolation of hou sehold s a n d com m u nities. We may s pecu l at e that i n c reased co m m u n ication is the co m m o n element of t h i s pe rvasiv e m obilizatio n .
Islamic conq uests es ta b li s h ed ne w i m peri a l powers o n t h e so uthern a n d eastern fla n k s of E u rope fro m the se ve n t h to the thirtee n t h ce n t u r i e s . Russia was u n d e r M o n go l o v e rl o r d s hi p from the t h irtee nth t o the m id fi ft een t h centu ry and was to e x p a n d i n to Siberia o n l y a ft e r 1 5 80. T u r ki s h invaders of the fi ftee n th ce n t u ry c rushed t he Byzantine em pire a nd con q uered C o ns ta n t i no pl e in 1 4 5 3 . T h e Ottoman e m pire exerted press u re on ce ntral E u rope u n t i l the late seventeenth ce ntury , so that the menace from the Turks was a maj o r preoccupation. Among bo o k s pr in te d in France be twee n 1 480 a n d 1 609, twice as many titles related
to the Turkish empire as to the Americas. It is still an open question w hether these invasions from Asia gave the im petus to westward ex pansion and the great ex plorations, or whether the prospects ()f oversea s discoveries made Europeans turn away from their easte rn frontier and thus facilitated the Mongol and Turkish invasions of the Near East, A frica, Russia, and the Balkans.9 At any rate, Western advances i n sail ing and artillery from the fifteenth century onward initiated a period of o utward expansion which allowed Eu ro pe ans to combine the prom ising adve nture of exploration with a circumvention o f the mo unting obstacles in the East. Portugal and S pain pioneered this ex pansion, but soon Holland. England. and France fol lowed suit. U n til the fifteenth century, oceangoin g vessels had used the seas primarily for trade ; their military use was con fi ned to guard ing the coastlines, defending ships against pirates, and carrying support for land warfare. However, as gun powder had revolutionized warfare on land, so cannons mounted on shi ps changed the balance of power on the high seas. 1 0 Early Euro pean colonization was con fined to trading concessions and coastal settlements. Even t hese limited colonizing ven tures, however, preem pted the se as, and occu pied territories outside Europe were treated in the same way that other conquests within Europe had been customarily treated in the past. The Portuguese initiated their overseas conquests and "sovereignty of the sea" under a papal mandate. The B ull of 1 454 granted Prince Henry the Navigator ( 1 394- 1 460) "the right, total and absolute, to invade, conquer. and subjec t all the countries which are under the rule of the enemies of Christ," adding the m ission ary charge that these " perfidious enemies of God" should be brought into the "Catholic fold ." l 1 The era of Portuguese explorations exte nde d from the discovery o f the nearby Madeira islands in 1 4 1 8- 1 4 1 9 and the in itiation of West A frican trade to the discovery o f a direct route to India by Vasco da Gama, who reached the Malabar coast in 1 498. Portugal
TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTUR Y
255
had pioneered this e x p a n sion but soon the other E u ropean po wer s vied with Po rtu gal for com m erci a l s upremacy on the h i gh seas a nd in over se as settle m e n ts . W est wa rd e x pansi o n to
the Americas also began from the Ibe rian pe n in s ula . Col umbus appealed i n vai n to the Portuguese king, b u t e v e n tu al ly found a s po n s or in Quee n Isabella o f S pa in . H is fo ur voyages from 1 492 to 1 504 led to d is<; o ve r ie s of various Caribbean islands and the coast of South America. Explorations in the sixteenth century yielded further d iscoveries in So ut h America, North America, A frica, and Asia. Th is e normou s ge o gra p h i c ex pa n s i on was accom panied within E u rope by population gro wt h , an i n tensification of trade, and an i n t e lle ctu al m ob il i z at io n thro u g h prin t i n g, ed ucatio n , and t he growth o f sci e n ce . For the countries bo rderi n g on the Medite rranea n , to ta l po pu l a t i on pro bably doubled between 1 500 and 1 600, in c re a s in g from ro u ghly 30 to 6 0 mill ion people. Co nside r i n g the fact that the economies o f the time were predominantly agric ultural and the bulk of the trade local or re gional, some of t he totals achieved in international trade a re q ui te
st riki ng. 1 02,000 casks of w ine w e re e xported from Bordeaux in 1 3 08-9, w h i c h looks
q u ite respectable alongside the 27 0,000 to n s of various goods w hic h the same port se nt to England in 1 96 1 . Some clues also m ake it possible to see how
i m po rtant the grain trade was. In the first half of the fou rteenth ce n t u ry , the total value of Engl is h e x ports was aro u n d £2 50,000, and she e x ported be t we e n 3 5 , 000 and 40,000 sacks o f wool (weighing 1 5 m illion pou nds) and 540,000 cloths ( each
28
yards long) ; and this lat ter fig u re represents o n l y pe r
h a p s one-third of Flemish cloth prod uc ti o n at its peak . The taxable val ue of
the goods e x po r ted fro m the princi pal H a nseatic towns i n t he 1 3 70's reached 3 m i l li o n Lubec k marks . . . . In t he fi fteen t h cen tu ry trade w ith Lombardy
brou ght Venice 2,800, 00 0 ducats, and t h ro u g h Venice the Lombard cities
imported 300,000 ducats-worth of pepper alone . 1 2
Braudel gives the exam ple o f Constantinople , a city o f
700,000,
wh e re
a m illion hundredwe ight (quintals) o f cereals ar rived annually, or of Naples, where business in the amoun t of 1 ,300,000 ducats was transacted on the exchanges in 1 559. 1 3 a grain fleet carrying
T o understand the intellectual mobilization o f the pe riod, w e must
describe the means of transport available to carry both goods and mail. Sea-going vessels were s mall,
30
to
50
during the fifteenth century, though
tons being more or less standard
200 to 500
tons were common ,
especially in Venice . Bulk goo d s were carried in a few larger boats. An estimate o f
3 5 0,000
tons o f shipping in the Mediterranean and twice
that tonnage in the Atlantic meant that sizable fleets were plying the
seas. The fastest s peed s achieved in the sixteenth century did not much e xc eed 200 kilometers per day at sea. Speeds on overland rou tes were
TO WA RD A MA NDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
necessar ily lower, though the fastest postal route between I taly an d B russels co v ere d 764 ki lo m ete r s in five and a half days, or about 1 3 9 ki lo m ete r s a day. Des pite these peak pe r formances, m o st transport an d communication re m a i n e d ir reg u la r a n d invol ved m a n y delays . 1 4 The fou n d a t i on o f u n i ve rsities i s perhaps , the sim plest index of i nte llectu a l mob i l i z at ion i n th e pre - Re fo r m a tio n pe r io d Precise dating is di fficult bec a u se corpo r at ions o f te a c hers and students o ften existed before they sec u red a papal or i m pe r ial c h a rter, a n d so me I talian schools o f law and medicine d a te back to the n i n t h a n d tenth centuries . I f w e consider only the fo r m a l ly established u n i versities between 1 1 60 ( Pa ri s ) a n d 1 900 ( B i rm i n g h a m ) and divide this pe r io d in half, we find th a t fi fty t h ree un i ve r s i t i e s were fou n d e d be fo re 1 53 0 , a n d sixty-five u niversitie s after that yea r. 1 5 The ea r l y universities were centers o f scholastic learn i n g outside the mo n aste r i e s a n d prov i d ed new opportunities for study; thus, one may well speak of a cultural awaken ing. The invention of printing in the m id fifteenth century revol ution ized com m unication. T h e sp r ead of the facility itself is ar. i m p ressive indication . Within fi fty years afte r the invention of movable type, 2 36 E u ro pea n town :; had their own printing presses. The n um ber of books printed before 1 500 (incunabula) i s unce r ta i n ; e stimates of the n u mber of copies of printed books vary between 8 and 20 million at a time when E u ro pe h ad abo ut seventy m il lion inhabitants. A somewhat better figure comes from the end of the sixteenth century, when different titles printed were estimated to number between 1 40, 000 and 200, 000 w hile the tota l European population was abo ut one h undred m illion . I f edi tions averaged 5 00 copies, the total n u m be r of books would be between 70 and 1 00 m illio n . While these im pressive totals remain uncertain, it is quite clear that printing trans formed the book trade . In Spain, around 8 00 , a book had cost roughly as much as two cows; in Lombard y, during the fifteenth century, a medical book cost the equivalent of the living costs of a person for th ree months, and a law book as much as living expenses for sixteen months. Printing brought books suddenly within reach of ordinary persons, although i nit i all y production was not on a large scale. Even the largest publisher o f the time only produced 236 works between 1 4 7 3 and 1 5 1 3 , averaging less than 6 works per year. 1 6 Other publishers prod uced only 2 works per year, o r even less, and many publications were broad sheets of various kinds. Germany seems to rank highest with the publication of 5 7 1 books in 1 520 and 944 books ,
.
(Opposite page)
The Art of Bookmaking
The fou r woodc uts ill ustrate the work of t h e pa pe rmaker, t he type cutter, the pri nter. and
t h e boo kbinder. The w hole work o f 1 1 4 woodcuts by Jost A mman ( 1 568) is o f interest be ca use it shows by its ti t le Die Stiinde or Stii7ldelntch t ha t by t he sixteenth cent u ry t he term t.l / a /t was used bot h in t he se n se of c ra ft or occ u pa t ion and in the sense of estate such as nobility or c le rgy . (Sliindebu€h, Frankfurt 1 568)
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....
mola abra os: "II etu M, 'V r ex e�ra ;textra li'luente ·ltabat.
trt;tur ;n 1" tabulis li m
o
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ma" us
..
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Typogra phus. �tr �ucf)brucftr.
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A
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Jl
R.!e mea reli'luM i llu ro T)pograpbus artts. Impr'mo �um 'Var;os IIrre mi,an �e librol. $Jpl prius
'"' ViffUi) i" .AonijsftuJio{us obambulat ',ortil,
�
US mitibus omne loeat, Huc;roperet,'Vigili eratatg, -volumina aextra, EJita Caltograp us 'lUI prius "'re aetlit.
TOWARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
in 1 52 3 . England , with an annual prod uction of 1 00 new books , ran ks m uch lowe r. 1 7 An index of the growing interest in science can be CO n structed from a com pilation o f scie ntific books published between 1 45 0 and 1 550. A total of 900 books is recorded for this period . Venice pub lished 220 books, Paris published 97, and seventeen other European towns published the re main ing 5 83 sc ie ntific titles. I S Other aspects o f inte l lectual mobilization cannot be dated or quan ti fied so readily . The Re formation o f the sixteenth century had a wide spread e ffect on intellectual life. Lay participation in religious learning and a ffai rs of the ch urch increased as the Scri ptu res became available in the vernacular, and t h i s in turn increased the habit of reading among the people. Literacy appare ntly increased during the sixteenth ce ntury, and by the end of the seve nteenth century between 3 5 and 45 percent of Protestant adults and betwee n 20 and 30 percent of Catholic adults were literate. Lut her's n inety- five theses of 1 5 1 7 we re disseminated with i m pressive speed. Between 1 5 1 7 and 1 520, Luther's thirty publications sold over 300,000 copies. Printed B ibles and prayer books greatly facil itated fam ily worship and blurred the boundaries between church and home. 1 9 A market for printed matter which appealed to a general public had emerged. The developments of urbanization and the commercialization of land, labor, and ca pital were accompanied by a many-sided inte l lectual mobilization.20 Various gro ups of educated m inorities became alerted to the social and cultural position of their own society in relation to the "de monstration of advances" beyond their frontiers, a process which acquired momentum in Europe in the sixteenth century and has since spread to most other countries o f the world. I shall sketch this mobili zation with reference to England . I NTE LLECTUAL MO B I LI ZATION IN EN GLA N D I n his Novum Organum ( 1 62 0), Francis Bacon noted that printing, gun powder, and the magnet had "changed the whole face and state of things throughout the world. " 2 1 Guns mounted on ships were the tech n ical means by which ex plorers and conquerors initiated the age of Eu ropean ex pansion overseas. The lifetimes of the main explorers (Colum bus, 1 445- 1 506 ; da Gama, 1 469?- 1 524; Magellan, 1 480- 1 52 1 ) overla pped with those of Luther ( 1 483 - 1 546) and Copernicus ( 1 4731 543) , s uggesting a broad concurrence between exploration, overseas expansion, and t he transformation of the prevailing religious and sci entific world view. All of this had been preceded by the invention of printing, the first Gutenberg B ible appearing sometime before 1 456 . 22 This new facility explains how overseas exploration , the Re form ation , and the early development of science resulted in a burgeoning literat ure of travelogues , religious pamphlets, and scientific and political trac ts. I
TRANSFORMA TIONS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTUR Y
2 59
process o f a m ore rapid prod uct io n a n d d i ffus io n of ideas the related inc rease in t he n um be r of w riters a n d reader s "intel lec d n a t u al mobi lization . " T h e c h a n ge o f soc i a l comp os i t i o n i n gover n m e n t service i s o n e ex a m p le of th i s mobilizatio n . U n t i l ro u gh l y the fi fte e n t h c e n t u r y most c i v i l se r va n ts were cl e r g y m e n t h o ug h for the h i ghest p osi t i o n s t h e k i n g o fte n ch ose aristocratic l a y m e n as well. T hese c o n d i tio n s c h a n g e d u nder the T udo r " revol ution in go v e r n m e n t i n the sixtee n t h centu r y , and by the ea rl y seve n teenth ce ntury E n gl i s h "civ i l serv ice" s howed a pred o m i n a nce
ca ll t h is w hole
,
,
"
o f la y m e n 2 3 .
The case o f law i s m o re com ple x . Origi n a l l y , l i t i ga t i o n was con d ucted w i t ho u t t he aid o f l awye r s th o u g h l i ti g a n t s co u l d b r in g a fri e n d ,
t o co u rt w i t h w h o m t he y took co u n sel. Such frie n d s w e r e often cle rics. However, as l e g al p roc e d u r e beca m e for m a l i zed in E n g l a n d , the j u ris
d ic t ion o f the ecclesiastical co u rts was more stric t ly con fi n e d . At the same time, ci v i l co u rts (in co ntrast to the Co ntinent) resisted the use of the Roman code a nd deve l o pe d a native "co m mon law" o uts ide the range of t he olo gical su bjec ts and c a n on law ta u g h t at the unive rsities. M uch common law l i t i gat io n was co nc e n tr at ed in Lon do n , where by t h e m iddle of t he fi fteenth century t he soc iet i e s of lawyers developed an o r ga n i zed l eg a l education in the I n ns of Court wh i c h p erha p s or i g i n a ted in dubs fo r m e d t o p ro vi d e lo dgi n g and service w h e n l egal b u s i n e ss bro ught law yers to t h e ca pital . I n this m a n ner , a sec u l a r l e gal ed ucation de ve lo ped ,
o u ts i d e the u n i ve rsities and u nrelated to the c h u rch . The le g al pro fes
sion came to play a s ig n ifi c a n t role in the E n g l i s h Re formatio n and the political re vol u t ion which fol lowed in the seve nteenth ce n t u r y . 2 4 Other ancient p rofe s s i o n s like medicine, n u rs i n g a n d t ea c h i n g were more c lo se l y tied to the c h u rc h . A lt ho u gh occas ional lay p h ysicians date back to an e a r l y a ge, ph ys ic i a n s r e g u larl y e n t e red t h e p r i e st h oo d be caus e t h e i r p ro fession a l ad v a nc e m e n t o ft e n depende d on a p po i n t m en t s to bene fices and hence on e c c l esias t i c a l status. This p ractice conti n ued u ntil the Re fo r m atio n , although the c h u rch often looked with disfavor o n the study of medicine by beneficed c le r gy and actively disc r i m i nated aga i ns t surgeons because it did n ot a pprove the s he dd i n g of blood by ecclesias tics. On t he other hand, n ursing was an a p p rove d ac t iv i t y of t he mon astic orders, and with their dissolution in sixteenth-century Engl an d n o l ay orga n iza t ions of ca r i n g for the sick arose for a considerable t i me . Physicians lost their bo n d with the church whe n the deve lop m e nt of medicine made the pro fe ss i o n independen t , whereas n u r s i n g was for a considerable pe r iod literally destroyed by the dissolution o f t he m on a ste r ie s T e ac h i n g was a s pe c i a l p rovince of the c h urch. Grammar schools fo r boys were e s t a b l is hed at cathedrals and co l le gi ate churches while others were found ed at c h a n tries (endowments for the c ha n ti n g of ,
.
TOWA RD A MA NDA TE OF THE PEOPLE masses, commonly for the fo u nde r) , guilds, a n d a fe w hospi tals . By 1 500
as many as four hundred grammar schools may have existed in England and Wales for a population o f 2.5 m il lion peo p l e . I n additio n , t he boy s
and g i r ls of wealthy households we re tu to r ed pri va t e l y . Education con sisted pr i m aril y of instruction in religion and Latin with a bit o f cipher ing, household skills, and medical k n o wledge added for the gi r ls . The boys of h igh- ra n ki n g families served as pages in the halls and castles of the aristocracy, receiving instruction in the co urt l y arts and knightly skills as well as in reading and w r i tin g . All higher e d ucation was under ecclesiastical jurisdiction. O l d un i versities like Oxford and Cambridge owed their pri mary a l l egi ance to the c h u rc h, a n d all students a n d teachers had the status of c l e ri cs , whether or not t h ey were in holy orders. While the teachers (or masters as they were called) were or ganize d as a gu i ld and had ju ri sdi ctio n over the adm ission of me mbers, only the bi s ho ps had the right to grant li censes to teach a n d only ecclesiastical cou rts had authority to d i scipl i ne the m asters. T he col leges were or ga n i ze d within the framework of the c h u rc h , but owi n g to the privileges or liberties gra nted by the crown, t he y soon achie ved a considerable auto n o m y. The students had to adapt themselves to a curriculum dominated by theological and classical learn i n g . In E n glan d , u n i ve rsity te ac h i n g rem ained a clerical pro fession u n til the n i neteenth ce n t u ry .2:> This syste m of e d u cat i on received a se t b a ck d u r i n g the Reformation of t he sixtee n t h ce n tury. The c rown's co ntinuous demand for funds probably m i li ta ted a gainst the private financ i a l e n dowments nee d ed for gr amm ar schools and universities. Spec ifically, m a n y gra m m a r sc hools had bee n assoc iated with chantrie s based on private endowments, and the disso lution of the chantries damaged t he ed ucation available in Tu d o r En gland . At the accession of Quee n E lizabeth in 1 5 58, com plaints were voiced in the Ho use of Co m m o n s concerning the lac k of sc hools, the decay of t he u n i versities, a n d the m a n y tow n s without sc hools or preachers.26
B u t these tre n d s were reversed d u r in g the last decades of the cen tu ry. Su p po rt fo r ed ucat io n became the fashion as wealthy fa m i l ies and the great town gu ilds e n dowed grammar schools as well as loan funds at the u n i \'e rs ities. Law yers a n d the Inns of Co u rt in Lo n don also ac qui red a new pro m i nence as aristoc r ats increasingly t urned from combat to li tigat i o n . Pr i va te l y en d owed l i braries were establis hed, a n d education in t he vernacular came to t h e fore . E n glish translations of the B ible and o f law books were made available. The fact that private in itiative was large l y r es po n si ble for these ed ucational deve lo p ments s u ggests that it is prope r to s peak of a w id es pread co n cern with lear n i n gP I n Cha pte r 6 ( pp. 204-206) t he increased aristoc ratic i n terest i n educa tio n was e xamined. Here i t w i l l be use ful t o conside r the effects
TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY
261
an d general causes of English educatio n . Oddly enough, the sen te nces i m pos ed on criminals give o ne indication of the im pact of learning. Due to the changed outlook of the Re formation, benefit of clergy was ex te n ded to lay men who could read. If a man was a ble to read a se n te nce from the Bible, he could plead benefit of clergy and have a death sen tenc e red uced to brandin g. I n this roundabout way we get at least a clue to the lite r ac y of the male po pulation of London: betw een 1612 and 1614, in a group of 204 men sentenced to death, 47 pe r c e nt successfully plea ded benefit of cle rgy. Other i ncentives to literacy a rose from the po pular prea c hi n g of the period w hich stressed the im portance of read ing the Bi ble. Between one-third and two-thirds of the male population could sign their names (accordi ng to two studies of the seve nteenth cen tury), if this can be used as an indication of li teracy. B u t the most per suasive evidence for the spread of learning cpmes from a tabulation of entrants to h igher education. I f attendance a t universities, Inns of Court, and private tutorials are added together, the a n nual tot al of stu dents increased from about 780 in the 1560s to a peak of 1,240 i n the 1 6 30s, the last figure representing about 2.5 percent of the annual male cohort reaching the age of seventeen.28 This educational revolution occurred when the demand for lay ad ministrators and professionals was increasing. Stone has suggested a model for analyzing social mobility and the role of learning between 1560 an d 1640. Over 90 percent of the population consisted of people whom contem poraries considered outside the rank of ge ntlemen, s uch as peasants, laborers, artisans, small traders, and de pendents . Surpris ingly, opportunities for acquiring an education existed even for sons of the more substantial yeomen , artisans, and shopkeepers at the top of this submerged majority; a n um ber of these became prom inent divines. Nevertheless, the major changes i n mobility occurred among gentlemen -that is, among the remaining 10 percent. Landed proprietors had always ranked first, although t he division between the peerage at the top, the county squirearchy. and the parish gen try was clearly i mportant. But in the course of the sixtee n th century, four other groups emerged which constituted 'social hierarchies of their own-namely, merchants, lawyers, clergy , and government officials (including military officers). As Stone comments, there was a status hie rarchy based on land, and there were additional occu patio n al hierarchies w hose relation to that standard system of refe re nce was uncertain.29 Learning was also stimulated by its manifest utility for merchants and cra ftsmen and early advances in science responded to these practical interests. Still, royal and aristoc ratic sponsorship of science was im por tant as well. When the u n i versities resisted the teachi n g of science, in stitutions of scienti fic learning like Gresham College were founded out side the universities. When during the agitation of the 1640s and 1650s
Emblem of the Royal Society, 1661
The foundation of the Royal Society was sponsored by king Charles II. whose bust is dis played on the pedestal. The figure to the left is the first president of the society. who is pointing to t he kin g's sponsorship. The fig u re to the right is Francis Bacon. the in itiator of the new science. who is poi nting to some of the scientific instruments (and to a gun) dis played on a wall behind h i m . Even this early allegory shows that science depends on politi cal sponso r s h i p but also claims independence from it. (Thomas Sprat, Hi./ory of the Royal
Sori,/y,
1734)
TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY
26 3
Ac:ademie des scienc:es, 1700
This picture of the French Academy shows the early proliferation of scientific instru
ments. On the far left are musical instruments for harmonic studies; on the lower shelf in the rear are cannon models for experiments in ballistics. Pulleys, catapults, globes, and geometric instruments are among the articles on display. (British Museum)
science was assailed as dange rous to established beliefs, the king's s pon sorship of the Royal Society (1661) helped to dispel popular and eccle siastical suspicion . Nevertheless, many early scientists and clergymen found it necessary to defend the com patibility among science, religion , and c ommerce.30 During the seventeenth century, religion was probably more im portant than science for arousing the intellectual interest of the popu lation. Lawrence Stone's estimate that rou ghly one-half of the total male population of London was literate by the early seventeenth century is best explained by the religio us agitatio n in which laymen supported their arguments by scriptural q uotations. In many Puritan congrega tions, lay men had become active in both the administrative and religious functions of their churc h . Church livings frequently depended on the financial sponsorship of aristocratic landowners and could be main tained only with their consent. In this way, popular religio us interest and aristocratic sponsorship fo und a basis of common concern despite the social divisions of English society. The promotion of literacy went beyond the confines o f the church,
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
though there was considerable o ppositio n to literacy. An act o f 1543 "for the advanceme nt of true religion" expressly prohibited the readin g o f the E n glish B ible by artificers and jou rneymen u nder the rank of yeoman , and by all women o f less than noble ra nk. This concern with the dange r of excessive social aspi rations among the lower classes existed until well into the eighteenth century, whe n c h u rchmen still in veighed ag ain st the subversive a ct ivity of teaching reading in charity schools .31 Neve rtheless, the sixtee nth and seventeenth centuries witnessed a ra pid growth o f a reading public, if one may judge from the seve n fold i ncrease in the number of printers in London d uri ng the reign of Quee n E liz abeth (1558-1603) and the tri pling of pri nting houses betwee n 1688 and 1757.32 Though the number of new books published a n n u ally re mained relatively small u ntil the end of the eighteenth centu ry, the size of editions increased and circulating libraries aided the di ffus ion of reading matter, o ffsetting the high price of each volume. For successful authors this growth of a reading public made free lance writing lucrative enough to pro vide an independen _ t livelihood . Writers had previously been t.roubled by the need to defer to their aris tocratic patrons. Now, dependence on an anonymous reading public meant freedom from personal s ubservience and a new social indepen dence from the aristoc racy. It meant, however, a new dependence on the t aste of the people. Ever since writin g developed into a profession, writers have grappled with the distinction between the few a nd the many. Soc ial distinctions based on titles and in heritance have bee n sup ple me nted (or eve n s uperseded) by the d istinction betwee n the few
marked o ff by their ed ucation and c reativity and "the people" whose n umbers give the m purchasin g power un related to taste. Populists see the mass of the people in terms o f t he virtues of the sim ple life; elitists see them in terms of vulgar tastes to which a crass com mercialism can readily appe a l 33 Similar cultu ral changes occurred elsewhere in Western civilization, although the details di ffer from country to country . Facilitated by the invention of printing in the fi fteenth ce ntury, old learned occupations turned secular, new professions based on learning developed, govern ments became bureaucratic, and secular education rose to social esteem and functional im portance. Furthermore, the Re formation gave i mpe tus to literacy among the middle and lower strata of the population, and later writing became an indepe ndent, secular profession. In the course o f these transformations, ma ny people became consumers of secular c u lture, whereas formerly they had been con fi ned to religious obser vances and po pular amusements. This emerge nce of a culture-consum ing public is the background for the intellectual leadership of an active minority , com posed o f lawyers, teachers, ministers, writers, and many others. .
TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY
265
Beginning in the e ra of the Reformation and o f overseas exp l o ra tio n , each major c han ge of the modern world has had demonstration effe cts a b road. Once the c h u rch was challenged, a king be he a d ed , or a parliament su preme, o nce ind ustrialization was i n i t i a te d a n d the i d ea l of eq uali ty p roclaimed, no country co uld rem ai n u naffected. E very wh e re people were made aware of eve nts and "ad v a n c e s " wh ich served as r e fer ence poi nts for t h e assessme nt of de v e lo p ments at home . In six tee nth-ce ntury England, " i nt e l le c tua l mobilization" was motivated from ac ross fron t ie rs by na t i o n a l rival ries an d religious fears . In the eigh tee nth and nineteenth centuries, "int ellectual mobilization" was a by prod uct of economic d evelo pment and of the s t ri v i n g for political and social eq uali ty. B ut these d istinctions are crude. " Intellectual mobiliza tion" crea te d cond i t io n s fav ori ng t he c ul tu ral l eadersh i p of educated m inorities, which played a majo r role in the state- and nation-building efforts of fol lower societies. An elaboration of this point will outline the framework that has guided the fol lowing studies . AUTHORITY RECON STITUTED: A FRAMEWORK FOR STUDY
Eu ropean explorations and conquests, trade and C hristian missions, the di ffusion of ideas through printing, the demonstration e ffects of modern science and of industrial economies, the ideas of the Re for mation and of the French revolution-all these had re perc ussions in most parts of the world. Soc ieties with ancient traditions have been d is rupted by this multiple outward thrust of Europe, often through coer cion or conquest but frequently also through the demon stration e ffect itself. This revolutionary process began wit h the first em pires built by Portugal and S pai n in the late fi fteenth cen t ur y , a process which Marx aptly described as "primitive accumulation." That process has entered its concluding phase o n ly now with the decolonization of most African and Asian societies, though the effects of overseas expansion were cen turies in the making and will not quickly disa ppear. We are dealing w i th a protracted revolution which has occurred wherever conquest, com merce, industry, technical innovations, and the s pread of ideas have overturned established social relations and polit i ca l structures. Commerce and industry were an important part of this overall rev olutionary process, but it does not make good sense to attribute all chan ges of the last four or five h undred years to "capitalism." In recent years we have come to recognize that sc ientific advance and technolog ica l innovation have ofte n developed a momentum of their own. Such advance m ust have some economic basis, but it often depends as well on the developmen t of a scientific or technical comm un ity (that is, a net work of communication among qualified people with related intellectual
266
TO WARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE
interests). Such com m u n ities have a social and p s yc hologi c a l c apaci ty fo r p romo t in g scie n ce and technology and are the re fore a force o f p rodu c tio n . Moreover, the era o f the "second i nd us trial revol u t ion" (w ith it s vast elaboration of electro n i cs , ato m ic power, che m i cal engineeri ng, and so forth ) has made us awa re that s cie n ce and technology have u nan ti c i pated e conomic re pe rcussions and that the re perc u ssio n s of ideas are fully as i m portan t as the material interests which play a role in sti m u latin g ideas. These i n sigh ts s hould not be con fined to the prese nt . For exam ple , the i n ve ntion of printing a n d t he scie n t i fi c revolution o f the seve ntee nth centu ry were part o f an i ntelle ctual mobilizatio n that was fa cilitated by commercialization in the earl y modern pe riod, but that also occurred well i n advance o f com mercialization a n d provided a mea n s to pro mote commerce and i n d u stry. I p ro pose to treat i ntellectual mobilization-the growth o f a readin g pu b lic and of an ed u cated se cular elite d e pe ndent on learned occu pa tions -as an independent cause of social c han ge. Recognition of this cause need not detract from the fam iliar processes associated with eco nomic development, such as urba n i zation and the comme rcialization of land, labor, and capital. But t h e re a re some mass movements since 1500, such as the Refo rm at ion , nationalism , agitation for ethnic and religio us autonomy an d fo r freedom and equality , which do not ha ve a simple basis
in the division of labor or class interest. N ationalism is noteworthy for its protean reaction to the international position of one's country , w hether it is a s u pe rpowe r among n at ion s or a cou ntry se archi n g for a new iden tity. Also, ethnic and religious agitation is rooted in a sense of com
m unity, o ften at t he p rice of e cono m ic well-being. Marx saw the h uman condition as defined by a pe rs on 's relation to the work process and by the use of his faculties in that process. B u t in his interactions with others, man's o ccu pat ional role is o n l y one sou rce o f id e n tit y among many. In the seventeenth and eig hteen t h centuries, England a nd France underwent major constitutional changes, and new modes of organizing social groups came into being. In Engla nd , Tudor and Stuart "absolut ism" was superseded by a new, contractual rel ation between king and p arl ia m ent in the revolution o f 1688. In France, a nation of citizens emerged in place of the division between notables active in and subje cts excluded from public affairs. These two reconstituted societies had been affected by the process of intellectual mobilization in an international setting. England felt the challenge of Spanish i mperial power and Cath olic subversion , while France res ponded to the challenge of English po litical institutions and the American war of independence. But once their own reconstitution was effe cte d the se t wo societies became the reference-point to wh ich follower societies res po n d e d by taking them either as models or as an indication of what to avoid in charting their own development. The purpose o f the following chapters on England, ,
TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY
lilrddo/(' u/u
'/"'�IIIIf,ralllr. tivl/lIIlJIl
t}"'IIlf'IINI 7111
IT'tWC/','"
267
J)rJl'dc.:< 7;'l;/II',1'
am:
/"/1/:<
Diffusion of French Revolutionary Ideas
Contemporaries of the French revolution were well aware of the "demonstration effect" and its association
with modern means
of communication, In t his cartoon
entitled "t.lec
tridte Republicaine donnant aux Despotes une Commot ion qui renverse leurs Trones," a Fre nc h
patriot turns the
handle of an electrical machine which sends a current of "Ii
berte, egalite, fraternite, unite, indivisibilite" through the thrones of Europe, (Mansell
Collection)
France, Germany, Japan, and Russia is to trace their respective devel opments away from the authority of kings and toward a mandate of the people. To achieve a p roper vantage point for t he more detailed studies which follow, it is necessary to broaden the evolutionist framework which we have inherited from the nineteenth century and which still influences modern studies o f social change. 3 4 That framework originated in Western Euro pe, It conceived of so , cieties in isolation and saw in economic develo pment and the division of labor the key to social change. This view had a certain plausibility . The social theories of the nineteenth century were develo ped in soc ieties
TOWARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE that pioneered the ind ustrial and d em oc rati c revolutions of t he modern world. These re vol utions occu rred in the center o f the B ritish e m pire a n d in the g reat state of Fra nce, soc ie ties wh ic h could easily be consid e r ed in i solation . The theories developed in E n gl a n d and France d e pi c t e d societies as self-contained u n i ts and foc used attention on th e ma jor classes strivi n g fo r social and po li tic al reco gn ition . It is true that the main p o l iti c a l t h e ories took so me limited notice of the i n ternatio n al set ti n g. Li be ral theory was con ce rned with in ternational trade. Co nse rva tive theory emphasized the inequality of n ation s as a n at ural ou t g ro w th of power poli tics. And rad ical t h eory construed in ternatio na l a ffairs as a con tin ua t i o n of the natio n al class struggle by other means . Yet these conside rations remained periphe ral extensions o f the idea t h at eco nomic d e v elopme nt based on t he d i v i sion of labor was t he main deter minant of change in the "moderni zation " of societies . In add it ion , ninetee nth-ce ntury t he or ie s were n otably selective . Lib e ral theory em phas ized the rise of pro d uctivity and marke t exchange as by-p roducts o f t he division of l abor. Such an approach tended to ac c ou n t only for people d irectly i nvolved i n exchange relations , t hereby exclud i n g economic de pe ndents of all kinds. Con servative theory em phasi zed the d i vision of society i n t o statu s gro u ps, each wit h its rights and d uties de fined as part of t he w ho le . This accounted for peo ple with assured status , but neglected all persons of in fe rior status, t he e fforts of s uch people to gain status, and intellectua ls or foreigners w hose status was unclear. Nor cou ld con servatives do m uch with c ategories l i ke legal equality or citizenship which appl i ed in prin ci ple to evel·yone. Radical theory saw the d ivision of l abor in terms of conflicts between exploiters and exploited and t h us accounted o nly for peo ple i nvolved in e m ploy ment relationshi ps . Wome n , childre n , intellectuals , old peo p l e, ethnic m i no rities, and others we re subsumed under this arche typical confli ct whether or not it pe rtained to t h ei r expe rience . To note these deficiencies is not to reject the division o f labor as an i m p or tant agent of social change or the partial i nsights of t he se theories. But in t he case studies which fol low , t hi s age nt is slighted in favor of the i m pact o f external eve nts o n societies, enge nder i n g ideas w h ic h have facilitated "m odernization ." The reas ons for this reorientation are stated here in sum mary form. 1. The political revolutions in En gla nd a nd France and the com mercial a n d ind ustrial revol utio ns in England had a profound cultural impact in the seventeenth and eigh teenth centu ries . Men of letters be gan to fo r m ulate pervasive contrasts between a traditiona l soci al order wh ich existed befo re these revo l u tions , and a modern soc ial order whi ch these revolutions had brou ght about. B ut these contrasts were mislead i n g, for trad ition and m ode rnity h ave coexi sted throughout. A recent study traces the rise of European i ndivid ualism back to t he twe l fth cen-
TRANSFOR MATIONS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY
26 9
tury; thus, elements of the m oder n revo lutions s i nc e the seventeenth cent u ry are fo und in t h e remote pa st . 3 :; Con ve rse l y , t he e arl y cu ltural a nd polit ical d i ffe re n tia tion of ki n g sh ip t raced in the first part o f t his s tud y still has r e perc us s io n s to d ay . 2. S ince the late e ightee n th cent u r y , Eu ropea n soc ial theorists have i n t e rp re te d the commerc i al i zation of lan d , labor, and capital as aris i n g from spec i fically En glish, a n d more broad ly Western Eu ropea n , pre cond ition s. The ge n e ra l te nde n cy has bee n to attribute all other social changes and all ideas ab out so c i ety to thi s basic cause -the d i v i sion of labor. Economic chan ge is basic, all other c h a n ge is derivative, and all basic and derivative change can be best understood by ex a m i n i n g what goes on w ithin a soc iety . I m a i n tain aga in st th ese co n ce pti o n s that every p rocess of modern i zatio n, i nc h ! d i ng t h e ea rly brea kt h ro u gh s in Engla nd and Fr an ce , involves causal links that run in both d i recti ons , co mbi ning ta n gi b le a n d i de al interests as well as i n d igenous a n d fore i g n i n fl uenc es . 3 . Industrializa tio n and de moc ra ti zatio n a p pear to h ave certain necessary and sufficient prerequisites w i t h out which these types of de
velopment cannot occur. And conversely, once these prerequisites are given , the pred i cte d change is considered inevitable. Ag a inst this con ception of a largely uniform structural change I emphasize the i m por tance of ide a s and of go vernme nt "intervention" for an un d ers ta ndin g of c h a n ge . Once co nst itution alism, in d us tr i al iz atio n , and de m ocrati za tion had bee n initiated in Engla n d and Fr a nce , both the institutions and the ide a s o f the ad vanced country were used in others as a model in order to move ahead more ra pidly a nd a vo id , if possible, t he p ro ble ms encountered in the pio neering co un tr y . For these reasons, we sh o ul d never have assumed that the p rocesse s
of industrialization and democratization would follow similar sequences c hange in any two countries. It is e a sie r to see this now. We know that the pionee r i ng role of a bo ur ge o isie was not the sole factor in the de velopment of any modern industrial economy. When the strength of the bourgeoisie is w antin g , other social groups may come fo rw a rd to pro vide po litic al an d eco no mic le ad ershi p , t houg h there is n o assurance of success. The w hole past history of uneven development has created mo unting, wor l dwide inequalities for which there is no easy remedy. But ideas travel quickly, and in co u ntr i es that become aware of their back wardness in co mpa r iso n with an advanced country , the se a rch for ways to overcome that backwardness often precedes every o ther kind of c h a n g e . T h is ins ig ht was formulated early , but has not received t h e a t te n t ion i t dese r ve s . In the late 1840s, the German conservative Wilhelm Riehl gave a te lli n g an al ys i s of this co r relation be tween economic bac kwardness a nd inte l lec tual mobilization. He entit led his c hap te r Die Proletarier der Geistesarbeit or, l ite r al ly , the p roleta ri a ns o f mental la bor . of
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE In German y, the i ntellectual proletariat is t h e r eal, fighting c h u rch of the fourth estate. It represen ts t he grea t vanguard of that social stratum which has broken with the traditional social structure, o pe n ly and sel f consciously .... I t h ink of this gro u p of the fOllrth estate in the broadest terms. It con sists of a proletariat of civ i l servants, a p ro le t a riat of schoolmas ters, perennial s t u dents oftheology, starving academic instructors, literati, journ a l i s ts artists of all kinds ranging downwards from t h e travel l i ng virtuosi to the itinerant co medians, organ-grinders and vaudeville s i ng e rs. If o n e exam ines the legions of this i n tell ectual proletariat in German}" one can o n l y c o ncl u d e that this g r o u p of the fourth estate is in no cou n t ry of Europe more n u m erous and \ ari ed than it is with us. This goe s to prove that the tumover of the nation's material c a pi t al is disproportionately s m all compa red with t h is wholesale and retail trade, t h is ha wk i ng and profiteering in spiritua l goods. Germany pro d uces m ore men tal prod uct than she can use or pay for. T h i s over-produc tion which is not transitory but permanent, a nd in fact always growing, is a sy mptom of sickness in the w h ole natio n al economy, of an unnat u ral division of labor. The i n tellectual proletariat is a m uch more poign ant satit'e of the nation's welfare than all the m i sery amo n g factory-workers and peasan ts.
,
-
We are confronted with a vicious circle. In tellectual work shoots u p like weeds, because eco nom ic en terprise does not provide it w i t h sufficiently ex ten si\-e opportu n i ties for g ro wth , an d t h i s growth in turn can not come to fruition, beca use every s u r pl u s of energy is dissi pated i n an end less foliage of books. There are various d a nge rs in t his for the social co ndi tions of Ger many. In other coun tries the fourth estate was created by t he sudden and
overwhelming rise of indusu'y, In Germany, the fourth estate is largely the
o n es ided res u l t of an overgrown i n t ell e ctua l uprising. Also , t he German bou rgeoisie o wes i t s prevailing i nfluence i n mode rn society to the two great facts of an intellectual u p l i s i ng the Reformatio n and the classical period of the newer natio nal literatu re. IL is o nly during the most recent period that ind u stry has begu n to weigh th e scales i n favor of the bourgeoisie. The lush growth of the i n tellectual proletariat is the reverse side of a spirited devel o pment in the bourgeoisie.:'6 "
,
Riehl's conservatism put him out of sympathy with the intellectuals he described. B ut his insight into the inverse relation between an "intellec tual proletariat" and a vigorous m iddle class applies quite generally to follower societies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As one moves east in Europe during the n i neteenth century, or as one observes old societies today that have lain on the periphery of Eu rope's outward thrust over the centu ries, one finds countries in wh ich an economically pioneering bourgeoisie is not an indige nous develop ment, or not a vigorous one. Such countries are arenas of intellect ual mobilization, in which officials, teachers, literary people, and other members of Riehl's "intellectual proletariat" tend to coalesce into a class of their own .37
TRANSFORMA TIONS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY
271
This coalescence results from an archetypical experience. In com ris pa on with some or all advanced countries, the educated minority or in tel ligentsia sees its own country as backward. This is a troubled per ce ption , for it ide ntifies stren gth if not good ness with alien forces and sees weakness if not evil in the lan d of one's bi rth In t h is setting, ideas are used to locate and mobilize fo rces which wil l be ca pable of e ffectin g ch a nge and th us red ressin g this psyc hologically u n favorable accou n tin g . A ty pical strategy of pe rception a n d argu men t ensues . As viewed b y the ou tsider, the strength o f the a d va nced coun t ry is formid able, but it is also sa pped by false values, corruption, and s pi ritual dec ay a n d there fore should not or cannot end ure. At the same time, the wea kness of one's native land is pervasive , but the hidden spiritual v a l ues of the peo ple are an untapped so urce o f strength which will prevail in the end . Thus, the dominance o f t h e advanced country carries within it the seeds of its own destruction, while the backward people and the underdevel oped country possess capacities that are signs of a bright futu re. Behind this strategy lies the simple belief that ultimately the advanced cou ntry m ust be weak because its people are evil, while the backward country must be strong because its people are good. Such secular prophecy has been an important factor in nationalist efforts to achieve the social and economic development of backward co untries by routes other than those which were followed in the West. This archetype of "intellectual mobilization" under conditions of relative backwardness provides only a model. When sensitive and articulate men and women suffer from the weakness and de privation that is all around them, they will leave no avenue untried to better the fortune of the country and its people. When practical measures to do so are unavail able, free play is given to ideas. The result is a kaleidoscope of responses. The following chapters do not provide a comprehensive account, but focus attention on those i ntellectual oppone nts of the status quo who propose a reconstitution of authority. In the nineteenth century, social thought tended to be divided be tween those who considered politics and economics from the standpoint o f Realpolitik and those who considered ideas as a world divested of all crass , materialistic interests. When this second, idealist approach pre vailed, it was quite persuasive to o ppose it with the first, more tough minded view of the world. Economists and sociologists tend to agree with the Marxist thesis that governments and ideologies are secondary phenomena, because political maneuvers and any expression of ideas "merely" reflect the more basic interests at work. This materialism is not as realistic as it pretends, even if one accepts the fact that ideas, like political actions, are con tin uations of the struggle for existence by other means. For the cultural and institutional life (which Marx lumped to gether under the term superstructure) is an extension o f the mind and of .
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
social relations th ro u gh which men seek to e n h a nc e their opportunities in situations of relative a dv e rs ity Men a l way s face such situations, but the s i gn ifi canc e attributed to ideas seems to increase in roughly inve rse .
pro port io n to the o pportu nities fo r c hange wh ich are readily availabl e. The h i s to r y of Ma rxism is pe r h a ps the bes t evide nce for the l i m i ta tions of m a terialis m . Marxist the o ry was mode led on t he i n ter na l d e v e lo p ment of En glish c api tal is m . But as t h a t the ory traveled eastward to coun tries in w h ich an econ om ically p i on ee r in g m id dle class was n o t an in d i geno us develo p ment, Marxi s m was rei n te rpr eted in the interest of ach ie vi n g soc ialism in econom ically bac kward countries. Soc ieties that s til l see k to pro mote their i n dustri aliza tion h a v e seen little value in a Marx i s m wh ich made the ideal soc i e t y of the future d e pend on the eco n o m ic achieveme nts of a d v a nced c ap it alis m Economically bac kward co un tries have modified Mar xi sm in accord with their national a s p i ra .
tions, even though this nationalism conflicts with the strongly interna tionalist orientation of Marxism in its o rigi nal, theoretical formulation .3s Each of the case studies begins with the decline of a society'S aris tocratic culture pattern and fol lows wit h a sketch of its inte r national set t in g in order to characterize the emergence of national aspirations. Each s hows the emergence of ideological gro u ps sensitive to developments beyond their country's frontiers and anxious to find a more viable mode o f soc ial organization for their native land . The remainder of each chap ter is devoted to an analysis of basic po l i t ical ideas with em phasis on those which have provided the major themes of the country's subsequent development.
.
Part 1 dealt with the authority o f ki ngs and in particular with the early intermingling between consecration and secular struggles for power. The chapters of Part 2 begin at a time w hen t he sacred authority of kingshi p was being gradually undermined, sometimes through the very assertion o f absolute supremacy as under Louis XIV and Peter the Great. Three times in the successive revolutions of the modern world the sacred authority of the king was destroyed by violence: the English king, the French king, and the Russian tsar were executed in 1649, 1793, and 1918, respectively . In all cases, however, the effort to reconstitute authority in the name of the people has involved a search for a new mandate to rule that is more valid than the authority of kings. This is why "the people," the a ppeal to the nation , and the search for a national id e nt i ty recur so regularly in the movements of "intellectual mobiliza tion" which are o utlined in the following chapters.
9 KINGS AND PEOPLE IN ENGLAND
THE E N G L ISH REFORMATIO N AND THE RE IGN O F QUEE N ELIZAB ET H
THE
DECADES around 1500 provide a convenient separation between the medieval an d the early modern world. The conjunction of E uropean overseas expansion, pop ulation increase, trade expansion, the invention of printing, the rise o f modern science, and the Reformation heralded a new era. The polit ic al scene of that time was also one of intense activity I n the late fifteenth century, the Iberian peninsula was di vided from west to east into t he kingdom of Portugal, the kingdom of Castile, and the kingdom of Aragon which included eastern Spain, the Balearic I slands, Sardinia, and Sicily. The small kingdom of N avarre formed a wed ge between northern Castile and Aragon. In addition, the southern Emirate of Granada represented the remnant of the once powerful Muslim em pire in Spain. I n 1469 Prince Ferdinand (b. 145 2 d 1516) and Princess Isa be l la (b. 1 451-d. 1504) were married. Ferdinand suc ceeded to the throne of Aragon in 1479 , Isabe l la to the throne of Castile in 1474. This union of the two crowns was followed by the conquest of Granada in 1492, of the kingdom of Naples in 1503, and the acquisition of Navarre in 15 1 2 . Although this was also a period of S panish explo rations and conquests in the American colonies, t he newly united Span ish empire was orien te d toward the east as the defender of the Christian faith against the Turks. In 1 516 Ferdinand died, and the crowns of the Spanish kingdoms devolved on his grandson, C harles (1516-1556), ruler of the Nether lands and heir to the Austrian Habsburg dominions. In 15 19 the Ger man e lectors at Frankfurt designated him Ho ly Roman Emperor and during h is reign as Charles V the main focus of the em pire shifted to the center of Europe. Charles was a Netherlander at home neither in .
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273
274
TO WARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE
Spain nor in Austria. H is chie f preoccupation was the struggle against France, which was surrounded by the Netherlands in the north, the Holy Roman Em pire in the east, and the Spanish kingdoms i n the sou th. France responded to this encircle ment by con c lud i ng an alliance wit h the Ottoman Turks (1536). T h us C harles was simultaneo usly engag ed in Weste rn Europe and the Mediterranean. Afte r secretly ced i ng h i s hered i tary Austrian domains to his brother Ferdinand (1521), Charles' power primarily depended on his I t alia n and Dutc h possession s The wealth of the Netherlands and of Na ples together with large sums of money from Germany and from the colonies made the political struc ture u nder Charles V the most imposing em pire of the m id-sixteenth centu ry . After his electio n as em peror, one cou rtier wrote to Charles ,
.
.
Sire. n ow that God in His prodigious grace has elevated Your Majesty
above
all Kings and Princes of Christendom, to a pinnacle of power occupied before
by
none except your mighty predecessor Charlemagne. you are on the road
towards Universal Monarchy and on the point of uniting Christendom under a s ingle shepherd. I
One m ay discount the rhetoric of the courtier without diminishing the real concern with u niversal monarchy as a bastion of Christianity against the Turks. The rise of the Ottoman Turks in Anatolia dated back to the early fo urteenth century. Their expansion westward proceeded rapidly, both cause and conseq uence of the declining Byzantine empire. The fall of C o nsta ntinople in 1453 was one incident of the e x pa n s i on which by 1481 had encom passed the whole Greek peninsula and Macedonia, B ulgaria, Wallachia, and Bosnia to the north and west. Wars betwee n the Turks and the Venetian Re public broke out twice, and both wars (1463-1479, 1499-1503) witnessed the defeat o f Venice. Under the reign of Sulei man the Magnificent (1520-1566), the Turks captured Belgrade (1521) and Rhodes (1522), conquered the kingdom of Hungary (1526), laid siege to Vie n na (1529), and thereafter exerted pressure on central Eu rope for centuries. Pressure became intermittent when the Ottoman em pire also became engaged in conflicts with the Persians in the east. But the Turks remained in control of Hungary until 1699 and of Greece until 1830. The empire of Charles V had been a mai n bulwark against the Turks, but under Charles's brother, Ferdinand, who ruled the Habs burg lands after 1521, that central European defense had weakened. Charles's and Ferdinand's cosmopolitan outlook had been reflected in the Flemish, Burgundian and Italian members of their entourage , and in their encouragement of humanist learning. When Charles V abdi cated in 1556, his domains in the Netherlands, Italy, and Spain were inherited by his son, Phil i p I I (1556-1598). Philip was a Spanish and ,
KINGS AND PEOPLE IN ENGLAND
275
Cath olic traditionalist, concerned with def en ding t he fait h again st both Prot estants and M usl im s As crown prince, Phili p had married the C a th olic queen Mary Tudor o f England in 1554, w h ic h led to the perse cu t ion of P ro tes ta n ts in En gla n d and E n glish parti ci pa tio n in t he S pani s h war with France. In the peace of Cateau-Cambresis (1559), France con firmed Spanish hegemony in Italy and the S pa nish N ethe rlands, which were still the main bases of the struggle against the Turks. Suleiman died in 1566, and by 1571 Po pe Pius V h ad succeeded in o r ga n iz i n g a Holy League against the Turks. In the ens uing battle of Le pa n to (1571), th e combined Spanish, Ven etian, and pa pal fleets annihilated the Turk ish fleet. The vi c to ry had few strategic effects since the T ur ks q u i c kly recovered, but it was o f i mmense symbol ic i m po r ta n ce because it con fir med Phili p in his c h osen role as the defender of Christendom against the h ereti cs That role was fu rthe r enhanced when Phil i p settled th e long stan d ing conflict with Portu gal by com bi n i ng the two crown s of Spain and Portugal whi le allo wing the Portuguese their own ju ris dict ion at home and abroad. Henceforth, the two Iberian powers pos se s sed a world em pire w hic h drew on the treasures of t he Orient and t he Americas while denying all ot her powers access to these areas an d to the oceans of the worl d These large claims were sustained for a time by the grea ter navi gatio nal and geographic knowledge which t he pioneering explorers had acquired To rule this vast e m pire, Spain and Portugal de pended on the many Du tch sailors who were in their empl oyment an d on the Dutch commercial fleet, wh ich grew rapidly. But in 1581 the Netherlands de clared their independence from Spain, which marked the i nitial decline of Spanish power in world affairs. Until the seventeenth century, Spain and France were the dominant world powers . As Richard Koebner has observed, "To E n glishm e n of the six teenth and seventeenth centuries ascendancy was a salu ta ry ex pectation, but it was not one which had bee n secured Com pared with France and Spain , the country remained a power of the second rank."2 England's rise to a position of i n ternationa l im portance was d ue initially to the political consolidatio n which followed a lon g era o f c ivil wars. The early Tudor monarchs, Henry V I I (1485-1509) and Henry VIII (15091547), suppressed private feudal armies, established a number of effec tive courts (of w h ic h the Star Chamber, 1487, was one), put down several rebellions, engaged in wars with Scotland and France, and made the En gli sh church independent of Rome ( Act of S u premacy, 153 4). The future domestic and international politics of England were rooted in its d yn a s tic h is tory Henry V I II was followed on the throne by his ten-year-old son, E d ward V I ( 1 547-1 553) , who died at sixteen. Com plicated intrigues precede d the s ucce ss ion of Henry VI II's daughter Mary Tu d o r (1553.
.
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.
.
.
.
,
G E N E A LOG I CA L A F F I L I A T I O N S
Fadi/If/lid King of Spa i n
I Ca t h e r i n e of A ragon
Hi'll )"\' J'/II King of E n gla n d
I
Mary I
=
TABLE 2 of M A RY T U DO R and M A RY ST U A RT , Q U E E N of SCOTS
habel/f/
Queen o f S pa i n
jllall{/
t he m a d .
Q uee n of Cast i l e
Phi"})
Uta r/l'.1 I K i n g of S p
(Mary Tudor, Queen o f England) ( m . 1 554)
I
( H abshurg)
M a ry
Isabella of Port u ga l
Ph ilip II
K i n g o f S pa i n
M a rga rc t
EIII III WI 111'1 K i n g of Port u ga l
Ca t h e r ine d ' � ed i c i Iraly
E l i zabeth o f Valois
( m . 1 559)
=
s i st c r o f H e nry V I I I
Hi'll )"), /I K i n g of Fra nce
Mary of ( ; u i se ( France)
Fra llci.l /I King of France
(m.
1 558)
=
I
ja lll es
V King of Sco t l a n d
M {// -v S/lw )"1 Quee n of
Scots
jaml's I V King of Scotland
I
H e n r y Stuart
Lo rd Dar n l e y ( Ill . 1 5 6 5 )
I
james I
K i n g of England ( j a mes VI King of
Scotland)
KINGS A ND PEOPLE IN ENGLAND
2 77
1 55 8), but more im p o r tant l y , she was a Catholic and out of touch wi th E n gl i s h affairs. The a p parent _aberration o f M ary Tudor s re i gn be co m es m ore i n t e l l i gi bl e wh e n i t is r ecal l ed t h a t M a r y s mother was Cath e rine o f A ra gon, the d aughter of Fe r d i n a nd a n d Isabella o f S p a i n a n d th e first wife of Henry V I I I . M o reove r , M ar y s a u nt , J u a n a the Mad, m a r ri e d P h i l i p I , ki n g o f Castile, and their s on a n d M a r y s co usin was E m pe ro r Cha rles V . T h us, M ar y s t i e s w i t h Ca t h o l ic i sm , S pa i n , a n d t h e e m pi re we re a natu ral b y p ro d uc t of her fa m i l y co n n e c t io n s o n her mother's side. I n 1554 s he m a rr i e d he r second co us i n , Crown Prince Phili p of S pain, d es pi te con s ider ab l e E n g l i s h o p pos i tion . M a ry Tudor died i n 1558, and E li zabeth I ascended t he throne so o n a fter F r a nc e (un der the command of t he d uke o f Guise) had conquered Calais, the l a s t rema i n i n g Engli s h foo t hold o n the Continen t . In 15 59, w hen Spain , Fra nce, a n d En g l a nd concl uded their treaty of Cateau-Cambresis, Phili p I I married the d a u ghte r o f Henry I I , the king of France, t h u s consoli dating t he Spa ni s h Fre n c h alliance. But the French ki n g d i ed s u d denly , and his crown passe d to his so n , Francis I I , who was married to M a ry Stuart. The mother of Mary Stuart was Mary of Guise, w ho had become regent of Scotland following the death of her h usband, J ame s V, in 1542. Consequently, the new queen of France, Mary Stuart, made the house o f Guise dominant i n F rance and Scotland. The threat im plicit in this French claim to Scotland was en hanced by Mary Stuart's ri g ht to the English su ccessio n ( her grandmother was a sister of Henry V I I I) if Elizabeth died childless. The re l i g io us q u estion com pounded the diffi culty. Mary T u dor s ardent Catholicism had led to her unpopular mar riage with Philip of Spain ; now the Catholicis m of Mary Stuart became the focus of Catholic hopes. Real as well as imagined Catholic moves a ga inst E n gland became a constant preoccu pation d u ring Elizabe t h ' s reign ( 1 558-1 603). But despite these apprehensions, England was be coming a power to be reckoned with in international affairs, and in 1588 the English defeated the S p anish Armada. This outcome had bee n difficult to foresee at the beginning of the sixteenth century. England was a country on the pe riph e ry in com par ison wit h Franc e , S pain and the Holy Roman and Ottoman empi res In 1 5 00 the E nglish population was two and a half or three million , while that of Spain numbered six m illion and that o f France about twelve million . By 1 600 the English and I rish population had increased to fou r million, but the population of the Iberian peninsula numbered almost tw elve million and that o f France about sixteen million. E ngl i s h m en had hardly part ic ipa ted in the first half-century of ex ploration and conquest, and the first English book on geography appeared o n ly in 1 559. Until the last decades of the sixteenth century, Engla n d was a relatively back ward island-nation, whose richest merchants co uld not com pare with th ose of the Continen t . '
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TO WA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE I n t he abse nce o f co m p rehen sive statistics for the pe riod 1 5001 600, descri ptive s tate m e n t s veer uneasily between e m phasizi n g the backwardness of the English economy and notin g its signs of c h a n ge . 3 B u t t he grow th o f London is o n e c lear i n d ication of c h a n ge after 1 500. The c i ty i nc reased from 5 0 , 000 in 1 500 to 200, 000 i n 1 600, and i n the e n s u i ng fi fty ye ars the Lo ndon po p u l ation doubled to 4 00 ,000 . This growth a lo ne raised the demand for a gricultu ral prod ucts. The six tee nth ce n t u ry is note w o rt h y for the d e velopme n t of the woolen ind us try, build i n g co n structio n , coal m i n i n g, and so me promotion of trans port. Rivers were cleared of obstr uction so that by the early 1 600s the coun try posse s se d seven h u n d red m iles o f navigable rivers, and by 1 700 t h e re were few places more than fi ftee n m iles fro m access to wate r trans port.� Roads re ma i ned very poo r , since re pairs d e pended on the avail a b i l i ty o f local labor and s u pplies ; by the 1 5 70s, however, the carrier a n d postal system had made some headway and be nefited from the toU free land t ransportation w h ic h was carried over from the M id d le Ages . To conte m porary obse rvers, E n gland appeared as a country of increas i n g economic o pportu n ities. Reli gious re fu gees had other countries o pe n to them , but large n umbers of e n t repre neu rs came to England for its safety, grow i n g m arket, and che a p labor. Skilled cra ftsmen i n textiles and m i n i n g m igrated to E n gland , a nd by the 1 570s the co untry was pro d uctive and well-eq uipped both tec h n ically and financially. Though not rich by com parison with the large r co ntinental countries , E ngland was prospe ring.5 Amidst these grad ual chan ges, there we re two which had lasting e ffects on E n glish society : the price re volution and the H enric ian Ref ormatio n . With expansion , the E n glish economy needed an increasing su pply of commercial capital ; hence, the demand for money rose. Owing not only to this money shortage , but to t he abse nce of credit facilities, the d ebasements of the c urrency a n d re la te d factors, a lon g-term infla tionary trend resulted. Coi n s lost the i r p u rchas i n g power; creditors lost and debtors gained as loan s could be repaid in less valuable currency. Likewise , traders gained because they could pay the i r bills in cheaper coi ns , whereas lan downers with fixed re ntal i ncomes lost because the same amount o f money was worth less than before. These conditions we re advantageous for export. A gric ultural prod uc�rs were attracted by profits from a n expanding overseas m arke t for grains , dairy prod ucts, and wool. The wool trade in part icular ex panded e normously d uring t he si xteenth ce ntury, and m a n y fields were fe nced o ff and turned into shee p runs. W here arable land was tu rned into pasture , fewer hands we re needed. The result was that whole villages dec line d , m u sters for the m ilitia dwindled, and parish t ithes no longer s u p ported the priests. Villagers, the crown, and li terary men were u n i ted i n their opposition to the growth of sheep-farm i n g , w h ich enriched landlords and the wool
KINGS A ND PEOPLE IN ENGLA ND
2 79
trade rs but i m poverished the farm ers, es pec i a l l y i n the En g lish Mid lands. Ne vertheless, enclo s u res also faci l itated the consolid ation of h old i n gs a nd -a l o n g with new far m i n g tech n iques-con tributed to in crea se d prod uctivity. The En gli sh Refo rmation of the sixteenth century was the culm i nat io n o f re ligious deve lo pments w h ich reached far bac k into the past. Since 1 066, the E n gli s h k i n gs had re pea tedly attem pted to c u rta i l the co nnectio n between Ro me a n d t he high officers of the E n glish ch urch , bec ause the bishops were also tenants-in-ch ief of the k i n g and posed a threat to royal authority i f they became too i n d e pe n d e n t . The o p posi tion of prominent ecclesiastics like A rchbishop Anse l m , Thomas Bec ket, and others a g a i nst the E n gli s h k i n g was in part a stru ggle for ecclesi astical indepe ndence from the crown. I ndeed , w h e n royal authority weake ned , pa pa l tax co l l e c t o rs took a d v a nt age and t his i n t u rn pro voked po p u la r as well as o fficial resistance. D u ring the fourteenth cen
,
tury, these controversie s gave way to a settle ment (the statutes of Pro visors and of Praem unire, 1 35 1 - 1 3 5 3 , 1 3 65, 1 390- 1 393) , which p reserved the crown's control o ver a ppo i ntm e n t s to bishoprics, made it m o re di fficult for plaintiffs to carry the ir a p pea l s fro m E n g lish co urts to the papal court in Rome, and forbade under pe n a lty o f forfeiture the introduction from Rome o f pa pa l bulls a n d exco m m u n ications. The En glis h church was able to maintain this marked indepe n de nce from Rome because since Norman times the paris h c le rgy had o fte n been ap po i n te d by lay landowners . Church bene fices, therefore, were treated as secular property, and legal disputes involving suc h bene fices were referred to t h e royal, rather than the ecclesiastical, courts . The advoU'son or right to a p po i n t to a benefice co uld be sold or exchanged or be queathed like a pi e ce o f property, just as the in c u m be n t parson pos sessed his benefice as a freehold. Thus, when Henry V I I I formally abolished the papal right of appointment to bishoprics, h e l ega l i z e d con ditions that already existed . By abolishing papal j u ri s d i c ti o n , the king prohibited the payment o f taxes to the church in Rome and diminished the old conflict between secular and ecclesiastical courts. But he d i d not claim authority "in the ministration of s p ir i t ua l things," and his Stat u te of the Six A rt ic les (1539) largely restated Catholic doctrine. Desp i te these indications of co n t i n u ity with the English and Catholic traditions, the Henrician Reformation caused maj or c h a n ges in English soc ie t y . Between 1 535 and 1 540, all the monasteries of Engla nd either dis solved themselves or were suppressed under the direction of He n ry V I I I 's minister, Thomas Cromwell . There were at least 825 re l i gi o u s houses in England and Wales with a total collective income of over £ 1 60,000 a year, derived from about 25 percent of t h e country's agri cultural land. Royal revenue from land was a bo u t £40,000 a year; thus, the landed property taken from the monasteries b ro u ght t he crown a
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KINGS AND PEOPLE IN ENGLAND
fourfold increase in its annual inco me. Other valuables co n fi sc a t ed from the church added a furthe r £ 1 million to the royal treas ury . 6 Con fis catory policies did not terminate with the rei g n of H e n r y V I I I . U nder E d ward V I , lands worth more than £ 1 0 0 , 000 were confiscated from the endowm ents for prayers and masses (chantries), while Queen E l i za be t h ap p rop riated the landed estates (temporalities) o f som e b i s h o ps in ex chan ge for ti thes transferred to the bishops from the mon asteries ( sp ir itua lities) . Military expenditu res were certainly a m ajor factor behind this policy of the Tudor m o narc h y ; between 1 5 0 9 and 1 5 7 2 the crown spent so me £5 million on wars alone. The lands confiscated from the mon as te ries were sold or leased at current market prices, and crown lands were also sold to pay royal debts . Between 1 5 58 and 1 640, mo nastic a n d crown la n ds valued at more than £2 m illion were sold to meet the ex penses of the crown. 7 The sale o f monastic lands also had the e ffect of . com m itting the Eng lis h u pper classes to the Reformatio n . Whatever the reli g ious sentiment involved , landowning families had a manifest inter est in the validity of titles to former monastic estates which they had p urchased from the crown . This massive mobilization of land was paralleled by a religious re vival -a m obili zation of the spirit. Dyna s tic and secular motives had pro m pted Henry V I I I t o clear "the ground for reformers to attack what seemed the empty ritual of the Mass, the ignorance of the common c lergy , the corru ption of the monastic and mendicant orders, the world liness of the hierarchy."8 Though one e ffect was to stim ulate secular ambitions, another was to inte nsify rel i gious zeal. I n a period of twenty fo ur years-following the Act of Su premacy of 153 4-the go vern m ent' s religious policy vee red between the authoritarianism of Henry V I I I , t he Protestantism of Edward V I , the Catholicism o f M ary Tudor, and the religious settlement ( 1558- 1 559) u nder Elizabeth. In the absence of strong religious leadership , issues of church policy were decided by gov ernmental decree. It was partly as a reaction a gainst so m uch uncer t ainty th at reli g ious gro u ps formed which were determined to preserve the faith as t h ey had come to define it.9 There is also considerable circumstantial evidence for a rise of na tional s e n timent. Di fficulties at home mounted during the sixteenth cen(Opposite page) Title
Page of the Great Bible, 1539
Henry V I I I 's official version o f the Bible was based o n English translations of the preced
ing thirty years and became part of everyday thought and language . The title page shows
the king presenting the new work. labeled veTbum dei or word of God . to Chancellor Thomas
C romwe l l and
A rchbishop Thomas Cra nmer. These great men distribute the Bible to the
clergy who in turn expound it to t he laity. In response. the people cry vivat Tex or long live the ki ng. The use of Latin phrases shows the contin ued influence o f the Catholic t radi tio n . the stress on the Word of God reflects Protestant influences. whi le the people's g lor i fICation of the king con firms Henry V I I I as head of the Anglican c h u rch. (British Museum)
TO WA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
Dissolution of Monasteries T he ar istoc ra cy was i n terested in the dissolution of monasteries, w h ich e nabled them
to
ga in control of c h u rch lands. Fo u n tain s A bbey , Yorksh ire h ad been b u i l t by the C i ste r
c ian Order beg i n n i n g in 1 1 35. At its height th e abbey possessed pasture and cornland ,
game preserves a n d fisheries, lead m ines and quarries. A m o n k m ight have walked for
thirty m iles without leaving the communal property . The last abbot was forced to resign in 1 536 and three years later the abbey was dissolved . At the time its 543 acres yielded an
annual reve n u e of £ 1 ,000, i t s moveable wealth was val ued at £ 7 00, and its assets i ncluded over 3,000 heads o f cattle. The property was bestowed on a layman. Sir Richard Gresham. By 1 540 the churc h and cloister had been stripped of lead and glass, woodwork and fur n iture. The ruins of the abbey remain a Yorkshire landmark to this day. After being de se rted for over 50 yea rs the estate passed in 1 59 7 i n to the h a n ds o f Stephen Proctor, who
in 1 6 1 1 at t he height of his career b uilt Fou n tains HaU nearby, using the lead and stone of the abandoned abbey. I n the 1 9605 the abbey and hall together with related properties were pu rchased by the West Ri d in g of Yorkshire County Council. The HaU i s still occ upie d by its last private owners. ( British Museum)
tury. Landowners raised rents in order to keep up with inflation and meet the costs of financing land purchases. There was periodic unem ployment. Great anxiety was caused by the widespread distress due to enclosures, by vagrancy in the co untryside, and by sporadic rebellions. The last decades of the sixteenth century were a period of upheaval which should be seen in conj unction with England's international position. Uneasy alliances were formed between France, Spain , and the pope based on common opposition to the English heresy. Each move by the pope or by Spain had a potentially divisive effect in England, intensi-
KINGS AND PEOPLE IN ENGLAND
fying the con flicts among Catholics and Protestants. To counter these moves, England formed tacit alliances with the Huguenots in France and the Dutch in their struggles against Spain. Moreover, mounting difficulties led to a psychological mobilization . Threats from abroad linked to subversion at home helped to solidify religious and political sentiments so that along with their rising anti-Catholicism Englishmen developed a se nse o f national pride . 1 0 Eco n o m ic deve lo p m e nts also su p ported a sense of confidence. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, despite periodic economic distress, the re-export trade of goods from America and the East Indies as well as English manufacture developed rapidly. Many conditions of the industrial revolution were already present by 1 700, although obstacles in the techniques of pro duction had created a lull after 1640. RE FERENCE SOC I ETIES: SPA N I S H DO M I N AN C E A N D CATHOLIC DANGER In the European world of the sixteenth century , dom inated by the Holy Roman Empire o f Charles V, by Spain and the Ottoman Tu rks, a lesser country like England had to achieve its political position in re lation to these superpowers. Nevertheless, English self-con fidence rose owing to the country's increasingly active role in international affairs. European explorations overseas had been pioneered by the Por-
TO WA RD A MA NDA TE OF THE PEOPLE t u guese a n d the Spaniards for two ge neratio n s before E n gl is h me n be ga n to pa rtic i pate in t hese v e n t u res. The
e a r l y E n gli s h explorations we re for a northwest pas s pice trade of t he East . S pain' s
co n fined to t he Atla ntic fis he ries and to the search sage w h i c h wo u l d p ro vide access to the
m a r i t i m e stre n gt h preve n ted En gli s h ex plore rs fro m i n ter fe r i n g with t h e S pa n i s h sea ro utes. However, a m ajor change i n E n gl i s h-S pan ish re lations occ u rre d in t he 1 5 50s o w i n g to eve n ts i n the N etherlands. P h i l i p 11 s uccee ded to the thro n e i n 1 5 5 6 and two years later le ft the S p a n i s h N e t he r l a n d s i n the hands o f a vicero y , Card inal Gra n velle, w hose r u le p ro v o ked a series
of
loc al revolts lead i n g to
open re be l li on
by t he N e therl a n d s . E n gla n d favored the Dutch rebe l s , fo r u n d i s t u rbed Spa n i s h co ntrol in the N e therl a n d s w o u l d
m ake
a S pa n i s h i n v a s ion
E n gla nd m uch easier. S p a n i s h intrigues fo me n t i n g
of a C a t h o lic u prisin g
in E n gland lent s u p port to the fea r of i n vasio n . These c o n te n t i o n s were
co mpe tition with S pa i n on the hi gh seas when se c ret a ry , W i l l i a m Ce c i l , s po ke to the S pa nish am bas sador ( 1 56 1 ) , d i rectly challengi n g the right of t he po pe to p ar t i tio n the world as the papal b u l l o f 1 454 to He n r y the Nav i ga tor h ad done E n gli sh fears of the Spanish threat and of Catholicism were co n fi rmed w h e n the po pe exco m m u n icated Queen Eli zabeth in 1 5 70, t he re by call i n g for o pe n re volt against the E n gl i s h th r o ne Du rin g these years Joh n H aw k i ns la u nc h e d h i s tr ad i n g activities by s u p p l y i n g A frican Negroe s to S p a n i s h pla nters in H is paniol a (the mod e rn Dom inican Republic) . At first pe rm it ted if not fully recogn i ze d by the S pa n iards, this English t r a d e soon c a m e to be i n te r p re ted as an in vasion o f S p a nis h territories, in part because it coi ncided with the trou ble in the Netherlands. Hawkins's fleet was par tly destroyed in 1568 by the Spa n ish v icer o y i n San jua n de V lua, Mexico . Later in the same y ea r, t h is a ttack was co unte red by E n gla nd s seizure o f Spanish bullion sh i ps , w h ic h had fled into En gli sh ports to escape the channel pirates. In 157 1 Franc is Drake started his campaign of p r i vatee r i n g in the Caribbean . By t he time o f Drake's famous voyage of ci rcum n a v i g a t io n ( 1577 - 1 580), e x plo ration and privateering h ad become government po li c y . Drake's search for a Pacific e n d of the re p u ted northwest passage, his oc c u p atio n of the Cali for n i a coa st i n t h e q ue e n s mi m e , an d t he t r i um p ha nt conclu sion o f h i s voyage with its colossal p l u n d e r from Spanish settlements and s h i p p i n g were met wi th w ides p re a d ac cl a i m i n E ng la n d . H aw k i n s ' s p rivatee r i n g had shown that the Spanish sea routes could be plundered. Drake's c i rcum n a v i ga tion revealed tha t Spain and Por t u gal had to de fend w ide l y sca t t e red stro n g hold s in the Medite rranean, the Atlan tic , the North Sea, and the Pacific. Against this background, E n glish e x pl o ra t io n and p r i v a teer in g , li ke overseas trade and colon i al settle m e n t , were conce ived " for the go od of the N ation, the terror of A n t ic h r i s t , the com fort of t he C h u rc h , the honour o f our Prince, the l i n ke d
to
E n gla n d ' s
Qu ee n E li zabet h ' s
.
.
,
'
'
KINGS A ND PEOPLE IN ENGLAND re no wne of ou r kin gdo m, and the im m ortal i ty o f yo u r o w ne name ," as it say s in t he p rea mb l e o f a book d e di c a te d to S i r Francis D rake Y Where S pa n iards and Po r t u gu e se had undertaken a Christian mission wi t h the b le ss i n g of the po pe , E n g l i s h m en sailed forth r e call i ng " l e gen d s o f b o oty ea s i l y w o n fro m Spanish i nc o m pe t e n ce , and ri g hte ous ly won from tor tu re r s of Protestants a n d o p p re s so r s of Indians."12 No u n d e r ta kin g o f the sixteenth and seve ntee n t h centu ries w a s w i t h o u t i t s re l i g io u s motive . Th rou gh pr e ac h i n g and t h e printi n g press , the language o f t h e G os pe l an d of anti- Sp a ni sh fe e li n g had the power to c rystallize n a t io n a l sen time n t . E n gli s h overseas t ra de h a d bee n i n t h e h a n d s of foreign m e rc h a nt s
c e ntur ies , des p i te much E n gl i s h o ppo s i t i o n . The alie n traders e n royal p ro tectio n because their prices and c ustom s d ues we re ad van tageous to the crown . B y the mid sixteenth century, 42 perce n t of th e export of w ool e n prod u c t s was still i n fore ign hands. Mo reo ve r, En gl i s h trade was confined geo gra phical ly : E ngla nd' s most valuable m ar kets we re in Western Europe. Expansion beyond these mark ets pro ceeded slowly . The E ngl i sh Muscovy Com pany was fou n de d in 1 555 and e x p lo re d t he p ossibi li t ies o f the Russian market. Some E ngli s h mer chants bec am e en gaged in a precar i o u s but lucrative slave trade in Af rica, and t ra din g benefits accrued to the mercanti le com m u n i t y from the Nort h Atlantic fisheries. But the habitable part o f the North Amer ic a n co nt i ne n t rem a i n e d unexplo re d by E ng lis h na v iga tor s u n t il Fro bis he r a t t em pte d to find a n or t h w e s t passage i n 1 576. C e n t ral and So uth America were under Spa n i s h control, and the N ear and Far East were preserve s of t h e Venetians and the Portu gu ese . 1 3 Yet much of the world which was closed to ordi n ary E ngl i s h tr ade, w a s "ope n " to English pi rates. Profits from p rivateeri n g could be so ex t rao r d i n a r ily high that financial support o f such ventures was often more a ttrac t i ve, d espite the risks, than i nv es t men t in ordinary trade.a In t h e 1 570s a n d 1 5 80s, the English flee t was c o n s i d e rably ex pan ded , adding yet another impetus to the dri ft to w a rd w ar wi t h S pain. 1 4 Intermittent hostilities had oc c u r red for some fi ftee n years and in 1 585 war brok e o ut , l eading to the defeat of the S pani s h Armada in 1 588. De s pi te t h i s d e feat En gla n d w a s not free from the fear of invasion u n t i l Phili p I I's de ath ten yea rs late r. Thus, English over s ea s trade was pursued in a h i gh l y c h ar ged po l i t ica l s e t t i n g. I f a northwest passage co u l d be found, it would enable England to trade with the Indies and hence com pe te with Spain . Co lonial expansion would secure strong h olds for att ac ks on the S pan i s h fo r·
j oyed
8 1n 1 5 85- 1 603 the goods brought in by privateers came to 1 0 to 1 5 percent o f total imports . Also, a large part of the £4 .5 m illion bullion coined d urin g Elizabeth's reign came from plunder of precious metals seized from Spain .
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE e m pire and acces s to p re c io u s m e t a l s in the A m e ricas. Ove rseas sett le m en t s would p ro vide ma rke ts fo r E n g l is h prod ucts and s u pply t he co un
t r y with raw materia l s . Colonial e x pa n s io n w a s also desi rable for do mesti c polit ical reasons. There was i d l e n ess, c r i m e , and u n rest in E n gla n d a n d t hese s o c i al proble ms we re co n s i d e red t h e re s u l t o f u n e m ployment wh ic h i n t u rn was a t t r i b u t e d to o v e r c ro w d i n g. To fi nd ou tlets for an e x c es s o f po p u l a t io n w a s a n i m po r t a n t a rgu m e n t i n favor o f colo n i za t ion . l s E n g l i s h c o lo n i z a t io n too k o n a u n iq ue character bec ause i n N o rth A me r ica there w a s no doc i le l a bor fo rc e to be ex plo ited . As a res u l t , t he ,
E n g l i s h set t l e rs i nc l uded laborers
as
w el l
as
masters . J o i n t stoc k e n ter
p rises and roya l charters we re req u i l'ed t o fi n a n ce these v e n t u re s . The
m a i n task of pro mote rs was to a t t r a c t e n o u gh me n , ca p i t a l , an d govern ment s u p port to pro m ise rich re t u r n s to t he i n ve s tors and the E n g l i s h
c ro w n . 1 6 Colon izatio n , t h e re fore, bec ame a n a t i o n a l e n t e r p r ise rath er
than one that o n l y pro m ised ret u r n s to t h e k i n g and h is favor ites .
The c rown s u p ported E n g l i s h e x p l o ra tion and co lo n i zation at the same time that Queen E l i zabe t h attem pted to cond uct a ca u tious foreign policy . At the be gi n n i n g o f h e r re ign , s he co n trived to use t h e Protestant u pris i n g s i n Scotland and the religious con flict i n France i n order to rid herse l f of the Frenc h clai m s to Scot land and t h u s of an i m plicit t h reat to he r t h r o n e . B u t t h i s in itial s uccess was te m po rary . A fter the treaty of Catea u -C a m bre sis of 1 5 5 9 a new phase of co n fro n tation bega n , . . . domi nated by t he s p y , the as s as s i n , t h e
agen t prol'Ocateur,
t h e Fi ft h Col
u m n , t h e pl"i vateer and the pi rate. I n E n gla n d . S p a n i s h a ge n t s i n s t i gated and
s u p port e d t h e plots a n d risi n gs o f t h e Ro m a n Catholics; i n France, S pa in p ro m o ted t h e G u ise fac t io n . In t h e N et h e rl an d s . as the ari stocratic o p po s i t ion to P h i l i p's centra l i z i n g p la n s h anle n e d , t hose nobles w hose s y m pa t h ies were
P ro testan t looked to the Fre n c h H u g u en ot s fo r su p port. F r a nce h e rse l f
was
p l u n ge d i n to forty years o f cri p p l i n g vio lence and soc i al chaos, d u ri n g w h ich
she su ffe red , on a mod e s t cou n t , n i n e se pa rate civil wars , down to the Peace of Ven i n s in 1 598. \ 0
Under t hese cond ition s , the q ueen's atte ntion tli rned from France to S p a i n a n d to t h e po pe' s designs a ga i n s t E n glan d . E nglish Catholics see med a pote ntially s u b ve rs ive gro u p , and some Protestant s pokesmen calle d for their s u p press io n . Eli zabe t h ' s o w n conservative views and the d i fficu l ties she faced in m i n i m i zi n g i n ternal divisions led her to steer a
wary co u rse , w h ic h d i d not sat isfy t he believers on e i t he r side. A gainst the Catho licis m o f Mary Tudor she restored her father's Act o f Su pre macy w i t h i ts e n do rse m e n t of the c ro w n ' s aut hority ove r t he c h u rch. But with regard to t he co n d uct of re l i gious se rvices - w h i le gi v i n g sign s
o f h e r own Protestant pe rs u a s io n -s he dev iated as li ttle as possible from the co nventional Angl ican pattern with its many Cat holic legacies . The
KINGS AND PEOPLE IN ENGLAND
Armada Portrait of
Queen
Elizabeth I
This m ajestic portrait was painted shortly after the defeat of the Spanish Arm ada. On the left the English ships are shown in the light; on the right the Armada is tossed about in the darkne ss o f the storm . Elizabeth's face, set o ff by the raylike collar o f her splend id robe, can be likened to the sun and may have been meant to symbolize " G loriana," one of many encomiums addressed to her. She rests her hand lightly on the globe and seems to be covering the North American continent. ( From the
Woburn Abbey
the Marquess of Tavistock and Trustees of the Bed ford estates)
Collection
by permission of
quee n feared t he danger of Protestan t extre m ism bot h a s a th reat to her royal authority and as a d i s r u pt ion of po pular belie fs . I n a ffairs of state, she a l s o moved ca utiousl y . W h e n the N e t herlands revolted against Spain, E lizabe t h held the view t hat t he S pa n i s h c rown had the righ t fu l authority over the cou n tr y ; to deny that would put the royal pre roga tive i n q ue s t io n , Later, s he s u p ported the Dutch cause, but in he r eyes the Dutch merc h a nts were s u bjects of Spain and a s rebels they were questionable a l l ie s . She s n ubbe d the m iddle-class ne got iators sent to her cou rt and obvio u s l y pre fe rred to deal w i t h aristocrats as the natu ral leade rs of socie t y . l s E li zabeth 's attitudes grew out o f h e r role as a Protestant sovereign and a ruler wi thout hei r with pro fo un d l y conse r va ti ve i m pulses in all
TO WA RD A MA NDA TE O F THE PEOPLE
2 88
matte rs touching religio us and political a ffairs . As MacCaffrey has pu t it, W h i l e h e r co n te m pora r ie s ' r e ac t i o n s 1 0 po li t ic s we re cast m o re a nd m o re i n t h e fra m e s o f ideology o r o f po l i c y , t h e Q u e e n ' s re ac t i o n s t o a n y g i ve n po l i t ica l s i t u a t i o n re m a i n ed h i g h ly pe r so n a l o n e s . On some occ as i o n s h e r re s po n se s a ro se a l most a u to m a t ica l l y fro m
.
.
. h e r re v e rence for t h e pre ro g a
t i \'es of royal t y . . . . On o t h e r occa s i o n s s h e co u ld g i v e way to u n ex p e ct e d i m p u ls e , . , .
S i nce m a n y o f t h e m e n su r ro u nd i n g her he l d v i gorous a n d c l e a r-cut
i d e a s about n a t i o n a l p o l icy, ever y m ajo r - a n d m o st m i nor-dec i s i o n s were
t he c u l m i n a t i o n of a long, com p l i c ated a n d u n c om fort a b le seq uence of ma n e u \'ers in w h ich conc i l i a r pe t i t i o n , pe r s u a s i o n , a n d ex ho r t a t i o n al tern ated
w i t h royal hesitatio n , i lTi t a tion , a n d obst i n acy. T he re a r o se a basic po liti c a l pat t e rn i n w h ic h the s t u bborn b iases o f t h e ro y a l m i nd re peated l y c am e
adm'a n t he h a r s h ci l'c u m sta nces of co nt e m po rary po litics a n d cO U n ler to t h e po l i c i e s , the a m bition s, a n d the fears of her councillors . ' 9
I nterpretations have alternated between very positive 'and very negative portrayals of the q ueen's statecraft, often depending on an estimate of the economic and political proble ms she faced at home .20 But there is li ttle dispute about the q ueen's great cau tion in her domestic and foreign policies. Popular opin ion was not so moderate . Following the Catholic reign of Mary Tudor, a large n umber o f Protestant En glis hmen de fined the political situation in terms of their opposition to Spain and the Catholic d a n ge r . 2 1 To the m ,
Spain re prese n ted the Catholic c h u rch . As a world
em pire, Spain was a political and commercial threat to England. Catholic s ubve rsion in England after 1 559 was traced to Spanish i nfluence , Mary Stuart became a focus for religious and political discontent, Catholic m issionaries infiltrated the country, and the pa pal excommunication of E lizabeth in 1 570 released English Catholics from their duty of obedi e nce to the queen. Broadsheets and preaching pl us hearsay and fantasy added to the ten sion .b This conve rgence of opinion had been greatly e n hanced by the religious issues of the 1 550s. Mary Tudor's accession to the throne in 1 553 had reestablished Catholicism, th us reversing the English Re formation initiated by Henry V I I I. Under Mary, about eight h undred Protestant nonco n formists went into exile on the Continent. The im plications of this Catholi c in te rregn um for the emerge nce o f a noncon formist intellige ntsia are dis c ussed fu rther on. Here I call atte ntion to the martyrological literature hEnglish w riters of the pe r iod used re fe re n c es to re p ublican ideas from the classics, the revolt of the Neth
the Venetian constitutions, the fi g h t i n g Protestants o f France, and
erlands as polit ical and religious models for refo r m i ll E n gla nd. A l l t hese s y m bo ls be u n i ted t h rough o pposition to S pain .
cou ld
KINGS AND PEOPLE IN ENGLAND
in wh ich zealous Protestant believers defined England s new aspi r at ion as a world power at a time when the cou ntry s prospects seemed in great j eop a rdy. A large number o f annals and histories were published first o n th e Continent and then in England , after the exiles re tu rn e d du ri ng t he fi rst years o f Elizabeth's reign . J ohn Foxe's A cies and Monuments ( 1 563 ) , com monly called the Book of Martyrs , was a classic of th i s litera tu re and had a lasting i m pact. Foxe was one of the Marian exiles. H e noted that God's chu rch works not with the sword but with printing, reading and preaching. The Marian exiles pre pared a new translation of t he Bible . The Prot est ant conce ption of the individual's relation to God e m phasized the Bible printed in the language of the congre gation in contrast to the Catholic em phasis on a mass cond ucted in Latin . In additio n , Foxe ' s B ook of Martyrs hel ped to id e ntify Protestantism with the na t ion a l mission of En g land . The Scriptures contained the record of accomplished fac t and revealed truth The task of history was to retrace events in accord with scriptural authority '
'
,
.
.
[ Foxe's book] provided a c i rcumstantial account of the eve nts w hich led di rectly to the q ueen's accession . I n the stories of the Marian martyrs, with Elizabeth's own story for climax , it presen ted i n the most vivid dram atic terms t � e essence o f the faith presumed to have been e stablished in the n ational Chu rch by her a u t h ority It framed these stories in an acco u n t of ecclesiastical h istory w h i c h pur ported to show that this fai th was the same for w hich the ma rt y rs o f the p r i m i t i ve Church had died, the same w h ich h ad bee n brought u ncorru pted to Britain in the begi n n i n g directly from the apostles . This acco u n t of C h u rch history the book also linked to a history of the long succession of native r u le rs .
down to Eli zabeth , shown as ow i n g their a uthority d i rectly to d i v i n e appoi nt
ment and p rospering or not, and their people with the m , accord i n g as they heeded their vocation to de fe n d the faith and the peo ple in the faith , or su ffered themselves to be m i sled by false coun sellors, or overborne by mis believ i n g usurpers and in vaders. And to co nclude , the book made pla i n that by all the si gns to be fo und in sc ript u re and history the will o f God was about to be ful fi l led in E n glan d by a prince perfect in he r obed ience to her vocatio n , r u l i n g a people perfect i n t he i r obedience t o her authority . 2 2
The En glish church was a body of the elect charged with transmit t ing this message to the people. The elect and the church were identified with the nation, the nation with the queen, and the queen with the coun try's mission. The reli gion of the Word was synonymous wit h a nat iona l community set apart from all othe rs by God for purposes of H is own . The elect were called to cooperate with the Lord , for they were H is cho sen agents whose enemies were in league with Satan . "God is English," exclaimed John Aylmer in 1 559 , for you fight not only in the quarrel ,
"
TO WA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
of your country but also and chiefly in defense of H is true religion and of H is dear son Christ . " Pre a chi n g o f this kind appealed to the senti ments of "true believers."23 The whole nation was elect if it but followed the lead provided by these spokesmen, a se nti ment exis t ing s ide by side with the fact that a great majority of the peo ple were i ndi fferent to q ues tions of churc h government provided no one i n terfered d rastical ly with established ch urch practices.24 However q uestionable this mixture of anti-Catholicism and conventional religion may have been on theologica l grounds, it was a bracing doctrine indeed at a time whe n the country was threatened by s ubvers ion and grad ually ral lying its forces to mount a challenge agai nst the Spanish empi r e . 2 5 The international settin g of sixteenth-century England suggests the poli tical and ideological context in which a bac kward society was trans formed into a major Europea n power. For the first time, England be came a national society. Following major military de feats during the fif teenth century, the co untry had lost its great fiefs in France, some of which i t had held intermittent l y since the Norman conquest. Di plomatic reversals under Cardinal Wolsey followed in the early sixteenth ce ntury . The Eng l ish Reformation can be seen as an assertion o f E n gl ish na tionalis m at a t i me wh e n several oth e r d e v e lop m ents facilitated the growth of national u n ity . English towns favored a strong central gov e r n ment, for, in contrast to the Continent, they d id not dominate the surrounding co u nt r ysid e and therefore could not fend for themselves. U nder the Tudors, go vernment administration definitely becam e more ce n tralized and bureaucratic, t h u s stre ngt h e n i ng the monarc h y . At t h e local level, the Re formation put the administrative organization of t he parish at the d i spos a l of j ustices of the peace who were appointed by the crown. Once again, English society developed a balance between strong central and strong local rule, represented at the national level by a series of ·accom modation s between king and pa r li am ent . Perhaps the most im po rtant step toward national unification was t he subordination of the c hurch to monarchical authority . Since the king was both sovereign of John Foxe's Book of Martyrs
This e laborate title page of Actes and Monuments de picts the main message of the work. The le ft side shows Prote stant martyrs burnin g at t he sta ke singing or tru m pe tin g their praises of t he Lord , and above them those gone to heaven and the angels similarly praising the Lord . The right panel shows the devil and his m in ions trum peting their evil works while a Catholic mass below them appears to worship that satanic company. The le ft bottom panel portrays the Protesta n t worship of The Word from the pulpit ; the Hebrew word for God (Adonai) a ppears like the sun be fore which the devo u t kneel in adoration. The right bottom pane l s hows a Catholic p riest blessing the congregation, some of whom are hold ing prayer rosaries in their hands . To the right a procession led by priests moves toward s
an image of the crucified C hrist in w hat is-to the Protestant-a merely ceremonial dis play of p iety . (Folger Shakespeare Library)
AC TE S and Monu men ts ���� Df tbr(e lattn anb perina� bal't�) tOllcbin« mmter' ofrbr «:butcb. blIJerefn
ar eOtnIlUl)mllClI anD IIrfmbtb c�e ;teat petrnu 'iOM � bOJtlblueoallle., rb at baue "'lIflDJolll b r IIIb WftnfJ'eb bp ebe llolmCl!c i91f'acr ••fpeda1= Ipt ill rbis JUabne of 1I!IIIllanll anb &coe ....be . ifom tbt ptare of ou� lLolllec .IICanbr bnro tile rrme IIDlDe Wertnr. Gat hered and coJlcfrcd acco rding to che: mae caput (t lDJytinlro cccctlcacolie III llIel of Cbe pmiea tl)fln TelaCIJ rb.vrllfrctD,aa lifo oar of rbe 18iCl!1I\J8 IltIiDtro. \Vllieb Wee tbe borCi cbc�of, lip lohlf Fo.t. f1tI"*,,tJ ., LA,,"'" by loh. D.g. Dl»fIIfna DUff 1I111 crl'1JIIh. Call. pnoWegio Regit /olli elblh. •
r!i��
TO WA RD A MA NDATE OF THE PEOPLE
his country and head of the church, religious belie f and national feeling could merge under a popular sovereign l i ke Queen Elizabeth. The early P ro t es ta n t re formers were E nglish patriots and stro n g supporters of t he monarch y . I n a n era of nation a l ascendancy, most o f these re formers were pol i t ical l y con servative so that the re l igi ous emph asis on individual conscience was not e as i l y tra n s formed i n to a theoretical right o f resis
tance to constituted authority. 2 6 Be fo re t u r n in g to the leade rs who e ffected the c h a n ge towa rd par liam e n tary s u premacy , a d i gression on the term reference society is in or der, for the idea i m plied by t hat term rec u rs in each of the fol lowin g chapters . Sixtee nth-centu ry England was still com para t i vely slow in t he com mercialization of labor a n d ca pital , but the country witnessed a flourish i n g trade, a ra pid com mercialization o f land, and a high degree of i ntellectual mobilization . The awakening of both natio n al awareness and of sel f-con fidence m ixed with appre hension was due in good part to En glis h perce ptions of Fre nch, S pan i s h, and Catholic intentions. It was due also to E n glish self-perceptions vis-a -vis the S p a nish world em pire. I shall use the term reference society whe never intellectual leaders
and an educated public react to the values and institutions of another coun try with ideas and actions that pertain to their own country.2 7 P U R I T A N S, LAWYERS, A N D "TH E COUNTRY"
The inte rnational, eco nomic, and religious chan ges o f t he six teenth centu r y p re p ared the wa y for the reco n st i t u t i o n o f E n g l i s h go vern ment
during the seventeenth century . In the process, the traditional s u prem acy of the king was gradually re placed by the supremacy of the king-in parliament (that is, by a sharin g of hi ghest authority between king and parliament as representatives of the country). During the reigns of Queen E l i z abeth ( 1 558- 1 603) , James 1 ( 1 60 3� 1 62 5) , and Charles 1 ( 1 62 5 - 1 649) opposition to the concept of royal s upremacy was gradually intensified by three overla pping groups: Puritan preachers, common lawyers , and spokesmen of "the country" i n parliamen t. Each of these grou ps had a subculture of its own as well as a common meeting ground in parliament, for many members of parliament were themselves Puri tans and lawyers , or closely associated with the m . The following section d iscusses the se parate settings of the three groups, and the concluding section examines basic ideas of constitutional reform which were pro m ulgated in a religious, legal, and parliamentary framework. My dis cussion of the religious issues will be con fi ned to the main contrast be tween Anglicanism and Pu ritanism , that is , between the principle of an episcopal hierarchy and a p re sby t e ri a n or con gregational election of ministers of the church. These terms require some ex planation since they are diffic ult to
KINGS AND PEOPLE IN ENGLAND
293
avoi d but also difficult to define. The term Puritan was frequently used in the seventeenth century to de.s ignate part icular l y rigorous forms o f t h e Protestant persuasion . The term generally design ated the i n tens i ty o f P rotestant belief and practice within the A n g lican church , wh ile doc tr inal nonc o n fo r m ity and separation from the c hurch we re des i gna ted by te r ms like Brownist , A nabaptist , and so forth . My use of the word is no nspec i fic, as suggested by Basil Hal l : " Puritan is the regu l ar word for those cler gy men and laymen of the established C h urc h o f En gland w ho se att i tu de r a n ge d from the tolerab l y con fo r mable to the do w n r i gh t o bstre pe ro u s, and to those who sought to presbyteriani z e that Church from within . "2 8 An glica nism or the An glican church means the C h u rc h of E ngland which under Henry V I I I and Elizabeth I re t ained in its doc trine and ritual many Catholic features th a t were changed only slowly in a Protestant direction . The distinctive feature of the A n g lican c hurch is its government by a council of bisho p s in conference -hence the term episcopacy . Presbyteria n ism as a manner of think i ng about the doctrine and government of the Christian church owes its greatest debt to the te aching of Cal v in . The term presbyter means elected elder and refers to the idea that Christ as t he only head of the church moves his peo p le to elect from their midst various persons to discharge the church's func tions. The p resbyteria n princi ple of election conflicts with the episcopal principle of hierarc h y. Congregationalism em ph a si zes the electoral pri n ciple even more than Presbyterianism , since it stresses the autonomy of each congregation as a fellowship of eq uals and hence rejects all kinds of hierarchical subordinatio n . Even so , Co ngregat iona li sm is not as rad ical in this respect as other Protestant groups which derive from the so called Independents of seventeenth-century En gland , like the Quakers , some groups of Baptists. and others. THE RELI G I O US ASPECT
Religious dissent a n d treasonable disloyalty toward the king were se v erely in the six teenth c entury . Contempora r y o p in ion ac cepted the view that convicted heretics must suffer the penalty of burn ing at the stake, and treason was likewise puni s hable by death. In the English Reformation, these views were tested severely. By his Act of Su premacy ( 1 534), Henry V I I I con fronted his Cathol ic subjects with the alternative of diso be yin g t heir sovereign ruler or betraying their faith. In 1 553 , twenty years after this Protestant reform, policy was abruptly reverse d when Mary Tudor con fronted her Protest a nt s u bjects with the same alternative of treason or heresy. In practice, most men com pl ied first by obeying the Act of Su p remacy and later by obeying the resto ration of Catholicism. The Marian government aided this accommoda tion by permitting determined nonconformists to em igrate. Yet many nonco n fo r m i sts re mained in England. It is estimated that
j udged
29 4
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
in less than four years of Mary Tudor's reign some 2 7 5 persons were convicted of heresy and exec uted. The largest numbe r o f victims were artisans and laborers , which con fi rms that E n glish Protestantism was a po pular movement despite its o r i gin a l, poli tical motivatio n . Amon g these martyrs to their fai t h , t he re were also high church dignitaries such as the archbisho p of Ca n te r b u r y and the bisho p of Lo ndon . Their m a r t y r d o m was publicized i n s t a n t l y by the i r exiled brethren who had move d to the Continent, where they were allowed to settle in sel f-gove rn ing comm un ities. 29 The exiled gro u p co m prised some 800 persons , amon g them 472 males with a nonco n formist core of 1 8 6 cle rgymen, clerics wh o h ad not yet been o rdai n ed , stude nts o f theology, sel f-styled preachers, and the ex-religious.30 Such exile o f true believers bred dissent. Among the Protestant ref ugees, a m i nority came to reject Anglican church practices altogether because they retained too many Catholic elements. This minority went into a second exile from Fra n k fu rt to Geneva where they formulated their religious commitment, based on an overwhelming sense of m ission. They were prophets o f the Word who felt personally called to bear wit ness to the truth of the Lord. B y that standard, all mundane a ffairs and indeed the very structure o f constituted authority were matters o f no value . I n a stream o f pam phlets filled with in vective and denunciation, these Protestant exiles expressed a radical devaluation of the world. They would recognize authority only if it promoted God's glory. They recognized no distinctions o f ran k . I n the sight of God all men are equal, for all men are equa l l y res ponsible for the iniq u ities of this world and equally duty-bound to fulfill H is commands.3t One cannot know what the outcome of this reforming zeal might have been if the exiles had been forced to wander in the wilderness for decades. The death of Mary Tudor allowed the reforme rs to come home and seemed to vindicate their sense o f m ission. T h e prom ptitude w it h which p ro vidence t h u s bro u gh t abo u t their an tic i pated
deliverance con fi rmed their se nse o f t h e i r selec t io n , a n d they at o n c e made ready to participate i n the fu l fi l l m e n t o f its desi g n . . . . And ye t that provi dence sh o u ld be left LO shape its e n d s as it wo u ld , or the new q ueen her policie s , was the last t h i n g LO o c c u r LO the re t u r n i n g exiles a n d their partisans. Be lie vi n g that they had eve l' ),th i n g to lose if she should fail t h e m , t hey un d e rtook at once to i m po se u po n her, her go vern ment and the pu b l i c their co n ce ptio n o f the role w h ich the Lord ex pe cte d her to play. They announced at o nce that a great new a ge was a bo u t to begi n for t h e Chu rch and the nation, and that Elizabeth was the a p po i n ted age n t for bri n gi n g it abou t.32
Michael Walze r has characterized this "revol ution of the saints" as the first appearance of radical poli tics in modern European history. From E lizabeth's accession to the throne in 1 55 8 to the outbreak of the ci vil
KINGS AND PEOPLE IN ENGLAND
2 95
wa r i n 1640, elite grou ps o f true believers emerged w h ic h we re dedi c ated to re fo r min g the r eligio u s life o f t h e co u n try . To appreciate the impact of th ese believers, it is n ecessary to visu the loc a l role o f the c hu rch th ro u g ho ut the med ieval period . Men ize al attended S u n d a y services regu larly and were liable to pen women nd a al ties if they did not. E ach h o u se hold e r h a d to pay o n e-te n t h o f h i s pr o duce (tithe ) to the pa rish . The ecclesiastical cou rts handed out pe n a l t ie s not only for he resy, nonattendance at church, o r sexual i m m o ra lity but also for working o n Sundays or Saint's days, for non payme n t of tithes, and for o t he r t ra n s gre ss i o ns These cou rts were a n irritant for t h e well to -do who could escape se n te ncing, but a burden fo r the poorer people who had to suffer the penalties. At the same time, the c h u rch was the center of social life, es pecially i n t h e rural areas. M ilitary trai n in g went on in the churchyard. Titles to property we re kept in the c hu rch. Parish o fficials m a n aged poor relie f and administered co r po ra l punishment for petty crimes. In this setting, the parson played a major role in the po litical and moral life o f his parishioners, and was enjoined to make gov e rnment announcements from the pulpit a n d to preach sermons i n sup po rt o f official policie s . In many cases , he was the best-educated man in the parish and the only accredited expounder of Christian doctrine. Since the church censored books and determined the content of edu cation , n o other authoritative o pin io n s were available. I ne vitably , the words o f the parson carried great weight. Parson s were nom inated reg ularly by the main landed proprietors of the area, and bishops were legally bound to accept such nominees; thus, the ecclesiastical hierarchy was clo se ly tied to the landed wealth o f the cou ntry. All these functions were in jeopardy when the Reformation q ues tioned the legitimacy of the Catholic c h u rc h . A t tacks on c h urch property contin ued from t he dissol ution of the monasteries to the reign of Queen Elizabeth. Abbeys, friaries, and other church buildin gs were converted to secular uses. Penance and the sale of ind ulgences were abolished. Altars, statues, and other traditional objects o f church service were de stroyed. Under Mary Tudor and Elizabeth, e fforts were made t o reverse these de vel o pme n t s or prevent abuses, but the main difficulties of t he church were economic . B y allowing the parson to marry, his financial needs and aspirations increased, while the church had difficulty in mak i n g clerical careers financially attractive .c ,
.
A nglican c h u rch sought
to ease
its economic pro blems by sell i n g or leasin g r ig h ts
to tithes and pat ronage. Such righ t s to the i ncome of t h e c h u rc h , o r to its power poin ti ng m in i ste rs to a l i v i n g,
were
c a l led " i m propriated . "
The
of a p
laymen who ow ned or
rented i m propriated rights coul d make a handsome pro fit by a l lowin g t h e m in i ster a n
u t te r l y inadeq uate i ncome o u t of thei r proceeds . livin gs out o f a total of 9,244,
or 4 1 . 5
In 1 603 t h e re were 3,849 i m pro p riated o ften held several l i v i ngs ,
perce nt. One cle rgy m a n
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
The conditions of the Anglican church gave an impe tus to chu rch re form , a nd for a time that drive was at least tolerated by the E lizabeth an government. When the Marian exiles retu rned to England after 1 5 58 , a n umber o f them (along with other nonco n formists) were appoint ed to positions i n the ch urch. Fro m the standpoint of the governmen t , these men were needed to reverse the polic ies o f Mary Tudor and ens ure a clergy pe rsonally loyal to Elizabeth. At the same time, lead i n g Pu ritan s wanted to push re form further and hoped for the q ueen's support of their cause . However, the queen would not tolerate he r authority over the ch urch to be challenged . She dem anded "exact order and unifor m ity," and Archbishop Pa rker (i n his Book of A dvertisements o f 1 566) laid down fixed rules for the cond uct of public worship. En force me nt of this policy was sporadic because many bishops sym pathized with the reform ers, as did many landed patrons who control led parishes. Clergymen who re fused to obey were suspended from office, but discipline was ham pered because ceremonies of the church were in great disorder. Hence, many clergymen were able to cond uct services in -accord with their own precepts without risking suspension.d
beca use each of t h em paid v e r y lillIe. Pa storal d u ties were ne gl e cted as a result. Al so n ea rly 60 pe rcen t of t he bene lices of t he church were occ u p i ed by pe rsons who had been d e n ied the l ice n se to p re a ch because the ch u rc h a u t horities considered them either un q ua l i fied or po l i t i c a l l y un reliable. Only 3 , 804 lice n sed prea c h e rs had earned a university .
.
degree . 3 ' dQueen Elizabeth an d he r e a r l y S t u a rt s u cce s s o rs were co n ce r n ed w i t h t hese q uestions lor re a son s of s t a te as m uc h as of re l igi o n T hey p re fe lTe d the Book of Pr a ye rs to preach .
i n g because t h e l att e r fo ste re d d i s p u ta ti on and encou raged d i sobe d i ence.
The paucity of a n d their lack of e d u c a t i o n did not t ro u ble t h e m if o n l y the established form of w o rs h i p was p r e se ne d Elizabeth pl-eferred the m i d d le way in rel i gio us malleTS : " Prot estant doctrine fo r the i n tellect u a l s . C a t holi c ce l'emo n ies lo r the m asses . " 3 4 H e nce, resis tance to t he " religious sell lement" of 1 558 a n d other \'e i led attem pts to reform the c h u rch were considered a defiance of t h e law a n d t he ro ya l premgative. Harsher m e a su re s a ga i n st nonco n formists may be d a te d from 1 5 7 7 . when the queen suspended A rc h b i sho p Grindal and ordered the suppression of meet i n gs i n w h ich c le rg y me n gat hered for the s t u d y of Script u res ( so-cal led p ro p he s yin gs ) . W i t h the a p poi n t me nt of Arch bishop W h i tg i ft in 1 5 83 . a pe r iod o f even grea ter J'e pre ssion set in. A Court of H i gh Com mission was ap po i n t ed w h i ch sup ple m e nted the o rdi n a ry diocesan controls of the church. Nonco n for mity as an organized move m e n t was cu rtailed. but iss u a n ce of a pe n a l code aga i ns t Cath olics in 1 593 made clear t h a t t he q ueen was determi ned to maintain her in termediate po si t io n . The posit ion re m a ined basi c a l l ) t he same u n dCl' J ames I ( 1 603- 1 62 5 ) . though w i t h a more pe r mis s i \ e policy toward Catholics on the one hand and -at l e a st verbally -a more consisten t p ressure a ga i n s t Pu rita n s on t he other. The M i llenary Pe t i t i o n ( 1 603). w h ich clai med to eXPJ'ess the \'iews of more t h a n a thousand m i n i sters. only u r ged the abolition of some p rac tic e s li ke the ring in m a r ria ge or the s i gn o f th e c ros s i n b a p ti s m w h ile ot h e r malleTS like the cap a n d s u r p l i ce we re to be left o p t i o n a l B u t even these st u d i o u s l y model'ate demands were rejected . James I i n sisted o n co n for m i ty beca u se such demands a ppeal'ed to hi m a s a preSb)lerian allack o n t h e bishops and through them on p reachers
.
"
"
'
'
.
.
h i s own su pre m acy ,
KINGS AND PEOPLE IN ENGLAND
2 97
Yet the intrinsic radicalism of the Pu ritans could not be dis g u ised fo r Puritan spokesme n advanced the claims of Scri pture against all ex te rn al aspects of ch urch or ganization In so doing, they tended to dis co u nt the sacred character of the priest while elevating t he sel f respec t of the c on gre gatio n . a s P re a chi n g of th is kind was fi r m l y circumsc ribed under Elizabeth and Ja mes I. But it was not crushed , because the Pu ritans had powe rful sym pathizers at co u rt w h o fo u n d the m ore mod erate noncon fo r m ists use fu l i n kee p i n g a politica l balance among con flict ing interests, even tho u g h they were read y to discipl i ne , i m pris o n , or even ha n g the most fanatic dissenters.36 The preachin g of the Word was the ideologic a l and organiza t ional m ainstay of the Puritan move ment within the framework of church and state . Puritans were not se p aratists ; they wanted to re form the church from within. By 1 539 the Bible as the foundation of truth had become available in the vernacular. In his sermons on selected passages from the Scri ptu res, ,
.
-
t he preacher . . . taught peo ple to see themselve s , their own predicamen ts , the predicaments of their time, m i rro red in the script u ral saga of s piritual striving. H e demonstrated by what they co uld not but take for i ncontrover tible proof t he way of esca pe from frustration, doubt and confu sion , and he desc ribed t he in ner process by which such relief would make its coming known, the way of /ife that m ust inevitably follow, and the ine ffable reward . 3 7
Protestant churches became aud itoria for the pul pit rather than places for processions and ceremonies with their organ m usic, prayers, and expositions of the catechism . To Puritans, Archbishop Laud's ( 1 63 3 1 645) emphasis o n "the beauty o f holiness" in ritual and ceremony seemed little better than popery. The restoration of priests to a position of privilege, the enclosure of the altar, and the ins istence on k n ee l i n g at communion suggested the doctrine of the real presence o f Christ's body and blood in the sacrament and thus a reversal of the Reformation.3s Preachers and writers who had been driven into exile or hidin g under Mary Tudor found that preaching was an impo r tant organiza tional device, and soon there were more men eager to preach than the church could support. There was a prima facie case for ordaining and licensing recruits capable of preaching, because in 60 percent of the bene fices the incumbent did no preachin g . As a result, a new institution of lectu reships developed : [They provided ] for regular preac h i ng i n ad dition t o t he le gall y req u i red quarterly or monthly sermons and a nex us between the various com po nents of the Puritan connect io n . The u n i versities provided the trai n i n g ground and recruiting place for lecturers; the town corporatio n , gen try patron , or city parish provided n ot only the pul pit and freq uently the financial basis of lec tures, but also powerful friends to protect and i n tercede in the lectu rers' beh a l f. 3 9
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
The Puritan pre ac h e rs saw th e m se l v e s as called on to do God's will on e a rt h . Th e i r task was d i ffic u l t , s i nce co n g re gat i ons were either indiffer e n t, d e s p a i r ing, o r overco n fi d e n t . As W i l l i a m H a ller h as p u t it, " T h ey had i n the fi rs t place to a ro u se m e n o u t of i n d i fferenc e by w a r n i n g t hem o f t h e wrath to co m e . A fter that t h e y were e n grossed with two s u pre me d a n ge rs to mo rale , the fa i l u re
of c o n fi d e nce a n d t h e excess o f con fi
d e n c e . " 4 o E a rnest preac hers c reated a n i n tense a t m o s p h e re i n w h ich t h e i r passionate c u l t ivation o f the C h r i s t i a n o f t h e A n g l ic an c h u rch .
THE LEGAL
s
p i ri t
ve rged
on s u bv e r s i on
A S PECT
N e i t h e r then n o r tod ay do l a w ye r s
tit t h i s i mage of n o nco n fo r m ist They we re men o f a ffai rs in co n t rast to P u ri ta n d i v i n e s who stood i n the service o f t h e Lord. L awy e rs we r e orga n i ze d in a n o ffic ia ll y recogni zed g u ild and p ursu ed a highly remunerative career as free pro fessionals, whereas Puritan d i v ines w e re a ppoi n ted to their livings or l e ctureships and often e njoye d only a modest subsistence. However, la w yers played an im po r t an t , perha ps a decisive, role in the great constitutional debates of the seve n teenth century. Sir Edward Coke ( 1 552- 1 634) was the most famous, but still only one of many, legal s po k esme n for the view that the ancient law of the land circumscribed the prerogative ju risd i c t ion of the crown. This limitation of royal ab solutism resulted from t h e conservative claims of a pro fession which was jealo usly safe g u ard i ng its j u ri sd ict io n . There were important affi nities between Puritans and law ye rs. Pu r itans sou ght to reform the church without separating from it. Similarly, E n glish lawyers used a common-law tradition to oppose absolutist c l aims, but maintained their loyalty to t he crown . Lawyers and their clerica l brethren stood for hallowed precedent, w hether this consisted of Anglo Saxon antecedents, Magna Carta, o r the congregational prac t ices of the primitive church. Lawyers opposed on legal grounds the prerogative claims o f the Co urt of H igh Com m ission (the in q uisitorial commission under Archbishop Whitgift) which Puritans opposed on grounds of con science. Ties based on principle, k i nshi p, and policy account for the fact that in a critical period lawyers and Puritans became in fluential spokes men in the House of Commons, un ited in t heir opposition to royal absolutism . 4 1 T h e legal profession had develo ped over a lon g pe rio d . A system of courts and a body of law had become established by the thirteenth century. By the early fourteenth century, legal ed ucation had become divided between clerical and secular institutions, with the universities teaching Roman and canon law and the four Inns of Co urt (as well as the associated Inns of Chancery) teaching common law . The contrast i n tel lectuals .
KINGS AND PEOPLE IN ENGLAND
2 99
be tween eq u i ty and com mon law proved to be one basis for the consti tutional transformation of seventeenth-centu ry E n gl and . The com mon law was e s s en t ia l l y t h e l aw o f the land, handled by t h e Co u rt of Com mon Pleas and i n volving the b u l k of the i m po rt ant l i t i gation until well into the six teenth cent u r y . e I n its ea r l y for m , the com mon law had consid er ab le flexibility. Cases co u ld move fro m cou rt to co u rt ; t he d i vision between differe n t ju risdictions were not hard a n d fast. Royal inte rve n t i o n and co n stant con tact w i t h the king's council pe rm it ted t h e j ud ges to exercise a good d eal o f d iscretion . Their own train i n g as ec c l e s ia st ic s in Rom a n and canon law also en c o u rage d the m to tem per t h e rigid a p pl i c a tion o f rules by considerations of eq uity, de fi n e d as "the ope r a tion of co n sci en c e in legal p roceed i n gs . "4 3 B u t after 1 3 1 6 no e c c l es i a s tic wa s a ppo i nte d to a j udgeship, and the S tat u te of N ortha m pt o n ( 1 3 2 8 ) d e clared t hat no royal co m m a n d shall disturb the course of the com mon law . By the m id-fourteenth centur y , eq u i ty was d isa ppearin g fro m the
practice of common law. From then on, the role and proced ure of the courts were cha ngi n g . The bench and bar re peatedly declared that cases had to be decided in accord with ancient usage i n contrast to the earlier period whe n the courts could use their discretion in decid in g similar cases. When the j u d ge s could not make u p the i r m i nds in difficult cases parliament, lay com missioners, or a group of lords undertook to settle the matter in the s k i l l were req u i re d to fo rmulate the i s s ue to be tried , to present the the l i t igan ts , and to aid the co u rt i n the app lication o f laws t o that issue. Legal k no wl edge became an object o f s e cu l a r education, for the chu rch i ncre a si n gl y disco u r aged t he c le rg y from prac ti cing law ou tside the ecclesiastical courts. The history of legal edu cation is also a h is to r y of court procedure which became s pec ial i z ed as t h e j ud i c ial system wa s elaborated . At successive s ta ge s , professional ad vocates we re ca l led n a rrators , se,· jea n t s , barristers, and a variet y of other names, designatin g d istinctions o f status and fu n c tion, but by the m i d- fift ee n t h century the legal pro fe s sio n was subdivided i n to two gro u ps . One group com prised lecturers a n d students (apprentices) at the I n ns o f Cou rt and Chan cery from whose rank s jud ge s a n d barristers w ou l d e v e n t u a l ly be c h ose n . The o t h er gro u p con sisted o f attorneys and solicitors w h o s pec ia l i ze d in the d rafting of legal doc u ments and had contact with clients, but we re not called to the ba r and indeed were not members of the I n n s of Court. Sitti n g judges were at the to p o f this hierarchy . They a lone nomi nated new judges who were t hen a ppoi n t ed by the c rown . Judges h a d t h e ri g h t to serve in the Inns of Court as e x a m i n e rs and to call an a p pre ntice to the ba r. O n l y those ad m itted to the ba r h ad the right to pra c t ice law or lecture an d a rgue in t he moot co u rts at the Inns. Ord inarily, th e In ns we re governed by th e lecturers ( Masters of the Bench), a self- pe r petuat ing body presided ove r by a member elected a n n u a lly . The Masters o f the I n n s of Cou rt w e re nei ther u n ive rsi ty professors nor jurists writing commentaries, but practicingjudges a n d bar ris ters w hose teach i n g was t ied d i rectl y to the work of the co u rts. E n g l ish l ega l ed u c a t i o n retai n e d i t s e mpi r ical character of learn ing the law as a "craft" rather than as a "science." Practice i n the cou rts was t he main fo u n d a t i o n of a care e r i n the law, which led to a j ud icia l post or the work of a barrister.u e K nowledge and
clai m s of
TO WARD A MA NDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
300
name of the king. This meant that when the courts gai n ed some ind e pendence from the crown, the y lost their reco urse to the use of disc re tion. At the local level, rich landowners had little interest in equity, w h ic h m a d e it easie r for their poorer n e i gh bors to b r ing them into court and w i n cases . T h e p rocess by w h i c h t h e fi n a l s i n gl e i s s u e was u l L i m a t e l y
a r r i v ed
at w a s re
fi n e d a n d e la b or a t e d hy t h e r u t h less a p p l i c a t i o n of p u re d i a lectical m e t hod,
and be c a m e
ity . .
. .
an
e x ac t sc ie n c e o f e x t raord i n a ri l y m i n u t e a n d s u b t l e tec h n ical
Each o f the fo r m s of ac t i o ll - i . e . , the a c t i o n s w h i c h i t was possible to
brin g u nde r
an
o r i gi n a l w r i t - re q u i re d st rict a d h e r e n c e to t h e d et a i l ed r u les
of plead i n g a p p l icable to it. The choice o f the wrong w r i t on w h i c h to base
a claim
or
a m is t a k e in the p lea d i n gs . . . m e a n t t h e i n s t an t d i s m i s s a l of t he
s u i t . " D u p l i c i t y " , w h ic h m e a n t not dece i t fu l n ess, but plead i n g or a t te m p t i n g
to p le ad m o re t h a n one i ss lle , was at o n c e fa t a l , even thou g h a c le a r m i scar
ria ge o f j u s t ice wo u l d res u l t . H
B e n c h and bar als o had an interest in m aintaining a hardened sy s tem of writ and precedent, and elaboration o f tec h nicalities ga ve over w hel m ing ad v antage to those who could afford to pay for the assistance of the most skilled legal practitio ners . Moreover, the upper grad e s of the legal profession were as a rule indis t ingu i shable from the prosperous country gentry - in terms of ed ucatio n , social status, and local or na tional po li tical office. The disappearance of equity from the common law coi ncided with the we akening of royal power, and with the ascen dance of the baronage since the fourteenth ce ntury . However, the common law h a d limitations which p ro v id e d an o pen ing for new de v elopments. Du ri n g the si xteenth ce ntury . t he com mon law courts were denounced for the slowness and costliness of their pro ced u res. The leisurely pace of court sched ules was onerous for a grow ing commercial society. Designed for peo ple who owned land. its writs, pleadings, a nd weakness in the finding of facts were i nadeq uate in cases i n volving other kinds of property and different types of l itigants . The use of executive methods and more equitable rules were demanded ; these were matters best handled by securing prompt personal atten dance of the parties and by giving t he m direct personal commands to act or desist.45 Accordingly, the principl e of the royal prerogative was u pheld in ce rtain courts in which the " operation of conscience in legal proceed ings" was applied. Du ri n g the Tudor pe riod . the use of s pecial writs and cou rts (Star Cham ber. Court of Req uests. of Chancery, and others) develo ped swiftly . These courts used various forms of petition between the parties. Proceedings of the crown could be initiated by in formatio n , citation . and the l i ke, th us em ploying the forms used by ad min i strat i ve officers toward their s ubordinates. The prerogative courts
KINGS AND PEOPLE IN ENGLAND
301
were a means of ensu ring t he broader judicial use o f royal aut hori ty . r The courts of the common l.aw were identi fied with the interests o f t h e la nded gentry a n d t h e legal profession. J udicial o ffice was consid ered private pro perty and became the source of immense fortun es. The la ng uage of the time r e ferred to such pro perty as pertai ning to the lib e rty o f the s ubject, a usage reminiscent of the earlier identification be tween privilege and liberty. The common law was thus associated with the rigid defense of privilege . By contrast, the prerogative courts adapted their procedure to the demand for equity in social and economic dis putes, especially in the Court of Requests. B ut this gain in flexibility was partial and tem porary. The courts of Star Chambe r and H igh Com mission buttressed royal supremacy as they handled religious d issension , economic distress, and domestic sedition. Under the influence of chan cellors trained in the common law , other courts like Cha ncery soo n de veloped delays and intricacies of their own. Whe n such drawbacks mounted , courts of equ ity became unpopular in turn and the king's privy council took many cases in order to handle them more expeditiously Y The people at large probably stood in fear of the courts generally. There was little chance to prevail against the massive interests of lawyers and landowners. Perhaps men had a better chance in the prerogative courts. The baronial disorders of the fi fteenth century had made people anxious to keep the peace, and in that con text the king's co urt of Star Chamber was a popular i nstitution. Moreover, under the royal prerogfIn the early Tudor period, t here was no fu ndamental incom patibility between the prerogative cou rts and the common law courts. Kings a n d the i r ministers did not press for a fundamental legal refo r m . Common lawyers recogn ized the j urisdiction of t he Privy Council and the Cou rt o f C hancery in a large n u m ber of cases involving mercan t i le and domestic disputes as well as sed ition, heresy, u n l icensed printing, pe tj ury , and riot. A n exception i s found i n Cardinal Wolsey's ten u re o f office
( 1 5 1 6- 1 52 9 ),
w hich was marked
by an em phasis on eq uity in heari n g poor men's com plaints and by a determi ned assertion of the royal prerogative against the interests associated with the common law . Under Wolsey's successor, Sir Thom a s More, con flict was m u ted, b u t tension re mained . Whe n Henry V I I I decided to use parliament in his quarrel with the pope , the king had to com prom ise since t h e common lawye rs were strongly re prese nted i n t h e House o f Com mons. When the king sought to forestall legal methods of evad i n g fe udal d ues, his con flict o f interest w i t h the landed pa rliament became ma nifest a n d negotiat iolls were protracted. To some extent, both sides gained . The royal j urisdiction o f the C hancery wa s ex pandi n g a t t he expe nse o f the common law cou rts, t h e conciliar tribunals o f t h e crown were po p ular, a n d throu gh t h e prerogative courts the c rown hand led m uch lega l busi ness. On t h e other h a n d , t h e k i n g a ppointed com mon lawyers to t h e office of chancellor. A decree o f
1 546 proclaimed that only com mon lawyers trai ned in a n I n n o f Court a n d a ppoin ted by the chancellor and the two c h ief j ustices were eligible to plead in the prerogative courts. The study o f canon law was forbidden, and law re ports came to record judicial decisions rather than plead ings, givin g sti l l greater prestige to the judiciary . < &
3 02
TO WA RD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE
ative even a poor man could still hope for the "ope ration of consc ie nc e" in the handling of his com pla in t . In the pers pective of the time, bo th the com mo n law and the k i n g's prerogative ca me to be considered pa rts o f the E n glish heritage. To u s , it appears that seve ntee n t h -ce n t u ry E n gland witnessed a str u ggle for sovereignty be twee n t he k i n g and the men of pro perty re p rese n ted in the H ouse of Com mo n s . Contem poraries did not t h i n k in these term s . They were heirs to a tradition i n which the ki ng's a u t hor ity ran ked s u preme, albeit with the u n d e rstan d i n g that he take co u n sel w ith the great men o f his rea lm . 4 11 In t he seve n tee n t h ce nt u ry that trad ition was challe n ged by the asse rtion that in certain respects the king's au thority was subject to law and the conse nt of parl iament . Yet the lawyers who iss ued that challenge we re traditionalists the mselves and had great d i fficulty freei n g themse lves fro m the time-honored acce ptance of royal s u pre m ac y . Seve ral cases illustrate t h i s di ffic ulty . Edward H ake ( l 560 ? - 1 604) affi rmed the absolute powe r o f the king and the freedom of the subject from his d uty of obedience when the king' s act was against t he law . John Pym ( 1 5 84 - 1 643) den ied that " o u r sovereign Lord the K i n g" had " sov e re ign power," but he did not claim such power for parlia me n t either. In the 1 62 0s, a major leader of the H o use of Commons, Sir J o h n Eliot ( 1 592- 1 63 2 ) , acted on t he princ i ple that parliament's authority m ust prevail ove r that of the king. For his pains he was con fi ned to the Tower. Late r , Sir John wrote a boo k w h ich asserted that the king was subject o n l y to the law of God a n d posse ssed absol u te aut hority even against the written law . E ve n Sir Edward Coke cha m pioned the royal prerogative in the first part of his caree r a n d la ter became a c ha mpion of the C O ID mon law . I n his own m i n d , he may have felt that there was less of a qistinction between these two positio n s than we see today . For w h i le be lievin g in the king's prerogative , Coke distingu is hed between disputable and i n d i sputable issues. In his view, the king is bo und by common law in matters a ffecting disputes ove r private property. On the other hand, the king's p rerogative is i n d is putable i n matters i n volving war and peace and the security o f the rea l m . Yet from a strictly royalist standpoint, the classification of some issues as "d is p u table" was n ull a nd void , since that d e n ied the king' s supreme authority in all matters . In h is own m ind, Coke was a conservative u phold i n g the time honored trad itions of his co untry. Yet the potential radicalis m of his position became evident when the Stuart monarchs used reasons of " national emerge ncy" to i n te rvene in domestic a ffairs . A d m i ttedly, the ki n g alo ne was entitled to j u d ge what constituted a n e merge ncy, but Coke's d is tinction suggests that there were circ u mstances under which t hat sovere ign j u d gment i tsel f had to be l i mite d . The crisis of the sev-
KINGS AND PEOPLE IN ENGLAND
e nte en th centu r y was preci pitated when Charles I ( 1 62 5 - 1 649) used hi s "ind is putab l e" prerogative i n order to intervene in the "d isputable" mat ters s ubject to the laws of the land.49 "THE CO UNTRY"
This label was a te rm o f political disco urse in the seventeenth cen t ury most commonly a p pl i ed to the o p posi tio n to the c rown between 1 620 and 1 640. O r i gi n ally , the term had been used as a synonym for "county," but by the time of Queen E l izabeth this meanin g was fused with the general idea of re p rese n tation and the public interest. Also, the "coun try" was frequently and invidiously contrasted to the cou rt as a mode of existence denoting sturdy honesty and inde pendence as distin gu ished from the re fined and corrupt manners of court society. H ence , The term, ' Co u ntry' , s u ggested that the men it design a ted were persons of public s pirit, un moved by private in terest, u n t a i n ted by co u rt i n fl u e nce and corru ption -representatives, in short, of the h ighest good o f their loc a l com m un ities and the natio n in w hose i n terest t h e y , and the y alone, acted .50
The term referred to an a morphous but very real concentratio n o f in fluence in the hands of a group of landed aristocrats in parliament united by their common religious persuasion , legal doctrines, and op position to the court and the king. Many write rs refer to En gland's great crisis o f the seventeenth cen tury as t he English civil war ; others do not hesitate to speak o f the En glish revolution . This u ncertain terminology is d ue in part to the res toration of the monarch i n 1 660, only eleven years after the civil war ended with the execution of King Charles I . U ncertainty may be d ue as well to the essential co n se r vatism of the Puritan divines who opposed the doctrine, liturgy, and organization of the Anglican church, and of the common lawyers w ho opposed royal absolutism . These men wanted to purify and maintain but not overturn the best religio us and l e gal tra ditions of their country, a s they understood the m . However, divines and lawyers would have had little political effect by themselves. Their intel lectual leadership of the reform movement in church and state was ef fective only because they received the support of "the cou n try."5! Politics in sixteent h-century England centered on ministers o f the crown who attracted prominent aristocratic followers and contended with one another for influence on the king or queen. Poli tics consisted of factional struggles at the court and was little influenced by the bulk of the E nglish aristocracy. As a political factor of consequence, "the country" emerged only in the later sixteenth century whe n the pe rsona l auth ority of great men a t co urt attracted increasing support from locally prominent gentry ; henceforth, the struggle for the ruler's favor in-
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE volved an i n c reased p a rt i c i pa t i o n of the r u lin g a r isto c r ac y in the co un ties. The H o use of C o mmons i n c reased i n size from 2 9 8 me mbe rs in H e n r y V I I I's fi rst p a r l ia me n t to 467 i n the fi rst p a r liame n t of J ames I . Bor ou g h re p rese n ta t io n was extended , c om petition for seats gre w , and educa tion at u n i versities or i n the I n n s o f Co u rt becam e co m m o n amo n g members of pa rliament. The ran ge o f pa r l ia me n tary ac ti vity i nc re a se d alo n g wit h the extension of roya l power, for par l ia me n t a ry statutes sanc t i o n e d the Act o f Su premacy (1534) , t he dissol ution of the mo n a ste ri e s the c re a t io n of new ad m i n istrative bodies , a n d the m a n y r o ya l e d i c t s aga i n s t t reaso n . U n de )' H e n r y VII I a n d Mary Tudo r , t he re w e re OCca s i o n a l i n s tances of p arliame n t a ry o p position a ga i n s t the royal will, and suc h o p position became mo re pron o u n c ed under Pu ri tan le ad e r s h i p in Elizabethan times. M a n y segments o f the p u b l ic ha d become thoro u g h l y alerted t o re ligio u s a n d po litical i s s u e s b y Catholic co n s pi rac ies a g ai n st a p o pular Protestan t q uee n . Accord i n g to J . E. Ne ale , the Eli z a bethan H o use of Com mo n s was overwhelm i ngly Pu r i t a n i n i ts s y m pathi e s P r o m i ne n t s poke s me n expressed t heir apprehensions that the rather conservative religio us settleme n t under Elizabeth would once again e n dan g e r the Re fo rmation. The Catholic restoration under Mary Tudor was within recent m e mo ry Pa r l iame n tar y notables a g itate d for the queen's mar riage to sec u re a Protestant s uccession to the throne . They ad vocated penal legislation against Catholics, u rged the executio n of Mary Stu art, and a d vis e d more precautions ag a i n s t Catholic s ubvers ion after her deat h . The civil and re l i g io u s establishment u n d e r E lizabeth had man y devoted partisans who did not shr i n k from personal pressure on the q uee n . The e ffect of this agitation was to i n c re ase the role of pa r l i a m e nt in the public a ffairs of the rea l m , but active o p position ists we re still a s m a l l g ro u p and their tec h n iques of o p position undevelop e d Moreover, these c r itics of the quee n's cautio u s pol i cies were the mse lves her lo ya l followers, who did not challenge her pe rsonal autho r ity and popularity. ,
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Fonnal Session of Parliament u nder Elizabeth I
T h is picture from Glover's NobiLilae Politica shows the presentation of the Speaker of the House of Commons ( prolocutor) to the quee n , November 1 5 84. He is standing at the rail in the center foregro und along with the kn ights and bu rgesse s w ho have chosen him at the invitation of the Lord Chancellor. The e m pty sack directly in fro nt of the throne is for the Lord C hance l lor w ho , in the queen's presence, stands beh ind the throne to her right and speaks for her , in this case te lling the House of the queen's pleasu re to accept the choice of Speaker. T he core of the parliament is seen in the inne r square of four re d woo l sacks on w hic h are seated the j udges and royal counselors. Between the two rows of seated cou nselors, includ ing the clerk of parliament and the clerk of the crown , are other clerks writing. On the long benches flanking the wool sacks sit the Lord s or peers ; the lords
spiritual or bishops to t he q ueen's le ft a n d t he lords temporal on t he right. ( Folger Shake s peare Library)
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3 06
Un d e r t he reig n of J a m e s I ( 1 603 - 1 62 5 ) , these l i m i tation s on pa r liamentary o p positio n q u ic k l y d i m i n i shed . The S pa n is h d a n ge r and hence the need fo r un ity h ad passed , w h i le i n flatio n , h ea v y debt s , and t h e i n e pt n e s s o f the new k i n g read i l y p rovo ked controvers y . The H o use of Com mo n s had by then d evelop e d a corporate co ns c i o u s n es s e x p re sse d i n the declarat ion t h at i t s p ri v i l e ges were not a gi ft from the c rown but a right w h ic h co u l d not be a br i d g e d without a ppare n t w rong to the " w hole state o f the rea l m . " In 1 607 the H ouse fi rst used the de vice of "the com m i ttee as a whole" b y w h i c h it cou ld elect its own ch a i r m a n a n d t h e re b y evade the rule o f t h e S p e a k e r , w ho was a nom inee of the c ro w n . By these a n d re la te d p roc e d u ral i n nova tions, the H o use wo n po l i tical i n i t i a tive fo r itse l f. T h i s became a s o u r c e of i n c r e a s i n g contro versy with t h e k i n g , fi n a l l y pro m p t i n g C h a rl e s I to d issolv e par l i a m e n t in 1 62 9 by spec i fic re fe rence to t h i s pa rlia m e n tary u s u r pa t i on of au t hori ty . T h e ea r l y Stuart par li a m ent s i n c l uded an in c re as ing n u m ber of men o p p o s i ng various meas ures o f royal aut h ority , in contrast to the E lizabethan pa r l i a m ents in which o p p o s i t io n to the q ue e n' s policies had gr a d u a ll y d i m inished. A fter the d issol ution of parliament in 1 62 9 , the king exercised p e rsonal rule u n til circu mstances forced him to recon vene pa r li a ment i n 1 640, the so calle d Long Parliament which s at pe riod ically until 1 649. More t h an a quarter of t he members of the Long Parliament had a l rea d y served as re p re sentati ve s in 1 628/29 or earlier; nin e t y one or 1 9 .4 pe rce n t of 467 h a d been opponents of t he k ing be fo re the d i s sol u ti o n . M uch pr ivate consultation among these o p po si t ion ists had take n place in the Stuart pa r l i a m ent s since 1 604- 1 6 1 0. T he re were not only co m pl a ints a ga in s t t his prac t ice by the king's spokesmen but r e pe a te d and ex pl i cit defenses of the p rac t i ce by parl i amentary spoke sm e n M o s t i m po rtan t p ro m i nen t rep rese ntativ es of "the cou n try were in illicit communication and met illegall y while the king ruled with out convoking par l i ament ( 1 629- 1 640). Several m ajor leaders of "the coun try" a p paren t ly found a means of continui n g their collaboration in the several com panies for colon ization which held charters from the crown, for under that she l t er the y could discuss matters other than com pany business . Militant Puritans were me mbers of these com panies, and through i n te r m a rriage many of them were related to other opponents of the king's rule. Ties of frie ndship and a common re l i gious per s uas io n facilitated a clo se association with still other opponents. These persona l ties amo n g a determined minori ty help to e x pla i n the cohesion of the op position once the king convened the Long Parliament to help him co pe with h i s rebel l ious s ubjec ts in Scotland. Cohesion of an i n ner circle of country politicians" was indispensable for managing the contacts with the Scottish army which were de s ign ed to put the king under pres sure while preserving the a ppearance of loyalty to t he c rown.
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KINGS AND PEOPLE IN ENGLAND During the Lon g Pa r l i a m e n t , the leaders of "the country" e n gaged in a c o nce r ted drive a ga in s t th e m on a rc h y s t ra d i t ion a l a ut h o rit y B u t these o p positionists were not "progress i ves" i n a n y modern sense o f th e wor d , nor were they prom pted by s oc i al resentment. On the co ntrary , th ey co u l d clai m to re present "the co u n t r y" in the o ld - fashioned se n s e th at they were p i l l a rs of soc iety who h a d always h a d t h e righ t and priv il e ge to do so. All t h e s e o p pos itio n ists i n parl i a m e n t were landed aris toc ra ts, j u sti ce s l a wy ers , and other membe rs o f E n g la nd s high s o c i et y A m o ng them we re p ro m i n e n t peers with stro n g P u ritan s y m pa thies whose po l i t ic a l an d re l i g i o u s bel i e fs alone d i s t i n g u i s h ed t h e m from peers lo ya l to the crow n . More s u rprisi n g still were landed aristocrats who had ri s e n to a m i dd l e rank in the service o f the king, but were out of sym pathy with h i s po l i c ies a n d a ppa re nt ly felt free to oppose them, sin ce t h ey were not h i gh l y eno ugh p l aced to be d i rec t ly responsible to the king. In add i tion , p ro m i n e n t merchants s u ppo rte d the o p po s i ti on The le ad ers h i p of "the co u ntr y was clearly in the hands of a r i s toc ra t s with .
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the counties and their many ties with Puritan divines members o f the bar. Without the ba c k i n g of the se aris tocratic leaders, divines a n d l a wye rs could not have sustained their claim of o p pos i n g the "misgu ided" policies o f church and crown in the n a me of the nation . their con tacts i n and pro m i n en t
CONSENT, EQUALITY , AND LAW centu r y England w i t n e sse d a major transformation can be d es cr ibe d by several contrasts between the reigns of J a m e s I ( 1 60 3 - 1 625) and George I ( 1 7 1 4 - 1 72 7 ) : Se vent ee nth
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w h i ch
James su cceeded b y hered i tary right, co n fi r m ed b y Elizabe t h ' s n o m i n ation ;
in 1 7 1 4 Geor ge l owed h i s t h rone to an Act of Par l i a m e n t w h i ch p a s se d over many persons w i th a be tte r hered itary clai m . James, like the Tudors be fore
h i m , c hose m i n isters a n d favou rites as seemed best to h i m ; by the ea rly eigh tee n t h cent u ry min iste rs co u ld not govern without a Pa rl ia m entary majori t y . J ames w a s still ex pected to " l i v e on his own", t o fin ance gove rn m e n t from c ro w n lands, fe u dal d ues a n d the cus to m s : no distinction was drawn be twee n the p ublic and private ca pac ity of t h e K i n g. Pa r l i a m e n t , s u m moned at the Kin g's absolute d iscretio n , e x pected to vote taxes only i n an emergency (though here theory a l ready lagged be h i n d practical necessi t y ) . B y 1 7 1 4 Pa r liament, i n almost per m a n e n t session , h ad complete control of fi n ance. I n James' reign members o f the landed class themselves ad m i t ted t o bei n g ab su rdly undertaxe d ; in A n ne's the gen try paid fo r Marlboro ugh's wars . B y then Parliament had e stablished a degree of control over t h e exec u t i ve and over a l l its actio ns-i n c l u d i n g fo reign policy, which early Stuart k i n gs had regarded as the i r pri vate preserve . [ I n t he early seven te e n t h cen t u ry] the economy was h ighly regu lated . . . . At the e n d o f the pe riod eco n o m ic policy was for m u lated by Par l i a m e n t and most s pheres .52
laissez.1aire
had succeeded regulation in
3 08
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
The Great Seal of England, 1651 The Great Seal was traditiona lly used to a u then ticate the most i m po rtant state documents. I n this case it was struck as a commemorative medal. To show the House of Commons on the reverse side of the Great Seal of England testified to the ascendance of parliament and made official the victory of the Commonwea lth u nder Oliver Cromwell over a king who
had w ro n g fu l l y u s u r ped the a u t h or ity of pa rliament. The seal is inscribed, " 1 65 1 in the third year of Freedom by God's Blessing restored." (British Museum)
One way of understanding this transformation is to consider the rein terpretation of traditional beliefs by Puritan divines, spokesmen of the common law, and representatives of "the country." These reinterpretations had little or nothing to do with modern ideas of freedom and eq uality. The freedom of a town, a freehold estate, a pa rliamentary franchise, the "liberties of the House of Commons," the rights and privileges of freemen in t he com mon law courts -these were the privileges or liberties associated with property. "He that hath no property in his goods, is not free," as a member of parliament put i t in
KINGS AND PEOPLE IN ENGLAND
3 09
1 624, ech oing an earlier statement by Sir Thomas S m ith that such men "have no voice nor au t h o r i ty in our commonwealth, and no acco u n t is made o f the m , but only to be rul e d . "53 In E n gland, the a ut ho r i t y o f kings was re i n te r p rete d s o a s to gi ve greater w e i g h t to the mandate o f the peo ple . B u t " peo pl e" re fer red t o th o se who owned pro pe rty and enjoyed re p rese n t atio n in pa rliame n t . The m a i n iss ues of the period arose o u t of collisions b etwee n the king and t h e s e p ro pe rtyho l de rs ove r the d i s t r i bu t i o n of the i r res pective righ ts a n d p r ivi l e ge s. Re l i gion was also concerned with pro perty, as, fo r e xa m p le , in the titles to former mon astic la nds , the collection o f tithes, or the several l i v i n gs to w hich ind ividual c h urch dign i taries were a p po inted . However, issues of prop
erty were secondary to the religious ideas of the Puritan m o ve m e n t which gave the co n fl ic ts be t we e n ki n g and p arlia m en t a broader mean ing. For the main challe n ge to governance by an exclus i ve hie rarchy of dign itaries originated in the religious s p he re . Luther's doctrine o f justification by faith alone im plied that before God all men were equ a l l y sinners, however t he y m i g h t d i ffe r in t h e i r world l y status. For his part, Calvin based the church on a " co mm uni o n of sai nt s," in which there was roo m for electe d ministers as interpreters of God's Word, but in which all must share with on e another, united in b ro t herly love. By advancing the cla i ms of Scripture against the primary e m phasis on the sacraments, the English Puritans aimed at an ad m i n istrative revol ution of the church . Thomas Cartwright ( 1 53 5- 1 603) ex pressed the main te ne ts of the Puritan position . As s u m m arized by Haller, [the c h u rch was to be] t he divi nely inspired orga n o f s piritual life i n human society, having reciprocal relations with the rulers of this wor ld by acting in com ple te indepen dence o f their aut horit y . I ts task was to .·e nder men obe
dient fi rst to God and t he n under God to Caesar, w hose first duty also was to obey God as his Chu rch might direct . . . . Be fore God all men were equal in sin, eq ually deservin g of damnatio n . If any were raised above the rest in this world, it was God's doing, not theirs . . . . In the c h u rc h , the peo ple with out distinction of person m ust c hoose by w hom they were to be ta ught and served. Pa rish by parish they should elect their elders and m in iste rs, and the ch urch as a n ational bod y s hould be knit together by a grad uated series of representative assemblies d rawn from the parishes.54
Thus, man's vol untar y obedience to the Word of God is the most basic assum ption of Puritanism . Where such voluntary obedience prevails, a pro per soci a l order will ensue. Such an order must observe a strict sepa r ation between church and state, fo r Christ's k i n gdom is not of this w o rld. In making this dis ti n ction, Calvin spoke of two worlds "over which di ffe rent k in gs a nd differen t laws have aut hor ity . " Cartwright echoed t his view when he said
TO WA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE that a n
ecclesiastical rule under the monarchy may
kee p t h e pe ace , " y et the
thousand conten of the c h u rch is se pa rate from the st ate by the elected minister of a congregation. H e re o p position to a nonreside n t clergy, im pro
peace w h ich is without t r u t h is more exec rable than a tions . "55
A prope r orga n i zation
in that the Word is the reason
for
is
preac hed
the PU ritan
priated liv in gs, and stereot y ped re adi n gs fro m the Book of Praye rs . A l l
t h i s robs the c h u rc h of a spiritual rea l m fo unded on conse n t an d broth
e rl y love. H e re also i s t he reason w h y m i n i sters m us t not meddle i n c i v i l
in so do i n g t he y symbolize the o u tward force o f the state . W h e n m e n fe ar the sword , they will q uestion whethe r their convers ion is vo uchsa fed , as it should be , by the powe r and sim
a ffa i rs or hold public offic e , fo r
plic ity o f the Word alone. C o n se n t o r w i l li n g obedience is co m b i ned
in the Pu ritan creed w i t h the bel i e f in the spiritual eq u al i ty of m e n . Soc ial distinctions do not mat ter in com parison with the i n w a rd voice of conscience. Puritans of Cart w righ t ' s persuasion did not subsc ribe to an indiscriminate egalitarian ism . Th ey recognized, as Calvin had , that "the gifts of the Spirit are variously distributed." O n ly those who have made an open - profession o f the truth are al l o we d to supervise the examination of a prospective minister and partici pate in his election. Ultimately, all members of the con gre ga ti on will know the truth, the world will be free of corru ption, and with total obedience to God's word there will be no need for the sword . That time was not yet. Cartwright believed that in the meantime it was t h e task of the state to serve God's purposes by p rom pt in g men to stand before
God
vol un tarily as brothe rs in truth and submission.
This approach implied that the state wo uld lose its reason for being when in the fullness o f time the spi r i tu al task would be accom plished. In 1 5 7 0 Ca r twrigh t was dismissed from his Cambrid ge professorship for seeking to make the state serve as an instrument of the church. The problem o f aut ho r i t y in ecclesiastical affairs was at the heart of the Puritans' " s pirit ual , serious way of worship" (Richard Baxter, 1 642 ) . Preachers o f this persuasion wanted to reform rather than chal lenge the authority of the church. Even a conservative like Archbishop Whitgift ( l 53 3 ? - 1 604) ha d conceded that in early Christianity and in free cities a church might well have been governed by elders and elected assemblies. The Puritans wanted to practice now what the archbishop conceded for the remote past. In Whitgift's view , the queen had the last word in all ecclesiastical affairs. He insisted on the superiority of bishops, which derived from the need for order and from the existence of a C h r i sti a n monarchy.56 Hence, the Puritan claim that they did nothing against the word of God was n ull and void , for the Word of God and the word of the ruler were one and the s a me . According to W h itgift , there were two kinds of government in the church, the one invisible and s p i r i t ual , the other visible and external.
31 1
KINGS AND PEOPLE IN ENGLAND
Th e firs t is ruled by God alone who d i rects the hearts a n d conscie nces o f men. The second is the government exec uted by ma n : it cons ists of ex ter nal d isci pline, visible cere mo n ie s , and an order ad m inistered by bis ho ps under the authority of the crown . Such an order is i n d is pe ns a ble , for there would n e ve r be any law if its execution req u i red e v e r y " s i n gu l a r m an 's co nsent. Such an order is also j us t b e c a u se in E n gl a n d roya lty governs "
with eq u i ty and reason . . . acco rd i n g t o t h e laws t h a t a re p r es c r ibed for him to r ule by . There i s neithe r pr i n ce nor prelate i n this land that ruleth "a fter their pleas u re a n d l us t " , but acco rd in g to t hose laws a n d others that are ap pointed by the commo n co n se n t o f t h e whole realm i n pa rl ia m e n t , and by suc h laws of this monarc h y a s never hitheno any good s u bject hath misliked. 5 7
Against t hi s a pproac h Puritan s pokesm e n took an exalted view of the ministerial office. They clai med to base their anti-e piscopal stand on the eternal d e crees of salvation conveyed to the elect b y the preachin g of the W o rd Ministers were spiritually e levated a t the expe n se o f bis hops. In the Puritan view , the c hurc h hie rarc hy (or episco pacy) repre se n te d a hu man i nstitution no t sanctioned b y scri ptural authority. Since these preachers of the Word had to orde r affairs among themselves, their organization o f the church was an obvious c h alle n ge to established church au th o r i ty Strict parity among ministers was a pres by te r i a n princ iple incom p atible w it h the subordination o f one church ( o r m ini ster) to another. Pres by ters had be e n members of t he governing body of the early Christian c h u rc h , and fol lo wi n g that model seven teen th ce n tu r y Pres byteri a n i s m advocated a re presentative governm e n t of the church. ( I n this view, any hierarchical o r ga n i zatio n derived from the pope's claim to supreme a ut ho ri t y ) At the lowest level the local chu rc h would consist of a m eeting (classis) made up of ministers an d . elders of the church. Above this, at successively higher levels, synods wo u ld be o rga n ized E ac h mee ti ng or synod wo uld be conducted by a p resid i n g officer selected on a rotating bas i s so that the pri nci ple of par ity among ministers and elders would be p rese rve d , in contrast to the Angl ic a n e pisco pal or gan izat io n . Yet Pre sbyte ri an i sm held back from full equality . It p rov ide d for the subordination of local churches to the m i n i s t ers and elders of the church, and of their me et in gs to the synods. Even t he n , t he Pres byteri an movement re presen ted a type of re l i g io us organ i za t ion that was bound to conflict with the p re va il i n g views of the Anglican church. The meetings called p ro phesy i n gs e xe m p l ify another challenge. The s e mee t i ngs occurred in m arket towns where the ru ra l clergy could gather conveniently in the p ri n ci pa l ch urch; they were a kind of b ibli ca l con fe rence for mutual edification and sociability. P rac t ice s at t hese meetings varied w ide l y They might involve scholars and students e n,
.
.
-
.
.
"
.
"
312
TO WA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
ga ge d in learned, Lat i n d i sc o u rse for m utual instructio n . A more pop ula r m e et i n g would permit the p ubl ic to listen to discussions in the ve r nacular, or e ve n allow membe rs of the con g regatio n t o p ar tic i pa te in t h e d i sc ussion of a sc r i pt u r a l passage . P ublic sermon s and discussions were s u p plemen ted by private co n fe renc e s in w h ic h the preachers would ce n s u re one another's doctrine, l i fe , and m a n ne r . 5 8 Since royal inj u n c t ion s req u i re d the clergy to u n d e rt ak e biblical studies, such con fe rences were c o n vo ked with t h e a pprov a l of the bishop B u t such me eti n gs q u ic k l y .
became suspect in the eyes o f the c h u rch when the y came under P u r ita n i n fluence. Th us, the use of E n glish and public partic i pa ti on exem pl i fi ed the Pu ritan belief i n the brotherhood of all bel ievers ; partici pa tion by laymen i m plied a critique of the c h u rch hie rarchy w i th its e m phasis on ecc le sia st ic a l ran k ; and the rec i procal edi fication and control a mong minis ters constituted an exercise of a ut h or i t y outside the channels o f the h i e ra r c h y . C a rtw ri gh t had been d i s m i s sed from Cambridge in 1 5 70, and for decades thereafter the preachers of the Word who favored presbyterian princ i ples were in sporadic conflict with spokesmen of the hi-erarchy like Whitgift, Bancroft, and others . Between the accession of Charles I ( 1 62 5 ) and the begi n n ing of the Long Parliament ( 1 640), the Puritan cause, t h o u gh on the defensive at home, was much invigorated by the e x a m p le of the American colonies. Moreover, the preaching of the
Word had stimulated the rise of a more radical religious movement, cul m in ati n g in the civil war ( 1 642 - 1 646 , 1 64 8 ) . As commander of the par liame n ta ry fo rces, Olive r C ro m we l l reorga n ized the army by giving free reign to the Pu ritan s p i r i t ; and although parliament voiced its misgiv ings , military success a ppeared to vindicate the spontaneous religious fer vo r o f the nonconformists fighting the righteous cause. We have Richard Baxter's circumstantial account of the sentiments to w h ich radical army preachers a ppealed . They told the soldiers that Christ judges only by the heart and that magistrates have nothing to do with matters of religion . Puritan teaching had already instilled the belief that Christ had entered into the souls of the elect. Now the trouble was that there were too man y men in the
army who, over persuaded that they had but to reach forth their hands a nd retake paradi se, . . . j u st as they had taken B ristol or Basing House or Worcester. That is to say, from Baxter's view point, they were poo r s i m ple so uls, plun ged into mortal error . . . on the c r u c i a l point of j u stifica tion . . . . They j umped to the fallacious and dangerou s co nc l us i o n that the e ffect of grace was immediate, absolute, and total, that the com in g of Ch rist was in stant or at least proxi mate , and that the liberation and c rownin g of the sai nts was to be loo ked fo r not in the inde fi n ite future or u po n terms but at
C h r i st wit h i n , were del uded into thi n ki n g that they had
o n ce and u n conditionally.
KINGS AND PEOPLE IN ENGLAND pu rit an p reac h i n g had done i ts work too w e l l . "Justific atio n b y faith al on e" hel ped to win ba ttles i n the civil war, b u t the advocate s o f a pres byterian c h u rch d rew back be fore this rad icalization of their own mes sage . Cromwe ll crus hed the agi ta to rs in the arm y . Men l i ke Baxter s pe n t years o f a n xious pa m p h le te e ri n g i n attem pts to d raw a l i n e betwe e n h i s
own hopefu l
anticipation
o f " t h e C h r istian sa fely l a nded i n Pa radise " and
this mis guided be lief that " o u r Tale n t , o u r wel l d o i n g , our o verco m i n g . . . [is] a
Reason
for o u r Coro n a tion and Glor y . " 59 T h e latter bel ie f modi fies
the Puritan message by i m p l y i n g
a
ce rtainty o f election based o n true
faith i tse l f or on secular s uccess . It i l l ustrate s an a n t i -e piscopal
and
egal
itarian potential, which had re pe rcussio n s in the later d e ve l o pme n t o f both entrepreneurial a n d rad ical political ideolo gies i n E n g l i s h soc iety. The rel igious inte rp re t atio n o f co n se n t and eq uality had an e ffect
the constitutional tra n s fo rmation o f England d u ri n g the seventeenth century. One reason w a s the m od e ratio n of c l ai ms by the political an tagon i s t s. En glan d was an intensely conservative country and to many conte m porari es the political agitatio n preceding and ac co m pa nyin g the civil war appeared radical in the extreme. Nevertheless, even radical no nc o nfor m i s t s ac kno wled ged some li mits to the p r i n cipl e of eq u alit y The Levelle rs did not a d voc a t e that eq u a l i ty should be extended below the level of " free" Englishmen to t hose who were economically d epen dent on the head of the household .., The radicals of the civil war de manded the eq ual i ty only of those who h a d a stake in their country.60 At the same time, t he pa rl i a me n ta r y leaders of "the country" were more than defenders o f t he i r own privileges. In the patriarchal sense that the master is respo n sible for his dependents, t hey claimed to represent the interests of t h e nati o n The champions of "the country" were conservative . They di d not set out to alter the established order, but based their stand on the law and the ancient constitution of E n gla nd
on
.
.
.
What they conceived t h e mselves as contes t i n g, the re fore, were those inva sions o f power that deran ge d the equilibrium and violate d law. For the K i n g t o l e v y im positions on m e rch a n d ise ; to exact forced loa n s a n d benevolence s ; to com m it m e n t o prison without showi n g lawfu l cause ; t o l a y a d i rect charge on his peo p le withou t their co m mo n con se n t in parliame n t -these things , done by James I a n d Charles I , they co ndemned as altogether i l lega1 . 6 1
Against this posit ion, s pokesmen for the crown d id not contend that the king was above the law . Rather, they enunciated the doctrine of the king's prerogative in a l l matters affecting the general good and safety "Leveller is the name of a pa rty that arose in the army o f the Long Pa rliament (c. 1 647) and advocated the leve ling of the traditional ran ks o f English society as well as the estab lishment of a more democratic government.
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
of the realm. In these matters the kin g alone was judge of the circum stances in which his "absolute pre ro g a t ive " a pp l i ed . Both s i des clai med ancie n t precedent fo r t h e i r pos i t i o n s and thus posed the basic consti tutional issue which provoked the civil war. Zagorin has poi nted out that the language o f parliamentary debate contained a core o f ra d i cali s m des pite its ve ry real co n serva t i s m . T h e spokesmen o f "the co u n try" felt the m selves to be the re p re s e n ta tive s and trustees o f "the peo ple" and j u s t i fi e d the privi leges o f parliame nt on tha t basis. Phrases like "We are en trusted for our co u nt r y " or " Le t us re member that E n gland sen t us" became com m o n . E m ph as i s was adde d when various parl i am e n tar y leaders noted the fa te o f continental assem blies under absolute kings : the es tate s - ge ne ral o f France had hel d their last meeting in 1 6 1 4 , and the taxing po w e r was conceded to the Fre nch king. Charles I had dissolved parl iament in 1 62 9 because the exa l ta ti on of a representative bod y jeopardized the exaltation of the king's crown under God . 62 Du r ing the seventeenth century, the su preme authority o f t he " k i n g - i n - parliament" replaced the medieval dualism of ki ngs h i p . In medieval times, legiti m a te autho ri ty was vested in the k i ng and the great magnates, both claiming ri g hts justified by immemorial custom. Max Weber has recognized the t e nsion imp l i c i t in these claims, for imme morial custom endorses the view that what is ancient must remain un a l te r ed , whether it is the king ' s r i ght to ex ercise h is prerogative and hence use h is j udgm e n t or the time-honored ri ghts of the magnates who d escend from ancie n t fam i l ies and o ffer their counsel and a id at the
king's court. However, custom also le g it i mi zes the king's time - honored prerogative of disregarding custom whe n he deems this necessary for t h e welfare o f the realm as he interprets it. 63 By the second and third decade o f the seventeenth century, English constitutionalism had come to embody both pri nc i pl es . Parliamentary spoke s men had s p ecifical l y justified the r i g hts of parliament on the ground that parliament rep resented "the country," and they claimed that the king had overste pped his rightful pre ro gat i ve when he denied these r ights . To explore t h is as pect of constitutional reform , we must look at the legal champions of co nsent who were the architects of constitutional monarchy based on a contrac t between the people and their king. Common lawye r s , like Pu ritan d ivines, sought a new foundation of authority in response to what they conceived as external and internal threats to their country. Puritans had used the ideal of the p ri mit i ve church o f early Christianity in t he i r effort to base religion on an elected minister p reaching the Word to his congre ga tion. Lawyers used the fic tion of England's ancient constitution in their e ffort to limit the ro yal p rerogative and raise parliament as t he high es t j udi c ial and legislative
KINGS AND PEOPLE IN ENGLAND
body of the realm. Lawyers, like Puritans, claimed to uphold tradition wh en they argued in terms of immemorial custom and sc riptu ral truth. 64 Sir Edward Coke was the most influential interpreter of the com mo n law under Elizabeth and the early Stuarts. He served as solicitor ge n eral, attorney general, chief j ustice of common pleas, and of the k i ng 's bench between 1 5 92 and 1 6 1 6 , when he was a b ru pt ly dismissed by Jam es I . T h erea ft e r he was active in parliamen t and playe d a key role in the Petition of Righ t of 1 6 2 8 . For Coke, the common law was the an cient and fundamental law of the rea l m which possessed a pervasive co herence or co n co rdan c e derived from the " un ity and consent" among judges and courts "in so m a n y successions of ages. " U l ti m ately such unity p roceeds from God and men should do nothi n g to distu rb it. I t i s a max i m i n polic y , a n d a trial by e x pe rience , that the a l te ra t i o n o f an y [ fundamen tal po i n t of the ancient com mon law] i s most dan gero u s ; fo r that
which hath been relined a n d pe r fected by all the w isest men i n fo r m e r succes sion of ages, and p ro ve d a n d a p proved by con t i n ual experience to be good and profitable for the Com monweal th , ca n not withou t great hazard and dan ger b e al tered o r chan ged . 65
With this maxim as a basis, j udicial decisions of the past are the proper key to disputed cases in the present. Inconsistencies or contradictions are only apparent and can be readily dispel l e d by those whose " legal reason" derives from " lo n g studie, often con ference , lo n g ex perienc e , and con tinuall observatio n ." For Coke, there was a direct link between his view of the antiq uit y of fundamental law and the key role of judges and lawyers as expert in terpreters of that law. The pr i ncipl e that a pre vious j udicial decision should have aut hority in deciding a later case (the rule of precedent) came to the fore in the sixteenth century alon g with the ris i ng p ro m i nence of common law. Such judge-made law contrasts with law enacted by king or parlia ment. Judge-made law is identified with custom or customary law, con sisting of acts re peated again and again because they have been found good and beneficial. A s uccess ion of cases having ancient origin s ac quires the force of law. By contrast , written laws are made by the edicts of pri n ces or cou nci ls ; they are i m posed on the subject without having been tested by experience, w hich alone can show whether they will fit the circumstances of the people. Thus, enacted laws may grow obsolete , while custom is always u p-to-date, or else it would have been abandoned. Statutes may violate fundamental law, they may be copied fro m fo reign sources, and they may have to be repea led because of m any inconven iences. On the other ha n d , c ustom is i n digenous and grows out of the people's experience. Also, statutes are but the wisdom of one man or generation, while custom e mbodies the wisdom of untold ge ne ra tions .
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
and its retention proves its wisdom and utility. On this basis, Coke con cluded that "no man ought to take it on himself to be wiser than the laws. "66 A fundamental and indige nous English law was almost universally accepted in the sixteen th and seventeenth centuries. Royalist spokesmen argued that the king's sove reign prerogative formed part of immemori al law , much as Coke rested his case for the common law on the ancie nt constitutio n . This way of thinking was in accord with the risin g n a tionalism of the pe riod in which an argu ment gained weight by an a logues to ancient precedent, like the king's prerogative to declare war or the Norman conquerors' prom ise to uphold the old laws o f Edward the Con fessor.67 B ut while everyone rested his case on this type of a r gument, the spokesmen for the common law tended to shift the discus sion in favor of parliament. The common law, used synonymously with customary law , was j u d ge-made and required the power of "legal reasoning." But it al so re flected the wisdom of the people . By associating judicial decision-mak ing with antiquity, the com mon lawye rs linked custom with the idea of consent. For precedents had proved t heir worth over time by their fit ness under changing circumstances, and these precedents embodied in n umerable j udgments of what was reasonable in specific cases. Custom was constantly ada pting but also immemorial, at once flexible and con stant. Custom was thus lin ked with fundamental law, antiquity, native origi n , the people's con sent, reason , and truth. All these equivalences tes t i fied to the g lory as well as the con t i n uity of En gland's ancient constitution. This ideological structure was bolstered at the same time by a purely negative argument: " For a truly immemorial constitution could not be subject to a sovereign : since a king could not be known to have founded it originally, the king now reigning could not claim to revoke rights rooted in some ancestor's will."68 In the great agitation leading to the Petition of Right ( 1 62 8) , Coke used this argument with telling effect. Parliament was a court of law, consisting of the king, the Lords, and the Commons. He claimed that this highest court of the realm had existed lon g befo re the time of William the Conqueror. Hence, no act of par liament is valid unless it results from the consent of the king, the Lords, and the Commons. There is no appeal from the j udicial acts of parlia ment as the highest court, and in a sense no appeal is needed. For by means of concurrence in parliame nt, consent is achieved at the highest level of the realm. Coke considered that this consent reflected the an cient customs of the realm. I f it did not, it would prove inconvenient to the com monwealth and the law would adjudge s uch acts n ull and void. He did not resolve the q uestions raised by contradictions between ju-
KINGS AND PEOPLE IN ENGLAND
di cia l decisions and parliamentary statutes . But it is clear that in his h an ds asse rtions t h a t the l a w w a s i m m e morial tended t o b e re placed by assertions th a t pa rl i a m e n t , a n d e s pec i a l l y a house o f co m mo n s re prese n t i n g the p ro p erty-ow ners , was i m m e m o r i a l . O n e of the u n d e rl y i n g t h e m e s i n the h i stor y
of seve n tee n t h -ce n t u ry po l i t ical tho u g ht is the trend fro m the cl a i m t h at t h e re is
a
fu n d a m e n t a l law, w i th pa r l i a m e n t as i ts g u a rd i a n , to t h e c la i m that par
li a ment is sovere i gn . 69
The common denominator of parliamentary arguments was the d efe nse of property rights. For centuries these rights of the freemen of th e realm had been defe nded agai nst encroac hments by the crown . The six teenth century had witnessed the extension of governmental author ity into many spheres o f life , as in the case of the dissol ution of the monasteries, but these were assertions of the king's authority based on the ancient principle of royal sovereignty over the whole realm . In that context, James's theory of the divine right of kings was not as excep tional as later writers have m ade it seem. Assertions of royal sovereignty were commonplace, and "to call a right divine in the seventeenth century meant no more than that you attached im portance to it."70 The burden of proof was on the side of parliament. For when Coke attacked the royal prerogative by using the great tradition of the common law, he was challenging lawyers for the crown who were using the same tradition to defend the prerogative. 71 S hortly be fore his dismissal by James I in 1 6 1 6, Coke had rejected the king's claim to be the highest judge of the realm. Coke quoted Bracton to the effect that the king was under God and under the law and claimed that "the king hath no prerogative but that which the law of the land allows him. "72 Sovereign power, he said, was "no parliamentary word" and would weake n "all our statutes," though he acknowledged nonetheless that "prerogative" is part of the law . 73 When the Protestation of 1 62 1 stated "that the liberties, fran chises, privileges and j urisdictions of Parliament are the ancient and undoubted birthright and inheritance of the subjects of England," the assertion obviously bene fited from the myth of an ancient constitution. By 1 62 8, in arguing for the Petition of Right, Coke already rejected any reference to the "sovereign power" of the king. Hence, Coke's erratic use of precedents, extravagant language (" Magna Carta is such a fellow that he will have no sovereign") , and panegyrics of com mon law were weapons in a struggle for power. The ambiguity was finally resolved only in the revol ution of 1 688. The Tories, bound by the legal tradition Coke had done so much to establish, were unable to find an argument against Jame s I I ( 1 65 8 - 1 688) consistent with their own recognition of his legitimate title. It remained
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
The Protestant Grindstone
This political cartoon of 1 690 symboli zes the end of serious Catholic contention for the English throne . J ames I I had been deposed and William and Mary had been elevated to the throne by the "Glorious Revolution" o f 1 688. In the cartoon, W illiam and Mary look on while the arc hbisho p of Canterbu ry and the bisho p of London grind the pope's nose. The d itty below the cartoon conveys the anti-Jacobite sentiments of the time. (British
M useum)
for the Whigs to break with this tradition and claim that the king had forfeited the crown by breakin g the contract between king and people. I f the king violated his oath of coronation, the people were released from their oath of allegiance. Although the hereditary claim of James I I was unimpeachable, the nation had a right to expel a king who had broken the "original contract," thereby violating the "fundamental law." In these resolutions of 1 689, the old arguments based on history were superseded by appeals to reason and natural law . In the Whig inter pretation propounded by John Locke , it was no longer a question whether the law was derived from the will of an ancient sovereign or from the people's consent embodied in ancient custom and judicial de cisions. Henceforth, law was to be derived "from the natural rights of " every individual and from his will, as a rational and sociable being, to set u p machinery to secure them. "74
KINGS AND PEOPLE IN ENGLAND
Little room w a s le ft fo r t h e p r inciple of e qua li ty where so m uch e m p h as i s was put on a consent reflecting the in te res ts o f property own e rs , as re prese nted b y the king, Lords, and Commons . Nor d i d the idea of a n original contract between king and pe o p le advance eq uality . It is t r ue that in these seventeen t h-century debates a kind of equality was rec o g n ize d in the indi v i d ual's freedom to trade. Legal i n t e r p reta ti ons bu ttresse d that freedom b y d e fe n d i n g t he rights o f pro p e r ty and the ri gh t s of labor aga inst the restraints o f trade resul t i n g from royal pate nts o f monopo ly and from guild restrictio ns. i 5 B u t seventeenth-cen t u ry E n gl and knew little of e q u ali ty in the modern se n se . The excl usion of all de pen d e nts from the pol i t i ca l natio n " was take n for gra n ted i n a society i n which re li gio u s s pokesme n con sidered "civ i l equality mo ra lly impos s i b l e 7 6 I ndeed, t h e very elitism of l a n d e d aristoc rats and wealthy co m moners was the psycholo gical b a s is on w hi c h the challenge of the ro yal p re rogat i ve had been mounted. Divines and parliamentarians of the s eve nte e n t h centur y lived in a society in which any stron ger emphasis on equality seemed to them con trary to nature and the d ivine ordinance. Yet their d evelo p me nt of a "
."
church and a state based o n consent bore within it the possibilities of a much more radical egalitarianism . T h roug h agitation in the pa r ishe s and in parliament, the Puritan movement combined re l igi o us with pa triotic zeal. Its egalitarian message appealed to the con science and sel f confidence of the people against the hierarchic organization of the church, though the Puritan s remained within the Anglican church. But the egalitarianism of Pu ritan preaching was e stabli s h ed primaril y in t he spiritual sphere and was paradoxically associated with elitism. For this "equality of believers is an equality in their superiority to other men . . . . Considered in relation to t h e world in which it s ubsists, [the congregation] is an aristocracy of grace."77 B ut within t h i s aristocracy of grac e, some are more equal than others. In this, the Puritan move ment exemplified a dilemma which has beset i ntellectual leaders in "modernizing" societies ever since. Puritan divines had more scriptural knowledge than their parish ioners. As servants of their Lord, these men of the cloth were sole l y concerned wi th i m parting the truth of the Scriptures to the laity , though this could lead to controversies over the vestments which d istinguished the minister from his flock. It is true that the tendency was to reduce the organization of the church to the simple relation between the preacher and his congregatio n . B ut this anti-orga nizational attitude was ambivalent, because the equality derived from doctrine did not square with the inequality of function . H umble as he was be fore the Lord, the preacher was still His chosen instrument. At his best, the Puritan preac her was singled out by the ca pacit y to search his heart for signs of false pr i d e and by a conscience so exacting that its severity made him a leader "
"
3 20
TO WA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
among me n . 7 8 Thus, an el itism of conscience lay at the heart of thi s " brotherhood of all believers ," and the same paradox has bedeviled sub seq uent revol utions. , It is a paradox whic h occ u rs in re presentative institutions as well. The political agi tation in the E n glish parliaments of the sixteenth and seventeenth centu ries was not egalitarian at all. For these re presentatives of the shires and boroughs were notables of t he realm, accustomed to having access to public affairs from which the bulk of the population was excluded . At the begin ning of parliamentary asce ndancy , these men expressed their concern fo r the pe rsonal safety of Queen E lizabeth and for the poli tical and religious integrity of the realm with s uch vigor that t heir actions often verged on the idea of a parliament coequal with the q ueen in guiding the fo rtunes of the nation . 79 This suggested an equality (if one may stretch the meaning of the word) among the property-own ing rulers of the co untry. The queen frequently considered the demands of her parliaments as unpreceden ted encroachments on her authority, and her Stuart successors certainly considered the claims made in the name of the common law a challenge to their sovereign a u t hority. In the end, the men of parliament began to speak more directly in the name of the co untry, first in the events leading up to the revolution of 1 64 0 , and more firmly a fter the revol ution of 1 68 8 established a con stitutional monarchy. But once the king-in- parliament was supreme, elected representatives faced the paradox of being both populist and elitist. For as populists they spoke in response to the opinions and wishes o f their constituents, w h i le as e l i t i s t s they used their j udgment in s peak ing for the country as a whole. The idea o f a government b y consent, ultimately derived from a mandate of the people, was advanced d u ring the se venteenth century through challenges of authority in ch urch and state. At the time, the demand for consent did not seem to i m ply equality in any m undane sense, since in the religious s p he re the congregation constituted an "ar istoc racy of grace," while in the political realm parliament constituted an elite of the ti tled and the wealthy. The egalitarianism im plicit in the demand for consent had to await the further developments of the eigh teenth century. The ideal of eq uality became one hallmark of the French revolutio n .
10 TOWARD T HE N ATI O N-STATE : FRANCE
ABSOLUT IST RULE A N D ENTRENCHED PRI V I LEGE
T
HE FRE N C H revolution of 1 789 was the principal turnin g point in the transition from the authority of kings to the mandate of the people Because I have considered French kingship only in the Merovingian and Carolingian period , I wish to be gin here with a direct contrast between French and English kingship and the fate of the Reformation in the two countries. The Norman con q uest achieved the political unification o f England under one ruler. One-fifth of the land be lo n ged to William the Con queror and most of the rest of the land was appropriated by the new Norman aristocracy The holdings of the French kings of that time were small by com par ison A ll but one of the French king's vassals had lands larger than royal domains. France consisted of five d uchies (Brittany, Normandy, B urgundy, Aquitaine, Gascony) and six shires (Comte of Anjou, Flanders, Blois, Champagne, Toulouse, Barcelona) which m ade up the bulk of the country. The French king was an elected overlord of France rather than an hereditary monarc h and had direct authority only over his own domains. When Henry II ( 1 1 54- 1 1 89) was king of En gland, he was also duke of Aquitaine and legally a vassal of the French king as far as Aquitaine was concerned. In terms of resources and power, the Engl ish ruler was much the stronger of the two. But although the resources of the French king were limited, his domains were cen trally located around Paris . French royal authority was graduall y en larged either by direct territorial ac quisitions or by increased authority over the vassals through the customary devices of feudal rule. The Hundred Years' War with England ( 1 33 8- 1 453 ) assisted t his process of .
.
.
32 1
1328
[�lt�Jt1tl
FRENCH
R OY A L
1 0. France from the Eleventh to the Fourteenth Century
OOM A I NS
TOWARD THE NA TION-STA TE: FRANCE
royal ascendance, in paruhro u gh im poveris hing the French nobility. The grad ual impositio n of the taille (a pro perty tax on non-nobles) and the gabelle (a sales tax eventually l i m ited to a tax on salt) pe rmitted t he Fre nch crown to establish a sta n d i n g army i n the fi fteenth ce ntury . By then the French king had acq u i red s u fficient land and reso urces so that the great dukes and co unts of France were no longe r his rival s . The royal court became the center of French society m uch as it had in E n gland . The grad ual enla rgement o f ro yal authority i n France t h us contrasts with th e royal su p re m ac y ach ieved by conquest in the case o f En gland . The Re formation of the sixteenth century presents a seco nd major co ntrast between the two coun tries. The English Re fo rmation preserved some doctrinal and l it u rgical conti n u ity with the Ro man Catholic faith. In France the movement for church re form was i n s pired by the Lu theran doctrine of justification by faith alone. I n deed, i n the first part of the sixtee nth century French reformers were known as Lutherans , thou gh after 1 550 they came to be called H u guenots. ! Protestantism was popular since it rejected the cumulative abuses of the old c hurch. But whereas the En glish Re formation began with the legitimation of the new faith by Henry V I I I's royal edict (the Act of Su premacy), t he French Reform ation was initiated by religious leaders whose popular appeal led to religious conversions. The Frenc h governme n t supported the Cath olic church. Serious con flicts ensued as the movement o f reform spread , and several true believers became martyrs to the Re formed faith i n the 1 520s. In 1 534 placards condemning the Catholic mass were found on the city walls of Paris and even outside the king's bedroom . An edict o f 1 535 ordered the extermination o f heretics and resulted in a general emigration. John Calvi n , who settled in Geneva, was one of these reli gious refugees. Calvin form ulated a constitution of the Re formed church, which declared that ecclesiastical authority resides ultimately in the people , with the faithful selectin g the e lders who are charged with s u pervision of the c hurch and the choice of pastors. The higher levels of this Re formed church were organized on the E n glish presbyterian princ i ples disc ussed in Cha pter 9. Inspired by this doctrine, H u guenot commu nities be gan forming in France in the 1 540s, assembling for their first synod in 1 558- 1 559 ( the year of E lizabeth's accession to the E n glish throne). Only fifteen H u guenot churches were re presented at this synod , but two years later there were over two thousand. This rapid spread of the movement and its official persecution prod uced an atmos phere of agitation in which som e H u guenots formed a conspiracy in 1 560 with the inte ntion of kidnapping the king. The plotters we re executed, and a new edict formally proh ibited the practice of the Protestant religion. Nevertheless, efforts at reconciliation contin ued and another edict ( 1 562)
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
The St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre, 1572
Religious con flicts marked much of the sixteenth century. I n France they led to intermittent civil war between 1 562 and 1 598, w h i le E ngland under Elizabeth achieved a tension-filled accom modation after the religious persecution of Mary Tudor's reign. Mass killings like the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre weakened France's position and probably contributed to a legacy of anticlericalism . ( Bibliotheque Nationale)
con firmed the religious liberty of the H u guenots. But the agitation could no longer be stayed by edicts . A numbe r of Huguenots, asse mbled for worship i n 1 562 , were mas sacred by leade rs of the Guise family, and when the duke of Guise sub seq uently staged a cou p d'etat, the H u gue nots u nder the leadership of Conde organized for war. The resultin g civil war lasted intermitte ntly until 1 598, w hen the H u guenots at last obtained their charter of religious and poli tical toleration , the Ed ict of N antes. The famous St. Bartholo mew's Day massacre ( 1 5 72 ) of some 20,000 H u guenots was a major ep isode in this destructive stru ggle. The forty years of religious wars co incided with the years of Quee n E lizabeth's religious settleme n t ; th us,
TOWARD THE NA TION-STA TE : FRANCE
E n gla nd cou ld c o n s ol i d ate its positi on while France was divided . One co nsequence of the stru ggle in France was the elaboration of H u gue not po litic al doctrine in the writi n gs o f Franr;ois H otman and in the an on ymo US tract, Vindiciae con tra tyrannos ( 1 5 79 ) . These writers postulated a gove r n m ent by conse n t of the gove rne d a n d a right to rebel against tyr a nn y. Thus, the Frenc h doctrine o f consent was e n tire l y identified with the H u g u e no ts a Protestant mi n o rity in an o verwhel m i ng ly Cat holic co u ntry . In England, by contrast, a more moderate doctrine of parlia mentary re pre se nta tion of t he cou n t ry was for m u lated by le ad i n g aris tocrats in the Ho use of Commons, who were nonco n formists b u t very much part o f the English go v er n ing class in local a n d n atio nal a ffairs . France was split into a H u gu enot " party , " i n te n t on gai n i n g c i v i c reco gn itio n for the Re forme d faith, and the " party" o f the Co u nter Reformation led by the d u kes of Guise, w ho were related b y mar r iage to the French and Scottish royal houses. The French king negotiated an d fou ght with both parties. French religious po l icy was ambiguous, for the country fought the Protestants at home on religious gro un ds while also fighting Catholic Spain abroad for political reasons. But this antagonism toward Catholic Spain was temporary. The peace of Cateau Cambresis ( 1 559) cemented a new Franco Span ish friendship by Phili p II's marriage to the daughter o f King Henry I I o f France ( 1 54 7 - 1 559) . This clearly made France an anti-Protestant power abroad as well as at home. We saw earlier that d ynastic relations s upported this Catholic front against Protestant England. Mary Stuart was the daughter of Mary of Guise, the queen-regent of Scotland after 1 54 2 . Mary Stuart had married Francis II of France, and her uncle, the d uke of Guise, had defeated the Eng l ish at Calais in 1 5 59. Fo r a short time it appeared that France and S pa i n would l a u nch a crusade against the English heresy. But suddenly, France's reigning house was weakened b y two deaths i n quick s uccession : Henry I I died in 1 559 a n d Francis I I in 1 560. Their reigns were followed by the m inority of Charles IX ( 1 560- 1 5 74), whose reign commenced at the age of ten , and by the weak rule of Henry I I I ( 1 574- 1 5 89). Throughout these decades, the stru ggle continued be tween the Catholic League under the Guise family and the Protestant faction. Strong personal rule was restored only by Henry of Navarre, who was a descendant o f the Bourbon family and became king of France in 1 589 as Henry I V. The religious "settlement" under Henry IV ( 1 5 89- 1 6 1 0) is a convenient starting point for surveying the dilemmas of French "abso lutism." I put both terms in q uotation marks since relations with the Huguenots were not settled either by the Edict of Nantes in 1 598 or by its revocation in 1 685, and since this partial resolution of the religious issue reveals the limitations of French royal authority. The Huguenots represented a religi ou s m inority of one million in a population of eigh
,
-
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
teen million Frenchme n . Henry I V's ac ce s s i on to the th ron e seemed to s u p port t h e H u gu enot position , since he was the rightful heir and he was a Calvinist. B ut H e nry's s uccession was disputed by the Catholic League because o f his religio us be l ie fs , and in 1 5 9 3 Henry abj u red the Re formed fai t h ; he was crowned at Chartres the following ye ar. The Catholicis m of France was ens u red, as was the c rown ' s s upre m acy in ecclesiastical a ffairs . The king's conversion to Catholicis m appe ared to facili t a te a settle ment of the religio us iss ue. I n 1 5 9 8 the Edict o f Nan tes granted the H u guenots a recognized , though second-class , status . Hu guenot com m u n ities were allowed a se parate s yno d a l o r g an iz ation as well as a n umbe r o f locatio n s whic h they could fo rtify and ad m i nister under their own j u risdictio n . U nder s pec i fied condi tions, t h e priva te a nd public wors h i p of the Reformed faith was permitted . But th e Hu guenots we re obliged to observe Catholic marriage laws and pay tithes in su pport of the Catholic church . Th us t he H u guenot s were t reated as a second-class group, tolerated and segregated in a fashion which was typ ical of the ancien regime . The conflict between the Catholic m ajori ty and t he H u guen ot mino rit y was settled through a grant of circum scribed rights to the minority. In the e a rl y seventeenth centu ry, French royal a uth o r ity was limited by a var i e ty o f i nstitutio n s which l a rge l y rep resented vested interests. A c o m pa ris o n with En gland and Russia will put the French regime in per s pective. Under Elizabeth, the English pa rl i a m e n t was com posed of lead ing notables fro m t h e shires and boroughs who claimed to represent the ,
interests of the queen's re alm. Although parl iament rece ived setbacks
under the Stuarts, it was c le a rly e s tab li sh i ng itself as representative of "the c o u nt ry In Russia, the Muscovite d y n a s t y had risen at the expense o f independent princes and bo yars and landed notables h ad become a class of high-ranking servitors. Their assemblies of the seventeenth cen tury (zemskii sobor) wanted to restore rather than lim it autocratic rule. France possessed neither a parliament in the English sense nor the Rus sian servitor assemblies. Instead, the French monarchy had become preeminent by successive arrangements between the French king and various sociopolitical groups and institutions. Additional reven ues of the crown were obtained th r oug h entitlements to revenues, privileges, ex em pt ions, and the like. The French ancien regime of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries re flected that earlier equivocal ascendance of the French kings over their mighty vassals. For that reason, the term absolutism is not easily a pplied to a mo na rc h y which in its period of great e s t power did not achieve control over what Montesquieu was to call the corps intermediaires of society. A system of government in which the ruler has unli mited powers is not p r ac t i cable in any case, though he may be extremely arbitrary and impose his will on many. But while "absolu tist ."
,
TOWARD THE NA TION-STA TE: FRANCE rule" was not th e pra ct ice in the literal sense , the aspiration to extend m o n archical authority and the claims to "absolute" authority were evi de n t in the seventeenth and eighteenth centu ries. The central control of maj or functions of government was actually achieved only in the nine teen th century .2 The ancien regime possessed a great diversity of "re presentative" in sti tutions. Like the E n glish parl iament, the institution of the Etats Generaux (Estates-General) origi nated in the king's council, which was ca lle d together on special occasions to give counsel and financial assis tance. But the E state s - Gene ral did not develo p into a national repre sen ta tive body. Its ex i s tence depe n ded on royal summons, and strong rulers d ispensed with it. Under Henr y I V, the ins t itut ion langu ished without being formally abolished. The last meeting, which occurred in 1 6 1 4, exem p lified both the im passe of entrenched interests and the lim itations of "absolute" m onarc h y . The Estates-General were com pose d of representatives of the cle r gy (the First Estate) , the nobility (the Second Estate) , and pro pe r tied com moners (the Third E sta te ) . 3 The Third Estate re fers to the middle strata which co mprised a wealthy pa tr ici ate often with h ered itar y title to mu nicipal o ffice, members of guilds or co r pora t ion s (also mostly heredi tary) , bankers and financiers, as well as com m erci al and smaller mer chants. Families of pa tri cian s and financiers often intermarried with the nobili ty . 4 The three estates met se pa r a te l y i n 1 6 1 4 (as they had be fore ) and voiced their several griev a nce s. With declining land revenues, the no bility faced increasing financial difficulties and used the opportunity to curb the pretensions of the Third Estate. The clergy and the no b i l i ty fo r ma l l y asked the Third Estate to petition the king for aboli tion of t he
paulette, a measure which al lowed officials from families of commoners
to make their posts hereditary in return for annual tax payments. The Third Estate com plied, but under two conditions . The First and Second
Estates
should reciprocate by petitioning the king for
property
tax (taille)
a red uction of the
and of the king's ex pendit u re s on pensions which
largely benefi ted the nobility. Despite such conflicts , t he meeting of the Estates-General p roved e mba r r ass i ng to the government.
As a rec e n t
study concludes,
An Estates General . . . served to focus the complaints of the people. The Estates General of 1 6 1 4 failed because it had no means of imposing its will on the government and because the unity of its cahiers frightened t h e u p pe r echelon bureaucrats. For the first time sensible men from the provinces had united and s hown the way to reform, but the reform seemed too dangerous. That could not be permitted to happen again. If it did the bureaucrats . . .
TOWARD THE NA TION-STA TE: FRANCE m i ght be fo rced to power and i f i t did o f the process o f ab uses that could
try refo r m which if it worked wou ld lessen their growi n g n o t m ight pl u n ge France i n to civil war. T he continuation stre n gt h e n i n g the central gove r n m e n t and of igno rin g not b e eas i l y u prooted seemed to b e t h e o n ly sensible
choice . s
T h e Estates-General o f 1 6 1 4 were d i ssolved . T h e y ha d shown that the mo narchy could assert its ce ntral a u t hority but could not ea s i l y encroach o n the rights a n d p r i v i leges it ha d gra nte d The roy a l or sove reign co u rts of law ( parlements) we re much more i m po r tan t t han t he E ta ts Generaux . They h ad ex t en s i ve j u d i c i a l d u ties and were entitled to re gister an d promulgate roya l decre e s and to issue ad m inistr a ti v e edicts . A pa r lem e nt could also refuse registration i f the proposed decrees were in c onsistent with p r e v ious legislation, and in this connection i t had the r ig h t to address remonst r an ces to the king. Such an a d verse ruling could be countermanded by a spe c ia l session ( lit de .
justice) in which the king could personally command the registration . On occasion, a pa rlement would resist even that command and would be exiled in consequence. Such con frontations occurred prima r ily in Paris
and became more frequent when the king's position weakened. The parlement of Paris was the oldest and most prestigious of these bodies, setting the tone for the several parlements in the p rovin c es The Paris parlement had jurisdiction over a large part of France. Some eleven hundred members of the parlements constituted the powerful noblesse de robe. Me m bers were neither elected nor appointed. I nstead, mem bership depended on wealth and birth, and parliamentary seats were available for purchase from owners or heirs as a free , hereditary prop erty, provided the p u rch aser was of noble birth. In this way, the parlia .
mentary nobil ity could' defend its monopoly against other clai mants and
against the king himse l f. By the seventeenth century, most provinces were cen trally ad min istered (pays d'election) fro m Paris, and taxes were assessed without con sultation with the estates. B ut on the periphery, the estate-assemblies of the locally administered provinces (pays d'Etat) had important govern mental functions, though these were to decline in the course of the eigh teenth century. Membership in these provincial assemblies was by estate, the relative weight of each depending on the mode of election and the social conditions of the province. In B ritanny and Languedoc, where A French Parliament
In France as in England, representative institu tions originated in assemblies called by the king to help him dispense justice. In this m iniatu re by Jean Fouquet, King C harles VI I , seated above the others i n the rear, presides over a special session of the parlement
( 1 485).
This highest coun was called to j udge the duke of Alen�on, who had been accused of high treason. (Bayerische Staatsbibliothek)
TO WARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE
3 30
estate-assemblies still fu nctioned in the eighteenth century, the asse m blies deve lop�d permanent com mittees and officers that remaine d at work between m eetin gs and hand led the increasingly complex busi n ess of governmen t (like co nscri p tio n , road -buildin g, and relief of the po or) . B ut the Estates-Gene ral, the small number and di m i ni s hing functions of t he pays d' E tat, and the pa r l e m e nt s in the pays d'election do not ye t gi ve an adeq uate pictu re of Fre nch "govern mental" institutions. That picture eme rges only when one reco gnize s that in practice th e m o na rch y rested on a series of contrac t s ( m ade] w i t h t he d i ffere n t u n i ts o f w h ic h F ra n ce was co m p os ed : p ro v i nces, c i tie s, eccles iastical fo u n d a t i o n s , soc ial cl asses and even eco nomic gro u ps such as
the trade gu i l d s . A l l these co n t racts le ft to each gro u p i ts own l ib e r t i es a nd
privile ges and no one saw a n yt h i n g o u t of t h e wa y in t h e i r e x i stence side by side with s u b m ission to the k i n g. Pro v i nces, cities, fo u n d atio n s , gro u ps, or de rs a n d states were all fa i th fu l s u bjects o f the king, but with their
own
privileges . 6
The basis of 'th is arrangement was either a family's ancient tide or the purchase of tide and o ffice . The hereditary magistracy of parlementaires was based securely on landownersh ip, going back three or fou r gener ations. Most parlementaires had a legal ed ucation, partici pated actively in public affairs, and had regular access to the king and his officials. With the i r facility for meeting privately, the parlemen taires assumed leadersh ip over the French nobility as a whole ; and conversely, the older nobility obtained through the parlementaires a professional leadership it had not had before . The leadership of the other "intermediate" bodies was perhaps not as well-trained as the parlementaires, but every town, foundation , or order had an elite of its own, h ighly conscious of its rights or privileges and quite pre pared to put u p a stiff fight in their defense. During the seventeenth century, and especially under the reign of Louis X I V ( 1 64 3 - 1 7 1 5),8 the French monarchy was in the ascendant over this multitude of intermediate bodies. One can assess the rise of absolutism by the degree to which the monarchy superim posed its centralized ad ministrative system on entrenched and highly diversified elites. But be fore sketching the ascendance of monarchy, two circum stances of seventeenth-century France must be described. One is eco nom ic. Holland. not France. was the foremost economic power of the period, its eight to nine thousand vessels re presented about half of the world's shipping. Amsterdam was the principal international market and warehouse, and Dutch commercial practices and financial facilities we re the most ad vanced of their time. By comparison, France did not " Lo u is XIV was born i n began his e ffective r u le in
1 638, became ki n g of France in 1 643 1 66 1 at the death of Card i nal Mazari n .
at
the age o f five. and
TOWARD THE NA TION-S TA TE ; FRANCE
33 1
have a d eve lD pe d eCDnDmy . It had no. na tiD n al bank Dr b u d ge t French currency h ad to' cD m pe te wit h forei gn cDins, waterways and rDads were Dften im passable, French cDal fi e l d s l a y dDrmant, its irDnwDrks were technically backward. The l is t Df econDmic deficiencies is ID n g and in c l ude s the cDn d i tion D f Frenc h agriculture. Y e t seven teenth-century France h ad the reputation o f bein g t he for emo s t pDli t ic a l powe r D f Eu rope as well as its main c ultu ral center. The country was engaged in foreign wars fo r almDst fi fty years between 1 600 and 1 7 00, and i n ad di t iDn the government had to' put down a large n um be r Df i n ternal re belliDns. Demographic s t rengt h was the basis of thi s great outward suc cess, since with the ex ce pt i o n D f Russia, France had two or three times the po p u l a tiD n Df any Dther E u rope a n country. Of almDst twenty million peD ple, some twelve million were prDd uctive and taxable, and the CDun t ry s po pu la tiDn may have been near t h a t level s i n ce the mid sixteenth century. France had the u n u s u a l ly high average Df Dne h undred inhab itants per square mile , at a time wh e n pD p u l a t iD n d ensi t y was a S D u rce of m il i tary and eCDnomic s t re n gt h 7 The other circumstance is pol it ic a l . The rise of monarchical power at t he expense of local j u risd ic t iD n d e pe nd ed Dn personal rule at the ce n te r Df affairs , and that rule was strong under Cardinal Richelieu ( 1 624- 1 642), Card i n al Mazarin ( 1 642- 1 66 1 ) , an d Louis X I V . I t is tr u e t h at H e n ry I I I and Henry I V were assassinated in 1 589 and 1 6 1 0, a n d Louis X I I I ( 1 6 1 0- 1 643) was first under the influence Df his mDther, M arie d e Med ici, and her cD n fi d a n t s, and the n under that of R ich e li e u But two strong regents and Louis X IV's strDng persD n a l rule after 1 66 1 coun ted fDr mDre than these vicissitudes . Ric helieu's i n fl uence rose in th e midst Df a re vD l t by the H u g u en D ts ( 1 625- 1 628). The cardinal also had to. d e feat a c D n s pi ra c y Df the king' s brother a n d the duke Df MDnt mDrency in 1 632 while directin g France's pa rticipa ti D n ( 1 63 1 - 1 648) in the Thirty Years' War. H is succeSSDr, Card i n a l M a za r i n , rea ped the ben efits D f F renc h gains frDm the Peace o f Wes t p h a l i a ( 1 648), t h D u gh the same year witnessed the D u tb reak Df the Fronde ( 1 648- 1 653), t he last attempt Df the Fre nc h n o b i l i t y to. o ppose t h e k i n g b y armed resistance. Lo u i s X I V s CD nce r n w i t h h is d i gn i t y, greatness , and re pu t a t ion was expressed above all in his m i li t a ry u n de r ta ki n g s In fairness one should add that France had reaSDn to. fear encirclement b y the Austrian and Spanish branches Df the House of Habsbu rg. b The 1 660s w i t n e ss ed t he ,
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bIn t he Mediterranean , the S panish H absburgs controlled not only Spai n but the Bal earic Islands, Sardinia, and the kingdom of N a ples (including Sicily). I n addition , S pain controlled the province of M i l a n , Franc he Comtc� (an a rea adjoining the Western border of modern Switzerland), and t he Spanish Nethe rlands to the north. Farther east, the Aus trian Habsburgs controlled an a rea extendin g from the so uth o f Berli n to the Ad riatic co ast and from te rritories adjoi n i n g the Rh ine j ust north of Basel to a section of t he kin g dom of H ungary .
332
TO WA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
king' s fo rays i n to the S panish Nethe rlands , the 1 6 70s his w ar agai ns t Holland ( 1 6 72- 1 6 7 8 ) , and 1 683 anothe r i n vasion of the S panish Net h e rlands.c The revocation o f the Edict of Nantes in 1 685 res ulted in a massive e m igration of Fre nc h H u guenots. Followin g the revocati on , Louis was e n gaged in a war with the League o f A u gsburg fro m 1 68 9 to 1 69 7 , a Protesta n t coalition against France which had been organ ized by William, Prince of Orange, who had become ki ng o f Engla n d ( 1 689- 1 702 ) . From 1 70 1 to 1 7 1 4 , Lo uis was e n ga ged in the War o f the Spanish Succession . The first eleve n years o f Lo uis' e ffective rule were m arked by great s uccess abroad and at home, but after 1 6 72 his m ilitary s uccesses were outweighed by defeats arising from various E uro pean coal itions against France . France was at war for twenty-five out of t he last thirty years of Louis X I V's reign . How does this record o f foreign i n volvement based on a sturdy if old- fashioned economy relate to the inte rnal policies of the ancien re gime? An older view , partly inspired by Tocqueville, held that a centr al ized bureaucrac y had been establ ished long be fore the Fre l).ch revolu tion and i ndeed had prepared the way for the nati o n-st a te , but more recent studies s uggest that central adm inistration o ften remained on pa pe r . 8 The substi tution of royal for local authority was a protracted and uneven development. The record o f Richelieu m akes this clear. The cardinal had been ruthless in de fending the kin g' s interests a gains t the H u gue n ots and va r io us co n s p ir acies by the queen mother, t he ki ng's brother, and le a ding members of the n o b i l i ty . But Richelieu d id not cre
ate a centralized form of governm ent. The m embers of town councils a n d the parlementaires re t a ined their authority mo re or less u n i m p aire d . Richelieu raised reven ue by t he o l d methods o f selling useless p u bli c o ffices as well as th e very l ucra tive rig h t to collect taxes. He did appoint provincial governors (intendants) to s u pervise re gi o nal and local a ffairs , b u t their mis si ons were tem porary and limited to a few prov in c e s. Still, the i n te n da n t s were begi nning to encroach on t h e r i gh ts of the parlements. The civ i l war, kno wn as t he Fronde ( 1 648- 1 653), was in part directed a ga inst this interference , since leaders of the revolt de manded the abolition of the intenda nts as w ell as the reconfirmation of the parlementaires a nd t h ei r w e l l-est a blis hed ri g hts .9 T he ascen dance o f absolutism may be dated from the e ffec tive rule of Lo uis X I V, as l o n g as the term is understood with the proper res e r v a tio n s . The co m pa n ie s o f o fficers or ga n i ze d in the Fronde were abolishe d . In 1 673 the parlements wer e i ns t ructed to re gi s ter ro yal CThe Netherlands' declaratio n of independence from Spain in 1 5 8 1 (see Chapler 9 , p. 2 75 ) referred only to the independe nce of the United Provinces (roughly, modern Holland). Span ish forces reconq uered t he south ( roughly, modern Belgium), wh ich re mained pa rt of the Spanish branch of the H absburg em pire under the general designation of the Span ish N etherlands. Spain lost these possessions in the Treaty of Utrecht of 1 7 1 4 .
TOWARD THE NATION-S TA TE: FRANCE
333
ed ic t s fo rth wi th. T hey co u ld sti ll add ress t hei r h u m bl e pet it i o ns to the kin g, bu t he would then end the m atte r b y sa y in g yes or no. There was som e resistance , bu t it was put d ow n The emasculatio n o f the o fficers o f finance was e ffective . These men had pa r t ic i pa ted in the Fronde but we re not su p pressed by fo rce I n s te a d t he l ess i m po rta nt ones we re bo u gh t out by the govern ment, while the more i m port a nt o n e s were re pl a c ed b y the intend a n ts, who took over the assessment of the taille. The highest ranks of the nobi l i ty i ncludin g the p ri n ces of the blood , were shoved aside by c re ati n g for them s ple n d i d so u n d i n g posts w hich confe rred no power. So me nobles w h o he l d p ro v i nc i al gove rn ors h i ps had th eir terms reduced to three ye a rs and we re for b i d d e n to reside in the area of their o ffic ia l duties. Louis X I V' s lavish c o u rt soc ie t y had the political purpose of forcing the nobility'S pe rso n a l a t te ndance T h e y could win favors onl y by personal petition o fte n i m po v e r i sh i ng them sel ves in the process. No bles who stayed at home were s ubj e c te d to sea rches o f their titles, a calculated subordination of recalcitrants which .
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could lead to their demotion and provided an indirect method of tax ation besides. The creation of many new titles as well as the sale of titles and coats of arms provided further revenue and served to degrade the nobility. In the be gi n n i ng o f Louis X I V's reign , France' s po s i ti o n seemed assured. The country was wealthy e no ugh to s upport the massive ex penditures of the k in g s foreign u n derta kin gs witho u t com pelling a re orga n izatio n of domestic a ffairs . Admi n i s t rat i o n was in the hands of Jean-Baptiste Colbert as controller gene ral o f finance ( 1 662 - 1 683). The crown's income of 60 million livres a year was unmatched by any other country except Holland . In addition, Colbert p ro moted the construction and purchase of ships. The French army was organized along the new lines ad o pted by the main European powers after the 1 560s. The em phasis was on discipline, inspections, maneuvers, the storage of arms, ammunition, and supplies ; strategic mil i ta ry positions were re pa i re d and garrisoned; and morale was bolstered through pe rio dic public reviews.10 The French army wi th 70,000 me n and some 1 ,800 cannon was t he larg est in Europe. Savings on expenses was Colbert's most successful device for fi n ancing the king's ambitious undertakings. Half the annuities payable by the crown were simply abolished and the remainder was cut substan ti ally The savings achieved were worth 4 m i l l io n livres to the royal trea sury. Th o u sand s of new offices had been created and sold after 1 630, costing more than 8 m ill i o n a year in salaries. By repurchase, Colbert relieved the annual drain of these payments by more t h an 2 mill io n . By these and other methods, he succeeded in reducing the permanent charge on the annual budge t from 52 to 1 4 m ill i o n livres over a ten year pe r io d . Some of Colbert's positive measures were equally success'
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334
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fu!. He increased the reve n ue from the property tax (taille) in the pay s d' E tat by 50 percent. Income from the royal estates increased from vir tually nothing to 5 million by 1 67 1 , and the revenue collected from the peasants from 3 7 to 60 m illion . Between 1 66 1 and 1 6 7 1 , Lo uis' net in come had doubled , and a substantial surplus o f income over expendi tures mounted from year to year. ! ! Governmental ad ministration was still rudimentary. Colbert and his associates accom plished a great deal during the first, rather peace ful pe riod of Louis X I V's re ign ( 1 66 1 - 1 6 7 2 ) . But a few men at the top, some th irty councillors, less than thirty intendants, perhaps a h und red masters o f requests , and al l the attendant scribes and servants made u p an ad min istrative corps o f less than one thousand persons trying to re organize a coun try of twenty million people. Although quite a bit was acco m plished, a centralized admin istration of provincial and local gov ernment was not achieved . Instead , new privileges were added (even when old privileges were curtailed) , largely in order to raise more rev enue but also because the monarchy respected, and depe�ded on, the institutions of privilege . 1 2 Colbert's intention t o establish a centralized administration had been shared by a n U01ber of his predecessors. Royal intervention in the relations between landlord and peasant dated back to the fou rteenth century. Appeals could be addressed to royal officials for relief from the abuses of landlords. Also, u rban com m u n ities e manci pated themselves
from their feudal overlords and thereby came under the control of royal In theory, royal a u t hority became the gu arantor of ju stice, an idea developed in Jean Bodin's doctrine of royal sovereignty (Six Livres de La Republique , 1 5 7 6 ) In practice, royal officials assumed admin istrative and judicial authority over some peasants and collected taxes from them, while others continued under seignorial jurisdiction. The royal call to arms had originally been add ressed to the nobility, and was only gradually extended to some of the tenants of landowners . Many o f these measures were poorly ad ministered, but conditions of war generally favored the extension of royal authority. The provincial estates, where they still existed, were rendered powerless by official su pervision of their discussions and the alternate use of bribes and threats. The major cities saw their franchises undermined little by little, as one right or exemption after another was curtailed or eliminated. In 1 667 the king created a lieutenant general of the police for Paris. By 1 699 lieutenants of police had been appointed in the majority of cities, their duties com prising in rudimentary fashion the various functions we as sociate with municipal administration. The exigencies of war probably were the most i m portant causes of administrative centralization and reorganization. m agistrates.
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TOWARD THE NATION-STATE: FRANCE
335
T h e a ggravation of o l d burd e n s a n d t h e i m position of new o n e s h a d t h e c u
rious e ffect of gi vin g t he royal ad m i n i stration a more settl e d , e ffective a n d a u t horitative place i n the ki n gd o m . M i l i t a r y o rga n i zat io n , su pp lies , troo p m ove me n ts, coastal d e fe n s e s , new taxes, letters patent o f n o b i l i t y or office s for sale, a l l these were ad ded t o t h e work o f t h e intendan ts .
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[ Fro m t h e
1 690s o n ] each intendant h a d h i s o w n offices w h i c h were beco m i n g i ncre as i n gl y orga n ized , and a fa i r n u mber of assista n t s w hose use fu l n ess no o n e drea m e d a n y lo n ger o f disputi n g a s C o l be r t h a d once do n e . A n a d m i n istra
t i o n with
i nc rea s in g
powers
and
i n fl ue nce was
develo p i n g
with i n
the
k i n gd o m P
But the polic ies of war which furthered administrative centraliza tio n entailed financial burdens in excess of France's still considerable wealth. Between 1 6 72 and 1 676, France's de ficit reached 24 m illion livres . Colbert was forced to resort to "extraordinary meas ures." Tax exem ptions were first sold to minor officials, and then the intendants were instructed to impose new taxes on these clients of t he government at exorbitant rates. Some 8 million were obtained in this way, and al though the policy was suspended as unwise, it was resumed later. Half the tax exemptions on freeholds were sold for 7 million. The sale of offices and licenses reappeared, the purchasers sim ply adding their cost to the price of the goods they sold to the public, thus increasing the indirect tax on commodities. Half the royal estates which had been re purchased were sold o ff o nce again. Old taxes were revived a n d regular ones increased. A whole series of new taxes were im posed on the mas tery of a craft, on pewters and tobacco, and on all acts of ecclesiastical administration. The clergy was required to increase its "voluntary do nations." But the costs of war kept rising and the government fell back on borrowing. Municipal bonds were sold at steadily increasing rates o f interest. I n 1 6 76 Colbert borrowed from Genoese bankers and the king's financiers in France at rates of 1 0 percent on the amici pated income for 1 677.
Colbert died in 1 6 83 , and his work of financing the king's wars by ever more extraordinary measures was taken up by his s uccessors . It is sufficient to state the overall effect in Goubert's words : Yea r by year, the cost of t he war, of financi n g the war and of the war time economy had affected the people of the kingdom : taxes and the depredations of tax collectors and soldiery alike, the m ilitia and the continual h u n t for deserters ; scarcity and fam ine, made worse by the war, poverty and profi teers ; mone tary difficulties, the dread o f cou n terfeit coin and " notes" o f all descriptions, all deva l u e d by 80 or 90 percen t ; the growing burden o f de bt placed on the peasantry a nd the i m possibility of finding farmers to col lec t the k i n g s taxes or private revenues ; demographic crises of a m ild or ca�a strophic nature ; swine feve r ty phoi d, scarlet fever, dysentery a n d m e as l e s '
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TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE a ffect ing everyone fro m t h e cou rt to the re motest co u ntryside ; ba nds of beg
ga rs , br i ga n d s , and deserters lurk i n g i n eve r y forest in the lan d and e mergin g
to ravage eve ryt h i n g in s i g h t ; sud d e n pa n ic u p risin gs i n rural com m u n iti es precipi tated by a new t a x , w h e t h e r real or i m a gi n e d a n e w gove rn me n t ,
a ge n t , a load of g r a i n , troo p move m e n t s or t h e rumou r that b r i ga n d s we re
m a s s in g i n t he reg i on; t h e a rm y , as it had i n the p r e v i o us ce n t u ry , puttin g down d i s t u rba nces H .
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E ve ry t h i n g suggests, as Go ubert states, that when Louis X I V died in 1 7 1 5 , eve ry s ubject of the king e x pe rie n ce d a profound se n se o f relief. There a re in d i ca tion s that a fter 1 7 1 5 a fairly rapid economic re cO \'ery was made possible by many o f the same factors which had ac co u n ted for Franc e ' s preem inence in E u ro pean affairs two generat ions earlier. But the poli t ical di ffic u l ties of "absolutism" persisted despite re
cO\'ery and the return of peace. Where the king's officials took over the functions of seignorial rule or municipal government, peasants and town residents were se parated from their earlier affiliations and became direct subjects of the king. But royal officials a ppeared only occasionally , whereas landlords and urban patricians were ever-present. The point is that the ancien regime did not destroy existing privileges or dispense with the delegation of authority. Rather, the government withdrew from the existing system of inequality the earlier association between status and authority. Louis X I V abolished authority as a right associated with other privileges. Even the most distinguished families were de prived of their political rights. But exce pt in periods of great emergency, most nobles were exem pt from ordinary taxes, military service, and the ne cessity of quartering royal troops. They enjoyed j udicial privileges al-
Peasant Bearing a Priest and a Noble on His Back
This eighteenth-cen tu ry caricature sym bolizes the crushing tax burdens imposed on the peasantry while clergy and nobility were
largely
exempted
from
taxation.
Rabbits and d o ves, protected by law for the sport of the u pper classes, are shown eating the
peasants' grain. These same
laws also allowed aristocratic hunting parties to follow the chase even if they trampled and devastated the peasants' fie lds. (Bi bliotheque N ationale)
TOWARD THE NA TION-STA TE: FRANCE
337
lo w in g easy access to a parlement as well as a myriad o f special ri g h ts wh ich varied from one l oc a l i ty to another. I S These privileges were ex ten d ed to royal officials so that their noble status would c o r r e spo nd to their official function .d B ut the chances for en nobleme nt i ncrease d m o re r apidly than the functions o f government. W h e n there w a s a shorta ge o f a v a ilab le posts , t h e office s ee k e r s w e re q u i c k to th i n k u p n e w o n e s . . . . T o a m a n o f s o m e ed ucat i o n a n d w i t h a l i t tle money
of his own i t see med u n beco m i n g to go to his g rave without h a v i n g held a n po s t so metime i n his c a reer. 1 6
o ffic i a l
Offices also m ulti plied because the go v ern me nt thou g h i t de st royed the right to a uth o r i ty as an inherite d priv i le ge did not dispense with the creation o f priv i leges as a source of reven ue . To c q u evi l le cites the example of towns which had enjoyed their m unici pa l liberties for centuries. Louis XIV destro yed these liberties but restored them to all towns in a positio n to buy them b ac k . Seven times in a period of ei ghty years "the towns were in v i ted to buy the ri g h t of e l ectin g their e xecutive officials ; then, after they had tasted for a while the pleasure of self gov ern ment, the right was withdrawn and sold back to them once more."17 Simila rly, ennoblemen t thro ugh the issuance o f letters patent had be come the vesti ge of earlier, verbal grants of honor and priv i le g e I n the past, such grants had been revoked only on rare occasions. But under Louis XIV, letters of nobility were revoked by the government on nine sepa ra te occ as io n s, forc in g the holders of such letters to buy letters of con firmation or other forms o f exempt i o n 1 8 In addition, the king sold his a u tho r i ty anew thro u gh various franchises, immunities , or corporate liberties in order to fill his coffers and perhaps also to get the work of government out of the hands of the ancient n obili ty 1 9 Ulti mate royal authority was assured. B ut its exercise was divided haphazardly among the royal intendants, the parlements, the old "in termediate bodies ," and the newly p rivile ged individuals and com mu nities for whom public offices were a source of income and p res t i ge Royal o fficials often proved to be recalcitrant agents of the royal will.20 Adm in ist ra t i ve centralization stood side by s ide with privileges bought and sold for a price, and these privileges p rovi d ed their incumbents with income that more ofte n than not stood in no relation to the functions they performed . In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, everyone considered -
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d I n a population of some 20 million people , approxi mately 1 90,000 were nobles . This group was divided between the ancient nobility o f t he sword, t he nobility of the robe based
on j udicial office (some 2,300 in the high offices and pe rha ps ten times that number in the lower). and a small grou p o f en nobled town magistrates. The nobility as a w hole was very heterogeneous. since a tax assessment of 1 695 distin guished n i neteen classes o f no bles , with incomes ranging from 2,000 down to
6 Iivres.
TO WARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE
monarchies a stron g form of government. Monarchs see med to beco me all-powerful as the authority of pa rlements and estate asse mblies w ere c u rt ailed. K i n gs could rally the resources o f their co untry in support o f thei r goals, and frequent war emerge ncies were a significant cause of ad m i n istrative centralizatio n . Success w as meas u red by m i l itary victories and territorial ex pa nsion w h ich added to the royal treas ury. "A king could declare war and make peace, conc l u d e a l l i ances, se nd a n d rece iv e am bassado rs, levy taxes, a d m inister j u stice a n d a p po i n t s ubord i na te 01' ficials . " 2 1 To put these broad claims i n to e ffec t it was necessary to u n i fy t h e central govern ment a n d develop a clear divi sion of labor among ad ministrative agencies. The ce ntral gove rnment laid down rules for the i m ple m e n tation of laws or edicts . The k i n g's personal se rvants became royal o fficials. I n the process, the ruler e ncou raged a direct relation with his peo ple, rallyi n g them to support the royal cause over and above the petty tyra n n ies of church and nobility. To an extent, the sel f-proclaimed glory of the king, and thro u gh him of France and its people, was meant to transform the unive rsal submission to the king into fervor for his great design s . Yet absolutism was beset by paradox. In the name of the king, of ficials assumed control of affairs formerly in the hands o f local institu tion s . The claims o f authority were certai n l y absol ute, and t he result was a proli fe ration of d uties im posed o n the inte ndants and their subordi n ates . B u t the scope of these d uties wen t far beyond what royal o fficials could acco m plish by themselves. I n practice, the n , authority was dele gate d a n e w , and local j u risd ic tions or i nd i v id u als appoi nted to t he task now exercised authority in the name of the king rather than their own. In all these activities, the governme n t did not i n fringe syste matically on the rights of property in offices and land . T h u s , t he prescriptive au t hority of government existed side by side with t he structu re of existing privileges now be re ft of their former j udicial or administrative autonomy. In theory, all adult house holde rs were of direct concern to the high est authority , and the king and his officials we re informed of all public affairs and exercised absolute authority . I n practice, they had to rule without knowing the conditions of the wuntry or the e ffects of their own measures. No re presentative i n stitutions existed thro ugh which their i mpressions could have been checked. Two generations after the death of Louis X I V, Turgot would write in his Memoire sur les munici palites ( 1 7 7 5 ) that neither the king nor his ministers, nor the intendants of the provinces, nor yet their s ubde legates, could acq uire a knowledge of the co un try. The root o f the evil was the lack o f a constitution, of any real u n ity, "with the result that there prevails a pe rpetual con flict of com peting and particularistic interests. " Pierre Goubert has described this con d ition based on the research which has accu m ulated since Tur got's day . The kingdo m of France was made u p of a
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col lection of " nations," pays , seign ories , fiefs an d parishes . . . . Each of these e ntities was accustomed to living indepe n de n tly, with i ts own c u stoms, priv ile ges and even language , s n u g in its own fields and within sound of its own bel ls. T h e k i n g consec rated at Rheims w a s a priest-ki n g t o be revered and almost wors h i ped , b u t from a far. When someone sent by him t u rned up i n t he village acco m panied b y an e scort o f armed o r black-clad men , or m e rely beari n g a n o rder i n w r i ti n g, he was met, on principle with s u s picio n or even open hosti l i ty . What " ne w fa n gled" idea h ad he bro u g h t with h i m ? A blow struck at local custo m ? Or a levy of money, horses, or men ? . M a k i n g the ki n g's voice heard in t h e depths of the co u n tryside was easier said than done w hen the c u re, who was the only means of spread i n g it, garbled , scam ped or merely forgot a task w h ich was clearly n o part of h i s d u ties ; when co u rts of law were far o ff, cost l y , u n reliable and even less res pected , the forces of l a w and order never there, the i ntenda n t a m yste ry an d h is assistants powe rless. We have only to look at poo r Colbert, try in g to establish his m a n u factu res , his ten ta tive regulations and h is com panies. No one wanted them beca use all had the ir own traditions, habits and interests and c lu n g fiercely to their own indepe ndence . . . . We h ave only to stress the ras h of desertions prevale n t in t h e regular a r m y and still more in the m ilitia (where it may have been as h igh as 50 percen t) at a time when parishes a n d even whole provinces were ready to cond one, h ide and feed the deserters . 2 2 .
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In the France of Louis X I V these seething undercurrents and the massive inertia of the population made the task of the king and his min isters extremely difficult, if not im possible.
FRENCH REACTIONS
TO
ENGLAND AND AMERICA
In The Old Regime and the Revolution , Tocqueville assessed the public reactions to the dilemmas and abuses of absolutism. He felt that a cynical egoism was all-pervasive though it was associated, however erratically, with a spirit of independence. The government made money by selling its offices. Purchasers could do what they wished with them, but the government was in a position to exact additional payments from the in cumbents. O ffices had become private property and were exploited at the public's expense. Though officials were "perniciously estranged from the common people" and had become a " pseudo-aristocracy," on occasion they displayed "the spirit of resistance of a true aristocracy."23 Increasing exploitation and the demise of public spirit were also true in other contexts. The provinces and towns lost the substance of their an cient franchises, and nobles could not assemble for com mon deliberation without express permission from the king. Every private right was superseded by the right of royal officials to regulate public affairs. Nevertheless, in practice privileges remained, permitting men of rank to enjoy the liberties o f their high station .
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE The nobility had the utmost contem pt for the admin i stration properly
so
called, though now and again they add ressed petitions to it. Eve n after the su rrender of their former power they kept somethin g of their ancestral pride. t h e i r traditio nal antipathy to servitude and s ubordination to the commo n law. True, they gave little t houg ht to t h e freedom of the p o p ulace at large and were quite ready to let the a ut h ori ties rule t h o se around them with a he avy
hand. But t h ey re fused to let that hand weigh on themselves and were pre pared to
run
the greatest risks in the defense of the i r libe rties i f and when
t h e need arose .
.
.
.
2�
Nobles now used their rank to overawe royal officials and defy the gov e rnment, whereas at an earlie r time their pride and privileges had been syno n ymous with t he exercise of authority. In Tocqueville's view, the old regime was not an e ra of servility and subservience, but the freedom of the nobility had become illegitimate . Immunities and privileges dan gerously widened the d i vision between rich and poor when men of priv ilege exploited their offices for private gain in lieu of servin g their pUbl ic functions. As penetrating as this famous analysis is, it treats the problems of the a ncien regime in isolation from its international setting. I n the course of the seventeenth century, France became the foremost power o f Europe and maintained that position for m uch of the eighteenth cen tury. Meanwhile, domestic problems cumulated , and Frenchmen of con servative and liberal pe rsuasions reflected on the nature of these dis contents, freq uently by com paring Frenc h conditions with those of other countries. Among these reflections, those dealing with the political and moral conditions o f England and the American colonies are of special inte rest. The following discussion deals with France's international po sition and the development of French opinion concerning England and America. In the sixteenth century, S pain had been all-powerful, whereas France was on the defensive. The treaty of Cateau-Cambresis (1559) marked a turning point, for it established a tem porary alliance between the two powers. In 1659 France concluded the Treaty of the Pyrenees with Spain, which followed twenty-four years of intermittent war. Now conditions were reversed, with Spain in decline and France beginning its dominance over much of Europe. During the reign of Louis XIV, French policies precipitated a great European coalition against France, first in the war of 1 689- 1 697 and then in the War of the Spanish Succes sion (170 1 - 17 1 4) . In the eyes of the anti-French alliance, France's pol icies had raised the spectre o f the same ruling family (the Bourbons) on the French and the S panish throne. These wars marked the ascendance of England and the arrest of French advances on the Continent, but rivalry between the two powers contin ued. Frederick I I of Prussia ( 1740- 1 786) observed that both countries sought to be arbiters of all
TOWARD THE NA TION-S TATE: FRANCE
341
Eu rope, France because of its armies and resources and England because o f its navies and com m ercial we a lth . Despite its setbac k s, France re mai n ed the major Eu ro pe an power. D uring the eigh tee nth century, its population increased from 1 80r 19 to 2 5 or 26 millio n , figures which were matched only by Austria and, at the end of the century, by Russia. In deed, through its colonizing ventures in India and North America, Fra nce was in com petition with England on a global scale . For much of the century France was prosperous , and on the Co ntin e nt no one dis pute d the country's c u ltural preeminence. French superseded Spanish a nd Italian as the inte r national language. Frederick II o bser ved that whoever knew Frenc h could travel throughout E u rope without in ter preter. The Seven Years' War ( 1 756-1 763) i n volved all the Eu ro pea n pow ers, combinin g a many sided territorial war on the Continent with co lonial str u ggles ranging from I ndia to North Ame rica. The Franco-B rit ish conflict in the Seve n Years' War had broke n o ut in the colonies before 1 756, and one can consider the French campaigns against elec toral Hanover (dynastically united with England) and the H a noverian allies as a by product of the colonial rivalry. (The Seven Years' War was also an Austro-Prussian war in which France, Russia, and Sweden were committed to Austria while B ritain was allied with Prussia.) The out come of this war was im portant, for in the Treaty of Paris ( 1 763) France ceded to Great B ritain all the mainland of North America east of the Mississippi (e xclu ding New Orleans and its environs), so m e West Indian islands, and all Frenc h conquests in India or i n the East Indies since 1 749. In turn, Great Britain restored to France several islands in the West Indies and the Atlantic, t he West African colony of Goree (Sene gal), and the islan d off the coast of Brittan y , Belle-He-en-Mer. In the competition for e m pire England had won a clear victory over France The country which the whole Euro pean world and the French them selves considered the supreme power and the center of civilization had suffered its first major defeat in several generations. It is more difficult to assess French public opinion d u ring the eigh teenth century than it is to assess public opinion in England two cen turies earlier. English antagonism toward Spain together with the coa lescence between Protestantism and nationalism under a highly popular queen provide us with clues to the coalescence between educated o pin ion and po pular feeling. By contrast, eighteenth-century France pos sessed no single focus of educated opinion and popular sentiment, per haps because of its dominant position on the Continent. But this dominance did not make the country impervious to foreign influences. The ideas emanating from England are of special interest among the many currents of opinion during the eighteenth century. French Engl ish relations had been marked by interdependence and rivalry ever -
-
,
.
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
342
since the Norman
the seventeenth ce n t ury , E n gland and i ts partnership between king an d pa rliame n t as well as exte nd ed its colonial and me rca nti le empire. En g lis h parl ia me nt ary institutions were ana t hem a to conservative French men bu t attractive to Frenchmen with commercial interests and enlight ened ide as It was gli bly said by Lo u i s XIV t h at all would be well i f the En g li s h would content t h em sel ves w it h bei ng the g reat est merchants of Europe and leave to the French ki n g as his share whateve r he could conquer in a 'just wa r But this d i si n ge n uo us statement meant little in practice.25 The king himself a ct ively sup po rt e d the cause of the Stuarts; England in turn in tervened in Euro p e an affairs. The two countries were colonial rivals. The most pro mi n en t poli tical j udgments i n France reflected these com plex realities . The French feared English commercialism and cr i tici z e d its cultural effects, but they realized t hat En g lis h industry and political i nstitutions gave the country a d yn a m is m that was m issing in France. I n 1753 the intendant du comm.erce, Vincent de Go urnay, comm_e nted that English merchants saw to the quality of their merchandise because they advanced a way of life respected by the whole country, while French merchants made their fortunes as quickly as possible in order to escape business life through pu rchase of an official positio n . A few years later, the French foreign secretary, the duc de Choiseul, wen t even further in his appreciation of English institutions. Choiseul was a royalist with an authoritarian frame of mind ; he deplored the factionalism and near conquest. During
settled its Protestant a l l eg i a n c e ,
.
'
."
anarchy of English political life. But his main concern was to make
France strong and efficient enough to compete successfully with En gland. He was prepared to copy E n gli s h practices, from industrial tech niques even to its representative institutions, if that was w hat it took to rival or exceed E ngland's political and mercantile achievements.26 This d ual evaluation of E n gland was similarly true of educated opinion. Frenchmen recalled the expulsion o f James II of England in 1 688 and the conditions under which William of Orange had become king of England. Parliament had successfully challenged the absolute prerogatives of the king; religious toleration and individual liberty seemed secure o r could be defended successfully. As French opposition to absolutism surfaced after 1 715, it became pert!nent to consider the reasons for England's freedom at home and strength in world affairsP But it was not England alone which was used by eighteenth-century writers to put France in perspective. Perhaps the most striking, and cer tainly one of the most famous , national assessments is contained in Mon tesquieu's Persian Letters ( 172 1 ). Su pposedly written by two Persian trav elers , the book mocks the re ign o f Louis XIV, makes fun of Parisian civilization, repeatedly com pares Christianity with Islam, and satirizes Roman Catholic doctrine. It was a vigorous, iconoclastic satire which
TOWARD THE NATION-STATE: FRANCE
343
refl ected the relief felt at the easing of royal autocracy as well as the fact th at in its seem ingly sec ure position France's nobility felt free to m ake li ght of what most of Europe admired . Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de la Brede et de Montesquieu (1689-17 55) , had i n herite d title, p ro pe r t y , �nd a parliamentar y seat in Bordeaux. He set out to m ake his way in Pa risian society and, des pite the oppo s ition occasioned by the Persian Letters, was elected to the Academie Fran<;aise in 1 728. Subseq u ent travels to Austria, I taly, Hun gary, Germany, and England broadened his education , and o n his re turn to France in 1 73 1 he settled on his estate and devoted himself to wide - ranging studies which eventuated in his Espirit des Lois in 1 748. The book went through thirteen editions in eighteen months . Though its great vogue declined after 1767, ten more edition s a p pe a r ed between 1 75 1 and 1 789. The wor k combined com parative studies with the genre of national evaluation, or what we would call the study of political cul ture. Among its most in fluential ideas was Montes q uieu ' s elaboration of the contrasts among a monarchy based on honor, a despotism based on fear, and a r epub lic based on virtue. These elaborations arose directly from the author's reflection on th e political experience of his time. Republics like H olland or Switzer land are by nature small. They have to give u p all idea of expansion if they want to survive. In some instances, small republics like the Italian cities are afflicted by internal corruption, for the y encourage a free at titude toward the laws which can quick l y turn into licen se. And they face the dilemma of either falling into the hands of an oligarchic nobility or undergoing a popular revolt resulting in dictato rship. When Montes quieu spoke of virtue as the basis of a republic , he referred to a people's capac i ty to choose their representatives an d submit to their wisdom. In republics, political decisions are made by constituted bodies, whose foremost task is to prevent despotism . Monarchies, accordi n g to Montesquieu, also face the problem of despotism. The constituted bodies of their aristocracies are hereditary rather than elected, but a monarchy will be incorruptible only if these bodies obey the laws (that is, if they abide by the principle of honor). Corruption begins when this regard for constitutional law declines. Montesquieu apparently believed that under the conditions of the e igh teenth century, only mixed forms of government were viable. [The problem] could be solved only within the context of the difficult but fruitful compromise between the structures of the nobility, of the citizens, of
sover eig n . u n doubtedly better, the
the judiciary and the
This compromise might take the French
form, or,
English. In the former the constituted bod
ies became intermediaries. In the second, they were the very base of the sep
aration and equilibrium
of the three
powers [legislature, executive,judiciary).
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
344
M on tesquieu described ( Book XI, Chapter 6) this balance of powers. He favored the English constitution but was careful to add that most E u ropean kingdoms e njoy a moderate government because although the prince is invested with legislative and executive functions, he leaves j u dicial authority to his s ubj ects Montesquie u underscored this cautionary com ment w hen he poin ted out ( Book I I I , Cha pter 3) that those favoring democracy had been devoid of virtue in the English civil war, that as a result the government had bee n contin u ally changing, and that finally the pe ople after "undergoing many v iolen t shocks "-had been obliged to return to the monarchical government they had previously de stroyed .28 M ontesquie u s bal anced j ud gment wa s forgotten because o n l y his favorable view o f t h e British constitution w a s generally remem bered.e This favorable assessment was partly incorporated in the Ency clopedie (to which I refer later) and fu rthered Frenc h admiration of a political structure which appeared best suited for the defense of liberty.29 This view of the En glish constitution declined tem porarily during t he Seven Years' War ( 1 756- 1 763) , but the years following the Treaty of Paris witnessed an outpouring of pro-English sentimenf in France. French nobles admired the brilliant role played by English aristocrats in parliament, the limited power of the king, the absence of arbitrary im prisonment, and the balance achieved by the se paration of powers . Philosophers like Claude Helvetius (17 1 5- 1 77 1 ) believed that the Brit ish parliament had the happy effect of associating enlightened men with the conduct o f government. English public affairs were better arranged than the French because t hey were freely discussed in parliament. Many others praised the reconciliation of liberty with order , the respect for property, and the safeguarding of individual rights which provided pro tection against servitude as well as anarchy. To scientists and men of letters, England was the home of Newton and Locke. Voltaire contrasted Descartes, who had to leave France to " philosophize in liberty," with Newton, who lived a tranquil, happy and honored life in a free country. These sanguine appraisals were challenged by conservative critics. To French royalists, the English revolution of 1 688 meant that the peo ple had the right to take the throne away from the king if, for example, he con verted to Catholicism . The Frenchmen who thought this principle conte m ptible and dangerous to neighboring monarchies tended to sup port James II and his heirs . Moreover, England seemed unreliable to them , for no English king could kee p his word under the capricious pressures of parliament. There was the further danger of heresy. A fter the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1 685, French Huguenots .
-
'
·Other admirers of England were less restrained than Montesquieu. Di derot excor iated English commercialism and Voltaire, who had championed English liberty, included a devastating comment on English justice in his Candide.
TOWARD THE NATION-STATE: FRANCE
345
flocked to England, where they we re o fte n com m e rci a l l y successful and be gan to exert their in fluence in English po l itics French Catholics par t icul arl y feared that this influence would affect French domestic affairs , for the H u g u enot ref u gees retained many ties in France. These fears were intensified when English supporters of the dethroned James fled to France and recounted cases of English insubordination and irreligion. J ust as England harbored French Protestants, so France became a haven for Engli sh Catholics (J acobite s). f French apprehension s conce rnin g En gland's commercialism and representative institutions increased d u ring the decades follo w ing the death of Louis XIV. A s u p p osed anglophile l ike the Abbe Leblanc thought the En glish political system was fall i ng a part because of the con fli c t i ng private interests to which it wa s subjected. A jou rnal spo n sored by the m a rqu i s de Mirabea u asserted in the 1 7 60 s that the Englis h con stitution e nc o u ra ged c o nstan t civil w a r be twe en l a n d e d p rop r ietors and ca pital i s t s . At an earlie r time, the m arquis d'Arge nson ( 1694- 1757) had commented that the English were incapable of putting t h e p u bl ic good be fore their petty p rivate interests, a ra ther ty pi c a l judgme n t that was often contrasted to the legendary pu bl ic virtues of the Romans. The a bu s e s o f Engl ish politics were vigo rou s l y denounced, s uch a s t he cor ru p tio n of pa rl i a men t , the divi s ive ness of pol itic a l part ies , dipl om atic d upli c i t y mercantile i mperialism, and moral corruption. French con servatives were not alone in m aki n g the s e j u dg m ents The En glis h Tory Lord Bolingbroke lived in France from 1715 to 1723 an d from 1735 to 175 1. To m an y, he was a n enlightened philoso pher in the age of reason. But in his po l itics, Bolingbroke longed for the days of untrammeled royal a u t h o rity , wh e n the Engl ish constitution had not been u n dermined by corruption and party strife. Like Le bl a nc or d' Argenson, Bo l i n gbroke believed that the Englis h constitutional system m ilitated a ga i nst patri o'tism by e nco u raging parties , and that in this res pect the French system was supe rior. In the ju d gment of Derek Jarrett, " For every Frenchm a n who saw Englan d through the admiring eyes of a Voltaire or a Mon tesquieu, t here were p robably four or five wh o knew it from the soured .
,
.
recriminations of exiled Jacobites. "3o The critical view of English institutions receive d a dditio nal i m pulse s from French assessments of England's colonies in North America.31 Early in the eighteenth ce ntury, some note had be e n taken of the B ritish colonies, both favorable and unfavorable. America was a new and prim itive land, with the In d i a ns considered as "good sa vages by some and as an infe r ior breed by others . The American climate was be l ie ved un fa vora b l e to human life . Attractive only to settlers motivated by avarice
"
lj a cobites
ar e the Catholic followers of J ames II and his descendants and should not
be confused with the
Jacobins
of the French revolution.
TOWARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE
(an obvious defamation of the B ritish colonists) , the country was thought incapable of producing any notable cultural achievement. The Dutch writer De Pauw, publishing in French i n 1768, considered the discovery of America the most im portant and disastrous event in the history o f civilizatio n . H is idea of the degeneration of man i n the New World has its place in the history of evolution ist thought, and it was in fluenced by his sojourn at the Prussian co urt, which actively disco uraged em igratio n . But h e obviously appealed t o French royalists with his declaration that a second catastrophe like the discovery o f Ame rica would brin g mankind to extinction. In the conservative view, the American rebellion against the legiti m ate sovere ign was de plorable and the prospect conseque ntly dark. Appealing to these sentiments, Simon Linguet predicted that the colo n ies would soon be divided by factional struggles and dege nerate into a despotism ruled by petty local tyrants . Disorder would increase as vices were magn ified by a horde of restless emigrants from Europe. There was also the possibility that America's wealth and power would grow. Both prospects were threatening to Euro pean civilization. Fostered by news from America transmitted by the English press, a number of French writers elaborated an anti-American ideology. The abbe Mably expressed serious doubts about the wisdom of the common man and the prospects of American democracy ( 1784). Other writers q uestioned the pa t r iotism of Americans during the war of independence and poin ted out that 700,000 slaves lived in that land of liberty. Also, a large n umber o f com plaints arose from businessmen e ngaged in French-American trade and from unsuccessful ventu res of emigration to America. These and related argu ments appealed to French conservatives, who were made uneasy by an alliance with an America demanding independence. But there were counterarguments a ppealing to liberal sentiments, and for a time these came to dominate French o pinion. Some French writers had noted the accomplishments of the Quakers in Pennsylvania toward the end of the seventeenth century. One writer remarked that in New Jersey there were no lawyers, doctors, or theologians, which seemed a very good thing to French critics of their own country. These pamphlets were addressed to French Huguenots in order to encourage their emigration to America. Similar ideas were included in several ar ticles of the Encyclopedie , which noted the principles of religious tolera tion and enligh tened govern ment in the colonies. Following the Treaty of Paris of 1763, interest in America gradually increased. A number of American artists and scientists visited France. W hen Benjamin Franklin came to Paris (1767) as the American colonists' re presentative in London, his scienti fic and political reputation won him ready acclaim.32 With the Declaration of Independence i n 1776, the
TOWARD THE NATION-STATE: FRANCE
3 47
French fad for America turned into widespread enthusiasm. Although the French governmen t was suspicious of American republicanism , even conservative royal officials welcomed the attack on England, which promised to open the A merican market to French trade. In this sense, French conservatives also cham pioned American independe nce. For a time, the French govern ment furnished secret aid and then, i n 1778, joined in a military alliance with the American s and declared war on England Among the F rench public this move was ve ry popular. Re ven ge for the hum i liatio n suffered in 1 763 was one reason ; participation in the war by p ro m inent Fre nch soldiers like La fayette was another. During the war and in the years following, information about the e merg ing nation was s u ppli e d i n increasing quantity, with French writers is suing books on America and newspapers devoting considera b le space to reports on American a ffairs, incl u ding copious translations of con temporary American writers and documents. In this setting, Franklin became a pi votal figure, skillfully e x ploiti n g the situation and his own popula r ity in a propaganda campaign fayorable to the American cause. As a scientist, moralist, and politician, Franklin p reached the gospel of American prospe rity and progress and personified the ideals of liberty and equality. The cham p ionshi p of American independence soon broadened into the philosophic and political idealization of America. To the leading re p resentatives of the ancien re gi me, France 's alliance with America prob ably appeared as old-fashioned power politics: England was the enemy and here was a chance to defeat it. Once France had joined the Amer ican war of independence, a critical a pp roac h to English institutions be came widely accepted among liberal writers as well.33 TheJoumal ency clopedique noted in 1782 that the prestige of the British constitution diminished as sy m pathy with the American colonies rose. England had not merel y the imperfections to be found in other governments, but a rather large number s pecific to itself. Fiscal impositions and co r ru ption were suffocating Englis h liberty, a point on which Frenchmen of many persuasions could readily agree. At one time, the English parliament had led that nation against the king, but now parliament itself was hostile to the colon i sts a point seemingly confirmed by the list of grievances in the American Declaration of Independence. Thus, the liberties o f En glishmen were defended more energetically and effectively in the col onies than in the mother country, a point of some weight with those Frenchmen who identified themselves with the libertarian e lements of the English constitution . Many arguments were advanced to suppleme�t this position like the right of the colonists to self-taxation which all other Englishmen enjoyed, or the o ppressiveness of English colonial trade. These and related spec ifics were probably overshadowed by nationalist .
,
,
,
TOWARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
sentiments in which most Fre nchmen could j oin even though they dif fered in other respects. After all, France had been defeated by B ritain in the Seven Years' War. France ' s participation in the American war of independence opened a pandora's box of liberal sentiment. Enth usiasm co uld be o penly ex pressed for the l i be rty , equality, and constitutionalism of America, and by pr a ising America an d co nde mning England, Fre nchmen could attack monarch ical absolutism and demand the thorough re form of their own society without saying so explicitly. Turgot called America the "hope and model of the h uman race . " An anonymo us writer j us tifi ed the war of independence on the ground that England had bro ken the social con tract. B rissot extolled the princ iple that in the American re public all power emanates from the people . Diderot called America "an asylum from fan aticism and tyranny ." Man dril lon praised the spirit of tolerance and emphasized the political maturity of the Americans . America was transformed imaginatively from a n umber of En glish colonies over throwing British political and econom ic domination into a symbol of an entire people opposing the tyranny of absolute power, assertin-g the in alienable rights o f man. Transferred to France, the pragmatic realities of En glish settlers in America became the ideal qualities of a popular revolution. At the same time, American politic al literature was published e x tensively in France. The basic constitutional doc uments elicited wide interest and demonstrated tha t " American li be rty" had specific content: representative governmen t , religious toleration, trial by jury, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press. A num be r of cultural features were associated with t hese spec ifically political ideas . Franklin made a great impression with his estimate that the population was doubling every twenty - five years. America was an a gricultural society in which people lived a peaceful , happy life. Liberty was made secure by t he equal distribu tion of landed property and the absence of great wealth. At the same time, prosperity was in evidence, though there was the danger that luxury would lead to corruption and inequality. Since the standard of living of the American farmer was m uch higher than that of the French peasant, some writers saw evidence for their advocacy o f a free agricultural economy, while others saw their belie f confirmed that l i be rty and enlightened legislation produced eco nomic prosperity. America provided evidence that through reason and e x perience men could attain material well-being and freedom from su perstition . French writers on America em p hasized the scientific, artistic, and educational achievements of the country. Franklin, Jefferson , and the other "founding fathers " made it seem that the ideal of a society governed by philosophers was realized at last. The hope that the arts and sciences could flourish without the corruptions of an aristocratic
TOWARD THE NATION-STATE: FRANCE
349
a nd urban society was inspi red by the image of a high civiliz ation emerg in g from a rustic setting at the edge of the wilderness. To many Frenchme n of the 1 770s and 1 780s, America had become the promised land in w h ich m an's power to create an ideal society was man i fest. Basic philosophical doctrines together with French aspirations in public affairs were projected onto a scene that was distant enough to sustain a myth and real enough to lend it credence. Many literary works together with much social and political writing seemed to co n fi r m that the Americans were do ing what John Locke had taught to his many French disciples This symbolic representation of America could encom pass a conservative and a progressive vision. In h is Letters from an Amer ican Farmer (1782-1784), de Crevecoeur proclaimed that in America men were making a new start, combining the sciences of a modern na tion with the simplicity and virtue of a rural society. I n 1 786 the marquis de Condorcet published an essay, "L' Influence de la revolution de l Amerique sur l'Europe, " w h ich stated that America had provided a singular object-lesson to E u rope. Men can exercise their rights only when prejudice and ignorance are destroyed ; people can achieve hap piness only where wealth is distributed equally. Both conditions were approximated in America, thus demonstrating t hat the rights of man are a practical possibility rather than merely philosophic s peculation . In the 1770s and 1 780s texts o f American state constitutions, bills o f rights, and eventually the new federal constitution became available in France. In this way, the earlier equ ation between virtue and enlightenment (as Crevecoeur described it) was given political significance i n a program of popular sovereignty, rep resentative government, and the guarantee of individual rights. In t h e early eighteenth century, French noblemen had admired En gland because its aris tocracy had acquired dominant political influ ence. French men of letters had idealized the division and balance of powers that had been achieved among the three branches of govern ment. By the 1 770s, attention shifted to the American struggle for in dependence, and writers like Turgot, Raynal, and others accompanied that struggle with a stream o f encouraging and cautionary letters and pam phlets. In 1 784 news reached France of a Society of Cincinnatus which had been created u nder the sponsorship of General Washington in order to perpetuate the military tradition of the revolutionary war and to constitute the o fficers and their descendants as an hereditary brotherhood. Franklin and his friends in Paris saw in this development the danger of a new aristocracy in the making. They suggested to the comte de Miraheau that he com pose a pam phlet attacking the Society of Cincinnatus and its spo nsors, General Washington and the marquis de Lafayette. Both men were prominent Freemasons, as were Franklin .
'
TOWARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE and m a n y m e m bers of his circle. Washi n gton withdrew h is s u p port o f Society (e ve n be fore the pam p h l e t was published), and the Soc iety
the
in turn d eleted from its by laws the clause concer n i n g hereditary mem
bers h ip. Still, here was a pamphlet by a Fre nch noble directed a gainst
t he d a n ge rs o f here d i tary n obility in America. Promin e nt aristoc rats a n d
F reemason s like t h e d uc d'Orleans, t h e marquis d e Lafayette, the Noailles fa m ily, the La Roc he foucau lds, the Bou i l lon s, a n d others joi ned in this
attack on their own posi tio n. I turn now to the nobility and m e n o f lette rs in
Fre nch
se ntiments.
soc iety who
helped
to
pro mote
such
prerevo l u t io n ary
WRITERS, PARLEMENTAIRES, AND FREEMA SONS Tocq uev ille states in
The OLd Regime and the RevoLution
t ha t Fre nch
society in the eighteenth century prese n te d a spectac le of "many abs urd and
u njus t
privil ege s " of "m a n y r idic ul o us, ramshackle i nstitutions," ,
which no one had atte m pted to harmon ize or
ada pt to
new
n ee d �
.
Faced
with t h is spectacle, t he philosophes or men of lette rs came to "loathe every
that savored of the past ," t h i n kin g that "what was wanted was to re p lac e the com plex o f traditional customs govern i ng the soc ial order
t hi n g
of the day by sim ple, e le mentary rules derivi n g fro m the exercise
of t he he de rules" hel pe d to turn diffuse
hum an reaso n and natural law."34 Tocqueville was r ight whe n
clared that these "simple and ele m e n t a r y d isc o n te n ts i n to a soc ial and political force.
Pre re volutionary France con
tained the classic example o f a n intelligelllsia a s defined b y
Webster's
DictionGrj (1961): a "cl ass of well-ed ucated articulate persons co n st ituti n g a d istir.ct , reco gn ized , and sel f-conscious soc ial stratum within a nation and c l a i m in g or assumin g fo r itse l f th e g u i din g role. " The m ost suc cessful p hiloso p h e s o f the e ightee nth celll u ry de fe nded pro perty and disti n c tions of social ran k and were q u i te eage r to be acce pted by h igh soc ie t y Yet they espoused the princi ple of Reason, and their ideas came to infhence members of the French n ob i lit y Revolutions occur more read i ly when ru li n g groups within a society begin Lo embrace views that conflict with the rationale of their own exis tence. Tocque v ille states that the Fre nch nobi lity engaged in the "de lightful game" of ligh the arte d l y talking about the "absurdity" of all the old French customs, while clinging to their immunities and privileges.3s How was this possible? Under the reign of Louis X IV, the French no bility had been excluded fro m p artic i pa tio n in public life, and Tocq ue ville felt that this e xclusion contributed to the spread of rationalist ideas among the nobility. Yet conditions changed after the death of Louis X I V in 1715. The parlements of France played a rather active role i n pu bl ic life between that date and the outbreak of the revolution in 1789. The agitation by t he members of p arle m e n ts (parlementaires or noblesse de robe) .
.
TOWARD THE NATION-STATE: FRANCE
351
ce ntered on the defense o f t heir privileges. B ut members of the nob i l ity and espe cia ll y the parlementaires were qui te prepared to clothe the de fense of privilege in the rhetoric of h umanity, even a pa r t from the in divid ual noble who actually pu t a co nception o f social res pon sib ilit y above his private concerns. This pote nti al for a coalescence o f views be tween the philosophes and the nobility hel ped to create a c li m a te of opinion favorable to the revol ution. The following discussion considers French men o f lette rs as a social group, the growth of opposition to royal government (especially among the noblesse de robe) , and one in stanc e of coalescence between w riters and nobility in t he gatherings of the Freemasons. French writers of the eigh teenth century came to form a social group as men of letters and as an oppositional van guard. They were sensitive to the fate of their country, aware of what went on elsewhere, and capable of formulating ideas that appealed to an increasing number of readers. They were versed in many fields rather than specialists in any one. Voltaire wrote that their philosophical spirit, their "searching and purified reason ... has greatly contributed to instructing and refin ing the nation ."36 Yet s uch a sense of importance was only gradually established. In 1 726 Voltaire was beaten up by hired t h u gs He had of fended the chevalier Rohan-Chabot and was sent to the Bastille for dar ing to seek revenge. In 1734 Voltaire noted the lowly position of writers in France in pointed contrast to the consideration they received in En gland . But by the 1 770s, an E nglish observer wrote that French men of letters "have considerable weight on the manners and sentiments of peo ple o f rank, of the public in general, and consequently are not without e ffect on the measures of government."37 In 1 778, after an absence o f .
twenty-eight years, Voltaire retu rned to Paris in trium p h (from his home
in Ferney on the Swiss border) and was treated with adulation at the Academie, at the Comedie Fran.;;a ise, and in the streets. Voltaire's case was unus ual, but not unique. Between the 1720s and the 1 770s, prom inent French writers had acquired social recognition, a certain notoriety, and a sense of im portance, despite the economic insecurity of many in dividual authors. Two conditions hel p account for this transformation: one is the im provement in the social and economic position of some writers; t he other is the contin uation of reli gi ous controversy. The transition from the writer's de pendence on private patronage to the development of a m arketplace for literature was a general phe nomenon of the period. In 1 760 O liver Goldsmith wrote that the man of letters could bravely assert the dignity of independence. This state ment applied more fully to England than to France, where the larger reading public was offset by the absence of an international copyright agreement which meant that m any French books were published abroad
3 52
TOWARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE
Philosophers Dining
The leading philosophers of the Enlighte n ment are pictured at d i n ner; among them are Voltaire (with hand raised) and the two editors of the Encyclopedie, Diderot (at Voltaire's
left) and d 'Alembert (left foreground). Bold and witty con versation was a lmost as i m portant a part of eighteenth-cen tury sociabilit y and culture as the written word. (Bibliotheque Nation
ale)
without compensation to the authors . Writers for the theatre were in a better financial position if their plays were really successful. B ut success was sporadic. Many prominent writers still depended on private pa trons; others had inherited property and did not wholly depend on in come from their writings. The copyright laws favored publishers rather than writers until the late 1 770s, though for prominent men of letters that legal disadvantage was made up by their increasing acce ptance in the circles of high society. Th us, the economic and social position of well-known writers improved, especially in the last decades of t he cen tury, though as a whole the profession of writing remained economically insecure, Religious controversy contributed to the writer's insecurity as well as to his sense of im portance. France s uffered from wars o f religion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centudes and from religious controversy in the eighteenth, The revocation of the Edict of Nantes ( 1685) was fol lowed by a royal declaration of 1724 which further strengthened p u -
TOWARD THE NATION-STATE: FRANCE
353
nitive measures agains t Huguenots who remained in France. The mon a rchy fully supported the Catholic church, and the church sou ght to monopolize the control o f religious beliefs. Furthermore , the church im posed its interpretation of philosoph y and history against all attempts to espouse the cause of science and reason. The church held firmly to the position of religious uniformity, which req u ired that the secular powe r must interve ne when an individual deviated from orthodox be lie f. In practice, the government did not go as far as the church desired, but in a few spectacular cases its persecution of Huguenots went far indeed and left an indelible im pression of utter intolerance. Church au thorities condemned various writings, and the Sorbonne faculty of the ology ex pounded the religious duties of secula r govern ment. All man uscripts had to be approved by the censor; even with a pproval, however, the author still ran the danger o f his book's suppression or proceedings against his person if o n publication the book aroused the hostility of the university or the parle ment. I n practice, many uncensored books were published in, or sm uggled into, France. But cen sorship exacerbated the condition of writers already beset with economic insecurity, at the same time that it made even mediocre write rs notorious for their defiance of authority.3s H igh society had treated writers with utter contem pt in the seven teenth centu ry, but Voltaire's experience with hired th ugs ( 1 726) was one of the last instances of this kind. As the writer's social and economic condition im proved, the i ntolerance and censorship by church and gov ernment were freque nt sources of both irritation and the sense that writing really mattered. The relation between men of letters and the leaders of society became a favorite theme of philosophical reflection, which m irrored the old fear of impotence and the new feeling of im portance. At one point, Diderot speaks of philosophy as the opium o f the passions, suggesting a painful aware ness of the discrepancy between the idea of Reason and political reality . A certai n tension developed be tween literati and activists over the relative em phasis on style and prop aganda. Since he favored high literary quality, Voltaire voiced his skep ticism to the two editors o f the famous Encyclopedie. g He addressed them occasionally as "Atlas and Hercules who carry the world on their shoulCfhe
Encyclopedie,
ou
Dictionnaire raisonne des sciences, des arts, et des metiers
began pub
lication in 1751 under the editorship of the philosopher Denis Diderot and the mathe matician d ' A lembert The widespread distribution of the
Encyclopedie
should be noted.
Estimates put it at 15,000 co pies between 175 1 and 1789. The various editions ranged
from 17 to 36 volumes of text and 3 to 11 vol u mes of plates. Eve n 15,000 copies of the whole work would come to betwee n 255,000 and 540,000 vol u mes of text and between
45,000 and 165,000 volumes of plates. The Encyclopedie was sold all over France and its reade rs consisted not only of the literary elite, but of the lawye rs, doctors, and other professiona ls in the provinces who later made thei r literary a nd revolutiona ry careers i n Paris. I am indebted t o Professor Robert Da rnton o f Princeton University for information on this point.
354
TO WARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE
ders, the De partment for the instruction of mankind. "39 As Robert Darnton has show n , the familiar figures of the Enlightenment were an elite. I n their view taste belonged "to a very small n umber of privileged souls . . . . It is u nknown in bo urgeois families, where one is constantly occupied with the care of one's fortunes. " Yet a host of lesser w riters flocked to Paris in the wake of these famous men. Desiring to make their fortune, they were often forced to eke out an existence by hack work, and these declasse men of letters were instru mental in tu rning the main ideas of the Enlightenment into a revolutionary ideology . 40 The suc cessful writers, on the other hand, cultivated their contacts with the no bility in fashionable salons and the othe r meeting places of high society. If the ancien regime allowed the moderate expression of libertarian ideas (or did not succeed in suppressing them and their debased ve rsions in the form of political diatribes and much obscenity), this was due in part to the prominent nobles who embraced and protected the philos ophy o f humanity. In the eighteenth century, Paris boasted a fashionable society in which brilliant writers gave expression to myriad discontents and were a pplauded and rewarded for their e fforts. Discontents had built u p dur ing the reign of Louis XIV and, as Tocqueville pointed out, were trans formed rather than allayed by the renewed prosperity of the coun try during the eighteenth century. For as· conditions improved, pressu res increased to oppose the onerous effects of a regime wh ich claimed to govern the country but in practice left m uch provincial and local rule in the hands of those who made a comfortable livin g from the financial ex ploitation of officeholding. Opposition was rife among nobles who resented the abrogation o f their political rights . Entre preneurs and fi nanciers resen ted the arbitrary and secretive handli n g of state debts because this often resulted in major financial losses for them. Many bourgeois officials and j udges developed a critical attitude toward the royal edicts which they themselves were obliged to im plement. Finally, some 400,000 Huguenot re fugees had left France following the revo cation of the Edict of Nantes ( 1 685) , and these Frenchmen abroad formed clubs and propaganda centers favoring a constitutional monarchy. By the middle of the eighteenth century, all these gro u ps provided a ready audience for men of letters who "wished to replace traditional customs . . . by elementary rules derivin g from the exercise of reason" (Tocqueville). These intellectual leaders a ppealed to many gro u ps . B ut they acquired a special resonance by virtue of the disaffection spreading in the circles of high society. The old regime was weakened by the dis loyalty of its leading strata long be fore the revolution of 1 789. Courtiers and other aristocratic men of affairs met with writers in the salons and literary clubs organized by ladies of fashion, in various academies, a nd
TO WARD THE NATION-STA TE: FRANCE
355
even in the popular gatherings of occult science. This ideological acti vation of the nobili ty can be understood by noting the increasing par tici pation of the parle mentaires i n p ublic affairs . Louis X I V had begun h i s e ffective rule i n 1 66 1 by silencing the Paris p arI ement in the m atter of re gis t er i n g ro yal edi c ts Th e reaft er t h e k ing red uced parIeme n ts' rights of registerin g ro yal edicts and of re mon strance to an em p t y formality . A fter the kin g's death , however, the situation changed abru ptly. Goubert states that "every parl e m ent in the real m was to s pen d the eighteenth ce ntury gett ing its re ve n ge for fifty years of c apti v ity 4 1 I n his wi l l, Lou is X I V had lim ited the powers o f Phili p o f Orlea ns , the regent during the minority of Louis XV ( 1 7 1 5- 1 723). The Paris parlement set aside the late ki n g s will in return for the regent's rec ognition of the parlement's right of remonstrance. B ut the regent then opposed the use of t hat right. From 1 7 1 6 to 1 720, the Scotsman Joh n Law was financial advisor to Philip of Orlea n s. Law aroused the oppo sition of parlement w hen he repudiated financial claims arising from the War of the S pan i s h Succession, devalued the currency, and put war contractors on trial for mal practice. This opposition took the usual form of a remonstrance to which the regent responded in the customary fash ion by meet i ng with the parIement ( lit de j ustice, 1 7 1 8), personally pro hibiting the remonstrance, and, when opposed, sending the parlemen taires into exile from Paris . Law remained in fa vo r until his schemes collapsed in 1 720, when he had to flee into exile w hile the Paris parle ment returned. A second aspect of the struggle between the Paris parlement and the French monarchy concerned religious issues. The Frenc h Catholic ch u rch and the papacy had been engaged i n intermittent controversy over the relation between royal and papal powers since the thirteenth century. The general tendency of the French c hurch had been to sup port the French kings' authority over ecclesiastical appointments and to accept papal teaching as infallible provided it was a pproved by a council of the whole church (Gallicanism ). This position was never accepted by the pa pacy, but it became the quasi-official postu re of the French church, though some French Catholics, especially the Jesuits, bitterly opposed Gallicanism . In addition, Jansenism became associated with this intra-Catholic struggle d uring the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Jansenism was a nonorthodox, Catholic religious movement, initi ated by the Flemish theologian Cornelius Jansen ( 1 585 - 1 638), who ex alted the all-powerful character of grace made available by Christ the Redeemer. This traditional Catholic doctrine a p peared suspect in the eyes of the Jesuits, partic ularly by its em phasis on the inviolable rights of individual conscience . The papal bull Unigenitus ( 1 7 1 3) condemned a Jansenist devotional work and the idea that Bible reading was a reli.
."
'
,
TOWARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE
gio us duty of l a ym e n . In his last year, Louis X I V enforced registration of th i s bull as a royal edict b y the Pa r is parlement. The parlementaires may not have been Janse n i sts themselves, but their Gal l ic a n ho s t i li t y to the in fluence of Rome was o utspoken. In 1 7 1 4 the Paris pa rIeme n t de clared i ts o ppo si ti on to Unigenitus . I n 1 720 the parle me n t secu red the c ro w n s a greement to mod i fy the bull a n d bring i t in l i n e with Gallican p r i n c i p les I n 1 730/3 1 p a r l e me n t defi ned Gallican princ i ples in intran sige n t te rm s, defyi ng Card i nal Fle u ry's attem pt to silence the parIe me n ta i res. And i n 1 752 t h e con flict flared up again when the arch b i s h o p o f Paris, a stro n g p ar t i s an of the pa pal positio n , o rdered h i s c l er gy to re fuse the last sac raments to all pe rsons sus pected of Jansenis m . I n res ponse, the parlement forbade any priest to re fuse the sacraments on such gro u n d s and in 1 753 added the Grand Re monstrance , which de man ded t ha t t he ki n g should not exercise h is authority in an unrestricted man ner." Louis XV ( 1 7 1 5- 1 7 74) rejected the remonstrance, pa rle ment de clared a judicial strike , and the magistrates were ordered into exile. But two years later they returned, having largely won their point. By 1 764 the Gallican parlementaires had won a clear victory with the expulsion of the Jesuits from F rance 4 2 A third aspect o f this rising o pposition b y the Paris parlement, and the p ro vi ncial parle ments a l l ied w i t h it, involved the pe re n n i a l t a x issue. The century witnessed many projects for financial reform which mis carried because of o p po s ition by the parlements. The struggle over the vingti'eme is a case in point. In 1 749 th e finance minister Machault had p roposed that t hi s tax on income be im posed on all p ro p rie tors . The p a r leme nt s i n it i at e d o p p o s i tio n and were jo i ned b y the clergy, who suc ceede d in o b t a i n i n g exe m pt io n from the tax for church property. This precedent was quickly taken up by others, and be fore long the vingtieme was so riddled with exemptions that it became little more than still an other tax on the unfortunate peasantry.43 The argument over taxation, old though it was, received a new i m petus from the Seven Years' War. The French defeat in the Treaty of Paris ( 1 763) was made still more galling by the huge debts of the govern ment, and it was popular to make a scapegoat of the financiers with their exorbitant profits and high in terest rates . In fact, corporations of every kind, many wealthy people, and even the king himself had lent money to the government during the war. But in 1 763 the pam phleteers of the parlements launched the attack on "the financiers," j ust as the Paris parlement was forced to reg ister two new tax edicts. It should be noted that this renewed agitation coincided with the final controversy leading to the expulsion of the J es uit order. These e x a m pl es suggest that b y the middle of the eighteenth cen tury, the pa rle m ent a i res were partici pating i n p u b lic life. Indeed, in the Grand Remonstrance of 1 75 3 the Paris parlement advanced a consti'
.
"
.
TOWARD THE NATION-STATE: FRANCE
357
tutional view of the monarchy. I ts declaration that "if s ubjects owe obe dience to kings kings for their part owe obedience to laws" came close to the idea of contract between the king and the people previously ar ticulated by the English parliament in 1688. To be sure, the parlements remained primarily co urts of law ; therefore, the starting point o f their agitation was the seemingly innocuo us one of wishing to preserve the integrity and contin u ity of the laws. The parlements were the o fficially recognized depositories of all laws; but repeated insistence that the parlements must verify all new enactments on behalf of the nation tended to transform the custodial functions of the parlements into the claim that some dozen parlements were as one body defending the rights of the nation . Local conflicts between the crown and a parlement, and particularly the re peated conflicts involving the parlement o f Paris, came to be interpreted as ma t ters of princi ple involving the whole c
Prote s ting agai nst moderniza tion of pro pe rty assessments, they had banded together in a union des c lasses, or a super-parlement claim ing to be re presen tative of the whole kingdo m . On the one hand, a royalist pamphleteer de nounced the pa rle m e nts as a "monstrous hereditary aristocracy" . On the other hand, the pa rl e m en ts , as early as the 1 7 60' s, put a good deal of incipienl
revolution a ry
language into wide circulation--citoyen, loi, patrie, constitution,
nation, droit de La nation, cri de La nation . It seems likely that the parlements
had more p os i tiv e influence
than the philosophes, es pecially among lawye rs
and othe r makers of public opi nion, to whom they s po ke out as weig hty and
reputable bodies in Paris and a dozen provincial capi tals.
In this way, the effort to preserve the law gradually blended with Mon tesquieu's i dea of the corps intermedio,ires, the i n termediary powers be tween the king and the countr y which had the right and duty of rep resenting the people as a whole . It remains true, however that the pa rlementai res were engaged in an excess of rhe tor ic when they used the language of the philosophes in d esc ri bing what was primarily a de fense of their own ves ted inte rests 4 4 The parIementaires were the most politically active segment of the French nobility and we re perhaps most influential among lawye rs and other makers of public o pinion." At the same time, there is evidence that the philosophes with their rational and humanitarian ideals, ex erted considerable influence on other segments of the nobility and o n wealthy commoners. This i s the reason why I conclude this part of the discussion with some attention to F reemasonry The idea that the Free masons were at the heart of a conspiracy leading to the revolution against the ancien regi me must be attributed to the myths of a plot which proliferated during and after the French revolution The only relation ship between Freemasons and the revolution worth taking seriously is an indirect one. As J. M. Roberts observes ,
,
.
"
,
.
.
,
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE [ t h e Fre e m ason s ] can hardly h ave failed to contribute to the short-lived at mosphere of p h i l a n t h ropic. libertarian , egalitarian a n d con s t i t ution al pro gressi veness w h ich i n s pired m u c h o f the early work of the N a t ional Assem bly . They n o doubt served t o ge nera lize a n d d i sse mi n a te t h e basic i deal s o f the h u m a n itaria n el ite of eighteen th-ce n tury France . ' 5
M y d iscussion o f the s pread o f e n l i gh te ned ideas b y t h e Freemasons am o n g the r u l i n g groups o f Fre nc h society is meant i n this sense. Free m asonr y h ad be gun in E n gland i n the late seventeenth ce ntury and was i n trod uced in France in the 1 7 30s by noble Scotch re fugees loyal to t he H o use o f Stuart. Masonic meetings became a gen e r a l ly ac c e pte d setting fo r the enco u n te r between writers and leaders of Frenc h society, who ranged from t h e hi gh e st ran ks o f the no b il i t y down to wel l to-do merchan ts and craftsmen of some sta n d i n g in their local com munities. Members of the Fre nc h clergy also e ntere d the order in con siderable numbers, though the church disa pproved and m uch hostility existed at the parish level. Membership in the order allowed all t hese
men to meet and enjoy one another's fellowship free from religious or political controversy and without challenging the social and political or der. As men all Masons were equal. Through its social structure as a secret and hierarchical society and through its humanistic a ppeals, Free masonry combined the ideals of liberty, equality. and fraternity in a France of little liberty. much inequality. and bitter class antagonisms. There are several clues to the paradox that an organization attrac tive to nobles would nevertheless sponsor ideals of equality . The order made a deliberate effort to attract members of the nobility. putting them at the head o f its lodges and having them lead its p rocessions and pa rades. From the standpoint of the order. noblemen could give valued financial and political support; and through their prestige and personal authority they could dam pen the fires of controversy within the order. From the stand point of the nobility, Freemasonry was attractive because it provided an acce pted form of escaping the artificialities of high society and the burden of a ffairs. There seemed nothing suspicious about an organization that engaged in a mixture of drinking. singing. lectures. philanthropy, religion without orthodoxy, benevolence. vague mysti ci sm. and a brotherhood that allowed the noble to enjoy his superior status anyway. The Freemasons were a secret society only in the sense that on en tering each member had to swear a solemn oath to kee p t he secrets of Masonry. Violators of the oath were threatened by extreme penalties which were almost certainly symbolic. The detailing of these penalties in the oath presumably expressed the social pressure to which the in divid ual exposed hi mself if he violated his commitment.46 On the other hand. membership in the order was o penly declared. The oath of se crecy m ade the order suspect. and Freemasonry took special care to as-
TOWARD THE NATION-STATE: FRANCE
359
sure the authorities of its religious and political probity. The Masonic order stood for science, and in the. early eigh teenth century that meant Newtonian physics. Newton himself was a devout Christian, but as a Protestant he was hardly reassuring to French Catholics. Moreover, En glish Freemasonry had been founded by a disci ple of Newton's, Joh n Theophilus Desaguliers ( 1 683- 1 744), a Frenc h H u gu enot whose fam ily had fled to E n gland after 1 6 85. These were damaging associations, and although in France the Catholic ch u rch did not prohibit the order, the Masonic a tti tude toward religion was a critical issue. Desaguliers formulated that attitude by expounding Newton's the ories to Christian laymen . Newton had reduced i n n u merable and con tradictory phenomena to a single doctrine and explained the mysterious movement of the heavenly bodies and of all other bodies by a unive rsal law . Desaguliers' God, like Newton's, appealed to the m ind rather than the heart, substituting observations of nature and experiments for di vine revelation. Under Desaguliers' i nfluence, the M asonic constitution incorporated what we would call an ecumenical a pproach to religion : A Maso n is obl i ge d , by h i s Te n u re, to obey the moral Law .
.
.
.
B u t though
in ancie n t Times Masons were c har g d in e very Coun try to be of the reli gion '
of that Coun try and Natio n , w h a teve r it was , yet t i s now thought more ex '
pedien t only to oblige them to that Religion in which all Men a gree, leavi n g t heir pa rticu lar O pi nion t o themse lve s ; t o b e good Men and true o r M e n o f Honour a n d Honesty, b y w hatever De nomin ations or Pe rsuasions they may be distinguis h' d ; whereby Ma so n ry becomes the Center of Union, and the
Means o f co nciliating true Frie nds h i p among Pe rso n s t h a t m ust e lse have rem ain'd at a per pe tual DistanceY
Masonry thus constituted itself as an institution capable of working for the social and mental unity of mankind. Under the influence of a s pir itualized interpretation of Newtonian science, the Masons abandoned revelation and dogmas as well as the earlier subordination of all private association to the prevailing religious dispensation . The Masonic attitude toward the state was similar. All initiates were enjoined to obey the moral law and civil authority. I n England, the order was sponsored by the Hanoverian dynasty and loyalty was taken for granted . But in France, w here the order was barely tolerated, failure to pledge loyalty to the king was an act of some defiance. I n t he Masonic pledge o f obedience, references to the civil powe r are very general. The pledge refers to "ancient Kings and Princes" u nder whom Masonry had always suffered war and bloodshed. Nevertheless, anc ient royalty had encouraged the orde r because it was known for its peacefulness and loyalty, and eighteenth-century Freemasonry l ikewise declared its peace ful intentions. The order wanted to be as free of political involvement as it was of organized religion. In the Constitution o f 1723 , the pledge reads as follows:
TO WARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE I f a B rother shou ld be a Rebel aga i n s t t he State, h e is not to be cou n ten anced i n his Rebe l lion , howe ve l" he may be p i t ied as an u n happy m a n ; and i f con victed o f n o other Cri me, t houg h t h e loya l B rotherhood must a n d oug h t to d isow n his Re be l l i o n , and give no Umbrage or Gro u n d o f political Jealo u sy [0
the Gove r n m e n t for t h e time be i n g ; th ey c a n n ot e x pe l h i m from the Lod ge , and h i s Rel ation to it re m a i n s i n d e feasible . 4 8
One m a y wonde r w h y t h e Fre nch gove rnme nt, anxious to m a i n t a i n i ts a u t hority, would cou nte na nce suc h trans pa rent re se rvations . Pe rha ps the a nswe r is that the Masons re m a i n ed com ple te l y aloof from p ub l ic
a ffai rs and i nc l uded a m o n g t he i r m e m bers some of
the most d is t i n i n c l u d i n g the k i ng ' s brothe r . Royal officials would ha r d l y proceed aga i n s t such person a l i ties, and one may say t h a t official tole ration of Masonic se crecy was sim ply one more grant of e xe m pt i on to men who enj oye d many such g ra nts alre ad y. T h e rules of the ord er s t i p u l ated t h a t no cand id ate may be asked his religious convictions or political opinions and that discussion of these matters is excluded from all lodge meetings.49 Free from the bonds of the outside world, the Mason is a man among men, engaged jointly with them in the cultivation of mora l i ty. gu is h e d n a m e s of Frenc h soc iety,
Le cri de l a nat u re , am i ,
c ' es t
L i ber te !
Ce d roit si cher a I ' h o m m e est ici respecte. E ga u x sans a n a rchie et l ibres sans license,
Obe i r a nos lois fa i r n otre i n d e pe n d ance . s o
In the seclusion of the lodge meeting, man's r i g h t to freedom is re spected. Here men can be equal without anarchy and free without li cen se, for by following their own laws they have achieved inde pendence. B y acce pting, though not endorsing, such an order, the civil authorities permitted Freemasonry to establish a realm of morality outside of church a nd state . " I n a nation teem i n g with o fficials" the order provided the meeting ground for men who either did not hold posts of any kind or, even if they did, wanted to meet with othe rs "keeping steadily aloof from the political arena ."S 1 This ostensibly non political stance was spurious. Masonic secrets allowed for a critical con frontation be tween morality and politics. just as freedom of expression for writers perm itted a critical assessment of history and religion. 52 In thei r relation to the world, bot h Masons and men of lette rs promoted the ideal of equality but asserted their supe riority over others. For the Masons, the ph ilosophy of humanity was embodied in the human fellowshi p made possible by their secret orga nization and was supported by the distinguished nobles participating in it. For men of lette rs, taste was for the privileged few rather than for those concerned with making a living. Writers like Duclos, Voltaire, and
TOWARD THE NATION-STATE: FRANCE
d'Alembe rt believed that enlightenment should begin with those w hose "superiority of birth and position commands our deference and our re spect."53 Masons and w riters c riticized church and state from this stand poin t of a higher morality. Nobles and men of letters met on an equal footing i n the Masonic lod ges. In France, Freemasonry developed ra pid l y in the 1 770s, the number of lodges increasing from 1 04 in 1 77 2 to over 600 in 1 7 89. Among these, the 65 lodges in Paris were the most i m portant. The phi losophe r and banker Helvetius and the astronomer Lalande hel ped to found the Loge des Neuf Soeurs ( 1 769), whose roster o f partici pants reads like a cross-section of the Frenc h elite. h Benjamin Franklin was elected master of the lodge in 1 779- 1 78 1 . Under h is leadership, the lodge became a center of p ro paganda for h u m anitarian causes, Amer ican independence, and t he ideals o f brotherhood . I n the last year of his life ( 1 77 8 ) , Voltaire was solemnly i nitiated into the Loge des Neuf Soeu rs , sponsored by Franklin and Lalande . The Masonic membe rs and prominent men of lette rs were elitists in terms of their social composition and their aspirations. But in terms of their appeal to fraternity and their philosophy of humanity they were also populists. Ambivalence about elitism and po pulism as well as tacit assumptions about the relations among virtue, ideas, and power are ar chetypical ingredients of an ideology that breaks with tradition . The purs uit of ideas by men of letters sets them apart from ordinary folk. But these men of letters also seek a responsive aud ience i n their own society. They sense thei r isolation and realize the defects or backward ness of their country in com parison with others. The resulting pers pec tive is exacerbated by a sen se of impotence. Men of letters typically do not have access to positio n s of power co mme n s u rate with the i r se n s e of mission and anxiety for their country. Thus, powerlessness is experi enced most acutely just when men of letters develop a group conscious ness. They are confronted with the tragic d iscre pancy between what is and what ought to be, between their political impotence and the signif icance o f ideas in their own lives. I n this setting, it is a great temptation to implicitly attribute to theory, to princi ple, to ideas a potential im pact, a power to move men. For men will seek maste ry where they can find it, and when ideas are their only weapons they will attribute special power to them. hA partial listing includes the scien tists Lalande, Lace pede, Bert helot, and Fou rcroy ; t he fi nanciers and noblemen Bailly, Prince de Ro han, d uc de la Roc hefoucauld , and the marq uis de Condorcet ; the pa rliamen tarians Duval d ' E s p re mesnil and President d u Pat y ; t he ph ilosophers and writers Montesq uieu, d ' A lem be rt, A bbe Sie yes, Cabanis, a n d other im porta n t artists and journal ists; and fi nally later revolutiona ries l i ke Dan ton, Desmo ulins, Brissot, and Raba ut-St. Etien ne.
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
AN EQUALITY OF R I G H TS During the eighteenth century, French society was marked by the paradoxes of absol utism, by a national awareness articulated in part through reflections on Engla nd and America, and by the mobilization of intellectual, social, and political elites. The affirmation of rights and the ideal of equality emerged in each of these contexts. B y re flecting on the En glish and American constitutions, intellectual leaders were en cou raged to adapt a libertarian constitution to their own situation . By their association with the leaders of French society , men of letters helped to catalyze the diffuse disaffection aroused by the ancien regime. Un wittingly, they also encouraged the rad icalization of aspiring literati who flocked to Paris. And , finally, the parlementaires in Paris and the pro vincial capitals became increasingly obstre perous defe nders of their vested interests, using a rhetoric of law, citizenship, and rights of the nation which had more radical implications than were probably intended. The main purpose of this concluding section is to consider equality of rights as the foundation of the mandate of the people. Some of the circumstances of the immediate, prerevolutionary period are crucial for an understanding of these ideas. By 1 783 France had incurred an e nor mous governmental debt d ue to its partici pation in the American strug gle for independence. Drastic tax re forms were proposed to settle the debt, but instead these reforms precipitated the crisis which culminated in the revolution. Royal edicts such as the tax pro posal had to be reg istered and promulgated by the parlement of Paris , but for decades the parlements had opposed royal edicts in defense of their privileges. In the process, they had thwarted m uch-needed administrative and fiscal reforms, while asserting their function as re presentatives of the nation.54 The contest between the parlements and the crown had stirred public opinion, while the rhetoric in which that con test was expressed had aroused expectations of reform . I n 1 787 and 1 7 88 ministers of finance re peatedly attempted to se cure agreement on a tax reform and a new tax on land. These measures were extre mely un popular. Atte m pts to bypass the parlements by ad hoc assemblies of notables proved in vain and provoked considerable popular agitation. By A ugust 1 788 the national exchequer was so de pleted that the finance minister agreed to a convocation of the Estates General, which had not met since 1 6 1 4. In Se ptember the parlement of Paris was called back into session a m id great acclaim. But when the royal decrees convoking the Estates-General were registered, parlement added the stipulation that the electoral provisions of 16 1 4 should be observed. Clergy, nobility, and the Third Estate should meet and vote separately; each estate should have an eq ual n umber of representatives; and the rights of the Third Estate to deliberate should remain limited . This dec laration aro used a storm of protest, and in the ensuing agitation the
TOWARD THE NA TION-STATE: FRANCE
whole struggle was transformed from a contest of the parlement with the monarchy into a struggle o f the Third Estate against clergy, nobility, and the entire royalist re gime. There was a se nse o f betrayal when the parlement, which had stood for decades as a symbol of libe rty against despotism , proved to be what in fact it had always been-an u pholder o f privilege . 5 5 This sense o f be trayal still echoed in the assertions of 1 787- 1 789 that only when the three estates met in the Estates-General as one body could the nation give the necessary consent to the i m position of a permanent tax. Under the rules for the election of the Estates-General, some 40,000 meetings were held to debate the issues. The organization of the elec torate and the extension of the franchise we re at the heart of this debate, and the royal government did its part, however u nwittingly, in mobiliz ing the Third Estate.56 I n the official view, the con vocation of the Es tates-General was a measure o f last resort. But it was i m portant that the govern ment hear grievances, for traditionally the depu ties to the Es tates-General had stated the grievances o f the electors to the king. From a conservative standpoint, it was plausible to think o f the forthcoming elections as an opportu n ity for the people to voice their com plaints and affirm their loyalty to the king who had granted the m this opportunity . l:',
t. ·1
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" 1
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The Three Estates
After an interval of 1 75 years, the Estates General were convened at Versailles on May 4,
1 789. Resisting the old procedure of se parate voting, the Third Estate declared itself the
only true representative of the nation (June 1 7) . Ten days later the king's opposition col lapsed and the Third Estate together with 1 70 clerical deputies and 50 nobles met in a
Constituent Assembly to "hammer out" a new constitution, as shown in this contemporary cartoon. (British Museum)
TOWARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
Recourse to the old p roce d u res could be seen as an appeal to royalist sentiment. It was largely taken for granted that the ge neral po pula t ion w as loyal to t h e kin g . From t h e s t and po in t o f reform , this p ro pose d retu rn to an aban doned insti tu t i on stood for the ac c u m ula t i o n of ills in Frenc h soc iety . By recourse to precedent, the m o na r ch y and the p arlemen t of Paris merely defended their privileges. The revolutionary ideas of the Third Estate as well as the idea of eq u ali t y were formulated in protest ag a inst thi s reco urse to the past . I n 1 7 75 T u rgo t had sta ted to t he king that "the rights of men gathered in society a re not founded on their hist o ry , but i n their nature." In the past, laws were made either out of ignorance or thro u gh com pro m ises w i t h "t he ve r y po we rfu l self-interests of par ties . " The king was not bound by s u c h pre ce d ents, for "there can be no reason to perpetuate es t abl i shm ents whi c h wer e made witho u t reason . " S 7 T u rgot ' s statement sho w s how far a loyal b u t reform-minded membe r of the royal government had come in recognizing history as the embod i m ent of ignoranc e or ill-advised com promise . Opposition to vested in terests s ustained by p re c ed e nt was symboli z ed by the appeal to reason and nature, and from this symbolic contrast emerged the ideal of an equality of righ ts . For t h e men o f the eighteenth ce ntury, p r ivil e ge an d equality were con t radi c tor y ideas. The philosophes based their opposition to privilege on the idea that in their human nature all men are equal. In his article on "natural equality" in the Encyclopedie, t he chevalie r de Jau c ourt re jected the most common m i s i nterpretati on o f that idea : Let no one do me the i nj ustice of su p po s i n g that with a sense of fa naticism
I a p prove i n a stat e t h at c h i mera, abso l u te
equality ,
w h ich cou ld hardly give
birth to a n ideal re public. I am o n l y s peakin g here of the
natural equality
of
m e n . I know too well the n ecessity of d i fferent ranks, grades, honors, dis t i n c tions, prerogatives, s u bo rdi natio n s that m u s t prevai l i n a l l governments. A n d I wou ld even state that
natural
or moral equality a re not co n t rary to this.
[ n the state o f n at u re men a re truly born i n to eq u ality but do not know how to re main so. Society forces them to lose it, and they o n l y become equal again by laws .38
I n practice men are unequal in their gifts and possessions, but let the state not add "an unj ust inequality of rights alongside this actual in equality of means."59 J aucourt's u nderstanding of the term natural equal ity is t hat each person should value and treat others as "naturally equal to h imself." From this he concludes that those who have risen above others should avoid insults to their inferiors, demand nothing beyond what is required, and be humane in demanding what is their due . Men must not claim more than others unless they have acquired a right to preferential treatment. And certain u niversal rights to humanity and
TOWARD THE NA TION-STA TE: FRANCE
justice should be equally e njoyed by all or enjoyed i n some d istributive manner that removes all suspicion of contempt or partiality . I n this d iscussion of equality the initial accent was o n inj u red pride. The pamphlet "What is the Third Estate?" by the Abbe Sieyes is the most re presentative expression of this view. As a cleric, F ree m aso n and active participant in the N ational Asse mbly of 1 7 89 , Sie yes was i n close touch with the prevailing c urrents of o pi n ion. He s ucceeded in putting the belief in a mandate o f the pe o ple in suitable ter m s ; h is principles were those of the revolution in its initial phase . In his pamphlet, Sieyes d rew u p a list of grieva nces which had been provoked by the denial o f status t o the Third Estate. The parlement of Paris had opted for the old proced ures in electing the new Estates-General, but then tried to soften the blow by declarin g in favor of fiscal equality among the three estates. T o Sieyes this seemed to add insult to inj ury, for it served as a rem inder that clergy and nobility had been tax exempt. "We expect you to submit to the common laws, not to offer a token of i nsulting pity for a n order which you have treated mercilessly for so long." If all are to be equal in the field of taxation, why deny to the Third Estate its emerge nce from political i ncapacity? The Third Estate has been excluded from all offices of distinction. I n the payment of taxes, it has bee n discriminated agai n st. I n legal matters, there has been no redress against oppression, for a com moner's lawsuit is regarded as insubord ination . The police are terrified to ac t a ga i n s t a man of privilege, but paupers have been maltreated merely on suspi cion. What of the judicial privileges of the nobility while the members of the Third Estate have s uffered personal humiliations from tax agents and petty officials? How does the nobility j ustify the exclusive privilege of bearing arms? Why do the privileged escape the penalty for the most horrible crimes? And if the y do not, they are first deprived of their title before they are punished. ,
W i t h w hat ridiculous and ferocious co nte m pt do y o u d are t o relegate the c riminal of the first two orders to the third, in order, so you p roclaim, to dewade him and apparently, to re nder h i m , i n such com pan y,
liable
to be
executed ! What would you say i f the legislator, before punishing some scoun d rel o f the Third Estate, proposed to rid h i s ord e r of him by givi n g him leuers-pate n t of nobility.60
In the l ight of such invidious privileges, an offer of fiscal equality ap peared to make matters worse, for it implied that the non privileged peo ple of France cared o nly for money w hile thinking nothing of "liberty, honour or equality before the law." Clearly, Sieyes spoke not for the lower classes on w hom the economic burden of t he syste m fell. He spoke for the lawyers, merchants, and other occu pations of the Third Estate who were moved by a "deeply wounded sel f- respect," by a sense of out-
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE
3 66
PEOPLE
rage at the privile ged orders deli b e r at el y h um i l iati n g m e n of who s po ke for the vast m ajo r ity o f t h e Fr e n c h p eo p l e . 6 1
true
m erit
I n this atmos phere of m o u nti n g e xasperatio n , S ie yes form u lated
the idea of ci t i ze ns h i p by u s i n g the arg u me n t of the pri v i l e ge d in re vers e . What has the Th ird Estate been u n til now? N o th i n g . What
is
the
Th ird Estate ? Everythi n g . In n u m e rical term s, the clergy an d nobi lity
to ge t h e r com prise some 20 0 , 000 i n d i vid uals in a natio n of 25 to 26 m il
lion pe rso n s. I n legal te rms, t he cle rgy h a s rights because it pe rform s a fu ncti o n , b u t the nobility does noth i n g . S i nce t h e privi leged con s u m e w i t h o u t prod uc i n g, the y are an a l i e n element i n
the
nat i o n . Moreover ,
because o f i ts civ i l a n d po litical prerogati ves, t he nobi l ity i s not s ubject
to the co m m o n
a citizen
law s and
t h u s stands a part from the nat io n . The m o m e n t
is granted s pec i a l privilege s ,
he is no l o n ger pa rt o f the common his new i nterest con fl icts w it h t he ge n eral i n terest ; he has beco me i n c om petent to v o te in the n a me o f th e pe o p le. Since the priv i l e ge d man stands outside the nation, he is not entitled to be re pre sented ; only i f he divests hi mse l f o f thi s unj ust u s u rpa tio n can he be re presented a s a citizen. For the righ t to be re presented is enjoyed by all citizens by virtue of what th ey have in common. True, there are many inequalities which divide them, including wealth , ability, age, and sex . But these d o not alter th e eq u a l i ty of citizenship, and the rights in herent in citizenship should not be attached to these differences. It is the com mon interest of citizens which is protected by law, and the law " protects what exists until what exists begins to be harmful to the common
order, fo r
interest. " 6 2
Here Sieyes's attack on privilege merges with the idea of po pu l a r s o v ereignt y wh ich Diderot had formulated s uccinctly i n his article on political authority ( 1 75 1 ) - t e n years be fore Ro usseau's Social Contract . No m a n has received fro m n at u re the right to com m a n d others. Liberty is a gift from heave n , a n d each i n d i v i d ual of t he same s pecies has t h e right to enjoy i t as soon a s he e njoys the use of reaso n . If n a t u re has establis hed any au thority , it is paternal contro l ; but pate rnal con t rol has its l i m its, and i n the
state o f n a t u re i t would te rmin ate when the ch ild re n co uld tak e care of them selves. Any other authority comes fro m another origin than n a t u re, . . . either [ fro m ] the force a n d violence o f an individual w ho has seized it, o r the con sen t o f those w h o have subm itted t o it by a co n tract made or assu med be tween th e m and the i n d ivid ual on whom they h ave be stowed authority .
Reliance on force depends on how long the force of one can prevail over that of another, and whoever wins has only the right of the strongest on his side. Diderot cle a rl y favored authority by consent, and he made interesting use of the idea that communities governed by kings are still under the law of God. N o man can give himself entirely to another, because in his entire being he belongs only to God . For the common good, God per m i ts men to esta bl i sh a system of subordination among
TOWARD THE NA TION-STA TE.� FRANCE
themselves ; this must be done with reason and proportion, n o t blindly or without reservation . God does not care about such external cere monies. But to "deliver one's heart, spirit, and co n duc t w i t h o u t a n y res ervation to the will and ca p r i ce of a mere creature, m a ki n g him the un iq ue and fi n al re aso n for o n e' s action," i s a " ve ritable crime o f idolatry . " I t took co u rage t o write this i n 1 75 1 , and t here were m a n y a ttac ks on this article. Yet Dide rot was no re vo l u tionary. He m e re ly elabo rated the contract theory of go v er n m e n t which had bee n pro p o u n d e d in th e remonstrances o f the parle m e n t s . I n his view, the prince h as bo und him self to t he pe o ple and the people in turn a re bound t o obey h i m ac co r di n g to the laws. The prince and h is m i niste rs are reposi tories o f au t h o r it y ,
.
Everywhe re the nation h as a right to main tain aga i n st a l l forces the co n tract that they have made ; no po wer can ch a n ge it; a n d when it is n o longe r vali d ,
the n ation recovers its rights and fu ll freedom to e n ter into a new o n e w i t h whomever a n d however it pleases t h em . This i s what would h a ppe n in France if by the greates t of m i s fortu nes the entire reign i n g fa m i l y h a p pe ned to die
out, including t he most remote descendants; then the sce ptre and the crown would return to the natio n .
Here radical principles were still com patible with support of the status quO. 63 B ut in Sieyes's hands the same premises led to re volutio n ary con clusions. He argued that a privileged class has special advantages w hich place it outside citizenship and hence deprive the nobility o f the right to be represented . Nor is there need to call on the n obil i ty, since the Third Estate has an ample n umber of men sufficiently affluent and ed ucated to take an interest in public affairs. "Such classes have no interest other than that of the rest of the People. Judge whether they do not contain enough citizen s who are educated, honest and worthy in all re spects to represent the nation p ro per l y ." S ie yes wished to vindicate not only the intelligence but the virtue of the people. "While the aristocrats talk of their honor, but pursue their sel f-inte rest, the Thi rd Estate, i.e., the nation, will develop its virtue, for if cor porate interest is egotism , national interest is virtue. "64 In this emphasis on popular sovereignty, the idea of the nation played a key role. To reach this result, men like S ieyes posited a series of contrasts : virtue against vice or abuse, equality against privilege, com mon rights against special advantages, citizenshi p and the national in terest of the vast majority against the separate status and corporate in terest of the few. If one chose one side or the other, one could derive a series of identities : virtue equality common rights citizenship national interest. Take any of these terms and the others were sure to follow. Des pite their conflict with the king, the parlements stood re vealed as the spokesmen of a narrow, corporate i nterest. To oppose =
=
=
=
TO WARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE
their pretensions, it was logical to appeal to the nation as the source of morality and law. The Freemasons had anticipated the identification of morality with h umanity and brotherhood . Sieyes followed in their foot steps when he declared, T h e n a t i o n is p rior to everyt h i n g . I t is the sou rce of everyt h i n g . I t s w i l l i s always lega l ; i nd eed it is t h e l a w itse l f. . . . The powe r exercised by t h e go v e rn m e n t has substance on l y i n sofa r as it is co n st i t u t i o n a l ; it is l e ga l o n l y i n so fa r as i t i s based o n t h e p resc ribed laws. T h e n a t i o n a l w i l l , o n t h e co n t ra r y , never n e e d s a n yt h i n g b u t its own e x i stence to be lega l . I t is the sou rce o f a l l lega l it y . 6 5
A generation earlier, Diderot had pointed the way with the statement, "the nation recovers its rights and fu ll freedom to enter into a new [contract) " once the old contract is no longer val id . By 1 789, this was no longer a theoretical issue. The common will o f the nation i s the ultimate source of legality and
A Scene from t h e French Revolution, August 1 0, 1 792 Louis XVI (behind the barred window at right) takes refuge in the hall of the legislative assembly, to jee rs from the Paris mob fresh fro m sacking the Tuileries. Later that day the king was deposed. (Musc:e du Louvre)
TOWARD THE NATION-STATE: FRANCE
cannot be delegated . B u t a nation cannot meet in solemn assembly ; therefore, the people elect extraordinary re presentatives who substitute for the whole nation i n fra m i n g its constitutio n . Sieyes a n t i c i pate d that no agreement would be reached on the o rga nizati o n o f th e newly co n voked Esta tes-Ge neral . The nation co u l d s peak o nly w i t h o n e voice , a n d
Si eye s
saw no
difficulty i f the
re prese ntative s
of
t he T h i r d Estate a s
s umed t h e ti tle o f N a t i o n al Assembly and deli be rated fo r the e n t i re na tio n , " m i n us a trivial two h u n d red thousand
would form a N ational Asse mbly by
hea ds . 6 6 The Thi rd "
Estate
itself. l
In what way do es this system of national soverei gn ty gu a ran tee the of rig hts? In a sense, t he que stion is rhetorical. Po pular sove r eignty means po pu l ar partici pation in the process o f formu latin g the constitution o f a country.
equality
Po litical rights derive fro m a pe rson's capacity as a citize n . These legal rights are identical for every pe rso n , whether his property h a ppens to be great or small . A n y citizen who satisfies a l l the formal req u i re ments o f an elector has the right to
be
represe n te d , a n d t he exte n t of his repre se n tation can not be
a frac tion of the exte n t of some other ci t izen's re presen tation. The right to be re presented is si n gle a n d i n d ivisible . A l l citize n s enjoy it eq uall y , just as they a re all equally protected by the law w hich they have hel pe d to m a ke . 6 7
I n the tho u ght o f the revolutionary pe r io d the ideas of freedom and equality were closely linked. All men have certain needs and drives and certain capacities of feelin g, actin g, and ex pressing themselves. S u rely men differ in their natu ral endowments ; but all men have endowments of some kind, given at birth and developed thereafter. Freedom refers to the right of each to bring his capacities or endowments to fruition as much as lies within him. Hence, the differences among men a re consid ered legally irrelevant. Whether a man owns much or little, each is free to own property j u st as eac h is free to develop his ca pacities, however great or small they may be. In these respects he enjoys the protection of the law. By saying that everyone has the right to develop and express himsel f, personal freedom is given a general application . The law must protect the whole range of moral and esthetic values since all men have the right to develop their capacities. But the law can allow the fullest scope to each man's sel f-development only because it does not evaluate . All men possess the same legal rights. To ensure this result, the law asks only whether or not a man's actions prevent another from developing to the full his own natural capacities. Th us, a great diversity of ideas and actions enjoys legal protection, as long as each man can do what he ,
·Sieyes conceded that this approach was perhaps too abrupt and suggested alternative procedures more in line with conventional thinking concerning the three estates. I cite hi s most extreme alternative here in order to suggest how far the thought of a moderate
spokesman had moved at the beginning of the revolutio n .
TOWA RD A MA NDA TE
OF
THE PEOPLE
will with his person and property . This freedom defi nes his value as a h uman being, and it is the fu nction of law to u phold that value.68 The Declaration of the R ights of M a n a n d Citizen o f August 1 7 89 states that "the aim of every political association is the preservation of the nat u ral rights o f man ." T h e purpose o f the declaration was to put be fore all members of the social body "a perpetual reminder" of these rights. At the same time, its for m u lations revealed a distinction between legal and political rights, between a passive and an active aspect of citizenship. Each man's e njoyment of "liberty , pro perty and sec urity" i s to be pro tected by law . T he e nj o y m e n t of t he n a t u ra l
r i ghts
of e v e r y m a n has for its l i m its o n l y t h o se
t h a t assure other m e m be rs of society the e nj oyment o f those sa me rights ;
such l i m its may be de t e r m i n ed o n ly by l a w
.
.
.
.
W h a tever is not fo rbidde n by
law may n o t be prevented. and no one ma y be con strained to do what i t does not presc ribe .
This law is to be "the ex pression o f the general will" ; that is, "aU citizens have the right to concur personally, or through their representatives, in the formation o f the law ," because they are active members o f the na tion, which is the ultimate source of sovere ignty . Also, "all citizens . . . are eq ually admissable to all public offices, according to their capacity, and without other distinctions than that of virtues and talents."69 B ut the citizen's right to concur in the "formation of the law" and to stand for public office proved more controversial than the right to eq ual protection u nder the law. As the principle of equality was im ple mented , inequalities reasserted the mselves. We saw that the Abbe S ieyes had opposed voting by estates with the assertion that the Third E state was identical with the nation and hence had the right to formu late its fundamental laws. B u t this populist position of a liberal reformer was egalitarian only within limits. Sieyes believed that in a large state re p resentation is indispensable. The great majority of the people are too preoccupied to be "available" for public o ffice. Certainly , citizen s have the right to concur in the formation o f laws w hich they m ust obey , as in voting for a constitutional asse mbly . The nation retains an ultimate authority w h ich it can not delegate . But the multitude can only increase its freedom by delegating a limited authority, much as in private life that man fares best who has people working for him rather than does every thing himself. Nothing in the idea of popular sovereign ty precludes s uch delegation. Rather, the national will is l-eflected by a proper represen tative assembly. Elected re prese n tatives should enjoy a free mandate to deliberate on the common good . When such deputies are bound by in structions from their constituents as they had been in t he old Estates Ge neral, they can only reflect partisan i nterests. If they have a free m an date , they can speak on be half of the interests of the whole nation . 70
TOWARD THE NA TION-S TA TE: FRANCE
37 1
To s upport this view o f re presentatio n , S ie y e s re l ied in p a rt o n his o pti on for a re st ricted franc h i se .. W i t h i n t he Third Estate, he d i stin gu ish e d between the m as s o f the po pulation and that se gment which e nj o yed a degree o f eco no m ic secu r i t y . O n l y t hose have an "active r ight" o f citize n s h i p who ca n a ffo rd to ta ke a large view of a ffa i rs . In t he de bates of the National A s se m b l y , Sieyes s tated that wome n , chi l d ren , for
e i g n e r s,
o r t hose who pay no taxes are excluded fro m
in pu blic affa i rs . To be s u re , a l l
of
ac tive
i n fl u e nce
them m ay e njo y t h e advan tages o f
society. B u t o n l y those w h o con tr ib u te t o t h e " pu blic e s tabl i s h m e n t" are
p roper shareholders in the great soc ial e nte rprise. They are i n truth
active
to
citizens,
members o f the political associatio n , and he nce q u a l i lied
stand for public o ffi c e . 7 1 In t h e debates o n t h e
Declaration of the R ights of Man ,
t hese i deas
were o p pose d by men who saw in t hese restrictions and t he sa feguards prov id e d for pro pe rty
s pec u lato rs . B u t be c au se those who do not own property are also n ot part of society, a s D u po n t de Nemours put it. They are too p re oc c u p ie d with m a k i n g a l iv i n g , their assemblies would be tu m u ltuous , a n d the y could be bribe d easily by aristocrats, thus beco m in g a danger to t he state . On the other hand, pro perty was part of the established order, and those who owned it had a vested interest in that order. The pro pe r tyless would not respect the rights of property and he nce the public interest. Direct democracy was i m po ss ible as lon g as Fre n c h m e n lac ked a more equ it a bl e d istrib ution o f goods a n d he nc e a sufficient har m o n y of i nterest. 72 How could the m e n who endorsed a limited franchise still claim they believed in equality? The answer is that they believed only in an eq u ali ty of lega l rights. They were q u i te a w a re o f th e i n eq u a li ties in wealth, talent, and rank which would remain . B u t they we re co m b a t ing a social order in which -over a n d above such " natural" d iffe rence s those who were specially p r ivile ged enjoyed the protection of the law. Property and equality a ppeared com patible because the defeat of pr iv i le ge meant that any man's rights to his property would be equal t o th e p rope r t y r i gh t s of everyone e l se . As they saw it, the sole function o f the law is to ensure that each man can dispose of his pro perty as he sees fit, so long as he does not curtail the freedom of others. By con sidering men only in their eq ual capacity as legal agents, the law ignores all other dist i nct ions . I n France, the electoral system was to become a weapo n i n the strug gle between rival p ol it ical cam ps ; thus, only o nce since 1 7 89 has the same system s urvived for as lon g as thirty consecutive years . 73 Neverthe less, s ubseq u e n t constitutions have con si st e nt ly re affirmed t ha t the right to vote should de pe nd on a certain level of i nterest and j u dgm en t . To t h is end, minimum age, se x , residence, and tax payments have all been u sed a d e fense of
monopolists a n d
the m ajority th o ug ht a restricted franchise adv isable ,
372
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
in various combinations. None of the constitutions has recogni z ed the rights of economic dependents. In i ts majestic im partiality, t he law for bids rich and poor alike to slee p under bridges, to use Anatole France's famous simile. The u n i fying theme of the revolution was the e q uality of legal rights in o pposition to legal privileges. Such e q ualit y m eant a di rect relation be tween the individ ual citizen and the state in contrast to the earlier im portance of "intermed iate bodies." In conclusion, it will be use ful to describe some aspects of this emerging conce ption of na tional citizenship. In eighteenth centu ry France, legal recognition of individual righ ts meant, in the first place, hostility to associations. We sa w that the gov e rnment had substituted royal m agistrates for elected municipal offi cials. In addition, the govern ment used corporations or guilds as agents implementin g its own administrative edicts 7 4 The Jesuits were a teach ing order and in a Catholic country preem pted the field of education The y came under attack and i n 1 763 La Chalotais argued against their control o f education and particularly against the e x cl u sion of laymen from the teaching profession. -
.
.
I claim the right to demand for the N a tion an ed ucation that will depe nd u po n the S tate alone ; because i t belo n gs essentially to it, because every nation
has an inalie nable and i m presc riptible right to in struct its m e m bers, and fi nally because the ch ildren o f the State s ho u ld be educa ted by m e m be rs of
the State. 75
The Jesuits were s u p pre sse d in 1 764 . The h o sti l i ty to a s soc ia t io n s co n tinued through t he French revolution , which abolished trade guilds in 1 79 1 , religious bodies in 1 790 a n d 1 792, academies and literary soc ieties in 1 793 , and financial association s in 1 794. Note the com ment by Sieyes that "the m ajor difficulty springs from the i n terest by which a citizen allies himself with j ust a few others. This ty pe of interest leads to con spiracy and co ll u sion ; through it anti-social schemes are plotted; through it the most fo rmidable ene m ies of the People mobilize themselves."76 In a speech be fore the Constituent Asse mbly of 1 79 1 , Le Chapelier argued against mutual bene fit societies among workers in terms that reveal the broad policy behind these meas ures, not j ust the hostility to organiza tions of workers .
It should not be permissible for citize n s in certain occu pations to meet to gether in defence of their pretend ed com mon interests . There m ust be no more gu ild s i n the State, but o n l y the ind ividual interest of each citizen and the general i nterest. No one shall be allowed to aro use in any citizen a n y kind of i n termediate inte rest a nd to separate him from the public weal t h ro u gh the med ium of cor porate i n t e r e st s 7 7 .
This opposition to corporate interests was aimed also at the Catholic church. Revolutionary spoke s men advocated a civil constitution of the
TOWARD THE NA TION-STA TE : FRANCE
3 73
clergy , substit u ting t he authority of the nation for that o f the king . Hence forth, ecclesiastical o ffices were to be elect i ve . I n this view, an qualified electors regardless of their own religion we re entitled to vote for eligible candidates. The principle of civil ma r r ia ge pointed in the same direction and had far-reachin g conseq uences. Ac co r di n g to the constitution of 1 79 I , m arriage was a civil contract under state control; a year la ter, mar riages were decl a red legal if concluded be fore a m u n ici pal official, even in the absence o f a pr ie s t . At the same time, all transactions affecting the civil status o f persons were secularized ; that is, the w r i tten registers of births, marriages, and dea t hs were taken from the clergy and en t rusted to m unici pal officials. The meas u re was de fended on the gro u n d that it would overcome the divisions among re ligious groups. As matters stood, only priests, m i nisters , or rabbis could prove the ci v il status of a pe rson, and this despotism of the differen t sects divided men from o n e another. T o overcome such divisions, i t was necessary to separate civil from religious transactions so that an French men could enjoy the same civil rights. Frenchmen were born as citizens before they became Catho lics, Protestants, or Jews. 78 I n the case of the Jews this a pproach presented special difficulties because the revolution sought to abolish rather than curtail Jewish com munities. Througho u t the Middle Ages, these communities (like the municipalities of which they were a s ubordinate part) performed a va riety o f duties for the government, including the col1ection of taxes. Also, the Jew i sh community maintained i ts own legal order with respect to marriage, inheritance, and related matters. The revol ution opposed such "corporate autonomy." In 1 7 89 de Clermont-Tonnerre declared in the National Assembly that "an should be refused to the Jews as a nation, but everything should be granted to them as i ndividuals."79 Rev olutionary leaders did not want to interfere with religious beliefs and were often sy m pa t hetic to Jews as a persecuted minority. B ut they gave little consideration to the Jewish tradition. Jews should be banished i f they refused to dissolve their com m unities, because this was tantamount to a sel f-willed exclusion from citizenship. On the other hand, they would enjoy the same rights as citizens if they abandoned their com munities except for strictly religious purposes. Th i s posit i on was echoed among the Jews themselves. A petition of the Jews from Avignon stated, -
-
Will the Jews again be tre ate d as before, i . e . , as citizens only in matters of payin g taxes, but as foreign ers in matters of righ ts? . . . N o ! French legislation will not be thus insulted . A contrad iction that would disgrace our laws shall
not be tole r ated . . . . When a system is fundamentally j ust, then it is necessary to accept the consequences . . . . I t is not possible to have abolished the
porations
cor
and ye t to ad m it the ex istence of one of them. The National Con
vention cannot recognize the Jews. There are no m ore Jews in France. There
are no more Catholics , Protestants, Jews, sectarian s of any kind , t h e re only Frenchmen . SO
are
TO WA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
374
Th is appeal to pri nc i pl e had eco n o m ic i m p l i cat io n s Jewish communi ties demanded that on dissol ution the i r debts be ass u med b y the govern ment, as was d o n e with t h e de bts owed by other r e li gio u s bodies . B u t t h e re v ol u t i o n a r y gove rn m e n t re fu sed t o acce pt fi n a n c i a l re s pon s i b i l i ty . .
As a co n seq uence , J e w i s h com m u n ities we re m a i n t a i ned fo r p u r poses o f t a x a t io n , t h o u gh in other lega l res pects t h e r e v olut ion a ry gove r n m e n t req u i red t he i r d i s so l u t io n . Co n t rary to w h a t t h e A v i gn o n
pe t i t io n
had
a n t ic i pated , Jews bec a m e c i t i ze n s i n t he i r civil stat u s , but not i n m a tters of taxa t i o n . c l a r i fy t he ge n e r a l r ev The most wides pread a n d o n e r o u s bu rden o f Fre n c h agric u l t u re w a s the p ri v ate a pp ro pr i a t i o n o f tax co l l ectio n . Taxes o n l a n d varied widely, a n d the reasons for t h e se d i ffe r e nces had beco m e obsc u re over t i m e The d e m a n d fo r eq u a l c it i z e ns h i p was in part a n at tac k on t h i s private a p pro p riation of a p u b l i c fu nction and on the c u m u lative i n eq u i tie s o f assessme nt. Citizenship s h o u l d m e a n a new nationwide assess m e n t of tax liability which was owed to the state rat her than to pri v ilege d individ uals. In this respect, the special treatment o f Jews with regard to their tax payment contin ued the old discrimination against the m . Questions of pe rsonal status w e re also con nected w i t h t he l a w o f land tenure. B y the eighteenth century, serfdom had long been abol ished, but the heirs o f a serf were more restricted in their rights than the heirs o f a fre em a n , a n d such distinctions ran kled . In t h e decades prece d i n g the revol utio n , agit a tio n again st t he s e and related p rac ti ces m o u n ted as the aboli tion of the " feudal system" became the demand of the d a y A decree of A ugu st 4 , 1 7 89 a bo l i s hed without com pensation all "feudal" d uties includ ing those associated with serfdom, while other d uties co uld be abolished against pay ment of an i ndemnity. B ut the e f fort t o dis t i n g u i s h d i fferent t y pes of property produced paradoxical re sults. One family wo uld be relieved of all charge s without indemnity while an adjacent one was still obliged to pay rent. Everything hate ful came to be condem ned as " feudal," but legal im plementation required that rightful claims be distinguished from those that were "fe udal" and hence illegitimate, a source of much controversy and confusion . 81 The opposition to " feudal" privilege was expressed in many ways. In March 1 790 the Assembly proclaimed that "all honorary distinctions, all power and s u periority, resulting from the feudal system, are abol ished ." Later that year, the Assembly abolished all hereditary nobility, tilles o f ran k, liveries , and armorial bearings. The Conve ntion abolished the law of primogeniture ( 1 793 ) , bestowing on all descendants the right to an equal part of the pro perty. These edicts affected all families of wealt h , not only noble families. The attack on privilege extended also to paternal authority in do-
T h e s pecial t re a t me n t o f t h e J e w s h e l p s to
l
o u tion
a ry
p r i n c i ples from w h i c h it deviates.
.
.
TOWARD THE NA TION-STA TE : FRANCE
375
mestic relations. Under the ancien regime, fathers possessed the righ t of correction over their children under the age of twenty-five. Before his majority, any man could be put in prison on his father's orders. Even beyon d that age he could be im prisoned if his father obtained a lettre de cachet from the king. I n 1 790 the lettres de cachet we re abolished, and later that year the father' s right to im prison his children was restricted. The age of minority was red uced to twe nty, the time of detention could not exceed a year, and the pe nalty could be in flicted only by a fam ily tribunal. In the relation between s pouses, the revol ution also diminished the authority of the h usba n d . Divorce was perm itted along with the sec ularization of marriage . The age-old d isability o f married women was red uced, though not eliminated . In this field , even radical spokesmen like Mirabeau and Robe spierre d rew the line . A woma n should reign within the house, but everywhere else she was out of place. In particular, women were denied political rights, the right to be a guard ian, and the right to take part in the council of the family. Under the laws of the revolution, then, the legal status of women improved, but political status was den ied them. 82 Opposition to "feudal privilege" was thus a unifying theme of rev olutionary legislation. With regard to the law of property , the land was liberated by prohibition of perpetual and irredeemable rents. The prin ciple of equal inheritance was instituted in opposition to testamentary freedom : revolutionary legislation " forti fied the proprietor during his lifetime, [but] it weakened his influence after death."83 (Subsequently, a reaction in favor of paternal authority set in. B y 1 800 the head of the family could again dispose of a considerable part of his property and favor one of his children, although primogeniture and entail were never restored .) With regard to the law of persons, the chan ges were even more sweeping. The division of the population into three estates with their corresponding fiscal and legal inequalities was abolished . Rules o f inheritance based on differe nces of status as well a s privileges and pen alties based on religious a ffiliation were eliminated. I n these and other ways (already described), a secular state was instituted in which individ ual property was given equal legal protection and the law of person s was emancipated from religious and patriarchal control. This legislative enactment of individual rights i n opposition to in herited privileges was buttressed by the revolutionary attack on church property. The revolution opposed all corporations intervening between the nation and the individ ual citizen. The church was s uch a corpora tion. French kings had expropriated church properties in times past. The auctioning of these properties was a ready means o f meeting the deficit i ncurred by French support of American independence. More over, the leaders of the revolution were haunted by fear of an aristo cratic counterrevolution , and they knew that such a cause would be
TO WARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE
aided by the churc h . There were many municipalities and private fam ilies anxious to buy church lands. When the sales ope ned in December 1 790, the purchase of ch urch lands was initiated by prominent members o f society , includ i n g members o f the royal fam ily. Most church prop erties were bought by wealthy me mbers of the Third Estate and the ric her peasan ts who became the mainstay of the new order. The sale of church lands thus gave rise to a m u l titude of proprietors whose interests were ind issolubly linked with t he revolution, m uch as the sale of mon astic properties in England more than two centu ries earlier had created a vested interest in the English Re formation among the landed gentry. 84 Some of these revolutionary ac hievements were undone under the Restoration and in the subseq uent develo pme nts of the nineteenth cen tury. Eventually, hostility toward "corporations" made way for the re eme rgence of "intermediate bodies . " The measures which facilitated the
Symbols of Privilege Destroyed
In this contemporary cartoon the m itres of bishops and the swords and insignia o f the nobility are destroyed by fou r young men representing the revolution and the people. Sim i larly, the commemorative medal struck to celebrate the Nation a l Assembly of Au gust 4, 1 7 89 shows the delegates swearing
an oath on the pillar inscribed to the father land under the slogan "Abandon all privi leges ." (Mansell Colleclion, London)
TO WARD THE NA TION-STA TE: FRANCE
37 7
subdivision of property and the diminution o f the fat her's and hus band's authority were partly reversed. But the old structure of estates had been destroyed and with it the division of the population on the basis of legally protected privileges. To an im portant degree , the nation state had emanci pated the individ ual from his previous s ubservience to the master of the house . Henceforth, t he "inequality of means" rather than t he "inequality of rights" still provided a basis for the u nequ a l dis tribution of opportunities. Soc ial solidarity wo uld arise from the interest by which a citizen allies himself with others rather than from alliances built on kinship and i n herited prerogatives. It would arise also from nationalist appeals which spoke directly to the individual citizen. The nation-state introd uced a formal e q u a l ity of citizens h i p, albeit hedged by restrictions based on property and sex, and these restrictions would provide the basis for agitation in the future. The ultimate paradox is t h at the nation-state introd uced the very j uxtaposition of t he individual c it i z en and the central powers of government which the a n c ie n re gi me under Louis XIV and Colbert had proclaimed, but had never achieved. It was the French revolution rather than "absolutism" w hich destroyed the "inte rmediate bodies" based on grants of pr ivile ge or e xemption .
11 N AT I O N -B U I LD I N G : GE RMANY
T H E HOLY ROMAN E M P I RE : PROVI N C I AL I S M A N D I NTE LLECTUAL M O B I L I Z A TION*
E
UROPE WAS the scene of a great struggle for power d uring the first half of the seventeenth century, from which France emerged as the dominant state. About a dozen wars were fou ght in di fferent parts of Europe . The Thirty Years' War ( 1 6 1 8- 1 648) centered on German territories and was part of that struggle. Since this area did not have great political significance, it provided a conve nient battleground for contentions among the Fre nc h monarchy, the Dutch Re public , Sweden, and the Austrian and S panish branches of the House o f Habsburg. Several treaties were signed in 1 64 8 ; one of them was the Peace of West phalia which ended the Thirty Years' War. Among the settlements was the end o f the eighty years' war between Spain and the United Provinces o f the Netherlands. Another was the end of the war between France, Sweden, and Germany's Protestant rulers on one side, and the H absburg emperor and the German Catholic princes on the other. The Franco-Spanish war continued for eleven years until 1 659 and ended with the defeat of Spain and the European ascendance of France. Hostilities also contin ued among Russia, Poland, Denmark, Swe den , and B randenburg, which ended in treaties assuring the rise of Rus sia and B randenburg at the expense of Poland and Denmark. In this general setting, France had a strong i nterest in preserving the territorial divisions and political and m ilitary weakness of the Holy Roman Empire, for it provided a buffer zone against A ustria. Sweden and Germany' s Protestant rulers shared this interest, because they feared not only Cath olic Austria but the German Catholic princes as well. * A m uch abbreviated version of this chapter was first published under the title " Prov ince and Metro polis : The Case of Eighteenth-Cent u r y Ge rmany," in Joseph Ben-David and T. N. Clark, eds., Culture and its Creators, Essays in Honor U n i versity of C hicago Press, 1 977), pp. 1 1 9-49.
of Edward Shils ( Ch icago :
NA TION-B UILDING:
GERMANY
379
The contrast between Germany's fragmentation and the unity o f En gland a n d France w a s of lon g _ standing. England was poli tically uni fied throu gh the Norman conquest in the eleventh century . France ach ieved political uni fication under kingship more grad ually a nd several centuries after England ; the process through which the Fre nch kings established their su pre macy left a legacy of j urisdictional particularis m . The German te rritories of the H o l y Roman Em pire were fragmented from the pe riod o f the Saxo n emperors of the tenth century to the dis solution of the em pire i n 1 806. Germany achieved political unity only in 1 8 7 1 . The following section discusses Germany during the seven teenth and eighteenth centuries, and specifically the poli tical disu nity and cultural ferment of the country. Under the terms of the Peace o f Westphalia, the Holy Roman Em pire contin ued to exist as a loosely orga nized con federation of sovereign territories. Austria, Bavaria, Prussia, and Saxo n y were the most impor tant of the eight electoral states (Kuifiirstentiimer) within the empire . I n addition, more o r less scattered but sovereign territories belonged to twenty-seven spiritual members of the College of Princes (archbishop rics, bishoprics, prince-abbots' lands), thirty-seven lay princes (ureltliche Fiirsten) , ninety-five im perial counts (Reichsgrafen) , forty-two im perial founders (Reichtsstifter) , and fi fty free or imperial towns (Reichsstiidte} . l Although the office o f e m peror was formally elective, h e was usually the head of the H absburg house and the power of that house was formi dable. The emperor was the leading Catholic ruler in Germany. The coronation oath obliged him to protect the rights of the small sovereign territories. I n practice , all these territories survived through their lin k with the imperial office, for the emperor used h i s legal powers and po litica l in fluence to preve n t the constitue n t u n i ts of the e m pire from en croaching on one another's jurisdiction. By u pholding the conditions laid down in the Peace of Westphalia, the emperor ensured the security of every petty territory and other j urisdiction despite its political and military impotence. But while the German em peror could preserve the status quo under the Peace of Westphalia, the powers of his office were very circum scribed. He was entitled to issue patents of nobility and to urge certain ecclesiastical appointments. H is reve n ues were limited to customary presents received on his coronation and to "protection money" col lected fro m the Jews. Earlier he had possessed other powers and reve n ues, but on successive coronations the electors had imposed restrictions (capitulations) which li mited the powers of the imperial office. This weakness of the em peror in taking any political initiatives of his own was reflected in the other i nstitutions of the empire. The Imperial Diet (Reichstag) was a congress of ambassadors rather than a legislature, since in practice it was incapable of enacting laws.
TOWARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE Some 1 60 " states" had the right to be re presented at the Diet in Re gensburg, but only about 25 delegates were active at any one time . Only those delegates attended whose territories were likely to be affected by the business on the agenda. Procedures were cumbersome and delays interminable, because the delegates were strictly bound by i nstructions and there was frequent need for consultation with the home territory. The agenda incl uded such ite ms as dis putes betwee n princes, between princes and their estates , or certain religious issues. Periodically, various states would re fuse to pay the taxes which a Reichstag majority had en dorsed, thus revealing the weakness of the em pire. A nalogous difficul ties were to be found in the i m perial co urts and the imperial army. Strong states like Austria or Prussia ignored or bypassed the em peror and the I m pe rial Diet with impunity. They would not subordinate their interests to the em pire, but at the same time they remained within it because they would not risk violating the sti pulations of the Peace of Westphalia. All the s maller sovereign territories were in a different po sition. I m perial k nights, bishoprics, and towns depended on the e mpire for their survival, as did an additional four thousand hometowns ':"'- sm all towns which for various historical reasons possessed certain rights of self-government.2 The Peace of Westphalia had sti pulated that all sel f governing territories o f the em pire might freely make or change alli ances in defense o f their liberties. This made for continued political fragmentation in the center of Europe, and as France and Sweden were guarantors of this settlement, they did nothing to promote unification. Every indepe ndent territory-even the smallest hometown-was preserved in its weakness : [ ForI where one's own a ppetite for poli tical power was fr ustrated an d smoth e red , the obvious policy was to hel p smother and frustra te the as pirations of others ; and this a p plied not on l y to a rival's e fforts at territorial ex pa n sion but also to any effort a ruler or estate m i ght make to i m pose full control over his ind ividual or corporate s u bjects. 3
One can learn m uch about the political conditions and cultural conse quences of German disunity by examining the institutions through which even small towns preserved the ir autonomy . In a typical home town one would find a council consisting of six to twelve life members. The com position o f the council was ach ieved by i n formal agreement among the most active heads of households, even when all heads of households formally elected the council. Heads of households together with leaders of guilds a nd districts constituted a citizenry which inter acted on a daily basis with the members of the council. Chief of the council was the mayor, who was chose n by COllegial conse nt and often held his office for life. The mayor ran the day-to-d ay affairs of the hometown , and he, together with members of the council, a ppointed
NATION-B UILDING: GER MANY
lesse r town officials. The council form u lated and the mayor executed com m u n it y policies w it h re gard to town pro pe r t i e s , po l ice powers , taxes, and fees as well as the issuance of residence pe r m it s to n ew citizens of the community. M e m be rs of the council also frequently held judicial posts, but most d i s p u t e s were settled out of court so as to prec l ude ad j udication by outside authorities. C e r t a i n fa m i l ies tended t o pe rsis t in co m m u n ity leaders h i p o v e r t he ge ner ations, and older fa m i l ies had an advan tage over newer ones. B u t their p o sitions were not presc r i ptive , or only vaguely or pa rtially so ; they co u l d be lo st in a ge neration . . . . The base of a ho m etow n leader's i n fl uence was with the co m m u nity, and d e pe n d e d in the end o n the possess ion of q ualities
fam ily trad ition included - t h at his fe llow tow n s m e n res pected and needed more than they envied or mistrusted t he m and that is a long way fro m he ,
red i tary right. . . . For the h o m etown leader was a Burger, a n d co u l d not t h i n k o f his place in terms other t h an t hose of his own tow n an d its B ii rgerschaft
.
a
The
B ii rge rschaft were his acquain tances or his relatives ; a great many of his ac q uaintances
were
his relatives, and almost every B ii rger had a relative or a
close acquain tance in
a
position of political i n fl ue nce. Social, political , and
econo m ic relations intertwi ned , giving the com m un i ty great strength even as i t gave great local power to the " uncles." That was the situation that written constitu tions and electoral sc hemes sou ght to e mbody and assure . 4
Hometown leaders and citizens l ike
controlled one ano t he r
a ffection arising from fa m i l ia r ity
To
gu i ld m aste rs a n d gu il d me m be rs devices of m ut u al s u s p ic io n and -
-
by the th ousa n d .
citizen of a hometown was a communal status g ra nted by one's nei ghbors. It involved all aspects of life , not j u s t one's civic status . And as it tied the individual to his neighbors t h rough his life, honor, and p ro perty, so it dee pe ne d his se pa ra tion from all outsiders and his hostility toward them. Me mbe rs hi p i n t he co m m u nit y was the issue on which patronage, familial influence, and considerations of economic ad van ta ge con ve rged , and the gradat io n of m e mbe rs h i p fees reflec ted this shared concern. To enter a guild, an outsider had to pay six t i me s as much as the son of a guild-member and three times as much as a citizen's son from another trade. The sons of citizens would obtain citizen status w ithout fee when they reached their twenty-fifth year, married with council approval, or were acce p ted as masters in a gu il d Fo r the s a me p riv i le ge outsiders paid fees of 1 20 to 300 Gu l de n for a man, 60 to 1 00 be t he
.
SBiirger, BiiTgerschaft, Biirgertum,
and
BiirgeTsland
may be translated townsman, towns
folk, citizenry, and commoner estate . In the eighteenth century, these terms referred to the town practice of allowing or denying the Biirgerrechl or municipal citizenship (the right
j
of the citizen to reside in the comm u nity), based on a com m u n ity udgment of his financial
and moral standing. These terms also convey the sense of be i n g below the aristocracy but above peasants and laborers, not to speak of domestic servants.
TO WA RD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE Gulden for the wife, and 20 to 3 5 Gulden for each child . b Marriage outside the comm u n ity meant either abandonment o f citizenship and residence or a special grant o f residence to the outside partner o n pay ment of an approp riate fee . Adm ission to the comm unity was re fused if a new resident's trade would result in com petition within a crowded occ u pation. Moreo ve r, members h i p i n the com mu nity was lost by entry into an occ u pa tion that in vol ved o utside ties, like the army or the civil service. To be w i t h o u t c i t i ze n s h i p mea n t
to
u s u a l l y n o m a r r i a ge a n d n o r i g h t
have n o right to p u rs u e a citize n ' s t r ad e ,
to
a n e s t a b l i s h e d h o m e , n o vote , n o e l i g i
b i l i t y for o ffice, n o co m m u n a l pr-otection a ga i nst t h e o u ts i d e ( o r a ga i n st c i t ize n s ) , a n d no s h a re i n co m m u n i t y p ro pe r t y . �
The BurgerschaJl was con tent with a moderate leve l o f living and used its powers o f exclusion to maintain the status quo. (The cleavage be tween the patriciate and the artisan class was more pronounced in towns o f large r size with more outside i n volvement.)6 The strongly conserva tive Burgerlum of the hometowns cultivated a localism that is not unique to Germany. But only there did it enjoy strong, if indirect, institutional support through the political fragmentation of the empire. A basic condition of the hometowns was that there was almost no penetration into their internal affairs from the o utside . This privilege o f sel f-rule was based on each sovere ign's acce ptance or formal acknowl edgment o f customary ju risdiction, which by its com plexity shielded each comm un ity against the outs ide . The towns always a ppealed to their ancient customs, consisting of local usage or statutory com pilations, m uch as the com mon lawyers had done in seventeenth-century England. In both cases, ancient custom was invo ked against the arbitrary acts of sovereign rulers . But i n England this a ppeal to a legal fiction had been used to assert the rights of parl iament to represent the country, whereas in Germany the same appeal was used to assert the separate jurisdiction of each town.C bThese are Wa l ke r' s fi gures for the tow n of Roltwe i l . It should be added that renunciation of citizens h i p i nvolved a n e m i gration tax and that contracts , especially those involving real estate, between residents and outsiders were subject to e laborate regulations. ° In an estimate for 1 800, Walker calculated that in a total German population o f abou t 28 mill ion (incl ud in g Prussia and German-speaki n g Austria), two-t hirds were rural and
one-third u rban _ The distinguis h i n g characte ristic of the u rban commun ity was t he exis
tence of some rights o f self-gove rnment. About 7 percent o f t he total population l i ved in three dozen "la rge" towns ( 1 5,000 and above) , w h i le 25 pe rcent l i ved in the fou r thousand
hometowns ( from 750 to 1 5,000 in habitants). I n t he German territories under the em pire
the hometown po pulation com prised some 7 m i l lion people . Hometowns were more fre
quent in t he western and sou thern parts of Germany and less frequent in Prussia and H a n nover.
NA TION-B UIWING: GERMANY
Local rule was quite similar in the other s mall territorial enclaves -those of imperial knights, the bishoprics, and n umerous petty prin cipalities-which were as insistent on their autonomy as the hometowns and also used their j u risdiction for defensive pu rposes. Th us, the fa milial and neighborhood control of the hometowns and the oligarchic paternalism of the rural areas were characteristic o f German society un til well into the nineteenth ce ntury. When conservatives of t he period extolled the virtues of t raditional authority, the y had in mind the home towns and small territorial domains where oligarchic and personal dom inati o n prevailed. They idealized the autonomy and freedom of pro vincial living and applied their model to all the territorial enclaves threatened by absolutist regi mes and enlightened th o u gh t . In the pro cess, they disregarded the fierce, if often tacit, coercion typical of fa milial and neighborhood interde pendence . 7 This personal loca l rule prevailed even i n Prussia, the best orga nized state of the empire. The earlier discussion of Prussia briefly traced the ascendance of monarchical authority over the estates as an aspect of adm inistrative centralization in military affairs . Yet this centralization was as compatible with local autonomy as it was in France. The Pruss ian government did not seek to abolish municipal institutions, though the Prussian towns were less strongly organized internally than other Ger man towns. Under the supervision of the Prussian government, local affairs continued to be administered in accordance with traditional local practices. From the standpoint of absolutist rule , the General Legal Code (Allgemeine Landrecht) of 1 794 was a major ste p in strengthening the state. B ut from the standpoint of law and administrative practice, the code did not supersede the customary legal practices of towns, guilds, and cor porations. The code endorsed these practices, but turned agen cies of self-government into instruments of state adm inistration. 8 Thus , - even the Prussian autocracy remained an intermediate phase between an estate or corporate society and a modern stale which a ttem pts to reg ulate society directly. Political particularism can mean different things in different coun tries. In France, the ancien regime consisted of a m ultitude of jurisdic tions which the king had c reated (more often than not) to raise revenue , and which the monarchy defended a s a right o f pro perty a n d a potential source of future reve n ue. In Germany, the empire prevented the sep arate and sovereign j urisdictions from interfering with one another. German particularism had a territorial basis which had been so en trenched that it prevented the rise of royal supremacy, and in this re spect the Peace of Westphalia only endorsed conditions which had ex isted from the time of t he S axon, Salian , and Hohenstaufen rule. The empire's balance of power through political fragmentation was disrupted by the War of the Austrian Succession ( 1 740- 1 748), involving _
TO WARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE
the con fli ct i n g claims of Bavaria , Saxo n y, Prussia , and France . The war was preci pitated by Prussia's oc c u pation of Silesia and its m ilitary as cendance ove r Austria. In the cou rs e o f this con flict, successive alliances occu rred between A u stria and E n gland , Russia and France, and between Prussia and France as well as E n gla nd . I n the end, Prussia's alli ance with E n gland and un provoked in vasio n of Saxony led to a coalition amo n g A u stria, Russia, Fra nce, a n d Sweden agai nst F rederick I I i n t h e Seven Years' War ( 1 756- 1 763 ) . The peace o f H u bert u sburg ( 1 763) between Austria, Prussia, and Saxony restored the p revious balance o f power, exce pt that Silesia remained in Prussian hands. Tha t balance was pre served u n til the French armies under N a poleon began their conquest of E u ro p e in 1 798. Na poleon reorgan ized the German states and al lowed a n umber o f them to seize ecclesiastical te r ritories i m perial cities , and the territories of the imperial knights.9 In A ugust 1 806 the Holy Roman E mpire was formally dissolved, and the last empe ror, Francis I I of Austria ( 1 792- 1 806) , abdicated I n the same year, Prussia, i n alliance with Russia, challenged the French seiz ure o f Prussian territories, but in October Prussia suffered a d isas tro us defeat at Jena. I n the peace settlement that followed , Prussia lost hal f its territories ; its population was reduced to some five million in habitants. M uch of this loss was made good after N a poleon's defeat in 1 8 1 5 . The Congress o f Vienna o f 1 8 1 5 c reated a German Confederation of thirty nine sovereign powers in the territory of the old Holy Roman Em pire, consisting o f the Austrian em pi re , five kin gdoms , one elector ate, seven grand duchies, ten d uchies, eleven principalities and four free cities. By the standards of the modern nation-state, this political consolidation of the old empire was still only the beginning of a devel o pment which would result in po litical unification in 1 870- 1 87 1 , and which was to be lost again in 1 945 at the end of World War II. The whole background of political particularism of the Holy Roman E mpire and the German Confederation had im portant repercussions for the country' s reorganization of authority on a constitutional basis. In order to assess Germany's equivocal transition from the authority of kings to a mandate of the people, the conseq uences of the country's political par ticularism for its economic and cultural developments must be considered. ,
.
-
,
From the thirteenth to the sixteenth century, German trade flour ished under the aegis of the H anseatic League, an association of north German towns and of German merchants abroad which combined a monopoly o f the Baltic trade with vigorous trading in the Low Co untries and England But in the era o f Euro pean ex pansion overseas , Germany became an economic backwater, and in 1 632 the H anseatic League was dissolved. I ts place was ta k e n by the Dutch, who occu pied the lower .
NA TION-B UILDING: GERMANY
Rhine and preempted the Baltic trade with Scandinavia, Russia, and Poland. On the lower Elbe , Denmark and Hanover (under E n glish sov ereignty) imposed various tolls and interfered with the trade of Ham burg. The bad e ffec t of external com petition on German trade was fur ther aggravated by the prol i ferat i on of i nternal customs barriers. On the Rhine from St rasbo urg to t he Dutch bo rder, ships had to pay thi r ty - two separate tolls. Mainz a n d Colo gne also claimed stapl e righ ts-the righ t of a local jurisdiction to demand that commodities in transit m ust be offered for sale for a certain period be fore further shipment is allowed to proceed . On land, s taple rights involved pre s c r i bed ro utes into towns. Violations of that right entailed con fiscation of the ship, horse and wagon , or shipment as well as fines or jail terms for t he boatmen or drivers . These tolls and rights were abolished when the Frenc h oc cupi e d the Rh ineland, and after 1 8 1 5 the Rhine became the greatest transport facility of Germany. N e gotiations with Holland concerning Dutch rights on the lower Rhine were com pleted only in 1 83 1 , wit h further conces sions coming twenty years later. Much the same was true of the Elbe River, where nineteen tolls were levied between Magdeburg and Ham burg. In 1 82 1 Prussia agreed not to i m pose tolls on goods in t ransit. Danish tolls were abolished in 1 85 7 , and Hannoverian tolls in 1 86 U o Other obstacles to economic development were also slow to be re moved. Political particularism produced a m ultiplicity of currencies and of weights and measures until well into the nineteenth century. Every territory had its passport controls, its transport restrictions, and its spe cial currency. As Goethe said in a conversation with Eckermann in 1 82 8 , I a m not concerned i f Ge rmany i s not unified ; o u r good roads a n d fut u re
railroads will have t h e i r own e ffect .d
•
•
•
Let [Germany] be one in that the
Ge rman Taler and Groschen have the same value in the whole Reich ; one in
that m y travel bag can pass u n opened thro ugh all thirty-six states. Let it be one in that the u rban passport of a Wei m a r c itizen will not be co nsidered insu fficient like the passport of a foreigner by the border officials of a large neighboring state. A m o n g German states t here should be no fu rther di ffer ence be twee n natives and foreigners . Furth ermore , Germ a n y should be one in her weights and meas u res, i n co mmerce and traffic, and a h u n d red s i m ila r
t h i n gs . 1 1
The economic consequences of political particularism greatly impeded the German economy. Here the comparison with France may be instruc tive, for in many respects France suffered from similar difficulties . The French government re peatedly tried t o replace the tangle of provincial and local levies as well as the old system of public finance through private enterprise by a national customs union and a centrally d in 1 828 , the first railroad had been ope ned i n En gland; in Ge rmany this was to occ u r in 1 835.
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE administered system of public reven ue . None of these e fforts succeeded until the French revolution abolished the private appropriation of public offices for profit and re placed i t by a bureaucratic organization, in which officials performed their public d uty for a salary . 1 2 Similar conditions occasionally existed in Germany as well. B ut in Ger many the private a ppropriation of public offices probably did not thrive, because it oc curred in some 250 sovereign territories (before 1 8 1 5) and only a few of these could com pete as Europea n powers . O f course, there was petty corru ption and a mushrooming of offices, but given their restricted economic and military base, the sale or purchase of offices was not a l ucrative field of public revenue or private investment. Most Ge rman sovereigns of the eighteenth century took it for granted that they m ust promote the economy as well as strengthen their military and political power. These im pulses meant a good deal in large states like Prussia or Austria, but they turned into travesties in the smaller territories. In spirit, the economic policies adopted were mod eled after those of Colbert. The government promoted trade and in dustry, supe rvised the conduct of economic e nterprises, and generally regulated social and economic li fe. A burgeoning officialdom was the inevitable accom paniment of monarchical rule. In eighteenth-century Germany, every sovereign territory down to the smallest im perial knight required a corps of officials ! In the electoral state of Mainz, some 900 officials were employed for a population of 224,000, not cou n ti n g co urt personnel and clergy . There was 1 official for every 250 i n habitants. Moreove r, m a ny constituent units o f the e m pire we re co m po sed o f scat tered rather than consolidated territories. Even under the same sover eign , each separate territory possessed its own administration and j u diciary. Biedermann estimates that there were some two thousand se parate jurisdictions.u This multiplicity of j urisdictions necessitated a large n umber of o fficials, though we have no overall figures. The ranks of the bureaucracy were swelled further by t he general practice of treat ing all teachers and-in Protestant territories-all clergymen as em ployees o f the state. Unlike the tolls on the Rhine , this large and het eroge neous officialdom did not d isappear later. In Germany, bureaucratization is a legacy of political fragmentation and absolutist economic policy, as well as a by-product of advanced capitalism and complex organization. Ever since the e ighteenth century, o fficials, teachers, and clergymen have re presented an important segment o f the German Burgertum . No appropriate E n gl i sh equivalent is available, and the French bourgeoisie is a literal but inappropriate translation . Burgertum and related German terms came to be assoc iated with a level of education, an d this association is absen t from "middle class" or "bourgeoisie." The term Burger also evokes connotations of "financial and moral standing" that have been
NA TION-B UILD ING : GER M A N Y
transferred from t he context o f a s e l f- go v e r n i n g s ma l l co m m u n i t y to the l a r ge r s oc iety . It is a sy m p to m o f these l i n g u i st ic and cultu ral differences that after another h a l f- c e n t u r y of economic deve l op me n t an d at a high point o f German l i beralism i n the re v ol u t io n o f 1 84 8 , 5 8 pe rcen t o f the delegates to the Germ a n N a tio nal Asse mbly at Frankfu rt ( t h e so-called Pau ls kirche) consisted o f c ivil se rv ants , te ac he r s , a n d c l e rg y m e n , while another 24 p erce n t co m prised law y er s , w riters , and other free p ro fes sionals. On l y 9 pe rce nt o f the delegates were m e rchants, man u fac t ure rs , artisans, and landed pro prietors o f no n - n o b le o r i gi n . 1 4 By c o n t r as t to Eng l a n d and to a lesse r extent France , the c ultu rally and pol i t ical l y most active segment of the Ge rman m iddle class consisted o f s t a te e m p l o yees . I n Ge rm a n y as e ls e w h e re , free p ro fe s s ion a l s and ent r e p re neu ria l types in many w a lk s o f l i fe pl aye d a n i m po r tan t role. But since the e i ghtee n t h century, the Ge rman B ii r ge r t u m included a disproportionately large n um be r of state employees. U nder the influence of this gro u p and of the free pro fe ss io na l s , ed u c a t io n b ec a m e s o i m port a nt a feat u re of the B ii r ger tu m as a w h o le that s pecial p hr a se s (B ildungaburgertum or gehob ene Schicht) were occasio n a ll y used to d i s t i n gu i s h this class from persons who lacked education. For this reason I use the p h rase educated common ers in the discussion here. Perhaps the rapid i n cre a se of intellectuals in the late eighteenth cen tury w as as i mpo rt ant a phenomenon a s bureaucratization . There i s no sim ple, causal relation between th i s "intellectual mobilization" a n d the p rolife r a ti o n of offic ia l s . L i te r ac y w as c er t a i n l y not con fined to o ffic i a l s, teachers, a n d c l e r gy men . Yet in te rms of status and ed ucatio n , t h i s stra tum stoo d c l e a rl y above the common people . C on te m po r a r y de s c r i p tions of officials id l in g away their time or attending to business in des ultory fashion also m ention t ha t t h ey re ad ne wspa p e rs . Gove r n m e n t o ffi c ia l s an d c le r gyme n ma y ha v e be e n n ar ro w l y p rov i n c ial , status con scio us, and n e gli ge n t of t hei r d uties, but t he y relied on the p ri n te d word, and in rel ati ve l y we l l- go ver n e d states like Prussia, m i l i t a ry discipline and reformist ze a l saw to it that th e servants of state and church did their d ut y . 1 S The eig h tee n th century witnessed the sporadic development of ed ucation at several levels. Commerce, administration , a n d a n e ffec t iv e m i l i tary force called for elementary l i terac y as well as for ed uc at i o n in law, finance, and higher administration. But the establishment of schools and universities d e pe n d e d on funds that we re o ften unavailable and a general interest in education that was o ften lacki ng. Spokesmen for the status q uo feared that e du cation -e ve n t he teac hi n g of re a d in g and writing-would prompt peopl e to a spire above the ir station. The en l i gh tene d rulers of the period shared such m is gi vings, t ho u gh they often called fo r the establishmen t of schools in the inte rest o f mili ta r y trai n i n g , administration , and commerce. They h ad le ar n ed that increased trade
TOWARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
an d i nd us try would lead to increased re ve n ues, but educational devel opment was im peded . Each of the 250 sove rei gn terri tor ies re q u ired a school system of its own , and funds for ed ucational development were limited. At the highest level, student e n rollm ent in the unive rsities ac tually decl i n e d d u ri ng the co u rse of the century . Average an n ual en rollment see ms to have reached a high o f 4 , 400 i n 1 7 2 0 , s u n k below 4 , 000 afte r 1 7 5 5 , and inc reased to above 7 ,000 after 1 82 0. 1 6 This record of sim u ltaneously promotin g and restraini n g ed uca tional d evelo pmen t re flects the interest of Ge rman rulers. Ed ucation would hel p make soldiers and o fficials into bette r instruments of the royal will but co uld also lead to reactions against autoc ratic rule. N o ed ucation could be insulated a ga ins t the free thou ght of the Enlighten ment. University training had provided pre paration for teachers a nd cl ergym e n , and a fter 1 740 it also became a condition of public employ ment. Three-quarters o f the students were enrolled in the fields of law and theology. Academic teaching was ofte n a ntiquated, though the uni versities of K o n igs be rg ( founded in 1 544), Jena ( 1 558), Halle ( 1 694) ,
and GOttingen ( 1 736) were notable centers of innovation. However, higher ed ucation served the strictly limited purpose of training teac h e rs cl e r gymen and public officials. German rulers generally sought to ach ieve a balance between maintaining the s ta tus q uo and fu rtherin g the intellectual mobilization needed for more effective government. The development of journals and newspa pers was of special con cern to them . Under Frederick the Great, Prussia had a relatively en ,
,
lightened a ttitude towa rd the press , though Frederick publicly dis par
aged German literature. His successors reverted to a more restrictive policy toward the press. However, the center of German cultural life was in the south and west rather than in Prussia. Early in the ei g h tee n t h century, the rulers of both Sa xo n y and Saxony W ei mar issued decrees prohi bi t i ng u n t ru t h fu l new spape r w riti n gs " declaring that t h e y d id no t want "reasoners for s ubj ec t s " 1 7 At the same time, Leipzig with its book fairs was an economic asset, and this made the authorities rather lenient in their censorship of p u bl i ca t i ons a l t ho u g h they still forbade debates on religious questions in the newspapers. Similarly, the duchy of Wiirttemberg witnessed both an intensification of intellectual life and the a r b i t ra ry s uppression of individ ual writers. Later in the century, Saxony-Weimer was exce ptional as the most famous center of high cul ture under the aegis of Goethe and h is patron, G rand Du ke Carl Augus t Thus, autocratic rule could intervene in, but could not control , a burgeoning cultural life owing to the pol it ical fragmentation of the country. With so many sovereign territories in which people spo ke the same la n gu a ge, it was rel a t i vel y easy to escape censorship by moving the place of p ub licat ion to a neighboring state. U nder the se conditions writ ers made invidious comparisons be tween German disunity and powerful -
"
,
.
,
.
NATION-B UILDING: GERMANY
co u n t ries such as France and E n g land , and thereby promoted the "in tellec t u al mobilization" of the ed uca t ed · public. Despite po li t ica l and eco nomic fragmentation, there was a virtual s pr ingtide of cultural in . tere s t in the second half of the eighteenth ce nt u r y S in ce 1 564 sem i-annual catalog u es of newl y p rin t ed works had a p pe a red , and book pu blicat ions p rovide a ro ugh index fo r t he growth of the read ing p ub l ic. D u r ing the e i ghte e n th ce n t u r y , t h e Leipzi g a n d F ran k fu rt book fairs we re the two ce n t e rs for the distribution of books. Most p ublications we re in Latin , Germa n , and French. I n 1 7 0 1 , 5 5 per ce nt o f the books were written i n Lat i n , but by 1 800 t ha t pro portio n had dec lin e d to 4 pe rcent. D u r ing the same pe riod , works in German and Fre nc h became the prevailing lan guage s of books published in all Ge r man-s pe aking territories. This shift in language signi fies a shift in a u d ien ce , for t h e Latin works were add ressed to scholars a n d cle r gym e n exc l u sively, while Fr ench and German works a ppealed to the general educ ated p u b lic . 1 8 TABLE 3 N U MBER O F BOOKS I N LEIPZIG BOOK FA I R CATA LOG UES BY YEAR A N D F I E LD Total
Field
Number of Books Listed by
1 700
1 72 0
1 74 0
1 760
4 30
374
436
Year
1 7 80
1 8 00
269
389
24 1
86
1 72
52
1 49
1 43
63
79
101
70
191
1 98
.H is tory b
1 57
209
22 1
277
469
63 1
Philosoph},c
1 97
1 98
334
392
96 8
1 ,590
46
33
62
1 38
476
1 , 209
978
9 79
1 ,326
2 ,642
4,0 1 2
Theology3 . Law Med ic i n e
Poetr}'d TOTAL
85
SoURCE: G ustav Schwetsc h ke , ed . ,
1 , 1 9 8e
Codex Nundinm-ius German iae Literatae B isec
alaris, Mess-Jah1'bi1c�r des Deutschen Buchhandels ( H a l le : G. Schwetsc h ke ' s Ver l agsb u ch h a nd lun g , 1 850, 1 8 77) , pp. 7 8 , 1 98 , 2 1 8 , 2 3 8 , 2 7 3 , 3 1 3 .
"T he o l ogy includes both P rotes ta n t a n d Catholic w r i t i n gs, but the former
predom inate througho u t . b Based on the more detai led br eakd o w n in 1 80 I and subseq uent yea rs, one can assu me that " history " includes biogra phy, classics, pol i t ics, geogra phy, and travel .
;.
·On similar assu m pt i o n s " p h i l osoph y " i n c l ude s e d u c a t io n , ph i l o l ogy , n a t u ral sc ien ce , eco nomics, "cameralist ics ," tec h nology , mathematics, mil ita ry science, a nd busin ess. d oe U P try" also incl udes music, nove l s , pla ys, and a rt boo ks. "The nu mbers for 1 760 wo u l d have been h igher i f book p u b l is hi ng h ad not
i: bee n affe cted by the Seven Ye a rs' War ( 1 756- 1 763 ) .
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
The data in Table 3 indicate only the ge neral trend in book pub licatio ns, not their absol ute magnitude . For example, the listings for the Lei pzig fair show 2 ,642 publication s for 178 0, but a con tem porary book seller estimated a total of some 5,000 German books and pam phlets, not ' counting foreign language books or m iscellaneous publications. An es timate for 178 3 suggests that some 2,000 se parate publications were is sued in editions totaling 2 m illion vol umes. The n umber of writers living in Germany is supposed to have doubled from 3,000 to 6,000 between 17 73 and 1 7 8 7 . Estimates of the n umber of writers i n specific areas or individual towns are probably more reliable, but all such estimates are a pproximate.19 In any case, there is little doubt abo ut the general trend. This pro fusion of reading matter was obviously a mixed lot: novels, plays, travelogues, biogra phies, religious tracts, and historical and sci entific lite rature at one end, and encyclopedias, almanacs, cookbooks, household manuals, calendars, and a profusion of lurid and occasionally pornographic booklets at the other. Books were often serialized in the various journals which also pro liferated in the last decades of the century, and here the figures seem to be quite reliable. According to the most comprehensive study avail able, 2 , 19 1 new journals were published between 1766 and 1 790 (248 in 1 766- 1 769, 7 18 in the 1 7 70s , and 1 ,225 in the 1 7 80s) . The total for 1 766- 1 790 was three times as large as the corresponding total for 1 741- 1 765 . Thirty-four percent of the new journals in the period 1766-1790 were light reading or fiction (Unterhaltungsliteratur). In other subjects, new journals for the twenty-five year period were distributed as follows: history literature theology pedagogy medicine
1 0 . 0 percent 10. 0 7.3 5.0 5.5
sCIence economics (cameralistics) popular science
4 . 9 percent 4. 0 8.5
The remaining 1 0 . 8 percent were distributed among military science, music, and philosophy. This sudden increase in the publication of jour nals and a rather high degree of specialization went together. There were fifty-six towns, many of them quite small, in which at least three new journals were published between 1766 and 1 790. In the minds of contemporaries, this whole intellectual mobilization represented a major change , and concern was frequently expressed at this proliferation of "scribblers." But whatever the evaluation , all parts of Germany under went a major intellectual mobilization in the last decades o f the eigh teenth century.20 These facts present a paradox which has reappeared many times. During the eighteenth century, the great majority of the German pop-
NA TION-BUILDING: GERMANY
391
ulation lived in the countryside and in sel f-contained hometowns. People were preoccupied with, and took pride in, local affairs. This positive well-being and sense of com m unity was given artistic expression in Goethe's Hermann and Dorothea ( 1 797), a poetic celebration of the par ochial spirit which regards refugees from the French revol u tion with sym pathy and detachment in the happy thought that one is not involved in these world affairs 2 1 B ut even in this quie sc ent population there was an occasional rebel l io u s spirit who railed at the confin ing world in which he had to live. In 17 99 H6lderlin wrote a famous outburst which cas tigated what Goethe had held up to admiration . .
It is a harsh statement and yet I say it, because it is the truth: I cannot think of a peo ple mo re torn a pa rt than the Germans. You see artisans, but not men, th inke rs but not men, masters and servants, youths and established peo ple but not men-is it not like a battle field where hands a nd ar ms and all l i m bs lie about dismembered, while the s pi l t li feblood melts into the sand?22
The vast majority of rural fol k and hometownsmen would have found H6lderlin's statement ve ry strange. Eighteenth-century German society was dee ply provincial. Yet it prod uced a Goethe and a H6lderlin who, for all their differences, were part of an intellectual mobilization which sought to cultivate in a docile, parochial population a concern with the larger issues of humanity. The paradox is that so m uch intellectual mo bilization occurred in the m idst of a society that was far from the main stream of contemporary history. COURT S O C I ET Y AN D THE CULTURAL IDENTITY OF COMMONERS
In the eighteenth century, French cultural influence on the courts of Germany's many sovereign territories was overwhelming. "Germany" was open to foreign influences, because the country had no unity of its own . Each of its many sovereign territories was a se parate social enclave, in which educated commoners were aware of the larger world and had to come to terms with t heir own social position and with the provinciality of their little land. Once the courts with their Fre nch manners and the responses to them are described, we can get a better understanding o f the eighteenth-century German reaction to the French revolution . Under Louis XIV, France had become the most powerful nation in the world. The Frenc h monarch ove rwhelmed his enemies at home and abroad not only in the m ilitary field, but by the exemplary magnificence of his buildings, the works of art he sponsored, and the elaborate cer emonial which distinguished his court at Versailles. The ruling circles of German society responded with alacrity to the latest French fashions.
392
TOWARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
Versailles in 1668 Loui s XIV tu rned a hunti n g lodge into a va st palace with e xte nsi ve ga rdens l a id out i n geo metric de si gn s. As nobles. officials, and retai ners m o ve d i nt o t he buildi n gs adjacent t o the palace, the communit y grew t o 150,000 persons. The design o f this royal establish ment was copied o n a smalle r scale by m any Ge rm an courts o f the eigh tee nth centu ry, as were the e ntertainment s. For exam ple, a three- day fe sti val of 1664 had as its ce ntral theme t he le gend of a m ythical island on which bra ve knight s enjoye d wondrous pleasure s w it h t he aid of an e nchanted ring. The fi rst day included a concert t a bleau extolli n g the fou r se a sons and em ploying animals from far- off lands. The seco nd day saw the prese ntation of a comedy and a ballet performance. T he t h ird day witne ssed great fest ivi tie s on t he e n chante d i sle gu arded b y strange and fearsome water monste rs. T he whole a ffair was con clude d wi th elaborate fi re wo rks. (Giraudon)
The im port of French luxu ry goods contributed largely to the fact that between 1700 and 1790 the German territories had a negative trade balance with France of some 1 8 million Marks ann ually_23 In actuality, most German courts could produce but a sorry imitation of their model, because the economic resources of these territories were small and their political power ne gli gible . Yet in their little worlds. many German rulers expressed their aspirations through buildings, festivals, liveried ser-
NATION-BUILDING: GERMANY
393
van ts a nd ceremon i al displa y s. O utward sp len dor made up for the lack of political substance. Such magn i ficence was seen as the necessary at tribute of a ruler who represented God on e a r t h . If the maintenance of such a court meant t he cru el exp loita tion of the pe o p l e, then this was also considered part of the divine order. The Ge rman courts received encouragement from Fra nce. French em issaries freq uented the re s i denc e s of German ruler s and these in turn ( or thei r r epre sent atives ) were received at Versailles. The Germ a n cul tivati on of the Frenc h manner was e n courage d by the 30,000 F renc h Huguenots who had fled to Ge r m an y after 1685. Dep e nden t on the po we rfu l among t heir German hos ts, t he s e re fuge e s promoted Frenc h fashions by means of the luxury trades in which they were engaged. Frenchmen replaced Germans as p rivate tutors at c o urts and i n ar i s to cratic households, and y oung aristocrats made a s pecial tour of the French capital part of their ed ucation . Eve n after the Seven Years' War, many sons of Ger man ruling houses (not allied with Fr ance ) volunteered for service in the French arm y! In so me court circles, French conver sation became so customary that native Ge rman was looked on as a vul gar, prov incial dialect, and persons of low rank were referred to as those w ho cou l d n ot s peak Fre nc h . The child ren at co urt we re first t au ght French, and outside rs sometimes wondered w hether pe op le at court still kne w German. Even e arly German c la ssics - p l ay s by Le ss i n g for ex a m p le - had to be translated into Fre nch to be perfor m ed (in the elec torate of B r u ns wic k ) . N at u rall y the veneer often cracked even at court: German was frequently s p o ken with i nters persed Fren c h ph r ases . Imi tation o f French fas h io n, use o f French as· the langu age of high socie t y an d de mo n s trat io n s of h oma ge to the French mona rch seemed a sma ll p ric e to pay for an unofficial, but seemingly unchallengeable, verifica t io n of sovere ign status at the German co u rts . The French model was not confined to language , fashio n , and cul ture. At Versailles, you n g German aristocrats could observe the seamier side of court life: sexua l license seemed to be an attribute of h i gh rank. The French hard ly invented the pr acti ce, but Ve rs ai l les gave it the stam p of cultural a pproval. The exclamation of a residen t in the c a pital o f a small German principality w hen he witnessed the wedding proc e ssion of t he re i gn i ng sovere ign illuminates a gener al condition: "Now our prince lacks nothin g bu t a beautiful mistress!" He had se en the fathe r and grandfather with their mistresses and saw this a s a n attribute o f princely digni t y .24 These petty ru l ers often vied. with one a n o t h e r, the n umber of their " conq u e s ts" sometimes taking on an obsessional q uality , as if the y could make u p by "lo ve " what they co ul d not achieve in politics . The re was m uch vi s i t i ng back and forth among the various courts : in 172 1 some four h u nd red fo reign aristocrats s pent time at the Saxon court at Dresden in an eigh t-month perio d . Man y of these cavaliers were ,
,
,
,
3 94
TO WA RD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE
foreign-born aristocrats like Casanova who set the tone by their prodigal man ner. They would spread the word from court to court concerning the customs and splendor they had witnessed elsewhere. There was much to te l l not o n ly about illicit, if eminently public, love affairs , but also about the ro und of activities of high society . Lavish and lon g-drawn-out meals with a multitude of guests we re staged; in the evenings , a French comedy or an I talian ope ra was performed. For persons of standin g, entry to these entertain ments was free of charge. Visits to neigh boring courts and longer journeys to the fairs at Lei pzig or Frankfurt or to the many famo us spas req uired a large entourage and much display. Many special festivals we re held to celebrate the birth day of the prince or his mistress, or the special days of the princely fam ily, or the presence of a visiting dign itary. For that matter, some festivity m ight be arranged sim ply on the spur of the moment. These events were given a baroque style through various allegorical devices. It was taken for granted that the ruler was free to call not only on his own resources but on the people of " his" realm with all of their pos sessions to serve the needs of his cou rt. The pre parations for the festi vals, the events themselves, and the reminiscences they left behind could bring commotion to a whole area for weeks or even months. These ac tivities were most conspicuous at t he small co urts with their discre pancy between prete nse at home and the world outside. But even at the Prus sian court the French fashion prevailed. With his contempt for German language and literature, Frederick II designed his Academy of Science on the French model, with Maupertius as its first president. Frederick hired an obscure French librarian at twice the salary he was willing to pay to Winckelmann , the famous German classicist. Voltaire was sur prised to find that everyone at the Prussian court spoke French. But Frederick combined French fashion and culture with personal austerity and strict disc i pline which he imposed on his entourage . Little of that Prussian spirit w as to be found elsewhere in German court society.25 By imitatin g the model o f Versailles, the German courts and cour tiers were separated by an unbridgeable gulf from the people at large. In Saxony, the aristocracy demanded that its sons be entirely segregated from the sons of bourgeois families, because a common education wou ld unfit them for their social role . Religious cere monies such as christen ings were to be conducted in aristocratic homes, because it would be demeaning to christen aristocratic babies with the same water as ordi nary children. Men of standing preem pted high offices while the actual work was done by bourgeois menials. Any social contact with persons of lower status was granted as a special favor or regarded as altogether demeaning. But the bastard children of a ruler's mistress or cavalie r adventurers with aristocratic manners and pretensions were readily ac ce pted as equals. I n such a setting, affairs of court and state were in the
NATION-BUILDING: GERMANY
395
Frederick the Great Visits Voltaire in His Study Voltaire was the guest of Frede rick II from 1750 to 1753 and in this picture remains seated w hile the king is standing. In t he view of the Enlighte n me n t. the philosop he r a nd this e n lightene d ruler were colleague s in the Re public o f Letters. Voltaire was showered with honors at the Prussian court but e ve n tually fe ll into disgrace. (Potsdam-Sanssouci)
hands of rulers and their confidants, while commentaries on such affairs by persons outside that circle were a social presum ption that was rejected out of hand. A public was absent in the specific sen se that no one outside the ruling circle had the right to an opinion. Frederick I I was relatively permissive in matters of cen sorship, yet his edict of 1784 sti pulated that no private individual had the right to make critical judgments concern ing the activities of sove reigns and their courts, or to publish news of these activities and distribute them by means of print. "A private person
TO WA R D A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
is quite incapable of making such ju dg men ts, since he will be lacking in the complete understanding of circum stances an d m o tive s 26 De fenders of the s ta t us q uo s uppo rted this hierarchic view of so ciety. As em ployees of the state, cle rgyme n teachers, and officials were hardly in a position to dissent from an interpretation whic h le g i t i mize d ."
,
their own role in soc iety. B ut the sa me view was shared by the people at large, es pecially by those middle strata of soc ie t y e n t r epre ne ur s o f various kinds a n d pro fessionals like lawyers, doctors, a n d writers-who in France stood in the fore front of intellectual and po l i ti cal mobilization. As a contem porary observer put it, "Every nation has its [own] great i m petus: in Germany it is obedie nce, in England freedom, in Holland com merce, in Fra nce the honor of the king. I t would take very great transformatio ns, in order to alter the whole direction of a w a y o f t h o u gh t. 2 7 Obedience toward established authority was a stronge r force in Ge r ma ny than "the honor of the king" was i n France . German re -
"
actions to the English and French revolutions reflect that obedience. The English revolution and the execution of Charles I i n 1649 marked the overthrow of an old social order. German writings on this event were unanimous: Th e y condemned the execution of a crowned head in the strongest terms, excoriated the Cromwellian regime which followed, and then welcomed the restoration of Charles I I to the Engl is h throne.28 This acceptance of every l egitima te ruler's sovereign authority remained the p re va il i n g opinion i n the eight.eenth century. To see such acceptance in proper perspective , it is necessary to refer back to the Ge r m an Reformation. Luther had rejected the monastic ideal of me dieval Catholicism and demanded that every Christian believer prove himself in this world. But Luther considered man both intellectually in capable of achieving kn ow l e dge an d morally incapable of achieving vir tue. In his view, man can be reborn by faith alone, each in the calling in which God has placed him. This doctrine proved highly suitable for aristocratic rule and mercantilist practices. Everyone is called to do his best in his a p po inte d role, with due re gard for the traditional modes of work and profit. Com petition and striving after wealth are dangers to the soul, but with faith as his guide the Christian believer may have a modest livin g. At the same time, the ruler and his officials have respon sibility for the country's welfare, which is of no concern to the ordinary citizen. The horizon of artisans and merchants is confined to their call i n g and their religion. It is the task or calling o f rulers and aristocrats at court to know di plomacy, the practices of court life , and the affairs of the world. In this religious construction of the social world, intellec tual interests belong to high society, not to the socially confined circle of commoners. This widespread attitude is reflected in the Moral Weeklies (Mo ralische Wochenschriften), a type of eighteenth-century publication _
NATION-BUILDING: GERMANY
397
modeled after such English journals as the Tatler and the Spectator. Pre dominantly moralistic and didactic in tone , the Moral Weeklies lacked any news content and used a variety o f entertaining literary devices to carry their message. An estimated 110 weeklies appeared in the hal f century between 1720 and 1770. Most of them had edition s of a few hundred u p to a thousand copies, and most lasted only a few months or years. However, ed i tors and publishers often started new ven tures, because when bound toge ther the weeklies served as books in private libraries, and this seem s to have made them profitable. The majority originated in Protestant territories, primarily in large towns like Ham burg, Leipzig, Berlin, Han nover, and Nuremberg. Though a good many were published in small towns, few appeared i n towns of princely res idences.29 The Moral Weeklies provide the best available evidence for the re actions of pe rsons who were educated and had leisure to read, but who were excluded from all political participation . The journals make little reference to occupations or estates but give considerable attention to a middle level of education and interest. They were written so as to be understandable to everyone of ordinary intellige nce-"neither too bad or vulgar for the scholar, nor too lofty and incom prehensible for the unlearned," as the Hamburg Patriot put it. They wanted to be useful and attractive to all estates, but in practice they counted officials , cler gymen, professionals, merchants, and above all women among their readers . The households depicted in the m have servants, the sons travel and go to universities, w h ile the daughters learn French. There is leisure for reading and conve rsation. Men of middle rank have some aristocrats for friends, but do not befriend artisans, peasants , or servants. The Moral Weeklies never portray the virtues of common people who live by proven rules and do not have either leisu re or background for a life of principles derived from reason. The wee klies did not begrudge these people their due respect if they were an asset to the community. How ever, one cannot expec t them to be "virtuous," as defined by the En lightenment. The laws of the time drew a distinction between the status of ed ucated commoners (Bildungsburgertum) who constituted the "na tion ," and common fol k (Po bel, literally rabble) who com prised the sub ject population. The Moral Weeklies were not likely to be egalitarian when even progressive writers called artisans and peasants "half-men" who were not ready for Enlightenment.ao The great majority o f subscribers were state em ployees ; only a few aristocrats figure in the two or three subscription lists which have sur vived. One may s peak of many subscribers as Beamtenbiirgertum (literally "officials as townspeople"), which shows how remote this eighteenth century social world is from the more familiar connotations of "bourgeoisie."31
TO WA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
The Moral Weeklies of the eighteenth century made an effort to instill a sense of purpose and self-assurance among the middle strata of society. Their message of virtue certainly included the demand that everyone promote the common welfare, es pecially in large towns like H amburg with civic traditions of their own. Still, this message was ad dressed primarily to questions of fashion, child-rearin g, and proper con duct in all phases of life. The cultivation of virtue itsel f was considered a way of promoting the com mon good . The object of these d iscussions was to suggest in what ways the common man-lry staying within his proper spheTe-contributes to the welfare of the whole . To be concerned with poli tics is not his task, and ridicule is heaped on those who presume to judge a ffairs of state which require a higher level of knowled ge than is com patible with the circumstances of private persons. Accordingly, the Moral Weeklies had nothing to say about the rights of man, but a good bit about his duties. When "rights" are mentioned at all, they refer to the ways in which a man can maintain his ha ppiness and his peace of mind by being sociable, living up to his contractual obligations, and obeying the authorities, for if he fails in these respects he will be pun ished and his peace disturbed. There is no mention of the inj ustice and arbitrary tyrannies that were rampant in the eighteenth century-not even in Moral Weeklies published in the impe rial towns that prided themselves on their free dom. Here is an exa mple from the Aite Deutsche, published in Hamburg. Just one essay in one issue deals with the freedom of the city, and it emphasizes t he duties which freedom e ntails. Disorderly conduct i s con
demned, as is any willful opposition to authority. One contributes to freedom in this way: I do not meddle in public a ffairs, I do not have the propel' calli ng fo r that. But still I possess love and honesty for the general wel fare. As I see it, free dom is there fore nothing else than the opportunity and the ef fort to promote the general good according to one's ow n fitness
[nach seinem Masse).
As I see
it, he is not worthy of freedom, who g rumbles when he is called upon to contribute his due share to the support of the general good .... To be bound by laws is not slavery; to resist the laws is not freedom, but wickedness.
Just as the common man has his duties, so indeed do those in authority. Moral Weeklies never question or challenge kings or princes. They ex press only the wish that rulers be fatherly, surround themselves with honest advisors, and act for the welfare of their subjects, and in these terms they criticized the courts.32 They state that commoners have their proper and important position in the social order. This self-definition in relation to the high ranks of society and to those below provides the most general background for the German reaction to the French revolution.
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399
The Moral Weeklies gave no direct attention to the affairs of the courts. Other pa pe rs re po rted t he rampant goss i p about l u x ur i es , in trigues, and scandals in over two hundred sove reign residences. But for the Moral Weeklies the world of the courts was a dangerou s or disquiet ing s phere which the honest man would be well advised to avoid . To achieve power and wealth thro ugh a career at court was a matter of luck and took place in a se tting that was hazardous to one's conscience and one's life . Courtly splen dor was a false veneer, service at court em pty o f purpose, and the rational and capable m a n cou ld d o far more useful things elsewhere. But while the Week l ie s denounced fawning and de ceiving courtiers and with the m the whole courtly way o f life, the polit ical i m pli cat ions of that critiq u e were never mentioned. There was no challenge to the i nst i t u tion of the court or to the legit i macy o f sovereign authority . Rather, the d iscussions of court society served as a back ground before which the ethical outlook of the educated commoner the em p hasis on virtue , general w el fare , d i li gence, fam il y h a p pi ness , so ciabi lity, and contentment-could be displayed to good advantage. Seventeenth-century writ i ngs on the courtly arts had advised the man of fashion and good b reed i ng how to cond uct himself in order to achieve his personal ends.33 I n pract i c e , this amounted to advice on the pe rsonal manipulation of others and an iron - wi l le d con trol over one's own emotions-all under t he ou tward guis e of pe rsonal grace and an elaborate etiquette. This is the type of conduct which the writers in the Moral Weeklies calle d po li t ical.
I understand here b y t h e ter m
political man
someo n e w h o loses sight of faith
fulness and honesty in order to realize his u njust inte ntio n s; who perjures himse l f, lies and know s how to dissemble, not in order to ach ieve somethi n g good i n secret, but in order t o d o an evil deed that much more secu rely. Such politics is att ributed to cou rtiers who are told that the y must not have a con " science, that they m u s t not hesitate to violate the holiest allia nce o r covenant
[Biindnisj,
and that they must be adroit enough a lways to i n ve nt a pretext.
But one meets with such politics also very frequently in ordi nary l i fe and in all k i n ds of commerce. It is unden iable that this politics is an i n vention o f hell and t h e most shamefu l v ice i n that it d estro ys e n tirely the good fait h
[Treu und Glaubenj
w hic h i s t h e s o u l of society. Nevertheless, this vice has
fo und its admirers, defende rs, and even preache rs, who have m ade out of it a n art and science and laid down its rules and laws. And in this way the art of being unfaithful appears under the name of politics. 34
Writers in the Moral Wee klies did not want such politics ; r at her, they wished the court would att rac t honest men so that the virtues of the educated commoner could flourish t h e re . One should add that these writings do not attribu te such virtues to some ancient and pure German tradition, nor do they attr i b ute the vices of court life to the evil influence of French culture. In the s pi r it of the En l ighte nment , v i rtue is accessi ble
TOWARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE
to every reasonable man and vice the result of unreason and lack of fai th.35 Hindsight may suggest that the identification of politics with d eception had very dangerous im plications for the future of German society. But as it appears in the Moral Weeklies of the ti me , the defi n ition was a means of rejecting co urt society and raising the self-assur ance of the Biirge rtum. In the co urse of the e ighteenth century, the number of German com moners with social aspi rations inc reased. Free professionals, arti sans, merchants, man u facturers , and the "civil service intelligentsia" ac q uired an ed ucation and were exposed to a considerable intellectual mobilization. Yet these educated com moners were confronted with the French cultu re and personal arrogance of aristocratic courtiers who themselves lacked statu re in the provincial setting of the small German cou rts. Still, most com moners doubted that they were capable of form ing relevant opinions. The y m ight enjoy a level of com fort or even a degree of affluence, but they were content not to come to the attention of autocratic rulers and their officials. Moreover, in thousands of home towns, commoners took pains to kee p this petty official world above t hem from intruding in their affairs. Commoners generally, but espe cial l y those with some ed ucation, tended to search for some sense of value in their own sphere. The personal worth of the individ ual in society is a major the me of German classical literature. In the Sorrows of the Young Werther (1774), Goethe portrayed the demeaning exclusion of his hero from an aristo cratic gathering as a sea r i n g experience-and his novel was a great pop ular success. In h is Wilhelm Meister ( 1 795-1796) , he d rew a telling con trast between the nobleman and the citizen (or com moner): Pe rsonal cultivatio n is only possible fo r the nobleman . . . a certain digni fied grace in common t hi ngs, a sort o f easy delicacy in serious and i m portant ones, beco mes h i m well, for he lets it be seen that he is everyw here in equilib rium. He is a pu blic pe rso n, and th e more cul tivated h i s movements, the more so norous his voice , the more rest rained and measured his w hole being, the more perfect he is . . . . He may be cold , but wit h a clear head; playing a part, but clean . . . . Every t hi n g else which h e has in him and abou t hi m-ca pac ity, talents, riches-all seem to be only extra gifts. Now ima gine a citizen o n l y thi n ki n g of maki n g so me clai m to these ad vantages; he must absolutely fail and he must be all the more unfortunate the mo re N a ture may have give n hi m of im pulse and ca pacity to t h a t mode of bei n g . . .. I f the noble man by hi s personal carriage offers al l t h a t can be as ked o f h i m , the c i tizen b y his personality offe rs not h in g and can o ffer nothing. T h e former has a right t o see m , the l atter onl y t o exist , a n d w hat he wishes to seem becomes ridiculous and in bad taste. The former is to ask and make, the latter i s to effect and procu re-he is to cu ltivate individual capabilities so as to become useful, and it is alread y presu pposed that t here is no harmony
NATION-BUILDING: GERMANY in his manner of existence nor can there be, because he is obliged to m a ke himsel f use ful in o n e direction and m ust, there fore, n e glect e verything else.
Goethe did not expect major c hange s in the condition he diagn os ed nor did he t hink the changes desirable. Eventually, Meister finds personal fulfillment under the ed ucative influence of a company of aristocrats. I ronic detachment was one of the ways in which great writers like Goethe distinguished themselves from the s en t i m e nt a li s m o f the Moral Weeklies .36 Most writers of the classical pe rio d shared Goethe's ske ptical esti mate o f Germany's ed ucat ed commoners, but these writers we re never theless close to the scene to which the Moral Weeklies addressed them selves. One no vel or play after another c o ntrasted the world of the courts and its occa sionally good but predominantly evil and always mas terful men to the world of commoners who were moved by ideals of feeling and piety, of dilige nce and rectitude. The world of commoners was inevitably narrow, and the greatness of German classical literature consists in part in the e ffort to break out of this ide ntification of passivity as the virtue of the Burger, although the scene is frequently and sig nificantly set outside Germany. The courts may be places of vice, but they are also centers of power; the commoner may be virtuous, but he is without power to achieve his ends. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, novels and plays tended to counter this impotence o f common ers by idealizing equanimity and contentment. Man should not quarrel with God, but accept the fate which befalls him as part of divine dis pensation. Indeed, the d ramatic heroes of this literature are almost always a ristocrats-even when the ir actions idealize the typical virtues of the educated commoner. This approach precludes all subjective claims on life, any idea that by his personal intervention a man can change his fate. In Lessing's Emilia Galotti ( 1772), virtue is preserved by the father kil lin g his own dau ghter rather than allowing her to be vio lated by the evil designs of the prince-passivity is overcome but at an enormous price, for action results in the d eath of the daughter, not of the prince. Many subsequent plays show the great difficul ties besetting the virtuous man of action. The inward struggle ove r the problem o f self-assertion provided the classic writers with one of their major themes. Schiller's Wilhelm Tell ( 1 804) is one of the few plays in which a com moner's right to individ ual assertion is finally vindicated, but the setting of the play is Switzerland many centuries earlier.31 With an outlook on life as portrayed by the Moral Weeklies and the classical writers, how d id German commoners respond to the French revolution? There can be no single or simple answer to th is question , but I believe that Friedrich Schiller's work may be taken as re presen tative in a symbolic sense. Schiller ( 1 759-1 805) directly confronted the questions raised by the French revolution . In a letter of 1 793 addressed
4 02
TO WARD
A
MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
to Duke Friedrich Christian von Augustenberg, he j ustified his own preoccu pation as a poet and philoso pher - b u t only after giving full con sideration to the political concerns of the day. The revolution in France seemed to re q uire the attention of every thought ful citizen. In ancient Athen s, Solon had condemn e d citizens who failed to take a stand for or against rebellion , and Schiller approved of Solon ' sjudgment. Surely, the same principle a ppl ied to the Fre nc h revolution , in which the g reat des tiny of mankind is
ca
ll ed
into question, and in which
it appears that o ne cannot remain neutral without becoming guilty of the most unpardonable indifference toward s the m ost h o ly concerns of man. A
sp irited , courageous nation w hich had been considered exe mplary for a l on g
time, had begun to take violent leave of its established social order a n d retu rn
to t h e state o f nature in which reaso n is the sole and absol ute la w - giver . An
a f fair wh i ch o rdinaril y only op port u n is m and the right of the stronger would have decided, has been b ro ug ht before the j ud g m ent - sea t of pure
reason
at least make s some prete nse of being d e ci d e d in acc or dance wit h
and
principles.
Every thinking person may consider h i mse lf ... an associate ju dge in t h is court of reaso n , a lt hough as man a n d
wo r l d - ci tize n
he is also a party to the
case a n d i n vol ved i n its success.38
But in Schiller's j udgment, the revolution had failed to ful fill its great promise. Lawmaking had not become rational, the new state was not founded on true freedom, and man was still manipulated rather than respected. The attempt of the Frenc h people "to institute the holy r igh ts of man and ach ieve political freedom has only revealed that the people are incapable and unworthy. " Elsewhere he says "that a moment so prodigal of opportunity finds a generation unprepared to receive it." The "moral opportunity is lacki n g ," because the lower classes only want to satisfy the i r base desires, while t he cultivated classes offer a repugnant spectacle of a lethargic and deprived character.39 I n Schiller' s view, the task was to reform the character of the people without recourse to the state, for under e x isting conditions the people were incapable of reforming the state.40 He claimed that by cultivating the arts he was addressing the political issues of his day , not evading them. Whatever one's assessment of Schiller's view, he was surely right that the people to whom the Moral Weeklies appealed· were not pre pared to u ndertake the political reconstruction of their country. These people were separated, psychological l y and culturally, from their aris tocratic rulers, and nothing constructive could be accomplished politi cally u n til that gap was overcome. The poet's task was to make one peo ple out of a socially divided society : Our's is no longe r the Hom eric world, in whic h a l l membe rs of society were at a pprox i mate ly the sa me stage in their fee l i n gs and o pinions, and he nce
could recognize themse l ves readily in the sa m e description and meet one an other in the sa me e motions. Toda y , a large gulf is visible between the e lite
NATION-BUIWING: GERMANY and the mass of the nation, due in part to the fact that moral ennoblement an d the en l ight en me n t of ideas.is a coherent whole, but nothing is gai ned by
mere fragm ents [of t h i s process). In addition
.
.
. the members of the n ation
have become extremely unlike each other in t hei r feelings and exp ress i o ns .
. . . In our ti me s ,
a
poe t of t he people h as
to
m ak e
a
choice between the easiest
and the most difficult (course). Either he accommodates himself exclusively
to the comprehension of the large crowd and forgoes the applause of the educated class. Or he pursues both purposes in combination and by the great
ness of his art vanquishes the en ormou s d i s tanc e ex i sti ng between the
twO.41
Thus, Sch iller explicitly defined his artistic task as educational and used his superb poetic gifts to present his audience with an u nderstand ing of the tragic realities of poli tical power 4 2 Along with other writers o f his da..y , Sch i l ler e m phasized the ideal of Bildung or self-cultivation at the cost of any direct involvement with public affairs. He denounced the all purs uing demon of criticizing the state."43 He believed that a higher interest in truth and beauty would lead men beyond the narrow tensions of the day and hel p unite a po litically divided world. Men of good will and liberal sentiment like Schille r and his friends saw little prospect of revolution in a politically fragmented country, and before long they witnessed the terror of the French revolution and became doubtful about revolutions altogether They had little taste for po l i tics where politics was defined as co urt in trigue, and they had no access to it in any case. Yet as spirited men they had high asp irat i ons, a nd under the circumstances the appeal to B i ldun g appeared as a constructive alternative . For they believed that self-cul tivation was worthwhile in its own right and, in the long run, of political significance as well. The ideal of B ildung defined a specifically German contribution to an e n lightened age. With such a co n t ri bution as a seem ingly viable alternative, many men would not opt for a political struggle that appeared hopeless. This is not to argue the case of German ideal ism, but to show what sen se it m ade to the believers. The ideal of Bil dung was a positive alternative in a world of court intrigue and crass commercialism, even though it is a lso true that this idea l ism fostered a neglect of political concerns and skills which proved pernicious to insti tutions based on popular sovereignty. To aim at greater unity among classes in a hierarchic society and contribu te to the cultiv ation of moral and intellectual qualities are wor thy goals in any country. B ut education is a long-run process, its results are always incomplete, and its relation to the political process equivocal. Art has educational im plications, but one suspects that the ideal of self cultivation simply asked too much of ordinary people. One wonders how much Schiller kept the public of his plays in mind when he idealized classical Greece as the model for the artist and the political analyst. Per haps he had an inkling of this difficulty when he wrote, .
"
-
.
TO WA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE Kaum hat das kalte Fieber de r Ga ll oman i e uns verlasse n ,
Bricht i n der Grakomanie gar noch ei n h itzi ges aus. Hardly has the cold fever of Gallomania de parte d , Than a hotter fever, Grecomania, e rupts .4 4
This ironic cou plet describes an i m portant shift from the idealization of French culture at the German courts to a new idealization of classical Greek culture, which had a lasting im pact on German secondary ed ucation. Wilhelm von H umboldt (1767-1835) declared that no people could rival the ancient Greeks in combining "so much simplicity and nature with so much culture," and H umboldt was to play a major role in re forming Pruss ian u niversity ed ucation. This approach was given public sanction when F. A . Wol f was called to the University of Halle in 1783. During the momentous years of the Frenc h revolution, this classical phi lologist justified ancient Greece as the principal subject of general ed ucation by pointing out that no other people could serve so well as a model . I n Wolfs view, the most glaring defect of all other cultures was their tendency to subordinate h igh culture to the most urgent needs of daily existence. Wolf considered it pro per enough to use German in writing on "poli tical, economic, medical , military, mathematical and other useful subjects," which to him were "voracious demands of civi lization"; but only classical Greek could reveal the "manysidedness and depth of culture . " 4 5 An anti political and anti utilitarian attitude of writ ers and academics had been espoused earlier when
the
Moral Weeklies
sought to boost the self-assurance of ed ucated commoners. The-tro uble was that in the hands of vulgar men, Bild ung (of the kind espoused by Wolf) could become a means of social and national self-assertion. It is an ironic reflection that perhaps the fault lay in the very talents of writ ers like Schiller, Goethe, and H umboldt . Psychologically and artistically, their aspirations were simply too esoteric for the ordinary German pub lic wh ich in the late eighteenth century had to come to terms with the French revolution. Among the many reactions to that revolution it is possible to find a common theme, aptly suggested by one of Goethe's Venetian e pi grams. Gallomania had prevailed at the courts, and educated common ers lacked self-assurance and political judgment in their relations with an aristocratic governing class. With this background in mind, Goethe wrote, Lange haben die GroBen der Franzen
Sp rache
gesprochen,
Halb nur geachtet den Mann, dem sie vom Munde nicht floB. Nun lallt alles Volk entziickt die
Sprache
der Franken.
Ziirnet, Machtige nicht! Was ihr verlangtet, geschieht!
NA TION-B UlWING: GER MANY Lo n g have the Gre a t spoken the French ies' lan guage , Little regard in g tho se who did not master the to n gue . Now, del ighted ly, a l l peo ple babble the la n guage of F rance.
M i g h t y ones, do not rage ! Wha t you have demanded, occu rs ! 4 6
The ru ling grou ps of German society had taken the Fre nch monarchy as their model and had ex ploited the people (though Goethe does not say so) to support the luxu ries' of a French cou rt life. Now suddenly, the French revol ution had re placed the old model with a new one. With subtle iron y Goethe suggests that the "m ighty o nes" sho uld not object if people stil l followed the model that had been set befo re them . How ever, he did not think the positive response to the French revolution evidence of a new sel f-ass urance among ed ucated commoners. H e dis approved of their political awake ning , tho u ght it misguided, and con sidered the ideal of self-cultivation irrelevant to the ri se o f political awareness . T he several pha se s of the French revolution set off responses in Germany ranging from a conservative rejection of the revol ution root and branch to democratic and socialist proposals for a con s titution and the equali zatio n of property. Each response had its liabilities. A com plete rejection of French revolutionary ideas also meant s uppor t of the Ger man status q uo with its political pa rticularism at a time when France was advancing the cause of nationalism . A good many conservatives feared revolution in their own cou n try and hence accepted the neces sity of re forms , albeit holding fast to the principles of a hierarchic social orde r and monarchic ruleY At the other end of the political spectrum, Ger man radicals did not want to de pe nd on French precedent and support as the German courts they detested had done, even though they com pletely acce pted the ideas of the French revol ution. In some circles, the credibility of German radical democrats was im paired by the ir identi fication with French revolutionar y excesses.48 The revolution and its Na poleonic aftermath thus tended to undercut both the unyieldi n g de fenders and the radical critics of the status quo. The French revol ution did change German politics despite these unresolved ambiguities . It showed that reform through e n lightened but autocratic rulers was n ot the only way of effecting reform, and this pre sented German critics with a great dilemma. M a n y crucial iss ues of the French revolution were caused by the same abuses which had aroused personal indign atio n and sporadic protest in German y for almost two gene r ations. Should all German critics of such abuses automatically identify themselves with the revol ution ? Or, if they rejected the revo lution, how could they continue as critics of the German status quo? Conservatives like the publicist Schloezer and the historian Johan nes von Mueller deplored aristocratic privilege , the immoralities of high
TO WARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE
society, and specific abuses like excessive taxation , hunting rights, as well as the infamous dragooning of men for military service in foreign coun tries. Schloezer was a highly respected and staunchly monarchist pub licist w ho had strongly opposed the American revolution. Yet this man cursed the despots who had made the Fre nc h revolution necessary. Can cero us lesions could not be hea led with rose water, he maintained. For his part, M ueller was a ske ptical critic of the Enlightenment and greatly feared radical change. Yet he thought it was a good idea that kings and magistrates learn they were also h uman . In his view, censorsh i p was useless because news of the revolution would spread anyway and carry its own message.49 Thus, even conservatives were pre pared for a favor able reaction to the French revolution because of the policies of e nlight ened absolutism -especially those of Frederick II and Jose ph I I . When relatively conservative men greeted the revol ution so warm ly, more lib eral spirits responded eve n more eagerly. Yet this ready acce ptance of an emancipatory ideal was matched by a very widespread rejection of the revolution itsel f. Many liberal Ger mans who had been enthusiastic about the revolution turned against it when Louis XVI was executed in 1 793 and a regime of terror followed. With the fall of Robespierre in 1 794, France ex perienced a retrench me n t under the Directory , allowing German sympathizers of the revo lution to maintain their liberal attitudes as well as their traditional ac ceptance of authority. Moreover, as their sce pticism toward revolutionary methods turned into outright condem nation, German liberals turned fo r i n s pirati on to the E n glish e x pe rience with constitu tional go ve rn m e n t and to the doctrines of the English classical economists.50 As a model for German aspirations, France had become tarnished. The artificiality of French cu lture at the German cou rts had become repugnant. German i ntellectual mobilization had preceded the French revolution for decades, and with the change from revolutionary ideals to the terror France no longe r appeared as the citadel of liberty. The need of Ge rman writers to look to France for cultural and political in spiration had diminished. To be sure, nothing could be done about Ger many's political fragmentation, but considerable progress had been made in reforming the abuses of autocratic rule. A system of laws had been established. Enlightened rulers had begun tc protect the common peo ple against the privileged, to promote elementary and higher edu cation, to clear swamps, and to develop the economy. Governments had become relatively free of corruption, and the better rulers em ployed trained officials to check on the execution of commands. Oppressive religious orthodoxy had been alleviated in the interest of toleration. There was no call for a revolution in the face of such promise , even if as yet only half-fulfilled. On the contrary, there was a belief that the
NA TION-B UILDING : GERMANY
German territories were finding their own way of reformin g the old re gime. 5 1 By the e n d of the eighteenth century, t hen ed ucated commoners and civil servants had acquired a sense of identity not only in the cu l t u ral realm but in public affairs . In 1 79 1 the publicist Sch loezer declared that the Germans were more pre pared than all othe r peo ples for the "q uiet reconquest of the lost righ ts of man ." ,
T o be s u r e the re vol ution will be slow, b u t it is occ u n-i n g. E nlighte n m e n t is ,
risi n g from below, as i n France ; b ut it is als o m e e t i n g with e nli g ht e n m ent i n
t h e u p pe r ra n ks o f society : nowhere a r e the re more cultivated so ve r e i gn s t h an in
Ge r m an y .
. . . Fro m a l l a ppea rances i t will be more the work o f
professional w r i te r s
[Scll1�rL\·telumi)
than of cab i net s t h a t t h i s [ revol utio n ) o c ,
curs slowl y, wi thout m ischief, without a n a rch y . Pr inces wi l l rem a i n p ri n ces
and a l l
Ge r m an s
will become free men . 5 2
That same year, the Prussian finance minister Struensee despaired of reforming the thousand and one anachronisms o f autocratic rule, but by 1 799 he declared that "the bene ficial revolution which . . . Frenchmen have conducted violently from below, we Prussians will cond uct grad ually from above. "53 Later, Goethe articulated the same idea in the manner o f "enlight ened absolutism." I t is t r ue, I cou ld not be a friend o f the French Revol ution , for i t s horrors
touched me too di rec t l y and revolted me daily and hourly, w hereas its ben e fic ial con seq uences cou ld not yet be en v isage d a t that time. N o r cou l d I b e
ind i ffe ren t when i n Ger m a n y one so ught t o i n trod uce i n an artificial manner " s i m ilar scenes, which in France were the co nsequence of a great necessit y . B u t neither was I a friend of an a rbitrary a u tocrac y . I was also com pletely
co nvinced that
a
great revo l utio n is ne ver the fa ult o f the pe o ple , but rathe r
o f t h e government. Revo l u tions are q u ite im possible whenever govern ments
a re pe r petually j u st and alert so t h a t through timely i m pro v e m e n t s they meet [ t he revol ution) half way and do not res ist until the necessary [ re forms) are forced upon the m from below.54
In Goethe's view, successful reform m ust grow out of a nation's own circumstances, rather than by i mitation of another country. He resented being labeled a defender o f the status quo. He was no friend of what was antiquated or unj ust under existin g conditions. But he wanted the good to be recognized where it existed, though he was convinced that even good institutions require constant attention and re form.55 Goethe w as not only Germany's most illustrious poet; he had been the highest paid official in the service of Grand Duke Carl August of Saxony-Wei mar-Eisenach. By virtue of his extraordinary gi fts, Goethe was a unique figure, and his outlook tended to the conservative side of the political
TO WARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE
s pectrum . Nevertheless, his combination of official duties and the ideal of self-cultivation was ty pical of the re form i ntelligentsia of the early nineteen th century. A REVOLUT I O N FRO M ABOVE? In the Ge rman society of the late eighteenth and early n ineteenth centuries, the re was no well-defined group of "leaders i n op po sit i on comparable to the lawyers, religious dissenters, and parliamentarians of England or the philosophes and parlementaires of Fran c e One reason was that Germany lacked a cultural center like Lo n don or Paris . The consequences of this fact are vi v idly described in a review article by Goethe : "
.
N o where i n Ger m a n y is there a cen ter of social l i fe and e d u c a t io n
schaJtlicher Lebensbildung] ,
[gesell
where wr iters can co ngrega te and develop, each i n
h i s o wn field, but i n a uni fied fashion . Bor n d is persed , educated very d i f ferently, mostly le ft o n l y to themselves and to im pressions from very di fferen t situations ; swe pt away by t he preference for this or that example of n ative or foreign l i terature ; i m pe l led to all ki nds of dabbli ng attem pts in order to
test t he ir po we rs wit hout g u id a nce ; o n l y t h roug h gradua l reflection con v i nced of w hat one should u n dertake ; instructed by practice in what o ne can accom pl is h ; led astra y time and again by a large public without taste, which devours the bad and the good with j u s t the same delight ; then again en
co u raged th roug h acquai nt a nce with the educated m ultitude scattered through all parts of th e Reich ; st re n gthe ned by con te m poraries engaged in collabo rative e ndea v o rs ; t h u s the Ge rman write r finally fi nds h i m sel f in t he age of
m a n h ood, in which worry about h is livelihood and a fam ily forces him to look around. O fte n he is forced with t he saddest feeling to obtain h i s l ivi n g
t h ro u gh works he h i msel f does n o t respect, in order to be al lowed to create what h i s mature m i nd would sole l y wish to be occu pied w i t h W hat respected .
Ger man wr i ter will not recog nize himse l f in this picture and con fess with
h u m ble sadness, how often he has si ghed for an o ppor tun ity to subordinate the pec u l iar ities of his creative genius to a national cultu re , which u n fortu nately d id not exist? For t he cu l t i vat i o n of the higher classes th ro ugh foreign fash ions and a fore ig n literat ure prevented a German from de veloping as a
Ge rman early o n howeve r m uch advantage such ,
c u l t iva t i on
has brought us
as we l 1 . 5 6
In our context, Goethe's description is best read as an account of the peculiar stam p which these conditions put on cultural life. In a frag mented country like Germany, the petty circumstances of daily life were not relie ved by larger public preoccu pations as in London or Paris . Per haps it was as a way of countering (or com pensating for) the provinc ial par t icular i sm surroundi n g them that German write rs came to focus on humanity as a whole. Citizenship of the world (Welthurgertum) was a fa vorite slogan of the period .
NA TION-B UILDING : GERMANY
Circumstances did not favor im pulses for reform, although the n umber and importance o f publicists increased considerably during the late eighteenth century. Most of these w riters were staunch monarchists who expected reforms from the enlightened rulers. Their concern with reform was manifested in publicized views that were read by public of ficials and educated commoners, the Beamtenbiirgertum as well as the Bildungsbiirgertum . But it is not clear what either officials or common ers could do. Officials were called royal servants and treated as s uch. Frederick William I of Prussia said , "One must serve the ruler body and soul, with all one's possessions, with honor and conscience, indeed with everything but one's salvatio n : that is from God, but everything else must be mine . " Frederick I I acted on this precept. He concentrated all decision-making in his hands, denied all initiative to subordinates , and distrusted everyone who served h i m -an attitude that inevitably made his officials conceal the truth and work in an atmosphere of universal suspicion. 57 Everywhere in the German states, the chances for construc tive reforms depended on the will and enlightenment of the ruler. Al though no state of the eighteenth century could achieve the com plete regulation of society called for by the ideology of the "well-ordered po lice state," Prussia came closer to this obj ective than most. Its militari zation of society established many direct relations between the state and the individual. The people were a resource of the state, and this ap proach prepared the way for the idea that people who serve the state are entitled to services by the state. This is another basis for government in the name of the people. Between Frederick I I's accession to the throne in 1 740 and the de feat by Napoleon in 1 806, Prussia's population increased from 2 . 2 to 1 0 . 7 m i ll io n people, and its total land area from 2 , 1 8 6 to 6,023 square miles. Total exports and im ports more than quadrupled between 1 752 and t he end of the century. Between 1 740 and 1 806, income from ro yal domains increased by a factor of three, total state income by four and a half, military expenditures by four, and the size of the standing army from 72,000 to 250,000 men.58 All these changes required an expanded civil service . Even Frederick I I, with his prefere nce for the aristocracy, could not hold the line against the administrative advanceme nt of com moners, especially after the Seven Years' Wa r ( 1 756- 1 763 ) had de creased the supply of q ualified aristocratic candidates. Frederick inter vened in the administrative process without warning, and under h is successors personal autocracy continued. Prussian rulers insisted on per sonally making even low-level appointments, partly because they wanted subordi nate officials recruited from retired noncommissioned officers and disabled soldiers, and partly because they wanted to make every official a personal servant of the king. 59 But gradually the Prussian rulers became less capable of personally
410
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
di rectin g a ll public affairs and had to rely on nominee s recomme n ded b y l e ad ing courtiers and officials. As a res ult, the role of profes s i onal ad ministrators increased and attem pts at management on the old pat tern declined , especially after Frederick's death in 1 786.60 By the 1 770s top ad min istrators control led adm issions and promotions thro u gh en trance exa m inations and the establishment of a civil service commission . Standardized qualific a tions for a ppointment and promoti on we re a re markably e fficient method of reintrod u cing discipline and coping with graft and u n a uthorize d exercise of power which had increased d u ring the Seven Years' War. At the same time, entrance examinations served to exclude many nonaristocratic u niversity gra d u ates from com petition , beca u se they lacked the resou rces to pay th e high exa mination fees and to beco me in-service trainees witho ut pay. Moreover, candidates for the examination had to be nominated by ranking supe r io rs who injected standards of social a ccept a b i lity in the selection proced ure. Such prac ti ces p rote cte d the privileged access of aristocratic you t hs to the civil ser vice, hardly a propitious basis for i n d e pen de nt t ho u g ht and in s ti tu t ional reform . Man y officials res po n d e d to the opportunities of a- greatly ex panded state by a determined exploi t a ti on of the adva nt ages accruing to their pr i vil e ged posit io n in state and s oc iety .6 1 Nevertheless, Hegel w as right when he singled out civil servants as "the greatest part o f the m iddle class, the c l a s s in which the consciousness of right and the de
veloped intelligence of the people is found ."62 Several factors contrib uted to this intellectual leaders hip of high government officials. Frederick I I an d his successors e mploye d ed ucated commoners and aristocrats from other German states in top positions when qualified Prussians were in short s u pp ly. H igh social status and experience outside Prussia contributed to the outlook of these men . Under a strong ruler, they were more dependable in the autocrat's struggle with recalcitrant subordinates or with the landed estates. They were likely to be at odds with the self-serving cl i q ue s of native aristocrats in the provinces and in the civil service. Ho we ve r, o ri gin education, and experience made these men impatient with autocratic interference and rather independent in a p proaching the problems of ad ministration . The entrance examina tions to the civil service could pro v i de them with a check against royal arbitrariness, and as non-Prussians they could leave the service in pro test. One reason for the intellectual lead e r s h i p of the Prussian civil ser vice, then, was the fact that at the center of affairs freedom from local ties and declining autocratic interference afforded officials of non-Prus sian origin a n o p po rt un it y to innovate.63 Another reason was the im portance of ed ucational qualifications. Universities were i n c re asi ngl y o rgani ze d to prepare young men for their official duties in government, ch urch, and school. Among the faculties, law had the h i ghes t pre st ige because it was u sual l y attended by stude nts ,
NATION-BUILDING: GERMANY
41 1
from a ristocratic fam ilies. Commoners tended to enroll in t heo l o g y and ph iloso p h y and prepare for a clerical or teaching career. 64 The standard traini n g was state controlled and n a r row in purpose , but by the last dec ades of the eighteenth century universities were losi n g some of th eir e a rl i er a ntiq uated characte r . T h e te ac h i n gs o f A d a m Smi t h became an
im portant, l iberalizin g i n fl uenc e Publi shed in E n gland in 1 7 76, the first vol ume of the Wealth of Nations a ppea red in Ge r m a n t ra n s l a ti on in the sa m e y e a r , w i th the se c o n d vol ume fol lowing two ye ars later. Unive rsities such as Gottingen, Ko n ig s b e r g, and H alle taught the d o c t r in es of eco nomic liberalism ; free trade and o pposition to guilds and other mono p olies became im portan t s ubjects of w ri t i n g a nd in s tr u c t i on Civil servants who became leaders of the Prussian re form m o veme n t had a t ten de d t hese universities and had s peci fically stud ied under professors who were te ac h i n g "Adam Smith. " There is a m p l e e vidence that among high o fficials in Denm ark, Schleswig, Holstein , and Berl i n in the 1 780s and 1790s, the doctrine o f free trade and o f o p pos i t ion to guild m o no po lies was a maj or topic of i n te re st 65 J o urn a ls be ga n to contain more d i rec t discussions of c u l t u r a l and political p ro ble m s . T h o u gh cl a ss i fi cat ion o f jo urna l s by content is un certain, o ne co m pi l a tio n indicates that the nu mber o f cultu ral- political j ourn a ls increased fro m seven in the 1 770s to twenty in the 1 780s and twenty-four in the 1 790s.66 Some of these journals were shortlived, al though a good many appeared for a decade or more . Many articles were pu b li s hed anon ymousl y , but fi ft y n i ne writers could be ide n ti fi ed : Nine teen were a r istoc rats and forty ed ucated commoners. While there were some conservatives among them, the great m ajo r it y of the writers fa vored re fo r m s and came from families of civil servants and c1ergymen.6 7 .
.
.
-
Th i s q u icke n i n g inte rest i n public issues a m o ng Germa n civil ser
vants was pa ral lele d by much cultural ferment in the Pru ssian capital of Be r l i n , the nearest a p p ro x i m a tio n to a co s m o po lita n city the n e x i sti n g in Germany. In 1747 the city had 1 07 , 000 i n h a b i ta n t s and by 1 798 that nu m be r had increased to 142,000-not i nclu d i n g t he m i l i ta ry ga rris on . In the decades a ro u n d 1 800, Be rl i n was a center of c u l t u ra l activities with i ts large number of journals ( inc l u d i n g a plethora of scu rrilous pamphlets), its priva tely o rg a n i zed lectures, and its fashionable salons .68 In our co nte x t, the so-called Wednesday Society ( M ittwochgesellschaft, 1783-1 800) is o f special interest, since it provided a meeting ground for higher civ i l servants and the literary intelligentsia. Lectures were held " in the ho u s es o f participa nts and dealt with political q u e stio n s of all kinds, e s p ec iall y with problems of ad m inistration and political philoso phy. The par t ici pa t io n of o ffic ials as p ro m i ne n t as Svarez, Klein , and Dohm suggests that for a m i n o r i ty o f h i g h l y placed civil servants the ideals of BiJdung reinforced their efforts of co pi n g with t he mou n t in g p ro b le m s o f s ta te a d m i n ist r at io n .69 ,
412
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
What kind of intellectua l leaders h i p could reform-minded civil ser vants provid e ? Most of them h a d shared in the init ial enthusiasm for the ideals of the French revolution and in t h e s u b s e qu e n t disenchant ment-a reaction which once again endorsed the enlightened absolut ism that most of them had never real l y abandoned. Yet this endorse ment was a contradiction from which Ge rman liberalism could never free itself. Re forms under absolutist auspices a re state directed, whereas en lighten m e nt means "to use one's intelligence without the gu idance of another" (Kant) . The desire to promote both state-d irected re forms and e n ligh t en m ent is paradoxical. Hegel's desc riptio n of c i v il servants ex em p lifie s that paradox . He cal ls civil servants the class which is politic a lly conscious and [ t he one in which ed ucatio n l i s most pro m i n e n t . Fo r this re ason i t is a l so the pillar o f the state so fa r as honesty and i n te llige nce are concerned . A state w i t h o u t a m i d d le class m ust there fore re main
on a
low le ve l . Russia, for in
stance , has a m ass of se rfs o n the one hand and a mass o f ru lers o n the other
.
I t is a prime co ncern of the sta te that a m i d d le class s hou ld be deve lope d ,
b u t this can be done only
.
.
.
b y givi n g a u t h o r i t y t o s pheres o f partic u lar in
te rests , w h ich are relatively i n de pe ndent [civil soc iety] , and by a ppoi n t i n g an a r m y of o fficials whose personal arb itrariness is b roken aga i n st such a u thor ize d bod ies . 70
On the one hand, civil servants are said to be the greatest and most
educ a te d part of the m iddle class, the pillar of the state. Yet the st ate , as a d m i n is te re d by these offic ials , is also cal led on to develo p " s p heres of pa rt ic ul a r interests, w hich are re lati vely independent." (This idea probably reflects both t he practice of g iv i n g state assistance to priv ate e n te r pr i se s and Hegel's recognition of civil societ y as the sphere of in depend ently acting individuals which he ada pted from E n gli s h political economy.) Under the direction of an absolute ruler, then, one part of the middle class (civil servants) is to h elp create another independent part of the middle class ( pa rtic u la r interests). Hege l adds that the o ffi cials will be prevented from using their "ed ucation and skill as means to an arbitrary tyranny" by the sovereign working on them at the to p and " corpo ra t i on r igh ts working on them at the bottom . 71 "
Hegel's assessment of the civil service accurately describes the out look of reform-m inded civil servants themselves. They understood that reform is the task of state action and that its aim must be the protection of ind ividual r i g h ts . The two principles were most re adily applied to the le ga l position of the officials the mselves. As servants of the king t he y are subject to arbitrary dismissal, but as servants of the state they must be protected against royal arbitrariness. Here state action itself m ust be reformed by l aw s which re gu l a te the legal position of civil servants. The
NA TION-B UIWING: GERMANY
ruler would the n be ob l i ge d to conform to the req uireme nts of the law . Some of these ch anges were incorporated in the General Prussian Code (;I.llgemeine Landrecht ) of 1794, w h ich substi tuted the phras e "officials of the state" for the earlier " royal servants" and prov i d ed some legal safe g uards against arbitrary dismissal. But these sa fegua rd s were lim ited a nd d id not p rovide fo r the pe rmanent tenure of civil servants d u ring good behavior. 72 The legal protect ion o f all civil servants against both arbitrary d ismissal and com pu l sory removal to another post had to await th e fu rther l e gislatio n of the 1 820s and 1 840s. Nevertheless, the Prus sian c ivil service of the early nineteenth century promoted the view that state action t h rough lega l re form and the protection of individ ual rights a re com patible goals. This ide a did not remain confined to the civil service. With prom in e n t officials in the forefront o f the reform movement and "enlight ened absolutism" t he most wi d e l y acce pted po litic al principle, it was nat ural to e x ten d the idea to s o c i e ty at large. The need for reforms was gene ra l ly acce pted, es peci al l y after the catast rop h ic Napoleonic v ictor y over Prussia in 1 806 . B y means of l aw the state could initiate reforms and define its own limits ; t h us, " pa rt icu l a r inte rests" would be both en coura ged by the state and pro te cte d in their r i gh t s by law, even from the state. The pro m otion o f i ndust r y is a case i n po i nt. Disillusion with the French revolution intensified the lo ng s ta n d i n g interest o f German liberals in Englis h culture . German t ravelers were impr e s se d by the e co nomic pros per ity of the country. It was natural, therefore , to visit E ngla n d with the idea of le a rn i ng its in d ust ri a l tec h no l ogy. The Prussian government se n t a n umber o f offi cia l s , and pr ivate ,
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entrepreneurs went as well . At the same time, German travelers, offi
cials , and entre preneurs noted with a ppre hension the seamy side o f in d ustrial p ro gr ess the poverty, ill h ea l th, and premature death of many -
workers. These observers came from a country in which the economic ro l e o f go ver n men t was p rominent In Prussia the state had its own salt mines, collieries, iron works, and armament factories ; and the o the r Ger m a n states p urs ued a similar pattern . So the re was no incentive to follow En g land s e xamp l e o f leaving industrialists and merchants to their own devices. On the contrary, it was assumed that by means of state sponsorship, t he advance o f German ind us t ry could be achieved more rapidly and the gap between Germany and England na r ro w e d 73 Leon a rd Krieger has observed , "The general rule of reform was the ex tensio n of monarchical a uthority by destroying the rem nants of aris tocratic and ad m i n i st rati ve autonomy, by establishing the eq ua l i ty of all citizens before the roya l law, and by conceding an economic and social mo bility which would u ndermine loc a l a n d provi ncia l attachments."74 The general rule was im plemented under N a poleonic a u s pices with the .
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TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
abolition of serfdom , the legal protec t ion of re l igiou s differences, an d t h e loosening of t he gu ilds' stranglehold on t ra de and i n d u s t ry . The great reformers of the pe riod were S tein, Hardenberg, and H umboldt. All three we re aristocrats and high civil servants who adhered to the German liberal creed of maximizing bot h state power and individual freedom . I n deed, they be lieved that the first was a necessary conditio n of the second. Karl Freiherr Vom und Zum Stein ( 1 757 -183 1 ) re pe at ed ly j uxta posed the sanctity of personal freedom with the need for a powe rful governmental administration and the duties of pa t riotism, w h ich would pro m pt the peo ple to sacrifice property and life for k in g and fatherl and. During the re form period , Stei n was natura l ly preoc c u p i ed with revitalizi ng the Prussian state ; thus, he conceived of the free activity of individ uals as a contribution to the stre ngt h of pol it ic a l a u t ho r ity Here freedom appears as a constituent element of state power, not a cons t rai n t on it. Freiherr Karl Au g us t von Hard e nber g s ( 1 7 50- 1 822) o utloo k was .
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very similar. Like many others, he endorsed the ideals of the French revolu tion but rej ected the rev olu t ion itsel f. He desired a more cen tralized German constitution and a federation o f p rinc es under Pru s s ia n h e gem o n y . He wanted to see the realization of "true freedom " ; eq ual application of t he laws, free co m petition based o n me r i t sec u r it y of property a n d pe r so n, a n d t he eq u a l distribution o f burdens . I f Prussia was to survive as a state , it must adopt these "democratic principles in a m on arch ic a l go ve rn m ent. ,
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The revo l u tion has been promoted to an eve r i ncreas i n g extent by the ill usion that o ne could cou nteract the revo l ution most e ffectively by adherence to the o ld a nd by the severe persecution of revolutionary princ i ples . [ B ut] t he power of these princi ples is so great, they a re reco gn ized a n d disse m i n a ted so gen e rally t h a t the state which rejects the m m ust acce pt it s own de m ise or face up to t he i r e n forced ado ptio n . E ve n N a poleon a n d his favorite aides with thei r crav i n g for do m i n ation, the i r pride a n d their plunde rin g are subject to the power of those princi ples, and will re main so. T here is no den y i n g that N a poleon ad heres to t hose princi ples in many essent ials , or is at least obl i ged to a bide by t he m to save appearances , despite the iron des potism of h i s rule. Our aim and our g u id i n g pri n c i p le is a revolutio n in t he good sense , one that will lead to the great goal of e n n obl i n g m ankind thro ugh the wisdom of governme nt and not t h ro u gh violent i m pu lses from w ith in or from the out side . De m ocra tic princi ples in a monarch ical government : to me this seems t he appropriate fo rm for t he spirit of t he prese n t a ge . 7�
On this basis, Hardenberg advocated unlimited freedom in economic and social activities, proposing the emanci pation of the peasant and the abolition of estate distinctions and of tariffs and guilds-though he re mained very cautious with regard to intellectual freedom and the ex tension of political rights. However such policies worked in practice,
NA TION-B UIWING : GERMANY
their goal was again a strengthening o f state power and of individu al freedom . Wilhelm von Hu mboldt ( 1 7 6 7 - 1 8 3 5 ) went farthest i n opposing state power on theoretical gro unds. He is best known for his essay " I deas for an Attem pt to Determine the Li mits of the Power of the Sta te, " which was written in 1 792 but not published d uring his lifetime. In this essay , Humboldt accepted the political system, but sought to exclude the state from all sphe res in which poli tics would hinder the development of the human spirit. When these convictions were put to the test, Hu mboldt tended to com promise. As Prussia's minister of ed ucatio n , he was con cerned with the cultivation of the individual's personality . B ut in that position he also recogn ized the necessity of state action on the ground that the state makes the social arrangements which i ndividuals need for their many-sided deve lopment. He meant to restrict the legal com pe tence of the state, but he also called for state action when me n were not sufficiently mature for a free development of the self. Thus, even the foremost German spokesman of an antistatist liberalism did not in prac tice deviate from the sim ultaneous endorsement of state action and in divid ual liberty. 76 It remains for us to consider what a "revolution from above" ac com plished for the mandate of the people. The answer is not much , and this answer is related to the social and political position of the bureau cratic elite which headed the Prussian reform movement. LIBERTY AT THE K I N G'S COM M A N D The mandate o f t h e people presupposes some idea of equality, i f only because such a mandate requires a larger popular participation i n politics than the authority of kings permits. Participation and equality are ideals with many facets. In England, religious dissenters opposed the hierarchy of church o ffice and advocated a more egalitarian orga nization in which the congregation could participate. The modes of that participation varied from the Presbyterian emphasis on elders to the Quaker emphasis on the brotherhood of all believers. At the same time, civil lawyers appealed to an ancient constitution and the supremacy of law to which all authority should be subordinated. The lawyers' principle of equality under the law arose from a narrow guild-spirit, though this was compatible with congregational equality. In France, still a third meaning of equality came to prevail. The philosophes defied the au thority of crown, church, and nobility in the name of reason. A new equality of citizenship was asserted in place of the old inequality of priv ilege. Hence forth, the nation alone possessed sovereign authority, and all men were equal partici pants in that nationwide constituency . The representatives of that constituency would issue the laws under which
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
men would live in peace . All three meanings of equality-under God, under the law , and in the name of reaso n -were incompatible with Prus sian traditions.e The pri n ciple of monarchical legitimacy proved to be the basic ob stacle . The French revolution had challenged that principle by its over throw of the monarchy and the election of a constituent assembly , thus replacing the old p ri nc i ple of legi timacy with the new one of the sov ereign nation under law . Was it possible or desirable to reconcile mo narch ical rule wit.h popu lar re presentatio n ? Between 1 807 and 1 82 2 , the st ruggle over constitutional reform in Prussia turned on this question. I m pulses for the re form of poli tical institutions antedated Prussia's de feat by N a poleon in 1 806, for there was dissatisfaction with the exclusion of commoners in a society of commercial and intellectual mobilization. Re form-minded civil servants were s pecifically dissatisfied with two glar ing defects of the old order: the multi plicity of overlapping j urisdictions and the multiplicity of guild monopolies , tax exe mptions, hereditary privileges, and other vested interests. Both preoccu pations were evident in the administrative career of Hardenberg long be fore he played a leading role in the reform move ment. In 1 7 76, as councillor of the exchequer (Kammerrat ) in Hannover, he advocated that the manageme nt of royal domains be put in the hands of private entre preneurs who could profit from increasing agricultural prod uctivity. Such a measure would have separated the economic s phere, based on capitalist princi ples, from the centrally organized administra tive staff, pa i d by fixed salaries and solely charged with go ve r nm e nt al responsibilities. This proposal was rejected. Later, as minister of the Prussian state of Ansbach-Bayreuth ( 1 790- 1 798) , Hardenberg ad dressed himself to the task of overcoming the crazy-quilt jurisdictions o f a territory with 400,000 in habitants extending over 1 1 6 square miles. The borders of this little land were broken u p by more than twenty dif ferent jurisdictions consisting of d u kedoms, imperial cities, principali ties, ecclesiastical estates, and various jurisdictions of imperial knights. In combating these conditions, Hardenberg m ade use of the centralized administrative devices that had been developed in France. As a result, he acquired the re putation of a radical reformer, possibly a Jacobin, in the eyes of those whose established rights his measures violated. 7 7 I n practice, the Prussian re formers faced an insoluble dilemma. Military defeat and foreign occupation had discredited monarchical au thority, whose conservative spokesmen were on the defensive against the populist ideas emanating from France . But a strong monarchical au_
• As in C h a pLer 5, the last two sections o f t his c ha pter dea l mostly with Prussia in con trast to the earlier sections w h ich deal-a lbeit broad ly-with "Germany." At a few points, t h i s focus on Prussia m ust be s u p plemented by reference to all-German events.
NA TION-B UILDING: GERMANY t h o r ity was re quired to si m p l ify jurisdictions and curb vested interests. U n der the c ircums ta nces, re fo r m e rs li k e Ste i n , H a rd e nbe rg , and others concluded that the monarchy had failed to engage p ub l ic interest and initiative. They favored po p u l ar re presentatio n largely in the sense of en li s tin g the populace in defe n di n g the fatherland and p rovidi n g stro nger sup p o r t of the monarchy. They believed that society must be b rou ght into closer coo p e ratio n with the state . The re formers addressed t his a p pea l to the king in the interest of making his rule more effective. But spokesmen of the restoration called o n t he kin g to grant greater authority to the old estate assemblies and hence restore the political par ticularism which the Hohenzollern r u l e rs had overco me in the seven teenth cen tury . Such ar gu m ents re gu la r l y conj u re d up the spectre of a po p ula r u prisin g which was imminent if any concessions were made to po p ular d emands fo r re presenta t io n . I n t he end, the forces of resto ration won out-supported as t he y were by similar forces in France and A u s t r ia. The Prussian k i n g 's rejec t io n of any form of po p u la r pa r t ic i pa tio n was made still more gallin g by pub lic p ro mi ses of a con stitution on three se parate occasions ( 1 8 1 0, 1 8 1 5, and 1 820). U n i late r a ll y give n, the se pro mi ses were as u nilater ally withdrawn. Each time, the fear of re vo l u t io n p ro vid e d the most e ffective argu ments in defense of e s t ab li sh ed priv il ege. 78 Still, many conse rva t i ve s w e re re ad y to accept re form once the le gi ti mac y of monarchical rule was assured. For the m o n a rchy had bee n defeated at j en a , its resou rce s were strained to the utmost, and po pular d i sa ffect ion could beco me dan gero u s if no refo r ms were u ndertaken. Reformers like Stein and H a rd en be rg were themselves conservative men who w an te d to make the established ord e r more effective. Thus, a go od many conservatives acce pted reforms that aided the mobilization of econo mic resources, even if t h ese reforms had to be p ushe d through against diehard defenders of the old p a rtic u l a r i st ic jur is d ic tio n s. "Lib erty ye s , po p u la r r e prese n ta t i on no !" would have been an apt summ ary of the sp i rit in which t he P r u ss i an bu re aucracy promoted institutional reform . 79 By int ro d ucing l ibe rt ies a t t he k i ng's command, the Prussian reformers saw to it that these new li be rt ie s would not enhance political libe rty as we l l . Prussia was predominantly ag ricultura l, and serfdom was its most gl a ri n g denial of liberty. W i t h the accession of F red e r ic k William I I I in 1 797, the king h im self took the initiative in s po n so r i n g the removal of restrictions, be gi nn in g with the e manc i pa t io n of pe a s a n t s on the roya l domains. T he wo rse ni n g international situation tem po r a r ily h a l te d th i s e ffo r t, but i n 1 807, fo l lo win g the defeat at j e na , it w a s declared that serfdom should be abolished on pr ivate esta te s t h rou gh ou t the co untry, the measure to take e ffect in 1 8 1 0. At t he time, owners o f la r ge estates in East P r u s s i a we re i nc reas i n g l y u s i n g la n d les s l abo re r s , a n d agr ic ul-
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
tural estates were changing hands at a brisk rate. The decree o f 1 807 al s o re moved all restrictions on the sale o f land ; thus, landed e sta te s h ithe rto rese rved fo r the aristocracy could now b e acq ui r e d b y m iddle class or pe asa n t pu rchasers , wh ile the a ris toc r ac y in turn was now al lowed to engage in i n d ustry and com me rce . B u t w h i le thes e last mea s u res e ffe c ti ve l y removed the legal basis of the ex i st ing estates , the e ma n cipa tio n o f the serfs prov ed m o re trou blesome becau se of la ndlord r e s i st anc e The bas ic problem o f abo l i s h i n g se r fdo m (as later in Russia) was t he e ffect of aboli tio n on the rights of p ro pe rty . Those who o p posed e man c i pa t i on on t hese g ro u nd s t y p icall y did no t s to p t o co n s i der tha t t h e r igh t s over t he peasa n t as a pe rso n h ad o ft e n bee n esta b l i s h ed b y u s u r p a t i o n generations earlier. Past violations did no t d i m in i s h the claims of those who c urre nt l y held title to the peasant's services. Hence, legislation had to come to terms with t h e q u e s tion o f how t he e a r l ie r obliga tion s o f peasant-serfs toward the k nigh t l y estate owner (Rittergutsbesitzer) were to be handled. The rights of peasants ranged from those of the hered i tary leaseholder t h rough claims of peasants to portions of the harvest down to the low status of the tem porary leaseholder. It became neces sary to define these several rights of peasants, assess their remaining service obligations, and determine compensation for the " purchase of freedom" appropriate to each level o f ob l igation Inev i t ably the estate owners claimed to be sho r tc hanged , espec ially where settled peasants rather than landless laborers provided the bulk of the work force. Under the edict of 1 8 1 6, w hich assessed the rent payments due from each peas ant, many peasants proved unable to keep up the payments require d of them. They had been freed only in the sense that they were now direct subjects of the king rather than personal subjects of their landlords. Unlike the peasants on the royal domains, they had not been relieved from the duty to provide services which were incumbent on them i f they were given the right to till the land. These were the d i ffic ul t ie s of transition from a rural economy in which land was encumbered by various rights often of long standing, to one in which land was a commodity freely traded on the market. In the earlier economy, the ri gh ts and duties attached to personal status could not be readily disting u ish e d from those con nected with the land, and the new legislation did not make that distinction any clearer. For ex ample. the noble estate owners lost their inherited claims to the personal service of t h e peasants on their estates. But neither the legal freedom of peasants nor the commercialization of land destroyed the old aris toc r atic righ ts of jurisdiction, exem ption from the land tax . and exclu sive control over local self-government in the country districts . (These r ights of the landed ar i s toc racy were lost only in 1 848/49, 1 86 1 . and 1 89 1 . respectively. 80) In the thirty years following the 1 8 1 6 edict. 1 mil.
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NA TION-B UILDING: GERMANY lion hectares ( 1 hectare = 2.47 acres) and well over 1 00 ,000 peasan t holdings came into the possession .of the aristocracy. 81 The peasants who were forced off the land and now constituted an agricultu ral proletariat were still subjected to a patriarchal regi men by law (Gesindeordnung o f 1 8 1 0 , a code regu lati n g domestic master-se rvant relations). Eco nomic li berty had been introd uced into the co untryside by the legal abolition of serfdom and the commercialization of land, but the privileges o f the lan ded aristocracy were re i n fo rced. The res ult was that the new inequalities o f the free market were com pounded by the old inequalities o f hereditary privilege. In accord with the princi ple of the free market, the peasants had bee n granted their "liberty" which exposed them to the risks of unem ployment and deprivation , unrelieved by whatever protection the old patriarchal sys tem may have provided . I n addition, the dispossessed peasants were in jured psychologically . T heir new personal liberty made contin ued social inferiority more galling because patriarchal authority under the new order was in practice indistinguishable from the old serfdom . As Max Weber was to observe later, Domestic servan ts flee the house hold of the m aste r. T h reshers wan t to seve r the ir close tie-in with the economy of the estate . The laborer on an n ual con trac t rel i nq u ishes his secu re positio n , i n order to m ake his precarious way as a
"free" day laborer. The peasan t with very l ittle l and would rather s tarve
t h an acce pt a job and work for someo.ne else . Inn u merable workers prefer to pay any price to a jobbe r for a piece o f land and to live in abject depen dence on creditors who c h arge usu rio u s inte rest rates , all this for the sake of the " se l f-de pendence" which they crave , i .e . , fo r the sake o f i n d e pendence from personal subservience to a master.82
We saw that the edict o f 1 80 7 permitted aristocrats to engage in trade and com moners to purchase a knightly estate (R ittergut ) . By 1 8 1 0 other decisive steps toward a free econo my were taken. Henceforth, ev ery adult worker was allowed to practice any trade on obtaining a license, though some occupations were made dependent on a proof of profi ciency as well. A year late r , t he old guilds with their monopolistic re strictions were abolished . Anyone could now hire apprentices or jour neymen, and most qualifyin g examinations were resc inded. 83 The effects of these measures were far-reaching. Until the m id nineteenth century, craftsmen made up a majority of the urban popu lation. With guild mono polies removed, the crafts were soon teeming with artisans who had little training and no capital. In a city like Be rlin, principles of economic individ ualism had found their s pokesmen well before 1 800, but by the early nineteenth century the municipality was alarmed at the deterioration of workmanship, the "speculation and ir responsibility" among a rtisans , and increasing une m ployment. By 1 838
NA TION-B UILDING: GERMAN Y
42 1
the handicrafts had deteriorated , the number o f bankruptcies increased , and expenditures for poor relief quadrupled in less than twenty years. O ther cities showed sim ilar developments, and the hometowns had a furthe r incentive for their excl usionist policies . 84 As a result, sen timents favoring the old protective, if mono polistic, system were widespread , even i n the large towns. The old order of many sovereign te rritories im peded trade by its ma ny customs barriers. The Prussian customs law of 1 8 1 8 abolished all i nternal imposts and levied d uty only at its external frontiers. In addi tion, between 1 82 8 and 1 83 6 the Ge rman customs union ( Zollverein ) under Pruss ian leade rsh i p abolished duties throughout the German Con federation. Only the states of northwestern Germa n y remained out side the union, though local resistance throughout Ge rmany was often considerable . Abolition o f internal customs barriers meant inc reased com petition and the encroachme nt of the factory system on local craft guilds and markets.sli Great strides in taxation were made in 1 8 1 0 when luxury and consumption taxes were a pplied generally, distinctions be tween u rban and rural tax payers abolished, and an occu pational and a
The Congress of Vienna, 1 8 1 5 In t his formal pictu re by Jea n -Baptiste Isabey, t h e fi gu res i n t he fo re grou nd ( fro m left t o r i ght) a re H ardenberg of Prussia (seated) , Metternich of A us t r ia (sta n d i n g) , C a s t l e reagh o f B r it ai n ( sea ted , partially hidden by the back of a chail"), TalleYl"a nd o f France ( sealed, full face) , and Stackelberg of R u ssia (seate d , in profile) . Th e assertion of m o narch ical le gitimacy and reli gi ous o r t hodo x y ga ve the " Holy A lliance" t he a ppearance of unity w h ich it d id not posse s s . A conte m po r a r y ca ricatu re gi ves another versio n of the Congress, showi ng (from left to righ t ) Talleyrand obse rv i n g events from t he sid e l i nes ; Castlereagh deliberating whet her to join the merry d a nce of England's allies, Fred erick William I I I , Mettern ich , and Alexa nder I.
Mea nw hi le , t he king o f Saxony fears the loss of hi s
crown and the Re public of G e noa plays up to the .. . .
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othe r powers in the ho pe of kee ping i ts indepen dence. (AI�rlina, Vienna)
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general income tax lev i e d . E v en a general land tax was introd uced w hich did a w a y with the previo us t a x e x e m p t i on s of the aristocracy But these initial successes of the reform moveme nt did not last, and d u ring the 1 820s a n d 1 8 3 0s m an y of the old privileges were reintroduced. In the field of taxation , lasting re form had to wait until the second hal f of the nineteenth ce ntury. The leaders of t h e P r u s si a n re fo r m moveme n t clai med to have made a revol ut ion from above ," for these and related measures were geher a ll y similar to those e n acted by t he co n stitue nt assembly of the Fre nc h revol utio n . Howeve r , Prussia s u p pre s se d a l l move s to w a rd co n s t i tut io n alism . E v en when privileged jurisdictions were d estroye d priv i lege s were freq u en t ly reasserted in another form. Moreover, Ge rm a n l i beralism itse l f dep a r t ed very early fro m t he princi ple of lai ss ez faire when it became apparent tha t a free market would create many intrac table social problems. 86 These tendencies toward restoration were part of an international reaction to the threat of revolution. Hence, the Prus sian deve l o pment must be related to German and, indeed, to European ' develo p ments which directl y affected Prussian internal affairs . The final defeat of N a po le o n in 1 8 1 5 was followed by the Congress of Vienna, convened by the victorious powers of Austria, Russia, and P rus s ia T he political order established under N a po leon was r eplaced by the Ge rman Confede ration ( Deutscher Bund) of thirty-nine so vereign territories ( including four cities) . The Congress (d ubbe d the "Holy A l liance ) endorsed the princ i ple of patriarchal government, based on the solidarity among throne, altar, and nobility. On the w hole, the policy of restoration was successful throughout Ge r man y After more than two decades of war and revo lution l arge segments of the po pu lat i o n were eager for peace. In Prussia, even the leaders of the reform movement endorsed the general effort to stabilize conditions under monarchical rule. B ut they believed such stability could be achieved only by moderate constitutional reforms, not by mere appeals to law, order, and loya l ty. This modest constitutionalism became the main point of controversy in Prussia as well as in the other states of the German Confederation . N apole o n s conquests had sp read the nationalism a n d constitution alism of the French revolution throughout the Continent. The national ist as piratio ns for a unified Ger m a ny were dashed by the Congress of Vienna, but con stitutionalist princi ples were not rejected . The Congress had an interest in helping the new states of the German Con federation consolidate the legitimacy of their several territorial po ssessions The adoption of a constitution was a means to that end, though in the spirit of the restoration these constitutions tended to combine explicitly con servative precautions with a toke n acceptance of liberal princ i ples. In any event, nationalism and constitutionalism were in the air, reverber.
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NATION-B UILDING: GERMANY ations of a revolutionary tradition which the N a poleonic era had height ened rather than diminished. A fter 1 8 1 5, small groups inspired by revolutionary nationalism sprang up in a ll parts of t he German Con federation, b rou g h t to ge t he r by common o pposition to the re storation with i ts political particularism , its domineering bu re a u c r a cy, a n d its legitimist defense o f monarch ical absol utism . Service in the wars of liberation against N a pol e o n had mo bilized German youths p o l i ti ca l l y In contrast to their fat he rs they were no longer con t e n t with the promises of enlightened rulers . The ideals of liberty, eq u a l i ty and fraternity were widely extolled , and nationalist agi tation was in fluenced by romantic no tions of the Ge r ma n folk com munity . I n student circle s and in the ge neral population, the c o n vi c t io n grew, especially in th e southwestern states of the Con federation , that a constitutional guarantee o f ind ivid ual rig ht s could be ac h i e ved only in a unified nation-state, based on gen er a l elections and a national re pre sentative assembly. De mands for individual rights and n ational u nity were voiced in a multitude o f literary societies, Maso n ic lodges, athletic clubs, and student associations (BurschenschaJten) , w hich were fluctuating in membe rship, often tem porary, and frequently on the borderline be tween i nnocent social gatherings and politically oriented, secret organizations. Conservative governments looked on these patriotic-libertarian as sociations with grave suspicion and denied them public recogni tion. As a govern ment spo kesman in Nassau put it (in words similar to those already used by Frederick I I) , " It is as unreasonable as it is in violation of the law , if private individuals should believe themselves to be calle d upon or e mpowered to participate inde pe ndently or directly in the great national affairs of Germany, either i n di v id u all y or in association with others , either now or in the future."87 Oddly, this was a bureaucratic echo of those anticorporatist slogans w hich in France had res u lted in the expulsion of the Jesuits, the expro priation of c hurch properties, and the suppression of guilds. In France , this approach had furthered the destruction of the privileges e njoyed by the nobility, but in the states of the German Confederation the same principle was used to support the absolutist claim that public a ffairs were the exclusive concern of the priv ileged classes. Prohibitions and declarations did not dampen the growing enthu siasm for nation and liberty. At the Wartburg festival of 1 8 1 7 , the Ger man student movement, gathering for the first time from all parts of Germany, proclaimed its support for " honor, freedom, fatherland." In the eyes of the dynastic governments of the period, such mobilization was ominous. The Wartburg fes tival was taken as a warning at meetings of the European powers , which included France and England. The con.
,
,
TO WA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
fron tations that followed quickly assumed a symbolic character. While conservatives saw the Wartbu rg festival as presaging revolution , the na tional liberals regarded the writer A u gust von Kotzebue as a symbol of reaction . Kotzebue had held up liberal and national ideals to public scorn and ridicule , and his notoriety inc reased when it was learned tha t he was e m p loyed by the Russian di plomatic service . I n 1 8 1 9 he was as sassinated in Man n heim by Karl Sand, a student who on his execution became a symbol of agitation against the status quo. This political as sassination was promptly seized on by conservatives. By pushing through the Karlsbad edicts in the year of Kotzebue's assassination, the A ustrian chancellor Metternich succeeded in coordinating policies of restoration in all sovereign territories of the German Con federatio n . Under the edicts , all German un iversities were subject to strict supervision, the Bur schenschaften were dissolved , censorship of the press was introduced, and a comm ission was appointed to investigate all radical agitation.88 In Prussia, this conservative reaction we nt further than in the other states of the German Confederation. In 1 82 1 a national constitution was rejected o utright by Frederick William I I I ( 1 797- 1 840) less than a year after it had been promised for a third time. 89 But this assertion of the Prussian ruler's prerogatives did not satisfy the spokesmen of the res toration . U nder the leaders h i p of the Prussian crown prince, it was pro posed that instead of a national re prese ntation the provincial estates be restored so as to ensure the desired relation between king and people . But the old estates and their corporate j u risdictions had been abolished. When the laws of 1 823- 1 824 established provincial assemblies, existing inequalities were reconfirmed while the principle of popular represen tation was evaded . The 5 84 seats in all the assemblies were distributed in rough proportion to the popu lation, two-thirds of the delegates rep resenting rural and one-th ird re presenting urban areas. But among the delegates, decided pre ference was given to landowners ; even the 1 82 dele gates from the towns qualified only because they owned land. It may not seem un usual if in the early nineteenth century day-laborers, small peasants, and domestic servants were excluded from voting for dele gates to these provincial assemblies. But every urban resident who did not own land was also denied the right to vote, including businessmen, professionals, and other ed ucated and often wealthy commoners. Land ownership as the prerequisite of the right to vote exacerbated the old division between privileged and second-class status.90 A series of paradoxes resulted. Typically, landowners depended on government loans, but these debtors of the government were repre se nted prominently. At the same time, many creditors of the govern ment such as bankers and ind ustrialists, who ranked highest in term s of wealth and tax payments, were excluded from representation when they did not own land. Also, the law de prived town residents of the intellec-
NATION-B u/WING : GERMANY
tual leadership typically provided by notables from the professions and the university, because they rarely owned land . The towns of the period included many agricultural pro prietors among their residents, and these were not only eligible but counted as urban re presentatives. In other words, the provincial assemblies were turned into bod ies which primar ily represented local, landed interests because these interests were con sidered " politically reliable" from the stand poi n t of the Prussian mon archy. And even then, the functions of the asse mblies were restricted to the right of petition and o f consultation on questions posed by the gov ernment. In effect, the provinc ial assemblies were token concessions to the demand for representation. The position of the Prussian monarchy was contradictory. The civil service had promoted a market economy and the growth of an entre preneurial class. The Gerrpan customs union promoted economic in terests which were national rather than local. Every step along the way toward a free market gave fresh impetus to demands for political rep resentation. Yet encouraged by his circle of intimates, Frederick William I I I brusquely an d repe a te d l y denied any right of sel f-government even to the provincial assemblies w hose one-sided com position was supposed to ensure loyalty and submission. Yet these carefully selected assemblies voiced demands for greater j urisdictional rights because the delegates responded to the p ress ure s resulting from economic com petition. Eventually, the anxiously conservative tem per of Frederick Willia m I I I and his court party also clashed with the civil service itself. The lib eral orientation of Pru ssia's l ead in g officials had been fostered by t he emergency conditions of the N a po l e onic era, the aspirations of German idealism, and moral appeals to a national regeneration.91 Hegel was ac curate when he noted that in a civil service "busy with the important questions arising in a great state . . . the habit is generated of adopting universal interests, points o f view, and activities."92 After 1 8 1 5 , Prussia's territorial acquisitions in Saxo ny, Wes t p h a l ia , Pomerania, and elsewhere had i ncre ase d the country's legal and geographic diversity, and the ed ucated civil service pro vid ed whatever unity Prussia in fact achieved. However, the monarch himself claimed to symbolically represent the whole people . This was his w a r ran t for s ubjec t i n g the un iversities, the clergy, and the te ac hi n g profession to an increasingly severe surveillance under the formal a ut ho ri ty of the Karlsbad edicts . The conservative re action reached the civil service by 1 823, initially in the form of new rules governing the proceedi n gs leading to dismissal. A secret ordinance of 1 82 6 dec l ared that officials could be dism issed because of moral failings or deficient conduct in office, even though the se grounds "are legally insufficient to sustain an a pplication for transfer or dismissal." In 1 833 th is ordinance was published to gi ve it added weight. This o penly ex tralegal procedure aroused much comment. It took the monarchy eleven
TO WA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
years to provide civil servants with legal protection against arbitrary d is missal ( 1 844), and this protection was still hal f-hearted. The d i fficulty was largely symbolic : The Hohenzollern ruler did not wish to acce pt any limitation on his authorit�· over officials whom he regarded as his "royal servants." Naturally civil servants reacted to the distrust shown them by the reignin g monarch . I n practice, they were the only people d irectly con ce rned with public policy o n a day-to-day basis, since no effective rep resentative system was pe r m i t ted and the mo narch reigned and inter fered but did not rule . Many civil servants did not own land and so were excluded as electors to the provincial assemblies. Many of them favored liberal policies, but in the restoration after 1 8 1 5 they had to maintain a very conservative official position. In effect, the governmental actions of civil servan ts helped to justi fy a monarch y which abridged their legal protection against arbitrary dismissal. The question was how long these officials would maintain their liberal outlook in economic affairs without being won over by the agi tation for popular re presentation which spread in part through the public im plementation of that liberal outlook. Some o fficials found it impossible to remain politically inactive. As one civil servant put it (in 1 844) , "I resign as an official, in order that I may re main a citizen [Burger]. "93 Civil servants who wanted to be citizens were elected to the re pre sentative assemblies of the 1 848 revolution in large n umbers, after the requirement of landownersh i p for elective office had been removed . In that year, revolutionary events i n France had prec i pitated poli tical u p heavals th roughout central Europe . Each o f the thirty-nine sovereign territories of the German Con federation was affected internally, and to this was added a national-liberal agitation for a united Germany, cul minating in the German national assembly in Frankfurt, the so-called Paulskirche. The deliberations of the assembly need concern us here only in their bearing on Prussia. The Paulskirche formulated a consti tution purporting to replace the German Confederation with a unified I m perial Germany, combining the monarchical princ iple with an Im perial Diet, elected on the basis of a general, equal, and direct franchise. This constitution was acce pted by the Paulskirche in 1 849. I m perial Germany was to be under Prussian leadership and was to exclude Aus tria. The Frankfurt assembly elected Frederick William IV ( 1 840- 1 86 1 ) of Prussia as hereditary emperor, and a delegation went to Berlin to offer the im perial crown . The Prussian king rejected the offer because he rejected the principle of popular sovereignty on which the Frankfu rt assembly had been based . I n these proceedings of the Paulskirche, liberal civil servants played a large role. In practice, the y were the only class of persons with some
NA TION-B UlWING : GERMANY
direct involvement in public affairs . In the Paulsk irche , civil servants along with free professionals com prised the vast majority of the dele gates , making it clear that throughout the German Con federation "ed ucated com moners" rather than landowners or entrepreneurs we re in the fo re front of political mobilizatio n . The pro portion of civil se rvants in the Paulskirche was 5 8 . 3 percent, and the proportion of civil servants among the Prussian delegation was still h ighe r (67 percent) . An addi tional 24.2 percent of the delegates were free pro fessionals ; thus, pe r haps some 70 percent were ed ucated commoners . 9 4 Accordingl y , the German idea of freedom was sha ped in close assoc iation with the state and the ideal of Bildung. By the time the proposal of the Paulskirche was subm itted to Fred erick William IV, the forces of the Prussian restoration had rallied once again. Prussia had not escaped the revolutionary agitatio n of 1 84 8 . In deed, the upheavals of that year in Berlin led to a fourth royal promise of a constitution, specifying the main liberal objectives in outline ( proc lamation of March 2 2 , 1 848 ) , including the destruction of patrimonial jurisdictions, the independence o f the j udiciary, the rights of free as sembly, and trial by jury in political cases and those involving censorship of the press.95 In the ensuing events, liberal agitation increased i n the Prussian national asse mbly, as did the conservative intransigence o f Frederick William and his intimates . The elected assemblies insisted o n the fundamental tenets of constitutionalism. But the k i n g made it clear that he would acce pt a constitution only if his right to veto any law and his authority over army and administration were preserved intact. No compromise was possible between these two positions, and i n the end the Prussian constitution of 1 85 0 with the king's provisos was im posed by royal fiat and remained in force until 1 9 1 8. However incongruously, this Prussian constitution institutionalized all three principles: the absolute royal prerogative, the liberal conce ption of fundamental human rights, and the hierarchic conception of society (antici pated in the provincial assemblies under the law of 1 82 3/24) . The person o f the king was "inviolate." He was the supreme head of gov ernment and the armed forces, responsible to no one. Laws could be enacted only through the concurrence of the two Houses and the king. At the same time, the king retained the absolute right to veto any en actment, and he alone was e mpowered by the constitution to issue emer gency decrees or impose m artial law . Second, the constitution contained a full list of basic individual rights -freedom under the law, personal freedom, religious liberty, freedom of opinion , freedom of association and assembly, the protection of property, and the right to justice. This bill of rights was basically flawed because the constitution and its inter preters declared these rights to be conditional. Nothing in the consti-
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
tu tion preven ted the legislature and the king from e nacting laws which interfe red with any of these rights; and once this was done, ad ministra tive abridgement of such rights was legal. I n this way, the bill of rights was made com pa tible with the absolute prerogatives of the king Third, the constitution in trod uced an electoral law (Dreiklassenwahlrecht ) which provided fo r indirect, u n equal, and open elections. Voters chose electors who in turn chose the delegates of a district. The voters of e ach d istrict were d ivid ed into th ree classes based on the level of taxation. Each class those a third of the electors, but the classes were of very unequal size. C lasses I and I I , com prising the wealthy and m iddle segments of the population, contained only 4 . 7 and 1 2 . 6 percent of the vo te rs, but chose two-th irds of the electors. Class I I I , c o m prising the poorest segment of t h e population , contained 8 2 . 7 percent of the voters , but chose only one third of the electors. Finally, the elections we re open so that the v o ting of the economically de pe ndent po pulation was not only de prived of pro portional participation but was supervised directly by employers and their agents.9 6 Liberty at the king's command was wit h out safeguard against the king's prerogative. Public affairs remained preem pted by the privileged few. The Prussian constitution of 1 85 0 institutionalized the monarchy s basic distrust of a po pular mandate, though it included a bill of rights . B u t b y t h e second half o f the nineteenth century, the popula t io n h ad .
'
The Imperial Crown Denied and Accep ted
In 1 849, t he PaulJkirche in Fran k fu rt voted to make the king of Prussia hereditary em peror. The first picture shows this National Assembly i n session and the second depicts a m iddle class de p utatio n o f that asse mbly i n Berli n , in fo rmin g the Pruss ian king o f his e lectio n . Frederick William I V renou nced t h e election , which h e con sidered a revolu t ionary ac t o f the people. Contrast this with t h e t h ird pictu re, a genre painting o f a scene in 1 87 1 a t the conclusion o f the Franco-Prussian war: William I of Prussia i s proclaimed German e m peror at Versailles by a com pany o f his ge nerals and o fficers led by C hancellor Bismarck and Gen eral von Moltke . (H istorisches Museum, Frankfurt)
TO WARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE
become mobil ized , and it was no longer sim ple to ignore the idea of a po pular mandate. When the constitutions of the North German Con federation and the German E m pire were e nacted in 1 867 and 1 87 1 , res pectively, they did not co ntain a bill of rights, but in stead extended voting rights to all males twenty-five years or over. These constitutions, like the Prussia n constitution be fo re them, were dictated from above and protected the absolute authority of the king and e m peror. Whil e the Prussian con stitution sa feguarded the king's authority by the three class su ffrage syste m , the con stitutions of 1 867 and 1 8 7 1 did so by freein g h i m from the financial control of the legislature . All three con stitutions stipulated that the army remain outside the com petence o f the legislature and that each soldier m ust swear his oath of loyalty solely to the Pruss ian king and, after 1 87 1 , to the em peror of the Reich . Nevertheless, the idea of a bil l of righ ts and of popular sovereignty h ad been at least verball y embraced , and the question was how long the people would remain under the political tutelage of the monarch and his court party. We know today that Germany was un prepar�d for the advent of popular sovereignty when that tutelage was destroyed in 1 9 1 8 . The history of the Weimar Re public demonstrated that the mentality of hometownsmen , a legal order primarily u pheld by officials , and the idealization of Bildung and duty had provided a weak foundation for national citizenship. Few people had internalized the "rules o f the game" of democratic politics and without that internalization a mandate of the people cannot function.
12 NATION-B U I LD I N G : JAPAN
THE TOKUGAWA SHOGUNATP
CIVIL
WARS had marked the history of the Ashigaka shogunate since the fourteenth century , as well as the reigns of Oda Nobunaga ( 1 559- 1 5 82) and Toyotomi H ideyoshi ( 1 582 - 1 598) . When Tokugawa Ieyasu won the ba ttles of Sekigahara in 1 600 and of Osaka in 1 6 1 4, he terminated this long period of internal wars and initiated a regime which was to last for the next two and a hal f centuries . Japan had never been conquered ; it had no territorial pos sessions on, or dynastic ties with, the mainland. The country had been secluded long before it adopted a policy of exclusion. If the rise of central authority in Japan had a European analogue, it was France. The French kings and Japa nese shoguns of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries achieved su preme authority after generations of weak rule. The central location o f the domains of both rulers (the Paris region and the Kanto plain) aided political unification. Both the ancien regime and Tokugawa Japan combined su preme authority at the center with considerable autonomy in the provinces . Each regime ex ercised central control through nationwide ad ministrative and police measures. The details of these similarities, of course, differ. The French kings established their supremacy primarily through the use of royal prerog ative i n wars with foreign powers , whereas Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Ieyasu established their supremacy primarily in wars with internal ene mies . japan's geographic location and exclusionist policies prevented any immediate outside threat to the country's political integrity; thus , aThe title shogun derives from Seii-tai-shogun (barbarian-quelling generalissimo) wh ich was bestowed on Mi namoto Yoritomo, the first Kamakura ruler, in 1 1 92. A fter that, the milita ry gove rnmen t of the shogunate came to be cal le d hakufu, as d istinguished from the
civil go vernment in K yoto.
43 1
432
TO WARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE
un like France , even prolonged periods of civil strife d id not entail the danger of foreign invasion. In Japan, central authority and local auton omy were largely com plementary , whereas i n France these two levels of au t h o r ity tended to be m u tually exclusive. The fo u ndat i o n of local au tonomy in France was privilege based on a grant or purchase , w hereas in Japan it was territory based on service and loyalty. J apa n achieved ad min I strative consolidation under the central aut hority of the Toku gaw a shogunate, b u t the long t r ad i t io n of regional autonomy was
preserved. I n what sense can the t e r mfeu da lis m be a pplied to Tok u gaw a Ja pan? [ In J a pan) t h e force o f a u t h ority which u n i ted t h e system was at t h e to p feu dal, particularly a s it a p plied t o t h e relatio nshi p between Shogun and daimyo.
Yet within t he ad m i n istrat ive subpa rts, w i t h i n the direct j u risdictions o f t he Shogun or dai myo, aut hority was increasi n gl y e xerted t h ro u gh bure a ucratic means . . . . The regi m e ke p t alive a d y n a m ic tension between fe udal and bu reaucratic tec h n iq ues and between cen t ralized and decentral ized authority . l
This tension may account for the phrase centralized feudalism w hich is o ften applied to Tokugawa Japan, though the phrase is a contradiction in terms. The evidence for centralization is massive : the shogunate con trolled a large portion of the land, monopolized the coinage, maintained a nationwide espionage system, prevented internal customs barriers ex cept for toll stations under central control, and moved daimyo about at wil l. A large patrimonial bureaucracy was required to administer these central con t rols , even though the d a im y o s personal liability for wrong doing or disobedience assisted governance and gave it a feudalistic ap pearance. I have suggested (in Chapter 7) that patrimonialism and feu �alism coexist and that a s pecific historical situation will show the prevalence of one or the other. It is doubtful that Western European feudal structures ever achieved a balance between centralizing and de centralizing tendencies that is com parable to those of Tokugawa Japan. I will refer to the Tokugawa regime, then , as absolutist i n the same sense as I refer to the absolutism of regimes of seventeenth- and eigh teenth-century Europe. For neither was the term absolutism strictly ap plicable to Western Europe, since absolutist regimes claimed complete control while in practice contending with considerable local autonomy. Sansom stresses this parallel when he notes, '
La te To kugawa Ja pan c a n be described as a fe udal state o n l y i f t h e word "fe udal" is e m ployed i n a very loose way and without any medieval conno tatio n s . It bore a c lose resem blance to the less highly centralized states of E u ro pe in the e ighteenth and early n i ne tee n t h centu ries and was undergoing a p roce ss o f cha n ge similar to that through wh ich most Euro pe a n co u ntries had pa ssed or were pass i n g i n the same pe riod. These deve lopme n ts we re not a part o f feudalism , though they might be, and freq ue ntly we re , out growths ala particular feudal institu t i o n . 2
NATION-B UILDING : JAPAN
433
Th o u gh absolutist regimes varied w i t h i n Western Europe , the pattern of governance-especially in France and Pru ss i a te n d ed to be bure au cratic at the center and "feudal" in the provinces . The roy a l government of Lo u i s X I V and his s uccessors so u ght to intro d u ce ce n trally o r ga n i zed controls through t h e intendants, whereas at the l o c a l level many quas i feudal elements of se i gn or i a l j u ri s d iction and patriarchal rule remained. Much the same c a n be said o f Prussian central govern me nt and local adm inistration.3 Though co nditions were b ro ad ly similar in ja pa n , they diffe re d in at least one signi ficant res pect. Tokugawa regional institu tions -the administration o f many han -achieved considerable effi ciency in contrast to the frequent i mm obili ty of European local -
adm inistration . Contrasts between To k u gaw a japan a n d Wes te r n E uro pean abso lu t is m are most c l e arl y marked in their political cultures . I n Western Euro pe and espec ially in France, the earlier patriarchal ideolo gy lost its appeal because of the commercialization of land and labor and the sale of offices. In japan, the ideology of master-servant relations and of per sonal loyalty continued to pervade the whole society. I n Europe, very large ex penditures for military preparedness and imperialist policies were a main factor in the bureaucratization of the central government. Rulers enlisted young aristocrats in the officer corps and thus involved the a r istoc rac y in their own pursuit of military glory abroad . In japan, there was no need for a large military force at the center. I n a po pulation of 20 million , some 1 2 , 0 00 men were on police duty, and o nly in wartime was that force increased to 35,000. The shogunate relied on the prin ciple of the master-servant relationship which was com patible with pat rimonial administration at the center and a bureaucratic administration in the daimyo domains. European militarism was directed outward and was highly centralized. I n i ts more secluded setting, Ja panese militarism was most i m porta n t as a code of honor and obedience, thereby ensuring internal peace. Local vendettas as well as larger struggles occurred throughout J a p anese history . But by the sixteenth century, civil war had become so en demic that historians c all this period the Age of the Co untry at Wa r (sengoku-jidai). The victory o f the Tokugawa put an end not o nly to the intensified hostility of the preceding era, but also to military feuds as the principal means of righting wrongs. During the early seventeenth century, the Tokugawa shogunate proceeded to buttress its preeminent position . In itially, t h e Tokugawa destroyed the power of o n l y 87 o ut of 245 dai myo, but by 1 65 1 the landholdings of 1 3 1 other houses had been confiscated, redistributed, or reduced for lack of succession or for dis ciplinary reasons. In this process, a cumulative total of some 1 8 . 6 million
o6"fA
c
rP
fX\\nU E!±Hm
T o k u g a w a D om a i ns Tozama
H ouses
I. Sa t s u m a 2. Choshu 3. Tosa
1 1 . Tokugaw a, Satsuma, Chos h u , and Tosa Do mains in 1 664
NA TION-B UILDING : JAPAN
435
kokub changed hands to the advantage of the Tokugawa and their closest allies, representing a very thorough change in the distribution of wealth and power among the country's landed aristoc racy .4 Within this bakuhan sy st e m ( from bakufu tent [ military] govern ment and han dai m yo fief or domain) , power was distributed st ra te g ical ly. B y the middle o f the seventeenth century, t he shogun's own do mains had risen from 2.0 to 6.8 m illion koku. The se lands supported a b o u t 23 ,000 direct retainers, or sa m urai , including 5 , 000 "banne rmen " (hatamoto), who were s e nior retainers, the more i m po r ta n t of whom held fiefs and also possessed aud ience privileges, and 1 7 , 000 "honorable house men" (gokenin) , w h o received hereditary salaries but d id not ha ve audience privileges. I n addition, the s ho gu n ad m inistered the im portant mines , which facilitated his control of the c ur rency ( p r eci o us metals), and the cities which were the main centers of trade and prod u ct ion The largest daimyo a fter the shogu n , the Maeda ho use , possessed only =
=
.
1 , 023 ,000 koku, or less than one-sixth of the Tok u gawa landholdings. Nor was this the full extent o f shogu na l power. Ieyas u buil t a hi e rarchy of graded loyalties , based on proxi mity and obligation to the Tokugawa house . Twen ty-three directly descended and collateral To kugawa fam ilies known as "related han " (shimpan) formed an outer line of de fe nse. The three major ones were founded by Ieyas u's sons at Mito, Nagoya, and Wak ayam a The domains controlled by all the collateral houses to ta le d 3,3 70, 000 koku. The sho g unate next directly con trolled the house daimyo (fudai) , who eventually came to n umbe r 1 45 a nd whose total holdings came to 6.7 million ko ku, although many individual domains were quite small. Added toge the r, these figures show that the shogunate had direct or indirect control over land yielding 1 6. 1 m illion koku, or about 65 percent of the country's total assessed yield o f rice for 1 602 . At the same time, 9 7 o f the largest daimyo were called "outside lords" (tozama ) , both in the geographic sense that they occu pied lands distant from the central stronghold of the Tokugawa (the Kanto region) , and i n the sense that these houses were descended from former enemies or recent allies of Ieyasu at the time o f Sekigahara. With a total yiel d of 9.8 million koku , the tozama daimyo would have been a formidable power had they ever united against the shogunate. Ieyas u and his suc cessors took elaborate precautions against this eventuality. Evidently , these were prudent precautions, for at the time o f the Meiji Restoration .
bOne koku equals fi v e A merican bushels of rice. Landholdings were asse ss ed in terms of the a rea needed to produce a
gi ven
quantity of rice . In 1 602 the total assessed revenue
of the coun try was 2 4 . 5 m ill i on kok u ; thus, the total a rea red i stribu ted between 1 600 and 1 65 1 represented some 75 perce n t of the 1 602 figure, a rough index only because it i n
cludes an unknown amount of do u b le cou n ting. At any rate, the exte n t of redistri bution was massive.
TO WARD A MA NDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
( 1 868) most leaders of opposition to the Bakufu came from these areas,
notably Satsuma, Chosh u, Tosa , and H ize n . The Tokugawa regi me managed t o preserve the distribution o f power ach ieved after 1 60 0 for a period of two a n d a half centu ries, i n good pa rt because internal powe r relations were insulated from extra neous influences. B y 1 64 1 , a fter a centu ry of Ch ristian missionary effort in J a pa n , Christianity was ba n ned and all contact with European for eigners was con fined to a small, rigid l y controlled Dutch colony in Na gasaki . This policy of exclusion faci l itated "a civil govern ment admin istered by a pro fessional mi litary caste"5 which retained many of its tradi tions of militancy but in the absence of i nternal feuds and forei gn wa rs The To kugawa shogu n at e forbade military feuding among terri torially based l in e ages in much the same way as E n gl and , France, and Germany had done in the s ixteenth and seventeenth centu ries. B ut un l i ke these Euro pe an powers , the To ku ga w a e st a b l i s h ed s peci a l internal controls as a counterpart to their policy of exclusion to ensure that the powe r ful tozama lords would continue to acce pt Tokugawa supremacy. To this end, the Bakufu regu la ted the po s ition of the emperor and the daimyo. The Tokugawa deferred to the pre st i ge of the emperor, but they also controlled and isolated him. In t he or y and by custom, the shogun a te go ve rn e d with the consent of the em peror, and each successive shog un assumed h i s posit i o n in accession ce re mo n ie s s ymbo l iz i ng this consent. No shogun ever a tte m p ted to cla i m t h e t h ro n e , and the fiction of im perial supremacy w as scr u pu lou s l y o bse r ved i n the l a n gua ge of loya lty by which the advice or requests of the s h og u n were submitted. The im pe r ia l co urt was assisted in re building its p al aces and the lands put at i ts d i spo sal y i e l de d a total of 1 8 7 , 000 koku. But this was somewhat below hal f the income of t he l a r gest fudai daim yo and very much below the income of many tozama d ai m yo . I n terms of wealth, the emperor and his e n tourage were pl ace d in t he lower half of the country's aristocracy. Moreover, the emperor and his court were controlled by a shogunal military governor and by a large garrison force stationed immediately adjace n t to the i m per ia l pal ac e in Kyoto. No daimyo was allowed to ap proach the i mpe r ial cou rt exce pt thro ugh the shogun'S re presentatives at the capital . The m i l it ar y governor worked through two court officials who transmitted the shogu nal wil l , s pec i fic a lly re gu la ti n g all appoint ments, including that of the s hog u n and h is successor. These direct con trols were s u ppleme n te d by a code for the Kyoto nobility which re stricted the emperor and his court to literary pursuits and ceremonial fu nc t io n s an d regul a te d the relations between the imperial fam i ly and the grea t templ es. All daimyo were vassals of the shogu n . By the mid-seventeenth cen.
,
NA TION-B UIWING: JAPAN
437
tury, only so me ten to fi fte en da imyo still remained on the ir original land . Control of the d a im y o began with the formal grant of investiture
by which the shogun confirmed them in office. Although in theory the grant was hereditary, the pra c tice of confiscation and t r a nsfe r made daimyo l and h o ldi n g p re c a rio u s Each daimyo swore a p r i v a t e oa th of loyalty to the shogun, p ro m i s i n g not to enter into col lusive a l l ia nces with o th er daimyo and to se rve the sh o g un wholeheartedly. Furthermore, the s h o g un ate im posed on the daimyo a code re g u la ti n g their private con d uct, including d re s s, m a r r ia ge and ceremonial tokens of subm is sion at the s h ogu na l court. Perhaps most i m portan t l y , the system of al ternate residence (sankin-kotai) was made com pulsory after 1 63 5 . The daim yo were o b l i ge d to build permanent residences in Edo (Tokyo) , with their wives, childre n , a n d a ppro p r ia t e retainers in pe r m anent at t en da n c e . The dai myo the m selves lived in Edo for req uired periods ev e ry other year and rem aine d a t t hei r do m a i n h e adqu a r te r s the rest o f the time. A h igh degree of political conformity was achieved, because the d aim yo could be ke pt u nder personal surveillance, and because t h e s a fe ty of fam ily ho st a ges at the s hogunal court was at stake. Moreover, .
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the system was extremely e ffective in two other ways. The constant com ing and goin g helped to stimulate local economic deve lo p m e nt by re quiring heavy expenditures by the d a im y o, and this in turn increased their de pendence. The system also helped to center all communications in Edo, while the shogu nal police controlled commun ications among the daimyo away from the ca pital.6 O fficially, the sankin-kotai system was interpreted in Con fucian terms, ex to ll in g the loyalty men in each rank owed to their superiors, from the shogun'S obeisance to the emperor down through the ranks of the d a i m yo and sam u rai to the obe isance each son owed to h is father. In the Hundred Articles or the Legacy of Ieyasu, a severe code of conduct was laid down which e mphasized the unquestioning per form a nc e of duty to superiors as the highest goal in life-at the expense of personal desire or even familial obligations. The code also extolled as inviolate the laws of t he first Toku gawa shoguns . 7 The desire to preserve the hierarchic structure established after 1 600 produced a reawakening of Con fucian doctrine : The I m perial Way which was t he ideal of Confucian ism was v irtually iden tical to the s piritual foundations of the Japa nese state -namely, the descent of the first e m pe ro r fro m the national dei ties ; the d ivine ori gi n of the realm was a guaran tee of righteousness. This I m pe rial Way, practiced in antiqu ity , had su ffered progressive d e ge n eration si nce the N a r a and Heian periods o f the eighth to twe l fth centu ries. T h i s decay was caused by the spread of an alien religion , B uddhism, w h ich ecl ipsed the national s pi ri t
(kokusui)
and ca used
degeneratio n . The poli tical consequences were spread across history: loss of i m perial vi rtue, weakening of the i m perial policy , takeover by the F uj i wara
Daim yo Procession
The Tokugawa requ irement of alternate residence involved great expense for the daimyo
domains. The river crossing o f a feudal lord and his e scort gives an im pression of the size of these biann ual exped i tions . As the feudal lord's escort enters the ou tskirts of Edo, the artist H i roshige d e p i c ts the m il itary bearing o f the re ta i n e rs and the de ference shown by the town residents-as long as they are with in sight of the procession . ( H i storiographical Institute, University of Tokyo)
TOWARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE re gents, th e insid ious superstit ions prom oted by the Buddhist clergy to ac quire po l i t i cal influence, dis ru pt i o n of poli tical tranquillity, hardships amon g the people
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The triumph of a m il i tary polity, th e th eory continues, re
mind ed the Ja panese of the true trad ition. The establis h m ent of the rescued the Imperi al Wa y
(odo)
bakufu
from the decaying court government and
restored the legitimate princi ple of p oli tical authority. The military estate
re stored the only possible political organization,
the jinsei:
an eth ical real m
based on the righteousness of the Im pe rial Way. The political organ ization ult i m at e ly adopted by the
Tokugawa-the baku h an system, a balance of cen the concrete manifestation of
tralized and decentralized elements-became
this "benevolent polity" operating under i mperial sovereignty.8
This ideology helped to combine e ffective central authority with a high degree of local autonomy. By contrast, European absolutist regimes such as Prussia became centralized at the expense of the estates, while in France centralized ad ministration was all-encom passing in theory but not in practice. Tokugawa absolutism achieved its more effective com bination of central controls and regional autonomy in part through the policy of exclusion. japan's external security stands in obvious contrast to the European powers during the seventee nth and eighteenth centu ries. In the 250 years between 1600 and 1850 France was at war 115 years ; Austria, 129.5 ; Great B ritain, 125; Spain, 160.5; Prussia, 97; and Russia, 142.5. Japan was at peace d uring the entire period .9 Aided by Japan's seclusion, the Conf ucian code of conduct could counteract the disintegrative effects o f local autonomy ; greater contact with the o utside world would have meant greater expos u re to foreign cultural influences, jeopardizing loyalty and hierarchy. Seclusion also made it easier to in crease the political and economic dependence of the daimyo on the sho gunate, since it precluded all alliances with foreign powers against the Bakufu. The daimyo were com pensated for these deprivations by their own extensive authority, which was as absolute locally as the shogun'S controls over the court and the dai myo were nationally. These were im portant assets of the policy of exclusio n ; its drawback was tech nological backwardness. The very stability of Tokugawa rule also increased the rigidity of shogunal administration. The s hogunate encouraged local authority in part for practical ad ministrative reasons. The daimyo was not taxed directly, but certain con tributions were expected from him on a fairly regular basis. Among these were military and logistic assistance in times of emergency. In an era of peace, economic aid was more i m portant, es pecially for the build ing of castles, roads, brid ges, and palaces . Such assessments in kind were called "national service" ( kokuyaku ) and were equally useful in strength ening the shogunate and weakening the prosperous daimyo economi cally. Gigantic fortifications in the strongholds of the Tokugawa were erected on this basis.
NATION-BUIWING: JAPAN
441
Under the Tokugawa shogunate, the daimyo domains varied greatly in size, ranging from the largest; Maeda, with over 1 million koku, down to over half the d aimyo who held territories o f less then 50,000 ko k u. In addition to an ave r age o f 265 daimyo, the re were 5,000 minor fie fs of the hatamoto and many thousands of jurisdictions of temples and shrines, not to speak o f sti l l more thousands o f subj u risdictions within the shogun'S own domains. Since many of these territories were non co n tiguo u s, the admin istrative map o f Japan was very com plex. Never theless, considerable administrative uniformity was introd uced by mov ing many daimyo and their retainers from domain to domain so that they acquired some characteristics of an administrative class. japan's population increased from roughly 20 million in 1600 to 30 mi l lio n i n 172 1 , the year of the first census. The administrative class, wh ich in cluded everyone from the shogun down to common foot soldiers of sam urai status, comprised 6 percent of the total population. Since France under Louis XIV had only about 1,000 administrators for a population of 18 million, it is clear that Japan with its over 1 million men of samurai status was an intensively administered coumry.lO This contrast between Japa nese and French "administrators" should be understood in context. The thousand administrators under Louis XIV estimated by Gaubert were all officials in the literal sense, which cannot be said of 1.2 million samurai. In France, there were far more officeholders then officials of the central government, but that large number of officeholders did not carry out the orders o f the government. Office was property and adm inistered or disposed of at will. By contrast, Japanese samurai carried o ut orders of the shogunal or daimyo govern ment, although many of their duties were nonadministrative, and no doubt many had no regular duties at all. B ut the ideology o f the master servant relation made all o f them ready to obey whatever orders were issued to them, and nothin g com parable can be said about officeholders in France. The daimyo exercised full rights of government over his own ter ritory under a shogunal grant. At his castle headq uarters he assembled his retainers, who swore an oath of loyalty to the daimyo and were en tered on his regi ster of men (samurai cho). At the highe s t level of this administrative class were so-called "elders," usually independent vassals who formed the daimyo's council of advisors. In peacetime they acted as the daimyo's deputies and/or judges; in wartime, they served as his generals in the field. Next in the hierarchy was a more numerous group of high-ranking retainers charged with civil administration such as fi na nce, security, and liaison with t he shogunate. Below the m were re tainers of middle rank who handled such civil functions as the admin istration of the castle town. the villages, tax collection, the civil police, household affairs of the daimyo, military procurement, civil enginee r .
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442
TOWARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
in g, education , and te m ples or s hr i nes. Still lower in rank was a body of foot soldiers, pages , and servants who pe rformed a va r iety of me n ial tasks. Each of th e villages , towns, and tem ples had self go vern ing u n its of farmers, u rban residents, and pri es ts or monks who lived under the au t ho rity of their own superiors. The shogunate had a more co m ple x adm inistrative a pparatus, but it o perated in the same basic pattern . I n addition to managin g a domain about seven times larger than the largest daimyo, it had a m ultitude of governmental functions. For his staff, the shogun relied on his "house dai myo" and di rect retainers rather than on the tozama or shi m pan houses. Most administrative act i v i ty pe rta ined to the shogun's domains . But "this territory by reason of its size-ro ughly a quarter of the co untry -and i ts reso urces, which i ncluded the major c ities of the land, placed the greater portion of the Japanese popul ation within the scope of the shogun's personal rule. "II Beyond this, the shogunate controlled all con tacts with fo reigners , supervised national defense, and ge ne rally policed the conduct of local affai rs . Despite the lar ge degree of autonomy allowed to each daimyo, the Tokugawa regime upheld the idea of a nationwide social order, formed by a hierarchy of status-groups. Laws were applied in terms of the social division to which the individual belon ged. The bulk of Tokugawa leg islation was directed toward defining the behavior appropriate to each rank and maintaining the boundaries between different ranks, especially the distinction between samurai and commoner. The population was divided into (1) warrior-bureaucrats, incl u ding different groups of daimyo, richly enfeoffed house elders, and bannermen down to foot soldiers, (2) peasants or primary producers, (3) artisans or secondary producers, and (4) merchants. I n this "national hierarchy," the mer chants were the most despised, although economically t hey were the most successful. The laws upholding this hie rarchy still applied to the family (the individual existed only as a member of his family and in terms of his rank within the family). But under the Tokugawa regime, the status of the individual was no longer the result of personal sub mission and preferment alone. By legal means, the Tokugawa intro duced a "rule by status .. . [which was] considerably more impersonal in its application to the individual than the exercise of direct personal authority" had been in the past.12 With the legal system and the ideology of neo-Confucianism up h o l di ng this hierarchic structure, it was uncom monly difficult for any individual to exist outside the accepted cate gories. Ronin or samurai without a lord and hence without status were particularly troublesome for the regime, and it tells us something about the status of priests, doctors, and teachers when we learn that only these occupations were open to t h e ron i n . -
NATION-BUIWING: JAPAN
443
The samurai were transformed from landed warriors into a class of urban ad ministrators and rentiers in the co urse of the sixteenth cen tury. This transformation was part of the process by which the daimyo superseded the earlier proliferation of petty fiefdoms, each with a castle of its own , and consolidated their landholdings, increased their income, and strengthened their m ilitary position. Castles were a means of military and political unification in addition to provid ing a stimulus toward urbanization . Twenty-five major Japa nese towns were huilt up around castles i n the brief period between 1 580 and 161 0. The shogun al edict of 1615 ordered the destruction of all but one castle in each pro vince. Sansom estimates that toward the end of the seven teenth centu ry Edo, Kyoto, and Osaka had betwee n 3 5 0,000 and 500, 000 inhabitants, while nine cities had more than 50,0 00, eleven cities more than 20,0 0 0, and about a hundred other castle towns more than 5, 000 residents. The construction of massive forti fications, resi dences, and tem ples, together with the maintenance of a large resident population , required the wholesale supply o f prod uce from the hinter land as well as the continuous commercial linkage of each daimyo econ omy with the major trading center of the region . I t is estimated that on the average, half the population of the castle towns consisted of samurai, their families, and retainers, while in some towns like Sendai and Ka goshima the proportion went up to 70 or 8 0 percent. 13 Inde pendent, landed, and self-equipped warriors had done the bulk of the fighting for centuries. Now , in the early decades of the To kugawa regime, they were transformed into an estate of u rbanized , aristocratic retainers. The agony of that transition was marked by the appearance of large numbers of ronin who had lost their previous po sition d u e to t he massive confiscation and red istribution of land by Ie
yasu and his successors. Sansom gives a cumulative estimate of 4 00, 000 ronin during the seventeenth century. Still, the transition was eventually accomplished, and a new political structure was established along the lines sketched previously. The samurai were now maintained as urban retainers on a rice stipend provided by their master, the ruler of the han: In the cities the gentry warriors of the earlier days became increasingly re moved from the actualities of the countryside both in their way of life and
in their legal relationship to the land. By the eighteent h century, except for a few locations, the
bushi [ warriors]
had been stripped of any directjurisdic
tion over their fiefs by the expanding power of the daimyo. Though as a class they nostalgically clung to t he concept that they were a landed aristocracy, they had been converted , in reality, to little more than salaried offi cials of the daimyo.
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Sepa ra ted from their dutie s of land management, they be
came a thoroughly urbanized group living increasingly in sede ntary style}4
444
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
The massive expro p riation of the sam urai was probably the major reason why Tokugawa absolut ism could com bine its h ighly centralized authority with so large a degree of autonomy in the daimyo domains. The daimyo we re fo rced to subord inate themselves to the shogunate, b u t they remained maste rs of their ow n han. He nce, the real b urden o f subordination fell on the sam urai w h o had lost wealth a n d power under the Tokugawa re gime , ,as well as much of the ir earlier identity as the fi ghting men o f the feudal order. Within decades of Sekigahara, the samurai were leading a peaceful civi lian existence. As re ntiers, they su pple mented their meagre rice sti pends by worki ng as craftsme n or teachers of fe nci n g. Others became peasa n ts or even me rchants. I S T hey had lost what little independence and aut hority they or their fathers had earlier posses s ed And as ren tiers the sam urai were typically e x ploite d, since the sankin-kotai system forced lavish expenditures and heavy debts on t he daimyo, who "supple mented" their regular reve n ues by a ppropriating nearly half of their retainer's i ncome. The practice of forced approp riations of samurai sti pends was widespread since the sa m u rai were in no position to resist their master, on whose good will they de pended and to whom they were bound by personal loyalty. From about 1700, more than a h undred han were heavily i n debt.16 Only the samu rai's high status seemed assured, symbolized by the exclusive rig h t and duty to wear two swords. .
Samurai Warrior
This samurai warrior with two swords and a lance is depicted in the Edo style of the
1660s. The warrior is anonymous and the posture and expression stylized, but both the strut and the fierce expression were very much "in style," the norm of conduct a ppropriate for a samurai proud o f his status and conscious of maintaining it by his bearing. (Honolulu Academy of Arts. Gift of James A. Michener)
.. �.),. ""
NATION-BUILDING: JAPAN
445
The dilemma fac i n g these men is illustrated by the Law o f the Mil itary Ho uses (Buke Sho-Hatto), p romu lga te d by I e yas u in 1 6 1 5, which decreed that t he samu rai m ust devote the msel v e s eq u ally to arm s and polite lear n i n g The fact is that there were no i m po r t an t calls to arms afte r the sup p re ssion of t h e Shimabara rebe llion of 1637. M o reo ve r, the growth of a settle d u rban population after 16 15 and the co nspicuous co n sum p tion imposed on the daimyo gave rise to a class of tradesm e n and ar t isans (chanin) that did not fit e asily i n to the traditional class struc t u re Pro s perity allowed new t y pe s of se n sibili ty to flou rish which were res po n sive to the tastes of t he chonin. In the Tokug a w a era, the earlie r aristocratic mo nopoly of culture was brokenY Accordingly, the Toku gawa regime put the sam u rai under s pecial ps ychologic al pressu re by e n co ur a gin g military skills while prohibiting combat and by c a lli n g on men of the sword to acquire le ar n i ng at a time when the arts were be c o m i n g in crea sin gly res ponsive to the p l e b eia n tastes of merchants. Within this ge n er al context the samurai were s u pposed to re m ain attached to their traditions of ceremonious conduct, intense pride of rank, and the cultivation of phy s ic al prowess-a most unlikely outcome: .
.
They were to serve as models of virtue and frugality for the e n tire n ation. But as time wen t on, the samurai proved the m selves unworthy of their high res po n sibili ties. They did not devote themselves in time of peace to the study of the literary arts, but since they were compelled to spend much of their t i me in [do, ind ulged
in
all the pleasures the capital afforded.... Their ex
travagant habits freq u e n tl y caused them to run up heavy debts with the city merchants .. . . Most samurai could see no way out of their predicament. Not schooled in the practical realities of business life, they were taught to despise every
thing that savored of trade as a low seeking after profit. Th us, though they m ight be so heavily in d e b t as to feel it necessary to address the merchants they met in the street in terms of great politeness (instead of t h e brusque tones of the superior), t h e samurai were convinced by train i n g that all their difficu l ties were the result of the businessmen's striving for profit; if only everyo ne would follow t h eir example of placin g righteousness before other considerations, all problems would soon be sol ved.18
The sam urai were not the only ones affected by the commercialization of land, labor, and capital. The whole hierarchic structure of Tokugawa society was in danger of being eroded , and the shogunate took strong measures in order to preserve that structure. Japan faced special problems because of its policy of exclusion. For example, the su pply o f basic foodstuffs always fluctuates from natural causes, and ordinarily this fluctuation can be offset by imports or e x ports. But this safety valve was less available to J apan because exclusion militated against foreign trade, just as it was less available to several Eu
TO WA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE ropean countries because mercantilist doctrine argued for national sel f su ffi c ien cy in food p roducti on Hence, in Japan and in Europe, gov e rnments s ought to counter the fluctuations of harvests, by imp rove ments in agricultural p rod uctivity Under the Tokugawa regime, the area under cultivation doubled between 1 600 and 1 730 and could sus tain a stead y gro w th in pop ulation . Yields per acre were increased by improved tools and seeds, draft animals, iron plows, hoes, and the use of fertilizers Areas of d oubl e cr opp in g expande d, cereal p rod uction doubled between 1 600 and 1 730, and the government p rovide d farmers with instruction on the imp rovem en t of a gricul tural techni ques By 1 72 1 the country's population had increased to 30 mi llion , but some time thereafter population leve led off, reaching only 32 million by the middle o f the nineteenth centu ry. Part of the exp l an ation is that with comp le te dependence on a rice diet pe riod s of acute crop fai lure led to wide spread famine. Between 1 675 and 1 837, several great famines brought more than a million pe ople to the edge of starvation. The shogunate and the daimyo provided what reli ef they could, but the evide nce of infanticide suggests that such relie f often proved in ad equa teyj Du rin g the eighteenth century, japan's agricultural economy was und ergoi ng a process of commercialization. Conditions in the villages ch an ged as sharp p ri ce fluctuations led to increased sales of land despite ed icts prohib i ting such sales. T he result was pau per ization and a class of landless laborers on the one hand, and the accumulation of surpluses and a class of wealthy farmers on the other. The benefits arising from .
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,
increased agricultural production largely accrued to the upper strata of
Tokuga wa society . The pe asan t w as the on ly regular taxpayer, and he was hard p ressed even in good times. When his crop was good, he had to turn in more bushels than ord in arily ; when it was bad, he had little left over for his own needs. From the shogun down to the samurai, the upper strata of Tokugawa society exerted pressure on the peasantry to meet the rising cost of government at central and local levels. The peas ants s uffered most as taxes were increased and repeated manipulations devalued the currency. From about 1700, the number of peasan t up risings increased. Between 1750 and the 1 860s, both the frequency and the size of these riots, sometimes involving 100,000 men , were a source of constant concern. The issues in these riots were s pecial levies in money or labor, unfair officials, or unjust methods of assessment. The riots were brutally suppressed, but the sources of unrest remained.20 Transport and communication facilities grew with the rising im portance of cities and of commercialized agriculture. Most of the im portant cities could be reached by water, bulk commodities were han dled by boat, and the development of shipping lines became a major industry. A h ighway system was also developed to handle com mercial transport and overland travel, as people of all levels went to and fro in
NATION-BUILDING: JAPAN
447
response to shogunal demands. Along the highways post stations and small settlements prospe red by ca�ering to the needs of travelers. In ad dition, run n ers operated a regular postal se rvice. The m aintena nce of the h ighways was a responsibility of shog u na l and daimyo authorities who i n turn put owners along the road in charge of building and main tenance for the stretc h of road passing their property. As communication increased and govern m ent became more bu reaucratic, there was w idespread attention to education. Ieyasu's ad monition of 1615 that the samurai acquire military skill and poli te learn ing was followed to a considerable extent. In 1 703 o n ly nine daimyo domains had schools, t ho ugh by then samurai families which could af ford it hired private tutors for their sons. By 1 79 1 the ad voc ate of "Dutch learning," Hayashi Shihei, gave his opinion that a soldie r wi tho u t literary attainments was no be tter than a barbarian.21 By 1 8 1 4 about half the domains, and almost all the large ones, had schools. In addition, a significant propo rtio n o f tradesmen and well-to-do farmers sent their sons to temple schools or private schools w here they learned the rudi ments of reading, writing and arithmetic. Even farmers could use the man uals on improved a gr iculture tech n iques sent to them. Figures for the number of private tutors and writing schools are uncer t ain But by the time of the restorat i o n in 1 868, 40 percent of Japa nese boys and 10 percent of the girls were receiv i ng formal education. It seems clear that schooling had increased steadily, if gra dual l y for at least a century and a half.22 The growth of tra n sport, communication, and ed ucation resulted from the chan ging position of the merchant and the growth of u rban centers in Tokugawa society . Although merchants stood at the bottom of the social hierarchy a nd as mere "movers of goods" were considered un p roductive the whole govern ing class from the shogu n down to the samurai became dependent on the merchant's services. The u rban con centration of s ho gunal and daimyo administration meant that the gov ernin g elite of the country required supplies for their headquarters and hence too k proc ure me nt merchants into their se rvice In t he large c ities and the more numerous castle towns, merchant quarters were laid out adjacent to t h e castle headquarters of the local ruler. Here, under close s upe r vis i o n , merchants w ere e ncouraged to serve the needs of the au thorities, albeit under the shadow of continuous social discrimin atio n The extent of the resulting com mercial activities is impres si ve. Though p roh ibited for a time, monopolistic guilds and other licensed organizations de veloped q u ic kly to hand le a multifa r io u s trade in silk threads, gold, silver, copper, l ime, and vegetable oils. Before 1 700 Edo had ten and Osaka twen ty four wholesale guilds During the eightee n th century , t he lic ensing o f such organizations expanded because the gov ernment relied on them to stabilize prices and assure adequate distri,
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-
.
TOWARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE bution. Annual license fees also added to the public revenue. Increas ingly. the commercial and fiscal operations of shogunal and daimyo domains came into the hands of merchant houses. Rural wholesalers bought commodities to sell in the castle towns and the commercial cen ters of Edo and Osaka. and such sales were often handled by urban wholesale guilds. Since the large cities served as distribution centers for the different daimyo territories. it was convenient to establish domain warehouses supervised by domain financial representatives. whose func tions were turned over from the daimyo's retainers to financially influ ential business houses. Soon, Edo and Osaka had exchange houses as well as rice and com modity markets. By 175 0 Osaka had over 1 3 0 han warehouses, and the annual flow of rice into its docks was about one million koku. By 1761 Japan had over 2 00 commercial houses, whose total capital worth had become equivalent to that of many daimyo. The great business estab lishments of modern times originated during this period. By 1690 Mitsui had become the financial agent for the shogunate and the imperial house, while Konoike handled the financial affairs of nearly forty daimyo, thereby earning an annual income in excess of most of the daimyo he served. Under the Tokugawa shogunate, the process of commerciali zation was thus well advanced. In the field of manufacturing it was sup plemented by the beginnings of mass production and of a modern labor force in such branches as silk-weaving, paper-making, lacquer work. and sake-brewing. This large expansion of commerce and industry altered the rela tions between samurai and merchants. In practice the samurai suffered most from the dislocations of economic expansion. The Bakufu and many daimyo met their financial difficulties time and again by reducing the allowances of their retainers. When such precipitous cuts were ag gravated by decreases in the money value of rice, samurai families were in dire straits, and their poverty-stricken life stood in stark contrast to their acknowledged social prestige. In these conditions, a good many samurai either became ronin or abandoned their status by taking up commercial pursuits. Still others adopted sons or daughters from fam ilies of prosperous merchants or farmers, conferring on them the status of samurai. Bakufu officials and daimyo were aware of these conditions and sometimes took steps to relieve distress, including the repudiation of debts. But such emergency measures did not alter the basic situation. Meanwhile, the merchants and artisans had grievances of their own. While a good many of these townspeople suffered from poverty and occasionally from shortages of food. the more prosperous among them chafed under the discrepancy between commercial success and inferior social status. Even the richest merchants and bankers suffered from of ficial interference in their commercial dealings. In the absence of na-
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tional loans, the bakufu met its recurrent budget deficits by special levies on the mercantile community. With foreign trade down to a trickle and the peasantry already overtaxed, there was no other source of cash avail able, since for political reasons the daimyo could not be asked for con tributions too frequently. The merchants were "invited" to lend large sums, but frequently these debts were not repaid because by so-called acts of grace the authorities would repudiate debts contracted by daimyo and their retainers. The sums involved were often enormous, whether these "loans" involved the bakufu directly or benefited his or the daimyo's hereditary followers. Sansom cites an instance of 1760 in which the sum "borrowed" from the trading guil ds equaled the total expenditures of the government for one year.23 None of this changed the official atti tude, according to which the merchant's contribution to society was in signi fi cant and per n icious. Such p rejudice was a convenient justification of the forced loans or confiscations of property imposed on the mer cantile community. Throughout the Tokugawa period the official attitude of contempt for the chonin was at odds with the nationwide commercialization of the economy. The merchants came to occupy a remarkably favorable eco nomic position. According to the house laws of the Mitsui clan, the merchant was obliged to understand his place and acknowledge the fact that he was a servant in th e samurai's world. But in his own world he was m aster. Relieved of the tem ptatio n to strive for noble status either by pur chase or infiltratio n, the Ja panese merchant could co ncen trate his energies on the struggle for busines s success. It was perhaps this feature of the To kugawa system which mor e than any other induced the chonin to press for the economic growth which so marked the latter half of the Tokugawa period.24
This account may suffice to explain why merchants were ready to join the movement against the Bakufu in the years preceding the restoration of 1868. We must turn now to a consideration of the nationalism and class consciousness of the samurai in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The economic position of the samurai deteriorated rapidly during this period, but significant numbers (perhaps a majority) retained their mil itancy and social pride. It will be seen that the policy of exclusion and its accompanying xenophobia contributed to this retention of the "sam urai spirit." Following the analysis of "reference societies" and Japan's rising nationalism, the third section analy zes the growth o f an anti bakufu movement among daimyo and samurai. The concluding section deals with the policies of restoration and the constitutional redefinition of the Japanese social order.
TOWARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE REFERENCE SOC I ET IES AND NATIONAL IDENTI TY A t te m p t s to invade the Japanese islands were few an d unsuccessful so tha t the country enjoyed e xce ptionally lon g pe riods of safety from aggression. But foreign i nfluences on Japan were, nevertheless, perva sive. The formative phase from the Yamato d y nasty to the Heian period (ca 300-1 1 85 A.D. ) was marked by the p re ponde rant prestige of Chinese civilization. Sansom notes that in a list com pile d at the end of t he seve nth century, over one-th ird of the Japanese aristocracy claimed Chinese or Korean descent. Monks, doctors , and a rt is ans had c rossed ove r from the mainland , b r ingin g with them treasures of learning and rel i gio n that were hi ghly prized in Japan .25 The skills an d ideas t h us transmitted helped to form Japanese c u lture , t ho u gh they became vehicles in strug gles for power as well. The high point of Chi nese polit ical influence was the adoption of the Taika reforms in 646 A.D. ( noted i n C hapter 3) . Chinese cultural influence persisted long after the methods of Chinese administration had lost their hold. By 8 3 8 A.D., the Japanese prohibited further cultural missions to China, which suggests that by then the coun try had attained a sense of identity which combined Chinese models with indigenous developments. This early prece de nt is recal led here because a somewhat similar pattern recurred in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Portuguese adventurers reached Japan in 1542, and between 1549 and 1551 Father Francis Xavier initiated the Jesuit mission which flourished for half a century. At first, Western traders were welcome. The Portuguese and the Dutch brought with them expertise in navigation and the use of fire arms. A civil war pervaded the country, and local overlords exploited such novel skills and resources to gain advantage over their opponents. Since traders accompanied the Jesuit mission, tolerance toward the Jes uits and adoption of the Christian faith also appeared to some local rul ers as a means of achieving trade benefits. The Christian mission re ceived its most important official endorsement under Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi, for the Jesuits represented a convenient coun terforce to Buddhism. Both leaders were engaged in a major struggle against Buddhist monasteries which doubled as military bases where warrior-monks and mercenaries stood as a major obstacle to political unification. But quite suddenly in 1587, Hideyoshi reversed his earlier tolera tion of the Christian mission by condemning Christian teaching and or dering the missionaries to leave within twenty days. He feared that Christian propaganda would undermine native traditions and thus impede his drive for military and po l itic al supremacy. Probably he also wanted to forestall hostile alliances with foreign powers. The main .
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Portuguese in Japan A Portuguese trading ship arrives in Nagasaki, awaited by Western and Japane se merchants on the quay. Detail (three panels) ofa six-leaf Nam ban screen, Momoyam a pe riod, from the end of the sixteenth century. (Asian Art Museum of San Francisco, Avery Brundage Collection)
grounds for an anti-Christian policy were political rather than religious and doctrinaire, and for that reason persecution remained sporadic and some missionary activities continued. Official persecution of Japanese Christians became severe in 1596, when the missions were interpreted as an advance guard of a Spanish invasion, launched from the Philip pines. The anti-Christian edicts of 1616 and 1624 were inspired by re newed fears of Spanish intervention. Peasant uprisings also caused fear of foreign intervention and led to the expulsion of Portuguese priests and traders in 1638. At the same time, foreign travel by Japanese na tionals was prohibited; eventually the death penalty was imposed for attempts to leave the country or to return to it after travel abroad. An embargo on Japanese foreign trade with Europeans followed, and as noted earlier only a small colony of Dutch merchants remained in Na gasaki, under strict surveillance. The shogunate feared that powerful regional rulers like the Mori and Shimadzu families might conspire with
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
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foreigners to obtain artil lery, ships, and even outright military support. Ieyasu had established the hegemony of the Tokugawa house , but its national authority remained precarious for several decades.c Japanese history th us presents two exam ples of contact with what was seen as a culturally or technically su perior civilization. Both con tacts are noteworthy for the read iness with which the Japanese adopted for eign ideas and practices and for the determined rejection whic h fol lowed. The seventh century wi tnessed an uns uccess fu l attem pt at cen tralized state-build ing through adaptation of Chinese bureaucratic institutions; later these institutions of the Taika reforms were aban doned . The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries witnessed a success fu l poli tical unification which terminated centuries of feuding among lo cally powerful clans. At first this drive for unity was aided by the trade and tech nology of the West ; later the policy of exclusion curtailed or prohibited contact with Europeans and their ideas. Paradoxically, Japan's intellectual mobilization occurred at a time of heightened seclusion from the rest of the world. In this respect, the preceding chapters on England, France, and Germany have dealt with "intellectual mobilization" i n quite different terms. I n all three countries, the period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries witnessed a burgeoning o f ed ucation, literature, and science, as well as an overall intensification of efforts to cope intellectually with each country's posi tion in the world. Ty p ic all y, these e fforts d isplayed a more or less cos mopolitan sensitivity to challenges from abroad and a more or less na tionalist striving to meet these challenges in a manner conducive to a personal and collective sense of worth.27 I n turning to Japan, one must understand that the Japanese ex perience d iffers significantly from the Western European one. A pattern of com plete cultural receptivity followed by an i ncreasingly selective ap proach to foreign ideas followed by the almost com plete rejection of them appears to be a very distinctive attribute of Japan's insularity and Cleyasu's succession t o the shogunate remained questionable un til h e eradicated the Toyotomi house in 1614, an d Tok ugawa legitimacy remained in some doubt even after the conquest of Osaka in that yea r. Accordin g to the p revailing doctrine, shogun a l legit i macy depended-in add ition to the im perial sanction-on unification of the country, a succession of rulers fo r three generation s, a n d official recognition of shogu n al supremacy by fo reign powers. Victory at Sekigahara and Osaka established the fi rst, and leyasu's formal retireme n t of 1605 in favor of his son Hidetada aided t he second criterion. Equally important was Japa n's internationa l position in East Asia. D u ring the 1630s, the sho g u nate inc reasingly declared its independence from the sinocentric world order which Japan had previously accep ted in order to maintain its trade relatio ns with China. By 1645, Japan had made itself diplomatically independent of China both thro u gh adoption o f a Japanese era name (Kan'ei) and the shogun's adoption of the new title Grand Prince of Japan (NiJum
koku Taikun).
This declaration of diplomatic i n dependence in relation to China greatly
aided the legitimation of Tok u gawa rule.is
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cultural history. U nlike many countries challenged by Western expan sion since the sixteenth century, Japan did not have to cope with the consequences of colonialism. I n the sixteenth century, it readily received Western traders and missionaries, but by the 1 590s a nativist reaction had set i n . In this respect, Japan rese mbles Germany and Russia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries . But Ja pan is unique in that it had to come to terms with t he ideas and institutions of an advanced foreign civilization from the beginning of its history. There m ay be no other co untry i n the world in w h ic h thinkers have been preoccu pied through o ut with what could be learned from another country and how s uch lessons might be useful to t heir native land. From the middle of the sixteenth to the middle of the seventee nth centuries this age-old pattern led from Christianity to exclusion, from neo-Con fucianism to Japanese nativism, and from Dutch learning to nationalism in its xeno phobic or pragmatic variants. As indicated earlier, Japanese political leaders of the sixteent h cen tury thought in terms of expedienc e when they tolerated the Christian missions. However, Japanese converts to Christianity applied the exact ing standards of true believers. In 1 579, after thirty years of missionary work by some 50 members of the Society of Jesus, the n u mber of Chris tians in Japan was about 1 30,000. By 1 600 that number was put at 300,000 in a population of 20 million, and by 1614 t h ere were approx imately half a million C hristians.28 In the early years, most Japanese converts were simple peasants, whose hard life was made still more burdensome by almost constant civil war. For such people, neither Buddhism nor Shinto offered much per sonal consolation, w h il e Christian ob servanc es provided scope for activ ity and an emotional outlet. Indeed, Japanese converts were noted for the intensity of their new faith. At times they subjected themselves to such merciless flagellation that the Jesuit fathers had to intervene. Vig orous preaching against suicide also appeared necessary, since the con verts' love for the crucified Christ and their devotion to the cross made it difficult to "moderate their spirit of love a nd penitence." The Japanese Christia n literature exa l ted the spirit of martyrdom and exhorted the faithful to be steadfast in the face of persecution. A tabulation for the period 1 6 1 4- 1 650 shows over 2, 1 00 Christian martyrs.29 The passionate commitment of t h ese converts probably owed much to the idealization of duty and self-sacrifice, which was a central tenet of Japanese neo Confucianism. In 1 6 1 0 Ieyasu ap poi nted Hayashi Razan ( 1 583- 1657) as his per sonal advisor and official scholar at the shogunal court. Hayashi was the outstanding Confucian scholar of his day and with the shogun'S ap proval established the neo-Confucian philosophy of Chu Hsi ( 1 1 30-
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1 2 00) as the norm of samurai ed ucation. According to Ch u Hsi, the sub ject was duty bound to render loyal se rvice to the sovereign and in an analogous manner so should the son obey his father, the wi fe her h us band, the younger brother his older bro t he r , and a friend his friend. The social order is secure when each person recognizes his proper sta tion in l i fe and thus upholds the idea of righteousness. In their dail y behavior, men must observe "social disc rimination"-that is, they m ust express their full loyalty and filial piety toward their immediate su perior rather than to any higher authority. Those who "exceed discri mination" are com m itting "the crime of usurpation and rebellion." Such an ap proach provided the new Tokugawa regime with a suitable j ustification of the lord-vassal relationship.30 Appropriate interpretation also provided a justi fication of usurpa tion. In China's legendary past, Tang and Wu had overthrown their lord . That act was bad , but the result i n g uni fication was good. In a dia logue between Tokugawa Ieyasu and H ayashi Razan , Ieyasu argued, not surprisingly, that what mattered was the norm of conduct once power is seized, not the means by which it is seized. For H ayashi the issue was more com plex. He could not reli nquish the Chinese conce ption that men are good only insofar as they practice the principle of loyalty. But neither could he relinquis h t he precedent of T ang and Wu. Hence, he argued that these two usurpers , knowing the principle of loyalty , had been justified in claiming that they obeyed the mandate of Heaven; and indeed their act had not revealed any private selfishness.31 The "Mandate of Heaven" theory had to be adapted to Japanese cond itions of shogunal power. The belief in the divine descent of the impe ri a l house and its unbroken continuity through the ages was a cen tral Ja panese tradition . Ac cordingly, Ja panese thinkers were bound to reject the Chinese view that under certain condi tions the sovereign might be removed or a dynasty overthrown. Yet, by emphasizing a dynastic continuity which p r eser ved the divine charisma o f the Sun Goddess (A materasu) , Japane se thinkers left the shogun's position in doubt. No one questioned either the ceremonial supremacy of the em peror or the actual authority of the shogunate . But there was room for argument whether (1 ) the emperor is the true sovereign and the shogun his rightful de puty; or (2) the shogun is the legitimate ruler in his own right, while the emperor is above him as an object o f reverence, but without actual con nection with the government; or (3) the emperor is the Supreme Deity in contrast to other countries whe re the decree of Heaven is above the ruler's decree. Hence, the s ho gun s actual supremacy and use of force are legitimate only as long as -
'
,
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they are in accord with t he wishes of t h e em peror to whom all reverence is d u e . 3 2
Under the Tokuga wa s h ogunate, com mentators o f the neo-Con fucianist tradition moved grad ually from the first to the second and toward the end o f the period-increasingly toward the third pos ition. This last position had been formulated by writers in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centu ries, who cast their imperial loyalty in religious terms. E v e ntu a ll y elaborations of their views i n s p i re d the restoration movement leading to t he overthrow of the shogunate in 1 868 . For our purposes it is s u ffic i e n t to note the growing ambivalence over Chinese models. One w riter ( Kumazawa Banza n , 161 9- 1 691) noted that in China all people are equal u n der heaven , and anyone who takes control can become sovere i gn . By contrast, the divine emperor of Jap a n is different from an o rdinar y mortal. Another writer ( Yamaga Soko, 162 2 - 1 685) reasserted t h e t r u e beaut y of Ja pa n against t h e neo-Con fuc ian idolization of China. The unbroken desce nt of the i m pe r i a l house from the Sun Goddess w a s the token of Japan's preem i n en c e . A third (Yamazaki A n sai , 1 61 8 - 1 682) we nt so far as to question th e "Mandate of Heaven" the or y , ra i s i n g do ubts about t he le giti m acy of T ung and Wu, who-in overthrowing their lords-had violated their d u t y as sub jects . The Tokugawa rise to power was not mentioned.33 B u t in a culture i m b ue d with hallowed p re c e den t s from Chinese h i s to r y , s uch q uestio n ing of the model countr y evoked u n e as y feelings, to sa y the le a s t - e s pe ci a l ly under the Tokugawa who relied on neo - Con fu c i a n doctrine for the le giti m a t ion of a u t hority . A w ri te r like Ya m a z u ki Ansai seems to have been gen u i nel y un aware of the a n tisho gu n a l pote n t ial o f his v i ews, al tho ug h some o f his d isci ples were p u n ished severely by the sh o g u n at e . A p parently, t h e To k u ga wa re gi me was divided in the mat ter . At home it e nco u r a ge d the neo-Confucian tradition with its e m p has i s on hierarchic authority, at least for a wh ile , and writers co n tin ued the citation of Chinese prece dents as bi nd in g . Occasional mavericks even extolled China at the ex pense of Japan. B ut in its foreign policy the s h o gu n a te took a much more independent position toward China, and the main trend of tho u gh t seems to have been that of a growing ambivalence toward this a ge - old model of Japanese culture . Various writers· began to " d i sc ove r " affinities between neo-Confucianism and Shinto, a tte m pting to inco r porate the prestige of Chinese cultu re into the native Japanese tradition. Before long, many o f the same writers asserted the u n iq ue s u perio rit y
of Japan included, even while th ey used Chinese traditions to define their new sense of Ja pan es e i de n t i t y . National lea rn i n g (kokugaku) was the w a tchw or d o f t h is re actio n again s t the d o m i na nc e o f the Chinese classics and of the re l a t e d desi re over all
ot he r
countries,
China
TOWARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE to derive all guidance from Japanese tradition. In its early modern form, kokugaku was the work of two scholars , Motoori Norinaga ( 1 7 3 0 - 1 801) and his self- styled di s c i ple , Hirata Ats utane ( 1 776- 1 843 ) . Motoo ri was the son of a wholesale merchant. He became a physi cia n and then turned to classical Japanese studies. Sponsored by a member o f the To ku ga w a fam ily, Motoori became a private tutor who attracted nearly five hundred students from all walks of life and all parts of the country . H is most im portant w r i t in g consists of a forty-eight-volume com mentary on the Kojiki , the Ja panese classic least affected by Chinese influence . The main theme of this wor k was the elaborate elucidation o f t he "Way of Japan as the Way of the Gods," based on the conviction that Ja pan is in here n t ly supe rior to all other countries. In su m marized form, Motoori's argument was as follows: the Way of the Gods is the cou rse of existence of the J a panese natio n ; land and people came i n to bei ng throu gh the agency of I zan agi and Izanam i ; Amaterasu was e s tablished as ruler to the e nd of time. Therefore , the ancient and etern al Way o f J a pan can be nothi n g else but the Way o f the God s . This i s not to be taken in the narrow sense o f religious worship alone, but rather as the fundamental source o f govern ment and of all moral an d social relations : as the u nchan ging character o f the J a panese n ation is fixed for all ages , it must be expressed in the daily life of the people. There is no reason whatsoever for the J apanese to be in flue nced by i n ferior foreign doctrines such as Con fucianism and Bud dhism. 34
I n poli tical terms, Motoori' s m ai n message was has no choice but to s ubmit to t he god s and hence
that the individ ual
to the e m pe ro r as their direct descendant. The task of preserving the Wa y of the Gods and hence the Wa y of t he
Sovereign
was
of such
overrid ing significance
that tem porary e v i l deeds by the so ve r eig n have no i mportance by com parison. The prevailing Tokugawa shogu nate was not merely the right ful dep u ty of the e m pe ror: such delegation was j ustified in accord with the origi nal instructions o f Amateras u. And si nce fore ign countries (pa r
ticularly China) are not the do main of the S u n Goddess, they have no fixed rulers like the divinely descende d imperial house. The forces of evil have corru pted foreign rulers . By focusing attention on the de scent and c o n t in u i ty of the imperial house, Motoori d iscredited Confucianism and the Chinese historical trad itio n . China had been conquered re peatedly by barbarians, and the Mandate
of
Heaven had been ex ploited
the Way of the Gods e m bodied
the Chinese Way commended
time and again to j ustify us u rp atio n s of the throne. B y com parison with
in Japa n ,
by Con fucianism was clearly fau l ty . T o these ideas , H irata Ats utane added not only literary elabora tions , but a rel i gio us em phasis . I f the e m pe ror is descended fro m the god s who fo unded the nation, then d u ty toward the e m pe ror is indis tingu ishable from worship. From this position it was a short ste p to the
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idea that J a pan as the origin al c reation of the god s was the a ncestor of all co untries , wh ile the e m peror was destined to
be
the sovere ign o f the
world . Therefore , the great task was to recover the truly Ancient Way of the country be fore i ts t r adi tions we re totally corru pted by foreign in £1uence . 35 The de fenders of t he To kugawa shogunate had take n a m ajor step when they extolled the native Japanese trad i tion at the e x pense o f the C h i nese model. In this abo ut-face , the y rejected the age - old identi fica tion with China as the ideal civ ilization . As if to co m pe n sate fo r what had been. given up, the kokugaku scholars proceeded to de pict Ja pan in terms o f its divine m ission as the very center of h u m a n cu ltu re . We have enco untered this new search for old roots be fore. I n se ventee nth century England, the great con flict between king and co untry was de bated wit h each side a p pealing to the "ancient constitutio n . " I n the eigh teenth century, French as well as German w riters and political activists sou ght to construct viable political and cultural models by re fe rences to classical antiq uity . It m ay be that the formation of national ide ntities requires this link with a n ideal past which has been lost, but is now fo und to be of the h ighest value. J apanese thinkers of the late eighteenth and early ninetee nth centuries were faced with an u n usually difficult prob lem. Because China had bee n the only viable model for so long, claims for the native Japanese tradition had to be especially strong. One would think that this xenophobic attitude would be incom pat
ible with a positive view of Western learning. The only thing in favor of that learning was its utility ; the massive argu ment against it was its total incom patibility wit h the new Japanese nativism. Neve rtheless, many writers found ways of combining national and Western le arning, fore shadowin g the attitude prevailin g a mo n g the poli tica l leaders o f t he res toration . To provide a context for understanding this union of different cultural e lements, we m ust say something about the Ja panese discovery of Europe. A fter 1 64 1 the E u ro pean presence i n Japan was confined to the tiny Dutch settlement in Nagasaki. The Dutch were friends neither of Catholicism nor the Portuguese, and this attitude made them acce ptable to the J a panese. Moreove r , the Dutch were sim ply traders and hence did not appear as menacing to the J apanese as the combination of trade , religious mission, and military conquest. All the same, Ja panese s uspi cions of foreigners were ac ute. T he Dutch were subject to detailed sur veillance and more or less deliberate indignities at the hands of Japa nese o fficials. But the Dutch presence , tho ugh miniscule, served the Japanese interest in European goods and skills. Western learning was another matter. Private scholars could obtain it only by s pecial and devio us ef fort, since the study of Dutch was pain fully difficult and Chinese books
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE on E u ropean reli gion and science were banned. To the Tok ugawa ce n sors, any passing re ference to Chr ist i a nity or E u rope even in Chinese books on subjects other than rei i gion was sufficient gro u nd for con fis catio n . Restrictions on the i m port of fo re i gn books were relaxed only in 1 7 20 , and the stud y o f Du tch was not o ffi c i a l l y e ncou raged until 1 740, u n d e r Sho g u n Yos h i m une ( 1 7 1 6- 1 74 5 ) . Not until 1 7 74 was a transla tion from th e Dutc h circulated o pe n l y . 3 (j B y t he 1 7 70s, i n terest i n Dutch lea rn i n g had increased marked l y . I n 1 7 8 3 Otsuki Ge n tak u pu blished h is Ladder to D utc h Studies , a n d by 1 789 he established the fi rs t D u tc h lan g u a ge s c hool in Edo. In the fol lowing d ec a des , s i m i l a r sc hools were established elsewhere. I n add ition to g r a m m a ti c a l instructions, Ots uki 's book contained a spirited defe nse of Du t c h studies, de c l a ring them to be as wor t h y of the s u perior man's atten tion as the C h i nese classics . At a bo ut this time, the Japanese term for fo re ign studies changed from bangaku (barbarian l ea r ni n g ) to ra n gaku (ra n derived from "Oranda" or Holland ) , suggestin g that Otsuki was not alone in h is views. I t might appear sim ple to add Dutch stud i e s to the Chinese classics and Japanese lore, but in fact the ran gaku schol ars challenged Chinese intellectual supremacy . Spokesmen of neo-Con fucianism were already breaking aw ay from tradition whenever t hey combined the C h i nese classics with an em phasis on Japa nese spi rit u a l values. By introd ucing Du tch stud ies o n an equal footing with Chinese culture, the rangaku scholars in effect challenged the Japanese to choose
An Early Japanese Use of a European Invention
An illustration from I hara Saikaku's no\'el The Man Who Spent His Life in Love ( 1 682) showing the nine-year-old hero training
his telescope on a maidservant in her bath. This w himsical episode exem plifies the in congru ities of cultu ral diffusion , but is hardly represen tative o f the deadly serious ness with which the use or m isuse of Euro pean inventions was debated a century later.
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459
between Chinese and Western knowledge as a com pleme nt to their na tive heritage. The clash between rangaku and Confucianism lasted for many years and was embittered by governmental measures endorsing the teac h ing of Chu Hsi and placing severe restrictions on Western learning. Dutch learn ing em p hasized u t ili ty science, and modern ity, while national learning emphasized j a pa n s ancient cultural tradition. Never theless, the rangaku and the ko k uga ku scholars had in common the de sire to preserve and e n hance their native land. Many J a pa n ese writers of the late eighteenth century saw that European science was a source of power wh ich could hel p protect their country ag ai n st invasion and make it economically so und. In finding ways of reconciling nativism with Western learning, these writers ranged from rather pragmatic consid erations to the extreme s of xenophobia. A few exam ples will ill ustrate this ran ge of attitudes ; I begin with the " pragmatists." In the 1 7 7 0s there were indications that Russian infiltration threat ened from the south as well as the north. This s uggested a resum ption of the dangers which the policy of exclusion had averted since 1 64 1 . Hayashi Shihei ( 1 73 8 - 1 7 93) was one of the fi rst Japanese to respond to this new challenge by linking the development of science with the needs of national defense. His book, M ilitary T alks for a M aritime N ation, ap peared in 1 7 9 1 . Hayashi le ft no doubt that reliance on Chinese texts was responsible for the neglect of the pro per coastal defenses.37 Although defenses were strengthened as Hayashi had advised, he was punished for insubordination. His transgression consisted in a ppealing to the pub lic by publishing a book dealing with affairs of state, and this constituted a violation of existing laws. In late-eighteenth-century Ja pan , neither public o pinion nor poli tics was tolerated because both were incompatible with the Confucian emphasis on duty to the superior. Yet the same shogunal regent (Mat sudaira Sadanobu, 1 7 59- 1 829) who had ordered both the strengthening of shore defenses and the punishment of Hayashi Shihei also initiated a collection of Dutch books for governmental use. His justification of this collection fully displays the ambivalence of officials pulled in dif ferent directions by nationalis m , the desire for security, the im portance of Western learning, the fear of its im plications for domestic tranqu illity, and the need to keep a ffairs under tight official control. ,
'
I began about 1 792 or
1793
to collect Dutch book s . The barbarian nations
a re skilled in the sciences, and considerable pro fit may be de rived from their works of astronomy and geograph y, as well as from their m ilitary wea pons and their methods of internal and exte rnal medicine. H o we ver , their books may serve to e ncourage idle cu r iosit y or may ex press harmful ideas; It might
thus seem ad visable to ban them , but p ro hi biti n g these books wou ld not pre vent people from reading them. There is, moreover, pro fi t to be derived
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE fro m t he m . Such boo ks a n d o t h e l' fore i gn t h i n g s s h o u l d t h e re fore not be allo we d to pass in lar ge q u a nt ities i n t o t h e ha n d s of i r responsible pe op l e ;
n e v e rtheless i t i s d e s i r a bl e to h a ve t h e m d e posited i n a gove rn m e n t l i brary. If t h e re i s
no
o n e to read t h e m . howe v e r . t h ey w i l l m e re l y be co m e nests for
i n se c t s . I i n formed t h e Go v e rn o r of N a ga s a k i t h a t if s u ch works w e r e ac
q u i red b)" t h e gove rn m e nt . t h e y w o u l d not be d i s pe rse d t h ro u gh o u t the co u n t r y . a n d co u l d t h u s be co n s u lted i f t h e re we re a n } ' o ffi c i a l need o f t h e m . T h i s i s h o w i t h a p pe n ed t h a t fo r e i g n boo k s ca m e t o b e pu rc h ased . 3 s
I n a statement like t hi s, the poten tial benefits of Eu ro pean lea rn ing w h i le recognized in princi ple- recede into the backgro und, as both the threat of " harm ful ideas" and the i m possibility of preventing peo ple fro m read i ng dangerous books a re realized . And w h i le the statement ado pts a m iddle course by endorsing a government co llection of Dutch books with access l i m ited to officials, it also reveals the cultu ral national ism , caution, and fear p re v a ili n g i n official circles . The "con siderable profit" to be derived from Dutch boo ks is overs hadowed by the notion that they could be consulted in a re s t r i c te d govern ment lib ra r y "if there were any official need of them ." When the leading statesman - of the day expressed himself in this manner, o ne would hardly expect shogunal officials to become eager students o f Dutch learn ing. These attitudes were not shared by everyone. Some bakufu officials (like Takashima S h u h an, 1 798- 1866, a nd E gawa Tarozaemon , 18001 855) who were in touch with local a ffairs became pioneers of Western science , e sp e c i a l l y in its m i l i ta r y aspects. Their work was an u phill strug gle, si nce Con fucianism and s uspicion of "barbarian lea r n i n g" prevailed in Edo . Hence, the initiative for combin i n g nationalism with Dutch stud ies tended to shift to the domains, especially to Satsuma, Mito, Ech izen, H izen , and Choshu.39 As Shimazu Nariakira of Satsuma put it in 1856: At th is t i m e w h e n d e fe n c e a ga i n st th e fore ign barbarians is o f crucial im po r t a n c e it is t he urge nt d uty of all samu rai both hi gh and low to cooperate in l e a rn i n g of co n d i t ion s in foreign l a n d s so that we may adopt their good poi nts to su pplement our nation
and
d efi c i e n c i e s
,
rei n fo rce the m ilitary might of our
keep t he barbarian natio n s u nd er contro l . 4 0
Shimazu did not see any con tradiction between Western technology, Ja pan's wealth, and the preservation of shogunal and daimyo authority. d For him and the other reforming daimyo, European science used to dShimazu was u nu s ua l for the pe rson a l i n terest he took in suc h novelties as pho tog ra p h }' , the te legr a p h , gas light i n g, t h e m a n u fac t u re of glass and agric u l t u ral i m p l emen ts
in
ad d i t i o n
to cannons and r i n es . Other re fo r m i n g dai m yo stressed the pol i tical aspects
w h i le allow i n g t heir re t a i n e rs to pursue Western st udies. The con verge nce of i n te rest be
t ween reform i n g d a i m )'o and bak u fu officials broke down a fter 1 85 7 w h e n the dai myo
became c r i t ical of o fficial nego t i a t i o n s w i t h fo rei gners wh ile the ba k u fu became suspicious of d a i m )'o self- i n terest i n the p rom o tion of i n ternal re forms.
NA TION-B UILDING : JAPAN
advance japan's economy and military technology was e ntirely i n har mony with Confucian eth ics stre ssing the obedience of each man to h i s superior. 4 1 B u t the interest i n Western learn ing was not confined t o a few bak u fu officials and reform-minded daimyo Paradoxically, it was taken u p b y the more fanatic spokesmen of ja panese nativism-for e x am pl e the kokugaku s cholar H irata Atsutan e He began his studies of Shi n to i n 1 80 1 , a n d h is first m aj or work was enti tled New Discussion of the Gods (Kishin Shinron , 1 805) . 4 2 For H irata as for other writers of the kokugaku school, Japan was the land o f the gods and superior to all other co untries because of i ts un broken line of god-descended e m perors. These views were a standby of Shinto doctrine. But in H irata's work they were com bined with t he idea that i n ac q ui r ing foreign learning the japan e se should select the goo d points of such studies and thereby make them part of Japanese cultu re. This approach was a ttacked bitterly by advo cates of a n cient Japanese learning who wanted to protect the ol d sim plici ties from defilement by Wes t e r n rationalism. However, for H irata, who was a phys ician, there was no going back to the innocence of ancient ways, and he turned the argument around. Only "beginners unsure o f themselves o r self-satisfied people like the Chinese would refuse to profit from the worthwhile parts of Western learning."43 But his attitude was not one of tolerance at all. He dismissed out of hand scientific find ings at odds with national superiority For exam ple, H irata acknowl edged that foreign medicine was far in advance of its Japanese co un ' terpart. But then he argued that in ancient Japan the medical arts had been unnecessary, since serious diseases had commenced only when Ja pan engaged in relations with China and other foreign co untries. It was only pro per to cure foreign d iseases by recourse to foreign med icine. Another exam ple is the use H i rata made of his knowledge of geography and economic relations to "demonstrate" japan's uniq ue position in the world . Other countries were larger, but Japan was superior in all re spects . Witness its sel f- sufficiency: other countries were u rging Japan to trade with them, but Japan enjoyed the special favor o f the gods and did not require trade ! I n other words, Hirata's adm iration o f Western learning did not imply esteem for Europeans. Perhaps he feared that the rangaku scholars would be as deferential toward the Dutch as Con fucian scholars had been toward t h e Chinese. At a n y rate, h e combined his acceptance of Western learning with a denunciation of the Dutch which ran the whole gamut of prej udiced rumors and quasi-racist slogans. Hirata's bigotry may have been atypical, but his im pulse to link the use of Western knowledge with extreme Japanese nationalism was shared by Yoshida Shoin ( 1 830- 1 859), among others. A sam u rai of Chosh u, Yoshida enc ompasse d i n his short life the whole ran ge of attitudes which .
,
,
.
.
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE inspired the young men of spirit (shishi). H is and their loyalty to the national cause (kokutai) had the intensity of the true believer who wants to sacrifice his li fe for his ideal.e In 1 85 8 Yoshida wrote ,
I n s t u d y i n g t he learn i n g o f E u r o pe a n d A merica, to adore and idolize
t h e barba rians . . . m ust be r eje c ted a bso l u t e l y B u t t he barba rians' a r t i l l e r y .
and s h i pb u il d i n g . t h e i r kn owled ge of medici n e . and of p h y sical scie nces, can
a l l be o f u s e to u s - t hese shou ld p ro pe r l y be ado pted . . . . W h e n I w as desiro u s o f
go i n g
to A me r i c a . m y teac h e r [ S a k u m a] Zozan
said to me : " I f t h is d u t y were to be u n d e rtaken by one w ho was not possessed
o f a fi r m a s p i r a t i o n for loyalty, o n e w ho d i d not reco gn i ze the obli gat io n resu l ti n g fro m the be n e fac t i o n s of t h e n a t i o n , it wo u l d u n fa i l i n g l y lead to great harm. Truly you are f i t t e d for t h is res ponsibi l i t y . "44
Men like Sakuma and Yoshida apparently did not feel tro ubled by the necessity to once more follow a foreign model. The Westerners might hold a tem porary advantage in sc ience and technology . B ut once Japan adopted these techniques, it would regain i ts rightful place in world af fairs and fulfill its destiny "as the so urce o f civilization and cemer o f an eternal world empire."45 One can discern a certain pattern in the preceding discussion . First, the Japanese accepted Christianity and then had recourse to Chinese precedent as a counterpoint to the expulsion of the Christian missions. Next, Japanese thinkers reacted against the age-old reliance on Chinese precedent by their idealization of the ancient Japanese tradition. Finally , Ja panese political and intellectual leaders d iscovered that Western learn ing was use ful for the national cause ; thus, advocates of Dutch learn ing found common ground with the spokesmen of kokugaku. The paradox of t he country's history was reenacted. Since its beginning as a political entity, Japan had always been indebted to cultu ral models taken from abroad. During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the si multaneous emphasis on national and Western learning was to dem onstrate that the tension between cultural dependence and self-assertion was as central to Japanese nation-building as it had been throughout the country's cultural history. Yoshida Shoin was twenty-three when Commodore Perry arrived at Uraga in 1 853 and p re sented the co untry with its most severe chal lenge since the Christian m issions three centuries earlier. The debate elicited by that challenge marked the decline of the Tokugawa shogun ate and the beginning of modern politics. For the first time, affairs of state became the concern of a public outside the ranks of government. eKokutai had a range of meanings incl u d i n g honor or avoidance of disgrace. dignity or prestige, i n fluence or author ity in action . the ideals of the spirit. Yoshida was executed in 1 859 for his part in plan ning the assassination of a high bak u fu official. His atti tude toward Weste rn learning was only a small part of his concerns. but it is cited here a s typical of the leaders opposi n g the Tok u gawa regime.
NATION-B UILDING: JAPAN
Instruction in a "Temple School" for Commoners
Sons from fam ilies below the aristocrac y were given instruction in read ing, arithmetic, and
calligraphy in terakoya schools. This picture o f a schoolroo m in action gives some impression of the youngsters' reactions. The task of maintainin g standards of excellence was corres pondingly great. (Kodansha International)
The debate on how to meet t h i s new challenge was indeed agon izing. But it is worth noting that the debaters, whether Yoshida and his loyalistf friends or the officials and neo-Confucianists defending the Tokugawa house, had the same vision of Japan's god-given superiority. The great controversy of the restoration move ment concerned the mean s by which the nation's goals could best be achieved. THE RESTORATION MOVEMENT: EMERGENCE OF PUBLIC DEBATE In the preceding chapters on England, France, and Germany, I have referred to an "intellectual mobilization" that was more or less se p arable from social and political action. In England this mobilizatio n in cluded lawyers and Puritan divines as well as members of parliament; 'The term loyalist becam e a catchword for a l l those w h o used "loyalty to the e m pe ror" as a basis for attacking the policies and. in the end. the existence o f the Tokugawa shog una te .
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE in France, the philosophes and Freem asons as well as the parlemen taires; and in Germany, writers and journalists as well as civil servants. In some cases, the political activist and the writer were the same person -Goethe and the Abbe Sieyes are outst a nd i ng examples; but on the whole, the two activities are se parable in the Euro pean context. Th is separation seems inappropriate to Japan. Certainly, the daim yo and sam u rai who took up Dutch studies in the interest of national defense were engaged in inte l lectu a l pursuits. B ut they are dist i nguished from "intellectuals" in nineteenth-century Europe by the extraordinary sin gleness of political purpose with which they pursued these studies Moreover, in Europe the divergence between conservatives and radicals im plied a conflict over goals as m uch as over the means to ach ieve them. This was not the case in Japan . An arch conserva t ive like Tokugawa Nariaki (see further on) and a fanatic like Yoshida Shoin both wanted to use Euro pean science for strengthening Japan against the dange rs of Western penetration. In dealing with the restoration movement, then, I shall be conce rn e d with the way in which members of the Japanese aristocracy became prepared to act politically in a social struct u re which was based on the suppression of politics . This movement also provided a training for leadership in the period of reconstruction which followed the restoration of 1 868.g The culture of the Tokugawa period encouraged regional loyalties and pride of rank over national concerns; it also militated against self discipline. The samurai had been demilitarized. Employed as daimyo officials, many could be expected to develop a bureaucratic mentality. The urbanized, rentier existence of others offered countless o pportu n ities for corruption . The o fficial e mphasis on rank together with the discouragement of com petition fostered social parasitism . Finally, many lower samurai families were forced to supplement their rice stipends by work they considered degrading. In one form or another, many samurai yielded their traditional postu re , yet the weakening of "moral fiber" was also intensely resented and resisted. Com parison with other aristocracies makes this moral resilience of a good many sam urai somewhat puz z ling. Negative cases are hard to interpret, but Thomas Smith has pointed out that some samurai re tained their traditional posture in part because under the Tokugawa shogunate their privileges were not challenged by a rising " democratic" movement. Japanese merchants never raised their private grievances to "a great principle o f struggle between right and wrong," despite their increasing wealth, e x perience in affairs, and intense resentment of an inferior position In the absence of a challenge from below, samurai
.
-
.
"Daim yo officials and sam u rai provided t he active political and i ntellec t u al leadership o f t he nation and pioneered i n moder n e n t re prene urial activities as well. This leadership role is reviewed in the follow ing section.
NATION-B UIWING: JAPAN
could retain a positive view of their position, however jeo pardized in fact, and thus avoid the rigid defensiveness so typical of aristocratic re sponses to populist movements. We may cite other reasons for the ultimately constructive activism of the samurai. At the beginning of the Toku gawa period , the samurai had been removed from their land, losing the main anchor of their in herited privileges. For more than two centuries , they had depended on government service or rice sti pends as their means of sustenance . Con sequently, they had an interest in supporting a government which func tioned effectively in their behalf. At the same time, the Tokugawa re gime and many samurai retained an ideology of militancy and service, even after the samurai had turned into rentiers and engaged either in administrative work, demeaning occupations, or simpl y dissipation . This discrepancy between an ideology of militancy and administrative rou tines or between claims to h igh status and the actuality of degradation brought the ideals of the samurai into frequent con flict with their way of life an d thus im parted much tension to their collective experience. Such tension is missing from the life style of Euro pe an aristocrats who enjoyed their privileges and merely defended their entrenched position.46 Education under the Tokugawa provides an important clue to this tension and helps to explain the moral resilience of many sam urai, as well as their leading role in the restoration movement. In 1 786 Hayashi Shihei formulated the aims of this education as follows : With the eight v irtues as your basis [his list is filial piety, respect for elders, loyalty, trust , courage, j ustice, straightforwardness, and a sense of honor] cultivate a boldness of s pirit without losin g self-discipline ; acquire wisdom and wide learning without des pising other peo ple. Do not becom e weak and feeble ; do not lose your dignity; do not sink stagnantly into mere logic-cho p
p i n g nor al low you rself to be carried away by prose and poetry. Do not lose your co urage ; do not become introverted . Do not become an admirer of China who sees no good in Japan. Do not fall in love with novelty or with pleasures of the eye. Practice your military skills with devotion and at the same time learn someth i n g o f astronomy and geogra phy, of the tea ceremony and of No dramaY
Hayashi's statement was representative of advanced opinion in his time. A number of writers combined the Confucian code of conduct with the
activist ethic of the samurai, the nationalist rejection of the Chinese model with the praise of m ilitary skills, modern science, and the tradi tional Ja panese arts. This set of ideas became increasingly com mon in the late eighteenth cent u ry and spread to the education o f commoners as well. In the fief schools and in schools for commoners, instruction be came a highly formalized affair. While it was intrinsically dull and mean ingless, reading and writing were used as media through whic h the stu-
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE dent learned proper behavior and the right frame of mind. The student's bearing and attitude were subjected to the most detailed scrutiny, and tedious re petition was the met hod by which self-d iscipline was taught.h This ed ucational syste m hel ped to maintain t he ideals of the sam urai. The teachers had a vested interest in these ideals, and the daimyo and bakufu officials encouraged their ed ucational endeavors because they considered these ideals suitable supports of domestic stability. Many samurai students did not acce pt with alacrity admonitions of sel f-d isc i pline, filial piety , and an activist way of life. Fief ed icts fre quently deplored the lack of diligence and urged sam urai students to show greater effort. Although the ideolo gy and practice of swordsman ship were con tin ued, personal m ilitancy was di scouraged and all contests or simulated combat among the pu pils was prohibited . One result of this double-edged policy was that, as Dore com ments, "combat was less and less practiced, and swordsmanship and the use of the lance became in creasingly a matter of formal gymnastics, and disciplined choreog raphy."4 9 This pres umably applied to those pupils who put dignity and respect for elders above the cult of action . There were others, however, whom circumstances and temperament prom pted to make the opposite choice. As ronin or masterless samurai, they lived by the sword at the expense of most other tenets of the sam u rai ethic. Yet some of the ronin made u p by ascetic rigor what they had lost in wealth and status ; they came to beli ev e that t h e y alone upheld the old standards . One can gauge the tensions inherent in Ja panese culture before the restoration when one observes that the Tokugawa regime did not abandon its praise of militancy despite its policy of pacification and the apprehensions aroused by the activities of the ronin. The famous story of the forty-seven ronin exem pli fies many of these themes. At the shogunal court a daimyo has drawn his sword and wounded a high court official to avenge an insult. As a penalty, the daimyo is asked to commit suicide because he has jeopardized Tokugawa supremacy and the policy of pacification on which it rests. The daimyo's retainers are now without a master ; t hey acknowledge that he had to die, but out of loyalty to him they make every effort to preserve their lord' s fief for the members of his family. This effort fails. For two years the forty-seven ronin (the original n umber is larger, but many withdraw) secretly plan to avenge their lord. After successfully eluding the ubiq uitous Tokugawa police, they kill the court official who had provoked their master. As a penalty for this violation, the shogun demands that t he forty-seven commit suicide in turn. The conduct of these men ex empli fies unconditional loyalty to their master, self-discipline in guardhSons o f com moners learned t he art o f writ i n g i n tem ple schools and through priv ate tu tors in a manner that is strikingly re m i n iscent of certain Pu rita n and V ictorian prece pts of co nduct. Literacy was linked to the ideology of self-discipline."
NA TION-B UILDING: JAPAN
Admiral Perry is Greeted by the Governor of Uraga (U.S. Naval Academy M useum)
in
1 853
ing their secret plans, and perseverance until their plan is executed. The story epitomizes the priorities and contradictions of Tokugawa culture . The ronin divorce their wives o r have their wives a n d daughters turn to prostitution for their livelihood so that as samurai they can fulfill their pled ge of loyalty to their dead master. For these men , the hierarchy of rank and action to fulfill their pledge are more important than fam ily ; for the shogunate, control of viole nce is more important than the hi erarchy of rank or the cult of action. These priorities are exemplified by the ronin who sacrifice their families and themselves to avenge their lord, and by the shogunate which protects the peace of the realm even though this necessitates punishing those who by their loyal action up-
TO WA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE hold the ideals of h ierarchy and m ilita ncy which the shogunate itself espo uses . This true story of 1 7 02 i n stan t ly became the cultural e pitome of the sam urai ethic ; in retrospect it reads more like a tragic e pit a p h t han an a p otheos is. One would suppose that many of these men , for whom m il itancy was t he mark of r a n k were aware at times of its em ptiness. W hile the story of the forty-seven ron in certain ly u p h e ld the ideal, did it not also underscore the p re te n s i o n s o f a mil itancy without war? Under the Tokugawa regime the p eaceful existence of most sam urai was at odds w i t h thei r m i l itant s t a nc e a c o nd i ti o n hardl y conducive to the vigo r and sel f-discipline the sam urai di sp la yed during the Meiji Restoration . H is torical instances are n umerous in which such conflicts be tween t h eory and practice lead to the decline of an ideal. Why did this not occur in Japa n ? Some allowance m ust be made for the accident of timi n g . W e will never k now whether the sa murai ethic would have become a sham if the Western cha l lenge to Japanese independence had come much later. All we know is that when the Tokugawa regime was jeopardized after 1 853, the sam urai displayed a capacity for self-disciplined action that had been jeopardized (and may well have been diminished) by the discre pancy between ideal and conduct in their life before 1 853. Bakufu officials had always u phe ld the ideal of samurai militancy while in practice insisting on the pacification o f the country. The best ele ments among the samurai probably tolerated such inconsistency, as lon g as the shogu nate itsel f appeared to act decisively. But even con sen'ative sam urai turned against the regi me once its capacity for action waned. For then it appeared that the shogunate was putting Tokugawa interests ahead of the interests of the country at a time of national emerge ncy. One should also consider that the cult of action found some outlets in Tokugawa society and in sublimated form had constructive results. Dore has shown how the militant ideal of sel f-disciplined action was "domesticated" through the educational syste m , especially in the teach i n g of calligr aphy Gradually, samurai ideals became ideals for com moners as well. In contrast to Europe, there is hardly any evidence in Tokugawa Japan suggesting that commoners should be barred from the acquisition of literacy on the ground that this would make them unruly. At the same time, sam urai who became important daimyo officials nat urally used their ed ucation to im prove the economic and administrative affairs of the several domains. Broadly speaking, it is probable that the top and m iddle strata of the samurai bene fited from the Tokugawa system. Beasley characterizes daimyo officials as the top of the sam urai class, com prising some 5,200 retainers with the right of audience ( hatamoto) in the Tokugawa do,
,
.
NA TlON-B UlWING: JAPAN mains and much smaller numbers of com parable ran k in the daimyo domains. A m iddle stratum of "ordin�ry" sam urai (hirazamurai) was more n u merous: in Satsuma they numbe red 3 ,900 fam ilies, in Chosh u and the Tok u gawa domains of Owari about 2 , 5 0 0 each. No total co unt of the top and middle ranks of sam u rai officialdom appears to be avail able, but these figures suggest that the two ranks com prised probably between 5 and 1 0 percent of the sam urai class as a whole.l The moderate leaders of the restoration movement, those who had the greatest stake in making the e x isting syste m more effective, were recruited from these ran ks of Tokugawa o r d aimyo officialdom. At the same time, many of these high officials were time-servers and corrupt, e x plo i ting their status and title to hide the ir inco m pe tence and lord it over their i n feriors . I n the last decades of the Tokugawa era, neo-Confucianism with its em phasis on hierarchy was used increasingly as a rationalization of bu reaucratic patho logie s At the same time, a large n u mber of educated samurai and commoners found that nepotism and corru ption barred them from e m ploy m e nt as shogunal or daimyo administrators . Indeed, the lower samurai were exploited, often c r uelly Many of the youn ger and more radical leaders of the anti-Tokugawa movement were re cruited from the ranks of these frustrated office seekers who chafed u nder i ncompetence in h igh places and strained to put their abi l ity at the service of the nation. The firebrands who pushed longest for ex puls io n o f the "barbari ans" and resorted to assassination as a political weapo n probably came disproportionately from these lower ranks of the samurai class as well as from the ronin, whose lack of a master placed them outside the system.j The restoration movement and the period of reconstruction which fol lowed provided t he opportun ity to overcome t he long- standing, in ternal contradictions of the Tokugawa regime. H aving endu red these contradictions between ideological militancy and a peaceable ren tier existence for so long, a significant minority of the samurai at last found an o utlet for their ambitions after 1 853. As Dore puts it in a telling sum mary, .
.
'Estimates p u t the n u m be r o f sam u rai households at 570,000 or a total o f 2 m illion persons of samurai status at the time of the restoration in 1 868. The n umber of o fficials varied amon g the domains, w i t h t he top ranks bei n g more n u merous i n the Tokugawa and the middle ranks more n u merous in the outside daimyo domains. A total of 5 7,000 in the top and middle ranks is not i m probable, since there we re some 250 daimyo domains in addition to t he many subdivisions of the Tokugawa holdings. The lower samurai were divided into foot soldiers, retai ners o f s u bvassals, a n d rural samurai ; they com prised the bulk of the class, say between 80 and 90 percent.so Ilf rou ghly 10 percent of t he samurai c lass were o fficeholders of high or m iddle ran k , while in 1 868 some 40 percen t o f Ja panese boys were literate, the gro up of frustrated o ffice seekers must have been large . C rude as this estimate is, it points to a n im portant problem of the Tokugawa regime. 5 1
TO WA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE S e n si t ive pride a n d fea r of s h a m i n g d e fea t , the stre n gt h of which probably
led t h e m ajority of sa m u ra i to avoid com pet i tive prom pted most ed u c a to r s
a n d teac h e rs
s i t u a tio n s
fra i n fro m c reatin g t h e m , also m e a n t t h a t -once com pet ition and t h e
race was
and certain l y
of m i l i tary s k i l l s d e l i be rate l y t o Te
was
decl ared
on - t h e sel f- re s pecl i n g s a m u rai rea l l y did go all out to
wi n.52
This release of pe nt-u p energies was decis ive. D u ri ng the critical pe riod from 1 85 3 to 1 8 6 8 (the so-called bakumatsu period), the goal of stre n gt h
e n i n g t h e co untry a n d d i m i n is h i n g t h e dange r o f foreign intrusion was s h are d by all. Spoke s m e n fo r the various ap proac h es shared a belief in filial piety , sel f-di sc i pline, and a n activist way of life as the model of rig h teo u s c o n d u c t . T he y di ffered , o ften violently, as to the best means of ach ieving the national goal. The sug ge st ed means ranged fro m gen u i n e acco m mo dat ion t h ro u g h evasive tactics to a pol i tic s o f v iole nce. N evertheless, the tas k o f re co nstr u c ti n g a co untry h as rare l y been con fronted with so muc h underlying u n a n im i ty . But then, only Japa n has con fronted that tas k after a millen nium of experience in d�a l ing w i t h fo reign cultures and more t h an two centu ries of secl usion from the ou t side wor l d .
Restoration means renewal, or else the return to a former cond i ti on , whether viable or moribund. The reestablishment of the English mon arch y in 1 660 was a restoration. So was the European defense of m o n arc h ic al pre roga ti ves which were threatened by constitutional and na tionalist movements m o b i l i zi n g the pe o p le . T he J a panese restoration move ment also sounded conservative, demanding obeisance to the sac rosanct wishes of the im pe r ial house which had not played a p o l i tical role for more than a thousand years. But the accent of the Japanese movement was on nat io n al renewal, not on the defense of established privile ge as in nineteenth-century Europe. The Tokugawa regime had been founded on the suppression of poli tics. The restoration movement m ade it legitimate to discuss political issues outside the circle of appo i n te d officials. To see this contrast, it is necessary to outline the preci pitating events which undermined the To kugawa settlement from the 1 830s to the 1 85 0s. In the first decades of the nineteenth century, the social and eco nomic situation of th e samurai deteriorated rapidly. Risi n g prices, cur rency manipulatio n s, and imposed red uct i ons of sti pends undermined their livelihood and degraded them socially. Between 1 8 1 9 and 1 837 , the currency was debased ni neteen times, yielding profits to the bakufu a mounting to one-half of the government's ann ual expenditures . Crop failu res, fa m i n es, a n d s porad ic peasant uprisi ngs are other evidences of acute distress in this pe r iod . In response , messianic religious move ments proliferated , as did debates expressing national appre he n sions. In the
NA TION-BUILDING: JAPAN daimyo domains, financial conditions deteriorated. One domain ( Owa.ri) borrowed o ne half of its annual rice income in 1 80 1 and more than seven times its total a n nual i ncome between 1 84 9 and 1 85 3 . Another (Satsuma) had a debt of almost twice its annual income in 1 807 and about six times that income in 1 830. By 1 840 the economic decline o f the Japanese aristocracy was manifest. In that year, Osaka merchants held daimyo debts equ iv alent to 60 m i l lion koku. I n terest on these debts amounted to a quarter of the country's tax reven ue. B ut it was paid v ery irregul a rly, i f at all. With bakufu s u p port, powerful dai myo used their social and political p r i v ileges to evade financial embarrassment-at least for a time. 53 A sense of urgency led to atte m pt s at re form . In 1 84 1 se n ior bakufu officials dismissed a thousand Tokugawa em ployees . New edicts were issued to preserve the hierarchy of ran k . Dangerous literature was cen sored. Rural poverty had led peasants to move to the towns; now bakufu officials attempted to force them to return to t he countryside. Officials sought to counteract the dec l i n i n g fortunes of the Tokugawa govern ment by recoinage and forced loans in unprecedented amounts. Since debts were mounting preci pitously , the government prohibited licensed monopo lies and wholesale trading organizations in line with the anti mercantile ideology of neo-Confucianism. The e ffect was to throw the supply of commodities into confusion and to provo ke still more infla tion. A decade later, the edict was canceled. Such measures had been tried before and failed . B ut this time they exacerbated divisions among Tokugawa s upporters, even provoking outspoke n disagreement with official policy among the daimyo and the collateral houses of the Tokugawa. Meanwhile, the large han also atte mpted reform, and a few were more successful than the bakufu . Some resorted to neo-Confucian prop aganda campaigns, others tried aid to agriculture and d rastic red uction of expenses. Among the most s uccessful were Choshu and Satsuma, the two tozama houses which were to become major centers of the resto ration movement. Choshu had been shaken by a peasant u prisin g in 1 83 1 . Six years later, internal reforms of the han were put on an e mer gency basis, startin g with a res urvey of the land for the purpose of a more equitable tax syste m . Han monopolies were converted into pro tected merchant enterprises, and debt payments were regularized on a lon g-term basis. Profits were increased by providing for better transport of goods. At the same time, military organization was im proved, based on the pu rchase of Western equipment. Similar measures were under taken in Satsuma. Debt payments were reformed, and t he production of sugar cane was increased, as was the domain's commerce, especially with the Ryukyu Islands. On balance, the record of han reforms was mixed. Failures in one domain were matched by successes in another. -
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Some be nefit was derived from regional decentralization, which allowed the different han to e x peri me n t with remedial measures. B ut the coun try contin ued to be in ser ious domestic trouble with no solutio n i n sight. Me a n w h ile fo re i gn pressure for J a pa nese t radi n g concessions com po unded the d om es ti c proble m s . The We stern powers wanted the harbors open to foreign trade , s u ppl i e s p rov ided for merchant v essels, pro t ectio n of sh i p w r ec ked s a i lo r s , and the a d m is si o n of o fficial re pre se ntatives on a reg u l ar basi s . The Russians attem pted to get such con cessions in the e i ghtee n t h century but were diverted by Napoleon' s i n v asion of Russia in 1 8 1 2 . B ritish ex p loration s in the eighteenth cen tu ry reached Ja pa n ese coastal waters in 1 80 8 , but Britain was diverted by its preoc cu patio n s in China. I n the end , t he main pressure came from the Ame r i ca n s Gold d rew the m to California in 1 84 8 , and shortly there after prospects of trade turned the m toward Canton an d Sha n g h ai Commodore Perry arrived in Uraga in 1 8 5 3 . In the following year, a treaty was signed with the United States. But this provoked such a storm of protest in Japan that for political reasons bakufu officials were unable to enforce the limited pro visions of this first treaty. Meanwhile, A mer ican pressure for enforceme nt and further concessions mounted. Only the a ppoi n tment of a virtual dictator (Ii N aosuke , 1 858- 1 860) led to a regular commercial treaty with the United States in 1 858. Even so, in tense controversy followed, and after two years Ii was assassinated. The au t hori ty of the baku fu was wa ni ng : by 1 862 shogun al control over the daimyo through required residence in Edo was relaxed. Domestic con tro ve rsy contin ued for another five years , and in 1 867 the Tok u gawa shogunate w a s repl aced by the e n th ro n ement of the Meiji e mperor. A fter a thousand years, the absolute political control by regents and sho guns had come to an end. ,
.
.
An un usual combination of central control and local autonomy in the Tokugawa system as well as the policy of exclusion had facilitated the pacification of Japanese society. But these achievements were ob tained at a price. Officials or leading Japanese aristocrats were unable to acquire any experience in foreign relations. W hen contacts became unavoidable, the result was xenophobia epitomized by the slogan "Re vere the emperor, expel the barbarian" (sonno-joi) . Exclusion also facil itated the s u ppression of internal politics . Neo-Confucian precepts in structed each person to show loyal obedience to his superior, so that all p u blic affairs were naturally managed by officials of the highest rank. No one outside t he ranks of Tokugawa officialdom could acquire ex perience in managing internal con flicts when even the daimyo were ex cluded from participating in the decision making process. Hence, when external pressures destroyed the policy of exclusion and demonstrated the incom petence of Tokugawa officialdom, they also destroyed the pos,
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sibility o f insulating adm inistrative actions from the opinions and inter ests of leading strata in Japanese _society . Commodore Perry ' s arrival in 1 853 sent s hock waves th rough the country , th o ugh such an event had been anticipated for decade s . Bakufu officials te m pori z ed when they could ne ither reject nor acce pt the de mands presented by the Americans. B ut te m por i z ing was an ob v ious sign of weakness in a regime claiming absolute authority. W hen that claim proved invalid in practice, conservative dai m yo allied with the Tokugawa ho use bega n to criticize shogunal policies in the inte res t of making them mo re effective . Tokugawa N ariak i was a conservative critic o f t his kin d . Sansom has called him a " se lf- i ndulge n t, tempestuous man," but perhaps it took such a man to break thro u gh the bureaucratic rigidities o f the shogunate. In 1 842 , as lord of Mito, N ariaki o pposed a shogunal plan to relax the pol icy of exclusion. In the same year, he wrote , " I f the Shogu n takes the lead in showing respect for the throne, the whole country will naturally be united, but it is vital that in this each should preserve hi s proper place. The samurai shows respect for his lord, the lord shows respect for the Shogun, the Sh o gu n shows respect for the Emperor."54 The lord of Mito was an important figure w ho came to differ publicly with the official position of the shogunate-despite these neo-Confucian prin ciples. In 1 855 cannon were cast in the M ito domain on his instructions, but without the required shogunal permission. As a result, Nariaki was ordered to retire as daim yo in favor of his son , and for five years t here after he was barred fro m active participation in han a ffairs. B u t this formal exclusion did not prevent his continued role in Mito or his in termittent pa rtic i pation as sel f-appointed advisor to the shogunate. Here was an o utstand i n g re p resentative of the re g ime w ho tried to fo rtify the shogunate by timely internal reforms. In 1 846 Nariaki u r ged a senior bakufu official to arrange for the translation and wide circulation of Dutch works on milita r y subjects. In the 1 850s, he made t he Mito domain a model o f " modernization" through financial and administrative reforms and through the estab lishment of We ste rn - style shipbuilding and an iron i ndustry. From 1 853 , he consistently oppose d diplomatic concessions, even in t he face of Ja pan's certain defeat by the Western powers. All these posi t io n s were ex emplary demonstrations of Mito's opposition to foreigners, reverence for the emperor, and concern for a strengthened J a pan. At the same time, Nariaki's role involved not only factional struggles within the Mito domain, but a more or less r u n ni n g battle for influence in bakufu coun cils, direct defiance of some bakufu decisions, and specifically a com plex , chan gi ng relationship with Abe Masahiro, a senior shogunal councillor. Nariaki was a senior member of the Tokugawa house and a relative through marriage or adoption of leading members of the im pe ria I court
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and of several to z a ma lords. H is o pinions and actions could not be ig nored, even when they were proscribed. By pressing these opinions on the basis o f so strategic a po sitio n , N a riaki contributed inadvertently to the emergence of political debate o utside the circles of bakufu officialdom . 5 5 In i n i t iat i ng t he debate o f public issues i n contravention o f past bak u fu practice, Tok u gawa N ariaki and the othe r "reforming lords" were an xious to make t h e sh og un ate more e ffective .56 They h a d to come to grips w it h their own dom ain problems a nd i n doing so became aware of Edo's g ro wi n g i nability to go ve r n effectively. They did not antici pate that the events they helped to set in motion would lead eventually to an overthrow of the entire bakuhan syste m . Foreign pressure, baku fu in decis ion , and the agitation o f their own samurai in the end pushe d these daimyo leaders beyond administrative re forms to debate and con flict over public issues. A first official step along that road was taken by Abe Masahiro. It had bee n shogunal practice to deal with foreign challenges arbitrarily. Now, in 1 853 , Abe recognized that it was impossible to drive off the Americans. Accordingly, he decided to send out letters requesting the d aimyo to give their o pinions. Responses to the request were sharply divided. 57 Nevertheless, a report was made to the imperial court. For the first time in more than two centuries, t he s hogunate had made a po lic y issue a matter o f public disc ussion-at least among ranking mem bers of the aristocracy. For the first time in over five hundred ye ars, the shogun submitted preliminary findings to the emperor, abandoning his own absolute authority as the "barbarian-subduing generalissimo." U nder these circumstances , Abe sought to minimize concessions to the Americans while pushing military preparations at home . But each step led to complications. Whatever its provisions, any treaty would ter minate the Tokugawa policy of exclusion. Abe's substitutio n of consul tation for authoritarian leadersh i p antagonized the fudai claimyo who opposed any policy discussions o utside bakufu official circles ; access to these discussions was among their most important prerogatives. Concil iation toward the foreigners antagonized those who wanted expulsion even at the risk of defeat. With the foreigners , bakufu officials were evasive . But temporizing merely provoked the foreign re presentatives and did not satisfy the Japanese w hose desire for decisive action ranged from the advocacy o f war to the pro motion of foreign trade. Bakufu e fforts to strengthen the defenses of the country came too late to protect the shogunate against foreign pressures. Meanwhile , its i nternal position was weakened through military pre parations in the daimyo domains. When the treaty of Kanagawa ( Yokohama) was signed in 1 854 , all these con flicting pressures resulted in a storm of protest throughout the country. In response, Abe's successor, Hotta Masayoshi ( 1 8 1 0- 1 864), turned to Kyoto for imperial sanction of a policy of com prom ise. Abe's
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consultation of the em peror had b ro u g ht the throne into the arena of foreign policy-making. Now , i n the 1 850s, bak u fu officials, daimyo, and sam u rai put pressure on i n fl uential cou rt nobles and the em peror for support o f the ir c on fl ic t i n g causes. A t ho u sa n d - y e a r tradi tion o f having el eva t ed o n l y th e re l ig i o us and artistic p r est ige of t h e i m pe rial house was s u d d en l y ex ploited to facilitate , by its hallowed pres t i ge , t h e reso lution of an in tractable p ol i t i cal controvers y . Then , i n 1 85 8 , matte rs were com plicated further by the s u dd e n death without heir of t h e in c u m be n t s ho g u n , To ku ga wa Iesada ( 1 82 4 - 1 8 5 8 ) . Se n i o r councillors and fudai daimyo, led by I i N aosuke, fav ore d To k uga w a Yoshitom i . Toku gawa collateral houses and tozama daimyo, led by Tokugawa N a ria ki , fa vo re d H itots uba s hi Yos h i nobu (or Ke iki) , Na r iaki ' s so n . The di s p ute over foreign po l icy was com po u n d ed by a d i s pu te over the s h ogu n al succession. I n this co nt ext , Na ri a k i appeal ed to the e m peror for su pport, b re a k i n g with the tradition of exclu d in g the court from inter ven i n g in the succession of regent or shogun . For the m o me nt, uncertaint y was overcome wh e n Ii N aos u ke be came Great Councillor. He signed the Amer ica n treaty of 1 8 5 8 without imper i al sanction, settled the succession in favor of Yoshitomi, and pun ished members of the " Hitot s u ba s hi pa r ty " with pena lt i e s r a ngin g from the execution of Yoshida Shoin to the houlie arrest imposed on i m por t ant d a im yo like those of M ito, Owari, Tosa, and Sats uma. B ut these actio ns only delayed the crisis. The succession dispute had hel pe d to forge an alliance among the daimyo who had lost out i n the s tru ggle ove r t he �hogun a l succession.58 When even these conservative daimyo had become po l i t ic a ll y mobilized, other a nd less co n ser va t iv e men were sure to follow. Two yea rs after the 1 85 8 treaty, Ii Naosuke was assas sinated by a group of Mito samurai who resented his treatmen t of t he i r lord and bitte rl y oppo sed his conciliatory fo re i gn policy. In the fol lowin g years, sporadic violence against fo reigne rs and bakufu or d a imyo offi cials further increased i nternal and external tensions. B ak u fu officials remained indecisive in the face of Western p ress u re, while daimyo and samurai leaders became inc reasi n gl y aware t hat time and institutional cha n ge were needed to preserve the country, eve n if this meant a tem porary accommodation to fore i gn dema n ds. The ga thering restoration movement co m prised all persons outside Tokugawa officialdom w ho were becoming actively concerned with the p ublic affairs from which the y were for m a l l y excluded. Tokugawa of ficials could not suppress the efforts to ob t ai n the emperor's sa nc tion for o ne policy or ano t her after Abe Masahiro had initiated that effort. Moreover, for the first time in a millennium, a le ading shog u nal official had called on the daimyo to s ub m it their o p i nio n s . It is this mo u n tin g controversy and the con flicting appeals to the emperor's sanction that I have cal l e d the emergence of p ublic debate. The restoration move ment culminated in the overthrow of the To-
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE kugawa shogunate in 1 868, the installation of the Meiji emperor as the supreme head of government, and the cond uct of a ffairs by an oligarchy of Meiji leaders who had become pro m i nent in the restoration move men t. The result was a transformation of the social structure, a n d under the Meiji constitu tion of 1 889 the su preme authority of the e m pe ro r was com bined with appeals to a popular mandate . A REVOLUT ION U N DE R O L I G A RC H I C LEADERS H I P O n Jan uary 3, 1 868, armed contingents from Satsuma and Choshu seized the im perial pal ace in K yoto. A council was called from wh ich To k u gawa partisans were excl uded and a formal return of governmen tal authority to the empero r was anno unced. Strictly speaking, the Meiji Restoration of 1 868 consisted in the dissolution of the shogunate and the formal transfer of authority to the emperor. B ut under the Meiji dynasty, the em peror remained a ceremonial figure j ust like his pre decessors . In what sense, then, was the Japanese state reconstituted in 1 868? Did the " return of authority" to the emperor have any realistic, political meaning beyond its legitimation of the new Meiji government? In practice, the Meiji leadership answered these questions by measures directly affecting the imperial house and the social and political position of the Japanese aristocracy. Tokyo ( Edo) was established as the national capital and the resi dence of the emperor. The change ending the age-old separation of the resi d e n ce o f the e m pe ro r from the se at o f government w as more th an symbolic. Henceforth, all s pecific acts of government were announced by, and im plemented in the name of, the emperor. In the past, shoguns had received their mandate to govern from the im perial house , but then acted in their own name. Their formal submission to the empero r had been con fined to the inception of their rule or to specific emerge ncies. Thereafter, invocation of the i m pe rial mandate was a sign of weakness in a shogunate. By contrast, after 1 868, each governmental edict was issued in the name of the e m peror, now a sign of strength. The gov ernment was identified with the impe rial court, and the emperor resided in the palace formerly occu pied by the Tok ugawa shoguns. The court was no longe r a center of potential opposition that had to be controlled , as had been the case in Kyoto in times past. The leaders of the Meiji government established new relations with the domains. Their first move was to issue an imperial edict wh ich ex pro priated all the lands belonging to the Tokugawa house, made them the property of the emperor, and subjected them to an imperial admin istration . By this action, the e m pe ror became the wealthiest of the coun try's landed proprietors . Moreover, imperial appropriation of Toku gawa domains clarified the purpose of the Meiji leaders who were clearly
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not en l a rgi n g their own dom ains at the expense o f the Tokugawa. By the e nd o f 1 868, the e m pe ror's househo ld was adm i nistratively se pa rated from t he management of th e i m perial dom ains. This se pa ra t io n q uick l y became the model for the country. All the daimyo domains were reorganized in s i m i l a r fashion. At all levels, se nior posts i n estate man agement were filled by men chosen for their ability, not because of their birth. A m ajo r i t y of the d a i m yo fa vor e d this a pproac h which seemed to re fo r m I.he old bak u han syste m now under im perial a us pices, but also preserved the p rer o gat i ves of the ol d d aim yo fam i l ies . The s e m e n t h o u g ht that total abolition of the old domains and p rero ga tives wo uld destro y the un ity of the new Meiji government. 59 T h is w a s p recis ely t he reason why some M e ij i leaders decided to go m uch fu rther. The fi rst reforms sti11 perpetuated regio nal subd ivisions and the old, inherited p r iv ile ges . In their view, to tal abolition of the domains was the preco n dition of national un ity . A c cord i n gly, a few of the Meiji leaders presente d all the daimyo with a fait accom pli . In March 1 869 a m e m o r ia l addressed to t h e em peror put the lands of Satsuma, Chos u , Tosa, and H i ze n at his d i s po sa l . Form ulated in the language of a "feudal s ubmission ," the memorial cited as its warrant the s ho g unal u s u r pa t ion of i m pe r i al authority some s e v e n centu ries earlier. The out come of th is bold move was uncertain. There was considerable o p po s i tion from samurai conservatives, and the p ri nc i pa l Meij i le aders m ad e m i l i tar y pre parations in the e ve n t of a h ead - o n clash. B ut by Ju l y 1 869 an impe r ial decree announced the court's acce ptance of the p roposa l and ordered all other daimyo to follow suit. Cl ea rl y, this was a ge n u i n e "return of a u t ho ri ty " to th e emperor. For it m ar ke d a decisive break with t he " pr i v atiz ation of authority" i n the hands of the d a i myo which had characterized Ja panese society fo r a millenni u m .
Under the new system, the d a i myo became governors o f la nd s which were t ra nsform e d from domains into pre fecture s . As go v e rnors, they would retain one-tenth of the former domain reve n ue as their household expenses. In t h e end, t h e dai m y o fell in l ine bec ause t h e n e w sy s te m a p pe ared to preserve their distinguished social and econom ic po sit io n . Nevertheless, the abolition o f the domains t urne d re l a t i ve ly autonomous local hi e rarch i e s w i th re gional l o yaltie s into factions strug gling for infl uence at the center. This mo v e m e n t toward national uni fication was pa ra l leled by decrees w h i c h s im pl i fi e d th e e x i sti n g hierarc hy of social rank. Court nobles and da imyo were trans fo r m e d into a single order of aristocracy ( kazoku ) , a n d all samu rai were di vided into two b r oa d c ate gor ies of ge ntry ( shizoku ) and foot soldiers ( sotsu ) . I t was soon evident that the abolition o f domains wo uld have far reaching re pe rc u s s io ns. In a po l i c y sta tement of 1 8 70, I wakura Tomomi (an i m p orta n t Me ij i leader of the co ur t no bili t y ) declared that tax col lection must be unifie d under a central authority to e n s u re financial sta-
TO WA RD A MA NDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
bil i ty and an equality of bu rd e ns am o n g th e re gio n s of the country . Sam urai privilege sho u ld be b rought to an end since s tipend s from public funds were not warranted in the absence of m i l i tary and administrative service. Iwakura also advocated a nati on a l system of ed ucation divorced from the Co nfuc i an tradition and a modern national army based on con scri ptio n . 50 These i n fl uential views fo res hadowed the meas u res which w e re e v en tual l y adopted. Abolition of the doma ins i n volved ha l f a m i llion sa m urai . I n d ucin g sam urai co m pliance was a critical problem , si nce the burden of ch a n ge fell disproportionately on them. W he n the domains were abolishe d , t he government had to assume res po n s ib i l i t y for col lecting the land tax th r o ug ho ut the co untry as well as for pa ying stipends to the sam u r ai . As a first ste p, t he i m pe r ia l govern ment u rged the prefectures to reduce sam u ra i stipends. In loya l i st areas like Satsuma, Choshu, and Tosa, re formers responde d by cu tt i n g s tipe n d s to the bone, w hile rewarding men of ability with inc reased stipend s in return for administrative or m i l i tar y se rv i ce . The h i ghe s t sti pe n d s were cut to some 1 0 perc en t of their former value, while samurai families of the middle and lo wer ranks were often red uced to a bare subsistence. Co nse q u ent l y, between 1 870 and 1 873, the amount req u i red for sti pe nds was reduced from one-half to one-third of the land tax . Further reductions could not be accom plished without causing real hardship. Abolition of the domains also jeopard ized the symbolic pos i t io n of the sam u r a i . Commoners received permis sion to intermarry w ith me m bers o f the newly established peera ge ( kazoku) . At the same time, s a m urai losr the right to use their swords on commoners to avenge an of fense. In 1 87 1 they were permitted to go about without w e aring their swords, and in 1 872 th e y were officiall y permitted to engage in trade or farming. Under the Tokugawa system, military units were loyal to the daimyo in each domain, and the daimyo, in turn, was bo und in loyalty to the s h ogu r In 1 870 I wakura Tomomi suggested that units should be de tached from their local affil i ation so as to m ake them part of a truly national ar my . O kubo Toshimichi, the main Meiji leader from Satsuma, u rged '.ll i litary reviews by the e mperor so t h at the men would "become s oldie rs of the co urt."5 1 Such proposals were highly controversial; the first pmponent of national conscription (Omura Masujiro) was assassi nated at the end of 1 869. N ever t heless, in 1 87 3 an imperial edict estab lished a cG n:>cript army in which all men, regardless of social back ground, wer·� made liable for three years of active mil i tary service, followed by four years in the reserves. This was p roba bly the most rev olutionary step of the M e ij i leaders. Commoners had been denied the right even to possess swords for almost th ree centurie s ; the distinction between samurai and commoners had de pended on the privilege d mil•.
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itary status of the former. Now, s uddenly, the masses were furnished with arms. This was a d rastic change toward equalit y a mere five years after the overthrow of the Tokugawa and was, therefore, circumscribed by strict military discipline. The Meiji leaders were m uch more cautious abo ut other moves to ward equality, but they were determined to put an end to sam urai priv ileges . While the 1 8 7 3 edict sought to placate samurai opi n ion b y its national appeals, the executive council of the Meiji government used the occasion for a slashing attack on samurai preten sions . A se parate dec laration called the samurai of the Tokugawa period obstinate and tur bulent, livin g at the expense of others . Now, after the abolition of do mains and the establishment of national conscription , samurai like commoners were "subj ects of the Em pire." A fter living a life of idleness for gene ration s, t h e sa m u rai have had their stipends red uced and have been a uthorized to take off their swords, so that all strata of the people m a y finally gai n their rights to liberty. B y this i n no vation the rulers and the ruled will be put on the same basis, the rights of the peo ple will be eq ual, and the way will be cleared for the unity o f soldier
and peasa n t . 6 2
It is sym ptomatic of the Me ij i Restoration that perhaps the first official re ference to the rights of the pe o ple occurred in this military context. The e q u a li ty of the sa m ura i and the commoners consisted in t heir equal liability to re n der military service under the e m peror Beas l ey has s ho w n that by 1 873 s ti pe nd payments by the govern ment to the samurai still amounted to o ne fo u rth of total reven ue, or one-third of the land tax .63 If the govern m ent ha d accepted this situa tion, a large part of its reven ue would have beco me a fixe d e x pe n di ture On the other hand, abolition of the stipe n d s meant a direct attack o n the livelihood of the samurai. The Me ij i leade rs understood the plight of the s amu rai whose background they share d but t hey were deter mined to proceed in the spirit of ser vice with w hich that bac kgro und had i mbued them. I n 1 873 the h i gher stipends were taxed for the first time. Sa m urai receiv i n g 1 00 koku or less w ere allowed to receive cash paym ents in l ie u of rice stipends. This measure p ro vid ed capital for middle a nd lower samurai w ho could then engage in far m ing or trade. By 1 876 the commutation of rice stipends into cash pay m ent s was m ade co m pu l s o ry at the sa me time that a l aw was pas s e d banning the we a ring .
-
.
,
of swords.
Thus, the main burden o f japan's national revolution had been im po s ed on the samurai. I n the initial pe r iod the great m aj o r i ty o f samurai felt almost as e xcl uded from the new ruling group as they had from the shogunate. They had expected that o verthrow o f the Tokugawa would be followed by prompt ex p U l s io n of foreigners, o n ly to fi nd that the new ,
TOWARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE govern ment sought accom modation with foreign powers and proceeded to destroy the dom ains as well as sam ura i privileges. But while its mea sures provoked great anxiety among the sam u rai, the Meiji government also depended on them for political su pport. The points of friction are apparent from a memorial left by a sa murai of Kagoshima who com mitted suicide in August 1 8 70 as a n act of publ ic protest. H is grievances were that a ppointments wen t to careerists rather than men of true merit, that expediency prevailed everywhere, that high prices, h igh taxes , rail ways, and treaties with fo re ign powers violated the s pi rit of the loyalist move ment. These complaints reflect not only the d isappoi ntment of an tiba k u fu sam urai, but the contin uation into the Meij i period o f problems that had been at the root of sam u rai debts, peasant protest, and anti foreign sentiment d u ring the Tokugawa era. 64 In the words of one Me iji leader, the samurai were "absurdly mis i n formed about the world at large . "65 But the government had to deal with the more fanatic "men of spirit" all the same . Those im prisoned by the Tokugawa were released and pardoned. The men were rewarded and honored, but rarely given responsibility. More positively ; provision was made early in 1 868 for the domains to send delegates to a sam u rai assembly. Reorganized several times d uring its brie f existence, this as sem bly permitted the debate o f such issues as the abolition o f domains, the wearing of two swords, forced loans, and the prohibition of Chris tianity. B ut this airing of "feudal opin ion" was term inated in July 1 869, presumably because the government felt strong enough by then to do without s uch consultation. Exploitation of the e m peror's prestige was probably a more important means of legitimation. In the past leading sam urai had called on, and manipulated, the rulin g daimyo to endorse policies which they had devised. Now, the govern ment manipulated the e m pe ror's symbolic endorsement of all decision-making in much the same way. B ut a ppeals to this new im perial legitimacy did not silence controversy within the ruling oliga rchy. The leaders of reform were ap prehensive . Some suggested the idea o f a war against Korea in order to rally people to a national cause and divert their attention fro m the griev ances provoked by the reforms. B u t senior officials such as Iwakura, O kubo, and Kido opposed this Korean project and secured the em peror's concurrence, w he reupon five members of t he Meiji government resigned. The in itial u nity of the ruling gro u p was destroyed. Eto Shimpei of H izen and Saigo Takamori of Satsuma, who had resigned over the Ko rean issue, withdrew to their home territories. Eto raised the flag of re volt in 1 874 and was quickly crushed by government forces. Saigo worked for local re form until the mandatory com m u tation of sti pends in 1 876 aroused the desperation of conservative samurai who rejected trade or farming as incom patible with their privileged status . In the end,
NA TION-B UIWING: JAPAN Saigo's loyalties were with these samurai, whose ideals he s hared , even though he thought their plans for a revolt ill-advised. H e could not re fuse them when the men put themselves under his le adership in a cam paign w hich the government suppressed only with difficulty. Saigo's death by suicide on the battlefield in 1 87 7 was avenged in the fo l lowi n g year b y the assassination o f Okubo Toshim ichi, the leading figure o f early Me ij i reform. A politics of violence had accom panied the restoration movement after 1 85 3 . Attacks against foreigners and some Meij i leaders also fol lowed the o verthro w of the shogunate in 1 868 , when it became apparent that the new governme nt would not expel foreign representatives. Spo radic violence against high officials accom panied the re forms o f the 1 870s and 1 880s. Such protest originated in the "loyalist" circles of mid dle and lower samurai, especially those o f Satsuma, Choshu, and H izen. The violence aroused by tem porizing foreign policies and social deg radation also symbolized the more diffuse com m itment to a cult o f action with which centuries of idealization had imbued Japanese life. This samurai legacy o utlasted the disappearance of the samurai as a class. The leaders of the Meiji government undertook drastic reforms in the interest of national s urvival. Voluntary sacrifice to fulfill a personal duty to the emperor was an act of filial loyalty. Samurai leaders causing the sacrifice of personal interests of the samurai were of critical impor tance in the restoration . To assess that importance one need only imag ine what would have h appened if the same burdens had been imposed by leaders representing the despised class of wealthy merchants. In the 1 860s, the samurai com prised about half a m illion households and two mi lli o n persons in a population of t h irt y million ( 1 872) . By contrast, European aristocracies n umbe red in the thousands or at most tens o f thousands, representing less than 1 percent o f the population, not 5 o r 6 percent as in Japan.66 Se paration from the land was the othe r unusual feature. The samurai p ro vided a ready reservoir of qualified personnel available and eager for public employment. The Meiji government had no need to go outside the ranks of the samurai and also no i ncentive to do so. Hall has identified twen ty-seven individuals as the most prominent leaders of the Meij i Restoration. Twen ty-one o f them were from the four tozama han ·of Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen. Three others came from two more tozama han ( Echizen, Kumamoto) , one was a bak ufu official, and two were court nobles from Kyoto . In 1 868 the average age of this group was slightly over thirty. For the most part, these men were lower sa murai who had begun their careers in their respective do mains, often in military service. All members of the gro u p were highly educated, and a good many had specialized training as well as contact
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE with Western culture. Despite their youth, they had been advisors to their daimyo, agents on diplo matic m issions , and organizers of military units. B rought u p i n the samurai code, they had been subject to military d isci pline and indoctrinated in the Con fucian virtues of loyalty and ded ication . Many of them knew one another from their days together at fencing school, or thro u gh negotiations in which they had engaged on behalf of their domains. 6 7 A study of t h e larger Meij i elite i s of interest here , because i t shows that court nobles and younger sam u rai were the leaders who trans formed their own class socially and eco nomically. Bernard Silberman's study of the Meiji ministers is based on a sam ple of 253 individ uals and includes 80 percent of those who held " high office" in the Meiji gov ernment from 1 868 to 1 87 3 . This was clearly a very distingu ished gro u p, since of those who remained in office un til 1 900, between 70 and 80 percent occu pied ministerial or vice-ministerial positions. The Meiji leadership re presented a shift brought about by the restoration. Under the Tokugawa government, neither court nobles (huge) nor lower sam urai had held high administrative office, these being reserved for daimyo and upper sam urai. Members from these previously excluded groups had become active politically between 1 853 and 1 868, and after 1 868 they comprised 65 percent of the Meij i administrative elite . 6 8 T h e different groups within the Japanese aristocracy d i d not enter the race for advancement under the Meiji d ynasty with equal chances of success. Much depended on the type of ed ucation they had received before 1 868. Court nobles, daimyo, and u pper samurai had had a tra <Ji tional, Con fucian education, and most of them were unsuccessful after 1 875 . However, some of these men had also acquired Western learning, and they had more successful careers in the Meiji era. Among lower sam urai, the proportion of those who had received a Western education was highest, and so was the proportio n of those with successful careers a fter 1 875. Regional origin and social status also affected careers under the Meiji. Daimyo and samurai from the tozama domains as well as the Kyoto nobility had been subject to special controls by the Tokugawa, and the Meiji government reversed this tendency. Of the 253 persons in Professor Silberman's sam ple, 1 24 came from tozama domains, 75 from Kyoto, 34 from fudai or Tokugawa houses, and 6 from Edo.69 During the first few years after 1 868 , the Meiji leadershi p was largely recruited from those who had prominently participated in the restora tion movement, but this criterion became obsolete. The marked consen sus on goals among the leaders seems to have extended to the personnel policies of the new government. For almost a generation after 1 868, Meiji officials were recruited from samurai families, albeit with an in creasing em phasis on ability rather than social origin. But by the 1 890s,
NA TION-B UILDING: JAPAN publi c em ployment c a me to be based on formal ed ucation and civil ser examination . 70 I t is as if successive Meiji governments had decided to give the sam urai an advantage in public em ployment as recom pense for their sacrifices. B u t a fter about twenty years, standards of perfor mance rather than soc ial and regional backgro und were to be the main criteria. By the 1 880s, Ja panese society had been transformed , as had the fo undations of sam u rai ex istence. Did the reforms undertaken by the Meiji leaders constitute a rev olutio n ? It is conven tional to identi fy all revol utions with lower class movements, and there was no widespread popular uprising in the over throw of the Tokugawa regime. Rathe r, it was a "revol ution from above" such as some Prussian reform ministers had had in mind, but d id not accom plis h . The Meij i Restoration was accom plished by members of the ru l ing class who ha d been di sa dvanta ged under the Tokugawa s h o gun ate. To kugaw a officials were o usted s umm a ri l y after 1 868, and higher government pos i ti o n s came into the hands of those court nobles and sa m u r a i who had previously been excluded from political par ti c i pat ion. I f the restoration h a d be e n confined t o th is c ha n ge o f pers o nne l , o ne would be e n title d to s peak only of a coup d'etat. I n fact, the Meiji gov e rn me n t went on to restructu re the whole social and po litica l orde r , a n d t h e cha nge it acc omplishe d should therefore be considered revolution ary. S hou ld this restruc t u ring be called a revolutio n , even though i t was undertaken in the in te res t o f n a tio nal survival and quic kly e n ta ile d the i m p o si t i o n of new rest r a ints ? It sho uld because both nationalism and the reas sertion o f au t hor ity are fo und in many ( possibly in all ) m ode rn rev olutions. ( For that reason Beasley's sugge s t i o n o f the term national rev olution seems to me less a pt than Thomas Smith's aristocratic revolution .) vice
A revolution occurs when the social order i t see k s to overthrow is dras
tic a ll y transformed, ing 1 868.
and
t h is was the case in J a pan
in the years follow
The leaders of t he restoration m ov emen t had stru g gl e d to expand public debate in orde r to m ake the To kuga wa s ho gunate more effective. In the end i ncre a sed part i c i pa tion was denied the m , t he re gi me i tse l f bec a me he l p le ss , a nd the y s ucceed e d i n ov er t h rowi n g the sho g u na te by recou rse to the traditional symbol of the e m pe ror. Once t h e y had achieved c o n tro l of the n e w government, the M eiji leaders were deter mined to effect major changes i n t he polit ica l and social structure o f the Tokugawa order but to prevent the "dem ocratiz a ti o n" of Japanese so c i ety . They were aware of the majo r depri vat io n s im posed on t he sam urai with whom they identified. Hence, they took measures t o make the drastic changes they introduced psychologically acc e ptable. The charte r oath o f 1 868 i s an exam ple of s u c h s ymbo li c le gi ti ma t i o n . I t c o mb i n ed reverence toward the e m pe ro r with a kind o f re presentati o n which pub licly favored the a ri stoc r ac y . At the same time, it contained th e mai n
TO WA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE points of the new governmental policy which i m posed sacrifices on t hat aristocracy. Hence forth, the im perial cou rt would decide matters of public pol icy in the interest of the coun try rather than of a particular faction like the Tokugawa. The oath committed all classes to the promotion o f na tional goals , a marked de partu re from the earlier em phasis on sam u rai loyalty to each daimyo and his domain . The oath refers to " people ," and this word i n g may have been bor rowed from the language of Western constitutionalism. But the japanese refe rence was to people who counted, that is, members of the aristocracy who preempted partici pation in pol itics under the Meiji government. Rich farmers and merchants were added only later. Under the Tokugawa shogunate, policy d iscussions had been confined to bakufu officials and a select grou p of daimyo. Under the new Meij i government, the "peo ple" legitimately concerned with politics were only those men of samurai bac kground who were properly quali fied to participate. The charter oath re ferred to the com mon people, but emphasized that "a widely convoked assembly" shall be established and that "all civil and military officials shall be allowed to fulfill their aspirations." Revocation of the policy of exclusion ("base cus toms from the past") and commitment of the country to observance of treaty obligations ("principles o f international j ustice") were j ust as tell tale and roundabout. The oath also endorsed the searc h for knowledge "throughout the world" i n order to strengthen the country, thus ending by imperial sanction the long debate over Western learning. 71 The Meiji govern ment, like the Tokugawa earlier, had to contend with samurai who u pheld the Con fucian ideals and expected more rad ical measures against foreigners, as well as samurai who expected more radical inte rnal reforms. All negotiations with foreign powers were sus pect in conse rvative circles. A ppeasement of samurai conservatives was also complicated by the necessity of abolishing samurai privileges . At the same time, official proposals for a constitutional regi me were suspect to japanese reformers who antici pated various safeguards of imperial au thority. Moreover, foreign advisors expressed con flicting Western ex pectations regarding a pro per constitutional syste m , and some of them had to be fulfilled i f ja pan was to gain international recognition. The Meiji leaders realized that " popular" partic i pation would jeopard ize their own oligarchic control and wo uld probably con flict with their ca pacity for decisive action . Many of these cross-currents are reflected in the following com ments by Ito H irobumi ( 1 84 1 - 1 909) , the princ i pal figure in the second generation of Meij i oligarchs and the main author of the Meiji con sti tution of 1 889. Re flecting on the movement for a constitution in t he 1 870s, Ito observed,
NA TION-B UILDING : JAPAN We were just then in an a ge of transitio n . The o pin io ns prevailin g in the cou n try were extremely he terogeneous, and often d i ametricall y opposed to each other. We h ad survivors of former generations who were still full o f theocratic ideas, a n d w h o believed that any atte m pt to restrict an i m pe r i al prero gative amou n ted to somet h i n g like h i g h treason. O n the ot he r hand th e re was a la rge
a nd
p ower ful body of the you n ger gen eration educa ted a t
the t i m e w h e n t he M a nches ter t heory w as i n vogue, and who in con seq uence were u l tra-radical in t h e i r id eas o f freed o m . M e m bers of the bureauc racy were prone to lend w i l l i n g ears to the Ge r m a n doctrinaires of the reac t io n a r y
p eriod while, on the other hand, the e d ucated politicians a mon g the people ,
ha v in g not yet tasted t he bitter si g n i fi ca n ce of a d m i n istrative responsibility, were liable to be more i n fl uenced by the dazzl i n g words a n d lucid t h eories of Mon tesquieu , Rousseau and similar Fre nch writers . . . . The virtues nec essary for the smoot h wor k i n g of a n y constitution, such as love of freedom of s peech , love of p ubli c i t y o f procee d in gs, the s pirit of tolerance for o pi n i o n s
o p po sed to one's own , etc . , had yet to be l ear n e d by lo n g experience.
It was under these c irc u m s ta nces that the first d r a ft o f the Const i t ution
wa s made and submi tted to H is Majesty .
.
. . 72
Ito's comments desc ribe the situation very well, bu t do not desc ribe the dilemma of reconciling con stitutio nalism with the maintenance o f strict authority. The overthrow of the To kugawa regime and the insti tution o f Meij i re forms requ ired strong leadersh i p . The pre ference for central authority was a pparent in the u se of
"
public opinion" as a syn
onym of national u n ity a gainst the " private opinion" o f shogunal or han officials . Si m il a r ly the memorial in itiating the abolition of domains had ,
as its major aim the preservation of "one central body gf government and one universal authority."73 The i m pe rial edicts on the code of ed ucation and national conscription ( 1 872) transformed ed ucation and military service fro m a sam urai privilege i n to a d u ty of c itize n s h i p and hence strengthened cen tral authority further. In the lon g deliberation s leadin g up to the Meiji con stitutio n , this em phasis on au thority was de liberately iden tified with the i m perial house. As I to observed , constitu tionalism had ancient and specifically religious antecedents i n E u rope . There were n o such antecedents in Japan : "The o n e i nstitu tion which can become the cornerstone of our constitution is the I m pe r i al House . . . . For this reason the first princ i ple of our constitution is the respect for the sovereign rights of the e m pe ror."74 Nevertheless, all members o f the Me iji oligarchy favored a consti tutional regime . In the statement j ust quoted , Ito explains that checks and balances must be establishe d , ministers must be held res pons ible i f "the danger o f abuse i n the exe rcise o f sovereign powers" is to b e pre vented. He thus agreed with all his colleagues t hat a pro perly Japa nese constitutional syste m would safe guard both "t he princ i ple of monarch i cal rights and the p r i nc i ple of joint rule of sovereign and s ubjects. " 75 I n
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE fact, Ito gave a fine account of the reasons why he and his colleagues favored constit u tional i sm despite their au t horitar i an tradition .
T he
p re s e n t
po l i t i c a l d i s t u rbance [ o f t h e
1 8 70s] is s y m pt o ma t i c
of a ge ne r a l
t re nd sw ee pi n g the whole world and is n o t l i m i t e d to a s i n g le n a tion or p rov
i nc e . A bo u t a h u n d re d years a go t h e revo l u ti o n s in E u ro pe sta rted i n France a n d s p r e a d gr a d u a l l y t o o t h e r E u ro pe a n nations. The moment u m o f t hese revo l u t i o n s g ai ne d s t ren gt h and has come to constit ute a t re m e n d o u s fo rce . S o o n e r or l a t e r
practically
a l l n a t i o n s . . . w i l l feel t h e
i m pact
of t h i s fo rce a n d
to
n e w w a s acco m
c h a n ge t h e i r fo r m o f gove m m e n t . The c ha n ge fro m old
pa n ied
b y v iolent d i s t u rha nces. T h e d is t u rbances h a ve l a s t e d
to
t h is v e r y d a y .
A n e n l i g h t e n ed r u le r a n d h i s w i se m i n i s te r s w o u l d con trol a n d d i v e r t t h e force t o wa r d s a s o l i d i fy i n g of t h e go vern m e n t . To a c h i e v e t h i s , a l l d e s po t i c co n d uct m u st be a ba n d o n e d , a n d there c a n be no avoid i n g a go vern m e n t ' s
p o wer
with the peo ple .
shari n g
of t h e
. . .
But while these general trends were sweepi n g the whole world," I to made clear that in Japan they would be adopted deliberately and very grad ually: "
E v e n as w e con t ro l t h e t r e n d s , t h e re a re
given
free reign they
will
will
b e n o vi o le n c e , a n d e v e n w h e n ideas
not lead [ people] astray .
Progress will be o r de rl y
a n d we w i l l set the pace of progress, a n d t h e passage of t i me w i l l b ri n g about the no r m a l i zation o f t he trend s . 7 6
This statement speaks with confidence of control and orderly progress. But how could a constitutional regime, responsi ve to the demands and rights of the pu blic be m a d e com pa tib le with the soverei gn authori ty of the emperor? The Meij i leaders were aware o f this dilemma. Only t h ree years a fter the restoration, the Iwakura m iss i on to Europe and America was charged with the task of studying " foreign laws customs and institutions and of recommending those which should be adopted by the Japa nese."77 Members of the mission like Kido Koin, Okubo Toshimichi, and I wakura Tomomi returned with tentative proposals for gradual steps toward constitutional reform. Meanwhile, a group of more radical constitutionalists had formed within the Meiji gover n men t When they res i gned after their proposal of war agains t Korea was rej ected , they submitted a memorial ( 1 874) calling for the immediate election of a popular a s sembly The memorial stated that, as mat ters stood, the govern ing power did not lie either with the imperial house or the people, but solely with the officials. The au thors of the memorial were j un ior councillors under the leadership of Itagaki Taisuke, a Tosa loyalist of middle samurai background . They challen ged the argu ment of more gradualist reformers, like the mem bers of the Iwakura mission. In their view , the Japanese were ready for a constitution. ,
,
.
.
Iwakura Mission, 1871 A group portrait of t h i s m ission w hich includes ( from left to right) K i d o Koin, Yamaguchi H isayoshi , Iwakura Tomomi, I to H irobum i, and Okubo Toshim ic hi. The fou r men from tozama han have adopted Wester n clothing whereas Iwaku ra, the cou rt noble , still appears in the traditional attire. (Kodansha International)
The reason w hy fore i g n e rs were so slow a n d g r a d u a l in d evelo ping a con stitutional form of go ve r n me n t was because they did not have any exam ple
be fore the m . B ut now the Ja panese had such an e x a m ple be fo re their eyes and co u l d i m i t a te it. J u s t as i n the t ec h n ic al sphere Japan was not wai ting to i n vent all t h e new machines and use new methods of resea rch b u t was ado pt
in g what had a l read y been invented in o t he r co u n tries , so also in the political
sphere Japa n could w i thout any gra d u al i s m adopt syste ms pe rfected i n other natio n s . 7 8
Yet these "radicals" were no democrats. They were concerned with the strength of the country, not the liberty of its citizens. They acce pted without question that political rights wo uld be given only to sam urai, rich farmers, and merchants . Pittau has examined the ensuing debate in the years 1 874- 1 878 and concludes that m uch of it revealed "a mix ture of liberal ideals and despotic methods."79 By 1 878 the Meij i government had pre pared the first draft of a constitution which reflected the widespread study of Western parlia mentary models. At the time, Iwakura Tomomi remained as the prin cipal survivor of the original Meiji leadership. Alarmed at the agitation
TO WA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE for radical refo rm and the govern ment's own draft proposal, he peti tioned the throne in 1 8 7 9 to order the junior councillors to present their views on a constitution. Such presentations were duly submitted. Through the su preme authority of the throne, the debate was removed from the public forum and made a matter of policy determination at the highest level. To be sure, public debate continued. B ut the e ffect of Iwak ura's i n i tiative was to place constitutional reform on the agenda of the gov ernment itself. As I noue Kowashi poi nted out ( in 1 88 1 ) , the Meiji gov ernment m ust assume leadershi p on the constitutional issue. I f this op portun ity was left un used for two or three years, " public o pinion will cast aside the draft of a constitution presented by the government, and the private drafts of the constitution will win out in the end."80 By the end of 1 88 1 , the outlines of the official position had been fixed. On October 1 2 of that year, the main spo kesman for constitu tional reform along British lines (Okuma Shigenobu) was o usted from the govern ment, and an imperial decree pro mised the establishment of a parliament by 1890. Shortly thereafter, a committee was appointed under the chairmanship of Ito H irobu mi, charged with the p re paration of a constitution .81 In March 1 8 82 Ito was ordered to lead another study m ission to Europe. He retu rned in August 1 8 8 3 , and the final text of the Meiji constitution was promulgated from the throne in 1 889. The debate on a constitution had been a main focus of Japanese politics since the early 1 870s. It had turned on the suitability o f Western precedents for J a pan . The Meiji government desired its o w n principles, but did not want to forego available sources of knowledge and legitimatio n . I n 1 87 8 , four years prior to Ito's mission, the government had hired the German con stitutional lawyer Hermann Roesler. And in 1 88 1 , Iwak ura Tomomi defined the govern ment's position, based on the preparatory work of Roesler, Inoue, and I to. This "Opinion on the Constitution" represents the consensus of those princi pally responsible for the Meiji constitution of 1 8 89. The guidelines incorporate what the second generation of Meiji oligarchs understood as a pro per blend o f imperial supremacy with the constitutional protection of liberty, property, and personal security that is, between Ja panese tradition and European i nstitutional models. The Japanese had several models from which to choose. In En gland , sovereignty was nom inally shared between king and parliament. In fact, the king e ntrusted all political authority to the prime m inister who depended on a parliamentary majority . Hence in practice, parlia ment was su preme, while the king's position was similar to that of the Japanese emperor prior to the restoration. By contrast, the Prussian sys tem put all executive power in the hands of the king. The Prussian prime minister was appointed by the king without any consideration of
NATION-B UILDING: JAPAN parliamentary majorities . Under this system, all ministers were directly and solely responsible to the king. As Iwakura's statement puts it, const i t u t ional go ve r n m e n t in o u r coun try and open creating something ne w . The problem i s : shall we fol low the En gl i s h m o d e l and establish a pa rty go vern m e n t , m a k i n g the par l ia m e n t ary majority res po n sible fo r t h e ad min istration? Or shall w e , fo l l o w i n g the principle of g rad u a l i s m , grant o n l y legis lative power a n d rese rve t h e ex ec u t i ve power to the E m peror, acco rdin g to the Prus sia n model ? H2 I f we plan
a
to e st a b l i s h
a
pa r l i a me n t we will be ,
The English constitution presupposed a two-party system with a suffi cient supply of persons in both parties capable of taking over the admin istration of affairs. Such conditions did not exist in Japan. Hence, the Prussian system seemed more appropriate. As in Prussia, the constitution should be created as a gift of the emperor to the nation. Like the Pruss ian king, "the Emperor shall have supreme command over the army and navy, declare war, make peace, conclude treaties, etc. ; moreover, the Emperor will direct the national administration."83 Thus, the emperor would have the power to appoint and dismiss ministers and high officials. To ensure that the cabinet would not be controlled by parliament, a provision should be adopted for continuation of taxes from the previous year in case the assembly and the cabinet could not agree on the annual budget. Finally, with re gard to the rights of citizens, I wakura's "opinion" stated that "consti tutional provisions of other nations should be consulted," but care should be taken to ensure a gradual approach toward constitutional gov ernment. The Prussian model appealed to the Meiji leaders because it made the king (or emperor) the father of his people. His power and sanctified authority permitted no diminution, stood above all contro versy, and was j ustified by the care he bestowed on all his subjects. In the Japanese version, this outlook was tied directly to the mythological origin and age-old tradition of the imperial house.k Yet this acceptance of the Prussian model created a major problem as well. Earlier, Ito had made it clear that a constitution meant safeguards against the abuse of sovereign power. B ut immediately after the em peror issued the Meij i constitution, he declared, A l t ho u gh it is i m pos s i b l e to avoid the rise of poli tical gro u p s in any parlia ment or soc iety , a government party i s most im pro pe r . . . . T he e m pe ror stands above the people a n d a part from every party. Co nseq uen tly, the go v e r n m e n t cannot favor one party above t he other. I t m ust be fa i r and im p a r kTo a legal rationalist l i ke Roesler, t h i s transce ndental legi t i m ation of i m perial a u thority was unacce ptable-de s pite h i s unqualified justi fication o f monarc h ical au t hority
i n W i l h e l m ian Germany in other respects.
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE tial. And the prime m i n ister ... w ho assists the e m peror, m ust not allow the governme n t to be m a n i pulated by the parties .
Even Ito's own followe rs were con fused. I noue stated that a ppare n tly I to i n tended "to apply co m pletely the B ismarckian absolute state to Ja pan." I to res ponded by as k i n g whether state min isters m ust the n be re s ponsible to the Diet. I n o ue answered "absolutely not," but then contin ued, "The re is no jus tific ation for the e m peror to place con fidence in a cabinet that has nothin g to do with public opinio n . Therefore, I be lieve that, though from the poi nt of legal theo ry the state ministers are re sponsible to the em peror, actually they are respons ible to the people through the Diet."84 This con fus ion was an i n tegral part of the Meij i Restoration . To a m a n , the Meiji oligarchs favored authoritarian rule under the mantle of i m pe rial sanction. But that position depended on the homoge neous o ut look of the restoration movement, and uaity disa ppeared o nce the To kugawa shogunate was overthrown. Against a background of centuries o f absolutist rule, it was agonizingly diffic ult to acce pt political parties and parliamentary res ponsibility, the two institution s which were imple menting the mandate of the people b y the end o f the nineteent h cen tury. The Meiji constitution of 1 889 sought to protect authoritarian rule under the e m pe ror against the growt h of parties and t heir influence on public affairs, but this atte m pt did not succeed. Ito Hirobumi, the ar chitect o f the constitution, fi nally accepted the inevitability and even the utility of political parties. Just as the Toku gawa shogunate had clothed absolutist rule in the language of feudal loyalty, so Meiji govern ments came to clothe a govern me n t of elite gro u ps in the language of consti tutionalism and imperial supremacy Ind i re c tly and reluctantly, Japa nese leaders began to acce pt the view that ministers formally responsible to the emperor m ust in practice be res ponsible to an elected Diet rep resenting the people. Once its i solation was ended, Japan did not escape the momentum of the Euro pean revolutions. .
13 NATION-BUILDING: RUSSIA
ENGLAND,
France, Ge rma n y , a n d Japan each we n t t hro ugh its own transition from an old t o a n ew system of authority. Where once kin gs had ru led and the people were excluded from public affairs , new structures of authority e merge d . The transition from the authority of kings to a m andate o f the peo ple is a protracted process which was cen turies in the making. One can examine these transitions at any time and atte m pt to distin guish between the leg acies from a country's past (tradition) and the signs of change which point to the future (moder n ity) . The distinction is use ful for analytic purposes, but one should remember that every historical develo pme nt is contin uous. Legacies from the past are the ever-present context in which changes toward the future occur. Russia emerged as a unified state o n ly a fte r lon g wars a gainst ene m ies to the east, the south, and the west. The early Byzantine influence and the impact of Mongol overlordship rei n forced Russia's c u l t ural iso lation, which was also increased by the Orthodox c h u rc h and its hostility to foreign ideas. Russia's t ransition from the seventeenth to the nine teenth centu ries involved a mobilization of resources, people, and ideas through trade, manufacture, and population i nc rease as wel l as through war and literacy. Autocratic rulers attem pted to develop their country by means of a "well-ordered police state," creating not only a great E u ropean power but a rising cultural a n d national aware ness o f t h e people. This transition of Russia was per ha ps more strongly influenced by for eign c ultures and empires than the development of any other country considered here-. In England, a long period of i n vasions ended with the No rma n con quest, a nd although En glish. relations with the Co ntinent rem ained close, the country develo ped a strong autonomy. The sixteenth and sev e n teenth centuries in particular wit ne ssed an intense period of nation building which was stimulated by a fear of Spanish and Catholic dominance. I n medieval Germany, political fragmentation was institu49 1
TOWARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
tionalized by the Peace of West phalia ( 1 648) . The n , u nder the stim u l u s of Frenc h absolutism a n d the French revol utio n , this fragmentation co inc ided with an extraordinary cultural flowering in the age o f Lessin g, Sch i ller, and Goe the , o f Ka nt, Fichte, and Hegel. Japa n was politicall y u n ified at an early time and was not conquered until 1945. Despite this ve ry prolon ged secl usio n , the country had to co pe from the begi n n i ng with t he cu ltural i n fl ue nces of the h i gh l y so phisticated civilization of C h i n a . Ja pan has a lon ge r h istory than any other country of developin g an indige n o us culture through a process of ada pti ng the ideal models o f another culture. The im peria l co urt at Kyoto neve r lost its pattern sett i n g i nfluence on the Ja panese peo ple; t h us, after 1600 the country co uld begin its political con solidation with an ancient an d hi ghly stylized c u l t u re vi rtually intact. A co u n try such as Ja pa n , e ffectively free of conquests for more than a m illen n i u m , w hich preserves its ter ritorial integrity de s pite internal conflicts, is clearly distinguished from a co untry s uch as Russia w h ich is exposed to invasions from all sides for some nine centuries and which emerges as a u nified state only after some se ven centu ries. T he c ultural contrast is more difficult to make, tho ugh it may be as im portant as the political. How does one com pare the Ja panese impe rial court and the Russian Orthodox c h u rc h , w hic h were both influenced by military and political forces? Both became ce n te rs of pervasive and enduring cultural influence. The Japanese co u rt invo l ved an aristocratic elite s u rro u nding the divinely descended e m pe ro r, while the Orthodox c h u rc h invo lved a hie rarchy of ecclesiastics from the Metropolitan dow n to a mass of il literate priests. The Japanese cou rt culture provided a ritual and es the tic elaboratio n of se nsibilities inspired by t he nature worship of S hinto , whereas Russian religious cult u re developed a ritual a n d esthetic elaboration of sensibilities inspired by the worship of God and C hrist. The possibili ties of such co m pa rison lie o u tside the framework of this study. They are noted here , neve rtheless, because they underscore that japan 's secl usion and resistance to change were fostered by prolonged cultural autonomy and the abse nce of conquest, whereas Russia's iso lation and resistance to c ha n ge developed despite repeated conquests and massive influences from abroad. The fo l lowing disc ussion begi n s with Russia during the seventeenth centu ry, when France was at the height of its contine ntal influence . The gre at rel igio us schism, the early influx of foreigners and alie n ideas, and incipient econom ic changes s uggest that Russia was slowly coming out of its cultural isolation. The autoc ratic transformation of Russia be gan with the d raconian meas u res of Pe ter I ( the Great, 1682- 1 725). Peter's im pact on Russia had part icular im portance for the Russian a ristoc racy. Further autocratic re forms occ urred under the reigns of Peter III ( 1762 ) and Catherine I I (t he Great, 1762 - 1 796) . All these initial ste ps
NATJON-BUlWING: RUSSIA
493
toward a break with lon g-established traditions were undertaken u nder the i nfluence of Western ideas. T hese eighteenth-century developments were contin ued by the tsarist reigns from Paul I ( 1796- 1 8 0 1 ) to N icholas I ( 1 825 - 1 855), which s ponsored Western ideas and ed ucation to provide needed skills . The story of Western models and Russian responses can best be told consecutivel y , for the grad ual transformation of R ussia's "backwardness" is indistingu is hable from its res ponses to the West. AUTOC RATIC T RAD IT ION S , WESTERN MODELS, A N D NATIVE RES PON SES I n the sixteenth and seve n teenth ce nturies , Russia was an i nward looking, provincial society o n an im perial scale , undeveloped economi cally and isolated culturally . At the same time, the late Renaissance and the Reformation , with their individualism and c u ltu ral efflorescence , marked the countries of Western Europe.1 Russia's isolation was guarded by the church through its control of education. Learning hardly went
Reception of Foreigners at
the Court
of Alexis (1645-1676)
Russia had great need of foreign skills, but when foreigners arrived in Moscow they were permitted to live and conduct their affairs only in rigidly segregated areas. In this scene the
tsar has surrounded himself with boyan, and after each foreigner is introduced the tsar performs a ritual ablution to cleanse himself of contamination. (Olearius, Voyages, 1662)
TOWARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE
494
beyo nd elementary skills of read i n g and w r iting Bi blical and litu rgical texts were memorized , and a considerable pa rt of the clergy remained i l l i terate. The co untry lacked secular sc h ool s and a leis ure class of ed ucated people who could p u rs ue ideas or sc ientific work free of ch urch con trol. Russia di d not possess a sin gl e un ivers ity, wh ich m ea n t that there was no formal training in j u risprude n c e , med icine, and astro nomy -with the addition of theology, the established subj ects of trai n i n g in Western universities. Moreover, Russians were usually forbid den to tra,"e1 abroad, because relations with other people were considered a pr ofa na t i o n and the Russian c h u rch strongly opposed any learn ing that detracted from religious wors h i p . As a conseq uence, the c h u rch con trolled almost the en tire c u l tural li fe o f the country. Secular knowledge was regarded as eq u ivale nt to he resy, arithmetic and geometry were treated as magic arts, and scie nce ge nerally was seen as the work of An tichrist. Western Euro pean cities had been ce n ters of trade and cosmopol itan contact for centuries, but this was not true of Russian towns. In stead , the m e rchants and artisans were organ ized by the governme n t so as to e n s u re the pay men t of taxes and the performance of services. This did not preclude individual i nitiative and success even on a large scale, and the govern ment encou raged such s uccess by grants of mon opolies and special honors. B ut me n of wealth who were t h us distin guished also had to pay the highest taxes, acco unt for their receipts, and be pe rson ally liable for vario us services. Ap plications for exem ption from s uch duties were de nied, causing merchan ts typically t o resort to subterfuge . A contem porary report on their attitude desc ribes not o n l y the mer chants but also a rather ge neral reaction to governmen t. .
,
The more t hey have, the more danger they a re in , not o n l y of their goods, but of their lives also. And if they have anything, they conceal it all they can, sometimes conve y i n g it i n t o mon asteries , sometimes h i d ing it u n d e r the gro und , and i n wood s , as men a re wont to do w h e re they are in fea r o f for e i gn invas ion .... I have seen t hem sometimes when they have l a i d o pe n their commod ities fo r a l i k ing [for approval) . . . to look still be h i nd them a n d to wards every door; as men in some fea r that l ooked to be set u po n a n d sur prised by some enemy. Whereof a s ki n g the ca use , 1 found it to be th is, that they h a"e doubted lest some noble m a n or "�yll boiarskii o f the Em pe ror's had be e n in co m pa n y and so laid a tra i n upon them to prey u po n thei r com modi ties per force.2
E ntry in the roster of wholesale merchants (gosti) had certain advan tages, such as the pe rmission to travel and the right to i nvest i n land. B ut merchants were in a precarious positio n and would eve n discontinue their commercial activities i f the government obliged them to provide special services. Under these conditions the merchants did not acquire a cosmopolitan o utlook.3
NA TION-BUILDING: R USSIA
495
Yet there were signs of c h a n ge even within the fra m e w o rk of M us covite Russia. Between 1 500 and 1 700, t he country was at war for 1 36 years, and d u ring the se venteenth centu ry its armed forces were grea tl y en la r ge d a nd reo r ga n i z e d, w i t h fi rearms provi d i n g a new m i litary tech n o l o g y .4 The count r y ' s territories were expanded through conq uest of borde rlands and expansion i n to Siberia at th e same t i me that defense headq uarters were establ ished against Poland, the Crime a. and Sweden. In the be gi n ni ng of t h e seventee n th ce n tury, m a i n te n a nce of the army re quired almost 250,000 rubles, and b y 1 680 that amount had tripled. absorbing half the state bu d ge t. Such a b u rden could not have been s us tained without some development of t he co u n t r y ' s resource s. Contacts with foreign powers ex panded. Trade and p ro d uct ion for the marke t i n c re ase d , as did the n um ber of special i z e d markets for g rain s , salt, fu rs, leathe r goods, co t to n , and metal pro du c t s . By t h e m id dle of t h e sev enteenth century, Moscow had become one of the l arges t c ities i n Eu rope with 200,000 inhabitants and many more s uburban and tem porary residents. The city retained regular m arketing relations with some 150 towns and 40 districts . In a d d i tio n, specialized markets existed in many places which provided tem porary cen ters of economic act i v it y. A de tailed study of " man u factor i es " in the seventeenth cen tury (iron m ills,
glass and leather factories, paper mills) records 5 7 such establishments, most of them built after 1 6 2 0 by foreigners or under state auspi ce s . The tsars increased the n um ber of m inistries and a ppointed more o fficials in order to cope with the expanding tasks of government. Eve n a regular postal service was established with several Euro pean countries. During the eighteenth century, economic development further increased. Un der Peter I there were only 98 factories in Russia; by 1762 there were
ten times that number; and at the death of Catherine II (1796), a total o f 3,16 1 . The last three decades of t he century witnessed a fourfold increase of exports and i m por ts. 5 Demo g raphi c factors account for m uch of Russia's rise as a maj or Euro pe a n power. The first census of the taxable male po pula t ion ( 1 7 1 9) showed a total of 7.8 million. By the seventh census o f 1 8 1 5 , that fig u re had increased to 21. 5 m illion. This increase was partly due to the sub
stantial territorial acquisitions in the i ntervening century. Anothe r .set of figures indicates that between 1762 and 1 796 Russia's total p o p u lat io n rose from 19 to 29 m illio n .6 Census-taking was rud i me ntar y and the u nits counted varied, but there is no doubt that the co u n t r y ' s pop u latio n increased substantially. Until well into the nineteenth century, more than 90 percent of the people lived on the land, and the bulk of state reve n ue and of t h e i ncome of the aristocracy came from agriculture. There were also sign s of cultural c h a n ge in M uscovite Russia. B y the seventeenth century, Kiev had become a cen ter o f growin g i nte lle c tual ac ti v i t y . Located in the Ukraine, in a frontier area between Mosc ow ,
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
Lit h uania, and Poland, the city was u nder Polish rule and inevitabl y in vol ved i n the struggles fo r te rritorial supremacy. Poli s h power over the Ukraine declined i n the 1660s, and in 1667 M uscovy a n nexed the left ban k of the Dnieper. [But]
the balance of cultural forces did not shift acco r d i ng l y . Though the
Muscovites grew strong enough to annex much of the Ukraine, their intel lectual strength had not increased. When Kiev became
a
Muscovite city, from
the cultural stand point it was Kiev which was increasingly influencing Mos cow, not the reverse ....
The reason for Kiev's cultu ral dominance was that the city had become a ce nter of learn ing. I n the Monastery of the Caves, Peter Mogila , the m etro politan of the Orthodox church ( from 1633), used t he method of Roman Catholic education and tau ght in Lati n . This mean t that the cul tu ral level of religious instruction was significantly raised, eve n t ho u gh no doctrinal change was contem plated . Moscow soon ado pted these i n novation s in the techn ique o f i nstructio n . 7 I n Moscow itself, Kievan and other influences led to a n incongruous m ixtu re o f cultural elements, best exem plified by Tsar Alexis (16451676). The tsar was i n te rested i n medicine and astronomy, but he was also a deeply religious man who gathered around him a gro u p o f young priests eage r to rejuve nate the Ort hodox c h urch . These were moderate re formers: Many came from Kiev and all were ded icated to increasing the ra n ge of learning, so long as there was no challenge to Orthodox beliefs . Even so, Kievan learnin g was suspect in the eyes of those who opposed all reform of the Orthodox c h u rch, because for them the orig i n al Doctrine of the Lord was a s piritual treas u re that m ust not be di m i n ished. Such sus picion becam e more pronounced when one o f the reformers, Nikon , was a p poi nted patriarch (1652-1666). Niko n ' s re forms no longe r seemed mode rate whe n he revived the old con troversy over printed ecclesiastical books. These books with all their idiosync rasies, errors, and inte r polations were the token of Russian Orthodoxy from 1500 onward, and any change was considered tantamo u n t to heresy. Nevertheless, Nikon or de red a revis ion o f the texts and i nstituted the Greek practice of m aking t he sign of the c ross with three fi nge rs and three "halleluj ahs" in lieu of the M uscovite practice of two finge rs and two "hallelujahs." In the Orthodox church, icon s portrayi n g sain ts making the sign o f the c ross were venerated as holy images ; thus, a change of makin g that sign a p peared lite rally as desecration . I n a council of 1656, Nikon even declared that al though he was a Russian he had the faith and ideas of a Greek, and he proceeded to buttress his position by e n dorse ments from church co uncils, other patriarchs of the c hurch, and Tsar Alexis himself. De s pite these e ndorse ments, the re forms were rejected by the Old Believ-
NA TION-B UILDING: R USSIA
497
ers or Old Ritualists, who were willing to die for the traditio n a l faith, thus acce ntuating a division between nativism and rece ptivity to " for eign" ideas. According to o ne estimate, over 20,000 Old Believe rs burned themselves alive between 16 7 2 and 1691 in thirty-seven communal con flagrations Nikon was eventually de posed fo r poli tical reaso ns, alt hough Tsar Alexis decided in favor o f the reforms Nikon had s ponso red . The Great Sch ism o f the mid-seve n teenth century t h u s led to the de feat of both Nikon and the Old Believers , the su premacy of the tsar ove r the church, and the openi n g of t he country to the s pread of learning.8 At the time, learn ing re fe rred to the Gree k traditio n s o f the Or thodox church and borrowings from Lat in sources t h rou g h which the methods ( not the content) of Catholic instruction h ad beco me i nflue n tial i n Moscow . The Nikonian reformers and the O ld Believers were divided only over the question of how best to preserve the Orthod�x ch urch Both gro u ps shared an anti-Western orie ntation. The c harter which Fedor III ( 1 676- 1 682) gave to the S lav-Greek-Latin Academy at the Zaikonospasskii monastery shows the strength of this opposition in the highest circles. The academy was permitted to teach the traditional, scholarly subjects. But it was also assigned the task of censoring im ported books, supervising the ideas of foreigners em ployed by the gov ernment, and keeping a l l secu l ar knowledge out of its c urric u l u m . Fe dor's charter ordered that teachers of the academy who dissem inated scien tific knowledge be conde mned as magicians and burned to death.9 T his basic suspicion of all foreign i nfluences was quite similar to the exclusion policy of Tokugawa Japa n . But Ru ssia was a Continental power and isolation was difficult to maintain. I n a country where all political decis ions originated with the tsar or his confidants, contacts with the West had to be initiated from the very top. I van IV (1533-1584) had sent young Russians to stud y in Ger many and had encouraged foreigners to come to Russia. B oris God unov (1598-1605) had hoped to establish E u ropean schools in his cou ntry and h ad tried to attract foreigners. A select grou p of tsarist officials be came interested in Western customs and ideas. Boris M orozov A. L. Ordin- Nashchokin, V. V. Golitsyn, and others ranked high at the tsarist court and could afford to take a larger view of a ffairs-despite the ge n eral cultural i nertia and defin ite hostility to foreign ways. Men l ike these had traveled widely, c riticized Russian backwardness, and c ultivated contact with foreigners. A few leading court officials also changed their li festyles, including the ir d ress and the interior decoration of their houses, as wel l as sponso red various leisure-time activities such as the atrical entertainments. Rich M uscovites began to accu mulate libraries and hire foreign-langua ge teachers des pite the edicts of 1672 and 1675 pro h ibiting possession or trading of foreign boo ks. Between 1550 and 1700, some 150 transla tions a ppeared , o f which only 37 were works on .
.
,
TO WARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE
Moscow's Foreign Quarters
Foreign professionals were required to live in a segregated but comfortable section of Moscow. The foreigners comprised the young tsar Peter's "university." One of his most
congenial companions was General Lefort, whose mansion is shown at the center of the engraving. This mansion was the scene of many evenings filled with conversation and high s p irited entertainment. (New York Public Library)
faith and morals; the others dealt with literatu re, history, geography, medicine, astronomy, and natural science and included various refer ence works. Significantly, nearly all these were disseminated by manu script rather than through publications controlled by the state-church,lo T he em ployment of foreigners was one way of resolving the conflict between an economy demanding skills and an orthodox religious culture inimical to secular learning and all things of Western derivation. As early as the fifteenth century, tsarist rulers had contracted for the services of foreign s pecialists needed for trade and military preparedness. Some were employed as tutors of children in aristocratic households; others were physicians, military officers, and translators, as well as assorted craftsmen and tech n icians. Initially, t hese foreigners were allowed to reside in Moscow. B u t when antiforeign feeling ran high, they were as signed to a "German" s uburb (Nemetskaya Sloboda) in Moscow as well as in other cities. Aside from the few who adopted Russian ways and con verted to the Orthodox faith, the bulk of the foreign residents consti tuted a cultural enclave of their own. Permission to worshi p their several
NATION-B UILDING: R USSIA
499
faiths was granted , but t h ey were not allowed to ad m i n iste r their own a ffa i rs . Abo ut 1 67 2 (th e year of Pe ter the Great's b i rth), so me 1 8,000 fo rei gners were est imated to reside "in the Muscovite empire."11 A few lead i n g aristocrats were in con tact w i t h fo rei gn ers and receptive to for eign id e as . In hi s y o ut h, Tsar Peter shared in these contacts and devel oped a taste for new ideas, e s pec ia ll y in the m i l i ta r y fie l d . THE REIGN OF PETER I AND ITs LEGACIES
The interest in Western ideas and i n s tit u tion s became a domi nant mo ti f of the Russian go ve r n me n t under the influence o f the young tsar .
Tho ugh fo rmally enthroned at the age of te n (168 2 ) , Peter repla c ed the regency of his half-sister Sop h ia in 1 689, at t h e a ge of seventeen. E arly in his reign , the yo ung tsar traveled to Weste r n E u rope (1697-1698) where he co mbined his i n terest in technical skills and i nno va t ions with firs t for ays in Eu ropea n d i plo m acy . In his travels, he became ac quainted with the ac ade mies of science in Lo ndon, Berlin, and Pa ris, wh ic h p ro vided information and advice. His ed u c a tio nal reforms stemmed from this experience. At the ele m en ta ry level, Peter ordered t he establish ment of " c i pher ing" schools and tried to make a ttendance co m puls ory . He fo unded m ili tary academies at w h ic h foreign inst r ucto rs ta u g h t Rus sian officer-candidates. At the highe st level, he established an Ac ademy of Sci ence, and he curbe d by e di ct the church's opposition to sec ular learning. Under these conditions, foreign s c i enti sts as wel l as students had to come to Russia since there was no Russian u n i v ers i ty fro m which Russian scien tists could be rec ru ited, and Russian sec onda r y ed ucation in the early eighteenth century did not prepare students for advanced work. Vasilii Tatishchev, one of Pe ter's emissaries to Sweden, suggested to the tsar that an academy without ed u c atio n a l instit u t io n s on w h ic h to build wou ld be a waste of money. a Pe ter replied that he knew "a Russian academy would rese mbl e a watermill wi thout water, but th at [this] be gin n ing wo u l d compel his s u ccessors to com plete the work by diggi n g a canal that would bri ng in the wa ter . "12 Peter a b r u ptl y returne d from h is Euro pean travels in 1 6 98 to put down a revolt of the guard regiment s in Mos c ow (streltsy), pre pare fo r a war aga in st Sweden, and launch an attack on the backward customs of h i s country. Many earlier tsars had imposed savage p u nis h m e n t s on ·On ly foreigners who did not know Russian were involved in the academy, and its proceedings were published in La tin . A gymnasium and university were attached to the academy in 1727, but only a few Russians attended the former and eight German students were brought to the latter so that it could pretend to function. Even a century later a Russian critic of education wrote, "The professors have been invited before there were students to hear them and though many of these scholars are prominent, few are really useful; for the students, being but poorly acquainted with Latin, are unable to understand these foreign instructors."
TOWARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE
thei r o pponents, and Peter's ac tion s were hard l y exce ptional. Neverthe less, his reign re presented an autocratic co up d'etat agai nst the old re
gime . Peter's t ravels abroad , his ac t ive inte rest in fore igners and their ideas , his German mistress, his cas ual regard of reli gious symbols (though not of rel i g ion)-all these were outrages to the eyes of the pious. Per so nal h u m iliation s were added. At a rece ptio n , Pe te r seized a scis sors a n d c ut the beard of a lead i ng c itizen. To bel ievers , this action and the edict a gain st beards which fol lowed we re fu rther heretical abo m i nations, since the beard was the pious m a n's sim u lation of God's i m a ge , while shaving m ade h i m the equal of a n im a l s . The tsar had taken to wearin g fo reign cloth i ng, and in 1700 an edict made s uch c l othi n g incumbent on all servitor aristocrats, while exem pti n g cle r gy men and ta x pa y i n g co mmo ners. In the fol lowi ng ye ars , a grad uated tax was im posed on all those who still wore beards and native costume . Soon, tax-exe m pt and clean -sha ve n court ar istocrats and soldiers i n foreign clothes or uni fo rms co uld be d isti nguished fro m the rest of the population who wore native clo thes and beards, and paid taxes.h Popular indignation against Pe ter foc u sed on these willful a n d sacrilegious cha n ges of n ative cus toms; thus, nationalism , defense of the faith, and po pular hatred of the t sar coalesced at the very begi n n i n g of the Northe rn War (1700- 1 709) and of the country's first period of major re forms.13 The
Cutting of Beards In this contemporary cartoon an old be liever and boyar protests futilely as the
barber. probably Peter the Great himself, pre pa res to cut his beard. In the eyes of
the orthodox. a beard meant a man's like
ness to the image of God. Foreigners re
ported that many believers saved their shorn beards and were buried with them.
(New York Public Library)
s
"Similar distinctions between court and country e x i ted elsewhere in Europe. but with Russian (kthodox)' and popular fee i g attributed to beards
out the religious significance
and clothing.
ln
NATION-B UlWING: R USSIA
501
To outrage native se n timent j ust a fter suppressing a revolt at home andjust be fore a major military-campaign abroad meant that Peter, like his p redecessors , Was not especially concerned with the reactions of h i s people . The tsar's extensive m ilitary involvements natu rally resulted in extraordinarily heavy tax burde ns. The police or m ilitary force were often needed at home to col lect these taxes, eve n in the m idst of m ilitary cam paigns abroad. Ye t Peter's ini tiative to re form Russian society had arisen from the desire to i ncrease the country's figh ting ca pacity. B e fore 1 689 the total budget of the tsarist governmen t had amounted to 1 .2 milli o n rubles, of w h i ch 700, 000 we n t fo r the arm y , 224,000 for the court, a n d 300, 000 for all other needs . More than half o f these outlays were raised through customs d ues on i m ported goods and a tax on liquor, t he rest through direct and special taxes obtained b y leasing lands belon gi n g to the tsar. By 1 70 1 the tax burde n had dou bled to over 2 . 2 million rubles, and by 1 7 1 0 it had risen to 3 . 1 m il lion . While the proportion of the regular bud get goi ng to m i l itary expendi tures remained roughly t he same, the budget tripled i n a period of twe nty years, and the measures used to raise additional reve n ue became more extreme. The tsar obtained cash throu gh forced loans from mon asteries, rich merchants, and moneylenders, as well as by dou bling the tax burdens of the towns. Special levies were i m posed. The currency was debased, and state mono polies of especially lucrative trades were created. By 1709 the cost of ma intain i n g the army had made the finan cial situation desperate. The tsar ordered a new ce nsus i n the expecta tion that the taxpaying population had i ncreased in the last thirty y ears, but instead the 17 1 0 census showed a decline of 20 percent. The gov ernment ignored the census and i n effect raised the tax assessment on each household in order to maintain its tax receipts despite the loss of population. I 4 This record of Peter's fiscal measures during the Northern War suggests that his wartime government con tinued the tradition of col lecting tribute (taxes) and recruits from a population whose only alter natives were com pliance, bribes , dece ption, or flight. For centuries past, this "system" of government had worked by t he ove rwhelm ing weight of the autocrat's prese nce and the awe he inspired in his subordinates. Pressure from above had been "an swered" by fear below and. whenever possible, by bribes and the hiding of resources. Such tactics could sta bilize th e relations between rulers and ruled, and to a degree such sta bilization could make life tolerable for the p eo ple. By prompting su periors to look the other way bribes facilitated evasions, false re ports, hoard ing, illicit profits, and the like. In that way, subjects could appear to com ply and still retain some margin of resources on which to live an d to comply to a degree on the next occasion, when exactions would be even larger. IS
502
TOWARD
A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE
The fi rst inroads on this network of bribes and decept ions had been made in Russia ' s m ilitary organ i zation , when regimen t s were created u nder fore ign mercenary officers. These regi ments pe rform ed no civil functions i n co n t rast t o m ili ta ry u n its recruited from the villages, led into battle by t heir peac et ime ad m inistrators, and r eturned to their vil lages on the cessation of hostilities. Peter's reforms began by assi gn i n g all recrui ts t o re gi me n ts under centrally appointed officers. Peasants were se para ted perma ne ntly fro m the i r villages, and the sons o f aris toc ra tic landowners had to serve fo r life . The newly created regime n ts were com posed of men fro m different areas, so that se rvitors w ho spe n t t heir lives toge t he r in military se rvice deve loped a regi mental allegiance. B y 1 72 5 the tsar had c reated t he largest standing army in E u rope , with 2 00 , 000 regular soldiers and about 100,000 irregulars . The great success of t his m ilitary fo rce m ade the co u ntry a form idable Eu ro pean power.IS At the same time, Russia lac ked the loca l i nstitution s on whose co o peration the tsa r's m ilitary undertakings could depend. The under de v el o pmen t of provincial society in Russia was dir ec tl y related to the adm inistra t ive weakness of the tsarist government. There were no "es tablished rights" o f estates which the tsar had to combat, and by the end o f the se ve nteenth century eve n the old princely and boyar claims had largel y d isappeared. I n practice, the governme nt mono polized all ini tiative in public affairs . B u t i n so doing, it lost touch with the people in socie t y o n w hose experience and energies other E uro p ean governments co uld d raw for the ach ievement of public ends. 1 7 Peter repeatedly tried to inculcate a sense of cor porate responsibil in aristocrats and merchants, de manding that they act for the "com ity mo n good," which in his view was identical with the i n terests of the state. B ut pro minent merchants hard ly a ppre c iated the " freedom" o f sel f ad min istration granted to them w hen it e n tailed a doublin g of their tax payments and other onerous services to the state. Local gentry hardly enjoyed a right of re prese ntation when they were compel led to elect delegates to provincial assemblies which had no autonomous functions to perfo rm. Nor could repeated census counts inspire public confidence when they were apparently ordered to "find" more people for purposes of taxation . Peter eventually used soldiers to collect taxes, even thou gh his own military reorganization had sought to se parate civil from mili tary functions. Th us, i n 1722 a census was completed under military pressure, and fo r five years soldiers were stationed in the villages to col lect taxes. Thereafter, centrally appo inted civil officials resumed control. But soldiers continued to hel p with the collection of taxes until 1 763, and civil officials were for the most part retired army officers.18 Peter's policies of "Westernization" were based on gove rnment by emergency decree and large-scale military engagements. From the de feat at Narva in 1 7 00 to the victory over the S wedes at Poltava in 1709,
NATION-BUILDING: RUSSIA
Peter was preoccupied with the Northern War. He also i nitiated Russia s dominance over Poland, a n nexed. Esto n ia and Livonia, and established his i n fluence in the Baltic through the marriage of his niece, An na, to the d uke of Kurland (or Courland). An u n s uccessfu l , but rather brief, m i li tary engagement with the Turks in 1 7 1 1 involv e d Russia o n ano the r maj or front. Fu rther military actions against Sweden e n s ued in the fol lowing years , leading to the withdrawal of Swed e n fro m the Continent and its re placement at man y poi n ts by Russia n troo ps. F u rther marri age alliances with t he Germ a n state s of Braun schw e ig and Holstein fol lowed, as did simultaneous mili ta ry e ngagements against Pe rsia . Peter's vast and almost contin uous military and d i plomatic involvements s uggest the tre mendous burdens he im posed o n the whole society. The founding of St. Petersburg as the new capital became the great symbol of that imposition, though canal construction by forced labor and the massive conscription of serfs were also important. The new city provided access to the Baltic and facilitated Russia's rise as a European power as well as enhanced its rece ptivity to Western ideas. But the city exacted an enormous price in capital, labor, and lives. It also exacer bated the antiforeign sentiment stron gly e ntrenc hed in the ch urch . Or thodox believers regarded Peter as the incarnation of Antic hrist. These sentiments coalesced into a growing o pposition to St. Petersburg and the court as "foreign" enclaves, filled with deceit and corruption and dom inated by foreigners.19 These anti-Western sentiments were greatly rein forced under Pe ter's n iece, Empress Anna I vanovna (1730-1740). Foreigners had been the obedient agents of the tiar before 1725, but now they began to have direct influence on government policy. The empress appointed men of Baltic or German origin to importan t positions. New guard regiments under foreign commanders were created. Eventually, Ernst Johan n Bi ron, as the closest advisor to (and lover of) the empress, became the symbol of oppression (Bironovshchina), because his name was linked with widespread terror. These Russianized officials of Ger man origin were probably no more corrupt than any of their predecessors or less loyal to their adopted country. Nor were autocratic practices under Anna harsher than they had been under Peter. But resentment against this "government of German foreigners" became a rallying point among courtiers and palace guards, whose intrigues followed Anna's death in 1740. Biron, Muennich, and Osterman lost out in the ensuing struggle over the succession, and the d aughter of Peter I, Empress Elizabeth (1740-1762), was hailed as a liberator from a foreign yoke. In practice, only German influence declined w hile European influe nces continued -this time u nder Frenc h auspices. Elizabeth retained men of foreign birth among her advisors and St. Petersburg as the capital. By mid-cen tury, the influence of Voltaire and the E ncyclopedists had begun to re'
TOWA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
place the earlier importance of Leibniz, C h ristian Wolff, and the pietism of Halle Univers i ty . The rising anti-German se ntiment and the turn to ward French models corres ponded with the ascendance of the Fre nc h E n l i ghtenme nt in Western Europe. As the service obligations o f the Russian gentry were li ghtened , in dividual cou rtiers discovered "that the acqu isition o f French c ulture was a factor of soc ial disti nctio n welco med at co urt and in society , and that it supplied those ele ments of bon ton w hic h c haracterized most of the Euro pean nobility ." Western ed ucatio n acqui re d from foreign teachers was no lon ger the compulsory activ ity it had been under Peter's reign , desi gned to prepare yo u n g aristocrats for their m i litary or governmental careers . Now "dancing, the French language, drawing, the atrical per formances , and fencing occupied as i m portant a place in the c urricu la of most educational institutio n s fo r the young gentry as did m athem at ics , history, political science, fortification , and othe r subjects useful in the military or civil service. "20 Inevitably, this i mitation of French culture was satirized and morally castigated, much as Gallomania was de nounced in eigh teenth-centu ry Germany. Yet reactions were qu ite d i f fe rent in the two contexts. In Ge rmany, Gallomania was re placed by a cosmopolitanism that modeled itsel f on the ancient Greeks. Sel f-cultivation (Bildung) o f the indi vidual was the new ideal in contrast to the e m pty grace o f the aris tocrat or the French manner affected by the Ge rman courts . But the se l f-cultivation of the individ ual was not a viable ideal for eightee nth centu ry Russia. The re was no rapid proliferation of educated readers w hich in German y was a by-product o f education for state service . Dur ing the eighteenth century, the a n n ual production of prin ted publica tions ranged in Russia from a low of 1 2 to a high of 366 in contrast with Germany w here it ranged fro m a low of978 to a high of 4,0 1 2.21 Russian officials often rema ined as uned ucated as the clergy. With little ed uca tion and little demand for l iteratu re, interest in such m atte rs was con fined to relatively few aristoc ratic fa milies. Russian men of letters were either foreigners or the first of the rawochintsy (that is, men who had become estranged from the gro u ps to which they belonged by the stan dard legal categories of the d ay) . A number of these w riters protested the evil influence of foreigners by c ultivating the Russian language and Russian traditions. Such efforts hel ped to develop a national conscio us ness, but R ussian c u lture remained u nder the pervas ive influence of Western ideas until well into the nineteenth centu ry.22 The s ubordination of Russian soc iety to dynastic and military exi gencies was noth i n g new , but Peter's adoption o f foreign models and the b u reaucratization of government were delibe rate innovation s. The o bli ga tion to se rve the tsar personally was made into an impersonal sys tem thro u gh reorganization of the aristocracy. A Table of Ranks was established in 1 72 2 , which was to enable people to ach ieve aristocratic
NATION-BUIWING: R USSIA
status by means of profess ional and economic success as well as by public and mi l itary service. In princ i pl e , a commoner could be ennobled once he achieved the civilian eq u ivale n t of t he lowest officer rank , or of the ei ghth rank i n the civil service. Peter's m ain obj ective was to make rank an accu rate reflection of service. In practice , some ambitious and s uc cessful commoners we re elevated , but claims based on a fam ily's length of service rather than on qualification alone cont i n ued to predom inate. Peter died in 1725, but h is new d is pe n satio n had altered the aris tocratic way of life. In place o f the old rotation between m ilitary and civilian service, t he tsar i n trod uced a sepa ration . Both types of service were now to be preceded by a s uitable, co m pu lsory e d ucatio n . In or d er to ach ieve the com plete recruitment and control o f the aristocracy, a register was established of those eligible for service p l us a record of their perfo rmanc e One third of the males in every aristoc ratic fam ily were assi g ned to civilian d uty ; all others were oblige d to ente r m ilitary service . Each young aristocrat had to enter serv i c e at the lowest rank at the age of fifteen. He was obliged to serve between twenty-five and thirty y e ars and his c areer advanced through fo urteen parallel grad es in the mili tary, the administrative, or the imperial court serv i ce T h rough the Table o f Ranks, rulings by officials had re placed the tsar's p e rsonal favor. No doubt his rule was harsh, but the psychological gain of the tsar's pe rso nal recognition also had had a compensatory ef fect. Now, rank had become a matter of seniority and b u reaucratic in trigue, while decisions on promotion rested wit h supe r ior officers or officials.23 This systematized service exacerbated ill will among the gen try. One can infer their resistance to the Table of Ranks from the edicts issued to enforce the new rules. Under Peter, evasion by aristocrats was to be punis hed by confiscation of property; evaders could be robbed and even murdered with impunity; informers who deno unced malin gerers were to be rewarded with the culprit's property; public disgrace was to be visite d upon the g u ilty. Aristocratic youths who failed to do well in the schools pre par i ng them for service were not perm itted to marry or inherit landed estates. The very proliferation o f these edicts suggests their limited success, but also shows how extreme was the bur den of required se rvic e 2 4 In the interest of a n un p rec ed e nted military build - u p , Peter system atized the subordination o f the servitor aristocracy and c omple ted the conscri ption of the peasantry as recruits, taxpayers, and state laborers . He sou g ht to compensate the aristocracy for their sacrifice by making pomestie hol d ing s he reditary and ind ivisible (l714).c W hen all land hold ing became service-bound in perpetuity, the old d i stinction be tween he.
,
.
.
TO WARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE
reditary patrimony ( votchina) and service land ( pomestie) was abolished , one more instance in which the grant of a right was indistinguishable from the duty to serve the state . The government also acce pted the prac tice o f landowners w ho sold their peasants without land. Alt hough thi s practice was formally prohibited, the tsar himself encou raged the sale of recruits to the army. Other changes instituted by Peter, s uch as the promotion of industry , the building of St. Petersbu rg, and the institution of required schooling, were all designed to develop Russia as a great Euro pean power. In the process, the people were decimated by war, forced labor, famine, and repression. There was also a mass exodus to the interior. I n the tradition of autocracy, Peter regarded the peo ple as child ren who would not learn anything without com pulsion . As Kliuchevsky has observed, T he Pe trine Re for m was a struggle . . . betwee n despotism a n d t h e people ' s to r por. He h o ped by means o f h a r s h govern mental m e as u res to evoke i n i tiative and e n te r pr i se amo n g an e n s laved society , and t hro ugh the age ncy of a slavehold i n g n obility to install Euro pe a n learn i n g in Russia. He wanted the slave, while re mai n i n g a slave, to act consciou s l y and free l y . To ach ieve the join t action of despotism and libert y , o f e d ucation and slave r y - t h i s is the pol i t ical eq u ivale n t o f squari n g t he c i rcle, wh ich we have been trying to so lv e for two cen t u ries, since Peter' s d a y . I t
is
still u n solved .
Tibor Szamuely, who quotes this comment, rem arks that Peter's reign evoked two incom patible reactions in Russia. Although he felt closer to the people than any other Euro pe an monarch , Peter was personally hated by conservative writers and the public at large. At the same time, liberal and radical writers ad mired Peter as t he great reformer of their backward country. This division of o pinion made Russia the first in a lon g line of modernizing countries which have been bedeviled by a sim ilar divis ion between nativists who resen t the disruption of established ways, and re formers who are prepared to force the pace of change. 2 s Peter is among the most tragic rulers considered in this study. A ph ysical giant endowed with e normous vitality which made it seem pos sible to undertake single-handedly the modernization of his country, Peter was excessive in everything he undertook, including his concep tion of tsarist authority. An army regulation of 1 7 1 6 proclaimed, " H is M ajesty is an absolute monarch who is not responsible to anyone in the world for his deeds ; but he has the right, and the power to govern his realm and his lands, as a Christian sovereign , according to his will and wisdom." Peter extended this exalted conce ption of monarchy to the q uestion of succession . In the Muscovite tradition, the crown usua lly passed to the oldest son , but Peter's son Alexis had been tortured to death in his father's presence on a trumped-up charge of conspiracy
NA TION-B UILDING: R USSIA
( 1 7 1 8) . Four years late r , Peter proclaimed the e m peror's r ight to appoint his own successor so that he m ight elim inate any me mbe r of the d ynasty
he considered unfit. Yet this extre me assertion of authority proved fu tile ; in 1 72 5 Pete r died w i thout ha v in g named a successor. A fter 1 72 5 dynastic in s tability weakened tsarist rule, and the aris tocracy was relieved of the worst burdens Peter had im posed. An im perial manifesto of 1 7 36 p rovid e d that in every family one son would be e x empt from ser vice to m anage the estate w hile the other sons were obliged to serve fo r twenty five years with the right to resign thereafter. Subsequent edicts relieved other burdens. The sons o f pro m inent ge ntry fam ilies were enrolled i n the service at b i rth so that they al ready pos sessed considerable se n iority under the Table o f Ranks by the time they ca m e of age. Servitors were given special leaves o f absence, or the ir ser vice d uties were reduced on an individual basis. In addition, sons of distinguished families were given privileged access to one of the three Moscow guard regiments and, after 1 73 1 , to the Corps of Cadets . Mi l i tary units attached to t he palace together with prominent cour tiers had played a major role i n the in fighting t y pical of cou rt and bu reaucracy since the sixteenth century. Now, a fter Peter's abolition of a succession based on pri mogeniture ( 1 722), it wa s still easier for court ie r s and the Moscow regiments to take decisive action w hen a s u ccessor to t he throne had to be chose n . During the eigh teenth century, Peter's reign w a s followed by e i g h t monarc h s : Catherine I ( 1 72 5 - 1 727), Peter II ( 1 72 7-1730), Anna ( 1 730- 1 740), I van VI ( 1 740- 1 74 1 ), Elizabeth ( 1 74 1 - 1 762), Peter I I I ( 1 762), Catherine II ( 1 76 2 - 1 796), and Paul I ( 1 796- 1 80 1 ) . Only two of these monarchs achieved the thro ne without military intervention ( Pete r I I I and Paul), and both were subsequently -
,
mu rdere d . 2 6
All these rulers pla yed le ad ing courtiers against one another in or der to exercise autocratic rule, but in this context some prominent per sonalitie s and the Moscow guard regiments found o p portunities for ad vancing their careers and i nc rea s ing aristocratic control over the peasants. Here is a partial list of the relevant imperial edicts : In 1 74 1 , peasant serfs no longer h a d to swear an oath of loyalty to the monarc h ; in 1 747, the custom o f selling peasants without land was lawful; in 1 760, a r is toc ra t ic landowners had the right to e x ile offending peasants to Siberia; in 1 765, lan d o w n e rs at their own disc retion had the right to sen tence peasants to convic t labor ; in 1 767, any attem pt by ser fs to lod ge com plaints against their mas ters was punishable by forced labor. 2 7 None o f these edicts touched the aristocracy's own ob l i gation to serve the state. The Petrine reforms of perio d ic census-taking, levies of
TO WA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
5 08
serfs for the standing army and for public works, and co ll ection of the head tax had been implemented increasingly by the army. When these m ilitary forces were moved to t he front during the Seven Years' War ( 1 756- 1 7 63 ) , t he prov inci a l government of R us si a was very nearly par al yzed. Landed aristocrats were needed as never be fore to adm inister local affairs , and the com pulsion under which unquali fied as well as quali fied aristocrats had to serve in the cen tral gove rnment was becom ing counterprod uctive . I I I A N D CATH E R I N E I I The aristocracy's service obligation had been relaxed a fter the reign of Peter I primarily because under less demand ing rulers exemptions increased and personally lodged com plaints found an occasional hear i n g Peter I l l's ed ict of 1 762 freed the aristocracy of its universal service obligation, a move that was popular among aristocrats and probabl y con venient from t h e standpoint of the government. The edict, however, did PETE R
.
not mean either a d i m i n ution o f autocracy o r a grant o f r i g h ts to th e ari s to c rac y Rather, aristocrats were g r ante d freedom from the com p ul sor y service ob li gatio n s of the past. Henceforth, the government could dis pense with the service of those who preferred to m ind their estates or l ive a l i fe of leisure. T he edict decreeing the "emanci pation" at the same time appealed to the aristocracy to continue its service. .
We hope that the w hole noble Russian ge n try, a p prec iative of o u r ge n e rosity t o them a n d their descen d a n ts , w i l l be inspi red by their m o s t d u t i ful loya lty to Us and t h e i r ze al, not to abse n t or hide themse l ves from service, b u t to e n ter it w i t h pride a n d e n t h usiasm , and co n t i n u e it i n an honorable a n d decen t m a n n e r to the exte n t of t h e i r ab i l i ty . . . . Those w h o h a ve not bee n in service a n y w he re , but spend a l l their t i m e in sloth a n d i d le n ess, and do not s u bject the i r c h i ld re n to a n y use fu l ed ucation for the be n e fi t of the fa t he r l a n d , these W e , as they are negli ge n t of the com mo n good, com mand all Our obed ient and true sons to des pise and sco rn , and they will not be a l lowed to appear at O U r Cou rt, or at public meeti n gs a nd celebrations.
Aristocrats who availed themselves of their legal freedom were to be ost rac ized Moreover, the edict of 1 762 said nothing about the desire of ar i stoc rat s for freedom from cor poral punishment, for a guarantee of se rf possessio n and for the imm unity of their estates from confiscation. The new freedom from com pulsory service obligation was h e d ged by im portant reservations. 2 8 The Russian aristocracy com prised be tween 1 and 2 pe rcent of t he p o p u l a t ion The nu mber of aristocratic fam ilies had been about 3 , 000 i n 1 700, but as a result o f tsarist largesse increased to a little u n de r 200,000 fam ilies in 1 800. 2 9 Eve n after 1 76 2 , more than 80 percent of this landowning aristoc racy continued to serve the state, o ften leaving the m a n a ge m e n t of their estates to bailiffs who put their own interests .
-
,
.
NA TION-B UILDING: R USSIA
first. Only the wealthiest fam ilies, com prising perhaps some 1 2 , 000 households, turned to the direct m anagement o f their estates . During the last decades of the eighteenth century, they could increase their in come from ex port of agricultural produce, from the distillatio n of al cohol, and to some extent from ind ustrial prod uction . I n 1 795 some 1 9 3 , 000 aristocrats owned 9.9 m illion ser fs . The dis tribution of serfs amon g gentry house holds is difficult to estimate , but figures for 1 834 indic ate the great disparities o f wealth among the gen try ( see Table 4) . These percentages mean that the lead ing 2,300 aris tocrats (those with more than 500 serfs each) owned just over 3 million serfs . Of these, some 2 million serfs belonged to 870 households, av eraging 2,342 se rfs per owner. 3 0 During the years 1 83 0 - 1 8 3 5 , the total Russian population stood at abo ut 48 m illion , and the total number of aristocrats at about 720 , 0 0 0 . I n 1 83 1 some 43,000 lived in Petersburg and another 1 6 , 000 lived i n Moscow. Thus, only about 8 percent, or 1 out of every 1 2 aristoc rats, lived under the direct supervision of the court and the central government. T h e vast majority of t his upper class lived in the provinces, and altho u gh the figures cited pertain to 1 834, the same conditions had prevailed earlier. 3 1 The aristocracy was not the sole owner o f the serf population. Ac cording to statistics for 1 796, 9 . 7 m illion males belo n ged to landed aris tocrats and the church, while 7.2 m illion males belonged to lands owned by the state and members of the i m perial fam ily .3 2 The government and the aristocracy depended on the rural population for the bulk of their income. Prior to 1 762 , the local manage ment of estates and peasants con sisted of little more than tax collection and m ilitary recruitment by officials of the government, o ften supported by military force . The peas ants worked the land accord i n g to their own custom . The ty pical p rob lem had been peasant flights when burdens became too heavy. In deal ing with these flights, t he government wanted to preserve the revenue derived from the productivity of the land, but it also wanted to settle newly colonized areas of the e m pire. A consistent policy was difficult to ach ieve under these circumstances. TABLE 4 BY
D I STRI B UTION O F GENTRY SERF OWN E RS ( H EADS OF HO USE H O LDS) S I ZE OF H O LD I N GS IN GREAT RUSS I A , 1834
Number of Seifs per Gentry Household
Percentage of Owners
Percentage of Serfs
Fewer than 1 0 0
8 1 .5
1 9.6
1 0 1 -500
15. 1
35.2
2. 1 1 .3
30.3
50 1 - 1 000 Over 1 000
1 4. 9
1 4 62 - 1 5 0 5
1 505 - 1 6 8 2
A U S T RI A N E M PI R E
1796 ----
B ou n d a ry o f a c q u i r e d areas by p e r i o d of
- . -
1 2 . Ex pansion
of
a c q u is i t i o n
Bound a r y
Russia, 1 462- 1 796
o f t h e G o l d e n H or d e unti l 1 4 8 0
NATION-BUILDING: R USSIA
51 1
A n umbe r of eighteenth-centu ry rulers were weak , b ut the principle of autoc ratic supremacy remained in force . When Catherine I I ascended the throne, albeit with the aid of cou rtiers an d the Moscow regi ments, she restored autocracy to its former stre n gth. Ca t herine II w as born in 1 729 as princes s of a petty German princ i pali ty ( An halt Ze rbst) . A t the age o f fi fteen , she was bro u ght to S t. Pete rsburg to marry G rand - Duke Pe ter, w ho was the son of the d uke o f Holste in and a Russian mothe r. Converting to Greek Orthodoxy fo u r months a fter her arrival, she mar ried in 1 745 and a son was born to he r nine years later ( the future Em pe ror Paul). Between the ages of sixteen and thirty-two, Catherine cul tivated good relation s at court. Punctilious regard for amen ities, demonstrative loyalty to her adopted country, and study of the enlight ened literature of the age marked those ye ars, as did a growing es trangement from her husband . A fter a re ign of o n l y seven months ( 1 762), Pete r I I I was forced to abd icate, and Catherine was proclaimed empress. Peter's murder followed only a few d ays later, probabl y with Ca therine's consent. The circumstances o f her accession to the throne, the len gth of her reign ( 1 762- 1 796) , and her handling of foreign affairs leave no doubt of Catherine's own sense of power politics. Russia had become a great European state during the eigh teenth century. Territorial acqui sitions were one reason . Through the peace of Abo ( 1 743), Sweden had ceded the Baltic co u nt r ie s and the territories adjoining the e astern shores o f the Gul f of Finland . U nder Catherine I I, one main obj ective of Russian policy was territorial gains at the expense o f Turke y ( Russian-Turkish war, 1 768- 1 774) . The treaty o f Kuchuk-Kainardji ( 1 774) bro ught the territories adjoining the northern and eastern shores of the Black Sea and the Sea of Asov under Russian dom ination . But through pressure from the Western powers Russia was forced to retu rn to Turkey its con q uests of Moldavia and Wallachia. The first partition of Poland ( 1 772) also falls into this perio d : Russia gained some eastern territories but m�or parts o f Poland were annexed by Prussia and Austria. The Rus sian annexation of the Crimea followed in 1 783 as well as a second wa r with Turkey ( 1 787- 1 792), in which Russia obtained additional coastal areas on the Black Sea. In the second and third partition of Poland ( 1 793, 1 7 9 5 ) Russia obtained further territories in Lithuania, Volh ynia, and elsewhere . In the Swedish -Russian war of 1 7 88- 1 7 90 Russia re tained its earlier annexations in the Baltic. The empress probably had a gen uine interest in the ideas of her age, but she also used he r co ntacts with luminaries like Voltaire, Diderot, and others to buttress her own legitimac y and enhance Russia's good name in Western Euro pe.33 Both im pulses are evident in her free ad aptation of ideas taken from Monte squieu. I n 1 764- 1 7 66 she d rew u p a series of in structions t hat were to guide the deliberation s of the Com-
TO WA RD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE
mittee of Deputies, con voked for the purpose of d rafting a new code o f l a w s . Mo ntesquie u iden ti fied a utocracy with des potic government, b u t the e m press sought to prove that a u toc rac y w a s com patible with t h e sep aration of powers , the observance of laws, and the other objectives of e n l i gh tened rule. Montesq u ie u had also ad vocated political privileges fo r the aris tocracy in a lim ited monarc h y , because s uch privileges would protect a co u n try against t he possible des potism of the sovereign . By contrast, Catherine thought of the privileged aristoc racy as a n as pect of the autocratic system, for u nder Russian co nditions privilege was m atched by the aris toc racy's obedience to the sovereign . I n practice, that obed ience had waned in t he co u rse o f t he eigh tee n t h ce n t u r y , largel}' d u e to t he combinatio n o f weak rule rs and the risi n g powe r o f the Moscow guard regiments. The aristocracy's aut hority ove r the ser fs had become absolute, a n d by the 1 7 7 0s t he peasants were at the end of their endura nce . I n 1 7 7 3 - 1 7 75 the Pugachev revolt en gul fed a large part of so uthern Russia. The revolt was ruthlessly s u p pressed, but the n Catherine turned her attention to the "undergov erned" provinces . The Pugachev crisis had shown that loc a l abuse of authority was ram pant, and the autoc ratic response was to stre n gthen a n d re form provincial government, p resumably i n the ex pectatio n that this would correct the abuses which the central go vernment itse l f had faci litated . Local authorities we re to be made u p of tsarist o fficials and landed notables elected by the local aristocracy, probably i n the hope that the two gro u ps would chec k each othe r's excesses. Also, p rovincial cou rts were to be separated from a dm in i s t r a ti v e age ncies so that the adjudication of local disputes wo uld not be m is used as a means of im plementing gove rn menta l ed icts. Re l y i ng on t hese prin c i p le s , [ C a t h c ]-i n e J borrowed t h eo re t i c a l argumen t s
from t he l l'eatise on law t h a t B l ac k s t o n e had published i n Ox fo r d i n 1 7 65-
6 8 and that had been t r a n slated i n to French i n 1 7 7 4 . ( I n 1 7 80- 82 s h e co m
m i ss io n ed D e s n its k y to m a k e a Russian t r a n s l a ti o n .) S h e wa s fas c i n a ted by th e
co n s t i tu t i o n of the E n g lish co u n t y , w h ich was based on a broad a u tonomy fo r
the l oc a l a d m i n istration a n d on the d o m i n a n t role of the landed n ob i l i ty in t h e d i s p e n sa t i o n o f j us t ice a nd the co n t rol o f the police.34
The res ulting Ordinance on Govemments ( 1 775) reduced the size of each provincial government a nd local district. It decreed both admin istrative decentralization and re presentatio n b�' e lected deputies from each j u risdiction. Courts for eac h class of free men (aristocrats , mer chants, artisans) were to be co m posed o f a presiding j udge a ppointed by the state and associate j udges elected by the res pective classes. By the e n d of Catherine's reign ( 1 796) , the n u m ber of provincial o fficials had rise n to 2 7 , 000 ( fro m 1 2, 7 1 4 in 1 7 74), and expe nditures for pro vincial ad m i n istration had risen to over 1 0 m illion rubles ( u p from 1 . 7 m i l lion
NA TION-BUILDING : R USSIA
in 1 7 74). Even with these increases, the limits of the country's admin istrative capability are suggested .by the fact that Prussia, with 1 pe rcent of Russia's land area, e m ployed 1 4,000 civil servants.35 These and related measures were supplemented by the Charter of 1 785. The aristocracy was now legally freed of its liability to corporal punishment (the token of its servitor status for centuries) ; it h ad free disposal over its estates, could engage in trade, and was protected under due process of law . Assemblies were institu ted with the right to debate govern mental proposals and to establish schools and hospitals through voluntary contribution s. Yet an aristocrat had to attain the ran k ofj unior officer before he had the right to vote in the election of assembly del egates. Members of the aristocracy might be free from com pulsory state service, but they were ineligible for elective office i f they did not per form such service. In practice, governmental restrictions on local activ ities remained severe, but initiative was not wanting when the occasion seemed promising. Witness the flood of grievances and proposals sub mitted to the legislative commission of 1 767, although these subm i ss io n s merely continued in altered form the age-old right to petition the tsar. Few remedies were forthcoming in response to such grievances. Ultimate jurisdiction remained in the hands of the provincial gov ernor-general. Catherine believed that autocratic rule d id not allow for any sign i ficant local autonomy, although s he admired the principle of local rule a s practiced in England. In h e r view, such principles were not a pplicable in Russia. Enormous resources were needed to sustain Rus sia's military and diplomatic efforts in the Euro pean concert of nations. As long as the supreme position of the landed aristocracy and the serf dom of the peasants contin ued, the state was supplied with the service and revenue it required. Centralized adm i nistration and the necessary use of force buttressed the prevailing system of exploitation and could contro l the u prisings which recurred from time to time. Yet coercion could not provide either the skilled work force or the teachers, administrators, and engineers which Russia needed to safe guard its status as a Euro pean power. Du ring the 1 780s, Catherine was concerned with organizing a school system that could provide her gov ernment with educated officials at the middle rank. A fter care ful prep arations based on the study of Western models, a statute of 1 786 pro posed the establishment of a two-year "minor school" in every district and a four-year "major school" in every provincial capital. Under Cath erine's s ponsorship, use ful learning was emphasized and the education of girls was encourage d . Rote learning and discipline were to be re placed. The guiding ide a was that children must be se parated from their fam ilies at an early age so that they might receive the full bene fit of a teaching uncontaminated by the surrounding society. I n 1 786 there had been only 40 schools with 1 36 teachers and some
TO WA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
4,400 p u p ils ; by 1 796, the last year of Catherine's reign , there were 3 1 6 sc hoo l s with 744 teache rs and some 1 7 , 340 pu pils . 3 6 But this outward s uccess was d ece i v i n g The ambition s o f t he autocrat were at odds with the educational conce ption s preva i l i n g i n the soc ie ty at l a r ge I n the maj or schools , less than half the students were children of aristoc ratic fam ilies and the rest were co m moners . The pa rents o f bot h grou ps were dissatisfied. For the aristocracy, association with social i n feriors seemed demeani n g as we l l as dange rous to the established order. For the com moners, sc ho o l i n g in the absence o f e m ployment opportun ities w as a d i spensable lux u ry As a town council stated i n 1 79 0 , Sc hoo ls are not necessary for the children of merchants and craftsmen. Therefore , we do not inte n d to se n d our childre n to school. We have no desire to s u p por t the sc ho ol s and we see no va l ue in them for US . " 3 7 Both attitudes were rein forc ed by the ed ucational practices of the d ay . Teachers were held in low esteem and paid next to no th i n g Man y children from the aris toc racy were ke pt home and give n private instruction . As for the .
.
.
"
.
children of commoners, only a s m a l l proportion of those attendin g ever graduated. A firs t ste p had been taken , but major educational advances had to await the secon d half of the nineteenth century. On balance, the reforms of C a t heri n e I I di d not change Russia's social order. Even the charter o f 1 7 85, which actually for mulated rights o f th e aristocracy, declared that "at the first summons from the auto c ra tic au t h o r i ty every aristocrat "is bound to spare neither labor nor life itself for the service of the state."38 The bulk of t he aristocracy was in p rac t ice so poor that t h e y were eager for government service and co uld not claim t h e e x e mpt i on to which t he y were now entitled . More over, in the borderlands of the so u t h , t he U kraine, and the west, the fortune of aristocrats depended on the state ; though t hey might want more freedom for themselves, they t horo u g h ly identified with the tsarist regime.39 A l t h o ugh a few aristocrats could afford to take their ease after centuries o f personal subservience and readily ignored the adm o n i tions to serve vo lun ta ril y neither this nor related reactions altered the close interdependence between the tsarist government and the aristocracy.d Since Catherine's accession to the throne was of doubt ful legitimacy, she maneuvered carefully by adding to he r European reputation and by fa voring prominent aristocrats with her largesse. Her determ ined suppression of peasant uprisings and her support of greater aristocratic dominance over the serfs do not suggest that she feared challenges to "
,
dPerhaps the most patheti c combination of abj ect subordination with pride was the re peated req uest that aristocrats who had committed acts deserving corporal punishment
be for mally divested of their title befo" e the penalty was infli cted on the m . Note the moral outrage with w h i ch the Abbe Sie y es commented on a similar "demotion before punish ment" in eighteenth-century Fran ce.
NA TION-B UILDING: R USSIA
her reign . At a n y rate , she fi r m ly rejec ted c o nsti tu t io n al lim itations on her su preme a u t h ori t y . 4 0 F ro m t h e s tan dpoi n t of the a rist oc racy , it was a reasonable com pro m ise. The ir own pre e m in e nce w a s as s u red , th e b u rde n o f pe rs o n a l se r v ice li gh te ned , a n d t he i r ri ghts over the serfs e n hance d . Meanw hile, they felt the threat of peasan t uprisings, not o n ly i n t h e great P u ga c h e v re vo l t b u t i n sp o r a di c viole nce against i n di v i d u al landowners. This in t er n al hazard n ec e s s ari l y loomed large r at t h e time o f t h e French rev olu t io n . A strong autocracy seemed the best guarantee of peace and o r der at ho m e , and it also pro ve d to be e ffective i n foreign a ffairs. The aristocracy was hardly averse to be n e fi t i n g from the successfu l m i li tary cam paigns against Turke y , t he t h re e pa rt i t io n s of Po la n d , t he secu lari za ti o n of church estates ( 1 7 64 ) , an d the oc c u pa t ion of the Crimea. Nor were the highest circles o f the ar i s toc racy disinclined to follow the court's lead in a do ptin g Frenc h c u lt u re as t h e model o f refinement. With an ann ual rent payment of 5 rub l es fro m e ach pe asa nt - se rf, the a r i s toc racy had an annual income from its serfs of 50 m il l io n rubles, of w h ic h Pro fessor Kahan estimates that over 35 pe rcent was s pent for im ported goods, education, and travel. 4 1 To purchase these fo reign amenities and thus support an aristocratic sense of well - be i n g , a family r e q uired a minimum work force o f o ne h undred male serfs . A m ajority of aristo
cratic households lacked these amenities but stil l depended on what serfs they possessed. Even w here their status was combined with ind ige nce , aristocratic fa mili es ra re l y wavered in their su pport o f a u toc r a tic rule . FOREIGN POLICY, MILITARISM , AND EDUCATION
Tsarist governments taxed the Russian population ever more rig orously in order to pursue their foreign policies and many mili t a ry un
dertakings. At the same time, the autocracy sponsored the development of education in order to i mprove the country's productive, administra tive, and mil i ta ry capability. B ut the second undertaking also involved contact with ideas from the West whic h called Russian autocracy into question. Indeed, Russia's aristocratic society i n Moscow and Petersburg was educated in the language and thought of Fr a nce and Germany; thus , the le ade rs of society were affected by suc h trends of the tim e as Protestantism , pietism , Freemasonry , and French socialism. Accord ingly, the following discussion considers the foreign involvements and educational policies of the s uccessive reigns of Paul I, Alexander I, and N icholas I. T he changing interplay between foreign affairs and e d uca tion exempli fy the peculiar brittleness of Russia's po l itic al tradition, see mingly ce ntralized and a l l - po wer fu l, and yet exposed to every cur re nt of o pinion from abroad. The five -year reign o f Paul I ( 1 796- 1 80 1 ), w hich fol lowed the
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
thirty-four-year reign of his mother, Catherine , ill ustrates the ease with which autocratic rule could change foreign models and revoke "liberal" concessions. Catherine ; s models had been France and England ; her son's model was Prussia. Paul thought of laws as if they were military com mands and tended to adopt policies which reversed those of his mother. Participation of estates in local government did not suit a military model. Local bodies were reduced in size, and henceforth re presentatives of the aristocracy were appointed rather than elected. More serious was Paul's decis ion to tax the aristoc racy in order to pay the costs of local admin istration , a direct contravention of the 1 785 charter. Still, these provin cial matters probably did not count for as much as the tsar's despotic measures at the center of affairs. One ed ict followed another in chaotic profusion . The import of fore ign books was banned; certain words were prohibited ; curfews were i m posed ; officials were dismissed ; officers were sent to Siberia for trivial reasons ; a dead general was disgraced posthumo usly; an adm iral was i mprisoned one day and ordered to head a squadron a few weeks late r. Russia's international position was also precario us. The French rev olution had been followed by N a poleon's rule, and h is series of con quests had provoked a European alliance against him. Under Paul's di rection , Russia joined the second coalition against Napoleon , largely because of Napoleon's conquest of Malta. The tsar was a Freemason and Grand Master of t he Knights o f Malta. These were strange preoccu pations for a head of state , but the m ilitary signi ficance of Russia's war aga i n st N a poleon was co n s i d e rable . I ts B a ltic fleet j oined the B r itish fleet near the Dutch coast, the Russian B lack Sea fleet together with Turkish naval forces operated in the Mediterranean, and Russian land forces de feated the French in northern Italy. B ut Russia then le ft t he coali tion as e rratically as it had joined when B ritain occu pied Malta as a move against the French and re fused to yield the island to the tsar. Paul's despotic treatment of the highest ranking officers and officials as well as these mystically motivated ventures in foreign policy were among the causes of an aristocratic conspiracy against his reign. In 1 80 1 Tsar Pau l was m u rdered and his son , Alexander I ( 1 80 1 - 1 825) , was installed on the Russian throne:12 The new tsar had known of the conspiracy to dethrone his father, but very early he had learned to disguise his feelings in coping with the greatly strained relations between his grandmother Catherine I I, who had seen to his liberal ed ucatio n , and his father Paul, who had conspired against his own sons. On Alexander's accession , whic h was greeted with a wave o f popular enth usiasm, the tsar declared that he would follow the s pirit o f Catherine's reign and his first ed icts quickly undid the worst featu res of his father's rule. Ousted o fficials and officers were author ized to req uest reinstatement ; am nesty was declared for political pris -
NA TION-B UILDING: R USSIA
oners ; the institutions of local government were restored ; the po l ice was ordered not to overstep its authority; the borders were reopened to trav elers and the im port of foreign books ; the Charter of 1 785 was restored ; the government prom ised not to i m pose new taxes ; the secret political po l ice was abolished . 4 3 By these and related meas ures Alexander seemed to express the liberal ideas he had absorbed from his grandmother and from his tutor Laharpe, a Swiss educator strongly i n fl uenced by the ideas of the French Enlightenment. The tsar surrounded himself in the earl y years of his reign with friends who represented a cross-section o f the country's "re ference so cieties." Prince Adam Czartoryski and Count N icholas Novosiltsov had stayed in Paris during the beginning of the French revolutio n . Count Stroganov had even been a member o f the Jacobin Club and had had extensive contact with Condorcet's ed ucational ideas. When a Ministry of N ational Enlightenment was established in 1 80 2 , its first director was Count Zavadovsky, who had a strong liking for German academic models. Condorcet's scheme of public education was close ly fol lo wed by the Rus sian statutes of 1 804, e mp hasizing the utilitarian approach to teaching and the princi ple of equal access based solely on qualification. Under Alexander's leadership , conservatives and reformers agreed that by an ticipating demands for culture and progress, a m ajor cause of public unrest could be averted . Between 1 80 1 and 1 825, the n umber o f uni versities increased from 1 to 6 , the n um be r of gymnasia from 12 to 5 7 , and the n umber of district schools from 44 to 370, w hile parochial and private schools increased from 1 80 in 1 805 to 960 in 1 825. The total n um be r of students d u ring Alexander's reign more than tri pled.44 These early liberal measures, the very rapid develo pment of edu cational institutions, a n d t h e liberal sentiments expressed by t h e tsar himself on a number of occasions encouraged the most hope ful expec tations for reform. Through h is com mittee of friends, A lexander had become acquainted with Michael Speransky ( 1 772- 1 839), the son of a country priest who had m ade a brilliant administrative career and pre pared several memo ra n da for t he committee. In 1 808 the tsar put S per ansky in charge of pre paring a new codification of Russian laws. Sper ansky quickly became the leading constitutional reformer of A lexander's reign and its outstandi n g statesman from 1 809 to 1 8 1 2. H is ideas for re form were modeled on French precedents, and this became the basis of his downfall. Speransky's position depe nded e n t ire l y on the favor o f the tsar, whose moves toward a more liberal conce ption o f autocratic rule were beset very early by the di fficulties of Russia's international position and by conservative tendencies at home . The new tsar had inherited a secret treaty with Na poleon and a policy frien dl y to France , altho ugh Russia's economic interests called for close r relations with England. In the circle around the tsar, ideas derived
TO l-VARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
from France had to com pe te with the sus picions aro used by the revo l u tion . For a time, Alexander o n l y dabbled in foreign a ffairs , but by 1 805 an E n glis h - R ussi an al liance was co ncluded w h ich was joined by A u stria and led to t he th i rd war of coa l i tion against N a poleo n . N a poleon remained i n asce ndance. I n less than two yea rs, Russian pol icy veered toward a d i vision o f spheres of i n te rest bet ween France and Russia , in itiated by the Pe ace o f Til s i t ( 1 807) and o fficia lly proclai med after a mee t i n g o f Alexander and Na poleo n in 1808 . This new alli ance led to Russian moves against Swede n a n d Tu rke y , w h ic h al lowed N a poleon freed o m of action against A ustria. B u t bo th rulers were evidently wary . N a poleon avo ided i n volve m e n t agai nst Sweden a n d Tu rkey, w h il e Alex ander avoided i n volvement against A ustria. Na poleon' s co n q u ests in Northern Germany and h is s u p port o f Polish claims aro used Russian suspicio n s , while the Russians i n turn a p peared unreliable to N a poleon because they evaded joi n i n g the Conti n e n tal blockade against E n gland . Alexander knew that the alliance with France was u n popular. Rus sian conservatives saw N a poleon as a symbol of the revol ution , w hile Russian liberals saw him as the conq uering tyrant. In this co ntext, sev eral courtiers accused S peransky of undermi n i n g the country with for e i gn ideas in a period of national emergency. I n addition , Speransky hacL become incon ve n ient to Alexander as a critic of autocratic rule at a time when N a poleon's i n vasion of Russia ( 1 8 1 2 ) called for national u n ity under the personal leaders h i p o f the tsar. S peransky was dismissed from his post and exiled ( 18 1 2) , though late r he was re habilitated ; how ever, his m aj o r work of constitu tio n a l reform was te r m i nated . 4 5
Na po leon and Alexander I meet a t Tilsit.
(Bibliotheque Nationale)
NA TION-BUIWING: R USSIA
Napoleon's retreat from Russia with decimated troops and m uch diminished power was the great turning point in Russia's relatio ns with Europe. Alexander had become the savior of his people . He became the leader o f the final coalition against Napoleon , culm inating in the entry of Russian troops into Paris in 1 8 1 4 . Fol lowing the Battle o f Waterloo and the reorganization of E u ro pe at the Congre ss o f Vienna ( 1 8 1 5 ) , the tsar initiated the Holy Alliance amo n g Russia , Austria , and Prussia . This ideological com pact was addressed to all Euro pean sove re igns as fathe rs o f their people and sought to consolidate the political and mo ral fo un d ations of authority. To this end, foreign and domestic policies were linked. War became a n instrument of international defense a ga i n st rev olutionary and popul a r n ational movements everywhere , w hile domes tically a reinforced absol utism was to reign supreme. The Russian tsar had become a mystic. His European i nterventions came to little i n com parison with the strate gies of the Austrian chancellor Metternich . B u t the tsar's change of heart from his earlier, liberal convictions was echoed at home by a gatherin g of conservative forces. Na poleon's i nvasion o f Russia and his subsequent defeat had given a powerful boost t o Russian patriotism and the rising hostility toward all things French. The early liberal and later conservative phases o f Alexander' s reign were reflected in Russian education. The ed ucation act of 1 809 (spon sored by Speransky) provided that promotion above a certain level o f government service would depend o n a university certificate or o n pass ing an examination in the knowledge required for the positio n . The universities were to con trol the civil service examinations, and Speransky envisaged that the requisite instruction would be oriented toward West ern constitutional ideas. However, these plans foundered on internal opposition. I t proved i m po ssible to unify military academies, private schools for the aristocracy, seminaries for priests, and s pecial institutes for young ladies. The aristocracy retained its preference for foreign tu tors or foreign schools, while lagging enrollments in public schools raised awkward questions about large educational expenditures. Nor was it possible to extend the s ystem downward to the village level. More over, the education act of 1 809 aroused the indign ation of man y aris tocrats who could not attack the tsar directly and instead turned on Speransky.46 Alexander's and Speransky's early policies had been inspired by the Petrine tradition. For a century, ed ucated Russians had taken the ideas and institutions of Western Europe as their model. Russia's chances o f success in a m ilitary showdown with France were considered negligible d uring Napoleon's hegemony. Hence, the miracle o f the Russian victory over Napoleon in 1 8 1 2 and the ascendance of Russia as a leading Eu ropean power brought a bout an u ps urge of nationalism and Orthodoxy. Even during Alexander's liberal phase, there had been conservative
520
TO WA RD A MANDA TE O F THE PEOPLE
warnings against the d a n gers arisi n g from liberal ideas and too much ed ucatio n .e Th is conservative s pirit came to prevail in court circles and min istries once the tsar h i mse l f abandoned his earlier liberal views. As a res ult, a joi nt M i n ist ry o f Education and Religious A ffai rs was e stablished i n 1 8 1 7 , and two years late r Prince A lexa nder Golits i n was a p pointed as its head . Golitsin was p re side n t o f the B ib l e socie ty . Grad ually, the princi ple of utility w h ich had determined the earlier c u rric u l u m (based on Con dorcet 's ideas) was re placed by catechism lesson s on religious and national prece pts. In ad ditio n , the princ i ple of equality which had a llow ed the sons of com moners and even of peasants to at tend schools and un ivers ities on the b as i s o f state scho lar s h i ps was aban doned . 4 8 I n 1 824 Adm i ral Alexander Sh ishkov was a ppoi nte d m i n ister o f ed ucatio n . He bel ie ve d t hat unive rsal literacy would do the nation more harm than good , and his views we re seconded by the chief of po
lice who thought that ed ucated people would seek to curtail the power of the m o narchy . Nevertheless, Western models retained some o f their attraction. O fficers of Alexander's armies had s pent several years as yo ung adults cam paigning in Europe, and they returned to a homeland in which serf dom , poverty, and autocratic rule seemed appalling in com parison with Western freedom, prosperity, and constitutionalism. When Alexander I died suddenly in 1 82 5 , leav i n g some con fusion over the succession, groups o f these Westernized army o fficers (the so-called Decembrists) s ta ged a brief and futile attempt to introduce a constitutional monarchy. N icholas I ( 1 825- 1 855) came to the throne, and the s pirit of his reign is well expressed in the manifesto of 1 826 in which the death sentences of the Decembrist leaders were announced. These leaders had stood for ideas taken from the constitutional p rovisions o f Engla n d and France. To the tsar and his ministers, this was ideological poiso n . Admiral Shish kov had warned his subordinates that young people who lack reverence for God, Emperor, and Fatherland, who have no "love for j ustice and mankind and a sense of honor, will be infected by pseudo-philosophiz in g, flighty d ream i ng, puffed- u p pride and pernicious sel f-esteem." In an n o uncing the e x ecution of five officers, the tsar himself stated, Let pa ren ts turn a l l the i r a t te n t ion to the mOl'al ed ucation of their c h i ldren. The absence of fi rm princi ples . . . has prod uced this fanaticism w hich has aro u sed violent passio n s , t h is pern icious l u x u ry of hal f-assimilated knowl edge. this urge toward \'i sionary extre mes w h ich starts by debasin g morals a n d ends in perd i t i o n !9 e Ru ssian conservati ves were jo ined by a n u m be r of E u ro pe a n s . A mo n g t hem was J o se ph de M a i st re. the fa mous Cat holic cri tic of the Fre nch revolution, w h o served in Pe t e rsbu rg as m i n ister plentipotentiary of the k i n g of Sardinia. De M aistre wa rned the tsarist court in 1 804 that its educational re forms would lead to a " Po u gatchev d'un iversite" (that
is, a revolt o f the i n te l lect uals). When Alexander's pol icies became conservative , de M aistre's
friend, Cou n t Alexei Ra z u monk i i ,
was
a p poi n ted m i n ister of ed ucation in 1 8 1 0 . "
NA TION-B UILDING: RUSSIA
52 1
The new regime reversed what remained of liberal educational ten dencies. The admission o f serfs to seco nda ry schools and universities, t h o u g h never large , was pro hi bi t ed Access to some sc h ooli n g was p re se r ved for all o t her strata, but cou rs e s o f s t ud y we re ad a pt e d to the p ro b able future careers o f students. C u rricular re forms so u ght to neutr al i ze the revolutionary p o t e n t ial o f Weste rn ideas. Req uirements were in creased, and courses were con fi ned to strictly sc ie n t i fic and academ ic s ubj ec ts Fac ulty and st u dent s were su pe r vi se d by district ins pector s, who were usually recruited from former m il i t a ry personnel. The e m peror himself ac t ed a s the su preme inspector, t ra ve l i n g u n anno unced and m a kin g s po t chec k s to ensure co n fo r m it y The new ed u c a tio n a l stat utes of 1 828 were drawn up not under Fre nc h or Polish influence, but under that of Prussian legis l a t i o n The Prussia which N icholas I consid e red an a pp ro pr ia t e model was that of Frederick the G rea t not that of Wilhelm von H u mboldt.50 But ta k e n as a m odel, Frederician Prussia i m p l i ed that t he k i n g is the firs t se rvant o f his co un try and that his obj ective is the develo pment o f its resources and people. Although the Russian population do ubled between 1 80 1 and 1 855, the n umber of students in all schools increased almost tenfold. More of this growth occurred in the elementary schools and those controlled by the Holy Synod than in the seco n d a ry schools , while at the universities student enrollments increased markedly only under Alexander I and then fluctuated between a low of about 2,000 and a high of 4,000 u nder the re ign of N ic holas 1. 51 The conclusion m ust be drawn that u nder N ic h o l a s I educational advance was ge nerally encouraged. The Ministry of Education spent large sums on new build ings, laboratories, librarie s , and teachers' salaries. Moreover, the govern ment evidenced inte rest i n t h e ed ucational standards of the country, especially under the leadership of S. S. Uvarov, minister o f education from 1 83 3 to 1 849. The e mperor himself gave special encouragemen t t o technical education a n d professional schools . U nder N icholas I , t h e state also imposed a centrally con trolled sys tem of uniform req uirements and detailed s u pervision w h ic h would eliminate every trace of intellectual opposition or subve rsion. The aim was not to eliminate the influence o f ideas from abroad , but to use o n l y what. was sound and safe . I n t h e words of a n h istorian o f Moscow University, .
.
-
.
.
,
[the a i m of ed ucation was] to sti m u late in a l l estates, but especial ly i n the ge ntry, the s pirit of patriotic com petition . . to provide for [ou r you t h ] all the means necessary to fo l low the ach ievements, inventio n s , and disco veries of the worldwide enlighte n me n t and to tra n sm i t these benefits to the fa therland , eliminating harm and e v i l w h ich are inevitable in all a ffairs of men ; .
for that pur pose to raise the u n iversities and to place them on a level with conte m po rary E u rope a n sch o la rsh i p ; .
.
.
to stim u la te the develo pment o f the
TO WA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE practical sc iences, usefu l to s oc ie ty , trade, a n d i nd u s tr y , in order to develop the material forces o f the state and thus to kee p pace with the better aspects of the p rogress of sc holars h i p i n the West ; i n another se n se , to o p pose its m a te r i a l is m , to s a n c t i fy t h e e n t i re tem ple o f popular ed ucation by the Lord' s
a l tar, the c ro s s , a n d praye r - t hese a re the problems w h i c h have been solved in t he cou rse of t h e last t h i rt y years in the h istory of ed ucation of ou r fa t h e r l a n d , acco rdi n g to t he t h o u ght and the w i l l of o U i' indefati gable m o n a rc h . 5 2
This statement brings out the full paradox of the official positio n . Even its most conservative leaders realized that Russia could not di s pe n se with Western ideas, provided of co urse that t hese ideas were sa feguarded against the poli tical conta m i nation of Western constitutionalis m . Russia had acquired t h e status of a grea t power. The Russian pop u lation more than doubled between 1 800 and 1 860, reaching 74. 1 m il lion people . Between 1 804 and 1 860, the number of enterprises in c reased by a factor of six and the work force by a factor of five. To be sure, half a million ind ustrial workers in a population of 74 m illion did no t indicate very speedy progress, but the economy was beginning to move. Total exports and i m ports increased tenfold between 1 802 and 1 860. In the Baltic ports, the number of ships almost doubled, w hile in the Black Sea ports, that n umber increased by a factor of six. U rbani zation between 1 8 1 1 and 1 863 gives a similar picture o f slow but definite growth, with population increase in selected Russian cities ranging from a low of 1 . 2 to a h i gh of 1 5 . 4 percent . U rban po pulation in European Russia doubled between 1 8 1 1 and 1 863, reaching 6. 1 million or about 1 0 percent by the latter year.53 To develop and maintain the po sition indicated by these figures, Russia had to develop a skilled work force, literacy, and an ed ucated e lite. A vigorous educational system was needed as a source of technical personnel. Such a system could propagate approved beliefs and sup press heretical or subversive views, even as it strove to combat the pro found ignorance of the population and hel ped narrow the great divide between a Europeanized gentry and an illiterate peasantry. Neverthe less, education is a m ixed blessin g in an autocracy, however much it may be shielded against subversive influences . When the student is intro duced to the physical and intellectual world around him, his analytic capacity is improved. The schools and universities facilitate the state's search for quali fied personnel, but they also give large r segments of the population an opportunity to im prove the mselves. The higher educa tion of commoners antagonized the traditionally privileged and caused disconte n t among the newly ed ucated if they could not then seek or find e mployment com mensurate with their new q ualifications. An expanding educational system tends to increase the students' expectations and jeopardize their ready com pliance with prevailing con ditions and, among a few, even the unquestioning devotion to the
NA TION-B UILDING: R USSIA
throne. Although leading o fficials were well aware of t hese risks, the government had no choice but 10 seek the desired results of ed ucation w hile avoid i n g or deflecting its potential da n ger s That seemed a feasible u n d ertaki n g as long as Russia's m ilitary preem inence remained intact. The state of Nicholas I i n vested a great part of its resou rces i n the m il it a r y e stablishment; hence, the fo undatio n s of tsarist society were s haken when that establishme nt went down to de feat i n the C ri m e a n War of 1 854- 1 856.54 .
A UTO CRAT I C RE FO R M S A N D C I V I L SOC I ETY Of the countries examined here , eighteenth- a n d nineteenth-cen tury Russia is a special case, for in com parison with Western Europe and J a pan its civil society was very weak and developed only a fter 1 86 1 . In Russia, tsarist autocracy i m plemented the princi ple of a direct confron tation between govern ment and the individual which in Western Europe was a basic tenet of the French revolution. With the rise of M uscovy, the functions of government had become concentrated, leading to a cen tralized system of taxation , adjudication , and conscription. Many other spheres of life also became subject to governmental regulation. I n a na tion of subjects or of citizens, civil society refers to all institutions in which individuals can pursue common interests without detailed direction or interference from the govern ment. ! T he municipal corporations and parlements of eighteen th -century France are exam ples of civil society . In Prussia, where the Hohenzollern rule rs suppressed the estate-assem blies, landed aristocrats stil l associated with one another to conduct the ir local affairs. In Japan , which had no i nstitutions resembling the estate assemblies of Europe, many daimyo domains were large enough so that deliberations and the formulatio n of common inte rests took place on a regional basis. In the case o f Russia, a number o f asse mblies (zemskii so bor ) had been convened under the early Romanovs, but their main pur pose was the restoration o f stable government, and they lacked the will to oppose autocratic rule; they came to an end a fter 1 653. Villages and landed aristocrats on their estates also had a degree of autonomy (but tressed by the Charter of 1 785), but they were isolated from other vil lages and estates. Western European regimes and Japan possessed civil societies because they had inhe rited a tradition o f local privileges or lib erties. Russia did not e njoy a com parable inheritance. 55 The rise of the Muscovite state had left as its enduring legacy a servitor aristocracy, servitor municipalities, and an enserfed peasantry. r The term civil
society
corresponds to Montesquieu's corps intermediaires . See the earlier
discussion of civil society u nder the ancien regime and of the opposition to civil soc iety unde r the inspiration of the Enlightenme n t and t he French revolution (Chapter 1 0, "An Equality of Rights").
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
All concerted action de pended on commands by the tsar and his offi cials. " Moderniza tion" in eighteenth- and n ineteenth-century Russia is i n good part the story of the tsarist government tryin g to rule the h uge co un try from the center. When measures were adopted which required some action below, it was a matter of local "independence at the tsar's command," to be exercised in the interest of the state. The tsar's subjects had no rights . Peter I l l's edict of 1 76 2 and Catherine's Charter of 1 785 abolished the earlier obligation of the aristoc racy to serve the state, and allowed occasional meetings o f consultative assemblies o f the aristocracy. B ut these measures did not establish re presentative institutions with a j u risdiction of their own. The develo pment of some indepe ndence from an o m n i present bureaucracy belon gs only to the period after 1 8 5 6 , when au tocratic reforms had given the initial i m petus toward the eman cipation o f the serfs and the meetin g o f assemblies (zemstvos). The Russian development o f the n i neteenth and twentieth centu ries set a precedent for plebiscitarian types of dom ination which differ from the movements toward a mandate o f the people cons idered th us far. Plebiscitarian domi n at ion is my term for modern, one-pa rty dictatorsh i ps in w h ich govern ments typically rule in the name o f the people. The ex tension o f this term to nineteenth-century Russia may be awkward, since the tsars ruled over the people in the name of God ; but the patriarchal claim of being the father o f his people im plies quasi-plebiscitarianism in t he sense that the tsars periodically appealed to the peo ple for dec larations of loyalty by acclamation . The idea of the tsar as God's re p rese ntative on earth was among the most venerable tradition s of Russian culture. Tsarist ministers, conservative journ alists, members of the ar istocracy, large segments of the peasantry , and -as we shall see -the Soviet regime a fter 1 928 adhered to the view that any organ ization of interests i n civil society constitutes a us u rpation o f sovere ign authority. The principle of autocracy req uired that the tsar initiate all gov ernment policies personally. The conseq ue nces of this claim to omnip otence were very real, although o m n i potence is a chimera. Max Weber has pointed out that "the Russian tsar of the ancien regime was rarely able to put across permanently anything that displeased his bureaucracy and violated its power interests."56 Weber attributed this inability to the ex pert knowled ge of the officials and to bureaucratic infighting ove r issues of policy. In e ach ministry, di fferent proposals on how to deal with the issues were n atu rally interlaced with personal intrigues and organ iza tiona l ambitions. Each ministry de pended on its leading officials to be on good terms with the tsar, or with those select few who for a time had access to hi m . Each so ught to presen t certain proposals as the only ap propriate means of executing the tsar's wishes and maintain ing his a u thority.
NA TION-B UILDING: R USSIA
Faced with difficult policy q uest ions and beleaguered by com p eting officials, the tsar would seek the- counsel of his confidants . In 1 809 Alex ander I ini t iated his project of legal reform after disc ussion with a circle of friends who ha d b een the com panions of his youth . Such con fidants m ight or migh t not be called on to serve in an official ca paci ty As lon g a s these advisors retained the tsar s tru s t, the y constituted a s hadow cab inet on which he would call for counsel or assistance in any manner he deemed appro p riate T h is created uncertainty at the very center of a f fairs because the membe rs of the shadow cabinet wo uld often acquire great , even d ecisiv e infl uence ove r decisions, but neve rtheless remain hidden behind the tsar's pe rson. Furt her uncertainty was created by the disj unction between au thority and responsibility The tsar announced all major decisions as his own, and he appointed the ministers respo nsible for the implementation of his policy. But policies are formulated in ge neral terms, wh ile the difficulties and ambiguities lie in the details. The tsar would often vac i l late in view of the c o n fli c t i ng advice he received. He frequentl y dele gated responsibility to m i nis ters representing inco m patible points of view who sometimes served concurrently in different fields of policy and sometimes consecutively i n the same field . Be t ween 1 80 2 and 1 9 1 7 , R us sia's six tsars appoi n ted among them thirty six ministers of the interior, twenty-seven ministers of ed ucation, twenty-five ministers of transpor tation, twenty-one ministers of justice, ni n eteen ministers of war, e i gh teen ministers of finance, and fifteen m in is ters of fo reign affairs. 5 7 This simple index suggests t hat the most difficult problems facing the autoc racy concerned matters under the jurisdiction of the minister of the in terior, especially serfdom and self-government. Tsarist policies con cern ing these two problems il l ust ra te the relations between autocracy and civil society. Between the 1 7 80s and 1 850s market considerations a ffected the management of landed estates as opportunities of selling agricultural products increased at home and abroad. Whenever serf owners found it profitable to produce for the m arket , they preferred the use of forced labor (barshchina) to the collectio n of a head tax (obrok) . On the whole, forced labor was prefe rred i n fertile areas and the head tax in less fertile ones, or where serfs co uld earn wages that co uld be taxed. The overall growth of commercial agriculture is s uggested by the fact that the per centage of serfs - who we re obliged to render t heir d ues in the form o f labor on t h e owner's land rose from about 5 0 percen t i n 1 790 to 70 percent in the 1 8 50s. 5 8 Total agricultural o u tput increased with t h e growth of t h e serf po p ulation. But increases in o utput per man-ho u r, while needed for in creased income and reven ue, were di fficul t or i m poss i ble to obtain as .
'
.
.
-
TO WARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE
Russ ian Serf Owners A bo u t 1 00, 000 R ussian a ri stocra ts ow n ed some 2 5 m i l lion sel-fs, though such owners h i p was "ery uneq ually d i stributed_ W h e n ha l-d p r e ss ed lor cas h , some of the m as t ers would bet their l a n ds and t hei r se rfs as s t a ke s in po ker ga mes_ ( Pa u l Gustave Dorc�, Hisloire pittom'!"" dramlllique ,I caricalures de III .willie RII.<sie, 1 854)
lon g as serfdom contin ued. To ach ieve more prod uctivity, serfs would have had to abandon their prim itive farming methods and consolidate the l a n d s they til led . Such consolida tion would have d i sr u pte d t h e rural social order based on the th ree -field system and the period ic reparti tioning of fields among membe rs of the com m unity. For their part, the owners s u pported village practices i n the inte rest of maintaining law and order. Nor had many serf owners an interest in improvements. They were reluctant to invest capital in new methods of c ultivation when they often had more land than they could farm and, besides, an abundance of che a p labor which could be ex ploited without apparent cost to them selves. The o fficial attitude reinforced resista nce to change by em p ha sizing that the serfs did not enga ge in agriculture for their own profit, but as an obligation to serve the sove reign, the estate owner, a nd the whole society. Yet the govern ment could not remain passive when social stability was threatened by peasant u prisings, the high debts of the aristocracy, and the collection of taxes by force. Regulations were issued to curb abuses o f local authority. Credit was extended in the hope that it would be put to productive use. Attem pts were m ade to achieve better agri cultural practices by experimentin g with model villages . More freedom was granted to state peasants and peasa nts on tsarist lands i n the hope of increasing agricultural prod uctivity. All these measu res were so many
NATION-B UILDING : R USSIA
e ffo rts to undo the e ffects o f serfdom without disturb i n g the privi leges o f th e aristocrac y or t he es t ab l is hed pract i ces of pe asant serfs in their vil la ges . 59 B ut any attem pts at local re form u nder central directio n de pen d ed on the will to act and the means to do so. I n this respect, the tsar ist government was underfina nced and u nderstaffed and co u l d not re l y on local coo pe ration . U ntil well i nto the n ineteen t h century, local a ffa i rs were co n t ro l l ed by se r f owners and village comm u n ities. From a con servative standpoint, serfdom appeared as the corne r e s ton of Russian society, though from Cathe ri ne I I to N icholas I Russia's rulers had mentioned on occas i on that so m ething needed to be done about serfdom. Pride i n the established order, t he growth of ag r ic u lt u ra l prod uction , and the alarmed reaction to the Decem brist revolt o f 1 825 put this question aside until the utte r colla p se of Russian forces in t h e Crimean War ( 1 854- 1 856) .60 That defeat brought the fau l ts of t h e country ' s social organ ization to the s u rface , particularly the institution of serfdom . That i n stitu tion was l i n ked d i rectly to R ussia's m ilita r y position . t Mos European states mainta i ned a small standin g army i n peacetime to hold down costs, but kept a large trained res e rve in ca se of war . Russia alone m aintained a large stand i ng army which i n t i me of need co u l d not be greatl y or ra pid l y expanded. The Crimean War had shown that the army was unequal to the task. When the outcome of the war h u ng in the ba l ance, the R ussian hi gh com m and co u ld m us ter onl y 1 0 0, 000 men for the purpose (out o f a to tal o f 2.25 mil l i on men under arms), because substan tial forces were needed on the western frontiers. At that po i nt , even the enlistment of another I mi ll i o n raw recr u i ts did not hel p, becaus e the necessary o fficers and equip m ent were u n ava i la ble . The C rimean War absorbed more than three times the em pire's annual revenue and removed more than o ne million me n from the econom y for three years . Se r fdom was t h e s pec i fic reason for the ab sence of a trained reserve corps , for Russ ia ' s i nordinately la r ge m il itar y budget in peacetime, and for its man power d i fficulties i n ti m e of war. U nder serfdom t he arm y was rec ru ited from the tax- paying pop u l ation ( peasant and meshchanin or u rban poor) on the basis of fi ve or six per thou sand for a period of twe n ty-five years. Every serf who ful filled his service
obliga t ion left the army a free man, but few were l ucky e n ou gh to su rvive the lo ng term and those who did were hardly fit fo r fu rth e r military service i n a n y capacit y . In
ot h e r
word s t hey co uld not be expected to form the nu
cle u s o f a trai n ed rese rve .
The obvious alternative o f red ucin g the term of service and build i ng u p a t rained reserve was considered too dange rous . It would have greatly i ncreased the annual recruitment, freed serfs at a rapid rate, and left a mass o f landless rural l ab o rers trained in the use o f firearms.6 1
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
G reat politica l decisions like the emanci pation of the serfs hav e co m ple x origins and neither the Cri m ean debacle nor Russia's proble m s of m i l itary manpower were alone decisive. There had been talk o f em a n ci pati o n since the Prussian reform legislatio n ea r l y in the centu ry a n d the an tislavery cam paigns in En gland and America in the 1 840s . U nd er N ic h o las I, some h i gh government o fficia ls we re sensitiv e to fo rei g n o p i n ion and aware tha t se r fdo m symbo l i zed Russia's bac kward ne ss . B u t the fact remains that eman c i pati o n was i nitiated by Alexande r I I ( 1 8 5 5 - 1 8 8 1 ) j ust after the Crimean defeat and that the tsar gave t he highest prior i ty to m ilitary considerations. The m ilitary re form s ad o pted betwee n 1 86 7 and 1 870 also show the close relation between serfdo m a n d m il i t ary ques ti ons The m i nister o f war, D. A . Miliutin ( 1 86 1 - 1 88 1 ) , more than doubled the e ffective rese rve o f the Russian army. With the backi ng of the t s ar , but against heavy op p o s ition, M iliutin worked suc cessfully to introduce u nive rsal military service and red uce the term of serv ice to s i x years. This recruitment policy put newly e mancipated peas a nts on a pa r with members of the a r i sto cr ac y, for now both had eq ual obliga t ions I t is probable, therefore, that Alexander com m itted himself to e mancipation because he wanted to preserve Russia's position as a g reat m il i tary power, and the Crimean defeat had put that pos ition in q uestion Before an audience of the Moscow ge ntry, Alexander I I declared .
.
.
in 1 856,
You you rsel ves know t h at t h e e x i st i n g orde r o f ruli n g o v e r l i v i n g sou ls cannot re ma i n unchan ged. It is better to aboli s h se r fdom from above t h a n to await t he da y w h e n i t w i l l beg i n to abolish itse l f from be low. I ask you, ge ntle men, to consider how this is to be accom plished. Convey my words to the gentry
for t h e i r consideratio n . H2
The tsar thus attached some i m po r tance to the coope r ation of the gen try. He wrote that "it was up to the nobles to figure out how all this can best be carried OUt. " 63 But the t sar did not await the deliberations of the aris tocracy On returning to Peter s burg, he immediately instructed the Minis t ry of the Interior to elaborate the princi ples of the reform and the methods of put t ing it into effect.6-1 In fact, there was little reason for the tsar to count o n the wealt hy gen try to cooperate , for emancipation meant a direct th rea t to their ac customed way of life . Moreover, tsarist officials had reason to distrust the leading members of the local gentry, who did not relish the attempts of the central government to ad mi n i ster l ocal a f fai r s Duri n g t he pre c e d i ng reign of N ic holas I , the staff of provincial and di st rict govern ments had increased between two and eight times. It is estimated that the staffs of all central agencies increa s ed fou r times between 1 80 1 and 1 85 1 . Administrative expenditures naturally soared. Still, Russia re.
.
NA TION-B UILDING : R USSIA
m ain ed an "undergoverned" country, especiall y at the local level , al thou gh complaints about the burdens of officialdom were legion . Var i ous partial studies have led scholars to the conclusion that aroun d 1 850 th e c ou n try had about 1 . 2 civil ser v ants pe r 1 ,000 population. Such a p rop ortion becomes signi fi can t when it is con t rasted to 4 . 1 public o ffi ci als per 1 ,000 in Britai n ( I 85 1 ) and about 4.8 o fficials per 1 ,000 in F ra nce ( 1 845).65 Russia's great increase o f taxes during the first half of the n i ne teen th century largely bene fited the military budget, interest pay ments on foreign loans, and an e x panded finance ministry. Between the defeat o f N a poleon in 1 8 1 2 and the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1 854 , the co u ntry remained a nation at arms, with debts from military expe nses mounting ra pidly even d u ring the periods of peace from 1 832 to 1 849. In 1 854, France had one soldier for every sixty-two inhabitants, while Rus sia, with its much greater poverty, h ad one s ol d ier for every seve nty five inhabitants.ti6 Between 1 8 1 2 and 1 85 4 , local government received hardl y any additional funds, thou gh the n umbe r of cle rks i ncreased . That paradox is explaine d by low pay. Provincial governors had to re-
A Provincial Administrator in Tsarist Russia Unlettered persons
from
l
the rural a 'eas were given admini strative res po nsibilities. This
lithograph by P. M. Bok levsky for N i colai Gogo l ' s comedy The
Inspector
( 1 863) shows a low
functionary decked out in a u n i fo rm and s h i ning leather boots " ba r k in g " at the well- fed
merchants stand i n g humbly before h i m . "You scound rels , rascals , an d swi ndlers , YOll wa n t to bring a lawsuit against me ? ! " The servants carry i ng the wares a n d the ladies in t he back ground are sile nt witnesses to the merchants' hum iliation. ( P. M. Boklevsky , By u ...k m/ic�,\ky
Kalak�zis. St. Petersburg. 1 863)
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
cruit nearly uneducated rural folk ; few educated persons were eit her available or willing to serve in provincial ad ministration. With fu n ds short and the military successfully pressin g its clai ms, the low pa y of provincial officials was j usti fied by their lack of q uali fication . Prov inci al gove rnment was thus chron ically understaffed , u nqualified, or both . I t was frequently this need for staff at t he loca l leve l which prompt ed the gove rnment to atte mpt the corporate orga n i zation of the provincial gen try. The object was to im prove local administratio n , not to encoura ge local political activity . B ut the coopted notables were reluctan t to serve and reacted to the flood of central d i rectives by tacit resistance. Accordi ngly, the tsar's declaration of 1 8 56 acce ntuated a basic di lemma of autocratic rule. To e mancipate the peasants without consult ing the ge ntry would have needlessly affronted the principal supporters and beneficiaries of the regi me, as wel l as jeopardized the fiction of the gentry as the "first estate" of the realm. B ut to consult the gentry pre supposed a tradition of constructive partici pation i n questions of public policy which did not exist. Consultation also ran the risk of finding t he majority of wealthy aristocrats opposed to emancipation, or at any rate to any specific im plementation of the policy . However, not to consult the gentry meant that the government deliberately ignored local infor mation and issued decrees i n a vacuum. Hence, the logic of the situation demanded that the tsar and his ministers retain the initiative for refo r m but obtain local cooperation by a type of consultation that was clearly distingu is hed from political partici pation and all forms of constitution alis m . Ex p ressi on s o f o p i nio n on the e manci patio n issue were dangerous for autocratic rule, and yet indispensable for its exercise. This paradox is worth analyzing because it reveals what may be called a quasi-civil so ciety (that is, the kind of politics that was still com patible with personal autocracy). The tsar's Moscow address seems to have opened the floodgates of public o pinion. Between 1 82 5 and 1 855 the n umber o f newspapers and journals founded per annum had averaged 8 . 3 , but between 1 856 and 1 863 that annual average increase d to 33.4. In addition, in t he 1 850s vario us government ministries made their house organs a forum of dis cussion o n matters of policy. A latent public opinion was ready to play its part, once the signal had been given from above. Moreover, the tra dition of referring to Western models was quickly felt. In 1 855 only 97 articles on European countries appeared in Russian publications, but in the two succeeding years that n umber jumped to 269 and 300, respec tively. Self-help organizations in the provinces also were proliferating to an astonishing degree. The Im perial Free Economic Society of Pe tersburg became a clearing ho use for schools o f trade and agriculture and for small public libraries opening i n provincial towns. Primary schools were opened as were Sunday schools, a Petersburg conservatory.
NA TION-B UILDING : R USSIA
53 1
a nd co m m i ss io ns o n lite r ac y a nd po l i t ic a l e conomy as part of t he I m pe r i a l Ge o gra p h i c Society. Professor Starr, from whose study these data a re taken , sp eaks of a po l i t ic a l effervescence" among membe rs of the p ro v i n c i a l gentry which was matched by reform-m inded officials in the c a p i ta l . 67 B ut t h e tsar's initial de c l ar a t io n elicited little coherent response. He ed to ur t h e p ro vinces in person to goad the gentry i nto actio n and rece ive the g r ate ful thanks of the serfs. Reca lcitra n t s were ad monished to be grat efu l for their loving s o v e re i gn s be nevolence. Meanw hile, the min is tries in St. Pe te rs b u r g w orked o ut the details a n d inevitably came to in c o m p a t i bl e co nclusio n s , o ne gro u p favoring the gentry and another the serfs . O fficials on both s ides su bj ec t e d the tsar to a barrage of pro posals, each making his c a se m o re persu a s i v e by the p u b l i c support he cou ld elicit for his side. This a p p ea l to the p a rt i es concerned was u n av oida b l e . No case could be m a de without the opi n io n s of t h e ge n tr y, t he p rov i n c ia l governors , and others. Indeed, the tsar himself had called for their o pini o n s . Nevertheless, every u n o ffic i a l o pinion was vie w ed w it h t he d e e p e s t distrust, si nce no o ne outside the government could act in the m a tter Ale xa nd e r co m p l a i ned that t here w a s no one he could trust and no one who took this burden fro m his shoulders . He was in deed a lo n e l y man , for under a u t oc r a cy the u ltimate decision rested with "
'
"
"
.
him .
I n e ffect, the tsarist government took the le ad in fo r m u l a t i n g i ts o l i cy of e m anci pa t ion a n d then attem p t e d to elicit e x p re s s i o n s o f o pi n p ion in support of that po l i c y Lanskoi, the m i n i s te r of the i n ter io r , urged a plan relatively favo r ab l e to the pe a sa n t s and urged that it be t este d in Li th uan i a where ( wi t h the c ons en t of the tsar) instructions had been is sued to Governor-General Nazimov to prod the ge n t r y into respo n di n g to the i m pe r i a l policy. Yet N a z i mo v arrived in St. P e t e rs b urg with pro pos a ls from the Vilna gentry which, contrary to government po l ic y fa vored e m a nc i p a tio n of the serfs without granting them any land. This pro po sa l had been a pp ro ve d by a secret adv i so ry committee which the tsar h ad a p po i n t ed Thus, even in a co m m i ttee of his own c hoice, a maj o ri ty of the ad vi so r s were ind i fferent or hostile toward t he re form which the tsar favored ! Consequently, Alexander interve ned pe r so n a ll y rej e c ting the p r inc i p l e o f landless e m anc i p a t ion He instructed Lanskoi to d r a ft a n i m pe ri a l edict for N azimov w h ich would direct t h e gentry to set u p p ro v i nc i a l committees i n Lit h uania to prepare pre c i se pro po s a l s . These pro po sa l s were to include the following princi ple s : .
,
.
,
.
The la ndlords were to re main owners of the land, b u t t h e peasants were to acqu ire ownership, by pu rchase over a defi nite pe riod of time, of their h ouse and the surroundi n g lot, and were also to be assured the use of further land, su fficie n t for their needs ,
in
return for
obrok
o r labor se rvices. The peasan ts
we re to be allotted to vi l lage co m m u n it ies, but the land lords were to retain
532
TO WA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
po lice powers and the I'e were
to
be a rr a n ge m e n ts to e n s u re the pay me nt o f
taxes a n d the d i scharge o f local service s . 6 H
Su bseq uently , this program was publi shed as an i m pe r ia l d i rec tive in 1 8 5 7 . T he existence of the tsar's secret co mmittee was made publ ic , bu t its mem bers contin ued to disagree , and di fferent m i n i stries sub m i tte d co n flict i n g plans of ad m i n istrative i m p le m e n tatio n . I t was di fficult to choose among these co n flicting sc hemes, wit h their m a i n i n tent o ften obsc u red by details. Publicatio n o f t h e e d ict also led to lively d iscussions in the press, so lively and radical that censorsh i p w a s i m po se d in April 1 8 5 8 t o co n fi ne the disc ussion t o "learne d , t heo retical, and statistical articles. " D u r i n g that year committees were se t u p i n most provinces o f Russia ; these were a s evenly d i vided be tween op po n e n ts and ad vocates of re form as the tsar's own com mittee . To deal with t he mass of material that was com i n g in from t h e p rov i n ces ( o ft e n cons is t i n g o f m aj o ri ty and m i no rity v i ews) , e d i to r i a l com missions were a p po i n te d in 1 8 59 . Two main q uestio ns were at issue . Fi rs t , how m uch land should be giv e n to the peasants and on what terms? Second, what local adminis trative authority should re place the a u t hority the landowners had ex e rc ised over their serfs ? The details o f these ma n y -si d e d issues do not co n c e rn us here, but it is relevant to obse rve the overla pping con flicts w h ic h s urfaced in t h is debate o ve r e m anc i pa t io n . First, the re was the con flict between serf ow ners eage r to retai n t h ei r privileges and tsarist o fficials eager to e ma n c i pat e the serfs . H oweve r , some la ndowners vol u nta r i ly freed their se rfs a n d acted as advocates of e manc i pation , while
some government officials ( li ke the ministers of state domains and of finance) continued to oppose e ma n c i p at i on at the risk of incu rr i n g the tsar's d is pleasure. Second, there was the con flict be twee n officials in the central government at St. Pe t e rsb u r g a nd the p ro v inci a l governors, with most o fficials at the cen ter and some gove r n o r s a d v oca t ing (or ap pe aling to) central d ec i si on - makin g on all issues w hile some officials and most governors advocated the devo l ution of authority. Third , there was the conflict within the cam p of the reformers be tween bureaucrats who were convinced that emancipation could be realized only by a benevolent au tocracy, and landowners who coupled e m anci pa t ion with the idea of an elected local government, and ultimately with some form o f a national assembly.69 The w hole process in v ol ve d th e ts ar i s t re gi m e in half-directing and half-soliciting t he ex p re s s i on of o pinion on the q uestion of e m anc i pa tion. In e ffect, the autocracy had initi ated a degree of public partici pation whic h was u l t i ma tel y incom patible with personal autocracy. Nor could it be expected that the provincial gentry, so long h a b i t u ated to receiving com mands t hrou g h a rigid hierarchy from above, would nec-
NATION-B UILDING : R USSIA
533
e s s ar i l y a bi d e by the terms of th e debate a s the governmen t conceived o f th e m . Eventually, t he ge n t r y lost t hei r accu s tom e d ret i c e n ce a nd ra ised la rge r issues, e s pe c i a l l y those of re p rese n tati on sel f-government, ,
an d j u d ic i a l re form. E lements of a civil society we re e m erg i n g In 1 859- 1 860 de puties from the provincial assem blies were c alled to St . Petersburg. This was the fi rst instance in which t he gover nment ha d called on the aristoc racy for co n s u lt a t ion since Catherine's legislative c o m m i s sion of 1 76 7 . A good many d e p uties apparently believed (or w an te d to believe) that t he y had been invited as legislators to plan the re form . Lansko i and other high offic ials we r e a ppre h e n s i v e that the expression o f opinion could l e a d to the fusion o f "like-thinking parties" an d the formation o f h a r m fu l oligarchies. The tsar himse l f proceeded on t h e as s um pt ion that the d e p u ti es from the p ro v i nci al committees understood that the y had been in vited to clear u p poin ts o f detail, not to disc us s the basic p r in c i ple s of re for m whic h were his e x c l u s i v e pre ro gat i ve The clash came w h e n one gro u p of deputies s ubm i tted a pe tition d irec t l y c ri tic i z i n g the editorial com missions , whi l e another gro u p p u t forward a whole democratic po l iti c a l program. The t w o petitio n s .
.
w e r e isolated in stances . B u t t h e govern ment seve rely reb u ked bo t h
of de p u ties and i s s u e d a ern m e n t proj ec ts. Nevertheless , gro u ps
b a n o n all further d i scussion o f gov further disc u s sions e n s ued w h e n the
de puties returned to their pro vincial asse mblie s , and by 1 860 t h e gov ernment relented by stipulatin g five questions on which it w o u l d wel
com e the
o p i n ion
of t he ge ntry. Significantly, these q uestions re fe rred
to problems of local adm i nistration and excluded the emanc i pation is sue. The i m per ia l decree o n the emanci pation of the se r fs was iss ued in
1 86 1 , an ama lga m
of
re fo r m i st and conservative i m p u lses . 70 M a n y o f
t he co n trove rsial iss ues were left
for
pointed arbitrators.1I
future decision b y s p ecially a p
The e ma nc i p a t io n of the serfs was u lti mately ach ieved on ter ms agreeable to the government. Cons ultation with the gen try had take n place, but without political discussion . Petitio n s for p a rti c ipa t ion in pol icy dec is io ns,
or for a legislative
assembly, were rejected o u t o f han d and
"pro per" pe n a lt ies meted o u t to the pe t it ion e r s .
In
the years a ft e r 1 86 1 ,
this conservative impu lse was greatly rein forced by the constitu tional demands o f the T ver' assembly under the leadersh i p
of A .
M. U n kovsky
in 1 862, the Polish insurrection o f 1 863 , i ncreas i n g student agi tation , and the u ns uccessful attem pt
on
the tsar's life in 1 866. These events
almost e l i m inated whatever ge nerous i m pulses toward the former •
ser fs
The debate I have described co nce r ned only about one-half of the serf po p ulation.
The other half belonged to the state, the (Sarist fami ly, and the ch u rch. Their freedom
from serf law depended on actions of the central government w h ich preceded or pa ral
leled the "emanc i pa tion per iod" from 1 86 1 on.
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
534
existed in the highest circles, where it was perceived that the tsar' s u n limited pe rso n al au t ho r i ty m ust be ma i ntained at all costs. The re gi me d e pe nded on the tsar's right of ulti mate decision and of pr ee m pti ve in terven tion in all a ffa i rs of t he rea l m . Pro fessor Starr has poi nt e d o u t, I n c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n s Ru s s i a ' s t o p b U I'ea ucrats n eed ed the bro a d pri n c i ple of a u toc racy e v e n if i n d a i l y p ract ice t h e y d i d n o t need t h e a u toc rat h i m sel f. T h i s t r u t h h e l ps to e x p l a i n t he a n x i e t y w h ich a l l local i n i t i a t ives, ad m i n istra_ tive o r p u blic. a ro used in Pe t e rs b u rg d u r i n g every c r i s i s fro m t h e C r i mean
War
to
1 9 1 7.'1
Autoc ratic rule d i d n o t a l low fo r pe aceful ways o f limi t i n g it s aut h o ri t y w hether pe rsonal l y exercised by the tsar or by h is o fficials. The u p heavals of t he 1 860s and 1 870s rei n fo r ce d this conviction and ove r shadowed the whole debate over local sel f-govern ment. ,
From the standpoint of civil society at the local level, cond itions had deteriorated markedly by the m iddle of the nineteenth century. The gentry did li ttle to improve agricultural prod uctivity, but instead sought to increase o utput and their own income by more severe exploitation. Their serfs were forced to work the owner's land (barshchina) to such an extent that it encroac hed on their a bi lity j ust to s ubsist from workin g the plots assigned to them. At the same time, the numbers o f the Russi a n aristocracy increased, a n d so did their conspicuous co n sum p t io n Two consequences followed . On the one hand, the gentry resorted to state credit to m e e t their i n c re as i n g "need s . " One way of doing so was to mortgage the future prod uction of their ser fs : The n umber of serfs mor t gage d to the state rose from 1.8 million in 1 820 to 7 . 1 m illion in 1 859, the latter fi g ure re prese nti n g 66 pe rce n t of all serfs and the equiv alent of 42 5 m illion rubles . ;2 On the other hand, peasant unrest in creased , and peasant u prisings in the m idst of the Crimean War com plicated matters st ill further. Clearly, social stability in the countryside was i n jeopardy. We know of these difficulties at the local level primarily through the reactions of officials . In Russia (as in France after 1 800) even m inor provincial affairs had to be brought to the attention of the central government for its consideration and decision . By 1 85 1 the costs of that centralization had become so prohibitive that min istries were instructed to cut down on proced u res and correspondence so as to reduce their staffs. In the two decades prior to the Crimean War various publicists and officials had stud ied the Western European ex perience of local administrative re forms, and this study resulted in the establishment of a Committee on Reducin g Correspondence. Its deliberations became urgent as the gov ernment's financial situation deteriorated in the 1 850s. Yet the com m ittee could accom plish noth ing as long as the tsar and his officials dis.
NA TION-B UIWING: R USSIA
535
tr us te d every s i gn o f loca l initiative. As one Petersburg censor and se nato r pointed out i n 1 856, a n y red uction o f centralization and hence o f go ve rn men t al expendit u res meant that more power and appropriate spheres
of action must be surrendered to subordinate and local agencies. 73 The proposal to decentralize autho rit y met with very deter m ined osition i n several Pe te r s b ur g m i nistries, but fo und w ides pread sup pp o among provincial governors . For decades, the latter's wor k had ort p hampered by close s u pe r v is io n a n d ar b i t r a ry inte r ference from the een b nter. Hence, the case for decentralization and lo cal s e l f- gov e r n m e n t e c o r gin ate d when liberal bure aucrats at the center coo pted a care fu l l y se lected group of provincial gove rnors. T he efforts o f t h i s group of o f ficials were ultimately s uccessfu l . B u t this success only co ncern e d the decentralization of au thor i ty to the pro v i nc i al governors . Even i f it ha d be en c a rri ed out fu l l y (and it was not) , it would have meant that the tsa rist government cou l d exert i ts own a uth o r ity more e ffe cti ve l y at the re gional a n d local le vels. That would have be e n a conside rable ach ieve ment, given the bu rea u cratic mores in the provinces. But more de c en
tralized authority was still an administra tive refo r m . It made no allowance as yet for more indepe ndence and initiative in p rovin c ia l soc iety itself. I n deed , there was little chance for the initi ative of p ri vate pe rsons or of local associations as lon g as the ce ntral gove rnment distrusted even its own agents. Administrative decentralization was a necessary condition for more local inde pen dence, but it was not s u fficient. While the issue o f e m a n c i pation was being debate d , it became clear that admin istrative decentralization could not be pushed too · far. Land owners power
had possessed virtually absolute power o ver the serfs , a n d that had to be abolis hed if the serfs were to be free . How, the n , was
local government to be a d m i n iste red ? The answer was that the police power of the landowners was replaced by
the
po li ce power of d istrict
and local officials , appointe d b y the Ministry of the I n terior. That meant more centralization, not less. Reform-mi nded o fficials believed that the
authority, the avarice liberals who feared
abolition o f serf law req uired the initiative o f e n li ghtened since officials would protect the interest of peasants a gai n s t of the landowners . This belief was s hared by Russian
that even if a national re presen tative assembly could be established, it would be dom inated by landed inte rests and enc roach o n the interests of the peasa n ts. Some sections of t he aristoc racy contin ued to demand s uch an as sembly despite the proh ibition to do so. They favored local self-govern ment as a fi rst step toward a constitutional monarchy. hand,
conservatives opposed
On
the other
provincial sel f-government as well as a rep
resentative assembly, because they tho ught both threate ned autocratic rule. Thus, the re form o f local gover n ment and he nce new opportu nities fo r
a
civil
society
at le ast at the
local
leve l were
burdened at
the
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE o u tset w i t h a very d ee p se a te d lac k of trust. The govern ment's fe ar of ch a l l e n ge s to absol ute a ut ho r it y was m atc hed by the fear of re for mers -
that loc a l i nitiative would e n ha nce e n tre n c hed interests a nd he nce pe r pe t u a te or even i n t ensi fy t h e poverty and e x pl o i t a t i o n of the r u r a l po p
Local sel f- go\'ernment develo ped des pite these m i s g i v i n gs because emanc i pation had pro vid ed the necessary i m pe t u s , fo r the prob lems of local a d m i n ist r at i o n it entailed were too n umero us to be h a n d le d u l at io n .
by t h e government u naided .
I n 1 864 an edict on l oc a l go ve rn ment instituted an assembly ( urn stva ) at the leve l of t he d istrict (uezd ) and t he pr o v i nce T he distric t as s e m bl i es were elected by t h ree se pa rate el e c tora l col le ges c o m po sed of ge n try townsme n , and peasants, re s p ec t iv e l y . T h e p r o v i n c i a l asse mbl ies in t u rn were c o m pose d o f d e l e g a tes elected by the d istrict asse mbl ies fro m a m o n g the i r own membe rs . Proced ures varied a mong the three soc ial gro u ps . Most re pres e n tat i v e s came from the aristoc racy, but its .
,
,
previous monopoly of access to au thority had bee n c u rtailed . U n der the law of 1 864 , ze m s tv o i n stitutio n s we re established in n i n e teen pro vinces d u r i n g the fo l l o w i n g year, t hen in fifteen ad ditional provi nces in t he pe rio d 1 866- 1 8 7 5 , and in n i ne more in 1 9 1 1 and 1 9 1 3
.
By 1 9 1 4 the Russian e m p i re had zemstvo i nstitutions i n fo rty-three Out of seventy p ro v i n ces . With regard to a n um ber of pro grams , the advo cates of se l f-gove rn me n t were ce rtainly v i n dicate d As a whole, district .
and pro v i ncial asse mblies were a s uccess in road -building, the supervi sion of fo rests, the management of c re d i t institutio n s , the ad m i n istration of vacc i n a tion s , and the con trol of e pide m ics. The y also introd uced
an
e ffect ive syste m of fire i n s u rance w here none had existed be fore , and
in a co u n try of wooden buil d i n g s t h is was a great advance. Nevertheless, the fi n ancial reco rd of the ze mstvos also makes clear that from t he first they we re h a m pered by the l i m itation s placed on their right to levy local taxes. As ze mstvo i nstitutions were e stabli s he d in additional p rovinces, t he i r aggregate reven ue increased from 5 . 6 m illion rubles in 1 865 to 2 4.2 a n d 3 3 . 1 m i l l i o n rubles in 1 87 0 and 1 8 80, respectively. But u ntil the 1 890s, these d istrict and provi ncial assemblies were forced to spend between 40 a nd 5 0 percent of t heir fu nds for nonlocal purpose s , such as con sc r i ption , re lief of fa m ilies of war casualtie s , and certain expenses o f j udicial o fficials. 74 Throu ghout the 1 860s and 1 8 70s, co n servative s pokes m en consid ered the ze mstvo move m e n t s u s pect beca use of its association with the earlie r ge ntry agitation for a natio nal re prese ntative asse mbly. O fficial s uspicio n s we re rei n forced by t he radical a gitation of the pe riod . As a result, each assembly had to fi n d o ut a ne w how to d i stin g u i s h between properl y loc al m a tters a n d those w h ic h , in the s h i ft i n g views of the gov ernment, enc roac hed on the prohibited sphere of poli tics and public debate. Above all, t he zemst\'o faced
financial a n d
organizational diffi-
NA TION-B UILDING: R USSIA
537
c u lti es. I n the field of pub li c he a lth , ap pro pri ati o n s were nonexistent or ch ro nically i n s u fficient a n d trained personnel u nav a ila b le . Schools faced si m ilar d i ffi c ul ti es , and many assemblies tried to pass res po n s i b i l i ty for
e d u ca t io n to local churc h i nstitutions, or to the arbitrators ap poi n ted afte r 1 86 1 to settle d i s pute s a ri s i n g fro m the
w ho had been e manci pation t. Most z e m s tv o programs were ham pe red because the col lec tion of dic e taxes re mained in the h a n d s o f the local po l i ce o ver whom t h ey had no a u t h or i ty. Assemblies could ad m i n i ster local a ffairs , but were gi v e n l i ttle fin a nc ial resources and no poli ce a u t h or ity to d o s o e ffect i ve ly . 75 T h e a s se mbl i e s stru ggl ed o n d e s p ite t he se ha n d ic a ps and t h e i r e f forts re presen t an i mpo rta n t de ve lo p m e nt o f civil so c ie t y i n recent Rus sia n histo r y . In the pol itical debates o f t h e time, the work of the ze mstvo ca me to be known a s "liberalism of small deed s . " It is true t h at i n c reasi n g re strictions were place d o n them a fter th e unsuccess ful attempt on the ,
tsa r' s l i fe in 1 866. Comm u n ication a mong the ze mstvo of d i fferent areas " was p roh ibited , and all ze mstvo publications requ i re d the a p proval of the provinc ial governor. S u pe rvision of local education was put in the ha nds of marshals of the aristoc racy with m i n i mal ze mstvo re prese nta
tion . Local o fficials elected by the zemstvo were re place d by government officials. Provincial governors were given control li ng authority ove r the members h i p of ze mstvo boards, over ze mstvo decisio n s , and over the selection of peasant delegates w hose a lread y small n u m be r was reduced further. Pe rha ps the most d a maging restriction was a new law w h ich held the preside nts of assem blies and di rectorates to ful l acco u n t fo r the le gality of an y measu re passed u n de r the i r chai rmans h i p . S pecifically, presi dents we re ex pected henceforth to open and c lose all meetin gs, ap prove the agenda, cu t debate on u n scheduled to pics , maintain o rder, and close the meeting in t he event of any action viola t i n g the ge neral inte rests of the state. 76
Yet controls we re easier to decree than to im plement. Provincial officials could not be ev e rywhe re , the i r n umbers remained i n ad e q u a te , and t h e zemstvos continued thei r efforts. 77 In practice, the tsarist government o f the later n i ne te e nth centu ry did not want to tolerate the inde pe ndent activity of ze mstvo institutions but co uld not quite con trol the local aristocrats who had become active in these institutions. Much t he same conclusion follows from the record of judicial reform . Enacted i n to law in 1 864, like the zemstvo reforms, the new statutes seemed to establish for Russia the acce pted p rinc i ples of E u ro pean j u ris prudence. Their i m ple men tation spread
by
ra pidl y , but
1 868 a re acti on ar y trend set in with the a p pointment of Count C. l .
Pah len , an o pponent o f t he re form, as m i n ister o fj ustic e . W hat fol lowed was a c u m u l ative record o f admin istrative exce ptions to the esta b lish ed
rule
of law . An ever-increasing n umbe r o f c ases was transferred to s pe
cial judic ial tribu nals w h ic h wo uld handle issues of the press , crim e s
TO WARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE agai nst
the state, and related m a tt ers in close agreement with the pre cepts of ts ari st autocracy . 78 But these restrictive measures could not undo what the governme n t itself had started -namely, the d e velo pme nt of a legal pro fession with standards of its own . The record of reform in local self-government and the j udici a l s ys tem indicates that i n the last decades of the n i neteenth century, the tsar ist government co uld no longe r fore go the sponsorship o f eco no m ic growth , education , and new pro fessional activity, each of which s tim u_ lated local and individ ual initiative wh i c h in turn clashed with the re strictions o f autocratic rule. A fter 1 8 6 1 these deve lo pments, all un der state sponsorship, engendered a civil society (that is, associations inter vening between the ind i vid ual and the state ) , des pite quite determined e fforts by the government to control and curtail them . In 1 86 1 Russia was still a p r ed o m i nantl y ag ra r ia n c o un t ry w i t h o n ly t he beginnin gs o f industry and almost without ra ilroads, a bankin g sy s tem, or business corpora ti o ns . Methods of prod uction and distrib uti on were backward in com parison with We stern Euro pe and the avera ge stan dard o f living corr es po n di n g l y low . Population growth was a main fo rce for change i n t he po s tema nc i pa t ion period , the total increasin g from 74 m i l l io n in 1 86 1 t o nearly 1 70 million in 1 9 1 6 . Du rin g t h i s sa me period t h e r ai l roa d n e tw ork de v elope d fro m a mere 1 , 000 m iles to 4 0 , 000 m iles, a major factor in the deve lo pment o f heavy indust ry and the marketing of agricultu ra l prod u c t s Agric ulture co ntin ued to be .
m arked
by
low per-acre yi el d s and low o utput per man-hour in co m
parison with more advanced co untrie s . N e ve rthe less, there was a major e x pansion of the area under cultivation and a slow growth in y i e ld per a c re . Agricultu re
remai n e d
th e
m o s t i m po r tan t
sector of the economy,
with nearly one-ha l f of the natio nal income deriving from it as late as
1 9 1 3 . Grain e xports ro se ro u g hl y sixfold be tween 1 860 and 1 895 and
con stituted about 50 pe rce n t of Russian e x ports in the last three decades of the ce ntury. T he use of fertilizers, machinery, and scie n tific farming methods was o n ly be gin n i n g in a limited way in the years be fo re World War I. Overall, it is estimated that agric ultural prod uction increased at the rate of about I perc e n t per year, in contrast to ind ustrial prod uction ( including man u facturing, mining, and handicraft) w hich increased at a rate of
5 perce n t
per year.
However, this develo pment started from a very low level i n 1 860.
By
1 9 1 3 ind ustry em ployed o n l y abo ut 5 percent of the labor force but
co ntributed about one-fift h of national income. The total volume of o ut put includi n g not only ind ustry and agriculture , but trade , trans portation, and services may have increased at an annual rate of 2 . 5 per
cent. This exceeded the growth of po pulation by about I percent. It
should be remembered that the averages given for the period 1 860 to
TA BLE
5
RUSS I A N C LASS ST RUCT U RE in 1 89 7
Numbers
(Percentage)
A. Heredi tary nobility inc l u d i n g I . W hole noble landow n i n g class 2 . H ighest ran k s of the armed forces
3 . H i g hest ran ks of t he bu rea ucracy 1 , 2 2 0 , 1 69
(0.97)
630, 1 1 9
(0. 50)
588,947
(0.47)
I . Distinguished citizen s (many professionals)
342 ,92 7
(0.27)
2. Merchants (business class)
28 1 , 1 79
(0.22)
H ighest ran ks of t he professions
4.
B. Pe rso n al nobles and o fficials not of the nob i l i t y inc lud i n g
I . Great m ajority from h i gher gove rnment serv ice ( n u m bers dou bled between 1 880 and 1 9 1 4) Some landowners
2.
3. Some p ro fessionals
C. Ecclesiastics
D . U p pe r classes in towns (other than nobles and o fficials)
E. U rban poor (meshchane) includi n g
I.
S ma ll
sho pkee pers
2. White-col lar employees 3 . A rtisans 1 3 , 3 86,392
4 . U rban Workers
( 1 0. 66)
F. Peasa n ts includin g 1 . Cossacks (some 3 m i l lion)
po p ulation of the em ployed (some 6.6 m illion)
2. Large floating
G . Indige nous peoples
H. Finns
99, 825, 490 8,297 ,965 353,9 1 3
U nclassified
7 1 ,8 3 5
K. Foreigners
605 ,500
L.
Total
SOURCE:
(79,45) (6.6 1 )
3 5 , 5 85
I. Other soc ial c lasses
J.
casually
( 0. 37) (0.48)
1 2 5 , 640,02 1
N . A . Troynitsky. ed . , Obshchii svod po imperii rezul'tatov razrabotki dannykh
pervoy vseobshchey perepisi naselen iia, Proizve-Dennoi 28 Ian varia 1 897 Coda tersbu rg, 1 905), I,
pp.
(St.
Pe
1 60- 1 . I am indebted to John B rown of the George Ken
nan I n stitute, Sm ithsonian I n stitution, Washingto n , D. C . , for assistance with this sou rce . The categories are adapted from Seton-Watson, Russian Empire. pp. 5 34- 5 .
540
TOWARD A MANDATE OF
i.;'
p.
�...
'. �, .a , "
J
.W;,' .<�.:'
�',
1',.)
THE
PEOPLE
-<:;�. r"f! If·d·�:
.", : �:: i .'
A Political Caricature of Russia's Social Hierarchy About three years after the 1897 ce n s u s the Union of Russian Soc i al i s ts issued a caricature of Russian society in a clandestine leaflet. At the LOp of the py ram id the tsar and tsarina are depicted: "We reign oyer you:' Below them a1'e lea ding representatives of government: "We rule m'er you," At the third Inel are the dignitaries of the church: "We brainwash you," The sold i ers are at the fourth le\'c1: "We shoot at you," At the fifth level are members of the aristocracy in a social gathering: " W e eat for you," At the bottom, the p e o ple are crushed by the whole superstructure: "We wOl'k lor you, we feed yo u ," The st a n za below reads: "The t i me will come when the people in their fury will st ra ighten their bent backs and b"ing down the stl'llclUre with one mighty push of their shoulders," (Sallykov Schedrin Public Librar�', Leningrad)
NATION-B UILDING: R USSIA
541
19 1 3 disguise not only considerable fluctuations (including sporadic fam ines) , but also the difference betwee n rathe r slow growth betwee n 1 860 and the 1880s and quite ra pid growth after 1 890.79 The e ffect of these developments can be summarized by Table 5, a st atistical summary of the Russian class structure, based on the 1897 cens us. This tabu lation should be read in the light of development s since 1 86 1 , specifically the decline of the landowning gentry and the rise of a n inde pe ndent peasan try as well as the great pro mine nce of profes si onals as com pared wit h e n tre preneu rs in the com position of the "mid d le class." In practice, the aristocratic landowners did not bene fit from e man tion. Their holdings fell from 8 7 . 2 million desiatiny in 1 862 to 43 .2 c ipa million in 1 9 1 1 (l desiatina 2 . 7 acres) . They rece ived nearly 600 mil lion rubles for acreage ceded d u ring 1 86 1 - 1 87 1 , but almost half of this reverted to the treasury as payment for outstanding mortgage loans. Little of the rest was invested in agricultu re , and by 1 8 80 th e gentry's mortgage debt had risen once again to 400 million rubles, exceeding the debt level be fore 1 86 1 . During the same period, the holdings by indi vidual peasants, peasant associations, and peasant communes rose from 5. 7 to 30.4 million desiatiny, while the other 1 9. 3 million desiatiny were acquired by merchants and other townspeople. so Along with the gro wt h of industry and the rise of professionals, educational fac i lities were developed th rou g h the foundation of the Academy of Science (1 725) , universities ( from 1 755 to 1 8 1 9), secondary schools (after 1825), and elementary schools (after 1 840) . Students in elementary schools increased from 400,000 in 1 856 to about 2.2 million in 1 885, an increase of 450 percent in one generation. Arcadius Kahan h a s put this development in perspective by com paring the growth of an industrial work force with the development of student enrollments. =
D u ri n g the period 1860-1913 the n u mber of employed i n d u strial, construc tion a n d railroad worke rs i n c reased abo u t 4.3 ti mes (from 1,960,000- to
8,415,000), while pu pil s in elementary a n d secondary sch oo l s increased 16 times (600,000 to 9,840,000). I n 1860 t here were three times as man y wor kers as school attendan ts; by 1900 the numbe r of st ude n ts a l ready exceeded the number of workers by about 40 percent. However , d u r i n g t he years 1900-
1913 workers increased relatively faster than pu pils, and by 1913 st udents
exceeded workers by o nly 12 pe rcen t . 81
Between 1 865 an d 1914, the n umber of students at Russian u niversities increased from 4,641 to 35,695, almost a nine fold rise which does not include the considerable number of students at higher institutions of learning other than universities. 82 As in other undevelo ped economies, it proved easier for Russia to develop its educational facilities than its industria l plant. By the end of
542
TOWARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE
the century, the effect was a notable increase
of
pro fe ssio na l s and w hi t e
_
collar worke rs It is di ffi c ul t to distinguish the two groups in the 1 897 ce nsus, espec i a lly since it is im po s sibl e to say how many em ployees of the central and local government and how many military o ffi cer s h a d profe ssiona l training Those c le a r l y de sign at ed as p ro fe ssionals ( teache rs, l i t e rati , art ists , doc to rs, l a w yers and e ngi ne e rs ) numbered 22 2,703. If .
.
,
one assumes that all white-collar workers had received at least some sec ondary education , then the total number w ith h igh e r ed ucation comes to 728, 106. (The latter figure in c l u d e s govern ment em ployees in the military and civilian bureaucracy.)83 The h ig her ranks of all white-collar workers a nd p ro fessionals taken t o get he r are almost three times the size o f the upper business class . By the 1 890s, it had become a stereotype in li be r a l and socialis t cir cles that Russia did "not h a \ e a bo urgeoisie in the Western Eu ro p ea n sense of the word."H4 Peter Struve made the same point more po lem i cally when he stated that "the farther to the East in Europe, the more politically we ak, co ward ly and base the bou r ge o is i e becomes."H5 These nega tive judgments are true if one considers that in Russia even prom inent merchants obtained their often substantial ad vantages t h ro u gh services rendered to the state. Such businessmen became staunch de fe nders of tsarist eco n omic po l ic ies However, members of the pro fes sions were in a diffe r en t position than businessmen. Doctors, lawyers, and e ngineers might be subordinate, but their training prepared them for independence and the cul t ivation of com petence For that reas on Russia's civil s oc ie t y d e vel o pe d through the associations of pro fes sionals The I m perial Free Econo mic Society of St. Petersburg h a d been founded in 1765 under the spo nso rsh i p of Catherine I I. Its purpose was similar to that of se vera l dozen agricultural associations, namely, to give assistance on the techn i ca l and econom ic questions of a gricult u re But by t he 1 890s, owing to the developments I have traced, the Free Econom ic Society had become an expanded cultu ral center, in which academics, agricultural experts, jo urnalists, and leading spokesmen of the feuding socialist groups argued rather fre e ly about current eco nomic and po litical issues. I n 1863 the Moscow Society of Jurisprudence had been founded , and it too was a center of discussion as was the Pi rogov Society of Russian Doc tors, founded in 1 885. The Economic So cie ty of Petersburg was probably the most im portant of these associa tions ; it had some eight h undred members com prising the leading members of the moderate i ntelligentsia in the capital. Govern ment con trols curtailed or suppressed both the Pe tersburg and the Moscow so cieties by 1 900, but these associations were only the most prominent among many others. Writers and journalists d e v e l oped a network of rather loose organizations, like the charitable Litera ry Fund, founded in 1 85 9. Committees on illiteracy dev e lo ped t hrough which adult edu'
,
.
.
,
.
.
NATION-B UILDING: R USSIA
543
ca tion , lecture classes, e le mentary reading courses, and gram m ar text books were made available to ma . n y parts of the cou n t r y 86 In the 1 870s and 1880s, a num ber of interest organizations in the metal, petroleum and other industries also develope d . The gove rn ment wa tched al l these activities closely and i m posed severe sanctio ns on "dan gerous tendencies ," but civil society was astir nonetheless. In the second half of the nineteent h century, voluntary associations were even pro moted by the government, sim ply because they e nga ge d in ac ti vit ies of which the government a pproved . .
,
In 1862, the re were six private charitable organizations; in 1899, more than
7,000. Six learned societies were started in the eighteenth century, of which only one, the Free Economic Society, survived. In 1856, there were not more than 20 to 25 such societies, but in 1899 there were 340. By 1905, Russia had the beginnings of a network of voluntary associations-social, cultural, eco nomic, scientific, etc.-all of them forbidden to pursue political aims and seem ingly harmless.87
The author adds that under an edict of 1 906 the regulation of these societies was shifted to provincial boards and that this allowed for more freedom than the stricter, central controls be fore 1905. Russia's civil society was not destined to flourish in the long run despite promising begi n n in gs. The tsarist government im posed increas i ngly restrictive measures . Official impulses toward reform were cur tailed after the uns uccessful attempt on the tsar's life in 1866. Terrorist actions after 1 878 and the assassination of Alexander I I in 1881 brought on restrictions of the reforms which had been introd uced after 1861. The thrust of this governmental reaction is critical to an understanding of the following developments and eventual revolution. In the European context, the English and French revolutions had preceded the execution of the kin g (in 1649 and 1793); in Russia, a reigning tsar was assassinated thirty-six years before the revolution. The terrorists were only a tiny splinter group within the Russian revolution ary move ment; yet they rep resented the assassination of the tsar as implementing the Peo ple's Will and adopted the name Narodnaya volya which means both People's Will and People's Liberty. The tsarist government responded to the inc reas ing violence not o n ly by harsher measures against revolutionaries, but by imposing ever more severe restrictions on the zemstvos, the judiciary, and the professions. In the view of government s pokesmen like K. P. Pobedonostsev ( principal tsarist advisor, 188 1 -1905), all liberal movements within civil society (even those the government's own pro grams had sponsored) were signals of the revolution which must be sup pressed at all costs. At the accession of N icholas II in 1894 there was l i ttle promise of change. Under the influe nce of Pobedonostsev, the new tsar warned
544
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
. ,.
Assassination of Tsar Alexander II, 1881
(lIIullml�d Lond,," New,. April 2. 1881)
of the ze m s tvo s not to engage in " se n seless phantasies" such as plans for const it u tional re form and specifically popul a r partic i pation in the government. But by J une 1905 the tsar had to reve rse himself. The country had suffered an economic depre ssion in the pre cedin g years . In 1 904 Pleve , the minister of the interior, had been as sa ssin a ted . From Jan uary to May 1905 Russia suffered a series of dis astrous de feats in its war with Japan , accom panied by a succession of strikes, assassinations, and revol utionary upheavals throughout Russia. By June 1 905 the tsar declared to another zemstvo delegation that an assembly of elected re presentatives of the people was his "unalterable will." An imperial manifesto of October 1905 called for the introduction of freedom of speec h , assembly, and association, popular suffrage, and the principle of legal enactments by a re presentative asse mbly (duma). By then zemstvo and m u n icipal institution s provided a basis for an organized response to this opportun ity. Despite all the restrictions placed on them, these institution s had contin ued their "liberalism of small deeds, " and both the professions and an intelligen t si a of "legal Marxists" had developed apace . Congresses of these and related groups were held wi th the consen t of the government even d u ring the Russo-Ja panese war. But the government was pre pared to make only limited concessions re p resentatives
NATION-B UILDING: R USSIA
545
onc e the im pe rial duma assembled . The fi rst duma meeting of a little over two months was d issolved by J u ly 1906; the second duma meeting of three months was dissol ved in June 1 907. The reu pon , the govern me n t changed the electoral law so that the third dum a ( 1 907-19 12) wo uld have a less "radical" com po sition . B ut des p it e this manipulation of the law to ensure com pliance , m uch had changed. Political par ti es had legal ly recogn ized organ iza t ions and elected re p resentatives i n the assembly . Political issues co uld be open ly discussed, and the ma i n polit i cal groups had their o wn newspa pers . Under these co n di t ions even as se mblies based on a very restric ted franch ise, like the third d uma, were not servile or reactionary bodies . Fu rther reforms were undertake n un de r Prime Minister P. A. Sto ly pi n ( 1 906- 19 1 1 ) , a re former but also a s u pporter of the regi me , w ho was quite prepared to coo pe rate with elected re p resentatives of the peo ple , p ro vided they com pl i e d wi t h his policies. But despite the significant reforms introd u ced under his lead ership, only a semiconstitutional politics was permitted . Laws voted by the duma became valid only t h rough consent of the upper h ouse , w h ich was predominantly con servative, and the s i gna t u re of the tsar. Ministers were res pon s i ble to the tsar rather than the duma; thus , no government could be voted out of o ffice. In addition, t he ar m y and navy were ex empt fro m the budge tary con trols of the assembly. The basic distrust between tsarist ministers and the duma n ullified the daily work of the parliamentary system which even these restrictions might have allowed under more favorable conditions. Stolypin was assassinated in 19 1 1 , just three years before the o utbreak of World War I. The lim ited dev elop ments toward constitutionalism and a civil society were destroyed by the reperc u s sions of th a t great conflict. INTELLECTUAL OPPOSITION AS SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
In the last few decades of the nineteenth centu ry, high o fficials fre quently expressed the fear t hat vol untary associations, in nocent as their civil p u r poses might be , would inevitably turn i nto politic al challen ges . Officials were p articularly a p p re hensive with regard to the free expres sion of ideas. In soci e tie s that are latecomers to industrialization, educated persons , including government officials, ty p ic a l ly stress the im portance of ideas as a means of effecti ng social change. Que stions as to what course Russia should follow had stirred inter mittent controversy since the m iddle of the seventeenth century. Spokes men for the old regime as well as those pro t esting again st it alternated between reassert i n g Russia's national traditions and looking on various Western countries as e x e m plars in one respect or another. B y the e arly nineteenth century, ed ucated pe rsons c r itical of the old regime bega n to g athe r in i n for m a l groups. In turn, the tsarist government saw the
TO WA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
growin g interest in literature and ph i lo soph y as a sourc e o f d ange r . In tellectual a w a k en i ng , an as pect of civil s oc ie t y , was bound to co me i nt o conflict with autocratic rule and in fact was a n ea rl y antecedent of t he Russ ia n revolution s of 1905 and 1 9 1 7. Du ring the nineteenth ce ntury , tsa rist officials perce iv e d , de s p i te their misgivings, that education was needed to train o fficers for t he military and s pec ia l i sts for t he d e ve l o pmen t of mining, a g r i c u l ture , and the manufactu re o f armaments. Equally i m portant was the persis tent shortage of quali fied personnel at h i gher levels of the civil service. Ac cord ing to one re port, the em pire had 80,000 government pos it io n s , of which 3,000 fell vacant a n n ua l l y. But in the late 1 850s only about 400 i ndivid uals grad uated from the u n i ve rsi t i es , l ycees , and law schoo ls. 88 A c cor d i n g ly , ed u c atio n a l oppo r tun i t ie s we re e x p a n d e d , es pec i a l l y in t he s ec ond half of the centu r y. As the gen try a n d le adi ng o ffi c ia ls a do pt ed a more po si t ive a t t i t u de , education was advanced at all levels. The number of p rofessio n a l s i n creased rapidly, as evidenced in the census of 1 897. Among the men e n tering m i litary service, l i teracy increased from 22 perc e n t in 1 88 0 to 65 pe rcent in 19 1 0, a 43 percent rise in t hirty years. According to data for factory labor in Vladimir district in 1897, workers age sixty and over we re about 30 percent literate , while young workers u nder fourteen were over 60 percent literate. To be s u re , the im pact of educational ad vance varied gre atly , and school attendance was much higher in urban than in rural areas. But it is clear that education at all leve l s took a m aj or leap forward during the last half-century of the tsarist regime. 89 Covert social criticism by the inte l l i gents i a antedated the era of ema n c i pation which began in 1 856, but after this year Russia's ed uca tional ins t i t utions certai n ly provided the setting in w hich critical im pulses sprea d quickly. Unrest seemed to be endemic in universities and secondary schools. It is an open q u estio n w h ethe r wi t ho u t that co n ge n ial setting the Russian intelligentsia would have acquired its considerable historical significance. Marx's reasoning about the conditions favoring w orki n g - c lass solidarity (ease of communication in the work place and mounting conse nsus through struggles with a com mon opponent) ap plied directly to Russian students in their relations with the government. Ele mentary education was clearly useful in economic and military terms, but it also upset Russia's rigid social hierarchy. For the sons of p easants and the urban poor it was a first step of upw ard social mobility. The aspiration to advance beyond primary school increased as educa tional facilities expanded. It was easy, of course, to regulate the admis sion of students from different social strata, but it was difficult to main tain a consistent policy. If one just considers boys in high sc hoo l (gymnasia), one can observe the e ffects o f official policies during the nineteenth century. U nder Alexander I ( 1 805- 1 825), m any members
NATION-BUILDING: R USSIA
547
o f t he aristocracy still p r eferred private t utorin g for their children. Henc e, a lar ge proportion of hi gh school boys (over 60 percent ac c ord in g to one count for 1 80 1) came from urban an d r ural tax payin g g roups (tha t is, from families of pea sants and the urban poor) . Then, u nder N ic hol as I (1825-1855) , decided preference was gi ve n to sons of the gentry and of high officials , t heir proportion risin g to a s h igh as 80 per cen t of all pupils . Under Alexander II ( 1 855-188 1 ) and his successors , this policy was reversed . T h e need for quali fie d personnel beca me ur gent by the end of the centu ry, so boys in gymnasia fro m the highest social circles re presente d probably a bit ove r 50 percent of the pu pils, while most of the remai nd e r came from urban taxpayi n g grou pS.90 The access to educational opport u n ities aroused a great deal of class feeling, especi ally after the debate over emancipation had publi ci z ed the problems of inequality. Social unrest among students had been wide spre a d in response to the ema n c i pation declaration of 1 86 1 . Students, along with many liberals, e x pressed their solid arity with the peasants, w ho strongly disliked the terms of the emancipation settlement and in one case rose in violent protest. Terrorist attacks began in 1 866, and unrest became w idespread du r ing the 1 870s as students flocked to the "po pulist" movement. Between 1 873 and 1 879, more than a q uarter of 1 ,665 p articipants in th e movement were u nde r twenty- on e and 8 7. 2 perce n t we re u nd er th ir ty. Anothe r study re ports that of 5 ,664 per so n s i mplic ated in radical m ovements d uring the 1 870s, 433 we re teachers, 644 came from eleme n tary o r seco ndary schools , 266 from clerical sem inaries, 3 7 from military schools, and 2,023 from institutions of higher lear ning, a total of 3,403 or 6 1 .6 pe rc ent. 9 1 Con ser vat iv es natu r ally at tribu ted these developments to the expansion of education beyo nd the circle of the privileged. In addition, tsarist officials became concer ned because many students fro m nongentry families d ro p pe d out before completing their studies and because Jews constituted a l ar ge proportion of the students in secondary schools and universities. Consequently, pro vincial officials were adv ised in 1 887 not to admit to univ ersity prepar atory schools "children of co achm e n, men ials, cooks, washerwomen, small shopkeepers, and the like. For, excepting occas ionally gifted chil dren, it is com pletely u nwarranted for the children of such peop le to leave their position in life . "92 When this c i rcular became known, it met with public outcry, for by the 1 880s the tsarist government had lost much of its for mer control over the expression of opinion, despite the gener al reaction against the terrorists. Also, as a practical matter, there seemed no warrant for social discrimination when the children from families of the gentry and o f tsarist officials could not fill the growing demand for qualified personnel. Nor were childre n from aristocratic families immune to revolutionary ideas . Increased education seemed generally to con t ri b ute to the unrest the government sou g ht to suppress .
TO WARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE ......
....
----. �.-....
. .. -, .
l
!
St. Petersburg Police Discovering a Nihilist Printing Press, 1887
(1IIlMraled l.ondon News. April 16. 1887)
I n 1 85 5 some 17,000 boys were enrolled in seven ty-seven secondary schools.93 The fact that u nder Nicholas I pu pils from gentry families predom inated is less im portant than that the gymnasia were boarding schools, isolated from the family environ ment and a meeting-ground for students from di fferent parts of the country. These schools were financed and controlled by the state . Usually located in the same district town as provincial government, the gymnasia were centers of civilization in a primitive setting. rather than subordinate institutions in a cultured, urban milieu like secondary schools in Western Europe.94 Teachers in the gymnasia belonged to the "high society" of these towns, while as civil servants they symbolized the authority and cultu ral mission of the state. In side the schools, the studen ts were put in uniforms, reinforcing their isolation from society and , one can presume, their identification with one another. I n many respects, the Russian schools were modeled after the elite schools in other European countries, especially between 1866 and 1880 under the leadership of Count D . A. Tolstoi, minister of ed ucation. Tolstoi was a scholar o f some note concerned with the high quality of ed ucatio n , but also a staunch monarchist determined to excl ude or sup press subversive ideas . H is method was a heavy em phasis on Greek and Latin and mathematics . in contrast to his predecessor in office (A. V. Golovnin, 1 86 1- 1 866) who had stressed natu ral science and Russian history , language , and literature . Even with regard to the classics, the
NA TION-BUILDING: R USSIA
549
curriculum emphasized. grammar and la n gu a ge rather than literature to red u ce to a minim u m the intrusion of pote ntially s u b ve rsive idea s .
Per ha ps some of this was a bit e x t reme even i n nineteenth-ce ntu ry Eu rope , but Engli sh , French or German schoo l boy s were subj ected to a co m para bl e regimen. B as i c a l l y , this was the contemporary i d e al of ed
ucation for tho se who as p i red to study at a un iversity. Unlike his su cc e s s ors , Tolstoi rejected class d i scr i m i nat i on o r d i s crimination against Jews. But in e m p ha s i z ing the classics he certainly wanted to ke e p students busy with a curriculu m so de m a n d in g that they simply h a d no time for a n yth ing else. Nor did he rely solely on t h e cur ri cul um to ke ep students i n li ne . Special cou n se lo rs (nastaunik) ju dge d the student's m o ral a n d pol i tica l reliability, a n d their recommendation was a re q u i re d part of the certificate needed to enter a u nive r sity . Whe n student unrest s pread in the gymnasia as we l l as t he univers ities in the 1 870s, Tolstoi's answer was more detailed s upe r vision . [He]
sought to li m it the
a nother and
to
opportunities students would have to
proselytize one
red u ce their contacts with unreliable e l e m ents outside the
schoo ls : the former by pro h ibiting stude n ts from forming societies and fro m bringing any books but texts into the buildings; the latter by declaring public places like clubs,
co
ffee
s hops, taverns, billiard parlors, and, in many in
stances , theaters off limits and by wou ld give pupils
no
pro po sing
a rigid work s che d u l e which
time fo r frivolo u s pa s ti mes during weekday nights.95
Nearly all disciplinary m atters were withdrawn from the j urisdic tion o f the ind i vid ual school councils and placed i n the ha nds o f the school di rectors or the curator o f the ed ucational distr ict . Within a short time, even these local officials lost most of their authority to the officials o f the central m inistry. In t h e field o f ed u cat i on , a s in t h a t of self-govern ment generally, the autocratic response to unrest, as to most other prob lems, was more centralization . Massive con trols i m posed o n students a n d t h e aridity of t h e sec ondary school curricul um did not distinguish t he Russ i an schools from boa rding schools elsewhere in Europe . B ut in Russia, students reacted against the state as their most visible and oppressive o pponent, and they used the declarations o f state offi cials as weapons in their attack. In the 1850s, the state itself had initiated an era of reforms. When young men and women m ade refo r m a matter of p r inc i pl e, it was easy to show that vacillating and conflict-ridden state po licies violated principle at every point. The contrast is sha r pes t wit h English cond i ti ons , where p ubl ic schools with many of the same features as the Russian gy m n a s i a pro duced quite different results . The grad uates from the En gli s h schools could j oin the elite of a successful em pire , whereas Russian grad uates h ad to enter the ruling e li te of a starkly backward society or join a rev ol u tionary minority which condemned autocracy and backwardness.
55 0
TOWARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
The com pa rison is closer with Prussian conditions. Some Prussia n stu dents certainly resembled their radical counterparts among the Rus sians, t hou g h the many states of German society may have helped to diffuse, while Russia's state consolidation helped to i n tensify , rad ical ten dencies. At any rate , Russian student reactions exempli fy Tocqueville's general maxim that revolutionary fervor rises sharpl y not when condi tions are at their worst but whe n there are signs of i m provement, as in Russia a fter 1 856. The activism of university students was a direct response to gov ernmental policies. U n der N icholas I, quasi-military controls had been im posed on university students, but this policy was reversed after the Crimean de feat. Military d rill was discontin ued and limitations on en rollments and auditors removed. Also, the government pro v i ded help for many i ndigent studen ts by more state sch o larsh ip s. M os t i m p or tant , many s t uden t or gan i za tion s sup ported needy students by loans, rais i ng money by special per fo rm anc es p rov id i ng student libraries, and so forth. Such activities were fo rbi d de n by law, but some gove rn me n t of ficials ope n l y enc o u raged these p hilanth ro pic efforts, while others sim ply looked the other way. Before long, e s calat i n g ille gal activities on the pa rt of t he students and re pre s siv e meas ures on the part of the govern ment replaced t h is be ni gn at mo s p he re 9 6 The tsarist government could not tolerate student activism even d u ri n g t he li ber al ph ase of the 1 850s and 1 860s, when s u c h a ctivi s m too k th e for m o f ph i lan t hro pi c work or of Sunday sc ho o ls o r g an ize d to com ba t il l ite rac y In a m emo rand um of 1860, the chie f o f po l ice , Prince Dol gorukov, stated his reasons for s u bj ec ti n g the Su nda y schools to of fi cia l co n tro l ,
.
.
.
The government cannot permit h a l f of the po pulation to owe its ed ucation not to the state but to itse l f or to the private philanthro py of any particular class. The m iddle stratum o f soc iety and in visible force s w h ich rel y u pon its stre n g t h have arbitrarily assu med the leadership of this im portan t enterprise . By teac h i n g w i thout payment they have establi s hed a solid basis of trust and
gratitude on the part of the mas ses for whom they are the benefactors.9 7
Here again,
not h in g could
be permitted to intervene between the pop a ll power ful ts ar , les t h is le gi timac y be impaired. Not only his officials but the tsar himself nee ded the pat r i arc h al fiction that the ruler is the source of all benefits to the people and that these benefits justify the controls i m p osed in his name. Prince Dolgorukov echoed, oddly enough, the radical senti m e nt s e x pre ssed in Fra n ce a century e ar lier, when Jesuit control o f ed u ca tion wa s o p po s e d on the gro und that the nation should have an education "that will de pen d upon the state alone."98 ulation and the
-
NATlON-BUlWINC: RUSSIA
551
I n Russia, the tsar and his officials preem pted public affairs . A gov er n ment like that makes ideas into a public affair by the act of kee ping t hem under surveillance . Also, by censoring ideas and controll ing or su ppressing all activities that are inde pendent of govern ment, the re gi me un wittin gly endows the world of ideas with a special ca pacity for expressing human aspirations and the riches of ex perience.h Under the circumstances, the majority of the people were red uced to grum bli ng abo ut bureaucracy. Ye t i n any large po pulation there are a few men and women who have the urge to express their aspirations and those of others, come what may. Over the centuries, men of ideas have re sponded to censorshi p and oppression in different ways. In nineteenth century Russia, they hard ly thought of challenging the government di rectly. But they were eager to acknowledge the im portance of ideas. In the face of poverty and corru ption, of hypocrisy above and sycophancy below, in the presence o f tyranny that crushed the individual, they would u phold the dignity of the human spirit . B y giving all their passion to the pursuit of truth and beauty, they wou l d realize a better life even under tsa r ism . Faced w i t h such single - m inded dedication , the tsarist government con fronted cruel dilemmas of its own . It was ready to suppress all overt opposit ion and political opi n ion , but how was it to deal with the personal inde pe ndence embodied in cultural ex pressions without appearin g as the enemy of truth and beau ty? An e pisode involving the great poet Alexander Pushkin illustrates the d i l emma. Following the Dec e m brist revolt of 1 825, Pushkin had been exiled because some of the active par tici pants had been his friends. When the harsh re pression of the revolt was at an end, Tsar Nicholas I want e d to demonstrate his magnanimity. He ordered Pushkin's re le ase from exile, because an ythin g concerning the famous man would achieve maximum p ubl icity . A very frank inter view followed. Push kin acknowledged his sym pathy with the Decem brists and the tsar paid his respects to Push kin's great gi fts . B ut then Pushkin complained about censorship and t he tsar offered to be the poet's pe rsonal censor. It was the grand gesture of a su preme ruler and Push kin appreci ate d it as such. Opposition-minded students at Moscow University , who had flocked to Pushkin on his return from exile, tur n ed against him when the y discovered his support of the tsar. Pushkin re plied in vers e : "He freed m y thought. How should I not / Sincerely sing his praise? " This d e licat el y ambiguous response had to be submitted to the censorship of the tsar, who declared, "Let it be circulated , but not printed. "99 Like the censors who ke pt aski n g the government for guide hAt least one American writer commented dur i n g the 1 960s that by its control of literature the Soviet re gime gave e v i d e nce of taking literat ure seriously, whereas in the United States official tolera nce was indistinguishable from indifference toward culture.
552
TOWARD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE
lines wh ich were never forthcoming, the tsar hi mself was uncenain how to proceed when praise itself somehow bordered on the subvers ive. Nor was it easy to dism iss praise which so famous a poet offered to authority . Nicholas chose the method of private circulation i n preference to an official endorsement, just as Russian writers ever since have circulated their works in man uscri pt (samizdat) whe n they could not get them past the cen sor. Unde r these circumstances , literature became a substitute for life itsel f. By its control of all activities inde pendent of government as m uch as by cen sorship, the tsarist government had helped to stimulate infor mal associations among individuals who shared an interest in literature and saw in the expression of ideas an act of social responsibil ity . The term intelligentsia became common only late in the nineteenth centu ry, but the group to which it refers developed earlier. This group was de fi ned by the civic function which intellectuals attributed to ideas. Neither the changing social origin of the intelligentsia nor the succession of in tellectual fashions (like German idealis m , French utopian soci�lism , or the belie f in scientific progress) are as i m portant a constituent of the group as this concept of social or civic responsibility, for it provided a criterion of exclusion. Specific intellectuals, like spokesmen for the church or the autocracy, or liberal government officials, or persons in terested in ideas for the ir own sake , did not belong to the intelligentsia, because they had betrayed the "cause ." The conce ption of social re sponsibility had a common core. A person would be recognized as a member of the intelligentsia if he was concerned with the fate of the people and the nation, opposed to the established order, preoccu pied with effecting social change by means of ideas, and most importantly always read y to subordinate all private interests to this conce ption of social responsibility . That way of defining the term hel ps to ex plain the furious debates of the nineteenth century in which a man could be judged as belongin g to the intelligentsia only in part, or only at one time in his life but not at another. With a man like Alexander Herzen ( 1 8 1 2-1870) , the ques tion might not be put quite this way. But his long exile (after 1 848), wealth , and cosmopolitanism cast doubt on his dedication to the cause, even tho ugh he had been imprisoned and exiled for his beliefs and de voted most of his energy to the advance of Russian liberty. Novelists like Gogol and Dostoevski underwent similar changes o f reputation. Gogol's portrayal of provincial li fe and Dostoevski's early novels and Siberian exile had "qualified" them. But their ultimate adherence to the Ortho dox faith cast doubt on their conce pt of social responsibility . Turgenev was suspect because of his cosmopolitan dedication to literature. Isaiah Berlin has followed the Russian critic Paul Anne nkov in la-
NATION-BUILDING: R USSIA
553
belin g the period from 1838 to 1848 "the marvelous decade." Preoc cupation with philosophy and litera�u re was considered the only possible way o f meeting one's responsibility. A case in point is the career and s ubsequent re putation o f Vissarion Belinski (1811-1848). B ro ugh t up in a remote provincial tow n , he was aroused early to an acute sense of injustice by the casual brutality of his father, a retired naval doctor, and by the poverty-stricken student li fe he was forced to lead as a provincial com moner among the sons of the aristocracy at Moscow University . III health and expulsion fro m the university for a mildly subversive play added to his misery. The rest of his short life was spent as a pe n niless literary critic. During his lifetime, he was idolized by such diverse figures as Herzen, Turgenev, Goncharov, an d Dostoevski . Belinski became "the idealized ancestor of both the reformers and the revolutionaries of the second half of the century ."IOO He died of consum ption in 1848, ap parently just after havi n g received an invitation to visit the police, of ficially known as the Third Section of the I m perial Chancellory. Gen darmes attended his funeral as they had attended Pushkin's, to keep an eye on his friends and prevent any demonstration. Belinski brought to his critique of literature a quite extraordinary moral passion. The ques tions that concerned him were the pe rennial ones. How do individuals relate to one another and to society, what are the ends of life , and above all what is the proper moral purpose of im aginative literature? So intense was his preoccu pation with a truthful answer to these large questions that even the suspicious officials of the Third Section thought of Belinski as wayward and o ffensive, but for all that concerned solely with questions of taste, not with anything that touched on "either politics or communism."lol But this was not how Belinski and hi!> frie nds regarded their i nterest in ideas. There is a quality o f thought which can transform intellectual preoccu pations into parti san struggles in the re public of letters Belinski himself commented on the Russians' inabi lity to "divorce a man from his thought, on their tendency "to lose time, to ruin their own health and make enemies from attachment to some deeply felt o pinion, from love for some lofty, disintereste d tho u ght. " l o 2 A sam pling of Belinski's opinions conveys the atmosphere of these literary circles, in which sheer passion for truth turned differences of opinion into moral- political commitments. At age twenty three, Belinski noted that men of letters discussed every idea imported from abroad but did not create anything of their own . This exploitation of read y made ideas was "the cause of our in credible instability. Seven years later his lament was still more despairing: .
"
-
-
"
We are a peo ple without a co u n try, worse than that, we are peo ple whose co untry is a ghost, and we are ghosts ourselves. Yet we are peo ple w ho make
5 54
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
enormous demands on life, capable of any sacrifice, though forced to stand still like idle spectators.... Without goal there is no activity, and without ac tivity our life withers away.
Yet Belinski co uld not be inactive and neither could his friends. He was torn, as they we re, betwee n the heady attraction of ideas take n from abroad and revulsion at the realities of bourgeois societies; after visiting France, Belinski wrote of the "syphilitic sore running through the French body [poli tic] ." At the same time, all these men were sick at heart when they contem plated their own country. They had "a passionate desire to see in it the realization of human ideals, and to promote them as far as one's strength permits." At one poin t in his intellec tual journey, Belinski deeply shocked his friends when he suddenly made his peace with the tsarist regime , rec ogn izing the rationality of the real i n Hegelian fashion . But the very terms in which he endorsed tsarism reveal his mo r al fanaticism. Drown yourself, lose yourself in science
and
an, love them
as
the
goal
and
necessity of your life, and not as mere instruments of education and winning success in the world-only then will you be blessed .... Without a prior sense of truth in feeling, it is impossible to acquire it in knowledge .... Above all, avoid politics and steer clear of any political influence on your cast of mind. Politics in Russia are senseless and only empty heads can busy them
selves with political questions. Love what is out useful to your country, without
good, and
you are bound to turn
t h i n king or striving to be useful
to it ....
This passage is followed by a discou rse on the Russian tsar-e mperors, above all Peter the Great, who alone could safeguard the people and gave them like children what rights they could handle without commit ting m ischief. B ut then Belinski returned to his theme that men of ideas must be apostles of enlightenment like the early apostles w ho hatched no con s piracies but boldly preached their doctrine in the face of em perors and judges. Subsequently, Belinski re pudiated this position with the same passion with which he had embraced it, saying that he would not m ake his peace with vile realities. 1 03 In his Thoughts and Notes on Russian Literature (1846), Belinski gave an assessment of his life's work by contrasting the facts of society with the effects of literature. There i s a prevailing spirit o f disunity i n our society: each of our social estates possesses specific traits of its own-its dress and its manner, and a way of life and customs, and even its language .... It would be wrong to say t hat we had no society whatever. Undoubtedly, there exists with us a strong demand for society and a striving toward society, and that in itself is important .
.
.
.
NATION-BUILDING: RUSSIA But the beg i n n i n g of t h i s
rapprochement
5 55
a m o n g the soc ia l esta t e s
.
.
.
does n o t
by an y mea n s b e l o n g exc l u s i ve l y . to ou r times : it m e r ge s w i t h t h e begi n n i n gs
o f o u r lite rat u re .
.
.
.
I n speak i n g o f the pro gress o f soc i et y ' s ed ucatio n , w e h a ve i n m i n d the p ro g re ss of o u r literatu re, fo r ou r ed ucat ion is the d i rect e ffec t of o u r li t e rat u re
u po n the ideas and morals of soc ie t y . Our l i te r a t u re has c rea ted the morals o f o u r soc iet y , h as a l re ad y ed ucated several ge nerations o f w i d e l y d i verge n t c h a racter, h a s paved t h e way for t h e i n n e r
fo rmed a
s pe c i e s
rapprochemen t
o f p u bl i c o pi n i o n a nd prod uced
soc ie ty that d i ffers fro m the
middle estate
a
o f t h e estates, has
sort o f s pec i a l class in
i n t h a t i t co n s i sts not o f the m e r
c h ant r y and co m m o n e rs a l o n e b u t of peo p le of a l l es t a te s w h o have bee n
drawn toge t h e r
t h ro u g h
ed ucat ion, w h ic h , w i t h u s , ce nte red e x c l us i ve l y i n
a lo v e o f litera t u re . . . .
Pec u n i a ry interests , t rade, shares, bal l s , social ga t h e ri n g s a n d d a nc es a re also
l i n k s , b u t t he y are e x t e rn a l , not vital, orga n i c li n k s, th o u gh n ecessa ry and
usefu l . Peo p le are i n te r n a l l y bound toge t h e r by co m m on moral i n terests, s i m
eq ual it y o f e d uc a t io n combined with a m u tual regard d i gn ity B ut all ou r moral i n te rests , all o u r spiritual life, have h i t he rt o been and w il l , sti l l for a lon g time to c o m e be c o nce n u a t ed in literat u re : it is the vital s p r in g from w h i c h a l l h u m a n sentiments and co n cept io n s pe rcolate i n t o society . l o 4 ilarity of
v ie w s ,
and
fo r one another's hu m an
,
.
,
'
A year later, in h is famous letter to Go gol, Belinski followed a passionate den unciation of orthodoxy and autocracy with a further paean to lit erature, which alone s hows signs of li fe and a progressive movement. That is why the writer in Russia is held in such high esteem, even if he is a man of little talent. E very liberal tendency in literature is rewarded with universal notice by a public whic h "looks upon Russian writers as its only leaders, defenders, and saviors against Russian autocracy, or thodoxy, and nationality, and there fore, while always prepared to forgive a writer a bad book, will never forgive him a pernicious book."I 05 Thus, Belinski touches on the s pecial power which literature has retained in Russian society to this day. Writers take enormous moral and social re sponsibility upon themselves when autocracy (or dictators hip) makes them the sole spokesmen for human dignity and individual freedom . t ° 6 In the "marvellous decade," literature had become a substitute for civil society. Belinski said as m uch when he referred to a "kind of public opinion" created by literature, to " persons simply associating with other persons," to an "internal meeting of social classes." For these are ref erences to ideas and associations independent of govern ment, whic h yet transcend the concerns of the individual. "The love of what is good . . . as the goal and necessity of life" was considered the only possible way of meeting one's social responsibility. B ut the European revolutions or 1848, the military defeat of 1856, and Alexander's "promise" of emancipation changed the setting, especially for men of ideas. Between
TO WA RD A MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE
1 856 and 1 866, a period of he ated debate ensued, even of agitation , in which philosophical and literary argu ment alone appeared insufficient. The moment it was possible to go beyond the previously prescribed lim its of permissible ex press i o n , i t became i m perative to do so. How else could men of ideas meet their res pon sibility, subord inate private inter ests to the welfare of the peo ple , and lin k their "lo ve of what is good" with a search for the forces that co uld overthrow autocracy and make "truth" a reali ty ? Under tsarist censorsh i p, literature re mained i m por tant as a means of com m u n icating about soc ial conditions, but now per sonal com m itment to progressive social action loomed m uch larger. Nikolai Chern yskevski ( 1 82 8- 1 889) e xe m pl i fi e s this change in in tellectual opposition from the 1 840s to the 1 860s. 10 7 H is father, a parish priest, was a com paratively ed ucated man who taught his son himsel f and borrowed nonreligious books for him from the notables of the area. The boy read Gogol, Belinski, Herze n , and everything else that reached his native Saratov. The family background was orthodox and patriar cha l , but e v i d ently be n ign At age eightee n , his father enco uraged Cher nyshevski to leave for St. Petersburg, where he was admitted a s a student at the un iversity. Under Russian conditions it was unusual for the son of a priest not to follow an ecclesiastical career, to be admitted to a uni ve rsity , and indeed to move from the province to the ca pitaJ . 1 0 8 Chernyshevski's birthplace and e arly experiences left a lasting im p ressio n o n him. Saratov on t he lower Volga was frontier territory, where the rising M uscovite state had battled against Tartar tribes and whe re Cossac ks or free peasants later' had owed allegiance neither to landlords nor to the tsar. Many Old Believers (raskolniki) and merchants trading with the East had settled in this area. State centralization had left its mark, but so had peasant revolts, the encounter of m any ethnic gro u ps, and the corporate interests of international traders. Life on the frontier was a hard struggle against packs of wolves, bands of brigands and horse thieves, nomads who came to seize and enslave Russian peas ants, e pidem ics . and the stark poverty which turned men into li felong drunkards. Chernyshevski's realism about provincial society remained with him througho ut his life. H is career was brie f and tragic. A fter com pleting his university studies he retu rned to Saratov to teach in a local secondary school. He seems to have been an exceptional teacher, but he noted in his diary that th ings he said in class "smell of penal servitude." During his stay in Saratov he married a local socialite, who may have been attracted to him by his cham pion ship of women's rights. He warned her that he might be arrested at any time for views he could not cha n ge . In 1 853. Cher nyshevski returned to Petersburg with his family. For two years, he made a precarious living as a journalist a nd translator. while pre paring his dissertation in hopes of an academic career. These hopes were dis.
NA TION-BUILDING : R USSIA
557
a ppo i n ted and in 1 85 5 he acce pted an i n v i ta t i o n to j o i n the staff of the Contemporary (Sovremennik) . By 1 859 he had become e d itor- i n -c h ie f and a very pr omi n e n t fi g u re . The Contemporary w a s one of t h e maj o r j o u r n a l s i n whic h the issues of peasa n t e ma nc i pa ti o n were debated . O b v i o usly , t he gove rn me n t sc ru ti n ized the jo u r n al an d i ts editor closely a nd tried to e s t a b l i s h li n ks be tween C he r n ys hevs ki a nd the a gi tatio n prec i pi t a te d by t he prospect o f eman c i pat io n . The journal was suspe nded i n 1 862 a n d its e d i to r ar re st e d . A fter spe n d i n g two years i n p ri so n wa i t i n g for h is secret t r i al , Ch e r n ysh e vski was con de m ned to fo urtee n years o f hard labor i n S i beria and to pe r pe t ua l banishment. He h a d been ca u t i o u s o u t of co n s i d e rati o n for his fami ly , but his a p peal to the yo u n ger ge ne r ation was su Hicient re a so n fo r the go vern ment' s desire to sile nce him. They d id not s ucceed, but Ch e rn ys he vs ki spe n t all but fo ur months o f h is rem a i ni n g twenty seven years i n penal se r vitude and exile from E u ro pean Russia. Chern yshevski's con t ro ve r s i a l d issertation on esthetics il lum i n a tes the gen erati o n a l chan ge i n t h e intelligentsia. Beli ns k i h ad distinguished betwee n a bad book and a harmful one, t h us i n trod u c in g a social or political pe rs pec ti ve i n to l ite r a ry criticism . Ch e r n ys he v sk i elaborated this em p has i s by s tre s sing the l i n ks between the wor k of art and its historical se t tin g . He turned Be l inski's l iter a ry commitment into a m a n i fe s t o o f artistic realism. This argu ment did not a ppeal t o the o l de r g e n erat i o n of w rite rs . One critic u p held P ush ki n's p u re art a ga i ns t C h e rny sh e v ski 's exaggerated i mi tat io n o f Gogo l a n d Belinski . T u r ge ne v i n i tiated a cam pa i gn against " t h i s d i sgus tin g book" since h e "cou l d no t l o n g live with this ar t h a ting a nd do g mati c school maste r. To lsto y despised his d re a r y provi n c ia l ism, his total lack o f aesthetic sense, his i n to lera n c e, his wooden rational i s m , his m addening se l f-ass u rance . " l o9 Moreove r , To lstoy alon g with T u r ge n ev made nasty, snobbish references to C hernyshevski's p riest l y, plebe ian or i gi n . It m a y seem j u st a l i te rary vendetta with over tones of class d iscriminatio n , but Che rny shev sk i cha l le nge d the very idealization of literature by means of which the older ge ne ra t i on had ex p ress e d its love of truth and human dig n it y. Tsar i s t ce nsors h i p had been r es po n s i ble for a literature doing double d uty as art and soc ia l crit icism. A fter 1 856, Che r n ys h e vs ki was no longer sa t i s fi e d w i t h t hi s con ce pt ion and stressed the social utility of a rt . A ge n era t io n that h ad ach ieved much under Belinski's leade rs h i p n at u r a l l y re s i ste d see i n g its a ccom pl i s hme n t s cast a side o r even dis parage d . However, Chernyshevski's main concern was j ourna l ism , not liter a t ure. For a few years a fter 1856 he was able to d i sc uss p u b li c quest ion s as far a s ce n sorsh ip pe rm itted. Most o f Chernyshevski's c r i t ica l com mentaries dealt with Western Euro pe , in part because he sa w th e po s s i bi lity of profit i ng from the e x a m p le and the m istakes of the West. I n Russi a , "we a re st i l l onl y for e s e e i ng t h ese cha nge s , we m ust pre pare for
TO WA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE e ve n ts , a nd control the ir deveiopments." l l o Accordi n g l y , he wrote about social p roblems that had arisen in the cou rse o f ind ustrialization and about ideas for re form which we n t beyond the us ual half-mea s u res . Some o f these discussions were c u t by the ce nsors, b u t C h e r n y s h e v s k i was al lowed to re po r t news from o t h e r cou n t ries , and Russian readers knew how to inter pret such news in the ligh t of Russian con d i tions. C hern ys h e vski s d iscussion of emanc i pation could be more forthright since the issue was debated publ icly. H e strongly advocated that the emanc i pa ted peasants be given the lan d t hey had tilled. T h ro u ghou t h i s l i fe , C h e rn y s hevski retained a s hy manner, do ubt ful of his cou rage but ada mant i n his conviction s. H e was a sec u la r as cetic wh ose m o r al pro bity and pedestrian man ner m ade him a n o bject of derision among the older literati, but he was venerated by the yo u n ge r ge ner atio n Wi t h h i s c ustomary e l o q u e nce Isaiah Berlin has described C h e rn ys h e v s ki s m an ner : '
.
,
'
C he r n y shevski la id it dow n t h at the function of art was to help men to satisfy t h e i r wan ts more rationally, to disse m i n ate knowled ge, to comba t - igno rance, prej u d ice and the a nti-social passion s , to i m pro ve l i fe in the most literal and narrow sense o f these words . . . . This outlook hel pe d to m ake h i m the n at ural leader o f t he " hard" yo u n g m e n w ho had succeeded the idealists o f the "fo rties . " C hern yshevski's hars h , flat , d u l l , h u m o u rless, grat ing sen tences, h i s preoccu pation with conc rete eco n o m ic detail, his se l f-disc i pline, h i s passion ate dedication to the material and moral good
of
his fellow m e n , the grey,
se l f-e ffac i n g personality, the tireless, devoted , m i n u te i n d ustry, the h a t red of
style o r of an y concession s to the graces, the u n q u e st io n abl e sincerity , the
com b i n ation of brutal d i rectness, u tter sel f- forgetfulness, i n d i ffe rence to the claims of private l i fe, in nocence, personal kind ness, pedantry, m oral charm, capacity fo r se lf-sac ri fice, created the i m age that later beca me the protot y pe of the Russian revo l utionary hero a nd martyr . l l I
All these qualities find expression i n the novel What Is To Be Done? One need not dwell on its literary failings, since the author himself ac knowledged that he did not have "a trace of artistic talent."1 1 2 It is the story of a young woman rescued from the petty tyranny of her parents by a young scholar who marries her. The couple agree to live inde pen dent lives, and she sets u p a cooperative shop of seamstresses. When she falls in love with her husband's friend, the husband disappears and the lovers marry. Later, the first husband returns in the com pany of his new wife , and the two couples live together in harmony. Both young men are of lower class origin, tough-minded, scientifically trained, and dem ocrats by conviction. They reject all high-minded precepts like con science and sel f-sacrifice, claiming to be moved entirely by rational ego ism . But they act by the most sel fless standards and are com pletely devoted to the cause of the people . One high point of the novel is a dream of the young woman which glimpses a future in which people
NA TION-BUILDING: RUSSIA
559
erB o y abundance, freedom, and t he equality o f the sexes. Another high point is the por t ray al of the minor character Rakhmetov, a n aristocrat w ho has traveled to America and gone over to the peo p le . Rak h metov leads the life of an athlete in tr a in i n g for the com i n g revolution , deve l opin g h is strength a n d divest ing himself of all ties so as not to be d e flected from his pu rpose. I n the novel, Chernyshevski extols Rak h metov as o ne of the chosen few , but also states that "a man with an a rdent love of good ness can not but be a sombre monster . " He wrote this book i n prison w hile awaiti n g trial. T h e novel was published in Contemporary, w hich was appea r i ng aga i n be fore bei n g ban ned permanentl y . T h ereafter, the novel circulated in clandestine fashion and remained p o p u l ar fo r decades. C h e r nys he vski thought its merit consisted in its truthfu lness. Fo r th e y o u n ger gene r atio n the book symbolized their idealized dedication to the cause o f revolution. After 1 856 m e m be r s of the in t e l li ge nts i a and students in th e uni versities flocked to t he re vo lu tio n ary cause as s i n gle ind ivid uals or in sm a l l groups. They we re v i goro u sl y condemned and s ubj ecte d to severe penalt i es The y shared the conviction that industrialization imposed mounting human costs on the vas t mass of t he peasantry, a lread y vic timized by centuries o f cruel abuse. With renewed urgency t hey co n fro n ted the q ues tio n o f whether Russia should follow the path of West ern Europe or could reach a better social order without inc urrin g the horrors of industrialism, the mate r i a li s m of bour geois c u l ture , and the ,
.
pretenses of a merely formal, legal equa l ity Alexander Herzen an swered this question in a manner that echoed the aspirations of many reformers and revolutionaries : "Human development is a form of chronolo gical unfairness, since late-comers a re able to p rofit by the la .
bours o f their predecessors without paying the same price . "1 1 3
I n that hope, a m inority o f true believers took their stand a ga i n st the u gl y realities of autocracy, poverty, and inequality. They did so in part because they felt guil ty. Peter Lavrov ( 1 823- 1 900), a former officer and political activist who escaped from Siberia to Switzerland in 1 870, put into words the underlying reasons for the appeal of C hernyshevski's exemplary conduct and for the popularity of his novel: Every com fort which I e njoy, every thought which I had the leisure to acquire or work out, was purchased by blood , by the suffering of or by t he labor of millions. I c a n not correct the past, and n o matter h ow dearly my de velopment cost, I can not renou nce it . . . . Only the weak and intel lectuall y backward person falters from the respo nsibility weigh i ng u po n h i m . . . . E vil has to be righted , insofar as that is possible , and it has to be do n e o n l y during one's l i fetime .
.
.
. I remove from myself respons ibility for the bloody cost o f my
deve lo pme n t
if I
use t h i s very de velo pment i n order to lessen evil i n the pres
e nt and in the future. I f I am a deve lo ped man , the n I am obliged to do this . . . .
560
TOWARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
Lavrov thought this an easy duty, because searching for and dissemi nating truth and the idea o f a j ust soc ial order would satis fy the indi vid ual and potentially help the s u ffering majority . B u t his idealism was also demanding: :'I: e i t h e r li t e ra t u re , n o r a rt , n or sc ience saves o n e fro m i m mo r a l i n d i fference. By t he m se l v e s th e y do not i n c l ude n o r
w i t h tools .
.
.
.
B u t only that w r i te r ,
c
a u se
a n i st , o r
progress. They o n l y fu rn i s h it
sc h o l a r se rved progress w h o d i d
a l l t h a t h e co u l d t o a p p l y h i s e n e r g ie s t o t h e d i s se m i n a tion a n d s t re n g t he n i n g
o f t h e c i v i l i z a t i o n o f h i s t i me , w h o s t r u ggle d w i t h e v i l , e m bodied h i s a rt i s t i c ideal s , sc ien t i fic t r u t h s , p h i loso p h i ca l i d e a s , p u b l ic is t i c s t r i v i n gs i n c reations w h ic h
w e re
fu l l y i n fu sed with t h e life o f h is times. W hoever did less . . .
[ w hoe\'er] fo r go t abo u t the im m e n s e a m o u nt o f e v i l a n d ignorance, aga i n s t w h i c h he s h o u l d
have been
st r u ggli n g, m ig h t as well have bee n a n y t h i n g
a s k i l l ed a rt i st , an u nco m mo n sc h o l a r , a bri l l i a n t publ i c i s t - b u t he excl uded
h i m se l f from t h e ra n ks o f co n sc io u s actors o f h i stor ical progres s . " 4
In this spirit, young men a n d wom e n joined the revolutionary move ments o f the 1 87 0s. Education re presented a debt which they had to re pay by working for the progress of their country. Whatever t heir spec ific pe rs uasion , they were all nationalists in that se nse . The i ntelligentsia co uld re pay their debt to the people only if it worked for a futu re in w h ich au tocracy, poverty, and inequality would disa p pear. If i t failed i n this duty, u n re lieved tyran ny and destitution would cause stil l more blood to be spilled. Motives such as these made the q uest des perately urgent. Heated , e nd less argu me nts o ver how to lift the tsarist yoke fro m the peo ple divided the Russian intellige ntsia for decades. The passionate intensity of these arguments reflected the intelligentsia's se nse of social responsibility, and Chernyshevski e pito m ized the socially res ponsible individual. T hese Russian movements of the ninetee n t h century foreshadowed the movements for reform or revo l ution in other countries that we re also latecomers to ind ustrialization and , possibly, de mocratization . Such protest movements consist largely of an ed ucated m inority o f elitists with a bad consc ience. Elitism is man y-sided , but t here is some structure to its d iversity. An ed ucated elite in a bac kward country has the choice be tween moral and rational means. I t can seek to reform itself morally -by an ascetic l i fe style based o n the conviction that no reform is possible u n less i ndividual men and women live virtuously ; -by exe m p lary cond uct w h ic h can symbolize the ex piation of guilt, virtues that can redeem others, and so forth ; -by se lf-discipline which pre pares the ind ividual for his role i n the coming crisis. An ed ucated elite can also seek reform by in tellectua l preparation. This
NA TION-B UILDING: R USSIA
wo uld enable the individ ual to quali fy for the necessary le ade rsh i p th ro ugh the acq uisition of ideas and skills: Here again many ways are possible. An elite can pre pa re i tse l f -by its "love for sc i e nce and art" (Belinski) as t he only spheres in which h uman dig n ity and freedom can be preserved ; -by the pursuit o f science and institutional reform for the imme diate good it can do (like med i cine or the ze mstvo m ov emen t ) ; -by the study o f h isto r y i n the belief that the prior development of other coun tries has lessons to tea c h us from which our own country may profit ( Herzen, Chern yshevski) ; -hy the study of social and economic conditions, for without u n derstanding the causes of m isery we can do little to remove them (some versions of pop u lis m and Marxism). These are some of the options amo n g which members of the intelligen tsia c hose du ring the ninetee n th century. But elitism is never enough. It p ro vo kes its opposite -"populism" in the broad se nse of that term. Members of t he i ntellige ntsia cannot ignore the fact that they constitute an educated m ino r ity pi t ted against an entrenched autocracy in the midst of an indiffe re nt or hostile pop ulatio n A vast majority of the peasants adhered to the myth of the tsa r lon g a fter they had become bitter opponents of his officials. When young revol utionaries in the 1 870s went to the people not to teach but to learn , they were met with deep suspicion and freq uently denounced to t h e police. With that experience, t h e so-called po pulist movemen t lost m uch of its earlier appeal, but po pulis m as a doctrinal com plement to elitism lived on. The intelli gentsia dedicated itsel f to the cause of the people and hence had to relate to the people in some form. The question was how to conceive o f the pe o p le : as backward , as a source of virtue, or as a force capable o f overthrowin g their oppressors. The intelligentsia could seek to teach t he peo ple -before the comin g revolution, in order to make the people ready for this great turning point and safegua rd j u s tice a nd eq u ality in the society to come ; -after the comin g revolution, because centu ries of oppression have barbarized the peo ple and nothin g but a cataclys m ic overturn can re deem them from their present state. Or the inte l li gents ia could learn from the people because wisdom and virtue inhere in t h e i r accustomed way of life. I n Russia, this view always turned on the at t ribu tes of the peasant community (mir) , wh ic h were variously seen as -the foundation o f s piritual values inherent in the Russ i an tradi tion and hence a protective shield against Western ind ividualism (Slavophils) ; .
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
-the foundation of spiritual val ues from which the intelligentsia has become separated through ed ucation and to which it must retu rn i f it and the co untry are t o be restored ; - t he fo undation o f fu t u re co o pe r a ti ve s and hence the be gi n n i n g s ( a nd no mo re) of a more eq u i table soc iety ( C h e r n y shevs k i ) ; -the fo u n d a t i o n of the collectivism c h a racteristic o f a s oci a l i s t so ciety w h e re b y Russia can arrive a t the desi red fu t u r e witho ut having to incur the h i g h costs of ca p i t a l i s m ( H e rze n). O r t h e i n te ll i ge n t s i a co uld rely o n t h e people as a sou rce of that strength wh ich alone can overthrow a u tocrac y . So conceived , t he peo ple would t h ro w off t he i r c h a i n s , either soon or at some point in t h e fut u re , because
-their bu rdens and t h e vileness of t he i r oppressors have become ( Bakunin ) ; -both their suffering a n d the s pread o f advanced ideas have pre pared them for the final day on which they would not only overthrow the old regime, but take the reconstruction of the new society- into their own hands (ethical and legal populism) ; -once the necessary force has been supplied to make a revolution, the people will be guided to effect the desired social reorganization, lest through ignorance or educated deception they would fall victim to re vived or new types of oppression (Tkachev, Lenin). No doubt this listi ng is incom plete . Even if i t could be com pleted, it would not con vey either the sheer welter of opinion in the last decades of the n i neteenth century or the profo u n d ambiguity o f these i d e as. Men like Chernyshevski, Lavrov, and many others did not hold the same views throughout their lives . They probably held most of their views in an ambiguous fashion (however doctrinaire their formulations), for cir c umstances changed along with the hope or despair that accom panied their search for a way to the new society. The great range of liberal and socialist opinion in the West provided an i m portant resource for the intelli gentsia's opposition to the tsarist regi me, but was regarded warily by nearly everyone . Westernize rs and Slavophils were eager to avoid the weaknesses of the Western tradition and build on the strengths of the Russian , A Westernizer like Herzen commented on his "elective affin ity" with the Slavophils : " Like Janus, or the two-headed eagle, we looked in opposite direction s, but one heart beats in our breasts . "1 1 5 Herzen's comment applies generally to the revolutionary move ments of the nineteenth century, not only to the old dispute between Slavophils and Westernizers. The re Wa.5 a unity underlying the virulent dis putes. All the revolutionaries were concerned with the regeneration of their co untry. Most revolutionaries and, indeed , a good many of the liberal reformers favored autocratic methods, at least after the failure of the Western-European revolutions in 1 848. Some of them worried u n be a rable
NA TION-BUILDING : RUSSIA
about the dangers of a new autocracy: m ight not a futu re soc iety under the direction of the "i ntelligents" prove as oppressive as the old ? An a rchi s ts like Bakunin or mora l ly scru pu l ous men like C he r nyshevs ki and Kropotkin were concerned with that q uestion but co uld not resolve it. Amon g most, passion d i s pelled such scru p l es . T heir overri ding concern was that in the West liberal pa rt ies an d th e i r l e a d e r s neith e r u n d e rstood nor m a d e
a
seriou s e ff()n
to fo rwa rd t h e fun d a m e n t a l i n t e re sts o f the o p p re s se d po p u l at i o n s of t h e i r
co u n t r i es . W h a t t h e v a s t m aj o r i t y o f pe a sa n t s i n Russia (or workers in E ur o pe )
n e e d ed was to b e fed a n d clothed, t o be given p h y sical s e c u r it y, t o b e resc ued from d i sease, ignora n c e , po verty and h u m i l i a t i n g i neq u a l i t ie s . As fo r poli tical rights, votes, parl i a m e n t s , re p u b l i ca n fo rms, th e s e were m e a n i n g l e ss a n d use
l e s s to i gno r a n t , ba rba m u s , h a l t� naked and s t a rvi n g m e n ; such p ro gram mes me re l y mocked their m i s e r y . 1 1 6
All of them agreed fu rther that the urgency o f these needs req u i red unswerving personal dedication. Driven by a sense of social responsibility , t he radical op po nent s of the tsarist regime put its abolition above all other considerations. When peasant hostility and govern ment arrests caused the populi s t movement to fail in the 1 870s, a mino r ity eme r ged from this ex pe rience more de ter m ined than eve r. In the clandestine meetings which followed, some wanted to continue their work for the peasants' needs and aspirations. Others opted for terrorist blows against the government. Members of the l a tte r grou p planne d and car ri ed out the assassination of Alexander II in 1 88 1 . I n docume n ts made public after the tsar's death, the "ex ecutive committee" justified its action by r eciting the h istory of intelli gentsia opposition and government re pression. In add ressing Alexander I I I ( 1 88 1 - 1 894) , t he te rro r i s t s declared that the whole bloody struggle, i n cluding this final terrorist act, s prang from the failure of the govern ment to realize the will of the people . "The government has dege nerated into a pure ca m aril l a . . . . [ Its] inten tions have nothing in common with the desires of the people . " The gov ernment consists of us urpers, the document declares, in contrast to the revolutionaries who have tried i n several d i fferen t ways
to act on behalf of the people.
At the begi n
ning o f the se ven ties we c hose to live l i k e wor kers and peacefully pro pagate o u r Soc i al i st ideas. The m o vement was abso l u tely harm l e s s . But h ow did it e n d ? . . . A m ove m e n t , which was u n sta i ned by blood a n d w hi c h repud i at ed viole nce, was crushed .
...
T he short t i me t h a t we lived among the pe o ple
s h owed us how bookis h a n d doctri naire were our ideas . We then decid ed
to on behalf of the interests created by the people, interests which were inherent in its life and which it recognized. Such was t h e distinctive cha racter of Populism . act
From metaphysics and d reams we mo ved to positivism, a n d kept close to the soi l . . . . I n stead of s prea d i n g Socialist ideas, we ga ve first pl a ce to o u r
TOWARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE d e t e r m i n a t io n
it jflt,
,
, !I i
to rt'(lwakPII the peo/)Ip "y agitatiol/ in
the
n ll me
of the
in ln'est that
who e x pected to of t he worl d , G i v e n
T h i s d oc u m e n t was w r i tt e n b y m e n a n d w o m e n d i e a n d w a n ted to j ust i fy t he i r a c t i o n i n t he eyes
t h e i r o u tcast s t a t u s as re vol u t i o n a r y act i v i s t s , i t w a s e a s y fo r t h e m to d e
n o u nce t h e gove r n m e n t a n d d e n y i t po p u l a r legi t i m a c y . B u t i t w as n ot so e asy
to c la i m
a n llneqll il'ocal m a n d a te fo r t h e mselves , eve n t h o u gh
t h e y w rote i n t he i r own b e h a l f
.
I n a d ,"erte n t l y , t h e y revealed t h e pe r
s i s te n t a m bi gu i ty betwee n e l i t i s m and po p u l i s m . They c l a i m ed
to
h a ve
acted on be h a l f of t h e peo pl e a n d in t he i r i n terest. B u t t h e state m e n t
t h a t the pe o p l e recogn i zed t h e i r o w n i n terests i s q u a l i fi e d
For t h e d e of re vol u ti o n a ri es t o r e a w a ke n t h e peo ple by a gitati o n in t h e n a m e o f t he interes t that it fel t " m ea n s si m pl y t h a t an e l i te artic u l ates i n t e rests w h ic h it i m putes to th e peo ple . Act i o n on be hal f of the people's interest was con fused, perha ps unwit t in gly with action that would awaken or reawaken the people b y agitation . The intention of the revolution aries was to act in behalf of the people , but in practice they , were not satisfied with what the people themselves desired. I nstead, they would re present "interests which were in herent in {the people's] life." This eq u ivocation over what the peo ple want and what a revolutionary elite interprets as th e peo pl e s interest remained a characteristic of the rev olutionary movements which followed . The history of t h e movements which intervened between the assas sination of Alexander I I in 1 88 1 and the revolution of 1 9 1 7 will be omitted, for m y p u r pose has been to characterize the autocratic suppres sion o f civil society and the early formation of an o pposition to autoc racy. The declaration of the terrorists of 1 88 1 shows the equivocation concerni n g a po p u l ar mandate which has characterized the Len inist rev olution and the later Stalinist collectivization of agriculture. t e r m ina t i o n
.
"
,
'
REVO LUTION AND THE MANDATE TO RULE Rule in the name of the peo ple was a princi ple first articulated in seventeenth-century England and eighteenth-century France. Later writers discerned in Rousseau's concept of the general will a potential tyranny o f the majority. They hardly a ntici pated that one day a tyranny of the minority would also be exercised in the name of the people. Yet such a tyranny has been instituted under a Soviet regime which preempts decision-making by the highest a u thori ty , delegates all responsibility to the lower echelons, and thoroughly controls or s u ppresses civil society . The Soviet regi me has greatly intensi fied these characteristics of tsari st autocracy, confi rming Merle Fainsod's observation that "Bolshevism as a movement was an ind igenous , authoritarian response to the environ ment of tsarist absolutism which nurtu red it. "1 1 8
NA TION-B UILDING : R USSIA
After 1 88 1 a number o f revol utionary movements developed which existed as small, clandesti ne gro u ps in Russia and as com peting grou ps of Russian revolutionaries abroad . The Russian Social Democratic La bour party was one o f these gro ups, and in the cou rse of an internal dis pute in 1903 the rad ical left wing of the party adopted the name Bol shevik (majority) as distin guished from Menshevik (minority). These names persisted thro u ghout a long series of i n ternecine disputes . Lenin (born as V. I . Ulyanov in 1 8 7 0 , d ied i n 1 924) was the leader o f the Bolshevik faction and the greatest si n gle leader of the 1 9 1 7 revolution . Lenin's brother was executed ( 1 887) for part ic i pat i ng i n a plot to assassinate Alexander I I I . Lenin h i mself was a law student and revolutionary from 1 887 to 189 5, when he was arrested and deported to Siberia . In 1900 he went abroad, and though he traveled to Russia intermittently for some years, he remained in exile until his return in 191 7 . Tsarist Russia participated in World War I on the s ide of the West ern allies against the Central Powers of Germany and Austria. But after three years of war, the tsarist regime was overthrown in the revolution of 1 917. Russia's military defeat was caused not only by the devastations of war but by famines, e pidemics, and the accompa n ying breakdown o f the economy. The revolution o f February 1917 was d ue to the s ponta neous acts of Russian workers and peasants returning from the front, rather than to the action s of the revolutionary leadership. The early con stitutionalist phase of the revolution was followed on November 7, 1 9 1 7 by a radical, Bolshevik coup. Lenin and his followers regarded the war as a capitalist and imperialist venture and favored a peace without an nexations and indemnities. Civil war broke out be tween the new revo lutionary regime and its Russian opponents, who wan ted to contin ue the war agai nst Germany. The Western Allies, still engaged in fi ght i ng that war, sent some supplies and m ilitary assistance to the Russian oppo nents of the revol ution. These chaotic conditions hastened the opening of peace negotiations between the Bolshevik leaders and the Central Pow ers . Yet the negotiations dragged on because, in contrast to Germany, Russia had lost the will and the capacity to continue the war. When the Treaty of Brest- Litovsk was signed in March 1 9 18, Russia was forced to abandon Poland , Lith uania, the U kraine, the Baltic provinces, Fin land, and Transcaucasia. In the period afte r World War I, Russia underwe nt not o ne but two revolutions. The first revolution from October 1917 to Jan uary 19 1 8 consisted o f the conq uest o f power and the expropriation of land by masses of peasants. The large-scale destructions caused by the war and by m ilitary defeat precipitated these violent transformations so that the ruling groups of tsaris t society were e ffectively destroyed. The second revolution from 1 928 onwards did not res ult from military de feat and its e nsuing chaos. It occurred rather in an economy that was slowly re-
May Day Parade in Petrograd, 1 9 1 7.
The sloga n on t he banner read s : " Down with the old order . " ( New York Public Library)
NA TION-B UILDING : R USSIA
covering from cataclysmic decline. And it consisted of a collectivization of agriculture and a poli tical purge which were i nitiated and d riven for ward fro m above by the leadership of the Com m u n is t party . The i m plication s of both revol utions for the C o m m u n i st conce ption of a pop ular mandate can be understood o n ly against the bac kgro u n d of social and eco no mic conditio n s in post- 1 9 1 7 Soviet Russia. e p ide mics fa m ines, and c i v i l war caused preci pitous decline in ind ustrial and a gric u l t ural pro du c ti o n The gross indus trial output of t he Russian economy in coa l , o i l , a n d railw ay ton nage carried declined from an index of 1 00 in 1 9 1 3 to 3 1 in 1 92 1 . The prod ucti o n o f electricity fell to one-fo u rt h an d the p r o d u c t i o n of pig iron , steel, bricks, and s ugar virtually disa ppeared . Russia was still pre dominantly agricultural, but overall a g ric ultu ra l prod uction fell from 1 00 in 1 9 1 3 to 60 in 1 92 1 . Between these years, agricultural ex p orts fell to one seventy-fifth (from 1,520 to 20) and im ports o f finished p rod u cts to one-sixth ( from 1 ,374 to 208) of their former levels. 1 l 9 Shortages of food and fuel, aggravated by extensive disruptions of the transportation system, cre ated the worst problems. The peasants to gether with soldiers returning from the war seized and redistributed the land, acts which the Bolshevik regime q u i ckly legalized. E x pro pri ation of the landowning class had been a major part of the Bolshevik program. But because it was accom panied by much destruction of property and livestock, redistribution greatly aggravated the d i sru p ti o n . The concom itant rise of small peasant holdin gs also tended to lower productivity; implements and fertilizer were in short supply. Between 1 9 1 6 and 1 92 1 , the n umber o f horses and cattle declined by a fourth and the number o f shee p and goats by o ne -th ird . The con sequence was a red uction of the sown area from 79. 4 to 58.3 million desiatiny between 1 9 1 7 and 1 92 1 , and of the gross yield of crops from 3.3 to 1 .6 million pudy in the same period (one pud 3 6. 1 1 pounds). 1 2 0 As a result, the existing structure of society was overturned o n a massive scale. I n 1 9 1 3 industrialists, merchants, real estate owners , and officials in the towns as well as landowners and better-off peasants in the countryside had constituted about 16 percent of the Russian po p ulation. Persons in these categories represented the "capitalist class" in the Communist definition o f the term. By 1 92 1 "urban capitalists" and former tsarist officers and officials had either perished in the u pheavals of the period , emigrated , or been coopted by the new regime in sub ordinate, white-collar positions and as officers of the Red Arm y. In the countryside, larger landholdings were expropriated and redistributed to peasants who were allowed one horse and up to 4 desiatiny of land. These smaller holdings accounted for 72. 1 percent of arable land in 1 92 1 . Due to famine conditions, the number of industrial workers deIn
the
years after 1 9 1 7 ,
,
.
=
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
dined by half between 1 9 1 7 and 1 92 0/2 1 ; most of these workers re turned to their villages. Wh ite-collar workers increased by 60 percent between 1 9 1 3 and 1 920, d ue to ra pid bureaucratization and the shift of former entrepreneurs into managerial positions under political s u per visio n . Po pulation figures measure the im pact of the revolution and its aftermath in another way. The main losses occu rred in the eight-year period from 1 9 1 5 to 1 92 3 . Emigration accounted fo r two million people and deaths in World War I for another two million . Disease, famine , a n d civil w a r res ulted in t h e deat hs of fourteen to sixteen million people . Demographers also speak of a "birth deficit" of some ten million d ue to the deaths of child- prod ucing ad ults (that is, a deficit of children who would have be e n born if those ad ults had remained alive) . The overall loss which these upheavals im posed on the population has been esti mated at be tween twenty-eight and thirty million people . 1 2 1 The Bolshevik leadership sought to cope with these chaotic condi tions by its policy of "War Com munism" ( 1 920). Alec Nove has iden tified the main aspects of this policy as follows: (1)
A n a t te m pt t o ban private man u fact u re , t h e nationalization o f nearly all
ind ustry, the allocation o f nearly all m a te rial stocks, and of what l i ttle output
t h e re was, by the state, especially fo r w a r pu rposes .
(2)
A ban on private trade, never q u ite e ffective anywhere, but spasmodically
e n fo rced .
( 3 ) Seizure of peasa n t s ur pl uses (prodraz.verslka). (4) T h e partial eli m in a tion of money fro m t h e state's
deal i n gs with i t s own organ izations and the citize n s . Free rations, w hen there was a n y t h i n g to ratio n .
(5)
A l l t hese factors co mbined with terro r and arbitrariness, e x pro priatio ns,
req u isitions. E fforts to establish disc i pl i n e , with party co ntrol over trade
u n io n s. A siege -econ o m y with a com m u n ist ideology . A partly-organized chaos. Slee pless, leathe l'-j a c ke ted co m m issars wor k i n g aro u n d the clock in a vai n e ffort to re place the free marke t . 1 2 2
In a largely agricultural country, the main task was the procurement of foodstuffs to supply the towns and the army. The principal problem of "War Communism" was the relation be twee n the state and the peasantry which had just benefited from the seizure and redistribution of land . The Soviet regime had endorsed that redistribution and now, to meet an emergency, turned to the forced req uisitioning of grain from the peasants. This was a dangerous expedient: " Naked req uisitions . . . provoked the two t raditional re plies of the peasant: the short-term re ply of concealment of stocks and the long term re ply of refusal to sow more land than was necessary to feed his own family ." Maurice Dobb cites estimates for 1 920 according to which peasants concealed between 1 4 and 20 percent of the sown area and 33 percent of the harvested prod uce. 1 2 3
NA TION-B UIWING: RUSSIA
56 9
The policy of req uisitions and the peasan ts' response recalls the "local government by tribute col lection" practiced under the Mongols and the tsars . But the policy of War Com munism was more than an echo of things past or an emergency strategy. Nationalization , forced allo cation, rationing, the use of record-keeping ra ther than money as a means o f exchange, and state control of man ufacture, trade , and trade unions were anticapitalist measures in kee ping with co m m unist ideol ogy . The attack on property and money, expro priations, and rationing made it seem that emergency conditions unwittingly favored that sub stitution of planning for the market and that equality through allocation which were steps toward a socialist society . As Moshe Lewin h as stated, I n Capitalism the law o f value, in its d i ffere nt for m s , reg u l ated t h e economy t h rough an interplay o f spontaneous fo rces i n t h e market, but the social ist eco no m y would eliminate money, prices, wages , p ro fi ts, and the other capi talist market paraphe r n a l i a . Socialism and socialist pla n n i n g we re conceived u n iq uely in terms of
a
distributive function
in k i nd ,
w here economic activity
was n o lo n ge r concerned w i t h ma r ke t categories such as m e rchand ise, val ue, a n d cost but with human needs se rved by p ro d ucts created to satisfy them. E l i m i nation of private prope rty was an ind i s pe n sable precondi tion for the e l i m i n ation o f private p rod ucers , and the disappearance of private prod ucers excha n gi n g co mmodi t ies would lead to the e l i m ination of both the m arket and the category of "co m modities . " This logic was re spon sible for the fol low ing conce ption, i f not i l l u s io n : the more nationalization , the narrower the m a r ke t , the nearer the adve n t o f sociali s m, or the la rger the socialist sector . . . . When Le n i n su ddenly found hi mse l f i n a situation i n w h ich all the allegedly "ca pitalist" mechanisms began to disintegrate u nder the strains of war, the party leade rs fel l pre y to the i l l usion that the d re a m was beco m i n g real . 1 2 4
On the face of it, market mechanisms were replaced by administrative structures, and this seemed to identify the coming of socialism with the growth of the state machinery. Nationalization of the means of produc tion was hailed as a token of the disappearance of classes. With the dis appearance of the former ruling class, its agent -the state-would dis a ppear also. As Lewin poi nts out, opposition against an oppressive ruling class had libertarian con notations which "anesthetized the revo lutionary Bolsheviks and made them build a Leviathan when they thou ght they were entering the free world of their dreams."12:> By 1 92 1 the Bolshevik regime had won the civil war, but conditions had deteriorated badly. Bandits roamed wide areas; in the Kronstadt u prising, sailors protested against miserable conditions and the Bolshe vik commissars ; in some provinces large armed units were needed to suppress peasant rebellions . Lenin agreed to the substitution of a fixed tax in kind for the earlier requisitioning of agricultu ral surpl use s-the crucial step needed to pacify the peasants. He endorsed the New Eco-
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
nomic Policy (NEP), which establis hed a m ixed economy in the years from 1 92 1 to 1 92 7 . The res ults of this policy were notable, es pecially in the private sec tor of the economy. To be s ure, large-scale ind ustry, fore ign trade, and finance remained in the hands o f the state ; less than 2 percent of these activities were in private hands . B u t the pictu re was reversed in small scale ind u st r y and handicraft prod uction. By 1 92 6/2 7 , 7 7 .5 percent of such industry and p rod uction was privately owned, and this was down from 89.7 percent in 1 92 3 / 2 4 . The bulk of this production involved sel f em ployment and assistance by members of the family. During the NEP period, the traders and private entre preneurs of the towns became im portant econom ically and numerically. I n agriculture, 9 8 . 3 percent of the sown area was controlled by i ndivid ual p easants in 1 92 7 . 1 26 Private i niti ative had developed as soon as the combi ned pressures of the civil war and of the party's policy of War Comm unism were diminished. In the countryside, party influence declined as emergency conditions abated and privately ma n a ge d fa r m i ng became d o mi n a nt . This ascendance of private enterprise re presented a major reversal of party policy and was the subj ect of continuous debate throughout the NEP period In the eyes of many party leaders , NEP constituted a return to capitalism. When the peasants increasingly resisted the policy of req uisitions under War Communism, when they threatened the countrys i de with m aj or u pheavals, Lenin had re treated to markets, money, and cap italism. He stated that the increase of prod uctive forces in the rural sec tor would have to be measured in decades. The country had passed from tsarism to the Soviet system in five years, but now it was necessary to test "the steps forward [which] we proclaim every hour, take every min ute, and then prove every second . . . that they are fli m sy, s uperficial and misunderstood. " In his Central Committee Re po rt to the Eleventh Party Congress ( 1 922) , he made the following ar gu ment : .
O u r a i m is to restore the bond , to prove to the peasant by deeds that we are begin n i n g with what is intelligible , familiar and i m mediatel y accessible to him , in s pite of his poverty, and not with something remote and fantastic from the peasant's poi nt of view . We m ust prove that . . . in this pe riod of a p pallin g ruin . . . the Com m unists are really helping [the small peasant] . Ei ther we prove that, or he will send us to the devil. . . . This is the significance of the new economic policy . . . . Li n k u p with the peasant mass�s. w i t h t h e rank-and-file toili n g peasants, and begin to move fo rward i m measu rably , infin itely more slowly than we ex pected , but in such a way that the entire mass will actually move forward with us. If we do that we shall i n ti me get such an accele ratio n of pro gress as we can no t dream of now. 1 2 7
NA TION-B UILDING: R USSIA
57 1
But Lenin found it difficult to e x plain the new policy to the party . Was the policy of War Communism a step toward socialism , in which case the New Economic Policy w as a retreat ? Or was War Communism a m istake, in which case N E P would correct it and facilitate the transitio n to socialism? A s a retreat, N E P was tem porary, b u t a s a tra n s i t io n to socialism it could last for generations. 1 2 8 The debates over the fate of the revolution during the 1 920s tu rned on the contin uation or reversal of the New Economic Policy, and Lenin died in 1 924 before this issue was settled . The Russian revolution had based itself on Marxis m, w h ich predicted a proletarian revolution for the advanced, capitalist co untries. The paradox was that the Bolsheviks had come to power in an overwhelmingly agrarian coun try. The party called i tsel f the vanguard of the masses of worke rs and peasants. How was that party to transform the co un try econom ically once the ravages of World War I and o f the civil war were overcome ? The ma i n issue concerned the peasantry which m ade up the bulk of Russia's labor force . I n this respect, a moderate and a radical position were a rtic u lated in the later 1 920s. In view of the frequent factional struggles and chan ges of line," it is best not to identify these positions with specific names. 1 29 The moderate po sition e nvisaged the continuation of the New Eco nomic Policy for the foreseeable future. Farm surpluses came from the better-off rather than t he poor peasants. Hence, encou ragement should be gi ven to the peasants from whom surpluses could be obtained. The NEP goal was to achieve greater prosperity among the peasants and more commercial prod uction. The slogan get rich" was used for a time to signal this tolerance for private accumulation in the interest of agri cultural productivity. The only alternative, as the advocates of this policy ,
"
"
saw it, would be to favor the poor peasants and use coercion a gainst the
better-off peasants (kulaks) , as u nder War Communism The risk of this alternative was peasant unrest and loss of productio n . However, the ad vocates of a continuation of NEP were hard put to remain consistent. Although they favored the better-off peasants, they still wanted the poor peasants to cooperate with the socialist program. Hence, they withdrew the slogan ge t rich," continued their appeals to the poor peasants, and advocated that mOre industrial products should be supplied to all the peasants. The cham p ions of this moderate position saw that more coer cion in the interest of accelerating production in the towns and the coun tryside would promote an all-powerful state apparatus and violate the humanist goals of socialism . The radical position aro se from a concern with national security and great m i sgivin gs about the New Econom ic Policy. Western military as sistance to the Russian opponents of the revolution had fed fears of fur ther intervention that would aim at destroying the achievements of the .
"
572
TOWA RD A MA NDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
revolution. Such fears lent su pport to t he em phasis on speed y indus t rialization and hel ped to j ustify attacks on N EP as contrary to national as well as socialist interests. Since industrialization under a continued NEP would be slowed , this policy had to be abolished. At the same time, advocates o f the radical position realized that a primitive socialist ac cumulation" was needed to fi nance heavy i ndustry and expand the na tionalized sector of the economy. The necessary resources had to be obtained from the private sector and that meant primarily fro m the kulaks. In this i m pending con flict, it would be necessary "to pum p re sou rces out of the private sec to r and so fi nance the state's investments i nto the expanding socialist industrial sector. " 1 30 This radical position under the leadership of Stali n , was victorious. Stalin, w ho was born J. V . Dzhugas hvili in 1 879 (d. 1 95 3 ) , had risen through partici pation in clandestine and partisan activities be fore and during World War I. In 1 9 1 2/ 1 3 he had been chosen by Lenin as a member of the central com mittee of the Bo ls hevik party and as first edito r o f Pravda . In 1 922 he was appointed secretary-general of the Russian Com munist party and from that position rose to unrivaled lead ers h i p with the inaugu ration of the First Five-Year Plan ( 1 92 8- 1 933) and the d rive to collectivize agricultu ral prod uction. The NEP model was repudiated In effect, a new revolution was initiated from above, directed against private peasant agriculture as well as against p rivate trade and ind ustrial production. The coexistence of public and private sectors in the economy under N E P was replaced by t he controls of a central plan ning organization . The new policy of expro priations and requisitions resembled the emergency measures of War Com m unis m But now the goal was different, however similar the method . In 1 92 8 Russia was no longer in a state of siege and civil war. Now, industrial production was pushed forward at a feveris h pace. The pres sures created conditions of manpower conscri ption and full mobilization such as usually occur only in warti me . The Communist leadersh ip brushed aside the com plexity o f economic planning The idea of achiev ing balanced economic growt h was re placed by emergency measures and special-purpose campaign s As early as 1 92 1 , Stalin had revealed his distrust of experts when he urged Lenin to appoint "men of live politics, read y to act on the principle of ' report fulfillment This language of a civil-war commander proved to be symptomatic of the simulated com bat conditions under which the first five-year plans were launched : "
,
,
.
.
.
.
.' "
C ndoubte d l y , t h is style a n d ap proach were u n avoidable w he n the core o f the econo m ic policy con sisted of te m pos. "Tem pos decide the w hole th in g! " This d r a m atic s l o gan was i n tended by Sta l i n to mobi l ize energies and imagination . B u t t h e leaders h i p used terror in order to ma ke sure that these tem pos wou ld
n ot be sc ruti n i zed nor deri\"ed from a n y princi ple other than the need to r u s h . To ask the crucial q uestion "how m uc h , and w h y so m uc h ? " was t reated
NA TlON-B UIWING: R USSIA a s t re aso n . . . . Stal i n
u n d e r s tood
573
pla n s as te m porary sets o f ta r gets that, how
eve r hi g h , had to be s u r passed . . . . H ence, the core of Stali n ' s pro gram was the b u i l d i n g o f a s m a n y factor ies as possible . . . . Th u s , the " u n leashing" of p ro d uctive fo rces became t h e g u id e l i n e and was unde rstood a s a presc ri ption
fo r t he m a x i m u m o u t po u l'in g o f i n vestme n t i n to gia n t e n te r p ri se s w i t h o u t a n y re ga rd t o coord i n a t io n , co r re l a t io n , p ro po rtion , a n d lo n g - te r m co n sid e r a tio n s , w h ic h were now c o n s idered t reasonable meas u res i n tended to c u r tail the s a l u t a r y " u n leas h i n g . " 1 3 1
Special methods were needed to force the pace o f collectivization. The party had a d i fficult task in the countryside . As late as 1 92 7 , over 98 percen t of the sown area belonged to in dividual peasan ts. These were kula ks in the official de fin ition, and ide ology demanded that poor peasants be the princi pal agents of the party in the drive toward collectivization. The rural soviet (selsovet) was the local unit of the Comm unist party . The poor peasants we re tax exempt, yet as members of the soviet they were charged with t he task of tax col lectio n . One of the first steps away from NEP, then, was to activate the soviets manned by poor peasants to collect taxes from the kulak house holds which NEP had encouraged. B ut in 1 92 7 - 1 929, the better-off peasants quickly increased their re presentation in the soviets. These peasants were influentia l locally, and they n aturally sought to protect their i nterests . Moreover, peasant prop rietors had the ir own traditional methods of handling comm unity problems. In 1 9 1 7 the old village community (mir) had been in disa rray , with only 50 percent of the peasants be longing to it. B ut with the e ncouragement of pro prietorship under N EP, the peasants quickly reverted to the old practices and by 1 9 2 7 95 percent o f their holdings were regularly redistributed by the community. The responsibilities of the village assemblies involved the distribution and reallocation of strips, methods of crop rotation , communal use of graz ing land and forests, control of membership, as well as the disc ussion of community problems like schools and roads . The i m portance of vil lage assemblies (skhod) is suggested by the fact that in twenty-three dis tricts of Tula province, some 1 9, 000 assemblies met during 1 92 5/26. Whe n the party sought to activate the rural soviets with the onset of collectivization in 1 928, t hese assemblies had considerable funds and the gl'eat advantage of perfo rmi n g functions o f i nteres t to the peasants. By contrast, the rural soviets had few funds as well as unpo pular adm in istrative responsibilities. N evertheless, the d rive toward collectivization could be accomplished o n ly through the forced activation of t he rural soviets at the expe nse of the village asse mblies. 1 32 Collectivization thus meant the destruction o f civil society in the countryside. In this case , the record literally s peaks for itself. The prop e rty of 1 million kulak households, which had prospered during N EP,
574
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
was con fiscated. An estimated 4 . 5 m illion people were removed from their native area to other parts o f the country-the same method the Mu scovite tsars had used after their conquest of Novgorod ( 1 565- 1 5 72) . This cam pai gn against better-off peasant households was (among other th ings) a means of forcing the rest of the peasants to accept col lectivi zatio n . Betwee n 1 930 and 1 936, the proportion of col lectivized peasan t households increased from 23.6 to 89.5 percent, cove ring about 95 per cent of the cro p area by the latter date . The peasants reacted with the only means at their disposal. They red uced grain harvests from a high of 8 3 . 5 million tons in 1 930 to a low of 67.6 million ton s in 1 93 4 . 1 33 They also slaughtered their animals (see Table 6) . This resistance in the coun tryside was echoed by intensified strug gl es within the ruling Commu n ist pa rty . Stali n's collectivization drive was followed by the "Great Purge," i n which real and imagined oppo nents of the new policy and all those considered potential opponen ts of Stalin's leadership were summarily liquidated. Estimates of the n umber executed and of those who perished in Russian labor camps vary be tween ten and twenty m illion persons, with the weight of the fragmen tary evidence favoring the higher figure. 1 34 I n this second as well as in the firs t revolution , the n umber of deat hs amounted to between 12 and 1 5 percent of the Russian people ; em igration played an important role only in the first revolution . Put another way, Russian society underwent a loss of some thirty-four million people in a period of twenty to twenty five years. i B u t the two re volutions did not cons ist of coe rcio n a lo n e The Soviet regi me claimed to represent the laboring masses of the Russian people. This claim is basic for understanding the Communist concept of the mandate to rule. .
In the Communist Manifesto of 1 848, Marx and Engels had distin guished between workers and com m unists. They made clear that work ers' understanding was partial, nationalist, often backward, irresolute, and limited. By contrast, the understanding of communists was com' Krushchev is re ported to have given an esti mate of eight million purge victims, An· d rei Sakharov put the figu re between ten and fi fteen , while Conq uest comes to twenty (which he calls almost certainly too low). If one takes a m iddle estimate of fi fteen for the 1 930s and adds the estimate of a loss of n ineteen million (deaths or emigrations) during the civil war, one arrives at a minimum loss o f thirty-four million. If one takes birth deficits d ue to the deaths of child-bearing ad u lts into account, the total loss sustained d u ring the two revolutions was m uch h igher. I n citi ng these esti mates, one touches on a trauma o f the twentieth century. Earlier instances of mass killings may ha\'e been equally devastating: One thinks of the Mongol conquests i n Russia and Persia, the Thirty Years' War, the European powers at war on the Continent and overseas, or outbreaks of mass violence as in the parlition of India and Pakistan. The special trauma of the Soviet pu rges (or of genocide under the Nazis) is the use of mass killings as a government policy in peacetime, or so it seems to me.
NA TION-B UILDING: R USSIA
575
TAB LE 6 "192 8 ( m i l l i o n head)
70.5
38.4
2 6 .0
1 2. 1
1 46 . 7
50. 2
Cattle Pi gs Sheep and goats SOURCE:
N o ve , Economic History ,
193 3 ( m i l lion head)
p . 1 86 .
preh e n siv e , i nternat ionalist, re solute, and lo n g range . The d i stinction follow ed from the role which Marx attributed to reason and sc ie nc e . I n his vi e w, workers would provide th e political momentum for the revo lu tionary overthrow of capitalism , while the intellectual direction of this u p heaval would be p rovid ed by "bourgeo i s ideologists." While workers react against the inhumanities of exploitation, ideologists respond s ym p athetically to the intensified class struggle and the underutilization of man's p rod uctive potential. Marx allowed that worke rs would increase their un d erstanding through their experience in the class struggle. He also insisted that communists of bourgeois origin could not p rovi d e ef fective leadership at will, but only where the class struggle was prepari n g the ground for revolutionary action. Marx did not offer a sim ple solu tion . H e considered the relations between workers and "bourgeois ide ologists" problematic and would p robably have said that only practical, political action could resolve such relations in the future. 1 35 Equivocation is inevitable whenever an educated elite acts out its own sense of social res p onsibility by claiming to represent the needs and interests of the people. Marx himself made this clear when he wrote that "it is not relevant what this or that worker or even what the whole pro let a riat conceive to be their aim, for the time being. I t matters only w hat the proletariat is and that it will be forced to act historically in accordance with this being."136 In the Russian context, this equivocation preceded the adoption of Marxism as a revolutionary ideology. The terrorists who assassinated Alexander I I in 1 88 1 claimed to "act on behal f of the peo ple," but then declared that they were determined to "reawaken the people by agitation," that interests of which the people were unaware were yet inherent in their li fe. Previously, the terrorists had encountered the people's hostile reactions to their agitation , but they hoped that the assassination itself would bring popular grievances against tsarism out into the open. The intelligentsia'S uneasy relation with the people m ust be emphasized in order to a ppreciate the radicalism of Lenin's position. In his pamphlet What Is To Be Done ? ( 1 902), Lenin abandoned the idea which the po p ulists had shared with Marx, namely, that a radical
TO WA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
pol i tica l orie n tation would arise spo n t a n eous l y from the workers' ex perience in the class struggle . There is a lot of tal k abou t s po n ta n e i t y , but t h e spontaneous de ve lo p m en t of t h e l ab o r move ment lead s to i t s beco m i n g s u b o r d i n ate t o bou r ge o is ideol-
ogy . . . for t h e s po n taneous labo r move men t i s p u re and s i m p le t rade u n i o n i s m . . . . H e nce, o u r t a s k
. . .
is to co m ba t
spontaneity,
to
divert
t he labor move-
m e n t , with its s po n ta n eous t rade u n io n i st s t r i v i n g, from u n d e r the wi n g of
t h e bou rge o i s ie a n d to bring i t under t h e w i n g o f re v o l u ti o n a ry Social Democ racy . . . . The w o r k e r s can acq u i re c l ass po l i t ica l
consciousness only from without,
t h a t i s , o n l y o u tside of t h e eco n o m i c struggle , ou tside of t he sp h e r e o f rela t io n s betwee n worke r s a n d e m ploye rs . . . . a
T he S o c i a l - Dem o c r at ' s ideal s ho u l d not be
t ribune
of the people,
a
t rade - u n io n secretary, but
able to react to every m a n i festation of tyran ny and
o ppres sion . . . he m ust be able to gro u p a l l t hese manifestations i n to a single pic t u r e o f police v iolence and capitali st ex ploi tat io n ; he m ust be ab l e to take advantage of every pe t t y eve n t . . . , in order to ex plain to all and everyone the world- h i sto r ical signi ficance o f the s tr u g gle for the e m a n c i pat io n of the pro le tariat. 1 37
The u pgrading of what the professional revolutionary can do goes hand in hand with the downgrading of working-class sponta n e i ty . The n ucleus of the party must be com posed of persons whose " profession is revolutionary work ." They are to receive enough financial support from the party to change their place of work, engage in clan destine activity , and acquire the requisite knowledge and e x pe r i ence . All decisio n - making of the party must be concentrated in a cadre of profes sional revolutionaries. To be sure , the broad masses should be enliste d in the moveme n t . But only a party led by tested revolutionaries will cre ate a firm organization that in s pires confidence and ensures victory . Lenin formulated this principl e of centralized decision - making by a party elite in 1 902, long before the Bolshevik revolution. In What Is To Be Done ?, Len i n argued for strict centralization of controls in the party . He adopted the title of Chernyshe v ski ' s novel which had extolled the sterling qualities of professional revolutionaries, an em phasis natural to a political exile who had to identify with the masses from afar. Lenin retu rned to Russia in April 1 9 1 7 a fter the out break of the revolution. Under these circumstances, it was natural to employ the sloga n "All Power to the Soviets." Assemblies of workers and soldiers had been formed by left - wing political leaders after the tsar's abdication in March, but they were a familiar organizational form going back to the revolution of 1 905 and other antecedents. Leni n had di s paraged the spontaneous trade unionism of the working class in pe ace time, but he extolled the revo l u tio n ary spontaneity of Russian soldiers and workers . He used this mass mobilization as a legitimation of the
NA TION-B UILDING: R USSIA
57 7
B olshevik seizure of p o wer. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that he aban d oned his earlier, elitist view of . the central cadres of t he party as the le aders in the postrevolutionary period . 1 38 The legi timat i on o f a party leadership in exile differs from the le giti m atio n of party aut h orit y d u ring a revolution, and that i n turn d i f fe rs from legitima tion o f a revo lutionary government in authori ty . As the leader of a revo l u t ion a r y government, Lenin abandoned not only the earlier dichotomy between professional revol utionaries and "trade unionist" workers , but also any sim ple reliance on the soviets. He was clearly aware that t h e new regi m e needed all the po pular co operation it could obtain, but also that in order to s urvive it m ust obtain tha t co o per at io n on its own terms. This realization is re flecte d in his design of party organizatio n .
By "democratic centralism ," Lenin meant t hat there wo uld be free and vigo rous (indeed, ruthless) discussion among all party members , wh o were the closest a p proximation to the public and to popular se n timent which the party would encompass. Party members were the van guard of the masses, re presented their sentiments, and provided the needed cooperation -or so it was m aintained. Once discussion had taken place among the members, the leaders made the decision, and then every loyal party membe r must fol low the " party li n e . " In this way, Len i n sough t to combine the people's spontaneous cooperat io n with the leaders' full freedom of actio n . In practice, his own position was quite flexible. In his statements on the New Economic Policy, Lenin advocated a slow, personable approach so that the mass of the peasants could move forward with the party. He did not explain how party activists could he flexible in their work with the peasants while com plying unquestioningly with d e c i s io ns of t h e Ce ntral Comm ittee of the party . His last angu ished writings even argue d for a more accommodating a pproach among party leaders, although earlier he had emphasized toughness as indispensable for the dedicated party leader. How did the one-party dictatorship of the Bolsheviks claim to re p resent t he people whe n it first used the spontaneous outbursts of the revolutionary period to ap ply the old methods of "government by t r ib ute collection" and then reversed i tself and restored the capita l i st meth ods of small pri vate e nter prises? The answer is that from Lenin down to the present, Soviet leaders have j us t i fi e d these and later policies by reference to the ca pi t al i s t encirclement which threatens the ach ieve ments of the revolutio n . Len i n's last art i c le "Better Fewer, B u t Better" ( 1 923) i s sy mpto m a tic in this respect. He felt that the revolution had to its credit the destruc tion of capitalist indus t ry, medieval institutions, and landed proprietor ship. Now, however, t he Soviet Union had to kee p going on its pa th d espite the absence of socialist revolutions in more developed countries.
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
To be s u re , the interve n tion by the Weste rn ca pitalist powers had failed to overthrow Russia's revol utionary government. B u t in Le n i n s view , these powers had succeeded in preve nting the Bolshevik system '
from a t o nce taking the slep forward thai wou ld have justified the forecasts rif the socia lists, t h at wou ld have e n abled the l a t t e r . . . to d e v e l o p all t he pote n t i a l i t ies
w h ic h , taken to gether, wou l d have p rod uced soc i al i s m ; s oc i a l i s t s wo u l d t h u s
have p rov e d t o a l l a n d su n d ry t h a t soc i a l i s m co n t a i n s w i t h i n itse l f giga n tic fo rces a nd that man k i n d had n ow e n te red i n to a new stage o f d e v e l o p m e n t of e x traord i n a r i l y b r i l l i a n t pro s pects.
These brilliant prospects were delayed indefinitely, because timely conces sions had retarded the revol utionary movements in the develo ped co un tries . On the other hand, ca pitalist develo pment had begu n i n countries l i ke China and India, w here im perialist exploitation wo uld be the main cause o f worldwide revolution in the future. The tas k of Soviet leaders and the whole Russian people was there fore, "to hold on" u n til this future would come to pass, and Len i n had no doubt o f t h e o utco me ,
.
I n the last analysis, the o u tcome of the str u ggle w i l l be de te r m i ned by the fact that Russia, I n d i a , C h i na , etc . , acco u n t for the overwhel m i n g m ajority of the population of the globe . And d u ri n g the past few years it is t h is ma
jority that has been d rawn i n to the st r uggl e for emancipatio n with e xtraor
d i nary rapid i t y , so that i n this re spect there cannot be the slightest doubt wh al the final outcome
of the
world struggle will be. In
cialism is fully and absolutely assured.
.
.
.
Ihi5
sense, the complete
victory of so
To e n s u re o u r existence until t he next
m i l i tary conflict between the counte r-revol u t io nary i m perialist West and the
revol u t ionary and n ationalist East, betwee n t he most civilized cou n t ries of the world a nd the orien tally backward co u n t ries, w hich however, com prise the major i t y ,
this majority must become civilized.
We, too, lack enough civil izatio n to
e nable us to pa s s straight on to soc ial i s m , altho u gh we do have the poli tical req uis ites for i t . 1 39
Lenin did not say how socialism could have released "gigantic forces" imm e diat ely if the m aj o ri ty of the world population "must be come civilized" first. I n stead, he linked the brilliant promise of socialism ( his article of faith) with the certainty of victory. For now the majority of the world's po p u lation had been drawn into the development of cap italism and hence would e xperie n ce the p redicted intensification of the class struggle. This prospect made u p for what Lenin ack n ow ledged as an earlier and mistaken assum ption-namely, that the revolution would occur in the eco n omically advanced countries. H is discussion made So viet hopes de pend on the inevitable class conflicts which would occur as capitalism spreads. These conflicts would provide Russia with the respi te it needed to develop its indu stry and t h u s defend itself against Western capitalism and imperia l i s m ' 4 0 Lenin's article of 1 923 o ut lin e d the s i ege m ent ality which facilita ted .
NA TION-B UILDING: R USSIA
579
Stalin's rise to power i n the 1 920s. Stalin em phasized the role o f the Communist party as the general s�aff which could give "correct guidance to the proletarian millions." The Party m u s t b e , fi rst o f a l l , t h e v a n g u a l-d o f t h e work i n g class. T h e Pa ny m ust absorb a l l the best e l e m e n ts o f the worki n g c l ass . .
.
. The Pa rt y c a n n o t
be a r e a l Pa rty i f it li m its i t se l f t o re giste r i n g w h a t the m a sse s o f the work i n g class feel a n d t h i n k , i f i t d ra gs at t h e t a i l o f the s p o n t a n eo u s
m o ve m e n t ,
if it
i s u n a ble to ove rcome t h e i n e rtness a n d t h e po l i t ical i n d i fference o f the spo n taneo u s movement, i f it i s u n able to rise a bo ve the m o m e n tary i n terests o f the p roletariat,
if
it i s u n a ble t o elevate t h e m asses t o the l e ve l o f t h e class
i n terests o f the prole t a r i a t . The Pa rty must stand a t the head of the worki n g class; i t
must
see fu rt h e r t h a n t h e wo rki n g class; i t m u s t lead t h e proletariat. . . .
T h e Pa rty i s the poli tical l e a d e r of the work i n g class. 1 4 I
Stalin conceived of the party as a quasi-military instrument of rule against civil society. I n stead of waiting until a worldwide revolution would provide a more favorable setting, as the New Economic Policy and the moderate wing of the party had suggested, he used the per manent emergency ind uced by "ca pitalist encirclement" to advance the idea of "socialism in one country." Ordinary methods of administration do not suffice when the polit ical leaders of a country u ndertake the task of collectivization and rapid industrialization. Max Weber called an ideally functioning bureaucracy the most efficient method o f solving large-scale organizational tasks. But this ideal type can be a pproximated only where there is orderly admin istration under the rule of law. Such conditions did not exist after the revolution of 1 9 1 7 when the country faced internal chaos, nor did they exist after 1 928. The norms governing conduct cannot remain stable for any length of time when a government m ust cope with the aftereffects of war and revolution , or for political reasons wishes to force the pace of collectivization and industrialization. Under these conditions, officials are faced with an unremitting drive for prodigious ach ievement. They are likely to employ all the maneuvers of concealment not only to escape pressure and make their lives more tolerable, but also because the party leadership makes demands on them which are "irrational, " t hat is, in compatible with ex pert knowledge and systematic procedure. The party, on the other hand, m ust try to prevent s uch concealment. It will put executive officials under maximum pressure in order to utilize their ex pertise to the fullest extent. From this standpoint, it is "rational" to place a party functionary at the side of every major official in order to prevent . concealment and apply pressure. 1 42 Russia has become an industrial world power by means of emer gency decrees. The use of terror in factio nal struggles or as a means of applying pressure is no lon ger what it was at the height of the Stalinist
TOWARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
purges or at the end of World War I I , though the incalculable u se of severe , p u nitive measures remains a prominent feature of Soviet li fe . Rapid industrialization, military victory in World War I I , and Russia's position as a supe rpower a ppear to justify the claim of re presenting the Russian masses and laboring people everywhere. The Com m unist one party state has made this claim, backed by dictatorial power, ever since the 1 91 7 revol ution. This together with u nquestioned achievements at whatever price have sha ped the cate gories of tho u ght in which bot h the le aders and ordinary Russians thin k about the world. E n forcement of ideological conformity has been a princ i pal means o f inducin g the peo ple to cope with the ever-recurring i m pedi ments to the achievement of targets set by the party leaders . The dete rminatio n to overcome s uch obstacles by subjective effort and ardor are evidence o f Lenin's and Sta lin's em phasis on the decisive im portance of belief and action rather than favorable c o n d i tion s for the attainment of a socialist socie ty . 1 43 In this view, s ubjective factors can o utwe igh the disadvantages of back wardness, an approach which underscores the crucial im portance of the party and its correct political leadersh i p for overcom ing not only obsta cles to economic growth but to cultural develo pment as well. Capitalist encirclement and the dange r o f foreign military attacks further justify the lasting importance of the state in a socialist society. They also account for the punitive and terrorist methods the state uses -in the lon g-run inte rest of workers and peasants. Western leaders have repeatedly been told by their Russian coun terparts that on this ideological front there will be no relaxation of ten sions. The reason i s that Marx's d istinction between communists and worke rs , Lenin's d istinction between professional revolutionaries and t he spontaneous "trade unionism" of the working class, and Stalin's con ce pt of the party as the general staff of the proletariat remain the model o f the Communist concept of authority. The party is the guardian of the collective interests of the m asses, and all "immediate interests" m ust be subord inated to the decisions of the Central Committee. Article 1 26 of the USSR constitution of 1 936 (as amended in 1 965) ostensibly guar antees the right of all citizens to "un ite in mass organizations-trade unions , co-operative societies, youth organizations, e tc . " ; but it then adds, the most active a n d politic a l l y -co n scious c i t i zen s i n t he ran ks of the wor king class. wor k i n g peasan t s and workin g i n t e l l i ge ntsia [are] vo l u n tarily un i ted in t h e Co m m u n ist Party of the Soviet U n ion , w h ich i s t h e van guard of the work ing peo ple i n their struggle to build co m m u n is t soc iety
of a ll OIgcmiultion.l'
and
i.�
the leading COTe
of the u·orkillg people, both government and non-government .
NA TION-B UILDING: R USSIA
In other words, no organization in civil society is permitted which does not have its coordinate party cell exercising functions of control, agita tion , and ed ucation . The rights guaranteed by the constitutio n are in distingu ishable from d uties. People w h o re fuse to vote will be told that their right to vote is the " honorable d uty of a citizen." And this is the pers pective not only for the prese nt. Curren t Soviet writings abo ut a uto pian com m u n ist society of the future make clear that the party's guidance of the m asses will become ever greater u n til the day when "al l membe rs of society are raised to the same level of consciousness and organization as the mem bers of the Party . " The party can ful fil l its mandate to rule only by using all the means at its disposal to raise the consciousness of t he people . On the day when these e fforts are fully successful , the party will not have "withered away" ; it will have become an all-inclusive organization merged with all aspects o f the li fe o f the peop le . 1 44 I n this conce ption , govern ment in the name of the people will reach its final goal only whe n the people have come to agree with the party.
14 FROM ROYAL AUTHORITY TO POPULAR MANDATE : TWENTIET H - C E N T U RY PE RSPE C T I VE S
O
U R INQU I RY into structures of authority and their transformat i ons in different societies has taken us on a long jo urney through time. The study has placed the particu larities of each country within a general movement of history. In this con c l ud i ng chapter the same g u ideli nes are briefly applied to conte m porary societies, and it seems app ropr i at e to round out an earlier dis cuss ion (Chapter 2) by focusing on China and the Arab world. ,
THE C H I N ESE REVOLUTION Modernization has been marked by recurr i ng conflicts between nonindustrial and -industrial ways of life and between monarch ic and populist authority. Such conflicts have been intensified thro u gh the demonstration effects that are faciliated by modern communication . Major advances toward industrialization and a popular mandate in one country have had consequences in others, a process which is still contin uing. The history of China in the n ineteenth and twentieth centuries provides us with a recent example of t h is phenomenon as well as with a new setting and conception of the mandate of the people. During the nineteenth century, China was forced into wars with Western powers and with Japan C hina's technological backwardness was made evident not only thro u gh military de feats but also through the "treaty port" system in which China was forced to grant to Weste rn traders the rights of extraterritoriality and favorable conditions of trade.
.
TWENTIETH-CENTUR Y PER SPECTIVES
The Manchu d yn asty ( 1 66 2- 1 9 1 1 ) m a d e uns uccessfu l a ttem pts to cope with t hese pressures, but was weakened by po p u lar rebel lions which we re dir ect l y or in di r e c tly lin ked to the e ffec t s of foreign intrusio n . Reactions to co n t act wi t h fo re ign powers were ambivale nt. Chi nese scholars assumed that their civ ilization was the center of hu man cu ltu re and that foreign powe rs could be expected to pay trib u te to t h e C h i nese em pero r. Some tried to co pe with the Western threat by cla i m ing that the basic pri nciples o f science a nd tech no l o gy had lon g bee n known an d previously a pplied by t h e C h i nese ; thus , the m astering of adm itted l y s u pe rior Western tec h n iques in e ffect merely constituted a return t o ancient Chinese practic e s . Others clai med that t h e W e s t w a s n o th reat becau se it possessed a stri c tl y m aterial c u l tu re , as opp ose d to the higher spi ritual culture o f the East. A fter t he overthrow o f the Manc h u dynasty in 1 9 1 1 , t he se efforts at r e co n ci l in g an ancient tradi tion with the West e r n ideas o f " M r . Scie nce" a n d " M r . Democracy" gave w a y fo r a t i m e ( 1 9 1 7- 1 92 1 ) to a great c ultu ral ferment in which all the the ori e s then current in the West and in Japan were e age r l y d ebated . ) D u ring th e pe ri od of w arlordism under the Chinese Re public (ca. 1 9 1 6- 1 937), the Na nking government of the nationalist K uomin tang party was founded u n de r C hia ng Kai-shek ( 1 928). The Chinese Com munist party was e st a b lish e d in 1 92 1 , and for a time Soviet Russian re pre se n tativ es at te m pt e d to con t rol it. The party e v e ntuall y came into conflict with the Kuom intang , and after the famous Lo n g March of 1 9341 935 n o rthward across Western China, some 20,000 Chinese Com munist troops established their base and staging are a in Yenan in 1 936. During the Sino-Japanese war ( 1 937- 1 945), the Chinese Communist part y join e d the Kuomintang and the American forces in the st r u ggl e again s t Japanese occu patio n . Once the Ja pa nese were d e feated in 1 945 . a civil war broke out be tween the Ku o min ta n g and the Communists from which the latter emerged victorio us. The Chinese People's Re p u b
lic was proclaimed in Pe king o n October 1 , 1 949. The C hin e se Comm unist idea of a popular m a ndate combines the centralized mobilization of the peo p le with the spontaneous initiative of the peasant masses t hemselves. Origin at in g in the years of the Yenan retreat, t his ide a w a s de velo pe d fu rt her during the Com munist war mobilization of North China agains t th e Japanese . In this national mass mobilization , coo peration be tween peasants and Com m unists was gre atly enhanced by the dis ti nctiv e structure of the Chinese pe asan t ry . That structure can be d e fine d in contrast to the R us si a n peasantry. While Russi a n landlords and officials primarily considered the peasants as a sou rce of ta xe s and manpowe r , the village asse m b ly w as capable of collec t ive decision-mak i n g in regard to community affairs. When the tsa ris t regime disin te grated in 1 9 1 7, the peasants not only e x propria ted property from the old owners but also continued t hei r accusto m e d p r ac -
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
tices of a ru ral subsistence economy through com munal se l f go ve rn men t. When the N ew Economic Policy allowed individual ente r p rise it also permitted the contin uation of these old communal practices.2 How ever, rural tradi tions were disrupted by Stali n's policies of forced col lectivization , beginning in 1 928 . The Marxist as well as the tsarist tra d i tion contai ned an antirural bias which reinforced the weakness of civi l ties between the towns and the co u ntryside . Under the tsars, autocratic governments had ruled and ex ploited the provinces from the cen ter, and peasants as we ll as gentry had evaded that rule by every subterfu ge at their disposal. However, provincial ad ministration was very ineffi cient, and although Russian landowners exacted tribute from t he po p ulation, they were not otherwise involved in the sel f-contained affairs of the vi l l age The S tali nist drive o f collectivi zation was m uch more ruth less than tsarist ad min istration had been in breaking down the is olatio n o f the countryside and overcoming rural resistance to central directives. Yet even after more than fou r dec ades of a concerted dri ve to o r gan ize the peasantry, the private secto r still plays a signi ficant role in Soviet ag r ic ult u re 3 The Chinese v i lla ge was never as isolated from centers of authority as the Russian village community. Even in the nineteenth century, Chinese peasants had been linked to gentry, merchants, and artisans by regional market areas. Moreover, the local notables who retained their influential position in the village cultivated their ties with other notables and government officials in the marketing and ad ministrative towns of the region.4 These di fferences be tween the Russian and the Chinese v i l lag e i n part ex plain differences between the re v ol utio n s i n the two c oun t r ie s The Russian revolution o f 1 9 1 7 was generated by an upsurge of peasant o pp o si t io n to tsarism and the first World War. The e ns u i ng c ivi l war d es tro ye d whatever was le ft of the formal pol i t ic al structure o f t he old regime. The Chinese revolution of 1 9 1 1 destroyed the Manchu dy nasty and resulted in the establishment of the Chinese Republic, but much of the old network of personal relations, albeit badly fragmented , remained. Local warlords and gentry retained power, and neither work ers nor peasants were able to overthrow them. Indeed, the 1 920s wit nessed a resurgence of conservatism under the Kuomintang. The Chinese Communists "were pushed out of the cities (and most ad ministrative towns) of China altogether, forced to pu rsue a do-or-die strategy of ru ral guerilla warfare while the now r i g hti st re-oriented Kuomintang w as le ft in control of the most modern ized urban centers. ":; In contrast, the Bolsheviks were based in the towns and their military leadership duri ng the civil war was facilitated by the rail roads built under the tsars. The Chinese revolution had to base itself on the peasantry as the main rev ol utionary force, because Ch ina's urbanization was much less advanced -
,
.
-
.
.
TWENTIETH-CENTUR Y PERSPECTIVES
than that of Rus s i a . When the Nanking government was a ctu a lly joined by t he Chinese Comm u nists in the stru ggle agai ns t t h e Ja p an es e ( 1 9371 945), the Communists e x p a n d e d the ru ral areas under their control at the ex pe n s e of the J a pa nese. Thus, by 1 945 they controlled some nineteen "li berated areas" with a total of 70 to 9 0 m illio n persons. I n North China, they were c learl y the most e ffective leaders o f peasant re sistance to Japan . In Russia, m ili tar y de feat in World War I led to revolution and then to civil war. I n China, by contrast, m il i tar y v ictory over the Ja p a nese led first to c i vi l war between the Chinese Communists and the K uo mi n t an g and then to revolution. D u ri n g the ci v i l war ( 1 946- 1 949) , the Chinese Communist armies used their lo n g experience of or gan izi ng the peas ants in de feating and o ve r t hro w i n g the Nanking go vernment. Thus, the way was pre pa red for a ne w C hin es e version of what Marxists, Leni n ists, and Stalin ists had grappled with be fore - namely, the relations between town and country and between the Communist party and the masses. Mao Ts e-tun g wa s e x c e pti o na lly skilled in comb in i n g the Chinese tradition with ideas taken from a bro ad . In his youth, he studied the "new learning" from the West, but standard Western le ar n ing was tainted because of the acts of a gg ress i o n the Weste rn powers co mmi tte d again st China. Marxism- Le ninism was a more useful Wester n i m port for Mao. But he was carefu l to point out that a l t h o ugh the stu d y of Marxism w a s im porta n t , it was equally impor ta n t "to understand o ur h i sto r ic in heritance and to evaluate it critic a l ly by the use of the M a rxis t m e thod ." Tod ay' s C h i n a i s an outgrowth of hi storic C h i n a . We a r e M arxist historicists ; we m ust not mu ti late history. From Con fuc ius to S u n Yet-se n we m ust sum it up critically .
. . . The assi m ilation
o f this ( precious) heri tage itse l f tu rn s out
t o b e a kind of methodology that i s o f great h e I p i n the g u id a nce o f the rev o l u tio n ary move ment. C h i ne se peo ple
...
...
If a C h inese co m m u n ist w ho is a part of the great
tal ks of Marxi sm a part fro m C h inese peculia rities, this
M a rxism i s merely an e m pty abstractio n . Co n seq u e n t l y , the S i n i ficatio n of Marxism -that is to say , m a k i n g certain that i n all of its m a n i festatio n s i t is im bued with Chinese
pecu l i a rities . . . become s a
problem
u nders tood and solved by the whole Pa rty without delay .
..
that must be
.'1
I n 1 962, when Mao loo ked back on the p re ce d i n g twen ty-fo u r years, he ack n ow le dge d that the Chinese Communists had copied the Soviet Union d u r i ng the early years because of their lack of e x p erience in economic co n struc tio n . But be gi n n in g in 1 955, "we d ec id ed to make self-reliance our major pol icy," and henceforth foreign aid and i dea s would be seco n d ar y , a tem porary crutch o nl y . 7 China's collectivization of agriculture i s ev id e n ce of this i nd e pe n dence and pro v id es i m por ta nt dues for the Chinese co nce p tio n o f a po p u l ar mandate. The Chinese Communists came to power after th ree
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
years of civil war d uring w h ich they had alread y e ffected a working re lationship w i th the peasants in the regions they controlled m il i tarily. Ch inese co llectivization was accom p l ished be tween 1 954 and 1 956, with a b ou t 83 percent of farm h ouse holds collectivized by the latter date. The lands of rich landl o rds we re ex pro pl-iated and col lective farms were set u p for land-hungry pOOl" and middle-level peasants. No doubt, m any r i c h landlords were killed, but com p ared with Russia the cost in h uman lives was relatively moderate. T h ou gh the post-revolutionary expropri ations occu rred in two years , t he w hole revolutionary p rocess of expro priating and displac ing the rich was a gradual one .
D u r i n g over twenty y e a rs in the co u n t. r y s i d e of C h i n a . between 1 92 7 a n d 1 949. th e C h i nese Co m m u n i sts grad u a l l y develo ped t a c t i c s to d r ive t he war lords a n d ge n tr y fro m region a l and loca l . poli t ical - m i l i ta ry a n d eco nomic powe!". . . . The C h i nese C o m m u n ists both d i s p l a c ed . a n d i n a s e n s e . re p l aced t he warlord-ge n t ry nex us of pro v i n c ial-local powe r left ove r from the col la p si n g Old Reg i m e ; the peas a n t s still re m a i n ed orien ted t o n o n - p a roch ial leade rs w i th a foothold i n the localities. only the Party and Red A r m y h ier-
archies r e pl ac ed the landed and o fficial ge n t ry . 8
-
By building on their successful mass mobilization in the countryside dur i n g the Yenan period and the war against Japan as well as leading the popular attack on t he rich peasants, the Chinese Communists were in con tact with the masses-an inspiring and, among Communist move ments, u n i q ue experience. In Russia, by con trast, the peasants expropriated land on the ir own initiative. When agricultural production fell and supplies to the towns were disrupted, the Bolshevik regi me resorted to con fiscation to secure food supplies for the towns. I n response , the peasants curtailed agri cultu ral production and slau ghtered their cattle. The policie s of confis cation d uri n g the period of War Communism were reversed by the New Economic Policy which encouraged individ ual proprietorship (kulaks) and resulted in an increased food supply. B ut the kulaks later became the target of Sta lin's collectivization drive , thus perpetuating the antag onism between town and country. Russia's collectivization drive required a decade, with 93 percent of farm house holds col lectivized between 1 928 and 1 937. The cost in h uman lives and the unceasing struggle of the Soviet regime against the peasantry have been noted already.9 The contrast between the two collectivization drives was d ue not only to di fferent circumstances but also to d i fferen t cultural traditions. Mao Tse-tung' s em phasis on re-ed ucation rather than liquidation owed something to China's Con fucian legacyB and to the village collect ivism not to exaggerate t h e continu ities between Con fucianism and as So vie t a ppreciation () f Peter the Great or the "Slavicization" o f archeolo gi cal evidence serves Communist rather than historical or sc i e n t ific p u r poses. ·Ca re sho u ld be take n
C h inese comm unism , m uch
T WENTIETH-CENTUR Y PERSPECTIVES
of the past. The conce pt .o f "renovating the peop le " by moral inspiration (hsin-min) influenced Mao's youth and had been espoused by Mao's hero, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao ( 1 873- 1 929) , who echoed the Con fucian belief th a t it was a ge n tl eman ' s duty to inspire peop l e by his e x e m pla ry conduct. I n addition, there were traditional institution s which e ncou r a ge d collectiv ist i ndoctrination. I n th e sixteenth ce nt u ry, a v il la ge cove n a n t system (hsiang-yueh ) was devised which would re habilitate rebe ls by drawing t he m back into civ il soc ie ty. Evil was an antisocial act prod uced by de genera te customs and could be abolished only i f the inhabitants of a vi lla ge co v enant area ( u nd e r the guidance of vi rtuous officials) pledged themselves to "retu rn to goodness." I n periodic assemblies, good deeds w ere pr a i se d and bad ones den ounc ed ; ideally, every e ffort w a s made to he lp t he miscreant rather than turn him over to the authorities. But the accent of this system had bee n o n virtuous officials lecturing to the people , whereas Mao's experience with mass mobilization prom pted hi m to d e stroy the hierarchy of learning and urge every man to learn for himself. 1 o Mao used the Con fucian tradition even in his attacks on it. He chose to be remembered as the "Great Teacher" rather than by any of the other panegyrics he a pe d on h im . Education , he maintained, must break w i th rote learning and the traditional submission of the pupil to the au thority of t he teacher . Education must be linked to practice and must not be separated from the class stru ggle. The great objective was for students and for the m asses generally to combine s pontaneity and ini tiative from below wit h obedience to the correct li ne laid down from above. Stuart Schram h as pointed out that in M ao's view there was no contradiction between h is slogan "let a h undred flowers bloom" early in 1 957 and his policy later that year when many opinions were reclassified and suppressed as " poi s onous weeds." In July 1 95 7 Mao stated, Our aim is to create a political situation i n w hich there is bot h centralism and democ racy, both discipline and freedo m , both u n ity o f p u r po se and personal ease o f mind and livel iness, i n order to fac ilitate the socialist revolution and social constr uction and make it easier to overcome d i fficulties , so that we can build more quickly a modern ind ustry and agric u l t u re in o u r country, and the Pa rty and the state will be co nsolidated a n d better able to weather storms . . . .
A com m u n ist m ust be good at discussin g t h i n gs with t h e m asses, and must at no ti me be d ivorced from the masse s . The relations h i p between Party and m asses is exactly like that between fish and water. . . . 1 1
Mao's view was that the masses would provide the democracy, free dom, and liveliness essential to socialist construction, while the party would provide centralism, discipline, and unity of purpose. U nlike Lenin, and certa i n ly Stalin, Mao used the argument of the m asses (the so-called mass line) time and again to oppose the cumulative petri fic a -
TO WA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
tion of bureaucracy in the party and the government, countering t he em phasis on disci pline and regular proced u re by men like Liu Shao-ch'i, Lin Piao , and others. O f co urse , m assive press ures have been used under the sloga n of "voluntarism" to s u pport re-ed ucation ca m paigns w he n necessary . 1 2 Th is interplay between mass mobilization and guidance by the party represents wh at Mao means by the mandate of the peo ple. I n all t h e practical work of o u r Pa rt )', a l l co rrect l ea d e rs h i p i s necessa r i l y fro m t h e masses, to t h e m a sses. T h i s m e a n s : take the ideas o f t h e masses ( sc atte red a n d u n s y ste m at ic ideas) and conce n t rate t he m ( t h ro u g h s t u d y t u rn t h e m i n to conce n t rated a n d s y s te m at i c idea s ) , t h e n go to t h e m asses a n d propagate a n d e x pla i n t h e s e i d e a s u n t i l the ma sses e m b race t h e m as t h e i r o w n , h o l d fa st to t h e m a n d t r a n s late t h e m i n to
a c tio n ,
a n d test t h e correct n e s s of t h e se ideas
in su c h acti o n . T h e n once aga i n conc e n t r a t e ideas fro m t h e m asses a n d o nce aga i n take them to the m a s s e s so that the ideas a re pe rsevered
t h ro u g h . And
so O i l , o ve r
over
an
in
and c a r r ie d
e n d less s p ira l , w i t h the i d eas beco m i n g m o re correc t , m o re v i lal and riche r each t i me . 1 3 and
a ga i n i n
Perhaps without knowing it, Mao put into practice Trotsky's old saying that the majority is not counted, but won over in action . Now that Mao Tse-tung has died and memories of the "Yenan way" begin to fade, calls for discipline, con trols, and increased productivity become more insistent. For China a fter 1 949, t he Russian revolution became the "refe re nce society," at least for awhile. But Russia's overthrow of an old regime in an economically backward society and its forced collectivization and in dustrialization were achieved at enormous cost. The Chinese u nder the leadership of Mao Tse-tung reacted to this model by acce ptin g a slower rate of economic growth and with a positive emphasis on the peasantry, on re-ed ucation cam paigns, and o n the importance of subjective com m itment as a major cause o f c ha n ge . B y linking these policies with the Chinese tradi tion , they have created a new revolutionary model. Thus, Com m unist China has demonstration e ffects on other countries, which have bee n added to the demonstration e ffects of earlier revolution s and restorations. The Arab states of the twentieth ce ntu ry have also i n herited a great tradi tion which they m ust com bine as best they can with the challenges of tod a y . My remarks on the A rab world, like my remarks on China, are meant to be suggestive lor a fuller i n q u i r y i n to governance and legiti mation in the twentieth cen tu ry. ARAB N AT I O N A L ISM AND SOC IAL ISM M u hammad died in 632. A cen t u ry later the U mayyad cali phate reached from Spain across the North African rim and the Middle East to the I n d us valle}'. By 830, a process of political fragmentation began and has contin ued to the present. The Arab con q uerors of a great em-
TWENTIETH-CENTUR Y PER SPECTIVES
5 89
pire , the originators of a . great civilization, were conq ue re d themse l ve s by invaders from central Asia and elsewhere. Many com peting c a lip h ates, emirates, and other political un its e m e rge d , but in the m id st of this ce ntu ries l o n g fr a gm e n tati o n Arab c i v i l i z a t i on and Islam ach ieved a -
great c u l t u ral effloresc e nce. Until the sixteenth century, A rab spokes men con s idered the No rthern Europeans as barbarians, bu t I ndia, China, and others were felt to have great civilizations. To the h eirs of the Umayyad a nd Abbasid cali phates, t he ir own soc ie t y a p peared as hav in g the greatest h e ri t a ge of all, a se n ti m e n t which is retained a m o ng . Arab pe ople to this day. A rab co n tact with Western Euro pe dates back to 7 1 0 w he n the M us lims l a n d e d in S pa i n The C rusade s of the eleve n t h ce n t u ry m ade in roads upon the Near East ; Ottoman conq uests o f t h e fi ftee n t h c e n t ury established the T u rks in t h e Balkans. By the end o f the fi fteenth ce ntury the balance o f power be tween the Euro pean and Arab wo r ld s be ga n to s h i ft when the Christian s o usted the M uslims from Granada ( 1 492) an d Vasco da Gama made h is s uccessful voyage to I ndia ( 1 498) . But w hile the Eu ro pe a n s initiated their overseas expansion, Ottoman conquests of .
Syria and Egypt ( 1 5 1 7) and subsequent military engagements with Per sia established a land em pire which was dissolved only at the end of World War I ( 1 9 1 8) . U ntil the nineteenth century, o n ly Austria a n d Russia m ade military inroads u pon the Ottoman possessions in the Balkans and elsewhere, altho ugh European trade w ith the Middle East h ad existed for c e nturies . B ut in 1 798, Napoleon's occu pation of Egypt initiated a n era o f Euro pean military penetration on a larger scale, the first Western invasion of the M iddle East since the Crusades. The idea of Islamic s uperiority over the infidel West was shatte red . The pe r iod fo l lowi n g N a poleon's
withdrawal ( 1 799) witnessed internal Egyp t i a n re forms u nder Mo ham med Ali (viceroy of Egypt, 1 805- 1 848) , gre at e r administrative cen tralization of the Ottoman empire, b u t also the increasi ng commercial and military penetration of the Muslim world by t h e great European powers . British shipping com pan ie s bega n services to various Arab lands from India, and by 1 820 England had established its supremacy on the coasts of the Arabian peninsula. Regular shipping services by various European powers to the shores of the Mediterranean followed shortly thereafter. Native means of transport were soon replaced thro ugh road building and regular boat services on inland w aterways in Iraq and Egy pt. T he first Egypt i an railroad was built in 1 856, linking Cairo and Alexandria; by 1 9 1 4 there were over 3,000 miles of railroad track. In 1 869, the Suez Canal was opened. (Similar developments in Arab Asia occurred between 1 890 and 1 9 1 4, largely on French and Turkish ini tiative.) All these means of transport as well as irrigation constructed by modern equipment encouraged the extended cultivation of cot ton a nd
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
59 0
sugar in Egypt. The twentieth centu ry has added to a l l of this cars , lor ries, and airpl a n e s and after World War I the va st d e ve lo pm en t of o i l e x pl o ra t i o n a n d ext rac t io n . Euro pe an cultural penetration first occu rred through the vario us Christian minorities in Lebanon and Syr i a which oper ated printing presses i n their own languages. At the ti me Arabic books were printed in Eu rope and then circulated in the Near East. Although N a poleon brought an Arabic press with him to Cairo, the first M uslim printing press was est�blished in Egypt in 1 822, with Turkish books outnumber ing Arabic ones especially on technical and military s ubj ects. These de velo pme n ts were supplemented by the m issionary efforts of Fre n c h Jes uits and American Protestants, who maintained schools and col leges in Sy r i a established Arabic pr i n t ing presses, and trained a n e w generation of Arabs ,
a t o nce more conscious of their Arab heri tage and more a ffected by E u ro pea n i n fl ue nce . . . . It was in t h i s pe riod
[of the
late n i n e teenth cen t u ry] that
A rab natio nalism was bor n . I t was of m i n gled origi n . To the old A rAb d islike of Turks and the urge n t m istrust of the enc roach i n g and alien West we re added the E u ro pe a n idea of nationality and a rev ival of the A rabic language a n d culture . N a tio nalism was stro n gest among the Christians, least a ffected by the M u s l i m ideal of u n i t y , most by eco no m ic c h a n ge and Western cultural i n fluence. The Christian could not subscribe to the pa n - I slamic idea wh ich was the m odern political ex pression of the old co m m un i ty of Isla m . He sought in stead to give a new expression , in national rather than rel i gious terms, to the solidarity and resen tme n ts o f the East aga i n st the invad i n g West.
For M usli m s the two for m s of ex pres sio n were never really distinguished. The basic sen ti m e n t o f ide n t i ty was religious and social , the com plete society o f Islam expressed sometimes in n ational te r m s , so metimes in religious terms as synonymous a n d i n terc h a n geable sets of words denotin g the s am e basic reali ty . i 4
This mixture o f quasi-religious and xenophobic nationalisms was greatly e nhanced by direct European control. The French occupied Algeria from 1 830 to 1 962 and Tunisia from 1 88 1 to 1 956. British occupation of Egypt lasted from 1 882 to 1 936 and the Italian occupation of Libya from 1 9 1 1 / 1 2 to 1 95 1 . After World War I, mandates under the League of Nations were established in 1 920. T he French mandate over Syria and Lebanon came to an end in 1 94 1 ; the B ritish mandate in I raq ended in 1 93 2 , in Transjordan in 1 946, and in Palestine in 1 948. The state of Israel was founded in 1 948 in conformity with a United Nations plan partitioning Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states. The Arab states as well as China were subject to increasing Euro pean penetration d uring the nineteenth century, and both areas entered this period in political disarray. I n China, the Manchu dynasty was de clin ing and increasingly subject to internal and external attacks, but the
TWENTIE TH-CENTUR Y PERSPECTIVES
59 1
co un try retained its territorial in te g rity even when the overthrow of the Manchu was followed by the warlord i s m of the Chinese Re pu b l ic (ca. 1 9 1 6- 1 93 7). By con t rast, the A rab states of North A frica and the Middle East retained many of the po l i t ical divisions that had first appeared at the end of the Abbasid ca l i p h a te in the te nth century ; others we re p rov inces within the Ottoman e m pire. China s uffered periodic E u ro pean intrusions, but for the most part Euro pean occ u pa t i on w as confined to the treaty ports. By con trast, t he A r ab states we re s ubj ect to colon ization for pe ri o d s between 40 and 1 3 0 y ea rs and were subjec t to occupa t i o n under a mandate of the Leag u e of N at io ns fo r periods betwee n 1 2 and 28 years . The Second World War had pro fo u n d im pact in both a reas. China j oin e d the Allied powers in the s t r u ggl e a ga i n s t Ja pan ; internal political d i v i si o ns were put as i de In the wake o f Japan' s defeat, Ch ina underwent a rev o lutio n ary civil war t h a t ended with the takeover by the Chinese Communists. Contrast this t o the A rab ex perience d uring the war. Much of N orth A frica and the M id d le East were scenes of battle between the Axis powers and the Western Allies. The Arab states took n o effe c tive part in the struggle , tho ugh their peo ple were emplo yed by both sides and subjected to Allied and Axis propaganda Perhaps the greatest contrast is cultural. Even the Communist rev olution does not alter the fact that moral teaching s pecifically concerned with the conduct of government has been a main preocc u patio n of Chinese civilization for some three thousand years. The e mphasis of this tradition is reso l u tely secular. Islamic civilization has never made a dis tinct i on between religio us and po litical concerns ; the c al i phs were both religio us and political leaders of their c ommunity When a choice had to be made the maintenance of reli gi o u s functions had c lear priority One may rela te this prio rity to the I s l a m ic tradition which o bl i ges all members of the com m unity (umma) and above all its leaders to upho l d God's truth as embodied in the Qur'an ; one can relate it to the l o ng histo r y of poli tical division in the Arab world which meant that power was in the hands of i nvade rs while the religious conversion of these alien peoples presented a formidable c hallenge to t h e calip h s and the ulema. At any rate, there is lon g precedent for the separation of re l i gion from political affairs as long as the rulers protect the one true fai t h and its i n stitutions . During the nineteenth century, Western int r us ions into the coun tries of the Middle East provi ded a powerful stimulus to the emergence of an Arab intelligentsia, espec ially in the Otto man provinces of Syria, Iraq, and Egyp t . Eventu ally, clandestine opposition to the Ottoman re gime arose at the Ottoman capital, mainly among young army officers who cham pio n ed a Turkish natio nali s m and mo d ernism in c reasingly at odds with the or tho do x Islamic tradition . In the course of this o p po si ti o n, em phas i s shifted in some Ottoman provinces from the use of Brit,
.
.
.
.
·
59 2
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
ish or Frenc h precedents to German nationalism as a pattern for the development of an indige nous movement of reform or revolutio n . Ger man models were com pa tible wi th the new aspirations, partly because they were not identified with B ritain or France, and partly because the theory o f the "folk" supported Arab nativist ideals . l :; Outside Turkey, Arab nationalism has taken several forms. In the period si nce World War I I , eight of the fi fteen Arab states are still monarch ies (Bahrain, Jorda n , Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Quatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) . Hence , contem porary Arab variants of "power and the mandate to rule " include several ab sol ute monarchies trying to preserve their established order w hile at tempting to ind ustrialize the country. These states m igh t resemble the regi me of Lou is X I V were it not for the fact that personal monarchy m ust today be maintained in a world abounding i n revolutionary move ments and that these societies enco m pass both a nomadic way of life and the technology o f the twe ntieth centu ry. Saudi Arabia and the smal ler sheikdoms o f the Arabian peninsula reject the very idea of a _constitu tio n . All power is vested in the king, who is also the country's supreme religious leader. Legislation is by royal decree, and there are no political parties and no elections. All sensitive posts are held by members of the royal fam ily who favor economic develo pment. Because of its oil, Saudi A rabia is an immensely rich co untry which has engaged in recent years in an extensive program of industrializatio n . At the same time, leading members of the Saud i clan (which has some 3,000 members) are acutely awa re that it is difficult to contain this rapid develo pment within the framework of monarchy and Islam. Some internal dissension eviden tly exists , for i n 1 975 King Faisal was assassinated by a member of his clan as a protest against Westernization and modernization. The rulers o f Saudi Arabia give massive support to the m aintenance and protection of M uslim holy places, a popular move which combines genuine conviction with an effort to dampen revol utionary tendencies. The country also supports the overall cam paign against Israel, though primarily on religious grounds. The Saudis are naturally apprehensive that in conj u nction with that cam paign revolutionary extremists will jeopardize the monarchy as they have done in countries like Jordan and Libya. Consequently, Saudi Arabia often attem pts to mediate among the contending Arab states in an effort to forestall the demonstration e ffects of extreme political demands. The monarchy of Morocco exem plifies other aspects of the Saudi problem o f combining monarch y with twentieth-century conditions. The Moroccan constitution declares that sovereignty belongs to the na tio n , that poli tical parties and other voluntary organizatio ns are allowed, and that o n ly a "single party" state is explicitly prohibited. 1 6 The con-
TWENTIETH-CENTUR Y PERSPECTIVES
593
stitution also lists the political and economic rights of citizenship. These libertarian ideas of the French tradition naturally are at odds with a poor and autocratically governed country. for in practice the Moroccan kings rely on personal rule. arm y support. and emergency decrees if neces sary. It is an ope n question for how long a personal monarchy can com pensate for this discrepancy between theory and practice by economic development and a ppeals to the Islamic tradi tion Instability also threatens the six countries w hich are military re gimes with a n o mi n ally re publican constitution and mostly one-party rule. The six are Al geria. E gy pt. Iraq, Libya. Syria. and Ye me n ; the sev enth . Lebanon . has bee n ren t not only by its internal divisions but by the use of South Lebanon as a staging area for the Palestinian stru ggle aga inst Israel. Gen e rally. the ruling parties and military j u n tas seek to stabilize their regimes by sectarian and kinship loyalties, by military pre paredn e s s mo st ly directed at Israel, and by s uch economic development as their own resources, appeals for aid, and maneuvers among the big powers can engende r In addition. these Arab countries use a kaleidoscope o f political ideas derived from previous revolutions. Speeches and formal consti tutions declare that the people are the source of all authority. A formal bill o f rights is included in most constitutions. To these themes o f the French revolution are added those of the Russian. The single legal party is variously characterized as representing all the people, as the vanguard party adhering to the principle of "democratic centralism," and as the instrument which will con struct a socialist Arab society. Even the Chinese overtones are heard, as when the state is declared sacred only "to the extent that the masses have exercised their choice freely." Arab leaders pu rport to speak in the name of the masses, w hose se nti ments they claim to discern and whose consciousness they wish to raise, so that the people will be able to exercise the sovereign rights they are said to possess . The Arab leaders insist, as do the Russian and Chinese, that their mandate to govern derives from the people-with the proviso that the people must first be raised to the consciousness of their interests by the van guard partyY But the Arab countries are politically fragmented . and these verbal endorsements of revolutionary ideas are in practice political liabilities. since they raise quite unrealistic expectations. Religious and nationalist a ppeals are added to the ideological leg acies of earlier revolutions. All Arab constitutions (except that of Leb anon) declare Islam the religion of the state and Arabic its official lan gua ge ; a number of them add that Islamic sacred law, the Shari'a . is the primary source of legislation. More notable yet are the re peated refer ences to an Arab nation when in fact an Arab nation does not exist. but only the common adhe rence to Islam. These religious and nationalist .
.
594
TO WARD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
a ppeals began only in the nineteenth century. They express the gen uine desire of intellectuals who want to define an Arab identity that goes be yond the present political fragmentation, and there is reason to believe that this " religious" nationalism appeals to the masses as well. The fi fteen Arab states face a great paradox, whether they are con se rvative, relatively moderate, or revo lutionary ( a t least rhetorically) . Appeals to Islam transcend the bo undaries among them and evoke h is torical memories and powerful feeli ngs that at one level join the intel lectuals seekin g a "national identity" with the masses finding emotional release in the only world of ideas with which they are fam iliar. At this level, monarchs and military , one-party rulers alike seek legitimacy on the ground that the ir regi mes reflect and promote the underlying sol idarity of the Arab people at home and abroad. Such a solidarity may exist only as an ideal, but the appeals to this ideal seek to merge "the A rab nation" with the Islamic concept of the religio us com munity (umma) . In this way, nationalism (and socialism as well) can invoke tra ditional Muslim sentiments, fostering dreams of empire and desires for a restored Muslim community, buoyed by a sense of history, i dentity, and solidarity ! 8 The concept of the umma i s echoed i n a l l Arab countries. Its ro mantic appeal has a politically destabilizing effect in countries which are already divided along ethnic and religious lines and which are affected as well by a disparity between rich and poor that is embittered by mod ern economic developments. Even poli tically stable countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia are threatened in this way (despite their more ho mogeneous populations). Arab leaders are torn between appeals to the great Islamic tradition which t hey know to be popular and efforts to bring about economic change which along with secular political i nsti tutions tend to undermine that tradition . These two worlds m ust meet, as President Boumedienne of Algeria demanded ( 1 974), w he n he called on the spokesmen of his military, one-party regime to come in contact with the peasants . 1 9 So far such "contacts" have taken the form of mass meeti ngs with speeches punctuated by acclamations and probably at tended by few peasants. Other "contacts" con sist of nationalist and anti imperialist slogans and the advocacy of "Third World" interests. This propaganda probably creates enthusiasm among students , leaves other educated people ambivalent, and fails to persuade the peasants if indeed it reaches them. But Western observers cannot be surprised if an ag gressive rhetoric toward the outside world is used to secure political sup port at home. It is an open question how the Arab states, which hover between national and pan-Arab appeals, will come to terms with the paradox of an Islamic and i m perial legacy and their more or less per manent political divisions in a world of alien superpowers and a modern, technical civilization . 2 0
TWENTIE TH-CENTUR Y PERSPECTIVES
595
A SUM M A RY Kin gship and aristocracy re present one type of rule. A uthority is exercised by a sin gle person who i s typically consecrated in office. If he is only a nomin a l ruler, a regent will govern in his name. To sup p l e me nt his personal com mands, the sovere i gn must delegate a u thority ; t h us, rulers are always involved in com promises between ce ntral direction and local autonomy Th e se com promises help to account for t he vario us structu res of ro yal a u t hority from one century to another as well as from coun try to country. Des pite these variations, the royal cou rt is the sum mit of a country's hierarc h y of p r es t ige resulting in underlying uni formities of kingshi p The old majesty o f kings was permanently i m paired when i n En gland the king-in-parliament became the supreme authority of govern ment. I n the early seven teenth century, three groups d evelo ped which eventually coalesced in opposition to the rule of Char l es I . The first group consisted of Puritan divines, led by men who had been persecuted under the reign of Mary Tudor. A fter Elizabeth came to the throne, these men wanted to purify the An glican church of its Catholic legacies in doctrine and ritual, but they wanted to do so from within the church through reform of the c hurch service, the presbyterian principle of or gani za ti on, and widesp read lecturing. The second group consisted of common lawye rs members of a conservative pro fession, many of w hom had a gu ildli ke interest in the common-law courts as against the pre rogative courts of the k i n g I n the agita tion of the time, some spokesmen of this p rofessional gro u p developed legal princ i ples on the basis of an cient precedent which accentuated the gathering con flicts between par liament and the crown . The third group consisted of p romi n e n t landed gentry in parliament, men of great standing in the realm who s ponsore d Puritan clergy through their control of church benefices and em ployed common lawyers in their many lawsuits. These aristocratic representa tives of "the country" were o ften legally trained and many were t hem selves Puritans. In the co urse o f disputes with the king, some of these parl iamentary leaders developed techniques of organization wh i ch transformed diffuse resentments into a concerted par l iam ent a ry op position . The ties of interest which linked these three groups have been the subject of much controversy. There is less d i s p ute that a combination of religious inspi rat i on vested interest, and high social standing in the counties and in parl i a me nt brought about powerful opposit ion to the k i ng In 1 688 a new po lit ic a l balance was achieved between king and parliament as w e l l as between court and country ; henceforth, pr i nc iples of religious toleration and of law e x isted in a society dominated by a landed aristocracy. These achievements of the seventeenth century rev olution were to prove advantageous for the later developm ent of ci v i c .
,
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,
.
,
.
-
TO WA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
equality and law , but d u ring m uch of the eighteenth centu ry these ad vantages were d i fficult to disce rn . I t would have been plausible, though m isleading, to concl ude that the revolutions of 1 640 and 1 688 h ad re sulted only in a conservative restoration . The French revolution was led b y the radical philosophes and the con se rvative parlemen taires, the latter promoting their interests increas i n gl y i n t he language of the fo rmer. Pa ris society , with its salons and masonic lodges , provided a natu ral meeti n g-gro und for writers and members o f the Fre nch nobility. These men belonged to the established society, though i t is as true of France as it was of En gland that by artic ulating their own grieva nces and i deas they gave direction to the more d i ffuse discontents in t he society at large . By destroying not only royal authority , but also the legally protected privileges o f church and nobility , the French revolution established the new principle that all sovere ign aU lhority emanates from the nation as a w hole and that the central gov ernment is the only legitimate executor of that authority. All interme diate bod ies of c i v i l society , such as schools, municipalities, t he ch u rch, private associations, and assemblies, are under the ultimate authority o f t h e nation ; thus, in princi ple nothing i s allowed to intervene between the state and the individ ual citizen . This principle of the nation-state has had enormous a ppeal, although in practice many forms of private as sociation have developed (in France and elsewhere) which are tolerated as long as they do not interfere with sovereign functions of the national government, such as taxatio n , conscri ption, or adj udication. The French re\'ol ution and the populist revol utions which followed m ust be distin gu is hed from the English revol utions of 1 640 and 1 688. The main stream o f English revol utionary thought was limited by the religious and legal con texts in w h ich the old j usti fications o f authority had been ques tioned . English theory and practice remained com patible with the res tora tion of oligarch ic rule, tho ugh on the new basis o f the "king-in-pa r liament. " B y contrast, French revo l utionary thought wen t beyond s uch lim itations because it made the peo ple or t he nation the basis of all authority . The English a n d French antecede n ts ha\"e provided demonstration e ffects to w h ich ed ucated elites in other co untries ha\'e responded . At tem pts to develo p new stable po li t i c a l i n stitutions in the name of the people have ever since in \"Ol\"ed a reco llsecration of authority , howe ver oste nsibly secular or antireligious the new conce ptions have been . The Engl i s h revo l ut ion appealed to the ancient consti tutio n and the co untry, while the French revol ution based itself on the ancient precedents of repu blican virtue and the ultimately u nchallengeable authority o f the nation. In these cases, authority was taken from the king and retu rned to the people from whom kings were said to have derived their authority in the distant past.
TWENTIETH-CENTURY PERSPECTIVES
597
As a reaction to these. precedents, German rulers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in an effort to maintain their inherited au thority, proposed to do for "their" people -by a revolution from above -what the French people had done at high cost by and for themselves . The king as the "first servant of his people" and the officials' ideals of law, d u ty and B ildung were the newly consecrated foundation of Ger man governmental authority . The modern use o f the term revolution was unknown prior to the end of the eighteenth century, when Condorcet summed up what by then nearly everyone took for granted : "The word 'revolutionary' can be applied only to revolutions whose aim is freedom." The French rev olution has since served as a n implicit standard by which all other up heavals are assessed . Even today, revolution means progressive forces from below overthrowi n g an oppressive regime . However, s uccessful revolutions have had outcomes which did not res u l t in greater freedom . Stalin's regime caused a major u pheaval in Russian society but was also a human disaster, and some spokesmen of the progressive tradition have there fore denied that Stalin's regime was revolutionary. But revolution simply means that a form of government or social system is overthrown and another takes its place ; the term should be a pplied where such overthrows occur. Most revolutions have had equivocal results: They have enhanced some freedoms and diminished others. In addition , ma j or changes have occurred in the absence of political revolution, and they also have enhanced some freedoms and diminished others. Revo lutions are often initiated by dissension among the dominant groups in society rather than by the protest of subordinate groups. Past revolu tions do not re present a prototype of future revolutions, because those ,
who come late r will try to use the earlier re vol utionary ex perience to
their own advantage and in their own way. 2 1 Thus, in Germany, restorative tendencies and significant transfor mations prevailed in the n i neteenth century. Monarchy preserved its prerogatives not only in Prussia but throughout the German Con fed eration a fter 1 8 1 5 and even in the united Germany a fter 1 8 7 1 . More over, many aristocratic privileges were preserved, w h ich served to but tress autocratic rule. Nevertheless, major changes occurred. The development of the Ge rman legal system represented a major advance in the protection of individual rights, which was also a main ach ievement of the French revolution . A customs union achieved under Prussia's leadership unified a major part of the German Con federation, and Ger many as a whole became politically unified under the leadership of Bis marck. Since political fragmentation had prevailed in this Central Eu ropean area for a thousand years, these transformations of Germany ( however transitory) can hardly be dismissed as minor. It is true of Germany, as it was of England and France , that the
TO WARD A MANDATE
OF THE PEOPLE
changes which occu rred had equivocal results. What appeared " pro g re ssi ve from the stand point of German national liberation and uni fication (note t hat these terms have a more revolutionary connotation in t he twentieth cen tu ry than they did in the nineteenth) also c reated enormous liabilities for the future. B ut it w i l l not do to con t r ast these l iabilities of the Germa n trans formation with t he pos i t iv e results of the English and French revol utions. The consequences of German au toc racy and the weakness of German liberalism should be com pared rather with the costs of economic individ ualism 'in the industrial development of E n gland or France as well as the costs o f " free trade" i m perialism in the colonial e m pires of both co untries . As a gen e ra l rule, c o m pa r i s o n req u ires a consideration of assets and liabilities, rather t han c on t r ast s between the liabilities of one c ount r y and the assets of ano the r. J a p an is a unique case , si nce for a millen nium its governmental and ceremonial authority had been divided. Wh e n t h e go ve r n mental au thority of the Tokugawa shogunate faltered, recourse to the divinely descended imperial house was readily at hand, for its sacred, legi t i m a t ing functio n had never been abandoned . But the M e ij i emperor w as now so e x a l te d that i t became difficult to relate his imperial author i ty to t h e people w ithout desecration. Where German rulers sought to maintain themselves by now serving the people , the Meiji oligarchs had to find ways of p o li tical ly combining a godlike emperor with an organized e x p re ss i on of the nation' s interests. The Me ij i Restoration has rarely been called revo lutionary, bu t this "
may not be justified. The term restoratio n s uggested that the su preme
author i ty of the emperor had bee n usurped by the shogunate a thou san d years earlier, but that now in 1 86 8 the emperor was restored to his rightful position . This i n ter p re ta tio n was part of the time-honored Jap anese tradition which the Meiji oligarchs were eager to preser ve intact. Western observers, with the model of the French revolution in mind, readily agreed that the Meiji Restoration was a strongly conservative move ment, for it was initi a te d by members of the Japanese aristocracy. Nevertheless, the changes brought about by the restoration re presented a c om p lete transformation o f the old social structure. Samurai stipends were reduced drastically and eventually elim inated, daimyo domains were changed into administrative provinces, and commercial and in dustrial enterprises were officially encouraged and then left to fend for themselves. Merchants had been the most despised class in Tokugawa Japan ; u nder Meij i , the sa m urai were encouraged to become successful entrepre neurs. These and rela ted changes were achieved under con servative a uspices The very speed with which a highly disciplined ruli ng group forced the pace of industrialization le ft grave liabilities for the future development of the country. B ut it does not follow that major changes of a society are nonrevolutionary because they are accom plished .
TWENTIETH-CENTUR Y PER SPECTIVES
599
under conservative and militarist auspices or because they h ave led to militarism and dic tator s h i p. Since restorations can initiate impo r t an t c ha n ge s and revolution s need n ot have " progres s i ve " results, how are we to think of the Russian case? One should di s tin g u is h be twee n the re forms of the tsa ri s t r e gi m e ( from the e m anc i pa ti on of the serfs in 1 86 1 to the industrialization driv e a fte r 1 890) , t he revolution of 1 905, the revolution of February 1 9 1 7, the Bolshevik cou p of October 1 9 1 7, and finally the "revolution from above" from 1 928 onward .22 Stalin's revolution of forced collectivization under central party di rec ti ves and his o pt i n g for "soc ialism in on e coun try" represent a d a r i n g a n d vast ly costly innovation in the succession of Rus s i an transformations and m o d ern revolutio n s. We have no r ea son to think this final development inevitable. I f Russia had rem a i ned at peace in 1 904 and 1 9 1 4 , reforms und er tsarist au s pices m ight have had more effect. Le n i n m igh t have lived longe r and sided with the moderate wing of the party. But these and other possibilities m ust be set again st Russia's fateful legacy o f autocratic rule. For centuries, all civil impulses had been subordinated to the service of t he state, and since 1 928-for nearly half a century-the fiction of a popular m andate has been ma n ipulated to justify a wholly dictated revolution. Now, as previously, the Russian state is directed by a government supported through "tribute collection." The country has been industrialized by means of "primitive socialist accumulation," in which the peasants' surplus above subsistence has been expropriated by force. This is the same pe asantry in whose name in part the revolution was made. Tsarist authority was overthrown in the name of "soldiers, workers, and peasants" and ul timately in the name of the "world p roletariat. " Appeals to the Great Russian people, to Ru ss ian nationalism, and to the p i o n ee ri n g role of Russian civilization have supplemented the reconsecration of Soviet authority . CONC LUD I N G RE FLECT ION S
Authority exercised in the name of the people is a type of rule with at least as many structures of government as kin gs hi p and aristoc r acy. De s pi te these diversities, the direct relationship between the government and the citizens and the appeal to a popular mandate is characterized by the generic, ever-recurring paradox between elitism and populism. For the thesis that "sovereignty is the property of t he peo ple (Ba'th party constitution) does not preclude government by t he few and raises the q ues tion of how "the people" are to be defined. The initial answer o f the French revolution was the sim plest. The Abbe Sieyes distinguished between 25 million French men and the 2 00, 000 nobles and clergymen who hardly counted by com parison. More recently, Mao Tse-tung has employed a similar argument. Yet this "
600
TO WA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
contrast between the vast majority of the people and the few who hold power poses problems. As soon as an old regime is overthrown , t he per son nel of the new regime m ust be selected and difficul t q uestions of c itizenship m ust be answered . "The peo ple" m ust be classi fied into mi nors and ad u lts, into those liable to, or exem pt from , taxation and con scriptio n , and -be fore t h e d a y s of u n iversal franc hise-into those en titled, and those denied , the right to vote and stand for public office . Such definitions of "the peo ple" have a world-historical dime n sion . 2 3 T h e En glish a n d French revol utions liberated their societies from an inhibiting political framework . They redefi ned the rules under wh ich the people were entitled to participate in public affairs, though the French revol ution wen t m uch further i n this respect than the E n glish. The Russian revolution also destroyed an inhibiting political framework, but one that had allowed major economic developments since the 1 890s only to be weakened by defeat in two major wars. After a decade o f restoration a n d policy disputes, t h e Russian revolution proceeded t o its secon d phase in which the state, u nder a single-party system , col lectiv ized agriculture and forced the pace o f industrialization. In this second phase , the people were defined in terms of the loyalty which they could demonstrate by maxim u m performance under a regimen of universal civilian conscriptio n . Subseq uently, the C hinese atte m pted to do by mass cam paigns o f re-ed ucation what the Russians had done by coercion . Bending the Con fucian tradition in a revolutionary direction , the Chinese Communists have primarily applied moral pers uasion and gro u p pres s u re to all the people, not j ust to an ed ucated elite as Confucianism had done. This universal a pplication of a greatly altered Confucian tradition also constitutes a defini tion of "the people." We do not know the results of t h is a p proach or how it will be modi fied in the future . B ut a unive rsal morality for "the people" is not likely to be considered a viable JX>licy o utside China; ultimately, it may not be successful there. Most states that have won JX>litical inde pe ndence since World War II do not possess either China's territorial integrity or its political tra di tion of a rather effective linka ge between villages and the u rban cen ters of markets and government administration . Even in China, that lin kage bro ke down when dynasties declined. Other old states like those disc ussed here have gra ppled for centu ries with internal divisions and the problems of political integration . For exa mple, "England" does not include Scotland and Wales and is a m isleading name for the U nited Ki ngdom of Great Britain and Northern I reland . Scottish nationalism, Welsh language and culture, and the contin uing struggles in Northern Ireland certainly reinforce that point.24 I n other i nstances, old JX>litical divisions do not play a major role in contrast to the new divisions which do. In the Federal Re public of Germany, Lander like Bavaria, Baden W ii rttemberg, or West phalia were se parate political u nits at one time,
TWENTIETH-CENTUR Y PER SPECTIVES
60 1
but today's divisions among them do not com pare in importance with the division between East and West Germany. Oddly enough, this last division is partly responsible for more internal unity within the Federal Re public, because the pro portion of Catholics and Protestan ts in the West is more evenly balanced than was the case in a united Germany . Ethnic, linguistic, and religious divisions pose ever-changing problems of political accommodatio n , and societies are unified only in the sense that they have learned to handle such diversities . Terms like state or na tion play down or ignore these persistent divisions, but political unity is never com plete and serious challenges to it recur to this day even in the old states. I n the new states, the predominance of civil ties ove r the affinities of language, religion, and ethnicity is a m uch more recent and precar ious development.25 These new states are typically areas of great pov erty . The bulk of their po pulation is agricultural, while a small sector of the economy in a few urban centers consists of enterprises a nd a gov ernment derived from twentieth-century models and still dependent on foreign capital and personnel. My p�rpose here is to consider three im plications of that center-periphery contrast for a government in the name of the people : the conflict between communal and civic loyalties ; the absence of a political com munity; and the universal occurrence of nationalism . Where poverty prevails and governments are weak , people find what security they can in the protection which kinship affords them, for language, religion, and group identity are transmitted through the fam ily and thus given at birth. Where opportunities are scarce, claims based on such affinities are o ften effective. All modern states have developed in com petition with these communal a ffinities , for the state directs our
attention to the nonfamilial and, in that sense, impersonal exercise of authority. For a peo ple to constitute a political community, the govern ment must impose obligations on the individual, and these civic obli gations typically conflict with familial obligations. Thro u gh its legal in novations, the French revolution emanci pated the individual from such obligations. Henceforth, all persons who had come of age were empow ered by law to act in their own behalf, a principle greatly rein forced by the individualism of the marketplace . Through their political innova tions, communist and fascist regimes carry this "emancipation" further by obliging the individual to put the claims of the ruling party above the claims of his family. The use of family members as spies on one another or as hostages whose lives depend on the political con formity of their kind red is one typical technique of such regimes. Many new states which are organized as one-party regimes may attem pt com parable methods, but in their case the anti fam ilial drive in the name of the people comes into intense con flict with the communal affinities transmitted at birth .
602
TO WA RD A MANDA TE OF THE PEOPLE
The direct juxtaposition between the central govern men t and the in divid ual and hence an antifam ilial tendency is a ge neral attribute of the nation-state. though this common tendency does not diminish the dif ferences among legal, com m u n is t, and fascist domination, or the one party regimes of the new states. In the twentieth century, the people's u ltimate sovereignty in the new states suffers from weak poli tical institutions. I n the cou n tries we have studied, the institutions of the state were formed not only over centuries , but specifically thro ugh orga n ization for war. Hence, these older states became political communities in the sense that over the gen erations many of their citizens have faced death in the interest of ki n g and country. The com mon struggle o f life and death creates shared memories and symbols of group identity which greatly facilitate the functioning of political institutions even in ordinary times. Other groups than the state have demanded the individ ual's sacrifice of his life as the ultimate test of shared obligation . The political community combines this demand with its enduring power over a considerable terrhory and hence with greater resources and force than privately organized groups have at their disposal. 2 6 This emotional foundation of a political com munity is missing in the new states, whose people typically share collec tive memories o n ly of colonial domination and now of the struggle against it. Sabotage, armed struggle, nonviolent resistance, and all the other devices of independence movements did not help to build state institutions as did the syste m of vassalage and later the collection of taxes or the control of civilian populations for the organization of military supplies and the deployment of military forces. This weakness of an effective civilian government in the new state is one reason for the fre quency o f military, one-party regimes, since armies are functioning hier archies by definition. Such a substitute military government is often un stable, but it is readily available and seems to provide a solution for societies wh ich must simultaneously construct a state and develop a mod ern economy. Yet the armies of the new states cannot build political com munities, as some armies of the older states could, as long as the super powers and their nuclear deterrents prevent the new states from fighting large-scale wars, even if they had the means to do so. Fifty-one countries fo unded the United Nations in 1 945 ; from 1 946 to 1 976 ninety-one additional countries have become sovereign . Most new states have had to establish their governments on a new basis and define "t he people" as the ultimate source of authority. In the new states, there are nationalist app eals to legitimacy everywhere-even in the ab sence of war. But nationalism , while a nearly universal phenomenon in modern history, is not in fact a force that easily unifies countries . En gland, France, Germany, Japan, Russia , and C hina underwent long pe riods o f intellectual mobilization and polarization when they had to
TWENTIETH-CENTUR Y PER SPECTIVES
come to terms with challenges from abroad. I n the examples of English men res ponding to the S panish and Catholic danger, or more recently of the Chinese to "Mr. Science" and " M r. Democracy of the West, cer tain basic themes rec u r o ver and ove r again. Perce ption of advances abroad are rem inders of backwardness or dan ge rs and weaknesses at home. Men of letters m ust try to cope with the dilemmas of this recur rent situatio n : whether to adopt the advanced model and invite its at tendant corruptions, or fall back on native traditions and risk the ir in appropriateness to the world of power and progress . These dilemmas engender heated debates and ever-u neasy com pro m ises which have their common denominator in a shared concern for the native c ountry . Such intensive debates prom pted by com mon concerns are the foun dation of nationalism . The resu l t need not be divisive . A traditionalist like Gandhi and a modernist like Nehru could work together in their o ppos iti on to British rule. B u t the debates between " nativists" and "mod ernizers" remain unresolved more often than not, both during the strug gle against an old reg i me and afte r it has been overthrown and a new regime established. Before as well as after the revolution the root causes of nationalism remain. Men want their co u n try recogni zed and respec ted in the world, and to this end they cultivate or revive native traditions. The reconstruc tion of his tory is an act of resacralizing au t hority in the name of the people. I t is an appeal to civic loyal ty and national brotherhood in lieu of more d i v i s ive communal attachments, because birth in a c o m mo n homeland makes all people members of one nat ion sharing e q uall y in its past glorie s. But the desi re to be recognized and res pec ted in the world also calls for the development of a modern economy and govern ment w hi c h focuses attention on the ad v a nced society (or societies) of one's choice. This reference to foreign models has become inescapable sinc e the great intellectual mobilization of the sixteenth century. Several countries have been in the world-historical position of providing dem onstration effects . In the twentieth century, old models have been re placed once more . After Spain and Po rt u gal after England and France, it is now the turn of the United States, the USSR, and China. Any heir of the Western tradition will watch the new states with h u m ility and re spect fo r the personal courage of people w ho m us t try to blend restored traditions with the demands of modern development under the condi tions of the twe n tieth centu ry "
,
.
N OTE S CHAPTER I . I NTRODUCTION and nation-building are refers to the sphere of h i g h e st gove rn m en t a l aut ho ri t y and a d m i n i stratio n , but tha t is its modern me a ni n g . In the k i ngdo m s discussed in Pa rt 1 the ru l er possessed the high es t au th o rity but con troll ed only his own domai n s ; a s yet no ce nt r a l executive e x is ted . The emergence of the modern state is s y n o n ymous w i th the g ra du a l co n ce n t ration of a d m i n i st r a t i ve function s in the hands of th e central gove r n m e n t . Nation refers to at least two p hen o m en a : ( 1 ) an h i sto rically de ve l o ped co m m u nit y with a I T h e terms state a n d nation a n d their co g n a tes state-building
troubleso me, but u na voidable . State
distinctive cultu re and langu age in co m m o n ; (2) the j uxtaposition of the cen tral govern
a citizenry which consists of i n d i vi d ua l s who are eq ual u nder the law, a pri nci ple introd uced by the Fre nch revol utio n . Since there a re n a t i on al movements which transcend the bo u n d a r ies of several states, n at i on - s t ates w i th dissident national m i norities, states which lack the ca pacity to a ppeal to a na t ion a l com munity, states in which the French princi ple of n ati o n h oo d is practiced but in t he absence of a n h i sto ric a l ly de veloped community, and so o n , even a care fu l use of the terms cannot ach ieve c on s i s t ency . As an app ro x i m a tio n , I shall refe r to states and state-building in t he pe ri od before 1 500 while con fi ning the terms nation an d nation-building (and so m eti mes nation-state) to the peri o d since then. ment and
o f government
2See Ge r h a rd Lenski, Power and Privilege ( N e w York: McGraw- H ili. 1 966), pp. 1 901 92, 1 94-2 1 0, and passim for a more detailed discussion of these points. "This is t rue eve n
of the
early modern period. See ibid., a nd p. 228. H owe ve r,
there
were d i fferences between co u ntries and es pe cially between figures for the whole co u n tr y
1 688, Gregory King's esti mates suggest that 5 percent po pul a t i on controlled 28 percent of the i nco m e . Ca rl o C i po l la reports that studies of one French ( 1 545) and two Italian towns ( 1 427- 1 429) show 10 perce n t of the popu l a ti on co ntroll i ng more than 50 perce nt of the wealth. Carlo Cipolla, Before the Industrial Revolution. European Society and Economy. 1 000 -1 700 ( Lon don : Me t h ue n , 1 9 76) . pp. 9- 1 4. and for the towns. For Engl a n d in
of the
'Marx's statement co ncerni n g peasants in nineteenth -century France a p pl ies here: mass. the members of which live in similar con d iti o n s . but without entering into man i fold relations wit h o ne another. In so far as there is merely a loca l interconnection among these small peasants. and the identity of t h ei r interests be gets no unity. no national u n i o n . and no po l i t ical o rg a niz a tio n . they do not form a class." See Ka rl Marx. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New Yo rk: I n t er nat ion al Pub lishers. n.d.), p. 1 09. For a good state ment of t he Western i me r pre ta t io n of the social rank h ierarchy as part of a consecrated . cosmic order, see Theodor S pence r. Shakespeare and the Nature of Man ( New York: M ac m i ll a n . 1945). chap. 1 . "The small peasants fo rm a v a st
SJean Jacq ues
Rousseau, The Social Contract (New York : Hafner Pu bl i sh i ng . 1 957 ) , pp.
8-9.
8 The terms
tradition and modernity
are also troublesome and d i ffic u l t to avoid. There and modern history. and t h e terms tradition
are impor ta n t disti nctions between m edie va l
605
and modern ity e voke these d i s t i n ct io n s . There a re a l so ma n y u n w a rran ted ex trapolations from t h ese t e r m s . I h a ve d i s pe n sed with t h e u s e o f q u o ta t i o n marks to s u g ges t my res erva t i o n s . F o r a c r i t i q u e o f t h i s t e r m i n o lo g y, see R e i n har d Bendi x , "Tradition a n d Mo d e r n i ty Reco nsidered ," Embattled R eas o n (New Y o rk : Ox fo rd U n i versity Press , 1 970) , p p . 250-3 1 4 . 7 A d a m Ferguson , A n E.lsay O Il t he 1 7 8 2 ) , p p . 208-9, 3 0 5 , a n d pas s i m .
Hi�t()/'Y of Civil Society
( 5 t h e d . ; Lo ndon : T . C o de l l ,
8 For a review of t he lite ra t u re on mode rn i 7. a t i o n a n d a special e m p h a si s on its sel f
c r i t ic a l fe a t u re s , see H a n s - U lrich Wehler, Modem;'\;l'I"lIllgstheorie li n d Geschichte (Got t i n ge n :
Vandenhoeck & R u p re c h t , 1 97 5 ) , passi m .
a n a l y s i s o f moder n i za t i o n that does not re s u l t i n mode r n i t y , see m y ess a y a n d Mo d e r n i t y Reco n s i d e red , " cited in foot n ote 6. See a l so We h le r , Modemi .Iieru ngstheo rie , fo r an a n a l y s i s of the ide o logica l a s s u m p t i o n s u n d e rl y i n g the idea of a "com pl e te d m o d e r n i t y , " as for e xa m p l e in A m e r i ca n society. 9For an
" Tr a d i t i o n
I OThe special p ro bl e ms
o f E uro pea n
H a rtz, The Founding of New Societies
( New
s et tle me nt s
o v e r s eas
York : H a rco urt,
are examined in Lo u i s Brace & World , ( 964).
1 I 0tto H i n t ze , "Calvi nism and Raison d' Etat i n Early Seventeenth Century Branden burg," in Feli x Gilbert, ed . , The Historical Essays of 0110 H i nt u ( New Yor�: Oxford Uni versit y Press , 1 97 5 ) , p . 94. 1 2 Perez Zago r i n , The Court and the Country : The Begin n ing of the English Revolution (New York: Athenaeum , 1 9 7 1 ) , p. 1 9 8.
C H A PT E R I I . S A C RE D A N D S E C U L A R FO U N DAT I O N S O F K I N GS H I P
lThe terms ruler a n d sovereign are more com p re h e n sive than e m pe ro r , tsar, king, or pri n ce , but I shal l use k i n gsh i p and king in the gen eric sense of s overe ig n ruler u nless otherwise noted. The em phasis of this chap te r is on kingship. Chapters 3 through 6 deal with kingship and aristocracy. 2See Clifford Geertz, "Politics Past, Politics Present," European Journal of Sociology, vo l . pp. 1 - 1 4, as well as his forthcoming book on Bali.
8 ( 1 967) .
3For a brodd discussion of the destruction of kingship by oligarchic rule and o f the eventual displa..:eme nt of the latter fi rst by plebeian forces and subsequently by imperial rule and by military forces i n the provinces o f the Roman empire, see W. G. de B urgh , The LegaC:I of the A ncient World (Balti more : Penguin, 1 96 1 ) , chaps. 7-8. - Max Weber, Economy and Soc iety (tr. and ed. by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich: New York : Bed.ninster Press, 1 968) , H I , p. 1 1 4 2 . ' Fo r this interpretive extension of Weber's ge neral re mark s , I a m indebted to a n un published paper by David N. Keightley, "Shang Metaphysics" (presented at the Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, March 1 973), which is based on bone inscriptions concerned with divination, dating back to China in the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries B . C . Of course, Professor Keightley is not responsible for my general reading of his specific evidence .
NOTES TO PA GES 2 3-,. 3 2 'See J . M . Wallace-Had ril l , Th e Barba rian West, A . D. 400-1 000 ( N ew York: Harper Be Row, H arper Torchbooks, 1 962) , pp. 9- 1 0 . Two classic expositions of this material are Max Weber, "The So cia l Causes o f the Decay of Ancient Civilization," Journal of General Education, vol. 5 (October 1 950) , p p. 75-88, and Jacob B u rckhardt, The Age of Constantine the Great (Garden City: Doubleday , Anchor Books , 1 956) , chap. 1 . The latter contains a vivid acco u n t of im perial s uccession at the b i dding of t h e Roman a rmies . 7 1 infer t h i s diverge nce between the Roma n and the Germanic pe rspectives from the e v idenc e presented in J . M. Wallace- Hadrill, Early Germanic Kingship in England and on the Co nt inent (Lo nd on : Ox fo rd U n i v ersit y Press. 1 9 70) . ch a p . 1 . This di v ergence is not st ated by the author as di s ti nct ly as I put it in the text. Some Germanic tribes e m phasized he red itary kingship. while others combined the idea o f charismatic l i n ea g es with that of counsel and elec t ion . My poi n t is th a t the second princip l e proved inad vertently useful in the era of m igrations . See C hapter 6 here for further di s c u ssio n .
"Jan de Vries, A ltgerma nische Re ligionsges ch ichte (Berlin : Walter de Gr u y ter . 1 956). I I , p p . 76-80, 348 -52, an d passim.
9WilIiam Chaney, The Cult of Kingship chester University Pre s s, 1 9 7 0) , pp. 1 4-2 1 .
in Anglo-Saxon England
( Manchester: Man
I °See Fritz Kern, Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages (N ew York: Harper Be Row , Harper Torchbooks, 1 970) , pp. 1 2-27, for a discussion of "kin-right." The impo rtance of royal magic even after the decline of royal power is discussed in j. M. Wallace-Had ri ll, The Long-Haired Kings (Londo n : Meth uen , 1 9 62) , pp. 24 5 - 8 , and Kern , Kingship, pp. 35-6.
I I These Frankish co nq u e rors of Gaul and of a reas east of the Rhine were converted to orthodox Catholicism. The Frankish con version began with Clovis in 496 A . D . and fa cilitated the merger of pagan a n d Christian ideas of kingship , discussed further on .
I ZWallace-Hadrill, Early
Germanic Kingship , p. 1 35 .
1 3Modern scholarship concerning these problems is summarized in A. H . M . jones, "The Social Background of the Struggle between Paganism and C hristianity," and E . A. Thompso n , "Christianity and the Northern Barbarians," in A rnaldo Momigliano, ed. , The Conflict �tween Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century (Ox ford : Clarendon Press, 1 963), p p . 1 7- 3 7 , 56-78. USee H . M. Gwatkin and j. P. Whitney, eds., York: Macmillan, 1 9 1 1 ) , I, pp. 590-2.
I 5 Walter U l lmann , A History of Political
The Cambridge
Thought: The
M edieval
H is tory
(New
Middle Ages ( Baltimo re : Penguin,
1 965), pp. 36-7 .
I 8 A . Momigliano, "I ntroductio n : C hristianity and the Decline of t h e Roman in Momigliano, ed. , Conflict , pp. l O- l i .
USee U l lmann , Political
Though t ,
E m pi re , "
pp. 38-5 1 and passim .
"See Wallace-Hadrill, Barbarian Wes t , pp. 7 5 . 8 1 , and passim. "For a survey of this C hristian conception o f k i ngs hip in Western Europe , see Eugen Ewig, "Zum christlichen Kon igsgedanken im Friihm ittelalter," in Theodor Mayer, ed. , Das
NOTES TO PAGES 3 2 - 3 9
608
Kon igtum (Vortrage u n d Forschunge n , I n stitut fUr geschichtliche Landesforsch u n g des Bodenseegebiets; Li nd a u : Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 1 9 54) , I l l , pp. 7-73. See also the evi dence on the Christian conversion of Anglo-Saxon England in Chaney, Cu lt of Kingship , chap. 5 , w hich shows clearly that t h e population followed t h e precedents set by their kings, even where this involved re peated changes between paganis m and Christianity. 2 ° Ke r n ,
Kingship , pp.
5 1 -4.
" The phrase populnr will re fe rs to the ele me nt of consent reflected i n the act of ac cla mation by the magnates . My i n terpretation is based on ibid . , pp . 2 8 -3 3 . The author refers to a decree of 7 5 1 by Pope Zacharias declari n g s uitability as more i m portant than legitimate descent, to the Council of Paris ( 829) emphasizing the insign ificance of the rights of blood and the i m porta nce of ministeriu m , and to somewhat later documents af firming t he clai m s of individual ca ndi dates against those of the lineage . 22Quoted in Ull ma n n ,
Polit ical Thought ,
p. 88.
23 1 have para phrased the i n t e rpre t a t i on of t h e Ecclesiastical History by the Venerable Bede , as analyzed i n Wal1ace-Hadrill, Early Germanic K ingship , chap. 4. 24The greate r complexity of this seq uence is em phasized by Percy Schramm, A H is to ry Co ro na tio n (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1 9 3 7 ) .
of the E nglish
2'The belief i n the healing powers of the kin g is an example of that sacralization . See the study by Marc Bloc h , The Royal Tou£h, Sacred M onarchy and Scrofula in England and France ( London: Routledge & Kega n Pa ul, 1 9 7 3 ) . 2·W. Montgomery Watt, Press, 1 96 8 ) , p. 6.
Islamic
Political Thought ( Edinburg h : Edinburgh University
2 7See ibid . , pp. 9- 1 4. " I bid . , pp.
See als� the parallel interpretation in Hans Hein rich Schaedel', und Okzident ( M u nich : R. Piper, 1 960), pp. 3 1 2- 1 5. The pre-Islamic experience here described has parallels in the conditions under which authority was ex ercised in the Germanic t ribes in the pagan era. See Karl von Amira, GernlanisciIRs Recht (vol. 2 of G1'un driss des Germanischen Rechts ; Berli n : Walte r de Gruyter, 1 967 ) , pp. 44-50, 66-7 1 . 80- 1 . See further on for com ments on this parallel. 3 8 , 40-4 1 .
De r Mensch im Orient
29 [ rfa n Sha hid, " Pre- I slamic Arabia," i n P. M . Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton. and Bernard Lewis, eds. , The Cambridge History of Islam ( London : Cambridge University Press, 1 9 70), l, pp. 1 6- 1 7 . See also Schaeder, Mensch , pp. 3 1 5 - 2 2 , for material on Mecca. 30Max Weber, Ancien/ Judaism (Glencoe: Free Press, 1 952), pp. 206-7.
3 1 Cambridge History of Islam , I , pp. 3 1 -6. 3'The reference is to "believers and M uslim of Quraysh and Yath rib," the last term referri ng to the valley in which Medina is located . Th is statement from the preamble along with the whole text is re pri nted i n W. Montgomery Watt, Muhammad in Medina ( London: Oxford U niversity Press, 1 956) . p. 22 1 . 33 1 use the fo rmulation by G. E. von Gruneba u m, "Govern ment in I sl am ," Islam, Essays i11 the Natll re (/ lid Growth of a Clllt u ral Tmditiml ( Londo n : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1 96 1 ), pp. 1 2 7-8.
NOTES TO PA GES 4 1 -5 1 34See Max Weber, Economy
and Society,
609
I I , pp. 439-40.
35The following account is indebted to H. A . R. Gibb, "Constitutional Organization," in M ajid Khadduri and Herbert J . Liebesney , eds., Law i n the Middle Ea.!t (Washington : Middle East I nstitute, 1 955), pp. 3 - 2 7 . 36Quoted from Ibn Khald un in ibid . , pp. 1 3 - 1 4 . 3 7 1 n addition to Gibb's essay on constitutional organization, see Watt, lslamic Political chaps. 6, 7, 9, and S ir Hamilton Gibb, Studies in the Civiiiwlion of Islam ( Bosto n : Beacon Press, 1 962), especia lly pp. 1 4 1 -6 5 , where this accom modation o f political theory to the facts of absolutism is analyzed in the work of AI-Maward i . For religious scholars, the main task was the effort to integrate the di verse ethno-cultural grou ps into a com m unity of faith, an effort that h a d t o be protected from the dan gers of involve ment in political issues. l owe this point t o my colleague, Professor Elbaki H ermassi , who refers to the analysis of H. A. R. Gibb, " Religio n and Politics in C h ristianity and Isla m ," in J . Harris Proctor, ed. , Islam and International Relations (New York : Praeger, 1 965), pp. 3 - 2 3 .
Thought ,
38Th is saying, attributed to the first century a fter Muham mad's death, is quoted in H. A . R. Gibb and Harold Bowen , Islamic Society and the West (Londo n : Oxford University Press, 1 950), I , p. 28. 39Quoted in Gibb, "Constitutional Organization," p. 5. 4·See ibid., pp. 7 - I I , for an exposition of the Sunni theory of the caliphate according to AI- Baghdadi (d. 1 037). 4 1 Robert Heine-Gelde m , "Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia," mim eo (Data Paper no. 1 8 , Southeast Asia Program, Dept. of Asian Studies; I thaca : Cor nell U niversity Press, 1 958), p. 1 .
42Paul Wheatley,
The Pivot of the Four
Quarters (Chicago : Aldine,
1 97 1 ), p . 436.
43 A good descriptive account o f these beliefs in their ancient setting is contained in C . P. Fitzgerald, China, A S ho Tt Cultural Hi!tory (London: C resset Press, 1 965), pp. 34-54 . A detailed, functional analys i s of a ncestor worsh ip, based in good part on contem porary materials, is contained in C. K . Yan g , Religion in Chinese Society ( Berkeley and Los Angeles : University of California Press, 1 967), pp. 28-57;
44The statement is quoted from an unpublished paper by David N. Keightley, " Le gitimation in Shang China" (submitted to Confe re nce on Legitimation of Chinese I m perial Regimes, A siiomar, June 1 975), p. 4. My discussion of early C hinese religion and kingship is indebted to Professor Keightley's paper and to pe rsonal discussions w ith him. 4SIbid . , p. 5 . ··Ibid . , p. 2 3 . 47These statements by the Duke of Chou date back to the early period o f the Western C hou dynasty. They are quoted in H. G. Creel, The O,·igins of StatecmJt in China (Ch icago : Unive rsity of Chicago Press, 1 970), I, pp. 83-4. Va rious dates have been given for the begin ning of the Chou dy n asty . I have retained the traditional c h ronology. The details of the "Mandate of Heaven" theo r y are more com plex than my brief statement can sug gest. C [ Creel's discussion of t he issues in ibid. , chap. 5 and a pp. C with D. Howard S mith,
NOTES TO PA GES 5 1 - 55
610
"Divine K ingshi p in Ancient C h i n a , " Numen , vol. 4 ( Sept e mbe r 1 957), pp. 1 7 1 -2 0 3 , and H . H. Dubs, "The Archaic Ro yal Jou Religion," Toung Pao , vol . 46 ( 1 9 5 8) , pp. 2 1 759, w hich see m to date the theory rather earlier than Creel. For these and other refe re nces a n d for a c ritical read i n g of an original d ra ft of t h i s sec t ion , I am g re atly i ndebted to Pro fessor David Keightle y . "See P i n g - t i
H o , "Salient
As pe cts
of C h i n a 's H e ritage , " in P i n g-ti Ho and Tan g Tsou , of Chicago Press, 1 96 8 ) , I , pp. 1 -3 7 , and the
ed s . , China in Crisis (Ch icago : U n i versity e n s u i n g d i scussion w i t h an adde n d u m
<9See
Creel,
b y A r t h u r Wr ig h t , H e rbe rt Franke, by Ping-ti Ho on pp. 3 8-92 .
Ol'igins of Statecraft , chaps.
nas (Stuttgart : A l fred K roener Verlag,
Derk Bodde, and H e r rlee Creel ,
1 2- 1 3 , an d Wolfram Eberhard, Geschichte Ch i
1 97 1 ) , p. 30.
S OSee the descri ption of Con fucius' native state of Lu in the seventh to fi ft h c e n t uries in H . G. Creel, Confucius and the Chinese Way ( N e w Yor k: H arper & B ro t h e rs, Harper Torch books, 1 960), pp. 1 7-20. SI
For details, see ibid . , pp.
25-56.
S 2See ibid . , p. 1 96. S3My paraph rasing of the Con fucian teaching is based on Creel, Confucius , pp. 1 0972, unless noted otherwise. Tho u gh I am indebted to Professor Creel's work, I fi n d h is analogies between Con fucius and Kant's philosophy or modern democratic theories q u ite unconvincing-the d istinction between ethical teaching, charismatic prophecy, and other type s of ethical and religious leadership is worked out in Weber, Economy and Socie ty , I I , pp. 4 3 9- 5 \ . '
1 58.
in ibid . , p. 84, 86, 1 2 1 -2 . For a fuller discussion of Ii, see Creel, Origins of f£. , and Henry Rosemont, Jr., "State and Society in the Tziin hsu. A Philosophical Commentary," Monumenta Sel'ica, vol. 29 ( 1 970- 1 9 7 1 ) , pp. 50- 1 and passim. s ' Q uo ted
Statecmft , pp.
335
S6 Quoted in Creel, Confucius , p. 1 30. In his discussion Creel em ph asizes the egalitar ianism of Confucius, but does not allow fo r the kind of "egalitarianism" characteristic of aristocrats. When Confucius says that one should "feel kindly toward everyone, but be intimate only with the virtuous" (ibid . , p. 1 3 1 ) , he expresses a sentiment entirely com pat ible with the most glaring inequalities. I ndeed, since wealth and poverty depend on Heaven, each man can practice the Way in accord with his proper station in life. And by saying that the people will be attracted by good govern ment, Con fucius was commending a benevolent paternalism rather than speaking as an advocate of the people. ST My sketch is i ndebted to u n published pa pers by Jack L. Dull, "The Legitimation of the Ch'in" (Co n fe rence on Legitimation of Chinese Imperial Regimes, American Council of Learned Societies, Asilomar, June 1 975), and by Sebastian de Grazia, "The Du ra Lex of Legalism and the First Em pire" (forthcoming). '8Details on the ascendance o f Con fucianism are contained in John K . Shryock, The (New York : Century, 1 932), chap. 3, and Peter Weber-Schaefer, Oikumene und Impe" ;um, luI' Ziviltheologie des chinesischen Kais erreichs ( M unich : Paul List Verlag, 1 968), pp. 228-9 ff.
O rigin and Development af the Siale Cull of Confucius
NOTES TO PA GES 56-68
61 1
'9These co m pl ex i ties m ust be m e n tioned in order to guard aga i n st mistaking Con fu cia n ism for a single doctrine. H o we v er fa r they diverged fro m the o r igin a l message, most writers ca me to presen t their ideas in the name of the sage, thus providi n g that name with the charismatic aura h e re pudiated . O n l y the Taoist literature contai ns attacks on Confucius. S O C h a n W i n g-tsi t, SOUIU Book in Chinese Ph ilosophy
Press, 1 963), p. 22.
(Princeton : Pri nceton U n i versity
61 Qu oted fro m
t he Han Fei Tzu i n Arthur Waley, Three Ways of Thought in A ncient City: Doubleday, Anchor Books , 1 956), pp. 1 59-60. 1 h a ve followed Waley's acco u n t o f the relation between the Han Fei Tzu and the Le ga l i st or Realist school. See ibid . , pp. 1 56-7 a nd pass i m .
China ( G arde n
6'See Creel, Confucius , pp. 2 36-4 8 , fo r details of Con fucianism in practice under t he em peror W u . Ex perts di ffe r co n cer n ing t he po l i t ical in fluence of Co n fucian i deology , and there is little doubt that this ideology was largely add ressed to s u bo rdi n at e o fficials and aspi rants to office. Cf. the different views of Pi n g -ti Ho and H . G. Creel in Ch ina in Crisis, pp. 59-78, 84-92. Han
63See Rosemont, "State and Society," p. 47. My conc l ud i n g summary is indebted to the essay by Rosemont. a< See Wo l fgang Eberha rd, "The Political Function of Ast rono m y and Astronomers in Han China," in John K. F airbank , ed., Chinese Though!. and Institutions (Chicago : Uni versity of Ch i cago Press, 1 957), pp. 33-70.
C HAPTER
I I I.
JAPAN
' The Japanese term for c l a n , Uji, is sometimes re pl ace d by the Chi nese Shi ; both refer to e xt en de d kinship groups wors hiping t he same god.
"J ohn W. Hall, Government and Local Power in Japan ( Pr i nce to n : Princeton University Press, 1 966), pp. 26-7. Yama to refers to an area in the Kinki region of Honshu, a central location on the main island of J a pan . Note a l so the sum mary volume by John W. Hall, Japan from Prehistory to Modern Times (New York: Dell, 1 970). 3Sir George Sansom, History ojJapan ( Londo n : Cresset Press, 1 959), I, pp. 25-6.
< Ibid. , I, pp. 26, 3 1 . • A fuller discussion of the e a rl y rel igi ou s life of Japan will be found i n J oseph Kita gawa, Religion in Japanese History ( N ew York : Columbia University Press, 1 9 66), es pec ial l y c hap . I .
SHall, Government and Local Power, pp. 46-52 . 1 1 have fo l lo w e d t h e account in Wolfram Eberhard, Geschichte Chinas (Stuttgart : Alfred K roner Verlag, 1 97 1 ), pp. 1 62-4.
8See Kitagawa, Religion in Japanese History, pp. 33-6 and pa s s im . For a v i v i d descrip tion of religious sy ncretism and the role of the visual arts in co.urt society d uring the Heian
NOTES TO PA GES 68-73
612
per io d (794 - 1 1 8 5), see I v an Morris, The guin, 1 969), cha ps. 4- 7 . 9Sansom,
History , I ,
World of the S h i ni ng
Prince ( Harmondsworth : Pen
pp. 64, 66, 1 1 7 ; and Hall, Got'emment and Local Power , pp. 96, 98.
Local Power ,
p. 5 7 , and pp. 56-8 for the text of t h e Taika I, pp. 5 6 -9 , and Roge r Be rsi h a nd , Gescltichte Japans (Stuttga rt : A lfred K roner Verlag, 1 96 3 ) , pp. 7 1 -4 and p as s i m . I O See Hall, Go vernment a nd
edict. Re lated d is c u s s io ns are fo u n d in Sansom , Histmy ,
" H al l , Government and Local Power, p p .
"Sansom, Histmy,
6 1 -4 .
I , pp. 1 04, 1 5 1 , 1 63 , 1 69 , 256.
' 3 I bid., I , pp. 1 1 4- 1 5 . I t should be added t h a t a branch of t h e Fuj i w a ra family had played an i m por t ant role at cou rt as early as t he Tai ka re forms of 646; the dates given here refer to the period of thei r regency and civil dictatorshi p. "The details of this process are set out chap. 4 .
in i bid. , I,
pp. 67-70, 83-9, and H all,
Gov
ernment and Local Power,
I 5 H a l l mentions t h a t the last recorded instance of land redistribution in th e home provinces under imperial authority occurred in 844. See his Go vern ment and Local Power, p. 1 03 . 1 6 lbid., pp. 1 1 8- 1 9. 1 7e r. ibid. , pp. 1 29-35, fo r Hall's em phasis on the gradual emergence of a res pected warrior class out of the very institutions of the imperial government. I ·Sansom, Histmy, I , pp. 234-8.
The
q uotation
appears on p. 238.
I 9Statement by Ono-no-Yoshifu TU q uoted in H all,
Government and Local Power,
p . 1 30.
20Sansom , Histmy, I, p. 3 1 1 . See ibid., cha ps. 8, 1 0, 1 2- 1 5, for a detailed narration and a judicious appraisal of the main events. 2 1 The terms nobility, aristocracy , and genlly are used here in their generic meanings, which are obscured by the inevitable historical com plications. Members of a nobility are illustrious by rank, title, or birth ; the te rm has primary refe rence to status. Aristocracy medns literally "govern ment by the best citizens" and, more broadly, the noble class from which the rulers of state and society are derived ; the term has primary reference to rule. Com plications arise beca use the conditions a ffecting the com position of nobility and ar istocracy (that is, the conditions of prestige and rule) change over time. Gentry refers to those who ran k below the nobility in title and bi rth ; again the term has primary reference to status. My use of these te rms with reference to Japan takes account of the overall ten dency to leave the status-superiority of t hose associated with the em peror intact wh ile the actual government came into the hands of a class of m il i ta ry leaders whose formal status did not match their very real power. The overall use of the term aristocl·acy seems justified in view of the fact that all these people were i nvolved with ru le in one degree or anot her. In a b ro ad co m p a rati ve study, te r m i n o lo gi cal p rec isi o n may not be attainable, but a cau tio n ary note here wi\l alert the reader to some of the difficulties along the way. For a rather di fferent lise of these terms in the E u ropean context, see R. R. Palmer, The Age of the Dnnocmtic Revolution (Princeto n : Princeton U n iversity Press , 1 959), I , p p . 29-30.
NOTES TO PA GES 74 - 8 9 2 2 T he po p u lation o f Heian Ja pa n is est i m ated at lived i n the c a pital and less t h a n
5 m i l l ion ,
o f which perha ps
50,000
be lp n ged to the court nobility . See I va n Morris,
5,000
World of Shining Prince, p. 93 . 2 ' H a l l , Government and Local Power , pp. 1 3 1 , 1 3 6, 1 3 9. 24See Sansom, History , I, p. 2 4 3 , n . 3, fo r a com pilation of the h o l d i n gs of the two
c lans in the several areas of J a pa n . 2 ' lbid . , I , p. 346. Note the s tri k i n g d i ffe rence with En glish fe u d a l i s m in w h ich a d i rect
oa t h of a l le g i a nce by the v a s s als of great lords to the ki n g became a re gu l a r feature of Norman rule. Cf. this volume, C h a pter 2 6 I bi d . , I , p . 2 7See
ibid . ,
6.
352. I , pp.
345-58, for Sansom's descri pt i o n Ka m ak u ra s h o gu nate
class structure und e r the USee ibid. , I, ch a ps .
of fe udal gove rnment and the
.
17
and
1 9.
'lIThe fol lowi ng resume is based on i bi d . , I I , es pecial l y chaps.
1 1-12
and
1 5, and
on
the work of John Hall cited previously. 3°See the detailed analysis of this transformation in H all , Government and Local Power, cha p s .
7
and
8.
" Sansom, History, I I , p. 243. 32 Ibi d . , n , p.
208,
an d Hall, Government and Local Pou'er, p.
33Sansom, History , 1 1 , p.
275.
255.
'·Hall, Government and Local Power, pp. 9, 2 4 7 . See a l so pp. 240- 1 and
248 for evidence
of the increasing number of forts and castles in the three Kibi provinc es . 3'Sansom, History , I I I , pp.
255-7,
and Hall, Government and Local Power, p.
257
and
passim. Note also Sansom's discussion o f " House Laws and C i v il Adm inistration" i n History,
1 1 , pp. 25 1 -5, which daimyo .
gi ves
impressive evidence of the m a nagerial skil l of some se n gok u
38See H al l , Government and Local Power, ch a p .
1 1,
for a case study of consolidatio n at
the local and regional level. The data on firearms a re taken from Delmer M. Brown, "The I m pact of Firearms on
J apanese
Warfare," Far Eastel7l Qual·tel·ly , vol.
7 ( 1 947), pp. 236-
53, 3 7Sansom, History , I I , pp. 3 1 6- 1 9, 330-3 .
C H A PTER IV. RUSS I A I Michael Florinsky, Russia, A HistolY and all Intelp'retation ( New York : M a cmi l l a n , 1 947 and
1 953),
I , pp .
1 6- 1 7 .
N07ES TO PAGES gO-1 0 1
614
2See N icholas Riasanovsk y , A Hislm) of Rwsia ( N e w York: O x ford U n i ve rsi t y Press, 1 969), p p. 43, 4 5 .
3George V e r n ad s k y , K iel'a n
Russia
( N e w H aven : Y a le Univ e r s i t y Press, 1 9 7 3 ) , p. 2 8 9.
' I bid . , p. 6 1 . ' Fra n c is Dvorn i k , " By z a n ti ne Po l i t ical I d eas i n K i e v a n
R us s i a , " Dumbarlon
Oaks Papen ,
no s . 9 a n d 1 0 (Cambridge : H a n'ard U n iversity Press , 1 95 6 ), p. 8 8. "Quoted from the hbom ik of 1 0 76 i n ibid . , 7
I bid . ,
pp.
p.
93 .
94 -6.
8 See G u n t he r Stokl, R wsi.lche Geschichle ( S t utt ga rt : A l fred K roner, 1 96 2 ) , pp. 1 2 7 fr. , a n d J . L. I . Fe n ne ll , The Emergence of MoscoU' ( B e r ke l e y and Los A n geles : University of
Ca l ifo rn i a Press, 1 96 7 ) , p . 3 2 . See also H e n r i Pi ren ne , M edieval Cities (G a rd en Cit y : Do u b le d a y , A nchor Book s , 1 956), pp. 1 3 1 -5 1 .
·Stokl, R ussische Geschichte , pp. 70- 1 . I O For further details, see Fe nnell, E merge nce of M oscoU' , pp. 1 6- 2 7 . See also the details of t h e will o f Vasily I I , Grand Prince of Moscow, in 1 4 62, as described in J. L. I. Fe nnell,
It'an
the GI'eat of MoscoU' ( London : Macmillan, 1 96 1 ) , pp. xiii-xiv.
II Marc B loch, "The Rise of De pen de n t Cultivation and Seignorial Institutions," in J . H . Clapham and Eileen Power, eds . , The Cam bridge Economic History of Europe (Ca m bridge : Ca mbridge U n i versity Press , 1 94 1 ) , I , p . 254 .
1 2Je rome B l u m , La nd and Peasant in R ussia ( New Y o r k : At heneum , 1 96 4 ) , pp. 90-2, 25 1 - 3 . C f. also the contrasting p i c t u re of the peasantry in Western E uro pe and Russia in
Otto B r u n n e r , Neue Wege d(!',- Sozialgeschi1:hte ( G o t t i nge n : Vanden hoeck & Ruprecht, 1 968),
chap. 1 0. See a ls o Stokl, R us.lische Geschichte , p p . 69- 7 7 . l 3 Fo r a descri ption of t h e intricate relations between secular rulers a n d the Russian church du rin g the fourtee nth century, see the su mmary in A lbert M. Am m a n n , S.J . , A briss der ostslau·ischen Kirchengeschi1:hte ( Vien n a : Thomas Morus Presse im Verlag Herder, 1 950), pp. 9 1 - 1 06.
1 4Stokl, R ussische Geschichte , p . 7 9 . Pe rha ps this was an indication o f economic decline, since in thrivi ng towns weights and measu res were usually in the sa fekeeping of their assemblies, or of the merchant gu ilds whe re these existed. I S Eve nts at Sarai, the capital o f the Go lden Horde, are less a matter o f inference. During the fi rst half of the fou rteenth ce ntury one M uscovite prince and fou r princes of Tver' died violent deaths there. Later on, with the succession struggles among Mo ngol dyn asties m o u n t ing, the number o f yarlyki i ncreased ra pidly, and conseq uently their im portance for Russia declined. But, by then, the M uscovite rulers were well on their way to preeminence. l 6See Fe n nell, Emergence of MoscoU' , pp. 1 86-90, fo r an analysis of I van Kalita's will. 1 7 Fo r a brief descri ption of these com plex events see Ammann, Abriss , pp. 82-4.
NOTES TO PA GES 1 05- 1 1 3 ' 8 For an analysis of this . hagiographic practice, see M ichael Che rniavsky, Tsal' an d Peop le (New Haven : Yale Un iversity Press, 1 96 1 ) . By the m iddle of the sixteenth century the church probably owned abou t one-third of t he entire area under cultivation. See Flor insky, Russia , I, p. 1 33 . '9Quoted in Gerd Tellenbach, Chu rch, State, and Christian Society ( N e w Y o r k : Harper & Row, H arper Torch books, 1 97 0 ) , p. 33 . 2°The titles tsar (also spelled czar ) and autocrat came into use in Russia in the re ign o f Ivan I I I ( 1 462- 1 505) ; at an earlier time Russians had applied these te rms to the Byzantine em peror. The destruction of Byzantium and I va n ' s marriage to t he n iece o f the last By zantine e m peror we re interpreted by some observers to mean that the Russian ruler was heir to the Byzantine tsars. I va n I V ( 1 533- 1 584) was officially crowned tsar with the sanc tion o f the Russian church in 1 54 7 . See George Vernad s k y, A Hist ory of R ussia , The Mongols a nd R ussia (New Have n : Yale U n i versity Press, 1 95 3 ) , I I I , pp. 385-6. See also O. P. Backus, "M uscovite Legal Thought," in Alan Ferguson and A l fred Levi n , eds. , Essays in R lLlsian History ( H amden : Archon Books, 1 964 ) , p. 38 and passi m. 2 I See Gustave Aid, "The Crisis of the Muscovite Aristocracy," Fo rschu nge n zur Osteu ropiiilchen Geschichte , vol. 1 5 ( 1 970), pp. 1 5-58. The author emphasizes that "partible i n heritance" (that is, the division of property among the heirs) made Russian aristocrats rather willing to subordinate themselves to Moscow. 22 B y 1 688 Russia included S iberia and com prised 1 5,2 80, 000 sq uare k i lometers. See Richard Hellie, Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 97 1 ), p. 2 1 . for the sou rce of these figures. uSee George Vernadsky, A History of R ussia, The Tsardom Haven : Yale University Press, 1 969), V , part I , pp. 1 0- 1 4 .
of Moscou', /547-/ 682
(New
2'Cited in Florinsky, RlLSs ia , I, p. 79. 2'The details of the country's relations with the East during the Kievan and Muscovite periods a re set out in George V. Lantzeff and Richa rd A Pierce, E as tward to Empire, Ex pLoration and Conquest on the RlLSsian Open Fro nti£r to 1 750 (Montreal : McGill-Queen's Uni versity Press, 1 973). 26See Vasili Klyuchevsky , Peter the Great (New York : St. Martin's P ress, 1 969), p, 5 8 . Peter reigned from 1 682 to 1 725, but he was only ten in the year of his accession and the regency of h is half-sister Sophia lasted from 1 682 to 1 689. 2 7Com plex motives and s trategies were involved in the decisions to side with one or another of the contending powers . See the case study of one area by O. P. Backus, Motives of West Russian Nobles in Deserting Lithuania for Moscou', I'J 7 7 - 1 5 1 4 (Lawrence : University of Kansas Press, 1 957). See also the analysis by the same author, "Treason and Defections from Moscow to Lithuania," Forschungen zur Osteuropiiischen Geschichte , vol. 15 ( Berlin, 1 970), pp. 1 1 9-44.
28George Vernadsky, A History of Russia, Russia at the Da wn of the Modem Age (New Have n : Yale University Press, 1 959), I V , pp. 1 1 4 - 1 6 and passim. 29The rest were of miscellaneous Oriental and of unknown a ncestry. See Paul Dukes, ( London : Cambridge Unive rs ity Press, 1 967),
Catherine the G"eat and the RlLSsian Nobility
pp. 20- 1 .
3 0 Bl u m . Land.
pp.
1 7 0- 1 .
3 1 G i les Fletcher. Of the R usse Commonwealth (Cambridge : Harvard U n iversity Pre s s . pp. 25-6. 1 have mode r n i zed the s pe ll i n g. Accord i n g to Rich a rd Pi pes's statement
1 966).
i n the i n t rod uction . modern resea rch su ggests the correctness o f Fletche r's observation . Fletche r fo l lows t h e Russian sou rces in u s i n g "Tartar" or "Tatar" as a gen e ric re ference to the M o n gols though o r i g i n a l l y M o n gols and Tartars we re only two of the nomadic t ribes pa rticipat i n g in t he Asiatic i n vasions of Russia and E uro pe si nce t he t h i rteen th cen t u r y .
1 h a v e used " M o n gol" fo r the pe r iod of M o n go l overlord s h i p a n d "Tartar" t hereafte r. thou gh a more accu rate term i nology would be needed i n a more detailed acco u n t . 3 2 See B l u m . Lan d .
pp.
182 -8. on the t u rnover o f pomestie occu pa n t s a n d the decl i n i n g
d i stinction between pomestie a n d votc h i n a . For t h e pe riod from 1 5 80 to 1 62 0 . t h e a u t ho r c i t e s figures for t h ree dist ricts show i n g that o n l y 6 out o f 30. 1 0 o u t of 1 1 5 . and 5 o u t o f
46 n oble fam i lies reta i ned posses sion o f thei r original
pp.
lands by the
latte r d a te .
See ibid..
1 50- 1 .
33There is no good s ol u t io n to the res u l t i n g term inological problem . especially since a broad survey must cover different types o f ar is tocra t ic stat us. The term service aristocracy is a paradoxical com promise and should be ke pt in m i n d . even where synonyms like aris/ocracy or genhy are used .
UBlum.
Land.
35 Florinsky. His/olY of R ussia
p.
1 38 .
R ussia . l . pp. 1 79-80. For descriptive detai l. see V. O. Kl[yJ uchevsky. A ( New York: Russell & Russell. 1 960). I I . pp. 44-7 an d passim.
36See Hellie. Ens efme nt . pp. r
3 7 See Marc Raeff. Ol-igins
( New York : Harcourt. Brace & 3 K Flo r i n s ky . Russia . l .
39See
Raeff. Origins.
22-5.
of
the R ussian I n/elligenLfia : The Eighteenth-CentUlY Nobility
World. 1 966).
pp.
2 2 -3 .
p p . 1 02 - 3 .
pp.
4 5 - 7 . 60- 3 .
··See Florinsky. Russia . 1 . pp. 1 95-6 a n d passim. See also the related assessment o f the zemskii sobor i n Riasanovsky. HistolY . pp. 1 88-9. 208- 1 1 . a n d passi m . and i n more detail in Vernadsky. Histmy of R ussia . V. parts 1 and 2 (see index). < I Hellie. Emelfm ent . pp.
238-9.
<2See Stokl. R ussische Geschichte . pp. 299-307. For furthe r details. see Jack N. Cul pepper. "The Legislative Origins of Peasant Bondage in M uskovy." FOl'SChungen zur Osteu I'Opiiischell Geschichte . vol. 1 4 ( 1 969). pp. 1 62 - 2 3 7 . and Gustave Alef. " Das Erloschen des A bz u g srec h t s der Moskauer B oj a ren . " in ibid vo l . 1 0 ( 1 965). pp. 7-7 4. .•
"These similarities and contrasts between the Russian a n d the Japa nese aristocra cies ex plo red fu rthe r in Cy r i l E. B lack et a l . . The Modern iultioil of Japan and R ussia (New Y o r k : Free Press. 1 97 5 ) .
a l'e
NOTES TO PA GES 1 3 0- 1 54
61 7
C HAPTER V. I MPERIAL GE RMANY A N D PRUSS IA I The fo l lo w i n g account is based on pa r ts I a n d 2 o f Ge o ffre y B arra c lo u g h , Th e Origim
of Modern Germany
(New
Capricorn Books, 1 963) and by t he same author, The Cru Angeles: U n i ve rs i t y of Cal i fo r n i a Press, 1 976). The reade r would be well advised to t u r n to these books.
Yor k :
cible of Europe ( Be rke ley and Los
i n te rested
in more details
' B a r raclou gh ,
Origins, p.
1 35 .
3See i b id . , pp. 3 1 6- 1 9, for
t h i s d i scussion of the Colden B u l l .
' Fo r details, see t h e d isc u s s i o n i n F. L. C a rs t e n , endon Press , 1 95 4 ) , c h a ps . 3 , 4 , 7 , a n d 1 6 .
�See OUo
H i ntze,
The Origim of Prussia ( O x ford : Clar
Die Hohenzollern und ihr Werk ( B e rl i n :
Pa u l Pa re y , 1 9 1 5) , pp. 4 2 - 3 ,
6 6 - 7 . D is p u te s of t h i s kind w e re v e ry c ommo n . F o r a co m p a ra ti ve discussion o f t h e char
often resultin g from the m , see
N aef, " Friihformen des ' M odernen S t a a te s' v o l . 1 7 1 ( 1 959), pp. 2 2 5 - 4 3 . See a l so the ge neral disc ussion o f diffidatio, o r the re pu d i a t i o n of t h e feudal contract by the vassals if t h e lord did not ful fi l l his duties, in Walter Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages (New York : Barnes &: Noble, 1 96 1 ) , pp. 1 50 fr. , and by the same author, The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages ( Baltimore: Joh ns Hopki n s U niversity Press, 1 966) , pp. ters
Werner
im Spatm ittelalte r," Historische Zeitschrift,
64- 5 . 6See B a r rac lo u gh , Origins, 7See W i l l iam
1 964) ,
p. 8 5 ,
R.
pp. 3 2 7 ff.
She phe rd, Shepherd's Historical Atlas (New
York : Barnes &: Noble , and 1 4 1 5.
w hich shows the lands lost by B ra n de n bu r g between 1 3 2 0
8Barraclough, Origins, p. 3 2 5. 9The Hohenzollern dynasty had originated in
the
political fra gmentation that devel
oped out of the investiture controve rsy . By the third generatio n , one branch o f the Zollern fa mily had become bu rgraves o f N u re m be r g thro u g h intermar riage, a position they oc
cu pied from t he
eleventh
to the fi fteenth cen t u ry .
I OBarraclough, Origins, 11
p. 3 29.
H i ntze , Hohenzollern und ih r Werk,
pp. 4 8-50,
and
Ca rsten ,
Origins of Prussia,
pp.
95-6. I ' For detai ls see i b i d . ,
ch a p .
I I.
1 3See OUo H i ntze , "The H o h e n zollern and the Nobility," Historical Essays ( New York : Oxford U n i versity Press, 1 975),
pp. 3 5-43 .
1 4The contrast be tween t h e earlier autonomy and late r subjection of the
scribed in
Carste n, Origins of Prussia,
I � See ibid . ,
towns is de
pp. 46-5 1 , 1 3 6-4 8 , and pa ss i m .
pp. 1 65-78, fo r an account of
the " rule
of
the e st a te s " in
t he
di fle re nt
te rritories o f the Hohenzolle rn r u le rs . 1 6The
preceding paragraph pa r a p h ra se s
a c ha racte rization by O uo H i ntze i n
his
e ssay
"Geist u n d Epochen der Preussischen Gesc h ich te," Regierung und Vemallu ng (vol . 3 Gesa mmelte Abh an d lu n gen ; COll i n ge n :
V a n de n h oe c k &: Ruprecht, 1 96 7 ), pp. 5-8.
of
NOTES TO PAGES 1 5 6- 1 64
618
I 7 Hajo Holborn, A History p. 1 89 and passi m.
1 959),
I S H intze,
of
Modern
Germany, The Reformation
(New York : Knopf,
Hohenwliern u n d i h r Werk, pp. 1 86 - 7 ,
A ristocracy, and Au toc racy (Cambrid ge :
and Hans Rosenberg, B u reaucra cy, Harvard U n i v ers i ty Press, 1 958), p. 3 3 .
1 9 H intze reports (Hohe1lwllern, p. 1 8 7) t h a t in the second hal f o f the seventeenth ce n t ury a ristocratic landholdi ngs i nc rease d by 30 percent. All these developments should not be attributed to the Thirty Years' War, howeve r, since t here is evidence of depop ulation and pauperiza t i o n d ue to epidemics, emigration, rest rictive policies of craft gui l d s , an d rel i gi o us persecutions p rio r to the war. See K u rt H i nze, Die A rbeiterfrage zu Begin n des Modernen Kapitalismus in Brande1lburg.Preussen ( 2 n d ed . , vol. 9 of Veroffentlich u n gen der H is torischen Ko m m ission zu Berli n ; Bedi n : Walter de Gruyter, 1 963), pp. 2 7 -3 7 . 20See Carsten ,
Origins of Pms.! ia,
p. 1 89 and passi m .
2 1 l bid. , pp. 266- 7 1 . 22 See H intze, Hohen wllern und ill T Werk, pp. 205-2 1 , for details concern ing the strug gles between the elector and t he estate assemblies in his different territories. See . also the related accou nt in Carsten, Origins of PTU.!sia, pp. 205-52. 23The organization and financing of a standing army was a major factor in this as cendance and the related growth of a unified nation-state. Given the heterogeneity o f territories a n d t he particularist tendencies of their several estates until well i nto t h e eigh teenth century, a ste p toward the consolidation o f centralized rule may be seen in the edict o f Au g ust 1 3 , 1 7 1 3 , which declared all possessions o f the Hohenzollern house indivisible and inalienable. In this way all the territories together with the people residing in them were put on a par with the roya l domains a s the pro perty of the Hohenwllern dynasty. See H in tze, Die Hohenzoliern u n d illr Werk, p. 2 8 1 . "On t he religious development of the Prussian territories, see Otto Hintze, "Die Epo chen des evangelischen Kirchenregiments in Preussen," in Regierung und Ve7UIaUung, pp. 56-96 .
" H intze, "Geist und Epochen der Preussischen Gesch ichte," pp. 1 9-20. 2"See Peter Baumgart, "Zur Geschichte der kurmarkischen Stande im 1 7. und 1 8. Jahrhundert," in Dietrich Gerh ard, ed., Stii1ldische Verlrelungen in Europa im 1 7. und 1 8. Jahrhundert (GOttingen: Vanden hoeck & Ruprecht, 1 969) , pp. 1 3 1 -6 1 . 270pinion on this point is divided. Carsten, Origins of Prussia, pp. 2 1 6, 258, 269, em phasizes that only members of the aristocracy were appoi nted to high positions and s pe cifically rejects the contrary opinion of Otto Hintze. On the other side is the detailed study by Rudolf von Thadden, Die Brandenburgisch-Preussischen Hofprediger im 1 7. und 1 8. Jakr hunderl ( Berli n : Walter de Gruyter, 1 959), pp. 65-99, which shows that com moners of Reformed faith from outside areas rose to promi nence in the service of the Prussian kings. This was a bone of contention between the ruler and the aristocracy with neither side prevailing entirely. 2 8Another com parison for 1 740 indicates that whe n Prussia had 80,000 men under arms, Austria and France with a population ten times greater than Prussia had standing armies in peacetime which numbered 1 00, 000 and 1 60,000 men, respectively. See Otto
NOTES TO PA GES 1 65- 1 69 B usc h , M ilita rsyste m Itnd Sozialleben im Alten P1-eltSse71, 1 7 I J - 1 807 (vo l . 7 0f Veroffendic h u n gen de r Berliner H istorischen Kom m issio n ; Berli n : Walter de Gru yter, 1 96 2 ) , pp. 1 -2 ; E r n e st B a r k e r , The De velopmen t uJ Pu blic Services In We.ltern Eurupe ( Londo n : O x fo r d U ni v e rs i ty P ress, 1 944), note, p. 43; a n d J. O . Li nd say , ed . , The New Cambridge M o dern Hislm·y, The Old Regime ( N e w Yor k : Cambri d ge U n i v e r s i t y Pre s s , 1 9 5 7 ) , V I I , pp. 1 79-80, fo r the sou rces o f t he se figu res. ' " See B u sc h , Militar.IYJlem,
pp. 80- 1 , as we l l as t h e d isc ussion o f t h ese a n d 1·e1ated A rmy ( Ne w Y o r k : O x fo rd U n i ve rsity Pre s s , G a l a x y Books, 1 964) , p p . 1 0- 1 1 a n d pa s s i m .
me a s u re s i n G o rd o n A . C ra i g ,
The Polilics oj the Prussian
30 See B usc h , Militiirsyslem, p. 83 ; Ka r l Demeter, Dal Deutsche OJfizienkorpJ ( Frankfu rt : Be rnard & Graefe , 1 96 2 ) , p . 2 ; Robert Ergang, The Potsdam FUhrer ( N e w Yo r k : C o l u m b i a U n i v e rs i t y Press, 1 94 1 ) , pp. 7 8 - 8 1 ; a n d JupP Hove n , D e r Preussische OJJizier des 18. Jah1- hltnderts ( I n a u g u ra l D i s se rta t io n U n i vers ita t Le i p zi g ; Z e u le n rod e : B ern h a rd-Spo r n , 1 9 36) , p. 5 8 , for the s o u rc e o f these data. For a c h a racterization of e i gh tee n t h -ce n t u ry m i l i t a rism, see Barker, Developmen t oj Public Services, c h a p . 2, a n d Walter Dorn, Competition Jor Empi1"e ( N e w Y o r k : H arper & Row, H a rpe r Torchbooks, 1 96 3 ) , c h a p . 3 .
3 1 Carsten, Origins oj PTIt�'Sia, p. 266.
3 2 B u sc h , M ilitarsystem , p. 2. 33See H intze, data.
Die
Hohenzollerll und ihr Werk, pp. 295, 297-9, for the sou rce of these
" B u sc h , Militiirsystem, pp. 95-6.
3'See H intze, Hohenznllern und ihr Werk, p. 286, for the estimate by F re d e r i c k Wil l i am o f the e ffec t of war o n the ta x y i e l d o f towns. The estimates o f t h e p ro port ion o f m i l i t a r y to civilian po p u la t i o n are from Kurt H inze, A rbeiterfrage zu B egin n des Kapitalismus, p. 1 7 1 . Hinze's data on some other German towns indicate that the 20 percent mil ita r y personnel in the civi l i a n populati o n of Berlin was rather low. I
" Prussia," i n A. Goodwin, e d . , The E uropea n Nobility in the Eighteenth Adam and Charles B lack, 1 9 53 ) , pp. 93-9, for a review of Frederick's policies and the aristocratic response. The fam il y practices of the P r ussi a n no bi li t y i n the Electoral Mark (K u rm a r k ) are documented i n Fritz Marti ny, Die AdelsJrage in Preussen llOr 1 806 ( Be i h e ft 35 of V ier te ljahrs sc h r i ft fUr Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte ; Stuttgart : W. Ko h l h amme r, 1 938), p p. 2 8-30 and pa s s i m. One study shows that o f 547Jidei commissa cou n ted in se ve n eastern p rovinces in 1 885, 2 7 percent were fou nded before 1 800, 36.5 percent i n the half-century 1 800- 1 850, an d the re m a i n i n g 36.5 percen t in the thirty-five years till 1 885. See August Meitze n , Der Boden und die landwirlschaftlichen Verhiiltnisse des Preu5sischen Staates ( Berli n : Pa u l Pare y , 1 90 1 ) , V I , pp. 55 1 ( n . 3 ) , 554 (estimated). 30See A.
Good w i n ,
Century ( Lo n do n :
37Schools for cadets (Kadetten.lchulen) were large l y attended by sons of im pove r i s hed without landed prope rty. They we re financed publicly and th e n u m be r of p l aces in them equaled about 1 0 pe rc e n t o f the officer corps in 1 800. For data ind i cati n g the basis o f t hi s infe rence, see Marti n y , AdelsJrage, pp. 68-9. nobles
3·See ibid., pp . 69-73. On the last poin t the evidence is indirect. But o n l y on the of lapsed titles can we ex pla i n t h e l arge number of renewed titles from 1 79 0 to 1 839. See Reinhart Kosellek, Preu5sen zwischen Reform und Revolution ( v ol . 7 o f I n d us t rielle Welt; S tuttga rt : Ernest K lett Verlag, 1 96 7 ) , pp. 676-9.
assumption
NOTES TO PAGES 170-175 39See Martiny, Adelsfrage, pp. 74-80. For later evidence o n the distr ibu t i on of title s, see Kosellek, Preussen, pp. 676-9, which makes clear that until 1893 the bulk (over 80 percen t ) of new titles went to officers and officials serv i n g the mo n archy . <·Martiny, Adelsfrage, p. 113.
<'Ibid., pp. 65, 1 1 0-1 I. UCf. th e figu res for 1800-18 06 in Demeter, Deutsche Offilierskorps,
pp. 4-5,
w i th the
figures for 1780 gi ven in P. E. Razzell, "Social Origins of Officers in the Indian a n d British Home Army, 1758-1962," Briti�hJoumal of Sociology, vol. 14 (1963), p. 253 .
pp. 22-6: Busch, Mi p. 405: William O. Shana Columbia U n iversity Press, 1945), pp. 29-30;
• 3See M a rtin y, Adelsfrage, p. 80: Craig, PolitiCJ of Prussian Anny, litiirsYJ tem , pp. 56-61, 67-71: De m eter ,
Deutsche
ha n, Pru.I.!ian Military Reforms (lI:ew York: an d Rose n berg , Bureaucracy, pp. 58-9.
Offizimkorp.l,
"For a mod ern discussion of t h e Prussian reform movemen t, see W. M . S im o n, The Failure of the Prussian Reform Mo ve m ent (Ithaca: Cornell U niversi ty Press, 1 965). "This definition
of mi lita .-ism
is contained in Eckart Kehr , "Zur Genesis des Koniglich
Preu ssi s chen Reserveoffiziers," Der Primat deT hmenpolitik ( vol. 1 9 of VerofTentlichungen de r Historischen Kommission: Berlin: Wa l ter
pp. 12, 18, 26 , cited in this pa ra gra ph .
Deutsche OfJizierskorps, the data •
6See
Gruy ter, 1 965), p. 54.
See also Demete r , p p. 79-8 1 , for
Rosenberg, BureaueraC)', pp. 61-4, 67-70.
"Ibid. , pp. 175-81, <·See
de
and Craig, Politics of P russia n Army,
ibid.,
for
a
detailed description of this development.
pp. 59, 15 1 , 1 75-81, fOJ"
a
mor e detailed description of
these points.
<9See ibi d . , pp. 1 8 2-9 . ·" Marti ny, Adebfi"age,
pp. 1 1 4-18.
51 Kosellek,Preussell, pp. 5 1 1 -1 2 .
• 21n the eastern province 3.8 million hectares belonged to aristocratic owners as a gainst 0.88 million hectares bel o nging to middle-class owners. See Meitzen, Der Boden, VI, pp. 5 55-6. >!'See ibid., Beu"achtungen
S01.illlpolitik
V I, zur
pp. 552-3, a nd Max Weber, "Agrarstatistische und so zialpolitische Fide ik omm i ss f rage in Pre u ssen, " Ge.lllmml'lte Aufsatze zur Soziologie und
( T iib inge n :
J.
C.
B.
Mohr, 1 924), pp. 3 23-93.
HSee Kosellek, PI"eu.Utll, pp. 97- 8, 101-3, 1 07-8, and passim for details co nc e rning this eme'"gence
of an amalga mated
'''Ernst Troeltsch, "The Otto
Gierke, Nfltllml
(ap pendix).
gove rn ing class in Prussia .
Ideas of
Natural Law and Huma nity in World Politics," in
Law and the Theol)" uf Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1 9 5 7), p. 214
NOTES TO PAGES 176-187 CHAPTER VI. ENGLAND t
In what follows, I
usually refer to
England rat her t han
Saxon En gla nd, A nglo - No r m a n En g l and, and so on.
The
to
Roman Britain , Anglo
context wil l make clear what
period is unde r disc us sio n. 2See F. M. Stenton, Anglo - Saxon
E'lgland
(London: Oxford University
Press, 1 97 1 ),
pp. 34-7. Cf. the earlier discussion of these tribal conditions in Chapter 2, pp. 2 5 - 2 6 , 35-36.
3John Morris, T� Age of A rthur ( Lon don :
Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
19 73), pp.
326-7.
4The followin g discussion is based on Stenton,
Anglo-Saxon E n gland,
p p . 545 ff.
Slbid. , p . 5 5 2. 6 See ibid., pp. 35 1 -3, 550-3,
fo r these materials
on the
king 's counc il.
7lbid., p. 305.
8The interplay between the cult of kingship and the claims of kings is examined in detail in William Chaney, The Cult of Kingship in Anglo-Saxon England (Manchester: Man chester University Press, 1970). 9Stenton, A nglo-Saxon England, p. 36.
1"lbid., p. 680. IlSee David C. Douglas, William t� Conqueror (Berkeley and Los of California Press, 1964), pp. 266, 269, 302.
An ge le s : University
12See P. W. Sawyer, "The Norman Conquest of England," Conquest and Culture, mimeo (Past and Present Societ y , Annual Conference 1971; London, 1971), pp. 6-7. l3See G. O. S ayles , T� Medieval Foundations of England (New York: A. S. Barnes, 1961). pp. 226, 228 ff.; Carl Stephenson, Medieval Feudalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1 956) , pp. 75-7, and Douglas .. William � Conqueror. pp. 275-8. 281-3.295-8. for evi dence of the contrast between Norman England and the other countries mentioned. The Norman kings and their successors placed their executive, financial, and judicial business in the hands of personal appointees who had been trained in the king's service. See S. B. Chrimes. An Introduction to the Administrative History of Med,ieval England (New York: Mac millan, 1952), pp. 23-4, 87-8, on the social origins of major officials of the Crown, and pp. 156-8 on the general acceptance of officials as the king's personal agents. t4 S idne y Painter, Studies in the History of tM English Feudal Barony (Baltimore: Jo hns
H o pkin s U ni ve rsi ty Press, 1943). pp. 68-9.
"I bid. , pp. 57, 63-4.
t6See Frank Barlow, The Feudal Kingdom of England, 1042-1216 (London: Lon gmans,
Green. 1 955), p. 90.
17See
Do u gla s ,
William the Conqueror,
pp.28 1 - 3 .
'"Ibid., pp. 150-1. IBBarlow, Feudal Kingdom of EIlglalld, pp. 109-10.
2·See the account of the regency d u r ing the mi no rity of H en ry III in Sir M au rice Powicke, The Thirteenth Celltlll)', /2/6-lJ07 (London: Ox fo r d University Press, 1970), chap. I. 2. Ibid.,
22C.
pp. 524-9. The
quo t at io n appears on p. 529.
H. Mcilwain, "Medieval Estates," The
Cambridge Medieval History
(London: Cam
b ri d ge University Press, 1 932), VII, pp. 7 12-13. Mcilwain cites the following la nd marks of constitutional de v e l o p ment : the Provisions of Oxfo r d ( 1259), Ed ward l's concessions
in the c o nfi rm at i o n of charters (1279), the di sti nc t ion between ki ng and crown mad e in the reign of E d wa rd II (1307- 1 327), the ordinances of the barons (131 1 ), th e extension of baro ni a l control o v e r the Exchequer and even over the Ki ng's Wardrobe, and the en
l arge ment of parliamentary powers and cla i ms d uri ng the Lancastrian reign of the fif teenth c entury. See the further reference to representation in England in Chapter 7, "Representation," this volume.
230UO Hintze attributes the emergence of representative institutions to that "balance" in England and in some other Western European countries. See Ouo Hintze, Histarical Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 1 975), pp. 302-53. 24For the justi ces of the peace, see the detailed desc ri pt ions in Sidne y and Beatrice Webb, English Local Got1emmenl: The Parish and the Cou nly (London: Longmans, Green, 1 906), I, pp. 305-10, 372-3 , and passim. The Webbs discount the formal coordination
by the government because of the wide discretion enjoyed by justices of the peace. For Prussia, see Otto Busch, Militiirsyswm und Sozialleben im Alten Preussen, 1713-/807 (vol. 7 o f Veroffentlichungen der Berliner Historischen Kommission; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1 962), pp. 84-9, and Otto Hintze, Die HohenZLIliern und ih,' Werk (Berlin: Paul Parey, 1 9 1 5), pp. 286-8. For the military origin of the Landrat, see Otto Hintze, "Der Ursprung des .preussischen Landratamts in der Mark Brandenburg," Regierung und Verwaltung (vol. 3 of Gesammelte Abhandlungen; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967), pp. 1 64203. "Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England, p. 303. 26Frank Barlow, "The Effects of the Norman C onquest," in Dorothy Whitelock et aI., The Narman Conquest (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1 966), pp. 1 39-40. 27Marc Bloch, Feudal Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 961), pp. 59 ff., 190 ff. 28Painter, English Feudal Barony, p. 42 and passim. 29See May McKisack, The Fourteenth Century, J 307-1399 (London: Oxford University Press, 1 959), pp. 234 ff. 30 See Powicke, Thirteenth Century, p. 5 1 6. For the characterization of these conditions up to the sixteenth century, I have relied on Lawrence Stone, The Crisis of the A ristocracy (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 199-234. See Chapter 7 for a further ref erence to feuds as part of the feudal legal order.
NOTES TO PAGES 204-207 31Samuel Finer, "State- and N ati on-B u il di ng in Europe: The Role of the Mil i tary, " ed., The Formation of NatiQrlal States in Western E urope (Princet o n : Pr inceton U ni ver sity P re ss, 1975), pp. 114 ff.
in Charles Till y,
320n the
decl ini ng military expe ri enc e of the peerage, see Stone,
C"isis, pp.209- 16,
234-9, 265-6; see also pp. 454-8 for a des cri pt ion of ar istocra ti c military servic e under
and t he early Stuarts. T he decl ini ng mili tary capacity of the English army duri ng the early seventeenth century is documented by C. H. Fi rth , Cromwell"s Arm)' (London: M et hu en, U ni versi ty Paperbacks, 1962), chap. I. On the development of the duel, see Stone, Crisis, pp. 234 ff., and Sir G eorge Clark, War and S ociety in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: At the U ni vers ity Press, 1958), ch ap. 2. Elizabeth
33This proportion of en tr an ts was not reached again until after World War I and was exceeded only after World W a r I I. See Lawrence Stone, "The Educational Revolution in England, 1560-1640," Past and Present, vol. 28 (1964), p p. 57-69. Stone notes that entrants came from all strata of the population, but that the aristocracy was greatly overrepresented .
.. Ibid., p. 63. This pr o po rt ion fell to 45 percent in the years 1734-1761 and then again to 60 perc ent in the years 1818-1831. See Gerrit Judd, Members of Parliament, 1734-1832 (New H aven : Ya l e U n iver si ty Press, 1955), p. 37. rose
3&See
Stone, "Education al Revolution," pp. 69-73; Stone,
Crisis, p. 673
and passim;
a nd M. H. Curtis, Oxford and Cambridge in Transition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), pp. 265-70. 38See the vivid de scriptio n of this contrast by J. H. Hexter, "The E du c atio n of the Aristocracy in the Renaissance," in Reappraisals in History (New York : H arper & Row, Harper T or chbo oks, 1963), pp. 45-70. 3 7 Lawren ce
Stone and M ariu s J an sen, "Education and Modernization in Japan and vol. 9 (1966/67), p. 221.
Engla nd, " Comparative Studies in Society and History,
38For further d etails on the English mili ti a, see Walter Dorn, Competition for Empire. York: Harper & Row, Ha rper Torchbooks, 1963), chap. 3, and Juliu s H atschek . Englische Verwaltungsgeschichte ( Mu ni ch : R . Ol d enbo ur g , 1913), pp. 735-40. Hatschek not es th at th e Engli sh militia was org ani ze d after the Prussian cantonal admin istration, but in E ngl and this i mp lied the supremacy of the local gentry over t he recruits, whereas in Prussia the same administrative device ensured the ki n g's supremacy over both officers an d recr ui ts. 1740-1763 (New
39See Stone, Crisis. p. 53.
Peerage is the
term
used i n lieu of the earlier b arona ge
or
ten an ts -in-ch ief. 4°lbid pp. 385-98. .•
41Roger Lo ck yi er , Tudor
and Stuart Britain (London: Longmans. Green, 1964),
pp. 28,
86.
<· l bid. , ch aps. 2-5, pro vide a convenient summary of m ode m research and i nt er p retat i on conce rn in g these topics. 43See F. C. Dietz, E nglish Government Finance (Lond o n: Frank Cass, 1 964), I, pp. 3559, for examples from the reigns of Henry V II and Hen ry V I I I. These liabilities were as
NOTES TO PAGES 207 -213 much
d u e t o f or ei gn e ntanglements as
to the king's fi n ancial d epende nce on the ri sing to the ki n g's use of fore ign complicati ons for his own (ibid., I, p p . 53-9) , but also to the extension of E n glish rule over
class of merchants. Dietz poin ts pec uniary advantage I reland as
a major cause
of royal appeals for su bsidies from parliament (ibid. , II, p. 48).
HDuring the forty-five years from 1 558 to 1 603, 87 8 families were elevated to the knighthood, 3 were made Irish and 1 8 E n glish peers. This may be contrasted with the thirty - e igh t years between 1 603 and 1641. duri n g which 3,28 1 families were elevated to the kn ig ht hood, 542 were made En glish, Irish, or Scottish baronets, and 80 were made Irish and 1 03 Englis h peers. See Stone, Crisis, pp. 2 64, 755, for the source of th ese d ata . ··See the d ocu men t ation in Stone, • SThe
Crisis,
pp. 449-586 .
gr ow in g prominence of a concern
with country and hence an incipient na Foxe's Book of Martyrs and the Elect Nation (Lond on : J ona than Cape, 1963) , pp. 242-50. H aller refers to the late si xteen th century, w hile the later develo pment of an imper ial ideol ogy is d iscussed by R ichard Koeb ner, Empire (New York: Grosset & Dun lop, 1 96 1 ), cha p. 3. tio nalis m is su gges ted persuasively by Wil liam Haller,
HF.
W. Maitland, The Constitutional History of England (Cambridge: At the University pp. 74-5. See also the account of prim ogeniture in ibid . , pp. 37-9; 1 57-78.
Press, 1 96 1 ),
48See Ernest Barker, National Character (4th ed.; London: Methuen, 1 948), pp. 1 2 2-4.
··This summary is based on the detailed s tud y of medieval Lond on by Sy lvia Thrupp, The Merchant Class of Medieva l London (An n Arbor: Univer sity of Michigan Press, 1962), pp. 236-38, 245-7. and passim. See also Curtis, Ox ford and Cambridge, cha p. 10, a n d the w ritings of Stone and Hexter cited e arl ier. ·° Lock y ier, Tudor and Stua"1 Britain, p. 2 8. A somewhat d ifferent emphasis is pro vid ed by Wa gner , . who state s that six dukedoms and eight earldoms were destroyed through death in battle, execution, or forfeiture, but that the common impression of a decimation of the old nobility dur in g this peri od is mistaken. See A. R. Wagner, English A ristoc racy (London: Oxford Uni versi ty Press, 1 96 1 ), p. 43. However, the d estruction of fourteen major families is not negligible.
SISee Stone, Crisis, pp. 1 63-4. 52 Thru pp , Merchanl Class, pp. 244, 262-3 .
USee ibid., p. 2 80, fo r a d es cript ion of the steps by which a city merchant could change his status by assuming the social role of a country gen tle man . '·The source of these quotations an d ev ide nce for the status orientation of English society are contained in Perez Z agori n, The Court and the Country, the Beginning of the English Ret'ollliion (New York: Atheneum, 1 97 1 ), pp. 1 9�30. "R. H. Tawney,
The Agrariall Problem of the Sixteenth Century (New York : Burt Franklin,
n.d.), p. 384. '·Ibid., p p. 390, 392.407-8. Later sc holar ly revisions of Tawney's interpretation do not affect the points mad e in t h e text. See the summary of the literature and a compre-
NOTES TO PAGES 213-216 hensive bibliography i n Lawrence Stone's introduction to the Harper Torchbooks edition of Tawney's book (1967).
57Statement
of th e Duke of Wellington, justi fying t h e pu rc ha se of army commissions
at high price s , q uot ed in P. E. Razzell, "S oc ia l Origins of O fficers
Home Army , 58See t he
59].
1758-1962,"
Brit is h Journal of Sociology,
documentation of t hese
in the Indian and B ritish
vol. 14 (1963), p. 258.
points in Stone, Crisis, pp .
209-16, 234-9.
P e nguin, 1963), p. that the "gentleman ly professi on of serving-men" was declining at the end of the s ix teenth century. Since the reference here is to adults, this is compatible w i t h the st a tement by Phillipe Aries, Ce n tur ies of Childhood (New York: Vi ntage , (965), pp. 370-1, that the gr e a t families of the n o bi lit y retained the old system of ap pr ent i ceshi p lon g after the schooling of boys had been adopted by families of m i ddle rank. E. N e ale , The EliUlbethan House of Commons (Harmondsworth:
22, s u ggest s
\;eale, House of Commons,
pp. 22-3.
'See ibid., pp. 21-2, 133-4 . • 2See ibid., pp. several M.A. theses bethan parliaments.
24-5 for the q uotation and pp. 139-40 for Neale's reference to t he which document the overrepresentation of
rural
areas in the Eliza
63See F. M. L. Thompson, English Landed Society in the Nineteenth
Routledge and Kegan
P au l,
1963), p. 276 .
Century
(London:
• 4]. H . Plumb, The G ro wth of Political Stability in England, 1675-1725 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), p. 39.
ti5H. J. Habbakuk, "England," in A. Goodwin, ed. , The European Nobility in the Eigh teenth Century (London : Adam and Charles Black, 1953), pp. 2-3. A ful l er account of the technical details is contained in H. J. Habbakuk, " Marriage Settlements in the Eightee nt h Cent u ry ," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society (London: Royal Historical Society, 1950), 4t h series, vol. 32, pp. 15-30. 66See
S.
H. J.
Habba kuk, "The English Land Market in the Eighteenth Century," in
J.
Bromley and E. H. K.:>ssm ann, eds. , Britain and the Netherlands (London: Chatto & Wi n
d u s , 1960), pp. 154-5 and passim. I n France, the old regime had still another residence pat ter n because of the shift to Versailles. There aristocrats resided at court when in at tendance, possessed a townhouse in Paris (hOtel or palais), and owned various country res idences, shifting from one to the other as the ki ng ' s presence or their
own ambition in
dicated. For a detailed analysis of the French aristocratic life style as reflected in their li v in g arrangements, see Norbert Elias, Die hiifische Gesellschaft (Neuwied: Luchterhand , 1969), chap. 3. 87See ibid., pp .. 5-6. For the use of public offices as a source of income for the gentry, see J. Donald Kingsley, Representative Bureaucracy (Yellow Springs: ·"See the quotations in
Sir
Lewis Namier, England
Anti och
Press, 1944).
in the Age of the American Rellolution
(London: Macmillan, 1961), p. 19. This was the basis also of the pleas of the Continental Congress in 1774.
NOTES TO PAGES 216-223 69See Habbakuk in A. G oodwin , e d., Eumpl'w/ N()bility, pp. 7-1 1 , wh o stresses the extreme va riab ility of fa mily fortunes and the rather special economic imp roveme n t of
the landed gentry du ring the eight ee n t h century. For an illustrative survey of aristocratic S. D. Stirk, Die Aristokrarie und die industrielle Entwicklun g in Englan d (\'01. 1 5 of Sprache und Kultur der Germanisch-Romanischen Volker; Breslau: Verlag
economic activities, see
Hans Priebatsch, 1 93 3 ), especially cha p . 3. 70Th is state m ent b y W. E. H. Leek}' is quoted by Namier, England in the Age of the American Ret/olution. pp. 3 3-5, toge t he r with several other, similar observations conce rni ng
the eco n omic sophistication of the gentry. 7l0n the othe r hand, it is probable that this nonutilitarian education acted as a brake on the gentry's interest in the devel op m e nt of science and technolo g y . See the disc u s sio n by Lawrence Stone in j a n sen and Stone, "Education and Modernization in japan and
England, " pp. 21 9-32. "The special po sition of the navy is reflected in its ju ris di ctio nal autonomy, compar a ti vel y gene rous parliamentar y appropriations in times of emergenc y . the high propo r tion of sons from aristocrat ic families among naval officers, and the earl y professionalization of navy officer tr aini ng in the e igh t eenth century. For documentation, see Hatschek, En
glische Verwaltungsgeschichte, pp. 524-30; Dorn. Competilion for Empire, pp. 102-9 ;- and Mi chael Le wi s , A Social History of the Navy, 1 793- 1 8 1 5 (London : Geor ge Allen & Unwin, 1960). pp. 3 1 , 36, and passim.
"For an emp ir i c al analysis of aristocratic dominance thr oughout the nineteenth and L. Gutt sm an, The British Political Elite (New York: Basic Books, 1963).
into the twentieth century, see W.
74See the d e tai led discussion by Th om pso n , English Landed Society.
"See the analysis by Rupert Wilkin son , Gentlemanly PaUleI' ( Lon do n : Oxford University Pres s , 1964). 7 8See Walter Bageh ot , The Engl ish Constitution (2nd ed.; London : Oxford University Press, 1958). pp. 263-4, and Hipp ol }' te Taine, Noles on England ( London : Thames and Hudson, 1957), p. 155. This opi n i on was not confined to conservatives. For a concurring opinion by Friedrich Engels, see h i s Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (Chica go : Charles H. Kerr, 1 905), pp. xxxii-xxxiv.
CHAPTER VII. KINGSHIP AND ARISTOCRACY AS A TYPE OF RULE 1 For
details, see Robert G. Wesson,
The Imperial Order
(Berkeley and Los Angeles:
Univer si t y of California Pr ess , 1967), pp. 123-38 and passim.
2Marc Bloch, Feudal Society (Chicago: Uni versi t y of Chi cago Press, 1961), p. 40. 3The discussion of Germani c , Islamic, and japanese traditions pro vi ded glimpses of
the p rocess by which more complex political organi zations arose out of tribal units based on clans. For a surve y of these o ther ty pe s o f trad itional authori t y with s pe cia l reference
to Africa, see Lucy M ai r, Primitive GOt/emment ( B a l timo re : Pe nguin , 1964).
NOTES TO PAGES 225-232 4Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (N ew
York: Modern Library, 1940), p. 15.
5The phrase "governing class" has been s u g ge st e d by Ge rh a rd Lenski, POUle·" and Priv ilege (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966), pp. 219 f( I a d o pt it here so as to differentiate t radit ional societies with the ir coincidence of ru ling influence and actual government from mode m societies with their distinc tion between ruling class and political class. See Raymond Aron , "Social Class, Political Class, Ruling Class," E urope an Joumal o[ Sociology, \'01. 1(1960), pp.260-81.
6For
a
Medieval Statecmf/ and the U n i v e rs i ty Press, 1971), p. 65 and pass i m .
discussion of t hi s defin it ion, see J os eph R. Strayer,
Pel:lpectives of History 7 W e s son ,
(Princeton: Princeton
Imperial Order, pp. 85-6.
SAntonio Marongiu, Medieval
Parliamentl ( Lo n don :
Eyre & Sp ott isw oo d e , 1968). p.
21. "I bid .
'· Q uot e d in J. M.
Wallace-Hadrill. The Long-Haired Kings ( Lo n don : Methuen, 1962),
p. 1 84, n. 2. " See
Max Weber. Econamy and Society
(tr. and ed. by
Guenther
Roth and Cla us Wit
tich ; New York: Bedminster Press. 1 968). Ill. p p . 1 070-1.
' 2 Ibid.•
Il l. pp. 1 022 fr.. 1 072 fr.
'3 Ibid
Ill. pp. 1 074 -6. "Western European" refers to Northwestern Europe . In
.•
Spain. for example. See Ronald
the element of honor seems to have developed at the expense of fealty. Glassman. Political History of Latin America (New Yor k : Funk & Wag nalls . 1969),
pp. 11- 1 2.80-2. 14See Strayer.
Medieval Statecraft. pp. 66-72. for a delimitation of the
military element
in the development of feudalism.
'SThis synopsis and rephrasing of Weber's analysis is taken from Reinhard Bendix. Max Weber, An Intellectual Portrait (2nd ed.; Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Cal ifornia Press. 1 978), p p. 363-5. See Weber. Economy and Society. Ill, pp. 1 1 04- 9 a nd passim. 16See Norbert Elias, Uber
den Proz.ess der Zivilisation (2nd e d .;
Bern : Francke Verl ag .
1 969), I, p p. 266-9. (Originally published in 1939.) The discussion foll owing is primarily
a summary of this important study. " Quo ted from a fifteenth-century German text in ibid
.•
I , p. 272.
18See J. H u i zinga , The Waning of the Middle Ages (Harmondsworth: Peng u in. 1955), which contains a vivid portrayal of this atmo sph ere. Th e qualitie s listed are those
chap . I,
of the aristocracy. '·Elias,
Prouss,
1. pp. 281-2. cites this case from the sixteen th
ce ntu r y.
NOTES TO PAGES 232-239 'O Se e ibid . ,
I,
p p. 1 1 0-2 30. See also Philippe Erla n ger, The Age
of Courts
and Kings
(Garde n City: Do u bled ay , Anchor Books, 1970), p. 59 and pass i m . "See Elias, ProZfss, II, p p. 312 ff. Elias is not always clea r h ow he conceives the relation
b e twee n su ch cha n g ing patterns and the i n dividual. Violence and cruelty or the refine me nt of ma nners may be char acte r ist i c of a society for a perio d , but neither the c a pacit y for i nsta nt aggression n or that for etiqueue and polite mani pu latio n are distribu ted eq ually among the peo ple . I sug ge st that different p a tte r n s of i n t erd e pen d e nc e encourage
the pe rsona l ity types which are most effective at aggression or ma n i pulati on . See the anal y si s in Rein hard Bendix, " Co m pl ian t Behavior and Individ ual Personality," AmericanJour nal of Sociology, vol. 58 (November 1 952), p p. 292-303.
1 60.
"Quoted in Norbert Elias, Die H ojl." he GeselL,chaft (Ne u w i ed: Luchterhand, 1969), p .
'3My pa ra p hr a s e is based on Arthur Schopenhauer's tr ansla t i o n of t he work. See
Balt h as a r Gracian, Handomkel und KUllst del' Welthlugheit ( M unic h : Wilhelm Gold m ann
Verlag, 1 960). The work i s divided i n t o n u mb e red pa ragra p h s , and the points cited are fo u nd in p ara gra ph s 1 3 , 14,26, 35,84, 149, 150,2 8 7, and 29 7 . "'See George O. S a y les , The Killg'J Parliament of Engla nd (New York: W. W. . Norton,
1 974), pp. 2 1 -6. USee
M a ro n gi u ,
Medieval Pa'-[iaments, pp. 82-4 a n d passim.
··Ibid . , pp. 85-6. 27Fra ncis Bacon, "On Nobility," The Complete Eml)'s
f
o
Francis Bacon (ed . H. L. Finch;
:\ew York: Was hington Square Pr e ss, 1963), p. 36.
'"Gerhard Ritter, "Das britische Par l a m ent im 18. Jahrhundert," in Dietrich Gerhard, ed., Stiindisclie Ve l'l retungm ill Euro/)(I i", 17. I/Ild 18.J(llirhundert (Golli n gen: Vande n hoeck
& Ruprecht, 1 969), pp. 423-4. USee
A rch ib ald S.
Foord, "The Waning of t h e 'Influence of t h e Crown ,'" re printed
fro m t h e E llglisli Historical Ret'u.U' (1947) in Rosalind Mitchison, ed., Essays in Eighteenth CelituryHist01), (Lon don: Lo n gmans, Green, 1966), pp. 171-94 .
""Moreover, the property qualification of candidates for office increased the social h o m o ge n e i ty of the pol i tica l elite still further. See Ritter, "Das britische Parlament," pp. 4 1 6-18. "' R. R. Pal mer, The Age Press, 19 59 ) , I, chap. 2.
of the
De m uc ra t ic
Revolution ( Pr ince to n :
Pri n ce ton University
"This conflict did not occur e v e r yw h e r e . Northwestern Germany, for exa mple, con sisted o f subsidiary principalities, bisho prics, and m u n ici palities with out political a m bi tion s, a n d t h e same i s u'ue elsew here . I n s u c h areas, e state assemblies exercised legisla tive fun ction s u n t i l the
re percu s sions
of the Fr e nch "evolution destroyed the foundation of
these assemblies. See C hapte r II, "The Holy Rom a n E m pire," for a further discussion of the small German principalities. ""See Peter Baumgal'l, "Zur Gesch ichte del' kurmar k i schen Stande im 17. Jahrhundel'l," ill Dietrich Gerhard, ed . , Stiim/i.lclie Vn·tretllngl'n, p. 140.
u nd
1 8.
34lbid., pp. 144-6 and passim.
a'Nikolai N. Alexeiev,
J a hrh un de rt, " Forschungen
"
Be itrage
WI'
Ge sch i ch te des russischen Absolutismus in 18.
zur Osteuropaischen Ge.lchichte (Osteuropa-I nstitut, Frei e Uni
ve rs ita t Berlin; Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1 958) , VI, pp. 7-14 and pass i m .
a"Gustave Alef, "The Crisis of the Muscovite Aristocraq'," Forscllllllgen wr o .ltell ropiiischell Ceschichte, vol. 15 ( 1970), pp. 18-19. See a lso by the same alllhor, "Das Erloschen des Ab7.llgsrechts d er Moskauer Bojaren," in F01"Schllngen, vol. 10 ( 1 965), pp. 7-74. 37Alexeiev, Beitrage, pp. 15-16,41-7. M. M. Cherbatov, the most prominent aristo cratic s poke sma n in the s econ d half of the eighteenth century, made a spe c i al point of a tta cking the di s h on esty of tradespeople using s u bter fu g e in order to acquire aristocratic rank.
CHAPTER VIII. TRANSFORMATIONS OF WESTERN EUROPEAN SOCIETIES IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY ISee Otto Brunner, Land und Herrschaft ( Vienn a: R. M. Ro h re r, 1959), pp. 1-110. For
a detailed analysis of this process in Frankish,
Go ebel, Felony and
A nglo- S axon, and Norman law, see Julius of English Criminal Procedure (Com
Misdemeanor, A Stu dy in the Histo ry
monwealth Fund; New York: Ox ford University Press, 1937), pp. 17-18 and passim. "Ernst
Ke rn ,
Moderner
Staat und Saatsbegriff
(Hamburg: Rechts- und Staatswissen
schaftlicher Verlag, 1949), part 2. "See Ernest Barker,
The Development of Public
Services in
ford U n iversity Press, 1944), pp. 4-5 and passim.
West ern Europe
(London: Ox
fRights could be considered invalid even though a ruler had enacted them.
Moderner Staat,
pp. 71 ff.
See Kern,
'Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Knopf, 1948),.1, pp. 5-6 and
passim.
6The following discussion is based on Carlo M. Cipolla, Before
European
Society
and Economy, /000-1700 (Lo n d on :
7lbid., p. 173. See also E.
J.
Dijksterhuis,
don: Oxford University Press, 1961).
the Industrial Rellolution,
Methuen, 1976), chaps. 4-7.
The Mechanization of the Wo rld
Picture (Lon
8A major attempt along this line is contained in Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern Wor ld - Syste m , Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Six teenth C ent ury (New York: Academic Press, 1974). Wallerstein states that "idea systems are capable of being used in the service of contrary interests, capable of being associated with
quite different structural thrusts" (p. 62), and again "any complex system of ideas can be manipulated to serve any particular social or political objective" (p. 152). However, the universality of manipulation does not really come to grips with the differences among cultures, the persistent interest in ideas, or the question of what social and political inter ests may be served by a completely manipulative approach to ideas. A history and critique of this reductionist approach is co ntained in Hans Barth, Truth a ri d I d eo logy (Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976). My study d i ffers from WaJlel"Stein's
materialistic approach as well as from Barrington Moore's earlier Social Origill'\ of Dicta-
NOTES TO PAGES 253-258 torship and Democracy, LOI·d
an d Peasant in the Making of the Modern
World (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1966) by a greater e m phas i s on the polit i cal antecedents of the six teenth centu ry and o n the role of ideas in the formation of the modern world. 9See Fernand Braudel, The ,..,lediterrmlean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), II, p p. 666-7. Walle rs t ein , Modern World-System, pp. 41-51, gives an an alys is of the fa ctors accou n ti ng for Portu gal' s pioneering role in the overseas ex pan sion of Europe. '·Cipolla shows tllat the Muslims quickly borrowed the tech nique of produc i ng West ern artillery, but that for techn ic al and cultural reasons they were handicapped in its use. The reference to the number of French books dealing with Turkey and the Americas is also contained in C a rlo M. C ipolla , GUliS and Sails in the Early Phase of European Expal1sion,
1400-1700 (London: Collins, 1965), pp. IS, n. I. and 90 f r.
Pannikar, Asia and Western Dominance (Lon
" The text of this bul l is quoted in K. M. do n : Allen & Unwin, 1959 ), p p. 26-7.
'2Jacques Bernard, "Trade and Finance in the Middle Ages, 900-1500," in Carlo M.
Cipolla, ed.,
The Fontana Economic History of Europe, The Middle Ages
(London: Collins,
1972), pp. 309-10. I3Braudel,
Mediterranean World, I,
p. 4 19.
" See ibid. , I, pp. 355 fr., 39 4 II, for the details and for the author ' s r e pe at ed caut i ons
concerning the overall figures I hav e cited. See especially the detailed calculation of speeds with which news traveled between also Ci poll a, Before
V enice and various cities the Industrial Revolution, p. 166, n.
of Europe on pp. 362 ff. See
"I have used the list of fou ndat ion dates in William L. Lan ge r , of World History ( Boston : Houghton, Mifflin, 1968), pp. 1314-15.
ed.,
An Encyclopedia
"See Fernand Braude!, Capitalism and Material Life, 1400-1800 (London : Weidenfeld Enge ls i n g, Analphabetentum und Lektiire (Stuttgart : J. B. Met zl ersc h e Verlagsbuchhandlu n g, 1973), p p . 18-20; and Cipolla , Bifore the In dust ria l Revolution, pp . 167-8, for information on the e arl y book trade. and N icolson, 1973), p p . 289-99; Rolf
'7 Marjorie Plant, The En glish Book Trade 18 Margaret B.
Stillwell,
(London: Allen & U n w in , 1965), pp. 90-1.
The Awakening Inte'·e.!t ill
Science during the First Century of Print
ing, 1 450-1 550 (New York: Bibl iograph ical Society of America, 1970). I am inde bted to my assistant, Theodo re Bogac z, for his co m pilation of these figures.
\9Carlo M. Cipolla, Literacy and Development in the West (Baltimore: Penguin, 1969), p. linkages between the Refo rma tion and the invention of printing are ex plored by
61. The
Elizabeth
Ei senstei n , "The Advent of Pri n ti n g and the Protestant Revolt," in Robert Transition an d Revolution (Minneapolis: Burgess, 1974), pp. 235-70.
M.
Kingdon, e d. ,
2°1 use the phrase "commercialization of land, labor, and ca pital"
in preference to the
more familiar "rise of capitalism," following a suggest i on of Karl Polanyi. The phrase
su gges t s the ex tension of ex change relations and monetary transactions to the three main factors of production.
NOTES TO PAGES 258-264 21 Francis Ba con , " No vum O rg an um, " in E. A. Burt t, ed., The Eng lish Philosophers from Bacon to Mill (New York: Modern Library, 1939), p. 85. 221n a s eri es of articles, Elizabeth Eisen ste in h as an alyz ed the ramifications of th e change from a scribal to a pr i n ti n g culture, with special em ph as i s on the chan g es in world ou tloo k which followed fro m the easy reproducibility of texts. See Elizabeth Eisens t ei n , "Clio and Chronos," History and the Concept of Time (vol. 6 of H i s to ry and Theory; Mid
dletown: W es leyan University P r ess , 1966), pp. 36-64; "Some Conjectures about the Im pact of Printing on Western Soc i ety and Thought," Journal of Modern History, vol. 40 (March 1968), pp. I-5 6 ; "The Advent of P rin ting and the Problem of the R en aiss ance, " Past and Present, no. 45 (November 1969), pp. 19-89.
23See G. R. Elton, The Tu dor Revolution in Gove17lment (London : C am br i dg e Uni vers i t y Press, 1962), passim, and
G.
E. Aylmer, The King's Servants, the Civil Service of Charles I, U niv ersity Press, 1961), especially pp. 429-30, for a
1 625-1642 (New York: Columbia
sum mary of the laicization of the Eng li sh governm en t.
UThis brief st atemen t is based on the hi st oriog raphi c sketch in Wi l f rid R. Prest, The
Inns oj Court under Elizabeth I and the Early Stuarts ( Lo n don : Long m ans , 1972), pp. 1-5, and A. M. Carr-S aund ers and P. A. W il son, The Professions ( London : Frank Cass, 1964), pp . 7 - 5 8.
25See ibid., pp. 65 fr., 117 ff., for details on phy sicians an d n ursing . The s ketch of te aching is gleaned from M. H. Curt i s, Oxford and Cambridge in Tmnsition, 1 558-1 642 (London: Oxford University
P ress, 1959),
chaps. 2 and 7. For a d esc ri pt ion of the final
c ri sis of s ecul ariza tion from 1850 to 1870, see Brian Simon, Studies in the History of Edu cation, 1780-1870 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1960), pp. 281-99. 26J. B. Black, The Reign oj EliMbeth, 1 558-1 603 (2nd ed . ; London: Oxford U ni ve rs i ty Press, 1 959) , p. 320 . See the detailed survey of schools under Henry VIII and E dwa rd VI in Joan Simon, Education and Society in Tudor England (London: Cambridge University Press, 1 966) . USee the survey of private endowments of educational institutions in Louis B. Wright, Middle-Class Culture in Elizabethan England (Ch apel Hill: U nive rs ity of North Carolina Press, 1935), ch ap . 3, and Simon, Education in Tudor England. part 3, for surveys of edu cation during the reign of
Q ue en
Elizabeth.
28See the evidence and discussion in Lawrence Stone, "The Educational Revolution in England. 1560-1640," Past and Present, no. 28 Ouly 1964), pp. 42-7 and 54-7. 29Lawrence Stone, "Social Mob ili ty in England, 1500-1700," Past and Present, no. 33
(April 1966), pp. 18-20 and passim. 30These connections are stressed by Christopher H ill, Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution (London:
Ox for d
University P re ss, 1965), chap s. 2 and 3, wh e re he discusses
the links between Puritanism and Baconian science and the remarkable efflorescence of science te ach i ng for merchants and artisans at Gresham College. 3 1 See R ay m on d Williams, The Long Revolution (London: Chatto & W indus, 1961), p.
159, and M. G. J on e s, The Charity School Movement (London: C ambr idg e 1 938), pas sim .
U n ive rs i ty P re ss ,
. 2 W illiams, LOllg Retlo/lIliulI, pp. 1 60-1. " The res u l t i n g a m bi v a l e nce between " e l i t i sm " a n d " pop ulism" is a n al yze d i n Leo Lo wen t h a l a n d M a rjor i e F i s k e , "The Debate o v e r A rt and Popul a r Culture i n Eigh t een th
Century E n g l a n d " in M i rra Kom a ro n k y . e d . , Commull FrOllliers of Ihe Sucial Sciences ( G l e n ,
coe : Free PJ'ess, 1 95 7 ) , pp. 3 3 - 1 1 2 .
3 � In C h a p t e r I , nOIe 2. I re fe r n'd
to
my c ritical a s s es sme n t of the terms tradition,
modemity. and modem iUllioli i ll Rei l l h a rd Be n d i x , Em ball/ed Reason ( Ne w Y o rk : Oxford L n i ve r s i t )" Press. 1 9 7 0 ) , chap. I I . T h e fo l lo w i n g discussion is i n part based on
this
e a r li er
publication . .1 · C o l i n M o r r i s The Di,\[(}t 'elJ of the I lldit'idlia/, 1 050-12 00 ( N e w Yo r k : H a rpe r & Row, ,
H a rper T o r chbo o ks, 1 9 7 3 ) .
3 · ",. .i l h e l m Ri eh l Die B ii rgediche GeselLlchaji ( S t u ttgart : J . G. Cotta'sche Buch hand l u n g, ,
1 93 0 ) , pp. 3 1 2 - 1 3 . T h i s is pa rt of a l a r ge r work w h ich was wrillen from 1 84 7 to 1 85 1 . 3 ' The com pos i t ion o f t h i s c lass w i l l vary from co u n t r y to coun try, and even i n t he
same country over time. For a more j u d i c i o u s assessment of that co m posi t io n than Riehl's, see K laus E pste i n
,
The
Genesis of Germ a n C01l.\'e rmtism ( P rinceton : Princeton University
Press, 1 966 ) , pp. 48-5 8.
' 8 For an an a l ys i s of the rlsmg voluntar ism in the Marxist tradition, see Richard Lowenthal, "Unreason an d Re mhu ion, " EncoU lller, \'01. 33 ( N ovem ber 1 969), p p . 2 2 - 3 4 .
A related issue i s the social and c u lt u ra l dista nce betwe e n i n tellectuals and workers with wh ich M arxists have had to g r a pple si nce the C o m m u n i s t M an i festo. See Ch a p t er 1 3, f o ot note e, fo r a discussion o f this is s u e
.
C H A PTE R IX. K I N GS A N D PEO P LE IN ENG LAN D ' Quoted in Fe mand B raudel,
of Ph ilip
The MediterT(/IInlll
and the
Mediterranean World in the Age
/I ( New York : H a rpe r & Ro w, 1 97 3 ) , l I , p. 674 .
2 Richard Koebner, Empire ( London : Camb r i dge U n i ve rs ity Press, 1 966), pp. 6 1 -2 . See a l s o the following pages for English metaphoric uses o f "empire" d urin g t hi s pe riod
.
3The degree of occ upat i on al s pecialization in the sixteenth century is uncertai n since p roduction for the market and lor home c ons u m ption are difficult to distinguis h . In at
least o ne town up to one third of the residents were still engaged in agriculture until well -
i nto the se\'enteenth century. In other towns,
a
third of the enumerated po pulation were
engaged in the p ro duct io n o f textiles and clot h ing and t he remainder in food an d drink proc essin g , leather and metal work, transport and building. In t h e rural areas, the pro
portion of the work force en gaged in agric ul t ure r anged between 50 and 80 percent, w h i ch pres u mab l y means that between 2 0
and
50 percent were engaged in craft production of
some k i n d , a n d no doubt par tly for the ma rket. See L. A. Clarkson , The
Pre-Industrial and passi m .
Ecollomy ill Ellglalld, 1 5 ()() 1 7 00 ( Lo n do n : B. T. Ba t s fo rd , 1 97 1 ) , pp. 8 8 -9 -
� I bid . , p. 155. · S i r Geo rge C l a r k , Press, 1 946), p. 55.
The
Wealth ()f Eng/wId, 1 4 96-1 760 ( Londo n : Ox lord Un i versity
NOTES TO PAGES 28 1 - 28 8 6See Da v id H . Pi l l , TIle
English
Refomlation, 1 52 9 -58 ( London : U n i ve rs i ty
of
London
Pre s s , 1 97 3 ) , pp. 75-6, and C h r ist o p he r H i l l , Pul'ita n ifm and Revolution ( Lo n d on : Pa n ther Books, 1 96 8 ) , p . 4 2 .
7Clark, Wealth of England, pp. 64-5, 74. The author cites one estimate that the lands expropriated a n d so ld by the crown brought in t w e n t y times the i r a n n ual r ent al v a l u e , w h ich wou ld come t o ro u g h l y 5 m il l i o n i n t e r m s of the fi g u re s c i ted by H i l l and C lark. These fi g u res, as well a s those on th e co s t s o f war, a re a pproxi mations. · W i l l i a m H a l ler, Foxe's B o ok
1 963) , p. 2 1.
of Marty "s and the
Elect Nation ( Londo n :
Jonathan
C a pe ,
9 Herben Sc h o mer has a n a lyze d t he
proces s by w h ic h in t h i s se l l i n g political vac i l lation re li gio us a n x ie ty and led to a polarization of r el i g i o u s beliefs . See h i s D ie A nfange de s Puritanismus ( Kolner A n g l istische A r be i te n , vol. 1 4 ; Le i pzig: Bern h a rd Ta uc h n i tl, 1 932). For a conte m po rary e x p ression of a pp re he n si o n ari s i n g from a c h u rch p o licy d e p e nd e n t o n po litic al a u thori ty, see t he state m e n t by J o h n Rogers q uoted in M . M . K na p pe n , Tudor Puritanism (Chic ago : U n i versity o f C h ic a go Press, 1 939), pp.
in
c h u rc h
policy i nd uced
1 07-8.
I OSee the d isc us s ion in Lo u i s B . W rig h t , Middle-Class Culture in EliUlbethan England ( C h a pel Hill : Un i ve rsity
of
Nort h Carolina Press, 1 93 5 ) , c h a p . 2 . The book cove r s the
pe r iod from 1 558 to the 1 64 0 s , with s o me references before a n d after these years.
I I Q uo t ed from Phili p j ones's Certaine briefe and special/ Instructions ( 1 5 89) i n Lo u is B . W r i g h t , Religion a n d Empire, The Alliance between Pie ty and Commerce i71 England, 1 558-1 624 (Cha pel Hill : U n i versit y of North Ca rolina Press, 1 943), p . 3 7 . 1 2James A . Wil li a ms on , The Ocean in English History (London : Oxford University P ress ,
1 94 1 ), pp. 1 1 5- 1 6. 1 3] . B. B lack, The R eign of Elizabeth, 1 558 - 1 603 ( Lo n do n : Oxford University Press, 1 959), p. 2 7 . See the sim ilar assessment i n Williamson, Ocean. p. 4 . " I n 1 5 78 England possessed 1 3 5 ve ss e ls
of
more than 1 00 tons , i n 1 5 82 it h a d 223
s h i ps o f more than 80 tons, and by 1 588 t h ere were 363 suc h sh i ps . By 1 5 82 English
seamen n u m be red 1 6 ,306. See
J.
H ol la n d Rose et aI., eds., The Cambridge History of the
British Empire ( Lon don : Cam brid ge U niversity Press, 1 929), 1,
p.
1 1 6.
1 5See the s u rvey of these argu ments in K la us E . K n or r, B ritish Colonial Theories, 1 5 70-1 850 (Toro n to : Un i ve rs it y of Toronto Press, 1 94 4 ) , chap. 2. See a l so Williamson ,
Ocean, pp. 1 22-3. 1 6See ] . H. Parry, The Establishment of the European Hegemony, 1 4 1 5 -1 7 1 5 (New York: Ha rpe r &
Row,
Harper Torchbooks, 1 96 1 ), pp. 1 06-9.
1 7Charles Wi lson , Queen Elizabeth and the Revolt of the Netherlands ( Berkele y and Los Angeles : University
of Cali fo rni a
Press, 1 970) , p. 2 2 .
I " Ibid . , chap. 2 a n d passi m .
1 9 W . T . M acCaffrey , " E l i zabethan Po litics : The Fi rst Decade, 1 558- 1 568," Present, no . 24 ( April 1 963), p p . 2 6 - 7 .
Past (wd
NOTES TO PAGES 288-296 . O l n t h i s respect, the analysis by Cha rles W i lson just cited may be co m p are d with t h e
studies by
J.
E . Neale .
2 1 See t he d i sc u ssion by Carol W i e n e r , "The Belea g ue red I s l e , A S tu d y of Elizabethan a n d Early Jaco be a n Anti -Cat holicis m , " PILlt a n d P resent, n o . 5 1 ( Ma y 1 9 7 1 ) , p p . 2 7 - 6 2 . See also C h r istophe r H i l l , In tellect ual Ol"igin.l oj the E n glish
Revolution ( Lo n do n :
O x ford U n i
ve rsity P re ss , 1 96 5 ) , pp. 2 7 6 - 8 4 . 2 2 H a ller,
Foxe's Book oj lH a rtyrl ,
pp. 224-5.
' 3 Quoted i n ibid . , p . 8 7 . T h e p h rase true beliet.ers a p pe a rs i n t h e se r m o n s of Edward
De ri n g , p u b li shed in 1 5 7 6 .
H K n a p pe n a n d H a n give d i ffe re n t estimat es of t h e i n te n sely re li gious a m o n g the
Puritan and C a t h o li c m i norities, but agree that t hese were small m inorities. See Kna p pe n ,
Tudor Puritanism, p. 3 3 3 , n. 2 4 , and A. Tim es (London : Phoe n i x House,
Stuart
T i ndal H a r t ,
The Country Clergy in Eliza beth a n
and
1 958) , pp. 1 7- 1 8 .
U l bid ., pp. 7 4 - 5 , 80, 1 05 .
Reformation t o In dus tria l Revo lution
' ·Christopher H ill, son , 1 968), p p . 34-3 8 .
(London : Weidenfeld "& N icol
' 7My fo rm u latio n is mo d e le d a fte r Max Weber's definition of s oc i a l action. See Max Weber,
Economy and Soc i ety
(tr . and ed. by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich; New York :
Bedminster Press, 1 968), I , p. 4. 1 am also indebted to Robert Merton's analysis of ref erence grou ps in
Social Theor),
and Social Structure (Glencoe: Free Press, 1 95 7 ) , pp. 225-
386. · ·See Basil Hall, .. ' Puritanis m , ' the Proble m o f De fi n it io n , " i n G.
St udies in
Church History ( London :
J.
Cuming, ed.,
Cambridge University Press, 1 965), I I , p. 290. Hall's
definition is similar to Christopher H iU's sugges tio n that the term "inc1ude[sJ aU those radical P·r otestams who wanted to reform the Ch u rch but (before 1 640 at least) did not wam to se parate from it." See H il l , Intellectual
Origins,
p. 26. See also the ch a pt er "The
Definition of a Puritan," in C h r ist o p h er H ill, Society a nd Puritanism
E ngla nd
in
Pre-Revolutionary
(London : Panther Books, 1 969), pp. 1 5- 3 0 .
29 Hal ler, Foxe's Book of Martyrs, pp. 35-50, 7 2 - 7 . 3 · C . H. Garrett ,
The Marian Exiles
(London: Cambridge Unive rsity P ress, 1 938), p p .
32, 41-2. 3 1 M y statemem is indebted to t h e analysis of M ichael Walze r,
The
Revolution of lhe
Sa in ts (New York: Atheneum, 1 9 70), p p. 96- 1 00, 1 06, 1 08-9, and passi m .
3 2 H a ller, Foxe's Book of Mart),rs, pp. 85-6. 33Christopher H i ll
,
The C en tu r), of R evolutio n 1 603-1 7 1 4 ,
(New York: W. W. Norto n ,
1 966), p p " 86-7. These problems are examined i n detail in Hill,
Ch u rch
(London : Oxford University Press, 1 956) , part 2.
3 4 Hi l I ,
Reformation
to Indu.ltl"ial
Revolution,
p. 88.
Economic Problems
of
lhe
3$ See H ill, Pu ritan ism and Revolution, p. 56 a n d passi m .
36William H al le r, Liberty
U n iversity Press, 195 5), pp. " H alle r, 3SHill,
and Reformation in the Puritan Revolution ( New 1 1 - 1 3 a n d passi m .
Yo r k : Co l u m bi a
Foxe's Book of Martyrs, p. 9 7 .
Century of Revolution, pp. 82-3.
39 Pa u l S. Seaver,
The
Puritan
Lectureships, The Politics of Religious Dissent, 1 560- 1662 p. 2 2 . N e i t h e r An glicans nor Se pa ra t i s ts gave
(Sta n fo rd : Sta n ford U n i ve r s i t y Pre s s , 1 970) ,
s u c h significance to lecturing, b u t for the m a i n bod y of t he clergy a lect ures h i p became a
re g u l a r p h ase of their career. See also ibid . , pp. 36-54, for a n assess m e n t o f t h e lay
demand for lec tu rers .
4·Wi lliam H all er ,
The R ise of Puritan ism
( N e w Yor k : H a r per & Row , 1957), p. 1 54.
4 I The reli gious a ffil i a t ion s of lawyers i n the I n n s of Cou rt
reflected the vicissitudes
of reli gious po l icy under Elizabeth a n d James I. See the de tailed documentation in W i l fred R. Prest, The Inns of Court under Elizabeth and the 1972), cha ps . 8-9.
Early Stuarts (London : Longman Grou p ,
42The distinction between law as "craft" and as " science" is developed in Max Weber,
d Soc iety, I I , pp. 7 84 ff. My references to English legal history are based on T. H is t ory of the Common Law (Boston : Little, Brow n , 1 956) . For English lega l education , see also Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer from A nt iqu ity to Modern Times (St, Paul: West Publishing, 1 953), chap. 4.
Economy
an
F. T. Plucknett, A Concise
"Sir Charles Ogilvie, The King's Government and the Common
Law, 1 4 7 1 -1 64 1 (Ox ford :
Basil Blackwell, 1958), p. 26. H lbid . , p. 23 . See also ibid . , chapter 4, and Plucknett, Concise discussions
History,
p p . 155-9 , for
of the disa ppe arance o f equity from the common law.
° lbid . , p p . 1 76-8. 4eSee Ogilvie, King's Government. p p. 67-78. 4 7 See Plucknett, Concise History, pp. 176-90, and O gi l v i e, K ing's Government, pp. 7997. 4 8 1 follow the interpretation of Donald W. Hanson, From Kingdom to Commonwealth (Cambridge: Harvard U n iversi t y Press, 1970). 49See ib id . , pp. 28 1-308.
and Hill. Century of Revolution, pp. 62-3.
$· See Perez Zagorin, The Court and the Country,
The Beginning of the
E71glilh Revolution
(New York: Athene um, 1 97 1 ), p p. 3 3-7. The q uotation a ppears on p. 3 7 . $ ' The following disc ussion i s based on Zagorin's work. T h e po i n ts mentioned i n t h e text a n d a ppropriate citations are found i n ibid. , pp. 75 -83, 100-5 , 90-9 of cha p. 4.
NOTES TO PA GE S 3 0 7 - 3 1 6 & 2 H i l I , Ct'1I tUl), of Rpl'olutirm , p. 4 5 . See also S i r GeOl'ge C lal'k,
( London :
Ox lord U n iversity P ress. 1 960), pp. 8 5 -90.
5'Quoted
i n H i l l , Cf 1Itl/ l�"
oI Rel'ollltiol/ ,
ThR
Seventee nth Cmtury
p p . 1 - 2 . T h e s ta te me n t by S i r T h o m a s S m it h
was q uoted i n t h i s \'O l u m e , C h a pte r 6 , p . 2 1 2 . " See H al l e r , Rise of Pu rital/ism, p. 1 2.
5 5The q uotations fro m C a l v i n a n d Cart w r i g h t a re taken frolll David LillIe, Religio n , O rde r (wd LaU' ( Ox fo r d : Basi l B lac kwe ll, 1 9 70), p p . 53, 86, 9 2 . The present e x po s i t io n follows L i ll i e ' s i n t e r p retatio n . & IiSee Pat rick C o l l i n so n , The E liw bplhal/ Purit(l Il MOl'ement ( Lo n do n : J o n a t h a n Ca pe ,
1 96 7 ) , p . 1 03 . "Stat e m e n t by
J o hn
Wh i t g i ft q uo t e d i n
David LillIe,
Re ligio n , Order a n d LaU', p . 1 46.
See also pp. 1 3 5 - 1 4 7 lor a n exegesis o f W h i t g i ft' s positio n . ' " H ere a ga i n pract ic e would r a n ge w i d e l y between st r ic t e p i scopa l control. o n t he one
h a n d , · and co n t rol by the e lders of t he pa r i s h e s concerned , on the other. See Coll i n son,
Eliza betha n PI/ritan Movement, pp . 1 0 1 - 8 , 1 6 7-79, a n d passim for a detailed a n a l ysis of
" prophe s y i n gs ." 5 9 H a l le r ,
Libel"ly and Reformation in the PI/ rita ll R evo/utio n , p p. 1 95 - 7 and passim. My
ita lics . The ph rases from B a xter a re quo t ed in H a l l e r . ·"See H il l , Cmtl/T)' of ReI'u/lllio n , p. 1 3 1 .
· ' Z a gor in , COliI'I a m/ COU ll")', p . 84 .
·· I bid . , p p . 85-90. ·'See H a nson, K ingdom to Com m O i l wealth, pp. 24-5 and pa s s im , and Weber, Ecollomy
(/ li d Societ),. I . p p. 2 2 6 ff.
" ' This e m p h a s i s on the re sto ra t i o n of a nc i e n t pu rity has been stressed as a charac teristic which di stinguishes t he re\'olutions of the s i x t e e n t h and seventeenth centuries from those o f t oda y . See J. H. E llioll, " RemlUlion a n d Con t i n u ity in Early Modern E u ro pe , "
Pmt (/ lid PreseIlt, no. 42 ( Fe b ru a ry 1 969). p p. 3 5 - 6 . ··;Quoted i n Little, Religio ll . O rder (I l1d L(lil'. p . 1 76. Unless otherwise noted, statements
in q uotation m a r k s cited further on a re q uo t a t i o n s from Coke' s writings referred to i n ibid . , pp. 1 7 6-89. ""This paragl"aph and the next a re based on forlll u latio n s by Sir J o h n Davies, allorney ge n e r a l lor I reland ( 1 6 1 2 ) , and the d i scussion in J . G . A . Po c o ck , The A ncienl Cons/ifulion (1 m/ the Fellda/ L(lW ( Ne w Yo r k : W. W. �() rlon , 1 967). pp. 3 2 -5. " ' Ibid . , pp. 42, 5 4 - 5 . " " I bid . , p. 5 1 .
69
I bid . , p. 49.
7° H i ll, Ce ntury of Revolution, p . 64. 7 I See W i l l i a m Holdsworth, EssCty.l i71 Law and Hi.�tory ( Lo n do n : ' Oxfo r d U n i ve rsit y
Press, 1 94 6) , pp. 88-9 1 .
72 See Li tt l e Religi o n , Order and Law, pp. 1 8 8-9. ,
73See ] . R. Ta n n e r , E nglish Constitutiollal Conflicts oj the Seventeellth Cl'lI tlll)" 1 603 - 1 689 ( Lo n d o n : C a m b r i d ge U n ivers i t y P re ss , 1 92 8) , pp. 49, 63 . H pocock, A ncient Comtit lltion, p. 2 3 6 . See also T a n n e r , Const itutiolla l COllflicts,
pp .
263-7 for an acco u n t o f the co n stitutional debates between Tories a n d W h i gs a n d pp. 2 94 - 6 1'0r a s u m mary o f the th e o r y o f co n t ract
.
aSee Li ttle, Religion, Order and Law, pp. 1 89-2 1 7 . 7·State ment by George H ickes, Dean of Worcester, quoted in Ric h a rd B. Sch latter,
The
Social Ideas
p . 1 09 .
oj Religious Leaders,
1 660-1 688 ( London : O xfor d U nivers i ty PI'ess, 1 940),
77 A. S, P. Woodhouse, " Introduction ," in A. S . P. Woodhouse , ed. , pUf·;tanism and
Liberty (Chicago : University o f Chicago Press
,
1 95 1 ) , pp. 68, 8 1 .
7H As always, practice was more multifaceted than this pa radoxical log ic o f t he sit uation. For a survey of the different modes adopted, see Collinson, Eliwbetha n Puritan Movement, pp . 3 3 3-82 a n d pass i m
.
79] . E. N eale, Eliwbeth 1 and her Parliaments, 1 559-1 581 ( N e w York: St. Martin's Press,
1 95 8), pp. 4 1 7 - 1 8 and passim.
C H A PTER X. TOWARD T H E N AT I ON STATE : FRA N C E ' The origin o f the name i s uncertain. A Besan<;on Hugues (d. 1 532) led the Genevan movement agai nst annexation by Savoy. Huguenot may derive from a Fre nch contraction of that name with the Swiss word for cC1I1Irade (genol). According to another version, Hu guenot is a nickname. The Protestants of TOll r assembled by night near the gate of K ing Hugo, whom the people re garded as a spi r it In a sermon, a monk derided the Lutherans by sayin g that they o u ght to be called H uguenots, kinsmen of King H ugo, since they wen t out a t ni ght like that mythical spirit. .
2See Herbert H. Rowen, " Louis X I V an d Absolutism," in J oh n C . Rule, ed. , Louis XIV and the
Craft oj Kingship
(Col u m b u s : O h i o State U ni versity Press, 1 969), pp. 302- 1 6. See
also note 8 here.
3 1 n this discussion of sev e nteenth - and eighteenth-centu ry France , I s h a l l use the te rm nobility because the primary reference is to status. French nobles we l'e i l l u s t rious by rank,
t i tl e, or birth, but their share in government was diminishing during this pel·iod. For two accounts of the in t ern a l divisions of the nob i l ity cf . Dav id Bitto n , The Frf//dl Nobility ill ,
NOTES TO PAGES 3 2 7- 3 37 Cris is, 1 560 - 1 6 4 0 (Sta n ford : S t a n for d U n i ve rsity P res s , 1 969), chap. 6, and John Lou g h , A n Introduction to Eighteenth-CmtuT)" France ( Lo n d o n : Longman Grou p, 1 960), ch ap . 3. ' S e e the c a s e s t u d y of fi n a n c i e rs by
J ulian
De n t , C r is is i n Finance: Crown, Fina nciers
a n d Societ)' in Seven teenth-Cent1l1} Fra llce « (I.; e w Y o r k : SI. Ma r t i n ' s Press, 1 97 3 ) , e s pec i a l l y chaps. 8-9.
'J . M ic h ael H a yde n , Frallce a lld the Estates Gen eral of 1 6 1 4 ( Lo n d o n : Ca m b r i d ge U n i \'e rsity Press, 1 9 74 ) , p. 2 1 7. · Pie r re Go u be r t , Lou is XIV alld Tweltty M illion French men ( Ne w Y o r k : Ra ndom H o u s e ,
\'i n ta ge Boo k s , 1 9 7 0 ) , p,
52 .
' For fu r t h e r details on Fre nch h i stor ical d e m o g ra p h y and economic development, see Pie rre Go u ber t , The Ancient Regime, French Society, 1 600-1 750 ( N ew York : H a r pe r & Ro w ,
H a rper Torc h books, 1 9 74 ) , pp. 3 1 - i 7 .
'See A le x is d e Tocq u e vi l le , The Old Regime a rid the Ret/olution (Gard en C i t y : Do ubleday, A nchor Boo ks, 1 95 5 ) , p. 5 1 . See also Kurt Wo l ze n d o r ff, Der Poliuigedanke des modemen
Staates (vol. 35 of A bh and l u n ge n aus dem Staats- und Verwaltun gsrecht; B resla u : M. & H. Marcus, 1 9 1 8), wh ich describes Colbert's re gu lations in detail and tends to take them
at thei r face val ue . Nevertheless, the a ncie n regi me's ideology o f total regu latio n was an i m porta n t ele ment of " modern ization" i n its own right . See t h e d isc ussion by Marc Rae ff, "The Well-O rde red Police State and the Develo p m e n t of Mode rnity in Seve n tee nth- an d
Eighteenth-Century Europe , " A merica n Historical Review, vol. 80 (Decem ber 1 97 5 ) , p p .
1 22 1 -4 3 . 9Jo h n Lo u g h , A n Introduction t o Severlteenth-Century France ( Lo n don : Longman Gro u p ,
1 969 ) , pp. 1 23-6 . • OThis m i l i t ary re or g an i za t i o n wa s a E U l'Opean phe nomeno n . See Michael Roberts , "The M i l i ta ry Revo l u t io n , 1 560- 1 660, " in Essa)'.1 ill Swedish History (London : Weid e n feld & N icolson , 1 967), pp. 1 95-2 2 5 . II
See Goubert, Louis XIV, pp. 1 1 6- 1 2 4 a nd passi m fo r the figures cited and fo r a
cha racterizati o n of Colbert's wor k . I 2 Ibid. , pp. 86, 96 . • 3 Ibid . ,
pp. 85
fr. , 228.
The q u o t a t i on a p pears on pp. 2 1 2- 1 3 .
" I bi d . , p. 2 6 7 . See pp. 1 3 7-9, 1 79-8 1 , 2 76, 280-8, to r the other points re lati n g to
Colbert's fiscal po l ic ie s . " Franklin L. Fo rd , Robe and Sword (New Yo rk : H a r pe r & Ro w , Harper Torc hbooks,
1 965 ) , p p . 2 7-9, 3 1 -3 , 53-4. ' 6Tocqueville, Old Regime, pp. 9 1 -2 .
, 1 Ibid . , p p . 42-3. ' " Ford , Robe and Sword, pp. 1 3 - 1 4 .
NOTES TO PAGES 337-345
639
I "See E. N . W illiams, The A ncien Regime in
States, 1 648-1 789
(Harmondsworth :
Europe, Government and Society in the Majo r Penguin, 1 972), pp. 28, 1 67 , 1 97 , 2 1 0- 1 1 , 2 2 3 . See
the bibliogra phy of this work for full references to
Goh rin g , J acob ho nors.
von Klaveren , K. W.
the s t udies by Die tr i ch Gerhard, Martin Swart , and others de aling with the s ale of offices and
' OSee Ernest Barke r, The Development oj Public Services in Western Eumpe, / 660 - / 930 (Ne w York : O x ford U n i versity P ress, 1 94 4 ) , pp. 6 - 1 2 , and A l fred Cobba n , "The Decline of Di vine-Right Mon a rchy in Fra nce ," in The Nell' Cambridge Modern His/Dry ( Lo n d on : Ca m b ridge U ni versit y Press, 1 966) , V I I , p p . 2 1 4-40.
2 1J . O . Lindsay, "Monarch y and Administration," in ibid. , V I I , p. 1 4 2. See also Fri t z H artun g, "L' Etat, c'est moi," Historische Zeitschrift, vol. 1 69 ( 1 949), p p . 1 -30, fo r an a n al ys is o f the doctrine of kingship u nd er Louis X I V. "See Goubert, Louis XlV, p p . 305-6. The g uotation from Turgot is t a ke n from Doug las D a ki n , Turgo t and the A ncien Regime in France ( Londo n : Me th ue n , 1 939), pp. 273-4. The whole Me mo i re is translated in W. Wa lker Stephens, The Life and Writings of Turgot (London: Longmans, Green, 1 895), p p. 265-72. T urgot's views coincide closely with those expressed in the article on " Representation" in vol. 1 4 ( 1 765) of the Encyclopedie, wh ich was probably written b y Diderot. See text footnote g, thi s cha pter, for details about this wor k . 23Tocqueville, Old Regime, p. 1 1 5 . " I bid . , p. 1 1 0. "See Dere k J arr ett ,
The Begetters oj Revolution
( Lond on : Lo ngman Grou p, 1 973) , cha p.
I . T he full quotation of Louis X I V's statement a ppe ars on p. 5. 2" lbid . , p p . 3 3-6. 27A detailed to
an a l ysis
of d i fferent gro u ps i s
Louis Xl V; The Political and
con t ained
in Lionel Rothkrug, Opposition
Social Origins of the French Enlightenment ( Pr i nceto n :
Princeton
University Press, 1 965). The sense of relief following the death of Louis X I V is described
in Bernard Fay, Revolution c hap . I .
and Freemasonry, 1 680-1 800 (Boston : Little, Brown, 1 935),
' " M y presentation is indebted
to Franco Venturi,
(London : Cambridge U n i versi ty Press, 1 97 1 ) , p p.
Utopia and ReJorm in the Enlightenment
43-6. The q uotation
in the text a p pears
on p. 4 6 . "See Gabriel Bonno, La Constitution britannique devan! l'opinion Jra71J:aise de Montesquieu a Bonaparte (Par is : Librairie An cienne Honore C hampio n , 1 932), pp. 7-8, 1 7 . The fol lowing account is indebted to this stud y . 30Ja rre tt ,
Begetf£rs oj Revolution,
pp. 20-3 and passim. The q uota tion appears on p.
21. 3 ' The following account is based on Durand Ec heverria, Mirage in the West ( Prin c e to n : Princeton U n i versity Press, 1 95 7 ) ,
c ha p . 1 and
pa ss im .
It
may be compared with the
American reactions to Fra nce before and d uring the French revolution. See H o w ard
NOTES TO PAGES 345-359 Mumford Jones,
America and French CIIII"r�, 1 i50-1848 ( Cha pe l Hill: U ni v e r s i ty of North chap. 14.
Caroli na Press, 1927), 32See Echeverria,
Mimge, pp.
45-61, fin an account of Fr ank lin ' s influence.
La COllslilulioll bril(l/Il1ique, chap. 4, the study by Frances AlIglophobia ill Frallce, Ii63-li89 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1950), espe
33See, in addition to Bonno, Acomb,
cially chap. 5. 3·Tocqueville, Old
Regim�, p. 140.
The last phrase is
taken
from
p.
139.
a51bid., p. 142. 3· Volta ire,
pedia
"Men of Letters," in
(New York:
Gendzier,
Harper
Stephen J. Gendzier, ed., Denis Diderot's The Encyclo Torchbooks, 1967), p. 1 67. H ere aft e r cited as
& Row, Harper
Encyclopedia.
37 Q u o
te d
in John L o u gh,
Eigh/�elllh-Ce1Il1/1)' hrlllce, pp.
"Die E ntste hu ng des schriftstellerischen Sel bstbe ..... usstseins
ill
266-7.
in
See
also Fritz Schalk,
Frankreich," in Einleitung
die Ellryclopiidie der Franzosischen Aujkliirtlllg ( vol . 6 of M iin che ne r Romanistische Ar-
beiten; Munich: Max Hueber Verlag, 1936), pp. 45 -65.
38See Lough, Eighteenth-Cenlury Fmnce, 39 Q uote
d
in
Schalk , Eil11eilung, pp.
411Robert Damton, " T he
High
chaps .
7-8.
6 1 -2 .
Enlightenment a nd
the
Low-Life of Literature in Pre
Revolutionary France," Pasl and Presenl, no. 51 (May 1971),
pp. 81-115. The quoted sen Encyclopedie. See also Robert Dam ton, " Re adi ng W ri t i ng and Publishing in Eighteenth-Century France," Daedalus, winter 1971, pp. 2 1 4- 56, fo r a cr i tica l survey of the e\'idence on literacy and the reading public.
tence is
taken from Voltaire's article on "Taste" in the ,
279.
HSee Alf red Cobban, "The Parlements of France in the Eight e enth C en tu ry," in his A.lpecls of the Frmc h Ret/olulion (London: Paladin, 1971), pp. 72-3, a nd J. H. Shennan, The Parlemelll of Paris ( Londo n : Eyre & S po t tiswoo de, 1 968), pp. 309-14 . •3
Cob ban, AspecLI, pp.
73-4.
"See R. R. Pal me r , The Age of Ille Democ ralic Retlolulion (Princeton: Pri nce ton Uni versity P re s s 1 959), I, p. 449, for the 4uotation in the text. See J arret t Begellers of Revo lulioll, pp. 47-8 ; Cobban, Aspects, pp. 76-7; and Alfred Cobban, A Hislory oj Modern France, li15-1783 (B a lt imo re : Penguin, 1963), I, pp. 129-30, for rel ate d ma t er i als ,
,
.
43See J. M. R obe rts, The Mylhology of lIte p. 1 65 and pass im.
Secrel Socielies
(London: Secker and Warburg,
1972),
··The standard wordi ng of t he oath is quoted in Paul Haza rd, European Thoughl in Ille Eighlel'llih Ce"IU)' ( Har mo nd s w o rth : Penguin, 1965) , p. 289.
H Q uote d in
Bernard
James
Fay, Ret/ollliioll
A nd ers o n, The COII.llillllio"
alld Freemasollry', p.
320.
of
Ihe Freem(LlOn (1723)
reprinted
in
NOTES TO PAGES 360-367 48Ibid
.•
pp. 320-1.
49See Euge n Lennhoff and Oska ... Posnel'.
Internationaies Freimaurt'?"it'xikon ( Mu n ich:
Amalthea Verlag. 1932). p. 28.
5°Quoted
H azard. European Thought. p. 291. See Rei n hart Kosellec k , Kritik und Karl A lbe r. 1959). pp. 58-61, who quotes th i s poem and whose
from
Krise (Freibu ... g: Verlag
analysis I f oll ow at this poin t. 51Tocqu ev il le, T he Old Regime. p. 138. This description of Fre nch men of le tters ap p l i e s to m ember s of M a s onic lodges
as
well. fo ...
they we re chosen fo ... m em bers h ip so le l y good name. See Le n nho ff and Posne .... Freimaurerlexikon. p. 29. which gives J. G. Fi nd el's (1828-1905) su mm a ...y of the duties of the F ... eemason, fo... mulated originally in Ande ... son's constitution of 1723. in terms of th eir educat ion, moral princip les. and
5'See the further discussion
of
this analogy in Koselleck.
'3 Quoted from d'Alembert's H istoire des "The H igh Enlightenment and the Lo w-Life "See the accou n t
by Alfr ed
Kriti k und Kr ise . pp. 81 IT.
membres de I'Academie Frar/faise
in Darnton,
of Li terature." p. 91.
Cobban. "The
P a rl em en ts of France."
in
AJPects. pp.
68-82.
s S P a l m er. Age
oj Democratic Revolution.
I.
p. 473.
See Eberhard Schmitt. Reprasentation und Revolution (M un i c h: 89- 1 13. for an analysis of t h e eme ... gin g role of the pa rl e me nts as
'6Ibid .• I. pp. 475-6. C.
H. Beck. 1969).
a national
pp .
representative body.
s1Quote d from Memoire sur
les municipalites i n Ste phens. Life and Writings of Turgot.
p.
266.
'"See article on "natural 59Quoted from
equality"
a statement
in Gendzier. Encyclopedia. p. 170.
in 1789 of the A bbe S i e ye s in G. G.
Sieyes: His Life and Nationalism ( New York: C olum bi a
Un iversity
van
Du esen. E.
Pr e s s. 1932). p. 8 2.
J. n. 27.
6°EmmanueI Jose ph Si eye s. What Is lhe Third Estate? (New Y or k : Praege r. 1 963), p. 101. The points mentioned in the text appear on pp. 99-105. 61See Palmer. Age
characterizi ng
of Democrat ic Revolution. I. pp. 4 72-4. psychology o f the pe ri o d .
wh o uses these
phrases i n
the revolutionary
62 Sieyes. What Is the Third Estate?
pp . 57-9. 62-4. 161-2. 164-5.
63See Gendzier. Encyclopedia. p p. 185. 1 87-8. for the text of Diderofs statement. In Jaucourfs ar tic le on "Sovereignty." th e censor deleted a sentence st ati ng that the goal of sovereignty is the happiness of the governed and that when this is for gotte n the resulti ng governmen t ceases to b e legiti mate. Se e Doug las H. Gordon a n d No ... man L. Torrey. The Censoring of Di derot's EncyclopediL ( New York : Columbia University Press. 1947). p. 57. A revie w of the at tacks o n Diderot's article is contained in J o h n Lough. Essays on the Ency clopediL oj Diderot and d'Alembt'Tt (London : Oxford University Press. 1968). p p. 440-62.
NOTES TO PAGES 367-373 ·· Si eye s , What Is the Thil-d Esta te ? , p.78, 145, 164-5. Much th e same identification o f popular sovereignty wit h virtue animated Robespierre. See Alfred Cobban, "The Fun damental I deas o f Robespierre," i n A spects , pp. 137-58.
6'Sieyes, What
IJ
the Thh-d Estate?,
pp. 124-6.
6"Ibid., pp. 124-5, 130-1, 146-9 . • 7Ibid.,
pp. 79-80.
68This discussion
is indebted to Bernhard
G roet hu ysen , Philosophie
de La Rewlution
FrGllfaise ( Paris: Lib ra i rie Gallimard, 1956), p p. 219 ff.
69From po in ts 4, 5 ,
and 6 of the
Declamtion of the
Righ ts
of Man
and Citiz.en
(August
17, 1789) reprinted i n J . H . Stewart, ed., A Documentary SUTIley of the French Revolution (New York: Ma c m i l lan, 1965), p. 114.
Lowenstein, Volk und Pariament nach der S taatstheo rie der franziisische71 Na ( Munich: Drei Masken Verlag, 1922), pp. 10-38, for an anal ysis of Sieyes's ideas which differentiates between his earlier and later positions. The sum mary statement in the text describes the latter, wh ich ach ieved dominant influence in the National Assembly . LOwenstein's book was republished in 1964 by Scientia Verlag Aalen. TOSee
Karl
tionalversammlung von 1789
llQuoted in Heinz Klay, ZensuswahLrecht und Gleichheitsprinzip (vol. 19 of Berner Un tersuchunge n zur Allgemeinen Gesch ichte; Aarau: Verlag H. R. Sauerlander, 1956), p. 107.
72See ibid., pp. 74-8, \08-11. T3Peter Cam pbell, French Electoral Faber, 1958), p. 17 and passim.
Systems and ELections since 1789
(London : Faber &
NAn illuminating discussion of this process is contained in Otto Gierke, Das Deutsche ( Berlin: Weidmannsche B uchhandlung, 188 1), III, pp. 763 rf. I do not know of a comparably detailed analysis with rega rd to France.
GenossenschaJtsrecht
"See La Chalotais; "Essay on National Education," in F. de la Fontainerie, ed. , French LiberaLism and Education in the Eighteenth C entu ry (New York: McGraw-H ill, 1932), pp. 52-3. 76See Sieyes,
the Third Estate?, p . . 159. See also Roger Hahn, The Anatomy of a ( Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 197 1), p.
What Is
Scientific Institution
230 and passim.
"Quoted in In ternational Labour Office, Freedom of Associations (ILO Studies and Reports, series A, no. 28; London: P. S. King & Son , 1 928 ) , XXIX, p. 89. l8Quoted in Zosa Szajkowski,Jews a nd the French Revolutions of 1789, 1830, and 1848 (New York: KATV Publishing House, 1970), p. 359, n. 4. Cf. Arthur Hertzberg, The French Enlightenment and theJews (New York: Schocken Books, 1970) for a comprehensive treatment. 79Quoted in ibid:, p. 578.
NOTES TO PAGES 373-383 8°Quoted in ibid., pp. 584-5. RISee Geo rges Lefebvre, The French Revolution from Its Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 163-4 and passim.
Origins to 1793
(New York:
·'See Jean B rissaud, A History of French Private Law (Continental Legal History Series; Boston: Little, B rown, 1912), pp. 166, 150-1, 230-1, an d passim. 83H. A . L . Fisher, "The Codes," The Cambridge Modern History ( Lon do n : Cambridge U ni versity Press, 1906), IX, p. 148 . • 4John M c Manners , The French Revolution Harper Torchbooks, 1969), pp. 29 -31 .
and the Church (New York: Harper & Row,
CHAPTER XI. NATION-BUILDING: GERMANY I These summary figures are based on W. H. B ruford, G er many in the Eighteenth Century (London: Cambridge University Press, 1959), pp. 333-6. The actual numbe r of sove reign territories and ju risdictions is larger and more complex. The fol lowing sketch of the "Holy Roman E m pire" is derived from K laus E pstein, The Genesis of German Conservalism (Prince ton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 238-44, and Karl B iedermann,Deutschland im Achtzehnten Jahrhundert (Lei pzi g: J. J. Weber, 1880), I , pp. 14-7 1. My interpretation is indebted to the study of Mack Walker cited in footnote 2. The description of the empire is con fi ned to the eighteenth centu ry. Before that time the n umber of territorial jurisdic tions was larger and imperial institutions not as moribund. For a recent study of these earlier conditions, see G. Benecke, Society and Politics in Germany, 1500-1750 (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1974), p. 161 and passim. 'See Mack Walker, German Home Toums--Community, Stal e, and General Estate, 1 6481871 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971), pp. 27-33. I have adopted Mack Walker's term hometown, which refers to the German Kleinstadt, but have made it into one word to distinguish it from the American "home town," which has quite different connotations. 3Ibid., pp. 16- 17. 'Ibid ., pp. 56-67. Quotation marks have been added . 5Ibid., pp. 139-40. 8 An analysis of this growing cleavage is contained in Christopher R. F riedrichs, "Cap italism, Mobility and Class Formation i n the Early Modern German City," Past and Present, no. 69 (November 1975), pp. 24-49.
7See the analysis of the thought of J ustus Moser in E pstein, German Conservalism, chap. .6. "See Reinhart Koselleck, Prtuss en zwischen Reform und Revolution (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1967), p p. 37-8 and passim. For a case study of state support as well as regulation of guilds and corporations in the ve ry center of Prussian rule, see Frederick Marquardt, "The Manual Workers in Be rlin under the Old Regime" ( Ph . D. dissertation, University of Cali fornia, Berkeley, 1 973).
NOTES TO PAGES 384-389 9See Epstein, German Comen·ali.lm, pp. 616-26, for d e tai ls. Chapters 12 and 13 of E p s te in 'S book provide a convenient summary of the N apoleo nic era in Germany. IOSee Biedel"mann, Delll.vcll/ami. I, p p. 273-315; Hajo Holborn , A
Hil/or), of Modl'1'n
York: Knopf, 1969), p p. 10-11; and W. O. Henderson, The Zollverein (lon don: Cambrid ge University Press, 1939), p p. 47, 170,256-9,267-71.
German)' (l\ew
"See]. P. E c ke rmann, Ge.\priic11f mil Goelhe ( \V i es b ad e n : Insel Verlag, 1955), p p. 629-30. The date is October 23, 1828.
1] 2 . F. Bo s he r has docu mented that in ei hteel1lh-century France the private appro g priation of offi ces should
of bUl·eaucracy. In
be co nsi d e red a ca s e of"ca pilalist e ntr epren eurs hi p " rather than
his view, b ureau cr acy properly so-called is a by-product of Lhe French
re\ulmion. See]. F. Bosher,
The Single
169-70 a n d passim, and French
Duly Proj ect (Lond on: Athlo n e Press, 1964), pp.
Finances,
1770-1795 (Lond on : Cambrid ge U n ive rs i t y
Press, 1970), chap. 15. Hans Rosenberg's study of P russ ian bureau cracy (cited in note 15) shows some similar cond it io n s , but \'ersity remains
s t ill
to be
a
com pa ris on with German officialdom in all i ts di
wr it ten.
13Bied ermann, Deutschland, I, pp. 100-2. In the ducal resid ence of Saxony-Weimar, all civil servants and military a nd court personnel made up a fifth of the LOwn's ""dult male population in 1699 and a quarter in 1820. See Hans Eberhardt, Goethes Umwelt ( Weimar: Hermann Bohlau, 1951), p p. 26-7. UMembership of the Paulskirche is tabulated in Gerhard Schilfert, Sieg und Niederlage
des demokratischen Wahlrechts in
der dell/schen R"'ollltioll (Berlin: Ruetten & Loenig, 1952), p. 406. The author classifies the first group as a "civil service intelligentsia" (beamteie In /elligellz) as distinguished from the "free i ntel li gentsia. "
UEven in Prussia it was an uphill struggle. For a description of Prussian o fficialdom in the eighteenth century which emphasizes corruption, n epotism, indolence, and all the
other neg-.Hive attributes of bureaucracy, see Hans Rosenberg, Bureaucrac)', Aristocracy and 1958), chaps. 2-4. However, Rosenberg also shows the emergence of "public law" and the mel-it system.
Autocracy (Cambrid ge: Harvard University Press,
16 Fig ures on student enrollments in the eighteenth century are beset with difficulties spelled out in a study by Franz Eulenburg. Eulenburg auributes the decline after 1755 to three facLOrs: the g radual increase of economic activities, the greater attraction of a mil itary career for members of the arisLOcracy, and the impro\'ement of secondary education together with the prolongation of academic studies (all deterrents to university study). See Franz Eulenburg, Die Frequenz deT deutschell Univenitii tfll (vol. 24 of Abhandlungen der Philologisch-Historischen Klasse der Konig l. Sachsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaf ten; Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 19(4), p p. 1 3 1-9 and passim. See also Hans Waldeyer, "Zur Entstehung der Realschulen in Preussen im 18. Jahrhundert," in Klaus Hartmann et aI. , eds., Schule und Staal im lB. und /9. Jahrlumdert (Frankf urt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974), pp146-70. A useful collection of data on literacy, reading, and degrees of schooling in the eighteenth century is contained in Rolf Engelsing, An(llphabe/entllm und ukture (Stuttgart: ]. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1 973), chaps. 1 1-12. "Biedermann, Deu/.lch/mld, I, pp. 144-5.
I"The d etails of fiction and the reading public in eighteenth-century Germany have been analyzed by Alben Ward, Book Productioll, Fic/ioll alld the German Reading Public, 1i40-IBOO (London: Oxford University Press, 1974).
NOTES TO PAGES 390-.397 I"See ibid. , pp. 87-8, for. a compilation of these estimat es. 20
Da ta in the p r ecedi n g
pa ragr aph s a re
derive d f rom J ohannes Goldfriedrich , Ges des Borsenvereins der Deutschen Buchhandler, 1909), III, chaps. 5 and 9, and J oa ch i m Kirchner, Das Deutsche Zeitschriften wesell (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1958), I, pp. 115-18.
chich/e des deu tschen BuchlumdeLs (Leipzig:
V erlag
21Goethe was a conserv ative who op posed only some inconveniences of Germany's which from a cultural st andpo i nt had bro ugh t many benefits. Also, he felt perso na lly indebted for a s si st a nce and la rg esse to the benevolence of "his very own" ruler. For his attitude toward G ra n d Duke Carl August, see no. 34b of his Venetian epi grams in SamtLiche Werke (Z u ric h : Art emis V er lag, 1950), I, p. 229. The opening line reads political fragmentation
"Klein ist
unter den Fiirsten Germaniens freilich der meine .. . . "
22Quoted in Hans-Georg Hass, ed., Sturm u n d Dra ng ( M unic h : C. H. Beck'sche Ver II, p. 1545. Goethe's and Holderlin's attitudes toward the French revolution are ex a m ined by Claude David and La w rence Ry a n in Richard Brink mann et aI., Deu ts che Literatur und Franziisische Revolution (Golli ngen : Vandenhoeck & Ru p recht, 1974), pp. 63-86, 129-48. la g sb u chhandlu ng, 1966),
23Biedermann, Deutschland, I, note, p. 285.
2 4 Qu oted
from K.
Fr. von Moser, Der Herr und der Diener (1759), in ib id., II, part I ,
p. 101.
25This descrip t i on of the French fashion in Germany is indebted to Biedermann, Deutschland, II, part I , pp. 54-176. For a m ode rn characterization on which I h av e drawn as well, see Adrien Fa u ch ie r - M ag nan , The Small German Courts in the Eighteenth Century (London: Methuen, 1958).
26Quoted in Jii rgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Offentlichkeit (Neuwied: Hermann L u ch t erha nd, 1962), p. 38.
27Quoted fro m K. Fr. von Moser, VomNationalgeist (1766) in Biedermann,Deutschland,
I, p. 158.
28See Hermann Waetjen, Die erste Englische Revolution und die iiffen t liche Meinung in Deutschland (disser t ation , Hei de lberg Universi ty ; Heidelber g: Carl Wi nte r' s Universitatsbuchhandlung, 1900), passim, and Franz Muncker, A nschauungen vom en glischen Staat und Volk (Sitzungsberichte der Koniglich B ay eri sc he n Akademie der Wissen schaften; Munich: G. Franzsche Verlag, 1918), pp. 27 ff.
29The Moral Weeklies were not ably absent from the southwestern p arts of G erma ny . See Wolfgang Martens, Die BotschaJt der Tugend (Stutt gart: J. B. MetzIersche V erl ag sbuch h andlung, 1968), pp. 108-23, 16 1 - 7 . Martens considers the influence of E ng li sh weeklies like the Spectator s i gnific ant , but that influence is minimized in Hans M. Wolff , Die Welt anschauung der deutschen Aujklarung ( B er n : A. Francke Verlag, 1949), chap. 3. a"My characterization is based on Martens, Botschaft. The q uo tat i o n from the Patriot appea r s in ibi d. , pp. 146-7. :! I I bi d . , pp. 141-6\. S ee also ibid. , pp. 370-403, for a more det aile d an al ysis of atti tudes toward the a r istocr acy and the lower classes, as expressed in t he MOl·al Weeklies.
NOTES TO PAGES �98-403 32The MOl"al Weeklies expl"essed much mOl"al indignation about aJ"istoC\"atic arl"ogance and about the hal"d drinking and loose li v i n g , the debts and lack of culture, the obsession with horses, dogs, and the hunt
wh
ich
chal'anerized many aristocrats. FOI" examples of
these critiques of the COUl"ts, in addition to Martens, see Biedermann, Deutschland,
I, p p .
152-7. The quotation defining the non political altitude of educated commoners is taken from Del" Aile Deulsche ( 1 730) in Ma n ens , BolJchafl, p. 3 34 . 33The writings of Balthasal" Gracian wel"e ci t ed earlier as an example of this literature. See Chapter 7, footnote 2 3. 34Quoted from Der Mensch (1751- 1756) in Manens, Botschaft, pp. 349-50.
"' I bid., p. 353.
I ret urn to th is univel'salist as pect of the Enlightenment further on.
36For an analysis of Goethe's many-sided attitude toward his hero, Wilhelm Meister, see W. H. Bruford, The German Tradition ofSelj�Cultil'(Ltion (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), chaps. 2 and 4. The q uo t ation in the text is taken from [Goethe's) Wilhelm Meister, Apprenticeship and Trat'l'ls (tL by R O. Moon; London: G. T. Foulis, 1947), I, pp. 250- 1. aTFor a succinct statement of' this interpretation and supporting documentation, see Fritz Bruggemann, "Der Kampf urn die burgerliche Welt- und Lebensanschauung in der deutschen Literatur des 18. Jahl"hunderts," Deutsche Viertelsjahrschrift fUT LiteTatuTwissen .,chaft und Gtistesgeschichte, III ( 1 925) , pp. 94- 1 27. See also the discussion in Roy Pascal, The German S turm und Drang (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959), chap. 3
and passim. 3"Quoted f\"Om Hass, ed. , Sturm Wid DmJig, II, pp. 1537-8. '"See ibid., p. 1539, and Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Educatio n rif Man (tr. by
E.
Wilkinson and L. Willoughby; Oxfol"d: Clarendon Press, 1 967), pp. 30-43. Schiller's po sition may be contrasted to that of Wieland; see Bernd Weyergraf, DeT.sheptische Wielands Schriften
zur jTamiisischen
Revolution (Stuttgart :
Burger,
J- B. Metzlersche Verla g sbuch
handlung, 1972). 40See the letter to Duke Augustenbul"g in Hass, ed., Sturm und DTang, pp. 1 54 1 -2. "Friedrich Schiller, WeThe (Weimar: Hermann Bohlaus Nachfolger, 1958), XXII , p. 248. The passage occurs in a review anicle on the poems of G. A. Burger. Note how close Schiller's position is to the precept of the Hamburg Patriot, "Neither too bad or vulgar for the scholar, nor too lofty and incomprehensible for the unlearned"-a similarity which can be noted without minimizing the difference in cultural level. USee the instructive articles by Gordon Craig, "Friedrich Schiller and the Problems of Power," in Leonard Krieger and Fritz Stern, eds., The Responsibility of Power (Historical Essays in Honor of Hajo Holborn; Garden City: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1969), pp.
135-56, and "Friedrich Schiller and the Police," in Proceedings of the AmeTican Philosophical Society, vol. 1 1 2 (December 1 968), pp. 367-70. Schi11er's realism is recognized even in the
Marxist view that Schiller's work represents a retreat from politics into a timeless realm of beauty. See Georg Lukacs, G oet he und seine Zeit (Bern: A. Francke Verlag, 1947), pp.
106-9.
NOTES TO PAGES 403-408 .aSee the prepublication
a nn ou n cement of his journal,
Die Horen (1794),
in Schiller ,
Werke, XXII, p. 106.
"See J. W. Go e th e, Siimtliche W erke (Zurich: Artemis Verlag, 1953), ll, the Xenien of Goethe and S chil ler) .
p. 485 (from
"For the q uo tati ons from Humboldt and Wolf, see Friedrich Paulsen, Geschichte des (2nd ed.; Le ipzig : Veit, 1897), II, p. 200.
gelehrtenUnterrichts
Werke, I,
46Goethe,
p. 234 (e p ig ra m 58) .
., For a characterization of this reform conservatism within the whole range of con servative reactions, see the excellent and c omp rehe n si ve study by E p s t e in, German Con servatism, chap. 2 and passim . Epst e i n emphasizes that reform conservatism ante dated the French revolution .
8See the analysis of democratic and s oc ia lis t st irri n gs in Ge r many in Fritz Va lj avec, der politischen St riim un ge n in De utsc hlarul, 1770-1815 (Munich: R. Olden oou rg, 1951), pp. 180-228. The full range of German responses to the revolution has been studied a number of times. In addition to Epstein and Valjavec, see Alfred StelTl, Der Ei nfluss der Franmsischen Revolution auf dcu deulsche Geistesleben (Stuttgart: J. G. C otta 'se he Buchhandlung, 1928), which deals with the intellectual elite, and Jacques Droz, L'Allemagne et la revolution franfaise (Paris: 1949), which deals with the e li te as we ll as with reg i onal variations in response. Among the earlier studies of this topic in addition to those by Karl Biederman n, mention should be made ofWoldemar Wenck, Deutschland vor hundertJahren (Leipzig: Verlag F. W. Grunow, 1887, 1890), especially vol. 2 because of its ample use of fugitive contemporary sources. •
Die Entstehung
49Quoted
i n Wenck, Deutschland,
50Valjavec,
I , pp. 202-4.
pp. 146-79, 244-54. See also Robert Elsasser, Ober die poli (vol. 51 of Heidelberger Abhandlungen zur mittleren und neueren Geschichte; Heidelberg: Carl Winters Universitatsbuchhandlung, Entstehung,
tischen Bildungsreisen der Deutschen nach England
1917), chap. 4.
' "See the instructive article by Rudolf Stadelmann, "Deutschland und die westeu ropaischen Revolutionen," in Deutschland und Westeuropa (Schloss La u pheim : Ulrich Steiner Verlag, 1948), p. 22. For a more differentiated analysis of this political consensus, see Rudolf Vierhaus, "Politisehes Bewusstsein in De u tsc h la n d vor 1789," Der Staat, vol. 6 (1967), pp. 175-96.
52Quoted in ibid., p. 184. 53 Both statements by Struensee are quoted in
Epste i n , German
Conse rvatism,
pp.
391-2.
"Eckermann,
Gespriiche mit Goethe,
pp. 493-4.
The conversation
is dated
1824. USee the
con ve rsat ion of April 27, 1825 in ibid., pp. 518-19.
' "Goethe, "Literarischer Sansculottismus (1795),"
We rke,
XIV,
pp. 182-3.
January 4,
NOTES TO PAGES 409-412 -'The statement by
Frederick William I
is q u oted in
Ouo Hintze, Die BehordeooTganisation
(vol. 6 of Acta Borussica; Pare)" 1901), p. 277. For a viv id description of t he interaction between per sonal autocracy and evasive o ffi cia ls , see Walter Dorn, " The Prussian B ure auc rac y in the Eigh teen th Century," Political Science QlIarte,.{)', vol. 46 (1931), pp. 403-23.
Imd die a llgem e ine StaatSl'erwaltllllg Preussens im 18. jah,·hwlde,·t Berlin: Pa u l
SHGusta\' Schmoller, UmriSSf Imd UI/tenuchllllgl'li
Zl/I'
Verjassllngs-, Verwaltungs- Wid Wirt
sclraftsgeschichte ( L ei p l i g : Duncker und Humboldt, 1898). pp. 138, 166, 180.
59See H in t ze . Behiirdl'llorgani,lfllioll. pp. 276-88. 60See Rosenberg, Burea u c m cy , AI'istocmcy al/d Aulorrae)'. pp. 1 5 9 - 65 ,
son nel
under
practices
for detai ls of per
Frederick II.
·'Ibid., pp. 175-82, 190-1. 62Hegel's Philosophy of Right (tl". an d
Press, 1952), p.
63See
Hans
ed. by T. M.
Knox;
London: Oxford University
193.
Gerth , Die .!Ozialgeschichtliche Lage del" biirgerlichen /ntelligenz um die Wende (Ph.D. d issertation , University o f Frankfurt ; Berlin : VDI - Ve r lag,
des 18. jahrhunderts
1935), pp. ··See
110-13. Paulsen, Geschichte des gelehrten Unten'ichts, II, pp. 124-7
and passim.
'5The details of t his growing interest in Adam Smith among higher civil servants are set out in Wilhelm Treue, "Adam Smith in Deutschland," in Werner Conze, ed., Deu ts ch lal/d I/Ild Europa ( Fest sc hr i ft fur Hans Rot h fels; Dusseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1951), pp. 101-33. · ·J o han na
Sch ultze, Die AuseinandenetzUllg zwischen Adel und Burgertllm in den deuische n ( vol. 163 of His/m'ise/le Studien; Berlin: Verlag Emil Ebering, 1925), p. 27. In the 1780s thirteen new joumals were founded while fo ur were discontin ued, and in t he I 790s nine new jo u rn a ls were founded but seventeen were discontinued. Cen sorship became more severe after the French revolution . leitsehrijten, 1773-/806
·'See ibid . , pp.
16-18, 36-40, for biographical
d a t a on the co ntributors to these so
c iopo litic al journals. 6. For a vivid descri ption of this scene, see Wilhelm Dilthey, Leben ed.; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1 922), pp. 218-19.
SchleiermacheT5 (2 nd
·gCarl Got t l i eb Svarez (1746-1798) prepare d the General Legal Code (Allgemeine Land re cht) of 1794 and Klein was his assistant. For a description of the Mittwochsgesell schaft and an exam ple of its debates, see Adolf Stolze I, "Die Berli ner Mittwochgesellschaft liber Aufhebun g oder Refo.·m der Universitaten (1795)," FOT5chungen zur Bra nden bur gischtll I/Ild Preussisehen Geschichle, II (1889), pp. 201-22.
'''Knox, ed . , 71 I bid . , p.
Hegel 's Philu.wphJ uf Right, p. 291.
193. The most tel li ng passage which de s c ribes and to an extent endorses free market is fo u n d in ibid., p. 268 (addition no. 120 to §189).
the p rin c i p le of a
NOTES TO PAGES 413-421 72Cf. the provis io ns of the code in G. A. Grotefend, ed . , Das Allgemeine Preussische Landrecht ( D u ssel dor f : L. Sc h u m a nn'sc he Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1 89 7 ), part 2, title 10, especially nos. 94-102, w ith Hermann Conrad and Gerd Kleinheyer, ed s . , Vortrage uber
und Staat von C. G. Svarez ( C ologne : Westdeutscher Verlag , 1960), pp. 61-2. Svarez and his colleagues d i d achieve the permanent tenure of j u dge s, however. See part 2, t it le 17, no. 99 of the Allgemeine Landrecht. For the further development of the l eg al po s i tion of civil servants, see the summary by Otto Hintze, "Der Beamtenstand," in Soziologie un d Geschichte (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ru p rech t, 1964), p p . 91-4 and pa ssim .
Recht
" S ee H i l degard Pischke, Die englische IndtL5trierevolution im Spiegel der deutsclten Reise
1780-1825 ( Ph .D. dissertation, Uni vers ity of Breslau; Grone: August Schoenhuette , 1935) and W. O. H end erson , Britain and Industrial Europe (London: Leices ter University Press, 1965), p p. 1 39- 66 . On the contrast between German idealism and specialization, see the instructive summary by Roy Pascal, "' Bild u n g ' and the Division of Labour," in German Studies Presented to W. H. Bruford ( L ond on : George S. H a rr a p, 1962), pp. 1 4-28.
beschreibungen,
" Leo na r d
Kr ieger, The
German Idea of Freedum ( Boston : Beacon Press, 1 957), p. 144.
75From Hardenberg's Riga Memorial of 1807 reprinted in Geo r g Winter, ed., Die aus den Preussischen Staatsarchiven, vol. 93; Le i pzig : S. Hi rzel, 1931), pp. 305-6.
Reorgan i5ation des Preussischen Staates unter Stein und Hardenberg ( Publikationen
78My summary statement on Stein, Ha rdenberg , and Humboldt is based on Krieger, German Idea of Freedom, pp. 147-73.
77For a vivid description of these condi tions and reactions, see Peter G. Thie l en, Karl August von Hardenberg, 1750-1822 (Cologne: Grote'sehe Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1967), pp. 35-6, 59-60, and passim. 78See Ernst Klein, Von der R eform zur Restauration (vol. 16 of Veroffentlichungen der Kommission zu Berlin; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1965), pp. 169-208.
H istorischen
7. A de tailed account is readily
av a ilab le in Ernst Rudolf Huber, Deutsche Verl ag, 1957), I, passim.
Verfassungs
geschichte seit 1789 (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer
a· See Hajo Hol bo rn, A Histo cif Modern Germany, 1648-1840 (New Y ork: Knopf, ry 1968), I I, p. 407. 81 Ibid., p. 409. 82Max Weber, Die Verhaltnisse der Landarheiter im ostelbischen Deutschland (vol. 55 o f Schriften des Vereins fuer Sozialpolitik; Berlin: Duncker & Hum blot , 1892), p. 797. 83These rules a ppl ied on ly to the old Prussian territories; restrictions continued u n til 1845 in the territories acq ui red after 1815. See Hu be r, Verfas.5ungsgeschichte, I, pp. 207-8. " See Theodore S. Hamerow, Restoration, Revolution, Reaction, Economics
and Politics in
Germany, 1815-1871 ( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 32, 36, and passim;
also Marquardt, "Ma nual Workers in Berlin," chap. 3. 8S See Hamerow, Restorat i on, p. 33, for an example of armed attacks in 1832 by the popul ac e of Hesse-Kassel on toll hou s es as the detested symbol of the c u stom s union,
NOTES TO PAGES 422-435 SfiThis other side of German li ber alis m is exam i ned in Donald G. Rohr, The Origins of Social Liberalism in Germ a ny (Chicago: University of C h icag o Press, 1963), pp. 102 ff.
87Quoted in Huber,
Vel!a.I.Hmg.lgeschichte, I,
"See ibid., I, pp. 696-765,
p. 703.
for a detailed accollnt of Ge rma n national and liberal
ag itat ion and of the conservative reaction under the Karlsbad edicts. ·-Ibid., I, pp. 310-13.
-"I bid . , I, pp. 168-72 . •,
A characteristic feature of this pe ri od
was
the merger bet wee n the ideals of Bildung
and ev e ry citizen's duty to serve his country in war-a ble n d i n g that fo r a time animated
the efforts of Pru ssia' s foremost military reformers. See Heinz St u bi g, Armel' und Nation, Die piidagogischpolitischt1l Motive de,' preu.lsischen H eeres reform 1807 -1814 ( Fra n kfurt : Verla g Petn Lang, 1971), especially chaps. 2 and 7. ·'Knox, ed., Hegel's Philosophy of R igh t, p.
193.
93 Quoted in Reinhart Koselleck, Preussen zwilchl'n Reform und Reaktion, p. 4 I 3. See also ibid., p. 408, for the earlier quotation fmm the secret ordinance of 1826. My discussion is i n debted to this detailed study, especially pp. 337-447. The changing subculture of the Prussian civil sen' ice duri ng this period is examined i n J o hn R. Gillis, The Prussian Bu reaucraCJ in Crisis, 1840-/860 (S tanford : S tan fo r d U niv e rsit y Press, 1971). ·
9SHuber, Verfassungsgeschir.hte, II, p.
98See ibid . , 11, pp.
579.
751 fr.; IlJ, pp. 35-62, 85-112 .
CHAPTER XII. NATION-BUILDING: JAPAN 'J ohn W. H al l, japan from Prehistllry 10 Modern Times (New York: Dell, Del ta Books, 1971), p. 165; he reafte r cited as Hall,japan. See also John W. Hall,japanese History (pub licatio n no. 34, Service Center for Teachers of History; Wash i ngton , D.C.: American His torical Association , 1961), pp. 37-9. 2G. B. Sansom, The Western World and japan (New Y ork : Random House, Vintage Books,
1973), p. 229.
The book was originally published in
1949.
3 A com parison and contrast between Japan an d Prussia is contained in Reinhard Ben dix, Nation-Building and Citizenship ( 2 nd ed.; Berkeley and Los Angeles:
ifo rnia Press,
1977),
chap.
6.
"For a detailed tabulation of most hold ings in
A HiS/aT)' ofjapan
(London: Cresset Press,
1961), 11,
1598
and
1602,
U n ive rs ity of
see George
Cal
Sansom,
pp. 3-4, 413-16. A convenient ma p
sh owing the centr al location of Tokugawa domains in
1664
is fo u nd in Conrad Totman,
(Ca m bridge : Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 7 1 . The figures in the text are taken from John W. Hall, Land and Government in Medieval Japan (Sta n ford : Sta n ford U niversity Press, 1966), pp. 3 3 3 , 342, 3 5 5 ; a n d John K. Fairbank, Edwin O . Reischauer, a n d Albert M . C ra i g , East A sia, Tradition a n d Tran sformation ( Boston : H ou g hton , M i ffl i n , 1 973), p p . 400- 1 .
Politics of the Tokugawa Bakufu
S H al l , japan, p. 1 72 .
M y ske tch of Tok u ga wa
i n st i t u t i o n s is i n de bted to t h i s
w o rk fo r
i ts conc ise s u m mary of rece n t rese a rc h . 6The d e ta i l s
of t h i s syst e m a re described in
Tosh i o G. Te u k a hira , Feu.dal Control in Press, H a rvard East A s i a n M onographs, 1966) . The author shows (pp. 98 -100) that fi ve tozama and five fu d ai d o m ai n s spent betwee n 7 1 and 81 percent of their ann ual cash ex pe ndi t u res on costs re l a t i n g to the san kin-kotai system. The resu l t i n g indebted ness o f the han was a means of political co n trol, as well as a sti m u lant to economic g ro w t h . For a statement of this " s a n k i n - kot a i t heo r y, " see A lbert M. C ra i g, Choshu in the Meiji Restoration ( Cam b r i d ge : Harvard U niver sity Press, 1967), pp. 2 7-9 and passi m.
Tokugawa japan (Cam bridge : H a rva rd U n i v e rsity
7See Sansom,
Western World and japan,
pp. 1 8 1 -4 .
RH . D. Harootunian, Toward Restoration ( Berkeley and Los Angeles : Un iversity of California Press, 1970), pp. 13-14. 9See Quincy Wri ght, A
Study of War
(Ch icago : Un iversity of Chica go Press, 1 965) , p.
653. I °See
Fairbank et aI., East Asia, pp. 406, 417.
I I Hal l, japan , p. 177. 1 2 lbid . , p . 178. I 3See S a n so m , History ojJapan, I I I , pp. 1 1 1 - 1 3 . H is estimates of t h e urba n population are based on the assum ption of urba n residents as 10 percent of t he assessed value of the domain in which the castle towns were located. In another estimate, Hall Uapan, p. 2 1 0) states that by the e ighteenth century urban growth had assumed astounding proportions. By then , Edo may have had 1 million in habitants, and for the country as a w hole perhaps 10 percent of the peo ple lived in cities of over 10, 000 population. For the estimate o f the proportion o f urban residen t s who were samurai, see John W . Hall, "The Castle Town and Ja pan's Modern Urban ization," Far Eastern Quarterly , vol. 15 (1955), p. 46. U r ban growth was not continuous throughout the Tok ugawa period, especially in t he numerous provincial towns whose population became stationary or declined as com mercial and in d ustrial em ployments increased i n the surrounding cou ntryside. For an analysis of this process, see Thomas C. Smith , "Pre-Modern Economic Growth : Japan and the West," Past and Present, no. 60 (August 1 973 ), pp. 1 27 -60. I 'Hall, "Castle Town," p. 52. For the ronin, see Sanso m , Histury of japan, I I I , pp. 32-4, 54-8, who states that by 165 1 measures were taken to alleviate the condition and that by the end of the centu ry the number of TOnin was small. Still, the TOnin were a continuous concern because t he men u n der arms in the Bakufu domains were a relatively small force, and the n umber of i m poverished sam urai was considerable. Craig (Choshu, p. 16) estimates the size of the Tokugawa military force as between 2 0,000 and 30,000. The number of urbanized samurai may have been over 1 million. This educated guess fol lows
NOTES TO PAGES 443-453 if some 50 pe rcent of the u rb a n po p u l a t ion co n s i s t ed of sam Ul'ai and t he urban population is PUt at 2 m i l lion i n a t ota l pop u l a t i o n of 20 m i l lion. Fo r t wo large and two s m al l h a n , C raig (Cho.,hll, pp. 1 4 - 1 5 ) gi ves the act ual n u m be r of s a m u rai, both above a nd below t he n u mber assigned o ffic ia l l y . " S a n som (HiJtOl) of japl/ ll, I I I , p. 5 1 ) s t a t e s t h at by 1 660 m os t daimyo had i m ple mented the shogunal edict d e m a n d i n � that sa m u rai l i \' e i n t he cast le towns on their st i pe n d s . B y con t r a s t , Craig (ChoJhll, p. 1 4 ) s t a t e s t h a t i n Satsu ma , Ch osh u , a n d p res u m ably elsewhe re it was not fi nanc ial l y feas i b le fi) r t he d a i m yo to su ppo rt all t h e i r s a m u r a i a s castle t own r es i d e n t s .
I "See Craig, Choshu, pp. "Sa n som ,
39-46.
WeJtem World Iwd ja/lllll,
I " Donald Kee ne,
p p . 1 84 , 1 8 7- 9 3 .
The japlllle.le DiscOl 'e1)'
of E ll rope, l i2 0 - I 8 3 0 ( S t an fo r d : Sta n fo rd
L'n i\"ersit y Press, 1 969). p p . 96-7.
1 9The main points i n t h i s and the followi n g summary de scription of economic con d itions are taken from Sansom , We.ltem World a li (I j apa n , pp. 2 2 3 -4 3 ; Sanso m , HJs tory of japa n, lI l, passim ; and Hall, japllrI, pp. 1 99-2 1 3 . 2 " Fo r details, see Hugh Borton, " Peasan t U p r i s i n g s in Japan of the Tokugawa Period," of the A siatic Sorifl)' of japan, 2nd ser. , \'0 1 . 16 ( 1 93 8 ) , p p. 1 -2 1 9 . The trans formation of t he village is an alyzed i n Thomas C. S m ith , The Agrarian Origins of Modern japa ll ( S t an fo r d : Stan ford U n i ve rsity Press, 1 959).
TransactiO /IS
2 1 Q uoted in Keene, japi/ lle.le
Disrovf1Y,
p. 4 2 .
22 See Ronald Dore, Edllwtioll ill Tokugawa japa ll ( Be rkeley and Los An g eles : Un iver s i t y of Ca li fornia Press, 1 96 5 ) . U See Sanso m , Weste1'1l Wm'ld l/ lld japa n, p. 240. E \ ' en t hese methods were insu fficient and the shogunate resorted fr eq uen t l y to debasement o f the coinage, rea ping large but tem porary pro lits and p la c in g additional burde ns es peciall y on merchants and peasants.
2 4 Hall, japa ll, p . "Sanso m ,
2
1 3.
Western W01'ld
(/lid ja /m I! , p.
1 06 .
2 " For the analysis of le gitimacy in I'elation to the East Asian foreign policy un der the early Tokugawa, 1 am indebted t o a n u n p u bli she d pa pe r by Ronald P. Toby, " Re o pe n i ng t he Question o f Sll koku : Early Tokugawa Foreig n Policy and Legitimacy ," presen ted to t he Cen te r lor J a panes e Studies, U n iversity of California, B er k e ley ( November 1 976). " For these themes i n t h ei r Ge rman set ting, see Jo'ried rich Meinecke , Cosmopolitanism alld the l'lia/iollal State ( Princeto n : Pri nceton U n i versity Press, 1 970). 2 ·Sansom,
Wl's/em World
1l1ld Japll l/ , pp.
1 2 7 , 1 32 , 1 7 3 .
29 l bi d . , pp. 1 24 , 1 2 9 . 1 73 - 4 . See also C. R. Boxer, The Ch ristia n CI'1I/ury in japan ( Bel'keley and Los Angeles : U n i\'e rs ity of Ca l i fornia Press. 1 95 1 ), p. 448. Among the mar tyrs. sev en ty -o n e wel'e E Ul'opeans.
NOTES TO PAGES 454- 46 5
3"The statement in the t e x t . by Fuj i ta Toko is quoted in Harootunian, Toward Resto p. 5 1 . In the doctrine of t he Five Rdationshi ps, To k u g a wa neo- Co n fuci anism gave pr i de o f place to the superior-subordi nate relationship. See David M . Earl, Emperor and Nation in japan, Political Th in ke rs of the Tokugawa Period (Seattle : U n iversity of Washi n gto n Pre ss , 1 964 ) , p p . 3-6. The fo l l o w in g discussion is i n d e b t e d to this study, though m uch d e t a i l m u st be omitted in t he i n terest of bl·e vity. mtion ,
3 1 See H a roo t u n i an , Toward Restoration, pp. 1 9 -20 . "See Ea rl, Emperor and Nat io n , pp. 1 6- 1 7 . I h a ve modi fied P r o fesso r Earrs form u lation i n the i n te re st of simplic i t y . " !l l b id . , pp. 25, 37-5 1 , 5 3 .
H lbid . , p . 70. 3'See ibid . , ch a p.
5.
3"See Keene, japanese Discovery of Europe, pa s s i m .
37See ibid . , chap. 3, fo r details of Japanese contacts with Russian explorers and traders and of Hayashi Shihei's career. 3 " Quote d in ibid . , pp. 75-6. 3 9 For a general account o f the pragmatic accom modation between Western technol ogy and Japanese nati o n ali s m , see t he c ha pter " Forerun ners of t he Restoration Move ment" in Sa nsom , Western World and japan, pp. 248-74. �oQuoted in W. G. Beas le y , The Meij; Restoration ( S ta n fo r d : St a n fo r d Uni ve rs it y Press, 1972), p. 1 2 1. My discussion is in de bted to this work.
� l For d e tai ls , see ibid., chap. 5 . <2 1
rely on Donald Keene's d iscussion of Hirata At su tan e in japa neJe Discovery of Eu
!"Ope, pp. 156-72.
�3Quoted in ib id . , p.
1 59.
"Quoted in Earl, Emperor and Nation, p. 1 4 7 . I have rdied on Earl's account o f Yo shida Shoi n . See also Sansom , Western World and japan, p p . 269- 74, a nd H a rootunian, Toward Res/oration, p p . 184-245. �5Quoted i n Earl, Emperor and Nation, p. toward the nation, see ibid . , chap. 9.
1 5 8.
For fur t he r details on Shoin's at ti tu de
�6These and related points are discussed in Thomas Smith, "ja pan's Aristocratic Rev Yale Review, s p ri n g 196 1 , pp. 370-83. I h a ve used S m i t h' s a n aly si s lor a com parison between Ja pa n and Ge rmany in Bendix, Nation- B uilding and Citiumhip, chap. 6.
olution,"
HQuoted in Dore, Education in Tokugawa j apan, p. 64 . I have used Do re ' s work in an earlier p u bli ca t i on on which the following disc ussion is based. See Rein hard Bendix and Guenther Roth, Scholarship and PaTliIfI1l:ship ( Be r kel e y and Los An geles : U n i ve rsity of Cal i fo rn ia
Press, 1 97 1 ) ,
pp. 188-206.
NOTES TO PAGES 466-48 1 ··See Dore's tra n s l a t io n of t he rules posted in the tem ple schools in his Education ill Tokugawa japa n , pp. 3 2 3 fr. < 9 I bid., p. 1 5 1 . 5 0 For these 51
For
a
fi gures see Beasle y ,
Meiji Restoratioll, pp. 2 4 - 6 .
probi n g a n a l y sis o f thi s quest i o n , s e e T h o m a s S m i t h , . . ' M e rit' a s I deolog y i n
the Tok ugawa Pe riod , " i n
R.
P. Dore, ed . , A spects of Social Cha llge ill M odem japan ( Pr i nce
to n : Princeton Un i v e rs it y Press, 1 9 6 7 ) , pp. 7 1 -90. 5 ' Dore, Education in
Tokugawa japall,
p . 2 1 2 . FOI' a des cri ptio n of this pattern of "sen
s i t i ve p ride and fear of sham i n g defeat" i n t h e light of evidence from J apa nese history , see E d w i n O.
Re i scha u e r, 711e
Un ited States
and japall
( N ew York : V i k i ng, 1 95 7 ) , pp. 99-
1 7 7. "The figures are taken from Hall, j apa n , p p . 2 3 4 - 5 . The following sketch o f the domestic crisis in the so-called Tem po reform era o f 1 830- 1 844 is based o n H a l l' s presentation. ··Quoted in W. G. Beasley, The M odern History
ofjapan
(London: Weidenf�ld
&
N i
colson, 1 963), p . 52. SS My account is indebted to ibid., p. 5 3 . For f urther details see Conrad Totman, "Political Reconciliation in the Tokugawa Bakufu : Abe Masahiro and Tokugawa N ariaki , 1 844 - 1 852," in Albert M. C raig and Donald H. S h i vely, eds. , Personality in japanese History (Berkeley and Los Angeles : University of California Press, 1 970), pp. 1 80-208, and Fritz O pitz, Die uhensreformen des Tokugawa Nariaki nach dem "Hitachi-Obi" des Fujita Toko (Ph.D. dissertation, Philosophische Fakultat, Universitat Miinchen, 1 965), passim . Sansom's char acterization is quoted from his Weslern World and japa n, p. 293. 56See Sm ith, "Japan's Aristocratic Revolution," pp. 3 7 0-8 3 .
" ' H all, japa n , p. 2 5 5 , re rts that o f some fifty replies that are preserved, thirty-four po
called for rejection of Perry's req uest of a treat y , fourteen equivocated but ad vised con
ciliation, and two advocated opening the country to foreign trade. Only eight of the dai m yo favored resort to military action. 5 8 For details, see Beasley, Meiji Res/omlion, pp. 1 29-39, and passim. "See ibid., p. 328 and chap. 1 3 . The following discussion is based on Beasley's work. 60See ibid., p. 3 5 2 , for Iwa kura's 1 8 70 statement. 6 1 Quoted in ibid. , p. 362 . 6 2 Quoted in ibid. , p. 364. 6 3 I bid. , p. 3 8 1 . S · See ibid. , pp. 340- 1 , for this list of grievances from Kagoshima. 6'Statement by Kido Koin of Choshu quoted in ibid., p. 3 1 4 . 66See ibid. , p. 2 4 .
NOTES TO PAGES 482 -490
65 5
67See Hall, Japan, pp. 2 6 7- 7 0 . See also Beasley, Meiji Restoration, pp. more detai led discussion of this g roup .
3 1 8-2 0 ,
for a
• 8See Be r n a r d Silberm a n , Ministers oj Mo derniza tio n (Tucso n : University of Arizo n a P ress , 1 9 64 ) , p. 49.
6" l bi d . , pp. 5 2 , 5 8 , 74. For fourteen i n di v i du a ls in t he sample, the g e o g r aphic origi n could not be ascertai ne d .
7UFor details, see Robert M . S p au ld i ng , I mpe ria l Japan's Higher Civil Service Exa mination ( Pri n ceto n : Princeton U niversity Press, 1 96 7 ) . 7 1The text of the charte r o a t h is repri nted i n Joseph Pittau, S.j ., Political Thought i n Early Meiji Japan, 1868-1889 (Cambridge: Harvard Un ive rs i t y Press, 1 96 7 ) , p. I I . 72Quoted from an essay of 1 908 in Wm. Theodore de Bary et a!., eds. , Sou rces oj the Japanese Tradition (New Yor k : Col u m bia University Press, 1 95 8 ) , pp. 6 7 5 - 6 . By implica tion, I to's observations may exaggerate his own role as moderator, but his descri ption of the situation need not be discounted for that reason. 73Quoted in Pittau, Political Thought, pp.
1 8- 1 9 .
"Quoted in ibid. , pp. 1 77-8. '"Statement of in ibid . , p. 38.
1 872
by Miyajima Seiichiro in a letter to Iwakura Tomomi, as quoted
76Quoted in George Akita, Foundations of Constitutional Government in Modern Japan, H arvard University Press, 1 967), p. 29.
1 868-1900 (Cam bridge :
77 From the letter of Prime Minister Sanjo Sanetomi to Iwakura Tomomi as para phrased in ibid. , p. 40. The leading Meiji oligarchs participated in the Iwak ura mission. T h e considerations leadin g to t h e Iwa k u ra mission are anal yzed i n Ma rlene Mayo, " Ratio nality in the Meiji Restoration: The Iwaku ra Embassy," in Bernard S. Silberman and H . D . Harootunian, eds., Modern Japanese Leadership (Tucson: University o f A rizona Press, 1 966) , pp . 3 2 3-69. 78As paraphrased in Pittau, Political Thought, pp. 5 1-2. See also pp. 50- I , and Beasley, Meiji Restoration, pp. 373-8, 402-4 . 79Pittau, Political Thought, p. 70. 8·Quoted i n ibid., p. 166. 8 1 The oligarchic crisis o f 1 88 1 . leading to the ouster of Okuma Shigenobu from the government, is analyzed in Akita, Constitutional Government, chap. 3. Ito Hirobumi and I noue Kowashi were the p rincipal leaders o f the govern ment's constitutional policies . The ideas of both men had been formed a decade earlier in study tou rs of European capitals. 8'Quoted in Pittau, Political Thought, p. 83 lbid. , p.
88.
90.
··This exchange is cited i n Akita, Constitutional Government, pp.
7 0- 1 .
NOTES TO PAGES 493-499
C H A PTER X I I I . N AT I O N - B U I LD I N G : RUSS I A ' The res u l t i n g c l u m s i n e s s a n d feeling o f i n fe r i m- i t }' b y some M usco v i te tra v e l e rs to Western E u ro pe is described \' i v i d l y i n Geo r g e
V. P l ek h a no v ,
H is t ory
of
R ussia n Social
7 1wugh t ( t r a n s l a t i o n into E n g l i s h of Fo '-eign Social Scie nce Monogra phs, WOI'ks
P ro gre s s
A d m i n istratio n ; N e w Yor k : Co l u m b i a U n i vers i t y , De p a r t m e n t of Soc i al Sc ience, 1 93 8) ,
pp. 2 - 1 4 , ' G i les Fletc h e r , Of the R ussI' Commonwealth, 1 5 9 1 ( C a m bridge : H a r \' a rd U n i ve r s i t y
P re s s , 1 966),
pp. 4 6 - 7 .
S pe l li n g a n d p u n c t u a t i o n ha\'e bee n mod e r n i ze d .
3 Fo r co n t r a s t s betwee n t h i s pattern a n d the m e rca n t i le co m m u n i t y in Western E u ro pea n towns, see O u o B ru n ner, " E u ropaisches u n d russisches B ii rge r t u m , " Neue Wege del" Sozia lgeschichte (Gotti n ge n : Vanden hoeck &
R u p rec h t , 1 96 8) ,
'See C ha pte r 4, p p . 1 1 9- 1 20, fo r re fe re n c e
5See
t h i s m i l it ar y
t ra ns fo r m a t i o n .
of R ussia, vol. I , Fun k & W agna ll s , 1968), pp. 62 , I SO, 1 58, 1 77 ; Rein hard Wittram , Pelel' I, Czar und Kais er (Gottingen : Vandenhoeck & R u prec ht , 1 964), I, p . 7 0 ; and Joseph T. F uh r m a nn , The Origins of Capitalism in Russia ( C h ica go : Quad rangle, 1 9 72), pp. 243-4, fo r the sou rce of these figures. Population es timates for seventeenth-century Moscow vary from 200,000 to 524,000 around 1 650 and e ven 658, 000 in the 1680s, but these last fi g u r e s seem too h i g h even i f t hey include t h e l a r ge n umber of residents in outl y i n g d i str i ct s and suburbs. See George Vernadsky, A History of Russia. The Tsardom of Moscow, 154 7 - 1 682 ( New Haven: Yale University Press, 1 969), V, part 2 , p . 746. Pa ul M i l i ukov,
Charles Se i g n obo s ,
to
p p . 225-4 1 .
From the Begin n ing t o the Empire
"The
two
YO" k : K n o p f,
of Pe te r the
L. Ei sen m a n n , e d s . , Histm)
Grea l ( N e w York:
sets of fi g u res are cited in M a rc Rae ff, Imperial Ru.fsia, 1 682 - 1 825 (New 1 97 1 ), p. 89, a n d M i li ukov et aI., ed s . , His/m) of Russia, II, p. 150 , res pect i v el y .
7See Donald W. T rea dgo l d, The West in R lIJ.• ia a nd Ch i n a ( Londo n : Ca mbridge U n i versity Press, 1 973), I , p. 62. The author anal)'zes the com plex intermin g l in g of political a n d religious i n fluences in t he Ukraine d uring the sixteenth and seventeenth centu ries. 'See Mili ukov et aI. , His to ry of Russia, I, p p . 1 90-4, where N ikon's statement at the 1656 cou n c i l is q uo ted . Treadgold (West ill Russia, I, pp. 62-75) has another descri ption of the origin o f the schism and its results. The est imate of self-immolations by Old Be lie\"e rs is cited in N icholas R i a sano v s k y , A History of Russia ( New York : Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 22 1 . For a sy m pathetic appraisal of this controversy and of the Old Be lievers' movemen t as a desperate protest against t he secular state, see Michael Cherniavsky, "The Old Believers and the New Reli gion ," Slavic Re'{liew, vol. 25 ( March 1 966), pp. 1 -39. "See Alexander Vucinich, SCiellce ill R ussi(lll 1 7-25 . ' ''See Miliukov e t C lIllI/re, p p . 2 7 - 3 7 .
" See 1 6 - 1 7.
al. ,
C ultllre
His/or)' of RllJ.\ia, I, pp.
Wittl'a m , Peter I,
( Londo n : Peter
Owe n ,
1 965), pp.
1 8 2 - 6 , a nd V uc i n i ch , Science in Ru.•si(/II
I, pp. 6 3 - 7 , a n d Vucinic h , Scil'll ce i n R ussian
CultuTe,
pp.
" See i b i d . , p. 70. My acco u n t is b a s e d on V uc i n ic h and W i t t r a m , Peter I, II, p p . 1 94-207. See a lso Treadgold, WI'.f/ ill R II.tfia, I , p. 1 04 . The q uo t at i o n in footnote a is from
NOTES TO PA GES 499- 5 07
R icha rd
Pi pes , ed . , Karamzin '.! Memoir on Ancient and M o dern Russia ( New Y o r k : A thene um ,
1 966) , p. J 58. ' 3 See Mili u kov et aI., Hi.\tory of Russia, I, pp. 226-3 8 . "These de t a i l s a re ext racted fro m the a ccoun t i n ibi d . , I , p p . 2 4 3 - 5 1 . " T he d i sc ussion of loc a l respo n se to a Ulocratic gove r n m e n t is based on George
Yane}' , The Syslematiuzlion of Russian Government ( U rba n a : U n i ve r s ity of I l l i n o i s Press, 1 97 3 ) , pp. 2 1 - 8 , 5 1 - 5 . 1 acce pt Yaney's su ggestion t ha t in terms o f the i m pact on the local
po p u l a t i o n t h e re was l i t tle if a n y difference between conq uered a n d n ative R ussia n te,' ri to rie s . Fo r details of " go ve m me n t by t r ib u te col lection ," see the case s t u d y by A lton S. Don ne l l y , The R ussian Conquest of Bashkiria, 1552 - 1 740 ( New H aven : Y a le U n i versity P ress ,
1 9 6 8) . ' " For d ata on the size of t he Russian army u nder Peter and the psycholo gical i m por tance of re gimenta l a l legiance , see Vasili Kli uchevsk y , Peter the Greal ( New York: St. Mar tin's Press, 1 969), pp. 81-2, 1 02-3. "See Dietrich Geyer, " ' Gese llschaft' a l s staatliche Vera nstaltung," Jahrbucher fur die Gescliichle Osteuropa.!, v o l . 1 4 ( 1 966), p . 24. See a l s o N i kolaj AJexeiev, " Beitrage zur Ges
c hich te des r ussischen Absolutismus im 1 8. Jahrh undel't ," ibid. , vol . 6 ( 1 95 8 ) , pp. 8 - 1 6 , a nalyzi ng the eq u i va le nce between right a n d duty under Peter's re ign. ' ·See Yaney , Systematization, p p. 5 5 - 6. I 9 Hans RoggeI', National ConsciottSntss in Eightunth-Century Russia
vard U n i vers i ty
(Cambridge : Har
Press, 1 960), p. 1 0.
2° Ibid . , pp. 46-7. 2 ' Russian eighteenth-century statistics a re u n reliable since record-kee p i n g was poor an d the categories used quite uncerta i n . Neverthe less, t he c o n t rast is striking.
Cf.
Valentin
Giterman n , Geschichte Russlands ( Zurich : B iichergilde G u te n be rg, 1 94 5 ) , II, p. 4 80, for the Russian figures on publications with Table 3, Chapter I I , t h is volume, for t he Ge rman ligures. 2 2 For details on the eightee n t h -century writers who discovered " native
fol k ," devel
oped the national language , and contrasted R ussia's past to her i n glorious present, see the study by H ans RoggeI'. 23 For details , see James H assel l , " I m ple mentation of the Russian Table of Ra nks dur ing the Eighteenth Century," Slavic Rroiew, v ol . 2 9 (june 1 970), p p . 2 8 3 -95 . 2 ' See the description of these edicts in Michael Florinsky, R ussia ( New York : M ac milla n , 1 94 7 ) , I . pp. 4 1 7-2 1 . 25Tibor Szamuely, The Russian Tradition ( New York: McGraw - H ili, 1 974 ) , pp. 93 , 1 04 - 5 . The Kli uchevsky q uotat ion a p pears on p. 1 04 . 2 6 See Fl o ri nsky , RlI.lsia,
I,
p p . 330-3, 426- 7, for an accou n t of Pe ter's relations with
Alexis and for a sta te ment on the succession . The regulation of 1 7 1 6 is quoted on p. 426. 2 7 See Szamuel y , R lI.ls ia n Traditioll, p. 1 1 7 .
NO TES TO PAGES 508- 5 1 4 2 8 A d isc ussion of these l i m i t i n g conditions o f e m a n c i pation and o f the origin o f the
1 762 edict is contained i n Pa u l D u kes, Cathe" ine the G re at and the Russian Nobility ( Londo n : Camb r i d ge U n iversity Press, 1 96 7 ) , pp. 38-46. T h e q u otat ion from the edict a p pe ars
p.
4 3 . See also M a rc Rae ff, " T h e Domestic Po licies o f Pe ter
III
on
a n d h i s Overthro w , "
A merican Historical Review, v o l . 7 5 ( j u n e 1970), p p . 1 29 1 -4 , w h ich mentions
t he fou n d i n g as d irectly related t o the gov e rn me n t's need for q u al i fied ad m i nistrators and o ffice r s . T h e i n te rpretation o f the 1 762 edict as a result of a concerted a ristocratic d r i ve for freedo m from their ser v i ce o bl i g a t i o n m a k e s too m uch o f aristocratic d i sc o n t en ts w h ile e m p h a s i s o n t he ts a rist go v e r n m e n t s m a n powe r needs is probably too ra t io n a l i st ic The two statements on t h i s problem in Richard Pi pe s Russia u nder the Old R egime ( N ew Yo r k : Scribner's, 1 974) , p p . 1 30-8 a n d 2 4 9 ff a re ra t h e r contrad ict o r y o f m i l i t a r y acade m ies a n d of t h e u n i v e r si ty o f M o sc o w
,
'
.
,
.
.
29The first fi g u re is a n est i m a te by K li uc he v s k y cited in J e ro m e B l u m , Lord (l nd Peasa nt in R ussia ( New Y o r k : Athene u m , 1 96 4 ) , p. 349. The seco n d fi g u re is an es t i m a te by A r cadius Kahan cited in Raef!", Imperial Russia, p. I 03 n . Part of the increase indica ted by t hese fi g u res was due to te rritorial acq u i siti o n s d u ring the e i g hte e n t h century, but part o f it was d ue also to the favoritism practiced by Catherine and her s uccessors . See Giter mann, Geschichte R usslands,
I I , pp.
4 6 1 -2 , 4 83 . T he Russi an aristocracy com prised abo u t
1 . 5 pe rcent o f t h e population i n con trast to t he Ja panese aristocracy with 6 or 7 pe rcent o f t he population. See Cy ril B lack et al. , The Modernization ojJapan and R ussia ( New Yor k : Free Press, 1 97 5 ) , p. 7 8 . 3 " For t h e preceding data
I
a m in debted t o A rcadius Kahan , "The Costs of ' Weste r n
i z a t i o n ' i n Russia , " Slavic Review, v o l . 25 ( M a rch 1 966), p p . 40-66. 3 1 See S. Frederick Starr, Decentralization and SelF Government in Russia, 1830-1870 ( P ri nceton : Princeto n U n iversity Press, 1 97 2 ) , 32 See G.
T.
pp.
8-9.
Robinson , Rural Russia under the Old Regime ( Berkeley and Los Angeles :
Un iversity of Cal i fornia Press, 1 967),
p.
63. The fi gures fo r 1 83 5 , cited by Robin so n , d i ffer
substantially from the figure s q uoted in M i l i ukov e t
aI.,
eds., History
oj
Russia,
l l , pp.
250- 1 , b u t it see ms clear that in the 1 7305 t he state and the i m perial famil y had possessed a much s m aIler proportion of lands and peo ple . See History,
II,
pp. 50- I . A t that time,
a p proxi mately one -third o f the peasants lived o n la nds belon gi n g to the state, w h i le two t h irds were private l y ow ned . 33See Marc Raeff, ed . , Catherine the Great ( Ne w York : H ill a n d Wang, 1 97 2 ) , pp. 2 1 -63 , for accounts o f Cathe rine's i n teIlecmal develo pment and o f her frie n d l y but de tached relations with Diderot. With regard to Russian affairs, she concluded that Diderot did not k now what he was talking abo u t . 34The statement is q uoted from A. Kizevet ter's account i n M i l i ukov et a I . , History oj
Russia,
I I , p.
1 1 6. See also pp. 1 1 6- 1 9 for the foIlowing discussio n .
35The Prussian fi g u re is for o fficials in central a n d provincial administratio n , b u t that hardly d i m i nishes the contrast. See Robert E . Jones, "Catherine II and the Provincial Re form of 1 7 75," Canadian Slavic Studies, vol. 4 ( 1 970), p p, 502 -3 , 5 1 I . 3" For t he pe riod between 1 782 and 1 800, there was I student for every 1 , 5 73 perso n s . See Paul M i l i ukov, "Educatio nal Refo rms," i n Rae ff, ed. , Catherine the Great, pp. 1 09- 1 0 and pass i m . See also Patrick
L.
A l st o n , Education and the State in Tsarist Russia (Stanfo rd :
Sta n fo rd U niversity Press, 1 969), p p. 1 5 -20.
37Quoted in ibid. , p. 1 8 . 38Quoted in Yaney, Sy.stematization, p: 3 9 Se e
M a rc
1 44 .
Rae ff, "Staatsdie nst, Ausse n po l i t i k , I deologie n , "
Jahrbiicher fiir
die Ge.. -
v o l . 7 ( 1 959), pp. 1 5 7 - 7 2 for a typology of aristocratic attit u de s in re lation to their varyi n g frontie r ex pe rience. Cf. also th e su rvey of aristocratic opinions pre se nted to the le gi s la ti v e co m m ission o f 1 7 62 in D u k es , Catherine and the Russian Nobility, pp. 1 5 8-62, 1 7 9-80.
chichte Osteuropas,
<°It is noteworthy that Ca th e r in e rej ected e fforts by the Senate to li m i t her j urisdiction as early as 1 764, w he n her position was still q uite insecure. A Senate had been established i n 1 7 1 1 as a central govern ing body and su preme court o f appeal, but under Pe te r I's succe sso rs its governi n g function became secondary. See Giterman n , Geschichte R usslands, I I , pp. 1 98 , 202 ff. For a detailed study of autocratic rule in this pe ri od of aristocratic emanc i pation, see Robert E. J o n es , The Emancipation of the R uss ian Nobility, 1 762 -1785 ( P r i n ce ton : Princeton U n i ve rs it y Press, 1 97 3 ) . " See
K a ha n ,
"Costs of 'Western ization' in Russia,"
'2See Mili u kov
et
aI. , History of R ussia, I I ,
43 Fuller descriptions
of t hes e
measures
p . 46 .
pp. 1 72 -3 .
are
found
in
G i ter m a n n , Geschichte Russlands,
I I , pp. 3 1 2 ff.
"See Nicholas H a n s, History of Russian Educational Policy ( London : P. S. K i n g, 1 93 1 ) , p. 59. For details of o r ganiza t io n and the specific influence of Condorcet's ideas, see ibid . , chap. 2 .
I I,
de ta i ls of Alex a n excer pt o f a con temporary memoir by J . J. de San glen which recounts A lexander's pe rsonal reaction to what he took to be Speransky's e ffort to undermine autoc racy. See al s o the accou n t in H u gh S e ton - Wa t so n , The RUJ.
Gi te r m a n n , Geschicht.e Russlands,
pp. 296-3 1 1 , 3 1 9-30, fo r
ander' s and Sper ans k y 's careers. Gitermann re prints
(ibid . ,
pp. 498-500)
1 967), pp. 1 0 1 - 1 2 and passim.
· · For a contemporary, conservative re actio n to Alexander's educational reforms and the education act of 1 809, see Karamzi n's com ment cited i n te xt footnote a.
47See
A lsto n , Education and
the State,
p. 28.
4BA detailed d es cri ptio n of these pol i cie s and their abandon ment is fo und in Hans,
Russian Educational Policy, pp . 3 3-9 1 . 49The
last two q u o tation s
The Classroom and the Chancellory Press, 1 973), p. 1 3 . For the o the r state ments in the pre Education and the State, p p . 30-2. are taken from Allen S i nel,
(Cambridge : H a rvard U n ive rs i t y
ce din g paragrap h see SOFor deta i ls ,
Alston,
see H a n s , R ussian Educational Policy, pp. 67 ff. ,
and
A ls to n , Education a n d
t he State, pp. 32-4. 5 1 These trends are inferred from t h e
tables a ppended to Hans, R ussian Educational and to William Johnson, Russia's Educational Heritage (Pittsburgh : Car negie Press, 1 950), pp. 2 70- 1 , 290.
Policy, pp. 2 3 4-42 ,
NO TES TO PA GES 5 2 2 - 5 2 8
660
"Q u o t ed from S h e v y rev, " I storiya I m pe ra l o rs k o go Mo s k o vs ko go U n i versiteta" i n l" ic h o las R i a sa n o\'s k y , Nich olas l a ll d Ojfi£'ial Natio na lit), i ll
R ussia, 1 825 - 1 855 ( Be rke l e y an d
Los An ge les : U n ive rs i t y of Ca l i fo rn i a I) ress, 1 96 7 ), p p . 2 1 3 - 1 4 . " The se l i g u res a re taken fwm W i l li a m L. B lac kwe ll,
The Beg i n llings (!f R lm ilm 1 11 -
d'lstrializa t io l l , 1 800 - 1 860 ( P r i ncet o n : Pri nceton L' n i \ 'e rs i t ) ' Press, 1 96 8 ) , p p . 4 2 7 ff. See
also M . E. Fa l k u s , The Illdustria li'.alio ll of R ussia , 1 700 - / 9 1 4 ( Lo n don : � I a c m i l l a n , 1 9 7 2 ) . ' H See S i ne l , Classroo m , pp. 1 -3 . " Russia's u n fa vora b l e h e r it a ge i s a n al y ze d b y G u e n t her Sto k l , "Gab e s i m �foskauer S t a a t ' S t a n de ' ? "
Jahrbiicher ji"ir die
Gfschich/e ()stellmpas,
\ 0 1. 2 ( 1 963) , p p . 32 1 - 4 2 . S t o k l
show s t h a t d e m a n d s by " e s tat e s " lin reco g n i t ion of t h e i r r i g h t s by t h e t s a r occ u r red o n l y
i n t h e ex ce p t io na l c i l'c u m stances o f 1 6 1 0- 1 6 1 3 , w h e n d is s i d e nt notables n e go t i a t ed w i t h
t h e Po lish k i n g re g a r d i n g t he e lec t i o n o f C wwn P r i nce Wladyslaw to th e M uscovite t hwlle.
" " Max W e be r , E" ",wm), and Soc iet), ( tl'. a n d e d . by G u e n t h e r Rot h a n d C la u s Wittic h ;
� e w Yo r k : B edm i n ste r Press, 1 96 8 ) , I I I , p . 9 9 3 , M y ital i cs .
5 7 I n the c r i t ic a l period from 1 897 to 1 9 1 7 , the a ppointment of twelve m i n i s,te rs o f
ed ucation i ndicates a n e s pec i al l y ra p id t u rnover i n t h at se n s it i v e field. See E ri k Am bu rge l ',
Geschichte der Behordenorganisation RusslalllLI l'on Peter dem Grossen bis 1917 ( l.e ide n : E. J . B I'ill, 1 966) , pp . 1 36 - 7 , 1 9 1 -2 , 2 6 6 , 1 7 1 , 2 9 8 , 208, 1 30. · ·See Y a n e y , Systematization , pp. 1 5 0- 1 . A s u m m a ry of v a ry i n g conditions is contained i n T e rence E m mons, The
Russian
La11ded Gellt'] and t lte Peasa nt Emancipation of 1861 ( N e w
Y o r k : C a m bridge U ni ve rs ity Press, 1 968), pp. 2 1 - 6. For more deta i l s , see M ichael Con li no,
Doma;'les e t seigneun
e ll
RlI.lsie
l't'/'S
l a jill
dll
X VIlIe siecie ( Pa r is : I n stitut
de l' V n ive rsite de Pa ris, 1 96 3 ) , pp. 1 94-20 1 , a n d passi m .
E tudes
S la v e s
·'The prece d i n g d isc ussion of the obs tac le s s t a n d i n g in the way of agric ultural reform is bas e d on Y a ne y ,
SY.ltematization, p p . 1 5 1 -6 8 , and Starr , DecenlraliUltion, p p . 3 - 5 0 .
··See the study o f "Official N a t i o na l i ty " by N icholas Riasanovsky c i te d i n foot n ote 5 2 . A pparently s e rfdom w a s com pa t ible wi t h t h e gro wt h o f agric u lt u ra l o u t pu t , th ou g h prob
a b l y not o f prod uctivit y . See A lexander Gerschen kron , " Agraria n Policies and I nd ust ria l ization ," in
H.
J. H abba k u k an d
M.
Post a n , eds . , The Cambridge Economic History of Europe
( Lo n d on : Cam brid ge U n i ve rsity Press , 1 965), V I , part 2, pp. 706-7 . · ' The q uot a t i o n in t h e tex t and the content of t h i s para gra ph are derived from A l f red Riebe r , ed . , "The Po l iti c s of A ut oc r a c y , " slm'es ( Pa ris : Mouton, 1 966), •2
Q uoted
XII,
Etudes slI r {,h islo ire, l'economie et La sociologie des pays
p p. 26, 2 8, and passim .
i n Emmons, Landed Gentry and Peasant Emancipation, p. 5 1 . Refo r m from
above as an alternative to re vol u ti o n from below h ad been t h e s lo ga n of the Prussian
reform m i n i ster von H a rde n berg i n h is Ri ga M e morial of 1 80 7 . See Cha pte r 1 1 , p.
4 1 4 . S pe ra n s k }" s e fforts at re form under A le x a n d e r I pa ral leled those of von H a rden
be rg, which had been a d i rect res po n se to Prussi a's defeat at Jena ( 1 806) at t he ha n d s o f N a po l eo n . T h e s tat e me n t o f 1 856 by A lexandel' I I wa s a s i m i lar res po nse t o another d e fea t. ·:'Quoted in Rie be r , " Poli t ics of A u tocracy," p. 39. The tsar' s e x pe ctatio n of aristoc ratic coo pe ratio n in th e emanc i pation p roj ec t
was
not as u n re a l i s ti c as it see m s , s i nc e many h i gh
NOTES TO PA GES 5 2 8 - 5 4 1 acquired only a few serfs or none . On the other hand aristocrats with ma ny serfs we re li ke l y to be u ncoo pe rative or openly antagoni st i c : The difficulty was that the success of em ancipation at the local level often de pe n ded on t he we a l thy landowners. For a pre li m i nary re p ort on c urrent studies of t his problem, see Walte r P i n t ner, "The Russian H igher Ci v il Service on t he Eve of t he ' G reat Reforms,' '' Joumal of Social HistolY (spring 1 9 7 5 ) , pp. 55-68. aristocratic officials had i n he rited or we a l t h y
·· See E m mo ns , Landed Gentry and Peasant Emancipatio n ,
pp. 5 1 -2 .
65 Correspo n d i n g proportions
for modern developing cou n tries a re o ft e n co nsid e r ably pp. 1 3- 1 4 , 4 7 - 9 , and H a n s -Joa c h i m Torke, "Das Rus s isc h e Beamtentum in der ersten H alfte de s 1 9. J a hrhunderts," FOTSchungm zur osteu ropiiischen Gesehichte, vol. 1 3 ( 1 96 7 ) , pp. 1 3 3 - 7 . h i g h e r . See Starr, Decentralization,
·"For details o n Russia's military fo rce s u n d e r N icholas 1 a n d for its budge t a r y prob lems, see John Shelton C u rt i ss , The R uss ia n A rm,V under Nicholal I, / 825 - / 85 5 (Durh am : Duke U ni vers it y Press, 1 965), c h a p . 5 , and StalT, Decentralization, pp. 1 4 - 1 7 . 67See i bi d . , pp. 5 6-8, 59, 1 87 -9 1 .
p.
RHSeto n-Watson, RltSsian Empire,
3 3 7 . See
also Ri eber, " Po litics of Autocracy," p. 42.
691 h is summary i s t oo succinct to give a proper i m p ression o f the co m plexity o f the th e inten sity of t he debate. For detai ls , see t he two studies by St ar r and Em mons,
issues or
cited
p reviousl y .
7°My accoun t of the
process
leading to the e m a nc i pat ion
declaration is
based on S ta r r,
Deemtmlimtion, pp. 20 1 - 19, and Seton-Wa tso n , Russian Empire, p p . 34 1 -48.
71 Starr, Decentralization, pp.
327-8.
72See E mmo n s, Landed Gentry and Peasant figures. 73 Paraphrased from HSee
a
Florins ky , Russia,
q uotation
I I , pp.
pp . 332-3 and
in Start', Decentralization, pp.
th e sou rce
of
t h ese
1 1 7 - 1 8.
898-9.
75See Starr, Decentralization, pp. 78See ibid. ,
Emancipation, p . 26, for
293
ff.
passim, and George Fi sc her , Russian Liberalism (Cambrid ge: p p. 1 2 - 1 3 and pa s si m .
Harvard U n iversity Press, 1 95 8 ) , 7 7 For a s ym pat he ti c
apprais al
of the zemstvo movem e n t , see
Vi c tor Leontovitsch, Gt
.Ichichte des Liberalismus in Russla nd (l"rankfurt: V ittorio Klost e rm an n , 1 974), part 3. 7 HSee Flo ri nsk y , Rusl"ia, 1 1 ,
pp. 902-6, for
a
brie f account of
t his
deve lopment.
79This brie f s u mmary i s based on Ray m o nd W. Gol d sm i t h , " The Economic Gro w t h of Tsarist Russia, 1 860- 1 9 1 3 , " EcollOmie Development and Cultural Cha nge, vo l 9 ( April 1 96 1 ) , pp. 44 1 - 75 . See also Flo r i n s k y , Russia, I I , p. 939, fo r figures on Russia's grain e x po rts. FOI' circumstantial acco u n ts of a g r ic u l t ura l and industrial de\' e lo p me n t s , see Seto n - W a t so n, R ussia" Empire, pp. 506- 3 4 , and the two articles by Alexandel' Gerschen kron and Ro ger Portal in Cambridge Economic Hi.�to,y of Ellmpe, V I, pan 2, pp. 706-872. .
8°Flo r i n s k y , R ussia, I I ,
pp. 92 8-9.
M ' A rcad ius Kah a n , "Social S tructure, Pu blic Policy, an d t he Development of Education
a n d M a r y J e a n Bowma n , ( C h i c a go : A l d i n e , 1 965), p. 3 7 2 .
and the Econom y i n Csarist R ussia," in C. Arnold A n de r son eds . ,
Education
a n d Economic
Develupment
·' See H an s , R ussian Eduwtional Policy, p p . 2 3 8-4 0 . 8'See S e to n - Wa t s o n , R ussian Empirl', p. 5 3 6 , and K a h a n , "Soc i a l S truct ure, P ublic Po l
icy , " p. 3 74 ,
for the sou rce of t h e s e two ligures .
··Quoted from
p . 90 .
Vestnik Evropy ( Oc t obe r
1 89 5 ) , i n George Fisc h e r , Russ ia n
Liberalism,
·· Quo ted in ibid . , pp. 1 04 - 5 . From this Struve and ot hers i n fe r red the " g re ater c ul t ural a n d po li ti c a l tas ks of t h e
proletariat , "
but 1 am c o nce rn ed here with the first part of
S t r uve's observat ion . 8 6 M y descr i p t io n i s based on i b i d . , 87J ac o b Walk i n , The Rise
p p . 5 7 -60.
of Democracy in Pre-Revolutionary R1L�sia (New Yor k : Prae ge r ,
1 962), p p. 1 27-8. 8"See A l a i n
Besan<;on , Education et soc iete e n Ru.uiL dans Ie secon d tiers du XIX' siecle ( Pa r i s :
Mou ton, 1 97 4 ) , p. 7 5 and p a ss i m .
M9See Kahan , "Social S t ruct u re, Public Polic y , " pp. 366-8, for the figures cited in the text.
9 °See H a n s , Russian Educational Policy, p. 236; Kahan, "Social Structure, Public Policy,"
p. 370; a n d Besan<;on, Education et societe, p . 4 5, for three sets o f more or les s d i ve r ge n t fi gu re s w h ich , ho we ve r , do not alter the overall d e v e lo p me n t as stated in the text. 9 ' See
P h i l i p Pom per, The
Russian Revolutionary Movement ( N ew York : Thomas Y .
Radical ideas were a ppa ren t l y wides pread i n seco nda r y schools two decades earlier. At t h e Tsar s k oe -Selo Lyceum , fou nded by Alexander I, loc a ted i n one of the im perial s ummer parks and reserved for you n g me n fro m p ro m inen t fa milies, "there was not a single forbidden book which might not conceivably ap pear w it h i n its wa lls in the possession of boys o f fo u rtee n or fifteen." Quoted from a report b y A. M . Unkovsky in Sidney Monas, The Third Section, Police and So ciety in Russia under Nicholas I (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1 960) , n ote , p . 249. C rowell, 1 970) , p. 1 1 4, a n d S i nel, Classroom, p. 2 5 4 , for the source of these fi g u re s .
9'Th i s so-called "cook's circu lar" is
Education and the State, p. 1 29 . in the student body is related t o the high proportion of Jews among urban residen ts. In a country that was st i l l 90 percent ru ra l, the Jewish m i nority was 90 percen t u rban . Under Alexander I I I ( 1 88 1 - 1 894 ) , one fou rth of the co u n tr y ' s urban res idents we re Jew is h . See ibid., p. 1 22 . quoted
in Alston,
T h e s pecial pro ble m o f Je w i s h "overre presentation"
9 'Ac cor d i n g
to
H a n s , Russian Educational Policy, p . 235, sixty gymnasia
for boys had
1 4 ,000 pu pils in 1 82 5 . By 1 900 some two h u n d red gy m n a si a had an e nrollment of 7 1 ,584. 94 Besan<;on, Ed uca ti on et societe, p. 2 1 .
NOTES TO PAGES 549-557 95Sinel, Classroom, p. 1 7 9. M y comments on Tolstoi's policies are based on t his study. 96See Willi a m L. M a thes , "The Ori gins o f Con frontation Politics i n R u ssi an U n i ve r sitie s : Student Activis m , I S5 5 - l S6 1 ," Canadian Slavic Studies, vol . 2 ( s pri n g 1 965) , pp. 2S-45. 9 7Quoted i n Re ginald E . Zel n i k , " T h e S u n d a y -School Movement i n R u s s i a , I S59I S62,'· Journal of Modern History, vol. 3 7 (june 1965 ) , p . 1 5 7 . 98See Cha pter 1 0, p . 3 7 2 . T h i s parallelis m be tween t he radical and the a u toc ratic o p position to civil soci e t y underscores t he q uasi-plebiscitarianism of a u tocratic rule , as sug gested on p. 5 2 4 . 9" See M o n a s , Third Section, pp . 2 0 3 - 4 , 2 0 S . ' OO lsaiah B erlin , "A Marvellous Decade ; Beli n s k y : Moralist and Prophet," Encounter, vol. 5 (December 1 955), p.
23.
My acco u n t is greatl y indebted to this essay and to E . Lam
pert, Studies in Rebellion (Londo n : Rou tledge and Kegan Pa ul, 1 95 7 ) , chap. 2. ' O ' Quoted from the report of Count Orlov to Nicholas
I
i n Monas, Third S ecti o n , p.
1 92 . All references to Belinski ' s relations with the police are based on pp. 1 8 7 -93 o f t his work. ' 2 0 Quoted in Lampert, Studies in Rebellion, p. 5 3 , where the author also gives a sam ple of the literary feuds in which esthetic c r itic i sm turned q u ite regu la rly
i n to
political
condemnation. ' 0 3The quotations in the last two paragraphs are taken from Richard Hare, Pioneers oj Russian Social Thought ( New York: Oxford U niversity Press, 1 95 1 ) , pp. 37-4S. ' O ' Ralph York :
E.
P.
E.
Matlaw, ed . , Belinsky, Chernyshevsky, and Dobrolyubov, Selected Criticism ( New
Dutton,
1 962), p p . 3 - 9 .
' 05 Ibid., p. 89. I 08See the eloquent statement
of this position in
Martin Malia, " Mandelstam's Power,"
New York Review of Books, January 2 7 , 1 972, which reviews Mme. Mande lstam's memoir Hope against Hope and in the process com pares the past with the present situation of Rus sian literature . ' 0 7 For an attempt to put the change from the I S40s to the I S60s in general terms, see Vladimir Nahirny, "The Russian I n telligentsia : From Men of Ideas to Men of Con viction," Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 4 ( 1 962), pp. 403-3 5 . A lth o ugh the
author refers to m uch
the same contrast as
I
do in the text, he does not dearly d isting u ish
men of ideas like Belinski from men of co nviction (like Chernyshevski). C i rcumstances had chan ged, and the two gro u p s conseq uently thou ght of
their
socia l responsibility in
different terms. ' 0 8 M y accou n t is based
on E. Lampert, Sons against Fathers ( Londo n : Oxford
University
Press, 1 965), cha p. 3, and Franco Venturi, Roots oj Revolution (New Yor k : Grosset and
D un la p ,
1 966), pp. 1 29-S6.
' 09 Isaiah Berlin ,
" Introduction,"
to Venturi, Roots, p . xxiii.
I I ° Quoted in V e n t u r i , Roots, p. 150. 1 1 1 Berlin, " I n t ro d u c t i on , " t o V en t u ri , Ro o ts, pp. xxiii-xxiv . 1 1 2See Lam p e r t , Sons agairlJt Fathers, p. 2 2 3 .
1 1 3 Q uOled
by Berli n , " I n trod uction," to V e n t u r i , Roots, p.
xx .
I I · Quoted i n Phili p Po m pe r , Peter Lavrov a n d the R ussian Revolutionary Movement ( C h i ca go : U n iversity o f Chicago Press, 1 9 7 2 ) , p p . 1 02 - 3 . 1 1 5 Quoted
i n A v ra h m Yarmo l i n sk y ,
Road to Revolutio n
( Ne w Y o r k : Macmi lla n , Co llie r
Books, 1 962) , p. 7 3 .
" " Berli n ,
" I n trod uctio n , " to
Venturi, Roots, p p . ix -x .
1 1 7 Quoted in Venturi, Roots, pp. 7 1 7, 7 1 9. My italics.
1 1 8Merle Fainsod, HoUl R ussia 1.1 Ruled ( Ca m br idg e: Harvard University Press, 1 963), p. 3 .
1 1 9 Alec Nove, An Economic History of the USSR ( Baltimore : Penguin, 1 969), p. 68. 1 2 0 Alexander Baykov, The Development of the Soviet Eco no mic System (Na ti on al Institute of Economic and Social Research ; London : Ca mbridge University Press, 1947), p. 23. I 2 I See Bo ris Meissner, " Der soziale St r u k t u rwan de l im bolschewistischen Ru s s la n d , " in Boris Meissner, ed. , Sowjetgesellschaft im Wandel (St ut t ga rt : W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1 966), pp. 28-30. Fo r the estimate o f po pulation los ses du ri n g this period, see Frank Lorime r, The Population of the SOl'iet Union (Geneva : League of Nations, 1946), p. 4 1 and passim. 1 22 Nove, Eco nomic History, p. 74. 1 23The q uoted st a te me n t is from E. H . Ca r r, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917 -1923 ( H armondswort h : Penguin , 1 966), I I , p . 1 50 . FOI' t he estimates of concealment, see Maur ice Dobb, Soviet Economic Developme71t since 1 9 1 7 (6th ed. ; London : Routledge and Kegan Paul , 1 966), p. 1 17. I 2 4 Moshe Lewin , Political UnderClllTe7lts in Soviet Economic Debates ( P rin c eto n : Princeton C ni\'ersity P re ss , 1 974), pp. 80- 1 .
1 2 5 I bid. , p. 82 . 1 2 8 N o ve, Economic History, pp. 1 04, 1 06. I i 'See V. 1. Le nin , Selected Work.1 ( Moscow: Fo reig n Languages Pu blis hi n g House, 1 952), \"0 1 . 1 1 , part 2 , pp. 6 3 5 - 7 , 736. Le n i n ' s critical comment on haste ( p. 736) a p pe ars in his 1 92 3 a rticle "Better Fewer, but Better" to which I refer further on . Lenin empha si zed t he long-Ie/'m chan ge which could be ex pected from a smal l- pe asant economy, as q uo t ed in Alexander E rl ich , The Soviel Indwlrioliullion Debate, 1924-1928 (Cambridge: Han'ard U n iv e rsity Press, 1 960) , p . 8.
NOTES TO PAGES 5 7 1 -5 79 and
12 8See Lewi n , Political Undercurrents, pp. 85 - 9 ,
665
Nove , Economic History, pp. 1 1 9-
21. ' 2 9The books by Erlich a n d Lew i n prese nt the detai ls
that are om itted h ere . Fo r an leadi n g to t he re volution by forcible col lectivi zati on, see Moshe Le w i n , Russian Peasants and Soviet Power ( E van s t on : Northwestern Un iversity
analysis of the st ru ggles a n d
d ec i s i on s
Press, 1 96 8 ) . ' 3 0 Nove, Economic History, p. 1 26. I n t he mai n ,
I
h a v e followed N o ve' s accou n t o f t h e
great debate and especially of E. A. Preobrazhensky's statement of the rad ical pos itio n ,
w h ich date s from h is lectures o f 1 92 4 before t h e Communist Acad e m y - fo u r t o fi v e y ears be fore the po l ic y of fo rced collectivization was i n i tiated .
1 3 1 Lewin, Political Undercurrents, pp. 1 02 - 4 . The q uotation from S t al i n 's letter to Le n i n 10
1 92 1 a p pears on p. 1 0 1 . 1 32See Lewi n , R ussian Peasants and Soviet Power, pp. 8 1 - 9 3 . See c h a pters 3-6 fo r much
i ll um i na tin g
detail on the po s it io n of
' 3 3Nove,
the pa rty
in
the cou nt r y s i d e .
Ec on o mic History, p p . 1 67, 1 74.
I 3 4See Robert
C onq ue st ,
The Great
Terror
(New Y o r k :
Macmillan, 1 97 3 ) ,
' " ' For the distinction between wor ke.rs and com munists, see Karl
Marx
pp. 699-7 1 3 . and Friedrick
Enge ls, Man ifesto of the Communist Party ( New Yor k : International Pu b lis he rs , 1 93 2 ) , p. 2 2 .
1 have s i m pli fied
Marx's inferences based on t h i s distinction. A more co m p lete statement
is con tai n ed in Re i n ha rd Bendix, Embattled Reason ( New York: O x ford University Press ,
1 970) , pp. 35-40. 1 3"See Karl
p. 1 3 8.
My
M a rx and Fried rich Engels, Die Heilige Familie
( Be rl i n : Dietz VeFlag, 1 953) ,
tra n sl a t ion an d i ta l i cs .
I 3 7V. I. Lenin, What Is To Be D one ? ( New York : International Publi s h e rs , 1 929), pp. 4 1 , 76-8. An an al y s is of t hi s work in the context of Russi an ex i le po l i t i cs and its relations with European labor movements is co nt ai n ed in Dietrich Geyer, Lenin in der russischen Sozialdemokratie (Cologne : Bohlau Verlag, 1 962), pp. 2 37-46 and p ass i m . 1 3 8 See Oskar An we i le r , Die Riitebewegung in Russland, / 905-1921 ( Leide n : E. . J
Brill,
1 958), p. 1 88. See ch a pte r 4 of Anweiler's study for a detailed analysis of Le nin's and t he
Bolsheviks' attitude toward
t he soviets d u r i n g 1 9 1 7.
' 39 Q u o ted p hras es and page references are from Le n i n , " B e t ter Fewer, but Better," in Selected Works, II, part 2, p p. 7 35-52. The q uotations ital ics .
This
a p pe
ar
on pp. 748 and 750. My
article is co n ven ie n t l y re pri nted in Ro ber t C. Tucker, ed . ,
The Lenin A nthology
( New York : Norton, 1 975), pp. 7 34-46.
I 4 ° For a more de tai led expos i t i o n of Soviet Marxism's "basic self- i n ter pretatio n , " see
Herbert M a rc use , Soviet Marxism ( New York : Random House, Vi n tage
Books, 1 96 1 ), chap.
2 and pass i m . 1 4 1J . Stalin, Problems of Leninism ( Moscow: Fore i gn
1 940) , p. 73.
La n guages
Publi s h in g House,
NOTES TO PAGES 5 79 - 5 8 5
666
' ''The preced i n g parag raph restates m y ge n erali ze d co n c l u sions
from
a n e a rl i er
s t u d y of industrial re lations i n East Ge r m a n y . See R e inha r d
Citiunship
( Berkeley and Los A n ge l e s : U n iversity
. . 3 See the elaboration of this a pp roach to
Bendix, Nation-Building and of C a l i fo r n i a Press, 1977), pp. 17 5-2 1 1 .
" ra t
i o n a li t y "
in M a rc u s e ,
Soviet Marxism,
pp.
70-6.
Amos J . Pe a s le e , ed., Constitutions of N ij h o ff , 1 968), I l l , p . 1005 . M y italics. The re fe rence to vot i n g as a c i t i z en ' s d u t y occ u rs i n V a lery Chal i d ze , To Defend These Rights ( N e w Y o r k : Random H ou se , 1974), n ot e , p. 22. The uto p i a n v ision of the pa rty in re l a t i on to the p eo p le i n a publication by D. 1 . Ch e s n o k o v ( 1960) is quoted i n J e ro m e M. G i l i so n , The Soviet Image of Utopia ( Balti more : J o h n s H o pk i n s U n iversity Pre ss , 1 9 75), p. 123 and ' H Fo r a rticle 1 2 6 o f t he Soviet constit u tion , see
Nations
(T he H ague : M a r t i n u s
passi m .
C H A PT E R X I V . FROM ROY A L AUTHORITY TO POPU LAR M A N DATE : TWENTIETH-CENTU RY PERSPECT I V E S ' The responses o f C hi ne se scholars t o the
W e st er n
im pact have been a nalyze d w i t h
gre at su bt le ty b y J ose ph Levenson, Confucian China and Its M o dern Fate ( Be r ke le y a n d Lo s A n ge les : U n i versity o f California Press, 1 968), a n d t h e " May 4th" movement of 19 1 7 192 1 is c hron icled i n Chow Tse-t ung, The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China (Ca m b r i d ge : Harvard U niversity Press, 1 960). 2See D. J . Male , R ussian
Peasant Organization befoTe Collectivization ( Lo n do n : Cam bridge 197 1), pass i m , and Teodor Shanin, The Awkward Class, Political Sociology of Peasantry in a Developing S ociety : Russia 1 9/0-1 925 ( Lon d on : Ox for d U n i versity Press, 1972), part I and pa ssim . U n iversity Press,
3 See Karl-Eugen
Wadeki n , The Private Sector in Soviet Agriculture ( Be r keley Press, 1 973).
A nge les : U n iversity of Ca li fo r n i a
'See the detailed stud y by T'un g-Tsu Ch ' u , (Stan ford : Stanford University Press,
1969),
and Los
Local Government in China under the Ch'ing 1 0. Other aspects of the link
es pec ia l l y chap.
ages between vi I l age and region are analyzed in Fei Hsiao-tun g, "Peasantry and Gentry ," A merican Journal of Sociology, vol. 52 ( j u ly 1 946), p p. 1- 17, and W. G. Skinner, "Chinese Peasants and the Closed Co m m u n i ty , " Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 1 3 ( j u l y 197 1 ), pp. 270-8 1. 5Thed a Skocpol, "Old Regime Legacies a n d Com m u n ist Revolu tions in
China," Social Forces,
vol. 55 (Decembe r
1976),
p.
303.
Ru s s i a and
My discussion is indebted t o this
essay. sQuoted
Schram , ed . ,
172 .
from Mao Tse -tung's October 1938 report to the Sixth Plenum in Stuart The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung ( H arm o n dswo n h : Pen g u i n , 1 969),
R. p.
7Quoted from Mao Tse -tun g's s peech of J a nuary 1962 in Stuart R. Schram, e d . , A u thority, Participation and Cultural Change i n China (London : Ca m brid ge U n iversity Press, 1973), p. 8. I have replaced M ao's own da te of 1958 with 1 955, the beginning of t he C h i nese collectivization of agric ult ure .
" S koc pol , "Old Re g i m e Le gac i es ," pp. 303-4 . · O n e y ea r a l t e r Ch ine s e c o l l ec t i v i z a t i o n began , 90 pe rcent of C hi na' s 2 1 0,000 gov e r n m e n t districts had o rg a ni ze d party branches, w h e re as i n Russia a fte r th.'e e ye a rs o f col lect i v i zation mo re than hal f the co u n t r y 's r u ral a d m i n i s tr a t i v e u n its were wi t h o u t o r ganized part y mem bers. See T h o m a s P . B e rn stei n , " Lea de rs h i p and M a s s M obi l i zat i o n i n the Soviet and C h i n e se Colle c t i v i za t i o n C a m p a i g ns of 1 92 9 - 3 0 a n d 1 95 5 - 5 6 , " The Ch ina Quarte rly, no. 3 1 U u l y-Septe m be r 1 96 7 ) , p. 1 1 a n d pass i m . Re lated co mpa risons a re fo und in A le x a n de r Eck s te i n, Ch ina 's Economic Development ( A n n Arbo r: Uni versity of M i c h i gan Press, 1 97 5 ) , pp. 25 1 -4 , and S k oc po l , "Old Re gi m e Lega ci e s ," pp. 3 0 5 - 9 . I OSee Fred e r i c k W a ke m a n , History and Will ( Be r keley Califo rn i a Press, 1 9 7 3 ) ,
pp. 8 - 1 3 a n d
and
Los A n ge le s : U n ivers i t y of
passi m .
· ' Q uoted i n Sc h r a m , A uthority, Participation and C ultu ral Cha nge,
n i fica n c e o f t h i s s tate ment is attested by t he fac t in the new party constitution of A p ri l 1 9 6 9 ,
p p . 50- \ . The
sig
that its fi rs t l i n e s h a ve been incorporated
te l l i n g de sc ri p t ion of such c on t rol measu res co mbined with an i d e o lo gy of vo l c o n tai ned in Ezra Vogel, "Volun tarism and Soci a l Contro l , " in Donald W. T r e ad go l d, ed . , Soviet and Ch inese Communism (S e a t tle : U n iv er s it y of W as h i n gt o n Press, 1 967). pp. 1 68-84. 12A
untarism is
1 3Schram,
ed " Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung,
pp. 3 1 6- 1 7 . See
the ful l d isc ussion
o f C h ine se Commun ist i deolo gy in Fran z Sch u rmann, Ideology and Organization in Com
munist China (2nd ed. ; B e rk e l e y and Los A n ge l e s : U n iv ers it y of C a l i fo r n i a Pre ss, 1 96 8 ) ,
I 4 Bernard Lewis, The Arabs in History (New York : Harper & Row , pp. 1 72-3.
H arpe r Torchbooks,
1 967),
1 5 A use fu l su rvey of the emergence o f A rab nationalism is con t ai n e d in S y lv i a Haim's introduction to her ant h ol ogy . Arab Nationalism ( Be rkeley and Los A n geles : U n i versity of California P re s s , 1 962). For a s y n t he t i c view wit h e m p h a sis on the turn to Ge r man y as a model un d e r the i n te l lec tu al l e a d ers h i p of S a t i ' Husri ( 1 882- 1 968), see Bassam Tibi , Na tiona lismus in der dritten Welt am arabischen Beispiel ( Fra n k fu r t : E u ro p a i sc h e Ver l a gs a n s ta l t , 1 97 1 ) . The volume contains a co m p re h e ns i ve b iblio g r a p hy .
1 6Where the co n te x t suggests that I am paraphrasing the text of v ario u s constitutions and w here phra s e s are put in q uotation ma rks, I am refe rri n g to the appro pria te section of A. P. B la u s te in and G. H. Flimz, eds., Constitutions of the Countries of the World ( Do bbs Ferry : Oceana P ub l icatio ns, 1 97 1 ), 1 2 vo ls . Detailed citations appear su pe r fl uous . I have a lso relied on t he Area Handbooks on Algeria, Egypt and Syria, published under t he a uspices of Foreign Area Studies, American University (Washington, D :C . : U.S. Govern ment Printing Office, 1 9 72, 1 969 , 1 9 7 1 ) .
l 1The references in this pa ra gra p h are to the co n st i tu t io n s of Egypt, Algeria, Syria, and Iraq . The quoted sentence suggesting some Ch i n ese in flue nce comes from the 1 95 1 Soc i a l is t Arab Ba'th party constitution quoted i n Haim, ed. , Arab Nationalism, p . 235. The Ba ' th party is d o min a nt in Syria and I raq. I "See Guenter Le w y , Religion and Revolution ( New Y or k : Oxford U n ivers ity P ress , pp. 443-6 1 , for an accou n t of t he re l i gi ous overtones of Arab na tio n ali s m in Egypt.
1 974),
NOTES TO PAGES 5 94-602
668 ' " Q uo t e d
i n Co l i n Le g u m , ed . ,
Aj."ica
Conte mpora ry Rec o rd, 1 974 -1 975
( New York :
A fri ca n a Pu bl i s h i ng , 1 97 5 ) , p . 84 .
· · For
ex plorations of t h i s q ue s t ion , see M a lco l m Kerr, "The Po l i t i c a l Ou dook in t h e
Loca l A re a , " i n Abra h a m
S.
Becker, B e n t H a n s e n , a n d M a lco l m K e r r , e d s . , The Economics
and Politics of the Middle Ea5t ( Lo n d o n : E l sevi e r , 1 9 7 5 ) , p p . 4 1 - 7 3 , a n d Elbaki H e r m assi,
" Po l i t ics a n d C u lt ure in t h e M id d l e East," in a fo rt h c o m i n g publication by the U n i v e rs i t y
of C a l i fo rn i a Press.
2' For the
m e a n i n g o f re vo l ut io n and t he sou rce o f Co n d o rc e t ' s state m e n t , see H a n n a h
On Revolution
the mo de r n " P rol e gom e n a to the Co m pa ra ti v e H i st o ry of Re volution i n Early Modern E u rope , " Comparative Studies of S ociety a n d History, vol. 1 8 ( A p ril 1 9 7 6 ) , p p . 1 5 1 - 7 4 , and J . H . E l lion, " Re v o l u t io n and Con t i n u i ty i n E ar l y Modern Arendt,
( New Yor k : V i k i n g Press, 1 96 5 ) , p. 2 1 . For critiq ues of
conce pt of revol u tio n , see Pe re z Zago r i n ,
E u ro p e , " Pa.Jt a nd Present, no. 4 2 ( February 1 969), pp. 3 5 - 5 5 . "The o fficial History of the Comm unist Party, w h ich h a s been i n c o r p o r a te d i n Sta l i n ' s
" t he d is t i nctive fea t u re o f th e Russian revolution is t h a t it was on the initiative of the s t a t e , and d i rec t ly s u p ported from below, b�· the mil l i o n s of peasants, who we re figh t i n g to th row off kulak bondage and to l i ve i n fre e d o m in the col lective farms . " See History of t he Communist Party of the Soviet Union Bolshevik ( Sh o rt Course) ( Mosco w : Fo rei g n La ng ua ge s Pu b l i s hi n g House, 1 945) , p. 305. Pro fessor Robe rt Tucker of Princeto n U n i ve rs i t y has i n formed me that althou gh wr i t te n by a com m i ttee, the official h i s t o r y p ro b a b ly reflects Stali n's direct i n flu e nce on key formu lations such as t his one.
Collected
Work.5,
states
that
accom plis hed from a bo v e,
23See E l ba k i Hermassi, "Towards a Co m pa ra t i ve Study of Revolutions," Comparative Society and HistoTY, v o l . 1 8 ( Ap r i l 1 976), pp. 2 1 1 -3 5 , for a suggestive form ulation o f t h i s perspective.
Studies in
"See
the detailed study o f these d i visions w i t h i n the U n ited K i n gd om by M ichael Colonialism ( Be r ke ley a n d Los A n geles: Un i v e rs i ty of C a l i fo r n i a Press,
Hechter, I n tema l 1 975).
2 5 T h e con t ras t between c i v i l and co m m u nal t i e s i n t h e new s t a tes h a s be en ana ly ze d Edward Shils, " Political Development in t h e New States," C ompa ra t ive Studies in Society {w d History, vo l. 2 ( 1 960) , pp. 268- 8 7 , and in the essay on "The I n t eg rative Revolution : Primordial Sentiments and Civil Po li t i c s in the New States," in Clifford Geertz, The Inter p reta tion of Culture ( New Yor k : Basic Books, 1 97 3 ) , p p . 255-3 1 0. b)'
26 M ax Weber,
Economy Wi d S ociety (tr. and ed. by Guenther Rot h a n d Claus Wittich ; Bedm inster Press, 1 968), I I, p. 903. The d is t i nct i on between the political com m u n i ty or the state and pr i v a t e l y organized gro u ps diminishes the further back one goes in history. New York :
G lossary ( E n gla nd)
A dvowson
R i g h t to a p p o i n t to
A kzise
Sales t a x in seve n teent h -ce n t u ry Prussia
a
c h u rch be n e fice
( 1 794 )
A llgemeines Landrecht
Prussian Le ga l Code
A ngevin
Adjective referri n g to t h e Co u nt y o f A njou r u l ed b y t h e Plan tagenet fa m il y . Hence, t h e Pl a n t a g enet d y n a s t y is sometimes referred to a s t h e A n gevin ki n gs
Appmwge
La n d or other so u rce of reve n u e assigned fo r t h e maintenance of a me m ber of t h e rulin g fam ily
A rian is m
Doctrines of t h e G reek theologian A r i u s (280?-336 w ho taught that Jesus was not o f the same sub stance as God , but only the best o f c reated bei n gs
.
A.D.),
A rmigerous
A dject i ve re ferri n g origi n a l l y to the armor-beare r o f
k n ight ; used in E n glan d to re fe r t o a pe rs o n rank ing next to a k n i ght a n d e n titled to a coat of a r m s ( sq u i re) a
( La ti n)
A tlctorilas
M o ra l i n fl u enc e
Bakufu
He a dq u a rters of the Ja panese sh ogu n ( used sy non y mo u sly with shogu n a te)
Bak71han
J a panese te r m co n tra c t i n g bakufu ment and han
=
m i l itary go vern dai m yo fief o r do ma i n =
from
1 868 just
Baku1nSa/su
J a pa n e se Ilame for the pe ri o d prio r to the M e ij i Restoration
Bangaku
J a pa nese te rm for "barbarian le a r n i n g
Bcmilcizina
Labor obligation of peasants in tsarist R u ssia
Be
J a pa n e se workers, gro u ped by l oca l e o r occ u pation
Bm�Jice
A n ecclesiastical liv i n g ( E n gl a n d ) , such as
BeneJicium
O ffice or land or a n y sou rce of income gra n ted as right
Benefit
Right o f c h u rch aUlhorit ies to t r y , i n a n ecclesiastical c o u rt , any cle rgyman accu sed of a serio lls crime. J u d gm e n t s were ty pically len ient a n d the lega l fiction
of clerg')'
1 853
to
"
a
pasto rate a
o f be n e fi t o f cle rgy" was used i n E n gland to m i t i gate t he h a rsh ness of the c ri m i n a l l a w . "
B ildu lIg
Ger m a n i d e a l of c u l t i va t io n
669
pe r so n a l
grow t h
t h rough
sel f·
GLOSSARY Bolshevik
M aj o rit y w in g of t he Russian Social Democratic Labor party under Lenin's leadership, so designated at a party congress in 1903
Boyar
I n d epe n de nt ern Russia
Boyar duma
Council of landed n ota bl e s in medieval Russia
Bwgrave
Hereditary h e a d of a castle or many (literally: castle count)
Bllshi
MelTenaries in medieval J ap an
Calliers (also cahien dolermces)
d o cu ments in which the French estates
Literally
landowners of medieval and ea r ly mod
to w n
in medieval Ger
n otebooks. General term designating the
t h ei r gri e v a nces to
the
gove rnm e nt
submitted
Caliph
Successor to Muhammad, Muslim state
Ceorl
Head of rural household
Chan/ries
English endowments for the chanting of the masses, usually for the founder of the endowment
Chin
Grade in the Table of Ranks in tsarist Russia
Chollin
Japanese merchants and artisans
Clall
An early form of social group composed of several families claiming descent from a common ancestor, bearing the same family name, and following the same chieftain
Comi/a/lIS
Germanic
Commenda
A partnership contract developed in medieval Italy which facilitated the investment of savings in a com mercial enterprise and regulated the distribution of capital, risk, and protits among the partners
C01PS intermediaires
Montesquieu's general term for the parlements,towns, guilds, foundations and other "intermediate bodies" of the French ancien regime
Cuius )'egio, eius
He who controls the area controls the religion
war
title of
in
t h e head of the
early medieval Wessex
bands
religio Daimyo
Regional territorial governor of Japan before
Dei gmtia
By the Grace of God
Desiatina (pI. y)
Russian land measure
Dux (Latin)
Earl (medieval English title)
=
2.7
1868
acres
Dvoriane (Dvorianstvo)
Court servitor (court nobility) in tsarist Russia
Ealdorman (Old English)
Earl
(to) enfeoff
to invest a vassal with a fief,fee,or other possession
En/ail
The rule of descent settled for an estate
GLOSSARY
Escheat
Fe.udal rule according to which lands or various rights to the lord when there are no hei rs to inh erit the originaf grant revert
Estate
A political and social group as in the English division among the lords spiritu al the lords temporal, and the commons. English term for the German Stand ,
Etats-Generaux
French general assembly (Estates-General), a council l ast summoned by the king in 1614
Fe orm
Food rent levied to su pport the households of Anglo Saxon kings
Fideicommissum
German legal instrument for confining the inheri tance of a manorial estate to a single heir H o use d aimy o who was dependent on the Tokugawa
Fudai
sh og un
Cabelle
Origin ally a French s a le s tax on all commodities which was gr ad ually limited to a tax on salt
Gesith
Member of th e
Costi
Roster of
war-band of an A nglo-S ax on king
wholesale merchants in Russian medieval
towns Hakam
Arab tribal arbiter of
Han
Japan ese daimyo shogunate
Hundred
An administrative subdivisi on medieval England
Ikki
Defense leagues of Japanese peas ant s
Imam
"
dispu tes
dom ains
under the Tokugawa of a county (shire) in
M o h ammedan reli gious leader, officiating pr i est mosque
of
a
(to) impropriate
To place ecclesiastical property in the hands oflaymen
Incunabula
Books prin ted before
Intendants
F r e nc h p ro vi n ci al administrators under the ancien regime
Jihad
A Muslim h ol y war, campaign e n emi e s of Islam
Ji-samurai
Japanese yeomen peasa nt s
Jito
Land stewards under the Kamakura
Junkers
1500
agai nst unbelievers or
Aristocratic landowners in the
shogunate
Prussian territories
east of the Elbe Rive r Justiciars Kami
High ad ministrative and jud icial o ffi ci als under the
Norman and Pl ant agene t dynasties
General Japanese term for ancestral
o r d ivine
sp ir it
GLOSSARY
Japanese civil dictator. an office created in 880 which marks the ascendance of regents or governors over the emperor
Kampaku
Housemen of the Kamakura shogunate
Kenin Khan
(or
G,-eat Khan)
Supreme hereditary ruler of Mongol empire and of Tartar tribes
Khallate
Dominion of a khan
Koku
One koku eq u al s five American bushels of rice_ Jap anese measUl-e of land area needed to produce a
given quantity of rice Kokugahu
Japanese term for national learning
Kormlenie
Judicial and civil administrative post in tsarist Russia which rewarded officials out of the taxes they col lected for the government (also called tax farming)
Kreistag
County estate-assembly in Prussia
KUg)'o
High court nobles in imperial Japan
Klliak
Pejorative Soviet term for better-of f or wealthy peasants
KllIfunten
Electors of the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire of t he German Nation
Lmldmt
Prussian county official. elected by the county estate assembly fro m among the local aristocracy. but de pendent on instructions of the Prussian government
Lalldlag
Provincial estate-assembly in Prussia
Lateral sllccession
Rule of inheritance b y which the property passes from an owner to his oldest brother. then the second oldest brother. and so on
Lellers palent
A government document issued to a person. author izing him to perform some act or to enjoy some priv ilege. so called because the document is not sealed but open
Lellre de cachet
A letter under seal of the French king. usually one ordering imprisonment without trial
Lex lalioni,l
Blood revenge; Latin term for a practice widespread among Germanic. Arabic. and other tribes
Li
Religious ritual; Confucian metaphor for propriety. the right spirit. the "golden mean"
Lilleage
Direct descent fro m an ancestor. hence ancestry. family
Lil de jll.l/ice
Special session of a French parlement. called by the king for the purpose of personally ordering the reg istration of a decree the parlement had refused to registe r
GLOSSARY Liudi
Merchants and ar t isa ns
Living
An ec cles i ast i c a l office like a parsonage or rectory with revenues attached for the m ain ten ance of the minister and his household (England)
Mana
God-descended power; old Ger m an ic be lie f
Mandokoro
Office during the Kamakura shogunate, business for the Minamoto cIan
Menshevik
Minority wing of the Russian Social Democratic La bor part y under the leadership of Martov, Axelrod, and others; s o de s i gn a ted at a meeting in 1903
Mestnichestvo
Order of the Russian ar istoc racy which correlated serv ice rank with ge n e a l o gic al rank of the family
Ministeriales
Medieval adm inistrators and kni gh ts ranking below the highes t level of the German aris to cra cy
Ministe rium
Latin term
Mi r
Russian peasant com mun i ty in wh ich the l an d is pe r iod i c al ly redist rib uted among the members of that com m un i ty
Monchujo
Office of the Kamakura s h o gunate among vassals
Nestorianism
Doctrines of the Sy rian prelate Nestor ius (?451 A.D.), who taught that divinity and humanity existed as two d ist inct natures in Jesus and were not unified into a single per so n a l it y
for
of Kievan
Russi a
h a nd l in g
o ffice and duty
handling d i sp ut es
.
No drama
A highly s ty l i zed type of Japanese play
Nuhi
J a pa n e se s l aves
Obrok
Head tax (or
quitrent) paid by
peasants in cash or
kind Oprichnina
Dictatorial police regime; s pec ial royal domain cre a ted by Tsar Ivan IV
Particularism
The p rinc i ple of a l l owi n g each state (or othe r sub ordinate unit) of a federation, kingdom, or empire to retain its laws and promote its interests
Paulette
An ed ict of He n r y IV (1589-1610) of France which perm itted officials of n o n nob le o rigin to m a ke their positions hered i tar y in retu rn for an annual tax payment -
Pietism
A religious movement of the Lutheran church ad vocating a revival of the devotional ideal
Pomeshchiki
Holder of land on service tenure in tsarist Russia
Pomest'e (pomestye)
Land g ra nted in return for service to the
Popery
Pejorative term for the doctrines and customs of the Roman Ca t h o l ic church
Russia
tsar
GLOSSARY Pr ero ga ti v e
An exclusive right or privilege attaching to an office or position. espe c i a lly that of the king
Primogeniture
Principle o f inheritance b y t he first-born. spec ifica lly the oldest son
Pud
Rus sian we ight
Rangaku
Japanese term for Dutch studies
Raskolniki
Old Believers. a Russian sect which developed in pro test against the N ikonian re forms of the Orthodox church in the seventeen th century
Ra1.nochintsy
=
36.1 1 pounds
Men estran ged from the social groups to which they ac cordi n g to the law of tsarist Russia
belonged Regia potestas
Lat in term for the executive power of the ki n g
Rittergut
Knightly estate in Prussia. s o called because owner ship of such estates was for a time the exclusive priv ile ge of aristocratic warriors
Ronin
Masterless samurai. especially frequen t in seven tee n th-century Japan
Sale of indulgen ces
Payment to receive a remi ssion of the tem po ral pen alties still d u e after a sin has been forgiven ; a point of controversy es pecia lly in the Lutheran reformation
Samizdat
Russian term for clandestine. un publis hed literature. usually c irculatin g in handwritten or typed form
Sa mur ai
Japane se fightin g men; aristocratic title since the
Ka
makUTa shogunate
Samurai-dokoro
Office of KamakuTa shogunate, hand li n g m i li tary aff airs
Sa nk i n-ko ta i
Sy ste m of alternate residence of daimyo under t he Tokuga wa shogunate
Sayyid Scutage
Arab tribal chieftain Payment in lieu of service as an horseback in me d ieval England
Seign o r (ia l) (Seigneur(ial) )
French lord of to ... )
Sengoku-daimyo
Former subordinates of Shugo daimyo whose local power increased ove r their masters during the later Ashikaga shogunate
Sengoku-jidai
Japane se phrase for "the coun try at war," specifically the period 1467-1568
Sessho
Rege nt in Japan e se im per ial government
a
armed
knight on
fee or manor (a djective re ferri n g
Shari'a
Islamic sacred law
Shi
see
Shi'at Ali
Party of Ali, the fou rth cali ph after Mohammad
Uji
GLOSSARY Shimpa n
Collateral daimyo of the Tokugawa famil y
Shinto
Japanese nature worship
Shi,"es
Counties of Great Britain
Shogunate (Shogun)
Military
Shugo
Military governors under the Kamakura
Shugo-daimyu
Provincial military governors under the Ashikaga s h oguna t e
Simony
The sin
S ippe
German term for lineage
government (gove rnor) of Japan
of
shogunate
buy in g or selling ecclesiastical benefices
Smerdy
Peasants of Kievan Russia
Spiritualities
Pro pert i es belonging to English monasteries
Stdndestaat
A pol i t ical order of checks and balances between a prince and the estates of his territory, inadequately translated as "estate society" or "corporate state"
Streltsy
Professional soldiers in seventeenth-century Russia
Subinfeudation
Process whereby vassals of the king grant fiefs to thei r own tenants and thus remove them from direct con t ro l by the crown
Subregulus
Under-king or lesser king in Anglo Saxo n England
Sutra
Buddhist scripture
Syncretism
Atte m pted reconciliation or union of different or op pos ing principles and practices, es pe c i a l ly used with reference to culture and religion
Taille
-
General French term for tax in the Middle Age s
,
equivalent to the English tallage. Many forms of this
tax existe d since it was levied on income, real prop erty, and so forth and varied with the jurisd iction of those collecting the tax Temporalities
Private ly owned lands English church
belonging
to bishops of the
Teutonic order
A m i l itary and re l igious order founded (c. 1 190) dur ing the Third Crusade for charitable purposes and subsequently instrumental in the eastward expansion o f medieval Germany
Thegn
Local freeman,lowest rank of Anglo-Saxon a ristocracy
Theocracy
Literally the rule of a sta t e by God or a god; govern ment by priests, e mperors kings claiming to rule by divine authority ,
,
Tithe
The tenth part of the annual produce of a house holder paid as a tax for the support of the church and the cler gy "
GLOSSARY
da i myo who were descended from former enemies or recent allies of the Tokugawa and who we re located in areas d istant from t he Kanto "Outside lords,"
Tozama
plain
L'eul
Russian district or county
Vji
Japa n ese
extended kin-group
of sac red
Ulema
Islamic teachers
UlovIl'1lie
Russian law cod e
Umma
O r igi na l l y the
of
texts
1649
Ar a b ic
tribal community, the term has of the co mm uni t y of all
acquired the larger meaning
Muslim believers Assembly
Vee/Ie
Novgorod
Voldlina
of town notables in Kievan Russia and
Hereditary landed property in medie val pat rimon y of early princes
landed
Russia; also
Vox populi, vox dei
The voice of
We/gild
Compensation to be paid to relations o f a slain kins man in Germanic and other northern tribes
Wilella gemol
Great
Yarl)'k(i)
Mongol ch arter(s) authorizing the governing author ity of political subordinates
lemskii
sobor( i)
the people
is the voice of God
council of the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms
Estate asse mb ly ( ies ) in
tsarist Russia
Index
Abbasid d ynasty (750-1258), 43-44 Abe M asahiro 473-474 ,
Absolutism
in France, 337-339 in Japan and Western E u rope, 433 ple biscita rian domination i n n i neteenth century Russia , 524 Act of Su premacy ( 1 5 34), 2 8 1 , 2 86, 293, 304, 323 Alef, Gustave, 240 Alexander (Nevski) (1240- 1 263), 9697 Alexander I (1 80 1 - 1 825) libe ral reforms by, 516-5 1 7, 5 1 9, 525 and Napoleon, 5 1 7 -5 1 9 Alexander II ( 1 855- 1 88 1 ) declaration t o Moscow gentry ( 1 856), 528 assassination attempt ( 1 866), 533 assassination in 188 1 , 563-564, 575 Allgemeine Land recht ( 1 7 94) , 1 6 1 , 383 Am b rose, Bishop of Milan (340?397), 3 1 Anglican Ch u rch (Episcopacy) defined, 292-2 93 social and poli t ica l functions , 295 reform of, 295-296 Arabic peninsula nomadic tribes on, 35-3 6 described, 36-37 Arab tribes compared with Germanic, 39-40 -
*
Arianism declared heretical, 2 7 Aristocracy character of, 106, 1 07 culture of, 229-230 personal m i li tancy 2 3 1 -2 32 development of self-control, 232234 Francis Bacon on , 236 defined in relatio n to nobility , gentry, 6 1 2n2 1, 63 7 n3 A r istoc r acy , English com pared with Japanese, 1 95 in Anglo-Saxon society, 200 after Norman conquest, 201-203 and education, 204-2 05 definition of E n glish peerage, 206n London court and society ( 1 5901730), 206-207 inflation of honors, 207-208, 624 n 44 social mobility, 209- 2 1 1 rank order of, 2 1 1 -2 1 7 representation of, 2 3 7 -238 revoluti onary politics of "the country," 303-304, 3 1 3-3 1 4 Aristocracy, Ja panese era names, 67n under Taiho Code , 7 .3 court nobility, 73-74 warrior class (bus hi) , 76-77 Provincial social mobility, 76-7 7, 82-85 under Kamakura Shogun ate, 7880 ,
-
*Check glossary for terms not listed in the index. Index includes only those authors whose works are quoted in the text.
INDEX
Aristocracy. Japanese (continued) family names. 85n Russian and Japanese compared. 1 23-126 r ep resen t at io n of. 24 1 -243 economic conditions of. 470-471 reorga ni zed under Tokugawa. 477 Aristocracy. Prus s ia n . 168-174 corporate estates. 149. 158-160
loc al power of. 1 50- 1 5 1 r ecr ui ted as o ffi ce rs. 164-168 economic fortunes of. 168-17 1 inflation of honors. 1 69-170 civil service and. 172 economic and educational ch a nge s of. 1 73- 1 75 representation of. 23 8- 2 3 9 Aristocracy. Russian in Kievan Russia. 90-92.97-98 Boyar freedom. 98-99 inherited vs. dependent land ownership. 98. 1 1 1 - 1 15 rank order (Mestnichestvo). 1 1 51 1 7. 1 20- 1 2 1 effect of military organization on. 119-120
code of law (ulozhenie). 1 20- 1 23 Russian and Japanese compared. 1 23- 1 26 representation of. 240-241 emancipation of (1762).508.524 numbers of. 508 -509 Charter of the Nobility (1785).513. 524 attitude toward Catherine II. 515 debts of. 534. 54 1 Ashikaga Shogunate (1338-1573).8082
Authority legitimate. defined. 16-1 7 of kings. 2 1 -22. 218-228 patrimonial vs. feudal. 1 06- 1 07. 226-227 reconstitution of. through intellectual mobilization. 265ff. Bacon. Francis ( 1 56 1 - 1 626) on aristocracy. 236 Novum Organum ( 1 620).258 Barlow. Fran k. 200-20 1 Barraclough. Geoffrey. 1 40. 149 Basileios. Byzantine emperor (9761 025 A.D.). 94
Baxter. Richard. 310. 312-313 Beasley. W. B 479 .•
Belinski. Vissarion ( 1 8 1 1 - 1 848) .553 556 Berlin. Isaiah. 558. 563 Bernard. Jacques, 255 Bishops of Rome. See Popes Bloch, Marc, 2 1 0,222,248 Blood right, 25-26 Blum. Jerome, 1 1 3, lIS Bodin, Jean
Six Lit'res 334
de fa
Bolingbroke,
Republiqlle (1576),
Lord (167 8- 1 7 5 1 ) and
compared F r a n ce E n gl and , 345
Bishop anoints Pepin (751 A.D.), 32 Book l!F Mal'l)'I'S See Foxe, John Books-publications number of. since 1 456, 256-258 Gutenberg Bible ( 1 456) . 258 Bible of 1539.280 Enc),clopedie. 353n in eighteenth-century Germany. 389-390 Moral Weeklies in Germany, 3964 00 fOl'eign books admitted in Japan (1720), 458 in Russia, 497-498.504 Brandenburg settlement of, 145 controversy with Magdeburg Archbishop ( 1 280 ) . 146 corporate state (Stiindestaat), 149 investiture of Frederick Hohenwllern ( 1 4 1 5). 1 50 estate assemblies,15 1 Calvinist conversion of Elector Johann Sigismund, 157n Buddhism in Japan, 67-69 Bonifacius.
Calais, fall of to the Duc de Guise ( 1 558), 325 Caliphate, patriarchal, 40 Abu Bakr (632-634), 40-4 1 , 45 Vmar (634-644). 40-4 1 , 45 Uthman (644-656) , 40-41, 45 Ali ( 656-66 1 ), 40-43, 43nb , 45 Cal\'in. John ( 1 509- 1 564) , 323
INDEX Canossa (1077), 137-138 Cartwright, Thomas (1535-1603), 310,312 Catherine II (1762-1796), the Great Russian e xp a nsion under, 511 relation to the Enlightenment, 511-
Christianity (continued) See also Greek O rthodox Christianit y; Popes; Popular mandate; Reformation Chr onicl e s of Japan (Nihongi), 61 Chu Hsi (1130-1200), 453-454
512 Ordinance on Gove rnme n t (1775),
Cipolla, Carlo on Chr i sti a n saints, 253
5 12- 513 Charter of Nobility (1785),513,
Civil society defined co m pa ra t i ve l y, 523 Cnut (Canute) ( 1016- 1035), 183
524 educational
reforms of, 5 13-5 14
Coke, Sir Edward (1552-1634), 298,
Censorship in French ancien regime, 352-353
302, 315 - 318 Colbert, Jean - B a pt iste (1662-1683),
in Germany, 388, 395-396 in Russia, 532, 551-552, 556-557 Charisma
Col um bus,Chr isto phe r (1445-1506)
royal, 21-22 inherited, 23 lineage and, 25 Charlemagne (768-814
A.D.), 32 ,
12 8n, 130 See also Frankish empire Charles V, Holy Roman emperor (Charles I of Spain) (b. 1500d. 1558) rule of, 273-274 Chernyshevskii, Nikolai (1828-1889), 556-559 What is to be done?, 558-559, 576 Ch'in dynasty (22 1-2 06 B.C. ) , 55 Chou dynasty (1122- 256 B.C. ) , 5L-5 3 Christianity Constantine the Great (306-337 A.D.),27 early church councils, 27 ,94n conversion of Roman empire, 27-
28 church and state, 27-28,31-35 ascendance of papacy, 30-32 conversion of Franks, 32 Pope Gelasius on kingship, 105
333-335 four voyages (1492-1504), 255 Comparative study, method of, 1316 Conde, Prince de (1552-1588), 324 Confucius (551-479 B.C.), 51-56 Congress of Vienna (1815),384, 519 See also Holy Alliance Constantinople consecration of (330 A.D.),27 Russian mission to (839), 89 conquered by Turks (1453), 106,
254 Constitution of Clarendon ( 1 164 ), 235 Copernicus (1473-1543), 258
Crevecoeur,J. H. (1735-1813) Letters from an American Farmer, 349 Crimean War (1854-1856), 527 Cromwell, Oliver (1599-1658), 312 Cromwell, Thomas (1485?-1540), 207 Cyril (826-869), Byzantine missionary, 94 Da Gama, Vasco (1469?-1524) reaches India (1498), 254
church, 131-133 Cluniac reform movement (since
d'Argenson, Marquis (1694-1757), 345 Decembrist uprising (1825), 520,527 Demonstration effect See Development, uneven;
910), 136 investiture controversy, 137-140
Reference society Desaguliers, John T. (1683-1744),
consecration of German emperor,
130 alliance of German emperor with
conversion of England, 181-182 egalitarian implications of, 252-
253 mission to Japan, 450, 4 53
359 Development, uneven, 12-13 history of Marxism, 272 See also Reference society
680
INDEX
Division of labor, 12 Dolgorukov, Prince on edu catio n, 550 See also La Chalotais Dore, Ronald, 466, 470 Dou glas, David c., 1 88 Drake, Sir Francis
circumnavigation (1577-1580), 284285 Dukes, Paul, 508 Dvornik, Francis,94-95
Earl, David M., 456 Economic d eve l o p men t En gla nd , 27 8-27 9 France, 333-337 Germany, 385, 42 1 -422
Japan , 445-447 Russia ( 1 86 1 - 1 9 1 4) , 538-54 1 Soviet Russia, 56 7-574 Islam i c world, 589-590 Edict of N ant es ( 1 598), 324-326 revocation of ( 1 685), 332, 344, 352354 E d ucation and Prussian aristocracy, 173- 1 75 and En gli sh aristocracy, 204-205 fou nd at i on of U n iv ersit ie s ( 1 1 601 900), 256 Gresham C ollege London, 261 in sixteenth a nd seven teen t h c en tu ry En gla nd , 26 1 La Chalotais on, 372 German universities, 388 student enrollment in eig hteen th ce ntur y Ge r many , 388 e d u cat io nal reforms in Russia, 499, 5 1 3-514, 5 1 9 edu catio n al deve l op men t in Russia, 52 1 -522, 54 1 , 546-550 Prince Dolgorukov on , 550 Edward ( 1 042-1066) the Confessor, 1 83 Edward 1 (12 72- 1 307) , 1 93, 203 Edward I I ( 1307 - 132 7), 1 96 Edw ar d III ( 1 327- 1 377) , 1 97 Ele e l ion by acc la m atio n , 23, 2611 E li as , Norbert, 231-232 Eliot, Sir J ohn ( 1 592- 1 632),302 Elizabeth 1 ( 1 558- 1 603) re li giou s settlement under,28 1 excommunicated in 1 570, 284 policies of, 286-2 88
Em a nc i p a t ion of serfs in Russia ( 1 86 1 ) , 250,
507 , 52 8534 in Prussia ( 1 807- 1 8 1 0), 4 1 7419 English Re fo r m ation, 250 historical bac kgrou nd of, 279 dissolution of monasteries, 279283 Bible o f 1 539, 280 reli giou s settlement of Elizabeth I, 281 Act of Su pr em acy ( 1 534), 28 1 ff. anti-Catholicism, 286-289 Book of M a r t y rs , 2 89-29 1 M a ri a n exiles, 294-2 95 Pu ri ta n lec tu res hi p s, 297-298 role of l awye rs in, 302-303, 314315 prophesyin gs (religious mee tin gs) , 3 1 1 -312 Levellers, d e fi n e d , 3 1 3n com pared wi th French, 323-326 English Revolution and Civil War ( 1 640- 1 660), 250, 303 of 1 688, 266, 3 17-3 1 8, 320 role of la wyers in, 302-303, 3 1 4315 Parliament i n , 306-307 Puritanism and liberty in, 309-3 1 0, 3 1 9-320 Enlightenment E n c y clo pe die, 353n and Fr eemasonry, 360-36 1 moral equ a lity, 364-365 Diderot on au th ori ty , 366-367
"Declaration of the Rights of Man," 370-371 Voltaire at the Pru ssi an court, 394395 German self-cultivation (Bildung) , 400-4 0 1 Epidemics ( Black Death), 252 Epistola Clementis (400 A.D.), 3 1 Eq uali ty , ideal o f See Ch ri st ian ity ; Popul a r mandate Estate soc iety (Standestaat), 248 in France, 32 7-330 Etats Generaux (Estates General ) or ga n i za t ion and last meeting ( 1 6 1 4), 32 7-329 Convocation ( 1 788), 362-364
INDEX
Expa n s io n , Euro pe an Henry the Naviga to r (13 94-1460), 254 Russi an e xp ans ion into S iberia after 1580, 254 Papal B ull (1454) , 254, 2 84 Portu guese (1418-1498) , 2 54 da Gama, Vasco (1498) , 254 Col um b us , Christopher (14921504),255 Magellan , 258 of Spain in the fifteenth century, 273 Ottoman Turks and, 2 7 4-2 7 5 En glish, 284-2 86 Russian, 511 Fainsod, Merle, 564 Fedor I ( 1 584-1598), 118 Feudalism, 1 95 Marc Bloch on , 201 English, 201-202 Max Weber on, 227, 230,248 in Japan, 432-433 Fle tch er, Giles report on Russia (1591), 114 , 494 Florinsk y , Michael, 89 Foxe, John, Book of Mmtyrs, Actes and Monuments (1563), 289-291 Francis I I of Austria (1792- 1 806) abdicated as emperor of Holy Roman empire, 384 Frankish em pire, 26, 32, 1 28 n, 130131 Franklin, Benjamin (1706-1790) in Paris, 346-347 Freemasons
in France and A me r ic a , 349-350 origin in England, 358 social relations among, 358-359, 361 constitution of, 359-36 0 an d E n light en m ent, 360- 3 61 French Revol ution (1789-1795) convocation of Estates-General (1788), 362-364 What is the Third Estate?, 365-369 Declaration of the Righ ts of M an, 370-371 h ostilit y to corporations, 372-373 at t itu de toward Jews, 373- 3 74 anti-feudal legis lation , 374-37 5 German reaction to,401-408
681
Fronde (1648-1653),331, 332 Fujiwara r egents ( 858-1184), 66- 69, 71 Gaveston , Piers, 196 (1714-1727) reign of, compar e d with James I, 307-308 Germanic invasions Germania by T ac itu s (98 A.D.), 2 325 Alaric, conquest of Rome (410 A.D.), 23-25 V isi got hi c kin gdo m in G au l (418507 A.D.), 23-25 Vandals rule North A fr ica (429534 A.D.), 23-25 Ostrogoths rule Italy (493-553 A.D.), 23-25 Visigothic kingdom in Spai n (507711 A.D.), 23-25 B yzan ti ne e m pe ror J ust ini an (527565 A.D.), co nquers Germanic kingdoms, 23-25 G o - Daigo, E m pe ror ( 13 1 8),80 Goethe , j. W. (1749- 1 832), 385, 391, 400-40 1 , 404-405, 407-408 Golden Bull of 1356, 143 Goubert , Pierre, 330, 335-3 36,338339, 355, 44 1 Gracian, Balthasar Hand Oracle ( 1 64 7 ),233-234 Greek Orthodox Chri st ianity (in Russia) conversion of Kievan society, 9396 po l i tical consolidation an d , 99, 101, 103-105 worship of images i n , 103 Western Chri s tia nity co m pare d with, 105- 1 06 break of, with Constantinople (1448), 1 06 Gregory of Tours , 2 2 7 Guise family Due de Guise (1550-1588), 324 Mary de Gu ise (Queen Rege n t of Scotland-I542),325 G eo r ge I
Habbakuk. H . j. , 215 Hake, Edward , 302 Hall, John W., 61-62 , 432, 443,449, 481-482
INDEX
682
Haller,
William,294,297,298, 309, 312-313 Han Fei Tzu, 56-57 Hanseatic League,147,384-385 Hardenberg, Karl August von (17501822), 414-417
Hohenzollem dynasty (conti nued ) Frederick William III (1797-1840), 170 Frederick William IV (1840-1861), 426-427 William I (1861-1888),429
Harootunian, H. D., 437-440 Hawkins, John (English Explorer),
Ho lbo m , Hajo, 155-156 Holy Alliance reaction to liberation movements,
Hayashi Shihei (1738-1793),447, 459,465 Hay den , J. Michael , 327-329
Alexander I initiates,519 Hol y Roman Em pi re of the Ge r man
Hegel, G. F. W. (1770-1831),412413, 425 Heian period (794-1160), 69-72 Heine-Geldem, Robert, 49 Hellie, R i cha rd , 119-120 Helvetius, Claude (1715-1771), 344 Henry II (1l54-1189), 189 He nry III (1216-1272), 191 Henry IV (1056-1106) (of En gland ) character of his rule, 136-140
Ge rm an y Hotman , Fram;ois (1524-1590), 325
284 Hayashi Razan, 453-454
Henry IV (1589-1610) (of France) converts to Catholicism, 325-326 Heraclitus, 250 Herzen, Alexander (1812-1870), 552, 559, 562
H ill ,Christopher, 307 Hincmar, Archbishop (860 A.D. ) , 33 H intze, Otto, 17, 161 Hirata Atsutane (1776-1843),456457, 461
Holderlin , J. C. F. (I nO-1843), 391 Hohenstaufen dynasty (1152-1272) Frederick I (I 152-1190) Barbarossa, 129 Henry VI (1l90-1197), 141 Frederick II (1215-1250),141, 247 Hohenzollem dynasty, 150ff. considered com paratively, 163-164 Hohenzollem dynasty (1415-1918) Frederick (1415-1450), 150 George William (Elector) (16191640), 157
Frederick William (The Great Elector) (1640-1688), 158 Frederick William I (1713-1740), 160, 166-167
Frederick II (The Great)
(17401786), 160-161, 166, 340-341
Frederick William II 161, 170
(1786-1797),
423-424
Na tio n See Imperial
Hotta Masayoshi (1810-1864),474475
Hsun Tzu, 53n Hu guenots revolt (1625-1628),
321 First Synod (1558-1559), 323
settlement under the Edict of N antes, 323-326 religious wars with (1562-1598), 324 St. Bartholomew's Day Massa cre (1572), 324
revocation of Edict of Nantes (1685), 332, 344, 352-354
refugees, 354 origin of name, 637nl H u izinga , Johan, 231
Humboldt, Wilhelm von (17671835), 404,415 Hundred Years' War (1337-1453), 197, 320-322
Ibn Khaldun on kin gship, 44 Ii N aos uke , 472, 475 Imperial Germany defined, 128-129 considered comparatively, 161-162 composition of, 379 dissolution of (1806), 384 German Confederation (18151870), 384
Germany unified (1871), 384 In flation of honors Prussia, 169-170 England , 207-208 Intellectual Mobilization foundation of universities (11601900), 256
INDEX
Intellectual Mobilization (continued) archetype of, 271-272 of the Arab world, 591 -5 94 See allo Books-publication s; Education ; Enlightenment; Literacy; Professions; Un iversities In tell ectual mobilization, En gland education and English a ristocracy , 2 04 - 2 05 professions, 259-264, 2 98 - 30 2 ed ucation in sixteenth cent u ry, 261 literacy in seventeenth century, 261,263-264
dissolution of monasteries, 279-283 Bible of 1539, 280 Ma rian exiles, 294-295 Puritan lectureships, 297-298 pro p h esyings ( re l i gious meetin gs) , 311-312
Levelle rs, defined, 313n Intellectual mo bilizatio n, France rise of l iterat i,351-355 EncycLopedie,353n Jansenism, 355-356 Freemasonry, 358-361 Inte l lectual mobilization , Germany, 387-391 Gutenberg Bible (1456), 25 8 Biirgertum o r educated commoners,381n,386-38 7,397 unive rs ities in eighteenth century, 388 books in eighteenth century, 389390 Moral weeklies, 396-400 German self-cultivation ( Bildun g) , 400-401 "revolution from above" (St ruensee ), 407, 422 Intellectual mobilization, Japan land redistribution,435 urbanization, 443 commercialization, 446-447 concept of emperor, 454-455 foreign books admitted in Japan ( 1 720),458 com parison with Western Euro pe, 463-464 social role of samurai, 464-466 l ite r acy in, 469n samurai in Meiji Restora tion, 481483
Intellectual mobilization , Russia books,497-498,504 ed ucational reforms, 499, 513-514, 519
universities, 517 e ducational development, 521 - 522, 546-550
public opi nion emerges, 530-531 develop ment of professions, 541543 vol untary organizations, 542-543 literacy, 546 mean ing of intelligen tsia, 552 Belinski , Vissarion, 553-556 Chern ychevskii, Nikolai, 556-559 Lavrov, Peter, 559-560 types of protest by intelligentsia, 560-562 In vestitu re Controversy, 1 3 7- 1 40 Irfan Shahid, 37 Islam M u h a mmad the Pro phet (c. 570632 A.D.), 35- 41 Battle of Tours and Poitiers (732), 39 Shari' a ( Holy Law),39 Sunni and Shi'ite, 41-42 and Protestantism compared, 47n I t aga k i Tais u ke , 4 86 I to Hirobumi (1841-1909) com m ents on restoration, 484-486 m ission to Euro pe ( 1882),488 comments on con stitution , 489490 Ivan Kalita (1325-1341) , 1 00, 108 Ivan III (1462-1505), 108, 114 Ivan IV (1533-1584) the Te rrible, 108,118 Oprichnina of, 113 Iwakura Tomomi (1825-1883), 477478 mission to Europe a nd America ( 1871), 486-487 mission to Europe ( 1882),488 comments on constitution, 489 Jansen , Cornelius (1585-1 638),355 Jarre t , Derek, 345 Jena and Auerbach ( 1806),Battle of Napoleon defeats Prussia at , 38 4 , 4 09,4 16 Joac h i m II of Hohenzollern (153515 7 1 )
INDEX
Ki ngs h i p France development of, 321-322 FI'ench, compared with En gli sh
Joachim II (continued) Hohenzollern rule bank ru pt
,
under, 151-154
and Russian, 326-327 G e r ma n
John 1(1199-1216),191
K i n gsh i p,
Kahan, Arcadius, 515 Kalka, Battle of (1223) Mongols defeat Rus s ia n s at, 96
Kamak ura Shogunate
(1185-1333),
73, 78ff.
Karisbad Edicts (1819), 424-425 Keene, Donald, 445, 459-460 Keightley, David, 50-51 Kemmu Restoration (1334-1336), 80
Kido Koin , 486 Kievan Russia, 90-93 Kiev sacked (1240),
96 Kie\' sacked (1299), 101 Japan, compared with, 102-103 au th o ri ty in , 107-108
K in gsh ip
general discussion of, 5-8
o rigin of, 21-22 Byzan tine, 23 German ic conception of, 25 -27 Catholic policy toward , 31-35 Islam ic co ncepti o n of,40-44 Ancient Chinese co nceptio n of, 4957
on, 105 Lutheran conception of, 155-157 a ut ho ri t y of k in gs,218-228 Kin gship, E n gl a n d Celtic c h ie ft a in s u n d e r Ro ma n occ u pat io n (57 B.c.-450 A.D. ) , Pope Gelasius
176-177
Anglo-Saxon settlement
and, 177-
178
A n glo S a xon kings, 178-181 Christianization a n d , 181-182 Danish occ up a tion (from 835)
and,
D o m e sd ay Book (1086), 185 "orm an Co n q ue s t and, 185-188 Ro y a l powe r and representation , 188-196, 235 co mpar ed
with Russia and Japan,
197-199
Constitution of Clarendon 235
Investiture Controversy, 137-140 decl i ne an d Go lde n Bull," 140-145 conside red co mpa rat i v e l y , 161-162 K i n gship, Japanese
Impe r i al
"
origins of, 61-66 Japanese in Kor e a, 65n Imperial rule divided, 66-67,
71-
73 Buddhism and, 67-69
Chinese admin istration and, 68-71 cenu-alization of, in sixte e nt h century, 85-86
co mpared with Russia and England, 197-199 prohibition of cultural mission to C h i na (838), 450 theory of, 454-455 Kin gship, Prus s i a n (E l e c t o rs and Kings)
rulership under frontier conditions, 145-149 rise of Hohenzollern dy n a s ty, 150ff.
Lutheran ism and secular rule, 154-157
estates and military rule,157-161 co ns id e red comparatively, 163-164 Kingship, Russian decen tralization of, 88-93 Greek Orthodox Church and, 9496,99,101,103-106
-
182-183
consecration of Emperor, 130 alliance wi t h Church, 131-133
(1164),
"King-i n-Parl iament," 237-238 com pa re d wit h French and Russian, 326-327
Mongol O\'erlordship an d, 96-101 comparison with Japan, 102-103 comparison with J apa n and England, 197-199 co m pa red with English and French, 326-327 Peter I's concept of, 506-507 K l u che v s k y Vladimir, 115,506 Kojiki (Record of Anc ie n t Matters),61 Koran (Qur a n), 44-45 Kotze bue, A u gust von (1761-1819), ,
'
424
K ri ege l , Leonard, 413 Kumazawa Ba n za n (1619-1691),455 -
INDEX La Chalotais, L. R. de speech on education See also Dolgorukov,
Lateran council (1059)
(1763),372 Prince
abolishes lay investiture and simony 136 Laud, Wi IIi am (1633-1645) Archbishop, 297 Lavrov, Pe te r, 559-560 Law, John,355 Le Chape1 i e r , Jean speech against Mutual Benefit Societies (1791), 372 Lechfeld, Battle of (955) Otto I defeats Magyars at, 133 Lenin ( U lyanov, V. I.) (1870-1924), ,
565, 569-571 What is to be Done? (1902), 575-57 7 democratic centralism, 577 "Better Fewer, But Be tte r (1923), 5 77 578 Lessing, G. E. (1729-1781),401 Lewin, Moshe, 569,572-573 Lewis, Bernard, 590 Literacy, 258 17th Century England,261,263264 J apan, 469n Russia, 546 Local government in England and Prussia, 199-200 in France, 329 local rule in Prussia, 383 in Russia compared with E ngland and France, 529 development in Russia a fter 1864, 536-538 Louis XIII (1610-1643), 331 Louis XIV (1643-1715), 330 expansion under, 331-332 ascendence of absol u tism , 3323 34 economic conditions under, 333337 sale of offices, 337-339 Louis XV (1715-1774),355-356 Louis XVI (17 74-1792) executed (17 93) , 406 Luther, Martin (1483-1546),154157,258, 396 "
-
MacCaffrey,W. T., 288 Machiavelli, N., 225 , 248
685
Magellan, Ferdinand
(1480-1521), 258 Magna Carta (1215),191,235 M ai s tre,Joseph de, 520n Maitland, F. W., 209-210
Mao Tse-tung (1893-1976), 585-587 Marongiu, Antonio,226, 236 Mary Stuart (b. 1 5 42 d 1587) marries Francis I I (1558),325 Mary Tudor (1553-1558) marries P h il l i p II (1554), 275 religious persecution under, 293-
.
294
(1759-1829), 459-460 Mazarin (Cardinal) (1642-1661), 33 1 M edi na Mecca and, 36-39 constitution of, 38-39 Meiji Restoration (1868),250 Bak umatsu period (1853-1868), 470 memorial to E m peror (1869),477 abolition of domains, 478 military reorganization, 478-4 79 abolitio n of Sam u rai privil eges 479 Samurai in, 481-483 public debate in, 483-484 Memorial of (1874),486 Meiji Constitution (1889),488 Mestnichestvo (rank order) described, 115-117 abolition of (1682), 120-121 Peter I , Table of Ranks, 504-505 Methodiu s (815?-885 A.D.),94 Military organization firearms introd uced in Japan, 85 in seventeenth century Russia,119120 in England, 202-204,206 in Meiji Japan , 478-479 in Russia under Peter I, 502, 505507 in Russia and France, 529 Miliutin,D. A. (1861-1881),528 Minamoto, Yoritomo (1147 -1199), 78 Momigliano, Arnaldo, 30 Mongol(s) invasion of Midd le E a st, 47-49 seizu re of Peking by (1215), 96 overlords of Russia, 96ff. contin ued raids by ,102n Matsudaira, Sadanobu
,
INDEX
686
Montesquieu, Baron de (1689-1755), 342-344, 357 M o r r is, Ivan,74 Morris, John, 1 78 Moscow auacked, 1 01 Motoori N o r i naga ( 1730-180 I), 456 Muham mad th e Proph et (c. 570-632
A.D.)
See Isla m
d yna sty , ascendancy of, 99102, 108- 1 15 �Iusc()\'y Company, English, 285
�Iusco\'ite
�apoleon (b. 1 769-d. 1 821) con quest of E u ro pe (1798), 384 defeat of ( 1 815), 384 effect of c on quest s, 422-423 !'..; at i on/ !'..; ation-building
defined, 605n I Neale , J. E., 214 Netherlands declares' inde pe nde n ce from Spain ( 158 1), 275, 332n !'..;i kon i a n Reform , 496-4 97 Norman conq uest ( 1066) and English aristocracy, 183 - 1 87 !'..;o rmandy, loss of ( 1 204), 1 9 1 Nove , Alec, 568 No\'gorod R e publ i c of, 97 conquest of, 1 1 2- 113 Oda Nobunaga ( 1 559- 1 582) , 85 Offa ( 7 57-796), 181-182 Ogilvie , Sir Charles, 300 Okubo Toshim ichi (1830- 1 878), 4 86 Old Believers, 496-497 Old Regime-the structure, England Tudor revolution in government, 259 d issolution of monasteries, 279283 religio u s settlement of Elizabeth I, 281 Act of Supremacy ( 1534 ), 28 1, 286, 293 , 304 , 323 policies of Elizabeth I, 286-2 88 religious policies of Tudor monarchy, 290-292 , 296 Stuart monarchy and parliamentary opposition, 306 kingshi p com pared with French and Russian, 326-3 27
Ol d Regi me, England (continued) See also Stuart m ona r ch y ; Tudor monarchy
Old Re gi me - th e structure, France Estates General, 327-329
Courts of Law (parlements), 329, 3 56-3 58 Pays d'eJection and Pays d'bat, 329-330 Dutch and French economies compared, 330-331 wars and t rea t i es under Louis XIV, 331 ,340 pr<)\'incial governors (i nten d an ts) , 3 32 ascendance of absol uti s m , 332-334
sale of offices, 337-339 di sa ffe ctio n of nobility, 350-35 1 cen sorship, 352-353 Gallicanism , 355-356 Grand Remonstrance ( 1753 ) , 356 economic conditions, 362 prohibition of Jesuits ( 1764), 372 Old Regi me-the structure. Germany com position and government of Holy Roman Em pire, 379-380 hometown citizenship. 38 1-382 Biirgertum or educated commoners. 38 1n. 386-387, 397 dissol ution of Holy Roman Em pire ( 1 806), 384 German Confederation ( 1 8 1 5) , 384 consequences of political particularism , 384-386 economic unification, 385, 421-422 bureaucracy in, 386-3 87, 4 10-4 1 1 Fre nc h court as a model. 39 1-394 conception of politics, 395-3 96 , 398400 Moral Weeklies, 396-400 anti-populist reaction, 424-425 analysis of constitutions, 427430 Old Regi me-the structure. Japan See Tokugawa Ja pan Old Regi me-the structure. Russia overall com parisons, 491-492 isolation and orthodoxy, 493-494 towns in, 494 territorial and social change , 495 religious controversy, 496-497 foreigners in, 498-4 99
INDEX
Old Regime, Russia (continued) educational reforms, 499 budget/tax collection, 50 1 50 2 military o r gani z ation, 502 , 505507 , 527-528 Peter I, Table of Ranks, 504-505 dec rees on peasant ser fs , 507, 52853 4 changing positi on of nobility in , 508-509, 5 1 3 , 5 1 5 nu mber and distribution o f serfs, 509 local government , 5 1 2 - 5 1 3 529, 536-538 number of ministers in nineteenth century, 525 change in agriculture, 52 5 -52 7 problems of autoc racy, 530-535, 5 43 -5 45 Olga, Kievan Princess (945-964), 93 Omura, Masujiro, 478 On in War ( 1 467- 1 47 7) , 83 Otsuki Gentaku, 458-459 Otto I ( German Em peror) (93 6-973), -
,
93, 1 3 3, 1 45
relation s with Po pe,
1 3 611
Painter, Sidney, 1 8 6 Palmer, Robert, 357 Papal Bull ( 1 454), 2 54 Papal Bull ( Un igen itus,
Freemasonry, 360- 3 6 1 1 7 1 3 ), 355-
356
Paulskirche ( 1 849) , 426-42 7 Peace of Cateau-Cambresis ( 1 559) , 2 7 5, 286, 32 5, 340 Peace of Westphalia ( 1 64 8) , 3 3 1 terms of, 37 8-380 See also Thirty Years' War Pepin ( 747-768 A.D.), 32 Peter I (The Great) ( 1 682- 1 725), 507 travels in Europe, 499 social reforms, 499-50 0 budget, 50 1 military organization, 5 02 , 5 05 -507 war campaigns, 502-503 founding of Petersburg, 503 Table of Ranks, 504-505 Petition of Right ( 1 62 8) , 3 1 6 Philip I I o f Spain ( 1 55 6 1 5 9 8 ) , 2 74-
275
Pittau, joseph, 487 Plumb, ] . H. , 2 1 4-2 15
Pobedonostsev, K. P. , 543 Pocock, j . G . A., 3 1 7 Po pes Leo I (440-46 1 ), 3 1 Gelasius (492-496) , 3 1 , 1 05 Gregory I (590-603 ) , 3 1 , 1 8 1 Leo I II (795-8 1 6) , crowned Charlemagne (800), 1 30 Popu lar mandate Communist Manifesto ( 1 848), 5 74575 sum mary on, 599-603 Po pu lar mandate, Englis h st r uggles over Anti-Catholicism , 288 Book of Martyrs, 289-29 1 Puritan lectu reshi ps, 29 7 -298 role of lawyers in En glish Revolution, 302-303, 3 1 4-3 1 5 parliamentary opposition and Stuart monarchy, 306 Puritanism and liberty i n revolution, 309-3 1 0, 3 1 9-320 prophesying ( religious meetin gs) , 3 1 1 -3 1 2 Levellers, defined, 3 1 3n Popular mandate, French struggles over ideal of moral equality, 364-365 rights of Third Estate, 3 65-3 66 Diderot on , 366-3 6 7 Abbe Sieyes on, 367-369 Declaration of Rights of Man ( 1 7 89 ), 3 7 0- 3 7 1 ideal of national education, 3 7 2 anti-corporatism, 3 7 2-373 opposition to social ran ks, 374375
Lettres de caclu!t (abolished 1 790) , 37 5
See also French Revolution
Popular mandate, German struggles over Hegel on civil servants, 4 1 2 -4 1 3 Prussian reform movement, 4 1 2416
Prussian ki n g s promises of constitutions, 4 1 7 commercialization o f land, 4 1 7'
418
emancipation of serfs, 4 1 8-4 1 9
688
INDEX
Popular mandate, German struggles over (continued) destruction of guild monopolies, 4 1 9-42 1 revol utionary nationalism a fter 1 8 1 5, 42 3-424 civil servants as people' s re presentatives, 426-42 7 ambivalent liberalism in Prussi an con stitution, 427-4 30 Popular mandate, Japanese st ru ggles over See Meiji Restoration Popular mandate, Russian stru ggles over Pugachev revolt ( 1773- 17 7 5), 512 emancipation of serfs, 52 8-534 demands by Tver' Asse m bly, 533 Polish insurrection ( 1 863 ) , 533 Lavrov on, 559- 560 types of protest by intelligentsia, 560-562 assassins of Alexander I I on, 563564, 5 7 5 Stalin on, 572-574, 5 79-580 Marx's d istinction of workers and com munists, 574-575 Lenin on, 575-578 Populat ion and Black Death, 252 Mediterranean ( 1 500- 1 600) , 255 of England and cominent, 277 of France, 34 1 of Prussia, 409 of Russia, 495, 522, 5 74 Powicke, Sir Maurice, 1 93 Primary Chronicle, Russia's ( 1 1 1 0 or 1 1 1 2) , 88-89, 93 Professions law, 259, 298-302 medicine and n u rsing, 259 teaching, 259-260 writing, 264 development of, in Russia, 54 1 543 Prussia defin ition of, 1 5 7n becomes kingdom ( 1 70 I ) , 1 58 considered com paratively, 1 63 - 1 64 m ilitarism, 1 64- 1 68 in flation of honors, 1 69- 1 70
Prussia (continued) Prussian Reforms, 2 50, 4 1 3-4 1 5, 422-423 local rule, 383 War of Austrian Successio n , 383384 em ancipation of serfs ( 1 807- \ 8 1 0) , 4 1 7-4 1 9 Conservative reaction afte r 1 8 1 9, 424-426 liberal civil servants, 426-4 2 7 constitutions of 1 850 and later, 427430 Pu ritanism (including Presbyte rianism, Congregationalism) defi ned , 292-293 Puritan lectureships , 297-298 in Parliament, 304 and liberty in English revolution , 309-3 1 0, 3 1 9-320 Pushkin, Alexander, 55 1 -552 Py m , John, 302 Quray sh tribe of Mecca, 36-3 8 Record of Ancient M atters (Kojiki), 61 Re fe rence society deve lopment, u neven, 1 2- 1 3 defined, 292 in Japanese history, 452 Japan compared with Europe, 452453 Arab coumries and the West, 59059 1 Re ference societies, England Ottoman Tu rks conquer the Balkans, 274 Spanish an d French dom inance, 275 fear of French conspi racy in Scotland , 277 Act of Supremacy, 28 I ff. excommunication of Elizabeth ( 1 570), 284 privateerin g against Spain, 284285 search for North-West passage, 2 85-286 ami-Catholicism, 2 86-2 89
INDEX
Re ference societies , Englanq (continued) su pport of Holland, 288 English reformation co m pared with French , 323-326 Re ference societies , Franc e H u nd red Years' War ( 1 3 3 7 -145 3), 320-322 relations to Spain, 325 attitudes toward En gla n d , 341342 , 344-345 attitudes toward America, 345-349 France declares war on E n gland (177 8) , 347 Re ference societies, German y reaction to French Revolutio n , 391, 401-408 French cou rt as a model, 39 1 -394 reaction to the English revolutio n, 396 reaction to French culture at German courts, 397 definition of politics as court intrigue, 399-4 0 1 idealization of Greece, 404 Reference societies, Japan China as model, 450, 452 , 453-455 Christianity, 450, 453 anti-Christian policy, 450-452 Portuguese in, 450-452 national independence, 45 5 -457 Dutch learning, 457-4 60 ambivalence toward West, 4 60-463 missions to Euro pe and America, 486-488 European constitutional models, 488-490 Reference societies, Russia Ukrainian influence, 495 -496 contact with foreigners, 497-499, 503-504 educational reform, 499 Peter's reactions to Euro pe, 499 Catherine' s reactions to Europe, 5 1 1 - 5 1 2 , 516 aristocratic life style, 5 1 5 Prussia as a model, 515-5 1 6 and Napoleon , 516-5 1 9 conservative reaction against Euro pe , 520-521 Re fo rmation Wittenberg theses (15 1 7 ) , 1 54 , 258
689
Re formation (continued) Lutheran conception of kingship, 154- 1 57 , 258, 396 Luther' s publications , 258 Calvin, 323 i n France , 32 3-326 Edict of N an tes (1598) , 32 4-3 2 6 Lutheranism and politics, 396 See also E n glish Re formatio n Revolutions and restorat ion s enu merated , 250 " revolution from above, " 407,422, 524 de fined, 470, 483 Bolshevik revolution , 565-568 com parison of Russian and Chinese, 5 84-588 See also English Revolutio n ; Fre nch Revolution Richelieu (Cardinal) ( 1 624- 1 642 ), 331 Rieber, Alfred, 5 27-528 Riehl, Wilhelm, 2 69-270 Roberts, J. M. , 35 7-3 58 Romanov dynasty (1613-1917) , 120, 1 23 , 492-493 , 507 Alexis ( 1 645 - 1 6 7 6) , 1 20 , 493 Michael ( 1 613- 1 64 5),123 Fedor III (1676-1682), 497 Anna Ivanovna ( 1 730- 1 740) , 503 Eli zabeth (17 4 1 -17 62), 503-504 Catherine I ( 1 725-172 7 ), 507 Peter II ( 1 72 7 - 1 730), 507 Ivan V I ( 1 740- 1 74 1 ) , 5 07 Peter III ( 1 7 62 ), 5 08, 5 1 1 Paul I ( 1 7 96- 1 801) , 515-516 N icholas 1 (1825- 1 855), 520-522 N icholas II (1894-1917), 54 8 Alexander I I I ( 1 88 1 -1894) , 5 63 Alexander I ( 1 801-182 5 ). See Alexander I Alexander I I ( 1 855 -188 1 ). See Alexander I I Catherine I I (The Great) (17621 796) . See Catherine I I Peter I (The Great) (1682-172 5). See Peter I Rousseau , J . j., The Social Con tract, 8 Rudolf of Habsburg (1273- 1 291) Count of Swabia elected Em peror, beginning of Habsburg reign, 1 4 1 -142
INDEX
690
Rudolf of Rheinfelden (1077) Papal influence on election of, 137 Rurik dynasty (862 - 1 598),88, 1 1 8 Sacred and secular traditions, co m pared Islamic and Christian traditions, 4449 Christi a n , Isla m ic , and Confucian traditions, 57-6 0 S a igo, Takamori (of Satsuma), 480481 Salian dynasty ( 1 024-1 1 2 5),133 See also H e nry IV (of E ngland) Sa m urai Ron i n , story of 4 7, 466-468 expropriation of, and life style, 444445 frustration of, 464-466 education of, 465-466 social role of, 468-4 70 in Meiji restoration, 48 1 -483 Sansom, Sir George, 62-63, 72, 7879, 432 , 450 Saxon kings, 13 3- 135 Otto II (97 3-983 ) , 1 3 3 Otto III (983- 1 002), 134- 1 35 Otto I ( 93 6-973). See Otto I Schiller, ] . C. F. ( 1759- 1 805) , 4 01404 Science and technology since the ninth century, 252 as factor of production, 2 55-256, 265-266 Copernicus, 258 Gresham College, 26 1 Royal Society ( 1 66 1 ), 263 Seaver, Paul S., 2 97 Seto n-Watson, H ugh , 53 1 -53 2 Seven Years' War ( 1 756-1763), 161, 1 66, 344, 384, 409, 508 Hubertusburg, peace of, 1 6 1 , 384 described, 34 1 Treaty of Paris ( 1 763 ), 34 1 , 346, 356 Shang dynasty ( 1 766- 1 1 22 B.C.), 4951 Shimazu, Nariakira, 460-461 Shinto, 62-63 Shotoku, Taishi (574-622), 68 Sieyes, E. ] (Abbe) (1748-183 6) What is the Third Estate? , 365-369 .
Sigism und of Luxemburg, Emperor (1410- 143 7 ) in vests Frederick of N ii rnbe rg with Brande nbu rg, 150 Silberman,Bern ard, 482-483 Silesian War (1740-1742) , 1 60 Sinel, Allen,5 2 0,549 Social theory, liberal, conservative and radical c o m pared , 267-269 Societies,traditional,5-7 Societ y of Cincin natus ( 17 84 ) , 349350 Soga Regen ts, 66-67 Soviet Russia economic condi tions ( 1 9l 7 ),567 War Com munism (1920- 1 92 1 ),568569 New Economic Poli cy ( 1 92 1 - 1 927) , 569-572 Collectivization drive under First Five Year Plan ( 1 928- 1933), 5'72574 G reat Purge , 574 constitution of 1 93 6, 580 S pa n ish Armada defeated ( 1588), 2 85 Speransky, Michael ( 1 772- 1 839), 5 1 7519 Stalin (Dzhugashvili, ] . V.) ( 1 8791 953), 250, 572-574 " Problems of Leninism" ( 1 924), 579 U . S . S . R. Constitution 1936, Art. 1 26, 580 Starr, S. Frede ric k , 534 State/State-building d e fined, 605n 1 Stein, Freiherr vom ( 1 757- 1 83 1 ), 414 Stenton, F. M. , 1 80- 1 8 1 Stolypin, P. A . , 545 Stone, Lawrence, 205, 206n Structuralism, 13- 14 Stuart monarchy Charles I ( 1625- 1649) , 292 , 303, 306, 3 1 4 Charles II ( 1660- 1 685) , 262 James I ( 1 603 ':" 1 62 5) , 292 -2 93 , 296nd, 297 , 306, 3 1 5, 3 1 7 James I I ( 1 685- 1688), 3 1 7-3 1 8 Synod o f Worms ( 1 1 22), 1 3 8 Szam uely, Tibor, 506
INDEX
Tacitus, Germania , 25 Taiho Code (702), 69, 73 Taika reforms (646), 68- 7 1 , 450 Tak a s h i m a Shu han (1798 -1866), 460 Tawney, R. H. , 212 Te utonic Order,147 T h e od o re , Archbis hop (6 6 8- 6 90), 181 T h i rty Years' War (16 1 8-1648), 154158, 378 and Hohenzollern rule, 1 57-158 French pa r tici p a t i o n i n (16311648), 331 See also Peace of Westphalia Tocq ueville, Alexis de, 250-251, 332, 337, 339-340, 350, 354 ,
To kugawa, I esada ( 1 824- 1 8 5 8 ) , 4 7 5
Tokugawa, leyasu (1603-1616), 85 legacy of, 437, 447 Tokugawa, Nariaki (1800-1860), 473474 Tokugawa Japan com pared with French absolutis m , 43 1 -432, 441 feudalism of, 432-433 m ilitary force, 433 number of daimyo, 433-435 land redistribution, 435-436 position of emperor, 436 alternate residence, 436-439 daimyo administration, 440-443 castle towns, 443, 651n 13 agricultural development, 445-446 commercialization, 446-449 anti-Christian policy, 450-452 social role of samurai, 466-470 reform policies, 47 1 -472 Towns changing role of, 25 1 -252 castle towns in Japan , 443, 65 1n l 3 in Russia, 494 Toyotomi, Hideyoshi (1582- 1 598), 8586 Tradition and modernity, 605n6 Transformations of Euro pe, 9-12 early formation of state, 247-248 revolutions since fifteenth century, enumerated, 250 Tocqueville on rise of equality , 250 changing role of towns, 25 1 -252 technological change, 252
69 1
Transformation of E u rope (contin ued) m o bi l i z i n g im plications o f C hristianity, 252-253 pr i n ti n g ex ploration , and early mo d e r n science, 2 5 3 - 2 5 8 T re a t y of V e rd u n (843), division of Fran kish e m p i re 131 Tribal organ ization tribal luck, 25-26 lex talionis, 35 tribal com m u n ity, 35-36 Troei tsch , Ernst, 175 Tsar as title , 615n20 Tudor monarchy, 2 7 5 -277, 27 9-281, 286-289 Henry VI I (1485-1509), 202 , 207, ,
,
275
Henry VIlI ( 1509-1547), 207, 2752 76, 279 -281 Edward V I ( 1 547- 1 553 ) , 275, 28 1 E li zabe t h I (1558- 1 603). See Elizabeth I Mary Tudor ( 1553-1558) . See Mary Tudo r Turgot, A . R. J . (1727-1781) Memoire Sur lts Municipalites (1775), 338 U10zhenie (code of law) (1648), 120123 Umayyad dynasty (66 1 - 749), 41-43 U niversities fo undations of ( 1 1 60- 1 900 ) , 256 Gresham College ( London), 26 1 German, 388 Russian, 517 Venturi, Franco, 343 Vernadsky, George, 93 Vindiciae contra ty rannos ( 1 5 79), 325 Vladimir (978-1015), 93, 99 Vladimir II ( Monomakh) (11 131125), 89 Voltaire, 394-395 Walker, Mack, 380, 381, 382, 382n Wal kin, Jacob, 543 War, frequency of b y fifty-year intervals, I I I between 1600 and 1850, 440
INDEX
War of the Austrian Succession 1748) , 3 83 - 3 84
War of the Spanish Succession
( 1740(170 1 -
1 7 1 4) , 3 3 2,3 40
Waterloo, battle of (1815) European a lliance defeats Napoleon at, 4 2 2 Watt . W. Mont gomery , 35 Webe r, Max on kin gship, 2 1 on religious innovation, 3 7 on fe udalis m , 2 2 7 , 248 on peasant emancipation, 4 19 on Russian ancien r egi m e, 52 4 on bu reaucracy,579 Wesso n , Robe rt G . , 2 25-226 W heatley, Pau l, 49 W h itgi ft , John (Archbishop) ( 153 0-
Wil l iam Il (Ru fu s ) (1087-110 0) , 1 87188
William I I I (1689-1702) Prince of O r an ge leads Protestant coalition against France, 3 3 2 elevated to the E n glish t h rone, 3 1 8 Wi l so n , Charles, 2 86 Wo l f, F. A . , Ge rman classicist, 404 W u Ti ( Emperor) ( 18 7-140 B . C . ) , 55, 57
Yamato dynasty, 63 -66,450 Yamazaki , Ansai ( 1 6 18- 1 682) , 455 Yaroslav t he Wise (d. 105 4) , 9 0 Yosh ida, Shoin (183 0-185 9) , 461462
16 04),3 10-3 1 1
William the Ma rshall (re ge n t
of
England), 193
William
I
(The Conqueror) (1066-
1087), 183f[
Zagorin, Perez, 16,3 03,3 13 - 3 14
Zemskii Sobol' (Estate Assemblies) , 117-118