Joint Ventures: Authorship, Translation, Plagiarism
Fritz Gutbrodt
Peter Lang
Joint Ventures
Publications Universitaires Européennes Europäische Hochschulschriften European University Studies
Series XVIII Comparative Literature Reihe XVIII Série XVIII Vergleichende Literaturwissenschaft Littérature comparée Vol./Band 108
PETER LANG Bern · Berlin · Bruxelles · Frankfurt a. M. · New York · Wien
Fritz Gutbrodt
Joint Ventures Authorship, Translation, Plagiarism
PETER LANG Bern · Berlin · Bruxelles · Frankfurt a. M. · New York · Wien
Bibliographic information published by Die Deutsche Bibliothek Die Deutsche Bibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available on the Internet at ‹http://dnb.ddb.de›. British Library and Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data: A catalogue record for this book is available from The British Library, Great Britain, and from The Library of Congress, USA
The study was accepted as Habilitationsschrift at the University of Zurich in 1998.
ISSN 0721-3425 ISBN 3-03910-032-7 US-ISBN 0-8204-6266-7
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For Rita, Bettina, Katrin, and Sebastian, who know why.
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Contents
1. Preface: Authorizing Authenticity
2. The Genius as Compositor: Young’s Conjectures on Original Composition
9
35
I.
From Young’s Original to Joyce’s Hypertext
36
II.
Genius, Encyclopedia, Automata
57
III. The Mechanics of Originality IV. Forever Young 3. The Worth of Werther: Goethe’s Literary Marketing
76 104 129
I.
Names and Silhouettes
129
II.
Lovers, Authors, Bureaucrats
157
III. The Genius and Its Monstrous Doubles 4. The Volatility of the Letter: Baudelaire Translates Poe
182 193
I.
Destination Paris
193
II.
D— ciphering
205
III. Pure Language, Pure Signifier
223
IV. King of Apes
237
7
5. Transplants: Poe, Plagiarism, and Les Fleurs du mal
249
I.
Nevermore
249
II.
Madman in the Library
264
III. Sisyphos, Slave
283
Appendix “Une Lettre volée” in Magasin Pittoresque 13 (1845) Bibliography
8
305 315
Chapter 1
Introduction: Authorizing Authenticity “That romantic disease, originality, all around we see originality of incompetent idiots, they could draw nothing, paint nothing, just so the mess they make is original...Even two hundred years ago who wanted to be an original, to be original was to admit that you could not do a thing the right way, so you could only do it your own way.” Gaddis, The Recognitions1
The chapters of this book discuss what Wyatt Gwyon, the counterfeiter of Flemish masters in William Gaddis’s The Recognitions, calls the “romantic disease” of originality. His statement about the original has itself the status of a copy, for Wyatt faithfully repeats the words of Herr Koppel, the teacher with whom he studied in Munich. Thus his reference to a reverence for the great masters lives up to the aesthetics masterminded by his teacher: “When you paint you do not try to be original, only you think about your work, how to make it better, so you copy masters, only masters, for with each copy of a copy the form degenerates...you do not invent shapes, you know them, auswendig wissen Sie, by heart...” (89). The translation of the German phrase auswendig wissen into knowing by heart literally turns Koppel’s argument inside out. It is uncertain whether by counterfeiting great masters the artist can absorb or assimilate the shape of great art to make it truly his own or whether the skills he acquires are merely superficial, or auswendig. Is originality some intrinsic quality of art, or is it accidental? Are the artists that aspire to originality in “the mess they make” actually some kind of impostors? And how does it come
1
William Gaddis, The Recognitions (1955; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1993), 89.
9
to pass that what is called copy itself assumes the despotic authority of an original that demands imitation? The irony of a reversal is lying in ambush to attack and confuse the figures in the narrative as well as the reader at every turn of Gaddis’s postmodern novel about romantic misconceptions of originality. Wyatt’s apprenticeship in forgery is a case in point. His father had bought Hieronymus Bosch’s painting The Seven Deadly Sins in Italy and smuggled it across the border. “How were you certain it was the original?” (39), Wyatt asks the Reverend Gwyon when one day he talks about the origin of the picture that holds a strong fascination for his adolescent son. “That took some...umm...conniving, getting it through customs,” the father replies. Years later Wyatt will find out about the true nature of that connivance. But first the painter starts his astonishing career: Every week or so he would begin something original. It would last for a few days, but before any lines of completion had been drawn he abandoned it. Still the copies continued to perfection, that perfection to which only counterfeits can attain, reproducing every aspect of inadequacy, every blemish on Perfection in the original. He found a panel of very old wood, nearly paper-thin in places but almost of exact size, and on this he started the Seven Deadly Sins: Superbia, Ira, Luxuria, Avaritia, Invidia...one by one they reached completion unbroken by any blemish of originality. Secrecy was not difficult in that house, and he made his copy in secret. (55)
Long before he meets old Koppel, young Wyatt already endorses the idea that originality is a blemish that mars the perfection of a faithful copy. For while in counterfeits every mark of imperfection reproduces something that is already present in the original and thus makes that blemish an integral part of the work copied, any defect in an original work constitutes a fragmentation of the integrity of ideal beauty. Wyatt seems to learn two things about art and creativity: You cannot be made accountable for a copy; and in order to produce an original you have to avoid the phantasy of originality. Ironically, the lessons he teaches himself come back with a vengeance. As it turns out years later, the one blemish in the original he faithfully reproduced is that it 10
is in fact a fake. His father lied to him. This lie was the “conniving” he was talking about at the time, and the border across which he smuggled the painting was that between original and copy. Deception becomes the eighth deadly sin added to the painting in the process of forgery. It is a heavy blow to the professional forger that the Bosch painting he counterfeited – “unbroken by any blemish of originality” – was not the original painting. The cheater is cheated: “And it was false all the time! He spoke with more effort than he had yet made to control his voice. – Copying a copy? is that where I started?” (381). His teacher’s warning comes home to him after all: “You copy masters, only masters, for with each copy of a copy the form degenerates.” Koppel’s admiration of masters is not really shared by the masters themselves, who have always practiced their art by making countless copies. “When artists do not copy others, they may copy their own work over and over to deepen ‘the idea’ of their original,”2 as Hillel Schwartz reminds us in her book on the cultural history of the copy. As she sums up this practical practice with a wonderful pun: “The history of art is the history of copy rites” (248). Ironically, Wyatt had financed his course of studies with Koppel by selling what he thought was the original painting by Bosch. Having sold a fake as an original Wyatt’s whole career is founded, in a symbolic sense, on counterfeit money. Money and art are the two inseparable master media of communication in Gaddis’s novel, and it is impossible to tell whether Wyatt is shocked by the revelation of the fake or by the sudden depreciation of the work that was sold for the ridiculous sum of fifty dollars. Aesthetic value and market value are closely linked in The Recognitons, and their interdependence reveals the truth of Koppel’s remark about the devaluation of a work that represents the copy of a copy. Throughout the narrative the discourse about the original and the copy extends into the area of coinage as one of the oldest cultural forms of mechanical reproduction. Adamo da Brescia, the counterfeiter of money suffering in Dante’s Inferno, is 2
Hillel Schwartz, The Culture of the Copy: Striking Likenesses, Unreasonable Facsimiles (New York: Zone Books, 1996), 248.
11
Wyatt Gwyon’s true patron. In his essay on The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction Benjamin writes, In principle a work of art has always been reproducible. Man-made artifacts could always be imitated by men. Replicas were made by pupils in practice of their craft, by masters for diffusing their works, and, finally, by third parties in the pursuit of gain. Mechanical reproduction of a work of art, however, represents something new. [...] The Greeks knew only two procedures of technically reproducing works of art: founding and stamping. Bronzes, terra cottas, and coins were the only art works which they could produce in quantity. All others were unique and could not be mechanically reproduced.3
The passage neatly sums up the situation of the artist as forger in The Recognitions. Art is by definition reproducible, and one might indeed say that the the desire to repeat and reproduce works of art performes the mimetic relationship that exists between art and nature. As Benjamin writes: “The authenticity of a thing (Echtheit einer Sache) is the essence of all that is transmissible from its beginning, ranging from its substantive duration (materielle Dauer) to its testimony to the history which it has experienced” (221). In this sense authenticity is defined as the hallmark of copy. The reproduction of art is authentic because it reveals that authenticity – the “most sensitive nucleus” (221) of art – is the very element that can be transmitted. The original work itself, that is to say its originality, cannot be repeated. The reproduction produces a different work that takes place at a different historical moment, but the authenticity of art is the power by which art can recreate authenticity in countless new works of art. Thus Benjamin manages to separate the question of authenticity from the problem of identity that has marred any discussion of repetition, copy, and plagiarism in the discourse on art and literature. While identity and similarity play in the register of what Lacan calls the imaginary, authenticity is present3
12
Walter Benjamin, Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit, in Gesammelte Schriften, eds. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974), I: 474. The translation follows the text in Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken, 1968), 218. Subsequent references to the translation will be cited in the text.
ed by Benjamin as an historical concept. Works of art are authentic because they enter the order of history and they remain authentic as long as they endure the historicity of the moment that produces them. This is where Benjamin locates the problem that the mechanical reproduction art encounters in the age of photography and film. It is no longer authenticity that is transferred from nature to art or from one work to another but precisely what once seemed impossible to capture and what modern photography and film manage to displace or cite as moveable property: time and history. “Since the historical testimony rests on the authenticity, the former, too, is jeopardized by reproduction when substantive duration ceases to matter. And what is really jeopardized when the historical testimony is affected is the authority of the object” (221). What mechanical reproduction shatters, as Benjamin argues, is the aura of things and works of art, a term he describes at one point as “the unique phenomenon of a distance” (222). The telephoto lens and the speed of film shorten this distance and lead to what Paul Virilio has described as an aesthetics of disappearance.4 Benjamin’s essay maps out the threat to authenticity and authority that the discourse on art and literature faces and that Wyatt Gwyon faces in his acts of forgery. While certain crafts in art were, together with the minting of coins, the first instances of mechanical reproduction, painting as a performance of the hand has shown the strongest resistance to the kind of duplication that changed the face of literature with the invention of the printing press. This is why the emulation of great masters survived as the principal method of teaching in Herr Koppel’s school at Munich, where practice, citation, and counterfeit seem to exist in some kind of innocent relationship.5 4
See his Esthetique de la disparition (Paris: Editions Balland, 1980).
5
The history of copying masters for the purpose of an artist’s development and their use as citations is the subject of an exhibition catalogue by Egbert Haverkamp-Begemann, ed. Creative Copies: Interpretative Drawings from Michelangelo to Picasso (New York: The Drawing Center, 1988). On counterfeiting in art history, see Otto Kurz, Fakes: A Handbook for Collectors and Students (New
13
However, Wyatt not only copies great masters but also fabricates, under their name, works they have never painted. Using genuine canvass and other material of the period he fakes their style to make an original, and he thus falsifies precisely what Benjamin calls the “historical testimony” of art. What makes those forgeries interesting is that they are unoriginal originals. One such case is Wyatt’s faking of an undiscovered work by the fifteenth-century Flemish painter Hans Memling, which John Johnston has described in terms of Baudrillard’s concept of the simulacrum: “Wyatt’s painting is neither an imitation nor an original but a simulation of a Memling or a simulacrum. It is not an imitation or copy because there is (was) no original, but it is not an original either since it was not painted by Memling himself.”6 What started in Munich as an investiture of the great masters to be emulated ends up in the narrative as a total destabilization of an aesthetic ideology founded on the assumption that one can tell the original from the copy, the genuine from the counterfeit. This is where we come back to money as the medium competing with art in Gaddis’s novel, for doing big business with pseudoauthentic works the ring of forgers in Gaddis’s narrative make big money. Money has the quality of a simulacrum. It is a signifier that has the authority of authenticity without the presence of what it authenticates. It also combines the two levels Benjamin distinguishes in his essay with regard to the origin and use of art: the “cult value” and the “exhibition value of the work” (224). While money has ritual York: Dover, 1967) and the exhibition catalogue by Mark Jones, ed. Fake? The Art of Deception (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). 6
14
John Johnston, Carnival of Repetition: Gaddis’s The Recognitions and Postmodern Theory (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), 11; on Baudrillard’s concept of the simulacrum, see 194–96. See also the collection of essays by John Kuehl and Steven Moore, eds. In Recognition of William Gaddis (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1984). Information on historical and pseudo-historical or counterfeited figures and works in Gaddis’s vast novel is provided by Steven Moore, A Reader’s Guide to William Gaddis’s ‘The Recognitions’ (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982).
origins it is also the most exhibitionistic medium imaginable.7 In the passage cited earlier about the counterfeiting of Bosch’s Seven Deadly Sins we see Wyatt work in secrecy like the cavemen portraying the elk or the priests hiding their madonna described by Benjamin in his essay (225). Faking the pseudo-original Memling he works for the total exposure of a famous name that is going to be sold in the art market. In art and literature since the Renaissance the question of authority and authenticity has been played out in two registers that partake of both those levels of cult and exhibition at once: the signature and the performance. The Recognitions is the first novel in Gaddis’s massive and ambitious project on the discourse of art, economy, religion, and science in postmodernism. Jean-François Lyotard has described the postmodern world as a system that no longer relies on rules, models, and absolute precepts that would explain and, in the strict sense of the word, legitimize our contingent management of knowledge.8 Gaddis’s novel, published in 1955, presents something like an archeology of this world and a discussion of the ethics needed to live in it.9 Focusing on the question of authenticity and authority it provides a great 7
On the history of the ritual and religious origin of money, see Bernhard Laum, Ueber das Wesen des Münzgeldes: Eine sach- und begriffsgeschichtliche Studie (Halle: A. Riechmann, 1929), 33–66, which relates the religious origin of money to its connection with memory. Benjamin knew and admired the work. The symbolic dimension of money as a signifier is discussed by Jean-Joseph Goux. In particular see his book Les Monnayeurs du langage (Paris: Galilée, 1984), in part translated in Symbolic Economies: After Marx and Freud (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990).
8
Jean-François Lyotard, “What is Postmodernism,” in The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
9
His archeological project also lays bare the foundations that Joyce provided for his novel. Hugh Kenner’s, The Counterfeiters (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1973) can serve as a commentary on the counterfeiting going on in The Recognitions. On Gaddis’s ethical vision, see Gregory Comnes, The Ethics of Indeterminacy in the Novels of William Gaddis (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994).
15
narrative on why there are no longer any grands récits. In this narrative recognition and the shock of recognition become epistemological concepts that show the limits of the traditional models of representation that have determined our sense of authenticity and authority. In his excellent study entitled Recognition Terence Cave has offered anagnorisis (recognition) as a powerful alternative to mimesis, the master term in Aristotle’s Poetics that has informed Western thought on the representation of reality. His reading of the recognition scene in the Odyssey where Chariclea identifies Ulysses by the scar she sees in the course of her ritual washing of his feet challenges Auerbach’s reading of the same scene. While Auerbach turns the episode into an exemplary instance of mimesis as a closed system in which every mark can be attributed to an identifiable referent, Cave emphasizes the disruption that informs the effect of recognition: Anagnorisis seems at first sight to be the paradigm of narrative satisfaction: it answers questions, restores identity and symmetry, and makes a whole hidden structure of relations intelligible. Yet the satisfaction is also somehow excessive, the reassurance too easy; the structure is visibly prone to collapse. [...] Recognition may easily turn out to be an impostor, claiming to resolve, conjoin and make whole while it busily brings to the surface all the possibilities that threaten wholeness.10
Cave traces the impostor in the tragedies and comedies of mistaken identity that form our canon of literature from Sophocles’s Oedipus to Conrad’s Razumov in Under Western Eyes. As a concept anagnorisis opens up a perspective on the problem discussed in Gaddis’s novel of identifying the authenticity of the original in contradistinction to a mere copy or a genuine simulation. As Cave remarks, “Recognition is an activity taking place in a hall of mirrors where the only person present is a simulacrum” (21).
10 Terence Cave, Recognition: A Study in Poetics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 489.
16
The impostors the following chapters identify and expose are the original genius, the translator, and the plagiarist. In their activities as authors they engage with a tradition and transmission of texts that makes them approach either the oedipal drama we witness in Sophocles or the conspiracy of foreign spies that we see plotting their schemes in Conrad’s novel. Focusing on the relationship between masters and disciples, owners and borrowers, the first-born and the belated, the chapters address problems that not only inform the literary texts under discussion but also the criticism that comments on them. Anthony Grafton has investigated how the search for historical and scientific truth has led to a duplicity in Western scholarship that gives political power an academic and institutional frame,11 and Michel Schneider’s book about plagiarism and psychoanalysis demonstrates how duplicity even entered the circle of Freud and his disciples that wanted to redefine the discourse of human and social sciences from outside the big institutions.12 That duplicity and that anxiety cannot be dissociated from the indeterminacy of the concept of authorship and originality that befalls the discourse of the writers whose texts are discussed in this book. The texts chosen for discussion are taken from the eighteenth and nineteenth century, but the questions they raise may be said to explore what Lyotard calls the postmodern condition. Postmodernism begins with Romanticism. This point is forcefully made in Crimes of Writing, Susan Stewart’s excellent book on the problems of authenticity and authorship. “The postmodern ‘problems’ of rapidity and fragmentation might be seen as either an inheritance of or parallel to eighteenth11 Anthony Grafton, Forgers and Critics: Creativity and Duplicity in Western Scholarship (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). The book deals with forgeries from classical to modern times. See also Karl Corino, ed. Gefälscht! Betrug in Politik, Literatur, Wissenschaft, Kunst und Musik (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1992), and the essays on the politics of scholarship in Lise Buranen et al., eds. Perspectives on Plagiarism and Intellectual Property in a Postmodern World (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999). 12 Michel Schneider, Voleurs de mots: Essai sur le plagiat, la psychanalyse et la pensée (Paris: Gallimard, 1985).
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century cultural developments,” she writes at the end of a list of problems that I should like to cite for the project of this book: “The invention of a mass-market subjectivity of authorial ‘stardom’ within a context of deepening anonymity; the rapid production, dissemination, and disappearance of cultural objects; and the crisis in authenticity arising from various phenomena characterized by simulacral and nostalgic thematics and form.”13 Her point about the invention of “mass-market subjectivity” indicates that the modern subject is the effect of a highly competitive market in which the different stakeholders of society define their identity based on the roles they actually play and the roles they imagine for themselves. Authority is the principal new role the 18th century created for an increasing segment of society, and authorship a powerful tool to shape identity. In a cultural space dominated by a definition of subjectivity in terms of property rights and the rapid privatization of a newly created public sphere, the promise of the 18th century to create a community of free subjects that would be free based on their claim to speak their minds, or what Kant called their Mündigkeit, soon turned into a battlefield of ideology. The concept of authority inscribed as an instance of authorship initiated a self-representation and self-affirmation that Jerome McGann has aptly called the Romantic Ideology14 in which alterity, difference, and the voice of the Other was most efficiently and most effectively absorbed into a muted subjectivity. What Stewart calls the “context of deepening anonymity” started in the second half of the 18th century. This book focuses on authorship, translation and plagiarism as joint ventures. The Romantic concept of authorship, as will be argued, survives in modern and post-modern literature, philosophy, and criticism as the mark of a failed attempt to inscribe the “author” and the “signature” as agents of a stable identity. Translation and plagiarism 13 Susan Stewart, Crimes of Writing: Problems in the Containment of Representation (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 5. 14 Jerome McGann, The Romantic Ideology: A Critical Investigation (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1983).
18
will be presented as activities that play out the stakes in the Romantic fascination or obsession with originality as the guarantor of subjective identity. Both translation and plagiarism are cultural practices that, as one might assume, have existed since the beginning of writing. Exploring the relationship between the original and the copy they question their status. To say this is to make a Romantic move, for it is only in the 18th and 19th century that those concepts and practices began to play a major role. It is a role literary theory has revived since the 1960s. With the advent of structuralism and post-structuralism and their interest in linguistic structures and intertextual relationships, translation studies have become a major field of research, addressing the relationship between “source text” and “target text” from diverse theoretical or philosophical perspectives.15 Although the complex 15 See the landmark essays by Jakobson and others in in Reuben A. Brower, ed. On Translation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966); the collections of essays on translation and deconstruction by Joseph F. Graham, ed. Difference in Translation (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1985) and Alfred Hirsch, ed. Übersetzung und Dekonstruktion (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1997), and the book on Derrida by Kathleen Davis, Deconstruction and Translation (Manchester: St. Jerome Publishing, 2001); the essays on translation and cultural politics in Susan Bassnett and Harish Trivedi, eds. Post-colonial Translation: Theory and Practice (London and New York: Routledge, 1999) and Anselm Haverkamp, ed. Die Sprache der Anderen: Übersetzungspolitik zwischen den Kulturen (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer Verlag, 1997). On translation and philosophy, see Andrew Benjamin, Translation and the Nature of Philosophy: A New Theory of Words (London and New York: Routledge, 1989) and Sándor Albert, Übersetzung und Philosophie (Wien: Edition Praesens, 2001). For an overview of different approaches to the theory and practice of translation, see Louis G. Kelly, The True Interpreter: A History of the Translation Theory and Practice in the West (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979), William Frawley, ed. Translation: Literary, Linguistic, and Philosophical Perspectives (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1984), Edwin Gentzler, Contemporary Translation Theories (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), and Radegundis Stolze, Übersetzungstheorien: Eine Einführung (Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag, 1997). On the history, see Douglas Robinson, ed. Western Translation Theory: From Herodotus to Nietzsche (Manchester and Northampton, Mass.: St. Jerome Publishing, 2001); and, with a focus on Germany, Friedmar Apel, Literarische Übersetzung (Stuttgart: Metzler Verlag, 1983).
19
phenomenon of plagiarism has received less attention and has long been associated with the identification of sources or the history of motives that look back on a long tradition in literary criticism, recent investigations of copyright in new historicist and post-colonial criticism as well as legal studies have turned plagiarism from a moral or ethical issue into an important economic, political, and cultural debate.16 The chapter on Edward Young’s Conjectures on Original Composition explores the origin of what in Gaddis’s Recognitions is called “that romantic disease, originality.” Young wrote his essay in the period that Robert Folkenflik has called the great age of forgery. As he points out, “There was a steadily developing fascination with the poet as person and a shifting emphasis from the work he produced to the poem as expressive of his personality.”17 Macpherson’s and Chatterton’s faked originals demonstrate that this shift of emphasis did not simply lead to an empowerment of the author and his or her 16 See the annotated bibliography of Judy Anderson, Plagiarism, Copyright Violation, and Other Thefts of Intellectual Property (Jefferson, N.C. and London: McFarland Publishers, 1998). A comprehensive history of copyright in England, France, Germany, and the U.S., with chapters on cultural and legal aspects as well as on the internationalization of copyright and authorship, is provided by David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), which supersedes the earlier book by Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968). On the new historicist perspectives on copyright, see the important collection of essays in Martha Woodmansee and Peter Jaszi, eds. The Construction of Authorship: Textual Appropriation in Law and Literature (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1994). See also the essays with an emphasis on legal aspects in Brad Sherman and Alain Strowel, eds. Of Authors and Origins: Essays on Copyright Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) and the book by Rosemary J. Coombe, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Property: Authorship, Appropriation, and the Law (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998). Another interesting study is Marilyn Randall, Pragmatic Plagiarism: Authorship, Profit, and Power (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000). 17 Robert Folkenflik, “Macpherson, Chatterton, Blake and the Great Age of Literary Forgery,” Centennial Review 18 (1974), 381–82.
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name but rather produced texts by an allegedly unknown or anonymous author in order to express personality as the establishment of an idealized author figure. That figure is the original genius. In his “Essai sur la peinture,” written in 1765, Diderot complains about the teaching method in the academy that makes students endlessly copy models, forcing on them something foreign, a maniera, that prevents them from imitating nature naturally. At the end of the essay the original genius is presented as a figure that has direct access to nature. However, the talented genius gains singularity at the cost of being solitary and perhaps misunderstood: “De là l’incertitude du succès de tout ouvrage de génie. Il est seul. On ne l’apprécie qu’en le rapportant immédiatement à la nature.”18 Diderot’s conclusion gathers the major aspects of the art and cult of genius in the era of Romanticism. Breaking away from an interpretative community based on shared models and rules, the excellence of individual performance is threatened by an uncertainty of success. Everything depends on the creation of a deregulated market for a public that will buy into this success. Diderot managed to do this with his project of an Encyclopédie that gives the educated public an alphabet to construct or reconstruct the world of science and the arts. The chapter on Young discusses the encyclopedia as a model of thinking and writing that authorizes readers to be authors and gives them an almost divine power of knowledge, a power that takes on monstrous proportions in the case of Viktor Frankenstein, who constructed his creature from the kind of scholarly work that goes into handbooks and encyclopedias. New historicist criticism has indicated the importance of Young’s essay in contemporary debates about copyright that were instrumental in creating the market where the original genius must try to secure its success. The genius, as will be argued, is a compositor, and it will be important to demonstrate that the imagery of organic organicity Young deploys to describe originality is countered by the presence of the mechanical 18 Diderot, “Essai sur la peinture,” in Oeuvres, ed. André Billy (Paris: Gallimard, 1951), 1170: “Hence the uncertain success of any work of genius. It stands alone. One can only appreciate genius by relating it directly to nature.”
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press and the mint in the argument of his essay. The discussion of the Conjectures approaches the problem of copyright and the construction of authorship in relation to Kant’s discussion of the author’s and the printer’s voice in his essay on piracy. Contrary to what Herr Koppel says about the faintness of the copy of a copy in fine arts, the press issues countless identical copies and makes a book speak to hundreds of readers at the same time, which makes it difficult for the author to control his or her voice and distinguish it from the voice of the printer. The chapter that follows the discussion of Young is about Goethe’s Werther, a novel that provides a radical example of how authors make their name by creating the readers they need. Goethe invented the diversification of literature, it will be argued, and he did so by introducing Werther as a brand name. His name embodies the question of value or Wert in both the economic and aesthetic sense of the word. Wherever Werther’s letters say something crucial about his identity and his position in relation to others the word wert (worth) emerges in the text. Peggy Kamuf has shown how the institution of authorship plays with the inscription of a signature.19 Werther is an author that transforms the politics of the signature into a fetishism of the proper name. Goethe’s novel about his sick protagonist is also an extreme example of that “romantic disease” we have been talking about. In a motto prefixed to one of the many editions of the novel the reader is asked to accept the book and its protagonist as a friend. As the history of the craze that developed around the work shows, Werther is not only host to the readers but also hostile. Hillis Miller has presented the double meaning of host, which means both guest and parasite, as a concept of reading and writing that opens up a perspective on the history of the novel’s reception: “One of the most frightening versions of the parasite as invading host is the virus. In this case, the parasite is an alien who has not simply the ability to 19 Peggy Kamuf, Signature Pieces: On the Institution of Authorship (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988). See also Jacques Derrida, “Signature Event Context,” in Margins of Philosphy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 307–30.
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invade a domestic enclosure, consume the food of the family, and kill the host, but the strange capacity, in doing all that, to turn the host into multitudinous proliferating replications of itself.”20 That virus is Werther, who invades Lotte’s home, and it is also the book that as a virus caused the Werther-Fieber, that strange and for some indeed fatal sickness that started with a proliferation of Werther and Lotte impostors wearing dresses in the colors of their cult figures. The second half of the book explores the relationship between Edgar Allan Poe and Charles Baudelaire in the light of translation and plagiarism. The first of the two chapters devoted to their relationship explores what George Steiner has called the “hermeneutic motion“21 moving from trust to betrayal and finally aggression. What Douglas Robinson has described as the somatic and dialogical relationship between the original and the translation22 indeed takes an agonistic turn with Baudelaire. His translation of “The Purloined Letter” is not only the translation of a narrative about betrayal but itself performs that hermeneutic motion by presenting Poe’s American text in the original French language, as it were, of the narrator and the detective Dupin. “La Lettre volée” is a simulacrum in the sense discussed above with regard to Gaddis’s novel. Just as The Recognitions challenge Benjamin’s essay on the Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, Baudelaire’s and Poe’s texts fulfill his concept of translation offered in Benjamin’s “The Task of the Translator.” For one might indeed say that the necessity of translation Benjamin postulates, the longing of texts to be translated, has the same structure as the reproducibility he introduces as the hallmark of the authenticity highlighted in his essay on art. Benjamin’s notion of “pure language” will be confronted with the “pure signifier” Lacan posits in his 20 Hillis Miller, “The Critic as Host,” in Harold Bloom et al., eds. Deconstruction and Criticism (New Yorkl: Seabury Press, 1979), 221–22. 21 George Steiner, After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation, 2nd ed. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 312–435. 22 Douglas Robinson, The Translator’s Turn (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).
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Seminar on “The Purloined Letter/La lettre volée,” a text that has given rise to an intense and at times aggressively hostile debate in the contemporary critical community. The last chapter is about Poe’s literary battles with Longfellow, in which the charge of plagiarism became something of an obsession. To Poe plagiarism is an integral part and the ultimate effect of an intention in language that makes all literary texts connect with each other. That this is not just a version of the nihil novi sub sole will become clear in a reading of his poetics toward the problem of plagiarism. Poe presents plagiarism as some uncanny pre-existence texts can lead in texts by other authors, a playful and at the same serious notion that is intricately bound up with the inability of some of Poe’s fictional characters to die. The problem of death connects Poe’s obsession with plagiarism to Baudelaire’s literary theft in Les Fleurs du mal, where a passage from Poe and one from Longfellow are appropriated, translated and in this sense transplanted into his poetry. Thus Baudelaire’s translation of Poe’s detective stories finds some kind of continuation. In “Le Guignon,” which consists almost entirely of secondhand poetry, Sisyphos is addressed as a figure of repetition that suffers from the “solitudes profondes” in which Baudelaire finds his proper voice. Plagiarism is a sensitive subject, and most modern studies of the phenomenon get caught up in some kind of source hunting.23 This is not surprising, and the indignation at literary thieves is also felt in texts written about the subject in antiquity24 or the Renaissance,25 at a
23 Alexander Lindey, Plagiarism and Originality (New York: Harper, 1952). See also Edmund Bergler’s collection of deviant and devious behavior of authors, which includes sections on writer’s block and also plagiarism, The Writer and Psychoanalysis (Madison: International Universities Press, 1954), 183–210. 24 See Eduard Stemplinger, Das Plagiat in der griechischen Literatur (Leipzig und Berlin: Teubner, 1912) and Ludwig Adam, Über die Unsicherheit literarischen Eigentums bei Griechen und Römern (Düsseldorf: Schaubsche Buchhandlung, 1906). With reference to historiography, see also Hermann Peter, Wahrheit und
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time when the original genius had not yet assumed its position of authority and long before authorship was protected by copyright legislation. The plagiarized texts discussed in the chapters on Poe and Baudelaire have all been found out by scholarship, and in this sense there is nothing new to detect for the detective. While this may avoid trouble, it cannot avoid the question of what plagiarism says about the relationship between texts and the status of authorship. The following readings suggest that ultimately repetition is not possible. This should not be taken as a sign of shrugging off the ethical implications involved in the issue of plagiarism. As Poe’s accusation of Longfellow shows, the charge of having stolen someone else’s property is something extremely damaging, just as it is pernicious to enslave someone to work in the service of one’s text. Plagiarism is of specific relevance in the research and teaching conducted at the university.26 While it is important to know what a student’s individual performance or degree of originality is in a text submitted for grading or a degree, Neil Hertz has shown that the interest of professors in plagiarism may tell us something much more interesting about the phantasies teachers entertain about texts. Working out the implications of the self-righteous stigmatization of plagiarism in the academy his marvelous essay on a Cornell pamphlet about “A Writer’s Responsibilities” tells the story of a recognition scene. Kunst, Geschichtschreibung und Plagiat im klassischen Altertum (Leipzig and Berlin: Teubner, 1911), 416–55. 25 See Harold Ogden White, Plagiarism and Imitation during the English Renaissance: A Study in Critical Distinctions (1935; rpt. New York: Octagon Books, 1973) and David Quint, Origin and Originality in Renaissance Literature: Versions of the Source (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), 1– 31. 26 See, for example, Thomas Mallon, “Quiet Goes the Don: An Academic Affair,” in Stolen Words: Forays into the Origins and Ravages of Plagiarism (New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1989), 89–113. See also the comprehensive account on plagiarism and research by Marcel C. LaFollette, Stealing into Print: Fraud, Plagiarism, and Misconduct in Scientific Publishing (Berkeley, New York, and London: University of California Press, 1992).
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The pamphlet denounces plagiarism as an act of corruption whose “disloyalty” and “baseness” must “inevitably leave an ineradicable mark upon him [the student] as well as on the institution of which he is privileged to be a member.”27 Hertz shows that for all the “justifiable moral indignation, the righteous contempt of the honest for the dishonest” (149) the pamphlet ostensibly professes it betrays strange “fantasies of moral legibility” (148) that subscribe to a notion of hermeneutics as a tool of total control over texts and their authors. The problem such pamphlets issued by academic committees encounter is their inability to enforce the moral code they uphold, and what is scandalous about this is the infringement it constitutes on a hermeneutics of identification. It must be clear what is said, and what is said becomes clear as long as we know who is saying it. The challenge of matching meaning and text with author and source has recently been taken on by readers with a memory more powerful and faster than that of professors hunting down plagiarized sources in the stacks of university libraries. Some years ago an article in the New York Times gave a report on the “little plagiarism machine” developed by two scientists in Bethesda, which is able to scan documents to compare them with other material and “boldfaces text whenever 30 characters or more are identical.” 28 The computer program designed at the National Institute of Health may well be a major contribution to the moral health of the scientific community. “Fraud contaminates the literature,” the project manager emphasizes, adding that “We need mechanisms to find out what the facts are” (C9). In the age of the internet copying has become an easy cut and paste operation, and detection has become difficult. As a result there are a host of companies offering support to researchers and teachers, such as Plagiarism.org, CopyCatch Gold, 27 “A Writer’s Responsibility,” cited in Neil Hertz, “Two Extravagant Teachings,” in The End of the Line: Essays on Psychoanalysis and the Sublime (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 146. 28 Philip J. Hilts, “Plagiarists Take Note: Machine’s on Guard,” New York Times (January 7, 1992), C1. The text cites Walter Stewart, researcher at the Institute.
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IntegriGuard, Essay Verification Engine, and many others.29 Glatt Plagiarism Services, Inc. – a Californian software company owned by “Dr. Barbara Glatt, Ph. D. University of Chicago, nationally recognized as a leading expert in plagiarism research” – is advertising a package containing a Plagiarism Teaching Program, a Plagiarism Screening Program, and a Plagiarism Self-Detection Program. While the screening program is designed for faculty members – “teachers can monitor student performance” – the self test turns what Hertz describes as the “cops-and-robbers routine” (145) into a partnership with the students: “Using the same procedure as the Glatt Plagiarism Screening Program, whereby every fifth word is deleted from the student paper and replaced by a standard size blank, students can test themselves to detect plagiarism in their assignment before turning them in.” Interestingly, the sophisticated methods Glatt uses are informed by the Romantic notion that writing is a unique expression of personality: “The procedure assumes that each person has an individual style of writing, i.e., writing styles are as unique as fingerprints.”30 The forensic analysis undertaken by the Glatt plagiarism software may take us back to William Gaddis, concluding this introduction with a brief look at his fourth and latest novel, A Frolic of His Own. Gaddis’s narrative delivers a devastating satire on the impact the liability litigations of the legal profession have on life in the U.S. In contemporary American fiction phantasies about a huge and anony29 For a comparison of some companies, see Western Oregon University Library <www. wou.edu/provost/library/kincanon/plagiarism/chart.htm>. See also the discussion on plagiarism in the classroom in Lise Buranen et al., eds. Perspectives on Plagiarism and Intellectual Property in a Postmodern World (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999). See also Andrew Queen Morton, Literary Detection: How to Prove Authorship and Fraud in Literature and Documents (New York: Scribner, 1978), which examines text as well as art. 30 All citations on the Glatt Plagiarism Services are from promotional material, a hand-out describing the programs and a letter addressed to the deans of colleges and universities. See also their internet site <www.plagiarism.com>.
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mous conspiracy form a genre to which Gaddis’s lawyers, always ready to identify someone who is going to pay staggering sums in punitive damages to compensate the victims, seems like a grim consolation. It seems that the legal instrument of compensatory damages can serve as an incentive to cash in on the crisis of individual freedom and responsibility we are facing at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In a book on authorship, translation, and plagiarism the structure of the authority and accountability of individual agency as well as the question of its indeterminacy are of central importance.31 Taking the question of authorship to court A Frolic of His Own opens a perspective on the product liability of literary texts. The novel evolves around a suit brought by Oscar Crease on the television producer Constantine Kiester of Erebus Entertainment, who is accused of having plagiarized Crease’s play “Once at Antietam” for their box office hit “The Blood in the Red White and Blue.”32 The suit is about the Civil War in more than one sense, about the battle fought at Antietam as well as those fought in American courts. Incidentally, 31 On indeterminacy in Gaddis, see Gregory Comnes, The Ethics of Indeterminacy in the Novels of William Gaddis (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994). In the context of phantasies about conspiracy that turn any discussion of plagiarism into a form of the sublime I have found help in the study on individual agency by Frances Ferguson, Solitude and the Sublime: Romanticism and the Aesthetics of Individuation (New York and London: Routledge, 1992). 32 Gaddis’s novel actually belongs to a group of modern naratives that either make forgery or plagiarism their central motif or themselves constitute a fake. See the study by Kathrin Ackermann, Fälschung und Plagiat als Motiv in der zeitgenössischen Literatur (Heidelberg: Winter Verlag, 1992), discussing Borges’s famous story about plagiarism, Gide’s novel about counterfeiting, Les Fauxmonnayeurs, Eco’s fake of history in Il pendolo di Foucault, Hildesheimer’s fake biography Marbot, as well as Perec’s La Vie mode d’emploi and Calvino’s Se una Notte d’inverno un viaggiatore. Texts written by fictional or supposed authors – such as Chatterton’s, for example – constitute another genre close to those narratives. See Jean-François Jeandillou, Superchercherie Littéraires: La Vie et l’oeuvre des auteurs supposés (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 2001), which presents Pierre Louÿs’s Bilitis and other lesser known texts of French literature in their context.
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the play is about a soldier that pays someone to take his place. When, through a series of complications, they meet on different sides in the battle at Antietam and one is killed by his double, the fatal shooting becomes some weird case of suicide. The plagiarism of this fantastic scene doubles this killing of doubles. However, it all begins, quite inconspicuously as one might first think, with a casualty in a quiet residential area of an otherwise unremarkable suburb when Oscar Crease is run over by a car. As it turns out in the hospital, it was his own car that bowled him over. And, as finally becomes clear, nobody was sitting in it at the time of the accident. This is how Oscar and his half-sister Christina explain the situation to Harry Lutz, lawyer and Oscar’s brother-in-law: – Well this car, it’s not new, I mean it wasn’t new when I bought it and about a month ago the ignition switch broke and the garage didn’t have one, they had to order a new one but it hasn’t come in yet so they showed me how to start it by touching a wire from the coil to the battery and usually I stand beside it but this time... – He was standing right in front of it Harry. When it started suddenly it slipped into Drive and I mean why were you standing in front of it Oscar, how could the... – Because there was a puddle beside it and I didn’t want my... – Look nobody is asking him that, Christina. The insurance covers the owner of the car so he just sues the owner. – But he owns it Harry, it’s his car he owns it. – The owner’s insurance would probably go after the driver. – But there wasn’t any driver that’s the point! The car ran over him and nobody was driving it. – Let them worry about that, go after the car’s maker for product liability, it couldn’t have been in Drive or it wouldn’t have started, probably the only proof they’d need, just the incident itself. Res ipsa loquitur Oscar, like the chandelier 33 falling on your head.
The situation may be bizarre or even ludicrous, but we definitely have a legal problem here. Technically speaking, Oscar Crease is both the 33 William Gaddis, A Frolic of His Own (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 19. Further references to the novel will be cited in the text.
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victim and the driver, occupying two positions at once in the accident, for which – as the agent of Ace Worldwide Fidelity explains to him in due course – there is simply no provision in a car owner’s insurance. The accident is not covered under the policy, and the diffculties are compounded by the fact that the manipulation that started the car and caused the accident is one that any insurance would associate with car thieves rather than owners. “I believe that’s called hot wiring. We constantly have reports of cars stolen that way” (27), the agent remarks. Because of the strange fact of the driver’s absence in the accident, product liability remains the only way of making someone accountable for the accident. How can one talk about a non-driving driver or an owner hot wiring his own car? Actually Gaddis’s presentation of this hilarious incident jump starts the argument on originality and literary theft that lies at the center of his novel. For one might indeed read the episode as some kind of allegory of authorship in which the driver emerges as the author, the victim as the reader, and the car as the work of art that stands between them. The smack of over-exaggerated refinement this reading takes on is quite intended here. Oscar Crease is a professor of history, and before turning to writing his play on the Civil War he authored a monograph on Rousseau that elaborates on a concept of history as figural fulfillment, countering the prevalent tendency he sees in society and the university toward the notion of what at one point is called “history as a game show” (443). There is indeed a really figural, or figurally factual, connection between the car accident and the plagiarism suit he is contemplating at the time he is run over. The wounds inflicted on him – his family come to call it “his battle scar” (53) – makes him claim loss of income because he is temporarily confined to a wheelchair and thus cannot go on a lecture tour to give a paper on the battle at Antietam and promote his play. While this may be deplored it also puts him in touch with the soldiers he has glorified in his play. He is quite touchy on this point: “I think you’ve really got to establish serious injury, lose an arm or a leg or some real disfigurement to start an action for...– Well look at me! I still can’t move this leg if I try to turn this way or sit up straight it’s like a hot 30
pitchfork right through here, I was on the critical list in there wasn’t I? in the hospital?” (52). When Oscar cannot make a convincing case for a product liability suit he throws all his forces into the literary battle going on at the front of originality and plagiarism. Committing an act of plagiarism is like hot wiring a car and then get run over by it. Once one gets used to the crazy logic of Gaddis’s narrative the allegorical accident, or the accident of allegory, starts making sense. In a text that plagiarizes an unacknowledged source the author is not in the driver’s seat. He may perhaps be lucky enough not to be detected, and thus avoid being hit, but he never has full control over the power of a text that is not fully his own. He is at once author and reader, driver and victim, owner and thief, and in dividing his function between those different tasks, being in two different structural positions at once, he cannot explain what exactly shifts his work into Drive. Once a text powered by an external engine starts rolling it is difficult to either get it under control or step on the brake, since the author went out of his work and out of his way to get it going, striking a spark of inspiration by short-circuiting his power with the source of a power stored in the battery of another work. What remains is the mystery of who shifts the text into Drive. Oscar is absolutely positive that the car was properly parked when he started it and his proof or conviction rests on the assumption that cars don’t start unless the shift stick is in P. In his speculations on technical malfunction, the sloppiness of the local mechanics, and the conspiracy of the Japanese engineers that designed the car, the question of his own responsibility for an error does not even enter his mind. It is difficult to tell whether his experience with literary works can be trusted more than his expertise about mechanical engines. We are talking about transmission here, which is something rather complicated in both areas. The reader may always respond to a text in a gear that is different from the one in which the author has written it. Eventually, one keeps coming back to the question of the phantom agency that made the car jump on Oscar, the invisible hand shifting the gear stick. Curiously, in Gaddis’s excessive book about plagiarism and property rights the author as the creator of a unique work of art is blanked out: 31
The driver’s seat is empty. In two famous essays Barthes and Foucault have declared the death of the author. As Barthes writes emphatically in 1968, “Classic criticism has never paid any attention to the reader; for it, the writer is the only person in literature. [...] We know that to give writing its future, it is necessary to overthrow the myth: the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author.”34 Recent criticism has resuscitated the Author, and after or despite all those theoretical speculations about his or her demise Sean Burke sees the figure of the author as some kind of “ghost in the machine.”35 It is that Ghost (with a capital G) that sits in Oscar’s car.
***
Some of the texts in this study exist in earlier versions. Some parts of chapter 1 were published as “The Genius as Compositor: Young’s Conjectures on Original Composition and the Imprimatur of Romanticism” in Peter Hughes and Robert Rehder, eds. Imprints & Revisions: The Making of the Literary Text, 1759–1818 (Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag, 1995), a collection of essays that gathers papers given in a series of lectures on Romanticism at the University of Zurich. A version of chapter 2 appeared in Modern Language Notes 110 (1995). Some of the argument developed in chapter 3 was published as a review essay in diacritics 22.3–4 (1992) under the title “Poedelaire: Translation and the Volatility of the Letter.”
34 Roland Barthes, “The Death of the Author,” in Image–Music–Text (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), 148. See also Michel Foucault, “What is an Author,” in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 113–38. 35 Seán Burke, The Death and Return of the Author: Criticism and Subjectivity in Barthes, Foucault and Derrida (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), 187.
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I wish to thank Hans-Jost Frey and Peter Hughes from the University of Zurich for the inspiration and support they have given me for many years. At Johns Hopkins University I have benefited from the advice and comments of Werner Hamacher, Neil Hertz, Rainer Nägele, and David Wellbery. In a book dealing with translation a brief remark about the use of sources in languages other than English may be pertinent. In general, passages in German and French written by the authors under discussion or their contemporaries are cited in the original language, with the translation provided in the footnotes. Where no published translation was available I have translated the texts myself. Twentieth century criticism and theory is cited in English only. Thus Kant and Hegel, for example, are cited in German, while Benjamin and Barthes speak in English. Choosing this policy I have tried to strike a compromise between a desire for authenticity and an economy of space. But this is perhaps already part of the subject discussed in the following pages.
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Chapter 2
The Genius as Compositor: Young’s Conjectures on Original Composition “Why should it seem altogether impossible, that Heaven’s latest editions of the human mind may be the most correct and fair; that the day may come when the moderns may proudly look back on the comparative darkness of former ages, […] reputing Homer and Demosthenes as the dawn of divine genius?“ Young, Conjectures on Original Composition1 “I was in a Printing house in Hell & saw the method in which knowledge is transmitted from generation to generation.” Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell2 “Mr Bloom stood by, hearing the loud throbs of cranks, watching the silent typesetters at their cases.” Joyce, Ulysses3
1
Edward Young, Conjectures on Original Composition, in The Complete Works: Poetry and Prose (London, 1854; rpt. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1968), II: 571. Further references to Young’s works are to volume II of this edition and will be cited in the text by page number alone.
2
David V. Erdman, ed. The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake (New York: Anchor Press, 1982), 40. Further references to Blake’s work are to this edition.
3
James Joyce, Ulysses (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), 122.
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I. From Young’s Original to Joyce’s Hypertext Young’s heavenly press and Blake’s printing house in hell share the eighteenth-century interest in the press as the main agent in the transmission of reason and imagination, literature and knowledge. While Young’s essay was written before, Blake’s satire appeared after the French Revolution that accelerated the transformation of the Republic of Letters into a deregulated marketplace for a growing number of professional writers. Both develop a perspective on literature in which the question of authorship emerges as an issue of technology and where the power of genius is measured by its proximity to the printing press. The original genius, one might conjecture, is a compositor, as the person arranging the movable type for printing is called in the publishing business. No other author in English literature has been more radical in his resolution to exchange the writer’s desk with the printer’s press than the romantic poet that signed most of his works in the name of “The Author & Printer W Blake.” He composed his illuminated printings by etching text and pictures directly on the copperplates, uniting invention and execution in a creative process that performs writing as printing. The co-instantaneous nature of these processes shows in Blake’s work not only in the incidental reflections on his technique of etching but also, and primarily, in the fact that his method of composition necessitated a writing and drawing in reverse. He inscribed his texts on the copperplates backward, as in a mirror, and the pictures were etched as mirror-images.4 In printing, the negative and the 4
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In plate 5 of The Marriage of Heaven and Hell the author-printer sees his own image mirrored in the plate he is inscribing: “When I came home; on the abyss of the five senses, where a flat sided steep frowns over the present world. I saw a mighty Devil folded in black clouds, hovering on the sides of the rock, with corroding fire he wrote the following sentence now perceived by the minds of men, & read by them on earth” (35). As Erdman points out in his textual notes, the Devil is something like the reflection or shadow of the scribe bending over the plate or “flat sided steep.” For a careful as well as cautious reading of Blake’s
positive are – like heaven and hell – at once closely related and radically dissimilar, and much of the argument in Blake’s visionary philosophy, notably his revision of Milton, is based on an interplay between exact correspondence and radical difference that has its counterpart in the technique of the poems’ production. Central to his mythical vision, the working of the press also has clear political implications for Blake. “The Labours of the Artist, the Poet, the Musician, have been proverbially attended by poverty and obscurity,” he writes in the 1793 Prospectus of his works, adding that “this was never the fault of the Public, but was owing to the neglect of means to propagate such works as have wholly absorbed the Man of Genius. Even Milton and Shakespeare could not publish their own works” (692). In order to become independent of the booksellers, the poet must either have the exclusive copyright on his work or he must own the means of its reproduction in print. In the absence of the former, Blake concludes that the “Man of Genius” must be his own printer. His Milton performs what Milton lacked. It has both aesthetic and political implications that the printing press sits at the centre of Blake’s universe, marrying heaven and hell. It is this performance of a marriage or intimate union that turns the workrooms in the “Printing house in Hell” into a visionary space where Blake breaks with, and mocks, traditional modes of literary production that separate the author from the printer and set up the press as an instrument of mere reproduction and transmission of the word. The notion, as old as human history, that in the language of man spirit is related to the word like the soul to the body easily translates references to printing in his poetry, see Robert N. Essick, William Blake: Printmaker (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 206–16. Joseph Viscomi, Blake and the Idea of the Book (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) addresses Blake’s work from a technical perspective, adding a great number of photographs illustrating his art of etching. The historical significance of Blake’s reproductive techniques is intriguingly presented by Morris Eaves, The CounterArts Conspiracy: Art and Industry in the Age of Blake (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1992). In particular, see section IV, “Technology: The Artistic Machine,” 153–272.
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into the corresponding notion that the book is like a body in which the soul of its content is trapped. To Blake, author and printer at the same time, this view is unacceptable, and only his development of the new technique of relief etching cleared the way for the originality of his visionary poetry: “But first the notion that man has a body distinct from his soul, is to be expunged; this I shall do, by printing in the infernal method, by corrosives, which in Hell are salutary and medicinal, melting apparent surfaces away, and displaying the infinite which was hid” (39). Unlike the inscription of letters on a blank page, relief etching works on the blank space around the characters, making Blake’s text and illustrations emerge, as it were, from the infinity of the surface. In this sense writing literally becomes an act of cleansing rather than the addition of a mark, a process that creates the surface along with its inscriptions. If The Marriage of Heaven and Hell is a manifesto on authorship, the tour through the “Printing House in Hell” also reads like a printer’s manual. The history of “the method in which knowledge is transmitted from generation to generation” tells the story of an infernal genesis of the book: In the first chamber was a Dragon-Man, clearing away the rubbish from a caves mouth; within, a number of Dragons were hollowing the cave, In the second chamber was a Viper folding round the rock & the cave, and others adorning it with gold and silver and precious stones. In the third chamber was an Eagle with wings and feathers of air, he caused the inside of the cave to be infinite, around were numbers of Eagle like men, who built palaces in the immense cliffs. In the fourth chamber were Lions of flaming fire raging around & melting the metals into living fluids. In the fifth chamber were Unnam’d forms, which cast the metals into the expanse. There they were reciev’d by Men who occupied the sixth chamber, and took the forms of books & were arranged in libraries. (40)
Compared to the sublimity of Blake’s mythical figures the bookbinders and librarians shown in the last chamber appear as mere archivists of poetic vision. One of them could be Young.
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While Blake ridicules the bookish spirit of man, Young still entertains the phantasy of the library in which a host of French and British scholars staged their battle of the books in the decades around 1700. His Conjectures on Original Composition marks the end of the controversy between the ancients and the moderns, and as the passage from the essay cited as epigraph suggests, it is the printing press that breaks the supremacy of the ancients in matters of literature. The press establishes a power structure unknown to Homer and Demosthenes composing at “the dawn of divine genius.” They may have been inspired but they did not command the inspiration that has been flowing from the press since Gutenberg printed his first bible. What Young calls “Heaven’s latest editions of the human mind” is the figure of the original genius the Doctor of Divinity appoints as the agent of modernity, and there is little doubt that the genius is itself running the heavenly press. In Orality and Literacy Walter J. Ong describes how the transition from an oral to a scribal culture and the age of print affects the creative process and the structure of memory as the repository of images. “For the extreme Romantic, the perfect poet should ideally be like God Himself, creating ex nihilo: the better he or she was, the less predictable was anything and everything in the poem. Only beginners or permanently poor poets used prefabricated stuff.”5 Judged from this perspective even Homer could be counted among the beginners: “The meaning of the Greek term ‘rhapsodize’, rhapsoidein, ‘to stitch song together’ [...], became ominous. Homer stitched together prefabricated parts. Instead of a creator, you had an assemblyline worker.” Milman Parry’s discovery in the 1930s of Homer’s formulaic method of composition seemed to confirm what historical criticism in the eighteenth century had suspected. Although those scholars did not engage in the structural linguistics practiced by Parry, they on different grounds arrived at a similar conclusion: The father 5
Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (London and New York: Methuen, 1982), 22. Subsequent references will be cited in the text. Ong’s concept of an oral mnemonics continues the work of Frances A. Yates, The Art of Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).
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figure of Western literature was not an original genius. “Let it not be suspected, that I would weakly insinuate any thing in favour of the moderns,” Young writes in a passage that sounds noble but that also, in his usual manner, lacks sincerity: “No, I am lamenting their great inferiority. But I think that it is no necessary inferiority; that it is not from Divine destination, but from some cause far beneath the moon” (554). In a footnote he refers to the Enquiry into the Life and Writings of Homer by Thomas Blackwell, who claims on the basis of ancient sources that Homer actually borrowed some of his verse from the daughter of the old and blind prophet Tiresias: “However imaginary this Insinuation may appear, it would be rash to condemn it as entirely groundless,“6 as Blackwell summarizes his enquiry. It indeed is not. The scholarly work of Blackwell as well as the comments of classical authors labored to explain the change in literary taste and judgment that occured in the scribal culture after Homer. Even if some of Homer’s sources mentioned by Blackwell’s sources are spurious, the oracles of Tiresias’s daughter Manto are important because their transmission is part of the oral culture that already in classical times became outmoded and was replaced by a system of rhetoric that, as Ong emphasizes, was already part of writing and its new mode of technologizing the word: “The new way to store knowledge was not in mnemonic formulas but in the written text. This freed the mind for more original, more abstract thought” (24). Writing demands individual performance and produces a sense for originality. Typography marks further decisive step in the technologizing of the word. As McLuhan points out in The Gutenberg Galaxy it fostered “a consumer-oriented culture that is concerned about authors and labels of authenticity. Manuscript culture was producer-oriented, almost a do-it-yourself culture, and naturally looked to the relevance and usability of items rather than their sources.”7 While his remark is 6
Thomas Blackwell, An Enquiry into the Life and Writings of Homer (London: 1735), 177.
7
Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), 131. The distinction between pro-
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certainly correct with regard to the use of citation in medieval writing and the rise of a modern reading public that could buy books as a commodity and enjoy them in privacy rather than actively participating in literature as a communal event, it underrates the exclusive or even prohibitive status of the manuscript culture in which a small community of scribes were in control of the word and the interpretation of its truth. McLuhan also leaves the original genius as some kind of do-it-yourself man unaccounted for. The figure of genius was in fact invented in the eighteenth century to distinguish the author from the mass market for which he or she was writing. Interestingly, its exclusivity works in a way similar to that of the medieval scribes. Just as the monk is inspired to disseminate the holy word the genius is singled out by nature to present its original work, and in order to achieve their goals both strive to gain a privileged access to the technological means of textual production. What is new in the case of the modern genius is the institution of copyright needed to construct as well as protect the authority of individual authorship in a time of standardized production and duplication of works. Blake’s method of etching his work into a solid copperplate is unique in its direct transfer of handwriting into the new medium of print, resisting copying much better than texts set in type that can be easily reprinted by pirates. But Blake’s work, too, is inspired by the new spirit of the age: To the modern author the press is the organon of originality. McLuhan’s catchphrase that the medium is the message is also true for typography and the role of genius.: “The effect of the medium is made strong and intense just because it is given another medium as ‘content’.”8 Young’s essay demonstrates that the content that makes print such a powerful medium is the genius and its originality. Young would not have expected that one day Joyce would meet his challenge to the “comparative darkness of former ages” by ducer-oriented and consumer-oriented culture is repeated verbatim, and put in context, by Ong in Orality and Literacy, 122–23. 8
McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), 18.
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presenting Homer among the printers. The wind of change blows strongly in the Aeolus episode where Joyce’s latter day Ulysses is momentarily arrested on his voyage through Dublin by a printer waiting for the typesetters to get him some galleyproofs to check. “Mr Bloom stood by, hearing the loud throbs of cranks, watching the silent typesetters at their cases.” While the compositors are silent, the rotating press speaks: Sllt. The nethermost deck of the machine jogged forwards its flyboard with sllt the first batch of quirefold papers. Sllt. Almost human the way it sllt to call attention. Doing its level best to speak. (123)
What we hear is the voice of modernity as a machine working hard to present the cacophony of voices as a unified text framed and kept in check by the page on which it is printed. “Ulysses is not organized in memory and unfolded in time,” Hugh Kenner writes, “but both organized and unfolded in what we may call technological space: on printed pages for which it was designed from the beginning.”9 If the novel can be said to dramatize the transition from Homer’s oral technique of narrative to typography in which temporal sequence is locked into space, it also renders in print the formulaic and repetitive style that characterizes orality. In Joyce’s mosaic technique of composition Ong’s characterization of Homer as an assembly-line worker literally comes true. Not only because the novel closely retraces the steps of Ulysses like a detective taking casts of footprints a fugitive left in the wet soil, but also by reflecting upon the printing technology that makes up the record of the case. The assembly-line workers are the compositors silently arranging the type in the caseroom visited by Bloom.
9
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Hugh Kenner, Flaubert, Joyce and Beckett: The Stoic Comedians (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), 35. This is precisely what Ong keeps emphasizing in his books: “Writing had reconstituted the originally oral, spoken word in visual space. Print embedded the word in space more definitively” (Orality and Literacy, 123).
A reading of Ulysses in terms of the Conjectures must despair at the absence of what Young would call originality, and yet Joyce’s novel is a unique model for the text of modernity in that it parodies imitation precisely by imitating its model. The Romantic ideology of authenticity allows for a sense of irony that has made subject matter, plot, or imagery less important for the constitution of originality than the personal or individual style of expression. In Hegel’s aesthetics, originality as a “Begeisterung des Genius,” as the inspiration and ecstasy of genius allows the subject to present itself, the self, in the object it represents in works of art. In his view originality gives truth to the rules style dictates.10 Hegel feels edgy about the concept of irony introduced by the Jena Romantics because it resists his sense of historical fulfillment in aesthetics and presents the self as the paradigm of an infinite and thus also inconclusive cultural discourse. While the autonomy and authority of the self is seriously questioned in the wake of Romanticism, Joyce returns to style as the medium reflecting on the limits of writing. The idiosyncrasy of style is what remains of originality. “Stand up to hard ware and step into style,“11 as Joyce puts it obscenely in Finnegans Wake. In an almost absurd way Joyce’s last novel materializes Hegel’s dream of an historical fulfillment in aesthetics. It fulfills the promise of typography by presenting a text in which the compositors that in Ulysses are shown to be silently working in the caseroom seem to have gone berserk, mixing up the movable type as if they had accidentally dropped the 10 See Hegel, “Manier, Stil und Originalität,” in Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, eds. Werke (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), XIII: 376–85; citation on p. 385. Hegel’s discussion transforms Goethe’s 1789 triad of imitation, mannerism, and style. See “Einfache Nachahmung der Natur, Manier, Stil,” in Goethe’s Werke (München: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1973), XII: 30–34. On style as a paradigm of cultural and philosophical discourse, see Berel Lang, ed. The Concept of Style (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987) and Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht and K. Ludwig Pfeiffer, eds. Stil: Geschichten und Funktionen eines kulturwissenschaftlichen Diskurselements (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1986). 11 Joyce, Finnegans Wake (London: Faber and Faber, 1971), 614.
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galley and then hastily picked up the scattered letters to put them back into place at random. To typeset Joyce’s manuscript must be a compositor’s nightmare. No stylus, no pen or pencil could transpose the letters as carriers of meaning the way movable type can. Finnegans Wake is indeed a book composed directly at the compositor’s workplace. Literature takes place at the edge of history. This too is part of the story the composition of Ulysses and Finnegans Wake tells. While some may stylize the novels as supreme examples of writing in the age of print, others have claimed that they already announce writing in the electronic age to come. They seem like two prototypes of a “hard ware” operated by the language of a system software that allows a recombination of letters and word processing swifter than anything the printing press could achieve with its movable type. Only a computer, it seems, can manage the data of all the babble cascading from Joyce’s Babel. Discussing the control mechanisms of meaning played out and put to the test in Finnegans Wake Derrida characterizes the narrator of the novel as a demiurg, “setting up a hypermnesiac machine, there in advance, decades in advance, to compute you, control you, forbid you the slightest inaugural syllable because you can say nothing that is not programmed on this 1000th generation computer [...] besides which the current technology of our computers and our micro-computerified archives and our translating machines remains a bricolage of a prehistoric child’s toys.”12 If the performance of Finnegans Wake and 12 Jacques Derrida, “Two Words for Joyce,” in Derek Attridge and Daniel Ferrer, eds. Post-structuralist Joyce: Essays from the French (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 147. On Derrida and Finnegans Wake, see Alan Roughley, Reading Derrida Reading Joyce (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1999), 44–57. In Ong’s scenario of a literary kindergarden the students imitating Homer and other classical models in the schools of the eighteenth and nineteenth century resemble boys that “assemble a structure from an old Erector set or Mechano set or from a set of Tinker Toys” (22). In the case of Joyce, the Mechano set is replaced by something like Super Mario in the land of Nintendo, but in both scenarios, that of Ong as well as that of Derrida, the phantasmatic image of children imitating “great books” is placed in a scene of sublime fatherhood.
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Ulysses takes place at the forefront of information technology and at the intersection of different media of composition and communication, we should also note that its writing reconstructs and rediscovers the very orality that according to critics like Ong have gradually gone lost in the rise of a scribal culture and through the subsequent invention of print. Where indeed would one find an oral or aural event more powerful than the concluding monologue of Molly Bloom in Ulysses or that by ALP in Finnegans Wake? As Joyce writes about the latter novel in a letter to his daughter: “Lord knows what my prose means. In a word, it is pleasing to the ear.”13 Finnegans Wake plays in the different registers of writing and speech, sound and sight, combining them, unlocking the word locked into the space of the printed text while at the same time linking sounds to letters that spell out a meaning foreign to what they say. The mnemonic formulas of Homeric narrative are re–membered in print according to a governing principle that Finnegans Wake at one point calls “aural eyeness” (623). Derrida speaks of Joyce’s “phonemanon,” the clash of phonemes and phenomena in a text that presents language as an uncontrollable effect of translation from the medium of the voice into the medium of the letter and back again.14 Joyce’s hyperoriginality begets hypertext. The software engineers of the “micro-computerified archives” Derrida derides in his essay have celebrated Ulysses and Finnegans Wake along with Tristram Shandy and the fiction of Borges as prime examples of what in technological lingo is called “interactive fiction.” Although one would be hard pressed to define literature as anything other than interactive, it is interesting to see how the momentous change in media technology deals with the challenge Joyce’s work brings to literature. As Jay Bolter claims, “It is true that Joyce employs most every technique 13 Stuart Gilbert, ed. The Letters of James Joyce (London: Faber and Faber, 1957), I: 341. 14 Derrida, “Two Words for Joyce,” 153. Important on this aspect of Joyce’s narrative is Fritz Senn, Joyce’s Dislocutions: Essays on Reading as Translation (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984).
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available in the repertory of print: like Sterne before him, he experiments with the layout of the text, or recapitulates the history of those techniques [...]. But Joyce’s narrative strategy is too complex and too dynamic for the medium of print.”15 The point of Ulysses and Finnegans Wake is, of course, that they do take place in the printed medium, and the strategy of Joyce’s narratives is precisely to transform the medium of print by breaking – and thus at the same time also positing – its limits. This does not disqualify Bolter’s claim that they are instances of what is now called hypertext, a text in which the sequential, temporal as well as hierarchical order is replaced by a system of layers through which a reader can navigate in directions that are not predetermined as they are in a book. “How can one find all the references to Troy or Tolstoy or Hermes Trismegistus?” (136) he asks with reference to Ulysses. Hermeneutics becomes the task of linking information: “Each sentence or even each word might be made a topical unit in the electronic writing space. These units would first be connected in temporal order, as they appear in print; further links could then be drawn to indicate allusions and parallels. The result would be a massive network that the scholar [...] could traverse in a variety of ways” (137). In Finnegans Wake the result would be an odd decomposition of the very process by which Joyce makes two words collide in the same audio-visual space opened up in print, an effect of hypertext that hypertext effectually destroys. Used as a sophisticated and fast encyclopedia, hypertext is only an update on traditional modes of reading and existing technologies of information management, and the main problem it constitutes is the transformation of texts into pools or repositories of information. “The idea of the great, inescapable book belongs to the age of print that is now passing” (240), as Bolter concludes his book that is also available on a “computer diskette that can be obtained by sending in the order form enclosed in the book.” The doubling of his text into hypertext restores, to some extent perhaps, the Joycean character of his undertaking. 15 Jay David Bolter, Writing Space: The Computer, Hypertext, and the History of Writing (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1991), 137.
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“Readers who obtain the diskette wil see that the hypertext cheerfully violates the constraints imposed by the medium of print. [...] It does not confront the reader with a single persona; instead, it speaks in several, sometimes contradictory voices.” The multiple personality of authorship also includes an invitation to the reader to add his or her own comments on the screen that displays the virtual book. Elsewhere in his text Bolter equates hypertext with medieval manuscripts, “when the reader’s own notes and glosses had the same status as the text itself” (148–49). Although it is accurate that printed books put a greater distance between author and reader, Bolter’s scenario is tinged with the odd nostalgia American computer culture has shown for the monastic and feudal society of the middle ages. “Any reader could decide to cross over and become an author: one simply sat down and wrote a treatise or put one’s notes in a form for others to read. Once the treatise was written, there was no difference between it and the works of other ‘published’ writers, except that more famous works existed in more copies” (149). It is almost cute how the monks in Bolter’s version of a medieval scriptorium are transmogrified into students sitting down in a computer lab to write up their lecture notes for a seminar paper they have to hand in. As the research of Paul Zumthor has demonstrated, writing in the middle ages was the tactile performance of a vocalité that gave writing and copying an altogether different status, power, and immediacy, requiring also a tight control over who was allowed to write what.16 Bolton’s electronic scriptorium is reconstructed from the very perspective of Romantic authorship it seeks to circumvent, and his argument is a disturbing example of ongoing attempts to historicize concepts of authorship out of context. In his presentation hypertext reads like the electronic version of Joyce’s book of kills or Book of Kells in Finnegans Wake, buth without the parodic element. His remark about the number of copies as a measure of fame also shows that hypertext does not change the basic concept of authorship inherited from book culture, but rather the politics of their distribution. In the meantime the databases are still 16 See Paul Zumthor, La Lettre et la voix (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1987).
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managed by the Men occupying the sixth chamber in Blake’s Printing house in Hell that take the forms and arrange them in electronic libraries, even if it is a multi-media pop-up book. Cultural changes introduce new paradigms that may initiate a shift of power within a social system, but they do not alter the law of power itself that controls those changes. In his book on hypertextuality George Landow summarizes the change the concepts of authorship and originality undergo in the electronic media: One relevant characteristic quality of networked hypertext systems is that they produce a sense of authorship, authorial property, and creativity that differs markedly from those associated with book technology. Hypertext changes our sense of authorship and creativity (or originality) by moving away from the constrictions of page-bound technology. In so doing, it promises to have an effect on cultural and intellectual disciplines as important as those produced by earlier shifts in the technology of cultural memory that followed the invention of writing and print.17
The huge storage capacity on computer systems does not only affect the quantity but indeed also the quality of cultural memory. The change of paradigms the new electronic media promise concern the location of data and the concept of property that itself also belongs to a sense of place. The decentralization of data downloaded from a network that users can plug into from anywhere in the world; the hyperlinks that combine widely dispersed texts, pictures, and sounds on internet; the telematic system with realtime access to documents on which several users can work simultaneously from different locations; the virtual universities and electronic colleges with interactive teaching; photocomposition and online publishing – all these features and terms signal that the the author in a classical sense as well as the institutions where he has traditionally asserted his authority seem seriously challenged some thirty years after the announcement of his 17 George P. Landow, Hypertext: The Convergence of Contemporary Critical Theory and Technology (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopins University Press, 1992), 94.
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death by Barthes and Foucault. The figures of the author and reader have both become users in a network. As Landow emphasizes, reading and writing, producing a work and sharing a work are almost indistinguishable. However, Landow’s vision of an active reader participating in the text may still be said to reiterate or reconstruct the Romantic notion of authorship. “Landow gives us the hypertext reader as a supermarket shopper,” Christopher J. Keep argues, “‘freely’ moving about a world of endless lexical commodities, picking and chossing those which best suit the the color scheme of his or her reserach interests.”18 In Landow’s understanding of hypertext as radical de–centering the figure of the reader seems to take the traditional place of the author. “Organic unity and internal coherence may have been routed from the text by the advents of the poststructuralist literary theory, but they reappear in the undisturbed totality of the person sitting before the computer screen” (175). This person, Keep suggests, is not unlike Victor Frankenstein. Yet, collaborative writing, the idea of authorship as teamwork, remain an important area of investigation for educators studying the effects of hypertext and cyberspace textuality. Andrea Lunsford and Lisa Ede call for a “pedagogy of collaboration, one that would view writing as always shared and social; writers as constantly building and negotiating meaning with and among others,” which in their opinon would “advance efforts on a number of fronts to reconceive intellectual property and selfhood [...] commensurate with the idea of a postmodern democracy.”19 Although they discuss collaboration from the 18 Christopher J. Keep, “The Disturbing Liveliness of Machines: Rethinking the Body in Hypertext Theory and Fiction,” in Marie-Laure Ryan, ed. Cyberspace Textuality: Computer Technology and Literary Theory (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), 175. 19 Andrea A. Lunsford and Lisa Ede, “Collaborative Authorship and the Teaching of Writing,” in Martha Woodmansee and Peter Jaszi, eds. The Construction of Authorship: Textual Appropriation in Law and Literature (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1994), 438. For details of their research and the history of collaboration in writing, see their book Singular Texts/Plural Authors: Perspectives on Collaborative Writing (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois
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perspective of the classroom rather than intranet or internet, their approach is important in that it maps out a carnivalistic mode of cultural production in a Bakhtinian sense that applies very well to the politics and potential development of electronic media. Their militant critique of “the conception of a solitary, sovereign – and usually male – writer with individually ‘owned’ property rights” (436) is an accurate description of the ideology that has dominated not only literature but the whole field of intellectual activities. In the wake of the current interest in historical criticism, aesthetic ideology and the despotic authority of the Romantic author are, once again, under attack. In her introductory essay to the volume of papers presented at a conference on the construction of authorship, Martha Woodmansee compares collaborative projects from medieval compilations to those presented by Lunsford and Ede with the “kind of solitary origination Edward Young sought to promote.”20 Turning from Romanticism to the new electronic media she states that “the computer is dissolving the boundaries essential to the survival of our modern fiction of the author as the sole creator of unique, original works” (25). But precisely with regard to computer software Peter Jaszi, the co-editor of the volume, points out that, “lawyers and judges have invoked the vision of the Romantic ‘author–genius’ in rationalizing the extension of copyright protection to computer software. The conceptual challenge to copyright posed by computer technology has been submerged in an insistence that programs are no less inspired than traditional literary works, and that the imaginative processes of the programmer are analogous to those of the literary ‘author’.”21 University Press, 1990). As their research reveals, collaborative work has become common practice in the universities and in business, which the grading systems as well as corporate compensation schemes based on individual performance do not sufficiently take into account. 20 Martha Woodmansee, “On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity,” in The Construction of Authorship, 17. 21 Peter Jaszi, “On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity,” in The Construction of Authorship, 33–34.
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Copyright is not primarily designed to propagate the ideology of the author–genius but rather to regulate the control over the distribution of a work and thus the profit one makes from it. Woodmansee and Jaszi are well aware of this, and they have in fact done much to show that the booksellers and distributors have helped in the construction of the genius in order to secure the bigger share of the profit. But the reader is invited to forget that the Romantics were far away from an author’s copyright and that the vision of a sovereign author never materialized for them. In England authors had to wait until the Act of 1911 before their intellectual property was fully recognized and protected like any other personal property. As far as international copyright is concerned, publishers in the United States could freely print or reprint English authors up to the Chase Act of 1891, and only in 1952 the U.S. recognized all rights of foreign authors by joining the ratification of the Universal Copyright Convention. The Romanticism of authorship was a long time in coming, and it was the crude question of income they were fighting for throughout the nineteenth and well into the twentieth century. One of them was Joyce. Whatever his hypertexts may say about the end of Romantic authorship and the great book, he wanted to cash in on the little profit his books made.22 The myth that makes Jaszi put quotation marks around the word “author” whenever he uses it is not the product of Romantic but modern academic criticism, as Jack Stillinger’s book on multiple authorship and the figure of genius shows.23 Far from glorifying sovereign authorship, Romantic theory and practice have experimented with all forms of collaboration, have demonstrated in a most acute sense the instability of texts and the impossibility of appropri22 See his paper delivered to the P.E.N. Congress in James Joyce, Critical Writings, ed. E. Ellsworth Mason and R. Ellman (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 274–75. On international copyright, see N. N. Feltes, “International Copyright: Structuring ‘the Condition of Modernity’ in British Publishing,” in The Construction of Authorship, 271–80. 23 Jack Stillinger, Multiple Authorship and the Myth of Solitary Genius (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
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ating origins, and have invented the reader celebrated in hypertext. It is not surprising that the rise of electronic media has provoked a cultural war similar to the battle of the books fought out between the ancients and moderns that informs Young’s promotion of the original genius. Internet will change the canon and genres of cultural production, but there is little evidence that it will do away with the figure of the author. The World Wide Web will radically deregulate information, communication, and even art in order to create a market in which networked individuals and corporations will not only work on collaborative projects but also interact in fierce competition. A community of billions of users will be dependent on a few global providers of software to whom the eighteenth-century booksellers look small in comparison. If the postmodern technologies of the word can be said to fulfill the program of Romanticism, the genius is not a passive bystander. In fact a majority of the literature on electronic media restores this uncanny figure to a seat in front of the computer screen, as Keep rightly remarks. Just as the vision of the original genius as a compositor comes true in the age of desktop publishing, every user can become a local genius on the Local Area Network into which he or she is plugged. As Baudrillard argues, L’Homme Télématique lives in a space in which nothing is generated but in which everything can be altered. It is the space of virtuality in wich simulation takes the place of the simulacrum, the face and its confrontation with otherness is replaced by the interface replicating sameness. As the title indicates, his essay is informed by both Levinas and the Romantic phantasy of the sublime: Le xerox et l’infini. “If men dream of original and genial machines, it is because they despair of their own originality or because they prefer to give up and enjoy it through machines put between them.”24 Connected to the Minitel or the World Wide Web the genius becomes a machine. As we shall see in the next section, modern concepts of creative genius have always shown a close affinity to the
24 Jean Baudrillard, La Transparence et le mal (Paris: Editions Galilée, 1990), 58.
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mechanics of a machinery,25 and Baudrillard’s sublime horror is no less indebted to a Romantic idea of genius than the exuberant portrait of the genius in the age of electronic media given, for example, by Eugene Provenzo: “What is crucial, [...] is the realization that the telematic process – in which individuals are given access to ‘intelligent’ terminals in the form of microcomputers that are linked to sophisticated communication systems – suddenly makes it possible for them to become much more autonomous from the traditional hierarchical structure. As a result, creativity can be much more individualized and independent.”26 The eighteenth-century figure of the genius creates its homepage on the internet. The suspicion about the figure of the genius is certainly justified. As David Bromwich states in his article on the genius, Young’s essay is “the first modern association of genius with individual power, or with what we have come to call originality.”27 The equation of originality with individual power and its opposition to what one might call communal, collaborative, or democratic processes cannot be denied. The career of the genius finds its fulfillment in the Romantic concept of the person as individual subject, of personality as subjectivity, and if an essay as harmless as Young’s Conjectures on Original Composition stands at the beginning of this fulfillment, its perversion came with the cult of the genius in nationalist movements. Edgar Zilsel’s work on the emergence of a religious cult of personality shows that the enthusiasm for the genius in the German storm and stress movement inspired by Young and others was resolutely anti25 On the relationship between the original genius and the development of science and technology in the age of Enlightenment, see Günter Peters, Der zerrissene Engel: Genieästhetik und literarische Selbstdarstellung im achtzehnten Jahrhundert (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1982), 70–78. 26 Eugene E. Provenzo, Jr., Beyond the Gutenberg Galaxy: Microcomputers and the Emergence of Post-Typographic Culture (New York and London: Teachers College Press at Columbia University, 1986), 33. 27 David Bromwich, “Reflections on the Word Genius,” New Literary History 17.1 (1985): 143.
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authoritarian and politically rebellious before it was transformed into a worship of political leaders and a powerful weapon of racism. Published in 1918 Die Geniereligion anticipates the fascist notions of a genial race culminating in the figure of the Führer as genius in the Third Reich.28 The origin of a collective national genius can be found in Romanticism. This is a fragment from Novalis: Journale sind eigentlich schon gemeinschaftliche Bücher. Das Schreiben in Gesellschaft ist ein interessantes Symptom – das noch eine grosse Ausbildung der Schriftstellerey ahnden lässt. Man wird vielleicht einmal in Masse schreiben, denken, und handeln – Ganze Gemeinden, selbst Nationen werden Ein Werck unternehmen.29
The collections of fragments published in the Athenäum by Schlegel and Novalis mark the origin, in German Romanticism, of originality as an effect of multiple authorship, and one might be tempted to read this reference to Romantic journals as a prophetic statement about collaborative writing in the internet. But while the Romantic fragments gather a multitude of micro-systems to fuse them into One Work, something like hypertext constitutes One Network from which a multitude of texts are launched. The difference is decisive, but both make one feel uncomfortable. Hans Blumenberg cites Novalis’s fragment in the context of the Romantic idea of the absolute book, 28 Edgar Zilsel, Die Geniereligion: Ein kritischer Versuch über das moderne Persönlichkeitsideal, mit einer historischen Begründung (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1990). See also his book Die Entstehung des Geniebegriffs (Tübingen: Mohr, 1926). On the figure of the genius in German national socialism, see Jochen Schmidt, Die Geschichte des Genie-Gedankens in der deutschen Literatur, Philosphie und Politik 1750–1945 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1988), II: 194–237. 29 Novalis, “Über Goethe,” in Schriften, ed. Richard Samuel (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1981), II: 645, fragment no. 465: “Journals are in fact already communal books. Collaborative writing is an interesting symptom – indicating a great potential of writing. One day one might perhaps write, think, and act in one mass. Whole communities, even nations will be engaged in the enterprise of One Work.”
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arguing that it not only stands in a marked contrast to the unique nature and work of the solitary genius but also in opposition to the very idea of a public: “The intended paradox of this concept is that such a total subject can no longer count on the existence of a public.”30 The subsequent fragment in Novalis’s notebook makes this abundantly clear: “Jede Person, die aus Personen besteht, ist eine Person in der 2ten Potenz – oder ein Genius.”31 If the genius is not one but two persons, this does not vouchsafe a plurality of authorship or what Maurice Blanchot calls la parole plurielle, the proper language of the fragment.32 The two persons united in the genius seem to be the author and the reader turning in upon themselves. Blumenberg’s study on the readability of the world traces the history of the metaphor presenting nature as a book and the revisions this book has undergone with the changing technologies of reading and interpreting it. As an imitation of nature, within the tradition of mimesis, art has always entertained a privileged relationship to this book, and Aristotle calls the power of man as an artist techne. In an early essay Blumenberg points out that techne meant more than what we now call technology, the capacity to create a work as both an artist and artisan, in an artificial as well as artistic sense. To Aristotle “nature and art have the same structure,” as Blumenberg points out, and arts as well as crafts imitate or perfect what he calls the “autotechnical” nature of nature. That is to say, art can only do what is already prescribed in nature itself.33 The Renaissance breaks out of this mould to assert the authenticity of the second nature it creates; the eighteenth century awards this authenticity a place in the system of aesthetics, introducing the figure of the original genius as the progeny 30 Hans Blumenberg, Die Lesbarkeit der Welt (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1981), 301. Novalis is cited on the same page. 31 Novalis, Schriften, II: 645, no. 466: “Each person that consists of persons is a person in the second degree – that is to say, a genius.” 32 Maurice Blanchot, L’Entretien infini (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), 1–118. 33 Hans Blumenberg, “‘Nachahmung der Natur’: Zur Vorgeschichte der Idee des schöpferischen Menschen,” Studium Generale 10.5 (1957): 266.
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of nature. It is telling that the rise of the genius coincides with the growing interest in the mechanical arts. With the revaluation of techne in art comes a new language for technology. To illustrate what he calls the autotechnical structure of nature Blumenberg cites Aristotle’s remark that an architect building a house only does what nature would do if it “grew” houses. Romanticism employs organic growth as the master metaphor to describe the work of genius and distinguish it from mechanical technology. Twentieth-century literary theory has given Young credit for his original use of this metaphor in English criticism. His essay would possibly no longer be read if it was not for his reference to the “vegetable nature” (552) of genius. But Young’s interest in its organicism cannot be dissociated from his interest in the technology of printing. The historical significance of his essay lies in the fact that it concludes the controversy between the ancients and the moderns, the battle of the books in which the printing press is celebrated as one of the great inventions of modernity. This controversy gave technology its own language, and it is printed in its most comprehensive form in the encyclopedia. While the bible is the first book Gutenberg’s printing press issued, the encyclopedia is what Young calls “Heaven’s latest editions of the human mind.” Young’s metaphor refers to the original genius, and we shall have to see in what respect the encyclopedia is a work of genius. In the year Young published his Conjectures on Original Composition Diderot was printing his Encyclopédie. In his article “Encyclopédie” Diderot writes at great length about language and particularly about orthography. Providing a language for the management of knowledge, the encyclopedia focuses both on its history and on the place it is given in the system, on its orthography so to speak. “On prononce une langue, on en écrit une autre,” as he comments on the difference between letter and voice, adding that one gets so accustomed to this difference that one would not recognize words that would be written phonetically by someone bad at spelling, “on ne reconnaîtrait plus la langue parlée sous cette nouvelle combinaison de
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caractères.”34 The language would be similar to that of Finnegans Wake. It is one of the main tasks of an encyclopedia to bring language as close as possible to the phenomena it describes and defines, in some kind of phonetic writing as it were, but the encyclopedia also demonstrates that knowledge is discourse and that concepts and things are separated from nature by the letters and signifiers that describe them. Thus the encyclopedia is exposed to, and brings about, a defamiliarization. This also shows in its alphabetic ordering of knowledge. Taking apart what belongs together, a concept, thing, or part of a system appears in a “nouvelle combinaison de caractères” that may appear bewildering to someone who has learnt about these things in their natural or in a different context. Moreover the alphabet and its power of forming new combinations that lead to surprising or perhaps even original effects operates in the encyclopedia similar to the movable type arranged by the compositor at the press. At the press, the medium of the encyclopedia becomes the message. The original genius is close enough to pick it up.
II. Genius, Encyclopedia, Automata With Young’s essay, we have argued, the genius enters the domain of the typesetter or compositor. A look into the Encyclopædia Britannica published in 1771 finds support for the equivocation the title of the Conjectures on Original Composition invites: COMPOSITION, in literature, the art of forming and arranging sentiments, and cloathing them with language suitable to the nature of the subject or discourse. [...] COMPOSITION, in printing, commonly termed composing, the arranging of several types, or letters, in the composing-stick, in order to form a line; and of several 34 Diderot, “Encyclopédie,” in vol. VII of Œuvres complètes, eds. Herbert Dieckmann, Jacques Proust, and Jean Varloot (Paris: Hermann, 1976), 199.
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lines ranged in order in the galley, to make a page; and of several pages, to make 35 a form. SEE PRINTING.
In whatever area composition composes it seems it can invariably be subsumed under the general notion of assembling different parts into some kind of unified whole. The entry introducing the different kinds of composition reads as follows: “COMPOSITION, in a general sense, the uniting or putting together several things, so as to form one whole, called a compound” (II: 249). The question of how this composition is compounded is of particular importance to the enterprise of an encyclopedia since it presents knowledge precisely by “uniting or putting together several things” in alphabetical order. So does the printing press. The letters of the alphabet forms the basis of both the compositor’s and the encyclopedist’s work. According to the editors of the Encyclopædia Britannica their project is radically different from earlier dictionaries such as Chamber’s Cyclopedia or Diderot’s and d’Alembert’s much more voluminous French Encyclopédie: “Instead of dismembering the Sciences, by attempting to treat them intelligibly under a multitude of technical terms, they [the compilers] have digested the principles of every science in the form of systems or distinct treatises, and explained the terms as they occur in the order of the alphabet, with references to the sciences to which they belong” (I: v). Denouncing the dismemberment an alphabetical arrangement of knowledge performs, the editors use an organic metaphor to promote the advantage of what they call systems: “SYSTEM, in general, denotes an assemblage or chain of principles and conclusions, or the whole of any doctrine, the several parts whereof are bound together and follow or depend on each other” (III: 882). With regard to the systematic structure of their dictionary the Society of Gentlemen in Scotland find support in Bacon’s table on the relationship among the arts and sciences published in 1587 under the 35 Encyclopædia Britannica; or, a Dictionary of Arts and Sciences, Compiled upon a New Plan by a Society of Gentlemen in Scotland (Edinburgh: Bell and MacFarquhar, 1771), II: 250, 261.
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title of Encyclopedia, a term also used by Chambers for his dictionary in 1728. But their definition of system raises the question of how their own alphabetical enterprise can spell out the difference between mere “assemblage” and a “chain of principles” that would effectively be “bound together.” The alphabetical organization of knowledge was already used in the medieval Cornucupiae to collect the scientific observations and findings of classical authors, and the thesauruses, indexes, and manuals of the Renaissance steered the advancement of learning in a direction that caused some anxiety on the part of Pierre Bayle, author of the Dictionnaire historique et critique published in 1696, that the multiplicity of scientific knowledge would lead to a fragmentation of the idea of a scientia universalis. The book of nature became a collection of detached pages bound in a new order by systematic philosophy. As McLuhan argues this also increased its use value, and he links this value to the invention of print. With regard to Bacon’s encyclopedic mind he writes: “The medieval Book of Nature was for contemplatio like the Bible. The Renaissance Book of Nature was for applicatio and use like movable type.”36 In 1818, Coleridge set out on the project of a Romantic encyclopedia designed to avoid the fragmentation Bayle was so anxious about. In his Treatise on Method, which should have served as an introduction to Fenner’s and Curtis’s Encyclopaedia Metropolitana, he writes: “As the philosophical arrangement is, [...] [it] will give that unity of design and of elucidation, the want of which we have most deeply felt in other works of a similar kind, where the desired information is divided into innumerable fragments scattered over many volumes, like a mirror broken on the ground, presenting, instead of one, a thousand images, but none entire.”37 To put up a mirror that 36 McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy, 185. On the history of the encyclopedia, see François Moureau, Le Roman vrai de l’Encyclopédie (Paris: Gallimard, 1990). On Bacon, see Brian Vickers, Francis Bacon and Renaissance Prose (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968). 37 Samuel Taylor Colerdige, “Treatise on Method,” in Shorter Works and Fragments, vol. 11 of the Collected Works, eds. H. J. Jackson and J. R. de J. Jackson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), I: 683–84.
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would reflect nature undivided, Coleridge puts all his trust into the synthetic power of his idealist philosophy: “Throughout the ENCYCLOPAEDIA METROPOLITANA, the philosophical arrangement predominates and regulates; the alphabetical arrangement and the references [...] are auxiliary” (I: 684). This is of course precisely the original structure and idea of the Encyclopædia Britannica, even though the massive increase from three to twenty volumes in the fifth edition of 1817 loosened the tightly knit composition of the work published in 1771. As with most of his grand projects, Coleridge’s Romantic encyclopedia never materialized. What makes his essay yet remarkable is his effort to turn the encyclopedic spirit into the selfreferential system of what his Prospectus heralds as the “elements of future Science” (I: 587). Echoing German scientists such as Ritter the Prospectus proclaims “the manifest tendency of all the Arts and Sciences at present, from the most purely intellectual even to the labours of the common mechanic, to lose their former insulated character, and organize themselves into one harmonious body of knowledge” (I: 587). The Aristotelian concept of the organon that informed traditional organizations of knowledge is reorganized into the Romantic paradigm of organicity. Compared to Romantic projects of knowledge management, earlier encyclopedias seem to address the scientist primarily in his capacity as a “mechanic,” and their spirit is perhaps closest to the manuals on machines that had appeared since the sixteenth38 and the medical research that in the seventeenth century started to radically change the image of man. Thus William Harvey’s discovery of the circulation of the blood and the nervous system, for example, laid the foundation for a materialist anthropology that would soon inform every scientific dictionary. Organisms are some kind of machines: “ORGAN, in general, is an instrument or machine designed for the production of some certain action or operation; in wich sense, the mechanic powers, machines, and even the veins, arteries, nerves, 38 See A. P. Usher, “Machines and Mechanisms,” in Charles Singer, ed. A History of Technology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), III: 324–46.
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muscles, and bones of the human body, may be called organs.” (III: 443). What fascinated, astonished, or shocked contemporary readers unfamiliar with science was this uncanny relationship the mechanism of machines formed with the functions of the human body. One only needs to look at the figures on human anatomy in the French Encyclopédie or at the indeed graphic illustrations of amputation in Robert James’s Medicinal Dictionary of 1743 to see that a presentation of scientific knowledge literally entails the dismemberment the editors of the Encyclopædia seek to ward off with regard to their systematic organization of that knowledge. Turning the human body into an aggregate of mechanical parts, the encyclopedia itself becomes some kind of machine. One might actually say that the representation of truncated limbs and of organs dissected in order to exhibit the veins, arteries, nerves, and muscles operates on a level similar to the way in which the encyclopedia’s body of knowledge is divided up and scattered across the alphabet of its discourse. The organs that pull the muscles of the encyclopedia are the letters of the alphabet, whose “mechanic powers” it shares with the printing press and its movable type. If it makes sense to employ the array of human body parts on the dissection table in the illustrations to the encyclopedias as some kind of allegory of the lexicon’s structure as well as of the process of composition, we ought to note that this comparison is based on the sense of a radical dissimilarity. The limbs or interior organs displayed on the pages of the encyclopedia look totally different from the body as one knows or imagines it. They are no longer part of a living body. They do not seem to belong to each other or to the body as a whole. And in this they resemble the entries in the encyclopedia arranged alphabetically or the type cast as negatives. Both the illustrations and the text do not just present a new look at the body and the world around it. They actually represent a new and foreign way of looking. Walter J. Ong argues that the Encyclopédie marks the culmination of a development initiated by the press: “At this point the potential for locating discourse in space had been maximized through alphabetic letterpress print – which is alphabetic writing locked with new firmness into space – and man’s feeling for his lifeworld was undergoing a 61
major change.”39 The reference to a spatial organization of discourse is important here, not only because it explains the integral part the illustrations play as objects of a shocked or fascinated gaze. It also helps us to understand why the encyclopedia is some kind of machine transforming every object of investigation, including the human body, into a mechanism. From a technological point of view the vital difference between organic life and a machine is not that the former lives and the latter is dead. As Norbert Wiener points out in his work on cybernetics, non-linear machines can check themselves in operations that performs something like learning and self-reproduction, a dynamic performance that plays an important part in Niklas Luhmann’s theory of autopoeic reproduction and self-monitoring in social systems.40 In order to work, a machine does not need to live, but each part must be in its proper place. That is the principle of both the encyclopedia and the letterpress. In his Parallèle des anciens et des modernes Perrault presents a machine weaving silk stockings as one of the most astonishing or even miraculous achievements of modern technology. It is the work of genius, as Perrault points out, and one might note that the operation of this textile machinery is not unlike the ingenious machine the compositors work to print the text of Perrault’s book. Professing a vivid interest in silk stockings, Perrault’s worldly Abbot in the Parallèle exclaims: “Ceux qui ont assez de genie, non pas pour inventer de semblables choses, mais pour les comprendre, tombent dans un profond étonnement à la vûë des ressorts presque infinis dont elle est composée & du grand nombre de ses divers & extraordinaires
39 Walter J. Ong, Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology: Studies in the Interaction of Expression and Culture (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1971), 263–64. 40 Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (Boston: MIT Press, 1961), part II. Niklas Luhmann, Soziale Systeme: Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1984). See 468–69 for the impact of the print culture on social systems.
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mouvemens.”41 He then points out that due to its automatism the operator does not even need to understand how it works. What Marx one hundred and fifty years later will describe as the radical estrangement of the worker from his work strikes the abbot as proof of a perfect congruence of god’s creation of man with man’s construction of machines: “En quoy on la peut comparer à la plus excellente machine que Dieu ait faite, je veux dire à l’homme dans lequel mille operations differentes se font pour le nourrir & pour le conserver sans qu’il les comprenne, sans qu’il les connoisse & même sans qu’il y songe” (I: 77).42 Jacques de Vaucanson, a doctor and engineer from Grenoble owning two factories producing fabrics, was working on a refinement of the kind of machinery that Perrault’s abbot praises. While his genius as industrial inventor did not come to fruition, he became famous in quite another field. In his musical toys and mechanical animals his know-how in engineering and medicine was happily married to put Descartes’ ideas about automata into practice.43 With reference to his artificial duck and his project of a machine-man Voltaire soon speculated about the use one could make of such mechanical bodies in anatomy courses at the universities.44 Although Vaucanson’s androidic man was never completed, La Mettrie, in 41 Charles Perrault, Parallèle des anciens et des modernes en ce qui regarde les arts et les sciences (Paris, 1688; rpt. München: Eidos Verlag,1964), I: 76. “Those that have enough ingenuity – if not to invent similar things, so at least to understand them – are profoundly astonished at the sight of the almost infinite number of springs of which it consists and the great number of different and extraordinary mouvements of which it is capable.” 42 “In this we can compare it to the most excellent machine that God has made, that is to say, to man, in whom a thousand operations work to feed and sustain him without his understanding, remarking, and even thinking about it.” 43 See Perrault’s long digression on Descartes’ theory of automata in Paralèlle, V: 182–91 and 197–229. 44 Voltaire’s eulogy is printed, together with photographs of Vaucanson’s duck, in Jean-Claude Beaune, “The Classical Age of Automata: An Impressionistic Survey from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century,” in Michel Fehr, ed. Fragments for a Human Body (New York: Zone Books, 1989), I: 457.
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1748, seized upon the project as a corroboration of his scandalous theory propounded in L’homme machine: “S’il a fallu plus d’art à Vaucanson pour faire son Fluteur, que pour son Canard, il eût dû en emploier encore davantage pour faire un Parleur; Machine qui ne peut plus être regardée comme impossible, surtout entre les mains d’un nouveau Prométhée.”45 Frankenstein, we remember, is called a Modern Prometheus in the subtitle to Mary Shelley’s novel. Her narrative is one among many literary productions of Romanticism dealing with the Faustian quest for the secrets of life or the creation of human beings as automata.46 Frankenstein assembled his monster from body parts he gathered in the cemetery with a body of knowledge culled from works like James’s Medicinal Dictionary. “I became acquainted with the science of anatomy,” he explains to the narrator, “but this was not sufficient; I must also observe the natural decay and corruption of the human body.”47 In the meantime the reader observes the corruption of the anatomist’s mind. One marvels at the naivety with which the scientist uses his lecture notes, some manuals on natural philosophy, and the 45 Julien Offray de La Mettrie, L’homme machine (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1990), 120. “If it took Vaucanson more artistic skill to make his flute-player than his duck, he would have needed even more to make a speaking figure; a machine that no longer seems impossible, especially not from the hands of a new Prometheus.” Vaucanson’s flute-player and duck are shown and placed in historical perspective in Mary Hillier, Automata and Mechanical Toys: An Illustrated History (London: Bloomsbury Books, 1976), 45. 46 On the philosophical discourse on automata in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, see Alex Sutter, Göttliche Maschinen: Die Automaten für Lebendiges bei Descartes, Leibniz, La Mettrie und Kant (Frankfurt/Main: Athenäum Verlag, 1988). See also Lieselotte Sauer, Marionetten, Maschinen, Automaten: Der künstliche Mensch in der deutschen und englischen Romantik (Bonn: Bouvier, 1983) and Rudolf Drux, ed. Menschen aus Menschenhand: Zur Geschichte der Androiden (Stuttgart: Metzler Verlag, 1988). Johann Gutenberg’s partner Johannes Fust was often confused with the historical figure of Faust, linking the miraculous working of the press with Faust’s dealings with the devil. 47 Mary Shelley, Frankenstein; or, the Modern Prometheus, ed. James Rieger (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1982), 46.
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works of alchemists to patch together a human being.48 His phantasies about the popular myth of second creation produces only second-rate work. What Young, citing from Paradise Lost, says of Gulliver, that other giant in English literature, comes true for Frankenstein: “What a monster hast thou made of the ‘human face divine’” (567). Of Swift Young writes: “His was an infantine genius; a genius, which, like other infants, must be nursed and educated, or it will come to nought” (II: 558). Throughout his essay Young emphasizes, in agreement with all the other authorities on the subject, that it is impossible to become a genius by education. If Frankenstein bears out the truth of this doctrine, it is also important to note that the protagonist, who is studying at eighteenth-century universities,49 is fatally mired in the encyclopedic mode of thinking and the corresponding arrangement as well as application of knowledge. At least tacitly every encyclopedia is designed as a manual for the do-it-yourself genius. This is what spells disaster for Frankenstein, who is not accidentally named a modern Prometheus. Classical mythology tells that Athena endowed Prometheus with the gift of understanding the principles that move nature and the universe, which the torch bearer of enlightenment – traitor and teacher at once – passed on to the human beings he created in the form of knowledge about distinct arts and sciences such as architecture, astronomy, mathematics, medicine, metallurgy, and others. What Prometheus received as divine wisdom, man is taught in the unwieldy volumes of encyclopedias. Already in classical times there was a good deal of scepticism about the myth that tells of Prometheus’ creation of man. If he can pass as the first encyclopedist, 48 On the natural philosophy that informs Shelley’s novel, see Simon Schaffer, “Genius in Romantic Natural Philosophy,” in Andrew Cunningham and Nicholas Jardine, eds. Romanticism and the Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 82–98. 49 References to modern chemistry, electricity, the microscope, and in particular to Buffon’s Histoire naturelle, whose first part in fifteen volumes appeared between 1749 and 1767, indicate that Frankenstein studied in the second half of the eighteenth century. He is thus Young’s contemporary.
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there may also be some anxiety that as the founding father of technology he may have been a forefather of Frankenstein.50 The genius does not need instruction in the specific area of its talent nor can it learn about it. This talent, it seems, is a gift of nature. This is the conclusion at which modern writers unanimously arrive. It is “Un merveilleux sçavoir qu’on ne peut enseigner,” as Perrault writes in his poem “Le Génie,” included in his Parallèle.51 In his encyclopedic article on the genius Diderot explains this je ne sais quoi by writing that “le génie est un pur don de la nature; ce qu’il produit est l’ouvrage d’un moment.”52 Addison, the first English critic to devote an essay to natural genius, connects the spontaneity of the genius with its power to astonish and suprise: “Among great Genius’s, those few draw the Admiration of all the World upon them, and stand up as the Prodigies of Mankind, who by the meer Strength of natural Parts, and without any Assistance of Art and Learning, have produced Works that were the Delight of their own Times and the Wonder of Posterity.”53 In Young’s essay this natural excellence is the true property of genius: “Learning is borrowed knowledge; genius is knowledge innate, and quite our own” (559). If the genius can benefit from learning as some kind of supplement to its natural talent, one wonders what its position should be with regard to the encyclopedia, whose sole office is to impart knowledge. It is definitely not an inspired work dashed out on the spur of the moment, as Diderot describes the 50 On Prometheus as the agent of a link between nature, art, and the machine, see Horst Bredekamp, Antikensehnsucht und Maschinenglauben (Berlin: Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, 1993), 26–33. 51 Perrault, Parallèle des anciens et des modernes, Supplement to vol. I, p. 31: “A marvellous knowledge that cannot be taught.” 52 Diderot, “Génie,” article in his Encyclopédie, cited from Œuvres esthétiques (Paris: Garnier, 1968), 11: “The genius is a pure gift of nature; it produces on the spur of the moment. Taste is the work of study and time; it depends on the knowledge of a multitude of well established or assumed rules.” 53 Joseph Addison and Richard Steele, The Spectator, ed. Donald F. Bond (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), no. 160, II: 126–27. Further references are to this edition.
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genius’s mode of composition in his Encyclopédie. The genius thus constitutes a major challenge to the purpose and design of the encyclopedia. This is how the Encyclopædia Britannica faces this challenge: GENIUS, in matters of literature, &c. a natural talent or disposition to do one thing more than another; or the aptitude a man has received from nature to perform well and easily that which others can do but indifferently and with a great deal of pains. To know the bent of nature is the most important concern. Men come into the world with a genius determined not only to a certain art, but to certain parts of that art, in which only they are capable of success. If they quit their sphere, they fall even below mediocrity in their profession. Art and industry add much to natural endowments, but cannot supply them where they are wanting. (II: 672)
At first sight the entry seems to corroborate the sense that the genius is lost to the educational aim of the encyclopedia. But emphasizing both the unsurpassed excellence of natural talent and the partition of that talent into minute “spheres” of expertise, the power of genius is seen to be at once complete and lacking any sense of comprehensive breadth. In this it actually describes the very nature of encyclopedic articles. The entries arranged in alphabetical order also perform a division into innumerable different arts and sciences. “To perform well and easily that which others can do but indifferently and with a great deal of pains“: This definition of genius is an achievement the encyclopedia would like to claim for its own undertaking, which consists precisely in teaching others to understand areas of knowledge outside their natural “disposition” with less “pains.” Thus the encyclopedia complements the genius, and vice versa. Jean-Claude Beaune has pointed out that encyclopedias constitute something like automata: “As a cultural automaton, the Encyclopedia can be seen as a total and systematic machine.”54 Becoming part of this totalitarian system, the genius gets built into this machine. The genius is in fact itself a cultural automaton. It does what it is destined 54 Beaune, “The Classical Age of Automata,” 447.
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by nature to do, it cannot excel in anything else, and like the weaver at Perrault’s loom or the compositor at Young’s press it does not even understand the process of its production. The inability of the genius to develop its talent, and its appointment to a very narrow task or art tells the story of its instrumental nature. It is an organ in the powerful machine of eighteenth-century philosphical discourse, which gives it unlimited freedom within a very narrow compass in order to employ it in its service and subject its potentially dangerous nature to the tightest control possible. As we have already indicated, Young’s essay focused on the original genius in order to overcome the impasse in which the discussion about learning and progress in arts and sciences found itself around 1700. While the sciences made continuous progress, literature and the fine arts continued imitating traditional models and following prescriptive rules. While new technologies made the inventions and constructions of antiquity obsolete, Homer & Co. remained the master builders of literature and culture supervising modern authors and artists. With the construction of genius as a gift from nature, an emergency exit suddenly opened. Since the title of genius was conferred on an author at birth, the whole question of competing with the venerable ancestors seemed resolved. Imitation and rules were no longer a priority and could actually be labelled as a lack of genius. In this sense the championing of untutored originality might be said to have originated as some kind of defense mechanism. However, it is crucial that it was not to be considered a mechanism. As an endowment of nature the genius could enter the register of the organic in contradistinction to the mechanical. The history of the relationship between those two terms is long, and we shall have to come back to the problem it creates for the construction of the genius as natural talent. Suffice it to say at this point that Young’s essay is important because it was one of the first to claim, or reclaim, the organic nature of genius and originality at a time organs could be described as parts of a machine. The genius, conceived as something organic, supplemented the technological concept of progress by a sense of growth. The sciences make progress, the art of genius grows. Although this 68
distinction was amenable to an aestheticization that transferred art from the order of history to the order of nature, it is important to note that despite its organicist and aesthetic rhetoric Young’s essay insists on the coexistence of growth and progress: All arts and sciences are making considerable advance; with them, all the accomodations, ornaments, delights, and glories of human life; and these are as the root, and composition as the flower; and as the root spreads and thrives, shall the flower fail? (571)
Literary criticism has thrived on this flower of rhetoric, accomodating with great delight the ornament it fixes on an otherwise garrulous discourse. The flower is there, and we shall have to see where else in the essay its organicism takes root. But we might note that there is also composition in this composition, the imprint of the mechanical printing press that throughout the essay will compete with the vegetable life of flowers as an emblem of originality in the advancement of literature and art. Even if the genius in its untutored originality is not a reader of encyclopedias, it still seems to be one of the principal contributors to the project. Young, too, is one of those contributors. Under the heading of “COMPOSITION, in literature” the Encyclopædia Britannica actually prints substantial parts of his essay. As the editors point out in their Preface, “Not to mention original articles, they [the compilers] have had recourse to the best books upon almost every subject, extracted the useful parts, and rejected whatever appeared trifling or less interesting” (I: v). Apparently, one of those best books is Young’s Conjectures. Whatever value the editorial work of the compilers may have added to the rambling discourse of Young’s compilation in terms of its usefulness for a systematic treatment of the subject, it seems that the essay was included as an entry on the merit of its much professed originality. “I begin with original composition,” Young writes at the beginning of the essay, “and the more willingly, as it seems an original subject to me, who have seen nothing hitherto written on it” (549). Boswell has recorded his master’s caustic remark that he was
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“surprised to find the Doctor receive as novelties what Mr. Johnson thought very common thoughts.”55 Although Johnson’s sound judgment on Young’s achievements as critic and poet never failed him, as a maker of dictionaries the decision of his fellow compilers from Edinburgh would probably have met with his approval.56 To a large measure Young’s essay is a compilation of traditional opinions on originality, imitation, and a classical notion of poetic decorum balancing these two aspects of artistic creation. In this sense it has its proper place in an encyclopedia, and this is also why Young’s protestation of originality is one of the passages “extracted” from the entry. But we should also note the following passage that the compilers do reprint. It is one of several instances where Young, again using a traditional topos, laments the absence of originality and the flood of writing that define the predicament of modern authors: Born originals, how comes it to pass that we die copies? [...] The letter’d world no longer consists of singulars, it is a medly, a mass; and a hundred books, at bottom, are but one. (253)
Copying Young’s “original” the Encyclopædia actually describe its own mode of composition: a hundred books reduced or condensed into one. This is precisely the aim of encyclopedias. True, the context of the passage cited from Young’s essay focuses on the creation of works of art whereas the encyclopedia, as a repository of knowledge, necessarily turns everything into some form of popular science. But the citation is nonetheless to the point here because the Conjectures are also, if not primarily, a discourse on the different value the controversy between the ancients and the moderns placed on the concept of originality in science and art. Young’s essay can claim originality, as 55 Boswell, The Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides with Samuel Johnson, LL.D., in George Birbeck Hill, ed. Boswell’s Life of Johnson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), VI: 269. 56 On Johnson’s interest in issues concerning authorship and the publishing industry, see Alvin Kernan, Printing Technology, Letters and Samual Johnson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).
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it were, for confronting this controversy with the situation that evolved in the publishing business around the middle of the eighteenth century. The passage is interesting for another reason. Young’s essay is one of the first to give prominence to the concept of property in connection with originality,57 and the question cited – “Born originals, how comes it to pass that we die copies?” – appears in a somewhat ironic light when we consider that Young had indeed been dead five years by the time the compositors in Edinburgh arranged the type for an unauthorized copy of his essay on original composition. Although we must give the “Society of Gentlemen in Scotland” credit for crediting Young’s authorship in their list of contributors, in many cases the encyclopedists, citing their material without acknowledging their source, could indeed be accused of plagiarism.58 “Hope we from plagiarism any dominion in literature, as that of Rome arose from a nest of thieves?” (556), Young asks in a passage that obliquely connects the abduction and rape of the Sabinian women by the founding fathers of the Eternal City with the theft they committed by transferring the literature and philosophy of their Greek teachers into Latin language and culture. Originals are, and ought to be, great favourites, for they are great benefactors; they extend the republic of letters, and add a new province to its dominion: imitators only give us a sort of duplicates of what we had, possibly much better, before; increasing the mere drug of books, while all that makes them valuable, knowledge and genius, are at a stand. (551)
Originality, not plagiarism governs the colonial politics of the man of letters, and the increasing production of books does not multiply 57 See the pioneering essay by Gerhard Plumpe, “Eigentum – Eigentümlichkeit: Über den Zusammenhang ästhetischer und juristischer Begriffe im 18. Jahrhundert,” Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 23.2 (1979): 188–92. 58 Also of piracy and plagiarism among themselves. See Robert Darnton, The Business of Enlightenment: A Publishing History of the Encyclopédie 1775–1800 (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1979), 131–76.
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genius but rather duplicates imitation. The claim that not only the works of genius but also the dissemination of knowledge grinds to a standstill in the factories of the republic of letters is problematic and cannot be upheld. Throughout the essay Young’s faked or exaggerated indignation at all forms of imitation and adaptation struggles with the concept of progress that had become the hallmark of scientific investigation and philosphical discourse. A later passage about the disadvantages of imitation is more precise on this point than the one just cited: First, it deprives the liberal and politer arts of an advantage which the mechanic enjoy: in these, men are ever endeavouring to go beyond their predecessors; in the former, to follow them. And since copies surpass not their originals, [...] hence, while arts mechanic are in perpetual progress and increase, the liberal are in retrogradation and decay. (561)
The passage puts in a nutshell what the moderns had taken great efforts to point out in their controversy with the ancients. If literature and the fine arts were to keep pace with the development in the sciences, they would have to break out of the imitative mode that had established the critical tradition. The original genius is the agent appointed to achieve this. Since the authority of originality no longer rests on a reference to canonical authors, the principal adversary of the genius is the plagiary, who not only steals some work but usurps, as it were, the author’s voice and position. “Stat contra, dicitque tibi tua pagina. Fur es,” Young quotes Martial, one of those struggling to make his name as an author in that “nest of thieves,” the city of Rome: “Your page confronts you and says, ‘You are a thief’” (556). The citation is taken from a series of epigrams dealing with plagiarism, and it becomes clear that Martial must marshall his friends to remind the audience on festive occasions where his competitors recite lines from his work without acknowledgment that they are actually Martial’s property. “Et, cum se dominum vocabit ille,/ dicas esse meos manuque missos./ hoc si terque quaterque clamitaris,/ impones plagiario pudorem“: “And when he calls himself their owner, say they are mine, discharged from my hand. If you shout this three or four 72
times, you will make the kidnapper (plagiario) ashamed of himself.”59 The plagiarist is a kidnapper abducting the slaves “discharged” or set free (manu missi) by the author when he releases his work into the public. This is how the Encyclopædia Britannica defines the term: PLAGIARY, in philology, the purloining another person’s works, and putting them off for a man’s own. Among the Romans, plagiarius was properly a person who bought, sold, or retained a freeman for a slave; and was so called, because by the Flavian law such persons were condemned, ad plagas, to be whipped. (III: 480)
The Encylopædia should actually also take some whipping because it prints without authorization Young’s essay on originality. Putting his essay to work in their service without proper payment, Young as well as the original publisher of the essay are enslaved. The voice calling out “Your are a thief” would be the copyright protecting the pages of his work. It took several more decades before such a copyright would be in force. There is another reason why the issue of plagiarism is of some importance in this context. It is no accident that the encyclopedia confines plagiarism to duplication “in philology.” As we have seen, Young’s essay elaborates – inadvertently perhaps – a distinction between repetition in arts and the sciences. His remark that the “arts mechanic are in perpetual progress and increase” while “the liberal are in retrogradation and decay” does not simply imply that the original genius has originated in the sciences and has not yet been applied to literature. It rather means that repetition and imitation have a different status in the “arts mechanic.” The duplication and adaptation of ideas or knowledge is in fact the driving force behind this progress, and the encyclopedia is the very book designed to document it: “a hundred books, at bottom, are but one.” No one has pointed this out more 59 Marcus Valerius Martialis, Epigrams, ed. and trans. D. R. Shackleton Bailey, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1993), I: 52, ll. 6–9 in vol. I, 80–81. The passage cited by Young and the translation are from epigram 53.
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clearly than Hegel, who has actually written the Romantic encyclopedia that Coleridge was dreaming of. If Young’s essay can be said to originate from the controversy between the ancients and the moderns, one might also argue that, at the end of Romanticism, Hegel’s work comes to conclude the debates on originality, plagiarism, and the question of intellectual property that had fuelled the imagination of the eighteenth century. In his Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts of 1821, a supplement to his Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, Hegel writes: Die Fortpflanzung der Wissenschaften überhaupt und das bestimmte Lehrgeschäft insbesondere ist, seiner Bestimmung und Pflicht nach, am bestimmtesten bei positiven Wissenschaften, der Lehre einer Kirche, der Jurisprudenz usf., die Repetition festgesetzter, überhaupt schon geäusserter und von aussen aufgenommener Gedanken, somit auch in Schriften, welche diese Fortpflanzung und Verbreitung der Wissenschaften zum Zweck haben. [...] Inwiefern solche Wiederholung in einem schriftstellerischen Werke ein Plagiat werde, lässt sich nicht durch eine genaue Bestimmung angeben und hiermit nicht rechtlich und gesetzlich festsetzen. Das Plagiat müsste daher eine Sache der Ehre sein und von 60 dieser zurückgehalten werden.
Teaching implies repetition, learning means copying. This has grave implications for the usefulness of the original genius for academia and society at large, and we shall see that this is one of the limitations Kant imposes on the genius in his Third Critique. It also has impli60 Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, vol. VII of Werke, § 69, p. 148. The translation follows Hegel’s Philosophy of Rights, trans. T. M. Knox (London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 56: “Those engaged in the propagation of knowledge of all kinds, in particular those whose appointed task is teaching, have as their specific function and duty (above all in the case of the positive sciences, the doctrine of a church, the study of positive law, &c.) the repetition of well-established thoughts, taken up ab extra and all of them given expression already. [...] To what extent is such repetition of another’s material in one’s book a plagiarism? There is no precise principle of determination available to answer these questions, and therefore they cannot be finally settled either in principle or by positive legislation. Hence plagiarism would have to be a matter of honour and be held in check by honour.”
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cations for the effectiveness of copyright legislation. However fertile the Fortpflanzung or propagation of the sciences may be, the property laws do not seem to have made any progress since Martial, who, as we have seen, relegates plagiarism to pudor and thus also to the realm of ethics. In the passage quoted Hegel actually states: “Gesetze gegen den Nachdruck erfüllen daher ihren Zweck, das Eigentum der Schriftsteller und der Verleger rechtlich zu sichern, zwar in dem bestimmten, aber sehr beschränkten Umfange.”61 This is particularly true of encyclopedias and other forms of anthologies: Wie die hundert und aberhundert Kompendien, Auszüge, Sammlungen usf., Rechenbücher, Geometrien, Erbauungsschriften usf. zeigen, wie jeder Einfall einer kritischen Zeitschrift, Musenalmanachs, Konversationslexikons usf. sogleich ebenfalls unter demselben oder einem veränderten Titel wiederholt, aber als etwas Eigentümliches behauptet werden kann, – wodurch denn leicht dem Schriftsteller oder erfindenden Unternehmer der Gewinn, den ihm sein Werk oder Einfall versprach, zunichte gemacht oder gegenseitig heruntergebracht oder allein ruiniert wird.62
At Hegel’s hand, the problem of copying and reprinting, which indeed threatened the rise of a professional class of authors with financial ruin in the eighteenth century, is toned down into an accidental sideshow in the much more exciting arena of dialectical speculation about the impossibility of true repetition. Dialectical philosophy is the new machine that will run the business of organizing knowledge and 61 “Thus copyright legislation attains its end of securing the property rights of author and publisher only to a very restricted extent, though it does attain it within limits.” 62 Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts, 149: “For instance, the hundreds and hundreds of compendia, selections, anthologies, &c., arithmetics, geometries, religious tracts, &c., show how every new idea in a review or annual or encyclopedia, &c., can be forthwith repeated over and over again under the same or different title, and yet may be claimed as something peculiarly the writer’s own. The result of this may easily be that the profit promised to the author, or the projector of the original undertaking, by his work or his original idea becomes negligible or reduced for both parties or lost to all concerned” (56).
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imagination. Moreover, to the salaried professor at a nineteenthcentury university the question of plagiarism appears slightly ridiculous. Plagiarism, as a term, has ceased to exist, Hegel maintains, “es sei entweder, dass die Ehre ihre Wirkung getan, das Plagiat zu verdrängen, [...] oder dass ein Einfällchen oder Veränderung einer äusseren Form sich als Originalität und selbstdenkendes Produzieren so hoch anschlägt, um den Gedanken an ein Plagiat gar nicht in sich aufkommen zu lassen.”63 It is a long way from Young to Hegel. Although, to a philosophical mind, Young’s thinking might itself appear as merely a string of “Einfällchen” or trivial ideas about originality, we have seen that his essay breaks new ground in three ways. First, he establishes a connection between the liberal arts and the sciences by presenting the mechanical printing press as the organon of originality; secondly, he introduces the metaphor of organicism to describe the work of the original genius and distinguish it from the labors of imitation; and thirdly, he raises the question of intellectual property to give genius a legitimate claim to originality. Focussing on these three achievements we shall have to unfold his argument in which the mechanics of the printing press organizes his organic concept of the orginal genius as well as its position within the concept of natural law.
III. The Mechanics of Originality Having announced original composition to be the subject of his essay, Young pauses momentarily to contemplate the contemporary scene of writing : 63 Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts, 149: “It may be that honour has been effective in abolishing plagiarism, [...] or possibly an ingenious and trivial idea, and a change in external form, is rated so highly as originality and a product of independent thinking that the thought of plagiarism becomes wholly insufferable” (56)
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But, first, a few thoughts on composition in general. Some are of opinion, that its growth, at present, is too luxuriant, and that the press is overcharged. Overcharged, I think, it could never be, if none were admitted, but such as brought their imprimatur from sound understanding, and the public good. [...] This restriction allowed, the more composition the better. (549–50)
The essay will labor to demonstrate that good composition is not just a matter of sound understanding and the public good but that it receives its imprimatur from the hand of the original genius. The genius, to press this point once more, is a compositor. Thirty years lie between the Conjectures and the Epistles to Mr. Pope Concerning the Authors of the Age, in which Young had mustered all his power as a satirist to castigate the “writing tribe“64 that overcharge the press. The Epistles were written in response to the publication of the Dunciad in 1728. In a letter to Tickell dating from 1727, Young professes a shocked admiration for the heavy-handed approach Pope’s modern interpretation of classical models takes: Mr Pope is finishing a Burlesque Heroik on Writers, & ye modern diversions of ye Town, it alludes to Virgil & Homer thro[ugh]out. The 5th book of Virgil is burlesqud into games, in wh Booksellers run for Authors, & Piss for Authoresses & c; as is likewise part of ye 6th by a Vision of Heroes in Dullness & c: tis nearly done, & what is done is very correct.65
Young’s interest in the mores of the members constituting the Republic of Letters makes him make haste in the composition of a piece that on the one hand should show him to be a partisan to Pope’s cause and on the other stimulate the urinary tract of the booksellers. Competition is intense, and writing his Epistles Young contributes to the flood of letters on which he would like to set sail as a midshipman in Pope’s ark. 64 Young, Epistles to Mr. Pope Concerning the Authors of the Age, in Complete Works, II: 40, l. 49. References to the Epistles will henceforth be cited by line numbers alone. Unless otherwise noted they refer to the first epistle. 65 Henry Pettit, ed. The Correspondence of Edward Young, 1683–1765 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 60–61.
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Whilst you at Twickenham plan the future wood, Or turn the volumes of the wise and good, Our senate meets; at parties parties bawl, And pamphlets stun the streets, and load the stall. So rushing tides bring things obscene to light, Foul wrecks emerge, and dead dogs swim in sight. (ll. 1–6)
Young’s effort to make Pope pose as the solitary author holding intimate conversations with the wise men bound in vellum appears odd if one considers that Pope, as Mark Rose puts it, “more than any other writer of his day […] behaved like a literary entrepreneur and made a fortune from his verse.”66 The translator of Homer is indeed the ringleader among the “brokers in old song” (l. 58) upbraided and ridiculed by Young in his Epistles, and it is the hard-won success in his battles with the booksellers that awarded him this position as Britain’s foremost professional author in the eighteenth century. As Marlon Ross remarks in an essay most pertinent to our argument: “Caught at this turning point of history, Pope helps to authorize the individual’s possession of authority as an effect of print, even as he attempts to prevent this process by printing satires against individually possessed, self-proclaimed authorities.”67 Whether Young’s desperate attempt to jump on the bandwagon of public lament about the proliferation of all kinds of publications made him blind to the irony involved in Pope’s satire or whether it was simply his natural insincerity about his motives, it is striking that in 1730 he espouses the view that good composition must stand the test of time and that therefore authors should not do what he himself had just done by rushing his Epistles to the press in order to cash in on the success of Pope’s glaring critique of the publishing industry. “Write, and re– write, blot out, and write again,/ And for its swiftness ne’er applaud 66 Mark Rose, “The Author in Court: Pope v. Curll (1741),” in The Construction of Authorship, 216. Curll, by the way, is the winner of the pissing contest in the Dunciad, and we shall return to his impudence later in the chapter. 67 Marlon B. Ross, “Authority and Authenticity: Scribbling Authors and the Genius of Print in Eighteenth-Century England,” in The Construction of Authorship, 247.
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your pen” (Epistle 2, ll. 119–20), Young advises young and old authors, sending word to the printer that the press is indeed overcharged, “all, but sense, they print” (l. 117). The unprecedented and astonishing swiftness of the the printing press is the real driver of change in the Republic of Letters, and the booksellers are the agents of this change, gradually replacing the patrons and circle of friends among whom poets like Gray or Collins were circulating their manuscripts before even thinking of having them published. In one passage of the Epistles Young ridicules the vanity of a local genius to have his work printed, using words that are remarkable because they actually outline the strategy of the original genius he will develop some thirty laters in the Conjectures on Original Composition: He writes, in inspiration puts his trust; Though wrong his thoughts, the gods will make them just; Genius directly from the gods descends And who by labour would distrust his friends? Thus having reason’d with consummate skill, In immortality he dips his quill: And, since blank paper is denied the press, He mingles the whole alphabet by guess, In various sets, which various words compose, Of which, he hopes, mankind the meaning knows. (ll. 89–98; emphasis added)
The dabbling author seen here to assemble the letters of the alphabet like a compositor working on his sets of movable type will be transformed, in Young’s Conjectures, into the original genius amazing mankind by the spontaneous and irregular wildness of a work written directly, as it were, into the printing press. For the original genius is, as the essay will emphasize, “one who, to speak accurately, thinks and composes; while other invaders of the press, how voluminous and learned soever, (with due respect be it spoken,) only read and write” (565; emphasis added). While some just scribble, others compose their composition as the compositors of their own texts. By the time Young comes to write his essay his ambivalent feelings toward Pope have changed for the worse, not least because in the
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meantime he had himself moved in with the compositors that behind his desk were composing the original works he had just composed in order to prevent booksellers like Curll, the winner of the contest in the Dunciad, from cheating him out of his profit. In 1759 Young is a prospering author presenting the act of printing as an instance of original writing, and he boldly relegates Pope to the class of mere imitators. In an oblique reference to the poet that had preceded him in establishing the authority of the author in the eighteenth century, he writes: While the true genius is crossing all public roads into fresh untrodden ground, he [the imitator], up to the knees in antiquity, is treading the sacred footsteps of great examples, with the blind veneration of a bigot saluting the papal toe; comfortably hoping full absolution for the sins of his own understanding, from the powerful charm of touching his idol’s infallibility. (565)
Denouncing the imitator of ancient works as a catholic stooping to kiss the “papal toe,” Young treads on the toe of Pope, who was a catholic and whose career was built on the success of his translation of Homer. In the next paragraph the translators come under attack as poets that stoop or indeed prostrate themselves before the idols of their admiration: Were not prostrate spirits their voluntary pedestals, the figure they make among mankind would not stand so high. Imitators and translators are somewhat of the pedestal-kind, and sometimes rather raise their original’s reputation, by showing him to be by them inimitable, than their own. (565)
The act of translation confers originality on the original just as imitation renders its model inimitable. The status of being an original is thus not necessarily an intrinsic quality of the original, and in pushing those famed statues from their pedestals Young buries Pope under the debris of his argument.68 We have already cited the passage where 68 On the problem translation in Young’s essay, see Joel Weinsheimer, “Conjectures on Unoriginal Composition,” Eighteenth Century 22.1 (1981), 58–73.
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Young characterizes Swift as an “infantine genius” needing a good education to make it as a lesser figure in the world of originality, and in Young’s view Pope is another poet that belongs to that kindergarden. But in fact, already as a child Pope seems to have shown an unusual interest in print. Joseph Warton relates the anecdote that, “He was taught to read very early by an aunt; and of his own indefatigable industry learned to write, by copying printed books, which he executed with great neatness and accuracy.”69 Soon he was reproducing his copious handwriting in print. One of those books was the Dunciad Variorum with the prolegomena and notes by Scriblerus, a splendid example of how pubescent scribbling translates into print in the eighteenth century. The Dunciad Variorum, a book to end all books, should actually make a splendid addition to Young’s library. The war among booksellers and the dunces whose work they bring to public notice is closely related to the controversy between the Ancients and the Moderns that started in France with a stand-off between Fontenelle and Boileau in the camp of the ancients and Perrault and Fénelon as the generals in the army of the moderns.70 Boileau’s translation of Longinus’s treatise on the sublime, which plays an important role in this dispute, is mentioned as a model of its kind in the The Dunciad Variorum, and it is no accident that Pope’s burlesque looks very much like Richard Bentley’s Dissertations upon the Epistles of Phalaris of 1698, which proved the spuriousness of a work on which the ancients had founded their claim that classical literature excells modern poetry and which ignited the cultural war that had been ravaging in the French Academy 69 Joseph Warton, Essay on the Genius and Writings of Pope, 4th ed. (London: Dodsley, 1782), I: 81. The work is dedicated to Young. 70 On the history of this controversy, which has its roots in the renaissance, see H. Rigault, Histoire de la querelle des anciens et des modernes (Paris, 1856), for France as well as for England; and Hubert Gillot, La Querelle des anciens et des modernes en France (Nancy, 1914; rpt. Geneva: Slatkine Reprints, 1968). A selection of contributions to the debate in English criticism has been edited by J. E. Spingarn in vol. III of Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963).
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on British territory.71 The most clamorous English battle-cry in this war was raised by Swift in his Battel Fought between the Antient and the Modern Books in St. James’s Library published in 1710. It provides the context for Young’s faked despise of the “black militia of the pen” (l. 310) in his Epistles as well as for his polemics against Pope and Swift thirty years later. The Conjectures stage the waning controversy between the ancients and moderns as the final showdown in which the original genius, wearing the crest of the moderns, confronts a whole battalion of imitators. While Swift’s armies clash in a manner that makes Homer’s war scenes pale in comparison and brings the narrator so close to the frontline that the report about the war gets itself wounded by gaps inflicted on the manuscript, Young presides over the strife between original works and mere copies like a general observing the battle from a distant hill. What makes this detachment possible is the different weaponry Young brings to the combat. In Swift’s library the main weapon on both sides is the quill used to attack the enemy at close quarters: Now, it must here be understood, that Ink is the great missive Weapon, in all Battels of the Learned, which, convey’d thro’ a sort of Engine, call’d a Quill, infinite Numbers of these are darted at the Enemy, by the Valiant on each side, 72 with equal Skill and Violence, as if it were an Engagement of Porcupines.
In the Conjectures, the moderns spill their ink mainly by means of the printing press, and compared to the hog-like frenzy we encounter in 71 On the Phalaris controversy, see Alexander Dyce’s introduction to the Dissertation in The Works of Richard Bentley, D.D. (London, 1836; rpt. New York: AMS Press, 1966), I: v–xix. Incidentally, the controversy between Bentley and Boyle was started off by the negligence of Bennet, Boyle’s bookseller and printer, who claimed that Bentley had used his power as the King’s Librarian to withhold the MS. of the Epistles. The supposed antiquity of the Epistles is a construction of Renaissance scholarship. 72 Jonathan Swift, The Battle of the Books, in A Tale of a Tub, ed. D. Nichol Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 158), 221.
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Swift’s library the battle of Young’s essay takes place on the literary battlefield mapped out as “an ample area for renowned adventure in original attempts” (570). Young carefully plans his strategy that will lead the genius and its troops to their final victory: If [...] ancients and moderns were no longer considered as masters and pupils, but as hard-matched rivals for renown, – then moderns, by the longevity of their labours, might one day become ancients themselves; and old Time, that best weigher of merits, to keep his balance even, might have the golden weight of an Augustan age in both his scales; or, rather, our scale might descend; and that of antiquity (as a modern match for it strongly speaks) might kick the beam. (570)
What guarantees the longevity of the moderns is the press, which, whenever need arises, will reprint the works of their labor. Young’s reference to the scale cites the confrontation between God and Satan in book IV of Paradise Lost, and Milton is frequently called upon as the first modern author after Shakespeare to have surpassed the ancients: “With what a gust do we retire to the disinterested and immortal friends in our closet” (550). If Milton’s immortality is founded on the sublimity of his epic, we should also bear in mind that Paradise Lost is the first work of modern literature for which a formal contract exists between the author and his printer. Even though Milton’s eighteenth-century biographers and Blake complained that the sum of £20 he received from Samuel Simmons represented a crass case of exploitation, some biographers did point out the extraordinary fact that there was a writer that as early as 1667 actually entered into a contract on what for professionals authors meant paradise.73 This was not lost on Young, one might conjecture, whose essay keeps reminding the reader that immortality is a question of print as well as the profit one gets from it as an author. Immortality is a great advantage if you go to war, and Young was not the first among the moderns to notice that technological progress in literary matters put a weapon in their hands that was unknown to 73 On Milton as “our earliest modern professional author,” see Peter Lindenbaum, “Milton’s Contract,” in The Construction of Authorship, 175–90; 190.
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the copyists of manuscripts in antiquity. Perrault actually points out that the invention of the printing press historically coincides with the invention of modern artillery. The combination of ink and gunpowder is used to great effect in the war between the ancients and moderns: LE CHEVALIER. Après avoir parlé des Arts où les Modernes l’emportent sur les Anciens, il me semble que vous devriez dire quelque chose des Arts qui n’ont esté connus que dans ces derniers siecles, comme de L’Imprimerie & de l’Artillerie. L’ABBE’. Nous en avons parlé, nous avons remarqué que l’Imprimerie avoit rendu la science beaucoup plus commune qu’elle n’estoit, en mettant les livres dans les mains de tout le monde, & nous avons observé que l’Artillerie avoit changé toute 74 la face de la guerre.
The change modern artillery has brought about is not unlike that effected by modern printing technology. Both greatly increase the speed and range of delivery with an almost untiring automatism that makes weapons and the press mighty power tools in any conquest or contest. In his History of the Royal Society published in 1667 Thomas Sprat speculates about the role of print in the advancement of learning during the Renaissance: And now I am come to the time within our view, and to the third great Age of the flourishing of Learning. Whether this recovery of knowledge did happen by the benefit of Printing, invented about that time, which shew’d a very easie way of communicating mens thoughts one to another? or whether it came from the hatred [...] against the blindness, and stupidity, of the Roman Fryers? or from the 74 Perrault, Parallèle des anciens et des modernes, IV: 285. “The CHEVALIER: Having talked about the arts in which the moderns excel the ancients it seems to me that we should also say something about the arts that only became known in these centuries, such as the printing press and the artillery. / The ABBOT: Actually, we have talked about them. We have seen that the printing press made science much more popular than before in that it put books in the hands of everybody; and we also observed that artillery has changed the nature of warfare.” The abbot refers to II: 294–95.
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Reformation, which put men upon a stricter inquiry into the Truth of things? [...] I will not take much pains to determine.75
It is quite needless for Sprat to determine the primary cause because the cultural, spiritual, political, and scientific motives he touches upon are all interrelated through the press. By the time he writes his History the account of modernity as the great age of print had already become commonplace.76 The way in which the Society calls its history into being is a remarkable instance of the power the press had acquired in the seventeenth century: “Let this Book, Intit’led, The History of the Royal Society of London, for the Improving of Natural Knowledge, be Printed” (2). The decree recalls the creative word of divine utterance. Let there be light, let there be print. Soon the enlightenment would turn this decree into a powerful program. A number of the moderns participating in the controversy with the ancients belonged to the Royal Society, and it is not surprising that as the chief promoter of progress this body should evince a keen interest in the printing press. In our context Sprat’s remark in his History is also significant with regard to Samuel Richardson, who was was one of three printers employed by the Society for the Encouragement of Learning and later also secured a contract to print the Philosophical Transactions for the Royal Society, thus acting – at his printing machine – as the operator of technological progress. The Conjectures on Original Composition are composed, we remember, as a letter addressed “to the Author of Sir Charles Grandison.” Richardson is not only the addressee but also the co-author of the essay, which is in fact
75 Thomas Sprat, The History of the Royal Society of London (London, 1667; rpt. St. Louis: Washington University Press, 1959), 22. 76 See the comprehensive history in Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications and Cultural Transformations in EarlyModern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). On the politics of power exerted through print, see Roger Chartier, ed. The Culture of Print: Power and the Use of Print in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989).
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a composite composition,77 and he is also appointed as its printer. Young’s deeply unoriginal frame of mind was always looking for exemplary models, and Richardson, the prolific eighteenth-century man of letters, epitomizes the original genius portrayed in the Conjectures. It is more than a gesture of recognition and gratitude when Young dedicates his essay to him. Richardson achieved in his career as a printer what Young never attained as a writer, and this career in many ways exemplifies the argument of the essay. Having started out as an apprentice in a print-shop, he worked as a compositor, corrector, and overseer of a press, was made freeman of the Stationers’ Company, and finally set up his own printing-house in Fleet Street. He became printer to the Parliament and, in 1760, the year after the publication of the Conjectures, even secured a law patent that gave him the exclusive right to print books dealing with the common law in his function of Law Printer to His Majesty.78 Just as his contract with the Royal Society placed him at the organ of learning and scientific progress, his contract with Parliament gave him, at the cases of his printing press, a voice and a seat to which Young, despite all his shifting of political alliances, always aspired in vain. The year Richardson was appointed to print the King’s laws, Young was proposed for the honorific but insignificant appointment as Clerk of the Closet to the Princess Dowager of Wales.79 Public recognition came to him very late in life, and the considerable amount of money he made as an author constituted something like a compensation for the humiliation he endured, and continuously sought, in his long 77 For Richardson’s share in the writing of the essay, see Alan D. McKillop, “Richardson, Young, and the Conjectures,” Modern Philology 22 (1925): 391– 404. 78 On his business career, see T. C. Duncan Eaves and Ben D. Kimpel, Samuel Richardson: A Biography (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 37–86, 154–66, 498– 510. 79 See his letter of acceptance to the Duchess of Portland in Correspondence, 523: “As the Honour is great & the Duty small, [...] I do accept it with great Gratitude for Your remembrance of one who might easily & naturally be forgotten.”
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campaign for preferment. What must have fascinated him most about Richardson was his privileged access to the press. The endless and rapid flow of letters scribbled or composed by the correspondents in Richarson’s three novels could instantly be set in type and be printed. For Pamela, Clarissa, and Harriet Byron comes true what is implied throughout the Conjecture on Original Compositions: The vision of the author writing in a corner of the printing shop. Richardson also printed the first comprehensive edition of the Night-Thoughts, and a letter to Young intimates that a busy printer only really reads when composing a work for the press: I am expecting down the last proof of the new edition [...] of your noble work. And noble work it is indeed! I never before read it in series: the first numbers only when they came out; the second part, as I printed it, under your inspection; and the second edition of that second as I reprinted it, another printer doing Mr. Dodsley’s part. But, now printing the whole, it is not possible for me to express my admiration of it.80
In his reply, Young repays the compliment by praising Clarissa as a model for modern authors. “I rejoice at it,” he writes, “for the noblest compositions need such aids” (337). That he is also thinking of an unsentimental aid from the compositor of his poem becomes clear in his suggestion concerning its marketing: “Suppose, in the title-page of the Night-Thoughts, you should say —published by the author of Clarissa. This is a trick to put it into more hands; I know it would have that effect” (338). Richardson does not act on the advice, but ten years later the masterprinter will figure on the title page of the Conjectures as the embodiment of the original genius. The other exemplary genius inspiring the essay is Joseph Addison, who was not only the first modern English author to write about the genius but also the first to go public every day as a professional journalist. In contrast to Swift, who was inclined to “tyranny in wit,” and Pope, who was “for softening tyranny into lawful monarchy,” Addison is portrayed as a true republican in the eighteenth80 The Correspondence of Edward Young, 336.
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century Republic of Letters: “Addison’s crown was elective: he reigned by the public voice” (579). Young’s talent, developed in the course of his dealing with the system of patronage, for pegging ideas on eminent public figures in order to promote them is really astounding. The spontaneous nature of genius, the way in which it writes on the spur of the moment, is sponsored by Richardson in his capacity as both a sentimental letter writer and printer. The sponsorship for the whole problem of how originality can be handed down to posterity, the question of the legacy of genius, is passed on to Addison. This is why the deathbed looms so large in the second part of the essay. The long disquisition about Addison’s last words – “‘See in what peace a Christian can die!’” (581) – has generally been considered incongruous with its main argument, a sneak preview of the essay on moral composition Young promises in the postscriptum to his public letter to Richardson. But it can be said to organize the recurring references to the problems of succession in the essay, problems that prove to be virulent with regard to those ancient authors whose fame has immortalized them to such a degree that they simply refuse to die and make room for modern authors. The press allows Addison to prepare for death with the clear conscience of a Christian who has done everything to put his estate in order. In the first number of the Spectator he writes about his resolution “to Print my self out, if possible, before I Die.”81 Young’s essay professes great admiration for such an endeavor. “Imitate,” he writes at one point, “but imitate not the composition, but the man” (555). Addison is an original to be emulated because in his life the man and his work form a union that finds its best expression in the print-out of his articles and books. Even on his deathbed he is still working indefatigably on his last and greatest book, preparing it for posthumous publication. “His compositions are but a noble preface,” Young writes, “the grand work is his death: that is a work which is read in heaven” (582). It is an immortal work of genius.
81 Addison, The Spectator, no. 1, I: 5.
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As the supreme Being has expressed, and as it were printed his Ideas in the Creation, Men express their Ideas in Books, which by this great Invention of these latter Ages may last as long as the Sun and Moon, and perish only in the 82 general Wreck of Nature.
What sounds like the pathos of Young’s Night Thoughts turned into prose with some help from Milton is in fact a citation from Addison’s 1711 essay on books and the power of print in the Spectator.83 “Books are the Legacies that a great Genius leaves to Mankind, which are delivered down from Generation to Generation, as Presents to the Posterity of those who are yet unborn” (II: 154), the essay continues. It is a legacy bequeathed, on his death, to Young, who in his essay on genius will show originality to be an effect of print. However, there is a little wrinkle in Addison’s testament. The press, that “great Invention of these latter Ages,” has one flaw, and the types the compositors assemble to print the article on books in the Spectator spell out a serious problem the original genius has to grapple with. What at first sight looks like a great advantage the moderns have over the ancients now also becomes a liability: The Circumstance which gives Authors an Advantage above all these great Masters, is this, that they can multiply their Originals; or rather can make Copies of their Works, to what Number they please, which shall be as valuable as the Originals themselves. (II: 154)
If the press can print myriad numbers of identical copies, how are we then to tell the copy from the original? If the copy has the same value as the original, originality can no longer function as a reliable standard of value. What makes matters worse is that “this great Invention of these latter Ages” indiscriminately reprints also the works of the ancients. The classical authors are “accidental originals,” as Young 82 Addison, The Spectator, no. 166, II: 154; emphasis added. 83 Cp. also no. 124, I: 505–08 on essay writing as opposed to publishing books; no. 367, III: 379–81 on the paper manufacture; no. 379, III: 422–25 on reading, learning, and publishing.
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points out. “The works they imitated, few excepted, are lost,” and if thus their claim to fame is not based on the strength of their work alone, they are even “secured in it, in spite of Goths and flames, by the perpetuating power of the press” (553). Thus their work too “may last as long as the Sun and Moon,” as Addison had put it. In his Essay upon the Ancient and Modern Learning published in 1690, William Temple, the most perspicacious mind among the British ancients, uses the supposed advantage of the press as a tool of swift and perfect duplication with great advantage to make short work of the moderns’ claim that advanced technology gives their age ascendancy over classical learning: The Invention of Printing has not, perhaps, multiplied Books, but only the Copies of them; and if we believe there were Six Hundred Thousand in the Library of Ptolomy, we shall hardly pretend to equal it by any of ours, nor perhaps, by all put together; I mean so many Originals that have lived any time, and thereby given Testimony of their having been thought worth preserving.84
Young would not really contest this view, which corresponds exactly with his topical complaint about the multiplication of books by imitators. He in fact sets fire to the Ptolomean and all those other libraries to show the dismal state in which the Republic of Letters finds itself: So few are our originals, that, if all other books were to be burnt, the lettered world would resemble some metropolis in flames, where a few incombustible buildings, a fortress, temple, or tower, lift their heads, in melancholy grandeur, amid the mighty ruin. (553)
The sublimity of melancholy grandeur is perhaps the most sincere feeling or thought Young is capable of, in his essay as well as in his other writings. It is of no great help in distinguishing between originals and imitations in the age of print. Oddly enough, the most 84 William Temple, “An Essay upon the Ancient and Modern Learning,” in Spingarn, ed. Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century, III: 33–34.
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original contribution of the printing press to modern discourse is a new technology of duplication that transforms literature and the arts into a medium in which the original is an effect of imitation. Without copy there would be no original. How, then, are we to distinguish between originality and imitation? Curiously, this is a question Young would not even consider. “I shall not enter into the curious inquiry of what is, or is not, strictly speaking, original” (551), he remarks somewhere at the beginning of his essay with an indifference that might astonish modern critics. However, it was hardly surprising to his contemporaries. Nowhere in the essay does Young challenge the concept of mimesis that presents all art as an imitation of nature. “Imitations are of two kinds; one of nature, one of authors: the first we call ‘originals,’ and confine the term ‘imitation’ to the second” (551), he writes in a passage that on the one hand somewhat complicates his argument but on the other integrates it within the mainstream of eighteenth-century criticism. In this sense Young’s Conjectures on Original Composition takes the same stance as the Discourse on Poetical Imitation by Richard Hurd, another doctor of divinity interested in aesthetics, who approaches the subject from the other end. He argues that all productions of creative imagination are “derived from the archetype of one common original“85 and he thus distinguishes between “original copying,” which he calls “Invention” (II: 111), and “secondary or derivative image,” which is “Imitation” (II: 113): “And here the difficulty, we are about to examine, commences,” he states, for “the reader is often at a loss [...] to discern the original from the copy” (II: 113). Just like Young he focuses on the task of genius to arrange objects and images that have already been given by nature and copied by man: In this view every wondrous original, which ages have gazed at, as the offspring of creative fancy, [...] is itself but a copy, a transcript from some brighter page of this vast volume of the universe. Thus all is derived; all is unoriginal. And the office of the genius is but to select the fairest forms of things, and to present them
85 Richard Hurd, “A Discourse on Poetical Imitation,” in Works (London, 1811; rpt. New York: AMS Press, 1967), II: 131.
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in due place and circumstance, and in the richest colouring of expression, to the imagination. (II: 111)
The genius is a technician of imagination. It selects forms, puts them into their proper place, colors them. Hurd’s office of the genius is not unlike the office of Young’s compositor or that of an engraver in a print shop. Based on Locke’s philosophy the body of writings on genius and imagination in British criticism provides countless other instances of this mechanical procedure. Alexander Gerard’s Essay on Genius states: All the fine arts are, in some sense, imitative of Nature; invention in these arts, is only observing and copying Nature in a certain manner: natural objects and appearances are observed by the artist, they are conceived with distinctness and with force, their characteristical circumstances are selected, and so expressed as to imprint the whole form on the minds of others, with the like clearness and vivacity with which he himself apprehended it.86
Again we find the same mechanism: Observing, selecting, imprinting on the mind of others. In William Duff’s Essay on Original Genius we read: A Poet [...], who is possessed of original Genius, feels in the strongest manner every impression made upon the mind, by the influence of external objects on the senses, or by reflection on those ideas which are treasured up in the repository of the memory, and is consequently qualified to express the vivacity and strength of his own feelings.87
Conceived of as an archivist of images and feelings, the original genius can produce novelty only through new or even surprising combinations of images and ideas in a manner that has allowed us to compare the working of its mind to the work of a compositor: 86 Alexander Gerard, An Essay on Genius (London, 1774; rpt. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1966), 395. 87 William Duff, An Essay on Original Genius (London, 1767; rpt. Delmar: Scholar’s Facsimilies and Reprints, 1978), 159.
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Association is often so strong, that it bestows a sort of cohesion on several separate ideas, and makes them start up in numberless combinations, many of them different from every form which the senses have perceived; and thus produces a new creation. In this operation of the imagination, its associating power, we shall, on a careful examination, discover the origin of genius. (40– 41)
While the mechanical arrangement of ideas and words in associationist theories provides a rationale for Young’s argument, there is one important element that we have frequently alluded to in passing but to which we have not paid close attention so far: the organic metaphors Young employs to “discover the origin of genius.” Originals are organic, imitations are mechanical. This distinction will constitute the cornerstone of Romantic aesthetics, and the abundant growth of organic imagery in the Conjectures has made modern literary criticism praise Young as an early champion of Romanticism. Returning from the the caseroom at the printing press to the “sweet refuge” (550) of Young’s library, one might indeed ask whether the conjecture that the original genius is a compositor is not pressing the point too much. If the library is the place where the doctor of divinity seeks and finds consolation in “the pleasures of the pen” (550), his other pleasure spots are the “monumental marbles scattered in a wide pleasure-garden” (549) to which the door and window of his study open. Not the printing press but ancient ruins and the abundant growth of flowers seem to map out the territory on which Young stages his battle between the ancients and the moderns. In the setting of this park the original and the imitation are planted side by side and the genius loci protecting his garden is the original genius. Let us look at Young’s curious non-definition of originality in its entirety: The mind of a man of genius is a fertile and pleasant field; pleasant as Elysium, and fertile as Tempe; it enjoys a perpetual spring. Of that spring originals are the fairest flowers: imitations are of quicker growth, but fainter bloom. Imitations are of two kinds; one of nature, one of authors: the first we call “originals,” and con-
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fine the term “imitation” to the second. I shall not enter into the curious inquiry of what is, or is not, strictly speaking, original, content with what all must allow, that some compositions are more so than others; and the more they are so, I say, the better. (551)
Young might have been learned in things literary, but he does not really seem to be competent as a botanist. Plucking flowers for his herbarium, Young gathers those two species that resist easy classification and under close scrutiny turn out to be some kind of crossbreed: the original and the imitation. “Originality is seen in fact as a variant of imitation,“88 Thomas McFarland comments, or as Joel Weinsheimer justly remarks, “The Conjectures is blank at the center. Because Young omits to define the essence of originality and rests content with a comparative elucidation of the concept, we are entitled to ask whether originality has an essence [...]. If it does not, originality and imitation belong to a continuum; and it is therefore perfectly legitimate to speak of imitative originals as well as original imitations.”89 While Weinsheimer and McFarland are right in pointing out the instability of Young’s argument, their comments are also indicative of the continuum that has been constructed between Young’s mimetic stance and the Romantic discourse that will transform it. In his influential book The Mirror and the Lamp M. H. Abrams quotes what has become the most famous or notorious passage in Young’s essay. We cite his citation together with his comment: “An Original may be said to be of a vegetable nature; it rises spontaneously from the vital root of genius; it grows, it is not made: Imitations are often a sort of manufacture wrought up by those mechanics, art, and labour, out of pre-existent materials not their own.” The passage might almost serve as a précis of Coleridge’s basic distinction, half a century later, between mechanical making and organic growth, between the
88 Thomas McFarland, Originality and Imagination (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 5. 89 Weinsheimer, “Conjectures on Unoriginal Composition,” 59–60.
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reordering of given materials by artificers like Beaumont and Fletcher, and the 90 vital emergence of an original form in the plays of Shakespeare.
While Abrams points out that Young was by no means the first to denounce the mechanical aspect of art’s artifice in favour of some innate powers that would give poetry a life of its own, he does give him credit for having employed the metaphor of the vegetable nature of genius to describe the creative process of art and poetry in an original fashion: Young’s innovation is first, in setting up the growth of a plant as the contrary of mechanical manufacture, and second, in using the plant unequivocally as the analogue for the process, and not only the product, of genial creativity. In thus transferring the emphasis to the development of a work of art, Young imports from vegetable life certain attributes destined to become important concepts in organic aesthetics. As opposed to objects which are “made” by “art and labour,” the original work is vital, it grows, spontaneously, from a root, and (by implication) unfolds its original form from within outward. (199–200)
What the passage unfolds – “(by implication)” – is a reading that has its roots already in the soil of romanticism rather than showing Young’s essay to be the ground from which an organic aesthetics could be said to grow. Ironically, Abrams’s allusion to “Coleridge’s basic distinction […] between mechanical making and organic growth” points to a text that vividly demonstrates the tangled problem of originality. This is what Coleridge writes in the notes for his lecture on Shakespeare: The form is mechanic when to on any given material we impress a predetermined form, not necessarily arising out of the properties of the material – as when to a mass of wet clay we give whatever shape we like wish it to retain when hardened – The organic form on the other hand is innate, it form shapes as it developes
90 M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp (New York: Norton, 1958), 199. Emphasis in the source.
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itself from within, and the fullness of its developement is one & the same with 91 the perfection of its outward Form.
The privileged position Coleridge assigns to the organic form is of particular interest here because the note is an almost verbatim translation from A. W. Schlegel’s Vorlesungen über dramatische Kunst und Literatur. Citing and translating from Schlegel, he seems to present what Young calls “a sort of manufacture wrought up by those mechanics, art, and labour, out of pre-existent materials not their own” (552) rather than the “original form” whose “vital emergence” Abrams seeks in his lecture. Since the idea central to the distinction is not Coleridge’s intellectual property, the note can hardly be called an “organic form” that would be “arising out of the properties of the material.” Yet, it is precisely within the folds of his translation-asimitation that Coleridge tries to demonstrate how the organic “shapes as it developes itself from within.” His translation is this shaping and development. These are Schlegel’s words: “Die organische Form hingegen ist eingebohren, sie bildet von innen heraus, und erreicht ihre Bestimmtheit zugleich mit der vollständigen Entwickelung des Keimes.”92 While Coleridge follows Schlegel in the first part of the sentence, he transforms the “perfect development of the germ” into the “perfection of its outward form.” In a most literal sense, the translation “developes itself from within” in that it is an “outward form” growing from the seed of the original. Thus, Coleridge’s trans91 Coleridge, Lectures 1808–1819 on Literature, vol. 5 of the Collected Works, ed. by R. A. Foakes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), I: 495. Further references are to this edition and will be cited as LL. 92 Cited from G. N. G. Orsini, “Coleridge and Schlegel Reconsidered,” Comparative Literature 16.2 (1964): 102. The article gives a detailed history of the controversy about Coleridge’s apparent plagiarism. Foakes, the editor of the Bollingen edition of LL, follows Orsini when he points out that the only change Coleridge makes to Schlegel’s text occurs in the passage about the shape given to “a mass of wet clay,” which translates “einer weichen Masse.” We might note that the soft mass of clay comes to retain the impression of letters from the translator’s name: Coleridge and Taylor.
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lation appears at the same time as mechanical imitation of a “predetermined form” and as an “organic form” that yields the fruit or unfolds the flower hidden in the original. Whereas Young might be said to figure in the Conjectures as a somewhat confused botanist unable to clearly distinguish the traits of the original from those of the imitation in the crossbreed he discovers in his “pleasure-garden,” Coleridge seems to fuse the two species on purpose. As he writes in another lecture on Shakespeare and his contemporaries: There have been instances in the literary world that might remind one of a Botanist of a singular sort of parasite Plant, which rises above ground, independent and unsupported, an apparent original; but trace its roots and you will find their fibres all terminating in the root of a<nother> plant at an unspuspected distance. (LL, II: 145)
The revision that turns “a plant” into “another plant” is significant. For it is not sure whether the discovery of the “singular sort of parasite Plant” leads to the registration of a distinct difference between the original and the imitation. Their roots cannot easily be disentangled, and it is hard to say which of the two concepts is parasitic. Much of Coleridge’s writing enacts the originality of origins as an effect of plagiarism and citation. In his transcendental aesthetics it becomes difficult to tell the plant from the transplant. Abrams’s effort to present the organic imagery in the Conjectures as an early bid for romanticism has to be taken with caution. The essay’s achievement lies elsewhere. George Eliot has accused Young of a “disruption of language from genuine thought,“93 and one might indeed say that the essay does little to elaborate the concepts underlying its organic imagery. But it is due to his superficial rheoric that he inadvertantly lays bare the essential monstrosity of the original genius and the unnatural nature of its “vegetable nature.” The discourse of romanticism will take great pains to transform organic originality into a self-generating system. In Young’s essay originality appears as a 93 George Eliot, “Worldliness and Other-Worldliness: The Poet Young,” in The Writings of George Eliot (Boston, 1907; rpt. New York: AMS Press, 1970), 45.
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series of tricks in the grandiose show of a magician entering the arena of literature: The pen of an original writer, like Armida’s wand, out of a barren waste calls a blooming spring: out of that blooming spring an imitator is a transplanter of laurels, which sometimes die on removal, always languish in a foreign soil. (551)
The luxuriant garden and bower of Tasso’s wild enchantress, who in William Duff’s textbook about the original genius is compared to the witches in Macbeth,94 becomes a desolate place where spring is not the season of organic growth but rather a spell the genius casts on the reader. The bouquet of organic imagery originates in a “barren waste,” is then quickly removed to die, and is finally laid to rest in the “foreign soil” of imitation. Nature withers fast with old Young, like flowers in a herbary. His citation of Armida’s garden only illustrates that his essay is itself a very traditional florilegium where plants are removed from their native soil. In the end, the passage amounts to little more than a struggle for the laurels, and it remains unclear whether it is the genius or the imitator that puts them on his head. But most importantly, the passage points to the “barren waste” as the abode of the original genius, its native soil, its proper nature. Like the flowers that do not really grow but rather pop up suddenly by some kind of spell or decree, the genius has no natural genealogy. Although it is itself part of nature, something innate, it does not seem to be of natural parentage and it also seems that emerging from a “barren waste” it cannot procreate. The original genius is barren. This is Young’s only original insight. Kant will give it a conceptual base in his Third Critique. In his Kritik der Urteilskraft, Kant tries to stabilize the uneasy relationship between nature and art by granting aesthetic judgment a secure place among the faculties of the mind. The status it attains, 94 William Duff, Critical Observations on the Wrtings of the Most Celebrated Original Geniuses in Poetry (1770; rpt. Delmar, N.Y.: Scholar’s Reprints, 1973), 334.
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however, is one in which art is shown to have no recourse to conceptual understanding. This places the original genius as a promoter or chief executive of art in the gap opening up between theoretical understanding and practical reason. Gerard, to whom Shakespeare and Newton are the two greatest geniuses of modernity, still applies geniality to both arts and the sciences: “Genius is [...] the power of invention, either in science or in the arts, either of truth or of beauty” (318). In Kant’s Third Critique the genius is presented as a figure of aesthetics dealing mainly, or even exclusively, with arts. Aesthetic judgment deals with the beautiful, and aesthetic beauty consists in what the German language ambiguously calls der schöne Schein. Aesthetic beauty emerges as a shine, but it shines by virtue of its appearance as something that is apparent in both senses of the word. Imitating nature, “die schöne Kunst” – fine art and belles lettres – seems like a part of mere nature but is itself nothing natural. Art is merely the illusion of nature: An einem Produkte der schönen Kunst muß man sich bewußt werden, daß es Kunst sei, und nicht Natur; aber doch muß die Zweckmässigkeit in der Form desselben von allem Zwange willkürlicher Regeln so frei scheinen, als ob es ein Produkt der bloßen Natur sei. Auf diesem Gefühle der Freiheit im Spiele unserer Erkenntnisvermögen, welches doch zugleich zweckmässig sein muß, beruht diejenige Lust, welche allein allgemein mitteilbar ist, ohne sich doch auf Begriffe zu gründen. Die Natur war schön, wenn sie zugleich als Kunst aussah; und die Kunst kann nur schön genannt werden, wenn wir uns bewußt sind, sie sei Kunst, 95 und sie doch als Natur aussieht.
95 Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, in Wilhelm Weischedel, ed. Werke (Wiesbaden: Insel Verlag, 1957), X: § 45, p. 240; emphasis added. Further references to the Third Critique will be cited in the text by paragraph and page number. The translation follows The Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1991): “A product of fine art must be recognized to be art and not nature. Nevertheless the finality in its form must appear just as free from the constraint of arbitrary rules as if it were a product of mere nature. Upon this feeling of freedom in the play of our cognitive faculties – which play has at the same time to be final – rests that pleasure which aloe is universally communicable without being based on concepts. Nature proved beautiful when it
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While Kant’s presentation of art as illusion follows traditional explanations, his emphasis on a “feeling of freedom” that is free only to the extent that it is not based on rules or cognitive concepts, raises the difficult question of how these works of art can be produced at all. His answer is the original genius, and in so far as it does not produce its works according to some rule or other, the genius must be part of nature. For only nature is free from the constraints of arbitrary rules: Genie ist das Talent (Naturgabe), welches der Kunst die Regel gibt. Da das Talent, als angebornes produktives Vermögen des Künstlers, selbst zur Natur gehört, so könnte man sich auch so ausdrücken: Genie ist die angeborne Gemütsanlage (ingenium), durch welche die Natur der Kunst die Regel gibt. (§ 46, 241– 96 42)
Genius is an innate talent, something nature offers to certain artists and poets at their birth in the form of a contract. The terms of this agreement give the genius the right to produce originals freely and rule over the realm of art by setting examples that can be imitated by others that are not endowed with the same innate talent. At the same time, however, the means of production – the genius’s “innate productive faculty” – remains in the possession of nature. In other words, the original genius and its works are the exclusive property of nature. They belong to nature and as such can be neither appropriated nor alienated. Nature secures this right by not allowing the genius to grasp what it is doing. This is what Kant means when he argues in § 45 that art provides “that pleasure which alone is communicable without being based on concepts.” The genius communicates without either understanding (begreifen) or taking possession (greifen) of its own communication. wore the appearance of of art; and art can only be termed beautiful, where we are conscious of its being art, while yet it has the appearance of nature” (166–67). 96 “Genius is the talent (natural endowment) which gives the rule to art. Since talent, as an innate productive faculty of the artist, belongs itself to nature, we may put it this way: Genius is the innate mental aptitude (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art” (168).
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Listing the properties or characteristics of the genius, Kant adds to those of originality and exemplarity the inhibition to pass its talent on to someone else. The genius is an incompetent teacher, and this is why “der Urheber eines Produkts, welches er seinem Genie verdankt, selbst nicht weiß, wie sich ihm die Ideen dazu herbei finden, auch es nicht in seiner Gewalt hat, dergleichen nach Belieben oder planmäßig auszudenken, und anderen in solchen Vorschriften mitzuteilen, die sie in den Stand setzen, gleichmäßige Produkte hervorzubringen.”97 Ignorant of its own art, unable to impart knowledge, and thus, as it were, impotent to engender children in which their work would live on, the genius is appointed to die a solitary death. This is the fine print of Kant’s contract: In contrast to the scientist whose work enjoys a continuous progress, the genius suffers from a disadvantage, Weil für diese die Kunst irgendwo still steht, indem ihr eine Grenze gesetzt ist, über die sie nicht weiter gehen kann, die vermutlich auch schon seit lange her erreicht ist und nicht mehr erweitert werden kann; und überdem eine solche Geschicklichkeit sich auch nicht mitteilen läßt, sondern jedem unmittelbar von der Hand der Natur erteilt sein will, mit ihm also stirbt, bis die Natur einmal 98 einen andern wiederum eben so begabt. (§47, 244)
Kant’s employment of the original genius in the service of nature does not lead to the “eternal spring” Young phantasizes about in his essay but, rather, to death. Young was 76 when he composed his essay.
97 § 46; X: 242–43: “Hence, where an author owes a product to his genius, he does not himself know how the ideas for it have entered into his head, nor has he it in his power to invent the like at pleasure, or methodically, and communicate the same to to others in such precepts as would put them in a position to produce similar products” (169). 98 “Genius reaches a point at which art must make a halt, as there is a limit imposed upon it which it cannot transcend. This limit has in all probability been long since attained. In addition, such skill cannot be communicated, but requires to be bestowed directly from the hand of nature upon each individual, and so with him it dies, awaiting the day when nature once again endows another in the same way” (170).
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In a passage presented to praise the ultimate achievement of genius, Young points out that the human mind is boundless and can actually reach into the “vast void beyond real existence” (570). The image he conjures up to describe the “quite-original beauties we may call paradisiacal” (570) awaiting the poet and reader in that vast void are indeed a token of the horror vacui the genius creates. It is the image of Natos sine semine flores, the sterility of “flowers produced without seeds.” It shows Young’s pleasure-garden in its most desolate state. Ovid’s flowers bode ill for the supposed fertility of genius. An original author is born of himself, is his own progenitor, and will probably propagate a numerous offspring of imitators, to eternise his glory; while mulelike imitators die without issue. (569)
The remark merely produces another image of sterility and gives more life to the bastard imitator in the character of a patient mule than to the original author. Without biological parents and without a partner bound to him by love he resembles the self-reproducing machine in Wiener’s cybernetics or Frankenstein’s solitary Monster. The imitator’s death “without issue” brings us back to the mechanical printing press that works incessantly in the background of Young’s essay. The difference between the imitator and the original author is not that the former dies without offspring while the latter lives to reproduce. Only through the press can the author come into existence and in this sense become his own progenitor. And as Addison’s determination “to Print my self out, if possible, before I Die” shows, the original author must indeed propagate “numerous offspring” as the operator of the press. Printing texts he becomes part of the machine. At the centre of Young’s “pleasure-garden” stands a fountain that does not water the flowers but rather power a gigantic mechanism, “that fountain of fame (if I may so call the press)” (550). The original genius is a machine. In his Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie, Hans Blumenberg retraces a forgotten chapter in the history of the relationship between mechanical and organic interpretations of the cosmic world. The machina mundi of Lucretius does not
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have the connotation of a mechanism, he points out, but denotes the universe. The middle ages have used the term ingenium to describe the mechanical and distinguish it from the machina, and engenno in Spanish or engin in French indeed mean machine in a mechanical sense. The genius, as ingenium, is an engin or machine.99 Modern technology has reinterpreted the machina as a mechanism, and Blumenberg’s remark that mechanical creations are more dependent on their engineers than organic life on its creator or parent is important in our context: “A mechanism belongs as a thing completely to the engineer that has created it” (73). This tells as much about the seventeenth and eighteenth-century imagination of man and the world as God’s perfect machine as about the construction of the genius. In Young’s essay the old meaning of ingenium as engin survives. “Genius has ever been supposed to partake of something Divine” (556), he writes, pointing out that the genius is that God within ourselves. “Sacer nobis inest Deus,” he quotes from Seneca: With regard to the moral world, conscience – with regard to the intellectual, genius – is that god within. Genius can set us right in composition without the rules of the learned, as conscience sets us right in life without the laws of the land; this, singly, can make us good, as men; that, singly, as writers, can sometimes make us great. (557–58; emphasis added)
The divine nature of genius, the magic quality that marks genius as a great writer, is intimately bound up with its mysterious power to write directly into the printing press. However, to be a great author the original genius also needs a legal system that protects its property. While ethics might rely on what Young calls conscience and Kant will define as a categorical imperative, the genius must appeal to the “laws of the land” to harvest the fruit or flowers of its fertile mind. The genius must have a copyright on its work, for there is no originality if it can be illegally reprinted.
99 Hans Blumenberg, Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1960), 70, 71.
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IV. Forever Young The Conjectures begins with a last confession and a signature, presenting the essay as Young’s last literary will and testament: “Dear Sir, / We confess the follies of youth without a blush; not so, those of age” (549). Young commits his name to an undertaking that promises something like eternal youth, even though he is 76 years old when he writes the essay. One year after its publication he writes another last will: “In the name of God, & my most blessed Redeemer. Amen. I write this my last Will, with my own hand, Feby the 5th 1760, in ye manner following“100 – “I begin with original composition...” (549). The juxtaposition of his last will and his literary testament is an important structural element in the essay. Young is old, but being an original he will stay young and Young forever. He in fact builds his own monument. Gazing at the “monumental marbles” in the “churchyard walk” of his imagination, the man of the church writes: “To one such monument I may conduct you, in which is a hidden lustre, like the sepulchral lamps of old; but not like those will this be extinguished, but shine the brighter for being produced, after so long concealment, into open day” (549). The essay is not a “sepulchral lamp of old,” but the lamp of Young that shines bright because something original on originality is at long last produced, printed, and thus sees the light of day. We have already mentioned that the report on Addison’s death in the second half of the essay plays an important part because it organizes the question of legacy and cultural heritage the essay deals with. “It is piously to be hoped, that this narrative may have some effect, since all listen when a death-bed speaks” (584), Young concludes his essay in a passage that seems to refer to both Addison’s and his own deathbed.101 100 The Correspondence of Edward Young, 601. 101 It is telling that Young’s death in 1765 at the age of 86 re-enacts the scene at Addison’s bed with a significant difference. The latter received his step-son to teach him how nobly a pious man can die: “Forcibly grasping the youth’s hand,
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Young’s signature and the antithetical rhetoric of his distinction between old and young are more than part of a personal agenda because they are in fact tied to the difference between the works of the moderns and ancients. On the one hand Young emphasizes, using a staple argument of the controversy, that the moderns are older than the ancients: “Though we are moderns, the world is an ancient; more ancient far than when they whom we most admire filled it with their fame” (555).102 On the other hand the ancients are constantly rejuvenated by the power of the press: The works they imitated, few excepted, are lost; they, on their fathers’ decease, enter as lawful heirs on their estates in fame: the fathers of our copyists are still in possession; and secured in it, in spite of Goths and flames, by the perpetuating power of the press. Very late must a modern imitator’s fame arrive, if it waits for their decease. (553)
The notion that the ancients are “accidental originals” has already been cited, and like the argument about the moderns as the true ancients it is an idea widely used in the debate.103 What is peculiar to he softly said, ‘See in what peace a Christian can die!’ He spoke with difficulty, and soon expired. [...] Who would not thus expire?” (581). When Young’s estranged son Frederick asked to be received at his dying father’s bed, however, he was not allowed to see him: “I have now the pleasure to acquaint you, that the late Dr Young, tho’ he had for many years kept his Son at a distance from him, yet has now last left him all his possessions, after the payment of certain legacies. [...] The Father on his death-bed [...] was applied to in the tenderest manner [...] to admit the son into his presence, to make submission, intreat forgiveness, and obtain his blessings. As to an interview wih his son, he intimated that he chose to decline it [...]. With regard to the next particular, he said, I heartily forgive him; and, upon mention of the last, he gently lifted up his hand, and, letting it gently fall, pronounced these words, God bless him” (The Correspondence of Edward Young, 593–94, letter from Young’s curate to Thomas Birch). Even in his last words Young keeps the distance that marks all of his writing. 102 Cp. Perrault, Parallèle des anciens et des modernes, I: 49: “C’est nous qui sommes les Anciens.” 103 See for example Gerard, An Essay on Genius, 26: “This circumstance is often of peculiar disadvantage to modern authors; and it leads us, perhaps, to ascribe
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Young is his link with the laws regulating the inheritance of an estate as well as his notion of originality based on merit rather than birth. “After all, the first ancients had no merit in being originals: they could not be imitators. Modern writers have a choice to make, and therefore have a merit in their power. They may soar in the regions of liberty, or move in the soft fetters of easy imitation” (554). Originality becomes a matter of choice and thus of freedom, an idea that anticipates an argument advanced in Romanticism. The following remarkable passage about the status of the original genius combines Young’s notion of merit and right of birth: I have said, that some are born wise; but they, like those that are born rich, by neglecting the cultivation and produce of their own possessions, and by running in debt, may be beggared at last; and lose their reputations, as younger brothers estates, not by being born with less abilities than the rich heir, but at too late an hour. (560)
The drift of the argument is not easy to understand. The genius is a genius by birth, but while it cannot lose its talent, which is given by nature, it can lose its status if it does not properly attend to its production. At the same time, the genius cannot properly develop its talent awarded by nature if it happens to be second in succession to the estate. The first proposition emphasizes that even natural talent requires industriousness, the second points out the inequality that may arise from the incongruity that exists between the law of nature that presides over the birth of genius and the law of man that simply counts on the sequence of births. What makes the passage both difficult and remarkable is that it intricately intertwines two strands of the essay’s argument. The second part refers to the “accidental origigreater genius to the ancients, than they are entitled to. The former are accused of borrowing from their predecessors, many principles, sentiments, or images, for which they are indebted solely to their own genius. In the latter, every thing is reckoned original, because we know not, who had occupied it before. We can form no objection against the oldest authors extant, for the works of those who wrote before them, are long since lost.”
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nality” of the ancients that may deprive the modern genius of its success. The first part breaks with the stereotype, to be found throughout the essay, that natural talent would be something stable. The passage skillfully uses the metaphor of the estate to drive home its point. The genius is both a member of the landed gentry and must work hard to keep its estate in order and to produce the agricultural “produce” – that is to say, the books – that reap its success. Young thus combines the aristocratic notion of an estate and the notion of a meritocracy based on labor that constitute a shift in the discourse on copyright and intellectual property in the second half of the eighteenth century. Young was one of the first authors to establish a link between genius and intellectual property.104 His concern for ownership, mani104 We have already referred to the article by Gerhard Plumpe, “Eigentum–Eigentümlichkeit: Über den Zusammenhang ästhetischer und juristischer Begriffe im 18. Jahrhundert,” Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 23.2 (1979): 175–96. The first comprehensive study in the relationship between genius and copyright is the pioneering book by Heinrich Bosse, Autorschaft ist Werkherrschaft: Über die Entstehung des Urheberrechts aus dem Geist der Goethezeit (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1981). See also his article “Autorisieren. Ein Essay über Entwicklungen heute und seit dem 18. Jahrhundert,” LiLi. Zeitschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Linguistik 11 (1981): 120–34. In both works Young opens the discussion. Drawing on Bosse’s book, the influential essay by Martha Woodmansee, “The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the ‘Author’,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 17.4 (1984): 425–48, has helped to initiate the recent debate on copyright in American and English critical and legal discourse. See pp. 430–31 and p. 446 for references to the Conjectures. Woodmansee mainly discusses German sources, which is certainly justified with regard to Young. While his essay didn’t attract much critical attention in his own country, the 1760 translation by H. E. von Teubern added to the immense popularity he already enjoyed in Germany as the poet of the Night-Thoughts. See Gerhard Sauder’s edition of Gedanken über die Original-Werke (Leipzig, 1760; rpt. Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert und Schneider, 1977), with documents on the contemporary German reception on pp. 67–158. There has been a peculiar rediscovery of Young’s essay in twentieth-century Anglo-American criticism through Herder, Kant, Lavater, and German ideologies of the genius. The main German sponsor of Young as a poet was Klopstock; see Young’s letters to him in
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fest throughout the essay, is also based on personal experience. In 1741, Edmund Curll – one of English literature’s most notorious booksellers and the winner of the infamous pissing contest in Pope’s Dunciad – published an unauthorized edition of his collected works. Although the evidence is not quite clear (there is a letter from Young to Curll, in which he writes, “I heartily wish you all success in yt undertakg“) the texts were printed without his supervision and corrections and deprived him of some of the proceeds from his work.105 Young was also involved in three cases of piracy when his NightThoughts were reprinted by Alexander Donaldson in 1743, 1744, and 1749 respectively, on which occasions the receipts for his sale of copyright to Dodsley and Millar were used as testimonies in the trials.106 Also the other two originals authors and friends that have a hand in the composition and narrative of the Conjectures were victims of pirates.
Correspondence, no. 387, 389, 406, 435. One might indeed say that Young is in many respects some kind of German author. 105 See Correspondence, 74–76 for the letters to Curll. In 1717 Young fell out with Curll over the publication of a poem by Newcomb that he had recommended for publication. His subsequent denial of having passed on the poem for publication provoked Curll to state publicly that Young was “pleas’d to deny his own hand.” On this altercation see Correspondence, 7, 10–15. While Curll’s remark about Young’s denial of his own hand is not an altogether inaccurate description of his behavior in advertising the work of others and his own, or indeed of his insincerity as a writer in general, the notes in Correspondence show that Curll clearly manipulated Young’s hand in this as well as in the later case of his unauthorized edition of Young’s work. We might in this context note that in the same year Curll published an unauthorized edition of Swift’s correspondence, containing also letters to and from Pope, who successfully sued Curll under the Statute of Anne. See Mark Rose, “The Author in Court: Pope v. Curll (1741),” in Woodmansee and Jaszi, eds. The Construction of Authorship, 211–29. Curll is scorned by Young in his Epistles to Mr. Pope, Concerning the Authors of the Age in a couplet where “injured purse” rhymes with “nor Curll can wish them worse” (ll. 285–86). 106 The receipts are printed in Correspondence, 597–98.
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The printing of Sir Charles Grandison had to be interrupted in 1753 when a group of Irish booksellers advertised a publication of the novel in Dublin,107 necessitating an extensive revision of the text in order to make it an original composition again. “The patriarch of his print works, Richardson is also sole progenitor of his texts,“108 Terry Eagleton writes in terms that echo the passage from the Conjectures claiming that the “original author is born of himself, is his own progenitor.” But as Eagleton continues, “Yet texts, like apprentices, may be wayward and insubordinate, subject to piracy and rape; the phrase master printer has an oxymoronic ring to it, suggesting authority over the perpetually insubordinate, proprietorship of that which is nobody’s property” (9–10). It is indeed ironic that Richardson’s successful solicitation of a law patent gave him an exclusive right to print the kind of legal texts that failed to protect the copyright on his own novels.109 As to Addison, his desire “to Print my self out, if possible, before I Die” also has to be read against the background of eighteenthcentury piracy. In his Tatler he bitterly complains about the fact that “All Mechanick Artizans are allowed to reap the Fruit of their Invention and Ingenuity without Invasion” while an author that “has an Ambition to communicate the Effect of half his Life spent in [...] noble Enquiries, has no Property in what he is willing to produce, but is exposed to Robbery and Want.”110 In 1759 – the very year in which the Conjectures shows Addison on his deathbed, bequeathing the 107 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1993), 116. 108 Terry Eagleton, The Rape of Clarissa: Writing, Sexuality, and Class Struggle in Samuel Richardson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 9. 109 However, as Eaves and Kimpel point out in Samuel Richardson, 507, “there was some dispute about what rights it gave to print those [books] dealing with statute law.” Existing copyright laws were statutory, and Eaves and Kimpel report on a controversy over Richardson’s right to print a quarto edition of the Statutes at Large, 508–09. 110 Addison, The Tatler, ed. Donald F. Bond (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), no. 101. Addison’s critique of the booktrade is discussed along with that by Defoe in Rose, Authors and Owners, 34–41.
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legacy of the original genius to Young and posterity – the London bookseller Tonson, who had bought the copyright on the Spectator, sued a Scottish bookseller for illegally reprinting the journal.111 If the Conjectures can be said to engage in the last attacks fought in the Battle of the Books, its is also clear that Young is maneuvering to take a stand in what Patterson has called the Battle of the Booksellers.112 In this battle the writer is actually only some kind of soldier on foot fighting under the fire of the heavy artillery in the clash between the London booksellers and the provincial pirates. The booksellers virtually enjoyed a monopoly and permanent copyright until the landmark case of Donaldson v. Becket came before the House of Lords in 1774. Printing had long been regulated by royal privilege granted to institutions such as the university presses since the 1557 charter of Queen Mary, issued by the Stationer’s Company that regulated the trade and thus protected the interest of the booksellers, also enacting a subtle form of censorship. Only members of the Stationer’s Company were authorized to give the imprimatur and then actually print a work. One of them was Samuel Richardson, whose epistolary novels are indeed also printed to police the behavior and conduct among the sexes. Yet, he was quick in recognizing that Young’s appeal to censorship in his opening remark about admitting only those works to the press which “brought their imprimatur from sound understanding, and the public good,” was potentially dangerous to both the author and his printer. In the manuscript submitted to his scrutiny the passage read: “‘If legal authority stands centinel, &c.,” which Richardson first modifies into “If legal authority were to stand centinel at the press,” and later – because the subject could “give offence to the liberty-mad” – leads him to order the centinel to with-
111 See Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968), 165–67, and Mark Rose, Authors and Owners, 74–75. 112 Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective, 151–79. Cp. Rose, Authors and Owners, 67–91 for a survey of the same period between 1710 and 1774.
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draw altogether.113 Not censorship but copyright must protect the genius. Only in pursuing originality, Young consequently argues, the poet can secure his intellectual property by the authority of his authorship: His works will stand distinguished; his the sole property of them; which property alone can confer the noble title of an author; that is, of one who, to speak accurately, thinks and composes; while other invaders of the press, how voluminous and learned soever, […] only read and write. (565)
As Rose has pointed out, Young’s emphasis on the nobility of the author “invokes the ancient feudal linkage between real estate and aristocracy [...]. Thus ‘author’ becomes analogous to ‘baron’ or ‘earl,’ an honorific title grounded in authenticity and originality.”114 Young was very sensitive to honors and titles, but as we have seen, while his essay keeps coming back to the metaphor of the estate to describe the original genius as a member of the landed gentry, he also describes the property of the author-genius in terms of a concept of labor. The 1709 Statute of Anne had been designed to define intellectual property. Like all the licensing acts before it was not an author’s copyright, but it limited the period of the copyright the booksellers assumed wen buying a manuscript to fourteen years or, if the author was then still alive, to a maximum of twenty-eight years. Because one clause stipulated that the statute did not extend to university presses or “any person” with a legitimate right to reprint a book, nothing much changed until 1769 and 1773 when finally the provincial booksellers brought their cause before a tribunal. What is of interest here is not the legal quibbles that attended their battle but the argument advanced by the two parties. The limit imposed by the statute assimilated copyright to the letter patent on an invention, and the statute was clearly dictated by the spirit of progress in the sciences and mechanical arts prevalent in the years around 1700. As we have seen, philosophers writing on 113 See Correspondence, 445 and 485. 114 Rose, Authors and Owners, 118.
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the genius like Gerard retained the notion that scientific and aesthetic production are essentially the same: “Genius is [...] the power of invention, either in science or in the arts.” Inventio is the equivalent in classical rhetoric to what the moderns call originality, but the use made of it by Gerard and written into law by the Statute of Anne do not seem to account for the difference in the nature of the objects that are produced in the process. A mechanical invention is a tool that seems to be relatively independent of its maker, while artistic productions seem to be tightly related to, and controlled by, the personality of their authors. In the preceding section of this chapter we have seen that Blumenberg makes a convincing case that exactly the opposite was considered true before the advent of modernity. The London booksellers, in arguing that copyright is a permanent right of the author or his assignee grounded in the artist’s person, actually created an author persona that had no real existence but that was beginning to arouse the imagination of professional writers. As Rose writes in his important essay on the case of Donaldson v. Becket that eventually decided in favor of a limited copyright in 1774: “Putting it baldly, and exaggerating for the sake of clarity, it might be said that the London booksellers invented the modern author, constructing him as a weapon in their struggle with the booksellers of the provinces.”115 While the Londoners focused on the author’s common-law right, declaring authorship to be a personal right, the provincial booksellers emphasized that a book was merely an object, defining ownership as the right in a thing. These two aspects are interlocked in Lockean philosophy. The recent debate about intellectual property has rightly emphasized the impact of Locke’s definition of private property on the development of modern ideas about authorship and copyright legislation. His Two Treatises of Government, published in 1698, indeed brought about a momentous change in eighteenth century political philosophy and legal discourse by initiating a shift away from the 115 Rose, “The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket and the Genealogy of Modern Authorship,” in Brad Sherman and Alain Strowel, eds. Of Authors and Origins: Essays on Copyright (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 30.
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traditional Roman concept of property based on occupatio, the physical appropriation of things or land, to a definition of property as the product of labor, that is to say, as the formation of an object. While theories of occupancy claimed that property is a product of social contracts and thus focused on the question of distribution, Locke argues that the creation of private property constitutes a natural law antecedent to social conventions. While the former places emphasis on the power of the state and crown, the latter grounds property in individual labor and diligence as the source of man’s freedom. Written in response to the Revolution of 1688, the Two Treatises thus laid the foundation for the rise of capitalism.116 This is Locke’s famous paragraph initiating the fundamental change in the direction of modern thought on property, law, and economics: Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by his labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other Men.117
The success of Locke’s conception of property consists in his discovery that what he calls “person” can be defined through what he calls “property” and that “labour” establishes the bond between them. In the process of establishing this relationship the act of labor at once 116 In addition to the works discussed by Peter Laslett in the introduction to his edition of Locke’s work, see the comprehensive presentation of a history of property in Manfred Brocker, Arbeit und Eigentum: Der Paradigmenwechsel in der neuzeitlichen Eigentumstheorie (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1992) and the highly speculative but lucid book by Gunnar Heinsohn, Privateigentum, Patriarchatm Geldwirtschaft: Eine sozialtheoretische Rekonstruktion zur Antike (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1984). 117 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), Second Treatise, § 27, pp. 287–88.
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appropriates the object it forms and puts, as it were, something of the person into this form. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right will present the dynamics of this process as the dialectics of appropriation and alienation mediated or synthesized by the free will of the subject. While the subject is limited by the objects around it, those objects also define – both de–fine and un–limit – the subject that puts its will into them as a free subject. After Locke, property can be conceived of as an exclusive right in things or land because the personal right that makes this concept work pertains to the inviolable freedom of body and mind needed to work and thus create private property. It is in this sense that the two positions taken in the battle of the booksellers – the one that a book is a thing, and the other that a book is the expression of personal ideas – can be merged. But in what sense can intellectual property be either appropriated or alienated? How ist it possible to own language or letters, which are by necessity in the public domain? These are legitimate questions to ask, and they are of course the very questions raised in the eighteenth century debate. Mediated through Martha Woodmansee’s article on genius and copyright, a large number of scholars have turned to Fichte’s 1791 essay on the illegality of reprinting, “Beweis der Unrechtmässigkeit des Büchernachdrucks,” for an answer. While the content of a book can be appropriated, Fichte argues, the form of this content remains elusive to anyone trying to take possesion of it. As Woodmansee writes: “In his central concept of the ‘form’ taken by a thought – that which it is impossible for another person to appropriate – Fichte solves the philosophical puzzles to which the defenders of piracy had recurred, and establishes the grounds upon which the writer could lay claim to ownership of his work – could lay claim, that is, to authorship.”118 In this view, what Rose calls a construction of the modern author by the booksellers suddenly seems to materialize. However, Fichte’s distinction does not really solve the “philosophical puzzles“; it actually creates them. This is what Fichte writes in the passage Woodmansee refers to: 118 Martha Woodmansee, “The Genius and the Copyright,” 445.
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Alles, was wir uns denken sollen, müssen wir uns nach der Analogie unserer übrigen Denkart denken; und bloss durch dieses Verarbeiten fremder Gedanken, nach der Analogie unserer Denkart, werden sie die unsrigen: ohne dies sind sie etwas Fremdartiges in unserem Geiste, das mit nichts zusammenhängt und auf nichts wirkt. [...] Da nun reine Ideen ohne sinnliche Bilder sich nicht einmal denken, vielweniger andern darstellen lassen, so muss freilich jeder Schriftsteller seinen Gedanken eine gewisse Form geben, und kann ihnen keine andere geben als die seinige, weil er keine andere hat; aber er kann durch die Bekanntmachung seiner Gedanken gar nicht Willens seyn, auch diese Form gemein zu machen: denn niemand kann seine Gedanken sich zueignen, ohne dadurch, dass er ihre Form verändere. Die letztere also bleibt auf immer sein ausschliessliches Eigentum.119
On closer scrutiny it becomes clear that the ground on which Fichte’s idea of intellectual property rests is unstable. The first part of the passage cited shows that thinking, if we grant that it never happens in a void, always performs an act of appropriation. There is always something foreign, “etwas Fremdartiges,” in which thinking originates, and the labor of thinking that makes them our own, “dieses Verarbeiten fremder Gedanken,” has this foreignness as its substance. The activity of thinking works through and alters this foreignness to trans:form it into the property of one’s own ideas or concepts. It is important to note that this act of originary appropriation is analogous, 119 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, “Beweis der Unrechtmässigkeit des Büchernachdrucks,” in Werke, ed. Immanuel Hermann Fichte (Berlin, 1846; rpt. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971), VIII: 227–28. “All that we think we must think according to the analogy of our other habits of thought; and solely through reworking new thoughts after the analogy of our habitual thought processes do we make them our own. Without this they remain something foreign in our minds, which connects with nothing and affects nothing. [...] Now, since pure ideas without sensible images canot be thought, much less are they capable of represetation to others. Hence, each writer must give his thoughts a certain form, and he can give them no other form than his own because he has no other. But neither can he be willing to hand over this form in making his thoughts public, for no one can appropriate his thoughts without thereby altering their form. This latter thus remains forever his exclusive property” (“Proof of the Illegality of Reprinting,” translated by Woodmansee, 445).
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to use Fichte’s term, to the illegal appropriation someone might be tempted to perform. The forma formans Fichte speaks of, the formation of the form, is at once the essence that makes something our own property and the very essence that resists its alienation. The form appropriates and at the same time cannot itself be appropriated. This is the new puzzle Fichte’s essay introduces. Another piece in the puzzle is the implication that the exclusivity of the form prevents its proper communication to others. When Fichte argues that the author does not want to make his form public – he is “gar nicht Willens [...], auch diese Form gemein zu machen” – it is also implied that the author cannot bring across what belongs only to him, even if he wanted to. His originality cannot be accessed by others, which on the one hand protects it as the author’s property, but on the other also prevents the representation of its unique quality. The problem we face is one that will preoccupy Romanticism in the endless reconstruction of fictitious origins, in all the revision of its visions, and in the fragment as one of its major forms. In a passage immediately preceding the one cited above, Fichte writes that the material components of a book can be appropriated and its contents learned. But the form of thinking remains untouched: “Was aber schlechterdings nie jemand sich zueignen kann, weil dies pyhisch unmöglich bleibt, ist die Form dieser Gedanken, die Ideenverbindung, in der, und die Zeichen, mit denen sie vorgetragen werden” (227).120 The passage means, to be sure, that plagiaries cannot copy the author’s property. But strictly speaking, Fichte’s claim that never anyone – “nie jemand” – can appropriate a particular form of thinking also refers to the author himself.