I N T R O D U C T I O N TO M O D E L THEORY A N D TO T H E
METAMATHEMATICS O F ALGEBRA
ABRAHAM ROBINSON University of California, Los Angeles
1963
NORTH-H 0L L A N D PUBLISH I N G COMPANY AMSTERDAM
No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by print, microfilm or any other means without written permission from the publisher
PRINTED I N THE NETHERLANDS
PREFACE
Souvienne vous de celuy B qui, mmme on demanda B quoi faire il se peinoit si fort en un art qui ne pouvoit venir B la cognoissance de gueres de gents: ”Yen ay assez de peu, respondit-il,fen ay assez d’un, j’en ay assez de pas un.”
MONTAIGNE, De la Solitude
The author’s book “On the Metamathematics of Algebra” which was published in this series in 1951 has now been out of print for some time. The book was concerned with the logical analysis of the methods of Abstract Algebra and beyond that, set out “to make a positive contribution to Algebra using the methods and results of Symbolic logic.” This involved among other things the development of certain topics in what is now known as Model Theory. In the years since the publication of “On the Metamathematics of Algebra” the subject has developed vigorously. Accordingly, it was decided to replace the book by an entirely new work. The result is the present volume. At an estimate, less than half of its material was given already in the earlier book, and much of this material is presented here in an different way and with a simplified terminology. With one or two exceptions, the remainder of this volume is concerned with more recent developments. The general character of the work has been changed to some extent and it should now be suitable as a textbook for a first year graduate course on the subject. Many of the topics included in “On the Metamathematics of Algebra” - such as the development of a non-countable language, the properties of classes of structures which are closed under extension or under intersection, the method of diagrams, the completeness of the notion of an algebraically closed field of given characteristic, particular applications to Algebra - are by now well - established and there is no need to justify their inclusion in the present book. On the other hand, the suggestion V
VI
PREFACE
that numerous important concepts of Algebra possess natural generalizations within the framework of the Theory of Models has met with a rather less lively response. Nevertheless, it is still the author’s belief that investigations in this direction are both interesting and valuable. Indeed, the theory of algebraic ideals and varieties, up to the existence of the generic point for irreducible varieties, the notion of an algebraically closed extension, the notion of a system of resultants to a given set of equations, - all these can be discussed profitably in a metamathematical setting. Apart from providing a certain unity of outlook, this approach occasionally also produces new algebraic results, e.g. in the case of the concept of a differentially closed field. In the last three sections of the book, we present an introduction to Non-standard Analysis. This is a new application of Model theory which provides an effective calculus of infinitesimals and which appears to have considerable potentialities. Both the author’s working energy and the measure of patience that can be expected of a prospective reader imposed a limit on the scope of the book. Accordingly, it was not found possible to include a number of relevant items such as the theory of undecidable algebraic systems and problems (Tarski, Mostowski, R. M. Robinson, J. Robinson, Novikov, Boone, Markov, Rabin), the theory of computable algebraic systems (Frohlich-Shepherdson, Rabin, Higman), the proof-theoretic investigation of Arithmetic and Algebra (Kreisel), the properties of direct products of given structures (Mostowski, McKinsey, Horn, Fefermann-Vaught, Bing, Overschelp), the solution of the homomorphism problem (Lyndon), the model-theoretic approach to set theory (Godel, Shepherdson,Vaught, Montague, Mendelsson, Lkvy), the algebraization of quantification theory (Tarski, Henkin, Halmos), and various other topics which are mentioned in the text. The author takes this opportunity to emphasize the importance of these subjects, for which the reader should consult the original papers. Once again, my thanks are due to the editors of “Studies in Logic” and to the North-Holland Publishing Company for having invited me to contribute this volume to the series. In particular, I wish to put on record my indebtedness to Arend Heyting who read my books and papers before publication on several previous occasions. I am also grateful to Mr. D. Louvish for his help in reading proofs. ABRAHAM ROBINSON Hebrew University, Jerusalem, December, 1961
CHAPTER I
THE LOWER PREDICATE CALCULUS
1.1. General Introduction. The Metamathematics of Algebra is concerned with the analysis and development of Algebra by the methods of Mathematical Logic. Model theory deals with the relations between the properties of sentences or sets of sentences specified in a formal language on one hand, and of the mathematical structures or sets of structures which satisfy these sentences, on the other hand. Since the methods employed in Model theory are frequently algebraic in spirit if not in detail and since the algebraic theories of fields, rings, groups, etc. are in view of their transparent structure well suited to a detailed logical analysis, Model theory and the Metamathematics of Algebra supplement one another in a natural way. Indeed, in many cases it is hard to decide whether a particular topic belongs properly to the former subject or to the latter. The algebraic approach has penetrated into many other branches of Mathematics, and it was inevitable that the Metamathematics of Algebra should follow suit. Again, since the language of Topology has proved equally ubiquitous it can be used also in connection with the matters dealt with in this book. In fact, the task of drawing precise boundary lines within Mathematics has become notoriously difficult, and the above definitions are intended only to give a general indication of our purpose. However, in order to keep this book within reasonable proportions, we shall choose most of our examples from Algebra and we shall dispense with the use of topological language. The plan of the book is as follows. In the present chapter, we set up the formal language of the Lower predicate calculus, which is fundamental for the sequel. We then discuss the relations between the sentences of our formal language and the mathematical structures in which they hold. Finally, we establish the extended completeness theorem of the Lower predicate calculus and we derive some of its immediate consequences. The second chapter begins with a discussion of some fundamental concepts which are relevant to algebraic systems such as the notions of equality, of extension, of isomorphism, of homomorphism. This is 1
2
THE LOWER PREDICATE CALCULUS
11.1.
followed by the specification of axiomatic systems of some common algebraic concepts. The chapter concludes with a number of fairly direct applications of the extended completeness theorem, including Malcev’s theory of normal chains. In the third chapter, we discuss a number of typical problems of Model theory. These include the set-theoretic characterizations of systems of structures which are given by axioms in prenex normal form with certain special types of prefixes (e.g. with existential quantifiers only). Systems of structures which are closed under intersection are also considered. The fourth chapter deals with various notions of completeness, including model-completeness and relative model-completeness. Some of the most important instances of these notions are considered in detail. The first two sections of the fifth chapter are concerned with Beth’s theorem on definability in the Lower predicate calculus and with related results. This is followed by the discussion of another kind of definability problem which arises in Algebra, and by a metamathematical analysis of the notion of an algebraically closed extension and of related concepts. The chapter concludes with applications to Differential Algebra and to Hilbert’s theorem on the zeros of polynomials, the Nullstellensatz. Chapter VI contains logical analyses and generalizations of various standard algebraic concepts such as the notion of polynomial extension and of separability. The seventh chapter deals with the metamathematical theory of ideals, and the eighth chapter is concerned with the varieties of metamathematical ideals. It is shown that this includes the theory of algebraic varieties as a special case. Other applications deal with differential ideals and with a generalization of Artin’s theorem on Hilbert’s seventeenth problem concerning the representation of definite functions as sums of squares. The use of function symbols and their application to the elimination of quantifiers is discussed in the ninth and last chapter. This is followed by a brief description of the ultraproduct construction and of its fundamental properties. The chapter concludes with an introduction to Non-standard analysis. It is shown that the metamathematical approach provides a tool for the development of function theory in certain nonarchimedean fields, and that the resulting methods can be used for the proof of theorems in classical Analysis. The reader is expected to be familiar with the elements of the Lower predicate calculus up to the transformation of a sentence into prenex
1.2.1
3
RULES OF FORMATION
normal form. On the mathematical side, we shall make use of some standard results concerning groups, rings, and fields. We shall use the following set-theoretic notation - a E A denotes the membership relation, a is an element of A . A = B and A # B state that the sets A and B are equal (co-extensive, contain the same elements) or unequal, respectively. A C B and B 2 A indicate that A is a subset of B, including the possibility that A equals B. The union, intersection, and difference of two sets A and B will be denoted by A u B, A n B, and A - B respectively. The union and intersection of a set of sets {A,] will be denoted by {Ad
u
and by
V
nM . V
The cardinal number of a set A will be denoted by I A I. The sign of equality will be used also in order to define one symbol in terms of another symbol, or in terms of a group of symbols, e.g., X = [ [ A ] 3 [ B ] ] .
1.2. Rules of Formation. We set up a formal language L by means of the following rules : The atomic symbols of L are The (individual) object symbols, usually denoted by a, b, c, .. ., small italics, near the beginning of the alphabet, with or without subscripts, occasionally by other symbols such as numerals, 0, 1, 2, . .. to conform with common usage. They constitute a well-defined set of arbitrary transfinite cardinal number. The dummy symbols or variables, denoted by u, v, w, x , . . . ; these symbols are supposed to constitute a countable set. The relative symbols, divided into disjoint classes, R,, n = 0, 1,2, .. . (relative symbols of order n, or n-place relative symbols. Relative symbols of order n 2 1 will be denoted by A ( , , .. .), B ( ,), . . . (capital italics followed by n empty spaces, separated by commas, in round brackets). Relative symbols of order 0 will be denoted simply by A , B, C, . .. The classes R, constitute well-defined sets whose cardinals are specified but arbitrary. The connectives. These are the five symbols (negation), V(disjunction), A (conjunction), 2 (implication), and (equivalence). The quanti3ers. These are - the universal quantifier, denoted by (V ) and the existential quantifier, denoted by (3 ). N
4
THE LOWER PREDICATE CALCULUS
p.2.
The separation symbols, denoted by [ (left square bracket) and ] (right square bracket). This completes the list of atomic symbols. Atomic formulae are obtained by filling the empty spaces of a relative symbol of order n, n = 1, 2, . . . with object symbols or variables. For instance if A ( ,,) is a 3-place relation, then A (a, b, a) and A (b, a, z) are both atomic formulae. 0-place relative symbols are atomic formulae by themselves, by definition. Well-formed formulae, briefly ‘wff’ or ‘formulae’ are now defined inductively. They will be denoted by capital italics taken from the end of the alphabet, V, W, X, .. . Observe that these symbols do not belong to the formal language L. 1.2.1. Atomic formulae bracketed by square brackets are wff.
X and Y are wff, then [X V Y ] , [ X A Y ] , [ X 3 Y ] ,and [ X = Y ] are all wff.
1.2.2. If X is a wff then [- XI also is a wff. If
1.2.3. If X is a wff then [ (Vy) X ] and [ (3y) X ] are both wff, provided X does not already contain one of (Vy) or (3y). Thus, [ (3y) [ A(a, x ) ] ] and [ (3y) [ A(a, y ) ] ] are both wff while [ (Vy) [ (3y) [AQ)]]]is not a wff. It will be understood without detailed explanation what is meant by the phrase “X contains (Vy)”, etc. We shall also say that a wff X contains a wiT Y if X is constructed from Y and other wff by the (repeated) use of 1.2.2. and 1.2.3. We shall assume throughout that the language with which we are concerned contains at least one wff. WE are divided into complete formulae, or sentences, and incomplete formulae, or predicates, as follows. A wff X is called complete if whenever a variable is contained in it, say y , then y is contained in a wff Z such that 2 occurs in X in one of the forms [ (Vy)Z] or [ ( 3 y ) Z l . If y occurs in X more than once - excepting the cases where it occurs within the brackets of a quantifier - then the above condition is supposed to be satisfied whenever y occurs. For example, [ (Vy) [ [ A(y ) ] A [B (y ) ]] ] and [ [ (Vy) [ A( Y ) ] ] [ ($9 [ C ( r , a ) ] ] ]are both complete, while [ [ (Vy) [ A( y ) ] ]A A [ B ( y ) ] ]is incomplete. We may express this definition in a different way by introducing the notion of the scope of (an individual occurence of) a quantifier, e.g. (3y) within a wff X. This is the wff contained in X which begins with the left bracket following immediately upon (3y) and ends with the corresponding right bracket. X is then complete if every variable contained in a relation within Xis within the scope of a quantifier
1.2.1
5
RULES OF FORMATION
with the same variable. Any variable in X which does not have this property is calledfree (or more precisely, the occurence of the variable in question is free). We define the order of a wff as the number of pairs of square brackets contained in it. Thus, the order of [ A @ ) ] is 1 and the order of [[ (Vx) [ B ( x ) ] ]V [ C ( u ) ] ]is 4. The order of a wff constructed by negation or quantification (see 1.2.2. and 1.2.3. above) exceeds by 1 the order of the formula from which it is constructed. The order of a formula constructed by disjunction, conjunction, implication, or equivalence exceeds by 1 the sum of the orders of the two formulae from which it is constructed. The above is a version of the language of the Lower (restricted) predicate calculus which is distinguished by its straightforwardness at the cost of some lack of economy. Thus, it is known that three of the connectives (conjunction, implication, and equivalence) and one of the two quantifiers can be expressed in terms of the remaining symbols. Moreover, in our formulation a large number of brackets is required even for relatively simple expressions. An advantage of this notation is that it indicates quite clearly the mode of construction of a formula. However, later we shall simplify our notation by adopting the following rules. In the successive construction of a wff from a set of atomic formulae, the following square brackets may be omitted. Square brackets enclosing atomic formulae. Square brackets following a negation provided they enclose a negation. For example, [ [ X I ] may be replaced by [ XI. Square brackets preceding or following the symbol of conjunction provided they enclose a negation; square brackets preceding or following the symbol of disjunction, provided they enclose a conjunction or a negation. For example, [ [X A Y ] V [- Z ] ] may be replaced by [XA Y V ZJ. Square brackets preceding or following the sign of implication or of equivalence, provided they enclose a disjunction or a conjunction or a negation. In any sequence of quantifications such that both the quantifiers on the left and the brackets on the right follow immediately upon one another, all the square brackets may be omitted, with the exception of the innermost and the outermost pairs (which may however be removable by virtue of another rule). For example, [ (Vx) [ (3y) [ (Vz) [ X I ] ] ]becomes [ (W (3Y) (Vd [ X ] ] Finally, the outermost brackets in a wff may also be dropped. For
--
-
N
-
-
-
-
6
THE LOWER PREDICATE CALCULUS
example
[ (W [ (9) [ (V.4 [ [ [ A(x, Y ) ] A [ A(v, 411 may be written in simplified form as
t1.3.
= [ A(x,.>I ] ] ] ]
(W (VY) (W [ A (XY Y ) A A (YY 4 = A (x,41 * The above rules are framed in such a way that any formula which has been simplified by the use of some or all of them can be restored to its fully bracketed form without ambiguity. Rules for the omission of brackets in successive conjunctions or disjunctions are not included, since they involve the validity of the associative law for these operations. However, later on we shall introduce the further simplification of denoting the conjunction and disjunciton of any number of wff taken in any order of association by [XI A X2 A . . . A Xn] and [XI V X2 V . .. V Xn], respectively. Any statement or argument involving such expressions will then be meant to apply whenever the latter are replaced by corresponding fully bracketed expressions. Thus, [ X I V X2 V X3] will be replaceable by [XI V [X2 V X3]] or by [[XI V X Z ]V X3] where the particular choice of the fully bracketed expression is irrelevant. Moreover, different fully bracketed expressions may be selected for the same simplified formula if the latter occurs more than once. Finally, we may mention that some of the subsequent work is simplified if we rule out wfT in which the same variable appears more than once within the brackets of a quantifier (e.g. xin (3x)). This can be done without limiting the scope of our language, but the practice will not be adopted here. 1.3. Rules of deduction. From the set of sentences in L we now select a subset - to be called the set of theorems of L - by a purely formal procedure. Given any sentences X , Y, Z in L, the following are theorems. 1.3.1.
‘ X = [ Y = XI1 [ X = Y ] ]3 [ X = Y ] ] “ X D Y ] = [ [ Y DZ ] = [ X = Z ] ] ‘[XA Y ] = X ] . [ X AY ] 3 Y ] - [ X = Y ] = “X=, Z ] = [ X I [ Y V Z ] ] ] ] 2 3 [XV Y]] ‘Y = [XV Y ] ] & [ X IZ ] = “ Y = Z ] = “ X V Y ] = z ] ] ] [X- Y ] 3 [X = Y ] ]
x=
1.3.1
RULES OF DEDUCTION
7
[[I=Y ] = [ Y = XI]
Y ] = [ [ Y = XI = [ X E Y ] ] ] [ [ X I YI = [ [- YI = [- X I ] ] [ X = [- [- X I ] ] [- X I ] = X ]
[ [X =
"-
In simplified notation, the sixth of the above sentences, for example, becomes [ X I Y ] =) [ [ X = 21 I [ X = Y A Z ] ] We shall sometimes single out an object symbol or free variable with reference to a wff X by writing X(u) or X ( y ) in place of X . In the same way we may display several object symbols or variables, without necessarily mentioning all object symbols or free variables contained in X. Given X(u) we then mean by X ( b ) the result of substituting b for a wherever a occurs in X, with a similar notation for the substitution of variables. With these conventions, the following are supposed to be theorems, for arbitrary X , a, y.
1.3.2.
[ [ (VY) [ X ( Y ) l ] = X ( 4 3 [ [X(a)l = [(W X(Y)l]]
provided these are sentences in accordance with the rules of formation. Further theorems are obtained by the application of the following three rules of inference :
1.3.3. If X and [X 3 Y ] are theorems, then Y is a theorem. This is the rule of modus ponens. If [ X 3 Y(u)] is a theorem, where X does not contain a, then [X 2 [ (Vz) Y ( z ) ] ]is a theorem, provided it is a sentence. If [Y(u) X ] is a theorem, where X does not contain a, then [ [ (32) Y ( z ) ] 3 X ] is a theorem, provided it is a sentence. It should be understood that the symbols a and z mentioned in these rules signify arbitrary object symbols or variables, respectively. All rules of substitution are then deducible and need not be introduced as postulates. Two of these which are of frequent use are as follows
1.3.4. From any theorem X which contains a quantifier with variable y, another theorem is obtained by replacing y by any other variable z both in the quantifier and in its scope, provided that scope is not part of the scope of a quantifier which contains z.
8
r1.3.
THE LOWER PREDICATE CALCULUS
1.3.5. In any theorem, we may replace a formula which is obtained by bracketing a relative symbol of order 0 by an arbitrary sentence. The result is a theorem provided it is a wff at all. Two more standard results of the Lower predicate calculus which will be required in the sequel are as follows:
1.3.6. If
[[[ ...[X l A X z I A X 3 1 A ... AXn] 3 and
[[[ ... [ Y i A Yz] Y3]
...
Ym], m = l , 2 Yk] 3
,..., k
z]
are all theorems then
is a theorem.
[ [ [ ... [XiAXz]AXs]A ... A X n ] 321
1.3.7. To every sentence X there exists a sentence X ' which contains the same object and relative symbols as X such that X s X' is a theorem, and such that x' is in prenex normal form, i.e. where the qk denote quantifiers while Y, the matrix of the sentence, does not contain any further quantifiers. We include the possibility n = 0, in which case X' contains neither quantifiers nor variables. Let K be a set of sentences in L. We say that a sentence Y is deducible from K, in symbols K F Y, if there exists a finite sequence of sentences XI, XZ,. .., X,, in K such that
[ [ [ ...[X I A X ~ I A X ... ~ ] AX,,]
3
Y]
is a theorem in L. By a natural convention we include the possibility = 0, in which case it is understood that Y itself is a theorem. The set of sentences in L which are deducible from K will be denoted by S ( K ) . S (K) includes K as well as all theorems of L. Using 1.3.6. we may show that for all K, S ( S ( K ) ) = S ( K ) . If K c S ( K ) then K' is said to be deducible from K, in symbols K F K . A set of sentences Kis called contradictory if S ( K ) includes all sentences of L, otherwise K is consistent. K is contradictory if and only if S ( K ) contains a sentence of the form [X A [ X I ] . In addition to the theorems which were obtained above as a certain subclass of the sentences of L, we shall also have occasion to formulate
n
N
1.4.1
SEMANTIC INTERPRETATION
9
theorems outside L, in the usual sense of the term. By way of distinction these are sometimes called meta-theorems. We shall not use this term and shall instead relay on the context for elucidation. 1.4. Semantic interpretation. We now come to the semantic, or descriptive, interpretation of the sentences of the given language. A mathematical StructureMwhichcan be described by sentencesof Lis of the following type. It consists of a set of (individual) objects or individuals which (like the object symbols) will be denoted by small italics a, b, . . . and of sets of relations of order n, (e.g. A ( ), B ( , ), ...) such that for every relation A of order n defined in M and for every ordered n-ple al, ..., a n of different or identical constants of M, the instance A (al, .. .,a n ) of the relation either holds or does not hold (in M). We shall indicate the situation also by saying that A holds, or does not hold, at (al, . . ., an). We do not identify the relations as such with sets of ordered n-ples of individual objects of M so that two relations may hold at the same n-ples. We also include the possibility that relations of order 0 belong to M. Such a relation then holds, or does not hold in M, without reference to the individual objects of M. Relations of order 0 do not appear in the familiar mathematical structures which will be considered later. However, they do appear as the elements of structures defined in connection with the propositional calculus. On the other hand such structures do not normally contain any objects, or relations of positive order. Let C be a one-to-one correspondence which maps the individual objects of M on a subset of the set of object symbols of a language L and which, at the same time, maps the relations of M on relative symbols of L of the same order. Let K be the set of wff of L whose object and relative symbols all appear in C. We say that these wff are dejhed in M under C. To every atomic formula X in K which does not contain any variables there corresponds, by C, the expression X' of a relation between certain individuals of M , which either holds or does not hold in M. The following rules then determine, by definition, whether a sentence of K holds or does not hold in M (under the correspondence C). 1.4.1. Let Y be a sentence of order 1 in K, Y = [XI where X is an atomic formula. Then Y holds in A4 if and only if the expression X', which corresponds to X under C, holds in M. 1.4.2. Given two sentences Y and Z in K,
[YV 21 holds in M if and only if at least one of the two sentences Y
10
T€i@LOWER PREDICATE CALCULUS
[1.4.
or 2 holds in M; [ Y A Z ] holds in M if and only if both Y and 2 hold in M, [ Y 3 Z ] holds in M if Z holds in M , and also if neither Y nor Z holds in M ; [ Y 3 21 holds in M if both Y and 2 hold in M and also if neither Y nor Z holds in M ; and finally, [ Y]holds in M if and only if Y does not hold in it. N
1.4.3. Given a wff Y = Y(x)in which z is not quantified (does not appear within a quantifier) and no other variable is free, [ (Vz) Y (z)] holds in M if and only if Y(a) holds in M for all object symbols a in L which correspond to objects in M; [ (32) Y (z)] holds in M if and only if Y(a)holds in M for at least one a in L which corresponds to an object in M. Since each of the above rules 1.4.2., 1.4.3. bases the decision whether a sentence does or does not hold in M on a sentence of lower order while by 1.4.1. the decision whether or not a sentence of order 1 holds in M depends directly on M, it follows that these rules determine uniquely for any Y in K whether Y holds or does not hold in M (under C). However, the rule 1.4.3. is not effective in any constructive sense since it leaves the decision whether or not Y holds in M on the corresponding question for a set of sentences which may be infinite. Now let K be any set of sentences in L and let C be a one-to-one correspondence which maps the object symbols occuring in sentences of K (if any) on objects of M, and the relative symbols of K on relations of M of corresponding order. Extend C in some way to a correspondence C' as considered above, i.e. such that all objects and relations of M are mapped in one-to-one correspondence on object and relative symbols of L. Then it is not difficult to see that the answer to the question whether or not such a sentence of Kholds in L depends only on the correspondence C and not on the particular choice of the extension C'. However, since the cardinal number of the set of object symbols of L is limited it may happen that the number of objects in M is so large that no correspondence C' of the required type exists. This can be avoided by considering, in connection with any given structure M, only languages which possess a sufficiently large pool of object symbols from the outset. Alternatively, L as given may be embedded in a more comprehensive language L', the particular choice of L' being again irrelevant. If all sentences of a set K hold in a structure M under a correspondence C then we say that M is a model of K (under C). If K contains only a single sentence Y, then we shall say also that M is a model of Y.
1.5.1
RELATION BETWEEN DEDUCTIVE A N D DESCRIPTIVE CONCEPTS
11
So far, we have distinguished strictly between object and relative symbols on one hand, and individual objects and relations on the other. However, it frequently simplifiesmatters a great deal to suppose that the objects and relations of a structure M coincide with object and relative symbols of a language L in which M is described. In that case it is usual to suppose that these objects and relations coincide individually with the corresponding object and relative symbols of L, i.e., C is the identity. For certain purposes, it is useful to consider a language which is based on the same types of atomic symbols as the language considered above and whose set of wff is extended by the introduction of certain infinitary rules of formation. There exists a considerable body of information on such languages, but we shall make use of them only in some special cases. Thus, if XI, X Z ,Xs,. . . is a countable sequence of wff we may include among the wff also the infinite disjunction [XI V X ZV X3 V . . .] and the infinite conjunction [XI A X2 A X3 A . . .I. If all object and relative symbols of the Xi are reIated to the objects and relations of a structure M by a correspondence C as before, then we say that the above infinite disjunction holds in M if at least one Xt holds in M, and the infinite conjunction holds in M if all Xt hold in M . 1.5. The Relation between Deductive and Descriptive Concepts. Let K be the set of sentences of L which is defined in a structure M under a correspondence C. Then 1.5.1. Every theorem of L which is included in K holds in
M.
We shall omit the proof of this theorem, which is obtained by checking through the rules of deduction, (1.3). Some care is required in dealing with the rules of inference 1.3.3. Next 1.5.2. Every sentence
Y of K that is deducible from a set of sentences which hold in M must itself hold in M. Indeed, suppose that Y is deducible from a set of sentences X I , XZ,..., X, which hold in M.The sentence
[[[ ... [XiAXzIAXs]... AX”]3 Y] then is a theorem and so must hold in M. But if so, then Y must hold in M, by 1.4.2. A contradictory set K cannot possess a model. In fact, by assumption, we consider only languages which contain at least one statement. Since K is contradictory it cannot be empty. Let Y be an element of K and let
12
THE LOWER PREDICATE CALCULUS
[IS.
Z = [ Y A [- Y]]. If K is defined and holds in a structure M under a correspondence C then Z holds in M under the same correspondence. But if so then Y both holds and does not hold in M, which is impossible. From now on we shall usually omit references to the correspondence C which establishes the connection between a set of sentences, K, and a structure M. Thus, when stating that the sentences of K are (or, K is) defined in M, we shall take it for granted that this involves a particular correspondence C .We are going to prove 1.5.3. THEOREM. If a sentence X of L holds in every structure in which it is defined, then Xis a theorem. This is, essentially, Godel's completeness theorem for the Lower predicate calculus. 1.5.4. THEOREM (EXTENDEDCOMPLETENESS THEOREMOF THE LOWER
PREDICATE CALCULUS). Every consistent set of sentences K in a language L possesses a model.
1.5.5. THEOREM. If a set of sentences K and a sentence Yare such that Yis defined and holds in any structure which is a model of K then Y is deducible from K. Hence, Y is deducible from a finite subset of K.
Theorems 1.5.5. and 1.5.3. can both be reduced to 1.5.4. Suppose that the sentence Xmentioned in 1.5.3. is not a theorem of L. In that case the sentence [- XI - or, more precisely, the unit set containing [- X I cannot be contradictory. For if it were, then [ [- XI 3 Y] would be a theorem for all Yin L, hence [ [- XI 3 XI, [- XI] V X ] ,[XVXI, and finally X would all be theorems in L, by the rules of the calculus of propositions. This is contrary to assumption and so [- X I is consistent and possesses a model M , by 1.5.4. But if so then X i s defined, but does not hold in M,contrary to the hypothesis of 1.5.3. This proves 1.5.3. Coming to 1.5.5., suppose that Y is not deducible from K. It follows that for any finite number'of sentences XI, .. .,Xn of K, the conjunction
[I-
[[ . . . [XiAXz]AX3]... A [ - Y ] ] is not contradictory (otherwise [ [ [. . . [XI A X23 A X3] . . . A Xn]3
Y] would be a theorem, i.e. Y would be deducible from K). But this means that the set {XI, . . .,X,, Y} is consistent, and hence that K u { Y} is consistent. If so, then by 1.5.4. there exists a model M of K u {- Y > . M is a model of K i n which Y holds, contrary to assumption. This proves 1.5.5.
-
-
-
1.5.1
RELATION BETWEEN DEDUCTIVE AND DESCRIPTIVE CONCEPTS
13
To prove 1.5.4., suppose first that the sentences of K do not include any quantifiers or object symbols. That is to say, K consists of sentences built up from relative symbols of order 0 by means of connectives (and brackets). A model M of K then is a set of relations of order 0 in one-toone correspondence with the relative symbols of K such that any relation of the set either holds or does not hold in M y and such that the rules of 1.4.2. then imply that the sentences of K all hold in M. To simplify the argument we shall identify these relations with the corresponding relative symbols. Let S be the set of relative symbols of K. Then the question whether any A E S holds or does not hold in a structure M as indicated may be expressed by a valuation function a, ( A ) defined in S and ranging over the ‘truth values’ 0 (holds) and 1 (does not hold). Reference to 1.4.2. shows that the question whether or not a sentence which is built up from elements of S holds in Mycan then be decided by the standard truth table evaluation if we identify 0 with ‘true’ and 1 with ‘false’. Thus, if K contains only a single sentence X , the fact that we may assign values a, ( A ) = 0 or = 1 to the relative symbols of X so as to ensure that X holds may be accepted as a well-known result of the calculus of propositions. If K contains a h i t e number of sentences only, this may be reduced to the case of a single sentence by taking the conjunction of the elements of K in any arbitrary order. In order to prove the theorem for K of arbitrary infinite cardinal (countable or non-countable) we require the following auxiliary consideration. Without changing our notation we may, temporarily, regard S as an abstract set the character of whose elements, A , By C, . . . is irrelevant. By a partial valuation of S we mean a function of one variable which is defined on a subset V of S and takes values in the two-element set (0, l}. The valuation a, is called total if its domain of definition is the entire set S. We write Da, for the domain of definition of a partial valuation a,. Also, if U is any subset of S, we write a, I U for the restriction of a, to the set Da, n U. With this terminology, we propose to prove the following VALUATION LEMMA.Let @ = { p v } be a set of partial 1.5.6. SPECIAL valuations of S with index set I = { v } , such that for every finite subset U of S there exists a a, E @ which includes U in its domain of definition. Then there exists a total valuation JU, of S such that for every finite subset U of S there exists a yV E @ which includes U in its domain of definition and such that yI U = pvl U, i.e. v/ coincides with qv on U.
14
THE LOWER PREDICATE CALCULUS
[1.5.
For the proof, we shall call a partial valuation yl of S admissible if for any finite subset U of S there exists a pvE @ such that U c Dp, and yl U = p,lDy/ n U,i.e. yl coincides with pv on the intersection of U and Dyl. Given two partial valuations p and yl we shall call cy an extension of p if D p c Dyl and yllDp = p, in symbols p < cy. Let Y be the set of admissible partial valuations of S. Yis not empty for, by the hypothesis of the lemma it contains the empty partial valuation, i.e. the partial valuation whose domain of definition is empty. Also, Y is partially ordered by the relation of extension, <, defined above. Any non-empty totally ordered subset Y' of Y possesses an upper bound y'. Indeed, if Y = {wp) then we may define the domain of definition of w' as the union of the domains of definition of the yo, and the value of yl' for any argument within its domain of definition as the joint value of all ylh which are defined for that argument. Accordingly, by Zorn's lemma, Y contains at least one maximal element, V/O say. We wish to show that ylo is a total valuation of S. Suppose on the contrary that S - Dylo is not empty, and let A be an element of that set. Define a partial valuation yl1 of S, with domain of definition Dylo U (A}, by y l 1 = ylo on Dylo and yll(A) = 0. Since ylo is maximal, yl1 cannot be admissible. That is to say, there exists a finite subset V of S such that the conditions V c Dp, and ~ 1 V1 = VvlDyl1 n V are not satisfied for any pp.E @. Define a partial valuation y2 of S, with domain of definition Dylo U {A}, by V / Z = cyo on Dylo and ylz(A) = 1. Again, ylz cannot be admissible, and so there exists a finite subset W of S such that the conditions W c Dp, and ylzl W = q V ( D v zn W are not satisfied for any pvE @. We note that Y must contain A, otherwise the existence of a pv as required for admissibility follows from the fact that ylo is admissible. Similarly W must contain A. Now consider the set U = V U W. Since ylo is admissible there exists a pp E @ which, contains U in its domain of definition such that cyol U = prrlDylo n U. A belongs to the domain of definition of pp, since A E U and so either p p ( A ) = 0 or p,(A) = 1. But in the former case we then have y l i I V = pplDyll n V and V = D p p while in the latter case yl2l W = pplDy/z n W and W = Dp,. This contradicts our earlier conclusion that no element of @ with these properties can exist. Accordingly S - Dylo is empty, cyo is a total valuation, and since yo is admissible it follows that yo satisfies the conditions stated in 1.5.6. This completes the proof of the lemma. We return to the proof of 1.5.4. for the case that K is infinite and
1.5.1
RELATION BETWEEN DEDUCTIVE A N D DESCRIPTIVE CONCEPTS
15
consists of sentences without quantifiers or object symbols. Thus, K contains relative symbols of order 0 only. Denoting by S the set of relative symbols which appear in K, let S’ be any finite subset of S, and let K‘ be the set of sentences of K whose relative symbols belong entirely to S’. Since the number of elements of S’ is finite it follows that while the number of sentences of K’ may be infinite they must all be equivalent, in the sense of the calculus of propositions, to the sentences of a finite subset of K . We conclude that there exists a total valuation rpv of S‘ (i.e. ampartial valuation of S ) such that pvattributes the value 0 (‘true’ or ‘holds’) to all elements of K‘ according to the familiar truth table evaluation. For elements of S‘ which are not contained in,any sentences of K the value of rpv may be chosen arbitrarily, e.g. qv = 0. Let @ = {qp} be the set of all partial valuation of S obtained in this way, and let yo be a total valuation of S with the properties stated in 1.5.6. Let X be any sentence of K. We maintain that the values which are attributed by yo to the relative symbols of X yield the value 0 (‘true’ or ‘holds’) for X.Indeed if V is the set of relative symbols which occur in X then for some qv E @, V c Dqv = S’ and V / O = vvon V. It follows that X belongs to the set K defined above for the given finite set S’. And since qv yields 0 for X the same applies to yo, which is equal to vv on V. We conclude that yo yields 0 (‘holds’) for all sentences of K. This establishes 1.5.4. for the case that the sentences of K are built up from relative symbols of order 0 only. Suppose next that K may include relative symbols of arbitrary order, while still not containing any quantifiers or variables. As before, we shall use the relative and object symbols of K as the relations and objects of the structure M which satisfies K (i.e. in which K holds). Let S be the set of atomic formulae which occur in the sentences of K. Choose S’as a set of relative symbols of order 0 which are in one-to-one correspondence C with the elements of S. Two atomic formulae are regarded as different if they contain different relative symbols, or if they contain the same relative symbol, but differ at some point in the object symbols or variables that occupy corresponding places. By our definition of a language L, it is in fact not certain a priori that there are enough relative symbols of order 0 available for S’. However, in that case we may replace L by a more extensive language. We agree once and for all to carry out such extensions tacitly whenever a problem of this kind arises. Now let K be the set of sentences X‘ obtained from the sentences X of K by replacing all atomic formulae of S by the corresponding relative
16
THE LOWER PREDICATE CALCULUS
r1.5.
symbols of S‘. We claim that K‘ is consistent. This is true, trivially, if K and K‘ are empty. In the general case, let A be an element of S and let A‘ be the corresponding element of S’. If K‘ is contradictory, then it contains a finite number of sentences X i , . . . X i , corresponding to sentences XI, . . .,X , in K such that the sentence
is a theorem, where Y‘ = [ [ A ’ ]A substitution 1.3.5., the sentence
[-
[ A ’ ] ] ] .Hence, by the rule of
is a theorem where Y = [ [ A ] A [ [ A ] ] ] ,A being the atomic formula that corresponds to A ’ . But this shows that K is contradictory, contrary to assumption. We conclude that K‘ also is consistent. It follows from what has been proved already that K‘ possesses a model M‘, i.e. there exists a valuation of S‘ which makes all elements of K‘ ‘true’. For any atomic formula R(a1, . . ., a,) of S, we now define that R(m, . . ., an) holds in M if and only if the corresponding relative symbol of S‘ holds in M’. For any R (al, . . ., a,) of M which does not belong to S and hence, does not occur in K,we define arbitrarily that R (a,. ..,a,) holds in M. Since the decision whether a sentence X of K holds in M depends only on the question which of the atomic formulae of K hold in M, and since this connection is the same in M’ as it is in Myit follows that all sentences of K hold in M y M is a model of K. We now drop all restrictions on the form of the sentences of K. However, in view of the cases disposed of previously, we may suppose that K is not empty and that it contains at least one sentence that involves a quantifier. Replace every sentence X of K by a sentence X’ in prenex normal form, such as exists by 1.3.7., and let K be the set of all sentences X’ which are obtained in this way. Since X X’ is a theorem for all X E K it follows that every model of K‘ is also a model of K. And since X 3 X’ is a theorem for all X E K, and K is consistent, it follows (compare 5.3.6.) that K‘ also is consistent. Accordingly, we shall from now on confine ourselves to the case that all sentences of K are in prenex normal form from the outset. We count the quantifiers in any sentence in prenex normal form in their “natural” order, from left to right. In order to exemplify our procedure, we shall suppose that K includes a sentence of the form
1.5.1
17
RELATION BETWEEN DEDUCTIVE A N D DESCRIPTIVE CONCEPTS
where Q does not contain any further quantifiers. We shall use the relative symbols of K as the relations of a model M. The set of individual objects of M will be introduced in due course. A sequence of sets of sentences {KO,K I , Kz, , .] and a sequence of sets of object symbols {PO,P I , Pz, . . } are now defined by induction as follows. KO= K, while POis the set of object symbols contained in the sentences of K. However, if K does not contain any object symbols then we define that PO contains the single object symbol a, picked at random. KI contains all sentences of KO. Moreover, if X is a sentence of KO which begins with an existential quantifier then K1 contains a sentence X* which is obtained from X by deleting the existentialquantifier (and the brackets which belong to it) and by replacing the corresponding variable everywhere in the remaining wff by a new object symbol. Thus, if X is of the form 1.5.7. then we may select as X * the sentence
.
.
1.5.8.
provided b does not occur in PO.Moreover, it will be understood that we introduce distinct new object symbols for distinct sentences of KO.This completes the definition of K I .P I is obtained as the union of Po and of the new object symbols introduced just now. KZcontains all sentences of K I .Moreover, if Xis a sentence of K1 which begins with a universal quantifier, then KZ contains all sentences which are obtained from X by deleting the quantifier and by replacing the corresponding variable in the remaining wff by elements of Pi. Thus, we obtain from 1.5.8. the sentences
[@.I[(W[ (WQ (b, a,
2,
u,
41 . . .]
where a varies over all elements of P I .This completes the definition of K2. PZ is simply given by PZ = P I . In general, we obtain Kn and Pn from Kn-l and Pn-1 for odd n just the same way as K1 and PI was obtained from KOand PO,and we obtain Kn and Pn from Kn-1 and Pn-1 for even n in the way in which we obtained Kz and Pz from KI and P I . Let K = U {Kn} = KO U Ki U Kz U . . and P' = U {Pn} = PO u PI u PZ u n
n
.
. .. The set P' will serve as the set
of individual objects of the required structure M .
18
I1.5.
THE LOWER PREDICATE CALCULUS
We propose to show that K' is consistent. Since K can be contradictory only if a finite subset of K is already contradictory, and since K is the union of an ascending chain of sets Kn, it will be sufficient to prove that all Kn are consistent. If not, then there exists a first n, n = m say, such that Km is contradictory. Also, m 1 since KO = K is consistent, by assumption. Suppose first that m is even. Then there exist sentences Y1, . .., Y k E Km, and Z1, . . ., Zz E Km - Km-1 such that the set {Yi,. . ., Yk, Z1,. ..,Zz} is contradictory. 1 must be positive, otherwise Km-1 would be readily contradictory. By the definition of Km there exist sentences VI, . . ., Vi E Km-1 which begin with universal quantifiers,
1.5.9. such that
Vr = [ ( v x ) Sr(X)],
i = 1, . ..,I ,
zr = &(at)
where the at are certain object symbols which belong to Pm. Then the sentences [Vg 3 Zt] are theorems, by 1.3.2. Now if { Y17 . . Y k , Z1, . .., Z Z }is contradictory, then there exists a sentence W = [ [ A ]A [A]]], A a relative symbol of order 0, which is deducible from { Y I , ..., Yk, Z1, . . ., Z Z }and this is equivalent to the statement that
.
1.5.10.
[Yl A [Yz A [.
. .,
. . A Yk]
3
1-
W]
is deducible from (21, . Z Z }(or, if k = 0, that W is itself deducible from { Z l , . . . Z Z } ) But . since the sentences [ Vt 3 Zt] are theorems, this implies that the sentence 1.5.10. is deducible from { V1, .. . VZ},and hence that W is deducible from { YI , ..., Yk, V1, ... V Z ]= H, say. Then H is contradictory, although it is a subset of Km-1, which is consistent. This is impossible and shows that Km cannot be contradictory. Suppose next that m is odd. Then there exist sentences Y I ,. . .,Yk E Km-l, 21, . . . Zz E Km - Km-i, I > 0, such that { Yi7 . .., Yk, 2, ..., Zz} is contradictory. By the definition of Km there now exist sentences V1, . , ., Vz E Km-1 which begin with existential quantifiers,
1.5.11.
V C = [ @ y ) ~ t ( x ) ] , i = 1, ..., 2 ,
such that Zr = Si (at) where the ad are certain object symbols which belong to P, but not to Pm-1. Moreover, we may suppose that the 2, are distinct and so the Vt and the at are distinct. Since {YI, .. ., Yk, Z1, . . .Zz} is contradictory there exists a sentence W = [ [ A ] A [ [A]
-
1
1.5.1
19
RELATION BETWEEN DEDUCTIVE AND DESCRIPTIVE CONCEPTS
as before such that W is deducible from { Y1, ..., Yn,2, ..., Zr) and hence, by the rules of the calculus of propositions, such that 1.5.12.
[ Y i A [ Y z A [... A [ Y n A [ Z z A
... AZz] . . . I =
W]=U
is deducible from 21. Thus Z1 U is a theorem and hence, by the third rule of 1.3.3., V1 =I U is a theorem. It follows that { Y1, . . ., Yk, V1, 2 2 , . . . Z } is contradictory. Applying the same argument to 22,. . ., Z Z in turn, we conclude that { Y I , ..., Yk, VI, . . ., VZ} is contradictory. But this set is included in Km-l, and so our assumption was wrong, Km must be consistent. This concludes the proof of our assertion that K is consistent. Let K* be the set of sentences of K which do not contain any quantifiers. K* is consistent since it is a subset of K', and the relative symbols in K* are the same as in K' and in K while the set of object symbols in K* is P'. It therefore follows from an earlier argument that K* possesses a model M whose relations are the relative symbolsjust mentioned and whose set of objects is P'. We propose to show that Mis a model of K,rnoreprecisely, that M is a model of K' = K. This will establish 1.5.4. in its entirety. In order to prove that the sentences of K' all hold in M we use induction on the number of quantifiers in the prefix. For sentences without quantifiers the assertion is clearly valid for such sentences are included in K*, and M is a model of K*. Suppose then that it is true for all sentences of K' with k < n quantifiers, n 2 1, and let X be a sentence of K' that contains exactly n quantifiers. Consider first the possibility that X begins with an existential quantifier, X = [ (3y) S ( y ) ] . Since X belongs to K it belongs to all Km from some m onward, and in particular it belongs to some Km with even subscript m. But if so then Km+l contains a sentence S(u) which holds in M since it has only n - 1 quantifiers. It then follows from the semantic interpretation of X (1.4.3,) that [ (3y) S (y)], which is X,also holds in M. Suppose next that X contains exactly n quantifiers, of which the first is universal, X = [ (Vy) S ( y ) ] . Then we have to show only that S(u) holds in M for any u E P'. But it follows from the construction of K' and P' that there exists an odd subscript m such that X E Km and u E Pm (and the same is then true for all greater subscripts). Hence, by the definition of Km+l, S(u) is contained in that set and hence in K'. But S(u) contains n - 1 quantifiers only and so S(u) holds in Myas required. This completes the proof of 1.5.4. We shall now estimate the number of objects required for the model M
20
THE LOWER PREDICATE CALCULUS
11.6.
of K,in relation to the number of sentences in K. If K is finite then all Kn and all Pn are finite and so P' is, at most, countable. If K is infinite, of cardinal k, then all Kn, P n have at most k elements, and so P' has at most Hok = k elements. Hence if we define the cardinal number of a model as the cardinal of its set of objects, we have the following 1.5.13. THEOREM. If the consistent set of sentences K is finite then it possesses a finite or countable model M. If K is infinite then it possesses a model whose cardinal does not exceed the cardinal of k. For finite or countable Kthis is the theorem of Lowenheim and Skolem. The notion of a structure can be defined in a slightly different way which appears to be somewhat more natural from a set-theoreticalpoint of view. In this definition a relation of order n within a structure is identified with a subset of the set of ordered n-ples of individuals of the structure. It is then no longer possible that two distinct relations hold for the same n-ples (for in that case the relations are not distinct set-theoretically) but on the other hand it may happen that the correspondence between relative symbols and relations is many-one. While we may still use object symbols as individual objects it is now impossible for a relative symbol to take the place of a relation. In order to base our own approach on set-theoreticalconcepts we have to think of objects and of relations of different orders as the elements of distinct sets of individuals in some (absolute or axiomatic) Set Theory. The statement that R(a1, ..., an) holds in a structure M then signifies that the sequence of n 1 individuals R, U I , . . . an, belongs to a preassigned set.
+
1.6. Sets of Sentences and Their Varieties. Unless an explicit remark is made to the contrary, we shall suppose from now on that the relative and object symbols coincide with the relations and individual objects (constants) which they denote, and we shall refer to them simply as relations and individuals, or constants. Given a consistent set of sentences K in a language L we may, as we have seen, suppose that L has a model M but we may not, without making special assumptions on L, suppose that all the individuals of M are contained in L. However, it is clear that if we choose a 'universe' of individuals D which is large enough (e.g. that contains as many individuals in addition to the individuals of L as there are sentences in L) then to any given consistent set of sentences K in L we may find a model M such that all individuals of M belong to D. This
1.6.1
21
SETS OF SENTENCES A N D THEIR VARIETIES
ensures the existence of models to all consistent sets in a single universe of individuals and saves us from the embarassment of ill-defined totalities. A set of sentences K in a given language L will be called a T-system (T for Tarski) if it includes all sentences which can be deduced from it, in symbols if S ( K ) = K. For example, the set of all theorems in L is a T-system. A set of structures V (based on a definite universe of individuals, as explained above) will be called a variety (of structures) if Vconsists of all structures which are models of a set of sentences K in L. We shall also say in this case that Vis the variety of K, in symbols K + V.The theory of systems of sentences and of varieties of structures will be developed later (Chapter VII and VIII) in a more elaborate setting. In the present section we wish to establish a particular result on varieties which is closely related to 1.5.4. 1.6.1. COMPACTNESS THEOREMFOR VARIETIES OF STRUCTURES. Let { VV}be a set of varieties of structures such that the intersection of any
finite number of elements of { V y } is not empty. Then the intersection { VV}is not empty. V
Since the VVare varieties there exist sets of sentences KV such that for every v, KV+ VV,i.e. VV is the variety of Kp. Let K = (J {KV.}Then V
every model of K is a model of every Kv and hence belongs to every VV. Thus, in order to prove 1.6.1. we only have to show that K possesses a model. This, by 1.5.4. requires only that K is consistent, i.e. that every finite subset of K is consistent. Let {XI, . . ., X n } be any finite subset of K. Then there exist sets Kv, e.g. KI, . . .,Kn, such that Xt E Kt, i = 1, . ..,n. Now let M be an element of V I n . . . n Vnwhere Kt -+ VC,i = 1, . . .,n. Such a structure M exists by the assumption of 1.6.1. Then the sentences Xg hold in M, i = 1, ...,n. It follows that {XI, ...,Xn} is consistent. Thus, K is consistent and the theorem is proved. Closely related to 1.6.1. is the following
1.6.2. PRINCIPLEOF LOCALIZATION. Let K be a set of sentences such that every finite subset of K possesses a model. Then K possesses a model. Indeed, every finite subset of K is consistent since it possesses a model. Hence K is consistent. Hence K possesses a model, by 1.5.4. This proves 1.6.2. There is an essential difference between Theorem 1.5.4. on one hand and
22
[1.7.
THE LOWER PREDICATE CALCULUS
Theorems 1.6.1. and 1.6.2. on the other. Whereas 1.5.4. establishes a connection between the deductive or syntactical properties of a set of sentences on one hand, and the semantic or model theoretic properties of the set on the other, 1.6.1. and 1.6.2. refer only to the models of a set and do not contain any mention of its deductive properties. It turns out that for many applications 1.6.2. may be used in place of 1.5.4. The question arises whether the former theorems cannot be proved directly without reference to the rules of deduction. This is indeed possible, e.g. on the basis of the special valuation lemma 1.5.6. However, even in cases when the use of the rules of deduction is not essential, it may still be instructive. Since the very nature of the calculus of deduction shows that any deduction can involve a finite number of sentences only, the consistency of any set must be determined by the consistency of its finite subsets. Thus, the equivalence of consistency and of the existence of a model provides a natural explanation of 1.6.2. and 1.6.1. 1.7. Problems 1.7.1. Show how to modify the theory of this chapter if functions (function symbols) are included, such as p(x, y) for x y. (Compare section 9.1, below). 1.7.2. Show how to modify the theory of this chapter if object symbols are excluded. 1.7.3. Derive 1.6.2. and 1.6.1. (in that order) without using the calculus of deduction.
+
1.7.4. Modify the theory of semantic interpretation (section 1.4.) so as to suit the set-theoretic definition of a structure (end of section 1.5.).
References. The calculus introduced in sections 1.2, and 1.3. is a modified version of Hilbert-Bernays 1934/1939. 1.5.3. is proved in Godel 1930. Theorems 1.5.4., 1.6.1., 1.6.2. are equivalent if 1.5.3. is taken for granted. First came 1.6.2., which is due to Malcev (stated in Malcev 1941). Proofs of 1.5.4. will be found in Henkin 1949,A. Robinson 1951, compare also Rasiowa-Sikorski 1950, Beth 1951. 1.6.1. is stated in Tarski 1952. For the theorem of Lowenheim-Skolem (with a semantic definition of consistency) see Lowenheim 1915, Skolem 1920. The set-theoretic definition of a structure is given in Tarski 1952, where a structure is called a relational system. 1.5.6. is a special case of 9.3.2., below. It follows immediately from a lemma in Rado 1949. Deductively closed systems are considered in Tarski 193511936.
C H A P T E R I1
ALGEBRAIC THEORIES
2.1. Equality. There is scarcely a mathematical theory which does not
involve the notion of equality. Frequently, this notion is awarded a status which puts it outside the ordinary Lower predicate calculus as described in the preceding chapter. We shall not adopt this procedure and instead shall regard equality as a relation E ( x , y ) in the sense used previously, which satisfies the following conditions.
2.1.1.
w-9E (4 w 4 (VY) [m,Y ) = E ( Y , XI]
(reflexivity) (symmetry) (Vx)(Vy)(Vz) [E(x,y ) A E ( y , z) 3 E (x, z ] (transitivity)
2.1.2. For any relation under consideration (for example, contained in a
given structure), E satisfies the condition of substitutivity. Thus, if the relation in question is of order n, A (xi, . ..,xn), say, then the condition is
(VXI)
.. (Vxn) (Vyi) -
-
---
(VYI) [E(xi,YI) A E ( ~ z , ~Az ) A E(xn, ~ AA(x1, . - . , x n ) =A(.YI,. . - , ~ n ) l
n )
(Observe that for A = E, 2.1.2. is deducible from 2.1.1.). It will be seen that we have adopted the simplified bracket notation explained in section 1.2. above. Also, when mentioning a relation we shall from now on either fill its empty places with variables, or else omit the brackets, and the commas and spaces included in them. Any relation satisfying 2.1.1. is called an equivalence. There may well be two relations of equivalence contained in a given structure without being co-extensive. In general two relations A (xi, ...,xn) and B(x1, .,., xn) are co-extensive if for any ai, ... ,an in the structure under consideration A (al, ...,an) fB ( m , . . .,an). Two relations of equality must be co-extensive. For let Ei ( x , y ) and EZ( x , y ) be two such relations. Then we wish to show that El (a, b) E (a, b) holds for all individuals a, b in the structure. Indeed, by 2.1.2. with E = El, A = Ez, and using 1.3.2., Ei (u, a) A Ei (a, b) A Ez (a, a) 3 E2 (a, b) 23
24
ALGEBRAIC THEORIES
[2.1.
But E1(a, a) and Ez(a, a) hold by the first sentence of 2.1.1. and so El (a, b) 3 EZ(a, b) holds, and similarly EZ(a, b) 3 El (a, b), and hence E, (a, b) EZ(a,b) as asserted.We observe that while the use of the rules of deduction of 1.3. may help to ensure the rigor of an argument, such as that just given, we may also argue intuitively, by virtue of 1.5.3. In general, it will be convenient to suppose that there is only one relation of equality. It may also be convenient to suppose that E (a, b) does not hold between any two distinct individuals. In such a case we call the structure normal. Any structure M , which is not normal can be reduced to a normal structure M‘, by replacing its individuals by the equivalence classes that correspond to the relation of equality. Thus, the elements a and b belong to the same equivalence class, a, if E(a, b) holds in M. Any relation A (XI, ...,xn) is defined to hold between individuals al, . .., ag,of M’ (i.e. equivalence classes of M ) if for some, and hence for all elements al, ...,anof mi,. . .,an,respectively, A (al, ...,an)holds in M. It is then not difficult to verify that every sentence X that holds in M holds also in M‘. Two structures are called similar if they contain the same relations. Let M and M’ be two similar structures. Then M is called a partial structure or a substructure of M y and M’ is called an extension of M if all individuals of M belong to M’ and if for any relation A ( X I , . . .,xn) and individuals al, . . .,an which belong to M y A (al, . .., an) holds in M’ if and only if it holds in M . We then write M c M’, as for ordinary inclusion. Now suppose that a relation of equality E(x, y) is given in M and M’ and that M c M’. The above definition does not exclude the possibility that there exists an individual a which belongs to M’ but not to M such that E (a, b) holds in M’ for some b which belongs to M. If this does not happen then we say that the relation of inclusion between M and M’ is normal. Let M be any structure. Consider the set of all formulae A (al, ...,an) which hold in M , for all A and al, . . ., an in that structure. The set of these formulae is called the positive diagram of M yDf( M ) . Furthermore, the set of all formulae A (al, . . ., an) which hold in M (i.e. A (a, ..,an) does not hold in M , although A, ai, ..., an, belong to M) will be called the negative diagram of M , D- ( M ) .Finally, D ( M ) = D+ ( M ) U D - ( M ) is called the diagram of M . We have the simple but important
.
N
2.1.3. THEOREM. Let M and M’ be two similar structures. Then M’ is an extension of M if and only if it is a model of the diagram of M , D ( M ) .
2.2.J
SPECIFICATION OF AXIOMATIC SYSTEMS
25
In the formulation of this theorem it is understood that the correspondence C which occurs in the explicit description of the relation between M' and D ( M ) reduces to the identity for the elements of D ( M ) - i.e. the individuals of D ( M ) denote themselves. The proof is immediate and will be omitted. A one-to-one correspondence C between the individuals and relations of a structure M and the individuals and relations of a structure M' will be called an isomorphism, if the relations of any given order correspond to one another, and if, whenever a relation holds between certain individuals of M , the corresponding relation holds between the corresponding individuals of M ' , and vice versa. If M and M' are similar it will be taken for granted that C maps every relation on itself. If M = M' then the isomorphism is said to be an automorphism. Structures between which there exists an isomorphism are called isomorphic. A correspondence C between the relations and individuals of a structure M and the relations and some of the individuals of a structure M', respectively, is called a homomorphism if the correspondenceis one-toone between the relations while every individual of M is mapped on an individual of M' in such a way that whenever a relation holds between individuals of M , the corresponding relation holds between individuals of M'. The homomorphism is onto if all individuals of M' appear in the mapping, and M' is then said to be homomorphic to M. Let K be a set of sentences, M a model of K and M' a structure which is similar and isomorphic to M by an isomorphism under which all individuals of M which appear in K correspond to themselves. Then it is not difficult to see that M' also is a model of K .
2.2. Specification of axiomatic systems. We shall now detail axiomatic systems for a number of familiar concepts in Algebra. It should be understood that within the terminology of the present book the terms axiom and sentence are synonymous, so that the word axiom is used only for convenience. In many cases the detailed formulation of an axiom is irrelevant, the main point being the fact that it can (or cannot) be formulated within the language L. Accordingly, it is important that the reader should acquire some facility in deciding whether or not a given informal statement or property can in fact be formalized within the language of the Lower predicate calculus. However, it may happen that a statement or property which are not a priori given in this way possess equivalent formulations within the required framework.
26
r2.2.
ALGEBRAIC THM)RIES
All the sets of axioms which will be specified in the sequel will include a relation of equality E(x, y). By the term axioms of equality we shall mean 2.1.1. and the axiom of substitutivity 2.1.2. applied in connection with all the remaining relations of the set under consideration. In the formulation of the axioms no attention has been paid to the requirement of extreme economy (independence). First we axiomatize the notion of a group in terms of the two-place relation of equality E(x, y ) (read ‘x equals y’) and the three place relation S(x, y, z) (read ‘z is the product of x and y’). No individuals will be used in the axiomatization. 2.2.1. Axioms of equality (see above, 2.1.1. and 2.1.2.). 2.2.2.
(W VY)(3.4 s (x, Y , 4 (W VY)(VZ) W W ) 1s(x, Y , 4 A s (x, Y , w) = E (2, 4 1 (W (W (W (W V’U) (W P ( X , Y , 4 A s (z, t, 4 A s0.1,t, 0) = s (x, U , U ) 1 (3x1(YY) (34 [ S (x, Y , r) A s (2, Y , 41
The axioms of 2.2.2. ensure, in turn, the existence of the product, the uniqueness of the product, the associativity of the group operation, and the existence of a (left) unit with respect to which every element possesses a (left) inverse. The set of axioms 2.2.1. and 2.2.2. will be denoted by KG. An alternative to KG is obtained by introducing an individual constant e and by replacing the last axiom of 2.2. by 2.2.3.
(try> (W rs (e7 Y7 u) A
s
(z7
Y, 4 1
The resulting set will be denoted by Kk. In order to obtain a set of axioms for the concept of an abelian (commutative) group, we add to K G or Kk the axiom 2.2.4.
(W (try) (tr4 [ S(X7Y , z) = S(Y, x7 41
and we call the result KAGor KLG,respectively. In order to formulate the notion of an ordered abelian group, we introduce an additional two-place relation Q (x, y ) (read ‘x is smaller than or equal to y’) and we add the following axioms to KAGor KiG 2.2.5. 2.2.6.
CW VY)0’2) (W[E(x719A E(z7w) A Q (x, z> 3 Q (v,w)] (WVY)V 4 [Q (x, Y ) A Q ( Y , z) 3 Q ( x , z)] (W VY)[Q (4 r) V Q (u, 41 (W VY)[ [Q (x, Y ) A Q ( Y , XI] = E(x, Y ) ] (W (W (W (V0‘4 [s (x, Y , 4 A S (x, u, w)A Q 0, 0 ) 1 Q (z,~)]
2.2.1
SPECIFICATION OF
Axiomnc SYSTEMS
27
2.2.5. is the axiom of substitutivity for the relation Q ( x , y). The reader will have no difficulty in interpreting the axioms of 2.2.6. The resulting sets of axioms will be denoted by KOAGand KLAC,respectively. While it is possible in the present case to eliminate the relation of equality as a fundamental relation and to define it in terms of Q (x, y), we do not find it convenient to adopt this procedure. Next, we introduce a set of axioms KR for the notion of a general ring. There will be no individuals, one two-place relation, which is the relation of equality, E(x, y ) , and two three-place relations S (x,y, z)and P (x,y, z) (where the latter relation stands for ‘xy = z’while the former relation will now be interpreted as ‘ x y = z’). KR shall consist of the axioms of equality for the relations of KR, together with 2.2.2., 2.2.4., and the following list of axioms
+
2.2-7. Wx) (VY) (32)P (x,Y , 2)
[w,
(vx~~vY~(vz)(tJ~) YY z>v P(x, Y , 4 = E(z,w)] ~ ‘ x > ( ~ y ) ~ z ) ( v ~ ) ( v ~ ) Y( ,v4 ~ )A[ PP(z, ( x ,f, 4 A P(Y, t, 0) = = P(x, u, 41 (Vx) ~ y ) ( v z ) ( V t ) ( V u ) ( V v ) ( v w[)S @ ,Y , z> A Wz,I, 4 A P ( x , t, v) A P ( Y , t, w) = S(U, w, 4 1 ( V x > ( V y ) ( ~ z ) ( V ~ ) ( V u ) ( V ~ ) ([S(x, V w ) y, z) A W , z,4 A W , x , u) A
m y , w)
= S(0, w, 41 -
Of these, the first three ensure the existence, uniqueness, and associativity of the product, and the last two constitute the distributive law. Aset of sentences for the notion of a commutative ring, KCR is obtained by adding to K R the commutative law of multiplication, 2.2.8.
(W (VY) (VZ) [ p(x, Y , z) = P ( A x, 41
A set of axioms KF for the notion of a (general, skew) field is obtained as the union of KR and of 2.2.9.
(3x1(3v)[ E(XY v)] (VX) (VYX3Z)[s (XY x, XI v p ( x , z,v)] (VX)W Y )(34 [ S(XY x, x> v P ( z , x , u)] *
The first of these axioms requires that the structure contain at least two different individuals. The second axiom ensures the solvability of the equation xz = y for given y and for given x # 0. Observe that the predicate S(x, x, x) has been used as a characteristic property of 0. It is of course possible to avoid this somewhat artificial formulation by
28
r2.2.
ALGEBRAIC THEORIES
introducing a symbol for 0 within L. The third axiom of 2.2.9. ensures the solvability of zx = y for given y and x, x # 0. By adding 2.2.8. to KF we obtain a set of axioms KCFfor the concept of a commutative field. We now wish to formalize the notion of the characteristic of a field. For this purpose, we define predicates Sn(x, y), n = 0, 1,2, .. . by the following recursive definition 2.2.10.
So (x, y ) = S ( y , y, y ) S ~ ( Xy ), = (32) [S,-I(X, Z) A S(Z,X, y ) ] ,
n = 1,2,
...
In the first line of this definition, S ( y , y, y) is again used in order to characterize the neutral element with respect to addition, 0. Note that we write So (x, y ) even though x does not appear in the predicate on the right hand side. If it is desired to introduce x explicitly we may do so by adding E(x, x ) in conjunction. The predicate Sn (x, y ) is equivalent to y = nx (i.e. y is the result of adding x to itself, n times). Let X , be defined by 2.2.11.
Xn
= (VX)
(try) [s,(x, y )
3
s@,y, y ) ] , n = 1,2,3, ...
i.e. X states that nx = 0 for all x. A set of axioms for the notion of a commutative field of characteristic p, p a prime, is now obtained by adding X , to KCF.The result will be denoted by K;. On the other hand, in order to obtain a set of axioms K j for the notion of a commutative field of characteristic 0 we add to KCFthe set of sentences 2.2.12.
{- X2,
- x3,
x5,
...,
-
X,, ...)
where p varies over all prime numbers, K j is the first of the sets of axioms, considered so far which involves an infinite number of sentences. The natural question arises whether it might not be possible to find an equivalent set of sentences which is finite. The answer to this question will be given by theorem 2.4.5., below. Again, we may modify the axioms for commutative fields (of given characteristic) by introducing two individuals, 0 and 1 (which, as usual, will serve as the neutral elements with respect to addition and with respect to multiplication). Using these symbols, we replace the last sentence of 2.2.2. by 2.2.13.
(W (3-4 [S (0,YY v) A S (ZY YY 011
and the sentences of 2.2.9. by
2.2.1
-
29
SPECIFICATION OP AXIOMATIC SYSTEMS
E(0, 1) (VX)(3Y) [E(x, 0) v 4 %Y, 01 where we have taken into account that 2.2.8. is included. Also, the definition of SO(x, y ) in 2.2.10. may now be taken as 2.2.14.
So(& v) = EO,0)
2.2.15.
The resulting sets of sentences which replace KCF,KS, p = 0,2, 3, 5,
...,
will be denoted by K&, K(;). From now on, we shall use these setsin
preference to KCFand Kg. A set of axioms for the notion of an ordered field KOFis obtained, for example, by adding to KdF a number of axioms, involving the relation Q ( x , y ) (read ‘x smaller than or equal to y’, as before), more particularly the axioms 2.2.5.,2.2.6., and 2-2-16.
(Vx)WY)(Vz) [ p(x, Y , 2) A Q (0,~) A Q (0,r) 3 Q (0,~ I]
.
We also wish to formalize the notion of an archimedean ordered field. Archimedes’ axiom requires that for any positive number x and for any y there exists a positive integer n 2 1 such that nx 3 y. In this connection, nx is supposed to denote the sum x x ... x (n times). Using 2.2.10., we may write the inequality nx 2 y for any particular n as
+ +
2.2.17.
Q n k
U) = (32) [ S n k
2)
+
A Q(Y,
211
a
Introducing the notion of an infinite disjunction as indicated at the end of section 1.4., it is natural to express Archimedes’ axiom by 2.2.18-
(Vx)(Vy)[E(O,x ) V Qn<x,y)V . .]
-
-
Q(0,x ) V Q n ( x , y ) V Q ~ ( x , JV J)
.
V
Adding 2.2.18. to KOFwe then obtain a set KAFfor the concept of an archimedean ordered field. However, 2.2.18. is not a sentence of the Lower predicate calculus as defined in Chapter I, and the question arises whether it might not be possible to replace KAFby a set of axioms formulated entirely within that language. This question is settled by Theorem 2.4.22., below. Next, we turn to the axiomatization of the concept of an algebraically closed field. First, we define the predicates Pn(x, y), n = 0, 1,2, ... by 2.2.19.
Po(x, y )
= E ( y , 1)
- -
Pn (x, y) = (32) [pn-~ ( x , 2) V ~ ( 2x ,, u)], n = 1,2, Thus, Pn(x, y) corresponds to the operation of exponentiation y = xn.
30
12.2.
ALGEBRAIC THEORIES
The following predicate then expresses the equation 2.2.20.
xo
+ x1 y + . . . + xnyn =
22-21.
2
.. .,X n , y , and z Tn (XO, ...,X n , y , 2) = (3UO) (3241).- . ( h n ) (300) (3U1) . .. (3%) ( 3 ~ 1 ) .. . (3wn-1) [Po ( y , UO) A P l ( y , UI) A P z ( y , ~ 2 A ) ... A
regarded as a predicate of
XO,Xn,
Pn (Y, un) A P ( X O , YO,UO) A P (XI,UI,UI) A . . . A Pn (xn,Un, un) A ~ ( V O V, I , WI) A S(W, UZ, ~ 2 A) . . . A S(wn-Z, Un-1, Wn-1) A S(wn-1, Un, Z) ]
-
2.2.21. may be regarded as the correct formalization of 2.2.20. except for some obvious formal modifications for n Q 2. In order to obtain a set of
axioms for the concept of an algebraically closed field, RCFwe now add to KAF the sequence of axioms
22-22.
WXO)(vx1) . . . (Vxn-1) (3.~)T n (XO,X I ,...,~ n - 1 ,~y1, O),
n=2,3,
... .
2.2.22. states that every monk polynomial (polynomial with leading coefficient 1) of degree n possesses a root. In order to obtain sets of
axioms for the concepts of algebraically closed fields of characteristic p ,
Kc$?we add 2.2.22. to K ( $ ) , p > 0 .
A formally real field may be defined as a commutative field in which a sum of squares is always different from 0 unless all the (bases of the) squares are equal to 0 individually. This is expressed by the sequence of axioms
.
..
. . ( V X ~ )(V~I)(Vy2) . . . (VJJ~)(VZZ) . (VZn-1) [P2 (XI,YI) A P Z( ~ 2 YZ) , A . . A Pn (xn, yn) A S ( ~ 1 YZ, , ZZ) A S(ZZ,~ 3 ~ , 3 A ) A S ( Z ~ - 2yn-1, , zn-1) A S(zn-1, yn, 0) 3 E ( x i , 0) A E ( x z ,0)A A E ( x ~0,) ]yt = 2,3, .. .
2-2-23, (VXI) ( V X ~ )
-.
-
.. .
.
Adding 2.2.23. to KhFwe obtain the required set of axioms, KRF,say. An ordered field is by necessity formally real. A field is real-closed if it is formally real and if it possesses no algebraic extension which is formally real. As it stands, this definition cannot be expressed within the Lower predicate calculus. However, it is known that an ordered field F is realclosed if every monic polynomial of odd degree with coefficients in F possesses a root in F and if every positive element of F possesses a square root in F. This can be formalized by 2.2.21., for n = 3, 5, 7, . . . and by 2.2.24.
Wx) ( 3 ~ )Q[ (0,~) 3 P (Y, Y , 4 1
.
2.3.1
31
RELATED SETS OF SENTENCES
Adding the sentences just mentioned to KOFwe obtain a set of axioms ROFfor the notion of a real-closed ordered field. In a real-closed ordered field, an element is non-negativeif and only if it possesses a square root. Accordingly the following sentence holds 2.2.25.
W 4 WY) [Q (x, Y ) [ (32) (34 [S (x, z, v) A P (w,w,z) ] ] ]
.
Thus, we may if we wish replace Q ( x , y ) in all axioms of &IF by the predicate (3z) (3w) [S(x, z, y ) A P (w,w,x ) ] . The result is a set of axioms RRFfor the notion of a real-closed field which does not contain the order relation as a basic concept. In future, we shall not consider it necessary in all cases to give a detailed formulation of the axioms which correspond to a specified notion. The reader will have no difficulty in filling in the missing formulae. Instead of referring to a particular set of axioms for a given concept, it will sometimes be convenient to deal arbitrarily with ‘any set of axioms for’ that concept. Since the phrase which has just been given in quotes is vague, the reader may interpret it as meaning ‘any set of axioms mentioned previously for’ the concept in question. We shall then say that the concept as such has a certain property, e.g. ‘the concept (or the theory) under consideration is consistent’. In this way the meaning of some of our results (e.g. Theorems 4.2.14., 4.2.25. below) will become more intuitive. We shall also refer to the individual objects of a structure sometimes simply as its elements, again in agreement with common usage. 2.3. Related Sets of Sentences. In the preceding section we introduced, on several occasions, different sets of axioms for the same intuitive notion. In the cases in which this was done, the sets in question are therefore interchangeable in an intuitive but definite sense. The following framework makes this interrelation precise. By the vocabulary of a set of sentences K we mean the totality of individuals and relations which occur in sentences of K, with a similar definition for a set of wff or for a single wff. We shall say that a wff Xis defined in a set Kif the vocabulary of Xis included in the vocabulary of K. Two sets of sentences, K and K , we called equivalent if the sentences of K are deducible from Kand vice-versa, i.e. in terms of a symbol introduced earlier (section 1.3.) K k K’ and K‘ t K. In particular if K and K‘ possess the same vocabulary then they are equivalent if and only if their varieties of sentences coincide. TWOsets of sentences K and K’ will be said to be related if there exists a
32
[2.3.
ALGEBRAIC THFDRlFS
one-to-one correspondence between the individualsa of K and the individuals a' of K , a e,a', and the relations A of K and certain predicates R' which are defined in K', A e,R', and the relations A' of K' and certain predicates R which are defined in K, A ' e , R such that relations of order n correspond to predicates with exactly n free variables, and such that the following conditions (2.3.1., 2.3.2.) are satisfied.
2.3.1. If in any sentence X E Kwe replace the individualsby the corresponding individuals of K' and the relations by the corresponding predicates of K (more precisely - which are defined in K') then the resulting sentence X' is deducible from K';if in any sentence X' E K we replace individuals and relations by the corresponding individuals and predicates of K there results a sentence X which is deducible from K.
.
. .,xn) be any relation in the vocabulary of K and let R'(x1, ..., x,) be the corresponding predicate of K'. Let R(x1, ..,xn) be obtained by replacing the individuals and relations which appear in R' by the corresponding individuals and predicates of K. Then 2.3.2. Let A (XI,
.
.
K t- (Vxi) . . ( V X ~ )[A(xi,
. . .,xn)
R(xi,
. ..,x,)] .
A corresponding condition is supposed to hold for the relations of K. Consider for example the set of axioms K O A Gwhich expresses the concept of abelian ordered group in terms of the relations E (equality), S (addition, or multiplication), Q (order) and in terms of e (neutral element with respect to the group operation). In order to obtain a set K* which is related to K'OAGwe delete the axioms which contain Q (2.2.5, 2.2.6.) and we introduce a one-place relation P ( x ) (real ' x is non-negative, x 2 0') which satisfies the following axioms 2-3.3.
(x, Y ) A p (4 = p ( Y ) ] (W(W S(X,Y,O) = P ( X ) V P ( Y ) ] (W VY) S(X, Y , 0) A p (4 A P ( Y ) = E ( x , 011
w 4 (VY) [
I
w]
(vx)wY)(tJz)[S(x,y,z)hP(x)hP(y) * The set K* is obtained by adding 2.3.3. to K A G .A correspondence which establishes that K* is related to K O A Gis obtained by mapping E, S, e on themselves while Q (x, y) in K O AG is mapped on the predicate
[w,
(34 z, Y ) A (z)] which is defined in K* and P ( x ) is mapped on Q (e, x). We may verify that the conditions of 2.3.1. and 2.3.2. are satisfied. For example, the sentence of 2.3.2. becomes, for A = Q, fJ
2.3.1
RELATED SETS OF SENTENCES
33
and this is indeed deducible from K'OAG. Let X be any sentence which is defined in a set K and let K' be related to K. In X replace the individuals and relations by the corresponding individuals and relations of K', obtaining a sentence X' which is defined in K . Apply the corresponding procedure to X'. This yields a sentence X" which is defined in K. While X" does not in general coincide with X it is not difficult to see that X X" is deducible from K. Moreover, K k X if and only if K' t X'. It follows that two related sets are either both consistent or both contradictory. The notion just defined is not as yet sufficiently general to account for certain possibilities which arise in this connection in a natural way. Thus, the example of KG and K b shows that two sets may describe the same concept although one of them does, and the other does not, include an individual (object symbol). Accordingly, we introduce the following definition. Let K and K be two sets of sentences containing a relation of equality E(x, y) such that the vocabulary of K is included in the vocabulary of K' and such that all relations of K' are contained also in K. Then K will be called a contraction of K' if K t K and if for every individual a which is contained in K' but not in K there exists a predicate Q a ( x ) which is defined in K such that Qa(u) is deducible from K while the sentence
[ (3x1 Qa ( x ) ] A [ cJ4 (VY) [Q a (4A Qa 0 )=) E ( x , Y ) ]] is deducible from K. Moreover, if X = X ( a , b, ..., c) is in K and a, b, . . c are the individuals which appear in X but do not belong to the vocabulary of K,it is required that 2.3.4-
.
--
( 3 ~(32) ) .( 3 ~[X(Y, ) 2, . ..,W ) A Qa (.Y)A Q b (2)A - . . A Qc (w)] is deducible from K. (If no such individuals appear in X , this sentence is supposed to reduce simply to X). It can be shown that every model of K is a model of K. Conversely, a model M of K is a model of K if we permit a general correspondence between the objects of M and the object symbols of K', i.e. if we return to our original assumption that the object symbols of K' and the corresponding objects of M do not necessarily coincide. The set of axioms for the concept of a general group K Gis a contraction of the set Kb. The predicate Qe (x) which corresponds to the individual e in K b may be taken to be S(x, x, x).
23.5.
34
ALGEBRAIC THEORIES
[2.4.
We call the sets K and K' potentially equivalent if they possess related contractions. While these definitions do not exhaust the problem of this section they provide a formal framework which should be sufficient for most situations which are likely to arise in this connection. 2.4. Embedding Theorems and Transfer Principles. The extended com-
pleteness theorem of the Lower predicate calculus (1.5.4.) and its equivalents provide a powerful tool for the solution of certain classes of problems in Algebra. Let M be a structure and let K be a set of sentences such that the vocabulary of K and the vocabulary (sets of relations and individuals) of M may overlap but need not coincide. We enquire whether M can be embedded in a model M' of K. By this we mean that M' is a model of K if we ignore the relations of M' which do not occur in K, and M' is an extension of M if we ignore the relations of M' which do not occur in M. Then we have the following simple and fundamental result.
THEOREM. The structure M can be embedded in a model of the set of sentencesKif and only if every finite substructure of M can be embedded in a model of K.
2.4.1.
A finite substructure of M is obtained by taking any finite subset M' of the set of individuals of M and by defining that any relation of M holds between elements of M' if and only if it holds between them as elements of M (compare section 2.1. above). This will be expressed concisely by saying that the structure so obtained is the restriction of M to M'. Now any structure is an extension of M if and only if it is a model of the diagram D(M) of M. Hence, by 1.5.4., a structure of the required kind exists provided K U D(M)is consistent. Suppose K U D(M) is contradictory, then a finite subset of K u D (M) is contradictory. It follows that K U D* is contradictory for some finite subset D* of D (M). D* contains only a finite number of elements of M and these give rise to a finite substructure M* of M in the sense detailed above. Also, D* is included in the diagram D ( M * ) of M*, and so K U D(M*) is contradictory. But this is incompatible with the assumption that every finite substructure of M possesses an extension which is a model of K. Hence K U D(M) is consistent and the theorem is proved. Applying 2.4.1., we obtain for example, 2.4.2. THEOREM. Let R be a ring. If every finitely generated subring of R
can be embedded in a skew field then R can be embedded in a skew field.
2.4.1
EMBEDDING THEOREMS AND TRANSFER PRINCIPLES
35
PROOF.Let R* be a finite set of elements of R and consider the restriction of R* to R in the sense defined above. This structure will, without risk of misunderstanding, be denoted again by R*. R* is not necessarily a ring, but the intersection of all subrings of R that include R* is a ring R1,which is finitely generated since it is generated by the elements of R*. Hence, by the assumption of the theorem, RI can be embedded in a skew field and the same evidently applies to R* (which is included in R1). The notion of a skew field can be formalized in the Lower predicate calculus, e.g. by the set of sentences, KF. The truth of the theorem now follows directly from 2.4.1. An application with some different features is provided by 2.4.3. THEOREM. Let G be a group such that every finitely generated subgroup of G can be totally ordered. Then G can be totally ordered.
PROOF.We first determine a set of axioms for the notion of a totally ordered (not necessarily abelian) group. A set KOGas required is obtained by omitting 2.2.4. from KOAGand by replacing the fourth axiom of 2.2.6. by
W)WY)( V 4
OW ( V 4 [S(xyY , 4 A S (u, u, 4 A Q (x, 4 A Q (uy Qkw)] .
The argument used in the proof of the preceding theorem now shows that G can be embedded in a model of KoG, i.e. in a totally ordered group G'. But the total ordering of G' induces a total ordering in G and so G can itself be totally ordered. This proves 2.4.3. Leading up to our next group of results is the remark that the use of a formal language enables us to make certain statements about entire classes of theorems where 'conventional' Mathematics enables us to deal only with individual theorems. In particular, we may be able to show that any theorem of a certain class which is true for one type of mathematical structure is true also for another type of mathematical structure. A result of this kind will be called a transfer principle. In fact, the classical principle of duality in Projective Geometry may be regarded as a metatheorem of this kind. However, the logical character of this principle is so simple that its discovery did not require any detailed formalization. We shall say that an infinite sequence of sentences Yn,n = 1, 2, ... formulated within a language L (of the Lower predicate calculus, as usual) constitutes an increasing chain if Yn 3 Ym is a theorem for all n 2 m. This may be indicated by the expression
36
[2.4.
ALGEBRAIC THEORIES
which is not, however, included in L. An increasing chain will be called strictly increasing if Yn 3 Ym is a theorem only if n 2 m. 2.4.4. THEOREM. Let K be a set of sentences Y I , Yz,
.. .
which constitute a strictly increasing chain. Then there does not exist any sentence Y which is equivalent to K,i.e. such that K t Y and Y t K.
PROOF. Suppose, contrary to the conclusion of the theorem that K k Y, and Y k K for some Y. Then Y is deducible from a finite subset K of K, K = {Ys, Yj, . . ., Y z } ,say, where the subscripts i, j , . ., 1 have been written in their natural order. Since YZ3 Ym is a theorem for all m < Z, we have in particular, YZ3 Ys, YZ2 Yj, etc. Hence Y is deducible from YZalone, YZ3 Y is a theorem. (If K is empty, so that Y is a theorem, we take I = 1, arbitrarily). On the other hand Y t K and so in particular Y k Y z+I,i.e. Y 3 Yz+1 is a theorem of L. But if so then YZ2 Yz.;1 is a theorem, contrary to the assumption that the Yn constitute a strictly increasing chain. This proves 2.4.4.
.
2.4.5. THEOREM. The concept of a commutative field of characteristic 0 cannot be formalized by a finite number of axioms within the Lower predicate calculus. More precisely, there is no finite set equivalent to PCF or KAg.
PROOF.If it is possible to formalize the concept under consideration by a finite number of axioms, we may replace these by a single axiom, Y, i.e. their conjunction. Referring to 2.2.11, we define the sentence Y I as the conjunction. of the sentences of KCF or of KbF and we then define Yz = YI A X2, Y3 = YZA X3 and, in general, Y , = Yn-l A x p n - 1 where pn is the nth prime number, p l = 2, pz = 3, p3 = 5, etc. Yn states that the structure in question is a commutative field whose characteristic p is 2 Pn, or equal to 0. The sequence Y1, Y2, ... is an increasing chain since Yn 3 Yn-1 or, which is the same, 1Yn-l A Xpn-,] 3 Yn-1 is a theorem for n = 2, 3, . . . Moreover, the sequence is strictly increasing since for any n 2 1 the fields of characteristic pn satisfy Y , but not any Ymfor m > n. It follows that Y , 3 Ywzcannot be a theorem for m > n. Let K = { YI , Yz, . . . } then the models of K are precisely the commutative fields of characteristic 0, i.e. K is equivalent to K t F or to K&$ as the case may be. It then follows that KEF or K&$ cannot be
-
-
-
-
2.4.1
37
EMBEDDING THEOREMS AND TRANSFER PRINCIPLES
equivalent to a single sentence, otherwise the same would apply to K , contrary to 2.4.4. A slightly simpler argument leads to the following transfer principle: 2.4.6. THEOREM. Let X be a sentence of the Lower predicate calculus formulated in terms of equality, addition and multiplication, which holds in all commutative fields of characteristic 0. Then X holds also in all commutative fields of characteristic p > po where po is a positive integer which depends on X .
-
- -
PROOF.Since X is deducible from KOCF, i.e. from KCF U { XZ, X3, X5, . . .} it must be deducible from KCFtogether with a finite subset K‘ of the set {- X2, X3, X5, . . .} Let X,,, be the sentence with highest subscript po that belongs to K‘ (or if K‘ is empty, put po = 1). Then all fields of characteristic p > PO satisfy KCF and K and, hence, satisfy X . This proves the theorem. We shall now give a purely algebraic application of 2.4.6. For any polynomial q (XI, ...,x,) with rational integer coefficients we shall denote by q ( p ) (XI, . . .,x,) the corresponding polynomial with coefficients in the prime field of characteristic p , i.e., the polynomial which is obtained from q (XI, ...,x,) by reducing its coefficientsmodulop.
- -
-
2.4.7. THEOREM. If a set of polynomial equations with integer coefficients, 4, (XI, . . .,x,) = 0,q 2 (XI, . . .,xW) = 0, . ..,q k (XI, . . .,x,) = 0 does not possess a solution in any extension of the field of rational numbers then there exists a positive integer po (which depends on the given system) such that the set of equations
2.4.8.
2.4.9.
q(P)(X1,
. . ., x,)
...,
= 0,@‘)(XI, xn)
=o
=O,
.. .
q(P’(~1,
. . ., xn)
does not possess a solution in any field of characteristic p for p
> PO.
In order to reduce 2.4.7. to 2.4.6. we first formulate, for any polynomial with integer coefficients q(x1, . ., x n ) a predicate Q g ( x i , . . ., X n , y ) which contains the relations E, S, P, and does not contain any individuals and that &(XI, ...,X n , y) expresses the fact that y = q(x1, .. ., x,) in any field of characteristic 0. It is not difficult to construct such a predicate although it is by no means unique. Moreover, we may ensure by a natural choice of Q, that the same predicate expresses the equation y = q ( p ) (XI, . ..,x,) in any field of characteristicp , p an arbitrary prime.
.
38
12.4.
ALGEBRAIC THEORlEs
For example y = 3x2 may be expressed by Q q ( x , y) = ( 3 z ) [ P ( x ,x , z ) A Ss (z, y ) ] and the same Q q can be interpreted in any field of characteristic 2 and then states that y = 3x2 or, which is the same, that y = x2. The hypothesis of 2.4.7. is that for particular polynomials 41, . . ., qk: the sentence
X = (Vxn)
.. . (Vxn)[-
[Qql ( X I ,
.. , ~ n 0), A .- - A Qqk ( X I ,.. .,xn,O>]]
holds in all fields of characteristic 0. It follows, by 2.4.6., that X holds in any field of characteristic p > P O where PO is hence positive integer which depends on X. But in such a field, X expresses the fact that 2.4.9. does not possess any solution. This proves 2.4.7. A mathematical proof of 2.4.7. is as follows. If 2.4.8. has no solution in any extension of the field of rational numbers then there exist polynomialsfl (XI, . . .,xn) . .fk: (XI, . .., xn) with rational coefficients such that
.
f1q1
+f2q2 + .. .
+fk@
=1
.
Multiplying this equation by a suitable integer, a, we see that there exist polynomials g l , . . .,gk: with integer coefficients such that g l q l + g2q2
+ ... + gkqk
=a .
Let PO be the greatest prime divisor of a. Then if we take p > PO we have glql
+ 8242 + - - - + grqk + 0 (PI
and this proves that 2.4.9. cannot have any solution in a field of characteristic p. Thus, while it is not difficult to provide a mathematical proof for 2.4.7., the proof does make use of certain algebraic results which are not required for the metamathematical proof. However, it is not difficult to replace 2.4.7. by a somewhat more general result for which a purely mathematical proof does not seem to readily available, as follows. We shall say that two solutions of 2.4.8. are different if they differ with respect to at least one of the xt, i = 1,2, . . .,n. We then have 2.4.10. THEOREM.If the system of polynomial equations 2.4.8., does not
possess more than m different solutions in any (commutative) field of characteristic 0, then it cannot possess more than m different solutions in any field of characteristic p > PO where PO depends on the set of polynomials. The proof is similar to that of 2.4.7. It depends on the formalization if the statement ‘2.4.8. does not possess more than m different solutions’.
2.4.1
39
EMBEDDING THEOREMS AND TRANSFER PRINCIPLES
2.4.6. may be varied in several ways, e.g. by replacing ‘commutative’ in the two instances in which it occurs in 2.4.6. by ‘skew’ or by ‘algebraically closed‘. When interpreting the result for skew fields we may use polynomials whose variables do not necessarily commute. Consider next an integral domain R with unit (1) which satisfies the condition that every element of R is contained only in a finite number of prime ideals of R. Examples of such rings are provided by the algebraic integers in any finite extension of the rationals. Let X be any sentence which is formulated in terms of the relation of equality and in terms of addition andmultiplication, and in terms of the elementsof R. We then have 2.4.11. THEOREM. Suppose X as described, holds in all (commutative) fields which are extensions of R. Then for all except a finite number of prime ideals J in R, X holds in all fields which are extensions of the quotient ring R/J.
PROOF.Let D(R) be the diagram of R. Then the assumption of the theorem is that X holds in all models of K& U D (R), and hence, that X is deducible from that set. Thus, there exists a finite subset of elements of D ( R ) , Y1, . . ., Yk,say, such that YI . . . Yk =I X i s deducible from K&. Now the sentences Yj are of one of the following six forms
E(a, b), S(a, b, c), P(a, b, c),
N
E(a, b),
N
S(a, b, c),
-
N
P(a, b, c )
.
We may eliminate the sentences which are of the form S(a, b, c) by introducing the element d which satisfies S (a, b, d ) in R, and by replacing S(a, b, c ) by S(a, b, c) together with E(c, a). Sentences of the form P(a, b, c) may be eliminated in a similar way. Again, any sentence of the form E(a, b) may be replaced by a sentence of the term E(c, 0) together with S(a, c, b), where c = b - a in R. After all these reductions, we conclude that the Yj may be supposed to be of one of the following four forms. E(a, b), s(a, b, c), P(a, b, c), E(c, 0) .
-
--
N
N
-
Since the number of the Y5 is finite, we have only a finite number of individuals CI .. . cmsuch that the sentences E(ct, 0) appear among the Yj.By the assumptions of 2.4.1 1, there exist only finitely many prime ideals in R which include at least one of the ci. We propose to show that for any prime ideal J which does not belong to this set, X holds any field F which is an extension of RIJ. Indeed, since YIA . . . A Yk = X is deducible from KAF we only have to show that the Y I , . . ., Yk hold in F and since these sentences do not contain any variables or quantifiers N
40
[2.4.
ALGEBRAIC THEORIES
they hold in F if and only if they hold already in RIJ. But RIJ is a homomorphic image of R and so all Yj which are of one of the forms E(u, b), S(a, byc), P (a, b, c), hold in RIJ since they hold in R. On the other hand any of the form E(Q, 0) holds in RIJ since E(c4, 0) in RIJ would imply that ct belongs to J and such J have been excluded explicitly. This completes the proof of 2.4.1 1. As an important application, we have
-
2.4.12. THEOREM. Let R be an integral domain such that every element of R is contained only in a finite number of prime ideals of R. Let p(x1, ...,x,) be a polynomial with coefficients in R which is absolutely irreducible over R. That is to say, p (XI, . . .,x,) is irreducible in all fields which are extensions of R. Then XI, . . ., x,) is irreducible also in all extensions of the integral domain RIJ where J is any prime ideal of R, excepting only a certain finite number of such ideals.
PROOF.Let al, .. ., ar be the coefficients of p(x1, . . ., x,) ranged in some arbitrary but definite order. If p (XI, ...,x,) is reducible then the degrees of the factors are by necessity bounded by the degree of p. Thus, we may paraphrase the statement )(XI, . . ., x,) is reducible’ by the statement ‘there exist polynomials q (XI, . . ., x,) and r (XI, . . ., x,) of degrees not exceeding d - 1 such that, q(x1,
..., x,)
r(x1, .
..,x,)
= p(x1,
.. * ,
x,)
.’
It will be seen that this statement is essentially equivalent to the assertion that a certain system of equations, involving the coefficients of q and r as unknowns possesses a solution. For example, the statement ‘mx21 ~ 2 x 1 ~ 2~ 2 3 x 2 ~ U4x1 U5X2 a6 is reducible’ is equivalent to the statement that this polynomial is identically equal to a product ( ~ 1 x 1 ~ 2 x 2 y3)(y4x1 y5X2 Y6) and this in turn amounts to the assertion that the set of equations
+ +
2.4.13.
+
+ +
+
yly4 = al,Yly5
+
+ +
+
YZy4 = a2,Y2Y5 = a3, YlY6
y2y3
+
y3y5 = a4, y3y6 = a6
+
y3~4 = a4,
possesses a solution. Now this latter fact can be expressed without difficulty in terms of E, S,P,and the individuals al, ...,a k , by a sentence Y which expresses the solvability of 2.4.15 not only for any given field which is an extension of R but also for any field which is an extension of a homomorphic image of R. Taking X = Y in 2.4.11. we may therefore reduce 2.4.12. to 2.4.11. N
2.4.1
41
EMBEDDING THEOREMS AND TRANSFER PRINCIPLES
For number fields, it is customary to say > ( X I , . . ., Xn) is absolutely irreducible’ instead of ‘p is irreducible in all extensions (of the given integral domain)’. Supposing that R is the ring of algebraic integers in finite extension of the ring of rational numbers, we may then reword 2.4.12. as follows. 2.4.14. If a polynomial p(x1, . . .,xn) whose coefficients belong to the ring R of algebraic integers in a finite extension of the rationals, is absolutely irreducible, then p (XI, . . ., X n ) remains irreducible over the quotient ring R/J for all except (possibly) a finite number of ideals in R. 2.4.14. has been discovered repeatedly in classical Algebra. The reader will find it instructive to compare the classical proofs, which are by no means trivial, with the argument given above. If R is the ring of rational integers, then 2.4.11. reduces to 2.4.6., i.e. the rings R/J become simply the prime fields of prime characteristics. It is therefore not difficult to reformulate 2.4.14. for this particular case, in terms of fields of prime characteristic. Next, we consider briefly some properties of infinite conjunctions and disjunctions as introduced at the end of section 1.4. above. Let Y be an infinite conjunction in the sense of that section, Y = XI A XZA X3 A ... such that the Xi belong to a language L of the Lower predicate calculus defined in the usual way while Y itself is a sentence only in some extended language. We shall call Y ‘eflectivelyfinite’ if one of its partial conjunctions, Ym= [ X l A [ X z A [... AX,]
...I]
is such that Ym 3 Y holds in all models in which Y is defined. We then have as a consequence of 2.4.4. 2.4.15. THEOREM. An infinite conjunction Y is equivaIent to a sentence 2 of L (in the sense that Y EE 2 holds in all models in which it is defined) if and only if it is effectively finite.
.
In fact, Y =) Yk holds in all models in which it is defined, k = 1,2, .. If in addition Ym 3 Y holds in all models in which it is defined, for some particular m, then Ym Y, showing that the condition of the theorem is sufficient. To prove that the condition is necessary, consider the sequence YI, Yz, Y3,... This sequence constitutes an increasing chain, Yn 3 Ym is a theorem for n 2 m. Suppose now that for every positive integer rn there exists an n > m such that Ym 2 Yn is not a theorem. In that case we may select a strictly increasing chain from the sequence YI, Yz, Y3, . . ,,so
42
[2.4.
ALGEBRAIC THEORIES
... Ykn = ... Y k s = Ykz = Yk,, The set K of the elements of this sequence holds if and only if Y holds. But according to 2.4.4. no sentence Z of L has that property. Hence, if such a sentence exists, then for some m, Ym Yn for all n > m, and hence for all n, n = 1,2, ... This proves the theorem. Now let Y be an infinite disjunction, Y = [XI V X2 V X3 V .. .] such that the Xn are contained in L, and let Ym be the corresponding partial disjunctions Ym = [ X I V [ ~ V2 [. . . V X ~ . I..]] Then Y, = Y holds in all in all models in which Y is defined. Similarly, Ym Yn is a theorem for m < n. We call Y effectivelyfinite if for some rn, Y 2 Y, holds in all models in which it is defined. In that case, Y = Y, holds in all models in which it is defined, for all n 2 m. It follows that Yk 2 Yn holds for all k and for n 2 m. These considerations show that the condition of the following theorem is necessary. 2.4.16. THEOREM. The infinite disjunction Y is effectively finite if and only if there exists a positive integer m such that Yn = Ym is a theorem for all n(n = 1,2,3, ...).
In order to prove that the condition of the theorem is also sufficient, we shall show that if it is satisfied then Y = Ym holds in all models in which Y is defined. The contrary assumption implies that there exists a structure M in which Y holds and Ym does not hold. It follows that the sentences XI, . . ., Xm do not hold in M while XZholds in M for some 1 > m. But if so then YZholds in M while Ym does not, and so YZ 2 Y, cannot be a theorem. This is contrary to the hypothesis and proves 2.4.16. Now let Z be an expression of the form
.
. Z) V 22 (u,U , W , . .. Z) V . . .]
2.4.17. Z = (VU)(VV)(VW) . . (Vz)[Zi (u, U, W, . . v . . . v Z n ( U , u, w, . . . z) v
such that the components Z n of the infinite disjunction are themselves wff in the ordinary sense. We introduce the partial disjunctions Wm (u, U, w, ...,z) by Wm (u, U, W, . .,Z) =
[z,(u, U, W , .. .,Z) V [ z Z (u,U, W , . . .,Z) V 1. .. V Z m (u, U, W , and we define
z~T,
= (VU)(VU)(VW)
.. .,z)] .. . ]
. . . (VZ) Wm (u, U, W , . . ., z), rn = I ,2, .. . .
2.4.1
43
EMBEDDING THEOREMS A N D TRANSFER PRINCIPLES
Then Z: ZJ Z holds in all models in which Z is defined. We call Z effectively finite if, conversely, there exists a positive integer m such that Z =I Z: holds in all models in which Z is defined. It will be seen that, quite generally, Z: 2 Z: is a theorem for m < n, and so if Z 2 Z: holds in all models in which Z is defined, so does Z 2 Z: for n < m. 2.4.18. THEOREM. A sentence Z (in the wider sense, as defined by 2.4.17) is effectively finite if and only if there exists a set K of sentences of L, whose vocabulary is contained in the vocabulary of 2, such that Y holds in a structure M if and only if M is a model of K.
PROOF. The condition of the theorem is necessary. For if Z is effectively finite and Z; is the sentence used above in the definition of that concept then the set K = { Z i }has the required properties. Conversely, if a set K with the required properties exists then we have to show that Z is effectively finite. If this is not true then there exists, for every positive integer m a structure M in which Z is defined but such that Z 3 Z, does not hold in it. Such a structure does not satisfy Z:, but satisfies Z, and hence satisfies all sentences of K. Thus, K u {- Z:} is consistent for all m. Now let a, b, c, . . .,d be a set of individuals in one-to-one correspondence with the variables u, u, w, . . . z in Z, and which are not contained in 2. Then we maintain that 2-4-19. K U {
N
2 1 (a,
. ..)d),. .
byC, . . .,d),
Z2 (a, byC,
.}
. . .,d),...,
-
Zn (a, byC,
is consistent. For if this were not the case then, for some positive integer n
K U {- Zl(a, byC, .. . d),. . .,
N
Z~(U by,C,
. .., d)}
.
would be contradictory, hence Z1 (a, byc, . . . d ) V . . . V Zn (a, byc, . . d) would be deducible from K, and hence (since a, by c, . . . d do not appear in K ) the sentence
V
(Vu)(Vu)(Vw) [zZ
. . . (VZ) [Zl(U,u, w, .. .)z) v .. . V Zn (u,U, W, . ..,Z)1 .. .]
(u,U, W,Z) V
would be deducible from K. But this sentence is Z i , and so we have shown on one hand that that K U {- Z,} is consistent for all m and on the other hand, that K t Zn. This is impossible, showing that 2.4.19. is consistent. Let M * be a model of 2.4.19. Then M * satisfies K but it cannot satisfy Z, since this would imply that at least one of the formulae Zn(a, b, c, . .d )
.
44
r2.4.
ALGEBRAIC THEORIES
holds in M*. This contradicts the definition of M*. However, by the condition of 2.4.18. Z holds in every model of K. Thus we have again arrived at a contradiction, and we conclude that Z is effectively finite. This completes the proof of 2.4.18. Let K be a (finite or infinite) set of sentences within L and let K' be obtained from K by the inclusion of a sentence Z where Z is given by 2.4.17, and such that the sentences Z: can be deduced from K for m = 1,2, . . . Then
-
-
2.4.20. THEOREM. If the sentence X of L holds in all structures in which
K' holds then X can be deduced from K alone.
Indeed, the set K' U {- X } does not hold in any model, by assumption. It follows that the set
K U { - X y ~ Z i ( a Y b,...d),... ,c ,-Z~(U,~~C,...,~)~...} is contradictory, where we suppose that the individuals a, by c, . . . d do not occur in either K or X. We conclude that for some positive integer m y the set
-
. .. d)A [. .. A Z ~ ( Uby,C, .. .,d)] . . .]} is contradictory. Hence, as before, the set K u {- X , Z ; } is contraK U {- X,
[ Z i ( a ,by C,
--
dictory, i.e. X V Z: is deducible from K. But since Z: is deducible from K by assumption, it follows that X must be deducible from K. This proves the theorem. Let K, Z and Z: be defined as before and suppose that Z: can be deduced from K for all m. Then 2.4.20. THEOREM. If the set K is consistent then
model M of K.
-
-
-
Z holds in some
PROOF.Put X = A A A in 2.4.20., for some arbitrary relation A of order 0. If K u {- Z } does not possess any model then X holds in the models of K U {- Z } and hence is deducible from K alone. But this implies that K is contradictory, proving the theorem. We apply the above results in order to obtain some information regarding the position of Archimedes' axiom. 2.4.22. THEOREM. The set of axioms KAF for the concept of an archi-
medean ordered field cannot be replaced by any set of sentences K within L (finite or infinite) which are formulated in terms of the vocabulary of KAF.
2.5.1
45
MALCEV'S THEORY OF NORMAL CHAMS
PROOF. We first replace KAFby a single sentence of the form 2.4.17, as follows. Let V be the conjunction of the sentences of KOF,which are finite in number. Referring to 2.2.18., introduce the sentence of the extended language -
- ..
-
2.4.23. Z = (VX) (Vy) [ [ V h E(0, x)] V [ V h Q (0, x)] V [ V h V [ V A Q ~ ( x , Y )V] .]
N
QI(x,
v)]
Z is the required single axiom for the notion of an archimedean ordered field. Now, by 2.4.18., the existence of a set K as described in 2.4.22 would imply that 2.4.23. is effectively finite, i.e. that for some m ythe sentence 2 3 Z m holds in all models in which 2 is defined, where 2; = (Vx)(Vy)[ [ V h E(0, x)] V [ V h Qm-1
N
Q (0,x)] V
... V [V h
(w)]].
But this would signify that in every archimedean ordered field, with 1 for x, the number m - 1 = (m - 1) 1 is greater than all other elements of the field. This is impossible and proves the assertion. 2.4.24. THEOREM. If a sentence X formulated in the Lower predicate calculus in terms of the relations of equality, addition, multiplication, and order (and in terms of 0 and 1) holds for all non-archimedean ordered fields then it holds for all ordered fields.
We may put this in a slightly different way be saying that if a sentence (i.e. X) is consistent with KOFtogether with the sentence 2.2.18., then Xis consistent with KOFtogether with the negation of 2.2.18. Indeed, by 2.4.21., with 2 for 2.2.18., we only have to show the set KOF U {- X) is consistent, and this certainly follows from the assumption of the theorem to be proved. The present book is dedicated chiefly to the Lower predicate calculus and we shall therefore not pursue the subject of an extended language as above, any further. However, we mention that this subject has in fact been developed more systematically and has led to a number of important results. N
2.5. Malcev's Theory of Normal Chains. We shall now consider certain
questions in general Group theory amenable to treatment by metamathematical methods. A survey of Group theory shows that most interesting problems in that field go beyond the language of the Lower predicate calculus, particularly since they refer frequently to the existence and
44
[2S.
ALGEBRAIC THEoRlES
interrelations of the set of all subgroups, or of the set of normal subgroups, of a given group and these notions belong in a natural way to languages of a higher order. However, it was shown by Malcev in a pioneer paper that this difficulty can be overcome in certain cases. We shall use K & which is formulated in terms of E, S and e as a standard set of axioms for the concept of a group. Suppose that we wish to express the fact that a group G contains subgroups J and H, H a normal subgroup of J such that the factor group J / H satisfies a given sentence X within the language L of the Lower predicate calculus. In order to do so we first introduce two new one-place relations, R ( x ) and T ( x ) , which are supposed to indicate membership in J and H respectively. The sentences 2.5.1.
( V X ) WY)%[Y
(W (try> [J%,
39 A R (4 = R (Y)] Y) A T(x)= T(Y)]
then ensure that the relation of equality possesses the property of substitutivity with respect to R and T. In the terminology used at the beginning of section 2.1. this means that the relations of inclusion between G and J and between G and H are normal. The following sentences now express the fact that the elements of G which satisfy R constitute a subgroup of G 2.5.2.
( V x ) ( v Y ) w [ R ( xA ) R O A S(XY YY 4 R (4 ( V X ) (VY) [ R(4A S(X, Y,4 = R
]
= R(4]
We denote this set by KGRand we denote the correspondingset for Tby KGT. Thenext two sentences state that H (which is the set of elements of G that satisfy T ) is a normal subgroup of J (which is the set of elements of G that satisfy R)
2.5.3.
(W [W)= R (41 ( V X ) WY)V (4P O(‘d4[s (x, YY 4 A s (x, 2, 0 A s 0,YY 4 A R(x) A T(z)
T(u)].
Now let X be any sentence formulated in terms of E, S and e. We wish to state that X holds in J/H. Let the relation of equality in J/H be E* (x, y) and let the relation which represents the group operation be S* (x, y , 2). Instead of regarding J / H as a set of equivalence classes of J we shall supposethat it is made up of the same elements as J but that the definitions of equality and of the group operation have been changed so that
2.5.1
47
MALCEV’S THBORY OF NORMAL CHAINS
equality in J/H means equivalence in J with respect to the normal subgroup H of J. Thus, E* ( x , y ) is defined by 2.5.4.
E* (4Y ) = (W
[wA T(x,
z 7
Y)]9
Also, S* (x,y, z) has to hold whenever (lw)[S(x, y , w) A E* (w,z)] holds, so that the appropriate definition of S* ( x , y , z) is 2.5.5.
( W W [ S ( X ,Y , w) A S(W, 1, y ) A
W)]
We now introduce a sentence X * which is obtained from X by the following transformation. We first replace E and S everywhere in X by E* and S* respectively, and we replace E* and S* in turn by the right hand sides of 2.5.4. and 2.5.5. Then it will be seen that X * holds in G if and only if X holds in J/H. This is a particular example of the reduction of a statement which is, to begin with, outside the Lower predicate calculus, to a sentence within that calculus. A quasi-elementary property of a group is a property which can be expressed by a set of sentences P formulated in the Lower predicate calculus in terms of E, S, and e, and such that whenever P holds in a group G then P holds also in every subgroup of G. We shall identify P with the property described by it. By a normaI chain of a group G we mean, as usual, a finite sequence of subgroups of G, {GO,GI, Gz,. . ., GL) such that 2.5.6.
G = Go
3
GI
3
G2
3
... Gk = (e)
such that Gj is a normal subgroup of G j - ~ , j= 1,2, . . . k. k is called the length of the chain. Given a finite sequence of quasi-elementary properties 17 = {Pr, ...,P k ) we shall say that a group G is of type 17 if C possesses a normal chain of length k as in 2.5.6. such that the factor group Gj = Gj-I/Gj has the property Pj, j = 1, .. ., k. If a group G is of a given type 17 = {Pz, ... P k ) , then every subgroup H of G is of type 17. Indeed, G possesses a normal chain {Go, GI, . . .,Gk} as required. Now consider the sequence of subgroups of H, {Ho,HI, ...)Hk) where Hj = Gj n H. This is a normal chain since HO= H, H k = (e), and Hj = Gj rl H is a normal subgroup of Hj-1 = G5-1 (I H for j = 1, . . .,k. Moreover Hj-lIHj is isomorphic to a subgroup of Gj-l/Gj and so, by one of the conditions satisfied by an elementary property, Hj-IIHj like Gj-l/Gj satisfies Pj. Hence H also is of type IT. For given 17,we construct a set of sentencesKnas follows. We introduce one-place relations Rj, j = 1, ...,k and we include in Kn,(i) the set K i ,
48
AWEBRAIC THEORIES
j2.5.
(ii) sentences which state that the relation of equality is substitutive with respect to all the Rj (compare 2.5.1.), (iii) sentences which state that for every j, the set Gj of elements which satisfy Rj is a subgroup of the given group (see 2.5.2.), (iv) sentences which state that Gj is a normal subgroup of GI-1, j = 1, . . ., k (compare 2.5.3.), (v) a sentence which states that Gk contains only e and elements equal to e, e.g. the sentence (Vx)[Rk(x)3 E ( x , e ) ] ,(vi) sentences which state that the factor group G f = Gj-I/GJ possesses the property Pj,j = 1, . . ., k. In order to express this fact we replace every sentence X which belongs to P5 by a sentence X* which is obtained from X by means of the relations Rj-1 and Rj just as in the example given above (see 2.5.4. and 2.5.5.) we obtained X * from X by the use of the relations E and T. All sentences that are obtained in this way will be included in Kn. This concludes the construction of Kn. It follows immediately from the construction that every model of Kn is a group of type 27 (the subgroups Gj being determined by the predicates RJ.)A given group G of type 17 is not in the usual sense a model of Kn since the relations Rj which we obtained in the vocabulary of Kn do not belong to G. However, we have the theorem 2.5.7. THEOREM. For given h ' , a group G is of type I7 if and only if the set D ( G ) U Kn is consistent where D(G) is the diagram of G.
PROOF.If the group G is of type l?, then it includes a normal chain {Go, . . ., Gk} with the required properties. We introduce relations Rj
into the structure G by defining that Rj(a) holds for any element a of G if and only if a belongs to Gj,j = 1, . . .,k. With this supplementary definition G becomes a model both of D (G) and of K, so that D (G) U Kn must be consistent. Conversely, if D(G) u Kn is consistent, let G' be a model of that set. Then G' is a group of type 17 and an extension of G, and so, by a previous remark, G also is of type 17. This proves the theorem. We now come to the main theorem of this section. 2.5.8. THEOREM. Suppose that every finitely generated subgroup of a
group G is of type 17. Then G is of type 17.
PROOF.Construct Kn as above and consider the set D(G) u Kn.By 2.5.7. we only have to show that this set is consistent. We know from the usual argument that this will be the case if every finite subset of D ( G ) u K, is consistent. Now this will certainly be true if for every finite subset of elements of G, G' say, D(G)' U Kn is consistent where
2.6.1
PROBLEMS
49
D (G') is the diagram of the restriction of the relations of G to G'. But if G" is the group which is generated by the elements of G', then on one hand D (G") U Kn is consistent by 2.5.7., and on the other hand D (G') c c D(G"). Hence D(G') U Kn also is consistent. This proves 2.5.8. From among the many interesting applications that Malcev made of his theorem (2.5.8.) we mention the following two. A group G is said to be solvable of rank k if it possesses a normal chain of length k such that the factor groups Gj-l/Gj are abelian (commutative). Thus, G may be said to be of type 17 where 17 = {PI, . . .,Pk}, PI = . . . = = P k = P, and P contains the single sentence i.e. the group in question is commutative. We see immediately that P is quasi-elementary and so 2.5.8. applies. Hence 2.5.9. THEOREM. If every finitely generated subgroup of a group G is solvable of rank k then G is solvable of rank k. Now let 17 = {PI, Pz}where P 2 = P is the property of commutativity as in the last section and Pi states, for a given positive integer n, that the group in question does not include more than n different (i.e. unequal) elements. It is easy to check that this property also is quasi-elementary. Hence, by 2.5.8., noting that GlfG2 = Gl/(e) is isomorphic to GI , 2.5.10. THEOREM. If every finitely generated subgroup of a group G contains a normal subgroup of index 6 n then G contains a normal subgroup of index < n.
In view of the important role played in the above theory by the kind of properties called quasi-elementary it is natural to ask what distinguishes a set of sentences which is such that whenever it holds in a group G then it holds also in every subgroup of G. This is a typical problem of Model theory, to which a full answer will be provided in the next chapter (section 3.3). 2.6. Problems 2.6.1. Let S = ( A y } be a set of disjoint non-empty abstract sets. The axiom of choice states that there exists a set which has just one element in common with every set A, in S. Employ the extended completeness theorem 1.5.4. in order to prove the axiom of choice for the case that all Ar are finite. (Hint. Introduce the relation of equality E ( x , y ) and relations
50
ALGEBRAIC THEORIES
[2.6.
R,(x) such that R, (a) holds if and only if a E A,. For an additional relation P (x), ensure by means of sentences in the formal language L that for every R, there exists just one element which satisfies both R1(x) and P(x).) The method does not apply to infinite A,. Why? 2.6.2. Prove the maximal ideal theorem for Boolean algebras by means of
1.5.4. (and, of course, without using the axiom of choice).
2.6.3. A graph is called k-chromatic if k is the smallest positive integer for which there exists a partition of the nodes of G into k sets Gt such that no two elements of any Gt are linked by an edge of G. Prove the theorem
of de Bruijn and Erdos [de Bruijn-Erdos 19511 that every k-chromatic graph contains a finite subgraph which is also k-chromatic.
2.6.4. Let K,,be the set of sentences which are formulated in terms of
the relations of addition, multiplication, and equality, E, S, P,and in terms of individuals 0, 1, 2, . .. (with their usual meaning), and which hold in the system of natural numbers, Mo. Show that there exists a model M of K which is a proper extension of Mo. Such a structure M is called a (strong) non-standard model of Arithmetic (Compare section 9.3. below) (Hint. Define H a s the set of sentences E(a, n) where a is an additional individual, and n = 0, 1,2, . . . .Prove that K u H i s consistent). N
2.6.5. Show that not every element of a model M as defined in 2.7.4. is
the product of a finite number of primes. Why is this compatible with the fact that M is a model of KO?
References. Embedding principles are considered from a mathematical point of view in Lo61955 and A. Robinson 1955. Compare also Neumann 1954. Theorem 2.4.6. is given in A. Robinson, 1951, 2.4.12. in Henkin 1953 and A. Robinson, 1955. For purely mathematical proofs of 2.4.14. see Ostrowski 1919 and Eichler 1939.The analysis of Archimedes’ axiom is in A. Robinson 1951. For more recent work on infinitary languages see Scott-Tarski 1958, Tarski 1958, Engeler 1961. Malcev’s work on normal chains including the main theorem 2.5.8. is in Malcev 1941.
C H A P T E R 111
SOME CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF MODEL THEORY 3.1. Skolem Functions; Relativization. Consider any sentence of L which
is in prenex normal form, e.g.
3.1.1.
(W ( 3 ~ 0'4 ) 0'4( 3 ~ (W ) (30 Q ( x , Y , z, u, v, w,0
where Q does not contain any further quantifiers. Putting
R (x, Y ) = (W (vu) (W (W ( 3 0 Q (x, Y , z, u, v, w, 1) we obtain from 3.1.1.
3.1.2.
(W(3Y) R
(x7
Y)
Let M be any model of 3.1.2. According to the semantic interpretation of 3.1.2. the fact that the sentence in question holds in M signifies that for any element a of M there exists an element b of M such that R(a, b) holds in M. That is to say there exists a function p ( x ) whose domain are the elements of M and which takes values in M such that for every a E M , the sentence R (a, q (a))holds in M. Note that the expression R (a, I (a)) as it stands does not belong to L. It denotes a sentence R(a, b) which belongs to L. We may interpret the remaining existential quantifiers in 3.2.1. in a similar way. Thus, the fact that 3.2.1. holds in M signifies that there (x,), w (x, z, u) x ( x , z, u, w) defined on M and taking exist functions I values in M such that for all elements a, b, c, d of M the sentence
3.1.3.
Q (a, I (4,b, c, w (a, b, c),
d, x (a, by c, 6))
holds in M . It is customary to replace the individuals a, b, c, d in this expression by the original variables, and to state simply that
3.1.4.
Q (x, I (XI, z, u, w ( x , z , 4 , w,x (x, z, u, 4 )
holds in M . 3.1.4. is called the open form (sentence) which corresponds to 3.1.1. and the function symbols q, w, x are known as Skolem functors, or sometimes as Herbrand functors. They were introduced by Skolem and 51
52
SOME CONCEPTS A N D METHODS OF MODEL THEORY
[3.1.
Hilbert, and exploited systematically by Herbrand. In general one obtains the open form of a sentence X in prenex normal form by deleting the prefix of X and by replacing the variables in the matrix which belong to existential quantifiers by distinct symbols denoting functions of all variables which belong to the universal quantifierspreceding the existential quantifier in question. If the sentence X begins with an existential quantifier then the corresponding functor is supposed to denote a function without variables, i.e. a particular element of M. The functions denoted by the functors are defined on all elements of M and take values in M. They are called Skolem functions. In general, we do not find it necessary to introduce separate symbols to denote the Skolem functors on one hand and the Skolem functions on the other. Skolem functions provide a concrete interpretation of the meaning of the existential quantifiers and have been found useful in various connections. Let X be any sentence in a language L of the Lower predicate calculus and let M be a model of X. Any reference in X to a particular element of M , or to the existence of an element of M with a particular property, need not state the fact that the individual in question is an element of M explicitly since it follows from the definition of a model that any individual mentioned is meant to be an individual in M. Now suppose that M is contained as a substructure in a larger structure M'. Then we cannot express the fact that X holds in M in terms of the semantic interpretation of Xin M'. In order to be able to do so, we introduce a one-place relation R ( x ) which is not contained in M (and hence neither in M' nor in X ) such that R (a) holds for an element a of M' if and only if a belongs to M. The resulting structure will be called M i . For any sentence Y which is defined in M , we shall now define a related sentence YR such that YE holds in M i if and only if Y holds in M . We shall in fact define YRquite generally for any wff Y in L. Thus, the passage from Y to YRamounts to a mapping of the wff of L into the set of WEof L. YBis a syntactical transform of Y, an informal term by which we mean that YRis obtained from Y by a rule which is purely syntactical and takes no account of the meaning of the wff. More particularly, in the present case, YRis called the transform of Y by relativization with respect to R,briefly the R - transform of Y and we write YR= p (Y). The mapping is defined following the rules of formation of wff (1.2.1.-1.2.3.). The following expression are written out in fully bracketed form. 3.1.5.
If Xis an atomic formula, then e ( [ X I ) = [XI
3.1.1
SKOLEM FUNCTIONS ;RELATIVIZATION
53
3.1.6.
3.1.7.
P ( [ W ) X ] )= < W " R W ] = P W ) ] p ( [ ( 3 y ) x ~= ) ( 3 y ) [ [ ~ ( yAAX)] )]
where Xis a wff which does not contain y quantified. The two formulae of 3.1.7. are crucial. They express the fact that where in the original wff a universal quantifier applies universally, it now is to apply only to elements that satisfy R,and where in the original wff the existence of a certain element is required such that Xis satisfied, it is now stipulated in addition that the element satisfy the relation R. Now let M and M' be similar structures, M' an extension of M , and X defined in M yi.e. the relations and individuals of X occur in M . Let R be a relation which does not occur in Myand let the structure MA be defined as before. Then 3.1.8. THEOREM.X holds in M if and only if X R holds in MA. The proof is by induction on the order of the sentences X which are defined in M (see section 1.2. for the definition of the order of a wff). If X is of order 1 then it is a bracketed atomic formula and sop ( X ) = XR = X, by 3.1.5. It is evident that in that case X holds in Mif and only if it holds in
MA.
If Xis obtained by the application of a connective to sentences of lower order for which the theorem has already been proved, then the assertion of the theorem is true also for X . To see this, suppose for example that X = [Y A Z ] ,X R = p ( X ) = [ p ( Y )A p ( Z ) ] .If X holds in Mythen both Y and 2 hold in Myhence, by the assumption of our induction p ( Y ) and p (2)hold in MA, hence XR = p ( X ) holds in MA.If X does not hold in M then one of Y and Z , Y say, does not hold in Myhence p ( Y ) does not hold in MA hence X R = p ( X ) does not hold in MA. The procedure is similar for all the remaining connectives. Suppose finally that X is obtained by quantification from sentences of lower order for which the theorem has been proved already. Thus if X = [ (Vy) Z ( y ) ] ,then the theorem is supposed to have been proved for all 2 (a),where a is any element of M. If X holds in M , then Z (a) holds in
54
SOME CONCEPTS AND METHODS
13.2.
OF MODEL THEORY
M for all elements a of M, hence p(Z(a)) holds in MA. It follows that [R (a)] 3 p (Z (a)) holds in M i for all elements a of M i ; for if a is in M then the implicate of the implication holds, and if a is not in M then the implicans of the implication does not hold, showing that the implication as such holds for all a. Hence (Vy)[ [ R ( y ) ]= p ( Z ( y ) ) ] = p ( X ) holds in MA where we take into account that if p (,Z(a))= Z'(a) then p ( Z ( y ) ) = = Z'(y). On the other hand, if X does not hold in M , then Z ( a ) does not hold in M for some element a of M , hence the sentences p ( Z ( a ) ) and [R(a)] 3 p(Z(a)) do not hold in MA for this particular a, hence (Vy)[ [R(y)] 3 p ( Z ( y ) ) ] does not hold in MA. Again, if X = [ (3y) Z ( y ) ] and the theorem has been proved for all Z (a) with a in M , suppose that X holds in M. Then Z (a) holds in M for some a, hence R(a) A p(Z(a)) holds in M i , hence (3y) [R(y)] A A p ( Z ( y ) ) ] holds in MA, as required. Conversely, if ( 3 y )[ [ R ( y ) ]A p ( Z ( y ) ) ] holds in MA then [ [ R ( a ) ) A p ( Z ( a ) ) ] holds in MA for some a, and that a is in M for it satisfies R (a). Hence, by the assumption of our induction Z(a) holds in M , X = [ (3y) Z ( y ) ] holds in M. This completes the proof of 3.1.8. Now let K be any set of sentences which does not contain R and let K' be the set of all sentences p (X)= X R , X E K. Let M' be any model of K'. Then we cannot affirm that set of elements of M' which satisfy R constitute a model of K, because that set may well be empty. For example, if K contains the sentence (Vx) T ( x ) as its only element then K' contains only the sentence (Vx) [R ( x ) 3 T ( x ) ], and this sentence holds in any structure M' in which R and T occur even if R does not hold for a single element of M'. Accordingly, we define the R-transform of the set of sentences K, p (K) = K R as the set of all sentences X R = p (X), X E K together with the sentence (3x) R (x) if no individuals are contained in K, or of all sentences R(a) for the individuals a which occur in K, if there are such individuals. With this definition, let M' be a model of KR. Then the set of elements of M' which satisfy R is not empty, and if we restrict the relations of M' to that set we obtain a substructure M of M' such that the sentences of K are defined in M . We may now conclude from 3.1.8. that M is a model of K.
1
3.2. The Extension of Models. Let K be any set of sentences. K is said to be complete if for any sentence X which is defined in K (i.e. whose relations and individuals are in the vocabulary of K), either K t X or K t X.
-
3.2.1
55
THE EXTENSION OF MODELS
This is one of the fundamental notions of Model theory. It is not to be confused with the notion of completeness of the entire Lower predicate calculus which was introduced in Chapter I. Let M and M‘ be two similar structures and let A be a subset of the set of individuals common to M and M’. A may be chosen so as to be empty even if there are individuals common to M and M’. Then M is said to be elementarily equivalent to M’ with respect to A if any sentence X whose relations are in the vocabulary of M and M’ and whose individualsbelong to A either holds in both M and M‘ or does not hold in either one of these structures (so that X holds in both). This definition may be formulated in a different way if for any structure M y and for any set of elements of M , A (which may be empty) we define S ( M , A ) as the set of all sentences X which hold in M and which do not contain any individuals other than the individuals of A . Then two similar structures, M and M‘ are elementarily equivalent with respect to A if S ( M , A ) = S ( M ’ , A). If A is empty then we say simply that M and M’ are elementarily equivalent. It is not difficult to see that a set of sentences S ( M , A ) must be complete for if X is any sentence defined in S ( M , A ) then either X or X belongs to S ( M , A). If A contains all individuals of M then we shall write also S(M, A) = S(M). Now let M and M’ be two similar structures such that M’ is an extension of M and let A be the set of all individuals which are contained in M. Then we say that M’ is an elementary extension of M ywrite M ee M’ if M and M’ are elementarily equivalent with respect to A. The notion of an elementary extension is due to Tarski and Vaught. A structure M ’may well be an extension of a structure M and at the same time be elementarily equivalent to M y without being an elementary extension of M . Thus, let M‘ be the structure which consists of a set of individuals {ao, al, a2, .. .} and of the single relation Q ( x , y ) such that R(an,am) holds if and only if n < m. Let M be the restriction of M’ to the set (al, u2, as, . . .}. Then M‘ is elementarily equivalent to M (i.e. elementarily equivalent with respect to the empty set), since M’ is isomorphic to M by the correspondence a n t)an+i,n = 0, 1,2, .. On the other hand, M‘ is not elementary extension of M since the sentence (Vx) Q (x, al) holds in M but not in M‘.
-
-
.
3.2.1. THEOREM. Let M’ be an extension of M and let A be the set of individuals of M. In order that M’ be an elementary extension of M it is necessary and sufficient that for every sentence X which begins with an
56
SOME CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF MODEL THEORY
I3.2.
existential qualifier, X = (3y) Z ( y ) , say, and which is defined in M and holds in M', there exists an element a E A such that Z ( a ) holds in M'. PROOF.The condition is necessary. For if M' is an elementary extension of M , then since X holds in M' it must hold also in M . That is to say, for some a E A , Z ( a ) holds in M and hence in M'. The condition is also sufficient. Let X be any sentence which is defined in M and holds in M', then we have to show that X holds also in M . We may suppose for the proof that X is in prenex normal form since any other sentence is equivalent to a sentence in prenex normal form with the same vocabulary. We now prove our assertion by induction with respect to the number of quantifiers in the prefix of X.If X does not contain any quantifiers, then since all the atomic formulae contained in X hold or do not hold equally in M and M', and since the question whether X does or does not hold in a given structure is then decided by the truth-table method of the propositional calculus, it follows that X holds equally in M' and in M . Suppose now that there exists a sentence in prenex normal form which holds in M' but not in M . If so there exists such a sentence for which the number of quantifiers is minimal although as we have seen already, it must be positive. Suppose first that X begins with a universal quantifier, X = (Vy) 2 (y). If X does not hold in M then the sentence Z (a) does not hold in M for some a E A. But in this case Z (a) cannot hold in M' either since the number of quantifiers in Z(a) is less than in X. It follows that (Vy) Z ( y ) does not hold in M' contrary to assumption. Suppose next that X begins with an existential quantifier, X = (3y) Z ( y ) . Since X holds in M' it follows from the assumption of the theorem that for some a E A , Z(a) holds in M'. Again, Z ( u ) contains less quantifiers than X and so holds in M . But if so then (3y) Z ( y ) holds in M , again contrary to assumption. This completes the proof of the theorem. Let M' be an elementary extension of M and let A be the set of individuals of M yas before. Let X be any sentence in prenex normal form which is defined and holds in M y e.g.
3.2.2. X = ( V X ) ( ~ Y(Vz) ) (Vv) ( 3 4 Q (xYY , Z, u, 4 where the matrix Q does not contain any further quantifiers. We introduce the open form of X , i.e. for the above example, the expression
Q ( x , v (42, w (x, z, uY4) so that ~ ( x ) ~, ( xz), are the Skolem functors which belong to X . With these assumptions, we have
3.2.1
57
THE EXTENSION OF MODELS
3.2.3. THEOREM. Consider any definition of the Skolem functions of X (e.g. p (x), ly (x, z ) ) in the set of individuals of M , A. Then these functions can be extended to the entire set of individuals of M' so as to constitute Skolem functions for X within M'.
Indeed, suppose that the prefix of X contains the universal quantifiers . . . (Vxk) in that order together with certain existential quantifiers, which appear interspersed between the (Vxj). Then we have to show that if the variables XI, . . . xf are replaced by individuals which belong to M , and hence the functional values of all Skolem functions which contain no other variables are determined as certain elements of M , then the values of the remaining Skolem functions can still be determined appropriately in M' for arbitrary values of the remaining universally quantified variables. But this is clearly possible, for the substitution of elements of M for XI, ..,xj, and for the Skolem functions in question, turns X into a sentence A" which holds in M and hence in M'. Thus, the remaining functions may be chosen appropriately. For example, if in 3.2.2. we take j = 2 and replace x, z, by elements a, b, of M , then the only Skolem function determined by a and b is q (x). Accordingly, we put X' = ( v ) (3w) Q (a, p(a), b, u, w). Then X' holds in M' and so it must be possible to define ~ ( ab,, u) for arbitrary values of u in M ' . It is clear that if M' is an elementary extension of M and M" is an elementary extension of M ' , then M" is an elementary extension of M , It is also true that if M' is an extension of M and M" is an elementary extension of M' and an elementary extension of M , then M' must be an elementary extension of M. For suppose that X holds in M , but not in M ' , i.e. X holds in M'. If so then both X and X hold in M " which is impossible. Let 0 = ( M y } be a monotonic set of similar structures, that is to say for any two elements M,, M y of @ we have either M p c Mv or MI M,. We may introduce a structure M which is by definition the union of the structures Mv, M = U { M y } in a natural way by taking the set of (Vxl)
.
N
h)
individuals of the My, and by defining that a relation R (XI, . . .,xn) holds between elements al, . ..,apzif M if and only if R(a1, ...,an) holds for any (and hence for all) M , that contains al, . ..,an. V
3.2.4. THEOREM. Let Mybe a set of similar structures such that for any M,, Mv of @ either MBee Myor M y ee M,(so that @ is a monotonic set). Then the union M = U { M y }is an elementary extension of every M y in @. V
58
[3.2.
SOME CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF MODEL THEORY
PROOF.We show first that there exists some structure M' which is an elementary extension of all M y in @. Let S(M,) be the set of all sentences which are defined and hold in Mv, as introduced earlier, S ( M v ) = = S(Mv, Av) where A, is the set of all individuals in Mv. Consider the union S = U ( S ( M v ) } . The S(M,) constitute a monotonic set of V
sentences and so every finite subset S' of S is contained already in a single Mv. Hence S is consistent and possesses a model M'. But for every M y , S(Mv) contains the diagram of Mv. Hence S contains the diagram of Mv and M' is an extension of Mv. Moreover, M' satisfies all sentences of S ( M v )and so it is actually an elementary extension of Mv. Now let M = U {My }.We propose to show that M' is an elementary V
extension of M. It then follows from an observation made earlier in this section that M is an elementary extension of Mv. To prove that M' is an elementary extension of M , we make use of 3.2.1. Thus, let X be a sentence which is defined in M and holds in M', and which begins with an existential quantifier, X = (3y) Z (y). Since the number of individuals in X is finite X must be contained already in some Mv. Hence, for since a 4 Av, Z(a) holds in Mv and hence in M'. But A is contained in M , and so the conditions of 3.2.1. are satisfied and M' is an elementary extension of M . This completes the proof of 3.2.4. 3.2.5. THEOREM. Let M and M' be two similar structures, and let A be the set of individuals common to both. Suppose that M and M are elementarily equivalent with respect to A, S ( M , A) = S ( M ' , A). Then there exists a structure M * which is an elementary extension of both M and M'.
PROOF.Let S ( M ) and S ( M ' ) be the sets of all sentences which hold in M and M' respectively. We shall show that the set S ( M ) U S ( M ' ) = T is consistent. If not then some finite subset T' of T is contradictory. T' must contain elements of both S ( M ) and S ( M ' ) otherwise it would be a subset of one of these sets and hence, would be consistent. Moreover, together with any two sentences, S ( M ) contains also their conjunction, and the same applies to S(M'). Accordingly, we may suppose that T' contains just two sentences, X E S ( M ) and X' E S ( M ' ) such that X A X' is contradictory. Now let al, . . ., Uk be the individuals which occur in X and are not contained in M' and let bl, ..., bj be the individuals which occur in X' and are not contained in M. Thus, we may write X = Y(Ui, ., Uk), x' = Y'(bi, ...,bj),k 2 0,i 2 0. Now if Y(a1, ., U k )
..
..
3.2.1
59
THE EXTENSION OF MODELS
A Y (bl, calcu1us,
. ..,bj) is contradictory, then by the rules of the Lower predicate
3.2.6. (3x1)
...( 3 4 (3yi) ..- @~j) [Y(xi, ... ,xk) A Y'(yi, ...,yj)]
also must be contradictory, where we have introduced xf, yg which did not occur previously. Since bl, . . ., bj do not occur in Y(a, . .,ak) the yr do not occur in Y(x1, . . ., xk) in 3.2.6. and so we may replace 3.2.6. by the equivalent.
.
3.2.7.
[ (3x1) . . . (3xk) Y(xi, . . ., ~ t ) ]A [ ( 3 ~ 1 ). . . (3yz) Y' ( ~ i ,.. ., ~j)]
Now the conjuncts in 3.2.1. are defined in both M and M', and they belong to S ( M , A ) and S ( M ' , A ) respectively. But S ( M , A ) = S ( M ' , A ) and so 3.2.7. holds in both M and M'. This proves that 3.2.7. is consistent. We conclude that T is consistent and possesses a model M*. M * is an elementary extension of M since it satisfies S ( M ) and it is an elementary extension of M' since it satisfies S ( M ' ) . This concludes the proof 3.2.5. We shall now consider the question to what extent we may assign the cardinal number of an extension in which we are interested, arbitrarily. By the cardinal number of a structure, without reference to a relation of equality, we mean the cardinal number of its set of individuals. Given a structure M of cardinal 01, we may find an elementary extension of M of a preassigned cardinal 01' > a in the following trivial fashion. We choose a set of individuals, B, whose elements do not belong to the set of individuals A of M , such that B is of cardinal a' or a' - CY according as a' is infinite or finite. We also select an arbitrary but definite element a of A . The structure M' with set of individuals A U B is then defined as follows. For any relation R (XI, .. ., x,) which is contained in M , R (a:, .. .,a;) shall hold in M ' , a;, . . ., a; E A u B if R(a1, . . . an) holds in M where ac = a; if u; E A and a6 = a if a; E B. The structure M' obtained in this way is an extension of M . We wish to show that it is more particularly, an elementary extension of M , i.e. that all elements of S ( M ) hold in M' or, which is the same, that any sentence which is defined in M and holds in M' holds also in M. Again, it is clearly sufficient to prove the assertion for sentences in prenex normal form since all other sentences are equivalent to sentences of this kind. We map any X' E S ( M )which is in prenex normal form on a sentence X E S ( M ) by replacing any b which occurs in X' by the particular element U E A .In particular, if X' does not contain any elements of B then X' -+X = X ' , i.e. X ' is mapped on itself. Accordingly we shall have proved the theorem if we can show that
60
SOME CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF MODEL THEORY
[3.2.
X holds in M if X' holds in M'. If X' is of order 1 then X holds in M if and only if X' holds in M', by the definition of M'. If X' is free of quantifiers, then it is obtained from certain sentences of order one by the same successive application of connectives by which X is obtained from the corresponding sentences of order one (which are defined in M). It follows that for such sentences also X holds in M precisely when X' holds in M'. For general sentences in prenex normal form we only have to prove that if X' holds in M' then X holds in M and we do this by induction with respect to the number of quantifiers in X'. The assertion is correct if the number of quantifiers is zero. Also if X' = [ (3y) 2' (y)] holds in M' and X' +X = [ (3y) Z ( y ) ] , then Z'(b') holds in M' for some b' E A u B. But Z' (b') +Z ( b ) where b E A and so Z ( b ) holds in M. Hence [ (3y) Z (y)] holds in M , as required. Again, if X' = [ (Vy) Z' (y)] holds in M' and X'+2 = [ (try) 2 (y)] then Z'(b') holds in M' for all b' E A u B and so Z ( b ) holds in M for all b E A. Hence [ (Vy) Z (y)] = X holds in M as required. In spite of the length of the above proof, the result is fairly obvious. There is however a more interesting problem regarding the cardinality of an extension which applies only to systems that include a relation of equality. Thus, let M be a structure which contains a relation of equality. When talking of the cardinal number of M one usually assumes that M is normal. Thus two distinct individuals a, b of M are never equal in the sense of the relation E(x, y), i.e. E(u, 6) holds in M (see section 2.1. above). When M is not normal one implicitly takes the cardinal of the corresponding normal structure, or, which is the same, the cardinal number of the set of equivalence classes of the individuals of M with respect to the relation E(x, y). Let M be a structure with relation of equality such that M is of finite cardinal a, in the sense just defined. In that case, it is not difficult to see that there does not exist any elementary extension of M which is of greater cardinal, indeed there does not exist any normal proper extension of M which is elementarily equivalent with M. For the sentence
-
(3x1)
- - - (3x4 (try)[w, y ) v - v E(xa, y ) ] * *
holds in M but it does not hold in any normal proper extension M' of M whose cardinal, a', is greater than a. The situation is quite different if a is infinite. Suppose first that the number of relations defined in a does not exceed a. In that case the
3.2.1
61
THE EXTENSION OF MODELS
number of sentences in S ( M ) must be of cardinal a also. For by considering all possibilities for sentences which involve 1,2, 3, ..., n, ... atomic symbols, we find that the number of different sentences in S ( M ) cannot exceed a + a 2 + a 3 + . . . + a ~ + . . . = a + a + a + . . . = a . On the other hand, by considering the set of all sentences E (a,b,) where a is an arbitrary but fixed individual of M and b, varies over all the individuals of M which are different from (not equal to) a,we see that the cardinal of S ( M ) cannot be less than a.
-
3.2.8. THEOREM. Suppose that the number of relations in a structure M with equality E ( x , y ) does not exceed the number, a, of different individuals, which is infinite. Then there exists an elementary extension M' of M which is of cardinal a and which contains at least one element that is not equal to any element of M. Moreover, for any cardinal a' > a there exists an elementary extension M' of M which is of cardinal a. To prove the first part of the theorem, we select an individual c which is not contained in M and we then define K as the set of all sentences E(c, b,J where b, varies over all elements of M. Let H = S ( M ) U K. Then we claim that H i s consistent. Indeed, if H where contradictory then a finite subset of H would be contradictory. It follows, that for some finite subset K of K and for some finite S' c S ( M ) the set S' U K' would be contradictory. K' cannot be empty for S(M)alone is certainly consistent. Let
-
K' = {- E(c, bl), . . .,
N
E(c, b k ) } ,
k 2- 1
and let X be the conjunction of all element of S'. Then X also belongs to S ( M ) . If H is contradictory, so is
Y =X A
-
E(c, bi) A
... A
N
E(c, h)
which is the conjunction of the elements of H'. Thus we have for any arbitrary sentence Z of L, e.g. 2 = [A n A], for some relation A of order 0, that Y =I 2 is a theorem. It then follows from the third rule of 1.3.3. that Y =I 2 also is a theorem, where (for a suitable variable z which does not appear in X) N
-
Y' = ( 3 z ) [ X A E(z, bl) A
... A
N
E(z, b k ) ]
But if so then Y' also must be contradictory, and the same then applies to
Y" = X A [ ( 3 ~ ) [ - E(z, b ~A)
... A - E(z, b k ) ] ]
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SOME CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF MODEL THEORY
[3.2.
Y” hoIds in M for this is true of X,and also of the second member of the conjunction, (32) [
N
E(z, bi) A
. .. A
-
E(z, bk)]
for the latter sentence states only that M contains an element different from bl, . . . b g , which is certainly true. Hence Y” is consistent, contrary to the conclusion reached on the assumption that H is contradictory. Hence H i s consistent and possesses a model M ’ . Moreover, a computation made at the end of section 1.5. (see Theorem 1.5.13.) shows that we may suppose that the cardinal of M’ does not exceed the number of sentences in H. But we have seen already that S ( M ) contains exactly a sentences, while it is evident that there are just a elements of K. Hence H contains a sentences, and we may suppose that M’ does not contain more than a different (unequal) individuals. On the other hand, M’ contains at least a different individuals, i.e. the elements b,. It follows that the cardinal of M’ is equal to that of M , i.e. a. At the same time, M’ contains the element c which is different from the elements of M . This proves the first part of the theorem. (From now on, whenever we introduce a quantified variable by virtue of the second or third rule of 1.3.3. it will be taken for granted that the variable so introduced did not occur previously in the sentence under consideration.) In order to prove the second part of the theorem, we choose a set of individual constants C = {c,} of cardinal a‘ such that C has no elements in common with the set of individuals of M , and we introduce the sets K1 = {,- B(c,, by) } where b, varies over a set of different elements of M as before and c, varies over all elements of C, and KZ = { w E(c,, c,)} where cg and c, vary independently over all elements of C. Then the cardinal number of K1 is a’ a = a’ and the cardinal number of K Z is a‘ * a‘ = a’. Consider the set
-
H = S ( M ) U Ki U K z
+ +
The cardinal number of H i s a a‘ a’ = a‘. We propose to show that H is consistent. If not, then (see the first part of the proof) there exist a single element X of S ( M ) and finite subsets K; and Ki of K1 and K2 respectively, such that {X}u K; U Ki is contradictory. K; consists of a finite number of sentences of the form ,- E(c,, by), and K i consists of a finite number of sentences of the form E(c,, c,). We denote the conjunction of all elements of K; u K i by Y(b1, ..., bj, c1, ..., CZ) where we have displayed all the individuals which appear in the sentence. Then N
3.2.1
63
THE EXTENSION OF MODELS
.
.
2 = X A Y(b1, . . , bj, c1, . ., CZ) is contradictory and this entails, similarly as before, that X A [ (321) . (323) Y (bl, ...,bj, z, ... Z I ) ] is contradictory. X holds in M since it is an element of S ( M ) , and ( 3 ~ .~. .) (3zj) Y (bl, . ., bj, ZZ, . ., ZZ) holds in M since it is equivalent to the existence of some b . ., b: in Mwhich satisfy Y (bt, . . .,bjYb t, . .,b *I). But the latter sentence holds in M for any choice of bT, . . ,b*, which are different from each other and different from bl, ... bj. And since the set of individuals in M is infinite, it is certainly possible to find b*,, ... b: of this description. We conclude that H is consistent and possesses a model M’. The cardinal of M’ is 2 a’ since the elements of C are all different (i.e. not equal) in M‘.On the other hand, since a’is the cardinal of H we may suppose, as before, that M’ has been chosen in such a way that its cardinal is not greater than a’.Hence M’ is of cardinal 01’. Moreover, M‘ is an elementary extension of M since it is a model of S ( M ) . This completes the proof of the theorem. In the usual algebraic structures, the number of relations is finite and includes a relation of equality. Thus, if the structure itself is infinite (with respect to E(x, y ) ) the conditions of Theorem 3.2.8. are satisfied. It is nevertheless of considerable interest to investigate the situation for the case that the number of relations exceeds the number of individuals. An examination of the arguments involved in the proof of 3.2.8. shows that if M includes a relation of equality E ( x , y ) and is infinite (with respect to E), and 01’ is any cardinal which is not smaller than the sum of the number of relations and individuals of M (i.e. the number of relations, if it exceeds the number of individuals), then there exists an elementary extension of M which is of cardinal a’. However, we may still ask, whether for the case that the number of relations of M exceeds the number of individuals, there exists a structure M’ which has the same cardinal as M and which is a non-trivial elementary extension of M in the sense that it contains at least one individual which is different from all individuals of M . In certain cases, the answer is negative, as shown by Theorem 3.2.9. below, which is due to Rabin. Let A be a countably infinite set and let a relation of equality E(x, y ) be defined in A such that E coincides with the identity. That is to say, E(a, a) holds for all a E A and E(a, b) does not hold for any two distinct elements a, b of A . Arrange A in an infinite sequence, A = {ao, al, az, . . .} and define that the relation P(az, ak) holds if and only if i < k . Thus, P is a relation of order defining an ordered set of type o.Finally suppose that to every subset B of A there is assigned a one-place relation Q B ( x )
.
T, .
..
.
.
.
64
SOME CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF MODEL THEORY
[3.2.
such that QB(u) holds if and only if a E B. All these relations together define a structure M with set of individuals A. Note that the number of these relations is 2N0. We shall make use of a result due to Sierpinski which states that there exists a collection R of countable subsets of A such that the cardinal of R is 2 N 0 , and such that the intersection of any two elements of R is finite. Thus, let B1, BZ be two elements of R, then there exists a sentence X B ~B~, which states that B1 and Bz have precisely n elements in common where n is a non-negative integer which depends on BI and Bz. A suitable formulation of X B B2 ~ is (3x1). .. ( W W y ) [ E ( x l yY ) A E h , Y ) A . . A E(xnyU) Q l (Y) A Qz ( Y ) ] where Ql and Qz are the one-place relations which correspond to Bi, and B2 respectively. The formulation has to be changed slightly if the intersection of B1 and Bz is empty.
-
3.2.9. THEOREM. Any elementary extension M' of M which contains at least one element that is different from all elements of M, possesses a cardinal which is greater than or equal to 2%O.
PROOF.Let
a be an element of M' which is not equal to any element of M. Then it is not difficult to see that P(at, a) holds for all as E A. Indeed, if P(a, at) held for some at E A, i > 0, then a would have to be equal to some ak E A, k < i, since the fact that there are just i - 1 elements of A which precede at in the ordering of A is expressible as a sentence of S ( M ) . At the same time (Vx)[P(at,x ) V P ( x , at) V E(x, at)] also is a sentence of S (M). This proves that P (at, a)holds in M'. Again, for i = 0, we cannot have E(at, a) and so P(ac, a) holds in M',as before, Now let B be any infinite subset of A and let Q B( x ) be the corresponding one-place relation. Then the following sentence belongs to S ( M ) .
('W(3~) [P( x , Y ) A Q B ( Y ) A
~(Y z) V , E ( Y , z ) ] ] ]. This sentence states that for every x there exists a y greater than x which is contained in By and which is the first element of B greater than x that is contained in B. In other words y is the first element after x which is contained in B. Since this sentence belongs to S ( M ) it holds also in M', [VZ)[QB(Z)
= ~ ( z x, ) v E(z, x) V
and so in particular, the sentence
(34 [P(a, V ) A Q B ( AA [ (VZ) [Q B (z) = p (z, a) v ~ ( za), V P (Y, z) v E (Y, 4 ] ]
3.3.1
65
THE PREFIX PROBLEM
holds in M'. Thus, there exists an individual U B in M' such that [(Z) [ Q B < Z >
[P(a, U B ) A Q B ( ~ B )A =P(z,a)VE(z,u)VP(uB,z)VE(Utr,z)]]]
and this element is unique (in the sense of the relation of equality). Now let B1 and BZ be two different elements of R and let UB = bl for B = El and UB = bz for B = Bz. We claim that bl and bz are different in M', E(b1, bz) holds in M'.Indeed, since X B ~ Qholds in M there exists an u k E A such that
-
(VY) [P( ~ k V, )
N
Q i (7) V
-
Qz
(Y)]
holds in M,and hence in M'.But P ( U k , a) and P(u, bl) and P(u, 62) all hold in M' and so bl and b2 are greater than U k in M' and, accordingly, cannot be equal. Now let A' be the set of all bj corresponding to sets El that belong to C. Then the bj are all different (not equal). Since C is of cardinal 2#0 and the mapping of C on A' is, as we have just shown, one-to-one, it follows that A' is of cardinal 2%O. Hence M' is of cardinal 2%Oat least. This proves the theorem. The above provides an important example of one of the various possibilities which arise if the conditions of Theorem 3.2.8. are not satisfied. 3.3. The Prefix Problem. Consider the class N of all wff X in prenex form in a language L of the Lower predicate calculus. We recall that such a wff X consists of two parts, its sequence of quantifiers or prefix, and the wff which follows upon the prefix and which is called the matrix of X . We now classify the sentences of N according to the nature of their prefix as follows. By a block of existential (universal) quantifiers in the prefix of a wff X of N we mean a sequence of consecutive existential (universal) quantifiers which cannot be extended to left or right (either because the next quantifier is of the other type or because the prefix begins or ends with the block in question). For example, the blocks of quantifiers in the sentence ( V 4 ( 3 4 (Vw)(W (34(34 Q (u,u7 w, x , Y,4 , where Q is the matrix, are (Vu), (h), (Vw) (Vx), (3y)(32). A wff N will be said to belong to the class Bn, n = 0,1,2, . . . if it contains not more than n blocks of quantifiers. Thus, the above-mentioned sentence belongs to En for n 2 4. Moreover, in B n we distinguish two subclasses as follows. An element X E Bn, n = 0,1, 2, .. . will be said to belong to An, if either
66
SOME CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF MODEL THEORY
r3.3.
X contains less than n blocks of quantifiers (i.e. X belongs also to B,-.I) or it contains exactly n blocks of quantifiers of which the first block consists of universal quantifiers. X E Bn will be said to belong to En, again if either X is also in B,-1 or if it contains precisely n blocks beginning with a block of existential quantifiers. Thus B , = A , = E , and, in general B, = A , u En. There are other classifications of the wff of N according to the nature of their prefix, e.g. by taking into account the number of individual quantifiers which appear in each block. The prejix problem deals with the question of discovering set-theoretic (or model-theoretic) properties which characterize the varieties of structures that are given by sentences with prefixes of a certain class. We do not try to delimit the kind of property that we have in mind by any formal definition, but we shall show that, for some classes of sentences at least, the answers that have been provided to the prefix problem are simple and striking. A sentence X will be called persistent under extension if whenever X holds in a structure M it holds also in all extensions of M . X will be called persistent under restriction if whenever X holds in a structure M it holds also in all substructures of M that contain the individuals of X . If X is persistent both under extension and under restriction if will be called invariant. X is persistent without qualification shall mean ‘Xis persistent under extension’. In concrete cases, it is usually more interesting to consider, not all structures, but only those structures, which are models of a certain set of axioms given in advance (e.g., to consider all groups, all fields). Thus, given a set of axioms K, X will be called persistent (under extension) with respect to K if whenever X holds in a model M of K it holds also in all models of K which are extensions of M. X will be called persistent under restriction with respect to K if whenever X holds in a model M of K it holds also in all substructures of M which are models of K and which contain the individuals of X. If X is persistent with respect to K both under extension and under restriction we say that Xis invariant with respect to K. We introduce similar definitions for the case that Xis replaced by a set of sentences, H . Later we shall require similar notions with respect to predicates and it will be appropriate to introduce them at this point. Let Q(x1, . ..,x,) be a predicate which is defined in a structure M , i.e. whose relations and individuals are contained in M . The n-dimensional Cartesian space Mn over M , n 2 1,is defined as the set of all n-element sequences (al, .. .,a,)
3.3.1
67
THJ3 PREFIX PROBLEM
with coordinates ag in Myi = 1, ...,n. These sequences are then called the points of Mn. We may if we wish identify M with MI. The predicate Q is said to hold at a pointP E Mn, P = (ax, . . ., an) if Q(m, ..., 0%) holds in M. Q is said to be persistent (under extension) at a point P E Mn if Q (a1, . . .an)holds in M and in all extensions of M . Q is persistent in M if it is persistent at all points of M n at which it holds. Finally, Q is persistent if it is persistent at all points at which it holds, over all structures in which it is defined. Similarly Q is persistent under restriction at a point P E Mn if Q(u1, . . ., an) holds in M and in all substructures of M which include the individuals of Q (a,. .., an). Q is persistent under restriction in M if it is persistent under restriction at all points of M at which it holds. If this is true for all structures in which Q is defined then Q is said to be persistent under restriction. If Q is persistent both under extension and under restriction, in connection with one of the three kinds of persistence just defined then Q is said to be invariant (at a particular point, in a given structure, or without any qualification). We may relativize these concepts, as before, by restricting our attention to models of a given set of axioms K. In that case, M also is supposed to be a model of K. For example, Q is persistent at a point P E M nover M if Q holds at P in M and in all extensions of M which are models of K. Q is persistent if it is persistent in all models of K. We may regard the definitions given earlier for the different types of persistence and of invariance as special cases of persistence of invariance of a predicate (with respect to a given set of axioms). It is not difficult to see that persistence in any of the above meanings is preserved under conjunction and disjunction. Thus, if two sentences X and Yare persistent under restriction with respect to a given set of axioms K then X A Y and X V Y are persistent under restriction, with respect to K , etc. If a sentence Xis not persistent (under extension) with respect to a set of sentences K , then it is not difficult to see that Xis not persistent under restriction, with respect to K. For the assumption is that there exist two models of K, M I and M2 such that M2 is an extension of M I and such that X holds in M I but not in M2, i.e. X holds in M2 and is defined in M I but does not hold in that structure. Conversely, if a sentence X is not persistent under restriction, with respect to a set of sentences K, then there exist models M1 and M Z of K , M Zan extension of M I and X defined in it such that X holds in M Zbut not in M I . Hence X holds in M I but not in M z . We conclude that X is persistent under extension with respect to a set of sentences K if and only if X is persistent under restriction with N
-
N
N
68
SOME CONCEPTS A N D METHODS OF MODEL THEORY
f3.3.
respect to K. It follows that Xis invariant with respect to K if and only if X is invariant with respect to K. A corresponding result holds for predicates. A set of sentences H is called conjunctive if for any X I and Xz in H there exists an X3 in H such that XI A XZE X3 is a theorem. H is conjuctive relative to a given set of sentencesK if for any XI, XZE Hthere exists an X3 E H such that K k X I A XZE X3. Exactly similar definitions lead to the notion of a disjunctive set, and of a set which is disjunctive relative to a given set. The discussion of the corresponding definitions for general wff requires some care. We shall say that a set of wff H is conjunctive if for any X I and XZin H there exists an X3 E H such that N
(Vy)
... (Vyn) [XiA Xz G X3]
is a theorem, where we have introduced universal quantifiers for all free variables contained in XIA XZE X3. Note, that according to this definition a set H which consists of the predicates Q ( x ) and R ( x ) may well be conjunctive, although the set J = {Q (x), R ( y ) } is not. Thus let A and B be two one place relations and let Q(x) = A(x), R ( x ) = A(x) A B ( x ) . Then (Vx) [Q ( x ) A Q ( x ) E Q ( x ) ] , (Vx) [R( x ) A R ( x ) R ( x ) ] , and ('W [Q ( 4 A R (4 E R ( x ) ] are all theorems, and so H is conjunctive. But neither ( V x ) ( V y ) [ Q ( x ) A R ( y ) Q ( x ) ] nor (Vx) (Vy) [Q ( x ) A R ( y ) R ( y ) ]is a theorem and so J is not conjunctive. - Conjunctivity relative to a given set of sentences and disjunctivity are defined correspondingly. It follows from an earlier remark that the set of all sentences H which is persistent (or, persistent under restriction) relative to a set of sentences K is conjunctive and disjunctive relative to that set. Also, if H is the set of all predicates with free variables XI, ...,X n which are persistent relative to a set K then H i s conjunctive and disjunctive. The same applies if we restrict H to a specified vocabulary. Again, the set BO= A0 = EOdefined at the beginning at this section is conjunctive and disjunctive and so are the sets A n and En. The set B1 is not conjunctive as will be shown later in this section. In order to appreciate that A n and E n are conjunctive, consider for example the class As. Typical elements of class A3 are
Xl
QI
... ( V W g ) (3x1). ..(3Xk) (Vy1) ... (Vyt) ...,wg, XI, ...,~ kJQ, , .. .,yg, ZI, . ..,~ j )
= (VWl)
(WI,
3.3.1
69
THE PREFIX PROBLEM
and
Xz
=WWl)
. . . ( V W k ) (3x1) . . . (3x1)(VZl) . . . (VZ,)
Q Z( ~ 1 ,. . ., WIG, XI, . . .,z,ZI, . . ., ~ mJQ, , . . .,y p )
whereg20, h > O , i > O , j > O , k > O , I > O , r n > O , p > O , a n d where we have displayed the free variables of X I and XZ respectively. Note that in this example, the variables of XIand XZoverlap. To find an appropriate X3, we first replace the variables wq, xq,zqin XZby sq, t,, uq and the variables y , in Xi by uq, respectively. The results are sentences X i and X i such that t. (VZl) . . . (VZj) [Xlz X i ] 1
(VYl) . . . )Vyp)[Xz3 Xi1
Note that in either sentences we have changed only the bound variables so as to avoid an overlap with the free or bound variables of the other sentence. We now define X3 by
. . . (vwg) (vsl) . . . (vspk)(3x1) . . . ( h h ) (ltl) .. . (3tl) Wdvl) . . . - - . (VUm) [QI (w1,. . ., wg, XI,. . .,xh, U1, . . .,UI, z1, .. .,zj) A QZ (~1,. . .,sk, 11, . . ., tt, ~ 1 ,. . .,Urn, .YI, . . .,~ p ) ] . - . (Vy’yp) [XI A XZ X3I Wzl) - - (Vzj)WY~)
X3 = (vwl) ( b t ) (VUl)
Then
is a theorem of the Lower predicate calculus, the interchange in the order of the quantifiers being permitted because of the elimination of any undesirable overlap of variables between X I and XZ.If by chance some free variables appear in both X I and XZthey have to be left unchanged. This example will serve to illustrate the general procedure. It is evident that if we restrict the classes An and En to the sentences contained in them, the resulting sets are still conjunctive and disjunctive. The same applies if we consider only wff or sentences which are defined in terms of a specified vocabulary. A sentence which belongs to the class A0 = Eo will be called quant$erfree. It is not difficult to verify (by means of an argument which has been applied previously to particular free sentences) that a quantifier-free sentence is invariant. A sentence X which belongs to the class A1 will be called a universal sentence,
X = (Vyi) ... (Vyd Q (yi,
... YIC)
where Q is the matrix and (hence) does not contain any further quantifiers. Suppose that X holds in a structure M and is defined in a substructure M‘
70
[3.3.
SOME CONCEPTS A N D METHODS OF MODEL THEORY
of M. That is to say, the individuals which occur in X are contained in M'. We claim that X holds in M'. Indeed, let al, . . .,Uk be any set of individuals which belong to M ' . Then Q(a1, . . ., a g ) holds in M and, being quantifier-free, holds also in M'. It follows that X holds in M'. In other words, Xis persistent under restriction. It is now natural to ask whether the converse is true, i.e. whether any sentence X which is persistent under restriction is by necessity universal. The answer to this is trivially false since, for example, all theorems are persistent under restriction. Clearly, all we can expect is that X be equivalent to a universal sentence, and this will indeed be shown to be true. In order to derive this result, we shall consider immediately a somewhat more general situation. Let K be a set of sentences (which will be kept constant throughout this discussion) and let X and Y be two sentences which are defined in K and hence, in all models of K. We wish to investigate under what conditions it is true that whenever X holds in a model M of K, Y holds in all substructures M' of M which are models of K. It is not difficult to see that this will be the case if there exists a universal sentence Z which is defined in K such that K t X 3 Z and K t Z 3 Y. Indeed, since X and X 3 Z hold in M , 2 holds in Myhence, as a universal sentence, 2 holds in M' and since Z 3 Y also holds in M' this shows that Y holds in M'. We shall now establish a theorem which shows that the converse is also true. 3.3.1. THEOREM. Let the sentences X and Y be defined in K such that whenever X holds in a model M of K, Y holds in all substructures of M which are models of K. Then there exists a universal sentence 2 which is defined in K such that K t X f> Z and K t Z 3 Y, i.e. the sentences X 3 2 and Z 3 Yare deducible from K.
PROOF.Let H be the set of all universal sentences W which are defined in K such that K t X 3 W . It will be seen that H is conjunctive and disjunctive. Consider the set J = K U H u { Y } .Suppose that J i s consistent and let M' be a model of J. It then follows from the assumptions of the theorem that there does not exist any extension M of M' which is a model of K such that X holds in M (otherwise Y would hold in M'). Hence, K u D' t X where D' is the diagram of M'. We conclude as usual that there exists a finite subset D* of D' such that K u D* !- X. Let Q (al, ...,a g ) be the conjunction of all elements of D*, where we have displayed the individuals which are not contained in K(if any). We may always suppose that D* is non-empty, if necessary by introducing an N
N
N
3.3.1
THE PREFIX PROBLEM
-
.
-
71
arbitrary element of D'. Then K t Q(a1, . ., ar) 3 X and so K t X 1 Q (al, . . ., ak:). Since al, .. ., ak: are not contained in K, and hence are not contained in X , we conclude further that
[ (VZI). ..( V Z [~ Q (zi, ...,zk:)]] where the variables z1, . . ., zk did not occur previously in Q. It follows that the sentence (Vz1) ... (Vzk)[- Q(z1, ...,zk:)] = W, say, is an K tX
2
-
.
element of H, and hence holds in M'. But W is equivalent to (321) , . (3zk) Q (ZI, .,zr) and this sentence holds in M' since Q (a,..,a#) is a conjunction of elements of the diagram of M' and hence holds in M'. Clearly W and W cannot hoth hold in M' showing that J is contradictory. It follows that there exists a finite subset H* of H such that K u H* u {- Y} is contradictory. We may suppose that H* is not empty. Indeed, for any relation A (XI, . . .,x,) which belongs to the vocabulary of K, n 2 0, the sentence (Vxl) . (Vx,) [ A(XI, . x), V A (XI, . .,x,)] belongs to H, and we may introduce such sentences into H* at our pleasure. Let 2 be a universal sentence which is equivalent to the conjunction of the elements of H*, then Z E H and K k [Z A Y].This entails K t 2 =) Y, i.e. 2 satisfies the conclusion of 3.3.1., the proof is complete. Suppose in particular that X coincides with Y.Then K t X G 2 and so we obtain the result
..
.
-
..
..
-
.
- -
3.3.2. THEOREM. Let X be a sentence which is defined in a set of sentences K such that whenever X holds in a model M of K it holds also in all substructures of M which are models of K (i.e. such that X is persistent under restriction relative to K). Then there exists a universal sentence Z which is defined in K such that K t- X 2. As they stand, these theorems become empty if Kis empty, since in that case there are no sentences X and Y as described. Nevertheless we may use a simple artifice in order to arrive at 3.3.3. THEOREM. Let Xand Y be two sentences such that whenever Xholds in a structure M and Y is defined in a substructure M' of M then Y holds in M'. Then there exists a universal sentence Z whose relations and individuals are contained in either X or Y such that X t 2 and 2 t Y. In order to reduce 3.3.3. to 3.3.1., we introduce a set of sentences K which consists of a finite number of theorems containing all relations and individuals which occur in X or Y and no others. Thus, if a relation
72
[3.3.
SOME CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF MODEL THEORY
A (x, .. .,x ) is contained in X or Y, n 2 0, then we may include in K the sentence (Vxl) .. . @xN)[ A(XI, ...,xn) V A (XI, . ..,xN).For any individual in X or Y, b say, we may include some A (b, . . ,,b) V A (b . . . b). With this definition of K, the assumptions of Theorem 3.3.1. are satisfied. Indeed, any structure M is a model of K provided only that all the relations and individuals which occur in X or Yare contained in K. Thus, if X holds in a model M of K, Y holds in all substructures of M which are models of K. It follows that for some universal Z which is defined in K, i.e. whose relations or constants are contained in either X or Y, X 3 Z and Z 3 Yare theorems, and this is the assertion. In particular,
-
N
3.3.4. THEOREM. Let X be a sentence which is persistent under restriction. Then there exists a universal sentence 2 whose relations and individuals are contained in X such that Z is equivalent to X . A sentence X which belongs to El is said to be an existential sentence. An existential sentence is persistent. Theorems 3.3.1.-3.3.4. give rise to corresponding results concerning existential sentences of which we mention the first two.
3.3.5. THEOREM. Let the sentences X and Y be defined in the set of sentences K such that whenever X holds in a model M of K, Y holds in all extensions of M which are models of K. Then there exists an existential sentence Z which is defined in K such that K t X 3 Z and K t Z 3 Y. Indeed, the conditions of 3.3.1. are satisfied, for the same K, if we replace X and Y in that theorem by the present Y and Xrespectively. Accordingly, there exists a universal sentence 2' = (Vy,) . . . (Vyk) Q ( y l , . .. yk) which is defined in K such that K t Y 13 Z' and K t 2' u - X I t f o l l o w s t h a t K t - Z ' = ) Y a n d K t X D - - ' . B u t - Z'is equivalentto Z = ( 3 ~ 1.).. ( 3 p ) [ Q ( y l , . . ,,yx)] and this is the required existential sentence. N
-
-
N
3.3.6. THEOREM. Let X be a sentence which is defined in a set of sentences K and persistent relative to it. Then there exists an existential sentence Z which is defined in K such that K t X 2. The proof is by reduction to 3.3.2. Some of the interrelations which are assumed in the above theorems, e.g., if X holds in a structure M then Y holds in all extensions of M in which it is defined, may be regarded as special kinds of consequence relations.
3.3.1
73
THE PREFIX PROBLEM
We may ask whether this consequence relation is subject to a principle of localization or some other principle of this kind. The answer is provided by
3.3.7. THEOREM, Let H be a set of sentences, X a sentence which holds in every extension M' of a model M of H such that Xis defined in M'. Then there exists a finite subset H' of H such that for any extension M' of a model M of H', X holds in M' provided only Xis defined in M'. PROOF.We relativize H with respect to a one-place relation R which is not contained in either K or X (compare section 3.1. above). Let the resulting set be HR. Then X holds in all model of HR in which it is defined. It fdlow that Xis deducible from a finite subset H I of HR. Let H2 be the finite subset of H whose transforms are included in HI. For any individual u such that R(a) E H I we add to HZa sentence of H which contains a. Let the result be H . Then X holds in all extensions M' of models of H' such that Xis defined in M', as required by 3.3.7. Similarly,
3.3.8. THEOREM. Suppose that the sentence X holds in all substructures M' of the models M of a given set of sentences H such that Xis defined in M'. Then there exists a finite subset H' of H such that X holds in all substructures M' of models of H' such that X is defined in M'.
-
-
For the proof, we now relativize X calling the result XR. Then H U XR) is contradictory, otherwise X R would hold in a model M of H which contains at least one element a that satisfies R ( x ) (i.e. such that R(u) holds in M). Hence X would hold in the substructure M' of M which is obtained by restricting the relations of M to the elements that satisfy R.This is contrary to the assumption of the theorem and shows that H u { [ ( 3 x ) R (x)] A X R } is contradictory. It follows that there exists a finite subset H' of H such that H' 1 [ ( 3 x ) R (x)] =I XR. H' satisfies the conditions of the conclusion of 3.3.8. 3.3.7. and 3.3.8. can again be relativized with respect to a given set of sentences K. For example, corresponding to 3.3.8. we have, assuming for simplicity that Xis defined in K,
{ [ (3x) R (x)] A
-
3.3.9. THEOREM. Suppose that the sentence X holds in all models of a given set of sentences K which are substructures of models of K u H. Then there exists a finite subset H of H such that X holds in all models of K which are substructures of models of K U H'.
74
SOME CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF MODEL THEORY
r3.3.
It will be sufficient to give the proof in outline. We note that K U H U KR u {- X R ) is contradictory, similarly as before and we deduce that K u H u KR u {- X R } is contradictory for some finite subset H of H. This is the required set. We are now in a position to prove the counterparts of Theorems 3.3.2. and 3.3.6. for sets of sentences.
u
3.3.10. THEOREM.Let H be a set of sentences which are defined in a given set of sentences K such that H i s persistent under restriction relative to K. That is to say whenever a model M of K is also a model of H, then all substructures of M which are models of K are also models of H.Then there exists a set J of sentences which are defined in K and belong to A1 such that J is equivalent to H with respect to K, i.e. K u H I- J and K u JkH.
PROOF.Let J be the set of all universal sentences Y which are defined in K such that K U H t- Y. Then K U H t J. Let X E H then we have to show that K u J t X. Since X belongs to H, it holds in any substructure M'of a model of K u Hand such that M'is itself a model of K. It follows, by 3.3.9., that there exists a finite subset H' of H such that X holds in all models of K which are substructures of models of K u H'. Let Z be the conjunction of all elements of H .Then by 3.3.1. there exists a universal sentence W which is defined in K such that K t Z 3 W,K t W 3 X . But Z is a conjunction of elements of H, and so K U H t W, W belongs to J. Hence K t W 3 X entails K U J t X, which was the result to be proved. There is a corresponding result for persistence under extension. In that case, J is a set of existential sentences. Several of the above results can be adapted to predicates instead of sentences. For example 3.3.11. THEOREM. Let Q(x1 . . ., xn), n 2 1, be a predicate which is defined in a set of sentences K and persistent relative to it. Thus Q is persistent at all points in all spaces Mnover models M of K. Then there exists an existential predicate P(x1, . . ., xn) (i.e. a predicate which belongs to El) such that P(x1, .. ., xn) is defined in K and K t ('4x1)
. . . ( V X ~ )[Q (xi, . . .,x,)
P (XI, . . .,x.)].
PROOF.Excepting trivial cases, we may suppose that K contains at least one relation of positive order A(x1, . . ., xk). Now let al, . . .,an be a set
3.4.1
75
OBSTRUCTIONS TO ARITHMETICAL EXTENSION
of distinct individuals which do not appear in K and add to K a single theorem Ywhich contains al, . . .,an.Such a theorem is Y = [A (a,...,al) V A(a1, .. . a)]A [A(az, . ., U Z ) V A ( a z , . . U Z ) ] A .. . A [ A (an, . . ., an) V A (an . . an)]. Let K' = K u { Y } then the sentence X = Q (al, . . .,an)is defined in K' and is persistent relative to K, and hence, relative to K'. It follows by 3.3.6. that there exists an existentialsentence Z which is defined in K', 2 = P(a1, ...,an)say - where we have displayed only the individuals which are not included in K - such that K I- Q (al, . . .,an) P ( a , . . . an), or N
N
.
K I- Y =I [ Q ( a l ,
.
.
N
.. ., an)
P(a1,
. . ., an)].
But Y is a theorem and so
K I- Q(a1, . ..,a,)
Again, al,
G P(a1,
...,a n ) .
. ..,an do not appear in K and so finally
K I - ( x l ) ... ( x n ) [ Q ( x l ,..., x n ) - P ( x l ,
. e m ,
-
xn)]
This proves 3.3.11. It will be seen that the reduction of 3.3.11. to 3.3.6. involves only technicalities. This concludes our discussion of sentences or predicates that belong to the classes A1 and El. It is equally possible to find a satisfactory answer to the problem as regards sentences of the class Az. This will be done in the next section. 3.4. Obstructions to Elementary Extension. Let M be any structure and let M' be an extension of M. We say that M' obstructs M if there does not exist any extension of M' which is an elementary extension of M .
3.4.1. THEOREM.In order that a structure M be obstructed by one of its extensions, M', it is necessary and sufficient that there exist a sentence X E A1 such that X holds in M but not in M'.
PROOF.Let H = S ( M ) u D(M') where we recall that S ( M ) is the set
of all sentences which are defined and hold in M and D ( M ' ) is the diagram of M'. If H is consistent then it possesses a model, M * M* is an extension of M' since it is a model of D(M'), and it is an arithmetical extension of M since it satisfies the sentences of S ( M ) . But no such structure exists, by the assumption of the theorem and so H must be contradictory. Thus there exists a finite subset J of D ( M ) such that S ( M ) u J is contradictory. Let Y(a1, . . .,an) be the conjunction of all
-
76
[3.4.
SOME CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF MODEL THEORY
elements of J, where we have displayed the individuals which occur in Y and which do not belong to M, n 2 0.Then S ( M ) F Y(m, . ,an) and, since the al, ..., a, do not belong to M, S ( M ) F ( " X I )... (Vx,) [ Y(x1, . . .,x.)]. The sentence X = (Vxl) .. . (Vx,) [ Y(x1, . . . x,)] is defined and holds in M since it is deducible from S ( M ) and so it actually belongs to S ( M ) . On the other hand, since Y ( m , . . .,an) is a conjunction of elements of the diagram of M', it holds in M' and so therefore does the sentence (3x1) . . . ( 3 ~Y ~( x 1) , . . ., x,). But this sentence is equivalent to X and so the condition of the theorem is necessary. To prove sufficiency, let X be a sentence as described in 3.4.1., e.g. X = (Vxl ). . . (Vx,) Y ( X I , . . ., x,) where Y does not contain any further quantifiers. Then X and hence, the sentence 2 = (3x1) . . (3xn)[- Y(x1, .. ., x,)] holds in M', by assumption. But 2 is an existential sentence and so it holds in all extensions of M'. On the other hand 2 is defined but does not hold in M since X holds in that structure. It follows that there does not exist any extension of M' which is an elementary extension of M . This proves 3.4.1. Let it4 be a structure and let K be a set of sentences. K may include relations that are not contained in M. When saying that a model M' of K' is an extension of M , we shall ignore such relations. In this sense, we shall say that K' obstructs M if every model M' of K' which is an extension of M, obstructs M .
..
N
-
N
-
-
.
3.4.2. THEOREM. In order that the set of sentences K' obstruct the structure M , it is necessary and sufficient that there exist a sentence X B AI, such that Xis defined and holds in M and Xis deducible from K'. N
PROOF.Suppose that X is a sentence of the kind described in 3.4.2., and let M be an extension of M and a model of K'.Then Xis defined N
in M' since it is defined in M and it holds in M' since it is deducible from K'. On the other hand, X holds in M. Hence, no extension of M' can be an elementary extension of M, by 3.4.1. Thus the condition is sufficient. It is also necessary, for suppose that it is not satisfied and let H be the set of all sentences of class A1 which are defined and hold in M. Then K' U H must be consistent. For if K' is inconsistent, then the condition of 3.4.2. is satisfied, trivially. While if K is consistent but K' U H i s inconsistent then Y = [ X I A .. . A X,] is deducible from K for certain elements X I , . . .,X, of H, n 2 1. But A1 is conjunctive and so for some X that belongs to H, Z = X is deducible from K'. This shows that the condition of the theorem is satisfied, contrary to N
N
3.4.1
77
OBSTRUCTIONS TO ARITHMETICAL EXTENSION
assumption. It follows that K'
u
H is consistent and possesses a model
M'. M' is an extension of M since it ( M ' ) is a model of H and H contains
the diagram of M. Suppose that M' obstructs M. Then, by theorem 3.4.1., there exists a sentence X P A1 which holds in M but not in M'. Since X holds in M it belongs to H and so, must hold also in M'. This yields a contradiction and proves that the condition of the theorem is also necessary. A set of sentences K will be said to obstruct the set of sentences K if there exists a model M of K such that K' obstructs M.
3.4.3. THEOREM. In order that a set of sentences K' obstruct a set of
-
sentences K it is necessary and sufficient that there exist a sentence Y EA2, such that Y is defined in K' and deducible from it while Y is consistent with K (i.e. such that K U {- Y } is consistent).
PROOF.Suppose that the condition of the theorem is satisfied, and let M be a model of K u {- Y > .Since Y belongs to A2 it must be of the
form
Y
= (VXl)
... (VXk)($l)
. . (3ym) z(Xl, . . . *
y
k 2 0,m 2 0
X k , y1,
-
. . ., y m ) ,
where 2 does not contain any quantifiers. Y holds in M y so there exist individuals al, . . .,ak in M such that the sentence
x = (VYl) ... (Vym)[-
Z(a1,
.- .,
m
y
y1,
...,r m ) ]
holds in M. But Y is deducible from K' and so the same applies to the ~ (a, ) . . ., ak, yl, . . . , y m ) and hence to sentence (3yl) . . . ( 3 ~ Z (Vyl) . . . (Vym)[ Z(al, . . ,,ak, y l , . . .,ym)] which is X . This shows that the conditions of 3.4.2. are satisfied, K obstructs M , the condition of the theorem 3.4.3. is sufficient. In order to see that the condition of the theorem is also necessary, suppose that K' obstructs the model M of the set of sentences K. Then there exists a sentence X P AI,
-
N
x= VYl) ... (Vym) Z(a1, - -
*,
ak,yl,
.
*
.,ym)
where Z is free of quantifiers such that X holds in M and Xis deducible from K . In this connection, we have displayed the individuals al, . .., U K which are contained in X but not in K', if any. Applying the second rule of 1.3.3., we find that the sentence N
Y = (VXl)
. .. ( V X k ) (3y1) ... (3Ym) [
-
Z(X1,
*
. .,Xk, Yl, ... rm)] Y
78
13.4.
SOME CONCEPTS A N D METHODS OF MODEL THEORY
is deducible from K'. On the other hand, the sentence (3x1)
.. .
( 3 X k ) (Vy1)
..
*
(Vym) z (x1,
. . .,Xk, y1, . .,y m ) *
-
holds in M (since X holds in M). This sentence is equivalent to Y which therefore holds in M. It follows that Y is consistent with K, since the elements of that set all hold in M. This concludes the proof of 3.4.3. Now let X be any sentence of class A2, and let {Mr} be a monotonic set of models of X. Then it is not difficult to see that X holds in U { M y } = M. V Indeed, suppose that X is given by N
. . .Wxn)(3y1) . . .(3ym) Z ( X 1 , . . .,Xn,y1, . . * ,y m ) where Z does not contain any further quantifiers. The corresponding open form sentence is 3.4.4. X = Wx1)
3.4.5.
Z(x1,
. . .,x n , ~ l ( x 1 ., - ., xn), - .., qm(x1, - .,,xn))
and we have to show that there are functions of n variables which realize the functors pg(XI, ...,xn) such that
z (a1, . ..,an, p (a1, . .,an), . pm (a1, - . . an) holds for all al, ...,an in M. Now for every sequence (a,...,a,) * *Y
Y
in M we can find an Mv which contains all elements of the sequence, although the choice of Mv is not general unique. We select the functional values of the p~in M for xg = at, i = 1, . . . n as any possible set of values of the p in M,,. Such values exist since M,, satisfies X. This proves our assertion. A sentence X i s called o-persistent if whenever X holds in all elements of an increasing sequence of structures ( M n } , n = 1,2,3, . . ., then X holds also in (Ma}. (Mn) is increasing if Mn C Mk for n < k. We haveproved n
u
3.4.6. THEOREM. Any sentence X
E
A Zis o-persistent.
It has been shown by EoS and Suszko that the converse of 3.4.6. is also true (Theorem 3.4.9. below). We consider a somewhat more general situation, as follows. A sentence X is said to be a-persistent with respect to a given set of sentences KOif the following condition is satisfied. Let (Mn},n = 1,2, . .. be any increasing sequence of structures, and let M = U {Mn}. Then if MI, M2,
n
... are models of KOand of X and M is a model of KO,M is also
a model of X.
3.4.1
79
OBSTRUCTIONS TO ARITHMETICAL EXTENSION
We introduce a similar definition for a set of sentences H in place of the single sentence X. 3.4.7. THEOREM. If a set of sentences H is a-persistent with respect to a set of sentences KOthen there exists a set of H' of sentences of class Az such that H i s equivalent to H' with respect to KO.
PROOF. Let H' be the set of sentences of class A2 which are defined in, and deducible from, H U KO.We propose to show that H is deducible from H' u KO.This will prove the theorem. Suppose on the contrary that there exists an X E H which is not deducible from H u KO.Then the set K = H' u KO U { X } is consistent, and possesses a model, M I . Suppose that H u KOdoes not obstruct K. Then there exists an extension M2 of M I which is a model of H u KO such that some extension M3 of M2 is an elementary extension of M I . M3 is a model of K so there exist extensions M4 of M3 and M5 of M4 such that M4 is a model of H U KOand M5 is an elementary extension of M3. Continuing in this way, we obtain an increasing sequence of structures {Mn} such that M 2 k is a model of H U KOand M2k+l is an elementary extension of MZk-1, k = 1,2, ... Then
-
kf =
(Mn)
n
-
=
u k
(kf2k)
=
u
{M2k+l)
k
is an elementary extension of each M2k+l (as proved in section 3.2.) and, accordingly satisfies X and KO. But M is also a model of H since H is a-persistent with respect to KOand the MZk satisfy H and KO,while M satisfies KO. Hence, M satisfies X . This is impossible and shows that H u KOobstructs K. Hence, by 3.4.4. there exists a sentence Y of class A2 which is defined in, and deducible from, H u KO,while Y is consistent with K. But Y EH ,by the definition of H', and H' c K. Accordingly, Y belongs to K, a contradiction. It follows that H' U KO t X for all X E H, as required. This completes the proof of 3.4.7. Now suppose that the set H in 3.4.7. contains a single sentence, X. Then the theorem shows that there exists a set of sentences, H' c A2 such that { X } u KO !- H' and H U KO !- X . Hence, there exists a finite subset H*of H' such that { X } U KO t H * and H * u KO t X. LetX* be a sentence of class A Z which is equivalent to the conjunction of the elements of H*. Such a sentence exists since A Z is conjunctive. Then { X } u KO t X * and { X * } U KO t X and so KO t X z X * . Hence
-
3.4.8. THEOREM. If a sentence X is a-persistent with respect to a set
80
SOME CONCEPTS A N D METHODS OF MODEL THEORY
p.5.
of sentences& then there exists a sentence X * E AZsuch that KO k X E X*. In particular, if KOis empty, we obtain 3.4.9. THEOREM. If a sentence X is a-persistent then there exists a
sentence X *
E
A2 such that Xis equivalent to X*.
3.5. Convex Systems. We shall now consider an important class of sets of axioms which are characterized by the set-theoretic properties of the varieties of structures which belong to them. We suppose throughout this section that a relation of equality is included in the sets of axioms and structures under consideration. Moreover, unless the matter is raised specifically we shall assume that the relation of inclusion between two structures is always normal (compare section 2.1.). That is to say, if M c M' and a and b are two individuals of M' such that E(a, b) holds in M' and a belongs to M then b also belongs to M . A fundamental property common to all the usual algebraic concepts is, roughly speaking, that the intersection of two models, or indeed of any number of models, is again a model. Accordingly, we introduce the following definition. A set of sentences K which includes a relation of equality E is called convex if for any two models M I and M2 of K that are included in a model M of K the intersection M I n MZ is again a model of K provided it is not empty. By the intersection of M I and M2 regarded as a structure we mean the restriction of M to the intersection of M I and M Z(provided that set is not empty). It is not difficult to check that the sets introduced earlier for groups, rings, and fields are all convex. It is important to bear in mind the condition that M is a model of K and a normal extension of M I and Ma. For example, if we take K = KG, a set of axions for the notion of a group, and drop either of these conditions then the intersection M I n M Zmay well be non-empty without constituting a group. A natural example of a set which is not convex is provided by the concept of a densely ordered set with different first and last elements. 3.5.1. THEOREM. Let { M y }be a monotonic set of models of a convex set of axioms K. Then A4 = U { M y }is a model of K. V
PROOF.Let D be the diagram of M. Then the diagrams D,of the structures M y are subsets of D. Consider the set of sentences K u D. This set is consistent. For if D' is any finite subset of D then there exists an M , such
3.5.1
81
CONVEX SYSTJlMS
that D' c D,. But M y satisfies K, and so K U Dv is consistent, and the same applies a fortiori to K U D' which is a subset of K U Dy.It follows that K u D is consistent and possesses a model M*. M * contains A4 as a substructure which is not necessarily normal. However, this situation can be corrected without difficulty by replacing any individual a of M * which is outside M but equal to an element b of M simply by that b. Now let R ( x ) be a one-place relation that is not contained in M. For any a E M * , R (a) is defined to hold precisely when a is in M. We call the structure which is obtained from M * in this way, MR.We propose to show that M is a model of K. Let D* be the diagram of M * and let K R be the relativized transform of K with respect to R (see section 3.1. above). Consider the set
H = D* U K U K R U {R(uA), R(bJ, [ W'dx) (VY) [JV, Y ) A R (4 R ( Y ) ]I N
= I
where ax varies over the elements of M and bp varies over the elements of M * - M . We claim that H i s consistent. Otherwise, there exist elements al, . ., at in M and bl, .., b , in M* - M such that the set
.
.
...,
H ' = D' U K U KR U {R(ai), R(uz), R (bl), * * * Y R (bm),( V X ) WY) [ W Y Y ) A R (4 = R ( Y ) ] I N
is contradictory. Now, there exists an M y which contains all individuals al, .., at. Consider the structure M' which is obtained from M* by introducing the relation R into M* in such a way that R(a) holds in M' if and only if a is in M . Then R(al), . . ., R(az), holds in M' while R (bl), . . ., R (bm)does not hold in it. Moreover, M * is a model of D* and K, and is a normal extension of My. It follows that H' holds in M', be a model of H. Then W is a H is consistent, H is consistent. Let model of Kand an extension of M*. By a suitable choice of the individuals is a normal extension of M*. On of A?, we may ensure, as before, that the other hand, W is a normal extension of the structure W Rwhich is the restriction of the relations of i@ to the set of elements for which R ( x ) holds in A?. If we disregard the relation R in i @we ~ obtain a model &TO of K which is an extension of M . Hence the intersection M * n must be a model of K and an extension of M. But this intersection actually coincides with M since all elements of M* which are not in M satisfy R ( x ) in i@ and therefore cannot belong to W R and to Hence M * n i@o = M is a model of K, proving 3.5.1. The theorem shows that a convex set of axioms is o-persistent. This
.
a,,
-
no.
82
13.5.
SOME CONCEPTS A N D METHODS OF MODEL THEORY
implies, by 3.4.9. that it is equivalent to a set of sentences of class As. However, the converse is not generally true. Thus, if we add to the axioms for a commutative field KCFan axiom which states that the polynomial x3 - 2 possesses a root, then the resulting set is a-persistent but not convex. 3.5.2. THEOREM. Let { M y }be a set of models of a convex set of axioms K such that all M , are contained in a joint extension M which is a model of K. Suppose that { M y }= M' is not empty. Then M' is a model of K. V
The intersection (I{ M y }regarded as a structure is the restriction of M to
n {My} regarded as a set. V
V
PROOF,Let D be the diagram of M and, for any My, let D, c D be the diagram of Mv. Introduce a new one-place relation R ( x ) and consider the following set of sentences H = D U K U KR U { R @A),
-
R ( b d ,(VX)(VY) [E(x,Y ) A R (4 3 R W] }
where aA varies over all elements of M' and bp varies over all elements of M - M'. If H is not consistent then there exist elements al, . . ., a2 in M' and bl, . . .,bm in M - M' such that the following set, H is contradictory
H =D U K But M' =
.
-
KR U (R(uI), . ., R(uz), R(bl), (W (VY) v) A R (XI = R ( Y ) ] -
U
[m,
n {My},so there exists a particular
.
...,
-
R(bm)
belonging to that set
such that M f iincludes al, . . .,al but excludes bl, . .,bm. It follows that if we introduce a relation R into M such that R (a) holds if and only if a belongs to M f ithen the resulting structure is a model of H'. We conclude that H is consistent and possesses a model M *. Now consider the intersection M A n M*, where MAis an arbitrary element of the set {My} and M*, is obtained by restricting M* to the set of elements that satisfy R ( x ) and by neglecting the relation R in the resulting structure. Then M * may be supposed to be a normal extension of M and hence of MA, as before, and M * is a normal extension of M*,, since it satisfies V(x)(Vy) [ E ( x ,y ) A R ( x ) 1 R ( y ) ] . Hence M A n M*, is a model of K. We claim that this structure coincides with M'. Indeed, by the definition of H, M c M A n M*,. On the other hand, if a E M A does not belong to M' = { M y }then R (a)holds in M * and so a does not belong to M*,. V
V
-
3.5.1
CONVEX SYSTEMS
83
Hence M’ = M A n M*, is a model of K, as required. This completes the proof of 3.5.2. A set K is called strongly convex if it is convex and if the intersection of any set of models of K which are contained jointly in a model of K,is not empty. As a simple example of a set K which is convex but not strongly convex we consider the set K which consists of the usual axioms of equivalence for the relation E ( x , y) (2.1 .l.above). Clearly any substructure of a model of K satisfies K, but the intersection of two such structures may well be empty. On the other hand if K contains at least one individual a and is convex then it must be strongly convex, since all models of K must contain a. Let K be strongly convex. Any model M Oof K which is such that no proper substructure M‘ of MO(M’ # Mo) is a model of K will be called a core model of K. Let M be any model of K. Then M contains a unique core model Mo, the intersection of all substructures of M which are models of K. MOis called the core of M. Let K = KCF,a set of axioms for the notion of a commutative field, then the core models of K are precisely the prime fields of the various characteristics p = 0,2, 3, 5,. , . Let K be convex, M a model of K and S a non-empty set of individuals of M . Then the intersection of all substructures of M which contain S and are models of K is again a model of K. It will be said to be generated by S. Varying this situation we consider a substructure M’ of M which is a model of K and a set S of individuals of M which do not belong to M‘. Then the intersection M’(S) of all substructures of M which are models of K and contain both M’ and S is said to have been obtained by the adjunction of S to M. If S contains a single element only, S = {a}, then we write M’ (a) instead of M ( S ) and we say that M’ (a) is a simple extension of M’. In algebraic field theory and in its extensions and related theories one tries to gain an insight into all possible extensions of a model of the set of axioms under consideration by first studying the simple extensions of the given model. All other models are then obtained by the successive adjunction of single elements. The same procedure can be applied to arbitrary convex systems as is shown by the following theorem. 3.5.8. THEOREM. Let M be a model of a convex set of axioms K and let M’
be a substructure of M which is a model of K , M’ c M. Then there exists a well-ordered sequence { M y }of models of K such that MO= M’, if v is not a limit number then M vis a simple extension of MY-1; if v is a limit
84
SOME CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF MODEL THEORY
[3.6.
limit number then, Mi is defined as the union of all M p for p < v, and MV is a simple extension of M i ; finally, M is the union of all M7. In order to show that there exists a sequence {Mv) as described, we select a choice function f ( M * ) which assigns to every substructure M * of M which is different from M and which is a model of K, an element of M which does not belong to M * . The transfinite sequence (My} is now defined by transfinite induction. We first define MO = M'. Suppose that M y has been defined for all ordinals v < p. If p is not a limit number and M A is a proper substructure of M (i.e. MA # M ) where 3, is the predecessor of p then we put M p = MA MA)). If M A = M , we put MP = M . If p is a limit number and { M y }= M : is a proper
n
V1
substructure of M , we put Mh = M r ( f ( M * J ) . If M* = M then we put Mh = M . By this definition all structures Mh and M : (where MZ is defined only for limit ordinals p) are models of K. From some ordinal rl onward all Mh are equal to M where the cardinal of Iz cannot exceed the cardinal of M . In other words the procedure terminates as soon as MA= M . Thus, all extensions of M' which are models of K can be obtained by the successive adjunction of single elements. The notion of convexity will be applied later, in Chapter VI, in order to elucidate certain standard concepts of Algebra.
3.6. Model-consistency. Let K be a consistent set of sentences. The sentence X will be said to be model-consistent with K if for every model of K, the set K U D ( M ) U { X } is consistent, where D ( M ) is the diagram of M, as usual. Thus, X is model-consistent with K if and only if for every model M of K there exists a structure M' which is an extension of M and a model of K such that X holds in M'. Similarly,the set of sentences H is model-consistent with K if K U D ( M ) u H is consistent for all models M of K.
3.6.1. THEOREM. Let K be a consistent set of sentences which belong to the class A2 and let X be a sentence of that class, where Z is an existential predicate. In order that X be model-consistent with K i t is necessary and sufficient that for every model M of K and for every set al, .. ., a,, of elements of M , there exists an extension M' of M which is a model of K such that the sentence Z(a1, .. ., an) holds in M'.
3.6.1
85
MODEL-CONSISTENCY
PROOF.The condition is necessary. For if the model M of K contains elements al, . . ., a n and if X is model-consistent with K then there exists an extension M' of M which is a model of K such that X holds in M'. But X
3
Z(a1,
.. .,a,)
is a theorem and so Z(a1, . . .,a,) also holds in M'. To show that the condition is also sufficient, suppose that it is satisfied, for given K and X , and consider any model M of K. Let S be the set of all sentences Z(a1, . . ., an) where al, . . .,an is any array of n individuals of M , and let D be the diagram of M . We claim that K U D U S' is consistent for any finite subset S' of S. Indeed, let S' = (21,. . ., Zm} where 2, = ~ ( a i.,..,a:), j = 1,
..., m
and where the a{ are individuals of M. Then K U D U { Z l } is consistent according to the condition of the theorem. Let M(1) be a model of K u D u { Z l } and let D(l) be the diagram of M ( 9 . Then the condition of the theorem ensures that K U D(1) U ( 2 2 ) is consistent and possesses a model M(2) with diagram D(Z). M(2) satisfies also Z1, since 2 1 is existential. Similarly, the model K u D(2) U ( 2 3 ) is consistent, and possesses a model M ( 3 )which satisfies Z l , Z z , Z3. Continuing in this way, we finally obtain a model M(mt of K which is an extension of M and which satisfies (21, . ..,Z,} = S'. Hence K U D U S' is consistent. Since this is true for any finite subset S' of S, K u D U S is consistent. Let M I be a model of K u D u S, with diagram D1, and let SIbe the set of all sentences Z(m, . . ., a,) with al, . .., a n in M I . Then K U Di u S1 is consistent, similarly as before, and possesses a model M Zwith diagram Dz.Let S2 be the set of all sentences Z (a,. ..,a,) with ar, . . ,a n in Mz,then K u D Z u S2 is consistent and possesses a model M3. Continuing in this way, we obtain a sequence of models of K,
.
.
T = { M I ,Mz,. ., Mk...}
such that Mk c Ma for k
< I.
Let M* =
u k
(kfk}.
Then M * is an
extension of M which satisfies the sentences of K since these sentences are of class Az. Now let al, ..., a, be any set of individuals in M * . Then a, . . ., an E Mk for some positive integer k. By our construction, the sentence Z (al, ...,an) holds in Mk+l and hence in MZfor all I > k, and SO in M*. This shows that X = (Vyi) . . . ( V y n ) Z ( y l , . . . y,) holds in M * which is an extension of M and a model of K. The proof of 3.6.1. is now complete.
86
[3.7.
SOME CONCEPTS A N D METHODS OF MODEL THEORY
The same method of proof leads to the following theorem which is a slight generalization of 3.6.1. 3.6.2. THEOREM. Let K be a consistent set of sentences of class A2 and let H be a set of sentences of the same class, H = {X?} when
xv = (VYl) .. . (Vyn) zv (Yl, - . .,Y n J ,
n 2
0
9
Zvexistential. In order that H be model-consistent with K, it is necessary and sufficient that for every model M of K and every Zv,and for every set of elements al, .. .,an, of M ythere exists an extension M‘ of M which is a model of K such that Zv(al, . . ., any)holds in M‘.
The only noticeable difference in the situation is that we now have to consider finite sets of sentences S’ whose elements are obtained by substituting individuals for the variables in different Zv.Apart from that, the proof proceeds exactly as before. 3.6.2. may be used in place of Zorn’s lemma, or the well-ordering theorem in order to show that every field can be embedded in an algebraically closed field. Thus let K = K C Fbe a set of axioms for the notion of a commutative field as in 2.2, so that the sentences of K belong to class Az. Let H = { Y,}, n = 2,3,, . . be a sequence of sentenceswhich state that every monic polynomial of degree n possesses a root. All these sentences also may be supposed to belong to class A2. The condition of 3.6.2. requires that every particular monic polynomial with coefficients in a given field M possesses a root in some extension of M. Supposing that this has been established, by the familiar construction of KroneckerSteinitz, we may conclude by means of 3.6.2. that every commutative field can be embedded in an algebraically closed commutative field. This argument is not sufficient to prove that every field possesses an algebraically closed algebraic extension. 3.7. Problems 3.7.1. Prove the following theorem. In order that any two models of a set of axioms K that have only individuals of K in common, possess a joint extension it is necessary and sufficient that the set of sentences which are defined in K and are consistent with K be conjunctive. The sentence Xis said to be consistent with K if K u { X } is consistent. 3.7.2. Prove that the concept of a ring cannot be formulated in terms of sentences of class B1 (i.e. existential and universal sentences) alone.
3.7.1
PROBLEMS
87
3.7.3. Prove the following theorem. In order that a sentence X be such that whenever X holds in a structure M then it holds also in the homomorphic images of all extensions of M it is necessary and sufficient that X be equivalent to an existential sentence whose matrix is a conjunction of atomic wff. 3.7.4. Give another example of a consistent set of axioms which is a-persistent but not convex. 3.7.5. Prove the following theorem. In order that a sentence X be modelconsistent with a set of sentences K i t is necessary and sufficient that for any existential sentence Y which is defined in, and consistent with, K the sentence X A Y also be consistent with K. References. For some uses of Skolem functors see Herbrand 1928 and Hilbert-Bernays 1934/1939. For the operation of relativization see Herbrand 1928 and Tarski-Mostowski-Robinson 1953. The notion of an elementary extension is introduced in Tarski-Vaught 1957. Another version of 3.2.5. is proved by the present method in A. Robinson 1956b (with the weaker conclusion that there exists a joint extension M* which is elementarily equivalent to M and W ) .The present version was given by Keisler For the remainder of section 3.2., compare A. Robinson 1951 and Rabin 1959. The theorem of Sierpinski's which is used in the proof of 3.2.9. is given in Sierpinski 1928. The notion of persistence is introduced in A. Robinson 1951. Theorem 3.2.9. is proved in Los 1955a and A. Robinson 1956c. It is a generalization of Theorem 3.2.4. which is given in Tarski 1954/1955. The argument in section 3.3. follows A. Robinson 1962. Theorem 3.4.9. is proved in LoS-Suszko 1957 and in Chang 1959. For the method and other results of section 3.4. compare A. Robinson 1959a. Additional work on the prefk problem is summarized in Lyndon 1959.3.5.1. is proved in A. Robinson 1951 on the basis of a somewhat stronger definition of convexity. Improvements are due to Chang 1959 and to Rabin, who suggested 3.5.2. Rabin has recently obtained a complete syntactical characterization of convex sets.
C H A P T E R IV
COMPLETENESS
4.1. A Test for Completeness. We recall (compare section 3.2.) that the
set of sentences K is said to be complete if for every sentence X which is defined in K (i.e. whose relations and individuals all occur in the sentences of K ) either X or X is deducible from K, in symbols, either R t X or K t X. There are two trivial cases when K is complete, one when K is contradictory, the other when K is empty. The following basic fact about completeness is due to Lindenbaum.
-
N
4.1.1. THEOREM. Let K be a non-empty and consistent set of sentences.
Then there exists an extension K' of K which contains no additional relations or individuals, such that K' is consistent and complete.
PROOF. Given K, non-empty and consistent as assumed in the theorem, let H be the set of all sentences which are defined in K,and let J = {Ky} be the set of all consistent subsets of H, which include K. Then J includes K. J is partially ordered by inclusion, and every totally ordered (i.e. monotonic) subset J' of J has an upper bound, which is the union of the elements of J', KOsay. Indeed, since J' is monotonic, every finite subset of KOis contained in some element of J', Hence, if KOwere contradictory
then some element of J' would be contradictory, and this is contrary to assumption. It now follows from Zorn's lemma that J contains at least one maximal element, K* say. K* is consistent and contains K . We shall show that it is also complete. Indeed, let X be any element of H, such that X i s not deducible from K*. Then we claim that X is deducible from K*. Consider the set K* u ( X } = K I . Since K* is maximal it follows that either Xis included in K* or Ki is contradictory. Since X is not deducible from K* it can certainly not be contained in that set. Hence K* u { X } is contradictory. It follows that there exists a finite subset of K * , e.g. the set { Y1, . . ., Ym}, such that { Y l , . . ., Ym, X } is contradictory and hence, such that X are theorems. [YI A . .. A Ym A X ] and Y i A , . . . A Ym 3 The last sentence shows that Xis deducible from K*, as asserted. Note
-
N
-
N
88
4.1.1
89
A TEST FOR COMPLETENESS
that if m = 0 to begin with, then we may always introduce arbitrary elements of Kin order to ensure that the implicans in Y1 A .. . A Ym 3 3 X i s not empty. Thus, the proof of 4.1.9. is complete. Except in the trivial case when K is itself complete, there are usually numerous complete extensions of K which are not equivalent to one another. Thus, let K be non-empty and consistent, and let X be a sentence of H such that neither Xnor Xis deducible from K . It follows that both KI = K U {- X > and Kz = K U { X } are consistent. Indeed, by an argument which has been used before and which will be used again in the sequel, if K I = K U {X} is contradictory then XI, . . . A X , A X is contradictory, for some XI, . . ., X n E K and so X I A . . ., AX, 3 Xis a theorem, Xis deducible from K . (In the trivial case that K is empty X is a theorem and is regarded as deducible from the empty set, by convention). K Z is consistent for an exactly similar reason. Hence, by 4.1.1 ., K1 and Kz, respectively, possess complete extensions K; and Ki. Thus K; and Ki are two distinct complete extensions of K. The importance of the notion of completeness for the mathematical applications is largely due to the fact that if we have established that two non-isomorphic structures are models of the same complete set of sentences K then every set of sentences which is defined in K and which holds in one of the structures holds also in the other one. Accordingly, it is of great interest to establish that certain familiar notions of Algebra are given by complete sets of axioms. A simple but effective test for completeness is as follows N
-
N
4.1.2. THEOREM (VAUGHT’S TEST).Let K be a consistent set of axioms which includes a relation of equality E ( x , y), and let a be the (finite or
infinite) cardinal of K. Suppose that all models of K are infinite and that for some infinite cardinal a’ 2 a all models of K are isomorphic (in the sense defined for sets with a relation of equality). Then K is complete. - If K includes any individuals then it is taken for granted that the models of K are isomorphic by mappings under which the individuals that are contained in K correspond to themselves. PROOF.Suppose that the conditions of 4.1.2. are satisfied and let X be a sentence which is defined in K. Then we have to show that either X or X is deducible from K. Suppose on the contrary that neither X nor Xis deducible from K then, by the usual argument, the sets K I = K U {- X} and KZ = K U {X}are both consistent. Their cardinal number is a 1, and since a’ is infinite we have a’ 2 a 1. It then follows from
--
+
+
90
comLJ3TENESs
[4.1.
Theorem 1.5.13. that there exist models M Iand M Zof KI and K2 respectively such that both M I and M Zare of cardinal a’.But if so then Mi and Ma are isomorphic, by one of the assumptions of 4.1.2. and hence satisfy either Xor X, simultaneously. This is contrary to the construction of M I or of M2 and proves the theorem. As a first example of a complete set of axioms which arises naturally in Mathematics, we consider a set of axioms K for the concept of a densely ordered set without first or last element. K may be expressed by a finite number of sentences formulated in terms of a relation of equality B(x, y) and a relation of order Q ( x , y ) (x smaller than or equal to y) and without individuals. Then all models of K are infinite and all countable models of K are isomorphic by a well-known result of Cantor’s. Hence, by Vaught’s text, K is complete. We formulate this result, which is essentially due to Langford as
-
4.1.3. THEOREM. The concept of a densely ordered set without first or last element is complete.
Corresponding results hold for the concepts of densely ordered infinite sets with first and last elements, and of densely ordered sets with first but without last element or with last but without first element. Consider now the set of sentences Rc:)(section 2.2.) for the notion of an algebraically closed field of specified characteristicp (p = 0,2, 3, .. .). It follows from a theorem of Steinitz’ that any two algebraically closed fields of the same characteristic and of cardinal a’ > No are isomorphic. Hence, by Vaught’s test 4.1.4. THEOREM. The concept of an algebraically closed field of specified
characteristic is complete.
This result shows that if a theorem X which can be formulated in the Lower predicate calculus in terms of equality, addition and multiplication, has been proved in any manner whatever for the field of complex numbers then it holds also for all other algebraically closed fields of characteristic 0. This is a transfer theorem of the kind discussed previously in section 2.4. It lends a limited but unambiguous meaning to the heuristic argument known as Lefschetz’ principle. However, it is possible that Lefschetz’ principle has some heuristic value in cases which go beyond the confines of the Lower predicate calculus. Combining 4.1.4. with the methods of section 2.4. we obtain the following result
4.2.1
91
MODEL-COMPLETENESS
4.1.5. THEOREM. Let X be a sentence formulated in the Lower predicate
calculus in terms of the relations of equality, addition, and multiplication and with individuals 0 and 1 (or, without individuals - the difference is irrelevant). Then if X holds in the field of complex numbers it holds also in all algebraically closed fields of characteristic p > po where PO is a constant which depends on X . 4.2. Model-completeness. In spite of the remarkable efficacityof Vaught's test, there are many important examples of complete sets of axioms whose completeness can be established only by different means. We shall now present a method which proves successful in at least some of these cases. We first introduce a modified form of completeness which will be called model-completeness. Let K be a non-empty and consistent set of sentences. Whenever we mention that a structure M is a model of K we shall suppose that all relations of M are contained in K. K will be called model-complete if for every model M of K with diagram D, the set K u D is complete. An equivalent definition is as follows. K is model-complete if for any model M of K, any extension M' which is a model of K is an elementary extension of M . Indeed, if K is model-complete by the first definition, and M and M' are models of K such that M' is an extension of M , let D be the diagram of M. Then M' satisfies both K and D and K u D is complete. Now let X be any sentence which is defined and holds in M. Then X is defmed in K u D and hence, is deducible from K U D. It follows that X holds also in M ' , M' is an elementary extension of M. Conversely, suppose that K is model-complete according to the second definition, and let D be the diagram of a model M of K. Then we have to show that K U D is complete. If K U D is not complete then there exists a sentence X which is defined in K U D and that neither X nor X is deducible from K U D.One of these sentences must hold in M and we may suppose without any essential limitation of the generality of the argument that X holds in M. If X is not deducible from M then K u D U { X } is consistent and possesses a model M'. But M' is an extension of M and a model of K. It follows that M' must be an elementary extension of M , and hence that X holds in M . This contradiction shows that K u D is complete, the two definitions are indeed equivalent. The notions of completeness and of model-completeness overlap but neither one of them includes the other. In fact, let K be the set of sentences formulated in terms of the relation of order Q ( x , y ) (i.e. x < y ) and
-
-
92
r4.2.
COMPLETENESS
without individuals which hold in any ordinary sequence M = {ul, a2, as, . . .} for instance in the sequence of positive integers. Note that the relation of equality may in the present case be replaced by the defined predicate Q (x, y ) A Q (y, x). The diagram D of M is the set of all sentences Q (a$,a,) for i < j , Q (a, uj) for i >j , i, j = 1, 2, .. . The sentence (Vx) Q (al, x) is defined in K u D and holds in M . However, this sentence does not hold in the structure M' which is given by the infinite sequence {UO, al, a2, . . .}, a0 an additional individual, although M' is isomorphic to M and hence a model of K, while at the same time it is an extension of M. On the other hand, we shall show presently that the concept of an algebraically closed field formulated in terms of the usual relations E, S, P is model-complete. The concept is certainly not complete for as long as the characteristic of the field is not specified, the sentence N
can be neither proved nor refuted (i.e. neither X nor X is deducible). A necessary and sufficient condition for model-completeness will now be derived. A well-formed formula (wff) will be called primitive if it is in prenex normal form of class El (existential) and if its matrix consists of formulae of order one - i.e. bracketed atomic formulae, in the full notation - and of the negation of such formulae. Thus, if we take a nuniber of elements of a diagram in conjunction, and we replace some of the individuals in the conjunction by variables and prefix the corresponding existential quantifiers to the result then we obtain a primitive sentence. N
4.2.1. THEOREM. (MODEL-COMPLETENESS TEST). Let K be a non-empty and consistent set of sentences. In order that K be model - complete it is necessary and sufficient that for any two models, M and M', of K, such that M c M' any primitive sentence which is defined in M may hold in M' only if it holds in M. PROOF.The condition of the theorem is necessary. Let M and M' be models of a non-empty K, M' an extension of My such that for some primitive sentence X which is defined in M y X holds in M' but X holds in M . Then the second definition of model-completeness given above shows that K cannot be model-complete. The condition is also sufficient. Let S =- {MyX } be the set of all ordered pairs such that M is a model of K with diagram D and X is a sentence defined in M (and hence in K u D ) such that neither X nor N
-
4.2.1
93
MODEL-COMPLETENESS
Xis deducible from K U D. If K is not model-complete then S is not empty, Moreover, in that case, S contains pairs in which the second element is in prenex normal form. For if ( M , X ) is any element of Xand X' is equivalent to X and in prenex normal form and contains the same relations and individuals as X (and such an X' exists) then ( M , X ' ) also belongs to S. Moreover, in any element of S the second number of the pair must contain at least one quantifier. For if Xis free of quantifiers and holds in M then it holds also in all extensions of M and hence, is deducible from D alone, while if X holds in M then X i s deducible from D. Thus, ( M ,X ) cannot belong to S. Finally, if S is not empty then it contains a pair whose second member is in prenex normal form and begins with an existential quantifier. For if ( M , X ) belongs to S then (M, X) also belongs to S, and if X begins with a universal quantifier then the usual reduction of X to prenex normal form (e.g. from [ (Vx) 2 ( x ) ] to (3x) [ Z ( x ) ] ) leads to a sentence which begins with an existential quantifier. Thus, let S' = ( M , X) be the set of ordered pairs such that M is a model of K with diagram D and Xis a sentence in prenex normal form beginning with an existential quantifier and defined in M such that neither X nor X is deducible from K.Then we have just shown that S' cannot be empty if K is not model-complete. Supposing that K is not modelcomplete, let (M, XO) be an element of S' for which the number of quantifiers in XO is a minimum. Thus, XO= (32) Q (2)say, where the number of quantifiers in Q is one less than in XO.By assumption, the set K U D u { X O }is consistent, and possesses a model, M'. M' is therefore a model of K and an extension of M such that for some a in M',Q(a) holds in that structure. Since Q(a) contains less quantifiers than XO, the pair ( W ,Q ( u ) ) does not belong to S'. On the other hand Q ( a ) is defined in M' and so either Q(u) or Q(u) must be deducible from K U D' where D' is the diagram of M'. But Q (a)cannot be deducible from K U D' since Q (u) holds in M' which is a model of K U D'. Hence Q(a) is deducible from K U D'. Also, Q (a) 2 [ (32) Q (41,i.e. Q (a) =) XO,is a theorem of the Lower predicate calculus and so XOis deducible from K u D'. It follows that there exists a sentence Y which is a conjunction of elements of D' and hence is free of quantifiers such that Y 2 XO is deducible from K. Now let Y = Y(a1, . ..,am),where we have displayed the individuals which are contained in Y but which do not belong to M , m 2 0. Since XO is defined in M and since all individuals of K occur in M , the individuals ul, . .., a m do not appear in K. Moreover, m must actually be positive, otherwise Y would N
N
-
N
N
-
N
94
[4.2.
COMPLETENESS
be a conjunction of elements of D , and hence deducible from D . But Y 3 XOis deducible from K, and so XOwould be deducible from K u D, contrary to assumption. Now K t Y 3 XO implies that Z h Y 3 XO is a theorem of the Lower predicate calculus for some coniunction 2 of a finite number of elements of K. Hence Y(a1, . . . a,) 3 [ Z 3 XO]is a theorem and hence, by one of the rules of deduction of the predicate calculus, [ (3Yl) * * * (3Ym) Y(Y1, . . .,y m ) ] = [z = XO] is a theorem for suitable variables yg (i.e. yt which do not occur in Y(a1, . . .,am)).Putting XI = (3y1) . . . (gym) Y ( y l , . . . y,) we then see that 2 3 [XI3 XO]is a theorem, and hence K k [XI 3 XO].We claim that ( M , X I ) belongs to S’. Indeed, XI is defined in M , and in prenex normal form, and begins with an existential quantifier. At the same time XI is not deducible from K u D since K k 1x1 =I XO]and so XO would be deducible from K as well. On the other hand X I is not deducible from K U D since XI holds in M’ which is a model of K U D. It follows that ( M , XI) belongs to S’. But XIis primitive and so, if the conditions of the theorem are satisfied, XI can hold in M’ only if it holds in M. Since XI is existential it would then hold also in all extensions of M and hence, be deducible from D . This contradicts the above conclusion that XI is not deducible from K u D . We infer that if the conditions of 4.2.1. are satisfied then S’ and S are empty, K is model-complete. This proves the theorem. It will be shown in the sequel that the notion of model-completeness possesses some importance of its own. However, in many cases it can also be used to establish ordinary completeness, in the following way. Let K be a non-empty and consistent set of sentences. A model MOof K will be said to be a prime model of K if every model M of K possesses a substructure which is isomorphic to Mo. For example if K is a set of axioms for the notion of a densely ordered set, then a prime model for K is constituted by any countable densely ordered set without first or last elements. Indeed, it is well known (and can easily be checked) that every densely ordered infinite set contains a densely ordered countable subset without first or last element. As this example shows, a given model of K may contain many prime models. In fact, in the present example, the ordered sets of type w also constitute prime models for K so that two prime models of a given K need not even be isomorphic. On the other hand, suppose that K is a set of axioms for the notion of a commutative N
4.2.1
95
MODEL-COMPLETENESS
field of specified characteristicp (p = 0,2,3, . ..). In this case, all prime models are isomorphic to the prime field of characteristicp , i.e. the field of rational number’s for p = 0, or the residue ring modulo p, forp # 0. Moreover, every model of K now includes only a single prime model. 4.2.2. THEOREM. Let M Obe a prime model of a set of sentences K and let DObe the diagram of Mo. Then any sentence X which is defined in K and deducible from K u DOis deducible also from K alone.
PROOF.By assumption there exist elements Y1, . .., Ym of D (where m may always be supposed positive, for ease of notation), such that K k Yi A .. . A Ym 3 X , or K k Y 2 X where Y = Y1 A . . A Ym. Let Y = Y(a1, . . ., am), n > 0 where the displayed individuals are those that occur in Y but not in K. Then by an argument used previously, more particularly in the proof of 4.2.1.,
.
Now the existential sentence Z = (3yl) .. . (3yn) Y ( y l , .. .,yn) holds in Mo and so it holds also in any structure which is isomorphic to MOand in any extension of such a structure. But according to our assumption, all models of K are extensions of structures which are isomorphic to M and so 2 holds in all models of K , It follows that X also holds in all models of K, and hence that K k X. This proves the theorem. 4.2.3. THEOREM. (PRIME MODELTEST).Let K be a model-complete set
of sentences which possesses a prime model. Then K is complete.
PROOF.Let M Obe a prime model of K , and let X be any sentence which is defined in K. Then we have to prove that either K t X or K t X. Since X is defined in Mo, either X or X holds in MOand we may suppose, without limiting the generality of our considerations, that X holds in Mo. Since K is model-complete, it follows that X is deducible from K u DO where DOis the diagram of Mo. And since MOis a prime model of K, 4.2.2. applies and we may conclude that X is deducible from K alone. N
N
This proves 4.2.3. Another test by means of which completeness can be inferred from model-completeness depends on the existence of joint extensions. It is sometimes useful, though less frequently than 4.2.3. 4.2.4. THEOREM. Suppose that any two models MI and Mz, of the model-
complete set of sentences K which have only the individuals of K in
96
[4.2.
coMPLETENF.ss
common can be embedded in a joint extension, M , which is a model of K. Then K is complete.
-
PROOF.Suppose that K is not complete. Then for some sentence X which is defined in K neither K t X nor K t X . It follows that the sets K u { X} and K U { X } are consistent and possess models M I and M Z respectively. Clearly, we may choose M I and M2 in such a way that they have only the individuals of K in common. If K satisfies the condition of the theorem then there exists a model M of K which is an extension of both M I and M2.But K is model-complete and so the fact that X holds in M I must entail that it holds also in M. By the same argument, the fact that X holds in M2 entails that X holds also in M. This is a contradiction and proves that K is complete. As a first application of Theorems 4.2.1. and 4.2.3. we consider again the case that K is a set of axioms for the concept of a densely ordered set without first or last element formulated in terms of the relations of equality E(x, y ) and order, Q (x, y), (i.e. x Q y). We wish to show that K is model-complete. Let then M and M’ be two densely ordered sets without first or last element such that M’ is an extension of M. Let X be any primitive sentence formulated in terms of the relations E and Q, and in terms of a number of individuals of M , such that X holds in M’. Then we have to show that X holds already in M. Let N
N
4.2.5.
x = (3y1) . . . (3yn)z(y1, . . .,y,)
where Z is the matrix and does not contain any quantifiers. Then the assumption is that the predicate Z ( y 1 , . . ., y,) is satisfied by a set of individuals bl, . . ,,b which belong to M‘ (i.e. by a point (bl, . . ., bn) in the space M’n) and we have to show that this predicate holds also for some set (c1, . , .,c,) of individuals of M . Interpreting 4.2.5. in ordinary mathematical language, we see that it affirms the existence of a solution to a finite system of equations and inequalities of the form
a=B,
4.2.6.
a>B
a#P,
- the
second and fourth expression being the negations of the preceding ones, respectively. In this notation, and /3 denote either elements of M o r y t , i = l , 2 ,,.., n. The assumption is that the system in question possesses a solution yc = br, i = 1,2, . ., n in M’ and we have to show that it possesses a (Y
.
4.2.1
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MODEL-COMPLETENESS
solution already in M. We first reduce the list 4.2.6. by the following considerations. If the system contains a relation of the second kind mentioned in 4.2.6., a # p, then this may be replaced either by a < p or by p < OT according to the relation which holds in M' foryt = bt, i = 1, . . .,n. If a relation of the third kind mentioned in 4.2.6, occurs in the system, i.e. a < p, then we may replace this by a < p or a = p, in accordance with the relation which holds in M' for yc = bl, i = 1, ..., n. Finally we may eliminate all relations of the form a = jl successively by replacing the symbol which is written on the right hand side of this equation B in all the remaining expressions of the system by a. We see therefore that in order to prove model-completeness in the present case, we may confine ourselves to a finite system of inequalities 4.2.7.
aj
< pj
j = 1,
.. .,m
where q,pj denote either elements of M , at, or unknowns, yr, and where it is known that the inequalities are satisfied simultaneously by yt = bc in M'. If in the set of a6 and bt there are still pairs which are equal to one another (in the sense of the relation of equality of M and W )then we may again eliminate one of the elements of any such pair. Doing this successively,we finally arrive at a situation in which all at are different from one another, and the bt are different from the ar and different from one another. Suppose that the at which occur in the resulting system, which will again be assumed to be given by 4.2.7., are ranged in their specified order, so a1 < a2 < . . . < ak, k 2 0. These elements divide M' into k 1 intervals I;, I;; . . .,I;, which are given by y < al, a1 < y < az, ..., a& < y, in that order. If k = 0, then I: contains all elements of M'. The solutions yg = bt are in the interior of the intervals I;, since no br is equal to an u5. Suppose then that an interval I ; as introduced above contains a set of elements bt of M ' , e.g. b({)< b([)< . . . < b({,)where aj-l< b({)if 1; possesses a left end point, and b(i,)< aj if Zj possesses a right end-point. Now let (ct3), . . ., be any set of Ij elements in the interior of the interval Ij which is the restriction of I; to M , i.e. the set of individuals of Ij which belong to M , such that cy) < c $ ) . . . < c\{). Map the set S' = (at, b(g}, i = 1, .. ., k,j = 0, . ..,k, m = 1, . . . l j on the set S = {a, cE}with the same range for i, k, m,by the correspondence ug H a t , b c <+ CEand note that the set of b z coincides with (bl, . . .,bn). Then the correspondence S t)S' in order-preserving. It follows that we obtain a solution of 4.2.7. by replacing the bt everywhere by the corresponding c1. But the individuals ct all belong io M and so we have proved
+
~$3)
98
i4.2.
COMPLETENESS
4.2.8. THEOREM. The concept of a densely ordered set without first or last element is model-complete.
Observing that any countable densely ordered set without first or last element is a prime model for the concept in question, we conclude by means of 4.2.3. that the concept of a densely ordered set without first or last element is complete. This is 4.1.3. which was proved previously by a different method. The following result is of a somewhat deeper character. Let K be a set of axioms for the concept of a discretely ordered set with first but without last element, formulated in terms of the relations E ( x , y) and Q (x,y) (i.e. x 6 y, as before). K comprises the axioms of equivalence for E together with the axiom of substitutivity with respect to Q (see 2.1. above). In addition, K includes the following sentences 4.2-9.
(W 09)(W [Q(xyr) A Q 0, 4 Q (x, 41 (‘W VY)[Q (x, Y ) A Q (Y, E(x, Y ) ] (W WY)[Q (xyY ) V Q (Y, -41 ( 3 4 (VY) [Q (Y, x) 3 E (x, A] (V-4 (39 (Vz) [Q (x,V )A E (x,Y ) A [Q (x, 4 A Q (2,v) 3 E (x, 4 V =)
-
J W , Y ) ] ]* Of these the first two sentences require no comment. The fourth affirms that there is a first element while the last establishes the existence of an immediate successor to every element. 4.2.10. THEOREM. The set Kis complete.
We wish to prove this theorem via model-completeness but we observe immediately that the present K is not model-complete. Indeed, the sentence (Vy) [Q (y, a) =) E(a, y ) ] which affirms that the individual a is the first element of the set, may well hold in a model M of K but not in an extension M ’ of M which is a model of K. In order to obtain such an M’ from a given M y we only have to add to M a single predecessor to its first element, a. Accordingly, we supplement K as follows. We introduce an individual a and a two-place predicate S ( x , y) - “ y is the successor of x” - and we define K’as the set of axioms which is obtained from K by replacing the last two sentences of 4.2.9. by 4.2.11.
(W [Q ( Y , 4 2 E(a, Y ) ] ( W V Y ) W 4 [ [ S ( x ,Y ) A S ( x y2) =. Q (x, Y ) A E(x, Y ) A E ( Y , ~ ) ] A [S ( x A A Q ( x 4 A Q ( ~ 39E ( X J ) V E ( z , ~ )] ] (W (WJ’ (x,Y ) N
4.2.1
99
MODEL-COMPLETENESS
It will be seen that K I- K.We propose to show that K' is model-complete. Indeed, let M be a model of K' and let M' be an extension of M which is also a model of K'. The model-completeness test, 4.2.1., now amounts to the following. Let there be given a system of relations of the type 4.2.12.
a = P,
a
#
P,
a
< P, a > P,
S(a,P),
N
S(a,P)
where a,P denote either elements of M or unknowns, yg, i = 1,2, .. .,a. Suppose that the system has a solution yg = bg in M', then we have to show that the system possesses a solution also in M. We first consider any expression of the form S(a, p), which by assumption is satisfied in M'. This may happen either if p < a or if P = a or, finally, if there exists an element b such that a < b and b < p, and precisely one of these S(a,P) situations is realized in each particular case. We then omit and add fi < to the system in the first case and p = a in the second case. In the third case, we introduce a new unknown y' and we add 01 < y' and y' < P to the given system. Applying this method to a11 expressions of the form S(a,B) in the given system, we obtain another system which consists of expressions of the first five types mentioned in 4.2.12. We may now apply the methods of reduction used in the proof of 4.2.8. in order to eliminate all but the expressions of the form N
-
(Y
-
Suppose that the individuals of M which appear in the system are al, ...,U k , in that order, and that the unknowns are yr, i = 1, ..., m and that the system is satisfied by yr = bt, i = 1, . . . m in that order, where the bg are elements of M' and where we may again suppose that all the elements of the array al, . . ., U H , bl, . . . bm are different. 1 intervals Iz,I ; respectively The ut again divide M and M' into k I = 0, . . . k,which are given by the conditions y < al, a1 < y < as, .. ., u k < y. Then the bt are divided up into k 1 sets, b({)< b",' < .. . < b t ) , each in the interior of the interval I; and it is sufficient to show that we may replace the b($)which are elements of M' by certain C'Z) which are elements of My in such a way that the order is preserved and, moreover, such that if S(q-I, b({))or S(b$', b$) or S (b({,),uj) holds in M' then the corresponding relation S(q-1, c({)), S(c(:', S(cyi, a,) holds in M. Now we note that if an element c in M is nthin order after an element b, where n is a positive integer, then no additional elements can be introduced into the interval from b to c on passing from M to M'. Accordingly, we distinguish between I, which contain only a finite number of individuals
+ +
4+,),
100
[4.2.
coMPLETEm
and infinite Zj. In the former case all the Z$ are elements of M from the outset. In the latter case those by) which are nth successors of ag-1, n any positive integer, are also by necessity in M and the same applies to the b y which are nth predecessors of a5. The remaining by) decompose into a finite number of segments, where a segment is a set of consecutive elements of M'. However, since our system contains expressions of the form S(a, /3) but none of the form S(a, p), it is sufficient to map all these by) on a set of consecutive elements in I5 provided these elements are neither nth successors of 03-1 nor nth predecessors of aj, There must exist such a set in M since the number of elements in the interval between c~5-1 and aj is infinite, by assumption. This completes the argument, except that we observe that slight verbal modifications are required in order to deal with the first and last intervals. Accordingly, we have shown N
4.2.13. THEOREM. The set K' is model-complete.
Moreover, K' possesses a prime-model M O and this prime-model is unique, except for isomorphism. As M Owe may in fact take any ordered set of ordinal o,which begins with a. Hence 4.2.14. THEOREM.K' is complete.
It remains to be shown that the completeness of K' entails the completeness of K. Let then X be any sentence which is defined in K. Then Xis defined also in K' and since K' is complete either X or Xis deducible from K'. We may suppose that Xis deducible from K' and we shall show that in that case Xis deducible from K. Denote the axioms of 4.2.1 1. by 21,22,Zs respectively, and denote the conjunction of the remaining sentences by W. Since these sentences belong to K, we have K k W. Then N
or, equivalently,
ZiAZzhZ3hW2X 21 3 [ Z z A Z s h W 2
XI,
are theorems.
Since u does not appear in the square brackets we may replace Z1 by 2; = ( w v Y ) [ e c x , Y ) = E ( x , y ) ]
sothatZr2 [ Z z h 2 3 h W 3 X ] a n d h e n c e Z 2 h Z s 3 [ Z r h W ~ X ] are theorems. Now suppose that there exists a model M of Kin which X does not hold. We supplement the relations of M by introducing S ( x , y)
4.2.1
101
MODEL-COMPLETENESS
and by defining that S(b, c) holds between elements b and c of M if and only if holds in M . Let M’ be the supplemented model, then 2 2 and 2 3 hold in M‘. Also, 2: and W hold in M‘ since these sentences hold in M. It follows that M’ is a model of K‘, and so X holds in M’. This involves a contradiction and shows that X is deducible also from K. Thus, K is complete. The above example shows that we may increase the range of applicability of the model-completeness test by the introduction of auxiliary relations and individuals. Further applications of the notion of modelcompleteness will be found in A. Robinson 1956. Here we shall establish model-completeness only for two of the most important cases, in addition to those considered above. Let K = R’CF(see section 2.2.) be the specified set of axioms for the concept of an algebraically closed field. We propose to show that K is model-complete. Among the various proofs available for the purpose, we select one that requires relatively few algebraic results. Thus, let M be an algebraically closed field of arbitrary characteristic and let M‘ be another model of K which is a proper extension of M . Suppose that the primitive sentence Xis defined in M and holds in M ‘ . Then we have to show that X holds also in M . In the present case, X states that there exists a solution to a finite system T of equations and inequalities of the following types, 4.2.15.
a=j?
a#j?
a+j?=r
a f Q # ~ aP=y
aj?#y
In these relations, which are here written in ordinary algebraic notation, the Greek letter denote either individuals ai, i, = 1 . . .,k,which belong to M or “unknowns” yt, i = 1, .. .,m. The assumption is that the system T is satisfied by elements yt = bt of M‘. Consider the algebraic closure M * of the field M(b1, . . .,bm). Then the degree of transcendence of M * over M is at most m, and the given system is satisfied in M*. If the bl, . . ., bm all belong to M then M* = M and we have finished. If not there exists a chain of 1 1 algebraically closed fields
+
M=MocMlc
... c M l = M * ,
I<m
such that each field is of degree of transcendence one over its predecessor, if any. Now if T has a solution already in MO then we have finished. If not, then there exist two fields Mt c Mt+l such that T has a solution in Mi+l but not in Ma, i.e. such that X holds in Mi+1 but not in Mc. Since
102
r4.2.
COMPLETENESS
X is defined in Mi, we may replace M and M' by MZand Mt+i. Thus, we have shown that it is sufficient to prove that X holds in M , given that it holds in M', for the particular case that the degree of transcendence of M' over M is precisely one. Since every algebraically closed field M a which is a proper extension of M contains a subfield which is isomorphic to M' under a correspondence under which the elements of M remain fixed, it follows that X holds in M". Thus, if c is an individual which does not appear in M then X must be deducible from the set of sentences K' which is the union of K and of the diagram D of M and of a set of sentences H which is defined as follows. For any polynomial p ( x ) with coefficients in M select a predicate Q p ( x ) which is defined in M and which states that p ( x ) is equal to 0. Let H be the set of all sentences Qp(c) for p ( x ) not identically 0. H states that c is transcendental over M. Thus, every model of K is of degree of transcendence one at least over M and hence, satisfies X . It follows that Xis deducible from K' and hence from K U D together with a finite number of sentences of the form w Q p ( c ) ,e.g. Qpl(c), .. . Q p j(c). These sentences may be replaced by the single sentence Qpo( c ) where PO ( x ) = p l ( x ) . .. p j (x). Thus, we have N
N
-
N
N
K U D k
N
Q p o ( ~ )3
X
and so, by an argument used several times already, K U D k [ (3x1"
4.2.16.
Q ~ o < x ) ] ]2
X
Now K and D hold in M. So does the sentence ( 3 x ) [ Qpo( x ) ] since it merely affirms the existence of an element which is different from all roots of Q p o ( x ) ,i.e. from the elements of a certain finite set. But any algebraically closed field is infinite and so there exists an individual d such that Qpo ( d ) hold in M. This shows that ( 3 x ) [ Qpo( x ) ] holds in M. Referring to 4.2.16., we conclude that X also holds in M. This proves an assertion. We have established N
N
-
4.2.17. THEOREM. The concept of an algebraically closed field is model-
complete.
Since K'CF is not complete this provides the example, promised above, of a set of sentences which is model-complete but not complete. However, if we add to R'CFan axiom (for p # 0) or set of axioms (for p = 0) which fixes the characteristic of the field, then the resulting set R';) possesses a prime model, Ma, i.e. the algebraic closure of the prime field
4.2.1
103
MODEL-COMPLETENESS
of the given characteristic. It follows that the sets Kc;), which are still model-complete, are also complete as proved previously by a different method (Theorem 4.1.4., above). As a last application of the model completeness test, we shall consider the case where K = ROF,a set of axioms for the concept of a real-closed ordered field, formulated in terms of the relations of equality, addition, multiplication, and order, E, S, P, Q. We propose to show that ROF is model-complete. We begin by proving the following auxiliary result. 4.2.18. THEOREM. Let M be a real-closed field, and let M(b) be a simple
transcendental ordered extension of M. Then the order of M ( b ) is determined uniquely by the set of relations
4.2.19.
b
< av
a,, < b
or
whichever holds in M(b), where as varies over all elements of M .
PROOF.It is sufficient to show that 4.2.19. determines whether an arbitrary element of M(b), other than 0, is positive or negative. Let c E M(b), so that t=a
4.2.20.
+ a, b + a2b2 + ... + bk k 2 0 , m 2 0 a; + a;b + aib2 + ... + bm’ a0
where a, ao, a,, a2, ...,ao,a,, a2, ... belong to M . If t belongs to M and is different from 0 then t is positive according as it is or is not the square of an element of M. In the general case, both the numerator and the denominator of 4.2.20. can be decomposed into linear and quadratic factors, I
4.2.21.
,
,
t = a Z7(b - bj) Z7( (b - bj)2
+ ci)/Z7(b- bj) Z7( (b - b5)2 + ci)
with distinct ranges for j in the different product symbols, where b5, c5 belong to M. The quadratic factors in 4.2.21. are positive, while the sign of the linear factors is determined by 4.2.19., and the sign of a is determinate since a belongs to M . All these together determine the sign oft. This proves 4.2.18. In order to prove that ROFis model-complete we consider a system T of relations of types 4.2.22.
a=
P.
B,
f Y
a#
P,
a
< 8, a > P,
a
+ P = y, + P # y, a@ = y, a
where the Greek letters denote either elements at of a model M of ROP,
104
[4.2.
COMPLETENESS
. .. k, or unknowns yg, i = 1, . . ., m. We have to show that if T has a solution yr = bs in some extension M' of M which is a model of ROFthen is possesses a solution already in M . The fact that T possesses a solution is expressed by a primitive statement defined in M'
i = 1,
X = W )
... (3ym)QCul, ..., y m L
whichis therefore supposed to hold in M' and of which we wish to show that it holds also in M . An argument similar to one used in the proof of 4.2.17. shows that we may suppose the degree of transcendence ofM' over M to be exactly one. Let b be an arbitrary but fixed element of M' which is not contained in M , then M' is the real closure of M(b). Let H be the set of all sentences E(b, av) where av varies over the elements of M , together with all sentences N
Q (by av) and Q (an b) which hold in M' and put K = ROFu D u H, where D is the diagram
4.2.23.
of M. Let M" be any model of K' and let M* be the real closure of M ( b ) in M". Then M* is isomorphic to M', by 4.2.18. and so X holds in M * and hence, in M". This shows that X is deducible from K' and hence, from ROFU D together with a finite subset of H, H' = { Yl, . . ., Yh}, say. Let Y = Y ( b ) = Yi A . . . A Yh where we have displayed the individual b which occurs in Y, and where we note that all other individuals which occur in Yare contained in M . To avoid trivial difficulties, we may see to it that H is not empty. We then have and hence, as usual,
ROFU D ROFU D
t- Y ( b ) 3 X
t- [ @ y ) y ( y ) ] 2
x
Thus, in order to show that X holds in M we only have to establish that the sentence 2 = (3y) Y ( y ) holds in M. 2 is a primitive sentence, so that we are again faced with the existence of a solution to a particular system of relations, T'.However, T'has the special property that it contains only a single unknown, y, and that it contains only relations of one of the types 4.2.24.
a
.#B
where the Greek letters stand either for y or for elements of M . We know that T' is satisfied in M' by y = b, where b is different from all elements of M , and so we may replace 4.2.24. by relations of the type 01 < p only. The resultant system is of the form
4.3.1
RELATIVE MODEL-COMPLETENESS
4.2.26.
ug<x, X
105
i=l, ...,j i = j + 1, ... 1
where one or the other of these two sets may be empty and where we may suppose that the at are all different and that we have ranged them in each set according their given order in M. However, we know that the equations of 4.2.26. are compatible since they possess a solution in M' and so uj < uj+l if both sets are non-empty. In that case, the system is solved in M by x = (uj uj+1)/2. Again, if the second set is empty, then x = uj 1 is a solution, while if the first set is empty, we havej = 0, uj+l = U I , and we may choose x = ul - 1. This shows that ROFis modelcomplete. We have proved
+
+
4.2.27. THEOREM. The concept of a real-closed ordered field is modelcomplete.
Now ROFpossesses a (unique) prime model, i.e. the field of algebraic real numbers. Hence, by 4.2.3. 4.2.28. THEOREM. (TARSKI).The concept of a real-closed ordered field is
complete.
This important result was first proved by Tarski by an entirely different method. Relative Model-Completeness. Throughout this section we shall suppose that the sets of sentences Kand K* are non-empty and consistent. We recall that a set K* is said to be model-consistent relative to a set K if every model M of K can be embedded in a model M * of K*.(That is to say M * is a model of the diagram D of M). Thus, K* is model-consistent relative to K if for every model M of K, with diagram D,the set K* U D is consistent. K* will be said to be model-complete relative to K if for every model M of K, with diagram D,the set K* u D is complete. 4.3.
4.3.1. THEOREM. Let K* be an extension of the set of sentences K such
that K* does not contain any relations or individuals that are not also contained in K, and such that K* is model-consistent relative to K. In order that K* be model-complete relative to K it is necessary and sufficient that for every model M of K, and for every primitive sentence X defined in M, X either holds in all extensions of M which are models of K* or in none. The proof is a refinement of the proof of 4.2.1. The conclusion of the
106
COMPLETENESS
r4.3.
-
theorem is equivalentto the requirement that either Xor Xbe deducible from K* U D where D is the diagram of M. Since for any K* which is model-complete relative to K this condition must be satisfied for all X (and not only for primitive X) the condition of the theorem is clearly necessary. The condition is also sufficient. For suppose that K* is not modelcomplete relative to K. Then there exists a model M of K with diagram D and a sentence X which is defined in M such that neither X nor X is deducible from K* u D. We may suppose that X is in prenex normal form and that we have chosen a model of K and a corresponding sentence X such that the number of quantifiers in the prefix is a minimum. This minimum must be positive, for if X does not include any quantifiers then either X or X is deducible from D alone. Moreover, we may suppose that X begins with an existential quantifier, for if X as chosen begins with a universal quantifier, then we may pass to the negation of X and transform it to prenex normal form in the usual way. Thus, X = (32) Q (z) where Q ( z ) is a wff in prenex normal form which may contain further quantifiers. Xis defined in a model M of K but neither Xnor Xis deducible from K* U D,where D is the diagram of M. It follows that there exists a model M * of K* which is an extension of M such that X holds in K*, Q ( a ) holds in M * for some individual a. Let D* be the diagram of M * . Since M * is a model of K and Q(a) holds in M * it follows from the minimal property of X that Q (a)is deducible from K* u D*.Hence also, K* U D* t X since Q ( a ) =I X is a theorem. We propose to show that K* U D I- X. The set K* U D* contains in addition to the set K* U D only certain sentences of order one (bracketed atomic formulae) or the negations of such sentences. Let D' be the set of these sentences D' = D* - D.D' is not empty, so (in any case) there exists a sentence Y(ai, .. .,am)which is a conjunction of a finite number of elements of D' such that K* U D I- Y(a1, ...,a m ) 3 X.
-
-
In Y, we have displayed the individuals which do not belong to M , and hence do not occur in K* or D or X. It follows that
K* U D I- [ (321) . .. (32,) Y ( z ~ ., . .,zm)]
2
X
NOW (321) . . . (32,) Y (zi, . . .,z,) is a primitive sentence which is defined in M and which holds in M * . Hence, by the condition of 4.3.1., this sentence is deducible from K* u D.It follows that Xalso is deducible
4.3.J
RELATIVE
MODEL-COMPLETENESS
107
from K* U D.This contradicts our original assumptions on Xand proves 4.3.1.
In certain cases it is easier to derive relative model-completeness from ordinary model-completeness than to apply the above test directly. This can be done by means of the following theorem. 4.3.2. THEOREM. Let K* be an extension of a set of sentences K such that
K* does not contain any additional relations or individuals and such that K* is model-consistent relative to K. Suppose that K* is model-complete in the ordinary sense and that for every model M of K, with diagram D, the set K* U D possesses a prime model. Then K* is model-complete relative to K. PROOF.Let M be any model of K, with diagram D. Then we have to show that K* U D is complete. Let M*, be any prime model of K* u D with diagram D*, and let X b e any sentence which is defined in K* u D,and hence, in D alone. Since K* is model-complete, either X or X is deducible from K* U D*,. It will be sufficient to consider the former possibility. Then X is deducible from K* U D together with a finite set S of sentences which belong to D*, - D. If S is empty then we have finished. If S is not empty let Y = Y(a1, . . ,an) be the conjunction of its elements, where we have displayed the individuals which do not belong to M , n 2 1. Thus
-
.
and hence
K* U D I-
-
Y(Ul,
...,an)
3
X
-
K* U D [ (3y1) -.(3yn) y ( y l , . , Y n ) ] x In order to show that K* u D t Xis therefore sufficient to establish that K* U D I- 2 where 2 = [ (3y1) . . . (3yn) Y ( y l , . . .,y n ) ] , in other words, we have to verify that Z holds in all models of K* U D.Let M1
be any model of that set then by the definition of a prime model M I contains a substructure MT which is isomorphic to M*,, such that the individuals of D correspond to themselves under the isomorphism. It follows that 2 holds in MT and, being an existential sentence, that it holds in M I which is an extension of M:. This completes the proof of the theorem. Let us now consider some examples of relative model-completeness. Clearly, ordinary model-completeness is a special case of relative modelcompleteness, corresponding to K = K * . Now let K = KAF be a set of axioms for the concept of a commutative field as described in section 2.2.
108
COrnLETENESs
14.3.
above, and let K* be the set RhF for the notion of an algebraically closed field. Then it is easy to check that K* is an extension of K with no additional individuals or relations and that it is model-consistent relative to K, i.e. that every field can be embedded in an algebraically closed field. Moreover, by 4.2.17., K* is model- complete, and if M is any model of K, with diagram D,then K* U D possesses a prime model, namely the algebraic closure of M. This shows that the conditions of 4.3.2. apply. We conclude 4.3.3. THEOREM. The concept of an algebraically closed field is modelcomplete relative to the concept of a (commutative) field.
Now let K* = R($ be a set of axioms for the concept of an algebraically closed field of specified characteristic p as above, p = 0,2,3, . . . Then K* is still model-complete (since it is an extension of RbF with no additional relations or individuals) and it is model-consistent relative to set K = KiF for the notion of a field of the same characteristic. The remaining conditions of 4.3.2. also apply, and so 4.3.4. THEOREM. The concept of an algebraically closed field of specified
characteristic is model-complete relative to the concept of a commutative field of the same characteristic. Next, let K* be a set of axioms for the concept of a real closed ordered field, K* = ROF, then K* is model-complete by 4.2.27. Let K be a set of axioms for the concept of an ordered field, K = KOF.Since every ordered field can be embedded in a real-closed ordered field, more particularly in its real closure, the conditions of 4.3.2. apply, and we obtain the theorem 4.3.5. THEOREM. The concept of a real-closed ordered field is model-
complete relative to the concept of an ordered field.
Now let K and K* be sets of axioms for the notions of a formally real and of a real-closed field formulated in terms of the relations E, S, P,and in terms of the individuals 0 and 1 (compare section 2.2.). It is then casy to ensure that K* is an extension of K. Then K and K* have the same vocabulary and K* is model-consistent with K. Taking into account 4.2.27., it is not difficult to show that K* is model-complete. Nevertheless, we are going to show that K* is not model-complete relative to K. Indeed, let M be the field obtained by adjoining a square root 6 of 2 to the rational numbers. Then M is a model of K. Consider the sentence
4.3.1
109
RELATIVE MODEL-COMPLETENESS
x = (39fJ (Y, Y , 5) We claim that neither X nor Xis deducible from K* U D where D is the diagram of M. Indeed, there exist real-closed extensions of K , M * , and M : say, such that E, is positive in MT, and negative in M : . Then X holds in M:, and X holds in M*,. But M : and M*, both are models of K* u D,and this proves our assertion. It is quite possible that a set K* is model-complete relative to two nonequivalent K. Thus, if K* is a set of axioms for an algebraically closed field as in 4.3.3. then K* is model-complete not only relative to the concept of a field but also relative to the concept of a field of specified characteristic, in addition to being model-complete relative to itself. On the other hand, we shall now show that if a set K possesses an extension K* with the same vocabulary such that K* is model-consistent and modelcomplete relative to K, then K* is essentially unique. In this case, we are justified in calling such a set the model-completion of K. N
N
4.3.6. THEOREM. Let K,KT, KZ be three non-empty and consistent sets of sentences, K c KT, K c K*,, such that the individuals and relations
of Kf and K*,are contained in K and such that both KT and K*, are model-consistent and model-complete relative to K. Then KT and K*,are equivalent, i s . they are deducible from one another and hence, possess the same set of models.
PROOF.Let X E K : then we have to prove K*, t X . Suppose on the contrary that X E K: but that K*, U {-J X ) is consistent. In that case, let M be a model of K i U {- X } with diagram D.Since K*,is modelcomplete relative to K it follows that X is deducible from K*, u D
-
while at the same time Xis deducible from K : U D, trivially. In order to prove the theorem, it is therefore sufficient to show that for every model M of K with diagram D,and for every sentence X which is definable in M, either X is deducible both from K : u D and from K*, U D or X is deducible from each of these sets, separately. Suppose on the contrary that there exists a model M of Kand a sentence X defined in K such that Xis deducible from K: U D and Xis deducible from K*, U D where D is the diagram of M . Familiar arguments then show that X may be supposed to be in prenex normal form, and that it must contain at least one quantifier. We select an M and a sentence X satisfying these conditions such that the number of quantifiers in X is as small as possible. Moreover, we may suppose that X begins with an N
-J
110
COMPLETENESS
14.4.
existential quantifier, otherwise we consider the sentence X transformed into prenex normal form, and we interchange the sets KT and K:. Let X = (3y) Z (y), where Z may contain further quantifiers. Let MT be a model of KT U D, with diagram DT,then X holds in MT since it is deducible from K : U D. Thus M*, contains an individual a such that Z ( a ) holds in MT. But MT is a model of K and so KT u DT is complete, and K : U D t Z (a). Moreover, 2 (a)contains one quantifier less than X and so Z ( a ) must be deducible also from K : u DT. This entails that Xis deducible from K*, U DT. On the other hand, K : u D t k Xby assumption and so K : U D t X. This implies that K : u DT is contradictory. But that is impossible since K*, is model-consistent relative to KI and MT is a model of K. We conclude that we cannot have K : U D t Xand K*, U D t Xfor any model M of K. This completes the proof of 4.3.6. The theorem shows that for a given set of axioms K there can be essentially no more than one extension of K, K*, which satisfies the conditions of 4.3.6. In particular, the variety of all algebraically closed fields of specified characteristic occupies a unique position relative to the (more extensive) variety of all fields of the same characteristic. A similar position is occupied by the variety of all real-closed ordered fields relative to the variety of all ordered fields. We shall see later (section 5.4.) that a corresponding concept can be formulated relative to the notion of a differential field. On the other hand, there exist K for which a K* of the kind described does not exist at all (see Problem 5.6.4., below).
-
N
-
4.4. Problems 4.4.1. Establish the completeness of the concept of an infinite abelian
group in which every non-zero element is of given prime order p.
4.4.2. Let K be a non-empty and consistent set of sentences. Suppose
that for any two models of K, M and M’ such that M c M‘ any primitive sentence which is defined in M may hold in M’ only if it holds in M. Show that under these conditions any existential predicate Q ( X I ,.. .,xn) which is defined in K is equivalent with respect to K to some universal predicate R(x1, . . .,x) (i.e. K t (XI) . . . (xn) [Q(xl, . . ., xn) zz R(x1, . . ., 41). Hence, give an alternative proof for the model-completeness test 4.2.1. 4.4.3. An abelian group G is completely divisible (briefly, divisible)
4.4.1
PROBLEMS
111
if for every a E G and for every positive integer n there exists a b E G such that nb = a. Prove that the concept of a completely divisible ordered abelian group which contains at least two different elements is complete. 4.4.4. Prove the model-completenessof the concept of a discretely ordered set without first and last element formulated in terms of E and Q and in terms of a relation S(x, y ) for successiveelements. Show that this concept
is model-complete relative to a set K which includes the axiom for ordered sets (compare 4.2.9.) together with and together with the axiom of substitutivity for S(x, y).
References. Concerning Lindenbaum’s theorem, see Tarski 1935/1936 Vaught’s test is given in Vaught 1954. 4.1.3. is proved by a different method in Langford 1927. For characteristic 0, 4.1.4. is a consequence of Tarski’s theorem 4.2.28., for arbitrary characteristic it was first proved in A. Robinson 1951. The theorem of Steinitz’ which was used in the proof of 4.1.4. is in Steinitz 1910. The theory of model-completenessis developed in detail in A. Robinson 1956b. 4.2.10. is stated without proof in Tarski 1935/1936 and is proved by the present method in Robinson-Zakon 1960. For Tarski’s theorem, 4.2.28., see Tarski-McKinsey 1948/1951. The theory of relative model-completeness is developed in A. Robinson 1957.
CHAPTER V
DEFINABILITY
5.1. The Consistency Lemma. In the present chapter we shall be concerned
with connections between sentences, or sets of sentences, with different vocabularies. It will be convenient to use the following notation. Given a set of sentences K, we denote by Wt ( K ) the set of individuals which are contained in the sentences of K1 and by Wr( K ) the set of relations which are contained in the sentences of K. We write W ( K ) for the entire vocabulary of K, so that W ( K ) = Wg ( K ) U Wr (K). If K contains only a single sentence, K = { X } then we write Wr ( X ) in place of W g ( { X } ) , and so on. 5.1.1. THEOREM. Let K be a non-empty complete set of sentences, and let
KO,K1 be two consistent sets of sentences such that
KO 3 K, Ki 3 K, Wt(K0) C K, Wr(K1)C K Then the set KO U Ki is consistent. PROOF.Suppose, contrary to the assertion of 5.1.1. that there exist K, KO,KI,which satisfy the conditions of the theorem but not its conclusion. Then there exist sentences X I , . . ., Xj E KO - K, and YI, ., YmE K, such that the sentence
..
XiA
... A X j A Yi ... A Y m
is contradictory, i.e. such that
... A Y m 3 [XiA ... A X j ] Neither the set { YI,. . ., Ym}nor { X I , .. .,X j } can be empty, since the 5.1.2.
YIA
N
sets KOand K1 are, separately, consistent. Now let Yi A ... A Y m = Y(ai,
...,0%)
where we have displayed the individuals which occur in this conjunction but which do not belong to the vocabulary of K and, hence, do not belong to the vocabulary of XI . . . X I . Then, from 5.1.2. 112
5.1.]
113
T€!E coNsIsTENcy LEMMA
5.1.3.
t
2 -~ [ XiA
... AXj]
where Z = ( 3 ~ 1 ). . . (3zn)Y (z1, . . ., z,), n 2 0. Also, the sentence Y(a1, . . .,am) 3 2 is a theorem and so K1 t 2. Since W ( Z ) c K and K is complete, either K t 2 or K t Z . Now if the latter applied, then we should have also K1 t Z since K c KI . But we have just shown that K1 t Z , and we know that K1 is consistent. Hence, K t Z is impossible, and we must have K t 2. Also, KO 3 Kand so we certainly have KO t Z . Hence, by 5.1.3., KO t [XIA . . . A X j ] . But this is impossible since Xg E K, i = 1, .. . , j . Thus, we have arrived at a contradiction, proving
-
-
N
-
5.1.1. 5.1.4. THEOREM. Let K be a non-empty and complete set of sentences and let X be a sentence which is consistent with K (i.e. K u { X } is consistent), such that Wc(X) c W t ( K ) .Let M be any model of K. Let K1 be the set of all sentences which are defined and hold in M. Then X is consistent with Ki.
PROOF.Put KO= KU {X}.Then the sets K, KO,K1, satisfy the conditions of theorem 5.1.1. This leads to the conclusion that KO U Ki = KI u { X } is consistent - as required. Note that if Wr(X)c Wr (K)then the theorem is trivial. 5.1.5. THEOREM. Let M I be any structure, and let MT be a structure which is obtained from Mi by ignoring some (but not all) of the relations of M I . Let M*, be any elementary extension of M:. Then there exists an elementary extension of Mi which is also an elementary extension of M z as far as the relations which occur in M*, are concerned.
PROOF.Let K1 be the set of all sentences which are defined and hold in M I , and let K*, be the set of all sentences which are defined and hold in M;. Any model of H = K1 U K*, is an elementary extension of both M I and M*,, so in order to prove 5.15, we only have to show that H is consistent. If H is contradictory, then there exists a finite subset {XI, .. .,X k } of K*,,k 2 1, such that Ki u {XI, ...,Xk) is contradictory. Let XI A . . . A Xk = Y(a1, . . .,a,) where we have displayed the individuals in that conjunction which are not contained in M I . Then K1 t Y(a1, . . ., an) and, since the al, . . . an are not contained in K I , K1 I- (XI) . . . (xn) [- Y(x1, . . ., x.)] Now the sentence
-
2 = (Xl)
...
(&a)
[
-
Y(X1,
... 4 1 y
114
IS.1.
DEFINABILITY
is defined in A41 and contains only relations which occur in M ; and hence in MT. It follows that Z is defined in MT, and holds in that structure (since 2 holds in M I which is a model of K1). Thus, 2 holds in M t . On the other hand, Y(a1, . . .,an) holds in M*, and the same therefore is true of the sentence 2' = (3x1) .. . (3xn) Y (x,1 . . .,xn). But Z' is equivalent to the negation of 2, and so we have arrived at a contradiction. This shows that His consistent and proves the theorem. 5.1.6. THEOREM (THECONSISTENCY LEMMA). Let K be a non-empty and complete set of sentences and let H I , HZbe two consistent sets of sentences which include K, H I n HZ 2 K. Suppose that W(H1) n W ( H z )= W ( K ) . Then H I U HZis consistent.
We begin the proof with the following reduction. If HI u HZis contradictory then there exist finite subsets { X I , . .., X h } , { Y l , ..., Yk) of HI and HZrespectively such that X A Y is contradictory, where X = XI A ... A Xh, Y = Y1 A ... A Yk. Note that h 2 1, k 2 1. X and Yare, separately, consistent with K, since K u { X I is deducible from HI and K U { Y > is deducible from Hz.Thus, in order to prove 5.1.6., it suffices to show that X A Y must be consistent. Accordingly, it remains for us to prove the following theorem. 5.1.7. THEOREM. Let K be a complete set of sentences and let X I and XZ be two sentences such that W(X1) n W(X2) = W ( K ) . Suppose that X I and X2 are, separately, consistent with K. Then the conjunction X I A XZ is consistent.
For the proof, we may suppose that Wt(X1)c K and Wt(X2) c K. Indeed, suppose that we have already proved the theorem with this restriction. In the general case, we put
XI = Yl(a1, - .., am), X2 = Yz(b1,
*
., bn)
where we have displayed the individuals which are not contained in K. The sets ai, . . ., am and bl, . . ., bn are disjoint. Put z 1=
[ (3x1) ... (3xm) Y l ( X 1 , ...,xm)]
zz = [ ($9) ..- (3yn) Y2 (Yl, ...,yn)]
(where the variables xf, ya did not occur previously). Then Z1 and Z2 are, separately, consistent with K. Hence, according to the special case of 5.1.7. which is supposed to have been proved already, 2 1 A 2 2 is consistent. Now if X I A X Zwere contradictory, then by a familiar argument, the
5.1.1
115
THE CONSISTENCY LEMMA
sentence Z which is obtained from X I A XZ by r;placing al, ..., am, X I , ..., X m , y l , ...,yn, with subsequent existential quantification with respect to these variables -
bi, ..., bn by
Z = (3x1)
.. . ( 3 x m ) (3~1). . . (3yn) [ YI( X I , . .,x m ) A Y2 ( ~ 1 ,.. .,y n ) ]
would be contradictory as well. But t. 2 2 1 A ZZ and 21A 22 has already been proved consistent. This shows that we may suppose Wr(Xi) c W W ) , Wi(X2) c W ( K ) . Now let M I be a model of K u (XI] and let M be the structure which is obtained from A41 by ignoring the relations which do not occur in K. Let K: be the set of all sentences which are defined and hold in MT. Since X2 is consistent with K and MT is a model of K, the conditions of Theorem 5.1.4., are satisfied and the set KT U ( X Z }is consistent. Let M2 be a model of this set and let M*,be the structure which is obtained from M2 by ignoring the relations which do not occur in K. Then M2 is an elementary extension of MI, since it is a model of KT. Thus, the structures MI, M:, M*, satisfy the conditions of 5.1.5. It follows that there exists an elementary extension M3 of M I which is also an elementary extension of M*, as far as the relations which are contained in M*, are concerned. Thus, if M ; is obtained from M3 by ignoring the relations which are not contained in M*, then M*, is an elementary extension of M*,. It follows, again by 5.1.5. that there exists a structure M4 which is an elementary extension of M2, such that MZ is an elementary extension of M : where M t is obtained from M4 by ignoring the relations which do not occur in M:. Continuing in this way, we obtain a sequence of structures MI, M2 M3, . . ., Mn, . . . and a corresponding sequence MT, M*,, M : , . . ., M:, ... such that the following conditions are satisfied. The structures MI,M3, M5, ... contain precisely the same relations, and MI ee M3 ee M5 ee . . . (i.e. it43 is an elementary extension of MI, M5 is an elementary extension of M3, etc.). Similarly, the structures M2, M4, M6 contain the same relations and M2 ee M4 ee M6 ee . .. Finally, M : is obtained from Ma by taking into account only the relations of K, which are contained jointly in the structures with odd and with even subscripts and MT ee M*,ee M : ee . . . Now let M* = U { M : } , M' = {M2k+l} and M" = U { M z k } .
T
n
u k
k
Then the three structures M * , M', M" coincide so far as their sets of individuals are concerned and, moreover, M* is obtained from M' and from M" by ignoring the relations which are not contained in K. We may
116
[5.1.
DEFINABILJTY
now define a structure M, by supplementing M* simultaneously with the relations of M' and of M" as given in these structures. Since the relations of M' and M" do not overlap except for the relations of M*, the definition is unique. But MI satisfies XI and so Ms, M5, . . . and finally M' satisfy XI. Similarly M Z satisfies XZand so Mz, M4, . . . and finally M" satisfy Xz.It follows that M satisfies both XI and XZ.This shows that M satisfies X I A XZand proves the theorem. Clearly, the assumption that K is complete is essential for the proof. Otherwise, if K is not empty, we may take any X defined in K such that neither K t X nor K t- X. Then both K U {-J X} and K u {A') are consistent, but X A X certainly is not consistent. The following theorem which is essentially equivalent to the consistency lemma differs from it by its purely syntactical character.
-
N
5.1.8. THEOREM. (CRAIG'SLEMMA). Let X 2 Y be a theorem of the n Wr(Y) is not empty Lower predicate calculus, t X 2 Y. If Wy(X)
there exists a sentence ZOsuch that W(Z0) c W ( X ) n W ( Y )and such that t X =) ZOand t ZO3 Y. If Wr(X) n Wr(Y) is empty and X is consistent then t Y.
PROOF.Suppose first that W y ( X ) n W,(Y) is not empty. Let S be the (non-empty) set of sentences 2 with W ( 2 ) c W ( X ) flW ( Y ) .We may suppose that X is consistent for if X is contradictory then an arbitrary contradictory element of S, e.g. a sentence 20of the form 2 A Z with Z e S, satisfies the conditions of the theorem. For consistent X, let S' be the set of elements Z of S such that t X 2 2. We have to show that 1 Z 3 Y for some Z E S'. If no such Z exists then S' u {- Y )is consistent. For otherwise Y would be deducible from a finite subset S" of S', and hence from the conjunction of the elements of S", which is itself in S'. Supposing that S' u { Y} is consistent, let M be a model of that set and let K be the set of sentences of S that hold in M. Then K is complete. Clearly, Y is consistent with K since Y holds in M . We claim that X also is consistent with K. Indeed, if this were not the case then for some finite subset K' of K, K = {XI, .. ., Xn},n 2 1, the set K' u {A'} would be contradictory and so X 2 N [XIA . . . A Xn], or X 3 X' where X' = X I A .. . A Xnis an element of K'. But if so then X' E S' by the definition of S' and hence X' E K. This is impossible since K is consistent and so X is consistent with K. Hence by the special case of the consistency lemma, 5.1.7., X A Y is consistent. But this contradicts the assumption t X 2 Y. It follows that for some ZOE S' t
-
-
-
N
N
N
-
N
5.2.1
117
BETH’S THEOREM
k ZO1 Y,while I-X 3 20by the definition of S‘. This proves the first part of the theorem. Suppose next that Wr(X) n W r ( Y ) is empty but that Y is not a theorem. Then there exists a model M of Y such that the individual constants of Y appear as individuals in M. Moreover, we may suppose that the cardinal of M is precisely No, where the cardinal of M is defined without reference to any relation of equality. We may also suppose that the individuals of X which do not appear in Y have been included in M y and, we may define the relations of X in M in such a way that M becomes a model of X also. Thus X A Y is consistent, contrary to assumption. This completes the proof of the theorem. Conversely, it is not difficult to deduce 5.1.7. and hence, 5.1.6. from 5.1.8. Suppose that XI and XZare, separately, consistent with the set of sentences K. We have to show that XI A XZis consistent. Suppose on the contrary that XI A XZ is contradictory, then t- X I 3 XZ.Since XZ is consistent with K, X2 is not a theorem and so, by 5.1.8., the intersection Wr(X1) n Wr(Xz)is not empty. Accordingly, for some Z with W ( Z ) c W(X1) n W(X2), we have !-XI 3 2 and t- Z 1 XZ.Now, by the assumption of 5.1.7., W ( K ) 3 W(X1) n W(X2) and so 2 is defined in K.It follows that either 2 or 2 belongs to K. But if 2 belongs to K then K t XZ since t- Z 3 ZZ,and so K u {XZ}cannot be consistent, while if Z belongs to Kthen K t- XI,since t- Z 2 XZ, and so K u {XI} cannot be consistent. Thus, either assumption leads to a contradiction, and we may conclude that X I A XZ is consistent. This completes the proof.
-
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N
-- -
--
-
-
N
5.2. Beth’s Theorem. In this section we shall use the notation X(F, GI,..., Gm) in order to indicate a sentence of the Lower predicate
calculus which is formulated in terms of a relation F(x1, ..., xk), k 2 0 and in terms of other relations GI, .. .,Gm, m 2 1 , In addition, X may contain a number of individuals, which are not displayed in the above notation. Let Y = (Vxl) . . . (Vxk) [F(xl, .. ., xk) G F’(x, .. ., x k ) ] where F’ is an additional k-place relation (and where the quantifiers are omitted in case k = 0), and let Z
..., Gm) A X ( F ’ , GI,..., Gm)
= X(F, GI,
where the second element of the conjunction is obtained from the first by replacing F everywhere by F’. We shall say that X defines F implicitly in
118
t5.2.
DEFINABILITY
terms of G I , . .., Gm if Z 3 Y is a theorem, t- Z 3 Y.We shall say that X defines G I , . . ., Gm explicitly in terms of G I , . . ., G m if there exists a , is defined in terms of G I , . . ., Gm and in terms wff Q ( X I , .. .,X X )which of the individuals of X ( F , GI, . . .,Gnr),such that
- - - ( V X k ) [ F - .. Xk) = Q (Xl, ... X k ) ] is deducible from X(F, GI, ...,Gm). Beth‘s result on definitions may (VX1)
(XI,
y
y
now be formulated as follows.
5.2.1. THEOREM (BETH).If a relation F(x1, . . .,xk) is defined implicitly in terms of relations G I , . , Gm by a sentence X(F, G I , . . ., Gm) then F can also be defined explicitly in terms of G I , .. .,Gm and in terms of the individuals of X .
..
PROOF.Let al, ...,a& be k individuals which are not contained in X . Then it follows from the assumptions of the theorem that
5.2.2. t- X ( F , G I ,
Hence
. .., Gm) A X(F’, G I , .. ., Gm) 2 = F’(a1, . . .)U X ) ]
I- X ( F , G I , 3
..., Gm) A F ( u I , . . .,
[X(F’, G I ,
. .., Gm)
3
[F(uI,
..., ak) E
ak) 3
F’ ( ~ 1 ,. .
.,~ k ) ]
By Craig’s lemma 5.1.8., there exists a sentence W = Q(a1, ...,ak), formulated in terms of the vocabulary of X, excepting F, such that 5.2.3.
t- X ( F , G I ,
. . ., Gm) A F(a1, . ..,a&)
Q (01,
2
...,U X )
and 5.2.4.
. ..,ax) [ X(F’, G I , .. ., Gm)
t. Q ( U I ,
3
2
F’ ( ~ 1 ,. . ., U X ) ]
Modifying 5.2.3. slightly, we obtain 5.2.5.
t X(F, G I ,
...,Gm)
2
[F(ai,
..., a&)
2
Q ( ~ 1 ,...,u.)]
.
Similarly, substituting F for F‘ in 5.2.4. and using another simple transformation of the propositional calculus, 5.2.6.
t- X ( F yG I , .
. ., Gm) 3 [Q(czI,. .., a&) 2 I”(a1, .
.,U X ) ] -
Combining 5.2.5. and 5.2.6. and employing one of the rules of inference
.
5.2.7. t- X ( F , G I , . . ,Gm) 3 ( X I )
. .. (x&)[ F ( x I ,. . .,XX) E Q ( X I , . . .,X X ) ]
and this is the conclusion of Beth‘s theorem.
5.3.1
119
RELATIVE D E F I " S
It is understood that the proof requires some trivial mod,fications for
k = 0. If k 2 1 and at least one G6 is of positive order GI = G ( X I ,. ..,
xz), say, then we can always ensure that all at appear in W, if necessary by adding the sentence [G(al,. .., al) G(a1, ., a l ) ] A . .. A [G (a,, . . .,a,) G (am,. . .,a,)] to the given Win conjunction. If all Gt are of order 0, then W is by necessity a sentence which does not include any variables.
..
5.3. Relative Dehitions. The following section has some points of contact with 5.2. but it deals with a different situation, which arises in Algebra on several important occasions. Let K and K* be two sets of sentences. A sentence X' which is defined in K will be said to be invariant relative to K* over K if for every model M of K,Xis either satisfied in all models of K* which are extensions of M or in none. 5.3.1. THEOREM. Let K and K* be two non-empty and consistent sets of sentences such that all relations and individuals of K* are contained in K and such that K* is model-consistent with K. Let X * be a sentence which is defined in K* (and hence in K ) and is invariant relative to K* over K. Then there exists a sentence X which is defined in K such that X holds in any model M of K if and only if X* holds in all models of K* which are extensions of M.
PROOF.Given K, K*, and X*, as described in the theorem, let KR be the set that is obtained by relativizing K with respect to a relation R (x) which is not contained in K and hence is not contained in K* or X *
either. We recall (compare section 3.1.) that KR contains, in addition to the R-transforms of the individual sentences of K, the sentences R (a) for all individuals a which occur in K, and the sentence (3x) R (x) if no such individual exists. We shall show presently that we can find a sentence X which is defined in K such that
5.3.2.
K R U K* I - X * _ X R .
Accepting this result, it is not difficult to derive 5.3.1. Indeed, supposing that such an X exists, let M and M * be models of K and K* respectively such that M * is an extension of M. Introduce the relation R ( x ) into M * by defining that R(u) holds in M * precisely for all elements a of M y and call the resulting structure M:. Then M: is a model of K R as well as
120
15.3.
DEFINABILITY
of K*, and so X * X R holds in M i , by 5.3.2. Suppose that X * holds in M * and hence, in M*. Since X * X R holds in M * , X R also holds in the same structure, and this in turn entails that X holds in M. On the other hand, if X * holds in M * , then the same method shows that X holds in M. Thus, in order to prove 5.3.1., it is sufficient to find a sentence X such that X R satisfies 5.3.2. Let S be the set of sentences X which are defined in K such that X * 2 X R is deducible from KR U K*. S is not empty for it includes all theorems (of the Lower predicate calculus) which are defined in K. Moreover, S is conjunctive for if X * =, X R and X * =, YR are deducible from KR U K*, then X * 2 [ X Rh YR] is deducible from that set as well. But [XRh YR] coincides with [ X h Y]R, and so X h Y also belongs to S. Let T be the set of all sentences X R for X E S, and put
-
-
H = K R U K* U TU { - X * } .
If this set is consistent then it possesses a model, M:. The individuals of M: which satisfy R ( x ) constitute a model M R of KR, and if we ignore the relation R(x) in M R then we obtain a model M of K. Let D and D R be the diagram of M and M R respectively, so that DR is obtained from D by adding the sentence R(a) for all individuals a of M. The set H = D R U KR U K * is consistent since M i is a model of this set. We propose to prove that H' t X * . Indeed, if H U { X * } = D R U KR u K* u { X * } is consistent then it possesses a model N:. The individuals of N: which satisfy R (x)constitute a model N R of KR which is at the same time an extension of M R . Thus, N: and M: are models of K* and extensions o f M , but N: satisfies X * while M: satisfies X*. It follows that the structures N * and M * which are obtained from N i and M: by ignoring R ( x ) also satisfy X * and X * , respectively, although they are both extensions of M. This is contrary to the assumptions of 5.3.1. and proves that H k X * . Thus, there exists a conjunction Y of a finite number of elements of DR, Y = YI h . . . h Yk such that the sentences Y 1 X * and, hence, X* 3 Yare deducible from KR u K*. Every YZis either of the form R(a) or a formula of order one (a bracketed atomic formula) defined in M or a negation of such a formula. Accordingly, Y may be written as a disjunction, or as an implication of the form N
N
N
-
-
-
-
R(a1) h
... h R ( u ~1) Z
where Z is a disjunction of negations of elements of D. By adding, if
5.3.1
? 21
RELATIVE DEFINITIONS
necessary, suitable elements to the original { Y1, . .., YR),we may always ensure that Z is not empty, and that it contains as individuals precisely U I , . . . , an, Z = Z(a1, . . ., an).Then KR U K* I-X* 3 [ R ( a l ) A ... A R ( u ~3) Z ]
.
The conjunction R(a1) A . . . A R(an)may be shortened by deleting all terms R ( q ) such that uj is contained in K, if any, for these terms are included in KR. Suppose then that aj is in K for j = m 1, ...,n, then 5.3.3.
KR U K* I- X *
3
[R(ai)A
... A R(u,)
+
2
Z]
.
However, if m = 0, then this sentence is to be read simply as X * 3 Z . Now the individuals al, ...,am are not included in K R or K* or X * and so 5.3.3. entails that the sentence
X* 2 [ (Vxl) .. . (Vxm) [ R( X I ) A . . . AR (x,)
--
Z(x1,
3
.. .,x,,
+ 1,
an)]]
is deducible from KR U K*. It follows that the sentence X* deducible from KR U K*, where 3 *. *
am
WR = (vxl)[R(x1) = [ (vx2) [ R(x2) [R(x,) = Z(X1, .* .,X m , U m + l , * .,an)]
.
3
W R is
...] .
But, as anticipated, by our notation, WEis the relativized transform of W = ( V X ~ .)
.. ( V X ~ )2 ( X I , ..., Xm, am+l, - .- an)
and so the fact that KR U K* I- X* 3 WRimplies that W E Sand W RE T. We now recall that M i is a model of H = KR U K* U T U {N X*}. This implies that M i satisfies WR. It follows that M i satisfies also the sentence R(a1) A . . . A R(am) 3 Z(a1, . . .,am, u ~ + I.,. ., an) .
..
But R(a1) A . A R(anb)holds in M i since that structure is a model of KR, and so Z(a1, . .,an) also holds in M:. Also, Z(a1, ..., am) is equivalent to the negation of a conjunction Z’ of elements of the diagram D of M , and so Z’ holds in M and M:. Thus Z(a1, . . .,an) holds in M i , yielding a contradiction which proves that the set His contradictory. Since T is conjunctive, it follows that there exists an element XR of T such that KR U K* I-XR 2 X * . But at the same time KR U K* k X * 3 XR
.
N
122
15.3.
DEFINABILITY
by the defining property of T and so
This completes the proof of Theorem 5.3.1. We note that the sentence X
whose existence is affirmed by 5.3.1. is essentially unique, i.e. if both X = XI and X = X2 satisfy the conclusion of the theorem, then XI X2 is deducible from K. There is a corresponding result for predicates. Let K and K* be two sets of sentences. A predicate Q* (xi, .. .,xn), n 2 1,which is defined in K will be said to be invariant relative to K* over K if for any given model M of Kand for any set of elements al, . . .,an of Myeither Q * (a,. . . an) holds in all extensions of M which are models of K* or Q * (al, . ..,a n ) holds in all extensions of M which are models of K*.
-
5.3.4. THEOREM. Let K and K* be two non-empty and consistent sets of sentences such that the relations and individuals of K* are contained in K and such that K* is modeI-consistent with K. Let Q * (XI, .. .,X n ) , n 2 1 , be a predicate which is defined in K* and is invariant relative to K* over K. Then there exists a predicate Q(x1, ..,Xn) which is defined in K, such that if M is any model of K, and (a,. .. an) is any set of elements of M , the sentence Q (al, .. ., a%)holds in Mif and only if Q* (al, .,an) holds in all models of K* which are extensions of M.
.
..
..
PROOF.Let bl, . ,bn be a set of individuals which are not contained in K We extend K and K* without extending their sets of relations by adding otherwise arbitrary sentences which involve bl, . .., bn and no other individuals and which are theorems of the Lower predicate calculus. Let the resulting sets be called KOand K*,. Consider the sentence X * = Q* (bl, . ..,bn). X* is defined in K*, and in KO.We are going to verify that X* is invariant relative to K*, over KO.Indeed, if MOis any model of KOand M*,, M t are models of K*,,then bl, .. ., bn are contained in all three of these structures. Since Q*( X I , . . ., xn) is invariant relative to K* over K, and since Mo is a model of K, and M : and M*, are models of K*, it follows that X * holds either in both M: and M*,or it holds neither in M: nor in M*,. Moreover, the relations and individuals of K*, are contained in KOand if MOis a model of KO, and hence of K then it possesses an extension M*,which is a model of K*. But bl, . . .,bn belong to MO and hence to M*,, and K*, contains, in addition to K* only a number of theorems of the Lower predicate
5.3.1
123
RELATWE D-ONS
calculus. Hence M*, is a model of K*,, K*, is model-consistent with KO. This shows that the conditions of Theorem 5.3.1. are satisfied, and we may conclude that there exists a sentence X which is defined KOsuch that X holds in any model MOof KOif and only if X* holds in all models of K*, which are extensions of Mo. We may suppose that X contains the individuals bl, . . .,bn for if this is not the case from the outset then we may achieve the desired situation by adding to the original X a theorem (of the Lower predicate calculus) which contains bl, ..., bn. Accordingly, we may write X = Q (bi, . . ., bn). We maintain that Q (xi, . . .,X n ) satisfies the conditions laid down in the conclusion of 5.3.4. To see this, let M be any model of K and let al, . ..,an be any set of elements of M. Let M* be an extension of M which is a model of K*. It is evident that the definition of Q (XI, . . .,xn) is independent of the choice of bl, . ..,bn subject only to the condition that these individuals do not occur in K, and we may therefore suppose that they were selected from outside M*. We extend M by adding the constants bl, ...,b, to its set of individuals and by defining that any relation A (XI, .,x k ) shall hold for a set involving some of the br precisely if A ( X I , . . .,x k ) holds in M for the set which is obtained by replacing the bt by the at with equal subscript. The enlarged structure will be called Mo. Enlarging M * in a similar way by means of the same set bl, . . ., bn we obtain a structure M*, which is an extension of Mo. MOand M*, are models of KOand K*,, respectively. Suppose now that Q* (al, .. .,an)holds in M , then X* = Q*(bl, .. .,bn) holds in M*, by the construction of M z , and so X = Q (bl, ...,bn) holds in Mo by 5.3.1. Hence, Q (al, ...,an) holds in M, by the construction of Mo. Similarly, if Q*(ai, . . ., an) holds in M* then Q(a1, . . .,an) holds in M. This completes the proof of 5.3.4. The sentence Xwhose existence is established by 5.3.1. ispersistent with respect to K (see section 3.3.) To see this consider any two models M and M' of K such that M' is an extension of M and X holds in M. Suppose that X does not hold in M', so that X holds in that structure. Let M * be any extension of M' which is a model of K*. Such an M * exists since K* is model-consistent with K. Then X* holds in M*, by one of the defining properties of X.On the other hand, M* is also an extension of M which satisfies X. Hence, M * satisfies X*.This involves a contradiction and shows that X holds also in M', X is persistent with respect to K. A similar argument shows that X also is persistent with respect to K, i.e. X is invariant with respect to K. Hence, taking into account Theorem 3.3.2., 3.3.3., we obtain
..
-
-
N
N
N
12.4
15.3.
DEFIN ABILITY
5.3.5. COROLLARY. The sentence X in 5.3.1. may be selected as an existential sentence, or as a universal sentence.
Similarly, the predicate Q (XI, . . ., xn) which appears in the conclusion of 5.3.4. is invariant with respect to K. Hence, 5.3.6. COROLLARY. The predicate Q (XI, . . .,x,) in 5.3.4. may be selected as an existential predicate, or as a universal predicate. For practical purposes, it is useful to link the above results with the notion of relative model-completeness. 5.3.7. THEOREM. Let K and K* be two non-empty and consistent sets of
sentences such that the relations and individuals of K* are contained in K and such that K* is model-consistent with K and model-complete relative to K. Let X * be any sentence which is defined in K*. Then there exists a sentence X which is defined in K such that if M is any model of K and M * is a model of K* which is an extension of M , X holds in M if and only if X * holds in M*. Moreover, X may be chosen as an existential sentence, or as a universal sentence. Similarly, to any predicate Q* (XI, . . .,x,) which is defined in K*, n 2 1 there exists a predicate Q (XI, . .,x,) which is defined in K such that if u1, . . .,an are elements of any model M of K and M * is a model of K* which is an extension of M,then Q(a1, . .,an) holds in M if and only if Q* (a,. ., a,) holds in M*. Q is invariant with respect to K and hence, may be chosen as an existential predicate or as a universal predicate.
.
.
.
PROOF.To prove the first part of the theorem we have to show, in view of 5.3.1. that any sentence X * which is defined in K* is invariant relative to K* over K. Let M be any model of K with diagram D. Then K* U D is complete, since K* is model-complete relative to K. It follows that either X* is deducible from K* u D and hence, holds in all models of K* which are extensions of M , or X * is deducible from K* u D and hence, holds in all models of K* which are extensions of M. This proves the assertion. The truth of the second part of the theorem is established in a similar way. To give an example of a situation in which the conditions of 5.3.7. are satisfied, we consider the case that K is a set of axioms for the concept of an ordered field K = KOFas defined in section 2.2. and K* is a set of axioms for the concept of a real closed ordered field K* = ROF.Then the assumption of 5.3.7. are satisfied with respect to K and K * . Now let p (u) be any monic polynomial of pre-assigned degree m > 0 with coeffiN
5.4.1
125
APPLICATION TO THE NWLUTELLENSATZ
cients in an ordered field M,and let I be a closed interval in M.If k is any specified natural number, k 2 0, then the property (of p ( u ) ) to possess exactly k distinct roots in I may be regarded as a predicate of the coefficients xo, . . .,Xm-1 of p (u) - the leading coefficient being 1, by assumption - and of the two end-points of I, y and 2. However, in Algebra as opposed to Arithmetic, one is in general interested not in the number of roots which belong to the given M, but in the “total” number of roots in I, more precisely, in the number of roots in I which belong to the real closure of M.Thus, if M is the field of rational numbers, one wishes to determine the number of real roots in Z or, which is the same, the number of real algebraic roots. Accordingly, the predicate Q* (XO, .. .,Xm-1, y, z) which states that p ( u ) = xo XI u . . . xm-l um-1 u m possesses precisely k roots in the closed interval y < u < z, refers to M*. Theorem 5.3.7. now tells us that there exists a predicate Q(x0, . . ., xm-l, y, z) which holds in M,i.e. in the original field, precisely when p possesses k roots in the interval determined by y and z in any real-closed extension of M.The reader will recognize that we have thus disposed of a problem which, in standard Algebra, is settled by means of Sturm’s method. Similarly, the problem whether or not a system of equations in a given field possesses a solution in the algebraic closure, or in any algebraically closed extension of that field, comes within the scope of 5.3.7. In standard Algebra, this problem is dealt with by means of the construction of resultants. In the next section, we shall give an application of 5.3.7. which shows that our methods provide a ready means for establishing the existence of numerical bounds in certain algebraic problems.
+
+
5.4. Application to the Nullstellensatz. Hilbert’s theorem on the zeros of a system of polynomials, briefly the Nullstellensatz, is commonly formulated as follows.
5.4.1. “Let f ( x 1 , . . .,x,), f1 (XI, . . .,xn), . . ., fr (XI, .. .,x,) be polynomials in the polynomial ring M [XI, . .,xn] over a given field M such that f vanishes for all joint zeros of the polynomials fi, ...,&. Then there exists a positive integer p such that fe belongs to the ideal (fl, . . ,
.
.
fr)”.
We observe that the above statement is correct if by “all joint zeros” we mean all joint zeros in all commutative fields which are extensions of M” or “all joint zeros in all algebraically closed extensions of M ” or even “all joint zeros in the algebraic closure of M”. The statement is not
126
15.4.
DEFINABILITY
correct, generally speaking, if by “all joint zeros” we mean “all joint zeros in My’, and one of the earlier interpretations is usually taken for granted, implicitly. The second and third interpretation are equivalent by virtue of the model-completeness of the notion of an algebraically closed field. More precisely, let Q* be the formula 5.4.2.
[fi (XI, .. ., x,)
=0 A
(VXl) .- . (vxn) . .. A & (xi, . . .,x,)
=O 3
XI,
. . .,x,)
= 0]
when written out in detail within the Lower predicate calculus in terms of the relations of equality, addition, and multiplication, E, S, and P. We may regard Q* as a predicate of the coefficients of the polynomials f., . . ., & andf’taken in an arbitrary but definite order, yl, . . .,y k , say. Thus, Q* = Q*(yl, . . .,y k ) may be formulated in terms of E, S, and P, and without individuals. It follows that if we take K = KCF,a set of axioms for the notion of a commutative field and K* = RCF, a set of axioms for the notion of an algebraically closed field, then the conditions of Theorem 5.3.7. are satisfied. Accordingly, there exists a predicate Q (yl, .. .,y k ) formulated in terms of E, S, and P,and without individuals such that for any field M and elements al, .. ., Uk of M , the predicate Q ( a 1 , . . ., a k ) holds in M if and only iff vanishes for all joint zeros of fly , ., fry in the algebraic closure of M (or, in any other algebraically closed extension of M ) . It is of interest to note that the definition of Q is independent of the characteristic of the field under consideration. The conclusion of 5.4.1. asserts, in more detail, that there exists a positive integer p, and polynomials gl (XI, . . .,x,), . .,gr (XI, ..., x,) such that
.
.
5.4.3. g1 (Xl,
.. . X,)fl y
(Xl,
.. .
y
x,)
- ..,x,))Q=
+ . . . + gr
(f(x1,
(Xl,
...,xn)& (Xl, . .. x,) . y
Observe that in this context, it is taken for granted that the coefficients of 8