Kant Yearbook 3-2011: Anthropology

Kant Yearbook 3/2011 Anthropology

Kant Yearbook 3/2011

Anthropology Edited by Dietmar H. Heidemann (University of Luxembourg) Editorial Assistant: Katja Stoppenbrink (University of Luxembourg) Editorial Board: Henry E. Allison (University of California at Davis), Karl Ameriks (Notre Dame), Gordon Brittan (Montana State University), Klaus Düsing (Universität zu Köln), Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Boston University), Kristina Engelhard (Universität zu Köln), Brigitte Falkenburg (Universität Dortmund), Hannah Ginsborg (University of California at Berkeley), Michelle Grier (University of San Diego), Thomas Grundmann (Universität zu Köln), Paul Guyer (University of Pennsylvania), Robert Hanna (University of Colorado at Boulder), Georg Mohr (Universität Bremen), Angelica Nuzzo (Brooklyn College/ CUNY), Robert Stern (Sheffield University), Dieter Sturma (Universität Bonn), Ken Westphal (University of East Anglia), Marcus Willaschek (Universität Frankfurt)

De Gruyter

The Kant Yearbook is an international journal that publishes articles on the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Each issue is dedicated to a specific topic. Each annual topic will be announced by way of a call for papers. The Editorial Board of the Kant Yearbook is composed of renowned international experts, and selects papers for publication through a double blind peer review process. Online access for subscribers: http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kantyb

ISBN 978-3-11-023653-8 (Print) ISBN 978-3-11-023654-5 (Online) ISBN 978-3-11-023655-2 (Print+Online) ISSN 1868-4599 (Print) ISSN 1868-4602 (Online) Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. ” 2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston Cover image: Martin Zech, Bremen Printing and binding: Hubert & Co. GmbH & Co. KG Göttingen ⬁ Printed on acid-free paper Printed in Germany www.degruyter.com

Contents Andrew Stephenson Kant on Non Veridical Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

Thomas Sturm Freedom and the Human Sciences: Hume’s Science of Man versus Kant’s Pragmatic Anthropology

23

Liesbet Vanhaute Systematic Classification or Purposive Moralization? On why Teleology is not the (only) Key to Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43

Matthias Wunsch The Activity of Sensibility in Kant’s Anthropology. A Developmental History of the Concept of the Formative Faculty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

67

Thomas Wyrwich From Gratification to Justice. The Tension between Anthropology and Pure Practical Reason in Kant’s Conception(s) of the Highest Good . . . . . . . . . . . . .

91

Job Zinkstok Anthropology, Empirical Psychology, and Applied Logic . . . .

107

Gnter Zçller Kant’s Political Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

131

List of Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

163

Note to the Studi Kantiani . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

165

Kant on Non Veridical Experience Andrew Stephenson Abstract In this paper I offer an interpretation of Kant’s theory of perceptual error based on his remarks in the Anthropology. Both hallucination and illusion, I argue, are for Kant species of experience and therefore require the standard co operation of sensibility and understanding. I develop my account in a conceptualist frame work according to which the two canonical classes of non veridical experience involve error in the basic sense that how they represent the world as being is not how the world is. In hallucination this is due to the misapplication of categories and in illusion to the misapplication of empirical concepts. Yet there is also room in this framework for a distinction in terms of cognitive functionality be tween the level of experience, which is merely judgementally structured, and that of judgement proper, which involves the free action of a conscious agent. This distinction enables Kant to allow for the otherwise problematic phenomenon of self aware non veridicality.

Introduction Non veridical experience has been a central topic in epistemology and philosophy of mind since at least the time of Descartes. Even disregard ing worries about radical sceptical scenarios in which experience is glob ally delusive, the residual but trenchant issue of how to deal with local delusion remains the dividing question in analytic philosophy of percep tion.1 Yet little has been written that explicitly aims to expound Kant’s views on the matter.2 My aim in this article is to begin to remedy this fact. Doing so will not only shed new light on the on going debate con cerning the fundamental nature of Kant’s theory of human experience; 1 2

See Crane (2006). One notable exception is Beck (1978), whose account differs markedly from mine. A recent two part article by Frierson (2009) discusses Kant’s account of mental disorder at length and also focuses on the Anthropology, but his con cern is primarily with psychiatric and practical issues. My thanks to Dan Rob inson for bringing this paper to my attention.

2

Andrew Stephenson

it will also expose certain Kantian tools that have so far gone unexploit ed in contemporary discussion. I will not be directly concerned with Kant’s relation to any form of scepticism, but rather with his account of the particular mechanisms of non veridical experience. Kant’s most extended remarks concerning these mechanisms occur in his Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View. Like the topic itself, this is a text that has been almost entirely ne glected in the literature on the theoretical philosophy,3 and it is another key aim of this article to begin to remedy this fact as well. First I outline how sensibility (§1) and the understanding (§2) func tion in cases of hallucinatory experience. Then, partly by way of shading in this outline, I explain how Kant’s model also has a place for illusion (§3), before further addressing the general issue of how it can cope with cases in which the subject is aware that her experience is in some way non veridical (§4). Finally I offer some very brief, largely promissory re marks about the potential consequences of my account (§5).

1. Hallucination is the experience as of an object when no object is pres ent. A canonical example is Macbeth’s seeing a dagger before him, the handle toward his hand. There are plenty of complications if one goes into the details of the notion but this much will suffice here. Hallucination, as a species of experience, must involve sensibility. This lower mental faculty is commonly characterized in terms of passive receptivity. What it is for us to possess a passive faculty for receptivity is for us to be able to receive information about the surrounding environ ment merely through being causally affected by it. And what it is for us to have representations that belong to this faculty is for such information to get encoded in mental states that have their sufficient causes in are nothing but a causal effect of sensory stimulation light being reflect ed to strike the retina and dissipate molecules of fatty acid, for example.4 3 4

One notable exception is Brandt (1999). The notion of information encoding might sound rather anachronistic but it is simply supposed to latch on to the idea that the different representations at this very low level of mental function have different features in virtue of the differ ent circumstances in which they are brought about, and that it is these features that are exploited in various ways by the higher faculties in whatever subsequent

Kant on Non Veridical Experience

3

Kant calls these representations sensations or intuitions, which for pres ent purposes I will take to be roughly equivalent (though I am far more neutral on this controversial matter than such a stipulation might sug gest, which fact I return to in the last section). However, what is crucial for hallucination is that there is a sense in which sensibility is not entirely passive. Kant’s model of the human mind is essentially that of a data processor, with input, function, and output.5 Sensibility’s role is to provide the input, without which “there would be no material that could be processed” (Anthr., 144).6 In itself this role dictates nothing about the source of that data. The bare fact that a data processor needs informational input creates logical space for a certain restricted degree of underdetermination in this regard. I say ‘restricted’ because I do not mean to introduce sceptical worries about malign supernatural implantation or brains in vats. Let us suppose for the sake of argument that we fix the distal origin of our data as gen uine causal affection by external physical objects. It nevertheless remains a possibility that once such data has been originally received once gen uine causal affection has occurred it could somehow be regurgitated after the fact and then presented for processing in the normal way. Such would remain the work of sensibility, understood as data provider, and yet would require more than sheer passivity. This active element to sensibility, I propose, is at least one of the roles Kant intends for the imagination (though it certainly plays others): Sensibility in the cognitive faculty (the faculty of representations in intu ition) contains two parts: sense and the power of imagination.—The first is the faculty of intuition in the presence of the object, the second even with out the presence of it. (Anthr., 153)

5 6

cognitive role such representations are to play. Sellars (1968) talks about this in terms of counterpart properties. For discussion of this general interpretive approach see Hanna (2001, 14 – 66) and Longuenesse (1998, 35 – 58). All in text page references are to volume VII of the Akademieausgabe (AA), which contains Kant’s Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (Anthr.). References to other of Kant’s works are restricted to footnotes and, with the exception of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (CPR), are given by volume and page number of the Akademieausgabe along with a short English title. References to the Kritik take the standard A/B format. I follow the English translations of The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant but have made modifications where deemed appropriate. The details of the particular volumes I have used from the Cambridge collection are contained in the bibliography.

4

Andrew Stephenson

The power of imagination (facultas imaginandi), as a faculty of intuition even without the presence of the object, is either productive, that is, a faculty of the original presentation of the object (exhibitio originaria), which thus pre cedes experience; or reproductive, a faculty of the derivative presentation of the object (exhibitio derivativa), which brings back to the mind an empirical intuition had previously. (Anthr., 167) 7

And Kant even goes on to point out the ultimately parasitic nature of the imagination in this naturalistic guise: The power of imagination (in other words) is either inventive (productive), or merely recollective (reproductive). But the productive power of imagina tion is nevertheless not exactly creative, for it is not capable of producing a sense representation that was never given to our faculty of sense; one can always furnish evidence of the material of its representations. To one who has never seen red among the seven colours, we can never make this sensation comprehensible… the sensations produced by the five senses in their composition cannot be made by means of the power of imagina tion, but must be drawn originally from the faculty of sense. (Anthr., 167 – 8) 8

The imagination normally plays such a role in cognitive processes that are entirely epistemically legitimate, like memory (Anthr., 182 5),9 but there is room here for an altogether more pernicious function in hallucination. Consider the following picture. In veridical experiences there is an object that is causally affecting us at the time of the experience and in virtue of which act of sensing we acquire a manifold of intuitions. In hallucinatory experience, however, there is no such object, no such causal affection, and no such act of sensing. Instead there is the imaginative re call of a previously acquired manifold (perhaps even one that has been somehow carved up and combined with other parts of previously ac quired manifolds). It is this (perhaps gerrymandered) manifold that is then presented for intellectual processing. What results is an experience

7 8 9

Cf. Metaphysics Mrongovius (AA 29:881), Metaphysics Volckmann (AA 28:449), Metaphysics L2 (AA 28:585), Metaphysics Dohna (AA 28:672). Cf. CPR A 770 – 1/B 798 – 9, and the Vienna Logic (AA 24:904). It would be entirely appropriate to be reminded of Hume (1978) in observing this connection to memory, as there is much in the following account that par allels the role he attributes to the imagination. I cannot go into this topic here but I should note that it differs significantly from the aspect of the relation be tween Kant and Hume’s theories of imagination discussed, for example, in Strawson (1971).

Kant on Non Veridical Experience

5

as of whatever object originally caused the relevant intuitions, but with out the actual and current presence of that object.10 Furthermore it seems entirely possible that things might go awry in this way without us noticing or even being able to notice. On the data processor model there might be nothing intrinsic to the data we process that tells us whether it is the result of current affection or rather of some more surreptitious procedure. Again we need not go as far as entertain ing radical sceptical hypotheses. Indeed, we might even concede that there is always something intrinsic to the data that could tell us this much, at least when we take a large enough collection of it. It would still seem entirely possible that this feature is not always accessible to us, and this is sufficient to motivate the present worry. Kant himself ges tures towards this issue of the apparent possibility of subjective indistin guishability: […] the power of the imagination, which puts material under the under standing in order to provide content for its concepts (for cognition), seems to provide a reality to its (invented) intuitions because of the analogy between them and real perceptions. (Anthr., 169) 11

At the level at which representations are processed, there might, at least under certain circumstances, be no way to tell the proximal origin of those representations. Or to put it another way, the higher faculties can not as it were reach down into sensibility in order to check which part of it, sense or imagination, is currently activated. So far I have talked as though the imagination provides information for processing directly, bypassing passivity altogether. In fact we need to complicate this picture slightly because of certain things Kant says in this context about a division in the passive part of sensibility: 10 Something very similar is implied at CPR B 278. Allais (2010, 59) points out that Kant talks about intuitive representation there, rather than intuition as such, but in light of the passages we have just seen I cannot agree that this is particularly significant. Rather we should look more carefully at the oft cited claim in the Prolegomena (AA 4:281 – 2) that “An intuition is a representation of the sort which would depend immediately on the presence of an ob ject”—note the subjunctive tone and the fact that Kant goes on in the (rarely cited) next sentence to talk about an object’s presence “either previously or now”. 11 He is more explicit in the Prolegomena (AA 4:290): “The difference between truth and dream, however, is not decided through the quality of the represen tations that are referred to objects, for they are the same in both”. Cf. also CPR B 279.

6

Andrew Stephenson

The senses, however, are in turn divided into outer and inner sense (sensus internus). The first is where the human body is affected by physical things; the second, where it is affected by the mind. (Anthr., 153)

Suppose, then, that some passive part of sensibility is always involved in experience outer sense for veridical cases and inner sense for halluci nation. After all, it seems right to say that hallucination involves actually undergoing sensuous modifications of the mind, rather than merely a punctiform episode of information recall. On this approach, the imag ination fully replaces the object and is attributed similar causal powers. What distinguishes hallucination from veridical experience at this level of mental function is not the bypassing of the senses. It is simply that it is the imagination rather than the object that fulfils the role of causal instigator in cases of hallucination. The addition of this intermediary step has the benefit of emphasiz ing the important fact that the kind of imaginational activity currently under discussion is very different to intellectual activity. And it also sug gests an intuitive alternative role for the otherwise difficult notion of inner sense. In other works Kant focuses on distinguishing inner sense from apperception and relating this distinction to the epistemic humility of transcendental idealism.12 But this matter “does not really belong to anthropology” (Anthr., 142), so in his lectures on this subject he talks instead about […] taking the appearances of inner sense for external appearances, that is, taking imaginings for sensations… it is mental illness: the tendency to ac cept the play of representations of inner sense as experiential cognition, al though it is only fiction […] and accordingly to trick oneself with the in tuitions thus formed (dreaming when awake). (Anthr., 161)

Indeed I think it is generally fair to say that the account I have outlined brings us closer than most to the idea of imagination many of us would have prior to reading the Transcendental Deductions.

2. We have seen what has to happen at the level of sensibility in order for hallucination to occur, but this is not the whole story. Hallucination is one kind of output of our cognitive system, and while we can suppose 12 See e. g. CPR B 153 – 6.

Kant on Non Veridical Experience

7

that there is a perfectly robust sense in which the input of sensibility constrains this output, it does not alone determine it. Different input can pro duce different output, but this can also depend on the nature of the functions that map one onto the other.13 In Kantian terms, as a species of experience, hallucination must also involve our higher mental faculty, the understanding. More specifically, hallucination is a normative phenomenon at least insofar as it involves some kind of mistake. Yet sensibility, both in its passive and active part, functions entirely within the natural realm. Its representations are the immediate, unprocessed result of causal affection, and whether this occurs because of the object or because of the imag ination, it is a natural event and in no sense assessable for correctness. Kant makes this absolutely crucial point in the following striking pas sage: The senses do not deceive […] not because they always judge correctly, but rather because they do not judge at all. Error is thus a burden only to the understanding.—Still, sensory appearances (species, apparentia) serve to ex culpate, if not exactly to justify, understanding. (Anthr., 146) 14

It is the intellectual activity of the understanding its act of information decoding that first brings us into a normative realm at all. Kant’s ex plicit ought talk is largely restricted to the practical sphere,15 but his core machinery makes a certain structural connection to a certain kind of normativity clear: concepts can be correctly or incorrectly ap plied and judgements can be true or false. It is true that so far this is an extremely bare kind of normativity, in effect exhausted by truth con ditions. Indeed one might even question the wisdom of calling it nor mativity in the first place and later we will have cause to turn briefly to a far richer and more uniquely Kantian notion. But it is significant enough for now that it is only once the understanding and its cognitive machinery becomes involved that representation, and thereby misrepre sentation, is possible. The product of sensibility functioning alone does 13 This is one way of stating the problem that McDowell (1996) and (1998) has addressed under the Sellarsian rubric of the Myth of the Given. More specifi cally that functions could produce output, if not without input, then in some sense regardless of it. 14 Cf. CPR A 293/B 350, Prolegomena (AA 4:290 – 1), Metaphysics Mrongovius (AA 29:759, 833). 15 Though see CPR A 135 – 6/B 174 – 5. My thanks to Ken Westphal for the pointer, who cites this passage in his (2004, 168).

8

Andrew Stephenson

not represent the world as being a certain way at all, and so cannot be mistaken in even this very basic sense. So exactly how does hallucination involve a mistake? Well in a nut shell the Kantian intellectual machinery works as follows: the concept of an object provides the rule in accordance with which the understanding processes the data it receives from sensibility; what it is for the under standing to carry out this process is for it to interpret that data as collec tively indicative of the perceptual presence of an object; and the expe rience that is the result of this process has what I will call a judgemental counterpart something like ‘that there is an object here and now’ which is in effect the experience’s content. Hallucination involves a mistake, then, in the sense that the concept of an object is misapplied, the data provided for intellectual processing in some sense should not be interpreted as indicative of the perceptual presence of an object, and the resultant judgemental counterpart is false. Note that it is crucial for the application to hallucinatory cases that this judgemental counterpart to experience does not depend for its sense on the actual existence of its object. If there is in fact not an object here and now, then the claim that there is an object here and now is false, but at least it is meaningful. This application proscribes singularity of refer ence in virtue of demonstrative type reference to a particular object; as suming, that is, that judgements that refer in such a way judgements to the effect that that object is here and now are not merely false but fail to have any determinate truth value when they fail to refer because the object does not exist. But it is consistent with singularity of reference in virtue of spatiotemporal indexicality. So there is something analogous to demonstration about the judgemental counterpart to experience. It is just that it is not the object part that sustains the analogy. After all, the concept of an object is as general and descriptive as any other con cept (as we will see in the next section). Rather what sustains the anal ogy are the spatiotemporal indexicals, and these are immune to refer ence failure regardless of what objects happen to exist at the time and place of an experience, veridical or no, there is always a time and place to that experience.16

16 My thanks to Arthur Melnick for prompting me to clarify this point and sug gesting the particular locution I have adopted. A similar position, though with differences concerning the Kantian jargon, is developed in depth by Howell (1973). It contrasts with that of Thompson (1972).

Kant on Non Veridical Experience

9

Moreover, I take it that this reading of the judgemental counterpart to experience as the claim that there is an object here and now need not necessarily fly in the face of any facts about ordinary linguistic prac tice. Even if we do appear to use demonstratives in reporting on what we experience ‘this object exhibits such and such features’ it is not at all obvious that these reports really express any object dependent con tent. And it would be thoroughly in keeping with the current proposal that the demonstrative locution in such cases simply reflects a general default assumption that experience is veridical (as we will see in §4). The thought is that we tend to talk about our experiences as though they are object dependent simply because we tend to believe that there is an object in the world that we are experiencing; that we tend to act as though it would not be a problem if our experience were ob ject dependent because we tend to presume we are experiencing an ac tual object. But that this practice and this assumption exist entails neither that the content of our experience is in fact object dependent nor even that it is on reflection somehow more intuitive to say that it is. Nor, of course, was ordinary linguistic practice of particular concern to Kant. This account of hallucination remains fairly skeletal. One way to flesh it out further would be to consider some salient variations on the theme. For example, how does Kant’s model accommodate cases of partial hallucination? If only the dagger is unreal, and the courtyard in which Macbeth sees it situated is real, then it seems that his under standing cannot be entirely wrong in all its conceptualizing activity. And what about coincident hallucination? Suppose that what I halluci nate just so happens to coincide with the actual state of my environ ment, that the data my imagination provides just so happens to be ex actly the same as the data my outer sense would have provided had I been experiencing veridically. Something has clearly gone wrong, and my experience will likely not be a suitable basis for knowledge, but con cepts are instantiated and judgemental counterparts come out true. Fi nally, how can a subject hallucinate something she has never come across? Presumably it is possible to hallucinate a unicorn without ever having sensed one, but then the imagination even in this naturalistic manifestation must do something a little more than mimic whole senso ry manifolds. I am confident that Kant has as sophisticated resources as any to deal with standard complications like these. Some have already been mooted and some will come out in what follows. What I want to do now, however, is move on to the second core class of non verid ical experience, illusion.

10

Andrew Stephenson

3. For present purposes I will treat illusions as cases in which an object is experienced as possessing properties it does not as a matter of fact pos sess. A canonical example is seeing a straight stick half submerged in water and its looking bent. To understand Kant’s account of illusion we need to turn in more detail to the role of the concept of an object. There is a crucial ambiguity in this notion between a representation that involves no empirical elements and a representation that involves some empirical elements, albeit alongside pure elements. It is specifically the concept of an object in general that involves no empirical elements. This is the concept articulated by the categories. There are both sche matized and unschematized versions of it, depending on whether it is separated from our particular modes of sensibility, space and time. The unschematized concept of an object in general is not my concern here. It is something like the concept of a whole with parts that enjoys some more or less limited reality and which can stand in some kind of ground and consequence relation to other such things. Many things qualify as objects in this sense, including noumena and Platonic abstrac ta. The schematized concept of an object, on the other hand, is more restrictive. It is something like the concept of a spatiotemporally extend ed and located, sensible property possessing, fully causally functioning, really existing particular, event, or state of affairs. So the categories are mobilized wholesale, as collectively articulating this concept of an object in general. Paradigmatic of such objects are medium sized dry goods, like tables and chairs. Yet what makes it the concept of an object in general is that what further empirical concepts are instantiated is left undetermined. If something is cognized as an object in general then it could but is yet to undergo further descriptive specification according to what particular sensible properties it happens to possess, such as that of being rectangular or that of being wooden or that of being a table. Once one starts to specify in this way then one is no longer working solely with the pure, categorial concept of an object in general. It becomes, for example, the concept of an object that is rectangular and wooden. The categories are still involved since whatever instantiates the species instantiates the genus but there is now an admixture of the empirical as well.17 17 Note, however, that even prior to empirical specification the pure concept of an object, in both its schematized and unschematized versions, is descriptive.

Kant on Non Veridical Experience

11

This point also has its judgemental counterpart. The judgement that there is an object here and now does not involve any concepts other than the categories (assuming that whatever spatiotemporal determina tion it involves is non conceptual). But it could be empirically specified without altering its basic structure simply by adding predicates. Our ex perience might be as of a rectangular wooden object here and now, to which the corresponding judgemental counterpart would be that there is an object that is rectangular and wooden here and now. The relevance of this distinction for hallucination is that things go wrong at the categorial level, before any empirical specification takes place, for there is nothing perceptually present that is spatially located and extended, fully causally functioning, or really existing. But what has this got to do with illusion? Like hallucination, illusion is at a normative (=representative) level of cognitive output and in volves a mistake of some kind. To continue a passage from which I quoted earlier: Thus the human being often mistakes what is subjective in his way of rep resentation for objective (the distant tower, on which he sees no corners, seems to be round; the sea, whose distant part strikes his eyes through high er light rays, seems to be higher than the shore (altum mare); the full moon, which he sees ascending near the horizon through a hazy air, seems to be further away, and also larger, than when it is high in the heavens, although he catches sight of it from the same visual angle). And so one takes appear ance for experience; thereby falling into error, but it is an error of the under standing, not of the senses. (Anthr., 146) 18

But unlike hallucination, this mistake does not occur at the level of cat egorization. In cases of illusion, the application of the categories, bare as they are, is entirely correct. Unlike hallucination, there is in cases of il lusion an occurrent act of outer sensing, so there is indeed in the subject’s perceptual presence something that instantiates the concept of an object in general, that of a spatiotemporally extended and located, sensible prop erty possessing, fully causally functioning, really existing particular, Indeed I take this to be a definitional characteristic of concepts per se. It there fore stands in place of the predicate rather than the variable in sentences like ‘there is an x, such that Fx’. If anything plays an analogous role to that of the variable here—and we have to be very careful in translating into an anach ronistic idiom—it is intuition. (See the comment below on how to articulate the principled distinction between hallucination and illusion.) 18 Kant gives further examples of illusions at p. 137, which include the observa tion that “white stockings present fuller calves than do black ones”!

12

Andrew Stephenson

event, or state of affairs. Illusion, then, goes awry at the level of empirical specification, when a subject ascribes properties like roundness, high ness, farness and largeness. Note, however, that it is not empirical specification per se that causes the problem. When I experience a straight stick as bent, I am correct to apply the concept of an object that is a stick. This concept remains ge neric enough to be instantiated by the object instigating the illusory ex perience. What I ought not do is apply the still more specific concept of an object that is a straight stick. And in the other direction, note that I have not expressed the dis tinction between hallucination and illusion schematically. For it would not be correct to do so in terms of the difference between ‘there exists an x’ (for hallucination) and ‘there exists an x such that x is F’ (for illusion), since for all this dictates ‘F’ could be a pure categorial predicate like ‘causally functioning’ or ‘property possessing’ rather than an empirical one like ‘high’. Sticking with the simple formulation in terms of error at the catego rial level and error at the empirical level, then, on the face of it this looks to be a plausible and principled way to draw the distinction. This is pri marily because it entails that actual mental malfunction only occurs with hallucination, which is important due to the utter ubiquity of illusion in comparison to hallucination. Despite the fact that the notion of a mis take is a notionally normative one and we are in some basic sense at a normative level of processing here, in both classifications of non verid ical experience it is ultimately the natural realm that determines whether or not a mistake has occurred; the question of whether or not we are undergoing non veridical experience, be it of the hallucinatory or illu sory variety, ultimately depends on how the world is. Indeed this simply indicates the fact that at the current level of cognitive function the norms in play can be fully articulated by a list of truth conditions. But in hallucination, and crucially only in hallucination, there is a cause that we can locate more specifically in sensibility. In illusion, sen sibility is functioning as usual and we are sensing in exactly the same way as we do when we experience veridically it is the object and outer sense that are involved rather than the imagination and inner sense. Un like Macbeth seeing a dagger, there is nothing wrong with the subject who sees a stick looking bent when half submerged in water. Still, we need to elaborate a little, for going on what we have so far one might worry that cases of radical misrepresentation will get incor rectly classified. If a subject is looking at a chair but seeing an elephant,

Kant on Non Veridical Experience

13

intuitively it would be correct to say that she is hallucinating. This kind of case seems radically different to that in which someone sees a white chair as red due to nonstandard light conditions. But the categories might appear to remain applicable. Should it then be classified as illu sion? In fact the current model very naturally suggests how we are to deal with such cases. The categories are applied uniformly across all manifolds irrespective of contingencies of content, for all empirical intuitions are as of objects in general. Whether I perceive a bird or a tree or a bird in a tree or a bird flying out of a tree, for example, I perceive a spatiotemporally lo cated and extended, sensible property possessing, fully causally function ing, particular, event, or state of affairs. With empirical concepts how ever, just which ones are mobilized in the production of any given ex perience is determined by the particularities of the relevant intuitions. Not all intuitions are caused in us by red things, for example, so not every experience will require us to mobilize the empirical concept of red or be as of an object that is red. In this way the activity of the under standing counts as radically spontaneous in its categorization of the sen sible manifold, and yet at the same time can remain constrained from below insofar as it also consists in the application of empirical concepts.19 In the kind of case proffered above, the bottom up constraint is clearly missing, and this indicates that there has indeed been some men tal malfunction, that there has been a break in the mechanistic chain. A good explanation of such a case would require positing the surreptitious working of the imagination, for the fact that there is a chair present is explanatorily irrelevant. The categories do not remain applicable because they have not been applied to a manifold caused by that chair at all. In this way such cases would qualify (correctly) as hallucinations.20

19 See Watkins (2008) for an extended treatment of this anti McDowellian point. Note also that I take this characterization of spontaneity to be entirely compat ible with the more standard one (which does not distinguish between the em pirical and pure manifestations of the understanding): deploying spatiotemporal concepts—i. e. both empirical ones, which are automatically spatiotemporal, and pure ones, which are spatiotemporal when schematized—does not carve the world of things in themselves at its joints. 20 Further complications include Müller Lyer cases, in which it is also far from clear that there is ‘nothing wrong’ with susceptible subjects.

14

Andrew Stephenson

4. Having addressed the mechanisms involved in both canonical classes of non veridical experience and utilized distinctive Kantian tools to sug gest a principled distinction between them, we need to confront an issue that applies generally in this context. Any vaguely credible account needs to allow room for cases in which the subject is aware that her ex perience is non veridical. The motivation is not merely that non verid ical experience is rarely if ever actually subjectively indistinguishable from veridical experience. Even if this were common, the fact would remain that our ulterior knowledge of the way the world works could well inform how we decide to take the evidence of our senses. Yet at first it might seem as though Kant cannot cope with this simple and ubiquitous phenomenon, for he ties experience too closely to judgement. If I know that my experience is in some way non veridical when, for example, I see a stick half submerged in water looking bent, then surely I ought not to judge that there is a bent stick here and now. Indeed it seems plausible that I ought to judge that it is not the case that there is a bent stick here and now. The worry is that something like a Moorean paradox arises for subjects who do what they ought in such cases; that in cases of self aware non veridicality rational subjects judge that the stick is bent and that it is not bent. And this worry is not specific to illusion. The same would apply if Macbeth decided that what he saw before him was in truth a dagger of the mind, a false creation, proceeding from the heat oppressed brain. Fortunately, this objection underestimates the complexity of Kant’s model. I have talked about judgemental counterparts to distinguish the kind of thing that accompanies experience from what we might call full blown judgement. The basic thought is that these are significantly dif ferent kinds of representation, occurring at different levels of cognitive engagement, indeed with different attendant kinds of normativity, and that this allows room for a subject to be able, coherently, to make full blown judgements that contradict her experiential judgemental counter parts. This needs some explanation. By full blown judgement I mean the kind of unification of concepts that Kant so famously divides into analytic and synthetic. Both full blown judgement and the judgemental counterpart to experience qual ify as judgement because they constitutively involve concepts and are objectively valid in the sense that they are truth evaluable. However, full blown judgement constitutively involves only concepts. Experience

Kant on Non Veridical Experience

15

and its judgemental counterpart, on the other hand, constitutively in volve concepts and intuitions in experience we unify intuitions with concepts, not just concepts with concepts. The involvement of concepts at all is enough to secure a kind of judgemental form, but the constit utive involvement of intuitions ensures that it is of quite a unique kind. The most important and general consequence of this has to do with the relative primitiveness of experience in comparison to full blown judgement. There is a definite hierarchy here. Experience and its judgemental counterpart justify or provide rational ground for full blown judgement. They are not equivalent to it. For example, the full blown synthetic a posteriori judgement that some sticks are bent would normally garner justification from the experience as of a bent stick and the judgemental counterpart that there is a bent stick here and now. But this relation only holds firm in epistemically suitable sit uations. It can readily be overridden by a variety of countervailing fac tors, as when a subject is fully aware that putting straight sticks in water does not bend them. Another way to approach this issue, and one that will bring us back to the text of the Anthropology, is via the notion of consciousness. Kant defends the explicitly anti Lockean doctrine that we can ‘have representations and still not be conscious of them’. In particular: The field of sensuous intuitions and sensations of which we are not con scious, even though we can undoubtedly conclude that we have them; that is, obscure representations in the human being (and thus also in animals), is immense. Clear representations, on the other hand, contain only infin itely few points of this field which lie open to consciousness; so that as it were only a few places on the vast map of our mind are illuminated. (Anthr., 135)

It seems as though Kant virtually defines intuitions and sensations as ob scure in this passage, and experience as clear, for remember that whole manifolds of information encoding natural mental states must be con ceptually unified by the understanding in order to produce a single rep resentational experience as output. If so, we are not given manifolds in any sense that allows us to consciously choose how to conceptualize them we do not consciously decide how to process our data set, and although the activity of the understanding is more intellectually so phisticated than the activity of the imagination, it is not as sophisticated as voluntary action.21 21 Bennett (1974, 19) makes this mistake, presumably unaware of Kant’s discus

16

Andrew Stephenson

One could go further and say that we are not normally conscious at the level of sensibility at all and that the understanding is itself partly constitutive of normal human consciousness. But this is a difficult and controversial issue.22 Fortunately, all that is essential here is the much weaker claim that it is only on the basis of consciousness as of objects that we do things like make decisions. This is enough to produce the required hierarchy between full blown judgement on the one hand and experience and its judgemental counterpart on the other. For one especially salient way to make a decision is to make a full blown judge ment about how the world is. Now that is not to say that experience is entirely neutral in this regard. After all, it presents us with the world as being thus and so, not merely as possibly being thus and so. In modern parlance we might say that experience does not simply provide us with bare propositional content but also prompts us to adopt an attitude of belief towards it; or that experience both supplies accuracy conditions and suggests that they are fulfilled. But what is crucial is that experience has this manner even if we know that the world is not thus and so. As Kant says, “Illusion is that delusion which persists even though one knows that the supposed object is not real” (Anthr., 149).23 And it is precisely because we have no choice in the matter that we fall short at this level of making the kind of commitment typical of full blown judge ment. Under epistemically optimum conditions we can readily consent to asserting that the way the world is presented as being in experience is indeed the way the world is. Yet we could also resist this if there were reason to do so. The conscious strengthening of propositional attitude, in either direction, represents a decision and constitutes a cognitive shift up from the level of experience and its judgemental counterpart to the level of full blown judgement. Note that the claim is not that every judgement actually involves something that could be correctly described as a choice. This would be implausible, for judgements can surely be as unbidden and uncon sion in the Anthropology of ‘the involuntary course of one’s thoughts and feel ings’ (Anthr., 133). 22 Kant certainly acknowledges some form of consciousness at the level of bare sen sation (see e. g. CPR B 207, A 320/B 376), but it is not at all clear what role it plays or how we should characterize it. Sellars (1975) and George (1981) offer deflationary adverbial accounts. 23 Cf. CPR A 293/B 349 A 298/B 355, where Kant discusses the fact that non veridical experience shares this feature with the transcendental illusion against which his critical method is designed guard.

Kant on Non Veridical Experience

17

trolled as experience. Rather the claim is that every judgement possibly involves this kind of thing. But this is enough to bring with it a much richer and more thoroughly Kantian kind of normativity. The mere possibility of exercising a certain freedom makes judgement normatively binding in a way that experience is not. Ultimately, in fact, it means nothing less than that judgement is governed by a categorical impera tive. But all that is crucial here is that, according to Kant’s model of the human mind, the case of self aware non veridicality is not analogous to a Moorean paradox at all. It is far more like the case of deciding to do one thing whilst nevertheless being tempted to do another, and in this there is no hint of irrationality, merely humanity.

5. If the account I have given in the preceding four sections were com plete, there would be immediate repercussions for several central dis putes in contemporary Kant scholarship. In particular I am thinking of two issues that draw heavily on recent work in analytic philosophy of perception. First of all, the account I have sketched is clearly not naive realist.24 I mean by naive realism the particular form of disjunctivism about hallu cinatory experience that maintains it is of a fundamentally different kind to veridical experience because veridical experiences have as metaphysical constituents their real world objects. Neither intuition nor experience, as I have understood these notions, are relational in the sense that they require the actual and current existence of their objects. For we have seen that one species of experience is hallucination, and that the repre sentations produced by the imagination’s affect upon inner sense therein are a species of intuition. Though we have also seen that hallucination is essentially reproductive, that it is ultimately parasitic upon genuine caus al interaction with the external environment, so there does seem to be at work some weaker, externalist sense in which intuition and experience depend on that environment. And there might even be room for weak er forms of disjunctivism, though this is not least because of the broad ness of disjunctivism’s criterion of fundamental difference.25 Despite the similarity of structure and constituent on the current picture, it is not 24 Contra e. g. Hanna (2010) and Allais (2010). 25 See Soteriou (2010).

18

Andrew Stephenson

obvious that it should not count as a fundamental difference between veridical and hallucinatory experiences that only in the former are we in direct causal contact with actual objects, especially if we consider that this issue might well partially determine whether or not the episode in question can be theoretically and practically assimilated into a single, law governed picture of the world. Second, as I have explained it here Kant’s model is not one that ac tively makes room for non conceptual world oriented content. Very roughly, the content of a mental state is what is conveyed to the subject who is in that state; this content is world oriented if it is intentional in some suitable sense and puts the subject in cognitive touch with the world in some suitable way; and it is non conceptual if it is not itself conceptually structured, for example in a way analogous to the semantic structure of a proposition, and does not itself constitutively involve con cepts.26 Going solely on what I have said above, Kant thinks that mental content is either non conceptual but not world oriented sensation/in tuition/information encoding natural representation or world orient ed and conceptual experience. For all we have seen here, there is no middle ground.27 However, the account I have given is clearly not complete there is clearly much more to say. And so in light of this I in fact make no claim to have established either that Kant was not non conceptualist about some world oriented content or that none of the Kantian classes of rep resentation are object dependent in the naive realist, relationalist sense. To positively rule these out would require much fuller treatments of all the key notions of ‘imagination’, ‘intuition’, ‘concept’ and ‘experience’, not to mention ‘synthesis’ (which I have talked about in terms of proc essing and function). But I do think anyone would be forced to admit that Kant uses each and every one of these absolutely pivotal terms in different ways at different points, and the research questions would in clude: Is there a significant usage of ‘intuition’ where it denotes some 26 In fact there is a much weaker sense in which one might think content could qualify as non conceptual, namely if it does not require the subject to possess concepts which would enable her to interact with it in certain ways, such as describe it. I cannot discuss this influential alternative in these brief remarks, ex cept simply to say that it does not look especially Kantian (see Hanna (2010) for quasi independent reasons to suspect its robustness as a form of non conceptu alism). 27 Contra e. g. Hanna (2008), Hanna (2005) and Allais (2009), and in line with Ginsborg (2008).

Kant on Non Veridical Experience

19

thing in between a spatiotemporally ordered manifold of sensations and full cognitive experience? Or is there a significant usage of ‘experience’ according to which it remains objective but does not require the under standing? Ought we to impose a principled distinction between intu itions and imaginings, even though Kant simply does not make one ter minologically explicit and regular? And is there a much richer role for the imagination that yet does not go as far as rendering it subordinate to the understanding? I do not claim to have answered or even addressed any of these questions. Nevertheless, there are several points at which my account, such as it is, goes against the explanatory grain of the positions under consider ation. For example, I have shown that Kant’s model has the resources to provide quite a rich bottom up explanation of both canonical classes of non veridical experience as well as the general potential for subjective indistinguishability. Modern day naive realists, on the contrary, tend to use subjective indistinguishability as a primitive, and they do so in order to offer a much more austere definition of non veridical experi ence, as merely that which is subjectively indistinguishable from verid ical experience. And concerning the issue of non conceptualism, one of its key motivations is the idea, which is very natural indeed, that expe rience is more basic than judgement, that seeing is not believing. Yet by considering how Kant could deal with self aware non veridicality we have seen that he makes room for this distinction within varieties of con ceptually structured representation. Moreover, the way I have explained the Kantian concept of an ob ject in general as collectively articulated by the categories can be put to work in a similar regard. A key argument in favour of the relational view of experience is that it is necessary to explain how we can derive concepts from experience, and in particular the concept of mind inde pendence. Now it is a complex matter as to just what this concept amounts to in the context of transcendental idealism, but suppose that mind independence is entailed by having a spatiotemporal extension and location, being fully causally functioning, and being really existing, which seems highly plausible. Then we have seen that for Kant this is a concept that is precisely not derived from experience. Rather it is mo bilized as a necessary and constitutive condition of it. Kant’s innatism in this regard discharges much, though admittedly not all, of that essentially

20

Andrew Stephenson

empiricist motivation for the relationalist view.28 And this tool might also be used to undercut a significant class of arguments in favour of non conceptualism. For the view I have attributed to Kant is only moderately conceptualist in the sense that, strictly speaking, only the pure cat egories and not empirical concepts are necessary for experience. Savages can cognitively experience houses as objects in general without having any conception of what a dwelling established for men would be, and although they could not thereby describe the objects of their experien ces as such, they could certainly track those objects through spacetime and even causally reason about them in some limited way.29 Still, these are really nothing more than promissory notes. I leave a fuller discussion for another occasion.

Conclusion In the preface to his Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View, Kant defines the discipline as “the investigation of what he [the human being] as a free acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself” (Anthr., 119). So formulated, it sounds very broad. The references to autonomy and normative injunction imply that it is to include moral philosophy, and this relationship has been much dis cussed. Less attention has been paid to the fact that such marks are equally apt to pick out key aspects of Kant’s theoretical philosophy. The spontaneity exhibited by the human mind in its application of con cepts (in particular the pure ones), the freedom the conscious agent can express in deciding what to make of her experiences, and the rich and complex normative structure of the realm we thereby enter, are all foundational issues in Kant’s mature philosophy of mind and epistemol ogy. And though we have seen that the spectre of non veridicality is built right in to the nature of the human mind on Kant’s model,30 it re mains the case that we ought not be seduced into making false judge 28 See Gomes (2010) for a much more in depth treatment of this topic. His target is Campbell (2002). 29 Cf. the Jsche Logic (AA 9:33) (and the Dohna Wundlacken Logic (AA 24:702)). 30 In fact this suggests another structural connection to anthropology (even more broadly construed), for it is Kant’s anthropic turn that leads him to his data pro cessor model in the first place. Contrapositively put, God could not undergo non veridical experience. There is an intriguing passage in the Critique of Judg ment (AA 5:401 – 3) that can be read as elaborating on this connection.

Kant on Non Veridical Experience

21

ments on the basis of it. We should make of ourselves beings who agree with one another, and are right, about the world.31

Bibliography Allais, Lucy (2009): Kant, Non Conceptual Content and the Representation of Space, in: Journal of the History of Philosophy 47, pp. 383 – 413. Allais, Lucy (2010): Kant’s Argument for Transcendental Idealism in the Tran scendental Aesthetic, in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110, pp. 47 – 75. Arens, Patrick E. (2010): Kant and the Understanding’s Role in Imaginative Synthesis, in: Kant Yearbook 2, pp. 33 – 52. Beck, Louis W. (1978): Did the Sage of Konigsberg Have No Dreams?, in: L. W. Beck (ed.): Essays on Kant and Hume, London, pp. 38 – 60. Bennett, Jonathan (1974): Kant’s Dialectic, Cambridge. Brandt, Reinhard (1999): Kritischer Kommentar zu Kants Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, Hamburg. Campbell, John (2002): Berkeley’s Puzzle, in: J. Hawthorne and T. S. Gendler (eds.): Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford, pp. 127 – 143. Crane, Tim (2006): Is There a Perceptual Relation?, in: T. S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.): Perceptual Experience, Oxford, pp. 126 – 146. Frierson, Patrick (2009): Kant on Mental Disorder. Part 1: An Overview; Part 2: Philosophical Implications of Kant’s Account, in: History of Psy chiatry 20, pp. 267 – 310. George, Rolf (1981): Kant’s Sensationism, in: Synthese 47, pp. 229 – 255. Ginsborg, Hannah (2008): Was Kant a nonconceptualist?, in: Philosophical Studies 137, pp. 65 – 77. Gomes, Anil (2010): Kant and the Explanatory Role of Experience, unpublish ed MS. Hanna, Robert (2001): Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, Ox ford. Hanna, Robert (2005): Kant and Non Conceptual Content, in: European Journal of Philosophy 13, pp. 247 – 290. Hanna, Robert (2008): Kantian Non Conceptualism, in: Philosophical Studies 137, pp. 41 – 64. Hanna, Robert (2010): The Rational Human Condition, unpublished MS. Howell, Robert (1973): Intuition, Synthesis, and Individuation in the Critique of Pure Reason, in: Nous 7, pp. 207 – 232. Hume, David (1978): A Treatise of Human Nature, eds. L. A. Selby Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, Oxford. 31 In addition to those already mentioned, I would like to thank Keith Wilson and the other attendees of the Warwick work in progress seminar, an anonymous reviewer from the Kant Yearbook, Bob Hanna, Anil Gomes, and above all Ralph Walker for such useful comments on earlier drafts of this article.

22

Andrew Stephenson

Kant, Immanuel (1998): Critique of Pure Reason, ed. and trans. P. Guyer and A. W. Wood, Cambridge. Kant, Immanuel (2000): Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. P. Guyer, trans. P. Guyer and E. Matthews, Cambridge. Kant, Immanuel (2001): Lectures on Metaphysics, ed. and trans. K. Ameriks and S. Naragon, Cambridge. Kant, Immanuel (2002): Theoretical Philosophy after 1781, eds. H. Allison and P. Heath, trans. G. Hatfield, M. Friedman, H. Allison and P. Heath, Cam bridge. Kant, Immanuel (2004): Lectures on Logic, ed. and trans. J. M. Young, Cam bridge. Kant, Immanuel (2007): Anthropology, History, and Education, ed. G. Zöller and R. B. Louden, trans. A. Gregor, P. Guyer, R. B. Louden, H. Wilson, A. W. Wood, G. Zöller, A. Zweig, Cambridge. Longuenesse, Béatrice (1998): Kant and the Capacity to Judge, Princeton. McDowell, John (1998): Having the World in View: Sellars, Kant, and Inten tionality, in: Journal of Philosophy 95, pp. 431 – 491. McDowell, John (1996): Mind and World, Cambridge. Sellars, Wilfrid (1968): Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes, London. Sellars, Wilfrid (1975): The Adverbial Theory of the Objects of Perception, in: Metaphilosophy, pp. 144 – 160. Soteriou, Matthew (2010): The Disjunctive Theory of Perception, in: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = . Strawson, Peter F. (1971): Imagination and Perception, in: Foster and Swanson (eds.): Experience and Theory, London, pp. 31 – 54. Thompson, Manley (1972): Singular Terms and Intuitions in Kant’s Epistemol ogy, in: Review of Metaphysics 26, pp. 314 – 343. Watkins, Eric (2008): Kant and the Myth of the Given, in: Inquiry 51, pp. 512 – 531. Westphal, Kenneth R. (2004): Kant’s Transcendental Proof of Realism, Cam bridge.

Freedom and the Human Sciences: Hume’s Science of Man versus Kant’s Pragmatic Anthropology1 Thomas Sturm Abstract In his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Kant formulates the idea of the empirical investigation of the human being as a free agent. The notion is puz zling: Does Kant not often claim that, from an empirical point of view, human beings cannot be considered as free? What sense would it make anyway to in clude the notion of freedom in science? The answer to these questions lies in Kant’s notion of character. While probably all concepts of character are in volved in the description and explanation of human action, Kant develops a specific notion of character by distinguishing character as a “mode of thought” (Denkungsart) from character as a “mode of sensing” (Sinnesart). The former no tion is distinctively Kantian. Only mode of thought reveals itself in human ac tion such that actions can be seen as linked to an agent’s first person perspective and the capacity to rationally reflect one’s own intentions and desires. By ref erence to this concept human actions can be empirically explained qua free ac tions. The point of this paper is not only to rule out the interpretation that Kant is an incompatibilist concerning the dilemma of freedom and causal determin ism. It is also argued that Kant defends a version of soft determinism which is more sophisticated and more adequate for the human sciences than Hume’s.

1

This essay is a strongly updated and extended version of a conference paper that first appeared in German (Sturm 2001a). It also extracts materials of (Sturm 2009, esp. ch. VII §§14 – 18 and ch. VIII §§ 5 – 6). Work on this article was sup ported by the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Berlin, and the Spanish Ministry for Science and Innovation (MICINN), reference number FFI 2008 – 01559/FISO.—I am grateful to Christopher Green, Paul Erikson, and to an anonymous reviewer from the Kant Yearbook for several suggestions that helped to improve my English. All translations are my own.

24

Thomas Sturm

Introduction The project of a science of human nature was of great concern to eight eenth century philosophers and scientists. A wide range of conceptions for it were available at the time, all competing for the distinction of the most adequate and fruitful program for how to investigate the human being. There were serious controversies over the methods, aims, and the characterization of the subject matter of the human sciences. In Ger man speaking countries the debate raged in the 1770s, when in partic ular the advocates of what was called “empirical psychology” and “med ical” or “physiological anthropology” happened to meet (see, for in stance, Bonnet (1770 71); Platner (1772); Herz (1773); Schütz (1771); Tetens (1777, Introduction)). They discussed, among other things, the legitimacy of introspection (is it a reliable and useful tool for justifying empirical knowledge about the mind?), the nature and the architecture of the human mind (what are its basic and derived fac ulties?), and the possibility of physiological explanations of the mental (can they be given? are they necessary at all?). Kant observed these debates. He had serious problems with both of these approaches and their answers to various methodological and met aphysical questions (see Sturm 2009, chap. II, IV V). I cannot discuss these topics here, but I shall assume the following, for which closer ar guments can indeed be given (ibid., chap. III IV). Despite his well known skepticism about the then existing empirical psychology and its aspiration to become a true natural science (see AA 4:471) 2, Kant did not deny the possibility of a systematic empirical investigation into the human mind and behavior at all. From 1772/73 until 1795/ 96, he taught in every winter semester what he soon came to call “prag matic anthropology”. In AA 25 we have an excellent critical edition of manuscripts from these lectures. Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View of 1798 stems from these lectures. He even often described this anthropology as at least potentially a systematic science with its 2

Kant citations are taken from the Akademie Ausgabe (Kant 1900 ff.), indicating volume and page numbers. For the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR) I depart from this practice and, as is common, indicate the page numbers of the first (A) and second (B) edition (1781/1787). Also, a few of the passages quoted here have been taken from lectures on anthropology not contained in AA 25 and are cited here by their title and page number (e. g., Reichel 109); these lec tures are accessible on the internet (http://web.uni marburg.de/kant//web seitn/gt ho304.htm).

Freedom and the Human Sciences

25

own architectonic, or as built from a definite idea (AA 7:119, 121 f.; AA 10:146 f., 242; AA 25:470, 551, 782). It would also incorporate what is valuable in empirical psychology (CPR A 849/B 877; AA 28:223, 541, 584 and 876; AA 19:756 f.). Both the lectures and the book reveal his continuing reflection on and reaction to then ongoing debates, and how this led to some of his puzzling ideas concerning the human sciences. One of these ideas arguably the most puzzling, but also most im portant one is the following. Kant determines the subject matter of his anthropology as an empirical inquiry into what “the human being, as a free agent, makes, or can and should make, of himself” (AA 7:119). In other words, human freedom is not only incorporated into his anthro pology, but even plays a central role in it. Interpreters of Kant’s Anthropology have often ignored his programmatic statement;3 and insofar as they recognize it they often wonder how the program could be realiz ed.4 What is on Kant’s mind here? Clearly, this part of his conception relates closely to a challenge for the human sciences up until today, namely: When we look at actions from a scientific point of view, what sense should we make of the ordinary idea that we are free agents, capable of initiating our own actions, and able to act responsibly? Is this assumption perhaps only to be used when we consider actions from a practical perspective and thus, theoretically or scientifically speaking, an illusion? Or could it be integrated into science in a serious way? The problem cannot be foreign to Kant. After all, he also says that if ac tions are viewed empirically, they are as causally determined as any other natural event (CPR A 549/B 577; AA 5:99). Does he not strictly hold apart viewing ourselves from an empirical point of view, as mere natural objects, and viewing ourselves as moral agents? These questions are connected to the familiar metaphysical problem of freedom and de terminism. However, I shall not deal with this problem here, but rather consider how different stances towards it can lead to different concep tions of the human sciences. In order to discuss Kant’s approach, it is useful to reflect on a com parable project for the investigation of human action a project that 3

4

Many scholars have for long followed Beck’s view on Kant’s Anthropology, who thought that it simply examined “how men should conduct themselves in or dinary affairs of life”, resulting only in an “episodic elaboration of practical rules” (Beck (1960, 7 and 54)). After the appearance of AA 25, this has clearly changed. Thus Hinske (1966, 425). About a few recent attempts to make sense of Kant’s statement, more in part 2 of the present essay.

26

Thomas Sturm

also struggled with the problem of freedom and determinism in an era that began to scientifically investigate human thoughts, feeling, inclina tions and action. I mean Hume’s project of a “science of human na ture.” As will become clear, Kant and Hume agree in that if the concept of freedom is to be integrated into science in a serious way, this integra tion has to use the notion of character. However, they do so in strikingly different ways, related to their different conceptions of the “science of human nature” and “pragmatic anthropology.” In part 1, I will explain Hume’s approach, showing how he tried to defend a version of compa tibilism concerning freedom and causal determinism. I shall also note two serious problems with his view. In part 2, I turn to Kant’s different approach and will show how it could avoid the problems Hume’s ap proach was faced with.

1. Freedom in Hume’s project of a “science of human nature” 1.1. Hume’s compatibilism concerning freedom and causal determinism Hume argues that there does exist a meaningful concept of freedom that is perfectly compatible with the causal determination or necessity of our actions. He characterizes the concept as follows: “By liberty […] we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will; that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may” (Hume 1748 51, 95). A human being acts freely if (and only if) she acts according to her desires or passions, where this course of action is neither undermined nor produced by (external) co ercion. The point of this claim, and its consequences for a scientific inves tigation of human nature, becomes clear when we bring into play one of Hume’s distinctions. Like many others, he distinguishes two different concepts of freedom: the “liberty of spontaneity” on the one hand, and the “liberty of indifference” on the other. Hume understands the notion of indifference as the total absence of causes or necessity. He maintains that it is the view of many philosophers that an action can only be free if it is not caused, since causes bring about their effects necessarily. On the view of advocates of the liberty of indifference, howev er, it cannot be necessary that we act in the ways we do, if we act freely (Hume 1739 40, 407; 1748 51, 94 n.). We must always have a real

Freedom and the Human Sciences

27

possibility of doing otherwise, and of doing so under the very same causal circumstances. Similarly, our past actions have only been free if we could have done otherwise, again under the same causal circumstan ces. Hume opposes this notion of freedom on various grounds. He thinks it implies the existence of chance, that it is incompatible with the general causal determinism, and that is a threat to the project of a science of human nature.5 The idea that human action is subject to caus al laws is a well known and crucial tenet of his project of an empirical science of human nature. Indeed, what sense would it make to first cau sally explain an action and then to claim that those causes need not have that action as their consequence? The notion of freedom as spontaneity, fortunately, does not undermine this project. Spontaneity is what Hume has in mind when he explains freedom by saying that we act freely if and only if we act according to the “determinations of the will” according to our desires or intentions. This, he thinks, is the only meaningful no tion of freedom that there is. Spontaneity is enjoyed by “everyone, who is not a prisoner and in chains” (Hume 1748 51, 95). The freedom of spontaneity is, therefore, only opposed to (external) coercion or vio lence. It does not require the absence of causes or the possibility to act otherwise even under identical causal conditions. To be true, spon taneity allows for a certain meaning of the common phrase that one could have acted otherwise: I could have acted otherwise if I also had desired otherwise if, in other words, it hadn’t been the case that the ante cedent causal conditions had been the same. Since we can, in Hume’s view, explain and predict our actions by reference to such determina tions of the will according to the laws of human nature, freedom of spontaneity is compatible with the causal determination of actions and with the project of the empirical science of human nature.

1.2. Two problems of Hume’s compatibilism Hume’s argument is widely taken as a paradigmatic defense of compa tibilism, and indeed a successful one, at least in part.6 But we should not overlook the problems with his views. To begin, it is certainly true that Hume’s concept of freedom as spontaneity is compatible with the ideas of the causal determination and the empirical investigation of actions. 5 6

See Stroud (1977, 141 – 150); Penelhum (1993, 130 f.). Stroud (1977, 144); Penelhum (1993, 129).

28

Thomas Sturm

But, at the same time, the concept is totally irrelevant for this investiga tion: Since all actions can be explained completely by reference to pas sions, intentions, and other “determinations of the will,” the concept of freedom itself can be eliminated from the “science of human nature.” In order to give causal explanations of human actions, one cites the rele vant “determinations of the will,” and that’s it. That the actions are also free in the sense of spontaneity might be mentioned, but does not add anything to the explanations. One need not complain about this. However, it is important to note this point since, as we will see, this marks a critical difference between Hume’s and Kant’s approaches. There are also separate problems with Hume’s theory, two of which I shall point out here.7 The first is the problem of explaining our impres sion of being free in the sense of indifference. Hume fully admits that we do have the impression that we are free in the sense of being able to act otherwise under identical antecedent causal conditions. He notes that from a first person point of view it often appears to us that no causes for our actions are given, and that we therefore appear to our selves as being able to choose arbitrarily between different alternatives. But this impression is wrong, he maintains, and it is so for the following reason: We may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves; but a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character; and even where he cannot, he concludes in general, that he might, were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper, and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition. (Hume 1739 – 40, 408 f.; 1748 – 51, 94 n.)

Such an external spectator is, of course, the “scientist of human nature.” But even if we grant that an external spectator may be capable of ex plaining and predicting our actions causally, or that the impression of indifference or absence of causes is misleading why does that impres sion arise specifically from the first person point of view? It can hardly be the general lack of knowledge of the causal relations between deter minations of the will and actions, since Hume assumes that we all have such knowledge and apply it when observing other agents. So, we should expect that Hume takes it for granted that we apply such knowl edge to ourselves as well. But he does not. Moreover, as he explicitly asserts, we do not only in fact have such causal knowledge, we also need to have it. Only beings having such knowledge of causes can in 7

See also Stroud (1977, 146 – 149).

Freedom and the Human Sciences

29

teract with other agents, ascribe responsibility to them, and so on. Hume does not explain why such knowledge, if it must be ascribed to every agent, coheres with the idea that every agent, under certain cir cumstances, has the firm impression that no causes necessitate his own course of action. Neither does he explain why this impression or idea goes hand in hand with an asymmetry between the first person and third person point of view if indeed any such asymmetry exists, which of course may be doubted. In any case, Hume’s treatment of the liberty of indifference is not sufficiently thorough. A second problem for Hume’s theory of freedom concerns the con nection between that theory and his conception of the science of man. As he admits, human beings act in ways which seem to be quite irregular and, therefore, not accessible to an empirical analysis of action based on universal causal laws. He proposes the following: Human beings or groups of human beings may differ in their courses of action, but one can, nevertheless, observe regularities within particular agents or partic ular groups of agents. Here Hume brings into play the concept of char acter. Traits of character fulfill an explanatory role, since they are more or less persistent causal properties of human beings leading to constant behavior. Most importantly and typically (though perhaps not always), character traits are long term desires, intentions and other determina tions of the will.8 There are, Hume says, a “variety of maxims” among mankind. But it is also true, he says, that each person has “max ims” or a “fixed and established character,” and according to this “fixed and established character” the agent acts in typical ways (Hume 1748 51, 85 88). That does not mean that people cannot change, nor that they cannot occasionally act out of character. But they do so in accord ance with the causal laws of human nature. That it is not always easy for us to discern a person’s character shows merely that the scientific study of mankind is not yet mature. In any case, for Hume “character” is a technical term. Examples of the explanatory function and the complexity of this concept can be found in Hume’s History of England (Hume 1754 62). Almost every chapter on the rule of a particular monarch ends 8

See Bricke (1995); McIntyre (1990). I shall not discuss here how tight the re lation between character and action is in Hume (see Johnson (1990)), nor the qualifications and exceptions one would have to give concerning the idea that, by and large, character traits are composed of long term desires or passions (see the beautiful discussion of this topic by Baier (2008, ch. 1).

30

Thomas Sturm

with a section on that person’s “Death and Character,” listing the com bination of traits observed in that person that led to him living and act ing as he did. The character of Charles I was mixed “as that of most men, if not of all” (Hume 1754 62, V 542). On Henry VIII, Hume writes: It is difficult to give a just summary of this prince’s qualities: He was so dif ferent from himself in different parts of his reign, that […] his history is his best character and description. The absolute, uncontrouled authority which he maintained at home, and the regard which he acquired among foreign nations, are circumstances, which entitle him, in some degree, the appella tion of a great prince; while his tyranny and barbarity exclude him from the character of a good one. He possessed, indeed, great vigour of mind, which qualified him for exercising dominion over men; courage, intrepidity, vig ilance, inflexibility […]. (Hume 1754 – 62, III 321 f.)

Now, an important problem that arises with Hume’s notion of character relates to the following point. Traits of character are what make sense of the idea of an ascription of responsibility that, for Hume, is such a cru cial part of his theory of freedom. Actions are, as he says, “temporary and perishing,” and we do not hold a person responsible if she does a certain thing only once, because it is always unclear whether it was real ly she who performed the action. Henry VIII had a complex and partly evolving character, but it is pretty clear that through most of his life he was a dominating, strong person. This trait also supported his immoral traits (his “barbarity”, say), and they are the reason why we think that he had no good character, and why we blame him for many of his actions. Only a reference to traits of character permits an ascription of responsi bility, since those traits are “durable and constant” features of one’s mind (Hume 1748 51, 98). However, at a closer look this only means that the reference to traits of character is a reference to causal reg ularities. Hume does not say why it is precisely the concept of character that provides the link needed for practically evaluating a person, ascrib ing responsibility, and so on. Put differently, he does not explain how the agent himself can cause an action. After all, a fixed attitude or a con stant motive for a type of action can be determined by external coercion in a way that does not reveal this coercive force, thereby undermining Hume’s own criterion for free action. An empirical investigation of human action, at least one with Hume’s intentions, should introduce and reflect relevant conceptual and empirical differences here. But Hume’s “science of human nature” never achieves this. In this regard,

Freedom and the Human Sciences

31

his project neglects a task crucial to any moral psychology. So much for Hume.

2. Kant’s pragmatic anthropology as a science of free agency That leaves us with Kant. As mentioned, he specifies the subject matter of his Anthropology as an inquiry into what “man, as a free agent, makes, or can and should make, of himself” (AA 7:119). The first question we must ask is what notion of freedom is on his mind here.

2.1. Transcendental and practical freedom Let me begin by noting what Kant does not maintain about freedom. Though many influential commentators assert the contrary, he was al ways a vigorous opponent of the notion of freedom as indifference. In other words, Kant is not an incompatibilist about freedom and deter minism.9 In the Critique of Pure Reason he introduces a distinction that might appear to be identical with the Humean distinction between 9

Allison speaks of Kant’s “contra causal” or “incompatibilist” notion of freedom (Allison (1990, 1, 25 f.)). This suggests—and Allison does not offset the impres sion—that Kant thought indifference is a necessary condition for free action. Hudson explicitly claims that between Nova Dilucidatio and the critical phase Kant changed his view accordingly: He made the capacity to do otherwise a necessary condition for free action (Hudson (1994, 7 and particularly 72 f.)). This assumption shapes essential considerations in Hudson’s discussion (espe cially Hudson (1994, 72 – 98)). But Hudson is wrong. Kant consistently rejects the notion of freedom as indifference, from Nova Dilucidatio (1755) to Metaphy sics of Morals (1797) (AA 1:403; AA 6:226 f.). Neither does he change his mind in between (see, for instance, R 4226=AA 27:465 (1770s) or similar statements in lectures on metaphysics from the 1780s and 1790s, AA 29:901 f.; AA 29:1022 f.). Kant mentions, among other things, Buridan’s ass: a total indiffer ence towards motives can never explain how and why we act freely (AA 28:677 f.). Hudson’s treatment of passages from the first Critique and other writ ings (CPR A 554 – 556/B 582 – 584) is also unsatisfactory: for Kant the fact that we can do otherwise means that we can reflect whether our action is guided by the right practical norm, and that this reflection can have causal relevance for what we do. This varies the causal prerequisites, instead of keeping them strictly identical. For Kant the possibility stressed by Hudson, namely, that we may de viate from the norm, is not proof of indifference freedom; not all possibilities are capacities (Wood 1984, 81 f.).

32

Thomas Sturm

the liberties of indifference and of spontaneity, namely the distinction between “transcendental” and “practical” freedom. Transcendental freedom refers, as he says, to the capacity of bringing “about a state of affairs by oneself” or of “beginning a series of events completely by one self” (CPR A 533 f./B 561 f.), that is wholly free of any natural causes. However, his defense of the possibility of transcendental freedom in the third Antinomy by no means advocates the idea that we might act in differently, or that we could have done otherwise under completely identical causal circumstances. One consequence of this for his anthro pological project should be clear. His intention is not to realize the proj ect of explaining human action causally and simultaneously maintaining that the action thus explained might also have been done otherwise. That would undermine the idea of causal explanation itself, and it would make Kant an incompatibilist. A lengthy defense of both the lib erty of indifference and a program for a causal explanation for human action had been developed by Johann Nicolas Tetens (1777, vol. II, 1 148). Kant justifiably dismisses Tetens’s discussion of freedom and determinism as confused and useless (AA 10:232). This rejection of incompatibilism both on the metaphysical and the scientific level seems to imply that all Kant has left is the Humean no tion of freedom as spontaneity, or that “practical freedom” has to be un derstood as the ability to act according to one’s given desires or inclina tions. Henry Allison maintains that Kant’s anthropology has no room for the concept of transcendental freedom. Many passages in Kant’s writings seem to support that reading. Transcendentally free actions are said to not be something we ever encounter in experience. Conversely, Kant also claims that if we consider actions from an empirical point of view, they are as causally determined as any other natural event. In con trast, he characterizes practical freedom as the capacity of human beings to develop a certain “independence from sensuous impulses”, and he explicitly states that this freedom can be “proven from experience” (CPR A 802/B 830). One might thus believe that practical freedom, and it alone, is the concept appropriate to Kant’s anthropological inves tigations. That is what Alix Cohen (2009) has recently proposed. Un fortunately, that won’t work either. Kant maintains that practical free dom presupposes transcendental freedom. In other words, we get no “independence from sensuous impulses” (no practical freedom) without a capacity to “bring about a state of affairs by oneself” (A533 f./B561 f.). More positively, this shows that Kant is interested in an aspect of the notion of freedom that has been overlooked by many interpreters, but

Freedom and the Human Sciences

33

which, in his view, is crucial both for the empirical explanation of human agency and for practical purposes such as ascribing responsibility. It is the idea that we are active subjects, or that we can, in a certain sense yet to be explained, be the originators (Urheber) of our actions. This is a different assumption about freedom than the popular assumption of being able to do otherwise even under identical causal circumstances. According to the intuition of self determination, it may very well be that our actions are caused in a certain fashion, namely by the agent. In this view, the very concept of freedom becomes predicated not pri marily of actions, but of agents. This does not lead Kant to adopt an oth erwise unexplained notion of agent causation, as had been maintained in his time by, say, Thomas Reid. There are certain capacities a human being must possess to be such an agent and, moreover, these are ca pacities that one does not possess from the beginning but which we have to develop. This developmental aspect is another essential difference between Hume and Kant. It also leads to the next step we have to take: Kant explains his view that we can be, and can become, originators of our actions by one of his anthropological concepts of character.

2.2. Character in Kantian anthropology In his anthropology lectures, Kant uses as textbook the chapter on em pirical psychology from Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s Metaphysica (1757). This text was basically a faculty psychology: a doctrine of the basic mental powers such as cognition or volition and their sub powers such as the senses, memory, the intellect, and so on. Kant’s strongest de viation from this structure comes in the latter half of the 1770s. From then on, he models only the first part of his anthropology, which he also describes as the “general part” or a “doctrine of elements,” after the faculty psychologies. To this, he adds a second part, the so called “Anthropological Characteristics”.10 This is no accident. These “Char 10 Kant’s Characteristics are either dealt with skimpily or not at all in Marquard (1965); Hinske (1966); Van de Pitte (1971); Firla (1981); Kim (1994); Wilson (2006); not even by those interested in Kant’s theory of action from a modern perspective (Meerbote (1984); Allison (1990); Hudson (1994)). Brandt (1999) addresses the “Characteristics” at length, but does not tackle the guiding ques tion of the present essay; neither does Frierson (2005) in his otherwise useful account of Kant’s empirical theory of action.

34

Thomas Sturm

acteristics” provide the key to the problem of how we can be studied as originators of our actions from an empirical point of view. In the opening section of the “Characteristics” Kant begins with a distinction that resembles Hume’s distinction of properties that are shared by all human beings alike from properties which Hume thinks force us to develop a differentiated analysis of human individuals or groups. But it would be false to view Kant’s “Characteristics” as another early instance of what we would nowadays call a differential psychology. From at least the mid 1770s11 Kant additionally introduces a distinction between human beings as natural beings and as free beings. A typical statement goes as follows: The character of a human being is the distinguishing mark of one human being from another, or of mankind in general from other beings. It is [first] the character of a person, then that of sex, that of a nation and, finally, of the species. One may, then, consider the human being [both] as a natural and as a free being. As a natural being one considers him in terms of the predisposition to be found in him, and that is the character of human beings as animals. […] The character of the human being as a free being is being made part of his will. (AA 25:1530; cf. AA 25:1384; Reichel 109 and 122)

Kant’s reflections do not always take the same route, but all aim in the same direction: In order to express what is special about man’s character as a free being, one must distinguish one kind of character that consti tutes a “mode of sense” (Sinnesart) from a kind of character that consti tutes a “mode of thought” (Denkungsart; alluded to in AA 25:649 and clearly in AA 25:821 f.; cf. AA 7:285, 292). They are both kinds of character for the following two reasons. First, to have a character gen erally means for Kant (as for Hume) that one’s own behavior can be de scribed as subject to certain regularities. If one knows the regularity under which the behavior of a person falls, one knows what one “can expect of a man” (AA 7:292). This holds both for the concept of char acter as a person’s “mode of sense” and her “mode of thought.” There fore, both concepts can fulfill the explanatory role that the concept of character is traditionally expected to fulfill. Second, Kant assumes that having a character does not mean having another mental capacity. Rath er, character is always the result of the development and exercise of certain powers (AA 25:227, 437, 624). The next natural question is what these 11 In 1772/73 Kant still says that a person “cannot give himself a character other than the one nature has given him” (AA 25:228). But perhaps in 1775/76 and clearly as of 1777/78 he does claim the opposite.

Freedom and the Human Sciences

35

powers are, and how they are developed and exercised and how that establishes a difference between mode of sense and mode of thought. That there are differences between the two forms of character Kant supports by pointing out that we not only speak of character as some thing that describes the type of behavior a person normally exhibits. We also speak of a person as having or lacking character at all: If we can say of a man simply: “He has character”, we are not merely say ing a lot about him but also paying him a great compliment; for this is a rare thing that inspires respect and admiration. (AA 7:291 f.)

Thus we do not merely use the character vocabulary for descriptive pur poses. We also use it for evaluating a person’s deeds. This, of course, is a familiar phenomenon. However, although the descriptive and the eval uative concepts do differ, one should not think that Kant would separate them such that the evaluative notion of character only finds use in prac tical life and the descriptive one only in the scientific investigation of human action.12 That our notion of character enables us to evaluate de meanor is also an empirical fact. Any empirical investigation that ne glects that fact would neglect crucial features of human conduct.

2.3. Character as “mode of thought” (Denkungsart) Now, for the practice of evaluating other agents Kant uses the concept of character as a “mode of thought.” This he does because he relates only this notion to the concept of freedom. As he puts it at one point, “mode of thought” is a disposition by which we “fixate our free dom” (R 1517 = AA 15:867 f.). But how can we do that? Two essential features of the concept of a mode of thought need to be pointed out here. They are not surprising to those familiar with Kant’s other works, but it is important that he developed them within his anthropology and never omitted them there. First, he assumes that the fixation of one’s freedom involves the use of one’s practical reason (AA 25:227, 437, 624). This capacity consists in the ability to formulate practical principles or maxims, or to evaluate given practical rules (AA 7:199; cf. CPR A 547/B 575). Just as central as this feature is the second one, which is peculiar to the Kantian conception, but also linked to the first feature: To have or employ a mode of thought involves having a 12 This goes against, say, Beck (1960, 29 – 32; 1975) or O’Neill (1989, 67).

36

Thomas Sturm

certain first-person perspective on one’s own actions and the intentions and rules that guide them. Describing a person’s deeds by reference to her mode of thought requires that any explanation of her acts will involve a reference to her own perspective. Not all behavior must be viewed in that way, as Kant’s distinction between a mode of thought and a mode of sense makes clear. We may often view human beings as not acting according to rules that they have evaluated and deliberately adopted. For instance, we may act according to the traditional rules of a certain time or society, which may become, as Kant says, “another nature” (AA 7:121). But something that may be important for the explanation of significant areas of our lives would be missing if we ignored our own perspective as agents.13 The topic of the first person perspective or the self consciousness in thought and action is indeed central for Kant’s approach. His lectures begin with it and he claims that it arises over and over again in the an thropological investigation of human cognition, feeling and action: The Self involves what distinguishes man from all other animals. If my horse could grasp the notion of Self, I would have to dismount and view him as my companion. The Self makes man a person, and this notion gives him the power over all else, it makes him the object of his own re flection. The Self is involved in all our thought and action, and is our great est concern. (AA 25:859; cf. AA 25:1215 f., 1438; AA 7:127)

The general claim of the relevance of the notion of the self can best be illustrated by the issue of human “egoism” and the complex dynamics of human social interaction it leads to. Every human being craves recogni tion and enjoys drawing attention to his or her “beloved Self”. Kant ob 13 It is therefore difficult to see what Allison means by claiming “that there is no room even for the thought of such freedom [namely transcendental freedom] in connection with the empirical character of rational agents” (Allison 1990, 46). Allison sees the “incorporation thesis” as the crucial thesis in Kant’s theory of freedom. According to this thesis motives can only enter explanations of our actions if they are “taken up” in a maxim; and maxims are expressions of the spontaneity of our selves and their rational capacities (Allison 1990, 5 f.; cf. CPR A 547 f./B 575 f.). These claims are by no means excluded from An thropology, however. In a another way Hudson is mistaken by saying that the Kantian idea of an empirical explanation of action can only be an explanation in terms of natural causality, and by equating the view of the same actions using the vocabulary of freedom and a strictly non empirical point of view. Kant is a compatibilist in a far reaching sense: it is possible to empirically describe human actions as being free because we can empirically use concepts of the self as an agent and concepts of that self’s practical maxims.

Freedom and the Human Sciences

37

serves that people don’t overly appreciate egoism in others, even though they themselves are tempted to act similarly (AA 7:127 130). If I wish to act prudently, I must learn to take into account that others share traits of egoism; I must take their point of view into account. More impor tantly, I must grant others opportunities to speak favorably of them selves. By sensing my esteem for them, they will in turn form a better opinion of me a fact I can then exploit in order to gain their support or recognition. Throughout the lectures Kant discusses similar needs to understand actions as being conditioned by one’s view of oneself and the related view that others have opinions about me. One may cite Kant’s analysis of the omnipresent practice of role playing in society, of “concealing” one’s own intentions and beliefs and “dissembling” be fore others and so on (AA 7:151 f.). In other words, we acquire a mode of thought if we do acquire it at all only through rather complicated social dynamics and learning processes. Kant’s views naturally involve difficulties. To mention but one point: He embeds the idea of an agent being the originator of his or her action in his anthropology, thereby giving sense to his claim that practical freedom presupposes transcendental freedom, but he also con nects the concept of transcendental freedom in Critique to more de manding and problematic assumptions as well. In the Critique, he links the concept of transcendental freedom to the notorious distinction be tween “things in themselves” and “appearances” (it is a matter of serious dispute whether all of his statements can be read as involving a so called two aspect instead of a metaphysically problematic two world view). This leads him to a number of obscure claims for example, that acting transcendentally free or from “absolute spontaneity,” means acting from an atemporal cause. One cannot save the “whole Kant”: Certain deci sions have to be made. Mine is, as should be clear, to side with the more mundane view. 2.4. Comparison with Hume’s views It would be wrong to think that I have argued that Kant’s views about the notion of freedom in relation to the human sciences constitute his considered reaction to Hume’s views on the same topic. There is, of course, considerable circumstantial evidence for such a historical con nection: Kant was familiar with both Hume’s Enquiries and with his History of England as well. Moreover, Kant was following the general call of

38

Thomas Sturm

a comprehensive human science, for which Hume’s work was often seen as paradigmatic. Finally, the close conceptual, even terminological connections between the notions of freedom and character in both au thors are striking, too. But my point is more systematic than historical. As mentioned, Hume’s views about the relation between the scientific investigation of the human mind and behavior and the assumption of freedom are nowadays often seen as a major inspiration. This cannot be said about Kant. We may wonder whether that is justified. So, how do Kant’s solutions compare to Hume’s? To begin, some of the aforementioned topics in which the concept of the self seems to play an essential role are familiar to Hume, of course. The ideas of self love, pride, and humility are often involved in his description of the charac ters of human beings (cf. Hume 1748 51, 233 f.; 1739 40, 277 ff.). However, Kant’s notion of the self in connection with the concept of character has an additional aspect. He remarks: […] when we simply say that [a person] has character, we mean [he pos sesses] that property of the will by which he binds himself to explicit prac tical principles which he has prescribed himself irrevocably through his own reason. (AA 7:292; cf. 285 and 294; AA 25: 649 f., 823, 1385)

The rules the Kantian anthropologist uses in explaining human action when he refers to a person’s mode of thought are not merely rules under which those actions either do or do not fall. Rather, they are the result of the capacity to view those rules as being one’s own in the sense that one is able to reflect and evaluate them rationally, to find them correct or incorrect according to certain criteria, and so on. If in a given case such a rational reflection has a positive outcome, one identifies actions as one’s owns in a way that one doesn’t for other behavior. Hume’s views cannot cover these sorts of cases because he thinks of the regularities governing human conduct along the lines of mere laws of nature.14 In this sense, to speak of a person’s character is 14 Against Frierson, who maintains (2005, 3 and 8) that Kant’s empirical account of human action is in terms of strict natural laws and has in itself no role for the notion of freedom. Later on, Frierson (2005, 26 ff.) first notes that the Kantian explanation of the origin of character seems not to be naturalistic in this strong sense, but then continues to insist that it has to be. In my view, Frierson over looks the conceptual and developmental centrality of the first person perspec tive in his otherwise complex interpretation of Kant’s account of character. The converse mistake is made by Cohen, although she (2009, 117) claims to be fol lowing Frierson’s account. Cohen frequently refers to Kantian statements that bring into play the self determination of free actions (interpreting these in

Freedom and the Human Sciences

39

not to ascribe to her the character or rule but to say that she has devel oped her own character as opposed to being merely formed by nature or tradition. In this sense and in no other Kant views us as possible originators of actions or, more precisely: as originators of principles of action. Moreover, by using this notion of character, Kant introduces a developmental perspective to the investigation of human conduct, and a specific one one in which we are not mere products of our own development, but in which we are also viewed as potential (and partly actual) producers of our development. This first person point of view can surely be tied to Kant’s concept of the self or ‘I’ as found in his theoretical and practical philosophy (without being identical with these notions). What we have here is a formal conception of the self: a conception of a hierarchy of possibly reflected rules of action of a person. Such rules are intentional states of a higher order, but not merely this (versus Frankfurt (1982)). I can observe myself remembering something, or I can remember that I once had a certain belief. Such second order intentions are merely no ticings. Other second order intentions, in contrast, might form and direct first order intentions, and Kant identifies the former as principles of rea son. Which principles have priority, and why they do, are different questions which he answers elsewhere. In his anthropology, he is quite careful not to overstep the boundaries of an empirical investiga tion: what anthropology does is to study the empirical conditions which further or hinder the development of character as a mode of thought. Finally, remember that there were two main problems with Hume’s views. First, his unexplained assumption of an asymmetry between the view of one’s own actions and those of other human beings: only in the former case we are said to experience a liberty of indifference or a non existence of causes. Hume has no explanation for this claim, which is even incompatible with his claim that we must assume for various rea sons the connection between causes of actions and actions themselves to be necessary. Second, he admits that actions appear oftentimes irregular, terms of practical freedom in a problematic way, as noted above) but does not connect these statements with Kant’s account of character. Moreover, her claim (2009, 116), that bringing into play the notion of freedom implies “no dimin ution of the necessity of natural laws” is fine. One never violates any physical law when acting freely, of course. But we should not infer from this that self legislated rules of reasoning or Denkungsart character are themselves mere laws of nature.

40

Thomas Sturm

but claims that we can nevertheless explain them by using the concept of character, which he thinks also explains the practice of ascribing agency and responsibility to persons instead of the fleeting actions. How ever, it is unclear why he thinks so, since his notion of character in volves only the idea of agent specific regularities; it remains open whether we should take the practice of ascribing responsibility also seri ously. In Kant’s approach, in contrast to Hume’s, agent and spectator do have a symmetrical explanation for our belief that we could have done otherwise without making use of the dubious notion of the liberty of indifference: We know what it means to apply the principle of one’s action to oneself, to justify such a principle, to follow it correctly, to vi olate it consciously, and so on. We can ascribe the same abilities to oth ers just as well. We do not mean thereby that their or our actions are uncaused, or that we could act otherwise under identical causal circum stances. Character as a mode of thought is, as Kant’s freely admits, some thing to be acquired through a learning process in which other human beings are our teachers. This process may never be perfect, but that does not mean that actions done on the basis of merely following tradition and actions performed by following one’s own reflected maxims are the same. The anthropological point of view is not to be equated with the first person point of view, but a Kantian anthropologist takes into consideration that such a first person point of view does exist, and that it can figure in our lives, and how it is restricted by cer tain circumstances and furthered by others. Admittedly, that is at best a framework for an empirical investigation of free agency. But it is clear that, however one would have to carry out such a project, it would connect Kant’s anthropology to his views on the relevance of understanding human education, history, and society, and it would particularly involve the actual empirical investigation of all educational, sociological, psychological, and historical conditions which further or hinder the development of character (cf. AA 4:289; AA 6:417). In other words, Kant anticipates work currently pursued where disciplines like personality and developmental psychology, and social and moral psychology intersect. Historically speaking, Hume’s views about the “science of human nature” and its relation to the ordi nary assumption of human freedom have prevailed, at least in certain camps, and Kant’s conception of anthropology has, as far as I know, never been viewed as a precursor to later developments in, say, person ality or developmental psychology. That is an interesting historical ex

Freedom and the Human Sciences

41

planandum. I suspect part of the explanation has to do with the heavy weight of later perceptions of Kant as being the author of the Critiques rather than also as a serious philosopher of the human sciences.

Bibliography Allison, Henry E. (1990): Kant’s Theory of Freedom, Cambridge. Baier, Annette (2008): Death and Character, Cambridge, MA, London. Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb (1739/41757): Metaphysica, Halle. Beck, Lewis White (1960): A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, Chicago. Beck, Lewis White (1975): The Actor and the Spectator, New Haven. Bonnet, Charles (1770 – 71): Analytischer Versuch über die Seelenkräfte, transl. Christian Gottfried Schütz, Göttingen. Brandt, Reinhard (1999): Kritischer Kommentar zu Kants Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, Hamburg. Bricke, John (1995): Hume’s Conception of Character, in: S. Tweyman (ed.): David Hume: Critical Assessments, 6 vols., London, vol. VI, pp. 248 – 254. Cohen, Alix (2009): Kant’s Concept of Freedom and the Human Sciences, in: Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39, pp.113 – 136. Firla, Monika (1981): Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von Anthropologie und Moralphilosophie bei Kant, Frankfurt, Bern. Frankfurt, Harry G. (1988): Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, in: Frankfurt, Harry: The Importance of What We Care About, Cam bridge, pp. 11 – 25. Frierson, Patrick (2005): Kant’s Empirical Account of Human Action, in: Phi losophers’ Imprint 5, No. 7, pp. 1 – 34. Hinske, Norbert (1966): Kants Idee der Anthropologie, in: H. Rombach (ed.): Die Frage nach dem Menschen, Tübingen, pp. 410 – 427. Hudson, Hud (1994): Kant’s Compatibilism, Ithaca, London. Hume, David (1748 – 51): Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby Bigge (3rd ed. P. H. Nidditch), Oxford 31975. Hume, David (1754 – 1762): The History of England, London (rev. edition London 1778, reprint 1983). Johnson, Clarence Shole (1990). Hume on Character, Action, and Causal Ne cessity, in: Auslegung 16, pp. 149 – 164. Kant, Immanuel (1781/1787): Kritik der reinen Vernunft, ed. Jens Timmer mann, Hamburg 1996. Kant, Immanuel (1900 ff.): Gesammelte Schriften, Akademie Ausgabe, Berlin. Kim, Soo Bae (1994): Die Entstehung der Kantischen Anthropologie, Frankfurt am Main. Marquard, Odo (1965): Zur Geschichte des Begriffs ‘Anthropologie’ seit dem Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts, in: Collegium Philosophicum, Basel, Stuttgart, pp. 209 – 239.

42

Thomas Sturm

McIntyre, Jane L. (1990): Character: A Humean Account, in: History of Phi losophy Quarterly 7, pp. 193 – 206. Meerbote, Ralf (1984): Kant on the Nondeterminate Character of Human Ac tions, in: W. A. Harper, R. Meerbote (eds.): Kant on Causality, Freedom, and Objectivity, Minnesota, pp. 138 – 163. Penelhum, Terence (1993): Hume’s Moral Psychology, in: D. F. Norton (ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Hume, Cambridge, pp. 117 – 147. Platner, Ernst (1772): Anthropologie für Aerzte und Weltweise, Leipzig. Schütz, Christian Gottfried (1771): Betrachtungen über die verschiednen Methoden der Psychologie; nebst einem kritischen Auszug aus des Hrn. Abt von Condillac Traité des sensations, in: C. Bonnet: Analytischer Ver such über die Seelenkräfte, Göttingen 1770 – 71, vol. II, pp. 187 – 273. Stroud, Barry (1977): Hume, London. Sturm, Thomas (2001): Eine Frage des Charakters: Kant über die empirische Erklärung freier Handlungen, in V. Gerhardt, R. P. Horstmann, R. Schu macher (eds.): Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung, Akten des IX. Internatio nalen Kant Kongresses, Berlin, vol. 4, pp. 440 – 449. Sturm, Thomas (2009): Kant und die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, Pader born. Tetens, Johann Nicolaus (1777): Philosophische Versuche über die menschli che Natur und ihre Entwickelung, 2 vols., Leipzig (reprint Hildesheim, New York 1979). Van de Pitte, Frederick P. (1971): Kant as a Philosophical Anthropologist, The Hague. Wilson, Holly L. (2006): Kant’s Pragmatic Anthropology: Its Origin, Meaning, and Critical Significance, Albany, NY. Wood, Allen W. (1984): Kant’s Compatibilism, in: A. W. Wood (ed.): Kant on Self and Nature, Ithaca, London, pp. 73 – 101.

Systematic Classification or Purposive Moralization? On why Teleology is not the (only) Key to Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View Liesbet Vanhaute Abstract This paper is intended to place the suggestion that Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View is an essentially teleological work, in the right perspec tive. Kant does indeed make use of teleological judgments in his anthropology, but this form of judgment does not provide an exhaustive characterization of the work. The assumption that it does unduly stretches Kant’s concept of tel eological judgment. I investigate the merits and deficiencies of the teleological reading. Though to a certain extent the reading is confirmed by Kant’s critical theory of teleological judgment, it leads to two problematic implications. The teleological reading implies first, that non teleological disciplines like empirical psychology are too unsystematic to be included in pragmatic anthropology. But though Kant doubted empirical psychology could ever become a full fledged science, he did believe it could bring about systematic, non teleological infor mation that is valuable for anthropology. The teleological reading secondly im plies that pragmatic anthropology can be classified as ‘moral anthropology’. Contrary to this, it can be argued that pragmatic anthropology as a whole (so not only insofar as it contains empirical psychology) can do without teleological presuppositions. This means that the focus on human morality is not predom inant and that Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View cannot be re duced to moral anthropology.

Introduction Several Kant scholars1 have recently suggested that Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View should be understood as an essentially teleological work. This paper is intended to place this suggestion in the right 1

Alix Cohen, Robert B. Louden and Allen Wood have all, in different ways, made the claim that pragmatic anthropology is teleological. Cohen (2008, 511): “The guiding principles and procedures of Kant’s anthropological meth od are, I believe, essentially teleological”; Louden (2003, 72): “The strong tel

44

Liesbet Vanhaute

perspective by showing that Kant does indeed make use of teleological judgments in his anthropology, but that this form of judgment does not provide an exhaustive characterization of the work. The assumption that it does unduly stretches Kant’s concept of teleological judgment and overlooks another form of judgment that also plays a role in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. The first section of this paper investigates the merits and deficiencies of this teleological reading. After showing that it derives some confir mation from Kant’s critical theory of teleological judgment, I will indi cate two implications that result from it. The teleological reading im plies first that non teleological disciplines like empirical psychology are too unsystematic to be included in pragmatic anthropology, and sec ond, that pragmatic anthropology can be classified as ‘moral anthropol ogy.’ The second and third sections of the paper will argue that these implications are problematic: pragmatic anthropology does incorporate some empirical psychology, and it cannot be reduced to moral anthro pology. This will allow me to conclude that Kant’s pragmatic anthro pology is more than a teleological study of human nature.

1. Kant’s pragmatic anthropology and teleological judgment Kant’s Critique of Judgment certainly suggests a strong connection be tween teleological judgment and human nature. Insofar as commenta tors emphasize this, they are faithful to Kant’s writings. However, when they further argue that Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View is primarily a teleological work, they overburden Kant’s theory of teleological judgment. This first, introductory section will show that Kant believes teleological judgment is best suited to understand a specific range of phenomena, including some features of human nature (1.1). After that, it will suggest that it is nevertheless problematic to in terpret pragmatic anthropology as consisting exclusively out of teleolog ical judgments (1.2).

eological thrust of these descriptions […] within the anthropology lectures also serves as a correction to the view that Kantian anthropology is simply empirical science”; Wood (2003, 45): “Insofar as Kant has a conception of its methods at all, he thinks of anthropology as following the looser method of biology, based on regulative principles of teleological judgment”.

Systematic Classification or Purposive Moralization?

45

1.1. Kant’s theory of teleological judgment Kant understands teleological judgment as a form of reflective judg ment. Reflective judgments do not simply apply a priori principles to ex perience: they search for rules and concepts that are not (yet) given.2 As such, they are useful to understand realms of experience that cannot im mediately be understood as constituted by the categories of the under standing or the principles of practical reason.3 The activity of reflective judgment consists in striving for systematic comprehension of these realms. In the course of this activity, specific assumptions prove to be heuristically useful.4 The most basic, transcendental presupposition which all forms of reflective judgment share is that nature is systematic enough for judgment’s activity to be successful. Reflecting judgment as sumes that general rules and principles can be found, even in seemingly contingent, mere empirical phenomena. Kant terms this assumption “the subjective purposiveness of nature.”5 Teleological judgment is one type of reflective judgment. Human reason resorts to it whenever it encounters specific phenomena that can only be understood by conceptualizing them in terms of purposes. In addition to transcendentally assuming subjective purposiveness, teleo logical judgment also holds that it is heuristically necessary to assume real, objective ends. In Critique of Judgment, Kant indicates that the phe nomenon most in need of such conceptualization is that of organic na ture.6 But because reason successfully judges organisms as (internally) purposive, it necessarily7 starts to look for (external) purposive relations between individual phenomena in nature.8 2 3

4 5 6 7

First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment (FI), AA 20:209. In Critique of the Power of Judgment (CJ), AA 5:175, Kant argues that there is a form of cognition which, unlike the understanding or practical reason, does not legislate through a priori principles. This cognition finds empirical rules and concepts that are different from the laws of practical reason or the categories of the understanding. See Guyer (2003) and FI, AA 20:214. FI, AA 20:202 CJ, AA 5:369. For an in depth analysis of the internal teleological judgment on organisms, see Beishart (2009). CJ, AA 5:379 – 380: “[…] only matter insofar as it is organized […] necessarily carries with it the concept of itself as a natural end […]. However, this concept necessarily leads to the idea of the whole of nature as a system in accordance with the rule of ends” (my italics).

46

Liesbet Vanhaute

Kant makes it expressly clear that external teleology is more prob lematic than internal teleology. Whereas he describes the judgment on organic organization as immediately and necessarily asserting that a thing in nature is internally structured in a purposive way, he argues that judgments on external purposiveness contain an element of contin gency: one could say that a thing A is the purpose of a thing B, but also that this thing B is the purpose of thing A.9 The only way to overcome the triviality of judgments on external purposiveness, according to Kant, is to assume that events in nature have an absolute end. But the only co herent way to think of such an absolute end (that is no longer a means to anything) is by understanding it as human morality.10 Hence, Kant ar gues that if we want to acknowledge purposive relations between nat ural phenomena, we are to understand them as having one final pur pose. This purpose can only be human morality. To see progression in nature, we must assume human morality as the end of natural evolu tion. With this theory of external purposiveness, Kant critically legiti mates the possibility of progressive history in Critique of Judgment. If morality is taken as its ultimate goal, history can be understood reflec tively as a teleological process guided by the interaction between human nature and the challenges posed by hostile, external nature.11 From this perspective, human nature can be seen as fundamentally dis posed to develop reasonably and morally throughout every generation. Humanity’s evolution can be captured in external teleological judg ments; its dynamic can be understood as having a final purpose. In this way, external teleological judgment allows us to grasp the otherwise unintelligible realm of historical events.12

8 Its purpose here is to conceive nature in accordance with the idea of “the whole of nature as a system in accordance with the rule of ends.” CJ, AA 5:379 – 380. 9 CJ, AA 5:426 – 427. 10 CJ, AA 5:448: “it is a fundamental principle, to which even the most common human reason is compelled to give immediate assent, that if reason is to provide a final end a priori at all, this can be nothing other than the human being (each rational being in the world) under moral laws.” 11 See, for example, CJ, AA 5:432. 12 On the unintelligible character of non teleological history, see Idea for a Univer sal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim (IUH), AA 8:17.

Systematic Classification or Purposive Moralization?

47

The concept of a human predisposition is an essential part of this ex ternal teleological view on human history.13 History can be understood as a coherent whole by focusing on the development of the human pre disposition to reason.14 The teleological perspective thus provides us with a coherent, systematic theory of human nature insofar as it allows us to understand humanity as developing towards a moral end. The in dividual human being is part of this evolution and carries a predisposi tion that will unfold throughout history.

1.2. Teleology, empirical psychology and moral anthropology Kant’s firm conviction that the teleological perspective is necessary to conceive of certain aspects of human nature has led some commentators to presume that every anthropology must adopt a teleological view. The preceding elaboration on teleological judgment has shown that this makes sense to a certain extent: human nature in its historical develop ment is a phenomenon that must be understood teleologically. But does this mean that pragmatic anthropology consists entirely of teleological judgments; that all its “observations and reflections are subordinated to the ethical final ends of human existence”? 15 I will argue that this is not the case by showing that the teleological reading is deeply inter woven with the following two problematic assumptions. 1) A teleological understanding of human beings can bring about a co herent, systematic interpretation of human development. The teleological reading of Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View thus has the advantage that it can explain in which manner the work is systematic.16 This is some thing Kant is deeply concerned about: he stresses that pragmatic anthropol 13 Kant introduces the concept of a ‘predisposition’ in the context of biological problems—the concept thus seems to have its proper place in internal teleolog ical judgments about biological (organic) nature. Nevertheless, in CJ, AA 5:378, Kant explicitly states that the organic model of ‘natural ends’ (i. e. organ isms) cannot be applied to human behavior. Insofar as history takes up the talk of ‘predispositions’ to understand the history of human behavior, the concept there takes on another, non biological meaning (see Vanhaute (2011)). This contradicts Wood’s suggestion, quoted in footnote one, that pragmatic anthro pology would follow biology’s methods. 14 IUH, AA 8:17. 15 Wilson (2006, 24). 16 Wilson (2006, 96): “judgments of purpose allow us to judge in a systematic way instead of merely enumerating an aggregate of experience.”

48

Liesbet Vanhaute

ogy cannot be an unsystematic collection of random facts.17 But can we conclude from this concern with systematicity that the perspective of prag matic anthropology is identical to that of teleological judgment? This is only possible if we assume that Kant can only concieve of one kind of sys tematic theory of human nature, namely a teleology of human nature. He would have to be of the opinion that non teleological ways of studying the human being, like empirical psychology, are fundamentally deficient. This is not Kant’s view. He believes human phenomena can be sys tematically understood without teleological presuppositions. In fact, it is exactly his view on empirical psychology that shows most clearly that this is the case. This view will be examined extensively in the next sec tion of this paper. 2) If the teleological reading were correct, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View would assume a moral end of human evolution. Its perspec tive would require a focus on the morally predisposed nature of human be ings. This focus is unavoidable: a non trivial teleology of human nature re quires the assumption of morality as an end (cf. supra, 1.1). As such, the teleological reading suggests that pragmatic anthropology is primarily con cerned with those features of human beings that facilitate morality. It would amount to the discipline that Kant calls ‘moral anthropology’: The counterpart of a metaphysics of morals […] would be moral anthro pology, which […] would deal […] with the subjective conditions in human nature that hinder people or help them in fulfilling the laws of a met aphysics of morals.18

Such a pragmatic anthropology would ignore more accidental features of human behavior, features that are not related to the (lack of) unfold ing of moral predispositions. The third section of this paper will show that this conflicts with Kant’s intentions in the pragmatic anthropology. Though human morality plays a role in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, we cannot just conclude that Kant saw the work as a ‘moral anthropology’ or as concerned with the historical development of human predispositions. The perspective of pragmatic anthropology may include a teleological perspective, but it cannot be reduced to it. Pragmatic anthropology has its own methodological singularities and advantages, and these are overlooked if the work is read as primarily concerned with teleological judgment. 17 Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (AP), AA 7:119. 18 Metaphysics of Morals, AA 6:217.

Systematic Classification or Purposive Moralization?

49

2. Pragmatic anthropology contains empirical psychology Kant defines empirical psychology as the study of the experiences of inner sense. It is a discipline that strives to be a science, but that will probably never become one. This section considers whether these doubts led Kant to believe that empirical psychology is deficient and un systematic. I argue that there are reasons to believe that Kant wanted empirical psychology to play a role in pragmatic anthropology (2.1). I then show that he nevertheless perceived a number of problems which empirical psychology must avoid (2.2). If it succeeds in avoiding its inherent problems, empirical psychology can generate useful infor mation. Kant insists that this information can be systematic (2.3).

2.1. Empirical psychology is included in pragmatic anthropology In the published version of the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Kant does not explicitly comment on the place of empirical psy chology. He did make several statements on the issue, however, in the decade before publishing this work. These remarks often assert that em pirical psychology can provide only a very limited amount of knowl edge.19 Nevertheless, Kant is concerned about the place this knowledge should take in the system of sciences. He observes that many have treat ed it as a part of metaphysics, but that this is not the appropriate place for it. It would be better if it were to become a part of anthropology: Empirical psychology must thus be entirely banned from metaphysics […] it can establish its own domicile in a complete anthropology.20

Contrary to Holly Wilson,21 and in agreement with Thomas Sturm,22 I maintain that Kant never really changed his mind on this point. Al 19 Vorlesungen ber Metaphysik 1790 – 1791, AA 28:735, Vorlesungen ber Metaphysik Volckmann 1784 – 1785, AA 28:367. 20 Critique of Pure Reason A 848 – 849/B 876 – 877. 21 Wilson (2006, 21 – 24) seems to suggest that Kant may have included empirical psychological data in anthropology, but always within the context of teleolog ical judgments. Without teleological additions, empirical psychology is too un systematic to be part of pragmatic anthropology. 22 Sturm’s book, Kant und die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, presents a comprehen sive analysis of Kant’s thoughts on the relation between empirical psychology and anthropology. I believe that he makes a very strong point, and I make fre quent reference to his work throughout this section.

50

Liesbet Vanhaute

though he doubts that empirical psychology will ever become a science (these doubts are the topic of the next section), he never explicitly ar gues against including the small amount of knowledge that it can pro duce in anthropology. I present three arguments to support this claim. The first refers to the relation of pragmatic anthropology to what Kant calls ‘knowledge of the schools.’ A second argument concerns the structure of anthropology, and a brief final argument refers to the specific content of anthropology. It is important to note that these argu ments are not intended to show that Kant’s anthropology can be re duced to empirical psychology, or that it relies heavily on empirical psy chology. I present them only because they suggest that Kant does not explicitly reject the inclusion of empirical psychological data in prag matic anthropology. 1) At first sight, my initial argument might appear to be a rejection of empirical psychology. In an anthropology lecture from 1791, Kant remarks that empirical psychology should be classified as “school knowledge” (Schulkenntniss).23 He contrasts this form of knowledge with “world knowledge” (Weltkenntniss), as found in pragmatic anthro pology. Understood correctly, however, this remark appears to be an ar gument for rather than against the interrelatedness of anthropology and empirical psychology. Note that Kant’s intention in asserting that Weltkenntniss is different from Schulkenntniss is to say that neither of the two forms of knowledge can be reduced to the other. He certainly does not want to argue that they should be separated completely. On the contra ry, he believes that they are complementary. School knowledge necessarily precedes world knowledge.24 Hence, having school knowledge (of which psychology is a part) is a prerequisite for finding world knowl edge (like anthropology). As such, the distinction between school knowledge and world knowledge certainly does not rule out the possi bility that some empirical psychological knowledge could find its way into the worldy pragmatic anthropology.25 On the contrary, it would actually make sense that anthropology occasionally uses empirical psy chological knowledge, which Kant defines as knowledge of the appear ances of the soul. Cognition of the human psyche can be helpful in the 23 Anthropologie Dohna Wundlacken 1791, Ausgabe Kowalewski s.72 24 AP, AA 7:120, see also Sturm (2009, 293 – 296). 25 Sturm (2009, 189 – 191) argues that anthropology probably incorporates psy chological knowledge, but that Kant’s conception of anthropology differs from the conception of empirical psychology.

Systematic Classification or Purposive Moralization?

51

quest for useful world knowledge about human beings.26 Without some insight in the human soul, we cannot acquire useful knowledge of human behavior (see also infra, 2.2, Objection 3). 2) The structure of the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View confirms the inclusion of some elements of empirical psychology. The tripartite division of the opening section (“On the cognitive faculty”, “The feeling of pleasure and displeasure” and “On the faculty of desire”) is taken from empirical psychology; it corresponds to what Kant consid ers to be the structure of the human soul.27 We experience this division by means of our inner sense, which is the source of empirical psycho logical data. The threefold division of human mental powers is thus based on a datum from empirical psychology. Pragmatic anthropology uses this structure as a guideline for research on human behavior. Hence, Kant does not seem to object to the use of empirical psychology in anthropology. This is also clear from his use of Baumgarten’s Psychologia Empirica as a handbook for his lectures. Kant notes that he uses it as a guiding thread for structuring his lessons. The structure of anthropol ogy is thus fundamentally influenced by empirical psychology. Kant maintained this structure throughout all of his anthropological lectures, as well as in the published Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. This demonstrates that empirical psychology has always played a certain role in the development of pragmatic anthropology. 3) That Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View can be character ized as partially based on empirical psychology is also clear on a very specific, textual level. When legitimating his use of Baumgarten’s work, Kant not only claims that he uses it to structure his lectures, he also notes that it provides useful material. 28 Some of the content of Baumgarten’s empirical psychology is included in pragmatic anthropol 26 Empirical psychology proceeds from self perception. Although self perception is certainly not the only way in which we can arrive at anthropological knowl edge, Kant does not rule it out altogether as a source of anthropological knowl edge. He remarks that self perception is often the basis of our judgment of oth ers. AP, AA 7:143: “… knowledge of the human being through inner experi ence, because to a large extent one also judges others according to it, is more important than correct judgment of others.” 27 Metaphysik Mrongovius 1782 – 1783, AA 29:877. 28 Menschenkunde 1781 – 1782, AA 25:859: “Da es kein anderes Buch über die Anthropologie gibt, so werden wir die metaphysische Psychologie Baumgart ens, eines Mannes, der sehr reich in der Materie; und sehr kurz in der Ausfüh rung ist, zum Leitfaden wählen.”

52

Liesbet Vanhaute

ogy. Moreover, Kant states several times29 that he is referring to matters of psychology. For example, when discussing suicide, he mentions that the question of whether suicide presupposes courage is a psychological one. He then immediately starts answering it, and we can only assume that the answer is composed of psychological ideas.30 He also introduces his discussion of the temperaments by stating his intention to analyze them psychologically.31 Although pragmatic anthropology certainly cannot be reduced to empirical psychology, I believe that data from the latter discipline are indisputably included in the former discipline. But in which form? It is certainly not in the form of a full fledged science: Kant denies that empirical psychology can be scientific. He formulates a number of ob jections against scientific empirical psychology, and these objections in fluence the way in which empirical psychology is used in pragmatic an thropology. I present these objections in the following section.

2.2. Problems with empirical psychological knowledge Kant does not consider the empirical psychological data that are includ ed in anthropology to be results of proper scientific research. Empirical psychology can provide information that is correct and relevant enough to become part of pragmatic anthropology, but that does not mean that it is a proper science. This is enigmatic: how can empirical psychology provide some (but not very many32) valuable facts without being a sci ence? Kant discusses the problems of empirical psychology in a short and dense fragment of Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. In his study Kant und die Wissenschaften des Menschen, Thomas Sturm distills from this (and from some other passages in Kant’s work) four problems with em pirical psychology. One problem is that its method of introspection is 29 AP, AA 7:214, 7:238. 30 AP, AA 7:258. 31 AP, AA 7:286. Kant writes that we can understand temperaments as conse quences of physiological phenomena, or that we can use physiological termi nology as a mere metaphor for psychological phenomena. In the next section, he states that he will use the physiological terminology only for classification. Apart from this his approach is thus psychological. 32 Vorlesungen ber Metaphysik 1790 – 1791, AA 28:735, Vorlesungen ber Metaphysik Volckmann 1784 – 1785, AA 28:367.

Systematic Classification or Purposive Moralization?

53

psychologically unhealthy. This is not, however, an argument against empirical psychology as a science (and Sturm does not present it as one either): many sciences can be psychologically unhealthy but still be proper sciences. I shall ignore this objection to empirical psychology and discuss the three remaining objections by referring to both Kant’s original text and Sturm’s interpretation of it. The objections I present are that (1) empirical psychological data can be mathematized only to a very limited extent; (2) no psychological experiments are possible and (3) the objective observation of psychological phenomena is impos sible. 1) Sturm offers the following interpretation of Kant’s belief that “mathematics is not applicable to the phenomena of inner sense:”33 for a discipline to be a science, Kant requires that it studies data that can be mathematized. Only when a priori categories can be applied to such data can scientific laws be derived from them. Intuitions can be fully mathematized if they are constituted in space and time, the a priori structures of experience. External experience is constituted in both space and time. Inner experience, which is the basis of empirical psy chology, is only temporal and not spatial. This does not mean that psy chological phenomena cannot be mathematized at all, but that this is possible only to a limited extent. Psychological phenomena can be mathematized only in so far as their temporal extension can be meas ured. But how is this possible? It makes sense to suggest that, in princi ple, psychological phenomena could be timed: we could quantify them in terms of minutes and seconds. What form these measurements should take, however, is completely unclear.34 Internal experience takes the form of an entirely temporal permanent flux in which one mental state constantly evolves into a next one. There is no ‘space’ in between psychological phenomena; although they are somehow distinct, it is not clear where one ends and the next begins. For this reason, it is impos sible to know when to start measuring and when to stop. Hence, al though it is in principle possible to mathematize psychological phenom ena to a certain extent (by measuring temporal phenomena), it is not clear how this would appear in practice. Because of this, Kant doubts that empirical psychology will ever become a science. It is important to note that the preceding characterization of empir ical psychological phenomena does not imply that they are marked only 33 Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (MFNS), AA 4:471. 34 Sturm (2009, 238 – 239).

54

Liesbet Vanhaute

by their temporal dimension. Sturm remarks that Kant sometimes sug gests that, in addition to duration, psychological phenomena also have a dimension of intensity.35 Kant believes that we can state with quite some certainty that one psychological experience is either more or less intense than another; this allows for a certain classification of psychological phe nomena. Such classicification, however, is based only on a comparison of the intensity of psychological states. An exact and complete mathe matization of the intensity of these phenomena is just as problematic as is the adequate measurement of their temporal dimension. 2) The lack of secluded phenomena, which is the root of the prob lem of mathematization, is also the reason for Kant’s second objection to scientific empirical psychology: because there are no separate occurenc es, we cannot ‘recombine them at will’: [T]he manifold of inner observation can be separated only by mere division in thought, and cannot then be held separate and recombined at will (but still less does another thinking subject suffer himself to be experimented upon to suit our purpose).36

According to Sturm, Kant here refers to the problematic fact that no ex periments are possible in empirical psychology. Neither my own, nor someone else’s psychological states can be adequately manipulated, and it is therefore impossible to experiment on them. In a proper sci ence, it is possible to manipulate phenomena: situations are created in order to determine whether a phenomenon occurs as a predictable result of them. In psychology, this is impossible. Because there are no secluded phenomena, it is impossible to state with certainty that a certain event re occurs regularly. I want to emphasize the fact that Kant does not say that the psycho logical flux cannot be divided at all. He writes that inner observation can be “separated by mere division in thought:”37 we can assume a certain division in our thinking about these phenomena. Such a division can serve as a ‘working hypothesis’ to which we can resort when speaking and thinking about these phenomena. Even if it is impossible to identify exactly when a certain psychological state (e. g. a moment of sadness) started and ended, it is still possible to refer to it as distinct from the states occurring before and after it. 35 Sturm (2009, 242 – 250). 36 MFNS, AA 4:471. 37 Ibid.

Systematic Classification or Purposive Moralization?

55

3) Even if we are not setting up an experiment, but simply observing our own psyche, we can never be sure if we get to know our object as it is: “observation by itself already changes and displaces the state of the observed object.”38 In this assertion, Kant is alluding to the familiar phe nomenon that, by directing our attention towards our inner experien ces, these experiences can change: self consciousness has an influence on our mental states. It is not clear, however, whether Kant believes that this makes ob jective self observation only very difficult or completely impossible. In his metaphysics lectures of 1792 93, he asserts the impossibility of psy chological experiments. 39 He attributes this not to the lack of secluded phenomena but to the fact that experimentation changes the phenomenon we try to observe. This is contrasted with self observation, which is very hard but not impossible. This suggests that only the awareness of being involved in psychological experimentation fundamentally alters the psy chological state ‘mere’ self observation does not necessarily do this. The published Anthropology also appears to reflect the belief that self ob servation is difficult, but not impossible: […] knowledge of the human being through inner experience, because to a large extent one also judges others according to it, is more important than correct judgment of others, but nevertheless at the same time perhaps more difficult. For he who investigates his interior easily carries many things into self consciousness instead of merely observing.40

Kant thus believes that self observation is problematic and an inappro priate basis for a science. However, in so far as it is necessary in order to make correct judgments about other human beings, it appears to be unavoidable (which is probably one of Kant’s reasons for including empirical psychological knowledge in pragmatic anthropology, cf. supra 2.2., Argument 1). Though the three difficulties listed above make it impossible for em pirical psychology to become a full fledged science, they certainly do not rule out the possibility of interesting and relevant empirical psycho logical data. Empirical psychology can avoid its inherent problems: it 38 Ibid. 39 Metaphysik Dohna 1792 – 93, AA 28:679: “wir verfahren überhaupt method isch, durch observiren, oder experimentiren; das erste ist schwer, und das letz tere unmöglich; denn das Experiment was wir machen, ändert schon unsern Gemüthszustand.” 40 AP, AA 7:143.

56

Liesbet Vanhaute

can divide psychological phenomena as a ‘working hypothesis’ and compare the length and intensity of the phenomena that result from this division. It should avoid psychological experimentation, which is deeply problematic, but it can base itself to some extent on self obser vation. If empirical psychology takes these guidelines into account (avoid experiments, be careful with self observation, …) it can navigate around its inherent problems. Although it will probably never become a science in the narrow, Kantian sense of the term, it can provide us with some insight into our own psyche. Without this self insight, it would be very difficult to understand others. Therefore, psychological insights play a role in pragmatic anthropology: individuals cannot make sense of the behavior of others without having some understanding of their own mental lives.

2.3. How systematic can empirical psychological data be? One might offer the objection that the findings of empirical psychology are fragmented and diffuse. If empirical psychology must indeed slalom around the various difficulties listed above, it would be logical to expect it to generate only disparate and incoherent results. If this is the case, it would make sense to argue (cf. supra, 1.2.(1)) that Kant thought that empirical psychological findings should be included in teleological judgments in order to ensure that they would be a proper part of sys tematic pragmatic anthropology. But Kant never thought of empirical psychology as entirely unsyste matic. Even in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, in which he presents the three above listed objections to scientific empirical psy chology, he describes it as a discipline that arrives at a certain level of systematicity: Therefore, the empirical doctrine of the soul can never become anything more than […] a natural doctrine of inner sense which is as systematic as possible, that is, a natural description of the soul, but never a science of the soul […].41

In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant states that empirical psychology seeks to explain phenomena,42 hence not just to enumerate disparate facts. He 41 MFNS, AA 4:471. 42 Critique of Pure Reason A 347/B 405.

Systematic Classification or Purposive Moralization?

57

makes a similar suggestion in a lecture on logic from 1789 90, in which he states that empirical psychology studies the human soul’s phenomena by placing them under general rules.43 If empirical psychology searches for such general rules, then it must be more than a mere collection of disparate facts. It must be able to achieve systematic results. The key to understanding Kant’s conception of empirical psychol ogy as a search for systematic rules in empirical data can be found in the the First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment, where Kant notes the following: If what is to be found is merely the ground for the explanation of that which happens, then this can be either an empirical principle, or an a priori principle, or even a composite of the two, as one can see in physical me chanical explanations of events in the corporeal world, which find their principles in part in the general (rational) science of nature, and partly in those sciences which contain the empirical laws of motion. Something sim ilar takes place when one seeks for psychological grounds of explanation for what goes on in our mind, only with this difference that, as far as I am aware, the principles for this are all empirical, with only one exception, namely the law of the continuity of all changes (since time, which has only one dimension, is the formal condition of inner intuitions), which is the a priori ground of these perceptions, but which is virtually useless for the sake of explanation.44

The discipline of empirical psychology has thus only one a priori princi ple, and that principle is useless for explanation. It therefore resorts to ‘empirical laws’: general rules that are separate from this a priori princi ple. Empirical psychology uses these empirical laws to classify and ex plain facts; because of this, it can provide systematic information. Elsewhere in the First Introduction and the Critique of Judgment, these empirical laws are understood as the result of an activity of the reflecting power of judgment. This, however, is the general heading under which Kant treats teleological and aesthetic judgment, which suggests that the empirical laws of psychology are teleological judgments (that they would be aesthetic judgments is rather unplausible). Is this the case? As I explained in the first section of this paper, Kant states that we resort to teleological judgments if we are dealing with phenomena like organ isms and human history: realms of facts that cannot be reasonably understood without introducing the concept of an objective end. Empirical psychol 43 Logik Busolt 1789 – 90, AA 14:611. 44 FI, AA 20:237.

58

Liesbet Vanhaute

ogy studies neither organisms nor human history.45 It searches for em pirical generalities within the realm of inner experience. Kant’s argu ment in Critique of Judgment (cf. supra, 1.1.) suggests that it would be superfluous to take the teleological perspective in order to find such em pirical laws: it suffices to assume that nature as a whole is subjectively purposive with regard to our cognitive capacities, that it lends itself to find ing systems of empirical laws, even in seemingly contingent facts like those provided by inner experience. Empirical psychology does not need to resort to objective purposiveness, hence it does not proclaim teleological judgments. Asserting that it does comes down to unduly stretching Kant’s concept of teleological judgment. This means that empirical psychology proclaims judgments that are neither teleological nor aesthetic, but which Kant nonetheless considers reflective. Kant thus seems to assume that there is a form of reflective judgment that cannot be reduced to either teleological or aesthetic judg ment. Paul Guyer has noticed this (not specifically in relation to Kant’s thoughts about empirical psychology) and has argued that Kant assumed a third46 form of reflective judgment: judgment that searches for empir ical laws and concepts.47 This third type of reflective judgment exists in the capacity to find empirical laws and principles that are able to systematize facts underde termined by a priori principles. By drawing upon this capacity, empirical psychology can find an order in the experiences it studies, even if it will 45 Empirical psychology does not deal with human beings as either organisms (as biology does) or as part of a historically developing species (it studies the data of inner sense rather than the historical development of mankind). 46 In fact, Guyer (2003, 1 – 62) maintains that there are five forms: aesthetic judg ment and teleological judgment are general terms, each of which incorporates two forms of reflecting judgment. For the sake of clarity, however, I will ab stract from this part of his argument, even though I believe it is correct. In the remainder of this article, I will thus speak of a third form of reflecting judg ment. 47 Guyer (ibid.) presents this form of reflective judgment as playing an important role in the emergence of systems of natural science. It finds regularities that con nect the a priori categories of a science to a posteriori facts. One could object that my interpretation of empirical psychology as reflecting judgment goes against Guyer’s point because empirical psychology is not a natural science. However, it is possible to understand empirical psychology as analogous to a natural sci ence in a very early stage. It has only one a priori principle and seeks to add em pirical regularities to this meager basis. For this reason, it searches for empirical laws and concepts. It will not find as many of these as a real science would, but that does not mean it cannot assume the same method.

Systematic Classification or Purposive Moralization?

59

never become a full fledged science. As a search for coherence in inner experience, empirical psychology does not stand in any direct connec tion to the final end of human beings, morality (cf. infra). In spite of this, it plays a role in pragmatic anthropology. I admit that this role might be limited, but it cannot be ignored. On the contrary, it deserves to be emphasized: it shows that pragmatic anthropology is not fully composed of teleological judgments. In so far as it takes up data from empirical psychology, pragmatic anthropology is systematic in a non teleological way. This suggests that a systematic study of human beings is not completely dependent on assumptions about objective ends or (moral) predispositions. At least one other strategy is possible: that of careful, systematic self observation.

3. Pragmatic anthropology is more than moral anthropology As we saw in the first section, Kant writes that moral anthropology fo cuses specifically on those aspects of human nature that promote or hin der morality. The teleological reading of Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View seems to imply that it is the equivalent of moral anthropol ogy: it studies the human being from the standpoint of a priori ethics. But is this correct?

3.1. Empirical psychology’s blindness for morality Kant’s writings make it quite obvious that whenever pragmatic anthro pology resorts to the findings of empirical psychology, it will not con tain any reference to morality. The free ego that feels moral motivation does not appear empirically to inner sense; and for this reason it cannot be grasped by empirical psychology. In the self cognition of the human being through inner experience […] he can only recognize himself as an object through his representation in expe rience as he appears to himself, not as he, the observed, is in himself.—If he wished to cognize in the latter way, he would have to rely on a conscious ness of pure spontaneity (the concept of freedom), (which is also possible), but it would still not be perception of inner sense and the empirical cog nition of his inner self (inner experience) which is based on it. Rather, it can only be consciousness of the rule of his actions and omissions, without thereby acquiring a theoretical (physiological) cognition of his nature, which is what psychology actually aims at.—Empirical self cognition

60

Liesbet Vanhaute

therefore presents to inner sense the human being as he appears to it, not as he is in himself […].48

3.2. Pragmatic anthropology versus teleological history It is not only in view of the empirical psychological elements in anthro pology that the teleological interpretation of the work is untenable. The minor interest in teleology is characteristic for the work as a whole. This can be noticed by comparing the pragmatic anthropology to Kant’s de scriptions of history.49 The latter discuss the development of human pre dispositions as they stand in interaction with nature. They are able to teleologically judge history as a progressive evolution towards mankind’s final, moral end and as such they answer questions that arise from a spec ulative, theoretical interest.50 To get a grasp of their subject matter, they take the perspective of a distant observer of mankind.51 As such, they regard the human species as a whole. Pragmatic anthropology has a different interest and takes a different perspective: Therefore, even knowledge of the races of human beings as products be longing to the play of nature is not yet counted as pragmatic knowledge of the world, but only as theoretical knowledge of the world.52 In addition, the expression ‘to know the world’ and ‘to have the world’ are rather far from each other in their meaning, since one only understands the play (Spiel) that one has watched, while the other has participated (mit gespielt) in it.53

Contrary to the philosopher of history, who rises above the ‘play’ he studies, the anthropologist searches for knowledge that is not merely theoretical. Anthropological knowledge is based on participation rather 48 AP, AA 7:397. 49 I focus on IUH and §§82 – 84 of CJ. 50 In IUH, AA 8:17, Kant suggests that the desire to find order in human history arises from “observing [human] activities as enacted in the great world drama.” It is the philosopher who looks for a “definite plan of nature.” In CJ, AA 5:24, the interest in finding such a plan derives from speculation on why things are there. 51 IUH, AA 8:17: “History […] allows us to hope […] that if it considers the play of the freedom of the human will (Spiel der Freiheit des menschlichen Willens) in the large, it can discover within it a regular course.” 52 AP, AA 7:120. 53 AP, AA 7:120.

Systematic Classification or Purposive Moralization?

61

than distant observation. The anthropologist studies human behavior and interactions from an insider’s perspective. He understands what it’s like to live in a human society and interact with human individuals and he takes this as the basis for his theory. This perspective is difficult to harmonize with that of the historian, who looks on to the development of the human species as a whole. In the course of his speculative attempts to understand the develop ment of humanity, the historian judges teleologically. But in the shift in perspective from history to anthropology, his subject matter disappears out of sight. The historical evolution of humanity as a whole is no im mediate topic for the pragmatic anthropologist, who bases his theory on the concrete behavior of human individuals. This means that resorting to teleological judgment is no longer immediately necessary.54 To co herently understand human phenomena from the anthropologist’s ‘in sider’s perspective’, no teleological assumptions are required. The an thropologist does not need to accept morality as the final end of nature, and he can drop the strong focus on humanity’s process of moralization. As such, his perspective is broader than that of the historian.

3.3. Pragmatic anthropology and reflective classification If describing the human process of moralization is not the pragmatic an thropology’s priority, what is the main purpose of the work? Textual evidence suggests that the work is primarily concerned with classifica tion of human phenomena. In a letter to Herz from 1773, for example, Kant remarks that his intent in the anthropology lectures is to arrive at general knowledge of the human being by “seeking the phenomena and their laws” rather than to bring about a modification of human nature.55 The intention that is expressed in this letter is preserved in Kant’s ma ture conception of anthropology. In the published version of the work, 54 Nevertheless, teleological concepts like that of a ‘predisposition’ are used regu larly in anthropology. This does not contradict my interpretation. I argue that the teleological perspective is not predominant, but I concede that anthropol ogy can occasionally take it up, for example when the anthropologist, from his ‘insider’s perspective’ ponders over what the future development of humanity will be. Kant is obviously doing this in AP, AA 7:321 – 333. 55 Correspondence, AA 10:145: “The intention that I have is to […] seek the phe nomena and their laws, rather than the ultimate conditions of the possibility of the modification of human nature in general.”

62

Liesbet Vanhaute

he notes that one of its greatest advantages is that it provides a system of headings for a classification of human phenomena.56 The content of the work confirms this: Kant treats very diverse topics, including non moral aspects of the human being like the quest for happiness,57 the extent to which humans are determined by natural temperaments, contingent facts as nationality or sex,58 and trivial things about why humans laugh.59 If this is pragmatic anthropology’s focus, it makes sense that Kant did not choose to compose it out of teleological judgments. Teleological judgment’s unavoidable assumption of morality as a final end of nature would interfere with the anthropology’s attentiveness to the diversity of phenomena that are to be classified. A teleological perspective requires a focus on those (predisposed) features of human nature that promote morality. Such a focus would be much too restrictive for a discipline at tempting a classification of human phenomena.60 Pragmatic anthropol ogy needs a broader perspective. Nevertheless, though the general perspective of teleological judgment is not called for in pragmatic anthropology, Kant’s anthropological proj ect will most probably have to resort to reflecting judgment. The realm of human actions is one that seems underdetermined by a priori principles.61 Hence, if pragmatic anthropology wants to systematically classify seem ingly disparate human phenomena, it will have to search for general principles that are not yet given. In view of this, it will need to assume subjective purposiveness: it needs to presuppose that human behaviour and interaction constitutes a realm of facts that can be systematically under stood by human thinking. Only if it presupposes this will its reflective activity of searching for general principles to classify the manifold of human phenomena make sense.

AP, AA 7:121 – 122, 7:270 and 7:312. For an interesting discussion of this quest, see Kain (2003, 242) AP, AA 7:303 – 308, 7:311 – 321. AP, AA 7:255. That the focus on morality is not predominant is also clear from AP, AA 7:119: pragmatic anthropology studies what the human being “as a free acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself.” The ‘should’ thus con stitutes only a third of the subject matter. 61 Kant calls it a manifold. Anthropology’s task is to find order in this manifold. Menschenkunde 1781 – 1782, AA 25:856: “aus dem Mannigfaltigen, was wir am Menschen wahrnehmen, Regeln zu ziehen.” See also IUH, AA 8:17.

56 57 58 59 60

Systematic Classification or Purposive Moralization?

63

3.4. The usefulness of reflective classification for morality The systematic classification of human phenomena will never be com plete if it overlooks phenomena indicating human morality. According to Kant, every human being has the capacity to respect the moral law.62 And even though humans rarely (perhaps never) 63 act from mere respect for the law, their moral capacities and sensitivities will shine through and have impact on their actual behavior.64 In systematically classifying this actual behavior, pragmatic anthropology will thus encounter morally promising aspects of human nature, as well as immoral behavior. These are inventoried, along with many other significant aspects of human nature that do not stand in direct relation to human morality. As such, anthropology is not possible without some reference to mor ality. An experience based study of human beings can and must also concieve of moral responsibility. This implies that pragmatic anthropol ogy, as a systematic study of human beings and their social world, does contain some moral anthropology. Pragmatic anthropology, in being knowledge “for the world’s use”65 is thus useful for the moral philoso pher who is curious about “the subjective conditions in human nature that […] help [people] in fulfilling the laws of a metaphysics of morals.”66 Also, the non teleological interpretation of the work allows us to acknowledge that the moral relevance of pragmatic anthropology is not limited to this. Apart from providing the moral philosopher with a moral anthropology, an empirical counterpart to his theory, pragmatic anthropology is able to help every reader to better understand herself 62 See for example Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason, AA 6:27. 63 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, AA 4:406. 64 This ‘shining through’ often takes interesting forms. For example, Kant de scribes the capacity to feign virtue as somehow indicating the capacity for true virtue. In AP, AA 7:152 – 153, he calls it ‘permissible moral illusion’, because there is some, though very little, virtue involved. For an interesting discussion of such ‘empirical markers of morality,’ see Frierson (2008). See also Brandt (2003, 30), who notes: “The relationship between [anthropology and ethics] mirrors […] the relationship between [empirical and intelligible character] in and/or of human beings. If one compares the relation between these two char acters with the two sides of a coin, then this ‘human coin’ has a peculiar char acteristic: the images on the two sides resemble one another. Neither side is in dependent of the other, rather, they stand in a fixed relation to each other—at least a similarity relation.” 65 AP, AA 7:119. 66 Metaphysics of Morals, AA 6:217.

64

Liesbet Vanhaute

and her world. Such an understanding is morally promising in several ways: insofar as it presents the human being as endowed with moral ca pacities, it might cultivate confidence in one’s own moral talents,67 or in the case of a less virtous reader, knowledge of one’s moral deficiencies.68 As an inventory of the different kinds of empirical characters and tem peraments, it can help to understand how to adapt one’s good intentions to the specific person one is dealing with.69 To the extent that it explains how humans act from principle, it helps educators and politicians to promote genuine rather than superficial morality.70 So interestingly, as a discipline that is mainly interested in systematically describing all kinds of anthropological phenomena, pragmatic anthropology’s useful ness for morality is more diverse than that of a teleology describing mor alization, or a moral anthropology confirming the possiblity of a priori ethics.

4. Conclusion My goal in this essay was to demonstrate that Kant’s pragmatic anthro pology is primarily interested in the classification of human experiences, whether they stem from inner sense or from other sources. I have shown that the anthropologist needs to assume subjective purposiveness, not only when he uses insights from empirical psychology, but also when he studies human society from his characteristic ‘insider’s perspective’. The additional assumption of objective purposiveness is not as unavoid able. We can thus conclude that anthropology always judges reflective ly, and occasionally teleologically. Readings that present the pragmatic 67 AP, AA 7:153 deals with the importance of believing in the possibility of human virtue. Human characteristics that indicate man’s moral capacities are politeness or sociability (AP, AA 2:277). 68 Characteristics that promote viciousness rather than virtue are laziness, coward ice and duplicity. (AP 7:276) Also a tendency to imitate others might lead to wickedness. (AP, AA 7:293). 69 Kant’s account of the temperaments in AP, AA 7:287 – 291 could be useful in the following manner. We can imagine a sympathetic person with pragmatic knowledge of human beings taking the anger of a phlegmatic man very serious, because she knows the anger will not pass away quickly, as the anger of a chol eric man will. She will also realize that she must help a choleric person in a dif ferent manner, for example by not paying too much attention to his angriness, or by helping him deal with his anger. 70 Menschenkunde 1781 – 1782, AA 25:858.

Systematic Classification or Purposive Moralization?

65

anthropology’s perspective as predominantly teleological, ignore the richness and multiplicity of Kant’s anthropological project.

Bibliography Page references to Kant’s writings refer to Kants Gesammelte Werke (1900, Kö niglich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften (ed.), Berlin) (Akademie Aus gabe, AA) with the exception of the reference to the Dohna Wundlacken lec ture notes, which is to the electronic edition of Kant’s works on the Kant im Kontext CD ROM (2009, Karsten Worm Verlag, Berlin). English citations are taken from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (see refer ences below). Beishart, Claus (2009): Kant’s Characterization of Natural Ends, in: Kant Year book 1, pp.1 – 30. Brandt, Reinhard (2003): The Guiding Idea of Kant’s Anthropology and the Vocation of the Human Being, in: B. Jacobs and P. Kain (eds.): Essays on Kant’s Anthropology, Cambridge, pp. 85 – 104. Cohen, Alix (2008): Kant’s answer to the question ‘what is man?’ and its im plications for anthropology, in: Studies in History and Philosophy of Sci ence 39, 4, pp. 506 – 514. Frierson, Patrick (2008): Empirical psychology, common sense, and Kant’s em pirical markers for moral responsibility, in: Studies in History and Philos ophy of Science 39, 4, pp. 473 – 482. Guyer, Paul (2003): Kant’s Principles of Reflecting Judgment, in: Kant’s Cri tique of the Power of Judgment, Lanham, pp.1 – 62. Kain, Patrick (2003): Prudential Reason in Kant’s Anthropology, in: B. Jacobs and P. Kain (eds.): Essays on Kant’s Anthropology, Cambridge, pp. 230 – 265. Kant, Immanuel (2007): Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, in: Kant, Immanuel: Anthropology, History, and Education, trans. R. B. Louden and G. Zöller, Cambridge. Kant, Immanuel (1999): Correspondence, trans. A. Zweig, Cambridge. Kant, Immanuel (2000): Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. P. Guyer, Cambridge. Kant, Immanuel (1997): Critique of Pure Reason, trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood, Cambridge. Kant, Immanuel (2000): First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment, in: Kant, Immanuel: Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. P. Guyer, Cambridge. Kant, Immanuel (1996): Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals, in: Kant, Immanuel: Practical Philosophy, trans. M. Gregor, Cambridge. Kant, Immanuel (2007): Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim, in: Kant, Immanuel: Anthropology, History, and Education, trans. R. B. Louden and G. Zöller, Cambridge.

66

Liesbet Vanhaute

Kant, Immanuel (2002): Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, trans. Michael Friedman, in: Kant, Immanuel: Theoretical Philosophy after 1781, eds. H. Allison and P. Heath, Cambridge. Kant, Immanuel (1996): Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason, in: Kant, Immanuel: Religion and Rational Theology, trans. A. W. Wood and G. Di Giovanni, Cambridge. Kant, Immanuel (1996): The Metaphysics of Morals, in: Kant, Immanuel: Practical Philosophy, trans. M. Gregor, Cambridge. Louden, Robert B. (2003): The second part of morals, in: B. Jacobs and P. Kain (eds.): Essays on Kant’s anthropology, Cambridge, pp. 60 – 84. Sturm, Thomas (2009): Kant und die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, Pader born. Vanhaute, Liesbet (2011): How biological is human history?, in: Logical Anal ysis and History of Philosophy 14. [Forthcoming] Wilson, Holly L. (2006): Kant’s Pragmatic Anthropology: its Origin, Meaning and Significance, Albany. Wood, Allen (2003): Kant and the problem of human nature, in: B. Jacobs and P. Kain (eds.): Essays on Kant’s anthropology, Cambridge, pp. 38 – 59.

The Activity of Sensibility in Kant’s Anthropology. A Developmental History of the Concept of the Formative Faculty Matthias Wunsch Abstract Kant usually characterizes sensibility as receptivity. Hence it can seem paradox ical to speak of the “activity of sensibility” in his philosophy. Yet that sensible representations are receptive in origin does not necessarily mean that their con tent is due to our receptivity alone. In fact, as early as his 1770 inaugural dis sertation Kant assumes acts of coordinating the sensible as conditions of sensible knowledge. In the context of his anthropology he then attributes these acts to the so called “formative faculty” which he conceives as part of sensibility. With the concept of the formative faculty Kant unifies Baumgarten’s conception of the lower cognitive faculty. Moreover he outlines his own theory of the activity of sensibility by means of the formative faculty and its various facets. Further more, a closer look at the various transcriptions of Kant’s lectures on anthropol ogy shows that, in the late 1770s, the concept of the imagination supplants that of the formative faculty as the foundation of his conception of an active sensi bility, and shows also how the distinction between productive and reproductive imagination is able to stand in for the various facets of the formative faculty. The paper concludes with a brief look at the prospects beyond the field of an thropology.

Introduction It can seem paradoxical to speak of the “activity of sensibility” in Kant’s philosophy. Kant’s standard characterizations of sensibility, beginning with his 1770 inaugural dissertation On the form and principles of the sensible and the intelligible world (De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis; hereafter Dissertatio), leave no doubt that sensibility is passive. “Sensibility (sensualitas)”, as he writes in the Dissertatio, “is the receptivity (receptivitas) of a subject in virtue of which it is possible for the subject’s own representative state to be affected in a definite way by the presence

68

Matthias Wunsch

of some object.”1 Although this initial characterization has a decisive and systematic significance for Kant, nonetheless it only describes one as pect of sensibility: its transcendental aspect, or the aspect of the origin of sensible representations. Kant turns this against the Leibniz Wolff school, which he criticizes for only having defined sensible representa tions according to their epistemic type (i. e. logically), as representations of something represented in an obscure or confused way. On Kant’s conception, such logical classifications absolutely fail to capture the dif ference between sensible and intellectual objects,2 which depends in stead on the difference in origin between the various representations. The aspect of the origin of sensible representations is to be distin guished from that of their content. Their being receptive in origin does not necessarily mean that their content is due to our receptivity alone. In terms of their content, sensible representations are appearances, for which Kant distinguishes between matter and form. Whereas the matter consists in passively received sensations, the form of the appear ance is “the aspect namely of sensible things [sensibilium species] which arises according as the various things which affect the senses are co or dinated by a certain natural law of the mind.”3 Thus the form of the ap pearance derives from acts of coordinating the sensible, which are deter mined by a law of coordination that is binding and identical for every individual item of sensible knowledge.4 However, in the Dissertatio Kant is not concerned with examining the ways that the sensible gets coordinated in any more detail, since he focuses here on the principles of the form of appearances. He identifies these principles as space and time principles that guarantee the general connectability of the parts of the sensible world and are the subjective conditions of coordination.5 The Dissertatio does not explain which faculty is responsible for this work of coordination anymore than it clari fies the ways of coordinating. Essentially two faculties or capacities come 1 2 3 4

5

MSI, § 3, AA 2:392. All quotations in English from the Dissertatio are taken from Kant, Immanuel, Theoretical Philosophy 1755 – 1770, trans. and eds., David Walford and Ralf Meerbote, Cambridge 1992. MSI, § 7, AA 2:394. MSI, § 4, AA 2:392. As this law holds for the form of all sensible knowledge, Kant subsequently identifies it with the form of sensible representations: the form of sensible rep resentations “est […] non nisi lex quaedam menti insita, sensa ab obiecti prae sentia orta sibimet coordinandi” (MSI, § 4, AA 2:393). MSI, § 14, 5; § 15, D.

The Activity of Sensibility in Kant’s Anthropology

69

into question for Kant at this time: sensibility and understanding. What could be more obvious than to argue that sensibility is ruled out, since it is characterized from the beginning as receptivity? And yet nowhere in the Dissertatio does Kant state that coordination is the work of the un derstanding. In my view it can be shown that the question of where to situate coordination in the theory of faculties was still open, for Kant, around 1770; however, I cannot deal with this point here.6 Only in the course of the 1770s, in the context of his anthropolog ical investigations, does Kant arrive at a closer examination of the ways in which the sensible gets coordinated and by which faculty.7 As we know, starting in the winter semester of 1772/1773 Kant regularly held lectures on anthropology based on the “Psychologia empirica” chapter of A. G. Baumgarten’s Metaphysica. 8 It is a central thesis of this paper that in his anthropology, following Baumgarten’s doctrine of the lower cognitive faculty, Kant developed a differentiated concep tion of specifically sensible activity under the heading of “formative powers” and the “formative faculty.” The activity of coordination finds a place in this conception as well: “The formative faculty concerns the form of the entire lower cognition, namely the coordination, since one can join representations to one another in different ways.”9 Thus the activities of the formative faculty that Kant investigates in his an thropology are the conceptual heirs and further specification of the co ordination of the sensible as conceived in the Dissertatio. Moreover, it is worth mentioning three other reasons (which have been hinted at al ready to some extent) why Kant’s conception of the formative faculty deserves our attention: With the concept of the formative faculty Kant succeeds in unifying Baumgarten’s conception of the lower cognitive faculty. 6 7

8

9

I plan to make up for this deficit in a future publication on Kant’s conception of the coordination of the sensible. The generally decisive texts for Kant’s anthropology are the Reflexionen zur An thropologie (AA 15:55 – 654), the Entwrfe zu dem Colleg ber Anthropologie aus den 70er und 80er Jahren (AA 15:655 – 899), the transcripts of his Vorlesungen ber Anthropologie (AA 25) and the Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (AA 7). The Metaphysica, Baumgarten’s main theoretical work, first appeared in 1739. Kant used the fourth edition (1757), which was the first to contain Baumgar ten’s German translation of several important terms. The chapter “Psychologia empirica” comprises §§ 501 – 739 of the Metaphysica and is reprinted in AA 15:5 – 54 (§§ 504 – 699) and AA 17:130 – 40 (§§ 501 – 503 and 700 – 739). Refl 331 (1776/8?), AA 15:130 f.

70

Matthias Wunsch

Kant outlines a conception of the activity of sensibility by means of the formative faculty. Historically, Kant’s conception of the formative faculty has to be seen as the precursor to his later conception of productive and re productive imagination. In this paper, following a brief sketch of Baumgarten’s “doctrine of lower knowledge” (gnoseologia inferior) (1) I will clarify how Kant unifies Baumgarten’s conception of the lower cognitive faculty in his anthro pology under the aspect of the formation of sensible representations (2). From here I will show that the formative faculty as Kant conceived it is the active part of sensibility, and will outline the basic features of his theory of the formative faculty (3). It will then be possible, with the help of the various transcriptions of Kant’s lectures on anthropology, to re construct how, in the 1770s, the concept of the imagination supplants that of the formative faculty as the foundation of his conception of an active sensibility (4), and to show how the distinction between produc tive and reproductive imagination is able to stand in for the various fac ets of the formative faculty (5). The paper then concludes with a brief look of the prospects beyond the field of anthropology (6).

1. Baumgarten’s doctrine of lower knowledge (gnoseologia inferior) Kant had several reasons for choosing the chapter “Psychologia empiri ca” from Baumgarten’s Metaphysica as the textual basis for his anthropol ogy lectures. Firstly, he had enormous respect for Baumgarten, despite his increasing theoretical distance.10 Secondly, he was already quite well versed in Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, which he regularly used as the basis for his lectures on metaphysics. Thirdly, the “Psychologia em pirica” chapter is very rich in material and more sophisticated than other texts in the tradition of empirical psychology. Finally and this is espe 10 In his Neuen Anmerkungen zur Erluterung der Theorie der Winde (1756) Kant mentions the Metaphysica as “the most useful and exhaustive of all such com pendia” (AA 1:503). According to the Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner Vorle sungen from the winter semester of 1765/6 Kant appreciates Baumgarten for “the wealth and precision of his teaching” (NEV, AA 2:308). And in the Cri tique of Pure Reason Kant praises the “excellent analyst Baumgarten” (A 21/B 35 Anm.).

The Activity of Sensibility in Kant’s Anthropology

71

cially significant here Baumgarten’s philosophy, and particularly his empirical psychology, lends itself to an important motif in Kant’s thought since 1769/70: the philosophical reappraisal of sensibility. Baumgarten brought an innovative reorientation to the tradition of German philosophy going back to Leibniz and Wolff, taking as his start ing point the inadequacy of the traditional logic for the problems of philosophical poetics.11 He formulated the need to broaden philosophy to include a science that would do proper justice to the lower cognitive faculty a science which he would later become the founder of, and which he entered into the philosophical vocabulary under the name of ‘Aesthetica.’12 For him, ‘aesthetics’ did not have today’s narrow sense of a theory of art, but rather referred to a comprehensive science of sensible knowledge (scientia cognitionis sensitivae). Baumgarten divided it into four aspects: “theory of liberal arts” (theoria liberalium artium), “doc trine of lower knowledge” (gnoseologia inferior), “art of beautiful think ing” (ars pulchre cogitandi) and “art of the analogue of the reason” (ars analogi rationis).13 For our purposes here, only the second aspect is signifi cant, the doctrine of lower knowledge, which plays a very instructive role for Kant’s anthropological theory of sensibility. We can see it as a science of (a) the indistinct representations and (b) the lower cognitive faculty. (a) Baumgarten turns to the Leibnizian hierarchy of ideas, but reas sesses the theoretical value of obscure and confused ideas by introducing or emphasizing more positive characterizations of them. Rather than going into this in detail,14 we should just note Baumgarten’s termino logical innovation relative to the Leibniz/Wolff tradition of designating those ideas that are acquired through the lower part of the cognitive fac ulty and are “indistinct” (non distincta) as “sensible representation” (repraesentatio sensitiva),15 a term that Kant then took up in his Dissertatio.

11 Baumgarten, Meditationes philosophicae de nonnulis ad poema pertinentibus (1735), § 115. 12 Ibid., § 116. In the Aesthetica (1750/8) Baumgarten introduces his conception of aesthetics. 13 Baumgarten, Aesthetica, § 1.—On the significance, content and context of Baumgarten’s aesthetics see Poppe (1907), Baeumler (1967) (11923) and above all Franke (1972), where the various aspects of the aesthetics are compre hensively discussed. 14 Cf. Franke (1972), esp. 44 and 46 – 8. 15 Meditationes, § 3; Metaphysica, § 521.

72

Matthias Wunsch

(b) Baumgarten calls the faculty of obscure and confused or indis tinct cognition the “lower cognitive faculty.”16 Thus his terminology al ready implies that he emancipates that which Wolff called the ‘lower part’ of the cognitive faculty from the ‘higher part,’17 since he speaks of an independent cognitive faculty rather than a part of the cognitive faculty. Accordingly, the discussion of the lower cognitive faculty takes on a much larger role relative to the higher cognitive faculty in Baumgarten’s empirical psychology than it does in the corresponding discussion by Wolff. Moreover, Baumgarten’s investigation of the lower cognitive faculty is not just more comprehensive, relatively, but also more fine grained. In his Psychologia empirica, under the heading “Of the lower part of the cognitive faculty” (De facultatis cognoscendi parte inferiori), Wolff only distinguishes between Sensus, Imaginatio, Facultas fingendi (faculty of fiction) and Memoria (Oblivio, Reminiscentia),18 whereas Baumgarten draws a much finer set of distinctions. When he comes to the corresponding point of his theory, he discusses a number of faculties: Sensus, the ability to feel the state of my own soul or body; Phantasia, the ability to have representations of the past (phantasmata, imaginationes); Perspicacia, the ability to recognize the congruences (ingenium or wit) and differences (acumen or acutenes) of things; Memoria, the ability to recognize reproduced representations; Facultas fingendi (faculty of fiction), the ability to isolate phantasmata to some extent and recom bine them; Praevisio (foresight), the ability to be aware of one’s future state and the future state of the world; Iudicium ( judgment), the profi ciency in judging things, that is, to recognize their perfection or imper fection; Praesagitio (expectation), the ability to represent an anticipatory representation as the same representation one will have in the future; and Facultas characteristica (faculty of signs), the ability to correlate signs with the things signified.19

16 Baumgarten, Metaphysica, § 520: “Facultas obscure confuseque seu indistincte aliquid cognoscendi cognoscitiva inferior est.” 17 Wolff, Psychologia empirica, §§ 54 f. 18 Ibid., §§ 56 – 233. 19 Baumgarten discusses these faculties in the order indicated in his Metaphysica, §§ 534 – 623. In the Aesthetica, §§ 30 – 7, he discusses these faculties in a less gnoseological and more genuinely aesthetic context as the faculties of the ‘in genium venustum.’

The Activity of Sensibility in Kant’s Anthropology

73

2. Kant’s unification of Baumgarten’s ‘lower cognitive faculty’ under the aspect of formation In the course of his anthropology, Kant takes up the activities of several of the lower cognitive faculties discussed by Baumgarten under one and the same aspect: the formation of sensible representations. Thus with his conception of the formative faculty he seeks to unify Baumgarten’s “doctrine of lower knowledge”. To make this clear, we will first have to specify the concept of the formative faculty that is discussed both in Kant’s Reflections on anthropology and in the various transcrip tions of his anthropological lectures. The notes from his early lectures distinguish between a whole series of various kinds of faculties of forma tion:20 1. the faculty of direct image formation (Abbildungsvermçgen); 2. the faculty of reproductive image formation (Nachbildungsvermçgen); 3. the faculty of anticipatory image formation (Vorbildungsvermçgen); 4. the faculty of imaginative formation (Einbildungsvermçgen); 5. the faculty of completing formation (Ausbildungsvermçgen). Another formative faculty can be added to these: 6. the faculty of counterimage formation (das Vermçgen der Gegenbildung, the faculty to represent something by means of signs).21 Since every one of these can be described as a formative faculty, we can take ‘formative faculty’ as the generic term for them. The formative fac ulty in its broader sense is to be distinguished from the narrower sense of the expression according to which the ‘formative faculty’ could just 20 See V Anth/Collins/Philippi (1772/3), AA 25:45, 76; V Anth/Parow (1772/3), AA 25:303; V Anth/Friedlnder (1775/6), AA 25:511 f. At one point this list is preceded by the heading “On the formative faculties” (V Anth/Philippi, AA 25:76.4). 21 This faculty is not mentioned in any listing of the individual formative faculties in the transcriptions of Kant’s anthropology lectures. However, the expression ‘counterimage (formation)’ is found in the Reflexionen zur Anthropologie. See Kant’s remarks on “Gegenbild, symbolum” and “Bezeichnung: signatrix (s Gegenbild)” within the discussion of the formative faculties; Refl 314 (1769?), AA 15:124.17 and Refl 326 (1769/70?, s addendum: 1770s), AA 15:129.6. In Refl 313a (1769?), AA 15:123, Kant explicitly adds “The counter image: symbolum” to the series of the five formative faculties initially men tioned. The lecture transcription V MP L1/Pçlitz, AA 28:237 also mentions the “the faculty of counterimage formation” as a “faculty of formative power.”

74

Matthias Wunsch

refer to the first of the six faculties (the faculty of direct image forma tion).22 Rudolf A. Makkreel has already argued for the thesis that Kant uni fies Baumgarten’s lower cognitive faculties with his conception of the formative faculty.23 However, in my view a few more things need to be added to his characterization. Makkreel claims that the Abbildungsvermçgen, the faculty of “direct image formation” from sensations, “roughly” corresponds to Baumgarten’s faculty of exact perception, the ‘acute sense’ (sensus acutus).24 But for Kant and Baumgarten both, acute senses are senses that already register fine distinctions and can be sharpened through practice.25 Thus they are only needed for an especial ly accurate formation of images and not for the ability to represent im ages of present objects per se. Thus Kant’s ‘Abbildungsvermçgen’ just cor responds to Baumgarten’s ‘sensus’, insofar as it is already associated with a formative activity. This is precisely what Baumgarten seems to assume, as suggested by the line: “Every sensation is a sensible representation that has to be formed by the lower cognitive faculty” (omnis sensatio est sensitiva formanda per facultatem cognoscitivam inferiorem).26 Kant’s Nach-, Vor- and Einbildungsvermçgen (the faculties of reproductive, anticipatory, and imaginative image formation), as Makkreel notes, correspond to Baumgarten’s phantasia, praevisio (foresight) and facultas fingendi (faculty of fiction). The Ausbildungsvermçgen, the faculty of completing forma tion, does not correspond to anything in Baumgarten. Kant probably adopted it into his theory of formative faculties following A. F. Hoff mann and C. A. Crusius.27 Crusius discusses a “power to finish incom plete ideas” and emphasizes that Hoffmann had “first dealt with this in

22 See V Anth/Collins, AA 25:76.5 – 7, and V Anth/Brauer/Parow, AA 25:303.19 – 23. 23 Makkreel (1990, 11 – 14, here: 12). On this thesis see already Schmidt (1924, 7 f.). 24 Ibid., 13 f.—On Baumgarten’s ‘sensus acutus’ see Metaphysica, § 540, and Aes thetica, § 30. 25 V Anth/Collins, AA 25:57.17 – 20. 26 Baumgarten, Metaphysica, § 544, my emphasis.—This passage also clearly shows that Makkreel’s (1990, 2) claim that Baumgarten only emphasizes the formative ability in connection with the “ars formandi gustum” (§ 607) is inadequate. Rather, references to this ability are also found in the empirical psychology of the Metaphysica in §§ 522, 544, 557, 570, 571, 632 and 637. 27 This is overlooked by both Makkreel (1997) and Schmidt (1924, 8).

The Activity of Sensibility in Kant’s Anthropology

75

particular.”28 The Vermçgen der Gegenbildung (faculty of counterimage formation), finally, corresponds to Baumgarten’s facultas characteristica (faculty of signs). Makkreel does not mention that Kant’s choice of the generic term ‘formative faculty’ has also a concise textual basis in Baumgarten, who notes that the sensitive share of a representation ba sically “is formed by the lower cognitive faculty” (formatur per facultatem cognoscitivam inferiorem).29 Although Kant’s conception of the formative faculty and Baumgart en’s conception of the lower cognitive faculty are closer than Makkreel presents them to be, it should not be forgotten that Kant’s concept of the formative faculty is developed against the background of a different theory of representation from Baumgarten’s doctrine of lower knowl edge. As mentioned at the outset, starting with the Dissertatio at the lat est, Kant no longer primarily classifies representations as obscure, con fused or distinct; the differences in their origin are more fundamental than this logical distinction. In establishing this difference, Kant is led to a theory that assumes a pure sensibility and laws founded on this pure sensibility. The various formative faculties have to be seen as a part of this theory; according to the Collins transcription, in 1772/ 1773, Kant dealt with them in his anthropology lecture under the head ing “Of Sensiblity.”30 But now this leads us straight back to the thesis mentioned at the beginning, namely that Kant develops the conception of an active sensibility in his anthropology.

28 Crusius, Weg zur Gewissheit und Zuverlssigkeit der menschlichen Erkenntnis, § 101, italicization removed by author, and § 104. This text by Crusius is a reworking of the Vernunftlehre of his teacher Hoffmann; see Wundt (1945, 262 f., 248 – 54). 29 Baumgarten, Metaphysica, § 522, my emphasis. In § 570 Baumgarten stresses this for the ‘phantasia’: “[O]mnis imaginatio est sensitiva […], formanda per facul tatem cognoscitivam inferiorem”. Of Baumgarten’s other lower cognitive fac ulties not mentioned so far, perspicacia (i. e. ingenium and acumen), iudicium and praesagitio do not correspond to anything in Kant’s formative faculties (even though they are often discussed in the transcriptions of the anthropology lec tures), whereas memoria, as I will explain at the end of the 3rd section, is a mode of the faculty of reproductive image formation. 30 V Anth/Collins, AA 25:44 f. See also the early approach taken in Refl 316 (1769?), AA 15:125.19 f.

76

Matthias Wunsch

3. The formative faculty as the active part of sensibility Kant calls representations that do not rest on mere affectivity, as impres sions and sensations do, ‘images.’ The primary epistemological charac teristic of images is that we generate them ourselves through the action of the formative faculty. This distinguishes the formative faculties in general from the senses as capacities for receiving sensation. By the end of the 1760s Kant already distinguished the production of sensible representations according to whether it was “either passive or active,” i. e. whether they were generated passively through affection or related to an activity of the mind.31 By 1769/70 Kant was considering the idea of allocating this activity to sensibility: sensibility was to be responsible for the material aspect of sensible representations through its receptive sense, but was also to include a “faculty of intuition” that would account for the sensible form of these representations.32 A Reflection that accord ing to Adickes probably dates from 1773/5 captures this dichotomy and relates it to the formative faculty: Our sensible faculties are either senses or formative powers. The latter are produced by us ourselves, not through the impression of the senses but none theless under the conditions in which the objects would affect or have af fected our senses.33

In the Metaphysik L1 lecture transcription (from the second half of the 1770s) Kant distinguishes accordingly between the “faculty of the senses themselves” and the faculty of the “imitated knowledge of the senses,” which “can quite properly be called the formative power.”34 Thus here as well we find Kant drawing a two fold distinction within the “sensible cognitive faculty,” i. e. “for sensibility,”35 based on the origin of the rep resentation. In sense the representation arises “entirely through the im 31 Refl 314 (1769?), AA 15:124.4. 32 Refl 680 (1769/70), AA 15:302: “Sensibility can be considered according to its matter or its form. The matter of sensibility is sensation, and its faculty is sense; the form of sensibility is appearance, and its faculty the intuition.”– Refl 650 (1769/70), AA 15:287: “Sensible representations are either sensations and re quire sense, or appearances and are founded on the faculty of intuition.” 33 Refl 287 (1773/5?), AA 15:107 f.; my emphasis.—According to the quotation, we produce the formative powers themselves; but what Kant means is their products. 34 V MP L1/Pçlitz, AA 28:230.8 – 10 (the first two quotations), AA 28:235.17 – 8 (third quotation). 35 Ibid., p. 230.8 and p. 235.11.

The Activity of Sensibility in Kant’s Anthropology

77

pression of the object,” and in the case of the formative power it arises “from the mind, but under the condition in which the mind is affected by the objects of the senses.”36 Sensible representations arising “from the mind” are thus representations subject to the formal principles of intu ition and generated by the formative activities of the mind. Thus Kant counts them among the representations that are ‘made’ rather than ‘given.’37 He sees them as representations of the formative power that “originate from the spontaneity of the mind,” and at the same time he believes that the formative power “belongs to sensibility.”38 The conclusion from all this is obvious: in conceiving the formative faculty as a part of sensibility, Kant ascribes a dimension of spontaneity and activity to sensibility. Thus he goes beyond the simple equation ‘sensibility = receptivitas’ not just in supposing that sensibility is the source of its own laws which all sensible content is subject to, but also in seeing this content as fashioned by an active faculty of knowl edge, the formative faculty. In what follows I will sketch the basic fea tures of Kant’s anthropological theory of an active and spontaneous sen sibility by describing the activities of the various formative faculties and examining how they relate to each other and depend on one another. The first three formative faculties mentioned above distinguish themselves by the fact that their representations come with a temporal index and a reference to reality: the faculty of direct image formation represents a present object as actually present, while the faculties of re productive and anticipatory image formation represent an absent object as actual in past or future. The anthropology prepares the way for Kant’s renowned thesis from the Critique of Pure Reason that “imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself” by ascribing the active mo ment of formation to the Abbildungsvermçgen, the faculty of direct image formation.39 This faculty “is active,” since it “goes through the acts of making images from impressions;” its product, the “direct image,” is a sensible representation put together into an intuitive whole from impressions.40 36 Ibid., p. 230.10 – 14; cf. p. 235.19 – 21. 37 Ibid., p. 230.26. 38 Ibid., p. 230.21 f.; p. 231.5.; cf. p. 235.21 f. On Kant’s conception of an active sensibility according to V MP L1/Pçlitz; see also Caygill (2003, 180 f.). 39 CPR, A 120 note. 40 V Anth/Parow, AA 25:303.33 (first quotation); Refl 327 (1772?), AA 15:129.25 f. (second quotation); Refl 314 (1769?), AA 15:124.16 (third quota tion).—See also V Anth/Collins/Philippi, AA 25:45.3 – 9, as well as the follow

78

Matthias Wunsch

In regards to Baumgarten, Kant identifies the faculty of reproductive image formation with both “Phantasie” and “Imagination”41 and the faculty of anticipatory image formation with “Praevision.” Not just reproduc tive images but also anticipatory images depend on the associations of temporally linked types of representations.42 If an associative link exists between two representations that occurred successively in the past, then the occurrence of a representation of the first type can allow one to an ticipate a representation of the second type. The anticipated representa tion is a preliminary formation generated on the basis of associative con nections. The faculty of anticipatory image formation clearly depends on the faculty of reproductive image formation, since the ‘terminus an tecedentus’ of the associative connection first has to be reproduced from the current representation before its associate correlate can be formed in anticipation.43 What makes Kant’s conception of the relation between the faculty of direct image formation and the faculties of reproductive and anticipa tory image formation particularly interesting is that it seems to anticipate several of the phenomenological insights of the 20th century. For one thing, Kant sees the faculty of direct image formation as the “founda ing passages: “The formative faculty is the compilation of impressions, from which a whole then emerges.” (V Anth/Philippi, AA 25:76 note 3)—“For every sensibility there is at the same time an act of direct image formation, in which we gather the images of the impressions that occur to our senses and rep resent them to ourselves at once” (V Anth/Parow, AA 25:269.3 – 6).—“When the eyes are opened many sensible impressions occur, my mind puts them to gether and makes out of them a whole, and this is the formative faculty.” (V Anth/Parow, AA 25:303.26) 41 V Anth/Collins, AA 25:45.18. On the identification of the faculty of reproduc tive image formation with the first see also V Anth/Parow, AA 25:304.2, and with the second see V Anth/Collins, AA 25:78.8 – 9 and 95.11. 42 V Anth/Friedlnder, AA 25:512.23 – 5: “The faculty of reproductive image for mation has its law, it follows the law of association of the representations.”— Refl 315 (1769?), AA 15:125.6 – 7: “The subjective ground of the reproductive image formations is also the ground of the anticipatory image formation.” See also V Anth/Parow, AA 25:304.10: “Anticipatory image formation happens just like reproductive image formation.” 43 See Refl 316 (1769?), AA 15:125.22 – 7. “The Phantasie [reproductive image formation] consists in this: the present reproduces the past, and one of these representations another; the former is the cause of the reproduction, the latter [is the cause of] the continuation, both according to the law of association. The Praevision [anticipatory image formation] is only an effect of this, when we set the terminum antecedentem of Phantasie in the present moment.”

The Activity of Sensibility in Kant’s Anthropology

79

tion” of the other modes of formation,44 since reproductive and antici patory images are produced on the occasions of current direct images and in light of past direct images. For another, the faculty of direct image formation also presupposes the work of reproduction and antici pation, as can be seen in several of the examples from Kant’s anthropol ogy. For instance, when we are reciting something, it is a precondition for the coherence of the recital that we ‘protend,’ i. e. form in anticipa tion, that which immediately follows.45 Kant also mentions that an im provising pianist has to “in part preview the future notes and in part re view the notes produced if no dissonance is to occur.”46 We can con clude from this that a ‘direct image’ of complete temporal wholes re quires reproductive and anticipatory activities. While we are ‘directly’ forming the melody played by the pianist, we also reproduce sequences played earlier and anticipate this or that continuation or rule it out.47 Yet the direct formation of spatial wholes and not just temporal wholes also involves reproduction and anticipation: “In intuiting what is present we continuously look to the past and the future. In this way we bring it into a connection and become aware of it.”48 The intuition of that which is present does not consist in the impressions filling some possible Now; it is equally constituted by the activity of reproduction and anticipation.49 Even if Kant’s anthropology is not designed to aim at any fundamental epistemological analysis, it nonetheless implies the general idea that it is a condition of all our acts of speaking and thinking as well as action and perception that we incorporate that which is past, anticipated, or possi ble. The three formative faculties discussed so far are characterized by the temporal reference and context of their representations and by repre senting their objects as actual. In contrast, the “Einbildung is an image 44 Refl 315 (1769?), AA 15:125.3. 45 V Anth/Collins, AA 25:119.4 f.; see also V Anth/Parow, AA 25:335.5 f. 46 V Anth/Parow, AA 25:249.29 f. In Refl 390 (1776/8), AA 15:156, Kant formu lates this thought as follows: “That in speaking we always look a distance back and a distance ahead, without which there would be no connection.” 47 We do not explicitly rule out certain conceivable continuations in listening; but that we have ruled them out de facto can be shown by the fact that we are sur prised when they in fact occur. 48 V Anth/Philippi, AA 25:87.26 – 8. 49 Cf. V Anth/Philippi, AA 25:119 note 2: “If we understand the present to be a whole stretch of time, then we do not see something like a point before us that expresses the present, but rather a whole district in time.”

80

Matthias Wunsch

of fabrication, facultas fingendi, it is an image of an object that is neither present nor past or future, but rather is a fiction.”50 The work of the faculty of imaginative formation enables us to “create a whole new object,” i. e. “produce self created objects.”51 However, the possibilities of imag inative formation are constrained by what is sensibly given, since we cannot create sensations,52 but only combine them.53 The faculty of completing formation relates to this point. When a given representation is incomplete or imperfect, we add the missing element in our representation by interpolating, supplementing or improving it actions which characterize the faculty of completing formation, the “faculty of perfection” (facultas perficiendi).54 The faculty of formation has a tendency to complete everything in our mind. Thus when we become aware of something, we make ourselves a concept of it. If the object does not accord with the concept, the mind in cessantly strives to complete it.55

Thus the activity of completing relies on a concept that functions as a standard. In the case of a half hidden spatial object, for example, this standard consists in an empirical conception of the thing. But the con cepts of numbers or aesthetic ideals can also serve as standards, such as when we ‘round up to a dozen’ or improve “an imperfect piece in the comedy” in our thoughts.56 The faculty of counterimage formation is the faculty to represent things by means of signs. The signs (counterimages) in question can be divided

50 V Anth/Friedlnder, AA 25:511.21 – 4; my emphasis. 51 V Anth/Parow, AA 25:269.13 (first quotation); V Anth/Philippi, AA 25:87.24 – 5 (second quotation). 52 See V Anth/Parow, AA 25:321.33, u. V Anth/Collins, AA 25:95.23 – 4. 53 V Anth/Collins, AA 25:46.1 – 2: The “Einbildung only takes the materials from the senses, but it creates the form itself.” Cf. V Anth/Philippi, AA 25:76 f.: “We can never entirely fabricate something, rather we have always so to speak cop ied the materials and thus we can only change the form.”—An additional limit to our freedom in forming new representations is that we cannot imagine any thing logically impossible (V Anth/Parow, AA 25:326.6 – 7; V Anth/Collins, AA 25:100.1 – 2). 54 V Anth/Friedlnder, AA 25:512.22. 55 V Anth/Friedlnder, AA 25:512.1 – 5. The “tendency […] to perfect (perficien di)” is already mentioned in the Refl 313a (1769?), AA 15:123. 56 See the examples in V Anth/Friedlnder, AA 25:512.6 – 17.

The Activity of Sensibility in Kant’s Anthropology

81

into linguistic signs (words) and non linguistic signs (symbols).57 We cannot go into the understanding of symbols here, since for Kant it pre supposes an analogical use of reason58 and thus can’t be ascribed to the active part of sensibility. In the case of words, however, Kant sees the formation of counterimages primarily as an associative reproductive image formation. “For each word one reproduces (nachbilden) the repre sentation that one tends to associates with the word.”59 Kant’s theory of the formative faculty is made even more complex by his distinction between two different ways of using each faculty: an involuntary and a voluntary use. Whereas the former is described as un conscious, unrestrained and without rules, the latter is a conscious use in accordance with the understanding. For Kant, all humans face the chal lenge of bringing all of their faculties under their own free will and thus attaining self control. This demand of pragmatic anthropology is not pri marily ethical in nature, but rather a law of prudence. Prudential behav ior towards oneself and in the world entails acting with self determina tion. For this purpose, according to Kant, all of our faculties have to be disciplined, cultivated and instructed by the understanding. Thus Kant continually warns us against the involuntary use of the formative faculty, whereas he attributes great significance to its voluntary use, since it se cures the proper goal directed functioning of the formative faculties (epistemically, for example). That Kant allows for a voluntary and involuntary use of the individ ual formative faculties leads to a sort of doubling of the entire theory of formative faculties. I would like to briefly illustrate this using the exam ples of the faculties of reproductive image formation and imaginative formation. a) The involuntary formation of reproductive images causes some images to reappear all of a sudden, and is to be distinguished from memory, the activity of remembering, i. e. the faculty of reproducing images from the past at will. ‘Memory’ refers to the conscious reference to the past. b) Kant also distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary imaginative formation. He discusses involuntary imaginative formation in conjunction with dreams, hypochondriac behavior, and various men 57 V MP L1/Pçlitz, AA 28:237.16; Refl 313a (1769?), AA 15:123.21; cf. Refl 314 (1769?), AA 15:124.17. Sometimes Kant calls symbols ‘sense images’; see for example V Anth/Collins, AA 25:126.23; V Anth/Friedlnder, AA 25:536.2 – 3. 58 V Anth/Friedlnder, AA 25:552.2 – 6; V Anth/Pillau, AA 25:778.33 – 35; cf. Anth, AA 7:191. 59 V Anth/Parow, AA 25:305.24 f.

82

Matthias Wunsch

tal disorders. Voluntary imaginative formation, in contrast, is typical of all acts of discovery, invention and creativity, such as in art or in the for mulation of hypotheses.

4. Transformation: From ‘formative faculty’ to ‘Einbildungskraft (imagination)’ For the purposes of getting a clear outline of Kant’s theory of the for mative faculties, it would be better to view the theory as a stable struc ture and to ignore questions of the shifts, terminological and otherwise, that the theory undergoes. Nonetheless, in what follows I would like to turn to the historical development of the theory in order to reconstruct the prehistory of Kant’s later theory of the Einbildungskraft (at least in sofar as it concerns the anthropology). The transcripts from Kant’s an thropology lectures of the 1770s are particularly indispensable to this.60 Together with Kant’s Reflections on anthropology they give us a clear history of the various stages in the development of the theory of the formative faculties and allow us to date when Kant started to take the concept of the Einbildungskraft as the new foundation of his concep tion of active sensibility. Kant had already used the concept ‘formative faculty/power’ before his first anthropology lecture in the winter semester of 1772/3.61 His early conception of the formative faculty first emerges in 1769/1770, thus at the same time that he was developing his new theory of sensibil ity. The relevant passages are the Reflections 313a 326, where Kant de scribes the modes of formation that he later sets out synoptically in his 60 H. Mörchen, who has produced the most detailed and informative investigation of “Kant’s anthropological discussions of the imagination” thus far (Mörchen (1930, 319 – 52)), was not yet able to make use of these transcriptions, and thus treats Kant’s statements on the formative faculty and the imagination, which he characterizes (ibid., 334 – 50) based on the V MP L1/Pçlitz, as a static structure. The same holds for V. Satura (1971, 113 ff.).—Yet no sufficient clari ty has been achieved on the anthropological prehistory of Kant’s theory of Ein bildungskraft since the publication of Kant’s anthropological lectures in the Aka demie Ausgabe (1997). 61 If Adickes’ dating is correct, then the Refl 352 (1762/3?), AA 15: 138 is to my knowledge the first mention of the formative power. However, the question Kant poses in that passage (“Whether the stream of Phantasie, as well as the di rection of its formative power, stems from the mind?”) is not sufficient to re construct his earlier concept of the formative power.

The Activity of Sensibility in Kant’s Anthropology

83

first anthropology lecture.62 Thus according to the published material Kant’s theory of the formative faculties emerges in the time from 1769 to 1773. As it concerns the conception of sensibility, the central thought which, judging by Adickes’ dating, Kant probably first set down in 1773/1775 is that sensibility includes not just the receptive ca pacities, the senses, but also the active faculties of the formation of sen sible representations.63 The theory of the formative faculty remains essentially constant from 1769 to 1776; and within this context, ‘Einbildungskraft’ refers solely to the faculty of producing new representations. This changes in the Pillau transcription of the anthropology lecture from the winter semester of 1777/8, where Einbildungskraft takes on the functions that had previously been reserved for other formative faculties. Among other things, Kant now says of the Einbildungskraft that it is “the representation of things past.”64 Since ‘Einbildungen (imaginings)’ thus take on a possible reference to the past, one could expect that this would simultaneously push into the background the terms previously used for this, ‘Nachbil dung (reproductive image formation)’ and ‘Phantasie.’ And this is in fact the case for terms like ‘Nachbildung(svermögen)’ and ‘nachbilden (reproductive image forming).’ They appear in the Friedlnder transcription (1775/6),65 but not in the Pillau transcription,66 which instead talks about the ‘Reproduktionsvermögen (faculty of re production)’67 or, as just quoted, the ‘Einbildungskraft.’ The term ‘Phantasie,’ in contrast, continues to be used throughout all transcrip tions, though it takes on a narrower meaning over the course of time. While in the transcriptions of the first lecture in 1772/3 it is used (a) synonymously with ‘reproductive image formation’68 and (b) to refer 62 Refl 313a 326, AA 15:123 – 9. V Anth/Collins/Philippi, AA 25:45 and 76 f.; V Anth/Parow, AA 25:303. 63 Refl 287 (1773/5?), AA 15:107 f.; see as well Kant’s earlier Reflections quoted in note 32. 64 V Anth/Pillau, AA 25:751.10 f. 65 V Anth/Friedlnder, AA 25:511.19 – 21 as well as p. 512.22 – 4. 66 A look at the guiding texts of the edition of Kant’s anthropology lectures shows that such expressions occur most frequently in Collins and Parow (around ten times each), less often in Friedlnder (four times), not at all in Pillau, only occa sionally (twice) in the longest guiding text (Menschenkunde) and then later not at all ( just as in Anth). 67 V Anth/Pillau, AA 25:752.6 f. 68 V Anth/Collins, AA 25:45.15 – 18, 78.8 f. and 95.11; V Anth/Parow, AA 25:305.22 f.

84

Matthias Wunsch

to the uncontrolled production of images,69 for example as is character istic of the so called ‘fantasists,’70 the first meaning (a) ‘Phantasie’ as the reproduction of the past has disappeared by 1775/6. The latter meaning is now dominant and thus with it the ‘fantasticalness’ and the perverse, unruly, arbitrary, rhapsodical, dissipated, depraced and pathological fantasy.71 Thus Kant increasingly distances himself from Baumgarten’s concept of ‘phantasia,’ which referred primarily to the fac ulty of becoming conscious of the past states of the world and only marginally included the “vana phantasmata” and unrestrained fantasy (phantasia effrenis).72 Kant restricts the meaning of ‘Phantasie’ to this marginal area and from this point on gives the expression a primarily negative connotation. Thus ‘Phantasie’ falls under the purview of the involuntary formative faculty and is essentially identified with it. In the Pillau transcription (1777/8) this restriction of the meaning of ‘Phantasie’ to a merely involuntary activity which means: the episte mological devaluation of the concept goes hand in hand with an ex tension and higher valution of the concept of ‘Einbildungskraft’, of which the following passage is typical: In a more narrow sense the Einbildungs Kraft is the representation of things past. But typically people see it as the whole field of the formative faculty, in dependently of the presence of the objects. […] Einbildung is sometimes distinguished from Phantasie. The Einbildung is the formative faculty insofar as it is in some measure subject to the will [Willkr]: Phantasie is without will [Willkr], even contrary to the will [Wille]. A fantasist is not someone who has no many images, but someone for whom the images impose themselves contrary to his will. Einbildung also does not act in accordance with our will, but we can direct it towards objects.73

Two points concerning the relation of the Einbildungskraft to Phantasie and the formative faculty are worth emphasizing. Firstly, Kant distinguishes Einbildungskraft from Phantasie. His crite rion is that the latter is in essence involuntarily active, whereas we can at least point the former in a certain direction. Since, in contrast to Phan69 For example: V Anth/Collins, AA 25:87.21; V Anth/Parow, AA 25:310.16 – 20. 70 V Anth/Collins, AA 25:105 – 7; V Anth/Parow, AA 25:326.25 – 7 and p. 330 f. 71 V Anth/Friedlnder, AA 25:514 f., p. 528 – 31; V Anth/Pillau, AA 25:753.8 – 30, p. 758.21 f., p. 763 – 5; V Menschenkunde, AA 25:945.22 – 946.12, p. 948.19 – 949.20, p. 955.9 – 959.14, p. 1006, p. 1012.14 – 8, p. 1033.19 – 22. 72 Metaphysica, § 557 and § 571. 73 V Anth/Pillau, AA 25:751.10 – 22, my emphasis.

The Activity of Sensibility in Kant’s Anthropology

85

tasie, we are able to ‘steer’ Einbildungskraft, Kant plays this off against the negatively connotated Phantasie and gives it a higher relative epistemo logical value. As Kant sees involuntary activity in the Reflection 338, we are in a sense not the subject of the act of Phantasie, and thus Phantasie is passive in this regard: “Phantasie is passive. [/] It plays with us;” whereas in contrast: “Einbildungskraft is active. [/] We play with it.”74 Secondly, and this is the decisive point, the voluntary use of the Einbildungskraft is identified with almost the entirety of the formative faculty. As will shortly become clear, there is only one exception. The Einbildungskraft, Kant writes, is “the whole field of the formative faculty, independently of the presence of the objects.” This should be taken to mean that all the representations that represent things “that are not present” can be called ‘Einbildungen (imaginings).’75 However, we can relate to such things not just through new, self created representations, but also through rep resentations of the past or the future and by means of signs. Completions of images (Ausbildungen) are also to be understood as representations of things that are not present; since it is precisely because an object is not entirely present (in the sense that it is partially hidden, for example) that we fill in the complete representation of it. This means that the Einbildungskraft so conceived covers all formative activities with the exception of direct image formation: the formation of reproductive, anticipatory, imaginative, completing, and counter images. Thus Kant quite consis tently modifies the distinction of sensibility described above, between senses and formative powers, and now writes: “Sensibility. Sense and Einbildungskraft.”76 Thus the Einbildungskraft has taken the place of the formative faculty.77 This terminological shift shows that it has now taken over the function of almost the entire epistemically relevant activity of sensibility.

74 Refl 338 (1776/9?), AA 15:133.20 f. Around this time Kant also emphasizes the difference between Phantasie and Einbildungskraft in Refl 337 (1776/9?) and Refl 369 (1776/9?), AA 15:133 and 144. 75 V Anth/Pillau, AA 25:750.27. 76 Refl 223 (1776/8?), AA 15:85. Cf. Refl 225 (1783/4), AA 15:86.4ff; Refl 342 (1780/9), AA 15:134; Refl 1482 (s addendum 1775/89), AA 15:675.18 f.; Refl 1503 (s addendum 1780/1804), AA 15:801 and Anth, AA 7:153. 77 Both are identified accordingly in Refl 339 (1780/9), AA 15:134.5 f.

86

Matthias Wunsch

5. The distinction between ‘productive’ and ‘reproductive’ Einbildungskraft Since as of 1777/8 ‘Einbildungskraft’ serves as the general term in Kant’s anthropology for all activities of the formative faculty (aside from direct image formation), Kant now requires a terminological appa ratus to register the distinctions within the concept of the formative fac ulty within his new and comprehensive conception of the Einbildungskraft. He makes use of the following distinction: the “faculty of the Einbildungskraft is twofold, productive and reproductive.”78 This distinc tion, which is the foundation of Kant’s conception of the Einbildungskraft, first emerges in the surviving transcripts from his anthropology lectures in 1781/2, i. e. in the Petersburg and Menschenkunde transcripts.79 The reproductive Einbildungskraft or the “faculty of reproduction is the faculty of producing again the images of things that were formerly pres ent.”80 This matches the substance of Kant’s earlier characterization of the faculty of reproductive image formation. Accordingly the passage goes on immediately to say: “This faculty underlies […] all memory, where our Einbildung only reproduces.”81 It is characteristic of memory that it recalls representations of the past “with consciousness” and “vol untarily.”82 The substance of this characterization is also familiar material from the earlier transcriptions of the anthropology lectures. Termino 78 V Menschenkunde, AA 25:945.1 f. 79 The Pillau transcription from 1777/8 does not yet explicitly make this distinc tion, even if we find there the contrast between a ‘faculty of reproduction’ and a ‘faculty of creation’ (V Anth/Pillau, AA 25:752.5 – 9). The passages on pro ductive and reproductive Einbildungskraft in V Menschenkunde are: AA 25:945, 974, 981 and 1062.—The Petersburg transcription does not belong to the guiding texts of the edition of the anthropology transcriptions in AA 25. However, like all other transcriptions, it is available on the internet in the elec tronic documentation of Kant’s lectures on anthropology (http://www.uni marburg.de/kant/webseitn/gt ind30.htm). The passages on reproductive and productive Einbildungskraft in the Petersburg transcription are found on pages 62, 83, 90 and 172.—It is worth noting several other anthropological remarks by Kant that do not rule out putting the date of the distinction before 1781. According to Adickes’ dating, their terminus post quem is 1780 (Refl 340 and 341, AA 15:134) or even 1776 (Refl 1485, AA 15:699.12); yet the late terminus ante quem, 1789, does not force the earlier dating. 80 V Menschenkunde, AA 25 945.2 – 4. 81 Ibid., p. 945.4 – 6. 82 Ibid., AA 25:974.8 – 14.

The Activity of Sensibility in Kant’s Anthropology

87

logically, however, memory is now associated with the generic term ‘Einbildungskraft’ or more precisely with the voluntary mode of that Einbildungskraft which is called ‘reproductive.’83 Its counterpart in Kant’s anthropological theory of Einbildungskraft is the involuntary activity of reproductive Einbildungskraft, which is called “Imagination” and “Phan tasie” in the transcript of the 1781/2 lecture.84 The ‘faculty of imaginative formation,’ i. e. the ‘facultas fingendi’ of the earlier transcripts of the anthropological lectures is now absorbed into the productive aspect of the more broadly conceived Einbildungskraft. The faculty of production is creative and produces things that were not thus in our senses previously.—This creative faculty is also called the productive Einbildungskraft or the poetic faculty.85

Unsurprisingly, Kant also distinguishes two modes of exercising the pro ductive Einbildungskraft as well. “This faculty of production is divided into the voluntary and involuntary imagination. […] The involuntary is called Phantasie.”86 Poetic creation, in contrast, is “actually the inten tional creation of new representations, […] thus the act whereby I de liberately use given materials to make for myself new ones.”87 Thus whereas of ‘poetizing’ and ‘memory’ refers to the voluntary use of the productive and reproductive Einbildungskraft, ‘Phantasie’ refers to the entirety of the involuntary use of the Einbildungskraft. This distinction between reproductive and productive Einbildungskraft gives Kant the conceptual apparatus he needs in his anthropology in order to trace the individual formative faculties (with the exception of direct image formation) back to the Einbildungskraft. The connections that we found in our discussion of the formative faculties can help to 83 In the earlier Pillau transcript, memory, “as the power of will over the products of the Einbildungskraft,” is first brought together with the Einbildungskraft, (V Anth/Pillau, AA 25:756.17 f.), although Kant does not yet explicitly distinguish between reproductive and productive Einbildungskraft. This offers further sup port for the view defended in the previous section that the Pillau transcription already features a decisive expansion of the meaning of the term ‘Einbildungs kraft’. 84 V Menschenkunde, AA 25:974.14 – 22. 85 Ibid., AA 25:945.6 f.—Ibid., 981.4 – 6. 86 Ibid., AA 25:945.22 – 6. Elsewhere Kant also names the involuntary productive Einbildungskraft simply “Imagination,” thus calling it by the name used in the above quotation for the general term for both types of productive Einbildungs kraft. Ibid., AA 25:981.9 – 12. 87 Ibid., AA 25:981.7 – 9.

88

Matthias Wunsch

clarify how this works. Anticipatory image formation is based on repro ductive image formation, which in the new terminology has to be clas sified as an activity of the reproductive Einbildungskraft. Completing for mation is founded essentially on adding imaginatively to the representa tion, i. e. imaginative formation, which within the new terminology has to be considered an activity of the productive Einbildungskraft. Counter image formation, if the signs in question are words, is an associative re productive image formation in Kant’s conception and thus is based on reproductive Einbildungskraft. However, nowhere does Kant explicitly set out the reduction sketched here; yet the fact that the terms ‘forma tive faculty/power’ cannot be found in the Critique of Pure Reason and any of his later publications, and that the activities previously discussed under this heading are now attributed to the Einbildungskraft, shows that Kant had made this reduction de facto.

Conclusion From the end of the 1760s to the second half of the 1770s Kant had de veloped a conception of the formative faculty that is active and sponta neous and yet at the same time belongs to sensibility. Kant’s develop ment of this conception began with the Dissertatio concept of the coor dination of the sensible, and in the context of his anthropology it was motivated by his goal of unifying the diverse activities that Baumgarten attributed to the ‘lower cognitive faculty.’ It is precisely for the purposes of achieving a unified theory that the concept of Einbildungskraft then proves to be more stringent, since it avoids the redundancies that had marked the concept of formative faculty and yet due to the internal ‘productive/reproductive’ distinction it can almost completely absorb the diverse jobs the formative faculty had been responsible for. Only direct image formation cannot be reduced to the Einbildungs kraft. As the examples above have shown, it presupposes reproductive and anticipatory work and thus presupposes the work of the reproductive Einbildungskraft. Yet in the Critique of Pure Reason it is part of Kant’s core conception of direct image formation, i. e. the perception of empirical objects, that it also involves the activity of the productive Einbildungskraft. In his anthropology Kant lacks both the interest and the conceptual means to get a better view of this activity. For this reason the question of the epistemological consequences of the anthropological conception of active sensibility cannot be answered here. What would it take to

The Activity of Sensibility in Kant’s Anthropology

89

bring these consequences to light? The anthropological concept of productive Einbildungskraft would have to be grounded in a transcendental concept.88 On Kant’s view we can only understand this transcendental concept of productive Einbildungskraft in working through the problem of the transcendental deduction of the categories. Here we would also have to determine precisely how autonomous the imaginative activity of sensibility is, that is, to what extent it should be seen as independent of the understanding. Thus in terms of historical development we would have to examine Kant’s outlines of such a deduction preceding the Critique of Pure Reason with a view to the Einbildungskraft. 89 In this light it is quite significant that, so far as all present source materials indicate, Kant first explicitly distinguishes between reproductive and productive Einbildungskraft in an outline for such a deduction stemming from the spring of 1780 the ‘loose page’ B 12 in which Kant also introduces the transcendental Einbildungskraft. 90 This text would have to play a central role if we wished to expand this examination of the historical develop ment of the activity of sensibility in Kant’s anthropology in connection with Kant’s epistemology.

Bibliography Baeumler, Alfred (1967): Das Irrationalitätsproblem in der Ästhetik und Logik des 18. Jahrhunderts bis zur Kritik der Urteilskraft. Mit einem Nachwort zum Neudruck [reprint of the 1st edition, Halle 1923], Darmstadt. Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb (1954): Reflections on Poetry: A. G. Baum garten’s Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus, Halle 1735, trans. K. Aschenbrenner and W. B. Holther, Berkeley. Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb (41757) (11739): Metaphysica, Halle, reprinted in: AA 15:5 – 54 and AA 17:5 – 226. Carl, Wolfgang (1989): Der schweigende Kant. Die Entwürfe zu einer Deduk tion der Kategorien vor 1781, Göttingen. Caygill, Howard (2003): Kant’s Apology for Sensibility, in: B. Jacobs (ed.): Es says on Kant’s Anthropology, Cambridge, pp. 164 – 193.

88 Then the ‘productive’ activities of Einbildungskraft would include not just those by means of which we can creatively see a dog in a cloud, for example, but those that we need to see anything as a dog at all. Cf. Strawson (1974). 89 These outlines are found in Kant’s Reflexionen zur Metaphysik (AA 17); see also the text mentioned in the following note. 90 The ‘loose page’ B 12 is found in AA 23:18 – 20. For a detailed analysis of the text see Carl (1989).

90

Matthias Wunsch

Crusius, Christian August (1965): Weg zur Gewissheit und Zuverlässigkeit der menschlichen Erkenntnis, Leipzig 1747, reprint: Hildesheim. Franke, Ursula (1972): Kunst als Erkenntnis. Die Rolle der Sinnlichkeit in der Ästhetik des Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Wiesbaden. Makkreel, Rudolf A. (1990): Imagination and Interpretation. The Hermeneut ical Import of the Critique of Judgment, Chicago. Mörchen, Herrmann (1930): Die Einbildungskraft bei Kant, in: Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung 11, pp. 311 – 495. Poppe, Bernhard (1907): Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten. Seine Bedeutung und Stellung in der Leibniz Wolffischen Philosophie und seine Beziehun gen zu Kant. Nebst Veröffentlichung einer bisher unbekannten Hands chrift der Ästhetik Baumgartens, Leipzig. Satura, Vladimir (1971): Kants Erkenntnispsychologie in den Nachschriften seiner Vorlesungen über empirische Psychologie, Bonn. Schmidt, Raymund (1924): Kants Lehre von der Einbildungskraft. Mit beson derer Rücksicht auf die Kritik der Urteilskraft, in: Annalen der Philosophie und philosophischen Kritik, H. Vaihinger and R. Schmidt (eds.), 4, 1/2, Kant Festschrift, pp. 1 – 41. Strawson, Peter F. (1974): Imagination and Perception, in: P. F. Strawson: Freedom and Resentment and other essays, London, pp. 45 – 65. Wolff, Christian (1968): Psychologia empirica, Frankfurt, Leipzig 21738 (11732), in: Gesammelte Werke, vol. II.5, reprint: Hildesheim. Wundt, Max (1945): Die Schulphilosophie im Zeitalter der Aufklärung, Tü bingen.

From Gratification to Justice. The Tension between Anthropology and Pure Practical Reason in Kant’s Conception(s) of the Highest Good Thomas Wyrwich Abstract The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that there is a tension between anthro pological and solely ‘pure’ rational elements in Kant’s conceptions of the ‘high est good.’ Whereas ‘happiness’ serves in the second Critique still as a humanly conceptualized form of gratification commensurate to virtue, Kant is searching for a purely moral form of ‘happiness’—as the objectification of virtue—in his later works. Distancing himself from certain aspects of the postulates, Kant lo cates this purely moral form in the concept of a (basically punitive) justice. Ac cording to the main idea of this paper, moral justice is not exclusively or not even in the first instance an ‘all too human’ concept but a demand of pure, di vine practical reason itself.

Introduction1 It is a well known fact that Kant considers it necessary to expose a ten sion between specific anthropological conditions and ‘self sufficient’ pure practical reason in order to establish a categorical metaphysics of morals. In the Groundwork, Kant points out that a true moral law “must hold not only for human beings but for all rational beings as such, not merely under contingent conditions and with exceptions but with absolute necessity” (AA 4:408; see also 4:411 f.). If there are also un conditional laws in the realm of practical philosophy, they cannot essen

1

Translations have been taken, as far as possible, from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. In some cases I have given my own translation or I have modified a translation. References to Kant’s works are given in the text, by volume and page number of the Akademie Ausgabe.—I would like to thank Silvia Jonas (Berlin) and an anonymous referee for the Kant Yearbook for helpful comments.

92

Thomas Wyrwich

tially depend on empirical conditions, not even if they are “necessary human” conditions.2 Although this claim is widely accepted as a core of what one might call the “analytic part” of pure moral philosophy (including at least Groundwork I and II and the Analytic of the second Critique), it is notice able that this systematic difference does not attract the same interest in the analysis of the Dialectic of the second Critique at least not in recent time. In this paper, I will try to show that the consideration of this dif ference is important in order to reconstruct Kant’s theory of the “high est good” in the second Critique and classify it adequately, namely, as a primarily anthropological conception (1). After that, I will argue for the claim that in later works, Kant transforms his theory of the highest good into a “purely” moral form by focusing on the concept of justice (2). Fi nally, I will provide reasons for the thought that such a transformation must also involve a new ascertainment of the relation between God and pure practical reason (3).

1. In the Introduction to the Critique of Practical Reason (CPrR), Kant claims that […] we shall not have to do a critique of pure practical reason but only of practical reason as such. For, pure reason, once it is shown to exist, needs no critique [!]. […] It is therefore incumbent upon the Critique of Practical Reason as such to prevent empirically conditioned reason from presuming that it, alone and exclusively, furnishes the determining ground of the will (CPrR, AA 5:15 f.; see already the very beginning: AA 5:3).

On the other hand, he asserts outright at the beginning of the Dialectic that pure reason in its “practical use” also has “its dialectic” (CPrR, AA 5:107). The rising “unavoidable illusion” could only be removed “through a complete critical examination of the whole pure faculty of rea son” (ibid., my italics). An obvious question to ask is whether Kant is simply contradicting himself here, or whether it is legitimate to speak about pure practical reason from two different standpoints: the as it were ‘analytical’ standpoint of pure practical reason (that might need 2

Therefore, “anthropological” might also be translated into “not purely rational” in the critical philosophy. Two instructive German essays deal with that prob lem/topic mainly with reference to the Groundwork and the Analytic of the sec ond Critique: Forschner (1983) and Cramer (1991).

From Gratification to Justice

93

no critique) and the (as we will see) ‘dialectical’ standpoint of pure prac tical reason (that needs a critical investigation and an additional stabili zation). If there is such a dialectical standpoint, the assumption will sug gest that this position is based on a certain mixture of pure and empiri cally conditioned practical reason (as already becomes clear in the Introduction). To clarify this question, it seems helpful, first of all, to take a closer look at the emergence conditions of the dialectic of pure practical rea son in the second Critique. This dialectic rests upon the following cir cumstance: As pure practical reason it likewise seeks the unconditioned for the practi cally conditioned (which rests on inclinations and natural needs), not in deed as the determining ground of the will, but even when this is given (in the moral law), it seeks the unconditioned totality of the object of pure practical reason, under the name of the highest good (CPrR, AA 5:108).

It is eye catching here that Kant is speaks about a form of pure practical reason that is from the outset structurally and “synthetically” related to given empirical conditions like “inclinations and natural wants.”3 Like pure theoretical reason, this “pure” practical reason tries to include all finite “natural wants” in an all embracing way.4 At the outset, the Dialectic 3

4

Kant emphasizes this explicitly in the Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Rea son: “The proposition, ‘Make the highest possible good in this world your own ultimate end’, is a synthetic proposition a priori which is introduced by the moral law itself, and yet through it practical reason reaches beyond the law [!]. And this is possible because the moral law is taken with reference to the characteristic, natural to the human being, of having to consider in every action, besides the law, also an end” (AA 6:7, n. 2, my italics).—This “a priori” might be called an ‘a posteriori condi tioned a priori.’ In contrast to the law of pure practical reason (that could be formulated by a complete non sensual, holy being as well), this “synthetic prop osition a priori” essentially depends on human nature. This already implies a tension with the Analytic: The demand of pure practical reason is adapted here to the natural circumstances, whereas the categorical im perative itself requires an adoption of all natural circumstances to its command. Whereas pure practical reason seeks the unconditioned “for the practically con ditioned (which rests on inclinations and natural needs)”, here in the Dialectic, pure practical reason rather seeks the unconditioned against or through the subju gation of the “practically conditioned” in the Analytic (see, e. g., CPrR, AA 5:44, 5:80 f. etc.).—One might notice furthermore that already the “pure” theoret ical reason is not so “absolute pure” in case of the four antinomies: the a pos teriori given, contingent conditioned resp. the contingent string of conditions is needed here in order to ‘conclude’ the unconditioned as well (in contrast to the onto logical proof of the existence of God, which is actually based on a pure notion).

94

Thomas Wyrwich

is therefore about “the” pure practical reason of a finite being and its supposed perspective (which is by no means necessary, as the Groundwork see once again AA 4:408 and 4:411 f. has brought to mind). This becomes even clearer through the following dissection of the in tended highest good: That virtue (as worthiness to be happy) is the supreme condition of what ever can ever seem to us desirable and hence of all our pursuit of happiness and that is therefore the supreme good has been proved in the Analytic. But it is not yet, on that account, the whole and complete good as the object of the faculty of desire of rational finite beings [!]; for this, happiness is also re quired, and that not merely in the partial eyes of a person who makes him self an end but even in the judgement of an impartial reason, which regards a person in the world generally as an end in itself. For, to need happiness, to be also worthy of it, and yet not to participate in it cannot be consistent with the perfect volition of a rational being that would at the same time have all power, even if we think of such a being only for the sake of the experiment (CPrR, AA 5:110; partly my italics, Kant’s italics partly delet ed).

On the one hand, Kant is reactivating his old claim (inter alia spelled out in the first Critique (CPR), see CPR A 806 ff./B 834 ff.) that the moral worthiness to be happy is the supreme and irreducible condition of every rational hope for happiness. On the other hand, the extending (and maybe new) claim is added that even the pure practical reason of finally “rational finite beings” itself should regard it as unjust and unacceptable if a being which naturally requires happiness and even deserves it, might never achieve it.5 The “perfect volition of a rational being” is arranged here in such a way that this volition would intend in the case of a being, whose “reason certainly has a commission from the side of its sensibility which it cannot refuse, to attend to its interest” (CPrR, AA 5:61; my italics), the gratification of this natural, morally neutral com mission as well of course if the being proves itself worthy.6 5

6

Milz (2002, 109 f.) draws attention to the possibility that Kant is referring here to the motive of the “disinterested observer,” taken from the tradition of Eng lish political philosophy. Milz points out that the function of this reference is to indicate that this fair minded disinterested observer is coincidentally judging from the point of view of pure practical reason, as the finite being, as I would add, insinuates here in the Dialectic.—Before Milz also Albrecht (1978, 61 (n. 208), 70 (n. 229)) has taken the view that this “highest good” is an un ambiguous idea of the “pure” practical reason. Kant defines “happiness” in the Dialectic as “the state of a rational being in the world in the whole of whose existence everything goes according to his wish

From Gratification to Justice

95

However, there are other passages in the Kantian work that are ap propriate to indicate that such attributions and conclusions have not al ways been as strict as they appear here. In Reflection 7059 (1776 78), Kant notes more carefully: The worthiness to be happy isn’t our first wish indeed but it is the first and indispensable condition under which reason approves it. However, it seems that reason also promises us something in this demand: namely, that some one can hope to be happy if one behaves in a way that doesn’t make him or her unworthy to be happy (AA 19:238; my italics and translation).

And consequently, it is no complete ‘pure moral reason’ in the “Canon” of the first Critique (1781) that legitimates the assumption of a highest good, but a reason of a gracious being “whose business it is to dispense all happiness to others” (CPR A 813/B 814; my italics and translation). Putting together these passages, the basic anthropological presuppo sition of the Dialectic and the “old” idea of the gratification of the virtuous man, that Kant has already discussed in lectures (see n. 6), we can draw the following conclusion: Kant presupposes in the Dialectic a form of pure practical reason that shall additionally want the fulfilled happiness of a finite human being, insofar as the being acts on purely moral mo tives. A being that is “sentenced to happiness” must have the real pos sibility to become happy that is the extending postulation of this rea son. But once again the question arises if this is actually a demand of (ab solute) pure practical reason or rather of the “empirically conditioned” prac tical reason. The second possibility appears much more plausible once we recall what Kant accentuates in the Analytic:

and will, and rests, therefore, on the harmony of nature with his whole end” (CPrR, AA 5:124; my italics). What I personally wish and will, should—as long as it is based on merely moral motives!—come true. Here, Kant obviously refers back to his “old” idea (e. g. mentioned in different lectures) that virtue can claim gratification or reward in the form of happiness, see: “The natural, moral belief is with all virtuous man, as one believes that good actions will be rewarded as such” (AA 24:243; my italics and translation).—“The man who lives morally can hope to be rewarded for it” (AA 27:284; my italics).—“Every upright man […] cannot be possibly upright, without hoping at the same time, on the analogy of the physical world, that such righteousness must also be reward ed” (AA 27:285).—In contrast to that, as Kant puts it 1788, the moral law itself “demands of us disinterested respect”, and that “without [!] promising or threatening anything with certainty” (CPrR, AA 5:147).

96

Thomas Wyrwich

But it is requisite to reason’s lawgiving that it should need to presuppose only itself, because a rule is objectively and universally valid only when it holds without the contingent, subjective conditions that distinguish one rational being from another (CPrR, AA 5:20; my italics).

If that is true, it seems justified to assume that the finite, practically pure rational being tries to constitute a “synthetic” harmony between the necessary ought and its subjective, natural will under the name of the “highest good.” But this “more” appears as a mixture of moral and an thropological needs. Therefore, the Dialectic seems to rest upon the hy postatization of a contingent human need (sensible happiness), that is a “problem imposed upon him by his finite nature itself” (CPrR, AA 5:25; my italics) 7, to an objective and therefore necessary demand of pure prac tical reason. It has been mentioned in the literature as well that such a hyposta tization cannot work without a shift of perspective. Beck convincingly points out: The need of reason to believe in the existence of a highest good and to pos tulate the existence of its conditions does indeed arise from ‘an objective determining ground of the will’, but only because of ‘inescapable human limitations’. It is therefore not a ‘need of pure reason’ but a need of all too human reason (1960, 254).

And Hegel already notes in his Faith and Knowledge that the speculative aspect of the ‘highest good’ has “certainly been transfused by Kant into the human form that virtue and happiness harmonize” (TWA, 2:330; my translation). However, it does not seem necessary to presume that Kant had no awareness of these relations.8 On the contrary, in the following passages he is exhibiting “our reason” that isn’t able to conceive the highest good “only on the presupposition of a supreme intelligence” (CPrR, AA 5:126). And it does not need Jacobi or Hegel to conclude that this 7

8

See also just before: “To be happy is necessarily the desire of every rational but finite being and therefore an unavoidable determining ground of its faculty of desire” (CPrR, AA 5:25). It shouldn’t be ignored that this “problem” isn’t im posed upon us by reason but by “our nature”. When Denis, for example, ex plicates (in accordance with Engstrom): “Our own happiness becomes an object of pure practical reason when it is pursued on a maxim that gives priority to virtue” (2005, 35), she is eluding the question why a naturally grounded (and not only “moral”) happiness should be finally a real object of “pure” practical reason. Schwarz (2004, 258) argues in a similar way.

From Gratification to Justice

97

“our reason” cannot be fully identical with the “pure rational reason” that sets from itself moral “bounds […] to the mankind [!]” (CPrR, AA 5:85), as Kant underlines in the Analytic. 9 In fact, it is therefore not the ‘pure’ practical reason itself that produces a dialectic subsequent to the presupposition of the “highest good” but a finite, “empirically supported” practical reason that apparently cannot avoid to grade up a need “imposed upon us by our own finite nature” to a finally purely moral demand.10 And, as we will see, also the aspired solution has to rest upon a similar ‘upgrade’. There is no room here for a detailed analysis of the complex antin omy of practical reason. For the purpose of my topic it should be suf ficient to mention that reason can only resolve the antinomy if it can be demonstrated how the postulated highest good as a synthetic propo sition a priori is possible. 11 Analogous to the first Critique, the first step relies on the introduction of the critical difference between the sensible and the intelligible world. This difference (that has already been opened ex negativo by theoretical reason) shall principally reveal that the possibil ity of the highest good is cogitable at all. Natural happiness as propor tion to pure virtue could be an “effect” (see CPrR, AA 5:115) of an in telligible cause; and even if this happiness would never be completely re alized in the sensible world, it could be the case that this realization oc curs in the intelligible world. However, this conception seems not suf ficient to explain how the highest good could be realized. For such a task a more specified theory about such proportion as causality is needed. And since this highest good requires a certain form of “distribution” (of happiness), it appears legitimate for finite reason to postulate a “wise and all powerful distributor” (CPrR, AA 5:128). Nevertheless, in a later retrospection, Kant consequently also limits that idea in the fol lowing way: 9 See also: “Pure reason is practical of itself alone and gives (to the human being) [!] a universal law which we call the moral law” (CPrR, AA 5:31); cf. AA 6:406. 10 It is quite difficult to decide whether the antinomies of pure theoretical reason rest upon such an ‘anthropological absolutization’ as well. My conclusion here refers only to the constellation of the second Critique. Nevertheless, it could be quite interesting to take a closer look at Groundwork, AA 4:411 f. (“we must not make its principles [pure practical reason] dependent on the particular nature of human reason, though in speculative philosophy this may be permitted”) for further investigations in this context. 11 Among others Milz (2002) has suggested such a convincing interpretation.

98

Thomas Wyrwich

I said above that in accordance with a mere course of nature in the world happiness in exact conformity with moral worth is not to be expected and is to be held impossible, and that therefore the possibility of the highest good on this side can be granted only on the presupposition of a moral au thor of the world. I deliberately postponed the restriction of this judgement to the subjective conditions of our reason […]. In fact, the impossibility re ferred to is merely subjective, that is, our reason finds it impossible for it to con ceive, in the mere course of nature, a connection so exactly proportioned and so thoroughly purposive between events occurring in the world in ac cordance with such different laws (CPrR, AA 5:145).

The same restriction can be assigned to the other postulates, whose as sumption is obviously altogether “subjective, that is, a need, and not objective, that is, itself a duty” (CPrR, AA 5:125). The postulate of the im mortality of the soul, that should provide a possibility to make the “perfect accordance of the mind with the moral law” (AA 5:122) thinkable, turns out to be a prolongation of anthropological structures into the in telligible world. Because “all the moral perfection that a human being can attain is still only virtue” (AA 5:128), and never holiness,12 there is nothing left for “the creature but endless progress” (ibid.). And whereas the Analytic was able to provide a “deduction” of freedom (AA 5:47 f.) and its “reality” (AA 5:49 and 56) based on the moral law, freedom becomes finally only a “postulate” in the Dialectic as well (see AA 5:132 f.). The reason for that seems to be clear: The finite human being can only hope and postulate that its freedom can actually be naturally realized in the sensible world, in order to establish a condition for the existence of a good the creature is hoping for on his part.

2. Although Kant does not explicitly speak about “gratification” in the Dialectic, it seems obvious that this “old” conception has left its mark in the idea of “happiness as proportion (to virtue)”. However, it is quite inter esting to see that Kant refrains from certain elements he has exposed in the Dialectic in subsequent works. In his essay about The End of All Things from 1794, he takes a stand for the so called “dualists” from a practical point of view (see AA 8:328 330). In contrast to the “unitar ians”, who want to allow the possibility of an enduring process of ex piating even after death (in order to enable a potential “eternal beati 12 See also CPrR, AA 5:82 – 84.

From Gratification to Justice

99

tude” for all humans), the “dualists” accept the mode of moral probation only for the finite life (in order to let some take part in final “beatitude” but all others in “eternal perdition” (AA 8:329) 13). So the ‘anthropolog ical’ way of moral execution is strictly reserved for the sensible world by the “dualists,” whose system should be, as Kant henceforth clarifies, the “assumable” (AA 8:330) in practical philosophy, whereas the previous postulate of a continuous immortal soul reminds much more of the sys tem of the “unitarians.” But such positional clarifying can already be found in the third Critique (CJ) from 1790. Kant’s restriction of what Hegel would call a “bad infinity” (see TWA, 5:150 155, 288) to the sensible world is also re flected in his reconstruction of the experience of the “sublime:” Our frustrating feeling of an endless and always insufficient progress of our imagination coincides for Kant with an elevating feeling of a “supersensible faculty in us” (CJ, AA 5:250).14 The negative feeling has to be encom passed by something positive and complete, which also accords with the idea of a “true infinity” of the moral world (CPrR, AA 5:162; my italics) that has already been exposed at the very end of the second Critique. And once again, such a complete “true infinity” can obviously not be identified with an “endless” moral pursuit of happiness. Corresponding ly, such a progress of the soul has lost its basic function in the third Critique. Instead of that, we find a quite different argument for the necessity of the “highest good.” The problem of the “virtuous atheist Spinoza” (who just wants to act morally, does not believe in God and immortality and does not care about the consequences of his actions at all) is not that he ignores his own anthropological happiness. Rather his problem rests upon the fact that deceit, violence, and envy will always surround him, even though he is himself honest, peaceable, and benevolent; and the righteous ones besides himself that he will still encounter will, in spite of all their worthiness to be happy, nevertheless be subjected by nature, which pays no attention to that, to all the evils of poverty, illnesses, and untimely death, just like all the other an imals on earth, and will always remain thus until one wide grave engulfs them all together (whether honest or dishonest, it makes no difference). (CJ, AA 5:452, my italics) 13 For Kant, this notion is also strongly connected with the idea of a “last judge ment” (AA 8:328) and therefore, as we can conclude, connected with a kind of ‘intelligible accountability’. 14 See also Wundt (1924, 431).

100

Thomas Wyrwich

“Honest or dishonest, it makes no difference” this seems to be decisive here. An absolutized neutral nature (as well as every “unitarian”) has to level this crucial difference. Therefore, the problem of the “highest good” transforms into a merely moral problem of justice in the third Critique. This “moral” transformation can also be detected in Reflection 6454, written between 1790 and 1804, where Kant specifies the pro portionality of virtue and happiness as a “purely moral wish” (AA 18:725). But “happiness” has to do very little here with our natural “wish and will” or with gratification. Instead of that, our need to assume a “highest moral good […] is a moral need to assume a just judge, who is not [!] a being whose benevolence we hope for but whose holiness we fear” (ibid.; my translation). “Happiness” (here as correlate to “punish ment”) only means moral justice in this Reflection. The justification for this moral transformation might be found in the fact that Kant tries to exhibit a kind of analytical relationship between pure morality and justice in his later works, last but not least in his Metaphysics of Morals from 1796/97. In the first part, in the Doctrine of Right, he concludes: The law of punishment is a categorical imperative, and woe to him who crawls through the snake windings of the doctrine of happiness in order to dis cover something that releases the criminal from punishment or even re duces its amount by the advantage it promises, in accordance with the pharisaical saying, ‘It is better for one man to die than for an entire people to perish.’ For if justice goes, there is no longer any value in human beings’ living on the earth. (AA 6:331 f., my italics)

So the categorical imperative can also be reformulated in the following way: Be just and try to donate justice! And since for Kant, “ought im plies can,”15 such justice must be possible as well. But whereas in the ex ternal realm of right and law such justice seems to be up to rational hu mans, at least to some extent, such justice can never be adequately es tablished in the realm of morality by human beings, since they have no access to their own “real” moral characters16 and since they have no full physical control of the external word. Therefore, Kant also draws the conclusion at the very end of the Metaphysics of Morals that only a divine and punishing being is able to guarantee such exhibited moral justice that should not be mixed up with love or happiness: 15 Cf. CPrR, AA 5:30, AA 6:62, AA 8:287 f., AA 6:49 f., AA 22:507, AA 23:245. 16 See for example: CPR A 551/B 579 (n.), AA 6:392 and AA 8:284 f.

From Gratification to Justice

101

The divine end with regard to the human race (in creating and guiding it) can be thought only as proceeding from love, that is, as the happiness of human beings. But the principle of God’s will with regard to the respect (awe) due him, which limits the effects of love, that is, the principle of God’s right, can be none other than that of justice. We might, speaking as we must do after the way of human beings [!], express it that way, that God has created rational beings from the need, as it were, to have something outside himself which he can love and by whom he can be loved in return. [break] But not only as extensive, but even more extensive (for the principle is restrictive) is the demand, which, even our own reason judges, divine justice, as punitive, raises compared to us. Because a reward (praemium, remuneration gratuita) has no reference to a justice against beings, that have only several duties and no right against the other [divine being], but only to love and benefaction (benignitas); even to a lesser extent such a being can have an en titlement to wages (merces), and a remunerate justice (iustitia brabeutica) in the relation of God to human beings is a contradiction [!] (AA 6:488 f.; partly my translation, italics added).

“After the way of human beings” happiness is the last aim of a loving, di vine will. But even our own (pure) reason tells us that a divine, in case of doubt punitive justice is an “even more extensive,” all encompassing principle.17 So the anthropological concept of reward, that is only con nected with the ideas of “love and benefaction” and that has sustained the concept of the highest good in the second Critique, is now clearly contrasted with the concept of a purely moral justice.

3. However, irrespective of the transformation of the basic conception of the highest good, isn’t the idea of a judging and just being a very similar construction to the one of the Dialectic of the second Critique? Isn’t it again a very anthropomorphic idea to seemingly “postulate” such a 17 See also AA 27:284 ff., AA 28:1085, AA 28:1292 – 1294.—The idea of a moral, punitive justice should not be mixed up with the contrarian concept of an iustitia distributiva (see for example: AA 6:297). It is the latter concept of a rewarding justice that seems to be associated in the following passage of the second Critique as well: “And the holiness that his command inflexibly requires in order to be commensurable to his justice in the share he determines for each in the highest good is to be found whole in a single intellectual intuition of the existence of rational beings” (CPrR, AA 5:123; my italics). Nevertheless Kant already exposes a close conceptual connection between pure morality and the idea of a punitive justice in the second Critique (AA 5:37 f.).

102

Thomas Wyrwich

(personal) divine judge? One might think so, but again, we find some evidence in Kant’s late works that such an interpretation would not be really appropriate. First of all, in the Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant establishes an instructive connection between the moral law and the idea of a divine lawgiver: Agreement with the mere idea of a moral lawgiver for all human beings is indeed identical with the moral concept of duty in general, and to this ex tent the proposition commanding the agreement would be analytic (AA 6:6, n.).18

So here we can identify an analytical connection between the moral law and a divine lawgiver, whereas in the second Critique, this connection could only be established synthetically on the basis of a very human “highest good.” Kant develops this connection further in the Opus postumum: There must also, however, be—or at least be thought—a legislative force (potestas legislatoria) which gives the laws emphasis (effect) although only in idea; and this is none other than that of the highest being, morally and physically superior to all and omnipotent, and his holy will—which justifies the statement: There is a God. (AA 22:126)

Putting together the notion of an analytical relation between the moral law and a correlative divine lawgiver on the one hand, and the notion of a “legislative force which gives the laws emphasis (effect),” that can be connected or even identified with the idea of justice, on the other hand, we can draw the two following conclusions: 1. There must be a certain form of identity between God and the moral law, and that is exactly what Kant says in the Opus postumum: “God is [!] the moral practical autonomous reason” (AA 21:145; my ital ics). “The concept of God is the idea of a moral being, which, as such, is judging [!] and universally commanding. The latter is not a hypothetical thing but pure practical reason itself” (AA 22:118; my ital ics).19 2. If a judging God, or the moral law respectively, is connected with the idea of a “legislative force,” then it seems legitimate to claim that pure practical reason itself demands justice and since ought implies

18 See also Förster (2000, 136). 19 See very similar: AA 4:408 f., AA 8:264, AA 8:350 (n.), AA 22:104 f., AA 22:116, AA 28:1076.

From Gratification to Justice

103

can also has to “guarantee” the possibility of this justice (at least in an intelligible world). But such assumable and believable guarantee can only work if an “ob ject” or “material” is demanded that is directly connected with pure prac tical reason. And this cannot be, all in all, a naturalized happiness, but only a (moral) justice.

Conclusion In this paper I have tried to show that Kant’s dialectical theory of the “highest good” and the three postulates that are required in order to demonstrate the possibility of this highest good, intentionally rest upon an assumption that someone might call an absolutization of an an thropological standpoint the necessary moral “ought” and the very natural “will” shall harmonize in this object as finite reason insinuates. I have argued that it is also necessary (entirely analogous to the analytic part of Kant’s pure moral philosophy) to restrict an overwhelming an thropological perspective in order to establish a critical (meaning “pure ly” moral here) conception of the highest good as well. I have tried to show that Kant himself takes this route, starting in the third Critique and ending in the Opus postumum. Ideas like “gratification” and (even di vine) “love” are restricted to a human perspective in the Metaphysics of Morals. All in all, in the critical philosophy it can be shown that con cepts like a reward of virtue, an endless prolongation of the probation of the soul (see once again Kant’s criticism in The End of All Things and his theory of the “sublime”), a merely “postulated” freedom and last but not least a benevolent distributor are conceptually taken from the sen sible world of the finite human being. Kant finds an instructive classifi cation for such conceptions in the third Critique: They turn out to be just “jat’ %m¢qypom”, and not “jat’ !k¶¢eiam” (CJ, AA 5:463). In contrast to that, the “true” idea of justice could be exposed as an analytical, “material” implication of the moral law that in turn could it self be identified with God from a certain perspective.20 It is important 20 It should be mentioned that even after the second Critique, Kant nevertheless sometimes refers to the “anthropological” conception of the highest good as a synthetic extension. Concerning the history of its development, it might be more accurate to say that Kant is working with both conceptions in his late works.

104

Thomas Wyrwich

to mention that this concept of moral justice should not be mixed up with the “happiness” of the stoics in the second Critique, who pretend to feel happy while acting morally. Justice (also as punitive) does not mean a heteronomous “motivating” object, because it is equivalent to say someone is motivated by the moral law itself or by the purely moral “object,” which means that she is motivated to donate justice (as pure practical, divine reason commands).21 So, if man is searching for an “object” of pure practical reason, she should also search for some thing that is not only “human.” This is something we might conclude in accordance with Kant. It is, of course, Fichte who will take the same direction.

Bibliography Albrecht, Michael (1978): Kants Antinomie der praktischen Vernunft, Hilde sheim, New York. Beck, Lewis White (1960): A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, Chicago, London. Cramer, Konrad (1991): Metaphysik und Erfahrung in Kants Grundlegung der Ethik, in: Neue Hefte für Philosophie 30/31, pp. 15 – 68. Denis, Lara (2005): Autonomy and the Highest Good, in: Kantian Review 10, pp. 33 – 59. Förster, Eckart (2000): Kant’s final synthesis: an essay on the Opus postumum, Cambridge, London. Forschner, Maximilian (1983): Reine Morallehre und Anthropologie. Kritische Überlegungen zum Begriff eines a priori gültigen allgemeinen praktischen Gesetzes bei Kant, in: Neue Hefte für Philosophie 22, pp. 25 – 44. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (TWA 1969 ff.): Theorie Werkausgabe (Werke in 20 Bänden), eds. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, Frankfurt am Main. Kant, Immanuel (1993): Opus Postumum, ed. E. Förster, Cambridge. Kant, Immanuel (1996): The Metaphysics of Morals, ed. M. Gregor, Cam bridge. Kant, Immanuel (1997): Critique of Practical Reason, ed. M. Gregor, Cam bridge. Kant, Immanuel (1997): Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. M. Gregor, Cambridge. Kant, Immanuel (2000): Critique of the Power of Judgement, ed. P. Guyer, Cambridge. Kant, Immanuel (2005): Notes and Fragments, ed. P. Guyer, Cambridge. 21 In later passages this moral justice de facto substitutes the conception of a (hu manly desired) gracious allocation that has sustained the concept of the highest good in the second Critique.

From Gratification to Justice

105

Kant, Immanuel (2005): Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, ed. A. Wood and G. Di Giovanni, Cambridge. Milz, Bernhard (2002): Der gesuchte Widerstreit. Die Antinomie in Kants Kri tik der praktischen Vernunft, Berlin, New York. Schwarz, Gerhard (2004): Est Deus in nobis. Die Identität von Gott und reiner praktischer Vernunft in Immanuel Kants „Kritik der praktischen Ver nunft“, Berlin. Wundt, Max (1924): Kant als Metaphysiker. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie im 18. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart.

Anthropology, Empirical Psychology, and Applied Logic Job Zinkstok Abstract Kant’s anthropology has always been taken as a practical discipline (either moral or pragmatic). Such readings neglect the fact that Kant also envisaged a use of anthropology in logic. In this paper I explore this logical relevance of Kant’s an thropology. I do so by first arguing that Kant’s anthropology is for an important part concerned with empirical psychology. I then show that this empirical psy chological part of anthropology is highly relevant for the branch of logic that Kant calls applied logic, viz., the kind of logic that is “directed to the rules of the use of the understanding under the subjective empirical conditions that psychology teaches us”. I illustrate the relevance of anthropology for logic by analyzing Kant’s conception of prejudice and showing how empirical psychological knowledge is used in applied logic to prevent the errors arising from prejudice. Anthropological logica is applicata.1

Introduction In the past decade, interest in Kant’s anthropology has risen steadily. Thanks to this new engagement, anthropology has come to be recog nized as an important supplement to Kant’s philosophy, as the empirical and less formal side to a system otherwise (in)famous for its strong a priori and formal nature.2 In these interpretations, Kant’s anthropology is al 1

2

Reflection (henceforth abbreviated as Refl.) 3332, AA 16:738 (dated 1780s, per haps late 1770s; translation mine). References to Kant’s works use to volume and page number of the Akademie Ausgabe (I. Kant, Gesammelte Werke, ed. königlich preußische (später deutsche) Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin 1900 f.), abbreviated AA. Translations of Kant’s works are from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, unless otherwise stated. See especially Louden (2000).

108

Job Zinkstok

ways taken as a practical discipline, i. e., as a discipline dealing with human action and comportment within society, be this action moral or merely pragmatic.3 This is not strange, as Kant explicitly advertises his anthropology as an anthropology from a pragmatic point of view (cf. the title of his 1798 book). Moreover, he also explicitly envisioned a moral anthropology, for example in the Metaphysics of Morals (1797): The counterpart of a metaphysics of morals, the other member of the di vision of practical philosophy as a whole, would be moral anthropology, which, however, would deal only with the subjective conditions in human nature that hinder people or help them in fulfilling the laws of a metaphysics of morals. It would deal with the development, spreading, and strengthening of moral principles (in education in schools and in pop ular instruction), and with similar teachings and precepts based on experi ence.4

As I will argue, however, this specific interest has given rise to a rather one sided evaluation of Kant’s anthropology as a merely practical disci pline. Although it is certainly not wrong to read Kant’s anthropology as such, I will argue that the contents of this discipline are of broader ap plicability than just the action of human beings in society. This is due to the fact that an important part of anthropology consists in empirical psychology. As I will show, Kant actually considered at least one other area of application for this psychological content namely that of logic, more specifically, applied logic. Applied logic, for Kant, is a branch of logic in the broad sense, and it is described in the Critique of Pure Reason as “di rected to the rules of the use of the understanding under the subjective empirical conditions that psychology teaches us”.5 In this paper I will explore this connection between anthropology and logic. In section 1, I will start by briefly reviewing the common, moral interpretation of Kant’s anthropology. After that, I will turn to the relation between empirical psychology and Kant’s anthropology, ar guing that Kant indeed envisioned an empirical psychological discipline as part of anthropology. Moreover, I will argue that even in the anthro 3

4 5

Note that I use the term ‘discipline’ not in the Kantian sense, but rather as a general term indiscriminately referring to any more or less systematic or scien tific body of knowledge. I use the term ‘practical’ here and below in a wide sense, i. e., as encompassing both moral and non moral action. This is in con trast to Kant’s use of the term in (for example) the Critique of the Power of Judg ment (CPJ), where it is explicitly tied to morality (e. g. on AA 5:171). Metaphysics of Morals (MM), AA 6:217. Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), A 53/B 77.

Anthropology, Empirical Psychology, and Applied Logic

109

pology lectures, although they have a decidedly pragmatic (non theo retical) aim, empirical psychology nonetheless constitutes an important layer.6 The third section will then turn to logic, in order to investigate Kant’s view on the connection between logic and psychology. We will see that Kant came to reject any psychological foundation for formal logic (or pure general logic), but that he explicitly allowed for another kind of logic, applied logic, which draws on psychology in order to teach the way human beings should reason in concrete situations. In the fourth section, I will flesh out Kant’s conception of applied logic by offering an example and showing how applied logic is informed by empirical psychology as it is offered in anthropology.

1. Kant’s anthropology and a common interpretation of it When speaking of Kant’s anthropology, one generally refers to the book Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, which Kant published in 1798. This book is the outcome of the lectures on anthropology that he offered every year from 1772 until 1796, as a companion course to his lecture on physical geography. Together these courses formed a kind of popular introduction to knowledge of the world, and they were indeed Kant’s most popular lectures.7 In the Anthropology Kant defines this discipline as a “doctrine [Lehre] of the knowledge of the human being [Kenntniß des Menschen], system atically formulated”.8 He distinguishes two points of view from which anthropology can be pursued: a physiological and a pragmatic one. Physiological anthropology concerns “what nature makes of the human being”, whereas pragmatic anthropology concerns “what he as 6

7 8

I use the term ‘theoretical’ in this paper as referring to cognition that pertains to the domain of nature as opposed to the (practical) domain of freedom (cf. CPJ, AA 5:171). Note that when I speak of theoretical cognition in this paper, which deals with the empirical cognition of anthropology and psychology, I do not wish to include transcendental philosophy. For more on Kant’s anthropology lectures, see Stark (2003), as well as Brandt and Stark (1997). Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (Anthr.), AA 7:119. Note that a doc trine [Lehre] is not taken here as Doktrin, which is opposed to Kritik (cf. CPR B 25). It rather refers to the way Kant also uses the term ‘Lehre’ in the preface to the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (MFNS, AA 4:467). Moreover, keep in mind that the Lehre of anthropology concerns an empirical discipline.

110

Job Zinkstok

a free acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of him self”.9 As follows from the fact that Kant, with his anthropology lecture, wanted to prepare his students for the world outside of the university, his lecture provides a pragmatic anthropology. Taking the faculty of memory as an example, Kant explains that theoretical reasoning on the physical causes of memory in the brain is a futile enterprise. More successful is the following approach: But if he uses perceptions concerning what has been found to hinder or stimulate memory in order to enlarge it or make it agile, and if he requires knowledge of the human being for this, then this would be a part of an thropology with a pragmatic purpose, and this is precisely what concerns us here.10

The Anthropology is divided into two main parts. The first, the “Anthro pological Didactic”, concerns the “manner of cognizing the interior as well as the exterior of the human being”,11 and it treats the three main faculties of the human mind: the faculty of cognition, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and the faculty of desire.12 In all three cases, Kant treats both the higher and the lower part of the faculty (e. g., in the case of the faculty of cognition both the understanding and sensibil ity). The contents of this part thus present the human mind as it is given in all human beings. The second part, the “Anthropological Character istic”, concerns the “manner of cognizing the interior of the human being from the exterior”.13 The “Characteristic” treats the notion of character and especially the differences in character among human beings, more specifically, differences that depend on for example sex, nation and race. As I indicated above, interpretations of Kant’s anthropology have focused on its practical orientation. Reinhard Brandt (partly together with Werner Stark), for example, has argued that although Kant started his anthropology lectures as a theoretical course on empirical psycholo gy, by the Winter Semester of 1773 1774 the lecture had undergone a “pragmatic turn”.14 After this turn, Brandt argues, Kant’s anthropology is a “doctrine of prudence [Klugheitslehre]”, in which students are taught 9 10 11 12 13 14

Anthr., AA 7:119. Anthr., AA 7:119. Anthr., AA 7:125 (translation modified). This division is of course also to be found in the CPJ, AA 5:178 ff. Anthr., AA 7:283 (translation modified). Brandt (1994); for the term ‘pragmatic turn’, see, Brandt and Stark (1997, xvii).

Anthropology, Empirical Psychology, and Applied Logic

111

the rules of the game that is human society. Now although Brandt con cedes that in this new science of pragmatic anthropology there are still traces of the older psychological content, he is quite adamant that “Kant frees himself from the idea of the natural cognition of man as an empir ical psychology qua theoretical discipline”,15 and that he starts to “in creasingly refrain from presenting his new discipline [i.e., anthropology] as psychology, and even emphasize that his anthropology is not psychol ogy”.16 Moreover, Brandt claims that “anthropology has, as a practical discipline, changed its epistemological place” in that it “is excised not only from metaphysics, but also from the academic disciplines in the narrower sense, to which physics and empirical psychology belong”.17 For confirmation of his reading, Brandt draws on the passages in the Anthropology and the lectures in which Kant explicitly says that he is dealing with pragmatic anthropology, and he also points to a letter Kant sent to Marcus Herz toward the end of 1773, in which he distances his ap proach to anthropology from the psychosomatic approach of Ernst Plat ner, who published his Anthropologie fr rzte und Weltweise in 1772.18 Brandt further argues that the anthropology lectures are not identical to the moral anthropology Kant calls for in some of his writings.19 Al though Kant touches on moral issues here and there in the lectures, he never uses the terms ‘categorical’, ‘imperative’ or ‘autonomy’.20 Robert Louden has a somewhat different approach. Although he shares Brandt’s view that Kant’s anthropology is a practical discipline, he explicitly hails Kant’s anthropology as “the second part of morals”, thus interpreting it as moral anthropology. 21 Louden admits that Kant no where in his lectures nor in the Anthropology explicitly says he is treating this moral anthropology, and he also concedes that the anthropology lectures do not offer a systematic and straightforward account of it. Still, disagreeing with Brandt, he is convinced that moral anthropology is an important ingredient of Kant’s anthropology: “[a]lthough Kant nowhere (i. e., neither in the anthropology lectures nor anywhere else) hands over to readers a single, complete, tidy package of moral an thropology, I aim to show that a bit of careful detective work neverthe 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

Brandt (1994, 21). Brandt and Stark (1997, xi). Brandt and Stark (1997, xiv). AA 10:145 – 146. I come back to this issue in the next section. For example in MM, AA 6:217. Brandt and Stark (1997, xlvi–xlvii). Louden (2003); cf. Louden (2000), esp. Chapter 3.

112

Job Zinkstok

less can lead us to some fulfilled hopes regarding Kant’s philosophia mo ralis applicata.”22 Louden goes on to elaborate on the moral dimension of anthropology, dealing with Kant’s treatment of particular, subjective hindrances to carrying out the moral law, the relevance of knowledge of the world for making morality effective in the lives of human beings, and the way in which anthropology specifies the “moral map” that ori ents our life at the “normative destination” of humanity.23 Although it is clear that Brandt and Louden disagree concerning the moral dimension of Kant’s anthropology, they do agree that it is a practical discipline: anthropology deals with human action, be it moral or merely prudential. In what follows I will not challenge this line of in terpretation by arguing that Kant’s anthropology does not concern ac tion at all rather, I will show that the use of some of its contents does not limit itself to practical matters (whether moral or pragmatic), but that it is relevant as well for applied logic.

2. Empirical psychology and anthropology As I indicated in the introduction above, applied logic is a branch of logic that “is directed to the rules of the use of the understanding under the subjective empirical conditions that psychology teaches us”.24 It is thus a branch of logic that is informed by empirical psycho logical knowledge. In order to prepare our investigation of applied logic, in the present section I will argue that Kant’s anthropology indeed contains empirical psychology; and that for him empirical psychology, although a problematic discipline and not a proper science, is still a via ble enterprise. In order to see this, we have to take another look at the anthropology lectures, more specifically at its first and biggest part, the part which is called “Anthropological Didactic” in the Anthropology. As said before, this first part of Kant’s anthropology deals with the three main faculties of the mind. It derives mainly from Kant’s concern with the empirical psychology as it was taught in the Wolffian tradition. More specifically, it is based on the empirical psychology part of Alexander Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, the textbook Kant also used for 22 Louden (2003, 64). 23 Louden (2003, 67 – 75; the quotations are on p. 72). Firla (1981) and Frierson (2003) emphasize the moral importance of anthropology, too. 24 CPR A 53/B 77.

Anthropology, Empirical Psychology, and Applied Logic

113

his metaphysics lectures. In fact, even before Kant started lecturing on anthropology in 1772, he already treated the empirical psychology part in those metaphysics lectures, and quite extensively at that. Throughout his lecturing career it remained a substantial part of his metaphysics lecture, even though he scaled it down because he incorpo rated the material in his anthropology lectures.25 However, although Kant retained empirical psychology in metaphysics, from 1770 onwards he was very clear that it does not properly belong there: being an em pirical discipline, it has no place in metaphysics, which is by definition a priori. 26 In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant explains this, as well as the reason for retaining it in his lectures on metaphysics: [Empirical psychology] comes in where the proper (empirical) doctrine of nature [Naturlehre] must be put, namely on the side of applied philosophy, for which pure philosophy contains the a priori principles, which must therefore be combined but never confused with the former. Empirical psy chology must thus be entirely banned from metaphysics, and is already ex cluded by the idea of it. Nevertheless, in accord with the customary scho lastic usage [Schulgebrauch, i. e., academic usage] one must still concede it a little place (although only as an episode) in metaphysics, and indeed from economic motives, since it is not yet rich enough to comprise a subject on its own and yet it is too important for one to expel it entirely or attach it somewhere else where it may well have even less affinity than in meta physics. It is thus merely a long accepted foreigner, to whom one grants refuge for a while until it can establish its own domicile in a complete [aus fhrlichen] anthropology (the pendant to the empirical doctrine of nature).27

It would thus seem to be the case that Kant came to consider empirical psychology as a part of the empirical discipline of anthropology. Indeed, in the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant repeatedly characterizes em pirical psychology as an anthropological discipline, for example where he claims that psychology “is really merely an anthropology of the inner sense, i. e., knowledge of our thinking self in life, and as theoretical 25 See the letter to Marcus Herz of 20 October 1778 (AA 10:242): “My discussion of empirical psychology is now briefer, since I lecture on anthropology.” In the metaphysics lectures empirical psychology can be found in the following tran scripts. For the 1760s: Metaphysik Herder, AA 28:143 – 144, 850 – 886 and 924 – 931. For the 1770s: Metaphysik anon Korff (K1), AA 28:1519 – 1520 and Meta physik anon L1 (Pçlitz), AA 28:228 – 262. For the 1780s: Metaphysik Mrongovius, AA 29:877 – 904. For the 1790s: Metaphysik anon L2 (Pçlitz), AA 28:584 – 590; Metaphysik Dohna, AA 28:670 – 679; Metaphysik anon K2, AA 28:815 – 816; and Metaphysik Vigilantius (K3, Arnoldt), AA 29:1009 – 1024. 26 See the Inaugural Dissertation (ID), AA 2:397. Cf. Brandt (1994, 16). 27 CPR A 848 – 849/B 876 – 877.

114

Job Zinkstok

cognition it also remains merely empirical”.28 But what is important in this quotation is not only the fact that empirical psychology is said to be part of anthropology, but also that Kant characterizes it as a theoretical discipline. Indeed, in other works it is confirmed that empirical psychol ogy is part of the doctrine of nature (as opposed to the doctrine of freedom). This can be made clearer by drawing on the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. There Kant divides the doctrine of nature in general into that of outer sense (the doctrine of body) and that of inner sense (the doctrine of the soul). Both, we learn further, have a ra tional and a historical (empirical) part.29 He thus explicitly allows for an empirical theoretical discipline treating the soul. It is this doctrine of na ture of inner sense that is explicitly called the anthropology of inner sense in the third Critique. 30 I would suggest, therefore, that for Kant a “com plete anthropology” not only comprises the empirical counterpart to practical philosophy (moral anthropology), but also part of the empirical counterpart to theoretical philosophy (next to empirical physics): the empirical doctrine of man as an object of outer sense (anthropology of outer sense, i. e., doctrine of the body, or medicine) and of inner sense (anthropology of inner sense, i. e., empirical psychology).31 One may raise several objections to this account. Whereas Kant in the passages just cited relegates empirical psychology to anthropology as a theoretical discipline, in other places he claims that a theoretical em pirical psychology is not viable. He does so most conspicuously in the Anthropology. With regard to inquiring into the natural causes of human mental faculties, he says that “all theoretical speculation about this is a pure waste of time”.32 And already in a letter to Marcus Herz of 1773, Kant raises such criticism, in contrasting his plan for the an

28 CPJ, AA 5:461; cf. CPJ, AA 5:277. 29 MFNS, AA 4:467 – 468. 30 Cf. MM, AA 6:385; and What Real Progress Has Metaphysics Made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff ? (RP), AA 20:308. 31 An early reader of Kant, G.S.A. Mellin, is quite clear in dividing Kant’s view of anthropology thus: see the lemma “Anthropologie” in Mellin (1797, 277 – 282). Also Kim (1994, 147 – 153), in his careful investigation of Kant’s concep tion of anthropology, proposes this as a reconstruction of Kant’s views. It must be noted, of course, that medicine does not belong to the (physical) doctrine of body as it is actually treated in the MFNS; rather, it would be part of biology, or the doctrine of organisms. This is outside of the scope of this paper, however. 32 Anthr., AA 7:119.

Anthropology, Empirical Psychology, and Applied Logic

115

thropology lecture with Ernst Platner’s book Anthropologie fr Aerzte und Weltweise, which was published in 1772: This winter I am giving, for the second time, a lecture course on Anthro pology, a subject that I now intend to make into a proper academic disci pline. But my plan is quite unique [gantz anders; i. e., different from Plat ner’s]. I intend to use it to disclose the sources of all the sciences, the sci ence of morality, of skill, of human intercourse, of the way to educate and govern human beings, and thus of everything that pertains to the practical. I shall seek to discuss phenomena and their laws rather than the first grounds of the possibility of the modification of human nature in general [erste Grnde der Mçglichkeit der modification der menschlichen Natur berhaupt]. Hence the subtle and, to my view, eternally futile inquiries as to the man ner in which bodily organs are connected with thought I omit entirely.33

This objection, however, is not justified. One must realize that in the eighteenth century there were different approaches to empirical psy chology (and to anthropology in the broader sense), and that Kant’s criticism in the passages cited is directed against a specific kind of psycho logical investigation rather than against empirical psychology in general. Kant criticizes an empirical psychology that searches for the physical or biological causes of mental processes an approach that can be designat ed as physiological psychology.34 What is problematic is the attempt to trace back mental phenomena to their “first grounds”. Hence Kant does not think that empirical psychology can be a science in which phenom ena are explained by grounding them. This kind of psychology would involve tracing mental phenomena back to their physical, corporeal grounds something Kant is not very optimistic about. In short: Kant criticizes a naturalistic empirical psychology, an approach that was

33 Letter to Marcus Herz, end of 1773, AA 10:145 (translation modified). 34 See Sturm (2008) for more on eighteenth century physiological approaches to psychology. He mentions Johann Theodor Eller (1689 – 1760), Ernst Platner (1744 – 1818), Johann Gottlob Krüger (1715 – 1759), Charles Bonnet (1720 – 1793) and David Hartley (1705 – 1757) as representatives of this approach. It must be noted, by the way, that Sturm uses the term ‘empirical psychology’ to designate the (among others) Wolffian approach to the science of man; he also, alternatively, refers to physiological approaches as ‘anthropological’, as the latter term was commonly understood to refer to man as a whole, i. e., com prising both mind and body. If I use these terms in this paper, however, I do not follow Sturm. I use the term ‘empirical psychology’ as a general term for the science of the mind, encompassing both the Wolffian and the physiological ap proach.

116

Job Zinkstok

known as physiological psychology.35 As it is, Kant’s criticism of a spe cific approach to empirical psychology (viz., physiological psychology) does not imply that other approaches to empirical psychology are equal ly problematic. Indeed, it would be very strange if Kant would take a discipline he considers entirely futile to be an important source for his anthropology. Still, this is not to say that Kant is highly optimistic about the pros pects of empirical psychology as a science. As is well known from the famous passage in the preface to the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant denies psychology the status of a proper science: “Yet the empirical doctrine of the soul [empirische Seelenlehre] must remain even further from the rank of a properly so called natural science than chemistry.”36 He gives two reasons for this. First, psychology does not easily lend itself to mathematization; and second, in psychology one cannot properly isolate phenomena and conduct experiments. This claim and the reasons Kant gives are difficult to interpret, and I will not go into this too deeply. Suffice it to say with regard to the first rea son that psychology, dealing with phenomena of inner sense, does not allow the a priori construction of its objects in space, only in time its mathematical treatment is thus more difficult than that of physics.37 The second reason Kant gives concerns a number of problems encoun tered in trying to investigate mental phenomena: it is difficult to get hold of such fleeting phenomena, and they do not lend themselves to systematic, repeated observation, but only to thought experiments. Moreover, observation of one’s own mental phenomena tends to alter these phenomena. In the Anthropology Kant addresses this second, methodological rea son for the lower scientific status of empirical psychology as well. There he does not only draw attention to the disturbing effect that observing someone has on his or her behaviour, but also to the fact that observing 35 I thus do not agree with Sturm when he states that Kant “never claims that these anthropologies [viz., physiological ones] cannot be scientific” (Sturm 2008, 496). As Kant says physiological psychology is “eternally futile”, I do not see how Sturm can conclude that Kant “never argues against the possibility of a physiological anthropology” (ibid, 499). In my view, Kant’s remarks do not seem to leave open much room for the possibility of a scientific physiological psychology. 36 MFNS, AA 4:471. 37 See Sturm (2001) for a convincing argument for this specific “restricted impos sibility claim”.

Anthropology, Empirical Psychology, and Applied Logic

117

oneself is difficult: that “when the incentives are active, he does not ob serve himself, and when he observes himself, the incentives are at rest”.38 Moreover, Kant expresses serious reservations concerning the value of introspection: it easily leads to “enthusiasm [Schwrmerei] and madness”, especially when one tries to observe the inadvertent course of one’s mind.39 Because of these methodological problems with which empirical psychology is confronted, Kant came to advocate a dif ferent methodological approach. Empirical psychology should rely on the observation of actual behaviour rather than on introspection.40 Indeed, in the Anthropologie Mrongovius (1784/1785) we find the remark that “This [the state of one’s mind] I can experience just as well by means of attention to my actions”.41 Similar remarks can be found in the Menschenkunde (1781/1782),42 and also in the Anthropology Kant states that one can obtain knowledge of human beings through social intercourse, and that the main features of characters in novels and plays “have been taken from the observation of the real actions of human beings”, which is why they are useful to anthropology.43 Consequently, the methodo logical emphasis in Kant’s study of the human mind shifts from intro spection to observation of behaviour. In sum, the problems with empirical psychology for Kant come down to two things. In the first place there are methodological reasons on account of which Kant argues that no kind of empirical psychology can be a proper science: mathematization is impossible, and experimen tation and introspection are unviable methods of research. Although these reasons imply that empirical psychology cannot attain the highest scientific status, they do not relegate empirical psychology to fiction it can still be a systematically ordered science. Indeed, Kant proposes that instead of relying on introspection, (any kind of) empirical psychology should rely rather on observation of external behaviour in order to draw conclusions about internal psychological mechanisms. This 38 Anthr., AA 7:121. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant has “and when he does not observe himself” (my emphasis) in the second part of this sen tence, which is a mistake. The original has “und wenn er sich beobachtet”. 39 Anthr., AA 7:132 – 134. 40 See Sturm (2001), esp. 174 – 178, for more details on this. Sturm argues that Kant, with this methodological stance, argues especially against Baumgarten, whom he considers to be a strong proponent of introspectionist psychology. 41 AA 25:1219 – 1220 (translation mine). Cf. Sturm (2001, 174 – 175). 42 AA 25:856 – 857. 43 AA 7:120 – 121.

118

Job Zinkstok

comes down to a methodological restriction. Secondly, there is Kant’s criticism of physiological psychology on account of the impossibility (or at least difficulty) of getting to know the material causes of mental phenomena. With this, Kant limits the scope of empirical psychological knowledge. As a result, he considers a specific kind of empirical psy chology (viz., physiological psychology) futile, because it aims at obtain ing knowledge of precisely those material causes. The upshot is thus that empirical psychology is restricted: both in its method and in its scope. What he does not argue for, however, is the impossibility of empirical psychology. Still, even if empirical psychology is a viable theoretical discipline that is part of a complete anthropology, how does this square with Kant’s repeated claims that anthropology is a pragmatic discipline? Cer tainly it cannot be denied that Kant’s anthropology has a pragmatic aim, and that its main intention was to provide knowledge of the world in order to teach what man “as a free acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself”.44 For that purpose, anthropology is to provide students with knowledge that helps them to actually go about in the world, and to govern and influence both themselves and others. It thus aims at knowledge of man as a citizen of the world: Such an anthropology, considered as knowledge of the world, which must come after our schooling, is actually not yet called pragmatic when it contains an extensive knowledge of things in the world, for example, animals, plants, and minerals from various lands and cultures, but only when it contains knowledge of the human being as a citizen of the world.45

There is thus no doubt concerning the aim of Kant’s anthropology: it is pragmatic, and therefore practical. That does not mean, however, that everything it contains is pragmatic or practical in nature as well. The passage just cited indeed confirms this, as it presents theoretical knowl edge of the world (here specifically of physical and biological objects) as a first step in the direction of a pragmatic discipline: just in virtue of containing this theoretical knowledge it is “not yet” pragmatic. Rather, it has to be applied to, implemented in a pragmatic context. Hence Kant does not have any problems with presupposing theoretical knowledge as a source for anthropology and it is obvious that an important part of the knowledge you need in order to govern yourself and deal with other people concerns psychology. 44 Anthr., AA 7:119. 45 Anthr., AA 7:120.

Anthropology, Empirical Psychology, and Applied Logic

119

In order to clarify this further, it is useful to distinguish here be tween anthropology as the lecture course Kant offered, and the com plete anthropology as it is part of Kant’s encyclopaedia of the sciences. As I argued, in the latter Kant distinguished between a theoretical and a practical branch of anthropology, empirical psychology being part of the theoretical branch. The lecture course can conversely be thought of as a mixture of both branches: it has a strong pragmatic slant (and may justly be called pragmatic anthropology because of that), but incorporates the parts of theoretical anthropology (empirical psychology) where it is nec essary to grasp the pragmatic knowledge that is the purpose of the course. It will be clear that the results we have obtained so far deviate from the common interpretations of Kant’s anthropology I discussed in the previous section. Although Brandt is certainly right that the pragmatic anthropology as Kant taught it is a practical discipline, his claims do not hold for the broader conception of anthropology, which, as I have argued, encompasses at least some theoretical cognition. More spe cifically, according to Kant this broader conception of anthropology contains empirical psychology, as the quotations from the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of the Power of Judgment prove. Any argu ments that can be found in Kant’s works against the viability of empiri cal psychology, I have argued, are to be understood as directed at spe cific approaches to or methods applied in empirical psychology, not at empirical psychology in general. It is thus clear that even after the “pragmatic turn” in the lectures Kant thought that a theoretical, empir ical psychological part within anthropology was viable. It is therefore, I would suggest, more plausible that this pragmatic turn was confined to anthropology as the specific lecture course, and did not apply to the more encompassing discipline of a complete anthropology. Further, it is perfectly all right if Louden singles out the moral rele vance of Kant’s anthropology. At the same time, however, it will by now be clear that this point of view is one sided, and should be com plemented by a broader view which encompasses not only the non moral side to human action in society, but also the theoretical parts that have relevance outside of the merely practical.

120

Job Zinkstok

3. The use of anthropology in logic Our next step is to turn to logic, and to see where empirical psycholog ical considerations come in. Let me first introduce Kant’s division of logic into several branches, as he offers it in the introduction to the Transcendental Logic in the first Critique. There Kant defines logic as “the science of the rules of understanding in general”.46 He then pro ceeds to divide logic according to the way it can be undertaken: either with regard to the general use of the understanding (general logic) or with regard to its particular use (particular logic). General logic “contains the absolutely necessary rules of thinking, without which no use of the understanding takes place, and it therefore concerns this [understanding] without regard to the difference of the objects to which it may be di rected” a condition he later specifies by stating that general logic ab stracts “from all content of cognition, i. e. from any relation of it to the object”. 47 Particular logic, on the contrary, “contains the rules for correctly thinking about a certain kind of objects”.48 General logic, in turn, is sub divided into pure logic and applied logic. Applied general logic concerns the “rules of the use of the understanding under the subjective empirical conditions that psychology teaches us”, and is called a “cathartic of the common understanding”.49 Pure general logic, on the other hand, abstracts from these psychological conditions of thought. It is the “pure doctrine of reason [Vernunftlehre]”, and it is said to be “properly scientific, al though brief and dry, as the scholastically correct presentation of a doc trine of the elements [Elementarlehre] of the understanding requires”.50 With this division of logic, Kant first of all takes a stance against the Wolffian conception of logic. Wolff famously argued that logic derives principles from both ontology and psychology: from the former because ontology must teach “what to look for in order to know things”, the latter because psychology must teach “how the operations of the intel

46 CPR A 52/B 76. 47 CPR A 52/B76 and A 55/B79; translation modified, and emphasis in latter quotation mine. For more on the difference between both characterizations of the relation of logic to objects, and a defence of the second as the more ac curate one, see Tolley (2007, esp. 127 – 132). 48 CPR A 52/B 76. 49 CPR A 53/B 77 – 78. 50 CPR A 53 – 54/B 78.

Anthropology, Empirical Psychology, and Applied Logic

121

lect are used in knowing truth”.51 Kant’s view of logic is diametrically opposed to this, as he thinks that there is a formal core of logic, i. e., pure general logic, which has recourse neither to any information con cerning the object of thought, nor to any information concerning the subject of thought (i. e., the mind). Because of this radically new concep tion of logic, Kant has been hailed as the first to speak of “formal logic”.52 This strict conception of the core of logic, however, should not make us forget that Kant, as his division of logic shows, also has a broad er conception of logic, in which various other logical, though less for mal disciplines find their place. Important among those are the particular logics, logics that refer to specific objects to which logic may be applied, and which form methodologies of specific sciences. An important ex ample would be the particular logic of mathematics.53 Our concern, however, is not with the logics that specifically refer to the object to which logic may be applied, but rather with the logic that specifically refers to the human mind that is to carry out the thinking, applied general logic. Kant’s use of the term ‘applied logic’ is somewhat idiosyncratic here, as he himself admits: it does not comprise “certain exercises to which pure logic gives the rule”, as was common in his time.54 Rather, it concerns the conditions under which thought is exer cised in the case of human beings, as can be inferred from the fact that its counterpart, pure logic, is said to abstract from all empirical conditions under which our understanding is exercised, e. g., from the influence of the senses, from the play of imagination, the laws of memory, the power of custom, inclination, etc., hence also from the sources of prejudice, indeed in general from all causes from which cer tain cognitions arise or may be supposed to arise, because these merely con 51 See § 89 of the “Discursus praeliminaris” in Wolff’s Latin Logic, Wolff (1983[1740]), 39 – 40: “quaenam sint ea, ad quae in rerum cognitione attendere tenemur”; “usum […] operationum ipsius [i.e., intellectus] in veritate cogno scenda”. Translation from Wolff (1963 [1728]). 52 See for example MacFarlane (2000, 20 – 22 and esp. 95 – 113). Michael Wolff (1995, 207, esp. n. 44), however, claims earlier ancestry for this term (most im portantly Joachim Jungius in his Logica Hamburgensis of 1638), but Longuenesse (2006, 163 n. 8), argues that formality nevertheless plays a ground breaking role for the first time in Kant’s work. 53 See Michael Wolff (1995, 205 – 221), for an explication of what this particular logic of mathematics would be for Kant; he carefully argues that the rule of mathematical induction would belong to this particular logic of mathematics. 54 CPR A 54/B 78.

122

Job Zinkstok

cern the understanding under certain circumstances of its application, and experience is required in order to know these.55

A few pages later Kant adds to this that applied logic “deals with atten tion, its hindrance and consequences, the cause of error, the condition of doubt, of scruple, of conviction, etc.”.56 Now what do these characterizations of applied logic tell us about this discipline? It seems quite clear that applied logic provides a descrip tion of the way thought proceeds in concreto, as carried out by actual human beings. Moreover, as especially the last description quoted re veals, applied logic is in effect an empirical doctrine of error: it deals with the obstacles to correct reasoning, the ways in which concrete thinkers (may) go astray. Therefore, by looking at what Kant says about error and its causes, we can learn more about applied logic. The basics of Kant’s view of error can be found (among other pla ces) in the Critique of Pure Reason. At the start of the Transcendental Dialectic Kant explains that error can arise when the understanding in teracts with other faculties (and especially with those of sensibility). Such interaction may cause the understanding to deviate from its own laws: In a cognition that thoroughly agrees with the laws of the understanding there is no error. In a representation of sense (because it contains no judg ment at all) there is also no error. No force of nature can of itself depart from its own laws. Hence neither the understanding by itself (without the influence of another cause), nor the senses by themselves, can err; the first cannot, because while it acts merely according to its own laws, its effect (the judgment) must necessarily agree with these laws. But the for mal aspect of all truth consists in agreement with the laws of the under standing. In the senses there is no judgment at all, neither a true one nor a false one. Now because we have no other sources of cognition besides these two, it follows that error is effected only through the unnoticed in fluence of sensibility on understanding […].57

Hence, as applied logic deals with error, and as error is caused by the illegitimate interaction of the understanding with other faculties of the mind, applied logic has to deal with this interaction among mental

55 CPR A 53/B 77 (translation modified). 56 CPR A 54/B 79 (translation modified). 57 CPR A 293 – 294/B 350. Cf. Jsche Logic ( JL), AA 9:53. See also Refl. 2244, AA 16:283 – 284 (dated 1760s); Refl. 2250, AA 16:286 (dated 1770s); and Refl. 2259, AA 16:288 (dated 1780s–1790s).

Anthropology, Empirical Psychology, and Applied Logic

123

faculties.58 The distinction between pure and applied logic, therefore, is a distinction between studying the laws of the understanding as it acts in isolation and studying the laws of the understanding as it interacts with sensibility, for that will teach us what kind of misleading influence sen sibility may have on the understanding. This state of affairs explains as well why applied logic needs recourse to empirical psychology: under standing the way in which human beings can go wrong in concrete in stances of reasoning must be based on empirical knowledge of the var ious faculties of the mind and the way in which they interact that is, it must be based on empirical psychology. Indeed, in the Jsche Logic applied logic is characterized in exactly these terms. In the first section of the introduction, which expounds the concept of (pure general) logic, it is made clear that pure general logic does not take recourse to psychological, contingent principles, be cause “[i]n logic we do not want to know how the understanding is and does think and how it has previously proceeded in thought, but rather how it ought to proceed in thought”59 that is, pure general logic is not a descriptive discipline, but one offering prescriptive rules. The second section then turns to the divisions of logic (in the broad sense), and there we find applied logic defined as follows: In pure logic we separate the understanding from the other powers of the mind and consider what it does by itself alone. Applied logic considers the understanding insofar as it is mixed with the other powers of the mind, which influence its actions and misdirect it, so that it does not proceed in accordance with the laws which it quite well sees to be correct. Applied logic really ought not to be called logic. It is a psychology in which we consider how things customarily go on in our thought, not how they ought to go on. In the end it admittedly says what one ought to do in order to make correct use of the understanding under various subjective obstacles and restrictions; and we can also learn from it what furthers the correct use of the understanding, the means of aiding it, or the cures for logical mistakes and errors. But propaedeutic it simply is not. For psychol ogy, from which everything in applied logic must be taken, is part of the philosophical sciences, to which logic ought to be the propaedeutic.60

This passage confirms my interpretation of applied logic and its relation to psychology. In order to explain errors as made by actual human be 58 Of course, Kant distinguishes transcendental error as well, caused by transcenden tal illusion. Applied logic does not deal with that, only with what one could call empirical error. 59 JL, AA 9:14. 60 JL, AA 9:18.

124

Job Zinkstok

ings and to enable one to deal with them, we need a discipline that tells us how the understanding interacts with other faculties of the human mind, and how these interactions can make the understanding deviate from its own laws. Such consideration presumably gives us rules, addi tional to those of pure general logic, that teach us how to avoid or to overcome the errors we are prone to or at least it shows what kind of processes need care and attention in order not to run off course. Given this characterization of applied logic, it is not surprising that the passage in which Kant introduces applied logic in the Critique of Pure Reason, indeed mentions a number of mental faculties that might inter fere with the understanding: “the influence of the senses, […] the play of imagination, the laws of memory”.61 Neither should it be a surprise that these three faculties are all treated in Kant’s anthropology.62 There fore, connecting this to the results of the previous section, it will be clear that there is a close connection between applied logic and anthro pology, at least to the part of anthropology that consists of empirical psy chology. Because Kant relegates empirical psychology to anthropology, it is in anthropology that we must seek the principles that applied logic requires in order to fulfil its task. In order to substantiate this claim, I will now turn to a concrete example of what applied logic would be.

4. An example of applied logic: prejudice Although Kant thus had a rather clear view of applied logic, and repeat edly indicates its place in the broader science of logic, he never actually offered an explicit applied logic. However, we can reconstruct an exam ple from his works, especially from his lectures on logic and his anthro pology. I will reconstruct the case of prejudice. In the eighteenth century, prejudice was commonly dealt with in logic,63 and Kant, in his lectures on logic, is no exception. According to the Critique of Pure Reason treat ment of “the influence of the senses, […] the play of imagination, the laws of memory, the power of habit, inclination, etc., hence also from

61 CPR, A 53/B 77. 62 Anthr., AA 7:153 – 167 (the senses); 7:167 – 196 (the imagination); and 7:182 – 185 (memory, being a sub faculty of the imagination). 63 See for example §§ 1011 – 1016 of Wolff (1983 [1740], 729 – 733); §§ 168 – 172 of Meier’s Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre, AA 16:396 – 429.

Anthropology, Empirical Psychology, and Applied Logic

125

the sources of prejudice” pertains to applied logic.64 Consequently, an analysis of what prejudice is and how it is caused should provide us with a concrete example of what applied logic is about and how it is connected to anthropology. Prejudices, according to the Jsche Logic, are “provisional judgments insofar as they are accepted as principles”. 65 A provisional judgment, in turn, is a judgment “in which I represent that while there are more grounds for the truth of a thing than against it, these grounds still do not suffice for a determining or definitive judgment, through which I simply decide for the truth”.66 Hence the main problem of prejudices is that they are taken as objective and determining instead of merely provisional; they are caused by the mistake that “subjective grounds are falsely held to be objective, due to a lack of reflection, which must precede all judging”.67 It is thus quite clear that for Kant prejudice is a source of error: any cognition built on principles that are provisional judgments, and that thus rests on merely subjective grounds, is liable to error. To see what Kant’s account of prejudice has to do with empirical psychology, and thus why it is part of applied logic, we have to look into the sources of prejudice after all it is these sources that Kant says are treated in ap plied logic. Now the principal sources of prejudice, as the Jsche Logic tells us, are “imitation, custom, and inclination [Nachahmung, Gewohnheit, und Neigung]”.68 This is confirmed by the description of the contents of applied logic in the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant mentions both custom and inclination and connects them with the sources of prejudice (note the ‘hence’ in the quotation given above). Even though prejudice itself is not treated explicitly in the Anthropology, we do find a treatment of its sources. I will briefly go over them.

CPR A 53/B 77. JL, AA 9:75. JL, AA 9:74. JL, AA 9:76. For similar accounts of prejudice, see the Logik an Wien (Wiener), AA 24:863ff; Logik Philippi 3 (Philippi), AA 24:424 – 425; Refl. 2530 (dated 1775 – 1778), AA 16:406 – 407. 68 JL, AA 9:76 (translation modified; the Cambridge translation has “habit” for “Gewohnheit”. Cf. Logik an Blomberg (Blomberg), AA 24:166; Logik Philippi 3 (Philippi), AA 24:425; Logik Pçlitz 3.1 (Pçlitz), AA 24:547 – 548; Refl. 2519 (dated 1760s), AA 16:403; Refl. 2550 (dated 1790s or early 1800s), AA 16:412. 64 65 66 67

126

Job Zinkstok

Inclination is defined in the Anthropology as “habitual sensible de sire”.69 From this definition it is immediately clear that inclination ex plicitly pertains to sensibility, more specifically to the sensible part of the faculty of desire. If therefore inclination serves as a basis for a judg ment, this judgment is subjective and cannot serve as a principle for ob jective knowledge. If it is taken thus, however, it is a prejudice. This source of prejudice, therefore, can be understood only by inquiring into the way the faculty of desire interferes with the understanding. Custom is also treated in the Anthropology, and it is defined as “sub jective practical necessity […], and so designates a certain degree of will, acquired through the frequently repeated use of one’s faculty”.70 In a note from the 1780s Kant alternatively describes it as “the ease of exe cution through frequent repetition.”71 He connects custom to the law of association as it belongs to the reproductive imagination: “empirical ideas [Vorstellungen] that have frequently followed one another produce a cus tom in the mind such that when one idea is produced, the other also comes into being”.72 This interpretation of the basis for the subjective necessity of custom is confirmed by a note in Kant’s logic textbook, where he writes that concepts belong to a consciousness “partly in ac cordance with laws of the imagination, thus subjectively, or of the un derstanding, i. e., objectively valid for every being that has understand ing”.73 Consequently, custom is a subjective necessity, not an objective one, based upon the workings of the reproductive imagination.74 Hence if a judgment based on custom, i. e., based on subjective necessity deriv ing from the laws of association, are taken for sound judgments express ing objective necessity on which one may base other judgments, a pre judice arises. In order to understand and explain the possibility of this kind of prejudice, we need to understand the way the reproductive imagination works and how it interferes with the understanding. Imitation, finally, is the least clear cut case. In his anthropology Kant treats it most conspicuously in the context of explaining genius, i. e., the Anthr., AA 7:251; cf. AA 7:265. Anthr., AA 7:147. Refl. 1510 (dated 1780s), AA 15:829 (translation mine). Anthr., AA 7:176 (translation modified). For the distinction between produc tive and reproductive imagination, see CPR B 152. 73 Refl. 3051 (dated late 1770s to 1780s), AA 16:633. 74 Cf. Kant’s treatment of David Hume’s conception of custom, CPR B 127 – 128, A 760/B 788, and A 765/B 793. 69 70 71 72

Anthropology, Empirical Psychology, and Applied Logic

127

“originality of the cognitive faculty”.75 Imitation is contrasted with gen ius, as the latter is supposed to produce original things. Still, not all imi tation is considered harmful for genius: it is indispensable in order to learn “certain mechanical basic rules, namely rules concerning the ap propriateness of the product to the underlying idea; that is, truth in the presentation of the object that one is thinking of”.76 Here imitation is connected to a treatment of imagination, something which is explicit in a note where Kant writes: “Imagination […] is either productive or re productive. The first belongs to genius, the second to imitation and memory”.77 In this specific context, however, it is not clear what imi tation has to do with prejudice. The most likely connection can be found in Kant’s treatment of character. For Kant, the character of a per son is closely related to authenticity it refers to traits that are character istic or peculiar. In the 1770s Kant notes: “the spirit of imitation aims at the singular, and is also not characteristic [eigenthmlich]”,78 and “Imita tor: no character”.79 He is more specific on what character is in another note dating from the 1780s: For character in general it is required, first, that man has a will of his own, that is neither imitated nor guided by someone else. Therefore he has to decide on the basis of his own consideration what he decides, not on the basis of fashionable rules of life. At the same time he has to be not as weak as to want to please and comply with everybody […]. Second, he must practice not to act through instinct and tempers or whims, but ac cording to principles; in the same vein not according to custom. Third, he has to keep word to himself, even if only in order to know that his in tention will not be futile, that is to say perseverance or firmness of inten tion: tenax propositi vir, not out of stubbornness, but out of principles. Fourth, always keep word to others, so that he has character also in the eyes of others. Hence choice of maxims.80

From these notes, I suggest, we can gather that for Kant imitation is a form of distortion of one’s own character, leading one to act in ways that are not based on proper, objective principles. Obviously, these notes have a pragmatic slant they concern our behaviour towards oth ers. Nonetheless, analogous considerations apply to the context of logic: 75 76 77 78 79 80

Anthr., AA 7:224. Cf. CPJ, AA 5:309 and 318 – 319. Anthr., AA 7:225 (translation mine). Refl. 1504 (dated 1780 – 1784), AA 15:805. Refl. 761 (dated 1772 – 1773), AA 15:332 (translation mine). Refl. 1495 (dated 1773 – 1778), AA 15:759 (translation mine). Refl. 1517 (dated 1780s), AA 15:865 – 866 (translation mine).

128

Job Zinkstok

blindly adopting other people’s judgments and taking them as objective grounds for other cognitions makes one liable to mistakes. Hence it is not difficult to see that imitation can be a source of prejudice. However, it remains unclear what psychological knowledge is needed in order to explain imitation. It may be the case that the (reproductive) imagination plays a role, as is hinted at in the passages on imitation and genius the imagination may be (partly) responsible for the process of copying other people’s judgments, or that of getting so used to those judgments that one starts trusting them as if they are based on sound principles. Perhaps it is character, or rather the lack thereof, which explains one’s suscept ibility to imitation. Reading through the anthropology lectures and the Reflections pertaining to them, I cannot find more conclusive leads. In this case, therefore, the link between anthropology and empirical psy chology remains weak. Taking stock, the example of prejudice makes clearer what applied logic is, and how it is connected to anthropology. As we saw, the sour ces of prejudice all have to do with the interaction of the understanding with other faculties, which lead one to take subjective grounds as if they are objective. Understanding such errors, and being able to avoid them, therefore requires knowledge concerning the various faculties of the human mind. For this kind of knowledge applied logic has to draw on the empirical psychology as it can be found in anthropology.

Conclusion In this paper I have argued that interpretations of Kant’s anthropology that solely stress its practical (moral or pragmatic) nature fail to take into account another interesting side of this discipline, namely its use in logic. I have argued, first, that a complete anthropology comprises em pirical psychology, i. e., the empirical, descriptive study of the faculties of the human mind. Although Kant is critical of a number of methodo logical tools used in empirical psychology, and although he denies the possibility of certain kinds of empirical psychology altogether, he none theless does not want to get rid of it completely. In Kant’s view, empir ical psychology, even though it is not a proper science, still enables us to obtain systematically ordered knowledge of the mind that can be used in various other disciplines. Among these disciplines are not only moral an thropology (the application of moral principles in the case of human be ings, including the specific obstacles and hindrances to moral behaviour

Anthropology, Empirical Psychology, and Applied Logic

129

that derive from the specific mental constitution of human beings) and pragmatic anthropology (the application of knowledge of human beings in the service of prudential comportment in society), but also applied logic: the logical discipline that deals with the interaction of the under standing with the other faculties of the mind and the errors that might originate from this interaction. Because of this connection to anthropol ogy, one might, in analogy to moral anthropology, call applied logic as well logical anthropology, or, as Kant calls it himself in a note in his text book for his lectures on logic, anthropological logic: “anthropological logica is applicata”. 81

Bibliography Brandt, Reinhard (1994): Ausgewählte Probleme der Kantischen Anthropolo gie, in: H. J. Schings (ed.): Der ganze Mensch. Anthropologie und Litera tur im 18. Jahrhundert. DFG Symposion 1992, Stuttgart, Weimar, pp. 14 – 32. Brandt, Reinhard, and Werner Stark (1997): Einleitung, in: R. Brandt and W. Stark (eds.): Kants gesammelte Schriften, Vol. XXV, Göttingen, pp. vii–cli. Firla, Monika (1981): Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von Anthropologie und Moralphilosophie bei Kant, Frankfurt am Main. Frierson, Patrick (2003): Freedom and Anthropology, in: Kant’s Moral Philos ophy, Cambridge. Kim, Soo Bae (1994): Die Entstehung der kantischen Anthropologie und ihre Beziehung zur empirischen Psychologie der Wolffschen Schule, Frankfurt am Main. Longuenesse, Béatrice (2006): Kant on A Priori Concepts. The Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories, in: P. Guyer (ed.): The Cambridge Compan ion to Kant and Modern Philosophy, Cambridge, pp. 129 – 168. Louden, Robert B. (2000): Kant’s Impure Ethics. From Rational Beings to Human Beings, New York, Oxford. Louden, Robert B. (2003): The Second Part of Morals, in: B. W. Jacobs and P. P. Kain (eds.): Essays on Kant’s Anthropology, Cambridge, pp. 60 – 84. MacFarlane, John (2000): What Does It Mean to Say that Logic Is Formal?, Pittsburgh. Mellin, Georg Samuel Albert (1797): Encyclopädisches Wörterbuch der kriti schen Philosophie, Band 1, Züllichau, Leipzig. Stark, Werner (2003): Historical Notes and Interpretative Questions about Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology, in: B. W. Jacobs and P. P. Kain (eds.): Essays on Kant’s Anthropology, Cambridge, pp. 15 – 37. 81 Refl. 3332, AA 16:783 (dated 1780s, perhaps late 1770s).

130

Job Zinkstok

Sturm, Thomas (2001): Kant on Empirical Psychology. How Not to Investigate the Human Mind, in: E. Watkins (ed.): Kant and the Sciences, Oxford, pp. 163 – 184. Sturm, Thomas (2008): Why Did Kant Reject Physiological Explanations in His Anthropology?, in: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 39, 4, pp. 495 – 505. Tolley, Clinton (2007): Kant’s Conception of Logic, Chicago. Wolff, Christian (1963 [1728]): Preliminary Discourse on Philosophy in Gen eral, transl. R. J. Blackwell, Indianapolis, New York. Wolff, Christian (1983 [1728]): Philosophia rationalis sive logica, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. II:1, ed. J. École, Hildesheim. Wolff, Michael (1995): Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel. Mit einem Essay über Freges Begriffsschrift, Frankfurt am Main.

Kant’s Political Anthropology Gnter Zçller Abstract The essay investigates the anthropological foundations of Kant’s political thought. Section 1 argues for the mutually supplementary relation between the critical theory of reason and the natural history of reason in Kant. Section 2 deals with the implied politics of Kant’s anthropology focusing on the relation between nature and culture. Section 3 addresses the human social character, in particular the dual process of the civilization and the moralization of human be ings, in Kant. Section 4 presents the political vocation of the human being elu cidating the paradoxical relation between good and evil and the role of civic republicanism in Kant’s political anthropology. “For from an animal that engages in reasoning everything is be expected.”1

Introduction Immanuel Kant’s stature as a political philosopher depends chiefly on his late work on the moral conditions of political action, contained in On the Common Saying: That May be Correct in Theory, But It Is of No Use in Practice (1793), Toward Perpetual Peace (1795), “Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right” from The Metaphysics of Morals (1797) and “Second Part. The Conflict of the Philosophy Faculty with the Faculty of Law” from The Conflict of the Faculties (1798). In ad dition, Kant’s foundational work in moral philosophy in general, pre sented in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and Critique of Practical Reason (1788), often has been appropriated for purposes of po litical philosophy, recently so in the works of John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. Generally then, Kant’s contribution to political philosophy has been taken to consist in a normative account of the ethical and 1

Reflexion 1521, AA 15/2:891.

132

Günter Zöller

legal principles that are to underlie moral politics. By contrast, little at tention has been paid to the place and the role of political thought in Kant’s extensive anthropological writings, which span almost his entire career as an academic philosopher and which supplement the critical ac count of the principles of theoretical and practical reason with an ac count of the natural and cultural conditions of the development of rea son in human practices during pre historical and historical times. The following essay aims at redressing the one sided reception and effective history of Kant’s political philosophy by gathering and present ing the anthropological foundations of Kant’s political thought. The term, “political anthropology,” which is not be found in Kant himself, here serves to convey both the political dimension of Kant’s anthropo logical thought in general and the anthropological basis of his political thought in particular. Section 1 addresses the relation between the crit ical Kant and the anthropological Kant and argues for the mutually sup plementary relation between the critical theory of reason and the natural history of reason in Kant’s philosophy. Section 2 deals with the implied politics of Kant’s anthropology and focuses on the relation between na ture and culture in Kant’s bio politically based anthropology. Section 3 turns to Kant’s explicit anthropology of politics concentrating on the human social character in general and the dual process of the civilization and the moralization of human beings in particular. Finally section 4 presents the political vocation of the human being according to Kant by elucidating the paradoxical relation between good and evil and the role of civic republicanism in his political anthropology. The focal point of the essay throughout is Kant’s detailed analysis of the human species in terms of naturally based and culturally developed characteristics, which set human beings apart from other animals, while maintaining their integration into the realm of nature. Politically perti nent aspects of Kant’s naturalist account of cultural anthropogenesis ad dressed in the essay include an anti essentialist understanding of the human species character, the conception of a natural history of human reason, a non theological understanding of good and evil, a strictly secular perspective on the origin, development and end of human history and the political goal of negative freedom in matters of education, legislation and religion. Given the wealth of anthropological material in Kant, the essay has to confine itself to the main outlines of Kant’s natural and cultural anthropology in general and of his political anthropology in particular.

Kant’s Political Anthropology

133

1. Geo-anthropology On the standard account, Kant’s contribution to modern philosophy rests on his project of a self critique of reason involving the assessment of the origin, the extent and the boundaries of reason in its various, spe cifically different modes of employment, chiefly in its theoretical use for the determination of objects (knowing) and its practical use for the de termination of the will (doing). In disciplinary terms, Kant’s work therefore is located mainly in epistemology and moral philosophy, more specifically in the elucidation of the non empirical (“a priori”) principles of reason based knowing and doing. Given Kant’s particular concern with “our,” human potential for rationality in theory and in practice and his espousal of a mind based (“transcendentally idealist”) account of knowing and a will based (“autonomous”) account of doing, Kant’s twin theory of a priori knowledge and moral volition draws on the constitutive role of the human mind in knowing and act ing, thus lending his critical philosophy the character of a philosophical psychology or a philosophy of mind.2 But Kant’s philosophical œuvre is not exhausted by his groundbreak ing and multi disciplinary critical philosophy. Already before he under went his critical turn in the 1770s, and from then on contemporaneous with the development and elaboration of the critical philosophy, Kant pursued wide ranging and far reaching philosophical interests that led to numerous publications and several lecture series the popularity of which stands in a marked contrast to the enormous intellectual demands and the highly scholastic nature of the critical philosophy.3 While Kant did not believe that the critical philosophy could ever become popular, he always aimed a substantial part of his teaching and writing at the non professional philosophical public. In fact, much of his philosophy in the popular vein can be seen as an exoteric extension of his esoteric core project of the critique of reason. Moreover, for Kant, popular philo sophical work constituted an essential part of his philosophy in that it afforded to expand philosophy from its narrow “scholastic concept”

2 3

On Kant’s transcendental theory of mind and its subsequent reception, see Zöl ler (1993). On the peculiar relation of Kant’s critical philosophy to the Enlightenment concern with intensional and extensional popularity, see Zöller (2009).

134

Günter Zöller

(Schulbegriff) to its wider “cosmic concept” (Weltbegriff) 4 and to put the results and achievements of the critical system of reason to use for prac tical purposes that would be of interest to a wider audience or reader ship. In essence, Kant’s popular philosophical project is a sustained study of the human being in his natural and cultural variety as well as unity.5 The main forum for the development and presentation of his popular philosophy were Kant’s lectures in anthropology, which he held regu larly every winter semester starting in 1772, after having obtained his chaired professorship in logic and metaphysics in 1770, until retiring from teaching at the University of Königsberg in 1796.6 In fact, Kant was the first to devote a lecture course to this subject matter drawing on the then still comparatively obscure term, “anthropology” (Anthropologie), to designate a comprehensive treatment of the human being tran scending existing or emerging disciplinary divisions and combining psy chological, ethnological and socio cultural perspectives on the patterns and courses of human existence.7 After finishing his teaching career Kant issued a textbook that presented the cumulative results of his dec ades long research and teaching on anthropological matters. The title of the work neatly stressed the practical, worldly purpose of the enterprise: Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, 1798). In Kant’s own development as a teacher of philosophy the lectures on anthropology were preceded by another long term teaching project, which, in part, prepared the independent course in anthropology, viz., his regular lecture course on physical geography, which he had offered since 1756 and continued to offer after starting the anthropology lec tures, alternating between the course in anthropology during the winter semester and the course in physical geography during the summer se 4 5

6 7

On the distinction between the two conceptions of philosophy, see Critique of Pure Reason (CPR) A 838/B 866. As a matter of historical accuracy and in order not to obscure Kant’s biased usage of language, which addresses the natural and cultural conditions of human beings primarily with reference to the male representatives of the spe cies, the English word, “human being,” used to translate the German masculine noun, “Mensch,” will be associated with the masculine gender in this essay. For a representative selection of student transcripts from Kant’s anthropology lectures, see AA: 15/1 and 15/2. On the disciplinary origins of anthropology in Kant’s time, see Eckardt/John/ van Zantwijk/Ziche (2001).

Kant’s Political Anthropology

135

mester of each of his years of academic service.8 While the main focus of the lectures on physical geography lay on the natural properties and conditions of the earth as a whole and of its geographically diverse parts (continents, oceans, mountains, rivers, etc.), already the earlier of Kant’s popular twin lecture set included sections on the human being in general and on specific human populations considered in terms of the geo physical conditions of their generic and characteristic proper ties. The later lectures on anthropology continued the geographical in terest in the role of natural ambient factors in the development and dif ferentiation of the human species but concentrated on the individual characters of the European peoples, leaving the treatment of the geo graphically conditioned character of non Europeans to the lectures on physical geography.9 In addition, the newly developed lecture course in anthropology included ample material on the cognitive and appetitive powers and the feeling ability of the human mind, for which Kant drew on contemporary German academic philosophy (the discipline termed, “empirical psychology,” in the metaphysical systems of the Wolff school) and his own, emerging or established, critical philosophy. Further evidence of Kant’s long term, in breadth as well as in depth academic occupation with anthropological matters include: an early es sayistic work on the anthropology of aesthetics, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (1764); a tract on the taxonomy of mental illnesses, Essay on the Maladies of the Head (1764); an article on the ana tomical distinction between animals and humans, Review of Moscati’s “Of the Corporeal Essential Difference Between Animals and Humans” (1771); a trilogy of writings on the geographically influenced differen tiation of the human species into relatively stable subspecies (“races”), Of the Different Races of Human Beings (1775), Determination of the Concept 8

9

For a documentation of Kant’s lecture notes on physical geography, see AA 26/ 1:1 – 320 (Manuscript Holstein); see also AA 9:151 – 436 (a compilation of Kant’s lecture material on physical geography published under Kant’s name in two volumes by D. F. Th. Rink in 1802). The publication of a representative selection of student transcripts of Kant’s lectures on physical geography, to ap pear in AA 26/2, is in advanced preparation (ed. Werner Stark). Kant’s former student and eventual critic as well as rival, Johann Gottfried Herder, retained the joint treatment of geographical and anthropological mat ters in his multi volume unfinished main work, Ideas for the Philosophy of the His tory of Humankind (1784 – 1791). On the historical and systematic relation be tween Kant’s and Herder’s geo anthropological projects, see Zöller (2011) and Zöller (2011a). For an alternative assessment of the relation between Kant and Herder, see Zammito (2002).

136

Günter Zöller

of a Human Race (1785) and On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy (1788); as well as occasional reflections on the bodily influence of the mind, On the Philosopher’s Medicine of Body (1786), and on the rela tion between mind and brain, From Soemmerring’s “On the Organ of the Soul” (1796). In addition, Kant’s anthropological thought has entered into his contributions to the philosophy of history and pedagogy, in par ticular Essays Regarding the Philanthropinum (1776/1777), Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim (1784), Review of J. G. Herder’s “Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Humanity”, Parts 1 and 2 (1785), Conjectural Beginning of Human History (1786) and Lectures on Pedagogy (1803).10 The nature and extent of Kant’s philosophical concern with anthro pological matters is all the more surprising given the strictly non empir ical, a priori character of the principles established by the critique of rea son and the methodological distinctions drawn by Kant between the ob jectively valid, apodictically certain rules of knowing and willing and their contingent, fallible instantiations. Compared to the standards and strictures of his “pure philosophy” (reine Philosophie) 11 Kant’s anthropo logical interest may seem a sideline to his main work in critical philos ophy and to have the function of a temporary and contingent relief from the latter’s rigorous requirements of universality and necessity. But rather than amounting to a lighter and more approachable ver sion of Kant’s core philosophy, or even a mere diversion from it, his anthropological corpus provides an important and much needed supplemen tation of the critical account of reason’s a priori principles. While the critical philosophy purports to identify and legitimate the sum total of a priori principles that govern knowing and willing as well as feeling, the system of the critical philosophy largely leaves unaddressed the fac tual origin, subsequent development and eventual actualization of the potential for rationality in the human species. In focusing on the “ob jective validity” (objektive Gltigkeit) of the rational principles governing 10 For a comprehensive edition of Kant’s published anthropological works, in cluding the overtly historical and pedagogical publications, in modern English translations with detailed introductions, notes and bibliographical information, see Kant (2007). In what follows references to this edition that do not specify the title of the cited work by Kant are to the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. 11 CPR A 840/B 868 (contrast to “empirical philosophy” [empirische Philosophie]) and A 848/B 876 (contrast to “applied philosophy” [angewandte Philosophie]).

Kant’s Political Anthropology

137

knowing, willing and feeling,12 Kant’s critical philosophy systematically brackets the contingent, concrete circumstances and conditions of the practice of reason. To be sure, this methodological restriction is not to be counted as an intrinsic shortcoming of Kant’s critical project, which could only succeed in establishing a finite body of universal prin ciples governing the employment of reason at the expense of pursuing a high level of abstractness and generality. Neither is it to be expected from Kant’s anthropological works that they achieve the complete inte gration of concrete, naturally determined and culturally diverse human existence into the critical theory of reason. Instead of correcting or improving upon actual or alleged shortcom ings of the critical project, Kant’s work in anthropology counterbalances the intentionally narrow methodological and systematical orientation of the critique of reason, geared at a critical theory of a priori principles, with a broadly conceived, empirically informed and practically geared account of the human condition. The technically philosophical, critical Kant and the popular, anthropological Kant share an interest in the human being as rational, or at least: as capable of reason. In the critical perspective, reason is taken objectively, with an eye toward the set of principles that govern its various modes of employment. From the standpoint of anthropology, reason is considered subjectively, in view of the conditions that favor and shape the first emergence, subsequent development and actual employment of reason. The former project ad dresses the context of justification with regard to reason its normative status independent of factual matters; the latter aims at the context of discovery with regard to reason at its emergence and appearance among actual human beings located in place and time, or rather: in ge ography and history.13 In extensional terms, the difference between Kant’s critical project and his anthropological project turns on the distinction between the human as an individual being or as many, ideally all individuals of hu mankind and the human being as a species (or a subset thereof) and as a subject of natural and cultural development in its own right, concep tually independent of the single or collective comportment of individual 12 On the central role of the axiological concept of validity in Kant’s theoretical philosophy, see Zöller (1984). 13 On the analogy and disanalogy between space and time as factors in human de velopment, see Reflexion 1404, AA 15/2:612 f.

138

Günter Zöller

human beings.14 The difference between the critique of reason’s essen tially individualist conception of the human being and the species based approach of Kant’s anthropology is especially striking when it comes to the contrast between a critico rationally geared account of interhuman relations centered around non empirical “laws of freedom” and an an thropologically oriented account of human social life in terms of natural regularities.15 But the supplementary relation between the critical and the anthro pological project in Kant goes in both directions. Not only does the concern with the natural and cultural particulars of human existence materially enlarge the formal focus on the pure rules of reason. A min imal normative conception of rationality in turn provides orientation in the wealth of dimensions and details that characterize naturally and cul turally particularized humanity. The guiding role of reason is all the more needed given that in Kant the portrayal of the human condition, while seemingly descriptive and empirical, is laden with normative or normatively charged preconceptions and premises regarding human pre historical and historical developments and therefore fraught with prior notions and prejudices that, retrospectively, can be unmasked as racism, sexism, classism and many other ways of turning distinction into discrimination and difference into deficiency. Kant the anthropol ogist certainly is not free of such prejudice. But the inner affinity and structural convergence between his bottom up account of reason in the anthropological project and his top down account of reason in the critical project helps him and helps his readers differentiate be tween alleged anthropological facts and their normative interpretation and significance for an account of the flourishing of reason under nat ural conditions. 14 See Reflexion 1467, AA 25/2:645. 15 The methodological and systematic distinction between the critical project and the anthropological project in Kant maintained in this essay is intended as an exegetical alternative to recent Anglo American work on Kant that seeks to re dress the perceived shortcomings, one sidedness or otherwise defective struc ture of his ethics (formalism, rigorism, universalism) by drawing on his anthro pology for a materially specific, historically concrete and culturally inflected re interpretation of Kant’s ethics. Rather than integrating Kant’s anthropology into his ethics, the present essay maintains the distinction between critical phi losophy and anthropology in Kant as two closely related but differently organ ized and oriented philosophical projects. Not the merging of the two projects but their joint consideration is able to provide the entire Kant.

Kant’s Political Anthropology

139

2. The bio-politics of anthropology At the conceptual and doctrinal center of Kant’s work in anthropology stands the relation between nature and culture in the development of human life. Yet Kant’s consistent focus is not on the opposition between nature and culture but on their dynamic interrelation. More specifically, Kant considers the human being as an animal thereby likening him to other animals which operate under the guidance of instinct and yet as an animal with the capacity to reason, a capacity that sets him apart from the other animals by weakening the grip of the instincts on the human being and thereby making him both more vulnerable and more danger ous than other animals. Moreover, the animal endowed with reasoning ability that the human being is makes him dangerous not only to other animals, which he may hunt, tame and devour, but also to his own kind. A chief concern of Kant’s anthropology throughout are the relations be tween human beings in their twofold dependence on natural and cultur al factors. Kant’s social anthropology (again a term not employed by Kant himself) extends from the natural basis of societal life through var ious processes of social cultivation to the overtly political organization of human society under the guise of the state. While the shapes and stages of the process of culturation are the main focus of Kant’s anthropology, he devotes considerable attention to the purely natural preconditions and manifestations of human life. The concern with the natural development of the human being reflects an interest on Kant’s part in the human species as an animal species sub ject to naturally induced differentiation and resulting in natural diversity even prior to the cultural processes of specification and individualiza tion. Kant’s particular concern is with the natural unity of the human animal species amidst its geographically induced differentiation into populations that are marked and distinguished from each other by un failingly hereditary traits, specifically epidermal pigmentation (“human races”).16 But Kant’s detailed and repeated discussions of these matter, which involved him in a protracted argument with the naturalist and explorer, Georg Forster, over the original unity or plurality of the human species monophyleticism being defended by Kant, polyphyle ticism by Forster ,17 also served the methodological function of provid ing Kant with a model from nature for understanding and assessing cul 16 On Kant’s work on the human races, see Lagier (2004). 17 On the dispute between Kant and Forster, see Riedel (1981).

140

Günter Zöller

tural development. When charting the cultural development of the human species, Kant retains the naturalist terminology and conceptual ity of pre given “predispositions” (Anlagen) and “germs” (Keime) and that of “drives” (Triebe) along with their “development” (Entwicklung) and selective actualization in response to ambient factors. This allows him to account for the radical openness and extreme malleability of the human being, while at the same time acknowledging the limited range of actualizations afforded in each case by a given predisposition that enables as much as pre structures and thereby channels human de velopment. But the natural and the cultural are not only conceptually opposed and analogically connected in Kant’s account of anthropogenesis. For Kant human cultural development is, to a large extent, itself natural, part of an encompassing nature that includes the shaping influence of natural means on the development of human culture. In a move that continues older teleological thinking about the operations of nature, Kant tends to personify nature, addressing “her” as an agent with prac tical intelligence and in pursuit of her own designs. In English transla tions of the German noun for “nature” (Natur) Kant’s personification of nature is often rendered by capitalizing the word’s initial letter (“Na ture”). While the personification of nature in Kant is more than a mere figure of speech, it should not be taken literally, as if Kant were actually attributing to nature intelligent design. Kant was weary of dogmatic tel eology even before elaborating his critical account of the teleology of nature in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. In Kant’s anthropological thinking reference to nature’s ends serves the methodological purpose of identifying developmental structures in nature, and specifically in living nature, that span the modal difference between potentiality and actuality and that present themselves with the directionality and orientedness characteristic of human purposive activity. In addition, the teleological perspective on nature and the human being in it allows Kant to address the natural and cultural development in non descriptive or normative terms that do not simply state or describe what is the case but that an nounce and prescribe what is to be or ought to be the case, according to some standard further to be specified. The critically mitigated teleological perspective on living nature also allows Kant to draw together the more narrowly natural, “animal,” as pects of human life and those cultural processes that, while being exclu sively characteristic of human life, operate prior to or independent of conscious planning by individual human beings. To be sure, the pres

Kant’s Political Anthropology

141

ence or absence of complete instinctual control radically distinguishes mere animals or brutes from human animals or intelligent beasts. But the loosened grip of the instincts on the human being is not per se tan tamount to completely rational self control. Rather, on Kant’s anthro pological account, the human freedom from instinctual determination first and for the longest time, and for the most part even all the time, goes together with alternative, not directly instinctual forms of natural control and natural guidance. For Kant the anthropologist, the factual freedom from the instincts opens the human being up to other, more subtle ways of natural direction that typically elude the awareness of the human being creating the impression or the illusion of free choice in human conduct. The key concept by means of which Kant marks the essential differ ence between instinctually driven animals (brutes) and instinctually free but, for the most part, alternatively driven animals (humans) is the no tion of character. In Kant’s anthropological thinking “character” does not have the narrow meaning of the basic mental constitution of an in dividual human being. Rather the term serves to designate the ingrained marks and traits of entire populations that reach in size and scope from families through ethnic groups to all of humanity. Moreover, the term is also employed by Kant to identify the basic behavioral set up of non ra tional animals. Since the character of a given population of living beings is an inner constitution that eludes direct inspection by others, a given character has to be ascertained by external means, chiefly, especially in the case of human beings, by observing outward traits and comport ment. Kant here draws on the ancient epistemic practice of physiogno my or the cognition of the inner character from external features, espe cially facial features.18 Kant devotes the entire second half his published anthropology to the “anthropological characteristic” (anthropologische Charakteristik) or “the way of cognizing the interior of the human being from the exte rior.”19 After first discussing in quite some detail the characteristic prop erties of persons in terms of “natural aptitude” (Naturell) and “tempera ment” (Temperament), Kant turns to the characteristics of the two sexes, of different peoples and of the various races. In the final section of the second part of his published anthropology, at the very end of the entire work, he addresses the character of the species (Gattung), presenting 18 See Reflexion 1498, AA 15/2:774 – 777. 19 AA 7:283; Kant (2007, 383).

142

Günter Zöller

“basic traits of the depiction of the character of the human species.”20 The culmination of the published anthropology in a characteristic as sessment of the entire human species is prepared by the prominent final position of the characteristic of the human species in the student transcripts of Kant’s anthropology lectures since the mid 1770s.21 In ad dition, Kant’s literary remains (Nachlaß) in anthropology contain numer ous entries on the species character of the human being, with further related entries to be found in his literary remains in logic and the phi losophy of right.22 Kant’s extensive reflections on the character of the human species do not lead to the identification of a fixed and finite set of properties that would uniquely characterize the human being. To begin with, Kant voices skepticism about the very possibility of finding and defining the human character as such, when no comparison group of other, non earthly rational animal beings is available for ascertaining what might be characteristic of finite rational beings in general and of human such be ings in particular.23 In this situation Kant resorts to the contrastive com parison of the human being, as the only rational animal being on earth, with non rational animals. While every other animal species has its own specific character, the human animal, on Kant’s account, does not pos sess a species character that is set from the beginning and removed from change and development. Rather the sole species character that Kant sees fit to attribute to the human being is what could be termed a meta character, viz., to acquire a character in the first place and to do so by his own means and measures, although not without nature’s guid ance.24 Kant’s minimalist and developmentalist conception of the human species character makes his anthropology intellectually inhospitable to 20 AA 7:330; Kant (2007, 425) (translation modified). 21 See AA 25/1:675 – 728 (“On the character of humanity in general;” Anthroplo gy Friedlnder; winter semester 1775/75); AA 25/2:838 – 847 (“Character of the human species;” Anthropology Pillau; winter semester 1777/78); AA 25/ 2:1194 – 1203 (“On the character of the entire human species;” Menschenkunde; winter semester 1781/82); AA 25/2:1415) (“3rd chapter on the character of the human species;” Anthropology Mrongovius; winter semester 1784/85). 22 See Reflexionen in anthropology, AA 15:602 – 654. See also Reflexionen in logic, AA 16:170 – 813, and Reflexionen in the philosophy of law, AA 19:603 – 612. For a compilation of the pertinent material from the Nachlaß, see Kant (1985, 201 – 255). 23 See AA 7:321; Kant (2007, 416). 24 See AA 7:329; Kant (2007, 424).

Kant’s Political Anthropology

143

the traditional question, “What is the human being?,” which Kant him self avoids asking and answering in his anthropological writings. Also outside of Kant’s anthropological works the question rarely occurs, and if it does, then only in marginal texts and occasional contexts25 that would not justify attributing to him any particular interest in the question as such or in answering it. Kant’s anthropological concern is not with a fixed being or an essence of humans but with their open ended developmental potential. Even the traditional locutions of the “nature of the human being” or of “human nature” and the appeal to it when judging what is possible and what is not possible for the human species to achieve attract Kant’s criticism. For Kant, one cannot know in advance what such nature might be and encompass with regard to future developments.26 By effectively denying the human being a species character akin to that of the other animals, Kant has opened up the human being for an existence in history capable of undergoing long term change and espe cially long term development by natural and cultural means. He also has, in the exceptional case of the human species, broken with the tradi tional, religiously based conception of the constancy of the animal spe cies. But unlike Darwin’s theory of evolution over half a century later, Kant’s revolutionary anthropology does not envision an “origin of spe cies” and specifically the “descent of man,” but concerns the far reach ing development of the human species from purely natural origins, which are considered given and not subject to further derivation, to the eventual world wide expansion of human cultural achievements. Moreover, unlike Darwin, Kant does not countenance a change in the physical constitution of human beings but a vast, various and volatile cultural anthropogenesis. Given the radical openness of the human species for future develop ment and its complete lack of an initially fixed and subsequently con stant character, the possible directions and the eventual outcome of the development of the human species cannot be ascertained empirically by referring to something given in past or present experience. Rather the philosophical reconstruction of the overall course of human devel opment has to take recourse to modes of thinking that exceed what is empirically given in light of conceptions of reason (“ideas”), chiefly 25 See AA 11:429 (letter to C. F. Stäudlin from 4 May 1793) and AA 9:25 (Logic, ed. G. B. Jäsche). 26 See Reflexion 1524, AA 15/2:896.

144

Günter Zöller

those of the ends or purposes attributable to the development of the human species. The chief device drawn on by Kant to address the non empirical purposive structure of human species development is the contemporary, theologically based discourse of the “destination,” “calling” or “vocation” of the human being (Bestimmung des Menschen), which Kant transposes from the religious to the secular and from the es chatological to the historical sphere.27 Morever, Kant regards the factual or intentional pursuit of the human vocation as a process of perfection ing, and of self perfectioning at that, during the course of which the human species progresses toward a goal that is elevated and remote without being elusive and excluded. In a remarkable move that has deep repercussions beyond his an thropological project Kant excludes the happiness of the human being from the scope of his vocation, thereby relegating the natural and to that extent unavoidable pursuit of happiness to a mere means for achiev ing the genuine end of human development attributable to nature, viz., the maximal unfolding of his abilities or “talents.”28 The philosophical point behind Kant’s anti eudaemonist anthropological vision is the ex clusive linkage of the human vocation with activity, spontaneity or “work” (Arbeit) rather than passivity, receptivity or “enjoyment” (Genuß). To be sure, the vocation of the human being to the develop ment of talents of all kinds does not remove happiness altogether from the course of human development. Yet the achievement of happiness is not itself the naturally pregiven goal of human history but an effect, however welcome and even to be wished for, of pursuits that aim at something else. In Kant’s natural teleology of the human species happi ness is considered not as a factually pursued and eventually obtained goal but normatively as an ideal state tied to desert and merit. A politically sensitive consequence of Kant’s anhedonic natural teleology of human existence is the exclusion of modes of human life that he considers to be merely “passive” and oriented solely to sensory gratification (“ease” [Gemchlichkeit], “good living” [Wohlleben], “happiness” [Glckseligkeit]).29 For Kant all such primitive forms of life lie at the margins of cultural development and fall outside of the proper scope of human his tory. In geo political terms, Kant’s discriminatory ethnology leads him 27 On the contemporary discourse of the “vocation of the human being,” see Zöl ler (2001). 28 Reflexion 1521, AA 15/2:887. 29 See AA 7:325; Kant (2007, 420).

Kant’s Political Anthropology

145

to restrict the effective cultural anthropogenesis to Europe and its cul tural development from classical Greece onward.30

3. The anthropology of politics Resorting to the teleological discourse of the vocation or destination of the developmental life of animate beings, Kant presents a detailed ac count of the structural difference between mere animals and humans be ings. The common premise in describing the vocational course of mere animals and of human animals is the teleological principle that all pre dispositions in a living being are destined to be actualized. Nothing in nature is in vain, and no predisposition goes to waste.31 Mere animals achieve their vocation over the course of their individual lives, each sin gle one for itself. Typically, they grow, mature and reproduce before dying, thereby fulfilling their natural life cycle. Considered as animals, human beings, too, typically reach their vocation over the course of their life time. However, when considered as rational beings, human beings, on Kant’s account, do not reach their vocation during the span of their individual lives.32 The main reason for the asymmetry in the vocational success of mere animals and rational animals is the latter’s lack of a fixed and finite set of characteristic predispositions, which delineate the life course of the mere animal. The freedom of human beings from complete instinc tual control renders their vocation open and infinite. To reach the in finite human vocation exceeds the possible accomplishment of any in dividual human being and even that of any joined number of human beings. It is only the human species, so Kant, that may perdure long enough to eventually reach its vocation. Hence the proper subject of an anthropology geared at determining the vocation of the human being as such has to be an anthropology not of individual human beings but of the human species. To be sure, the human species is not an entity of its own, really distinct from any and all human beings and subject to a different course of life than the human beings themselves. Rather it is 30 See Reflexion 1501, AA 15/2:788 – 790. 31 See AA 8:18; Kant (2007, 109) (Idea for a Universal History, First Proposition). 32 For the distinction between individual vocation and species vocation, see Re flexion 1454, AA 15/2:635; Reflexion 1467, AA 15/2:645; AA 8:18; Kant (2007, 109) (Idea for a Universal History, Second Proposition).

146

Günter Zöller

the culturally aggregated and historically accumulated result of the de velopment of infinitely many individual human beings, none of whom, except the very last ones,33 get to experience the eventual fru ition of their fragmentary contributions to the development of the human species. Moreover, Kant’s systematic references to the human species as the secret subject of historical change and development do not imply a guarantee that the complete human vocation in fact will be achieved in a future however remote. Kant is not predicting the fu ture course of human history but exposing the natural and cultural dy namics underlying it and presenting the rational prospects for the suc cessful approximation of the naturally given vocational end of the human species.34 Yet while the members of the human species are endowed with un characteristically multiple predispositions capable of many, indeed infin itely many modes and manners of development, they also lack the im mediate propulsion that motivates and orients instinctually driven mere animals or brutes. The freedom from the instincts therefore threatens to render human beings inert and indolent. In order to compensate for the lack of immediately effective specific drives, nature, on Kant’s account, has provided the human being with a surrogate of instinctual compul sion that functions as a general predisposition for activating further pre dispositions and germs that might otherwise remain dormant and, per haps forever, inactive. The compensatory meta disposition of human beings consists in their peculiar social character. As animals that are not longer ruled by instinct alone, human beings rely on their own volition to govern their conduct and seek to live ac cording to their own will. This exercise of the will represents a minimal, anthropological sense of freedom that may well go together with the human being’s will being in turn determined by factors not subject to volitional control. With respect to other human beings, the predisposi tion to follow one’s own will leads, positively, to the imposition of one’s will onto that of others and, negatively, to seeking to avoid having one’s own will governed by that of others. The primary trait of the human social character reveals itself to be asocial, viz., seeking to dominate oth ers while simultaneously fleeing their dominion. 33 See Reflexion 1524, AA 25/2:896. 34 On the distinction between a factual description of humankind and its norma tively conceived history, see Reflexion 1405, AA 25/2:613.

Kant’s Political Anthropology

147

But this controlling evasive streak is only one half of the human so cial character, as analyzed by Kant. As a result of the many needs that a single human individual is not able to fulfill entirely on his own, human beings not only flee each other, for fear of being dominated by another human being, but also seek each other in the hope of gaining support, gathering influence and increasing their own dominion. Famously Kant terms the antagonistic social constitution of the human being that makes him flee the company of his kind as much as seek it, his “unsocial soci ability” (ungesellige Geselligkeit).35 For Kant the countervailing tendencies in the human social character do not result easily in a stable equilibrium. Rather the development of the human species is marked for Kant by the conflicts arising from the contrary aspirations to asociality and sociality, to an anti social self sufficiency that the human being cannot really af ford and a social integration that the human being cannot really bear. For Kant the diverse and multiple attempts at resolving the basic an tagonism in the human social character shape the course of human de velopment and especially of human history, which is to be regarded as the arena for the experimental reconciliation of human asociality and sociality. In the process of negotiating a precarious balance between their conflicting social asocial orientations, human beings, on Kant’s ac count, are driven into actualizing many a previously dormant predispo sition and developing abilities they otherwise never would have known to possess, much less brought into usage. According to Kant, the socially provoked abilities are not restricted to technical skills in dealing with the material world but essentially involve social skills for dealing with other human beings, all of which operate under the secret desire to follow only their own will, while seemingly cooperating with each other. In Kant’s bleak picture of the origin and development of human social life social mores are essentially marked by dissimulation, conceit and hy pocrisy, not to mention the violent alternatives to the failures of these measures at assuring domination and superiority. But Kant’s sober and disillusioning portrayal of the genealogy of morals in the human species is counterbalanced by his firm belief in the human possibility and even in the human potential (“vocation”) for societal peace on a large scale, however remote that end of history may be and however arduous the path toward it may prove to be. Con sidered in its entirety, the interplay between cunning, cheating and con flict at the level of individual human beings serves the slow overall prog 35 AA 8:20; Kant (2007, 111) (Idea for a Universal History, Fourth Proposition).

148

Günter Zöller

ress at the level of the human species, so that the faults and failures of the human species prove to be or may prove to be or will prove to be so many indirect but indispensable naturally prepared means for achieving the best possible human world. Kant distinguishes three main stages in the naturally prepared and culturally executed progressive development of the human species, each based on a natural predisposition that finds it gradual and incre mental actualization over the long and lingering course of human histo ry. First comes the “technical predisposition” (technische Anlage), fol lowed by the “pragmatic predisposition” (pragmatische Anlage) and finally the “moral predisposition” (moralische Anlage).36 Kant correlates the three predispositions, which he takes to be present in human beings at all times and in all places, with three types of human development that occur successively in human history and actualize the three simultane ously present predispositions in serial form, beginning with the unfold ing of the technical predisposition, then moving on to that of the prag matic predisposition and finally turning to the realization of the moral predisposition. In each case, the actualization of the respective predispo sition is not a temporally and spatially fixed event but takes the form of a lengthy and open historical process. All three predispositions of the human species distinguished by Kant concern ways in which the human being acts and does so in a manner radically different from the acting abilities of non rational animals. The technical predisposition of the human being consists in his ability of act ing upon things by intentionally employing mechanical means. The re maining two specifically human predispositions concern the ability of the human being to interact with other human beings. The pragmatic predisposition consists in his ability to employ other human beings for his own purposes. The moral predisposition consists in his ability to act upon himself as well as others according to non natural laws involv ing freedom as a principle of acting.37 All three predispositions are geared toward the successful and expansive use of reason, with the tech nical predisposition providing mechanical skills for the efficacy of reason and the pragmatic and moral predispositions furnishing social skills for reason’s prudential and moral efficacy.38 36 AA 7:322 – 324; Kant (2007, 417 – 419). 37 See AA 7:322; Kant (2007, 417). 38 See AA 7:323 – 325; Kant (2007, 418 – 420).

Kant’s Political Anthropology

149

Kant considers all three basic predispositions of the human being to be natural predispositions and hence ways in which nature in him rather than the individual human being for himself, by his own willing and choosing, enables the engagement of his reason with things and with other human beings. That the basis for the history of the use of reason is entirely natural also holds for the moral predisposition. In an anthro pological perspective the path to morality goes from inculcated practices to moral principles and not vice versa, as in moral philosophy, from moral principles to practiced morality.39 Kant distinguishes the specifically different gradual and incremental processes through which the three basic human predispositions unfold as the “cultivating” (cultiviren), the “civilizing” (civilisiren) and the “moral izing” (moralisiren) that the human being undergoes as much as, uninten tionally, brings upon himself.40 The notion of cultivation and particular ly the cultivation of talents of all kinds derived from the old Latin word the working of the soil (cultura) here does not have the generic meaning of a contrast to nature but the specific sense of indicating the development of technical skills that reach from the artisanal to the artis tic and that involve the able operation of mechanical means for intelli gently chosen ends of all kinds. Like all post natural development (“cul ture” in the broadest sense) culture in the specific, technical sense in volves activity, even “work” (Arbeit), while for Kant pre cultural, merely natural human existence remains passive and geared toward “en joyment” (Genuß).41 By contrast, the notion of the human being becoming civilized of effectively, if not intentionally, civilizing himself involves not techni cal, essentially mechanical processes but the social, essentially interhu man transformation the nature guided self transformation of the human being from the “natural state” (Naturzustand) to the “civil state” (Civilzustand).42 This mode of culture (the concept being taken in the widest sense) consists in substituting the crudity of mere “personal force” (Selbstgewalt) through a “well mannered” (gesittet) conduct, even if the latter is not yet ruled by principles that are genuinely “ethical” (sit39 See AA 7:328 f.; Kant (2007, 423). 40 See AA 7:324 f.; Kant (2007, 420). 41 On culture and enjoyment as alternative basic modes of human life, see Reflex ion 1521, AA 15/2:889. On the significance of work, rather than intellectually lazy intuitive vision, in philosophy, see AA 8:387 – 406 (Of a Recently Adopted Elevated Tone in Philosophy). 42 Reflexion 1521, AA 15/2:889.

150

Günter Zöller

tlich).43 The transition to the civil state and the ability to maintain it re quires “education” (Erziehung) under the twin shape of “instruction” (Belehrung) and “discipline” (Zucht, Disciplin).44 In becoming a “citizen” (Brger) or entering into a “civil constitution” (brgerliche Verfassung),45 the human being has entered into a social life that is essentially a shared or common life, even though it is deeply shaped by the asocial procliv ities of the human beings that enter into it and that makes them inclined to distrust each other as much as rely on each other. Considering that in Greek the linguistic equivalent of the Latin based terms, “citizen” and “civil” (from civis and civilis, respectively), are “politikos” and “polites,” the basic character of human development under Kant’s second, pragmatic predisposition can be viewed as that of his political development. More precisely, human development under the pragmatic predisposition is political in a twofold sense: on the basis of the pragmatic predisposition the political dimension of human existence first arises, and the further unfolding of the pragmatic predisposition involves the progressive development of the political mode of human existence, from fairly elementary forms of communal life to abstractly organized and efficiently administered statehood in its various modes of governance and further on to the international associ ation of individual states. In essence the unfolding of the pragmatic, socio political predisposition of the human species makes up the entire course of human history, including a long distance future that may, or rather is to, include the political perfection of the human species. In the meantime, though, human beings, on Kant’s account, can be considered refined and polished but not really “civically minded” or “civilized” (brgerlich gesinnet, civilisirt).46 Even less successful than the political progress toward true civility is, in Kant’s eyes, the progress made so far toward the perfect actualization of the third, moral predisposition. Kant diagnoses in history so far und up to the present “morals” (Sitten) without “virtue” (Tugend), “sociable ness” (Geselligkeit) instead of “righteousness” (Rechtschaffenheit) and “vanity” (Eitelkeit) rather than “love of honor” (Ehrliebe), so that human beings “on the whole” (im Ganzen), i. e., as a species, are “al 43 44 45 46

AA 7:323; Kant (2007, 418). AA 7:323; Kant (2007, 418) (translation modified). AA 7:327; Kant (2007, 422). Reflexion 1524, AA 15/2:897.

Kant’s Political Anthropology

151

most not all all […] moralized” (beynah gar nicht […] moralisirt).47 From an anthropological viewpoint Kant is not concerned with moral prog ress in the lives of individual human beings, which may be achieved at any moment in time und under all circumstance due to the radical freedom that the human being possesses as a consciously free agent en dowed with the faculty of practical reason (“person”).48 Anthropologi cally considered, morality derives from moralization or the lengthy for mative process by which the socially camouflaged pursuit of one’s own will gradually is superseded by genuine concern for the common good and the latter’s pursuit for its own sake. For Kant the moral anthropo genesis concerns not so much a novel set of ends to be set by a morally predisposed agent as a motivational reorientation in the social life of human beings from practical “solipsism”49 to the felt (“moral feeling”) distinction between “right” (recht) and “wrong” (unrecht) in actions con cerning the agent himself as well as others.50 For Kant the anthropologist morality as a condition as well as an end of human practice is a socio political matter belonging to the naturally based and artificially devel oped culture of human coexistence.

4. The political vocation of the human being The eminently political character of the anthropological account of human developmental history, as presented by Kant in terms of the three successively realized basic predispositions of the human species, becomes apparent in his critical engagement with Rousseau’s political philosophy of culture. Kant correlates each of the three specifically human predispositions with a particular work and a systematic aspect in Rousseau’s thinking about nature, culture and politics. In each case Kant pairs his own progressist assessment of the development of the pre disposition in question with Rousseau’s pessimist picture of human cul tural development. In particular, Kant correlates his discussion of the technical predisposition with Rousseau’s analysis of the physical and mental “weakening” that the human species undergoes through cultural progress, especially in the development of the arts and sciences, as de 47 48 49 50

Reflexion 1524, AA 15/2:897. See AA 7:324; Kant (2007, 419). Reflexion 1471, AA 15/2:649. See AA 7:324; Kant (2007, 419) (translation modified).

152

Günter Zöller

tailed in the Discourse on the Arts and Sciences (1750). Kant’s analysis of the pragmatic predisposition of the human species for the process of civili zation is said to have its correlate in Rousseau’s discussion of the cultur al political origin of inequality and mutual suppression among human beings, as detailed in the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1755). Fi nally, Kant confronts his treatment of the moral predisposition and the progressive moral education of the human species with Rousseau’s por trayal of “education contrary to nature and deformation of the mind set,” as illustrated in Rousseau’s novel, Julie, or the New Heloise (1761).51 The point of Kant’s sustained parallelism between his own anthro pology of human development and that of Rousseau is not simply to contrast a positive and a negative account of the transition from nature to culture. Rather Kant takes over substantial aspects of Rousseau’s cul tural pessimism into his own account of human progress, just as he in corporates elements of his own optimist general outlook on human his tory into his interpretation of Rousseau. In particular, Kant expands on the threefold pairing of the specifically human predispositions in his own cultural anthropology and Rousseau’s three works in the critique of culture with a second triad of writings by Rousseau which, according to Kant, supplement the negative assessment of culture in the first triad with Rousseau’s founding and envisioning of a counter culture destined to overcome the essential shortcomings of failed arts and sciences, failed politics and failed pedagogy. Kant mentions specifically Rousseau’s Social Contract (1762), his Emile (1762) and the Profession of Faith of a Savoyard Vicar (from Book IV of the Emile) as works for which the three cor related works in the negative critique of culture were meant to provide the “guiding thread” (Leitfaden) for an alternative form of political, pedagogical and moral culture.52 On Kant’s reading of the architectonic of Rousseau’s philosophy, the latter’s overall strategy is not to advocate the return to the state of nature but the regard for nature as a measuring stick for human cultural development. By advocating “looking back” (zurck sehen) onto the state of nature, rather than “going back” (zurck gehen) 53 to the state of nature, Rousseau, on Kant’s revisionist reading, orients the human species to a 51 See AA 7:326; Kant (2007, 422). On the identification of the works alluded to by Kant, see Kant (2007, 542 note 145). For a more detailed discussion, see Brandt (1999, 326 f.). 52 See AA 7:327 f.; Kant (2007, 422). 53 AA 7:326); Kant (2007, 422) (translation modified; emphasis in the original).

Kant’s Political Anthropology

153

possible future culture free from the ills of current cultural corruption a final state of culture that retrieves under cultural conditions the pre historical state of nature that was lost by the advent of culture. The reintroduction of Rousseau as interpreted by Kant into Kant’s own anthropology results in a threefold scheme of human development according to which the state of nature is followed by the state of culture, the long term development of which ultimately is to lead to a state in which “perfect art again becomes nature” (vollkommene Kunst wird wieder zur Natur).54 Drawing on Rousseau’s “three paradoxical propositions” (drey paradoxe Stze) 55 about the harms caused by the apparent benefits of scientific progress, a civil constitution and unnatural pedagogical means and reverting Rousseau’s negative criticism of cultural develop ment into the latter’s defense, Kant formulates what could be termed the paradox of culture, according to which the inventions of culture prove both objectionable, even reprehensible, when compared to the lost state of nature, and functional, even beneficial, when considered in their in direct preparatory role for the eventual restitution of nature under the terms of culture. What in Rousseau might have seemed an attack on culture citing its constitutive ills, is turned by Kant into an apology of culture citing the benefits that come or are to come out of those very ills. For Kant, under Rousseau’s influence, culture is both anti nature and ante nature, the opposite of nature and the condition for its return. The very evidence that leads Rousseau or rather, Rousseau as inter preted by Kant to the indictment of culture makes Kant mount its de fense. The Kantian reading of Rousseau and the concomitant Rousseauian inspiration of Kant’s anthropology also manifest themselves in moral terms, when it comes to ascertaining the predispositional presence of good or evil in the human species. Kant acknowledges the dual presence of good and evil in the predisposition arguing that the “inborn propen sity” (angeborener Hang) to the good constitutes the “intelligible character of humanity in general” (intelligibeler Charakter der Menschheit berhaupt), while the equally “inborn propensity to the evil” (angeborener Hang […] zum Bçsen) constitutes the human being’s “sensible character” (sensibeler Charakter).56 Kant argues that any contradiction between the opposed basic inclinations falls away upon considering that the “natural voca 54 Reflexion 1454, AA 15/2:635, and Reflexion 1523, AA 15/2:896. 55 Reflexion 1521, AA 15/2:889. 56 AA 7:324; Kant (2007, 420) (translation modified).

154

Günter Zöller

tion” (Naturbestimmung) of the human being is to progress continuously toward (moral) improvement.57 But Kant’s anthropological analysis of the human natural predispo sition toward evil is not limited to his discussion of the moral predispo sition. Kant widens the scope of the initially specifically moral treatment of good and evil to an outright anthropology of good and evil that draws on Rousseau’s association of naturalness with goodness and his condem nation of the evils of culture’s break with nature, while preserving Kant’s own overall assessment of human cultural development as pro gressive and ameliorative. In particular, Kant’s maintains with regard to the general course of human history the “production” (Hervorbringung) of the good from the evil, more precisely, of a good that is not intended by the human being himself but that, once developed, pre serves itself and that arises from the evil due to the fact that the latter is “always internally at odds with itself” (innerlich mit sich selbst immer sich veruneinigendes Bçses).58 In Kant’s analysis of culture the conception of the “origin of the good from the evil” is tied closely to the reverse conception of the “ori gin of the evil […] from the good.”59 In leaving the state of nature and with it nature’s instinctual tutelage, the human being employs his newly discovered ability to reason for freely pursuing his own well being in ways that infringe upon other human beings and that give rise to all kinds of “vice” (Laster) and “misery” (Elend). Yet due to the essential instability of selfishly governed social life, the lapsarian passage from the good to the evil at the beginning of human history, on Kant’s assess ment, is to find its eventual inner worldly redemption in the inverse origin of the good from the evil. By turning evil into an “incentive for the good” (Triebfeder zum Guten) 60 and vindicating the Rousseauist vilification of culture into culture’s paradoxical self overcoming, Kant undertakes an anthropodicy, or a justification of the evils of human cul ture in view of the good they secretly serve. While this move, inspired 57 On the distinction between the “natural vocation” (Naturbestimmung) of the human being, which is culturo political, to be promoted by natural means and to be fulfilled in the natural order, and the “rational vocation” (Vernunft bestimmung) of the human being, which is ethico religious, to be promoted by non natural means and to be fulfilled in the moral order, see Reflexion 1521, AA 25/2:885, 888. 58 AA 7:328; Kant (2007, 423). 59 Reflexion 1521, AA 15/2:891. 60 Reflexion 1501, AA 15/2:790.

Kant’s Political Anthropology

155

by the earlier religious project of the justification of God in the face of the evils of the world (theodicy), does not take away from the horrors and the suffering in human history, it furnishes the philosophical reflec tion on the nature and the course of history with a point of view that integrates historical processes into a comprehensive structure of signifi cance on a spatially and temporally comprehensive, anthropological scale. Moreover, the anthropological prospect of inner worldly self re demption of the human being, with the aid of nature, lacks the other worldly perspective characteristic of Kant’s moral philosophy61 and its extension into ethico theology and moral religion.62 In an anthropological perspective the radical reality of evil in the human being is not a matter of a sinful fall and its long term moral con sequences; nor is the restitution of the good an affair involving an indi vidual human being’s act of inner moral revolution under divine assis tance. Rather good and evil are features of the naturally induced and naturally governed development of human culture. They are normative predicates used to classify, at the anthropological level, the various forms of interaction between nature, freedom and reason that determine the course of human existence. In particular, animality combined with in stinct, as characteristic of the state of nature under a Rousseauist descrip tion, amounts to the good; so does freedom combined with reason, as characteristic of the eventual perfectly civilized state of the human being. By contrast, animality combined with freedom, as characteristic of the imperfectly civilized state of the human being, amounts to the evil, yet is ultimately productive of the good due to the eventual matu ration of reason beyond its merely instrumental beginnings.63 For Kant the precarious position of the human being between the good and the evil is a result of his complex constitution as, at once, an “animal human being” (Tiermensch) and a “moral human being” (mo ralischer Mensch).64 In the former regard as an animal human being , the human being is an “animal capable of reason (animal rationabile)” (vernnftiges Thier) or a being capable of employing its reasoning ability in the service of its animality and of the latter’s naturally selfish needs of 61 See AA 5:122 – 132; Kant (1999, 238 – 246) (Critique of Practical Reason). 62 See AA 6:18 – 53; Kant (1996, 69 – 97) (Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Part One. Concerning the Dwelling of the Evil Principle Alongside the Good or Of the Radical Evil in Human Nature). See also AA 5:434 – 474 (Critique of the Power of Judgment, §§ 84 – 91). 63 See Reflexion 1501, AA 15/2:790. 64 Reflexion 1521, AA 15/2:888.

156

Günter Zöller

self preservation, self propagation and self enjoyment. On Kant’s assess ment, the instinctually free but not yet rationally self determined human animal instrumentalizes reason for its animal ends, thereby deforming instinctually regulated natural pursuits into unnaturally liberated, vicious practices. In the latter regard as a moral human being , the human being is a “rational being (animal rationale)” (Vernunftwesen) 65 capable of, conscious of, called upon and conscious of being called upon to act on purely ra tional grounds. Brought together the two halves of human existence do not actually fit together until the human being himself, with nature’s aid, has turned his freed animality enhanced by instrumental reason into a freed rationality enhanced by good will. But unlike in his moral philosophy, Kant’s concern in his anthropology is not with the norms and form of such moral willing and acting but with the arduous path of the human species through rationally enhanced animality toward morally conditioned rationality. That path leads not through the heart of the individual moral agent but through history and employs not the inner constraint of conscience, moral respect or moral feeling but the outer means of socially organized constraint. Accordingly, the domain of socially mediated and historically manifest human self perfection is the political.66 Under conditions of rationally enhanced animality, the political project of the self perfection of the human species takes on the form of human self governance. Kant’s political point of departure is the twofold recognition that the human animal is in need of a “lord” (Herr) able to curb the natural human tendency to socially harmful prac tical egoism and that, in the absence of other earthly rational beings, only the human being himself is available for the indispensable task of social control.67 In Kant’s natural history of human social life, the begin ning of human self governance is the tribal monarchical reign of one human being over many others with the ensuing rivalries and outright warfare both within the tribe and between several such tribal entities. The political instability of tribal and intertribal strife leads, on Kant’s ac count, to the transition from the “natural state” (Naturzustand) to the 65 AA 7:413; Kant (2007, 416 note); see also AA 7:321; Kant (2007, 416). 66 For an analysis that extends the specifically political character of Kant’s philos ophy into his moral philosophy, in particular his late ethics in The Metaphysics of Morals, see Zöller (2010) and Zöller (2010a). 67 See Reflexion 1500, AA 15/2:785 f.

Kant’s Political Anthropology

157

“civil state” (brgerlicher Zustand), in which the governance is said to re volve around “freedom” and “law” (Freiheit, Gesetz), supplemented by “power” (Gewalt) to ensure the rule of law under conditions of free dom.68 But first and foremost human self governance under “civil legisla tion” (brgerliche Gesetzgebung) is imperfect and lacking the proper bal ance of freedom, law and power. Kant presents a fourfold combinatorics of the three constitutive elements of political governance, three of which represent deficient political constellations with a different one of the three constitutive elements missing in each of the three cases. First, there is law and freedom without power, resulting in “anarchy” (Anarchie). Then there is law and power without freedom, constituting “despotism” (Despotism). Finally there is power and freedom without law, amounting to “barbarism” (Barbarei). The complete combination of all three constitutive political elements and with it the only “true” civil constitution power together with freedom and law yields what Kant terms a “republic” (Republik). The term here serves not to indicate a particular organization of the body politic but “a state in gen eral” (ein Staat berhaupt),69 or the core conception of the state as such, in which the well being of the commonwealth is the highest political principle. Kant stresses that the well being constituting the objective of the supreme law of a republic is not the “sensual well being” (Sinnenwohl) or the “happiness” (Glckseligkeit) of its citizens but the “intellec tual well being” (Verstandeswohl) or the preservation of the constitution of the state.70 Kant’s political conception of a republican constitution of the state draws on the Latin origin of the term, “republic” (res publica, meaning “common cause”), in pre imperial, free Rome and places his political anthropology into the context of modern republicanism, as advocated by Machiavelli in the Discourses on Livy, Spinoza in the Tractatus politicus and Rousseau in the Social Contract. 71 In Kant’s anthropological perspec tive the freedom required for and realized in a true republic, where it is conditioned by law and safeguarded by power, is essentially republican 68 Kant (1900, 7:330); Kant (2007, 425) (translation modified; in the original em phasis). 69 Kant (1900, 7:330 f.); Kant (2007, 426) (translation modified). 70 Kant (1900, 7:331); Kant (2007, 426) (translation modified; in the original em phasis). 71 On the Greek roots of modern republicanism in Plato and Aristotle, different from its Roman roots in Cicero and Livy, see Nelson (2004).

158

Günter Zöller

freedom, not the minimal, formal and permissive freedom of individual preference and choice but the substantial, contentually specific and po litically obligating freedom of a civil society that is a society of citizens. In addition, the normative identification of state and republic in the an thropology serves as a politically significant supplement to the primarily juridical conception of the state in Kant’s late philosophy of right.72 Given the radically asocial social propensities of human beings, the republican political order has to exercise constraint for its instauration and continued maintenance. But it is to do this only in such a way that the constraint is mutual and according to law. Most importantly yet, the laws limiting the constraint are to be laws that the human beings have given themselves. Republican freedom involves “mutual con straint under laws issuing from the human beings themselves” (wechselseitiger Zwang unter von ihnen selbst ausgehenden Gesetzen).73 To judge from the extant student transcripts, Kant was even more outspoken in his lectures on anthropology than in the printed version on the egalitar ian and even revolutionary implications of his political anthropology of the perfect civil constitution envisioning a “society of equal beings” (Gesellschaft gleicher Wesen) to be hoped for as a result of “many revolu tions” (viele Revolutionen) that yet would have to occur.74 In the print version the former final vision of the perfect polity is rendered as one of a “cosmopolitan society” (weltbrgerliche Gesellschaft) encompassing all human beings, but only with the status of a “regulative principle” for the infinite approximation of an unreachable end.75 But the political freedom hat Kant envisions under a republican civil constitution is not limited to the narrowly political freedom of self leg islation and self governance. For Kant the improvement of the human species in all three areas of social life under the basic predispositions to self cultivation through (public) education, self civilization through (state) legislation and self moralization through (moral) religion is geared toward freedom from extraneous authority and the establishment of self rule. In particular, Kant’s criticizes the predominant politico cul 72 See AA 6:229 – 372; Kant (1999, 386 – 506) (The Metaphysics of Morals, The Doctrine of Right). On Kant’s republican conception of the state, see also AA 8:349 – 353; Kant (1999, 322 – 325) (Toward Perpetual Peace). See also Kant’s discussion of Plato’s republic (platonische Republik) as a practical idea in the CPR A 316/B 372. 73 AA 7:331; Kant (2007, 427) (translation modified). 74 AA 25/1:690 f. (Anthropologie Friedlnder). 75 AA 7:331); Kant (2007, 427) (in the original emphasis).

Kant’s Political Anthropology

159

tural condition of human beings in past and present under a comprehen sive system of threefold “tutelage” (Unmndigkeit): the “domestic” (huslich) tutelage in matters of education, which prevents human beings from thinking for themselves even after their formal education is finish ed; the “civil” (brgerlich) tutelage in political matters, which prevents human beings from governing their own affairs; and the “pious” (fromm) tutelage in religious matters, which keeps human beings from following their own conscience and moral judgment.76 On Kant’s analysis, removing the extraneous constraints from the three domains of possible human self improvement will result in an al ternative cultural politics of “negative education”, “negative legislation” and “negative religion.” In negative education the child’s talents, incli nations, choices and morals are encouraged to develop free from the strictures of the mere copying of conduct, artificial constraint, fixed ex amples and corrupting enticements. In negative legislation the citizens stand under laws issued from simple reason free of indoctrination and obfuscation. In negative religion the concept of God is reduced to its moral core freeing religion from the intercession of priests and an arcane theology.77 Kant concedes that the called for “freedom of education, civil freedom and religious freedom,” which in turn is to enable the “general improvement” (allgemeine Verbesserung) of the human species, is still a remote goal for a humankind not yet “susceptible” (susceptibel) of such radical measures. But in regard to the natural history of the human species from nature, with nature, through cultivation and civ ilization to moralization , he is equally certain that in the long run “nothing brought about forcefully [rather than freely] will last” (nichts erzwungenes Bestand hat).78 Kant’s eminently political anthropology con cludes and culminates with the vision of the human world this world in the future rather than a future world characterized by the very no tion that is also at the core of his moral philosophy, viz., freedom.

76 Reflexion 1524, AA 25/2:898 f. 77 See Reflexion 1524, AA 25/2:898 f. 78 Reflexion 1524, AA 15/2:898.

160

Günter Zöller

Bibliography Brandt, Reinhard (1999): Kommentar zu Kants Anthropologie (1798), Ham burg. Eckardt, Georg, John, Matthias, van Zantwijk, Temilo, Ziche, Paul (eds.) (2001): Anthropologie und empirische Psychologie um 1800. Ansätze einer Entwicklung zur Wissenschaft, Cologne, Weimar, Vienna. Kant, Immanuel (1900 f.): Gesammelte Werke, ed. Königlich Preußische (spät er Deutsche) Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin, New York (Akade mie Ausgabe; AA). Kant, Immanuel (1985): Schriften zur Geschichtsphilosophie, ed. M. Riedel, Stuttgart. Kant, Immanuel (1996): Religion and Rational Theology, ed. A. W. Wood and G. Di Giovanni, Cambridge. Kant, Immanuel (1999): Practical Philosophy, ed. M. J. Gregor, Cambridge. Kant, Immanuel (2007): Anthropology, History, and Education, ed. G. Zöller and R. Louden, Cambridge. Lagier, Raphaël (2004): Les races humaines selon Kant, Paris. Nelson, Eric (2004): The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought, Cam bridge. Riedel, Manfred (1981): Historizismus und Kritizismus. Kants Streit mit G. Forster und J. G. Herder, in: Kant Studien 72, pp. 41 – 57. Zammito, John H. (2002): Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology, Chi cago, London. Zöller, Günter (1984): Theoretische Gegenstandsbeziehung bei Kant. Zur sys tematischen Bedeutung der Termini “objektive Realität” und “objektive Gültigkeit” in der “Kritik der reinen Vernunft”, Berlin, New York. Zöller, Günter (1993): Main Developments in Recent Scholarship on the Cri tique of Pure Reason, in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52, pp. 445 – 466. Zöller, Günter (2001): Die Bestimmung der Bestimmung des Menschen bei Mendelssohn und Kant, in: V. Gerhardt, R. P. Horstmann and R. Schu macher (eds.): Kant und die Berliner Auflärung. Akten des 9. Internationa len Kant Kongresses (26. bis 31. März 2000 in Berlin), Berlin, New York, vol. 4, pp. 476 – 489. Zöller, Günter (2009): Aufklärung über Aufklärung. Kants Konzeption des selbständigen, öffentlichen und gemeinschaftlichen Gebrauchs der Ver nunft, in: H. F. Klemme (ed.), Kant und die Zukunft der europäischen Aufklärung, Berlin, New York, pp. 82 – 99. Zöller, Günter (2010): Autocracy. Kant on the Psycho Politics of Self Rule, in: S. R. Palmquist (ed.): Cultivating Personhood. Kant and Asian Philos ophy, Berlin, New York, pp. 401 – 414. Zöller, Günter (2010a): Autocracy. The Psycho Politics of Self Rule in Plato and Kant, in: E. B. Pires, B. Nonnenmacher and S. Büttner von Stülpnagel (eds.): Relations of the Self, Coimbra, pp. 385 – 404. Zöller, Günter (2011): Genesis und Klima. Geo Anthropologie bei Herder und Kant, in: S. Bacin, A. Ferrarin, C. La Rocca and M. Ruffing (eds.): Kant

Kant’s Political Anthropology

161

und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht. Akten des XI. Internatio nalen Kant Kongresses Pisa 2010/Proceedings of the XIth International Kant Congress Pisa 2010, Berlin, New York. Zöller, Günter (2011a): Mensch und Erde. Die geo anthropologische Parallel aktion von Herder und Kant, in: M. Heinz and A. Nuzzo (eds.): “Meta kritik.” Transformationen vorkritischer—Figurationen nachkantischer Phi losophie, Stuttgart Bad Cannstatt.

List of Contributors Andrew Stephenson, Laming Junior Research Fellow, Queen’s College, University of Oxford Thomas Sturm, Dr., Department of Philosophy, Autonomous Univer sity of Barcelona Liesbet Vanhaute, PhD Fellow of the Research Foundation Flanders, Department of Philosophy, University of Antwerp Matthias Wunsch, Dr., Department of Philosophy, University of Wup pertal Thomas Wyrwich, Dr., Department of Philosophy, University of Mu nich Job Zinkstok, Department of Philosophy, University of Groningen Günter Zöller, Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Munich