Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Reports: Volume 34 (Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Reports)

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The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, concerned principally with the claims of U.S. nationals against Iran, is the most important international claims tribunal to have sat in over half a century. Its jurisprudence is bound to make a uniquely important contribution to international law and, in particular, the law relating to aliens. The series is the only complete and fully indexed report of the decisions of this unique Tribunal. These Reports are essential for all practitioners in the ﬁeld of international claims, academics in private and public international law and comparative lawyers as well as all Governments and law libraries. Each volume contains a detailed consolidated index and tables of cases covering the whole series to date. karen lee is a Fellow of the Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law at the University of Cambridge.

IRAN – UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL REPORTS Volume

34

This volume may be cited as: 34 IRAN–U.S. C.T.R.–

IRAN – UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL REPORTS Volume

34 edited by KAREN LEE, MA (CANTAB.) consulting editor SIR ELIHU LAUTERPACHT, CBE, QC honorary professor of international law university of cambridge bencher of gray’s inn A PUBLICATION OF THE LAUTERPACHT RESEARCH CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

GROTIUS PUBLICATIONS

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CONTENTS page ix

Editorial Note Acknowledgment s

x

Table of Cases – Volume 34 Alphabetical According to category According to case number

xi xii xiii

Consolidated Table of Cases Alphabetical According to category According to case number According to Decision/Award number

xiv xxx li lix

Awards

1

Award on Agreed Terms

183

Index

199

vii

EDITORIAL NOTE This series of Reports contains the texts of Decisions, Awards, Awards on Agreed Terms, Interim Awards, Interlocutory Awards, Interim and Interlocutory Awards, Selected Orders and Refusal Cases emanating from the Iran–U.S. Claims Tribunal set up under the Claims Settlement Declaration to which the Governments of Iran and the United States adhered on 19 January 1981. The present volume contains material dated during the period 1 January to 31 December 1998. All Decisions, Awards, Interim Awards, Interlocutory Awards and Refusal Cases are printed in these Reports. Procedural Orders are printed on a selective basis from the many thousands that have been issued by the Tribunal since its inception. Also, from time to time a section of a volume may be devoted to additional documents of a procedural nature. Awards on Agreed Terms now largely follow a standard form and are individually of little legal signiﬁcance. These therefore are also printed on a selective basis, together with some relevant supporting documents. One such Award on Agreed Terms appears in this volume. Each volume contains a Consolidated Index and Tables of Cases for the whole series, as well as Tables of Cases for the volume itself. Decisions and Awards of the Tribunal are issued in numerical sequence on the basis of the date on which they are ﬁled. The intent of these Reports is to reproduce the texts in that chronological order. This is only departed from if it is felt that a decision of particular signiﬁcance should be brought forward or if there is insufﬁcient space in a particular volume for an unusually lengthy text. Separate Opinions of individual judges follow the Decision or Award to which they refer, except when ﬁled so late as to be unavailable for inclusion in the same volume. In such cases the absence of an Opinion is indicated by a footnote at the beginning of the case; the late-ﬁled Opinion appears at the beginning of the ﬁrst volume for which it is available. It has been the policy of successive editors of these Reports to make no changes to the texts issued by the Tribunal. Editorial input to the texts is limited to two types. First, consistency has been sought in some small matters of style and layout, such as captions, headings and citation of Tribunal cases and decisions. Secondly, some editorial footnotes have been introduced. These are used to indicate the presence or absence of Opinions, to cross-reference previous Decisions and Awards of the Tribunal and to add other points of information for the reader. These notes are indicated by the enclosure within square brackets of both the footnote indicator and the footnote itself, and original footnotes are renumbered accordingly. ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This volume has been prepared within, and upon the initiative of, the Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law of the University of Cambridge. Special thanks are due to Miss Maureen MacGlashan, CMG, for her work on the Consolidated Index. Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law University of Cambridge

x

Karen Lee February 2003

TABLE OF CASES – VOLUME 34 ALPHABETICAL Brown & Root, Inc. v. Iran, 185 Davidson, George E. (Homayounjah) v. Iran, 3 Ford Aerospace & Communications Corporation v. Iran, 102 Hakim, Kamran v. Iran, 67 Iran v. United States, A15(IV) and A24, 105 Iran v. United States, A27, 39

xi

TABLE OF CASES – VOLUME 34 ARRANGED ACCORDING TO CATEGORY: AWARDS AND AWARDS ON AGREED TERMS AWARDS Davidson, George E. (Homayounjah) v. Iran, 3 Ford Aerospace & Communications Corporation v. Iran, 102 Hakim, Kamran v. Iran, 67 Iran v. United States, A15(IV) and A24, 105 Iran v. United States, A27, 39

AWARD ON AGREED TERMS Brown & Root, Inc. v. Iran, 185

xii

TABLE OF CASES – VOLUME 34 ARRANGED ACCORDING TO CASE NUMBER Case No. – Page 93 – 102 432 – 185 457 – 3 953 – 67

Case No. – Page A15(IV) and A24 – 105 A27 – 39

xiii

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES 1 ALPHABETICAL Abboud, Raymond v. Iran, 1, 230; 24, 265 Abrahamian, Katrin Zohrabegian v. Iran, 23, 285 A.B.S. Worldwide Technical Services, Inc. v. Iran, 3, 176, 192 Accurate Machine Products Corporation v. Iran, 19, 374 Adams International Division of Beatrice Foods Company v. Iran, 6, 1 Advanced Computer Techniques Corporation v. Iran, 2, 33; 3, 326 Aeromaritime, Inc. v. Iran, 1, 135 Aeronutronic Overseas Services, Inc. v. Telecommunications Company of Iran, 5, 187; 14, 339 Aeronutronic Overseas Services, Inc. v. The Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1, 483; 7, 217; 8, 75; 11, 223 A.E. Staley Manufacturing Company v. Iran, 8, 42 AFIA v. Iran, 8, 236 Agrostruct International, Inc. v. Iran State Cereals Organization, 18, 180 AHFI Planning Associates Inc. v. Iran, 3, 350; 11, 168 Ainsworth, Jonathan v. Iran, 1, 230; 4, 26; 18, 92; 25, 188 Air La Carte, Inc. v. Iran National Airlines Corporation, 1, 163 Airlines of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, 22, 365 Alcan Aluminium, Limited, the Management of v. Ircable Corporation, 2, 294 Alfred Haber, P.A. v. Iran, 23, 133 Allard, Robin J. v. Iran, 23, 413 Allen, Juliette v. Iran, 28, 382 Allis-Chalmers Corporation v. Iran, 4, 39 American Bell International Inc. v. Iran, 3, 209; 6, 74; 12, 170; 14, 173 American Cast Iron Pipe Company v. Ahwaz Water and Sewage Board, 9, 203 American Cyanamid Company v. Iran, 2, 269 American Express Company v. Iran, 17, 368 American Express International Banking Corp. v. Iran, 29, 209 American Farm Products International, Inc. v. Cyrus Consulting Engineers, 18, 175 American Hospital Supply Corporation v. Iran, 7, 269 American Housing International Inc. v. Housing Cooperative Society, 5, 235 American Independent Oil Company v. National Iranian Oil Company, 3, 372; 9, 184 American International Group, Inc. v. Iran, 4, 96 American Lecithin Company v. Iran, 10, 365 American Motors Corporation v. Iran, 4, 29 AMF Inc. v. Iran, 16, 335 AMF Overseas Corporation, Re, 1, 392 Amman and Whitney v. Khuzestan Urban Development Organization, 5, 115; 12, 94 Amoco International Finance Corporation v. Iran, 4, 4; 15, 189; 25, 314 Amoco Iran Oil Company v. Iran, 1, 493; 2, 283, 345; 3, 297; 5, 51; 25, 301 Anaconda-Iran, Inc. v. Iran, 3, 209; 13, 199; 28, 320 Arco Exploration, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Company, 28, 392 Arco Iran, Inc. v. Iran, 3, 372; 16, 3; 25, 339 Arco Seed Company v. Iran, 14, 349 Arensburg, Walter W. et al. v. Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, 10, 37 Arjad, Alex v. Iran, 26, 190 1

The ﬁgures in bold type refer to the volume number.

xiv

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (ALPHABETICAL) Arthur J. Fritz & Co. v. Sherkate Tavonie Sherkathaye Sakhtemanie, 22, 170 Arthur Young & Company v. Iran, 17, 245 Aryeh, Eliyahou v. Iran, 33, 460 Aryeh, J.M. v. Iran, 33, 272 Aryeh, Laura v. Iran, 33, 272 Aryeh, Moussa v. Iran, 33, 368 Aryeh, Ouziel v. Iran, 33, 460 Aryeh, Vera-Jo Miller v. Iran, 33, 272 Asghar, Ali v. Iran, 24, 238 Assistance in Developing Educational System, Inc. v. Iran, 4, 18 Atlantic Richﬁeld Company v. Iran, 8, 179; 28, 401 Atomic Energy Organization of Iran v. National Audiovisual Center, 21, 303 Atomic Energy Organization of Iran v. United States, 6, 141; 12, 25 Austin Company v. Machine Sazi Arak, 12, 288 Avco Corporation v. Iran, 19, 200, 253 Baker International Corporation v. Iran, 1, 230; 12, 385 Bakhtiari, Afrasiab Assad v. Iran, 25, 289 Bank Markazi Iran v. Barclays Bank International, Ltd., 2, 35 Bank Markazi Iran v. Continental Bank Intl. (Paciﬁc), 8, 371 Bank Markazi Iran v. European American Banking Corporation, 13, 95 Bank Markazi Iran v. United States, Case No. 780, 8, 364 Bank Markazi Iran v. United States, Case No. 821, 8, 366 Bank Mellat v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 5, 155 Bank Mellat v. Chemical Bank, New York (Case Nos. 836, 847 and 890), 2, 35 Bank Mellat v. Crocker National Bank, 2, 246; 3, 316, 318, 380; 5, 57 Bank Mellat v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, 2, 246; 3, 316, 318, 380; 5, 57 Bank Mellat v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, 1, 486 Bank Melli Iran v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., New York, 21, 11 Bank Melli Iran v. United States, 9, 205 Bank Sepah v. City Bank, N.A., 2, 30, 35 Bank Sepah v. Mellon Bank, N.A., 2, 35 Bank Sepah v. United States, 8, 362 Baroid International Petroleum Services, Inc. v. Iran, 10, 365 Bassin, Moshe, Re, 9, 3 Bavanati, Parviz Sadigh v. Iran, 31, 36 Baygell, Noah H. v. Iran, 11, 72, 300 Bearings Inc. v. Iran, 19, 374 Bechtel, Inc. v. Iran, 14, 149 Behring International, Inc. v. Islamic Republic Iranian Air Force, 1, 230; 3, 173; 4, 89; 6, 30; 8, 44, 238; 14, 23; 27, 218 Bell Industries v. Iran, 18, 390 Bendix Corporation v. Iran, 18, 352 Bendone-Derossi International v. Iran, 1, 178; 6, 130; 18, 115 Benedix, Homa Diba v. Iran, 21, 20 Benedix, Jr., August Frederick v. Iran, 21, 20 Berger (Louis) International v. Plan & Budget Organization of Iran, 14, 349 Berookhim, Albert and the Berookhim Partnership v. Iran, 25, 278 B.F. Goodrich Company v. Abadan Petrochemical Company, Ltd., 1, 342 B.F. Goodrich Company v. Kian Tire Manufacturing Company, 1, 123 Bikoff, William and Eisenpresser, George v. Iran, 7, 1 Birnbaum, Harold v. Iran, 14, 147; 29, 260; 31, 286 Blount Brothers Corporation v. Iran (Case No. 52), 10, 56

xv

xvi

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (ALPHABETICAL)

Blount Brothers Corporation v. Iran (Case No. 53), 10, 95 Blount Brothers Corporation v. Iran (Case No. 63), 6, 118 Blount Brothers Corporation v. Iran Air, 21, 303 Blount Brothers Corporation v. Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, 2, 268; 3, 225 Blum (Herman) Consulting Engineers, Inc. v. Iran, 1, 218; 5, 354 Bodnar, Jurij, Re, 21, 6 Boeing Company v. Iran, 5, 152; 6, 43; 13, 359 Borg Warner Corporation v. Iran, 11, 372 Boroumand, Irene v. Iran, 29, 59 Brown & Root, Inc. v. Iran, 34, 185 Browne (Stewart R.) Disc, Inc. v. Iran, 17, 368 Buckamier, W. Jack v. Iran, 28, 53, 307 C and T Commodities of America, Inc. v. Iran, 13, 370 Cabot International Capital Corporation v. Iran, 4, 83 Cal-Maine Foods, Inc. v. Iran, 6, 52 Carlson, Roy P.M. v. Iran, 26, 193 Carolina Brass, Inc. v. Arya National Shipping Lines, S.A., 12, 139 Carrier Corporation v. Iran, 1, 178; 3, 36, 78 Cascade Overview Development Enterprises, Inc., Re, 1, 127, 129, 132 Case ( J.I.) Company v. Aryan Yadak Company, 14, 349 Case ( J.I.) Company v. Iran, 3, 62 CBA International Development Corporation v. Iran, 4, 53; 5, 177 CBS Inc. v. Iran, 21, 279; 25, 131 Chamness, Ronald E. v. Iran, 1, 178; 25, 172 Charter (Iran) Petroleum Company v. National Iranian Oil Company, 3, 372; 5, 88 Chas. T. Main International, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water and Power Authority, 1, 337; 3, 156; 4, 60; 5, 185; 8, 41; 10, 21; 11, 259; 21, 12 Chas. T. Main International, Inc. v. Mahab Consulting Engineers, Inc., 3, 270 Cherafat, Gloria Jean, Roxanne June and Ramin v. Iran, 28, 216 Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company v. Iran, 24, 305 Chevron Research Company v. National Iranian Oil Company, 1, 155, 334; 2, 364; 3, 78 Chicago Bridge & Iron Company v. Iran, 7, 225; 11, 372 Christensen, Inc. v. Iran, 30, 292 CMI International, Inc. v. Ministry of Roads and Transportation, Iran, 4, 263 Coast Survey Limited v. Iran, 23, 314 Collins Systems International Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran Navy, 28, 21, 195 Columbia University in the City of New York, Trustees of v. Iran, 10, 319; 11, 283 Combustion Engineering, Inc. v. Iran, 3, 366; 24, 297; 26, 60; 27, 288 Commercial Development Center v. United States, 18, 390 Commodities (C and T) of America, Inc. v. Iran, 13, 370 Commonwealth Associates, Inc. v. Iran, 13, 370 Component Builders, Inc. v. Iran, 8, 3, 216; 9, 404; 23, 3 Computer Sciences Corporation v. Iran, 8, 99; 10, 269 Consortium for International Development v. Iran, 26, 244 Container (CTI) Leasing Corporation v. Starline Iran Co., 26, 275 Continental Corporation v. Iran, 1, 403 Continental Grain Export Corporation v. Government Trading Corporation, 3, 319 Continental Grain Export Corporation v. Union of Consumers’ Co-operatives for Iranian Workers (EMKAN), 11, 292 Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago v. Iran, 1, 230, 232; 30, 3 Control Data Corporation v. Iran, 1, 230; 18, 60; 21, 303; 22, 151 Cook Industries, Inc. v. Iran, 12, 397

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (ALPHABETICAL)

xvii

Corporation (FMC) v. Iran, 11, 372; 14, 111, 261 Corporation (INA) v. Iran, 8, 373 Corporation (NCR) v. Iran, 1, 327 Corporation (VSI) v. Iran, 2, 31, 33, 260; 3, 73, 78 Cosmos Engineering, Inc. v. Ministry of Roads and Transportation, 13, 179 Craig, Alan v. Ministry of Energy of Iran, 3, 280 Creditcorp International, Inc., Re, 21, 10 Creditcorp International, Inc. v. Iran Carton Company, 23, 265 Cross Company v. Iran, 8, 97 CTI-Container Leasing Corporation v. Starline Iran Co., 26, 275 Cummins, John Francis v. Iran, 14, 21 Cyrus Petroleum Ltd. v. Iran, 11, 70 Dadras International v. Iran, 30, 104; 31, 127 Dadras International v. Iran, Kan Consulting Engineers & Kan Residential Corporation, 33, 41 Daley, Leonard and Mavis v. Iran, 18, 232 Dallal, Mark v. Iran, 3, 10; 5, 74 Dames and Moore v. Iran, 4, 212; 8, 107 Dana Corporation v. Iran, 19, 374 Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall v. Iran, 1, 160 Danielpour, Michelle v. Iran, 22, 118 Danielpour, Steven Joseph v. Iran, 22, 123 David, Donald W. v. Iran, 24, 252 David Mikhael, Inc. v. Iran, 3, 84; 6, 20 Davidson, George E. (Homayounjah) v. Iran, 34, 3 De Soto, Inc. v. Iran Aircraft Industries, 14, 349 Delly, Daniel Purnell v. Iran, 19, 360 Delly, Sharon L. Jezl v. Iran, 19, 360 Deloitte, Haskins and Sells v. Computer Services Company, 3, 34 Department of Energy (Oak Ridge Operations) v. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, 21, 303 Department of the Environment of Iran v. United States, Case B-53, 5, 105 Detroit Bank and Trust Company, Re, 1, 129; 2, 312; 3, 3 Detroit Parts Manufacturing Company v. Iran, 8, 79 Development and Resources Corporation v. Iran, 3, 209; 25, 20; 26, 256 Diagnostic Products Corporation v. Iran, 9, 306 Diba, Benny and Wilfred J. Gaulin, 23, 268 Dic of Delaware, Inc. v. Tehran Redevelopment Corporation, 1, 154; 8, 144; 21, 4 Dillon v. Ministry of Mines and Industries of Iran, 3, 87; 7, 260 Distribution International Corporation v. Iran, 17, 245 DoAll Dallas Company v. Iran, 23, 413 Donin de Rosiere, Paul v. Iran, 13, 193; 14, 100, 102; 18, 63 Dorian International Credit Co., Inc., Re, 21, 10 Dorian International Credit Co., Inc. v. Iran Carton Company, 23, 265 Dow Chemical Company v. Iran (Case No. 257), 6, 38 Dow Chemical Company v. Iran (Case No. 499), 1, 122 Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Iran (Case Nos. 103–104, 107–110), 3, 212 Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Iran (Case Nos. 105 and 137), 2, 291 Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Iran (Case No. 106), 3, 332 Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Iran (Case No. 466), 1, 280, 284, 305, 320 Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Iran (Case Nos. 467–469 and 471), 9, 346 Dreyco, Inc. (E.D. Allmendinger Division) v. Iran, 8, 13 Drucker, Jr., George W. v. Foreign Transaction Company, 1, 252, 284, 305, 320; 2, 4; 19, 257 Du Pont de Nemours (E.I.) and Company v. Iran, 4, 183

xviii

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (ALPHABETICAL)

Eastman Kodak Company v. Iran, 17, 153; 27, 3, 269 Eastman Kodak International Capital Company, Inc. v. Iran, 17, 153 Ebrahimi, Cecilia Radene v. Iran, 22, 138; 30, 170; 31, 3 Ebrahimi, Christina Tandis v. Iran, 22, 138; 30, 170; 31, 3 Ebrahimi, Marjorie Suzanne v. Iran, 22, 138 Ebrahimi, Shahin Shaine v. Iran, 22, 138; 30, 170; 31, 3 Econocorp, Inc. v. Iran, 8, 360 Economy Forms Corporation v. Iran, 3, 42; 5, 1 Edwards, George v. Iran, 23, 290 E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Company v. Iran, 4, 183 Electric Heating Equipment Company v. Iran, 19, 374 Electronic Data Systems Corporation v. Iran, 7, 244 Electronic Systems International, Inc. v. Ministry of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 22, 339 Elghanayan, Dora Sholeh et al. v. Iran, 32, 221 Endo Laboratories, Inc. v. Iran, 17, 114; 18, 113 Enserch Corporation v. Iran, 8, 66 Enserch Service Company of Iran v. Iran, 8, 81 E.R. Squibb and Sons, Inc. v. Iran, 2, 44 Esphahanian, Nasser v. Bank Tejarat, 2, 157, 178 Esso Africa, Inc. v. Towlid Rowghan Reﬁning (Public) Company, 2, 305 Esso Europe Supply Company, Inc. v. Towlid Rowghan Reﬁning (Public) Company, 2, 305 Estate of Mary Jane Smythe Wilson v. Iran, 23, 413 E-Systems, Inc. v. Iran, 1, 178, 222, 225; 2, 51; 4, 197 Etezadi, Catherine and Hooshang v. Iran, 25, 264; 30, 22 Etka Organization, Re, 19, 185 Exxon Corporation v. Iran, 3, 372; 16, 3; 23, 401 Exxon Corporation v. National Iranian Oil Company, 17, 3 Exxon Research and Engineering Company v. Iran, 15, 3; 16, 110 Farrington, Ralph Wilson v. Islamic Republic of Iran Airlines, 18, 390 Fedders Corporation v. Iran, 13, 97; 18, 72 Fedders Corporation v. Loristan Refrigeration Industries, General Industrial Corporation, National Industries Organization of Iran, and Iran, 29, 401 Federal Mogul International Distribution, Inc. v. Iran, 18, 390 F.H. Maloney Company v. Iran, 9, 70 Figgie International Inc. (Geo. J. Meyer Manufacturing Division) v. Zam Zam Bottling Company, 8, 214 First Interstate Bank of California v. Iran, 29, 205 First National Bank in St. Louis v. Iran, 18, 390 First National Bank of Boston v. Iran, 19, 307 First National Bank of Chicago v. Iran, 29, 201 First Travel Corporation v. Iran, 1, 340; 9, 360 Flexi-Van Leasing, Inc. v. Iran, 1, 166, 455; 3, 202; 5, 138; 12, 335; 13, 324 Fluor Corporation v. Bimeh Iran, 23, 413 Fluor Corporation v. Iran (Case No. 333), 1, 121, 178; 11, 296; 18, 56, 68; 23, 413 Fluor Corporation v. Iran (Case No. 810), 23, 413 FMC Corporation v. Iran, 11, 372; 14, 111, 261 Ford Aerospace & Communications Corporation v. Iran, 2, 281; 3, 349; 10, 108; 14, 24, 255; 34, 102 Ford Aerospace & Communications Corporation v. The Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1, 268, 284, 305, 320; 3, 384; 6, 104; 8, 284; 11, 184; 12, 304 Foremost McKesson, Inc. v. Tolidaru, 2, 278

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (ALPHABETICAL) Foremost Tehran, Inc. v. Iran, 2, 33; 3, 361; 4, 62; 10, 228 Fox (H.B.) Geotechnical Consultants, Inc. v. Iran, 18, 70 French American Banking Corporation v. Iranit, S.A., 2, 303 Fritz (Arthur J.) & Co. v. Sherkate Tavonie Sherkathaye Sakhtemanie, 22, 170 Futura Trading Inc. v. Khuzestan Water and Power Authority, 9, 46 Futura Trading Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Company, 13, 99 Gabay, Norman v. Iran, 27, 40, 194 GAI-Tronics Corporation v. Iran, 19, 374 Gaulin, Wilfred J. v. Iran, 23, 268 General Atomic Company v. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, 1, 223 General Dynamics Corporation v. Iran, 1, 485; 5, 386 General Dynamics Telephone Systems Center, Inc. v. Iran, 9, 153 General Electric Company v. Iran (Case No. 360), 7, 239 General Electric Company v. Iran (Case No. 386), 26, 148 General Electric Company v. Pars Appliance Manufacturing Company, 2, 132 General Electric Company (Space Division) v. Iran, 9, 6 General Motors Corporation v. Iran, 2, 33; 3, 1; 7, 220; 13, 282 General Petrochemicals Corp. v. Iran, 27, 196 General Tire and Rubber Company v. Iran Tire Manufacturing Company, 3, 351 Georgetown University v. Iran, 23, 413 Getty Iran Ltd. v. Iran, 3, 372; 13, 370 Ghaffari, Abbas v. National Iranian Oil Company, 25, 178 Ghaffari, Fereydoon v. Iran, 18, 64, 79; 31, 60, 124 Gianoplus, Constantine A. v. Iran, 11, 217 Gibbs and Hill, Inc. v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission Company (TAVANIR) of the Ministry of Energy of the Government of Iran, 1, 236, 284, 305, 320 Gillette Company v. Iran, 3, 218 Global (RCA) Communications, Inc. v. Iran, 3, 8; 4, 5, 9; 5, 121; 16, 335 Glucosan (Private Joint Stock) Co., Re, 19, 191 Golpira, Ataollah v. Iran, 2, 171, 178 Golshani, Abrahim Rahman v. Iran, 22, 155; 29, 78 Goodrich (B.F.) Company v. Abadan Petrochemical Company, Ltd., 1, 342 Goodrich (B.F.) Company v. Kian Tire Manufacturing Company, 1, 123 Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company v. Tasmeh Melli Company, 3, 181, 192 Gould Marketing, Inc. v. Ministry of National Defense of Iran, 3, 147; 6, 272; 9, 406 Granger Associates v. Iran, 16, 317 Granite State Machine Company, Inc. v. Iran, 1, 185, 442 Grimm, Lillian Byrdine v. Iran, 2, 78 Gruen Associates, Inc. v. Iran Housing Company, 2, 327; 3, 97, 124 Grune and Stratton, Inc. v. Iran, 18, 224 Gulf Ports Crating Company v. Ministry of Roads and Transportation, 2, 126 H & F Kornfeld, Inc. v. Iran, 21, 303 Haber (Alfred), P.A. v. Iran, 23, 133 Haddadi, Manuchehr v. United States, 8, 20 Hafez Glaziery and Glass Cutting Shop v. United States, 8, 349 Haji-Bagherpour v. United States, 2, 38 Hakim, Kambiz v. Iran, 24, 269 Hakim, Kamran v. Iran, 34, 67 Halliburton Company v. Doreen/IMCO, 1, 242, 284, 305, 320; 6, 4 Halliburton Company v. Iran, 9, 310 Harnischfeger Corporation v. Ministry of Roads and Transportation, 4, 76; 7, 90; 8, 119

xix

xx

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (ALPHABETICAL)

Haroonian, Paridokht Kohan v. Iran, 2, 226 Harounian, David v. Iran, 23, 282 Harrington and Associates, Inc. v. Iran, 16, 297 Harris International Telecommunications, Inc. v. Iran, 17, 31; 18, 76 Harza, Richard D., John A. Scoville and George E. Pabich, Trustees v. Iran, 1, 234; 2, 68; 4, 59; 11, 76 Harza Engineering Company v. Iran, 1, 499 H.A. Spalding, Inc. v. Ministry of Roads and Transport, 10, 22 Haus International, Inc. v. Tehran Redevelopment Corporation, 3, 87; 5, 144; 9, 313 Hawaiian Agronomics Company, Re, 1, 138 H.B. Fox Geotechnical Consultants, Inc. v. Iran, 18, 70 Helali, Re, 1, 134 Hemmat, Nahid (Danielpour) v. Iran, 22, 129 Henry F. Teichmann, Inc. v. Hamadan Glass Company, 13, 124 Herbach & Rademan Inc. v. Iran, 19, 374 Herman Blum Consulting Engineers, Inc. v. Iran, 1, 218; 5, 354 Highlands Insurance Company v. Iran, 25, 212 Hilt, Kathryn Faye v. Iran, 18, 154 Hofﬂand Honey Company v. National Iranian Oil Company, 2, 41 Hollyﬁeld, William Ray v. Iran, 23, 276 Holstein, W. Lloyd v. Iran, 23, 413 Honeywell Information Systems, Inc. v. Information Systems Iran (ISIRAN), 1, 181 Hood Corporation v. Iran, 7, 36; 8, 53 Housing and Urban Services International, Inc. v. Tehran Redevelopment Corporation, 3, 87; 5, 144; 9, 313 Houston Contracting Company v. National Iranian Oil Company, 14, 18; 20, 3 Howard, Needles, Tammens and Bergendoff (HNTB) v. Iran, 1, 248, 284, 305, 320; 2, 368; 11, 302 Howland (T.G.) International Company, Limited v. Iran, 23, 413 Hyatt International Corporation v. Iran, 9, 72; 10, 365 INA Corporation v. Iran, 8, 373 Indian Head, Inc. v. Iran, 13, 370 Industrial & Mining Bank (R.C.39), Re, 19, 179 Industrial & Mining Bank (R.C.40), Re, 19, 182 Industrial Equipment Co. of Houston v. Iran, 19, 374 Industries (ITT), Inc. v. Iran, 2, 348 Industries (NL), Inc. v. Iran, 10, 365 Ingersoll-Rand Company v. Iran, 18, 390 Interaction Research Corporation v. Iran, 17, 362 Intercomp Resources Development and Engineering, Inc. v. Oil Service Company of Iran, 1, 391 Intercontinental Hotels Corporation v. Iran, 7, 249 Intercontinental Hotels Corporation and Overseas Private Investment Corporation v. Iran, 7, 249 Interﬁrst Bank Dallas, N.A. v. Iran, 16, 291 International (CBA) Development Corporation v. Iran, 4, 53; 5, 177 International (CMI), Inc. v. Ministry of Roads and Transportation, Iran, 4, 263 International Ore & Fertilizer Corporation v. Razi Chemical Company Ltd., 18, 98 International Schools Services, Inc. v. Iran (Case No. 12), 10, 6; 14, 65, 279 International Schools Services, Inc. v. Iran (Case No. 122), 1, 156 International Schools Services, Inc. v. National Iranian Copper Industries Company, 2, 156; 3, 316, 318; 5, 338; 9, 187 International Systems & Controls Corporation v. Iran, 3, 209; 12, 239 International Systems & Controls Corporation v. National Iranian Gas Company, 24, 47

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (ALPHABETICAL)

xxi

International Technical Products Corporation v. Iran, 9, 10, 206; 11, 182 International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation v. Iran, 22, 213 International (TME), Inc. v. Iran, 1, 178; 24, 121 Intrend International, Inc. v. The Imperial Iranian Air Force, 3, 110, 124 Iowa State University of Science and Technology v. Ministry of Culture and Higher Education, 13, 271 Iran–United States, Case A/1, 1, 144, 189 Iran–United States, Case A/2, 1, 101 Iran–United States, Cases A/15 (IV) & A/24, 29, 214 Iran–United States, Case A/18, 5, 251 Iran–United States, Case A/19, 16, 285 Iran–United States, Case A/20, 11, 271 Iran–United States, Case A/21, 14, 324 Iran v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 5, 155 Iran v. United States, Case No. 951, 14, 11 Iran v. United States, Case A-4, 5, 112, 131 Iran v. United States, Cases A4, A7 & A15 (I: F & III), 33, 362 Iran v. United States, Cases A13, A15 (I and IV:C) and A26 (I, II and III), 32, 207 Iran v. United States, Case A-15, 4, 28; 5, 112, 131; 8, 63; 12, 40; 13, 173; 14, 171, 311; 25, 247 Iran v. United States, Case A/15 IIA and IIB, 28, 112 Iran v. United States, Cases A15 (IV) and A24, 32, 115, 34, 105 Iran v. United States, Case A-25, 21, 283, 302 Iran v. United States, Case A27, 34, 39 Iran v. United States, Case B-1, 4, 57; 10, 207; 18, 45; 19, 3, 273; 21, 279; 22, 105; 23, 407; 27, 282 Iran v. United States, Case B-14, 23, 413 Iran v. United States, Claims of less than US $250,000, 27, 275 Iran Brockway Company Ltd., Re, 17, 331 Iran Chevron Oil Company v. Iran, 3, 372; 10, 357 Iran (Civil Aviation Organization) v. United States (Military Assistance Advisory Group), Case B-60, 24, 291 Iran Electronics Industries, Re, 19, 188 Iran Helicopter Support & Renewal Company (R.C.32), Re, 23, 244 Iran Helicopter Support & Renewal Company (R.C.33), Re, 23, 247 Iran Helicopter Support & Renewal Company (R.C.34), Re, 23, 250 Iran National Airlines Company, Re, 17, 337 Iran National Airlines Company v. United States, Case B-8, 17, 187 Iran National Airlines Company v. United States, Case B-9, 17, 214 Iran National Airlines Company v. United States, Case B-10, 17, 238 Iran National Airlines Company v. United States, Case B-12, 17, 228 Iran National Airlines Company v. United States, Case B-51, 17, 200 Iran National Gas Company v. United States, 17, 183 Iran Railway v. United States, Case B58, 32, 92 Iran Touring and Tourism Organization v. United States, 18, 84 Iranian Customs Administration v. United States, Case B-2, 13, 155 Iranian Customs Administration v. United States, Case B-3, 8, 89 Iranian Customs Administration v. United States, Case B-13, 13, 158 Iranian Customs Administration v. United States, Case B-16, 5, 94 Iranian Customs Administration v. United States, Case B-18, 13, 161 Iranian Customs Administration v. United States, Case B-20, 13, 164 Iranian Customs Administration v. United States, Case B-21, 8, 93 Iranian Tobacco Company (R.C.26), Re, 21, 8 Iranian Tobacco Company (R.C.27), Re, 7, 275

xxii

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (ALPHABETICAL)

Irrigation (K and S) Company, Re, 1, 228 Irving Trust Co. v. Iran, 29, 189 Isaiah, Benjamin R. v. Bank Mellat, 2, 232 Itel Corporation v. Iran, 1, 326; 28, 159 Itel International Corporation v. Social Security Organization of Iran, 7, 31; 21, 279; 24, 272 ITT Industries, Inc. v. Iran, 2, 348 Jafari, Kianoosh v. Iran, 18, 90 Jahanger, Re, 1, 128, 129, 132 Jahani, Re, 1, 168 J.D. Marshall International, Inc. v. Iran, 8, 11 J.I. Case Company v. Aryan Yadak Company, 14, 349 J.I. Case Company v. Iran, 3, 62 John Carl Warnecke and Associates v. Bank Mellat, 3, 256 K and S Irrigation Company, Re, 1, 228 Kahen, Hooshang v. Iran, 18, 289 Kaiser Engineers International, Inc. v. Iran, 2, 366 Karim-Panahi, Parviz v. United States, 28, 225, 318 Karubian, Rouhollah v. Iran, 32, 3 Kaysons International Corp. v. Iran, 29, 222 Kem International Co. v. Iran, 29, 395 Khachatourians, Andranik v. Iran, 26, 37 Khajetoorians, Arakel, Arik and Asteghik v. Iran, 26, 37 Khatami, Morteza v. Iran, 30, 267 Khosravi, Thomas K. v. Iran, 32, 73 Khosrowshahi, Faith Lita, Susanne P., Marcene P., Kevin Kayvan and Cameron Kamran v. Iran, 1, 339; 24, 40; 30, 76 Khosrowshahi, Nasrollah v. Iran, 17, 266 Khubiar, Raymond Joseph v. Iran, 11, 180 Kiaie, Jacqueline M. and Julia S. v. Iran, 14, 307; 32, 42 Kiaie, Jubin T., 14, 307 Kidde, Inc. (Walter Kidde Division) v. Iran National Airlines, 5, 78 Kidde Consultants, Inc. v. Haydar Ghyai & Associates, 30, 302 Kimberly-Clark Corporation v. Bank Markazi Iran, 2, 334 Koehler, Ronald Stuart v. Iran, 10, 333; 11, 285 Kornfeld (H & F), Inc. v. Iran, 21, 303 Ladjevardi, Ninni (formerly Burgel) v. Iran, 29, 367 Lauth, Theodore v. Iran, 11, 150 Lawrence, Lilly Mythra Fallah v. Iran, 1, 178; 25, 190; 33, 483 Leach, Jimmie Barnell v. Iran, 18, 231; 23, 233 Leasing (NIC), Inc. v. Iran, 5, 85 Lee, Robert J., Re, 21, 7 Lerner, Kay v. Iran 1, 215 Levitt, William J. v. Iran (Case No. 209), 14, 191 Levitt, William J. v. Iran (Case No. 210), 27, 145 Lianosoff, Alexander Lyons v. Iran, 5, 90 Linen, Fortinberry and Associates, Inc. v. Iran, 8, 85; 19, 62 Lischem Corporation v. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, 7, 18 Litton Systems, Inc. v. Iran, 12, 126 Lockheed Corporation v. Iran, 11, 363; 18, 292; 19, 317 Logos Development Corporation v. Information Systems Iran, 11, 53

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (ALPHABETICAL)

xxiii

Lord Corporation v. Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Company, 18, 377 Louis Berger International v. Plan & Budget Organization of Iran, 14, 349 Lowe Marschalk, Inc. v. Iran, 14, 349 M & M Productions, Inc. v. Iran, 6, 125 Mackay, Jack W. v. Iran Beverages Company, 5, 134 Mahmoud, Leila Danesh Arfa v. Iran, 9, 350 Main (Chas. T.) International, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water and Power Authority, 1, 337; 3, 156; 4, 60; 5, 185; 8, 41; 10, 21; 11, 259; 21, 12 Main (Chas. T.) International, Inc. v. Mahab Consulting Engineers, Inc., 3, 270 Malek, Reza Said v. Iran, 19, 48; 28, 246 Malekzadeh, Joan Ward, Sonya and Alireza v. Iran, 29, 3 Maloney (F.H.) Company v. Iran, 9, 70 Management (The) of Alcan Aluminium, Limited v. Ircable Corporation, 2, 294 Mandig, David Michael v. Iran, 23, 413 Mandig, Kathleen Marie, 23, 413 Mandig, Mrs. Duane H. v. Iran, 23, 413 Mang˚ard, Judge N., Re (Challenge Decision), 1, 111, 509 Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Iran, 29, 193 Marine Midland Bank v. Iran, 29, 185 Marks, Burton and Harry Umann v. Iran, 8, 290; 9, 69 Marshall ( J.D.) International, Inc. v. Iran, 8, 11 Maxon Corporation v. Iran, 19, 374 McCabe, Betty Lou v. Iran, 23, 413 McCabe III, Joseph H. v. Iran, 23, 413 McCabe, Jr., Joseph H. et al. v. Iran, 23, 413 McCabe, William R. v. Iran, 23, 413 McCollough & Company, Inc. v. Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone, 11, 3, 287 McHarg, Ian L., William W. Roberts, David A. Wallace, Thomas A. Todd v. Iran, 7, 277; 13, 286 McLaughlin Enterprises Ltd. v. Iran, 12, 146 Mellon Bank v. Iran, 29, 197 Merrill Lynch & Co. Ltd. v. Iran, 27, 122 Middle East Management and Construction Corporation v. Iran, 9, 340 Mikhael (David), Inc. v. Iran, 3, 84; 6, 20 Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of Iran v. United States Department of Agriculture, Case B-5, 23, 413 Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of Iran v. United States Department of Agriculture, Case B-19, 23, 413 Ministry of Defense of Iran v. United States, Case B-15, 24, 305 Ministry of Defense of Iran v. United States, Case B-74, 18, 74; 27, 275 Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance of Iran, Re, 6, 27 Ministry of Mines and Metals and National Iranian Steel Company, Re, 23, 253 Ministry of National Defence, Iran v. Department of Defence, United States, Case B-1, 4, 57; 10, 207; 18, 45; 19, 3, 273; 21, 279; 22, 105; 23, 407; 27, 282 Ministry of National Defence, Iran v. United States, Cases A-3 and A-8, 27, 256 Ministry of National Defence, Iran v. United States, Case A-14, 4, 74 Ministry of National Defence, Iran v. United States, Cases B-59 and B-69, 12, 33 Ministry of National Defence, Iran v. United States, Case B-66, 14, 276 Ministry of Oil of Iran v. United States, 23, 413 Ministry of Petroleum of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, 1, 383 Ministry of Roads and Transportation (R.C.41), Re, 23, 256 Ministry of Roads and Transportation (R.C.48), Re, 17, 343 Ministry of Roads and Transportation v. Port of Vancouver, Washington, 3, 338

xxiv

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (ALPHABETICAL)

Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company v. Iran, 1, 230; 8, 15; 17, 294 Mitra Leasing Corporation v. Iran, 18, 62; 28, 389 Mobasser, Re, 1, 176 Mobasser, Shahram v. Iran, 10, 177 Mobil Oil Iran Inc. v. Iran, 3, 372; 16, 3; 25, 339 Modern Film Corporation v. Iran, 18, 150 Mohajer-Shojaee, Reza and Shahnaz v. Iran, 25, 196, 273 Mohtadi, Jahangir and Jila v. Iran, 32, 124; 33, 3 Moin, Jalal v. Iran, 30, 70 Monemi, Betty Laura, Cameron Mitchell, Sara Glory and Dana Paul v. Iran, 28, 232; 33, 349 Morgan Equipment Company v. Iran, 3, 7; 4, 272 Morris, Henry v. Iran, 2, 241; 3, 364 Morris (Philip) Inc. v. Iran, 1, 220 Morrison-Knudsen International Company, Inc. v. Iran, 9, 357 Morrison-Knudsen Paciﬁc Ltd. v. Ministry of Roads and Transportation, 3, 76; 7, 54 Motamed, Linda J. and Mehrdad v. Iran, 21, 28 Motorola, Inc. v. Iran National Airlines Corporation, 19, 73 Moussavi, Mohammad v. United States, 8, 24 Murphy Middle East Oil Company v. National Iranian Oil Company, 13, 370 NAHAJA, Ministry of Defence, Re, 19, 197 National Airmotive Corporation v. Iran, 1, 158; 3, 91, 124 National Corporation for Housing Partnerships v. Ministry of Mines and Industries of Iran, 3, 87; 7, 260 National Iranian Copper Industries Company, Re, 17, 346 National Iranian Oil Company, Re, 17, 334 National Training and Development Service for State and Local Government v. Iran, 21, 303 Navy of the Government of Iran v. General Dynamics Corporation (Pomona Division), 14, 251 Nazari, Mohsen Asgari v. Iran, 26, 7; 28, 192; 30, 123 NCR Corporation v. Iran, 1, 327 Near East Technological Services USA, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force, 21, 13 Nemazee, Reza v. Iran, 32, 184 Nemazee, Reza and Luz Belen v. Iran, 25, 153 New York Blower Company v. Polyacryl Iran Corporation, 13, 370 NIC Leasing, Inc. v. Iran, 5, 85 Nikpour, Rana v. Iran, and Foundation for the Oppressed, 29, 67 NL Industries, Inc. v. Iran, 10, 365 Norad Private Joint Stock Co. v. United States, 19, 374 Northern Virginia Community College v. Iran, 18, 66; 23, 413 Norton Lilly & Co., Inc. v. Iran, 6, 147 Nourafchan, George v. Iran, 23, 307; 29, 295 Nourafchan, Richard v. Iran, 18, 88 Nourafchan, Zaman Azar v. Iran, 23, 307; 29, 295 Ocean-Air Cargo Claims, Inc. v. Iran (Case No. 11102), 23, 303 Ocean-Air Cargo Claims, Inc. v. Iran (Case No. 11429), 23, 296 Oil Field of Texas, Inc. v. Iran (OSCO), 1, 347; 12, 308 Onesco, Inc. v. National Iranian Gas Company, 12, 160 Orton/McCullough Crane Company v. Iranian State Railways, 25, 15 Otis Elevator Company v. Iran, 14, 283 Otis Elevator Company (New Jersey) v. Iran, 19, 374 Otis Engineering Corporation v. Iran, 9, 310 Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation v. Iran, 2, 322; 4, 1, 280

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (ALPHABETICAL)

xxv

Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Iran, 4, 205 Panacaviar, S.A. v. Iran, 13, 193; 14, 100, 102; 18, 63 Parguin Company v. United States, 4, 210; 13, 261 Parsons (Ralph M.) Company v. Iran, 14, 349 Payne, Thomas Earl v. Iran, 12, 3 Penwalt Corporation–Wallace & Tiernan Division v. Iran, 19, 374 PepsiCo, Inc. v. Iran (Zamzam Bottling Company Azerbaijan, et al.), 1, 173; 2, 33; 13, 3, 326 Pereira, Victor E., Re, 21, 3 Pereira (William L.) Associates, Iran v. Iran, 1, 219, 484; 5, 198 Perkin Elmer Corporation v. Iran, 19, 374 Perry-Rohani, Anita v. Iran, 22, 194 Petrolane, Inc. v. Iran, 27, 64, 264; 28, 3 Pﬁzer, Inc. v. Iran, 2, 90 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Iran, 10, 121 Phelps Dodge International Corp. v. Iran, 10, 157 Phibro Corporation v. Ministry of War–ETKA Co. Ltd., 11, 289; 26, 15, 254 Philip Morris Inc. v. Iran, 1, 220 Phillips Petroleum Company, Iran v. Iran, 1, 487; 2, 1, 283; 3, 297; 5, 51; 21, 79, 285 Picker International Corporation v. Iran, 11, 372; 12, 306 Pickup, Jr., Edmund, v. Iran, 11, 372 Pishdad, Mrs. Khojasteh v. United States, 25, 339 Plicoﬂex, Inc. v. Iran, 28, 309 Pneumo Corporation v. Iran, 19, 374 Pointon, Vernie Rodney and Mary Lou v. Iran, 27, 49 Pomeroy v. Iran, 2, 372; 4, 237 Pomeroy Corporation v. Iran, 2, 391 Portland State University v. Iran, 19, 374 Powell (William) Company v. Iran, 19, 374 Procon International Inc. v. Iran, 6, 120 Proctor and Gamble Company v. Iran, 3, 186, 192 Productions (M & M), Inc. v. Iran, 6, 125 Protiva, Edgar and Eric v. Iran, 23, 259; 31, 89 Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority v. Star Line Iran Company, 14, 349 Queens Ofﬁce Tower Associates v. Iran National Airlines Corporation, 2, 247 QuesTech, Inc. v. Iran, 2, 96; 4, 72; 9, 107 Ralph M. Parsons Company v. Iran, 14, 349 Ram International Industries, Inc. v. Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 3, 203; 29, 383 Ram International Industries, Inc. v. Iran, 26, 228 Rankin, Jack v. Iran, 17, 135 RayGoWagner Equipment Company v. Iran Express Terminal Corporation, 2, 141 RayGoWagner Equipment Company v. Star Line Iran Company, 1, 411 Raymond International (UK), Ltd., Re, 1, 394 Ray-O-Vac International Corporation v. Electric Storage Battery Company Iran, 4, 47 RCA Global Communications, Inc. v. Iran, 3, 8; 4, 5, 9; 5, 121; 16, 335 Reading & Bates Corporation v. International Bank of Iran, 5, 155 Reading & Bates Corporation v. Iran, 2, 401; 4, 199 Reading & Bates Drilling Company v. Iran, 18, 164 Reading & Bates Exploration Co. v. National Iranian Oil Company, 26, 265 Reliance Group, Inc. v. Iran, 16, 257 Reliance Group, Inc. v. National Oil Company, 1, 384 Revlon Inc. v. Iran, 8, 353

xxvi

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (ALPHABETICAL)

Rexnord, Inc. v. Iran, 2, 6 Reynolds Metals Company v. Iran, 3, 119, 124 Reynolds (R.J.) Tobacco Company v. Iran, 1, 119, 336; 2, 124; 3, 39; 4, 2; 7, 181; 8, 55 Riahi, Frederica Lincoln v. Iran, 28, 176 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company v. Iran, 1, 119, 336; 2, 124; 3, 39; 4, 2; 7, 181; 8, 55 Rockwell International Systems, Inc. v. Iran, 2, 310, 369; 23, 150; 24, 3 Rondu Holdings Inc. v. Iran, 7, 26 Rorer (William H.), Inc. v. Toobi Company Ltd., 3, 390 Rumsey Electric Company v. Iran, 19, 374 Saboonchian, Esahak v. Iran, 27, 248; 28, 51 Saghi, James M., Michael R., and Allan J. v. Iran, 14, 3; 29, 20 St. Regis Paper Company v. Iran, 14, 86 Samrad, Ardavan Peter v. Iran, 26, 44 Samrad, Gitty Diana v. Iran, 26, 44 Samrad, Parvin Mariam v. Iran, 26, 44 San Jacinto Eastern Corporation v. Iran, 3, 372; 16, 3; 21, 303 San Jose State University v. Iran, 24, 305 Santa Fe International Company v. Iran, 10, 365 Santa Fe Overseas, Inc. v. Iran, 10, 365 Satellite Application Project, Re, 17, 340 Sayco Corporation v. Iran, 23, 413 Schering Corporation v. Iran, 5, 361 Schlegel Corporation v. National Iranian Copper Industries Company, 14, 176 Schott, Robert R. v. Iran, 24, 203 Scott, Foresman and Company v. Iran, 16, 103 SeaCo, Inc. v. Iran, 11, 210; 22, 370; 28, 198 Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Iran, 1, 335; 3, 87; 4, 65; 6, 149 Security Paciﬁc National Bank v. Bank Markazi Iran, 30, 13 Sedco, Inc. v. Iran Marine Industrial Co., 18, 58; 21, 31 Sedco, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Company, 8, 28; 9, 248; 10, 3, 180; 15, 23; 16, 282; 18, 3; 21, 31 Seismograph Service Corporation v. National Iranian Oil Company, 22, 3 Sether, Opal H. v. Iran, 18, 275 Shannon and Wilson, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, 9, 397 Sherkate Tractor Sazi Iran (Sahami Khass), Re, 19, 178 Shifﬂette, Steven G. v. Iran, 22, 111 Shinto, Hidetomo v. Iran, 1, 178; 19, 321 Short, Alfred L.W. v. Iran, 14, 20; 16, 76 Showrai, Re, 1, 226 Singer Company v. Iran (Case Nos. 343 and 365), 8, 18 Singer Company v. Iran (Case Nos. 344 and A-9), 7, 236 Singer Company v. Iran National Airlines Corporation, 1, 140 Sinker, Frederick K. v. Iran, 18, 390 Skidmore, Owings & Merrill v. Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, 10, 37 Smith International, Inc. v. Iran, 4, 33 Sobhani, Mohabatullah v. Iran, 31, 26 Sohio-Iran Trading, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Company, 3, 372; 6, 33 Sola Tiles, Inc. v. Iran, 14, 223 Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Company, 13, 370 Southern Illinois University, Board of Trustees of v. Iran, 19, 345 Sovereign International Corporation v. Iran (Case No. 397), 1, 178; 25, 229 Sovereign International Corporation v. Iran (Case No. 398), 1, 178; 25, 235

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (ALPHABETICAL)

xxvii

Sovereign International Corporation v. Iran (Case No. 399), 1, 178; 25, 241 Spalding (H.A.), Inc. v. Ministry of Roads and Transport, 10, 22 Sperry Corporation v. The High State Council of Informatics of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1, 216 Sperry-Sun, Inc. v. Iran, 10, 365 Squibb (E.R.) and Sons, Inc. v. Iran, 2, 44 Staley (A.E.) Manufacturing Company v. Iran, 8, 42 Stanwick Corporation v. Iran, 4, 20; 5, 76; 24, 102 Starrett Housing Corporation v. Iran, 1, 386; 4, 122; 7, 119; 10, 110; 13, 350; 16, 112 State University of New York College of Environmental Science and Forestry v. Ministry of Culture and Higher Education, 13, 277 Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Iran, 13, 370 Stewart, Charles P. v. Iran, 24, 116 Stewart R. Browne Disc, Inc. v. Iran, 17, 368 Stone and Webster Overseas Group, Inc. v. National Petrochemical Company, 1, 274, 284, 305, 320; 4, 192 Stromberg-Carlson Corporation v. Iran, 19, 352 Sun Company, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Company, 28, 394 Sundstrand Data Control, Inc. v. Iran, 1, 408 Sylvan Ginsbury, Limited v. Iran, 21, 303 Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc. v. Iran, 5, 141; 8, 298 Tadjer-Cohen Associates, Inc. v. Iran, 9, 302; 18, 59, 287; 21, 303 Tai, Inc. v. Iran, 29, 411 Tavakoli, Vivian M., David Jamshid and Keyvan Anthony v. Iran, 14, 309; 33, 206 Tchacosh Company, Inc. v. Iran, 28, 371 T.C.S.B., Inc. v. Iran, 1, 261, 284, 305, 320; 4, 61; 5, 160 Technical Laboratory & Soil Mechanics of the Ministry of Roads & Transport of Iran v. Federal Highway Administration of the US Department of Transportation, 24, 305 Technology Enterprises, Inc. v. Foreign Transaction Company, 2, 5; 5, 118 Tehran American School Association, Trustees and Members v. Iran, 1, 230; 19, 365 Tehran Regional Electric Company, Re, 19, 178 Teichmann (Henry F.), Inc. v. Hamadan Glass Company, 13, 124 Telecommunication Company of Iran v. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 5, 357 Telecommunications Company of Iran v. United States, Case B-44, 24, 305 Telecommunications Company of Iran v. United States, Case B-55, 23, 320 Teledyne Farris Engineering v. Iran, 19, 374 Teledyne Industries, Inc. v. Iran, 23, 126 Texaco Iran Ltd. v. Iran, 3, 372; 13, 370 T.G. Howland International Company, Limited v. Iran, 23, 413 Tidewater, Inc. v. Iran, 9, 308 Tidewater, Inc. and Tidewater Marine Service, Inc. v. Iran, 9, 61 Timber Purchase Company v. National Iranian Oil Company, 3, 169 Time, Incorporated v. Iran, 7, 8 Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA, 6, 219 TME International, Inc. v. Iran, 1, 178; 24, 121 Too, Emanuel v. Greater Modesto Insurance Associates, 23, 378 Touche Ross and Company v. Iran, 3, 59, 200, 208; 9, 284 Tour, Lili v. Iran, 21, 25 Training Systems Corporation v. Bank Tejarat, 13, 331 Transaero, Incorporated v. Iran, 21, 303 Transamerica ICS, Inc. v. Iran, 3, 84; 26, 275 Transocean Gulf Oil Company v. Iran, 3, 372; 10, 365

xxviii

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (ALPHABETICAL)

Transportation Consultants International v. Iran, 1, 340; 9, 360 TransWorld Airlines, Inc. v. Iran, 5, 249 Troemner, Inc. v. Iran, 19, 374 Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York v. Iran, 10, 319; 11, 283 TRW, Inc. v. Iran, 19, 374 Turner Entertainment Co. v. Iran, 16, 335 Uiterwyk Corporation v. Iran, 19, 106, 107, 171; 26, 3, 186 Ultrasystems Incorporated v. Iran, 2, 100, 139; 4, 77 Unidyne Corporation v. Iran, 1, 178; 2, 138; 29, 310; 30, 19 Union Oil Company of Iran v. National Iranian Oil Company, 13, 370 United Painting Company, Inc. v. Iran, 23, 351 United States v. Iran, Case No. 86, 3, 77; 25, 327 United States v. Iran, Case A-16, 3, 316, 318, 380; 5, 57; 9, 97 United States v. Iran, Case A-17, 8, 189 United States v. Iran, Case B-24, 5, 97 United States v. Iran, Case B-29, 6, 12 United States v. Iran, Case B-31, 19, 374 United States v. Iran, Case B-33, 23, 413 United States v. Iran, Case B-36, 32, 162; 33, 56, 346 United States v. Iran, Case B-38, 25, 327 United States v. Iran, Case B-39, 16, 335 United States v. Iran, Case B-76, 25, 327 United States v. Iran, Case B-77, 25, 327 United States v. Iran, Claims of less than US $250,000, 3, 77; 25, 327 United States v. Ministry of Defense of Iran, Case B-32, 27, 275 United States (Aeroquip Corporation) v. Iran (Civil Aviation Organization), 24, 305 United States (Commodity Credit Corporation) v. Iran, Case B-22, 19, 374 United States (Department of the Air Force) v. Iran (Iranian Air Force and the Foreign Ministry), Case B-35, 24, 291 United States (Eberle Tanning Company) v. Iran, 7, 247 United States (Federal Aviation Administration) v. Iran (Civil Aviation Organization), Case B-26, 24, 291 United States (Food and Drug Administration of the Public Health Service) v. Iran (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare), Case B-28, 24, 291 United States (Shipside Packing Company, Inc.) v. Iran, 3, 331; 5, 80 United States (Synalloy Corporation) v. Iran, 7, 258 United States (Taylor Machinery Company) v. Iran, 5, 150 United States (Teledyne Industries Inc.) v. Iran, 3, 336 United States (West Chemical Products, Inc.) v. Iran, 5, 148 United States Medical Export Company, Inc. v. Iran, 8, 83 United Technologies International, Inc., Re, 21, 5 United Technologies International, Inc. v. Iran, 13, 254; 17, 368 United Technologies International, Inc. v. Iranian Air Force, 3, 209; 7, 209 United Technologies International, Inc. v. Telecommunications Company of Iran, 3, 334 Universal Enterprises, Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Company, 8, 368 University of California, Santa Barbara v. Ministry of Culture and Higher Education, 17, 368 University of Idaho v. Iran, 19, 374 University of Southern California v. Iran, 30, 283 Upjohn Company v. Iran, 2, 332 Varo International Corporation v. Iran, 25, 3

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (ALPHABETICAL)

xxix

Vernor, Bruce, Joseph Howard, Charles Petze, James Kirkendall, James Wood, Joseph Butler, James Corn, Randell Stansﬁeld and Edward Suber, Trustees of the Tehran American School Association, and Members of the Tehran American School Association v. Iran, 1, 230; 19, 365 VSI Corporation v. Iran, 2, 31, 33, 260; 3, 73, 78 Warnecke ( John Carl) and Associates v. Bank Mellat, 3, 256 Warner-Lambert Company v. Iran, 1, 230; 2, 261 Washington, Emory B. v. Iran, 19, 374 Watkins-Johnson Company v. Iran, 2, 362; 22, 218 Weatherford International Inc. v. Iran, 17, 368 Wells Fargo Bank v. Iran, 30, 8 Western Dynamics Corporation v. Iran and Etka Organization, 8, 49 Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. Iran, 8, 183; 13, 93, 370; 14, 104; 33, 60, 204 White Consolidated Industries, Inc. v. Iran Compressor Manufacturing Company, 14, 349 White Westinghouse International Company v. Bank Sepah-Iran, New York Agency, 1, 169 Whittaker Corporation (Bermite Division) v. Iran, 14, 263 William H. Rorer, Inc. v. Toobi Company Ltd., 3, 390 William L. Pereira Associates, Iran v. Iran, 1, 219, 484; 5, 198 William Powell Company v. Iran, 19, 374 Williams, Gordon v. Iran, 17, 269 Williams Brothers International Corporation v. Iran (Case Nos. 25 and 492), 14, 349 Williams Brothers International Corporation v. Iran (Case Nos. 26 and 27), 2, 228 Wilson, Estate of Mary Jane Smythe v. Iran, 23, 413 Woodward-Clyde Consultants v. Iran, 3, 239; 5, 73 World Farmers Trading, Inc. v. Government Trading Corporation, 3, 197; 22, 204; 25, 186 Worldwide (A.B.S.) Technical Services, Inc. v. Iran, 3, 176, 192 Xerox Corporation v. Iran, 7, 223 Yeager, Kenneth P. v. Iran, 17, 92 Young (Arthur) & Company v. Iran, 17, 245 Zokor International, Inc. v. Iran, 1, 271, 284, 305, 320; 8, 72

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES 1 ARRANGED ACCORDING TO CATEGORY: DECISIONS, AWARDS, AWARDS ON AGREED TERMS, INTERIM AWARDS, INTERLOCUTORY AWARDS, INTERIM AND INTERLOCUTORY AWARDS, ORDERS AND REFUSAL CASES DECISIONS Ainsworth v. Iran 25, 188 American Bell International Inc. v. Iran, 14, 173 American Express International Banking Corp. v. Government of Iran, 29, 209 Avco Corporation v. Iran, 19, 253 Bank Markazi Iran v. European American Banking Corporation, 13, 95 Bank Melli Iran v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., New York, 21, 11 Baygell v. Iran, 11, 300 Behring International, Inc. v. Islamic Republic Iranian Air Force, 4, 89; (Amendment to Decision), 6, 30 Birnbaum v. Iran, 31, 286 Buckamier v. Iran, 28, 307 Cherafat v. Iran, 28, 216 Collins Systems International, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran Navy, 28, 195 Component Builders, Inc. v. Iran, 9, 404 Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago v. Iran, 30, 3 Control Data Corporation v. Iran, 22, 151 Dallal v. Iran, 5, 74 Dames and Moore v. Iran, 8, 107 Development and Resources Corporation v. Iran, 26, 256 Dic of Delaware, Inc. v. Tehran Redevelopment Corporation, 21, 4 Eastman Kodak Company v. Iran, 27, 269 Endo Laboratories, Inc. v. Iran, 18, 113 Exxon Research and Engineering Company v. Iran, 16, 110 Fedders Corporation v. Iran, 13, 97 First Interstate Bank of California v. Iran, 29, 205 First National Bank of Boston v. Iran, 19, 307 First National Bank of Chicago v. Iran, 29, 201 Flexi-Van Leasing, Inc. v. Iran, 13, 324 FMC Corporation v. Iran, 14, 261 Ford Aerospace & Communications Corporation v. Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 12, 304 Ford Aerospace & Communications Corporation v. Iran, 14, 255 Gabay v. Iran, 27, 194 Ghaffari (F.) v. Iran, 31, 124 1

The ﬁgures in bold type refer to the volume number.

xxx

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY CATEGORY) Harris International Telecommunications, Inc. v. Iran, 18, 76 Hood Corporation v. Iran, 8, 53 Interﬁrst Bank Dallas, N.A. v. Iran, 16, 291 International Schools Services, Inc. v. Iran, 14, 279 International Technical Products Corporation v. Iran, 11, 182 International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation v. Iran, 22, 213 Iran–United States, Case A/1, 1, 144, 189 Iran–United States, Case A/2, 1, 101 Iran–United States, Case A/18, 5, 251 Iran–United States, Case A/19, 16, 285 Iran–United States, Case A/20, 11, 271 Iran–United States, Case A/21, 14, 324 Iran v. United States, Case 951, 14, 11 Iran v. United States, Cases A4, A7 & A15 (I:F & III), 33, 362 Iran v. United States, Case A-15, 8, 63; 13, 173 Iran v. United States, Cases A-15 (IV) & A24, 29, 214; 32, 115 Iran v. United States, Case B-1, 22, 105 Irving Trust Company v. Iran, 29, 189 Karim-Panahi v. United States, 28, 318 Kidde, Inc. (Walter Kidde Division) v. Iran National Airlines, 5, 78 Koehler v. Iran, 11, 285 Lockheed Corporation v. Iran, 19, 317 Mang˚ard, Re (Challenge Decision), 1, 111 Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Government of Iran, 29, 193 Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Government of Iran, 29, 185 McCollough & Company v. Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone, 11, 287 McHarg, Roberts, Wallace & Todd v. Iran, 7, 277 Mellon Bank N.A. v. Iran, 29, 197 Ministry of National Defense of Iran v. United States, Cases A-3 and A-8, 27, 256 Mohajer-Shojaee v. Iran, 25, 273 Morris v. Iran, 3, 364 Nazari v. Iran, 28, 192 Panacaviar, S.A. v. Iran, 14, 100 Parguin Company v. Iran, 4, 210 PepsiCo, Inc. v. Iran, 13, 328 Petrolane, Inc. v. Iran, 27, 264 Phibro Corporation v. Ministry of War–Etka Co. Ltd., 26, 254 Picker International Corporation v. Iran, 12, 306 Ram International Industries, Inc. v. Air Force of Iran, 29, 383 Saboonchian v. Iran, 28, 51 Security Paciﬁc National Bank v. Bank Markazi Iran, 30, 13 Sedco, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Company, 16, 282 Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York v. Iran, 11, 283

xxxi

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CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY CATEGORY)

Uiterwyk Corporation v. Iran, 19, 171; 26, 186 Unidyne Corporation v. Iran, 30, 19 United States v. Iran, Case A-17, 8, 189 United States v. Iran, Case B6, 33, 56, 346 United Technologies International, Inc. v. Iran, 13, 254 Universal Enterprises, Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Company, 8, 368 Wells Fargo Bank v. Iran, 30, 8 Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. Iran, 13, 93; 33, 204 Woodward-Clyde Consultants v. Iran, 5, 73 World Farmers Trading Inc. v. Government Trading Corporation, 25, 186

AWARDS Abboud v. Iran, 24, 265 Aeromaritime, Inc. v. Iran, 1, 135 Aeronutronic Overseas Services, Inc. v. The Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 11, 223 Agrostruct International, Inc. v. Iran State Cereals Organization, 18, 180 AHFI Planning Associates, Inc. v. Iran, 11, 168 Ainsworth v. Iran, 18, 92 Alcan Aluminium Limited v. Ircable Corporation, 2, 294 Alfred Haber, P. A. v. Iran, 23, 133 Allen v. Iran, 28, 382 American Bell International Inc. v. Iran, 12, 170 American Farm Products International, Inc. v. Cyrus Consulting Engineers, 18, 175 American Housing International Inc. v. Housing Cooperative Society, 5, 235 American International Group, Inc. v. Iran, 4, 96 Amman & Whitney v. Khuzestan Urban Development Organization, 12, 94 Amoco International Finance Corporation v. Iran, 15, 189 Anaconda-Iran, Inc. v. Iran, 28, 320 Arco Iran, Inc. v. Iran, 16, 3 Arjad v. Iran, 26, 190 Arthur J. Fritz & Co. v. Sherkate Tavonie Sherkathaye Sakhtemanie, 22, 170 Arthur Young & Company v. Iran, 17, 245 Aryeh (M.) v. Iran, 33, 368 Aryeh (O. & E.) v. Iran, 33, 460 Aryeh (V., L. & J.) v. Iran, 33, 272 Asghar v. Iran, 24, 238 Atomic Energy Organization of Iran v. United States, 6, 141; 12, 25 Austin Company v. Machine Sazi Arak, 12, 288 Avco Corporation v. Iran, 19, 200 Bakhtiari v. Iran, 25, 289 Bank Mellat v. Crocker National Bank, 5, 57 Bank Mellat v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, 5, 57 Bavanati v. Iran, 31, 36 Baygell v. Iran, 11, 72 Bechtel, Inc. v. Iran, 14, 149 Behring International, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force, 27, 218 Bendix Corporation v. Iran, 18, 352 Bendone-Derossi International v. Iran, 18, 115 Benedix v. Iran, 21, 20 Berookhim v. Iran, 25, 278

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY CATEGORY)

xxxiii

Bikoff and Eisenpresser v. Iran, 7, 1 Birnbaum v. Iran, 29, 260 Blount Brothers Corporation v. Iran (Case No. 52), 10, 56 Blount Brothers Corporation v. Iran (Case No. 53), 10, 95 Blount Brothers Corporation v. Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, 3, 225 Boroumand v. Iran, 29, 59 Buckamier v. Iran, 28, 53 Cal-Maine Foods, Inc. v. Iran, 6, 52 Carlson v. Iran, 26, 193 Carolina Brass, Inc. v. Arya National Shipping Lines, S.A., 12, 139 CBA International Development Corporation v. Iran, 5, 177 CBS Inc. v. Iran, 25, 131 Chamness v. Iran, 25, 172 Chas. T. Main International, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water and Power Authority, 11, 259 Chas. T. Main International, Inc. v. Mahab Consulting Engineers, Inc., 3, 270 CMI International, Inc. v. Ministry of Roads and Transportation, Iran, 4, 263 Collins Systems International, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran Navy, 28, 21 Combustion Engineering, Inc. v. Iran, 26, 60 Component Builders, Inc. v. Iran, 23, 3 Computer Sciences Corporation v. Iran, 10, 269 Consortium for International Development v. Iran, 26, 244 Continental Grain Export Corporation v. Government Trading Corporation, 3, 319 Continental Grain Export Corporation v. Union of Consumers’ Co-operatives for Iranian Workers (EMKAN), 11, 292 Cosmos Engineering, Inc. v. Ministry of Roads and Transportation, 13, 179 Craig v. Ministry of Energy of Iran, 3, 280 Creditcorp International, Inc. v. Iran Carton Company, 23, 265 Cyrus Petroleum Ltd. v. Iran, 11, 70 Dadras International v. Iran, 31, 127 Dadras International v. Iran, Kan Consulting Engineers & Kan Residential Corporation, 33, 41 Daley v. Iran, 18, 232 Dallal v. Iran, 3, 10 Dames and Moore v. Iran, 4, 212 Danielpour (M.) v. Iran, 22, 118 David v. Iran, 24, 252 Davidson (G.E.) (Homayounjah) v. Iran, 34, 3 Department of the Environment of Iran v. United States, Case B-53, 5, 105 Development and Resources Corporation v. Iran, 25, 20 Diba and Gaulin v. Iran, 23, 268 Dic of Delaware, Inc. v. Tehran Redevelopment Corporation, 8, 144 Dorian International Credit Co., Inc. v. Iran Carton Company, 23, 265 Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Iran, 3, 332 Drucker, Jr. v. Foreign Transaction Company, 19, 257 Eastman Kodak Company v. Iran, 17, 153; 27, 3 Eastman Kodak International Capital Company, Inc. v. Iran, 17, 153 Ebrahimi v. Iran, 30, 170; 31, 3 Economy Forms Corporation v. Iran, 3, 42; 5, 1 Edwards v. Iran, 23, 290 Electronic Systems International, Inc. v. Ministry of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 22, 339

xxxiv

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY CATEGORY)

Endo Laboratories, Inc. v. Iran, 17, 114 Esphahanian v. Bank Tejarat, 2, 157, 178 Etezadi v. Iran, 25, 264; 30, 22 Exxon Corporation v. Iran, 16, 3 Exxon Corporation v. National Iranian Oil Company, 17, 3 Exxon Research and Engineering Company v. Iran, 15, 3 First Travel Corporation v. Iran, 9, 360 Flexi-Van Leasing, Inc. v. Iran, 12, 335 FMC Corporation v. Iran, 14, 111 Ford Aerospace & Communications Corporation v. Iran, 14, 24; 34, 102 Ford Aerospace & Communications Corporation v. The Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 11, 184 Foremost Tehran, Inc. v. Iran, 10, 228 French American Banking Corporation v. Iranit, S.A., 2, 303 Futura Trading Inc. v. Khuzestan Water and Power Authority, 9, 46 Futura Trading Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Company, 13, 99 Gabay v. Iran, 27, 40 General Atomic Company v. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, 1, 223 General Dynamics Corporation v. Iran, 5, 386 General Dynamics Telephone Systems Center, Inc. v. Iran, 9, 153 General Electric Company v. Iran, 26, 148 General Motors Corporation v. Iran, 13, 282 General Petrochemicals Corp. v. Iran, 27, 96 Ghaffari v. National Iranian Oil Company, 25, 178 Ghaffari (F.) v. Iran, 31, 60 Gianoplus v. Iran, 11, 217 Golpira v. Iran, 2, 171, 178 Golshani v. Iran, 29, 78 Gould Marketing, Inc. v. Ministry of National Defense of Iran, 6, 272 Granite State Machine Company v. Iran, 1, 185, 442 Grimm v. Iran, 2, 78 Gruen Associates, Inc. v. Iran Housing Company, 3, 97, 124 Grune and Stratton, Inc. v. Iran, 18, 224 Haddadi v. United States, 8, 20 Haji-Bagherpour v. United States, 2, 38 Hakim (Kambiz) v. Iran, 24, 269 Hakim (Kamran) v. Iran, 34, 67 Harnischfeger Corporation v. Ministry of Roads and Transportation, 7, 90; 8, 119 Haroonian v. Iran, 2, 226 Harounian v. Iran, 23, 282 Harrington and Associates, Inc. v. Iran, 16, 297 Harris International Telecommunications, Inc. v. Iran, 17, 31 Harza v. Iran, 11, 76 Harza Engineering Company v. Iran, 1, 499 H.A. Spalding, Inc. v. Ministry of Roads and Transport, 10, 22 Haus International, Inc. v. Tehran Redevelopment Corporation, 9, 313 Henry F. Teichmann, Inc. v. Hamadan Glass Company, 13, 124 Highlands Insurance Company v. Iran, 25, 212 Hilt v. Iran, 18, 154 Hofﬂand Honey Company v. National Iranian Oil Company, 2, 41

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY CATEGORY)

xxxv

Hollyﬁeld v. Iran, 23, 276 Hood Corporation v. Iran, 7, 36 Houston Contracting Company v. National Iranian Oil Company, 20, 3 Howard Needles Tammen & Bergendoff v. Iran, 11, 302 INA Corporation v. Iran, 8, 373 International Ore & Fertilizer Corporation v. Razi Chemical Company Ltd., 18, 98 International Schools Services, Inc. v. Iran, 14, 165 International Schools Services, Inc. v. National Iranian Copper Industries Company, 9, 187 International Systems & Controls Corporation v. Iran, 12, 239 International Systems & Controls Corporation v. National Iranian Gas Company, 24, 47 International Technical Products Corporation v. Iran, 9, 10, 206 Intrend International, Inc. v. The Imperial Iranian Air Force, 3, 110, 124 Iowa State University of Science and Technology v. Ministry of Culture and Higher Education, 13, 271 Iran v. United States, Case A-15, 14, 311 Iran v. United States, Case A-15 IIA and IIB, 28, 112 Iran v. United States, Cases A15(IV) and A24, 34, 105 Iran v. United States, Case A27, 34, 39 Iran v. United States, Case B-1, 19, 3, 273 Iran National Airlines Company v. United States, Case B-8, 17, 187 Iran National Airlines Company v. United States, Case B-9, 17, 214 Iran National Airlines Company v. United States, Case B-10, 17, 238 Iran National Airlines Company v. United States, Case B-12, 17, 228 Iran National Airlines Company v. United States, Case B-51, 17, 200 Iran National Gas Company v. United States, 17, 183 Iran Railway v. United States, Case B58, 32, 92 Iran Touring and Tourism Organization v. United States, 18, 84 Iranian Customs Administration v. United States, Case B-2, 13, 155 Iranian Customs Administration v. United States, Case B-3, 8, 89 Iranian Customs Administration v. United States, Case B-13, 13, 158 Iranian Customs Administration v. United States, Case B-16, 5, 94 Iranian Customs Administration v. United States, Case B-18, 13, 161 Iranian Customs Administration v. United States, Case B-20, 13, 164 Iranian Customs Administration v. United States, Case B-21, 8, 93 Isaiah v. Bank Mellat, 2, 232 Itel Corporation v. Iran, 28, 159 Itel International Corporation v. Social Security Organization of Iran, 24, 272 Jafari v. Iran, 18, 90 J.I. Case Company v. Iran, 3, 62 John Carl Warnecke and Associates v. Bank Mellat, 3, 256 Kahen v. Iran, 18, 289 Karim-Panahi v. United States, 28, 225 Karubian v. Iran, 32, 3 Kaysons International Corp. v. Iran, 29, 222 Khajetoorians v. Iran, 26, 37 Khatami v. Iran, 30, 267 Khosravi v. Iran, 32, 73 Khosrowshahi v. Iran, 17, 266; 30, 76 Khubiar v. Iran, 11, 180 Kiaie v. Iran, 32, 42

xxxvi

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY CATEGORY)

Kimberly-Clark Corporation v. Bank Markazi Iran, 2, 334 Koehler v. Iran, 10, 333 Ladjevardi v. Iran, 29, 367 Lauth v. Iran, 11, 150 Leach v. Iran, 23, 233 Levitt v. Iran (Case No. 209), 14, 191 Levitt v. Iran (Case No. 210), 27, 145 Lianosoff v. Iran, 5, 90 Linen, Fortinberry and Associates, Inc. v. Iran, 19, 62 Lischem Corporation v. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, 7, 18 Litton Systems, Inc. v. Iran, 12, 126 Lockheed Corporation v. Iran, 18, 292 Logos Development Corporation v. Information Systems Iran, 11, 53 M & M Productions, Inc. v. Iran, 6, 125 Mackay v. Iran Beverages Company, 5, 134 Mahmoud v. Iran, 9, 350 Malek v. Iran, 28, 246 Malekzadeh v. Iran, 29, 3 Marks and Umann v. Iran, 9, 69 McCollough & Company v. Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone, 11, 3 McHarg, Roberts, Wallace, Todd v. Iran, 13, 286 McLaughlin Enterprises Ltd. v. Iran, 12, 146 Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. v. Iran, 27, 122 Middle East Management and Construction Corporation v. Iran, 9, 340 Ministry of National Defence, Iran v. United States (Case A-14), 4, 74 Ministry of National Defence, Iran v. United States (Cases B-59 and B-69), 12, 33 Ministry of National Defence, Iran v. United States (Case B-66), 14, 276 Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company v. Iran, 17, 294 Mobasser v. Iran, 10, 177 Mobil Oil Iran Inc. v. Iran, 16, 3 Modern Film Corporation v. Iran, 18, 150 Mohajer-Shojaee v. Iran, 25, 196 Mohtadi v. Iran, 32, 124; 33, 3 Moin v. Iran, 30, 70 Monemi v. Iran, 28, 232; 33, 349 Morgan Equipment Company v. Iran, 4, 272 Morris v. Iran, 2, 241 Morrison-Knudsen Paciﬁc Ltd. v. Ministry of Roads and Transportation, 7, 54 Motamed v. Iran, 21, 28 Motorola, Inc. v. Iran National Airlines Corporation, 19, 73 Moussavi v. United States, 8, 24 Navy of the Government of Iran v. General Dynamics Corporation (Pomona Division), 14, 251 Nazari v. Iran, 30, 123 Near East Technological Services USA, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force, 21, 13 Nemazee v. Iran, 25, 153; 32, 184 Nourafchan v. Iran, 18, 88; 29, 295 Ocean-Air Cargo Claims, Inc. v. Iran (Case No. 11102), 23, 303 Ocean-Air Cargo Claims, Inc. v. Iran (Case No. 11429), 23, 296 Oil Field of Texas, Inc. v. Iran, 12, 308

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY CATEGORY) Onesco, Inc. v. National Iranian Gas Company, 12, 160 Orton/McCullough Crane Company v. Iranian State Railways, 25, 15 Otis Elevator Company v. Iran, 14, 283 Parguin Company v. United States, 13, 261 Payne v. Iran, 12, 3 PepsiCo, Inc. v. Iran, 13, 3 Perry-Rohani v. Iran, 22, 194 Petrolane, Inc. v. Iran, 27, 64; 28, 3 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Iran, 10, 121 Phelps Dodge International Corp. v. Iran, 10, 157 Phibro Corporation v. Ministry of War–Etka Co. Ltd., 26, 15 Phillips Petroleum Company Iran v. Iran, 21, 79 Plicoﬂex, Inc. v. Iran, 28, 309 Pointon v. Iran, 27, 49 Pomeroy v. Iran, 2, 372; 4, 237 Pomeroy Corporation v. Iran, 2, 391 Protiva v. Iran, 31, 89 Queens Ofﬁce Tower Associates v. Iran National Airlines Corporation, 2, 247 Questech, Inc. v. Iran, 9, 107 Ram International Industries, Inc. v. Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 3, 203 Ram International Industries, Inc. v. Iran, 26, 228 Rankin v. Iran, 17, 135 RayGoWagner Equipment Company v. Iran Express Terminal Corporation, 2, 141 RayGoWagner Equipment Company v. Star Line Iran Company, 1, 411 Reading and Bates Drilling Company v. Iran, 18, 164 Reliance Group, Inc. v. Iran, 16, 257 Reliance Group, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Company, 1, 384 Rexnord, Inc. v. Iran, 2, 6 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company v. Iran, 7, 181; 8, 55 Rockwell International Systems, Inc. v. Iran, 23, 150; 24, 3 Rondu Holdings Inc. v. Iran, 7, 26 Saboonchian v. Iran, 27, 248 Saghi v. Iran, 29, 20 St. Regis Paper Company v. Iran, 14, 86 Samrad v. Iran, 26, 44 San Jacinto Eastern Corporation v. Iran, 16, 3 Schering Corporation v. Iran, 5, 361 Schlegel Corporation v. National Iranian Copper Industries Company, 14, 176 Schott v. Iran, 24, 203 Scott, Foresman and Company v. Iran, 16, 103 Seaco, Inc. v. Iran, 28, 198 Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Iran, 6, 149 Sedco, Inc. v. Iran Marine Industrial Company, 21, 31 Sedco, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Company, 15, 23; 18, 3; 21, 31 Seismograph Service Corporation v. National Iranian Oil Company, 22, 3 Sether v. Iran, 18, 275 Shannon and Wilson v. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, 9, 397 Shifﬂette v. Iran, 22, 111 Shinto v. Iran, 19, 321

xxxvii

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CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY CATEGORY)

Short v. Iran, 16, 76 Skidmore, Owings & Merrill v. Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, 10, 37 Sobhani v. Iran, 31, 26 Sola Tiles, Inc. v. Iran, 14, 223 Sovereign International Corporation v. Iran (Case No. 397), 25, 229 Sovereign International Corporation v. Iran (Case No. 398), 25, 235 Sovereign International Corporation v. Iran (Case No. 399), 25, 241 Stanwick Corporation v. Iran, 24, 102 Starrett Housing Corporation v. Iran, 16, 112 State University of New York College of Environmental Science and Forestry v. Ministry of Culture and Higher Education, 13, 277 Stewart v. Iran, 24, 116 Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc. v. Iran, 8, 298 Tavakoli v. Iran, 33, 206 Tchacosh Company, Inc. v. Iran, 28, 371 T.C.S.B., Inc. v. Iran, 5, 160 Technology Enterprises, Inc. v. Foreign Transaction Company, 5, 118 Telecommunication Company of Iran v. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 5, 357 Telecommunications Company of Iran v. United States, 23, 320 Teledyne Industries, Inc. v. Iran, 23, 126 Time, Incorporated v. Iran, 7, 8 Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA, 6, 219 TME International, Inc. v. Iran, 24, 121 Too v. Greater Modesto Insurance Associates, 23, 378 Touche Ross and Company v. Iran, 9, 284 Tour v. Iran, 21, 25 Training Systems Corporation v. Bank Tejarat, 13, 331 Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York v. Iran, 10, 319 Uiterwyk Corporation v. Iran, 19, 107; 26, 3 Ultrasystems Incorporated v. Iran, 2, 100; 4, 77 Unidyne Corp. v. Iran, 29, 310 United Painting Company, Inc. v. Iran, 23, 351 United States v. Iran, Case A-16, 5, 57; 9, 97 United States v. Iran, Case B-24, 5, 97 United States v. Iran, Case B-29, 6, 12 United States v. Iran, Case B36, 32, 162 United Technologies International, Inc. v. Telecommunications Company of Iran, 3, 334 Varo International Corporation, 25, 3 Watkins-Johnson Company v. Iran, 22, 218 Western Dynamics Corporation v. Iran and Etka Organization, 8, 49 Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Iran, 33, 60 White Westinghouse International Company v. Bank Sepah-Iran, New York Agency, 1, 169 Whittaker Corporation (Bermite Division) v. Iran, 14, 263 William L. Pereira Associates, Iran v. Iran, 5, 198 Williams v. Iran, 17, 269 Woodward-Clyde Consultants v. Iran, 3, 239 World Farmers Trading, Inc. v. Government Trading Corporation, 3, 197; 22, 20 Yeager v. Iran, 17, 92

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY CATEGORY)

AWARDS ON AGREED TERMS A.B.S. Worldwide Technical Services, Inc. v. Iran, 3, 176, 192 Accurate Machine Products Corporation v. Iran, 19, 374 Adams International Division of Beatrice Foods Company v. Iran, 6, 1 Advanced Computer Techniques Corporation v. Iran, 3, 326 Aeronutronics Overseas Services, Inc. v. Telecommunications Company of Iran, 14, 339 A.E. Staley Manufacturing Company v. Iran, 8, 42 AFIA v. Iran, 8, 236 Air La Carte, Inc. v. Iran National Airlines Corporation, 1, 163 Airlines of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, 22, 365 Allard v. Iran, 23, 413 Allis-Chalmers Corporation v. Iran, 4, 39 American Cast Iron Pipe Company v. Ahwaz Water and Sewage Board, 9, 203 American Cyanamid Company v. Iran, 2, 269 American Express Company v. Iran, 17, 368 American Hospital Supply Corporation v. Iran, 7, 269 American Independent Oil Company v. National Iranian Oil Company, 9, 184 American Lecithin Company v. Iran, 10, 365 American Motors Corporation v. Iran, 4, 29 AMF Inc. v. Iran, 16, 335 Amoco International Finance Corporation v. Iran, 25, 314 Amoco Iran Oil Company v. Iran, 25, 301 Arco Exploration, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Company, 28, 370 Arco Iran, Inc. v. Iran, 25, 339 Arco Seed Company v. Iran, 14, 349 Atlantic Richﬁeld Company v. Iran, 28, 401 Atomic Energy Organization of Iran v. National Audiovisual Center, 21, 303 Baker International Corporation v. Iran, 12, 385 Bank Mellat v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 5, 155 Baroid International Petroleum Services, Inc. v. Iran, 10, 365 Bearings Inc. v. Iran, 19, 374 Bell Industries v. Iran, 18, 390 B.F. Goodrich Company v. Abadan Petrochemical Company, Ltd., 1, 342 B.F. Goodrich Company v. Kian Tire Manufacturing Company, 1, 123 Blount Brothers Corporation v. Iran (Case No. 63), 6, 118 Blount Brothers Corporation v. Iran Air, 21, 303 Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University v. Iran, 19, 345 Boeing Company v. Iran, 13, 359 Borg Warner Corporation v. Iran, 11, 372 Brown & Root, Inc. v. Iran, 34, 185 C and T Commodities of America, Inc. v. Iran, 13, 370 Cabot International Capital Corporation v. Iran, 4, 83 Carrier Corporation v. Iran, 3, 36, 78 Charter (Iran) Petroleum Company v. National Iranian Oil Company, 5, 88 Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company v. Iran, 24, 305 Chevron Research Company v. National Iranian Oil Company, 2, 364; 3, 78 Chicago Bridge & Iron Company v. Iran, 7, 225; 11, 372 Christensen, Inc. v. Iran, 30, 292 Coast Survey Limited v. Iran, 23, 413 Combustion Engineering, Inc. v. Iran, 3, 366; 24, 297; 27, 288

xxxix

xl

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY CATEGORY)

Commercial Development Center v. United States, 18, 390 Commonwealth Associates, Inc. v. Iran, 13, 370 Continental Corporation v. Iran, 1, 403 Control Data Corporation v. Iran, 21, 303 Cook Industries, Inc. v. Iran, 12, 397 Cross Company v. Iran, 8, 97 CTI-Container Leasing Corporation v. Starline Iran Co., 26, 275 Dana Corporation v. Iran, 19, 374 Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall v. Iran, 1, 160 David Mikhael, Inc. v. Iran, 6, 20 De Soto, Inc. v. Iran Aircraft Industries, 14, 349 Delly (D.P.) v. Iran, 19, 360 Delly (S.L.J.) v. Iran, 19, 360 Deloitte, Haskins and Sells v. Computer Services Company, 3, 34 Department of Energy (Oak Ridge Operations) v. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, 21, 303 Detroit Parts Manufacturing Company v. Iran, 8, 79 Diagnostic Products Corporation v. Iran, 9, 306 Distribution International Corporation v. Iran, 17, 353 DoAll Dallas Company v. Iran, 23, 413 Dow Chemical Company v. Iran (Case No. 257), 6, 38 Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Iran (Case Nos. 103-104, 107-110), 3, 212 Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Iran (Case Nos. 105 and 137), 2, 291 Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Iran (Case Nos. 467–469 and 471), 9, 346 Dreyco, Inc. (E.D. Allmendinger Division) v. Iran, 8, 13 Econocorp, Inc. v. Iran, 8, 360 E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company v. Iran, 4, 183 Electric Heating Equipment Company v. Iran, 19, 374 Electronic Data Systems Corporation v. Iran, 7, 244 Elghanayan v. Iran, 32, 221 Enserch Corporation v. Iran, 8, 66 Enserch Service Company of Iran v. Iran, 8, 81 E.R. Squibb and Sons, Inc. v. Iran, 2, 44 Esso Africa, Inc. v. Towlid Rowghan Reﬁning (Public) Company, 2, 305 Esso Europe Supply Company, Inc. v. Towlid Rowghan Reﬁning (Public) Company, 2, 305 E-Systems, Inc. v. Iran, 4, 197 Exxon Corporation v. Iran, 23, 401 Farrington v. Islamic Republic of Iran Airlines, 18, 390 Fedders Corp. v. Loristan Refrigeration Industries, 29, 401 Federal Mogul International Distribution, Inc. v. Iran, 18, 390 F.H. Maloney Company v. Iran, 9, 70 Figgie International Inc. (Geo. J. Meyer Manufacturing Division) v. Zam Zam Bottling Company, 8, 214 First National Bank in St. Louis v. Iran, 18, 390 Fluor Corporation v. Bimeh Iran, 23, 413 Fluor Corporation v. Iran (Case No. 333), 23, 413 Fluor Corporation v. Iran (Case No. 810), 23, 413 FMC Corporation v. Iran, 11, 372 Foremost McKesson, Inc. v. Tolidaru, 2, 278 GAI-Tronics Corporation v. Iran, 19, 374 General Electric Company v. Iran, 7, 239

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY CATEGORY)

xli

General Electric Company v. Pars Appliance Manufacturing Company, 2, 132 General Electric Company (Space Division) v. Iran, 9, 6 General Motors Corporation v. Iran, 7, 220 General Tire and Rubber Company v. Iran Tire Manufacturing Company, 3, 351 Georgetown University v. Iran, 23, 413 Getty Iran Ltd. v. Iran, 13, 370 Gillette Company v. Iran, 3, 218 Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company v. Tasmeh Melli Company, 3, 181, 192 Granger Associates v. Iran, 16, 317 Gulf Ports Crating Company v. Ministry of Roads and Transportation, 2, 126 H & F Kornfeld, Inc. v. Iran, 21, 303 Hafez Glaziery and Glass Cutting Shop v. United States, 8, 349 Halliburton Company v. Doreen/IMCO, 6, 4 Halliburton Company v. Iran, 9, 310 Herbach & Rademan Inc. v. Iran, 19, 374 Herman Blum Consulting Engineers, Inc. v. Iran, 5, 354 Honeywell Information Systems, Inc. v. Information Systems Iran (ISIRAN), 1, 181 Hyatt International Corporation v. Iran, 10, 365 Indian Head, Inc. v. Iran, 13, 370 Industrial Equipment Co. of Houston v. Iran, 19, 374 Ingersoll-Rand Company v. Iran, 18, 390 Interaction Research Corporation v. Iran, 17, 362 Intercontinental Hotels Corporation v. Iran, 7, 249 Intercontinental Hotels Corporation and Overseas Private Investment Corporation v. Iran, 7, 249 International Schools Services, Inc. v. Iran, 1, 156 Iran v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 5, 155 Iran v. United States, Cases A13, A15 (I and IV:C), A26 (I, II and III), 32, 207 Iran v. United States, Case B-1, 23, 407; 27, 282 Iran v. United States, Case B-14, 23, 413 Iran v. United States, Claims of less than US $250,000, 27, 275 Iran (Civil Aviation Organization) v. United States (Military Assistance Advisory Group), Case B-60, 24, 291 Iran Chevron Oil Company v. Iran, 10, 357 ITT Industries, Inc. v. Iran, 2, 348 J.D. Marshall International, Inc. v. Iran, 8, 11 J.I. Case Company v. Aryan Yadak Company, 14, 349 Kaiser Engineers International, Inc. v. Iran, 2, 366 Kem International Co. v. Iran, 29, 395 Kidde Consultants, Inc. v. Haydar Ghyai & Associates, 30, 302 Lawrence v. Iran, 33, 483 Lockheed Corporation v. Iran, 11, 363 Lord Corporation v. Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Company, 18, 377 Louis Berger International, Inc. v. Plan and Budget Organization of Iran, 14, 349 Lowe Marschalk, Inc. v. Iran, 14, 349 Maxon Corporation v. Iran, 19, 374 McCabe, Jr., et al. v. Iran, 23, 413 Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of Iran v. United States Department of Agriculture, Case B-5, 23, 413

xlii

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY CATEGORY)

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of Iran v. United States Department of Agriculture, Case B-19, 23, 413 Ministry of Defense of Iran v. United States, Case B-74, 27, 275 Ministry of Defense of Iran v. United States, Case B-75, 24, 305 Ministry of Oil of Iran v. United States, 23, 413 Ministry of Roads and Transportation v. Port of Vancouver, Washington, 3, 338 Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company v. Iran, 8, 15 Mitra Leasing Corporation v. Iran, 28, 389 Mobil Oil Inc. v. Iran, 25, 339 Morris Inc. v. Iran, 1, 220 Morrison-Knudsen International Company, Inc. v. Iran, 9, 357 Murphy Middle East Oil Company v. National Iranian Oil Company, 13, 370 National Airmotive Corporation v. Iran, 3, 91, 124 National Corporation for Housing Partnerships v. Ministry of Mines and Industries of Iran, 7, 260 National Training and Development Service for State and Local Government v. Iran, 21, 303 NCR Corporation v. Iran, 1, 217 New York Blower Company v. Polyacryl Iran Corporation, 13, 370 NL Industries, Inc. v. Iran, 10, 365 Norad Private Joint Stock Co. v. United States, 19, 374 Northern Virginia Community College v. Iran, 23, 413 Norton Lilly & Co., Inc. v. Iran, 6, 147 Otis Elevator Company (New Jersey) v. Iran, 19, 374 Otis Engineering Corporation v. Iran, 9, 310 Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation v. Iran, 4, 280 Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Iran, 4, 205 Penwalt Corporation–Wallace & Tiernan Division v. Iran, 19, 374 Perkin Elmer Corporation v. Iran, 19, 374 Pﬁzer, Inc. v. Iran, 2, 90 Phillips Petroleum Company Iran v. Iran, 21, 285 Picker International Corporation v. Iran, 11, 372 Pickup, Jr. v. Iran, 11, 372 Pishdad v. United States, 25, 339 Pneumo Corporation v. Iran, 19, 374 Portland State University v. Iran, 19, 374 Procon International Inc. v. Iran, 6, 120 Proctor and Gamble Company v. Iran, 3, 186, 192 Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority v. Star Line Iran Company, 14, 349 Ralph M. Parsons Company v. Iran, 14, 349 Ray-O-Vac International Corporation v. Electric Storage Battery Company Iran, 4, 47 RCA Global Communications Inc. v. Iran, 16, 335 Reading & Bates Corporation v. International Bank of Iran, 5, 155 Reading & Bates Corporation v. Iran, 4, 199 Reading & Bates Exploration Co. v. National Iranian Oil Company, 26, 265 Revlon Inc. v. Iran, 8, 353 Reynolds Metals Company v. Iran, 3, 119, 124 Rumsey Electric Company v. Iran, 19, 374 San Jacinto Eastern Corporation v. Iran, 21, 303 San Jose State University v. Iran, 24, 305

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY CATEGORY)

xliii

Santa Fe International Company v. Iran, 10, 365 Santa Fe Overseas, Inc. v. Iran, 10, 365 SeaCo, Inc. v. Iran, 22, 370 Singer Company v. Iran (Case Nos. 343 and 365), 8, 18 Singer Company v. Iran (Case Nos. 344 and A-9), 7, 236 Singer Company v. Iran National Airlines Corporation, 1, 140 Sinker v. Iran, 18, 390 Smith International, Inc. v. Iran, 4, 33 Sohio-Iran Trading, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Company, 6, 33 Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Company, 13, 370 Sperry Corporation v. The High State Council of Informatics of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1, 216 Sperry-Sun, Inc. v. Iran, 10, 365 Stanwick Corporation v. Iran, 4, 20; 5, 76 Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Iran, 13, 370 Stewart R. Browne Disc, Inc. v. Iran, 17, 368 Stone and Webster Overseas Group, Inc. v. National Petrochemical Company, 4, 192 Stromberg-Carlson Corporation v. Iran, 19, 352 Sun Company, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Company, 28, 394 Sundstrand Data Control, Inc. v. Iran, 1, 408 Sylvan Ginsbury, Limited v. Iran, 21, 303 Tadjer-Cohen Associates, Inc. v. Iran, 21, 303 Tai, Inc. v. Iran, 29, 411 Technical Laboratory & Soil Mechanics of the Ministry of Roads & Transport of Iran v. Federal Highway Administration of the US Department of Transportation, 24, 305 Tehran American School Association, Trustees and Members v. Iran, 19, 365 Telecommunications Company of Iran v. United States, 24, 305 Teledyne Farris Engineering v. Iran, 19, 374 Texaco Iran Ltd. v. Iran, 13, 370 T.G. Howland International Company, Limited v. Iran, 23, 413 Tidewater, Inc. v. Iran, 9, 308 Tidewater, Inc. and Tidewater Marine Service, Inc. v. Iran, 9, 61 Timber Purchase Company v. National Iranian Oil Company, 3, 169 Transaero, Incorporated v. Iran, 21, 303 Transamerica ICS, Inc. v. Iran, 26, 275 Transocean Gulf Oil Company v. Iran, 10, 365 TransWorld Airlines, Inc. v. Iran, 5, 249 Troemner, Inc. v. Iran, 19, 374 TRW, Inc. v. Iran, 19, 374 Turner Entertainment Co. v. Iran, 16, 335 Union Oil Company of Iran v. National Iranian Oil Company, 13, 370 United States v. Iran, Case No. 86, 25, 327 United States v. Iran, Case B-31, 19, 374 United States v. Iran, Case B-33, 23, 413 United States v. Iran, Case B-38, 25, 327 United States v. Iran, Case B-39, 16, 335 United States v. Iran, Case B-76, 25, 327 United States v. Iran, Case B-77, 25, 327 United States v. Iran, Claims of less than US $250,000, 25, 327 United States v. Ministry of Defense of Iran, Case B-32, 27, 275 United States (Aeroquip Corporation) v. Iran (Civil Aviation Organization), 24, 305 United States (Commodity Credit Corporation) v. Iran, Case B-22, 19, 374

xliv

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY CATEGORY)

United States (Department of the Air Force) v. Iran (Iranian Air Force and the Foreign Ministry), Case B-35, 24, 291 United States (Eberle Tanning Company) v. Iran, 7, 247 United States (Federal Aviation Administration) v. Iran (Civil Aviation Organization), Case B-26, 24, 291 United States (Food and Drug Administration of the Public Health Service) v. Iran (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare), Case B-28, 24, 291 United States (Shipside Packing Company, Inc.) v. Iran, 5, 80 United States (Synalloy Corporation) v. Iran, 7, 258 United States (Taylor Machinery Company) v. Iran, 5, 150 United States (West Chemical Products, Inc.) v. Iran, 5, 148 United States Medical Export Company, Inc. v. Iran, 8, 83 United Technologies International, Inc. v. Iran, 17, 368 United Technologies International, Inc. v. Iranian Air Force, 7, 209 University of California, Santa Barbara v. Ministry of Culture and Higher Education, 17, 368 University of Idaho v. Iran, 19, 374 University of Southern California v. Iran, 30, 283 Upjohn Company v. Iran, 2, 332 VSI Corporation v. Iran Aircraft Industries Corporation, 3, 73, 78 Warner-Lambert Company v. Iran, 2, 261 Washington v. Iran, 19, 374 Weatherford International Inc. v. Iran, 17, 368 Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. Iran, 8, 183; 13, 370 White Consolidated Industries, Inc. v. Iran Compressor Manufacturing Company, 14, 349 William H. Rorer, Inc. v. Toobi Company Ltd., 3, 390 William Powell Company v. Iran, 19, 374 Williams Brothers International Corporation v. Iran (Case Nos. 25 and 492), 14, 349 Williams Brothers International Corporation v. Iran (Case Nos. 26 and 27), 2, 228 Xerox Corporation v. Iran, 7, 223 Zokor International, Ltd. v. Iran, 8, 72

INTERIM AWARDS Aeronutronic Overseas Services, Inc. v. The Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 7, 217; 8, 75 Atlantic Richﬁeld Company v. Iran, 8, 179 Behring International, Inc. v. Islamic Republic Iranian Air Force, 3, 173; 8, 44 Bendone-Derossi International v. Iran, 6, 130 Boeing Company v. Iran, 5, 152; 6, 43 CBA International Development Corporation v. Iran, 4, 53 E-Systems, Inc. v. Iran, 2, 51 Fluor Corporation v. Iran, 11, 296 Ford Aerospace & Communications Corporation v. Iran, 2, 281 Ford Aerospace & Communications Corporation v. The Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 3, 384; 6, 104 Linen, Fortinberry and Associates, Inc. v. Iran, 8, 85

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY CATEGORY)

xlv

Panacaviar, S.A. v. Iran, 13, 193 QuesTech, Inc. v. Iran, 2, 96 RCA Global Communications, Inc. v. Iran, 4, 5, 9; 5, 121 Reading & Bates Corporation v. Iran, 2, 401 Rockwell International Systems, Inc. v. Iran, 2, 310, 369 Tadjer-Cohen Associates, Inc. v. Iran, 9, 302 Touche Ross and Company v. Iran, 3, 59, 200 United States (Shipside Packing Company, Inc.) v. Iran, 3, 331 Watkins-Johnson Company v. Iran, 2, 362

INTERLOCUTORY AWARDS Abrahamian v. Iran, 23, 285 Aeronutronic Overseas Services, Inc. v. Telecommunications Company of Iran, 5, 187 American Bell International Inc. v. Iran, 6, 74 Amoco Iran Oil Company v. Iran, 1, 493; 3, 297 Anaconda-Iran, Inc. v. Iran, 13, 199 Chas. T. Main International, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water and Power Authority, 3, 156; 5, 185; 8, 41; 10, 21; 21, 12 Computer Sciences Corporation v. Iran, 8, 99 Danielpour (S.J.) v. Iran, 22, 123 Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Iran, 1, 280, 284, 305, 320 Drucker, Jr. v. Foreign Transaction Company, 1, 252, 284, 305, 320 Ebrahimi (C.R.) v. Iran, 22, 138 Ebrahimi (C.T.) v. Iran, 22, 138 Ebrahimi (M.S.) v. Iran, 22, 138 Ebrahimi (S.S.) v. Iran, 22, 138 Ford Aerospace & Communications Corporation v. The Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1, 268, 284, 305, 320 Gibbs and Hill, Inc. v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission Company (TAVANIR) of the Ministry of Energy of the Government of Iran, 1, 236, 284, 305, 320 Golshani v. Iran, 22, 155 Gould Marketing, Inc. v. Ministry of National Defense of Iran, 3, 147 Halliburton Company v. Doreen/IMCO, 1, 242, 284, 305, 320 Harza v. Iran, 2, 68; 4, 59 Hemmat v. Iran, 22, 129 Howard, Needles, Tammens and Bergendoff (HNTB) v. Iran, 1, 248, 284, 305, 320 Hyatt International Corporation v. Iran, 9, 72 International Schools Services, Inc. v. Iran, 10, 6 International Schools Services, Inc. v. National Iranian Copper Industry Company, 5, 338 Iran v. United States, Case A-4, 5, 131

xlvi

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY CATEGORY)

Iran v. United States, Case A-15, 5, 131; 12, 40; 25, 247 Iran v. United States, Case B-1, 10, 207 Itel International Corporation v. Social Security Organization of Iran, 7, 31 Khosrowshahi (F.L.) v. Iran, 24, 40 Lawrence v. Iran, 25, 190 Malek v. Iran, 19, 48 Marks and Umann v. Iran, 8, 290 Nazari v. Iran, 26, 7 Nikpour v. Iran, 29, 67 Nourafchan (G.) v. Iran, 23, 307 Nourafchan (Z.A.) v. Iran, 23, 307 Oil Field of Texas, Inc. v. Iran (OSCO), 1, 347 Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation v. Iran, 2, 322 Phillips Petroleum Company, Iran v. Iran, 1, 487; 3, 297 Protiva v. Iran, 23, 259 Riahi v. Iran, 28, 176 Saghi v. Iran, 14, 3 SeaCo, Inc. v. Iran, 11, 210 Sedco, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Company, 9, 248; 10, 180 Starrett Housing Corporation v. Iran, 4, 122; 7, 119 Stone and Webster Overseas Group, Inc. v. National Petrochemical Company, 1, 274, 284, 305, 320 T.C.S.B., Inc. v. Iran, 1, 261, 284, 305, 320 Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. Iran, 14, 104 Zokor International, Inc. v. Iran, 1, 271, 284, 305, 320

INTERIM AND INTERLOCUTORY AWARDS Behring International, Inc. v. Islamic Republic Iranian Air Force, 8, 238 Component Builders, Inc. v. Iran, 8, 216

ORDERS Abboud v. Iran, 1, 230 Advanced Computer Techniques Corporation v. Iran, 2, 33 Aeronutronic Overseas Services, Inc. v. The Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1, 483 AHFI Planning Associates, Inc. v. Iran, 3, 350 Ainsworth v. Iran, 1, 230; 4, 26 American Bell International Inc. v. Iran, 3, 209 American Independent Oil Company v. National Iranian Oil Company, 3, 372

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY CATEGORY) Amman and Whitney v. Khuzestan Urban Development Organization, 5, 115 Amoco International Finance Corporation v. National Iranian Oil Company, 4, 4 Amoco Iran Oil Company v. Iran, 2, 283, 345 Anaconda-Iran, Inc. v. Iran, 3, 209 Arco Iran, Inc. v. Iran, 3, 372 Assistance in Developing Educational System, Inc. v. Iran, 4, 18 Baker International Corporation v. Iran, 1, 230 Bank Markazi Iran v. Barclays Bank International, Ltd., 2, 35 Bank Markazi Iran v. Continental Bank Intl. (Paciﬁc), 8, 371 Bank Markazi Iran v. United States, Case No. 780, 8, 364 Bank Markazi Iran v. United States, Case No. 821, 8, 366 Bank Mellat v. Chemical Bank, New York (Case Nos. 836, 847 and 890), 2, 35 Bank Mellat v. Crocker National Bank, 2, 246; 3, 316, 318, 380 Bank Mellat v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, 2, 246; 3, 316, 318, 380 Bank Mellat v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, 1, 486 Bank Melli Iran v. United States, 9, 205 Bank Sepah v. City Bank, N.A., 2, 30, 35 Bank Sepah v. Mellon Bank, N.A., 2, 35 Bank Sepah v. United States, 8, 362 Baroid International Petroleum Services, Inc. v. Iran, 1, 178 Behring International, Inc. v. Islamic Republic Iranian Air Force, 1, 230; 14, 23 Bendone-Derossi International v. Iran, 1, 178 Birnbaum v. Iran, 14, 147 Blount Brothers Corporation v. Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, 2, 268 Carrier Corporation v. Iran, 1, 178 CBS v. Iran, 21, 279 Charter (Iran) Petroleum Company v. National Iranian Oil Company, 5, 88 Chas. T. Main International, Inc. v. KhuzestanWater and Power Authority, 1, 337; 4, 60 Chevron Research Company v. National Iranian Oil Company, 1, 155, 334 Component Builders, Inc. v. Iran, 8, 3 Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago v. Iran, 1, 230, 232 Control Data Corporation v. Iran, 1, 230; 18, 60 Cummins v. Iran, 14, 21 Dadras International v. Iran, 30, 104 David Mikhael, Inc. v. Iran, 3, 84 Development and Resources Corporation v. Iran, 3, 209 Dic of Delaware, Inc. v. Tehran Redevelopment Corporation, 1, 154 Dow Chemical Company v. Iran (Case 499), 1, 122 Drucker, Jr. v. Foreign Transaction Company, 2, 4 E-Systems, Inc. v. Iran, 1, 178, 222, 225 Exxon Corporation v. Iran, 3, 372 Fedders Corporation v. Iran, 18, 72 Flexi-Van Leasing, Inc. v. Iran, 1, 166, 455; 3, 202; 5, 138 Fluor Corporation v. Iran, 1, 121, 178; 18, 56, 68 Ford Aerospace & Communications Corporation v. Iran, 3, 349; 10, 108 Ford Aerospace & Communications Corporation v. The Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 8, 284 Foremost Tehran Inc. v. Iran, 2, 33; 3, 361; 4, 62

xlvii

xlviii

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY CATEGORY)

General Dynamics Corporation v. Iran, 1, 485 General Motors Corporation v. Iran, 2, 33; 3, 1 Getty Iran Ltd. v. Iran, 3, 372 Ghaffari v. Iran, 18, 64, 79 Gould Marketing, Inc. v. Ministry of National Defense of Iran, 9, 406 Gruen Associates, Inc. v. Iran Housing Company, 2, 327 Harnischfeger Corporation v. Ministry of Roads and Transportation, 4, 76 Harza v. Iran, 1, 234 Haus International, Inc. v. Tehran Redevelopment Corporation, 3, 87; 5, 144 H.B. Fox Geotechnical Consultants, Inc. v. Iran, 18, 70 Herman Blum Consulting Engineers, Inc. v. Iran, 1, 218 Houston Contracting Company v. National Iranian Oil Company, 14, 18 Howard, Needles, Tammens and Bergendoff (HNTB) v. Iran, 2, 368 Intercomp Resources Development and Engineering, Inc. v. Oil Service Company of Iran, 1, 391 International Schools Services, Inc. v. Iranian Copper Industries Company, 2, 156; 3, 316, 318 International Systems & Controls Corporation v. Iran, 3, 209 Iran v. United States, Case A-4, 5, 112 Iran v. United States, Case A-15, 4, 28; 5, 112; 14, 171 Iran v. United States, Case A-25, 21, 283, 302 Iran v. United States, Case B-1, 4, 57; 18, 45; 21, 279 Iran Chevron Oil Company v. Iran, 3, 372 Itel Corporation v. Iran, 1, 326 Itel International Corporation v. Social Security Organization of Iran, 21, 279 Kay Lerner v. Iran, 1, 215 Khosrowshahi v. Iran, 1, 339 Kiaie v. Iran, 14, 307 Leach v. Iran, 18, 231 Ministry of Defense of Iran v. United States, 18, 74 Ministry of Petroleum of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, 1, 383 Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company v. Iran, 1, 230 Mitra Leasing Corporation v. Iran, 18, 62 Mobil Oil Iran Inc. v. Iran, 3, 372 Morrison-Knudsen Paciﬁc Ltd. v. Ministry of Roads and Transportation, 3, 76 National Airmotive Corporation v. Iran, 1, 158 National Corporation for Housing Partnerships v. Ministry of Mines and Industry of Iran, 3, 87 NIC Leasing, Inc. v. Iran, 5, 85 NL Industries, Inc. v. Iran, 1, 178 Northern Virginia Community College v. Iran, 18, 66 Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation v. Iran, 4, 1 Panacaviar, S.A. v. Iran, 14, 102; 18, 63 Pepsico, Inc. v. Iran (Zamzam Bottling Company Azerbaijan, et al.), 1, 173; 2, 33 Phibro Corporation v. Ministry of War–ETKA Co. Ltd., 11, 289 Phillips Petroleum Company, Iran v. Iran, 2, 1, 283

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY CATEGORY) Questech, Inc. v. Iran, 4, 72 RCA Global Communications, Inc. v. Iran, 3, 8 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company v. Iran, 1, 119, 336; 2, 124; 3, 39; 4, 2 San Jacinto Eastern Corporation v. Iran, 3, 372 Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Iran, 1, 335; 3, 87; 4, 65 Sedco, Inc. v. Iran Marine Industrial Co., 18, 58 Sedco, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Company, 8, 28, 34; 10, 3 Short v. Iran, 14, 20 Sohio-Iran Trading, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Company, 3, 372 Sperry-Sun, Inc. v. Iran, 1, 178 Starrett Housing Corporation v. Iran, 1, 386; 10, 110; 13, 350 Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc. v. Iran, 5, 141 Tadjer-Cohen Associates, Inc. v. Iran, 18, 59, 287 Tavakoli v. Iran, 14, 309 T.C.S.B., Inc. v. Iran, 4, 61 Technology Enterprises, Inc. v. Foreign Transaction Company, 2, 5 Tehran American School Association, Trustees and Members v. Iran, 1, 230 Texaco Iran Ltd. v. Iran, 3, 372 TME International, Inc. v. Iran, 1, 178 Touche Ross and Company v. Iran, 3, 208 Transamerica ICS, Inc. v. Iran, 3, 84 Transocean Gulf Oil Company v. Iran, 3, 372 Transportation Consultants International v. Iran National Airlines Corporation, 1, 340 Uiterwyk Corporation v. Iran, 19, 106 Ultrasystems Incorporated v. Iran, 2, 139 Unidyne Corporation v. Iran, 1, 178; 2, 138 United States v. Iran, Case A-16, 3, 316, 318, 380 United States (Teledyne Industries Inc.) v. Iran, 3, 336 United Technologies International, Inc. v. Iranian Air Force, 3, 209 VSI Corporation v. Iran, 2, 31, 33, 260 Warner-Lambert Company v. Iran, 1, 230 Western Dynamics Corporation v. Iran and Etka Organization, 1, 178 William L. Pereira Associates, Iran v. Iran, 1, 219, 484

REFUSAL CASES AMF Overseas Corporation, Re, 1, 392 Bassin, Re, 9, 3 Bodnar, Re, 21, 6 Cascade Overview Development Enterprises, Inc., Re, 1, 127, 129, 132 Creditcorp International Inc., Re, 21, 10 Detroit Bank and Trust Company, Re, 1, 129; 2, 312; 3, 3 Dorian International Credit Co., Inc., Re, 21, 10

xlix

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CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY CATEGORY)

Etka Organization, Re, 19, 185 Glucosan (Private Joint Stock) Co., Re, 19, 191 Hawaiian Agronomics Company, Re, 1, 138 Helali, Re, 1, 134 Industrial & Mining Bank (R.C.39), Re, 19, 179 Industrial & Mining Bank (R.C.40), Re, 19, 182 Iran Brockway Company Ltd., Re, 17, 331 Iran Electronics Industries, Re, 19, 188 Iran Helicopter Support & Renewal Company (R.C.32), Re, 23, 244 Iran Helicopter Support & Renewal Company (R.C.33), Re, 23, 247 Iran Helicopter Support & Renewal Company (R.C.34), Re, 23, 250 Iran National Airlines Company, Re, 17, 337 Iranian Tobacco Company (R.C.26), Re, 21, 8 Iranian Tobacco Company (R.C.27), Re, 7, 275 Jahanger, Re, 1, 128, 129, 132 Jahani, Re, 1, 168 K and S Irrigation Company, Re, 1, 228 Lee, Re, 21, 7 Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance of Iran, Re, 6, 27 Ministry of Mines and Metals and National Iranian Steel Company, Re, 23, 253 Ministry of Roads and Transportation (R.C.41), Re, 23, 256 Ministry of Roads and Transportation (R.C.48), Re, 17, 343 Mobasser, Re, 1, 176 NAHAJA, Ministry of Defence, Re, 19, 197 National Iranian Copper Industries Company, Re, 17, 346 National Iranian Oil Company, Re, 17, 334 Pereira, Re, 21, 3 Raymond International (UK), Ltd., Re, 1, 394 Satellite Application Project, Re, 17, 340 Sherkate Tractor Sazi Iran (Sahami Khass), Re, 19, 176 Showrai, Re, 1, 226 Tehran Regional Electric Company, Re, 19, 194 United Technologies International, Inc., Re, 21, 5

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES 1 ARRANGED ACCORDING TO CASE NUMBER Case No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

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25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35

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Page 1, 219, 484; 5, 198 4, 96 4, 183 25, 153; 32, 184 11, 160 1, 236, 284, 305, 320 6, 219 1, 123, 342 10, 365 10, 365 9, 310 9, 310 1, 169 2, 31, 33, 260; 3, 73, 78 2, 141 1, 411 1, 173; 2, 33; 13, 3, 328 1, 155, 334; 2, 364; 3, 78 28, 392 28, 394 13, 370 13, 370 1, 386; 4, 122; 7, 119; 10, 110; 13, 350; 16, 112 14, 349 2, 228 2, 228 2, 401; 4, 199 26, 265 1, 185, 442 1, 181 7, 223 1, 335; 3, 87; 4, 65; 6, 149 1, 340; 9, 360 1, 119, 336; 2, 124; 3, 39; 4, 2; 7, 181; 8, 55 1, 166, 455; 3, 202; 5, 138; 12, 335; 13, 324 2, 33; 3, 361; 4, 62; 10, 228 5, 361 1, 487; 2, 1, 283; 3, 297; 5, 51; 21, 79, 285 2, 372; 4, 237 2, 391

Case No. 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55

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56 57 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68

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Page 3, 209; 7, 209 1, 347; 12, 308 22, 138; 30, 170; 31, 3 22, 138 22, 138; 30, 170; 31, 3 22, 138; 30, 170; 31, 3 3, 209; 6, 74; 12, 170; 14, 173 3, 147; 6, 272; 9, 406 6, 272; 9, 406 1, 242, 284, 305, 320; 6, 4 10, 56 10, 95 4, 212; 8, 107 1, 493; 2, 283, 345; 3, 297; 5, 51; 25, 301 4, 4; 15, 189; 25, 314 2, 334 2, 96; 4, 72; 9, 107 3, 209; 25, 20; 26, 256 10, 37 2, 268; 3, 225 6, 118 5, 141; 8, 298 8, 99; 10, 269 4, 20; 5, 76; 24, 102 3, 239; 5, 73 1, 248, 284, 305, 320; 2, 368; 11, 302 2, 332 2, 78 3, 372; 13, 370 3, 372; 10, 357 3, 372; 16, 3; 25, 339 3, 372; 9, 184 3, 372; 16, 3; 21, 303 3, 372; 5, 88 3, 372; 10, 365 3, 372; 6, 33 3, 372; 13, 370 3, 372; 16, 3; 25, 339 7, 1 3, 119, 124 2, 100, 139; 4, 77 3, 77; 25, 327

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CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY CASE NUMBER)

Case No. 87 88 89 90 91 92 93

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94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111

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112 113 114 115 118 119 120

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Case No. 136 137 138 139 140

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Page 3, 351 2, 291 1, 218; 5, 354 3, 218 1, 261, 284, 305, 320; 4, 61; 5, 160 4, 29 1, 403 5, 134 2, 269 32, 73 26, 228 3, 203; 29, 383 3, 10; 5, 74 3, 372; 16, 3; 23, 401 2, 305 2, 305 2, 305 17, 3 15, 3; 16, 110 2, 348 2, 157, 178 1, 483; 7, 217; 8, 75; 11, 223 1, 268, 284, 305, 320; 3, 384; 6, 104; 8, 284; 11, 184; 12, 304 3, 8; 4, 5, 9; 5, 121; 16, 335 8, 373 29, 185 14, 307; 32, 42 3, 42; 5, 1 7, 8 3, 209; 13, 199; 28, 320 22, 118 22, 123 22, 129 1, 140 2, 247 14, 18; 20, 3 3, 87; 5, 144; 9, 313 9, 308 9, 61 4, 39 1, 339; 24, 40; 30, 76 3, 350; 11, 168 4, 76; 7, 90; 8, 119 14, 149 28, 225, 318 5, 90 16, 317 3, 270 1, 163 17, 269

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY CASE NUMBER) Case No. 188 189 190 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 226 227 228 229 230 231 233 236 237 238 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248

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Page 2, 327; 3, 97, 124 2, 303 18, 175 28, 371 19, 48; 28, 246 7, 18 18, 180 18, 150 21, 279; 25, 131 5, 115; 12, 94 5, 235 2, 241; 3, 364 6, 1 19, 307 1, 178 29, 189 1, 216 2, 90 1, 230 18, 352 14, 191 27, 145 2, 171, 178 30, 292 30, 104; 31, 127 33, 41 30, 104; 31, 127 9, 397 4, 18 2, 232 3, 110, 124 26, 7; 28, 192; 30, 123 5, 152; 6, 43; 13, 359 29, 193 1, 230 17, 153; 27, 3, 269 2, 366 2, 366 2, 278 2, 33; 3, 361; 4, 62; 10, 228 7, 249 8, 353 9, 350 3, 334 1, 230 1, 215 2, 33; 3, 326 3, 62 4, 263 8, 368 29, 197 26, 193

Case No. 249 250 251 252 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 271 273 274 275 276 277 279 280 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 298 299 300 302 305 307 308 309 310 311

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Page 29, 201 13, 97; 18, 72; 29, 401 23, 290 1, 230, 232 1, 271, 284, 305, 320; 8, 72 1, 154; 8, 144; 21, 4 21, 20 6, 38 9, 357 9, 357 11, 210; 22, 370; 28, 198 19, 200, 253 1, 178 12, 160 13, 124 5, 85 33, 368 6, 125 24, 203 25, 278 32, 124; 33, 3 25, 196, 273 28, 232; 33, 349 25, 3 22, 170 28, 216 3, 176, 192 3, 7; 4, 272 1, 485; 5, 386 14, 283 9, 153 14, 263 29, 205 19, 374 12, 146 25, 289 1, 230; 2, 261 9, 340 1, 274, 284, 305, 320; 4, 192 30, 8 12, 288 31, 36 14, 3; 29, 20 8, 214 1, 178 9, 10, 206; 11, 182 17, 368 2, 126 3, 366; 24, 297; 26, 60; 27, 288 25, 178 14, 349 8, 81

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CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY CASE NUMBER)

Case No. 312 313 314 315 316 317 319 320 321 322 324 325 328 332 333

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334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370

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Page 7, 26 27, 248; 28, 51 11, 217 18, 289 23, 259; 31, 89 14, 223 25, 264; 30, 22 8, 97 30, 283 27, 49 13, 99 9, 46 2, 5; 5, 118 30, 13 1, 121, 178; 11, 296; 18, 56, 68; 23, 413 13, 179 12, 3 1, 178; 29, 67 1, 178 16, 291 16, 335 6, 52 1, 178; 8, 49 1, 408 8, 18 7, 236 1, 230 3, 280 1, 178; 10, 365 1, 178; 10, 365 1, 178; 10, 365 26, 37 1, 178; 30, 3 11, 372; 14, 111, 261 1, 178; 28, 309 17, 353 1, 178; 29, 3 1, 178; 24, 121 1, 230; 19, 365 9, 6 7, 239 11, 372 13, 370 29, 209 1, 178; 17, 368 8, 18 17, 114; 18, 113 29, 222 1, 178; 2, 138; 29, 310; 30, 19 1, 230; 12, 385 2, 362; 22, 218

Case No. 371 373 374 375 377 380 381 382

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383 – 384 – 386 – 387 – 388 – 389 – 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 412 413 414 415 418 419 420 421 422 423 425 427 428 430 431

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Page 17, 266 1, 135 1, 178 1, 178; 6, 130; 18, 115 23, 285 1, 178; 25, 172 19, 106, 107, 171, 186 1, 230; 3, 173; 4, 89; 6, 30; 8, 44, 238; 14, 23; 27, 218 1, 230; 24, 265 14, 349 1, 178; 26, 148 1, 178; 3, 36, 78 1, 178, 222, 225; 2, 51; 4, 197 8, 183; 13, 93, 370; 14, 104; 33, 60, 204 1, 178; 25, 190; 33, 483 1, 178; 25, 190; 33, 483 1, 178; 25, 190; 33, 483 12, 397 27, 122 8, 3, 216; 9, 404; 23, 3 8, 179; 28, 401 1, 178; 25, 229 1, 178; 25, 235 1, 178; 25, 241 1, 178 1, 178 1, 178 1, 178 1, 178 1, 178 1, 178 1, 178 1, 178 17, 31; 18, 76 5, 187; 14, 339 23, 307; 29, 295 26, 190 18, 88 23, 307; 29, 295 2, 226 32, 3 18, 90 29, 411 7, 249 1, 230; 8, 15; 17, 294 5, 78 3, 181, 192 2, 38 2, 310, 369; 23, 150; 24, 3 28, 21, 195

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY CASE NUMBER) Case No. 432 433 434 435 436 437 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 457 458 459 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 471 473 474 476 477 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490

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Page 34, 185 5, 155 5, 249 25, 212 6, 120 10, 22 3, 209; 12, 239 25, 15 4, 47 1, 391 22, 3 18, 390 18, 62; 28, 389 8, 66 23, 282 13, 331 1, 158; 3, 91, 124 9, 203 26, 275 3, 84; 26, 275 8, 236 1, 230; 4, 26; 18, 92; 25, 188 26, 244 34, 3 8, 290; 9, 69 14, 349 26, 44 26, 44 26, 44 26, 44 26, 44 1, 280, 284, 305, 320 9, 346 9, 346 9, 346 9, 346 21, 303 11, 289; 26, 15, 254 7, 31; 21, 279; 24, 272 14, 349 29, 59 3, 59, 200, 208; 9, 284 19, 73 3, 169 21, 25 17, 245 28, 176 18, 98 11, 53 4, 205 3, 390 1, 326; 28, 159

Case No. 491 492 494 495 498 499 510 534 536 540 541 543 548 556 559 569 576 580 582 591 624 625 626 668 679 763 764 766 767 769 770 771 772 778 780 783 800 801 802 803 804 806 808 810 811 812 814 819 821 827 828 829

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Page 13, 370 14, 349 24, 47 2, 41 13, 193; 14, 100, 102; 18, 63 1, 122 21, 11 21, 11 21, 11 21, 11 21, 11 21, 11 21, 11 21, 11 9, 205 1, 486 5, 155 5, 155 2, 246; 3, 316, 318, 380; 5, 57 2, 246; 3, 316, 318, 380; 5, 57 11, 70 11, 180 29, 395 8, 371 13, 95 8, 20 3, 197; 22, 204; 25, 186 4, 210 30, 267 12, 126 21, 28 27, 40, 194 7, 244 2, 35 8, 364 2, 35 32, 221 32, 221 32, 221 32, 221 32, 221 6, 147 2, 44 23, 413 23, 413 22, 155; 29, 78 22, 339 21, 303 8, 366 31, 26 27, 196 11, 363; 18, 292; 19, 317

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lvi Case No. 831 – 832 – 833 – 834 – 836 – 839 – 840 – 841 – 842 – 843 – 844 – 845 – 847 – 880 – 890 – 926 – 928 – 930 – 931 – 934 – 940 – 941 – 942 – 945 – 947 – 949 – 950 – 951 – 952 – 953 – 954 – 957 – 965 – 967 – 968 – 1000112782 – 10026 – 10035 – 10043 – 10047 – 10059 – 10065 – 10066 – 10067 – 10087 – 10089 – 10105 – 10110 – 10126 – 10159 – 10163 –

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY CASE NUMBER) Page 22, 194 14, 309; 33, 206 11, 372 14, 176 2, 35 33, 460 33, 460 30, 302 33, 272 33, 272 33, 272 21, 13 2, 35 23, 378 2, 35 3, 84; 6, 20 4, 53; 5, 177 28, 382 13, 370 1, 383 23, 268 28, 53, 307 8, 349 2, 30, 35; 8, 362 10, 177 8, 24 30, 70 14, 11 24, 269 34, 67 16, 335 14, 251 23, 265 29, 260; 31, 286 18, 79; 31, 60 3, 77; 25, 327 19, 374 12, 139 5, 148 8, 79 18, 224 21, 303 18, 390 19, 374 23, 276 17, 362 23, 413 19, 374 10, 365 23, 133 19, 345

Case No. 10172 10173 10199 10212 10216 10273 10296 10303 10335 10355 10398 10405 10415 10418 10425 10427 10457 10513 10514 10517 10541 10547 10569 10605 10606 10633 10638 10645 10656 10706 10712 10719 10792 10812 10832 10853 10854 10855 10856 10861 10865 10871 10891 10913 10972 10973 11005 11038 11045 11102 11135 11157

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Page 16, 103 11, 372; 12, 306 17, 92 11, 72, 300 19, 374 19, 321 24, 305 14, 349 11, 150 19, 374 23, 413 13, 370 19, 374 13, 370 8, 360 18, 154 19, 374 8, 85; 19, 62 18, 232 10, 319; 11, 283 19, 374 19, 374 19, 374 19, 360 19, 360 18, 164 21, 303 22, 111 23, 413 14, 86 16, 297 8, 83 18, 64 3, 336; 23, 126 14, 147 7, 277; 13, 286 7, 277; 13, 286 7, 277; 13, 286 7, 277; 13, 286 21, 303 5, 150 24, 305 19, 374 17, 135 19, 374 18, 377 14, 349 18, 390 22, 213 23, 303 14, 20; 16, 76 18, 390

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY CASE NUMBER) Case No. 11244 11286 11294 11300 11377 11415 11429 11445 11485 11486 11491 11507 11539 11553 11590 11614 11653 11657 11697 11713 11723 11803 11815 11875 11887 11961 12118

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Page 17, 368 23, 351 19, 352 19, 374 18, 275 19, 374 23, 296 9, 70 18, 390 19, 374 24, 238 8, 11 19, 374 8, 42 23, 413 7, 247 14, 349 19, 374 9, 306 10, 333; 11, 285 14, 21 24, 252 7, 258 3, 331; 5, 80 17, 362 18, 390 9, 302; 18, 59, 287; 21, 303 18, 231; 23, 233 23, 413 17, 153 18, 66 24, 116 19, 374 8, 13

12183 – 12257 – 12384 – 12438 – 12458 – 12567 – 12701 – 1271312721 – 23, 413 12756 – 18, 70 12762 – 23, 413 12778 – 19, 374 12783 – 13, 261 12784 – 25, 339 12785 – 19, 374 1278612892 – 18, 393; 27, 275 A/1 – 1, 144, 189 A/2 – 1, 101 A-3 – 27, 256 A-4 – 5, 112, 131 A4, A7 and A15 (I:F and III), – 33, 362 A-8 – 27, 256 A-9 – 7, 236

lvii

Case No. Page A-13, A15 (I and IV:C), A26 (I, II and III) – 32, 207 A-14 – 4, 74 A-15 – 4, 28; 5, 112, 131; 8, 63; 12, 40; 13, 173; 14, 171, 311; 25, 247 A-15IIA and IIB – 28, 112 A-15 (IV) and A24 – 32, 115; 34, 105 A-15IVA and A24 – 29, 214 A-16 – 3, 316, 318, 380; 5, 57; 9, 97 A-17 – 8, 189 A/18 – 5, 251, 428 A/19 – 16, 285 A/20 – 11, 271 A/21 – 14, 324 A-24FT – 29, 214 A-25 – 21, 283, 302 A27 – 34, 39 B-1 – 4, 57; 10, 207; 18, 45; 19, 3, 273; 21, 279; 22, 105; 23, 407; 27, 282 B-2 – 13, 155 B-3 – 8, 89 B-4 – 23, 413 B-5 – 23, 413 B-7 – 6, 141; 12, 25 B-8 – 17, 187 B-9 – 17, 214 B-10 – 17, 238 B-11 – 22, 365 B-12 – 17, 228 B-13 – 13, 158 B-14 – 23, 413 B-15 – 24, 305 B-16 – 5, 94 B-18 – 13, 161 B-19 – 23, 413 B-20 – 13, 164 B-21 – 8, 93 B-22 – 19, 374 B-24 – 5, 97 B-26 – 24, 291 B-27 – 21, 303 B-28 – 24, 291 B-29 – 6, 12 B-31 – 19, 374 B-32 – 27, 275 B-33 – 23, 413 B-35 – 24, 291 B-36 – 32, 162; 33, 56, 346 B-38 – 25, 327 B-39 – 16, 335

lviii Case No. B-40 B-41 B-44 B-47 B-51 B-53 B-55 B-56 B-58 B-59 B-60 B-63 B-65 B-66 B-67 B-69 B-71 B-72 B-73 B-74 B-75 B-76 B-77 R.C.1 R.C.2 R.C.3 R.C.5 R.C.10 R.C.11 R.C.13 R.C.14 R.C.15

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY CASE NUMBER)

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Page 17, 183 24, 305 24, 305 21, 303 17, 200 5, 105 23, 320 5, 357 32, 92 12, 33 24, 291 18, 84 18, 390 14, 276 3, 338 12, 33 13, 277 13, 271 23, 413 18, 74; 27, 295 24, 305 25, 327 25, 327 1, 127, 129, 132 1, 128, 129, 132 1, 129; 2, 312; 3, 3 21, 3 1, 138 1, 234 21, 6 21, 5 1, 176

Case No. R.C.16 R.C.17 R.C.18 R.C.19 R.C.20 R.C.21 R.C.24 R.C.26 R.C.27 R.C.28 R.C.29 R.C.30 R.C.32 R.C.33 R.C.34 R.C.35 R.C.36 R.C.38 R.C.39 R.C.40 R.C.41 R.C.42 R.C.43 R.C.44 R.C.45 R.C.46 R.C.47 R.C.48 R.C.49 R.C.50 R.C.51 R.C.56

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Page 1, 168 21, 10 21, 10 21, 10 1, 392 1, 394 6, 27 21, 8 7, 275 1, 226 1, 228 21, 7 23, 244 23, 247 23, 250 17, 331 23, 253 19, 176 19, 179 19, 182 23, 256 17, 334 19, 185 17, 337 19, 188 19, 191 17, 340 17, 343 19, 194 17, 346 19, 197 9, 3

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES 1 ARRANGED ACCORDING TO NUMBER OF DECISION OR AWARD DECISIONS Decision No 1-A2-FT 2-REF 5-2 3-REF 11-2 4-REF 1-FT 5-REF 2-FT 6-REF 10-2 7-255-3 8-AI-FT 9-REF 16-2 10-REF 15-3 11-REF 14-2 12-A1-FT 13-REF 13-2 14-REF 30-2 15-REF 28-1 16-REF 29-1 17-REF 20-FT 18-REF 21-FT 19-REF 26-1 20-REF 27-1 21-REF 17/REF18/ REF 19-3 22-REF 3-FT 23-REF 3-FT 24-10853/10854/10855/ 10856-1 25-510/534/536/540/ 541/543/548/556-1 26-200-1 27-382-3 28-766-3 29-67-3 30-149-1 31-425-1 32-A18-FT 33-REF 24-3 34-100-3 35-A15-FT 36-54-3 37-A17-FT 38-246-2

1

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Page 1, 101 21, 3 1, 134 1, 127 1, 128 1, 138 21, 4 1, 144 1, 168 1, 176 21, 5 1, 189 21, 6 21, 7 1, 226 1, 228 1, 392 1, 394 21, 8 7, 275

Decision No 39-REF 56-1 40-395-3 41-302-3 42-10517-1 43-11713-1 44-89-3 45-A20-FT 46-10212-2 47-159-3 48-10173-3 49-389-2 50-679-2 51-250-3 52-A15-FT 53-114-3 54-36-1 55-18-1 56-951-1 57-498-1 58-48-3 59-93-1 60-353-2 61-123-1 62-A21-FT 63-155-3 64-129-3 65-A19-FT 66-338-2 67-REF 35-2 68-REF 42-2 69-REF 44-2 70-REF 47-2 71-REF 48-2 72-REF 50-2 73-409-1 74-366-3 75-REF 38-1 76-REF 39-1 77-REF 40-1 78-REF 43-1 79-REF 45-1

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21, 11 3, 364 4, 89 4, 210 5, 73 5, 74 5, 78 5, 251 6, 27 8, 53 8, 63 8, 107 8, 189 8, 368

The ﬁgures in bold type refer to the volume number.

lix

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Page 9, 3 9, 404 11, 182 11, 283 11, 285 11, 287 11, 271 11, 300 12, 304 12, 306 13, 93 13, 95 13, 97 13, 173 13, 254 13, 324 13, 328 14, 11 14, 100 14, 173 14, 255 14, 261 14, 279 14, 324 16, 110 16, 282 16, 285 16, 291 17, 331 17, 334 17, 337 17, 340 17, 343 17, 346 18, 76 18, 113 19, 176 19, 179 19, 182 19, 185 19, 188

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CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY AWARD NUMBER) Decision No 80-REF 46-1 81-REF 49-1 82-REF 51-5 83-202-2 84-829-2 85-B1-FT 86-88-3 87-11045-1 88-REF 32-3 89-REF 33-3 90-REF 34-3 91-REF 36-3 92-REF 41-3 93-764-1 94-454-3 95-273-1 96-381-1 97-474-3 98-60-3 99-771-2 100-A3/A8-FT 101-131-2 102-227-3 103-313-2 104-431-2

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Page 19, 191 19, 194 19, 197 19, 307 19, 317 22, 105 22, 151 22, 213 23, 244 23, 247 23, 250 23, 253 23, 254 25, 186 25, 188 25, 273 26, 186 26, 254 26, 256 27, 194 27, 256 27, 264 27, 269 28, 51 28, 195

Decision No 105-221-1 106-227-2 107-941-3 108-182-2 109-163-2 110-204-2 111-223-2 112-247-2 113-249-2 114-287-2 115-363-2 116-A15(IV) & A24-FT 118-148-2 119-252-3 120-294-3 121-332-3 122-368-3 123-968-2 124-967-2 125-A15(IV)/A24-FT 126-B36-2 127-389-2 128-B36-2 129-A4/A7/A15 (IF and III)-FT

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Page 28, 192 28, 216 28, 307 28, 225 29, 185 29, 189 29, 193 29, 197 29, 201 29, 205 29, 209 29, 214 29, 383 30, 3 30, 8 30, 13 30, 19 31, 124 31, 286 32, 115 33, 56 33, 204 33, 346

– 33, 362

AWARDS Award No. 1-8-2 2-373-2 3-171-2 4-122-3 5-5-3 6-186-2 7-14-3 8-31-2 9-30-3 10-205-2 11-95-3 12-281-3 13-119-1 14-8-2 15-90-2 16-342-3 17-143-1 18-30-3 19-98-2 20-17-3 21-132-3 22-495-2 23-428-2

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Page 1, 123 1, 135 1, 140 1, 156 1, 160 1, 163 1, 169 1, 181 1, 185 1, 216 1, 220 1, 223 1, 327 1, 342 1, 384 1, 408 1, 403 1, 442 1, 499 1, 411 2, 6 2, 41 2, 38

Award No. 24-808-3 25-71-1 26-206-2 27-84-3 28-307-3 29-92-1 30-16-3 31-157-2 32-211-2 33-418-2 34-26/27-2 35-219-2 36-200-1 37-172-1 38-291-3 39-145-2 40-230-2 41-91-3 42-105/137-2 43-189-3 44-151/152/153-3 45-70-1 46-57-2

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Page 2, 44 2, 78 2, 90 2, 100 2, 126 2, 132 2, 141 2, 157 2, 171 2, 226 2, 228 2, 232 2, 241 2, 247 2, 261 2, 269 2, 278 2, 294 2, 291 2, 303 2, 305 2, 332 2, 334

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY AWARD NUMBER) Award No. 47-156-2 48-19-1 49-228/229-1 50-40-3 51-41-3 52-125-3 53-149-1 54-387-1 55-165-1 56-15-1 57-244-1 58-449-3 59-220-2 60-83-2 61-188-2 62-482-2 63-279-1 64-807-1 65-427-1 66-764-1 67-148-1 68-103/104/107/108/ 109/110-3 69-139-3 70-185-3 71-346-3 72-124-3 73-67-3 74-62-3 75-112-1 76-243-1 77-106-2 78-238-2 79-B67-2 80-136-1 81-308-2 82-489-3 83-66-1 84-142-3 85-441-2 86-177-2 87-101-1 88-A/14-2 89-84-3 90-96-1 91-3-3 92-293-3 93-2-3 94-388-1 95-28-1 96-488-1 97-54-3

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Page 2, 348 2, 364 2, 366 2, 372 2, 391 3, 34 3, 10 3, 36 3, 42 3, 73 3, 62 3, 91 3, 110 3, 119 3, 97 3, 169 3, 176 3, 186 3, 181 3, 197 3, 203

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3, 212 3, 218 3, 270 3, 280 3, 256 3, 239 3, 225 3, 319 3, 326 3, 332 3, 334 3, 338 3, 351 3, 366 3, 390 4, 20 4, 29 4, 47 4, 39 4, 33 4, 74 4, 77 4, 83 4, 183 4, 192 4, 96 4, 197 4, 199 4, 205 4, 212

Award No. 98-113-2 99-245-2 100-280-2 101-66-1 102-11875-1 103-77-2 104-183-1 105-B16-1 106-B24-1 107-B53-1 108-A16/582/591-FT 109-328-2 110-144-2 111-10043-2 112-10865-2 113-433/576/580-2 114-140-2 115-928-3 116-1-3 117-119-3 118-434-3 119-138-1 120-B56-1 121-201-1 122-38-3 123-283-3 124-51-2 125-79-3 126-926-1 127-257-1 128-B29-1 129-63-2 130-436-1 131-267-1 132-B7-1 133-340-3 134-806-2 135-33-1 136-49/50-2 137-312-2 138-82-2 139-166-2 140-194-2 141-7-2 142-100-3 143-127-3 144-180-3 145-35-3 146-42-3 147-94-1 148-130-SC 149-360-SC

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lxi Page 4, 280 4, 263 4, 272 5, 76 5, 80 5, 88 5, 90 5, 94 5, 97 5, 105 5, 57 5, 118 5, 134 5, 148 5, 150 5, 155 5, 160 5, 177 5, 198 5, 235 5, 249 5, 354 5, 357 6, 1 5, 361 5, 386 6, 4 6, 33 6, 20 6, 38 6, 12 6, 118 6, 120 6, 125 6, 141 6, 52 6, 147 6, 149 6, 272 7, 26 7, 1 7, 8 7, 18 6, 219 7, 36 7, 54 7, 90 7, 181 7, 209 7, 220 7, 225 7, 239

lxii

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY AWARD NUMBER) Award No. 150-32-SC 151-344/A9-SC 152-772-SC 153-11614-SC 154-233/422-SC 155-11815-SC 156-102-SC 157-87-SC 158-11507-SC 159-12701-SC 160-423-SC 161-343/365-2 162-763-3 163-949-3 164-11553-1 165-341-1 166-35-3 167-446-2 168-25-3 169-10047-1 170-311-3 171-10719-9 172-B3-3 173-B21-3 174-320-1 175-180-3 176-255-3 177-389-2 178-299-1 179-453-3 180-64-1 181-942-2 182-236-2 183-10425-2 184-161-1 185-359-3 186-302-3 187-325-3 188-176-2 189-458-3 190-11445-3 191-59-1 192-285-2 193-75-3 194-111-1 195-450-2 196-302-3 197-480-1 198-11697-3 199-175-2 200-12/13-1 201-174-1

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Page 7, 223 7, 236 7, 244 7, 247 7, 249 7, 258 7, 269 7, 260 8, 11 8, 13 8, 15 8, 18 8, 20 8, 24 8, 42 8, 49 8, 55 8, 66 8, 72 8, 79 8, 81 8, 83 8, 89 8, 93 8, 97 8, 119 8, 144 8, 183 8, 214 8, 236 8, 298 8, 349 8, 353 8, 360 8, 373 9, 6 9, 10 9, 46 9, 61 9, 69 9, 70 9, 107 9, 153 9, 184 9, 187 9, 203 9, 206 9, 284 9, 306 9, 308 9, 310 9, 313

Award No. 202-292-2 203-467/468/469/ 471-2 204-237-2 205-258/259-1 206-34-1 207-217-2 208-73-3 209-78-3 210-10126-3 211-10/11-2 212-437-3 213-61-1 214-134-1 215-52-1 216-53-1 217-99-2 218-135-2 219-947-2 220-37/231-1 221-65-1 222-10517-1 223-11713-1 224-347/348/349-1 225-89-3 226-353-2 227-833-2 228-487-3 229-10173-3 230-624-1 231-10212-2 232-97-2 233-10335-3 234-179-2 235-625-3 236-159-3 237-314-1 238-158-1 239-120-2 240-130-3 241-361-3 242-829-1 243-112-1 244-68-2 245-335-2 246-B7-1 247-B59/B69-1 248-198-1 249-769-1 250-369-2 251-393-2 252-10035-2

Page – 9, 340 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

9, 346 9, 350 9, 357 9, 360 9, 397 10, 357 10, 365 10, 365 10, 365 10, 22 10, 37 10, 365 10, 56 10, 95 10, 121 10, 157 10, 177 10, 228 10, 269 10, 319 10, 333 10, 365 11, 3 11, 372 11, 372 11, 53 11, 372 11, 70 11, 72 11, 76 11, 150 11, 168 11, 180 11, 184 11, 217 11, 223 11, 259 11, 372 11, 372 11, 363 11, 292 11, 302 12, 3 12, 25 12, 33 12, 94 12, 126 12, 385 12, 397 12, 139

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY AWARD NUMBER) Award No. 253-289-1 254-263-2 255-48-3 256-439-2 257-295-2 258-43-1 259-36-1 260-18-1 261-133-2 262-222-1 263-324-3 264-264-1 265-B2-2 266-B13-2 267-B18-2 268-B20-2 269-72/80-3 270-389-2 271-334-2 272-22-1 273-23-1 274-10418-2 275-12783-3 276-B72-2 277-B71-2 278-362-2 279-94-1 280-491-3 281-931-3 282-10853/10854/ 10855/10856-1 283-448-1 284-10405-3 285-25/492-2 286-10303-2 287-384-2 288-11653-2 289-93-1 290-123-1 291-10706-1 292-353-2 293-410-3 294-181-1 295-834-2 296-126-2 297-209-1 298-317-1 299-957-1 300-459-2 301-286-1 302-B66-1 303-11005-1

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Page 12, 146 12, 160 12, 170 12, 239 12, 288 12, 308 12, 335 13, 3 13, 370 13, 359 13, 99 13, 124 13, 155 13, 158 13, 161 13, 164 13, 370 13, 370 13, 179 13, 370 13, 370 13, 370 13, 261 13, 271 13, 277 13, 370 13, 282 13, 370 13, 370

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

13, 286 13, 331 13, 370 14, 349 14, 349 14, 349 14, 349 14, 24 14, 65 14, 86 14, 111 14, 339 14, 149 14, 176 14, 349 14, 191 14, 223 14, 251 14, 349 14, 263 14, 276 14, 349

Award No. 304-284-2 305-310-2 306-A15-FT 307-477-3 308-155-3 309-129-3 310-56-3 311-74/76/81/150-3 312-11135-3 313-10172-1 314-24-1 315-115-3 316-954-2 317-339-2 318-160-1 319-B39-2 320-184-1 321-10712-3 322-154-3 323-409-1 324-10199-1 325-366-3 326-10913-2 327-305-2 328-11244-2 329-227/12384-3 330-B40-2 331-355-3 332-10089-3 333-B8-2 334-B51-2 335-B9-2 336-B12-2 337-B10-2 338-484-1 339-114-3 340-11887-2 341-371-3 342-187-3 343-423-3 344-364-1 345-10066-1 346-10973-2 347-B63-3 348-414-3 349-420-3 350-454-3 351-486-3 352-375-1 353-196-2 354-10427-2 355-10633-2

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

lxiii Page 14, 283 14, 349 14, 311 14, 349 15, 3 15, 23 15, 189 16, 3 16, 76 16, 103 16, 112 16, 257 16, 335 16, 335 16, 335 16, 335 16, 317 16, 297 17, 3 17, 31 17, 92 17, 114 17, 135 17, 368 17, 368 17, 153 17, 183 17, 353 17, 368 17, 187 17, 200 17, 214 17, 228 17, 238 17, 245 17, 368 17, 362 17, 266 17, 269 17, 294 17, 368 18, 390 18, 377 18, 84 18, 88 18, 90 18, 92 18, 98 18, 115 18, 150 18, 154 18, 164

lxiv

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY AWARD NUMBER) Award No. 356-190-2 357-444-1 358-195-1 359-10059-1 360-10514-1 361-11157-2 362-11038-3 363-11377-2 364-B65-2 365-315-2 366-11961-1 367-829-2 368-11485-3 369-208-2 370-B1-FT 371-10163-2 372-10513-2 373-481-3 374-B22-1 375-381-1 376-B31-3 377-261-3 378-173-3 379-121-2 380-12785-2 381-10110-2 382-B1-FT 383-11486-2 384-10569-2 385-10026-2 386-11415-2 387-10216-3 388-11539-3 389-10541-3 390-12567-3 391-10355-1 392-10415-1 393-10972-1 394-11294-1 395-11300-1 396-12778-1 397-10547-2 398-11657-2 399-10273-3 400-10891-1 401-10067-1 402-288-1 403-10605/10606-3 404-10457-1 405-358-3 406-845-1 407-76-3

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Page 18, 175 18, 390 18, 180 18, 224 18, 232 18, 390 18, 390 18, 275 18, 390 18, 289 18, 390 18, 292 18, 390 18, 352 19, 3 19, 345 19, 62 19, 73 19, 374 19, 107 19, 374 19, 200 20, 3 19, 257 19, 374 19, 374 19, 273 19, 374 19, 374 19, 374 19, 374 19, 374 19, 374 19, 374 19, 374 19, 374 19, 374 19, 374 19, 352 19, 374 19, 374 19, 374 19, 374 19, 321 19, 374 19, 374 19, 374 19, 360 19, 374 19, 365 21, 13 21, 303

Award No. 408-473-1 409-10638-2 410-12118-3 411-10861-1 412-256-2 413-483-2 414-770-2 415-10065-1 416-819-1 417-88-3 418-B27/B47-3 419-128/129-2 420-443-3 421-B11-2 422-260-2 423-10645-1 424-168-3 425-39-2 426-276-3 427-831-3 428-764-1 429-370-1 430-814-1 431-395-3 432-10812-3 433-333-1 434-810-1 435-811-1 436-150-3 437-10159-3 438-430-1 439-10105 and 12713-12721-1 440-12183-1 441-B73-2 442-10656-1 443-965-2 444-940-2 445-12257-2 446-10087-2 447-B4-2 448-11590-2 449-12762-2 450-447-3 451-251-2 452-B1-FT 453-B5/B19-3 454-10398-1 455-11429-3 456-11102-3 457-B55-1 458-11286-3

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Page 21, 303 21, 303 21, 303 21, 303 21, 20 21, 25 21, 28 21, 303 21, 303 21, 303 21, 303 21, 31 22, 3 22, 365 22, 370 22, 111 22, 118 21, 79 22, 170 22, 194 22, 204 22, 218 22, 339 23, 3 23, 126 23, 413 23, 413 23, 413 23, 401 23, 133 23, 150

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

23, 413 23, 233 23, 413 23, 413 23, 265 23, 268 23, 413 23, 276 23, 413 23, 413 23, 413 23, 282 23, 290 23, 407 23, 413 23, 413 23, 296 23, 303 23, 320 23, 351

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY AWARD NUMBER) Award No. 459-B14/B33-2 460-880-2 461-39-2 462-10296-2 463-B26/B28/B35/B60-2 464-494-3 465-B44-2 466-B15-3 467-66-1 468-12458-2 469-B75-2 470-B41-3 471-10871-3 472-308-2 473-357-1 474-268-1 475-11491-1 476-11803-1 477-383-2 478-952-2 479-476-2 480-55-2 481-56-3 482-275-1 483-CLTDs/86/B38/ B76/B77/-FT 484-440-3 485-60-3 486-197-2 487-4-3 488-380-3 489-309-3 490-273-1 491-435-1 492-74-3 493-12784-1 494-397-1 495-398-1 496-399-1 497-319-1 498-81-3 499-269-1 500-290-1 501-381-1 502-451-2 503-474-3 504-350-2 505-461/462/463/464/ 465-2 506-308-2 507-386-1 508-413-3

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Page 23, 413 23, 378 21, 285 24, 305 24, 291 24, 47 24, 305 24, 305 24, 102 24, 116 24, 305 24, 305 24, 305 24, 297 24, 121 24, 203 24, 238 24, 252 24, 265 24, 269 24, 272 25, 301 25, 314 25, 3

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

25, 327 25, 15 25, 20 25, 131 25, 153 25, 172 25, 178 25, 196 25, 212 25, 339 25, 339 25, 229 25, 235 25, 241 25, 264 25, 339 25, 278 25, 289 26, 3 26, 275 26, 15 26, 37

– – – –

26, 44 26, 60 26, 148 26, 190

Award No. 509-248-1 510-452-1 511-147-1 512-455-1 513-29-1 514-227-3 515-771-2 516-322-1 517-B32/B74/1278612892-3 518-131-2 519-394-1 520-210-3 521-308-2 522-828-1 523-382-3 524-313-2 525-B-FT 526-431-2 527-445-1 528-941-3 529-A15-FT 530-490-1 531-260-2 532-182-2 533-274-1 534-193-3 535-354-1 536-20-1 537-21-1 538-396-1 539-167-3 540-192-1 541-930-3 542-626-3 543-356-1 544-298-2 545-479-1 546-812-3 547-250-3 548-367-2 549-967-2 550-412/415-3 551-368-3 552-421-1 553-118-1 554-319-1 555-321-1 556-212-1 557-950-2 558-178-2 559-221-1

lxv

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Page 26, 193 26, 275 26, 228 26, 244 26, 265 27, 3 27, 40 27, 49

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27, 275 27, 64 27, 122 27, 145 27, 288 27, 196 27, 218 27, 248 27, 282 28, 21 28, 389 28, 53 28, 112 28, 159 28, 198 28, 225 28, 232 28, 246 28, 309 28, 392 28, 394 28, 401 28, 320 28, 371 28, 382 29, 395 29, 3 29, 20 29, 59 29, 78 29, 401 29, 222 29, 260 29, 295 29, 310 29, 411 29, 367 30, 22 30, 283 30, 292 30, 70 30, 76 30, 123

lxvi

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY AWARD NUMBER)

Award No. Page 560-44/46/47-3 – 30, 170; 31, 3 561-841-1 – 30, 302 562-767-3 – 30, 267 563-827-2 – 31, 26 564-296-2 – 31, 36 565-968-2 – 31, 60 566-316-2 – 31, 89 567-213/215-3 – 31,127 568-A13/A15 (I and IV:C)/ A26 (I, II and III)-FT – 32, 207 569-419-2 – 32, 3 570-164-3 – 32, 42 571-146-3 – 32, 73 572-B58-2 – 32, 92 573-271-3 – 32, 124; 33, 3 574-B36-2 – 32, 162

Award No. 575-4-3 576-800/801/802/ 803/804-3 577-390/391/392-1 578-214-3 579-389-2 580-832-3 581-842/843/844-1 582-274-2 583-266-3 584-839/840-3 585-457-1 586-A27-FT 587-953-2 588-432-1 589-93-1 590-A15 (IV)/A24-FT

Page – 32, 184 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

32, 221 33, 483 33, 41 33, 60 33, 206 33, 272 33, 349 33, 368 33, 460 34, 3 34, 39 34, 67 34, 185 34, 102 34, 105

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Page 4, 122 5, 131 5, 152 5, 185 5, 187 5, 338 6, 43 6, 104 6, 130 6, 74 21, 12 7, 31 7, 217 8, 41 8, 44 8, 75 8, 85 8, 99 8, 179 8, 216 8, 238 8, 290 9, 72 9, 248 9, 302 10, 6 10, 21 10, 180 10, 207 11, 210 11, 296

INTERIM AND INTERLOCUTORY AWARDS Award No. ITL 1-6FT ITL 2-51-FT ITL 3-68-FT ITL 4-121-FT ITL 5-140-FT ITL 6-159-FT ITL 7-254-FT ITL 8-298-FT ITL 9-466-FT ITL 10-48-FT ITL 11-89-2 ITL 12-55-2 ITM 13-388-FT ITL 14-97-2 ITM 15-59-1 ITM 16-93-2 ITM 17-480-1 ITL 18-113-2 ITM 19-870-2 ITM 20-480-1 ITM 21-58-1 ITM 22-480-1 ITL 23-120-2 ITL 24-49-2 ITM 25-382-3 ITM 26-480-1 ITM 27-11875-1 ITM 28-159-3 ITM 29-160-1 ITM 30-160-1 ITM 31-928-3

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Page 1, 236 1, 242 1, 248 1, 252 1, 261 1, 268 1, 271 1, 274 1, 280 1, 347 1, 487 1, 493 2, 51 2, 68 2, 96 2, 281 2, 310 2, 322 2, 362 2, 369 2, 401 3, 59 3, 156 3, 147 3, 173 3, 200 3, 331 3, 384 4, 5 4, 9 4, 53

Award No. ITL 32-24-1 ITL 33-A4/A15-2 ITM 34-222-1 ITL 35-120-2 ITL 36-410-3 ITL 37-111-FT ITM 38-222-1 ITM 39-159-3 ITM 40-375-1 ITL 41-48-3 ITL 42-120-2 ITL 43-476-2 ITM 44-158-1 ITL 45-120-2 ITM 46-382-3 ITM 47-158-1 ITM 48-10513-9 ITL 49-65-1 ITM 50-396-1 ITM/ITL 51-395-3 ITM/ITL 52-382-3 ITL 53-458-3 ITL 54-134-1 ITL 55-129-3 ITM 56-12118-3 ITL 57-123-1 ITL 58-120-2 ITL 59-129-3 ITL 60-B1-FT ITL 61-260-2 ITM 62-333-1

CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF CASES (BY AWARD NUMBER) Award No. ITL 63-A15-FT ITM 64-498-1 ITL 65-1-167-3 ITL 66-298-2 ITL 67-389-2 ITL 68-193-3 ITL 69-169-3 ITL 70-170-3

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Page 12, 40 13, 193 13, 199 14, 3 14, 104 19, 48 22, 123 22, 129

Award No. ITL 71-44/45/46/47-3 ITL 72-812-3 ITL 73-316-2 ITL 74-377-3 ITL 75-412/415-3 ITL 76-178-2 ITL 77-390/391/392-1 ITL 78-A15-FT

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lxvii Page 22, 138 22, 155 23, 259 23, 285 23, 307 24, 40 25, 190 25, 247

AWARDS

GEORGE E. DAVIDSON v. IRAN

3

George E. Davidson (Homayounjah), Claimant v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Respondent (Case No. 457) Chamber One: Broms, Chairman; Noori,[1] Duncan, Members Signed 5 March 1998[2] Award no. 585-457-1 The following is the text as issued by the Tribunal: Award APPEARANCES For the Claimant:

Mr. George E. Davidson, Claimant, Prof. Arthur T. von Mehren, Mr. Sumner J. Chertok, Counsels, Mr. Edward H. Davidson, Mr. Eshagh Nejat Haim, Witnesses.

For the Respondent:

Mr. M. H. Zahedin Labbaf, Agent of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Dr. A. A. Riyazi, Mr. F. Momeni, Legal Advisors to the Agent, Mr. M. Tavassoli, Legal Assistant to the Agent, Mr. A. Fatemi, Mr. M. Mullai, Legal Advisors from the Bureau of International Legal Services, Tehran

[1 Mr. Noori’s signature is accompanied by the words “Dissenting Opinion.” This Opinion, signed on 2 February 2000 and ﬁled on 2 February 2000, will be reprinted in 36 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R.] [2 Filed 5 March 1998.]

4

GEORGE E. DAVIDSON v. IRAN

Mr. Gh. H. Sadeghi Ghahareh, Mr. H. Safari, Witnesses, Mr. N. Nobahar, Mr. Gh. A. Meshkinfam, Mr. A. Mozaffari, Observers. Also present:

Mr. Sean Murphy, Agent of the Government of the United States of America, Mr. Allen Weiner, Deputy Agent of the Government of the United States of America.

table of contents i.

introduction

ii.

procedural history

iii.

jurisdiction 1. The Dual Nationality of the Claimant 2. The Dominant and Effective Nationality of the Claimant 2.1 The Parties’ Contentions 2.2 The Tribunal’s Findings

iv.

merits: facts and contentions 1. Ownership 1.1 The Claimant’s Contentions 1.2 The Respondent’s Contentions 1.3 The Tribunal’s Findings 2. The Caveat 2.1 The Parties’ Contentions 2.2 The Tribunal’s Findings 3. Expropriation 3.1 The Claimant’s Contentions 3.2 The Respondent’s Contentions 3.3 The Tribunal’s Findings 4. Valuation of the Claimant’s Property 4.1 The Parties’ Contentions 4.2 The Tribunal’s Findings

Para. 1 3 24 24 27 27 42 47 47 47 56 69 74 74 76 78 78 89 103 112 112 117

GEORGE E. DAVIDSON v. IRAN

5

v.

interest

119

vi.

costs

120

vii.

award

121 i. introduction

1. The Claimant in this Case is GEORGE EDWARD DAVIDSON3 (HOMAYOUNJAH) (“the Claimant”). The Respondent is THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (“the Respondent”). The Claimant alleges that around 1 June 1980 the Respondent had expropriated ﬁve properties in which he held interests, namely the Kamran, Manouchehri, Ahar, Jalleh and Caravan Hotel buildings, in Tehran, Iran. The Claimant ﬁrst claimed the sum of U.S. $3,850,000 as compensation for the loss of the properties. Later and at the Hearing he modiﬁed the sum by deducting outstanding mortgage loans and sought the sum of U.S. $3,650,000 as the value of the properties. In addition, the Claimant seeks interest on the sum claimed together with arbitration costs. 2. The Respondent states that the Claimant has failed to establish his dominant and effective U.S. nationality at the time the Claim allegedly arose as well as the ownership and expropriation of the properties at issue. The Respondent requests the Tribunal to dismiss the Case for lack of jurisdiction and claims a reasonable amount for the expenses incurred as arbitration costs. ii. procedural history 3. On 6 January 1982 the Claimant sent for ﬁling a letter including his claim with regard to ﬁve properties allegedly expropriated by the Revolutionary Courts of Iran. The Tribunal Registry received this letter on 12 January 1982. On 14 January 1982, the Tribunal informed the Claimant that it could not accept the letter for ﬁling since it was only in English and no Persian text was presented with it. 4. On 25 January 1982, the Claimant ﬁled a submission dated 16 January 1982, which he titled “Statement of Claim” on his behalf and with power of attorney on behalf of his brothers DAVID E. DAVIDSON, HENRY E. SASSOON and KAMRAN E. SASSOON. On 1 February 1982, the Tribunal 3 The Claimant’s name was changed by court decree from George Edward Homayounjah to George Edward Davidson as part of his naturalization in the United States in 1980. The record shows that at the time of the Claimant’s birth his surname was, following his father’s name, Esraeel, which was changed to Homayounjah in 1964, back to Esraeel in 1973 and, after reaching the age of majority, back to Homayounjah on his own application in 1976.

6

GEORGE E. DAVIDSON v. IRAN

Registry refused to accept the submission since it was overdue, but noted that the refusal was, upon the Claimant’s objection, subject to review by the Tribunal within 30 days. The Claimant’s objection was received on 12 February 1982. The Claimant explained, inter alia, that the letter of 6 January 1982 had been accompanied with a Persian text, but the latter might have been misplaced. Also, the Claimant stated that if the letter of 6 January 1982 is accepted, the ﬁling of 25 January should be considered as “merely a more detailed speciﬁcation and substantiation” and supplementary to the previously ﬁled Claim. The letter dated 6 January [1982], together with its Persian text, was later accepted as a Statement of Claim and was marked as ﬁled on 18 January 1982. 5. On 22 February 1983, the Deputy Agent of the Islamic Republic of Iran submitted an objection to the Claimant’s submissions, arguing that these two submissions should be denied, because the submission of 18 January 1982 did not qualify as a Statement of Claim and the submission of 25 January 1982 was ﬁled after the deadline for ﬁling of claims set out in paragraph 4 of Article III of the Claims Settlement Declaration. 6. In the Order of 15 March 1983, the Tribunal asked the Claimant to address and clarify whether the document ﬁled on 25 January 1982 constituted an amendment to the Statement ﬁled on 18 January 1982. On 2 May 1983, a letter in English was received from the Claimant, stating that the submission of 25 January 1982 was to clarify the Statement of Claim. On 25 January 1984, the Claimant ﬁled another response to the Tribunal’s Order and conﬁrmed that the original Statement of Claim is the one drafted by the Claimant himself, dated on 6 January 1982 and ﬁled on 18 January 1982. The response further requested that the document prepared by the Claimants’ counsel and ﬁled on 25 January 1982 be treated as supplemental to the original Statement of Claim. 7. Noting the Full Tribunal’s Decision of 6 April 1984 in Case No. A/18,4 the Tribunal by its Order of 25 June 1985 requested that the Claimant ﬁle by 27 September 1985 all evidence he wished to submit in connection with the issue of his nationality, as the Tribunal has to determine whether he was a national of the United States of America or the Islamic Republic of Iran, or both, and, in the latter case, to decide the dominant and effective nationality. The Respondent was asked to ﬁle by 27 December 1985 all evidence that it wished to be considered on the issue of nationality. 8. After having been granted one extension, the Claimant and his brothers submitted on 16 December 1985 a document entitled “Claimant’s Memorial and Evidence on Nationality.” After having granted the Respondent three extensions of the time limit to submit all evidence on the issue of nationality, the 4 Islamic Republic of Iran and United States of America, Decision No. DEC 32-A18-FT (6 Apr. 1984), reprinted in 5 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 251.

GEORGE E. DAVIDSON v. IRAN

7

Tribunal by the Order of 21 January 1987 informed the Parties that, in view of the procedural history of the Case, no further extensions were to be granted. The Tribunal intended to commence its deliberations regarding its jurisdiction on the basis of the evidence before it, unless the Parties informed the Tribunal of ongoing settlement negotiations calling for a postponement of the proceedings. On 16 August 1988, the Claimant and his brothers informed the Tribunal that no such discussions had been contemplated and asked the Tribunal to consider the issue of jurisdiction at its earliest convenience. 9. By its Order of 10 May 1991, the Tribunal provided the Respondent with the ﬁnal opportunity to ﬁle by 9 August 1991 all evidence it wished the Tribunal to consider on the issue of dominant and effective nationality. After having been granted another extension, the Respondent ﬁled a submission entitled “Respondent’s Brief and Evidence on the Claimants’ Nationalities” on 30 August 1991. 10. By its Order of 6 September 1991, the Tribunal granted the Claimant and his brothers a further opportunity to ﬁle, by 31 October 1991, a response to the Respondent’s Brief ﬁled on 30 August 1991. After having been granted one extension, the Claimants ﬁled “Claimants’ Reply to Respondent’s Brief and Evidence on the Claimants’ Dominant and Effective Nationality” on 30 December 1991. In their submission the Claimant and his brothers informed the Tribunal of the withdrawal of the Claim with regard to David E. Davidson and stated that the waiver was made with the reservation that the Claims of the three remaining persons were not prejudiced. 11. The Tribunal, by its Order of 15 January 1992, decided to join all jurisdictional issues to the merits of the Case and to set a schedule for the Parties’ further submissions. On 28 October 1992, David E. Davidson, Henry E. Sassoon and Kamran E. Sassoon ﬁled a letter informing the Tribunal that they withdrew their claims. The Respondent did not object to the termination of the proceedings as regards these three persons. Pursuant to Article 34(2) of the Tribunal Rules, the Tribunal, by its Order of 16 December 1992, terminated the proceedings with respect to these persons and noted that in view of this Order, it need not decide whether they can be considered as Claimants in this Case. 12. After having been granted three extensions, the Claimant, George E. Davidson, submitted “Claimant’s Hearing Memorial” and “Attachments to Claimant’s Hearing Memorial” on 14 January 1993. After having been granted four extensions, the Respondent ﬁled “Respondent’s Brief on Jurisdictional Issues and Merits, Volumes I-II” on 12 April 1994. On 31 January 1995, after having been granted four extensions, the Claimant submitted “Claimant’s Memorial Replying to Respondent’s Brief on Jurisdictional Issues and Merits as well as Explaining the Evidence, and Summarizing the Issues Presented”

8

GEORGE E. DAVIDSON v. IRAN

and “Attachments to Claimant’s Memorial Responding to Respondent’s Brief.” On 24 March 1995, the Claimant ﬁled a revised “Attachments to Claimant’s Memorial Responding to Respondent’s Brief.” 13. On 16 August 1995, the Claimant ﬁled a letter entitled “Motion for an Order Compelling Respondent to Produce Documents and Other Objects Contained in Safe Deposit Box in Respondent’s Possession” stating, inter alia, that on or about 3 October 1991, the Respondent conﬁscated Edward H. Davidson’s safe deposit box No. 416 in Bank Sepah in Tehran, containing documents which, according to the Claimant, would enable him to establish his ownership interest in the properties that are the subject of this claim. In its Order of 24 August 1995, the Tribunal requested the Respondent to submit by 23 October 1995 the documents referred to in the Claimant’s request, or to explain why the submission of any of these documents was not possible. 14. In its response to the production request, the Respondent stated that it was complying with the Order of the Tribunal, notwithstanding its belief that the Claimant’s request was not motivated by genuine need, because the Claimant’s Rebuttal Memorial and Evidence had already been ﬁled prior to that request. In addition, the Respondent pointed out that the Claimant had not fulﬁlled his evidentiary burden and therefore the Respondent should not have been required to produce rebuttal evidence. As regards the object of the request, the Respondent conﬁrmed that the “deeds” had already partly been ﬁled by the Respondent and that the requested documents, to the extent available to the Respondent, were attached to the submission. 15. The Respondent further doubted the evidentiary value of the “other things” (gold and jewelry) allegedly contained in the safe deposit box. Even if they existed, they belonged to Edward Davidson, and the Claimant therefore was not entitled to demand their recovery. As regards the request for documents concerning the “blacklisting” of the Claimant and his family, the Respondent contended that the Claimant was not entitled to ask for production of documents related to every member of his family. Finally, with regard to any other documents or power of attorney, the Respondent denied having them in its possession. 16. On 29 August 1995, the Respondent asked the Tribunal to order the Claimant to put his Iranian passports at the Respondent’s disposal to enable the Respondent to prepare certain parts of its Rebuttal Memorial. On 7 September 1995, the Tribunal issued an order requesting the Claimant to submit by 29 September 1995 a copy of all of the pages of his Iranian passports, should they still be in his possession, and to bring the originals to the Hearing. On 26 September 1995, a letter from the Claimant and a copy of his Iranian passport were received by the Tribunal’s Registry and placed in the Master File, as the submission did not comply with the Tribunal’s ﬁling requirements. On

GEORGE E. DAVIDSON v. IRAN

9

28 September 1995, the Respondent ﬁled a letter requesting the Tribunal to instruct the Claimant to make the required ﬁlings in full. 17. On 23 October 1995, the Claimant submitted twenty-two copies of his new passport, issued in 1984, and replacing the one that the Claimant maintained had been returned to the Iranian Interest Section in Washington, D.C. Relying on an entry in the passport indicating that a power of attorney had been issued to the Claimant, the Respondent on 16 November 1995 asked the Tribunal to order the Claimant to present the original of that power of attorney. By its Order of 24 November 1995, the Tribunal requested the Claimant to comply with the Respondent’s request or to explain why the presenting of the document was not possible. On 20 December 1995, the Claimant submitted a letter in which he asserted, inter alia, that Edward Davidson kept the copy of the power of attorney in the safe deposit box that allegedly had been conﬁscated by the Respondent. According to the Claimant, the original of this power of attorney was kept at the Notary Public Ofﬁce No. 64 in Tehran. The Claimant further requested the Respondent to furnish him with a copy of the power of attorney. 18. On 22 December 1995, the Respondent submitted comments on the Claimant’s response, stating, inter alia, that it is not in possession of the power of attorney. The Respondent also stated that as a matter of practice expired passports are returned to their holders, since they contain entries such as visas, which are still needed by the holders. Also, in the Respondent’s view, the assertion by the Claimant’s father that he had not returned to Iran after 1979 contradicts the statement that the power of attorney was put into the safe deposit box. On 30 May 1996, the Claimant submitted a letter, in which he asserted that the power of attorney relating to the Claim was executed before Edward Davidson left Iran and that Edward Davidson, before departure, put it in the safe deposit box. The Claimant further argued that the power of attorney executed in 1984 has no relevance for the merits of this Claim, but was executed to expedite its resolution. It was further maintained that neither the Claimant nor his father ever returned to Iran. 19. After having been granted ﬁve extensions, the Respondent ﬁled on 29 July 1996 documents entitled “Respondent’s Rebuttal Memorial, Volumes I-II.” On 27 September 1996 the Tribunal issued an Order requesting the Parties to appear before Chamber One of the Tribunal for a Hearing which was scheduled to take place on 24, 25 and if necessary, 26 February 1997. 20. On 23 December 1996, the Claimant ﬁled new evidence, which included a number of passports belonging to the Claimant and his father. The Respondent objected to this ﬁling on 30 December 1996. In view of the circumstances of the Case and the nature of the ﬁling, the Tribunal found by its Order of 14 January 1997 that the Claimant’s introduction of new evidence at this

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stage was justiﬁed, and that the Respondent may respond to these documents at the Hearing. The Tribunal also decided to deny the Claimant’s second motion for a production request, contained in the same ﬁling. 21. On 13 January 1997, the Claimant submitted his witness list, which included Mr. Edward H. Davidson, the Claimant’s father, as a witness. On 15 January 1997, the Respondent objected to this list. By its Order of 23 January 1997, the Tribunal decided that the status of Mr. Edward H. Davidson would be decided at the Hearing. On 24 January 1997, the Agent of the Islamic Republic of Iran submitted the Respondent’s witness list. 22. On 12 February 1997, the Claimant again submitted new evidence. On 14 February 1997, the Respondent submitted an objection to the Claimant’s ﬁling. On 20 February 1997, the Respondent presented an additional witness, Mr. Hassan Safari, who was accepted by the Tribunal by its Order of 21 February 1997. 23. The Hearing was held on 24 and 25 February 1997. At the Hearing the following persons were heard: the Claimant and as his witnesses, Mr. Edward Davidson and Mr. Nejat Haim, and, as witnesses for the Respondent, Mr. G. H. Sadeghi Ghahareh and Mr. Hassan Safari. Furthermore, the Respondent submitted an enlarged copy of one of the Claimant’s exhibits. Both the Respondent and the Claimant made use of the new documentary evidence that the Claimant had submitted to the Tribunal on 12 February 1997. iii. jurisdiction 1. The Dual Nationality of the Claimant 24. On 15 January 1992, the Tribunal issued an Order joining all jurisdictional issues to the consideration of the merits in this Case. See, supra, para. 11. To determine whether the Claimant has standing, the Tribunal must establish whether he was a national of the United States of America or of the Islamic Republic of Iran, or of both countries during the relevant period, i.e., from the date the Claim arose until 19 January 1981, the date on which the Claims Settlement Declaration entered into force. If the Claimant was a dual national during that time, the Tribunal must determine the Claimant’s dominant and effective nationality during that period. See Case No. A18, supra. In this Case the relevant period commences on or about 1 June 1980, i.e., when the Respondent allegedly expropriated the properties for which the Claimant now seeks compensation. 25. George E. Davidson was born on 10 June 1956 in Tehran, Iran, to Iranian parents. The Claimant acknowledges that these facts sufﬁce to establish his Iranian nationality under Iranian law (Article 976 of the Iranian Civil Code). The Respondent conﬁrms that the Claimant was born to Iranian parents in

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Tehran, that the birth was registered with the competent authorities and that the Claimant was issued an Iranian Identity Card on 26 June 1956. There is no evidence in the record of the Claimant having renounced his Iranian nationality. The Respondent submits that, according to its inquiries, there is no record of legal change of the Claimant’s nationality at the Department of Nationality and Refugees Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, therefore, the Claimant is still considered a national of Iran. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that on 9 March 1977 the Claimant, having reached the age of majority, applied for and was granted a duplicate identity card. Moreover, on 14 February 1984 an Iranian passport was issued to the Claimant. In conclusion, there is no dispute as to the Iranian nationality of George E. Davidson. 26. With regard to the Claimant’s United States nationality, it is undisputed that he was naturalized as a United States citizen on 5 March 1980. As evidence of his U.S. nationality, the Claimant has submitted a copy of his Certiﬁcate of Naturalization No. 10233542 as well as a copy of two pages of his United States passport No. B-1218150, issued on 7 May 1981, which remain unchallenged by the Respondent. Therefore, the Tribunal concludes that the Claimant obtained United States nationality by grant, commencing from the date of the certiﬁcate. Accordingly, the Tribunal concludes that during the relevant period the Claimant was a national of both Iran and the United States. 2. The Dominant and Effective Nationality of the Claimant 2.1 The Parties’ Contentions 27. The Claimant states that he attended the Don Bosco School in Tehran from the age of six until he was twelve years old. The Claimant asserts that, before he was born, his parents had decided to emigrate to the United States. This was, according to the Claimant, the reason for selecting the Don Bosco School and that in 1964 the family began spending summers in the United States. 28. The Claimant asserts that he entered the United States with a green card at the age of sixteen on 31 December 1972, subsequent to his elder brother Kamran, who had moved there in 1971, and that he was followed by his younger brothers David in 1973, Henry in 1974, Robert in 1977, and Jack in 1978. The Claimant’s parents moved to the United States in 1979. First, the Claimant lived in Worcester, Massachusetts. During the ﬁrst six months of 1973 he attended high school in Worcester (“North High School”) and graduated in June 1973. Subsequently, he attended a local college in Worcester (“Quinsigamond Community College”) and received the degree of Associate of Arts in May 1975. The Claimant further contends that during his studies he became active in college sports and was elected class president. Moreover, in May 1975 he registered as available for U.S. military service.

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29. Further, the Claimant submits that he has been employed and paid taxes in the United States since 1973. Since 1975, while continuing his studies, the Claimant says that he worked in the computer ﬁeld and that he subsequently received a B.S. in Computer Science. At the Hearing, the Claimant stated that he continued to work in this ﬁeld after his naturalization and because of U.S. Department of Defense regulations, he had to go through a security clearance after his naturalization in 1980. The Claimant further contends that he has participated in many local and federal elections and he did not leave the United States until his honeymoon in 1981. 30. In August 1979, the Claimant and his brother David bought a house in Worcester; shortly thereafter, when the Claimant’s parents moved to the United States, the Claimant and his brothers Kamran and David bought a house on Commonwealth Avenue, in West Newton, Massachusetts, where their parents have lived ever since. According to the Claimant, he married Deborah Tehrani in 1981. He states that his wife was born in the United Kingdom to an Iranian father and a British mother and moved to the United States at the age of two. She is a naturalized United States citizen and has never been to Iran. The Claimant also maintains that his social life is exclusively American and that English is spoken at home. The Claimant declares himself “proud to be American and to be part of this generation” and insists on having “no incentive nor any qualiﬁcation whatsoever to establish any personal or professional ties with Iran or any other country outside the U.S.A.” The Claimant emphasizes that since 1972 he has not returned to Iran. The Claimant asserts that the Iranian passport that was issued to him in 1984 was applied for by his father and without the Claimant’s knowledge. 31. According to the Claimant the naturalization on 5 March 1980 constituted the last remaining element required to establish his dominant and effective nationality of the United States. The Claimant notes that under Iranian law he could not have renounced his Iranian nationality before 10 June 1981 when he reached the age of twenty-ﬁve, and this step would have required the approval of the Iranian Council of Ministers. Such consent, the Claimant contends, evidently occurs rarely in practice. 32. The evidence produced by the Claimant to support his dominant and effective U.S. nationality includes, besides the afﬁdavits submitted by him, his father, his brothers and his uncle, copies of his high school diploma, his Associate of Arts Degree, a letter from the Selective Service System, and his oath of renunciation and allegiance. Furthermore, the Claimant has submitted copies of his wage and tax statements from the years 1977 to 1979 and 1981, a letter and a business card concerning his employment, two letters of character reference, a letter from the Worcester Jewish Community Center conﬁrming his membership from 1973 to 1978, and a letter from the Yeshiva Synagogue-Chabad

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Worcester certifying that the Claimant has been an active member of the Synagogue since 1972. 33. The Respondent disputes the value of the evidence presented by the Claimant in support of his dominant and effective U.S. nationality. The Respondent points out that, although reviewing the life of the Claimant from his birth until the end of the relevant period is necessary, the evidence produced by the Claimant mainly relates to the time when he had not yet acquired U.S. nationality. The Respondent asserts that “[the Claimant’s] individual and social life never had indications of the characteristics of the life of an American so that one could believe his American nationality was his dominant and effective nationality at the beginning of, during and until the end of the relevant period, and that he has locus standi before this Tribunal.” 34. The Respondent points out that the Claimant himself alleges he was naturalized as a U.S. citizen on 5 March 1980. Therefore, from his birth until the beginning of the relevant period, he had been exclusively a national of Iran for 23 years and 9 months while he held the dual nationality of Iran and the United States for only 2 months and 27 days. The Respondent asserts that until 5 March 1980 no ties bound the Claimant to the U.S. Government. To the contrary, all of his political, social, economic and family ties bound him, as a citizen, to his home country, Iran. 35. As far as the Claimant’s education is concerned, the Respondent points out that the Andisheh School in Iran, also known as the Don Bosco School, was an Iranian school with an Iranian educational curriculum, although it was privately managed. Thus, the Respondent sees no link between the Claimant’s education in that school and the intention of the family to emigrate to the United States. With reference to Arakel Khajetoorians, et al. and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Award No. 504-350-2 (25 Jan. 1991), para. 20, reprinted in 26 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 37, 42 and Ardavan Peter Samrad, et al. and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 505-461, 462, 463, 464 & 465-2 (4 Feb. 1991), para. 32, reprinted in 26 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 44, 54, the Respondent also maintains that schooling in the United States does not as such indicate an individual’s attachment to the country. 36. According to the Respondent, the Claimant’s action to maintain his Iranian nationality and his decision not to renounce it suggest that he considered his Iranian nationality as dominant. In support, the Respondent refers to the Claimant’s act of obtaining a duplicate identity card in 1977, an Iranian passport in 1984 and the veriﬁcation of a power of attorney by the Iranian authorities in September 1982. Only in May 1981 was a United States passport issued to the Claimant. 37. The Respondent also challenges the Claimant’s contention that he did not visit Iran after his departure in December 1972. The Claimant’s application

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for a new surname and a duplicate identity card in 1977 is said to prove that he was then present in Iran. Otherwise, he easily could have presented documentary evidence showing that those matters were carried out by virtue of power of attorney or he could have presented his Iranian passport to prove that no visit took place. 38. Furthermore, the Respondent points out that the Claimant was a dual national for less than three months before the relevant period started, which was, according to the Claimant, June 1980. The Respondent views the short period of 10 12 months from the Claimant’s naturalization until the entering into force of the Algiers Declarations as insufﬁcient to secure the Claimant’s integration into U.S. society and to establish and maintain dominant and effective U.S. nationality. 39. The Respondent contends that the Claimant’s and his family’s substantial ﬁnancial interests in Iran and the fact that they did not have such interests in the United States support the view that the dominant and effective nationality of the Claimant was Iranian. The Respondent points out that the Claimant was ﬁnancially dependent on his father, who derived his income from Iran. The Claimant held shares in a number of buildings in Iran. This was possible solely on the basis of Iranian nationality. The Claimant paid taxes to the Government of Iran on the income derived from his joint ownership of those buildings. 40. The Respondent disputes that the Claimant has paid taxes to the United States. The Claimant’s Wage and Tax Statements in the United States are, according to the Respondent, merely a declaration of income, which does not necessarily result in the payment of any taxes. Moreover, the Respondent disputes the value of the letter concerning the enrollment for conscription and points out that it does not show that the Claimant ever served in the U.S. military. The decision to marry an Iranian woman also is said to indicate the importance the Claimant attaches to Iranian nationality and culture. 41. In conclusion, the Respondent holds that the Claimant has failed to prove that his effective and dominant nationality during the relevant period was that of the United States. Therefore, the Respondent requests the Tribunal to dismiss the Claim on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. 2.2 The Tribunal’s Findings 42. Having found that during the relevant period the Claimant was a citizen of both Iran and the United States, the Tribunal must determine the Claimant’s dominant and effective nationality during that period. For that purpose the Tribunal must establish the country with which the Claimant had stronger factual ties. If each of the two nationalities is real and effective, the Tribunal has to determine which one is dominant. In establishing the Claimant’s dominant and effective nationality, the Tribunal must consider all relevant factors, including

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the Claimant’s habitual residence, center of interests, family ties, participation in public life and other evidence of attachment.5 While the Tribunal’s jurisdiction depends on the Claimant’s dominant and effective nationality during the period between the date the Claims arose, allegedly around 1 June 1980, and 19 January 1981, events and facts preceding that period remain relevant to that determination.6 43. Looking at the evidence as a whole, in support of the Claimant’s dominant and effective Iranian nationality during the relevant period is the fact that he lived his childhood until the age of sixteen in Iran, that he became a United States national only about three months prior to the date his Claim arose and less than eleven months before the entering into force of the Claims Settlement Declaration. He also appears to have some ﬁnancial interests in Iran. The Respondent asserts that the Claimant was present in Iran when the duplicate of his Identity Card was issued in 1977. However, since the Respondent failed to substantiate the assertion, there is no evidence that the Claimant returned to Iran after 1972, e.g. to live, to work or to continue his family business there. 44. Turning then to the facts supporting the Claimant’s dominant and effective U.S. nationality during the relevant period, the Tribunal ﬁnds that even before the Claimant moved to the United States with a green card in 1972, he had spent lengthy periods there during the summers, starting in 1964. His parents, brothers and other close family members have all emigrated to the United States. By obtaining an education, the Claimant laid the basis for an independent life in the United States and this enabled him to start a career in computer technology. During his studies he was elected class president and became active in various extra-curricular activities. The Respondent has made reference to Arakel Khajetoorians, supra, and Ardavan Peter Samrad, supra, in which schooling in the United States did not as such indicate attachment by the individual to the country. It should, however, be kept in mind that in those cases the claimants submitted no further evidence in favor of dominant and effective United States nationality. 45. The Claimant registered with Selective Service for potential conscription into the U.S. military in 1975, long before becoming naturalized, and he applied for U.S. citizenship as soon as he qualiﬁed for it. The Claimant has been employed in the United States both during his studies and after his graduation. He also purchased real estate in the United States. The fact that he married a woman with some Iranian roots is only a token of the common human interest 5 See Case No. A/18, supra, p. 265. See also Leila Danesh Arfa Mahmoud and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 204-237-2 (27 Nov. 1985), para. 15, reprinted in 9 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 350, 353; Arakel Khajetoorians, et al., supra, para. 14, reprinted in 26 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 37, 41. 6 See Reza Said Malek and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Interlocutory Award No. ITL 68-193-3, para. 14 (23 June 1988), reprinted in 19 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 48, 51.

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in ﬁnding a partner with similar background. That he was granted a duplicate of his Iranian identity card in 1977, a new veriﬁcation of a power of attorney in his Iranian passport in 1982 and a new Iranian passport in 1984, also do not necessarily show that his Iranian nationality was dominant and effective during the relevant period. The record does not show that the Claimant ever used these documents or that he had any intention of moving back to Iran. All these ﬁndings support the conclusion that after the Claimant’s departure from Iran, his private, professional and public activities, both prior to and after his naturalization, have been solely and entirely centered in the United States. 46. Therefore, although the period during which the Claimant was a United States national prior to the entering into force of the Algiers Declarations is short, it appears to the Tribunal that during the relevant period the Claimant’s ties to the United States outweighed his ties to Iran. Consequently, the Tribunal decides that during the relevant period from the time his Claim arose until 19 January 1981 the Claimant’s dominant and effective nationality was that of the United States. iv. merits: facts and contentions 1. Ownership 1.1 The Claimant’s Contentions 47. The Claimant speciﬁes the ﬁve properties forming the subject matter of his claim as follows: 1) The Kamran Building, constructed on approximately 300 square meters of land, with six-and-a-half stories and two basements, comprising 1,825 square meters of space, including ﬁve large stores and thirteen ofﬁce or apartment suites at Avenue Karimkhan-Zand, Kheradmand Jennubi No. 20, corner of Naghavi, Tehran; 2) The Manouchehri Building, constructed on approximately 195 square meters of land, with a three-story commercial building located at Manouchehri Street Nos. 162 and 164, Tehran, containing three ofﬁce or apartment suites of 5 to 6 rooms each, a basement commercial apartment and space for two large stores on the ﬁrst ﬂoor with an approximate area of 585 square meters; 3) The Ahar Building, a residential villa of the Davidson family, erected on approximately 248 square meters of land, consisting of a two-story building with two family residences with a total area of 304 square meters, at Old Shemiran Road, Avenue Ahar, No. 5, Tehran; 4) The Jalleh Building, constructed on a plot of approximately 150 square meters, a three-and-a-half-story commercial building at Avenue Jalleh No. 127, Behnam Station, Tehran, containing three large and one small

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apartment suites and three retail stores. At the rear of the building is a 500 square meter lot with a large villa; and 5) The Caravan Hotel, constructed on approximately 1,400 square meters of land, a four-story building with forty furnished rooms with a total area of approximately 2,500 square meters, at Avenue Koushk No. 11, Tehran. 48. In his original Statement of Claim, ﬁled on 18 January 1982, the Claimant asserts that the ﬁve properties, which he claims were taken by the Respondent, “are titled in the name of Homayounjah.” In the Supplemental Statement of Claim, ﬁled on 25 January 1982, the Claimant refers to himself and his brothers David E. Davidson, Henry E. Sassoon and Kamran E. Sassoon as the owners of the properties, without distinguishing between their respective ownership interests. In his Hearing Memorial the Claimant speciﬁes in more detail the ownership interests he claims in the properties. He maintains that he has no access to the records of the Notary Public Ofﬁce in Tehran and that the documentary evidence put in the safe deposit box of the Claimant’s father, Edward Davidson, was subsequently conﬁscated by the Respondent. 49. According to the Claimant, in 1973 Edward Davidson arranged the purchase of the land on which the Kamran Building was built and the construction work commenced in 1974. The Claimant argues that shortly after the purchase the title to the property was conveyed to George (now Davidson) and Kamran (now Sassoon) Homayounjah, who remained the owners until the expropriation of the property in 1980. Thus, the Claimant asserts an ownership interest amounting to one-half of the Kamran Building. The Claimant asserts that the costs for the land and construction of the building amounted to approximately U.S. $2,350,000. The Claimant’s father, Edward Davidson, states that there was a mortgage on the property originally in the amount of U.S. $210,000 upon which payments were promptly made until the Revolutionary Government prevented the Claimant from making payments, ultimately causing Bank Melli to foreclose on the property. The Claimant contends that the monthly rentals generated from the building amounted to approximately U.S. $12,000. 50. The Claimant states that the Manouchehri Building was purchased by Edward Davidson in 1965 for about U.S. $200,000. At the time of the taking the title to the property was in the names of George and David Homayounjah (now Davidson). Therefore, the Claimant concludes that his ownership interest in the Manouchehri Building amounted to one-half. According to the Claimant, the monthly rental income from the building amounted to U.S. $2,000. The Manouchehri and Ahar Buildings were both subject to a single mortgage, totaling U.S. $260,000. 51. The Claimant asserts that the Ahar Building, the residential villa of the Davidson family, was purchased in 1959 by Edward Davidson for about U.S.

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$120,000. The title was conveyed to Edward Davidson’s sons George, David and Henry, who were the owners of the property at the time of the expropriation. Thus, the Claimant contends that his ownership interest in the Ahar Building was one-third. The Claimant further contends that the building was subject to the same mortgage as the Manouchehri Building and that the monthly rental income from the building amounted to U.S. $2,000. 52. According to the Claimant, his father originally received the land upon which the Jalleh Building was constructed as a gift from his parents. The Claimant submits that, at the time of the taking, the property was registered in the name of Edward Davidson’s three sons George, David and Kamran. Thus, the Claimant asserts an ownership interest amounting to one-third of the property. At the time of the taking there was no mortgage on the Jalleh Building and the Claimant contends that it generated U.S. $3,000 in monthly rental income. 53. The Claimant contends that Edward Davidson purchased a one-third interest in the Caravan Hotel and submits that persons outside the Davidson family at that time owned the rest of the hotel. At the time of the alleged taking, the Claimant asserts he owned a one-third interest in the hotel and the title to the property was in his name.7 There were no mortgages on the property and, according to the Claimant, the monthly rental income amounted to about U.S. $5,000. 54. In his Rebuttal Memorial and at the Hearing, the Claimant introduced a new argument regarding the ownership of the buildings. The Claimant bases his argument on the notion of beneﬁcial ownership, relying on the Tribunal’s ﬁndings in James M. Saghi, et al. and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 544-298-2 (22 Jan. 1993), reprinted in 29 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 20. The Claimant argues that the Tribunal has favored beneﬁcial ownership over merely nominal ownership of property and has awarded compensation to beneﬁcial owners for expropriation and other measures affecting property rights. The Claimant states: “[o]ne who has paid fair value to the holder of record not knowing that the recorded title was only nominal prevails over the beneﬁcial owner; against all others, the beneﬁcial owner prevails. Conversely, compensation claims based on mere nominal ownership are not entitled to protection under the [Algiers] Accords.” 55. The Claimant based his argument in favor of beneﬁcial ownership on transactions allegedly carried out by his father. The Claimant argues that in 1978 and early 1979 his father redistributed, on the basis of documents giving him power of attorney to act on behalf of his sons and his wife, the 7 In the Claimant’s Hearing Memorial the Claimant’s alleged ownership interest in the Caravan Hotel is corrected from the 20 per cent presented in his earlier submission to one-third.

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family’s ownership interests in the properties at issue, to adapt to a possibly altering situation in Iran. The redistribution increased the Claimant’s ownership interests in certain properties and decreased it in others. At the Hearing, Edward Davidson maintained that he left the documents giving him power of attorney and other documents related to the deeds in question in the safe deposit box No. 416 at Bank Sepah and that the Respondent later conﬁscated the contents of the box. Therefore, he was allegedly prevented from carrying out the necessary formalities at the Notary Public Ofﬁce in Tehran to effectuate the transfers. Edward Davidson also asserted at the Hearing that after being arrested twice, he tried to register the documents effecting the redistribution, but these efforts were frustrated by the authorities. Therefore, he attempted to execute the transfers himself and deposited the documents in the safe deposit box. 1.2 The Respondent’s Contentions 56. The Respondent points out that in the course of the proceedings the Claimant has a number of times and without justiﬁcation altered the relief he is seeking. Also, at an advanced stage of the proceedings the Claimant modiﬁed the amount of his ownership interests in the properties at issue. Thus, the Respondent contends that the Claimant’s conduct goes beyond a mere amendment to the relief sought and is tantamount to the ﬁling of a new claim. 57. The Respondent argues that, apart from the Kamran Building, the Claimant has failed to produce registration particulars to substantiate his ownership interests and contends that the indisputable documentary evidence it submitted establishes that the Claimant fails to show ownership interests in some properties for which he claims relief and that he owns fewer shares than claimed in some of his submissions. 58. With regard to the Kamran Building, the Respondent points out that the title deed of property No. 6933/372 bearing registration No. 18099 located in District 2, Tehran, indicates that seven individuals, Edward, George, David, Henry, Robert and Jack Homayounjah and Rosalin Sassoon purchased the property for 5,600,000 Rls. The record further shows that the property was mortgaged to Bank Melli for ﬁfteen years in 1973. Thus, the Respondent concludes that the ownership interest of the Claimant amounted to one-seventh of the property. The Respondent refers to the Executive Transfer Deed dated 5/2/1364 (25 April 1985), produced as evidence. It explains that the bank had an executive writ issued in its favor, because the owners failed to pay their debt within the prescribed time limit and that the property was transferred to the bank on 1 May 1985. The Respondent maintains that Bank Melli has acted in accordance with Iranian laws and regulations as well as terms and conditions included in the mortgage agreement, and that as a result, the Claimant no longer has any ownership interests in the Kamran Building.

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59. As to the Manouchehri Building, the Respondent has submitted a copy of a title deed of property No. 328 bearing registration No. 5598, located at District 2, Dowlat in Tehran. According to this document eight members of the Homayounjah family purchased the property in 1976, including Edward, Kamran, George, Henry, David, Robert and Jack Homayounjah and Rosalin Sassoon. Each transferee acquired one-eighth of the property. The record shows that the property was mortgaged to Bank Melli for ﬁfteen years in 1976. The Respondent contends that Bank Melli lawfully foreclosed on the property because of the owners’ failure to perform their contractual obligations. The writs of execution were notiﬁed to the debtors on 10/4/1360 (1 July 1981). As the debtors failed to apply within the prescribed time limit for the auction of the mortgaged property, failed to object to the execution process and failed to pay the creditor, the property was assigned to the creditor. An execution transfer deed was registered at the ofﬁce of Notary Public No. 285 on 21/5/1363 (12 August 1984). 60. According to the Respondent, the Ahar Building, property No. 6933/4666, bearing registration No. 27325, located in Tehran, District 2, was purchased by Rosalin Sassoon in 1959 and was mortgaged to Bank Melli in 1976 by Edward Homayounjah, acting on her behalf. This property was assigned to the mortgagee bank, Bank Melli, by virtue of an Execution Transfer Deed on 10/12/1362 (1 February 1984), after the owner failed to comply with the mortgage agreement. The Respondent emphasizes that the Claimant never owned the property and thus cannot claim compensation for it. 61. The Jalleh Building has been assigned property No. 18/6, registration No. 11077, and is located in District 7 of Tehran. The Respondent does not dispute that the Claimant had an ownership interest in the property. The Respondent maintains, however, that in 1978 the property was subject to a transaction in which Rosalin Sassoon sold ﬁve of six undivided shares of the property to David, Kamran, Henry, George, Robert and Jack Homayounjah, so that each of the children acquired ownership of one-sixth of the ﬁve undivided shares and she retained the remaining one share. Therefore, according to the Respondent, the Claimant’s ownership interest amounts to one-sixth of ﬁve-sixths of the Jalleh Building. 62. With regard to the Caravan Hotel Building, the Respondent contends that the documentary evidence concerning the property, numbered 1176 and 1177 under Registration No. 4680 situated in District 2, Dowlat, Tehran, demonstrates that the Claimant never held any ownership interests in the property. The record shows that the Claimant’s brother, Jack Homayounjah, held for a period of time two out of ten undivided shares on the basis of a conditional sale deed in 1978 for which an executive writ was issued. Nevertheless, the Tehran Public Civil Court subsequently annulled the sale deeds and the executive transfer deed, and the two shares returned to their prior owner, Ms. Maki.

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63. The Respondent disputes the Claimant’s contention of beneﬁcial ownership as unsupported and inadmissible. The Claimant has repeatedly changed the percentage of his holding in the alleged property without supporting his contention by evidence, while the Respondent has presented the title deeds of the alleged ﬁve buildings to identify the actual percentage of the Claimant’s share. The Respondent contends that beneﬁcial ownership was asserted after the deadline set by the Algiers Declaration, and therefore is inadmissible and must be dismissed without entering into its merits. 64. The Respondent disputes that the evidence corroborating the Claim is in the Respondent’s possession. The Respondent argues that the Claimant has produced no evidence to show that the documents effecting the redistribution of property actually exist. The Respondent does not accept the account of the Claimant’s father, Edward Davidson, that he was not permitted to register the transactions at Notary Public Ofﬁce No. 64 or any other Notary Public Ofﬁce. The Respondent’s rejection of the account is based on a number of documents and an afﬁdavit by Notary Public Nasser Behbahani. The afﬁdavit by Mr. Behbahani, who has been a notary at the Notary Public Ofﬁce No. 64 since 1948, and the annexed documents show that Edward Davidson registered twenty-three transactions for himself and on behalf of his wife and children at the Notary Public Ofﬁce in 1978 and 1979. Only four of these transactions were signed by Edward Davidson’s attorney. Mr. Behbahani adds that Mr. Edward Davidson was not forbidden to carry out transactions during the years 1978 to 1981, and that it was not until 1991 that a prohibition was issued. 65. The Respondent brings to the Tribunal’s attention the Claimant’s statement suggesting that Power of Attorney No. 2450, dated 16/7/1361 (8 October 1982), was kept by the Claimant’s father in safe deposit box No. 416 at Bank Sepah. The veriﬁcation of the said power of attorney by the Iranian Interests Section in Washington is mentioned in the Claimant’s passport which was issued on 14 February 1984. Thus, the Respondent argues that the only copy of that power of attorney must have been deposited in the safe deposit box at a date after 14 February 1984, i.e., about two years after the ﬁling of this claim with the Tribunal. According to the Respondent, this amounts to an admission by the Claimant that the safe deposit box and its contents must have been accessible to the Claimant for at least some period after 8 October 1982. The Respondent concludes that, if the documents regarding the redistribution exist, there is no reason why they would have been left in the safe deposit box when the power of attorney was put there. 66. The Respondent submits that the law applicable to the property is that of Iran, locus rei sitae. According to Articles 22, 46 and 48 of the Registration Act, transactions related to immoveable property must be carried out through a notarized deed at the ofﬁce of the Notary Public; non-notarized transactions are not valid. Moreover, the Respondent states that the assertion of beneﬁcial

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interest in property registered in the name of another person is inconsistent with applicable law. 67. The Kamran, Manouchehri and Ahar Buildings were mortgaged to Bank Melli. The Respondent points out that, according to Article 6 of the mortgage agreements, the mortgagor is not authorized to transfer any rights without the permission of the mortgagee (the bank). Also, Article 793 of the Civil Code of Iran nulliﬁes transactions made by the mortgagor without the creditor’s permission. Thus, as Bank Melli has not given such permission, the alleged transactions involving the Kamran, Manouchehri and Ahar Buildings are, according to the Respondent, null and void. 68. In making his claim of beneﬁcial ownership, the Claimant refers to Saghi, supra, paras. 18-26. The Respondent contends that this Award does not create a precedent for this issue as the Claimant erroneously confuses the right to bring an indirect claim with the theory of beneﬁcial ownership, failing to note the ﬁndings of the Tribunal on the same issue in Ian L. McHarg et al., claims for less than U.S. $250,000 presented by the United States and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 282-10853/10854/10855/10856-1, para. 58 (17 Dec. 1986), reprinted in 13 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 286 at 302, and Roy P. M. Carlson and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Award No. 509-248-1, para. 40 (1 May 1991), reprinted in 26 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 193 at 210-211. The Respondent also calls attention to Catherine Etezadi and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 554-319-1, para. 66 (23 Mar. 1994), reprinted in 30 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 22 at 40. In that case, although it was agreed under the sale contract that the authorized title deed of the apartment, after its completion, would be issued in the name of Mrs. Etezadi, the Tribunal held: “However, that title deed was never made out, and the right of the Claimant to the apartment itself was not established.” Based on that argument the Tribunal dismissed the Claimant’s claim. In the Respondent’s view, the Claimant’s arguments for beneﬁcial ownership must similarly fail. 1.3 The Tribunal’s Findings 69. The Tribunal notes that in order to meet his burden of proof the Claimant must establish the following elements: that he had ownership interests or other property rights at issue, and that an expropriation or other measures amounting to an expropriation affecting his ownership interests or other property rights, attributable to Iran, took place.8 8 See, e.g., Mohsen Asgari Nazari and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 559221-1 (24 Aug. 1994), para. 109, reprinted in 30 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 123 at 154 and Leonard and Mavis Daley, a claim of less than U.S. $250,000 presented by the United States of America and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 360-10514-1 (20 Apr. 1988), paras. 17-22, reprinted in 18 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 237-238.

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70. The Tribunal notes that the Claimant has not provided any ofﬁcial title deeds or other authorized documents showing title to the alleged property. Instead, the Claimant tries to carry his initial burden of proving his ownership through a number of inconsistent statements by himself and his closest relatives. As a general rule, contradictory statements of an interested party should be construed against that party.9 71. Moreover, the ownership asserted by the Claimant has changed throughout the proceedings, and at a very late stage the Claimant claims that he has a beneﬁcial ownership in the property because his father had redistributed ownership interests. However, the Claimant provides no ofﬁcial documents of transfer related to the alleged redistribution of ownership. The Tribunal holds that the Respondent has provided sufﬁcient rebuttal evidence on the applicable provisions of Iranian laws and the Tribunal’s practice concerning the transactions of properties such as the ﬁve buildings in this case. The documentary evidence submitted by the Respondent shows that such properties must be registered to give the transfer of ownership legal validity. 72. The Claimant has asserted that his father could not register the redistribution of ownership because his father was prevented from carrying out the necessary formalities at Notary Public Ofﬁce No. 64. However, the Claimant is unsuccessful in corroborating his father’s account. The Respondent, on the other hand, has provided evidence in rebuttal, showing that during 1978 and 1979 the Claimant’s father carried out a large number of other registration formalities at the same Notary Public Ofﬁce and at other administrative or judicial ofﬁces. The Tribunal concludes that, even if Edward Davidson intended to transfer or redistribute ownership interests in the ﬁve properties, it has been proven neither that he gave effect to his intention nor that he did it in the manner required by Iranian law and according to the approved practice of the Tribunal. A mere intent, even if it existed, cannot effectuate a legally valid transfer of real property. 73. Additionally, the Respondent has presented the title deeds to the ﬁve properties. An ofﬁcial title deed is prima facie strong evidence indicating that the title to real property has been ofﬁcially conferred on the person whose name appears on the deed as the owner or transferee. See Rouhollah Karubian and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 569-419-2 (6 Mar. 1996), para. 114, reprinted in 32 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 3 at 29. Consequently, the Tribunal concludes that, as reﬂected in the deeds, the Claimant’s ownership interests were one-seventh in the Kamran Building, one-eighth in the Manouchehri Building, none in the Ahar Building, ﬁve thirty-sixths in the Jalleh Building 9 See, e.g., Woodward-Clyde Consultants and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Award No. 73-67-3 (2 Sept. 1983), p. 16, reprinted in 3 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 239, 249.

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and none in the Caravan Hotel. The Tribunal notes that the Kamran and Manouchehri Buildings were later, in 1985 and 1984, transferred to Bank Melli due to the owners’ failure to fulﬁl their contractual obligations under their mortgage agreements. These transactions were based on executive writs and accordingly registered. The signiﬁcance of these transfers will be dealt with in the discussion of the alleged expropriation by the Respondent. 2. The Caveat 2.1 The Parties’ Contentions 74. The Respondent argues that the caveat of the Full Tribunal Decision of 6 April 1984 in Case No. A18, supra, bars the Claimant’s claim on the merits, since he acquired and maintained his ownership interests by violating the laws of Iran. According to the Respondent the Claimant violated the laws of Iran by failing to renounce his Iranian nationality “before or after his naturalization as a United States citizen” and by continuing to maintain real property after his naturalization in breach of Article 989 of the Iranian Civil Code.10 The Respondent considers the Claimant’s continued ownership of immovable property in Iran after his naturalization to be “a clear example of abuse of rights.” 75. The Claimant disputes the Respondent’s conclusion and maintains that the Respondent offers no evidence to establish that the Claimant misrepresented or concealed his U.S. nationality. Furthermore, the Claimant contends that the property in question was acquired long before he became a U.S. national. Referring to Article 988 of the Civil Code,11 the Claimant points out that according to Iranian law, he could not have renounced his Iranian nationality before reaching the age of twenty-ﬁve, which occurred on 10 June 1981. The Claimant contends, relying on note 6 of Article 989 of the Civil Code and the conclusions in Saghi, supra, para. 52, that Iranian law permits those Iranians who have obtained foreign nationality to hold their Iranian real property for up to a 10 According to Article 989 “[i]n case any Iranian subject acquired foreign nationality after the solar year 1280 (1901-1902) without the observance of the provisions of law, his foreign nationality will be considered null and void and he will be regarded as an Iranian subject. Nevertheless, all his landed properties will be sold under the supervision of the local Public Prosecutor and the proceeds will be paid to him after the deduction of the expenses of sale . . .” 11 Article 988, in relevant part, reads as follows: Iranian nationals cannot abandon their nationality except on the following conditions: 1. That they have reached the full age of 25; 2. That the Council of Ministers has allowed their renunciation of their Iranian nationality; 3. That they have previously undertaken to transfer, by some means or other, to Iranian nationals, within one year from the date of the renunciation of their Iranian nationality, all the rights that they possess on landed properties in Iran or which they may acquire by inheritance even if Iranian laws permit their ownership by foreign nationals . . .; 4. That they have completed their military service.

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year before being obliged to sell it. The one year time limit in the present Case had not expired before 19 January 1981. 2.2 The Tribunal’s Findings 76. In this case the Tribunal has already decided that the Claimant was a dual national of Iran and the United States from his naturalization in the United States in March 1980 and that during the relevant period the Claimant’s dominant and effective nationality was that of the United States. See, supra, para. 46. The Full Tribunal has stated about the caveat in Case No. A18 that, “the other nationality may remain relevant to the merits of the Claim.” See Case No. A18, supra, at 265-266. The Tribunal also discussed the substance of the caveat in Saghi, supra, paras. 45-64. The caveat has been applied by the Tribunal as an instrument of equity intended to prevent abuses of right. Therefore, claims by dual nationals for beneﬁts generally limited by relevant Iranian laws to persons who are nationals solely of Iran have been considered barred. Consequently, these persons have been refused an award in their favor. 77. The Tribunal notes that the Claimant acquired the property in question before he became a national of the United States on 5 March 1980 and possessed this property as a dual national until the alleged expropriation around 1 June 1980. The Tribunal concludes that the ownership of the property remained legal at the time of the alleged expropriation, since Iranian law permitted those Iranians who obtained foreign nationality to hold their Iranian real property up to a year before being obliged to sell it. See Civil Code of Iran, Articles 988 and 989. As it has been shown neither that the Claimant enjoyed his property rights by violating municipal law, nor that he would have enjoyed them by abusing his Iranian nationality, the Tribunal holds that the Caveat expressed by the Full Tribunal in Case No. A18 is not applicable to this Case. 3. Expropriation 3.1 The Claimant’s Contentions 78. The Claimant asserts that the properties at issue were expropriated in June 1980, when the Government of Iran interfered with his property rights to an extent that rendered them valueless. Until 1979, when he left Iran, the Claimant’s father managed the ﬁve properties at issue here. When leaving Iran in the summer of 1979, the Claimant’s father made arrangements with Mr. Nejat Haim to manage the properties and to collect the rents, to make mortgage payments, to pay taxes and other expenses, and to remit the balance to the members of the Davidson family in accordance with their respective ownership interests. 79. The Claimant further asserts that on or about 21 June 1980, Mr. Haim ceased to remit the balances since the Revolutionary Prosecutor General’s Ofﬁce

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notiﬁed him that the Davidson family no longer owned the properties; the Revolutionary Court had assumed supervision and ownership of the properties in question. Mr. Haim was further requested to transfer to the Revolutionary Prosecutor General’s Ofﬁce whatever remained from the collected rents after paying the mortgage, taxes and expenses. He emphasizes that all instructions he received from that Ofﬁce were oral. When he asked for written instructions, one of the ofﬁcials, Mr. Safari, responded that no written instructions were needed. It is stated by the Claimant that Mr. Haim had to report to and visit the Revolutionary Prosecutor General’s Ofﬁce once a month. Around 25 June 1980, Mr. Haim was told by the Revolutionary Prosecutor General’s Ofﬁce not to make any mortgage payments to Bank Melli. The Claimant asserts that in accordance with that request, Mr. Haim discontinued the mortgage payments to Bank Melli concerning the Ahar, Kamran and Manouchehri Buildings. He remitted the remaining balance to the Revolutionary Prosecutor General’s Ofﬁce. 80. The Claimant argues that governmental interference with the collection of rents and the management of the ﬁve properties rendered his ownership interests worthless. The Claimant also points out that under international law a deprivation or taking of property may occur even where legal title to the property is not affected. 81. As far as the exact date of the alleged taking is concerned, the Claimant argues that where a taking occurs through a chain of events, the date of the expropriation is not necessarily the ﬁrst or the last of such events, but rather when the Claimant has been permanently deprived of fundamental rights of ownership. The Claimant also asserts that such a date of taking is unaffected by a subsequent taking of title to the property. The Claimant points out that by the end of 1980, when he wrote a letter to Senator Edward Kennedy, stating that his properties had been conﬁscated, he understood himself to have been deprived of enjoyment of economic beneﬁts and control over the properties and he was convinced that this was not merely temporary. At the hearing the Claimant explained that his father originally drafted the letter, but he later signed it. 82. The Claimant maintains that, even if title was taken long after January 1981, he is entitled to relief because, since the latter part of 1980, he has been deprived of the fundamental rights of ownership. The Claimant asserts that the interference was not only limited to his enjoyment of the income from the property, but he also was prevented from making mortgage payments on certain properties. As a result, the mortgagee, Bank Melli, foreclosed on some of the properties. 83. The Claimant emphasizes that a formal conﬁscation eventually took place in the spring of 1982. To support this assertion, the Claimant refers to the letter from the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ofﬁce of Restored Properties, to a tenant named Sion Okhovat concerning a ruling of the Revolutionary Court

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27

of 24 April 1982. The Claimant also provides three letters from the authorities to tenants in the Kamran Building after the relevant date of 19 January 1981. In these letters the tenants are advised to pay the monthly rent to the bank account of the Revolutionary Prosecutor General’s Ofﬁce. It is the view of the Claimant that the Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce had already notiﬁed the tenants in the summer of 1980 that the Davidsons no longer owned the buildings and that no further rental payments were to be made to them. To support the conclusion the Claimant has submitted the following ﬁve afﬁdavits. 84. In the ﬁrst two afﬁdavits, Fredi Muslavi and the Claimant’s aunt Josephine Israel assert that they were contacted by Edward Davidson in the summer of 1980 and asked to speak to the tenants of the ﬁve buildings and to Iranian ofﬁcials to ﬁnd out the status of the Claimant’s properties. Both of them assert that, at that time, the Revolutionary Prosecutor General’s Ofﬁce had advised the tenants not to make any rental payments to the Davidson family as they no longer owned the properties, which the Revolutionary Government had taken. The Revolutionary Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce also told them that nothing could be done to change the situation. Mr. Muslavi and Ms. Israel informed Edward Davidson of the results of the inquiries later in the summer or early fall of 1980. 85. In his afﬁdavit, Mr. Faraj Jahanbani explains that he made on Edward Davidson’s request inquiries concerning two of the ﬁve properties, namely the Kamran and Manouchehri Buildings. He met with some tenants of both buildings, whom he mentions by name. The ofﬁcials of the Revolutionary Prosecutor General’s Ofﬁce had informed these tenants not to pay rent to the Claimant’s family or representatives. Mr. Jahanbani adds that governmental ofﬁcials personally informed him that the Claimant’s properties had been conﬁscated. He informed Edward Davidson of all this in October 1980. 86. The Claimant’s cousin Ziba Foroozan states in her afﬁdavit that, pursuant to the request by Edward Davidson in the late summer of 1980, she made inquiries about two of the ﬁve properties at issue in this Case. Ms. Foroozan met with ﬁve tenants from the Jalleh Building and one from the Ahar Building, whom she refers to by name. All of these tenants informed her that governmental ofﬁcials had told them not to pay the rent to Homayounjah or his representatives, because all of the properties had been conﬁscated by the Revolutionary Government. Inquiries carried out at the Ofﬁce of the Revolutionary Prosecutor General produced the same result. Ms. Foroozan also asked a friend, Ms. Fateme Shahrouki, whether her father, who was a local ofﬁcial, could do anything to rectify the situation. After a week, Ms. Shahrouki called Ms. Foroozan back to tell that her father had been informed by the Revolutionary Prosecutor General’s Ofﬁce that the Homayounjah family no longer owned these properties and that they had been taken over by the Iranian Government.

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Ms. Foroozan concludes that she informed Edward Davidson of the outcome of her investigations in the summer or early fall of 1980. 87. Mr. Roushan Khalil Kalimi Isfahani has submitted an afﬁdavit explaining that he was a tenant for many years in the Kheradmand (Kamran) Building. Until about June 1980 he paid the rent to Mr. Haim. He claims that Mr. Safari from the Revolutionary Prosecutor General’s Ofﬁce then informed him that the property no longer belonged to the Davidsons, but had been taken over by the Revolutionary Government. He was advised to pay the rent to Mr. Haim, who then was collecting the rents on behalf of the Revolutionary Government. 88. At the Hearing, the Claimant’s witnesses Edward Davidson and Nejat Haim testiﬁed that before Edward Davidson left Iran in the summer of 1979 he made arrangements with Mr. Haim to collect rents from the tenants in the ﬁve buildings. Mr. Haim said he had an ofﬁcial power of attorney for the Kamran Building and that he acted upon oral instructions from the Davidsons as regards the other buildings. From the rent he collected, Mr. Haim was to pay the mortgage payments, taxes and other expenses relating to the properties, and he was to send the balance to Edward Davidson for distribution to his sons. This arrangement worked until about 20 June 1980 when payments stopped coming from Mr. Haim to Edward Davidson. On or about 20 June 1980, the Revolutionary Prosecutor General’s Ofﬁce told Mr. Haim that the Homayounjah (Davidson) family no longer owned the ﬁve properties and that the Revolutionary Court now supervised and owned these properties. Mr. Haim said he was told to send the money that remained from the collected rentals after paying the mortgage, taxes and expenses to the Revolutionary Prosecutor General’s Ofﬁce, and he followed instructions. On or about 25 June 1980 that ofﬁce told Mr. Haim not to make any mortgage payments to Bank Melli, and he again obeyed orders. Later, after the relevant period, some tenants received letters from the authorities regarding these matters and Mr. Haim informed Edward Davidson that the Prosecutor General’s Ofﬁce had instructed some tenants of these ﬁve properties to pay the rents directly to the Revolutionary Government. 3.2 The Respondent’s Contentions 89. The Respondent disputes the value of the evidence produced by the Claimant. Also, according to the Respondent, no weight can be given to the statements of the Claimant or his father since they are both interested parties. Moreover, both statements are mere reiterations of the Claim. The signiﬁcance of the statements of the Claimant and his father is considered reduced even further by the fact that at the time of the alleged expropriation they were staying in the United States. The afﬁdavits submitted by the Claimant regarding the inquiries made about the status of the Claimant’s properties are also said to be of secondary nature and based on hearsay.

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90. Commenting on the afﬁdavits introduced as evidence by the Claimant, the Respondent states that most of the afﬁants are relatives of the Claimant and their statements are not corroborated by any other independent sources or contemporary evidence. The Respondent points out that the afﬁants fail to name the person in the Revolutionary Prosecutor General’s Ofﬁce who allegedly told them of the taking of the properties. The Respondent also notes that these afﬁdavits were prepared in English, and further asserts that the majority of the afﬁants only knew Persian and thus lacked proper knowledge of the language in which they were prepared. 91. Comparing the afﬁdavits of Mr. Muslavi and Ms. Israel, the Respondent furthermore notes that they are identical, with the exception of the names, and that both share similar drafting errors. The same applies to the afﬁdavits of Mr. Jahanbani and Ms. Foroozan. In connection with Ms. Israel’s statement concerning the events in the summer or fall of 1980, the Respondent points out that the Claimant had ﬁrst asserted that his aunt, Ms. Israel, had left Iran in 1975 and therefore could not have possibly witnessed these events. Later the Claimant amended this statement to the effect that Ms. Israel had returned to Iran and lived there during 1979 and 1980 and later left Iran again. 92. As for the phone number to which Mr. Jahanbani allegedly placed a call to contact the authorities, the Respondent has produced an afﬁdavit from Ms. Marvasti, stating that this phone number has been registered since 1963 in the name of her father. Also, Ms. Marvasti states that the phone line was installed in a building rented by the Department of Education and that the building has never been at the disposal of the Revolutionary Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce or its subordinates. 93. The Respondent also challenges the statement of Mr. Kalimi Isfahani, regarding the instruction received by Mr. Safari from the Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce to pay the rent to Mr. Haim. The Respondent points out that the tenants of the Kamran Building had already been asked to pay their rent to Mr. Haim since 1979, according to the arrangement between them and the Claimant’s father. 94. The Respondent expresses doubts about the correctness of Mr. Haim’s assertion concerning the oral instructions allegedly given to him by the Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce, arguing that such oral instructions would have been contrary to administrative practice and usage. Therefore, the Respondent considers it unproven that an oral order was issued. As rebuttal evidence the Respondent has submitted afﬁdavits from persons with knowledge of the procedures of the revolutionary courts and prosecutor’s ofﬁces. These afﬁdavits are written by Mr. Gholam Hussain Sadeghi Ghahareh, Mr. Abolfazl Mazinanian and Mr. Hussain Dadgar; they maintain that oral orders were never used to administer punishment or to expropriate property. At the Hearing Mr. Sadeghi Ghahareh conﬁrmed that all expropriation orders were in writing.

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95. The Respondent has submitted a copy of an agreement concluded on 28 June 1981 altering a previous tenancy agreement between Mr. Haim, the lessor’s attorney, and Mr. Khoshkou, as evidence of Mr. Haim acting for the Claimant’s family as late as June 1981, i.e., after the entering into force of the Claims Settlement Declaration. The Respondent points out that the agreement contained no reference to the involvement of the Revolutionary Prosecutor General’s Ofﬁce or to that of other judicial authorities. Furthermore, the Respondent maintains that the correspondence between Mr. Haim and the Revolutionary Prosecutor General’s Ofﬁce concerning the Kamran Building also indicates that he was still, in late 1981, acting for the Claimant and that the Revolutionary Prosecutor General’s Ofﬁce had given no expropriation order regarding the properties in question. In addition, the Respondent points out that in his 10 December 1981 letter to Bank Melli, Mr. Haim referred to a statement by the Revolutionary Prosecutor General according to which “. . . the said property has been taken for supervision . . .” Therefore, the Respondent argues that Mr. Haim never indicated anything that would support the Claimant’s assertion that expropriation had taken place. 96. With regard to the evidence the Claimant submitted to prove that rental payments were made to the account of the Revolutionary Prosecutor General’s Ofﬁce, the Respondent explains that Mr. Haim presented no convincing evidence to demonstrate that the rental payments collected by him from June 1980 until 19 January 1981 were paid into the account of that Ofﬁce. The Respondent points out that all these orders were issued long after the jurisdictional cutoff date of the Tribunal, 19 January 1981, and that the orders show that rental payments for late 1981 and 1982 had to be made to a special bank account opened by the Revolutionary Prosecutor General’s Ofﬁce, acting as a trustee for the owner, pending investigations regarding the status of the properties. 97. The Respondent notes that even the Claimant admits that prior to the date the Algiers Declarations became effective no formal order of expropriation of his property was issued. As regards the letter from the Islamic Revolutionary Court to Mr. Sion Okhovat that the Claimant has submitted as evidence of expropriation, the Respondent asserts that the original letter in Persian has been manipulated to refer to the Homayounjah family. In reality, the letter was to a person named Ebrahim Lavian, who, according to the Respondent, has no connection at all to the Davidson family. To support this, the Respondent has produced a letter from the Revolutionary Prosecutor General’s Ofﬁce conﬁrming that the expropriation order was issued against Mr. Ebrahim Lavian. 98. Further, the Respondent claims to have no knowledge of whether or not Mr. Haim was remitting money to the Claimant or stopped remitting it in June 1980. The Respondent also asserts that the Revolutionary Prosecutor General’s Ofﬁce never received the two letters, now submitted by the Claimant,

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dated 4/9/1360 (25.11.1981) and 19/9/1360 (10.12.1981). The earlier letter states that Mr. Haim stopped paying loan instalments to Bank Melli on the Kamran Building as of 15/5/1360 (6 August 1981),12 pursuant to the oral instruction given by Mr. Safari. The Respondent asserts that Mr. Haim only had a power of attorney to act on behalf of the Claimant’s family with respect to the Kamran Building and that the Claimant cannot prove that the Respondent caused nonpayment of the mortgaged debt in respect of this property. 99. At the Hearing, the Respondent’s witness Mr. Safari explained that he worked in the Prime Minister’s Ofﬁce from 1979 until he was appointed to the Revolutionary Prosecutor General’s Ofﬁce on 5 October 1980. Mr. Safari met Mr. Haim when Ms. Maki made a complaint about the Caravan Hotel, whose owner was abroad. The Ofﬁce sent an invitation to the owners’ representative, Mr. Haim, and he came to the Ofﬁce, showing a power of attorney relating to the Kamran Building. Mr. Safari asserts that Mr. Haim asked him to help make the tenants pay their rents. Later Mr. Safari invited some of these tenants to the Ofﬁce and told them to pay their rents. Mr. Safari denies collecting rents from Mr. Haim or from the tenants of the Kamran Building. Mr. Safari also denied having received or seen the two letters that Mr. Haim allegedly wrote to the Revolutionary Prosecutor General’s Ofﬁce. 100. Also, the Respondent reiterates that the Kamran, Ahar and Manouchehri Buildings were foreclosed by the mortgagee bank and title to these properties was therefore transferred to the bank by virtue of the execution deed. Should it be assumed that the Iranian Government took over the buildings mortgaged to Bank Melli, this would in the Respondent’s view call into question the fact that it was later possible for Bank Melli to have a writ of execution issued against the Claimant as the owner of the mortgaged property. The executive writ proves that the mortgagor still owned the mortgaged property on the execution date. 101. According to the Respondent, the letter which the Claimant addressed to Senator Edward Kennedy, assuming it is authentic, does not prove in any way the taking of the Claimant’s property between 5 March 1980 and 19 January 1981. Moreover, the letter contains untrue matters, e.g., that the Claimant had children who had inherited property in Iran from their grandparents. As of the date of the letter, on 22 December 1980, the Claimant was single and childless and both his parents were alive. 102. The Respondent concludes that during the relevant periods it neither interfered in the properties, nor exercised supervision over them. Therefore, the Respondent requests the Tribunal to dismiss the Case for want of jurisdiction. 12 Because of the Claimant’s initially erroneous conversion of the Iranian date to 6 August 1980, the Respondent believes that the Claimant also based the alleged date of interference with his ownership on that error.

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3.3 The Tribunal’s Findings 103. The Tribunal notes that the Parties disagree as to whether the Government of Iran ever formally expropriated the Claimant’s ownership interests, e.g., by rendering a judgment. The Claimant asserts that this did not happen until 24 April 1982, when the Islamic Revolutionary Court passed a ruling to this effect. If the Tribunal were to base its ﬁndings on that date only, it would have to dismiss the claim for want of jurisdiction, since that date is beyond the jurisdictional cutoff date of the Tribunal. But the Claimant has based its claim not on a formal taking, but rather on the alleged interference with his property rights prior to the jurisdictional cutoff date. 104. Measures taken by a State can interfere with property rights to such an extent that these rights must be deemed to have been expropriated. Such an expropriation occurs, for example, when the owner is deprived of the effective use, control, and beneﬁts of his property. Thus, an expropriation may take place even though the State does not admit having expropriated and the legal title to the property remains with the original owner.13 105. According to Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration, the Tribunal has jurisdiction over claims that were outstanding on 19 January 1981, whether or not ﬁled with any court. Hence, for the Tribunal to have jurisdiction in the present Case, the Claimant must establish that the claims had arisen prior to that date. In the Tribunal’s practice it has been established that a claim for the taking of property is outstanding on the day of the taking. Should the alleged expropriation have been carried out by way of a series of interferences in the enjoyment of property, the cause of action is deemed to have arisen on the day when the interference ripened into an irreversible deprivation of property rather than on the date these events began. The point at which interference ripens into a taking depends on the circumstances of the case and does not require the transfer of legal title.14 106. While a government’s assumption of control over property does not automatically and immediately justify a conclusion that the property has been taken by the government, thus requiring compensation under international law, such a conclusion is warranted whenever events demonstrate that the owner has been deprived of fundamental rights of ownership and it appears that this deprivation is not merely ephemeral. In establishing expropriation, less signiﬁcance is to be attached to the intent of the government and to the form of these measures 13 See Starrett Housing Corporation, et al. and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Interlocutory Award No. ITL 32-24-1 (19 Dec. 1983), pp. 51-53, reprinted in 4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 122, 154-157. See also United Painting Company Inc. and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 45811286-3 (20 Dec. 1989), para. 58, reprinted in 23 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 351, 368; Faith Litha Khosrowshahi, et al. and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Award No. 558-178-2 (30 Jun. 1994), para. 23, reprinted in 30 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 76 at 84. 14 See International Technical Products Corporation, et al. and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Award No. 196-302-3 (28 Oct. 1985), pp. 240-241, reprinted in 9 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 206.

GEORGE E. DAVIDSON v. IRAN

33

of control or interference than to the reality of their impact on the owner.15 This does not, however, relieve a claimant asserting expropriation from the obligation to demonstrate the requisite government interference. See United Painting Company Inc., supra. 107. In this Case the title deeds provided by the Respondent establish that the Claimant had ownership interests in three of the ﬁve buildings in question, namely one-seventh in the Kamran Building, one-eighth in the Manouchehri Building and ﬁve thirty-sixths in the Jalleh Building. These title deeds do not mention any measures amounting to an expropriation. However, the Tribunal notes that the lack of any ofﬁcial written documentary evidence of an expropriation within the relevant period does not exclude the possibility of a taking. 108. The Tribunal refers to the testimony at the Hearing of Edward Davidson and Nejat Haim as regards their arrangements for managing the family properties. The Tribunal also refers to the testimony of Mr. Haim concerning events of the summer of 1980 (see, supra, para. 88). The Tribunal ﬁnds the testimony of Mr. Haim persuasive and his statement corroborates that of the Claimant’s father. The evidence provided by Mr. Muslavi, Ms. Israel, Mr. Jahanbani, Ms. Foroozan and Mr. Kalimi Isfahani also corroborates the key statements made by Edward Davidson and Mr. Haim. Moreover, Mr. Kalimi Isfahani states that in June 1980 Mr. Safari of the Revolutionary Prosecutor General’s Ofﬁce personally told him that the Davidsons no longer owned the property and that it had been taken over by the Revolutionary Government. Mr. Kalimi Isfahani paid the rent to Mr. Haim, who conﬁrmed that he was collecting the rent for the Revolutionary Government. 109. In conclusion, all oral statements and afﬁdavits of Edward Davidson, Nejat Haim, Fredi Muslavi, his aunt Josephine Israel, Faraj Jahanbani, his cousin Ziba Foroozan and Roushan Khalil Kalimi Isfahani are consistent, and that consistency strengthens their probative value. Even if the Tribunal evaluates the probative value of this evidence with caution to protect the Respondent against claims not properly founded, it demonstrates that in the summer of 1980 the Iranian Revolutionary authorities ordered the tenants to cease paying their rent to the Davidson family, as the properties in question were under the effective supervision of the Revolutionary Government. As a result, the Claimant did not receive any rents. Mr. Safari’s testimony does not convince the Tribunal of the opposite. First, the Respondent has not submitted contemporaneous evidence to support his assertion that Mr. Haim had asked him to force the tenants to pay their rent. For this reason Mr. Safari’s statement fails to convince the Tribunal that he played only a passive role in the collection of rent for the Davidson 15 See Tippets, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton and TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran, et al., Award No. 141-7-2 (29 June 1984), pp. 10-11, reprinted in 6 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 219, 225-226. See also Seaco Inc. and The Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Award No. 531-260-2 (25 Jun. 1992), para. 38, reprinted in 28 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 198 at 210; Nazari, supra, para. 121.

34

GEORGE E. DAVIDSON v. IRAN

properties. Second, the Respondent presented Mr. Safari as a witness at the last possible moment, which unfairly prevented the Claimant from doing much more than conﬁrming Mr. Safari’s identity. 110. The actual transfer of the properties to Bank Melli occurred after the alleged taking and subsequent to the relevant period. Thus, their only relevance to this Case is to demonstrate the result of the Respondent’s action not to permit mortgage payments. 111. Therefore, the Tribunal holds that the Respondent permanently deprived the Claimant of his fundamental rights of ownership, because he could not control, use or enjoy the beneﬁts of these properties. Even if legal title was not transferred, the Tribunal concludes that the Respondent’s interference with the Claimant’s property rights ripened into a taking at the latest on 1 July 1980. 4. Valuation 4.1 The Parties’ Contentions 112. The Claimant’s father, Edward Davidson, estimates that the fair market value of the ﬁve properties in the late summer of 1980 was as follows (in U.S. dollars): Kamran Building (less $200,000 for loans) Manouchehri Building (less 12 of $260,000, i.e., $130,000 for loans) Ahar Building (less 12 of $260,000, i.e., $130,000 for loans) Jalleh Building Caravan Hotel

$2,700,000 $400,000 $400,000 $350,000 $3,000,000

Loans secured by mortgages were outstanding on the ﬁrst three properties. The Kamran Building had a loan of $200,000, while the Manouchehri and Ahar Buildings had a combined loan of $260,000. 113. The Claimant’s second estimate is presented by Engineer Mohammad Taghi Mazhari Abbasi, who evaluated the properties in late May 1983, when he was an ofﬁcial appraiser of the Iranian Ministry of Justice. Mr. Abbasi evaluates the properties as follows (exchange rate calculated at a rate of 72 rials per U.S. $1.00): Kamran Building Manouchehri Building Ahar Building Jalleh Building16 Caravan Hotel

211,950,000 rials 21,000,000 rials 32,700,000 rials 18,500,000 rials 210,000,000 rials

($2,943,750) ($291,667) ($454,167) ($256,944) ($2,916,667)

16 The existence of a separate villa in connection with the Jalleh Building has been conﬁrmed neither by Mr. Abbasi nor by the ofﬁcial title deed related to that building.

GEORGE E. DAVIDSON v. IRAN

35

The Claimant urges that this estimate of the fair market value in May 1983 should be accepted and not be reduced on the ground that Tehran real estate values rose between 1980 and May 1983, unless there is persuasive evidence that the rise was in excess of 20 percent. According to the Claimant, estimates given by the ofﬁcial Ministry of Justice appraisers such as Mr. Abbasi are some 20 percent below what is thought to be the fair market value. Later the Claimant pointed out that Mr. Abbasi was advised of the purpose for which the appraisal was sought and the relevant dates. Consequently, he had no reason to give 1983, rather than 1980, values. 114. The Claimant’s third appraisal was made by Morteza Banayan, an Iranian realtor for more than forty years, who claims to have tried to sell the Davidson family’s property before the taking. Mr. Banayan’s opinion of the fair market value in 1980 is as follows: Kamran Building Manouchehri Building Ahar Building Jalleh Building Caravan Hotel

191,950,000 rials 19,000,000 rials 22,000,000 rials 15,000,000 rials 215,000,000 rials

Mr. Banayan asserts that real estate values in Iran actually decreased from January 1980 through June 1983. In early 1979 Mr. Banayan obtained a bid from one of his customers for the Kamran Building at about 175,000,000 rials and for the Caravan Hotel at 190,000,000 rials, but no deals were made. Edward Davidson also said that he received bids in 1978 and 1979, but four of them were refused as too low and the ﬁfth, for the Ahar Building, was declined because Mrs. Davidson opposed the sale. The bids were: Kamran Building Manouchehri Building Ahar Building Jalleh Building Caravan Hotel

175,000,000 rials 20,000,000 rials 23,000,000 rials 22,000,000 rials 190,000,000 rials

115. The Respondent provides an appraisal of the properties as of June 1980 by two independent licensed experts, Engineers Mohammad Reza Yazdi and Ebrahim Azad Harf. The appraisal was conducted in 1994. They evaluate the properties, including the superstructure and the land, without calculating the “key-money”, which they maintain should be deducted from the value of each property, as follows: Kamran Building Manouchehri Building Ahar Building Jalleh Building Caravan Hotel

60,000,000 rials 10,000,000 rials 10,000,000 rials 4,000,000 rials 80,000,000 rials

36

GEORGE E. DAVIDSON v. IRAN

116. The Respondent argues that the Claimant has given contradictory statements regarding Mr. Abbasi’s evaluation, since it does not clearly state whether the prices of 1980 or 1983 have been applied. Furthermore, the Respondent does not approve of Mr. Abbasi’s opinion, because the prices of property had substantially increased from 1980 to 1983. Moreover, the Respondent believes that the issue of the “key-money” belonging to the lessees has not been adequately taken into account. Doubting the expertise of Mr. Banayan, the Respondent provides a letter from the guild of real estate consultants according to which no license as real estate agent or consultant has been issued for him. Furthermore, the Respondent’s experts, Mr. Yazdi and Mr. Azad Harf, do not share Mr. Banyan’s opinion about the excellent quality and good location of the properties and they rate them below average. Finally, the Respondent presents a letter dated 20/2/1375 (10 May 1996) from Bank Melli in which the mortgage debts in May-June 1979 are said to have been 11,537,254 rials (Kamran Building), 8,897,484 rials (Manouchehri Building) and 10,076,543 rials (Ahar Building), totaling 30,511,281 rials. This amount is almost the same as the Claimant’s estimate (U.S. $460,000). The Respondent asserts that these debts should be deducted from the value of the property. 4.2 The Tribunal’s Findings 117. The Tribunal notes that the Parties have presented quite similar ﬁgures regarding the mortgages and they have agreed that these mortgage debts should be deducted from the value of the properties. Apart from this, the Parties disagree on their value. The Parties have referred to three valuation reports by experts and the Claimant has also referred to a valuation made by his father. The Tribunal must attempt to determine the properties’ fair market value, which has been described by the Expert in Starrett as “the price that a willing buyer would buy given goods at and the price at which a willing seller would sell it at on condition that none of the two parties are under any kind of duress and that both parties have good information about the relevant circumstances involved in the purchase.” See Starrett Housing Corporation et al. and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Award No. 314-24-1 (14 Aug. 1987), para. 18, reprinted in 16 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 112. 118. The difﬁculty is, however, in determining a fair market value at the time of the alleged taking in the summer of 1980, because at that time no real estate market existed in Iran in an ordinary sense. Due to the revolution the general economic, political and social conditions were exceptional and no ﬁxed price level existed in the real estate market. The Tribunal notes that the two valuations by Mr. Banyan and Mr. Abbasi state similar values for the properties.

GEORGE E. DAVIDSON v. IRAN

37

Mr. Abbasi’s report, dated May 1983, does not, however, indicate whether it uses 1980 or 1983 values. The Claimant has been unsuccessful in showing that Abbasi’s valuation has used other than 1983 prices. Therefore, the Tribunal is bound to treat Mr. Abbasi’s report as reﬂecting 1983 prices. The appraisal jointly made by Mr. Yazdi and Mr. Azad Harf diverges considerably from the two other reports. It states much lower values for the properties; for the Jalleh Building the estimate is more than 75% lower than that of Mr. Abbasi, who generally has expressed the highest values, but in 1983 prices. The Tribunal notes also that the experts disagree as to whether the “key-money” received from the tenants has any impact on the commercial value of the properties. Therefore, the Tribunal is bound to make reasonable approximations within the limits of the given appraisals by the experts. After deducting appreciated mortgage debts, the Tribunal ﬁnds that the values of the properties at the time of the expropriation were as follows: Kamran Building Manouchehri Building Jalleh Building

120,000,000 rials 7,000,000 rials 10,000,000 rials

Consequently, as the Claimant’s ownership interest is one-seventh in the Kamran Building, one-eighth in the Manouchehri Building and ﬁve thirty-sixths in the Jalleh Building, the compensation to the Claimant is as follows:17 Kamran Building Manouchehri Building Jalleh Building

17,142,857 rials ($245,178) 875,000 rials ($12,514) 1,388,889 rials ($19,864)

Total

19,406,746 rials ($277,556)

As a result, the Tribunal decides that the Respondent should pay the Claimant U.S. $277,556 with interest, calculated at a rate the Tribunal considers appropriate, from the date on which the Claimant’s property is deemed to have been taken, i.e., on 1 July 1980. v. interest 119. The Tribunal considers it appropriate to award interest to the Claimant at the rate of 7.789% in accordance with the principles outlined in Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc. and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 180-64-1 (27 June 1985), reprinted in 8 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 298, 320322, from the date of interference with the property rights. 17 The exchange rate applied is the average exchange rate for June 1980 (69.920 rials to one U.S. dollar) as listed by the International Monetary Fund. See International Financial Statistics, Supplement on Exchange Rates, Suppl. Ser. No. 9 (1985).

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GEORGE E. DAVIDSON v. IRAN

vi. costs 120. The Claimant claims all costs incurred during the proceedings, including lawyer’s fees, witness fees, and travel expenses. The Respondent requests the Tribunal to compel Claimant to pay a reasonable amount for the expenses incurred by the Respondent for defending against the Claimant’s unfounded Claim. vii. award 121.

For the foregoing reasons,

THE TRIBUNAL AWARDS AS FOLLOWS: (a) The Claim for the expropriation of the Claimant’s ownership interest in the Ahar Building is dismissed for failure to prove any ownership interest; (b) The Claim for the expropriation of the Claimant’s ownership interest in the Caravan Hotel is dismissed for failure to prove any ownership interest; (c) The Respondent, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, is ordered to pay the Claimant, GEORGE E. DAVIDSON, the amount of Two Hundred Seventy-Seven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty-Six United States Dollars and No Cents (U.S. $277,556), plus simple interest at the rate of 7.789% per annum (365 day basis) from 1 July 1980 up to and including the day on which the Escrow Agent instructs the Depositary Bank to effect payment to the Claimant out of the Security Account, for its interference with the Claimant’s property rights in respect of the Kamran, Manouchehri and Jalleh Buildings in Tehran, Iran. (d) The Respondent is ordered to pay the Claimant costs of arbitration in the amount of Twenty Thousand United States Dollars (U.S. $20,000). (e) The above-stated obligations shall be satisﬁed by payment out of the Security Account established pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria of 19 January 1981. (f) This Award is hereby submitted to the President of the Tribunal for the notiﬁcation to the Escrow Agent.

IRAN v. UNITED STATES, CASE A27

39

The Islamic Republic of Iran, Claimant v. The United States of America, Respondent (Case No. A27) Full Tribunal: Skubiszewski, President; Broms, Arangio-Ruiz, Noori,[1] Aldrich, Ameli,[2] Allison,[3] Aghahosseini,[4] Duncan, Members Signed 5 June 1998[5] Award no. 586-A27-FT The following is the text as issued by the Tribunal:

Award

APPEARANCES For the Claimant:

Mr. M. H. Zahedin-Labbaf, Agent of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Dr. Ali Akbar Riyazi, Legal Adviser to the Agent, Prof. Bruno A. Ristau, Counsel to the Agent, Prof. Joe Verhoeven, Counsel to the Agent.

For the Respondent:

Mr. D. Stephen Mathias, Agent of the United States of America,

[1 Mr. Noori’s signature is accompanied by the words “Concurring. See Separate Opinion.” The Opinion appears at p. 64, below.] [2 Mr. Ameli’s signature is accompanied by the words “Concurring Opinion.” The Opinion appears at p. 62, below.] [3 Mr. Allison’s signature is accompanied by the words “Separate Opinion.” The Opinion appears at p. 65, below.] [4 Mr. Aghahosseini’s signature is accompanied by the words “Concurring. See Separate Opinion.” The Opinion appears at p. 64, below.] [5 Filed 5 June 1998.]

40

IRAN v. UNITED STATES, CASE A27

Dr. Sean D. Murphy, Deputy Agent of the United States of America, Mr. Conrad K. Harper, Legal Adviser, United States Department of State, Ms. Lisa J. Grosh, Attorney-Adviser, United States Department of State, Prof. Andreas Lowenfeld, Counsel for the Respondent, Mr. Russell La Motte, Attorney-Adviser, United States Department of State, Mr. Douglas Letter, United States Department of Justice, Mr. Roberts B. Owen, Witness.

table of contents Para. 1

i.

introduction

ii.

facts and contentions A. Factual Background 1. The Tribunal’s Decision in Case No. A21 2. The Gould Enforcement Proceedings in the United States 3. The Avco Enforcement Proceedings in the United States a. The Tribunal’s Award in Avco b. The Avco Enforcement Proceedings B. The Parties’ Contentions 1. Iran 2. The United States

12 17 17 19 26 26 39

iii.

jurisdiction

55

iv.

merits A. The Claim Related to the Nonenforcement of the Award in Avco and the Alleged Undue Delay B. The Claim Related to the 24 Cost Awards

56

award

83

v.

6 6 6

56 79

IRAN v. UNITED STATES, CASE A27

41

i. introduction 1. At issue in this Case are the United States obligations under the Algiers Declarations6 concerning the enforcement in the United States of Tribunal awards rendered against United States nationals in favor of Iran. Relevant to this Case are the Tribunal’s ﬁndings in Islamic Republic of Iran and United States of America, Decision No. DEC 62-A21-FT (4 May 1987), reprinted in 14 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 324 (hereinafter “Case A21”). 2. In Case A21, Iran had requested that the Tribunal hold that the Algiers Declarations obliged the United States to satisfy any award rendered by the Tribunal against United States nationals in favor of Iran. The Tribunal concluded that the Algiers Declarations did not impose on the United States any obligation, either express or implicit, to satisfy any such awards, and it denied Iran’s request. In reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal pointed out, however, that “[t]he Parties to the Algiers Declarations are obligated to implement them in such a way that the awards of the Tribunal will be treated as valid and enforceable in their national jurisdictions.” Id. at para. 14, 14 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 330. 3. In this Case, Iran contends that the United States has breached its obligations under the Algiers Declarations concerning the enforcement of Tribunal awards, which obligations, Iran asserts, were delineated by the Tribunal in its Decision in Case A21. As a basis for its claim, Iran invokes the refusal by the United States courts to enforce the Tribunal’s Partial Award in Avco Corporation and Iran Aircraft Industries, et al., Partial Award No. 377-261-3 (18 Jul. 1988), reprinted in 19 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 200 (hereinafter “Avco”). Iran also adduces an alleged undue delay by the United States courts in enforcing the Tribunal’s Award in Gould Marketing, Inc. and Ministry of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 136-49/50-2 (29 Jun. 1984), reprinted in 6 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 272 (hereinafter “Gould ”). The United States denies liability. 4. According to its ﬁnal pleadings, Iran seeks U.S. $3,513,086.03, the amount that the Tribunal awarded the Iranian parties in Avco, and U.S. $48,914, the legal expenses that Iran allegedly incurred in connection with the Avco enforcement proceedings in the United States. In addition, Iran seeks U.S. $344,767.80, the total amount of arbitration costs that the Tribunal awarded Iran in twenty-four other awards. Iran concedes that it has not attempted to seek enforcement of those cost awards in the courts of the United States. In Iran’s 6 Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria (“General Declaration”) and Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (“Claims Settlement Declaration”), both dated 19 January 1981.

42

IRAN v. UNITED STATES, CASE A27

view, in light of the unsatisfactory outcome of the Avco and Gould enforcement proceedings, it would have been futile to do so. Iran seeks interest on all claimed amounts. 5. A Hearing in this Case was held on 27 and 28 February 1996 in the Peace Palace, The Hague. ii. facts and contentions A. Factual Background 1. The Tribunal’s Decision in Case No. A21 6. On 19 July 1985, Iran requested that the Tribunal determine whether the Algiers Declarations obliged the United States to satisfy awards rendered by the Tribunal in favor of Iran against nationals of the United States. Iran contended that the “ﬁnal and binding” nature of the Tribunal’s awards, as this term is used in Article IV, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration, imposed an obligation on the United States to satisfy such awards when its nationals failed to do so voluntarily. This interpretive dispute was assigned docket No. A21. 7. As noted, in its Decision in Case A21 the Tribunal held that the Algiers Declarations did not contain any express or implied obligation of the United States to satisfy Tribunal awards rendered against its nationals in favor of Iran. The Tribunal reasoned as follows. 8. The terms “ﬁnal” and “binding,” when used in instruments relating to international arbitration, “do not ordinarily mean that an award is self-enforcing. Rather, as is generally recognized, a ‘ﬁnal’ and ‘binding’ award is one with which the parties must comply and which is ripe for enforcement.” Case A21, supra, at para. 10, 14 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 329. The Tribunal also disagreed with Iran’s argument that the Algiers Declarations established a “reciprocal system of commitments” that obliged the United States to pay awards against its nationals. The establishment of the Security Account “as the source for payments of awards against the Government of Iran and its controlled entities” and the absence of “an identical obligation of payment upon the United States” demonstrate that the Declarations “clearly contemplated something other than parity of treatment of the two States Parties as regards enforcement mechanisms.” Id. at para. 11, 14 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 329. 9. The Tribunal went on to hold, however, that the Algiers Declarations did “impose upon the United States a duty to implement the Algiers Declarations in good faith so as to ensure that the jurisdiction and authority of the Tribunal are respected.” The High Contracting Parties are obliged to implement the Declarations “in such a way that the awards of the Tribunal will be treated as valid and enforceable in their respective national jurisdictions.” Id. at para. 14, 14 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 330. “This good faith obligation leaves a considerable

IRAN v. UNITED STATES, CASE A27

43

latitude to the States Parties as to the nature of the procedures and mechanisms by which Tribunal awards rendered against their nationals may be enforced.” Id. at para. 15, 14 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 331. 10. The Tribunal continued: Certainly, if no enforcement procedure were available in a State Party, or if recourse to such procedure were eventually to result in a refusal to implement Tribunal awards, or unduly delay their enforcement, this would violate the State’s obligations under the Algiers Declarations. It is therefore incumbent on each State Party to provide some procedure or mechanism whereby enforcement may be obtained within its national jurisdiction, and to ensure that the successful Party has access thereto. If procedures did not already exist as part of the State’s legal system they would have to be established, by means of legislation or other appropriate measures. Such procedures must be available on a basis at least as favorable as that allowed to parties who seek recognition or enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.

Id. 11. The Tribunal found no grounds upon which to conclude that the United States had failed to satisfy its obligation in that respect. Up to that point, Iran had made no attempt to avail itself of any procedures that existed for the enforcement of Tribunal awards in United States courts. Thus, it would have been premature for the Tribunal to consider whether those procedures were adequate. The Tribunal concluded by stating: Only if it were to be established that recourse by Iran to the mechanisms or systems existing in the United States had not resulted in the enforcement of awards of this Tribunal against United States nationals would the question arise as to what further measures, if any, the United States might be required to take in order to ensure the “effectiveness” of the Algiers Declarations.

Id. at para. 16, 14 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 331. 2. The Gould Enforcement Proceedings in the United States 12. On 29 June 1984, the Tribunal rendered Award No. 136-49/50-2 in Gould Marketing, Inc. and Ministry of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran. See supra, para. 3. In Gould, the Tribunal awarded U.S. $3,640,247.13 to the Iranian Ministry of Defence (hereinafter “the Ministry”). In addition, the Tribunal ordered the claimant, Gould Marketing, Inc. (“Gould”), to make available to the Ministry certain communications equipment owned by the Ministry that was in Gould’s possession. Gould failed both to pay the award and to make the equipment available to Iran. Thus, in June 1987, Iran sought conﬁrmation and enforcement of the Tribunal’s award by petitioning the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Gould responded by ﬁling a motion to dismiss on the ground that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

44

IRAN v. UNITED STATES, CASE A27

to hear the enforcement action. The United States government ﬁled a statement of interest in which it argued that the District Court did have subject matter jurisdiction under both the New York Convention7 and 28 U.S.C. §1331, a provision generally granting jurisdiction over civil actions arising under the laws of the United States. 13. The District Court held that it had jurisdiction to hear Iran’s enforcement action because the Tribunal’s award in Gould satisﬁed the requirements of the New York Convention. Gould appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 14. On 23 October 1989, the Ninth Circuit afﬁrmed the District Court’s decision and held that that court had jurisdiction to enforce the Tribunal’s award in Gould pursuant to the New York Convention. The case returned to the District Court for cross motions and summary judgment. By Order of 6 December 1990, the District Court conﬁrmed the Tribunal’s award to the extent it granted U.S. $3,640,247.13 to the Ministry, but modiﬁed it to the extent it required speciﬁc performance by Gould. The District Court relieved Gould of the obligation to make the communications equipment available to the Ministry because it believed that “doing so would violate United States export restrictions.” The Court went on to say, however, that, if those restrictions were lifted within a reasonable time after the Court’s Order, Gould was to return or make available the equipment as directed by the Tribunal’s award. 15. Iran appealed from this decision, urging that the District Court should have afﬁrmed the award “as is.” On 30 June 1992, the Ninth Circuit vacated the District Court’s Order to the extent it relieved Gould of the speciﬁc performance obligation and remanded that portion of the Order for further proceedings. In so deciding, the Ninth Circuit considered a proposal by the United States Department of State, put forward in an amicus curiae brief ﬁled by the United States Department of Justice, to make the equipment available to Iran in the United States. 16. On 31 March 1993, Iran and Gould concluded a settlement agreement, pursuant to which Gould agreed to pay Iran a certain amount and to transfer the communications equipment in question to Victory Van Warehouse in the United States. 3. The Avco Enforcement Proceedings in the United States a. The Tribunal’s Award in Avco 17. On 14 January 1982, Avco Corporation (hereinafter “Avco”) presented a Statement of Claim against the Islamic Republic of Iran and certain entities 7 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 10 June 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, in force 7 Jun. 1959 (effective in the United States 29 Dec. 1970).

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controlled by the government of Iran (hereinafter collectively “Iran”). Avco’s claim consisted of several components, including certain claims for unpaid invoices. The Case was assigned No. 261. Iran asserted certain counterclaims against Avco. On 18 July 1988, the Tribunal issued Award No. 377-261-3, Avco Corporation and Iran Aircraft Industries, et al., see supra, para. 3, awarding Iran a total of U.S. $3,513,086.03, plus interest, on its counterclaims. In the Award, the Tribunal, inter alia, rejected part of Avco’s claims for unpaid invoices. To substantiate its invoice claims, Avco had submitted, inter alia, a veriﬁcation of the underlying invoices by an independent accountant, but not the invoices themselves. In rejecting the invoice claims, the Tribunal said that, while the method of evidence chosen by Avco provided the Tribunal “with adequate evidence of the existence of the invoices listed in Avco’s accounts receivable ledgers,” it did not “include any material allowing the Tribunal to ﬁnd that the [claimed invoices] were actually payable.” Id. at para. 32, 19 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 208. As examples of such materials, the Tribunal cited “purchase orders, bills of lading, written demand for payment or other documentary evidence.” Id. at para. 66, 19 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 214. 18. In a Concurring and Dissenting Opinion appended to the Avco Award, Judge Charles N. Brower, the United States-appointed Arbitrator participating in the Case, stated with respect to Avco’s invoice claims that Avco had been advised to submit the independent invoice veriﬁcation, and not to submit the copies of the many underlying invoices, by the previous Chairman of Chamber Three at a Pre-Hearing Conference in 1985. In Judge Brower’s view, “[s]ince Claimant did exactly what it previously was told to do by the Tribunal the denial in the present Award of any of those invoice claims on the ground that more evidence should have been submitted constitutes a denial to Claimant of the ability to present its case to the Tribunal.” (Footnote omitted.) Avco Corporation and Iran Aircraft Industries, et al., Award No. 377-261-3 (18 Jul. 1988), Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Charles N. Brower, at para. 22 (18 Jul. 1988), reprinted in 19 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 231, 238. According to him, “the Tribunal ha[d] misled the Claimant, however unwittingly, regarding the evidence it was required to submit . . .” Id. at para. 1, 19 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 231.8

8 To support his view, Mr. Brower primarily relied on the following colloquy between the Chairman of Chamber Three and Avco’s Counsel at the 1985 Pre-Hearing Conference: [Chairman]: I don’t think we will be very, very much enthusiastic getting kilos and kilos of invoices. [Counsel]: That, that’s what I thought so . . . [Chairman]: So I think it will but help us . . . [Counsel]: We’ll use . . . [Chairman]: to use the alternative rather. [Counsel]: Alright . . .

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b. The Avco Enforcement Proceedings 19. Avco failed to pay the Avco award voluntarily. Thus, on 5 June 1991, Iran petitioned the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut for an order conﬁrming the award. Avco responded by ﬁling a motion for summary judgment, requesting that the District Court deny enforcement. Under the applicable rules of procedure, Iran was required to ﬁle its response to Avco’s motion by 28 November 1991 but failed to do so. On 9 December 1991, Iran ﬁled a motion for an extension of time to ﬁle that pleading. On 10 December 1991, the District Court, “after careful review and absent objection,” granted Avco’s motion for summary judgment and, consequently, denied enforcement of the Avco award. 20. On 13 December 1991, Iran ﬁled before the same District Court a “Motion To Reopen And/Or For Relief From the [10 December 1991] Judgment.” On 22 January 1992, the District Court denied Iran’s motion. In its decision, the Court noted that Iran had “failed to ﬁle the requisite memorandum of law in support of [its] motion” and that it “otherwise failed to demonstrate any legitimate basis upon which the Court might relieve [it] from the previously entered judgment.” 21. On 7 February 1992, Iran appealed from the District Court’s 10 December 1991 order denying enforcement of the Avco award before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In the appellate proceedings, Iran argued that the Tribunal’s awards were directly enforceable in United States courts because, pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration, all decisions and awards of the Tribunal “shall be ﬁnal and binding.” Iran argued, in the alternative, that the Avco award was enforceable in accordance with the New York Convention. Avco, for its part, contended that the District Court had properly denied enforcement of the award pursuant to Article V(1)(b) of the 1958 New York Convention. That Article provides for the nonenforcement of an award when “[t]he party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case . . .” In Avco’s view, it was unable to present its case to the Tribunal because the Tribunal had misled it as to the proper method to substantiate its invoice claim. 22. On 24 November 1992, following brieﬁng and oral argument, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court had been right in denying enforcement of ( footnote continued from p. 45) [Chairman]: On the other hand I don’t know if, if any, if there are any objections to any speciﬁc invoices so far made by the Respondents. But anyhow as a precaution maybe you could . . . [Counsel]: Yes, sir. [Chairman]: Get an account made. Id. at para. 17, 19 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 236.

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the Avco award; consequently, it afﬁrmed the lower court’s decision. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals, which considered de novo the legal question whether the Tribunal’s award in Avco was enforceable, held that the “ﬁnal and binding” language found in the Claims Settlement Declaration did not bar consideration of the defenses to enforcement provided for in the New York Convention. The Court of Appeals went on to state that, at the Pre-Hearing Conference in Case No. 261, the then-Chairman of Chamber Three of the Tribunal speciﬁcally advised Avco not to burden the Tribunal by submitting many invoices and “approved the method of proof proposed by Avco, namely the submission of Avco’s audited accounts receivable ledgers.” Iran Aircraft Industries, et al. v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 146 (1992). 23. According to the Court of Appeals, the Tribunal never made Avco aware that “the Tribunal now required the actual invoices to substantiate Avco’s claim. Having thus led Avco to believe it had used a proper method to substantiate its claim, the Tribunal then rejected Avco’s claim for lack of proof.” Id. The Court of Appeals, perhaps persuaded by the reasoning in Judge Brower’s Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, see supra, para. 18, and in the absence of any Statement of Interest by the United States government, thus concluded: We believe that by so misleading Avco, however unwittingly, the Tribunal denied Avco the opportunity to present its claim in a meaningful manner. Accordingly, Avco was “unable to present [its] case” within the meaning of Article V(1)(b) [of the 1958 New York Convention], and enforcement of the Award was properly denied.

Id. 24. One of the three judges on the panel, Judge Cardamone, dissented from this decision and voted to enforce the award. He wrote that Avco had had a full opportunity to present its claims and was on notice that there might be a problem with its proof, especially in light of certain questions that the Tribunal posed to Avco at the Hearing; that there was no clear indication that at the PreHearing Conference, the Tribunal had issued a “deﬁnitive ruling” concerning the evidence Avco should produce to substantiate its invoice claims; and that in electing to produce only a summary of the invoices, rather than the invoices themselves, Avco took a “calculated risk.” Id. at 148 (Cardamone, J. dissenting). 25. Iran did not seek judicial review of the Court of Appeals’ decision denying enforcement of the Avco award. B. The Parties’ Contentions 1. Iran 26. Iran contends that the United States has breached its obligations under the Algiers Declarations concerning the enforcement of Tribunal awards rendered in favor of Iran against United States nationals. Iran argues that under the

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Declarations, the United States is obliged to provide a mechanism that ensures the enforcement of all such awards, and not merely some of them. In support of this proposition, Iran relies on the language from the Tribunal’s Decision in Case A21, on the Algiers Declarations themselves, and on principles of customary international law. 27. With regard to the Tribunal’s Decision in Case A21, Iran points in particular to paragraph 15 thereof, which states in relevant part: Certainly, if no enforcement procedure were available in a State Party, or if recourse to such procedure were eventually to result in a refusal to implement Tribunal awards, or unduly delay their enforcement, this would violate the State’s obligations under the Algiers Declarations.

According to Iran, this language requires that each and every Tribunal award rendered in favor of Iran against United States nationals be enforced. This result, it argues, ﬂows directly from the principle of good faith, is in conformity with the object and purpose of the Algiers Declarations, is necessary to ensure their effectiveness, and is also necessary to protect the jurisdiction and authority of the Tribunal. 28. Iran further points out that in paragraph 11 of its Decision in Case A21, the Tribunal stated that the principle of reciprocity of obligations between the States Parties applies to the Algiers Declarations taken as a whole. In Iran’s view, therefore, the Declarations – with the sole exception of Iran’s obligation to establish a Security Account to pay awards rendered against it – require parity of treatment of the two States Parties with respect to enforcement of Tribunal awards. Hence, the United States must provide a mechanism that ensures the enforcement of all Tribunal awards rendered in favor of Iran against United States nationals. 29. Iran asserts, moreover, that not only must the United States ensure that all Tribunal awards are enforced, but it also must ensure that they are enforced promptly and at a reasonable cost to Iran. In support, Iran relies primarily on language from paragraph 15 of the Tribunal’s Decision in Case A21, stating that “if recourse to [the available enforcement procedure] were eventually to result in a refusal to implement Tribunal awards, or unduly delay their enforcement, this would violate the State’s obligations under the Algiers Declarations.” (Emphasis added.) Delay is undue, according to Iran, if it takes substantially longer to enforce an award against a United States national in the United States than it takes to pay an award against Iran out of the Security Account. 30. Iran argues that its interpretation of the United States enforcement obligations under the Algiers Declarations is also supported by General Principle B of the General Declaration. The ﬁrst sentence of that Principle provides, in relevant part, that “[i]t is the purpose of both parties, within the framework of

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and pursuant to the [two Declarations], to terminate all litigation as between the government of each party and the nationals of the other, and to bring about the settlement and termination of all such claims through binding arbitration.” Iran contends that the settlement and termination of a claim and the end of the related litigation can be attained only through an enforceable award. Iran contends, moreover, that by using the word “settlement” in General Principle B, the States Parties intended to prohibit any further proceedings – including enforcement proceedings – after the issuance of an award by the Tribunal. 31. In this connection, Iran invests with particular signiﬁcance the words “ﬁnal and binding” found in Article IV, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration, which provides in full that “[a]ll decisions and awards of the Tribunal shall be ﬁnal and binding.” When the parties to an arbitral agreement stipulate that an award is ﬁnal and binding, Iran argues, they recognize that that award shall be enforced. The United States, which is bound by that provision, must therefore ensure that all Tribunal awards are enforced in the United States. 32. In any event, Iran continues, because both the Tribunal and its awards are international in character, a Tribunal award would be ﬁnal and binding even if no express language to that effect were found in the Algiers Declarations. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Iran argues, is international in character for two independent reasons. First, because it was established by treaty – the Algiers Declarations. Second, because it adjudicates disputes between states. The awards of the Tribunal, likewise, are international, because they are based on the Algiers Declarations. Iran asserts that principles of customary international law require that awards rendered by an international tribunal be recognized and enforced in domestic courts. Domestic authorities may not review or refuse to enforce such an award; authenticity is the only aspect of the award that they may verify. 33. Iran maintains that the enforcement mechanism provided by the United States pursuant to the New York Convention does not satisfy the United States obligations under the Algiers Declarations and international law. This is because the New York Convention, Iran argues, by its own terms, does not apply to international awards; it covers the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards only.9 The Convention is inadequate, most notably, because, under conditions speciﬁed in Article V, it allows for a court to refuse recognition and enforcement of an award. See e.g. supra, para. 21. Because the international nature of 9

Article I, paragraph 1, of the New York Convention provides the following: This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out of differences between persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement are sought.

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the Tribunal’s awards mandates that they be enforced in the domestic sphere, Iran urges, Article V of the Convention cannot apply to those awards. For all the above reasons, Iran concludes, the New York Convention is not suitable for the enforcement of Tribunal awards. 34. As a factual matter, Iran contends that the refusal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to enforce the Avco award, see supra, para. 22, demonstrates that the mechanism available in the United States does not result in the enforcement of all Tribunal awards rendered against United States nationals in favor of Iran. In Iran’s view, this fact is sufﬁcient to establish the United States liability for this claim. Iran asserts, moreover, that the history of the enforcement of the Tribunal’s award in Gould, see supra, paras. 12-16, shows how the procedures available in the United States unduly delay enforcement of Tribunal awards. That history also demonstrates that it is not cost-effective to attempt to enforce Tribunal awards in the United States. Iran contends that it incurred over U.S. $300,000 in legal expenses in connection with the Gould enforcement proceedings. 35. As damages for the alleged breach by the United States of its obligations under the Algiers Declarations, Iran seeks U.S. $3,513,086.03, the amount that the Tribunal awarded the Iranian parties in Avco, and U.S. $48,914, the legal expenses that Iran allegedly incurred in connection with the Avco enforcement proceedings in the United States. 36. In addition, Iran seeks U.S. $344,767.80, the total amount of arbitration costs that the Tribunal awarded Iran in twenty-four awards. Iran argues that, having demonstrated that there is no realistic prospect of enforcing Tribunal awards in the United States, it is entitled to seek payment from the United States of those twenty-four cost awards without ﬁrst attempting to enforce them in United States courts. 37. Iran seeks interest on all claimed amounts. 38. Iran also seeks an order requiring the United States to establish a suitable procedure for the enforcement of all future Tribunal awards rendered in favor of Iran against United States nationals, including awards of arbitration costs. 2. The United States 39. The United States rejects Iran’s interpretation of the United States enforcement obligations under the Algiers Declarations. Iran’s arguments, the United States contends, are directed toward the revision of the Tribunal’s Decision in Case A21. As recognized by that Decision, the Declarations do not require the United States to step in and pay Tribunal awards rendered against United States nationals in favor of Iran. Rather, they simply require that the United States (1) provide procedures in its domestic law whereby enforcement of Tribunal awards may be obtained; (2) ensure that Iran has access to those

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procedures; and (3) see that the procedures made available to Iran are at least as favorable as those afforded other parties wishing to enforce foreign arbitral awards. This the United States has done: it offered enforcement on the basis of the New York Convention. 40. In support of its position, the United States relies primarily on language from paragraph 15 of the Tribunal’s Decision in Case A21, stating that it is incumbent on each State Party to provide some procedure or mechanism whereby enforcement may be obtained within its national jurisdiction, and to ensure that the successful Party has access thereto . . . Such procedures must be available on a basis at least as favorable as that allowed to parties who seek recognition or enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.

See supra, para. 10. In the United States view, the Tribunal’s choice of the word “may,” rather than “shall,” indicates that it was not requiring the parties to provide procedures that guaranteed enforcement of Tribunal awards in every instance, as Iran argues. The United States enforcement obligation is one of providing an appropriate procedure rather than one of ensuring a successful result. 41. The United States alleges that Iran has misconstrued the Tribunal’s Decision in Case A21. In particular, the United States insists, Iran misinterprets the following language from paragraph 15 thereof: Certainly, if no enforcement procedure were available in a State Party, or if recourse to such procedure were eventually to result in a refusal to implement Tribunal awards, or unduly delay their enforcement, this would violate the State’s obligations under the Algiers Declarations.

According to the United States, this sentence just means that, should enforcement procedures not exist in the United States or not provide a framework for the enforceability of Tribunal awards without undue delay, the United States would be in breach of its obligations under the Algiers Declarations. This sentence does not mean, however, that if the available procedures result in nonenforcement of even a single award the United States is obligated to pay all Tribunal awards rendered against its nationals, including those that Iran never attempted to enforce in United States courts. 42. The United States further points to the language in Article IV, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration, characterizing the Tribunal’s awards as “ﬁnal and binding” and contends that that language does not mean that the Tribunal’s awards are self-enforcing or that their enforcement is guaranteed. Rather, as the Tribunal stated in paragraph 10 of its Decision in Case A21, a ﬁnal and binding award “is one with which the parties must comply and

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which is ripe for enforcement.” Tribunal awards, therefore, are no more and no less enforceable than any other foreign arbitral award. 43. The United States next makes an argument based on Article IV, paragraph 3, of the Claims Settlement Declaration, which provides: Any award which the Tribunal may render against either government shall be enforceable against such government in the courts of any nation in accordance with its laws.

The United States ﬁrst points out that this provision deals only with the enforcement of awards rendered against either government. By using the words “in the courts of any nation” and “in accordance with its laws,” the United States continues, the High Contracting Parties agreed that enforcement of such awards would occur pursuant to national legal rules and procedures, including those in force in Iran and the United States. 44. The United States observes that the Declarations do not, on the other hand, expressly provide for any obligation concerning the enforcement of awards made against nationals of either government. Such an implied obligation, if it exists, cannot reasonably be interpreted more broadly than the analogous express obligation regarding enforcement of awards rendered against either government, as set forth in Article IV, paragraph 3, of the Claims Settlement Declaration. Consequently, awards rendered against nationals of either state shall be enforced the same way as those rendered against either government – in accordance with national laws. The law applicable in the United States for the enforcement of non-domestic arbitral awards, including those of the Tribunal, the United States points out, is the New York Convention. 45. As to the Tribunal’s legal nature, the United States argues that the Tribunal is a hybrid entity. It is clearly a creature of public international law established by treaty; but it is also capable of, and indeed charged with, deciding disputes of a commercial character, predominantly claims brought by private parties against either government, as was Avco’s case. Article V of the Claims Settlement Declaration, which states that the Tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of principles of commercial and international law, as the Tribunal determines to be applicable, indicates that the Algiers Declarations empower the Tribunal to decide both commercial disputes and public international disputes. 46. The United States also makes an argument based on the negotiating history of the Algiers Declarations. It maintains that during the negotiations, Iran never requested that the United States guarantee payment of awards rendered against United States nationals in favor of Iran; nor did the United States ever volunteer to do so. Similarly, Iran never agreed to guarantee payment of awards rendered against it in favor of United States nationals. In support, the United States relies, inter alia, on the testimony given at the Hearing by Mr. Roberts

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B. Owen, who served as the Legal Adviser of the United States Department of State during the relevant period and participated in the negotiations. 47. The United States contends that, as a factual matter, it has complied with the requirement in paragraph 15 of the Tribunal’s Decision in Case A21 that it make available to Iran procedures for the enforcement of Tribunal awards on a basis at least as favorable as that allowed to parties who seek recognition or enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. First, it has offered Iran enforcement of Tribunal awards on the basis of the New York Convention, which was codiﬁed as part of the United States Federal Arbitration Act. The New York Convention, the United States asserts, is the primary framework through which the international community regulates the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. 48. Second, the United States contends that, as demonstrated by both the Avco and Gould enforcement proceedings initiated by Iran in the United States, Iran has unhindered access to the enforcement procedures available in the United States on terms just as favorable as those allowed to any other party seeking to enforce a foreign arbitral award. Finally, the United States points out that, as a matter of substantive law, in both those proceedings, the United States Courts of Appeals held that the Tribunal’s awards were enforceable in United States courts pursuant to the New York Convention. 49. The United States denies that the enforcement mechanism available in the United States unduly delays enforcement of Tribunal awards, as Iran argues based on the history of the Gould enforcement proceedings. The United States observes that Iran has not shown that it would have taken less time for any other party to obtain enforcement of an award of that nature. In addition, the United States contends, Iran’s argument ignores that the Gould enforcement action presented a case of ﬁrst impression, where a United States court for the ﬁrst time was asked to apply the terms of the New York Convention to the enforcement of Tribunal awards. The United States notes in this connection that the Avco enforcement action moved through the courts much faster than Gould. There is no reason to believe that Iran’s future enforcement efforts would not also move efﬁciently. 50. With regard to Iran’s contention that it is not cost-effective to seek to enforce Tribunal awards in the United States, the United States points out that there is nothing in the Algiers Declarations or in the Tribunal’s Decision in Case A21 that would limit the costs Iran might incur in pursuing its enforcement actions. Iran faces the same cost-beneﬁt evaluation of any litigant in any jurisdiction. 51. The United States next argues that Iran has failed to pursue actively the enforcement of Tribunal awards in United States courts. According to the United States, paragraph 16 of the Tribunal’s Decision in Case A21, see supra, para. 11, required that Iran avail itself of all existing enforcement procedures in

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the United States before the Tribunal could pronounce itself as to whether those procedures were adequate. This, the United States asserts, Iran has not done. Iran’s conduct in the Avco enforcement action was characterized by repeated late ﬁlings and, most notably, by Iran’s failure to respond to Avco’s motion for summary judgment requesting that the United States District Court deny enforcement of the Avco award. The United States contends that this conduct by Iran contributed to the Second Circuit’s decision not to enforce that award. 52. Moreover, the United States asserts that, by neglecting to seek a rehearing of the Avco case en banc by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit or to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari, Iran chose not to exhaust the judicial process available in the United States for the enforcement of Tribunal awards. Iran reasonably could have been expected to pursue those avenues, because the Avco award ultimately might have been enforced after further review by the Second Circuit en banc or the Supreme Court. 53. To this argument, Iran responds that neither of those remedies – rehearing en banc by the Court of Appeals or discretionary review by the Supreme Court of the United States – constituted a viable solution. According to Iran, its case was not eligible for a rehearing en banc before the full court of the Second Circuit, because the decision of the three-judge panel of the Second Circuit in Avco neither presented a conﬂict with a decision by another panel in that Circuit, nor dealt with “a question of exceptional importance,” as required by the United States Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. As to discretionary review by the Supreme Court, Iran contends that the chances of it being granted were nonexistent, because none of the extraordinary circumstances warranting the exercise of the Supreme Court’s discretionary powers were present in the Avco case. 54. Lastly, the United States contends that that portion of Iran’s claim relating to the twenty-four Tribunal cost awards should be dismissed because it is inconsistent with the Tribunal’s Decision in Case A21. As noted, the United States contends that paragraph 16 of the Tribunal’s Decision in Case A21 required that Iran avail itself of all the existing enforcement procedures in the United States – which it did not do – before the Tribunal could pronounce itself as to their adequacy. See supra, para. 51. iii. jurisdiction 55. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction over this Case is undisputed. The Parties disagree about the interpretation of the Algiers Declarations and about the obligations they impose on the United States. This dispute thus clearly falls within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph 17 of the General Declaration and Article VI, paragraph 4, of the Claims Settlement Declaration.

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iv. merits A. The Claim Related to the Nonenforcement of the Award in Avco and the Alleged Undue Delay 56. In its Decision in Case A21, the Tribunal held that “[t]he Parties to the Algiers Declarations are obligated to implement them in such a way that the awards of the Tribunal will be treated as valid and enforceable in their respective national jurisdictions.” Case A21, supra, at para. 14, 14 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 330. The task before the Tribunal is to determine whether the United States, by virtue of the refusal by its courts to enforce the Avco award, has breached that obligation. 57. Before turning to this task the Tribunal will deal with the question of its own legal nature, as that nature has been discussed by the parties and forms a backdrop against which the Tribunal may view the actions of the United States. Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration in relevant part provides: An international arbitral tribunal (the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal) is hereby established for the purpose of deciding claims of nationals of the United States against Iran and claims of nationals of Iran against the United States, and any counterclaim which arises out of the same contract, transaction or occurrence that constitutes the subject matter of that national’s claim . . .

Pursuant to paragraph 2 of that Article, the Tribunal shall also have jurisdiction to decide ofﬁcial claims of the High Contracting Parties against each other arising out of contractual arrangements between them for the purchase and sale of goods and services. Pursuant to Paragraph 17 of the General Declaration and Article VI, paragraph 4, of the Claims Settlement Declaration, moreover, the Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over any dispute as to the interpretation or performance of the Algiers Declarations. 58. The Tribunal was established by an international agreement concluded between Iran and the United States. The States Parties empowered it to decide intergovernmental claims as well as claims by nationals of one State Party against the government of the other State Party. Under contemporary international law, the fact that an individual or a private entity is party to proceedings before a forum created by an international agreement does not deprive that forum and its proceedings of their international legal nature. The Tribunal is “clearly an international tribunal,” Islamic Republic of Iran and United States of America, Decision No. DEC 32-A18-FT, at 18 (6 Apr. 1984), reprinted in 5 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 251, 261, and “it is subject to international law,” Anaconda Iran, Inc. and Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Interlocutory Award No. ITL 65-167-3, para. 97 (10 Dec. 1986), reprinted in 13 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 199, 223. By deﬁnition, international arbitral

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awards, if ﬁnal, are binding. Recourse to this Tribunal implies the undertaking to respect its awards. 59. In Case A21, the Tribunal stated that it was “incumbent on each State Party [to the Algiers Declarations] to provide some procedure or mechanism whereby enforcement [of Tribunal awards] may be obtained within its national jurisdiction, and to ensure that the successful Party has access thereto.” Decision in Case A21, para. 15, 14 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 331. In this connection, it should be noted that “[t]he Tribunal has no authority under the Algiers Declarations to prescribe the means by which each of the States provides for such enforcement.” Id. The States Parties enjoy “considerable latitude . . . as to the nature of the procedures and mechanisms by which Tribunal awards rendered against their nationals may be enforced.” Id. However, that latitude, though “considerable,” has its limits. In its Decision in Case A21, the Tribunal held that those procedures “must be available on a basis at least as favorable as that allowed to parties who seek recognition or enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.” Id. The procedures and mechanisms among which a State Party to the Algiers Declarations may choose must also be adequate to achieve the objective envisaged by the Declarations, i.e., the enforceability of Tribunal decisions and awards as ﬁnal and binding. That limitation on the Parties’ latitude in choosing those procedures and mechanisms clearly follows from the Tribunal’s Decision in Case A21. See infra, para. 61. 60. In paragraph 15 of its Decision in Case A21, the Tribunal also stated that if recourse to [a municipal enforcement] procedure were eventually to result in a refusal to implement Tribunal awards, or unduly delay their enforcement, this would violate the State’s obligations under the Algiers Declarations.

This interpretation of the Algiers Declarations by the Decision in Case A21 conforms to international law. See supra, para. 58. As paragraph 14 of that Decision points out, it is important to ensure the “effectiveness” of the Algiers Declarations and ensure that the jurisdiction and authority of the Tribunal are respected. The Parties to the Algiers Declarations are obligated to implement them in such a way that the awards of the Tribunal will be treated as valid and enforceable in their respective national jurisdictions.

61. The mechanism available in the United States for the enforcement of Tribunal awards is the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. See supra, footnote [7]. As noted, in the Gould and Avco enforcement proceedings, the United States courts held that Tribunal awards were enforceable pursuant to that Convention. See supra, paras. 14 and 22.

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62. In its decision denying enforcement of the Avco award, the Second Circuit held that the Algiers Declarations did not bar consideration of the defenses to enforcement provided for in Article V of the New York Convention.10 See supra, para. 22. In the statement of interest it ﬁled in the Gould enforcement proceedings before the District Court of the Central District of California, see supra, para. 12, the United States, for its part, while arguing that in principle Article V of the New York Convention applied to Tribunal awards, recognized that subparagraphs (1)(a) and (2)(b) thereof did not apply to such awards. With respect to the balance of the Article V exceptions to enforcement (subparagraphs (1)(b) through (1)(e) and subparagraph 2(a)), at the Hearing, the Legal Adviser to the United States Department of State conceded that there appeared to be, on the surface, “some infelicities.” 63. The Tribunal agrees that those provisions are problematic in the context of Tribunal awards, particularly when viewed in the light of the States Parties’ obligations under the Algiers Declarations relating to the enforcement of those awards. Indeed, Article IV, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration, which provides that “[a]ll decisions and awards of the Tribunal shall be ﬁnal and binding,” rules out the possibility of readjudication of the merits of Tribunal awards by a municipal court, either under the guise of Article V of the New York Convention or by any other means. See infra, para. 70. 10 Article V of the New York Convention provides in full: 1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that: (a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made; or (b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or (c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or (d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or (e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made. 2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought ﬁnds that: (a) The subject-matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or (b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.

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64. Indeed, it is difﬁcult for the Tribunal to believe that any of its awards could fall within the scope of Article V of the New York Convention. In any event, the fact that the mechanism chosen by the United States to enforce this Tribunal’s awards is the New York Convention does not exempt the United States from liability if its courts err by denying enforcement of an award that should, by virtue of the Algiers Declarations, have been enforced.11 See also Decision in Case A21, para. 15, 14 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 331. 65. In denying enforcement of the Avco award, the Second Circuit held that Avco had been “unable to present [its] case” before the Tribunal within the meaning of Article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention. See supra, para. 23. In reaching the conclusion that the Tribunal had “denied Avco the opportunity to present its claim in a meaningful manner,” the Second Circuit found (1) that at a Pre-Hearing Conference held in 1985, the then-Chairman of Chamber Three approved the method of proof proposed by Avco to substantiate its invoice claim, namely the “submission of Avco’s audited accounts receivable ledgers” and (2) that the Tribunal never made Avco aware that “the Tribunal now required the actual invoices to substantiate Avco’s claim.” In the Second Circuit’s view, “[h]aving thus led Avco to believe it had used a proper method to substantiate its claim, the Tribunal then rejected Avco’s claim for lack of proof.” See supra, para. 23. 66. This decision by the Second Circuit was erroneous. A careful reading of the Tribunal’s award in Avco shows that it was based not on the absence of the invoices underlying Avco’s claims, but on a lack of proof that those invoices were payable. See supra, para. 17. Indeed, the Tribunal stated at paragraph 32 of its Award that it did not question the existence of the invoices, but rather, whether Iran Aircraft Industries owed Avco on the basis of them, a defect in proof the invoices themselves could not have cured. Consequently, this erroneous decision by the Second Circuit places the United States in violation of its obligation to make the Avco award enforceable in the United States. 67. The United States elected not to ﬁle a statement of interest before the Second Circuit in Avco. The Tribunal believes that a statement should have pointed out why the Avco award deserved enforcement and, if ﬁled, might have improved the chances that the majority of the court would have paid due attention to the text of the Tribunal’s award, rather than apparently relying on the Dissenting and Concurring Opinion of one of the Members of the Tribunal, see supra, para. 18. 11 The Tribunal recognizes that no tribunal can declare itself immune from procedural error or the possibility of fraud, forgery, or perjury that it may not detect. In such hypothetical cases, however, revision of the award could be done only by the Tribunal, if it concluded that it had the authority to do so, not by any other court. See Harold Birnbaum and Islamic Republic of Iran, Decision No. DEC 124-967-2, paras. 14-19 (14 Dec. 1995); Ram International Industries Inc., et al. and Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Decision No. DEC 118-148-1, para. 20 (28 Dec. 1993).

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59

68. Indeed, the fact that the Second Circuit effectively adopted the dissenting view of the Tribunal Member in the minority illustrates an additional problem with its decision. That Member argued that Avco had been unable to prove its claim solely because the Tribunal supposedly misled it into not submitting its invoices. A majority of Chamber Three of the Tribunal considered this argument and, by not adopting the minority’s view, rejected it. The Second Circuit thus reconsidered a speciﬁc question raised and conclusively decided by the Tribunal; in effect, the Second Circuit repudiated the merits of the Tribunal’s award in Avco. 69. By reconsidering an issue that had been already aired and decided by the Tribunal, the Second Circuit, in violation of Article IV, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration, failed to treat the Tribunal’s decision as “ﬁnal and binding.” Once an issue has been raised and decided by the Tribunal, no enforcing court may reexamine that same issue – whether under the guise of the New York Convention or by any other means – without violating that Article’s proviso that “[a]ll decisions and awards of the Tribunal shall be ﬁnal and binding.” In this connection, see also Case Concerning the Factory at Chorz´ow (Interpretation) (Germany vs. Poland ), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 13, at 19 (16 Dec.); Case Concerning the Factory at Chorz´ow (Claim for Indemnity) (Merits) (Germany vs. Poland ), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 33-34 (13 Sep.). 70. In other words, a party to a case before the Tribunal cannot evade ﬁndings made by the Tribunal by relitigating them in an enforcing court. The Claims Settlement Declaration requires the States Parties to stand behind the Tribunal’s ﬁndings and makes them liable if their courts second-guess decisions the Tribunal has made. In this Case, the signiﬁcance of the invoices underlying Avco’s claims and of the colloquy between the Chairman of Chamber Three and Avco’s Counsel at the 1985 Pre-Hearing Conference were considered and decided by the Tribunal. It was not open to the enforcing courts of one of the sovereign parties to decide that the dissenting arbitrator was right after all. 71. Based on the foregoing, the Tribunal holds that, through the refusal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to enforce the Avco award, the United States has violated its obligation under the Algiers Declarations to ensure that a valid award of the Tribunal be treated as ﬁnal and binding, valid, and enforceable in the jurisdiction of the United States. It is a well-settled principle of international law that every international wrongful act of the judiciary of a state is attributable to that state.12 Consequently, the United States is 12 Lord McNair writes: “[I]f . . . the courts . . . decline to give effect to the treaty . . . , their judgments involve the State in a breach of treaty.” Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties 346 (1961). The Draft Articles on State Responsibility adopted by the International Law Commission of the United Nations provide that if an act of a judicial organ of the state constitutes a breach of an international obligation of that state, such act produces an internationally wrongful act of the state entailing its international responsibility. See Articles 1-6, International Law Commission, 48th Sess., at 125-126, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996).

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liable for damages pursuant to paragraph 17 of the General Declaration and Article VI, paragraph 4, of the Claims Settlement Declaration. It is appropriate to recall here that the Parties to the Algiers Declarations undertook to respect the jurisdiction and the authority of the Tribunal. 72. To be sure, there were imperfections in the way Iran pursued enforcement of the Avco award before the United States courts. For example, Iran failed to respond to Avco’s motion for summary judgment before the District Court, it did not seek a rehearing en banc by the Second Circuit, and it did not petition the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari. See supra, paras. 19-20 and 25. Nevertheless, while an enforcing party must carry the burden of enforcement, the Tribunal does not believe that, taken as a whole, the evidence compels it to refuse relief to Iran because of those shortcomings. It should be noted, in particular, that, despite Iran’s failure to respond to Avco’s motion before the District Court, the Second Circuit heard arguments upon and reviewed the question of the enforceability of the Avco award. 73. With respect to the alleged delay of enforcement, the Tribunal ﬁnds that the record, as it stands, does not support Iran’s contentions that the procedures available in the United States unduly delay enforcement of Tribunal awards and that it is not cost-effective to attempt to enforce Tribunal awards in the United States. See supra, para. 34. 74. In view of its decision in this Case, the Tribunal need not address Iran’s request for an order requiring the United States to establish a suitable procedure for the enforcement of all future Tribunal awards rendered in favor of Iran against United States nationals. 75. Where it ﬁnds that one of the State Parties has not fulﬁlled its obligations under the Algiers Declarations, the Tribunal has, according to paragraph 17 of the General Declaration, authority to award the other State Party damages to compensate for losses resulting from such a breach. In the circumstances, the Tribunal holds that the United States is liable to compensate Iran in the amount of the award in Avco, namely U.S. $3,513,086.03. 76. The Tribunal further holds that Iran is entitled to pre-judgment interest on that amount, as the Second Circuit would likely have awarded such interest if its decision had been to grant enforcement of the Avco award.13 The Tribunal therefore awards Iran simple pre-judgment interest at the annual rate of 10 percent14 (365-day basis) from 18 July 1988, the date the Avco award was issued, 13 See Born, International Commercial Arbitration in the United States: Commentary & Materials (DeventerBoston 1994) 623-24. 14 In Avco the Tribunal awarded U.S. $886,127 to the Respondent Iran Aircraft Industries (“IACI”) and U.S. $2,626,959.03 to the Respondent Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Company (“IHSRC”), for a total of U.S. $3,513,086.03. It further awarded simple interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum on the amount awarded IACI, U.S. $886,127, from the date of the award up

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61

until 24 November 1992, the date the Second Circuit rendered its decision denying enforcement of that award. 77. Iran also seeks reimbursement of the legal expenses it incurred in pursuing the enforcement of the award in Avco after the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut denied enforcement of that award on 10 December 1991. These expenses, however, would have been incurred even if the decision of the Second Circuit had been to grant enforcement. Consequently, they are not recoverable as damages. 78. Consequently, the Tribunal awards Iran a total of U.S. $5,042,481.65 on its claim related to the nonenforcement of the Tribunal’s award in Avco. This amount includes the amount awarded by the Tribunal in Avco, U.S. $3,513,086.03, plus U.S. $1,529,395.62, the aggregate pre-judgment interest awarded supra, at para. 76. The Tribunal further awards simple post-judgment interest on U.S. $5,042,481.65 at the annual rate of 5 percent (365-day basis) from 25 November 1992 up to and including the date of payment of this Award. B. The Claim Related to the 24 Cost Awards 79. Iran seeks U.S. $344,767.80 – the total amount of arbitration costs that the Tribunal awarded it in twenty-four awards. Iran argues that, having demonstrated that there is no realistic prospect of enforcing Tribunal awards in the United States, it is entitled to seek payment of the cost awards in question directly from the United States. See supra, para. 36. The issue is whether the United States is obliged to satisfy such awards, though Iran has never made any attempt to enforce them in United States courts. 80. In its Decision in Case A21, the Tribunal held that the Algiers Declarations did not contain any express or implied obligation of the United States to step in and satisfy Tribunal awards rendered against its nationals in favor of Iran. See Case A21, supra, paras. 10-13, 14 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 328-30. On the evidence before it, the Tribunal is not prepared to assume that, because United States courts denied enforcement of a single award, they will also deny or unduly delay enforcement of the cost awards that are the subject of this claim. 81. Only after Iran has made timely attempts to enforce those cost awards in United States courts, and only if Iran establishes that those courts have to and including the date of payment. The Tribunal did not grant post-award interest on the amount owing to IHSRC because IHSRC had limited its interest request to the pre-award period. See Avco, supra, para. 139, 19 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 229. Given the inequity of the fact that IHSRC was not paid promptly after the Avco award, however, the Tribunal believes an enforcing U.S. court would likely have exercised its discretion to award post-award interest on the amount owed to IHSRC as well.

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wrongfully refused to implement the awards or have unduly delayed their enforcement, “would the question arise as to what . . . measures, if any, the United States might be required to take in order to ensure the ‘effectiveness’ of the Algiers Declarations.” Id. para. 16, 14 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 331. A request by Iran to the Tribunal as to the performance of the Algiers Declarations pursuant to Article 17 of the General Declaration and Article VI, paragraph 4, of the Claims Settlement Declaration “would be appropriate at that stage.” Id. 82. Consequently, Iran’s claim relating to the twenty-four cost awards must be dismissed. v. award 83.

In view of the foregoing,

THE TRIBUNAL DETERMINES AS FOLLOWS: (a) By virtue of the refusal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to enforce the Avco award, the United States has violated its obligation under the Algiers Declarations to ensure that a valid award of the Tribunal be treated as ﬁnal and binding, valid, and enforceable in the jurisdiction of the United States. (b) Consequently, the United States is obligated to pay Iran the sum of Five Million Forty-Two Thousand Four Hundred Eighty-One United States Dollars and Sixty-Five Cents (U.S. $5,042,481.65), plus simple interest at the annual rate of 5 percent (365-day basis) from 24 November 1992 up to and including the date of payment of this award. (c) Iran’s claim related to the reimbursement of the legal expenses it incurred in pursuing the enforcement of the award in Avco before the Second Circuit and Iran’s claim related to the total amount of arbitration costs awarded to Iran by the Tribunal in twenty-four awards are both dismissed. Concurring Opinion of Koorosh H. Ameli[1] I concur in the Award in this Case and write separately to make a few observations. I would have preferred that for the rate of interest for the post-breach period, that is, from 24 November 1992 to the date of payment, 10% be applied in accordance with the long established practice of the Tribunal, as indeed the rate of interest applied in the Award for the period from the date of the Avco [1 Signed 5 June 1998; ﬁled 5 June 1998.]

CONCURRING OPINION, AMELI

63

Award to the breach date, 18 July 1988–24 November 1992. Award, para. 76. In intergovernmental claims, the Tribunal has consistently applied this rate.2 The Claimant has sought this rate and the Respondent has not argued otherwise. The Respondent in fact as recently as a year and a half ago has sought 10% interest, as pleaded by the Assistant Legal Adviser of the United States in B36, another intergovernmental case, where the United States was claimant. Award No. 574-B36-2 (3 Dec. 1996), para. 76. I take note that in the present Case, the Tribunal has favored the Sylvania3 formula, that is the prevailing standard in private claims, and which for the period between November 1992 and June 1998 yields to 5% on the basis of interest rates for six-month certiﬁcates of deposit of the dollar in United States markets. As to the Claimant’s legal expenses concerning the Avco proceeding before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, I would have preferred the Tribunal to grant them for they clearly constitute “damages to compensate for a loss resulting from a breach of this Declaration or the Claims Settlement [Declaration]” under paragraph 17 of the General Declaration. In accordance with Article 32, paragraph 2, of the Tribunal Rules, the parties have also undertaken “to carry out the award without delay.” As the Tribunal held in its Decision in Westinghouse, the Tribunal awards must be complied with promptly and fully. Decision No. DEC 127-389-2 (23 Apr. 1997), para. 5. It is unclear why legal expenses directly connected with the breach of the treaty in the enforcement proceeding of a Tribunal award should be incurred by the Claimant. Award, para. 77. Nor is it clear why it should be confused with the situation of successful enforcement, where there is no breach and thus no case. If the Award intends to say that in the United States legal expenses for successful enforcement of Tribunal awards [are] not recoverable, its relevance is quite questionable in the case of the breach of a special bilateral treaty as the Algiers Declarations. Nevertheless, even the United States has not argued that such legal expenses are unrecoverable in a successful enforcement proceeding 2 Iran National Airlines Co. and The Government of the United States of America, Award No. 334-B51-2 (30 Nov. 1987), para. 26, reprinted in 17 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 200, 212; Iran National Airlines Co. and The Government of the United States of America, Award No. 335-B9-2 (30 Nov. 1987), para. 36, reprinted in 17 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 214, 217; Iran National Airlines Co. and The Government of the United States of America, Award No. 337-B10-2 (30 Nov. 1987), para. 22, reprinted in 17 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 238, 244; Iran National Airlines Co. and The Government of the United States of America, Award No. 336-B12-2 (30 Nov. 1987), para. 28, reprinted in 17 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 228, 237; Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and The United States of America, Award No. 246-B7-1 (14 Aug. 1986), reprinted in 12 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 25, 28-30; The United States of America and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 128-B29-1 (5 May 1984), reprinted in 6 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 19; Department of Environment of Iran and The United States of America, Award No. 107-B53-1 (18 Jan. 1984), reprinted in 6 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 105; see also, Telecommunications Co. of Iran and The United States of America, Award No. 457-B55-1 (19 Dec. 1989), reprinted in 23 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 320, 337. 3 Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc. and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 180-64-1 (27 Jan. 1985), reprinted in 8 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 298, 320-22.

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before a U.S. court. I believe attorney’s fees are likely recoverable in U.S. courts in connection with enforcement of arbitral awards, although one may have to show a bad faith refusal to comply with the award on the part of the award debtor.4 In any event, the legal expenses should be recoverable here, given Article 32, paragraph 2, of the Tribunal Rules and the conduct of Avco in refusing to comply with the award, not seeking its revision before the Tribunal under its practice (Award, para. 64, no. 6) and only contesting it in the U.S. court enforcement proceeding. But what is disturbing in the denial of these legal expenses is its effects on the denial of the 24 cost awards for average amount of $15,000 each on the ground that Iran has not yet sought their enforcement before U.S. courts against the award debtors and U.S. courts have not refused their enforcement and with which I have concurred, Award para. 81. It is disturbing, because by denial of the legal expenses concerning the Avco proceedings, the Tribunal has also made obviously ineffective its own cost awards, as legal expenses for their even successful enforcement would clearly exceed the amount of every cost award, especially if the legal expenses are not readily recoverable in a successful enforcement in the United States. But more importantly, denial of the legal expenses here gives the United States and the U.S. cost award debtors a free ticket not to comply with these and similar future cost awards, as no reasonable claimant would commit itself to more than the awarded sum for its enforcement before U.S. courts and this Tribunal. This will also demonstrate that under A21 there is no practical mechanism in the United States for the enforcement of these cost awards. By denying the legal expenses concerning the Avco proceeding, the Tribunal has taken away the only means for possible enforcement of the cost awards. Separate Opinion of Assadollah Noori and Mohsen Aghahosseini[1] Having concurred in principle with the conclusions in the present Award, we write separately to express ourselves on two points of some signiﬁcance. 1. In line with a long-established precedent of this Tribunal, we would have preferred the application of a 10% rate of interest for the post-violation period. Such has been the awarded rate of interest in all disputes between the two Governments2 and, indeed, the rate of interest applied in this very Award for 4 See G. Born, International Commercial Arbitration in the United States: Commentary and Materials, 627-28 (1994). [1 Signed 5 June 1998; ﬁled 5 June 1998.] 2 See e.g. Telecommunications Company of Iran and The United States of America, Award No. 457-B55-1 (19 Dec. 1989), reprinted in 23 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 320, 337.

SEPARATE OPINION, ALLISON

65

the pre-violation period. The Award opts for a 5% rate of interest for the postviolation period, namely, the period running from 24 November 1992 up to and including the date of payment. This chosen rate is evidently based on the so-called Sylvania3 formula; a formula which, in the precedent of the Tribunal, is routinely applied in private disputes, and which is, therefore, both inadequate and inappropriate here. 2. Inappropriate is also the decision in the Award not to grant to Iran the costs it incurred for its enforcement efforts before the United States Court of Appeals. Those costs should have been awarded not only because they are the direct results of a breach of international law by the United States, but additionally for a more important consideration. As the Award notes, some twenty-four cost awards rendered so far by this Tribunal in favor of Iran have remained unenforced. Since these are of relatively small amounts, and since the expenses of resorting to the United States courts for enforcement are relatively high, Iran would have no ﬁnancially sound reason to incur such expenses unless it is assured that, should the United States courts once again violate the terms of the Algerian Declarations, Iran’s expenses would be compensated by this Tribunal. The Award’s refusal to redress the costs incurred before the United States Court of Appeals deprives Iran of that single incentive. The end result visa` -vis those cost awards, as well as any other to be awarded in future, is not difﬁcult to envisage. Where a judgment debtor is unwilling to abide, as those in the said twenty-four awards have been, there would be no prudent means of enforcement. And this, of course, is an outcome utterly abhorrent not only to the expressed wish of the two Government Parties to the Algerian Declarations, but to law and fairness in general. Separate Opinion of Richard C. Allison[1] 1. In the award that is the principal subject of this Case, Avco Corporation and Iran Aircraft Industries, et al., Partial Award No. 377-261-3 (18 Jul. 1988), reprinted in 19 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 200 (hereinafter “Avco”), Chamber Three called for postaward interest at the rate of 10% per annum on the U.S. $886,127 awarded to Iran Aircraft Industries. At the same time the Chamber explicitly denied postaward interest on the U.S. $2,626,959.03 awarded to Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Company (“IHSRC”). Id. at 229. The Full Tribunal in the present Case has seen ﬁt to depart from the Chamber’s Award in the latter respect. 3 Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc. and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 180-64-1 (27 June 1985), reprinted in 8 IRAN U.S. C.T.R. 298, 320-22. [1 Signed 9 June 1998; ﬁled 9 June 1998.]

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2. In my view it would have been preferable for the Full Tribunal to have adhered to the Award as Chamber Three rendered it and not to have granted post-award/pre-judgment interest on the amount owed to IHSRC. This would have obviated the need for speculation about how an enforcing United States court might have exercised its discretion whether to grant post-award interest when the award itself declined to do so. See The Islamic Republic of Iran and The United States of America, Award No. 586-A27-FT, para. 76, n. [14] (5 June 1998), reprinted in 34 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 39, 60. Such speculation has required that the Tribunal divine not only that the U.S. court would have ignored the Avco Award and granted IHSRC post-award interest but also that the court would have stipulated a rate of 10%, far in excess of market rates for the relevant period (July 1988 to November 1992). 3. Otherwise I concur in the Award in the present Case.

HAKIM v. IRAN

67

Kamran Hakim, Claimant v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Respondent (Case No. 953) Chamber Two: Skubiszewski, Chairman; Aldrich, Ameli,[1] Members Signed 24 June 1998[2] Award No. 587-953-2 The following is the text as issued by the Tribunal:

Award

APPEARANCES For the Claimant:

Mr. Kamran Hakim, Claimant, Mr. Leonard van Sandick, Mr. Hamid Sabi, Mr. Kendall R. Meyer, Ms. Farkhondeh Sabi Attorneys, Mr. Alexander von Franquemont, Ms. Mary E. Davenport, Mr. Farhad Eshaghpour Assistants, Ms. Parvin Hakim, Mr. Said Hakim, Mr. Masud Hakim, Persons appearing for the Claimant, Mr. Manoochehr Vahman, Mr. Thomas Lembo, Mr. Chris Rosenthal, Mr. Carl Miller, Expert Witnesses,

[1 Mr. Ameli’s signature is accompanied by the words “Concurring in part; dissenting in part. See, Separate Opinion.” This Opinion is unavailable at the time of printing.] [2 Filed 2 July 1998.]

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HAKIM v. IRAN

Mrs. Ellen Hakim, Observer. For the Respondent:

Mr. M. H. Zahedin-Labbaf, Agent of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Dr. Jafar Niaki, Mr. Seifollah Mohammadi, Dr. Rahim Davarnia, Legal Advisers to the Agent, Mr. Mahmoud Tavana, Attorney for Respondent, Mr. Yousof Karimi, Witness, Engineer Ahmad Khorassanchian, Mr. Abolghassem Merati, Rebuttal Witnesses, Mr. Jahangir Beglari, Observer.

Also present:

Mr. D. Stephen Mathias Agent of the United States of America.

table of contents Para. 1

i.

introduction

ii.

late-filed documents

iii.

facts and contentions: nationality

17

iv.

facts and contentions: property and company interests 1) The Velenjak Property 2) 77 Pirasteh Street 3) The Vanak Property 4) Pars Machine Manufacturing Company (“PMMC”) 5) Pars Machine Company, Pars Union Company, Emerson Electric Company and Ranel Frigo Company

28 28 34 40 47

v.

jurisdiction 1) Nationality 2) Other Jurisdictional Issues 3) Conclusion on Jurisdiction

67 67 72 74

vi.

merits 1) The Velenjak Property 2) 77 Pirasteh Street

75 75 86

5

58

3) 4) 5) vii.

HAKIM v. IRAN

69

The Vanak Property Pars Machine Manufacturing Company Pars Machine Company, Pars Union Company, Emerson Electric Company and Ranel Frigo Company

87 93

valuation 1) Standard of Compensation 2) Facts and Contentions a. Experts’ Opinions b. Land and Building c. Equipment and Machinery 3) The Tribunal’s Findings on Valuation a. Introduction b. Land and Building c. Equipment and Machinery d. Tax Liabilities e. Partners’ Accounts f. Conclusion on Valuation

106 113 113 114 114 116 119 122 122 125 128 132 133 134

viii. interest

138

ix.

costs

139

x.

award

140 i. introduction

1. The Claimant, KAMRAN HAKIM, ﬁled a Statement of Claim on 19 January 1982 against the GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (“the Respondent”) seeking compensation for the alleged expropriation of real property and company shares. As ﬁnally pleaded, the Claimant seeks compensation in the total amount of U.S. $11,958,930, plus interest and costs.3 2. The Respondent disputes the jurisdiction of the Tribunal on various grounds and denies any liability to the Claimant for the claims. 3. In an Order of 3 March 1989, the Tribunal joined all jurisdictional issues, including the Claimant’s nationality, to the consideration of the merits of the Case. 4. The Hearing in this Case was held on 12-14 June 1996.

3 In his Statement of Claim, Mr. Hakim sought U.S. $45,000,000 consisting of U.S. $11,000,000 as compensation for the value of the real estate and U.S. $34,000,000 for the company shares.

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ii. late-filed documents 5. On 9 November 1995, while listing the present Case for hearing, the Tribunal stated that no new documents would be introduced prior to the Hearing without the permission of the Tribunal and unless a request for such introduction was ﬁled at least three months before the Hearing. The Tribunal also stated that at the Hearing “new documents may not be introduced in evidence unless the Tribunal so permits, which permission should not be anticipated except for evidence in rebuttal of evidence introduced at the Hearing.” 6. At the commencement of the Hearing, the Claimant submitted a dossier consisting of 33 documents and requested that it be admitted into the record. The Claimant’s explanation for his delay in submission was that he had had difﬁculty in gaining access to the documents and had obtained them only a short time before the Hearing. In response to a question from the Tribunal, the Claimant also argued that most of the proffered documents fell within the category of “public” documents which should be admitted by the Tribunal. Further, he argued that their introduction would not prejudice the Respondent because the documents had always been in the Respondent’s possession. 7. The dossier contained numerous documents that the Claimant had submitted to the Tribunal previously and which the Tribunal had previously rejected. Thus, at the Hearing, the Tribunal reiterated its earlier rejection of these documents. The Tribunal went on to admit one document, a judgment of 6 March 1984 by the Islamic Revolutionary Court of Tehran against the Claimant and his siblings. Finally, although noting that it had not received an adequate explanation for the Claimant’s delay in presenting the documents, the Tribunal held that it nonetheless would be prepared to admit any of the remaining documents, provided that the Claimant could prove that they were publicly available. The Tribunal concluded that documents that could not be deemed to be publicly available must be rejected as a result of the Claimant’s inadequate explanation for the delay and the Tribunal’s requirement of orderly procedure. 8. By an Order of 20 November 1996 the Tribunal admitted another document contained in the dossier, a letter dated 22 December 1980, No. 30/9940, from the Ofﬁce of the Revolutionary Prosecutor of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Foundation for the Oppressed (the “Revolutionary Prosecutor’s letter”), on the ground that the Tribunal had previously requested the Respondent to produce this document in a prior order in this Case. 9. In that same Order of 20 November 1996, the Tribunal postponed a decision on the admission of two other late-submitted documents: a letter dated 26 November 1980 from the Iranian Ministry of Industries and Mines to

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Mr. Morteza Khatibi (the “IMIM letter of appointment”) and a hand-written document entitled “Notice of Changes in Pars Machine Manufacturing Co.,” dated 29 November 1980 (the “notice of changes”). The IMIM letter appointed Mr. Khatibi as a governmental observer of PMMC for a period of three months and speciﬁed his functions and powers in that position. See infra, para. 56. The notice of changes, signed by Mr. Khatibi and two other PMMC employees, described certain changes which assertedly had been made in PMMC’s operation and management. In the same Order the Tribunal gave the Respondent an opportunity to ﬁle a response as to (a) the admissibility of the IMIM letter of appointment and the notice of changes and (b) the merits of those two documents as well as the Revolutionary Prosecutor’s letter. 10. On 30 June 1997, the Respondent ﬁled its response, annexed to which were 18 exhibits (“June 1997 response”). The Claimant ﬁled a reply to that submission on 15 August 1997, and on 5 September 1997 the Respondent ﬁled an objection to the Claimant’s reply. 11. The Tribunal decides on the above three post-Hearing ﬁlings as follows. Because the Respondent’s June 1997 response was requested by the Tribunal’s Order of 20 November 1996, that document, including its supporting exhibits, is admitted. However, the Tribunal did not request the two documents ﬁled in August and September 1997, and it considers it inappropriate to permit their introduction at this late stage of the proceedings. Consequently, the August and September 1997 ﬁlings are not admitted into the record. 12. In its June 1997 response, the Respondent argued that the IMIM letter of appointment and the notice of changes were inadmissible because they were late-ﬁled and were not documents of public record. The Respondent argued also that their admission would be inconsistent with Tribunal practice, would seriously prejudice the Respondent and would disrupt the orderly conduct of the proceedings. 13. The Tribunal notes that the IMIM letter of appointment appears on its face to be an internal government communication. Thus, without further information, one might think it not publicly available. However, in its June 1997 response, which has been admitted by the Tribunal, the Respondent annexed an ofﬁcial Ministry of Justice Notice of Appointment, issued by the Bureau for the Registration of Companies and dated 1 December 1980. This document is an ofﬁcial publication of Mr. Khatibi’s appointment as an observer for PMMC, and it refers to the IMIM letter of appointment. That reference shows the public nature of the IMIM letter of appointment. A full understanding of the Ministry of Justice Appointment Notice required an examination of the IMIM letter of appointment, and the Tribunal infers that the Ministry of Justice Appointment Notice would not have referred to the IMIM letter unless it could be so examined. Thus, the Tribunal considers the IMIM letter of appointment to be a document

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of public nature admissible pursuant to the Order communicated to the Parties at the Hearing. 14. By contrast, whether or not the notice of changes is a publicly available document is not clear. That document is signed by Mr. Khatibi and two other PMMC employees, and it purports to make certain changes in PMMC, including dissolving PMMC’s board of directors and cancelling its contracts. However, the above-mentioned Ministry of Justice Notice of Appointment indicates that the three signatories to the notice of changes exceeded in that notice the powers conferred upon them by the IMIM letter of appointment. Consequently, several decisions purported to have been made in the notice of changes were not approved by the Iranian Bureau for the Registration of Companies and presumably were not made available to the public. However, in light of the Tribunal’s decision in paragraph 105, infra, a decision on the admissibility of the notice of changes is rendered moot. 15. In admitting the IMIM letter of appointment, the Tribunal notes that late-ﬁled documents are admitted exceptionally. The factors considered relevant by this Tribunal for the admission of untimely documents were the subject of detailed discussion in Harris International Communications, Inc. and Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Award No. 323-409-1 (2 Nov. 1987), reprinted in 17 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 31 (“Harris”). In that Award, the Tribunal stated “[f]ilings containing facts and evidence are the most likely to cause prejudice to the other Party and to disrupt the arbitral process if ﬁled late.” Id., at para. 63, 17 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 47. Because the IMIM letter of appointment contains facts and evidence, the statement from Harris has direct relevance to the Tribunal’s decision on the admission of the letter. However, other considerations also come into play, such as the “fundamental requirements of equality between, and fairness to, the Parties, and the possible prejudice to either Party.” Id., at para. 61 (footnote omitted). With respect to the concept of prejudice, the Tribunal notes that a party is not prejudiced merely because the contents of late-submitted documents are likely to produce a ﬁnding in favor of the party which submits those documents. Rather, the prejudice to which Harris refers arises when the non-submitting party is not afforded the opportunity to respond to the substance of the lateﬁled documents. See W. Jack Buckamier and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 528-941-3, para. 31 (6 Mar. 1992), reprinted in 28 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 53, 61. 16. In the present Case there are two reasons why the Respondent is not prejudiced by the admission of the IMIM letter of appointment. First, the Respondent has been given ample opportunity to respond to that document (more than six months). More importantly for the present circumstances, that appointment letter was a publicly available document, see supra, para. 13, and has always been in the Respondent’s possession.

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iii. facts and contentions: nationality 17. The Claimant was born to Iranian parents in Iran on 1 July 1940, so, pursuant to Article 976, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code of Iran, he acquired Iranian nationality at birth. 18. Between 1951 and 1956 the Claimant attended various boarding schools in the United Kingdom. In 1956 he was sent to California and studied at Acalanes High School from where he graduated in 1958. He continued his education at Pasadena City College and then Woodbury College, Los Angeles, and he received an Associate in Arts Degree and a Bachelor of Business Administration in 1961 and 1963, respectively. 19. During his ﬁrst two years in the United States, the Claimant lived with an American family and was raised, he asserts, “as an ordinary American teenager.” It was at this early stage, he contends, that his integration into American society began. 20. In April 1963, at the age of twenty-one, he moved to New York where he met Ellen Manoochehrian, a United States national by birth whose father was born in Iran. They were married in the State of New York in a Jewish ceremony. 21. At this juncture, the Claimant commenced his professional career in real estate. He ﬁrst worked for a New York real estate brokerage ﬁrm for two years and thereafter started his own real estate business in New York City. He has submitted several documents and letters of commendation as proof of his business activities. While engaged in his own business, the Claimant also functioned as the United States-based representative for the family business of Pars Machine Company and its afﬁliates. 22. The Claimant states that he has paid U.S. taxes since 1964. He has submitted copies of his individual income tax returns for several years between 1972 and 1988, and a copy of a record of his social security payments for the years 1958 through 1988. 23. The Claimant has four children, all of whom were born in the State of New York, are United States citizens and have been educated exclusively in the United States. He asserts that his wife and children have never been to Iran and have no knowledge of the Persian language. The Claimant has tendered afﬁdavits by close friends attesting to his social and family life in the United States. He has also been a longtime active member of Temple Beth El of Northern Westchester in the State of New York. 24. The Claimant maintains that he visited Iran “a few times” between 1951 and 1977 and that his longest visit was for a period of two weeks. His sister, Parvin Hakim Benaresh, states in an afﬁdavit that the Claimant visited

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Iran in the summers of 1953 and 1959 and once every two years from 1966 until 1978. 25. Unable to produce his original United States certiﬁcate of naturalization of 14 November 1973, which he states was lost, the Claimant has submitted a) copies of duplicate certiﬁcates of naturalization issued in 1980 and 1981 by the Immigration and Naturalization Service; b) a United States District Court statement; and c) a letter from the Department of State conﬁrming that he was naturalized as a national of the United States on 14 November 1973. The Claimant has produced only his 1981 United States passport, stating at the Hearing that he is no longer in possession of his previous United States or Iranian passports. 26. The Respondent disputes the authenticity of the Claimant’s evidence relating to his United States citizenship and takes exception to the Claimant’s production of two duplicate certiﬁcates of naturalization rather than the original. The Respondent alleges that there are a number of discrepancies between the two duplicate certiﬁcates. It further contends that the Claimant has not relinquished his Iranian nationality in accordance with Article 988 of the Civil Code of Iran and asserts that, as a consequence, his only nationality is that of Iran. 27. Alternatively, the Respondent argues that, if the Tribunal decides that the Claimant is a United States-Iranian dual national, his United States nationality is not sufﬁciently dominant and effective for the Tribunal to assume jurisdiction over the Case. The Respondent asserts, inter alia, that the Claimant’s inability to produce a copy of his original certiﬁcate of naturalization issued in 1973 as well as any U.S. passport which he might have been issued prior to 1981 is proof of the fact that the Claimant obtained United States citizenship and a United States passport only in 1981. The Respondent further maintains that the Claimant’s business activities in the United States were for the purpose of contacting United States companies for trade based in Iran, and that the Claimant conducted his business in the United States as an Iranian national. iv. facts and contentions: property and company interests 1) The Velenjak Property 28. In his Statement of Claim, Mr. Hakim sought compensation for four parcels of land in Velenjak, Iran. In later pleadings, an additional 3,000 square meter parcel in Velenjak was claimed. The Claimant has submitted title deeds in his name for all ﬁve properties. He asserts that the aggregate area of the ﬁve parcels measured approximately 8,500 square meters and that they were purchased at different times by his father, Isaac Hakim. 29. The Claimant contends that he made various improvements to the properties, and he submits a letter and an afﬁdavit by Mr. Ralph Sassouni in

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support of this contention. Mr. Sassouni asserts that he owned land and lived in the Velenjak area for over 25 years. He conﬁrms the existence of brick walls, water wells, planted trees and shrubs, a hot house, and a small cottage on the Claimant’s Velenjak property. A similar description of the improvements is outlined in a protest letter of November 1985 from the Claimant’s tax attorneys to the United States Internal Revenue Service. In a supplemental afﬁdavit, Mr. Sassouni states that despite the presence of planted trees and a cottage, the Velenjak lots were undeveloped. The Claimant contends that $857,000 was spent on purchasing the land, on various taxes and on the improvements. 30. The Claimant maintains that the property was expropriated by the Respondent pursuant to the Act Concerning Abolition of Ownership of Mawat [Undeveloped] Urban Lands and the Method for Development of Such Lands of 1 July 1979 (the “1979 Abolition Act”) and its implementing Regulations. 31. The Respondent asserts, by contrast, that the 1979 Abolition Act was not applied and was not applicable to the Velenjak property in light of the Claimant’s admission that various improvements had been made to the property.4 The Respondent has tendered a document from the Department General for Urban Land, Tehran Province which states that the Velenjak property was not affected by the 1979 Abolition Act or any related by-laws and a statement by Mr. Hamid Mahdi Damavandi, manager of the Gandhi Housing Agency, Tehran, who says that the lands of the Velenjak area “have never been considered as unutilized lands and that in [1979-1980 the Respondent had] not declared the land . . . as unutilized lands.” 32. As for the additional 3,000 square meter parcel, the Respondent presented an expert at the Hearing, Mr. Yousof Karimi, who testiﬁed that he had consulted the relevant Iranian land registration records and found that the additional parcel, which was part of the original parcel of land purchased by the Claimant’s father, had subsequently been fully subdivided and became the other four parcels claimed by Claimant, and so no longer existed. 33. As ﬁnally pleaded, the Claimant values the Velenjak property at U.S. $2,753,412, or approximately U.S. $325 per square meter, as of the expropriation date. The Respondent values the Velenjak lands during 1979-1981 at 1,000 to 1,500 rials, or approximately U.S. $14 to U.S. $21, per square meter. 2) 77 Pirasteh Street 34. The Claimant alleges the expropriation of a residential property located at 77 Pirasteh Street, Tehran, that measures 1,534 square meters. The title deed he submitted indicates that the property was registered in his name in 1947. 4 The Respondent, however, has also submitted an afﬁdavit by Mr. Paryab, the former accountant for the Hakim family, who states that he has no knowledge of the amount of $857,000 having been spent in relation to the Velenjak property.

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35. The Claimant asserts that when his mother, Mrs. Touba Hakim, moved out of 77 Pirasteh Street in late 1978, the former servants of the family remained living there and took control over the property. Afﬁdavits by Mr. Hessam Nourmand, the Claimant’s cousin and accountant of the Hakim family from 1948 through 1980, and Mr. Samuel Talmud, who acted as caretaker of the house after Mrs. Hakim left, describe how they observed people apparently associated with the Revolutionary Guards occupying the house. Ms. Parvin Hakim, the Claimant’s sister, and Mr. Ralph Sassouni, a former Pirasteh Street neighbor, allege observing the same. 36. Mr. Talmud contends that some of the occupants had told him in 1979 that they were paying rent to the government. He states that when he visited the house in 1988 he noticed that the garage in front of the house had been turned into an auto repair shop and the “remainder of the house ha[d] become the residence for one of the high ofﬁcials of the Revolutionary committee.” 37. The Respondent denies expropriating the property and submits afﬁdavits by Ms. Shahrokh (Fatima) Zabihi Fard, wife of the late Hakim family gardener, Reza Hashemi, and her son, Abbas Hashemi. Ms. Zabihi Fard says that she currently resides at 77 Pirasteh Street. She states that after her husband’s death in October 1980, Mrs. Touba Hakim asked her to be the janitor at 77 Pirasteh Street and that subsequently, Mrs. Hakim consented to Abbas Hashemi’s use of part of the house as a shop. Ms. Zabihi Fard attests that she and her family resided in the house during the period 1978 to March 1981 and that none of her family members belonged to the Revolutionary Guards or other such bodies. Ms. Zabihi Fard adds that she is waiting for the day when the Hakims “return to Iran and settle down in their home.” Abbas Hashemi makes a similar statement. 38. The Respondent also submits a letter from the Chief Justice of the Islamic Revolutionary Court of Tehran which states that “after examination of the records and judgments rendered until the end of 1360 [20 March 1982], no order of expropriation was issued with respect to the properties belonging to Kamran Hakim . . . by the Islamic Revolutionary Courts of Tehran up to the above date.” Mr. Hassan Paryab has also stated that, as an accountant who had supervised the ﬁnancial affairs of the Hakim family, it is his understanding that the Claimant “did not have a residential house in Pirasteh Ave.” 39. As ﬁnally pleaded, the Claimant values 77 Pirasteh Street at U.S. $1,357,143. Mr. Damavandi, for the Respondent, estimates the value of land on Pirasteh Street from 1979 till the end of 1980 to be between 1,700 to 2,000 rials per square meter and the value of each square meter of building between 3,000 and 5,000 rials. At the Hearing, the Respondent’s expert witness, Engineer Khorassanchian, valued the land at 2,500 rials per square meter and considered that the building, having spent its useful life, possessed no value. Mr. Khorassanchian testiﬁed that he visited the Pirasteh Street property.

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3) The Vanak Property 40. The Claimant alleges ownership in ﬁve parcels of real estate located in the Vanak district. He submitted no title deeds to the property, however, and asserts that all the relevant documentation proving his ownership of these parcels was in the possession of his maternal uncle, Mr. Yaghoub ( Jack) Hay, who was forced to leave it behind when he ﬂed from Iran. At the Hearing, Counsel for the Claimant conceded that the Vanak properties were not registered in the Claimant’s name. 41. Afﬁdavits and statements by Mrs. Touba Hakim, the Claimant’s mother, Mr. Hassam Nourmand and Mr. Hay have been submitted in support of the assertion that the Claimant’s mother and father invested the equivalent of U.S. $2,400,000, on the Claimant’s behalf, in real estate in Mr. Hay’s residential development project in the Vanak area sometime in the early 1970s. 42. The Claimant maintains that the Vanak property was expropriated by means of a decree by the Iranian Prosecutor General, announced by the Public Relations Ofﬁce of the Deeds and Real Estate Registration Department and published in Iran News of 22 February 1980. That newspaper report, as translated by the Tribunal’s Language Services Division, states that the assets of Mr. Hay “and his close relatives” were expropriated by the above decree. Additionally, the Claimant relies on the 1979 Abolition Act to substantiate this expropriation claim. 43. The Respondent denies the Claimant’s ownership of the Vanak property. Mr. Hassan Paryab states in his afﬁdavit that, during his employment as the Hakim family accountant, he would have been aware of any substantial investment made by the Claimant, or on his behalf, but that he did not have knowledge of a U.S. $2,400,000 payment to Mr. Hay for the purchase of Vanak land on behalf of the Claimant. 44. At the Hearing, the Respondent’s expert witness, Mr. Karimi, stated that he had searched the ﬁles which concerned the Vanak property in the Iranian Bureau for the Registration of Land. According to his testimony, his investigations revealed that four of the ﬁve parcels of land were transferred to Mr. Hay for the beneﬁt of his children at various times between 1967 through 1974 and that the ﬁfth was transferred in 1974 to an individual unconnected to the present Case. 45. Assuming, for the sake of argument, the Claimant’s ownership of the Vanak property, the Respondent denies its expropriation. The Respondent ﬁrst points to an Etela’at newspaper report of March 1980, which, the Respondent contends, announced that the property of Mr. Hay only, and not that of his relatives, had been expropriated. The Respondent, however, did not submit a copy of the report to the Tribunal. The Respondent further asserts that the 1979 Abolition Act did not apply to the Vanak property, and it submits a letter from the Department General for Urban Land, Tehran Province, which states that

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the 1979 Abolition Act or related by-laws were not applicable to the speciﬁc land parcels identiﬁed by the Claimant. Finally, the Respondent submits a statement by Mr. Damavandi who opines that the Vanak property claimed by Mr. Hakim has “never been considered as unutilized lands . . .” 46. As ﬁnally pleaded, the amount allegedly invested on behalf of the Claimant, U.S. $2,400,000, is the amount he claims for the Vanak property. The Respondent’s expert, Mr. Damavandi, considered that each square meter of land in the Vanak area during 1979 through 1980 had a value of between 1,200 and 2,000 rials, and its expert witness at the Hearing, Mr. Ahmad Khorassanchian, stated that a square meter of Vanak land during the same period would range from 1,500 to 1,800 rials. 4) Pars Machine Manufacturing Company (“PMMC ”) 47. Pars Machine Manufacturing Company (“PMMC”) was incorporated pursuant to the laws of Iran in 1964. The shares of PMMC were converted from their original bearer form into registered shares in 1971. The Claimant initially asserted ownership in 7,500 out of 10,000 PMMC registered shares, and he submitted 75 certiﬁcates of stock each representing one hundred shares. Of the submitted shares, 2,000 are in his name. The remainder do not identify an owner. At the Hearing, the Claimant reduced his claimed ownership in PMMC to 20 percent of that company. 48. PMMC was located in the vicinity of Azadi Square to the west of Tehran. The Claimant’s elder brothers, Masud and Said Hakim, were responsible for its daily management because they were residing in Iran. The Claimant acted as PMMC’s representative in the United States. 49. Masud left Iran for the United States in 1978. Said Hakim asserts that he left Iran after the Revolution, returned in September 1979 but left again around the end of November 1979 after he became aware that an order for his arrest was being prepared. He maintains that after leaving Iran he made a number of telephone calls from New York to his ofﬁce in Tehran. He adds: During the earlier calls I spoke with my employees, but later representatives of the [workers’ committee] picked up the phone. I was told that they had taken control and I should only speak with them. They asked me why I called. They said I had no right anymore. When I said that I wished to come over I was told not to do so. If I came, I would be in real big trouble. It was my understanding that they meant that I would be put in prison. There were two or three of such calls. This was towards the end of 1980.

50. It appears that by the end of 1979 all the Hakim brothers had left Iran. The only member of their family that remained was their sister, Parvin Hakim. She asserts that because her brothers had left the country, she for the ﬁrst time

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became involved in the management of their business interests, together with Mr. Nourmand and Mr. Paryab. She contends that as time passed, the workers’ committee representatives acquired more and more control of the business, and by the time she left Iran in August 1980 “it was clear there was no way to exercise the ownership rights of my brothers any longer.” At the Hearing, she stated that as long as she remained in Iran neither the Government nor its agencies exercised control over PMMC. 51. The Claimant asserted at the Hearing that PMMC was taken as of November 1980 and to this day remains managed by representatives of the Government of Iran. He submits that he has not been able to inﬂuence them in any way, that those representatives control PMMC’s bank accounts, that he has not been paid any dividend, and that no shareholder meetings have ever been called by the new management. 52. The Respondent denies interfering with the affairs of the company between 1979 and early 1981. It asserts that the Claimant and his family abandoned the company and left Iran because their mismanagement pushed PMMC to the verge of bankruptcy, and that the company could not pay its employees’ wages. The Respondent asserts that, consequently, the workers took over the management of the company. In its post-Hearing submission of June 1997, the Respondent maintains that the appointment of Mr. Khatibi on 26 November 1980 as an observer was neither an expropriation nor an interference with the Claimant’s property rights. 53. The late-ﬁled documents admitted into the record by the Tribunal contain, inter alia, the letter dated 22 December 1980 from the Ofﬁce of the Revolutionary Prosecutor addressed to the Bonyad Mostazafan. That letter states: In view of the report received in connection with Pars Machine, Emerson Electric and afﬁliated companies belonging to the Hakim family, who are fugitives, it is appropriate to take measures in regard to the supervision and reactivation of these companies and to provide this ofﬁce with a report of your activities as soon as possible.

54. In its June 1997 response, the Respondent explained that this letter was dispatched by the Revolutionary Prosecutor only after the PMMC workers had repeatedly asked in 1979 and 1980 for government representatives to assume the management of the company due to the absence of PMMC’s regular management and its deteriorating situation. The Respondent asserts that the Bonyad Mostazafan did not take any action on this letter because it was informed that the Ministry of Industries and Mines had already appointed a provisional observer. An afﬁdavit to this effect has been submitted by Mr. Mohammad Afzali, who was a member of Bonyad Mostazafan’s Legal Council at the time.

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55. The PMMC workers’ letters of appeal to the government were submitted by the Respondent as exhibits to its June 1997 response. The earliest dates from 29 December 1979 and the following is an example of such a letter. Addressed to the Revolutionary Prosecutor, signed by ﬁfty-ﬁve workers and dated 5 May 1980, it states in relevant part: Respectfully, we, the employees of [PMMC], pursuant to our letter No. 7394 dated 29 December 1979 concerning the company’s lack of the management, shareholders and budget for ordering the raw materials as well as non-existence of an authorized and responsible person which has led to insufﬁciency of production, request you to order the Ministry of Industries and Mines to take appropriate measures for running this manufacturing unit which has been left in uncertain conditions since the victory of the Revolution.

56. The exhibits to the Respondent’s June 1997 response also show that PMMC workers had made repeated requests to the IMIM to send a representative to assist in the management and operation of the company. Another exhibit to that ﬁling is an afﬁdavit sworn by the appointed observer, Mr. Morteza Khatibi. He states that the IMIM’s initial responses to the requests were to inform the workers to wait as long as possible for the return of the company’s shareholders and only when the workers failed to convince the shareholders to return did the Ministry appoint him as a provisional observer primarily to invite the return of the shareholders by way of formal notices in newspapers. The IMIM appointment letter of 26 November to Mr. Khatibi states: By virtue of Legal Bills No. 6738 dated [16 June 1979] and No. 8780 dated [7 July 1979] of the Provisional Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and in accordance with this letter of appointment, you are hereby appointed as observer of Pars Machine Manufacturing Company Co. for a maximum period of three months. It is appropriate that you fully observe all the affairs of the said entity using the powers conferred on you pursuant to the above-referenced Bills. Meanwhile, ﬁnancial and obligatory instruments or documents of the Company will be signed jointly by you, one of the members of the Workers Council namely, Mr. Hassan Palizadar, and the Company’s accountant, Mr. Hassan Paryab.

57. Mr. Khatibi contends that after his appointment, he “basically engaged in studying the records [of PMMC] and publishing notices of invitation of shareholders and directors in pertinent newspapers. The factory’s administrative and ﬁnancial matters were carried out by the company employees themselves.” Several of the notices he had published have been produced by the Respondent in its June 1997 response. In concluding his afﬁdavit, Mr. Khatibi states: I know for a fact and state that the notice of invitation of the shareholders was published with the sole purpose of inviting the shareholders to return and take charge of their factory, because there was no other logical reason for it. Had the [Respondent]

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intended to acquire the factory in those days, there was no need for it to invite the shareholders, especially as the Ministry of Industries, in light of the grave ﬁnancial situation of the said factory, could have no interest in inheriting disorganization, heavy debts, and a factory which was virtually bankrupt. The Ministry of Industries’ sole objective was to return the factory to its original owners as soon as possible.

5) Pars Machine Company, Pars Union Company, Emerson Electric Company and Ranel Frigo Company 58. In the Statement of Claim, Mr. Hakim sought compensation for the expropriation of a seventy-ﬁve-percent share in Pars Machine Company5 (“PMC”). The Statement of Claim did not mention Pars Union Company (“Pars Union”), Emerson Electric Company (“Emerson Electric”) and Ranel Frigo Company (“Ranel Frigo”), but the Claimant referred to these companies in subsequent pleadings as afﬁliate companies of PMC. 59. PMC, the Claimant contends, was established by the Claimant and his brothers Masud and Said to import appliances and electronic products into Iran after the death of their father in 1957. The Claimant stated at the Hearing that PMC as a company was liquidated in or about 1969 and that the name PMC was thereafter used merely as a name to designate a general partnership between the three Hakim brothers in the other family businesses: Pars Union, Emerson Electric and Ranel Frigo. 60. The Claimant contends that the partnership agreement was reduced to writing and that pursuant to it he owned a 24 percent interest in Pars Union, Emerson Electric and Ranel Frigo, while Masud and Said each owned a 38 percent interest in those companies. The Claimant did not submit the alleged partnership agreement to the Tribunal. Masud Hakim stated at the Hearing that it had been left in Iran. 61. According to the Claimant, Emerson Electric imported electronic products and small appliances from the Far East, Ranel Frigo imported home appliances from the United States and Europe, and Pars Union imported products not imported by the other entities. The Claimant acknowledged during the Hearing that Emerson Electric is registered in the name of Said Hakim and members of his family, while Pars Union and Ranel Frigo are registered in the name of Masud Hakim and the members of his family. At the Hearing, Masud Hakim stated that he believed the Claimant held shares in Pars Union, but he provided neither evidence nor further details. 62. The Claimant asserts that the best available evidence to prove his ownership of shares in Emerson Electric, Ranel Frigo, and Pars Union is a 17 5 The Statement of Claim asserted that Pars Machine Company was a company incorporated under the laws of Iran. In a later pleading, however, Mr. Hessam Nourmand stated that PMC was not incorporated.

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October 1977 agreement between the three brothers. That agreement was registered with a Tehran notary public and refers all existing commercial disputes between them to arbitration. The source of the dispute – the individual entitlements of the three brothers under the general partnership – is said to indicate that each of the brothers possessed interests in PMMC, PMC, Pars Union, Emerson Electric and Ranel Frigo regardless of whether they were registered shareholders. 63. The Claimant maintains that the arbitrators, unable to reach a decision, recommended only that the three Hakim brothers settle the dispute between themselves. As a result of that recommendation, the Claimant contends that the brothers agreed to increase his shareholding in PMMC to 75 percent and to give him a 50 percent ownership interest in PMC, Pars Union, Emerson Electric and Ranel Frigo. However, the Claimant stated at the Hearing that because he could not establish that the alleged settlement occurred before the date of taking he would decrease his claim for each company to the percentage of his interest in the PMC general partnership allegedly owned prior to the settlement agreement. He argues that his 20 percent share in PMMC is evidence of his percentage in the general partnership, and he thus claims that he had a 20 percent interest in Pars Union, Emerson Electric and Ranel Frigo. 64. Alternatively, the Claimant asserts that he possesses a 20 percent beneﬁcial ownership in Pars Union, Emerson Electric and Ranel Frigo. 65. The Respondent argues that the Claimant has failed to prove his ownership of the three companies. It further asserts that by ﬁrst referring to those companies only after the Statement of Claim was ﬁled, Mr. Hakim has submitted new claims which, in accordance with Article III, paragraph 4, of the Claims Settlement Declaration, should not be accepted by the Tribunal. 66. As ﬁnally pleaded, the Claimant seeks U.S. $40,000, U.S. $1,960,000 and U.S. $740,000 for a 20 percent interest in Pars Union, Emerson Electric and Ranel Frigo, respectively. Although in the pleadings the Claimant sought compensation up to U.S. $7,500,000 for a 50 percent interest in PMC, that claim was abandoned at the Hearing after admission that PMC was dissolved as a company in 1969. v. jurisdiction 1) Nationality 67. In accordance with the Full Tribunal’s decision in Islamic Republic of Iran and United States of America, Decision No. DEC 32-A18-FT (6 April 1984), reprinted in 5 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 251, the Tribunal must ﬁrst determine if the Claimant was, during the relevant period, from the time his claims arose until 19 January 1981, the date of the Claims Settlement Declaration, a national

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of the United States, a national of Iran, or a national of both countries. If the Claimant is found to be a national of both countries, i.e., a dual national, the Tribunal must determine whether his United States nationality was dominant and effective during that period. For the Tribunal to assume jurisdiction over his claims, the Claimant must show that during the relevant period, his dominant and effective nationality was that of the United States. 68. The Claimant contends that his claims arose sometime between 1979 and December 1980. Thus, the Tribunal assumes for the purpose of determining the Claimant’s dominant and effective nationality that the relevant period is between 1979 and 19 January 1981. 69. It is undisputed that the Claimant is a national of Iran by virtue of his birth to Iranian parents in Iran. There is no proof that he ever relinquished his Iranian nationality or that he otherwise lost that nationality. At the same time, the Claimant has shown to the Tribunal’s satisfaction that he has also been a United States national since 1973 and that he maintained that nationality during the relevant period. The Tribunal, therefore, ﬁnds that the Claimant was a national of both Iran and the United States during the relevant period. 70. The question remains, however, as to the Claimant’s dominant and effective nationality during that same period. The Tribunal is of the view that although the Claimant may have had numerous contacts with Iran because of his family and ﬁnancial interests, ample evidence appears on the record to conclude that, during the relevant period, the United States was the center of his personal and professional life. The Tribunal is satisﬁed that the United States has been the Claimant’s continuous and habitual place of residence since his arrival there in 1956; his education from 1956 onward was undertaken solely in the United States, and his career in the real estate business has been based in New York since he commenced work in that ﬁeld in 1964. It is also of note that he became a United States national in 1973 and that his wife and children have had a near exclusive connection with the United States. These facts, which are unrebutted by the Respondent, leave the Tribunal with no doubt that, during the relevant period, the Claimant’s dominant and effective nationality was that of the United States. 71. Having found that the Claimant was a dominant and effective United States national during the relevant period, the Tribunal concludes that his claims are of a national of the United States as deﬁned in Article VII, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration. See Case No. A18, supra, at 25, 5 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 265. 2) Other Jurisdictional Issues 72. The claims are for the alleged deprivation of the Claimant’s rights in real property and company shares and therefore fall within the Tribunal’s subject

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matter jurisdiction of claims arising “out of . . . expropriations or other measures affecting property rights.” Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration. 73. The Tribunal is satisﬁed that the claims were owned continuously by a national of the United States, in accordance with Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Claims Settlement Declaration and that they were outstanding on 19 January 1981, as required by Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration. 3) Conclusion on Jurisdiction 74. Based on the foregoing, the Tribunal determines that it has jurisdiction over the claims in this Case. vi. merits 1) The Velenjak Property 75. The Claimant’s ownership of four of the ﬁve parcels of the Velenjak property is not in dispute. In light of the Tribunal’s conclusion in para. 85, infra, it need not decide on the existence or ownership of the ﬁfth 3,000 square meter Velenjak parcel. 76. Mr. Hakim alleges that his Velenjak property was taken as a result of the 1979 Abolition Act and its Regulations, which he asserts applied to “mawat” (undeveloped) and “bayer” (previously developed) urban lands. 77. In Rouhollah Karubian and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 569-419-2, para. 111 (6 Mar. 1996) (“Karubian”), the Tribunal held that the very existence and binding force of the 1979 Abolition Act and its Regulations did not by themselves constitute an expropriation of the claimant’s real property in Iran. Accordingly, to the extent that Mr. Hakim’s claim is for the expropriation of the Velenjak property, it must fail. 78. Nonetheless, the Tribunal must also examine whether other measures within the meaning of Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration affected the Claimant’s property rights. Tribunal precedent has recognized that a claim for expropriation necessarily includes a claim for other measures as provided in Article II. See Eastman Kodak Company, et al. and Government of Iran, et al., Award No. 329-227/12384-3 (11 Nov. 1987), reprinted in 17 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 153, 169. 79. In Karubian the Tribunal held that while the cumulative effect of the Iranian land reform legislation at the time of the Revolution and related governmental action did not rise to the level of an expropriation, the interference could be of such a degree as to constitute other measures affecting property rights. Karubian, supra, Award No. 569-419-2, at para. 144. In so holding, the

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Tribunal noted that the 1979 Abolition Act, as amended, along with its implementing Regulations, “made all undeveloped or unutilized properties in both urban and rural areas vulnerable to a determination that they were mawat, and as a consequence of that determination, subject to immediate cancellation of their title deeds by Iran.” Id., at para. 143. The Tribunal held in Jahangir Mohtadi, et al. and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 573-271-3, para. 68 (2 Dec. 1996) (“Mohtadi”) that lands which were in fact bayer might also have been affected by that Act and its Regulations by virtue of the deﬁnition of mawat land in the Regulations. 80. In light of the Karubian and Mohtadi Awards, the Tribunal must determine whether the Velenjak land was affected by the 1979 Abolition Act or its implementing Regulations. 81. Article 2 of the Regulations to the 1979 Abolition Act appears to exempt from the Act’s application land on which “acceptable development and improvement” has been made, and it sets forth nine categories of such acceptable development and improvement. Land falling within these categories presumably is considered neither mawat nor bayer. 82. The language of Article 2 is ambiguous in that it does not indicate whether development or improvement other than what is speciﬁcally deﬁned therein is acceptable. In addressing ambiguities contained in other Iranian land legislation, the Tribunal in Mohtadi stated that it normally would view the responsibility for providing a complete and persuasive explanation of Iranian legislation as falling upon the Respondent. This is because the Respondent is surely better positioned than a claimant to explain the meaning and effect of its own laws. Especially where the legislation is confusing and its scope ambiguous, as in the case of the Lands Grant Act, the Respondent may not conﬁne itself to the mere assertion that particular legislation does not apply. On the other hand, it falls to the Claimant to demonstrate with clarity the facts that bring his property within the scope of the legislation that allegedly expropriated his property. Where, as here, there is no evidence of physical interference attributable to the Respondent . . . the Claimant must take particular care to demonstrate that the subject property is, as a factual matter, of the type apparently covered by the Lands Grant Act. In that event the burden would shift to the Respondent to demonstrate that the scope of the Act was in fact narrower than the Claimant suggests.

Id. at paras. 82-83. 83. In view of the above, and considering the absence of any evidence that the property was subject to any physical interference by the Respondent, it is the Tribunal’s opinion that Mr. Hakim has the burden of proving that his Velenjak property was of the type which fell within the scope of the 1979 Abolition Act and that it was not exempted under the implementing regulations. Because the Claimant has submitted evidence of substantial development of the property

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and has claimed that substantial funds were spent, in part, on developing the property, the Tribunal is unable to determine whether the Velenjak property was affected by the laws and regulations on which he relies. That legislation was aimed primarily at the abolition of private ownership of undeveloped land, and the evidence in the record showing development leaves the Tribunal with some doubt as to whether the land was of the type vulnerable to cancellation of title deed under the 1979 Abolition Act and its Regulations. Thus, the Claimant has not met his burden of showing that the Velenjak property fell within the scope of that legislation. 84. At the Hearing, Counsel for the Claimant argued that the development on the Velenjak property fell below the level of development deemed to be acceptable under the Regulations to the 1979 Abolition Act because Mr. Karimi, the Respondent’s expert witness, had testiﬁed that the land was registered as bayer, i.e., land previously utilized but which had fallen into disuse. However, although Mr. Karimi inspected the registration ﬁles, he did not visit the property. Furthermore, the entries in the registration ﬁles to which Mr. Karimi made reference appear to have been recorded in the 1950s. In view of the fact that the Claimant’s development of the Velenjak property occurred well after the date those entries were recorded, the Tribunal cannot ﬁnd that the degree of actual development in 1979 is to be determined by a classiﬁcation made more than two decades prior to that year. 85. The Tribunal concludes that, on balance, the Claimant has not made out a claim “for other measures affecting property rights” with respect to the Velenjak property. Therefore, this claim must fail for lack of proof. 2) 77 Pirasteh Street 86. The Tribunal is satisﬁed that the title deed submitted by the Claimant is sufﬁcient proof of his ownership of 77 Pirasteh Street. However, the Tribunal ﬁnds that the evidence before it is not adequate to prove that 77 Pirasteh Street was expropriated or that it was subjected to other measures affecting the Claimant’s property rights. The sworn statements of Mr. Nourmand and Mr. Talmud do not give a clear indication as to the activities of the Revolutionary Guards at the house, the frequency of the visits by the Guards, or the measure of control the Guards exercised over the property. The mere observation of Revolutionary Guards entering and leaving premises does not, by itself, amount to a de facto expropriation. Vernie Rodney Pointon, et al. and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 516-322-1, para. 36 (23 Jul. 1991), reprinted in 27 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 49, 61-62. Further, Mr. Talmud fails to identify the occupants of the house who allegedly told him that they were paying rent to the government, nor for the purposes of jurisdiction does he offer any precise date as to when this conversation took place. For these reasons, the Pirasteh Street property claim

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must be dismissed for lack of proof during the period over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction. 3) The Vanak Property 87. The Claimant admitted at the Hearing that no formal agreement, title deed or other contemporaneous documentary evidence exists to prove his ownership of the Vanak property, and the Respondent’s expert witness, Mr. Karimi, testiﬁed that he found no entry in the ofﬁcial land registration ﬁles to show that the Claimant possessed an ownership interest in the Vanak property. 88. The evidence the Claimant does submit as to his ownership of this property is not persuasive. The Claimant’s mother admits that she does not know the exact amount invested on behalf of the Claimant in Mr. Hay’s Vanak project but says that her accountants told her that it was equivalent to U.S. $2.4 million. Mr. Hessam Nourmand has sworn that he instructed Mr. Hassan Paryab to prepare a statement on the funds given to Mr. Hay for investment in Vanak property on behalf of the Claimant. Consequently, a statement relating to the Vanak property, purportedly signed by Mr. Paryab, was submitted by the Claimant. Mr. Paryab, however, has sworn that the testimony ascribed to him was a forgery, that he was never given any such instructions by Mr. Nourmand, and that no investments were made on the Claimant’s behalf in properties in the Vanak region. Some time thereafter, Mr. Nourmand admitted that the signature that statement bore was not Mr. Paryab’s. 89. Mr. Hay has stated that because he ﬂed Iran, he left behind the documents evidencing the Claimant’s ownership of the Vanak property. The Tribunal is mindful that a person making a sudden departure from Iran during the revolutionary events prevailing at the time may have left behind documentation or other material that could prove a claim. It would be unfair to impose a rigorous standard of proof on a claimant in such instances. However, in adopting such an approach, the Tribunal also must be careful not to expose the Respondent to claims not properly evidenced. See W. Jack Buckamier and Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Award No. 528-941-3, para. 67 (6 Mar. 1992), reprinted in 28 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 53, 74-76. There is no precise formula to balance these competing concerns; each case is to be decided with due regard to the particular circumstances which surround it. 90. It seems clear that the Claimant’s alleged interest is not recorded in the relevant land registration ﬁles. Although that fact, on its own, may not be sufﬁcient to ﬁnd against the Claimant, the Claimant has failed to proffer any documentation of adequate probative value to overcome the strong legal presumption against him. It may be true that documentary evidence was left behind in Iran but the afﬁdavits and statements relied on by the Claimant are not sufﬁcient to prove that the Claimant possessed an ownership interest in the

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Vanak lands. The afﬁdavits submitted in support of the Claimant’s ownership of the Vanak property are vague and imprecise. Mr. Hay’s afﬁdavits do not specify what type of ownership interest the Claimant held, i.e., a whole, part or some other interest in the ﬁve parcels of the Vanak land. Mr. Hay’s absence from the Hearing and failure to elaborate on his written afﬁdavit also adds to the Claimant’s evidentiary problems. The Claimant’s mother has admitted that she did not know precisely how much of the Claimant’s inheritance from his father or her gifts to the Claimant was made available to Mr. Hay for investment in Vanak real estate. Furthermore, the main basis for Mr. Nourmand’s opinion is the statement falsely attributed to Mr. Paryab. 91. The Tribunal also notes that where a Claimant alleges a proprietary interest of the magnitude at issue here, it would be reasonable to expect the Claimant to have with him in the United States some documentation, which would have evidenced his ownership interest in that property. The Claimant here has proffered nothing of the kind. 92. Based on the foregoing, the Tribunal dismisses for lack of proof the portion of the Claim relating to the Vanak property. 4) Pars Machine Manufacturing Company 93. The Parties ultimately agreed that the Claimant owned 20 percent of PMMC. Consequently, the Tribunal now turns to examine whether the appointment of Mr. Khatibi as an observer at PMMC in November 1980 constitutes an expropriation or other measures affecting the Claimant’s property rights under Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration for which the Respondent bears responsibility. 94. Mr. Khatibi was appointed pursuant to Legal Bill No. 6738, the “Law Concerning the Appointment of Provisional Manager(s) to Supervise Productive, Industrial, Commercial, Agricultural and Services Units in the Private and Public Sectors” (“Law of 16 June 1979”). That same law has been the subject of detailed consideration in previous awards. Indeed, in determining whether an expropriation occurred in prior cases, the Tribunal has examined both the text of the law pursuant to which the appointment was made and the events occurring after the appointment. 95. In Thomas Earl Payne and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 245-335-2, para. 20 (8 Aug. 1986), reprinted in 12 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 3, 10 (“Payne”), the Tribunal held that the “effect [of the Law of 16 June 1979] is to strip the original managers of affected companies of all authority and to deny shareholders signiﬁcant rights attached to their ownership interest.” See also Starrett Housing Corporation, et al. and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. ITL 32-24-1 (19 Dec. 1983), reprinted in 4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 122, 154. Likewise, the Tribunal here notes that the Law of 16 June 1979 provides that once an observer is appointed

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he will remain in his position, and the shareholders have no rights whatsoever to appoint a person in his place for the period of his appointment unless it is earlier revoked by the appointing authority. Article 2 of the Law of 16 June 1979. 96. The mere appointment of an observer under that Law is, however, not conclusive of a ﬁnding of expropriation. In addition to examining the powers that were conferred pursuant to the appointment itself, prior cases have generally contained a detailed discussion of the speciﬁc actions actually taken by the appointee. For instance, in Harold Birnbaum and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 549-967-2, para. 30 (6 Jul. 1993) (“Birnbaum”), the Tribunal noted that the appointed manager testiﬁed that he had “assumed control over all of AFFA’s affairs on the basis that the law . . . gave complete authority to conduct the ﬁrm’s business.” Id. He testiﬁed further that he “also felt obligated to exclude the owners of the ﬁrm from all management responsibilities.” Id. The manager went on to say that “he did not try to contact AFFA’s partners who were outside of Iran because he was ‘not in a position’ to do so.” Id. In Faith Lita Khosrowshahi, et al. and Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Award No. 558-178-2 (30 Jun. 1994) (“Khosrowshahi”), as in the instant case, the Government of Iran had appointed an observer, as opposed to a manager. There, the Tribunal determined on the evidence before it that once the observer was appointed and assumed his duties, “he immediately excluded the existing Khosrowshahi management. There is no evidence that [the observer’s] appointment was intended to be or in fact was temporary. The subsequent appointment of directors and chairman of the board also shows that the intention of the Government was permanent exclusion of the existing management.” Id., at para. 25. 97. In the instant case, although Mr. Khatibi was appointed pursuant to the Law of 16 June 1979, the evidence of his actual interference in PMMC falls short of that described in Birnbaum and Khosrowshahi. In contrast to the latter two cases, the evidence concerning PMMC indicates that the relevant government authorities resisted involvement in PMMC and appointed Mr. Khatibi only at the insistence of PMMC workers. 98. Mr. Khatibi states in his afﬁdavit that PMMC workers had been managing the company before he arrived and that they continued to do so after he assumed his position. He asserts that he “basically engaged in studying the records and publishing notices of invitation of shareholders and directors in pertinent papers.” He placed advertisements in various newspapers inviting the shareholders to hold a special general meeting, but the shareholders neither returned nor responded. Thus, in the instant case, the Tribunal has not been presented with the evidence of the exercise of actual control that was present in Birnbaum and Khosrowshahi, among other cases. Furthermore, the evidence is insufﬁcient to hold that between the appointment of Mr. Khatibi, 26 November 1980, and the end of the relevant period, 19 January 1981, the Respondent’s

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actions had ripened into an outright taking of property. See SEDCO, Inc., et al. and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. ITL 55-129-3 (28 Oct. 1985), reprinted in 9 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 248, 278 (“SEDCO”). 99. Therefore, taking into account the particular circumstances of the present case, the Tribunal ﬁnds that the appointment of the observer was not an interference of a degree sufﬁcient to justify a conclusion that PMMC was expropriated within the relevant period. But a ﬁnding that there was no expropriation does not preclude a determination that the above governmental actions deprived the Claimant of his property rights. 100. According to Mr. Khatibi, his primary function was to invite the PMMC shareholders to attend an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting, which function is supported by the newspaper notices published at the time. However, Mr. Khatibi was also given signiﬁcant powers in the company by virtue of the appointment letter and pursuant to the bill under which he was appointed. As noted above, see supra, para. 95, the law under which he was appointed stripped the shareholders of their rights to choose others in his place. Moreover, the IMIM appointment letter authorized Mr. Khatibi to “observe all the affairs of [PMMC] using the powers conferred upon [him] pursuant to the abovereferenced Bills.” Most importantly, the appointment letter provided that ﬁnancial and obligatory instruments were to be signed by Mr. Khatibi and two employees of PMMC, Mr. Palizdar and Mr. Paryab. Thus, Mr. Khatibi, together with the other two individuals, assumed full control over the company’s ﬁnancial affairs. 101. By conferring the power over ﬁnancial matters on Mr. Khatibi, the Government of Iran prevented the legitimate company ofﬁcials from signing documents on behalf of the company. An individual with the authority to sign obligatory documents in any organization has a position of substantial responsibility, and the importance of that power at PMMC is highlighted by the fact that a number of extraordinary general meetings had been convened by the shareholders of the company during 1977 through 1979 speciﬁcally to decide who was entitled to sign on behalf of the company. Thus, the effect of the appointment was to impair signiﬁcantly the rights belonging to PMMC’s owners. They lost control over the contracts PMMC would subsequently enter and were deprived of the right to liquidate or sell the company as they saw ﬁt. Moreover, the owners’ loss of control over PMMC’s management would have thwarted any attempts to ﬁnd a buyer. Thus, by preventing the shareholders from signing ﬁnancial documents and from affecting management decisions, the Respondents deprived the shareholders of their right to participate in the operation of the company. The effect was to deny shareholders signiﬁcant rights attached to their ownership interests. See, e.g., Payne, supra, at para. 20, 12 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 10.

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102. As discussed above, the Tribunal is mindful that the IMIM appointed Mr. Khatibi because the legitimate managers of PMMC had left Iran and the workers had repeatedly requested a government supervisor. Nevertheless, Tribunal practice dictates that “[t]he intent of the government is less important than the effects of the measures on the owner.” Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton and TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran, et al., Award No. 141-7-2, at 11 (29 Jun. 1984), reprinted in 6 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 219, 225-226 (“Tippetts”). 103. The existence of a causal nexus between the appointment of Mr. Khatibi and the PMMC workers’ interest in maintaining the operation of the factory does not change the fact that that appointment resulted in substantial loss of control over PMMC by its shareholders, including the Claimant. The Tribunal is aware of and understands the social circumstances of the appointment. But the reasons for assuming control of a company, however compelling, cannot relieve a government from the obligation to compensate for the loss suffered. Birnbaum, supra, Award No. 549-967-2, at para. 35, Phelps Dodge Corp., et al. and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 217-99-2, para. 22 (19 Mar. 1986), reprinted in 10 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 121, 130. Khosrowshahi, supra, Award No. 558-178-2, at para. 28. Furthermore, due to the conditions prevailing in Iran, the departure of the Hakims and managers of PMMC at the time was not unjustiﬁed. See, e.g., Birnbaum, at para. 26. Finally, the Tribunal points out that the evidence does not indicate whether the notices published by Mr. Khatibi were communicated to the Hakim family. 104. The Tribunal is also aware that the appointment of Mr. Khatibi was deemed to be a temporary one. The terms of his appointment expressly limited his duties to a period of three months, although Mr. Khatibi himself has stated that this period was extended for a second three-month period. Nevertheless, in the practice of the Tribunal, provisional or temporary appointments have not precluded a ﬁnding that a taking occurred. See Motorola, Inc. and Iran National Airlines Corporation et al., Award No. 373-481-3, para. 58 (28 Jun. 1988), reprinted in 19 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 73, 85; Birnbaum, supra, Award No. 549-967-2, at para. 29. The “form of the measures of control or interference is less important than the reality of their impact.” Tippetts, supra, 6 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 226. The evidence indicates that the interference with the Claimant’s rights was not merely transitory. The control established by Iran with regard to PMMC was not simply a temporary interruption of the existing management. 105. The Tribunal concludes that while the interference created by Mr. Khatibi’s appointment did not rise to the level of an expropriation, it did deprive the Claimant of his basic rights as a PMMC shareholder. The Claimant was effectively deprived of the use and control of his property. Consequently, the Respondent is obliged to compensate the Claimant for the value of the lost property rights.

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5) Pars Machine Company, Pars Union Company, Emerson Electric Company and Ranel Frigo Company 106. As ﬁnally pleaded at the Hearing, the Claim for the alleged interests in PMC was abandoned. The Claimant has admitted that the company was liquidated in 1969 and no longer exists. 107. As for Pars Union, Emerson Electric and Ranel Frigo, there is no mention of these three companies in the Statement of Claim. Indeed, their earliest reference appears in the Claimant’s brief ﬁled on 22 April 1991. Despite this belated expansion of the initial claim, the Claimant sought no amendment to his claim, but rather asserted that these were “afﬁliated companies” of PMC. The Respondent objected to the late inclusion of the companies, arguing that they were new claims. 108. Amendments of claims are governed by Article 20 of the Tribunal Rules of Procedure which states: During the course of the arbitral proceedings either party may amend or supplement his claim or defence unless the arbitral tribunal considers it inappropriate to allow such amendment having regard to the delay in making it or prejudice to the other party or any other circumstances. However, a claim may not be amended in such a manner that the amended claim falls outside the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.

The above provision affords wide latitude to a party who seeks to amend a claim. See Emanuel Too and Greater Modesto Insurance Associates et al., Award No. 460-880-2, para. 13 (29 Dec. 1989), reprinted in 23 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 378, 382; International Schools Services Inc. and Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Award No. ITL 57-123-1, at 10-11 (30 Jan. 1986), reprinted in 10 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 6, 12. However, additional claims presented under Article III, paragraph 4, of the Claims Settlement Declaration have been dismissed by the Tribunal to the extent that they represent new claims. See, e.g., W. Jack Buckamier and Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Award No. 528-941-3, paras. 24-29 (6 Mar. 1992), reprinted in 28 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 53, 59-60. In the present circumstances, the Tribunal’s decision on the merits, see infra, para. 112, renders moot a decision as to whether the late inclusion of claims relating to Pars Union, Emerson Electric and Ranel Frigo are permissible amendments under Article 20 or should be construed as new claims that are inadmissible. 109. Counsel for the Claimant admitted at the Hearing that there was no evidence on record of the Claimant’s direct ownership of Pars Union, Emerson Electric and Ranel Frigo. The Claimant has argued that he possessed an ownership interest in Pars Union, and he bases that claim on a statement made at the Hearing by Mr. Masud Hakim that the Claimant had a registered interest in that

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company. That statement is not sufﬁcient to prove the Claimant’s ownership in Pars Union in the absence of contemporary documentary evidence. 110. As regards Emerson Electric and Ranel Frigo, a 20 percent beneﬁcial ownership interest is claimed. In essence, the Claimant asks the Tribunal to imply from his ownership of 20 percent of PMMC that he was also the owner, in that same percentage, of Emerson Electric and Ranel Frigo. The Tribunal is unable to do so in light of the scant evidence before it. The Claimant maintains that the arbitration agreement is strong circumstantial evidence of his interest in these companies, yet while that agreement may suggest that the business relationship between the brothers extended beyond PMMC, it is not conclusive evidence of the Claimant’s ownership in those companies, and in any event, it does not indicate the percentage of the Claimant’s ownership interest, if any, in Emerson Electric or Ranel Frigo. 111. The Tribunal has previously held that a person who is not a record shareholder may nonetheless be deemed a beneﬁcial owner of company shares. See James M. Saghi et al. and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 544-298-2, paras. 18-44 (22 Jan. 1993) (“Saghi”). With respect to the level of proof required to establish a beneﬁcial ownership interest, the Tribunal in Reza Nemazee and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 575-4-3, para. 54 (10 Dec. 1996), observed “it is incumbent on a claimant to produce strong evidence that he or she, and not the person registered as the legal owner, was in reality the true owner of the property.” In applying this standard to the facts at hand, the Tribunal is of the opinion that the Claimant has fallen well short of discharging his burden of proof. 112. The Claimant has failed to meet his burden of establishing that he held a beneﬁcial or other interest in Pars Union, Emerson Electric or Ranel Frigo. These claims also are dismissed for lack of proof. vii. valuation 1) Standard of Compensation 113. In this Case, as in Saghi, supra, Award No. 544-298-2, at para. 79, Khosrowshahi, Fereydoon Ghaffari and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 565-968-2, para. 100 (7 Jul. 1995) (“Ghaffari”), and Edgar Protiva et al. and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 566-316-2, para. 92 (14 Jul. 1995) (“Protiya”), the Tribunal adopts as appropriate the Treaty of Amity6 standard of compensation without deciding whether the Treaty itself is applicable to claims of dual nationals whose dominant and effective nationality in accordance with the criteria set forth in 6 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States of America and Iran, signed 15 August 1955, entered into force 16 June 1957, 284 U.N.T.S. 93, T.I.A.S. No. 3853, 8 U.S.T. 900.

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Case A18 was that of the United States or Iran, as the case may be. Under the Treaty of Amity, the Claimant must be compensated for the “full equivalent” of the deprived interests. See Phelps Dodge, et al. and Islamic Republic of Iran, supra, 10 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 131-132; Petrolane, Inc. et al. and Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Award No. 518-131-2, para. 105 (14 Aug. 1991), reprinted in 27 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 64, 99; Birnbaum, supra, Award No. 549-967-2, at para. 37; and Protiva, supra, Award No. 566-316-2, at para. 92. Accordingly, the Tribunal must determine what is the “full equivalent” of the Claimant’s 20 percent share in PMMC. 2) Facts and Contentions a. Experts’ Opinions 114. The Claimant’s valuation experts, Mr. Rosenthal and Mr. Miller, ﬁrst presented their report at the Hearing. They valued PMMC as of 26 November 1980. Because they did not value PMMC as a going-concern, their valuation does not include PMMC’s future earnings, goodwill or other intangible assets. Rather, to arrive at the fair market value of PMMC, they begin with PMMC’s book value based on its 20 March 1980 ﬁnancial statements, negative U.S. $358,766, and they then make three adjustments to this ﬁgure. First, they add the fair market value of the land and buildings as appraised by the Claimant’s land expert, Mr. Vahman, less the net book value of those items. Next, they add the fair market value of the machinery and equipment as assessed on a “cost to build” basis by the Claimant’s equipment and machinery expert, Mr. Lembo, less the net book value of those items. Finally, they eliminate the “partners’ accounts” line items because they assert that, although those accounts are fairly stated from an accounting standpoint, they represent intercompany accounts which have no value in a fair market analysis. After making the above three adjustments, they conclude that as of 26 November 1980 the fair market value of PMMC was U.S. $13,541,831. Another valuation of PMMC was made by Mr. Lembo who, at the Hearing, came to the conclusion that PMMC was worth U.S. $12.5 million, using a hypothetical “rule of thumb” approach based on PMMC’s estimated output. 115. Mr. Merati, for the Respondent, also did not consider that PMMC was a going-concern either in his written report, ﬁled with the Tribunal during the course of written pleadings, or in his testimony at the Hearing. He began with the net book value of PMMC and made several adjustments thereto. His main adjustments were to adopt Mr. Khorassanchian’s valuation of land and buildings and to increase PMMC’s liabilities by 26 million rials for alleged income tax arrears for the years 1967-79. He also included a 63.9 million rial liability described as “partners accounts” and a 21.7 million rial asset of the same description. Mr. Merati concludes that at the end of the ﬁnancial period 1979-1980, the net realizable value of PMMC was negative 24.8 million rials.

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b. Land and Building 116. The Claimant has proffered several statements in relation to the value of PMMC’s land and buildings. Parviz Yari, the owner of a factory adjacent to PMMC, states in an afﬁdavit that land in that area was worth 30,000 rials (U.S. $415) per square meter just prior to the Revolution. Said Hakim, the Claimant’s brother, estimates PMMC’s land and buildings to have been worth U.S. $20 million at the time of expropriation, and, in the opinion of the Claimant’s cousin, Mr. Nourmand, their value in 1978-1979 was U.S. $30 million. 117. At the Hearing, the Claimant presented Mr. Vahman, a real estate appraiser who was residing in Iran until early 1980. Mr. Vahman does not claim to have visited the property, but he priced the land in the vicinity of PMMC during 1979 and 1980 at 9,800 rials (U.S. $136) per square meter. On the assumption that PMMC owned 35,000 square meters of land, he calculated that the land alone was worth 343 million rials (U.S. $4,744,450). He estimated the price of the buildings and landscaping at 225,742,000 rials (U.S. $3,122,512) and 15 million rials (U.S. $207,483), respectively. His conclusion was that the buildings and land together had a fair market value of 583,742,000 rials (U.S. $8,074,445). 118. The Respondent relies on a report by Mr. Khorassanchian, an Iranian valuation expert accredited by the Ministry of Justice as an ofﬁcial appraiser. At the Hearing he stated that he visited the PMMC factory, saw the “registration plaque of the land” and investigated the ﬁles at the real estate registration ofﬁce. According to him, PMMC owned only 14,121 square meters of land which he valued at 2,000 rials (U.S. $27.66) per square meter, thus totalling 28,242,420 rials (U.S. $390,655). He valued the buildings and landscaping at 28,240,400 rials (U.S. $390,627) and 1.5 million rials (U.S. $20,748), respectively. On the basis of a land area of 14,121 square meters, his total ﬁgure for land and building was 57,982,820 rials (U.S. $802,031). c. Equipment and Machinery 119. Mr. Thomas Lembo testiﬁed for the Claimant on the value of PMMC’s equipment and machinery. He is the founder and chairman of International Technology and Trade Incorporated, a Canadian company which, inter alia, designs, manufactures and installs industrial equipment used to produce domestic appliances on a mass scale. He has been in this line of business for approximately thirty years. He made two valuations of PMMC’s equipment and machinery: one based on its 1980 break-up value and the other based on the 1980 costto-rebuild (and install) the equipment and machinery. He arrived at a 1980 break-up value of U.S. $3,352,120 and a 1980 cost-to-rebuild value of U.S. $5,259,720. Mr. Lembo testiﬁed that he did not visit the PMMC factory but interviewed former PMMC ofﬁcials to determine what equipment was there. He

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cross-checked this information by establishing what equipment and machinery would theoretically be necessary to achieve an annual production capacity of 10,000 refrigerators of the type manufactured by PMMC. He testiﬁed that he established that productive capacity of PMMC after reviewing correspondence which existed between PMMC and its licensors and suppliers. He did not, however, submit those documents. In ascertaining the value of the equipment and machinery, he also had discussions with a number of companies in the United States and Canada which manufacture and supply equipment and machinery similar to that used by PMMC. 120. The Respondent’s valuation expert, Mr. Merati, valued PMMC’s equipment and machinery by reference to their net book value (their value as stated in the company’s ﬁnancial records after a rate of depreciation for accounting purposes is applied) because he believed their useful life had been spent. He maintained that the equipment and machinery had been purchased secondhand and that, therefore, they were depreciated even at the time of purchase. 121. In reply to Mr. Merati’s position, Mr. Lembo stated that “[t]he principal pieces of equipment here, if they are properly maintained, should be producing the same in 1980 as they did in 1963, assuming that they were built in 1963, which I cannot attest to . . .” 3) The Tribunal’s Findings on Valuation a. Introduction 122. In conformity with its well established practice, the Tribunal will make its best approximation of the value of PMMC and the Claimant’s shareholding interest therein based on the best possible use of the evidence and taking into consideration all the relevant circumstances of the Case. In so doing, the Tribunal is aware that [w]hile the Claimant must shoulder the burden of proving the value of the expropriated concern by the best available evidence, the Tribunal must be prepared to take some account of the disadvantages suffered by the Claimant, namely its lack of access to detailed documentation, as an inevitable consequence of the circumstances in which the expropriation took place.

Sola Tiles, Inc. and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 298-317-1, para. 52 (22 Apr. 1987), reprinted in 14 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 223, 238 (“Sola Tiles”). 123. The Tribunal need not decide whether PMMC was a going-concern because neither the Claimant nor the Respondent advance a going-concern valuation. See Vivian Mai Tavakoli, et al. and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No.

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580-832-3, para. 93 (23 Apr. 1997); Birnbaum, supra, Award No. 549-967-2, para. 38; and Sola Tiles, supra, para. 52, 14 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 238. 124. Rather, in making its best approximation of PMMC’s value, the Tribunal utilizes the dissolution method of valuation, i.e., it examines the value of PMMC “after the collection of all assets and the discharge of all obligations.” Tippetts, supra, at 12, 6 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 226. See also Birnbaum, supra, Award No. 549-967-2, at paras. 40-41. However, given the paucity of evidence, the Tribunal will restrict its discussion only to PMMC’s assets and liabilities which were the focus of the valuation experts. See Birnbaum, at para. 52. Further, in determining PMMC’s fair market value, the Tribunal must not consider as a valuation factor the impact of Mr. Khatibi’s appointment on the Claimant’s property rights. See SEDCO, at para. 31, 15 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 35; Birnbaum, supra, Award No. 549-967-2, at para. 42. In addition, while any diminution of value caused by the deprivation of property itself should be disregarded, the Tribunal recognizes that changes in the general political, social, and economic conditions should be considered to the extent they could reasonably have been expected to affect the value of the enterprise’s assets.

Birnbaum, supra, Award No. 549-967-2, at para. 42. b. Land and Building 125. Although Mr. Vahman’s valuation is substantially lower than the earlier estimates submitted by the Claimant, it, like the earlier estimates, is not supported by any credible evidence. Notwithstanding the above concern that relevant evidence might not readily be available to the Claimant, the Tribunal is forced to conclude that Mr. Vahman’s valuation is vague, devoid of detail and unsupported by credible data. Therefore, the Tribunal ﬁnds it difﬁcult to place much weight on his report. 126. The Respondent’s expert, Mr. Khorassanchian, visited the land and building and inspected relevant documents and registration ﬁles. While the Tribunal recognizes that, in the absence of any pre-Hearing evidence by the Claimant, Mr. Khorassanchian may not have felt it necessary to include much detail in his report, it notes nevertheless that he had access to the registration ﬁles relating to PMMC but presented none of its contents as evidence. However, despite the deﬁciencies in Mr. Khorassanchian’s report, in the absence of any credible evidence by the Claimant, the Tribunal accepts his position that PMMC’s land measured 14,121 square meters, rather than Mr. Vahman’s assumption of 35,000 square meters. 127. Given the paucity of reliable evidence on the land and buildings, the Tribunal is unable to ascertain their precise value. A reasonable approximation

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of the fair market value of PMMC’s land and building will be reﬂected in the valuation of PMMC as a whole, see infra, para. 136. c. Equipment and Machinery 128. The Tribunal believes that Mr. Lembo’s expertise in the ﬁeld of valuing the relevant equipment justiﬁes relying on his opinion over that of Mr. Merati. Although Mr. Lembo admitted that his business was not in ﬁnancial valuation, he stated that he conducts valuations on the basis of productive capacity. Further, he has detailed knowledge of, and substantial involvement in, the manufacture and installation of the industrial production equipment of the types used in PMMC’s factory. 129. Nonetheless, the Tribunal is not prepared to accept Mr. Lembo’s valuation in its entirety. For instance, Mr. Lembo includes in his break-up valuation U.S. $269,700 for installation costs. The Tribunal considers these costs inappropriate since they are normally borne by the buyer of such equipment. The Tribunal further considers that there is no documentary evidence as to the actual equipment and machinery owned by PMMC in 1980 or their condition at the date of taking. 130. Moreover, the Tribunal is aware that Mr. Lembo did not visit the PMMC factory and had no ﬁrst-hand knowledge of its productive capacity. When the PMMC workers wrote to the Ministry of Industries and Mines in December 1979, they indicated that in the ﬁrst nine months of 1977, 1978 and 1979, PMMC manufactured 7,033, 5,411 and 2,354 units, respectively. However, these ﬁgures offer no precise information as to the productive capacity or performance of PMMC’s equipment because the decrease in unit production may well have been caused by a variety of factors which a reasonable purchaser would also take into account. The Tribunal also notes that the Respondent’s expert visited PMMC in 1991, and he believed that the factory was still working as of that date. 131. In order to provide a ﬁrm basis for valuing equipment and machinery, the Tribunal would prefer documentary evidence indicating such particulars as the date of manufacture, name of the maker, purchase contracts, photographs, comparable sales, maintenance reports and contemporaneous offers of sales. Nevertheless, while the Claimant’s failure to produce such probative evidence is relevant, the Tribunal is generally satisﬁed with the inquiries and investigations that Mr. Lembo made on that score, particularly since the Respondent, who had access to the actual equipment and machinery, failed to provide any information regarding them.7 However, given the uncertainty as to exactly what 7 The Tribunal recognizes that the failure of the Claimant to provide a report by Mr. Lembo in the course of written proceedings placed the Respondent at a disadvantage in dealing with the details of his report at the Hearing.

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equipment and machinery existed and as to their condition on 26 November 1980, the Tribunal is unable to ascertain the precise value of PMMC’s equipment and machinery. Thus, a reasonable approximation of their fair market value will be reﬂected in the valuation of PMMC as a whole, see infra, paras. 135-136. d. Tax Liabilities 132. Mr. Merati’s report states that PMMC was liable for income tax unpaid for the years 1967-1979, but he has not presented any evidence in support of his position. The Respondent has always been in a position to have access to all PMMC’s tax records and thus could have produced evidence to show on what basis these taxes were assessed and that they were actually payable. Having failed to do so, the Tribunal, for lack of proof, is unable to take the alleged tax liabilities into consideration when deciding on the amount of compensation owed to the Claimant. See Birnbaum, supra, Award No. 549-967-2, at paras. 106-107; Ghaffari, supra, Award No. 565-968-2, at para. 87. e. Partners’ Accounts 133. The 1980 ﬁnancial statements of the company show that PMMC shareholders (or partners) had paid into their company accounts a sum of 63.87 million rials (i.e., a liability from PMMC’s viewpoint) and that PMMC had advanced to the shareholders 21.67 million rials (i.e., an asset from PMMC’s viewpoint). There is no evidence that the Claimant was involved in these accounts. In considering all the circumstances, particularly the other shareholders’ departure from Iran, the Tribunal concludes that there was no reasonable prospect of PMMC collecting the shareholders’ debts or of PMMC paying the 63.87 million rials owed to the partners. See Birnbaum, supra, Award No. 549-967-2, at para. 95. Thus, the Tribunal considers both these items uncollectible and does not include them in its valuation of PMMC. f. Conclusion on Valuation 134. The Claimant and Respondent have put forward widely divergent assessments as to PMMC’s value. The Tribunal considers the ﬁgure of U.S. $13,541,831 offered by the Claimant’s valuation experts as too high. A large portion of that ﬁgure is based on Mr. Vahman’s land appraisal which has not been substantiated and Mr. Lembo’s “cost-to-rebuild” estimate which the Tribunal considers an inappropriate approach under these circumstances. Mr. Lembo’s “rule of thumb” estimate of PMMC’s total plant value is also not helpful to the Tribunal because it is based on a number of assumptions that have not been proven. While Mr. Lembo’s break-up value is helpful, the Tribunal cannot accept it fully. On the other hand, the main emphasis of the Respondent’s expert’s

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report is on the value of assets and liabilities of PMMC as they appear on the company account books. The Tribunal does not accept this approach. Nor can it fully agree with the adjustments the Respondent’s expert had made to the book value of PMMC ﬁxed assets. For these reasons, the Tribunal cannot base its decision as to PMMC’s fair market value on the report of Mr. Merati, the Respondent’s expert. 135. In light of the deﬁciencies in the Claimant’s and Respondent’s valuations, the Tribunal will have to make an approximation of that value “which is reasonable and equitable taking into account all the circumstances in this Case.” Seismograph Service Corporation et al. and National Iranian Oil Company et al., Award No. 420-443-3, para. 306 (31 Mar. 1989), reprinted in 22 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 3, 80. In so doing, the Tribunal notes that PMMC owned a large piece of land situated in the vicinity of Tehran which contained buildings and machinery enabling refrigerators to be assembled or produced on a commercial scale, that its machinery was operational up to the date of taking, and that it maintained a workforce of at least ﬁfty employees. The Tribunal also takes into account the impact of political, social and economic conditions on the value of PMMC’s assets on 26 November 1980. 136. Accordingly, based on the best possible use of the evidence in the record and taking into account all the circumstances of this Case, the Tribunal determines that a fair and reasonable assessment of PMMC’s value as of 26 November 1980 is 250,000,000 rials, of which the Claimant’s 20 percent share is 50,000,000 rials. 137. In conclusion, the Tribunal ﬁnds that the Claimant is entitled to 50,000,000 rials as compensation for measures attributable to the Respondent which deprived him of his 20 percent ownership interest in PMMC. This amount is equivalent to U.S. $691,611 when converted at the rate of exchange of rials 72.295/U.S. $1. This was the rate of exchange prevailing in November 1980. See International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Supplement on Exchange Rates 64 (1985). The Tribunal therefore awards the Claimant U.S. $691,611. viii. interest 138. In order to compensate the Claimant for the damages he has suffered due to delayed payment, the Tribunal considers it fair to award interest at the rate of 7.5 percent per annum from the date of the interference. ix. costs 139.

Each Party shall bear its own costs of arbitrating this claim.

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x. award 140.

For the foregoing reasons,

THE TRIBUNAL AWARDS AS FOLLOWS: (a) The Respondent, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, is obligated to pay the Claimant, KAMRAN HAKIM, Six Hundred Ninety One Thousand Six Hundred Eleven United States Dollars and No Cents (U.S. $691,611.00) plus simple interest at the rate of 7.5 percent per annum (365-day basis) from 26 November 1980 up to and including the date on which the Escrow Agent instructs the Depositary Bank to effect payment out of the Security Account. (b) The obligation shall be satisﬁed by payment out of the Security Account established by paragraph 7 of the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria of 19 January 1981. (c) Each Party shall bear its own costs of arbitrating this claim. (d) This Award is hereby submitted to the President of the Tribunal for notiﬁcation to the Escrow Agent.

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FORD AEROSPACE v. IRAN

Ford Aerospace & Communications Corporation, Claimant v. The Islamic Republic of Iran and Bank Markazi Iran, Respondents (Case No. 93) Chamber One: B¨ockstiegel, Chairman; Noori, Holtzmann, Members Signed 16 November 1998[1] Award No. 589-93-1 The following is the text as issued by the Tribunal:

Final Award 1. On 18 November 1981, the Claimant, FORD AEROSPACE & COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION (“Ford Aerospace”), presented a claim against THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (“Iran”) and BANK MARKAZI IRAN (“Bank Markazi”) based on certain contracts that formed part of the so-called “IBEX” project.2 Iran asserted certain counterclaims. 2. On 29 January 1987, the Tribunal issued a Partial Award in this Case, namely, Ford Aerospace & Communications Corporation and Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Award No. 289-93-1 (29 Jan. 1987), reprinted in 14 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 24 (“Partial Award”). The Partial Award resolved all the claims, counterclaims, and issues in this Case except for a counterclaim by Iran for the delivery of certain equipment held by the Claimant in the United States, which equipment had been shipped to the Claimant by Watkins-Johnson Company on behalf of the Iranian government. See Partial Award, para. 101. The Tribunal retained jurisdiction over Iran’s claim relating to that equipment pending a decision by the Tribunal in Watkins-Johnson Company, et al. and Islamic Republic of Iran, et al.3 See Partial Award, paras. 105 and 106 (subpara. 5). [1 Filed 16 November 1998.] 2 The purpose of the IBEX project was to modernize and expand Iran’s military electronic gathering system. See Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc. and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 180-64-1 (27 Jun. 1985), reprinted in 8 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 298. 3 The Tribunal rendered its Award in that Case on 28 July 1989. See Watkins-Johnson Company, et al. and Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Award No. 429-370-1 (28 Jul. 1989), reprinted in 22 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 218.

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3. In the Partial Award, the Tribunal also struck Bank Markazi as a Respondent. See id. para. 3. Thus, Ford Aerospace and Iran are the sole remaining parties in this Case. 4. On 18 December 1997, the Agent of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran submitted a letter to the Tribunal, referenced “Request to Close the Case,” stating, in relevant part, the following: I write in reference to the Para. 106(5) [of the] Partial Award . . . to request the Tribunal to close the Case. The reason for this request is that, as far as Ford Aerospace’s obligation in the instant case is concerned, the Ministry of Defence of Iran has no claim to follow. Ford Aerospace has already delivered the Iranian-owned equipment, to the extent remaining in its possession as of 21 April 1994, to the Victory Van Warehouse. Iran’s claim with respect to the United States’ obligation, under the Algiers Declarations, to transfer the items in question to Iran on 19 January 1981 and any other issues in this case bearing upon that commitment will be pursued in Case B61.

5. On 9 February 1998, the Claimant submitted its comments on the Iranian Agent’s “Request to Close the Case.” The Claimant, inter alia, stated: Since the Partial Award in this case, the only remaining claim has been Respondents’ counterclaim relating to certain equipment previously held by Claimant. As Respondents state in their request, that equipment has been delivered to the warehouse in the United States designated by Respondents. Accordingly, Claimant agrees with Respondents that this case should be closed and Respondents’ counterclaim dismissed.

6. Thus, the parties agree that the Claimant has delivered to Victory Van Warehouse in the United States the equipment that was the subject of the counterclaim by Iran over which the Tribunal retained jurisdiction, see supra, para. 2; the parties also agree that Iran’s counterclaim for the return of that equipment has become moot and there remains no dispute to be decided between the parties in this Case. 7. On 1 April 1987, Mr. Mohsen Mostafavi resigned from his position as the Iranian-appointed Member of Chamber One. Mr. Mostafavi had participated in the Hearing that took place in this Case on 18 and 19 June 1986. On 27 August 1998, the Chairman of Chamber One informed the Agent of the Islamic Republic of Iran in writing that the Tribunal had sent the documents related to this Final Award to Mr. Mostafavi, but it had been unable either to deliver them at his last known address or to ﬁnd a forwarding address; in these particular circumstances, the Chairman of Chamber One invited the Agent to designate a substitute for Mr. Mostafavi to act in this Case. On 8 September 1998, the Agent of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran appointed Mr. Assadollah Noori to act as a Member of Chamber One in this Case. Mr. Assadollah Noori was designated by Presidential Order No. 91 of 14 October

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1998 to Act as a Member of Chamber One in this Case and, accordingly, signs this Final Award. 8. Based on the foregoing, THE TRIBUNAL AWARDS AS FOLLOWS: (a) Iran’s counterclaim against the Claimant, FORD AEROSPACE & COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, for the return of certain equipment, over which counterclaim the Tribunal retained jurisdiction (see supra, para. 2), has become moot; thus, there remains no dispute to be decided between the parties in this Case. (b) The arbitral proceedings in this Case are hereby terminated.

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The Islamic Republic of Iran, Claimant v. The United States of America, Respondent (Cases Nos. A15(IV) and A24) Full Tribunal: Skubiszewski, President; Broms,[1] Arangio-Ruiz, Noori,[2] Aldrich,[3] Ameli,[4] Allison,[5] Aghahosseini,[6] Duncan,[7] Members Signed 28 December 1998[8] Award No. 590-A15(IV)/A24-FT The following is the text as issued by the Tribunal: Partial Award APPEARANCES For the Claimant:

Mr. M. H. Zahedin-Labbaf, Deputy Agent of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Dr. Ali Akbar Riyazi, Legal Adviser to the Agent, Prof. James Crawford, Counsel to the Agent, Prof. Bruno Ristau, Counsel to the Agent,

[1 Mr. Broms’ signature is accompanied by the words “Dissenting and partly concurring. See Separate Opinion.” The Opinion appears at p. 177, below.] [2 Mr. Noori’s signature is accompanied by the words “Concurring in part; Dissenting in part. See Separate Opinion.” The Opinion is unavailable at the time of printing.] [3 Mr. Aldrich’s signature is accompanied by the words “Concurring in part; Dissenting in part. See Separate Opinion.” The Opinion appears at p. 169, below.] [4 Mr. Ameli’s signature is accompanied by the words “Concurring in part; Dissenting in part. (Separate Opinion).” The Opinion is unavailable at the time of printing.] [5 Mr. Allison’s signature is accompanied by the words “Concurring in part; Dissenting in part. See Separate Opinion.” The Opinion appears at p. 169, below.] [6 Mr. Aghahosseini’s signature is accompanied by the words “Concurring in part; Dissenting in part. See Separate Opinion.” The Opinion is unavailable at the time of printing.] [7 Mr. Duncan’s signature is accompanied by the words “Concurring in part; Dissenting in part. See Separate Opinion.” The Opinion appears at p. 169, below.] [8 Filed 28 December 1998.]

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Mr. Behzad Nabavi, Dr. Mohammad Ekhterai Sanai, Mr. Parviz Mamaghani, Witnesses. For the Respondent:

Mr. D. Stephen Mathias, Agent of the United States of America, Dr. Sean Murphy, Deputy Agent of the United States of America, Mr. Michael Hertz, Chief Counsel for the Respondent, Ms. Joan Hartman, Counsel for the Respondent, Prof. Fred L. Morrison, Counsel for the Respondent, Mr. Mark Joelson, Party Representative, Mr. Ronald Bettauer, Assistant Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, Ms. Lisa Grosh, Attorney-Adviser, U.S. Department of State, Ms. Sally Rider, Attorney-Adviser, U.S. Department of State, Mr. Lloyd Cutler, Mr. David Anderson, Mr. William Lake, Witnesses.

table of contents Para. 1

i.

introduction

ii.

proceedings

iii.

admission of documents A. The Issues B. The Tribunal’s Decision 1. “Opposition of the United States to Iran’s Request for an Order Requiring the United States to Stay the McKesson Lawsuit” 2. The United States Submission of the 23 June 1997 Memorandum Opinion of the United States District Court

5 11 11 17

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for the District of Columbia in Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran

107

18

iv.

facts and contentions A. Case No. A15(IV) 1. Factual Background 2. The Claims a. Claim A b. Claim B c. Claim D d. Claim E e. Claim F f. Claim G g. Claim H B. Case No. A24 1. Factual Background 2. The Claim

21 21 21 32 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 39 48

v.

jurisdiction

49

vi.

merits A. Case No. A15(IV) 1. Claim A a. Iran’s Position b. The United States Position c. The Tribunal’s Decision (1) The Scope of the United States Obligation to Terminate Litigation and Claims (a) The Meaning of General Principle B (b) Termination of Claims (c) Waiver (d) Termination of Litigation in United States Courts: Suspension i) The United States obligation to terminate litigation ii) Evaluation of the suspension method against the background of the Algiers Declarations iii) Conclusion (e) Timing of the Termination Obligations of the United States (2) Counterclaims

50 50 50 50 59 70 71 71 81 84 87 87

92 101 104 111

108

vii.

IRAN v. UNITED STATES, CASES A15(IV) & A24

2. Claim B a. The Parties’ Positions b. The Tribunal’s Decision 3. Claim D a. The Parties’ Positions b. The Tribunal’s Decision 4. Claim E a. The Parties’ Positions b. The Tribunal’s Decision 5. Claim F a. The Parties’ Positions b. The Tribunal’s Decision 6. Claim G a. The Parties’ Positions b. The Tribunal’s Decision 7. Claim H a. The Parties’ Positions b. The Tribunal’s Decision B. Case No. A24 1. Iran’s Position 2. The United States Position 3. The Tribunal’s Decision a. The Foremost/OPIC lawsuit during the period from 11 April 1986 until 1 April 1988 b. The Foremost/OPIC lawsuit from 1 April 1988 onward

116 119 123 126 126 130 134 134 140 146 146 158 165 165 173 178 178 184 189 189 194 198

award

214

198 206

i. introduction 1. At issue in these two consolidated Cases (“the Cases”) is the United States obligation under the Algiers Declarations9 to terminate litigation initiated by United States nationals against Iran. These Cases revolve around General Principle B of the General Declaration (“General Principle B”), which obliges the United States, through the procedures provided in the Claims Settlement Declaration, 9 Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria (“General Declaration”), and Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (“Claims Settlement Declaration”), both dated 19 January 1981, reprinted in 1 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 3-12.

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to terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts involving claims of United States persons and institutions against Iran and its state enterprises, to nullify all attachments and judgments obtained therein, to prohibit all further litigation based on such claims, and to bring about the termination of such claims through binding arbitration.

2. In Case No. A15(IV), Iran contends that the Executive Order and certain of the Treasury Regulations that were issued by the United States after 19 January 1981 to implement the United States obligation to terminate litigation violated the United States obligations under the Algiers Declarations, in particular, the United States obligations under General Principle B. Iran asserts eight claims, termed A through H, alleging eight breaches by the United States of General Principle B. Speciﬁcally, Iran contends that the United States breached its obligations: (a) by suspending some judicial proceedings in United States courts, instead of terminating all litigation (including counterclaims) of United States nationals against Iran (“Claim A”); (b) by failing to terminate claims in United States courts arising from contracts containing forum selection clauses requiring litigation to be brought before Iranian courts (“Claim B”); (c) by failing to nullify injunctions obtained by United States nationals in United States courts that enjoined United States banks from honoring calls made by Iran on certain standby letters of credit (“Claim C”); (d) by failing to prohibit further litigation in United States courts after the date of the Algiers Declarations (“Claim D”); (e) by failing to forbid United States nationals from engaging in litigation against Iran in courts outside the United States (“Claim E”); (f ) by failing to nullify attachments on Iranian assets that were in existence prior to 14 November 1979, the date the President of the United States issued Executive Orders freezing Iranian assets in the United States (“Claim F”); (g) by failing to nullify post-14 November 1979 attachments in a sufﬁciently prompt fashion (“Claim G”); and (h) by failing to nullify judgments obtained by United States nationals in United States courts (“Claim H”). 3. In Case A15(IV), Iran essentially requests that the United States be ordered to terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts involving claims and counterclaims of United States nationals against Iran and to compensate Iran for the damages Iran allegedly incurred in connection with litigation that the United States should have terminated either on 19 January 1981 or shortly thereafter. 4. In Case No. A24, Iran claims that the United States allowed a case that was decided by the Tribunal, Foremost Tehran, et al. and Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Award No. 220-37/231-1 (11 Apr. 1986), to be revived and to proceed in a United States court as Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Civ. No. 82-0220-TAF (D.D.C.), and it thereby breached its obligation under the Algiers

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Declarations to prohibit relitigation of claims already decided by the Tribunal. Iran requests that the United States be ordered to terminate the lawsuit pending in the United States court and to compensate Iran for all damages that Iran incurred in defending against that lawsuit. ii. proceedings 5. On 25 October 1982, Iran presented its Statement of Claim in Case No. A15, and on 5 August 1988, Iran presented its Statement of Claim in Case No. A24. On 15 October 1991, Iran submitted a request for consolidation of Cases Nos. A15(IV) and A24. By Orders of 18 November 1991, the Tribunal consolidated the two Cases for joint proceedings and decision. Accordingly, the Tribunal allowed the Parties to submit ﬁnal consolidated submissions in these Cases. Iran presented its consolidated submission on 16 February 1993, and the United States submitted its consolidated response thereto on 12 November 1993. Iran responded to that submission with a further submission of 31 March 1994, to which the United States replied with a submission of 1 July 1994. 6. By Order of 16 October 1992, the Tribunal limited the present proceedings to the consideration of the legal and factual basis of the United States liability. In this connection, the Tribunal requested Iran to include in its ﬁnal consolidated submission a list of cases in which Iran believed it had been wrongfully compelled to respond to litigation in United States courts. The Tribunal further stated that the amount of damages to compensate the losses, if any, incurred by Iran would be determined in subsequent proceedings. 7. On 16 February 1993, Iran submitted a “Request for an Immediate Order to Stay the Foremost Lawsuit, Civil action No. 82-0220, Subject of Case A/24 in the United States.” By Decision of 18 May 1993 (Decision No. DEC 116-A15(IV) & A24-FT), the Tribunal denied this request. 8. The Hearing in these Cases was held on 13-15 September 1995 in the Peace Palace, The Hague. 9. On 22 February 1996, pursuant to settlement agreements between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America, the Tribunal issued a Partial Award on Agreed Terms (Award No. 568-A13/A15 (I and IV:C)/A26 (I, II, and III)-FT), which terminated, inter alia, Claim C in Case No. A15(IV). Accordingly, the subjects of this Award are Iran’s Claims A, B and D through H in Case No. A15(IV) and Iran’s claim in Case No. A24. 10. On 10 May 1996, Iran presented a “Request for an Order Requiring the United States to Stay the Foremost-OPIC Proceedings in the United States.” By Decision of 11 October 1996 (Decision No. DEC 125-A15(IV) & A24-FT), the Tribunal denied this request.

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iii. admission of documents A. The Issues 11. As noted, on 10 May 1996, Iran asked the Tribunal to stay the ForemostMcKesson proceedings in the United States. See supra, para. 10. By Order of 17 May 1996, the Tribunal invited the United States to comment on Iran’s request for stay. On 7 June 1996, the United States submitted a document entitled “Opposition of the United States to Iran’s Request for an Order Requiring the United States to Stay the McKesson Lawsuit.” On 10 June 1996, Iran objected to the United States Opposition, asserting that it “embodie[d] factual and legal arguments which [were] of no direct relevance to Iran’s Request” and represented “unauthorized and improper post-hearing submissions directed at the very issue of the U.S. liability” in Case No. A24. Iran urged the Tribunal to consider the United States submission “merely as an opposition to the Request and give no effect whatsoever to its contents as far as the issue of liability [in Case No. A24] [was] concerned.” 12. On 20 June 1996, the Tribunal issued a Communication to the Parties, informing them that it denied Iran’s Request for stay of the Foremost-McKesson proceedings in the United States. The Tribunal further noted that, “with respect to the issue of the preclusive effect of its awards, the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and authority may not be impinged upon and that the awards and decisions of this Tribunal must prevail over judgments of courts of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America.” The Tribunal asked the United States to forward a copy of its Communication to the Parties to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 13. On 26 August 1996, Iran submitted a document entitled “Reiteration of the Request to disregard the [United States Opposition of 7 June 1996] to the extent going beyond an Opposition to Iran’s Stay Request.” In this submission, Iran responded to the substance of the United States Opposition and renewed its request that the Tribunal not admit that document. 14. On 23 June 1997, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia issued its decision in Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran. By letter of 30 June 1997, the United States proffered a copy of the District Court’s Memorandum Opinion to the Tribunal. 15. On 22 July 1997, Iran submitted a document (i) reiterating its request that the Tribunal reject the 7 June 1996 “Opposition of the United States to Iran’s Request for an Order Requiring the United States to Stay the McKesson Lawsuit” and (ii) requesting that the Tribunal not admit the United States submission of 30 June 1997 proffering the 23 June 1997 Memorandum Opinion of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in ForemostMcKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran. With respect to the latter issue, Iran

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argued, inter alia, that the District Court’s Memorandum Opinion represented a “covert attempt to evade the preclusive effect of the Tribunal’s Award” in Foremost Tehran, supra, para. 4. Iran also argued that the United States should not be allowed, by submitting that Opinion, “to alter the legal status . . . the Tribunal was asked to decide upon, as existing at the close of the Hearing.” If the Tribunal admits either that Opinion or the United States 7 June 1996 Opposition, Iran asserted, then Iran should be permitted to “ﬁle detailed comments on those documents.” On 11 August 1997, the United States presented a response to Iran’s 22 July 1997 submission. 16. On 18 September 1997, Iran submitted a twelve-page document, providing a “more elaborate treatment” of the reasons why, in Iran’s view, the 23 June 1997 Memorandum Opinion of the United States District Court failed to accord preclusive effect to the Tribunal’s award in Foremost Tehran. To its submission, Iran appended a table, entitled “Outline of the U.S. Court’s Inconsistent Decisions,” identifying seven instances in which the District Court Opinion allegedly failed to respect the ﬁnal and binding character of the Tribunal’s prior award. On 30 September 1997, the United States provided a substantive response to Iran’s 18 September 1997 submission. B. The Tribunal’s Decision 1. “Opposition of the United States to Iran’s Request for an Order Requiring the United States to Stay the McKesson Lawsuit” 17. The United States submitted its Opposition document in compliance with the Tribunal’s Order of 17 May 1996 asking the United States to comment on Iran’s request for stay of the Foremost-McKesson proceedings before the United States District Court. In its ﬁlings of 10 June and 26 August 1996, Iran had the opportunity to respond, and did respond, to the substance of the United States Opposition. Thus, even if that document contained submissions that went beyond the scope of the Tribunal’s Order of 17 May 1996, as argued by Iran, its admission would neither prejudice Iran, nor disrupt the fair and orderly conduct of these proceedings. Consequently, the Tribunal admits the United States Opposition. 2. The United States Submission of the 23 June 1997 Memorandum Opinion of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran 18. As reﬂected in the Tribunal’s Communication to the Parties of 20 June 1996, see supra, para. 12, one of the issues in Case No. A24 is whether the United States courts, in their treatment of the Foremost-McKesson proceedings, have accorded preclusive effect to the Tribunal’s award in Foremost Tehran – in other words, whether those courts have respected the ﬁnal and binding nature of

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that award. The Memorandum Opinion rendered by the United States Court for the District of Columbia on 23 June 1997 is important evidence that is directly relevant to the Tribunal’s determination of this issue. The Tribunal is mindful that the District Court Opinion might be appealed and, therefore, that the resolution of the issue at hand might have to await the end of the appeals. This, however, is no reason for the present Award to ignore proceedings completed to date in the United States courts. 19. Moreover, Iran offered comments on the District Court Opinion and explained in detail why it believes that the Opinion fails to respect the ﬁnal and binding character of the Tribunal’s award in Foremost Tehran. See supra, para. 16. Thus, Iran had a full opportunity to present its views on the matter. 20. In light of the foregoing, the Tribunal admits the United States submission of 30 June 1997, proffering the 23 June 1997 Memorandum Opinion of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran. iv. facts and contentions 10 A. Case No. A15(IV) 1. Factual Background 21. On 14 November 1979, in the aftermath of the seizure of the United States Embassy in Tehran, the President of the United States issued Executive Order No. 12170, which blocked the transfer of Iranian assets subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or in the possession or control of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The United States Department of the Treasury subsequently issued a series of “Iranian Assets Control Regulations” implementing Executive Order No. 12170 (31 C.F.R. Part 535). Section 535.504 of the Regulations, as amended on 4 December 1979, authorized judicial proceedings against Iran, but not the “entry of any judgment or of any decree or order of similar or analogous effect . . .” Section 535.418 of 19 December 1979 clariﬁed that the general authorization for judicial proceedings contained in Section 535.504 included “pre-judgment attachment.” 22. Subsequently, United States nationals ﬁled hundreds of claims against Iran in United States and foreign courts. In many of these cases, the claimants obtained judicial attachments on Iranian assets that had been blocked and frozen by the United States President’s 14 November 1979 Executive Order. A large number of suits involved outstanding standby letters of credit that had been called by Iranian banks. 10 More details regarding certain facts and contentions will be given, as appropriate, in connection with the merits of the claims, infra.

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23. In the fall of 1980, Iran and the United States began negotiations, conducted through Algerian intermediaries, with a view to resolving the crisis between the two countries. Iran’s conditions for resolving the crisis were formulated by the Majlis, the Iranian Parliament, on 2 November 1980, in a Resolution stating Iran’s position concerning the release of the members [of ] the United States diplomatic staff detained in the United States Embassy in Tehran. This Resolution constituted the basis of the Iranian position throughout the negotiations and is referred to in the Preamble of the General Declaration.11 The third of the conditions listed in the Resolution, in particular, refers to questions at issue in these Cases. The Majlis requested the following: The cancellation and annulment of all economic and ﬁscal decisions and measures against the Islamic Republic of Iran, the implementation of all requisite administrative and legal measures for the cancellation and annulment of all claims of any sort or kind of the American government and American agencies and companies against Iran, the implementation of all requisite administrative and legal measures to ensure that no new legal, penal, or ﬁnancial claim of any kind be raised by any ofﬁcial or nonofﬁcial natural or juridical persons of the American government and/or by American agencies and companies. And, should any claim be raised in any court against Iran and Iranian nationals in connection with the Iranian Islamic revolution, the seizure of the American conspiracy center, and those arrested therein, and a decision against Iran or Iranian nationals be rendered, the American government undertakes and guarantees to be answerable therefor and undertakes and guarantees to pay the damages and reparations arising therefrom.

24. From the outset, the United States made clear that claims could be removed from the United States courts only by the establishment of an alternative arrangement to ensure their settlement. This was stated by Deputy Secretary of State Christopher in his meeting with the Algerian Foreign Minister on 10 November 1980. In its initial written response to Iran’s conditions dated 11 November 1980, the United States accepted, in principle, the Majlis’ Resolution as the basis for ending the crisis and declared itself to be prepared, inter alia, to do the following: In order to bring about the cancellation of all judicial orders and attachments relating to the capital and assets of Iran within U.S. jurisdiction, the United States is prepared to deliver . . . a copy of a signed Presidential declaration committing the United States to join with the Government of Iran in a claims settlement procedure which will lead to the cancellation of such orders and attachments as rapidly as possible.

The United States also declared itself to be prepared to deliver a copy of “a signed Presidential declaration committing the United States to withdraw all 11 This Resolution, together with the United States’ ﬁrst and second written responses of 11 November and 3 December 1980, respectively, and Iran’s written response of 21 December 1980, may be found in 3 A. Lowenfeld, Trade Controls for Political Ends DS-809, et seq. (2nd ed. 1983).

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claims pending against Iran in the International Court of Justice and to refrain from pursuing any other claims for ﬁnancial damages” resulting from the seizure of the United States Embassy. Furthermore, the United States declared itself to be prepared to join with the Government of Iran in a claims settlement procedure which will lead to the cancellation and annulment of all claims asserted by U.S. nationals, including U.S. companies, and by agencies, instrumentalities and controlled entities of the U.S. Government against Iran.

25. In reply to a message from Iran requesting answers to nine questions delivered through the Algerian intermediaries, a second American response, dated 3 December 1980, stated in its Comment 2: [I]t is understood that Iran is willing to pay all of its legitimate debts to U.S. persons and institutions and that it wishes to terminate all related litigation. Accordingly, the United States agrees, in the context of the safe return of the hostages, to terminate all legal proceedings in U.S. courts involving claims of U.S. persons and institutions against Iran and its state enterprises, to nullify all attachments and judgments obtained therein and to prohibit all future litigation by U.S. persons and institutions based on existing claims against Iran, when Iran agrees to submit all existing claims of U.S. persons and institutions [except those referred to in paragraph 11 of the General Declaration] to an international claims settlement process for the determination and payment of such claims. This process would include binding third party arbitration of any claim not settled by mutual agreement.

26. The Iranian response of 21 December 1980 to the proposals contained in the United States communication of 3 December 1980 stated, inter alia, the following: Since the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran undertakes to settle its bona ﬁde debts to American persons or institutions, the Iranian Government accepts that the claims of American entities and citizens against Iran, and the claims of Iranian nationals and institutions, be settled, in the ﬁrst stage through agreement between the parties and, failing such agreement, through arbitration acceptable to the respective parties.

27. On 19 January 1981, Iran and the United States adhered to the Algiers Declarations. The provisions of the Declarations that arguably may be relevant to the present claims are the following: a. General Principle B of the General Declaration. That Principle, which mirrors the language of Comment 2 of the second American response of 3 December 1980, provides: It is the purpose of both parties, within the framework of and pursuant to the provisions of the two Declarations of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, to terminate all litigation as between the government of each party and the nationals of the other, and to bring about

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the settlement and termination of all such claims through binding arbitration. Through the procedures provided in the Declaration relating to the Claims Settlement Agreement, the United States agrees to terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts involving claims of United States persons and institutions against Iran and its state enterprises, to nullify all attachments and judgments obtained therein, to prohibit all further litigation based on such claims, and to bring about the termination of such claims through binding arbitration.

b.

c.

Paragraphs 6, 8, and 9 of the General Declaration, which set forth the obligations of the United States to act to bring about the transfer of all Iranian deposits and securities in United States banking institutions in the United States, all other Iranian ﬁnancial assets and all other Iranian properties; Article I of the Claims Settlement Declaration, which provides: Iran and the United States will promote the settlement of the claims described in Article II by the parties directly concerned. Any such claims not settled within six months from the date of entry into force of this Agreement shall be submitted to binding third-party arbitration in accordance with the terms of this Agreement. The aforementioned six months’ period may be extended once by three months at the request of either party.

d.

Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration, which deﬁnes which claims of nationals of Iran and of the United States are within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; e. Article IV, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration, which states that “[a]ll decisions and awards of the Tribunal shall be ﬁnal and binding”; and f. Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Claims Settlement Declaration, which provides that “[c]laims referred to the arbitration Tribunal shall, as of the date of ﬁling of such claims with the Tribunal, be considered excluded from the jurisdiction of the courts of Iran, or of the United States, or of any other court.” 28. As part of a series of actions by the United States aimed at implementing its obligations under the Algiers Declarations, on 24 February 1981, the President of the United States issued Executive Order No. 12294 (“Executive Order 12294”), which provides in pertinent part: ... Section 1. All claims which may be presented to the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal under the terms of Article II of [the Claims Settlement Declaration] and all claims for equitable or other judicial relief in connection with such claims, are hereby suspended, except as they may be presented to the Tribunal. During the period of this suspension, all such claims shall have no legal effect in any action now pending

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in any court of the United States, including the courts of any state or any locality thereof, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, or in any action commenced in any such court after the effective date of this Order. Nothing in this action precludes the commencement of an action after the effective date of this Order for the purpose of tolling the period of limitations for commencement of such action. ... Section 3. Suspension under this Order of a claim or a portion thereof submitted to the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal for adjudication shall terminate upon a determination by the Tribunal that it does not have jurisdiction over such claim or such portion thereof. Section 4. A determination by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal on the merits that a claimant is not entitled to recover on a claim shall operate as a ﬁnal resolution and discharge of the claim for all purposes. A determination by the Tribunal that a claimant shall have recovery on a claim in a speciﬁed amount shall operate as a ﬁnal resolution and discharge of the claim for all purposes upon payment to the claimant of the full amount of the award, including any interest awarded by the Tribunal. ... Section 6. Nothing in this Order shall prohibit the assertion of a counterclaim or set-off by a United States national in any judicial proceeding pending or hereafter commenced by the Government of Iran, any political subdivision of Iran, or any agency, instrumentality, or entity controlled by the Government of Iran or any political subdivision thereof. ...

The United States Department of the Treasury subsequently amended the Iranian Asset Control Regulations to implement Executive Order 12294. 29. In the meantime, within days of the signing of the Algiers Declarations, the United States Department of Justice ﬁled Statements of Interest in each case against Iran in United States courts of which it was then aware. The Statements of Interest advised the courts of the conclusion of the Algiers Declarations and notiﬁed them that the Declarations and the implementing actions taken by the Executive Branch would “substantially affect the attachments of Iranian assets and claims by or against the Government of Iran.” The Department of Justice requested that all proceedings in each case be stayed until 26 February 1981. 30. On or after 26 February 1981, the United States ﬁled a second Statement of Interest in the cases against Iran in United States courts of which it was then aware. The United States advised the courts that Iran and the United States had agreed to settle claims of United States nationals against Iran through binding arbitration. It further advised the courts that, to implement the Algiers Declarations, President Carter had terminated attachments against the Iranian assets blocked by his 14 November 1979 Executive Order and that President Reagan had suspended those claims against Iran “that may be within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.” Accordingly, the United States requested that the courts

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(1) stay litigation of those claims that were arguably within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and (2) vacate the attachments against Iranian assets. 31. Several United States plaintiffs in actions against Iran challenged the lawfulness of the United States President’s suspension of their claims and nulliﬁcation of their judicial attachments. In June 1981, the Supreme Court of the United States accepted Dames & Moore v. Regan as the case in which to decide those issues. On 2 July 1981, the Supreme Court rendered an opinion sustaining the United States President’s actions. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, et al. 453 U.S. 654 (1981). Shortly thereafter, the United States ﬁled a further Statement of Interest in lawsuits against Iran, calling the courts’ attention to the Supreme Court’s opinion and renewing its request that the courts stay litigation of claims against Iran that might be presented to the Tribunal. The United States asserts that, in those cases where the plaintiffs argued that Dames & Moore v. Regan did not apply to them, the United States ﬁled specialized Statements of Interest pointing out the breadth of the Supreme Court’s decision and asking that the courts apply it. 2. The Claims a. Claim A 32. In this claim, Iran contends that the United States has breached General Principle B by failing to terminate all litigation in United States courts involving claims of United States nationals against Iran that arose before 19 January 1981. As noted, General Principle B obliged the United States “to terminate [, through the procedures provided in the Claims Settlement Declaration,] all legal proceedings in United States courts involving claims of United States persons and institutions against Iran and its state enterprises.” Iran contends that, rather than terminating those legal proceedings, the United States, through Executive Order 12294, has limited itself to suspending some of them. In addition, Iran maintains that the United States has breached General Principle B by permitting cases dismissed by the Tribunal for want of jurisdiction to be revived in United States courts and by allowing United States nationals to assert counterclaims or set-offs in cases brought by Iran in United States courts. b. Claim B 33. This claim centers on the last clause of Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration, which excludes from the Tribunal’s jurisdiction “claims arising under a binding contract between the parties speciﬁcally providing that any disputes thereunder shall be within the sole jurisdiction of the competent Iranian courts, in response to the Majlis position.” Iran contends that the United States has breached its obligations under the Algiers Declarations by failing to terminate litigation against Iran in United States courts involving

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claims arising from contracts with forum selection clauses referring disputes to the Iranian courts. c. Claim D 34. This claim arises from Section 1 of Executive Order 12294, which provides that “[n]othing in this action precludes the commencement of an action [in a United States court] after the effective date of this Order for the purpose of tolling the period of limitations for the commencement of such action.” Iran contends that this provision violates General Principle B’s requirement that the United States “prohibit all further litigation” of claims of United States nationals against Iran in United States courts. d. Claim E 35. In this claim, Iran contends that the United States has breached General Principle B by failing to prohibit litigation initiated by United States nationals against Iran in courts outside the United States. e. Claim F 36. On 19 January 1981, as part of a series of actions taken to implement the Algiers Declarations, the President of the United States issued Executive Orders which nulliﬁed attachments of Iranian assets obtained by United States nationals in United States courts after 14 November 1979, the date on which the President had ordered the freezing of Iranian assets.12 These Executive Orders left in place attachments obtained by United States nationals prior to 14 November 1979. At issue in this claim is whether the United States was obliged under General Principle B to nullify also such pre-14 November 1979 attachments. Iran argues that it was. f. Claim G 37. In this claim, Iran contends that the United States has breached the Algiers Declarations by failing to nullify in a sufﬁciently prompt fashion attachments obtained by United States nationals against Iran in United States courts after 14 November 1979. g. Claim H 38. In this claim, Iran contends that the United States has violated the Algiers Declarations by failing to nullify judgments that United States nationals 12 By Executive Order 12170 of 14 November 1979, the United States President blocked the transfer of Iranian assets subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or in the possession or control of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. See supra, para. 21.

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obtained against Iran in United States courts before the date of the Algiers Declarations. Iran relies on General Principle B, which requires the United States “to terminate all legal proceedings . . . [and] to nullify all . . . judgments obtained therein.” B. Case No. A24 1. Factual Background 39. On 16 November 1981, Foremost Tehran, Inc., Foremost Shir, Inc., Foremost Iran Corp., Foremost Foods, Inc., and Foremost McKesson, Inc. (collectively “Foremost”) and Overseas Private Investment Company (“OPIC”)13 presented a claim to the Tribunal, alleging, inter alia, that Iran, through agencies that it controlled, had expropriated Foremost’s 31 percent interest in Sherkat Sahami Labaniat Pasteurize Pak (“Pak Dairy”), an Iranian joint stock company. Foremost and OPIC sought compensation from Iran for the insured portion of Foremost’s investment in Pak Dairy and for the insured portion of Foremost’s share in any unpaid dividends declared before the date of the alleged expropriation. The case was assigned No. 37. 40. On 12 January 1982, Foremost presented a further claim to the Tribunal for the expropriation of its interest in Pak Dairy. By this claim, Foremost sought compensation for the portion of dividends and equity in Pak Dairy of which Foremost was the sole owner and in which OPIC held no beneﬁcial interest. The case was assigned No. 231. 41. On 22 January 1982, Foremost and OPIC ﬁled a complaint against Iran in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for the purpose of tolling the relevant statute of limitations, in accordance with Section 1 of Executive Order 12294. The case is known as Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Civ. No. 82-0220-TAF (D.D.C.) (“Foremost/OPIC lawsuit”). Foremost and OPIC sought compensation for the expropriation of the insured portion of Foremost’s 31 percent interest in Pak Dairy and for the insured portion of its share in any unpaid dividends declared before the date of the alleged expropriation. 13 By insurance contract with OPIC, an agency of the United States government, executed at the time of the initial investment, Foremost obtained insurance covering 64 percent of its 31 percent interest in Pak Dairy against expropriation. Pursuant to settlement agreements dated 29 July 1980 and 3 August 1981, OPIC paid compensation to Foremost for the alleged expropriation of Foremost’s equity interest in Pak Dairy and for the non-payment of declared dividends, in accordance with the limited coverage provided for in the insurance contract. Pursuant to the settlement agreements, Foremost retained legal title to all of the shares it owned in Pak Dairy, while transferring to OPIC the beneﬁcial interest in those shares that were insured and for which OPIC paid insurance beneﬁts to Foremost. See Foremost Tehran, et al. and Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Award No. 220-37/231-1, at 14-15 (11 Apr. 1986), reprinted in 10 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 228, 238.

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42. On 11 April 1986, the Tribunal issued its Award in Cases Nos. 37 and 231.14 It found that Iran’s interference with the substance of Foremost’s rights in Pak Dairy “did not, by 19 January 1981 . . . amount to an expropriation.” Foremost, at 31, 10 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 250. Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed Foremost’s expropriation claim. The Tribunal, however, held that the level of interference with Foremost’s rights constituted “other measures affecting property rights.” Accordingly, it awarded Foremost a total of U.S. $902,835, plus interest, for unpaid cash dividends declared in 1979 and 1980. See id. at 32-33, 10 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 251-52. 43. On 1 April 1988, Foremost (now known as McKesson Corporation) and OPIC ﬁled a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Iran before the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, thereby reviving the lawsuit that had been initiated in 1982 for the purpose of tolling the statute of limitations. In their Motion, Foremost and OPIC stated that they were seeking to “revive the lawsuit and to narrow the issues presented in the [1982] Complaint . . .” They further stated: Plaintiffs fully accept, as they must, the conclusion of the majority of the arbitral panel [of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal] to the effect that there had been no expropriation as of January 19, 1981. Since the Tribunal determined that the expropriation claim had not ripened within the time period submitted to its jurisdiction, it did not purport to rule on the merits of a post-January 19, 1981 expropriation claim. This issue is now suitable for hearing and disposition by this Court . . .

Accordingly, Foremost and OPIC urged the District Court to ﬁnd that “Iran is liable to Foremost for the unlawful expropriation, in October 1981, of Foremost’s equity interest in Pak Dairy” and that it “is also liable to Foremost for the expropriation of the dividend for the year 1980 declared by Pak Dairy in 1981 and paid to Iranian shareholders but not to Foremost.” 44. On 13 December 1990, Foremost and OPIC ﬁled a Motion for Leave to Amend their 1982 complaint before the District Court. Speciﬁcally, they sought to amend the complaint to increase the amount of damages to include Foremost’s full 31 percent ownership interest in Pak Dairy as well as to state an alternative theory of recovery (Iran’s tortious interference with Foremost’s rights as a minority shareholder in Pak Dairy). In addition, Foremost and OPIC sought to exclude the dividends awarded to Foremost by the Tribunal in its 1986 Award from their claim for recovery of dividends owed up to the date of the alleged expropriation. The District Court granted Foremost’s Motion. 45. On 23 June 1997, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia issued its decision in the Foremost/OPIC lawsuit, holding that Iran’s 14

Foremost Tehran, et al., supra, note [13] (hereinafter “Foremost ”).

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interference with Plaintiffs’ shareholder rights in Pak Dairy had ripened into an expropriation by April 1982. In the Memorandum Opinion stating the reasons for this conclusion, the District Court discussed, at the outset, the effect of the Tribunal’s decision in Foremost on the Foremost/OPIC lawsuit. The District Court, noting that the Algiers Declarations provide that the Tribunal’s decisions are “ﬁnal and binding,” stated that [u]nder the Accords, then, the Court may not revisit the Claims Tribunal’s conclusion that no expropriation occurred as of January 19, 1981, nor may it reconsider the factual basis for the Claims Tribunal’s conclusion . . . In addition, the Court may not take issue with the legal principles applied by the Tribunal; Article V of the Claims Settlement Declaration states that the Tribunal “shall decide all cases on the basis of respect for law, applying such choice-of-law rules and principles of commercial and international law as the Tribunal determines to be applicable, taking into account relevant usages of the trade, contract provisions and changed circumstances.”

46. The District Court went on to say that it was not bound by the Tribunal’s ﬁndings concerning events that occurred after 19 January 1981, as those events represented “matters not consigned to [the Tribunal’s] discretion by the arbitration agreement.” The Court added: “To the limited extent the Tribunal mentioned post-cutoff events, . . . it did so in order to evaluate whether an expropriation had occurred as of January 19, 1981.” The Court then stated that it was its responsibility to examine the post-cutoff events before it and to determine whether an expropriation of Foremost’s equity interest in Pak Dairy had occurred after 19 January 1981; in making that determination, it could consider events occurring before that date, “as determined by the Tribunal.” 47. In establishing whether such an expropriation occurred, the District Court, as an initial matter, recalled certain of the Tribunal’s ﬁndings in the Foremost award concerning events that took place before 19 January 1981. It then proceeded to examine events that occurred after that date. It reached the following conclusion: Given the Claims Tribunal’s binding determination that the evidence of an expropriation was “ﬁnely balanced” as of January 19, 1981, there is no question in the Court’s mind that the interference with McKesson’s shareholder rights ripened into an expropriation after that date. The Court ﬁnds that the “more or less irreversible deprivation” of McKesson’s property, see Tribunal Award at 29, constituting an expropriation occurred by April of 1982. By that time, McKesson had not received its dividends for a fourth consecutive year, McKesson had no voice in the management of the company since October of 1981, and McKesson had received no shareholder communications from Pak Dairy since it had requested them to be sent in October of 1981.

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2. The Claim 48. In this claim, Iran contends that the United States has breached its obligations under the Algiers Declarations by allowing Foremost and OPIC to ﬁle a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in 1982 identical to the statement of claim submitted before this Tribunal in Cases Nos. 37 and 231, and by allowing the same lawsuit to be revived in 1988 and to proceed before the District Court. v. jurisdiction 49. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction over these consolidated Cases is undisputed. The Parties disagree about the interpretation of the Algiers Declarations and about the obligations they impose on the United States. This dispute, pursuant to Paragraph 17 of the General Declaration, thus clearly falls within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. vi. merits A. Case No. A15(IV) 1. Claim A a. Iran’s Position 50. Iran contends that the United States has breached its obligations under the Algiers Declarations by failing to terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts involving claims of United States nationals against Iran that arose prior to 19 January 1981. Iran asserts that General Principle B required the United States to terminate all such proceedings. Yet, the United States has, instead, merely suspended some of them through Executive Order 12294. In addition, the United States has permitted cases dismissed by the Tribunal for want of jurisdiction to be revived in United States courts. Iran contends, moreover, that the United States has also breached General Principle B by allowing United States nationals to assert counterclaims or set-offs in judicial proceedings brought by Iran in United States courts. 51. At the outset, Iran points out that General Principle B distinguishes between the United States obligation to terminate “all legal proceedings” of United States nationals against Iran in the United States and its obligation to terminate the “claims” involved in those proceedings. Iran asserts that the termination of “legal proceedings” by the United States was to occur immediately upon the signing of the Declarations, while the termination of “claims” was to occur at a later stage, either through settlement by the parties concerned or through binding arbitration before the Tribunal.

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52. Iran asserts that the plain language of General Principle B clearly obliges the United States to terminate, and not simply suspend, all litigation against Iran in United States courts. In this connection, Iran points to the language in General Principle B which states that it was the purpose of both High Contracting Parties to “terminate” all litigation and that the United States agreed to “terminate” all legal proceedings in United States courts involving claims of United States nationals against Iran. Iran observes that a treaty should “be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” Article 31, paragraph 1, of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.15 And the ordinary meaning of “terminate,” Iran contends, is “to end,” “to ﬁnish,” or “to cancel.” Consequently, mere suspension of claims that may be within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction does not satisfy the United States obligation to terminate them. 53. Iran states, further, that in General Principle B “all” litigation means “all,” and not only litigation that falls within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. In response to an argument by the United States, Iran asserts that there is no link between the United States termination of litigation obligation and the United States undertaking, in General Principle B, to accomplish this end “[t]hrough the procedures provided in the [Claims Settlement Declaration].” Nowhere in the Algiers Declarations is there a provision that makes “the performance of the former obligation contingent upon the implementation of the latter.” 54. According to Iran, claims of United States nationals outstanding on 19 January 1981 that do not fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction are forever extinguished. In this connection, Iran notes that it was the United States that drafted the Algiers Declarations. Thus, in accordance with the rule in dubio contra proferentem, the United States failure to include certain categories of claims within the jurisdictional limits set by Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration must be construed as a waiver of those claims by the United States. 55. Iran argues, moreover, that the mere suspension of litigation, whereby claims are maintained on the dockets of United States courts pending their resolution by the Tribunal, also conﬂicts with Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Claims Settlement Declaration, which provides that “[c]laims referred to the arbitration Tribunal shall, as of the date of ﬁling of such claims with the Tribunal, be considered excluded from the jurisdiction of the courts of Iran, or of the United States, or of any other court.” Suspended cases, Iran asserts, remain within the jurisdiction of the courts on whose dockets they appear. 56. Iran maintains that, because the ordinary meaning of General Principle B is clear, the Tribunal need not examine the negotiating history of the Algiers 15 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).

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Declarations for guidance in interpreting that Principle. Iran further maintains, however, that if the Tribunal were to examine that history, the Tribunal would ﬁnd that it conﬁrms Iran’s interpretation of General Principle B, since the only condition that the United States attached to the termination of all legal proceedings of United States nationals against Iran in the United States was the establishment of this Tribunal, a condition that Iran accepted. 57. Iran contends that, because the United States failed to terminate all litigation against Iran in United States courts, Iran has been compelled to continue legal representation in that litigation, thereby incurring legal fees and court costs. Accordingly, as part of the relief requested, Iran seeks to be compensated for legal costs it allegedly incurred in monitoring and defending against the claims and counterclaims that the United States should have terminated by 19 January 1981. Iran disputes the United States position that the steps Iran took were voluntary and unnecessary. Iran contends that, faced as it was with a breach of the Algiers Declarations, Iran was entitled to take all reasonable steps in order to protect its interests. 58. Finally, concerning the timing of the United States obligation to terminate legal proceedings, Iran argues that this obligation arose immediately upon the conclusion of the Algiers Declarations, although a de minimis delay of a few weeks would have been acceptable to Iran. In principle, however, the United States should have terminated legal proceedings as soon as the Declarations came into operation. b. The United States Position 59. The United States rejects Iran’s interpretation of the Algiers Declarations. The United States contends that General Principle B required it to terminate only the litigation arising from claims that fell within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Because it could not be known at the outset of the arbitral process which claims would be determined by the Tribunal to be within its jurisdiction, the United States argues that it had to devise some mechanism to prevent the claims that would ultimately be rejected by the Tribunal on jurisdictional grounds from being barred in United States courts by the statutes of limitation applicable in the United States. The most appropriate mechanism was the suspension of litigation, as set forth in Executive Order 12294. The United States asserts that this procedure was the functional equivalent of dismissal: all litigation against Iran was terminated, but cases were allowed to remain on the dockets in an inactive status so that they could be revived if the Tribunal determined that it had no jurisdiction over them. 60. The United States contends that the plain language of General Principle B explicitly links the United States termination obligation to claims within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The ﬁrst sentence of General Principle B, the United

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States urges, explicitly describes the United States termination obligation as coextensive with the arbitral jurisdiction of the Tribunal: “[i]t is the purpose of both parties . . . to terminate all litigation . . . and to bring about the settlement and termination of all such claims through binding arbitration.” 61. The second sentence of General Principle B, the United States continues, conﬁrms the link between termination of litigation and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in that it provides that litigation will be terminated only “[t]hrough the procedures provided in the [Claims Settlement Declaration].” According to the United States, by tying the United States termination obligation to the procedures in the Claims Settlement Declaration, General Principle B limits the scope of that obligation to those claims that can be settled by negotiation or by arbitration pursuant to the Claims Settlement Declaration – that is, claims within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction as deﬁned in Article II, paragraph 1, thereof. 62. The United States agrees with Iran that General Principle B explicitly distinguishes between the termination of “legal proceedings” of United States nationals against Iran in United States courts and the termination of the “claims” at issue in those proceedings. The United States contends that all “legal proceedings” were in fact terminated in 1981, by means of Executive Order 12294, which suspended all claims that may be presented to the Tribunal and denied them any legal effect in United States courts so long as they were suspended. With respect to the termination of the claims that were thus suspended, the United States points out that, pursuant to the ﬁnal clause of General Principle B, they are to be terminated only “through binding arbitration” before the Tribunal, at the end of the arbitration process, and it contends that Executive Order 12294 ensures compliance with that obligation by stating, in Section 4, that “[a] determination by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal on the merits that a claimant is not entitled to recover on a claim shall operate as a ﬁnal resolution and discharge of the claim for all purposes.” 63. The United States next contends that Iran’s interpretation of General Principle B is inconsistent with other parts of the Algiers Declarations. The United States ﬁrst points out that, in the Undertakings of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran,16 Iran “afﬁrmed its intention to pay all its debts and those of its controlled institutions.” Id. paragraph 2. Iran’s argument that claims that do not fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction are waived conﬂicts with its promise to pay all its debts to United States claimants. 64. The United States argues, moreover, that Iran’s interpretation also conﬂicts with General Principle A of the General Declaration, in which the United States undertook to restore the ﬁnancial position of Iran, in so far as possible, to 16 Undertakings of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran with Respect to the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, 19 January 1981, reprinted in 1 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 13.

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that which existed prior to 14 November 1979. The United States asserts that it did not agree to place Iran in a better ﬁnancial position by waiving whole ranges of claims. 65. Continuing, the United States contends that Iran’s interpretation of General Principle B would render other provisions of the Algiers Declarations superﬂuous. Paragraph 11 of the General Declaration, for example, provides that the United States will “withdraw” all claims pending against Iran before the International Court of Justice and that it will “bar and preclude” the prosecution against Iran of “any pending or future claim” arising out of speciﬁed events related to the United States Embassy incident and the Islamic Revolution.17 According to the United States, if General Principle B did indeed require the termination of all claims against Iran in United States courts, regardless of the existence of jurisdiction before the Tribunal, as argued by Iran, then Paragraph 11 of the General Declaration would be superﬂuous, because the claims described therein would already be covered by the termination of claims obligation in General Principle B. 66. The United States also contends that Iran’s interpretation of General Principle B conﬂicts directly with Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Claims Settlement Declaration, which states merely that claims shall “be considered excluded” from the jurisdiction of the United States courts and then only as of the date of their ﬁling with the Tribunal. The United States asserts that this provision does not require that a claim should be “physically dismissed” as of the date of its ﬁling with the Tribunal. 67. Concerning the negotiating history, the United States asserts that this history shows that the United States did not intend to forfeit nonarbitrable claims and that Iran understood and accepted this position. 68. As to damages, the United States contends that Iran has failed to identify any cases in which it was wrongfully required to respond to litigation in United States courts in cases arguably falling within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Consequently, because Iran has suffered no injury, Iran’s claim should be dismissed for lack of proof. 17 Paragraph 11 of the General Declaration reads in full: Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the certiﬁcation described in Paragraph 3 above, the United States will promptly withdraw all claims now pending against Iran before the International Court of Justice and will thereafter bar and preclude the prosecution against Iran of any pending or future claim of the United States or a United States national arising out of events occurring before the date of this Declaration related to (A) the seizure of the 52 United States nationals on November 4, 1979, (B) their subsequent detention, (C) injury to the United States property or property of the United States nationals within the United States Embassy compound in Tehran after November 3, 1979, and (D) injury to the United States nationals or their property as a result of popular movements in the course of the Islamic Revolution in Iran which were not an act of the Government of Iran. The United States will also bar and preclude the prosecution against Iran in the courts of the United States of any pending or future claim asserted by persons other than the United States nationals arising out of the events speciﬁed in the preceding sentence.

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69. The United States concedes that between January and July 1981, some litigation against Iran in the United States continued. It points out, however, that the issues litigated related almost exclusively to the validity of the Algiers Declarations under the United States Constitution. The United States denies that it should compensate Iran for any costs Iran incurred in connection with these cases, since both High Contracting Parties anticipated that the validity of the Algiers Declarations would be challenged in United States courts. It is clear from the Algiers Declarations, the United States contends, that the Parties estimated that it would take about six months to resolve this litigation. According to the United States, this is demonstrated, in particular, by the fact that the General Declaration, in Paragraph 6, gave the United States six months from the date of the Declarations to effect the transfer of Iranian assets subject to attachments in United States courts.18 The United States thus concludes that it had six months within which to terminate litigation against Iran. Consequently, any legal costs incurred by Iran during this six-month period would not constitute a violation of General Principle B. c. The Tribunal’s Decision 70. This claim presents three broad issues. First, what is the scope of the United States obligations under the Algiers Declarations with respect to the termination of claims and termination of legal proceedings in United States courts; in other words, what claims and what legal proceedings were to be terminated and when were they to be terminated? Second, did the United States breach its obligations by implementing them through Executive Order 12294; that is, by suspending claims which may be presented to the Tribunal pending their resolution by the Tribunal and by denying them any legal effect in any legal proceeding in United States courts during such period of suspension? Third, did Executive Order 12294 violate the obligations of the United States by allowing counterclaims or set-offs by United States nationals in legal proceedings subsequently commenced by Iran? (1) The Scope of the United States Obligation to Terminate Litigation and Claims (a) The Meaning of General Principle B 71. As noted, Iran asserts that General Principle B obliged the United States to terminate with prejudice all legal proceedings in United States courts 18

Paragraph 6 of the General Declaration reads in full: 6. Commencing with the adherence by Iran and the United States to this Declaration and the Claims Settlement Agreement attached hereto, and following the conclusion of arrangements with the Central Bank for the establishment of the interest-bearing Security Account speciﬁed in that Agreement and Paragraph 7 below, which arrangements will be concluded within 30 days from the date of this Declaration, the United States will act to bring about the transfer to the Central Bank, within six months from such date, of all Iranian deposits and securities in U.S. banking institutions in the United States, together with interest thereon, to be held by the Central Bank in escrow until such time as their transfer or return is required by Paragraph 3.

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involving claims of United States nationals against Iran that were outstanding on 19 January 1981, regardless of whether those claims were within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Iran asserts, moreover, that the United States suspension of legal proceedings did not satisfy General Principle B’s requirement to terminate them. Accordingly, Iran seeks a declaratory award ﬁnding that the United States has breached its obligations pursuant to General Principle B; compelling the United States to terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts involving claims of United States nationals against Iran; and ordering the United States to reimburse Iran for the expenses Iran incurred in monitoring and defending against claims and counterclaims that the United States should have terminated on or about 19 January 1981, with the amount of these damages to be determined at a later stage of the proceedings. 72. The United States denies that it breached its obligations under the Algiers Declarations and also denies that Iran is entitled to any part of the relief sought. The United States contends that General Principle B required the United States to terminate only those claims that fell within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction; this means that its termination obligation did not extend to claims falling outside that jurisdiction. As to the suspension of claims provided for in Executive Order 12294, the United States contends that this was a necessary and appropriate device that ensured that the claims the Tribunal dismissed for want of jurisdiction would not inadvertently be barred by the statute of limitations. The United States maintains that by depriving all suspended claims of legal effect in any action in United States courts and by providing that a decision on the merits of any such claim by the Tribunal operates as a ﬁnal resolution and discharge of the claim, the United States has complied with its obligations. 73. The task of the Tribunal is to ascertain the content and scope of the obligations undertaken by the United States in the Algiers Declarations with respect to termination of claims and litigation of United States nationals against Iran in United States courts. “The means to be employed in the process of interpretation of an international agreement [of the nature of the Algiers Declarations] are set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.” Islamic Republic of Iran and United States of America, Decision No. DEC 62-A21-FT, para. 8 (4 May 1987), reprinted in 14 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 324, 328. Article 31, paragraph 1, of the Convention provides: A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.

74. As an initial matter, the Tribunal agrees with the Parties that General Principle B distinguishes between (i) an obligation of the United States to terminate “litigation” and “legal proceedings” by United States nationals against Iran in United States courts and (ii) an obligation of the United States to terminate

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the “claims” at issue in those proceedings. This conclusion is supported by the plain language of the second sentence of General Principle B, which obliges the United States, inter alia, “to terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts involving claims of United States persons and institutions against Iran and its state enterprises” and “to bring about the termination of such claims through binding arbitration.” These two related but distinct obligations are at issue in this claim. 75. Thus, General Principle B requires the United States to satisfy its termination obligation in two steps: ﬁrst, through termination of legal proceedings (or litigation) by United States nationals against Iran in United States courts; and second, through termination of the claims at issue in those legal proceedings “through binding arbitration” before this Tribunal. The phrase “through binding arbitration” indicates that a claim will be terminated only after its resolution by the Tribunal on the merits. This conclusion is also supported by the language of the ﬁrst sentence of General Principle B, which states that it is the purpose of both Parties, within the framework of the Algiers Declarations, “to terminate all litigation as between the government of each party and the nationals of the other, and to bring about the settlement and termination of all such claims through binding arbitration.” (Emphasis added.) Settlement of a claim, by deﬁnition, requires its resolution on the merits.19 76. Turning to the structure of General Principle B, it should be noted that the ﬁrst sentence of that Principle states one of the purposes envisaged by the Parties to the Algiers Declarations, namely, the termination of all litigation as between the government of each Party and the nationals of the other and the settlement and termination of all such claims through binding arbitration. This purpose is qualiﬁed by the reference to “the framework” and “the provisions” both of the General Declaration and the Claims Settlement Declaration. The second sentence of General Principle B, on the other hand, neither conﬁnes itself to elaborating on the said purpose nor does it, contrary to the ﬁrst sentence, concern both States. Rather, it lays out rules of conduct which, in the circumstances, must be distinguished from a mere purpose and which, moreover, are addressed to only one of the two High Contracting Parties, the United States. 77. Despite these distinguishing features, the two sentences are part and parcel of the same principle. Thus, they must be read as a whole. In particular, the second sentence of General Principle B cannot be divorced from the ﬁrst sentence because it translates the purpose stated in the ﬁrst sentence into a concrete obligation, or a series of concrete obligations, of the United States. 19 Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) deﬁnes the term “settlement,” inter alia, as the “[a]ct or process of adjusting or determining.”

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These obligations, the second sentence provides, are to be performed “[t]hrough the procedures provided in the [Claims Settlement Declaration].” 78. It is undisputed that there is litigation and there are claims that remain outside these procedures. Certain claims fall outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction by virtue of express exclusions contained in the Declarations. For example, Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration bars from the Tribunal’s jurisdiction certain claims against Iran, described in Paragraph 11 of the General Declaration, that arise out of speciﬁed events related to the seizure of the United States Embassy in Tehran and to the Islamic Revolution. See supra, note [17]. Other claims fall outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction because they do not ﬁt within the jurisdictional parameters set by Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration. For example, the Tribunal may not entertain claims that arose after 19 January 1981; claims not arising out of debts, contracts, expropriations or other measures affecting property rights; and claims by persons who do not qualify as Iranian or United States nationals, as the case may be. One of the primary issues in this Claim A is precisely the fate of claims that do not fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction: by agreeing, in General Principle B, to terminate “all” legal proceedings in United States courts involving claims of United States nationals against Iran, did the United States waive claims that the Parties excluded from the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and extinguish them, as argued by Iran? This is simply another way of asking what the scope is of the United States obligation to terminate legal proceedings and claims of United States nationals against Iran in the United States. 79. In determining what this scope is, the Tribunal cannot overlook the language in the second sentence of General Principle B, which states that the termination by the United States of “all” litigation against Iran is to occur “[t]hrough the procedures provided in the [Claims Settlement Declaration].” See supra, para. 77. Thus, the second sentence of General Principle B expressly ties the United States obligation to terminate litigation to “the procedures provided” in the Claims Settlement Declaration. There is no reason to regard this qualifying language as meaningless or irrelevant in understanding the word “all.” Rather, this language must be taken into account in interpreting the word “all.” It would otherwise be unclear why the Parties included those words in the text of General Principle B – and with a certain insistence at that. The only plausible answer is that the Parties intended for this language to have operative effect. 80. What then are the “procedures provided in the [Claims Settlement Declaration]” through which the termination of claims and litigation against Iran in United States courts must occur? The Tribunal holds that these procedures are embodied in the following provisions of the Claims Settlement Declaration: (a) Article I, which obliges the two State Parties to promote the

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settlement of the claims described in Article II; (b) Article II, which deﬁnes the types of claims that shall be resolved by arbitration before this Tribunal; (c) Article IV, paragraph 1, which provides that all decisions and awards of the Tribunal shall be ﬁnal and binding; and (d) Article VII, paragraph 2, which provides, inter alia, that “[c]laims referred to the arbitration Tribunal shall, as of the date of ﬁling of such claims with the Tribunal, be considered excluded from the jurisdiction of the courts of Iran, or of the United States, or of any other court.” All of these provisions relate to the settlement and adjudication of claims that are within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. There are no other provisions in the Claims Settlement Declaration that relate to the “termination” of claims and litigation. (b) Termination of Claims 81. Based on the foregoing, the Tribunal concludes that what was referred to by “procedures provided in the [Claims Settlement Declaration]” in the second sentence of General Principle B was the arbitration mechanism before the Tribunal as set out in that Declaration. It follows that any claims which, under the terms of the Claims Settlement Declaration, cannot be resolved on the merits by the Tribunal are not within the scope of the termination obligation imposed on the United States by General Principle B; this is because those claims cannot possibly be terminated “[t]hrough the procedures provided in the [Claims Settlement Declaration].” 82. Thus, the United States termination obligation under General Principle B does not cover claims that fall outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The dismissal of a claim on jurisdictional grounds does not fulﬁl the purpose set out by the Parties in General Principle B – that is, that claims as between the government of one Party and the nationals of the other be settled and terminated “through binding arbitration.” Settlement and termination of a claim through binding arbitration means resolution of that claim on the merits. Otherwise, there would have been no point in the Parties’ referring claims to this Tribunal. This conclusion implies that the United States obligation to terminate a claim arises only once the claim has been decided on the merits by the Tribunal. 83. The question remains, however, as to what obligation is imposed on the United States by Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Claims Settlement Declaration, which provides that “[c]laims referred to the arbitration Tribunal shall, as of the date of ﬁling of such claims with the Tribunal, be considered excluded from the jurisdiction of the courts of Iran, or of the United States, or of any other court.” This provision is important because only the Tribunal is competent to determine which of the claims referred to it are within its jurisdiction, and that determination often has been made only many years after a claim was ﬁled with the Tribunal. Article VII, paragraph 2, by requiring that all ﬁled claims

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be considered excluded from the jurisdiction of courts after they are referred to the Tribunal, implicitly recognizes that such claims may also be pending in other courts while it explicitly obligates the parties to deem them not subject to the jurisdiction of such other courts by ensuring that the claims not proceed unless and until the Tribunal determines that they are outside its jurisdiction. Consequently, until the Tribunal determines its jurisdiction with respect to a ﬁled claim, Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Claims Settlement Declaration places on the United States an obligation to halt proceedings in its courts with respect to that claim. See infra, paras. 87, et seq. (c) Waiver 84. The Tribunal has concluded that the language in General Principle B qualifying the United States obligation to terminate claims must be given operative effect. See supra, paras. 79-82. There is only one hypothesis in which the qualifying language of that Principle would have no effect: if the United States had agreed that all claims submitted to the Tribunal be waived as of the time of such submission. A waiver expressed in such terms would evidently include claims not within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and arguably would prevail over the qualifying and limiting language contained in General Principle B. For the following reasons, however, the Tribunal holds that, other than the claims referred to in Paragraph 11 of the General Declaration, the United States did not waive any of its nationals’ claims against Iran. 85. Termination of municipal litigation and submission to arbitration as set forth in General Principle B cannot be mistaken for, or identiﬁed with, a waiver of any claims. The claims continue to exist, although the nationals no longer have at their disposal any domestic court procedures to pursue their claims. Closing the road to municipal courts cannot, in itself, amount to a waiver. Moreover, nothing in the Algiers Declarations allows for the conclusion that the United States intended to waive any of its nationals’ claims. Indeed, rather than providing for a waiver of claims, General Principle B provides a speciﬁc mechanism to deal with them. 86. Nor does the negotiating history of the Algiers Declarations lend any support to the proposition that the United States waived claims of its nationals other than those described in Paragraph 11 of the General Declaration.20 In the second American response of 3 December 1980, discussed supra, at para. 25, the United States, in Comment 2, stated: 20 Of course, recourse to the preparatory work is not strictly necessary, because the Tribunal has already reached its conclusion based on the plain language of General Principle B. Preparatory work is a “supplementary means of interpretation.” Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Nonetheless, it serves here to conﬁrm the conclusion that the United States did not waive any of its nationals’ claims.

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[T]he United States agrees, in the context of the safe return of the hostages, to terminate all legal proceedings in U.S. courts involving claims of U.S. persons and institutions against Iran and its state enterprises . . . when Iran agrees to submit all existing claims of U.S. persons and institutions [except those referred to in Paragraph 11 of the General Declaration] to an international claims settlement process for the determination and payment of such claims. This process would include binding third party arbitration of any claim not settled by mutual agreement. (Emphasis added.)

Thus, in December 1980, the United States informed Iran that it would agree to the termination of all legal proceedings against Iran in the United States if – and only if – all claims involved in those proceedings would be submitted to this Tribunal. The United States made clear that those claims were to be resolved on the merits, either through settlement by the parties or through binding arbitration before this Tribunal. This position, clearly, cannot be squared with the proposition that the United States waived any of its nationals’ claims. And nothing in the negotiating history of the Algiers Declarations suggests that the United States, prior to the signing of the Declarations, changed the position it had taken on 3 December 1980. Furthermore, it appears that Iran acquiesced in the United States position. In its response of 21 December 1980, Iran stated: Since the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran undertakes to settle its bona ﬁde debts to American persons or institutions, the Iranian Government accepts that the claims of American entities and citizens against Iran, and the claims of Iranian nationals and institutions, be settled, in the ﬁrst stage through agreement between the parties and, failing such agreement, through arbitration acceptable to the respective parties. (Emphasis added.)

(d) Termination of Litigation in United States Courts: Suspension i) The United States obligation to terminate litigation 87. The second sentence of General Principle B requires the United States to “terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts involving claims of United States persons and institutions against Iran and its state enterprises.” Further, Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Claims Settlement Declaration requires the United States to consider claims referred to the Tribunal excluded from the jurisdiction of United States courts “as of the date of ﬁling of such claims with the Tribunal.” Finally, Article I of the Claims Settlement Declaration requires the High Contracting Parties to encourage negotiated settlement of claims and requires that claims not settled by negotiation be brought to the Tribunal. It is clear from those provisions and from the preparatory work of the Algiers Declarations that the High Contracting Parties agreed that the Tribunal would be a substitute forum for deciding speciﬁed claims asserted against a State Party by nationals of the other State Party. 88. It is also clear from the above provisions and from the negotiating history of the Algiers Declarations that a claim may not be litigated in courts of the

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United States (or of Iran) while the same claim is pending before the Tribunal. First, neither Iran nor the United States agreed to any such parallel litigation. The language of General Principle B leaves no doubt in this respect. Second, Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Claims Settlement Declaration requires the States Parties to ensure that claims that have been ﬁled with the Tribunal are not litigated in their respective courts. See supra, para. 83. 89. The Tribunal holds that the Algiers Declarations oblige the United States to terminate all legal proceedings initiated by United States nationals against Iran in United States courts involving claims that arguably fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. A contrary ﬁnding would render the second sentence of General Principle B as well as Article I and Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Claims Settlement Declaration meaningless. The Tribunal has found that General Principle B requires the United States to terminate only claims that fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. See supra, para. 82. Thus, in conformity with that ﬁnding, the United States obligation to terminate legal proceedings, as delineated hereabove, ceases with regard to legal proceedings involving claims that have been dismissed by the Tribunal for lack of jurisdiction. 90. In the history of each claim, whether or not that claim ultimately is found by the Tribunal to be within its jurisdiction, there must always be a period during which there is no litigation related to that claim proceeding in the United States. With respect to claims that the Tribunal ﬁnds are outside its jurisdiction, that period ends when the Tribunal renders its jurisdictional decision; those claims can thereafter be litigated in United States courts. By contrast, claims that the Tribunal has decided are within its jurisdiction cannot be revived in domestic courts. 91. Thus, a timing difﬁculty becomes apparent: it cannot be known in advance over which claims the Tribunal ultimately will take jurisdiction. Nevertheless, by acceding to General Principle B, the United States undertook to “terminate” all legal proceedings against Iran in United States courts. This choice of words by the High Contracting Parties carries substantial weight. Iran was entitled to expect that legal proceedings against it in United States courts would in fact be terminated. In interpreting the Algiers Declarations, the Tribunal cannot ignore the express terms agreed upon by the Parties, nor can it replace those terms with others that would unavoidably change the original meaning. ii) Evaluation of the suspension method against the background of the Algiers Declarations 92. On 24 February 1981, the President of the United States issued Executive Order 12294, which provides for the suspension of all claims that may be presented to the Tribunal and directs that “[d]uring the period of this suspension, all such claims shall have no legal effect in any action now pending in

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any court of the United States.” Thus, the United States chose to implement its obligation to terminate all domestic litigation against Iran through the suspension mechanism provided for in Executive Order 12294. The Tribunal will consider whether the choice of this mechanism was consistent with the United States obligations under the Algiers Declarations. 93. In interpreting a treaty, the Tribunal has consistently applied Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and has searched “for the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” See supra, para. 73. It is appropriate to note at the outset that according to their ordinary meaning, the terms “termination” and “suspension” imply different rights and obligations and, consequently, different legal effects. The two terms designate distinct legal notions. Therefore, “suspension” of litigation, from both a conceptual and grammatical viewpoint, does not conform to the language of General Principle B, which speaks of “termination” of litigation. 94. The conceptual difference between these two terms is readily recognizable. Generally, “termination” implies that the activity being terminated is brought to an end. “Suspension,” on the other hand, implies a temporary cessation of activity. The United States could satisfy its obligations under the Algiers Declarations only by doing what those Declarations said, namely, by “terminating” all litigation against Iran in United States courts involving claims that arguably fell within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.21 Thus, on its face, “suspension” could be seen to produce a legal effect different from that produced by “termination.” 95. However, the ﬁndings made supra, in paras. 93-94, do not sufﬁce to conclude that the United States violated its obligation to terminate litigation against Iran in United States courts. The Tribunal must analyze the matter further. Obligations under General Principle B are, generally speaking, obligations of “result,” rather than of “conduct” or “means.” Although it could be said that the United States, by suspending the litigation rather than terminating it, failed to comply with its obligations under the Algiers Declarations, the Tribunal cannot conﬁne itself to a strictly literal or grammatical interpretation of those Declarations but must also test the method chosen by the United States – suspension of claims pursuant to Executive Order 12294 – against the object and purpose of those Declarations. The answer to the question whether suspension fulﬁlled the function of termination depends on practice. Thus, the test is in factual evidence. 96. Unless otherwise agreed by treaty, general international law permits a state to choose the means by which it implements its international obligations within its domestic jurisdiction. See Islamic Republic of Iran and United States of 21 Of course, as noted supra, in para. 89, the termination obligation ceases with respect to those claims dismissed by the Tribunal for lack of jurisdiction.

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America, Decision No. DEC 62-A21-FT, para. 15 (4 May 1987), reprinted in 14 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 324, 331. Nonetheless, a state’s freedom with respect to the choice of the means for implementing an international obligation is not absolute. The means chosen must be adequate to satisfy the state’s international obligation, and they must be lawful. The internal law of a state must conform to that state’s international obligations, including those assumed in an international agreement. Consequently, a state must choose a method of implementation that gives full effect to those obligations. Further, a state “may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justiﬁcation for its failure to perform a treaty.” Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. A state that assumes an international obligation must be presumed to know what that obligation entails and how it must be carried out. 97. The Tribunal has no need to consider alternative or hypothetical solutions that were or might have been at the disposal of the United States in order to implement its obligations under the Algiers Declarations. The Tribunal is aware of, and takes into account, the dilemma faced by the United States: the need to comply with the obligation to terminate litigation without extinguishing claims that did not fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. 98. There is no reason to doubt that the United States acted in good faith when it suspended, rather than terminated, the litigation. By suspending the litigation and declaring that the suspended “claims shall have no legal effect in any action now pending in any [United States] court,” Section 1 of Executive Order 12294, the United States took a step in the right direction. Whether suspension of litigation, in practice, achieved the same result as termination is another matter. 99. Section 1 of Executive Order 12294 is silent on the termination of the litigation. The impact of that Section on actual termination is not clear, and one may well ask whether that approach effectively terminated the proceedings, in accordance with General Principle B. Depriving claims of “legal effect in any action now pending in any court of the United States” may not have been sufﬁcient to preclude further procedural steps – and thus, under certain circumstances, litigation – in those courts. The Tribunal holds that by adopting the suspension mechanism provided for in Executive Order 12294, the United States adhered to its obligations under the Algiers Declarations only if, in effect, the mechanism resulted in a termination of litigation as required by those Declarations. This issue will be addressed in a subsequent phase of these proceedings. 100. The Tribunal assumes that the interpretive statements contained in the foregoing paragraphs represent, by themselves, a partial satisfaction to Iran. iii) Conclusion 101. During the Hearings in this Case, Iran proffered a list of legal proceedings in the United States in which Iran claims to have been wrongfully

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compelled to participate. The Tribunal will examine these facts in the second phase of the proceedings in this Case. If, as a result of such examination, the Tribunal concludes that Iran was reasonably compelled in the prudent defense of its interests to make appearances or ﬁle documents in United States courts subsequent to 19 July 1981 in any litigation in respect of claims described in Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration or in respect of claims ﬁled with the Tribunal until such time as those claims are dismissed by the Tribunal for lack of jurisdiction, then the Tribunal will ﬁnd that the United States has not complied with its obligations under General Principle B of the General Declaration and under Article I and Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Claims Settlement Declaration. In that event, the United States will be required to compensate Iran for any expenses that Iran was caused to incur as a result of making appearances or ﬁling documents in United States courts after 19 July 1981 in any litigation in respect of claims described hereabove. 102. The extent of Iran’s participation in United States courts, and the expenses associated therewith, depended on the circumstances of each case. The Tribunal expects Iran to show in the second phase of these proceedings what expenses it incurred with respect to each speciﬁc case and what was the particular justiﬁcation for the speciﬁc sums it spent. Iran will be expected to produce factual evidence of the losses it suffered as a result of its making appearances or ﬁling documents in United States courts subsequent to 19 July 1981 in the prudent defense of its interests with respect to the claims described supra, in para. 101. The Tribunal also expects Iran to produce factual evidence of the losses it suffered as a result of the monitoring of the suspended claims and invites both parties to address the question of whether Iran should be compensated for those losses. 103. The Tribunal will not award any damages related to, or arising from, Iran’s participation in United States court litigation during the six-month period following the signing of the Algiers Declarations. See infra, para. 110. Nor will it award any damages related to, or arising from, Iran’s participation in cases regarding the validity and constitutionality of the Algiers Declarations under United States law. (e) Timing of the Termination Obligations of the United States 104. The Tribunal next turns to the timing of the United States termination obligations under the Algiers Declarations. In this connection, it should be recalled that the Algiers Declarations imposed on the United States obligations relating both to claims and to litigation. See supra, para. 74. The question thus arises as to when these obligations accrued. 105. The obligation to terminate claims extends only to those claims found by the Tribunal to fall within its jurisdiction. It is clear, therefore, that this

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obligation cannot mature until the Tribunal has decided a claim on the merits. The timing of the United States obligations with respect to litigation, however, is different. 106. Iran argues that the obligation to terminate litigation arose immediately upon the conclusion of the Algiers Declarations, although a de minimis delay of a few weeks would have been acceptable to Iran. In principle, however, the United States should have terminated legal proceedings as soon as the Declarations came into operation. See supra, para. 58. Concerning the termination of the claims at issue in those legal proceedings, Iran agrees that it was to occur either through settlement by the parties involved or resolution by the Tribunal. The United States argues, in contrast, that it had six months from the date of the Algiers Declarations within which to halt proceedings in United States courts in cases against Iran. This is because both High Contracting Parties anticipated that the validity of the Algiers Declarations would be challenged in United States courts, and it is clear from the Algiers Declarations that they estimated that it would take about six months to resolve this litigation. See supra, para. 69. 107. The Algiers Declarations set forth no express deadlines for carrying out the obligations they imposed on the United States with respect to terminating legal proceedings in United States courts. Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Claims Settlement Declaration requires the United States to consider claims excluded from the jurisdiction of United States courts “as of the date of ﬁling of such claims with the Tribunal.” Thus, one might understand that the United States obligation to terminate legal proceedings came into existence only when the particular claim at issue in the proceeding was ﬁled with the Tribunal. But a similar obligation is also implicated by Article I of the Claims Settlement Declaration, which requires the two Governments to encourage negotiated settlement and requires that claims not settled by negotiation be brought to the Tribunal. Permitting litigation to continue until the day a claim is ﬁled with the Tribunal seems inconsistent with those obligations under Article I. Thus, in the absence of an express deadline, the Tribunal relies on the general treaty interpretation principle of good faith, which requires the conclusion that the United States was obliged to terminate, within a reasonable period of time, legal proceedings and litigation against Iran in United States courts that were arguably within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and that consequently should be referred to the Tribunal. The Tribunal therefore must consider what, under the circumstances, would be such a reasonable period. 108. In considering what would be a reasonable time during which the United States was required to fulﬁl its obligations, it is useful to look to the express time limits that the Declarations imposed regarding other related obligations. Article I of the Claims Settlement Declaration provides for a six to nine-month period during which Iran and the United States would promote the settlement of

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outstanding claims falling within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction pursuant to Article II of the Claims Settlement Declaration. Article I provides that “[a]ny such claims not settled within [that period] shall be submitted” to the Tribunal. In the Tribunal’s view, a similar period logically would constitute a reasonable time frame for terminating the corresponding United States litigation of such outstanding claims. 109. Similarly, a six-month period is foreseen in Paragraph 6 of the General Declaration as the time that might be required for the return to Iran of Iranian deposits and securities in United States banks. See supra, note [18]. The Tribunal is persuaded that the six-month delay in the transfer of funds in United States banks was required because many of them were subject to attachments which, like the litigation at issue here, required United States court action to release. Given the separation of powers between the different branches of government in the United States, neither the release of judicial attachments nor the termination of legal proceedings could be accomplished by Executive Order 12294 alone; both required United States court compliance with that Executive Order. The Tribunal is satisﬁed that such compliance could be assured only after the Executive Order’s constitutionality was established by the Supreme Court of the United States. 110. Based on the above indicia in the Algiers Declarations concerning timing, the Tribunal concludes that a six-month period after the signing of the Algiers Declarations was a reasonable time within which the United States was to terminate legal proceedings and litigation of United States nationals against Iran in United States courts. Consequently, any litigation continuing during that six-month period does not constitute a violation of the Algiers Declarations entailing the responsibility of the United States. (2) Counterclaims 111. The ﬁnal issue in Claim A is whether the United States violated the Algiers Declarations by allowing United States nationals to bring counterclaims against Iran in United States courts. Section 6 of Executive Order 12294 provides that “[n]othing in this Order shall prohibit the assertion of a counterclaim or set-off by a United States national in any judicial proceeding pending or hereafter commenced by the Government of Iran . . .” See supra, para. 28. Thus, Executive Order 12294 allows the assertion of such counterclaims in United States courts, even if they would fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. 112. Iran argues that, by allowing United States nationals to assert counterclaims or claims for set-off against Iran in United States court proceedings, the United States has breached its obligation under General Principle B to terminate all litigation by United States nationals against Iran in United States courts. If United States nationals had claims against Iran, Iran contends, they

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should have submitted those claims to the Tribunal without waiting to be sued by Iran in the United States. 113. The United States responds that it would be unfair to allow Iran to present claims against United States nationals in United States courts after the deadline for the ﬁling of claims before the Tribunal, while preventing United States nationals from asserting counterclaims in reply to such claims. The United States argues that the Algiers Declarations relieve Iran of the obligation to defend itself against involuntary litigation in United States courts which falls within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction; nothing in the Declarations, however, requires the United States to grant Iran a favored position by precluding the assertion of counterclaims in litigation that Iran itself voluntarily chose to commence in United States courts. 114. It is clear from General Principle B and from Articles I and II of the Claims Settlement Declaration that claims that would have been within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and were not settled by negotiation were to be presented to the Tribunal, and that if a claimant chose not to present such a claim to the Tribunal, he was not to be permitted thereafter to raise it in United States courts. Although the existence of the Security Account ensured that the vast majority of claims deemed meritorious by claimants would be presented to the Tribunal, the Tribunal does not doubt that there were some claims not ﬁled with the Tribunal because of concern by the claimants about possible counterclaims by Iran. By including Section 6 in the Executive Order, the United States, in effect, encouraged such claimants not to come to the Tribunal, and thus failed to comply with its obligations under General Principle B and Article I of the Claims Settlement Declaration. 115. Iran seeks an award of damages for legal fees and court costs incurred in defending against such counterclaims. The Tribunal shall make its determinations as to the nature and the amount of the damages incurred by Iran, if any, in a subsequent proceeding. See supra, para. 102. 2. Claim B 116. Iran contends that the United States has breached General Principle B as well as Article II, paragraph 1, and Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Claims Settlement Declaration by suspending, rather than terminating, litigation involving claims arising from contracts with forum selection clauses referring disputes to Iranian courts. 117. The Tribunal has found that the Algiers Declarations obliged the United States to terminate all legal proceedings commenced by United States nationals against Iran in United States courts involving claims that arguably fell within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and that such obligation ceases with respect to any claim once that claim has been dismissed by the Tribunal for

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lack of jurisdiction. See supra, para. 89. The Tribunal has further found that “termination” is not synonymous with “suspension,” but has deferred its decision as to whether by suspending all litigation against Iran in United States courts involving such claims, the United States has violated its obligations under the Algiers Declarations. Before making this decision, the Tribunal ﬁrst must examine whether in each speciﬁc case, suspension of litigation had the same effect as termination. That examination belongs to the second phase of these proceedings. See supra, para. 99. The remaining issue is whether the United States has breached the Algiers Declarations by allowing cases that the Tribunal had found to be excluded from its jurisdiction by the type of Iranian forum selection clause referred to in the exclusion contained in Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration to be revived in United States courts subsequent to the dismissal of the claim by the Tribunal for lack of jurisdiction. 118. The provision at the heart of this claim is the last clause of Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration. It excludes from the Tribunal’s jurisdiction “claims arising under a binding contract between the parties speciﬁcally providing that any disputes thereunder shall be within the sole jurisdiction of the competent Iranian courts, in response to the Majlis position.” The question is whether this language means that such claims must be brought in Iranian courts or whether it merely means that such claims may not be heard by the Tribunal. a. The Parties’ Positions 119. Iran contends that pursuant to the Algiers Declarations, the United States is obliged to terminate all litigation in United States courts involving claims based on contracts with Iranian forum selection clauses, whether or not these claims fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Thus, Iran argues, it was improper for the United States merely to suspend such litigation and allow its revival in United States courts after dismissal by the Tribunal for lack of jurisdiction. According to Iran, the purpose of the exclusion contained in Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration was to preserve the jurisdiction of Iranian courts. Thus, if these claims are allowed to return to United States courts after having been dismissed by the Tribunal for lack of jurisdiction, the purpose of excluding them from the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to begin with would be defeated. 120. Iran seeks a declaratory award ﬁnding that, by failing to prohibit legal proceedings commenced by United States nationals against Iran in United States courts involving claims arising from contracts with Iranian forum selection clauses, the United States has violated General Principle B as well as Article II, paragraph 1, and Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Claims Settlement

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Declaration; requiring the United States to terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts involving claims based on contracts with Iranian forum selection clauses; and ordering the United States to compensate Iran for the damages it suffered as a result of the United States breach, including the legal fees and court costs that Iran incurred in monitoring and defending against those claims after 19 January 1981. 121. The United States denies liability. It points out that under General Principle B, it is required to terminate only claims that are within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction; it argues that there is no reason to treat claims involving Iranian forum selection clauses differently than any other claims not within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. If the Tribunal accepts jurisdiction over a forum selection clause claim, that claim will be terminated through arbitration before the Tribunal. If the Tribunal declines jurisdiction over such a claim, then the litigation related thereto may be resumed in any court where it otherwise could have been brought – including a United States court, where proceedings would begin with a determination of the enforceability of the forum selection clause. 122. The United States asserts that it never expected that United States nationals would be able to take their claims to Iranian courts given the changed circumstances subsequent to the date on which the contracts containing the forum selection clauses had been concluded. As a result, the United States notes, it insisted on inserting the word “binding” in the exclusion clause in Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration in the hope that the Tribunal would later determine that the changed circumstances rendered the forum selection clauses unenforceable. The United States points out that, although it asked the Tribunal to make that determination, the Tribunal held that the Algiers Declarations did not authorize it to do so, and consequently it did “not reach the question as to whether changes in Iran may have any impact on the enforceability of forum selection clauses in contracts.” Halliburton Company, et al. and Doreen/IMCO, et al., Interlocutory Award No. ITL 2-51-FT, at 7 (5 Nov. 1982), reprinted in 1 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 242, 246 (“Halliburton”). In so holding, the Tribunal did not question the right of national courts to determine the enforceability of choice of forum clauses, and the United States asserts that, if the Tribunal is to be consistent with its holdings in the Halliburton and other forum clause cases, it cannot now hold such clauses to be, in effect, enforceable by denying all non-Iranian fora the right to examine their enforceability. The United States denies that it ever agreed that such clauses would be enforceable, and it asserts that there is nothing in the Algiers Declarations that requires the United States to enforce forum selection clauses in contracts between United States nationals and Iran or its instrumentalities by divesting United States courts of their existing jurisdiction to decide the enforceability of

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such clauses where the clauses have excluded claims from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. b. The Tribunal’s Decision 123. In Halliburton, the Tribunal was faced with the question of whether it had jurisdiction to determine the enforceability of forum selection clauses. In that Case, the Tribunal held that [i]t is not generally the task of this Tribunal, or of any arbitral tribunal, to determine the enforceability of choice of forum clauses in contracts. If the parties wished the Tribunal to determine the enforceability of contract clauses speciﬁcally providing for the sole jurisdiction of Iranian courts, it would be expected that they would do so clearly and unambiguously. Thus, the Tribunal would be reluctant to assume such a task in the absence of a clear mandate to do so in the Algiers Declaration.

Halliburton, supra, at 5, 1 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 245. See also George W. Drucker, Jr. and Foreign Transaction Co., et al., Interlocutory Award No. ITL 4-121-FT, at 4-5 (5 Nov. 1982), reprinted in 1 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 252, 255; Stone & Webster Overseas Group, Inc. and National Petrochemical Company, et al., Interlocutory Award No. ITL 8-293-FT, at 4 (5 Nov. 1982), reprinted in 1 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 274, 276. Thus, in Halliburton and the other cited forum selection clause cases, the Tribunal held that it has no jurisdiction to decide whether forum selection clauses in the contracts at issue in cases before it are valid and enforceable. 124. To hold that the purpose of the forum clause exclusion contained in Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration was to protect the sole jurisdiction of the Iranian courts – or, in other words, that claims that the Tribunal excluded from its jurisdiction because of Iranian forum selection clauses must be brought in Iranian courts – would amount to holding that Iranian forum selection clauses in claims excluded from the Tribunal’s jurisdiction because of the forum clause exclusion are valid and enforceable. But if the Tribunal were so to hold, it would abjure its 1982 decision in the forum selection clause cases, see supra, para. 123, that it has no jurisdiction to determine the enforceability of such clauses. The Parties have not suggested that the Tribunal should reconsider its 1982 decision on that question, and the Tribunal is not disposed to do so. 125. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to determine the enforceability of forum selection clauses; that question is for national courts, not the Tribunal, to decide. Consequently the Tribunal is unable to hold that the failure of the United States to terminate litigation with respect to claims that the Tribunal dismissed because of the forum clause exclusion contained in Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration violated any obligation imposed on the United States by the Algiers Declarations. Accordingly, Iran’s Claim B is denied.

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3. Claim D a. The Parties’ Positions 126. Iran contends that the United States has breached General Principle B by permitting its nationals to ﬁle suits against Iran in United States courts after the date of the Algiers Declarations. The suits at issue were brought pursuant to Section 1 of Executive Order 12294, which permits lawsuits to be ﬁled for the sole purpose of tolling the statutes of limitation applicable in the United States while the Tribunal determines whether it has jurisdiction over the underlying claims. See supra, para. 28. Iran seeks a declaratory award ﬁnding that, by allowing the ﬁling of such suits, the United States violated General Principle B; ordering the United States to bring about the dismissal of such suits and to prohibit all further litigation of claims by United States nationals against Iran in United States courts; and ordering the United States to compensate Iran for the damages it suffered as a result of the United States breach, including the legal fees and court costs that Iran incurred in monitoring and defending against tolling suits ﬁled after 19 January 1981. 127. The United States contends that because General Principle B required it to terminate only the claims of its nationals against Iran that fell within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, it had to devise some mechanism to prevent claims rejected by the Tribunal on jurisdictional grounds from being barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. The mechanism the United States chose was to permit its nationals to initiate suits to toll the limitations period but then to suspend these suits immediately; the cases would remain inactive on the courts’ dockets but could be revived if the Tribunal found that it lacked jurisdiction over the underlying claims. 128. The United States argues, further, that under the suspension regime created by Executive Order 12294, it was unnecessary for Iran to ﬁle any responses to suits initiated to toll the limitations period. In support of this argument, the United States points out that in the many instances where Iran ﬁled no answer to such a tolling suit, it suffered no adverse consequences. The United States therefore contends that Iran’s claim must fail for lack of proof of damages. 129. Iran contends that because not all of the complaints ﬁled against it in United States courts mentioned whether the underlying claim also had been ﬁled with the Tribunal – and, thus, whether it was subject to suspension pursuant to Section 1 of Executive Order 12294 – Iran was forced to respond to these complaints or else it would be exposed to the risk of default judgments. Iran asserts, moreover, that it does not matter whether some of its actions may have turned out in retrospect not to be strictly necessary; since it was faced with a breach of the Algiers Declarations by the United States, it was entitled to take all reasonable measures to protect its interests. Iran argues that because the United

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States breached the Declarations, it has the burden of proving that Iran’s legal expenses were unreasonably incurred. b. The Tribunal’s Decision 130. In the ﬁrst sentence of General Principle B, the High Contracting Parties set forth as one of their purposes “to terminate all litigation as between the government of each party and the nationals of the other, and to bring about the settlement and termination of all such claims through binding arbitration.” In the second sentence of that Principle, moreover, the United States agreed “to prohibit all further litigation” based on claims by United States nationals against Iran. The issue is whether the mechanism provided in Section 1 of Executive Order 12294, permitting United States nationals to initiate suits after the date of the Algiers Declarations for the purpose of tolling the limitations period, is consistent with the above-quoted provisions in General Principle B. 131. The Tribunal ﬁnds that the mechanism chosen by the United States – allowing the ﬁling of suits to toll the limitations period22 – is not permitted by the ﬁrst sentence of General Principle B. To allow suits to be ﬁled, even for tolling purposes, conﬂicts, furthermore, with the letter and spirit of the United States undertaking in the second sentence of that Principle “to prohibit all further litigation” based on claims by United States nationals against Iran. It is difﬁcult to deny that such suits represent “further litigation” within the plain meaning of General Principle B. While General Principle B does not forbid that certain means be employed to allow claims outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to be preserved, the one means it clearly does forbid is the bringing of suits in United States courts after the date of the Algiers Declarations. Tolling the limitations period, by itself, would not conﬂict with those Declarations; it is the particular method chosen by the United States – the initiation of litigation in the United States after the date of the Declarations – that so conﬂicts. 132. Consequently, the Tribunal holds that by allowing the ﬁling of suits after the date of the Algiers Declarations, even for the limited purpose of tolling the applicable statutes of limitation, the United States did not act consistently with its obligations under General Principle B. 133. The Tribunal shall determine in a subsequent proceeding the nature and the extent of the damages, if any, incurred by Iran as a result of the United States authorizing the ﬁling of tolling suits. Iran will be expected to produce factual evidence of the losses it suffered as a result of its making appearances or ﬁling documents in United States courts subsequent to 19 January 1981 in the prudent defense of its interests with respect to tolling suits ﬁled after 22 And then immediately suspending those suits. Suspension of litigation has been discussed supra, at paras. 87, et seq.

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19 January 1981 asserting claims described in Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration or asserting claims ﬁled with the Tribunal until such time as those claims are dismissed by the Tribunal for lack of jurisdiction. The Tribunal also expects Iran to produce factual evidence of the losses it suffered as a result of monitoring the tolling suits and invites both parties to address the question of whether Iran should be compensated for those losses. See supra, paras. 101 and 102. 4. Claim E a. The Parties’ Positions 134. At issue in this claim is whether the United States was obliged under the Algiers Declarations to terminate litigation initiated by United States nationals against Iran in courts outside the United States. 135. Iran advances three principal arguments. First, it argues that under the international law principle of espousal of claims, the claims settlement agreement concluded by Iran and the United States extinguished all private claims of their nationals then in existence; that is, that agreement bound each country’s nationals absolutely. Hence, once Iran and the United States agreed in General Principle B “to terminate all litigation as between the government of each party and the nationals of the other, and to bring about the settlement and termination of all claims through binding arbitration,” United States nationals were precluded from bringing claims against Iran in any forum other than the Tribunal. While the United States does not have the power to control foreign courts, Iran contends, it does have the power to control the conduct of its citizens abroad. The United States was therefore required to take all necessary steps to prevent its nationals from suing Iran in fora outside the United States. 136. Second, Iran argues that the clause at the end of the second sentence of General Principle B requiring the United States “to prohibit all further litigation on such claims” necessarily refers to litigation in courts outside the United States. If not, that passage would be superﬂuous since the ﬁrst clause of the second sentence of General Principle B already requires the United States to terminate legal proceedings “in United States courts.” Iran therefore concludes that “such claims” refers to claims generally deﬁned in General Principle B, and not only to claims asserted in United States courts. 137. Third, Iran argues that Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Claims Settlement Declaration, which states that claims ﬁled with the Tribunal are considered “excluded from the jurisdiction of the courts of Iran, or of the United States, or of any other court,” obliges the United States to prevent its nationals from pursuing claims against Iran in “any other court,” including courts outside the United States.

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138. Iran seeks a declaratory award ﬁnding that, by failing to prohibit litigation initiated by United States nationals against Iran in courts outside the United States, the United States has breached General Principle B and Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Claims Settlement Declaration, and ordering the United States to compensate Iran for legal expenses and court costs incurred in defending against that litigation as well as for other damages Iran sustained as a result of the United States alleged breach. 139. The United States contends that the plain language of General Principle B obliges it to terminate only litigation in United States courts. General Principle B provides: Through the procedures provided in the [Claims Settlement Declaration], the United States agrees to terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts involving claims of United States persons and institutions against Iran and its state enterprises, to nullify all attachments and judgments obtained therein, to prohibit all further litigation based on such claims, and to bring about the termination of such claims through binding arbitration.

General Principle B says nothing about proceedings in foreign courts. Appealing to the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the United States argues that the speciﬁcation of an obligation with respect to United States courts excludes such an obligation in other courts. b. The Tribunal’s Decision 140. The critical question is whether, by undertaking “to prohibit all further litigation based on such claims,” the United States agreed to terminate litigation in courts outside the United States. 141. As an initial matter, the Tribunal dismisses Iran’s argument based on the principle of espousal of claims. The Tribunal has held previously that by entering into the Algiers Declarations, Iran and the United States did not espouse the claims of their nationals. See Islamic Republic of Iran and United States of America (Case No. A21), supra, para. 12, 14 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 330. 142. Turning next to the plain language of General Principle B, the Tribunal holds that the term “such claims” in the penultimate clause of General Principle B refers to the preceding clause, which requires the United States “to terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts.” Nothing in General Principle B suggests that “such claims” refers to litigation in courts outside the United States or that the United States undertook to terminate such litigation. 143. By expressly referring to “United States courts,” General Principle B conﬁnes the United States termination obligation to litigation pending in such courts – in other words, it excludes litigation pending in any other courts. The

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Tribunal is not prepared to assume that the language of General Principle B could be, or was, understood to accomplish more. The assumption by a state of an obligation to prohibit its nationals from litigating in foreign courts would be an extraordinary measure; if a party were to undertake such an obligation, one would expect it to do so explicitly. 144. Lastly, the Tribunal rejects Iran’s argument based on Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Claims Settlement Declaration. That Article provides: “Claims referred to the arbitration Tribunal shall, as of the date of ﬁling of such claims with the Tribunal, be considered excluded from the jurisdiction of the courts of Iran, or of the United States, or of any other court.” Nothing in this provision obliges the High Contracting Parties to prevent their nationals from pursuing claims in “any other court,” as Iran argues. See supra, para. 143. Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Claims Settlement Declaration means that once a claim is ﬁled with the Tribunal, that claim is considered excluded, at least initially, from the jurisdiction of any other court. If the Tribunal takes jurisdiction over the claim, the exclusion becomes permanent. If the Tribunal declines jurisdiction, the claimant may then pursue the claim elsewhere – in the courts of Iran, of the United States, or of another nation. 145. The Tribunal concludes that General Principle B does not oblige the United States to terminate litigation involving claims of United States nationals against Iran in courts outside the United States. This is the same conclusion reached by the Tribunal in E-Systems, Inc. and Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Interim Award No. ITM 13-388-FT, at 8 (4 Feb. 1983), reprinted in 2 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 51, 56. Iran’s Claim E is dismissed. 5. Claim F a. The Parties’ Positions 146. As part of a series of actions to implement the Algiers Declarations, on 19 January 1981 the President of the United States issued Executive Orders Nos. 12277 and 12279-12281, which nulliﬁed attachments of Iranian assets obtained by United States nationals in United States courts after 14 November 1979, the date on which the President had ordered the freezing of Iranian assets. See supra, para. 21. These Executive Orders left in place attachments obtained by United States nationals before 14 November 1979;23 this, Iran claims, is a breach of the Algiers Declarations. 23 Section 1-102(b) of each Executive Order provides: All rights, powers, and privileges relating to the properties [of the Government of Iran] which derive from any attachment, injunction, other like proceedings or process, or other action in any litigation after November 14, 1979, at 8:10 a.m. EST . . . are nulliﬁed, and all persons claiming any such right, power, or privilege are hereafter barred from exercising the same.

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147. Iran argues that Paragraphs 4-9 of the General Declaration, as well as General Principle B, require the United States to nullify attachments made before 14 November 1979. Paragraphs 4-9 require the United States to arrange for the transfer to Iran of “all Iranian assets” located in the United States on 19 January 1981 or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States on that date. Because those assets could not be moved as long as they were encumbered by judicial attachments, Paragraphs 4-9 of the General Declaration implicitly required the United States to lift attachments that restrained that property. This requirement is made explicit by General Principle B, which obliges the United States to “nullify all attachments and judgments obtained [in United States courts].” General Principle B, Iran contends, does not distinguish between attachments obtained before 14 November 1979 and those obtained thereafter. 148. Iran further argues that maintaining judicial attachments serves no legitimate purpose in cases within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, because the Security Account guarantees that all Tribunal awards rendered in the claims underlying the attachments will be satisﬁed. 149. Iran seeks a declaratory award ﬁnding that, by failing to nullify attachments obtained by United States nationals against Iran in United States courts before 14 November 1979, the United States has breached General Principle B; directing the United States to nullify all attachments obtained in United States courts in all proceedings involving claims of United States nationals against Iran, including attachments made before 14 November 1979; ordering the United States to compensate Iran for the damages it suffered as a result of the United States breach, including the legal fees and court costs that Iran incurred since 19 January 1981 in connection with pre-14 November 1979 attachment proceedings; awarding damages for the loss of use and the decrease in value of the assets restrained by attachments made before 14 November 1979; and ordering the United States to reimburse Iran for storage costs incurred since 19 January 1981 in connection with restrained assets. 150. The United States denies that the Algiers Declarations required it to nullify attachments that United States claimants had obtained, through normal processes and without Executive Branch license, before the President’s freeze of Iranian assets on 14 November 1979. The United States contends that Iran’s interpretation of General Principle B amounts to an implausible suggestion that the United States assumed an obligation to nullify all attachments, no matter how old, obtained by United States nationals against Iran in United States courts. 151. The United States argues that General Principle B’s requirement that the United States “nullify all attachments” must be interpreted in light of General Principle A, which obliges the United States to “restore the ﬁnancial

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position of Iran, in so far as possible, to that which existed prior to November 14, 1979.”24 In General Principle B, the United States thus agreed to nullify attachments only to the extent that this would fulﬁll its obligation under General Principle A to restore Iran to the ﬁnancial position it enjoyed prior to 14 November 1979. The United States did not agree to place Iran in a better ﬁnancial position by nullifying attachments made before 14 November 1979. 152. In response to this argument, Iran contends that General Principle A cannot reduce the United States obligation to nullify attachments made before 14 November 1979, since that Principle does not require the United States to reproduce Iran’s precise ﬁnancial situation as of 14 November 1979. Iran argues that such restoration can be accomplished only “on an overall basis.” This means that if Iran loses in certain areas, it will gain in others. 153. The United States further argues that Paragraph 9 of the General Declaration also conﬁnes the United States nulliﬁcation obligation to attachments made after 14 November 1979, because it provides that the transfer of Iranian properties is “subject to the provisions of U.S. law applicable prior to November 14, 1979.” The United States contends that those laws authorized legitimate judicial attachments of Iranian and other properties. 154. The United States also relies on the negotiating history of the Algiers Declarations. It contends that during the negotiations, Iran never demanded nulliﬁcation of attachments obtained before 14 November 1979, and the United States never offered or agreed to assume such an obligation. In particular, the United States points out, the Majlis resolution of 2 November 1980, see supra, para. 23, contained no demand that such attachments be nulliﬁed; the resolution, rather, focused on the removal of the effects of the United States President’s 14 November 1979 freeze order. The United States alleges that the only restraints on Iranian property that Iran requested the United States to lift were those resulting from that order. The United States asserts that the nulliﬁcation of attachments made before 14 November 1979 would have left the United States susceptible to lawsuits by United States claimants alleging unconstitutional takings. One would have expected to ﬁnd some discussion of this potential liability in the negotiating history if the United States had agreed to nullify those attachments. 155. Relying on the afﬁdavit of Roberts B. Owen, the Legal Adviser of the United States Department of State during the relevant period and a member 24 General Principle A reads in full: Within the framework of and pursuant to the provisions of the two Declarations of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, the United States will restore the ﬁnancial position of Iran, in so far as possible, to that which existed prior to November 14, 1979. In this context, the United States commits itself to ensure the mobility and free transfer of all Iranian assets within its jurisdiction, as set forth in Paragraphs 4-9.

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of the United States negotiating team, the United States alleges that during the negotiations Iran was given drafts of the Executive Orders that would implement the Algiers Declarations, which Orders explicitly provided for the nulliﬁcation only of attachments made after 14 November 1979. Thus, Iran must be deemed to have known that the United States would not nullify pre-14 November 1979 attachments and, by its silence, to have acquiesced in that position. The United States therefore argues that Iran should be estopped from asserting this claim. 156. Iran responds, ﬁrst, that it never agreed that the Executive Orders issued by the United States on 19 January 1981 form part of the context of the Algiers Declarations; those Executive Orders therefore cannot deﬁne the scope of the United States obligation to nullify attachments. Second, Iran argues that its alleged failure to object to the draft Executive Orders does not estop it from asserting its present claim. Third, Iran contends that the Executive Orders in question could not, and did not, amend or modify the Algiers Declarations. 157. At the Hearing, Iran conceded that during the negotiations, the United States negotiators showed it some draft Executive Orders, but Iran claims never to have agreed to their content. Mr. Behzad Nabavi, the head of the Iranian delegation that negotiated the Algiers Declarations, stated that the draft Executive Orders that the Iranian negotiators received on or about the date of the Algiers Declarations did not mention any date limitation on the nulliﬁcation of attachments in the United States; he asserted that if those drafts had contained any such limitation, the Iranian negotiators would have objected. b. The Tribunal’s Decision 158. The critical provisions for the resolution of this claim are General Principle A, Paragraphs 4-9 of the General Declaration, and General Principle B. In General Principle A, the United States undertook to “restore the ﬁnancial position of Iran, in so far as possible, to that which existed prior to November 14, 1979.” General Principle A goes on to provide: “In this context, the United States commits itself to ensure the mobility and free transfer of all Iranian assets within its jurisdiction, as set forth in Paragraphs 4-9 [of the General Declaration].”25 159. In the Tribunal’s view, the most logical reading of General Principle A is that the commitment of the United States to ensure the mobility and free transfer of all Iranian assets within its jurisdiction is expressly tied to, and limited by, the requirement in the same provision that the United States restore Iran’s ﬁnancial position to that existing prior to 14 November 1979. 25 Paragraph 9 of the General Declaration, in turn, requires the United States to “arrange, subject to the provisions of U.S. law applicable prior to November 14, 1979, for the transfer to Iran of all Iranian properties which are located in the United States and abroad and which are not within the scope of the preceding paragraphs.”

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160. In General Principle B, the United States agreed to terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts involving claims of United States nationals against Iran and “to nullify all attachments . . . obtained therein.” The question is whether the United States obligation to nullify “all attachments” covers attachments of Iranian property made both before and after 14 November 1979 or is limited to attachments made after that date. 161. The Tribunal holds that the United States obligation, under General Principle B, to nullify “all attachments” must be interpreted in light of General Principle A, which requires the United States to ensure the free disposition of Iranian assets – and thus, implicitly, to lift the attachments restraining those assets – only to the extent necessary to restore Iran’s ﬁnancial position to that existing before 14 November 1979. In Islamic Republic of Iran and United States of America, Interlocutory Award No. ITL 63-A15-FT, para. 24 (20 Aug. 1986), reprinted in 12 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 40, 49, the Tribunal stated: Before the imposition by the United States of economic sanctions in response to the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran and the detention of United States nationals, Iran had the free disposition of its assets in the United States, subject only to possible attachments in favour of United States or other corporations claiming damages against Iran or to possible set-off by banking institutions. Iran’s ﬁnancial position, therefore, will be restored only when it will have recovered the free disposition of the assets not attached or subject to set-off for the payment of commercial or ﬁnancial debts.

Thus, if Iranian assets were restrained by attachments on 14 November 1979, those attachments were a component of Iran’s ﬁnancial position at that date. To lift those attachments would therefore improve Iran’s position, rather than merely restore it. Hence, General Principle B should be understood as requiring the United States to nullify only attachments of Iranian property that were obtained by United States nationals in United States courts on or after 14 November 1979. 162. As to Iran’s argument that General Principle A cannot reduce the United States obligation to nullify attachments, the Tribunal has already found that General Principle A “must be understood as embodying broad legal commitments” of the Parties, Islamic Republic of Iran, supra, para. 17, 12 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 47. There is no reason why the time limitation contained in General Principle A should not be given effect in deﬁning the scope of the United States obligation, under General Principle B, to nullify “all attachments.” 163. In making its determination, the Tribunal considers it signiﬁcant that there is no indication that during the negotiation of the Algiers Declarations Iran ever demanded the nulliﬁcation of attachments obtained before 14 November 1979. Neither the Majlis resolution of 2 November 1980 nor any of the exchanges that followed explicitly deal with that issue.

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164. The Tribunal concludes that the Algiers Declarations do not oblige the United States to nullify attachments obtained by United States nationals against Iran in United States courts before 14 November 1979. Iran’s Claim F is denied. 6. Claim G a. The Parties’ Positions 165. On 19 January 1981, the United States issued Executive Orders to implement the Algiers Declarations. These Orders nulliﬁed attachments obtained by United States nationals against Iran in United States courts after 14 November 1979. In this claim, Iran asserts that the United States has violated the Algiers Declarations by failing to take a sufﬁciently active role in enforcing those Executive Orders so that all attachments were nulliﬁed promptly. 166. Iran alleges that some United States courts allowed attachments to remain in place as a result of the United States passivity in implementing those Executive Orders. For example, rather than intervening before the courts as a party, the United States merely ﬁled Statements of Interest in the various lawsuits. As a result, in several instances Iran was forced to appear in court to obtain the nulliﬁcation of attachments restraining its property. 167. Iran emphasizes that the key question is whether the United States complied with its obligation under General Principle B to nullify all attachments of Iranian assets, not whether the United States did everything in its power to achieve this result. 168. Iran seeks a declaratory award ﬁnding that, by failing to establish a mechanism ensuring prompt nulliﬁcation of attachments obtained by United States nationals against Iran in United States courts, the United States has breached General Principle B; directing the United States to nullify all existing attachments; ordering the United States to compensate Iran for all the damages it suffered as a result of the United States breach, including the legal fees and court costs that Iran incurred in obtaining court orders vacating attachments on Iranian assets; and awarding damages for the loss of use of those assets. 169. The United States denies Iran’s allegations and contends that it acted vigorously and promptly to nullify all attachments made after 14 November 1979 on Iranian property. On the date the Algiers Declarations were signed, the President of the United States issued a series of Executive Orders, which provided for the nulliﬁcation of all attachments obtained on Iranian property frozen by President Carter’s 14 November 1979 Executive Order. Subsequently, on 24 February 1981, the Department of the Treasury issued regulations implementing those Executive Orders. In the United States view, those Executive Orders and implementing regulations were sufﬁcient, by themselves, to allow the transfer to Iran of all Iranian assets that were required to be transferred pursuant to the Algiers Declarations.

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170. The United States contends, further, that the Executive Branch took extraordinary measures to ensure that United States courts would vacate all postfreeze attachments before the deadline established in the Declarations for that transfer. In January, February, June, and July of 1981, the Executive Branch ﬁled Statements of Interest in all proceedings pending against Iran in United States courts, including those involving attachments of Iranian assets. In addition, the Executive Branch ﬁled Statements in particular cases where it deemed that those four previous Statements were not sufﬁcient. Moreover, attorneys for the United States appeared at numerous hearings before federal and state courts to explain the terms of the Algiers Declarations and the requirements of the Executive Orders and implementing regulations. The United States maintains that the attachments were lifted as a result of these efforts, regardless of whether Iran took any action in court. Consequently, the United States argues that any legal fees or costs expended by Iran to vacate those attachments were unnecessary and therefore are not compensable. 171. At the Hearing, the United States presented as a witness Mr. David Anderson, the Director of the Federal Programs Branch of the Civil Division of the United States Department of Justice. Mr. Anderson oversaw the implementation of the United States obligations under the Algiers Declarations with regard to litigation, attachments, and judgments against Iran in United States courts. He conﬁrmed the United States statements described in the foregoing paragraph concerning the steps the United States took to attain the nulliﬁcation of attachments of Iranian property in United States courts. 172. The United States further asserts that virtually all the attachments were vacated before 20 July 1981. In cases where an attachment was not explicitly vacated by that date, either no property was attached, or the attachment had no legal effect because another lien covered the property and restrained its transfer. b. The Tribunal’s Decision 173. This claim raises two questions. The ﬁrst is whether the United States took a sufﬁciently active role in fulﬁlling its obligation under the Algiers Declarations to nullify attachments of Iranian assets made in United States courts after 14 November 1979. The second is whether the United States succeeded in nullifying those attachments within the period required by the Algiers Declarations. 174. As to the ﬁrst question, the Algiers Declarations impose on the United States a duty to implement them in good faith and to take steps to ensure their effectiveness. “This good faith obligation leaves a considerable latitude to the States Parties as to the nature of the procedures and mechanisms” applied to fulﬁll their treaty obligations. Islamic Republic of Iran and United States of America (Case No. A21), supra, para. 15, 14 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 331. The issue is

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whether the steps the United States took were adequate to satisfy this good faith obligation. 175. The evidence shows that the United States devoted extensive resources to carrying out this obligation. Nothing in the evidence suggests that the United States stopped short of doing everything it could pursuant to the procedures of its legal system to have all post-freeze attachments lifted. The Tribunal therefore holds that the United States has satisﬁed its good faith obligation in this respect. Consequently, Iran’s claim that the United States has failed to take a sufﬁciently active role in nullifying attachments made after 14 November 1979 is dismissed. 176. Concerning the second question, the United States agreed in General Principle B to “nullify all attachments . . . obtained [in United States courts].” The Tribunal has found that this nulliﬁcation obligation covered only attachments made on or after 14 November 1979. See supra, para. 161. The issue here is when the United States obligation to nullify such attachments arose. For the same reasons it relied upon when it determined the timing of the United States obligation to terminate litigation against Iran in United States courts, see supra, paras. 108-10, the Tribunal holds that the United States had six months from the date of the signing of the Algiers Declarations within which to nullify all post-freeze attachments of Iranian property. This also was the time-frame within which Iranian deposits and securities in United States banks had to be returned to Iran in accordance with Paragraph 6 of the General Declaration. See supra, note [18]. 177. If there were any post-freeze attachments that were still in effect and that actually restrained Iranian assets in the United States after that six-month period had expired, thereby limiting the free disposition of those assets by Iran, then they constitute a violation of the United States obligation to nullify postfreeze attachments in a timely fashion. The Tribunal shall determine in a subsequent proceeding whether any such attachments were still in effect at that date and, if so, the nature and the amount of damages, if any, Iran suffered as a result of those attachments. See supra, para. 102. 7. Claim H a. The Parties’ Positions 178. In this claim Iran contends that the United States has violated the Algiers Declarations by failing to nullify judgments obtained by United States nationals against Iran in United States courts before the date of the Algiers Declarations. Iran relies primarily on General Principle B, which obliges the United States “to terminate all legal proceedings . . . [and] to nullify all . . . judgments obtained therein.” 179. As noted, Section 1 of Executive Order 12294 suspended all claims against Iran that arguably fell within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and provided

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that such claims would have “no legal effect.” See supra, para. 28. Iran points out that the Executive Order does not explicitly nullify “judgments” obtained by United States nationals against Iran in United States courts; it may only suspend their legal effect to the extent that such judgments are treated as claims. In any event, suspension of judgments would not satisfy the United States obligation to nullify them. Iran maintains that, as a result of the United States violation, Iran was forced to appear in United States courts to vacate the judgments. 180. Iran seeks a declaratory award ﬁnding that, by failing to nullify judgments obtained by United States nationals against Iran in United States courts, the United States has breached General Principle B; directing the United States to nullify present, and prohibit future, judgments based on claims that were in existence on 19 January 1981; and ordering the United States to compensate Iran for legal fees and court costs incurred in vacating judgments in United States courts as well as for other damages Iran sustained as a result of the United States alleged breach. 181. The United States argues that it has treated judgments against Iran in the same way it has treated claims that arguably fell within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Executive Order 12294 provided that such claims would have “no legal effect” in any court of the United States. If a claim has no legal effect, the argument continues, then neither can a judgment based on such a claim. 182. The United States contends that, because Executive Order 12294 suspended all judgments based on claims arguably within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, Iran is in the same position with respect to judgments that it is in with respect to the claims that form the bases of those judgments; that is, if the Tribunal takes jurisdiction over the claim underlying a judgment, then the judgment is terminated when the Tribunal issues an award on the merits; if the Tribunal dismisses the claim for lack of jurisdiction, then the judgment can be revived in United States courts. 183. Of the cases identiﬁed by Iran where judgments allegedly remained in effect after 19 January 1981, the United States asserts that some cases lie outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, others do not exist under the docket numbers provided by Iran, and the remainder have been vacated or dismissed. The United States contends that, in any event, Iran has not identiﬁed any harm accruing from the United States alleged failure to nullify judgments in a sufﬁciently timely fashion. b. The Tribunal’s Decision 184. As an initial matter, for the same reasons it provided when determining the scope of the United States obligation to terminate claims against Iran, see supra, paras. 81-82, the Tribunal holds that the United States is obliged to nullify only judgments that are based on claims that are within the jurisdiction

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of the Tribunal, as deﬁned in Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration. As to when that obligation accrued, the reasoning behind the Tribunal’s decision concerning the timing of the United States obligation to terminate litigation against Iran applies with equal force here. See supra, paras. 108-10. Accordingly, the Tribunal holds that the United States had six months from the date of the signing of the Algiers Declarations within which to nullify judgments pursuant to General Principle B. 185. Executive Order 12294 provides that [a]ll claims which may be presented to the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal under the terms of Article II of the [Claims Settlement Declaration] . . . are hereby suspended . . . During the period of this suspension, all such claims shall have no legal effect in any action now pending in any court of the United States . . .

Thus, Executive Order 12294 does not speciﬁcally refer to “judgments.” The question therefore arises whether judgments obtained by United States nationals against Iran in United States courts are nevertheless included within the scope of that Order. 186. In the Tribunal’s view, the Algiers Declarations do not contemplate any distinction between a claim and a domestic court judgment entered thereon. A judgment has no status under the Declarations independent of the claim upon which it is based (see the conclusion reached by the Tribunal in Burton Marks, et al. and Islamic Republic of Iran, Interlocutory Award No. ITL 53-458-3 (26 Jun. 1985), reprinted in 8 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 290, 294-95). It should also be noted that there seems to be no dispute that Executive Order 12294 in fact suspended the execution of judgments in cases within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. See, e.g., American International Group, Inc., et al. and Islamic Republic of Iran, et al. Award No. 93-2-3, at 4 (19 Dec. 1983), reprinted in 4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 96, 98. The Tribunal therefore concludes that judgments were included within the scope of Executive Order 12294. 187. The resolution of Claim H, then, is similar to that of Claim A, because the judgments at issue in Claim H have no status independent of the claims at issue in Claim A. Pursuant to the Tribunal’s conclusions in Claim A, therefore, the United States is obliged to nullify only those judgments that are based on claims that the Tribunal decides on the merits. As to the United States obligations under Article I and Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Claims Settlement Declaration, the United States chose to implement them through Executive Order 12294 – that is, by suspending the judgments and declaring them to be without legal effect during the period of suspension. 188. In line with its conclusions in Claim A, the Tribunal holds that, if Iran reasonably incurred legal expenses in relation to judgments that remained in

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existence after 19 July 1981, then the United States breached its obligations under the Algiers Declarations concerning nulliﬁcation of judgments against Iran. This question can only be answered on the basis of factual evidence and therefore is one for the subsequent proceedings in this Case. See supra, paras. 101, et seq. B. Case No. A24 1. Iran’s Position 189. Iran contends that the claim pursued by Foremost and OPIC before the United States District Court for the District of Columbia is the same as the claim that was decided by the Tribunal in Foremost. Iran argues that, by allowing the Foremost/OPIC lawsuit to be brought before the District Court, the United States has breached its obligation under the Algiers Declarations to prohibit all further litigation of claims resolved by the Tribunal. More speciﬁcally, Iran asserts that the United States has breached General Principle B as well as Article IV, paragraph 1, and Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Claims Settlement Declaration. 190. Iran points out that the Complaint that Foremost and OPIC ﬁled in the United States District Court in January 1982 tracked the Statement of Claim they ﬁled before the Tribunal in Case No. 37. Iran asserts that the facts Foremost and OPIC presented to the District Court in support of their claim were identical to those they relied on before the Tribunal in Foremost. 191. Moreover, Iran contends that in deciding Foremost, the Tribunal considered all the relevant facts, including those that occurred after 19 January 1981 (in particular, events that occurred in October and November 1981). Iran states that the Tribunal “considered and evaluated developments even after that date to determine whether any” such events could “shed additional light on the claimed impairment” of Foremost’s shareholder rights before 19 January 1981. 192. Iran further contends that, by not terminating the Foremost/OPIC lawsuit once the Tribunal had decided the Foremost Case on the merits in 1986, the United States violated, in addition to the Algiers Declarations, the terms of Section 4 of Executive Order 12294. Section 4 provides, in relevant part, that “[a] determination by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal on the merits that a claimant is not entitled to recover on a claim shall operate as a ﬁnal resolution and discharge of the claim for all purposes.” 193. Iran seeks a declaratory award ﬁnding that, by allowing the Foremost/OPIC lawsuit to proceed in the United States District Court, the United States has breached General Principle B as well as Article IV, paragraph 1, and Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Claims Settlement Declaration; ordering

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the United States to terminate the Foremost/OPIC lawsuit and to prohibit any future litigation of that claim; and ordering the United States to reimburse Iran for the legal expenses incurred in monitoring and defending against the Foremost/OPIC lawsuit. 2. The United States Position 194. The United States contends that it has no obligation to terminate the litigation in the United States District Court because Foremost and OPIC’s claim in that forum is different from the claim decided by the Tribunal in Foremost. The latter was for an expropriation alleged to have occurred in 1980, while the former is for an expropriation alleged to have occurred in October 1981. 195. The United States argues that the claim before the United States District Court is based on a broader set of facts than the claim decided by the Tribunal in Foremost. According to the United States, Foremost and OPIC allege new facts before the District Court, including new and intensiﬁed expropriatory measures that arose or continued after January 1981. The United States concedes that Foremost and OPIC also reallege facts that were already before the Tribunal in Foremost but contends that the addition of the new allegations of events that occurred after the Tribunal’s jurisdictional cutoff date means that the claim before the District Court is different from the one decided by the Tribunal. 196. The United States further argues that, even if Foremost and OPIC had presented no new facts to the District Court, the United States still would not have been obligated to terminate the District Court lawsuit because the Tribunal in its Foremost Award did not resolve and could not resolve on the merits the claim now before the District Court. While the Tribunal held that the expropriation claim was not ripe by 19 January 1981, it made no determination as to whether the claim could be considered ripe at a later date. Indeed, the United States continues, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to determine whether a taking of the property in question occurred at any date after 19 January 1981. Consequently, because the Algiers Declarations do not require the United States to terminate claims that do not fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, the United States had no obligation to preclude the Foremost/OPIC lawsuit. 197. The United States points out, moreover, that its obligation to terminate the claim decided by the Tribunal was satisﬁed through Section 4 of Executive Order 12294. That section provides that a “determination by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal on the merits that a claimant is not entitled to recover on a claim shall operate as a ﬁnal resolution and discharge of the claim for all purposes.”

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3. The Tribunal’s Decision a. The Foremost/OPIC lawsuit during the period from 11 April 1986 until 1 April 1988 198. The Statement of Claim Foremost submitted to the Tribunal in Case No. 37 on 16 November 1981 and the Complaint it ﬁled on 22 January 1982 before the District Court for the District of Columbia for purposes of tolling the limitations period were identical. The two documents named the same parties; they invoked the same cause of action; they alleged the same facts in support of the claim for the expropriation of Foremost’s ownership interest in Pak Dairy; and they sought compensation in the same amount. In its 1982 Complaint before the District Court and, subsequently, in its Veriﬁed Amended Complaint of 13 December 1990, Foremost conﬁrmed that its Statements of Claim before the Tribunal concerned “the subject matter of this [i.e., District Court] action.”26 199. It is true that, while the Statements of Claim before the Tribunal specifically alleged that “[t]he claims asserted [therein] were outstanding on January 19, 1981” [Statement of Claim in Case No. 37, para. 8], the Complaint before the District Court did not speciﬁcally state that the claim asserted therein was likewise outstanding at that date. In the Tribunal’s view, however, this apparent difference does not mean that the Complaint before the District Court was broader than the Statements of Claim before the Tribunal in that it arguably also included an expropriation claim that arose after 19 January 1981. The reference to the 19 January 1981 cutoff date in the Statements of Claim before the Tribunal was intended merely to place the claims in Cases Nos. 37 and 231 squarely within the jurisdictional parameters set by the Algiers Declarations.27 It did not affect the substance of the claims. Because there was no jurisdictional requirement before the United States District Court that the claim be outstanding at 19 January 1981, silence in the Complaint as to this fact is irrelevant to the issue discussed in the present paragraph. 200. Neither the Statements of Claim in Foremost nor the Complaint ﬁled before the United States District Court indicated a speciﬁc date for the alleged taking of Foremost’s ownership interest in Pak Dairy. Rather, they both included references to expropriatory actions by Iran alleged to have occurred both before and after 19 January 1981. 201. In Foremost, the Tribunal concluded that Iran’s interference with Foremost’s rights did not, by 19 January 1981, amount to an expropriation. See id. 26 At the Hearing, Mr. Mark Joelson, Counsel for Plaintiffs in the Foremost/OPIC lawsuit before the United States District Court, stated that it was the Tribunal’s 11 April 1986 decision in Foremost that caused Plaintiffs, in April 1988, to change their legal theory from a pre-19 January 1981 to a post-19 January 1981 expropriation. 27 Pursuant to Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration, a claim had to be “outstanding” at 19 January 1981 in order for it to fall within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

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at 31, 10 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 250. In reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal considered also certain events that had occurred after that date, namely, that Foremost representatives on Pak Dairy’s board of directors played an active role in the company’s affairs until October 1981, when Foremost chose to withdraw them. See id. at 28-29, 10 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 248. 202. The Tribunal’s decision in Foremost represents both its ﬁnding that the claim before it fell within its jurisdiction and its ﬁnal resolution of that claim. The Tribunal has held that once a claim is found by the Tribunal to fall within its jurisdiction, the United States is required by the Algiers Declarations to terminate ﬁnally all litigation related to such claim in United States courts. See supra, paras. 82-83 and 89-91. As noted, the Statement of Claim Foremost presented to the Tribunal in Case No. 37 and the original Complaint it ﬁled in 1982 before the District Court were identical; and they so remained until 1 April 1988, when Foremost ﬁled its Motion for Summary Judgment against Iran before the District Court, see supra, para. 43, alleging a different date for the expropriation of Foremost’s ownership interest in Pak Dairy. 203. The Tribunal holds that, by not acting to have the Foremost/OPIC lawsuit in the District Court dismissed from the District Court’s docket within a reasonable time after 11 April 1986, the date the Tribunal issued its award in Foremost, the United States has violated its obligation under the Algiers Declarations to terminate ﬁnally litigation in United States courts related to claims resolved by the Tribunal on the merits. 204. Even if the original Complaint Foremost and OPIC ﬁled before the District Court was broader than the Statements of Claim they ﬁled before the Tribunal in Foremost, see supra, para. 199, the United States still would have been obliged under the Algiers Declarations to put the District Court on notice, within a reasonable time after 11 April 1986, that proceedings in the Foremost/OPIC lawsuit were to be considered terminated to the extent they related to that portion of the claim that had been decided by the Tribunal in Foremost (i.e., the claim for a pre-19 January 1981 expropriation of Foremost’s ownership interest in Pak Dairy). 205. As a result of the United States omission, Iran is entitled to damages to the extent it was reasonably compelled in the prudent defense of its interests to make appearances or ﬁle documents with respect to the Foremost/OPIC lawsuit from 11 April 1986 until 1 April 1988, to the extent those expenses are not already sought by Iran in Case No. A15(IV). See supra, paras. 101, et seq. b. The Foremost/OPIC lawsuit from 1 April 1988 onward 206. As noted earlier in this Award, on 1 April 1988, Foremost and OPIC ﬁled a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Iran before the United

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States District Court for the District of Columbia, thereby reviving the lawsuit that had been initiated in 1982 for the purpose of tolling the statute of limitations. In this connection, the Tribunal recalls that the Algiers Declarations do not prohibit the preservation of those claims that the Tribunal would ultimately determine fell outside its jurisdiction. See supra, para. 131. Thus, the fact that the United States preserved such claims, including Foremost and OPIC’s claim against Iran, is not inconsistent with the Algiers Declarations. 207. In their Motion for Summary Judgment of 1 April 1988, the plaintiffs in the Foremost/OPIC lawsuit in the United States stated: Plaintiffs fully accept, as they must, the conclusion of the majority of the arbitral panel to the effect that there had been no expropriation as of January 19, 1981. Since the Tribunal determined that the expropriation claim had not ripened within the time period submitted to its jurisdiction, it did not purport to rule on the merits of a post-January 19, 1981 expropriation claim. This issue is now suitable for hearing and disposition by this Court . . .

See supra, para. 43. The plaintiffs went on to allege that Iran expropriated Foremost’s equity interest in Pak Dairy in October 1981. Likewise, in their Veriﬁed Amended Complaint of 13 December 1990, the plaintiffs alleged speciﬁcally that “[a]s of October 1981, Iran had deprived McKesson entirely of the enjoyment of its ownership interest in Pak Dairy.” The plaintiffs based that allegation on numerous facts that occurred before and after 19 January 1981. According to the plaintiffs, acts of interference carried out by Iran prior to 19 January 1981, combined with acts carried out thereafter, led to the expropriation of Foremost’s interest in Pak Dairy in October 1981. In their Veriﬁed Amended Complaint, the plaintiffs also increased the amount of damages to include Foremost’s full 31 percent ownership interest in Pak Dairy and stated an alternative theory of recovery (Iran’s tortious interference with Foremost’s rights as a minority shareholder in Pak Dairy). In addition, the plaintiffs excluded the dividends awarded to Foremost by the Tribunal in its 1986 Award from their claim for recovery of dividends owed up to the date of the alleged expropriation. 208. The Tribunal has recognized that an expropriation can be carried out, not only by way of a single act, but also by way of a series of interferences with the enjoyment of the property concerned. “[T]he breach forming the cause of action is deemed to take place on the day when the interference has ripened into more or less irreversible deprivation of the property rather than on the beginning date of the events.” International Technical Products Corp., et al. and Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Award No. 196-302-3, at 49 (28 Oct. 1985), reprinted in 9 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 206, 240. 209. Although the Foremost/OPIC lawsuit, as pursued from 1 April 1988 onward, relies, to a large extent, on the same facts as those invoked in the claim

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before the Tribunal, the cause of action alleged in that lawsuit is materially different from that considered by the Tribunal in Foremost: the issue before the Tribunal was whether Iran had expropriated Foremost’s property on or prior to 19 January 1981; the issue before the District Court was whether Iran had expropriated Foremost’s property after that date. In the Tribunal’s view, extensive reliance on the same facts, without more, does not cause two claims between the same parties that are based on different causes of action to become identical for purposes of precluding a claim. In this connection, it should also be noted that in the Foremost/OPIC lawsuit, the plaintiffs asserted new rights based on facts that they had not relied on before the Tribunal in Foremost, namely, Iran’s alleged failure to pay stock and cash dividends that were declared and became due only after 19 January 1981. See supra, paras. 43-44. “[A] claim based on a distinct injury is an assertion of a new right – a right that has been violated – and would be considered as a new case.”28 210. Although in Foremost the Tribunal considered certain events that took place after 19 January 1981, it limited its decision to a determination that no expropriation had occurred on or prior to that date. It held: “Having examined the totality of the evidence in the present Cases, the Tribunal reaches the conclusion, on balance, that the interference with the substance of Foremost’s rights did not, by 19 January 1981, and still less by 27 May 1980, amount to an expropriation.” Foremost, supra, at 31, 10 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 250. (Emphasis added.) The Tribunal did not, and was not competent to, decide whether an expropriation had materialized after that date.29 The consideration by the Tribunal of certain facts that occurred after 19 January 1981 for the purpose of clarifying Iran’s relevant behavior on or before that date, see supra, para. 201, cannot imply any binding determination about whether Iran’s behavior after 19 January 1981 amounted to an expropriation.30 211. What is important here is that the Tribunal would not have been competent to decide on the merits the claim before the District Court as pursued by Foremost and OPIC from 1 April 1988 onward. This factor is crucial. Consequently, the conclusion is unavoidable that the Foremost/OPIC lawsuit, as pursued from 1 April 1988 onward, does not fall within the scope of the res judicata of the Tribunal’s decision in Foremost and, therefore, is not contrary to the Algiers Declarations. 28 29

Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals 345 (1987). The Tribunal deﬁned its task in Foremost as “to evaluate the rights Foremost had in Pak Dairy in the period prior to the alleged expropriation; the extent to which these rights were diminished or interfered with prior to 19 January 1981; and, ﬁnally, whether such interference amounts in law to an expropriation giving rise to a right to compensation.” Foremost, supra, at 28, 10 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 248. 30 It should be noted that the Tribunal did not make any ﬁndings with respect to Iran’s alleged failure to pay Foremost dividends that became due after 19 January 1981.

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212. The Tribunal now turns to the Memorandum Opinion rendered by the United States Court for the District of Columbia on 23 June 1997 in the Foremost/OPIC lawsuit, holding that Iran’s interference with Plaintiffs’ shareholder rights in Pak Dairy had ripened into an expropriation by April 1982. See supra, para. 47. As an initial matter, that Opinion shows that the only claim considered by the District Court was a claim for an expropriation of Plaintiffs’ ownership interests in Pak Dairy that occurred after 19 January 1981. As to whether the Opinion respects the ﬁnal and binding character of the Tribunal’s award in Foremost, the Tribunal holds that it so does. In this connection, it should be recalled that in Foremost, the Tribunal found that Iran’s interference with Foremost’s ownership interests in Pak Dairy did not, by 19 January 1981, amount to an expropriation. The Memorandum Opinion does not question this ﬁnding by the Tribunal, as that Opinion holds that Iran’s interference with Plaintiffs’ shareholder rights in Pak Dairy ripened into an expropriation by April 1982. Furthermore, the Memorandum Opinion gives preclusive effect to all of the Tribunal’s ﬁndings in Foremost concerning matters that were within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction as deﬁned in Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration. It should be beyond dispute that only such ﬁndings acquired the force of res judicata and are thus covered by the ﬁnal and binding language of Article IV, paragraph 1, of that Declaration.31 For these reasons, the Tribunal concludes that the Opinion does not impinge upon the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and authority. 213. For the foregoing reasons, Iran’s claim in this Case, to the extent it relates to the period beginning on 1 April 1988, must be dismissed. vii. award 214.

In view of the foregoing,

THE TRIBUNAL DETERMINES AS FOLLOWS: A. IN CASE NO. A15(IV): a. On Claim A: (1) General Principle B obliges the United States to terminate only claims by United States nationals against Iran in United States courts that fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. This termination obligation accrues once the Tribunal has decided a claim on the merits. (2) The Algiers Declarations oblige the United States to terminate all legal proceedings initiated by United States nationals against Iran in United 31 “An arbitral tribunal is one of large and exclusive powers within its prescribed limits, but it is as impotent as a morning mist when it is outside these limits.” Bin Cheng, supra, at 259. (Quoting from the French Company of Venezuelan Railroads Case (1905).)

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States courts involving claims that arguably fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The United States obligation to terminate legal proceedings arose on 19 July 1981, six months after the signing of the Algiers Declarations; that obligation ceases with regard to legal proceedings involving claims that have been dismissed by the Tribunal for lack of jurisdiction. Claims that the Tribunal has decided are within its jurisdiction can never be revived in domestic courts. (3) The suspension mechanism provided for in Executive Order 12294 satisﬁes the United States termination obligations under the Algiers Declarations only if, in effect, the mechanism resulted in a termination of litigation as required by those Declarations. The Tribunal will examine the facts bearing on this issue in the second phase of these proceedings. If, as a result of such examination, the Tribunal concludes that Iran was reasonably compelled in the prudent defense of its interests to make appearances or ﬁle documents in United States courts subsequent to 19 July 1981 in any litigation in respect of claims described in Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration or in respect of claims ﬁled with the Tribunal until such time as those claims are dismissed by the Tribunal for lack of jurisdiction, then the Tribunal will ﬁnd that the United States has not complied with its obligations under General Principle B of the General Declaration and Article I and Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Claims Settlement Declaration. In that event, the United States will be required to compensate Iran for any expenses that Iran was caused to incur as a result of making appearances or ﬁling documents in United States courts after 19 July 1981 in any litigation in respect of claims described hereabove. (4) The Tribunal expects Iran to show in the second phase of these proceedings what expenses it incurred with respect to each speciﬁc case and what was the particular justiﬁcation for the speciﬁc sums it spent. Iran will be expected to produce factual evidence of the losses it suffered as a result of its making appearances or ﬁling documents in United States courts subsequent to 19 July 1981 in the prudent defense of its interests with respect to the claims described in subparagraph (3) hereabove. The Tribunal also expects Iran to produce factual evidence of the losses it suffered as a result of the monitoring of the suspended claims and invites both parties to address the question of whether Iran should be compensated for those losses. (5) The Tribunal will not award any damages related to, or arising from, Iran’s participation in United States court litigation during the six-month period following the signing of the Algiers Declarations. Nor will it award any damages related to, or arising from, Iran’s participation in cases

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regarding the validity and constitutionality of the Algiers Declarations under United States law. b. On Claim A: (1) By allowing, in Section 6 of Executive Order 12294, the assertion of counterclaims and claims for set-off by United States nationals against Iran in United States court proceedings, even if those counterclaims and claims are included within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, the United States failed to comply with its obligations under General Principle B and Article I of the Claims Settlement Declaration. (2) In the second phase of these proceedings, the Tribunal shall determine the nature and the amount of the damages incurred by Iran, if any, in defending against counterclaims and claims for set-off asserted in United States court proceedings in violation of the Algiers Declarations. c. Claim B is dismissed. d. On Claim D: (1) By allowing, in Section 1 of Executive Order 12294, the ﬁling of suits after the date of the Algiers Declarations, even for the limited purpose of tolling the applicable statutes of limitation, the United States did not act consistently with its obligations under General Principle B. (2) The Tribunal shall determine in the second phase of these proceedings the nature and the extent of the damages, if any, incurred by Iran as a result of the United States authorizing the ﬁling of tolling suits. Iran will be expected to produce factual evidence of the losses it suffered as a result of its making appearances or ﬁling documents in United States courts subsequent to 19 January 1981 in the prudent defense of its interests with respect to tolling suits ﬁled after 19 January 1981 asserting claims described in Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration or asserting claims ﬁled with the Tribunal until such time as those claims are dismissed by the Tribunal for lack of jurisdiction. The Tribunal also expects Iran to produce factual evidence of the losses it suffered as a result of monitoring the tolling suits and invites both parties to address the question of whether Iran should be compensated for those losses. e. Claim E is dismissed. f. Claim F is dismissed. g. On Claim G: (1) Iran’s claim that the United States has failed to take a sufﬁciently active role in nullifying attachments obtained by United States nationals on Iranian assets in the United States after 14 November 1979 is dismissed.

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(2) If any post-14 November 1979 attachments were still in effect and actually restrained Iranian assets in the United States after 19 July 1981, thereby limiting the free disposition of those assets by Iran, then this would constitute a violation of the United States obligation to nullify post-14 November 1979 attachments in a timely fashion. The Tribunal shall determine in the second phase of these proceedings whether any such attachments were still in effect at that date and, if so, the nature and the amount of damages, if any, Iran suffered as a result of those attachments. h. On Claim H: (1) The United States is obliged to nullify only those United States court judgments obtained by United States nationals against Iran that are based on claims that are within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. This obligation accrued on 19 July 1981. (2) If Iran reasonably incurred legal expenses in relation to any such judgments that remained in existence after 19 July 1981, then the United States breached its obligations under the Algiers Declarations concerning nulliﬁcation of judgments against Iran. The Tribunal shall determine in the second phase of these proceedings whether any such judgments were still in effect at that date and, if so, the nature and the amount of damages, if any, Iran suffered as a result of those judgments. B. IN CASE NO. A24: (1) By not acting to have the Foremost/OPIC lawsuit in the District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed from the District Court’s docket within a reasonable time after 11 April 1986, the date the Tribunal issued its award in Foremost, the United States violated its obligation under the Algiers Declarations to terminate litigation in United States courts related to claims resolved by the Tribunal on the merits. (2) As a result of the United States omission, Iran is entitled to damages to the extent it was reasonably compelled in the prudent defense of its interests to make appearances or ﬁle documents with respect to the Foremost/OPIC lawsuit from 11 April 1986 until 1 April 1988, to the extent those expenses are not already sought by Iran in Case No. A15 (IV). The Tribunal shall determine in the second phase of these proceedings the nature and the amount of Iran’s damages, if any. (3) Iran’s Claim in this Case, to the extent it relates to the Foremost/OPIC lawsuit as pursued from 1 April 1988 onward, is dismissed.

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C. FURTHER PROCEEDINGS: The Tribunal will describe and schedule by separate Order further proceedings and submissions in these Cases. Separate Opinion of George H. Aldrich, Richard C. Allison, and Charles T. Duncan, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part.[1] We concur in the Award in these two Cases, except for certain ﬁndings in Claim D of Case No. A15(IV) and in Case No. A24. In Claim A of Case No. A15(IV), the Tribunal correctly holds that “[o]bligations under General Principle B are, generally speaking, obligations of ‘result,’ rather than of ‘conduct’ or ‘means’.” Award, para. 95. For this reason, the Tribunal concludes that it need not answer the abstract question of whether the United States breached General Principle B by authorizing the suspension of litigation rather than its termination, but rather holds that the United States breached General Principle B only if, in practice, suspension of litigation proved less effective than termination. Award, paras. 95 and 98. That is, in Claim A the Tribunal concludes that the United States breached General Principle B only if “Iran was reasonably compelled in the prudent defense of its interests to make appearances or ﬁle documents in United States courts subsequent to 19 July 1981 in any litigation in respect of claims described in Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration or in respect of claims ﬁled with the Tribunal until such time as those claims are dismissed by the Tribunal for lack of jurisdiction.” Award, para. 101. We concur in that conclusion. Having followed that logical and pragmatic approach in Claim A, the Tribunal proceeds to ignore it in Claim D of Case No. A15(IV) and in Case No. A24. The resolution of Claim D follows directly from the resolution of Claim A, and Case No. A24 is a speciﬁc application of the standards set forth in Claim A, yet the Tribunal’s resolution of both of these claims is entirely at odds with Claim A. While in those two cases, the Tribunal properly ﬁnds the same factspeciﬁc, limited liability of the United States – that is, liability only to the extent, if any, that Iran was reasonably compelled in the prudent defense of its interests to make appearances or ﬁle documents in United States courts in any litigation in respect of claims described in paragraph 101 of the Award – the Tribunal nevertheless, in Claim D and Case No. A24, unnecessarily and erroneously divines non-existent obligations and holds the United States in breach thereof. While no additional liability results from these gratuitous ﬁndings of breaches, [1 Signed 28 December 1998; ﬁled 28 December 1998.]

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we believe the Tribunal should have remained consistent with its analysis in Claim A and should have held that the United States was in breach of its obligations in Claim D and in Case No. A24 only if Iran was reasonably compelled in the prudent defense of its interests to make appearances or ﬁle documents in any litigation in respect of claims described in paragraph 101 of the Award. We therefore dissent from the Tribunal’s conclusion in Claim D that the United States failed to act consistently with General Principle B by authorizing lawsuits in its courts for the limited purpose of tolling the statutes of limitations. Award, para. 132. We also dissent from three of the Tribunal’s holdings in Case No. A24: that the claim Foremost ﬁled in the Tribunal was identical with the claim it ﬁled in District Court; that because the claims were identical, the United States breached the Algiers Declarations by failing to have Foremost’s case in the District Court dismissed within a reasonable time after the Tribunal issued its award; and, that even if Foremost’s claim in the Tribunal had not been identical with its claim in the District Court, the United States would still have violated the Algiers Declarations by failing to put the District Court on notice of that portion of Foremost’s claim that had been decided by the Tribunal. Award, paras. 198, 203 and 204. case no. a15(iv) claim d By Executive Order 12294 of 24 February 1981 (the “Executive Order”), the President of the United States suspended the prosecution in United States courts of all claims that might be presented to the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal pursuant to Article II of the Claims Settlement Declaration. The Executive Order provided that during the period of suspension, the suspended claims would “have no legal effect.” The suspension of any such claim would terminate, however, if the Tribunal were to ﬁnd that it lacked jurisdiction over the claim. In order to prevent the passage of time from barring a claim against Iran or the United States over which the Tribunal would ultimately determine that it did not have jurisdiction, the Executive Order authorized the ﬁling of an action designed to toll the running of the statute of limitations. While recognizing that General Principle B of the General Declaration did not preclude steps intended to preserve claims that fell outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, the Tribunal nevertheless holds in the context of Iran’s Claim D in Case No. A15(IV) that the method selected by the United States to preserve such claims – the tolling suit – violated its General Principle B commitment to terminate the litigation of claims against Iran and to prohibit all further litigation based on such claims. Award, paras. 131-132. Simply by posing the question of whether the United States authorization of tolling suits violated General Principle B, the Tribunal ignores the careful

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and pragmatic approach it adopted in Claim A. The Tribunal held in Claim A that the United States could be considered to have violated General Principle B only if Iran was required to ﬁle documents or make appearances with respect to the claims described in paragraph 101, and the proper resolution of Claim D follows directly from that holding. Pursuant to Claim A, just as it is irrelevant whether, in the abstract, “suspension” can be said to equal General Principle B’s requirement of “termination,” it is likewise irrelevant whether, in the abstract, the tolling suit mechanism can be said to be inconsistent with the requirements of General Principle B. Whether a suit had been ﬁled in the United States courts before the signing of the Algiers Declarations or only after by means of a tolling suit, the scope of United States liability is the same: The United States breached General Principle B and must pay damages to the extent, if any, that Iran was compelled in the prudent defense of its interests to ﬁle documents or make appearances in United States courts with respect to the claims discussed in paragraph 101. And that liability is unrelated to any conclusion the Tribunal might reach as to the appropriateness of the tolling suit mechanism; that is, the Tribunal’s conclusion that the tolling suit mechanism was inconsistent with General Principle B does not subject the United States to any liability if Iran was not compelled to ﬁle documents or make appearances in United States courts with respect to such suits. The Tribunal recognizes this in its description of United States liability in paragraph 133. Conversely, the United States could not escape liability had the Tribunal determined that the tolling suit mechanism was consistent with General Principle B if Iran was in fact compelled to ﬁle documents or make appearances in United States courts with respect to such suits. The United States obligation is one of result. Regrettably, the Tribunal’s conclusion that the tolling suit mechanism violates General Principle B is not only unnecessary and without effect on the liability of the United States; it is also wrong. It is too evident for discussion that a state party to an international agreement is bound to implement its terms in good faith. See Islamic Republic of Iran and United States of America, DEC 62-A21-FT, para. 14 (4 May 1987) reprinted in 14 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 324, 330. However, as the Award correctly states at paragraph 96, the speciﬁc manner of compliance is – unless it is stipulated in the agreement itself – left up to the complying state. Id. at 331. That is not to say that the complying state has absolute discretion as to whether its chosen mechanism for compliance is consonant with the terms of the treaty. The mechanism must by any objective standard be both reasonable and effective. The tolling suit mechanism was both. Paralyzed and of “no legal effect” from the moment of its ﬁling, the tolling suit can hardly be deemed “litigation” in any normal sense. Moreover, any of the other conceivable methods by which the United States might have preserved the claims pending the Tribunal’s jurisdictional determination were certain to have raised complex and

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difﬁcult issues that would have been costly and vexatious to Iran. The tolling suit mechanism raised none of those difﬁculties; most importantly, it gave Iran exactly what it was entitled to expect under General Principle B – freedom from litigation of claims that were to be decided by the Tribunal. Consequently, we dissent from the Tribunal’s conclusion in paragraphs 131 and 132 of the Award that the tolling suit device was inconsistent with the obligations of the United States contained in General Principle B. case no. a24 In Claim A of Case No. A15(IV), the Tribunal set forth with great care and detail the obligations the United States assumed in adhering to General Principle B. The Tribunal held that the United States breached General Principle B if Iran was reasonably compelled in the prudent defense of its interests to make appearances or ﬁle documents subsequent to 19 July 1981 in any litigation in respect of claims described in paragraph 101. It went on [to] say that it would, in the second phase of proceedings, apply that standard to the facts of the cases in American courts in which Iran claims a violation. However, one of those cases, Case No. A24, had already been consolidated with Case No. A15(IV) and so provided the Tribunal its ﬁrst opportunity to apply the standards it established in Claim A to a particular case ﬁled in United States courts. In 1959, the Foremost group of companies (“Foremost”) joined a group of Iranian citizens to establish a dairy, Sherkat Sahami Labaniat Pasteurize Pak (“Pak Dairy”), in Iran. Foremost’s equity interests in Pak Dairy ﬂuctuated over the years until, by 1979, Foremost owned or controlled 31% of Pak Dairy’s shares. During its 20 years of involvement with Pak Dairy, and regardless of its level of ownership interests therein, Foremost played a major role in the company’s management. According to Foremost, beginning in late 1978, the Iranian government entities that were shareholders in Pak Dairy launched a concerted effort to drive Foremost out of Pak Dairy. Foremost believed that the Iranian government entities undertook a series of actions over a period of three to four years which had the cumulative effect of depriving Foremost of the use and beneﬁt of its 31% interest in the company. Consequently, Foremost ﬁled law suits against Iran, claiming, in essence, that Iran had effected a creeping expropriation of its ownership interests in Pak Dairy.2 Foremost ﬁled its lawsuits before two different bodies. First, Foremost ﬁled two Statements of Claim before the Iran-United 2 A “creeping expropriation” refers to a series of events, which at some point culminate in an expropriation. Since there is no single expropriatory action, it can at times be difﬁcult to ﬁx with certitude the date at which the events ripened into an irreversible taking of property.

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States Claims Tribunal.3 The Tribunal has jurisdiction only over claims outstanding on 19 January 1981, so for Foremost to prevail in the Tribunal, it had to prove that Iran’s creeping expropriation had culminated by that date. See Claims Settlement Declaration, Art. II, para. 1. Fully aware of this jurisdictional requirement, Foremost alleged in its Statements of Claim that “[t]he claims asserted herein were outstanding on January 19, 1981 . . .” Next, Foremost ﬁled a complaint against Iran in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for the purpose of tolling the applicable statute of limitations. The United States District Court’s jurisdiction is not limited to claims arising by 19 January 1981, so Foremost’s complaint before the District Court contains no speciﬁc allegations as to the date at which Iran’s actions ripened into an expropriation. Foremost’s claim before the District Court was immediately suspended by Executive Order 12294, and the Tribunal proceeded to decide the claims before it. On 11 April 1986, the Tribunal decided, among other things, that “on balance [Iran’s] interference with the substance of Foremost’s rights did not, by 19 January 1981, . . . amount to an expropriation.” See Foremost Tehran, et al. and Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Award No. 220-37/231-1 (11 April 1986), reprinted in 10 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 228, 250. Two years later, on 1 April 1988, Foremost revived its suit in the District Court by ﬁling a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. As the Award notes in para. 207, Foremost made clear in that Motion that it accepted the Tribunal’s determination that the expropriation did not culminate prior to 19 January 1981 and was pursuing in the District Court only a claim for an expropriation culminating after that date. The Tribunal, in Case No. A24, states at the outset that the Statement of Claim Foremost ﬁled in Case No. 37 before the Tribunal and the complaint it ﬁled before the District Court “were identical.” Award, para. 198. The Tribunal then reasons that because the two claims were identical, the United States should have had Foremost’s suit in the District Court dismissed within a reasonable time after the Tribunal issued its award, and by failing to do so, the United States “violated its obligation under the Algiers Declarations to terminate ﬁnally litigation in United States courts related to claims resolved by the Tribunal on the merits.” Award, para. 203. Second, the Tribunal states in dictum that even

3 As the Tribunal explains in the Award at footnote [13], Foremost received insurance compensation for 64% of its investment in the shares in Pak Dairy from OPIC, an agency of the United States Government. For this reason, Foremost brought two suits before the Tribunal; in Case No. 37, Foremost, along with OPIC, sought compensation for the insured portion of Foremost’s investment in Pak Dairy, and in Case No. 231, Foremost sought compensation for the uninsured portion of its investment in Pak Dairy as well as for certain breaches of contract.

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if the original complaint ﬁled in the District Court had been broader than the Statement of Claim, the United States still would have been obliged under the Algiers Declarations to put the District Court on notice, within a reasonable time after 11 April 1986, that proceedings in the Foremost/OPIC lawsuit were to be considered terminated to the extent they related to that portion of the claim that had been decided by the Tribunal in Foremost (i.e., the claim for a pre-19 January 1981 expropriation of Foremost’s ownership interest in Pak Dairy).

Award, para. 204. The Tribunal errs in both its reasoning and its conclusions. The Tribunal’s initial conclusion – that Foremost’s Statement of Claim and its District Court complaint were identical – is patently wrong. The Tribunal acknowledges that the Statement of Claim contained the allegation that Foremost’s claim for expropriation was outstanding on 19 January 1981 while the complaint contained no such allegation, but the Tribunal concludes that “this apparent difference does not mean that the Complaint before the District Court was broader than the Statements of Claim before the Tribunal in that it arguably also included an expropriation claim that arose after 19 January 1981.” Award, para. 199. Far from being an “apparent” difference, the fact that the Statements of Claim alleged an expropriation which culminated by 19 January 1981 while the complaint contained no such date restriction is a real and important textual difference which reﬂects the real and decisive difference between the two claims. Foremost claimed in the Tribunal that Iran had effected a creeping expropriation by 19 January 1981. Foremost’s claim in the District Court was not so limited; in the District Court Foremost alleged a creeping expropriation which ripened at an unspeciﬁed date but one which might well be determined to be subsequent to 19 January 1981.4 Indeed, because the District Court’s jurisdiction is not conﬁned to claims arising by 19 January 1981, Foremost had no reason to restrict its claim to that date and every reason not to. The purpose of the tolling suit in the District Court was to preserve Foremost’s rights in the event the Tribunal subsequently determined that it lacked jurisdiction over that claim, and the only plausible ground for the Tribunal to ﬁnd lack of jurisdiction was the one it in fact found: that actions for which Iran was responsible had not yet ripened by 19 January 1981 into an expropriation. Thus, there would have been no point to Foremost’s even ﬁling the tolling suit had it been limited to the claim that the expropriation occurred by 19 January 1981. Failing to recognize this, the Tribunal erroneously ﬁnds that Foremost ﬁled a claim in the District Court that was identical to the claim it ﬁled in the 4 That Foremost did not expressly state in the complaint that the expropriation might have occurred after 19 January 1981 is understandable as Foremost would have been concerned that such a statement would be used against it in its suit before the Tribunal.

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Tribunal; it then reasons from that ﬁnding that the United States should have had Foremost’s suit in the District Court dismissed within a reasonable time after the Tribunal issued its award in Foremost and that by failing to do so, the United States “violated its obligation under the Algiers Declarations to terminate ﬁnally litigation in United States courts related to claims resolved by the Tribunal on the merits.” Award, para. 203. In so holding, the Tribunal creates an obligation that is both wrong on the merits and that ﬂouts the standards the Tribunal so carefully set forth in Claim A. The Tribunal assumes in Case No. A24 that, in order to satisfy its obligation to terminate ﬁnally cases decided by the Tribunal on the merits, the United States is obliged to remove cases from the dockets of the relevant United States courts once the Tribunal has issued its awards in those cases on the merits. The holding is wrong because the Algiers Declarations impose on the United States no such obligation. In our opinion, the United States satisﬁed its obligation to terminate ﬁnally claims decided by the Tribunal on the merits by promulgating Section 4 of Executive Order 12294, which provides that “[a] determination by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal on the merits that a claimant is not entitled to recover on a claim shall operate as a ﬁnal resolution and discharge of the claim for all purposes.” In Claim A the Tribunal set forth the standards applicable to cases such as Case No. A24, and it notably did not impose on the United States an obligation to remove cases from the dockets of United States courts. The reason the Tribunal imposes no such obligation on the United States in Claim A is that the approach the Tribunal does adopt in Claim A precludes such an imposition. The Tribunal states in Claim A that the United States can be considered to have breached General Principle B only if Iran was reasonably compelled in the prudent defense of its interests to make appearances or ﬁle documents in the cases described in paragraph 101. Thus, a dead case which remains in name only on the docket of a United States court after the Tribunal has issued an award on the merits of the case is not a violation of General Principle B. Only if Iran was required to ﬁle documents or make appearances in such a case would the United States violate General Principle B. One sees, then, that the determination of whether the claim Foremost ﬁled in the Tribunal was identical to the claim it ﬁled in the District Court is important only insofar as it deﬁnes the scope of potential United States liability. If the claims had been identical, then the United States would be obliged to pay Iran damages for each instance in which Iran was reasonably compelled in the prudent defense of its interests to ﬁle documents or make appearances in the District Court between 11 April 1986 and 1 April 1988. However, since, as we believe, the claim in the District Court was, from its inception, broader than the claim before the Tribunal, the United States liability should extend only to instances in which Iran was reasonably compelled in the prudent defense of

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its interests to ﬁle documents or make appearances after 11 April 1986 in that portion of the case that had been decided by the Tribunal on the merits. The Tribunal’s alternative dictum for imposing liability on the United States in Case No. A24 is equally inappropriate. The Tribunal holds in the alternative that even if it believed that the complaint in the District Court had been broader than the Statement of Claim in the Tribunal, the United States would still have been obliged “to put the District Court on notice” within a reasonable time after 11 April 1986 that proceedings in the Foremost lawsuit were to be considered terminated to the extent that they related to that portion of the claim that the Tribunal had decided. Award, para. 204. Again, we disagree – here even more vehemently – with the Tribunal’s determination that such an obligation exists. In announcing the obligation, the Tribunal refers to no provision of the Algiers Declarations, and that is because there is no such provision. The Algiers Declarations contain no language whatever that can be interpreted as requiring the Executive Branch of the United States government to remind the Judicial Branch – a co-equal branch of the same government – of the obvious: that it must comply with the United States obligations under the Algiers Declarations. The Tribunal likewise errs in not recognizing that even if General Principle B did obligate the Executive Branch to “put the District Court on notice” that the Foremost proceedings were to be considered terminated to the extent that they related to that portion of the claim the Tribunal had decided, the Executive Branch would have satisﬁed that obligation by its promulgation of Section 4 of Executive Order 12294. As noted above, Section 4 provides as a matter of United States law that “[a] determination by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal on the merits that a claimant is not entitled to recover on a claim shall operate as a ﬁnal resolution and discharge of the claim for all purposes.” No clearer “notice” can be imagined, nor was any necessary. But, ultimately, the Tribunal errs, yet again, in reaching a conclusion precluded by the Tribunal’s resolution of Claim A. If, as the Tribunal’s alternative theory correctly presumes, the claim Foremost ﬁled in the District Court was not identical to the claim it ﬁled in the Tribunal, then pursuant to Claim A, the United States breached the Algiers Declarations only if Iran was compelled in the prudent defense of its interests to ﬁle documents or make appearances in the District Court in that portion of the case that had been decided by the Tribunal on the merits. The United States liability is in no way affected by whether or not the Executive Branch “put the District Court on notice.” Regardless of any measures the Executive Branch might have taken, the United States remains liable to Iran if and only if Iran had to ﬁle documents or make appearances in the District Court in that portion of the case decided by the Tribunal on the merits. In the Tribunal’s words in Claim A, “the test is in factual evidence.” Award, para. 95.

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Case No. A24 should be a very easy case. The only necessary task before the Tribunal was to determine whether the claim Foremost ﬁled in the District Court was identical to the claim it ﬁled in the Tribunal. Once that determination was made, the Tribunal’s resolution of Claim A supplied the relevant standards of liability. The Tribunal has at least applied the latter correctly: in paragraph 205, the Tribunal concludes that the United States is liable to Iran for “damages to the extent [Iran] was reasonably compelled in the prudent defense of its interests to make appearances or ﬁle documents with respect to the Foremost/OPIC lawsuit from 11 April 1986 until 1 April 1988, to the extent those expenses are not already sought by Iran in Case No. A15(IV).” Thus, the Tribunal’s ﬁnal conclusion as to liability is consistent with Claim A as well as with the Tribunal’s initial but erroneous determination that Foremost’s two claims were identical. In between the Tribunal’s initial determination and its ﬁnal conclusion, however, the Tribunal implies into General Principle B two obligations that are both wrong on the merits and in direct contravention of the standards the Tribunal established in Claim A. For these many reasons, we dissent from Part VI(B)(3)(a) of the Award; we believe that Iran’s entire claim in Case No. A24 should be dismissed. We, therefore, concur in Part VI(B)(3)(b) of the Award in which the Tribunal dismisses Iran’s claim in Case No. A24 to the extent it relates to the period beginning 1 April 1988. Dissenting and Partly Concurring Opinion of Bengt Broms[1] I am not able to concur with the majority as regards several central issues in the two Cases. The majority’s position makes the reasoning inconsistent and weak. From the legal point of view, these ﬁndings are consequently untenable. The ﬁrst of my concerns relates to the ﬁndings with respect to Claim A of Case No. A15. In my opinion, the majority should have been satisﬁed with the conclusions reached concerning the differences between the terms “suspension” and “termination”. The Award states that [t]he conceptual difference between these two terms is readily recognizable. Generally, “termination” implies that the activity being terminated is brought to an end. “Suspension” on the other hand, implies a temporary cessation of activity. The United States could satisfy its obligations under the Algiers Declarations only by doing what those declarations said, namely, by “terminating” all litigation against Iran in United States courts involving claims that arguably fell within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.2 [1 Signed 28 December 1998; ﬁled 28 December 1998.] 2 See paragraph 94.

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Because I fully subscribe to the above-mentioned citation, I cannot accept the ﬁndings in the subsequent paragraphs 95-100, essentially signalling that suspension may, under certain conditions, be regarded as sufﬁcient to fulﬁl the obligation to terminate litigation. Second, while it is clear that the Respondent’s obligation to terminate claims is made dependent on whether or not the Tribunal assumes jurisdiction over the case, I disagree with the majority’s treatment of the timing of the Respondent’s termination obligation vis-`a-vis litigation. The majority correctly states that in the absence of a clear provision in the Algiers Declaration in this respect, the conclusion is required that the United States was obliged to terminate such litigation within a reasonable period of time. The majority has, nevertheless, found that such a reasonable time is a six-month period, based on the analogous implementation of the time limits mentioned in Article I of the Claims Settlement Declaration and paragraph 6 of the General Declaration. A careful reading of those provisions reveals that those time limits do not relate to the present issue and that the application of an analogy is therefore inappropriate. Neither can I accept the view of the majority that the United States should be granted a six-month period due to administrative difﬁculties. Such a ﬁnding is particularly presumptuous as the Award in a previous paragraph – with regard to the general obligation to terminate litigation – speciﬁcally refers to the well-known rule, expressed by Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (“Vienna Convention”), that a state “may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justiﬁcation for its failure to perform a treaty.” Bearing in mind that Article I of the Claims Settlement Declaration provided a time limit of six to nine months, during which the Parties should promote settlement of the outstanding claims, it would be contrary to the object and purpose of this provision, within the meaning of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, if litigation would have been allowed to take place concurrently during a six-month period. In fact, it would render Article I without any signiﬁcance at all. The majority has not based its ﬁndings with respect to this obligation on well-established rules of treaty interpretation as evidenced by the Vienna Convention. For the above-mentioned reasons, I ﬁnd the Claimant’s argument convincing that in the absence of express provisions, the obligation to terminate litigation arose within a few weeks after the conclusion of the Algiers Declaration. Consequently, I am of the opinion that the Respondent’s liability for the Claimant’s litigation costs ensued after the Algiers Declarations had been in force for one month. The other central ﬁnding of the majority with which I disagree is its treatment of Claim B. At a very late stage of the deliberations, the majority has taken the

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Halliburton award3 – one of the pilot cases on the forum selection clauses – as a starting point for the ﬁndings of the Tribunal. For several reasons, I believe that that award is not very helpful in solving Claim B. The majority has quoted at length an excerpt from the Halliburton award, stating inter alia, that “[i]t is not generally the task of this Tribunal, or of any other arbitral tribunal, to determine the enforceability of choice of forum clauses in contracts.”4 What the majority overlooks is that the award in Halliburton was not a request by either of the Parties to the Algiers Declarations to interpret Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration. It was rather a claim by a private party for compensation. What makes the Tribunal’s statement in Halliburton even more curious is that it involves a fundamental paradox. The Tribunal is faced with the issue of enforceability of a forum selection clause in every case wherein such a clause is invoked, and it has not avoided considering such clauses. If the Tribunal has proceeded with a case where enforceability is an issue, it undoubtedly will also have determined that the forum selection clause is ineffective to bar proceedings at the Tribunal. My conclusion is that the Halliburton award did not attempt to pronounce on the general question of whether the Tribunal, in abstract terms, has jurisdiction to determine the enforceability of forum selection clauses. In that context, it would not even have been proper for the Tribunal to elaborate upon such an issue. Although an argument could be made that the Halliburton award in 1982 did not close the doors of any non-Iranian court to a United States claimant whose claim was considered barred in this Tribunal by the wording of Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration, that award could not be relied upon as a basis for initiating subsequent proceedings in the United States. A holding to the contrary would render the forum exclusion clause in Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration meaningless. It is my ﬁrm opinion that the Parties have used speciﬁc terms to exclude from the Tribunal’s jurisdiction “claims arising under a binding contract between the parties speciﬁcally providing that any disputes thereunder shall be within the sole jurisdiction of the competent Iranian courts.” Such claims that the Tribunal consequently has found to be outside its jurisdiction cannot later be revived in United States courts because of the explicit commitment made by the Respondent to exclude such claims from the jurisdiction of this Tribunal in favour of competent Iranian courts. To the extent this has occurred in United States courts, the Respondent has not acted in conformity with its obligations under the Algiers Declarations. 3 See Halliburton Company et al. and Doreen/IMCO et al., Interlocutory Award No. ITL 2-51-FT (5 Nov. 1982), reprinted in 1 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 242. 4 Id., at 245. The Tribunal also did not cite any authority for that conclusion.

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Furthermore, I cannot agree with the ﬁndings of the majority with respect to the part of the Award dealing with Case No. A24. It is my view that the Respondent’s obligation to terminate litigation operates independently from the issue of whether or not the later proceedings in the Foremost/OPIC lawsuit gave appropriate preclusive effect to the Foremost award by this Tribunal. Therefore, the Tribunal should have concluded that – from the point of view of the Respondent’s international obligation to terminate domestic litigation – it is impertinent to determine whether the domestic lawsuit, as amended, and the subsequent Summary Judgement in June 1997, respect the res judicata effect of the Tribunal’s award in Foremost. Instead of venturing into a futile examination of res judicata, the majority should have followed and applied the reasoning of the Award with respect to the obligation to terminate claims, where the Tribunal stated that [s]ettlement and termination of a claim through binding arbitration means resolution of that claim on the merits. Otherwise there would have been no point in the Parties’ referring claims to this Tribunal. This conclusion implies that the United States obligation to terminate a claim arises only once the claim has been decided on the merits by the Tribunal.5

The majority seems to neglect the fact that the Respondent allowed the Foremost/OPIC lawsuit to continue to be pending with the United States District Court even in 1988, almost two years after the award in Foremost, and in a format identical to the claim that had already been decided by the Tribunal. In fact, the Complaint before the District Court was not amended until April 1988, so that the cause of action fell outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The only legally defendable solution would have been for the majority to hold that the Foremost/OPIC lawsuit should have been ﬁnally terminated well before the proceedings in the United States courts were resumed in 1988. By allowing the Foremost/OPIC lawsuit to be pending with the District Court during the time the case was pending before this Tribunal and also long after 11 April 1986, the date the Tribunal issued its award in Foremost, the United States violated its obligation under the Algiers Declaration to terminate claims that have been resolved on the merits by the Tribunal.6 To the extent Iran was reasonably compelled in the prudent defence of its interests to make appearances or ﬁle documents in the Foremost/OPIC lawsuit, it should therefore have been 5

See paragraph 82 of the Award. Moreover, it appears to me that even Section 4 of Executive Order 12294 (see paragraph 28 of the award), which is a United States regulation, supports the termination of the claim. 6

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compensated for those losses by the Respondent to the extent that those expenses are not sought under Claim D. The only parts of the present Award I believe were correctly decided were Claims D, E, and F of Case No. A15. I also concur in the ﬁndings with respect to Claims G and H, except as regards the timing of the respective obligations.7 7

With respect to the timing of the obligations, see my ﬁndings, supra.

AWARD ON AGREED TERMS

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Brown & Root, Inc., Brown & Root, S.A. and Brown & Root International Ltd., Claimants v. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Respondents (Case No. 432) Chamber One: Broms, Chairman; Noori, Duncan, Members Signed 8 July 1998[1] Award No. 588-432-1 The following is the text as issued by the Tribunal:

Award on Agreed Terms 1. On 18 January 1982, the Claimants in this Case, BROWN & ROOT, INC. (now known as BROWN & ROOT HOLDINGS, INC.), BROWN & ROOT, S.A. (now known as BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC.) and BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, LTD., submitted their Statement of Claim against the Respondents, the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN and THE NAVY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (the “Iranian Navy”). The dispute concerned two cost plus contracts that two of the Claimants, Brown & Root International, Ltd. and Brown & Root, S.A., signed in 1977 with one of the Respondents, the Iranian Navy. The Contracts concerned the design, detailed engineering and construction of a naval base and shipyard at Chahbahar Harbor and the expansion and improvement of another naval base and related facilities at Bandar Abbas. The Respondents have ﬁled a Statement of Defense and Counterclaims in the Case. 2. Pursuant to Article 34 of the Tribunal Rules, a Joint Request for Arbitral Award on Agreed Terms (the “Joint Request”) was ﬁled on 30 June 1998. Attached thereto is a settlement agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”), dated 4 June 1998. It is signed by the Agent of the Islamic Republic of Iran and a representative of the Iranian Navy, on the one hand, and a representative of the Claimants, on the other. [1 Filed 8 July 1998.]

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Article XI of the Settlement Agreement provides that:

The Parties agree that this Settlement Agreement shall be subject to ratiﬁcation by the appropriate authorities of the Respondents. The submission to the Tribunal of this Settlement Agreement shall conclusively demonstrate ratiﬁcation hereof by the appropriate authorities. Should for any reason whatsoever such authorities choose not to ratify this Settlement Agreement then this Agreement shall become null and void [. . .].

4. The Settlement Agreement also includes a provision, Article V, paragraph 1, according to which the agreement together with a joint request for an Arbitral Award on Agreed Terms should be submitted to the Tribunal, on or before 29 June 1998. Otherwise, the Settlement Agreement becomes automatically null and void. The Tribunal notes, however, that the Parties agreed in an exchange of letters that this deadline be extended to 30 June 1998. As the Settlement Agreement and the Joint Request have been signed by the Agent of the Islamic Republic of Iran and a representative of the Iranian Navy and have been ﬁled on 30 June 1998, the Tribunal ﬁnds that the conditions set out in Article V, paragraph 1 (as amended by the exchange of letters), and Article XI, of the Settlement Agreement for the validity of this agreement have been satisﬁed. 5. Article II, paragraph 1, of the Settlement Agreement provides: In full, complete and ﬁnal settlement of all disputes, differences and claims arising out of the rights, interests, relationships and occurrences related to the subject matters of the Statements of Claim and the Counterclaim in Case No. 432 between the Claimants, on one part, and the Respondents on the other part, and in consideration of the covenants, promises and other agreements contained herein, the sum of U.S. $17 million dollars (U.S. $17,000,000) (the “Settlement Amount”), or such lesser amount as is determined in accordance with Article IV, Paragraph 2 below, will be paid to the Claimants [. . .]

According to paragraph 2 of the same article, the settlement amount will be paid “[. . .] out of the security account (the ‘Security Account’) established under Paragraph 7 of the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, dated January 19, 1981.” 6. The Tribunal also notes that in Article IV, paragraph 1, of the Settlement Agreement, the Claimants have undertaken to deliver certain equipment and work product to Iran or, alternatively, to the Victory Van Warehouse in Virginia, if appropriate licenses and permits are obtained from the United States Government. Otherwise, such equipment and work product will be stored by the Claimants at no cost for the Respondents until such time as delivery

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can take place. Article IV, Paragraph 2, of the Settlement Agreement further provides: On or before June 15, 1998, the Claimants shall notify the Respondents whether the Claimants are in the custody and control of the switch gear. In the event that Claimants notify the Respondents that they are in the custody and control of the switch gear, Claimants shall make their best efforts to transfer the switch gear to the Victory Van Warehouse in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 1, above. In the event that the Claimants notify the Respondents that they are not in the custody and control of the switch gear the Parties agree that the sum of U.S. $16,718,214 shall be paid to the Claimants (U.S. $17,000,000 less U.S. $281,786) pursuant to Article II of this Agreement. Such notiﬁcation by the Claimants to the Respondents shall be annexed to this Agreement as Exhibit A.

7. The Tribunal ﬁnds that the Claimants have notiﬁed the Respondents by means of a letter dated 15 June 1998 (attached to the Settlement Agreement) that they are not in the custody and control of the switch gear and that the settlement should therefore be reduced from U.S. $17,000,000 to U.S. $16,718,214. 8. Pursuant to Article III, paragraph 2 of the Settlement Agreement, “[. . .] all bank guarantees provided by the Respondents or any other Iranian entities in connection with the Claims [. . .]”2 shall be released to the Respondents. The Registry of the Tribunal has acknowledged receipt of the bank guarantees mentioned in Article III, paragraph 2, subparagraphs a) to i) of the Settlement Agreement. In accordance with that paragraph, these bank guarantees are to be handed over to the Respondents upon the issuance of an Award on Agreed Terms. 9. Copies of the Joint Request,[3] the Settlement Agreement[4] and the exchange of letters[5] are attached hereto as integral parts of this Award on Agreed Terms. 10. The Tribunal is further satisﬁed that it has jurisdiction over the Settlement Agreement between the Claimants and the Respondents within the terms of the Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran of 19 January 1981. See Islamic Republic of Iran and United States of America, Decision No. DEC 8-A1-FT, 12 (signed on 14 May 1982), reprinted in 1 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 144, 152. 2 The term “Claims” is understood to comprise all cases and proceedings against the Respondents, including but not limited to the claims with the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal under Case No. 432, see Settlement Agreement, preface, page [189]. [3 See pp. 188–9, below.] [4 See pp. 189–95, below.] [5 See pp. 196–8, below.]

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For the foregoing reasons,

THE TRIBUNAL DETERMINES AS FOLLOWS: (a) The Settlement Agreement ﬁled with the Joint Request and an exchange of letters is hereby recorded as an Award on Agreed Terms, binding on the Parties in full and ﬁnal settlement of the entire Case. (b) In accordance with the Settlement Agreement, the Respondents, THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, and THE NAVY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN are obligated to pay to the Claimants, BROWN & ROOT, INC., BROWN & ROOT, S.A. and BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL LTD., the amount of Sixteen Million Seven Hundred and Eighteen Thousand Two Hundred and Fourteen United States Dollars (U.S. $16,718,214) which obligation shall be satisﬁed by payment out of the Security Account established pursuant to paragraph 7 of the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria dated 19 January 1981. (c) In accordance with Article III, paragraph 2, of the Settlement Agreement, the Registry of the Tribunal is ordered to release the bank guarantees mentioned in that paragraph to the Respondents. The Tribunal declares this Case terminated in its entirety and with prejudice. This Award is hereby submitted to the President of the Tribunal for notiﬁcation to the Escrow Agent. Joint Request for Arbitral Award on Agreed Terms[6] Pursuant to Article 34 of the Tribunal Rules, Brown & Root Holdings, Inc. (formerly known as Brown and Root, Inc.), Brown & Root International Ltd., and Brown & Root International, Inc. (formerly known as Brown & Root, S.A.) (“Claimants”), on the one part, and the Iranian Navy and Islamic Republic of Iran (“Respondents”), on the other part, jointly request that the Tribunal issue an Arbitral Award on Agreed Terms that will record and give effect to the Settlement Agreement reached among them, a copy of which is attached hereto. On 4th June 1998 the Parties have entered into such Settlement Agreement settling all claims and counterclaims now existing or capable of arising in connection with Case No. 432 and any other matters related thereto. The undersigned hereby request the Tribunal to record the Settlement Agreement as an Arbitral Award on Agreed Terms, and direct the payment of seventeen million United States dollars to the Claimants as required by Article II(1) [6 Signed 4 and 30 June 1998; ﬁled 30 June 1998.]

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of the Agreement or such lesser amount as is determined in accordance with Article IV(2) of the Agreement and terminate these Cases in their entirety and with prejudice. Settlement Agreement[7] This Agreement is made as of the 4th day of June, 1998 between and among The Iranian Navy and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (collectively, the “Respondents”), on the one hand, and Brown & Root Holdings, Inc. (formerly known as Brown & Root International, Inc.), Brown & Root International Ltd., and Brown & Root International, Inc. (formerly known as Brown & Root, S.A.) (collectively, the “Claimants”). For the purposes of this Agreement, each of the Respondents and each of the Claimants acts not only on its own behalf but also on behalf of its agencies, instrumentalities, afﬁliates, predecessors, successors, assigns, subsidiaries and/or parents (“Related Entities”). WHEREAS, the Claimants have ﬁled certain claims with the IRAN-U.S. Claims Tribunal in the Hague (the “Tribunal”) under Case No. 432, and initiated certain other proceedings including but not limited to the proceedings in the United States courts (if any) and in the German courts (all these cases and proceedings are collectively referred to as “the Claims”) against the Respondents; WHEREAS, Respondents have asserted certain counterclaims against the Claimants, or certain of them, in such Case No. 432 (the “Counterclaims”); WHEREAS, Claimants acknowledge that certain unﬁnished test stands having an original incurred cost of $631,167 (the “test stands”) and certain switch gear having an original cost of $281,786 (the “switch gear,” and, collectively with the test stands, the “Equipment”) owned by the Respondents was not sold by the Claimants and instead has remained under the custody and control of the Claimants; WHEREAS, Claimants acknowledge that copies of certain designs, drawings, speciﬁcations, notes, and other work (the “Work Product”) developed in the performance of the Chahbahar and Bandar Abbas contracts (the “Contracts”) that are the subject of the Claims and Counterclaims have remained under the custody and control of the Claimants; WHEREAS, the Parties to this Agreement (the “Parties”) have agreed to settle all of the Claims, Counterclaims, disputes and differences outstanding or capable of arising between them and in general all the Claims and Counterclaims as deﬁned above; NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of mutual commitments and under the terms and conditions set forth herein, the Parties agree as follows: [7 Signed 4 June 1998; ﬁled 30 June 1998.]

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Article I 1. The scope and the subject matter of this Agreement are to settle, dismiss, withdraw, quitclaim and terminate, deﬁnitively, forever and with prejudice all disputes, differences, claims and matters directly or indirectly raised or capable of arising out of the relationships, contracts, transactions, occurrences, rights and interests and proceedings arising from and related to the Claims and Counterclaims. 2. With respect to the scope and subject matter of this Agreement, the Respondents fully reserve their rights with respect to cases before the IranU.S. Claims Tribunal against the United States Government. The Parties do not intend that any language in this Agreement shall affect in any manner whatsoever the rights of any party in any other case before the Tribunal. The Claimants acknowledge that, as provided in the Contracts, title to, and all the interests in, all property (the “Property”) that the Claimants procured or manufactured for the Respondents under the Contracts existing in the United States on 19 January 1981 continued to be vested in the Respondents through that date. Article II 1. In full, complete and ﬁnal settlement of all disputes, differences and claims arising out of the rights, interests, relationships and occurrences related to the subject matters of the Statements of Claim and the counterclaim in Case No. 432 between the Claimants, on one part, and the Respondents on the other part, and in consideration of the covenants, promises and other agreements contained herein, the sum of U.S. $17 million dollars (U.S. $17,000,000) (the “Settlement Amount”), or such lesser amount as is determined in accordance with Article IV, Paragraph 2 below, will be paid to the Claimants in the manner set out in the paragraph below. 2. The Parties agree to submit this Settlement Agreement, and such other documents as may be necessary or appropriate, to the Tribunal with the joint request that the Tribunal record this Settlement Agreement as an Award on Agreed Terms pursuant to Article 34 of the Rules of Procedure of the Tribunal and order the Settlement Amount to be paid to Claimants out of the security account (the “Security Account”) established under Paragraph 7 of the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, dated January 19, 1981. Article III 1. Upon the issuance of an Award on Agreed Terms, the Claimants shall cause without delay and with prejudice, all proceedings against the Respondents and their Related Entities in all courts, fora or before any authorities

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or administrative bodies to be dismissed, withdrawn and/or terminated, and shall be barred from instituting and/or continuing with any proceedings before the Tribunal or any other forum, authority, or administrative body, whatsoever including but not limited to any United States, German or Iranian court in connection with disputes, differences, claims and matters related to the Claims and Counterclaims, and/or matters which are within the scope and the subject matter of this Agreement as deﬁned in Article I above. 2. Upon submission of this Agreement to the Tribunal, the Claimants shall vacate and terminate all attachments, garnishments, liens and/or any other incumbrance against the Respondents and their Related Entities, and their property, whether in the United States, Germany or elsewhere, and shall deposit with the Registry of the Tribunal the original of all bank guarantees provided by the Respondents or any other Iranian entities in connection with the Claims (“Guarantees”), including but not limited to the following: a) bank guarantee issued by DG-Bank Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank on February 27, 1987 for DM 2,730,000.– (“B¨urgschaft Nr. 1”), b) bank guarantee issued by DG-Bank Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank on February 27, 1987 for U.S. $15,353,360.– (“B¨urgschaft Nr. 2”), c) bank guarantee issued by Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale on February 27, 1987 for U.S. $5,020,069.– (“B¨urgschaft Nr. 3”), d) bank guarantee issued by Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale on February 27, 1987 for DM 924,000.– (“B¨urgschaft Nr. 4”), e) bank guarantee issued by Westfalen Bank Aktiengesellschaft on February 26, 1987 for U.S. $3,699,987.– (“B¨urgschaft Nr. 5”), f) bank guarantee issued by Westfalen Bank Aktiengesellschaft on February 26, 1987 for DM 546,000.– (“B¨urgschaft Nr. 6”), g) bank guarantee issued by Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale on February 26, 1987 for U.S. $19,147,955.– (“B¨urgschaft Nr. 7”), h) bank guarantee issued by Westfalen Bank Aktiengesellschaft on February 26, 1987 for U.S. $6,260,784.– (“B¨urgschaft Nr. 8”) and i) bank guarantee issued by Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale on February 27, 1987 for U.S. $4,614,443.– (“B¨urgschaft Nr. 9”). Upon the issuance of an Award on Agreed Terms giving effect to the provisions of this Settlement Agreement, the Registry of the Tribunal shall release the Guarantees to the Respondents, and all such attachments, garnishments, liens and Guarantees, including those speciﬁed above, shall be considered as null and void and without any effect. 3. Upon the issuance of an Award on Agreed Terms, the Respondents shall cause, without delay and with prejudice, all proceedings against the Claimants and their Related Entities, in all courts, fora or before any authorities or administrative bodies to be dismissed, withdrawn and/or terminated, and shall

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be barred from instituting and/or continuing with any proceedings before the Tribunal or any other forum, authority or administrative body, whatsoever, including but not limited to any United States, German or Iranian court in connection with disputes, differences, claims and matters related to the Claims and/or Counterclaims and/or matters which are within the scope and the subject matter of this Agreement as deﬁned in Article I above. Article IV 1. Claimants shall use their best efforts to obtain by October 29, 1998 such licenses and permits from the United States Government as are necessary to permit the transfer of the Equipment and Work Product from Claimants’ custody to Iran or, if that is not possible, to the Victory Van Warehouse in Arlington, Virginia, and shall transfer the Equipment and Work Product to the Victory Van Warehouse, in the event that such licenses and permits are obtained.8 The Claimants undertake to inform the Respondents of the progress of their efforts in this regard. In the event that Claimants fail to obtain such licenses and permits, Claimants shall provide to the Respondents written notiﬁcation that the United States Government failed to provide such licenses and permits, notwithstanding Claimants’ best efforts. The Claimants agree to keep all Iranian properties covered by this Article in trust under its control and custody at no cost to the Respondents until such time when the Equipment and Work Product may be transferred to the Respondents. 2. On or before June 15, 1998, the Claimants shall notify the Respondents whether the Claimants are in the custody and control of the switch gear. In the event that Claimants notify the Respondents that they are in the custody and control of the switch gear, Claimants shall make their best efforts to transfer the switch gear to the Victory Van Warehouse in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 1, above. In the event that the Claimants notify the Respondents that they are not in the custody and control of the switch gear the Parties agree that the sum of U.S. $16,718,214 shall be paid to the Claimants (U.S. $17,000,000 less U.S. $281,786) pursuant to Article II of this Agreement. Such notiﬁcation by the Claimants to the Respondents shall be annexed to this Agreement as Exhibit A. 3. On or before September 15, 1998, the Claimants shall provide to the Respondents an itemized listing indicating in chronological order all of the Property that the Claimants purchased for the Respondents and did not ship to the Respondents, the original cost of each item, the date each item was sold and the amount received. This listing will be inclusive of all such Property reﬂected 8 Respondents wish to note that in order to mitigate losses and preserve the status quo ante litem until Case B61 and other relevant cases are decided by the Tribunal, Iran has no choice but to consent to storing the Equipment at issue in the Victory Van Warehouse.

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in the record of Case No. 432. The Claimants shall make their best efforts to provide this listing to the Respondents prior to September 15, 1998. Article V 1. The Parties agree to submit this Agreement to the Tribunal on or before June 29, 1998. If this Agreement is not submitted and ﬁled by such date then it shall automatically become null and void, and the parties, without prejudicing their respective rights, will be placed in the same position as they were prior to the date of this Agreement. 2. The Parties hereby request that the Tribunal expedite the issuance of the Award on Agreed Terms and the issuance by the President of the Tribunal of the notiﬁcation to the Escrow Agent to pay the amount speciﬁed in this Agreement. Article VI 1. The Claimants hereby release, quitclaim and discharge the Respondents and their Related Entities from any and all Claims, rights, causes of action, interests, liabilities and obligations that they have ever had, now have, and/or in the future may have in connection with disputes, differences, claims and matters and proceedings related to the Claims and/or Counterclaims, and/or matters which are within the scope and the subject matter of this Agreement as deﬁned in Article I above. 2. The Respondents hereby release, quitclaim and discharge the Claimants and their Related Entities from any and all Counterclaims, rights, causes of action, interests, liabilities and obligations that they have ever had, now have, and/or in the future may have in connection with disputes, differences, claims, matters and proceedings related to the Claims and/or Counterclaims, and/or matters which are within the scope and the subject matter of this Agreement as deﬁned in Article I above. 3. Upon issuance of an Award Upon Agreed Terms, Claimants shall indemnify and hold harmless the Respondents and their Related Entities against any claim, counterclaim, action or proceeding which any or all of the Claimants, their Related Entities, their ofﬁcers and employees may now or in the future raise, assert, initiate or take against the Respondents or its Related Entities in connection with disputes, differences, claims, matters and proceedings related to the Claims and/or Counterclaims, and/or matters which are within the scope and the subject matter of this Agreement as deﬁned in Article I above. 4. Upon issuance of an Award Upon Agreed Terms, Respondents shall indemnify and hold harmless the Claimants and their Related Entities against any claim, counterclaim, action or proceeding which any or all of the Respondents and their Related Entities may now or in the future raise, assert, initiate or take against the Claimants or its Related Entities in connection with disputes,

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differences, claims, matters and proceedings related to the Claims and/or Counterclaims, and/or matters which are within the scope and the subject matter of this Agreement as deﬁned in Article I above. Article VII Upon the issuance of the Award on Agreed Terms, the Claimants and the Respondents shall waive any and all claims for costs (including attorneys’ fees) arising out of or related to the arbitration, prosecution or defence of the claims asserted before the Tribunal, United States courts or elsewhere with respect to matters involved in the Statements of Claim or Counterclaim in Case No. 432. Article VIII Upon the issuance of the Award on Agreed Terms, the obligations, declarations, releases, waivers, withdrawals, dismissals, transfers of rights, interest, beneﬁts and titles in properties contained and referred to in this Settlement Agreement shall become self-executing. After the issuance of the Award on Agreed Terms by the Tribunal no further documents need to be executed by the Parties in implementing the provisions of this Agreement. Article IX 1. This Agreement is for the sole purpose of settling the disputes identiﬁed herein. Nothing in this Agreement shall be relied upon or construed as relevant to or to affect in any way any arguments Respondents have raised, or may raise, concerning the jurisdiction or the merits of other cases whether before the Tribunal or any other forum. Article X The representatives of the Parties hereby expressly declare that they are duly empowered to sign this Agreement. Article XI The Parties agree that this Settlement Agreement shall be subject to ratiﬁcation by the appropriate authorities of the Respondents. The submission to the Tribunal of this Settlement Agreement shall conclusively demonstrate ratiﬁcation hereof by the appropriate authorities. Should for any reason whatsoever such authorities choose not to ratify this Settlement Agreement then this Agreement shall become null and void and in that event no party to this Settlement Agreement may rely upon, cite or publish its terms or any statements made in the course of settlement discussions.

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Article XII For the purpose of construction and interpretation of this Agreement the entire agreement shall be read and construed as a whole without giving any speciﬁc effect to any article separately. Article XIII This Agreement has been written and signed in both languages of Persian and English and each text shall have the same equal validity. Article XIV This Agreement contains all the understandings and agreements of the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof. It may not be amended or modiﬁed except by a writing executed by the parties. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Agreement to be executed by their duly authorized representatives this 4th day of June, 1998.

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Via Facsimile 011-31-70-329-6567 and DHL Courier M. H. Zahedin-Labbaf Agent of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the IRAN-U.S. Claims Tribunal Bureau of International Legal Services De Werf 15 The Hague, The Netherlands Re: Brown & Root et al. v. Iranian Navy (Case No. 432, Chamber 1) Dear Mr. Zahedin: Pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 2 of the Settlement Agreement dated June 4, 1998 in the above claim (the “Agreement”), Claimants hereby notify Respondents that Claimants are not in the custody and control of the switch gear, as that term is deﬁned in the Agreement, and that the Settlement Amount thus should be reduced from U.S. $17,000,000 to U.S. $16,718,214 (U.S. $17,000,000 less U.S. $281,786) pursuant to Article II and Article IV, paragraph 2 of the Agreement. In light of this Notiﬁcation, the sum of U.S. $16,718,214 shall be paid to the Claimants pursuant to the Agreement. This Notiﬁcation shall be annexed to the Settlement Agreement as Exhibit A. Eight originals of the Notiﬁcation will be sent to you at the above address by overnight courier. As we have agreed, this Notiﬁcation will be made in the English language only. Sincerely,

Grant Hanessian cc: Peter W. Arbour Sean Murphy

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Date 29 Jun 1998 AGENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL The Hague IN THE NAME OF GOD FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL SHEET Telefax to:

Mr. Peter W. Arbour Vice President and General Counsel Brown & Root Holdings, Inc. Houston TX 77001-0003 U.S.A. Fax No: 713.676.4514 Total pages (including this sheet): 1 If all pages are not received, please contact us immediately. MESSAGE: Re: Brown & Root, et al. v. Iranian Navy, et al. Case No. 432 Dear Mr. Arbour, This is to advise you that despite the best efforts made I have not been able to talk to the appropriate authorities in Tehran this afternoon regarding their ﬁnal decision on the ratiﬁcation of the Settlement Agreement. Thus, the Respondents propose to extend the time-limit stipulated in Article 5(1) of the Settlement Agreement by 1 July 1998. I would appreciate it if the Claimants could agree with this short extension. The Settlement Agreement will immediately be ﬁled with the Tribunal if ratiﬁcation is received before this new time-limit comes to an end. Yours sincerely,

M. H. Zahedin-Labbaf Agent of the Islamic Republic of Iran

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Brown & Root Holdings, Inc.

Post Ofﬁce Box 3 Houston, TX 77001-0003

July 29, 1998 Via Facsimile and Courier Service M. H. Zahedin-Labbaf Agent of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Bureau of International Legal Services De Werf 15 The Hague, The Netherlands Re: Brown & Root et al. v. Iranian Navy (Case No. 432, Chamber 1) Dear Mr. Zahedin: Claimants hereby agree to extend the date for submission to the Tribunal of the Settlement Agreement dated June 4, 1998 (the “Agreement”) from June 29, 1998, as stated in Article V of the Agreement, to June 30, 1998. Sincerely,

Peter W. Arbour PWA/id cc: Sean Murphy PWA03200 DOC

INDEX 1 Abuse of judicial authority 5, 128 Abuse of right 29, 57, 183-4, 32, 40 Account stated 4, 220, 221, 228, 230-4, 236, 8, 162-8 Acquiescence: see Estoppel Acquired rights 6, 163 Act of State 4, 102, 115 n. 2, 5, 12, 16, 99, 17, 100-1, 19, 285-9, 292, 24, 11: see also State responsibility enquiry into by international tribunal 25, 157, 165 Admissibility: see Evidence, admissibility; Jurisdiction of Tribunal, admissibility Admission, effect 3, 205 n. 2, 235, 288 Agency 1, 356-62, 376-81, 2, 11, 23-4, 3, 205, 4, 278, 279, 6, 159, 160, 193-5, 8, 130, 140, 17, 14-15, 25-30, 19, 126, 129-32, 133-5, 138-9, 140, 152-3, 23, 142-6, 299-300, 305-6: see also Evidence of, agency applicable law 19, 126 broker distinguished 2, 399 general principles of agency law 19, 126 Aggregation of cases: see Procedure, consolidation of cases Airline practice 9, 360-75 Algeria, duties 5, 49 Algiers Declarations: see also Claims Settlement Declaration; General Declaration as changed circumstances 1, 208 damages for breach 25, 260-2, 34, 59-60 equality of States Parties, enforcement mechanisms 34, 42 good faith obligation to implement 34, 42-3, 139, 155-6 interpretation— —express terms 34, 135 —“terminate” 34, 135 —Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) as applicable law 34, 129

negotiation and conclusion 34, 114-15 Aliens, treatment of 4, 166, 167, 5, 293, 383-4, 17, 147, 181: see also Expropriation; Expulsion; State responsibility wrongful death 2, 81-9 Alternative forum 6, 49 Alternative pleading 4, 231, 233, 235, 236 American Arbitration Association: see Arbitration rules, American Arbitration Association American law: see United States, law of Appeal 3, 128, 364, 5, 74: see also Award, correction; Award, reconsideration Applicable law 3, 8, 14, 19, 56, 58, 4, 5, 113-16, 174, 234, 267, 270, 292, 293, 6, 46, 97, 98, 7, 99, 102, 109, 113, 115, 130, 191, 8, 105, 10, 239, 277, 12, 143, 273, 13, 88-9, 229-33, 14, 138-40, 186-7, 229-30, 245, 15, 29, 214-24, 236-9, 16, 20-8, 194-6, 256, 17, 132, 142, 230-1, 239-40, 18, 119, 361 n. 10, 19, 29-31, 286, 21, 68, 72, 23, 357, 26, 226: see also Choice of law agency 1, 377, 379-80, 19, 126 authenticity of document 29, 124 contracts 1, 422, 2, 27, 3, 48, 56, 4, 267, 6, 236, 7, 131, 8, 162, 231, 232, 9, 121, 124, 326, 10, 216, 13, 26, 17, 230-1, 240, 21, 103, 154, 22, 243, 268-89, 324, 325, 24, 170, 26, 146: see also State contracts below corporations— —ownership 17, 328, 21, 77 n. 30 —pre-incorporation agreements 2, 154 n. 1 date determining 15, 215 diplomatic protection 19, 31 disqualiﬁcation of arbitrator 20, 203-4, 272-3

1 This is a consolidated index identifying the contents of all previous volumes as well as the present volume. The ﬁgures in bold type refer to the volume number.

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INDEX

Applicable law (cont.) expropriation —international law 16, 25, 29, 27 —Treaty of Amity 16, 25, 194-5, 239, 21, 118, 121, 125, 30, 255-7, 31, 3-6, 119-20 expulsion, international law 17, 142 general principles of commercial and international law 16, 21, 28, 104, 26, 106 general principles of law 19, 30, 20, 204 immovable property transactions 2, 250, 256, 33, 4-5 international law 16, 28, 19, 30-1, 286, 23, 357 —displacement by Claims Settlement Declaration 25, 28 —Tribunal 34, 55-6 interpretation and substance, different systems to apply 16, 21 law of parties 19, 30, 28, 209 lex loci actus 21, 63 marital rights 30, 49-56 nationality 2, 166, 183, 224, 32, 85, 86-7, 88 payment of cheque 1, 171 pension rights 30, 42-3, 63 practice of parties 17, 231, 240 principles of mutual goodwill and good faith 21, 154 procedure 8, 161, 30, 55 promissory notes 21, 44-5, 63-4 relevance 12, 214 share transfers 19, 272 State contracts 16, 27-8, 19, 31, 22, 287-9: see also contracts above —international law 32, 180 time limits 17, 190 Tribunal, international law 34, 55-6 Tribunal’s— —failure to indicate 1, 422 —freedom to determine 13, 232, 30, 49-50, 32, 179-80 Appointing authority designation 1, 513-14 powers 1, 114-15, 117, 21, 388, 390 Arbitral tribunal: see International tribunals; Tribunal Arbitration clause, jurisdiction 25, 26, 73-4, 141-2 failure to comply with 7, 202 n. 1

meaning 5, 183 nature 7, 78 objection to conduct of 25, 6 waiver of right to 7, 202 n. 1 Arbitration rules: see also International Chamber of Commerce; International Law Commission; Tribunal Rules; UNCITRAL Rules American Arbitration Association 20, 206, 209, 245, 250, 310 American Code of Ethics for Arbitrators 3, 40, 296, 4, 181, 20, 205, 207, 208, 209, 212, 218-19, 251 Grain and Feed Trade Association 3, 323, 20, 250 Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission 20, 206 International Bar Association Guidelines 20, 211-12, 216, 251 International Institute for the Uniﬁcation of Private Law 20, 205 London Court of International Arbitration 20, 206 Netherlands Arbitration Institute 20, 250 UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East 20, 205 UN Economic Commission for Europe 20, 205 Uniform Arbitration Act 3, 210, 211, 295 Arbitrator absence 1, 415-17, 425-8, 431-2, 433, 453-4, 2, 14-16, 27-9, 343-4, 3, 24-146, 155, 168, 209-11, 237, 238, 254, 255, 268, 269, 276, 277, 291-6, 316, 8, 42, 19, 116-17, 21, 239-40, 29, 364 n. 11 appointment 5, 277 n. 1: see also Appointing authority challenge 1, 111-18, 509-18, 5, 277 n. 1, 20, 177-330, 21, 196, 279-82, 318-402, 24, 309-24 —admissibility 24, 319, 324 —conﬁdentiality 20, 233-4 —effect 21, 280, 351, 358-9 —failure to act 27, 293-336 —legal standard 20, 243-6, 271-82 —procedure 20, 184 —time limits: see Time limits, arbitrator, challenge to currency offence, alleged 21, 380-3, 395, 396-8 disclosure obligation 20, 177-330 passim

INDEX disqualiﬁcation 1, 111-18, 509-18, 2, 346, 358, 5, 266 —applicable law 20, 203-4 —effect 20, 239 —non-disclosure and 20, 214, 215-16, 257, 282-5, 21, 195-6 exceeding power 5, 366 n. 1, 6, 271, 21, 400 failure to sign award 1, 204, 415-17, 424-41, 449, 452-4, 2, 13-16, 27-8, 170, 177, 227, 343-4, 3, 92, 108, 118, 124-9, 137, 141-6, 155, 168, 210, 211, 237, 238, 254, 255, 268, 269, 276, 277, 292-4, 4, 111, 5, 348, 6, 39, 229, 230, 252, 7, 222, 14, 8, 10, 15, 187-8, 16, 112 n. 1, 237, 255-6, 282, 18, 3-44, 19, 107 n. 1, 161-71, 179 n. 1, 194-8, 295, 26, 5-6, 189, 29, 23 —effect on validity of award: see Award, validity impartiality 1, 115-18, 424, 427, 433, 514, 516, 518, 2, 21, 346, 357-8, 3, 129, 299, 303, 304, 315, 20, 179-80, 182-3, 186, 21, 349, 355-6, 387, 390, 398, 24, 310-11, 316-18, 319-24 independence 3, 209, 20, 179-80, 182-3, 186, 24, 310-11, 316-18, 319-24 —European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 20, 218 resignation 1, 415-17, 426-7, 433-4, 436, 2, 14-15, 3, 41, 108, 117, 137-9, 144-6, 155, 168, 209-11, 237, 238, 254, 255, 268, 269, 276, 277, 291-3, 295, 375, 376, 5, 362, 6, 103, 7, 56, 183, 14, 271 n. 2, 16, 284 n. 8, 19, 117, 34, 103-4 rights 19, 167 substitute 14, 312, 353-4 withdrawal 5, 338, 20, 329-30 witness, relationship with 20, 184, 185, 186, 242, 250-4, 266-7, 329 Attachment release 4, 277, 15, 185 right of 22, 78 Attribution: see Controlled entity; State responsibility Award: see also Recognition and Enforcement of Award; Settlement, enforcement additional 5, 74, 14, 258, 280-1, 16, 110-11, 284, 18, 76, 25, 187, 273-4, 28, 51-2, 195-7, 29, 293-4, 31, 289 on agreed terms: see Settlement

201 amendment 6, 30-2, 269, 270 arbitrary nature, alleged 21, 338-45 basis— —contractual obligations 10, 256, 257 —legal principles 5, 42, 48, 21, 338 —to be stated 4, 180, 5, 129, 6, 268-70, 21, 215, 338, 33, 439-40 basis for legal action 6, 135-9, 18, 118-19, 120-8, 130-1 bias, alleged 21, 332-8, 378-9 binding nature: see ﬁnal and binding below challenge to 21, 295-6 —withdrawal 21, 302 compliance 23, 208, 33, 204-5 contradictory 5, 130, 33, 441-7 contrary to fact 5, 46, 47 correction 3, 364, 4, 111, 5, 73, 74, 6, 270, 8, 133-4, 11, 284, 286, 301, 13, 93-4, 14, 101, 173-4, 256, 18, 76-8, 114, 19, 172-5, 253-5, 20, 171, 23, 122-5, 230-2, 25, 187, 188-9, 273, 274-6, 26, 186-7, 27, 264-8, 28, 307-8, 30, 19-21, 31, 124-6, 288, 33, 56-8 credibility 5, 267 date of receipt 8, 53, 134, 9, 405, 16, 283 declaratory 21, 74-5 deferred implementation 26, 147 delay in making 4, 3, 21, 261-2, 21, 275-8 deviation from 18, 79 discriminatory 6, 269 duty to comply with 7, 219 error in 16, 284 Escrow Agent, effect in absence of notiﬁcation 21, 286, 288, 293 exceeding remedy sought 6, 232, 17, 30 ﬁnal and binding 3, 365, 4, 16, 5, 74, 252, 6, 109, 8, 107-18, 11, 274, 276 n. 3, 16, 84, 20, 209, 21, 293-4, 295, 301, 349, 352, 375, 22, 208, 26, 258-61, 29, 23, 387-92, 31, 289, 290, 33, 348, 34, 42, 57 —implied undertaking to respect 34, 55-6 —proceedings in another forum and 2, 63, 98, 29, 220-1, 34, 57, 59, 165, 180-1 ﬁnancial position of respondent, relevance 21, 51 Full Tribunal, powers regarding 21, 283-4

202

INDEX

Award (cont.) grounds for setting aside 5, 128 illegal 5, 41, 49, 7, 201 insufﬁcient reason for 19, 16 interim: see Table of Cases by Category interlocutory: see Table of Cases by Category interpretation 3, 364, 5, 74, 6, 284, 8, 116, 12, 304-5, 13, 328-30, 14, 174, 257, 261-2, 18, 113-14, 19, 172-3, 317-19, 25, 187, 26, 188, 254-5, 27, 194-5, 31, 288-9, 33, 348 jurisprudential value 6, 115 language 21, 392-3 —authentic version 21, 293 —validity in absence of translation 21, 286, 288, 293-4, 295, 296-301, 27, 267 length 30, 169 modiﬁcation 4, 81, 29, 260 n. 3 —of award in parallel case 31, 67-86 non-legalistic 7, 17 null compromise 5, 335, 6, 271 null and void 6, 271, 7, 201 —deemed by Parties as 21, 290, 296 —status of Award 21, 293-4 omission from 16, 284 partial 1, 185, 2, 44, 100, 3, 197, 319, 366, 4, 20, 74, 5, 76, 6, 141, 7, 90, 181, 220, 225, 8, 15, 183, 9, 10, 11, 363, 372 n. 2, 13, 370 n., 14, 24, 311, 15, 189, 16, 3, 17, 31, 92, 153, 19, 3, 107, 200, 273, 21, 20 postponement 3, 105 reasons for: see basis above reconsideration 3, 364, 365, 4, 60, 5, 74, 75, 6, 46, 8, 107-18, 14, 101, 256, 18, 76-7, 23, 123, 25, 186-7, 28, 318-19 rehearing 3, 364, 365, 5, 74 reinstatement of case 28, 216-24 rescission 5, 74, 75 review: see reconsideration above revision 29, 387-92, 31, 286-92 —Tribunal’s inherent power 31, 289-91, 33, 58-9 —Tribunal’s sole competence 34, 58 n. 11 satisfaction of claim in another forum 9, 257 supplementary 19, 255-6, 318, 319-20 Tribunal’s inherent power 8, 117, 118 unjust 7, 17

validity 1, 417-24, 433, 2, 14-16, 27, 170, 177, 286, 289, 290, 346, 3, 54, 124-9, 140-4, 210, 211, 295, 297-9, 302, 315, 324, 6, 115, 7, 162, 198, 29, 23 violation 4, 73 void 5, 336 —ab initio 5, 335 without prejudice 5, 72 Bad faith 5, 266, 300 Bailee 6, 279, 8, 270 Balance sheet, preparation of 6, 244 Bank guarantee: see Performance guarantee Banking institutions: see Undertakings Banking obligations, breach 7, 48 Banking practices 1, 170, 191, 198, 201-2, 205, 207, 210, 505-6, 2, 168, 3, 19, 21, 25, 27, 30, 5, 29, 38, 6, 167, 7, 43, 17, 284-5: see also Cheque waiver of defect 17, 285, 291-2 Bankruptcy 2, 151, 8, 257-9, 9, 15, 27, 21-2, 34-6, 38-9 liquidation distinguished 2, 10 Bill of exchange: see Negotiable instruments Bill of lading 5, 31, 32, 39, 6, 291 Burden of proof 3, 16-18, 20, 29, 65, 66, 68, 71, 107, 108, 114, 115, 252, 294, 308 n. 2, 4, 80, 232, 251, 268, 276, 5, 22, 23, 36, 43, 47, 173, 176, 219, 229, 231, 368, 375, 376, 6, 66, 178, 210-12, 7, 28, 29, 68, 80, 88, 106, 107, 116, 117, 128, 129, 190-2, 9, 42, 57, 119, 244, 355, 10, 216, 217, 221, 344, 11, 275, 278, 281-2, 336-7, 12, 153, 224, 297, 314, 13, 23, 54-5, 58-9, 72, 112, 136, 139, 141, 153, 197, 15, 87, 16, 101, 106-7, 17, 57, 68, 75, 104, 112, 142, 151, 191, 193, 204, 222, 257, 263, 285, 18, 14, 68, 102, 105, 160, 161, 193-4, 196, 221, 228, 237, 238, 241, 263 n. 22, 264, 270-1, 324, 325, 329, 362, 369, 19, 14, 124, 210, 220, 269, 270, 20, 14-323, 325-7, 21, 16, 18, 27, 29, 22, 54, 56, 59, 88, 99, 110, 133, 171, 242, 251, 355, 23, 168, 173, 191-3, 195, 225, 226-7, 266, 284, 293-4, 335, 337, 368, 24, 23-4, 112, 114, 133, 152, 225, 245, 251, 258, 25, 116, 120-1, 202, 232, 244, 27, 52, 80, 28, 11-12, 139, 267-8 actori incumbit onus probandi 1, 209, 420, 464, 18, 216, 29, 92-3

INDEX allocation 3, 18, 20, 70, 71, 5, 245, 9, 172 authenticity of document 2, 119, 31, 161-2, 181-2, 246-56 beneﬁcial ownership 33, 474 breach of General Principle B 34, 138, 146-7, 166-7 —excluded matters 34, 166-7 construction work 33, 261-2 contract— —amendment 2, 389, 390, 399 —breach 2, 382 —existence 30, 106 controlled entity status 1, 420-1 defective equipment 33, 140 defective performance 33, 141 dominant and effective nationality 26, 7 n. 1 ei qui afﬁrmat, non ei qui negat, incumbit probatio 20, 266, 29, 123-4, 33, 316-17, 320 n. 40 entitlement to travel expenses 33, 182 expropriation 28, 71, 30, 41, 154, 160, 163, 31, 109, 33, 49, 265 by legislation 32, 151-2, 34, 85-6 implementation of contract 2, 153 invoice or work performed 2, 108, 115 losses attributable to Iranian Government 33, 359-61, 456 lost fees 33, 260-1 modiﬁcation of previous valuation 29, 279 nationality of corporation 1, 457-8, 464, 475-7, 481-2 ownership 32, 202, 33, 226, 34, 22-3, 92-3 payment of account 2, 121 prevention of export 28, 9 probandi necessitas incumbit illi qui agit 18, 325 shift 28, 291-2, 29, 123-4 to support defence 3, 18, 20, 27 n. 2, 70, 71, 4, 80 valuation 34, 96 Calvo Clause 18, 246 n. 5 Canada, law of 7, 167 Causation foreseeability 3, 266: see also Frustration proximate cause 2, 42, 3, 249, 266 Chambers: see Tribunal, Chambers Changed circumstances 3, 52, 68, 198, 199, 309, 322, 324, 4, 260, 268, 5, 211, 8,

203

441-4, 9, 38-147, 11, 33, 15, 214, 217-19, 16, 39, 21, 341, 23, 171-2, 218 n. 5 Algiers Declarations as 1, 208, 241 Claims Settlement Declaration provisions 1, 311 forum selection clause and 1, 287-94, 308, 311-14 in Iran 1, 245-6, 251, 256, 264-6, 277 political changes 16, 39-40, 21, 111-12 Charitable institutions: see Corporations, non-proﬁt Cheque 1, 169-72, 3, 10-21, 24-7, 30-3, 235 bank as drawer 2, 235-8 beneﬁciary of 3, 12 burden of proof 3, 19, 20 holder in due course 3, 20 n. 2 right to payment 2, 168-9 signature 3, 20 n. 1 Choice of forum: see Forum selection clause Choice of law 4, 234, 6, 98 general principles of law 7, 99, 8, 140, 141, 16, 25 Choice of law clause 4, 267, 268, 5, 293, 7, 107, 8, 156, 10, 63, 11, 26, 16, 20, 25, 26-8: see also Forum selection clause forum selection clause distinguished 1, 236-41, 251, 262-4, 281-2, 286-7, 299-302, 377 interpretation and implementation distinguished 16, 26-8 procedure, applicability to 13, 68 Civil action, alternative forum 4, 60 Civil Code of Iran: see Iran, law of Claimant: see Proper claimant Claims: see also Statement of Claim abandonment 5, 171 ambiguity 9, 296, 11, 90 amendment: see Statement of Claim, amendment for amounts larger than claims in US courts 4, 143 assignment 11, 84, 13, 19, 15, 183-4, 285, 16, 301-2, 310-12, 26, 154 barred 7, 116, 10, 218 basis— —absence of 22, 353 —alternative 26, 217 n. 2, 251 —anticipatory breach of contract 29, 232 —arbitration contract 18, 118-19

204

INDEX

Claims (cont.) —award of International Chamber of Commerce 6, 130, 131, 18, 118-19, 120-8 —bank account 10, 98, 342, 13, 336, 26, 251-2, 31, 106, 33, 358 —beneﬁcial ownership 12, 275-84, 29, 25-8, 32, 67-70, 33, 469 —binding contract 4, 230, 231, 10, 257, 325, 22, 115 —conﬁscated equipment 25, 67-9 —contractual arrangements for the purchase and sale of goods and services 32, 103-14, 173-4 ——movable/immovable property distinguished 32, 173-4 —contractual basis, need for 27, 138 n. 6 —customs charges 13, 157, 160, 163, 166 —debt 21, 45, 75, 27, 137 —decline in value of dollar 6, 287 —demand for payment 24, 219-20, 243-5, 247, 248-9, 28, 42-3 —different causes of action 13, 115-17 —equity 16, 48 —expropriation: see Expropriation —failure to establish 6, 127, 129 —failure to re-export 27, 92-8 —failure to secure customs clearance 29, 327-30 —government interference with contractual relations 12, 351, 29, 229, 33, 53 —inadequacy 29, 350-64 —insurance contract 23, 65-8, 110-22 —intentional tort 12, 261-3 —invoice 23, 173-89, 24, 149-51, 25, 39-42, 53-7, 98, 26, 74-6, 87, 88-94, 115-18, 119-20, 132-7, 27, 76-7, 82-5, 29, 231, 323-7 —latent defect 19, 15, 38-46 —letter of guarantee 13, 157, 160, 163, 166, 167-72 —loss of property 24, 151-2, 222-6, 26, 81, 33, 358 —loss of rent 33, 358 —payments made 16, 19, 72 —performance guarantee— ——demand for payment 25, 100-1

——return 19, 212-13, 239-40, 25, 53, 62-7, 98, 126-9 —personal injury 17, 140 —promissory notes 13, 21-7, 21, 44-5, 46-52, 63-7 —property right 16, 195-6, 230-1, 238, 239, 17, 99, 139-40, 169, 174 n. 8, 24, 110-11, 29, 308-9, 32, 32-6, 141-2 —putative damages 27, 230 —relocation costs 30, 153 —retained monies 27, 76-7, 86-7, 112-15 —salary 30, 153 —settlement agreement 8, 264, 24, 133, 153 —social security payments: see Social security payments —standby letter of credit 5, 57-61, 66-72, 6, 222 —statement of account 12, 155 —storage costs 27, 226-8, 29, 343-4 —termination of contract 26, 76-7 —tort 17, 99, 139-40 —Tribunal not limited to parties’ theories 9, 56, 12, 184 —trust account 27, 228-30 —unjust enrichment 23, 146 —work performed 23, 189-200, 218-28, 25, 57-8, 90-4, 26, 106-8, 27, 189, 193 between government entities 3, 348, 5, 113: see also Claims, ofﬁcial by banking institutions: see Undertakings by corporation indivisible 11, 87 by Domestic International Sales Corporations 7, 186, 188, 200 by individuals 4, 115, 7, 121 by Iran against US nationals 3, 152, 4, 1, 75, 101-10, 5, 15, 66, 127, 8, 364, 366, 368, 373, 23, 245, 248, 251, 254, 257 by Iranian banks against US banks 8, 362, 364, 366, 371, 9, 36, 97-106, 16, 293 n. 4, 17, 253: see also Undertakings by Iranian nationals against Iran 7, 123, 132, 171, 26, 131 by non-proﬁt institutions 3, 317 n. 1 collective 11, 88 continuity 16, 15, 104, 17, 267, 18, 261, 21, 42, 22, 10, 23, 301, 24, 270, 25, 58, 138, 26, 154, 27, 70 n. 4, 28, 17-19, 62,

INDEX 66, 380-1, 29, 227, 266, 306, 30, 185, 31, 149-50, 32, 57: see also assignment above; Claims Settlement Declaration, Article VII, Paragraph 2; Nationality of claim, continuity contract, arising out of 16, 18 courts 4, 142 critical date 29, 232-3, 378-9, 32, 189 damage, need for 22, 57-8, 182-3, 212 date arising 10, 48, 19, 53, 55, 60-1, 211-12, 240, 25, 58-9 declaratory relief 22, 60-1, 252-3, 335-6, 26, 170-1 derivative 4, 276 direct 5, 297, 298, 300, 8, 368-70, 12, 261-4, 15, 101, 26, 206-12, 216-26 dismissal 7, 123, 9, 344 effect of amendment to contract 11, 233-6, 250-5 equitable 8, 263 frivolous 4, 19, 6, 129 indirect 4, 243, 244, 5, 379, 6, 28, 65 n. 3, 7, 6, 7, 183, 185-7, 199, 200, 206, 207, 8, 368-70, 9, 233, 254-66, 10, 61-4, 279-81, 11, 84-9, 212-14, 311-13, 347, 12, 251-61, 272-87, 13, 18-19, 298-9, 14, 179-92, 199, 15, 195-6, 221-2, 16, 14, 195-6, 239, 258, 17, 115, 116, 297-8, 18, 101, 103, 19, 105 n. 12, 118, 22, 10, 215, 23, 270, 25, 138, 175-6, 26, 65-6, 130, 212-16, 28, 204-5, 30, 150-1 —on behalf of Iranian companies against Iran 10, 85, 279-80, 11, 311-12, 347 —effect of expropriation 9, 265 —entitlement to full recovery 10, 63-4, 82-4 —ﬁnancial losses, relevance 30, 160 —loss of shareholder status 9, 265 n. 17 —requirements 7, 186 —Treaty of Amity and 15, 34 n. 14 insurance compensation, effect 10, 239 insurance contract, relevance 10, 258, 14, 292 interest as part of 16, 289-90 interest-only 13, 95-6 interstate nature 5, 291, 294-8, 334, 18, 385-7: see also Diplomatic protection

205 joinder: see Procedure, consolidation of cases joint 16, 13-14, 24, 245-7 —commingled 24, 247 judgment of municipal court as 8, 294-6, 11, 196 larger embraces smaller 10, 252, 17, 169, 22, 42 of less than $250,000 3, 77, 4, 211, 5, 83 n. 1, 9, 16, 16, 104, 261-2, 18, 24, 66, 109 n. 15, 245, 275, 383, 393-6, 19, 345, 352, 360, 22, 112, 213, 216-17 —as claim of owner 11, 284, 286, 301 —need for request for espousal 18, 245-6 liquidated 8, 263 malicious 5, 86, 87 multiple causes of action 7, 126 new 16, 259, 27, 69-70, 33, 76, 290-1, 292 not previously ﬁled with US courts 4, 143 ofﬁcial 5, 96, 99-104, 6, 13, 12, 36-7, 14, 278, 17, 183-5, 216, 229-30, 18, 66-7, 74-5, 86, 19, 11, 346, 23, 337 outstanding 3, 65, 103, 151, 312, 313, 315, 348, 358, 4, 95 n. 1, 5, 82, 373, 6, 223, 264, 7, 42, 43, 47, 50, 52, 53, 98, 107, 115, 8, 261, 10, 98-101, 104-7, 325, 353, 11, 315, 357, 12, 122, 162, 13, 21-7, 46, 337, 345, 347-9, 14, 47-8, 272 n. 3, 15, 6, 197, 16, 16-17, 18, 152, 166, 290, 372, 19, 68, 138, 151, 21, 44-5, 63-6, 152, 22, 352, 23, 213, 24, 110, 243, 281-2, 26, 110-11, 125-6, 27, 43, 47-8, 137, 28, 19-20, 30-4, 66-7, 197, 228, 262-5, 275-302, 29, 265-6, 30, 64, 96 —appointment of temporary managers, relevance 32, 46-55 —standing of claimant distinguished 31, 104 —termination of contract 28, 30-3 —“whether or not ﬁled with any court” 1, 491-2, 497-8, 16, 17, 30, 98, 151, 33, 358 pendente lite 5, 113 perfected 8, 261 proper claimant: see Proper claimant proper respondent: see Proper respondent property, interest in 16, 195-6 reclassiﬁcation 18, 66-7, 19, 346

206

INDEX

Claims (cont.) refusal to accept 7, 275, 276 —authority for 19, 177-8, 180, 183, 187, 190, 193, 195, 199 release from 14, 317, 320 shareholder: see Corporations, shareholders subrogation 23, 300-1 termination 3, 375: see also General Principle B third party, on behalf of 16, 303, 20, 35, 39, 81, 115, 119, 136, 137 third party equipment 27, 98-9 time-barred 12, 143-5, 17, 189-91, 202, 232, 239-42, 24, 258, 28, 56-8, 32, 177-81 —effect of arbitration agreement 12, 145 —purpose 12, 144 validity, duty to examine 5, 85 waiver 8, 67, 81-2, 20, 112, 167, 168, 23, 39, 40, 42, 24, 154 —failure to resubmit claim 28, 39-40 —General Principle B obligation to terminate proceedings and 34, 133-4 —refusal to accept satisfaction 28, 19 —settlement agreement as 28, 67-70 —silence regarding 28, 122 —tacit 11, 251-5, 330-1, 345-6 withdrawal 1, 232-3, 385, 391, 486, 2, 36-7, 246, 260, 3, 205, 332, 333, 4, 98 n. 1, 6, 5, 7, 8, 11, 7, 262, 8, 67, 184, 186, 187, 265, 349, 353, 9, 9, 38, 43-4, 16, 296, 18, 63, 28, 376-7 Claims of nationals: see Nationality of Claim Claims Settlement Declaration Article I 11, 290, 12, 69 n. 9, 18, 86, 25, 259, 34, 139-40 Article II 1, 149, 245-6, 255, 264-6, 276-7, 288-90, 295, 349, 494, 497, 504, 2, 199, 208-10, 212, 315, 3, 5, 102, 151, 152, 167, 310, 312, 324, 5, 295, 344 n. 1, 6, 103, 10, 35, 11, 7, 8, 36, 215, 279, 311, 12, 82, 13, 180-2, 223, 224, 227, 300-1, 15, 242, 16, 307, 19, 335, 25, 259, 28, 48, 211 —Paragraph 1 1, 103, 106-10, 136, 138, 168, 171, 225, 236-40, 242-7, 248, 250, 252-60, 261-7, 268-70, 271-3, 274-9, 280-3, 284-303, 305-19, 320-2, 372, 394, 395, 412,

455, 490-2, 496, 497, 503, 507-8, 2, 9, 39-42, 55, 62-3, 66, 79-80, 82, 85-6, 88, 97, 105-6, 109-10, 112, 120 n. 1, 120 n. 2, 138, 143, 160, 296, 300-1, 312-13, 318, 320-1, 323, 324, 338, 370, 377, 378, 395, 396, 401, 3, 3, 59, 61, 65, 66, 104, 113, 115, 116, 198, 199, 201, 231, 235, 243, 251, 252, 259, 260, 273, 286, 314, 315, 319, 320, 323, 335, 348, 384, 387, 4, 6, 8, 53, 54, 95, 99, 101, 115, 142, 215, 216, 219-21, 224, 225, 229-33, 243, 247, 5, 2, 14, 15, 69, 82, 92, 119, 120, 125, 126, 171, 173, 181, 182, 184, 194, 195, 233, 253, 268-70, 274, 278, 279, 284, 298, 342, 371, 373, 378, 388, 6, 5, 27, 77, 79, 80, 83, 93, 100-2, 109, 112-14, 132, 135, 139, 158, 221-3, 231, 232, 235, 236, 250, 251, 255, 263, 264, 268, 270, 7, 21, 33-5, 42, 47, 53, 66, 82, 107, 122, 132, 134, 188, 195, 218, 275, 8, 5, 22, 27, 45-6, 51, 77, 86, 221, 224-5, 229-31, 261, 262, 264, 268, 293-7, 306, 405-6, 9, 31-5, 36, 38 n. 18, 40, 50, 51, 88, 115-16, 135, 195, 211-12, 223, 225-6, 245, 252, 257, 293, 333-4, 400, 401, 10, 44-5, 54, 62-3, 98, 104, 168, 233, 243, 251, 308, 311, 316, 325, 11, 36, 55, 67, 74, 85-6, 92, 109, 151, 170-2, 188-9, 228, 241, 248, 294, 315, 317, 350, 355, 357, 12, 100, 142-3, 150, 162, 174, 262, 273, 275, 287 n. 49, 291, 13, 21, 27, 46, 101, 102, 132, 168-72, 203, 225, 263, 307, 322, 337, 345, 14, 33, 48, 51, 105, 118-19, 127-8, 131, 179, 253, 272 n. 3, 277-8, 292, 15, 198, 272, 296, 16, 78-9, 87 n. 2, 259, 289-90, 17, 64, 83, 98-100, 115, 119, 139, 140, 169, 184, 185, 255, 259, 260, 262, 18, 86, 99, 100, 101, 119, 123, 128, 147, 152, 158, 166, 167, 189, 196, 208-9, 222 n. 35, 227, 282 n. 5, 290, 291, 298, 334, 355, 356, 360, 372, 19, 30 n. 13, 203, 249, 251, 20, 8, 9, 78, 21, 8, 23, 29, 42, 45, 100, 102, 148, 152, 343, 22, 187, 253, 290, 297, 351-2, 23, 7, 128, 129, 131-2, 135, 213, 215, 237, 240, 241, 266, 369, 385,

INDEX 24, 4, 47 n. 2, 83, 110-11, 119, 220, 243, 25, 10, 11, 17, 29, 70, 138, 142, 195, 268 n. 3, 272, 288, 297, 300, 26, 81, 119, 125, 223, 27, 18, 27, 58, 136, 141, 156, 235, 28, 30, 67, 122-3, 243, 258, 262, 325-6, 354, 29, 13, 27, 41, 65, 75, 187, 188, 191-2, 195-6, 30, 12, 17-18, 36, 59, 64, 74, 80, 150, 183, 185, 186, 280, 31, 33, 42-3, 66-7, 103-6, 149, 153, 32, 26, 32-3, 75, 33, 53, 76, 196-7, 211, 373, 466, 34, 32, 55, 83-6, 88-91, 142-4 —Paragraph 2 1, 103, 106, 107, 178 n. 2, 292, 2, 53, 3, 348, 4, 100, 5, 14, 15, 96, 99-104, 352, 6, 13, 141, 8, 77, 91, 95, 329 n. 3, 9, 136-7, 10, 83-4, 85, 139-40, 309, 342, 346, 12, 25, 36, 37, 13, 156, 159, 162, 165, 168-72, 197, 273, 279, 284, 14, 271 n. 2, 16, 17, 17, 184, 189, 201, 229-30, 239, 18, 66, 75, 86, 19, 11, 285, 346, 27, 322, 32, 109, 173-4, 34, 55, 83-4 —Paragraph 3 1, 102, 103, 5, 14, 15, 58, 8, 91, 95, 204, 209, 10, 46, 126, 325, 12, 60, 13, 180, 21, 100, 28, 123, 29, 29, 217, 31, 150 Article III 1, 112, 149, 2, 314, 14, 353, 354, 19, 285, 21, 309 —Paragraph 1 1, 117, 431-3, 436, 2, 301, 3, 40, 77, 126, 139, 211, 296, 364, 7, 204, 9, 409, 21, 160, 201, 203, 310, 313, 26, 14 —Paragraph 2 1, 114, 130, 451 n. 4, 458, 476, 511, 516, 2, 209, 301, 3, 211, 296, 6, 100, 7, 21, 316, 8, 275 n. 48, 11, 84, 274, 279, 16, 307, 26, 258 n. 4, 27, 317 —Paragraph 3 1, 2, 176, 177, 209, 230 n. 2, 2, 301, 3, 77, 4, 115, 210, 211, 5, 83 n. 1, 297, 7, 203 n. 3, 277, 11, 283, 285, 301, 12, 132, 307, 13, 263, 16, 261, 18, 66, 245, 383-7, 389-90 —Paragraph 4 1, 127-30, 176, 226-9, 394, 396, 2, 178, 312-13, 315-16, 317-21, 338, 3, 3, 287, 4, 99, 5, 79, 6, 29, 68, 102, 8, 369, 9, 4, 12, 289, 13, 278, 16, 304, 306-8, 21, 3, 7, 10, 25, 259, 27, 69, 28, 378-9, 29, 116, 33, 76, 155, 357

207 Article IV 8, 266 n. 39, 18, 148 —Paragraph 1 2, 56, 63, 3, 365, 4, 16, 5, 74, 252, 6, 109, 8, 114, 9, 406, 11, 88, 12, 285 n. 45, 14, 10, 174, 317-18, 328, 333, 20, 209, 21, 293, 349, 352, 26, 258, 29, 220-1, 387, 34, 57, 59, 165 —Paragraph 2 8, 379, 23, 334 —Paragraph 3 1, 331, 406, 465, 2, 56, 63, 94 —Paragraph 4 14, 332 Article V 1, 198, 200, 201, 291, 294, 308, 374, 377 n. 15, 420, 422, 477, 2, 94, 223, 237, 3, 58, 4, 70, 114, 234, 267, 5, 21, 22, 233, 261, 274, 292-4, 6, 97, 140, 161, 268, 442-3, 8, 132 n. 10, 9, 122, 146, 169, 177, 330, 10, 143, 147, 192, 312, 11, 26, 30, 32, 50, 142, 351, 358, 12, 21, 82, 13, 119, 230, 14, 9, 138-40, 186, 15, 214, 218-20, 294 n. 12, 16, 24-5, 39, 287-90, 18, 119, 19, 30, 21, 68, 72, 104, 111, 154, 23, 357, 26, 106, 28, 209, 29, 388, 33, 439 Article VI 1, 198 —Paragraph 2 2, 37, 5, 291, 7, 221, 8, 37, 185, 186, 9, 62, 21, 379 —Paragraph 3 1, 106, 195, 5, 291, 6, 68, 10, 35 —Paragraph 4 1, 102, 103, 294, 2, 59, 315, 320, 5, 58, 252, 8, 91, 95, 204, 209, 210, 10, 85, 11, 274, 275, 277, 14, 327, 332, 16, 289-90, 21, 100, 34, 55, 59-60 Article VII 1, 123, 137, 149, 166, 397, 503, 2, 19, 32, 156, 208, 211, 377, 395, 3, 2, 160, 4, 142, 5, 78, 268, 283, 284, 353, 7, 221, 11, 170, 181, 274, 276, 13, 180, 263, 14, 118, 18, 208, 297, 21, 68 —Paragraph 1 1, 136, 139, 223, 392, 417, 455, 456, 458, 463, 477-9, 481, 2, 16-17, 19, 33, 105-6, 160, 209-12, 248, 301, 303, 304, 335, 3, 46, 102, 103, 113, 161, 245, 259, 260, 4, 1, 99, 216, 217, 264, 273, 5, 1, 2, 18, 21, 22, 92, 126, 163, 254, 267, 269, 279, 282, 284, 338, 339, 341, 342, 352, 6, 127, 285, 7, 5, 20, 27-9, 41, 97, 121-3, 127-9, 185, 8, 128, 154, 234, 261, 294, 307, 326, 370, 9, 15, 70, 88, 116, 156, 194, 252, 291, 400,

208

INDEX

Claims Settlement Declaration (cont.) 10, 126, 166, 238, 263 n. 9, 278-9, 11, 86, 151, 188, 212, 271, 12, 100, 132, 142, 162, 251, 275, 345, 13, 18, 101, 131, 202, 306, 336, 14, 6-8, 34, 72, 156, 179, 199, 226, 268, 15, 5, 17, 5, 64, 115, 162, 255, 18, 166, 189, 237, 261, 355, 19, 202, 203, 20, 7, 21, 16, 18, 22, 24, 29, 51 n. 16, 102, 103, 22, 235, 23, 135, 168, 262, 263, 266, 273, 283, 284, 24, 44-5, 50, 110, 133, 218, 245-6, 255, 267, 281, 25, 10, 28, 138, 175, 195, 200, 229, 231, 232, 235, 237, 238, 239, 241, 244, 245, 268 n. 3, 272, 281, 297, 26, 14, 17, 18, 65, 130, 199-200, 207, 27, 58, 70, 71, 136, 28, 169-243, 315-16, 29, 13, 23, 27, 65, 75, 227, 241-3, 313, 315-16, 381, 30, 36, 280, 31, 33, 33, 373, 466, 34, 83 —Paragraph 2 1, 136, 139, 381 n. 20, 385, 388, 392, 394, 395, 399, 456, 477, 479, 2, 9, 55-6, 63-4, 98-9, 148, 226-7, 248, 282, 295-300, 363, 378, 396, 401, 3, 46, 60, 273, 386, 4, 54, 99, 101, 181, 216, 218, 243, 5, 6, 92, 93, 129, 153, 154, 196, 271, 365, 377, 379, 388, 6, 45, 58, 79, 80, 93, 108, 110, 115, 116, 127, 131, 263, 7, 5, 6, 29, 66, 97, 134, 185-8, 199, 206, 218, 219, 8, 77, 128, 159, 232-3, 261, 265 n. 38, 294, 368, 9, 38, 132, 253, 254-66, 281, 293, 324, 325, 329 n. 12, 379, 10, 61-3, 178, 279-81, 11, 84, 86-9, 109, 138-41, 151, 213, 215, 246, 298-9, 311-12, 12, 162, 174, 251, 257, 262, 273, 275, 276, 278, 283, 285 n. 45, 291, 322, 13, 18, 193 n. 1, 300-1, 320, 323, 14, 49, 93, 110, 179, 192, 199, 226, 244, 292, 15, 196, 221, 16, 13, 104, 259, 17, 81, 139, 166, 180, 267, 297, 298, 18, 89, 91, 95, 101, 103, 152, 158, 227, 261 n. 20, 19, 68, 105 n. 12, 118, 269, 271, 21, 42-3, 68, 22, 175, 215, 351, 370 n. 1, 23, 299, 355, 362, 24, 255, 270, 271, 25, 10, 28, 58, 138, 175, 201, 233, 238, 245, 268 n. 3, 283 n. 4, 26, 56, 65, 130, 154, 200, 206, 212, 223, 27, 70 n. 4, 71, 137, 155, 213, 216-17, 254, 28, 62, 66, 190,

228, 371-2, 380-1, 29, 25, 27, 227, 266, 306, 315-16, 30, 57, 150, 160, 185, 273, 31, 66-7, 32, 75, 34, 132-5 —Paragraph 3 1, 349, 350, 356, 372, 381, 412, 413, 419, 427, 504, 2, 20, 21, 105, 142, 143-4, 146-8, 235, 248, 295, 302, 338, 3, 47, 102, 103, 259, 260, 273, 281, 4, 99, 216, 218, 264, 273, 5, 1-4, 6, 7, 13-18, 48, 135, 136, 148, 150, 164, 237, 239, 242, 378, 389, 6, 58, 221, 285, 7, 5, 10, 20, 42, 247, 258, 8, 11, 13, 79, 83, 154, 221, 351, 360, 9, 166-7, 238 n. 35, 257, 277, 306, 344, 400, 10, 240, 242, 280-1, 341, 11, 6, 75, 90, 151, 170, 189, 215, 294, 12, 6, 142, 149, 162, 174, 291, 345, 346, 350 n. 13, 352, 358, 370, 372, 13, 21, 131, 272, 278, 302, 326, 14, 105, 129, 156-8, 167, 179, 199, 269, 292, 15, 5, 17, 116, 163, 166, 167, 168, 180, 184, 188, 215, 229, 272, 18, 86, 111, 152, 166, 177, 276, 297, 382, 19, 68, 119, 203, 325, 335, 350, 21, 43, 67, 69-70, 22, 175, 178, 183, 193, 23, 135-7, 278, 281, 292, 334, 362, 363, 24, 51, 255, 281, 26, 13, 18, 27, 66-7, 71-2, 141, 155, 206, 28, 61-2, 29, 23, 25-6, 41, 91-2, 229, 33, 49 —Paragraph 4 1, 381, 2, 302, 5, 2, 6, 15, 16, 18, 6, 27, 8, 351, 9, 93-4, 156, 231, 233 n. 30, 266, 400, 13, 272, 278, 14, 105, 16, 18, 78, 105, 17, 5, 180, 188, 215, 229, 18, 382, 19, 350, 23, 334, 383, 384, 25, 10, 28, 138, 140, 141, 216, 27, 141 Article VIII 1, 138 interpretation: see Jurisdiction of Tribunal, interpretation of Declarations status 21, 309 Class action 2, 300-1: see also Nationality of claim, shareholder claims Co-Registrar, exceeding powers 7, 275, 276 Commercial law 1, 374, 377 n. 15, 378, 445-7, 3, 19, 20, 4, 101, 268, 270, 276, 5, 394: see also General principles of, commercial law; International Chamber of Commerce; Iran, law of, Commercial Code; United States of America, law of, Uniform Commercial Code

INDEX Compensation: see Damages; Expropriation, compensation Concurrent jurisdiction: see Forum selection clause, jurisdiction of Tribunal Concurring opinion: see also Concurring and dissenting opinion; Declaration; Dissenting opinion; Explanatory remarks; Separate opinion; Separate statement; Supplemental opinion Aghahosseini 30, 105, 33, 365 Aldrich 2, 349, 3, 348, 5, 267, 11, 268, 345, 14, 320, 18, 323, 21, 162, 29, 56 Allison 23, 130, 27, 306 Ameli 12, 364, 26, 37 n. 1, 33, 365, 34, 62 Ansari 10, 35, 13, 121, 19, 73, 24, 47 n. 2 Bahrami 10, 177 n. 1 Bellet 2, 316 Brower 6, 32, 110, 8, 5, 22, 40, 206, 9, 280-3, 10, 34, 363, 11, 150 n. 1, 276, 12, 233, 15, 289, 16, 60, 17, 19, 294 n. 1, 19, 332 Holtzmann 1, 227, 229, 284, 2, 57, 3, 55, 78, 192, 199, 325, 330, 4, 159, 5, 111, 144, 267, 6, 40, 47, 133, 8, 206, 9, 284 n. 2, 313 n. 2, 360 n. 2, 10, 37 n. 2, 269 n. 2, 12, 146 n. 2, 13, 3, 124 n. 2, 331 n. 2, 14, 320, 16, 237, 22, 215, 26, 148 n. 2 Kashani 2, 65, 3, 323 Khalilian 24, 116 n. 1 Lagergren 2, 317 Mosk 1, 305, 363, 449, 2, 27, 57, 114, 146, 298, 386, 3, 277, 293, 387, 4, 111, 5, 230, 269, 6, 64, 7, 201, 10, 81, 12, 108, 126 n. 2 Mostafavi 8, 203, 10, 103, 12, 30, 13, 280 n. 1 Noori 30, 123 n. 1, 33, 365 Riphagen 5, 273 Salans 14, 320 Sani 2, 65 Shafeiei 2, 65 Concurring and dissenting opinion: see also Concurring opinion; Declaration; Dissenting opinion; Explanatory remarks; Separate opinion; Separate statement; Supplemental opinion Aghahosseini 33, 206 n. 2 Allison 27, 187, 28, 292, 29, 117, 33, 269

209

Ameli 10, 229 n. 1, 28, 255 n. 21, 30, 76 n. 1 Ansari 8, 203, 11, 45, 180 n. 1, 184 n. 2, 23, 351 n. 1, 26, 31, 28, 307 n. 1 Bahrami 8, 203, 11, 168 n. 1, 12, 82 B¨ockstiegel 8, 203 Broms 34, 177 Brower 9, 241, 11, 35, 53 n. 1, 184 n. 1, 16, 277, 304, 17, 173, 288, 19, 93, 231, 304, 20, 132, 22, 86, 23, 78, 24, 85, 27, 24 Holtzmann 9, 107 n. 2, 10, 229 n. 1, 333 n. 2, 14, 24 n. 2, 65 n. 2, 191 n. 2, 17, 31 n. 2, 19, 298, 23, 217, 24, 121 n. 2 Khalilian 18, 324, 21, 62, 26, 129, 28, 3 Mostafavi 9, 107 n. 1, 10, 269 n. 1, 13, 329 n. 1, 14, 86 n. 1, 17, 31 n. 1 Noori 18, 128, 198, 244, 24, 162, 33, 272 n. 1 Conﬁdentiality of proceedings: see Tribunal, conﬁdentiality of proceedings Conﬁscation: see Expropriation Conﬂict of laws 3, 48, 6, 99 n. 1, 8, 136, 140-1, 9, 178, 14, 186, 19, 126, 21, 63 Consolidation of cases: see Procedure, consolidation of cases Consumer law 6, 99 Continuity of claim: see Claims, continuity; Nationality of claim Contract 8, 164, 19, 15, 38-46, 29, 321-3: see also Applicable law; Force majeure; Forum selection clause; Lease agreements; Licence; Limitation of liability clause; Negotiable instruments; Purchase order as contract acceleration clause 13, 21-7, 46-7 adhesion 7, 192 airline tickets as 17, 230 alleged bribery 12, 270-1, 314-15, 326 ambiguous terms 5, 180, 184, 192, 195, 8, 229-30, 306-7, 9, 31-5, 215-17, 323-4, 367, 373, 11, 36, 45, 13, 235 amendment 11, 166, 12, 109-13, 116-18, 13, 188, 16, 37, 54, 272, 279, 18, 195, 202-7, 19, 226, 21, 154 —ad hoc 16, 37 —conduct of parties 18, 195-6 —de facto 16, 37, 41, 54 —implicit acceptance 1, 37 —Tribunal award as 20, 133

210

INDEX

Contract (cont.) —unilateral 22, 46, 97-8: see also Stabilization clause annulment 21, 154 anticipatory breach 3, 151, 7, 42, 53, 107, 115 applicable law 1, 422, 2, 27, 3, 48, 56, 4, 267, 6, 236, 7, 131, 8, 162, 231, 232, 9, 121, 124, 326, 10, 216, 13, 26, 17, 230-1, 240, 21, 103, 154, 22, 243, 268-89, 324, 325, 24, 170, 26, 146 —applicable law clause 5, 366 assignment 6, 233, 8, 155-60 breach 2, 116-18, 382, 386-7, 399, 3, 50, 51, 55, 57, 153, 164, 247, 261, 265, 289, 293, 294 n. 1, 4, 232, 233 n. 1, 234, 235, 240, 252, 267, 5, 127, 398, 6, 63, 64, 136, 137, 139, 189, 199, 200, 203, 206, 216, 222, 285, 286, 290, 293, 294, 7, 13, 24, 75, 79, 82, 103, 105-7, 109, 110, 113, 114, 202 n. 1, 215, 8, 168-71, 310-12, 9, 112-18, 157-60, 10, 254, 12, 151, 294, 351, 13, 46-50, 113, 121-3, 133-4, 142, 143, 303, 14, 200-3, 15, 31, 234-44, 16, 28-43, 47, 59, 64-8, 72, 17, 77, 18, 96, 328-31, 19, 14-15, 22, 56-7, 99-100, 299-310, 24, 73-80, 31, 194-9 —applicable law 16, 26 —damage, need for 22, 57-8 —delays, whether 33, 136-7, 168-9, 170-1 —justifying— ——repudiation of contract 24, 74 ——suspension of work 12, 294, 22, 309-10 —nationalization as 15, 243 —notice of 22, 102 —termination for: see termination, for breach below —timeliness of complaint 25, 98 cancellation 14, 269-70 collateral 23, 145 collateral promises 6, 197 condition precedent 7, 109, 114 contra proferentem rule: see verba ambigua accipiuntur contra proferentem below counter offer 7, 113 creation of new agreement 4, 221, 5, 395 cross-termination clause 10, 175 date 23, 42 discharge 2, 251, 254

dispute settlement provisions 8, 223, 21, 105, 29, 351-2 disputes relating to 19, 341-2 duty of reasonable efforts: see good faith, duty of below election 3, 289 enforceability 2, 221, 381, 398, 3, 13, 14, 16, 18, 27-9, 287, 6, 62, 162, 7, 192, 8, 160-2, 223 error 8, 133 escalation clause 16, 247-9 evidence of: see Evidence of, contract excessively onerous 9, 122 n. 14 excuse 3, 153, 154, 264, 7, 67, 75, 110, 193, 9, 196-7, 18, 302-3, 19, 69-70 exercise of rights under 7, 157, 158 extension 6, 145, 13, 338-9 ﬁxed-price 24, 172-3 force majeure: see Force majeure formation 3, 47, 55, 162, 6, 162, 176, 189, 191-3, 196, 197, 7, 107, 109, 9, 56, 13, 273-5, 279-81, 17, 126, 131, 197, 18, 159, 19, 69, 22, 306-9, 23, 340, 347 n. 5 —by conduct of parties 3, 48, 49, 6, 17, 145, 191, 192, 197, 7, 103, 113, 114, 8, 130-1, 13, 111-13, 22, 307-8, 32, 111-13 good faith, duty of 6, 197, 198, 7, 160, 8, 133, 141-3, 9, 122 n. 13, 14, 140-1: see also Good faith guarantee 8, 91-2, 8, 95-6, 13, 157, 160, 163, 166 illegal 4, 249, 250 implied terms 9, 147-9, 216-17 impossibility see Frustration independence 7, 66 inequality of parties 13, 245 interpretation 1, 107 n. 1, 108, 209, 213 n. 7, 214 n. 8, 3, 251, 261, 4, 252, 260, 5, 117, 128, 180, 181, 184, 192, 196, 197, 228, 6, 114, 115, 161, 227, 237, 262, 277, 7, 13, 23, 71, 72, 75, 76, 78, 79, 86, 87, 192, 8, 225, 231, 306-7, 9, 148-9, 323-4, 327-9, 367-73, 10, 222-3, 329, 11, 8-11, 12, 109-13, 13, 214-15, 235-6, 14, 54, 273-5, 15, 148, 236, 17, 64, 315, 18, 312, 22, 42, 237-9, 292-8, 28, 43-4 —applicable law, relevance 22, 293

INDEX —circumstances at time of conclusion 22, 292 —conduct of parties 2, 118, 3, 288, 5, 232, 6, 227, 262, 7, 193, 12, 103, 200, 212, 16, 54, 22, 238-9 —context 22, 292 —expressio unius exclusio alterius est 16, 27 —intention of parties 7, 73, 75, 79, 83, 9, 392, 15, 148, 152 —preparatory works 11, 9-11, 45-6 —trade usage 9, 367, 9, 380-1 legal relationship between parties 5, 173, 7, 82, 8, 130-3, 8, 142, 9, 326-7 letter of credit distinguished 13, 102 liability under collateral contracts 12, 37 limitation of liability clause: see Limitation of liability clause merger of rights under separate 7, 34, 35 obligations of parties in absence of 12, 134 obligations under, attempt to discharge 19, 80-1 oral 8, 160-1, 22, 20-1, 115 for ownership of land 7, 131 part performance 8, 160-1 performance 5, 393, 398, 6, 85-9, 94, 274, 290, 292-4, 7, 110, 161, 9, 117-18, 12, 150-1, 18, 302-3 —failure to complain of defective 33, 104-7, 141 —interpretation and 22, 298 —prevention 28, 96-103 —progress reports, responsibility for 9, 218 —standard 11, 110, 114-16 —time of the essence 22, 300-2 —waiver of defects in 6, 87, 88 principals bound by 6, 72, 159 privity of 18, 210 pro forma invoice 3, 41, 49, 54, 5, 25, 38, 43, 46, 7, 25 progress payments 24, 29-30 proper law of: see applicable law above quantum meruit: see Quantum meruit ratiﬁcation by conduct of parties 1, 413, 414, 2, 145-6, 154, 380, 397, 3, 163, 164, 247, 248, 4, 249, 250, 5, 395 recovery under 5, 172 reformation or rectiﬁcation 2, 117 renegotiation clause 15, 297, 16, 63 repudiation 7, 107, 16, 40-1, 64

211 required to be in writing 7, 13 res inter alios acta 13, 122 revenue actually earned 9, 372-5 rights under, export of property 22, 79 sales of goods and services between Iran and US 5, 96, 99-101, 103, 104, 13, 156-7, 13, 162-3 —educational instruction a service 13, 273 scope 19, 70 severability of provisions 8, 223, 31, 154, 33, 46 stabilization clause: see Stabilization clause standard inspection clause 19, 13-14 standby arrangement: see suspension below State’s duty to respect 15, 242, 294-8 sub-contractors, authorization 24, 30-2 —liability for 19, 46-7 sub-licence 6, 163 subject of 7, 25 substitution 3, 274 succession to 1, 359-60, 15, 60-1, 17, 15, 17, 20, 7-8 superseded by Settlement Agreement 10, 282-4 suspension 10, 168-70, 16, 37-40, 54, 22, 30-2, 46, 47, 236-7, 23, 171, 25, 36, 33, 80 tax withheld 22, 19-20 termination 2, 388, 3, 154, 155, 232, 265, 266, 289, 294, 4, 235, 259, 260, 5, 210, 317-19, 6, 274, 7, 15, 107, 8, 313-14, 338-40, 9, 118-20, 147-50, 196, 10, 290, 12, 182-5, 234-6, 13, 187-8, 213-16, 245-52, 302, 14, 35-9, 54, 60-1, 119-21, 140-1, 16, 20-45, 62-3, 272, 17, 65-8, 18, 159-60, 331-2, 19, 70-1, 330-1, 340-2, 20, 49, 22, 32-3, 46-7, 237, 298-9, 23, 90-6, 25, 36, 27, 165-7: see also Force majeure; Frustration —for breach 26, 160-1 —burden of proof 22, 54, 56, 99 —by agreement 2, 116-18 —for cause 23, 25, 90 —compensation for 2, 117 —for convenience 23, 26, 69, 79, 91, 25, 96 —date 9, 196, 17, 68, 19, 70, 22, 53, 100, 27, 167 —for delay 25, 97 —invalidity distinguished 8, 222

212

INDEX

Contract (cont.) —legal consequences 9, 120-33, 196-7, 20, 74-5 —matter of election 12, 185 —non-performance 22, 30 —notice of, need for 22, 56-7, 23, 223-4, 28, 40 ——waiver 33, 104 —past obligations unaffected 9, 201 —protection of property 23, 27 —right of 22, 21-2, 41-2, 46, 96, 248 —suspension, whether 22, 30-1, 25, 39-40 —timeliness 25, 97, 98 —waiver of right 13, 251-2 third party beneﬁciary 3, 274, 278, 4, 276, 6, 160, 161, 193, 195, 196, 8, 271, 9, 401, 23, 144, 301, 24, 11 third party rights 28, 79 trade usage 9, 367 translation of 1, 317, 318, 9, 31-5, 212-14, 13, 181-2 ultra vires 2, 24 unilateral changes 15, 240 unjust enrichment: see Unjust enrichment validity 1, 413, 414, 2, 116-17, 119, 145, 155, 380-2, 397-9, 3, 48, 162-4, 231, 245, 246, 251, 252, 278, 286-9, 4, 249, 250, 6, 176, 189, 192, 196, 7, 113, 8, 160-1, 222-3, 9, 195, 392-4, 12, 150, 315, 28, 95-6, 29, 232, 31, 151-2, 163-5, 33, 102-3 value of rights under 4, 156 verba ambigua accipiuntur contra proferentem 9, 371, 393-4 waiver of rights 7, 23, 13, 251-2, 16, 62-3, 274, 20, 90, 327 —evidence of 9, 162, 11, 233-8, 250-4, 330-1, 345-6 warranty: see Warranty Contradictory assertions 7, 123-6, 135 Controlled entity: see also Evidence of, controlled entity status Government agency carrying out acts of State and commercial acts distinguished 1, 421-2 independence 21, 71 n. 17, 72-3 Iran 1, 372, 389, 412, 413, 418-23, 427, 445, 475, 503, 2, 9-10, 17-23, 26, 105, 143-4, 146-52, 165, 258-9, 302, 338, 3,

47, 65, 103, 104, 160, 230, 231, 260, 273, 286, 323, 4, 218, 5, 1-23, 48-50, 71, 135, 136, 210, 237-9, 242-5, 370, 371, 378-80, 6, 58, 59, 221, 285, 7, 5, 10, 20, 42, 97, 188, 8, 154-5, 9, 15, 51, 88-96, 324-6, 343, 400, 10, 24, 46, 62, 142-7, 166, 240-2, 281-2, 341, 11, 55, 151, 215, 294-5, 12, 149, 348, 372, 13, 19, 102, 131-2, 202, 14, 157, 179, 269, 15, 5-6, 33, 198, 237-9, 17, 6, 116, 119, 130, 163, 169, 174-8, 184-5, 188, 225, 298-300, 18, 111, 158, 177, 19, 118-19, 183, 184, 186, 187, 189, 190, 192, 193, 195, 196, 198, 199, 203, 325-9, 335-40, 21, 43, 67-70, 22, 178-82, 183-93, 23, 135-7, 278-81, 333-4, 363, 24, 281, 25, 138-41, 26, 153-4, 27, 24, 71-2, 28, 61-2 —Bank Melli 33, 357 —Council for the Protection of Industries 10, 138-9 —critical date 17, 165, 22, 171, 187, 29, 229 —joint-stock company 5, 2-23 —Mostazafan Foundation 9, 88-96, 31, 114 —NIOC 1, 356 —private structure of organization, relevance 6, 58-9, 22, 186 —Social Services Organization 14, 129 —subsidiary of 19, 119 —test for control 5, 6-11, 10, 241-2, 13, 19-21, 17, 166-7, 299-300, 23, 136, 279, 25, 140-1 —TRC 8, 154-5, 9, 325 responsibility for obligations of, bankruptcy risk, relevance 25, 144 substitution of State for 17, 167, 179, 22, 182 United States 1, 106, 2, 165, 5, 71, 13, 273, 278, 23, 383-4, 27, 141 —ﬁduciary responsibilities 10, 84 Cooperatives 5, 238, 239, 244 n. 1 Corporate veil 7, 205, 12, 360-1, 365, 21, 72 Corporations: see also Cooperatives; Evidence of, corporation agency: see Agency applicable law: see Applicable law, corporations

INDEX continuity of ownership: see Nationality of claim, continuity of ownership control 1, 358, 359, 363, 381, 382, 384, 385, 4, 101, 7, 5, 6, 123, 134, 135, 200, 206, 207, 9, 258-64, 281, 11, 214, 28, 62-5, 30, 150-1: see also Controlled entity; Nationality of claim, corporations independence 6, 70, 7, 121, 130, 131, 9, 378-9 legal personality 6, 70, 7, 120, 133, 9, 378, 28, 65-6 nationality: see Nationality, corporations; Nationality of claim, corporations non-proﬁt 3, 317 n. 1, 5, 345, 348, 350, 352, 6, 250, 7, 180 n. 1, 17, 254 n. 4 —control 5, 349, 350 —interest of directors 5, 350 —jurisdiction of Tribunal 5, 338, 341, 343-7, 349, 351 ownership 6, 127, 11, 214, 312-13, 16, 259-60, 17, 297-8, 325-8, 18, 100-1, 103-9, 19, 269, 21, 77-8, 23, 383 —nominal 7, 186 shareholders: see also Nationality of claim, shareholder claims —assignment of shares 15, 101 —duties 30, 165-7 —rights 2, 352, 4, 242, 243, 7, 120, 122, 130-4 ——to bring claim 11, 87 succession 1, 359-63, 373-6, 382, 387, 389, 13, 334 wholly-owned subsidiary 7, 206 Costs 1, 171, 414, 415, 447, 448, 451, 508, 2, 12-13, 40, 146, 169, 177, 239, 244, 245, 254, 342, 385, 400, 3, 17, 33, 58, 66, 72, 107, 108, 117, 206, 236, 253, 254, 267, 268, 275, 276, 279, 291, 294, 332, 333, 4, 18, 19, 79, 81, 82, 110, 120, 228, 229, 271, 278, 5, 87, 93, 96, 101, 111, 120, 137, 174, 175, 181, 230, 231, 241, 242, 360, 373, 374, 401, 6, 18, 64, 68, 69, 129, 175, 217, 229, 283, 287, 288, 7, 7, 16, 24, 25, 29, 30, 48, 88, 117, 198, 8, 61, 92, 96, 134, 177, 323-4, 329-36, 384, 403, 9, 59-60, 150-1, 168, 199, 301, 345, 377, 10, 33, 34, 35-6, 55, 80, 103, 134, 175, 179, 256, 316, 347, 11, 33, 34, 43-5, 52, 68, 69, 136, 137, 165, 167, 178, 179, 181,

213 184 n. 1, 206-7, 208, 222, 249, 250, 255, 267, 295, 344, 12, 16, 30, 36, 38, 107, 137, 138, 145, 158, 159, 169, 231, 264, 297, 322-3, 356, 362, 13, 35, 117, 145, 157, 160, 163, 166, 191, 269, 276, 281, 285, 309, 323, 344, 14, 26, 49-50, 52, 80, 81-2, 93, 132, 168, 184, 211, 242, 270, 278, 279, 281, 300, 15, 21, 184, 289, 16, 86, 103 n. 1, 109, 235, 236, 254-5, 275, 281, 303, 17, 18, 19, 30, 31 n. 1, 86, 113, 129, 133, 152, 172, 199, 212, 227, 237, 244, 265, 268, 290, 294 n. 1, 323-4, 18, 87, 89, 91, 96, 102, 119, 153, 163, 173, 179, 197, 230, 243, 277, 291, 320, 372, 19, 72, 92, 160, 229-30, 270, 331, 20, 150-1, 21, 19, 27, 30, 60, 61, 161 22, 85, 86, 116, 122, 183, 199, 255, 336, 354, 355, 23, 74, 121, 149, 215-16, 228-30, 238, 267, 274, 284, 294, 306, 338, 389, 24, 84, 114, 119, 201-2, 226, 247, 259, 271, 288, 25, 13-14, 19, 109-10, 129, 150, 176, 200, 232-3, 239-40, 245-6, 288, 297, 26, 30, 43, 127, 183, 252, 27, 23, 31, 62, 119, 120, 121, 144, 185-6, 217, 245-6, 28, 49, 50, 110, 215, 317, 381, 385, 29, 55, 56, 65, 116, 117, 120-2, 240, 293, 309, 348, 30, 162, 31, 204-6, 34, 38: see also Damages, expenses in ‘A’ Cases 27, 257-63 auditors’ fees 9, 133, 14, 50 in ‘B’ Cases 27, 257-63 in claims of less than US $250,000 10, 327, 11, 167, 13, 309, 323, 14, 93 conduct of parties and 31, 205 damages distinguished 23, 228 for defending malicious claims 5, 86, 87 determination deferred 9, 44 evidence of: see Evidence of, costs experts’ 2, 75, 76-7, 11, 136, 137, 267, 16, 236, 255, 30, 234-5 frivolous claim 2, 245 lack of jurisdiction and 2, 43, 227, 343, 12, 39 legal fees 3, 53, 58, 8, 177, 331-5, 9, 133, 150-1, 242, 355, 403, 10, 316, 14, 49, 17, 19, 20, 128, 23, 228-30, 302, 337, 24, 155, 26, 183, 27, 31, 186-7, 33, 268 non-legal fees 8, 330-1, 334, 9, 150, 20, 128

214

INDEX

Costs (cont.) in ofﬁcial claims 12, 30 out-of-pocket expenses 17, 19 parties to pay own 30, 43, 44-5, 101, 31, 33, 43, 123, 206, 32, 40, 72, 91, 114, 182, 203, 33, 55, 193, 34, 100 principle underlying 16, 254-5, 281 private attorney 8, 13, 309, 323 reasonable 9, 150-1, 202, 338, 377, 10, 81, 12, 36, 137, 28, 368-9 —failure to provide information and 2, 113 respondent to pay 33, 342-3, 400 result of delays in proceedings 4, 81, 8, 39 translation 18, 197 travel expenses 14, 50 unsuccessful party 32, 159-60 withdrawal of claim 2, 260 Counterclaims 1, 171, 218, 232, 233, 336, 384, 385, 390, 485, 507, 508, 2, 338, 384, 400, 4, 143, 177, 178, 214, 243, 8, 45-6, 383-4, 10, 287-8, 11, 48-50, 108-35, 317, 341-2, 12, 215-29, 321-2, 16, 231-2, 303, 18, 101, 116-20, 128-31, 195-7, 207-8, 219-23, 304-5, 313, 314-15, 316-17, 320, 348-51, 356, 362, 19, 153-4, 212-13, 249, 251-3, 21, 145-52, 22, 81-3, 25, 10-11, 12-13, 59-61, 69-90, 149-59 admissibility 2, 324-6, 8, 384, 9, 223-4, 13, 227, 229, 15, 272, 21, 146-8, 30, 6-7, 11-12 —against indirect claimant 11, 110 —against third party 11, 109 amendment 7, 182, 11, 108, 13, 228-9, 17, 253-4, 23, 167-8 arising out of counterclaim contract 33, 154-5, 170-1, 195-200 arising out of same contract, transaction or occurrence 2, 51, 55, 63, 324-6, 378, 379, 396, 3, 115, 116, 152, 167, 235, 251, 252, 260, 261, 286, 4, 7, 243, 247, 5, 173, 233, 400, 6, 83, 84, 95, 100-3, 109, 7, 21, 82-4, 195, 196, 207, 208, 8, 267-9, 9, 36-7, 135-6, 167, 225, 10, 53-4, 168, 11, 315, 316, 12, 6-7, 291, 13, 134-5, 284-5, 306-7, 14, 105-10, 118, 119, 127, 15, 18, 19, 100, 284-5, 16, 293, 17, 259, 18, 123, 298, 356, 360-1, 19, 68, 78, 153, 223, 228, 249, 251, 270, 20, 35, 37-8, 21, 148-9,

150, 22, 82, 210, 254-5, 337, 24, 47 n. 2, 83, 25, 70-1, 106, 26, 28, 81, 99-101, 215, 27, 141, 235-6, 239, 244-5, 28, 325-6, 29, 187-8, 191-2, 200, 204, 208, 212, 237-9, 30, 12, 17-18, 33, 76-7 —bank claims, application to 16, 294, 29, 187-8, 191-2, 204, 212 —series of contracts 25, 71, 33, 183-4, 190-2 based on— —invalid claim 12, 36 —tort 6, 46 —violation of Iranian law 6, 84 characterization of 6, 46 conditional 8, 226 contractual waiver 13, 221-3, 240-4 damage, need for 25, 93 as defence 4, 246, 5, 173, 233, 400 delay in presenting 7, 116, 9, 22, 11, 135, 137, 17, 57-61, 21, 146-8 entitlement to ﬁle 10, 168 in excess of claim 3, 152 for— —advance payment 15, 94-5 —audit 25, 90 —bad oil ﬁeld practices 21, 153-9 —balance of down-payment 8, 325, 17, 82-3 —bank guarantees ——cancellation 9, 229-30 ——collection 8, 327-8, 9, 29, 20, 39-41 —bonus payments 15, 87-91 —breach of contract 9, 41-2, 58, 10, 174, 11, 22-6, 38-9, 12, 156-7, 13, 144, 14, 50, 167, 15, 18, 279-82, 285-8, 18, 305, 27, 103, 29, 334-45, 33, 89, 130-1 —breach of duty to protect goods 8, 271, 27, 241-5 —cost of replacing goods 13, 142 —costs incurred 16, 232 —customs duty 15, 99-100, 20, 35, 22, 81-2 —damaged property 11, 19, 13, 143 —damages and interest 27, 140-1 —debts 15, 97-8 —default 20, 81 —defective equipment 24, 153, 197-9, 287-8, 33, 138-40

INDEX —defective performance 8, 173-7, 9, 133, 299, 10, 305-6, 11, 18-19, 121-35, 142-3, 145-9, 247-8, 342, 12, 220-4, 13, 143-4, 306, 15, 85-7, 18, 196, 220, 313, 19, 81, 20, 30-1, 33-5, 134-7, 21, 159-60, 23, 58-62, 214, 26, 103, 118-19, 27, 236-41, 28, 338-87, 33, 136-8 ——damage, need for 25, 93 ——defective supervision 12, 224 ——failure to complain 28, 338-87, 33, 141 ——inadequate qualiﬁcations 12, 220-1 ——unsatisfactory documents 8, 12, 221-3 —defective supervision 12, 224 —delay 13, 143, 18, 219-20, 20, 117, 23, 54-8, 29, 332-3 —deliverables 8, 325-6, 344-7 —double payment 25, 81-5 —due to excess vacations and unauthorized absences 12, 226 —education of Iranian children 14, 79 —equipment held by claimant 14, 52, 19, 216-18, 223-4, 33, 171-2 —expenses 11, 192-3, 17, 287, 18, 220-1, 20, 79-81, 82, 33, 181-2 —expired guarantees 11, 316-17, 341-2 —failure to deliver 17, 319 —goods supplied 20, 115-16, 169-70, 27, 119 —improper estimates 11, 120-1 —improper payments 12, 215-18, 25, 70-2, 78-81, 25, 85-7 —inadequate qualiﬁcations 12, 220-1 —inﬂation-related damages 23, 62-3 —judgment award 22, 82 —legal expenses 3, 261, 267, 8, 268, 9, 230, 22, 254-5 —liquidated damages 8, 177 —liquidation fees 27, 144 —loss of— ——operating capacity 12, 137 ——use of land 14, 210 —losses— ——arising out of failure to return items sent for repair 12, 137

215 ——to employees 19, 154 —medical insurance 25, 89 —non-performance 11, 67, 19, 70-1, 20, 119 —overcharges 7, 191 ——due to excess vacations and unauthorized absences 12, 226 —overpayments 10, 304-5, 12, 218-20, 321, 15, 16-17, 20, 77-8, 23, 52-4, 116-19, 25, 87 —payment of good performance bond 8, 177, 20, 78-9, 116, 22, 83 —performance guarantees 24, 275, 26, 81: see also for bank guarantees above —reduction of fee 25, 76-8 —reimbursement of— ——down-payment 14, 50, 20, 117-18, 26, 171-2 ——escalation payments 9, 227 ——fees 8, 172, 10, 326-7 ——overcharges 13, 35, 72-7 ——overpayment 19, 224-5 ——payments to contractors 8, 172-3, 9, 26-8, 166-7, 11, 19, 192, 20, 33-5, 27, 103, 140 —relief from bank guarantee 11, 193-4, 17, 170-2 —rent 16, 232 —repayment of— ——social security payments 17, 262-3 ——tax costs 12, 224-6 —return of— ——documents 8, 177, 11, 19-20, 17, 83-5 ——materials 20, 80 ——payments 33, 131 ——property 14, 126, 26, 176-7 ——unliquidated down-payment 19, 212-13 —salary arrears 25, 88, 27, 104-5 —services 15, 95-6, 17, 262, 20, 39, 81, 22, 82, 25, 72-6, 26, 82, 27, 119 —severance pay 15, 87-91, 26, 82, 27, 104-5 —Social Security payments: see Social Security payments, counterclaim for

216

INDEX

Counterclaims (cont.) —speciﬁc performance 7, 159, 9, 26, 16, 231-2 —standby letter of credit 17, 253, 24, 275 —taxes: see Taxes, counterclaim for —termination of staff contracts 2, 112-13 —testing costs 20, 32-3 —unjustiﬁable collection of funds in Trust Account 8, 272-3 —unpaid sums 25, 88-9, 27, 116-18, 233-5 —unpaid taxes 25, 89-90 —unsatisfactory documents 12, 221-3 —value of— ——leased goods 19, 153, 154 ——missing property 12, 226, 27, 118 ——spare parts 9, 28-9 —withdrawal of suit 12, 321-2 —withheld documents 26, 103-4 —wrongful expulsion 9, 16-18 interest 17, 82-3 invalid claim as basis for 12, 36 jurisdiction of Tribunal 2, 54-60, 62-4, 65-7, 97-9, 311, 363, 371, 3, 60, 61, 151, 152, 201, 235, 251, 261, 322, 335, 386, 4, 7, 55, 242-5, 246 n. 1, 261, 5, 129, 227, 229, 6, 82-4, 93, 100-3, 108-10, 115, 116, 7, 20, 21, 82, 84, 201, 219, 8, 76-8, 203, 232-3, 265, 364, 366, 368, 371, 9, 223, 10, 287-8, 306, 11, 109, 12, 6-7, 106, 218, 291, 13, 72-4, 78-83, 132-3, 144, 221-9, 284, 306-7, 342-3, 14, 105-10, 15, 90, 96, 272, 283-5, 288, 309, 16, 293, 294-5, 313, 18, 102, 116-20, 128-31, 167, 360-1, 372, 19, 228, 249, 251-3, 310, 20, 78, 21, 148-52, 343-5, 25, 70-1 —dependence on jurisdiction over main claim 9, 38, 87, 17, 264, 18, 102, 119, 21, 18-19, 26, 126, 215-16, 251, 28, 314-16, 32, 91 —exclusive 2, 98, 8, 77 —failure to prove 9, 223 —previous settlement 24, 114, 196-7, 199-200 —withdrawal of main claim, effect 10, 312, 12, 264, 18, 117 limitation on 6, 102, 13, 226-7 municipal courts 8, 77

offset and 10, 309, 16, 293, 19, 310-16, 21, 55, 74, 344-5, 26, 144, 169-70, 29, 191, 195, 199, 207, 211, 30, 16 outstanding 3, 115, 10, 102, 20, 118, 27, 104, 143-4, 28, 46-7 possibility of separate pursuit 13, 244 preparation of 2, 288 proper claimant 15, 90, 96, 98, 19, 153, 154, 25, 149, 27, 104 proper respondent 6, 82, 83, 7, 126, 11, 315, 15, 19 relation to claim 4, 243, 244, 7, 82, 9, 312 right of 1, 103, 108, 219 same party 2, 324-6, 378, 4, 75, 5, 173, 7, 21 termination of proceedings and 30, 6 third party 8, 270-1, 9, 36-7, 15, 98-9 time limits: see Time limits, counterclaims in US courts as breach of General Principle B 34, 140-1, 167 validity 7, 202, 9, 58-9 withdrawal 34, 102 —implied 30, 6 Course of dealing 5, 45, 46 Criminal action, alternative forum 4, 60 Currency 10, 91-4, 11, 40-2, 50-1, 164, 184 n. 1, 206, 230, 13, 265-6, 15, 62-4, 16, 274-5, 24, 187-90 conversion 2, 13, 3, 233, 250 n. 1, 288, 4, 104 n. 1, 5, 168, 169, 175, 214, 6, 171, 7, 73, 74, 8, 17, 98, 165, 291-2, 403, 420-7, 9, 163 n. 7, 227-8, 247, 336, 10, 54, 78-9, 91, 345-6, 352-3, 11, 16-17, 31-3, 35, 93 n. 8, 141, 164, 176 n. 5, 199, 206, 208, 230-1, 240-2, 340-1, 357-8, 12, 106, 124, 13, 190, 304, 343-4, 14, 183, 189-90, 15, 63-4, 16, 223, 256, 274, 17, 225 n. 14, 301, 18, 162, 277, 285-6, 20, 128-33, 24, 180, 27, 105, 31, 87-8, 122 —contract provision 11, 32, 358, 13, 192, 16, 274, 17, 319 —exchange rate changes 5, 11, 32-3, 41, 50, 206, 208, 11, 32-3, 41, 50, 206, 208, 12, 304-5, 16, 274, 20, 22-5, 95, 23, 70 Currency exchange controls: see Foreign exchange controls Customary international law 2, 179, 188, 196, 197, 210, 4, 105, 116-18, 268,

INDEX 5, 269, 279-81, 286, 294, 300, 6, 177, 178, 208, 209, 8, 395-403, 9, 273, 10, 185, 189, 11, 358, 14, 330, 15, 222-4, 231, 246, 290, 16, 230 act of State 19, 292 evidence of, agreed settlements, whether 21, 121 export control 28, 144 expropriation 21, 120-2, 198, 330-1, 30, 197-8, 200, 238-44, 31, 4-6, 33, 270-1, 332-3 expulsion of aliens 16, 88-9, 17, 107, 142-4, 18, 161 interest on damages 17, 22 n. 4 jus cogens 15, 266 opinio juris 21, 121 protection of aliens 17, 147 sovereign immunity 28, 133, 156, 158 treaties and 10, 192, 202, 15, 34-5, 16, 69, 88, 17, 264, 21, 120-2, 330-1 Customary international practice 3, 19, 4, 67, 68 Customs dues 15, 99-100, 20, 35, 91-2 Damages 1, 387, 388, 445, 448, 452-4, 4, 108-9, 5, 248, 10, 309, 12, 22-3, 319, 333-4, 15, 39-40, 105-7, 111, 124, 255-6, 265-9, 308, 16, 293, 18, 7-9, 18-19, 23, 25-6, 19, 88, 224-5, 330-1, 21, 55, 70, 75, 143-5, 163-4, 25, 148, 27, 99-101, 28, 13-14, 29, 279, 280-3: see also Expropriation, compensation additional costs 11, 231-8, 250-5 admitted liability 28, 44-5 advance payments 2, 107 advertising 14, 204 assigned debts 21, 52 bank charges 14, 208, 22, 250-1, 334-5, 23, 205-8 bank guarantees 11, 99, 175-6, 12, 162-5 bonds 19, 151-2 for breach of Algiers Declarations 25, 260-2 —excluded elements 34, 138 —General Principle B 34, 137-8, 146-7, 158-9, 162, 166, 168 for breach of contract 12, 134-5, 15, 73, 17, 127-9, 31, 199-200 calculation: see computation below capital advances 16, 19, 55, 72, 19, 127 capital contribution 14, 166-7

217 cargo damage settlements 19, 128-9 carrying costs 7, 111, 112, 114 causal link, need for 27, 15-17, 25 collection expenses 3, 249, 253, 5, 400 computation 2, 107-11: see also measure and valuation below —error in 19, 173-4 —need for precise criteria 12, 20-4, 28, 213 conditional on return of goods 12, 135 consequential 4, 240, 277, 5, 400, 6, 204-6, 7, 75, 24, 288 construction costs 33, 259-60 consultancy fees 16, 312 n. 23, 19, 71, 25, 51-2 contract labour 15, 151-2 contractual obligations 16, 54 —foreseeable circumstances 16, 54-5 contractually determined 24, 197 conversion of currency: see Currency, conversion cost adjustments 20, 157-9 costs of arbitration: see Costs costs arising from unforeseen anomaly 11, 111-14 costs of delay 9, 160-3, 174-7, 10, 72-4, 89-91, 20, 56-65, 67-70, 113-14, 29, 330 costs incurred 19, 134-5, 152-3, 23, 203, 28, 108-9, 29, 29, 235, 430 customs dues 5, 96, 20, 91-2 damage to ﬁnancial health 11, 18 damaged effects 10, 171-2 on damages 12, 24 date 19, 134 deduction for 7, 114, 115, 10, 77-8, 309, 12, 105, 15, 84, 16, 293, 17, 8, 124-5, 18, 304, 350-1, 19, 218, 220, 221, 21, 74-8, 22, 39, 337, 23, 64, 208-10, 26, 162, 29, 345, 348: see also valuation, discounts below —corrected invoice 15, 130, 131 —credit for work performed 10, 70 —debts 12, 23-4, 21, 53, 61 —depreciation 17, 109, 28, 3, 12-17, 107-8 —diminished prospects 33, 253 —down-payment 13, 188, 15, 107-8, 132-3, 149 —excess man-hours 20, 64, 139-41 —materials 20, 63

218 Damages (cont.) —overpayment 15, 63-4, 129 —payments made 15, 140, 144, 155 —proﬁts from resale 4, 270, 19, 145, 154, 158 —shipping costs 17, 109 —social security payments 20, 74, 87 —taxes 2, 324, 13, 304, 15, 64, 16, 274, 276, 280, 25, 52, 53-4, 74, 87, 30, 228-30, 31, 21-5 —unauthorized work 11, 104-5 —uncompleted work 11, 229-30, 33, 142-57 —undelivered equipment 11, 192 —unliquidated advance payment 9, 164 —unsatisfactory performance 18, 335-8 —waived charges 17, 224-5 delivered goods 11, 202-4, 12, 136, 19, 219-20 destroyed leased equipment 12, 316 dispatched goods 18, 316 double recovery avoidance 28, 172, 214 escalation payments 10, 72-7, 22, 15-20, 91-2 evidence of: see Evidence of, damages excess taxes 10, 290-8 exchange losses 10, 174, 11, 33, 201-2, 339, 12, 16, 29-30, 20, 22-5 exchange rate: see Currency, conversion exemplary 10, 205, 11, 44 expenses 9, 35, 198-9, 298, 14, 123-4, 204, 206-7, 19, 124-5, 27, 183: see also legal expenses below —additional 18, 192-3, 214-15, 20, 60-1, 65, 67-9, 112-14 ——need for notiﬁcation 18, 192-3, 215 —maintenance and repair 19, 136 —rental payments 19, 135-6 —voyage 19, 123-4 expropriated bank account 12, 213-15 expropriation: see Expropriation, compensation extended overhead costs 10, 72, 77 facilities expenditures 11, 334 for failure to return leased property 10, 254, 258, 19, 132-5 foreseeable consequences: see Causation

INDEX guarantee costs 19, 150-1 guarding costs 22, 38-9, 81, 95 handling and storage 3, 52, 53, 56, 57 housing costs 25, 444-6 improper charges 17, 110-11 improper deductions 15, 83, 132 increased costs 15, 78-81, 129-30, 145-50, 22, 20-1 inﬂation 4, 270, 8, 168, 29, 53, 277-8 injunction bond 22, 252, 23, 204-5, 24, 38-9 interim fee 13, 183 inventory costs 14, 123, 26, 168-9 invoice claim 9, 19-20, 10, 70-1, 170-4, 11, 12-14, 20-1, 228-9, 320-30, 12, 168, 198-213, 295, 13, 264-6, 303-4, 14, 39, 15, 56-85, 17, 15, 124-7, 188, 193-8, 201-2, 204-12, 222-7, 235-7, 242-3, 18, 364, 367, 22, 37-9, 59-60, 237-42, 245-7, 331-4, 26, 162-4, 173-4, 178-9, 27, 107-12, 28, 36, 39-42: see also Claims, basis, invoice —corrections 15, 62 late payments 12, 165-8 lease payments due 1, 414, 415, 2, 259 legal basis 18, 332-5 legal expenses 11, 238-42, 255-8, 14, 205, 17, 76-8, 91 n. 9, 19, 125-7, 22, 37-8, 251-2, 23, 203-4, 24, 37-9, 27, 183-4, 29, 29, 209 —enforcement proceedings 34, 61-2, 65 legitimate expectations 16, 54-9, 73, 17, 76 letter of credit underfunding 9, 20-1 limited by amount of claim 3, 251, 12, 106 liquidated 5, 103 n. 1, 15, 131, 23, 55-8, 85-6 loans 16, 226-31, 19, 136-50, 27, 18-20, 27-8, 31, 33 —equitable subrogation 19, 137, 143, 145, 147, 149-50, 151 —interest 2, 111 —interest on 16, 229, 19, 140 loss of enjoyment of property 10, 251, 22, 103-4 loss suffered by third party 28, 12 loss of use of money 12, 167 losses on assets 12, 193-4, 17, 107 losses on discounted goods 26, 165-7

INDEX losses prior to settlement 28, 139 lost capital transfers 24, 113 lost deposit 17, 111-12 lost earnings 16, 101-2, 17, 109-10 lost fees 8, 170, 33, 260-1 lost opportunities 18, 193-4, 216 lost proﬁts 2, 383-4, 387-90, 399, 3, 233, 234, 4, 107, 108, 118 n. 1, 260 n. 1, 268, 270, 6, 170, 203, 204, 215, 216, 294, 295, 8, 169-71, 319, 9, 23-6, 123-4, 127-8, 149-50, 160, 199, 12, 23, 14, 45, 122-3, 142-3, 209-10, 15, 299-304, 16, 19, 55-8, 74, 238, 240, 276, 277, 17, 76, 18, 13-15, 21, 346 n. 36, 22, 40-2, 49, 60, 80-1, 95 n. 97, 99, 102-3, 104, 23, 202-3, 26, 165, 27, 25, 36, 101, 30, 201, 258-62 —breach of contract, relevance 28, 84-5 —contract as measure 16, 74 —contract terminated by agreement 2, 110-11, 33, 104 —costs and overheads distinguished 22, 96-7 —damnum emergens and 28, 9 n. 17, 17, 84-5 —evidence of 31, 200-4 —frustrated contract 33, 104, 126 —“reasonable” 22, 40-1, 95-7 lost property 9, 166, 179-80, 12, 16, 16, 102 n. 16, 17, 108-9, 18, 194-5, 216 lost revenue 15, 51-3, 26, 169 lost volume seller 26, 165 materials 20, 27 measure 1, 446, 447, 450, 451, 453, 454, 3, 56-8, 106, 154, 233, 4, 105-9, 111, 112, 116-20, 157, 173-7, 269, 271, 5, 227, 6, 65, 169, 170, 177, 204, 206, 213-16, 244, 245, 250, 266, 268, 269, 274, 275, 281, 285-7, 294, 7, 162-71, 172-5, 177, 8, 162-71, 380-3, 387-92, 9, 123, 128-30, 163-4, 197-9, 247, 336-8, 10, 64-78, 132-3, 268, 11, 89-108, 157-63, 174-8, 198-9, 319-41, 12, 12-16, 104-6, 13, 18, 14, 78, 126, 203-10, 238-42, 15, 13-14, 34-56, 102-55, 159-82, 248-52, 300, 16, 54-8, 194-235, 249 n. 15, 272-3, 17, 108-9, 18, 3-44, 303-4, 19, 88-92, 100-5, 297, 20, 75-6, 141-2, 145, 21, 22, 47, 57-60, 122-45, 164-94, 203-38, 22, 47, 23,

219 27-31, 79-85, 100-6, 371-4, 24, 100-1, 25, 147-8, 27, 15, 17-23: see also computation above; valuation below —absence of evidence 22, 78 n. 30 —actual beneﬁt 6, 213, 215 —actual damage 22, 79-80 —actual use 6, 177, 213, 215, 216 —contract provision 2, 106-7, 110-11, 116-19, 399, 3, 56, 164, 232-4, 289, 293, 294, 4, 234-6, 251, 260, 270, 5, 110, 111, 234, 359, 360, 6, 63, 227, 275, 7, 24, 192, 8, 164, 9, 124, 147-50, 160, 10, 64-9, 326, 11, 177, 12, 188, 238, 13, 138-9, 28, 88, 33, 87 —contract terminated by agreement 2, 106-11, 117-18 —damnum emergens 2, 387 n. 1, 10, 189, 15, 248, 268, 30, 201 —equitable determination 27, 21 —fair market value 8, 380, 12, 22-3, 15, 34, 16, 201, 238, 240-1, 244-7, 19, 102, 21, 57, 58, 119-20, 329-30, 25, 147, 27, 99-101, 28, 12-14, 16-17, 29, 46, 30, 89, 93-4, 206-7, 31, 19-20, 34, 36-7 —fair and reasonable 20, 114, 33, 87-8, 104, 399-400 —force majeure and breach of contract distinguished 12, 120-5, 187, 193, 194, 15, 13, 33, 169, 175, 201 —going concern 2, 354-5, 4, 106-8, 118-20, 8, 382, 12, 21-2, 15, 270-1, 19, 88, 100-5, 29, 271-3, 30, 91-4, 258, 33, 334, 338-42 ——evaluation as 33, 232-42 ——relevance 33, 231-2, 333, 34, 96-7 —hypothetical settlement 16, 54 —lucrum cessans 2, 387 n. 1, 15, 249-51, 258-9, 270, 305, 21, 330 —Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims 30, 238 —reasonable and equitable 9, 162, 22, 34, 80, 32, 157 —restitutio in integrum 2, 386-7 —service companies 12, 21-3 —settling of accounts 6, 294 —unpaid royalties 2, 340, 342 —Upton case 30, 238-9 —work performed 24, 15 mental anguish, grief and suffering 2, 78-9, 87

220

INDEX

Damages (cont.) method of payment 19, 296, 301-2 mitigation 3, 52, 56, 289, 293, 294, 7, 108, 110, 111, 14, 43, 17, 128, 132, 18, 160, 20, 160, 22, 34, 36, 47, 93, 94, 212, 243-5, 310, 23, 207, 214, 24, 38, 26, 161-2, 28, 8-9: see also deduction for above —international law 22, 244 —Iranian law 22, 243-4, 324-31 —US law 22, 244 nominal 9, 42 ofﬁce costs 11, 99, 12, 211-13 offset: see deduction for above out of pocket loss 12, 16 overhead costs 14, 124, 205-6, 219-20, 25, 42, 118-19, 33, 108-9 partial to avoid double recovery 11, 88-9, 138-41, 313-14 payment for equipment 19, 205 payments due 20, 13-14, 19, 27-9 performance costs 9, 124-7, 163-4, 201, 14, 208-9, 218-19, 220-2, 28, 103-8 performance withhold 2, 108-9, 8, 315-17, 9, 22, 24, 125-7, 164, 221, 11, 14-17, 37, 174, 334, 12, 151-3, 13, 134-5, 183-4, 305-6, 14, 41-2, 18, 191-2, 211-14, 20, 74-6, 85-7, 97-100, 145, 23, 45-8, 49-52, 106-16, 28, 90-1 post-contract expenses 11, 17-18, 38 pre-incorporation costs 14, 165-6 principle underlying 16, 254-5, 281 private attorney 8, 13, 309, 323 progress payment 20, 13-14, 23, 31-3 provisional acceptance 28, 36-8 punitive 2, 78, 87, 10, 205, 15, 248 quantum meruit: see Quantum meruit quasi-contract: see Quasi-contract reasonable 9, 150-1, 202, 338, 377, 10, 81, 12, 36, 137, 28, 368-9 recalculation of 3, 57, 114, 250, 257, 262, 264, 265, 290 reduction of 5, 220, 232, 234, 11, 66-7 relocation costs 12, 191-3, 18, 312, 22, 248 rentals 10, 254, 258, 15, 144-5 repair charges 12, 320-1, 19, 47 —undeliverable goods, on 19, 213-15 repayment of loan 13, 21-7, 30-3 repudiation of contract 18, 369 restitution: see Restitution

result of delays in proceedings 4, 81, 8, 39 return of goods 17, 286-7, 19, 286-93 salaries 11, 96-8, 12, 16, 190-1, 18, 310-11, 24, 220-1, 259-64 —deﬁnition 25, 79 salaries and allowances 10, 256, 343-5, 11, 157-60, 166, 13, 218-19, 14, 77, 25, 40-2 sales commission 28, 89-90 seconded staff costs 14, 163-5 security costs 2, 109-10 seizure of money 17, 110 services 10, 172, 284-8, 11, 330-4, 12, 168, 197-206, 15, 151, 19, 220-1, 225-7, 20, 25-6, 22, 34-7, 48, 58-9, 94, 98-9, 102, 115-16, 25, 98, 26, 174-6, 179, 33, 129 set-off: see deduction for above Settlement Agreement 10, 282-3 severance pay 24, 221 social security premiums 13, 340, 342, 22, 42-3, 50, 60, 23, 39-42, 89 n. 13, 90 standby fee 22, 33-4, 92-4, 98 stock dividend 10, 265 n. 12 storage costs 19, 209-10, 215-16, 222, 26, 168-9, 176 —between 14 November 1979 and 19 January 1981 28, 138-9 supplies 10, 172, 255 tax liability: see Taxes technical service fee 13, 219 termination costs 10, 290, 11, 160-3, 12, 153-5, 176-97, 236-7, 13, 189-90, 219-20, 305, 321-2, 338-9, 14, 82-5, 17, 31 n. 2, 19, 210-11, 221-2, 23, 201-2, 25, 47-50 —in absence of contractual provision 14, 42-5 —accomplishment fee 12, 197, 237-8 —contractual proﬁt 14, 53, 121-5, 22, 60 —cost of residual ofﬁce 12, 194-6 —demobilization expenses 11, 336-40 —force majeure and 17, 74-5, 87-91 —miscellaneous expenditure 12, 196 —overhead costs 14, 44-5, 25, 50 —repatriation expenses 10, 172-4, 256, 288-90, 11, 176, 13, 190, 216-18, 14, 77, 26, 179-80 —security and lease of building 17, 75

INDEX —termination of apartment leases 12, 194 —termination of contract and 8, 164-265 —termination payments 15, 141-3, 22, 60 —unamortized expenses 22, 39-40, 48, 60 termination of pension 30, 65-6 trade debts 27, 18 trademark fees 10, 255-6 translation 18, 197 travel expenses 11, 98-9, 14, 50, 18, 161, 19, 71, 25, 46-7, 117 unbilled items 13, 139-40 unjust enrichment: see Unjust enrichment unjustiﬁed attachment 4, 277 unpaid rental payments 12, 320 unreleased deposit 11, 196 unsold items 26, 167-8 valuation 2, 353-4, 4, 116-18, 175, 10, 132, 192-5, 12, 11-13, 14, 234-7, 15, 34-5, 246-52, 16, 69, 194-5, 238-44, 33, 246-9: see also computation and measure above —adjusted net asset value: see dissolution value below —approximation, 34, 97-100 —assets 15, 155-9, 18, 7-15, 18-20 —book value 16, 243, 19, 105, 21, 57, 33, 229 ——adjustment 30, 220-5, 33, 229-32, 338 —capitalization factor 19, 103 —Chorz´ow Factory 2, 354, 15, 246-7, 260, 299-304, 21, 122, 198-9, 30, 238, 251 —current net book value 21, 57 —customary international law 21, 120-2, 330-1 —date for 15, 244, 16, 201, 244, 19, 297, 298, 299-301, 304-6, 27, 16, 29, 49, 33, 240-1 —Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) 4, 157, 176-7, 241-4, 15, 256-65, 308, 16, 126, 201-20, 21, 123-4, 162-4, 199-200, 222-5, 328-30, 345-7 ——lost proﬁts and 21, 123, 199, 222-38, 246-61, 271-5, 346 n. 36, 356-8, 28, 17 n. 31, 30, 258-62

221 —discounts 30, 231-3, 31, 15-21, 33, 395, 400, 456-7: see also deduction for above —dissolution value 6, 226, 21, 57, 29, 271-2, 34, 97 —effect of change in political, economic and social circumstances 29, 53, 277-8, 30, 89, 100-1, 206-7, 31, 11-15, 33, 334 —effect of expropriating act on value, relevance 15, 46, 29, 46, 53, 273, 30, 213-14, 33, 333-4, 34, 97 —expert evidence: see Experts, evidence of —goodwill 12, 23, 19, 105, 30, 225-6, 262-3 —historical book value 15, 115 —inaccurate data 18, 20-1 —insured value 15, 39, 105, 110-11, 18, 7, 9-10, 11, 22-3 —international arbitral tribunals 15, 258 —just 15, 252, 292, 16, 195, 239, 21, 119, 122 —lawful expropriation 15, 252 —lawfulness of taking, relevance 15, 246, 248-52, 16, 69, 240, 21, 70-2, 121-2, 198-9, 330-1, 29, 270, 30, 202 —liabilities 15, 159-82, 18, 16-18, 29, 284-93 —linked companies 33, 338 —lost proﬁts: see lost proﬁts above —price adjustment receivables (PARs) 30, 207-17, 220, 263-4 —shares 33, 154-5, 256, 258-9 —State practice 15, 266 —trees 33, 263 —uncollectible items 34, 99 —unjust enrichment 15, 268-9, 308, 21, 70-1, 73 value of goods 10, 254, 258 waiver 8, 60-1, 12, 167, 317, 13, 185 “warehouseman’s lien” 8, 278-80 withdrawal of claim 16, 296 withheld dividends 10, 252, 257 withheld taxes 12, 296 work performed 10, 70-2, 11, 101-3, 174-5, 190-2, 199-200, 268-70, 13, 135-9, 267, 304, 16, 272-4, 276, 277-80, 20, 54-9, 61-4, 66, 69-72,

222

INDEX

Damages (cont.) 100-5, 159-61, 23, 33-9, 28, 42, 89, 33, 109-10 —as measure when damages inappropriate 12, 134 work permits 11, 99 work-in-progress inventory 19, 209, 215, 221 wrongful call on bank guarantee 11, 196 wrongful death 2, 82-6 wrongful expulsion 9, 43-4 Debt 1, 169-72, 185-8, 411-15, 442-8, 3, 35, 53, 65, 72, 113, 114, 119, 169, 235, 246, 247, 249, 250, 4, 221, 228, 231, 7, 14, 15, 190, 191, 21, 52, 75-6 allocation of payments 22, 13, 86-90 assignment 3, 274, 275, 21, 52 controlled entity: see Controlled entity, responsibility for obligations of evidence of 21, 49 government’s responsibility for predecessor government’s debts 32, 175-7 legislation providing for compensation for expropriation as basis 28, 260-2 limitation period 32, 177-8 “odious” 32, 175-7 outstanding, date of becoming 9, 40, 21, 44-5 waiver of 5, 373 Decision: see Award Declaration: see also Concurring opinion; Concurring and dissenting opinion; Dissenting opinion; Explanatory remarks; Separate opinion; Separate statement; Supplemental opinion Ameli 13, 40 Bahrami 13, 192, 14, 8 Declarations of Algiers: see Algiers Declarations; Claims Settlement Declaration; General Declaration Declaratory relief: see Claims, declaratory relief Demurrage, responsibility for 26, 24-30, 33-6 Denial of justice 1, 396-402, 3, 297 Diplomatic protection 1, 465-7, 478-80, 2, 161-6, 180, 196-209, 224-5, 5, 260-3, 273, 274, 299, 302, 303, 324, 326, 331-4, 9, 255, 256, 10, 85, 16, 7, 18, 246 n. 5, 262, 279, 383-90, 19, 31

Algiers Declarations, espousal of claims, whether 34, 148 applicable law 19, 31 dual nationals 31, 46-54 national, by 22, 168 nationality and 12, 284-6, 18, 261 n. 20, 22, 136, 23, 289 nature of relationship between State and individual 18, 387-8 Discontinuance: see Claims, withdrawal Discount 7, 197 Discounted Cash Flow method: see Damages, valuation, Discounted Cash Flow Discovery 4, 28, 58, 94, 95 Dispute settlement provisions: see Contract, dispute settlement provisions Dissenting opinion: see also Concurring opinion; Concurring and dissenting opinion; Declaration; Explanatory remarks; Separate opinion; Separate statement; Supplemental opinion admissibility 16, 333 Aghahosseini 27, 297, 29, 349, 30, 19 n. 1, 31, 206, 32, 207 n. 1, 33, 3, 401 Aldrich 1, 320, 396, 3, 380, 4, 279, 9, 356, 12, 64, 14, 300, 27, 258 Allison 22, 183, 200, 27, 259, 30, 112 Ameli 8, 403, 9, 187 n. 1, 10, 110, 13, 45, 351, 16, 327, 18, 47, 32, 207 n. 1 Ansari 5, 193, 275, 8, 228, 10, 5, 12, 306 n. 1, 13, 176, 19, 16, 56, 333, 22, 127, 135, 145, 160, 23, 90, 288, 315, 25, 112, 27, 32 Bahrami 9, 169-81, 10, 134, 11, 137, 300 n. 1, 346, 12, 17, 299, 13, 167, 177, 14, 134, 185, 16, 294, 19, 16 Brower 8, 284, 9, 410-13, 10, 224, 12, 64, 265, 13, 118, 16, 86, 18, 102 Enavat 1, 104 Holtzmann 1, 129, 167, 174, 178, 284, 320, 396, 2, 33, 35, 81, 254, 3, 17, 66, 78, 84, 87, 316, 358, 380, 4, 12, 63, 65, 72, 206, 5, 141, 9, 187 n. 2, 10, 219, 259, 351, 11, 250, 12, 64, 356, 13, 345, 14, 94, 271, 26, 216, 27, 259 Kashani 1, 104, 241, 250, 463, 2, 317, 5, 1, 85, 115, 121, 275, 7, 119 Khalilian 18, 79, 24, 40, 25, 131 n. 1, 27, 265 Lagergren 1, 197, 241, 250, 5, 348

INDEX Mosk 1, 119, 158, 230, 232, 305, 320, 396, 2, 124, 139, 146, 3, 40, 41, 76, 77, 209, 318, 374, 377, 4, 3, 28, 58, 76, 80, 93, 229, 5, 181, 242, 374, 7, 48, 8, 134, 10, 103, 30, 45 Mostafavi 8, 336, 9, 204 n. 1, 377-96, 10, 16, 85, 108, 328, 348, 12, 38, 108, 324, 13, 177, 193 n. 1, 310, 14, 53, 212, 243, 258 Noori 19, 16, 356, 370 n. 1, 22, 257, 23, 150 n. 1, 24, 3, 25, 190 n. 1, 264 n. 1, 278 n. 1, 30, 44, 32, 207 n. 1 Sani 1, 177, 241, 250, 2, 14, 317, 4, 237 Shafeiei 1, 104, 241, 250, 2, 1, 178, 284, 317, 327, 345, 3, 297, 5, 275 Dollar Account No. 1 8, 198, 12, 40-93, 14, 316-20, 323 Dollar Account No. 2 5, 67-9, 8, 197-206, 12, 51, 54-63, 13, 95, 16, 293 n. 4, 30, 16-17 Domestic International Sales Corporation, character of 7, 186, 187, 200, 205 Domicile 22, 143, 147 Drafts: see Negotiable instruments Dual nationality: see Nationality, dual nationality Due process 3, 365, 30, 156 Duress 16, 43, 21, 52 Earnest money 5, 359, 360 Election of remedies 4, 233, 235, 236 Embassy, competence 5, 241 Enforcement: see Recognition and enforcement of Award; Settlement, enforcement; Time limits England, law of: see United Kingdom, law of Equality of States 5, 263, 266, 304, 311, 312, 327, 331 dual nationality and 26, 7 n. 1, 29, 14, 65, 383 n. 1 Equity 6, 169, 170, 274, 294, 8, 105, 262-3, 9, 4-5, 197, 199, 332, 402, 10, 173, 240, 11, 41, 111, 12, 197, 13, 119-21, 14, 188, 15, 251, 268, 16, 48, 221, 254, 262, 18, 332, 348, 21, 56, 58, 61, 105, 123, 142-3, 296, 339 Caveat 18 and 34, 25 Escrow Agreement (1981) 1, 189-214, 8, 209 Escrow Agent’s functions 33, 346 n. 2 Paragraph 2 1, 147 Paragraph 3 1, 147

223

Paragraph 4 1, 147, 148, 206, 209, 211, 212, 214, 12, 44, 60, 84 Paragraph 5 1, 192 purpose 12, 61 Technical Clariﬁcations 12, 56-7, 60, 75-6 Estoppel 1, 287, 315 n. 15, 318, 375, 376, 2, 149 n. 3, 3, 26, 27, 30, 261, 4, 112 n. 3, 113, 235, 5, 247, 248, 271, 274, 6, 47-51, 7, 47, 103, 135, 143, 162, 201, 9, 100, 10, 287, 11, 229, 236, 12, 104, 150-1, 174-5, 208-9, 228, 378, 13, 33, 229, 253, 339, 14, 143, 230, 15, 196, 16, 47, 71-2, 266, 19, 77, 20, 90, 153-6, 21, 154-9, 160-1, 22, 57, 73, 74-5, 77, 83, 99, 101, 115, 246, 25, 99, 26, 36, 28, 208-10, 29, 87-92, 176-7, 228, 232, 32, 37-8, 33, 319-20, 323, 423-6, 433, 440, 450-1 European Community 13, 91-2 European Court of Human Rights 8, 419, 449, 10, 251, 267, 29, 389 Evidence 1, 155, 215, 226-9, 260, 306, 318, 334-6, 340, 341, 369 n. 8, 420, 421, 455-82, 10, 87-9, 348-50: see also Evidence of; Procedure absence of challenge 8, 261-2, 9, 20, 21, 126, 198, 218, 28, 39 adequacy 12, 132-3, 17, 192-8, 202-3, 220-1, 233-4, 242-3 admissibility 2, 121-3, 3, 67, 68 n. 1, 164, 350, 4, 70, 78, 245, 7, 70, 14, 20, 259, 16, 190-1, 17, 296-7, 19, 113-16, 27, 153 admissibility of documents (Cases A15(IV) and A24) 34, 111-13 afﬁdavits 1, 202, 423, 462, 463, 503, 3, 247, 5, 245, 9, 21, 17, 52, 28, 74-7, 29, 30-3 applicable law 11, 279-80 assessment: see evaluation below authenticity 2, 35-7, 106, 118-21, 3, 206, 4, 80, 6, 71, 8, 107-18, 19, 163-7, 31, 162, 165-94, 206-46 availability to other parties 3, 350 burden of proof: see Burden of proof claimant’s statement as 18, 282 computer program as 19, 132 conduct of parties 22, 30-1, 32-3, 25, 7, 26, 115, 28, 31-3, 33, 89 conﬂicting 6, 280, 28, 76

224

INDEX

Evidence (cont.) contra proferentem 1, 214 contradictory statements 3, 26, 69 n. 1, 249, 358, 359, 5, 240 costs 22, 34, 28, 103-8 credibility 6, 200, 18, 247-60, 19, 170, 227, 269 documents, unexplained 3, 251 duty to consider 5, 196 duty to submit 3, 66, 69-71, 4, 58, 9, 110-11 evaluation 3, 381, 4, 60, 107-9, 119, 120, 245, 11, 276, 277, 13, 58, 15, 45-51, 16, 264, 18, 338-47, 28, 275-88, 290-2, 293-302, 303-6 exclusion 13, 70-1 expert: see Experts, evidence of failure to submit 2, 115, 152, 153, 300, 304, 355, 3, 16-18, 20 n. 2, 21, 22, 24, 27, 53, 65, 66, 70, 71, 115, 205, 206, 247-9, 252, 382 n. 2, 4, 70, 78, 79, 110, 225, 255, 261, 5, 23, 33-6, 111, 226, 240, 245, 380, 383, 394, 6, 65, 92, 96, 127, 145, 173, 178, 212, 282, 7, 14, 15, 28, 68, 70, 79, 80, 110, 116, 128, 129, 8, 52, 202, 9, 29, 37, 40-2, 95, 125, 166, 180, 198 n. 13, 217, 227, 230, 10, 175, 285, 11, 18, 19, 26, 58, 71, 130, 156, 160, 175, 177, 178, 181, 205, 295, 327, 333, 342, 12, 136, 137, 167, 209, 219-20, 223, 224, 226, 227, 351, 352, 13, 154, 189, 266, 269, 302, 322, 14, 18, 205, 206, 15, 14, 16, 18, 94, 247 n. 13, 272, 313, 17, 17, 24, 263, 315-16, 319, 333, 336, 339, 342, 345, 348, 18, 160, 297, 306, 308, 371, 372, 19, 154, 178, 181, 184, 187, 190, 193, 196, 199, 209, 210-11, 226, 20, 23, 62, 89, 101, 103, 105, 110, 117, 118, 119, 157, 160, 166, 21, 26, 29, 22, 40, 47, 60, 82, 180, 183, 211-12, 23, 266, 25, 13, 105, 106, 117-18, 146, 149-50, 27, 138, 162-5, 187-93, 234, 28, 45, 214, 228-9, 231, 315-16, 384, 29, 231, 233, 234, 236, 242-3, 246-59, 33, 478 false 22, 43-8, 29, 93-116, 117-20, 123-84 —duty of party to check authenticity 27, 45-6 form 20, 148 hearsay 3, 68 n. 1, 12, 371-2

inconsistent 6, 71, 19, 268-9 inference 2, 11, 33, 115, 121, 142, 297-300, 355, 384, 3, 21, 22, 69, 82, 4, 81, 100, 223, 261, 5, 245, 6, 17, 18, 80, 145, 7, 75, 104, 109 insufﬁcient 2, 108, 8, 163-74, 9, 44, 58, 343, 403, 10, 49, 50, 53, 54, 11, 88-9, 12, 16, 315, 316, 13, 28-9, 33, 144, 189-90, 197, 214, 216, 217, 267, 307, 342, 14, 130, 132, 15, 31, 91, 150, 160, 164, 276, 279, 285, 16, 107-9, 232, 17, 113, 257, 18, 96, 153, 161, 166-7 n. 5, 170, 172-3, 178-9, 194-5, 228-30, 239, 240, 241, 304, 311, 312, 313, 314, 316-17, 319, 357-8, 362, 369, 19, 127, 148, 215, 216, 220, 221, 222, 223, 232-8, 20, 25, 59, 61, 66, 71, 73, 78, 80, 81, 82, 104, 108, 135, 141, 147, 165, 21, 53, 61, 152, 22, 81, 182, 24, 215-18, 221, 224-5, 258, 25, 113-18, 232-3, 238-9, 244-5, 26, 239-43, 27, 61-2, 138-40, 28, 169-75, 29, 327, 342-3 interested parties 24, 178-81, 28, 5-6 interpretation 17, 119 judicial notice: see Judicial notice late submission 10, 101, 106, 128, 11, 304-5, 13, 131, 27, 212-13, 29, 297 n. 4, 313, 30, 25-6, 45-6, 129, 31, 136-7, 32, 164-5 minutes 20, 34, 72, 125, 136-7 newspaper articles 19, 328, 337-9, 32, 34, 143-4 participation in elections 22, 148-50 passport 18, 237, 260-2, 273 n. 46, 22, 143, 23, 135 performance of contract 22, 115 photocopy 28, 4 post-hearing submission: see Procedure, post-hearing submissions presumption 1, 480, 5, 196, 6, 173, 231, 16, 266, 279, 17, 193, 209-10, 221-2, 18, 308, 318, 20, 24-5, 69 prima facie case 2, 238-9, 382, 399, 3, 69, 71, 72, 288, 5, 245, 376, 7, 11, 9, 28-9, 29, 93-116, 117-20, 123-84, 235 rebuttal, right of 29, 5, 68 relevance 3, 252, 381, 4, 95 n. 3 reliability 20, 19 request for 15, 271 return of 4, 60 shareholder agreements 29, 29-30

INDEX standard 10, 34, 14, 203, 17, 108, 191, 257, 20, 132, 23, 188, 29, 117, 124, 31, 162, 246-56, 283-4, 33, 317 submission of invoices 16, 279-80 subsequent events 10, 263 n. 9 subsequent to decision of Tribunal 29, 29 tape-recorded 8, 38 timesheets 20, 59, 62, 63-4, 65, 66, 67, 72, 143-5 translation 1, 234, 326, 336-8, 341, 484, 2, 139 n. 4, 368, 9, 31-5, 13, 54, 14, 18, 18, 62, 29, 308-9 unchallenged 12, 168, 16, 278 uncontroverted 10, 255, 12, 295 unsigned draft 19, 208 validity 12, 380, 19, 123-4, 243, 22, 161 weight of 2, 115, 121-2, 139-40, 3, 66, 68 n. 1, 71, 72, 381, 4, 80, 119, 120, 245, 261, 5, 23, 231, 375, 376, 6, 207, 7, 80 witnesses 2, 115 —compulsory attendance 19, 269 —credibility 3, 23, 24, 68, 31, 169-79, 262-73 —notiﬁcation 14, 292, 17, 62-3 —relationship with arbitrator 20, 184, 185, 186, 242, 250-4, 266-7, 329 Evidence of acceptance of— —letters 20, 17 —services 9, 40 —Settlement Agreement 19, 366, 22, 152 advance of funds 30, 152-3 agency 1, 357, 358, 378-80, 2, 11, 325-6, 9, 57, 343-4, 13, 111, 17, 14-15, 18, 178-9, 28, 77-9 amendment of Settlement Agreement 9, 62 amounts claimed 13, 27 approval of plans 9, 335 attributability 17, 101-5, 144-8, 287 authenticity of document 29, 93-116, 31, 165-94, 206-32, 33, 317-20 authority 15, 63, 66-9 bribery 12, 270-2, 314-15 capital transfer 3, 15, 16 claims, interrelationship 16, 293 continuity of ownership 11, 7 contract 1, 413, 414, 3, 48, 162, 231, 289, 5, 43, 6, 193, 292, 7, 13, 8, 160-1, 10, 26-33, 11, 56-7, 12, 102, 13, 112-13,

225 138-9, 22, 115, 24, 74-80, 87-97, 26, 115, 135, 28, 170-1, 172-3, 32, 174 —amendment 12, 102-3, 15, 120-1, 16, 272, 277-8, 20, 26, 34 —authenticity 15, 134-6, 31, 169-94, 232-46 —breach 13, 22-5, 22, 100-1, 23, 292-4, 26, 159, 160, 33, 168-9 —intention to amend 19, 226 —letter of credit 13, 111-12 —liability 15, 6 —non-operativeness 16, 37 —notice under 13, 25-7 —oral evidence 9, 368-71, 382-7, 11, 237 —performance 14, 35, 16, 265-70, 19, 80, 26, 106 —ratiﬁcation 2, 145-6, 3, 163, 164 —State responsibility for 21, 154 —terms 18, 311 contractor relationship 13, 121-2 contractual practice 13, 305-6 control of corporation 1, 359-61, 7, 6, 11, 312-13, 30, 159, 188-91 controlled entity status 1, 413, 419-21, 2, 150-2, 302, 3, 47, 160, 230, 231, 286, 5, 135, 242-5, 6, 59, 7, 10, 8, 155, 9, 400, 10, 167, 11, 215, 12, 373-5, 14, 157-8, 17, 130 n. 2, 165-8, 174-8, 298-300, 333, 336, 339, 342, 345, 348, 19, 326-7, 328-9, 337-9, 22, 179-82, 185-93, 25, 139-40, 29, 41, 45, 33, 49: see also nationality of corporation below —appointment and dismissal of managers 2, 17-23 corporation 26, 31, 27, 213-15 costs 4, 81, 10, 34 —absence of 9, 60, 133, 242, 10, 102 custom and usage 6, 97 customary international law 21, 121 damages 2, 384, 388-90, 56, 57, 164, 231, 233, 234, 250, 4, 269, 271, 6, 172, 173, 205, 213, 214, 14, 206-7, 33, 130-1 debt 18, 276-7, 21, 49 delay 20, 64, 146 delivery of goods 17, 322, 18, 228-30, 363, 367, 33, 115-19 escalation formula 22, 15 excess freight charges 2, 11-12, 25 existence of goods 17, 127, 131 expenses 19, 123-5, 140-1, 144, 20, 39

226

INDEX

Evidence of (cont.) expropriation 1, 420, 428 n. 6, 504-7, 4, 105, 154, 167-9, 222, 223, 6, 164-6, 238, 240, 10, 303, 11, 178, 221-2, 12, 345-51, 13, 302, 337-8, 14, 298-306, 18, 95-6, 20, 123, 124-5, 21, 112-16, 22, 71-3, 27, 60-2, 28, 169-70, 171-2, 173-5, 212, 30, 37-8, 39-40, 58-9, 74-5, 86-7, 154-60, 188-93, 31, 107-13, 32, 30-1, 32, 151-3, 33, 50-3, 330-1, 377-83, 402-18, 34, 33-4, 86-7 —absence of formal evidence, relevance 34, 33 expulsion 17, 105-7, 144-52, 257-8 force majeure 15, 6-11, 17, 286, 33, 77-80 inheritance 33, 477-9 interference with property rights 32, 33-5 Iran’s exclusive jurisdiction 5, 116 legislative intention 33, 23-7 liabilities 19, 212-13, 214-15, 219-21, 22, 16, 39 loss of property 24, 227-34 lost proﬁts 31, 200-4 mailing 17, 278-9, 284 marriage settlement 30, 53-6 mitigation of damages 3, 56, 294 nationality of claim 1, 389, 455-82, 5, 22, 11, 151, 188-9 nationality of corporation 1, 223, 224, 334, 335, 384, 385, 418, 427, 428, 455-82, 503, 2, 9, 16-17, 31-2, 33-4, 395-6, 3, 1, 4, 141, 142, 216, 217, 273, 5, 22, 23, 209, 237, 343, 6, 127, 7, 27-9, 65, 66, 97, 8, 234, 9, 13-15, 87-8, 116, 252-3, 292, 10, 23-4, 60-1, 278-9, 11, 7, 212, 227, 274-6, 277-82, 12, 132, 142, 149, 161, 251, 290, 13, 180, 202, 336, 14, 155-6, 227-8, 15, 4-5, 195, 16, 15, 16, 17, 4-5, 162, 18, 99-101, 177-8, 208-9, 355, 19, 202, 20, 6-7, 21, 16-19, 42, 22, 174-5, 24, 50, 25, 25, 26, 138, 26, 17-18, 41-3, 29, 225-6, 244-6, 315-16 —absence of challenge 8, 262, 18, 177 nationality of person 3, 23 n. 1, 9, 14-15, 353-5, 356, 12, 6, 13, 300, 14, 6, 198, 18, 236-7, 260-2, 19, 51-2, 54-5, 57-8, 324, 21, 21-3, 29, 22, 42-3, 134-5, 242, 246, 262, 267-8, 272, 25, 175, 202, 203, 26, 38-40, 192, 28, 62, 29, 10-13,

14-15, 16-19, 64-5, 31, 40-1, 32, 55-6, 33, 76 —certiﬁcate of naturalization 34, 11 —continuing nationality 34, 10-11 —dominant nationality 25, 203-10, 26, 7-14, 28, 185-91, 29, 10-13, 14-15, 16-19, 73-4, 76-7, 379-81, 30, 274-80, 31, 10, 31-3, 41-3, 65-6, 146-8, 32, 26, 57, 59-60, 76-90, 128-31, 33, 45-6, 212-13, 216-20, 269-70, 304-7, 371-3, 464-5, 34, 83 ——imprisonment as obstacle to leaving country, relevance 31, 31, 34-5 —minor claimant 29, 12-13, 16-19 —renunciation 31, 40, 44 naturalization 32, 56, 76 nature of loan 13, 31-2, 86-8 ordering of goods 17, 321-2 ownership 9, 233, 13, 320, 17, 297-8, 325-8, 18, 100-1, 103-9, 32, 71-2, 198-9, 202-3, 33, 374, 34, 87-8 —beneﬁcial 29, 28-41, 32, 67-70, 199-202, 33, 470-4, 34, 23-4, 92-3 payment 8, 19, 12, 296-7, 17, 193, 19, 128, 146-7, 20, 35, 22, 15-16, 18-19, 86-8, 24, 185, 28, 38, 30, 98, 33, 113-14 payment due 20, 13, 18, 20-1, 22, 92 performance 25, 36-8, 33, 112-14, 119-21, 170 permanent residence 31, 54-5 receipt of— —documents 17, 288-90 —goods 17, 119-24 request for transfer of funds 10, 100, 104-6, 342, 13, 346-9 rescission of contract 14, 72-3 right to charge electricity connection fees 33, 252-4 satisfactory performance 9, 221, 375, 403, 11, 62-7, 198, 199, 204, 247, 12, 105, 150-1, 294-5, 13, 136-7, 303, 14, 40-1, 16, 268, 270, 271, 278, 17, 6-7, 8, 68-74, 315, 18, 169-73, 313, 320, 357-8, 29, 345-6 service of notice 13, 64-7 services rendered 19, 221, 20, 116, 26, 175, 33, 104-7, 114-15, 119, 126-9 settlement 3, 358, 359, 24, 133-43, 175-82

INDEX shareholder status 30, 161-2, 184, 185-6, 223-6, 33, 321-4 shipment 10, 216-17, 221, 13, 114, 18, 311, 19, 206-8, 28, 41 social security payments 20, 14-15, 28, 161, 163 —liability for 2, 112 subcontractor relationship 3, 273 succession 1, 360-3, 373-5 sums expended 13, 267 taking 15, 29-33, 54-5, 19, 86-7, 27, 60-1 tax liability 3, 107, 236, 15, 273-5 title to property 32, 29-30 undertaking to refund unincurred costs 12, 225 unlawful expulsion 16, 100-1, 125-6 unpaid invoices 25, 144-5 validity of promissory notes 21, 47-50 valuation 20, 89, 30, 91-4, 31, 120-2, 32, 155-7, 33, 32-40, 177-81, 398-400 value 19, 88, 91, 100, 20, 27, 29, 46-55, 274-93 value of shares 33, 258-9 waiver of contractual entitlement 9, 162, 11, 233-8, 250-4, 330-1, 345-6 work performed 1, 107, 20, 59, 62, 142-3, 22, 242-3, 28, 88 Exchange controls see Foreign exchange controls; International Monetary Fund Exchange rates: see Currency, conversion, exchange rate changes Exclusive jurisdiction: see Counterclaims, jurisdiction of Tribunal; Forum selection clause, jurisdiction of Tribunal Exhaustion of local remedies 15, 196-7, 30, 62-3, 97-8 enforcement of Award and, 34, 61-2 Experts appointment 1, 235, 390, 2, 70-5, 76, 355, 3, 107, 164, 167, 4, 91-5, 157, 5, 185, 8, 272 n. 45, 276 n. 51, 12, 228, 13, 16, 40, 142, 149-50, 175, 14, 155, 15, 288-9, 23, 68, 24, 24-8 —prerequisites 4, 94, 24, 26-7 costs: see Costs, experts’ evidence 1, 202, 423, 462, 3, 165-7, 4, 60, 119, 120, 261, 8, 45, 272, 11, 5, 111-35, 264-6, 13, 351, 354, 16, 122-92, 196-232, 244-9, 252-3, 256, 19, 243-4, 31, 281-2

227

evidence of— —evaluation 34, 97-100 —going concern 33, 229-32 —impartiality 19, 244 —inconsistency 31, 179-82 —need for adversary proceeding 9, 34 —opportunity for parties to comment 9, 35, 16, 190-2 —Tribunal’s obligations in respect of 11, 141-2, 16, 196-200, 256 —valuation 16, 122-92, 30, 206-17, 218-35, 257-8, 32, 155-7, 33, 32-40, 34, 36-7, 94 need for 6, 267, 269, 14, 28 payment 3, 166, 167, 4, 59, 92, 93, 95, 158, 5, 186, 8, 41, 10, 21, 11, 136, 137 qualiﬁcations 32, 156, 33, 398 terms of reference 4, 95, 159, 173, 175-8, 6, 30-2, 7, 172-7 —amendment 6, 31 timetable 10, 110-20 Tribunal’s responsibility 10, 117 Tribunal’s right to appoint 2, 122 n. 1 Explanatory remarks: see also Concurring opinion; Concurring and dissenting opinion; Declaration; Dissenting opinion; Separate opinion; Separate statement; Supplemental opinion Aldrich 14, 3 n. 1, 9 Ameli 16, 103 n. 1, 255 Ansari 8, 30, 15, 187, 18, 3 Briner 14, 3 n. 1, 9 Brower 15, 187, 16, 282 n. 1 Holtzmann 16, 237 Mang˚ard 15, 187, 16, 282 n. 1 Mostafavi 14, 65 n. 1, 100 n. 1, 279 n. 1 Noori 26, 7 n. 1 Export licence 7, 213, 17, 85-6 Expropriation 1, 287, 375 n. 14, 387, 389, 422, 504-7, 2, 175-7, 207, 350, 3, 290, 4, 105-12, 115-18, 143, 154-6, 159, 162-79, 223, 5, 227, 371, 6, 164-8, 178, 189, 200-3, 206, 207, 209, 215 n. 6, 216, 225, 231, 241, 250, 256, 257, 260, 268, 7, 6, 7, 47, 48, 50, 51, 123, 125, 126, 129, 133, 134, 146, 152, 153-5, 164, 165, 168-70, 173, 256, 8, 380-4, 385-90, 391-450, 9, 230-41, 266-83, 10, 130-1, 136, 170, 259-68, 302-4, 12, 7-16, 214-15, 346-51, 370-5, 14, 230-4, 15, 101-87, 213-34, 297-300, 16, 43-5,

228

INDEX

Expropriation (cont.) 64-9, 193-6, 237-47, 17, 258-9, 18, 95-6, 238, 19, 81-7, 94-9, 20, 123, 21, 106, 111-22, 341, 23, 69, 96-100, 294, 366-70, 24, 215-18, 25, 147-9, 27, 91-2, 141-3: see also Damages; Evidence of, expropriation; Property rights, measures affecting action against speciﬁc individual 28, 11, 71-4 appointment of temporary managers 2, 21, 14, 297-300, 30, 38-9, 58-9, 191-2, 32, 51-5, 33, 327-8, 34, 88-91 appropriation of property distinguished 23, 25 bankrupt company 21, 56-60 breach of contract: see lawfulness, breach of contract below by decision of court 12, 318 coercion and duress 4, 171 compensation: see Expropriation, compensation conformity with domestic law, relevance 7, 15, 225, 32, 51 constructive 12, 261-4, 287 n. 49, 17, 152 n. 22 contract rights 4, 163, 6, 237, 243, 250, 15, 220-1, 267, 269-70, 299, 16, 231, 234-8, 21, 106, 111-12, 119, 123-4, 24, 82-3, 28, 211-12, 215 —lawfulness, determined by international law 16, 25 control of corporation 2, 176, 349, 351, 352, 7, 154, 159, 162, 9, 257, 17, 168-9, 30, 158 creeping 10, 206, 28, 296 n. 2, 29, 44-5, 30, 160, 31, 107, 33, 20-2, 324-31, 34, 172 critical date 32, 137-8, 154-5, 160-1, 34, 32 date of taking 4, 156, 159, 164, 165, 171, 173, 9, 240-1, 246, 265 n. 18, 278, 10, 249-50, 12, 11, 15, 225-9, 290, 21, 116-18, 28, 259-64, 266-302, 30, 192-3, 33, 19-20, 324-31, 34, 32, 34 decision reserved 9, 42-3 denial of access to funds 4, 172 deprivation of rights, 6, 225, 245, 256, 15, 29-56, 17, 181, 22, 71, 77-9, 103-4, 26, 108-9, 34, 34

discrimination 15, 231-2, 28, 211 effective taking 10, 131, 147-52, 12, 11 elements of 6, 256, 9, 238-9, 275-9, 10, 261-2, 15, 223 —insurance company’s assessment 10, 264 —substantive value of property 25, 149 —treaty determined 15, 246 evidence of: see Evidence of, expropriation exchange controls as 24, 110-11 expulsion as 17, 139-40 failure to protect property rights as 2, 79-80, 86-7 force majeure and 21, 107, 31, 8-9: see also Force majeure forced sale 9, 240 formal act, relevance 9, 224-7, 10, 259, 267, 34, 32-3 government involvement, need for 9, 238-9, 12, 349, 15, 35, 18, 242-3, 30, 40-1 indirect claim, effect on 9, 265 intent of government, relevance 6, 225, 256, 21, 115, 30, 86, 157, 190, 32, 51, 34, 32-3 interference with internal management 6, 165, 166, 199, 201, 238, 240, 7, 162-7, 179 n. 1, 180 n. 1, 21, 70 interference with use or enjoyment of property 6, 225, 10, 243-52, 12, 9, 319, 18, 239-40, 19, 85-7, 94-9, 27, 96, 28, 71-3, 210-11, 288, 296, 29, 41-6, 30, 38-9, 84-6, 157-60, 163-8, 31, 107-14, 32, 51, 33, 15-37, 34, 32 —car parking 28, 290, 293 —permanent deprivation, need for 28, 288, 296 n. 2, 29, 44, 267-70, 34, 32-4, 91 —taking of corporation and assets distinguished 15, 112 —taking of shares distinguished 30, 160, 165-6 jurisdiction of Tribunal 4, 101, 115, 5, 210, 6, 223 lawfulness 16, 65, 241, 27, 143 —breach of contract 15, 232, 242-6 —criteria 10, 204-5 —under domestic law 30, 86 —under international law 16, 25, 29, 270

INDEX lawfulness, relevance: see Damages, valuation, lawfulness of taking, relevance legislation as 24, 215-17, 28, 267-8, 32, 28-9, 31-2, 135-41, 33, 21-2, 29-30, 34, 84-6 loss, need for 21, 56, 60, 33, 27-32 mortgagor’s calling in of mortgage outside relevant period, relevance, 34, 34 nationalization as basis of jurisdiction 28, 258 non-contractual 22, 71 pension rights 30, 41-3, 46-9, 59-66 public purpose 15, 233-4, 21, 122 repudiation of contract as 16, 43-5 shares 30, 154-62 survival of rights and contract obligations 6, 242 unlimited responsibility 6, 265 valuation: see Damages, valuation Expropriation, compensation 1, 141, 171, 415, 422, 450, 451, 2, 353-5, 383, 399, 3, 53, 54, 106, 232-5, 264-6, 278, 279, 288-90, 293, 294, 4, 105-9, 111, 112, 116-18, 156-7, 173-7, 223, 270, 271, 277, 5, 109, 110, 169, 227, 248, 399, 400, 6, 172, 225, 265, 281, 287, 290, 7, 24, 50, 69, 71, 76, 112, 114, 165, 173, 8, 162, 314-24, 340-2, 378-80, 393-405, 9, 273, 10, 4, 133-4, 184-206, 15, 33, 34-56, 223-4, 244-71, 298-308, 16, 33, 34-56, 68-9, 17, 98, 21, 70-7: see also Damages agreed settlements 21, 121 applicable law 8, 415-19 basis 19, 302-4 BITs 30, 245 currency 8, 425-6 customary international law 10, 195-203, 267-8, 14, 234, 15, 223-4, 231, 21, 198, 30, 197-8, 200, 238-44, 31, 4-6, 33, 270-1, 332-3 —developments 30, 237-54 duty 6, 169, 9, 219-20 failure to attempt to exercise rights, relevance 2, 269-70, 33, 29-31 for failure to return goods 19, 293-7 interest 8, 384, 402 interference less than expropriation 27, 15, 32, 35-6, 141-6, 157-9, 160-1, 33, 27-32

229

liability for 1, 21, 106-7 measure: see standard below request for, need for 28, 266-8 standard 30, 196-202 —adequate 15, 230-1 —appropriate 8, 386-90, 14, 234, 237, 30, 197-9, 201, 236-7, 247, 31, 3-4 —full equivalent 6, 265, 266, 10, 184, 187-206, 267-8, 15, 34 n. 14, 35, 269, 16, 195, 239, 21, 119, 29, 46, 271-3, 30, 88-9, 100, 199-201, 248-52, 31, 3-6, 120, 227, 270-1, 33, 332-4, 34, 93-4 —Hull doctrine 8, 385-90, 30, 239, 31, 6-7 —negotiated settlements as precedent 8, 399-400, 10, 185, 196, 21, 121 —prompt 10, 203 n. 36 —“prompt, adequate and effective” 30, 197-8, 246, 31, 3-4 —UNGA Resolution 1803 30, 197 n. 13, 240, 242-3, 249 termination of contract by agreement 2, 117-18 Treaty of Amity provisions 16, 195, 239, 243, 21, 120-2, 125, 329-31, 30, 3-6, 88, 100, 196, 255-7, 31, 85, 119-20, 33, 332-3 Tribunal practice 30, 247-53 World Bank Guidelines (1992) 30, 245-6 Expulsion 16, 78, 83-102, 17, 97-113, 139-51, 18, 161-2, 23, 233-8, 239-43, 24, 264 in cases involving claims of less than $250, 000 9, 18 n. 8 constructive 16, 87-9, 94-7 criteria 9, 16-18, 17, 106-7, 142-3 global adjudication not appropriate 17, 97-8 juridical person 16, 97-8, 17, 258 property rights affected 17, 99-100, 139-40 State responsibility 17, 100-7, 256-8 Extraterritorial effect of legislation 8, 258-9, 30, 64 Fair trial 20, 218 Filing of claims: see also Time limits, ﬁling of claims meaning 1, 127, 128, 130, 132, 226, 228

230

INDEX

FMS Trust Fund 19, 296, 300, 301-32 FOB (free on board) 7, 103 Force majeure 1, 452, 2, 116, 310, 369, 386, 388, 389, 3, 52, 106, 152-4, 231, 4, 13, 161, 165, 174, 179, 253 n. 2, 259 n. 5, 5, 210, 7, 13, 8, 306-10, 312, 9, 22-6, 27, 116-25, 149-50, 157-60, 171-4, 196, 201, 294-8, 10, 74-5, 82, 173, 174, 289, 11, 126, 149, 338-9, 12, 103-6, 112-15, 119, 120-5, 184-6, 205, 210-11, 235, 237, 13, 92, 133-4, 142, 143, 147, 150, 153-4, 211-16, 245-50, 363, 14, 35-7, 72-9, 217, 15, 11-14, 70-3, 110, 122-3, 136-51, 211-14, 16, 37-40, 54, 84, 269, 17, 24, 65-8, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 87, 89-91, 285-6, 319, 18, 160, 203-4, 326-31, 371, 372, 19, 80, 85, 86, 94, 162, 224, 247, 20, 23, 48, 75, 117, 124, 21, 107-11, 329, 22, 56, 116, 242, 247, 312-16, 328, 331-2, 354, 355, 23, 47, 50, 53, 57, 58, 72 n. 44, 85-6, 89, 91-2, 95, 169-73, 185, 188-9, 190, 191-3, 196-7, 219-22, 225-6, 24, 11-14, 60, 25, 34-6, 115, 124-6, 27, 79-82, 85, 115, 28, 96-9, 29, 221 n. 10, 225 n. 23, 32, 30-1, 33, 76-80: see also Frustration act of State as 24, 11 continuing obligations 9, 298, 12, 205, 211, 15, 11-12 contract, effect on 21, 107, 25, 39-40, 99, 124-6, 27, 167-8, 28, 196-7, 33, 76-81 —notice, need for 28, 34-5 —parties’ control over events and 33, 130-1 —provision for 13, 211-12, 246-8, 15, 212, 16, 38-9, 17, 65-8, 29, 336, 342-3 —suspension 23, 171, 25, 36, 33, 80 —termination 14, 73, 23, 25-6, 26, 77, 80, 144-5, 28, 31-3, 29, 336, 342-5, 33, 80, 112, 136, 168-9, 174-5 duration 16, 38-9 general principle of law 16, 39 liability for 28, 103 n. 17 —costs incurred before force majeure occurred 29, 344-5 —losses arising 24, 36, 171-2, 26, 77, 144-5, 164, 27, 167-8, 183, 185, 28, 43-4, 87, 29, 327, 342-3, 31, 200, 33, 80-1, 141-2, 177, 201-3

Foreign exchange controls 2, 219, 220, 221, 239, 245, 340, 3, 13, 32, 68 n. 2, 5, 376 n. 1, 380, 381, 6, 167, 178, 208-11, 7, 44-53, 10, 106-7, 298-302, 16, 106, 107-9, 17, 112, 18, 228: see also International Monetary Fund, Agreement capital transfers 3, 13, 15-18, 28 n. 1, 29, 7, 45, 46, 51, 52, 24, 111-13 current transactions 7, 45, 46, 51, 52 duty to seek approval 24, 111-13 effect on contract 3, 13, 14, 16, 18, 27-9 as expropriation 24, 110-11 justiﬁcation 5, 382 validity 3, 13, 5, 383, 7, 49, 50, 52, 28, 29, 32 in violation of treaty 5, 381, 383, 7, 51, 53 Form of award: see Settlement, form of award Forum selection clause binding, whether 1, 241, 245-7, 251, 254-7, 263-7, 270, 276, 277, 285-97, 302, 305-15, 3, 160, 198, 5, 120, 26, 18-19, 33, 36, 249-51 changed circumstances and 1, 287-94, 308 clear provision, need for 9, 216-17, 28, 67 jurisdiction of Tribunal 1, 236-319, 490, 491, 496, 497, 2, 4, 5, 54-6, 66-7, 105-6, 138, 370, 378, 396, 3, 61, 98, 99, 104, 113, 161, 198, 199, 246, 260, 321-5, 335, 384, 386, 387, 388 n. 2, 4, 7, 8, 55, 143, 181, 220, 225, 230, 5, 115-17, 119, 120, 126, 127, 130, 171, 180-4, 191-7, 210, 365, 388, 389, 6, 5, 80-2, 93, 109, 112, 113, 115-17, 221, 222, 236, 250, 251, 255, 263, 268, 270, 7, 33-5, 188, 218, 219, 8, 3 n. 2, 51-2, 220-5, 228-31, 264-5, 306-7, 405-7, 9, 31-5, 88, 115-16, 156, 170-1, 211, 293, 333, 10, 44-5, 242-3, 277-8, 11, 7, 35-7, 45-7, 151, 170-1, 197, 12, 100-1, 142-3, 149-50, 13, 21, 44, 180-2, 192, 225, 14, 33-4, 199-200, 17, 17, 63-4, 259-60, 300, 18, 110, 189, 20, 8-9, 22, 236, 23, 127-9, 130-2, 168-9, 371, 24, 51-2, 25, 17-18, 27, 156-7, 28, 29-30, 29, 141, 316-17, 31, 152-3 nulliﬁcation 21, 105-6

INDEX separability 1, 292, 308, 309, 8, 432, 9, 170-1 to determine enforceability 34, 144, 178-9 Forum shopping 12, 285 France, law of 5, 19, 7, 166, 21, 69 n. 12 arbitration law 20, 206-7, 214-15 —Civil Code— ——Article 524 7, 175 n. 1 ——Article 1131 11, 356 ——Article 1134 24, 191 n. 38 ——Article 1135 1, 108 ——Article 1156 1, 108 ——Article 1157 1, 107 n. 1 ——Article 1162 1, 213 n. 7, 214 n. 8 ——Article 1184 8, 165 ——Article 1290 21, 74 n. 25 ——Article 1315 1, 209 ——Articles 1372-5 7, 164 n. 1 ——Article 1643 19, 38 nn. 30, 31 ——Article 1644 19, 39 ——Article 1655 19, 40 —Code of Civil Procedure— ——Article 341 20, 206-7 ——Article 384 1, 233 ——Article 385 1, 233 ——Article 394 1, 233 ——Article 395 1, 233 Fraud 3, 30, 7, 25 Frustration 2, 250-3, 3, 153, 155, 6, 176, 177, 274, 281, 7, 17, 8, 340, 383, 9, 122 n. 13, 196, 13, 250-1, 15, 211-13, 16, 39, 18, 191-2, 19, 70, 216, 246, 22, 299, 310-16, 24, 14: see also Force majeure basis of jurisdiction, effect on 33, 195-6, 201-3 fault of claimant, effect 17, 256-8 foreseeability and 2, 251, 253 requirements 2, 250-1 Full Tribunal: see Tribunal General Assembly Resolutions 2625 (XXVIII) 8, 445 3171 (XXVIII) 8, 445 as source of law 8, 408-13 General Declaration breach, remedies 25, 260-2 compliance, tribunal’s powers respecting 25, 261 effect 25, 258 equitable claims 8, 263

231 General Principle A: see General Principle A General Principle B: see General Principle B interpretation 34, 128 —Declaration as a whole 34, 130-1 —object and purpose 19, 294, 28, 149-50 —structure 34, 130-1 Paragraph 1 5, 14 Paragraph 2 2, 147 n. 1, 209, 12, 50 Paragraph 3 12, 49-50 Paragraph 4 1, 208, 5, 61, 12, 64 n. 4 Paragraphs 4-9 12, 48, 70-1, 73 n. 14 Paragraph 5 1, 208, 5, 61-8, 206, 12, 64 n. 4 Paragraph 6 1, 146, 203, 208, 5, 61, 68, 8, 206, 12, 50, 55, 64 n. 4, 71 n. 12 Paragraph 7 1, 124, 136, 141, 146, 157, 161, 164, 172, 182, 188, 190, 199-201, 203, 205, 206, 208, 210, 211, 213, 217, 221, 328, 331, 343, 346, 404, 407, 410, 415, 427, 448, 2, 13, 45, 91, 114, 127, 133, 147 n. 1, 169, 229, 231, 240, 262, 269, 270, 278, 280, 292, 306, 307, 333, 342, 349, 359, 365, 367, 386, 440, 3, 35, 37, 54, 74, 79, 92, 108, 117, 120, 142, 170, 177, 182, 187, 192, 207, 213, 219, 236, 254, 268, 276, 291, 327, 340, 352, 368, 369, 391, 4, 21, 22, 29, 30, 34, 35, 40, 48, 84, 86, 110, 184, 185, 193, 198, 200, 202, 206, 207, 229, 271, 281, 5, 61, 69, 77, 81, 89, 149, 151, 230, 250, 355, 374, 6, 2, 5, 19, 21, 34, 35, 39, 64, 66, 119, 121, 124, 132, 148, 175, 7, 7, 16, 22, 24, 88, 117, 118, 198, 210, 221, 224, 228, 236, 242, 245, 248, 251, 253, 259, 263, 264, 270, 8, 3, 14, 16, 43, 62, 74, 80, 84, 98, 178, 188, 215, 237, 279, 328, 354, 361, 384, 425, 30, 295, 31, 88, 123, 32, 183, 223, 34, 38, 101 Paragraph 8 1, 208, 5, 61, 65 n. 4, 212, 9, 8, 45, 60, 63, 71, 137, 168, 186, 200, 243, 301, 307, 309, 312, 339, 348, 358, 377, 10, 55, 81, 134, 176, 258, 318, 328, 347, 358, 361, 363, 365, 366, 11, 30, 34-5, 69, 75, 137, 165, 179, 208, 250, 267, 345, 365, 12, 17, 38, 50, 55, 64 n. 4, 71, 77, 107, 138, 159, 169, 233, 285, 298, 324, 389, 392, 13, 39, 40, 43, 45, 118, 146, 191, 276, 310, 345, 361,

232

INDEX

General Declaration (cont.) 14, 52, 81, 168, 169, 170, 184, 212, 243, 282, 342, 15, 22, 187, 16, 276, 319, 322, 17, 19, 113, 130, 288, 325, 355, 358, 363 Paragraph 9 1, 208, 5, 61, 12, 50, 65 n. 4, 18, 147, 174, 244, 278, 322, 374, 378, 19, 72, 93, 161, 231, 286-8, 290-7, 303-4, 331, 346, 353, 362, 367, 368, 20, 131, 21, 51, 61, 161, 287, 289, 22, 85, 117, 256, 356, 23, 216, 377, 24, 85, 115, 156, 25, 111-12, 151, 26, 128, 27, 186, 28, 50, 111, 130-1, 144, 370, 391, 393, 395, 397, 29, 241, 293, 349, 397, 404, 413 Paragraph 10 2, 208 Paragraph 11 1, 136, 305, 490, 496, 2, 39, 40, 79, 88, 109-10, 120 n. 1, 208, 5, 47, 268, 7, 153, 276, 8, 27, 432, 9, 195, 201 n. 2, 10, 144, 168, 16, 78-9, 87 n. 2, 17, 98, 99 n. 3, 101, 256, 21, 8, 9, 23, 257, 361-2, 27, 58, 34, 131, 133-4 Paragraph 16 2, 313, 315, 318, 320, 13, 177, 14, 329 Paragraph 17 1, 102, 117, 190, 2, 59, 313, 315, 318, 320, 5, 58, 61, 112, 204, 209, 210, 12, 43-5, 60, 66, 82, 14, 329, 28, 123, 29, 217, 34, 55, 59-60 peace treaties distinguished 5, 284 Point IV 8, 269 n. 42 Preamble 19, 288 as Treaty 5, 259, 19, 286-8, 28, 149 General Principle A 5, 61, 130, 8, 211, 12, 45-52, 62, 64-73, 87, 89-93, 19, 294, 303, 25, 253, 254, 256-62, 264, 28, 114-15 aid to interpretation 28, 138, 34, 153 as broad legal commitment 34, 153 requirement to negotiate 12, 62-3 General Principle B 1, 101, 103, 105, 106, 108, 293, 294, 309, 310, 386, 399, 2, 55, 56, 61-2, 160, 401, 3, 304, 305, 307, 310-13, 315, 4, 115 n. 2, 142, 5, 61, 153, 154, 268, 271, 284, 295, 343, 6, 45, 7, 122, 8, 211, 263, 295, 9, 137, 255, 12, 67-70, 274-5, 322, 13, 223, 225, 14, 333, 16, 310, 17, 178, 184, 185, 18, 86, 106, 111, 147, 21, 68, 69 n. 12, 25, 253, 254, 262-3, 28, 129-32, 152-3, 29, 27, 33, 197, 34, 108-81

nulliﬁcation of judgments and— —“claims” (Executive Order 12294) as “judgments” 34, 158-9 —claims falling outside Tribunal’s jurisdiction 34, 157-8, 168 —damages for breach 34, 158-9, 168 —deadline for 34, 157-8, 168 nulliﬁcation of pre-14 November 1979 attachments and 34, 152-4 —deadline for 34, 156, 168 —standard of diligence 34, 154-6, 167 obligation of result and 34, 136, 169-72 termination of claims— —“procedures provided in the Claims Settlement Declaration” 34, 131-2 —termination of litigation/legal proceedings distinguished 34, 129-30, 133, 135, 138-9 —through binding arbitration leading to settlement 34, 130, 134 —waiver of claims and 34, 133-4 termination of litigation/legal proceedings 2, 62, 9, 136-7, 34, 108-81 —claims falling outside Tribunal’s jurisdiction 34, 131-3, 135, 164-5 ——Tribunal’s right to determine jurisdiction and 34, 132-3, 135, 165 —counterclaims and 34, 140-1, 167 —in courts outside US 34, 147-9 —deadline for 34, 138-40, 165, 178 —ﬁling of suits for tolling purposes and 34, 145-7, 167, 169-72 —identity of cause, need for 34, 161-4, 168, 170, 172-7 —notiﬁcation to courts, need for 34, 162, 170, 176 —“such claims” 34, 148 —suspension distinguished 34, 135-7, 141-2, 166, 169, 177-8 —US failure— ——burden of proof 34, 138, 146-7, 166-7 ——damages for 34, 137-8, 146-7, 162, 166-7 General principles of accounting 6, 244, 251, 269 adjudication 7, 125, 126 agency law 19, 126 commercial arbitration 6, 135

INDEX commercial law 5, 233, 394, 6, 98, 11, 30, 13, 239, 15, 29, 16, 28, 21, 104, 26, 106 common law 23, 144, 145 constitutional law 1, 423 contract law 7, 192, 15, 81, 19, 295, 23, 191, 224, 225, 340, 26, 165 equity 1, 130, 133, 232, 233, 2, 237, 254, 3, 58, 279, 4, 259, 268, 5, 248, 293, 6, 294, 11, 41 evidence 13, 71-2 experts, use of 16, 199 fairness 3, 30 international arbitration practice 11, 274, 18, 119, 131, 24, 27 international law 1, 109, 114, 180, 207, 212, 213, 232, 233, 289, 290-2, 294, 361, 374, 376, 377 n. 15, 402, 450, 458, 464, 475, 476, 478, 482, 2, 194, 195, 201, 205, 207, 210, 212, 213, 223, 225, 255, 257, 353, 354, 358, 3, 58, 69-71, 298, 312, 313, 316 n. 3, 4, 105, 114, 155, 162, 165, 167, 172, 175, 177, 247, 5, 3, 11, 20, 21, 48, 95, 99, 227, 233, 260, 265, 269, 270, 277, 281, 283, 286, 289, 290, 292-4, 300-4, 310, 313, 321, 322, 325, 331-5, 341, 346, 371, 6, 98, 201 n. 1, 209, 225, 228, 243, 251, 257, 265, 270, 7, 51 n. 3, 52, 130, 135, 153, 159, 173, 191, 192, 8, 393-403, 10, 155, 11, 30, 12, 273, 13, 239, 14, 9, 185, 245, 327, 16, 25, 27, 28, 247, 17, 142, 189, 218, 231-2, 240, 241, 18, 246 n. 5, 19, 295, 304, 21, 120, 198, 22, 80, 23, 289, 28, 208, 209, 29, 14, 30, 43, 63 —implementation of 10, 149 —prescription 32, 180-1 —stay of proceedings 2, 59-61 —Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, codiﬁcation 12, 61 judicial procedure 5, 36 jurisprudence 5, 11, 37, 40, 46, 49 justice 1, 114, 158, 374, 375, 396, 400, 2, 320, 329, 330, 356, 3, 32, 54, 298, 302, 362, 4, 268, 6, 294, 17, 23 law 1, 209, 212, 232, 233, 361, 362, 374, 415, 416, 420, 421, 464, 475, 2, 154 n. 1, 185, 186, 237, 380, 397, 3, 32, 54, 58, 66, 278, 293, 307, 4, 221, 231, 242, 261, 268, 270, 5, 18, 41, 42, 129, 233, 248, 261, 293, 294, 373, 398, 6, 90, 97,

233

98, 168, 225, 269, 271, 7, 75, 120, 121, 131, 158, 163, 197, 8, 140, 161, 162, 427, 9, 122, 176, 402, 10, 308, 11, 32, 13, 33, 211, 16, 26-7, 66, 17, 23, 19, 30-1, 20, 204, 206-8, 21, 70, 154, 345, 22, 297 n. 50, 23, 86, 171, 370, 28, 208, 209 —absence of arbitrator 2, 14 municipal law 5, 3, 21, 48, 261, 6, 228, 243, 7, 130, 10, 143, 11, 139 private international law 2, 185, 186, 205, 3, 47, 5, 292, 325 synthesis of civil and common law 13, 59 trusteeship 6, 293 Germany, Federal Republic Constitutional Court 7, 168 law of 7, 167 —Civil Code 8, 141, 19, 33 —Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 134 Gifts, in Iranian law 33, 321-4 Good faith 1, 109, 206, 376, 378, 2, 209, 223, 3, 308, 5, 26, 273, 277, 290, 6, 209, 251, 270, 295, 7, 159, 160, 178, 215, 8, 141, 11, 11, 15, 233, 16, 48, 54, 63, 72, 296, 310, 18, 262 n. 22, 21, 154, 155, 22, 297, 24, 80-2, 86-7, 96: see also Bad faith Algiers Declarations, implementation 34, 42-3, 139, 155-6, 171 Governing law: see Applicable law Government, meaning 23, 136-7 Guarantee 5, 241 Guarantor 7, 115 Hague Convention on Choice of Court (1964), Article 5 1, 269 Conﬂict of Nationality Laws (1930) 2, 181, 196, 5, 260, 262, 265, 266, 291 —Article 1 2, 161, 224, 5, 260, 302, 31, 48-9 —Article 2 5, 302 —Article 3 5, 302 —Article 4 2, 161, 162, 189, 194-9, 201, 202, 205, 207, 214, 223, 224, 5, 260, 261, 299, 300-4, 322, 323, 325-7, 331 —Article 5 2, 162, 189, 195, 198, 199, 203, 205, 5, 262, 299, 322, 325, 326 Law Applicable to Trusts and Their Recognition 12, 274

234

INDEX

Hague Convention on (cont.) Paciﬁc Settlement of International Disputes (1899) 29, 388 Paciﬁc Settlement of International Disputes (1907) 5, 293 Hardship 1, 127, 128, 130, 132, 133, 175, 300, 399, 3, 209, 375 Hearing, postponement: see Postponement of hearing Holder in due course 7, 99, 100, 102 Hostages, relevance 14, 315 Immovable property transactions 2, 250, 256, 7, 131, 132, 33, 4-5: see also Iran, law of, immovable property Indemnity 13, 120 India, arbitrator’s alleged breach of currency laws 21, 380-3, 395, 396-8 Institute of International Law 2, 162, 163, 187, 199, 5, 326, 328, 335 Resolution of 10 September 1965 2, 196, 197, 200-2, 204, 207, 208, 214, 223, 5, 266, 301, 303, 322, 324, 328, 331, 333 Interest 1, 170-2, 414, 415, 446-8, 450, 451, 453, 454, 2, 169, 239, 240, 342, 343, 385, 390, 400, 3, 33, 53, 54, 56, 57, 72, 106, 116, 117, 206, 235, 236, 251, 253, 267, 275, 279, 290, 291, 294, 4, 110, 118, 120, 224, 228, 229, 247, 270, 271, 5, 48, 110, 111, 169, 174, 175, 219, 226, 227, 230, 367, 374, 395, 399, 401, 6, 18, 19, 62-5, 68, 69, 173, 178, 216, 217, 229, 283, 287, 7, 16, 24, 74, 76, 80, 89, 101, 104, 108, 111, 112, 115, 117, 118, 183, 191, 193, 194, 198, 8, 60-1, 168, 171, 178, 320-2, 342-4, 384, 9, 44, 59, 198, 10, 54, 80, 175, 189 n. 29, 252, 255, 256, 257, 264, 304, 316-18, 327, 346-7, 11, 26-31, 34, 41-5, 52, 67-8, 69, 75, 105-7, 136, 137, 164, 165, 178, 179, 205-6, 207, 208, 242-4, 250, 254, 266, 267, 343-4, 12, 16, 28-9, 30-2, 138, 155-7, 168-9, 229-31, 297, 298, 321, 362, 13, 29-30, 33-5, 89-90, 95-6, 145, 191, 192, 233-8, 252-3, 268-9, 275, 308-9, 344, 14, 46, 78, 124-6, 184, 15, 20-1, 152, 184, 289, 16, 48-58, 69-75, 101-2, 233-4, 236, 249-54, 275, 276, 280, 17, 17, 20-2, 23-4, 30, 31, 79, 133-4, 199, 212, 227,

237, 244, 287-8, 322-3 18, 163, 173, 195, 216-19, 243, 277, 285, 304, 306, 308, 318, 319, 320, 321, 364, 367, 372, 19, 72, 73, 92, 155-8, 172, 228-9, 238-9, 246-9, 20, 126-8, 21, 52, 53, 60, 161, 22, 83-4, 116-17, 242, 251, 253-4, 255, 336, 355, 361-2, 23, 33, 63, 64, 71-4, 121, 148, 208, 210-11, 337, 366, 24, 113, 154-5, 201, 25, 108-9, 110, 111, 129, 150, 26, 36, 80, 126-7, 182-3, 27, 22, 23, 31, 87, 105, 115, 119, 185, 29, 55, 239, 293, 34, 38: see also Damages, interest on money borrowed accrued 10, 345 applicable law 11, 27 —relevance 12, 28, 13, 269 bad faith not precondition 13, 269 calculation 6, 217, 7, 193, 194, 11, 28-30, 13, 34, 33, 348 compound 7, 191, 192, 8, 320, 13, 234-5, 16, 234-5, 251-4, 24, 83-4, 25, 109 —international law, under 16, 253-4 contract-based 7, 192, 11, 105-7, 136, 178, 343-4, 12, 31-2, 106, 13, 34, 234-7, 252, 308, 14, 160-5, 15, 152, 21, 76-7, 24, 47 n. 2, 74, 83-4, 25, 150, 32, 181 on damages 2, 259, 31, 200, 34, 60-1 date of commencement 9, 44, 59, 129, 338, 377, 10, 331, 11, 27-31, 68, 12, 29, 106, 108, 124, 133, 135, 169, 229-31, 233 n. 4, 297, 303, 321, 13, 34, 145, 191, 237, 248, 269, 308-9, 15, 20-1, 53, 16, 234 n. 63, 280, 17, 17-18, 20, 134, 322-3, 18, 195, 372, 19, 72, 92, 155-8, 228-9, 238-9, 246-9, 20, 126, 21, 52, 22, 84, 252, 361-2, 23, 86-9, 25, 109, 26, 164, 27, 31, 87, 28, 48-9, 30, 101, 234, 31, 123, 32, 182, 129, 33, 268, 342, 34, 37 on debt 2, 12, 27, 32, 181-2 double recovery, avoidance 19, 158-9 effect of Security Account 8, 321, 343-4, 11, 30 general principle of law 23, 86 generally admitted usage 5, 17, 20, 128, 17, 17, 20, 128 lawfulness of conduct and 11, 150 n. 1, 164, 167 need for consistency 8, 320-2, 10, 80, 304, 11, 31, 12, 28, 32, 156, 31, 124-6

INDEX non-contractual basis 12, 28, 13, 237-8, 252, 14, 78, 211, 242, 28, 48 post-judgment 34, 61 pre-judgment 34, 60-2 principles governing 11, 29-31 purpose 11, 29, 42, 12, 28, 229, 13, 269, 30, 101, 234, 31, 88, 125-6 rate 5, 111, 8, 61, 320-2, 9, 129-30, 167, 202, 243, 300, 376-7, 10, 80, 304, 11, 27-31, 164, 206, 243, 12, 28, 31, 137, 155-6, 229, 321, 13, 236, 269, 16, 234, 17, 112, 287, 18, 173, 195, 19, 155, 228, 21, 76-7, 25, 85, 150, 26, 182, 28, 48-9, 88, 368, 29, 55, 56, 239-41, 293, 330, 30, 1, 234, 264-5, 31, 88, 123, 33, 193, 268, 342, 34, 37, 100 —in case of damages for failure to enforce award, reference point 34, 65-6 —in ofﬁcial/intergovernmental claims 12, 29, 31, 34, 62-5 repayment in case of error 33, 346-8 terminal date 17, 20-2, 33, 268 —customary international law 17, 22 n. 4 uniform rules, desirability 16, 292 waiver 28, 48 Interim measures aggravation of dispute, avoidance 8, 277 applicability 8, 182, 220 attachment of goods, withdrawal 3, 7 certiﬁcate of insurance 8, 281 conservation of— —goods 3, 173-5, 331, 5, 128, 8, 46, 275-82, 13, 257-8 —rights of parties 6, 50, 8, 46, 77, 227, 9, 304, 13, 258 expert’s expenses 8, 46-8 expiry 11, 246 export licence 13, 259-60 full relief 8, 46 ICJ and 8, 7 n. 4, 13, 258 indemnity against third party vendor claims 8, 280-1 inherent power of international tribunal 2, 59-62, 8, 275 n. 49 justiﬁcation for 5, 113, 6, 51, 8, 6-7, 109 —irreparable damage 8, 7, 22, 108, 110, 276 n. 50, 29, 218 legal standards 6, 134, 135 obligation to comply 8, 78, 87, 227

235

payment of fees 1, 154, 21, 4 protection of property 5, 112-14, 131-3 re-exportation of goods 1, 121 rendered inapplicable 8, 64 requirements 33, 363-7 restraint of misuse of trademark 1, 122 return of goods 13, 173-5 revision 8, 48 stay of attachment 6, 131-3, 140 stay of proceedings 1, 222, 225, 2, 55-7, 65-7, 98-9, 281, 282, 311, 363, 371, 402, 3, 8, 9, 60, 61, 201, 298, 336, 337, 349, 385-8, 4, 7, 8, 12-14, 15, 17, 55, 56, 72, 73, 5, 121, 126-9, 130, 154, 6, 46-51, 108-11, 115-17, 7, 219, 277, 278, 8, 3 n. 2, 5, 74-7, 78, 85-8, 225-7, 232-4, 9, 131-2, 152, 304, 305, 11, 297-9, 13, 194-8, 14, 48-9, 17, 80-1, 87, 18, 59, 288, 21, 11, 23, 7, 212-13, 32, 115-23, 34, 132-3: see also Procedure, stay of proceedings storage costs 13, 259 substantive jurisdiction, in advance of decision on 6, 131, 8, 45, 77 withdrawal of bank guarantee 13, 197-8 Interlocutory Award, revision 14, 70-1 International Air Transport Association (IATA) 17, 230 International Chamber of Commerce 2, 401, 402, 5, 388, 6, 130, 138, 13, 52 n. 8, 18, 118-19 arbitrators, independence 20, 249 conﬁdentiality 20, 234 Court of Arbitration 6, 135, 137 —Internal Rules 20, 208, 316 ——2(2) 1, 449 n. 2 ——6 1, 130 joinder of cases 27, 300 n. 5 Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration 1, 278, 18, 120-5 Statute— —Article 37 5, 274 —Article 38 8, 407-8 —Article 54(3) 1, 424 —Article 62 3, 298 —Article 75 5, 111, 6, 46 —Article 89 1, 233 Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits 1, 170, 5, 28, 29, 39, 46

236

INDEX

International Chamber of Commerce (cont.) —Article 3 5, 28 —Article 7 17, 291 n. 3 —Article 8 17, 284 —Article 11 1, 170, 17, 286 —Article 47 7, 22 Uniform Rules for the Collection of Commercial Papers (1967) 1, 443 —Article 4 1, 446, 447 —Article 6 1, 446, 447 —Article 12 1, 447 International Court of Justice (ICJ) 1, 104, 110 n. 5, 290, 293, 307, 308, 313, 374, 402, 449 n. 2, 450, 457, 458, 466, 467, 475, 2, 162, 163, 189, 196, 202-4, 208, 210, 214, 223, 245, 253, 257, 258 n. 1, 299, 352, 353, 355, 3, 20, 28, 32 n. 1, 210, 295, 298, 299 n. 1, 302, 305 n. 1, 310 n. 2, 311 n. 4, 376, 4, 113, 114, 116 n. 1, 173, 174, 5, 20, 21, 113, 263, 266, 288, 309, 322-4, 329, 331-3, 6, 108, 131, 134, 135, 211, 7, 51 n. 3, 122, 133, 135 n. 1, 151, 152, 203, 8, 213 n. 21, 405, 434, 449, 9, 353, 10, 132 n. 7, 143, 185, 191, 11, 144, 12, 366, 14, 104 n. 4, 321, 15, 216, 218, 16, 85, 92 n. 29, 94, 196, 18, 261 n. 20, 268, 271 n. 41, 282, 21, 118 n. 33, 155 n. 45, 22, 288 n. 34, 24, 179 n. 20, 180 n. 23, 25, 271 n. 8 stay of proceedings 2, 61 US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran 2, 84, 89 n. 1 International law: see Customary international law; General principles of, international law; Sources of international law; Subjects of international law International Law Commission 2, 206 Draft Articles on State responsibility: see State responsibility, ILC Draft Articles on International Monetary Fund 2, 220, 3, 12 n. 1, 13, 14, 5, 376 n. 1, 382, 383, 6, 178, 211, 7, 52, 73, 10, 353 n. 4, 16, 106, 24, 111 Agreement 3, 14, 16, 18, 19, 28, 29, 5, 381, 383, 6, 178 n. 1, 208, 210, 7, 40, 51, 10, 106 —Article VI 2, 221, 3, 13, 7, 40, 51, 15, 29 —Article VII 3, 13 n. 1, 7, 45

—Article VIII 2, 220-1, 3, 13, 14, 16, 28-30, 32, 5, 383, 6, 210, 211, 7, 44 —Article XIV 3, 13 n. 1, 14, 6, 210, 7, 44, 45 n. 1 —Article XIX 5, 383 n. 1, 7, 45, 46, 51, 52 —Article XXX 3, 29 n. 1, 6, 211 —violation 5, 383 International responsibility, extension 6, 168 International tribunals 1, 310, 7, 307, 12, 318, 16, 198-9, 18, 271 n. 39 AGIP 15, 251 AMCO 18, 217 n. 28, 30, 253 American-British Claims Commission 1, 132 Aminoil 8, 386, 12, 187 n. 7, 234, 14, 236-7, 15, 232, 233, 243, 246, 251-2, 259, 270, 292, 297 n. 16, 305, 306 n. 31, 16, 28, 65-7, 242 n. 10, 252, 18, 223 n. 38, 21, 121, 123, 140-1, 22, 288 n. 34, 30, 199, 241, 243-4 Anglo-German Commission 2, 185-6, 5, 308, 318 Anglo-Greek Commission of Arbitration 1, 202 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 22, 288 n. 34 Anglo-Italian Conciliation Commission (1952) 3, 70, 16, 247 n. 14 Anglo-Mexican Arbitral Commission 2, 194, 18, 282 Aramco 22, 288 n. 34 Arbitral Commission against the German Government 5, 298 Arbitral Commission on Property Rights and Interests in Germany (1957) 2, 59 —Rules of Procedure 1, 233 Austro-Romanian Mixed Arbitration Tribunal 21, 363 n. 44 Benvenuti & Bonfant v. Congo 22, 288 n. 34 BP (Libya) v. Libya 15, 251 British-American Civil War Commission (1872) 2, 181, 190, 5, 305 British-Mexican Commission 2, 187, 188, 5, 302, 308, 309, 9, 331, 24, 178 n. 20, 179 n. 21 British-US Claims Commission 5, 309 n. 1, 24, 180 n. 24 British-Venezuelan Commission 5, 307, 313

INDEX Central American Court of Justice 5, 298 Christian Rosing A/S 1984 v. Air Canada 22, 301 n. 53 Colombia-United States Mixed Commission 7, 135 n. 2 Ecuador-United States Court of Arbitration (The Mechanic) 21, 155 n. 46 European Commission of Human Rights 5, 298 European Court of Human Rights 5, 298 Flegenheimer 31, 51-2, 32, 86-7, 33, 433, 450 France-US Arbitral Tribunal 2, 257 Franco-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal 2, 148, 3, 70, 16, 247 Franco-Italian Conciliation Commission (1948) 2, 59-60, 5, 263 French-German Commission 2, 185-7, 5, 308, 319 French-Mexican Claims Commission (1928) 2, 188, 3, 210, 294, 5, 316, 18, 105 French-Turkish Commission 5, 319, 320 French-US Commission 5, 300 n. 1 French-Venezuelan Mixed Commission (1902-5) 2, 184 German-Mexican Claims Commission 2, 82, 5, 349 German-Polish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal 10, 251, 21, 155 n. 44 German-US Mixed Claims Commission 17, 22 n. 4, 18, 265 n. 28, 19, 31 n. 14, 24, 180 n. 23, 30, 239 Great Britain/Spain, Spanish Moroccan Claim 9, 331 Greco-Bulgarian Commission 5, 308, 319 Greco-Bulgarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal 3, 311 Hungarian-Belgian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal 6, 214 Hungarian/Serbo-Croatian-Slovene Commission 2, 185, 5, 308 Imbrie 2, 85-6 International Chamber of Commerce: see International Chamber of Commerce International Court of Justice: see International Court of Justice (ICJ) Italian-Mexican Claims Commission 18, 246 n. 5, 262

237 Italian-US Conciliation Commissions 2, 163, 189, 197, 5, 263, 272, 300, 303, 310, 321, 322, 324, 325, 327, 25, 163, 165-6, 200, 206 Italian-Venezuelan Commission 5, 307, 315 Lena Goldﬁelds 15, 299 LETCO 30, 253-4 LIAMCO 15, 251, 293 n. 8, 296 n. 15, 305, 306 n. 31, 16, 28, 65 n. 9, 17, 22 n. 4, 18, 217 nn. 28, 29, 283 n. 38, 21, 346 n. 36, 30, 199, 241, 242, 244 Lighthouses Arbitration between France and Greece 15, 251 London Court of Arbitration, International Arbitration Rules 1, 130 Lusitania cases 2, 82-3 Medina 31, 52 Merg´e 22, 146 Mexican Arbitral Commissions 2, 194 Mexican Claims Commissions 1, 158, 180, 401, 402, 457, 475, 2, 82, 83, 301, 3, 70, 376, 7, 204 Mexican-US Claims Commission 5, 309 n. 1, 6, 257, 16, 246, 247, 17, 104 n. 9, 18, 105, 246 n. 5, 24, 179 n. 23, 180 nn. 24, 25, 182 n. 6 Mexico City Bombardment Claims 18, 271, 24, 182 n. 26 mixed arbitral tribunals 2, 163, 185, 189, 191, 194, 209, 214, 5, 298, 308, 318, 321, 29, 388-9 North Atlantic Fisheries 21, 155 n. 45 Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims 15, 262 n. 15, 299, 19, 30 n. 12, 30, 238 OPIC 18, 223 n. 38 Permanent Court of Arbitration 1, 117, 509-11, 513, 518, 2, 184, 190, 3, 70, 5, 307, 332, 7, 135 n. 2, 10, 197, 16, 247 n. 14 —Pious Fund Case 2, 64 n. 2 Permanent Court of International Justice: see Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) Peru-US Arbitral Commission 6, 169 practice 3, 14, 20, 28, 31, 32, 66, 70, 85, 249, 287, 298, 302, 4, 237, 5, 129, 287, 293, 297, 298, 304, 331, 346, 351, 7, 135, 10, 149, 185, 11, 27-30, 32, 43, 50, 12, 275-7, 13, 58-9, 14, 105, 16, 17, 27, 55, 199, 246-7, 290, 17, 22 n. 4,

238 International tribunals (cont.) 190, 218, 18, 79, 80, 278-9, 281 n. 4, 19, 30, 31, 171, 20, 305, 21, 104, 239 —acts of State, enquiry into 25, 157, 165 —jurisdiction, consent of parties 22, 296 Revere Copper 22, 288 n. 34 Salem 31, 52 Sapphire International Petroleum Ltd v. NIOC 15, 251 Shufeldt Claim 21, 155 n. 47 Spanish Zones in Morocco 21, 155 n. 47 SPP (Middle East) Arbitration 15, 262 n. 15, 306 n. 31 Tacna-Arica Case 18, 271 n. 40 TOPCO 8, 386, 15, 251, 293 n. 8, 296, 30, 198-9, 241, 242, 244 Tripartite Claims Commission (US, Austria, Hungary, 1928) 5, 307 Upper Silesian Arbitral Tribunal 5, 272, 23, 387 US-Venezuelan Mixed Claims Commission 2, 184, 215, 5, 306, 317, 16, 99, 30, 238-9 Venezuelan Arbitral Commissions (1903-5) 2, 162, 182, 189, 190, 3, 70, 311 n. 1, 5, 307, 18, 217 n. 28 Iran: see also Iran, law of claims against US nationals 1, 101-10, 475, 4, 75, 8, 364, 366, 368, 14, 278 controlled entity: see Controlled entity, Iran courts— —enforcement of judgments 9, 152 —jurisdiction 5, 130, 7, 130-2, 137, 9, 132, 293-4, 11, 246, 250, 22, 253, 256, 290, 30, 42-3 ——forum selection clause and 9, 194-5: see also Forum selection clause ——inherent and general 5, 128 —right to resort to 5, 127-9 —stay of proceedings: see Interim measures, stay of proceedings —Tribunal orders and 4, 15 duties under international law 6, 111, 9, 151-2 Foundation for the Oppressed 9, 88-96 French nationals in 22, 56

INDEX individuals’ right to bring claims 9, 128, 383 Lands Valuation Committee 33, 32-3 liability for controlled entity 2, 26, 147 nn. 1, 2, 165, 258, 259, 4, 72 n. 4, 248, 249, 5, 227, 368, 371, 6, 66, 10, 258, 303, 21, 67 —proprio motu measures 5, 371 Majlis’ position (including Resolution of 2 November 1980) 1, 236, 237, 242, 243, 246, 248, 252, 253, 255, 261, 265, 268, 269, 271, 272, 274, 275, 280, 281, 284, 291, 296, 306 n. 3, 310, 488, 490, 491, 494, 496, 497, 3, 198, 304-9, 311, 313, 314, 5, 119, 182 n. 1, 298, 7, 153, 218, 19, 288-90, 34, 113-14 misappropriation of assets 6, 252 railways— —control and operation 32, 98-100 —ﬁnancial claims relating to 32, 100-2 —— “purchase and sale of goods and services” under CSD, whether 32, 103-14 responsibility for compliance with treaty obligations 4, 15 Workers’ Councils 5, 369, 370, 379, 380 Iran, law of 1, 108, 266, 282, 291, 293, 294, 314, 315, 362, 374, 419-21, 489, 490, 495, 4, 247, 5, 126, 127, 333, 334, 367, 384, 6, 160 Abolition Act (1979): see Unutilized Urban Lands, Law for the Abolition of Ownership of (1979) below Administration of Bank Affairs, Legal Bill concerning (1980) 28, 259 Administrative Justice Tribunal Act (1982) 30, 43 Administrative Regulations Pertaining to the Registration of Companies Act, Article 1 3, 22 agency 1, 266, 378-80 Apartment Purchasers Bill (1980) 4, 146, 152 Appointment of Temporary Managers, Act for (1979) 2, 150-2, 350, 351, 4, 147, 153, 154, 7, 162-5, 11, 215, 12, 7 n. 5, 14, 305 n. 3, 16, 240 n. 9, 29, 266-70, 30, 85-6 —Article 1 2, 150, 151, 350, 7, 162, 21, 69, 30, 186, 189

INDEX —Article 2 2, 151, 350, 4, 147, 30, 85, 186, 34, 88-9 —Article 3 2, 151, 152, 350, 4, 147, 30, 85, 186, 32, 4, 52-3 —Article 4 2, 152 —Article 5 2, 151, 350, 4, 147 —Article 6 2, 152, 350, 4, 147 arbitration 3, 210, 295, 18, 125 Articles of Association of the Foundation for the Oppressed, Law on 5, 378, 9, 88-9 authorizing Claims Settlement Declaration 6, 236 Banking and Monetary Law (1972), Article II(c) 7, 44 bankruptcy 7, 131, 132 Banks Nationalization Law (1979) 4, 151, 8, 378, 10, 241, 19, 53, 28, 250-60, 264, 30, 97-8 By-law Concerning Landed Property Ownership by Foreign Nationals (1949) 4, 160, 6, 183 n. 1 Civil Code 5, 147, 9, 329 —Article 5 1, 249, 250, 5, 182 —Article 9 3, 388, 4, 114 —Article 10 6, 98 —Article 18 7, 175 n. 1 —Article 27 32, 30 —Article 138 9, 393 n. 6 —Articles 141-5 32, 30 —Article 183 22, 307 n. 62 —Articles 191-4 22, 306 n. 61 —Article 193 3, 163, 8, 161, 23, 340 —Article 196 6, 72, 159, 160, 195 n. 3, 196, 24, 11 —Article 198 6, 194 —Article 219 22, 300 n. 53 —Article 220 6, 99, 22, 300 n. 53 —Article 221 24, 71 —Article 223 2, 119, 33, 323 —Article 224 16, 26 —Article 225 16, 26 —Article 227 9, 119 n. 11, 24, 71, 171 n. 12 —Article 229 24, 71, 171 n. 12 —Article 230 6, 99, 14, 142, 24, 197 —Article 231 1, 375 n. 13, 6, 72, 159, 18, 210 n. 6 —Article 234 24, 11, 71 —Article 237 24, 66 —Article 239 8, 223

239 —Article 240 8, 223 —Article 247 2, 154, 380, 13, 33, 22, 324 —Article 248 2, 154, 380, 13, 33 —Article 259 22, 326 —Article 261 22, 326 —Article 263 22, 326 —Article 292 2, 116, 4, 232, 8, 157 —Article 294 21, 74 n. 25 —Article 295 18, 351 —Article 301 2, 236 —Articles 301-6 2, 155, 4, 231 —Articles 301-37 14, 186 —Article 303 2, 236, 237, 22, 326 —Article 306 7, 163 —Article 308 22, 326 —Article 317 22, 326 —Articles 328-31 6, 99 n. 2 —Article 336 4, 231, 7, 76, 9, 402, 18, 347 —Articles 336-7 2, 155, 9, 402, 12, 375 —Article 338 14, 143 —Article 340 22, 306 n. 61 —Article 365 33, 432 —Article 377 5, 40, 22, 317 n. 92 —Article 387 22, 301 n. 53 —Articles 416-21 13, 74-5 —Article 422 19, 40 —Articles 422-9 19, 40 —Article 424 19, 40 —Article 463 33, 322 n. 41 —Articles 571-606 5, 147, 9, 327 —Article 575 3, 161 —Article 656 1, 379 —Article 658 1, 378, 6, 194 —Article 662 6, 159, 160 —Article 684 9, 223, 224 —Article 685 26, 22 —Article 709 26, 22 —Article 744 13, 75 —Article 745 33, 322 —Article 747 33, 321 —Article 799 33, 321, 322, 34, 22 —Article 803 33, 322 —Article 867 31, 105 —Article 868 31, 104-5 —Articles 875-85 31, 116-17 —Article 961 31, 117, 33, 391-2, 444-5 —Article 968 1, 378 n. 16, 22, 289

240

INDEX

Iran, law of (cont.) —Article 969 22, 161 n. 3 —Article 976 5, 272 n. 1, 22, 158, 24, 44, 26, 12, 29, 57 n. 21, 33, 306 n. 34, 34, 10 —Articles 976-91 9, 354 —Article 988 5, 272 n. 1, 334, 9, 354, 31, 44, 117, 32, 38, 153-5, 33, 6-15, 387-8, 389-92, 427-30, 34, 25 —Article 989 5, 334, 9, 354, 28, 266-7, 274, 31, 44, 32, 38, 153-5, 33, 7-15, 16, 18, 387-8, 391, 392-5, 427-30, 452-4, 34, 25 —Article 990 14, 7 —Article 993 33, 306 n. 34 —Article 998 9, 223, 224 —Article 1001 33, 306 n. 34 —Article 1005 22, 150 —Article 1006 22, 150 —Article 1061 30, 66-7 —Articles 1106-7 2, 85 —Article 1111 2, 85 —Article 1127 2, 85 —Article 1180 33, 322 —Article 1287 14, 245 —Article 1288 33, 323 —Article 1306 5, 43, 6, 192, 196, 8, 161 —Article 1310 8, 161, 9, 6, 192 —Article 1324 6, 196 Civil Procedure Code 8, 77-8 —Article 3 16, 26 —Article 23 7, 131 —Article 30 21, 74 n. 25 —Article 35 7, 131, 132 —Article 36 7, 131, 171 —Article 48 2, 64 —Article 57 2, 64 —Article 72 7, 125 —Article 127 2, 64, 3, 388 —Article 133 27, 300 n. 5 —Article 146 2, 64 —Article 147 2, 64 —Article 225 1, 390 —Article 284 6, 102 n. 1 —Articles 290-8 2, 67, 6, 116, 8, 233 —Article 298 1, 233, 2, 64, 3, 388 —Article 300 100, 115 —Article 301 100, 115 —Article 302 100, 115 —Article 322 8, 174

—Article 356 1, 209 —Article 508 21, 74 n. 25 —Article 564 5, 46 —Article 629 1, 329 n. 2, 405 n. 2 —Article 630 1, 329 n. 2, 405 n. 2 —Articles 632-7 23, 128 —Articles 632-76 23, 132 —Article 635 1, 240 —Article 641 3, 40, 296, 7, 204 —Article 649 3, 210, 295 —Article 657 1, 240, 282 —Article 660 1, 425, 432, 3, 210, 295 —Article 662 1, 240 —Article 665 1, 240, 282, 5, 128, 7, 164 n. 2 —Article 713 12, 24, 13, 252 —Article 719 14, 162, 26, 146 —Article 728 14, 142 —Article 740 3, 287 —Articles 971-5 18, 145-6 —Article 988 2, 218, 224, 31, 115, 117 —Article 989 2, 218, 224, 31, 115 Civil Responsibility Law 6, 99, 26, 22 Civil Service Act— —Article 70 30, 41-2 —Article 74 30, 41 —Article 82 30, 41-2 —Article 86 30, 42 Commercial Code 5, 17, 147, 7, 171, 9, 327, 10, 136, 21, 44 —Article 6 3, 22 —Article 16 30, 144, 147 —Article 17 30, 144, 147 —Article 20 5, 237, 28, 64 —Articles 20-194 5, 147 —Article 40 10, 239, 21, 77, 26, 226, 29, 27, 137-8 —Article 45 2, 176 —Article 74 2, 176 —Article 94 5, 18 —Article 103 11, 347-8, 14, 229, 243 —Article 118 2, 154 n. 2, 3, 287 —Article 119 3, 161 —Article 126 2, 23 n. 1, 13, 69 —Article 129 2, 24 n. 1, 21, 47, 51 —Article 131 21, 51 —Article 134 13, 68 —Article 135 2, 154 n. 2, 3, 287 —Article 136 14, 297 —Article 141 25, 149

INDEX —Article 142 30, 166 n. 6 —Articles 199-231 2, 150 —Article 258 30, 166 n. 6 —Article 269 30, 166 n. 6 —Article 313 3, 19 —Article 357 2, 24 n. 2 —Article 371 22, 317 n. 92 —Article 382 5, 39 —Article 383 5, 39 —Articles 412-550 2, 150 —Article 413 14, 302 —Article 426 33, 322 n. 41 —Article 583 5, 237 —Article 584 28, 64 —Article 585 28, 64 —Article 587 5, 4 —Article 589 5, 237 —Article 590 5, 2, 18, 7, 130 —Article 591 5, 2, 18, 7, 130 conformity to international standards 5, 273 n. 1 Constitution 1, 413, 423, 3, 308, 6, 201, 8, 77-8 —Articles 1-5 5, 378 —Article 31 5, 243 —Article 44 2, 144, 150 —Article 80 5, 243 —Article 94 5, 378, 9, 94 —Article 96 5, 378, 9, 94 —Article 104 5, 379 —Article 107 5, 378, 9, 93 —Article 139 5, 334 n. 1 —Article 143 5, 245 —Article 150 17, 102 n. 8 —Article 166 5, 129 —Principle 104 5, 369 —Principle 139 3, 305-9, 8, 222-3 —Principle 170 33, 25 n. 34 Constitution (Supplementary) (1907) 33, 394-5 Construction Completion Bill 4, 146-7, 153 —Article 2 4, 146-7 contract 3, 163, 286, 287, 5, 43, 6, 192, 195, 196, 8, 161, 24, 11 Cooperative Companies Act 22, 184 corporations 7, 132, 136 Development of Petrochemical Industries Act (1965) 15, 224, 238, 243, 21, 154 —Article 1 15, 154 —Article 3 15, 238

241 Direct Taxation Act (Esfand 1345) 3, 241, 29, 281-91, 31, 122 —Article 76 9, 179, 10, 283, 287, 11, 349 —Article 174 31, 122 —Article 177 31, 122 —Article 178 31, 122 —Article 184 31, 118 —Article 193 31, 118 —Article 194 31, 117 —Article 283 11, 354 n. 12 Direct Taxation Act (Esfand 2525) 21, 151, 25, 106, 108 —Article 44 21, 73 —Article 75 16, 280 Duties and Authority of Temporary Managers Act (1980) 18, 96 enforcement 5, 234, 9, 177-8 Enforcement of Civil Awards Law (1977), Article 169 18, 145-6 foreign currency regulations 5, 375 n. 1, 7, 45, 46, 52 Foreign Investments, Law on Attraction and Protection of (1955) 2, 220, 337, 339, 340, 6, 54, 57, 62, 7, 40, 44, 10, 141 n. 8, 243, 15, 238, 243 —Article III 10, 243 Foreign Nationals Immovable Properties Act (1931) 4, 160, 6, 183 n. 1, 32, 39, 33, 390 Foreign Nationals Ownership of Landed Property Decree (1963) 32, 39, 33, 390-1 Foreign Nationals Ownership of Property Decree (1948) 32, 39 Foreign Technical Experts Employment Law (1970) 3, 287 General Public Code 7, 161 government agencies 5, 4, 5, 12 Government Transaction Regulations 9, 103 n. 8 Holding and Management of Stocks in Contracting and Consulting Engineering Firms and Institutes, Law on (1980) 3, 230, 18, 96, 31, 10-11 immovable property 7, 131, 132, 175, 33, 3-15, 387-95, 426-35: see also relevant legislation Income Tax Act 30, 87 inheritance 31, 105, 115-19, 33, 478-9 Insurance Law 23, 67, 120, 122

242 Iran, law of (cont.) interpretation— —burden of proof 32, 151-2 —principles governing 33, 429-50 Islamic Land Reform Act (Amendment) (1986) 28, 267-8 Islamic Workers’ Councils for Manufacturing, Industrial, Agricultural and Service Units, Law Establishing 5, 379 Issuance of Cheques Act (Tir, 2535), Article 2 3, 19 Joint Stock Companies Act (1969) 5, 12, 18, 19, 21, 7, 130 —Article 1 5, 17, 7, 131 —Article 2 5, 18 —Article 94 7, 130 —Articles 199-231 7, 171 Labour Code 3, 286, 24, 192, 193 n. 42 —Article 33 15, 162, 18, 17 —Article 38 30, 140 Lands Grant Act (1979) 32, 13-14, 147, 148 —amendments 32, 13-14, 148-9 —Implementing Regulations (12 May 1980) 32, 14, 149 —purpose 32, 148 Law 7/2571 (1979): see Appointment of Temporary Managers, Act for (1979) above Law 6738 (1979): see Appointment of Temporary Managers, Act for (1979) above Management of the Non-Governmental Education Units Bill 27, 60 Maritime Act 5, 39 —Article 1(a) 21, 78 —Article 52 5, 39 n. 1 —Article 54(6) 12, 145 n. 8 —Article 65 5, 39 Mining Law of Iran (1957), Article 10 7, 4 n. 1 Monetary and Banking Law (1972) 29, 138 —Article 11(c) 2, 220, 3, 13 —Article 42(a) 3, 27, 13, 88 Municipalities Act (1955) 29, 140-1 National Divisions and the Duties of Province Governors and District Governors, Law on (1937) 5, 3

INDEX nationality 2, 167, 168, 174, 218, 224, 5, 272, 334, 9, 354, 24, 44, 31, 43-7 Nationality Decree (c. 1896) 33, 388-90 Nationality Law (1906) 32, 38-9 Nationality Law (1929) 33, 389-90 Nationalization of Insurance Corporations Law (1979) 4, 117, 120, 8, 378, 417, 9, 265 n. 17, 10, 241 Nationalization of the Iranian Oil Industry Act (1951) 3, 309, 15, 228, 233 Nationalization of Nation’s Forests Law (1963) 32, 150-1 Notaries Public Law (1937) 33, 427 —Implementing Regulations 33, 427-30, 442-3 Organization of Guilds Act (1971) 13, 76 n. 26 Organizing the Distribution of Public Necessity Goods and Punishment of Hoarders and Overchargers Act and Executive Regulation (1973) 13, 76 n. 26 Pahlavi Properties, Decree of Imam Concerning Conﬁscation of (1979) 4, 168 partnership 21, 105 n. 21, 31, 87 Penal Code 12, 218, 13, 76, 22, 325 Petroleum Law (1974) 27, 96 n. 11 Ports and Shipping Organization, Act on Permission to Establish (1960) 5, 3 Ports and Shipping Organization, Regulation of (1970), Article 3 6, 195 n. 1 Prevention of Hoarding Act (1942) 13, 76 n. 26 Protection and Development of Iranian Industries Act (1979) 2, 152 n. 1, 302, 349, 350, 6, 241, 7, 50 n. 2, 9, 273-4, 21, 114, 24, 206, 215-17, 29, 140-1, 33, 326-7 —Amendment (15 July 1979) 33, 52 —Article 1(a) 2, 302 n. 2, 9, 273 —Article 1(b) 9, 273 —Article 1(c) 2, 350, 5, 244, 6, 55, 58, 9, 265, 273-4, 10, 205-6 —Article 1(d) 9, 274 —Article 2 6, 58 —Article 3 6, 58 —Article 15 6, 224 Protection and Exploitation of Forests and Pastures Act (1967) 32, 150

INDEX Protection of Industries and Prevention of the Closure of the Country’s Factories Act (1964) (also referred to as Protection of Industry and Prevention of Shutdowns at the Nation’s Factories, 1964) 4, 154, 7, 164, 10, 129-30, 144-6 —Article 2 10, 130 —Article 7 10, 130 —Article 10 10, 130 Protection of Iranian Small Shareholders in Nationalized Banks and Credit Institutions (1980) 28, 259-64 Provision of Capital for the Continuation of the Activities of Nationalized Banks and Credit Institutions (1980), Legal Bill concerning 28, 259 Public Accounting Law, Articles 71-9 9, 103 n. 8 Punishment of Merchants and Sellers Hoarding or Overcharging Act (1943) 13, 76 n. 26 Punishment of Violators of the Organization of Guilds Act (1973) 13, 76 n. 26 Purging the Ministries and State Institutions, Legal Bill on (1979) 30, 42, 48, 65-6 Reconstruction of Ministries, State Agencies and Government-afﬁliated Institutions (1981) 30, 42 nn. 9, 10 Registration of Deeds and Realty Act 9, 237-41, 29, 131, 136, 170-1 —Article 34 9, 237-8, 240, 241, 245 n. 5 Registration of Property Act— —Article 22 7, 164, 34, 22 —Article 41 32, 30 —Article 46 34, 22 —Article 48 34, 22 Retirement and Pension Law 30, 48, 61 retroactivity 22, 20 Single Article Act (1980) 1, 489, 495, 496, 3, 61, 201, 303-6, 308, 309, 313, 314, 323, 324, 4, 8, 5, 298, 333, 334, 13, 168, 170, 15, 224, 228-9, 230-1, 233-4, 261, 290, 292-3, 16, 17, 25, 43-4, 62 n. 4, 21, 105, 114 Social Insurance Act (1960) 24, 192, 193 n. 42 —Article 28 17, 261 —Article 38 4, 227, 10, 313, 315

243

Social Security Act (1975) 24, 192 n. 40 Social Security Law (1976) 23, 39, 40-1, 24, 192 Social Security Law (1978) 22, 20-1 Social Security Organization, Law for the Formation of (1979), Article 7 3, 103-4 State Employment Law (1967), Article 1 5, 4 Statute of Limitations 3, 287, 5, 128, 7, 116, 8, 136, 17, 189, 216, 19, 329-30, 340-1, 30, 157 stay of proceedings 3, 388, 4, 12, 15 Stock Companies Act, Article 40 17, 327-8 Tax Law, Article 85 18, 15 taxation 3, 115 Temporary Director or Directors for the Supervision of Manufacturing, Industrial, Commercial, Agricultural and Service Units Whether in the Public or the Private Sectors, Law for the Determination of the Limits of the Duties and Authority of (1980) 12, 9 Treaty of Amity as part of 4, 114 unjust enrichment 6, 168 n. 2 Unutilized Urban Lands, Law for the Abolition of Ownership of (1979) 19, 60, 23, 313, 32, 28-9, 31-2, 139-41, 160-1, 33, 16-32, 34, 84-6 —Amendment (27 August 1979) 32, 12 —Preamble 32, 135-6 —Article 1 32, 10-11, 136, 33, 17 —Article 3 32, 11, 136-7, 33, 17 —Article 4 32, 11 —Implementing Regulations 32, 11-12, 137-8, 33, 24-6, 34, 84-6 —Urban Lands Extension Act (1979) 32, 11, 138-9 Urban Lands Act (1982)— —Article 5 32, 12-13, 31-2, 33, 26-7 —Article 9 33, 27 violation of 5, 19, 21 Wider Share Ownership, Law on 10, 242 wife’s property right in husband 2, 85-6 Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports 6, 108 n. 1 Joint and several liability 5, 220-2, 7, 82 Judgment in absentia 4, 15 quashed 5, 46

244

INDEX

Judicial independence 8, 78 Judicial notice 1, 459, 460, 480, 481, 2, 122 n. 1, 300, 5, 244 n. 1, 24, 14 in international law 1, 481 Judicial proceeding de novo 5, 183 ﬁnal and binding 5, 183 Jurisdiction of Tribunal in absence of agreement on implementation of General Declaration 12, 63 absence of objection 13, 263 account stated 23, 137 act of State, review 19, 286, 292 action in response to seizure of US embassy 28, 230-1 admissibility 16, 300-3, 18, 86 —distinguished 16, 306-9 admission, effect 1, 266, 318, 2, 302 advisory opinions 12, 82 alternative 16, 312-13 applicable law 9, 330, 11, 30, 142, 15, 100, 26, 226 assets in domestic branches of US banks 8, 201-2, 205-6 availability of local remedy 2, 10, 165, 320, 3, 151, 4, 102, 115 n. 2, 7, 10 claims arising out of seizure of hostages 2, 39-40, 79, 80, 88, 34, 131 Claims Settlement Declaration as basis 9, 157, 10, 62, 142, 281, 12, 273, 275, 13, 223-6, 15, 196, 197, 215, 16, 289, 19, 11, 21, 104: see also Claims Settlement Declaration, Article VII compliance with award 23, 208 concurrent 1, 489, 495, 2, 310-11, 371 consent of States 2, 210, 213, 3, 298, 303, 304, 5, 287, 288, 7, 200 contested by claimant 8, 259-66 continuity 14, 332-3 contractual undertakings, dispute arising from 23, 137, 34, 55 counterclaims: see Counterclaims, jurisdiction of Tribunal determination by Tribunal 5, 99, 8, 6, 265, 9, 4, 12, 66, 17, 333, 336, 338, 342, 345, 348, 34, 132-3 enforcement of another tribunal’s awards 6, 131-3, 8, 296, 11, 195, 197, 18, 118, 146

equitable discretion 12, 186-7, 196, 28, 14-16 ex aequo et bono 12, 82 exceeded 13, 145-7 excluded issues 6, 227, 228, 34, 131 exclusion of claims 1, 103, 237, 239-40, 489, 490, 495, 2, 56-7, 62-4, 66-7, 88, 97-9, 110, 338, 3, 60, 61, 99, 151, 198, 199, 201, 246, 260, 286, 313, 314, 321-5, 335, 348, 4, 8, 12, 16, 55, 75, 101, 102, 142, 220, 221, 225, 230-2, 244-6, 5, 1, 2, 15, 16, 47, 67, 96, 100, 101, 103, 116, 117, 119, 120, 126-30, 171, 182, 192-4, 196, 197, 268, 270, 388, 389, 6, 231, 250, 255, 263, 270, 7, 7, 33-5, 47, 124, 127, 131, 132, 135, 136, 153, 218, 8, 224-5, 229-33, 264-6, 9, 355, 10, 179, 11, 197, 201, 12, 16, 35-6, 100-1, 142-3, 149-50, 263, 13, 157, 160, 163, 182, 183, 16, 17-18, 18, 89, 91, 111, 290, 19, 177, 180, 26, 73-4: see also Claims, by Iranian banks against US banks; Forum selection clause —tortious character of act and 16, 79 exclusive 8, 266, 11, 47, 12, 322, 13, 306, 22, 253 existing contract 22, 115 extension 5, 13, 16 forum selection clause, determination of enforceability 34, 144, 178-9 generalized decision contrary to 16, 82 IMF Agreement, alleged violation 16, 106 immigration restrictions 28, 230-1 insurance payment, relevance 14, 292 interest, authority to award 16, 289-90 —inherent 16, 290 —uniform rules, desirability 16, 290 interim measures: see Interim measures interpretation of Declarations 1, 101-10, 117, 189, 190, 509-18, 2, 85-7, 5, 113, 7, 33, 9, 253-7, 11, 274, 12, 43-5, 65-70, 83, 13, 78, 16, 289, 18, 12, 34, 55, 123 —Co-Registrars and 3, 8-9, 21, 17, 332, 335, 338, 341, 344, 348, 19, 177, 180, 183, 186, 189, 192, 195, 198 —exclusive jurisdiction 7, 275, 276 —Undertakings as aid 12, 51

INDEX interpretation of Undertakings 8, 206-13, 9, 104-6, 12, 74 n. 15 Iranian nationality of respondent, relevance 9, 40 liquidation proceedings not a bar 14, 158 matters of Iranian domestic law 30, 42-3, 62, 63 mediation not authorized 12, 82 military articles, whether covered 19, 290 municipal law 8, 258-9, 280 nationality, determination 22, 161 over non-government party 5, 66, 67, 12, 35-6 over partnership 9, 292, 10, 43 over United States nationals 23, 383 parallel proceedings, threat to from 29, 218-20: see also General Principle B parity between governments 5, 15-17 parties’ power to amend 8, 212-13, 297 performance guarantees 9, 222 political claims 2, 42-3 primacy 2, 58-9 procedural discretion 16, 314 proprio motu consideration 3, 298, 9, 333, 14, 61, 25, 17, 28, 314 n. 3 ratione materiae 21, 68, 26, 126, 145 ratione personae 21, 67, 68, 26, 126, 130 restricted 5, 6, 13, 70, 8, 3 n. 2, 231, 9, 378, 10, 139, 11, 47, 281, 349, 13, 168-9, 22, 296-7 settlement: see Settlement Social Security payments: see Social Security payments State responsibility: see State responsibility taxes: see Taxes tortious acts 23, 237, 240 n. 2 unjust enrichment 23, 137 Laches 9, 176 Lease 2, 251, 254: see also Contract; Contract, discharge frustration 2, 250-3, 256, 258 —attributability 2, 251, 253, 256, 258 —foreseeability 2, 251, 253 Lease agreements 1, 411-15, 2, 250-9 Legal presumption 6, 72 Lender, liability 5, 245 n. 1 Letters of credit 1, 507, 5, 28, 29, 31, 38-40, 58, 67, 68, 6, 288, 9, 298-9, 13, 111-12, 17, 31 n. 1: see also Claims, basis, standby letter of credit

245

creation of special account 2, 127 Letters of guarantee 5, 96 Licence: see also Contract anticipatory breach 2, 340, 341 breach 2, 340, 341 ratiﬁcation 2, 339 termination 2, 341 validity 2, 339, 340 Limitation of liability clause 6, 89, 90, 94, 95-100, 33, 137-8 enforceability 6, 98 exceptions to 6, 97, 99, 100 validity 6, 97, 99 Liquidation: see Bankruptcy Luxembourg Declaration 13, 91-2 Majlis position: see Iran, Majlis’ position (including Resolution of 2 November 1980) Margin of appreciation 16, 222 Marital rights 30, 49-57 applicable law 30, 49-56 as property rights 30, 68-9 Materials guarantee 17, 316 Measures affecting property rights: see Expropriation; Property rights, measures affecting Military property 4, 28 Minors as claimants 30, 79-80, 185-6, 33, 294-6 gifts to 33, 321-4 nationality 28, 242, 29, 12-13, 16-19 Misrepresentation 5, 247 Most favoured nation treatment (MFN) 17, 143 Municipal institutions, respect for 7, 171 Municipal law 1, 108, 421, 422, 451, 464-6, 480, 481, 5, 16, 19-21, 269, 270, 286, 292, 294, 302, 7, 124, 160, 8, 8-10, 258-9, 281-2, 14, 331 analogy to 1, 362, 374, 432 effect of bribery on contract in 12, 270 n. 18 incorporation of Treaty provisions in 12, 144-5, 15, 219-20 non-compliance with international obligations and 13, 177, 19, 287-8, 29, 43, 34, 136-7, 178 obligations under, Tribunal and 8, 281-2, 16, 302-3

246

INDEX

Mutuality of commitments by Iran and US 5, 16 Mutually agreeable arbitration principle 5, 49 Naples Declaration 13, 92 Nationality: see also Naturalization applicable law: see Applicable law, nationality Barcelona Traction 1, 466-7 continuing nationality, evidence of 34, 10-11 corporations 1, 135-9, 223, 224, 384, 385, 392-402, 412, 417, 418, 455-82, 503, 2, 9, 16, 3, 46, 47, 63, 103, 113, 161, 202, 205 n. 2, 230, 245, 260, 272, 273, 4, 100, 273, 5, 2, 18, 23, 237, 342-4, 6, 57, 80, 93, 7, 20, 27-9, 124, 127-30, 185, 8, 156, 220-1 n. 4, 234, 307, 9, 194, 252-4, 258-64, 291-2, 366-7, 10, 166, 11, 83-4, 12, 251, 13, 17-18, 14, 226-8, 16, 15-16, 104, 259-60, 17, 20, 21, 33, 143, 156, 248, 255, 296, 297, 304, 18, 102, 189, 227, 20, 6, 25, 25-8, 29, 225-7, 315-16, 31, 149: see also Evidence of, nationality of corporation —Certain Norwegian Loans 1, 457-8 critical date 28, 239-40, 253-4, 30, 27-34, 32, 26 date of acquisition 25, 59, 176, 202 determination of as preliminary matter 18, 70, 80-3, 25, 271 diplomatic protection and 12, 284-6, 18, 261 n. 20, 22, 136, 23, 289 domicile 22, 143, 147 dual nationality 2, 160-8, 173-5, 178-225, 5, 251-336, 9, 354, 356, 13, 300, 18, 70-1, 260-2, 24, 42-6, 25, 157, 26, 7-14 —A18 caveat 29, 33-41, 56-8, 63-4, 65-6, 75-7, 382, 30, 66-8, 73-4, 87-8, 98-100, 193-6, 31, 30-3, 47-9, 62, 66, 86-7, 115-19, 32, 36-40, 153-5, 33, 3-15, 301-2, 307, 331-2, 386-95, 418-59, 34, 24-5: see also fraudulent use below ——as instrument of equity 34, 25 —citizenship 5, 267, 269, 270, 283, 285 —critical date/relevant period 34, 10, 82-3

—dominant and effective 2, 161-5, 168, 173, 174, 178-82, 185-91, 195, 198, 199, 201-5, 208, 211, 212, 214, 223-5, 5, 260, 262-6, 273-5, 283, 290, 291, 299, 304, 305, 310, 311, 315-17, 321-6, 331-3, 335, 14, 7-8, 18, 96, 19, 51-61, 118, 21, 23-4, 22, 120-2, 125-6, 127-8, 132-4, 135-7, 142-5, 158-60, 163-8, 197-9, 200-3, 23, 261-3, 271-3, 282-4, 285-9, 308-14, 315-17, 24, 44-5, 218, 25, 158-71, 182-5, 190-211, 264-72, 278-88, 289-97, 26, 7 n. 1, 9-14, 41-3, 45-59, 28, 185-91, 238-45, 29, 3-41, 63-5, 72-5, 30, 73-5, 274-80, 34, 11-16 —equality of States and 26, 7 n. 1, 29, 14, 65, 383 n. 1 —fraudulent use 2, 166, 167, 225, 5, 272, 22, 136, 30, 88, 98-100, 194-6, 31, 10-11, 119: see also A18 caveat above —Hague Convention on the Conﬂict of Nationality Laws (1930) 31, 48-9 —ICSID Convention (1965) 31, 48 —link theory 5, 263 —Merg´e 25, 163, 200, 206 —pension rights 30, 66-8 —Reparations Case 31, 48 —rights under Treaty of Amity 30, 256 —Saghi 34, 22, 25 evidence of: see Evidence of, nationality Flegenheimer 25, 165-6, 31, 51-2, 32, 86-7, 33, 433, 450 jus sanguinis 2, 181, 184, 185, 5, 274, 305, 22, 120, 125, 131-2, 143, 158 jus soli 2, 181, 184, 5, 274, 305, 22, 131, 143, 158 loss of 22, 149, 25, 170-1 marriage 14, 56-7, 22, 146, 150, 197, 24, 44, 29, 10 minor 28, 242, 29, 12-13, 16-19 natural persons 1, 168, 479, 480, 2, 16, 17, 226, 227, 3, 286, 5, 92, 279, 282, 292, 6, 57, 7, 5, 19, 324, 21, 25-6 —uncertainty over 9, 3-5 non-responsibility principle 2, 162-4, 178, 180, 181, 184, 187-91, 194-204, 207, 208, 212, 214, 215, 223, 5, 265, 266, 290, 291, 304, 305, 309 n. 1, 310, 311,

INDEX 315-17, 321, 323, 324, 326-8, 331, 333, 7, 171 Nottebohm 25, 166, 206, 31, 48, 49-51, 32, 85, 87 partnership 6, 221, 10, 43-4 recognition 5, 260, 334 religion 22, 165 return of passport, effect 18, 237, 261 Nationality of claim 1, 384, 385, 392-402, 2, 105, 297-300, 378, 3, 39, 245, 246, 272, 4, 101, 142, 217, 218, 5, 209, 365, 6, 80, 285, 7, 97, 185, 206, 207, 9, 255-6, 366-7, 10, 126, 12, 259, 272-84, 16, 239, 19, 118: see also Corporations; Evidence of, nationality of claim beneﬁcial ownership 7, 29, 11, 85-9, 29, 27-8, 242-6 continuity of nationality 11, 84 continuity of ownership 2, 227, 234, 235, 4, 101, 5, 92, 93, 377, 8, 262, 293-4, 9, 38, 264-6, 10, 126-7, 140-1, 239, 325, 342, 11, 55, 188-9, 220, 12, 100, 257-61, 313-14, 13, 18, 180, 202, 14, 228-30, 243-4, 15, 196, 16, 259-60, 302, 17, 115, 255, 18, 95, 96, 158, 166, 19, 68, 22, 132, 25, 28, 27, 216-17, 254 corporations 1, 135-9, 455-82, 2, 9, 10, 16, 3, 205, 4, 100, 101, 141, 142, 181, 216-18, 5, 21, 163, 210, 237, 341, 342, 348, 353, 364, 365, 388, 7, 5, 6, 9, 41, 66, 97, 122, 123, 127, 129, 134, 185, 206, 207, 8, 156, 9, 194, 252-4, 366-7, 10, 126, 13, 101, 17, 105, 272, 301, 353, 395, 396, 19, 75-6, 117-18, 202-3, 22, 174-5, 26, 152-3 determination as prerequisite for Award 5, 126 shareholder claims 2, 297-300, 377, 378 transfer of claim to non-US nationals 11, 138 Nationalization: see Expropriation Natural resources 24, 97-9 Naturalization 2, 192-4, 203, 9, 353-5, 356, 26, 41, 49, 50, 51, 56, 31, 44-7, 64-5, 32, 56-7, 85-7: see also Nationality Medina 31, 52-4 Salem 31, 52 Negligence 3, 30, 5, 398, 6, 100, 7, 43 Negotiable instruments 1, 185-8, 445-7, 5, 373, 7, 115, 13, 21-7: see also Cheque

247

applicable law 21, 44-5, 63-4 cause of action 21, 44-5, 62, 63-7 common law and 21, 44 as contract 21, 77 evidence of debt 21, 49 guarantor 5, 373 loans 21, 50, 65-6 validity 21, 51-2, 66-7 Negotiated settlement: see Settlement Netherlands, law of application to Tribunal 8, 335 n. 8 arbitration 20, 207, 210, 217, 250, 274 Code of Civil Procedure —Article 642 1, 331, 406 —Article 649 5, 128 —Articles 1029-76 20, 207 —Article 1033 20, 210, 217, 274 enforcement of arbitral award 1, 331, 406 Nominalism 8, 421, 426 Non-responsibility principle: see Nationality, non-responsibility principle November Resolution: see Iran, Majlis’ position (including Resolution of 2 November 1980) Nulliﬁcation of claims: see Settlement Nulliﬁed oil agreements, jurisdiction of Tribunal 1, 487-98, 2, 284-7, 3, 298-301, 303-5, 309, 313-15, 5, 51-3: see also Iran, law of, Single Article Act Odious debt 8, 446-7 Offset: see Counterclaims, offset and; Damages, deduction for Order by President, distinguished 3, 316 disregard 4, 13-16, 73 of exequatur 6, 133, 135, 138, 139 reasons not normally given 14, 21-2 validity 2, 346 Outstanding claims: see Claims, outstanding Partnership 3, 161, 208, 9, 327-33, 21, 102-5 nationality and 31, 87 right of partner to bring suit 9, 332, 16, 13, 15, 21, 102-5 Passports, nationality and evidence of 18, 237, 260-2, 273 n. 46, 23, 135 return of passport, effect 18, 237, 261

248

INDEX

Patent rights 2, 339, 341: see also Licence Pension rights applicable law 30, 42-3, 63 dual nationality, relevance 30, 66-8 expropriation 30, 41-3, 46-9, 59-66 Performance guarantee 2, 241-5, 3, 267, 7, 42, 53, 121, 8, 327-8, 9, 22, 26, 29, 35, 12, 151-3, 23, 363-6: see also Damages, performance withhold; Materials guarantee cancellation 8, 322, 9, 130-1, 164-5, 220-2, 242-3, 299, 12, 106-7, 14, 46-7, 125, 17, 31 n. 1, 79-80, 316, 22, 57-8, 84-5, 256, 335-6, 23, 211-12, 217 counterclaim for 24, 275, 26, 81 demand for payment 19, 212-13, 239-40, 25, 53, 62-7, 98, 100-1, 126-9 purpose 22, 57-8 reduction 28, 45-6, 50 Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) 1, 210, 212, 213, 312, 329 n. 1, 402, 405 n. 1, 2, 210, 354, 3, 20, 21, 32 n. 1, 298 n. 1, 302 n. 4, 305 n. 1, 308 n. 2, 310 n. 1, 313 n. 1, 314 n. 1, 315 n. 3, 4, 115, 118, 163, 5, 261, 287, 292-5, 316, 342, 346 n. 1, 351, 6, 126, 163, 166 n. 3, 7, 135 n. 2, 152 n. 4, 8, 207 n. 8, 208 n. 9, 211 n. 19, 213, 278 n. 54, 449, 10, 197, 11, 27 n. 14, 14, 234, 321-2, 15, 222, 246-7, 300-4, 18, 217, 223, 262 n. 22, 264 n. 27, 385-6, 21, 155 n. 46, 198, 22, 288 n. 34, 296 n. 43, 297 nn. 46, 47, 48 Certain German Interests in Upper Silesia 2, 147 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions 2, 149 Revised Rules (1936), Article 69 1, 233 stay of proceedings 2, 61 Political acts, as proximate cause 2, 253, 254, 256-8 Post-hearing submissions: see Procedure, post-hearing submissions Postponement of hearing 2, 124-5, 3, 209-11, 316-18, 362, 375, 377, 378, 8, 30, 284-9, 11, 227, 289-91 Power of attorney: see Representation Precedent 1, 287, 2, 185, 186, 189, 191, 301, 9, 169, 216, 12, 233 n. 5, 16, 82, 18, 271-2, 349, 22, 216-17, 289 n. 40, 23, 130, 27, 263, 31, 67-8, 33, 226

Preclusion 21, 155 n. 46, 198 general principle of law 21, 154-5 Prescription 1, 132, 17, 189-90, 216, 218, 231-2 general principle of international law 32, 180-1 Presidential direction 9, 409-13 Presidential Order No. 1 1, 321, 398, 3, 365, 7, 205, 16, 251, 286-90, 21, 312 No. 8 21, 100 No. 9 3, 141 No. 10 3, 126, 141 No. 12 3, 175 No. 17 5, 112 No. 19 21, 221 No. 21 20, 221 No. 27 8, 64 No. 28 8, 64 No. 29 7, 226, 236, 240, 245, 248, 250, 8, 64 No. 33 7, 259, 262, 269, 8, 2, 14, 16 No. 36 7, 262 No. 49 12, 389 No. 50 12, 389 No. 51 14, 174, 341, 353 No. 52 16, 287 No. 53 14, 354 Principles of law: see General principles of, law Pro forma invoice: see Contract, pro forma invoice Procedure: see also Time limits; Tribunal Rules abuse 3, 380, 16, 329-34 admissibility of documents (Cases A15(IV) and A24) 34, 111-13 agent, role 21, 370-1, 376, 392 alteration of captions 11, 165, 18, 279 applicable law 8, 161, 30, 55 arbitrator, challenge to 20, 184, 188 case resolution techniques 2, 301, 302, 3, 77, 5, 298 consolidation of cases 2, 379, 396, 3, 99, 105, 112, 213, 4, 239-41, 12, 99, 109, 132, 345, 366-7, 13, 335-6, 16, 261-2, 18, 58, 21, 5, 26, 147, 27, 296-310, 32, 94-5, 164, 34, 110 —time limits 4, 241 consolidation of issues 3, 154, 155, 17, 97-8

INDEX date of receipt of documents 8, 53-4, 21, 361-3, 376, 379, 391 delays 3, 40, 41, 55, 77, 87-9, 129, 296, 317, 318, 376, 383, 4, 3, 4, 46, 71, 72, 81, 5, 140-3, 146, 7, 203, 204, 8, 30-40, 134, 284-9, 9, 167, 10, 15, 210, 17, 56, 189-91, 202, 219 dissipation of judicial resources 10, 227 duplicate proceedings, need to avoid 8, 363, 365, 367, 372 duty to abide by commitments 8, 29-30 equality of parties 9, 172, 17, 49, 18, 187, 283, 325, 20, 6, 21, 16, 28, 6, 29, 377-8, 30, 121-2, 33, 287 error in description of party 9, 50 ex parte motion 3, 387 excessive formality 8, 139 expeditious conduct of business 3, 7, 7, 204, 8, 288 failure to appear 8, 40, 27, 222 failure to provide translation 10, 272, 33, 332 fairness to parties 2, 9, 123, 284, 288, 289, 346, 356, 3, 23, 31, 85, 88, 89, 129, 130, 257, 281, 296, 298, 301, 302, 362, 365, 374-6, 383, 388, 389, 4, 58, 64, 65, 67, 70-2, 93-5, 214, 241, 242, 261, 279, 5, 140, 7, 70, 119, 120, 126, 137, 204, 9, 322, 342, 344, 10, 4, 5, 108, 128, 210, 324, 341, 12, 6, 131, 225, 228, 345, 13, 16, 101, 189, 228, 298, 317, 14, 155, 226, 16, 222, 258, 259, 17, 45-52, 56-7, 59, 82, 139, 219, 296, 19, 112-13, 238, 21, 16, 24, 131, 29, 377-8 joinder of merits and— —determination of date claim arose 19, 53 —interim measures 18, 130 n. 3 —jurisdictional issues 29, 10, 14, 56-7, 33, 402 joinder of parties 3, 161 joint ﬁling of submissions 3, 373 judicial notice 10, 106 late submissions 9, 343, 10, 5, 128, 272-3, 324-5, 341, 12, 324, 13, 101, 131, 14, 225-6, 291, 16, 258, 17, 45-52, 18, 187-8, 207-8, 226-7, 231, 19, 112-13, 238, 21, 15-16, 101-2, 23, 163-5, 353-5, 24, 131, 25, 113, 27, 135, 29,

249 29, 60, 376-8, 30, 25-6, 33, 287-9, 332: see also Evidence, late submission —counterclaim 17, 57-61, 18, 188, 24, 131 —documents in the public domain 34, 70 minutes 13, 326 n. 4 need for— —adversary process 10, 224-5 —simpliﬁcation of proceedings 10, 219-22 notice 1, 232, 233, 418, 421 post-Award review 8, 116 post-Award submissions 8, 115 post-hearing submissions 2, 9, 122, 123, 139, 345, 3, 39, 40, 76, 87-90, 99, 116, 226, 257, 281, 302, 303, 365, 380-3, 5, 139, 7, 70, 74, 88, 9, 300, 10, 272-3, 15, 271, 17, 49, 28, 324-5, 30, 26, 31, 135-40, 33, 287, 288 postponement of hearing: see Postponement of hearing pre-hearing conference 2, 125, 327, 3, 377, 378, 8, 5, 133, 18, 54-5 preliminary issues and merits, joinder 10, 15 —separation 18, 79-83 preliminary objection 3, 298 Procedural Guideline No. 1 1, 285 procedural safeguards 1, 215 proper party: see Proper claimant; Proper respondent reliance on defence not included in Statement of Defence 10, 210 reliance on written record 11, 73 reopening of hearing 30, 104-22, 31, 140-5: see also Award, rehearing reply and rejoinder 3, 98, 9, 322 request for— —further hearing 9, 300 —hearing 3, 387, 388, 25, 276 —information 18, 45-7, 48-54 —production of documents 12, 345, 367, 13, 17, 18, 68-9 —rehearing 27, 210-13 request to— —stay decisions 13, 16 —submit further statement 3, 362, 363 res judicata 12, 174, 367 stay of proceedings 7, 237, 9, 254: see also Interim measures, stay of proceedings

250

INDEX

Procedure (cont.) submission of— —evidence 9, 109-11 —Memorials 5, 144, 146, 147 surprise submissions 3, 31, 365, 381, 8, 341 suspension of proceedings 3, 298, 18, 72-3 technical imperfections 14, 99 third parties, absence 28, 326-7 translation 19, 169 validity 2, 345-7 violation of 5, 2, 335 Promissory notes: see Negotiable instruments Proper claimant 1, 176, 177, 2, 82-5, 105, 3, 161, 246, 4, 101, 143, 181, 210, 211, 5, 70, 78, 79, 377, 6, 265, 7, 35, 120-4, 127, 129, 134-6, 171, 174, 199, 205-7, 8, 21-2, 23, 9, 378-9, 10, 127, 13, 96, 16, 13, 15, 194, 226, 302, 17, 5, 271, 18, 166-7, 190-1, 209-11, 19, 77-8, 21, 102-6, 23, 7-8, 142-6, 26, 19, 130-2, 27, 67-9, 136-7, 141: see also Words and phrases, locus standi beneﬁcial owner: see Claims, basis, beneﬁcial ownership claim on behalf of Iranian people 28, 228 existence of counterclaim 9, 87 identity, certainty 31, 145-6, 33, 44-5 joint claim 16, 13-14, 194 minor 30, 79-80, 185-6, 33, 294-6 percentage of share ownership, relevance 27, 58, 59 Proper law: see Applicable law Proper respondent 1, 134, 219, 389, 412, 413, 418, 427, 484, 503, 2, 24-6, 147 n. 1, 338, 3, 53, 103, 230, 250, 275, 286, 351, 4, 1, 75, 143, 5, 138, 6, 27-9, 70, 129, 174, 208 n. 1, 7, 121, 124-6, 8, 133-8, 9, 244 n. 2, 323-6, 367, 10, 242, 281, 11, 55, 215, 247, 12, 290, 13, 35, 42-3, 97-8, 101, 121-2, 130, 326, 341, 14, 26, 71, 197, 292, 15, 197-8, 16, 17-18, 78, 194, 17, 5-6, 30, 52-3, 163-8, 255, 272, 18, 230 n. 7, 19, 77-118, 20, 7-8, 22, 10, 254, 23, 362-3, 24, 132, 27, 156, 29, 227-8, 31, 151-2: see also Controlled entity; Corporations, succession

Property rights: see also Iran, law of, immovable property beneﬁcial ownership 9, 230-3, 12, 275-84, 29, 25-8, 30, 56-7, 66, 32, 67-70, 33, 469, 34, 22, 25 foreign nationals’ rights 32, 36-40 inheritance rights 31, 105-6, 115-23 loans as 27, 28 marital rights 30, 68-9 measures affecting 2, 41-3, 79-80, 81-8, 207, 3, 65, 66, 4, 154-6, 162-5, 167-72, 6, 260, 17, 99-100, 139-40, 169, 174 n. 8, 23, 369, 27, 13, 18, 32, 61-2, 32, 32-6, 141-53, 157-8 —immigration restrictions 28, 230-1 —interference with contractual right 22, 79, 33, 53-4 —obligation to protect 23, 369-71, 385-6 —unlawful conduct 2, 42 pension as 30, 63: see also pension rights in persons 8, 22, 23 right in person 2, 79-80, 81-8 transfer of ownership, requirements 34, 23 Proportionality 22, 78 Protection of goods, claimant’s duty 8, 271 Protection of parties 6, 40, 41 of claimants’ own position 9, 5 Public order 5, 384, 17, 143 Public order, protection 7, 165, 166, 169, 170 Purchase order as contract 4, 266, 267, 276, 7, 108, 109, 113: see also Contract Quantum meruit 1, 287, 309 n. 9, 2, 111, 4, 220, 221, 228, 230-6, 5, 171, 6, 169, 7, 76, 8, 162, 9, 218, 402, 11, 17-18, 16, 272, 18, 179, 348, 19, 142, 148, 23, 200, 26, 201, 28, 79-80 contract distinguished 4, 232, 234, 8, 224, 234 Quasi-contract 3, 278, 4, 231, 235 Real property: see Immovable property transactions Rebus sic stantibus: see Changed circumstances Recognition and enforcement of Award 5, 130, 6, 135-9, 7, 219, 14, 331, 333-6, 18, 131-46 Avco enforcement proceedings

INDEX Case A27 34, 39-65, 105 defences to enforcement, availability 34, 57-8 enforceability 6, 271 equality/non-parity of US and Iran 34, 42 Gould enforcement proceedings 34, 43-4, 57 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 2, 60, 6, 137 n. 2, 14, 327 n. 8, 18, 136 n. 21, 138-9 —applicability to Tribunal awards 34, 56-8 obligation to provide enforcement procedures 14, 331, 333-6, 34, 42-3, 56 —appeal/relitigation distinguished 34, 57, 59 —choice 34, 56 —delay 34, 60 —effectiveness/refusal 34, 56, 62 —erroneous reading of Award, relevance 34, 58 —failure of Iran to pursue 34, 43 —foreign arbitral award enforcement as standard 34, 56 —responsibilities of party seeking enforcement 34, 60-2 —State responsibility for 34, 59-60 —US government’s failure to intervene, relevance 34, 58 State practice 18, 124-7, 131-46 US responsibility (Case A21) 34, 41-3, 55 Regular course of dealing 7, 113 Rehearing: see Award, rehearing; Procedure, reopening of hearing Representation 1, 176, 177 power of attorney 1, 167-388 —whether needed 9, 15 proof of authority 2, 30, 35-7 Representative case 2, 285, 286, 301, 3, 300 Request, meaning 3, 175, 388, 389, 4, 15 n. 1 Respondent: see Proper respondent Restitution 1, 287, 309 n. 9, 422, 423, 2, 236, 3, 57 n. 2, 293, 4, 231, 5, 112, 6, 294, 295, 9, 402, 10, 204-5, 12, 138, 379, 21, 198 Rial Account 8, 188, 350

251

Rights of parties 3, 300-3, 387, 4, 115 argument to Tribunal 3, 19, 28, 29, 299-303, 315, 4, 242 defence, right of 2, 3, 288, 327, 330, 3, 87, 127, 128, 130, 315, 4, 70, 71, 241, 7, 124-6 prejudice to 6, 70 Roman law 6, 168 Rules of international law: see General principles of, international law Rules of procedure: see Tribunal Rules Sales contract 5, 38, 40 Security Account 12, 50, 54-5, 13, 118, 119-20, 276, 345, 360, 361, 22, 336, 356 abuse of 4, 207, 208, 13, 116-17 currency of 8, 425-6, 11, 32, 340, 16, 274, 275-6 disposition of interest 1, 189-92, 197-214 effect on— —costs 8, 334 n. 7 —liability 9, 367, 17, 178-80 —rate of interest 8, 321, 343-4 indemniﬁcation of depositary 1, 196, 197, 8, 279 n. 56 nature of 12, 285 payment of bank fees 1, 192-6 payments from 3, 128, 195, 196, 5, 49, 8, 14, 16, 43, 62, 98, 178, 188, 237, 327, 354, 361, 9, 8, 45, 60, 63, 71, 137, 168, 186, 200, 243, 301, 307, 309, 312, 339, 348, 358, 377, 10, 55, 81, 134, 175, 257, 258, 317-18, 328, 347, 358, 359, 361, 11, 30, 34-5, 69, 137, 179, 207, 250, 267, 344, 365, 12, 16, 17, 38, 72, 107, 138, 159, 169, 231, 232, 233, 298, 323, 389, 392, 13, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 44, 145, 191, 310, 14, 16, 52, 81, 168, 169, 170, 184, 212, 243, 283, 342, 15, 22, 186, 187, 16, 235, 236, 274, 276, 319, 320, 17, 19, 22, 113, 130, 288, 324, 355, 358, 363, 18, 148, 174, 244, 278, 322, 373, 374, 19, 72, 93, 161, 231, 255, 331, 346, 347, 353, 355, 362, 367, 368, 20, 129, 21, 61, 161, 287, 289, 22, 85, 116, 256, 23, 74-8, 148, 149, 216, 377, 24, 84, 85, 115, 156, 25, 110, 111, 151, 26, 5, 31, 127, 128, 184, 27, 23, 120, 121, 186, 28, 50,

252

INDEX

Security Account (cont.) 111, 369, 370, 391, 393, 401, 29, 56, 240-1, 293, 349, 397, 404, 413, 30, 295, 31, 88, 123, 32, 183, 223, 34, 38, 101, 186 —basis for 17, 173 —deduction from 14, 16-17 —deemed to be by principal debtor 7, 115 —deferment 13, 242 —unauthorized items 3, 82, 358, 359, 4, 208 possible dissipation 10, 363 purpose 17, 167, 179, 18, 147, 21, 51, 25, 144 repayment to 7, 210, 211, 214, 9, 9 Separate opinion: see also Concurring opinion; Concurring and dissenting opinion; Declaration; Dissenting opinion; Explanatory remarks; Separate statement; Supplemental Opinion Aghahosseini 28, 303, 29, 122, 31, 3, 34, 64 Aldrich 1, 200, 21, 61, 26, 58, 28, 142, 33, 195, 34, 169 Allison 28, 142, 30, 160, 236, 34, 65, 169 Ameli 16, 330, 29, 241 Ansari 6, 66, 8, 65, 11, 45, 165, 277, 13, 244, 14, 332, 17, 23, 130, 290, 325, 19, 243, 20, 151, 22, 109, 25, 162 Bahrami 8, 65, 11, 277, 14, 334 B¨ockstiegel 16, 329, 333 Brower 8, 29, 10, 189, 11, 289, 13, 240 Duncan 34, 169 Holtzmann 1, 200, 5, 82, 101, 138, 6, 175, 8, 329, 391, 9, 138-52, 200-2, 13, 319, 14, 82, 149 n. 2, 16, 329, 17, 87, 23, 338, 24, 156, 227, 248, 259, 25, 201, 29, 16, 30, 163 Kashani 1, 115, 203, 329, 404, 4, 67 Khalilian 18, 278, 19, 310, 22, 109, 23, 389 Lagergren 8, 385 Mosk 1, 132, 200, 6, 95 Mostafavi 8, 65, 11, 255, 277, 283 n. 1, 298, 12, 80, 14, 81, 334 Noori 22, 109, 23, 239, 34, 64 Sani 1, 452 Shafeiei 1, 115, 203, 2, 356, 5, 175, 6, 288

Separate statement: see also Concurring opinion; Concurring and dissenting opinion; Declaration; Dissenting opinion; Explanatory remarks; Separate opinion; Supplemental opinion Aldrich 21, 256 Ameli 31, 34 B¨ockstiegel 26, 5 Briner 21, 240 Holtzmann 22, 218 n. 2, 26, 5, 29, 221, 383 n. 2 Khalilian 21, 194, 245, 263 Noori 28, 189, 243, 29, 14, 65, 383 n. 1 Separation of issues 2, 146, 285, 287, 3, 297-301, 4, 82, 5, 54, 377 Services, meaning 5, 101, 102 Settlement 1, 123-6, 140-3, 156, 157, 160-5, 181-4, 216, 217, 220-1, 327-33, 342-6, 403-10, 2, 44-50, 90-5, 126-31, 132-7, 228-31, 261-7, 269-77, 278-80, 291-3, 305-9, 332, 333, 348-61, 364, 365, 366, 367, 3, 34-5, 36-8, 73-5, 91-6, 119-23, 169-72, 176-80, 181-5, 186-97, 212-17, 218-24, 326-30, 338-48, 351-7, 366-71, 390-4, 4, 20-5, 29-32, 33-8, 39-46, 47-52, 83-8, 183-91, 192-6, 197-8, 199-204, 205-9, 280-5, 5, 76-7, 80-4, 88-9, 148-9, 150-1, 155-9, 249-50, 354-6, 6, 1-3, 4-11, 20-6, 33-7, 38-42, 118-19, 120-4, 147-8, 7, 209-16, 220-2, 223-4, 225-35, 236-8, 239-43, 244-6, 247-8, 249-57, 258-9, 260-8, 269-74, 8, 11-12, 13-14, 18-19, 42-3, 66-71, 72-4, 79-80, 81-2, 83-4, 97-8, 183-8, 236-7, 249-352, 353-9, 9, 6-9, 306-7, 308-9, 310-12, 347-9, 357-9, 10, 357-65, 11, 363-72, 12, 385-404, 13, 359-70, 14, 339-49, 16, 54-5, 317-35, 17, 353-68, 18, 377-82, 390, 19, 345-74, 21, 285-93, 22, 365-79, 23, 401-13, 24, 291-305, 25, 4-5, 301-39, 26, 265-75, 27, 275-81, 282-8, 28, 389-91, 392-3, 394-400, 401-2, 29, 395-400, 401-10, 411-19, 34, 185, 198 absence of ﬁnancial obligations noted 8, 82 agreement not to pursue claims 6, 36, 8, 67 amendment 7, 238, 8, 214-15, 9, 348, 12, 388 applicable law 7, 268

INDEX approval of Iranian bank 3, 193, 194, 213, 220, 359, 360, 4, 34 assignment of rights 6, 6, 12, 394 authority of representative 6, 39-41, 7, 221, 12, 395, 28, 67-70 availability 3, 79 binding nature 6, 22 concurring opinion 2, 357, 358, 3, 78, 358, 10, 363-5 conditional agreement 7, 213, 214, 237, 240-2, 263, 267 conditional award 3, 340, 352, 358 conditions for recording 1, 149-53, 3, 78, 82, 192-4, 358 —jurisdiction 1, 152 —reasonableness 1, 152, 153 conﬁdentiality of —negotiations 2, 356 —terms 3, 37, 74, 79, 80, 83, 169, 212, 339, 4, 207, 209, 5, 81, 82, 84, 88, 6, 25, 34, 35, 7, 210, 211, 222, 237, 8, 185, 10, 128, 358, 359, 12, 388 correction, request for 22, 151-4 costs, waiver 18, 381 currency of payment 24, 187-90 default 7, 211 delays in payment of award 3, 196 dissent from 3, 37, 38, 74, 78, 177, 182, 187, 192, 194, 327, 330, 352, 360, 4, 22, 34, 84, 198, 200, 206, 5, 77, 82, 355, 6, 3, 21, 121, 16, 327, 22, 370 n. 1 documents, conformity 16, 327 effect on contract 10, 13-14, 17-19, 25, 227 enforcement 1, 330, 331, 406, 407, 3, 37, 38, 74, 177, 182, 187, 194, 195, 327, 330, 353, 360, 4, 22, 34, 41, 48, 84, 198, 200, 206, 5, 77, 82, 355, 6, 3, 21, 121, 10, 18 —Security Account 17, 167 escrow payment 7, 210 exception to 7, 220, 226-8, 230 extinction of claims 8, 264 failure to— —agree 16, 54-5, 29, 465 n. 2 —implement 10, 13-14, 16, 328 form of award 1, 329, 330, 405 formation of agreement 25, 222-7 indemnity from costs and taxes 12, 392-3 interdependence of terms 6, 121 interpretation 10, 283, 16, 328, 18, 382

253

—“upon execution” 8, 105 invitation to negotiate 7, 177-9 joint request for award on agreed terms as basis 19, 366, 22, 152 jurisdiction of Tribunal 1, 161, 5, 83, 353 modiﬁed 6, 120, 7, 261, 9, 358 null and void 7, 210, 211, 213, 214 payment to Iranian bank 3, 192 performance 7, 213, 214 precedential value 6, 122, 124 prejudicial to one party 6, 40 ratiﬁcation 7, 222, 240, 8, 19, 185, 186 reach 7, 215, 8, 105, 270-1, 282, 10, 46-53, 282-3 —damages for 8, 105-6 reasons omitted 17, 259 reciprocal obligations of parties 3, 75, 80, 177, 182, 194, 195, 327, 330, 353, 360, 4, 22, 34, 84, 198, 200, 206, 5, 77, 82, 355, 6, 3, 21, 121, 7, 220, 8, 66, 97 release from liability 8, 214, 12, 387, 388, 392, 393, 18, 380-1 request for, need for agreement 25, 5 revocation 7, 214 separate opinion 18, 382-90, 21, 293, 294 signature of parties 4, 22, 23, 39, 29, 397 simultaneous settlement of ICJ case 32, 207-20 standards for acceptance by Tribunal 3, 78, 82, 358, 4, 208 status 5, 353 suspension of— —contract rights 8, 105, 10, 13-14 —proceedings 7, 237, 18, 380 terms of attempted settlement not admission 14, 77 third party claims 6, 24 waiver of claims 8, 81-2 withdrawal 3, 99 withdrawal of claims 9, 9, 14, 343 without payment from Security Account 7, 236 without prejudice 1, 161, 5, 159 Shareholder claims: see Corporations, shareholders; Nationality of claim, shareholder claims Social security payments 3, 248, 249, 7, 69, 9, 132, 10, 54, 78, 313-16, 13, 340-3, 17, 31 n. 1, 259-64, 20, 28, 24, 156-61, 190-6, 200-1, 287, 25, 42-4, 28, 48

254

INDEX

Social security payments (cont.) clearance certiﬁcate 20, 13-14, 15, 28, 85, 95-7, 99, 156-8, 24, 144-8, 157-8, 159 contractual obligation, whether 9, 167, 177, 225-6, 15, 18, 93-4, 221-3, 24, 157, 159, 26, 181 counterclaim for 3, 116, 167, 236, 4, 246-8, 5, 233, 234, 6, 84, 85, 90, 91, 96, 174, 7, 87, 8, 326, 347-8, 9, 135-6, 167, 177, 299-300, 10, 313-16, 11, 26, 39, 51-2, 67, 172, 184 n. 1, 204-5, 248-9, 317-19, 349-55, 12, 157, 233 n. 5, 13, 182-3, 307, 342-3, 14, 79-80, 168, 281, 15, 19-20, 91-4, 17, 83, 262-3, 18, 167, 197, 221-3, 297-8, 349-50, 20, 35-6, 82, 118-19, 22, 254, 337, 23, 62, 215, 25, 90, 94, 101, 26, 83-4, 97-8, 99, 143-4, 180, 27, 103-4, 119, 29, 348, 33, 193 effect of contract on 6, 91, 92, 12, 157 indemnity, request for 23, 213 payment, evidence of 20, 14-15, 28, 161, 163 withhold, liability for 22, 20, 26, 77-80, 88, 94-7, 137-43 Sole jurisdiction: see Forum selection clause, jurisdiction of Tribunal Sources of international law 2, 84, 196, 4, 114, 5, 233, 332, 8, 397-401, 407-9: see also Customary international law; General principles of, international law; Treaties international tribunals 15, 223, 17, 142, 18, 216 State practice 15, 223, 16, 310-12, 17, 142 UN General Assembly Resolutions and Declarations 10, 185-6, 198-200, 15, 223 writings of scholars 17, 142, 18, 216 Sovereign immunity 1, 107, 207, 2, 149, 212, 259, 4, 115 n. 2, 5, 6, 7, 10, 16, 117 customary international law conﬁrming US law 28, 133, 156, 158 lien on property of foreign government and 28, 130, 154-8 restrictive theory 28, 155-6 waiver 28, 156-7 Sovereignty 1, 105, 106, 192, 210, 212, 213, 516, 2, 183, 188, 205, 206, 210, 224, 353 n. 1, 3, 298, 308 n. 2, 312-14, 5,

11, 7, 47, 135, 170, 8, 340, 12, 19, 22, 49, 287, 314, 315, 330, 337 Soviet Union, law of 5, 19 Speculative reasoning 6, 71 Stabilization clause 9, 178, 15, 239-41, 243, 294, 297, 16, 27, 64-8, 21, 140-1, 162-3: see also State contracts whether binding on government 15, 240-1, 16, 65-8 —conditions 16, 66-7 State government as synonym 23, 136-7 “political subdivision” 23, 384 State contracts: see also Stabilization clause applicable law 16, 27-8, 19, 30-1, 22, 287-9 —evidence of 21, 154 limitation period 32, 177-8 State organ 9, 238-9 State practice 15, 223, 16, 310-12, 17, 142 arbitral award, enforcement 18, 124-7, 131-46 expropriation, compensation 15, 266 limitation period for settlement of contractual debt 32, 177-8 State responsibility: see also Act of State; Aliens, treatment of; Expulsion; Public order, protection abusive practice 2, 188, 189, 6, 210 acts and omissions of— —bank 9, 238-9 —controlled entity 1, 421-2, 12, 352, 364, 366, 15, 237-9, 17, 178-9, 21, 67-73, 25, 144, 27, 96 n. 11 —judiciary 2, 64, 34, 59-60 —ofﬁcials 6, 202, 203, 27, 13-14 —overthrown government 16, 84-5 —predecessor 32, 175-7 —revolutionary movement and 2, 88-9, 17, 102-5, 23, 361-2, 24, 119, 152, 234-6 ——individuals 18, 266-73 ——organ not formally recognized 17, 103-5 ——which becomes government 16, 84-5, 16, 98-100, 17, 101-3, 143-4, 147 —Revolutionary Prosecutor 31, 114-15 attribution 3, 153, 4, 143, 165-7, 171, 173, 5, 12, 6, 79, 83-6, 94-5, 99-102,

INDEX 166, 201, 203, 7, 152, 173, 10, 75, 17, 100-5, 110-11, 141, 147, 256-7, 18, 162, 178-9, 21, 110-11, 112 n. 26, 23, 387, 396, 26, 108-9, 27, 92, 31, 113-15 contract— —breach 22, 288 n. 34 —termination 17, 148 due diligence 2, 78-9, 81, 84, 89 duty to act, need for 30, 158-9 for effect of acts 6, 207, 17, 147, 23, 387 enforcement of contracts 2, 220, 221 expropriation 15, 246-7, 16, 43, 21, 70-3 expulsion 17, 100-7, 256-8 fault, need for 31, 7-11 ILC Draft Articles on 9, 238, 16, 83, 99, 100, 141, 143, 147-8, 17, 100-1, 111, 141, 143, 147-8, 20, 205 n. 4, 21, 112 n. 26, 23, 386, 24, 234, 31, 7 international obligations 8, 8-9, 9, 142 n. 7, 18, 288 lawful measures 2, 257, 258, 7, 166, 169 legal obligations of previous government 21, 111 minimum standard 23, 386 for nationals 7, 124 non-discrimination 23, 387, 388 omission 30, 168 protection of— —aliens 7, 169, 17, 111, 143 —foreign investments 7, 151, 152, 159, 160 —property 23, 385-6, 392-6 treaty obligations 3, 388, 6, 111, 8, 78 unjust enrichment 2, 237, 8, 390 visa acknowledgment 23, 382 State-controlled entity: see Controlled entity Statement of claim 1, 134, 6, 60, 62, 70, 8, 136, 9, 401, 10, 12, 17, 183 n. 3, 253-4, 19, 53, 24, 271, 28, 193-4, 378-80 amendment 1, 173, 174 n. 2, 176, 177, 392-402, 2, 338, 3, 11, 30, 31, 81, 82, 358, 359, 4, 1, 101, 5, 30, 377, 6, 28, 29, 60, 63, 68, 8, 126, 134-40, 297, 9, 127, 10, 12, 14-15, 16-17, 11, 17, 12, 6, 18-21, 131, 289-90, 346 n. 9, 13, 17, 97-8, 14, 26, 90-3, 94-9, 148, 310, 16, 304, 312, 17, 53-7, 138-9, 253-4, 18, 64-5, 19, 53, 23, 165-7, 382, 397, 24, 270-1, 26, 150-1, 239, 28, 58-60, 169, 377-9, 29, 264-5, 33, 75-6, 154, 198-200, 34, 92

255

—time limits: see Time limits, amendment of claim failure to include speciﬁc plea 13, 142, 148-50 preparation 4, 26 speciﬁcity, need for 19, 76-7 time limits: see Time limits video tapes 4, 26 Statement of counterclaim 7, 88 Statement of defence 1, 166, 5, 138, 139 act of State, whether 17, 172 amendment 3, 116 clariﬁcation 8, 269 n. 41 failure to ﬁle 2, 1-3, 3, 374, 375 preparation 2, 288 summary nature 3, 378 time limits: see Time limits, statement of defence Stay of proceedings: see Interim measures, stay of proceedings; Procedure, stay of proceedings Stock certiﬁcates, to be delivered 10, 253 Subcontractor 3, 273, 274, 278, 279, 5, 166 Subjects of international law, individuals, right to bring claims 18, 283 Subrogation 10, 133 Succession: see Contract; Corporations Summary enforcement procedures: see Award, basis for legal action Supplemental opinion Allison 29, 364 Arangio-Ruiz 29, 364 Suspension of claims: see General Principle B Sweden arbitration 7, 204 law of, RB 13:5(2), Grade 139 1, 233 Switzerland, law of— Code of Obligations 7, 191, 20, 228, 21, 75 n. 25, 103 company law 20, 242 —resignation of director 8, 20, 230 Taking: see Expropriation Taxes 2, 324, 7, 69, 10, 290-8, 13, 304, 15, 64, 16, 274, 276, 280, 21, 733-75, 24, 200-1, 25, 52, 53-4, 74, 87, 99, 29, 284-93, 30, 228-30, 31, 21-5: see also Customs dues; Social Security payments applicability 3, 115

256

INDEX

Taxes (cont.) contract liability 10, 294-8, 11, 94-6, 244-5, 18, 221-3, 28, 47-8 contract tax 3, 114 counterclaim for 15, 272-9, 23, 62, 68, 69, 25, 89-90 —jurisdiction of Tribunal 2, 113, 3, 115, 167, 236, 252, 288, 4, 246-8, 5, 233, 234, 6, 84, 85, 90, 96, 9, 37-8, 134, 167, 177, 225-6, 10, 54, 102, 287, 306-13, 346, 11, 26, 39, 51-2, 172, 245, 248, 317-19, 349-56, 12, 157-8, 233 n. 5, 13, 182, 192, 307, 343, 14, 50-1, 168, 210, 15, 279, 17, 263, 319, 18, 196-7, 221-3, 349-50, 19, 154, 20, 36-8, 119, 21, 45-6, 150-2, 22, 254, 337, 25, 89-90, 94, 26, 97-8, 99, 180-1, 27, 103-4, 119, 28, 48, 33, 193 —taxes outstanding on expropriated property 11, 318 deductibility 3, 114, 235, 262, 264, 288, 15, 14, 22, 19-20 effect of contract on 6, 91, 92 enforcement of laws relating to 5, 233, 234, 9, 152 n. 21, 10, 312-13, 346 income tax 3, 288, 34, 99 indemnity, request for 23, 213 production of receipts 3, 368 reimbursement 11, 95-6, 20, 90-1, 114-15 release from liability 14, 47-8 Technical Agreement with De Nederlandsche Bank NV (1981) 1, 192-9, 204-12, 12, 55, 13, 43-4, 59 n. 14 Appendix I 1, 204, 207 Paragraph 1 1, 196, 198, 3, 196, 6, 66, 8, 279 n. 56 Paragraph 3 1, 193, 194 Technical Arrangement between Banque Centrale d’Alg´erie, Bank of England and Federal Reserve Bank of New York 8, 209 n. 2, 12, 53, 78 n. 16, 192-9, 204-12: see also Dollar Account No. 1; Dollar Account No. 2 Paragraph 7 5, 68, 69 Paragraph 10 1, 193 Time limits: see also Procedure amendment of claim 2, 338, 3, 11, 30, 31, 6, 60, 68, 8, 134-40, 12, 20, 14, 93, 16,

303, 304, 306-9, 17, 53-7, 296, 22, 215, 216-17, 234, 28, 378-9, 33, 154-5, 198-200 arbitrator, challenge to 20, 234, 237, 21, 348, 349, 352, 355, 360-4, 375-7, 379, 391-4, 399-402 consolidation of cases 4, 241 contractual 17, 189-90, 217, 232, 240-1 correction of award 5, 73, 30, 19, 31, 288 counterclaims 2, 113, 268, 283, 286-9, 347, 3, 116, 226, 253, 4, 182, 5, 400, 9, 37-8, 227, 11, 205, 12, 100, 123, 225, 227-9, 17, 57-61, 252-3, 296, 18, 188, 20, 6, 22, 234-5, 24, 131, 275, 26, 102-3, 151-2, 27, 154-5, 30, 6, 11, 16 enforcement 3, 85, 379 exceptions 2, 315, 320 extension 1, 119, 120, 173-5, 230, 231, 320-5, 483, 2, 3, 125, 283-90, 311, 327-31, 345-7, 3, 41, 60, 85, 89, 90, 200, 301-3, 372-5, 377-9, 4, 13, 17, 59, 63-7, 71-3, 76, 5, 139, 140, 8, 28, 39, 361, 9, 348, 13, 310-17, 18, 56-7, 60-1, 73, 21, 12, 34, 6-9 —justiﬁcation for 3, 84, 18, 56-7 —when imposed by Award 2, 283 failure to meet 1, 132, 133, 171, 226-9, 334-6, 391, 485, 2, 3, 123, 312, 313, 317, 318, 320, 321, 3, 85, 90, 116, 226, 253, 380, 382, 4, 3, 61, 64, 67, 73, 76, 143, 182, 214, 227, 5, 400, 7, 116, 117, 182, 11, 181, 182, 287, 15, 20, 21, 7 —delay by Registrar 28, 57 —delay in mail 1, 127, 129-31, 226-9 —excused 2, 317 —failure of courier 1, 128-31, 2, 313, 318, 3, 5, 4, 76, 21, 3 failure to set 1, 158, 159, 178-80, 4, 66, 5, 141-3 fairness to parties 28, 61, 379 ﬁling of claims 8, 369, 9, 4, 28, 56-7 ﬁling of documents 12, 131-2, 17, 98, 22, 234 ﬁling of Settlement Agreement, amendment 9, 62, 71, 348 implied modiﬁcation 8, 185, 186 interest, claim for 17, 50-1 new claim 16, 259, 33, 76, 290-1 notiﬁcation of costs 13, 299, 16, 258, 17, 50-1

INDEX payments from Security Account, effect on 17, 367 request for hearing 22, 208-9 request for interpretation and correction of Award 9, 405 request for revision of Award 4, 11, 182, 22, 208 statement of defence 2, 283, 286-9, 3, 85, 89, 253, 374, 375 statutes of limitations and 3, 287, 5, 128, 7, 116, 8, 136, 16, 306, 17, 189-90, 216, 231, 240, 19, 329-30, 340-1, 30, 157, 33, 319 submission of evidence 17, 52, 28, 249-50 Undertakings: see Undertakings, time limits Trade law 3, 54, 5, 394 Trade practice 5, 32, 33, 13, 232-3, 16, 25, 48 applicable law 16, 27 Transfer of cases 7, 183, 200, 205 Transfer of documents 3, 108, 119, 120 Translation: see Award, language; Evidence, translation Treaties: see also Treaties (and analogous instruments) customary international law and 10, 192, 202, 15, 34-5, 16, 69, 88, 17, 264, 21, 120-2, 330-1 form 32, 110-11 interpretation: see Treaty interpretation obligations— —means of fulﬁlling, choice 34, 136-7, 171-2 —municipal law and 19, 287-8, 34, 136-7, 178 pre-existing obligations, effect on 19, 286-7 reservations 19, 287-8 right to invoke 10, 148, 150, 192 termination— —evidence of 15, 218 —parties’ rights and 10, 191 n. 9, 15, 218 validity— —duress or fraud 15, 214-15 —jus cogens 15, 216 —violation of internal laws 3, 303-9

257

Treaties (and analogous instruments) Agreement between US and Egypt Concerning Claims of Nationals of the United States (1976) 5, 283, 285, 329 Agreement Providing for Determination of Amount of Claims Against Germany, US-Germany (1922) 2, 83 Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, Iran-US (1955) 1, 313, 365, 501, 2, 84, 161, 257, 353, 4, 103-5, 109, 112-17, 155, 156, 174, 179, 5, 381-3, 6, 151, 168, 178, 200, 201 n. 1, 208, 7, 41, 47, 50, 51, 8, 378-9, 428-50, 9, 272-3, 10, 106, 267, 15, 29, 34-5, 214, 16, 249, 17, 143, 147, 18, 161, 23, 395, 26, 227 —applicability— ——dual nationals 31, 120 ——indirect claim 15, 34 n. 14 —Article II 4, 174 n. 2, 6, 168, 16, 88, 89, 17, 107 —Article III(1) 21, 71 n. 17 —Article IV 2, 353, 388, 4, 102, 112, 114 n. 1, 116, 174 n. 2, 234 n. 10, 6, 168, 200 n. 2, 225 n. 1, 7, 40, 46, 51, 8, 379, 404, 10, 131-3, 148, 184, 192-6, 203, 204 n. 38, 12, 12, 15, 34 n. 14, 219-22, 230, 231, 246, 252, 290, 292, 298, 16, 88 n. 5, 195 n. 29, 239, 241, 17, 107, 21, 118, 161, 29, 271, 30, 196, 31, 5 —Article V 6, 183 n. 1, 16, 88 n. 5 —Article VII 3, 28 n. 1, 5, 382, 6, 211, 212, 7, 40, 46, 47 —Article XVII 5, 270 —Article XX 4, 174 n. 2 —Article XXI 8, 405 —Article XXIII 4, 112, 113, 10, 131, 190, 15, 218 —and customary international law 9, 273, 10, 151, 184, 192, 14, 234, 15, 214, 300, 16, 69 n. 19, 88-9, 238 n. 5, 21, 125, 31, 5-6 —expropriation, applicable law 16, 25, 68-9, 194-5, 239, 21, 118-19, 121, 125, 30, 255-7, 31, 3-6, 85 —expulsion and 16, 88, 17, 107, 143 —“interests in property” 16, 195-6, 21, 118-19 —source of law 10, 132, 150, 184, 17, 143

258

INDEX

Treaties (and analogous instruments) (cont.) —termination or breach 4, 112-14, 5, 381, 383, 15, 218 —validity 7, 8, 379, 431-51, 10, 149, 190-1, 17, 143 —whether binding 5, 381 Claims Settlement Declaration: see Claims Settlement Declaration Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 5, 273 n. 1 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (1983) 5, 233, 18, 138-9 Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and Occupation (1952) 5, 272, 298 Draft Articles on Sovereign Immunity of States and State Properties 5, 11 n. 1 Draft Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations 10, 204 n. 39 Draft Convention on Arbitral Procedure 3, 301 n. 1 Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens 10, 259 n. 6 Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property (1967) 4, 118 n. 2, 174 Draft Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 9, 152 n. 21 European Convention on Foreign Money Liabilities (1967) 8, 424 European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (1961) 1, 292 n. 24 Federal Republic of Germany-Iran, Double Taxation Agreement 16, 223 General Convention providing a Uniform Law for Bills of Exchange (1930) 13, 32-3, 69, 21, 63 n. 2 General Declaration: see General Declaration Geneva Convention providing a Uniform Law for Cheques (1931) 2, 168, 235, 3, 19: see also European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration above

Germany-US, Treaty of Peace of Berlin (1921) 2, 80, 83, 84 Hague Conventions: see Hague Convention on Hague Rules: see International Convention for the Uniﬁcation of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading (1924) (amended 1968 and 1979) below Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens (1961) 2, 84, 89, 351, 352, 388, 4, 115, 118 n. 2, 162, 166 n. 1, 173, 7, 51 Harvard Draft Convention on the Responsibility of States (1929) 2, 196, 197, 205, 5, 326 Human Rights of Individuals who are not Citizens of the Country in which they live, Draft Declaration 16, 88-9 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility 5, 12, 12, 318 n. 4, 16, 83, 84, 99, 100 International Convention for the Uniﬁcation of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading (1924) (amended 1968 and 1979) 12, 143-5 International Monetary Fund Agreement: see International Monetary Fund, Agreement New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: see Recognition and enforcement of Award Seoul Declaration on the Progressive Development of Principles of Public International Law Relating to a New International Economic Order 14, 235 Treaty of Neuilly 3, 311, 5, 320 Treaty of Paris, France-Great Britain (1814) 2, 181, 5, 304, 312 Treaty of Peace, UN and Italy 2, 206, 5, 310, 326 Treaty of Rome 13, 92 Treaty of Versailles (1919) 2, 80, 83, 84, 186 Treaty of Washington, Great Britain-US (1871) 2, 181, 190, 5, 305 Tripartite Treaty of Alliance (Iran, United Kingdom, USSR) (1942) 32, 96-7

INDEX UN Charter 3, 24 n. 1 —Article 51 2, 258 n. 1 UN Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 4, 105, 106, 114 n. 1, 5, 11, 7, 170, 10, 185, 198, 15, 223 UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 5, 45, 13, 50, 19, 34, 22, 244, 245 n. 18, 318 n. 92, 329 UN Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods (1974) 32, 177-8 UN Declaration on the Establishment of a New Economic Order 10, 185, 198 UN Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals who are not Nationals of the Country in which they live 14, 20 UN Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention into Domestic Affairs of States 8, 445 UN Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (1962) 4, 114 n. 1, 10, 186, 198, 204 n. 38, 14, 235, 15, 242, 294 n. 12 UN Declaration on Principles of Friendly Relations 3, 8, 445 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 5, 273 n. 1 US-Iran Guaranty of Private Investments (1957) 10, 141, 148, 151-2 US-Mexican Claims Convention (1868) 2, 83 US-Mexican General Claims Convention (1923) 2, 80, 83 US-Mexican Special Claims Convention (1923) 2, 80 US-Poland Agreement (1960), Article 3 1, 466 n. 1 Vienna Convention: see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Warsaw Convention for the Uniﬁcation of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air 17, 230 n. 5 Treaty interpretation 1, 101-10, 190-2, 198-201, 205, 207-13, 288, 289, 292-5, 307, 308, 310, 2, 160-8, 178-215, 311, 315, 320, 363, 371, 402, 3, 305, 5, 2, 67, 83, 253, 259, 271, 273, 277, 294, 329-33, 341-6, 351, 6, 168, 7, 33, 8, 92, 95, 207-13, 295, 10, 140, 14, 328-30, 18, 123: see also Contract,

259 interpretation; Jurisdiction of Tribunal, interpretation of Declarations; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) aids 2, 161-4, 179-215, 3, 310, 5, 262, 281, 290, 291, 329, 8, 211, 19, 288, 28, 138 —context 17, 166, 28, 151 —judicial precedents 5, 262, 271, 304-28, 331, 332 —negotiating history 1, 245, 246, 255, 256, 265, 266, 276, 277, 284-6, 310-12, 477, 2, 161, 165, 196-8, 201, 202, 210, 212, 3, 303, 304, 305-11, 313-15, 5, 261, 300, 301, 304, 10, 193, 12, 75-6, 13, 168, 329, 16, 239, 19, 288-90, 21, 118, 34, 133-4 —subsequent practice 2, 149, 5, 71, 268, 271, 289, 332, 346, 347, 353, 8, 201, 407, 440, 447-50, 9, 104-5, 411-13, 18, 384, 19, 294, 304, 21, 28, 120-1, 129, 151 —writings of scholars 5, 262, 264, 328 ambiguity, effect 2, 317, 5, 287, 289, 290, 11, 87 applicable law 12, 82 associated agreements 12, 51 good faith 6, 251, 270, 12, 60-1, 14, 330, 16, 310 guidelines— —clear language required to vary existing rule 10, 313 —contra proferentem rule: see verba ambigua accipiuntur contra proferentem below —effectiveness 6, 251, 12, 46, 68 n. 7, 14, 330-1, 25, 258 —eiusdem generis 2, 79, 86-7 —equilibrium to be maintained 12, 54-5, 79-80 —express terms 34, 135 —expressio unius est exclusio alterius 8, 264, 12, 59, 78, 13, 252, 16, 307 —ﬂexible 1, 199 n. 1, 309 n. 8 —generalia specialibus non derogant 13, 88, 14, 329 —intention of parties 1, 103-5, 107-10, 190, 191, 198, 201, 205-7, 210, 211, 213, 245, 246, 255, 256, 265, 266, 276, 277, 284-6, 311, 312, 489, 491, 492, 495, 497, 498, 516, 2, 166, 210, 211, 213, 223, 315, 316, 320,

260

INDEX

Treaty interpretation (cont.) 3, 303-5, 307-10, 312-15, 5, 14, 260, 267, 270, 272, 280, 281, 288, 329, 352, 6, 270, 7, 33 —language, structure and purpose 12, 74 —object and purpose 5, 261, 268, 270, 271, 281, 284, 285, 8, 200-1, 18, 387, 19, 287, 294, 28, 149-50 —obligatio tertio non contrahitur 13, 43 —ordinary meaning 2, 55, 63, 8, 207-8, 10, 193-5, 12, 46, 14, 329, 18, 123-4, 19, 287, 25, 258, 28, 150, 33, 197 —pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt 13, 43 —plain language 28, 152, 34, 148-9 —reasonableness 10, 83 —relevant rules of international law 31, 6 —restrictive 1, 192, 198, 211-13, 309 n. 8, 480, 2, 80, 179, 211, 223, 3, 309, 312, 313, 5, 13, 93, 95, 99, 126, 281, 287, 288, 330, 351, 7, 135, 11, 87, 13, 168-9 —specialia derogant generalibus 1, 104, 410 n. 3, 15, 222, 21, 121, 125 —ut res magis valeat quam pereat 1, 292 n. 25, 12, 46, 68 n. 7, 89, 25, 258 —verba ambigua accipiuntur contra proferentem 2, 211, 5, 281, 286, 288, 330, 9, 255, 10, 329, 331 international claims practice 10, 83 lacunae 12, 54, 58-60, 21, 330 pacta sunt servanda 1, 114, 210, 9, 140, 13, 231-3, 15, 294 n. 10 —State’s duty to respect contracts distinguished 15, 242-3 phrases— —“control” 2, 16-22, 147-52, 17, 166-7, 178-9 —“property rights” 2, 82-5 —“terminate” 34, 135 preamble, status 12, 46-8, 67-8 proc`es-verbaux 2, 198 rebus sic stantibus: see Changed circumstances reciprocity 1, 106, 107, 8, 432-41 terms, meaning 3, 311, 314, 315, 5, 4, 260, 267, 268, 270, 280, 281, 284, 285, 289, 290

Tribunal: see also International tribunals absence of arbitrator: see Arbitrator, absence applicable law 20, 204 —international law 34, 55-6 arbitrary action 6, 232 authority of President 5, 51, 52, 9, 409-13 Chambers: see also Full Tribunal below —assignment of cases to 3, 92, 126, 141, 237, 254, 268, 276, 292 —authority 5, 47, 53 —composition 9, 409-13 —independence 5, 251, 16, 290 claims: see also Claims competence 5, 127, 6, 52 conﬁdentiality of proceedings 1, 424, 428-31, 441, 449, 2, 29, 343, 357, 19, 106, 167, 170, 21, 365-6, 387, 394, 29, 364-6 dicta 4, 178, 180 disclosure of documents 21, 354, 372-4, 389 discretion 3, 192, 207, 212, 234, 316, 339, 362, 382 n. 1, 4, 12, 224, 5, 262, 7, 116, 15, 148 duty to— —act in informed way 18, 111 —apply principles of law 9, 146 —avoid entering into execution of Award 13, 40 —avoid excessive technicality 8, 139 —avoid unjust enrichment 15, 257 —clarify aim 7, 121, 126 —clarify requests 5, 147 —determine legitimate expectation 16, 54 —enforce law of Iran 9, 177 —examine jurisdiction 9, 34, 332 —execute Algiers Declarations 8, 65 —exercise equitable discretion 16, 221 —ﬁll omissions in UNCITRAL rules 11, 278 —give reasoned decision 10, 330 —implement international law 7, 171 —respect laws of Iran 7, 136 —respect legal facts 5, 12 —respond to arguments 5, 289 —settle disputes 14, 64, 18, 106, 146-7 equity and 18, 334 exceeding powers 5, 335

INDEX expenses 1, 107, 108 Full Tribunal: see also Chambers above —binding nature of ﬁnding 11, 197 —preemption by Chamber 10, 85-6 —relinquishment of cases to 21, 98, 100-2 —residual authority 21, 283-4 functus ofﬁcio rule (dessaisissement de juge) 3, 177, 182, 187, 195, 196, 330 n. 3 impartiality 5, 36, 41, 42, 49, 86, 6, 41, 251, 252, 270, 271, 31, 246-85 inherent powers 5, 129, 6, 108, 7, 219, 8, 117, 118, 25, 187, 28, 221-3, 29, 383, 387-90 —interim measures 2, 59-62 —revision of award 31, 289-90, 33, 58-9 as international tribunal 5, 261, 284, 294-7, 299, 9, 177, 330, 34, 55-6 interstate nature 18, 385 juge d’instruction 2, 285, 286, 346, 3, 300, 5, 54 jurisdiction: see Jurisdiction of Tribunal majority decision 2, 29, 114, 123, 146, 390, 3, 55, 199, 210, 211, 277, 293, 295, 325, 4, 82, 111, 159, 5, 269, 277 n. 1, 8, 143, 9, 140, 409-13, 10, 96, 18, 47-8 moral issues 13, 117, 119 n. 3 neutrality 5, 15, 16, 24, 49 obligation to comply with decisions of 9, 394 parties’ legal theories, relevance 13, 101, 17, 50 powers— —to investigate 2, 115, 122 n. 1, 284, 285, 3, 88, 89 —to secure compliance with General Declaration 25, 261 precedent, effect: see Precedent President— —absence 21, 282 —appointment 21, 201-3, 309-17 —powers 21, 311-12 quorum 1, 117 refusal of Claims, responsibility for 19, 178, 181, 183, 184, 185, 193, 195, 199 statements contrary to fact 5, 36, 37 suspension of proceedings 7, 281, 289, 301-2, 8, 64 ultra petitio 13, 41, 43

261

ultra vires conduct 3, 125-9, 140-4, 146, 297-301, 302 n. 2, 315, 324, 5, 335, 336, 6, 252, 271, 13, 41, 43, 18, 48 workload 4, 68, 69, 71, 7, 203, 8, 415 n. 23 Tribunal Rules Article 1 19, 314 Article 2 1, 127, 128, 130, 226, 228, 337, 398, 7, 275, 8, 54 n. 4, 134, 361, 370, 376, 379, 391, 11, 183, 287, 13, 54, 17, 332, 335, 338, 341, 344, 347, 19, 180, 183, 186, 189, 192, 195, 198, 21, 3, 23, 245, 248, 251, 254, 257, 25, 237, 274, 28, 57 Article 4 1, 167, 2, 36, 28, 219-20, 223-4, 32, 154 Article 5 9, 407 Article 6 1, 113, 511-14 Article 7 1, 113 Article 8 1, 113 Article 9 1, 113, 114, 20, 179, 203, 204-6, 220, 221, 222, 273, 276, 278-9, 282-3, 285, 324, 21, 391, 24, 310, 312, 314, 316, 317, 318 Articles 9-12 21, 312, 24, 309, 311, 312, 316, 323, 324 Article 10 1, 112-15, 509, 512, 514, 516-18, 3, 209, 20, 183, 184, 220, 233, 241, 273, 278-9, 282, 315, 21, 318, 355, 390, 391, 395, 24, 324 Articles 10-12 20, 206-8 Article 11 1, 112-15, 509, 512, 516, 517, 20, 183, 184, 187, 188, 234, 266, 315, 21, 318, 348, 350, 352, 360, 375, 379, 391, 392, 393, 395, 399, 24, 319, 320, 27, 297, 312 Article 12 1, 112-15, 509, 512-14, 516-18, 20, 181, 183, 27, 297 Article 13 3, 126, 139, 209 n. 4, 215, 9, 409-13, 10, 96, 14, 271 n. 2, 312, 353, 354, 16, 284, 19, 106, 117, 162, 164, 167-9, 170, 21, 282, 393, 23, 234, 26, 5, 150, 189, 27, 293-336, 30, 22 n. 2 —Amendment to 7, 56, 92, 14, 271 n. 2 Article 14 3, 209 n. 4, 316 n. 3, 4, 214, 5, 362, 7, 56, 183, 20, 238 Article 15 1, 167, 306, 2, 54, 59 n. 1, 122 n. 1, 3, 88, 362, 372, 387, 389, 4, 64, 70, 95, 7, 126, 8, 115-16, 10, 109, 13, 130, 14, 71, 17, 45, 18, 111, 283,

262

INDEX

Tribunal Rules (cont.) 21, 282, 393, 22, 209, 25, 187, 276, 27, 308 n. 5, 28, 6, 380, 29, 370, 33, 287 Article 15(1) 30, 105, 112, 121-2, 31, 135, 142, 143-4, 33, 202 Article 15(2) 30, 109-11, 120-1, 31, 142-3 Article 17 1, 234, 2, 368, 4, 206, 8, 54, 10, 272, 13, 54, 17, 62, 21, 10, 293, 28, 384 Article 18 1, 134, 167, 396, 3, 378, 4, 26, 7, 88, 9, 109, 17, 254, 19, 313, 314, 21, 6, 10 —advisory 9, 109 Article 19 1, 120, 159, 167, 171, 175, 179, 498, 2, 268, 289, 3, 116, 226, 253, 374, 377, 378, 4, 143, 182, 227, 5, 400, 6, 83, 101, 7, 88, 116, 8, 428-9, 9, 38, 167, 168, 227, 10, 108, 308, 310, 11, 135, 12, 100, 13, 83 n. 31, 225, 228, 14, 281, 15, 20, 17, 57, 60-1, 254, 19, 313, 314, 21, 146, 147, 23, 188, 353, 354, 24, 131, 25, 13, 26, 151-2, 27, 154 Article 19(2) 2, 36 Article 19(3) 2, 70-1, 113, 33, 197-8 Article 20 1, 309 n. 9, 393, 395, 399-401, 2, 338, 3, 11, 31, 4, 101, 5, 378, 6, 28, 60, 63, 68, 70, 102, 8, 137, 297 n. 16, 9, 127, 10, 12, 16-17, 11, 17, 108, 12, 6, 20, 100, 131, 289, 13, 97, 228, 14, 26, 90, 95, 148, 308, 310, 16, 302, 306, 310, 17, 55, 138, 254, 18, 64, 19, 53, 60, 76, 22, 216, 234, 23, 166, 382, 397, 24, 131, 270-1, 26, 150, 239, 28, 58-60, 169, 192-4, 377, 379, 29, 269, 33, 75-6, 154, 198-200, 290, 34, 92 Article 21 1, 284, 285, 292, 294, 308, 320, 334, 335, 7, 136, 8, 44, 13, 162, 17, 184, 18, 80-1, 231 Article 22 3, 382 n. 1, 17, 45, 18, 187, 29, 377, 31, 135, 33, 287 Article 23 17, 45 Article 24 1, 323, 464, 477, 2, 300, 389, 3, 20, 294, 4, 58, 80, 268, 5, 22, 6, 210, 9, 244, 11, 274, 327, 13, 54-5, 16, 106-7, 17, 47, 263, 285, 18, 105, 111, 325, 20, 87, 24, 23, 25, 275 n. 6, 27, 52, 28, 249, 287-8 Article 24(1) 2, 115, 121, 33, 316, 320 n. 40 Article 24(3) 2, 122, 30, 58 n. 8

Article 25 1, 306, 458, 484, 485, 2, 122, 3, 381, 5, 59 n. 1, 11, 274, 276, 278, 281, 13, 326 n. 4, 14, 197-8, 200, 291, 17, 52, 62-3, 19, 113-15, 23, 342, 25, 7, 27, 153, 29, 245, 259, 313 —note 6 31, 144-5 Article 25(2) 30, 180, 181 Article 25(6) 2, 122, 31, 135 Article 26 1, 154, 390, 2, 65-6, 370, 371, 402, 3, 60, 175, 4, 7, 58, 5, 128, 6, 140, 8, 47, 65, 218, 275, 278 n. 55, 280, 13, 176, 177, 196, 257, 258-9, 16, 197 n. 37, 18, 122 n. 3, 21, 4 Article 26(1) 2, 60-1 Article 27 1, 235, 4, 95, 158, 8, 276 n. 31, 9, 34-5, 13, 351, 16, 190, 198, 245, 24, 24, 26 Article 28 1, 324, 3, 85, 363, 382 n. 2, 8, 40, 10, 179, 11, 181, 17, 46, 254, 18, 89, 187, 23, 265, 283, 286, 25, 230, 236, 26, 191, 29, 377, 33, 287 Article 29 2, 101, 122, 8, 115-16, 27, 52, 210-13 Article 29(2) 30, 104-5, 108-11, 112, 116-22, 31, 135, 141-2, 145 Article 30 9, 410, 412, 25, 6 Article 31 1, 200 n. 2, 323, 424, 429, 449 n. 1, 2, 29, 121, 3, 55, 4, 82, 159, 9, 410, 12, 233 n. 2, 268 n. 9, 16, 238 n. 4, 334, 18, 47, 19, 106, 167, 170, 21, 256, 349, 366, 367-8, 387, 394, 23, 218 n. 4, 29, 364 Article 32 1, 330, 331, 406, 420, 422, 449, 452, 454, 2, 333, 365, 367, 3, 37, 74, 79, 83, 109, 118, 155, 168, 169, 212, 238, 255, 269, 293, 294, 339, 365, 4, 180, 198, 206, 209, 5, 81, 84, 252, 6, 34, 109, 268, 7, 183, 210, 222, 8, 114, 185, 9, 400, 10, 152, 358, 12, 21, 119 n. 4, 388, 394, 14, 10, 174, 15, 187, 16, 256, 19, 163, 21, 338, 349, 352, 375, 26, 6, 189, 259, 260, 29, 23, 387, 397, 402, 413 Article 32(1) 2, 101 Article 32(2) 34, 64 Article 32(3) 30, 169, 33, 439 Article 33 16, 256, 18, 334 Article 34 1, 140, 149, 150-3, 156, 160, 161, 163, 182-4, 216, 220, 221, 328-31, 342, 343, 404-6, 409, 2, 45, 126, 133, 134, 229, 262, 269, 279, 292, 306, 333,

INDEX 348, 356, 357, 364, 367, 3, 35, 37, 38, 74, 75, 78, 92, 119, 141, 169, 176, 181, 182, 187, 192, 194-6, 213, 219, 327, 328, 330, 338, 352, 353, 360, 390-2, 4, 21, 22, 29, 30, 33, 34, 42, 47, 49, 83, 85, 86, 183, 185, 193, 194, 197-201, 205, 206, 282, 5, 74, 76, 77, 80, 82, 149, 151, 156, 250, 355, 6, 2, 3, 5, 21, 23, 34, 39, 121, 147, 7, 210, 221, 224, 227, 236, 237, 242, 245, 248, 250, 253, 259, 262, 264, 269, 8, 12, 14, 16, 18, 43, 67, 73, 80, 82, 84, 97, 184, 186, 187, 215, 237, 349, 354, 361, 9, 8, 63, 71, 185, 204, 205, 307, 309, 312, 348, 358, 10, 358, 359, 11, 365, 12, 394, 13, 361, 14, 342, 16, 294, 317, 319, 320, 17, 61, 355, 362, 363, 18, 63, 93-4, 377, 378, 19, 310, 345, 346, 352, 353, 354, 361, 362, 367, 21, 296-9, 302, 22, 208, 365, 366, 372, 373, 23, 403, 407, 409, 25, 5, 26, 252, 27, 275, 282, 284, 28, 222, 316-17, 376, 381, 389, 390, 393, 394, 401, 402, 29, 188, 192, 196, 200, 204, 208, 213, 30, 284, 295, 302, 32, 208, 212, 221, 224, 34, 185-6, 188 Article 34(1) 2, 90, 30, 8-9, 10, 14, 15, 284, 292, 33, 483 Article 34(2) 30, 7, 10, 12, 18, 173 n. 4 Article 35 3, 364, 4, 60, 5, 74, 8, 115, 9, 405, 406, 11, 182-3, 274, 287, 12, 305, 307, 388, 13, 327-8, 14, 70 n. 6, 101-2, 173-5, 256-7, 261-2, 16, 282-4, 19, 171-3, 318, 22, 208, 25, 187, 26, 186-7, 188, 258, 260, 27, 195, 270-1, 31, 288-9, 33, 204 Articles 35-7 33, 348 Article 36 3, 364, 4, 60, 81, 82, 111, 5, 73, 74, 6, 269, 8, 117 n. 11, 133, 9, 405, 406, 11, 182-3, 274, 283-4, 285-6, 300, 12, 306, 13, 93-4, 14, 70 n. 6, 101, 173-5, 256, 16, 282-4, 18, 76-7, 114, 19, 171-5, 253, 255, 20, 171, 21, 293, 22, 153, 208, 23, 122-5, 230, 231, 25, 187, 188, 275, 26, 186-7, 258, 261, 27, 195, 264-5, 268, 271, 28, 308, 29, 387, 30, 19, 20, 31, 288, 33, 204 Article 36(1) 31, 125, 33, 57-8 Article 37 3, 364, 4, 18, 5, 73, 74, 8, 53, 116-17, 9, 406, 11, 182-3, 13, 324, 327, 14, 70 n. 6, 257-8, 280-1, 16, 110, 282-4, 18, 76-7, 19, 253, 256, 318,

263

319-20, 22, 208, 25, 187, 274, 26, 258, 267, 27, 195, 271, 28, 51, 196, 29, 294, 387, 30, 19, 20-1, 31, 289, 33, 204-5 Article 38 1, 414, 447, 451, 2, 113, 259, 385, 400, 3, 33, 58, 71, 253, 275, 291, 4, 79, 5, 231, 7, 47, 88, 197, 8, 330, 9, 60, 242, 10, 34, 35, 316, 11, 43, 14, 282, 16, 111, 25, 109, 176, 26, 183, 260, 27, 260, 263, 28, 234 Article 38(1) 2, 12, 33, 268 Article 40 1, 414, 447, 451, 508, 2, 113, 245, 259, 385, 400, 3, 33, 58, 71, 253, 275, 391, 4, 79, 6, 217, 7, 47, 197, 8, 330, 331, 9, 60, 10, 34, 35, 103, 11, 43, 12, 38-9, 16, 254, 281, 21, 19, 23, 229, 25, 109, 176, 26, 183, 260, 27, 260, 29, 120, 30, 234 Article 40(1) 2, 40, 30, 168 n. 8, 33, 268 Article 40(2) 2, 12, 33, 268 Article 41(2) 2, 75, 76, 3, 166, 4, 92, 93, 158, 5, 186, 8, 41, 47, 331, 10, 21, 35 effect 33, 198 interpretation 16, 295 —travaux pr´eparatoires 27, 317-22, 324, 332 Introductory Rules, Article 3 1, 431 parties’ agreement on 5, 268 Section II 21, 309 violation 4, 81, 6, 70 Tribunal Staff Rules Article 1 16, 331, 332 Article 9 16, 331 UNCITRAL Rules 20, 210, 235 n. 4, 247-8, 27, 293-336: see also Tribunal Rules travaux pr´eparatoires 20, 247, 315 UNCTAD 8, 409 Undertakings 12, 50-2 interpretation, Tribunal’s jurisdiction 8, 206-13, 9, 104-6 object and purpose 12, 50, 73 n. 4 Paragraph 1 12, 50 Paragraph 2 6, 66 Paragraph 2(A) 5, 67, 10, 83, 12, 55, 72 Paragraph 2(B) 1, 137 n. 1, 2, 312-21, 3, 3-6, 381, 5, 58, 61, 67-70, 71, 8, 197-206, 9, 97-106, 12, 55, 72, 77, 16, 293 n. 4, 294, 29, 187, 191, 195, 199-200, 203-4, 207-8, 212, 30, 16-17, 32, 213, 217

264

INDEX

Undertakings (cont.) —ambiguity 8, 198-200, 205 procedural requirements 2, 313, 319, 3, 5, 6 time limits 2, 313-19, 3, 5, 6 Undue inﬂuence 21, 52 Unequal bargaining power 3, 320, 325 Unilateral commitments, binding nature 14, 321-3 United Kingdom arbitration law 20, 213-14, 242 n. 18 interest on debt 2, 12, 27 United Kingdom, law of Misrepresentation Act 1967 3, 30 —Oil and Undersea Pipeline Act 1975 7, 168 —Sale of Goods Act 1979 19, 32 n. 16, 33 United Nations 7, 170, 171 Charter, Article 11 10, 186 n. 19 resolutions, effect 30, 240-1 Security Council Resolution 598 of 20 July 1987 19, 293 United States courts— —expropriation 14, 236 —injunction 3, 267 —John Doe action 3, 15, 25 —jurisdiction 9, 136-7, 34, 134-5 —stay of proceedings 5, 154, 344 n. 1, 32, 115-23 —termination of claims, need to contest lien and 28, 129-30, 28, 152-3 enforcement procedures 34, 56 Foreign Claims Settlement Commission 5, 350, 10, 140, 12, 23, 18, 273 n. 46, 31, 59 law of 1, 459, 460, 464, 467-74, 479-81 —Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act (1978) 1, 472 —antitrust 13, 83-6 —arbitration 3, 210, 211, 295, 20, 207, 215, 216, 243-4, 253-4, 274-5, 278, 305-14 —Arbitration Act 20, 309, 310-11, 312-13 —Arms Export Control Act 19, 289-93 —Atomic Energy Act 1954 28, 134 —Bankruptcy Act 8, 257-9, 19, 118 —California

——Civil Code 14, 229, 30, 50-2 ——Code of Civil Procedure 6, 102 ——Constitution 7, 204 ——marital rights 30, 49-56 —Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 12, 145 —citizenship 5, 270 —Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes 7, 180 n. 1, 204 —Code of Federal Regulations 7, 192, 11, 176, 17, 217 —Code of Judicial Conduct 20, 275, 278, 310 —Code (USC) 7, 10, 122, 17, 22 n. 4, 217-18, 25, 204 n. 11 —Constitution 5, 296 ——Article II(2) 3, 307 n. 1 ——Article VI 4, 114 —contract 3, 163, 6, 196, 274 —corporations 7, 205, 21, 77 —Domestic International Sales Corporation 3, 40, 7, 186, 205 —Executive Order 12170 of 14 November 1979 (freezing Iranian assets) 7, 192, 13, 52 n. 7, 19, 288, 289-93, 23, 206-7, 34, 113 —Executive Order 12205 of 7 April 1980 29, 340 —Executive Order 12211 of 17 April 1980 17, 190-1, 233, 23, 391 —Executive Orders implementing Algiers Declarations 34, 154-6 ——Executive Order 12277 34, 149-54 ——Executive Order 12279 34, 149-54 ——Executive Order 12280 34, 149-54 ——Executive Order 12281 28, 125, 126-7, 129, 151, 34, 149-54, 170-2 ——Executive Order 12294 of 24 February 1981 (implementation of Algiers Declarations) 12, 287, 34, 116-18, 135-7, 145-7, 156-9, 167 —Executive Orders Prohibiting Transactions with Iran 2, 249, 251, 255 n. 1, 5, 60, 61, 6, 28, 13, 28, 19, 216-17, 247, 29, 340-2 ——disposal of blocked property 19, 217-18

INDEX —Export on Administration Act 1979 28, 134 —extraterritorial effect 8, 258-9 —Federal Communications Act (1934) 1, 468 —Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ——Rule 13(a) 6, 101, 13, 78-83 ——Rule 15 8, 136 n. 3, 16, 311 n. 19 ——Rule 17 16, 310-11 ——Rule 41 1, 233 —Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 12, 218 —Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (1976) 2, 148-9, 10, 205 n. 40, 28, 130, 157-8 —government agencies 5, 8-11 —Immigration and Nationality Acts 2, 222, 5, 100, 102, 22, 149, 25, 64 n. 5, 169-71, 26, 41, 49, 50, 51, 31, 45-7, 54-9 —International Claims Settlement Act 5, 346 n. 1 —International Investment Survey Act (1976) 1, 460 —Iranian Assets Control Regulations 2, 248, 251, 252, 255 n. 1, 5, 14 n. 1, 60, 13, 52 n. 7, 90, 24, 39 —Merchant Marine Acts (1920 and 1936) 1, 471 —military equipment, export 19, 289-93 —naturalization 32, 85-6 —non-proﬁt corporations 5, 345, 10, 325 —Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act 1978 28, 134 —offset 21, 74 n. 25 —partnership 3, 161 —receivership 21, 69 —Restatement of Agency (Second) 19, 126, 135 n. 14, 23, 146 n. 9 —Restatement of Conﬂict of Laws (Second) 7, 99 n. 1, 30, 53 —Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (Revised) (Draft) (1986) 10, 202 n. 35 —Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (Second) (1965) 2, 84, 5, 297, 7, 169, 8, 135, 397-9, 9, 142 n. 7, 18, 388

265 —Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (Second) (Revised) (Tentative Final Draft) (1985) 8, 11, 40 —Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (Third) 19, 56 n. 6, 23, 387 —Restatement of the Law of Contracts 13, 50-1, 24, 86 —Restatement of the Law of Contracts (Second) 28, 209, 30, 54, 55 —Restatement of the Law of Restitution 12, 379 —Restatement of Trusts (Second) 10, 239 n. 6 —Rules for the ICC Court of Arbitration 7, 204 —Securities Act (1933) 2, 148 n. 1 —Shipping Act (1916) 1, 471 —Statute of Limitations 17, 216-19, 231, 240 —Tax Reform Act (1984) 7, 205 —Tentative Final Draft Restatement, Foreign Relations Law (Revised) (1985) 9, 275 —Treasury Regulations 5, 14, 25, 256-62, 263, 28, 124-5, 127-37 —Uniform Commercial Code 4, 268, 5, 45, 7, 99, 102, 109, 113, 114, 8, 140 ——s 1-105 22, 287 n. 33 ——s 1-106 3, 57 n. 2 ——s 1-201 3, 20 n. 2 ——s 2-204 3, 48 ——s 2-206 3, 50 ——s 2-207 3, 49 ——s 2-208 13, 51-2 ——s 2-235 13, 51 ——s 2-240 7, 109 n. 2 ——s 2-301(a) 12, 300 n. 4 ——s 2-313 19, 31, 32 ——s 2-319 7, 100 n. 2 ——s 2-325 7, 109 ——s 2-504 7, 100 n. 2 ——s 2-509 7, 100 ——s 2-602 7, 101 n. 1 ——s 2-609 22, 318 n. 92 ——s 2-612 13, 50 n. 4 ——s 2-703 7, 110 n. 1, 13, 50 n. 4 ——s 2-706 7, 110 n. 1, 111, 114 n. 1, 22, 245 n. 18 ——s 2-708 7, 111, 26, 165 ——s 2-709 3, 52, 56

266

INDEX

United States (cont.) ——s 2-710 3, 52, 56, 7, 111 ——s 2-714 19, 33, 39 n. 35 ——s 3-122 7, 115, 21, 44 ——s 3-302 2, 235, 3, 20 n. 2, 7, 99 ——s 3-305 3, 20 n. 2, 7, 99, 100 n. 1 ——s 3-307 3, 20 ——s 3-309 3, 51 ——s 3-413 2, 168, 3, 19 ——s 3-506 3, 20 n. 2 ——s 3-507 2, 169 —Uniform Partnership Act 11, 313, 348 nationality of corporation, proof 1, 456-74 termination of proceedings/claims: see General Principle B, termination of claims; General Principle B, termination of litigation/legal proceedings validity of claims, duty to examine 5, 85 Unjust enrichment 1, 287, 309 n. 9, 2, 155, 234-9, 3, 30-2, 278, 279, 4, 231, 232, 278, 279, 5, 171, 172, 6, 168, 169, 172, 177, 213, 215, 8, 60, 390, 9, 56-8, 401, 402-3, 10, 107, 171, 11, 238, 335-6, 351, 12, 352-6, 363, 375-80, 13, 101, 115, 116, 117, 119 n. 3, 120, 14, 180-9, 15, 257, 268-9, 308, 16, 19, 18, 222, 309-10, 323-4, 347, 19, 139, 142, 146, 148, 150, 152, 295, 21, 70-1, 73, 22, 354, 23, 146, 26, 26-7, 251, 28, 16, 85-7, 205-8, 215 Unlawful acts 6, 169 Valuation: see Damages, valuation Video tapes: see Statement of claim, video tapes Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) 1, 190, 205, 209, 289, 5, 281, 351, 353, 8, 443, 9, 256, 12, 68 n. 7, 82 Article 2 19, 287 Article 12 1, 200 Article 19 19, 287-8 Article 26 1, 109, 12, 61, 13, 231 Article 27 1, 490, 495, 3, 304, 305, 34, 137, 178 Article 31 1, 109, 198, 200, 211, 288, 307, 2, 160, 161, 209, 210, 3, 305 n. 1, 310, 312 n. 1, 5, 83, 259, 260, 265, 273, 279, 281, 289, 290, 329-32, 341, 346, 8,

92, 95, 201 n. 12, 207, 295, 440, 447, 10, 193 n. 12, 11, 87, 12, 46, 51, 74, 89, 273, 13, 168, 14, 328, 16, 310, 18, 123, 385, 19, 287, 294, 304, 25, 258, 259, 28, 129, 151 n. 7, 31, 197, 34, 129, 136 Article 31(1) 2, 82, 147 Article 31(3) 2, 149 Article 32 1, 109, 211 n. 3, 288, 307, 2, 160, 3, 305 n. 1, 310, 5, 259, 279, 280, 11, 46, 13, 168, 15, 221, 19, 288, 34, 133 Article 33 11, 8, 9, 36, 46, 12, 82, 22, 295 Article 34 13, 43-4 Article 45 4, 112 n. 3, 113 Article 46 1, 490, 495, 3, 304-6 Article 47 1, 489, 495, 3, 304, 306 Article 49 15, 215 Article 51 15, 215 Article 52 15, 215 Article 53 15, 216 Article 54 4, 112 n. 3, 10, 191 Article 60 2, 257 Article 62 1, 314, 4, 112 n. 3, 8, 443-4, 9, 122, 15, 217 Article 65 4, 112 n. 3, 8, 444, 10, 191 Article 67 4, 112 n. 3, 10, 191 Article 70 10, 191 n. 9 Visa, suspension 23, 382, 385, 390-2 Warranty breach 19, 12-14, 31-8 implied 19, 31 n. 16 testing to conﬁrm speciﬁcations distinguished 19, 14 Wholly-owned subsidiary 7, 206: see also Nationality of claim, corporations Withdrawal of action: see Claims, withdrawal Witnesses: see Evidence, witnesses Words and phrases a rubro ad nigrum 8, 231 acta jure gestionis 1, 419 actio ex contractu 18, 139 actio non datur non damniﬁcato 13, 116 “actions in response to” 28, 122-3 actori incumbit onus probandi 1, 209, 420, 464, 18, 216 allegans contraria non audiendus est 1, 318 n. 17: see also Estoppel alternativa petitio non est audienda 6, 70 amiable compositeur 21, 368

INDEX causa proxima non remota inspicitur 3, 249 communis opinio juris 2, 197, 5, 300, 8, 387, 10, 185, 200, 14, 236 compensation l´egale 21, 74 n. 25 consensus ad idem 24, 182 contra proferentem 1, 214 culpa in contrahendo 3, 30, 5, 248 damnum emergens 2, 387 n. 1, 10, 189, 15, 248, 268, 21, 330 delegata potestas non potest delegari 27, 325 dessaisissement de juge 3, 177, 182, 187, 195, 196, 330 n. 3 dicta 4, 178, 180 dies certus quando 21, 64 n. 3 dies incertus quando 21, 64 n. 3 ei qui afﬁrmat, non ei qui negat, incumbit probatio 20, 266 eiusdem generis 5, 3, 23, 240 ex aequo et bono 12, 82, 21, 368 ex malo jus non oritur 8, 444-7 ex parte 3, 387 ex proprio motu 24, 27 exceptio non adimpleti contractus 22, 304, 317-23 exequatur 6, 133, 135, 138, 139, 18, 118, 122, 127, 137, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 149 n. 66 expressio unius exclusio alterius est 5, 268, 8, 264, 12, 59, 78, 13, 252, 16, 27, 307 faute quasi-d´elictuelle 3, 30 force majeure: see Force majeure forum non conveniens 7, 137, 8, 266 functus ofﬁcio 3, 177, 182, 187, 195, 196, 330 n. 3 generalia specialibus non derogant 13, 88, 14, 329 gestion d’affaire 7, 164 in absentia 22, 253 in jure, non remota causa, sed proxima spectatur 11, 48 “Iranian properties” 28, 125-41 juge d’instruction 2, 285, 286, 346, 3, 300, 5, 54 jus cogens 15, 216 jus imperii 10, 313, 17, 264 jus sanguinis 2, 181, 184, 185, 5, 274, 305 jus soli 2, 181, 184, 5, 274, 305 lacunae 21, 330 lex est dictamen rationis 21, 365 lex loci actus 21, 63 n. 2 lex loci contractus 21, 63 n. 2

267 lex non cogit ad impossibilia 18, 328 lex specialis 8, 378, 428, 21, 121, 125, 330, 30, 255 locum tenens 6, 6, 72, 239, 240, 7, 172, 18, 262 locus regit actum 21, 63 n. 2, 22, 161 locus standi 7, 120, 123, 124, 135, 198, 199, 9, 326-33, 10, 45-6, 148, 325, 11, 86, 213, 311-13, 14, 34, 15, 195, 16, 12-16, 300-3, 305, 310-12, 329, 17, 263, 18, 166, 209, 20, 266, 21, 103, 339-40 lucrum cessans 2, 387 n. 1, 15, 249-51, 258-9, 270, 305, 21, 330 mutatis mutandis 21, 3, 6 note en d´elib´er´e 4, 61 nullus commodum capere de sua injuria proprio 6, 228 obligatio tertio non contrahitur 13, 43 oeuvres pr´eparatoires 20, 247, 276 onus probandi 25, 116 opinio juris 21, 121 ordre public 2, 221, 3, 14 pacta sunt servanda 1, 114, 210, 9, 140, 13, 231-3, 15, 294 n. 10 pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt 13, 43 pendente lite 5, 113 p´eriode suspect 22, 136 n. 4 persona standi 5, 273, 274 probandi necessitas incumbit illi qui agit 18, 325 proc`es-verbaux 2, 198 proprio motu 3, 298, 5, 371, 9, 333, 14, 61 quantum meruit: see Quantum meruit quantum valebat 4, 234 ratione materiae 5, 278 ratione personae 5, 278 ratione temporis 5, 278 rebus sic stantibus: see Changed circumstances res derelicta 6, 173 res inter alios acta 13, 122 res judicata 1, 170, 171, 287, 2, 311, 371, 4, 16, 73 n. 1, 233 n. 1, 6, 227 n. 2, 11, 141, 12, 174, 367, 15, 196, 21, 295, 27, 266 res litigiosae 27, 266 restitutio in integrum 2, 386-7, 6, 157, 170, 8, 385, 395-8, 10, 201, 204 n. 39, 15, 247, 255, 262, 265, 266 soci´et´e simple 21, 103 stare decisis 8, 141, 9, 170

268 Words and phrases (cont.) sua sponte 5, 146, 6, 41, 177, 7, 116, 22, 107, 299 sub silentio 20, 263, 327 sui generis 4, 116 n. 1 ultra petitio 13, 41, 43 ultra vires 3, 125-9, 140-4, 146, 297-301, 302 n. 2, 315, 324, 5, 335, 336, 6, 252,

INDEX 271, 13, 41, 43, 18, 48, 21, 400, 22, 296 ut res magis valeat quam pereat 1, 292 n. 25, 12, 46, 68 n. 7, 89, 25, 258 venire contra factum proprium 20, 155 verba ambigua accipiuntur contra proferentem 2, 211, 5, 281, 286, 288, 330, 9, 225, 371, 393-4, 10, 329, 331