Karl Marx, Anthropologist
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Karl Marx, Anthropologist
Thomas C. Patterson
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Karl Marx, Anthropologist
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Karl Marx, Anthropologist
Thomas C. Patterson
Oxford • New York
First published in 2009 by Berg Editorial offices: 1st Floor, Angel Court, 81 St Clements Street, Oxford, OX4 1AW, UK 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010, USA
© Thomas C. Patterson 2009
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form or by any means without the written permission of Berg. Berg is the imprint of Oxford International Publishers Ltd.
Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Patterson, Thomas Carl. Karl Marx, anthropologist / Thomas C. Patterson. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-1-84520-511-9 (pbk.) ISBN-10: 1-84520-511-1 (pbk.) ISBN-13: 978-1-84520-509-6 (cloth) ISBN-10: 1-84520-509-X (cloth) 1. Marx, Karl, 1818–1883. 2. Anthropologists—Germany—Biography. 3. Anthropology—History. 4. Anthropology—Philosophy. I. Title. GN21.M2575P38 2009 301.092—dc22 [B] 2009000314
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 978 184520 509 6 (Cloth) ISBN 978 184520 511 9 (Paper) Typeset by JS Typesetting Ltd, Porthcawl, Mid Glamorgan Printed in the UK by the MPG Books Group
www.bergpublishers.com
For Friends, Colleagues, and Students
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Contents Preface
ix
Chronology
xi
Introduction Polemics, Caveats, and Standpoints Organization of the Book
1 3 5
1
The Enlightenment and Anthropology Early Enlightenment Thought The New Anthropology of the Enlightenment The Institutionalization of Anthropology
9 10 15 23
2
Marx’s Anthropology What are Human Beings? History Truth and Praxis
39 41 51 57
3
Human Natural Beings Charles Darwin and the Development of Modern Evolutionary Theory Human Natural Beings: Bodies That Walk, Talk, Make Tools, and Have Culture Marx on the Naturalization of Social Inequality
65 67 74 87
4
History, Culture, and Social Formation Marx’s Historical-Dialectical Conceptual Framework Pre-Capitalist Societies: Limited, Local, and Vital
91 93 105
5
Capitalism and the Anthropology of the Modern World The Transition to Capitalism and its Development The Articulation of Modes of Production Property, Power, and Capitalist States
117 119 128 138
viii • Contents 6
Anthropology for the Twenty-First Century Social Relations and the Formation of Social Individuals Anthropology: “The Study of People in Crisis by People in Crisis”
145 147 158
Notes
173
Bibliography
181
Index
219
Preface This book is an exploration of a form of social theory that has a long history of suppression in the United States. The high points of this were undoubtedly the Palmer Raids of the 1920s and the McCarthyism and the House Un-American Activities of the 1950s, although the antipathy of the vast majority of academics to anything but mainstream social thought in the decades that followed has been only slightly less deadening. The red-baiting of scholars who saw Marx only through the lens of anti-communism has gradually been replaced by scholars who assert that Marx is really passé, especially after the dismantling of the Soviet Union. While the sentiments underlying such statements are often conveyed by rolled eyes or kneejerk red-baiting, they are as often backed up by claims that one or another of the latest fads in social theory provide the bases for more textured analyses of what has happened during the last twenty years or even by declarations that history is over since the whole world is now, or should be, on the road to capitalism. What rarely happens, however, is any direct engagement and extended dialogue with what Marx actually said. More common are statements that rely on what someone claimed Marx said or that engage with the commentators on Marx, sympathetic or otherwise, rather than Marx himself. My goal is to engage directly with Marx’s works rather than those of subsequent writers in the Marxist tradition. Nevertheless, I am acutely aware of the difficulty of disengaging from the arguments and insights of subsequent commentators on Marx’s views, both sympathetic and otherwise, since my own thoughts and actions were shaped in part in the same intellectual and social milieu in which they wrote and were read. Keeping in mind Marx’s quip that he was not a Marxist, the book is Marxian rather than Marxist. Hence, it is not a book about Marxism and anthropology or Marxist anthropology; several of those have already been written. While Maurice Godelier’s (1973/1977) Perspectives in Marxist Anthropology, Ángel Palerm’s (1980) Antropología y marxismo, Marc Abélès’s (1976) Anthropologie et Marxisme, and Randall McGuire’s (1992) A Marxist Archaeology are a few that come immediately to mind, there are others as well. My first direct acquaintance with Marx’s writing occurred in 1959 in an introductory course in Western civilization with a selection from The Communist Manifesto. Two years later in Peru, I realized that broadly leftist newspaper writers in Peru provided accounts that better fit with my perceptions than those of their more mainstream contemporaries, and that they gave me a clearer and deeper understanding of what was happening there at the time. Over the next five years in
ix
x • Preface Peru, I would occasionally buy at a kiosk in Lima and read pamphlets containing articles Marx had written about capitalism. I also purchased the English-language edition of his Pre-capitalist Economic Formations shortly after it arrived in a Lima bookstore. The latter provided the inspiration and means for beginning to think in new ways about the societies, past and present, that were the object of inquiry for anthropologists. At various times from the late 1960s or early 1970s onward, I participated rather regularly in reading groups or university courses variously concerned with the writings of Marx, Engels, or their successors. These groups ranged from ones composed entirely of political activists through those with mixtures of activists, anthropologists, and students from different universities to courses and seminars with student and occasionally other faculty participants. Writing is a social rather than a solitary venture for me. I read passages to friends over the telephone and share drafts of manuscripts with them, hoping they have time to comment on them and feeling exceedingly appreciative when they do. I also try out ideas in courses to see if they are expressed clearly in ways that students can understand and use constructively to build and refine their own views. Since I have been doing this for quite a few years at this point in my life, the list of people, living and dead, who have helped me clarify my own ideas is a long one. Instead of attempting to list all of them, and undoubtedly missing a few in the process, let me mention just a few: Karen Spalding and Richard Lee who have been there almost since the beginning; Christine Gailey, John Gledhill, Karen Brodkin, Bob Paynter, Peter Gran, and Kathy Walker who have regularly helped me clarify my ideas and prose since the 1980s; Edna Bonacich, Joseph Childers, Stephen Cullenberg, Michael Kearney, and Juliet McMullin who have helped me to look at Marx through different lenses since I arrived at UCR in 2000; and, most of all, Wendy Ashmore—my colleague, friend, and wife—who sets high standards and has provided instantaneous feedback, constructive criticism, happiness, and contentment for more than a decade.
Chronology 1818 1820
5 May: Karl Marx born in Trier, Westphalia in the Rhineland of Prussia. 28 November: Frederick Engels born in Barmen, Westphalia in the Rhineland of Prussia. 1830 Marx enters high school in Trier. 1835 Marx’s essay on choosing a vocation; Marx enters the University of Bonn. 1836 Marx transfers to the University of Berlin. 1837 Marx writes about fragmentation of curriculum and begins to grapple with Hegel’s writings. 1838 Engels drops out of high school to work as unsalaried clerk in Bremen. 1841 Engels joins Prussian army and attends lectures at the University of Berlin. 1842 November: Marx and Engels meet at Cologne office of the Rheinische Zeitung; Engels goes to work at family textile firm in Manchester, England, where he meets Mary Burns who introduces him to English working-class life and with whom he has lifelong relationship; Engels begins collecting materials for The Condition of the Working Class in England (1845), arguably the first empirical anthropology of an urban community. 1843–4 Marx resigns from the Rheinische Zeitung; marries Jenny von Westphalen; emigrates to Paris in search of employment, and writes Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844); Marx and Engels meet for second time and begin lifelong collaboration, the earliest product of which was The Holy Family (1845), a critique of the Young Hegelians. 1845–8 February 1845: Marx expelled from France by the Minister of the Interior; Marx, his wife and children move to Brussels; Marx argues in Theses on Feuerbach (1845) for the importance of the practical activity of corporeal human beings as social individuals bound together by ensembles of social relations. April 1845: Engels arrives in Brussels; in The German Ideology (1845–6), Marx and Engels lay foundations of their materialist theory of history and refine the philosophical anthropology Marx sketched earlier; both devote energies to organizing workers and join the German Communist League. 21 February 1848: German Communist League publishes Marx and Engels’s The Communist Manifesto. 3 March 1848: King of Belgium deports Marx, who returns to Cologne and launches the Neue Rheinische Zeitung.
xi
xii • Chronology 1849
1851–3
1853–7
1857–9
1861–3
1864
1867
1870 1875
1876 1877–82
The Neue Rheinische Zeitung suppressed by Prussian government; Marx and Engels arrested and subsequently released; Marx deported and deprived of citizenship. June: Marx and family arrive in Paris, are placed under police surveillance in July, and leave in late August for London; Engels participates in armed uprising in South Germany, escapes as refugee, returns to England, re-enters family firm in Manchester as clerk. Marx and Engels analyze the failed revolutions of 1848–9; Marx’s The Class Struggle in France, 1848 to 1850 (1850) and The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852) and Engels’s Revolution and CounterRevolution in Germany (1851–3). Marx writes series of articles for New York Daily Tribune on colonialism and plunder of India, destruction of Indian textile economy, complexity of Indian society, village communities, and subversion of traditional property relations and creation of new property relations during colonial rule. Marx synthesizes his philosophical anthropology, critique of political economy, and notions of pre-capitalist modes of production in Grundrisse (1857–58) and A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859). Marx historicizes and further refines his views on labor, the importance and appearance of surplus values, and the role of competition and monopoly in creating dependence in an increasingly international capitalist economy in his early drafts of the three volumes of Capital. Formation of the International Workingman’s Association (i.e. The First International) in which Marx and Engels would play prominent roles until it was disbanded in 1876. Marx publishes first volume of Capital (1867), which analyzes the simple reproduction of capital and primitive accumulation using anthropological and historical information. Social relations and contradictions of the Paris Commune analyzed by Marx in The Civil War in France (1871). Marx circulates his Critique of the Gotha Program, a proposal put forward by socialists and communists in the German Democratic Workers Party who advocate social reform rather than revolution. Engels writes The Part Played by Labor in the Transition from Ape to Man. Marx writes large part of second volume of Capital, including section on the circuits of capital and expanded reproduction of capital; this was buttressed by readings of rural social organization in Russia, changes in global property resulting from colonialism and intrusion of capitalism into non-Western, non-capitalist societies in order to understand interconnections of cultural diversity and capitalist expansion; Marx circulates Workers’ Questionnaire (1880).
Chronology • xiii 1880 1883 1884
Engels writes Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. 13 March: Marx dies in London. Engels publishes The Origins of the Family Private Property and the State: In Light of the Investigations of Lewis H. Morgan (1884), which was based partly on Marx’s notes on Morgan’s Ancient Society (1877); Engels’s book translated into Italian, Rumanian, Danish, and French during next four years. 1893 Engels elected honorary president of International Socialist Congress (i.e. Second International). 1884–95 Engels prepares the second and third volumes of Capital for publication. 1895 5 August: Engels dies in London
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Introduction Karl Marx was an anthropologist. This may seem an unusual claim, since he is more frequently identified as a political radical, an economist, a journalist and, occasionally, even a philosopher. When Marx (1818–83) lived in the nineteenth century, knowledge had not yet been divided into the academic disciplines found on college and university campuses today. While anthropology as an academic discipline and a profession would not appear until the 1870s or 1880s, courses on anthropology had already been taught in some universities for more than a century by a variety of persons—physicians, historians, theologians, and philosophers, like Immanuel Kant who lectured annually on the subject for more than twenty years beginning in 1772. We know that Marx took an anthropology course taught by Henrik Steffens during his first year at the University of Berlin in 1837, and that he attended lectures by the anthropogeographer Carl Ritter (Finkelstein 2001; Kelley 1978, 1984; Ryding 1975: 7); however, we also know that taking a course in a subject is not a rite of passage that automatically or necessarily makes students into anthropologists or physicists at the end of the term. Thus, we need to look at the claim more carefully. Precisely what does it mean to assert that Marx was an anthropologist? What evidence and lines of argumentation support this contention? Anthropology has a dual heritage. One strand, which we will call “empirical anthropology” for the moment, examines both the external characteristics of human beings and their cultural achievements, including how they communicate symbolically, the activities that define their social lives and relationships, and the material evidence for their history both social and as a species (Diamond 1980: 13). Over the centuries, various writers have contributed to this strand of anthropological thought; these include Herodotus’s description of Egyptian society in the fifth century BC, Li Ssu’s analysis of tributary relationships during the Ch’in Dynasty, Domingo de Santo Tomas’s sixteenth-century grammar and dictionary of the Inca language, Heinrich Schliemann’s excavations at Troy, or Mary Leakey’s fossil and archaeological discoveries in East Africa, to name only a few. Empirical anthropology has had a very discontinuous distribution in time and space, and this fact has fueled a number of long-running debates concerned with whether anthropology originated in classical antiquity, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, or the late nineteenth century; whether it was quintessentially a European activity; and whether there might be non-European traditions of empirical anthropological practice. In my view, it is possible to talk about a number of distinct traditions of empirical anthropological inquiry, such as those fostered in classical antiquity, Renaissance
1
2 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist Italy, sixteenth-century Spain, or the late eighteenth-century Enlightenment (e.g. Pagden 1982; Rowe 1964, 1965; Wokler 1993).1 The other strand, often called “philosophical anthropology,” is concerned with the presuppositions of the various traditions of empirical anthropology, especially with what its practitioners believe to be the core features, or ontological structures, that constitute human beings. As Michael Landmann (1969/1974: 18) put it: “Are we looking for properties that must be manifested in all men who have ever lived or will live, in all cultures, or, in other words, for a criterion enabling us to determine whether or not a being is a man at all?” Since its scope is different, philosophical anthropology operates at a different level from the empirical strand and articulates in different ways with social critiques as well as with other discussions or disciplines. It arguably has a more continuous distribution in time and space. While I am not claiming that there is only a single tradition of philosophical anthropology, I would argue that, at any given moment, it resembles a cable with multiple, intertwined and interacting strands. Moreover, empirical inquiries have episodically forced changes in philosophical anthropology. While Marx was undoubtedly aware of both empirical and philosophical anthropology during his student days at Berlin,2 he was seemingly concerned initially at least with the former, judging by his 1842 critique of the philosophical underpinnings of influential faculty members, who constituted the “German historical school of law” and who argued among other things that laws typically develop organically from the community without the interference of authorities (Marx 1842/1975). His association with Frederick Engels, which also began that year, would soon bring the empirical strand and its ongoing importance into sharp focus. Shortly after they met, Engels would spend two years in Manchester, England where he worked in a family-owned mill and assembled the information for The Condition of the Working Class in England, which has a legitimate claim to being the first urban ethnography (Engels 1845/1975). In a similar vein, Marx and Engels’s (1848/1976) Communist Manifesto, which appeared in 1848, can be viewed as a set of policy recommendations not unlike those made today by applied anthropologists concerned with the well-being of the peoples with whom they work. It was an early effort at anthropological praxis—the merging of data, theory, and practice. These were followed from the early 1850s onward by the thick descriptions and analyses of The Eighteenth Brumaire and The Civil War in France, which depict the dynamics of mid nineteenth-century class struggle in France and the organization of the Paris Commune in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War of 1871 (Marx 1852/1979, 1871/1986). Interspersed with his more empirical studies were theoretically informed, historical analyses of different forms of pre- or noncapitalist property relations and the development of capitalism—i.e. The Grundrisse of 1857–8 and Capital, which he wrote in the mid 1860s (Marx 1857–8/1973, 1863–7/1977, 1864–94/1981, 1865–85/1981). Marx also continued his explorations of the philosophical underpinnings of a variety of subjects ranging from his critique
Introduction • 3 of the socialists’ Gotha Program to the new ethnology of Lewis Henry Morgan and others, which he outlined in his Ethnological Notebooks in the early 1880s just before his death (Marx 1875/1989, 1880–2/1974). This book has two aims. The first is to examine what one social theorist, Karl Marx, made of the anthropological discussions that had taken place since the mid eighteenth century and that, in many ways, had formative or shaping influences on his thought. For more than a century, commentators have customarily acknowledged that Marx drew inspiration from the writings of British political economists, German philosophers, and French socialists (e.g. Engels 1878/1987; Lenin 1913/1963). However, it is clear from citations and casual references that Marx read more widely than those commentators suggested. While trained as a philosopher, Marx was also an anthropologist by nineteenth-century standards if not by modern ones. The question here is: What were the sensibilities of his philosophical anthropology and what might it look like today? After contextualizing Marx’s work and elaborating his anthropology, I want to consider what his legacy actually is or could be to the issues of anthropological importance today—not just the obvious or the easy ones such as the transition to or the effects of capitalism but also issues about which he said little if anything directly. In other words, given what we know about his philosophical anthropology, what might he have said today about such issues of empirical anthropology as the evolution of humankind, the origins and consequences of symbolic communication with and through language, the development of personhood, state formation, and, perhaps most importantly, the question of where anthropology goes from here.
Polemics, Caveats, and Standpoints This book is a polemic. I have a perspective or standpoint on Marx’s writings and their relations with authors who employ and advocate other social theoretical traditions as well as with subsequent writers within the Marxist tradition who have been influenced to varying degrees and in different ways by Marx and his successors. Controversies have swirled around interpretations of Marx and his writings for more than a century. These result partly from different political and philosophical commitments and partly from disagreements over political tactics in particular concrete situations. There are diverse external critiques of Marx’s thought and that of his successors (e.g. Giddens 1981; MacGregor 1998; Rorty 1989) as well as even more numerous and diverse disagreements that are internal to the Marxist tradition (e.g. Cohen 1978; Cullenberg 1996; O’Neill 1982; Thompson 1978). Some of the debates reflect the availability of Marx’s writings at the time they were written. For example, the third volume of Capital was not published until 1895; the Theories of Surplus Value did not appear until 1911; The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, which were published first in German in 1932 and then in Russian in 1956, only became
4 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist available in English in 1960; and the Grundrisse was largely unknown in the West until Martin Nicolaus’s English translation appeared in 1973. In practical terms, this means that someone writing in 1910, for instance, might not even have been aware of the existence of the unpublished works and would certainly not have been able to assess either their content or potential significance at the time. A number of things are at stake in the debates. These include but are not limited to the following questions: Did Marx hold a linear theory of social (r)evolution, or did he have more textured appreciation of the possibilities of diverse trajectories of historical development and the importance of historical contingency? Was he an economic determinist who held to a strict base–superstructure model of society and believed in the economic determination of society, culture, and history in the last instance, or did he have a more nuanced understanding of the mutual interconnections of ensembles of social relations, culture, practical activity, and the capacity of people to make their own history on occasion? Did he argue that people were merely the bearers of economic, political-juridical, and ideological structures that shaped their beliefs and actions, or did he believe that human beings possessed agency and had the capacity to change those structures? Did he hold that human beings acted always as economically rational individuals and that the cultural norms of a society were reducible to individual choice, or did he think that people make their own history under circumstances not of their own choice but rather under those which they confronted? Did he accept a notion of society that was merely the sum of its individual parts, which existed prior to and independent of the totality (a Cartesian totality which could be reduced atomistically to those parts); did he adopt a more holistic (Hegelian) notion of society in which neither the parts nor the whole were reducible to the other and whose essence unfolded dialectically, successively, and teleologically throughout history; or did Marx see the sociohistorical totality as something that lacked a beginning (essence) or end (telos) and was instead “the ever-pre-givenness of a structured complex unity” as Louis Althusser (1963/1970: 199; emphasis in the original) claimed? Did Marx suppose that thinking and being were distinct from one another and that the latter had an ontological priority over the former, or did he believe that they were mutually constitutive of one another and hence both irreducible to and overdetermined by the other? Were social-class structures expressing domination, oppression, and exploitation universal features of the human condition, or were they historically constituted under particular circumstances and conditions? Were Marx’s social individuals—defined by their positionality in particular ensembles of social relations—also fragmented, contradictory subjects? Were they alienated individuals whose subjectivities were partly constituted through the perceptions of others; were their subjectivities self-constructed, situational, and impermanent; or did they only come into existence through the interplay of language and power lodged in impersonal institutions? The answers to these and similar questions are not exclusively academic concerns, since they may have immediate consequences for what you as a human being
Introduction • 5 believe, for how you choose to live your life, and for the kinds of practical activity, commitments, and political action with which you are able and willing to engage. As an activist friend, born and bred on the Lower East Side of New York, used to say: “The path to radical social change is like riding the Broadway local from the Staten Island terminal (a subway line that runs from Staten Island to the Bronx). Some people get off at the first stop; others will ride to Times Square or even Harlem; and a few will stay all the way to the end of the line.” This book has a standpoint with regard to these and other issues. Among other things, I will argue that Marx adopted a critical-dialectical perspective that historicized both nature and human society—a perspective that began with Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Buffon in the mid eighteenth century, and that ultimately had a significant impact on Scottish Enlightenment writers like Adam Smith as well as German critics of Enlightenment liberalism like Herder and Hegel. In the late 1830s and early 1840s, Marx began to develop a philosophical anthropology that included the corporeal organization of human beings, ensembles of social relations, the relation of the individual to society, the diversity and historicity of human societies, alienation, objectification, production, reproduction, labor, freedom, practical activity, and the historicity of dispositions and social relations commonly attributed to human nature. These informed the empirical anthropology he developed from the 1840s onward: his studies of the failed revolutions on the European continent in 1848–9, the Indian mutiny of the 1850s, the critique of capitalism in the 1860s, and the impact of imperialism on societies and cultural practices on the periphery of the capitalist world in the 1870s.
Organization of the Book Marx was a prodigious reader. He was familiar with the writers of both classical antiquity and the Enlightenment. Since neither were ever monolithic intellectual movements, this means that he had greater or lesser familiarity with various philosophical perspectives that were developed first in antiquity and then were recycled, refined, and superseded from the late seventeenth century onward. More importantly, he was familiar with the arguments they produced and with the ways in which they were inscribed in the cultural patterns, traditions, and politics of his day. Chapter 1, “The Enlightenment and Anthropology,” examines how nature and then human society were slowly historicized from the 1670s onward, culminating in Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws, Buffon’s Natural History, and Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, all of which were published around 1750. These path-breaking works had marked influences on subsequent writers. It is reasonable to say that the Scottish historical philosophers like Adam Smith as well as central European philosophers like Kant, Herder, and Hegel engaged in a dialogue with the historical-dialectical and critical anthropology outlined by Montesquieu,
6 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist Buffon, and Rousseau. An anthropological perspective, combining both its empirical and philosophical dimensions, crystallized at the University of Göttingen in the late eighteenth century; the importance of this, from our standpoint, was that this perspective served as the model for university reform in Europe and elsewhere, most notably at the University of Berlin where Marx was a student in the late 1830s. Chapter 2, “Marx’s Anthropology,” outlines the major features of his philosophical anthropology—the corporeal organization of human beings, the significance of ensembles of social relations, the diversity and historicity of human societies, and the importance of praxis in the production, reproduction, and transformation of those communities. Unlike Rousseau, Hegel, and others, Marx did not distinguish between the physical and moral character of human beings and thus separate the human history from the realm of nature. He saw a dialectical interplay between a biological substrate—the corporeal organization of the body, which endows all members of the human species with certain potentials—and the sets of social relations that shape everyday life in the worlds in which the social individuals of historically specific communities live and acquire their consciousness. Thus, human nature is not only historicized but also plural. Marx’s view of the world was profoundly historicist, and history involved the intertwined development of human beings, ensembles of social relations (societies), and nature itself. Finally, the chapter considers Marx’s notion of praxis, the most basic and characteristic feature of human beings, by means of which they establish relations with objects of the external world and with one another. Chapter 3, “Human Natural Beings,” considers the bases for Marx’s agreement with and positive evaluation of Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species (1859/1964). These included Darwin’s rejection of teleological arguments in the natural sciences, his adoption of a notion of historically contingent change, his concern with variation, and his view that individual organisms are the consequence of interactions with their environments. This provides a foundation for considering in more detail real or potential connections between the materialist and naturalist positions put forth by Marx and Charles Darwin in the nineteenth century—a process which has been set in motion by Joseph Fracchia, Richard Lewontin, David McNally, and others in recent years. The chapter then explores concepts elaborated by Marx in the 1840s, which he subsequently honed in later works: the corporeal organization of human beings, objectification (how they came to be aware of the world through sensory experience while living in social groups that transformed given natural and preexisting sociocultural worlds into human worlds), and dispositions (the capabilities and constraints embedded in those thinking bodies). Labor is an embodied process as are instruments of labor like the hand, the human perceptual system, the brain, and the anatomical structures associated with speech. Using this conceptual framework as well as Engels’s (1876/1972) essay on the role of labor in the transition from ape to human, it examines the human fossil record in order to discern the interplay of changing dispositions and anatomical structures, the emergence of practices such as tool-making and language, and how these might have happened.
Introduction • 7 Chapter 4, “History, Culture, and Social Formation,” explores the alternative Marx developed from the late 1850s onward to the societal evolutionism of the Enlightenment theorists of agrarian capitalism or to Hegel’s teleological views about the actualization of the human mind and the unfolding of free subjectivity. Marx focused instead on the historicity of the individual and of social relations rather than a human nature that could be reduced largely to its psychobiological or spiritual dimensions. In his view, the distinctive features of humankind—creative intelligence realized through and manifested in labor, sociality, language, culture, the production of use values (items that satisfy human needs), and the creation of new needs—were neither timeless nor persistent but rather were constituted, reproduced, and transformed in particular sociohistorical contexts. Marx began his analysis of how societies produced the material conditions for their own reproduction not with exchange, supply and demand, or the allocation of scarce resources (the starting points for classical political economists) but rather with production itself. Using the concept of a mode of production, he developed a commentary on alternative pathways in the development of property relations away from those of the original kinship-based communities. In effect, he argued that not all historically specific societies developed in the same way or even passed through the same succession of modes of production. Here, we examine both the theoretical framework Marx sketched as well as how archaeologists and historians have contributed to the clarification of its implications. Chapter 5, “Capitalism and the Anthropology of the Modern World,” considers what Marx thought about the processes underlying the transition to capitalism and the subsequent development of industrial capitalism on an ever-expanding scale through the formation of domestic and overseas markets, and colonies that supplied not only raw materials but also customers for the commodities produced. While it is a story of the plunder of primitive accumulation and the relentless subordination of ever-increasing numbers of people both at home and abroad into the disciplinary relations of capitalism, it is also a story of resistance, uneven development along different trajectories as a result of articulation of capitalist societies with societies with different modes of production that were differentially resistant to change, and the imposition of colonial rule by capitalist national states. The story also involved massive emigration, the rise of nationalist politics and its interconnections with diasporic communities, political fragmentation, creation of new colonial territories and national states, and the development of new forms of political institutions and practices. Marx was aware that there were state-based societies in which commodity production was not well developed and market exchange had not penetrated into all corners of everyday life. What distinguished them from capitalist societies and from one another were the forms of social property relations and production as well as the specific forms in which goods or labor power were appropriated from the direct producers by the members of non-producing class(es)—e.g. through extra-economic means such as coercion, taxes, laws, or rent or the exploitation of various categories
8 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist of unfree labor and wage-workers. He recognized that property was a relation between classes of individuals that was mediated by things. He also recognized that political power entailed maintaining injustice in and through property relations. This recognition underpinned his writings about the state from the 1840s onward both in general works and in accounts of particular cases, like France, Germany, or the United States. His views on these topics provide the foundations for a historical and critical-dialectical anthropology for the twenty-first century. Chapter 6, “Anthropology for the Twenty-First Century,” begins with Marx’s first premise of history: the existence of real, living human individuals. In The German Ideology, he identifies three additional premises: (a) the activities by which the individuals satisfy their needs; (b) the creation of new needs; and (c) the reproduction of the individual in the family. Marx also claimed that reality does not reside in the idea of society but rather in the reality of the individual, and that, while there can be no relation between the individual and society, there are relations among individuals. Moreover, history is experienced phenomenologically in the lives of living individuals. This raises a number of questions. For example, how do personal conditions and experiences become general ones? How do individuals realize needs and desires, create new needs, and reproduce themselves? What is involved in the self-realization of these capacities, and what constrains their self-actualization? The problems we confront in the twenty-first century have not changed: the need for social justice in its myriad dimensions, discrimination (based on racism, sexism, xenophobia, and the intolerance of various nationalisms and fundamentalisms), the inequities marked by class struggle, and the degradation of the world on which we live, to name only a few. Marx might even argue that the celebration of diverse identities in the absence of inequality and discrimination is probably not such a bad idea. The issue is how do we eliminate discrimination in circumstances in which diversity is continually reconstituted in order to perpetuate inequalities? Marx’s political activism and sense of social justice were always combined with continuous critical investigation. He was acutely aware of how unforgiving the consequences of political action can be; he also knew how important it is to understand as accurately and completely as possible the forces involved and in getting political action right. After all, some stories or visions of the future have better endings than others!
–1– The Enlightenment and Anthropology The Enlightenment, the “Age of Reason,” was a tumultuous period. It persisted, according to some, from the early 1600s to as late as the 1830s. It was marked by a series of processes that mutually shaped and reinforced one another. These included: (1) the formation of merchant empires and overseas colonies in the Americas, Africa, and Asia established by Holland, Spain, Portugal, England, France, and Russia from the mid fifteenth century onward combined with the creation of increasingly large domestic markets in England and other parts of Europe (McNally 1988; Tracy 1990); (2) the rise of anti-authoritarian sentiment, skepticism, and the appeal to reason or rationality which challenged and ultimately eroded the divinely ordained authority claimed by the churches and the aristocracy during and after the Reformation (Israel 2001; Popkin 1979); (3) the “scientific revolution”—also characterized as the “conquest of nature” or the “death of nature”—which involved the assimilation of a new understanding of nature into the wider culture and society, because of the desire of the emerging commercial classes for technological innovations and the erosion of barriers separating intellectuals and artisans (Forbes 1968; Jacob 1988; Merchant 1980; Zilsel 2003); and (4) the rise of industrial capitalism, analyzed later by Marx in Capital, which involved the appearance of new forms of manufacture from about 1750 onward that were based on the continual adoption of technological innovations, the transformation of social relations, the construction of factories, and the growth of cities across northern Europe (Hobsbawm 1968). The Enlightenment was also marked by continuous conflicts between Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, and various Protestant fringe movements from the 1520s onward. Some claim that this “war of the Churches constituted Europe’s prime engine of cultural and educational change” until the mid seventeenth century when “major intellectual turmoil developed first in the Dutch Republic and the Calvinist states of Germany” (Israel 2001: 23). Besides the ideological and political strife that formed the backdrop to everyday life, there were probably no more than a few decades between 1600 and 1830 when peace prevailed and battles or wars were not being waged somewhere in the world. The impact of the Enlightenment was not limited to the soldiers and sailors who died in these wars. It was felt by all layers of society. More than one aristocrat and preacher of the day lamented that “even the common people were susceptible to new ideas” (Israel 2001: 1, 8–9). While Europe is often portrayed as its center of gravity, this is not precisely correct. Enlightenment thought was discussed and deployed in the Americas, the Middle
9
10 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist East, and Asia. For example, the rhetoric of the American Revolution was rooted in the ideas of Enlightenment writers. The contents of Mercurio Peruano, published in Peru during the 1790s, included articles ranging from Newtonian science and natural history through commentaries on political economy to discussions of philosophy, the French Revolution, and the idea of the nation. Commercial minorities that connected the Ottoman state, India, China, and Japan to Europe were familiar with the scientific and social-theoretical contributions of the Enlightenment (e.g. Chatterjee 1986: 54; Gran 1979; Habib 1990; Mauro 1990; Rossabi 1990; Wang 1990). What the Enlightenment provided were analytical categories and a conceptual framework—a language, if you will—for discussing issues of the day. Political reformers and leaders of nationalist or revolutionary movements in areas as widely separated as Latin America, the eastern Mediterranean (including Egypt and Greece), and Japan used this language from the late eighteenth century onward to express and buttress their plans and goals. Moreover, virtually every nationalist movement of the last two centuries has made use of concepts originated by or derived from Enlightenment writers. This chapter has three goals. The first is to comment briefly on early Enlightenment thought in order to provide a background to standpoints that appeared around 1750 and affected social commentators, including Marx, who wrote after that date. The second goal is to examine both the philosophical and empirical foundations of the new anthropology of Enlightenment writers as well as the contexts in which it emerged in the mid eighteenth century. The third goal is to examine the subsequent development of anthropology and to consider the various manifestations of anthropological sensibilities in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
Early Enlightenment Thought The standpoints of Enlightenment thinkers never constituted a unified, fixed body of ideas and arguments. The movement can be described as a spectrum of warring factions engaged in heated debate, whose perspectives, boundaries, centers of gravity, and even membership shifted as they developed through time. At one end were the traditionalists who argued for the divinely inspired authority of the existing aristocratic and ecclesiastical hierarchies. The other, radical end of the spectrum was occupied by a number of individuals, the most notable of whom were Baruch Spinoza (1632–77) and Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716). The former, a Dutch lens grinder, challenged knowledge claims based on revealed religion and argued, among other things, that nature creates itself in accordance with rules which govern its operation, that the creations of nature are produced in a fixed order, and that human values (e.g. good and evil) do not exist in nature but are human creations instead (Allison 2005; Garrett 1995). The latter, a German mining engineer and civil servant, laid the foundations for seeing nature historically as a dynamic world in flux that had
The Enlightenment and Anthropology • 11 the capacity to change continually through time (Garber 2005; Glass 1959: 37–8; Sleigh 1995). Arrayed between the traditionalist and radical extremes were a series of intermediate, “moderate” standpoints—such as Cartesianism (rationalism) and empiricism. Each position had theological, scientific, political, and philosophical dimensions. The arguments among their advocates “rarely referred directly to the political and social conflict but did so in a mediated way. These conflicts were about the nature of fundamental boundaries, like that between mind and body, human and animal, living and non-living, male and female” (Jordanova 1986: 33). They also gave rise to enduring terms like “materialist,” “liberal,” “romantic,” “conservative,” and “socialist” not to mention the words “ideology” and “scientist.” The most striking features shared by a majority of the factions of the Enlightenment, but not always the same ones, were arguments about the autonomy of the individual, the importance of rationality or the use of reason, the existence of a natural world constituted outside of human beings, and rather mechanistic views about what nature was like. It is also clear, however, that they did not always necessarily see or understand the individual, rationality, and nature in quite the same way. This was true as well of their views on the importance of toleration, equality, property, and contracts, which were also widely discussed. For our immediate purposes here, the debates about nature and history from about 1670 to 1750, fueled in significant ways by Spinoza and Leibniz, laid the foundations for the development of a new way of perceiving and understanding nature and the place of human beings in it. As Jacques Roger (1963/1997: 366) observed, “Like the thought it was combating, the new scientific philosophy was to rest upon a general conception of man, nature, and God.” This perspective emphasized the importance of observation and reasoning; it asserted that mechanistic explanations which viewed nature as a huge machine were too simple to account for its complexity; and it transformed God from a creator who intervened directly in nature into an artisan who either acted indirectly or not at all.1
The World Historicized Both nature and human society were slowly historicized after the 1670s. By this, I mean that understanding the history of some thing was absolutely necessary for truly knowing that thing, regardless of whether it was nature, human society, or a commodity. Here, history involved the concepts of both process and succession. This historicized perspective of the world and its inhabitants crystallized in the mid eighteenth century with the appearance in rapid succession of Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws in 1748, Buffon’s Natural History in 1749, and Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origins of Inequality in 1755. Let us consider each writer in more detail. The Baron de Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat (1689–1755), was an astute social commentator and critic who had read widely in the travel literature
12 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist of the day and recognized the diversity of manners and customs that existed from one society to another. For our purposes, he wrote three books of note. The earliest was the Persian Letters (Montesquieu 1721/1973), in which two imaginary young princes from Persia travel throughout France and comment in letters they send home about the incomprehensibility of French mores and traditional values as they existed in the early eighteenth century around the time of Louis XIV’s death. In this work, Montesquieu saw “society as a reality that was external to the individual, constraining him to act and think in certain ways” and that “prevents him from evaluating his position in society with any degree of objectivity, . . . [since] his understanding of its values, norms and institutional structures are purely subjective” (Baum 1979: 43). In his second work, Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and Their Decline (1734/1965), Montesquieu rejected theological arguments and began to work out the methodological foundations for a historical standpoint that would neither view human history as one accident or error after another nor see the diversity of manners and customs of peoples around the world as signs of human weakness or irrationality (Althusser 1959/1982: 20–1). He sought instead to discover the particularities of Roman history. With regard to the former, he wrote: It is not chance that rules the world. Ask the Romans, who had a continuous sequence of successes when they were guided by a certain plan, and an uninterrupted sequence of reverses when they followed another. There are general causes, moral and physical, which act in every monarchy, elevating it. Maintaining it, or hurling it to the ground. All accidents are controlled by these causes. And if by chance of one battle—that is, a particular cause—has brought a state to ruin, some general cause made it necessary for that state to perish in a single battle. In a word, the main trend draws with it all particular accidents. (Montesquieu 1734/1965: 169)
Thus, as Raymond Aron (1965/1998: 15) put it: “behind the seemingly accidental course of events, we must grasp the underlying causes which account for them.” Montesquieu distinguished two phases of Roman historical development: one when the government and the society were in harmony or equilibrium; the other when there were contradictions between the aims of the state, on the one hand, and values, principles, or spirit that unified the populace, on the other. These crises were the dialectic of history, its motor. Montesquieu refined his concept of the underlying causes of development in his third work, The Spirit of the Laws (1748/1965). He argued that the diversity of laws and manners, i.e., forms of government, found in societies around the world could be reduced to a few types—republics, monarchies, and despotisms. Each type had its own distinctive nature, which was shaped by both the number of individuals who possessed sovereignty and the ways in which they exercised it; each type also had distinctive sentiments—such as morality, honor, or fear—that promoted harmony
The Enlightenment and Anthropology • 13 among its citizens. In other words, Montesquieu saw a connection between the form of government, on the one hand, and the style of interpersonal relations, on the other; he argued that social life is shaped by the way in which power is exercised. As he had shown earlier, when there were contradictions between the spirit (sentiments) of the people and the aims of the state, crises emerged which eroded the form of government. Montesquieu also considered the material or physical causes—like climate or soil—have on the customs, manners, and laws of diverse peoples. He argued that there was a correlation, for example, between the incidence of polygamy and warm climates, and that the laws and forms of government of nations reflect those material influences. Thus, there was a second dialectical relationship between the environment broadly defined and the customs and institutions of people. He was also adamant that the spirit or will of the people was determinant in the final instance. There is a continuous dialectic throughout The Spirit of the Laws “between absolute values which seem to correspond to the permanent interests of men as such, and those which depend upon time and place in a concrete situation” (Berlin 1955/2001: 157). The project of Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon (1707–88)—superintendent of the royal botanical gardens in Paris—was more expansive than that of Montesquieu. In the first three volumes of his Natural History, which appeared under the imprimatur of the Royal Press in 1749,2 Buffon covered diverse topics ranging from the history and theory of the earth and the formation of planets through biological reproduction and embryonic development to the natural history of human beings. There was a ready audience for his work, which was composed of a curious, sophisticated, and politically influential public that wanted to be usefully entertained without having to invest too much effort as well as the savants and natural philosophers of the various royal societies and academies of science. This audience was fascinated with the steady stream of unknown plants and animals from the far reaches of the earth that arrived each year in Amsterdam, Paris, and the other commercial centers of Europe; its members flocked to lectures illustrated with various scientific experiments, anatomical dissections, and opportunities to peer at specimens through one of the new, powerful microscopes fashioned in the 1670s by Anton van Leeuwenhoek (1632–1723). As a result, Buffon’s theories were widely read and critically discussed almost from the moment they appeared (Roger 1989/1997: 68–78; Sloan 1979, 1995). “Buffon made the study of natural history everybody’s pastime” (Mayr 1982: 101). The opening essay in the first volume, “Discourse on Method,” established a backdrop. Here, Buffon dealt with three issues: human reason, whether or not there is an order to nature, and man’s place in nature (Roger 1989/1997: 81–92). With regard to the first, the two dominant views concerning reason were those of Descartes and Locke; the former argued rational thought would yield truth; the latter claimed that the mind combined ideas derived from sensory experience in new ways. Buffon merged the two perspectives. Science was more than the
14 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist description of mere facts, since it also involved the use of reason—comparison, analogy, and generalization. With regard to the second question, he argued that there was indeed an order in nature, but that the mathematicians and taxonomists, like Carolus Linnaeus (1707–78), had simply failed to capture its complexity, because it was too complicated for their equations (Sloan 1976). In this discussion, Buffon’s model of the natural historian was Aristotle, the naturalist of living systems, organic diversity, and internal, teleological processes. Like Aristotle, Buffon took human beings as his starting point; however, he also added Leibniz’s recently published views about continuous gradations, or chains of being, in nature. In the next two essays, Buffon tackled the history and theory of the earth and the formation of planets (Roger 1989/1997: 93–115). Here, history meant a description of the present distribution of oceans, mountains, and strata, while theory was viewed as an attempt to explain the physical causes or past organization that produced the present distributions (Haber 1959; Porter 1972; Rossi 1984; Rudwick 1985). Buffon argued that the processes of planetary formation as well as the cyclical ones that operated on the earth’s surface after it formed erased virtually all traces of the original events. Thus, a proper theory of natural history had to combine natural causes with accidents. Jacques Roger (1989/1997: 114) described his theory in the following way: “The normal sequence of natural causes only generated an eternal repetition of the present, [while] chance alone could create the unique and irreversible event, after which nothing would remain as it was before.” The importance of Buffon’s theory was twofold. First it was a theory of transformation and change. Second, it freed studies of the history and formation of the earth as well as its antiquity from reliance on or even reference to the biblical account. Buffon’s underlying concern in the second volume of Natural History was to change the direction of natural history as a field of inquiry (Roger 1989/1997: 116–50). To do so, he distinguished living beings, animals and plants, from nonliving matter—a classification that recognized animal, vegetable, and mineral. The focus of the new natural history would be the study of reproduction; he further argued that it was necessary to start at the simplest level—the living (organic) matter that was shared by both animals and plants. This argument seemed to combine the materialism of the Epicureans and Leibniz. Buffon argued that living beings reproduce; the question in his mind was how rather than why they did so. This materialist formulation of the question, which was quite similar to the way he wrote about the formation and subsequent history of the earth, stirred some controversy, because it seemed to talk about internal molding forces while excluding two forms of creationism—preformationism and pre-existence—that had been popular among religious traditionalists and the mechanists since the late seventeenth century. 3 Buffon observed animal reproduction in a variety of species in order to establish regularities through comparison. The conclusions he drew were that the first development, the fetus at conception, was a production of parts that appeared for the first time, whereas subsequent embryonic development was merely growth of those parts.
The Enlightenment and Anthropology • 15 In other words, living matter (organic molecules) was combined and recombined to produce successive generations of individuals of the same species.4 Buffon’s third volume of Natural History picked up where the first one began— with man. Its concern was the natural history of the human species (Blanckaert 1993; Roger 1989/1997: 151–83). Buffon clearly placed human beings in nature and argued that all of their propensities—their capacities for speech, intellectual activity, and creative innovation, which underpin the rise of civilization—were also natural. Moreover, there was an unbridgeable gap between human beings and the rest of the animal kingdom, and Buffon simply refused to humanize the latter as some of his contemporaries did. Since human beings lived in the physical world, they had to appropriate the resources of that world in order to cope with the uncertainties of their own cultures and ultimately to survive. In the opening chapters, he examined the history of the individual and the different stages of human development—childhood, puberty, adulthood, and old age; he relied on differences in climate, environment, dietary regimes, and nationality to account for the physical and physiological differences noted in travel accounts. As Claude Blanckaert (1993: 33) remarked, it was necessary, after Buffon, to take account of the physiological demands and to consider the disruptive, initiating, or dynamic role played by customs, modes of subsistence, and education of peoples living in different climatic regions. Buffon also argued that the human species had been relatively uniform (and archetypically white-skinned) in its early stages, and that, as its members moved out from their mid-latitude homeland, their physical appearance, customs, and abilities were slowly altered (degenerated in his words) and diversified under the influence of climate into the varieties that are seen today. While Buffon’s empirical anthropology was rooted in the travel literature, medicoanatomical investigations, and biases of his day, his philosophical anthropology was materialist. It put human beings in nature and attempted to account for changes in the species in terms of its concrete interactions and relationships with the rest of the natural world at particular times and places. This led him to consider in new ways factors like climate, geography, diet, reproduction, or customs. The long-term impact of Buffon’s work rests on his capacity to integrate studies that ranged from cosmology and the history of the earth to animal reproduction. His analyses cut across different levels ranging from the molecular to the cosmological, historicized nature in the process, and integrated seemingly disparate ideas and information into a more or less coherent whole. More importantly, they influenced later writers (e.g. Reill 2005; Richards 2002; Sloan 1979).
The New Anthropology of the Enlightenment Montesquieu and Buffon provided a “green light” to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Adam Smith, and other commentators of the Scottish Enlightenment to write about the
16 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist history of human society.5 Although Locke and the natural law theorists had written about the origins of the ownership of private property in the late seventeenth century, Rousseau and the Scots historicized discussions about the origins and expansion of property rights and relations after 1750.6 Their accounts were conjectural histories concerned with the development of human nature and the progress of society as reflected by changes in modes of subsistence. In spite of the fact that they drew from the same ethnographic and historical accounts, their philosophical anthropologies as well as their views about contemporary commercial society differed in significant ways. The aim of this section is to consider both their differences and some of their shared concerns.
Rousseau’s Historical-Dialectical Anthropology Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78) was critical of modern, civil society, which was based increasingly on commerce and industry. In A Discourse on the Moral Effects of the Arts and Sciences, he charged that people were morally corrupted both by the civilizing process and by life in the commercial societies that were slowly crystallizing across the globe, as their elites steadily severed customary, mutually recognized obligations to the members of the lower classes and replaced them with social relations based on market exchange. He wrote that “the politicians of the ancient world were always talking about morality and virtue; ours speak of nothing but commerce and money” (Rousseau 1750/1973: 16). History, in his view, provided a corrective to what politicians said by focusing on what they actually did. It also furthered “people’s reflective self-identification and self-location within time, space, and a context of others,” and it had the potential of expanding their vision of human possibilities, of thinking of themselves not as “passive observers” but rather “as active participants” (Barnard 2003: 162). Rousseau (1755/1973, 1755/1992a) outlined his critical, philosophical anthropology in the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, published in 1755. Some of the distinctive features of his historical-dialectical perspective were: (1) human nature as a historical process associated with the emergence of human beings from nature through the creation of culture and their transformation of nature through social labor; (2) the interactions of human beings with one another and with their external (natural) world as shaped by successively different, historically specific sets of social relations; (3) a recognition of both the existence and anteriority of social forms other than modern bourgeois society; and (4) a historicized conception of “man” as a subject who was not always identical with “bourgeois man” of modern society. Rousseau saw human beings as part of nature (Rousseau 1755/1973: 37–8).7 While he declined to speculate on whether the first human beings were “covered with hair,” or “walked upon all fours,” he was certain that successive transformations in the constitution of the human species had occurred since its inception: “changes
The Enlightenment and Anthropology • 17 which must have taken place in the internal as well as external conformation of man, as he applied his limbs to new uses, and fed himself on new kinds of food” (Rousseau 1755/1973: 47). Rousseau (1775/1992a: 81–3) also believed that the great apes were a variety of human being, because they had similar biological and psychological dispositions;8 however, unlike savage and modern man, the ape had not “develop[ed] any of its potential faculties.” He inferred that there might be “a temporal and sequential relation” between apes and human beings, one reflecting “genetic continuity” (Frayling and Wokler 1982: 113–14; Wokler 1997a, 1997b). In his view, the test for determining whether apes and human beings were varieties of the same species would take more than one generation to answer; it involved determining whether they could produce hybrids that could continue to reproduce. Asher Horowitz (1987: 31) described this dimension of Rousseau’s philosophical anthropology in historical-dialectical terms: “As a biological species, humanity is the product of a process of evolution. The evolution of the human species is inseparable from the inauguration of its own history, and humanity’s biological evolution is a result of its own historical activity.” Let us consider more closely what was involved in emergence of history—i.e., the creation of culture—from nature. Rousseau began his historical account with “savage man” who initially was virtually indistinguishable from other animals, which he viewed as little more than “ingenious machines” whose demands were established and satisfied through “inherited repertoire[s] of instinctual behavior” (Horowitz 1987: 68). To the extent that proto-humans possessed an inherited repertoire, they were like other animals; what distinguished them, almost imperceptibly at first, from other animals was a capacity to learn from their experiences of and interactions with the external world. This process of free agency slowly released them from the constraints of their behavioral repertoire and laid the foundations for further learning and the development of truly social relations as opposed to the atomized, independent behaviors of animals like ants or bees. It also led gradually to what Rousseau called perfectibility or self-transformation: an increased consciousness of desires and needs, which in turn set the stage for the transformation of the external world through labor and the creation of new needs. Language and tool-making were early but essential steps in the process of perfectibility (Horowitz 1987: 60–76; Rousseau 1755/1973: 47–61). Thus, the development of both free agency and perfectibility was part and parcel of the sociohistorical development of human nature and of the transformation or mutilation of nature, both of which occurred within historically specific forms of social relations. This “self-constitutive practical activity” involved “the creation of a cultural, superorganic realm in the social process of labour” (Horowitz 1987: 86–7). Rousseau recognized three successive forms of society in the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, each with its own distinctive socioeconomic relations, internal contradictions, and incomplete realization of freedom and happiness. These were primitive society, traditional pre-capitalist society modeled after the Greek polis,
18 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist and modern, civil society. Rousseau (1755/1973: 72) also believed that “many of the differences between men which are ascribed to nature stem rather from habit and the diverse modes of life of men in society.” The historical development of primitive society rested on the growing importance in society, rather than in nature, of the bonds that were created by mutual affection, dependence, self-esteem, and self-interest; he called these sentiments amour propre and believed that the development of self-esteem and pride occurred as a result of public recognition of personal qualities of excellence that were valued by the community (Horowitz 1987: 92–4).9 Thus, amour propre played a crucial role in both the formation and control of behavior in primitive society, and primitive society itself was not entirely based on a system of needs, as the empiricists had claimed. In his view, communal life was an expression of the abilities of its members, who were further bound together by sharing. What internal differentiation existed in the community reflected a nascent division of labor based on age and sex, rather than a division in which the members of one or another group enforced order or monopolized the use of force. Life in primitive society was disrupted when production begins to be based on forms that the community could no longer replicate. The development of functionally differentiated forms of production was always historically contingent rather than necessary from Rousseau’s perspective. When new divisions of labor appeared, they undermined and ultimately dissolved both communal life and the existing social relations of production. The motors driving this change were the adoption of agricultural and metallurgy as well as the consolidation of new forms of amour propre that increasingly emphasized vanity rather than pride, competition for public esteem, and the life of the individual as opposed to that of the community. What emerged in their wake was a society that was simultaneously structured by newly forged sets of needs, by exchange relations rather than generalized reciprocity, by internal social differentiation, and by the institutionalization of separate spheres of activity. In a phrase, the emergent society was no longer a unity (Rousseau 1755/1973: 76–85; Horowitz 1987: 89–107). Rousseau’s second stage of sociohistorical development was constituted by the city-states of classical antiquity. Conceptually, they were midway between primitive society and the kind of commercial society that was emerging in the mid eighteenth century. The distinctive feature of Athens and the Roman Republic was that certain individuals had a new relationship with the community. They were citizens, because they fulfilled the obligations required of members of the community, such as serving in the army or as a state official. A right of citizenship was access to the productive resources of the community, which, while owned by the community, were held privately so long as the beneficiary discharged his duties to the state. These privately held resources were not worked by the citizen himself but rather by slaves or serfs who, as a result of their status, were not citizens. The goals of the productive activity of this servile class were neither production for the market nor the accumulation of profit; it was aimed instead at the production, maintenance, and reproduction of the
The Enlightenment and Anthropology • 19 citizen in his new relation to the community. This relationship was predicated on the organic unity of the citizen and his community. Amour propre was transformed in the process of forging this new relationship. Virtue came to be viewed increasingly in terms of “glory and public esteem in directly social endeavors,” and individuals strived for “the cultivation of personal qualities, so that communal virtue becomes the condition and occasion for personal virtue” (Horowitz 1987: 105). In sum, freedom and equality were realized only by individual citizens in the community, who cultivated virtue, on the one hand, and saw no distinction between the universality of their claims and the particularity of their social position, on the other. These early civilizations were exceedingly fragile and contained the seeds not only for their own destruction but also for their own transcendence. The possibilities for destruction included enlightenment (the capacity to think and speak for oneself), the further growth of individualism based on the distinction between public and private, increasing conflicts between the individual citizen and the state-based community, the expansion of commercial relations, the emergence of despotism, militarism, and defeat in war. The road taken for transcendence involved a further metamorphosis of amour propre, increased individuation, and alienation (Horowitz 1987: 102–7; Rousseau 1755/1973: 85–105; 1755/1992b). Civil society was Rousseau’s third stage of sociohistorical development. He viewed it as a vast system of needs, a form of society in which each man must now, therefore, have been perpetually employed in getting others to interest themselves in his lot, and in making them, apparently at least, if not really, find their advantage in promoting his own. Thus he must have been sly and artful in his behaviour to some, and imperious and cruel to others; being under a kind of necessity to ill-use all the persons of whom he stood in need, when he could not frighten them into compliance, and did not judge it his interest to be useful to them. Insatiable ambition, the thirst of raising their respective fortunes, not so much from real want as from the desire to surpass others, inspired all men with a vile propensity to injure one another, and with a secret jealousy, which is the more dangerous, as it puts on the mask of benevolence, to carry its point with greater security. (Rousseau 1755/1973: 86–7)
Rousseau’s conceptualization of the “dynamic of civil society,” as Horowitz (1987: 109) noted, “compel[ed] all the actors to foster actively the proliferation of the needs of others.” This system of social relations constructed as exchange relations promoted a condition characterized by “universal disorder, competition, and exploitation” (Horowitz 1987: 116). The historically contingent tendencies that underwrote the development of civil society emerged from the increasing conflicts between the individual citizen and the state-based community and the consolidation of individualism. These were buttressed by the simultaneous liberation of property from the community and the assertion of exclusive property rights (rights of ownership, use, and disposal) by individuals, and by the formation of the state,
20 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist which claimed to guarantee the safety, freedom, and equality of property owners— “the constituent elements of their being” (Rousseau 1755/1973: 92). For Rousseau, money was one of the characteristic features of civil society. The use of money facilitated exchanges initially between property owners producing different goods and later between property owners and those who lacked property. Its use was increasingly universalized. Not only was money equated with work itself, it was also pursued for itself, because it had became a sign of accumulated wealth. In civil society, “money was the prime necessity, and thus the immediate object of labour; and . . . in consequence all labour incapable of earning money was necessarily neglected” (Rousseau 1765/1986: 309–10). This impoverished everyday life and underwrote both the erosion of the last vestiges of community as well as the growing objectification, alienation, and repression of its members. In civil society, amour propre had become Hobbes’s “war of all against all,” one individual’s quest for power gained at the expense of others. Rousseau’s focus in his historicized account of humanity was its rise in nature, its slow creation of nature as a category, and its subsequent sociohistorical development, which he viewed as the continuous, but always historically contingent, transformation of the individual in society and of the simultaneous, related transformation of society itself. From his perspective, the existence of human beings outside of society was simply unthinkable. The motors driving his account were agency and perfectibility. He was also aware of the significant differences that existed between primitive society and modern civil society. The savage and the civilized man differ so much in the bottom of their hearts and in their inclinations, that what constitutes the supreme happiness for the one would reduce the other to despair. The former breathes only peace and liberty; he desires only to live and be free from labour. . . . Civilized man, on the other hand, is always moving, sweating, toiling and racking his brains to find still more laborious occupations. . . . He pays court to men in power, whom he hates, and to the wealthy, whom he despises; he stops at nothing to have the honour of serving them; he is not ashamed to value himself on his own meanness and their protection; and, proud of his slavery, he speaks with disdain of those, who have not the honour of sharing it. . . . [T]he source of all these differences is . . . [that the civilized or bourgeois] man only knows how to live in the opinion of others. (Rousseau 1755/1973: 104)
Moreover, Rousseau knew that the political life of the city-states of ancient Greece was no longer a model for politicians in modern society. In 1764, he wrote the following to the citizens of Geneva: The ancient peoples are no longer a model for the moderns; they are too foreign in every respect. You, especially, Genevans, stay in your place. . . . You are neither Romans nor Spartans; you are not even Athenians. Leave those great names alone; they do not
The Enlightenment and Anthropology • 21 become you. You are merchants, artisans, bourgeois, always occupied with your private interests, your work, commerce, profits; you are people for whom freedom itself is only a means toward untrammeled acquisition and secure possession. (Rousseau, 1764/1962: 284, quoted by Löwy and Sayres 2001: 47)
While the presuppositions of Rousseau’s philosophical anthropology were fundamentally different from those of the Scots as well as those of German commentators from the 1770s onward, his influence on them was nonetheless substantial.
The Scottish Historical Philosophers Through their travels, the Scots were acutely aware of what is now called uneven development. Their country was less prosperous than England, and there were significant differences within the country between the north and the south or between the Highlands and the Lowlands. In 1750, a day’s ride into the countryside from a commercial center like Glasgow with its shops and burgeoning factories must have seemed like a journey into a past era replete with clan chieftains, backwoods subsistence farmers, herders, and roving foragers on the margins, all of whom bartered the goods they owned. A sincerely felt moral concern among Scottish intellectuals, like Adam Smith (1723–90), was to determine how they could make a backward country prosper (Waszek 1988: 30–7). To accomplish this goal, they argued, it was necessary to have accurate empirical information derived from experiment and observation, comparison and analysis; they could then synthesize the information and use the results to formulate the natural laws of economic development (Forbes 1982). The methodology was Newton’s applied to human society rather than inanimate objects. To do so would be a virtuous act that would benefit the nation and meet with the approval of others; they knew the act was virtuous, because it involved sympathy (i.e., empathy), the capacity to put themselves imaginatively into the situation of others and to intuit what the others instinctively feel (Broackes 1995: 380). The concepts of spectatorship and sympathy played prominent roles in Smith’s (1759/1976) Theory of Moral Sentiments and guided the conjectural histories of society that Smith and his contemporaries wrote between 1757 and 1777. The Scots did not believe, as Hobbes and Locke had, that society was constituted by a rational act, a social contract among individuals, in order to protect life, liberty, and property. They argued instead that the formation of society could not be predicated on reason. In their view, emotion preceded reason and reflection, and awareness of the advantages of life in a community only emerged later. David Hume (1711–76) argued that the sociability of human beings was natural and rested on sexual impulse and desires that linked generations together and shaped their habits regarding the distribution of beneficial but scarce goods. For him, protecting property rights to goods was the main condition for society and preceded notions
22 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist of justice. Taking a slightly different tack, Smith argued that human sociability underpinned the development of morality, since individuals serve as mirrors for one another. The exchanges that occurred among individuals in the mirroring process were not only the means by which they gained the approval of others and satisfied their mutual needs, but they were also the way in which those individuals were constituted as individuals in the society. More importantly, they were the foundation of human sociability itself. Hume, Smith, and the other Scots had a common perspective on human nature that was intimately linked with their views on sociability. Despite the diversity of human actions, institutions, and customs—reflecting variously the influence of education, government, and environment as well as peculiarities of particular cultures and individuals—there were also stable characteristics, motives, and instincts that were shared by all human beings. That is, human beings have in common certain predispositions, such as “the natural effort of every individual to better his own condition” or “the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another” that distinguish them from other species (Smith 1776/1976: 17). These dispositions were fixed characteristics of the species that were invariant from one society to another or from one individual to the next; this view, of course, contrasted markedly with Rousseau’s. Besides their views about natural sociability of human beings, property, scarcity, exchange, and the immutability of human nature, the Scots also believed in progress, the idea that society was developing in a desirable direction. Smith and the others saw progressive development in areas of society as diverse as language, astronomy, jurisprudence, government, and, most importantly, the mode of subsistence. In his Lectures on Jurisprudence (1762–3/1982), Smith argued that the progress of society was a natural, law-driven process tied both to the natural dispositions shared by all human beings—e.g. to better their own circumstances—and to the increasing division of labor, which was associated with population growth and changes in their modes of subsistence. From his perspective, the first societies were composed of small numbers of individuals who provisioned themselves by hunting and foraging. As their numbers increased, they domesticated animals and became pastoralists. When their numbers increased even further, those in favorable environments domesticated plants and turned to agriculture. This was followed by a significant advance in the division of labor, as artisans—carpenters, weavers, tailors, and the like—ceased to produce their own food and settled instead in towns to pursue their crafts and to barter or exchange the goods they produced with other members of the community and then with the inhabitants of other nations. The Scots also recognized that the culture and values of a societies were linked to their modes of subsistence; hence, foraging societies were different from those whose economies were based on commerce and manufacturing. However, the sequence in which the different forms of society appeared followed from the nature of property, or as Smith (1776/1976: 405) put it, “according to the natural course of things.”
The Enlightenment and Anthropology • 23 The materialist, conjectural histories of society constructed by Smith and his associates in Glasgow and Edinburgh with their emphasis on the natural development of the economy were merely part of a more general system of morality rooted in a discussion of imagination and sympathy. They described, and promoted, the development of commercial society in accordance with natural laws and the natural propensities that were shared by all human beings. They realized that manifestations of these natural laws and propensities varied from one time to another, even as basic human nature itself remained constant. They interpreted the variation as a series of gradations that reflected not only continuous and uninterrupted historical change but also the unfolding of some potential or force that was inherent in society itself. While they historicized society, the Scots separated the study of history from the study of social dynamics; however, theirs were not the only attempts to historicize discussions of human nature and society in the mid eighteenth century. Rousseau and the Scots were concerned with the development of a new kind of society—commercialized and later industrialized—that came to be called “civil society.” Their questions were: What was it? And, how did it develop? While the Scots advocated, with some uneasiness, the growth of civil society as a means to increase the wealth of nations, Rousseau was openly critical of the effects of modern civil society on individuals, their outlooks on life, and the social relations that structured their interactions. The views of Rousseau and the Scots on the trajectory of human historical development, as well as their philosophical anthropologies, also differed significantly. While Rousseau blurred the distinction we now make between the human and the natural realms, the Scots highlighted their differences. For Rousseau, the motors driving human history were the interplay of free agency, perfectibility, and the transformation of the external world in contexts shaped by contingent rather than necessary forms of social relations. For Smith and the Scots, human history reflected the gradual, progressive development, in accordance with natural law, of propensities that were common to all human beings, even though they manifested themselves variously in societies with different modes of subsistence. The problems addressed by Rousseau, Smith, and the others, as well as their philosophical anthropologies, both influenced and provoked successive generations of writers from the late eighteenth century onward. Kant, Herder, Hegel, Jefferson, Marx, and others wrestled with their views about humanity and how the world in which they lived came to be the way it was.
The Institutionalization of Anthropology In the late eighteenth century the lines between disciplines were not as sharply drawn as they would become, nor were they even drawn in the same places as they are today. Instead, it was a time when a physiologist–comparative anatomist (Blumenbach) wrote about epistemology; when a naturalist (Buffon) discussed
24 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist mathematics; when a philosopher (Kant) lectured on anthropology, astronomy, history, and laid the foundations for the modern concept of biological species; when a poet, novelist, and statesman (Goethe) discovered the intermaxillary bone of the human skull, collected botanical samples, and drew pictures of Roman ruins; and when a political revolutionary (Jefferson) conducted archaeological excavations in Virginia and collected vocabulary lists of American Indian languages. What united them were curiosity about the world and their quest for enlightenment, for understanding that world without necessarily having to rely solely or exclusively on the authority of others. What inspired them, among other things, were authors like Montesquieu, Buffon, Rousseau, and the Scots, whose writings provoked critical thought and practice. The influence of Rousseau and others was already evident in the German principalities by the late 1750s. This was a time of massive foreign influence in Central Europe. East Prussia had been incorporated into the Russian Empire during the Seven Years War (1756–63), and the president of the Berlin Academy, French naturalist Pierre-Louis Maupertuis, actively sought to bring the issues of Enlightenment debate to the “center of German cultural discourse” by offering annual prize competitions on subjects selected by the Academy (Zammito 2002: 59). This was part of the cultural and political agenda of King Frederick II, who himself was a longtime friend of Voltaire. Another aspect of Frederick’s agenda was to reform the universities and remodel them after the curriculum at the University of Göttingen. A third aspect of Frederick’s plan was to undermine and displace academic philosophy, which he viewed as pedantic and out of touch with the real world. The king was supported in his effort to bring the ideas of the French and Scottish Enlightenments to the public, especially by that newly emerging layer of society, the “bourgeois intelligentsia,” whose members were concerned with education not only as a source of social mobility but more importantly as a sign of social identity (Zammito 2001, 2002: 16–35). Testimonials perhaps to the impact of these intellectual exchanges were Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1803) claims that “Hume awoke him [i.e., Kant] from his dogmatic slumbers” and that “Rousseau set him straight.” It was in this context that Kant and his student, Johann Gottlieb von Herder (1744–1803), began to grapple with Rousseau’s writings at the University of Königsberg in 1762, that Kant launched his annual course in anthropology in 1772, and that anthropology was institutionalized at Göttingen in the 1770s.
Kant’s Pragmatic Anthropology Kant’s early writings were concerned mainly with the natural sciences. Two additional themes appeared in his writings in the early 1760s. The first was an extended critique of Cartesian rationalism and the application of mathematical methods to metaphysical questions; his Inquiry into the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural
The Enlightenment and Anthropology • 25 Theology and Ethics (1762), which was runner-up for the Berlin Academy’s prize, shifted the study of human nature from metaphysics toward the natural world. It also gained him public recognition. The second theme dealt with human equality and education. By the time that Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (1764) appeared, Kant was already working his way through Rousseau’s comments about human nature, culture, enlightenment, inequality, and the trajectory of history; at the same time, he was also forging his own critique of academic philosophy in the German states (Beiser 1992a). Terms like “freedom” and “equality” slowly crept into his writings. The alternative he proposed in the mid 1760s was a practical philosophy, which would not only study “natural phenomena that hinder or contribute to the development of morality in human life,” but also be useful by helping us distinguish natural from artificial feelings by stressing what human beings share (Louden 2000: 18). The natural phenomena he had in mind included the diverse experiences of natural and civilized man, categories clearly derived from Rousseau, that resulted from differences in sex, age, culture, education, and environment (Zammito 2002: 108–9). In a course description for the 1765–6 academic year, he wrote: [It] considers man, throughout the world, from the point of view of the variety of his natural properties and the differences in that feature of man which is moral in character. Unless these matters are considered, general judgements about man would scarcely be possible. The comparison of human beings with each other, and the comparison of man today with the moral state of man in earlier times, furnishes us with a comprehensive map of the human species. Finally, there will be a consideration of . . . the condition of the states and nations throughout the world. (Kant 1765/1992: 289; emphasis in original)
This was one of the building blocks for the anthropology course that Kant taught each winter semester from 1772 to 1796 and for his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (Kant 1798/1978; Louden 2000: 62–4; Stark 2003; Zammito 2002: 221–307); it was apparently paired with an ethics course that he also taught during that period. While the content of the anthropology course varied somewhat from year to year, he typically dealt with human beings as sensuous things of nature endowed with natural talents and temperaments in one part and, in another, considered them as ethical beings who acted from principles and reason instead impulse or inclination in social contexts molded by diverse factors. Thus, he distinguished the physical character of human beings from their moral character. The former was what nature made of human beings; the latter was an individual achievement formed through education, moral discourse, reflection, and the ability to think for oneself (Louden 2000: 76–85). For Kant, the formation of moral character was the more fundamental question, judging by his remark that the proper materials of anthropology were “to be found neither in metaphysics nor in a museum of natural history in which the skeleton of the human being can be compared with that of other animals . . . [but]
26 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist rather these materials can be found only in human actions, in which the human character is revealed” (Kant 1785/1991: 211–12; emphasis in original). For Kant, there was a linkage between the emotional temperaments and physical states of the human species. He posited psychological differences between men and women and argued that these were rooted in nature. In his view, women played the central role in the formation of moral character, because, besides ensuring the preservation of the species, they were a moralizing force in society that influenced men, legislated customs, and established how social intercourse should be structured. It was the natural duty of women to provide individuals with the skills and discipline required to become rational and ethical human beings.10 Skill and discipline collectively constituted culture. Skills allowed individuals to use the products of nature; discipline allowed them to free themselves from the dominance of natural needs and desires. While the process of enculturation was apparently asocial in Kant’s mind, culture could only unfold and progress in the context of social relations and could begin to achieve its full potential in a civil society (civilization), which was composed of free individuals whose actions were constrained by the lawful authority of the whole. The moralization of civilization represented another, higher stage of historical development as yet unachieved (Louden 2000: 79–87, 143–4). The concepts of races and peoples also played roles in Kant’s philosophical anthropology. His concept of race, which built on Buffon’s work, was simultaneously historical, naturalistic, and teleological. Kant viewed race exclusively as skin color; it was hereditary, and involved the transmission of a latent set of natural predispositions manifest in all human beings that were activated differentially as human beings moved into different environmental settings.11 These predispositions helped the human species achieve its “collective destiny” (Louden 2000: 97). By a people, he meant the inhabitants of a region who viewed themselves as a civic whole because of their common descent, customs, and language (Kant 1798/1978: 225). For Kant, the two were not the same. Races reflected the effects of environment, whereas peoples reflected culture and history. From his perspective, some peoples were racially mixed, and races often included numerous peoples. Moreover, some peoples, mostly Europeans, had developed their natural predispositions, while others, mostly non-European, had yet to do so, because they lacked culture and civilization, which, of course, could only emerge in civil society. In sum, Kant historicized the development of the human species and human society. Like the Scots, he believed in progress; however, he saw it as moral progress, rather than economic progress. It was achieved through legal and political means and the “unsociable sociability” of individuals who simultaneously entered into social relations and fought with one another (Louden 2000: 146–53). Kant (1784/1986), 1785/1991, 1786/1991) began to develop his theory of history in the mid 1780s, building on Rousseau and on the liberal political thought of Hobbes, Locke, and the Scots; his essays were also responses to Herder’s Reflections
The Enlightenment and Anthropology • 27 on the Philosophy of History of Mankind (1784/1968). Kant understood history teleologically, as motion toward a goal. This movement was characteristic not only of the natural world viewed as lifeless matter in motion but also of humanity. In the former, the laws of nature were the motor driving change. In the latter, the underlying force was the increasing perfectibility of the natural capacity of human beings to reason. “Restless reason” induced by the constant tendency of human beings to move toward and away from one another was the initial impetus for movement away from animality (Galston 1975: 236). The threat of a war of all against all not only drove human beings into civil society with coercive laws but also promoted education, freedom, and commerce. Implicit in Kant’s notion of the perfectibility of reason were the ideas that someday, with freedom, there would be universal agreement and, hence, the “end of history”—ideas whose actualization he thought were a long way off. What he did sketch, however, was the kind of empirical information that the study of history would reveal and that could inform the enlightened peoples of his day: the advances of each civilization, the evils that led to their destruction, and the mechanisms of enlightenment that remained. As William Galston (1975: 265) noted, “morality participates in the universality of Reason, but Reason progresses. The content of morality is therefore everchanging. Moreover, this change corresponds to the actuality of history, for the universality of Reason manifests itself in concrete human affairs.” As you will recall, Kant distinguished between pure reason, which was independent of experience, and practical reason, which used empirical data in relation to particular bodies of experience. In light of this distinction, Robert Louden (2000) described Kant’s pragmatic anthropology as the study of the “impure ethics” that result when purely “rational beings” become “human beings” embedded in society.
Herder’s Historical-Dialectical Anthropology In 1765, Johann Gottfried von Herder, Kant’s student at Königsberg only two years earlier, also began to write about the question of how philosophy could be made more universal and useful. Herder’s (1765/2002) essay, “How Can Philosophy Become More Universal and Useful for the Benefit of People,” dealt with a theme that concerned his teacher as well. Kant’s inspiration was apparent both in the question itself and in how the essay was conceptualized; Herder also acknowledged the influence of Montesquieu, Rousseau, and the Scots. Nevertheless, he set forth an agenda whose developmental trajectory would increasingly diverge from the one pursued by his mentor. He argued that “if philosophy is to become useful for human beings, then let it make the human being its center;” later in the same essay, he suggested the “restriction of philosophy to anthropology” (Herder 1765/2002: 21, 27). Herder was critical of the views of Hume and Voltaire who saw humankind as pretty much the same in all times and places and who asserted that history has not
28 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist provided us with any new insights. What Herder proposed instead was to allow history and philosophy to interact and mutually enliven each other in order to learn “about the spirit of the changes in various ages” (1766/2002: 255; emphasis in original). In 1769, he stated this cultural relativism somewhat differently: “Human nature under diverse climates [i.e., the total physical, organic, and humanly constituted, cultural milieus] is never wholly the same” (quoted by Barnard 1969: 382). From his perspective, human nature was both malleable and variable. Moreover, each age and people had its own distinctive customs, ways of life, manners of thought, tastes, and forms of government; these changed; and what was considered true and useful for one might be false and useless for another. Moreover, there was less pronounced diversity among the individuals of the same age or people (culture). Herder would elaborate these themes for the rest of his life. For our purposes, three of Herder’s works are important. The first is his essay “Treatise on the Origin of Language,” which won the Berlin Academy prize in 1771 and established him as a major intellectual force (Herder 1772/2002). The second is “This Too a Philosophy of the History for the Formation of Humanity” which appeared in 1774 (Herder 1774/2002). The third is Reflections on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind, the first volume of which appeared in 1784 (Herder 1784/1968). In them, Herder laid the foundations for a philosophical anthropology concerned with language, culture, history, and their interconnections. Herder used the word “culture” in both the singular and the plural. Briefly, the former referred to the patterns of language, thought, and behavior that were characteristic of a particular community in time and space; the latter acknowledged the diversity that existed between communities that were separated from one another in time and space. For Herder, culture was an integrated whole a composite or complex configuration which, by virtue of its inherent relational characteristics, is something more than a mere sum total or aggregate. In an aggregate the parts are separate and unrelated, and their number can be increased or reduced without having this affect the nature of the total but merely the size. A whole, on the other hand, is something more than the sum of its constituent parts. The “more” is not contained in the parts considered in isolation, but rather arises from their inter-relation and the varying degree of their integration. Herder contrasted the holism characterizing culture with the atomism characterizing an aggregate, by comparing the former to an organism. In doing so, he wished to focus on two crucial qualities: functional inter-relatedness and self-generated activity. (Barnard 1969: 385)
Herder viewed the culture of a community as a complex of interacting organisms. There were two reasons for this perspective. First, he believed that the different parts or segments of culture might develop at different rates, which could disturb its internal cohesion and lead to conflicts and contradictions within the whole. Thus, the cultural whole was not necessarily in “a state of blissful harmony” but rather was
The Enlightenment and Anthropology • 29 “a field of tension” (Barnard 1969: 385–6). Second, the diversity existing within the social and political culture of a community also had the capacity to produce the kinds of tensions that were characteristic of the human condition. This diversity and the tensions it produced were consequences of the fact that Herder viewed politics as human activity rather than a set of practices and institutions that were associated exclusively with the state. Thus, the coherence of a culture was contingent and dependent, at any given moment, on the relations that existed among the reciprocally interacting processes that constituted the whole and on the intrinsic capacity of the whole to forge new features and integrate them into the fabric of everyday life. This provided a synchronic view of culture, which was situational and functional; however, it was clear to Herder that a historical, or diachronic, analysis was also needed in order to describe content or the purpose of particular cultural segments. Herder’s notion of history, which involved both persistence and change, was an interactive, dialectical one that involved the interplay of two processes: Bildung and tradition. Bildung was a non-repetitive process that entailed the assimilation, evaluation, and addition of new materials to the distinctive heritage of the community. Tradition was an ongoing, intergenerational process that entailed sifting through the stock of institutionalized beliefs and so forth in order to update them and to resolve the tensions and contradictions created by Bildung. Herder was less concerned with the antecedents of particular cultural segments or configurations than he was with their significance once they had been integrated into the heritage of the community (Barnard 1969: 389–90). He thought of historical development as motion in which what was already latent in a culture was actualized or made manifest; in other words, there was teleology in history. Herder’s views about teleology derived inspiration from both Spinoza and Leibniz. For Herder, a shared or common language was the cement that held together the members of a community. To paraphrase Barnard (1965: 57), there was a relationship, an interaction, among the language shared by the members of a community and the habits of thought and modes of life of its members. It was the means by which they became conscious of themselves as individuals and of their social relations with other individuals both inside and outside of the community. Language not only linked them to the past by revealing the thoughts and sentiments of past generations, it also allowed them to enrich and perpetuate those views for future generations through the processes of Bildung and tradition. In his essay on the origins of language, Herder, in contrast to Rousseau, saw language as a uniquely human attribute that separated human beings from animals. In his view, human beings were fundamentally different from animals; they were not simply animals with reason added, but beings whose energies had developed in an entirely different direction. Language, in his view, marked the possession of a reflective mind. At the time Herder was formulating his philosophical anthropology, the idea of race was being discussed increasingly by Enlightenment writers. Kant, for example, incorporated it into the core of his anthropological thought. Herder, however, did not
30 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist find any utility in the concept. In 1784, he described his thoughts and reservations about its use in the following way: Lastly, I could wish the distinction between the human species, that have been made from a laudable zeal for discriminating sciences, not be carried beyond due bounds. Some for instance [i.e., Kant] have thought fit, to employ the term races for four or five divisions, originally made in consequence of country or complexion; but I see no reason for this appellation. Race refers to a difference of origin, which in this case either does not exist, or in each of these countries, and under each of these complexions, comprise the most different races. For every nation is one people, having its own national form, as well as its own language: the climate it is true, stamps on each its mark, or spreads over it a slight veil, but not sufficient to destroy the original national character. This originality of character extends even to families, and its transitions are as variable as imperceptible. In short, there are neither four or five races, nor exclusive varieties, on this Earth, Complexions run into each other: forms follow the genetic character: and upon the whole, all are at last but shades of the same great picture, extending through all ages, and over all parts of the earth. They belong not, therefore, to proper systematic natural history, as to the physico-geographical [i.e., anthropological] history of man. (Herder 1784/1968: 7)
Herder’s historical-dialectical and critical anthropology built on Rousseau’s and consequently resembled it in important ways. Both, for example, distinguished culture from civilization—Herder explicitly and Rousseau more tentatively. For both, civilization was something mechanical that was associated with the state, and the civilizing process was one that muted or erased altogether people’s knowledge and experience of everyday life. Culture, in Herder’s view, was organic, and he situated it in activities and reflective thought of people who shared a language and resided in relatively unstratified communities. Culture emerged not from activities of intellectuals and officials supported by the state but rather from the creativity and spontaneity of people dealing with everyday issues in the worlds in which they lived. Herder was by no means an anarchist who advocated the end of the state. He argued instead that the state should take responsibility for the humanization of its subjects, for ensuring that they enjoyed a certain level of welfare, and for providing education so that they might achieve their full potential, and he was openly critical of those that did not. Herder agreed with the Scots who also argued that history was an unconscious process rather than a consequence of great leaders or the result of “restless reason” as Kant would have it. What bothered Herder about the arguments of many of his contemporaries was their ethnocentrism, their claims that the commercial society emerging in Europe represented the highest stage of sociohistorical development, and their concomitant obfuscation of the cultural diversity that existed among communities in different regions, whose members had the same mode of subsistence.
The Enlightenment and Anthropology • 31
Göttingen: Beyond “Anthropology for Doctors and Philosophers” The title of Ernst Platner’s (1744–1818) book, New Anthropology for Doctors and Philosophers: With Special Consideration to Physiology, Pathology, Moral Philosophy, and Aesthetics, published in 1772, marked the acceptance of new ideas about the linkages between the human and natural realms that were proposed earlier in the century. Unlike Descartes who viewed mind and body as independent substances—the former concerned with the principles of thought or consciousness and the latter possessing bulk and physical properties—Platner emphasized the mutual interdependence of mind and body and the natural forces involved in the process (Allert 1991; Košenina 1989; Zammito 2002: 237–53). The title also signaled the end of an era, for it gave no indication that new ideas about the significance of historical understanding, of organized systems as opposed to aggregates of individuals, of change through time, of the contexts in which things occurred, and of cultural and physical diversity were already crystallizing and becoming conjoined with one another, or that anthropology would be infused with these new perspectives by the end of the century. Montesquieu had linked the historical development of human society with nature (i.e., the environments in which different peoples lived). Buffon, Rousseau, and the Scots, in different ways, made human history part of nature: Buffon by looking primarily at the human species as a biological organism; Rousseau by seeing people, in the process of emerging from nature, as making their own history and transforming both themselves and the natural world through ongoing, reciprocal interactions with that world; the Scots by considering the historical development of humanity as the consequence of natural laws that were analogous to those of Newtonian physics. Their contemporaries and successors embroidered the fabric they had woven. The new historical understanding involved explanations of both the individual and individuality as well as of the development of society (Reill 1998). While Hume strove to develop a “science of human nature” that was applicable in all circumstances, Herder and others recognized the diversity of human societies and argued that the nature of individuals was shaped by the sociocultural and natural milieus of which they were a part. In a phrase, human nature was the result of socialization under historically specific and contingent social relations and circumstances, and it was imperative to take account of and to explain the diversity of both present and past societies. As Herder and others—like Johann Winckelmann (1717–68)—noted, there was uneven culture-historical development, and each era, each society had its own unique configuration of elements that underwrote its distinctive “spirit” or appearance. By the 1780s, Herder, Kant, and Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752–1840) were noting that sociohistorical and cultural development as well as the development of the human species itself was genetic in the sense that they involved both mechanical and teleological processes, and that the latter could not be reduced to the former.12 Their “fascinat[ion] about the idea of genetic
32 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist development was that it assumed the dual existence of individuality and regular order, without collapsing one upon the other” (Reill 1998: 119). It also required a new form of explanation, one that relied on narrative rather than reference to some universally applicable law. History was no longer the chronicles of kings, lists of dates, or the highways traversed by generals and armies but rather the byways where everyday folk wandered silently. An increasingly prevalent idea in the late eighteenth century was the notion that both the natural and human realms were constituted by more than mere aggregates of individual parts. Instead, they were organized wholes that resembled an organism. Unlike aggregates, the distinctive features of such totalities were more than the sum of their parts and were constituted by the organization of those parts. Writers began to think of nature and human society, both synchronically and diachronically, as internally differentiated structures that not only developed through time but also metamorphosed in the process. Friedrich Schelling (1775–1854), for example, viewed “nature as a dynamically shifting balance of forces,” while other Romantic writers were fascinated with the diversity manifested in tropical rainforests or the tangled banks beside English streams (Richards 2002: 295–306). The comparisons, analogies, and metaphors employed by Herder and others underwrote and supported new ways of conceptualizing organization, growth or change over time, and diversity at various levels: the natural world, human society, and the individual human being. More importantly, they allowed commentators to articulate issues related to human organization, change, and diversity to their own experiences and to the sociocultural milieus in which they lived and worked. The University of Göttingen was a focal point for the convergence of these ideas in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (e.g. Beiser 1992b; Denby 2005; Fink 1993; Flavell 1979, Leventhal 1986; Stagl 1995; Vermeulen 1992, 1995). Here, individuals with diverse interests rubbed shoulders with one another on virtually a daily basis. For example, classical philologist and archaeologist Christian Gottlob Heyne (1729–1812) was Blumenbach’s teacher, Herder’s close friend, and a colleague of August Schlözer (1735–1809) who wrote extensively about the history, linguistics, and ethnology of peoples on the margins of Europe and used statistics to develop the comparative study of states. Moreover, the philological seminar that Heyne taught for many years had shaping effects on the curricula of other universities, like Harvard and the Andover Theological Seminary in the United States. One of Heyne’s students in the seminar was Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767– 1835), who is hailed as a founder of comparative philology and as the educational reformer who modeled the curriculum of the newly opened University of Berlin after that of Göttingen. Marx, as you recall, was exposed to that curriculum and to Humboldt’s plan for a historically informed, comparative anthropology when he attended the university in the late 1830s (Bunzl 1996; Leroux 1958). Through the courses he took, Marx was also exposed to the critical-historical anthropology of Georg F. W. Hegel, who was the most prominent philosopher and social theorist on the continent until his death in 1831.
The Enlightenment and Anthropology • 33
Hegel’s Critical-Historical Anthropology Georg F. W. Hegel’s (1770–1831) philosophical anthropology sought to account for the actual (concrete) conditions of human existence and to explain how that social reality had been transformed by the collective (social) activity of human beings. From the late 1790s onward, he wrote with the ideas of Kant, Herder, Rousseau, and the Scots as almost continual points of reference. While he addressed themes that they had already discussed, he was at the same time critical of some of the conclusions they had drawn. For example, like Kant, Hegel believed that philosophy should be critical as well as systematic (scientific), that the social problems of the day were ultimately ethical or moral, and that social change was the product of human activity; however, unlike Kant, he viewed change from the standpoint of the community rather than the individual. From Herder, he gained an appreciation of the importance of historical understanding and the significance of varied cultural configurations of different historical epochs and civilizations; he also developed concepts of history and the primacy of collective social activity that were inchoate in Herder’s writings. Like Rousseau and Herder, he viewed history in terms of uneven development and the resolution of conflicts and contradictions. Hegel agreed with Herder and the Scots, notably Adam Ferguson, that the members of a society were bound together by shared cultural practices and beliefs as well as by the political institutions under which these habits manifested themselves. Like Rousseau and the Scots, Hegel was deeply concerned with the development of both modern civil society and the state as well as with the kinds of transformations they wrought on human beings. As a result, Hegel’s philosophical anthropology shared important features with those of his predecessors and diverged in significant ways from them (Lukács 1966/1976; Rockmore 1992/1993). His empirical anthropology was rooted in his concern with history and with the formation of civil society (e.g. Berry 1982; Dickey and Nisbet 1999; Knox and Pelczynski 1964; Waszek 1988). History, in Hegel’s (1822–30/1975: 11–151) view, simultaneously involved the interconnected development of the individual and the community in relation to the realization of a goal—the actualization of the human mind in all its potential and free subjectivity (Geist) in both. Thus, history was teleological; there was “a rationally discernible development in history, a development, which, once comprehended, would change the attitude of people toward their social environment” (Plant 1983: 57; emphasis in original). The clearest embodiment of this goal, which was inchoate in earlier stages of human history, was manifested most clearly in the latest historical stage—modern civil society—which was ushered in by the French Revolution. What emerged in the wake of the revolution was an era in which the institutions and practices of the old regime, which limited freedom and the capacity of reason, had been dismantled and replaced by rampant individualism. This was the first time, according to Hegel, that human beings had the freedom to actualize themselves as rational, moral individuals; moreover, through their individuality, they could also
34 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist actualize themselves as social members of a community. In this particular form of society, they could step back from their social roles in the community and conceive of themselves as autonomous, self-determining individuals who possessed rights as well as interests, ideas, and the capacity to make moral judgments that were distinct from those of other individuals in the community. They realized themselves as individuals in their social roles in the family, the market, and civil society and in their roles as citizens of a political state. States, in Hegel’s view, had evolved, embodying the positive values of earlier states, to ensure the actualization of the individuals and to promote the good of the community as opposed to the particular interests of its members (Hegel 1817–30/1978; 1821/1967). For Hegel, human beings were social beings. They satisfied biological, social, and cultural needs in society and actualized their distinctly human capacities— thought, language, and reason—by virtue of their membership in historically specific communities (Hardimon 1994: 153–6). Most importantly, they developed their minds, intellect, and subjective spirit in the context of the social institutions, practices, and roles—the cultural configurations—that shaped everyday life in those communities and formed the backdrop to the processes of socialization and education that took place in them. They not only determined how biologically given drives and desires were satisfied but also how individuals expressed and developed their interests, talents, and skills. Another way of saying this is that the physical, psychic, cultural, and social dimensions of human beings interpenetrated and articulated with one another, and that how the whole individual was actualized varied in important ways from one historical stage to the next and even within the same historical-cultural people. Hegel saw history as the progressive unfolding of reason and consciousness and the development of Spirit. As Robert D’Amico has noted, Hegel’s theory of history is based on self-production [in which] Spirit (Geist) manifests itself . . . in objectifications, externalizations, and alienations that represent forms of consciousness. Spirit comes to understand itself through the history of these objectifications. Spirit is ultimately the reason inherent in history as a teleological process. Hegel calls objectification a power of negativity because the objectifications of Spirit transform and therefore negate what is given in reality [i.e., external nature]. Human labor is just such a manifestation of the power of Spirit. Labor modifies its world and thereby allows man to know it and free itself from the bonds of natural necessity. . . . Hegel stresses two aspects of the role of labor as objectification. First, labor is defined as that which mediates the world. By the term mediation Hegel means that the human world becomes transformed (mediated by activity and purpose and therefore is no longer a world of natural objects. Culture or Spirit is precisely the objectification of this teleology or mediation. Second, practical activity, by giving meaning to its world, creates a “second nature” which conditions humanity. Since what is conditioning humanity is the externalization of its own purposive activity, it is conditioned by its own product and
The Enlightenment and Anthropology • 35 not by an external, natural object. . . . For example, law and morality condition and form human beings through a process of cultivation (Bildungsweise) or civilizing influence. (1981: 5–6)
As Hegel put it, “After the creation of the natural universe, man appears on the scene as the antithesis of nature; he is the being who raises himself up into a second world. The general consciousness of man includes two distinct provinces, that of nature and that of the spirit. The province of the spirit is created by man himself” (1822–30/1975: 44; cf. 1837/1956: 52–3, 241–2). Thus, for Hegel, objectification is characterized exclusively by consciousness, which has nothing whatsoever to do with the kinds of determination that occur in the natural world. History began with the rise of states and ended with the present. While Hegel acknowledged the existence of pre-state societies in the prehistoric period that had achieved “a significant development in certain directions” or even experienced “complications, wars, revolutions, declines,” these did not give rise to history (Hegel 1822–30/1975: 134–7). History progressed unevenly through fits and starts as the people of a historical era succeeded in resolving the contradictions of their time. For example, Hegel argued that neither Abraham nor Jesus was able to reconcile his vision of the independence and freedom of the individual with those of the wider communities of which they were members; consequently, they felt a sense of profound estrangement from those societies. The male citizens of the Greek city-states were able to overcome this kind of estrangement even though they did not see themselves as independent individuals in the modern sense—i.e., as distinct from the customs of the city-state or as participants in the market exchange relations that characterized modern civil society. The separation of the individual from the community only occurred during the Protestant Reformation (Plant 1983: 55–75). History was important, because it explained the present and ended in the present. It accounted for the cultural configuration of modern civil society as well as the modern state. In civil society, individuals satisfied their needs by pursing their private interests in the market, where the purchase and sale of goods and services made them interdependent and connected them in an increasingly dense web of social relations. The modern state not only reaffirmed the unity of the nation, which was weakened as individuals pursued their own goals, but also provided the system of ethical life and social substance that would allow them to reconcile and overcome the conflicts and contradictions of civil society and thereby ensure that they could achieve their humanity (Rose 1981). For Hegel, “the rational end of man is life in the state” (1817–30/1978: 242). Hegel was not the only theorist to comment on civil society and the state during the first quarter of the nineteenth century. His contemporary, Henri Saint-Simon (1760–1825) made a slightly different argument about their connection. SaintSimon was concerned with the appearance of industrial society, which, in his view, marked the both the internationalization of society and the end of the nation state.
36 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist While industrial society was built around the institutions of civil society, a point with which Hegel would have agreed, Saint-Simon viewed the state as opposed to the development of civil society because of the domination of society by incapable bureaucrats who were out of touch with the times. Unlike the Scots and Hegel who viewed the present as the end of history, Saint-Simon had a vision of what society could become in the future. Saint-Simon died in 1825, Hegel six years later in 1831, when the young Karl Marx had barely entered his teens. In the 1830s, Marx would absorb the ideas of both writers as well as those of Montesquieu and Rousseau among others. He would also absorb the importance of enlightenment, critical thought, and the difference between faith and reason. In this chapter, we have viewed the Enlightenment as an ongoing conversation among individuals who held distinct, theoretically informed views about the world, about human beings, and about their place in that world. The conversation was often acrimonious, and it was always threatening to those whose privileged positions in society rested on the maintenance of tradition and the active repression of critical inquiry. At times, the conversation was public as when the Scots, Kant, Herder, and Hegel responded in different ways to Rousseau and to one another. At other times, it was more private—an exchange of words between friends (Spinoza) or a university lecture published only posthumously (Hegel). The conversation was fueled by the conquest of nature, exploration, commerce, colonization, and later industrialization, which provided the grist for the development of an empirical anthropology that increasingly took cognizance of the history and diversity of human beings as well as the world in which they lived. This realization paved the way for the development of new philosophical anthropologies that were distinguished from one another by the (ontological) beliefs that their advocates held about the nature of human beings, their relations with one another, and their place in the world. In one sense, the Enlightenment provided a set of questions that the proponents of different philosophical anthropologies felt they needed to address. In another sense, the conversation that ensued can be viewed as a work in progress. Let us dwell for a moment on some of the issues and lessons that Marx’s predecessors raised for him. First, nature, human beings, and human society had been historicized and their diversity acknowledged. After Rousseau, it was no longer possible to argue effectively that individual human beings living in a state of nature entered into a social contract with the sovereign (Hobbes) or with one another (Locke) thereby creating society in the process; moreover, it was becoming increasingly difficult to argue that human beings were ontologically prior to human society. Second, while many of Marx’s predecessors believed in progress (Smith) or the dialectical unfolding of history (Hegel), others did not. For some of them, human nature was fixed and immutable and progress was a consequence of the passage of time; for others, however, human nature was culturally determined (Herder and Hegel) and progress, if it occurred at all, resulted from the resolution of contradictions. Third, Marx’s predecessors were collectively concerned with the
The Enlightenment and Anthropology • 37 inequalities and individualism that were characteristic of the commercial-industrial societies that shaped their everyday lives (Rousseau, Herder, Hegel, Saint-Simon). These civilizations, to use a term coined in response to Rousseau, were described as mechanical, associated with the state, and limited or muted the knowledge acquired in the course of everyday life in the community (Herder). Fourth, from the time of Rousseau onward, it was increasingly difficult to maintain that the profound individualism and kinds of unequal social relations developing in modern civil society were characteristic of all societies. Fifth, there also was a growing clamor about the meaning of freedom and the autonomous individual in the context of the class structure of modern civil society and the state (Hegel). Marx certainly learned from their writings and carried many of their arguments into his own work. In the chapters that follow, we will consider what he retained of their views and where he broke with them.
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–2– Marx’s Anthropology Marx was a child of the Enlightenment. As a teenager in Trier during the early 1830s, he discussed various writers with his father, his future father-in-law, and the director of the local high school that he attended (McLellan 1973: 1–16; Seigel 1978: 28–64). The writers ranged from Homer and Shakespeare, on the one hand, to Rousseau, Voltaire, Kant, and Saint-Simon, on the other. The discussions had a significant impact on the young man; for example, when he was seventeen and still a student in Trier, Marx (1835/1975) wrote an essay on choosing a vocation which contained arguments that paralleled those of Rousseau’s Émile, which had been published in 1762 (Hillmann 1966: 33–48). Marx was also a bookworm. He read classical, Enlightenment, and contemporary writers with considerable care (e.g. McLellan 1973: 15, 22, 113, 267, 418). The excerpts he copied from Aeschylus, Goethe, Winckelmann, and others and his commentaries on those passages would come to fill fifty notebooks—more than 30,000 pages—by the time he died (Prawer 1978: 348). From early onward, he quoted long passages from favorite authors like Shakespeare and Homer and easily found quotations in the works of Aristotle and other writers of classical antiquity. In fact, he made the first German translation of Aristotle’s De Anima and apparently intended to publish it (Meikle 1985: 58). His library would eventually include nearly a hundred volumes by Greek and Roman writers, many in the original language, as well as commentaries on those works by later authors (DeGolyer 1992: 115; Kaiser 1967). Marx owed an intellectual debt to Enlightenment writers: the importance of reason, the centrality of the problem of freedom, the denial of knowledge claims based on authority, the historicity of things including forms of society, and the separation of the real world from representations of that world, to name only a few. However, their influence, as Nigel Davidson (2005: 8–9) perceptively remarked, did not come exclusively from books. There are two obvious reasons for this. First, Marx, who was born in 1818, was raised in the Prussian Rhineland, which was occupied by the French from 1794 to 1814; it was the region in Europe “where the influence of the French Revolution was most directly experienced. . . . For Marx, therefore, the French Revolution was not simply absorbed from the works of French liberals, it was also a historical experience only recently past, whose effects and unfulfilled promises still defined the politics of the time” (Davidson 2005:
39
40 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist 8–9). Second, revolutions elsewhere formed an almost continuous backdrop to his childhood and adolescence: Naples (1820), Spain (1820), Greece (1821), Spanish America (1808–22), and, a decade later, the Irish Rebellion (1829), Holland (1830), and Poland (1830–1). The July Revolution in France (1830), the English Reform Act (1832), and Andrew Jackson’s presidency (1829–37) enabled mass politics and extended voting rights (Hobsbawm 1962: 138–40). The debate about revolution was not an abstract one. “There was going to be some sort of revolution—everybody but the dullest Prussian bureaucrat knew that—but what kind of revolution?” (Davidson 2005: 9). Marx’s participation in this debate as well as in the revolutionary politics of the nineteenth century was continuous from his days as a student at the University of Berlin in the late 1830s. The failure of the revolutions of 1848 and 1870 forced him to further hone and refine his analyses and understanding of the world. This process of continual critique and re-examination persisted until his death in 1883. This is the milieu in which Marx honed his philosophical anthropology—his answers to the questions: Who or what are human beings, and what has made them human? Some writers (e.g. Gould 1978; Henry 1976/1983: 12; Schaff 1965/1970: 50) have argued that the central categories of answers to these questions are the social individual, praxis, and history. With respect to these categories, Marx insisted that human beings are “a part of nature” and that they “begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical [i.e., bodily or corporeal] organisation” (Marx 1844/1975a: 276; Marx and Engels 1845–6/1976: 31; emphasis in original). These productive activities or practices always occur in the context of associated individuals living in specific “ensembles of social relations” that have varied in space and time (Marx 1845/1976: 4). Simply put, human beings are born into communities and formed as social individuals through the intersubjectivity (the shared meanings and activities) of the persons who participate in those sets of relations. Praxis is the creative and self-creative activity by which human beings shape their world and themselves; it involves work, the mastering of nature, and formation of the human individual as a subject and social being (Kosík 1963/1976: 133–7; Petrović 1991). The temporal dimensions to these processes are fundamental. Human beings are determined by their history; at the same time, they chart the course of that history through their actions, within the constraints imposed by their bodies and the societies of which they are members. In this sense, the human condition has an irreducibly historical character. This historical understanding—which has the capacity to make clear the interconnections of the past, present, and future—affords us not only the opportunity to confront the burden of the past but also, under some circumstances, to set off on new courses for the future. The goal of this chapter is to explore Marx’s historical-dialectical anthropological theory.
Marx’s Anthropology • 41
What Are Human Beings? Marx, like Rousseau and Hegel before him, saw a relationship between human beings and nature. While his predecessors distinguished between the physical and moral characters of human beings and thus separated nature from the realm of human history, Marx did not. While Rousseau and Hegel viewed the relationship as one of emergence—the creation of culture for the former and the actualization of free subjectivity for the latter—Marx believed instead that The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. The first fact to be established is of the physical [i.e., bodily or corporeal] organisation of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature. Of course, we cannot here go either into the actual physical nature of man, or into the natural conditions in which man finds himself—geological, oro-hydrographical, climatic, and so on. All historical writing must set out from these natural bases and their modification in the course of history through the action of men. (Marx and Engels 1845–6/1976: 31)
Thus, Marx rejected the notion of a fixed human nature or essence in the singular and adopted instead a historicized notion of human natures in the plural. That is, there is a dialectical interplay between the biological substrate, which endows all members of the species with certain potentials, and the ensemble of social relations that shape everyday life in the worlds in which they live and which they themselves produce, reproduce, and, on occasion, change. On the one hand, as Joseph Fracchia (2005: 40) has argued, the “transhistorical attributes of human corporeal organisation . . . underlie and make possible the infinite though not unlimited range of those changing manifestations of human being—that is, of socio-cultural forms.” On the other hand, the ensembles of social relations not only condition how human beings live but also shape their relations of production as well as the personalities, consciousness, and behaviors that are characteristic of each historical epoch (Fracchia 1991: 159–60). Keeping in mind that Marx was averse to both biological reductionist and culturehistorical relativist perspectives, let us now look in more detail at how he characterized human beings simultaneously as natural beings and as social and conscious natural beings, as he discussed the specifically human features, capabilities, needs, and dispositions shared generically by all members of the species.1
The Corporeal Organization of Human Beings While Marx made numerous references to the corporeal organization of human beings throughout his writings, he never systematically developed the idea. Nonetheless, the importance of the concept is evident in his remarks. For example, in the “Theses on Feuerbach,” he mentions “practical, human sensuous activity;” in
42 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist Capital, he discusses the corporeal foundations of use values (they satisfy the needs of human individuals) and the immiserating effects or costs on the human body that result from lengthening the duration of the work day and thereby diminishing the time for rest and recuperation (Marx 1845/1976: 4; 1863–7/1977: 125–6, 276–7, 341–416). Fracchia (2005: 41ff.) suggests that enough can be gleaned from these scattered passages to see the “systematic and foundational logic” underpinning the remarks; in his view, the organization of the human body is for Marx more than merely “a simple prerequisite” for being human. The foundations for Marx’s view that human beings were a part of nature first appeared in The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, which he wrote early in his career to begin sorting out his theoretical differences with other writers— especially Hegel, the political economists, and the socialists. Marx agreed with Hegel’s view that human beings were part of nature and that they had produced a “second world.” In the gendered, referential language of the day, Marx wrote: Man is directly a natural being. As a natural being and as a living natural being he is on the one hand endowed with natural powers, vital powers—he is an active natural being. These forces exist within him as tendencies and abilities—as instincts. On the other hand, as a natural, corporeal, sensuous, objective being he is a suffering, conditioned and limited creature, like animals and plants. That is to say, the objects of his instincts exist outside him, as objects independent of him; yet these objects are objects that he needs—essential objects, indispensable to the manifestation and confirmation of his essential powers. To say that man is a corporeal, living, real, sensuous, objective being full of natural vigour is to say that he has real, sensuous objects as the object of his being or of his life, or that he can only express his life in real, sensuous objects. To be objective, natural and sensuous, and at the same time to have object, nature, and sense outside oneself, or oneself to be object, nature and sense for a third party, is one and the same thing. Hunger is a natural need; it therefore needs a nature outside itself, an object outside itself, in order to satisfy itself, to be stilled. Hunger is an acknowledged need of my body for an object existing outside it. (1844/1975a: 336; emphasis in the original)
Marx made several points in this passage. Let us begin to unpack what he meant. First, human beings are active, sensuous creatures that perceive the world around them. Their sense organs—their eyes, ears, nose, mouth, skin—combined with motor skills that allow them to move their bodies or various parts of them, including the sensory organs, constitute an interrelated perceptual system. This system provides sensations of the world; more importantly, they are active mechanisms for exploring nature—for moving, looking, listening, smelling, tasting, and touching the various external objects in the world around them. It permits human beings to feel by providing both passive and active sensations of the external world. It provides perceptions, assessments, and understandings of the ambient conditions as well as the animate and cultural elements of the environments the human beings inhabit. The adjustments resulting from movement of parts of the perceptual
Marx’s Anthropology • 43 system—e.g. eye, head, or hand movements—constitute modes of attention that allow human individuals to explore the available information, to form conceptions of those externalities, to orient themselves and move in relation to them. The human perceptual system also provides a basis for communication (Gibson 1966/1983). The human perceptual system, broadly conceived, evolved through time over the past 60 or so million years. Parts of the human perceptual system are shared to varying degrees and in different ways with those of their non-human primate relatives and shared ancestors. Some features of the human perceptual system and the anatomical correlates associated with them are: upright posture; bipedal locomotion; increased brain size; emphasis on vision including the related brain centers: stereoscopic color vision; diminished sense of smell and taste relative to other animal species; ability to discern intensity and direction of middle-range sounds; hands with opposable thumbs and enhanced dexterity; relatively small deciduous and permanent teeth; reduced amounts of bodily hair and increased number of sweat glands; prolonged life history stages (gestation, infancy, immaturity); menstrual as opposed to estrus cycles in reproductive females; tool-use; and habitual speech including the vocal apparatus and related brain centers (Langdon 2005). The structure and organization of the system and their anatomical correlates, as well as the externalities of their environments dispose human beings to interact with the worlds around them in particular ways. For example, human individuals are terrestrial and diurnal—that is, they typically do not inhabit ocean floors, reside on high mountain peaks, or see very well at night. The system imposes limitations, some of which have been overcome in recent years as a result of enormous amounts of cultural intervention; for example, human beings carrying oxygen and other essentials with them regularly climb to the top of Mt. Everest or use night-vision goggles to see in the dark. Second, to say that human beings are part of nature means that they are also feeling organisms that are actively involved with the world in which they live. They experience a range of feelings and emotions: fear, joy, love, and hunger, to name only a few. This engagement begins at the moment of birth and starts from the individual. The world provides the objects and others that the human individual internalizes and objectifies. This is the process of subjectification—the formation and development of the self (Ego)—which underpins the self-expression of the individual. Subjectification is an active process that involves action, thinking, and feeling. As Agnes Heller (1979: 11) has noted, feeling “is an inherent structural part of acting and thinking rather than their mere ‘accompaniment.’” At any moment, the individual’s engagement with its surroundings may range from minimal (out of awareness or consciousness), on the one hand, to the center of conscious attention, on the other. Nevertheless, it is during the process of acting and thinking, of developing new capacities and reintegrating them into more meaningful wholes, that the individual’s capacity for feeling also has the potential to expand. Third, human beings distinguish themselves from the worlds in which they live through a process of self-objectification—i.e., labor or purposive activity—and
44 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist thereby constitute themselves in a world of externalized objects that they have not only created but also that condition their lives in turn. In other words, objects are subjected to human purposive activity, and the subject who is objectified in a world of objects, is transformed in the process. These externalized objects satisfy needs, like hunger, that are experienced subjectively and whose satisfaction requires an object outside the self. Objectification, labor in its essential form, has been described as “the embodiment of human motivation, purpose, and ends” (D’Amico 1981: 3) with the “modes of objectification . . . [being] as many as human capacities and practices and the results . . . [being] worlds of artifacts—material, social, and semiotic” (Fracchia 2005: 44). Marx argued that Hegel’s views about labor were abstract and philosophical, and that his standpoint was that of political economy. For Marx (1844/1975a: 333), Hegel “grasps labour as the essence of man—as man’s essence which stands the test: he sees only the positive, not the negative side of labour. Labour is man’s coming-to-be himself within alienation, or as alienated man. The only labour which Hegel knows and recognizes is abstractly mental labour.” Thus, Marx’s notions of objectification and labor were broader than those of his predecessor. They were tied not to thought or the movement of Spirit but rather to human activity and history as these were shaped by specific forms of alienation. Fourth, what is distinctive, in Marx’s (and Fracchia’s) view, about human corporeal organization are the bodily organs that were transformed into instruments of production: most notably, the perceptual system, arms, legs, hands, brain, and the vocal tract. Human beings deploy them and the objects they created as extensions of their corporeal organization to mediate, regulate, and control the metabolism that exists between them and nature. For Marx The solitary man cannot operate upon nature without calling his own muscles into play under the control of his own brain. Just as head and hand belong together in the system of nature, so in the labour process mental and physical labour are united. (Marx 1863–7/1977: 643) The use and construction of instruments of labour, although present in the germ among certain species of animals, is characteristic of the specifically human labour process, and [Benjamin] Franklin therefore defines man as “a tool-making animal.” (Marx 1863– 7/1977: 286) In creating a world of objects by his practical activity, in his work upon inorganic nature, man proves himself a conscious species-being. . . . Admittedly animals also produce. They build themselves nests, dwelling, like the bees, beavers, ants, etc. But an animal only produces what it immediately needs for itself or its young. It produces one-sidedly, whilst man produces universally. It produces only under the dominion of immediate physical need, whilst man produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom. An animal process only itself, whilst man reproduces the whole of nature. An animal’s product belongs immediately to its
Marx’s Anthropology • 45 physical body, while man freely confronts his product. An animal forms objects only in accordance with the standard and the need of the species to which it belongs, whilst man knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of every species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard of the object. Man therefore also forms objects in accordance with the laws of beauty. (Marx 1844/1975a: 276–7) We are not dealing here with those first instinctive forms of labour which remain on the animal level. . . . We presuppose labour in a form in which it is an exclusively human characteristic. A spider conducts operations which resemble those of a weaver, and a bee would put many human architects to shame by the construction of its honeycomb cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is that the architect builds the cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax. At the end of every labour process, a result emerges which had already been conceived by the worker at the beginning, hence already existed ideally. Man not only effects a change of form in the materials of nature; he also realizes his own purpose in those materials. And this is a purpose he is conscious of, it determines the mode of his activity with the rigidity of a law, and he must subordinate his will to it. (Marx 1863–7/1977: 283–4)
Marx referred repeatedly over the years to the centrality of labor as the condition for human existence and the self-realization of human beings. It is the way human beings mediate and regulate the metabolism that exists between them and nature. It is the way they appropriate and alter external objects and transform them into things that satisfy their needs. More important, however, is the fact that all labor or work involves physical activity as well as thinking and other mental activities. As a result, this development of all the human productive forces is a process of both self-creation and self-affirmation, one that entails aesthetic as well as utilitarian attitudes toward human activity. It is a mode of objectification involving intentionality rather than instinct; it makes the life activity of the individual an object of will and self-consciousness. Marx saw this as a process of emergence, “the creation of man through human labour and the emergence of nature for man” (1844/1975a: 304); the motor for the developmental and directional change in human corporeal organization was labor which he described as “the living, form-giving fire” (1857–8/1973: 361). Fifth, human beings work to satisfy existing needs and to create new ones in the process. Labor, for Marx, involved the articulation of physical and mental activities directly or indirectly through thought and language. While the objects made by human beings may be utilitarian in the broad sense of the word, they may more importantly be aesthetic expressions—for example, the beauty of a finely chipped stone knife, the splendor of a poem, or the exquisite taste of a carefully prepared meal in contrast to fast food. Marx (1863–7/1977: 276–7, 655) rather systematically distinguished between physiological and necessary needs. The former were indispensable for the production and reproduction of the individual; the latter were “habitually required” in a given society. The needs of human beings developed, in his view, with the development of the productive forces—i.e., purposive activity
46 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist (work), the instruments of work, and the objects upon which work is performed (Marx 1857–8/1973: 494, 612; 1863–7/1977: 284). Marx also alluded to social needs—“the level of needs of the worker as a socially developed human being at a given point” (Lebowitz 2003: 40). Social needs are the genuine needs of every individual in a given society, like adequate health care or rest; these are typically available only to the privileged layers of that society, who, like congressmen in the United States today, portray themselves as representatives of the masses. While Marx never systematically elaborated a theory of social needs, he and Engels made passing references to the needs of human beings in general (McMurtry 1978: 33–4). These included adequate food, drink, clothing, and habitation; fresh air and sunlight; adequate living and working space; cleanliness of person and surroundings; rest from exertion; variation of activity; time for intellectual development, social intercourse, fulfillment of social functions, free play of the vital forces of the body and mind; growth; development; healthy maintenance of the body; aesthetic stimulation; play; and meaningful interpersonal and sexual relationships (Marx 1844/1975a: 295–6; 1863–7/1977: 341, 362, 375–6, 611, 762–802; Marx and Engels 1845–6/1976: 38, 417).
“Ensembles of Social Relations” and Human Beings as Social Individuals Human beings are distinguished as much by their sociocultural and historical characteristics as they are by their need to work, their corporeal organization, or their biological features. Marx recognized the sociality of human beings and that being human was, in fact, actualized in their relations with other individuals, in their participation in historically specific communities. He wrote . . . that the development of the individual is determined by the development of all the others with whom he is directly or indirectly associated, and that the different generations of individuals entering into relation with one another are connected with one another, that the physical existence of the later generations is determined by that of their predecessors, and that these later generations inherit the productive forces and forms of intercourse accumulated by their predecessors, their own mutual relations being determined thereby. In short, it is clear that development takes place and that the history of a single individual cannot possibly be separated from the history of preceding or contemporary individuals, but is determined by this history (Marx and Engels 1845–6/1976: 438).
Another way of saying this is that these webs of social relations are the foundation on which intersubjectivity is possible. As a result, human individuals—their consciousnesses, their personalities, their ambivalences, their subjectivities, their individualities, their identities, and their cultures—have a profoundly social character (e.g. Henry 1976/1983; 54–118; Márkus 1978: 15–35; Negt 1988: 228–33: Schaff
Marx’s Anthropology • 47 1965/1970: 49–102). Human beings are shaped by the sets of relations into which they are born and which they help to actualize, reproduce, and occasionally even transform during their lives. The kinds of work they do—the ways in which they satisfy their needs, express their identities, and form new wants and desires—are all cast in this forge. In a phrase, sociality permeates all aspects of the individual’s life, even when he or she is seemingly alone. The spheres of activity founded on these relations are internalized, accepted, or rejected by the individuals involved. Thus, these ensembles are not natural relations that exist among generalized or universal human individuals but rather are the particular relations that exist among specific, concrete individuals who live at particular times and in particular places or, as Marx would say, in given historical epochs. As a result, “the specific character of human beings in a given era cannot be determined a priori but only in reference to the [particular] ensembles of social relations” (Fracchia 1991: 160). Human beings are clearly social individuals, but how did human social individuals come into being? For Marx, work in the broad, not exclusively utilitarian, sense was one distinctive feature. Consciousness was another. “Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from the life activity of the animal,” wrote Marx (1844/1975a: 294). By consciousness, he meant the mental outlook (1) that is formed under particular social conditions, and (2) that is, at the same time, an expression of those circumstances. His view of consciousness was broader than the one we typically employ today. It involves intentionality. It also includes “cognizance of the surrounding world” as well as the “mental production” of the whole sphere of presuppositions, dispositions, feelings, and so forth that are handed down by tradition and accepted in an unreflective manner (Márkus 1978: 26, 70n31a; Marx and Engels 1845–6/1976: 36). While consciousness is ultimately based on the possibilities for development in the corporeal organization of the species, consciousness itself is a social phenomenon. Adam Schaff describes this in the following way: at a certain level of biological evolution, which changes very slowly, man—in the sense of his attitudes, opinions, value-judgments, etc.—is a product of ontogenesis, a wholly determined social product. For what he becomes in ontogenesis is fully determined socially; and this in a way that is quite beyond his control—through language, which embodies a certain type of thinking, and education, which imparts certain customs, modes of behavior and of ethics, etc. (1965/1970: 66)
For Marx, consciousness is not the passive reception of stimuli from the natural and sociohistorical world in which the human individual lives. This socially and historically determined activity is, instead, a “creative and formative factor in all social activity” (Márkus 1978: 28). It entails increasing awareness of the objects of the natural world, other human beings, and their relations with them. It is a repeated moment in the life activity of the individual. It exists between the appearance, recognition, and subjectification of those objects, persons, and relations and the
48 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist potentials they have for satisfying or creating new needs; the appropriation of these “objects of social practice;” and “the activation of human actuality” (Márkus 1978: 29). Thus, consciousness is also related to Marx’s concepts of objectification and labor—the transformation of exterior objects to satisfy needs. Consciousness “is a particular type of activity directed toward the ‘appropriation’ of reality in a specific way” (Márkus 1978: 29). Social consciousness never exists in a general or abstract sense but rather always is a manifestation of particular ensembles of social relations and sociohistorical conditions; hence, it also includes “false consciousness”— mistaken ideas that conceal, distort, or invert reality and of whose existence the subjects are unaware. Marx portrayed the linkages of consciousness in his famous base–superstructure architectural metaphor: In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. (Marx 1859/1970: 20)
This passage is often read not as a shorthand or summary statement of complex relations but rather as claims for (1) the separation of the economic from the cultural and other realms of society and, ultimately, (2) the economic determination of society and history. It does not say that the culture is not economic or that the economic lacks significant cultural, legal, or political dimensions. Such claims also overlook passages Marx wrote earlier that are hard to square with models of economic determination. For example, In the case of the arts, it is well known that certain periods of their flowering are all out of proportion to the general development of society, hence also to the material foundation, the skeletal structure, as it were, of its organization. (Marx 1857–8/1973: 110) The mode of production must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence of the individual. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and how they produce. (Marx and Engels 1845–6/1976: 31–2)
In this view, “culture [consciousness] constitutes a mode of expression of life conditioned by the form of production or form of life activity” (D’Amico 1981: 11). Thus, cultures, which are the expression of particular ensembles of social
Marx’s Anthropology • 49 relations, are scaffoldings for human activity in historically particular circumstances. Consciousness renders those relations intelligible and reproducible; it is also a condition for transforming them (McMurtry 1978: 145–56; Outhwaite 1991: 128). As social beings, human individuals acquired their consciousness in historically specific communities and could develop as individuals only in those societies. Marx was aware that “the development of the individual is conditioned by the development of all other individuals with whom he stands in a direct or indirect intercourse, and that the various generations of the individuals, which enter into relations with each other have an interconnection” (Marx and Engels 1845–6/1976: 438). Their consciousness, passed from one generation to the next, is re-created daily, reworked, and transformed by particular historical individuals. Marx (1844/1975a: 299) was acutely aware of the dialectical relation between the individual and species-life (the community). Richard Lichtman writes that Like other dialectically related notions, individual life and species (communal) life can neither be separated from each other nor identified. Though joined, their mode of experience does not coincide. Individual life is the mode of “experience” of the social whole, and the social whole has itself no existence separate from the fact of its being experienced in the lives of individuals. Each individual is an experiencing nodule or terminus of the ensemble of relations that constitutes the social system. This is not to reduce society to the sum of individual experiences. For what the individual experiences is primarily the structure of social relations in dialectical polarity with the world of nature. But even more significant is the fact that how this experience is itself structured is also a dialectical consequence and cause of the particular form of individualism in a historical epoch. In short, the specific conscious experience of individuals occurs in the context of the totality of structural relationships among individuals, structural relationships among the aspects of nature, and the structure of relationships between these distinct but reciprocal realms. And, of course, there is that part of the human psyche, which plays no part in Marx’s system—the structure of the repressed unconscious. (Lichtman 1982: 220)
This does not mean, however, that all of the individuals of particular communities share some monolithic form of consciousness that is imposed externally or by tradition and that homogenized their views of the world, and Marx realized this. Gyorgy Márkus describes individuality and the constituents of personality in the following way: The material and ideal “elements” of his objective world become transformed into constituents of his own personality . . . only through a process of appropriation . . . [that is] due to his own selective activity. And it is first of all this activity and its social consequences that directly form the specific, irreducible individuality of every human being. Each concrete individual finds a more or less strictly circumscribed scope of historically possible forms of behavior and activity as something set by, and with, his
50 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist historical situation, class position, etc. . . . A concrete walk of life, the personal history of an individual is determined in the incessant interplay, give-and-take if his own actions and the “reactions” of his social environment. Human personality evolves . . . in a constant dialogue between man and world, between subjective activity and objective social reality. (Márkus 1978: 23)
Marx referred to this as “the difference between the individual as a person and what is extraneous [accidental] to him” (Marx and Engels 1845–6/1976: 81). Accidents are not the only way in which individualization and the emergence of individuality occur. As the production and reproduction of everyday life acquire an increasingly social character and individuals begin to produce for each other through cooperation, they have greater possibilities of learning from the experiences of those with whom they have ties. This is a consequence of the ongoing dialogue between human beings. This does not prevent them, as Marx and Engels (1845–6/1976: 47) phrased it, from hunting in the morning, fishing in the afternoon, herding in the evening, and criticizing after dinner without ever becoming a hunter, fisherman, shepherd, or critic. However, when and if a social division of labor develops and the interests of the individual conflict with those of the community, social relations are transformed. Some individuals begin to pursue their own interests and to exploit others—i.e., appropriate their objects and labor. Social differentiation and specialization follow in their wake. In the example cited above, individuals are no longer persons but rather have become hunters, fisherman, shepherds, or philosophers through the exchange relations and rules of distribution that have been forged. They are simultaneously universalized and depersonalized, which are two sides of the same coin. On the one hand, their dependence on others means that they can potentially draw on the knowledge and experience of an ever-widening circle of human beings. On the other hand, their autonomy and independence are diminished. In these historicized processes, they are increasingly estranged from nature, from others, from the products they produce, and from themselves. This estrangement, or alienation, resulting from forces that occur behind the backs of individuals, leads to the reformation of personality characteristics and individuality; they too are manifestations of historically particular ensembles of social relations. Marx’s focus on “ensembles of social relations” emphasizes the connection between the human individual who is growing self-conscious of other persons and of things that are external to him. His aim is to understand the human social being as a worker and thinker, a producer and consumer situated in historically specific social worlds that vary in time and space. The historical development of these variable social worlds provides the real conditions for individualization and human individuality. It underscores the sociohistorical character of work and consciousness, both of which, in turn, are linked dialectically to the corporeal organization of human beings. As Marx put it, real individuals are “individualized through the process of history” (1857–8/1973: 496).
Marx’s Anthropology • 51
History Marx’s view of the world is profoundly historicist in the sense that he believed it impossible to understand something fully unless one knew how it came to be the way it is. The historicity of things was important for understanding both process and succession. For Marx, history involved the inextricably intertwined development of human beings, of ensembles of social relations (societies), and of nature itself. Early on, he and Engels wrote that “we know only a single science, the science of history. One can look at history from two sides and divide it into the history of nature and the history of men. The two are, however, inseparable; the history of nature and the history of men are dependent on each other so long as men exist” (Marx and Engels, 1845–6/1976: 28). Marx’s materialist science of history has a number of distinctive features. Let us look at these in more detail. First, perhaps the most significant features of his historical science are the rejection of nineteenth-century atomist (Cartesian) reductionism, on the one hand, and the adoption of a dialectical holism, on the other. Reductionism, which is still a prominent mode of analysis of the natural and social worlds today, attempts to explain complex organisms, like human beings, and their behavior in terms of their constituent parts—e.g. neurons, genes, or the molecular sequences on chromosomes. The proponents of atomist reductionism are committed to five ontological principles: (1) each system has a set of natural building blocks which they seek to identify; (2) these units are homogeneous at least with regard to the whole of which they are parts; (3) the building blocks exist prior to the whole and hence have properties that are distinct and independent from those of the whole; (4) the whole may be nothing more than the sum of its parts, or the interactions of the building blocks may produce additional or emergent properties; and (5) causes are active subjects (agents) whereas effects are the properties of objects that have been acted upon. Marx (1840–1/1975) laid the foundations for his rejection of atomist reductionism in his doctoral dissertation and developed the argument throughout his career. Basically, he challenged the validity of each of its ontological premises and resisted reductionist epistemologies, which reduced the source of knowledge to appearances (cf. Levins and Lewontin 1985: 269; Meikle 1985: 10–15; Wilson 1991: 120–30). As Marx (1864–94/1981: 956) put it: “All science would be superfluous if the form of appearance of things directly coincided with their essence.” Second, Marx’s theory of history builds on the notion of a totality that includes both natural history and human history. In his view, a totality is a multileveled, historically contingent, and dialectically structured unity that exists in and through the diverse interpenetrations, connections, and contradictions that shape the interactions of the parts with one another, with the unity itself, and with the greater whole of which they are a part (Kosík 1963/1976: 18–9; Levins and Lewontin 1985: 133–42, 278–85; Mészáros 1991). Thus, (1) reality is structured by processes and
52 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist relations that are not always apparent on the surface; (2) the constituents of the totality are not identical with each other or in their relations to the whole; (3) the parts do not exist prior to the whole but rather acquire their characteristic properties in the interactions that constitute the whole; (4) the whole is always greater than the sum of its parts, and it is impossible to understand the whole merely by studying its constituent elements; (5) the whole is in continual flux though the parts and levels of the totality may be changing at different rates; (6) this flux means that they may destroy the conditions that brought the totality into being in the first place; and (7) these transformations create possibilities for new historically contingent structures that have not existed previously. Consequently, Marx’s ontology and epistemology have different foundations from those of atomist reductionism. As he put it: “The method of rising from the abstract to the concrete is only the way in which thought appropriates the concrete, reproduces it as the concrete in mind. But all of this is by no means the process by which the concrete itself comes into being” (Marx 1857–8/1973: 101). Third, Marx’s theory is firmly rooted in an appreciation of variation. He wrote approvingly that the historical geologists had shown that the formation of the earth was a process, a “self-generation” (Marx 1844/1975a: 304–5). 2 This historical, material world was a precondition for the existence of human beings, of human production, and of human society in its myriad forms. He appreciated the significance of variation in both time and space. It was impossible in his view to speak of either nature or society in general or in some abstract sense; it was necessary instead to think of the spatial and temporal particularities of both. He referred repeatedly over the years to the diverse “natural conditions in which man finds himself”—a multiplicity of worlds shaped subtly or not by their geology, hydrology, climate, and soil fertility exhaustion to name only a few of the factors he mentioned (e.g. Marx 1863–7/1977: 637–8; Marx and Engels 1845–6/1976: 31, 42). For human communities with similar modes of production, the consequence of such environmental variation is that even slight differences of emphasis in what is taken from nature or in how tools and labor power are employed, can yield significant variations in the details of how labor is organized. Marx was acutely aware of the fact that particular physical conditions, or material worlds, could impose limitations on human communities with particular means of production—for instance, the unpredictability or impossibility altogether of agricultural production in high-elevation or high-latitude environments, like the alpine grasslands of the Andes mountains or the tundra of northern Canada. Moreover, he was aware that environments changed with the passage of time. Some changes were due to the impact of new forms of human activity, like agriculture or the domestication of animals (Marx 1863–7/1977: 287–8). Other changes—such as those produced by earthquakes or floods—were less obviously or less directly the result of human activity. He also knew that the tempo and mode of such changes varied from region to region and from epoch to another. Frederick Engels, I believe, eloquently captured Marx’s sentiments in this regard when he wrote:
Marx’s Anthropology • 53 There is damned little left of “nature” as it was in Germany at the time when the Germanic peoples immigrated into it. The earth’s surface, climate, vegetation, fauna, and the human beings themselves have continually changed, and all this owing to human activity, while the changes of nature in Germany which have occurred in the process without human interference are incalculably small. (Engels 1873–82/1987: 511)
Fourth, although he often employed the language of essentialism and reductive materialism in his writing, Marx did not view historical change exclusively as either the unfolding of some potential inherent in the totality that revealed a necessary and regular succession of development stages or the outcome of forces or events that accidentally impinged upon the totality from the outside.3 Yet, there are elements of both developmental necessity (directionality) and chance (accident) in his historical arguments. For example, Marx (1863–7/1977: 772–80) described the developmental logic of capital accumulation in terms of concentration (reproduction on an extended scale) and centralization (regrouping capital into fewer units)—a logic that played itself out historically in England, albeit with fits and starts, in the nineteenth century. But, he also noticed that the development of capitalism in Russia in the 1870s was seemingly following a different pathway from that of England (Marx 1881/1983: 123–4). Moreover, when considering the structure of capitalist production in the 1860s, Marx (1864–94/1981: 567–72) suggested that there were several potential routes of its development in the immediate future given the then-existing property relations and balance of force—the formation of monopolies in certain spheres of production that would provoke both state intervention and the emergence of a new financial aristocracy. An alternative was the development of factories or companies run by workers. Both, in fact, have occurred since he wrote. “Developmental contingency,” a concept elaborated in another context by Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin (1985: 94–6), affords us a useful, shorthand description of Marx’s views about historical change. The concept captures the interplay of structure and process, of necessity and accident. To paraphrase their description of the concept and its implications, development is a historical process in which the effects of a force cannot be specified in a general or abstract way; they can only be specified in the singularity of the conditions and relations that exist at a particular time and place. One consequence of this is that the historical formation of ensembles of relations and their associated environments appear as “as a temporal sequence of events in which the exact order is critical” (Levins and Lewontin 1985: 95). Another consequence is that subtle variations among local communities have the potential to affect what happens or does not happen next; in other words, further development always involves confronting the existing structures and following, or not, one of several alternative pathways. Still another consequence is that the transition from one historical formation to another depends more on the conditions that prevailed at the time of the transition than on how those conditions and relations of the totality emerged. Finally, in some instances (labor strikes, for example),
54 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist the possible outcomes for particular communities are often quite constrained but perhaps not completely controlled; as a result, the driving forces involved appear to play themselves out with almost law-like regularity. At other moments, when the balance of forces are more nearly equal, people do have a real potential or capacity to make their own histories; whether they have chosen to do so or succeeded in doing so are other issues. Fifth, Marx’s science of history is not a philosophy of world history that attempts to describe humanity or the flow of history in some general or abstract sense. This is an impossibility. He is concerned instead with examining what is happening or what has taken place in communities that have particular locations in time and space. As a result, the histories of communities are not internally monolithic because the different subjectivities that emerge are inseparable from the ensembles of relations that make them possible. Nor is history homogeneous, either within a given historical epoch or when different communities are compared. While the ensembles of relations that produce and reproduce history are empirically rich in detail and specificity, they do not create or constitute an infinite diversity. There are limits. Marx recognized them. They underpin his concept of a mode of production, which acknowledges the forms of cooperation, the commonalities, of different types of societies. In the Grundrisse, Marx (1857–8/1973: 459–514) distinguished two broad categories: capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production. There were two major differences between them, as Jason Read (2003: 38) notes. Capitalist societies separated propertyless workers from the means of production and subsistence and freed up the flow of money within the community. In pre-capitalist communities, the workers retained control over their means of production, and wealth was integrated into the community. In addition, Marx made further distinctions within the category of pre-capitalist modes of production, which he labeled the primitive communal, ancient, Asiatic, Germanic, Slavonic, and feudal. The names Marx chose designated different forms of cooperation and social structure rather than either presumed geographically based identities or presumed inferiority resulting from some “chain of being” placement on a social evolutionary ladder whose top rung was occupied by Western capitalism. For example, the Inca and Aztec states of the Americas have been described in terms of the Asiatic mode of production; the Maasai and other pastoral peoples of East Africa have been described in terms of the Germanic mode of production; and the forms of cooperation and social relations of the primitive communal mode of production figure prominently in the everyday lives of numerous American Indian peoples, including many of those whose communities now own casinos. Eric Hobsbawm (1964: 36) is correct, I believe, when he interprets the various pre-capitalist modes of production identified by Marx not as an evolutionary succession or progression but rather as different forms of individuation and property relations, as alternative steps away from or pathways out of historically specific forms of primitive communal society.
Marx’s Anthropology • 55 Marx was struck by the observation that communities manifesting pre-capitalist modes of production tended to reproduce existing social relations. He described this in various ways: In all these forms—in which landed property and agriculture form the basis of the economic order, and where the economic aim is hence the production of use-values, i.e., the reproduction of the individual within the specific relation of the commune in which he is its basis—there is to be found: (1) Appropriation not through labour, but presupposed to labour; appropriation of the natural condition of labour, of the earth as the original instrument of labour as well as its workshop and repository of raw materials. The individual relates simply to the objective conditions of labour as being his; [he relates] to them as the inorganic nature of his subjectivity, in which the latter realizes itself; the chief objective condition of labour does itself appear as a product of labour, but is already there as nature; on one side the living individual, on the other the earth, as the objective condition of his reproduction; (2) but this relation to land and soil, to the earth, as the property of the labouring individual—who thus appears from the outset not merely as labouring individual, in this abstraction, but who has an objective mode of existence in his ownership of land, an existence presupposed to his activity, and not merely a result of it, a presupposition of his activity just like his skin, his sense organs, which of courses he also reproduces and develops etc. in the life process, but which are nevertheless presuppositions of this process of his reproduction—is instantly mediated by the naturally arisen, spontaneous, more or less historically developed and modified presence of the individual as member of a commune—His naturally arisen presence as a member of a tribe etc. [i.e., an ensemble of relations]. (Marx 1857–8/1973: 485)
With particular reference to communities manifesting the Asiatic mode of production, he wrote that The simplicity of the productive organism in these self-sufficing communities which constantly reproduce themselves in the same form and, when accidentally destroyed, spring up again on the same spot with the same name—this simplicity is the key to the riddle of the unchangeability of Asiatic societies, which is in such striking contrast with the constant dissolution and refounding of Asiatic states, and their never-ceasing changes of dynasty. The structure of the fundamental economic elements of society remain untouched by the storms which blow up in the cloudy regime of politics. (Marx 1863–7/1977: 479)
In the back of Marx’s mind as he wrote these passages was the dynamism of capitalism—the continuous reinvention of the subject and transformation of the productive forces. As Read (2003: 10) points out, capitalism was no longer fettered by the need to reproduce “any particular structure of belief, desire, or tradition.” One issue to be explained was that the different forms of consciousness, subjectivity, and social practice—as refracted by the modes of production manifested in particular
56 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist communities—directly affected and shaped the tempo and form of historical change. At the same time, Marx was acutely aware that historical changes had already happened, that they were taking place at an increasing pace in the present, and that, given the existing webs of social relations, they would continue to take place in the future. He portrayed the conditions that laid the foundations for the appearance of new forms of cooperation and subjectivity with the advent of capitalism: The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the indigenous population of that continent, the beginnings of the conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of blackskins, are all things which characterize the dawn of the era of capitalist production. . . . Hard on their heels follows the commercial war of the European nations, which has the globe as its battlefield. . . . These different moments are systematically combined together at the end of the seventeenth century in England; the combination embraces the colonies, the national debt, the modern tax system, and the system of protection. These methods depend on brute force, for instance the colonial system. But they all employ the power of the state, the concentrated and organized force of society to hasten, as in a hothouse, the process of transformation of the feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode and to shorten the transition. Force is the midwife of every old society which is pregnant with a new one. It is itself an economic power. (Marx 1863–7/1977: 915–16)
In this passage, Marx identifies the motors that are driving the expansion of the capitalist mode of production as well as the complexities of the transition from the dominance of one mode of production to the dominance of another. Read (2003: 5) described the historicity of transition as the tension between reproduction (determination) of traditional forms of cooperation and subjectivity, on the one hand, and their dissolution (underdetermination), on the other. The new conditions forged during moments of transition were apparent not only to the peoples of the traditional societies in the colonies but also to those of the metropole and its satellites or internal colonies. Importantly, transitions are processes rather than single events; they are spread over both time and space. For example, the cotton fabrics produced by English wage-workers in the textile mills of Manchester in the late eighteenth century were made from cotton that was grown by African slaves in South Carolina; much of the cotton cloth produced in northern England was ultimately sold in India where the British had destroyed the local textile industry earlier in the century. In sum, Marx’s theory of history contains notions of structure, transformation, and directionality (Callinicos 1995: 95–110, 141–65). The structure is forged by particular ensembles of social relations and the connections of those communities with the environments that they continually use and re-create anew. Marx used the concept of a mode of production to distinguish one kind or type of society from another. These types were different from actually existing communities. Historically
Marx’s Anthropology • 57 specific communities, like the one in Atlantic Canada around 1750, manifested either a particular mode of production or some combination of modes of production, one of which was dominant over the others. Marx’s notion of history was based on the contradictions, tensions, and conflicts that develop within the realm of social production in its myriad manifestations; these were the motors of historical change. It recognizes changes in tempo—moments of acceleration, moments of stasis—as well as alternative pathways of development. It also acknowledges that sometimes changes, which were possible, did not happen; they were blocked for one reason or another. Finally, Marx’s theory of history contains a notion of non-teleological directionality, what we referred to above as contingent determinism.
Truth and Praxis Praxis extends Marx’s answers to the questions: What are human beings? What is their reality? How was that reality formed? Praxis is the most basic characteristic of human beings and their most distinctive feature.4 It is not an attribute of either animals or machines. As you will recall from earlier in the chapter, something essential happens when the sphere of human being becomes established in opposition to the “givenness” of nature, when human being becomes distinct from what is not human. Praxis is the active process by which human beings establish a relation with objects of the external world and with one another. It is the way they renew those relations, create new relations, and gain a more profound understanding of what they have made. Most importantly, praxis is not something that exists outside of human beings; instead, it permeates the very core of their existence. As Karel Kosík (1963/1976: 139) noted: “Praxis is both the objectification of man and the mastering of nature, and the realization of human freedom.” Let us look in more detail at how Marx conceptualized and employed the idea of praxis. The first dimension of Marx’s notion of praxis is that it involves human activity and production; it also involves consciousness of self and other. As Marx put it: Let us suppose that we had carried out production as human beings. Each of us would have in two different ways affirmed himself and the other person. (1) In my production I would have objectified my individuality, its specific character, and therefore enjoyed not only an individual manifestation of my life during the activity, but also when looking at the object I would have the individual pleasure of knowing my personality to be objective, visible to the senses and hence a power beyond all doubt. (2) In you enjoyment or use of my product I would have the direct enjoyment both of being conscious of having satisfied a human need by my work, that is, of having objectified man’s essential nature, and of having thus created an object corresponding to the need of another man’s essential nature. (3) I would have been for you the mediator between you and the species, and therefore would become recognized as felt by you yourself as a completion of your own essential nature and as a necessary part of your yourself, and consequently would
58 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist know myself to be confirmed both in your thought and your love. (4) In the individual expression of your life, and therefore in my individual activity I would have directly confirmed and realized my true nature, my human nature, my communal nature. (Marx 1844/1975b: 227–8; emphasis in the original)
Marx makes several points in this passage. The objects produced by the individuals entail the transformation of raw materials provided by the natural world through the mental and physical activity of those persons. The objects are a manifestation of their activity in a congealed or crystallized form; as a result, the person and object are viewed as belonging to the same ontological category rather than to separate, distinct categories of person and thing (Bernstein 1971: 44). The object produced by one individual satisfies a need perceived by the other; thus, in Marx’s terms, the objects are use values. During the process of producing the object, the individual imagines the object in its finished form and subordinates his will to the task at hand. As Marx (1863–7/1977: 284) would put it later: “Besides the exertion of bodily organs, the process demands that, during the whole operation, the workman’s will be steadily in consonance with his purpose.” The way human beings apprehend the world with their bodies, how they interact with the natural and social worlds in which they live, and how they relate to each other in these processes are all aspects of objectification. In the process of objectification, human beings have not only made themselves; they also portray themselves as having dissolved the unity of nature and as having a separate existence from the material world. This is Marx’s theory of alienation, which is ultimately concerned with the separation of human beings from their practical activity, from the products they create, from one another, and from the realization of their own potential. Thus, the questions of how and what human beings produce are especially important, because Marx tied them to the question of freedom, which ultimately involves removing impediments to the development of the human capacity. Marx (e.g. 1844/1975a: 270–82; 1857–8/1973: 831–3) is clear that objectification takes different forms in different sociohistorical settings. In modern capitalist society, for instance, it involves alienation or estrangement of the worker from the product of his labor because of social relations that based on wage labor, private property in the means of production, and market exchange. Marx describes the process by which alienation emerges historically in capitalist society from a certain point of departure: The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces, the more his production increases in power and size. The worker becomes an ever cheaper commodity the more commodities he creates. The devaluation of the world of men is in direct proportion to the increasing value of the world of things. Labour produces not only commodities: it produces itself and the worker as a commodity. . . . This fact expresses merely that the object which labour produces—labour’s product—confronts it as something alien, as
Marx’s Anthropology • 59 a power independent of the producer. The product of labour is labour which has been embodied in an object: it is the objectification of labour. Labour’s realisation is its objectification. Under these economic conditions this realization of labour appears as loss of realization for the workers; objectification as loss of the object and bondage [subservience] to it; appropriation as estrangement, as alienation [and as externalization] . . . (1844/1975a: 271–3; emphasis in the original)
Marx proceeds to point out that “Political economy conceals the estrangement inherent in the nature of labour by not considering the direct relationship between the worker (labour) and production” (1844/1975a: 274; emphasis in the original). In other words, because they posit the categories and conditions that are historically specific to capitalist production as transhistorical and hence universally applicable, the political economists have only a partial understanding of this historically contingent reality. They have created instead an ideology and continue to portray their representation of the world as real. Consciousness, the second dimension of Marx’s theory of praxis, is intimately related to objectification. For Marx, consciousness of nature is always a social product conditioned by the level of development of the forces of production and the ensembles of social relations and cultural forms associated with them. Consciousness originates in a new relation between the subject and self; it is a reflective moment in which the unity of humanity (subject) and nature (object) is negated, and a new understanding of what the relationship could be is initiated through human activity. Consciousness is an integral part of activity—consciousness not only of the properties of the raw materials given by nature, what potentially can be done with them, and the processes for transforming them, but also, and more importantly, awareness of the needs, feelings, and sentiments of other persons. For Marx, consciousness is simultaneously an element of human experience, a moment in its historical development, and the understandings that result from the sociohistorical development under historically specific ensembles of social relations. Thus, consciousness combines both real (true) understandings of the world and other human beings with misperceptions and misunderstandings of both. This leads us to a third dimension of Marx’s idea of praxis: the “relentless criticism of all existing conditions.” This aspect of Marx’s work was already crystallizing when, as a student, he was first beginning to grapple with Hegel’s thought and writings. The criticism of the writings of Hegel, Feuerbach, the political economists, and others as well as of his own thoughts would continue for the rest of his life. The kinds of questions he posed in his critiques were: What is the argument? What is implicit and explicit in the argument? What are the presuppositions? Where is the argument persuasive and why? What are the weaknesses and fallacies of the argument? Where is it ambiguous or vague? What empirical evidence supports or refutes the claim? How might we move from misleading or inadequate arguments to ones that provide new insights and fuller explanations or representations of
60 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist human reality? What are the implications for action? What kinds of action have the arguments supported or sustained? In some instances, his critiques involved sentenceby-sentence analyses of the arguments he was examining (e.g. Marx 1843/1975a, 1875/1989, 1880–2/1974). In other instances, they were the bases for working out new hypotheses (e.g. Marx 1857–8/1973). In still others, they were detailed analyses and assessments of the balance of forces at particular historical moments, like the Paris Commune, and why the particular courses of action that unfolded ultimately failed with regard to the realization of human freedom (e.g. Marx 1871/1986). Thus, for Marx, praxis as the determination of reality begins with an accurate, theoretical understanding of existing institutions and the contradictions inherent in them. He realized the importance and significance of empirical evidence in the process of developing such an understanding of the world—that is, how it came to be the way it is and, given the conditions at any particular time, the real possibilities that exist for the future. Marx was not particularly concerned with speculating about what the future might be like. His “relentless criticism” did mean, however, that he devoted considerable time and energy to examining the ideas that people had about the world. These, he observed repeatedly, did not always conform to ways things really were, although, as Richard Bernstein (1971: 52) notes, they do tell us something about the reality at that moment in time. They are representations or reflections of reality rather than reality itself. Marx’s relentless criticism of institutions and beliefs, then, is ultimately concerned with understanding them rather than condemning them outright. For example, in a famous passage, Marx (1843–4/1975: 175–6) wrote that Religious suffering is the expression of real suffering and at the same time the protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions. It is the opium of the people. The abolition of religion as a people’s illusory happiness is a demand for their real happiness. The demand to abandon illusions about their condition is a demand to abandon a condition which requires illusions. The criticism of religion is thus in embryo a criticism of the vale of tears whose halo is religion. (as translated by Easton and Guddat 1967: 250; emphasis in the original)
The goal of this dimension of praxis, in Marx’s (1843/1975b: 144) view, should be the “reform of consciousness not through dogmas, but by analysing the mystical consciousness that is unintelligible to itself, whether it manifests itself in a religious or a political form.” A correct theoretical analysis of politics, political economy, religion, or philosophy and the contradictions inherent in them would yield understanding of the institutions, beliefs, and practices involved (Bernstein 1971: 53). It was essential, in Marx’s view, to speak to truth and to let the chips fall where they might. Consequently, he did not accept arguments based on authority or divine inspiration or rely on the eloquence of arguments themselves. He argued instead that there is empirical evidence and that an argument should mirror the facts.
Marx’s Anthropology • 61 In other words, Marx was committed to a correspondence theory of truth whose criterion involves praxis—i.e., an unmediated representation of reality of both the immediate forms and the underlying structures that are reflected in them; with regards to the criterion of praxis, this means that truth must be explanatory rather than predictive (Bhaskar 1991b). Thus, Marx rejected claims based on authority, divine inspiration, consensus, or whether an argument was consistent with, entailed by, or contingent upon another statement—i.e., what philosophers call subjective, voluntarist, or coherence theories of truth, all of which were resurrected by one or another subsequent writers in the Marxist tradition. From early onward in his writings about capitalist society, Marx privileged the standpoint of politically engaged and socially conscious working classes that are capable of exposing and potentially transcending the inhumanity of their real existing relations (e.g. Marx 1843–4/1975: 184–7; 1844/1975a: 281–2; 1844/1975c: 202–6; Marx and Engels 1848/1976: 493–6). One reason for this stance harkens back to the master–slave relationship that Hegel described in his Phenomenology of Spirit (1807/1977: 111–19, §178–96). As you will recall in this vignette, the master, in order to be a lord, must possess a slave, who produces things for the master to consume and is dependent upon him. The slave initially takes the master to be his reality and lives in fear of him; his essential nature is his labor, and his consciousness is expressed in the things he produces, which are externalized from himself. However, the more the master succeeds in his lordship, the more he fails, as he slowly realizes his dependent consciousness; he has in fact achieved his position by virtue of the slave who is his essential reality. As the slave begins to realize that he is more than the things he produces, he realizes that he has a consciousness in his own right as well as a self-existence and freedom outside of the things he produces. Increasingly, as his consciousness grows more independent, he realizes that he can no longer be reduced to the things he makes. Both master and slave are aware of their divided nature and contradictory being (Bernstein 1971: 24–8, 91). Clearly, the master and the slave have different perceptions and understandings of reality. For Marx, the standpoint of the slave provides a fuller, more accurate image of reality than does that of the lord. While there is no impetus for the master to alter his relation with the slave, the slave has every reason to emancipate himself, to become a free human being. The incompleteness of the master’s understanding as well as the perversity of his actions is another reason why Marx privileged the perspective of an engaged, conscious working class. In his view, “the non-worker does everything against the worker which the worker does himself; but he does not do against himself what he does to the worker” (Marx 1844/1975a: 282). In 1845, a third dimension of Marx’s notion of praxis crystallized. This was revolutionary practice, or as he put it, “philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is, to change it” (Marx 1845/1976: 5; emphasis in the original). This coincided roughly with his growing involvement in workingclass political movements (e.g. the Communist League), the deteriorating political
62 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist situation in Europe, his steadily more difficult economic circumstances, and the appearance of Frederick Engels’s (1845/1975) The Condition of the Working-Class in England. From Personal Observation and Authentic Sources. The appearance of Marx’s “revolutionary practice” involved a shift in perspective from that of the sympathetic philosopher looking at society from the outside to that of an empathetic participant in working-class everyday life and struggles—a participant scrambling to provide for his family and their survival, who simultaneously was critically assessing the balance of forces in European society, and trying to devise tactics and strategies for altering the balance of force and the circumstances of workers (e.g. Draper 1978; McLellan 1973: 137–225). Perhaps the most famous manifestation of this dimension of praxis is Marx and Engels’s (1848/1976: 519) call: “working men of all countries, unite!” Marx did not elaborate a theory of revolutionary practice. In his view, the possibility for revolution was a dialectical one that built on the contingency of relations, the balance of forces, and contradictions that existed at a particular moment. He did not have an elaborate theory about the form an ensemble of social relations would take as a people’s genuine needs were recognized and satisfied and as their freedom was actualized. He did not argue for a set trajectory of historical change; for example, as you will recall from the preceding section, he thought of pre-capitalist modes of production as alternative pathways out of a primitive communal condition. Instead, he pointed out the potential for revolutionary practice that might exist, given the balance of forces at particular moments. For instance, he suggested that there were at least two alternative possibilities for capitalist development in the 1860s (Marx 1864–94/1981: 567–73), and, together with Engels in 1882, he contemplated the potential impact of the ongoing class struggles in Russia and cautiously suggested: “If the Russian revolution becomes the signal for proletarian revolution in the West, so that the two complement each other, then Russia’s peasant-communal landownership may serve as the point of departure for a communist development” (Marx and Engels 1882/1989: 426). As a backdrop for the contingency of revolutionary practice were conditions of capitalist development that unfolded with almost lawlike predictability: the constant formation of new markets for commodities; the concentration and centralization of production into steadily fewer and, at the same time, larger enterprises; increased rates of technological innovation; the increased importance of technology relative to human labor power in developing economic sectors; the tendency of the rate of profit to fall; and periodic economic and financial crises that result from the impossibility of a smooth, continuous process of capital accumulation. In this chapter, we have sketched the outlines of Marx’s anthropology. As we have seen, Marx read widely and thoughtfully. At the same time, his interpersonal relationships and experiences while growing up in the Rhineland and, later, his steadily increasing involvement in political activism made him aware of what was happening in the world. His declining economic circumstances from the early
Marx’s Anthropology • 63 1840s onward thrust him into the working classes and helped to forge an awareness and consciousness of the fact that he could learn much from the experiences and understanding that the masses of workers had of the world in which they lived. The workers were not the objects of inquiry to be described and reported to the world; they were instead thoughtful, perceptive individuals with vast funds of knowledge from whom the world could learn. In this sketch of Marx’s anthropology, we have focused on the corporeal organization of human beings, the significance of ensembles of social relations, the historicity and diversity of human societies and their propensities to change, and the importance of praxis in the production, reproduction, and transformation of those communities. We have seen how Marx interwove the corporeal organization of human beings and their sociality with the diversity of their social relations as they engaged in practical activity to transform the raw materials of the environments to satisfy needs and to create new ones.
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–3– Human Natural Beings Marx was a materialist. In 1837, during his second year at the University of Berlin, he wrote to his father mentioning his struggle to understand Hegel’s system of philosophy and, more importantly, describing his efforts to bring together art and science, which were divorced from one another in the university (Marx 1837/1975: 18). While many writers have focused on Marx’s intellectual debt to Hegel, fewer have examined his connections with traditions of materialist thought. His attempt to bring the arts and sciences together in a single system involved studies in natural science, history, and the romantic philosophy of Friedrich Schelling (1755–1854) who sought the common basis of nature and self. Two years later, Marx (1839/1975) took extensive notes on the non-deterministic materialism of Epicurus (341–271 BC) and the school he established. Briefly, the Epicureans believed that life rose up from the earth rather than descending from the heavens; claimed that there were more worlds than this one and that the present one will change; noted the emergence and finite duration of living forms; denied the influence of distant, divine powers; stressed the importance of contingency or chance as opposed to necessity or teleology; argued that mind and body were united; and emphasized that men and women were active agents in the acquisition of knowledge and that they were capable of forging their own happiness (Foster 2000: 21–65). Marx’s doctoral dissertation, which he completed in 1841, dealt with the differences between ancient Greek philosophies of nature (Marx 1840–1/1975). In his view, the Epicureans who had influenced early Enlightenment writers—like Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, and Isaac Newton—were also the key that would unlock understanding of the present. Marx thought of Epicurus as “the greatest representative of Greek Enlightenment” (Marx 1840–1/1975: 73). As we saw in the last chapter, Marx was concerned with questions about the emergence and development of human natural beings, their creation of human and natural history, and their metabolism with nature. These were important issues in his materialist account of history. He framed his argument in terms of changes in human corporeal organization, ensembles of social relations, and activities and practices that varied because of the different metabolisms that existed between human social individuals and the particular natural and social worlds (environments) in which they lived. He saw these changes in non-teleological, historical terms. Parts of his theoretical perspective were already supported by empirical evidence while other parts were suppositions based on the limited evidence available. This combination
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66 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist included (1) the anatomical similarities of human beings and chimpanzees recognized by Edward Tyson in 1699; (2) the close taxonomic and presumably historical relationship of human beings and non-human primates postulated by Carolus Linnaeus in the 1735 and subsequent editions of his Systema Naturae; (3) the diverse arguments proposed from 1750 onward by the Comte de Buffon, James Hutton, Charles Lyell, and Abraham Gottlob Werner that the earth was significantly older than commonly believed; and (4) the view expounded by Georges Cuvier in 1812 that there was, in fact, a succession of past worlds on earth. Thus, as Valentino Gerratana (1973: 64) put it, “Marx was already not only taking for granted the principle of the historical evolution of animal species and of nature in general, which found little favour in the sciences of the time, but [he was] also tending to exclude from that evolution any finalist [teleological] assumption.” From the late 1830s onward, when Marx was formulating his materialist conception of history, his slightly older contemporary—a young Englishman named Charles Darwin (1809–82)—was also working out his own materialist views about the historical evolution of plants and animals (Ospovat 1981). Perhaps Marx’s (1857–8/1973: 105) most directly germane comment about human evolution before the appearance of Darwin’s The Origin of Species in 1859 was that “human anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape. The intimations of higher development among the subordinate animal species, however, can be understood only after the higher development is already known.” His later remark—“since Darwin demonstrated that we are all descended from apes, there is scarcely any shock whatever that could shake ‘our ancestral pride’”—suggests that, while Marx (1864/1985) was amused at the public outcry over the implications of Darwin’s ideas (i.e., human beings and apes shared a common ancestor, and there was a transition from ape to human), he was definitely not bothered by them. As we shall see, while Marx, in fact, had the highest regard for Darwin’s insights, he was also critical of the way in which Darwin and others naturalized explanations of social inequality and other culturally constructed categories. Thus, this chapter has four goals. The first is to review the bases for Marx’s agreement and positive valuation of Darwin’s arguments in The Origin of Species and to survey subsequent developments of evolutionary theory. The second is to use the lens provided by Engels’s (1876/1972) “The Part Played by Labor in the Transition from Ape to Man” and by Marx’s own theoretical framework to examine relevant data derived from paleoanthropology and the natural sciences in order to discern the interplay of the changing dispositions and anatomical structures of human beings and their primate relatives as well as the emergence of practices such as tool-making and language. The third is to consider the implications of this biocultural nature for population structures. The fourth is to examine briefly Marx’s and Engels’s critique of the naturalization of explanations of the social relations of capitalist society and how this critique played out in the historical development of anthropology both here and abroad.
Human Natural Beings • 67
Charles Darwin and the Development of Modern Evolutionary Theory Marx (1860/1985) first read The Origin of Species in 1860. He immediately recognized its significance, and, except for a minor complaint about the style of the argument, he had nothing but praise for the volume. Marx commented explicitly about certain points of agreement or conclusions he drew from Darwin’s arguments. Moreover, there must have been other points of agreement between Marx and Darwin because of the materialist perspective they shared; these can be inferred either from Marx’s other writings or from the implications of his materialist theoretical perspective. The former include: (1) a short quote from Darwin’s chapter on variation describing how natural selection acts on variations of form under different conditions (Marx 1861–3/1991: 387–8; 1863–7/1977: 461); (2) the notion that evolution is a gradual, ongoing process (Marx 1867/1987: 494, 1868/1987a: 558–9); (3) evolution involves both the continued preservation of what has been inherited and the assimilation of new traits (Marx 1861–3/1989: 427–8); (4) acknowledgement of Darwin’s “history of natural technology, the formation of the organs of plants and animals, which serve as the instruments of production for sustaining their life” (Marx 1863–7/1977: 493); (5) a refutation of Malthus in Darwin’s discussion of the extinction of animal species (Marx 1861–3/1989: 350–1); (6) human natural beings are descended from apes and, hence, are also a unity with nature (Marx 1864/1985: 581; Marx and Engels 1845–6/1976: 39–41); (7) Darwin’s “struggle for existence” in natural history is analogous to class struggle in human history (Marx 1860/1985: 232); and (8) a rejection of teleological arguments in natural science and, by extension, the adoption of a notion of historically contingent change (Marx 1861/1985: 246–7). In the latter category of inferences that may be drawn from Marx’s other writings or from his materialist perspective, we should include at least: (9) a notion of internal motors of formation and change as opposed to external engines of development, and (10) nonreductive forms of argumentation. In my view, one thing that emerges from Marx’s comments is that he saw Darwin, like himself, as more concerned with explaining processes of change rather than origins or events.
Darwin’s Metaphors and Theory of Evolution by Natural Selection The idea of evolution was “in the air” by the beginning of the nineteenth century. The universe had evolved according to Kant, the earth had evolved gradually according to Hutton, life on earth had evolved according to Lamarck and Geoffrey St. Hilaire, and even human beings had evolved according to Buffon and Rousseau—from apes no less. Nevertheless, there was a good deal of resistance to the idea of evolution. Part of it arose from the fact that none of Darwin’s predecessors had satisfactorily explained how one species actually evolved into another. The other source of
68 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist discontent among the public and a few natural historians was that it threatened their beliefs, religious and otherwise, about the world and man’s place in it (Desmond 1989). The publication of Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species in 1859 fuelled the discontent. At the same time, it marked a radical departure from the teleological worldviews of his predecessors, who saw “the real objects of the world as imperfect reflections of underlying ideals or essences” and “that the real variations between real objects only confuse us in our attempts to see the essential nature of the universe” (Lewontin 1974: 168). Instead of sweeping away the real variations among individuals of the same species in order to focus on the type, Darwin focused his attention on that variation and made it the object of his study. His singularly stunning insight, as Richard Lewontin put it, was that individual variation and the differences between species were causally related. Darwin’s revolutionary theory was that the differences between organisms within a species are converted to the differences between species in space and time. Thus, the differences between species are already latent within them, and all that is required is a motive force for the conversion of variation. That force is natural selection. (1974: 170; emphasis in the original)
Darwin, like Marx, initially framed his ideas in terms of already existing metaphors, analogies, and analytical categories. He built on the language and imagery of German romanticism, political economy, animal breeding, and natural science as he struggled to explain his new understandings of the natural world and the evolution of species (e.g. Kohn 1996; Richards 1992; Schweber 1980, 1985). Anyone who has ever written even a term paper will understand and hopefully be sympathetic with the notion that the language and imagery in which arguments are initially conceived are often quite different from those that clearly explain ideas and their implications. In a more self-reflexive moment, perhaps, this might account for Marx’s two comments in letters about Darwin’s “clumsy English style of argumentation” as well as his own, at times, fumbling and often opaque attempts to say what he actually meant. Darwin used four powerful metaphors in The Origin of Species to frame and express his new ideas about nature, variation, and the motor force driving evolution. They are “an entangled bank,” “the struggle for existence,” “natural selection,” and “wedging.” His metaphors were used singularly or more frequently in combination to produce powerful, evocative images rich in meaning. He employed the phrase “an entangled bank” to express the complexity of organization of nature. The dual sources of inspiration were the engravings, paintings, and poems he was familiar with before his journey on the Beagle, on the one hand, and the luxuriant, Amazonian rainforests of Brazil, on the other (Kohn 1996). In The Origin, Darwin described the interrelatedness of all nature in the following way:
Human Natural Beings • 69 It is interesting to contemplate the entangled bank, clothed with many plants of many kinds with birds singing on the bushes, with various insects flitting about, and with worms crawling through the damp earth, and to reflect that these elaborately constructed forms, so different from each other, and dependent on each other in so complex a manner, have all been produced by laws acting around us. (1859/1964: 489; emphasis added)
Darwin’s second metaphor was “the struggle for existence.” It too was not a new idea. Herder, for example, had remarked on crowding as well as the struggle between individuals and between species for survival; however, there was no sense of the potential for transformation in his view (Lovejoy 1959b: 211–2). Darwin, in contrast, used the metaphor to mean interdependence, chance, as well as contest, endurance, or persistence. He wrote that: I should premise that I use the term Struggle for Existence in a large and metaphorical sense, including dependence of one being on another, and including (which is more important) not only the life of the individual but success in leaving progeny. Two canine animals in a time of dearth, may be truly said to struggle with each other over which shall get food and live. But a plant on the edge of the desert is said to struggle for life against the drought, though more properly it should be said to be dependent on moisture. A plant which annually produces a thousand seeds, of which on average only one comes to maturity, may be said be more or less truly said to struggle with plants of the same and other kinds which already clothe the ground. The mistletoe is dependent on the apple and a few other trees, but can only in a far-fetched way be said to struggle with these trees, for if too many of these parasites grow on the same tree, it will languish and die. But several seedling mistletoes, growing close together on the same branch, may more truly be said to struggle with each other. As the mistletoe is disseminated by birds, its existence depends on birds; and it may metaphorically be said to struggle with other fruit-bearing plants, in order to tempt birds to devour and thus disseminate its seeds rather than those of other plants. In these several senses which pass into each other, I use for convenience the general term of struggle for existence. (Darwin (1859/1964: 62–3; emphasis added)
Darwin’s third metaphor, “natural selection,” was used to describe both how variation is maintained and how descent with modification occurs. He relates it to his second metaphor, the struggle for existence: Owing to this struggle for life, any variation, however slight and from whatever cause proceeding, if it be in any degree profitable to an individual of any species, in its infinitely complex relations to other organic beings and to external nature, will tend to the preservation of that individual, and will generally be inherited by its offspring. The offspring, also, will thus have a better chance of surviving, for, of the many individuals of any species which are born, but a small number can survive. I have called this principle, by which each slight variation, if useful, is preserved by the term Natural Selection, in
70 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist order to mark its relation to man’s power of selection. (Darwin 1859/1964: 61; emphasis added)
Darwin used his fourth metaphor, “wedging,” to represent in mechanical terms how natural selection actually operates on the hereditary variation that exists between individuals and between species. The imagery refers specifically to the activities of quarrymen and the implement they used at the Salisbury Craigs in Scotland to cut stone from the cliff faces, and, in the process, how they transformed a beautiful natural landscape into an ugly monument (Kohn 1996: 36). The fact of nature may be compared to a yielding surface, with ten thousand sharp wedges packed close together and driven by incessant blow, sometimes one wedge being struck, and then another with greater force. (Darwin 1859/1964: 67)
Let us describe Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection in slightly different terms. It is based on a series of observations he made about differences between individuals and on breeding experiments that he and other breeders conducted. First, hereditary variation exists between individuals of the same species and between different species. Second, the number of eggs, sperm, or seeds produced by an individual vastly exceeds the number of individuals born. This, in turn, exceeds the number that survive to the reproductive stage and that can potentially contribute hereditary material to the next generation; in one of Darwin’s plant breeding experiments only about one seed of a thousand actually germinated. Third, some individuals have a greater likelihood of becoming adults and reproducing than others, because the hereditary material they possess is advantageous for some reason in the environments in which they live. Fourth, as a result of differential survival, this advantageous material has a greater likelihood of being passed on to succeeding generations. Thus, Darwin could explain how both descent with modification and the formation of new species (speciation) occurred. He could account for the way these happened. He could assert with certainty that the kinds of plants and animals that exist today are the modified descendents of different kinds of organisms that lived in the past. He could declare with equal certainty that whatever happened in the future would be based on the organisms and conditions of the present. Darwin’s great insights were the principles of variation, heredity, and selection. What he could not explain, however, was the connection between individual variation, on the one hand, and the inheritance (heritability) of characteristics from one generation to the next, on the other. An Augustinian monk—Gregor Mendel (1822–84), a contemporary of both Marx and Darwin—would provide answers to these questions. While Mendel published the results of his experiments with plant hybrids in 1866, Marx was completely unaware of his work and Darwin, if he were aware of it, did not understand its importance. Although Mendel’s work was finally recognized in the early 1900s, its significance was still being hotly debated into the 1930s (Allen 1978).
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The Problems of Variation and Inheritance If Darwin made variation the proper study of biology, then Mendel was responsible for clarifying the mechanisms by which hereditary variation is created and transmitted. As Richard Lewontin (1974: 173–8) notes, Darwin and the other plant and animal breeders of his day were aware that offspring tend to resemble their parents (like produces like) but yet are different from them and that these differences are also inherited to some extent. They attempted to cross organisms from different varieties, and even species, and saw that, if any of the hybrids produced were fertile, they tended to revert to one or the other of the original parental type over a number of generations. Because the breeders focused on the differences rather than on the similarities, they viewed variation and inheritance as ontologically distinct categories. The effects of this were: (1) they saw the variation existing between individuals within the same species as different from the variation that exists between species; and (2) they focused their attention on the group or variety rather than on the individual. What Mendel did that was different from his contemporaries was that he focused on individuals, their ancestors, and their progeny. In other words, he distinguished between the individual and the group. Let us consider briefly what Mendel did in his experiments and what he actually showed. Mendel bred varieties of garden peas that differed from one another in a few traits—that is, when tall plants were bred with tall plants, their offspring were also tall. Mendel then bred a tall plant with a short one and noted that each of the hybrid offspring was tall and, in this trait, they resembled one of their parents. However, when he bred the hybrids of the first generation with one another, he noted that their offspring resembled one or the other of the original parental types—roughly three-quarters were tall and one quarter was short. On the basis of this experiment, he concluded, with regard to the characteristic being studied (1) that the hybrid individuals inherited a discrete particle (gene) from each of the parents; (2) that the expression of the gene for tallness was dominant over the other; and (3) that these particles re-assorted themselves in the offspring of the first-generation hybrids in such a way that there were both tall and short individuals in the second generation. When he bred individuals that were hybrids for two traits—such as tall vs. short plants and smooth vs. wrinkled pods—he observed that the gene pairs associated with different physical characteristics—let us say height and seed color—were inherited independently from one another. In other words, the significance of Mendel’s work was, to paraphrase Lewontin (1974: 177–8), that it showed that variation and inheritance were manifestations of the same underlying phenomena but that they required two different kinds of causal explanation. Mendel’s studies buttressed a later flurry of activity from the 1920s onward that was concerned with the genetic variation of populations and with how genetics related to the process of selection. This involved conceptualizing a local population of individuals, all of whose genes constitute the gene pool of the population, its reservoir of hereditary material that is passed from one generation to the next. Many
72 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist individuals or only a few may contribute to and share in the gene pool. The pool may be stable through time or change from one generation to the next depending on the particular conditions that prevail or appear. These investigations had three important consequences. First, they made it clear that no two individuals in a population have exactly the same combination of genes—including identical siblings who were born with the identical genetic systems but were subjected to different environmental and historical circumstances so that different genes mutated. Second, they clarified the nature of the genetic variation that exists within a population, identifying recombination, gene flow, and mutation as important sources. Recombination is what occurs when two individuals mate and their offspring receive half of their genetic complement from each parent. If the organism has about 30,000 gene pairs, as each human being seems to have, then the continual reshuffling from one generation to the next becomes a major source of the genetic variation that occurs in a population. Gene flow occurs when an individual from outside the population breeds with an individual from the population, and new genetic material is potentially introduced into the gene pool. The other source of variation is mutation. While many but not all of the mutations that appear in the gene pool of a population are variants that are already known and that already exist in the population, some are not. As a result, mutation is the ultimate source of new genetic material in a population. Third, these researchers began to examine how selection, as well as mutation and migration, alter frequencies of particular genes in a population They also suggested that genes acted in ways that controlled the metabolism of cells which in turn controlled the expression of particular characteristics; unfortunately, given the technology of the time, they had no way to prove it (Allen 1978: 126–40, 198). The first generation of population geneticists—Ronald A. Fisher (1890–1962), John B. S. Haldane (1892–1964), and Sewall Wright (1889–1988)—recognized that Mendel’s principles operated in all organisms; that small-scale, continuous variability in characteristics, like height, also had a genetic basis; and that even small selection pressures acting on minor genetic differences can result in evolutionary change (Gould 2002: 504). In a phrase, they integrated and synthesized the views of Mendel and Darwin. They established the foundations for linking the traditional subfields of biology—genetics, paleontology, ecology, systematics, or developmental physiology, to name only a few—into a more holistic biology, that would come to be called the Modern Synthesis or the New Synthesis in the 1940s. This fusion was launched with the publication of Theodosius Dobzhansky’s (1900–75) Genetics and the Origin of Species in 1937.
The Modern Synthesis and Beyond The heyday of the Modern Synthesis may have been in 1959 at the time of various centennial celebrations of the publication of The Origin of Species. Gould (2002:
Human Natural Beings • 73 503–84) described the Modern Synthesis as “a limited consensus,” that had “hardened” in the 1940s and 1950s in time for those celebrations. By the early 1960s, however, the three central tenets of the synthesis—adaptation, the individual organism as the unit of selection, and the sufficiency of microevolutionary theory to explain change as it is refracted in the fossil record—began to be challenged. One manifestation of the hardening, as Gould describes it, was an increased emphasis on adaptation: Every gene or gene complex was somehow adaptive. Adaptations, as you recall, are the products of natural selection modifying the gene pool of population in such a way that it increases the harmony between the population and its environment. Any hereditary characteristic that increases this congruity and promotes survival is an adaptation; adaptations take many different forms and may involve morphological, physiological, or behavioral features that enable individuals to survive and produce offspring. However, evidence was beginning to accumulate which indicated that some genes may be neutral—that is, they have no selective significance with regard to increasing or decreasing the fitness of individuals living in a particular environment, and, hence, they are neither advantageous nor deleterious. The second manifestation of the hardening and the challenge revolved around the question: At what level or levels does selection operate—the gene, the individual, the population, or the species? Advocates of the new synthesis argued that, while selection operates at the level of the individual, the adaptations that result might be beneficial to the group as well. The challengers disagreed. The arguments they raised in the 1960s and 1970s continue to the present. The third tenet is that the explanation used to account for small changes in the gene pool of a contemporary population is merely writ large, but identical, to the one that is refracted in the paleontological record. That is, change is steady and slow. Gould (2002: 558) called this the “principle of extrapolation.” One challenge to the uniformitarianism embodied in this tenet has been over the issue of whether the evolutionary process is always gradual, or whether it proceeds by fits and starts with moments of rapid change preceded or followed by periods of relative stasis (punctuated equilibrium). Gould concludes his discussion of the Modern Synthesis by noting how well it has endured, in spite of the challenges. Molecular biology has been a major growth field in the United States, England, and France since 1945 (Allen 1978: 187–228; Appel 2000). This development was accompanied by number of new technologies and techniques—computers, X-ray crystallography, DNA sequencers, powerful mathematical and statistical methods, and so forth—that afforded opportunities to examine for the first time the molecular structure of cell nuclei, the three-dimensional arrays of DNA molecules on chromosomes, the structure of genes, the regulation and development of genes, the sequence of DNA molecules on chromosomes, and the entire genomes of a number of species, including even that of human beings. We now know, for instance, that the genomes of human beings and chimpanzees are virtually identical (99 percent); that the rates of change in the proteins produced by the DNA code vary
74 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist little from species to species; that human beings and chimpanzees had a common ancestor 5 to 7 million years ago; that the 6 billion or so human beings in the world today fundamentally have, with few exceptions, the same genotype; or that there is more variation within human populations—let us say from Africa, Scandinavia, or Japan—than there is between them (Lewontin 1995; Marks 2002). There seem to be two counter-tendencies in biology today. The research of many biologists is reductionist in the sense that they are concerned with breaking down their objects of inquiry—the cell, the gene, the organism, or the environment—into their constituent parts. Another group—notably Richard Lewontin (1929–), Richard Levins (1935–), and their associates—views nature as a totality, a historically contingent and ever-changing structure. Nature is, in their perspective, a multi-leveled whole, a unity of contradictions, characterized by spontaneous activity, positive and negative feedback, the interpenetration and interaction of categories from different levels of the whole, and the coexistence of opposing principles that shape interaction. The various elements of the whole—the parts and the levels—as well as the whole itself are continually changing, though at different rates; consequently, at any given moment, one element might appear to be fixed in relation to another (Levins and Lewontin 1985: 133–42, 272–85). The importance of this dialectical world is that it helps us think of genes, organisms, and environments as interacting parts of a whole rather than distinct entities with their own roles to play. Lewontin (2000: jacket), for example, rejects the idea that genes determine the organism, which then adapts to its environment. He argues instead that the individual organism is a unique consequence of the interaction of genes and the environment, and that individual organisms, “influenced in their development by their circumstances, in turn create, modify, and choose the environments in which they live.” Marx would have appreciated how Lewontin and Levins have conceptualized and framed issues concerned with human natural beings and how we came to be the way we are, because of the non-reductive and dialectically interactive aspects of their argument.
Human Natural Beings: Bodies That Walk, Talk, Make Tools, and Have Culture The title of this section derives from David McNally’s (2001) insightful essay, “Bodies that Talk: Sex, Tools, Language, and Human Culture,” in his Bodies of Meaning. We saw in the preceding chapters the three distinctive markers Enlightenment writers used to characterize human beings: they reasoned, they made tools, and they talked. The anatomists and physicians of that era had a fourth characteristic: they walked upright. These are legacies from the Enlightenment. They were part of Marx’s intellectual inheritance as well. However, as we saw in the last chapter, he did not frame his answer to the question of what human beings are precisely in these terms. He emphasized instead that human beings were sensuous, active creatures;
Human Natural Beings • 75 that there was a dialectical interplay between their corporeal organization and the ensembles of social relations that shaped their activities; that their bodily organs were transformed into instruments of labor and production; that they objectified the world and the resources it provides to satisfy established needs and to create new ones; and that their conscious life activity in contrast to that of animals was increasingly determined by social relations and culture. As Raymond Corbey (2005: 93) correctly observes, scientific definitions of the genus Homo (that is, modern human beings and their ancestors) established in the late 1940s and early 1950s—e.g. erect bipedalism, a well-developed thumb, or rapid expansion of cranial capacity associated with craniofacial remodeling and reduction in jaw size—often incorporate or imply philosophical understandings of humanness, such as upright gait, tool-making, large brains, language, and culture. In the 1950s, it was possible to believe that these traits appeared roughly at the same time. We now know that they did not appear simultaneously, but rather sequentially over a period of time that spanned 5–7 million years for some scholars or 2–3 million years for others. The result of this is that the biological definition of Homo clashes with popular and philosophical views of what it means to be human. Consequently, some paleoanthropologists have argued that the genus contains both “animal” hominids and “human” hominids, and that the transition from ape to human occurred some time since the late Tertiary. This refracts in some complex way the criterion or criteria that particular individuals select to define “human.” Another potential complicating factor results from the fact that geneticists have found that chimpanzees and, to a lesser extent, gorillas are the closest living animal relatives of human beings. The primatologists who study these apes often stress their similarities with human beings rather than their differences. Thus, they portray the apes as conscious, active, and social creatures who vocalize, communicate, occasionally use tools, and have distinctive personalities; when they talk about ape language and culture, the discussion becomes murkier and the audience more skeptical. For our purposes here, the question is not whether the answers provided by present-day scientists are fundamentally different from and thus incommensurate with those of Marx, but rather how do or might Marx’s views articulate with contemporary perspectives and practices. A relatively unknown essay by Frederick Engels, Marx’s friend and collaborator for more than forty years, provides additional clues for contemplating the linkages.
Engels’s “The Part Played by Labor in the Transition from Ape to Man” The publication of Darwin’s The Descent of Man in 1871 was the impetus for Engels (1876/1972) to set down his own views on the transition from non-human primate to human natural being. It is useful to keep in mind a few facts about the context in which Engels wrote his essay, “The Part Played by Labor in the Transition from
76 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist Ape to Man.” While the first remains of “Neanderthal man” had been found in 1856, their significance was neither recognized nor appreciated until the early years of the twentieth century (Delisle 2007: 70–124). While writers speculated about whether human beings had lived at the same time as extinct animals, the first incontrovertible evidence was only uncovered in 1859; it consisted of stone tools and fossil animal bones sealed beneath an unbroken stalagmitic deposit in Brixham Cave in southern England. As a result, Engels’s argument was a deductive one, as were those of his contemporaries (Trigger 1967/2003). Engels argued that the ancestors of human beings were social, arboreal apes who lived in the Old World tropics toward the end of the Tertiary period, which we now know occurred between about 2 and 23 million years ago. He was clear that both human and non-human primates were behaviorally highly complex, and structurally integrated organisms. Even though he had no conception of the microevolutionary processes described above, he was also clear that a change in one behavior would ultimately be linked with changes in other organs (sensory and anatomical structures) and behaviors. Through reading and possibly even trips to the zoo, he argued that the arboreal primates of the present day used their forelimbs and hindlimbs differently when they climb. On this basis, he suggested that the decisive first step in the transition from ape to human involved upright walking, an erect gait. This change in the locomotor behavior and structures was accompanied by other changes, most notably in the hand. These changes involved the development of greater dexterity and of a precision grip involving an opposable thumb long before the first flints were fashioned into knives and these early humans began to manufacture tools. The development of the hand and all that this entailed were linked, in turn, with the development of the brain and other sensory organs, with new relations to the objects of nature, with increased dependence on others and the formation of new ensembles of social relations, and importantly with the development of language. The latter was facilitated by changes in the hand, speech organs, and brain—a combination that enabled these early humans to undertake more complex activities and to change the environments in which they lived in planned, conscious ways. Marx and Engels often forged and refined ideas in their letters. However, in none of these, to my knowledge, did they discuss Engels’s essay about the transition from ape to human, even though they may have done so in conversation. Moreover, there is no evidence that Marx disagreed in any way whatsoever with Engels’s conclusions in this regard. While parts of Engels’s argument could be stated with more precision today in light of the vast quantities of information that have been gathered, especially since the late 1950s, the basic timeline—erect posture, tool-making, and language— is still correct. In fact, it was adopted by paleoanthropologists, most prominently Sherwood Washburn (1911–2002) in the late 1950s (e.g. Washburn 1960; Washburn and Howell 1963; Woolfson 1982). The issues debated today are not whether the steps outlined by Engels occurred, but rather where and when they took place.
Human Natural Beings • 77
Fossils and Proteins In Marx’s day, the empirical evidence for the evolution of human beings was provided by the comparative anatomy of living species. Today, that evidence is provided by fossilized bones and their associated environments, by the similarities and differences of DNA or protein sequences that exist among different species, and by the molecular clock that the various sequences provide (Marks 2002: 7–31). The issues that paleoanthropologists explore and resolve are still upright walking, toolmaking, language, and culture; however, the terrain of the debates has shifted in the last fifty or so years because of the vast quantities of new information. According to molecular anthropologists, the last common ancestor shared by modern human beings and chimpanzees, our closest relative in the animal kingdom, lived 10 to 5 million years ago, and gorillas diverged from that group around 11 to 9 million years ago (Patterson, Richter, Gnerre, Lander, and Reich 2006). Together with earlier discoveries of fossil hominids in South Africa, this finding helped to focus attention since the 1960s on the tropical regions of Africa, especially those east of the Rift Valley in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania. Here, there were fossil-bearing deposits that dated to the end of the Tertiary—that is, the Pliocene Era, which occurred roughly 5 to 2 million years ago. In the mid 1990s, paleoanthropologists began to look for ancestral chimpanzees and gorillas on the west side of the Rift Valley, where the extant species live today. In Chad, they found a number of fossil hominids in late Miocene and early Pliocene deposits that ranged in age from about 7 to 3.5 million years ago. No one questions that the various early hominid species on both sides of the Rift Valley were bipedal walkers, keeping in mind that anatomical clues for this form of locomotion are scattered over the body: toes, ankles, knees, hips, shoulders, neck, and hands, to name only a few. Thus, at the present time, it seems that human natural beings appeared first in the tropics, perhaps in the triangle formed by Chad, Ethiopia, and South Africa. The fossil evidence has raised a number of questions: Did all of them share the same locomotor pattern? Were they bipedal all of the time or only part of the time? Are some individuals ancestral chimpanzees instead of precursors to the genus Homo? Did some of the earlier individuals belong to one of the later ancestral species shared by chimpanzees and early hominids? Did any of these individuals belong to species that stand in the direct ancestral line of modern human beings (Delisle 2007: 326–8; Gibbons 2006)? Besides the fact that ancestral ape and hominid species resided in tropical Africa 5 to 10 million years ago, what were the circumstances in which quadrupedal, treeclimbing primates became bipedal? Paleoanthropologists have described a number of potential advantages of upright walking that might have served them well: visual surveillance against predators, hunting, carrying food and other objects, feeding on low branches, and reducing the energy costs of traveling long distances because of scarcity of resources, and even display (Delisle 2007: 327). Marx would have been
78 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist fascinated, I suspect, by the changing circumstances in which this fundamental change occurred. Let us look briefly at two recent works. First, Pierre Sepulchre and his associates (2006) argued that the 6000-km-long escarpment created 12 to 10 million years ago by tectonic uplift associated with the formation of the Rift Valley in East Africa altered the prevailing patterns of atmospheric circulation, which brought moisture and precipitation to the interiors of Kenya and Ethiopia. The reorganized atmospheric circulations brought less moisture to the region, and, by 8 to 6 million years ago, the environmental conditions were beginning to shift from woodland to savanna grassland habitats and species; this transition occurred between 5 and 3.7 million years ago. A second argument, made by Geoffrey King and Geoff Bailey (2006), is that the ancestral apes and hominids of tropical Africa lived in the broken, hilly country created by the formation of the Rift Valley. Moreover, these complex, environmental mosaics with their diverse and variable resources were the primary habitats of the early hominids rather than the emerging savannas that were inhabited by new kinds of ungulates and a rapidly expanding diversity of terrestrial monkeys—the ancestors of modern baboons and macaques. This broken, hill country, they argue, continued to be the preferred habitat for human beings along their entire dispersal route of dispersal as they then began to move into the Eurasian landmass about 2 million years ago. The relation of these changes to the evolution of human beings will become apparent in the next few pages. Engels’s second inferred step in the gradual appearance of human natural beings involved changes in the anatomy and manual dexterity of the hand. This was closely associated with upright posture and gait. While all primates manipulate objects to varying degrees with their hands (as do raccoons and squirrels), the hands of modern human beings are quite distinctive in several respects—e.g. they can open a jar lid or thread a needle. Chimpanzees and other apes cannot do either easily, if at all. Modern human beings have power and precision grips and a much greater range of motion and rotation in their fingers, wrists, forearms, and shoulders than do nonhuman primates. These capacities are reflected in both anatomical structures and the ranges of motion they exhibit; they include long, opposable thumbs relative to the length of the other digits and the ability to rotate the index finger toward the thumb. These features contrast with those of modern chimpanzees, which have a restricted range of motion of the thumb; curved digits that are relatively long with respect to the length of the thumb; and powerful grasping muscles in both their hands and wrists (Trinkhaus 1992). The manufacture and use of stone tools has been taken as an indication of manual dexterity, a sign that “man the tool-maker” has arrived on the scene. The earliest stone tools now known are chipped cobbles and flakes from 2.5-million-year-old deposits in Ethiopia. These are probably not the oldest tools in the world; right now, however, they are the oldest ones we know about. We know that modern chimpanzees will break off twigs and use them to fish for termites, and we can safely presume, I
Human Natural Beings • 79 believe, that at least some hominids used sticks or rocks, for example, earlier than 2.5 million years ago. What we do not know about the tools from Ethiopia is who made them. There were two genera of early hominids in Ethiopia between about 2.5 and 1.0 million years ago: Australopithecus and Homo. We suspect that the latter made the tools, because the configuration of the fingers, hand, wrists, and forearms more closely resemble those of modern human beings. The australopithecines had hands with long curved fingers, thumbs and little fingers with a restricted range of rotation, and heavily muscled fingers and wrists adapted for grasping. Some paleoanthropologists argue that both genera manufactured and used stone tools; others suggest that only some australopithecines had the manual dexterity to make tools; a third group claims that stone tool-making was restricted to the genus Homo. Tool-making, of course, is a marker for something else. In this instance, as Engels indicated, it is linked with the development of the brain. All of the early hominids that lived before 2.5 million years ago had brain volumes that resembled those of chimpanzees. A significant increase in brain volume began to appear about 2.0 million years ago in the genus Homo and continued until about 100,000 years ago. The brain volumes of modern human beings are roughly three times larger than those of their Plio-Pleistocene ancestors. Paleoanthropologists have suggested a number of reasons for the expansion of brain size: the need for increased brain power to facilitate complex manipulative tasks like making stone tools; increased hunting; social cooperation; food sharing; language; and heat stress. Two issues emerge. First, what is the relationship between increased brain size and the structural organization of the brain itself? Second, was this increase in brain size gradual and continuous, or was it punctuated with episodes of growth followed by periods of relative stasis (Delisle 2007: 328–30)? The development of the brain was, of course, Engels’s third step in the evolution of human corporeal organization (Schoenemann 2006). There are three facts about the brain that it is useful to keep in mind. The convolutions on the brain’s surface leave their imprint on the interior surface of the skull; consequently, by examining the endocasts of the imprints left on the skulls, it is possible to learn about the surface organization of the brain. The second fact is that the endocasts of human and nonhuman primates—that is, chimpanzees and modern human beings—are different from one another. The third is that brains consume enormous amounts of energy; human adults, for example, use about 20 percent of the metabolic energy they have to regulate the temperature of their brains. Heat regulation is accomplished by the circulation of blood through a complex network of arteries and veins that crisscross their brains. Dean Falk (2004: 161) has suggested that the vascular system of the hominid brain was reorganized to deal simultaneously with “the changed hydrostatic pressures associated with erect posture” and with the changes mentioned earlier in this section that were taking place in the habitats of the African tropics in general and, more specifically, in the habitats in which the early hominids lived 7 to 2 million years ago.
80 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist Examining the endocasts of apes, the large and small species of australopithecines, and early members of the genus Homo, Falk learned (1) that the surface organization of the brains of large australopithecines resembled those of modern chimpanzees, and (2) that they were different from those of the later, small australopithecines and early species of Homo, both of which had features resembling the brain surfaces of modern human beings. In her view, the dentition of the large australopithecines, as well as associated paleoenvironmental evidence, indicated that they continued to live in wooded habitats. In contrast, the teeth and paleoenvironmental data indicated that the small australopithecines and early species of Homo moved into more open country, possibly savannas, but as likely the environmental mosaics described earlier in which patches of trees, grasslands, and water dotted the landscape. The heat stress induced by spending more time in open country created another set of selection pressures along with gravity and the changes in hydrostatic pressures that accompanied bipedal locomotion. More important, until the vascular system of the brain was able to regulate temperature more efficiently in those hominids that had moved into more open habitats, brain volumes remained low—that is, roughly similar to those of apes. Once the vascular system of the brain became more efficient, brain volumes increased. This process became apparent in the remains of H. habilis about 2.5 million years ago. It seems to have been a fairly continuous process until about 100,000 years ago, when the growth curve flattened out (Lee and Wolpoff 2003). The vascular system is not the only organ of the human body involved in heat regulation; others include sweat glands, the distribution of hair, and skin. Two of the truly distinctive features of modern human beings are that they have about 2 million more eccrine sweat glands than non-human primates, and that these glands are distributed over the entire surface of their bodies. What makes sweating an effective evaporative, cooling mechanism is that human beings are relatively hairless in comparison to the living apes, even though they have about the same number of hair follicles as chimpanzees. The reason for their appearance is that their hair shafts are much smaller than those of apes; hence they appear hairless except for the tops of the heads. In this regard, Adrienne Zihlman and B. A. Cohn (1988: 404) note that “hair retention on the head is probably important in protecting the scalp from the sun’s ultraviolet rays and may assist in stabilizing the temperature of the brain.” One inference that might be drawn from this extended argument is that even the earliest of our big-brained ancestors probably appeared relatively hairless in comparison to their primate contemporaries. This inference has some additional implications. As you will recall, hominid populations began to move out of the African tropics and onto the Eurasian landmass about 2 million years ago. Their remains have been found at deposits that are about 1.8 million years old at Dmanisi, which is located north of the Caspian Sea, where winter temperatures occasionally plunge below 0 °F (–17.8 °C). So, what does this imply for a relatively hairless hominid? Brian Fagan suggests an answer:
Human Natural Beings • 81 For Homo erectus to be able to adapt to the more temperate climates of Europe and Asia, it was necessary not only to tame fire but to have both effective shelter and clothing to protect against heat loss. Homo erectus probably survived the winters by maintaining permanent fires, and by storing dried meat and other foods for use in the lean months. (Fagan 1990: 76)
Thus, the elaboration of culture, Engels’s fourth step in the transition from ape to human being, is not unrelated to the development of the brain and other sensory organs. It also involved extending the body’s instruments of production and objectifying the world around them in new ways as they appropriated new kinds of external objects to satisfy new needs that were essential for their survival and reproduction in their new circumstances. The final step mentioned by Engels was the development of language. Both modern human beings and non-human primates, especially chimpanzees, are quite vocal. Both use vocalizations and gestures to communicate information, which suggest that our common ancestors 10–5 million years ago probably did the same. Nevertheless, the vocalizations and gestures of non-human primates are not the same as language, which is unique to the human species. Language, as you know, has three central features: (1) basic sound units produced in the oral cavity, which lack innate or intrinsic meaning; (2) rules for combining and recombining these sounds into larger units, like words (morphology) and sentences (syntax), have the capacity to communicate enormous ranges of information and meaning (semantics); and (3) symbolic reference involves both the arbitrariness of the utterance with regard to what is being represented and the ability to refer to things that are not immediately present or exist only in some abstract sense (Deacon 1992a). These features distinguish human language from other forms or systems of communication—such as the dances of honeybees, seasonal whale songs, or the calls of monkeys—which, respectively, are referential but not symbolic, involve mimicry, and express ranges of immediate feelings like fear, anger, or pleasure. There are important neuroanatomical differences between the vocalizations of non-human primates and the speech of modern human beings. Terrence Deacon describes them in the following manner: [Non-human] primate calls are controlled by neural circuits in the forebrain and midbrain that are also responsible for emotion and physiological arousal, but not the motor cortex, even though this area can control the muscles of the larynx and mouth. Stimulation of the vocalization areas in a monkey brain often produce other signs of arousal—such as hair standing on end, display postures, facial gestures and even ejaculation. Human speech uses a very different set of neural circuits. It depends on the region of the motor cortex that controls the mouth, tongue and larynx and the areas that are in front of it. Repeated efforts to train primates to mimic even simple speech sounds have had little success. The unique skill in learning to speak suggests that this facility may reflect some critical neurological difference. The ability to combine a larger number of
82 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist component sounds to form larger units, words and phrases, makes possible to syntactic complexity of speech. Common brain areas may be involved in speech production and grammatical processes because defects in grammar and speech production caused by brain damage often occur together. (Deacon 1992b: 119)
Two regions of the human brain involved in speech production are Broca’s area and Wernicke’s area. The former is a motor speech area associated not only with sensorimotor control of the structures of the oral cavity, the varied positions of the tongue, and their coordination with movements of the respiratory system, but also with manipulative and gestural abilities; it is typically located on the left hemisphere of the cortex and also seems to be associated with right-handedness—the tendency shared by about 90 percent of the human population today (non-human primates typically do not show a preference for left- or right-handedness). The latter, Wernicke’s area, which controls understanding and formulating coherent speech, is located on the cortex amid areas that are associated with seeing, hearing, and feeling (Gibson and Jessee 1999: 205; Tobias 1998: 72). All normally developed human brains have Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas. Since they are located on the surface of the brain, they leave imprints on the interior surface of the skull and thus appear on endocasts. While there are no endocasts currently available for hominids that lived before about 3 million years ago, both appear on endocasts of H. habilis (c.2.5 million years ago). An endocast from a late, small australopithecine, A. africanus (c.3.1 to 2.6 million years ago), has an ape-like pattern but shows evidence of Broca’s area. Thus, the earliest representatives of the genus Homo seem to have had the neural capacity for spoken language. The configurations of their brain surfaces resembled those of modern human beings rather than apes. This development coincided in time with the initial expansion of brain volume, the appearance of stone tool making (culture in the broadest sense), and preceded by a half million or so years the initial movements of hominids out of the African tropics (Tobias 1998). Between 7 million and 2 million years ago, a set of complex, interrelated changes occurred in the heads of our human and pre-human ancestors. A few of these were: the brain was reorganized as both the vascular and neural systems evolved; the surface topography of the cerebral cortex became more folded and complex; asymmetric hemispherical specialization of the brain appeared; the anatomy of the craniofacial region was significantly shortened, and, toward the end of that period, the volume of the brain itself expanded, particularly in the frontal area. In other words, the brains of our ancestors who lived 2 million years ago were quite different from the brains of their ancestors who lived 5 million years earlier. With regard to the evolution of language, the faculty seems to have been an emergent phenomenon that was a byproduct of other developments, rather than one that was built on a pre-existing structure or structures shared with other primates. That is to say, there is not a single structure that is concerned exclusively with language and speech production; instead
Human Natural Beings • 83 there seem to be several areas—one associated with emotions, another with sensation and motor control—that have become, in the course of the last 5 million or so years, interconnected by neural circuitry that was evolving simultaneously in response to selection pressures that had nothing to do with the development of language and only a little to do with other systems of communication more broadly defined. The interconnections between the faculties of language and tool use in human natural beings were confirmed more than seventy years ago. Lev Vygotsky and Alexander Luria (1930/1994) assessed studies that compared the development of speech and practical intelligence in individuals, both apes and human children; these studies showed (1) that the practical behavior of apes is independent of any speechsymbolic activity, and (2) that tool-use by apes was analogous to that of human beings who were either pre-verbal children or deprived of the ability to speak (aphasics). While the tool-using abilities of apes remained essentially unchanged throughout their lives, those that children manifested at different stages of psychological development changed dramatically, especially after they began to talk, first to themselves and then increasingly to others when they were confronted with a problem to solve. While practical intelligence (tool-use) operates independently of speech in young children, practical activity and speech are increasingly interconnected as the child matures. The egocentric, inner speech of four-year-olds becomes increasingly communicative as they turn to peers and adults for information and insight about the issues they confront. As the human child matures, speech increasingly moves from solving the problems that are immediately at hand to a planning function that precedes their actions; that is, speech and interpersonal relations begin to guide and dominate what they will do in future. In a phrase, practical activity (tool-use in this case) and language began to be linked increasingly in the development of human natural beings, not only in their evolution over the past 7 million years but also in the maturation process of the each individual human being. It is part of the complex process by which natural beings became human natural beings. As we have just seen, there are significant differences in the growth and development patterns of non-human primates and human beings. For example, ape neonatal infants have about 50 percent of the brain volume of adults of the same species, and their brains typically grow to roughly the same size as the adults by the end of their first year of life. In contrast, human infants are born with brain volumes that are about 25 percent of the size of those of adults; their brains double in size during the first six months, are about 75 percent the size of adults by two and a half, 90 percent by age five, and 95 percent in their tenth year. This protracted process of growth and development of humans has a number of implications: (1) brain development occurs much more rapidly in apes and through a seemingly smaller number of developmental stages; (2) the growth rate in brain volume extends beyond well beyond the first year of life in human beings; (3) human infants are relatively helpless in comparison to ape infants during the first years of life; (4) this prolonged period of maturation coincides with growth and developmental stages that witness not only the formation
84 • Karl Marx, Anthropologist of new neural connections but also the related elaboration of practical activity and speech; and (5) the changes in the neural circuitry of human infants and children are, in fact, associated with the elaboration of practical activity and speech. Paleoanthropologists have discerned the ape and human patterns of brain growth and development in the fossil remains of early hominids, provided that cranial and pelvic bones are present in their sample. An important limiting factor with regard to brain volume at the time of birth is the cross-section of the mother’s birth canal. The size and shape of the neonate’s head cannot be greater than the width and height of the birth canal. For example, an early hominid—H. rudolfensis that lived about 2.5 million years ago—had a brain volume of 800–900 cc but a birth canal that was only able of passing a fetal head with brain size of about 200 cc (Stanley 1998: 160–3). Thus, they infer that the human rather than the ape pattern of growth and development was already in existence at that time. This implied that the infants also exhibited the same pattern of prolonged maturation and dependence that exist in modern human beings. These traits coincided in time with the appearance of tool-making and language; they also coincided with the expansion of those stages of brain growth and psychological development when new neural connections are being formed as tool-use and speech become increasingly social activities embedded in ensembles of social relations. With more than 130 years of hindsight, it appears that “Engels got it right!” The broad outlines of his argument have stood the test of time. Nonetheless, the accumulation of diverse sorts of empirical evidence during that period has added unimaginable detail and enriched our understanding of the process. On the one hand, neither Marx nor Engels ever questioned that human natural beings were also social beings. As Engels (1876/1972: 251) put it, our primate ancestors “lived in bands.” On the other hand, they never considered in any extended manner the implications that the life histories, fertility, and mortality patterns of the early hominids might have on the demography and population structures of those groups.
Demography and Population Structure Neither Marx nor Engels ever wrote systematically about the relation between population and political economy (Seccombe 1983). Marx (1863–7/1977: 784) suggested that “every particular historical mode of production has its own special laws of population, which are historically valid only within that particular sphere. An abstract law of population exists only for plants and animals, and even then only in the absence of any historical intervention by man.” He refused to abstract population from historically specific social structures or ensembles of social relations. His comment is part of a larger discussion about the relation between the capitalist mode of production and the formation of a reserve army of labor. Marx was certainly aware of differences in mortality and fertility, the effects of the movement of workers from
Human Natural Beings • 85 the countryside to industrial cities; and the deleterious effects of industries, like pottery-making, on the health and life expectancies of the individuals engaged in those activities. Marx (1863–7/1977: 471) certainly recognized that age and sex were important factors structuring the division of labor in capitalism, and that they were potentially implicated in structuring discontinuities from one mode of production to another. He also implied that the determination of population dynamics is situated in the inner workings of particular modes of production