Interpreting Imperatives

INTERPRETING IMPERATIVES

STUDIES IN LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY

VOLUME 88

Managing Editors LISA MATTHEWSON, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada YAEL SHARVIT, University of Connecticut, Storrs, USA THOMAS EDE ZIMMERMANN, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt am Main, Germany Editorial Board JOHAN VAN BENTHEM, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands GREGORY N. CARLSON, University of Rochester, U.S.A. DAVID DOWTY, Ohio State University, Columbus, U.S.A. GERALD GAZDAR, University of Sussex, Brighton, U.K. IRENE HEIM, M.I.T., Cambridge, U.S.A. EWAN KLEIN, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, U.K. BILL LADUSAW, University of California, Santa Cruz, U.S.A. TERRENCE PARSONS, University of California, Irvine, U.S.A.

For further volumes in this series: http://www.springer.com/series/6556

INTERPRETING IMPERATIVES

by

MAGDALENA KAUFMANN University of Göttingen, Germany

123

Magdalena Kaufmann University of Göttingen Department of Linguistics/Courant Research Centre “Text Structures” Käte-Hamburger-Weg, 3 37073 Göttingen Germany [email protected]

ISSN 0924-4662 ISBN 978-94-007-2268-2 e-ISBN 978-94-007-2269-9 DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-2269-9 Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg London New York Library of Congress Control Number: 2011937654 c Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012  No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

Preface

The work that lead to this book started out years ago, in a different place and under a different name, when I was a new graduate student at the Graduiertenkolleg Satzarten in Frankfurt. Little may she have known that she set me on an enterprise that would occupy and intrigue me for many years when my then office mate Melani Wratil, herself deep in thought about the syntax of imperative clauses, suggested someone should look at their semantics. I’d like to thank her for this remark (as well as her support when I took to it), as the topic turned out to be one of the most interesting challenges of how to position the role of meaning at the interace between form and use. Years later what Magdalena Schwager handed in rather hurriedly as her doctoral dissertation in 2006 has been reworked and turned into a monograph by Magdalena Kaufmann. Although the result is still anything but perfect, it is now time to let go, and I hope that there is something to be learned from this book: for those interested in imperatives in particular, the meaning they carry and how it might be built up from smaller parts, and for those interested in how to conceive of the interface between form and function. Being an investigation at the interface between form and function, it touches necessarily upon many domains not every reader may be equally familiar with or even just equally interested in. I tried to be explicit and break things up in a perspicuous way so that readers can go about it somewhat selectively. To get an idea of what conception of the semantics-pragmatics interface I have in mind, it might be sufficient to look at Chapter 1 and Section 2.3. Readers interested in a comparison of different conceptions of the semantics-pragmatics interface, should look at Sections 2.1 and 2.2 in particular. Many of the more specialized topics (in particular, Sections 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.5 and Chapter 6) can be skipped by readers interested only in the core phenomena. Chapter 3 is most important to all concerns regarding the syntax-semantics interface. Chapter 4 spells out the technicalities of my account of imperatives, which is already introduced and motivated more informally in Section 2.3. Having reached this point, I would like to acknowledge the support and friendship of a number of people without whom the dissertation would never have made it into a monograph. You will find numerous notes of thanks and references to helpful comments and pieces of data distributed throughout this book, and I have— somewhat hesitantly—decided against repeating all of them here up front. In the v

vi

Preface

following, I will just try to mention a few people who had what I would like to call a ‘global’ impact on this particular piece of work. First of all, I want to thank my Doktorvater Ede Zimmermann. He has not only taught me an invaluable amount of things in semantics, but he has also passed on a bit of his constant curiosity and joy in discovering problems and their possible solutions, and he keeps doing so, as well as being incredibly helpful in all sorts of theoretical or practical matters. The process of turning the dissertation into a book started out from his comments, as well as those of my second supervisor, Günther Grewendorf, who keeps making me aware of what is thrilling about sytnax, and the external member of my committee, Arnim von Stechow, who was also my very first teacher in semantics and has never stopped to present me with thought provoking questions. The rewriting has profited a lot from discussion with the participants of my ESSLLI class on imperatives (Hamburg, 2008), and the joint one with Regine Eckardt on Speech Acts (Bordeaux, 2008). For their willingness to work through much messier earlier versions of this manuscript, their patience to really do so, and for providing me with annotated versions containing many challenging questions, I would like to thank in particular Cleo Condoravdi, Yurie Hara, Sven Lauer, the SLAP series editor Lisa Matthewson, Paul Portner, and an anonymous reviewer for Springer. Also, writing a book would have been extremely different without Nicholas Asher, Julie Hunter, Shin-Sook Kim, and Peter Sells, who were always there when I needed help with theoretical problems, with practical matters, or just with data. Ilaria Frana and Sarah Zobel watched my back to help me find the time for working on the book. Martin Prinzhorn and Viola Schmitt keep reminding me of the joy that lies in linguistics and how to combine it with other qualities of life. Thanks to Lewis Gebhardt for proof reading this manuscript, and to Helen van der Stelt for her patience with my delays and her careful supervision of the publication process at Springer. Finally, some people deserve thanks for their support in keeping my private life going during these past few years from dissertation to book. I want to thank my parents, Walter und Hildegund Scheiner, for all the help, patience and love they have been offering constantly—and for understanding so well that one can be so impassioned with work. Finally, Stefan and Sebastian had to put up with me through these painful last stretch of getting the monograph done. Maybe unexpectedly at the very end of acknowledgments, Stefan deserves credit as one of the most careful and also most unforgiving readers of earlier versions of this book. In addition to our joint work part of which is presented in Chapter 6, his thoughts have been extremely helpful in rewriting Chapter 2 in particular. But at the same time, and more in line with these acknowledgments coming to an end, he has my deepest gratitude for countless ways in which he would always make me take another step—from discussing problems to cooking lots of mabu tofu and Japanese-style karee. Sebastian beat the book by nearly a year, and he turned out to be infinitely more supportive of my work than what you’d usually expect of someone his age. While even his pure presence made a

Preface

vii

whole lot of a difference, his cheerful mood and nice sleeping habits deserve special mention as well. Many more people deserve acknowledgment here, and my failure to give a fairer list is just one of many mishaps that most certainly remain in an enterprise like this book. Let me stress that all mistakes and inadequacies are mine. This project was funded by the German Research Foundation and the German Initiative of Excellence Institutional support was provided by the University of Frankfurt, the University of Göttingen, and Northwestern University. Göttingen, Germany June 2011

Magdalena Kaufmann

Contents

1 Setting the Scene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Individuating Imperatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1.1 Trying a Purely Functional Individuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1.2 Trying a Purely Formal Individuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1.3 Imperatives as Clause Types Individuated by a Form-Function Pair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Clause Types and Actual Utterances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Semantics or Pragmatics?—Deciding on the Boundaries . . . . . . . . . 1.4 The Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 1 3 4 5 10 16 21

2 How to Handle Imperatives in Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Three Parameters of Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1 Split and Uniform Representationalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.2 Assigning Meaning to Imperatives: Static or Dynamic . . . . 2.1.3 Possible Denotata for Imperatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 A Few Recent Approaches to Imperatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.1 Speech Acts as Input to Semantic Computation . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2 Performative Modals and Non-epistemic Context Change Potentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.3 (Ex-)Changing the World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.4 Imperatives as Updating To-Do Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Modalized Propositions: Idea and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1 Performative and Descriptive Modal Verbs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.2 Updates and Speech Acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.3 Imperatives and Declaratives on a Par . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29 30 30 34 41 42 43 45 47 50 56 58 65 67

3 Imperatives as Graded Modals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Modality in Possible Worlds Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.1 Simple Modality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.2 Personal and Impersonal Conversational Backgrounds . . . . 3.1.3 Graded Modality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Imperatives at the Syntax-Semantics Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

73 73 74 76 83 86 ix

x

Contents

3.2.1

3.3

General Considerations on the Syntactic Make-Up of Imperatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.2 Tense, Aspect, and Their Relation to Modality . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.3 Temporal Oppositions in Imperatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.4 The Imperative Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.5 Do Imperatives Express Personal Modality? . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

87 93 102 105 122 128

4 From Modalized Propositions to Speech Acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Contextual Dependence in the Propositional Meaning Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.1 ORDERs, COMMAND s, and REQUESTs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.2 PROHIBITIONs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.3 WISHes and ABSENT WISHes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.4 ADVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Constraining the Predictions: The Presuppositional Meaning Component . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 Restrictions Familiar from Modal Verbs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.2 Authority: Deriving Self-Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.3 Epistemic Uncertainty and the Ordering Source Restriction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.4 Putting It All Together . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Some Considerations on Propositionality and Rejections . . . . . . . . .

129

155 162 163

5 Possibility Readings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Permitting Permissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.1 P ERMISSION-like Speech Acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Any Troubles? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.1 Indifference Any-Imperatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.2 Subtrigged Necessity Any-Imperatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.3 Recapitulating Any-Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 For Example-A DVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.1 (In)Exhaustive Necessity and Possibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.2 Diamonds Are a Girl’s Best Friend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

169 171 171 176 176 177 179 180 181 183 190

6 Embedding Imperatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Reported Speech and Imperatives from a Cross-Linguistic Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1.1 Indirect Speech, Parentheticals, and Quotations . . . . . . . . . 6.1.2 Quotative Constructions in Japanese and Malagasy . . . . . . 6.1.3 Fossilized Constructions in Ancient Greek and Middle High German . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1.4 Context Harmony in Old Germanic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

193

129 131 133 135 141 144 145 147

196 197 199 204 205

Contents

6.2

6.3

6.4

xi

6.1.5 Embedded Imperatives in Modern High German . . . . . . . . 6.1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conditional Imperatives and Modal Subordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.1 A Full Paradigm of CIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.2 CIs and the Modal Operator Analysis of Imperatives . . . . . 6.2.3 Modal Subordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conditional Conjunctions and Disjunctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.1 Comparing Conditional Flavors in IaDs, IoDs, and Speech Act Conjunctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.2 Towards an Analysis of Type II IaDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.3 Imperatives in IoDs and Non-classical Disjunctions in General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

208 211 212 213 216 219 220 221 225 233 244 254

List of Tags for Grammatical Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

Chapter 1

Setting the Scene

Probably anyone with an interest in language, or even anyone who is just learning a foreign language, is familiar with the basic distinctions between different types of sentences as declaratives, interrogatives and imperatives. As language users and as pragmaticists we have an intuition that we use them for different moves in the linguistic exchange. As semanticists we are used to thinking of declaratives as descriptions of states of affairs or as devices to enlarge joint information, and of interrogatives as requiring resolution with respect to what the state of affairs is in a particular respect. But imperatives are usually tip-toed around when it comes to the question as to what is the link between a linguistic form and its potential use. This book is meant to shed some light on the matter.

1.1 Individuating Imperatives ‘Enjoyable and fertile as their relations may have been, linguistics and philosophy are uneasy bedfellows. Nowhere more apparently so than over the matter of imperatives,’ Arthur Merin (1991:667) informs us. But there is hope; anyone who has ever worked on imperatives may have realized that within or across disciplines much disagreement as to what is the right analysis for ‘imperatives’ could be avoided if researchers made clear what the object of their study is. Some scholars think of particular verb forms in a paradigm (as often established by traditional grammarians), others think of a particular grammatical type of sentences, still others think of a particular grammatical sentence type used for a particular function, others again think of a particular conversational act (such as commanding), and yet others think of a sentence used for a particular conversational act (a concrete speech act). Clearly, the main parameter is whether the choice of what you call an imperative or not is a matter of form, of function, or of both, and, if function enters the picture, whether it is about utterance tokens or utterance types. What understanding you feel sympathetic to may well depend on your discipline. The concept of imperatives interests at least the linguistic domains of morphology, syntax, semantics, pragmatics, as well as logic, philosophy of language, artificial

M. Kaufmann, Interpreting Imperatives, Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy 88, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012 DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-2269-9_1, 

1

2

1 Setting the Scene

intelligence, and ethics, and most of these disciplines have a propensity towards a particular (default) understanding. As a semanticist, the phenomenon I find intriguing is what might be called the third clause type. Looking into an arbitrary grammar of an arbitrary natural language, there is a high chance of finding a distinction between at least declarative, interrogative and imperative sentences.1 For German, the paradigm looks like (1); the English translations exemplify the same phenomenon. (1)

a.

b.

c.

Du bist nett zu deiner Großmutter. you are nice to your grandmother ‘You are nice to your grandmother.’ Bist du nett zu deiner Großmutter? are you nice to your grandmother ‘Are you nice to your grandmother?’ nett zu deiner Großmutter. Sei be.I MP S G nice to your grandmother ‘Be nice to your grandmother!’

declarative

interrogative

imperative

Intuitively, while declaratives and interrogatives are concerned with what the world is like, imperative sentences seem concerned more with what the world should be like. Now, many scholars agree that with respect to declaratives and interrogatives, much can be said if we think of them in terms of truth conditions (or the truth conditions of their answers, respectively). For imperatives, establishing any connection to truth conditions looks like fighting a losing battle: imperatives simply don’t feel true or false—they may feel justified, or inappropriate, and they may feel related to certain courses of events.2 Yet, this is precisely what I will argue for in this book: semantically, imperatives do have truth conditions, and the reason that we do not normally perceive them as being true or false is pragmatic in nature. Many of my arguments will rely on imperatives that are not used as commands or as orders. For some of these cases it has been argued that they should not be considered imperatives—even by scholars who have an otherwise very similar understanding of ‘imperative’ as a particular clause type. So, the first thing that needs to be clarified is what underlies the more or less intuitive compilation of paradigms like (1). Ultimately, my understanding will be clearly form-biased. However, it is only if we take into account a relation to function that a cross-linguistically valid concept of imperatives as clause types can be established. The relevant arguments are presented in the following three subsections.

1

Cf. Sadock and Zwicky (1985).

2

In her recent handbook article on imperatives, Han (t.a.) asserts plainly: Imperatives cannot be said to be true or false. They do not assert anything about the current world and so it does not make sense to assign a truth value to imperatives.

1.1

Individuating Imperatives

3

1.1.1 Trying a Purely Functional Individuation It should be obvious that a purely functional conception of ‘imperative’ will never allow us to establish paradigms as in (1). And indeed, such an understanding is rareley adopted in linguistics, but it is quite common in philosophy. In his influential study entitled Imperatives3 Hamblin (1987:3) explicitly decides not to ‘make a case for any particular use of the word “imperative” other than what I take to be the usual and natural one.’ What he considers usual and natural turns out to be a purely functional conception, and the decision not to make it precise leads to a couple of shortcomings discussed in Merin (1992). But even making it precise would not help to single out our intuitive object of interest, namely paradigms like (1). The most widespread functional understanding of ‘imperative’ amounts to something like ‘directive speech act’ or ‘conduct-guiding act in conversation.’4 A purely functional understanding classifies as imperatives not only explicit performatives (cf. (2a)) or certain usages of modal verbs (cf. (2b)),5 but likewise questions used in indirect speech acts (cf. (2c)) and elliptic utterances (cf. (2d)). Under suitable circumstances, all of these can be used to give an order—certainly a most prototypically directive/conduct-guiding speech act. Therefore, in such utterances they should get classified as imperatives—and this is indeed the position taken by Hamblin (1987). (2)

a. b. c. d. e.

I hereby order you to leave. You must leave immediately! Could you leave the room now? Out! Leave the room!

Clearly, such an individuation is orthogonal to the aim of establishing paradigms as in (1). In particular, if the distinction between declaratives, interrogatives and imperatives is semantically relevant, individuation by function would give rise to massive ambiguity. Under that scheme, all the sentences in (2) can occur as imperatives; therefore, all of them can express the imperative meaning. For example, a sentence like (2c) is ambiguous between an interrogative interpretation (as it can easily be used to inquire if the addressee is able to leave the room) and an imperative interpretation (as—with the right intonation—it can be used to order him to do so). In general, all indirect speech acts would turn out to involve semantic ambiguities, and this is not a plausible assumption. Sadock and Zwicky (1985) argue explicitly that indirect speech acts are fundamentally different from other instances of natural language ambiguities. They adduce the following arguments: (i) The effect of indirect 3

Published posthumuously.

4

Broadie (1972) reserves ‘imperative’ for commands and orders and coins ‘imperation’ for the larger class of conduct-guiding conversational moves.

5

Modals under such a usage are called performative modals, see Section 2.3.1.

4

1 Setting the Scene

speech acts draws precisely on a deviation from a usage associated with their conventionally associated meaning. (ii) The difference between e.g. posing a question and giving a command differs crucially from structural ambiguities. Therefore, it does not seem to be a grammatical distinction of English. Structural ambiguities can often be resolved by grammatical operations. For example, (3a) is structurally ambiguous. Applying the operation of passivization results in (3b), which is no longer ambiguous. It only has the reading that the boy is taking a decision regarding the boat, not that the boy’s process of deciding is happening on the boat: (3)

a. b.

The boy decided on the boat. The boat was decided on by the boy.

their (144) their (145)

And (iii), indirect speech acts differ from classical ambiguities in that they are assumed not to be language specific. ‘Equivalent forms in other languages are likely to be just as effective in getting requests across and would succeed for exactly the same reasons’ (cf. Sadock and Zwicky (1985:192)). From this, we can conclude that a purely functional individuation does not help us to understand the intuitive relevance of paradigms like (1).

1.1.2 Trying a Purely Formal Individuation As the paradigm in (1) cannot be established in terms of purely functional considerations, we might use ‘imperative’ as a classification of a sentence form type. And indeed, such an understanding is often proclaimed in linguistics. To single out imperatives, we could draw on formal features exhibited by certain morphological or syntactic entities. One possibility for making sense of imperatives as a form type at the sentence level is to consider them ‘matrix sentences that have an uninflected verb and lack a subject pronoun’. This might be a good approximation to single out the class of linguistic elements traditionally understood as English imperative clauses (but cf. Bolinger, 1967; Broadie, 1972, for problems). We could then safely talk about the class of sentences that has exactly these properties in English. Nevertheless, in general, we take ‘imperative’ to be a cross-linguistically applicable concept. And intuitively, what we want to single out here is not just a certain morphosyntactic property a language might employ for some purpose or other (viz. a language might make systematic use of sentences with uninflected verb forms and lacking subject pronouns). It may indeed be interesting to see what is cross-linguistically encoded by e.g. uninflected verbs, and, in that particular case, we would even find that at least many Indoeuropean languages in fact use them for what is labelled the ‘imperative’ in paradigms like (1) (Wratil, 2005). Nevertheless, such an understanding of our empirical finding would already presuppose that we know what we are looking for. But these formal properties become of interest to us in connection with other properties, namely, (i) some sort of default function of influencing the addressee’s behavior, and (ii) in relation to other types of sentences that are traditionally classified as declaratives, interrogatives or exclamatives. Consequently, even if an imperative were to be identified with some cluster of

1.1

Individuating Imperatives

5

morphosyntactic properties, we would still have to know which cluster to pick: intuitively, given formally characterized sentence types of an arbitrary natural language, we have a clear idea what should be called the interrogative and what should be the imperative. But our conviction of which is which does not depend on purely formal criteria; rather, it depends on what the respective form types are normally used for within that language. Even if, cross-linguistically, lack of an overt subject pronoun and unusual inflectional poverty seem to constitute characteristics of sentences traditionally classified as imperatives, this is not the only way of marking them. Some languages employ sentence final particles (e.g. Korean) or morphological marking of the verb (e.g. Maricopa6 ) to do so, and some even have special pronouns to designate the imperative subject (e.g. Yokuts7 ), (cf. Sadock and Zwicky, 1985; Wratil, 2005, for general discussion). Therefore, we may conclude that the semantically relevant understanding of ‘imperative’ as a cross-linguistically applicable category cannot be rendered in purely formal terms either.

1.1.3 Imperatives as Clause Types Individuated by a Form-Function Pair I argued that neither a purely functional nor a purely formal understanding of ‘imperative’ allows us to single out precisely the phenomenon that is of intuitive interest to my investigation. Instead, I will employ an understanding of imperatives as clause types in the sense of Bach and Harnish (1979) and Sadock and Zwicky (1985). Ultimately, the role this concept plays in my investigation will turn out to be purely heuristic: as soon as the semantic analysis is in place (that is, at the end of Section 4.2.4), it is derivable from the semantic interpretation of formally marked clause types together with considerations as to what are prototypical utterance contexts. Sadock and Zwicky (1985) define clause types as pairs of form types at the sentence level together with their (prototypical) functions. Clause types are required to induce a partition on the set of all disambiguated sentences (that is, each sentence shows the formal marking of exactly one clause type), and we can find sets of sentences whose members differ only with respect to their respective clause type. These are exactly paradigms like our initial (1). More abstractly, we can think of such paradigms as follows. Syntactically, we distinguish a set of (disambiguated) sentential form types, H (e.g. types of standard LFs). On the other hand, pragmatics distinguishes various types of speech acts, i.e. types of moves speakers make in a conversation (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969), a set K , which is usually considered universal.8 Throughout, I am using small caps to 6

A North American Indian language which belongs to the Yuman family and is spoken in Arizona.

7

A family of North American Indian languages spoken in Northern and Central California.

8

The elements in K are often called illocutionary forces, cf. e.g. Gazdar (1981), who reserves ‘speech acts’ for the combination of sentence meaning and illocutionary force in a concrete

6

1 Setting the Scene

indicate speech act types. This should remind us that they are labels that need to be filled with content by a full-fledged theory of speech acts, which is more than I can provide in this book. Crucial differences between various theories of speech acts are largely orthogonal to the issues we are concerned with. Therefore, for the sake of concreteness, I will resort to a standard Austinian-Searlean conception in terms of preconditions, felicity conditions and sincerity conditions and combine it with likewise standard assumptions about the representation of utterance contexts (Stalnaker, 1978; Kaplan, 1989). This interaction will be described in more detail in Section 1.4. For the moment, it should suffice that speech acts are moves in the conversational game people make with utterances. Thereby, they change the commitments (both with respect to how to act and what to believe) of the various participants in the conversation. The set of clause types of a given language L can be conceived of as a set of pairs C TL ⊆ H × K , s.t. for each h ∈ H , there is exactly one k ∈ K , s.t. h, k ∈ C TL . Hence, each sentence level form type appears in exactly one clause type. It is thus unproblematic to assign the same label to both the sentential form type and the clause type it instantiates, which is why I will often omit ‘sentence’ even when talking about the form type. (4)

A simple Clause Type System a. declarative := <declarative (sentence), A SSERT> b. interrogative := c. imperative :=

Equipped with this understanding of clause types, we can try to individuate imperatives across languages as elements in the respective languages’ clause type systems. We have thus decided to give primacy to the form side. In the following, I will discuss some consequences of the understanding in terms of form-function pairs and explore some possible difficulties in singling out ‘imperatives’ that arise in various languages. Assume that we have individuated a certain sentence form type as being prototypically used for O RDERs. If we then find a token of that form type in an utterance that clearly cannot be meant as an O RDER, this doesn’t constitute evidence that the respective sentence is ‘not an imperative’ and that the corresponding usage could be disregarded in the enterprise of exploring the semantics of imperatives. At best, we could claim that two clause types can be realized by one and the same surface structure, giving thus rise to an instance of ambiguity. At first glance, this may seem tempting. Consider for example (5).

utterance. Speech act types would then most likely be categories of speech acts comprising the sentence meaning, e.g. the type of ‘commanding someone to pass the salt’, a concept I have not reserved a term for. For me, the corresponding speech act type is just ‘commanding’. I avoid the term ‘illocutionary force’ because of the heavy bias it seems to have achieved in favor of the literal meaning hypothesis, cf. Section 1.2.

1.1

(5)

Individuating Imperatives

a. b.

7

Close the door! Be blond!

While it is easy to imagine (5a) used as an O RDER (assumed to be the prototypical function of an imperative), this seems hardly possible for (5b). Out of the blue, the sentence may sound awkward, but it becomes perfect if you imagine someone muttering it to herself while on her way to a blind date. Should this mean that cases of apparent imperatives containing individual level verbs9 like (5b) should belong to another clause type (e.g. optative, prototypically linked to W ISH)? I don’t think so. Rather, we should make sure that mutual exclusion between clause types is not based on lexical properties. Instead of distinguishing two clause types depending on lexical properties, I would prefer to acknowledge that one and the same clause type interacts with certain lexical properties to render a particular speech act type more plausible in the respective context (ideally, all clause types should be able to co-occur with all propositions—although imperatives in particular are known to be problematic in that respect).10 In most though not all languages a particular morphological form of the verb figures prominently in distinguishing the imperative form type (exceptions being e.g. Hungarian that uses subjunctives; or Chrow11 that marks imperatives by intonation, cf. Sadock and Zwicky, 1985). In such cases, ‘imperative’ is often used interchangeably for morphological verb form and sentential form type—a common practice I will also subscribe to as long as it does not cause any harm. Where there is need for clarification I will resort to ‘imperativized verb’ vs. ‘imperative sentence’. However, sometimes we find grammatical distinctions that raise the question whether a language has various subtypes of the imperative clause type, or if we are faced with (minor) clause types that are closely related to, but distinct from, imperatives. In the following, I will briefly introduce a couple of such phenomena. Ultimately, these issues can only be settled by careful investigation of the respective cases.

9

Cf. Carlson (1977), Kratzer (1995) for the distinction between stage and individual level predicates. It has been claimed at various points that individual level predicates cannot be imperativized (cf. e.g. Han, 2000). I do not think that this is correct. (5b) is a perfectly natural thought (or, rather silent wish) for someone on their way to a blind date, hoping that the person they are about to meet would be blond. 10 An anonymous reviewer points out that this decision is not uncontroversial. I still believe that there is enough motivation for it. Firstly, declaratives and interrogatives are not affected by similar considerations. Secondly, even for (some) individual level predicates, the question of whether they are under the control of the subject depends on world knowledge—for example, under appropriate assumptions about magical abilities, whether one is blond or not could be chosen by the subject at birth and then be settled for the rest of their life. In that case, be blond would still behave like an individual predicate (e.g. with respect to temporal quantification), yet, (5b) could constitute a felicitous O RDER to a newborn. At the same time, our assumptions about magical powers do not seem to change the semantics of the verb. Thirdly, (5b) could be used as an A DVICE or an O RDER if the speaker wants to mock the addressee. The result strikes me as an insincere speech act rather than a non-literal use of the verb. 11

A Siouan language spoken in Montana.

8

1 Setting the Scene

Consider first two cases that suggest a classification as subtypes of the imperative clause type: Tagalog is sometimes claimed to distinguish imperatives that are to be complied with in the immediate future from imperatives that can be complied with later on; Maidu12 is said to formally distinguish between imperatives to be carried out in the presence vs. in the absence of the speaker.13 A closely related clause type (maybe not a subtype) are past imperatives, which are to be found at least in Dutch (cf. Mastop, 2005) and maybe Tsakhura14 (cf. Wratil, 2005). These express that something should have been done at a particular time in the past; even if one prefers to classify them as a minor clause type distinct from imperatives, their semantic meaning should be derived compositionally from ingredients found in ordinary imperatives combined with different temporal information. Their status and analysis will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.2.2. Another important area of typological variation is constituted by person agreement. Some languages seem to have specialized form types for third person imperatives (cf. Mauck, 2005, on the Indian language Bohjpuri). Other languages allow for first person equivalents of imperatives (called hortatives). English let’s + BARE I NFINITIVE has been handled as a case in point. Likewise German subject-verbinverted structures without interrogative intonation: (6)

a. b.

Let’s get started now. Fangen wir endlich mal an! start.1P.PL we finally QP RT VP RT ‘Let’s finally get started.’

Imperatives with first or third person subjects do not normally reach the degree of grammaticalization that second person imperatives reach (cf. e.g. Hopper and Traugott, 1993). In this study, I will confine my attention to the clearly addressee-related constructions. Yet, I am positive that the insights gained from second person imperatives will provide a useful basis for the analysis of clause types closely related to imperatives as conceived of here, or of subtypes of a more general imperative clause type. Ideally, some of the components in the semantics assigned to imperatives can be combined with different person information to give the right meaning for imperative-like clauses that don’t address the second person.15 Further research is needed to test this issue and elaborate on it. Clausal negation is another phenomenon that can make it hard to decide between two closely related clause types or two subtypes of one and the same clause type. 12

A cover term for three closely related North American Indian languages spoken in California. Cf. Wratil (2005). Unfortunately, many of the data in typologically oriented discussions of imperatives come from descriptive grammars that are not supported by theoretically informed semantic and pragmatic investigations. Therefore, some caution is warranted.

13

14 15

A (Lezgi-Samur) Dagestan language spoken in Azerbaijan.

One of the core questions in the analysis of third person imperatives is if the addressee still figures prominently as the one to bring about the action of someone else doing what is requested, or if any such effect should rather be treated as an epiphenomenon, maybe due to Gricean implicatures (Grice, 1975a).

1.1

Individuating Imperatives

9

Sadock and Zwicky (1985) discuss the possibility of distinguishing declaratives and denials, in contrast to assuming (positive and negative) declaratives. Imperatives pose a similar problem: the data in (7) could be captured in clause type systems that contain either (8a) or just (8b): (7)

a. b.

Get yourself one more beer. Don’t get yourself one more beer.

(8)

a.

imperative := prohibitive := <prohibitive, P ROHIBITION> imperative :=

b.

Depending on whether one assumes (8a) or (8b), (7b) is either a negated imperative, or belongs to an independent sentence type prohibitive (used to issue a P ROHI BITION ). Option (8a) amounts to the claim that English does not allow for negated imperatives. But I think that there are good arguments for (8b). In particular, it offers a better explanation for why we find the same range of non-prototypical functions for the negative case as for the positive case. Just as (9a) can under certain circumstances be used as a C ONCESSION that the addressee need not stay, (9b) can constitute a C ONCESSION that he need not go. Likewise, (9c) and (9d) seem to be parallel in being able to convey P ERMISSION to take an apple and to abstain from taking one respectively. (9)

a. b. c. d.

Okay, go then. Okay, don’t go then. Take an apple (if you like). Don’t take one (if you don’t want to).

I will therefore conclude that (at least in English) negation counts as part of the semantic object that expresses the content of an O RDER (or, in less prototypical cases, of a C OMMISSION or a P ERMISSION).16 Even if we have thus decided against a couple of possible splits of the clause type imperative, the clause type system of English, German and other languages is most likely more fine-grained than the simple three-element system in (4): at least exclamatives may enter the picture; in other languages, we may also find permissives or commissives.17 In any case, it is the three clause types listed in (4) that seem to be most interesting from a universal point of view: It is in some respects a surprising fact that most languages are similar in presenting three basic sentence types with similar functions and often strikingly similar forms. These are the declarative, interrogative, and imperative. (Sadock and Zwicky, 1985:160)

This immediately raises a big challenge: why is it that natural languages encode these three clause types instead of providing specific form types for additional functions or letting collapse, let’s say, interrogatives and imperatives? Intuitively, it 16

Compare Sadock and Zwicky (1985) for arguments against an independent clause type ‘denial’.

17

The latter two types are cross-linguistically rare. Pak et al. (2004) discuss their status in Korean.

10

1 Setting the Scene

somehow depends on what speakers want to achieve with utterances. It is difficult, however, to predict for which functions languages reserve particular form types. An interesting proposal (and, indeed, the first I am aware of) is sketched in joint work by Paul Portner, Raffaella Zanuttini, and Miok Pak (cf. e.g. Portner, 2005; Pak et al., 2004). They draw on the meanings assigned to the individual clause types together with assumptions about how the context of a linguistic exchange is represented to the participants. Unfortunately, one of the basic assumptions remains stipulative, namely that contexts are represented in this particular way. Portner’s more recent approach to imperatives (Portner, 2007) is more cautious in what can be predicted about the universality of clause types (see Section 2.2.4). The scope of my investigation is more modest. Given a system of clause types, what establishes the link between the form types and the function types? In particular, given the clause type of imperatives as realized in many languages, what is it that binds together that particular form type at sentence level (e.g., in German, sentences with a particular verb form in the position of the finite verb, mostly empty preverbal position, optional subject) with the prototypical function of an O RDER? The general question can be stated as follows: Issue 1.1 The problem of clause type encoding (CTE) Clause types are pairs of form types and function types. How are these pairs encoded? In particular, this poses the question whether the encoding is done by semantics18 or by pragmatics (Grewendorf and Zaefferer, 1991, dub this issue the question of modularity). In Section 1.3 I will argue for an answer in favor of semantics. For imperatives, CTE boils down to explaining why O RDER is felt to be the prototypical function of imperative sentences. A central goal of this book is to resolve this problem. But before approaching it, I want to shed some light on the difference between the prototypical function associated with a sentence level form type and the actual function performed by an actual utterance of one of its tokens.

1.2 Clause Types and Actual Utterances In Section 1.1.3, I have argued that each of the relevant sentence level form types comes with a prototypical speech act type. In this section, I will focus on the fact that each normal utterance19 is assigned a particular speech act type that can, but

18

‘Semantics’ in the sense of Cresswell’s (1973:238) ‘semantic pragmatics’, namely as concerned with meaning as a function from contexts to senses. That is, the way in which context produces the sense is part of the meaning. This contrasts with Montague’s (1974) view of semantics as completely independent of contextual notions. 19

Gazdar (1981) introduces ‘normal utterance’ for utterances that are used to perform a speech act (in contrast, for example, to utterances that are used to test a microphone).

1.2

Clause Types and Actual Utterances

11

need not, match the prototypical function of the sentence uttered. For example, declaratives are typically used for A SSERTIONs. Nevertheless, it is well known that declaratives can be used for many other speech acts as well; depending on the context, utterances of declarative sentences can constitute P ROMISE s, T HREATs, WARNINGs, O RDERs, etc. Now, this is of course reminiscent of Searle’s (1975) category of indirect speech acts, which he defines as speech acts that come about additionally in virtue of some other speech act being performed. It is well known that an interrogative like (10a) can be used as a R EQUEST to hand over the salt, or that a declarative like (10b) can work as an O RDER to close the window. (10)

a. b.

Can you pass the salt? I am cold.

The assumption that such utterances achieve two (independent)20 speech acts at one time is corroborated by observations that they allow for the addressee to react to direct, indirect, or both speech acts (Morgan, 1975; Gazdar, 1981). (11)

a. b.

A: Could you pass the salt? B: Yes. A: Do you mind if I use your two-way radio B (handing microphone to A): Sure. [from Gazdar (1981), who refers to a script of a TV series]

The standard assumption is that the second clause type comes in either via conventionalization (cf. Searle, 1975; Asher and Lascarides, 2001, e.g. (10a), (11b)) or via Gricean inference (cf. Gordon and Lakoff, 1975, e.g. (10b)). Therefore, the utterances realize the speech act type prototypically associated with the respective form type, but, in the particular utterance context, this gives rise to an additional act being performed (or, according to Asher and Lascarides, 2001, one complex act being performed). For such cases of indirect speech acts it is thus unproblematic to let the form type contribute the prototypical speech act type and start inferencing from there. Nevertheless, the plurifunctionality of declaratives mentioned above does not always warrant a treatment in terms of indirect speech acts. It seems to be one of the hallmarks of A SSERTIONs that they can be countered by That’s (not) true. (see also Section 4.3). Yet, such a follow-up is infelicitous with many of the usages made of declaratives. For example, if (12) is meant and understood as a P ROMISE , B’s reply is odd, even on the negative. (12)

A: I’ll be there on time! B: # That’s (not) true.

If the P ROMISE came about as an indirect speech act, in addition to an underlying A SSERTION, the follow-up should be acceptable as it could still target the

20

In particular, it is not the case that one is more specific as the other.

12

1 Setting the Scene

underlying A SSERTION-part of the utterance. Moreover, P ROMISEs, W ISHes, WARNINGs, . . . performed by declaratives lack the sense of indirectness present in examples like (10a) and (10b), which always seems to result in an additional pragmatic effect—oftentimes politeness or impoliteness.21 I therefore conclude that despite their canonical association with A SSERTION, declaratives can also perform a series of other speech act types without the other speech act type riding along on an underlying A SSERTION. Things are no different for imperatives. It is useful to look at a language with unambiguous marking of the imperative clause type, as for example German. Donhauser’s (1986) detailed study of German imperatives lists at least the speech act types in (13)–(14); moreover, (15) displays occurrences of imperatives that are apparently associated with functions at a sub-speech act level (see Section 6.3 for discussion and analysis). (13)

a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

f.

g.

Lies das! read.I MP S G this ‘Read this!’ Bleib weg vom Projektor! stay.I MP S G away from-the projector ‘Stay away from the projector!’ Geh nicht auf diese Party! go.I MP S G not to this party ‘Don’t go to the party!’ Hab viel Spaß auf der Party! have.I MP S G lot fun at the party ‘Have fun at the party!’ Dreh bitte das Licht ab. turn.I MP S G please the light off ‘Turn off the light, please.’ Nimm den A, wenn du nach Harlem willst. take.I MP S G the A, if you to Harlem want ‘Take the A train if you want to go to Harlem.’22 Fahr zur Hölle! go.I MP S G to-the hell ‘Go to hell!’

21

C OMMAND

WARNING

P ROHIBITION

W ISH

R EQUEST

A DVICE

C URSE

Ultimately, the distinction of whether a linguistic object achieves a particular speech act type directly or via the recognition of some other speech act type can only be answered by empirical study (for discussion of early experiments, see Noveck and Sperber, 2004). Thereby, it may also turn out that conventionalized indirect speech acts like Could you pass me the salt, please are truly different from non-conventionalized ones. Maybe they do not rely on the recognition of the underlying speech act type but are already grammaticalized as minor clause types with their own particular meaning. This issue is left aside as orthogonal to the investigation I am pursuing here. 22

Billy Strayhorn, via Sæbø (2002).

1.2

(14)

Clause Types and Actual Utterances

a.

b.

(15)

a.

b.

13

(Es beginnt um 8, aber) komm früher, wenn du magst! (it starts at 8, but) come.I MP S G earlier, if you like ‘(It starts at eight, but) come earlier if you like!’23 P ERMISSION Ok, dann komm eben nicht! (Wenn du dich für so schlau ok, then come.I MP S G P RT not (if you yourself for so clever hältst.) hold) ‘All right, don’t come then! (If you think you are so clever.)’ C ONCESSION Komm pünktlich und du kriegst einen Sitzplatz. come.I MP S G punctually and you get a seat ‘Come in time and you’ll get a seat.’ Conditional and, (IaD) pünktlich oder du verpasst den ersten Vortrag! Komm the first talk come.I MP S G punctually or you miss ‘Come in time, or you’ll miss the first talk!’ Conditional or, (IoD)

Davies (1986) offers a similar overview for English; typological studies like Palmer (1986), Bybee et al. (1994), and Xrakovskij (2001) parallel these observations for various types of languages whose imperatives have been studied in detail.24 Given this wide range of speech act types that imperatives can be associated with depending on the context, any attempt to reduce them to a common functional core faces the challenge of this common core becoming trivial. Note in particular that, despite the widespread idea that imperatives are always used for ‘directive speech acts’, not all of the above mentioned examples meet the commonly accepted characteristics of directive speech acts (cf. e.g. Searle and Vanderveken, 1985). With an A DVICE like (13f), the speaker can simply express what is the best way to get to Harlem without trying to get the addressee to actually take the A-train.25 Moreover, 23

Example from Hamblin (1987). It is particularly interesting that this spectrum of usages is even available in languages that have more specialized forms grammaticalized to express one or the other of them (e.g. Korean marks permissives as distinct clause type different from imperatives or declaratives, yet it can still employ imperatives to convey P ERMISSIONS), cf. Pak et al. (2004). 24

25

Searle and Vanderveken (1985:181) acknowledge two readings of the English speech act verb advise. According to them, when construed with a that-clause it describes an assertive act of presenting something as the optimal solution, whereas when construed with a to-infinitival, it describes a directive act of trying to get the addressee to do something. Without taking any stance on this syntactic distinction, addressing exchanges like (i), I intend my label A DVICE to describe a speech act that does not require the speaker to have any preference for the prejacent to be acted on (hence, not directive), yet, it requires that the propositional content be constituted by a future act of the addressee and that the speaker somehow accept or endorse the addressee’s goals. Hence, while Searle and Vanderveken (1985) would classify it as an assertive speech act, it differs from an A SSERTION:

(i)

A: How do I get to Harlem? B: Take the A-train.

See Section 4.2 for the relevant notion of endorsement.

A DVICE

14

1 Setting the Scene

W ISHes don’t require the propositional content to describe a future action of the addressee, and indeed we find W ISH-imperatives with non-future oriented content (see Section 4.1.3 for examples). In general, any attempt to find a common functional core would have to be combined with an explanation of how this common core can get specified to particular speech act types for imperative tokens in their context of use. I record the apparent inhomogeneity of usages associated with imperatives as the functional inhomogeneity problem (FIP): Issue 1.2 The functional inhomogeneity problem (FIP) Cross-linguistically, the imperatives of a given language tend to get associated with a rather inhomogeneous range of speech act types (C OMMAND , WARNING , P RO HIBITION , W ISH , R EQUEST, A DVICE , C URSE , P ERMISSION , C ONCESSION, etc.) and, at least in some languages, also function (in a pre-theoretic sense of the word) on a sub-speech act level (e.g. as conditional antecedents). In addition, we have to note that besides general inhomogeneity recorded by FIP the range of functions observed embodies a particular, highly intriguing inhomogeneity. Most of the speech act types (such as R EQUESTS , C OMMANDS , P ROHIBITIONS , W ISHES , WARNINGS , A DVICE , etc.) assigned to imperatives seem somehow concerned with constraining the development of the situation so as to verify the course of events described by the imperative. But a few of them (P ERMISSION , C ONCES SION ) are concerned with opening up further possibilities for developments of the situation. This pragmatic distinction of narrowing or liberalizing the addressee’s commitments is often represented formally as universal vs. existential quantification over possible worlds as the semantic meaning of the elements that are used to achieve that effect (e.g. the modal verbs must and may, see Sections 2.3.1 and 3.1). I would like to record this as the quantificational inhomogeneity problem (QIP): Issue 1.3 The quantificational inhomogeneity problem (QIP) The functional spectrum associated with imperatives in many natural languages includes both elements that, in semantics, are normally associated with universal quantification (C OMMAND , O RDER , R EQUEST, W ISH , . . . ) and elements that are usually associated with existenital quantification (P ERMISSION , C ONCESSION ). If we want to be able to deal with FIP (and QIP) we must not overdo our task of determining the prototypical function of a clause type, or of imperatives in our particular case. If imperatives were tied invariably to their prototypical function of O RDERing, it would be unclear how they could be used for A DVICE, WARNINGs, R EQUESTs, etc. The only natural way to still allow for other functions would be to classify them as indirect speech acts. But as I pointed out above, this does not seem motivated unless there is any evidence for both speech acts to be actually computed (for example replies, modifiers like please, or (im)politeness effects). Consider for example (13f): it does not live on the recognition of a primary order and it does not show any additional effects of (im)politeness resulting from the abuse of an O RDER for giving A DVICE. Likewise, follow-ups that should be appropriate for an O RDER (Ok, but give me a moment./I am right at it./ . . . ) are also unacceptable. A similar

1.2

Clause Types and Actual Utterances

15

argument can easily be given for (silent) W ISHes as (5b). Therefore, if we have settled the issue of how to encode clause types, in view of FIP (and QIP) an analysis of imperatives (and of sentential mood in general) has to face a challenge that can be spelled out as follows: Issue 1.4 The problem of assigning speech acts to utterances (ASA) What determines the speech act type assigned to an utterance? It would be a lot easier to deal with this problem if the entire range of functions observed in FIP/QIP could be reduced to a few core elements. Above I have argued that resorting to indirectness does not seem motivated. Likewise, I have already argued in Section 1.2 that there is little evidence for the assumption that some of the speech act types listed in the FIP could be set aside as occurring with other clause types that happen to have the same surface form as imperatives. As far as I know, no convincing arguments for such ambiguities have been offered in the literature so far. In their absence, arbitrarily splitting clause types is at odds with the form-biased individuation of imperatives I have argued for in Section 1.1. Moreover, the puzzling range of functions is not confined to a few Indo-European languages like English or German. Cross-linguistic commonness of a coincidence is generally considered a strong argument against ambiguity.26 Consequently, I consider it important not to stash away the more troublesome usages before embarking on the enterprise of assigning semantic value to imperatives. To my knowledge, none of the existing approaches to the semantics of imperatives gives priority to that. For a large part of the literature, the main goal lies in capturing the impossibility of imperatives being used as A SSERTIONs, and therefore, to make them differ from declaratives (cf. McGinn, 1977, for particular emphasis in this respect). What is stressed is that imperatives cannot describe the world as it is. I want to underline that this is only one side of the coin, and that, somehow, imperatives do give information as well (cf. Aloni, 2004, for a guarded argumentation in that direction). In Section 2.3.3, I will present a couple of arguments why the non-declarative/non-descriptive issue should not be stressed as much as it has been recently (for example by Portner, 2005; Mastop, 2005; Veltman, 2005; Franke, 2005; Portner, 2007; Han, t.a.). To make this point even clearer, consider a couple of examples from the literature that display how a very narrow understanding of what imperatives do tends to be presupposed when setting out to explore their semantics. 26 An anonymous reviewer points out that the cross-linguistic existence of ambiguities may be less unexpected if such ambiguities result along the path of grammaticalization processes, for instance. This point is certainly worth considering. In general, I think that such expressions or constructions should be treated as semantically uniform or polysemous (i.e., sharing a semantic core) as far as possible—in that sense, the burden of proof that two surface structures no longer share a common semantic core is on the objector. Now, in the given case, there is little evidence that imperatives used for O RDERs, A DVICE or W ISHes may show different degrees of grammaticalization. It seems that we are dealing with one and the same morphosyntactic construction that can be used for various types of speech acts. But note that this is less clear for imperatives occurring below the speech act level, e.g. (15), Therefore, in Section 6.3, I offer detailed arguments that these cases, too, are formally and semantically identical to ordinary imperatives.

16

1 Setting the Scene In natural language, the distinction between imperative mode and declarative mode is made by assuming that declarative sentences describe a state of the world, while imperative sentences convey an intention of the speaker that the addressee takes responsibility for changing the world in some particular way. We will study some simple logical languages where commands to change the world are interpreted literally as transitions that make things happen by effecting the desired change. (van Eijck, 2000:41) As a first, intuitive approximation, we can say that imperatives represent actions which the addressee should take. (Portner, 2005) I will assume for the remainder of this chapter that we can identify such a thing as the ‘imperative sentence type’. By this I mean a syntactically and/or semantically definable class of sentences of which all members share an interpretation of being some kind of instigation from the speaker to the hearer to perform some action. (Mastop, 2005:10)

Under such assumptions, the scholar’s task becomes to enrich her model of the semantics-pragmatics interface to encompass the particular function presupposed to underly imperatives. This differs crucially from the task of assigning adequate meaning to a linguistic expression and is therefore in opposition to the ultimately form-biased individuation via clause types that I am advocating here. The position exemplified by the quotes above allows (or rather, opts) for a far more specific and confined semantics than what will be needed for my task.

1.3 Semantics or Pragmatics?—Deciding on the Boundaries In this section, I will argue for a particular division of labor between semantics and pragmatics when it comes to the encoding of clause types and the assignment of speech act types to actual utterances. The first step towards an analysis of imperatives is to decide upon a general strategy to find compatible answers to the problems of how to encode clause types (CTE, cf. Issue 1.1), and how to assign speech act types to utterances (ASA, cf. Issue 1.4). Let us first focus on CTE, the problem of how the relation between form type and prototypical function as listed in a clause type system is encoded. I want to argue that the relation is mediated by the semantic value of the form type. Let us call this the mediating semantics hypothesis for clause types and phrase it as follows:27 Hypothesis 1.1 The mediating semantics hypothesis for clause types (MSH) Assume that the system of clause types for some language L is the set of ordered pairs CT L ⊆ H × K (where, H is the set of disambiguated sentence level form types, K the set of speech act types; see Section 1.1.3). Assume further that I is the interpretation function for L. Then, for each < h i , ki >∈ CT L , I (h i ) determines ki . At first glance, MSH looks similar to what Gazdar (1981) ascribes to Searle (1975) under the name of the literal meaning hypothesis.28 To encompass indirectness, it is 27 28

The deliberately vague notion of ‘determining’ will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.

Translated into my framework by substituting ‘speech act type’ for ‘illocutionary force’. Note that Gazdar/Searle sees R EQUEST as the prototypical function of an imperative.

1.3

Semantics or Pragmatics?—Deciding on the Boundaries

17

assumed that an utterance can perform more than one speech act, so each utterance context c is associated with a (possibly singleton) set of speech acts Mc ⊆ K , and for each utterance, c E is the disambiguated syntactic object uttered in c; E L is the set of disambiguated syntactic objects that can be generated by the grammar of L (in particular, c E ∈ E L for any non-deviant context c). Hypothesis 1.2 (not adopted) The literal meaning hypothesis (cf. Gazdar, 1981): There exists a function F ∈ K E L such that for all c ∈ C, F(c E ) ∈ Mc . If c E contains a performative prefix, then F(c E ) = k where k is the speech act type named by the performative verb in the prefix. Otherwise: F(c E ) = Q UESTION , when c E is interrogative F(c E ) = R EQUEST , when c E is imperative F(c E ) = A SSERTION, when c E is declarative. The basic message of the literal meaning hypothesis is that the linguistic object expressed strictly determines (one of) the speech act(s) associated with the utterance. Speech act types other than the prototypical one can appear at best in addition, in the case of indirect speech acts. Gazdar (1981:74f) argues convincingly that this runs into various kinds of problems. Similarly, I also argued above that declaratives can be associated with speech act types other than A SSERTION, and that imperatives can be associated with speech act types other than O RDER (or, R EQUEST as considered prototypical in the literal meaning hypothesis), without there being any evidence of indirectness. But note that, contrary to superficial appearance, the mediating semantics hypothesis (MSH) is very different from the literal meaning hypothesis. MSH is an answer to CTE, the problem of clause type encoding (cf. Issue 1.1), not to ASA, the problem of assigning speech act types to utterances, cf. Issue 1.4. That is, MSH claims that the semantic interpretation of the imperative form type is responsible for why O RDER is perceived to be the prototypical function of an imperative. It does not claim that the semantic interpretation of the syntactic object could in itself determine what speech act type a particular imperative token is used for in its utterance context. In contrast, assigning a speech act type to imperative tokens (and thus answering ASA) is exactly what the literal meaning hypothesis is meant to do (allowing for standard Gricean inferences to identify additional indirect speech act types). In opposition to the literal meaning hypothesis, I think that an answer to ASA has to take into account the influence of the context even where there is no evidence of indirectness. I will therefore propose the following (assume again that I is an interpretation function for the language under consideration):29 29

My view is similar to Hausser’s (1980): Syntactic mood does not determine the speech act. Rather, syntactic mood participates with all the other linguistic properties of a given surface expression φ in delimiting the

18

1 Setting the Scene

Hypothesis 1.3 The speech act assignment hypothesis (SAH) The speech act type associated with an utterance of a disambiguated object c E in a context c is determined by interplay of the semantic object I (cd ) with properties of the utterance context c (to be described in terms of beliefs, desires, obligations, etc. of the participants in c). So, both MSH (my answer to the problem of clause type encoding) and SAH (my answer to the problem of assigning speech act types to utterances) rely crucially on the semantic object expressed by the sentence uttered. But MSH claims that we only need to consider this semantic object, while SAH requires that we have to consider it in its interplay with an actual utterance context. Still, MSH answers the question of modularity in favor of semantics: clause types are encoded semantically. Alternatively, one could have opted for an encoding in pragmatics. For example, Dummett (1973) assumes that all clause types have the same Fregean sense, but are supplied with a force (comparable to the speech act types I have been talking about) that is to be analyzed in pragmatics (for discussion, cf. McGinn, 1977). Other authors claim that different clause types can differ in semantic meaning, and that this constrains which force operators they can combine with (e.g. Frege, 191830 ; Han, 2000). Still, the interpretation of the force operators (and hence, the crucial part of the encoding of the associated speech act type) is left to pragmatics. Without arguing against the possibility of a pragmatic encoding in detail, I want to list a few more or less standard arguments in favor of a semantic treatment of sentence mood. First, phenomena that prove to be robust with respect to embedding are traditionally classified as part of the recursive component of meaning assignment encoded in semantics. Sentence mood distinctions as established for matrix sentences are typically paralleled in the realm of embedded sentences:31 (16)

a. b.

John knows that it is raining. John knows whether it is raining.

Given the well known resistance of imperatives against embedding, relevant phenomena are harder to find for that particular clause type. But some instances seem to exist after all (see Chapter 6 for discussion). One case is quantifiers taking wide scope with respect to the imperative: set of use-conditions of φ. Since there is no one to one relation between syntactic moods and speech acts, it would be a mistake to implement speech act properties in the semantic characterization of syntactic mood. (Hausser, 1980:73) 30

In contrast to Dummett, Frege states explicitly that the sense of a declarative is a thought (ein Gedanke), but the sense of an imperative is not. 31

Even if generally accepted, this criterion has not gone completely undisputed. See e.g. Kamp (1978) for early arguments in favor of letting pragmatics (certain implicatures) enter the recursive component of meaning assignment. More recently, consider also work on scalar implicatures, cf. Chierchia et al. (t.a.).

1.3

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Semantics or Pragmatics?—Deciding on the Boundaries

a.

b.

19

Die meisten Anträge hat Hans nicht mal gelesen. the most proposals has Hans not P RT read ‘For most proposals it is the case that John has not even read them.’ Die meisten Anträge lies erst gar nicht. the most proposals read.I MP S G DP RT P RT not ‘Most proposals don’t even read.’

Another case is evidenced by languages that allow for imperatives in reported speech. This seems to be the case for colloquial varieties of German: (18)

da morgen Hans hat dir doch schon gestern gesagt, geh Hans has you DP RT already yesterday told go.I MP S G there tomorrow hin! VP RT ‘Hans already told you yesterday to go there tomorrow.’

Conditional imperatives like (19) constitute another phenomenon where imperatives seem to play a role at sub-speech act level (see Section 6.3 for discussion): (19)

Take a step to the left and you’ll fall off the stairs.

Here, the first conjunct can be shown to bear all the characteristics of the imperative clause type. Yet, it is not used for an independent speech act, and the overall speech act type assigned to (19) is most likely T HREAT or WARNING . Second, besides the prototypical function indicated in the clause type pair, most form types can cover a variety of other functions (cf. FIP for imperatives, Issue 1.2). A purely pragmatic solution would either have to require that for each form type all the speech act types it can be used for are listed along with the most prototypical one, or that we can assign a suitable supertype that is underspecified enough to encompass all other types. But this pragmatic account would also have to tell a story about why one element of the list is felt to be prototypical, or why one specification of the supertype is (apart from the fact that such a supertype still remains to be found). Third, if the encoding is taken care of by the semantic meaning assignment, some aspects follow automatically. For example, the semantic meaning assignment is assumed to be a function from forms to meanings. If we can define a suitable architecture of the semantics-pragmatics interface that draws on it, we derive automatically that each disambiguated form type belongs to exactly one clause type. On the other hand, if the encoding of clause types were taken care of by a separate pragmatic meaning assignment, its functional nature would have to be established independently. Fourth, a pragmatic solution seems to run into trouble if indirect speech acts are to be distinguished from direct usages. On the view presented above, any form of indirect speaking consists in the exploitation of the literal meaning of a linguistic item to convey something different. Hence, it depends on the literal meaning being computed and understood—including the sentence mood and the speech act that is being executed directly. Compare (20a) and (20b):

20

(20)

1 Setting the Scene

a. b.

I am cold. Am I cold?

While the declarative in (20a) can easily be understood both as an A SSERTION and an O RDER that the addressee close the window at the same time, the interrogative in (20b) requires considerably more context to achieve an additional effect of constituting an O RDER. But if both the interpretation of clause types and the inference to additional effects happen at the level of pragmatic interpretation, it is not clear how they interact and why there is an effect of indirectness. In any case, it seems that a layered system of pragmatic processes would have to be worked out carefully (compare e.g. Gazdar, 1979, for the interaction between entailments, implicatures, and presuppositions). Fifth, McGinn (1977) points out that we have to distinguish between what he calls the force associated with an utterance and the sentence mood associated with a linguistic object (i.e., our clause type). While the former can be suspended in a non-intentional context (e.g. example sentences in a grammar book, testing a microphone), sentence mood stays unaffected. That is, a sentence token can be recognized as an imperative without being associated with any particular speech act type. Sixth, if clause types are encoded in the pragmatic component, it is unclear how the assignment of pragmatic meaning interacts with the form type. A listwise associaton of complex form types with the respective functions does not seem very intuitive as a component of natural language grammar. On the other hand, if the encoding were to depend on the various aspects of a form type in a systematic way (similar to the compositionality hypothesis governing the relation between syntactic structure and semantic interpretation), the syntactic object would have to be subjected to semantic and pragmatic interpretation in parallel. Again, it seems preferable to make do with semantic interpretation alone if possible, and derive pragmatic meaning from its output in interaction with the context. Now that we have motivated a semantic encoding of clause types, we can reconsider their status for the theory. On closer inspection, they turn out to be a purely heuristic tool for the semantic analysis. If the semantic interpretation of the LF of a given sentence determines the prototypical function of this sentence as the one corresponding to its form type in the clause type system, it is enough for any given sentence to have syntax tell us the correct LF and to have semantics tell us its correct interpretation. But at least as far as imperatives are concerned, this is not what the current literature can offer us; it is our goal, not our starting point. Therefore, clause type systems prove highly useful to find out what data to look at when working out the semantics of ‘imperatives’. Ultimately, it is certainly desirable to discard clause types as a stepping stone towards the object of analysis. After all, the function type could only be indicated as ‘prototypical’. For any given language, a plausible list of clause types will tell us which of its sentence-level form types has to be assigned the imperative semantics we are about to develop. Working out a cross-linguistically uniform ‘imperative semantics’ is motivated by the empirical observation that the relevant form types behave surprisingly similarly cross-linguistically. As I have already pointed out in Section 1.2,

1.4

The Framework

21

languages may vary slightly in what subtypes of imperative they distinguish, or if they mark additional, closely related minor clause types. The MSH allows for a very natural solution to such slight differences. If the semantic representation of the imperative clause form type is computed compositionally, differences in the ingredients may give rise to different subtypes (still corresponding to one and the same prototypical function) or closely related types (associated with different prototypical functions). For detailed discussion of one such parameter see the interaction with tense and reference time (see Section 3.2.2). In the remainder of the book, I will pursue two goals. On the one hand, I will try to make clear what it means for a semantic object to determine a prototypical function by exploring what semantic object could be assigned to an imperative. On the other hand, I will show how that same semantic object can interact with the actual constellation of an utterance context to give rise to a particular speech act possibly different from the prototypical one.32 To account for this interaction between semantic meaning and speech act types, we first need to spell out a reference model for the semantics-pragmatics interface. This is the aim of the next section.

1.4 The Framework It was first pointed out by Robert Stalnaker that the relation between context and content is twofold: context influences content, since the expressions used to say something are often contextdependent: what they are used to say is a function, not only of the meanings of the expressions, but also of facts about the situations in which they are used. But second, the contents that are expressed also influence the context: speech acts affect the situations in which they are performed. (Stalnaker, 1999a:4).

Clearly, this mutual dependence is relevant for any attempt to spell out a semantic account for clause types or imperatives in particular. In order to address these questions, I will use a model of discourse that follows the informal outline in Stalnaker (1999b). I will slightly modify Stalnaker’s own implementation (e.g. in Stalnaker, 1978) in order to integrate a Kaplanian concept of indexicality (cf. Kaplan, 1989). Amendments along these lines are widespread practice in linguistic semantics. Any utterance context c is uniquely determined by a quadruple containing a speaker c S , an addressee c A , a time cT and a world cW .33 Assume that De is the

32

While I will not offer a theory of how further indirect speech acts are inferred from a primary direct speech act, I will try not to dismiss too quickly alternative solutions in terms of indirect speech acts. 33 The addressee parameter is added for simplicity. Strictly speaking, a context is already uniquely determined by the corresponding triple that excludes the addressee c A (cf. Lewis, 1980). Given c S , cT and cW , c A can always be determined as the person c S is addressing at cT in cW .

22

1 Setting the Scene

set of individuals, T is the set of intervals and W is the set of all possible worlds. The set of contexts C is then defined as follows. Definition 1.1 The set of contexts C is the set of quadruples < c S , c A , cT , cW > ∈ (De × De × T × W ), such that c S is speaking to c A at cT in cW .34 Additionally, each such context determines many more parameters: e.g., the location of a context c is determined as the place c L such that c S is at c L in cW at cT ; or, c E is the (disambiguated) linguistic object uttered in c by c S ; etc. Now, one of the core aims of linguistic exchange is to obtain a better understanding of one’s situation. In general, speaker and addressee will not be able to determine exactly what context they are in. For example, they may be insecure of the identity of their interlocutor, or, in a less marked case, they may not be exactly sure what the time is. In particular, in any normal utterance context, speaker and hearer are unable to determine the exact nature of cW . There are many facts they are ignorant about, which renders worlds that agree on all issues that constitute mutual joint belief of speaker and addressee, but may settle all other issues in all possible ways, equally good candidates for cW . For our purposes, only uncertainty with respect to the world parameter will matter. Instead of considering alternative contexts which speaker and hearer in the actual utterance context consider good candidates for their actual utterance context, we will thus focus on the alternative worlds they hold possible. Therefore, as an additional parameter determined by a given context c we will take into account the set of worlds that are compatible with what speaker and hearer hold as mutual joint belief in c.35 Stalnaker calls the set of such beliefs the common ground; the set of possible worlds that are compatible with mutual joint belief of speaker and hearer, i.e. the intersection of the common ground, is called the context set. Definition 1.2 The context set of a context c (henceforth CS(c)) is the set of possible world-time pairs that are compatible with what c S and c A hold as mutual joint belief at cT in cW . In the following, I sometimes ignore the temporal parameter and speak of a context’s context set as a set of possible worlds. We should keep in mind that this is a simplification. If it is clear what context c we are talking about, I will also write CS for CS(c) (and CG for the common ground CG(c)). Another, somewhat theory-internal parameter that is determined by the context is the variable assignment c G . Intuitively, the variable assignment is needed to store what is being talked about and can thus be referred to by pronouns. Additionally, it is also used on a purely technical level to implement binding as created by movement (cf. Heim and Kratzer, 1998). It may seem a particularly coarse simplification to rely on a single variable assignment as determined by the actual context. Usually, 34 Thereby we constrain the notion of ‘context’ in the sense of Kaplan (1989); for discussion cf. Zimmermann (1997). 35

For a formal definition of mutual joint belief, cf. Stalnaker (2002) and Fagin et al. (1995). Note that all alternatives according to mutual joint belief for a given utterance context have to agree on what is mutual joint belief of speaker and hearer.

1.4

The Framework

23

multiple variable assignments compatible with the information in the context are used to model indeterminacy as to the referents of indefinites (cf. Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1991, for a full-fledged dynamic treatment of variable assignments in utterance contexts). However, as all related intricacies strike me as orthogonal to the issue I am pursuing here, I will stick to this very useful simplification. c E stands for the disambiguated LF of the linguistic object uttered in a context c. It gets interpreted by a function ·c . This meaning function interprets declarative sentences as propositions and their constituents as individuals and functions of various types. Expressions are typed by the primitive types e for individuals, s for worlds, t for truth-values, i for times, and ε for events, as well as the complex types built from them in the usual way.36,37 Given these basic assumptions, Stalnaker (1978) provides us with a model of information exchange as it lies at the heart of A SSERTing (and accepting) declaratives. Declaratives express propositions. An (unmarked) utterance of a declarative constitutes an attempt to add it to the common ground, i.e. to intersect it with the context set. The core effect of a successful A SSERTION of a declarative φ in c (i.e., an A SSERTION whose content is accepted by the addressee) amounts to the following: the set of worlds compatible with mutual joint belief are intersected with the proposition expressed by φ in c, i.e. φc . Consequently, the context set of c records all accepted information pertaining to the issues discussed in c and gets updated by (successful) assertions. At the same time, it records all facts about the current discourse that both participants are aware of. That is, if both c S and c A are aware that c S has just pronounced the sentence I like porridge and are not in doubt about their respective identities, then all worlds in the context set in the context c make true that c S has pronounced a three-word sentence of English immediately before cT . In that sense, the context set has to reflect meta-conversational information as well. Moreover, if c A is willing to believe that c S was right in what she said (namely, that she indeed likes porridge), all worlds in CS(c) will further have the property that c S likes porridge, thus reflecting information expressed explicitly by the utterance.38 Stalnaker’s model allows us to represent how, in the course of an A SSERTION, the content of a declarative sentence influences the context. It does not aim at a general understanding of speech act types, though. In order to fully understand what it means for particular form types to get associated with some but not other speech act types, we need a better understanding of speech acts (i.e. acts in the world people undertake by making use of the literal meaning of linguistic expressions), 36

The set of logical types for any given natural language L consists of (i) the five primitive logical types, and, (ii) if α and β are logical types, α, β is a logical type. An expression of logical type α is interpreted as referring to something in the corresponding domain Dα . The domain Dα,β of a complex logical type α, β is the set of functions from Dα to Dβ .

37 Throughout this book I will not distinguish between sets and their characteristic functions. In other words, functions χ A of type α, t for any logical type α will often be treated as the largest subset A of Dα s.t. χ A maps all elements of A to the truth-value 1. 38

The metalinguistic aspects of an assertion are not modelled explicitly by Stalnaker (1978). For an implementation, cf. e.g. Roberts (1996).

24

1 Setting the Scene

and how they interact with the contextual settings. In the following, I will briefly present a standard Austinian-Searlean conception of speech acts (cf. Levinson, 1983, for an overview) and bring it together with the model of contexts outlined above. In fact, not much hinges on the particular details of the speech act theory chosen: any speech act theory should—minimally—offer us a description of what is happening in an utterance situation in which a particular speech act is being executed. Searle (1969) assumes that each speech act consists in combining a propositional content p with a force F, where ‘force’ corresponds to what I call ‘speech act type’. Each force is jointly constituted by a set of rules. In contrast to Searle’s own interest, I will use his theory of speech acts in a purely descriptive way. In particular, the status of the rules need not concern us: we will view them as descriptions of what has to be the case in a linguistic exchange such that we are willing to consider the speaker’s action (and possibly, the addressee’s reaction) a successful speech act of a particular type (or, as having a particular force).39 Searle distinguishes four types of rules that constitute a force: propositional content rules, preparatory conditions, essential condition, sincerity condition. Propositional content rules are needed to capture the fact that P ROMISEs are about future actions of the speaker, whereas R EQUESTs are about future behavior of the addressee, and T HANKing is about past actions of the addressee.40 Preparatory content conditions target (i) evidence with respect to the status of the propositional content, e.g. for an A SSERTION, the speaker has to have evidence for the truth of what she is asserting; and (ii) institutional facts, e.g. for the speech act of M ARRY ing, both parties have to be unmarried; for C OMMAND ing, the speaker has to have authority over the addressee. Sincerity conditions require that speaker and addressee have the relevant intentions and feelings; e.g. for an A SSERTION, the speaker has to believe the propositional content; for A DVIS ing, the speaker has to believe the propositional content will benefit the addressee. Finally, the essential condition states that the society must have a corresponding convention ensuring that utterances that meet all other conditions for a particular illocutionary act count as achieving that illocutionary act, and thus, as long as all other conditions are met, this speech act comes about. As we are interested only in what has to be observable in a particular linguistic exchange for a particular speech act type to be realized, we can ignore the essential 39 Ultimately, I believe that the rule based approach to speech acts should be replaced by an intentional treatment (cf. Bach and Harnish, 1979). The speaker’s utterance has to meet something like Grice’s (1975a) intentionality condition. This assures that the context transformation is indeed brought about by a speaker who employed his utterance with a particular communicative intention (cf. Grice, 1975b, for extensive discussion of all kinds of pathological cases concerning this condition, and a precise notion of the principle). For our particular concerns, this difference does not play a crucial role, and I will ignore it in the following. 40 Searle’s examples make clear that he does not intend the propositional content to be the output of the compositional semantic component, e.g. the propositional content of Thanks! can be ‘that you showed me the way’.

1.4

The Framework

25

condition. The only thing of interest to us will be that it specifies what is the intended effect of the speech act type (e.g. ‘counts as an attempt to get c A to do A’ (R EQUEST)), so it also tells us what will be the consequence of the act if it does not misfire. Moreover, we can more or less ignore the propositional content condition, as it will follow largely from presuppositions that are part of the formulations of preparatory conditions and sincerity conditions. For example, consider R EQUEST s: from one of the preparatory conditions, namely, that ‘it is not obvious to both c S and c A that c A would do A without being asked’ it follows that ‘A has to be a future act of c A ’.41 I will thus focus on sincerity and preparatory conditions. How do they relate to the model of context spelled out above? Apart from Stalnaker’s work on A SSERTIONs, there is surprisingly little systematic interaction between the literature on semantic meaning and utterance contexts and the literature on speech acts (concerned with linguistic exchange as (social) interaction) (but cf. Eckardt and Schwager, 2009; Condoravdi and Lauer, 2010). Nevertheless, Searle’s conditions (or any more systematic version of them) can be translated directly into a classification of sequences of contexts, such that the precontext c meets certain requirements (the preparatory and sincerety conditions), and the postcontext c of a successful execution of the speech act meets the aim mentioned in the essential condition (or, depending on the particular speech act type, sometimes the addressee’s recognition of the aim can be sufficient).42 Moreover, there is an intermediate context c that is characterized by the speaker uttering an element of the language spoken in the particular context. The standard classification of speech act types can now be spelled out in terms of properties of sequences of contexts. Searle’s conditions can be translated as properties of the precontext c , the actual utterance context c and the postcontext c , where cT immediately precedes the utterance context c in which the speaker expresses c E , which, in turn, is followed immediately by cT . Loosely speaking, I call such a sequence c < c < c a minimal sequence of contexts.43 Note that these 41 It has to be noticed that—without explicit discussion of the differences—Searle’s examples are not entirely systematic. For example, in some cases, preparatory conditions are spelled out as epistemic requirements ‘has reason to believe that’ (for WARNINGs), in other cases, they require both facts about the world and a certain status ‘c A is able to do A. c S believes that c A can do A’ (R EQUESTs). 42

Zeevat (2003) distinguishes explicitly between the aim that the speaker wants to achieve and the minimal effect. The former can be of various kinds and it does not depend on the speaker alone whether she is going to reach it. The latter is the effect the utterance will achieve simply in virtue of being perceived and recognized as such (with the intended speech act type). For example, for a WARNING it is sufficient that the addressee realizes that the speaker considers the given situation dangerous (minimal effect), while it is not necessary that she acts on it and avoids whatever she was warned of (aim). Strictly speaking, c and c  are not utterance contexts as no linguistic object c E is uttered in them. We can consider them as paracontexts that agree with c on all parameters apart from the linguistic object and the temporal parameter cT (which is shifted backward/forward minimally).

43

26

1 Setting the Scene

descriptions are not definitions, as reference to speaker intentions, and in particular to the causality between the linguistic utterance and the contextual effect, is omitted. For A SSERTIONs, the sequences can be described as in (21) and can be formalized straightforwardly in the Stalnaker-Kaplan set-up of contexts (‘possible’ is taken to be compatible with the common ground, ‘has-reasons-to-believe’ is a complex modal notion which I take as primitive for the moment). (21)

A SSERT(φ): (Pre1 ) φ is taken to be possible and ¬φ is taken to be possible. CS(c ) ∩ φ = ∅ ∧ CS(c ) ∩ ¬φ = ∅ (Pre2 ) It is possible that S has reasons to believe φ. CS(c )∩ has-reason-to-believe-φ (c S ) = ∅ (Post) c S and c A jointly believe that c S believes φ. CS(c ) ⊆ c S believes φ.   (Action) There is c in between c and c , such that at c c S utters a linguistic object c E .

The speech act theoretic descriptions for the sequences corresponding to P ERMIS SION s and COMMAND s are given in (22) and (23): (22)

P ERMIT(φ): (Pre1 ) φ is prohibited. (Pre2 ) c S is entitled to permit c A to do φ. (Post) It is mutual joint belief between c S and c A that φ is permitted. (Action) There is c in between c and c , such that at c c S utters a linguistic object c E .

(23)

C OMMAND (φ): (Pre1 ) ¬φ is not prohibited. (Pre2 ) c S is entitled to command c A to do φ. (Post) It is mutual joint belief between c S and c A that φ is commanded. (Action) There is c in between c and c , such that at c c S utters a linguistic object c E .

Stalnaker’s account of how the content of a linguistic object influences the context focuses on the exchange of information, and on A SSERTIONs in particular. In contrast, it is not immediately clear how to translate the descriptions of context sequences that speech act theory provides for P ERMISSIONs, C OMMANDs and other non-assertive speech act types into a representation that can be used to model interaction with linguistic objects. In other words, our contextual set-up allows us to specify what it means for a piece of information to be or become mutual joint belief, to contradict mutual joint belief, or to be compatible with mutual joint belief. Do we have to enrich the set-up so as to account for what it means that a particular course of events is or becomes commanded, permitted, recommended or the like? This question is crucial to an understanding of how imperatives affect contextual

1.4

The Framework

27

constellations and how the contextual constellations affect the particular speech act type assigned to an imperative token. In Section 2.1.1, I will discuss various possibilities of enriching the contextual set-up in order to integrate non-assertive speech acts. Ultimately, I will advocate a theory of imperatives that does not necessitate any such enrichment.44

44 In the meantime, many aspects have been recognized that require additions to the Stalnakerian picture even for pure information exchange, e.g. discourse referents (cf. Heim, 1982; Kamp and Reyle, 1993; Groenendijk et al., 1996), epistemic modals (cf. Veltman, 1996), consideration of a proposition for update (cf. Roberts, 1996; Groenendijk and Roelofsen, 2009), discourse particles and awareness (Karagjosova, 2004; de Jager, 2009). For all of these phenomena the literature contains proposals of additional mechanisms that work on the contextual representation in terms of common ground/context set as is and do not require an enrichment of the latter. The difference will become clear during the discussion in Section 2.1.1.

Chapter 2

How to Handle Imperatives in Semantics

In Sections 1.1.3 and 1.2, I introduced two problems any theory of clause types has to address. First, it should tell us how clause types (pairs of sentence level form types and their prototypical use) are encoded. This is the problem of clause type encoding (CTE, Issue 1.1). Second, it should account for the fact that, in a given context of use, a particular sentence is used for a particular speech act. This is the problem of assigning speech act types to utterances (ASA, Issue 1.4). In response to the first, I argued that clause types should be encoded semantically (mediating semantics hypothesis, MSH, cf. Hypothesis 1.1). This of course is compatible with radically different views on what the denotations of the various clause types should look like. In the following, I will only be concerned with imperatives. I will compare various ways of encoding them semantically (CTE for imperatives) and will evaluate how these approaches fare with respect to the challenge of explaining what speech act type is assigned to a particular utterance of an imperative sentence (ASA for imperatives). Most attempts to assign semantic meaning to imperatives start out from two observations. First, imperatives appear to be fundamentally different from declaratives in that they are not felt to have truth values/truth conditions. Second, imperatives seem to somehow manipulate or constrain the future course of events with respect to the actions of the addressee. But even if they start out from the same observations, the proposals vary considerably. In Section 2.2 I will discuss in detail a few of them that have helped me to shape my own ideas on imperatives. To get a better understanding of the particular contribution of each of these theories, I will introduce three parameters. The first one is not special to investigations at the semantics-pragmatics interface: as for any other attempt to assign semantic meaning to a linguistic element or construction, approaches differ as to whether they rely on a static or on a dynamic conception of meaning. In contrast, the other two parameters are particular to investigations conducted at the semantics-pragmatics interface. The second parameter concerns the choice of how utterance contexts are represented. Theories of imperatives differ as to whether they are developed against the background of a split representationalist or a uniform representationalist conception of contexts. The last parameter is perhaps the least clear-cut: the proposals vary in

M. Kaufmann, Interpreting Imperatives, Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy 88, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012 DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-2269-9_2, 

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the degree to which speech act related matters are imported into the semantics. Some approaches rely on (core) semantic meanings (i.e., propositions, properties, actions,. . . ) that do not make reference to particular speech act types, but are assumed, thanks to their very nature, to interact with the utterance context so as to obtain the effect a particular speech act type would have; other approaches explicitly import speech acts (or their effects on the contextual settings) into the realm of semantic denotata. When discussing a few proposals one by one, it will become obvious that the distinction is more a tendency than a clear-cut line. However, the classification along these lines proves helpful to gain a better understanding of the respective conceptions of the semantics-pragmatics interface. While theoretically independent, the possibilities of setting these three parameters show some connections. In particular, the assumption that linguistic expressions denote pragmatic concepts is hard to concretize unless it is backed by a dynamic conception of meaning. I will first discuss the parameter of how given theories choose to model utterance contexts (see Section 2.1.1). I will then show that, when applied to imperatives, both static and dynamic views on the meaning of linguistic expressions encounter serious problems (see Section 2.1.2). As a third parameter, I will discuss the differences between the semantic denotata various theories assign to imperatives depending on whether these semantic objects can be captured independently of particular speech act types (see Section 2.1.3). Having introduced these parameters, I will discuss a few recent approaches. While I find that all of them illuminate particular facts about imperatives, none of them is entirely satisfactory. In Section 2.3 I will introduce and motivate my own theory of imperatives.

2.1 Three Parameters of Classification 2.1.1 Split and Uniform Representationalism The observation that imperatives typically manipulate or constrain the future course of events with respect to the actions of the addressee forces any theory of imperative meaning to look at the interaction between utterances and the world in non-assertive speech acts. The Stalnakerian set-up discussed in Section 1.4 provides a model for how declaratives interact with the utterance context in the course of A SSERTIONs but it has little to say about how linguistic expressions interact with the utterance context in the course of other speech acts. Lewis (1979a) aims to extend Stalnaker’s model of the context in order to capture what one agent is permitted or commanded to do according to another and how these parameters can be changed. He implements commanding and permitting as a language game between a master and a slave and adds to the context set (i.e., the worlds that record mutual joint belief) a second set of worlds that describe what the slave is permitted to do according to the master. Lewis calls this set the permissibility sphere (PS). Crucially, this means that permissions and obligations are stored

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independently from the context set,1 and that their status can be affected directly by certain linguistic devices. Lewis assumes that in this particular language game between master and slave, sentences modalized by must and may (i) describe the status of the permissibility sphere (hence, they express propositions), and (ii) when issued by the master, the permissibility sphere self-adjusts to make such propositions true.2 I reserve the term split representationalism for any such approach to the semantics-pragmatics interface that makes use of particular storage sites for different sorts of information, for example for epistemic and deontic information. If more types of speech acts are taken into account, further storage sites come into play, e.g. question sets that store questions under discussion (cf. Ginzburg, 1995a, b; Roberts, 1996; Portner, 2005) and are reserved for modification by interrogatives. Split representationalist models of utterance contexts are particularly attractive for the analysis of non-declarative clause types because they offer immediate possibilities for linguistic objects to interact with the context differently from the way declaratives would interact with it. Recent versions of split representationalism often give up on a uniform type of semantic objects stored in the respective sites. For example, Portner (2005) assumes that, in addition to the common ground, which stores propositions, there is also a question set storing Hamblin-Karttunen-style question denotations (i.e., sets of propositions) and, for each participant in the conversation, a To-Do-List, which stores properties. Imperatives affect the To-Do-List of the addressee. Mastop (2005) adopts the framework of partial update semantics and assumes that epistemic and non-epistemic (action related) information is stored in a schedule and a plan respectively. The schedule contains for each point of time a set of pairs of the propositions whose truth value is known together with that truth value; the plan set contains for each point of time a set of actions (roughly similar, but different from properties; cf. Mastop, 2005, for details). Crucially, the different storage sites are each meant to play a particular role in discourse. As usual, the common ground is meant to record the information that constitutes mutual joint belief. Portner’s (2005) To-Do Lists are meant to provide a rationality check on the behavior of an agent: each participant in the conversation agrees that an agent acts rationally to the degree that (s)he strives to realize a maximal set of properties appearing on his/her To-Do List. Mastop’s (2005) plan set is meant to record the agreed-upon future actions of the addressee, though he does not specifiy what a violation would amount to. Despite suggestive names like ‘plan set’ or ‘To-Do List’, we have to ask if these storage sites can actually be assigned a uniform role in the context of the conversation. For example, the agreement that the addressee will close the door (because the

1 Lewis’s conception is easily integrated into our picture of the utterance context if we assume that PS is a function that assigns each context c its permissibility sphere PS(c). 2 Lewis himself acknowledges that he does not try to offer an account for how this self-verification works. My analysis aims to account for the non-descriptive behavior of propositional meanings assigned to imperatives and performative modals in general.

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speaker asked him to do so) and the agreement that it is best for him to do so softly (or else the addressee’s daughter will wake up and start crying) have a different status in the further interaction between speaker and addressee. Such distinctions are ignored in Mastop’s (2005) plan set. In contrast, Portner (2007) splits up the To-Do Lists into properties that came in as commanded, properties that came in as recommended, and properties that came in as desired by the agent the To-Do List belongs to. Still, they are all taken together when it comes to computing the rationality check. A challenge for any account in terms of split representationalism is the question of how the content stored in non-epistemic sites (e.g. what is commanded or permitted or questioned) is supposed to interact with what is stored in the epistemic site (i.e., what is mutually believed). Are these storage sites meant to reflect actual information about the world or simply facts about the conversation? For example, could something like Lewis’s permissibility sphere specify something an agent is committed to doing although the participants have no idea that this is the case?3 What if the addressee presumes that it is objectively settled by the speaker whether she may take an apple or not, but she does not know what the matter is? Intuitively, this seems to mean that she is uncertain about the exact content of the permissibility sphere. Alternatively, additional spheres could encode only information that is local to the on-going conversation. Extending the usual idealization that the conversational participants do not forget information, this would mean that there cannot be epistemic uncertainty about the status of any of the storage sites. But then, for many approaches it becomes questionable if such a storage site can actually play the role it is supposed to play. For example, how could Portner’s (2007) To-Do Lists constitute the sources of rationality checks if they didn’t interact with general rules that are being (tacitly) accepted in the on-going conversation (e.g. ‘stealing is bad’)? In general, split representationalism faces the challenge of determining how the contents of non-epistemic storage sites are supposed to interact with the common ground. Intuitively, the fact that something has been commanded, recommended or permitted should also be recorded as mutual joint belief. Update mechanisms that ensure the appropriate interaction are spelled out e.g. by Roberts (1996) and Portner (2007). In exchange for the challenge of assigning a uniform appropriate role to each storage site and for the technical complexity of keeping the common ground up-todate, split representationalism allows for semantic meanings that lead to an immediate effect on a non-epistemic storage site. It is easy to see that this may come in handy in defining a semantics for imperatives that accounts for their strictly nonassertive behavior (cf. e.g. Mastop, 2005; Portner, 2007). Yet, this has also a downside: sometimes, apparently declarative sentences can have similar non-assertoric

3 For a simple example, consider the following. Suppose that the speaker has obliged the addressee to clean all and only the speaker’s watches. Now, the speaker has forgotten that the watch in the top-most drawer of her desk belongs to her, too (mistakenly, she thinks its her grandfather’s). Should Lewis’s permissibility sphere entail that the addressee cleans this watch?

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effects. It should be subject to careful investigation in what sense they could interact with information in storage sites different from the common ground. Compare the alternative expressions in (1): (1)

a. b. c.

Open the door now! You must open the door now! I hereby command you to open the door.

Intuitively, not only imperatives as in (1a), but also some modalized sentences (like (1b)), and explicit performatives (like (1c)) directly affect what is permissible. Just like imperatives, such utterances seem to express semantic objects that lack truth values and can hardly be countered by That’s not true. Modal verbs used to change, rather than report on, what is permissible, have been dubbed performative modal verbs in contrast to the standard usages as descriptive modal verbs (cf. Kamp, 1973, 1978; Lewis, 1979b). The status of this distinction will be discussed in detail in Section 2.3.1. As it stands, none of the split representationalist approaches to imperatives addresses the problem of imperative-like effects of declarative sentences.4 In contrast to split representationalism, the type of approach I pursue in this book will be labelled uniform representationalism. As suggested by the name, what is commanded and what is permitted is considered information about the world just like ordinary, non-modalized facts. Consequently, what is commanded and what is permitted is also stored in the common ground only.5 Interestingly, the modelling of P ERMISSIONs proves intricate for both uniform and split representationalist frameworks. A particular problem resulting for split representationalist frameworks that employ a set of possible worlds as the permissibility sphere is introduced by Lewis (1979b) as ‘a problem about permission’. Assuming duality between what is permissible and what is commanded,6,7 split representationalist frameworks mostly only store what is commanded. That is, on Lewis’ classical picture, PS(c) can be obtained as the intersection of all propositions commanded in c. Permitting p has to have the effect of adding p-worlds to PS(c). Yet, as Lewis points out, it is unclear which worlds to add. Clearly, we cannot simply add all p-worlds to PS(c), as this would amount to removing an obligation towards verifying any proposition q as long as ¬q is compatible with p. For example, giving 4

But see Section 2.2.2 on van Rooy’s (2000) treatment of performative modal verbs.

5

For the sake of completeness, we can assume that questions also affect the context set, but nothing hinges on that. I will not spell out how the representation of contexts has to be enriched to distinguish whether a question has been raised (the belief state is partitioned) or not. For an implementation, cf. the framework of inquisitive semantics (Groenendijk and Roelofsen, 2009). 6 Two operators O and P are dual if the inner negation of one is equivalent to the outer negation of the other, [λp.O(¬ p)] = [λp.¬P( p)]. 7 Cf. Mastop (2005) for a different view on the issue. He refers to von Wright (1996), who treats this assumption as a closure condition on artificial systems of permissibility, as e.g. the law for a political unit. Mastop offers an elaboration of the non-dual view within a system of partial update semantics.

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the permission in (2a) should not result in also permitting (2b) or removing the information that the latter is not permissible. (2)

a. b.

You can use my car tonight. You may drink 6 pints of beer tonight and then drive home in my car.

Nevertheless, the set of worlds where the addressee drinks 6 pints of beer and drives home in the speaker’s car are certainly a subset of the set of worlds in which he uses the speaker’s car. Consequently, these worlds would also be added by a naive analysis of permissions that generates the new permissibility sphere by unifying the old one with the proposition expressed by the argument of the permission modal/operator (‘the addressee uses the speaker’s car’, for (2a)). Therefore, permission for (2a) could not be given without permitting (2b), too. Van Rooy (2000) proposes a solution that relies on a relation of comparative reprehensibility between worlds.8 Intuitively, only the (previously) least reprehensible of all worlds in which you use my car tonight get added to the permissibility sphere. It has to be assumed that speaker and addressee know that only worlds of this kind (i.e., worlds where the least reprehensible φ-worlds become accessible by a speech act of permission) are within the realm of epistemic possibilities. The modelling of permissions in split representationalist accounts that store nonepistemic information as sets, lists, schedules, etc. of non-propositional objects (e.g. properties or actions) is even less straightforward (for various possibilities, consider Mastop, 2005; Portner, 2007, 2010). Analogously, we have to ask what a permission of φ amounts to on a uniform representationalism framework. In Section 5.1, I will explore how the temporal parameter and facts about the world interact to let the context set of the precontext c transition to the one of the postcontext c such that at no world in CS(c ) φ-worlds were deontically accessible, whereas at all worlds in CS(c ) some φ-worlds are deontically accessible.

2.1.2 Assigning Meaning to Imperatives: Static or Dynamic In Section 1.3, I argued for a semantic analysis of clause types. Thus, it should be possible to discover the meaning of the imperative form type by the very same strategies semantic theories employ for other linguistic expressions. Depending on their conception of linguistic meaning, semantic theories are usually classified as being static or dynamic. In the following, I will explain some of the specific challenges posed by imperatives for either conception of meaning.

8

In contrast, Rohrbaugh (1997) considers Lewis’ problem about permission a knock-down argument against a possible worlds analysis for deontic speech acts in general. As an alternative, he spells out a partial update structure which allows for adding and removing paths (cf. Rohrbaugh, 1997, for details).

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Static semantic theories constitute the traditional camp. They rely on speakers’ intuitions about particular linguistic expressions that serve as primitives. The semantic value of expressions that cannot be analysed by intuitions about their reference is to be determined by abstraction, that is, by inferences about what such expressions contribute to the meaning of larger expressions. In the classical (and prevailing) version (Frege, 1892; Russell, 1905; Tarski, 1936), the expressions that are taken as primitives are sentences (referring to truth values/sets of possible worlds) on the one hand, and singular terms (i.e., expressions referring to individuals) on the other hand. Hence, truth conditions and reference to entities become the guiding stars to semantic meaning.9 In contrast, dynamic theories conceive of the semantic meaning of a linguistic expression as its (potential) effect on the utterance context, i.e. its context change potential. The so-called dynamic twist from static to dynamic theories is motivated primarily by the need to account for phenomena like anaphora, pragmatic presuppositions, and epistemic modality. All these phenomena are hard to account for at the sentential level and, thus, favor a theory of meaning that allows for consideration of larger linguistic objects. In contrast to dynamic theories, static theories do not necessarily talk about the relation between the output of the semantic interpretation and the use that is made of the linguistic expressions thus interpreted. Still, one of the pivotal assumptions of a truth-conditional static analysis translates naturally to a conception of meaning in terms of effects on the context. Declarative sentences are taken to express propositions. This idea can be motivated in two ways. On the one hand, if we think of propositions as truth-conditions (characteristic functions of sets of possible worlds), they model the language users’ capacity to decide if a sentence is verified by a given situation or not;10 this is the traditional static semantic motivation. On the other hand, if we are interested in a model of information exchange, propositions as sets of possible worlds can easily be reconciled with a simple view of belief states and the update of belief states. Stalnaker (1978) (see Section 1.4) assumes that belief states are modelled as sets of possible worlds that are compatible with the beliefs held by one agent or (mutual joint belief) of more agents. He proposes that a (successful) assertion of a declarative amounts to adding the proposition it expresses to the stock of mutual joint belief (the common ground) and thus to intersecting it with the context set. For simple sentences that do not involve any phenomena motivating a dynamic analysis (e.g., for sentences that do not introduce new discourse referents in the sense of Heim, 1982 and Kamp and Reyle, 1993), their effect on the discourse (if accepted) amounts to just this.11 Therefore, any linguistic expression that can

9 The following discussion of static theories is confined to this classical conception, i.e. to static theories that assign privileged status to truth conditions/values. E.g., I will not try to provide a comparison with situation semantic theories (cf. Barwise and Perry, 1983). 10 Ignoring questions of possible truth-value gaps. 11 Groenendijk and Roelofsen’s (2009) Inquisitive Semantics aims to explicitly account for the step between the decision of whether an assertion is to be accepted and the actual modification of the context.

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be captured satisfactorily in terms of a propositional object, can also be captured as a dynamic object: it can always be assigned the context change potential of removing all previously epistemically accessible indices that are incompatible with its truth conditions. It is a marginal difference whether this update effect is part of the semantic object proper, or whether the semantic object is a proposition and the update comes from a default process of what it means to update an utterance context with a proposition. At this point, it’s natural to ask if imperatives require a non-trivially dynamic treatment, or if they are amenable to an analysis within a static framework. At first glance, at least standard static theories which interpret sentences by assigning truth conditions face an obvious problem when applied to imperatives. If imperatives have truth conditions, for any arbitrary imperative, it should be possible to fill in Tarski’s (1936) schema in (3): (3)

The sentence ‘. . .’ is true if and only if . . . .

Despite its sentential status, it is highly counter-intuitive to ask whether an imperative is true (or false). Note that—in contrast to what is generally assumed in the literature—this should not be considered a proof that imperatives do not have truth values; it is just a fact about speaker intuitions.12 But no matter how decisive for whether imperatives have truth values or not: if speakers have no intuitions about how to fill in (3) for imperatives or even deny that this is possible, imperatives cannot be treated as primitives on the standard static view. In this they contrast with declarative clauses and singular terms, whose reference to truth values (depending on a condition accessible to every native speaker) and individuals respectively can be used as a starting point in the exploration of semantic meaning.13 Unfortunately, the strategy for ‘semantically unknown’ expressions, namely, to look at larger expressions in order to individuate systematic contributions, fails, too. Imperatives simply do not normally occur as parts of larger linguistic expressions. Where they do after all, the truth-conditions of the entire expression are equally disputable; compare (4a) and (4b). (4)

a. b.

Marry that man and we will kill you. If you want to go to Harlem, take the A-train.

Cosmopolitan, Feb 2010

What about other non-declaratives? They, too, fail an intuitive application of Tarski’s schema, but at least for interrogatives the overall situation is somewhat more favorable. First, main clause interrogatives possess counterparts in embedded positions, whose meaning can be assessed according to the Fregean strategy of asking what they contribute to the meaning of the complex expression they occur in. Embedded 12 The theory I will develop in the following chapters argues that it is indeed particular constraints on the contexts in which imperatives can be used—spelled out in Section 4.2—that prevent the intuition that imperatives are true or false. 13 Note that it is uncontroversial that imperatives do not refer to individuals under the standard e/t dichotomy of semantic reference.

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and matrix interrogatives are generally assumed to share common traits in semantics, therefore knowledge about matrix interrogatives can be gained from studying their embedded counterparts. Second, interrogatives are usually assumed to have a straightforward connection to the propositions that count as their answers. As these answers can be captured in terms of truth-conditions, an analysis of interrogatives as sets of answers (Hamblin, 1973; Karttunen, 1977), or as index-dependent propositions (Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1984, the exhaustive true answer) becomes available. Within the framework of static semantics, the general strategy of finding suitable links to propositions has also been applied to imperatives. In this case, despite the apparent lack of a truth-value, the imperative itself is (semantically) identified with a proposition, or even, syntactically, with a declarative that describes its impact on the situation in which it is used. Hamblin (1987) discusses the following three strategies of propositional reduction that have been proposed in the literature: (5)

a. b. c.

Go home!c = You will go home.c Go home!c = You should go home.c Go home!c = I order you to go home.c

you will-reduction you should-reduction performative hypothesis

All three types have been disputed at length since their respective inventions. The one that has gained the most attention is the performative hypothesis as developed in a syntactic variant mostly by Ross (1967, 1970) and Sadock (1974).14 Extensive criticism of this theory is to be found in Grewendorf (1972) and Gazdar (1979). The semantic variant of the performative hypothesis has been developed out of remarks in Lewis (1970), and it has likewise faced a lot of criticism (e.g. Grewendorf, 1979, 2002; for critical discussion pertaining to imperatives in particular, cf. Hamblin, 1987 and Mastop, 2005). In view of the extensive and detailed criticism to be found in the literature, I will just emphasize one problem that is especially obvious when trying to spell out any version of the performative hypothesis for imperatives. In Section 1.2, we saw that imperatives can be associated with a broad range of functions at, and maybe even below, the speech act level (the problem of functional inhomogeneity, FIP). It is unclear how this spectrum could be reduced to a particular speech act type (or, a suitable supertype). However, in the performative prefix, the slot for the performative verb has to be filled. If on the other hand, various options are available as the performative verb, it is unclear how the respective set is to be constrained, and what decides that O RDER is to count as the prototypical instantiation.15 I take this to be a particular problem any variant of the performative hypothesis faces in its application to imperatives. The you will-reduction has been given less general discussion. Syntactically, it has been motivated by the possibility of will you/won’t you-tags in imperatives (Katz and Postal, 1964). Recently, Truckenbrodt (2005) presents a you will-reduction that 14 15

It actually goes back to a footnote in Katz and Postal (1964).

See Section 1.2 for arguments against an analysis for functions other than ordering/commanding as indirect speech acts.

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relies on the effect of the acceptance of a simple you will-proposition in a particular context. Hence, it does not build any pragmatic notions or discourse effects into the semantic meaning of the imperative. Asher and Lascarides (2003a) (see Section 2.2.3) can be seen as a dynamic equivalent of the you will-theory, here, the effect of a simple you will-statement is built in as the update effect an imperative has on the context. Much of Hamblin’s (1987) criticism against the original you will-reductions carries over to the modern variants. In linguistics, much less energy has been put into developing and also into deconstructing the you should-theory. In contrast, Hamblin (1987) shows that the link between you should-statements and ‘imperatives’ (on Hamblin’s functional understanding, see Section 1.1.1) has gained much interest throughout the history of philosophy, reaching back at least to Kant’s Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics.16 But note that this entire discussion is grounded in a clearly functional understanding of ‘imperative’, and the philosophical difficulties arising from the difficulties of treating moral statements in general and you should-statements in particular (cf. Carnap, 1935). From the point of view of linguistic semantics, the fact that despite their (apparent) declarative clause type, certain modalized sentences are problematic in their relation to truth-values is highly interesting. Prima facie it is hard to decide between two options: is it that proposition-denoting linguistic expressions can sometimes behave as if they had no truth-value; or is it that certain seemingly declarative clauses belong to particular (minor) clause types that are not interpreted as denoting propositions? In Section 2.3.1, I will focus on modalized declaratives, and I will argue for the first option. If such an argument can be made convincingly for modalized declaratives, the philosophers’ intuitions as to the apparent absence of truth-values for moral statements turn into an argument in favor of the you should-reduction rather than an argument against it: speaker intuitions and use in conversation can simply not be considered decisive evidence as to whether a linguistic object denotes a proposition or not. If, at the level of the theoretical analysis, the correct behavior can be derived from a propositional object, there is no motivation to adopt a more complicated set-up of the context representation (causing independent problems as discussed for split representationalism, cf. Section 2.1.1) or an inherently dynamic theory. An independent argument that has often been adduced against any propositional reduction for imperatives is called Ross’s paradox. Ross (1944) observes that, while declaratives allow for disjunction introduction, imperatives do not:17 (6)

16

a. b.

I posted the letter. → I posted the letter or I burnt the letter. Post the letter!  Post the letter or burn it.

‘All imperatives are expressed by the word ought [or shall] and thereby indicate the relation of an objective law of reason to a will, . . . , They say that something would be good to do or to forbear.’ (Kant, 1959:35). 17 Ross’s original example is Either slip the letter into the letter-box or burn it! Ross (1944:41).

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At first glance, this seems like evidence that imperatives cannot be interpreted as propositions. Yet, in the meantime, similar effects like Ross’s paradox have been observed in other contexts as well, in particular in connection with modals. Therefore, it is natural to see Ross’s observation as arising from the phenomenon of free choice disjunction (see Section 2.3.1 for discussion). I will argue that it is captured most naturally under an analysis of disjunctive imperatives as modalized disjunctions. But even if a propositional reduction may seem to be the most obvious treatment in a (truth-conditional) static framework, it is certainly not the only possibility. A static theory (even one that relies on truth conditions) could also assign all kinds of non-propositional denotations as linguistic meanings to matrix level objects (i.e. objects that constitute the final output of semantic interpretation and do not serve as the input to further semantic computation). Usually, the assignment of a nonpropositional object would be motivated by considerations of what the respective expression contributes on alternative occurrences where it forms part of a larger expression (i.e., when it serves as the input to further semantic computation). But if non-propositional objects occur as the meanings of matrix level objects in the discourse as well, a theory is needed of how, on these occasions, they interact with the contextual settings. One option is to combine them with pragmatic operators (i.e. speech act operators). In this case, an analysis of clause types is no longer semantic, but pragmatic. Another option is to try to find an analogy to the treatment of propositions. Following Stalnaker (1978) one could assume that, by their very nature of characterizing sets of possible worlds, they can be associated with the default effect of intersection with the context set. A similarly suitable default update effect would have to be established for non-propositional objects. For imperatives, it is mostly assumed that an appropriate default effect for nonpropositional meanings can only be spelled out under the assumption of split representationalism (see Section 2.1.1). Hausser (1980) and Portner (2005) suggest that imperatives denote properties. Portner (2005) explicitly addresses the question of how these properties are to interact with the contextual settings. His theory (as well as the newer version Portner, 2007) is discussed in detail in Section 2.2.4. Another static, non-propositional solution is to be found in Han (1999). She proposes that imperatives denote restricted quantifiers over possible worlds, hence sets of propositions.18 This assumption receives immediate motivation from the fact that imperatives occur in complex constructions like (7) (repeated from (4a) above): (7)

Marry that man and we will kill you.

18 Although Han does not say so explicitly, this is what her analysis amounts to. According to her, imperatives are interpreted as expressing necessity w.r.t. an ideal set of worlds that is obtained by intersecting the set of propositions known to the speaker and applying a deontic ordering source to which the imperative is added. As the constrained operator is not combined with a nuclear scope argument, the standard Kratzer (1991b) semantics Han claims to draw on should result in an object of type st, t. For details on Kratzer’s semantics of modal verbs as well as an alternative theory of imperatives in terms of modal operators, see Sections 2.3, 3.1.3 and Chapter 3.

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In these cases, the imperative in the first conjunct behaves highly similarly to the antecedent of a conditional, hence, like the semantic object assigned by Han (1999).19 However, Han does not offer an account of how her imperative denotation interacts with the context in case of imperatives that are not embedded into a conditional conjunction.20 Han (2000) departs from her earlier view and assumes that imperatives consist of a combination of a particular type of irrealis marked proposition that is the input to a force feature directive. While the former is interpreted by standard truth-conditional semantics, the latter is interpreted pragmatically. Hence, her newer approach constitutes a pragmatic answer to the problem of clause type encoding. Mastop (2005) also assigns static, non-propositional denotata. For him, imperatives are interpreted as actions (a concept somewhat similar to properties, yet independent), and actions are treated by a particular update rule that adds them to the plan (the storage site reserved for non-epistemic information, see Section 2.1.1) as something that is ‘to do’. Like Portner (2005), Mastop lets a semantic object trigger a particular update process, but the choice of a new type of objects (actions) avoids the misprediction that other expressions with the same denotation should behave like an imperative (see Section 2.2.4). At the same time, the concept ‘action’ remains unsatisfactorily vague. Also, the relation between action-denoting and propertydenoting versions of the underlying lexical items is not fleshed out.21 Many recent approaches to imperatives give up on static conceptions of meaning altogether and exploit denotata that become available thanks to the dynamic twist. If the meanings of sentences are identified directly with their potential to update the context, under a uniform representationalist conception of the utterance context, dynamic theories open up ways of affecting the context set in a way that is different from what would be the effect of an assertion of a declarative (e.g. Asher and Lascarides, 2003a, see Section 2.2.3); on a split representationalist model of the context, additional storage sites become available for modification, which opens up an even broader range of possible denotations (see Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.4). Thereby, we obtain intrinsically dynamic theories (i.e., theories that cannot be reduced to a simple update rule that adds a static semantic object to one of the storage sites). The main strong point of such theories is that they immediately capture the inherent non-descriptive nature of imperatives. The challenge for such theories is to keep the

19

For sentences like (7), Schwager (2006b) independently derives an analysis along these lines from her you should-analysis of imperatives. Details and problems (all of which affect Han’s proposal as well) are discussed in Section 6.3.

20 Note also that her analysis faces obvious problems with embedding in other contexts, e.g. conditional disjunctions:

(i)

Marry that man or you’ll stay single for the rest of your life. ≈ If you don’t marry that man you’ll stay single for the rest of your life.

21 For problems with the interpretation of temporality and in particular temporal quantification in Mastop’s (2005) system, see Section 3.2.2.

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Three Parameters of Classification

41

effect abstract enough in order not to invariably link imperatives to one particular speech act type (thus failing to account for FIP and QIP in particular).

2.1.3 Possible Denotata for Imperatives The third and last parameter aims to classify semantic analyses of imperatives in terms of what denotations they assign on an axis between traditional semantic (‘core semantic’) and speech act-related objects. Roughly, on the standard (static) picture, declaratives denote propositions and are canonically used for A SSERTIONs. I will call such an output of the semantic interpretation ‘core semantic’, as the output of the semantic interpretation function (in this case, a proposition) does not involve reference to the level of speech acts (in this case, an A SSERTION). Alternatively, the domain of possible semantic denotata can be enriched to contain—in addition to propositions, properties, entities, truth values and the like—also speech act-like elements. On such a view, some concept of A SSERTION itself becomes the semantic value of a declarative. At first glance, this may seem in conflict with the mediating semantics hypothesis (MSH, see Section 1.3). The latter claims that natural language grammar does not encode any links between a sentence (as a form type) and a speech act type apart from what is contributed through the ordinary semantic interpretation function. But on more careful consideration, MSH is perfectly compatible with the assumption that the output of semantic interpretation contains reference to particular functions or speech act types. MSH does not exclude that (correspondents of) pragmatic objects, as for example speech acts or corresponding update functions, exist as semantic objects and can thus be assigned to syntactic objects by the semantic interpretation function. Of course, such a move raises the question as to what exactly is meant by a linguistic expression ‘denoting a speech act’. Intuitively, speech acts are things that happen in the world, and it is quite obvious that we have descriptions or names for them. However, for speech acts to occur as the denotata of linguistic expressions, we need more than that. Just consider the following: in a certain sense, the verb thank can be taken to denote a certain class of events; yet, this does not suffice to make it ‘denote a speech act’ in the sense that is needed for a theory of clause types (else, the idea collapses to the performative hypothesis, i.e. a propositional reduction). Intuitively, it is much easier to make sense of speech acts as semantic denotata in a dynamic than in a static setting. If speech acts are understood as changes in the epistemic and deontic commitments of the participants to the conversation, under appropriate assumptions as to how these commitments are represented, a dynamic framework enables us to spell out the corresponding context change potentials. These can then be assigned as semantic meanings. Krifka’s (2001) proposal (see Section 2.2.1) makes obvious that the assumption of a particular class of semantic denotata that is different from core semantic denotata and corresponds to clause types may have explanatory value as such, i.e. even without spelling out what exactly these objects are.

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Theories that interpret imperatives by assigning speech act-related denotata share the ability to predict the non-descriptiveness of imperatives: imperatives simply do not denote A SSERTION(-like context potential)s. The biggest challenge for any such theory is constituted by the problem of functional inhomogeneity (FIP). In principle, they could either identify an effect that is general enough so as to underlie all the functions observed and add a theory that, depending on particular contextual constellations, predicts how it gets specified to a particular speech act type (thus accounting for ASA), as well as an explanation for why O RDER is perceived to be the prototypical function of imperatives (thus accounting for CTE). Alternatively, such a theory could specify a family of effects assigned to imperatives (in the sense of an ambiguity). This again, would require an additional theory to decide between its members for particular imperative occurrences (to account for ASA) and, again, an explanation for the canonical link to O RDERs. In contrast, theories that stick to core semantic denotata face two challenges. On the one hand, if they assign objects that, like propositions or properties, can also be denoted by other linguistic forms they need to explain why these form types cannot generally play the role of imperatives and vice versa. On the other hand, they have to explain how the imperative denotation interacts with the contextual settings and what role this plays in the coming about of a particular speech act.

2.2 A Few Recent Approaches to Imperatives In this section, I will discuss a few recent semantic approaches to imperatives and the closely related phenomenon of performative modals. I will try to point out what settings of the above introduced parameters they rely on. The discussion (Sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3, and 2.2.4) can be skipped by readers already familiar with the approaches or readers only interested in the proposal I’ll be developing myself. The presentation starts with accounts that motivate and play on the introduction of pragmatic objects into the realm of semantic denotata, and then moves to more core semantic solutions. I start with Krifka’s (2001) general arguments for such a widening of the semantic domain and show that they do not carry over to imperatives. I then discuss van Rooy’s (2000) dynamic implementation of an update of a Lewisonian permissibility sphere, which builds the effects of C OMMANDs and P ERMISSIONs into the semantic denotata of performative must and may respectively. Next, I focus on Asher and Lascarides’s (2003b) theory of imperatives that relies on a particular non-assertive update effect on the common ground. Finally, I discuss Portner’s (2005) attempt to let a purely semantic object constrain its effect on the discourse and compare it to the more detailed, but slightly different version of Portner (2007). All these approaches bring up interesting aspects any theory of imperatives has to deal with. However, I do not find any of them fully satisfactory as an answer to both CTE and ASA. In Section 2.3 I will thus motivate and introduce my own analysis of imperatives.

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A Few Recent Approaches to Imperatives

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2.2.1 Speech Acts as Input to Semantic Computation Krifka (2001) proposes that speech acts constitute possible denotata for natural language expressions. The existence of this class is motivated by a particular pattern of behavior w.r.t. logical operations. In the following, I will evaluate whether imperatives show the relevant restrictions and whether they should thus be interpreted as having pragmatic objects as their denotata. Krifka observes that there is a class of linguistic objects that can easily be conjoined and outscoped by universal quantifiers, but cannot be disjoined or outscoped by other quantifiers. Consider questions as in (8). While (8a) is indeed the conjunction of two questions, (8b) does not feel like a ‘disjunction’ of two questions, in the sense that it would e.g. leave it to the addressee which one she chooses to answer; (8b) feels more like a correction (taking back the first move) than the presentation of two options. (8)

a. b.

What and why? Who went to Sweden, or who went to the US?

Krifka (2001) argues that the contrast is due to the fact that interrogatives, imperatives and declaratives are interpreted semantically as belonging to the particular semantic type a of speech acts. Upon the corresponding semantic domain A of speech acts, only the operation of conjunction, but not the one of disjunction, is defined. Krifka extends this to predict quantifier scope possibilities in interrogatives: pair list-readings (intuitively paraphrasable with wide scope for the quantifier) are possible for universal quantifiers, but not others: (9)

a. b.

Which dish did every guest bring? ok: ‘for each guest x: which dish did x bring?’ Which dish did most guests bring? not:‘ for most guests x: which dish did x bring?’

He argues that this is due to the fact that (i) interrogatives denote objects of type a, (ii) conjunction is the only operation defined on objects of type a, and (iii) universal quantifiers can be construed as conjunctions over all instances, while other quantifiers cannot. The contrast in availability extends to some embedded interrogatives (under wonder, ask), but not others (e.g. under know). It is straightforward to argue that wonder and ask embed objects of type a (hence the restriction to pair-list readings with universal quantifiers only) while predicates like know embed standard interrogative denotations of type st, t (which can be outscoped by arbitrary quantifiers). On closer inspection, imperatives conform to the restrictions only partly. According to Krifka (2002), matrix clause imperatives behave like objects of type a (i.e., speech acts) in that wide scope is available for the universal quantifier in (10a), but not for the proportional quantifier in (10b). (10)

a. b.

Confiscate every bottle of alcohol you can find! Confiscate most bottles of alcohol you can find!

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While I agree with the contrast for (10a) and (10b), I suspect it to be an artefact of the examples chosen. Wide scope readings for most require (speaker) specificity of the set of bottles that are to be affected.22 But restricting the domain by you can find would (under normal circumstances) block this (it cannot be known beforehand which bottles will be found), thereby hindering a wide scope reading of most. Consider the following examples instead: (11)

a.

b.

c.

nie nach Die meisten Bücher in diesem Regal lies the most books in this shelf read.I MP S G never after Mitternacht. midnight ‘For most books x on this shelf: don’t read x after midnight.’ Die meisten Anträge gib einfach gleich deinem the most proposals give.I MP S G simply immediately your Assistenten. assistant ‘For most proposals x: immediately give x to your assistant.’ Don’t even look at most of these proposals. (It is already clear from their titles that they are complete crap. But two or three seem to be really good.)

All these readings are stronger than what would be obtained if the imperative took wide scope w.r.t. the quantifier. The imperative is meant to hold for a (particular) major part of the books/proposals. In German, the reading requires a particular rise-fall intonation (bridge accent) which signals that the constituent carrying the rise is to be interpreted as a contrastive topic (Büring, 1999).23 For questions, this 22

Here, imperatives differ from other operators, as, generally, outscoping other operators does not automatically lead to specificity: (i)

You may not read most of these books.

If may in (i) is understood deontically, but with a source of obligation different from the speaker, the wide scope reading for most of these books is perfectly compatible with the speaker being ignorant as to what particular books verify the quantification. The fact that imperatives differ in that they require speaker specificity for wide scope quantifiers seems to be a side effect of their inherently performative nature. For reasons of space, I cannot attempt an in-depth analysis of specificity and wide scope quantifiers. Intuitively, the restriction should be made to follow from the authority condition (see Section 4.2.2). Compare also its relations to rhetorical effects for questions, see Section 2.3.3.3. 23 Note that this shows more generally that, at least in German, specific DPs can appear in imperatives, pace Portner (2004). Cases he deems unacceptable in English are grammatical in German and involve the same bridge accent: (i)

EINen Apfel iss NICHT. Der ist nämlich vergiftet. Ich zeig dir gleich, a apple eat.I MP S G not. it is DP RT poisoned. I show you immediately, welcher es ist. which-one it is ‘There is one apple that you must not eat. It’s poisoned. I’ll immediately show you which one it is.’

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A Few Recent Approaches to Imperatives

45

reading corresponds (modulo specificity) to the pair-list readings absent from matrix interrogatives or embedded interrogatives of the particular speech act type a. Obviously, imperatives do not obey the restrictions Krifka observes for speech act-denoting expressions. I conclude that, irrespective of whether in general objects corresponding to speech acts appear as semantic denotata or not, the semantics of imperatives can and should be characterised differently.

2.2.2 Performative Modals and Non-epistemic Context Change Potentials Van Rooy (2000) does not deal with imperative clauses but focuses on performative modal verbs. However, the analysis he offers constitutes a plausible candidate for the imperative clause type as well (van Rooy himself calls the performative modals he analyses ‘imperatives’). According to van Rooy, the distinction between descriptive and performative modal verbs24 is a matter of lexical ambiguity rather than a distinction in use. Consider the following examples in which additional material should help to bring forth one or the other type of modal verb. The examples in (12) suggest descriptive modal verbs, while the examples in (13) suggest performative modal verbs. (12)

a. b.

Peter has to do the shopping today (as far as I know). Peter may come tomorrow. (The hostess said it was no problem.)

(13)

a. b.

You must call me. Okay, you may come at 11. (Are you happy now?)

While the sentences in (12) are most naturally used to describe Peter’s obligations and possibilities, (13) can easily be used to bring about an obligation for the addressee to call the speaker (C OMMAND ), or render it permissible for the addressee to come at 11 (P ERMISSION ). Van Rooy argues that the performative modals in (13) and the descriptive ones in (12) have to be interpreted differently, and he develops a dynamic account for the performative versions of must and may. He relies on a split representationalist model of the context that, in addition to the Stalnakerian context set, contains also a permissibility sphere (adopted from Lewis, 1979b). The latter is the set of all possible worlds in which the addressee meets all her obligations. Now, while descriptive deontic modals just report on the state of the permissibility sphere (i.e., for must, what is entailed, and for may, what is compatible), in virtue of their

24 I.e. modal verbs in sentences that describe modal affairs (i.e., what is deontically/epistemically/teleologically/. . . possible or necessary) and modal verbs that change such states of affairs see Section 2.1.1; for detailed discussion of the phenomenon as well as an opposing conclusion, see Section 2.3.1 below.

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lexical semantics, (felicitous) utterances containing performative modals change the permissibility sphere. The entry for performative must is unproblematic: all it has to do is to eliminate from the permissibility sphere all those worlds that falsify its prejacent (i.e., the propositional argument of the modal operator). (14)

PS(c)[must(φ)] = PS(c) ∩ φ.

The entry for may is more intricate due to Lewis’s (1979b) problem about permission (see Section 2.1.1). Van Rooy proposes a solution in terms of a reprehensibility order: based on the state before the permission, he induces a reprehensibility order on all sets of possible worlds. Now, the effect of performative may is specified as adding to the permissibility sphere only the least reprehensible φ-worlds.25 (15)

PS(c)[may(φ)] = PS(c) ∪ PS(c)∗φ , where PS(c)∗φ is the set of worlds that make as many propositions entailed by PS(c) true as possible, but make also φ true.

Intuitively, an imperative φ! on its prototypical use as an O RDER has the very same effect van Rooy encodes for a performative must φ-declarative: all ¬φ worlds are eliminated from the permissibility sphere. It is thus tempting to explain the link between imperative sentences and O RDERs by equating imperatives and performative must: (16)

PS(c)[φ!] = PS(c)[must(φ)] = PS(c) ∩ φ.

This move has the immediate advantage that imperatives do not have truthconditions and cannot be used descriptively. They are semantically specified for being used as O RDERs, which immediately accounts for CTE (the problem of clause type encoding). However, the account creates problems for ASA (the assignment of speech acts to actual utterances): how come an actual imperative utterance can be used for a wide range of functions that have nothing to do with permissibility (e.g. A DVICE , T HREATs, W ISHes,. . . )? One possibility would be to further enrich the contextual representation by additional spheres for what is advisable, what is desired, what is being warned against, etc. The entry of the imperative (and to a certain extent the same problem exists already for modal verbs themselves) can then be underspecified w.r.t. which one of a designated set of spheres it affects in that particular context (note that, for example, the context set is not a possible site of modification, as imperatives and deontic modals cannot be used to enforce epistemic information). This, in principle, is a possibility, yet one has to ensure appropriate constraints on what spheres are needed in the contextual representation, what spheres can be modified by what elements, and how the particular spheres are supposed to depend upon each other (e.g. it seems that one can only advise what one permits, etc.). Also, an account is needed to explain which sphere is modified by a

25 Throughout the paper, van Rooy develops various refinements to account for conjunctions, disjunctions and lumping. For our purposes, these details can be ignored.

2.2

A Few Recent Approaches to Imperatives

47

particular utterance (ASA), and why the classical permissibilty sphere (and, hence O RDER) constitutes the default (CTE). Moreover, the theory faces a problem with respect to possibility-type usages of imperatives (P ERMISSIONs, in particular). Like many other authors (Wilson and Sperber, 1988; Han, t.a.; Portner, 2007, 2010), I will argue that they have to be derived indirectly (see Section 5.1). But given that a context change potential like (16) specifies a very particular effect on the contextual settings, I am not sure how it could be weakened to have an effect more like (15). An alternative would be to analyze imperatives as ambiguous between (16) and (15), but this strikes me as implausible for independent considerations (see Section 2.3.1). To sum up, I do not think that van Rooy’s (2000) proposal for performative must provides a suitable interpretation for imperatives. However, I agree with the intuition (suggested by his terminology) that performative modal verbs and imperatives have much in common. In Section 2.3.1, I will argue for a different treatment of performative modal verbs and will take it as a starting point for my analysis of imperatives.

2.2.3 (Ex-)Changing the World Asher and Lascarides (2003a)26 start out from the observation that imperatives ‘change the world’ in a more drastic sense than declaratives do. They assume that an imperative changes the context set to one that entails that the addressee complies with the imperative. The core effect of a (successful) directive speech act is captured in a uniform representationalist framework and without reference to permissibility or the like, merely by changing what count as possible futures after the execution of the imperative. If we compare their dynamic implementation to the propositional reductions discussed in Section 2.1.2, it should be obvious that it has some connections with the you will-reduction. The key motivation for Asher and Lascarides is the following observation: the canonical change induced by a felicitous use of an imperative φ! is that subsequently speaker and addressee agree that the addressee will do φ. They argue that this becomes manifest in exchanges like the following: (17)

Go to the traffic lights. There’s a roundabout to your right.

The sequence in (17) is uttered naturally in a scenario where the roundabout in question is not present at the location of the utterance context, but will be to the addressee’s right the moment she has advanced to the traffic lights. Yet the indicative in the second sentence is perfectly fine. Hence, the imperative Go to the traffic lights. allows the speaker to proceed as if it were mutual joint belief that the addressee 26 The analyses in the book (Asher and Lascarides, 2003b) and the article (Asher and Lascarides, 2003a) are similar apart from a minor detail with respect to the treatment of disjunction and how to avoid Ross’ paradox, which is irrelevant to our concerns here. My presentation follows the article.

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(at the (new) reference time) has moved to the traffic lights. Asher and Lascarides (2003a) abstract away from the temporal parameter and propose to account for this as follows:27 Imperatives change the context set (i.e., the set of worlds that are compatible with mutual joint belief) in such a way that each element of the resulting belief state verifies the content of the imperative. To ensure this, imperatives are translated as action term discourse representations28 that encode particular update relations between the elements of the input and the output context sets. As usual, an update with a declarative relates a world w in the input context set to the same world w in the output context set iff w makes the declarative true. Otherwise, w is eliminated from the output context set. Action terms as encoded by imperatives have a different effect on the context set. They express relations that hold between worlds w in the input context set and w in the output context set iff w makes true the corresponding declarative. Consequently, an update with an action term maps the old context set s to a new context set s  , such that all the worlds in s are replaced by worlds where the imperative is complied with. That is, we obtain a new information state that is entirely independent of the worlds that were accessible previously. This accounts for the observation that before the utterance of Go to the traffic lights! it is mutual joint belief that the addressee is not at the traffic lights, whereas afterwards, it is mutual joint belief that the addressee has gone to the traffic lights. Asher and Lascarides’s (2003a) account encodes a clear difference between truth at a world and the effect of an imperative. Intuitively, it captures the effect that imperatives somehow ‘change the world’. Yet, it faces some serious problems. The first problem is a technicality. As it stands, the update eliminates all information from the context set except that the imperative is complied with. This is clearly not what we want: like any other utterance, imperatives may trigger belief revision in particular contexts, but normally they do not remove mutual joint belief. Clearly, the change of the world has to be restricted somehow. One way to do this might be in terms of a pointwise minimality restriction such that each world is related to the closest possible world at which the imperative is complied with. The closest possible world could be understood along the lines of what Stalnaker (1968) proposes for counterfactuals (except that, for imperatives, the closest world would have to be epistemically possible). Unfortunately, this would most likely not retain in the information state all (epistemically) possible ways of complying with

27 Their approach is couched in the framework of SDRT (Segmented Discourse Representation Theory), a dynamic variant of DRT (Kamp and Reyle, 1993) that models the construction of discourse representations by taking into account the effect of rhetorical relations. Linguistic expressions are interpreted as building up discourse representations that are conceived of as relations between sets of world-assignment pairs constituting pre- and post-belief states. In the following, I will abstract away from discourse referents and will treat the belief states as sets of worlds. See Asher and Lascarides (2003b) for details. 28

The concept of an action term is taken from Segerberg (1990), who proposes it in order to interpret imperatives in a static framework. The goal is to ensure the non-propositional behavior of imperatives with respect to truth values and disjunction introduction (Ross’ paradox, see Section 2.1.2).

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A Few Recent Approaches to Imperatives

49

the imperative, but would leave us with the most plausible/stereotypical/easiest... ways the imperative could be complied with. In general, it seems far from trivial to spell out the appropriate restriction on the change of world. But even if some satisfactory condition of minimal change is added to overcome this technical problem, I remain sceptical whether the change in information about the addressee is indeed what should be associated with an imperative. First, despite the fact that sequences like (17) are acceptable, speaker and addressee still know that, immediately after the imperative is uttered and accepted, they are talking to each other, the addressee has not left, and the addressee is therefore not yet at the traffic lights. Switching back to the actual situation (e.g. by the use of here) does not require belief revision. Relatedly, Asher and Lascarides’s model runs into problems in connection with imperatives that are understood and accepted, but only under the proviso that the addressee will manage to comply with the imperative. Consider an example that contains an adverbial that explicitly locates the action called for by the imperative in the future as in (18). If the addressee promises (successfully) to comply with the imperative, both participants may epistemically discard all other options. Yet, they may also be aware of the possibility of highly unlikely intervening factors. Asher and Lascarides’s approach does not seem to be applicable in such environments which have a higher threshold for what counts as knowledge. It is also not completely clear to me how the effect of the imperative could be weakened in the case of a reply as in (18b). Intuitively, the imperative issued by the speaker is still the same, but its effect on the context set is at best equivalent to the weaker one in (19). (18)

Come tomorrow for lunch! a. Okay! b. Okay, I’ll try to do so.

(19)

Try to come tomorrow for lunch.

Answers like (18b) seem very natural, but are hard to integrate in a theory that assumes that imperatives are either complied with or rejected. If we look more closely at declarative sequences related to (17), new light can be shed on the puzzle that speaker and addressee know that the imperative—even if accepted—has not yet been complied with, while declaratives drawing on the poststate of complying are acceptable. (20) is as acceptable as (17), yet the imperative is replaced by a (modalized) declarative. (20)

You have to go to the traffic lights. There’s a roundabout to your right.

Reference to a background that has been introduced in a modal context is well known from cases of modal subordination (Roberts, 1989), where subsequent modals can be interpreted with respect to a non-actual context.29 But (17) is different 29

(i)

The phenomenon of modal subordination was discovered for epistemic contexts like (i). A thief might break in. There would be a car waiting for him outside.

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from those in that the second, declarative sentence does not involve modalization. Now, Paul Portner (p.c.) points out that the respective sequences do not even require modalization of the first clause. Therefore, he suggests to subsume them under the phenomenon of deictic recentering. (21)

There’s a traffic light at the corner, and then there’s a roundabout to your right.

The sequence in (21) can also be understood as the roundabout occurring in a situation temporally and locally shifted away from the corner with the traffic light, progression following the imagined pathway of the addressee. To sum up, although modals and imperatives may help deictic recentering, the effect obviously does not depend on their presence. Therefore, the possibility of sequences like (17) does not depend on the presence of an imperative and thus does not provide evidence for the kind of imperative effect Asher and Lascarides propose. While their specific proposal as to what is the impact of the imperative strikes me as highly problematic, I agree with Asher and Lascarides (2003a) on a more foundational issue: imperatives are like declaratives in that both clause types modify the context set. Yet, the particular update potential they assign to imperatives predicts straightforwardly that declaratives and imperatives modify the context set in different ways. In contrast, I will argue that the modification can always be spelled out in terms of eliminating worlds from the context set (hence, no inherently dynamic theory is required), but that imperatives differ regarding the grounds for refuting such an update (this being the real reason for the feeling that ‘imperatives change the world’).

2.2.4 Imperatives as Updating To-Do Lists Finally, I want to discuss the approach that has been developed by Paul Portner in Portner (2005, 2007) and in joint papers with Raffaella Zanuttini, Miok Pak, and Simon Mauck. On the one hand, their approach is close to what I myself will propose in that it assumes that imperatives denote core semantic objects that are associated with default processes that explain their interaction with the context settings. On the other hand, it contrasts with my proposal, as it employs a non-propositional semantics. In the following, I will focus on the two single-authored papers by Portner and show that they invoke two different conceptions of the semantics-pragmatics interface. In both papers, Portner relies on a split representationalist conception of the context (see Section 2.1.1). In addition to the common ground (the set of propositions that constitute mutual joint belief) and the question set (the set of questions, i.e.

Subtle differences between epistemic modals on the one hand, and deontic modals and imperatives on the other hand, are discussed in Chapter 6; these concern in particular the necessity of anaphoric elements like then.

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sets of propositions that the participants in the conversation mutually agree to try to answer), there is a To-Do List function (TDL) that assigns to each participant a To-Do List (a set of properties). At each point in the conversation, an agent’s To-Do List reflects what she is committed to doing in order to be judged rational and cooperative. This is ensured by the assumption that common ground and To-Do List interact closely: a To-Do List induces a (strict) partial order on the set of worlds compatible with the common ground (cf. (22a)); this ordering serves as the input to a conversational principle that allows an evaluation of the agent’s behavior (the agent’s commitment, cf. (22b)). (22)

a.

b.

Partial orderingof worlds
Now, each clause type has a particular effect on these contextual settings. According to Portner (2005) this is mediated by the fact that they correspond to different logical types: declaratives denote propositions (i.e., are of type s, t), interrogatives denote sets of propositions, and imperatives denote properties (i.e., are of type s, et). Portner (2005) argues that this allows us to predict their effect on the contextual settings by a discourse principle that amounts to adding each of them to the storage site that hosts elements of the respective type. For imperatives, this is not sufficient to explain why they are added to the To-Do List of the addressee rather than someone else’s To-Do List. Therefore, Portner adds a domain restriction to the property denoted by the imperative: imperatives denote properties that hold either of the addressee or of nobody at all. An imperative like Leave! is interpreted as in (23).31 (23)

λwλx : x = c A .x leaves in w.

Portner’s (2005) theory constitutes a clear-cut case of a static theory of imperatives in which a purely semantic object (a property) regulates its effect on the discourse. As stressed by Portner himself, this constitutes a way of extending a Stalnakerian view of the semantics-pragmatics interface to non-assertive objects (in particular,

< is a strict partial order (irreflexive, transitive). Note that Portner uses < for the inverse relation of what Lewis (1973) and Kratzer (1991b) use it for; for Portner, u
31 Portner adopts Heim and Kratzer’s (1998) convention of indicating presuppositions on argument variables between a colon and the dot that precedes the value term.

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To-Do List and question set-related ones). As such, the approach is highly interesting, but the implementation is not unproblematic. In particular, if the update effect on the context is mediated by the semantic type it remains unclear why other (arguably) property-expressing objects (e.g. to be the addressee and to leave, friend of mine,. . . ) fail to behave like the corresponding imperatives.32 And, indeed, this part of the account is given up in the newer version (Portner, 2007). An imperative like Leave! still denotes the property in (23). But additionally, Portner (2007) adopts an update principle for imperatives that contains two parts: it specifies an effect on the addressee’s To-Do List, and an effect on the common ground, cf. (24).33,34 C + φimp = , where: TDL’(addressee) ∪ {φimp }; CG’ results from CG by adding the proposition ‘it is ordered/recommended/. . . that the addressee do φ’

(24)

Note that this rule is not part of the semantic interpretation of the imperative, and it is not triggered by the semantic interpretation, either (rather, the static semantic interpretation of the imperative is one of the parameters referred to in the update rule). The rule itself is triggered directly by the form type of the imperative. Therefore, strictly speaking, Portner (2007) cannot be considered a semantic analysis of clause types (or imperatives in particular): imperatives denote (addressee restricted) properties and come with an additional Gebrauchsbedingung (condition of use, 32 This particular problem has already been pointed out by Bierwisch (1980) in connection with a proposal by Hausser (1980), who also assumes that imperatives denote properties and from this tries to derive their discourse behavior. 33 Portner’s (2007) formulation contains an additional parameter h for modal flavors (cf. Kratzer, 1978), which regulates whether an imperative is used as a C OMMAND, a R ECOMMENDATION or a W ISH. The parameter also induces a definedness condition on the update with an imperative. These details can be ignored for the moment. 34

For simple imperatives, the rule in (24) renders superfluous the restriction that its semantic meaning carries the addressee presupposition. But it seems that this assumption is still crucial to capture that even grammatical third person subjects as in (ia) or (iia) presuppose that the imperative subject is (one of) the addressees. (i)

a. b.

JOHN stand HERE and MARY stand THERE! (Portner, 2005, (16c)) λwλx : x = c A .John ∈ x & John stands there & Mary ∈ x & Mary stands there. (Portner, 2005, (17c))

(ii)

a. b.

Everyone sit down! λwλx : x = c A .(∀y ∈ x)[y sits down in w.]

(Portner, 2005, (16b)) (Portner, 2005, (17b))

For (ia), the interaction with the To-Do List update is straightforward (although, as far as I can tell, ‘John ∈ x’ and ‘Mary ∈ x’ should be part of the domain restriction, not the at issue meaning). But it is unclear how the To-Do List update works for (iia) (and in particular, corresponding examples with non-universal quantifiers like for example somebody). Are there To-Do Lists of plural addressees, and if so, how do they interact with the To-Do Lists for the individuals the plural addressees are composed of? In Section 3.2.4, I provide an alternative solution to the addressee-restrictedness of imperatives.

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A Few Recent Approaches to Imperatives

53

cf. Bierwisch, 1980) that accounts for their effect on the contextual settings. But this pragmatic twist in the encoding of the imperative clause type35 is not a crucial feature of the analysis: thanks to the assumptions Portner makes about contextual representations it is easy to translate Portner’s (2007) combination of a static semantic object and an additional pragmatic meaning component into a genuinely semantic yet dynamic theory of imperatives. To make his account of imperatives semantic, we only have to assume (ignoring the modal parameters) that an imperative like Leave! denotes a function from an input context to the maximally similar output context s.t. (i) TDL’(c A ) = TDL(c A ) ∪ {λwλx : x = c A .x leaves in w}, and (ii) CG’ results from CG by adding the proposition ‘it is ordered/recommended/. . . that the addressee leave’. This amendment is straightforward and gives us the corresponding semantic encoding of the imperative clause type. Portner (2007) improves over Portner (2005) in that he spells out explicit machinery to explain how the status of the To-Do Lists influences what is mutual joint belief and how imperatives influence the interpretation of subsequent descriptive modals. He assumes that To-Do Lists are flavored according to whether properties come in as O RDERs, as R ECOMMENDATIONs, or as W ISHes, and points out that they verify subsequent modal sentences of the same flavor (assume that Noah is the addressee):36,37

35

‘Pragmatic’ in the sense of Section 1.1.3, i.e. that the pairing of the imperative form-type and the canonical function of O RDERING is not mediated (exclusively) by the imperative’s semantic meaning. This contrasts with the question posed in Section 2.1.3 which regards the nature of the semantic denotation of the imperative and whether it makes reference to speech acts, i.e. inherently pragmatic objects.

36

Portner claims that this is similar for I NVITATIONs and A DVICE , which come with an addresseebouletic and teleological flavor respectively. Consider (i) (i)

a. b.

Have a piece of fruit! I NVITATION , his (19a) Noah should have a piece of fruit, given that it would make him happy. bouletic; his (19b)

Intuitively, it does not seem right to say that this makes true that according to what the addressee wants, it is best that he takes a piece of fruit (as would be predicted if deontic and bouletic modality worked on a par). In the Kratzer-style framework Portner is employing, an addressee-bouletic modal expresses what follows given the circumstances if additionally as many as possible of the addressee’s wishes come true. At least for invitations it seems incorrect to add imperatives (applied to the addressee) to these wishes of the addressee (in Kratzer’s account, the addressee bouletic ordering source), in the same sense as the content of an order is added to the set of propositions that specify ‘what is commanded’. Imperatives simply do not change the wishes of the addressee. For more details on Kratzer’s modal framework and its relevance to imperatives of all flavors, see Chapters 3 and 4. Recent work on anankastic conditionals and teleological modality (e.g. von Fintel and Iatridou, 2005) suggests that the relation may be more complicated even in the case of A DVICE. 37 Roughly, the effect is achieved by ruling out worlds from the context set at which standard Kratzerian parameters (modal base and ordering source) do not assign sets of propositions that verify the corresponding necessity. For details on standard Kratzer semantics, see Section 3.1; for this particular application to imperatives, cf. Portner (2007).

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Sit down right now! O RDER; his (18) Noah should sit down right now, given that he’s been ordered to do so. deontic

This meets one of the challenges I mentioned for split representationalism: Portner (2007) offers an explanation for how the status of the non-epistemic storage sites is represented in the storage site reserved for epistemic matters. Still the account remains problematic on three other aspects that regard the appropriate interaction of To-Do Lists with the context of communication. First, To-Do Lists serve to record what has been agreed on as properties the addressee should strive to realize in order to count as rational and cooperative. This is ensured by the Agent’s commitment (cf. (22b)), which draws on the partial ordering induced by the relevant To-Do List. It is not absolutely clear to me what  is meant by the requirement that the ‘actions [of the agent] in any worlds w ∈ CG 1  tend to make it more likely that there is no w2 ∈ CG such that. . . ’. Making the agent’s commitment precise would require making explicit what notion of causation is assumed, and what probability distribution is referred to. But no matter how the two concepts are made precise, any straightforward reading seems to imply that with respect to her To-Do List, the agent is committed to a metalinguistic task: convince your interlocutor(s) that you cannot obtain more of your To-Do List properties than what you are currently aiming at. Intuitively, there are two ways in which the CG can be influenced by an agent who wants to meet her agent’s commitment with respect to a To-Do List property like Leave the room right now!: (i) she leaves the room; then her actual world cannot be outranked by another world w2 because of the To-Do List property of leaving the room; (ii) she convinces her interlocutors that leaving the room right now is impossible: then, worlds where she leaves the room right now are eliminated from the context set, therefore, the property becomes irrelevant for the partial ordering; consequently, at least this property cannot be the one that makes another world in the context set strictly better. Clearly, option (ii) may not be what the speaker had had in mind, but still, it seems a rational way to deal with an unwanted imperative you have once made the mistake to accept. Unfortunately, the agent’s commitment fails to block a third line of behavior which, contrary to predictions, is intuitively not judged as rational or cooperative action. Assume again that an imperative like (26) is issued and accepted (i.e., added to the addressee’s To-Do List). (26)

Leave this room within the next 30 seconds!

Assume that nothing else is on the addressee’s To-Do List at that moment. Then it is agreed that the addressee counts as rational if she acts in a way such that in any world w1 in CG (i.e. given what we all know) her actions make it more likely that it is not the case that both (i) she does not have the property of leaving within  the next 30 seconds in w1 and (ii) there is a world w2 in CG in which she has that property. This follows immediately from the requirement to make it more likely that there is no better world, and the fact that in case of a one-item To-Do List, the only way for w2 to be better than w1 is that the agent has that property in w2 but

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not in w1 . Now, given that the negated requirement is conjunctive, it is sufficient to ensure that one of them fails. So, if the addressee does not leave the room within the next thirty seconds and this becomes publicly known to all the interlocutors, all  worlds where she has the imperative property are eliminated from CG for nonlinguistic reasons and the addressee is deemed rational and cooperative according to the agent’s commitment.38 It may well be possible to make precise the concepts involved in the agent’s commitment and to rule out the inertia strategy of complying with it; however, both aspects strike me as not entirely trivial. A second problem with Portner’s To-Do Lists involves their incapacity to make any sensible predictions for properties which the addressee cannot influence: (27)

a. b. c.

Have fun at the party! Please, be rich! Please don’t have broken another vase.

on one’s way to a blind date

Properties that, according to mutual joint belief, cannot be actively influenced by the addressee (e.g. (27a)), and properties that are already settled (e.g. (27b), (27c)) do not lead to a distinction of worlds according to whether the addressee strives to have them or not. Therefore, their presence in a To-Do List is predicted to only have the metalinguistic effect that the agent is commited to make it mutual joint belief that (s)he either cannot have them or has them already. Intuitively, this is not what is expressed by the imperatives in (27). Third, the neat split between clause types and modification of particular storage sites breaks down when we consider declarative sentences that are used in a nonassertoric fashion: (28)

a. b. c.

You must clean the table. I hereby order you to clean the table. I want you to clean this table immediately!

used as an order

Intuitively, if my friend Natalie informs me about my duties as a housekeeper by an utterance of (29), the question of whether I am a rational and cooperative agent should take into account all three properties mentioned, not just the one that came in as an imperative. (29)

You must water the flowers and feed the cats. And please empty the mailbox.

But the prediction of the theory is that CG says that in order to comply with Natalie’s W ISHes/O RDERs (depending on the flavor of the necessity modal), it is necessary that I water the flowers and feed the cats. But I prove to be a rational agent depending on whether I strive to empty the mailbox or not. As far as I can see, this is not what we want. Whether an obligation came in via a performatively used modal or via an imperative does not seem to be of any relevance for the development of

38

Pace Portner (2005) who claims that the predictions are correct for inert addressees.

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the conversation. Relatedly, utterances of declarative sentences as in (28) show the same effect upon subsequent descriptive modals as imperatives do. Portner himself acknowledges the existence of performative modals, but does not seem to consider the issue problematic. Rather, he argues, modeling imperatives in terms of To-Do Lists provides an account of what performative modals achieve in addition to their assertive meaning component (cf. Portner, 2007:363f). It is not entirely clear to me how this is to work, though. As soon as we allow for performatively used modals, explicit performatives, etc. to modify To-Do Lists, we lose the correspondence between clause types and effects on the discourse. Hence, we need an independent theory for what goes into To-Do Lists, and what goes into the common ground. In addition, for the agent’s commitment to be realistic, it may also be necessary to let general requirements present in CG interact with the orderings induced by the To-Do Lists instead of getting taken into account as background facts only.39 An attempt to solve this problem would be to take into account together with the content of his To-Do List all deontic, teleological and bouletic information stored in the common ground when it comes to evaluating an agent’s rationality and cooperativity. But this would be too strong: for example, the participants in a conversation may well know that an agent is liable to pay taxes for a second income obtained in another country, yet agree that it is more rational to try to avoid doing so. Therefore, only liabilities endorsed by the participants in the conversation should be taken into account. But as soon as we have such a CG-internal distinction between liabilities that should be followed and those that should or need not be followed, the need for separate storage sites like To-Do Lists vanishes. The task becomes to ensure that imperatives always introduce liabilities that are endorsed by the participants. In view of these worries about the status and function of To-Do Lists, I want to propose an alternative account of imperatives that involves similar ingredients to Portner’s proposal but obviates the problems resulting from the split representationalist framework. I will also draw on the intimate connection to descriptive modal verbs, the possibility of different modal flavors, as well as the conduct-guiding effect of (some) imperatives.

2.3 Modalized Propositions: Idea and Motivation In the previous sections, I established imperatives as a particular sentence-level form type that is associated with the prototypcial function of an O RDER. Concomitantly, without any detectable notion of indirectness, utterances of imperatives can be associated with a wide range of functions that cannot easily be reduced to a uniform pragmatic core. I argued that the relation to the prototypical function (O RDER) and the wide functional potential are best accounted for semantically: imperatives

39 Problems for the appropriate interaction of facts about modal states of affairs (i.e., what the law is like) and orderings are well known from the literature on conditionals, cf. Frank (1996), Saebø (2001), von Fintel and Iatridou (2005).

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57

denote an underspecified object that gets associated with O RDER per default, but can, in interaction with particular contextual constellations, naturally be used for a wide range of other functions as well. None of the existing proposals discussed above fully meets the challenge: they tend to either build too much of a particular O RDER-like discourse effect into the imperative, or fail to satisfactorily account for an imperative’s interaction with the contextual settings. To arrive at what I consider a more satisfactory alternative, I give up on one of the mission statements in recent work on imperatives, namely, that imperatives do not have truth values. Instead, I argue that imperatives express propositions (and hence, have truth values), but come with an additional presuppositional meaning component that makes them unfit for assertive use and shields the truth value from being conversationally accessible. This approach can be spelled out in a static framework40 and does not involve any import of pragmatic (i.e. speech act-like) objects into the realm of semantic denotata. I will take my point of departure from the above-mentioned similarity between imperatives and performative modal verbs. The conviction that their relation to modality is revealing for an understanding of imperatives is shared with Han (t.a.) and Portner (2007). Yet, I strengthen this to the point of saying that at the level of at-issue content, imperatives are equivalent to modalized declaratives. This allows me to spell out the interaction between the imperative clause type and the context in terms of a uniform representationalist conception of the contextual settings, which avoids many of the problems discussed in connection with the management and status of additional non-epistemic storage sites (see Sections 2.1.1, 2.2.2, and 2.2.4). I will first argue that performative and descriptive modal verbs should not be distinguished in their semantics; if this is correct, we need a suitable account for performative effects as obtained from propositional semantic objects; once we have an understanding of how this works, the very same factors can be built into the analysis of imperatives (see Section 2.3.1).41 Before I spell out the analysis in detail (see Chapters 3 and 4), I will introduce some general assumptions about speech acts and contextual representations (see Section 2.3.2) and point out a few independent advantages of a propositional treatment of imperatives (see Section 2.3.3).

40 Unless presuppositions in general are considered a dynamic phenomenon independently, an issue I will not take a stance on in this book. In any case, there is nothing specific to the imperative that would require a dynamic treatment. 41 In a footnote, Portner (1997) also suggests that his truth-conditional analysis of imperatives would have to be supplemented along such lines: ‘. . . assigning truth conditions to an imperative might lead one to expect that it could be judged true or false. I believe that the solution to why it cannot be requires a better understanding of the relation between semantics and pragmatics, in particular speech act theory, than we currently have. The same issue arises for indicatives used as performatives, sentences which I would assume to have their normal truth conditions.’ (p. 207, fn. 23). In Portner (2005, 2007), he abandons this strategy and proposes a non-truth conditional analysis for imperatives and, tentatively, performative modal verbs (must).

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2.3.1 Performative and Descriptive Modal Verbs Modal verbs like must/should/have to/. . . and can/may/. . . can either be used to describe the way the world is with respect to all kinds of possibilities and necessities (descriptive usages or descriptive modal verbs), or to change the way the world is in such respects (performative usages or performative modal verbs). The followups in the sentences in (30) disambiguate in favor of a descriptive reading. The sentences are understood as describing what the world is like with respect to what is permitted or commanded. The change on the context they evoke is that of an A SSERTION. (30)

a. b.

You should do the shopping today (as far as I know). Peter may come tomorrow. (The hostess said it was no problem.)

In contrast, (31) can easily be used to bring about an obligation for the addressee to call the speaker, or render it permissible for the addressee to come at 11. In particular, as implied by any standard definition of the speech act types O RDER and P ERMIT, this means that the corresponding modal state of affairs had not obtained before the utterance. (31)

a. b.

You must call me! Okay, you may come at 11. (Are you satisfied now?)

Like imperatives, performative modal verbs seem to lack a truth value: (32)

a. b.

A: You must empty out the trash! B: #No, that’s not true. A. You may take a cookie now. B: #No, that’s not true.

Ninan (2005) claims that deontic English must is always interpreted preformatively when occurring in unembedded position42 and individuates further characteristics of performative modal verbs. In particular, they are infelicitous if the speaker expresses that he does not believe the action will take place (cf. (33)). (33)

Sam must go to confession (#but he is not going to).

his (4)

Again, imperatives behave exactly like performative modal verbs: (34)

Go to confession (#but I know you won’t go).

In view of these similarities in contextual effects and in restrictions, I want to put forth the following hypothesis:

42 Below, I will argue that this is too strong and that one can find instances of descriptive deontic must in main clauses as well.

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59

Hypothesis 2.1 Imperative Semantics (preliminary version) An imperative of the form ‘(S UBJECT ) φ!’ denotes the same object as ‘S UBJECT/you P ERFORMATIVE -M ODAL φ’. This, of course, leaves it open whether it is a performative modal verb of necessity (like performative should) or of possibility (like performative may), or if the quantificational force is underspecified. In the following, I will argue that (in the absence of particular anti-exhaustifiers, see Section 5.3) imperatives are semantically like performative you should-sentences.43 For most speech act types that are observed with imperatives, the imperative could indeed be replaced by an utterance containing a performative modal verb that expresses necessity: (35)

Close the door! ≈ You must/should close the door!

But for a few speech act types that occur with imperatives, a paraphrase containing a performative possibility modal seems more natural. In Section 1.2, I have dubbed this the problem of quantificational inhomogeneity (QIP). Consider in particular P ERMISSIONs/I NVITATIONs (cf. (36a)), C ONCESSIONs (cf. (36b)), and inexhaustive advice (for example-imperatives, cf. (36c)). (36)

a. b. c.

Have another cookie! ? ≈ You may have another cookie. P ERMISSION /I NVITATION Well, then go to that damn party! ??? ≈ You may go to that party then. C ONCESSION Take the A-train, for example. ≈ You can take the A-train, for example. for example-A DVICE

Despite the paraphrases, I don’t think that this should be taken as evidence in favor of ambiguity in quantificational force. Even if clearly weaker than corresponding you must- or you should-sentences, the imperatives feel slightly stronger than the you can- or you may-sentences. In Section 5.1, I will argue that the similarity to possbility modals should better be treated at the level of pragmatics (this view is shared with Wilson and Sperber, 1988; Portner, 2007, 2010).44 For other speech act types, the parallel between the imperative and the corresponding performative you should-declarative is intuitive. I therefore propose to strengthen Hypothesis 2.1 to claiming that imperatives are like performative you should-sentences.45

43

Cf. Grosz (2008b) for a proponent of the underspecification hypothesis with respect to the quantificational force of the modal operator in imperatives.

44

The only exceptions are for example-imperatives which I take to reveal that the semantics assigned in Chapter 3 must not be considered primitive but results from an underlying atomic semantics and an obligatory operation of exhaustification.

45

Note that this is a special version of the you should-reduction discussed by Hamblin (1987); see Section 2.1.2. It is more specific in that I have made explicit that we are dealing with performative you should. Hypothesis 2.2 is meant to take into account only the at-issue content.

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Hypothesis 2.2 Imperative Semantics (final version) An imperative of the form ‘(S UBJECT ) φ!’ denotes the same object as ‘S UBJECT/you should φ’ with performative should. As it stands, we have just reduced one open problem to another, namely: what is the semantics of performative modal verbs? In the literature, we find two strategies. One type of approach interprets performative modal verbs just like descriptive modal verbs. Such an account needs to explain why the corresponding propositions can be self-verifying. The other strategy is to interpret performative modal verbs differently from their descriptive homonyms. This allows one to semantically identify performative modal verbs with the (non-assertive) change they evoke on the contextual settings (e.g. van Rooy, 2000). The generally accepted strategy in the analysis of natural language expressions is to minimize ambiguity. Therefore, a uniform semantics for descriptive and performative modal verbs constitutes the null hypothesis. One of the main arguments against a uniform semantics for descriptive and performative modal verbs consists in their seemingly different behaviour with respect to disjunction (cf. Kamp, 1973; van Rooy, 2000). Apparently, deontic may gives rise to the so-called free choice effect for disjunctions under its performative reading (cf. (37a)), but not under its descriptive reading (cf. (37b)). While (37a) is understood as the conjunction of the two modalized coordinands (either of the disjuncts is an option), (37b) is not (one of the disjuncts is an option, but we don’t know which). (37)

a. b.

You can ask Cécile or you can email to Patrick. → You can ask Cécile. And you can email to Patrick. FC You can ask Cécile or you can email to Patrick, I forgot which. → You can ask Cécile. And you can email to Patrick. no FC

But free choice effects are neither unique to performative usages, nor do they pertain to all of them. Consider epistemic might in (38a) and deontic can in (38b)46 for free choice readings with descriptive modals: (38)

a. b.

She might be in Boston or she might be in New York. descriptive ≈ She might be in Boston, and she might be in NY. FC I checked the rules for paying your ticket. You can pay online or you can pay at the police station. descriptive ≈ You can pay online and you can pay at the police station. FC

For lack of free choice with performative modals see an example with deontic may from Kamp (1978): (39)

46

You may go to Shoal Creek, or you may go to Shingle Creek, but stay away from the dangerous one. → You may go to Shoal Creek, and you may go to Shingle Creek. no FC

Example from Paul Portner (p.c.).

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Consequently, the behavior of free choice disjunction does not provide evidence in favor of a non-uniform approach. The second argument against a uniform treatment rests on the observation that performative modal verbs are confined to main clauses. Therefore, so the story goes, one should conclude that they differ from descriptive modal verbs in that they fail to enter the recursive meaning component.47 The argument is hard to assess, though, as it seems to already presuppose a non-uniform treatment of performative and descriptive modal verbs. Under a semantically uniform treatment, the effect of inducing a change in what is permissible would have to be explained in terms of the interplay of a proposition with particular contextual constellations. But then, we would not expect the very same proposition to enter such an interaction if it occurred in an embedded position. In that sense, the phenomenon is similar to the occurrence of embedded declaratives: it is generally assumed that they encode propositions just like their matrix counterparts. Yet, (40a) (if uttered sincerely and to a perceptive and believing addressee) will change mutual joint belief to include the assumption that it is raining. In contrast, no such change is induced by (40b). Here, an update that it is raining is blocked by the contribution of the matrix clause: the embedded clause itself does not achieve the same effect as the main clause in (40a) would. (40)

a. b.

It is raining. I don’t think that it is raining.

Moreover, if descriptive and performative modal verbs were semantically distinct, one might expect the occurrence of lexical items that come with only one of the two readings.48 At first glance, the deontic version of the English modal must exemplifies an item that has only a performative interpretation when occurring in a main clause (cf. Ninan, 2005; Portner, 2009). Upon closer investigation, this claim has to be challenged on an empirical basis. But even if it were correct it is not quite what we are looking for: Ninan himself points out that deontic must is read descriptively in embedded clauses (e.g. (41)). Moreover, there is also epistemic must which is read descriptively both in main and in embedded clauses (cf. (42)). (41)

John thinks you must close the door.

(42)

a. b.

You must be in your thirties. John thinks that you must be in your thirties.

So, even if main clause deontic must was only ever used performatively, must would not pass as performative modal verb that lacks a descriptive homonym. But deontic must’s putative restriction to performativity in main clauses seems to be a mere 47

‘a truth conditional analysis of imperatives gives rise to the expectation that command and permission sentences can be iterated, or embedded into one another, which in fact seems impossible.’ (van Rooy, 2000:121) 48 That prediction may not arise if the connection were analysed as an instance of regular polysemy. Unfortunately, to this point, I am not aware of a non-uniform treatment that works out the link between descriptive and performative reading.

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tendency anyway.49 In particular, according to-phrases help to trigger descriptive readings of deontic must in main clauses. (43)

According to RFC2182 section 5 you must have at least 3 nameservers, and no more than 7. Having 2 nameservers is also ok by me.50

So, must not only fails to provide evidence in favor of the non-uniform account, it even makes a non-uniform account look quite unattractive. A non-uniform account would have to posit that there is a performative deontic modal must which tends to occur in the absence of overt modification in main clauses, and a descriptive deontic modal must which occurs in combination with modifiers and in embedded position (in addition to descriptive epistemic must). Even if I won’t be able to spell out the details for English must, the uniform account fleshed out in the following promises a far more natural treatment. The idea would be that the parameter settings obligatory for imperatives constitute the default for must, but can be overwritten in embedding constructions or by explicit according to-modifiers. In the absence of convincing arguments in favor of two different interpretations, I assume that the distinction between performative and descriptive modal verbs is pragmatic. There is no semantic distinction between may or have to as occurring in A SSERTIONs and in P ERMISSIONs/O RDERs. Leaving aside complications with epistemic modals (cf. von Fintel and Gillies, 2007, for an overview), the semantics for descriptive modal verbs is generally taken to be propositional: that is, it outputs a proposition when all arguments (but the world argument) are filled. In cases of performative modal verbs, the proposition expressed by the clause can be used for commanding or permitting. It is the task of pragmatics to explain how this happens. Hypothesis 2.3 Performative and Descriptive Modal Verbs Modal verbs can be used performatively and descriptively and always denote the same sort of semantic object, namely (the curried version of) a function from a series of arguments to a proposition. Hypothesis 2.3 in combination with Hypothesis 2.2 yields what Hamblin (1987) labelled the you should-reduction. Hypothesis 2.4 you should-reduction A imperative ‘(S UBJECT ) φ!’ expresses the same proposition as ‘S UBJECT / you should φ’.

49

Counter-examples to Ninan’s generalization were first pointed out to me by Jonathan Shaheen (p.c.) and Craige Roberts (p.c.). 50 www.intodns.com/cpaneldnscluster.com. I am indebted to Lisa Matthewson (p.c.) for pointing out that this sequence may still feel contradictory, partly because of the also. Yet, it becomes acceptable if the second sentences is replaced with But having 2 nameservers is ok as far as I am concerned. This modified example can still be used to make the same point.

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But in contrast to modal verbs, imperatives can only be used performatively. I suggest that they carry an additional meaning component that confines them to usage in contexts where a corresponding modalized declarative would be used performatively. In order to establish the content of that additional meaning component, we only have to understand what contextual factors give rise to performative usages of modal verbs. In particular, why is it that a modalized proposition can be self-verifying? I think that a crucial property shared by the respective utterance contexts is that the participants in the conversation agree that the speaker cannot be mistaken about the modality in question. This can be either because it is up to the speaker herself to order, to command, to permit, etc., or because the speaker is considered an expert on the issue under discussion (e.g. when asked for advice). The specific nature of the speaker’s privileged position will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.2, together with further contextual properties that prove relevant for the performative effect. By giving rise to non-assertoric speech acts, the described constellations are also responsible for the unacceptability of follow-ups like that’s not true, you won’t do it or I don’t want you to do it, although the details are more complicated than what is generally assumed (see Section 4.3 for a tentative characterization). Now, modal verbs can very well occur in contexts that do not meet the characteristics we will single out as decisive for performative effects. In that case, they are used descriptively. If in contrast imperatives can never be used descriptively, we can take this to mean that they can never occur in contexts that do not meet these characteristics (that is, in contexts that would give rise to a descriptive effect of the modalized proposition). Technically, I will argue that the imperative carries as presuppositions the properties a context has to have in order to allow for a performative interpretation of a modal verb. Therefore, with imperatives, instead of descriptive usages we obtain presupposition failures. To sum up, the core of my proposal for imperatives consists of the following assumptions: • Performatively and descriptively used modal verbs correspond to the same semantic object, and (after argument saturation) yield propositions. • Modal verbs give rise to performative effects if particular contextual constellations hold. • Imperatives (i) denote the same propositional object as sentences of the form You should φ, that is, they are of type <s,t>, and (ii) they come with an additional presuppositional meaning component that constrains them to usage in contexts in which a modalized declarative of the form You must/should φ would achieve a non-assertoric, performative effect; that is, imperatives cannot be felicitously interpreted in a context where the corresponding declarative would achieve a descriptive reading.51

51 Modulo differences that might be caused by the fact that presuppositions can trigger accomodation.

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So far, we have only dealt with the most straightforward cases of performative modal verbs. O RDERs or P ERMISSIONs are such that the very state of obligations that is described by the proposition changes the moment the sentence is uttered. Yet, no such change is required by the conditions I imposed on contexts for performative use. This is in line with the observations by Ninan (2005) and Portner (2009) that the unacceptability of follow-ups like you won’t do it, which they argue to be indicative of performativity, carries over to speech act types like A DVICE where there is no change in what is optimal/possible. Again, imperatives behave in an entirely parallel manner; in (44), while both B and B’ express that taking the A-train is the best means to get to Harlem, neither of them induces any change in what is optimal with respect to A’s goal of getting to Harlem: (44)

A: How do I get to Harlem? B: To get to Harlem, you should take the A-train. B’: To get to Harlem, take the A-train.

Therefore, cases like C OMMANDs and P ERMISSIONs, where we see an actual change in what is necessary/permissible, are not the only ones in which modalized propositions are used in a not merely descriptive way. Portner (2009) explicitly draws the distinction between modal verbs that are used for A SSERTIONs (that is, merely descriptively), and modal verbs that are used for another speech act instead or on top of an A SSERTION. As an advocate of a non-uniform account, Portner is interested in defining a (lexical) class of modal verbs, and not a class of usages of modal verbs: I refer to a modal as ‘performative’ if, by virtue of its conventional meaning, it causes the utterance of a declarative sentence to perform a speech act in addition to, or instead of, the act of assertion which is normally associated with declarative clauses. (Portner, 2009:136)

On my semantically uniform understanding, the definitions have to be adapted as follows: ‘descriptive’ means ‘used in an assertion (or a question) about the state of modal affairs’, whereas ‘performative’ means ‘used for a non-assertoric speech act’ (confining attention to direct speech acts).52 In Section 3.1, I will introduce Kratzer’s semantics for modality in possible worlds semantics. In her account, modal verbs are context-dependent; for example, it is a covert contextual parameter that specifies whether must is to be read deontically or epistemically. I will show how this context dependence can be used to predict the entire range of speech act types found with imperatives (functional inhomogeneity problem, FIP, cf. Issue 1.2), how the contextual constellation influences which speech act type is realized by a particular utterance (the problem of assigning speech acts to utterances, ASA, cf. Issue 1.4), and why the presuppositional meaning component together with default assumptions about utterance contexts provides a solution to the problem of clause type encoding (CTE, cf. Issue 1.1).

52 Consequently, for Portner, the only modal verb that qualifies as performative (in his sense) is must, if Ninan were right in assuming that all its main clause appearances were non-assertive. In contrast, for me, most deontic modal verbs can be both descriptive and performative.

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2.3.2 Updates and Speech Acts At this point, I want to briefly reflect on the conception of the interface between semantic object and speech act type that emerges from the assumptions spelled out in Section 2.3.1. The underlying effect of an imperative is obtained from a proposition that updates the common ground. Therefore, one might be tempted to call it an assertoric treatment. But the terminology is misleading. I agree that it is an assertoric treatment in Stalnaker’s (1978) more technical sense of assertion. But I would like to follow Gazdar (1981) and assume that no A SSERTION (that is, no speech act of asserting) has to be intended, executed, and recognized, in order for performatively used modals (or imperatives, in my case) to obtain the effect of an O RDER, a C OMMAND , a P ERMISSION, etc. (contra, for example Bach and Harnish, 1979). Nevertheless, I assume that such a recognition of a primary speech act is crucial for what is generally called an indirect speech act. A typical example is an A SSERTION of I am cold that additionally works as an O RDER to close the window (see Section 1.1.3). But as I argued above, this happens exactly because the assertive act is intended, executed, and recognized. In terms of speech act types as descriptive categories of context transitions, the changes corresponding to imperative utterances meet the categories of C OMMAND or of P ERMISSION, of W ISH, etc., but (not necessarily) that of A SSERTION.53 As I am not assuming that there is a separate speech act-related layer in the linguistic object, their semantic interpretations as such have to determine the respective speech act types in interaction with the contextual settings. To allow for this, I introduce a pre-speech act theoretic notion of adding a semantic object to the context of the conversation. Depending on the logical type of the object, if successful, this results in adding it to CG (for propositions) or in partitioning the context set (for interrogatives, which can be construed as indexdependent propositions, cf. Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1984).54 I assume that this process corresponds to an update function J that specifies how semantic objects are integrated in the course of the conversation if accepted. J can be sketched as follows55 : (45)

J is a function from objects of type s, t or s, st and an input context c to a maximally similar output context c, s.t.

53

I don’t want to take a stance as to whether there are speech acts that can be executed with imperatives, yet would also meet all the criteria of an A SSERTION (A DVICE being an example in question). If this is so, a speech act theory should label a transition by the strongest label(s) such that the corresponding speech act(s) is/are intentionally executed and recognized as such. 54

Note that adding a linguistic object to CG already satisfies some of the transitional characteristics of an A SSERTION. At the same time, it can already be a stronger effect: in Section 1.4 I have described a successful A SSERTION as requiring only that it becomes mutual joint belief that the speaker believes the proposition asserted, not that the proposition itself becomes mutual joint belief. 55 For a technical representation of what it means for an information state to be partitioned, cf. Groenendijk and Roelofsen (2009).

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a.

b.

 if all presuppositions of p(or q) are satisfied, and if (CG(c)∪{ p}) = ∅ for p ∈ Dst , then c = c modulo CG(c ) = CG(c) ∪ { p}(or CG(c ) is partitioned by q ∈ D<s, st> ) otherwise, try to accommodate presuppositions (Stalnaker, 2002) and apply J to p/q and c as resulting from accommodation.

As it stands, J takes care of declaratives, imperatives, and interrogatives.56 Leaving it deliberately vague, I add the following pragmatic principle. (46)

A cooperative addressee will always act on the presumption that the context has changed from c to J (c E )(c) unless he has good reasons not to.

To get back to the notion of speech act types, we can spell out the following requirement on a theory of speech acts: (47)

A theory of speech acts assigns a speech act type to each triple such that J (c E )(c) = c , where c E is the linguistic object expressed in an intermediate context c, which is maximally equivalent to c with cT < cT < cT .

The properties of pre-, post- and intermediate contexts allow us to determine the type of speech act that is taking place. Crucially, in contrast to most approaches that focus only on the propositional information that is expressed by the sentences under consideration, I will also take into account that the worlds in the context set have to reflect what are taken to be future courses of the ongoing conversation. In particular, the participants will often hold it possible that the other person may say something and thereby execute a particular speech act. At the same time, the occurrence of other speech acts may be excluded by mututal joint belief. For example, if I am talking to my boss, it may be the case that we both exclude that I will tell him to proof-read my manuscript, while we consider possible that I will ask him to do so, or that he tells me to proof-read his manuscript. These meta-linguistic facts will play a role in the derivation of the self-verifying effect to be observed with many performative utterances. The rest of the book is devoted mostly to spelling out the details for standard main clause imperatives, as well as for imperatives occurring in non-canonical constructions and with non-canonical readings. Chapter 5 takes special care of imperatives that seem associated with possibility readings. Before I go into that, I will provide some independent motivation for my analysis in terms of modalized propositions (see Sections 2.3.3.1, 2.3.3.2, and 2.3.3.3). It turns out that equating imperatives and declaratives at the level of logical type makes not only the traditionally dreaded prediction that imperatives have truth values, but also provides straightforward explanations for a couple of phenomena to be observed with imperatives.

56 If further clause types (e.g. exclamatives) correspond to further logical types, the account has to be enriched (but see Portner and Zanuttini, 1999, and Roguska, 2005, for two recent approaches that both assign uniform logical types to interrogatives and exclamatives).

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2.3.3 Imperatives and Declaratives on a Par A good deal of the literature on imperatives takes as its starting point that imperatives and declaratives are fundamentally different, and that therefore a treatment that assimilates them to each other has to be considered an unfavorable stopgap. In this section, I will present a couple of phenomena that provide independent evidence in favor of the analysis I am proposing.

2.3.3.1 Imperatives as Semantic Answers The first argument in favor of a propositional semantics for imperatives comes from the theory of logical types. It is largely taken as favorable that the major clause types of declaratives, interrogatives and imperatives should correspond to distinct semantic types respectively. For example, according to Hausser (1980) and Portner (2005, 2007), declaratives correspond to propositions <s,t>, interrogatives correspond to sets of propositions <s,<st,t>> (or index-dependent propositions <s,st>), and imperatives correspond to properties <s,et> (see Section 2.2.4 for discussion). If we take a look at the literature on interrogatives, what is generally considered fruitful in order to understand them is their relation to answers (Hamblin, 1958), or more specifically true answers (Karttunen, 1977; Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1984). This makes the type of interrogatives dependent on the type of declaratives. But upon closer inspection, pairs of questions and answers as constituted by interrogatives and declaratives (cf. (48)) are paralleled by cases in which imperatives answer questions (cf. (49)). (48)

a. b.

(49)

a. b.

Q: Is it raining? A: Yes, it is raining. Q: Who came to the party? A: Verena, Magda and Hong came to the party. Q: What shall I do tonight? A: Go to the movies. Q: How do I get to Mannheim? A: Take the train.

It is quite clear that (49) are not just instances of constituent answers like the ones in (50). This can be shown by cases involving overt subjects (51a) and negation (51b), as well as by examples from languages that mark imperatives unambiguously, e.g. German as in (52). (50)

A: What will you do? B: Call him, (what else).

(51)

a. b.

Q: Which of us shall go to this reception? A: YOU go to the reception. Q: Should I go to the reception? A: Don’t go.

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a.

b.

Q: Was soll ich machen? what should I do ‘What should I do?’ A: Ruf deine Schwester an! call.I MP S G your sister VP RT ‘Call your sister!’

One might be tempted to argue that these are just instances of the pragmatic resolutions of questions. But this is a position there is little evidence for. Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984:222–226) distinguish semantically and pragmatically resolving answers as follows. For them, an interrogative q like Who came? denotes a relation on the set of possible worlds, cf. (53a). Therefore, it induces a partition on any information state S (set of possible worlds), written S/q, cf. (53b). (53)

a. b.

λw.λv.[λx.came(x)(w) = λx.came(x)(v)]. S/q := {[w]q | w ∈ S}, where [w]q = {v ∈ S | q(w)(v)}

Their notion of a semantic answer is given in (54): (54)

A proposition p is a semantic answer to an interrogative q iff p ∈ W/q (where W is the set of all possible worlds).

Pragmatic answers depend on an information state J ⊆ W and are defined as answers given by a proposition in that particular information state: (55)

a. b.

An information state S offers an answer for an interrogative q iff S/q = {S}. A proposition p gives an answer to an interrogative q in an information state S iff S ∩ p offers an answer.

Semantic and pragmatic answers to interrogatives differ in whether they depend on particular information states. For a pragmatic answer that is not also a semantic answer, it should be possible to find an information state with respect to which it does not answer the interrogative. For example, (56b) does not constitute a semantic answer to (56a) (that is, (56b) ∈ W /(56a)), but it gives an answer to this interrogative in an information state S ⊂ W that already entails that John won’t come to the party if it is raining. If no such relation is presupposed (or can be accommodated), the sequence in (56) results in infelicity. In such a case, the answer sounds incoherent and can be rejected along the lines of That’s not what I was asking you./So what?/. . . . In contrast, it is impossible to set up an information state that allows such a rejection for a semantic answer like (56c). (56)

a. b. c.

Will John come to the party? It’s raining. No, he won’t.

Going back to the imperative answers, we find that they behave like semantic answers. Independently of the context of the conversation, they give an answer to

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the interrogative. Rejections by That’s not what I was asking you/So what?/. . . are invariably infelicitous. If we do not want to assume that the corresponding interrogatives are ambiguous between a declarative related and an imperative related reading, the most straightforward explanation treats the corresponding imperatives and declaratives as expressing the same semantic object (i.e., the same proposition). In contrast to this obvious parallelism between declaratives and imperatives, other interrogatives can never semantically resolve questions. Interrogatives can pragmatically resolve a pending question when used as rhetorical questions (cf. (57)), and can provide the addressee with a strategy to resolve a pending question when used as information questions (cf. (58)). (57)

Q: Who came to the party? A: Who could possibly have wanted to go there?

(58)

Q: Who is the murderer? A: Who left the house last?

Considering the ability to semantically resolve questions, imperatives and declaratives pattern together and behave differently from interrogatives. Relatedly, we can compare the ability of particular objects to give rise to a stable or unstable state of the discourse. Krifka (2001) remarks that A SSERTIONs (as performed by uttering declaratives) lead to stable information states, while Q UESTIONs (as performed by uttering interrogatives) lead to an unstable state that requires resolution (by answering the question).57 Imperatives are claimed to likewise lead to an unstable discourse context, but this time to one that has to be resolved by action. Yet, this is not always correct: uttering an imperative can also maintain a stable discourse state (e.g. when used as a W ISH), or resolve an instable discourse state (e.g. when answering a Q UESTION ). In that sense, imperatives are again a lot like declaratives. 2.3.3.2 Insincere Imperatives Another respect in which imperatives pattern with declaratives is insincerity proper. It has often been argued that lying with an imperative would amount to commanding an action one does not want the addressee to realize. This could for example be useful in a scenario where the speaker already knows that the addressee will do the exact opposite of what he is told to do (cf. Hamblin, 1987). Apart from such rather marginal cases, I would like to point out that, after all, imperatives also allow for much simpler cases of insincerity proper, namely for trying to make the addressee believe something that is known to the speaker to be incorrect. Consider the exchange in (59).

57 Note that this is similar to the distinction between inquisitive and non-inquisitive semantic denotata as drawn in inquisitive semantics, cf. Groenendijk and Roelofsen (2009).

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A. How do I get to Harlem? S: To go to Harlem, take the B train. S’: To go to Harlem, it is best to take the B train.

By now we all know that going to Harlem requires taking the A-train. Let’s assume that participant S does as well. Nevertheless, for whatever reason she utters the imperative in S. This utterance has to be considered just as much of a lie as an alternative declarative utterance S’. The analysis of imperatives as expressing what is necessary/best to achieve a goal (and thus giving information proper) allows for a straightforward explanation of the phenomenon. In contrast to imperatives and declaratives, interrogatives can’t be used insincerely in a similar way. We could construe scenarios where the speaker does not want the addressee to answer the question. But this is closer to Hamblin’s (1987) scenario for improperly used imperatives and has little in common with the insincerity involved in an information exchange like (59). 2.3.3.3 Imperatives and Rhetorical Questions Last but not least, I would like to draw attention to a phenomenon that might at first glance look threatening to the individuation of imperatives as clause types. The main criterion for constituting a form type in a clause type system of a language is incompatibility with the formation of other clause types (cf. Sadock and Zwicky, 1985). It has often been argued that imperative clause types (taken to be marked by the imperativized verb in many languages) are incompatible with question formation. A straightforward argument for German would be that the imperative in (60a) cannot be paired with a wh-question as in (60b). (60)

a.

b.

deine Schwester an! Ruf VP RT call.I MP S G your sister ‘Call your sister!’ ∗ Wen ruf an? who call.I MP S G VP RT

But a first investigation of the data suggests that this grammaticality judgment only pertains to a use of (60b) as an information-seeking question.58 Apparently, wh-questions with German imperativized verbs are fully acceptable as rhetorical questions. Consider the following contexts: (61)

(speaking to a child who is carrying around a flower pot he should actually be able to put into the right place):

58 The data was first tested informally on 10 native speakers of German. Only one of them disagreed with my judgment. Kaufmann and Poschmann (2011) discuss an experimental survey that confirms this contrast.

2.3

Modalized Propositions: Idea and Motivation

a.

(62)

71

Na komm, den du weißt es doch. Wo stell DP RT come.I MP S G, you know it DP RT . Where put.I MP S G the Blumentopf hin? flower-pot VP RT ‘Come on, you know it. Where do you have to put the flower pot?’

(There are a few books one could read for the exam. The professor would be able to tell from the answers which book a student had studied. The authors are Mayer, Müller, and Schmidt. Schmidt’s book contains a couple of mistakes, but he has just written an article together with the professor the addressee wants to take the exam with; Müller’s book is quite good, but a bit expensive. Mayer’s book is actually quite good, but the addressee’s professor is known to hate him. After elaborating on all this, the speaker asks the addressee:) auf keinen Fall? a. Also was lies case so what read.I MP S G in no ‘So whose book is it that you really shouldn’t read?’

In the informal survey, nine out of ten informants answered straightforwardly that it was the book by Mayer that shouldn’t be read for the exam. None of them minded the imperative, not even when asked about salient grammatical features. Does this force us to conclude that German does not have imperatives? I would not say so. The lesson to be learnt is rather that imperativized verbs need not automatically and independently of all other factors determine the clause type to be imperative. Semantically, the interpretation of the imperative morphology contributes to a modalized proposition that is not in itself incompatible with question formation (cf. Reis and Rosengren, 1992) for independent syntactic arguments that the Vorfeld-position in imperatives should not be assumed to be marked as [-wh]).59 In this respect, it behaves exactly like its modal verb counterpart should. (63)

a.

b.

Wo sollst du den Blumentopf hinstellen? where should you the flower-pot put ‘Where should you put the flower pot?’ Wo stell den Blumentopf hin? where put.I MP S G the flower-pot VP RT ? roughly: ‘(Come on, you know this:) where is it that you should put the flower pot?’

59 The data I am concerned with in this section should not be confused with the wh-imperatives Reis and Rosengren (1992) consider. They are concerned with imperative clauses that contain a wh-item in preverbal position which has been moved there out of an embedded interrogative.

(i)

mir [ ti hat Maria ti gesehen.]] [ Weni sag who tell.I MP S G me has Maria seen ‘Tell me who Mary saw.’

In cases like (i), the matrix clause is unambiguously typed as an imperative.

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In Section 4.2.2 I claim that the imperativized verb triggers the presupposition that the speaker is an (epistemic) authority on the issue in question (see Section 2.3.1 above for an informal introduction of the idea). Consequently, the speaker cannot possibly lack information about the matter. Therefore, if the presuppositions induced by the imperativized verb are met for (63b), the speaker has perfect knowledge about where the addressee is to put the flower pot, and this also constitutes mutual joint belief. But this is just the prototypical constellation for an interrogative to be used as a rhetorical question (cf. Truckenbrodt, 2004, for an overview of question types). In contrast to that, the overt necessity modal sollst ‘should’ in (63a) lacks an authority presupposition. Consequently, it can easily be used in contexts where the speaker lacks knowledge about the desired positioning of the flower pot. But note that, if (63a) is used as an information-seeking question, it requires that the source of the obligation is either different from the speaker, or that the obligation is speaker based, but that he has in the meantime forgotten about it. As soon as we try to interpret should with respect to the speaker’s interests and assume that he himself is perfectly aware of these, we are constrained to the same rhetorical interpretation as for (63b). So far, I haven’t had the opportunity to test further languages for the possibility of forming rhetorical questions with imperativized verbs.60 Yet, I am confident that data like that discussed in this section will shed light on the question of how (if at all) clause types are marked in syntax.

60 Marina Stoyanova (p.c.) points out that the same phenomenon seems to be available in Bulgarian. But in contrast to questions formed with declarative verbs, the wh-phrases have to remain in situ in these cases. Whatever syntactic mechanism is responsible for that restriction may have interesting connections with the encoding of speaker authority.

Chapter 3

Imperatives as Graded Modals

In this chapter, I will work out the idea developed and motivated in Section 2.3 that imperatives express modalized propositions. To carry out the program of assimilating imperatives to modal verbs, I rely on a version of Kratzer’s semantics for modality in possible worlds semantics, which will be introduced in Section 3.1.1 This framework constitutes the standard approach to modality in linguistic semantics; its merits and faults are therefore well known. Apart from these opportunistic considerations, the framework promises to be particularly useful because it is explicitly designed to explain the interaction of modal elements with the utterance context. In view of the large variety of functions we found with imperatives that seemed to have little of a uniform semantic and hardly a uniform speech act-theoretic core, this makes the framework highly attractive for our enterprise. In Chapter 3, the framework will be applied to derive the propositional at-issue content of imperatives from the underlying syntactic structure. The resulting at-issue content will be enriched by an additional presuppositional meaning component in Chapter 4 to account for the behavior of imperatives at the semantics-pragmatics interface.

3.1 Modality in Possible Worlds Semantics In this section, I will give an introduction to Kratzer’s treatment of modality, which can be skipped by anyone already familiar with the framework. Section 3.1.1 discusses the basic idea of context dependence, Section 3.1.2 introduces the distinction between personal and impersonal modality as well as tests to distinguish between the two. Finally, Section 3.1.3 presents the refined version of the basic framework, which is needed to deal with different strengths of modal expressions as well as inconsistent backgrounds and practical inferencing in cases of conflict. The propositional analysis of imperatives I would like to propose requires the refined notion, i.e. graded modality.

1

Cf. Kratzer (1977, 1978, 1981, 1991b). For influential antecedents cf. Lewis (1973), van Fraassen (1973).

M. Kaufmann, Interpreting Imperatives, Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy 88, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012 DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-2269-9_3, 

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3.1.1 Simple Modality The basic idea of the framework goes back to Kratzer (1978). Modal elements like müssen ‘must’, können ‘can’, notwendigerweise ‘necessarily’ etc., display a wide range of meanings. (1)

a.

b.

Cécile kann in Berlin sein. Cécile may in Berlin be ‘Cécile may be in Berlin.’ Melli kann Rad fahren. Melli can bike ride ‘Melli can ride a bike.’

While the first sentence expresses the possibility that a friend of mine is in Berlin at the moment, the second ascribes a certain ability to another friend of mine. We can get rid of the apparent ambiguity of a modal verb like können by assuming that the meaning of modal elements depends on two parameters. One of them is called modal force and is specified to either necessity or possibility in the lexical entry. The other parameter is called modal base.2 It comes in as a (mostly covert) argument of the modal verb3 and is a function that assigns to a particular world all (relevant) propositions describing the relevant background for a particular modal flavor. Their intersection constitutes the set of worlds with respect to which necessity (entailment) and possibility (compatibility) are computed. Its value (e.g. what the law says for a deontic background, what we know for an epistemic background, etc.) is supplied by the utterance context. Technically, the modal base is a function from worlds into sets of propositions (type <s,<st,t>>). More generally, such functions are called conversational backgrounds. Modal verbs combine with a modal base and a proposition to give a proposition (they are of type <<s,<st,t>>,<st,st>>). The entries for the English modal verbs must and can can then be given as in (2). (2)

a. b.

mustc = λ f λpλw.(∀v ∈ ∩ f (w))[v ∈ p] canc = λ f λpλw.(∃v ∈ ∩ f (w))[v ∈ p]

Under very general assumptions about the syntax of the construction (cf. Heim and von Fintel, 2007), we can apply this to a simple example.4 The modal base is introduced by a covert pronoun f whose interpretation depends on the utterance context

2

It does the work of the accessibility relation in modal logic (cf. Kripke, 1963).

3

This is a standard assumption of more recent applications (e.g. Heim and von Fintel, 2007; von Fintel and Iatridou, 2005; von Stechow, 2004), but it deviates from the original formulation. Kratzer (1978) treats the modal base as a parameter to the interpretation function, not as an argument of the modal verb.

4 When more details are needed in the following, I rely on a feature-based version of generative grammar (the basic idea goes back to Chomsky, 1995; Sternefeld, 2006 for an introduction). My application to temporal and aspectual phenomena follows von Stechow (2002a, 2003).

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c, in particular, the assignment cG it determines (see Section 1.4). To obtain the circumstantial reading for the modal verb, we assume that the pronoun refers to the conversational background with respect to the relevant circumstances, cf. (3):5 (3)

a. b.

Verena can go to Mannheim. XP X

VP

X MB

c.

Verena go to Mannheim can f can(f)(Verena go to Mannheim)c (w) = 1 iff (∃w ∈ ∩ f (w))[Verena goes to Mannheim in w  ], where f (= cG (f)) = what the relevant circumstances are. For a scenario that verifies the sentence, assume for example that f (w) = { p, ¬ p → q}, where p = Verena’s car is repaired, q = Verena stays in Frankfurt.

I follow Kratzer (1986) in distinguishing the following types of conversational backgrounds (recently, they are sometimes called modal flavors): a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i.

epistemic: what I know, what we know, what Ede knows, . . . circumstantial: the relevant facts, . . . dispositional6 : Joost’s dispositions, the program code of Emacs,. . . physical: the laws of nature, . . . deontic: what the law says, God’s will, . . . doxastic: what I believe, what people say, what Rick believes, . . . teleological: our tasks, . . . buletic: what I want, what Marina wants, . . . stereotypical: the normal course of events, . . .

Conversational backgrounds correspond to the accessibility relations of modal logic7 and can consequently be distinguished according to the algebraic properties

5

To improve readability, the value the variable assignment function cG assigns to a free variable will often be written as the italicized counterpart of the variable in the object language. E.g., fc = cG (f) = f . 6 The treatment of dispositional modality along the lines of the other modal flavors is controversial. Consider e.g. Thomason (2003) for problems. 7 For any f : W → P (P (W )), there is an accessibility relation R ⊆ W × W , such that for any f u, v ∈ W , < u, v >∈ R f iff v ∈ ∩ f (u), and vice versa. Conversational backgrounds are more fine-grained though; each accessibility relation can be described by infinitely many conversational backgrounds.

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of relations (for a detailed study of accessibility relations and modal operators, cf. van Benthem, 1984a). A special case is the empty conversational background: j. The empty conversational background is the function cbemp :W → P(P(W )), such that for all w ∈ W : cbemp (w)= ∅. This function will be useful for technical purposes (see Chapter 4).

3.1.2 Personal and Impersonal Conversational Backgrounds Recent treatments within Kratzer’s framework sometimes take into account a distinction between personal and impersonal modal bases, giving rise to a distinction of personal vs. impersonal modality (for discussion, cf. von Stechow, 2004; Hacquard, 2000; Nauze, 2008; Portner, 2009). To a large extent, the relevant semantic considerations go hand in hand with the syntactic question of whether modal verbs are control or raising verbs, or rather, which ones belong to which class (cf. Brennan, 1993; Bhatt, 1999; Wurmbrand, 1999). I will mostly focus on the better studied syntactic side of the distinction. Depending on their modal base, modals like must and can sometimes behave like raising constructions (cf. (4a)) (e.g. on an epistemic reading), and sometimes like control constructions (cf. (4b)) (e.g. on a dispositional reading). For deontic cases, matters are still under dispute.8 (4)

a.

S NP the weatheri

XP X

VP

X MB ti be nice can f17

8

Brennan (1993) argues that with deontic modals, the subject can either be the bearer of the obligation (ought to do, e.g. (ia)), but it need not be so (ought to be, e.g. (ib)). She assumes this distinction to correspond to the one of control vs. raising. (i)

a. b.

You must register or else you’ll get kicked out. Thesis paper must be acid-free.

Bhatt (1999) and Wurmbrand (1999) argue that all deontic modals are raising constructions. Nevertheless, they don’t prove convincingly that no deontic modals are control constructions (cf. Portner, 2009).

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b.

77

S XP

NP Eric

X

VP

X MB play the guitar can f18 In the following, I will revisit a few arguments to distinguish control and raising constructions. First, German raising constructions are known to (marginally) allow for topicalization of the VP together with the subject (cf. (5a)), but control constructions do not (cf. (5b)); cf. Haider (1995). (5)

a.

b.

Ein Außenseiter gewonnen hat hier noch nie. an outsider won.PART has here still never ‘It has never been the case so far that an outsider has won here.’ ∗ Ein Außenseiter zu gewinnen verlangte hier noch nie. an outsider to win.I NF requested here still never ‘It has never been the case so far that an outsider has requested to win here.’

Können ‘can’ can now be shown to pattern with (5a) on an epistemic reading, while patterning with (5b) on its dispositional reading. (6)

a.

b.

Ein Außenseiter gewinnen kann hier wohl nicht. an outsider win.I NF can here DP RT not ‘It is impossible that an outsider wins here.’ ∗ Eric Gitarre spielen kann nicht. E. guitar play.I NF can not

Second, quantifiers in the subject position of raising verbs allow for either wide or narrow scope constructions, whereas quantifiers in the subject position of control constructions only allow for wide scope construal. (7)

a. b.

A dog seems to be in the garden. R1: ∃ > SEEM; R2: SEEM > ∃ A dog tries to be in the garden. ∃ > TRY; ∗ TRY > ∃

ambiguous unambiguous

Again, epistemically-read modals pattern with raising verbs in allowing for wide or narrow scope construal of quantifiers in subject position, while dispositionally read modals do not allow for narrow scope construals and thus pattern with control verbs:9 9 Epistemic vs. dispositional are the preferred readings for the given cases. My discussion is confined to these two interpretations as favored by the choice of the lexical material respectively.

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a. b.

A dog may be in the garden. R1: ∃ > MAY; R2: MAY > ∃ A dog can play the saxophone. ∃ > CAN; ∗ CAN > ∃

ambiguous unambiguous

Maybe the difference is to be seen most clearly with cases that yield contradictory readings under wide scope construal for the quantifier. While the epistemic interpretation of the modal allows both for a contradictory wide scope construal and a sensible narrow scope construal, the dispositional interpretation of the modal only allows for a contradictory reading. (9)

Keiner kann schwimmen und alle können schwimmen. no-one can swim and everyone can swim epistemic.NS: ‘In view of what we know, it is possible that no one swims and, in view of what we know, it is possible that all swim.’ epistemic.WS: # ‘In view of what we know, for no one is it possible that he swims and in view of what we know, for everyone is it possible that he swims.’ dispositional.WS: # ‘For no one is it possible that according to his dispositions he swims and for everyone is it possible that according to his dispositions he swims.’

So far, our semantics only accounts for the raising cases. In order to capture the control cases as well, we have to allow for lexical ambiguity of the modal verbs between proposition-embedding variants (as we have been looking at so far), and property-embedding variants. The control variant of can could look like (10). (10)

(preliminary) canc = λ f λPs,e,t λxλw.(∃w ∈ ∩ f (w))[w  ∈ P(x)]

For an example like (4b) we could assume f = what Eric’s abilities are. But intuitively this does not seem to extend to cases involving quantified subjects (e.g. (11a)). Nobody takes wide scope w.r.t. the possibility modal, and the conversational background seems to vary with the value picked for the subject as indicated in (11b). (11)

a. b.

Nobody can play the guitar. For no x: there is a world w [in which x has the same abilities as in the actual world] and x plays the guitar in w.

Ede Zimmermann (p.c.) argues that we can indeed show that conversational backgrounds have to somehow be accessible to quantification. Yet, (11a) is not sufficient to do so. Instead of my rendering in (11b), we could try to make do with f = what people’s abilities are. This makes (11a) come out as in (12): (12)

For no x: there is a world w [in which people have the same abilities as in the actual world] and x plays the guitar in w.

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In an email10 to Angelika Kratzer, Zimmermann provides a more convincing argument that conversational backgrounds be susceptible to quantification. Consider (13a) as describing the scenario in (13b): (13)

a.

b.

Genau zwei Kinder sollen gewinnen. exactly two children should win ‘Exactly two children should win.’ Assume a set of pairwise unrelated children all of whose parents are very ambitious with respect to their sons’ and daughters’ success in sports. Two of the children, namely Hans and Fritz, are good sprinters. Both Hans’s and Fritz’s parents want by all means that their son win the 100 m sprint. The other children are specialized in other disciplines, consequently their parents do not care so much about the 100 m sprint.

Intuitively, (13a) is true in the given scenario if sollen is understood deontically with respect to the wish of some of the parents. But this can’t be a group that includes Fritz’s and Hans’s parents, because at least their wishes are mutually inconsistent (Fritz’s parents want Fritz to win, and Hans’s parents want Hans to win). From this inconsistent background it does not follow that exactly two children win.11 Somehow, the wishes of the parents have to be considered separately. Hence, for these cases, conversational backgrounds have to be accessible to quantification. Now, the straightforward idea may be to capture this in terms of quantification into conversational backgrounds (i.e., Quantifierx [ . . . what x’s parents’ want . . . ]). This relies on a personal conversational background (‘λwλxe λpst .x’s parents want p in w’). But this is not the only possibility. The example in (13a) could also be dealt with in terms of existential quantification over modal bases of a particular (contextually salient) kind (here, some parents’ will). (14)

z)(w) & (∃2 ! x)[child(x)(w) & ∃ f ∃y∃z[child(z)(w) & parents(y,  f (w))[win(x)(w  )]]] f = y’s will & (∀w ∈

If for each of the x, z = x, we obtain the reading that is true in the scenario (13b). Therefore, it is hard to see whether we need an independent construal in terms of quantification into conversational backgrounds or if all apparent such cases should

10

Dating from December 11th, 2003. Under the analysis in terms of simple modality, the set of accessible worlds is empty, hence, the sentence is trivially true just like the (intuitively) false (i): 11

(i)

Exactly three children should win.

The revised version of Kratzer’s framework, graded modality (see Section 3.1.3), is designed to make correct predictions for inconsistent conversational backgrounds. Nevertheless, for the described joint (inconsistent) parental will, it predicts that in all accessible worlds someone wins (either Hans or Fritz). It does not predict that at all accessible worlds there are exactly two children who win. But this would be required by a paraphrase like ‘there are exactly two children such that in all worlds accessible according to the relevant parental will, these two children win’.

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be dealt with in terms of quantification over conversational backgrounds (here, existential closure would suffice). Two observations speak in favor of quantification into (and not just over) conversational backgrounds. First, one can quantify into overt indicators of modal bases as in (15). (15)

Genau zwei Kinder sollen ihren Eltern zufolge gewinnen. exactly two children shall their parents according-to win.I NF ‘Exactly two children shall win according to their parents.’

Second, the corresponding readings seem confined to those modals that have been proposed to be control verbs (at least on some of their occurrences). Variation of the conversational background dependent on the quantifier is possible for the deontically read sollen. In contrast, können in (16) is read epistemically (thanks to the perfect infinitive) and does not allow for the conversational background to vary with the subject. (16)

Genau zwei Kinder können gewonnen haben. exactly two children can won have ‘Exactly two children may have won.’

(16) requires one modal base f such that there are exactly two children x such that x has won is compatible with the worlds that verify what is known by the relevant attitude subject.12 I conclude that it is hard to come up with convincing arguments in favor of the existence of personal conversational backgrounds. Yet, I take the observations discussed in the last paragraph as evidence that there is a good chance we need both personal and impersonal conversational backgrounds. On their control verb construal, modal verbs can then be assumed to combine with personal conversational backgrounds. The corresponding entries for mustcontrol and cancontrol are given in (17). The personal variant of the dispositional conversational background is spelled out in (18). (17)

a. b.

(18)

cancontr ol = λ f <s,<e,<st,t>>> λPλxλw.(∃w ∈ ∩ f (w)(x))[w ∈ P(x)] mustcontr ol = λ f <s,<e,<st,t>>> λPλxλw.(∀w ∈ ∩ f (w)(x))[w ∈ P(x)]

f dispo is a function from a world w and individual x into a set of propositions that describe the inner make-up of the individual x in w. (Their

12 To turn this point into a fully convincing argument, one would have to show that only quantifiers in subject positions can bind into the modal base. Relevant examples are generally hard to construct and mostly involve intervening attitude predicates which blur the picture. Moreover, a reportative reading for sollen also allows quantification into the modal base. To my knowledge, reportative modals have not been addressed in the discussion of control vs. raising structures. I will leave these issues to future research.

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intersection is the set of worlds in which x has the same dispositions and abilities as in w.) I will assume that control modals always occur with personal modal bases and raising modals always occur with impersonal modal bases.13 The literature provides two further tests to distinguish between control vs. raising constructions (cf. von Stechow, 2004). The third test regards selectional restrictions. In raising constructions, selectional restrictions only depend on the lower verb. In control constructions, both verbs impose selectional restrictions. Von Stechow uses the following unembedded examples to test for potential changes under embedding. The subjects in (19b) and (19d) obviously violate the lexical selectional restrictions of the predicate (admire/succeeds a prime number).14 (19)

a. b. c. d.

Fritz admires Leonardo. number admires Leonardo. This number succeeds a prime number. ∗ Leonardo succeeds a prime number. ∗ This

Epistemically-interpreted must proves to be a raising verb; the acceptability judgements do not differ from the unembedded cases. (20)

a. b. c. d.

Fritz must admire Leonardo. ∗ This number must admire Leonardo. This number must succeed a prime number. ∗ Leonardo must succeed a prime number.

13 Note that this has nothing to do with wide vs. narrow scope construal of quantifiers that occur with modals that behave as raising verbs. In (i), the negative quantifier keiner ‘no one’ is most naturally interpreted as having wide scope, yet the modal base is constituted by the social laws in Germany and thus impersonal:

(i)

Den Sozialgesetzen zufolge muss in Deutschland wirklich keiner verhungern. the social-laws according-to must in Germany really no-one starve ¬∃x[(according to the social law) [x starves]] ‘For no x is it the case that in all worlds that are compatible with the social law x starves.’

Are there truly mixed combinations? Raising modals with personal modal bases seem to be unexpected. This would require that a case comes out as a raising construction syntactically, but that a subject quantifier would be forced to take wide scope in order to also quantify into the modal base; syntactically, this would amount to a parasitic gap construction and should therefore maybe not be excluded a priori. So far, I know of no data that would require us to permit it. A control modal with an impersonal modal base could easily be formulated if there was evidence for it. But this does not seem to be needed, either. 14 Fortunately, we do not have to say anything about the true nature of selectional restrictions here. It is sufficient to observe the clear relative differences in acceptability. In the following, I depart from von Stechow’s (2004) original example involving be prime because even irrespective of the subject it does not square well with dispositional modality.

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Dispositional can is a control verb. It is not sufficient for a subject to comply with the selectional restrictions of the lower verb—those of the upper verb have to be met as well (can in the following has to be understood as ‘is able to’). The crucial example is of course (21c): although the subject does meet the restrictions of the embedded predicate succeed a prime number, the sentence is unacceptable due to the fact that dispositional can imposes selectional restrictions as well which are not met by the subject this number.15 (21)

a. b. c. d.

Fritz can admire Leonardo. number can admire Leonardo. ∗ This number can succeed a prime number. ∗ Leonardo can succeed a prime number. ∗ This

Fourth, they differ in how passivization affects the truth conditions. Raising verbs are insensitive to passivization of the main verb, but control verbs allow for it to cause a difference in truth value. Again, epistemic must proves to be a raising construction, since it does not change the truth conditions under passivization. If must is interpreted as in view of what we know, (22a) and (22b) do not differ in truth conditions. (22)

a. b.

Fritz must admire Leonardo. Leonardo must be admired by Fritz.

In contrast to that, a control verb like want does change the truth conditions. (23a) may well be true without (23b) being true as well. (23)

a. b.

Werther wants to marry Charlotte. Charlotte wants to be married by Werther.

The German buletic modal wollen also passes the test as a control construction: (24)

a.

b.

Werther will Charlotte heiraten. Werther wants Charlotte marry ‘Werther wants to marry Charlotte.’ Charlotte will von Werther geheiratet werden. Charlotte wants by Werther married get ‘Charlotte wants to be married by Werther.’

We have seen that VP-Topicalization, availability of narrow scope for subjects, invariance of truth conditions under passivization, and selectional restrictions allow us to distinguish raising vs. control constructions. I adopt the standard assumption 15 The evaluation of these examples pertains only to the dispositional reading of can; judgements differ for what I think constitutes a teleological interpretation. For example, the sentence in (21c) is perfectly acceptable in a context where we are talking about which numbers can go where in our display, or maybe in a sequence of numbers we are making for a quiz (imagine any number which succeeds a prime number in the display has to be odd, and this number is odd, so it can succeed a prime number). I am indepted to Lisa Matthewson (p.c.) for pointing this out.

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that the former come with impersonal conversational backgrounds while the latter come with personal conversational backgrounds. In Section 3.2.5 these distinctions will be applied to imperatives. Contrary to prima facie appearance this will reveal that they are best treated as propositional modal operators. The conversational backgrounds appearing with imperatives will thus all be impersonal.

3.1.3 Graded Modality Kratzer (1981) discusses three problems that cannot be solved by the version of her theory that I introduced in Section 3.1.1 under the name of simple modality.16 These are the problem of inconsistent backgrounds, the problem of graded necessity/possibility and of practical inferences with conflicting goals. As an example, I will discuss the first issue (for the others, the reader is referred to Kratzer, 1977, 1981). I will then introduce the modifications of the framework by which Kratzer (1981) proposes to take care of them. Simple modality as spelled out in the entries we have given for modal verbs in Section 3.1.1 runs into a serious problem whenever conversational backgrounds contain inconsistent information. Kratzer’s (1977) famous example deals with New Zealand law texts. The law in Auckland has it that a deer is responsible for any damage it causes, whereas in Wellington it is not. Moreover, murder is a crime in both places. Intuitively, (25a) is false, and (25b) is most likely considered true. (25)

a. b.

In view of what the law prescribes in New Zealand, it must be the case that murder is not a crime. In view of what the law prescribes in New Zealand, it can be the case that a deer is responsible for damage it has caused.

Our meaning rules predict the opposite, though. Assume that w is the world of the scenario described above, and the modal base is interpreted as f 1 : (26)

f 1 (w) = {Murder is a crime (= p), A deer is responsible for damage it causes. (= q), A deer is not responsible for damage it causes. (= ¬q)}

Then, ∩ f 1 (w) is empty. Therefore, must φ is true for any φ, and can φ is false for any φ; consequently, (25a) is trivially true (cf. (27a)), (25b) trivially false (cf. (27b)): (27)

a. b.

(25a)c = mustc (w)( f 1 )(¬ p) = 1 iff (∀w  ∈ W )[w ∈∅→ w  ∈¬ p] (25b)c = canc (w)( f 1 )(q) = 1 iff (∃w  ∈ W )[w ∈ ∅ & w ∈ q]

16 Historically, this is a simplification. Kratzer’s (1978) approach in terms of simple modality is enriched by a Lewisian system of spheres in order to allow for reasoning with inconsistent propositions. But it is only in the newer version that the contextual parameter as constituted by the conversational background is subdivided into a consistent (often realistic) and a potentially inconsistent part, which allows us to unify the problems concerning inconsistency and conflicts and to express graduality of modal notions.

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Obviously, these predictions do not match our intuitions regarding the truth and falsity of (25a) and (25b). Kratzer obviates this problem by distinguishing between a (necessarily consistent) body of information (the modal base) and a second conversational background (possibly inconsistent) that induces an ordering amongst the worlds that comply with the modal base (the ordering source). For example, epistemic modal bases can be combined with less reliable information (e.g. stereotypical, doxastic,. . . ) as their ordering sources. Likewise, circumstantial modal bases can come with deontic, teleological, or buletic ordering sources. Now, a modal verb17 combines with two conversational backgrounds: a modal base f , and an ordering source g. The ordering source serves to induce a pre-order on the set of possible worlds: For any possible world w, the conversational background g induces the ordering relation ≤g(w) : ∀v, z ∈ W : v ≤g(w) z iff { p | p ∈ g(w) & z ∈ p} ⊆ { p | p ∈ g(w) & v ∈ p}

(28)

This allows Kratzer (1981) to define the notions of human possibility and human necessity, which in turn are taken to be the semantic values of modal verbs like can and must. As we will only be concerned with finite ordering sources, her original entries can be simplified by drawing on Lewis’s (1973) limit assumption. It says that for a non-empty modal base there is always a non-empty set of worlds which are optimal according to the ordering source. The assumption is warranted whenever there is no infinite approximation.18 (29)

The limit assumption (Lewis 1973:19ff) (∀f, g, w)[∩ f (w) = ∅ → O( f, g, w) = ∅].

O( f, g, w) is defined as the set of worlds conforming to the modal base f at w (i.e., in f (w)) that are best according to the ordering source g at w. (30)

(without temporality:) O( f, g, w) := {v ∈ ∩ f (w) | ∀z ∈ ∩ f (w): if z ≤g(w) v then v ≤g(w) z}

This immediately allows us to spell out human necessity and human possibility as follows: 17 I will not go into the discussion of whether truly all modal verbs have to be analysed in this way. As mentioned above, there is good reason to assume that dispositional modal verbs should be analysed differently. 18

In particular, this means that I will not investigate cases like (ia). For those, see Kratzer (1991b) for a semantics for modal verbs without the limit assumption. (i)

a. b. c.

Assimilate the value of constant c to π . You must assimilate the value of constant c to π . If this line was longer than it actually is, . . .

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a. b.

85

A proposition p is a human necessity in a world w with respect to a modal base f and an ordering source g iff (∀w ∈ O( f, g, w))[ p(w )]. A proposition p is a human possibility in a world w with respect to a modal base f and an ordering source g iff ¬ p is not a human necessity in w with respect to f and g.

Must and may are assumed to respectively express human necessity and human possibility as just defined. The semantics of must and may relativized to the worlds in the modal base f that are optimal with respect to an ordering source g can then be given as in (32). (32)

a. b.

mustc = λ f λgλpλw.(∀v ∈ O( f, g, w))[v ∈ p] canc = λ f λgλpλw.(∃v ∈ O( f, g, w))[v ∈ p]

As desired, the revised framework obviates the problems mentioned for simple modality. For example, it makes correct predictions with respect to New Zealand’s laws, cf. (33), if the examples are interpreted with respect to a circumstantial modal base and a deontic ordering source. If we took together all laws holding in all of New Zealand, we’d end up with an inconsistency with respect to the responsibilities of a deer. So, the laws cannot in themselves be considered facts (which cannot be inconsistent), but have to be seen as ordering the set of worlds that verify the relevant facts (whatever they are). Consequently, the laws in New Zealand is taken as an ordering source g, which in the described scenario w is g(w) = {A deer is responsible for the damage it causes (r ), A deer is not responsible for the damage it causes (¬r ), Murder is a crime (m)}. f (w) is taken to be empty (thus, we order all the worlds in W according to New Zealand’s laws). The propositions in (25) (repeated in (33a) and (33b)) are now translated as follows: (33)

a.

b.

In view of what the law prescribes in New Zealand, it must be the case that murder is not a crime. (∀w  ∈ O( f, g, w))[¬m(w  )] In view of what the law prescribes in New Zealand, it can be the case that a deer is responsible for the damage it has caused. (∃w  ∈ O( f, g, w))[r (w )]

The propositions are best checked in a minimal model. The ordering source g(w) distinguishes the following four types of worlds in W :

(34)

world w0 w1 w2 w3

m 1 1 0 0

r 1 0 1 0

Both r and ¬r are elements of the ordering source, so the worlds closest to g(w) (according to ≤g(w) ), are simply those that make m true. Consequently,

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O( f, g, w) = {w0 , w1 }.19 It is easy to verify that (33a) comes out as false and (33b) comes out as true, which is as it should be. It is sometimes assumed that some modal verbs can still express simple necessity or possibility. This can either be captured by mapping the ordering source to the empty conversational background (then, at any world O( f, g, w) = f (w) as no   world in f (w) is g(w)-better than any other world in f (w)). Alternatively, the definitions in (2) could be kept in the lexicon rendering modals ambiguous between simple and graded modality. For the sake of explicitness, I resort to the first option. We are now ready to apply the framework to imperatives.

3.2 Imperatives at the Syntax-Semantics Interface While the framework of graded modality is standardly applied to all kinds of modal elements in natural languages, its potential relevance for the study of imperatives has been acknowledged only rather recently. To my knowledge, Han (1999) is the first to draw on the parallel between imperatives and deontic modal verbs. More recently, Portner (2007) develops an analysis of imperatives that is intended to explain their effect on the truth of subsequently uttered modalized propositions. Approaches along these lines are desirable in that they offer a natural way to account for the interpretational variety we find with imperatives (FIP). But Han’s and Portner’s accounts focus on the fact that imperatives are apparently without truth-values. In the following, I will develop a more radical approach that does not merely use the same technical parameters (ordering sources, both Han, 1999 and Portner, 2007; and modal bases, Han, 1999) but strictly assimilates imperative clauses to modalized propositions in their semantics. What I will defend is the truth-conditional equivalence of one reading of (35a) with (35b) (given that all presuppositions are satisfied, see Section 4.2): (35)

a. b.

You should open the door! Open the door!

To obtain the equivalence, I propose that imperatives contain a modal operator that is interpreted as human necessity with respect to a modal base f and an ordering source g (cf. (36)).20 The wide variety of functions/readings is then to be explained in terms of choices for f and g. The definitions for O( f, g, w) and ≤g(w) from Section 3.1.3 are repeated in (37): (36)

OPimp c = λ f λgλpλw.(∀w  ∈ O( f, g, w))[ p(w  )] (preliminary version)

This is because for either of w0 and w1 it is impossible to reach another world w that would be strictly better in that it verifies the same and at least one more of the propositions in the ordering source.

19

20 In Section 5.3 I will argue that this is the result of the interplay between possibility and exhaustification. For the moment, we may consider the denotation of the imperative operator as atomic.

3.2

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Imperatives at the Syntax-Semantics Interface

a. b.

87

O( f, g, w) :={v ∈∩ f (w)| ∀z ∈ ∩ f (w): if z ≤g(w) v then v ≤g(w) z} ∀v, z ∈ W : v ≤g(w) z iff { p | p ∈ g(w) & z ∈ p} ⊆ { p | p ∈ g(w) & v ∈ p}

An imperative φ! isinterpreted as a function that maps a world w to the truth-value 1 if the worlds f (w) that verify as much of g(w) as possible (the g(w)-best  in worlds in f (w)) are φ-worlds. This approach keeps the interpretational flexibility achieved by Han (1999) and Portner (2007). However, at first glance, it suffers a huge draw-back in that it assigns truth-values to imperatives. But this is also a strong point: in Chapter 2 I have argued that the assimilation of imperatives to graded modal verbs allows for a much more natural interaction between imperatives and information about the world as expressed by declaratives or as requested by interrogatives. We have seen that more or less undisputedly propositional objects can also behave as if they were without a truth-value, and I have argued that it is a function of particular contextual constellations whether truth-values of propositions are accessible in a conversation or not. In Section 2.3.3 I discussed three phenomena that provide evidence in favor of a propositional semantics for imperatives. In the following sections, I will largely disregard the presuppositional meaning component responsible for the particular non-assertoric behavior of imperatives, and I will focus on how to derive their at-issue meaning in a compositional way. In the following, I will therefore spell out some basic assumptions about the syntaxsemantics interface in imperatives (relying mainly on Wratil, 2005). Particular attention will be paid to the temporal-aspectual layer (see Section 3.2.2), to the status of the imperative subject (see Section 3.2.4), and to the question of whether imperative modality is personal or impersonal (see Section 3.2.5).

3.2.1 General Considerations on the Syntactic Make-Up of Imperatives In the syntactic literature it is assumed quite generally that imperatives contain a (sentence mood) operator that is responsible for the relevant interpretation of a proposition it combines with (cf. e.g. Rivero and Terzi, 1995; Han, 2000; Platzack and Rosengren, 1997).21 As sketched above, we could easily adopt such an operator and endow it with the meaning of a necessity modal, and indeed this is a shortcut I will repeatedly adopt for simple imperatives throughout this book. Nevertheless, imperatives seem to share with declaratives and interrogatives more options for parametrization than what is generally assumed (compare in particular the parametrization of imperatives with respect to their temporal-aspectual properties, see Section 3.2.2, and the possibility for imperativized verbs to occur in interrogatives, see Section 2.3.3.3). To be able to account for such phenomena, we need 21

But consider Wratil (2005), who argues convincingly that, for imperatives, there is no syntactic evidence for the presence of such an operator in the vast majority of non-Indo-European languages.

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to break down the non-lexical meaning components present in an imperative into smaller pieces that are combined in a compositional fashion. Cross-linguistically, imperatives tend to be morphologically meagre, even if sometimes involving syntactic peculiarities (cf. van der Wurff, 2007). For iconicity, it has frequently been argued that (i) this morphological poverty corresponds to a (for a clause) semantically ‘impoverished’ object that does not involve a predicational relation or at least does not express anchoring in world or time (e.g., a property, Hausser, 1980, Portner, 2005; an action, Segerberg, 1996, Mastop, 2005; or an unanchored proposition, Huntley, 198422 ), and (ii) that this semantic poverty is based on a syntactic structure that is also meagre in that it lacks functional projections like AgrSP (Platzack and Rosengren, 1997), or TP and MoodP (Wratil, 2005). According to these authors, the lack of overt tense, person, or mood marking as exhibited by a bare verb stem as used e.g. in English or German is due to the absence of the respective functional projections. More or less implicitly, they assume a principle of (roughly) ‘no oppositions—no marking’. Given these ubiquitous assumptions, the semantics I am assuming here may seem unexpectedly rich and therefore implausible. In this section, I will slightly refine (36) so as to constitute an object that can be built up compositionally by concatenating tense (P RESENT), modality (), person and number marking (2S G/2P L), and aspectuality (P FV). I think there are four good reasons why this is not nearly as implausible as it may look at first glance. First, not all imperativized verbs are morphologically meagre. It is well known at least since Rivero and Terzi (1995) that, cross-linguistically, imperatives can be divided into two classes—class I imperatives being as morphologically meagre as we know them from a lot of Indo-European languages, and class II imperatives allowing for person, number, tense and aspect marking just like any other verb form. To this we should add that the boundary is not even that sharp. Slavic languages, for example, do not allow for tense marking, but distinguish perfective vs. imperfective aspect in their imperatives as with any other finite verbal forms (cf. Polish, (38)), and even English allows for progressive imperatives (cf. (39)) (cf. Davies, 1986). (38)

a.

b.

(39)

Napisz list! write.I MP.P FV letter ‘Write a letter!’ Pisz list! write.I MP.I MPFV letter ‘Be engaged in letter writing!’

Be waiting at the gate when I come by.

Second, imperatives differ crucially from forms that are truly characterized by a very general semantic contribution. The most obvious candidate to compare imperatives

22

See Mastop (2005) for convincing criticism of Huntley’s (1984) proposal that imperatives are not anchored in temporal or logical space at all.

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to in that respect is the infinitive, which seems to provide no restrictions on the reference of the entities that saturate its argument slots (that is, the realis or irrealis nature of the world argument, temporal location of the time argument, as well as person or number of further arguments). Consequently, infinitives are often assumed to have the same denotation as the bare verb stem, that is, for example, for the German infinitive schlafen ‘sleep’ (marked by the ending -en), schlafenc = schlaf- c . While imperatives can only rarely be embedded and are restricted both in temporal reference and in person reference, infinitives (i) occur in a wide variety of grammatical contexts (e.g. (40)), and (ii) allow for a wide range of interpretations (triggered by intonation, non-linguistic context, etc.) when used as (underspecified and maybe elliptic) forms in communication (cf. (41)). With a particular kind of intonation, they can even be used as a substitute for imperatives (cf. (42)).23 The reverse does not hold: only stand-alone infinitivals can sometimes be replaced by imperatives: therefore, the grammatical environments in which infinitives can occur form a proper superset of the environments in which imperatives can be used.24 (40)

a. b.

Ich werde nicht schlafen. I will not sleep.I NF Er versprach zu schlafen. he promised to sleep.I NF

(41)

Aufgeben. give-up.I NF ‘Give up.’ (as an answer to any kind of question like ‘what shall I do?’/‘what will he do?’/‘what do you consider?’/. . . )

(42)

Aufstehen! stand-up.I NF ‘Stand up!’

Consequently, imperatives cannot be as general as infinitives are. But the latter show overt marking in a lot of languages. Third, it is sometimes argued that the apparent semantic specifications of imperatives can be derived (at least partly) from their directive meaning (e.g. Platzack and Rosengren, 1997). Then it should in principle be possible to overwrite these specifications at least in certain cases (e.g. W ISHes and (speaker-disinterested) A DVICE). But some of the restrictions are stable: e.g. German imperative verbs clearly require their subjects to involve reference to the addressee (see Section 3.2.4 for details) and specify whether the addressee is singular or plural. Moreover, certain modifications (e.g. in the temporal realm) require the corresponding aspects of reference to 23

In some languages this is obligatorily the case for negated imperatives; e.g. Italian. See Han (2000) for extensive discussion.

24

With the possible exception of imperatives embedded in reported speech, see Section 6.1. Moreover, infinitivals are less acceptable as replacements of less authoritative imperatives, e.g. those used for W ISHes or A DVICE. The details of this functional restriction have to be left for future research.

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be represented in the semantics to allow for a compositional account of the corresponding phenomena. For instance, the interval for which the imperative is issued has to be accessible in the structure if we want to account for temporal quantification (cf. (43)). (43)

a. b.

Kiss her before every meeting. Never show up alone!

It is not clear to me how the quantification could be computed if temporal reference were a mere side effect of directive meaning. Fourth, the semantic value I assign to the imperative combines precisely those feature settings that seem to constitute the unmarked option in general.25 It is known that, cross-linguistically, present is often not marked overtly; likewise, we know from the literature on conditionals (Kratzer, 1991b), and disjunctions (Geurts, 2005) that covert modal operators are normally interpreted as expressing necessity rather than possibility (cf. also Portner, 1997; Rullmann et al., 2008, for further empirical arguments). Furthermore, bare stems are used especially for singular imperatives, whereas plural is often morphologically marked. And again, singular is usually taken to be the unmarked option.26 The observation that imperatives contain the unmarked members of each of the oppositions they encode27 opens up several possibilities as to how this should fall out from the underlying syntactic structure. One idea would be to spell out a default mechanism operating on the syntax-semantics interface. I will, however, stick to more traditional assumptions and assume that the features, variables, and relations introduced by an imperative are directly represented in the syntactic structure. I assume von Stechow’s (2002a, 2003) version of a minimalist framework in terms of interpretable and uninterpretable features. Uninterpretability is marked as ∗ · ∗. An inflectional form of a lexical verb (base generated in VP) carries a bundle of uninterpretable features which require checking against the corresponding interpretable features. These are carried by the subject and by covert aspectual, temporal, modal or clause type-related elements sitting in the corresponding specifier positions of the functional projections AgrSP, AspP, MoodP, TP, and CP. Checking of these features may require movement to the respective head position.28 25 I am indebted to Lisa Matthewson (p.c.) for pointing out that at least in the languages of South and North America, this also seems to be true of the aspectual value perfective. 26

But cf. Sauerland (2003) for arguments that plural should be considered the unmarked option.

27

Paul Portner (p.c.) points out that person marking seems to violate this tendency. Imperatives are somehow tied to the second person, while the unmarked option is usually third person. I think that this may have to do with the fact that imperatives do not impose a syntactic, but rather a semantic requirement on their subjects (equivalence to/subset of the addressee). See Section 3.2.4 for details. 28 The order of the functional projections as well as the corresponding semantics for the temporal and aspectual elements follows von Stechow’s (2002a) assumptions for indicatives. In contrast to von Stechow, I follow Wratil (2005) and Sternefeld (2006) and assume the presence of an

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In particular, the morphological imperative in (44) comes with a feature bundle {∗pfv∗, ∗2p ∗, ∗sg ∗ / ∗ pl∗, ∗impmod∗, ∗pres∗, ∗imp∗}29 , the single members of which are checked respectively in AspP, AgrSP, MoodP, TP, and CP, triggering overt movement to AgrSP in English, and to CP for the German equivalent. The tree for a simple English imperative as in (44) might then look like (45). (44)

Call me!

(45) CP C

O PImp

C C

TP Tl

T

T

P RES Moodk

Mood

Asp j Asp V calli

tl

MoodP Mood

F1 F2 I MPMOD f

gt k

AgrSP AgrS

I MPPROm tj

AspP Asp

P FV ti

VP tm ti me

additional AgrSP, which, in my case, mediates the requirement on the imperative subject as spelled out in Section 3.2.4. Note that all the uninterpretable features are encoded on the imperativized verb, and the carriers of their interpretable counterparts are all covert (with the possible exception of the subject). Therefore, my investigations do not contribute any new insights into the order of the functional projections and could be adjusted to fit different assumptions (provided the types of the covert semantic elements are adjusted accordingly). In general, my analysis of imperatives as modalized propositions does not hinge on this particular choice of framework. It could be replaced by any other framework that accounts equally well for the compositional interaction of temporal and aspectual categories in general. 29 See Sect. 3.2.4 for the characterization of 2p’, which is slightly different from the ordinary second person feature.

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In German imperatives, the three features linked to the highest positions CP, TP, and MoodP are fixed to one particular value. Therefore, for simple German imperatives, it is unproblematic to follow Wratil (2005) and assume that TP is lacking and that CP and MoodP are fused into a sentence mood specific projection, hosting an imperative operator. But if we take this seriously, it forces us to assume that the morphological category ‘imperative’ is strictly constrained to the clause type ‘imperative’. In view of the data in Section 2.3.3 this may be an undesirable simplification. There, I pointed out that in some varieties of German, imperatives can appear in interrogatives that are used as rhetorical questions. Syntactically, rhetorical questions are mostly assumed to constitute standard interrogatives. The respective syntactic set-up would thus be incompatible with the marking as an imperative clause. For the conception of clause types I am advocating in this book, it does not matter how clause types are encoded syntactically. What is important is the denotation, not whether it is derived from elements that mark a clause type only jointly, or whether one of them is in itself sufficient to determine that particular clause type. As long as we are concerned only with the analysis of simple German imperatives, we can assume for convenience that their semantics is encoded by OPImp . But if we want to investigate phenomena like the formation of rhetorical questions containing imperativized verbs, the meaning that is characteristic of the imperative clause type needs to be split up along the lines of (45).30 For the discussion of simple imperatives, I will therefore rely on a syntactic structure like (46). Here, *imp* corresponds to what is contributed by {*imp*,*pres*,*impmod*} in (45).31

30 Syntactically, one also has to explain why imperativized verbs always undergo V-to-C movement in German and other Indo-European languages. But this need not be motivated by an element that determines the clause type. In particular, it would be sufficient to assume that the presence of the verb in C is required by the imperative morphology and that this configuration is compatible with whatever is involved in encoding an interrogative clause. In this regard it may also relevant to consider the data discussed by Reis and Rosengren (1992). They point out that the preverbal position in imperatives is not marked as [-wh] and therefore allows for extraction data as in (i):

(i)

mir [ hat Maria gestern ti getroffen?] Weni sag who tell.I MP S G me has Maria yesterday ti met ‘Tell me who Maria met yesterday.’

Note that, in contrast to my examples of rhetorical questions, sentences like (i) clearly belong to the imperative clause type. See Section 2.3.3 for details. For a more general investigation of syntactic clause type marking in German, cf. e.g. Lohnstein (2000). 31 I also deviate from Wratil (2005) in not adopting SplitCP, and introducing a projection AspP above VP. AspP is needed to link the lexical content of the VP to the temporal domain opened up by the imperative, which will be treated in the tense-aspect system developed by Klein (1994) and von Stechow (cf. von Stechow, 2002b).

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(46)

93

CP F1 F2 g OP I mp f

C∗imp∗

AspP P FV Asp∗ p f v∗

VP I MPPRO call me

While this may also be adequate for English and any other language that does not allow tense distinctions in the imperative, I don’t agree with Wratil (2005) that TP is universally absent in imperatives. I think that interesting arguments have been put forth that Dutch does indeed allow for a distinction of present vs. past tense in imperatives or imperative-like clauses (cf. Mastop 2005; Boogaart and Trnavac 2004; see Section 3.2.2 for detailed discussion). Even if the past forms may belong to a closely related clause type (as I suggested in Section 1.1.3), it is clearly desirable to derive their semantics compositionally from otherwise identical ingredients (cf. Schwager, t.a., for an analysis along these lines). We can now proceed to the question of how the elements should be interpreted. For the sake of transparency, each of them will first be treated in its own right, walking through the tree in a bottom-up fashion. In the following, I will first focus on the modal component as well as its interaction with tense and aspect (see Section 3.2.2). The proper treatment of the imperative subject will be suspended until Section 3.2.4. For the moment, I will just assume it to be an overt or covert second person pronoun that denotes the addressee.

3.2.2 Tense, Aspect, and Their Relation to Modality 3.2.2.1 Tense and Aspect in Simple Imperatives Before taking a closer look at the temporal and aspectual properties of imperatives, a word of warning may be in order: a satisfactory investigation of any of these issues, independently of the clause type it occurs in, merits a book in itself.32 Nevertheless, to understand the mechanics of modal expressions in natural language one has to take into account their temporal properties as well, and this strikes me as particularly important for the modal element occurring in imperatives. Issues related to temporality have often been taken as constitutive of imperative clauses (e.g. future orientation). Aspect is usually considered crucial in bringing together temporal and lexical information, and imperatives have been argued to impose all kinds of restrictions with respect to which predicates can undergo imperative formation (cf. e.g. Mastop, 2005). 32 More details on the temporal and aspectual properties of imperatives as well as possible parametrizations are given in Schwager (t.a.).

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I assume that VPs contain positions for all the verb’s arguments and denote intensional properties either of events (achievements, accomplishments and activities) or of temporal intervals (states).33 In the following, I will focus mainly on properties of events. They are allocated w.r.t. a temporal interval by an aspectualizer, which is a relation in intension between times and properties of events. The aspectual feature on the head of AspP has to be checked against the corresponding aspectual relation located in its specifier. Von Stechow distinguishes perfective (P FV) and imperfective (I MPFV) aspectual relations to relate properties of events to intervals. Their semantics is given in (47).34 (47)

a. b.

P FV c = λPλtλw.∃e[τ (e) ⊆ t & P(e)(w)] I MPFVc = λPλtλw.∃e[τ (e) ⊇ t & P(e)(w)]

For most languages, we find P FV in imperatives by default. For languages that also overtly mark imperfective imperatives, they are used with negation (cf. Segerberg, 1996) for discussion of aspect and negation in Polish), or require salience for a temporal instant within the interval they are predicated of. But such restrictions are not unique to imperatives. Rather, they are in line with more general constraints on the occurrence of imperfective aspect. Due to the presence of an aspectual relation, at least when the level of AspP is reached, the denotation equals a property of times. E.g., in case of a perfective imperative Leave!, the AspP denotes the property of intervals to contain an event of the addressee leaving (cf. (48)). (48)

[AspP P FV [VP you leave ] ]c = P FVc (you leavec ) = P FVc (λeλw.leave(c A )(e)(w)) = λtλw.∃e[τ (e) ⊆ t & leave(c A )(e)(w)]

The specifier of Mood∗impmod∗ contains the relation I MPMOD, which is interpreted roughly like the modal must. That is, it will come out roughly equivalent to the graded variant of the modal verb’s semantics as we have seen it in (32a), Section 3.1.3 (repeated here as (49)). (49)

mustc = λ f λgλpλw.(∀v ∈ O( f, g, w))[ p(v)]

As it stands, after having applied to the modal base f and the ordering source g, the modal is still inapplicable to the denotation of AspP, because it combines with a proposition, whereas AspP denotes a relation between times and worlds. At this 33

The classification follows Vendler (1957), who assumes that accomplishments and achievements contain a cumulation point but differ in that the former includes preparatory phases whereas the latter is punctual (build a house/die); activities do not contain a cumulation point but are not completely homogenous either (e.g. run). States are completely homogenous be 2m tall; I follow Katz (1995) in assuming that this is reflected in the fact that such predicates are properties of times and not of events. 34 Von Stechow assumes that temporal properties as denoted by statives are linked to the reference time by a special aspectual relation of interval inclusion. I resort to a simpler system and assume that AspP may be lacking (or be empty) if the VP denotation constitutes an appropriate argument to the next functor. For example, I assume that I MPMOD can combine directly with a stative VP.

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point we have to consider the issue of temporal information we have shunned so far. Taking a closer look at imperatives and tense, it becomes obvious that two different parameters have to be distinguished. On the one hand, imperatives are issued at some interval t1 : they express that something is necessary at time t1 . I will simply call this the evaluation time. On the other hand, they oblige/recommend/desire/. . . the addressee to have a certain property at a more or less well-defined interval t2 , which I will call the event frame. With respect to these two aspects of temporality, we should again compare imperatives to modal verbs (cf. Condoravdi, 2002; von Stechow, 2005). The first corresponds to what is expressed as temporal information on the modal verb itself. (50a) expresses the necessity for Verena to leave with respect to what is permissible at the utterance time cT , whereas (50b) expresses the same necessity with respect to what was permissible at a contextually given interval before cT . (50)

a. b.

Verena has to leave. Verena had to leave.

The distinction depends on the temporal information on the modal verb and is usually taken to be encoded in TP. The morphological information on the verb in T is checked against a temporal variable in SpecTP that carries the same feature. On the temporal variable, it is interpreted as a presupposition on the variable assignment.35 Imperatives talk about what is permissible (or optimal according to some other modal flavor) at the time of the context.36 Consequently, as in a declarative like (50a), the imperativized verb carries the feature ∗pres∗, and SpecTP has to host a variable with the presupposition pres. Simplifying a bit, we can assume that such a variable is required to be identical to the utterance time c T .37 (51)

tpres c = cT

As expected, imperatives behave like performatively used modal verbs: they, too, depend on present tense morphology ((50a) can be used performatively, while (50b) can only be used descriptively). Now, we only have to change the semantics of a modal operator to make it depend on this temporal parameter that determines when the modal accessibility is to be calculated, i.e. what is permissible/hoped for/. . . . Our conversational backgrounds are no longer functions from worlds to sets of propositions, but rather from worlds and times to sets of propositions (type s, i, st, t). We change the notion of optimal worlds O (cf. (30)) to a four-place relation, depending on a modal base, 35

This is in the spirit of a deictic theory of tense (cf. Partee, 1973; Heim, 1994). In order to capture relative or semantically vacuous tense in attitude reports and other intensional contexts, one can rely on feature deletion under binding of (temporal) variables, cf. von Stechow (2003). 36 But see Section 3.2.2 for a possible parametrization at this point. 37

To be precise, one would have to say that the feature pres restricts the interpretation of the variable to intervals that include the utterance time: (i)

t16 pres c is defined only if cG (t16 ) ⊇ cT . If defined, t16 pres c = cG (t16 ).

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3 Imperatives as Graded Modals

an ordering source, and a time and a world of evaluation (cf. (52)). This allows to specify the semantics of must as in (53). (52)

(taking into account temporality) O( f, g, t, w) :={v ∈∩f (t, w)|∀z ∈∩f (t, w): if z ≤g(t,w) v then v ≤g(t,w) z}

(53)

mustc = λ f λgλpst λtλw.(∀v ∈ O( f, g, t, w))[v ∈ p]

After the modal has applied to the modal base, the ordering source, and its propositional complement, it applies to the temporal variable in TP that has to carry the temporal feature corresponding to the tense morphology of the modal verb. This last step specifies the temporal dependence of the modal accessibility relation (i.e., our conversational backgrounds). So far, I have not explained the technical details of how AspP and the modal element get combined. Also, we have not taken into consideration the event frame, which is supposed to narrow down the temporal possibilities of when to comply with the imperative. Usually, imperatives have to be acted on in the future; this is a crucial part of the analyses in e.g. Mastop (2005) or Portner (1997). In our ontology it would be natural to express this via assimilation to modals again. Modal verbs that combine with eventive38 prejacents are well known to express that the respective event can or must occur in the future. Condoravdi (2002) analyses this by saying that the modal expands its evaluation time forward, opening up an interval that extends potentially unrestrictedly into the future. If we interpret the modal element in the imperative analogously, we obtain something like (54): (54)

(preliminary) I MPMOD= λ f λgλPi,st λtλw.(∀w ∈ O( f, g, t, w))[P([t, _))(w  )]

Now the complement the imperative has to apply to is of the right type: P is a function from intervals into propositions and [t, _) denotes the interval that starts at t and extends unboundedly into the future. Applying this to a VP that is anchored by perfective aspect makes satisfactory predictions for plain imperatives. For example, (55a) gets interpreted as in (55b): (55)

38

a. b.

Call Melli! [t pr es [[ I MPMOD f g] P FV [VP I MPPRO call Melli]]]c = [ I MPMODc ( f )(g)(P FVc (λeλw.call-melli(c A )(e)(w))](cT ) = [ [λPλtλw.∀w ∈ O( f, g, t, w): P([t, _))(w )] (λtλw.∃e[τ (e) ⊆ t & call-melli(c A )(e)(w)])](cT ) = [λtλw.(∀w  ∈ O( f, g, t, w))[λtλw.∃e[τ (e) ⊆ t & call-melli(c A )(e)(w)]([t, _))(w  )]](cT ) =  λw.(∀w ∈ O( f, g, cT , w))[∃e[τ (e)⊆[cT , _) & call-melli(c A )(e)(w )]]

On the Vendlerian understanding, which is to be distinguished from Mastop’s (2005) use of the term.

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The result looks satisfactory. The fact that, on many occasions, not just any event of the addressee’s calling Melli in the future constitutes a good candidate to comply with (55a) (most likely, only calls located within the nearer future would do) is probably best taken care of by pragmatics. In other cases, such a temporal restriction is made explicit, e.g. (56). (56)

Call Melli tomorrow!

In this case, only events happening within tomorrow count. Obviously, the frame adverbial tomorrow restricts the relevant events to those that happen within tomorrow. One way of obtaining this under our current assumptions w.r.t. the aspectual relations and the I MPMOD is to assume that tomorrow adjoins to AspP and gets interpreted as a modifier of temporal properties (cf. (57a)).39 (57)

a. b. c. d.

tomorrowc = λPi,st λtλw.P(t∩ the-day-after-cT )(w) [AspP2 tomorrow [AspP1 P FV [VP I MPPRO call Melli]]] AspP1 c = λtλw[∃e[τ (e) ⊆ t & call-melli(c A )(e)(w)]] AspP2 c = λtλw[∃e[τ (e) ⊆ (t∩ the-day-after-cT ) & call-melli(c A )(e)(w)]]

While the account in terms of forward expansion works well for frame adverbials like tomorrow, it encounters serious difficulties with quantification, negation, and imperfective aspect. All three problems pertain to imperatives and modals alike. Here, though, I will focus on imperatives. First, consider quantification over events. Certain quantificational adverbials need to take into account a larger interval than what is given by the forwardexpanding modal. Consider (58). (58)

Don’t call Cécile more than three times while she is in Greece.

If we treat (58) how we analysed (56), we take into consideration only events of calling Cécile that happen from the utterance time on. Now, assume that (58) is issued at a time t  such that Cécile has already been in Greece for a week at t  and is to stay there for one more week. Intuitively, the total amount of calls you give her should be computed for the entire time, not just for the week starting from t  . That is, if you have already called her twice, you may only call her once more. And, if you have already called her more than 3 times, it would be natural to reject the imperative as something you cannot possibly comply with. But with the semantics in (54) we predict (59c), which only takes into account the week starting from t  .

39

My entry for tomorrow combines assumptions from von Stechow (2003) and Condoravdi (2002), to bring together von Stechow’s aspectual relations and Condoravdi’s semantics for the modal. My entry can be replaced by the simpler version in von Stechow as soon as (for independent reasons) the forward-expanding semantics is replaced by what I will call the event frame argument.

98

(59)

3 Imperatives as Graded Modals

a. b. c.

more than three timesc = λPε,st λtλw. |{e | P(e)(w)&τ (e) ⊆ t}| > 3 while Cécile is in Greecec = λPi,st λtλw.P(t∩ M AX (λt  .cecile-in-greece(t  )(w))) [t pr es [[I MPMOD f g ][not [[more than three times] [I MPPRO call Cécile]]][while she is in Greece]]] c = λw.(∀w ∈ O( f, g, cT , w))[[λtλw.¬ |{e |call-cecile(c A )(e)(w) & τ (e)⊆(t ∩ M AX (λt  .cecile-in-greece’(t  )(w)))}| >3]([cT , _))(w )] = λw.(∀w ∈ O( f, g, cT , w))[¬ |{e |call-cecile(c A )(e)(w ) & τ (e) ⊆ ([cT , _) ∩ MAX(λt  .cecile-in-greece(t  )(w  )))}| > 3]

The formula in (59c) counts only events within that part of Cécile’s contextually salient stay in Greece that follows the utterance time. Intuively, this is not what we want. In contrast, for indicatives, it seems mostly correct that adverbials that refer to intervals that properly include the utterance time are restricted to either the past or the future part by the temporal information. Consider (60) and related examples discussed in von Stechow (1995). (60)

Malte war heute dreimal hier. Malte was today three-times here ‘Today, Malte was here three times.’

Here, the quantification is restricted to that part of the utterance day that precedes the utterance time. Obviously, this is due to the past morphology on the verb. Intuitions are less clear with future reference. Yet, the German sentences in (61) still invite readings where the future information restricts the quantification to the part that follows the utterance time. (61)

a.

b.

Volker wird heute dreimal anrufen. Volker will today three-times call ‘(Counting from now on:) Volker will call three times today.’ Melli wird mich dreimal anrufen, während ich hier in der Küche Melli will me three-times call, while I here in the kitchen bin. am ‘(Counting from now on:) Melli will call me three times while I am here in the kitchen.’

I can hardly use (61a) to mean that Volker will have called three times by the end of the day.40 Likewise, I have a strong preference to conceive of all three calls in (61b) as happening in the future. Hence, the analysis in terms of intersection of a

40 In contrast, Paul Portner (p.c.) observes that this is exactly the reading obtained for the English sentence Volker will call three times today. Other speakers remark that the reading is possible, but that it would preferably be expressed by the use of will have called. At this point, I can only conclude that these English data require careful empirical testing.

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future interval and an adverbial modifier makes the correct predictions for German indicative futures. In contrast to that, for the imperative in (58), the preference to understand it such that the relevant calls happen in whatever part of the entire interval is very strong. Second, in the absence of an overt restrictor, the truth-conditions (i.e., the requirement imposed by the imperative) would come out too strong for negated imperatives. In particular, a sentence like (62a) gets assimilated to (62b). (62)

a. b.

Don’t turn off the stove! Never turn off the stove!

Clearly, this is again not what we want, and the problem is reminiscent of Partee’s (1973) observation that a (naive) operator theory of tense runs into problems with negation. (63)

I didn’t turn off the stove. a. = ‘there is a moment before the utterance time at which I did not turn off the stove.’ too weak! b. = ‘it is not the case that there is a moment before the utterance time at which I did turn off the stove.’ too strong!

Third, if there is a particular salient temporal instant at which the prejacent should be made true, imperatives can also occur in the imperfective aspect (cf. Davies, 1986). (64)

Be standing at the gate!

intended: when I get there

Crucially, if we rely on forward expansion without making explicit the contextual restriction, (64) would be interpreted as in (65), which requires that the entire future be contained within the addressee’s standing at the gate. (65)

λw.(∀w  ∈ O( f, g, cT , w))[∃e[τ (e) ⊇ [cT , _) & you-stand-at-the-gate(e)(w)]]

For the second two problems, the solution is quite obvious: we have to make explicit reference to the period in which the speaker intends that the event should happen. Typically, this will be a part of the future. Nevertheless, as for (58), this need not be the case. An overt frame-setting adverbial that properly includes the utterance time may require that we take into account part of the past, too. Consequently, I give up on forward expansion as introduced by the modal operator in (54). Instead, I assume that the imperative modal takes an additional temporal argument which stands for the interval at which the event has to happen—the event frame. While the event frame need not lie entirely in the future (cf. (58)), it must not lie entirely in the past either. This has to be guaranteed in order to predict the unacceptability of imperatives like (66): (66)

gestern an! Ruf call.I MP S G yesterday VP RT #‘Call yesterday!’

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To account for the unacceptability of such cases,41 I assume that (i) the event frame is presupposed to lie not entirely before the tense time (for unembedded imperatives, it may not entirely precede the utterance time, that is, it may not meet the presupposition past), and that (ii) the event frame may not be larger than an overt frame-setting adverbial that indicates when the imperative is to be fulfilled.42 The revised semantics for I MPMOD is given in (67a);43 the corresponding tree for the MoodP in a simple imperative like (55a) is given in (67b). (67)

a.

I MPMODc = λ f λgλt  λPi,st λtλw.(∀w ∈ O( f, g, t, w))[P(t  )(w  )], defined only if not t  < t (the event frame t  does not strictly precede the evaluation time t)

b.

MoodP AspP

F1 F2 t F3 I MPMOD f

P FV

VP

g I MPPRO call Melli

I take the result to be the correct at-issue meaning of the imperative. It is easy to see that the sequential application of the elements P RESENT and I MPMOD is equivalent to the semantics of OPImp (cf. (36)) as refined in order to take into account the twofold temporal dimension (cf. (68)).44 So far, the sole purpose of the feature ∗imp∗ is syntactic. It ensures that the imperativized verb move to C in languages like

41 It follows from standard assumptions in speech act theory that one cannot command things that should happen in the past. Thus, it may look as if (66) could be excluded on merely pragmatic grounds. Yet, imperatives can also be used as W ISHes and these can perfectly well target the past, see Section 4.1.3. 42

Without the second assumption, (66) should be acceptable in case the speaker has in mind an event frame spanning both yesterday, today, and tomorrow. I assume that this principle is in line with the more general behavior of covert contextual parameters. Yet, this assumption merits further study, which I have to leave for future research. 43 Throughout this book I am abstracting away of the need to bind into the presupposition. The necessity to bind variables across different dimensions of linguistic meaning is well known for presuppositions, cf. Karttunen and Peters (1979); for a dynamic implementation of binding across two different dimensions of meaning, cf. Nouwen (2007). For an implementation with respect to semantic presuppositions in terms of domain restrictions on argument variables, see Heim and Kratzer (1998); for an implementation compatible with the pragmatic conception of presuppositions, see van der Sandt (1992). 44 In the refined version (68) developed in this section, the interpretation of the imperative operator does not combine with a proposition any more, but rather with a temporal property.

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German (or lower positions in other languages). It would of course be nice to be able to assign a(n ideally) uniform meaning to V-to-C movement (cf. Lohnstein, 2000, for an attempt along these lines). Yet, this has to be the purpose of a more general study of clause types. The advantage of having the imperative-specific meaning encoded by I MPMOD is that the approach carries over immediately to languages that lack V-to-C-movement. (68)

(final version of the at-issue meaning component) OPImp c = λ f λgλt  λPi,st λw.(∀w  ∈ O( f, g, cT , w))[P(t  )(w  )]

For convenience, I will in the following resort to Wratil’s (2005) assumption that a complex CP/MoodP hosts OPImp and takes AspP as its complement (cf. (69b), which contributes exactly the same semantics as the more fine-grained (69a)). (69)

a.

CP TP T

P RES

T

ModP F1 F2 t Mod F3

∗impmod∗

g

AspP P FV Asp∗ p f v∗

I MPMOD f

VP I MPPRO call me

b.

CP(MoodP) F1 F2 t

C(Mood) C(Mood)∗imp∗

AspP

F3 g OPimp f

P FV Asp∗ p f v∗

VP I MPPRO call me

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The fact that the additional temporal parameter introduced for the event frame is not restricted to the interval starting with the utterance time cT helps make the correct predictions for (58).45 (70)

a. b. c.

more than three timesc = λPε,st λtλw. | {e |P(e)(w) & τ (e) ⊆ t} |> 3 while Cécile is in Greecec = λPλtλw.P(t ∩ M AX (λt  .cecile-in-greece(t  )(w)) [[OPImp f g t][[while Cecile is in Greece][not [more than three times [I MPPRO call Cecile ]]]]]c = λw.(∀w  ∈ O( f, g, cT , w))[|{e |call-cecile(c A )(e)(w ) & τ (e) ⊆ (t ∩ M AX (λt  .cecile-in-greece(t  )(w)))}| ≤ 3]

The formula in (70c) counts all events that lie within the intended event frame and within Cécile’s entire stay in Greece, instead of just those following the utterance time. This is as desired.

3.2.3 Temporal Oppositions in Imperatives In most languages under consideration so far, imperatives do not retain temporal oppositions familiar from declaratives and interrogatives. Consequently, the respective imperatives can be treated as in (69b), allowing for alternations between P FV and I MPFV as the aspectual relation. Recently, a couple of languages have been claimed to allow for distinctions in tense in their imperatives after all. They fall into two fundamentally different categories with respect to the tensing they exhibit. On the one hand, Dutch has been claimed to allow for pluperfect and past imperatives (cf. Proeme, 1991; Wolf, 2003; Mastop, 2005). Mastop argues that they are to be seen as true imperatives because they ‘share the same verb form (verb first, implicit second person subject) and have a closely related use’ (Mastop, 2005:71). (71)

Had je mond maar gehouden! had your mouth P RT hold.PP ‘You should have kept your mouth shut!’

45

Note that it is now crucial that the temporal restriction while Cécile is in Greece gets interpreted outside of negation (otherwise, the truth conditions get too weak). An alternative way to achieve this would be to interpret it as a presupposition on the event frame argument of the imperative operator. Ultimately, I would prefer that. But the problem is of course not restricted to imperative semantics. It arises likewise for cases like (i). (i)

Cécile didn’t call Ede more than three times while he was in Dublin.

With respect to the modalized case, note that Cécile’s stay in Greece is relativized to the respective worlds. But I think this is as it should be. The interval of her stay in the actual world does not have to be known exactly (maybe it has not even been fixed), and if it differs in a world w  then, for that world w  , we would be concerned with the interval she spends in Greece according to what is going on in w . I consider it a pragmatic effect that artificial shortening of Cécile’s stay is not normally considered a good way of complying with the imperative. The semantics does not exclude it.

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Reed dan ook niet zo hard. Je wist toch dat the politie drive.PAST P RT P RT not so fast. You know.PAST P RT that the police aan het conroleren was! on the check.I NF was ‘You shouldn’t have driven that fast. You knew the police were surveilling.’

Drawing on the interaction with various particles, he argues that these forms also give advice or point out an obligation—but for the time when the crucial decision was to be taken, not at the utterance time. Therefore, he considers them as truly performative (Mastop, 2005:74).46 I agree with Mastop (2005) that these examples indeed share a lot with imperatives, but nevertheless I would hesitate to classify them as imperatives as I chose to individuate them in Section 1.1.3. They exhibit a grammatical property (namely past tense marking) that restricts them from ever fulfilling the prototypical function of requesting or commanding that was taken to be distinctive for the imperative clause type. The speech act type is not a C OMMAND for a past interval in time (whatever that would be), but rather a R EPROACH that what was clearly to be known as advisable has not been complied with. I would therefore tentatively classify them as belonging to a different though closely related clause type of reproachatives. Nevertheless, my compositional build up for imperatives can straightforwardly account for the tight semantic relation between imperatives and reproachatives: we simply have to assume that the form types of both clause types involve the presence of I MPMOD.47 In order to capture their contribution, we have to allow for the tense time to be set to past and the event frame to be sensitive to this limit (e.g. not entirely precede the past reference time). This part is very similar to Mastop’s (2005) analysis. Moreover, the assumptions about the modal base (see Section 4.2) have to be adjusted to allow for the counterfactual meaning. A fullfledged analysis of Dutch past imperatives in the imperative framework proposed here is given in Schwager (t.a.). Other cases of tense in imperatives do not induce a different evaluation time, but involve grammaticalization of different restrictions on the event frame. This seems to be the case in some North American Indian languages. Mithun (1999:171f)

46

Wratil (2005) mentions a similar usage of irrealis-marked imperatives in Tsakhur, a (LezgiSamur) Dagestan language spoken in Azerbaijan: (i)

sa dawar ali-w-s-i buy-I MP-I RR a lamb ‘You should buy a lamb!’

47 Alternatively one could say that Dutch has a complex clause type that covers both imperatives and reproachatives and that these two subtypes are distinguished only by temporal marking. Given that, as far as semantics is concerned, clause type systems fulfill a purely heuristic purpose, I consider these issues a matter of taste.

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explains that Cheyenne48 and Maidu49 possess a morphological distinction between imperatives for actions that are to be carried out immediately and imperatives for actions that are to be carried out later on (and, for Maidu in particular, in the absence of the speaker).50 (73)

a.

b.

méseestse eat.I MP 1 Eat!’ méseheo?o eat.I MP 2 Eat (later on)! Cheyenne; from Mithun (1999) (1999:172)

Wratil (2005) reports similar effects for Tubatulabal51 and Takelma52 . In contrast to past evaluation times as observed for Dutch, these contrasts with respect to the event frame don’t change the prototypical function of the respective clauses. Consequently, it is entirely unproblematic to call them imperatives. If various restrictions on the event frame are grammaticalized in a language, we can capture this by saying that the language has more than one relation I MPMOD that can co-occur with the clause type distinctive feature imp. Future imperatives or imperative-like clause types that shift the evaluation time to the future (in analogy to the Dutch past imperatives) have not been reported so far. English and German are also known to possess another construction which is often associated with temporality. Here, the imperativized verb consists of the auxiliary haben/have that, together with the perfect participle, yields the present perfect. (74)

Bitte hab nicht noch eine Vase zerbrochen! please have.I MP S G not P RT a vase broken ‘Please don’t have broken another vase!’53

The status of this construction as an imperative proper has been questioned on pragmatic grounds in particular. Therefore, I will discuss it in more detail in Section 4.1.3 in connection with the functional restrictions it imposes (cf. also Schwager, t.a.). I will argue that it should be considered as an instance of the imperative clause type and that the modification is more of an aspectual than a temporal nature (the time of evaluation still being present).

48 A North American Indian language belonging to the Algonquian family that is spoken in southeastern Montana and western Oklahoma. 49

A North American Indian language belonging to the family of Maiduan languages that is spoken in northeastern California. 50

Cf. also Shipley (1964) and Mastop (2005) for discussion of these data.

51

A North American Indian language spoken in southern California.

52

A North American Indian language that was spoken in western Oregon, but is now extinct.

53

English example taken from Culicover and Jackendoff (1997a).

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3.2.4 The Imperative Subject 3.2.4.1 The Data The marking of grammatical person is one of the morphological oppositions that appear to be cross-linguistically reduced in imperatives. Moreover, even in a language that retains it, its impact for the classification of a particular form type within that language’s clause type system is far from obvious (cf. Mauck and Zanuttini, 2005, also Section 1.1.3 above). Here, I will confine myself to languages like English and German that are usually considered to have only imperatives for the second person; that is, the external argument of the verb is normally understood as referring to the addressee. The first surprising observation is that these imperatives can occur without overt subjects even though both languages do not allow for covert subjects in other finite clauses. This exceptional behavior of imperatives is cross-linguistically well known and has given rise to a lot of speculations about the possible absence of a subject in imperatives in general (for syntactic arguments, cf. Platzack and Rosengren, 1997; for arguments in favor of its absence in semantics, cf. Mastop, 2005). The assumption that the interpretation of the subject position in imperatives is not constrained by grammar, but is rather determined pragmatically falls short of at least the following three observations that have repeatedly been stressed in the literature. First, in the absence of an overt subject, second person reference is obligatory (in contrast, truly unspecified positions such as for example unrealized argument positions of infinitives depend on the linguistic or extralinguistic context). Second, in the absence of an overt subject, reflexives are marked as second person. Third, in view of standard assumptions with respect to case and in particular θ -role assignment, the alternation between missing subjects and overt second person pronouns cannot be accounted for satisfactorily. Therefore, I assume that imperatives invariably contain a subject, but that many (though maybe not all) languages54 also have a covert pronoun which may be confined to appearance in imperatives (Potsdam, 1998; Wratil, 2005; Zanuttini, 2008). Wratil (2005) argues that from a syntactic point of view, it has to be different both from PRO (which could never alternate with overt pronouns) and pro (which, if available at all, would be expected to occur in indicatives as well), and calls it I MP PRO . I follow her in assuming that, syntactically, I MPPRO is restricted to the subject position of imperatives. For the semantics it is only relevant that it is a covert variant of the second person pronoun and comes in a singular and a plural variant.55 54 Pace Zhang (1990) and Mauck and Zanuttini (2005), who claim universality of covert imperative subjects. As far as I know, a counter-example is provided by Icelandic where imperativized verbs always co-occur with overt subjects. 55 Han (2000) argues that it is PRO in some languages, and pro in others. Zanuttini (2008) proposes an account for why it might be that some languages allow covert pronominal subjects only in imperatives (see discussion below). As far as I can tell, the semantic account of the subject restriction in imperatives that I propose in the following works independently of whether covert imperative subjects are taken to be pro, PRO, or a specialized element. For the sake of concreteness, I will stick to the assumption of a separate covert pronoun I MPPRO.

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a. b.

I MPPRO c = c A . I MPPRO pl = c A iff c A is a plural individual. Otherwise undefined.

For German (and similarly for analogous examples in English), any theory has to exclude examples like (76). The straightforward solution may seem to simply postulate second person features on the verb. (76)

a.

∗ Gib

b.

∗ Geh

Hans mir einen Kugelschreiber. give.I MP S G Hans me a ballpen es nach Hause. go.I MP S G it to home

But second person subjects can alternate with other types of noun phrases even in languages that are considered to only have second person imperatives.56 For German and English it is well-documented that imperatives can come with quantificational subjects that behave as if they were third person (cf. (77)).57 They can e.g. bind third person possessive pronouns or third person reflexives, cf. (78). (77)

a. b. c.

Everyone take out a pencil! Someone get me an aspirin! Nobody move!

(78)

a. b.

Someonei give me hisi credit card! Everyonei wash himselfi !

Potsdam (1998:his (6a)) Potsdam (1998:his (6d))

Unfortunately, there is no full agreement in the literature as to what other noun phrases are acceptable. I assume that the relevant set is given by what Zanuttini (2008) characterizes as the core variety of American English.58 56 The assumption that, syntactically, these are all subjects (as opposed to vocatives, for example), is argued for convincingly in the literature, e.g. Potsdam (1998). It should immediately become obvious from the occurrence of negative quantifiers as in (77c). With respect to referential DPs, imperative subjects can be distinguished from vocatives by the following criteria: (i) lack of an intonational break, (ii) the possibility of picking out subsets of plural addressees (whereas vocatives always have to refer to the maximal (plural) individual that counts as the addressee), (iii) in English, proper names can appear as imperative subjects only if there is a list of parallel imperative clauses (cf. (80)) while no such restriction exists for vocatives (Zanuttini, 2008). 57 Cf. Mauck and Zanuttini (2005) for a cross-linguistic overview. 58 Zanuttini (2008) departs from the previous literature in distinguishing between two types of speakers of American English. According to her there is a core of possible imperative subjects acceptable to all speakers and an extension of further constructions acceptable only to some. Here, I am trying to capture the grammar of those speaking the core variety. From the discussion in Zanuttini (2008) it does not become entirely clear if the examples in (79) belong to the core or not. According to her initial semantic characterization of the core variety they should: what is required is that the addressee(s) is/are asked to do something himself/herself/themselves. Only some speakers additionally accept cases in which the addressee(s) is/are asked to see to it that someone else brings about a certain state of affairs (p. 186). But on p. 192 she claims that proper names and bare nouns are the only acceptable non-pronominal and non-quantificational imperative subjects, and in footnote 17 she explicitly excludes definites and free relatives (‘indefinites’) as

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In English, definites (79a) and free relatives (79b) can also appear as imperative subjects.,59 (79)

a. b.

The man with the list come here! Potsdam (1998:205) Whoever helped me set up the computer please shut it down again!

Provided that a name refers to an item on a list of alternatives, proper names are acceptable as well (cf. Potsdam, 1998:205).60 (80)

a. b.

# Mary

stand by the door! Mary stand by the door, John scatter the files, and I’ll watch the front!

German allows only a small subset of what is possible in English. We find overt and covert elements referring to the second person (81a), and quantificational subjects (82), but neither proper names (83) nor definites (84a), nor wh-relative clauses (84b): (81)

a.

b.

(82)

a.

b.

die Tür zu! Mach make.I MP S G the door closed ‘Shut the door!’ Mach du die Tür zu! make.I MP S G you the door closed ‘You shut the door!’ mal jeder seinen Namen auf einen Zettel! Schreib name on a sheet write.I MP S G QP RT everyone his ‘Everyone write his name on a sheet!’ Bring mir mal wer ein Aspirin! bring.I MP S G me QP RT someone an aspirin ‘Someone bring me an aspirin!’

not being ‘readily accepted by all speakers of English’. Zanuttini does not disclose further details about her empirical investigations, and all speakers I consulted informally judged these examples less problematic than the ones Zanuttini had earlier excluded from the core variety. Therefore, I assume that examples as in (79) form part of the core variety after all (as suggested by Zanuttini’s earlier semantic characterization). 59

(i)

I will not discuss in detail the case of bare nouns, emphasized in Zanuttini (2008). Boys be the cops and girls be the robbers.

(her (25a))

These cases fall out automatically if we allow for a covert second person pronoun whose appearance is restricted to imperatives (see below). The subjects in (i) can then be treated like overt modified pronouns (e.g. you boys, cf. Lyons, 1999). Note that this is similar to Zanuttini’s assumption of a covert determiner that lacks person features and gets syntactically valued as second person. Lisa Matthewson (p.c.) points out correctly that this predicts that the sentence can only be used if the speaker her/himself is part of neither group, which is at odds with her intuitions, but, as I hope, in line with what speakers of Zanuttini’s core variety of American English should allow. 60 Note that (80a) becomes acceptable if the initial noun phrase is realized with the intonation typical for a vocative; this is not required for the noun phrases in (80b).

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a.

∗ Maria

b.

mach die Tür zu! Maria make.I MP S G the door closed ok as vocative; set off by intonation ∗ Maria mach die Tür zu, Hans schließ das Maria make.I MP S G the door closed, Hans close.I MP S G the die Post. Fenster, und ich hole window, and I fetch.1S G P RES I ND the mail

a.

∗ Derjenige

the-one b.

mit der Liste komm her! with the list come.I MP S G VP RT

∗ Wer

auch immer die Liste hat komm her! whoever the list has come.I MP S G VP RT

It has been claimed in the literature that even third person subjects in imperatives retain an important connection to the addressee: the domain of the quantificational element or the alternative set from which a definite expression is drawn has to be constituted by the people talked to (i.e., the elements/atomic parts of the plural addressee); see Davies (1986) for English, Platzack and Rosengren (1997) for German. Without change in meaning, (82a) and (82b) can be reformulated as (85a) and (85b) respectively: (85)

a.

b.

mal jeder von euch seinen Namen auf einen Schreib name on a write.I MP S G QP RT everyone of you his Zettel! sheet ‘Everyone of you put his name on a sheet.’ Bring mir mal wer von euch ein Aspirin! bring.I MP S G me QP RT someone of you an aspirin ‘Someone of you bring me an aspirin.’

But is this part of the grammar of imperatives or just a logical consequence of these imperatives being used in some sort of directive speech act? Schmerling (1982) shows convincingly that the phenomenon constitutes a grammatical property of the imperative. Other clause types can be used for similar directive purposes; nevertheless, they still lack the requirement that the domain of the quantifier be the set of addressees: (86)

a. b. c.

Somebody fix this typewriter! This typewriter is to be fixed. Somebody has to fix this typewriter!

All three sentences in (86) can be used to get my office mates to take care that the typewriter gets fixed somehow. But the imperative in (86a) crucially differs from the declaratives in (86b) and (86c). Both (86b) and (86c) can be complied with by calling an agency to send someone to fix the typewriter. In that case, none of my officemates does the work himself. This is not an option to comply with (86a). In this

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case it has to be one of the addressees that takes care of the machine. Consequently, the restriction that the subject of an imperative belong to the set of addressees (as observed e.g. in (85)) is not a by-product of the usage made of an imperative, but has to be encoded in its grammar. The resulting hypothesis that imperative subjects always stand in the subset relation to the set of addressees is known as Downing’s characterization (cf. Downing, 1969).61 Issue 3.1 Downing’s characterization of imperative noun phrases The subject of an imperative must stand in a subset relation to the addressee. Potsdam (1998) claims that Issue 3.1 does not hold for English. The examples he adduces to falsify the characterization fall into three classes. Only the first is fully acceptable to speakers of Zanuttini’s (2008) core variety, i.e. the one I am trying to capture here. First, Potsdam observes cases where imperative subjects constitute supersets of the set of persons spoken to. (87)

Come at 8!

intended: the addressee and her husband

But this is a general feature of second person (and thus ‘addressee-referring’) pronouns. It occurs independently of the imperative clause type. (88) exemplifies it for questions: (88)

Why didn’t you (guys) come to the party yesterday? intended: the addressee and her husband

Obviously, (one of) the hearer(s) together with a set of absent people she is contextually understood to form a group with can constitute the referent of the second person plural pronoun. Hence, data like (87) does not provide counter-evidence to Downing’s characterization. The second type of Potsdam’s (1998) problematic imperative subjects is constituted by addressee-referring expressions conjoined with a DP picking out a set that has an empty intersection with the former. Therefore, the subject in its entirety consists of the addressee and other persons that are not conceived of as part of the addressee. This differs from cases like (87) and (88). In (89), the second person pronoun is taken to refer to the person that is present and thus constitutes the addressee. In the cases discussed before, the second person pronoun referred to the group. (89)

a. b.

You and your men be on guard for anything suspicious. Potsdam (1998:207) You and them make a deal! I’m out of this. Potsdam (1998:207)

61 Note that ‘subset relation’ has to be understood loosely enough to encompass the quantificational cases, where one should rather say that the imperative subject quantifies over the set of addressees. See Section 3.2.4.3 for details.

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Interestingly, these are precisely the cases resulting in agreement conflicts resolved by hanging topic constructions (or, marginally, second person inflection) in German declarative clauses. Whatever process is used for the somewhat marginal second person inflection in these cases could be claimed to save Downing’s characterization even in the face of data like (89). (90)

ihr Du und deine Männer {∗ waren/?? wart/, wart} you and your men {were.3P L/were.2P L/, you.2P L were.2P L} gestern zu spät. yesterday too late. ‘You and your men were too late yesterday.’

An even clearer conflict with Issue 3.1 results where there is no overlap between subject and addressee (all examples taken from Potsdam, 1998:208). (91)

a. b.

Those children of yours keep out of my garden, or I’ll set the dog on them! You get the paper and pencil and the catalogue, and George write down the names, and I’ll do the work! Go call him, will you, and tell him we need him and what he’s supposed to do.62

Although Potsdam (1998) and Zanuttini (2008) do not address the issue, confusion with remains of the English subjunctive can be excluded for the first two classes. Consider an example like (92). (92)

Don’t you and {them, him, her} fight again!

Here, the negation is formed with don’t, which is clearly the negation pattern for imperatives (cf. (93)), not for subjunctives that are negated with not (cf. (94)). (93)

Don’t give me that cheap talk!

(94)

a. b.

Who suggested that he not act so silly? Potsdam (1998) John asks that we not cut down his bean stock just yet. Potsdam (1998)

Neither Potsdam (1998) nor Zanuttini (2008) offer negated examples for type three imperatives. Therefore, it is tempting to treat the corresponding clauses as subjunctives. One way to test this is to look at bare noun subjects. These are known to be unacceptable in subjunctive clauses. As subjects of directively used sentences, bare noun subjects also become unacceptable if the addressee is not an element of their extension, which can be ensured by an appropriate vocative (Ms. Heiser in (95b)). (95)

62

a. b.

Girls be the cops, boys be the robbers! Ms. Heiser, (*the) girls be the cops, (*the) boys be the robbers!

Potsdam attributes this example to Poutsma (1928) via Bolinger (1967:354). I inserted the direct argument the names to make it grammatical (thanks to Lisa Matthewson, p.c., for pointing out this independent problem with the original example).

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Potsdam’s (1998) first two classes pattern with other imperatives and can therefore not be dismissed as subjunctives. Yet, I have shown that, contrary to what he claims, the first class does not violate Downing’s characterization at all. The second class should probably be seen as an instance of a marginal repair strategy for particular mismatches for agreement features that can arise with conjunctions. Contrary to Potsdam, who assumes that imperative subjects underlie no restriction whatsoever, I will thus claim that Downing’s characterization holds true.63 For German, Downing’s characterization holds unproblematically. Any attempt to construct examples such that the subject is not a subset of the addressee, results in ungrammaticality.64 ∗ Diese

(96)

Kinder von dir bleibt mir aus dem Garten! these children of you stay.I MP 2P L me.B EN DAT out of.the garden

For German it is straightforward to assume that the subject of imperatives is realized as an overt second person pronoun, as the covert I MPPRO introduced above, or as a partitive with an overt or covert second person domain argument: 63 Echo questions constitute a completely different type of example that raises a problem for Downing’s characterization in English. Mastop (2005) argues that the possibility of exchanges like (i) constitutes evidence against a person restriction on imperative subjects.

(i)

A: Don’t kill yourself! B: Don’t kill myself???

This is an interesting problem, which looks like a peculiarity of English (e.g., the exchange in (i) cannot be translated to German with an imperative in the rhetorical question). Nevertheless, even in English, an imperative addressed to a third party or an imperative containing an overt subject cannot be echoed straightforwardly (cf. (ii)). Both facts cannot be accounted for if there is no restriction on imperative subjects at all: (ii)

a. b.

A (to B): Don’t kill yourself! C: # Don’t kill herself??? A: Don’t YOU kill yourself about it! B: # Don’t I kill myself about it???

Consequently, I think that the burden of explaining (i) should be put on the theory of echoquestions. An analysis along these lines is offered by Kaufmann and Poschmann (2011), who treat echo-questions as instances of reported speech (cf. Poschmann, 2010) and argue that the imperative cases obey exactly the restrictions observed for embedded imperatives in Chapter 6. 64

Cases such as (i) seem to constitute counterexamples. But here the putative subject is rather an instance of a hanging topic. There is an intonational break and there is a preference to insert the overt subject pronoun in order to indicate a shift in the reference of second person pronouns (along the lines discussed for (87)). (i)

a.

b.

(ihr) auf, wer vorbeigeht! Du und deine Leute, passt you and your people, watch-out.I MP P L (you) to, who passes-by ‘You and your people, watch out who passes by.’ ??? Du und sie, schließt (ihr) einen Vertrag! you and they, make.I MP P L (you) a deal ‘You and them make a deal!’

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(97)

Mach {du, I MPPRO, einer (von euch)} die Tür zu! make.I MP {you, I MPPRO, one (of you)} the door close ‘You/One of you close the door!’

The structure underlying a German non-second person imperative subject is given in (98). (98)

QP Q

DP

einer

D’ D

NP

von/[O F] euch/I MPPRO

This restriction on the person marking of the subject has to be determined by the imperativized verb. But it proves surprisingly difficult to encode this either syntactically or semantically. Assume we wanted the imperativized verb to come with a disjunctive feature *⊆addr* that could be checked either against 2p (as carried by second person pronouns or I MPPRO ), or quantifiers, the domain of which was constituted by an element carrying such a feature (as in (98)). While the first part is unproblematic, it is unclear how the part about the domain can be verified. Only the top level of the quantificational DP can be visible to agreement processes, and normally, the domain argument of a quantifier does not project its person features. In other clause types, the person features of the verb can clearly not be determined by the domain argument of a partitive noun phrase. Whatever ties the imperativized verb to second person in the imperative clause (99a) despite its obvious third person subject, fails to do so in (99b). The indicative verb has to appear in the third person singular to agree with its quantificational subject.65

65 Even if in declaratives the person feature of the domain argument is unavailable for verbal agreement, it can appear on bound pronouns as long as the domain argument is spelled out overtly (cf. Zanuttini, 2008):

(i)

Everyone of you should raise (his/her/their)/your hand.

her (19a)

In imperatives, bound second person pronouns are possible even in the absence of overt of you (Potsdam, 1998:240): (ii)

a. b.

One of the boys test {yourself/himself} while I wait. Nobody forget {your/his} lunch for the picnic tomorrow.

It is not clear to me how the binding facts are to be accounted for. Potsdam (1998) suggests dealing with it in terms of semantic agreement. This sounds promising but the phenomenon is in itself not very well understood to date.

3.2

Imperatives at the Syntax-Semantics Interface

(99)

a.

b.

113

Gib mir irgendwer ein dickes Buch rüber. give.I MP S G me someone a fat book over ‘Someone hand me over a fat book!’ ∗ hast, ∗ habt} Irgendwer von euch {hat, mir ein ∗ Someone of you {has.3 P S G, have.2S G, ∗ have.2P L me a dickes Buch rübergegeben. fat book over-handed ‘Someone of you has handed me over a fat book.’

The extraordinary visibility of the domain argument cannot be explained in terms of the particular behavior of I MPPRO. The covert imperative pronoun can always be replaced by an overt second person plural genitive phrase (of you/von euch), giving rise to the same visibility effect. 3.2.4.2 Previous Attempts to Implement the Restriction Zanuttini (2008) offers the most promising syntactic analysis of the addressee relatedness found with imperative subjects. She assumes the presence of a functional projection, the Jussive Phrase, which is special to imperatives and whose head carries second person features. The imperative subject enters into an agreement relation (implemented as Pesetsky and Torrego’s 2007 version of Chomsky’s Agree) with the head of the Jussive Phrase and values the possibly unspecified person feature on the imperative subject: the subject has an unchecked case feature; the head of the Jussive Phrase acts as a probe, enters an Agree relation with the subject, and in so doing assigns a value to the person feature and checks the case feature of the subject. (Zanuttini, 2008:197)

This explains why empty pronominal subjects may appear in imperatives even if languages do not allow for them in declaratives: in any language, the Jussive Phrase is able to value person features on the empty subject pronoun, but the other inflectional heads may be unable to do so. But Zanuttini’s account strikes me as not entirely unproblematic. According to her, it is a case feature (unchecked due to the alleged absence of the tense projection TnsP in imperatives) that forces the subject to enter the agree relation. In order to explain the second person features on the domain of a quantificational subject, Zanuttini assumes that the overt quantifier comes with a covert domain argument (a silent noun) that is also valued via agreement with the head of the Jussive Phrase and thus has to carry the unchecked case feature as well. But as there is no TnsP, the entire subject DP should also bear an unvalued case feature, and it is entirely unclear to me how the Jussive Phrase could at the same time check the case feature of both the entire DP and the silent noun that constitutes its overt domain argument. Zanuttini remains silent about these details. In short, while I am very sympathetic to Zanuttini’s explanation of why extraordinary valuation of unspecified person features is possible in imperatives but not in other clauses, I am not entirely convinced that her proposal really overcomes the

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problem of why the relevant second person information can appear on either the entire subject DP or on its domain argument. Given the difficulties on the syntactic side, a semantic solution may look tempting, and this is indeed what I will resort to (see Section 3.2.4.3). But it’s not entirely straightforward to encode Downing’s characterization as a semantic restriction, either. Second person subjects and contrastively focused proper names or definites can be construed as subsets of the set of addressees, but quantificational subjects cannot. Under the standard interpretation of generalized quantifiers, nobody, everyone, and someone are interpreted as in (100). (100)

a. b. c.

nobody= λPe,st λQ e,st λw.¬(∃x)[P(x)(w) & Q(x)(w)] everyone= λPe,st λQ e,st λw.(∀x)[P(x)(w) → Q(x)(w)] someone= λPe,st λQ e,st λw.(∃x)[P(x)(w) & Q(x)(w)]

Neither these functions themselves, nor the result of applying them to the restrictor property of being one of the addressees in c (i.e., λxλw.x ∈ c A ), are subsets of the set of addressees. After the application, none of you denotes the set of properties none of the addressees in c has, everyone of you denotes the set of properties everyone of the addresssees in c has, and someone of you denotes the set of properties at least one of the addressees in c has.66 An inelegant but technically viable attempt to account for quantificational subjects restricted to the domain constituted by the addressees would be to stick to the purely syntactic solution of letting the imperative require 2p and postulate homophonous doubles of the lexical entries for the quantificational elements nobody, everyone and someone. These entries would have to be restricted to a second person domain (thus carry a presupposition as to their first argument being 2p) and themselves carry both 2p and 3p features (in order to account both for the optional 3p pronoun binding and the satisfaction of the subject agreement requirement of the verb). For German, the proposal would cover the data, without in itself accounting for the quantifiers’ inability to bind second person pronouns. For English wh-relatives, definite descriptions and proper names, lexical doubling is even more implausible. 3.2.4.3 A Quantifier-Theoretic Solution to the Second Person Restriction on Imperative Subjects In this chapter, I will propose a solution that relies on algebraic properties of quantifiers and allows us to assign semantic content to the syntactic feature needed to constrain imperative subjects. Moreover, my account allows for a surprisingly simple explanation of the differences between imperative subjects available in English 66 Under a different understanding of quantifiers where each is identified with the set of elements that count as a proof, the desired subset relation can still not be established for nobody. Intuitively, the proof set for nobody is constituted by the empty set, which is of course a subset of the set of addressees in any context. Nevertheless, this fails to distinguish between nobody ranging over the domain of addressees vs. nobody ranging over any other domain.

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and in German. This raises the hope that it could also account for further parameter settings that may be found cross-linguistically. The challenge raised by what are possible imperative subjects can be summarized as follows (if not specified otherwise, the statements hold for both English and German): • imperatives without an overt subject are understood as if they had an addresseereferring expression as their subject • overt subjects are (i) second person pronouns, or (ii) quantificational expressions with a second person domain, or, only in English (iii) expressions that refer to an element/a subset of the set of addressees For the quantificational cases, we obviously have to look at a property embedded within the subject expression, which suggests that we have to adopt a noncompositional solution. Remember that we cannot generally assume that the entire QP bears the person feature of the domain argument, otherwise one would predict declaratives like (99b) (repeated here as (101)) to allow for second person marking of the verb. (101)

∗ hast, ∗ habt} mir ein Irgendwer von euch {hat, ∗ someone of you {have.3 P S G, have.2 P S G, ∗ have.2 P P L} me a Buch rübergegeben. book over-handed ‘Someone of you has handed me over a book.’

Assuming that F is the critical feature the imperativized verb wants to see, we cannot simply stipulate that 2P percolates up to the DP layer in order to set F = 2P. (102)

everyone of you DP3p,F D’ D

NP

every one x2p In the following I will rely on results from work in quantifier theory to assign a value to F that expresses the second person restriction on the domain without over-riding the syntactic status of third person and without relying on a non-compositional syntax-semantics interface. Assume that a quantificational determiner Det (e.g. every) combines with its domain argument X to yield a quantifier. Johnsen (1987) proves the following (his proposition 2):67 67 Independently, Lerner and Zimmermann (1983) show that this reconstruction of the quantifier domain out of the denotation of the quantifier is possible for each of the common determiners occurring in natural language.

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Proposition 3.1 For each automorphism invariant determiner Det, and each X ∈ P(De ), if Det(X ) is not degenerate, then X = SL(L Det(X ) ). This means that there is a construction S L(L Det(X ) ), the precise nature of which will be clarified below and which, under certain conditions, allows us to extract from the entire quantifier its domain. Let us first check whether the quantifiers in question meet the requirements. Definition 3.1 Det(X ) is degenerate iff Det(X ) = P(De ) or Det(X ) = ∅. every X and no X are degenerate iff X = ∅ (to P(De )), some X degenerates to ∅ iff X = ∅ and to P(De ) iff X = De . In any non-deviant utterance context, the set of addressees has to be a proper subset of De (c S is in De , but is never among the addressees), and, given how we defined utterance contexts, the set of addresses can’t be empty either.68 Obviously, the quantifiers in subject position of imperatives are not degenerate. The second property we have to check is automorphism invariance, which basically says that the quantificational determiner Det only cares about the set relations and cardinalities mentioned and is insensitive to structure-preserving permutations of the universe.69 Definition 3.2 A determiner Det is automorphism invariant, if, whenever X, Y ∈ P(De ) and φ is an automorphism on P(De ), Y ∈ Det(X ) ↔ φ(Y ) ∈ Det(φ(X )). The quantificational determiners to be found in imperatives (everyone, someone, nobody, whoever, the) are all automorphism invariant (cf. Keenan, 1983; van Benthem, 1984b). The construction SL used in Proposition 3.1 relies on Barwise and Cooper’s (1981) notion of a quantifier Q living on a set X . Definition 3.3 Q lives on X ∈ P(De ) iff for any Y ∈ P(De ): Y ∈ Q ↔ Y ∩ X ∈ Q. Each quantifier Q is associated with a set L Q that is the collection of sets Q lives on: Definition 3.4 The live-on set of a quantifier Q is L Q := {X | Q lives on X }. Johnsen (1987) shows that L Q is a filter70 , and that consequently, there is a smallest element in L Q , which is obtained by intersecting the members of L Q . It is denoted by SL(Q). 68 Even the cases of absent wishes or past wishes that have often been claimed to crucially depend on there being no addressee (e.g. cf. Mastop, 2005), are (if interpretable) clearly not degenerate.

(i)

Please, don’t have had an accident with your mother’s car.

Both the imperative subject and other (overt) second person pronouns clearly refer to a specific individual the speaker is imagining as an addressee in a fictitious discourse. Apart from that, as I have argued above, they can likewise be used in a concrete interaction with that same individual. A function f is an automorphism on a structure < A, ⊆>, iff (i) f is a bijective function from A to itself, and (ii) for all X, Y ∈ A : X ⊆ Y iff f (X ) ⊆ f (Y ).

69

A filter is a non-empty subset F of a lattice < L , ∩, ∪ > such that (i) if X ∈ F, Y ∈ L and X ⊆ Y , then Y ∈ F, and (ii) if X, Y ∈ F, then (X ∩ Y ) ∈ F.

70

3.2

Imperatives at the Syntax-Semantics Interface

Definition 3.5 The smallest live-on set of a quantifier Q is SL(Q) :=

117



L Q.

We can now use the function SL to specify the restriction on the domain of a subject quantifier imposed by the imperative, namely that it be the set of addressees. Abstracting away from a proper treatment of the plural, I write C A for the set containing the addressee(s) (in the case of a single addressee, C A = {c A }).71 We can now define a feature [L c A ]72 as the value of F, and assume that this is what the imperativized verb has to check against. Definition 3.6 (preliminary) A DP bears [L c A ] iff SL(D Pc ) = C A . This looks satisfactory for quantificational imperative subjects, but it’s not immediately applicable to imperative subjects that refer to the addressee(s) (cf. (103a)) or one of the addressees (cf. (103b)). Also, we have not yet considered free relatives (whoever) and definite descriptions (cf. (107)). Let us first focus on the referential cases. (103)

a. b.

{You2 p , I MPPRO2 p } open the door. John open the door and Mary carry the piano.

The two cases are quite different. Despite being among the addressees, syntactically, John and Mary can still behave as third person subjects (as evidenced by the pronoun in (104)). (104)

Kids, John help himself and Mary help Paul.

Therefore, (103b) cannot be analysed by a shift to a subcontext as in (105) (in the sense of Zimmermann, 1991). Here, the first conjunct is uttered in a context with a plural addressee (all the students), but in the second conjunct the speaker zooms in on a smaller context where only one (or a proper subset) of the students gets addressed. This shift is required to make the contrastive focus interpretable. The new addressee is referred to by a second person expression, which can also bind second person reflexives (in contrast to the proper nouns John and Mary in (104)). (105)

Nearly all of you can wait for the TA, but YOU help yourself!

But both cases in (103) can be assimilated to the obviously quantificational ones under a Montagovian treatment of NPs as uniformly denoting quantifiers, cf. (106). Since proper names can only appear when they are part of the addressee, and you denotes the addressee(s), it is immediately obvious that both quantifiers live 71 Cf. Schwarzschild (1996) for a theory of plural; for an overview, cf. von Stechow (2004). Plural individuals must somehow be turned into sets of atoms of the correct type to constitute appropriate domains for quantifiers. If C A is the singleton set {c A }, it does not constitute an appropriate value for the quantifier domain. But this is just as with any other quantifiers (e.g. every gnu is generally taken to presuppose that there are at least two gnus; cf. Heim and Kratzer (1998) for discussion). 72 The abbreviation stands for lives on the addressee, any resemblance to other syntactic properties being purely coincidental.

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3 Imperatives as Graded Modals

on the set corresponding to the addressee(s) when occurring as the subject of an imperative.73 (106)

a. b.

x2 p c is defined if cG (x) = c A . If defined, x2 p c = λP.P(c A ) John c = λP.P(J ohn)

Now, second person referential subjects as in (103a) can be explained straightforwardly with the help of Proposition 3.1. For (106a), the intersection of all properties the addressee has is the set containing the addressee. But things are more complicated for subjects that pick out one among the addressees, as in (103b). For (106b), we consider SL(John) = {J ohn}, and in the given context John is not the only addressee, but one of more addressees, {J ohn} ⊂ C A . It turns out that we make exactly the right predictions if, for English, we loosen the requirement on the imperative subject to allow also for proper subsets of the addressee as the smallest set the quantifier lives on. Consider the examples with free relatives and definite descriptions (cf. (107)). (107)

a. b.

Whoever helped me set up the computer please shut it down again. The man with the projector put it down immediately.

The determiners whoever and the typically occur with a domain that is smaller than the set of addressees: they refer to the one element within the set of addressees that is the person who helped to set up the computer, or the man carrying the projector respectively.74 Therefore, they are similar to (103b) and application of SL can yield a proper subset of C A . This modification allows for a straightforward explanation of the contrast observed between English and German. ∗L c A ∗ has to be interpreted slightly differently in these two languages. While English ∗L ec A ∗ requires the quantifier to live g on a (possibly improper) subset of the set of addressees, German ∗L c A ∗ requires the quantifier to live on the set of addressees as such. Consequently, proper names, free relatives and definite descriptions are ruled out in German, while overt second person pronouns and quantificational elements like everyone, someone and nobody are acceptable. Definition 3.7 The L c A -feature refined for English and German: English: A DP bears L ec A iff SL(D P) ⊆ C A . g German: A DP bears L c A iff SL(D P) = C A . I also consider the treatment promising with respect to the agreement patterns observed with such second person restricted quantificational elements in imperatives 73 Strictly speaking, proper names N are equivalent to Det N , where Det can be any quantificational (conservative) determiner (e.g. every, some). For instance, [John] N = λx.[x = j], [(every) John] D P c = λQ.∀x[x = j → Q(x)]. But this is equivalent to λQ.Q( j). Lerner and Zimmermann (1983) adduce proper names as evidence that the determiner cannot in general be recovered from the quantifier (in contrast to the domain, cf. Proposition 3.1). 74 This is obvious for the definite in (107b), and maybe less so for (107a). But the standard interpretation of free relatives of the ever-type is in terms of definite descriptions that carry an additional presupposition of indifference or ignorance (cf. von Fintel, 2000).

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versus in other contexts. Of course, L c A is available on the respective DPs irrespective of the clause type. But it enters verbal agreement only in imperatives and it is only in imperatives that we find phenomena of semantic agreement with covert domain arguments (see fn. 65). It is tempting to speculate that only the agreement operation triggered by the morphology of the imperativized verb makes the domain property visible for semantic agreement. For cases as in (ii) (repeated here as (108)), we have to say that the pronouns bound by the quantified noun phrase agree with their binder in number but allow for agreement in person with the domain feature L c A .75 (108)

a. b.

One of the boys test {yourself/himself} while I wait. Nobody forget {your/his} lunch for the picnic tomorrow.

In an earlier version of this work (Schwager, 2006c), I assumed that in colloquial variants of Austrian German (ACG) imperativized verbs agree with the domain argument of quantificational elements not only in person, but also in number. Plural imperatives without overt subjects look like (109), and (110) exemplifies quantificational subjects. (109)

(110)

Gebts ihm eine Chance! give.I MP.P L him a chance (addressing more than one person): ‘Give him a chance!’ a.

b.

c.

ACG

mir da bloß niemand in das Zimmer! Gehts go.I MP.P L me.B EN DAT there DP RT nobody into the room ‘Nobody (of you) enter that room!’ ACG Gebts mir mal wer einen Schraubenzieher! give.I MP.P L me QP RT someone a screwdriver ‘Someone (of you) give me a screwdriver!’ ACG euch mal jeder die Füße! Waschts wash.I MP.P L yourself QP RT everyone the feet ‘Everyone of you wash his/her feet!’ ACG

I am indebted to Hubert Truckenbrodt (p.c.) for pointing out to me that in this variant the elements should better be analyzed as floating quantifiers: in contrast to the Standard German examples, they can co-occur with overt second person plural pronouns in the nominative (especially, but not necessarily, for contrast or emphasis). (111)

Waschts ihr euch mal jeder die Füße! wash.I MP.P L you yourself QP RT everyone the feet ‘Everyone of you wash his/her feet!’

ACG

However, pronominal elements bound by the quantificational subject still show third person agreement. Second person singular (deine ‘yours’) is ungrammatical, 75 This is similar to Zanuttini’s (2008) assumption that valuation of covert domain features happens in imperatives only. Unfortunately, as it stands, neither approach accounts for the occasional visibility of the person features of overt domain arguments for pronominal binding in indicatives, cf. (i) in fn. 65 above.

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because it fails to get bound by the quantifier, and at the same time, there is no singular addressee so as to interpret it deictically.76 (112)

Gebts mir mal weri seinei /∗ deine/∗ eurei Telefonnummer! give.I MP.P L me QP RT someone his/your.S G/your.P L phone-number ‘Someone give me his phone number.’

The details of the construction’s syntactic make-up merit further investigation. Also the strong preference to insert a particle like mal with quantificational imperative subjects both in Standard German and in the Austrian varieties deserves closer attention.77 So far, I have specified what singles out possible imperative subjects in English and German respectively, but I have not offered an explanation of how this property becomes operative to constrain syntactically wel-formed or semantically interpretable structures. The variants of L c A are unlike the standard values of grammatical person (first, second, third) in that they constitute non-lexical semantic properties of noun phrases (they are properties of the quantifier denotation). Therefore, it is not entirely clear how they can be made visible to syntactic agreement processes. I can think of two solutions to this puzzle. On the one hand, we can treat L c A as a constraint on interpretability and make it a presupposition introduced by the imperative morphology. This may look tricky: the Montagovian view of subjects as quantifiers that take the verb phrase as an argument gives rise to the wrong functor-argument structure for letting the verb impose requirements on its subject. But mediation of a functional head carrying the presupposition provides a natural solution. We simply assume a functional projection (most likely AgrSP) that is marked as [∗L c A ∗] by the imperativized verb and is interpreted in terms of functional application if the subject meets L c A , and leads to presupposition failure

76 For reasons unclear to me at the moment, in these cases, the overt subject pronoun cannot be inserted with any of the agreement variants (eure is of course fully acceptable on the referential reading where all the addressees share one telephone number):

(i)

∗ Gebts ihr seine/deine/eure Telefonnummer! mir mal wer give.I MP.P L (∗ you) me QP RT someone his/your.S G/your.P L phone-number for: ‘Someone give me his phone number.’

The explanation of this contrast has to be left for future research. In any case, the phenomenon is not specific to imperatives: (ii)

? Ihr

habts mir jeder seine/eure/deine Telefonnumer you.2P L have.I ND P RES 2P L me everyone his/your.2P L/your.2P L telephone-number gegeben. given for: ‘Everyone of you has given me his phone number.’

In the presence of an overt subject pronoun, both imperatives and declaratives block binding of a possessive pronoun by the floating quantifier. 77 I am indebted to Anita Mittwoch (p.c.) for pointing this out to me.

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Imperatives at the Syntax-Semantics Interface

121

otherwise. The crucial structural assumptions are sketched in (113)–(115); the interpretational requirement is spelled out in (116). (113)

[CP OPImp [C  [C verb.I MP] [ Agr S P DP [ Agr S  AgrS L c A [VP ti t j ]]]]]

(114)

AgrS’ c = VP c AgrSP L c A

(115)

DP AgrS

(116)

(115) c is defined only if SL(DP c ) = C A . If defined, (115) c = DP c (AgrS’ c ).

The other possibility is to reconsider the visibility of (non-lexical) semantic properties at the syntax-semantics interface in general. Other cases in favor of such a move are the agreement patterns observed with pronouns in English imperatives (repeated in (117)) and, as mentioned in passing, semantic number agreement, available in English but not in German (cf. (118)). (117)

Everyone raise his/your hand!

(118)

a. b.

c.

There was/were lots of people. Da waren/∗ war viele Leute. there be.PAST.3 P P L /∗ be.PAST.3 P S G many people ‘There were lots of people.’ Every boy did his/? their homework.

The distinction between mass and count nouns is another domain showing interesting effects in this respect. I am indebted to Manfred Bierwisch (p.c.) for pointing out the German example in (119), which displays unexpected plural marking on the copula. (119)

Das sind 20 Blatt. this.S G are.P L 20 sheet.S G ‘That is 20 sheet.’

Another case that may turn out to require a similar mechanism is the shift from individual noun to mass noun in (120a) by what Pelletier (1975) calls the Universal Grinder (abbreviated: UG). It is still ill-understood how this renders acceptable the empty determiner unavailable for singular count nouns. (120)

a. b.

There was dog all over the road. There was [DP ∅Det UG(dog)] all over the road.

For the moment, I want to stick to the possibility of encoding L c A -agreement via an intervening functional projection. But the potential visibility of non-lexical semantic properties at the interface to syntax is surely of high interest to future research on the organization of natural language grammar.

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3 Imperatives as Graded Modals

3.2.4.4 Conclusion In this section, I have defended the claim that imperative subjects are restricted to refer to, or quantify over, a (sub)set containing the addressee(s). I have shown that we are left with a puzzle as to how to encode this as a restriction introduced by the imperativized verb. I hope to have shown that, relying on the algebraic properties of quantifier domains, we arrive at a sensible way to encode the restriction in terms of the feature called L c A . Moreover, the account allows for a natural parameterization that derives the constraints to be found in English vs. in German. Last but not least, no matter how we choose to make L c A itself visible at the interface, letting L c A enter an agreement process pertaining only to imperatives provides a natural starting point for explaining why the features of even a covert domain argument are visible to other syntactic processes in imperatives, but not in other clause types. This is needed in order to explain the optional agreement patterns observed with pronominal elements in English.

3.2.5 Do Imperatives Express Personal Modality? In Section 3.1.3 I introduced the distinction between personal modality (expressed by modals that are control verbs syntactically and combine with personal conversational backgrounds, an individual and a property semantically) and impersonal modality (expressed by modals that are raising verbs syntactically and combine with impersonal modal backgrounds and a proposition semantically). Since I have argued that imperatives are similar to modal verbs, I am now forced to investigate whether they express personal or impersonal modality. Having looked in more detail at the properties of imperative subjects (see Section 3.2.4), we are now in position to investigate the matter. Unfortunately, most of the classical tests introduced in Section 3.1.1 will not prove applicable to imperatives in a fully conclusive way. First, consider German VP-topicalization together with the subject as in (121a) (repeating (5a)). Of course, this requires an overt subject to begin with. German imperatives do allow for subjects, so in principle the construction should be testable. It seems that (121b) is quite unacceptable. (121)

a.

b.

Ein Außenseiter gewonnen hat hier noch nie. an outsider won.PP has here still never ‘It has never been the case so far that an outsider would have won here.’ ∗ DU auf die Party komm auf keinen Fall. you to the party come.I MP S G in no case ‘YOU shouldn’t come to the party under any circumstances.’

According to the test (see Section 3.1.1) this should count as evidence in favor of personal modality. But the constructions are not entirely parallel. As the modal operator in the imperative is covert and requires overt movement of the imperativized

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verb, the VP to be fronted contains a trace for the finite verb. The construction is thus more parallel to the equally unacceptable (122): (122)

∗ [Hans

Hans

auf die Party] kommt auf keinen Fall. to the party come.3 P S G P RES I ND in no case

The VP-topicalization test seems to be inapplicable for syntactic reasons. Second, selectional restrictions don’t prove decisive either. As we have seen above, the subject has to be (one of the) addressee(s). Now, being an addressee in itself requires animacy. This bleeds any potential selectional restrictions of the imperative modality. Consider the paradigm in (123). (123)

a. b. c. d.

Admire Leonardo, Fritz! Leonardo, prime number! ?? /ok Be a prime number (, next number)! # Be a prime number, Fritz! # Admire

The crucial example is (123c). Here, the addressee (and hence, the subject) is the next number which meets the selectional restrictions of the lexical verb (be a prime number). Therefore, if I MPMOD were to combine with a proposition, we would not expect this to be any more deviant than (123a). It seems to be slightly marked though, and therefore we might assume that imperatives come with an agency restriction on their subject. In order to encode that, we would have to resort to personal modality. But on closer inspection, what is really strange about (123c) is the vocative. Leaving out the vocative, it becomes a lot easier to imagine it used as the urgent wish, muttered to oneself,78 of a person who has just made a bet that the next number in roulette will be prime. What I want to claim at this point is that apparent selectional restrictions with imperatives rather derive from general conversational restrictions as to what constitutes a possible addressee. Whatever is granted addressee status is automatically also granted the status of a possible subject of an imperative. Therefore, it seems impossible to independently test for the selectional restrictions of the imperative operator. Again, we do not have evidence in either direction. Third, testing for truth-conditional invariance under passivization seems to be hopeless. Even for those willing to believe in truth conditions of imperatives (like me), the intuitions are easily blurred by pragmatic notions of what would count as fulfilling an imperative. Moreover, imperatives are well known to be hard to passivize in a lot of languages, if not universally.79 Trying to be as attentive to the first worry as possible, we might still be able to overcome the second with a slight

78

Note that this muttering to oneself is crucial. I would like to speculate that this is due to a (pragmatic) mechanism of what counts as the addressee in a context which has to account for the fact that, as soon as there are people around, it becomes extremely misleading to address inanimate objects. 79 The data concerning passivization are one of the puzzles with imperatives I will have little or nothing to say about. Data from German suggests that this might be a reflex of passivized predicates

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3 Imperatives as Graded Modals

modification of the passivization test. Instead of passivization, we can try for lexical converses (e.g. follow/precede, sell/buy, give/receive). As with passivization, raising verbs, and thus epistemically, interpreted modals as in (124), are truth-conditionally invariant under substitution of converse descriptions. Control verbs and personal deontic verbs80 as in (125) are not. (124)

a. b.

Werther must be giving a letter to Charlotte right now. Charlotte must be receiving a letter from Werther right now.

(125)

a. b.

Werther is obliged to give a letter to Charlotte. Charlotte is obliged to receive a letter from Werther.

This relates directly to a footnote in Cresswell (1973:231, fn 191) who remarks that an appropriate semantics for the verb order should be able to account for the lack of entailment relations between (126a) and (126b): (126)

a. b.

John ordered Bill to follow Arabella. John ordered Arabella to precede Bill.

being incompatible with usage in C OMMANDs. C URSes (cf. (ia)) and reference to hypothetical experiences (cf. (ib)) are perfectly acceptable: (i)

a.

b.

von einem Haifisch gebissen! Werd shark bitten get.I MP S G by a roughly: ‘Get bitten by a shark (you damn idiot)!’ DU mal von einem Haifisch gebissen! Werd shark bitten get.I MP S G you QP RT by a roughly: ‘Get bitten by a shark yourself (before talking like that).’

Obviously, passivized imperatives do not allow for the subject (now the patient) to be in control of the event. But C OMMANDing, O RDER ing or A DVISing someone to do something requires that that person be able to bring about the event or at least prevent it from happening. The closest to C OMMAND, O RDER, or A DVICE imperatives with passivized predicates are therefore phrased with lass dich. . . ‘let yourself’. Substituting them in the examples in (i) changes their meaning. (ii)

dich von einem Haifisch beißen! Lass shark bite let.I MP S G you.ACC by a (roughly: ‘Make it the case that a shark bites you.’)

I take these observations as further corroboration of my claim that the imperative clause type does not depend on agency. Yet, a felicitous use in a C OMMAND, an O RDER , or an A DVICE does require an agent (or at least a ‘deliberate undergoer’, cf. (ii)). Therefore, passivized imperatives (like those involving individual level predicates, see Sections 3.2.2 and 6.3) are confined pragmatically to more marginal usages of imperatives. 80 Ignoring the syntactic make-up, I assume that be obliged to is interpreted as personal necessity with a personal deontic modal base (abstracting away from how to treat the event frame): (i)

be obliged to= λxλ f λgλPλtλw.(∀w  ∈ O( f (x), g(x), t, w))[P(x)(w )], f of type

e, s, s, t, t, gemp the empty ordering source (for consistency with other personal modals in a e, s, s, t, t-variant, as well), P of type e, s, t.

3.2

Imperatives at the Syntax-Semantics Interface

125

Given that the examples in (126) constitute natural reports of imperatives uttered by John, we might expect imperatives to show the same asymmetry under change of perspective. And this seems to be borne out indeed, providing a first argument in favor of personal modality. Uttering (127a) to Werther does not require the speaker to be inclined to issue (127b) to Charlotte, or, more dramatically, a speaker who was issuing both (127a) to Werther and (127c) to Charlotte might be called cruel, but not necessarily inconsistent. (127)

a. b. c.

Give a letter to Charlotte! Receive a letter from Werther! Don’t receive a letter from Werther!

Another observation in favor of a treatment in terms of personal modality is as follows: one could consistently explain the rules of a game saying (128), addressing with the first conjunct Team A (youa ), and with the second conjunct Team B (youb ). (128)

Youa , score as many goals as possible, and, youb , don’t let them score goals!

Does that mean that despite the absence of syntactic evidence for personal modals we need personal modal bases, and thus also have to assume personal modals so as to have the right types to combine? If the scenarios described for (127) are acceptable, we could explain this by adopting two different conversational backgrounds that both take into account the wishes of the speaker. This does not necessarily call for a personal modal base. Since no quantification is involved, we could easily use what I want Werther to do for (127a) and what I want Charlotte to do for (127b). Since the wishes of a speaker need not be consistent, this would account for this particular case. But this kind of solution does not seem to work for (128). By definition, rules of games are better kept consistent (otherwise, a game is not well-defined) and they are necessarily objective. Therefore, it cannot be the case that they explicitly oblige one particular person to do p and another particular person to do ¬ p. But they can do so indirectly: asymmetrical games as the one we are dealing with here, involve different roles (e.g., attackers and defenders; Mr. X and the detectives). Winning the game means different things for them respectively. Therefore, the goal of winning the game amounts to different subgoals conditional on the role someone is supposed to play. But then, even from an impersonal modal base, different actions may be necessary for different people depending on what role they play in the game. So far, we have only shown that neither VP topicalization nor selectional restrictions can be tested properly due to interfering independent factors. Invariant truth conditions under asymmetric predicates (as a variant of the classical passivization test) first seemed to provide evidence for personal conversational backgrounds (and thus personal modals), but the asymmetries also prove to be soluble with appropriate impersonal conversational backgrounds. In the following, I will argue that quantifiers in subject position of imperatives provide evidence in favor of imperatives taking propositional arguments.

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3 Imperatives as Graded Modals

The fourth test to distinguish personal and impersonal modality regards the scope of quantifiers in subject position. Narrow scope with respect to the modal should only be possible with impersonal modality. As we saw in Section 3.2.4, some languages allow for particular quantified subjects in addition to the usual overt or covert second person pronouns. Consider (129), an instance of a quantified subject imperative in German. (129)

mir bloß keiner in das Zimmer! Geh go.I MP S G me.B EN DAT DP RT no-one into the room ‘Nobody enter the room!’

Examples like (129) only allow for narrow scope of the negative existential (cf. (130a)); a wide scope reading with respect to the necessity operator is completely excluded (cf. (130b)). (130)

a. b.

 f,g λw.¬∃x[go-into-the-room(w, x)] ¬∃x[ f,g go-into-the-room(w, x)]

Maybe this is not so telling as it seemed at first glance. In Section 3.2.4, I argued that in these cases the quantifier has to come with a domain restriction to the group of addressees. Consequently, we could still assume that the modal operator combined with I MPPRO and the property of being a group G so that no one in G enters the room. Nevertheless, from the syntactic point of view, it is the quantificational element keiner ‘no-one’ that occupies the subject position. If it takes narrow scope with respect to the modal, even if semantically we could construe the modal’s argument as a property the subject has to have, syntactically, the relevant property has to be expressed by a constituent that contains a position for a quantificational subject.81 No matter whether the modality in question is personal or impersonal, what is puzzling is that we do not find a wide scope construal for the entire subject phrase as sketched in (131). (131)

¬(∃x ∈ C A )[ f,g λw.go-into-the-room(w, x)] ‘for none of you is it the case that (s)he has to go into the room’

Either this is a case of a more general instance of missing wide scope readings for especially negative quantifiers in imperatives, or it has to do with the person marking on the domain argument rather than on the quantifier itself.82 Indefinite subjects display the same lack of wide scope readings. Deontic modal verbs allow for anaphoric reference to an indefinite subject term (cf. (132a)); imperatives do not. The latter only allow for a narrow scope construal of the indefinite (cf. (132b)).

81

Note that there is a unique property corresponding to any proposition p, namely the one of living in a world w ∈ p, cf. Lewis (1979a).

82 For the scope of quantificational elements in subject positions of imperatives, cf. also Schmerling (1982).

3.2

Imperatives at the Syntax-Semantics Interface

(132)

a.

b.

127

Eineri von euch muss mir jetzt mal bitte 3 Euro geben. one of you must me now QP RT please 3 euros give. Derjenigei schuldet mir ohnehin noch 20. The-one owes me in-any-case still 20 ‘One of you has to give me 3 euros, please. That person owes me 20.’ Gib mir jetzt mal eineri von euch 3 Euro, bitte. give.I MP S G me now QP RT one of you 3 euros, please. # Derjenige . . . i That-personi . . . ‘One of you give me 3 euros, please. #That person . . . ’

But note that this is not confined to indefinites in subject position. It seems that indefinites in object position also fail to take wide scope. (133)

Lies einen Roman ehe wir uns wieder sehen! read.I MP S G a novel before we us again see ‘Read a novel before we meet again.’ not: ‘There is a particular novel s.t. you should read it before we meet again.’

In this case, wide scope for the indefinite could only amount to a specific reading.83 Portner (2004) claims that specific readings for indefinites are excluded from imperatives in general. This does not hold for German. If the indefinite is moved to the preverbal position a specific, wide-scope reading of the indefinite becomes possible:84 (134)

Einen Romani lies ehe wir uns wieder sehen! a novel read.I MP S G before we us again see ok: ‘One particular novel you should read before we meet again, namely. . . .’

In contrast to ordinary indefinites or quantifiers, quantificational subjects in imperatives cannot be moved to the preverbal position, which might account for their limited scoping possibilities. The reasons for this particular syntactic restriction have to await further research. Taking together the data considered in this section, we can conclude that syntactically, imperatives combine with clauses. Just as in the case of impersonal modals, there is no need for combining them with personal ordering sources. I thus propose to treat the imperative modal operator as an instance of impersonal modality that combines with impersonal conversational backgrounds.

83 The effect of speaker specificity in wide scope indefinites seems to be a restriction induced by performative modals, see Section 2.2.1. 84

Alternatively, (134) can be realized with contrastive stress on the indefinite determiner einen or the noun Roman ‘novel’. Then the respective contrastive readings obtain, e.g. one novel instead of many, or a novel instead of a novella, a drama, or some other genre.

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3 Imperatives as Graded Modals

3.3 Conclusion In this chapter, I have developed the propositional meaning component expressed by imperative clauses. I have argued that the morphology of the imperativized verb indicates the presence of a necessity operator that takes a propositional complement. In simple imperatives, the modal operator expresses that its prejacent is necessary at the utterance time. In addition to the conversational background arguments that are found with any modal operator, the imperative modal operator requires a further temporal argument as the intended interval at which the event/state is required to hold. Crosslinguistically, my assumptions leave room for parametrization with respect to the aspectual relation between the required event and interval at which it is required (perfective vs. imperfective imperatives) and the temporal allocation of the event frame (near or distant future). Parametrization with respect to the reference time (‘present’ vs. ‘past imperatives’) in Dutch yields the semantic object expressed in what I have argued to constitute a related minor clause type of reproachatives.85 The imperative morphology also constrains the prejacent to have a subject that—treated as a quantifier—has as its domain the set of addressees (German) or a (possibly proper) subset thereof (English). This explains why both English and German allow for overt or covert second person subjects, as well as quantifiers over the set of addressees, but only English additionally allows for proper names, definites, and free relatives. So far, my analysis accounts for the parallels with modalized propositions as expressed by modal verbs. In the following chapter, I will explore how the context dependence of the modalized proposition in connection with an additional presuppositional meaning component accounts for the imperative specific effects at the level of speech acts.

85

The construction also involves a shift in the modal base, see Schwager (t.a.) for discussion.

Chapter 4

From Modalized Propositions to Speech Acts

In this chapter, I will show how the context dependence of the propositional meaning of the imperative worked out in the previous chapter can be made to account for the functions listed in Section 1.2 and how an additional presuppositional meaning component can account for the performative effects and avoid overgeneration. Depending on the specific contextual constellations (in particular the interpretation of the pronominal elements corresponding to modal base and ordering source), we derive truth conditions that account for why their expression in a given context amounts to a particular conversational move, i.e. a particular speech act. To account for the behavior of imperatives at the semantics-pragmatics interface, I will thus first consider the influence of particular values for the conversational backgrounds appearing as arguments of the imperative modal operator (Section 4.1). Then, I will turn to the question why imperatives cannot be used for A SSERTIONs about modal states of affairs. To ensure the non-assertoric effect, I will spell out four presuppositions on the values of the modal base arguments (Section 4.2). These two aspects together will provide an answer both to the general question of why imperatives are prototypically used for O RDERs (the problem of clause type encoding, CTE), and to the specific question of what speech act type a particular imperative utterance is used for (the problem of assigning speech act types to utterances, ASA).

4.1 Contextual Dependence in the Propositional Meaning Components Let’s briefly recapitulate the different usages of imperatives we want to account for (see Section 1.2). (1)–(4b) display various types of O RDERs, C OMMANDs, P ROHI BITION s, W ISH es, and A DVICE that will be dealt with in Sections 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.3, and 4.1.4 respectively.1

1

WARNINGs and I NSTRUCTION s are not discussed in detail. I assume that they can be derived in a similar way as A DVICE and are largely unproblematic.

M. Kaufmann, Interpreting Imperatives, Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy 88, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012 DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-2269-9_4, 

129

130

(1)

(2)

4 From Modalized Propositions to Speech Acts

a. b. c. d.

e.

Get up! O RDER, single occasion Be nice to your grandmother! O RDER, long term Stay away from cigarettes! O RDER, long term Üb immer Treu und Redlichkeit! exert.I MP always faithfulness and honesty ‘Be always faithful and honest!’ proverbs Don’t budge an inch! P ROHIBITION, single occasion

a. b.

Have fun! Please, don’t have broken another vase!

(3)

Run (. . . there’s an avalanche approaching)!

(4)

a. b.

A: How do I make lasagne? B: Cut onions, boil tomatoes. . . A: How do I get to Rüsselsheim tonight? B: Take the S8, it’s more regular than the S9.2

W ISH W ISH, past WARNING I NSTRUCTION A DVICE

All these cases can be derived straightforwardly from different values for modal base and ordering source. The various types of O RDERs in (1) fall out from different properties of the prejacent proposition. P ROHIBITION s (cf. (1e)) can be derived as C OMMANDs that something should not happen. In contrast, P ERMISSIONs and for example-A DVICE are associated with possibility (see Section 1.2). It is thus not surprising that the necessity semantics does not readily account for cases like (5a) and the second reading of (5b). (5)

a. b.

Take some more (if you want)! P ERMISSION Kauf zum Beispiel keine Zigaretten. buy.I MP for example no cigarettes Reading 1: ‘One thing you have to do: don’t buy cigarettes.’ A DVICE (unproblematic) Reading 2: ‘One thing you could do: don’t buy cigarettes.’ for example-A DVICE (possibility-like)

As argued above, I do not think that either of them should be considered evidence that imperatives are ambiguous between containing a necessity and a possibility operator (as argued for by Platzack and Rosengren, 1997, for example). In Chapter 5, I will discuss both cases and spell out a pragmatic solution for P ER MISSION s and a semantic solution for for example-A DVICE. C ONCESSION s like (6) constitute another case that may allow for a possibility-like paraphrase, but I will only consider them in passing (see Section 4.2.3). (6)

Well then go to that damn party!

C ONCESSION

2 Rüsselsheim is a small town in the vicinity of Frankfurt/Main and belongs to the Rhine-Main Metropolitan region. S8 is one of the train lines of that transport association.

4.1

Contextual Dependence in the Propositional Meaning Components

131

For these cases I will suggest a pragmatic treatment similar to the one for P ERMIS SION s. It is also not obvious how the proposed semantics for the imperative should contribute to the conditional readings observed for conjunctions and disjunctions with mixed sentence types as in (7). (7)

a. b.

Get out of here or I’ll kill you! Come in and you’ll feel better.

conditional disjunction (IoD) conditional conjunction (IaD)

In Section 6.3.3, I will show how the imperative semantics proposed here together with a non-classical treatment of disjunction gives the right results for the conditional disjunction cases. In Section 6.3.2, I will propose an analysis for conditional conjunctions that integrates the ordinary semantic contribution of the imperative into this particular construction.

4.1.1 ORDERs, COMMANDs, and REQUESTs O RDERs have been singled out as the default usage of imperatives (see Section 1.1.3). I assume that, if a modalized proposition achieves a direct speech act of ordering, it involves a conversational background of what I order you to do. C OMMANDs and R EQUESTs involve closely related backgrounds.3 A simple O RDER like (8a) comes out as in (8b). (8)

a. b.

Get up! O RDER, single occasion According to what I order you to do, it is necessary that you get up (now).

We could thus assume that, if used as an O RDER, (8a) expresses simple necessity with respect to a modal base what the speaker orders and an empty ordering source (cG (g) = cbemp ), cf. (9). (9)

(preliminary) [[OPImp f g t ][ I MPPRO get up]]c = 1 iff (∀w ∈ O( f, g, cT , cW ))[(∃e)[τ (e) ⊆ t & get-up(c A )(e)(w)]], where f = ‘what the speaker orders’ and g = cbemp . presupposes: ¬(t < cT ).

This might indeed be the correct analysis for imperatives that occur in purely authoritative environments as, for example, military orders. But most order-like imperatives serve to guide the addressee’s actions by taking into account the particular situation the addressee is in. Obviously, they pay attention to what count as possible actions for the addressee, and, more generally, what count as possible future

3 The subtle differences are orthogonal to our considerations and have to be supplied by an appropriate speech act theory. As a starting point, consider e.g. Searle and Vanderveken (1985).

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4 From Modalized Propositions to Speech Acts

courses of events at the utterance time. Therefore, I will assume that the speaker’s commands are taken as the ordering source, while the modal base is constituted by what speaker and hearer jointly take to be possible future courses of events, i.e. the common ground CG(c). Therefore the set of worlds that gets ordered according to the speaker’s commands is the context set CS(c) (see Section 1.4). This conversational background differs from the ones we have seen before in that it is context dependent, but not world dependent. To each world, it assigns the common ground of the utterance context, i.e. the set of propositions that constitute mutual joint belief (cf. Stalnaker, 1978).4 In the following, I will write f CG(c) for the function that assigns to any w ∈ W the set of propositions that constitute the common ground CG of c. A simple O RDER results if the modal base is set to f CG(c) (I will assume that this is contributed by the modal operator itself) and the contextually given variable assignment cG interprets the ordering source variable g as referring to the function g that maps any world w on what the speaker orders in w. (10)

[[OPImp f g t ][ I MPPRO get up ]]c = 1 iff (∀w ∈ O( f CG(c) , g, cT , cW ))[(∃e)[τ (e) ⊆ t & get-up(c A )(e)(w)]], where g = ‘what the speaker orders’. presupposes: ¬(t < cT ).

This says that among the worlds that we jointly hold possible,5 the ones that conform best with what I order you to do all make true that you get up within the interval I have in mind (the event frame t). Leaving aside for the moment all natural worries about the imperative’s meaning constituting a truth condition proper, I consider this a favorable prediction. I also take it to be an advantage over the simpler formulation in (9) that potential inconsistency in what the speaker orders does not render the imperative vacuous. In contrast to modal bases, ordering sources may be inconsistent without trivializing necessity and possibility (see the discussion in Section 3.1 above). Of course, we now need to require that the imperative’s ordering source

4 Note that there are infinitely many possible ways of describing the context set through the intersection of a set of propositions, but I will follow Stalnaker and assume that one such set is given as the common ground. See also Section 1.4 above. 5 Most likely this is too coarse. In general, participants in the conversation not only constrain themselves to the set of worlds they hold possible, but rather confine the attention to a smaller set of worlds that are taken to follow the ‘normal course of events’. What exactly has to count as the normal course of events seems to vary from situation to situation. Deviation from what is considered the normal course of events may well render an imperative obsolete. It seems quite plausible that after a completely unforeseen incident one might ask oneself if one is still obliged to obey a command given before the incident. Cf. also Kaufmann and Schwager (2011) for discussion of the issue in connection with conditionalized imperatives. In any case, note that the question of which worlds should be taken into consideration at all regards the modal base, not the ordering source. In particular, the problem arises completely independently from imperatives.

4.1

Contextual Dependence in the Propositional Meaning Components

133

not be constituted by the empty conversational background cbemp –else imperatives could be used to express necessity according to what is mutual joint belief. The semantics for the imperative operator can now be refined as in (11). For the moment, the value of the modal base argument is ignored. The set of worlds to be considered is determined by the common ground of the utterance context. Below, this will be refined and the restriction to non-empty g will be strengthened further. (11)

(preliminary) OPImp c = λ f λgλtλPλw.(∀w  ∈ O( f CG(c) , g, cT , w))[P(t)(w  )] presupposes: g = cbemp and ¬(t < cT ).

Above, I have pointed out that O RDERs like (12) prove problematic for approaches that analyze imperatives as denoting action terms (see Sections 2.1.3 and 3.2.2). (12)

a. b.

Kiss her before every meeting. Stay away from cigarettes.

Imperatives as in (12) are not to be complied with by a single action at a single moment in the future but impose a restriction for the entire future course of events. This makes them particularly problematic for a treatment in terms of partial update semantics (consider e.g. Mastop, 2005). In contrast, my analysis in terms of quantification over possible worlds straightforwardly permits quantification over times or events within these possible worlds. Therefore, it extends naturally to examples like (12).

4.1.2 PROHIBITIONs P ROHIBITIONs (or negated imperatives) have often been treated separately from C OMMANDs, especially by approaches that model the process of information growth additively (e.g. Mastop, 2005; Rohrbaugh, 1997). By treating imperatives as expressing necessity within possible worlds semantics, P ROHIBITIONs semantically come out as necessity of a prejacent proposition that is expressed via negation of its complement under contextual constellations where the ordering source is set to the speaker’s commands. (13)

a. b.

Don’t go there! (13a)c = λw.(∀w  ∈ O( f CG(c) , g, cT , w))[¬(∃e)[τ (e) ⊆ t & go-there(c A )(e)(w )]], where g = ‘what the speaker commands’. presupposes: g = cbemp and ¬(t < cT ).

. At first glance, the ease at which we can deal with negated imperatives may seem undesirable: cross-linguistically, the interaction of imperative formation and negation is well known to be subject to various restrictions (cf. van der Auwera, 2005, for an overview). Some languages employ special morphosyntactic devices

134

4 From Modalized Propositions to Speech Acts

to mark negation in imperatives, such as the negative auxiliaries to be found in Latin (cf. (14)). Other languages employ different markers for negation in imperatives than they do in other clause types (cf. Classical Greek (15b), or Korean (16), data taken from Sells, 2004, his (18b,17b,19b)). Yet other languages use suppletive forms like subjunctives, infinitives, participles, or other nominalizations instead of the imperativized verb in combination with negation (e.g. (17b)). (14)

(15)

me tangere! Noli N EG AUX me.ACC touch ‘Don’t touch me!’ a.

b.

(16)

a.

b.

c.

Latin

ou legeis N EG P RT 1 speak.I NDACT 2S G ‘You don’t speak.’ Classical Greek mega lege! me N EG P RT 2 big speak.P RES I MP 2S G ‘Don’t boast!’ Classical Greek (Plato, Phaedo 95b) ka-ci anh-nun-ta go-C OMP N EG-P ROC-D ECL ‘(Someone) doesn’t go.’ ka-ci mal-ala go-C OMP I R N EG-I MP ‘Don’t go!’ ∗ ka-ci anh-ala go-C OMP N EG-I MP Korean

(17)

a.

b.

Va a casa! go.I MP 2S G to home ‘Go home!’ Non andare a casa! not go.I NF to home ‘Don’t go home!’

Italian

Should this be taken as evidence for a general semantic incompatibility of imperativization and negation? I do not think so. First, a lot of languages allow negation and imperatives to interact straightforwardly, e.g. German (18b) or Russian (19). And yet, neither negation nor imperatives seem to have different semantic or pragmatic properties than they do in languages that don’t allow for negation and imperativized verbs to co-occur. (18)

a.

b.

nach Paris! Fahr go.I MP 2S G to Paris ‘Go to Paris!’ Fahr nicht nach Paris! go.I MP 2S G N EG to Paris ‘Don’t go to Paris!’

4.1

(19)

Contextual Dependence in the Propositional Meaning Components

Na urokach ne boltajte! at lecture N EG speak.I MP P L ‘Don’t speak during the lecture.’

135

Russian

Second, even in languages that seem to employ lexically different elements to express negation in declaratives and in imperatives, on closer inspection, the choice is not determined by imperative vs. non-imperative environment. In Korean, for example, the choice of negation with an (N EG) vs. mal (I R N EG) seems to depend on the nature of the conversational background employed in a modalized sentence. If a deontic modal base (or rather, a prioritizing modal base)6 is involved, we find mal, and if not, we find an. This holds for declaratives, interrogatives and, interestingly enough, also for imperatives (see Section 6.3.2; the data in (20) is taken from Pak et al., 2004, their (15a,b)). (20)

a.

b.

mal-ayakeyss-ta Nayil phati-ey ka-ci tomorrow party-to go-N MLZ I R N EG-should-D EC ‘I should not go to the party tomorrow.’ Nayil phati-ey ka-ci mal-kkayo? Tomorrow party-to go-N MLZ I R N EG-I NT ‘Should I go to the party tomorrow?’

Third, cross-linguistically, imperative clause types are also associated with particular syntactic properties, especially regarding movement of the imperativized verb. Consequently, it might not be surprising that we find incompatibilities with expressions of negation. Zeijlstra (2004) offers a detailed description of the cross-linguistic behavior of imperatives and negation and develops a syntactic account. Against this background, the possibility of straightforwardly integrating P ROHI BITION s and negated imperatives constitutes a favorable consequence of treating imperatives as modalized propositions.

4.1.3 WISHes and ABSENT WISHes W ISHes and A BSENT W ISHes can be derived straightforwardly if the ordering source is set to the speaker bouletic conversational background. 4.1.3.1 W ISHes Like the corresponding declarative (21b), the imperative (21a) can only be issued if the presupposition of the definite description is met and the hearer is indeed going to see a film.

6

Cf. Pak et al. (2004) for suggestions towards an even more fine-grained distinction because of an observation with respect to promissives. This clause type allows for I R N EG if the P ROMISE is forced upon the agent externally, and N EG if it is given voluntarily.

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4 From Modalized Propositions to Speech Acts

a. b.

Enjoy the film! You will enjoy the film.

The modal base for the imperative is again constituted by the common ground and, because of the above mentioned presupposition, entails that there is exactly one salient event of the hearer seeing a film. Moreover, we might also assume some mutual understanding that seeing a film without enjoying it does not make for a nice evening. (23b) shows the LF assumed for (21a) and the truth conditions resulting from interpretation in a context c as described. (22)

[ [ OPImp f g t ] [ I MPPRO enjoy the film ] ] c =

λw.(∀w ∈ O( f CG(c) , g, cT , w))[(∃e)[τ (e) ⊆ t & enjoy-the-film’(c A )(e)(w  )]], where g = ‘what the speaker wants’. presupposes: g = cbemp and ¬(t < cT ).

The sentence comes out as true at a world w, s.t. g(w) = {c A has a nice evening}. Thinking back to our descriptive speech act categories, for this to really count as wishing well to the addressee, we also have to assume that it is presupposed that ‘c A has a nice evening’ is also among the wishes of c A himself. This is plausible enough for any unmarked utterance context; it is thus obvious that an update with the proposition in (23b) meets the description of a W ISH as provided by standard speech act theories. The addressee learns that the speaker wants her to have a nice evening—all other worlds get eliminated from the context set (note that this is an idealization: normally, the addressee will not learn the exact content of g, i.e., the wishes of the speaker, but just that with respect to the common ground of their conversation these wishes rank as best those worlds in which the addressee enjoys the film). W ISHes that something should not be the case come out as necessity of a negated proposition with respect to a bouletic ordering source. For the example under consideration, assume further that not being bored follows from having a nice evening as well. Again, the proposition comes out as true at a world w s.t. g(w) = {c A has a nice evening}. (23)

a. b.

Don’t get bored! [[ OPImp f g t ][ don’t P FV [I MPPRO get bored]]]c = λw.(∀w  ∈ O( f CG(c) , g, w, cT )[ ¬be-bored(c A )(t)(w  )], where g = ‘what the speaker wants’. presupposes: g = cbemp and ¬(t < cT ).

I consider this further support for treating imperative negation as propositional negation embedded under a necessity operator (compare also Section 4.1.2).

4.1.3.2 A BSENT W ISHes As mentioned above (see Section 3.2.2), at least English (cf. Culicover and Jackendoff, 1997b) and German allow for the formation of imperatives that show present

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perfect marking (a systematic cross-linguistic survey is still lacking), cf. (24). At the level of speech acts, the phenomenon of present perfect imperatives is tied closely to W ISHes (they are sometimes referred to as absent wishes). (24)

Please, don’t have broken another vase!

Cases like (24) challenge standard assumptions about imperatives. First, it is often deemed crucial that the intended ‘addressee’ be absent (e.g. Mastop, 2003). I do not think that this is correct. While they can indeed occur when the person targeted by the imperative is only imagined, they can also be used in their very presence. For example, think of a child showing up in front of her father, who is at the end of his rope, the child with a guilty expression on her face that does not augur well. Under these circumstances it is perfectly possible for the father to address the child with (24). Second, cases like (24) not only allow for truly stative predicates, but even involve reference to the past. In particular, they presuppose that the issue in question (whether a vase is broken or not) is already decided. This is at odds with the intuition that imperatives in general require the matter to be unsettled. Condoravdi (2002) assumes that unsettledness at evaluation time is crucial for metaphysical modality as opposed to epistemic modality. Roughly, p is not settled at t if we can find two possible worlds that are identical up to t (i.e., are historical alternatives, cf. Thomason, 1984) but differ with respect to whether p or ¬ p. By definition, this can only hold of things that happen at moments after t. Unsettledness indeed seems to be a typical ingredient of felicitous usages of imperatives. Both properties, namely that the addressee may (but need not) be physically absent, and that the matter in question is already settled, are shared by ordinary present tense imperatives involving individual level predicates, cf. (25). (25)

Please be rich!

on one’s way to a blind date

In view of this I assume that unsettledness and physical presence of an addressee are characterizing features of many speech act types occurring with imperatives (e.g. O RDER , A DVICE , R EQUEST, WARNING , P ERMISSION ) but are not part of the semantic meaning of imperatives. Consequently, imperatives used for other speech act types that are compatible with the semantic meaning of imperatives and don’t impose a requirement of unsettledness and/or physical presence of the addressee (such as W ISHes) may well differ in those respects. In the following, I will use A BSENT W ISH for the subtype of W ISH that can be expressed in the physical absence of the addressee and that targets a state of affairs that is known to be already settled. So, this is a pragmatic category. Present perfect imperatives will be kept as the label of a formal category. Note that not all present perfect imperatives express A BSENT W ISHes. If the reference time is shifted to the future, the property in question has to be settled at that point in the future, not at the utterance time. For example, (26) can easily be used as a R EQUEST.

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(26)

Bitte hab die Aufgaben dann schon gemacht! please have.I MP the homework then already done.PART ‘Please have your homework done by that time.’

To sum up, present perfect imperatives do not correspond to a pragmatic category, as they can be used both for A BSENT W ISHes and for other speech act types. At the same time, A BSENT W ISHes can be realized both by present perfect or by ordinary present imperatives. Hence, treating them within a general theory of imperatives is clearly desirable.7 Despite the obvious differences w.r.t. many other usages of imperatives, the analysis in terms of modalized propositions allows us to integrate A BSENT W ISHes straightforwardly. If they are expressed by present imperatives, they simply amount to expressions of what is necessary according to the speaker’s wishes. In that, their truth-conditions do not differ from what we have worked out for (21a). The only difference lies in the contextual property that ‘that the addressee be rich’ is taken to be already settled one way or the other, whereas ‘that the addressee enjoy the film’ is not. In the following, I will show that under suitable assumptions about the present perfect morphology, my analysis carries over straightforwardly to these seemingly more enigmatic marked cases. Culicover and Jackendoff (1997b) remark in a footnote that examples like (24), despite their reference to past events, do not constitute past imperatives, but express perfect aspect. That is, on our view, they express necessity of a proposition that describes the result state of an event. In the following, I will concentrate on German to evaluate the possibility of a uniform treatment in terms of result states.

7

In particular, A BSENT W ISHES should not be reanalyzed as reinterpretations along the lines of (ia) or (ib) as is often suggested informally. (i)

a. b.

Please, don’t turn out to have broken another vase! Please, don’t say you have broken another vase!

Such paraphrases make the unfavorable predictions that the speaker’s interest lies in the status of the information of there being another vase broken or not: if so, it should not get public, or should not get told. The original example (24) cannot be used in such a scenario. It is clearly concerned with the status of the vase as such. Moreover, a paraphrase like (ib) would be particularly inappropriate for the soliloquizing use where the speaker merely imagines the presence of the addressee. Consider also how examples like (24) could be rendered a language that does not allow for present perfect (or past) imperatives like Bulgarian, cf. (ii) (Marina Stoyanova, p.c.): (ii)

štastieto da si sˇcupil oste edna vaza! Ijay to C OP 2S G broken more one vase have.I MP luck ‘Just be so lucky to have broken another vase!’ (roughly: ‘Please, don’t have broken another vase.’)

The paraphrase chosen does not resort to an eventive predicate but uses a stative predicate that serves to evaluate a result state, hence, the non-prototypical property of settledness is maintained even in the absence of present perfect morphology.

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Von Stechow (2002a) argues that German perfect morphology is ambiguous in three ways. According to him, it can express perfect of the extended now (XN) (that is, open up an interval that abuts the current reference time; cf. (27a)), denote a result state (RS) (that is, express an aspectual operator that turns a transformative VP into a state, (27b)), or express semantic PAST (as in (27c)). (27)

a.

b.

c.

Arnim ist seit letztem Sommer mal in Wien gewesen. Arnim is since last summer QP RT in Wien been ‘Arnim has been in Vienna since last summer.’ Die Bibliothek ist seit 2 Stunden geöffnet. the library is since 2 hours opened ‘The library has been open for 2 hours.’ Wir sind gestern im Theater gewesen. we are yesterday in-the theater been ‘We were at the theater yesterday.’

It turns out that German present perfect imperatives allow for the entire spectrum of readings available for the present perfect in German. Consider the paradigm in (28). All these examples are very natural in a context where the speaker has taken up a bet with a third person that regards the addressee’s previous whereabouts. Now having the chance to settle the matter with the person the bet was about, the speaker can use any of the following to express her hope that the addressee’s answer will prove her right (the reading is brought out by a follow-up like sonst habe ich nämlich meine Wette verloren ‘otherwise I’ve lost my bet’). (28)

a.

b.

c.

seit Weihnachten mal in Frankfurt gewesen! Bitte sei please be.I MP S G since Christmas once in Frankfurt been roughly: ‘I wish for the following to be true: You have been to Frankfurt at least once since Christmas!’ noch immer dort angestellt! Bitte sei please be.I MP S G still always there employed ‘Please, be still employed there!’ Bitte hab 1990 noch in Tübingen gewohnt! please have.I MP S G 1990 still in Tübingen lived roughly: ‘I wish for the following to be true: In 1990, you were still living in Tübingen.’

The quantificational adverbial mal ‘(at least) once’ in combination with the temporal frame-setting adverbial seit Weihnachten ‘since Christmas’ count as evidence for an Extended Now-reading. Noch immer ‘still’ provides evidence for a Result Stateinterpretation, and the temporal adverbial ‘in 1990’ is usually considered evidence that (28c) does indeed get a PAST interpretation. Given my analysis of imperatives, on any popular theory of the German present perfect, (28a) and (28b) fall out naturally. Consider e.g. the analysis von Stechow (2002a) offers for the XN-perfect as well as for the perfect of result (adapted from Kratzer, 2000). (30) gives the calculation for an XN-perfect imperative in (29) and

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(32) gives the calculation for a RS-perfect as in (31) (t  >< t expresses that t  is an interval that reaches up to t, that is, t  >< t iff there is a t  s.t. t  < t and t  = [t  , t)). (29)

Bitte sei seit Weihnachten mal in Tübingen gewesen! please be.I MP S G since Christmas QP RT in Tübingen been

(30)

in Tübingen seinc = λxλtλw.in-Tübingen(x)(t)(w) HAVEG−XN c = λPλtλw.(∃t  )[t  >< t & P(t  )(w)] malc = λPλtλw.(∃t  )[t  ⊆ t & P(t  )(w)] HAVEG−XN mal I MPPRO in Tübingen seinc = λtλw.(∃t  )[t  >< t & (∃t  )[t  ⊆ t  & in-Tübingen(c A )(t  )(w)]] [[OPImp f g t] [HAVEG−XN mal I MPPRO in Tübingen sein]]c = λw.(∀w  ∈ O( f CG(c) , g, cT , w)) [(∃t  )[t  >< t & (∃t  )[t  ⊆ t  & in-Tübingen(c A )(t  )(w )]]] , presupposes: g = cbemp and ¬(t < cT ).

(31)

Frankfurt verlassen! Bitte hab please have.I MP S G Frankfurt left (I wish that the following be true: ‘You have left Frankfurt.’)

(32)

I MPPRO Frankfurt verlassen= λeλSλw[AGENT(e)(c A )(w) & B ECOME(e)(S)(w) & C AUSE(e)(S)(w) & S = ¬in-Frankfurt(c A )(w)] S TATE= λRλsλw.(∃K )(∃e)[R(e)(K ) & K (s)(w)] [[OPImp f g t][S TATE [I MPPRO Frankfurt verlassen] hab]]= λw.(∀w ∈ O( f CG(c) , g, cT , w)) [(∃K )(∃e)[AGENT (e)(c A )(w  ) & B ECOME(e)(K )(w ) & C AUSE(e)(K )(w ) & K = ¬in-Frankfurt (c A )(w )]], presupposes: g = cbemp and ¬(t < cT ).

In contrast to the XN-perfect and the RS-perfect, an interpretation of the morphological present perfect as proper past cannot be reconciled easily with the assumptions about the tensing of the modalized propositions I have spelled out in Section 3.2.2. Note first that even if the present perfect were interpreted as a semantic past in an imperative like (28c), it would have to play a different role from what we observed for Dutch reproachatives. For those the past morphology gives rise to a back shift of the time of evaluation, that is, the time at which the necessity operator’s modal base and ordering source are assessed. In contrast, (28c) still regards the speaker’s wishes at the utterance time. What seems located in the past by in 1990 is the event frame. This, of course, is at odds with the requirement spelled out on the event frame of imperatives in general. A straightforward way to maintain the assumption that the present perfect morphology in the declarative (27c) and the imperative (28c) expresses semantic past would then be to argue that, in the imperative, the semantic past gets interpreted as introducing the requirement that the event frame of the imperative be past. Alternatively, we could take the data in (28) as evidence

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that a unified analysis of the German present perfect morphology as proposed by Musan (2002) is on the right track. According to her, the contribution of the present perfect is always to locate the reference time in the post state of some event. Under this analysis, all three examples in (28) come with non-past event frames and can thus be analyzed straightforwardly as containing OPImp interpreted as in (11). The decision between these two strategies depends on arguments regarding the German present perfect morphology in general and goes beyond the bounds of the current study.

4.1.4 ADVICE In this section, I want to take a closer look at imperatives that are used for giving A DVICE. This usage is particularly interesting in that it proves problematic for approaches to imperatives that rely on a certain attitude the speaker takes with respect to the course of events described in the imperative (Bierwisch, 1980; Condoravdi and Lauer, 2010). When giving advice, the speaker need not take any interest in whether the addressee will act on it or not. As pointed out above, B’s imperative in an exchange like (33) can serve to merely inform A of what B thinks is the optimal way of getting to Rüsselsheim.8 (33)

A: How do I get to Rüsselsheim? B: Take the S8.

B need not want A to take the S8 or have a preference for A doing so. In particular, the imperative also need not constitute an attempt on B’s side to get A to take the S8.9 In the following, I will propose an account for such possibly speakerdisinterested A DVICE imperatives. In principle, (33) can be understood as an attempt to settle the matter of how A should pursue his specific task of going to Rüsselsheim, or also the more general question of how one (or A in particular) gets to Rüsselsheim. In the following, I will concentrate only on the reading that involves a specific intent to go there. Again, the imperative should express necessity with respect to possible courses of events that come closest to an ideal. I assume that (for the specific case that is under consideration here) the question posed by A leads B to accommodate that A

8

See fn. 2. In that sense, B’s speech act cannot be classified as ‘directive’ on standard definitions of the term. See Section 1.2 above for discussion of Searle and Vanderveken’s (1985) distinction between an assertive and a directive meaning of the English speech act verb advise. Remember that throughout this book I am using the label A DVICE for the possibly speaker-disinterested speech act of presenting something as the rationally optimal solution to a particular goal (i.e. Searle and Vanderveken’s 1985 assertive reading of advise). 9

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will be going to Rüsselsheim somehow,10 and, for the sake of concreteness, that A is to go by public transportation. Thus, the context set is restricted to worlds that make it true that A goes to Rüsselsheim by public transportation in the near future. The imperative is now evaluated with respect to this background and says that among these worlds, those that are best according to an ordering source g, are worlds in which A takes the S8. Most likely, g would be constituted either by what is known to constitute preferences of users of public transportation in general (e.g., at all worlds w in the context set, ggen (w) = {The train is not delayed, The train is airconditioned, The trip does not cost too much, The trip does not involve changing more than one time}), or alternatively by preferences A is known to have (e.g. at all worlds w in the context set, g A (w) = {A kisses Ruud van Nistelrooy, The trip does not cost too much, The train does not smell bad}). For any such g, (33) would be predicted to yield the truth conditions in (34): (34)

[[OP I mp f g t ][ P FV [ I MPPRO take the S8 ]]]c = λw.(∀w  ∈O( f CG(c) , g, cT , w))[(∃e)[τ (e)⊆ t & take-S8(c A )(e)(w )]] presupposes: g = cbemp and ¬(t < cT ).

Unfortunately, this cannot be right. Intuitively, something about (33) has to be new information for the addressee (otherwise, the imperative could not count as an answer to his information seeking question). By definition, A and B have perfect knowledge of what is in the common ground. Therefore, only the content of g could be new. This would mean that A already knows the relevant facts about public transportation in the Rhine-Main-region, but fails to be aware of what criteria to apply. But this is at odds with the scenario I have sketched above as one that is indeed very plausible for an exchange like (33).11 In the situation I have described, there is mutual agreement between A and B as to what are the relevant criteria for ordering the possibilites given, and A lacks information as to what these possibilities are, as she is not familiar with basic facts about the transportation system. Consequently, these facts are not part of the common ground. Yet, considering the system of graded modality, they have to be part of the modal base, not of an ordering source. A and B are only interested in worlds where trains behave exactly as they do in the world of evaluation: in the context of a question as in (33), information about public transportation has to be treated as facts, not as preferences. Therefore, we need to refine the treatment of imperatives slightly in order to account for A DVICE-imperatives in which the speaker adduces facts that are not yet

10 This amounts to the same effect as adding a designated goal to the modal base for teleological modality, cf. von Fintel and Iatridou (2005). 11 A more suitable scenario for the truth conditions we have just derived would arise from a question like How shall I go to Rüsselsheim?. In this case, the imperative could indeed constitute an advice to an addressee who is well aware of the (sad) facts about RMV-transportation, but does not know whether to give more weight to the high price for gasoline in case of going by car, or to the loss of time when going by public transport.

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part of the common ground. This can be done easily by making use of the modal base parameter f that, so far, has been ignored semantically in favor of always just using f CG(c) as the modal base. Now the imperative operator takes into account both argument slots for conversational backgrounds: the first can constitute a set of relevant facts the speaker adds to the common ground to yield the imperative’s modal base, and, as before, the second is used to order the intersection of the modal base.12 The imperative operator is now interpreted as in (35): (35)

OPImp c = λ f λgλt  λPλw.(∀w ∈ O( f CG(c) ∪ f, g, cT , w))[P(t  )(w  )] presupposes: g = cbemp and ¬(t < cT ).

For example (33) in the scenario under consideration, let’s assume that the speaker knows that only trains S8 and S9 go directly to Rüsselsheim, that the fares are the same, but that S9 is delayed more often than S8. Therefore, the particular modal base f that records the facts about public transportation in the Rhine-Main Metropolitan region assigns to each world w that agrees with the actual world in this respect the following set of propositions f (w) = {S8 and S9 and no other trains go directly from Frankfurt to Rüsselsheim, The fares are the same on S8 and S9, S9 is delayed more often than S8}. Any such world in the context set will survive an update by (33). In contrast, a world that differs in that S8 and S9 are also equally well-behaved with respect to delays would be eliminated: here, taking the S8 would not be singled out as the optimal action according to the known preferences. Even if the imperative may fail to narrow down the context set to a set of worlds that agrees on the facts of public transportation, it will be narrowed down to worlds at which the facts about public transportation are such that the S8 is singled out as the optimal choice according to the criteria under consideration. For example, after an update with Take the S8! there may be worlds left at which no other trains go to Rüsselsheim, worlds at which there are other trains but they all smell bad, worlds at which there are other trains but they are all awfully expensive, etc. That is, from updating with the imperative it will always become mutual joint belief that the option singled out by the imperative is optimal. Yet, depending on what was known before the update, this will not necessarily provide enough information as to why this is so. As far as I can tell, these predictions capture the behavior of A DVICE imperatives correctly. To sum up, for A DVICE imperatives it is crucial that speakers can adduce additional factual information through the additional modal base component f. For the other usages of imperatives investigated so far (i.e. O RDERs, C OMMANDS, R EQUEST, P ROHIBITIONS , and W ISHES) the additional modal base component f remains empty.

12 In the following, read ∪ between two expressions of type a, b, t, with a, b arbitrary logical types, as pointwise union. That is, for all f, f  ∈ Ds,st,t : ( f ∪ f  ) is short for λw. f (w)∪ f  (w).

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4.2 Constraining the Predictions: The Presuppositional Meaning Component The semantics proposed in (35) maps an imperative like (36a) onto the same proposition as could have been expressed by (36b). In a context c, both are interpreted as (36c).13 (36)

a. b. c.

Ask Melli! You should ask Melli! λw.(∀w  ∈ O( f CG(c) ∪ f, g, cT , w))(∃e)[τ (e) ⊆ t & ask-M.(c A )(e)(w )]

At least three objections can and should be raised immediately against such an analysis. As it stands, it predicts that (i) imperatives can serve as mere reports of necessities (e.g. the existence of certain obligations or desires), (ii) imperatives could come with a much wider range of conversational backgrounds and ordering sources than they actually do, (iii) modal particles should behave exactly as they do with corresponding modal verbs,14 and (iv) quantifiers should behave as they do with modal verbs. In this section, I will be concerned with the first two objections,15 and I will argue that they can be met by an additional non-truthconditional meaning component of the imperative semantics. Nevertheless, this does not require ad hoc-assumptions with respect to the treatment of clause types at the semantics-pragmatics interface. I propose that the additional meaning component consists of three presuppositions. All of these explicitly regard properties the utterance context needs to have. Nevertheless, they could be spelled out either as semantic or as pragmatic presuppositions. Here, I will treat them as pragmatic presuppositions in the sense of Karttunen (1974):16

13 Note that despite the equivalence in the at-issue meaning, there may be a difference in the presuppositional content already spelled out: while both should and the imperative presuppose that g not be the empty conversational background, the restriction on the event frame t may pertain to imperatives only. 14 I am indebted to Manfred Krifka (p.c.) for having pointed this out to me. 15 See Section 2.2.1 for a consideration of quantificational elements. The discussion of modal particles will have to be left for further research (cf. Grosz, 2008b; Schwager, 2010). If we follow Zeevat (2003) and assume that modal particles filter or modify (pre)conditions of speech acts, the presuppositional nature of imperatives I am proposing in the following sections provides a promising starting point for an explanation. 16 In Schwager (2006b), I had indeed spelled them out as semantic presuppositions. I have now changed this to pragmatic presupposition as this makes it easier to understand the self-verificational effect. But I consider this a matter of taste; the account should work with semantic presuppositions as well. In particular, I agree with von Fintel (2004) in that any semantic presupposition automatically gives rise to a pragmatic presupposition as well—linguistic expressions that fall outside the domain of the interpretation function cannot normally be uttered felicitously. For an overview and a critical discussion of variants of the definition of pragmatic presuppositions, see Gazdar (1979:105).

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Definition 4.1 Pragmatic presupposition Sentence A pragmatically presupposes proposition B iff it is the case that A can be felicitously uttered only in contexts which entail B (Karttunen, 1974:149). The first presupposition formalizes a long-standing intuition that imperatives are somehow related to either social or rational authority. The second one, the ordering source restriction, ensures that imperatives cannot be used to describe the way the world is or speculate how it might be; moreover, it captures both the subjectivity of imperatives and their instigating effect in case the embedded proposition is under the influence of the addressee. The third presupposition, epistemic uncertainty, ensures that an imperative can have an effect to begin with. Before I introduce these presuppositions in detail I want to point out that the semantics proposed in (35) can already account for some of the differences observed between imperatives and modal verbs. At the same time, a quick look at modal verbs in English and German will also reveal that imperatives are by no means unique in imposing restrictions on what conversational backgrounds they can combine with.

4.2.1 Restrictions Familiar from Modal Verbs Kratzer (1981) provides an overview of particular lexical properties of German modal elements, and further distinctions are mentioned in von Stechow (2004). We have already seen in Section 3.1 that modals differ as to whether they combine with personal or impersonal modal bases. Given that imperatives are assumed to combine with impersonal modal bases exclusively, the contrast in (37) should not come as a surprise. (37a) can express the addressee’s disposition to sneeze, but (37b) cannot. (37)

a.

b.

Du musst niesen. you must sneeze ‘You have to sneeze.’ # Nies! sneeze.I MP S G

The conversational background with respect to which the modal in (37a) gets evaluated has the wrong semantic type for combining with the imperative operator.17 Therefore, imperatives cannot be used to communicate dispositions.

17

That the modal and the conversational background have to be personal in (37a) can be shown by the fact that (i) allows only the wide scope reading for the quantifier (therefore, the modal is personal) with quantification into the modal base (therefore, the modal base is personal). (i)

Keiner muss niesen. nobody must sneeze ‘Nobody has to sneeze.’ not: ‘According to disposition, it must be the case that nobody sneezes.’

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Moreover, modals also differ in whether they allow or even require a non-trivial ordering source. The German modals sollen and müssen constitute a well-known example. Both encode the modal force of necessity, but only the latter may come with an empty ordering source (Kratzer, 1981, for (37a)). Also, müssen und sollen differ in what kinds of ordering sources they can combine with. Consider for example the contrast in (38): a judge can use müssen to express impersonal deontic modality, but not sollen, which is felt to bring in a ranking according to a third authority’s rules or preferences. (38)

a.

b.

müssen (dem Gesetz zufolge) 500 Euro zahlen. Sie according.to) 500 euros pay you.2P OLITE must (the law ‘(According to the law) you have to pay 500 euros.’ Sie sollen (dem Gesetz zufolge) 500 Euro zahlen. you.2P OLITE should 500 euros pay ‘(According to their rules) you should pay 500 euros.’

Similarly, instances of müssen expressing impersonal deontic necessity cannot be replaced by imperatives. To announce the verdict, the judge cannot use the imperative in (39a), and modification with dem Gesetz zufolge ‘according to the law’ is infelicitous (cf. (39b)). (39)

Sie 500 Euro. Zahlen pay.I MP P OLITE you.2P OLITE 500 euros ‘Pay 500 euros.’ b. #Zahlen Sie dem Gesetz zufolge 500 Euro. pay.I MP P OLITE you.2P OLITE the law according.to 500 euros ‘# According to the law, pay 500 euros.’

a.

For another type of restriction consider the German possibility modal dürfen. Its indicative is only acceptable with a teleological, deontic, or volitional conversational background. Its past subjunctive dürfte also has a reading of weak epistemic necessity. Yet another restriction is to be observed with adverbials in comparison to the corresponding impersonal constructions: (40)

a.

b.

ist wahrscheinlich, dass das Schiff sinkt. Es that the ship sinks E XPL is probable ‘It is probable that the ship will sink.’ Das Schiff wird wahrscheinlich sinken. the ship will probably sink ‘The ship will probably sink.’

While the impersonal construction conveys good possibility (in the sense of Kratzer, 1981) with respect to some sort of objective background (e.g. given the statistics for ships in that area), the adverbial requires a more subjective contribution of the speaker (e.g. circumstantial possibility ordered according to the speaker’s stereotypes about ships in the given situation). This subjectivity is slightly reminiscent

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of one of the presuppositions introduced below (the ordering source restriction, cf. (61)). These examples from the realm of lexically encoded modality provide independent evidence for the plausibility of the assumption that a modal operator can come with particular restrictions as to what conversational backgrounds it can combine with. Moreover, we have seen that the assumptions (i) that imperatives require impersonal conversational backgrounds and (ii) that imperatives never come with an empty ordering source already make correct predictions with respect to some of the missing readings. Let us now turn to the additional requirements OPImp (or, under the more finegrained version of the analysis, I MPMOD) imposes on the context.

4.2.2 Authority: Deriving Self-Verification Obviously, the propositional analysis of imperatives has to cope with the nondescriptive nature of imperatives, in particular, with the inaccessibility of the alleged truth value as well as the self-verifying effect of many imperatives (see Sections 2.1.2 and 2.3.1). In Section 2.3.1, I suggested that the speaker’s privileged position with respect to the modality in question is one factor that leads to a performative use of a modal verb and should hence be part of the presuppositional meaning component of the imperative. The core of the idea is the following: if in a given context it is taken for granted (i.e., presupposed) that the speaker is in a privileged position with respect to the truth of proposition p, then the addressee will accept p as true if the speaker expresses p (and there is no reason to suspect that she is lying). For example, if the social context is such that the speaker is in a position to command the addressee to act in a certain way (Lewis’s 1979b master/slave scenario) then the addressee will accept as true the speaker’s utterances about what she commands the addressee to do, simply because the truth of such propositions is up to the speaker (who can choose to give or to refrain from giving the respective command). The challenge is now to confine imperatives to contexts in which the speaker occupies such a privileged position and to make precise what kind of privilege it is. Clearly, not all imperatives see the speaker in a socially authoritative environment. Imperatives used to give A DVICE or express a W ISH are normally not charged with such a burden, at least they need not be. Hamblin (1987) points out that it has been noted at least as early as in Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651) that issuing an imperative involves either social or rational authority. That is, either the social status of the speaker with respect to the addressee allows him to issue an imperative that is meant to guide the actions of the latter, or, the speaker possesses some rational authority with respect to an issue so that he is authorized to give advice on the matter. In the case of social authority as underlying C OMMANDs and P ROHIBITION s, the speaker does not have to provide any evidence for his move. In the case of rational authority, the speaker has to be capable of providing justification for his imperative. In the

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following, I will argue that, as far as the interaction between linguistic objects and action is concerned, both aspects can be captured in terms of epistemic authority. I assume that modal verbs may, and imperatives must, combine with conversational backgrounds that invite the assumption that the speaker is an epistemic authority on the matter. To spell this out, I draw on Groenendijk and Stokhof’s (1984) notion of exhaustive knowledge. In this, I follow Zimmermann (2000) who employs it in a similar way to explain epistemic authority in connection with free choice disjunctions.18 (41)

Authority on a property P in a context c (ignoring temporality): (∀w ∈ BelcS (cW ))(∀x)[w ∈ P(x) ↔ cW ∈ P(x)]

This means that a speaker possesses (epistemic) authority w.r.t. a property P (is an epistemic authority on what is P) if she believes P of all and only those individuals that are indeed P at the actual world.19 To model the performative effect of a modalized proposition, we cannot rely on what is actually the case, but only on what speaker and addressee take to be the case.20 Therefore, I capture the concept of ‘counting as an authority in a context c’ as being an authority according to mutual joint belief in c (rather than being an authority in the actual world cW ). Moreover, we are not interested in arbitrary properties that a speaker may count as an authority on or not, but only on conversational backgrounds. Ignoring temporality, I will thus employ the following concepts: (42)

(ignoring temporality) a. x counts as an authority on a conversational background f in context c iff at all worlds w in the context set CS(c) it holds that (∀w ∈ Belx (w))(∀ p)[ p ∈ f (w ) ↔ p ∈ f (w)]. b. AUTH(x)(c) := { f : W → P(P(W )) | x counts as an authority on f in c}

cW is again the world of the utterance context c. Bel maps an individual and a world w to the set of worlds that constitute x’s belief set in w (the worlds compatible with what x believes). Bel’ is a refined version that takes a time argument into account as well. I write Belx and Bel’x for Bel(x) and Bel’(x) respectively. 18

19

Note that this is strong enough to derive what Zimmermann (2000:286) calls the authority principle (see proof there). (i)

Authority principle If the speaker is an authority on P in c, then, for any x: BelcS (cW ) ∩ P(x) = ∅ implies BelcS (cW ) ⊆ P(x).

This says that if an authority (on the respective matter) takes p to be possible then the authority believes p. 20 For simplicity, I don’t distinguish between mutual joint belief and public commitments. Therefore, I cannot attempt to provide a full analysis of cases in which the speaker manages to deceive the addressee into believing that she holds epistemic authority. But see Section 4.3 below for a few first considerations in that regard.

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When temporal information is taken into account, conversational backgrounds are of type i, s, st, t. Instead of (42a) and (42b), we will then use (43a) and (43b).21 (43)

(taking into account temporality) a. x counts as an authority on a conversational background f in c iff at all worlds w in the context set CS(c) it holds that (∀w , t   ∈ Bel(x)(t)(w))(∀ p)[ p ∈ f (t  )(w  ) ↔ p ∈ f (cT )(w)] b. AUTH(x)(c) := { f : W → P(P(W )) | x counts as an authority on f in c}

Now, to ensure that imperatives can only be used felicitously if the speaker is in an epistemically privileged position, the at-issue content of the imperative operator can be endowed with the authority condition, cf. (44).22 (44)

Authority condition: OPImp c = λ f λgλtλPλw.(∀w  ∈ O( f CG(c) ∪ f, g, cT , w))[P(t)(w  )] presupposes: f, g ∈ AUTH(c S )(c).

It is obvious that in any unmarked context conversational backgrounds like ‘what the speaker orders’ (used for O RDERs), ‘what the speaker commands’ (used for C OM MAND s) and ‘what the speaker wants’ (used for W ISHES ) are among the speakerauthoritative ones according to (42b) (or (43b)). Moreover, for all these cases we have assumed that the modal base is constituted by the common ground, which passes the requirement by definition. A DVICE is slightly different, as it requires a non-empty addition to the modal base. But this is felicitous exactly in those cases where the speaker is considered a rational authority on the matter in question (e.g., in the example considered in (33) above B is considered an epistemic authority on the relevant facts about public transportation). In particular, asking for advice is a straightforward means of acknowledging the other person’s authority on the relevant issue. Before investigating the claim that the presupposition helps to account for the self-verificational effect found with certain types of imperatives, I will briefly investigate the plausibility of the presuppositional status of the authority presupposition. Consider first A DVICE imperatives. Intuitively, if the speaker tries to issue a piece of advice which is obviously incorrect, the addressee can reject it by means that are familiar from other types of presuppositions failures. For example, the speaker can be challenged with Hey wait a minute! (cf. von Fintel, 2004). (45)

A: How do I get to Rüsselsheim? B: Take the 16. [obviously wrong piece of information]

21

Again I abstract away from uncertainty with respect to cT . This allows me to model the context set as the set of possible worlds that, taken at cT , are compatible with mutual joint belief at cT . 22 Again, I abstract away from how to achieve the binding between the argument variables and the restrictions imposed on them.

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A: Hey wait a minute, I thought you knew the city! Even I know that line 16 is north-southbound! The rendering of the authority requirement as a presupposition of epistemic authority may seem less straightforward in the case of O RDERs or C OMMANDs. But I think that this is only apparently so. Assume that A tries to command B to go home, but in fact A is in no position to do so, that is, A lacks the relevant social authority. In such a situation, a reply as in (46) seems natural: (46)

A: Go home immediately! B: Hey wait a minute, you are in no position to give me commands.

What is under dispute in such cases is not what would follow from the speaker’s commands, but rather whether he has the necessary social authority to enact commands in the first place. Therefore the theory may seem to make wrong predictions for these cases. The rebuke in (46) does not seem to target the speaker’s epistemic authority with respect to his commands, but rather his social authority. This would mean that B is saying something like ‘You know your commands, but you fail to know that you are in no position to give orders!’. But whether this is actually different depends on our conception of C OMMAND. I think that a C OMMAND requires the necessary social authority, and that an attempt to command something does not actually constitute a command. Hence, ‘what the speaker commands’ can only contain propositions that he is actually entitled to command,23 and thereby, an attempt to command something in the absence of the required social authority amounts to a failure of epistemic authority as well. The speaker fails to know what he is commanding because he fails to be aware what he could command in the first place. In particular, in our case (46), A believes to be commanding something he is not commanding because he cannot actually command it due to a lack of social authority.24 The authority condition can also be shown to behave like other presuppositions in connection with filtering. In particular, it can be filtered by conditional antecedents. Consider (47)25 : 23

Cf. Condoravdi and Lauer (2010) for a different conception.

24

At this point, we might ask why command-like imperatives have to come with the ordering source ‘what the speaker commands’ and why there couldn’t be a related type of imperative combining with ‘what the speaker tries to command’. This issue touches upon a fundamental problem with the standard Kratzer semantics for modality: as far as I know, it lacks a theory of what are possible conversational backgrounds in general. For imperatives and the above mentioned problem in particular, I believe that it is resolved by one of the other presuppositions, introduced below as the ordering source restriction (cf. (61)). Roughly, it is required that the ordering source has to be mutually accepted as constituting the relevant criteria for the addressee’s choice of action. Clearly, this can be the case for ‘what the speaker commands’, but not for ‘what the speaker tries to command’. 25 One might object that these fall into a particular class of non-hypothetical conditionals, namely relevance (or speech act) conditionals (cf. Bhatt and Pancheva, 2006). Therefore, one might be tempted to argue that it is not a presupposition of the clause but a felicity condition of the speech

4.2

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a.

b.

151

Wenn ich hier noch etwas zu sagen habe, ruf ihn an. if I here still something to say have, call.I MP S G him VP RT ‘If I am still in a position to say something, call him.’ Wenn ich dir etwas raten darf, komm nicht noch if I you something give-advice may, come.I MP S G not again mal zu spät. QP RT too late ‘If I may give you a piece of advice, don’t be late again.’

In short, I think that the presuppositional status of the authority condition is highly plausible and that its rendering in terms of epistemic authority makes the right predictions. We should thus move on to understand how epistemic authority contributes to the performative effect and to the inaccessibility of the truth value. Intuitively, the speaker expresses a proposition the truth of which depends only on conversational backgrounds he is an authority on. Therefore, the normal process of A SSERTing, which involves evaluating whether the new information should be made part of CG, need not take place. Rather, the information is just taken in, leading to an adjustment of CG w.r.t. the respective ordering source (e.g. what the speaker wants/commands/. . . ).26 In particular, for ordering sources like ‘what the speaker commands’ we obtain a self-verifying effect: if it does not lead to a presupposition failure, the utterance of the imperative itself has to constitute the speech act of C OM MAND ing that verifies the necessity proposition expressed. Technically, the effect is captured at a metalinguistic level, i.e. in terms of what the possible next speech acts are and whether they could be achieved with an imperative. Consider the picture in Fig. 4.1. At t1 , before the utterance, mutual joint belief is compatible with a variety of options for what may happen at the subsequent moment t2 . For example, S may say Good evening! thereby performing the speech act of greeting H (as in w1 ). Or, S may remain silent (as in w2 ). Or, S may utter the imperative Leave! and thereby perform the O RDER that H leave (as in w3 ). Or, S may say nothing but point to

act that gets filtered out. Independently from the fact that the observation could be turned around in order to say that such felicity conditions on speech acts are best treated as presuppositions, we can also show that relevance conditionals can filter ordinary presuppositions, e.g. the existence presupposition for the pronoun ihn ‘him’ in (i): (i)

Wenn du einen Hund hast, (∗ dann) kannst du ihn jetzt neuerdings auch in der as-well in the if you a dog have, (then) can you it now newly Straßenbahn mitnehmen. tram take-along.I NF ‘If you have a dog, you can now take it along on the tram as well.’

Insertion of dann ‘then’ is claimed to be unacceptable in relevance conditionals, thus forcing a hypothetical reading. Its oddity in (i) provides strong evidence that this is indeed a relevance conditional. 26

The dynamics resulting from the authority principle amounts to what is required by Lewis’s (1979a) truthful master condition.

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4 From Modalized Propositions to Speech Acts t1

t2

S says: ‘Leave!’, expressing λw. (∀ν ∈ O(cgF, g, w)) [H leaves in v], where g = ‘what is ordered by S’ S doesn’t order H to leave w0

S says: ‘Good Evening!’ S greets H w1

S says nothing w2

S says: ‘Leave!’, expressing λw. (∀ν ∈ O(cgF, g, w)) [H leaves in v], where g = ‘what is ordered by S’ S orders H to leave w3

S says nothing and points to the door S orders H to leave w4

Fig. 4.1 Sketch of a possible change in context set for a use of Leave! as an O RDER

the door and thus non-verbally order H to leave (as in w4 ). Consequently, all of w1 , w2 , w3 and w4 are elements of the context set in c. What is excluded, though, is a world like w0 : here, the speaker utters an imperative Leave! expressing necessity with respect to the ordering source ‘what the speaker orders’, but doesn’t actually order H to leave. Such a world represents the possibility that the imperative is false. If the imperative is to be felicitous, in view of the authority principle, at such a world S would know that the imperative was false. But this is at odds with what seems to be a fundamental principle about conversation: A speaker who expresses a proposition is taken to believe it unless this is prevented by explicit marking (e.g. rising intonation, particles, etc.). This holds independently of whether the proposition is used for an A SSERTION or any other type of speech act. Without committing to what the status of this generalization is, I will refer to it as the principle of truthful

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propositions. Of course, if we are willing to consider ‘express a proposition’ as an instance of ‘say (something)’ and assume that having adequate evidence amounts to believing something, then the principle of truthful propositions follows by modus tollens from the assumption that speakers follow the second clause of Grice’s maxim of quality. Definition 4.2 Maxim of Quality: Be truthful. (1) Do not say what you believe to be false. (2) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

[Grice, 1975a]

In other words, at a merely descriptive level, apart from cautious S UGGESTIONs (marked explicitly as indicated above), it seems that there are no sincere speech acts that are executed by expressing the truth of a proposition without believing that it is already true or is being made true by its very utterance. Therefore, in an unmarked conversational context, all worlds at which a speaker expresses a proposition (without marking it as a mere suggestion) are worlds at which the speaker also believes that proposition. Of course, in general, it could still be false, which in the case of an A SSERTION can give rise to a felicitous dispute as to whether S is right or not. For imperatives, this is ruled out by the authority condition. For an imperative to be felicitous, worlds in the context set where the speaker believes the imperative to be true are worlds where it is indeed true. Therefore, in a sincere conversation, worlds like w0 are excluded from the context set. At the same time, an utterance of the imperative Leave! at t2 rules out worlds w1 , w2 , and w4 for meta-linguistic reasons: they are obviously different from what S and H observe about the processes in their world. Therefore, an utterance of Leave! leaves S and H with worlds like w3 where an O RDER for H to leave has been given by S—with all the consequences O RDERs are known to have. This is entirely independent of imperatives: as it is mutual joint belief what an O RDER amounts to, after the update with the imperative, all worlds in the context set, that is, worlds S and H reckon with, will display these consequences (many of them modal in nature). So far, I have confined my attention to sincere conversations and have shown that the presence of w0 -like worlds, which might ruin the self-verificational effect, is excluded in that case. But what about insincere conversation? Could it be that the speaker expresses the imperative while believing it to be false? In that case, she would be at odds not with the authority principle, but with the more general conversational strategy of truthful propositions. Now, there may be contexts where S and H reckon with this possibility. But such a case seems extremely hard to construe for an O RDER. I don’t think that an O RDER can fail without the addressee noticing this, too.27 But then, if the speaker also already knows that she is not conducting an O RDER, what could be the point of expressing that the addressee’s leaving is 27 Here, I would like to abstract away from cases of highly institutionalized O RDERs that do not depend upon recognition by H but have independent factual status. I think that these are to be treated more in the vein of speech acts like M ARRYING, BAPTIZING, and they like. I adhere to the common wisdom that these cannot be explained by looking at semantic meaning and conversational constellations alone (in contrast to A SSERTION s, W ISHes, A DVICE, . . . ). For example,

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necessary with respect to what the speaker orders? I cannot come up with a sensible scenario to test the predictions of my theory with respect to false propositions expressing necessity of this particular type. Things are different for other speech acts, e.g. A DVICE or W ISHes. As I have already pointed out in Section 2.3.3.2, it is easy enough to imagine contexts in which insincere A DVICE is given. Note first that these cases also differ from O DERs in that they do not involve self-verification. If A DVICE or W ISHes (of the sort that can be expressed by imperatives) express a true proposition, that proposition has already been true independently of it being expressed in that very speech act. A context set could easily include worlds at which the speaker gives an insincere A DVICE or utters an insincere W ISH by expressing a false necessity proposition.28 Even though the empirical data is somewhat subtle and may require experimental testing, speakers’ intuitions seem to be that all insincere pieces of advice and all insincere wishes (if discovered by the addressee) give rise to much the same kinds of rebuttals respectively—independently of the clause type of the linguistic object used (see Section 4.3 for some first considerations). Epistemic authority already gives rise to a property atypical for assertive speech acts: if the presuppositions are met, the speaker cannot be challenged as having said something false. Yet, epistemic authority in itself does not block assertoric usages. Consider (48). (48)

My name is Magdalena.

A typical utterance of (48) is usually taken to constitute an A SSERTION, even if in any unmarked context I am considered an authority on the matter of what my name is. Therefore, more has to be said as to why context changes through felicitous utterances of imperatives meet the description of for example an O RDER or of an A DVICE rather than of a true A SSERTION w.r.t. what is ordered or what is best according to the addressee’s goals and the relevant facts. I assume that this hinges on the ordering source restriction introduced below. Also, authority does not rule out any conversational backgrounds. It only imposes a restriction on the context, and predicts replies that dispute the truth value of the proposition expressed to be infelicitous. Relying on authority means that—as long as the utterance is taken to be sincere—either a proposition is expressed and accepted without further ado, or a crucial prerequisite for uttering an imperative is not met. This seems an adequate characterization of the behavior of imperatives. Conversational backgrounds can be in AUTH(c S )(c)29 in virtue of their contextindependent nature; for example, a speaker is usually taken to have privileged access and thus be an authority about what his wishes are. Likewise, he is also taken to be

many of these institutionalized speech acts require fixed wordings, which shows their dependence on non-semantic aspects of the utterance. 28

Even more plausibly, such worlds could come under consideration again when the addressee realizes that the speaker has not been serious. Unfortunately, a detailed account of the mechanics of interactions involving insincerety is far beyond the scope of this book. 29 Note that any x in any context c is an authority on the empty conversational background.

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aware of what he commands. For these cases, most contexts c would have them in AUTH(cS )(c) and contexts that don’t are deviant. But for other cases, especially the ones where the speaker is giving advice, it is crucial that the context supports that x counts as an authority on the relevant matter. For example, for an arbitrary individual x, the set of contexts c that have ‘what is a fact about public transportation in the Rhine-Main-Region’ ∈ AUTH(x)(c ) is a lot smaller than that of contexts c that have ‘what x commands’ ∈ AUTH(x  )(c ). The authority condition offers a natural explanation for why imperativized verbs can never occur in information-seeking questions (see Section 2.3.3.3). Clearly, by standard assumptions about interrogatives, if the speaker is considered as having perfect knowledge with respect to the (modal) issue in question, the interrogative can only serve the purpose of a rhetorical question.30 But all in all the account is still too liberal. Various modal flavors may well meet the authority condition, yet give rise to readings unavailable for imperatives. To further confine the possibilities of imperatives, in the following section, I will introduce two further restrictions on the contextual settings required for the felicitous utterance of an imperative.

4.2.3 Epistemic Uncertainty and the Ordering Source Restriction As it stands, our semantics of imperatives would lead us to expect that an imperative as in (49) could also express something along the lines of (50a)–(50c). But this is of course blatantly false. (49)

Be home at 5!

(50)

a. b. c.

The alternatives that are most plausible according to what I know, are such that you are at home at 5. The alternatives that are most plausible according to what rumours say, are such that you are at home at 5. The alternatives that are most plausible according to what I take to be the usual course of events, are such that you are at home at 5.

In all these cases, the modal base is assumed to be the common ground and the ordering source is non-empty and impersonal. Moreover, it is highly plausible that the speaker is considered an authority on what she believes and it might well be the case that she counts as an authority on what she knows. Therefore, the authority condition is not going to help us out here. Only (50a) is ruled out by general assumptions about ordering sources (Kratzer, 1981): what is known is not used as a mere ideal (an ordering source),but can only restrict the modal base. In contrast, ordering

30 In principle, exam questions might be predicted to be available, too. The issue may merit further investigation, but I suspect that they might be excluded because of the instigating behavior caused by the ordering source restriction.

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sources that are constituted by less reliable doxastic or reportative conversational backgrounds need to be ruled out independently. In the following, I will present two additional requirements that are needed to characterize the contexts in which imperatives can be issued felicitously (and thereby also the types of ordering sources with which they can be used). First, issuing an imperative seems to require that the speaker believes the thus modalized proposition to be possible, but not necessary. That is, if the speaker is sure that φ is going to happen (or will not happen),31 then issuing an imperative φ! is infelicitous. I call this restriction the Epistemic Uncertainty Constraint. In that respect, imperatives differ from other necessity modals. Consider the contrast in (51).32 (51)

a.

b.

Ich weiß, dass du das auf jeden Fall tun wirst, und du musst es I know that you that in any case do will, and you must it auch tun. too do ‘I know that you are going to do this no matter what, and moreover you have to.’ # Ich weiß, dass du das auf jeden Fall tun wirst, also tu’s I know that you that in any case do will, so do.I MP S G-it auch. too # ‘I know that you are going to do this no matter what, so do it also.’

In the absence of epistemic uncertainty the modal verb is used descriptively. This is expected if in general epistemic uncertainty about the prejacent is part of the

31 Note that the issue under consideration here is slightly different from what Ninan (2005) points out as one of the characteristics of performative modal verbs, see Section 2.3.1. He observes that issuing an imperative is incompatible with expressing that it won’t be complied with. In contrast, EUC deals with the speaker’s expectations prior to his use of the imperative. EUC does not rule out that a speaker is absolutely convinced that his imperative will be obeyed, and, hence, that epistemic uncertainty is removed by the use of the imperative. 32 Something else seems to happen in cases of ‘fake P ERMISSIONS ’ like (ib) (I am indebted to Florian Schwager (p.c.) for having pointed out these cases to me):

(i)

a.

b.

A: Ich gehe jetzt schwimmen. A: I go now swim ‘I’m going swimming now.’ B: Ja, bitte, tun Sie das. B: yes, please, do.I MP P OLITE you.2P OLITE that ‘Please, do so.’

Somehow B’s utterance seems to suggest that he did not take A’s announcement as definite and would assume A to refrain from going swimming if he expressed resentment. One way of treating this would be to assume that A’s utterance is added to the common ground only with a proviso of ‘if you don’t object’.

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properties a context has to have in order for a modalized proposition to achieve a non-descriptive effect. The constraint is formulated in (52).33 (52)

Epistemic Uncertainty Constraint (EUC) OPImp = λ f λgλtλPλw.(∀w  ∈ O( f CG(c) ∪ f, g, cT , w))[P(t)(w  )], presupposes: the precontext c of c is such that for all w ∈ CS(c ) : (∃w ∈ Bel c S (cT )(w))(∃w ∈ Bel c S (cT )(w))[¬ p(t)(w  ) & p(t)(w )] (= the speaker believes that both ¬p and p are possible).

Given that EUC denies speaker epistemic necessity, is there a chance that EUC might rule out doxastic ordering sources? Consider the case in (50c). Assume that in c the speaker counts as an authority on what he takes to be the usual course of events (which is indeed highly plausible). Now, he attempts to issue (50c) in the form of the imperative (49) (repeated here as (53b) and (53a) respectively). (53)

a. b.

Be home at 5! Those alternatives that are most plausible according to what I take to be the usual course of events, are such that you are at home at 5.

In order to be interpretable in c, the EUC has to be met, consequently, (54) has to hold at the context immediately preceding the utterance of (53a): (54)

The speaker does not exclude that the addressee is going to be home at 5, nor does he exclude that the addressee is not going to be home at 5.

But, of course, it is perfectly coherent to believe that both p and ¬ p are possible, and yet to believe that p is a necessity with respect to what is most plausible or the usual course of events. Therefore, the impossibility of doxastic ordering sources can not be reduced to the independent requirement of epistemic uncertainty. Therefore, the constraint that imperatives come with a non-empty ordering source should be strengthened to require that they come with an ordering source related to preferences or goals. Portner (2007) coins the term prioritizing for conversational backgrounds of the relevant types (bouletic, teleological, or deontic) and sees them in opposition to dynamic (concerned with abilities) and epistemic ordering sources. But restricting the ordering source to a prioritizing one is not yet sufficient to guarantee the non-descriptive behavior of a modalized proposition. To ensure this, the ordering source not only needs to be constituted by the right kind of conversational background, it also has to be granted a particular status in the context of the conversation. 33 As a piece of the presuppositional meaning component, EUC is also related to the presupposition of dissociation as a meaning component of subjunctive attitude reports (cf. Farkas, 1992). Brasoveanu (2006) uses dissociation as a presuppositional meaning component of subjunctive attitude reports, requiring that there is at least one world w∗ among the speaker’s belief worlds s.t. the reported belief p is not true in w ∗ .

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So far, our conditions fail to account for the action-incentive character of imperatives. Consider a context c, which interprets the ordering source for (55a) as ‘Melli’s wishes’, and in which I am known to have perfect knowledge of Melli’s wishes. In particular, I happen to know that from Melli’s wishes it follows that Verena calls Melli that particular evening (the interval assigned to the event frame and fulfills the requirement of not entirely preceding cT ). Moreover, I am unsure whether Verena is going to call Melli within the intended event frame. But for some reason, I do not consider it a good idea for her to do so. Given that, it should be possible for me to issue (55a) just as well as the somewhat artificial (55b). But actually, (55a) is highly awkward. (55)

a. b.

Call Melli! # But I don’t want you to call her. Given how things are and given Melli’s wishes, it is necessary that you call her. But I don’t want you to call her.

The infelicity of the sequence in (55a) is not predicted by any of the restrictions imposed on imperatives so far. c S counts as an authority on a bouletic (hence, prioritizing) ordering source g, f is empty and therefore unproblematic, the temporal requirement of the event frame is met, and cS is unsure as to whether Verena will call Melli or not. Something similar to this puzzle has been pointed out by Frank (1996:84) for certain modal verbs (cf. (56a)). She observes that the interplay between speaker attitudes and certain prioritizing modalities is similar to the interplay between speaker knowledge and declaratives. The latter phenomenon is familiar as Moore’s paradox (cf. Hintikka, 1962; Gazdar, 1979) and is exemplified in (57): (56)

a. b. c.

(57)

# You

should go to Paris, but in fact, I think it is not advisable. her (11a) You should go to Paris, even if Peter thinks this is not advisable. her (11b) Max told me that you should go to Paris, but I think this is not advisable. her (11c)

# Paul

is dead but I do not believe that he is dead.

Lakoff (1975)

Intuitively, (56a) is awkward, because (unembedded) should is understood with a speaker-centered ordering source, so the speaker himself is taken to be the source of the advice given to the addressee. Consequently, the adversative clause expresses a contradiction to what has just been said. A similar effect obtains for imperatives: part of their performative nature seems to be that the speaker endorses that the addressee acts on what is pointed out as optimal by the imperative. Capturing this obvious intuition is not easy, though. Of course, it would fall out naturally under Bierwisch’s (1980) assumption that imperatives encode the cognitive attitude ‘I want that’.34 But

34 For a recent variant of this view compare Condoravdi and Lauer’s (2010) notion of effective preferences.

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159

I have argued that this is too strong for A DVICE-imperatives. Answering A’s question with an imperative as in (58) simply doesn’t commit B to a preference that A take the A-train (not even conditionally on a wish of going to Harlem as entertained by A). Nevertheless, an answer like B’ is entirely infelicitous. (58)

A: How do I get to Harlem? B: Take the A-train. B’: #Take the A-train but I don’t want you to do this.

The challenge is thus to find a relation between the speaker and the necessity expressed by the imperative that is weaker than a wish that the necessity be acted upon but strong enough to ensure that the speaker cannot express an open dispreference for the imperative to be acted upon. Although speaker preferences prove too strong, it seems to me that what all imperatives have in common is that the speaker suggests the prejacent as a suitable means to achieve a particular goal or, more generally, to settle the question of what to do. To make this precise, I assume that imperatives often occur in contexts in which a question with respect to action alternatives for the addressee is salient.35 We can think of this as a contextually given decision problem δ(c) (a set of propositions describing future courses of events that jointly exhaust the context set) such that the prejacent of OPImp constitutes one solution to it (i.e., is one of its elements).36 Now, even if the speaker does not have to have any preferences for the addressee to solve the goal in that particular way, she seems to endorse the kind of criteria the addressee is employing—even if only reluctantly so as in cases to be given below (cf. (62)). Also, it seems to be required that the addressee be also taken to accept this type of criterion. Jointly with the authority presupposition, this accounts for Ninan’s (2005) observation that performative modals (and, equally, imperatives) are infelicitous with follow-ups that indicate that the addressee won’t act out the prejacent ((59a), (59b) repeated from Section 2.3.1 above). (59)

a. b.

Sam must go to confession (#but he is not going to). Go to confession (#but I know you won’t go).

his (4)

I propose to capture this particular status of the ordering source as saying that it is mutual joint belief that speaker and addressee both think that the imperative’s ordering source (e.g. the speaker’s commands, the addressee’s goals, the addressee’s wishes. . . ) constitute the relevant criteria for solving the contextually given decision problem. But note that not all imperatives can be treated as relying on a decision

35 The salience of a question could be modeled e.g. by question sets (Ginzburg, 1995a, b; Roberts, 1996), or the framework of inquisitive semantics (cf. Groenendijk and Roelofsen, 2009). 36

See van Rooy (2003) for contextual salience of decision problems; Davis (2009) for an application relating to discourse particles in Japanese; Schwager (2010) for an application to discourse particles in German imperatives. Only recently have I become aware of Cariani’s (2009) analysis of ought, which crucially relies on action alternatives. Future research is needed to compare his proposal to my analysis of imperatives.

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problem: if the prejacent of the imperative is a proposition that describes a state of affairs not under the control of the addressee as in (60), the prejacent does not constitute a solution to any salient decision problem in the context. In this case, the speaker’s wishes are chosen as an ordering source. (60)

a. b. c.

Enjoy your meal! Please be rich! on one’s way to a blind date Please don’t have broken another vase!

Therefore, I suggest spelling out the restriction on the ordering source as follows: (61)

Ordering source restriction (OSR) OPImp c = λ f λgλtλPλw.(∀w  ∈ O( f CG(c) ∪ f, g, cT , w))[P(t)(w  )], presupposes: either (i) in c there is a salient decision problem Δ(c) ⊆ P(W ) such that in c the imperative provides an answer to it,37 g is any prioritizing ordering source, and speaker and addressee consider g the relevant criteria for resolving Δ(c); or else, (ii) in c there is no salient decision problem Δ(c) such that the imperative provides an answer to it in c, and g is speaker bouletic.

Given OSR, the infelicity of example (55a) becomes obvious. At the same time, it is not ruled out that the speaker personally does not care about the outcome of the decision problem (as in A DVICE, consider B in (58)), or even that he personally dislikes the outcome of the decision process, as long as he acknowledges that the addressee is applying the right set of criteria. But OSR is not entirely unproblematic in view of C ONCESSIONs like (62). (62)

eben auf diese verdammte Party. Ich kann dich ja Dann geh party. I can you DP RT then go.I MP S G DP RT to this damn eh nicht hindern. DP RT not impede ‘Well, then go to that damn party. I cannot keep you from doing so anyways.’

In such cases, the speaker seems to have a preference for the addressee not to act on the imperative, yet signals that he has given up on defending his real preference against the addressee. At least at first glance, this seems at odds with the assumption that speaker and addressee agree on what are the relevant criteria for action. Also, it has sometimes been argued that such C ONCESSIONs are paraphrased more adequately by possibility modals and should thus be treated as expressing 37 The notion of what counts as an answer to a decision problem should be treated parallel to what counts as an answer to an information question, cf. Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984); Ginzburg (1995a, b). Obviously, imperatives are felicitous if they constitute complete semantic answers to the decision problem, that is, if λw.P(t)(w) ∈ Δ(c). But imperatives can also constitute partial answers, as long as it is compatible with the common ground that the addressee obtains further evidence to actually resolve the decision problem.

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possibility as well (e.g. Grosz, 2010).38 To begin with, I don’t think that an analysis in terms of possibility is adequate for the examples in question. The corresponding possibility sentences lack the expression of annoyance and resignation genuine to imperatives like (62). While a detailed analysis of the phenomenon is outside the scope of this investigation, I think that these imperatives are still analyzed best as expressing necessity with respect to the addressee’s goals. In the given context, it is only with respect to these that the prejacent is evaluated as optimal (clearly, they are not shared by the speaker). By using them as the ordering source in an imperative, the speaker acknowledges them as the relevant criteria for action. As the outcome obviously conflicts with the speaker’s personal preferences, we derive the confrontational flavor of this particular speech act type. In particular, with (62) c S expresses that the speaker now accepts that the addressee acts according to her own wishes instead of acting on c S ’s advice. But as (62) typically constitutes the resolution to a previous quarrel, when the imperative is uttered, it is not mutual joint belief that the addressee’s wishes are the appropriate criteria to resolve the contextually salient decision problem (in this case, ‘the addressee goes/doesn’t go to the party’). Therefore, (62) either requires an accommodation of OSR with respect to the ordering source ‘the addressee’s goals’, or it constitutes an insincere way of speaking. I think that either option can account for the marked status of such examples. For the moment, I will not try to argue which view is correct. The ordering source restriction explains why uttering imperatives induces a strong pressure on the addressee to act upon them, which can make them unbequem ‘uncomfortable’ as Wratil (2005) chooses to put it. Of course, this does not hold for cases where the addressee had been lacking information in order to take the right decision (A DVICEs), or where the future course of events is not in the hands of the addressee, as in W ISHes like Enjoy yourself!, Get well soon!—which consequently, on my analysis, do not share the taste of discomfort Wratil (2005) postulates for imperatives in general. I take this to be a favorable outcome.39

38 These usages are similar to a particular type of verb-initial German main clauses involving sollen ‘should’ (cf. Önnerfors, 1997).

(i)

Soll er doch hingehen! shouldxs he DP RT go-there roughly: ‘Ok, then let him go there, what do I care.’

Such clauses are also used for C ONCESSIONs, i.e. to indicate that the speaker does not care whether the prejacent proposition is realized: either because she has given up a prior preference against this, or because contrary to expectations she never cared in the first place. 39 The ordering source restriction may sound reminiscent of Portner’s (2007) rationality check. Yet, it differs in two crucial ways: (i) while the rationality check serves as a global evaluation for rational behavior, the ORS is meant to evaluate an agent’s behavior very locally, i.e. with respect to a particular decision problem which stands in relation to the imperative prejacent; therefore, the theory of imperatives need not be extended to a general theory of what counts as rational behavior in a given situation, avoiding the problems discussed in Section 2.2.4 above; (ii) ORS captures correctly that prejacents that are not under the control of the addressee are associated with speaker

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4.2.4 Putting It All Together The semantic contribution of the imperative operator amounts to the propositional and presuppositional ingredients in (63).40 (63)

OPImp c = λ f λgλtλPλw.(∀w  ∈ O( f CG(c) ∪ f, g, cT , w))[P(t)(w  )], presupposes: a. ¬(t < cT ) Section 3.2.2 b. f, g ∈ AUTH  (c S )(c) Authority condition, Section 4.2.2 c. for the precontext c of c, CS(c ) ⊆ λw.(∃w ∈ Bel c S (cT )(w))(∃w ∈ Bel cS (cT )(w))[¬P(t)(w ) & P(t)(w )] Epistemic uncertainty (EUC), Section 4.2.3 d. either (i) in c there is a salient decision problem Δ(c) ⊆ P(W ) such that in c the imperative provides an answer to it, g is any prioritizing ordering source, and speaker and addressee consider g the relevant criteria for resolving Δ(c); or else, (ii) in c there is no salient decision problem Δ(c) such that the imperative provides an answer to it in c,41 and g is speaker bouletic. Ordering source restriction (OSR), Section 4.2.3

We are now ready to examine how good an answer this offers to the two problems individuated in Section 1.2. On the one hand, the problem of clause type encoding (CTE): why is it that imperatives are prototypically used for O RDERs? I assume that this falls out from the fact that, in any unmarked context, all presuppositions are met for the corresponding ordering source what I order: (a) O RDERs are meant to be acted on at some point in the future (cf. Searle, 1969), (b) speakers are generally taken to have perfect knowledge of what they order, (c) ‘what I order’ is a prioritizing ordering source, (d) speakers only order things they consider possible but not necessary, and (e) speakers are generally known to expect their addressees to act upon what they order them to do, i.e. it is assumed that felicitous orders are complied with. On the other hand, the presuppositions in (63) can be met by many other conversational backgrounds. Therefore, depending on the contextual settings, we can obtain very different flavors of necessity, corresponding to other speech act types of O RDER, R EQUEST , W ISH, etc. This leaves room for a satisfactory answer to ASA, the problem of assigning speech acts to utterances. In particular, we have also ensured that only prejacents that do not constitute action alternatives for the

bouletic ordering sources and have no effect on the evaluation of the addressee’s rationality, but automatically commit the speaker to have a preference for the truth of the prejacent. 40

Note again that I abstract away from the necessity to bind variables across different dimensions of meaning, see also fn. 43 above. Also, f ∪ f  is again short for λw. f (w) ∪ f  (w). f CG(c) is the function from w to the salient set of propositions that describe CG in c. 41

As qualified in fn. 37 above.

4.3

Some Considerations on Propositionality and Rejections

163

addressee get combined with bouletic ordering sources and thus constitute W ISHes at the level of speech acts. Analysing imperatives as graded modals relies on the idea of endowing imperatives with precisely those presuppositions that describe a context in which an overt necessity modal would be used performatively. This should warrant the connection in (64). (64)

Uttering φ = You must ψ (or φ = You should ψ), such that the LF of φ is [must f g you ψ] in a context c where the presuppositions induced by [OPImp f g t you ψ] are met, amounts to a performative (that is, nondescriptive, non-assertoric) usage of φ.

I am quite confident that the principles I put forth in the preceding two subsections ensure the validity of (64).42 Nevertheless, it has to be seen as a task for future research to find out if some of the principles can be reduced to more general requirements of speech act types as categories of moves in the conversational game.43

4.3 Some Considerations on Propositionality and Rejections One of the strongest objections against the propositional analysis for imperatives is the putative absence of a truth value, which is usually taken for granted given the intuition that imperatives cannot be countered with That’s (not) true. In this section, I want to elaborate a little on why I don’t find this convincing. In so far as it is true that imperatives cannot be countered by That’s (not) true, this only proves the conversational inaccessibility of a truth value, not its absence.44 I take it that it is a feature of most speech act types associated with imperatives that their truth-value is simply not up for discussion. Therefore, imperatives share this fate with those declaratives that are used for similar speech acts or that share certain properties.

42

The connection is weakened by the fact that not all imperatives can be substituted for by must or should indiscriminately. I take this to derive from the fact that modal auxiliaries like must and should are not completely neutral expressions of (graded) necessity themselves. Moreover, the claim does not extend to cases that draw on the presuppositional meaning component of imperatives in order to force accommodation (e.g. C ONCESSIONs). 43 Ede Zimmermann (p.c.) suggests that EUC could be considered the preference-related parallel to Stalnaker’s (1978) constraint against vacuous A SSERTION s (i.e. A SSERTIONs of propositions that are already entailed by the context set). 44 The idea that speaker’s intuitions about whether a linguistic expression is assigned a truth value can be blurred by the use made of these expressions has also been put forth to argue against the existence of truth values: von Fintel (2004) argues that certain sentences containing definite descriptions that fail to refer are judged to be false for pragmatic reasons even though thanks to a presupposition failure, semantically, they lack a truth-value. I consider this further support for my doubts against speaker’s intuitions as an argument in favor of a non-propositional analysis of imperatives.

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4 From Modalized Propositions to Speech Acts

At least some of the crucial pragmatic factors will fall out from the analysis of imperatives proposed in this book. The above-mentioned intuitions can be made precise as two different versions of what I would like to call the That’s (not) true-test for propositionality. I will argue that, even on the more plausible weak version, it is not a convincing instrument. (65)

That’s (not) true-Test (strong version) Utterances of linguistic objects that semantically correspond to propositions can be challenged or endorsed by replying with That’s (not) true! (or its equivalent in the language of the context).45

(66)

That’s (not) true-Test (weak version) A linguistic object (individuated in terms of a disambiguated LF) e for which we cannot find any context c such that e is uttered in c and is felicitously challenged/endorsed by c A with That’s (not) true! (or its equivalent in the language of c) cannot have a proposition as its semantic value.

Before discussing the two versions in more detail, I want to point out a general problem with both of them. The felicity of the follow-up depends crucially on the resolution of the propositional that-anaphor. If the previous utterance expresses a proposition there is a strong preference for it to constitute the antecedent of the pronoun. But in principle, any salient proposition could play that role. In particular, the felicity of an exchange like (67) would not normally be taken as evidence for the propositional nature of the semantic object expressed by A: (67)

A: Who is going to do the dishes? B: That’s true, we should have thought of this.

Rather, the demonstrative is either cataphoric to the modalized proposition that follows it or it refers to the assumption that A’s question is relevant. As far as I can see, both versions of the That’s (not) true-test are sharpened considerably if that is replaced by what you are saying. In Section 2.3.1 I have already argued against the strong version. Performative modal verbs cannot be countered by That’s (not) true in their very context of appearance. Yet, I have argued that even on such occurrences, the corresponding sentences still express propositions. A strong argument in favor of this position is the existence of clearly propositional occurrences of the same surface strings and the absence of clear arguments in favor of ambiguity. Hence, my analysis of performative modals rejects the strong version of the That’s (not) true-test, but does not stand in conflict with its weak version. In contrast, depending on rather subtle data to be given below, my analysis of imperatives may be at odds both with the strong and with the weak version. Independently of the empirical facts about imperatives, I will argue that there is no good evidence for the validity even of the weak version.

45

Ignoring matters of politeness.

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Some Considerations on Propositionality and Rejections

165

First, there are other linguistic objects that—in contrast to imperatives—are standardly assumed to correspond to propositions at the semantic level but still fail to pass even the weak version of the That’s (not) true-test. The first case is the subjunctive of sollen ‘should’, i.e. sollte.46 Despite its declarative form, both in German and in English it seems hard to force A’s utterance in (68a) into a descriptive usage or counter it by That’s not true. This is particularly true for German, where the deontically interpreted subjunctive modal always comes with the speaker-dependent flavor of ‘as far as I am concerned’. In that it is highly similar to the imperative in (69a). (68)

(69)

a.

A: Du solltest jetzt Melli anrufen. you should now melli call ‘(As far as I am concerned) you should call Melli now.’

b.

B: # Das ist nicht wahr. that is not true # ‘That’s not true.’

a.

A: Ruf jetzt Melli an. call.I MP S G now Melli ‘Call Melli now.’

b.

B: # Das ist nicht wahr. that is not true # ‘That’s not true.’

Grammatically, the modalized declarative in (68a) allows for the formation of a corresponding interrogative, which confirms its propositional nature. But the resulting interrogative (cf. (70)) can only be used as a rhetorical question or as guarded advice (maybe in relation to that, omitting the particles is hardly possible). (70)

Solltest du jetzt # ({nicht/(nicht) vielleicht}) Melli anrufen? Melli call should you now not/(not) maybe ‘At this point, shouldn’t you call Melli!?’

Again, sollte behaves exactly like an imperativized verb (see Section 2.3.3.3), for which the rhetorical effect was derived from the authority condition. Interestingly, sollte fares better with respect to the positive version of the That’s (not) true-test: (71)

a.

A: Du solltest besser die U-Bahn nehmen. you should better the metro take ‘You had better take the metro.’

46 For the following judgements, the homophonous past form has to be ignored, which is forced by inserting jetzt ‘now’. The past reading is also blocked by the adverbial besser ‘better’. Note also that, in German, subjunctives do not generally give rise to non-propositional effects.

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b.

B: Das ist (# nicht) wahr. that is (not) true ‘That’s true.’/# ‘That’s not true.’

And, again, imperatives behave similarly. Though the judgments are somewhat subtle, it seems possible to endorse imperatives used for A DVISING by That’s true. In contrast, the negative version is infelicitous both in English and in German. (72)

A: How do I get to Rüsselsheim? B: Take the S8. A: Oh right, that’s true. A’: Oh right, what you are saying is true. A”: # No, that’s not true.

(73)

B: Nimm am besten die S8. A: Stimmt./Das ist wahr, an die B: Take.I MP at best the S8. A: Correct./That is true, of it (=the S8) habe ich gar nicht gedacht. have I at-all not thought (roughly) B: ‘Take the S8.’ A: ‘That’s true, that one I hadn’t thought of.’

The impossibility of the negative version That’s not true in response to a speech act considered sincere follows immediately from the authority condition. As far as the positive version is concerned, the data merit closer investigation. But it is clear that A DVICE-imperatives (or also sollte used for A DVISING) stand a far better chance of being endorsed by That’s true than utterances that serve for example as C OMMANDs, P ROHIBITIONs, P ERMISSION s, and WARNINGs. A natural way to account for the similarity between sollte and imperatives is to burden this form of the modal with (part of) the additional, not at-issue meaning component assigned to imperatives in Section 4.2. But why is A DVICE different from other speech acts executed with imperatives with respect to endorsment by That’s true? And, more generally, what are the restrictions on challenging speech acts as lies (the only way in which imperatives could be false without giving rise to a presupposition failure thanks to a violation of the epistemic authority condition)? While I cannot give a fully satisfactory description of the restrictions on rebuttals and endorsements in this book, I would like to point out a few aspects that strike me as crucial. Epistemic privilege (as required by the authority condition) is clearly influential w.r.t. the acceptability of That’s (not) true. Even declaratives of rather undisputed propositional nature show systematic inaccessibility of truth-values in utterances pertaining to issues with respect to which the speaker is considered epistemically privileged. (74)

A: I am hungry. B: # That’s (not) true./# What you are saying is (not) true.

These cases show that more or less undisputedly propositional linguistic elements also have a hard time passing at least the strong version of the That’s (not) true-test.

4.3

Some Considerations on Propositionality and Rejections

167

Here, the reason seems to be that we normally take people to know better than their interlocutors whether they are hungry or not.47 I consider these cases as constituting independent evidence for the influence of epistemic privilege. If the sequences in (72) can be shown to be widely acceptable, one thing remains to be explained: A DVICE also requires the speaker to be in an epistemically privileged position with respect to the issue under debate. Therefore, it is clear that a follow-up by That’s not true is at odds with one of the preconditions (arguably, one of the preparatory conditions) of A DVISING. Thus, what is at the center of attention is most likely not the truth or falsity of the proposition, but rather the failure of one of the preparatory conditions. In contrast, if it is true that backing a successful A DVICE by That’s true is indeed possible, this could be taken as evidence that the epistemic privilege involved in A DVISING is different from the epistemic privilege involved in utterances like (74) or in utterances about the speaker’s commands or wishes. This doesn’t strike me as implausible: while a speaker may be in an epistemically privileged position, the addressee will often also have an opinion on the matter and is normally able to critically evaluate the content of the A DVICE received. Even if imperatives and declaratives behave similarly with respect to how epistemic privilege influences the acceptability of That’s not true-follow ups, they differ in whether an utterance can be discarded as a lie (leaving untouched the speaker’s epistemic privilege).48 (75)

A: I am hungry. B: That’s not true. You are lying.

(76)

A: Close the door! B: # That’s not true. You are lying.

C OMMAND

Nevertheless, independently of the findings for A DVICE-imperatives, I don’t think that one should adopt the weak version of the That’s (not) true-test. A closer look at what are possible follow-ups reveals that for declaratives we not only find the above mentioned asymmetry between positive and negative forms, but also all kinds of other rather subtle differences in acceptability. For example, already for the case in (75), B’s reply is awkward in the absence of You are lying. Moreover, That’s (not) true is considerably worse in a case like (77), which at first glance seems similar to (75): (77)

A: I really hope you’ll recover in time. B: # That’s not true. You are lying. B’: You don’t mean that. You don’t care about me at all.

47

The example still passes the weak version of the That’s (not) true-test. Consider a scenario in which A has a nervous disorder that makes her unable to feel hunger or pain, and where a doctor who is monitoring her condition via several biochemical tests asks her to speculate on the possible reasons for, let’s say, her shaky hands. It seems that the infelicity of the follow-ups in (74) vanishes. See also the liar-scenarios below. 48

I am indebted to Manfred Bierwisch (p.c.) for pointing this out to me.

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Also, That’s not true is impossible as a follow-up to a C OMMAND as in (78). (78)

A: I want you to close the door now. B: # That’s not true. You are lying.

Still, for both (77) and (78) one can imagine contexts in which B’s replies are felicitous: namely contexts where A uses his sentences as A SSERTIONs rather than the more natural use as W ISH/C OMMAND . With respect to non-assertive speech act types, imperatives behave like their declarative counterparts—only that they lack this possibility of being forced into an A SSERTION. (79)

A: Get well soon! B: # That’s not true. You are lying. B’: You don’t mean that. You don’t care about me at all.

(80)

A: Close the door now! B: # That’s not true. You are lying.

The impossibility of That’s (not) true follow-ups to an utterance of an otherwise undisputedly propositional sentences as in (78) when meant as a C OMMAND rather than an A SSERTION about one’s psychological state, or in (77) when used as a W ISH provides further evidence against the strong version of the That’s-(not)-truetest. But the fact that different speech acts call for different rebuttals (That’s not true; You don’t mean that; you are lying; You are lying;. . . ) challenges the weak version as well. Which follow-ups are acceptable depends on the speech act type, not on the clause type (compare for example (77) and (79)). The weak version of the That’s (not) true-test remains entirely silent about what follow-ups are possible in general and under what conditions; it only claims that propositional objects can at least sometimes be followed by That’s (not) true. But if the acceptability of the follow-ups depends on the type of speech act, and, as the findings above suggest, the acceptability of That’s (not) true requires the preceding utterance to be an A SSERTION (or maybe, in the positive case, an A DVICE) the weak version of the That’s (not) true-test boils down to saying that every proposition can be used as an A SSERTION in at least some context. But this claim requires independent evidence. If we can find a way of interpreting certain linguistic objects as propositions that are unfit for use as A SSERTIONs, the weak version of the That’s (not) true-test has to be rejected as well. So far, I am not aware of any general argument that excludes the existence of inherently non-assertoric propositions.

Chapter 5

Possibility Readings

In the literature on imperatives, it has often been remarked that imperatives are not only used for speech acts that constrain the future course of events (like O RDERs or A DVICE), but also for P ERMISSIONs and C ONCESSIONS, i.e. for speech acts that widen the range of possible actions (cf. e.g. Davies, 1986; Donhauser, 1986; Platzack and Rosengren, 1997). (1)

a. b. c. d. e.

Read this! Stay away from the projector! Have fun at the party! Turn off the light, please! Take the A train if you want to go to Harlem.1

C OMMAND WARNING W ISH R EQUEST A DVICE

(2)

a. b.

(It starts at eight, but) come earlier if you like!2 P ERMISSION All right, don’t come then! (If you think you are so clever.) C ONCESSIVE

Moreover, in Schwager (2005a), I observed that examples like (3) are ambiguous between an A DVICE-reading comparable to the conditional case in (1e), on which a particular restriction (among others) is pointed out as characterizing future courses of events that lead to the addressee’s goal (Reading 1), and an A DVICE-reading that points out one type of future courses of events that (among others) lead to the addressee’s goal (Reading 2). (3)

zum Beispiel keine Zigaretten. Kauf buy.I MP for example no cigarettes Reading 1: ‘One thing you may not do is buy cigarettes.’ Reading 2: ‘One of the things you can do is not buy cigarettes.’ for example-A DVICE

At the level of semantic interpretation as well as at the level of intuitive paraphrases, examples as in (1) and Reading 1 of (3) are usually associated with necessity, 1

Billy Strayhorn/via Sæbø (2002).

2

Example from Hamblin (1987).

M. Kaufmann, Interpreting Imperatives, Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy 88, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012 DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-2269-9_5, 

169

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examples as in (2) and Reading 2 of (3) with possibility. This difference is suggested by speaker intuitions as to what are possible paraphrases, but also in the acceptability of discourse particles that seem sensitive to the modal force of the modal operator.3 In Section 1.2, I recorded this observation as the problem of quantificational inhomogeneity (QIP). At first glance, QIP seems at odds with the uniform necessity semantics I have assigned. And indeed, Grosz (2008b) argues that imperatives contain a modal operator that is underspecified with respect to modal force (cf. also Platzack and Rosengren, 1997). In contrast, other authors have maintained that the apparent possibility readings are to be derived pragmatically from processes that usually serve to constrain the future course of events (cf. Wilson and Sperber, 1988; Portner, 2007; Davis, 2009).4 In Schwager (2005b), I spelled out an idea along these lines. A revised version of it will be presented in Section 5.1. A recent alternative is to be found in Portner (2010).5 In the following, I will argue that the three cases in (2) are all compatible with my uniform necessity semantics for imperatives, but arise from slightly different constellations each. In particular, for P ERMISSIONs (cf. (2a)), I assume that the effect comes about because an update with a necessity proposition conveys the information that the prejacent is compatible with what is required by the speaker. The details are spelled out in Section 5.1 below. For C ONCESSIONs (cf. (2b)), I have already argued in Section 4.2.3 that they express necessity with respect to the addressee’s goals or wishes. They occur in situations where there is a conflict between speaker and addressee, and it is not taken for granted that the speaker endorses the addressee’s goals or wishes as the relevant criteria to decide whether to act out the prejacent or not. In order for the imperative to be felicitous, this has to be accommodated. How far this accommodation should result in a serious speaker commitment or merely constitutes an act of pretending remains to be investigated in more detail. In this respect the status of imperative C ONCESSIONS like (2b) strikes me as largely parallel to utterances like (4) in similar contexts: (4)

I don’t care anymore. Just do as you please.

Here, too, it is anything but clear if the speaker really does not care anymore and if it is indeed ‘safe’ for the addressee to proceed as intended. But as the problem arises already for the first sentence in the sequence, which is declarative in nature, the proper treatment of such utterances is independent of imperatives. Therefore, I

3

Cf. Grosz (2008a), but Schwager (2010) for a different explanation.

4

Portner (2007) mentions conversational implicatures. Davis (2009) claims that permission effects arise where the addressee’s action alternatives get constrained to those that she already plans to act out anyway. This does not strike me as adequate, as imperative permissions are given typically in contexts where the addressee would not dare to act out the prejacent in the absence of the imperative utterance that signals the speaker’s acquiescence or even approval. 5 I will not discuss his approach in detail as the most interesting differences arise from his general approach to imperatives. For a discussion of Portner’s analysis of imperatives, see Section 2.2.4.

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171

assume that I have correctly sketched the semantics of imperative C ONCESSIONS, but that it is up to pragmatics to investigate the potential gap between literal meaning and actual speaker intentions. In this book, I will not discuss imperative C ONCES SIONS in further detail. Finally, pieces of A DVICE like (3) are slightly different. In Section 5.3 I will argue that they are best analyzed by decomposing the imperative operator as exhaustified possibility (which is shown to be equivalent to necessity). I claim that the exhaustification can be blocked by the presence of overt for example, and that therefore, in these cases, we sometimes see the underlying possibility operator. As exhaustification applies obligatorily in the absence of overt for example, nothing changes with respect to the assumption that, in all other cases, imperatives contain a necessity operator. Semantically, exhaustified possibility is indistinguishable from necessity.

5.1 Permitting Permissions 5.1.1 PERMISSION-like Speech Acts In contrast to those used for other speech act types, imperatives used for P ER MISSIONS are normally marked by modifiers or require very particular contextual constellations.6 I consider this tendency towards overt marking one of the foremost arguments against an analysis in terms of semantic ambiguity. Besides various particles (e.g. German ruhig as in (5a), nur, einfach, . . . ),7 we often find reduced conditional antecedents (German wenn du willst, or its English equivalent if you like). (5)

a.

b.

dir ruhig einen Apfel! Nimm take.I MP S G you DP RT an apple ‘(Feel free to) take an apple!’ Nimm dir einen Apfel wenn du willst! take.I MP S G you an apple if you like ‘Take an apple if you like!’

In view of these reduced antecedents it may be tempting to analyze away P ERMIS SION -imperatives at the speech act level. Could we think of them as O RDERS that

6

For a similar view see Portner (2010), who claims that ‘permission imperatives are severely restricted, and only come about in specific constructions and contexts’ (p. 10).

7 None of these particles occurs exclusively in P ERMISSIONs. In contrast to the more liberal nur and einfach, ruhig is limited to speech act types that somehow encourage or mark as possible the action alternative described by the prejacent. Schwager (2010) argues that this is best captured at this pragmatic level and should not be tied to co-occurrence with a possibility operator. Evidence in favor of this assumption comes from the occurrence of ruhig in declaratives that do not contain modal operators. Cf. Schwager (2010) for details. A similar idea is to be found in Portner (2010).

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are conditionalized on the wishes of the addressee? The example in (6a) would then correspond to the paraphrase in (6b). (6)

a. b.

Come earlier if you like. If you want to come earlier, (given what I order you to do) you must come earlier.

As pointed out by Hamblin (1987), this makes wrong predictions. Intuitively, even if the addressee wants to come earlier (and even if this is mutually known to speaker and addressee) there is no obligation for the addressee to do so after an utterance of (6a). For (6b) this does seem to be the case, though. But of course, a necessity operator in the consequent need not be interpreted deontically, and indeed, I will argue that P ERMISSION-imperatives with if you like-modifiers should be analyzed as ‘if you want to φ it is best that you φ’ where ‘it is best’ is understood as ‘according to what you want/according to what your goals are’.8 I want to argue that a P ER MISSION -like effect comes about by considerations of mutual dependences between speaker and addressee preferences. Note that despite the general claim that imperatives can convey P ERMISSIONs, the speech acts observed seem a little stronger. A speaker giving P ERMISSION may remain entirely neutral as to whether acting on what she has just permitted is good for the addressee or not. The P ERMISSION-like imperatives under discussion differ in that—in addition to all characteristics of a P ERMISSION—they also convey some sort of endorsement, therefore, they are more like I NVITATIONS or E NCOURAGEMENTS. On my analysis, this follows from the 8

On closer inspection, if you like-antecedents pose problems in their own right: even when occurring with overtly expressed permissions as in (i), the permission issued is not felt to depend on the addressee having a wish for what has been permitted. (i)

You may come earlier if you like.

Just imagine a scenario where the addressee did not have a wish to come earlier, but ended up doing so, for example because his taxi driver did not respect the speed limit. It doesn’t seem that he could be blamed by the speaker for having done something that was prohibited. Moreover, consider the following data from German. In the given context, the modal dürfen can only expresses deontic possibility. Now, an exchange like (ii) is a typical joke (A need not reply): (ii)

A: Wenn du willst, darfst du heute länger aufbleiben. - B: Und wenn ich nicht mag? if you like, may you today longer stay-up and if I not like ‘A: If you like, you can stay up longer today. - B: And what if I don’t want to?’

The fact that B’s reply sounds like a joke (or a misunderstanding) indicates that the consequent does not depend on the antecedent. Also, the proposition expressed (elliptically) by the antecedent constitutes one of Searle’s preparatory conditions for P ERMISSIONS. Therefore, pragmatically, (ii)-A looks a lot like a relevance conditional. Yet, syntactically, the examples with if you likemodifiers differ from relevance conditionals: the consequent can be preceded by dann ‘then’, but it can’t be transformed into a V2-clause. Both properties are typically taken as evidence that the example in question is not a relevance conditional (cf. Bhatt and Pancheva, 2006 and Section 6.2). A solution to these problems has to await future research. As far as I can tell, the discussion of anankastic conditionals (cf. e.g. Sæbø, 2002; von Fintel and Iatridou, 2005) provides the most promising starting point.

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Permitting Permissions

173

ordering source restriction encoded by imperatives (see Section 4.2.3). To recall this difference, I will continue to call the speech acts in question P ERMISSION -like. To derive the possibility-like behavior of imperatives at the pragmatic level, we have to ask ourselves under what circumstances we obtain a P ERMISSION-like reading for an imperative like (7). (7)

Take an apple!

It seems that for imperatives to have a P ERMISSION-like effect in a context c, c has to meet three requirements with respect to what the addressee wants and what the speaker allows.9 In the following, they are spelled out for the particular example in (7). It has to be presupposed that • the addressee wants to – take an apple, and to – please the speaker, and that • (i) the addressee is not allowed to take an apple by the speaker (consequently, taking an apple would upset the speaker), or (ii) it is unknown whether the addressee is allowed to take an apple (consequently, taking an apple might upset the speaker). Strictly speaking, only the variant with (i) gives rise to a P ERMISSION-like effect in that there is an actual change in what is deontically possible. In contrast, (ii) changes the epistemic status of whether the prejacent is deontically possible.10 In the following, I will focus first on the P ERMISSION-like effect arising in situations with condition (i) and then turn to (ii). To guarantee the necessary correlation between permissibility and the mood of the speaker, I assume that the following principle, which states that no one is pleased if their prohibitions are ignored, is common ground between speaker and addressee:

9 For the moment, I confine my explanation to simple cases where any further wishes of the addressee are compatible with each other and both with taking an apple and with pleasing the speaker. Potential further wishes of the addressee will thus not affect the status of these two propositions with respect to the set of addressee bouletically optimal worlds and can be ignored safely. 10 I am indebted to Dennis Bonnay (p.c.) for pointing out the second possibility. In general, the difference between what is allowed and what is known to be allowed is often ignored in the literature, see also the discussion in Section 2.1.1. The contrast carries over to questions:

(i)

a.

b.

Darf ich mir einen Apfel nehmen? Bitte! may I me an apple take? please! ‘Can I take an apple? Please!’ Darf ich mir eigentlich einen Apfel nehmen? an apple take may I me DP RT ‘Am I allowed to take an apple?’

Note that the interrogative in (ia) asks the addressee to change the deontic status of the prejacent if it isn’t already permissible, while (ib) simply investigates the prejacent’s current status.

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5 Possibility Readings

(8)

λw.(∀x e )(∀ pst )[ p is prohibited by x in w & w ∈ p & x is aware of p in w → x is not pleased in w]

In addition, both the addressee’s taking an apple and the speaker’s being pleased are compatible with the common ground before the utterance,11 and it is common ground that the speaker would become aware of p. Then, the context set of the precontext c can be characterized as follows: CS(c ) is a subset of ‘taking an apple is prohibited’, therefore, on CS(c ), ‘the addressee takes an apple’ and ‘the speaker is pleased’ have an empty intersection. Furthermore, CS(c ) entails that the addressee wants to take an apple and that the addressee wants that the speaker is pleased (with him). Assume that pa stands for ‘the addressee takes an apple (at some point in the contextually given event frame t)’, and ps stands for ‘the speaker is pleased (at the contextually given event frame t)’. The resulting description of the pre-context c is given in (9). (9)

a. b.

assumptions: CS(c ) ∩ pa = ∅, CS(c ) ∩ ps = ∅ presuppositions: (i) CS(c ) ⊆ ‘ pa is prohibited’ (ii) CS(c ) ⊆ ‘the addressee wants pa ’ (iii) CS(c ) ⊆ ‘the addressee wants ps ’ therefore, (∀w ∈ CS(c ))[g(w, cT ) ={ pa , ps }], for g = ‘the wishes of the addressee’.

Ordering CS(c ) as described in (9) with respect to the wishes of the addressee leaves us with the picture in Fig. 5.1. The set of optimal worlds in CS(c ) with respect to the ordering source g (the wishes of the addressee) O( f CG(c ) , g, cT , w) consists in the union of the two white segments, the one containing w2 characterized by ‘the addressee takes an apple’, ‘the speaker is not pleased’, and the one containing w1 characterized by ‘the addressee doesn’t take an apple’, ‘the speaker is pleased’. This is because, since CS(c )∩( pa ∧ ps ) = ∅, there is no world v s.t. v ≤g(w) w2 and not w2 ≤g(w) v, and likewise there is no world u s.t. u ≤g(w) w1 and not w1 ≤g(w) u. The imperative in (7) is interpreted as in (10): (10)

[ [ OPImp f g t ] [I MPPRO take an apple ] ]c = λw.(∀w  ∈ O( f CG(c) , g, cT , w))[∃e[τ (e) ⊆ t & take-an-apple(e)(c A )(w  )], where g = ‘what the addressee wants’ (= boulc A ).

For any context c, (10) describes the same set of worlds for each world w ∈ CS(c) (because for any w, w  ∈ CS(c))[CG(c)(w) = CG(c)(w  )], and in the given scenario, boulc A (w) = boulc A (w )). Therefore, it is either true of all the worlds in the context set, or it is not. It is easy to show that, in the precontext c , the imperative proposition is false at all worlds in the context set. Just pick for example w1 . For any 11 If the speaker was known to be angry with the addressee anyway, the reasoning wouldn’t make much sense. Likewise, if taking an apple is assumed to be impossible, permitting or prohibiting it does not make much sense.

5.1

Permitting Permissions

175 ¬pa ∧¬ ps

w2

pa ∧¬ ps

w1

ps ∧¬ pa

Fig. 5.1 CG, ordered by g(w, cT ) = { pa = ‘the addressee takes an apple’, ps = ‘the speaker is pleased’}

w ∈ CS(c ), w1 ∈ O( f CG(c) (c ), g, cT , w), but w1 ∈ pa . Therefore, the proposition expressed by the imperative, (10), has an empty intersection with CS(c ). But the worlds in the context set differ according to what happens at cT , the moment immediately after cT . In particular, as speaker and addressee consider it possible that the speaker issues a P ERMISSION at cT , there are worlds at which the speaker permits the addressee to take an apple. At such worlds, the truth value of ‘ pa is prohibited’ is changed to false. Now, at cT , the imperative is uttered. Under the assumption that speaker and addressee are both aware of this fact, CS(c ) is constrained to contain only worlds at which the speaker utters the respective string (all other worlds are ruled out by metalinguistic information). Moreover, thanks to the assumptions about the precontext, the proposition expressed by the imperative is true only at worlds where the utterance of this string actually constitutes a P ERMISSION, and, thanks to the authority condition, it would constitute a presupposition failure if it weren’t true at all worlds in the context set. Therefore, if the context is not such that the imperative results in a presupposition failure, the speech act executed in c constitutes a P ERMISSION (to be precise, a P ERMISSION -like speech act as described above) and the postcontext is such that the addressee is allowed to take an apple. Things are even more straightforward for cases where imperatives remove uncertainty about whether taking an apple is permissible or not (that is, if the third condition on the precontext as spelled out below (7) is not (i) but (ii)). In these cases, the context set of the precontext c contains worlds where pa is prohibited (and the imperative is false) as well as worlds where pa is not prohibited (and the imperative is true). If the imperative is felicitous in the given context (that is, if the authority condition is not violated), then, all those worlds at which the speaker subsequently utters the imperative are worlds at which it is true and, hence, pa is not prohibited. Consequently, an utterance of Take an apple results in a context set where pa is not prohibited.

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5 Possibility Readings

Note that it is not entirely clear what label should be assigned to such an update: if taking an apple was not prohibited before the utterance, the update does not meet the standard description of a P ERMISSION. Yet, thanks to speaker authority and ordering source affirmation, it does not behave like an A SSERTION either. For example, it cannot be followed by That’s true/That’s not true. (cf. Eckardt, 2009, for criticism of existing speech act theories and their inability to characterize appropriately certain mixed types). But even if an appropriate speech act theoretic label still needs to be found, this should not trouble a theory of imperatives: what is crucial is that the assumptions about the precontext together with the linguistic object expressed derive the effect the utterance has on its context.

5.2 Any Troubles? In the previous section, I have shown how the utterance of a necessity proposition can give rise to the effect of a P ERMISSION (and, due to the imperative’s ordering source restriction, a slightly stronger speech act of an I NVITATION or an E NCOUR AGEMENT ). In the following, I would like to consider the behavior of free choice items, which, at first glance, seems to be in conflict with my analysis. It is well known that any is licensed by possibility modals (11a), but not normally by necessity modals (11b), (cf. McCawley, 1970; Aloni, 2002). (11)

a. b.

You may pick any flower. must pick any flower.

∗ You

Imperatives pattern with possibility modals and license free choice any: (12)

Pick any flower!

This seems to constitute evidence that imperatives can express possibility. Above we have seen that even with a uniform necessity semantics we can account for the effect that imperatives sometimes open up possibilities (as would a performative possibility modal). Consequently, it might seem promising that any is licensed by the pragmatic effect of possibility. But that would explain only a small subset of the data to be accounted for. Instead of giving up the idea of a uniform necessity semantics I want to take a closer look at the nature of any-licensing imperatives. I will show that they come in two different types, and I will argue that neither of them has a reading equivalent to may, and one is even exactly parallel to must.

5.2.1 Indifference Any-Imperatives The first case of any-imperatives is constituted by cases like (13). Examples along these lines are generally discussed as imperatives that could not be expressed with

5.2

Any Troubles?

177

overt necessity modals (cf. (14)); the more accurate paraphrases contain possibility modals (cf. (15)). (13)

a. b.

(14)

a. b.

(15)

a. b.

Pick any flower! Pick any card! ∗ You ∗ You

must pick any flower! must pick any card!

You may pick any flower! You may pick any card!

The examples are used naturally when the domain of objects (flowers or cards in our case) is fixed. Typically, the addressee is presented with a flower bed or a set of cards. Taking a closer look at these examples we notice that they are not equivalent to their counterparts with may. While the imperatives seem to presuppose that one of the objects will or must be affected, this necessity part with respect to a neutral existential quantifier is lacking for the examples in (15). The reading we get for an imperative as in (13a) is paraphrased best as in (16). (16)

{You must pick a flower/you will pick a flower} but I’m indifferent as to which one you pick.

A treatment along these lines has been proposed by Aloni (2004). She assumes that the imperative is sensitive to alternatives as induced by existential operators and disjunctions, and with respect to these expresses the following proposition (where A is e.g. the permissibility sphere, and ALT the function that maps each proposition onto its sets of alternatives, e.g. with f 1 , f2 , f 3 the flowers in the context, AL T (you pick a flower) = {you pick f 1 , you pick f 2 , you pick f 3 }). (17)

λw.(∀α ∈ AL T (φ) M,g )(∃w ∈ Aw )[w  ∈ α] & (∀w ∈ Aw )(∃α ∈ AL T (φ) M,g )[w  ∈ α]

This reads as ‘each alternative is permissible and it is obligatory to chose one of them’. It is easy to see that it boils down to necessity with respect to the background whenever the complement proposition of the imperative induces a singleton set of alternatives. Therefore, in these cases any does not constitute an argument that imperatives can sometimes express possibility. Rather, they show that there is some dependency between any and what count as alternative ways of fulfilling an action. Interestingly, this comes into play in imperatives, but not in connection with overt necessity modals. Given this contrast, it seems that the potential sensibility of imperatives with respect to alternative ways of acting out the prejacent merits closer investigation.

5.2.2 Subtrigged Necessity Any-Imperatives Aloni’s (2004) treatment fails to capture a second type of any-imperatives. In these cases, the domain is open, but restricted by a presupposition of the predicate or a condition salient in the context.

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5 Possibility Readings

(18)

a. b.

Confiscate any guns. Remove any stains.

In these cases, necessity modals are just as acceptable, and the reading we obtain corresponds to necessity with respect to the entirety of objects in the restricted domain. This time, the speaker presents himself as ignorant or indifferent as to whatever objects might happen to be within the restricted domain. (19)

a. b.

You must confiscate any guns. You must remove any stains.

(20)

(∀x)[gun(x) & find(c A , x) →  confiscate(c A , x)]12

The cases involving presuppositions (and thus restriction of the domain of any) have generally been assumed to be on a par with the more general phenomenon of subtrigging (cf. Grand, 1975; Dayal, 1998). In the case of overt or contextually salient restrictions, the ungrammaticality of any under must vanishes. Here we obtain the same interpretation for any under must and in the imperative. (21)

a. b. c.

Pick any flower you find along the way. You must pick any flower # (you find along the way). (∀x)[flower(x) & find-along-the-way(c A ,x) → pick(c A , x)]

Clearly, the cases discussed in this section do not constitute an argument in favor of a possibility reading of imperatives.13

12 For these examples it is not entirely clear how the quantifier and the necessity operator should be assumed to scope with respect to each other; see Section 2.2.1 for discussion. 13

Subtrigging also offers a possible way to account for the P ERMISSION-like readings discussed in Section 5.2.1. As I argued in Section 5.1.1 above, imperatives felt to convey P ERMISSIONS (in that they change the status of an action from prohibited to allowed) are strictly speaking always slightly stronger than just that (due to the ordering source restriction). Thus, it could be that both (15a) and (12) render taking a flower permissible, but that (12) carries that additional pragmatic flavor of speaker endorsement that is inherent in imperatives in general. As the P ERMISSION-like effect is often brought out by an if you like-modifier, we could assume that such a modifier is present (covertly expressed or presupposed) in the any cases under consideration and that it leads to a subtrigging effect. (i)

a. b.

You must pick any flower you want to pick. λw.(∀w ∈ O( f CG(c) (c), g, cT , w)) [(∀x)[flower(x)(w ) & want(c A )(λyλw.pick(x)(y)(w))(w  ) → pick(x)(c A )(w  )]] implication in given context: ‘speaker has given up his preference against the addressee’s picking all the flowers he wants to pick’

Somehow, the assumptions about the background would have to ensure that the P ERMISSION-like effect is restricted to allowing only one flower to be affected (instead of an arbitrary number depending on the addressee’s wishes). This type of explanation combines (i) subtrigging as observed with necessity operators in general, and (ii) the pragmatic derivation of P ERMISSION-like effects for necessity propositions. For the moment, I don’t want to commit myself to whether such an analysis is superior to one in terms of alternatives (see Section 5.2.1) or not.

5.2

Any Troubles?

179

5.2.3 Recapitulating Any-Results Above, we have explored two different types of any in imperatives. In connection with subtrigging, imperatives behave exactly like necessity modals (see Section 5.2.2). The sentences express necessity with respect to all the objects in the (restricted) domain of any. What comes as a surprise though, is the behavior of any in those cases where the imperative could not have been substituted for by a necessity modal. Here, necessity with respect to the disjunction of all possibilities is backed up by possibility with respect to each single disjunct. Recently, various proposals have attempted to capture this additional meaning component of free choice items e.g. in terms of implicatures (cf. Schulz, 2003; Kratzer and Shimoyama, 2002; Aloni and van Rooij, 2007). Aloni and van Rooij (2007) give the following summary of the behavior of free choice items. In principle, we have to distinguish between existential (or, Italian un N qualsiasi, German irgendein, ein x-beliebiger) and universal free choice items (any, Italian qualsiasi N, German jeder x-beliebige, . . . ). The former are interpreted existentially, the latter are interpreted universally and impose the familiar restrictions on their context of occurrence (i.e., they require subtrigging in episodic contexts and when embedded under necessity modals). (22)

a.

b.

Gianni ha letto un libro qualsiasi (con la coperatina stracciata). Gianni has read a book whatever (with the cover torn) ‘Gianni has read some book with a torn cover.’ existential FC Gianni ha letto qualsiasi libro ∗ (con la copertina stracciata). torn) Gianni has read whatever book (with the cover ‘Gianni has read any book with a torn cover.’ universal FC

Aloni and van Rooij observe that, as long as they are acceptable, the respective types of free choice items give rise to the following pattern of implicatures (in all cases, the free choice item is equated with a disjunction over all the possibilities). (23)

existential FC-item a. A ∨∃ B → ♦A ∧ ♦B b. (A ∨∃ B) → ♦A ∧ ♦B c. ♦(A ∨∃ B) → ♦A ∧ ♦B

(24)

universal FC-item a. A ∨∀ B → A ∧ B b. (A ∨∀ B) → (A ∧ B) c. ♦(A ∨∀ B) → ♦(A ∧ B)

With respect to the two cases of any-imperatives, we may now remark that the second case patterns exactly as expected, that is as in (24b). The first case though, i.e. the imperatives that could not be paraphrased by necessity modals, follows a pattern we do not find with universal FC-items, neither when embedded under necessity

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5 Possibility Readings

(cf. (24b)), nor when embedded under possibility (cf. (24c)). All of a sudden, any behaves like an existential FC-item. Nevertheless, in the imperatives in question, it follows the pattern of an existential FC-item embedded under necessity: the implicature is that all disjuncts (i.e. all elements in the domain) are possible. While it is anything but clear to me why the universal free choice item any would behave in that way, it shows clearly that data as in (12) do not provide evidence that imperatives have to be analyzed as expressing possibility. One interesting direction for investigating any in imperatives might be to take a closer look at the interaction of necessity with authority, a factor that has been assigned a prime role in a number of theories on free choice phenomena (cf. e.g. Zimmermann, 2000; Schulz, 2003; Kratzer and Shimoyama, 2002), though not undisputedly so (cf. Zimmermann, 2005). Given that authority features so prominently as a presupposition in imperatives, this might be a promising direction for research. Another factor could be that imperatives, but not necessity modals, may be sensitive to alternative ways of realizing the prejacent. Ultimately, it may be possible to explain this by combining the decompositional analysis of the imperative’s necessity operator as exhaustified possibility (see Section 5.3 below) and MenéndezBenito’s (2005) exhaustification-sensitive theory of free choice any. An alternative explanation in terms of subtrigging was sketched at the end of Section 5.2.2. For the moment, I can only leave it to further research to spell out an account for the licensing of any in imperatives.

5.3 For Example-A DVICE In Section 5.1, I argued that the possibility-like effect in P ERMISSION -like imperatives is to be derived pragmatically. In this section, I will take a closer look at a particular type of A DVICE-imperatives, and I will argue that they should be analyzed semantically. While I will not give up on the assumption that imperatives, in general, contain a modal operator that expresses necessity (i.e., universal quantification), I will argue that it is not primitive but can be decomposed into exhaustified possibility. The problematic piece of data is repeated in (25). Imperatives can be modified by zum Beispiel ‘for example’, especially if they are used to give A DVICE. (25)

Kauf zum Beispiel keine Zigaretten! buy.I MP S G for example no cigarettes ‘For example, don’t buy any cigarettes.’

Example (25) is ambiguous. As an answer to questions as in (26a), it can be paraphrased as in (26b); as an answer to (27a), as in (27b): (26)

a. b.

Q1 : How could I stop smoking?/Q1 : What do I have to do in order to stop smoking? One of the things you may not do is buy cigarettes. ¬buy-cig(c A ) → It is necessary that you don’t buy cigarettes.

5.3

(27)

For Example-A DVICE

a. b.

181

How could I save money? One of the things you could do is not buy cigarettes. ♦¬buy-cig(c A ) → It is necessary that you don’t buy cigarettes.

So, (25) can either express that not buying cigarettes is part of the addressee’s obligations/needs, or that not buying cigarettes is a possibility to achieve his goal. On the second reading, not buying cigarettes is clearly not necessary. A semantics that relies on necessity as I have been arguing for so far fails to account for the reading exemplified in (27). The two variants of (26a) show that the modal force is not automatically determined by the modal force of the question predicate (Q1 asks for a possibility, Q1 ’ asks for a necessity; nevertheless, (25) is interpreted along the lines of (26b) in both cases, that is, as expressing necessity).

5.3.1 (In)Exhaustive Necessity and Possibility The reading on which (25) is similar to (26b) expresses that buying cigarettes is what I will call an inexhaustive necessity: it constitutes one obligation among others. The reading under which (25) is similar to (27b) expresses that buying cigarettes is an inexhaustive possibility: it constitutes one possibility among others. Let’s first briefly compare these modal relations to their respective exhaustive counterparts. Example (28) represents exhaustive possibility: (28)

a. b.

Q: What could I possibly do to stop smoking? A: Du kannst nur aufhören, Zigaretten zu kaufen. you can only stop cigarettes to buy ‘The only possibility you have (to achieve your task) is to stop buying cigarettes.’

Example (28b) expresses that the only possibility for the addressee to stop smoking is not to buy cigarettes anymore. The overt exhaustifier nur ‘only’ is used to indicate exhaustivity. Consequently, if she wants to stop smoking, it is necessary that she does not buy cigarettes anymore. So, exhaustive possibilities come out as necessities that are not specified with respect to their degree of exhaustivity. The unmodified necessity modal in (29) allows for an interpretation as exhaustive necessity. According to that, given the task of getting into a good university, nothing is necessary apart from having a lot of money. The possibility of B’s incredulous question clearly confirms the existence of this reading. However, if a reading of inexhaustive necessity is forced by overt zum Beispiel ‘for example’, B’s incredulous question feels incoherent (A’s utterance has already indicated that having a lot of money may not be the only requirement to get into a good university).14

14 Richard Breheny (p.c.) pointed out another puzzle. For him, the English translation of sentence (29b) also has a reading of inexhaustive possibility (roughly: ‘something (difficult) is necessary

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5 Possibility Readings

(29)

a.

b.

A: Um an eine gute Uni zu kommen, musst du viel A: in-order-to to a good university to get, must you lots-of Geld haben. B: Echt? Und das ist alles? money have. B: really? and that is all? ‘A: You must have lots of money to get into a good university. B: Really? And that’s all?’ A: Um an eine gute Uni zu kommen, musst du zum A: in-order-to to a good university to get, must you for Beispiel viel Geld haben. B: Echt? # Und das ist alles? example lots-of money have. B: really? and that is all? ‘A: To get into a good university, you must for example have a lot of money. B: Really? # And that’s all?’

Example (29a) shows that an unmodified necessity modal can indeed be interpreted as exhaustive necessity. Nevertheless, this does not seem to be part of the proposition that is asserted. B’s addendum in (30), starting with yes and hence affirming the proposition expressed by A, suggests that it is an implicature. (30)

A: To get into a good university, you must have a lot of money. B: Yes, but there is more to it than that!

Making exhaustive necessity explicit turns out to be surprisingly difficult. In particular, adding the exhaustifier only results in the sufficiency modal construction (cf. von Fintel and Iatridou, 2007): (31)

To get into a good university, you only have to have lots of money.

At least on its preferred reading, which involves a teleological interpretation of the modal, this does not express exhaustive necessity. Rather, it represents having enough money as a possible way to achieve the goal of getting into a good university, and at the same time ranks having enough money low on the scale of efforts.15 For

to get into a good university, and one way of saturating the requirement is e.g. to have a lot of money’). Consequently, we encounter the prejacent problem familiar from the corresponding cases involving only (the corresponding proposition without only is not true, cf. von Fintel (1997)), cf. (31). Such a reading is not to be expected under my analysis. But so far, I have not been able to verify its existence with other speakers of English. It does not seem to be available for the German case in (29b). The issue merits further investigation. 15

I think that German nur ‘only’ can express exhaustive necessity provided the modal is not interpreted teleologically: (i)

a.

b.

A: Was muss ich heute tun? What must I today do ‘What are my tasks for today?’ B: Du musst nur dein Zimmer aufräumen. you must only your room tidy-up ‘Your only task is to tidy up your room.’

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For Example-A DVICE

183

the moment, I don’t have much to say about how exhaustive necessity is encoded. It should suffice to see that there is a contrast between exhaustive and inexhaustive necessity which can be brought out clearly by the respective (im)possibility of a follow-up question as in (29). In the following, I will establish that unmodified imperatives always express exhaustive possibility (hence, necessity, as we have assumed so far). The underlying possibility force can only be brought out by an overt modifier like zum Beispiel ‘for example’, which I will call an antiexhaustifier.

5.3.2 Diamonds Are a Girl’s Best Friend In order to explain the ambiguity in (25), I propose to decompose the necessity operator occurring in imperatives into a possibility operator and an exhaustifier. That is, instead of the imperative semantics spelled out in Chapters 3 and 4 (see Section 4.2.4), whose at-issue meaning component I repeat in (32a), I will assume that the imperative operator has to be interpreted (roughly) along the lines of (32b) (the presuppositional meaning component remains unaffected). (32)

a. b.

OP I mp c = λ f λgλtλPλw.(∀w  ∈ O( f CG(c) ∪ f, g, cT , w))[P(t)(w )] OPImp c = λ f λgλtλPλw.(∃w ∈ O( f CG(c) ∪ f, g, cT , w))[P(t)(w  )] orig

To spell out a formal analysis for (in)exhaustive possibility/necessity with respect to a background, I will adopt a simplified version of how the modal operator combines with its parameters. I treat modal operators as propositional quantifiers that relate two sets of worlds (cf. Geurts, 1999, for an analysis along these lines in a DRT-framework). The first argument constitutes the background, and, under the analysis of graded modality I have employed, should be identified with the set of optimal worlds in the Common Ground that verify a potentially empty set of additional facts given by f and are optimal according to the ordering source g (i.e., the background is what has been individuated as O( f CG(c) ∪ f, g, cT , w)) so far. The second argument is constituted by the prejacent, which is said to be compatible with, or to follow from, the background. Possibility and necessity as they would e.g. be expressed by the modal verbs may and must respectively are interpreted as in (33) (cf. Geurts, 1999). (33)

a. b.

♦ = λbλp.(∃w ∈ b)[w ∈ p]  = λbλp.(∀w ∈ b)[w ∈ p]

As in (32b), we interpret the (unmodified) imperative operator as a possibility operator. The simplified tree corresponding to these assumptions is given in (34b) (tense and aspect information are abstracted away from for the moment).16 16 Note that it is fairly straightforward to rewrite the entries for the modal operators such as to take their usual arguments (i.e. conversational backgrounds) and have them combine to yield what is

184

(34)

5 Possibility Readings

a.

b.

OPImp c = ♦ (= λbλp.(∃w ∈ b)[w ∈ p])

CP C

p

O PI mp b Again, b describes the set of worlds that corresponds to what should be expressed in more detail as O( f CG(c) ∪ f, g, w, cT ) (see Section 4.2.4), where the presuppositions of authority have to be met by both f and g, and the ordering source restriction has to be met by g. As usual, the epistemic uncertainty condition has to be met by b with respect to the prejacent p. In the following, I will abstract away from the presuppositional meaning component. Exhaustivity and anti-exhaustivity can now be treated as modifiers of propositional quantifiers. Both are of type st, st, t, st, st, t.17 Intuitively, exhaustive possibility should express that ‘ p is possible (w.r.t. background b) and nothing else is possible’. A word of caution is apposite as to how exhaustivity should be interpreted with respect to properties of propositions (like the property of standing in a certain relation to a background). Zimmermann (2000) shows convincingly that for domains with the mereological structure of propositions or places (that is, where subparts are of the same kind), exhaustivity can never be computed making use of identity (in the sense of ‘x has property P and no y = x has property P’, as it underlies the familiar semantics for exhaustivity according to Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1984). It is easy to see that this would run into problems with proper sub- and supersets of p. If p is an exhaustive possibility with respect to b, their intersection is non-empty. But if the intersection ( p ∩ b) = p, then p ∩ b itself is a b-possibility, too. Hence, contrary to assumption, p is not an exhaustive b-possibility. On the other hand, every proper superset of p is a b-possibility as well and would thus also destroy exhaustivity. One possible way to compute exhaustivity for such domains is to relativize exhaustivity to relevance. van Rooy and Schulz (2006) develop an account along these lines to account for exhaustive interpretations of answers to questions. On such an account, p’s being an exhaustive b-possibility would come out roughly as ‘ p is possible w.r.t. b and no other possibility that is equally relevant is possible w.r.t. b’ (cf. van Rooy and Schulz, 2006). We could then say that sub-/superpropositions are not equally relevant, and this would allow us to stick to the standard account in

now fed in as a set of worlds b. For the sake of simplicity, I stick with the propositional quantifier versions in this chapter. 17 To make the analysis work for the original bracketing, we would have to lift the types of exhaustifiers and antiexhaustifiers. Abbreviating the logical type of conversational backgrounds i, s, st, t as β, they become modifiers of modal operators of type β, β, i, st, st.

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For Example-A DVICE

185

terms of identity (restricted to take into account a specific set of propositions only). For the time being, I will not further pursue this idea. Instead, I will adapt Zimmermann’s (2000) set-theoretic solution for exhaustifying lists of possibilities. He introduces an operator that closes off lists of possibilities p1 , . . . , pn to say that these propositions cover the entire background, that is, that their union is a necessity. The semantics for the operator is given in (35). The proof that it is equivalent to necessity of the union of p1 , . . . , pn is given in Zimmermann (2000; fn. 22) (35)

(∀q)[q ∩ Hc = ∅ → [q ∩ p1 = ∅ ∨ . . . ∨ q ∩ pn = ∅]]

his (24κ  )

In the following, I want to make use of this by interpreting ‘is an exhaustive possibility with respect to background b’ (in symbols, E X H (♦)(b)) as ‘covers all of b’. To obtain this, I adapt Zimmermann’s (2000) closure operator for single possibilities. The covert exhaustivity operator EXH has to modify the modal operator ♦ in the following way: (36)

EXH(♦) = λbλp.♦(b)( p) & (∀q ∈ ♦(b))[q ∈ ♦( p)]

This is equivalent to applying Zimmermann’s (2000) closure condition to single item lists. Consequently, we obtain the equivalence in (37). (37)

EXH(♦) (= E X H (OPImp )) ⇔ 

The proof for the equivalence is a straightforward adaptation of Zimmermann’s (2000) more general one for lists of possibilties and is given in (38).18 (38)

For arbitrary b and p: EXH(♦) ⇒ : for any w if w ∈ b, then {w}∩b = ∅, therefore {w}∩ p = ∅, therefore w ∈ p. For non-empty b and arbitrary p: EXH(♦) ⇐ : (∀w ∈ b)[w ∈ p], therefore b ∩ p = ∅. And if for any q, ♦(b)(q), then there is a w ∈ b ∩ q. But then w ∈ p, therefore q ∩ p = ∅, so q ∈ ♦( p).19

Now we have to generalize the notion of exhaustive possibility to a more general notion of exhaustivity that covers necessity as well. I suggest to interpret ‘ p is an exhaustive necessity with respect to background b’ (in symbols, EXH()(b)( p)) as ‘nothing follows from the background b that does not follow from p’. (39)

EXH() = λbλp.(b)( p) & (∀q ∈ (b))[q ∈ ( p)]

Exhaustified necessity EXH() boils down to identity of background and proposition. The proof for the equivalence is given in (40). This equivalence is as it should 18

The restriction to non-empty backgrounds strikes me as harmless, as empty backgrounds generally give rise to various kinds of triviality results, and, in particular, seem to be irrelevant for the analysis of imperatives. 19

I am indebted to Hans-Martin Gärtner (p.c.) for pointing out an error in a previous version.

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5 Possibility Readings

be. The deontic background, for example, is described as the set of worlds that verify whatever is commanded (the intersection of all the propositions that are commanded). If only one proposition is commanded, that proposition itself constitutes the deontic background. (40)

For arbitrary b and p: EXH()(b)( p) ⇔ (b = p) ⇐: b = p, therefore b ⊆ p, and (∀q ∈ (b))[q ∈ ( p)]. ⇒: EXH()(b)( p) = (b)( p) & (∀q ∈ (b))[q ∈ ( p)]. So, by the first conjunct and the interpretation of , b ⊆ p. Assume b ⊂ p. Then (∃w ∈ p)[w ∈ b]. Then, it would be the case that b ∈ (b), but not b ∈ ( p). Therefore, it cannot be the case that b ⊂ p. Hence, b = p.

Given (36) and (39), the closure condition can be generalized to the following modifier EXH of propositional quantifiers R: (41)

EXH(R) = λbλp.R(b)( p) & (∀q ∈ R(b))[q ∈ R( p)]

A natural interpretation for the antiexhaustifier zum Beispiel ‘for example’ is now to assume that it modifies a propositional quantifier by adding that the speaker does not exclude that other propositions than the complement proposition stand in the same relation to the background. It expresses that the negation of the second conjunct of the exhaustivity operator is compatible with the speaker’s beliefs (represented as the set of worlds Bel S that verify all propositions the speaker believes). This is spelled out in (42). (42)

zB(R) = λbλp.R(b)( p) & ♦(Bel S )[¬(∀q ∈ R(b))[R( p)(q)]]

So, for instance, if p ∈ zB()(∩‘what is commanded’), then p is an obligation, but the speaker does not exclude that there are further obligations independent of p. Now given the assumptions made in this section, apart from its presuppositional meaning component, the imperative operator OPImp is semantically equivalent to the modal verb may. To capture the fact that imperatives normally express necessity, I assume that OPImp and may differ in how they interact with (anti)exhaustification. OPImp combines obligatorily either with overt zB or with covert EXH (default). Only after doing so, it behaves like a modal in optionally combining with EXH or zB, before applying to background and prejacent. The possible LF-schemata are given in (43) (∅ indicates the absence of an (anti)exhaustifier at the respective position; options are given in curly braces). (43)

a. b.

[ [ {EXH, zB, ∅} [ {EXH, zB}OPImp ] ] b p ] [ [ { EXH, zB, ∅} [ { must, may,. . . } ] ] b p ]

According to (43a), in the absence of zum Beispiel, EXH is applied to OPImp . Consequently, possibility is turned into necessity as in (44), yielding the desired necessity reading for plain imperatives. (44)

EXH(OPImp ) = λbλp.♦(b)( p) & (∀q ∈ ♦(b))[q ∈ ♦( p)]

(⇔ )

5.3

For Example-A DVICE

187

The ambiguity of (25) (repeated here as (45)) relies on the two positions available for zB with respect to OPImp according to (43a). (45)

zum Beispiel keine Zigaretten! Kauf buy.I MP for example no cigarettes ‘For example, don’t buy any cigarettes.’

If zum Beispiel serves as the obligatory modifier of OPImp , the imperative expresses possibility. (43a) is instantiated as in (46). (46)

[[[ ∅ [ zB OPImp ]] b ] you don’t buy cigarettes ]

The complex modal operator is computed as in (47) and applies to background and prejacent as in (48). The reading obtained is the one of inexhaustive possibility as singled out in (27b). (47)

zB(OPImp ) = λbλp.♦(b)( p) & ♦(Belc S )[¬(∀q ∈ ♦(b))[q ∈ ♦( p))]]

(48)

♦(B)(you don’t buy cigarettes) & ♦(Belc S )[¬(∀q ∈ ♦(B))[q ∈ ♦(you don’t buy cigarettes)]], for a contextually given background B. ‘It is possible for you not to buy cigarettes, but I don’t exclude that you have other possibilities as well.’

The computation for the inexhaustive necessity reading individuated in (26b) is a bit more complicated. Alternatively to the structure in (46), the surface string in (45) can also be obtained from (43a) by the instantiation in (49). Here, covert EXH applies to OPImp and turns it into necessity, and zB occupies the position of the optional higher modifier. (49)

[[[ zB [ EXH OPImp ]] b ] you don’t buy cigarettes ]

This structure accounts for the reading of inexhaustive necessity as singled out in (26b). Intuitively, it says that p is an exhaustive possibility (that is, a necessity) with respect to b, but that the speaker does not exclude that other propositions (independent from p) might have the same property of being an exhaustive b-possibility. The modal operator is derived as in (50) and applies to the propositions as in (51). (50)

by the equivalence in (37) zB(EXH(OPImp )) = zB() = λbλp.(b)( p) & ♦(Belc S )[¬(∀q ∈ (b))[q ∈ ( p)]]

(51)

zB(EXH(OPImp ))(B)(you don’t buy cigarettes) = (B)(you don’t buy cigarettes) & ♦(Belc S )[¬(∀q ∈ (B))[q ∈ (you don’t buy cigarettes)]], for some contextually given B. ‘It is necessary that you don’t buy cigarettes, and I don’t exclude that there are more things that are necessary (w.r.t. B).’

So, the schema in (43a) together with the semantics assigned to the imperative operator, the antiexhaustifier zum Beispiel ‘for example’, and the covert exhaustifier

188

5 Possibility Readings

allow us to derive the necessity reading for plain imperatives and account for the ambiguity in (25) (= (45)). Now, we have to convince ourselves that the account does not overgenerate. First, it is predicted correctly, that instantiating (43a) by applying EXH to an R that has been antiexhaustified by zB attributes contradictory beliefs to the speaker (for arbitrary R). (52)

= λbλp.(zB(R))(b)( p) & (∀q ∈ (zB(R)(b)))[q ∈ (zB(R))( p)] = λbλp.R(b)( p) & ♦(Belc S )[¬(∀q ∈ R(b))[q ∈ R( p)]] & (∀q ∈ {t | R(b)(t) & ♦(Belc S )[¬(∀q  ∈ R(b))[q  ∈ R(t)]]}) [q ∈ {s | R( p)(s)&♦(Belc S )[¬(∀q  ∈ R( p))[q  ∈ R(s)]]}] # EXH(zB(R))

Assume again that speakers believe the propositions they utter,20 and that belief is closed under logical consequence.21 (53)

For any speaker S and any proposition A: utter S (A) → (Belc S )A.

With these assumptions, for arbitrary b and p the third conjunct causes the contradictory belief attribution: insert p itself as a q. By the first two conjuncts, p passes the restriction: R(b)( p), and ♦(Belc S )[¬(∀q  ∈ R(b))[q  ∈ R( p)]]. Hence, it should hold that R( p)( p) (maybe!), but also that ♦(Belc S )[¬(∀q  ∈ R( p))[q  ∈ R( p)]] (contradiction!). Hence, applying EXH to an operator that has been antiexhaustified by zB attributes a nonsensical belief to the speaker and is therefore most likely avoided. Furthermore, it is easy to see that (at least for modal operators construed from  and ♦) multiple occurrences of EXH don’t hurt. EXH(EXH(♦)) comes out as EXH() by the equivalence in (37). So we only have to worry about multiply exhaustifying necessity. But EXH() simply expresses identity (cf. (40)) which is not affected by further exhaustification (i.e., EXH(EXH()) = EXH()). (For arbitrary b and p, EXH(EXH())(b)( p) = EXH(=)(b)( p) by the equivalence of exhaustive necessity and identity. But this is b = p & (∀q)[(q = b) → (q = p)], which of course is true.) Finally, we may want to consider the combination of two antiexhaustifiers, zB(zB(R)). So far, I have assumed that zB is present only if encoded explicitly by zum Beispiel. Empirically, applying zum Beispiel twice does not give rise to a sensible reading (cf. (54)). This squares well with the fact that zB(zB(R)) is pragmatically equivalent to zB(R).

20

Note that (53) is motivated for independent reasons, see the discussion in Section 4.2.2 above. For the cases under consideration here, it would even suffice to assume that a speaker who expresses a proposition holds it to be possible. 21 Note that this is known to be a problematic feature of the Hintikka-style possible worlds analysis of belief. Yet, it is largely uncontroversial for simple cases of conjunction elimination such as those under consideration in the following, namely that from BelcS ( p ∧ q) it follows that Belc S p.

5.3

For Example-A DVICE

189

# Kauf

(54)

zum Beispiel zum Beispiel keine Zigaretten! buy.I MP for example for example no cigarettes

(55)

zB(zB(R))(b)( p) = (zB(R))(b)( p) & ♦BelcS [¬(∀q)[(zB(R))(b)(q) → (zB(R))( p)(q)]] = R(b)( p) & ♦Belc S [¬(∀q)[R(b)(q) → R( p)(q)]] & ♦Belc S (∃q)[(zB(R))(b)(q)&¬(zB(R))( p)(q)] = R(b)( p) & ♦Belc S [¬(∀q)[R(b)(q) → R( p)(q)]] & ♦Belc S (∃q)[R(b)(q)&♦Belc S [¬(∀q  )[R(b)(q  ) → R(q)(q  )]] &¬[R( p)(q)&♦Belc S [¬(∀q  )[R( p)(q  ) → R(q)(q  )]]]].

To show the pragmatic equivalence, we have to establish that the third conjunct does not add anything new. By standard assumptions (see above), the speaker who utters (54) is taken to believe each of the conjuncts. But then, by the first two conjuncts (i.e. the ones resulting from single application of zB) p itself makes true the existential quantification in the scope of the belief-operator in the third conjunct: by the first two conjuncts of the entire clause and the assumption that the speaker believes them, he holds possible R(b)( p) and that this may be inexhaustively so; so it only remains to be shown that he doesn’t believe both R( p)( p) and Belc S [¬(∀q  )[R( p)(q  ) → R( p)(q  )]]. Of course, the latter means to hold possible a straightforward contradiction, something no rational speaker self-ascribes. Hence, if speakers are rational and obey (53), repeated application of anti-exhaustification does not add anything new, which most likely accounts for the marked status of (54). The issue becomes of interest though if we take into account other elements that have an effect similar to zum Beispiel ‘for example’ in that they likewise block exhaustification. One candidate might be the discourse particle doch, which in A SSERTIONS usually indicates that the information expressed should already be known by the addressee, but that there is evidence that he is at least not aware of it (cf. Karagjosova, 2004, for detailed discussion). Added to an imperative as in (56), it either expresses that it should already be known to the addressee that he must not buy cigarettes, or it behaves like zum Beispiel in expressing that not buying cigarettes is one possibility to achieve a goal and that this is a pretty obvious/easy way to do so. (56)

Kauf doch keine Zigaretten! buy.I MP P RT no cigarettes

Now, doch can indeed co-occur with zum Beispiel without giving rise to infelicity (cf. (57)).22 (57)

22

Kauf doch zum Beispiel keine Zigaretten! buy.I MP P RT no cigarettes roughly: ‘One possibility you have is not to buy cigarettes (you know that, right?).’

I am indebted to Tatjana Scheffler (p.c.) for pointing these cases out to me.

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5 Possibility Readings

In this case, we only get the possibility reading. While a detailed analysis of doch in imperatives has to await further research, we may already note two issues. First, doch can behave like zum Beispiel in blocking exhaustification. Second, doch and zum Beispiel differ in that only the particle carries the notion that the information should have been obious or that the solution is easy. Therefore, it may not be surprising that, in contrast to repeated anti-exhaustification by zum Beispiel, the combination of doch and zum Beispiel is felicitous. Whatever turns out to be the correct analysis for the particle, one needs to ensure that it parallels the antiexhaustifier zB in blocking application of EXH. It should be allowed to apply after zB though.

5.4 Conclusion In this section, I have discussed different types of possibility-like effects associated with imperatives. First of all, I have argued that these phenomena do not belong to a single class. Imperatives used for particular types of P ERMISSION -like speech acts and for C ON CESSIONS were explained pragmatically. In Section 5.1 I spelled out in detail how a proposition that expresses necessity semantically can obtain the effect of a P ERMIS SION . This analysis in terms of semantic necessity is challenged by the fact that such imperatives behave like the possibility modal may (and not the necessity modals must or should) in that they can license free choice any. I have argued that the argument is refuted by two observations: First, there are two types of any-imperatives, and one of them behaves just as if any was embedded under a necessity modal in that it requires overt or covert subtrigging (see Section 5.2.2). Second, the interpretation of the other type of any-imperatives differs from any as interpreted either under necessity or under possibility operators (see Section 5.2.1). Along the lines of the standard typology of existential and universal free choice items, in these cases, any, which is usually classified as a universal free choice item, all of a sudden patterns with existential free choice items when embedded under necessity operators. Therefore, even the class of any-imperatives that seems intuitively closer to possibility modals than to necessity modals cannot be accounted for by treating the imperative operator as expressing possibility. In Section 5.3 I focused on an ambiguity arising in imperatives modified by antiexhaustifiers like German zum Beispiel ‘for example’. In contrast to P ERMIS SION -like imperatives and C ONCESSIONS , I argued that these cases should be accounted for in terms of semantic decomposition. In Section 5.3.1 I investigated (in)exhaustivity of modal relations in general. I then argued that the necessity operator in imperatives should be decomposed as exhaustified possibility, and that, on one reading, the application of an antiexhaustifier like German zum Beispiel ‘for example’ can block exhaustification and thereby bring out the contribution of the underlying possibility operator. For the moment, exhaustification and antiexhaustification have been treated as the semantic operators EXH and zB. Many of the notions involved deserve further investigation, and some aspects may be

5.4

Conclusion

191

better dealt with in pragmatics. Empirically, it would be interesting to compare the proposal with exhaustivity in disjunctions (cf. Geurts, 2005), and to try to extend it to modal operators in Salish that (like imperatives) express necessity as a default but are interpreted as possibility when necessity gives rise to a contradiction (cf. Rullmann et al., 2008). EXH and zB as defined here allow us to compute the different modal forces observed with imperatives depending on the interaction of OPImp with zum Beispiel. I think that this cannot be obtained directly from the necessity semantics, and I have therefore decomposed necessity into exhaustified possibility. EXH and zB carry over to modal verbs as well. So far, this all happens in semantics, which is most likely not as it should be (consider e.g. the considerations w.r.t. exhaustive necessity). The constraints on the optional (anti)exhaustification for modals and imperatives have to be studied in more detail. Last but not least, the assumption of an exhaustivity operator in the imperative might shed new light on the interaction of imperatives with free choice items that remained surprising in Section 5.2 (cf. Menéndez-Benito, 2007 for licensing of free choice items by exhaustivity operators).

Chapter 6

Embedding Imperatives

The imperative semantics developed in Chapter 3 treats imperative sentences like declaratives that contain a modal verb of necessity: as far as the at-issue meaning component is concerned, (1a) and (1b) are assimilated in their semantics. In addition, (1a) carries a presuppositional meaning component (see Section 4.2) that is not shared by (1b). (1)

a. b.

Close the window! You should close the window!

Consequently, one might expect that imperatives can be embedded just like their modalized declarative counterparts. As is widely known, this is not borne out for the majority of natural languages in which this issue has been studied (cf. Sadock and Zwicky, 1985). Consider reported speech in English, for example. By the criteria developed in Section 1.1.3, the string in (2a) has been classified as an imperative. In contrast to the overtly modalized declarative in (3), it resists embedding for example under a verbum dicendi.1 This holds independently of the tense form chosen for the matrix predicate (cf. (2b)). (2)

a. b.

∗ Laura

Don’t close the window. {said, says, is saying} (that) don’t close the window.

(3)

a. b.

You shouldn’t close the window. Laura says you shouldn’t close the window.

Contrasts like (2) vs. (3) are often taken to motivate the claim that imperatives cannot be embedded.2

1

At least apparently so. Cf. Crniˇc and Trinh (2009) for data that seem to point to a different conclusion.

2

For (2b) without the complementizer that, the interpretation as direct speech is of course available but disregarded as irrelevant to our concerns.

M. Kaufmann, Interpreting Imperatives, Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy 88, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012 DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-2269-9_6, 

193

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While a large body of literature on imperatives considers it a universal that imperatives cannot be embedded,3 some authors claim that this restriction pertains to individual languages only, or that there is no such restriction at all.4 Those who assume that imperatives cannot be embedded draw either on syntactic explanations such as for example uniform blocking of the complementizer position by the imperative operator,5 or adopt explanations of a more semantic or pragmatic nature, such as for example conflicts with the inherently performative nature of imperatives.6 Unfortunately, as with the notion of imperatives as such, the concept ‘embedded imperatives’ is applied to a rather diverse collection of phenomena. In particular, even if (2b) fails as a report of any of Laura’s utterances of (2a), there are of course felicitous alternatives like (3b) or (4). (4)

a. b. c.

Laura told you not to close the window. Laura demanded that you not close the window. Laura said that you shouldn’t close the window.

Hence, various finite and infinite clauses can be used to replace the imperative in such embedded positions. It could well be that one of them exclusively replaces imperatives, and therefore merits being called an embedded imperative.7 But the quest for such forms is largely orthogonal to my concern of assigning an appropriate interpretation to strings like Don’t open the window!, that is, sentences that are singled-out as imperatives qua the form-function pairing. It may well turn out that individual languages have specialized forms for the reporting of imperatives, and these may even turn out to be best analyzed as carrying (part of) the meaning of imperatives. Yet, the form-based individuation strategy does not pressure us to treat them similarly. Things are different if in a given language strings individuated unambiguously as imperative sentences can also occur in embedded positions. Of course, in such positions we would not expect that the forms retain the prototypical function used to individuate them in the first place. For example, embedded interrogatives are generally taken to make a semantically related or even similar contribution to matrix interrogatives, but the former are not normally used to perform questions. 3

E.g. Han (2000), Palmer (1986), Platzack and Rosengren (1997), Lohnstein (2000), Wratil (2000), Sadock and Zwicky (1985).

4 E.g. Rögnvaldsson (1998), Hamblin (1987), Parsons (1993), Krifka (2001), Portner (1997), Mauck (2005). 5 E.g. Rivero and Terzi (1995). But see Wratil (2005) for arguments against the universality of such an operator. 6 7

E.g. Han (2000).

Portner (1997) claims that the complements of deontic speech act verbs like demand are mandative subjunctives which are interpreted exactly like matrix imperatives. But first, mandative subjunctive and matrix imperatives differ formally (e.g. with respect to the realization of negation), and second, mandative subjunctives are not distinguished formally from other subjunctives, e.g. those embedded under hope or fear, and I am not aware of independent arguments in favor of these forms being ambiguous. Therefore, I am not convinced by the claim that the complements of verbs like demand should receive the same interpretation as matrix imperatives.

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The question of whether imperatives can be embedded is therefore independent of whether speech acts can be embedded.8 Moreover, the embedded counterparts may show formal differences thanks to the very fact that they occur in embedded position (consider for example the position of the finite verb in wh-interrogatives, or the presence of a complementizer in declaratives and polar interrogatives). I think that this is crucially different from an understanding of ‘embedded imperatives’ as for example forms that are specialized for reporting imperatives. In contrast to such a position, I will stick to formal similarities. Ideally, whatever expressions are shared by embedded and unembedded objects should make the same semantic contribution in either case. For German, I have argued that it is a particular (unambiguous) verbal form that indicates the presence of an abstract element that carries the propositional and presuppositional meaning singled out as distinctive for imperatives (I MPMOD or OPImp ).9 Wherever this distinct verbal form appears, we would expect the same abstract element to be present and to make the same semantic contribution. In the following, I will understand ‘embedded imperatives’ as follows: the piece of grammar that was argued to introduce the presence of I MPMOD (or OPImp ) in a given language occurs in a position that we want to call embedded. But the concept of an embedded position may be even more controversial. It is associated with a syntactic and with a semantic interpretation, which do not necessarily go hand in hand (cf. Culicover and Jackendoff, 1997b; Gärtner, 2001; Gärtner and Schwager, 2004; Gärtner and Endriss, t.a.; Ebert et al., t.a., for (apparent) mismatches). On the syntactic side, subordination is usually defined in terms of c-command and shows its repercussions in terms of binding and licensing restrictions. Along these lines, embedding is distinguished from parataxis and parentheticals. (5)

Syntactic Embedding: a. A constituent β is embedded under α iff α c-commands β. b. α c-commands β iff α is sister to a node γ that dominates β.

The semantic notion of embedding corresponds to the notion of being an argument to a functor, which is of course to a large extent theory-dependent.10 It is largely a matter of choice what is taken to be the argument and what is taken to be the functor. Additionally, dynamic semantic theories offer a notion of embedding in terms of the 8

Scholars in favor of such a position have argued that for example (i) can be used to perform the act of dismissing someone in virtue of the corresponding speech act being embedded under the factive verb regret, marked by the performative adverbial hereby (cf. e.g. Lee, 1975; Krifka, 2001; Parsons, 1993). (i)

We regret that we have to inform you that you are hereby dismissed.

9 In a different syntactic framework, the meaning could of course be encoded by the overt verbal form directly. For the present considerations nothing hinges on this choice. 10

Compare for example a Montagovian and a Fregean treatment of proper names.

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accessibility of discourse referents. Also, these two semantic notions need not go hand in hand. Consider for example the antecedents of hypothetical conditionals: while discourse referents introduced in the if -clause are accessible as antecedents for pronouns in the consequent (in that sense, the consequent seems to be embedded, cf. (6a)), quantifiers fail to bind from the antecedent into the consequent (in that sense, the antecedent seems to be embedded, cf. (6b)). (6)

a. b.

If a farmeri is rich hei owns a donkey. no professori wears a tie hei may not give a talk.

∗ If

I will not make any claims as to whether one notion of embedding is more relevant than another; for imperatives, it has been disputed that they can enter any of the above-mentioned types of dependence on the linguistic context. But if any of them prove possible after all, we have to explore how the semantic object expressed by the imperative contributes to the interpretation of the complex construction. Only if all of them should prove impossible universally should we try to derive this as a semantic (or syntactic) property of imperatives. On the basis of data considered in previous chapters as well as data to be considered in the following, I want to argue that there is no such thing as a universal restriction against the embedding of imperatives (or the modal operator contained in imperatives). In Section 2.2.1 I discussed the possibility that the modal operator contained in the imperative be outscoped by a quantifier. Also, in Section 2.3.3.3, I showed that the modal meaning component contained in imperatives (arguably, I MPMOD) can be outscoped by a wh-element and, in such a case, forms part not of an imperative sentence but of an interrogative (albeit one that is functionally highly constrained thanks to the presuppositional meaning component). In Section 6.1, I consider various degrees to which imperatives cross-linguistically can occur in reported speech. In Section 6.2, I will consider imperatives as consequents of conditionals. In Section 6.2.3, I show that imperatives can be modally subordinated. Finally, in Section 6.3 I will briefly discuss a universally widespread though somewhat marked construction of conjunctions and disjunctions that (apparently) receive a conditional interpretation. This overview of embedding phenomena concludes my discussion of imperatives.

6.1 Reported Speech and Imperatives from a Cross-Linguistic Perspective A large part of the literature devoted to the discussion of whether imperatives can be embedded has focused on instances of reported speech. Indeed, speech reports composed of a predicate that specifies what kind of utterance is reported (usually, a verbum dicendi) and an expression that specifies the content of that utterance are often uncontroversial for hosting the content expression as an embedded constituent according to any of the above criteria. For many such constructions it is rather easy to distinguish them from parenthetical constructions (which are sometimes argued

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to display a mismatch between semantic and syntactic embedding, cf. e.g. Asher, 2000), and quotational constructions (usually argued to require a different (noncompositional) treatment altogether). In the following, I will consider in detail a few languages w.r.t. the possibility of using imperatives in reported speech. The choice of languages is inspired by the discussion in the previous literature as well as observations reported to me by native speakers of the respective language.11 The following discussion reveals that—at least in some languages—embedding of imperatives in reported speech contexts is possible in principle, but that different languages impose different restrictions on the constructions in question.

6.1.1 Indirect Speech, Parentheticals, and Quotations Indirect speech, i.e. embedding under verba dicendi or attitude predicates, differs from both quotative constructions and direct speech in that deictic elements inside the reported utterance refer to the matrix utterance situation (as exemplified in (7a) vs. (7b)). (7)

a. b.

John said: ‘I am tired.’ John said that I was tired.

I = John I = c S ( = John)

While the distinction is clear for languages with prototypical indexical elements, it can be obscured by the presence of pronominal elements that can optionally be bound by reported utterance contexts (e.g. Amharic first person pronouns, cf. Schlenker, 2003, or logophoric elements that have to be bound obligatorly (e.g. the German subjunctive, cf. von Stechow, 2003). (8)

(9)

ˇjon ˇj@gna n@-ññ y1l-all John hero be-1S G say.3S G-Aux.3S G ‘John says that he is a hero.’

Schlenker (2003)

Cecile meinte, Patrick komme erst in 2 Wochen wieder. Er Cecile said Patrick come.3 P S G P RES S UBJ only in 2 weeks again. He nach Kuba geflogen. sei be.3 P S G P RES S UBJ to Cuba flown ‘Cecile said that Patrick would only be back two weeks later. He had flown to Cuba.’

Consequently, it is sometimes helpful to consider syntactic opacity (cf. Oshima, 2006) as a second criterion to single out direct speech. Indirect speech is fully 11 Slovenian and Korean have been discussed in detail with respect to imperatives in reported speech. Apparently, Slovenian allows for unrestricted embedding of imperatives, cf. Rus (2005). The status of Korean is more controversial: reported speech can contain forms that differ from main clause imperatives only in the absence of a speech style particle (cf. Han, 2000). Pak (2004) and Portner (2007) argue that the forms are still true imperatives and offer a pragmatic explanation for the absence of the speech style particle. For details, see the respective references.

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integrated into the matrix sentence and consequently allows for extraction, quantifying in, and NPI licensing. Direct speech is opaque to such phenomena. Consider for example wh-movement, cf. (10): (10)

a. b.

Whoi did Jiro say he had invited ti ? ∗ Who did Jiro say: ‘I invited’.

While indirect speech allows for long wh-movement out of the embedded clause (cf. (10a)), direct speech does not (cf. (10b)). Similarly, quantifiers can bind into an indirect speech complement (cf. (11a)), but not into direct speech (cf. (11b)). (11)

a. b.

No studenti told me that hei had cheated. ∗ No student told me: ‘He cheated.’ i i

These criteria are also applicable to quotative constructions, which are sometimes distinguished from direct speech as constructions that involve tighter syntactic integration (e.g. presence of quotative markers, full prosodic integration). The basic dichotomy between direct and indirect speech is complicated by the existence of mixed quotations (Cappelen and Lepore, 1997), i.e. indirect reports that contain parts that are directly quoted. Consider for example (12) (from Maier, 2008): (12)

Quine says that quotation ‘has a certain anomalous feature’.

In such cases, single expressions that need not even be part of the ordinary lexicon of the languages are used in speech reports under consideration of at least some non(core-)semantic properties (e.g. the exact wording, a deviant phonetic realization, an expressive meaning component). That is, while the content expression is embedded properly (passing the test of syntactic transparency, for example), a single element in it is quoted (meaning in particular that indexical aspects of its meaning are anchored to the reported utterance situation and not the actual one). Emar Maier suggests a mixed quotation analysis to account for the presence of imperatives in speech reports in Japanese (Maier, 2008) and in Colloquial German (Maier, 2010). I will not take a stand as to whether this type of analysis is correct for perspectival shifts in general, and I will of course not dispute that imperativized verbs can constitute the quoted part of a mixed quotation report. Yet, I will argue below that mixed quotation cannot account for all instances of imperativized verbs in reported speech constructions. Therefore, I will stick to the received view of distinguishing direct and indirect speech. In the following, I will look more closely at a number of languages that have been discussed in the literature which are said to either allow or disallow imperatives in reported speech. This will reveal a variety of slightly different restrictions on the respective constructions. At first glance, this may come as a surprise. Nevertheless, the restrictions observed seem to be linked to crucial ingredients of the semantic object assigned to imperatives. In this book, I can only give a first overview of the phenomenon by bringing to light the restrictions that obtain in each of the languages

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under consideration. In particular, I won’t attempt to offer an analysis of how the presuppositional meaning component behaves in the embedded cases. For example, the presuppositions (e.g. the requirement of epistemic authority) are no longer imposed on the actual speaker, but are anchored to the speaker in the reported utterance context (cf. Crniˇc and Trinh, 2009, for details). In the following, I will briefly discuss quotative constructions and embeddings in Japanese and Malagasy, performative constructions in Old Germanic languages, as well as idiomatic expressions in Middle High German and Ancient Greek. I will discuss in more detail embedded imperatives in Modern High German, since German has traditionally been taken as an example of a language where embedding of imperatives is completely impossible.

6.1.2 Quotative Constructions in Japanese and Malagasy For languages that happen to have elements that serve both as complementizers (introducing a subordinate context) and as quotative markers (introducing a quote, a string of direct speech), it is often not easy to decide on the first glance if imperatives can occur in embedded contexts or not. It has to be tested whether the imperative is restricted to quotative contexts or may also occur in the subordinate cases. Languages in question are for example Japanese or Malagasy.12 Han (2000:145) remarks in a footnote that Japanese may be a language that allows for the embedding of imperatives, although she does not mention the double role of the element -to as either a quotative or a subordination marker.13 If followed by a short intonational break, it can be interpreted either as a quotative marker or as a subordination marker. It is exclusively interpreted as a subordination marker if prosodically integrated into the matrix sentence (no intonational break). But it seems that this intonational clue is rather subtle and not always reliable (cf. Maier, 2008). Therefore, indirect speech and quotative construction are better distinguished by standard tests (shifting indexicals, syntactic opacity). In (13), the personal pronoun watashi ‘I’ does allow for two different readings. When -to is used as a quotative marker, the first person pronoun refers back to John and the temporal adverbial asita ‘tomorrow’ refers to the day preceding the utterance day (reading RQuote ). When to is used as a subordination marker (as forced by omission of an intonational break; reading RSub ), the first person pronoun refers to the utterance speaker and the temporal pronominal refers to the day after the utterance day.

12 For the data in this section I am indebted to Jiro Inaba, Yasutada Sudo, Yurie Hara, and Sanae Tamura (Japanese) and Hanitry Gerull and Joachim Sabel (Malagasy). 13

I am indebted to Peter Sells (p.c.) for having pointed this out to me.

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(13)

John-ga ototoi [watashi-ga asita tokyo-e iku] to John-N OM day-before-yesterday [I-N OM tomorrow Tokyo-to go] TO itta said RQuote : ‘John said two days ago: “I’m going to Tokyo tomorrow.”’ RSub : ‘John said two days ago that I was going to Tokyo tomorrow.’

Clearly, imperatives can occur in to-complements. It remains to be seen if any of them are proper embeddings (i.e., indirect speech), or if this disambiguates in favor of a quotative construction. The pronominal test seems to argue in favor of imperative embedding in Japanese. Under an integrating intonation contour, the possessive pronoun is understood as referring to the matrix speaker. yom-e]] to itta Mary-ga John-ni [[watashi-no hon]-o book]-ACC read-I MP] TO said Mary-N OM John-DAT [[my RQuote : ‘Mary said to John: “Read my book!”’ RSub : ‘Mary said to John that he should read my book.’

(14)

The same facts can be repeated with temporal pronominals. (15)

John-ga ototoi Mary-ni [asita tokyo-e ik-e] John-N OM day-before-yesterday Mary-DAT [tomorrow Tokyo-to go-I MP] to itta TO said RQuote : ‘John told Mary two days ago: “Go to Tokyo tomorrow.”’ RSub : ‘John told Mary two days ago that she should go to Tokyo tomorrow.’

The quotative reading is preferred (Mary is to go the day after John’s utterance), but we also get an embedded reading (Mary is to go the day after the utterance of the entire sentence).14

14

It should be added though that, additionally, Japanese has an imperative form that occurs preferably in embedded constructions. In a matrix context, it has an elliptic flavor (filling in an explicit expression for I order you renders it more acceptable). Consequently, for (ib) only the subordinated interpetation is available (asita ‘tomorrow’ refers to the day after the utterance of the entire sentence). (i)

a.

b.

Asita Tokyo-ni iku-yoomi # (I order you) tomorrow Tokyo-to go-I MP dep ‘Go to Tokyo tomorrow!’ John-ga ototoi Mary-ni [asita Tokyo-ni iku-yoomi] John-N OM day-before-yesterday Mary-DAT tomorrow Tokyo-to go-I MP dep (to) itta. (C OMP) said RSub : ‘John told Mary two days ago that she should go to Tokyo tomorrow.’ (*RQuote : ‘John told Mary two days ago: “Go to Tokyo tomorrow.”’)

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Syntactic opacity provides a further argument that Japanese imperatives can occur in proper embeddings. Consider for example long distance whextraction:15,16 (16)

John-ga [doko-e ik-e] to itta no? John-N OM where-to go-I MP T O go.PAST QPART ‘Wherei did John say you should go to ti ?’

So, from pronominal shifting and syntactic facts, we can conclude that Japanese imperatives can occur in indirect speech. Yet, the distinction between direct and indirect speech in Japanese is complicated by the fact that, even when some indexicals (e.g. personal pronouns) are shifted, the perspective of indexical verbs like kuru ‘come’ (movement toward the speaker) and iku ‘go’ (movement away from the speaker) can be retained from the reported utterance situation (Kuno, 1988, speaks of ‘blended discourse’). (17)

ik-u] kinoo, Matsushima-kun-wa [kyoo boku-no uti-ni today I-G EN home-DAT go-P RES yesterday Matsuhima-TOP to it-ta C OMP say-PAST ‘Yesterday, Matsushima said that he would go to my house today.’ Oshima (2006:15)

Given that boku is interpreted as referring to the matrix speaker, we would expect the perspective of the verb to be adapted to the actual utterance context as well. As the content of the reported utterance describes movement towards the actual speaker, one might expect that iku ‘go’ would be replaced by kuru ‘come’. This is not borne out. Oshima (2006) analyses these cases as instances of perspectival shift. Maier (2008) proposes to treat all to-complements as indirect speech and consider all indexical items that are still anchored to the reported utterance context (i.e., all elements taken as evidence for a quotational use of to) as the quoted elements of an instance of a mixed quotation. In particular, he proposes that this holds of Japanese imperativized verbs as well. Hence, (18a) is analyzed as (18b). (18)

a.

ashita made ni sono shigoto-o yare to jooshi-ni tomorrow until at that work-ACC do-I MP T O boss-BY

iwaremashita was.told.P OLITE b.

‘I was told by the boss that I should finish that work by tomorrow’ ≈ ‘I was told by the boss that I should “finish!” that work by tomorrow’

Maier (2008:(23)) According to this analysis, Japanese imperativized verbs occur in indirect speech only as quoted expressions (i.e., mentioned, not used). 15 16

Japanese wh-words are generally realized in situ.

This was pointed out to me by Yasutada Sudo (p.c.). Cf. also Saito (2009) for an example along these lines.

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I don’t think that this analysis can be maintained. Maier (2008) argues that politeness marking provides evidence for his claim: even in the presence of shifted indexicals (indicating indirect speech), plain imperative forms do not indicate impoliteness w.r.t. the actual addressee. That is, (18a) is an appropriate report of the actual speaker’s boss’s command in (19) even though the actual speaker is using polite forms to address the actual addressee (e.g. iwaremashita). (19)

asatte made ni kono shigoto-o yar-e day-after-tomorrow until at this work-ACC do-I MP.P LAIN ‘Finish this work in two days!’

But the analysis in terms of mixed quotation predicts that plain (impolite) forms can’t be used to report polite imperatives. This is not borne out. The report in (20) does not entail that John used the—rather rude—plain form of the imperative to tell Mary to go to Tokyo (Yasutada Sudo, p.c.). (20)

John-ga Mary-ni [Tokyo-e ik-e] to itta. John-N OM Mary-DAT Tokyo-to go-I MP.P LAIN TO said ‘John told Mary to go to Tokyo.’

To wrap up, imperatives can be reported with plain forms without creating an impoliteness effect towards the actual addressee. At the same time, there is no suggestion that the speaker of the reported context had been impolite towards the addressee in the reported context. Therefore, I would suggest a different line of analysis: ‘plain forms’ are in general used not only to indicate absence of politeness, but they also serve as the neutral form in contexts in which politeness need or even must not be indicated, e.g. in descriptions, etc. Also, it has been observed that politeness marking tends to get omitted in embedded contexts in general (Saito, 2009). Both facts about the level of politeness attached to reported imperatives can be explained naturally as an absence of honorific marking in embedded contexts.17

17

Saito (2009) claims that polite forms cannot appear in embedded clauses in general; consider for example the relative clause in (i). (i)

∗ Watasi-wa

[kinoo katta/∗ kaimasita hon]-o yomimasita I-T OP yesterday bought.P LAIN/bought.P OLITE book-ACC read.P OLITE ‘I read the book I bought yesterday.’

But consider (ii) from Coulmas (1985). (ii)

kare-wa [watashi-ga matta machigaimashita] to iimashita again was.wrong.P OLITE T O said-P OLITE he-T OP I-N OM RQuote : ‘He said: “I was wrong again.”’ RSub : ‘He said that I was wrong again.’

Upon closer consideration, the polite form Saito considers for reporting imperatives (oide itadakemasu ‘come’) is not really a polite imperative, but an idiomatic expression of politeness. The details of which polite forms can be embedded and under what constraints have to await further investigation. It would also be interesting to compare the Japanese data to the alleged absence of

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To conclude, the data considered in this section corroborate the hypothesis that Japanese imperatives can be used in speech reports without these being an instance of partial or full quotation. A first survey of the situation in Malagasy points in the opposite direction. Malagasy distinguishes two complementizers, hoe and fa, both of which allow for true subordination. The possessive-marked noun fiarako ‘my car’ in (21) can be understood to belong to the actual speaker both when embedded under hoe and under fa. (21)

tamin’i Nilaza Hans i Maria hoe/fa PAST-ACT F OC-say PAST.P REP’NART Hans NART Maria C OMP ny fiarako. nosasany PAST.PAT F OC.wash.by.her D EF car.my ‘Maria told Hans that she had washed my car.’

But only hoe allows for usage as a quotative marker in addition. An additional marker hoy can mark direct speech in these cases. (22)

Maria tamin’i Hans hoe/∗ fa: Hoy i to NART Maria PAST-P REP’NART Hans C OMP: ny fiarako.’ ‘Nosasany PAST.PAT F OC.wash.by.me D EF car.my ‘Maria said to Hans: “I have washed my car.”’

Imperatives can only be embedded under hoe; fa is ungrammatical. Apparently, this leads to a loss of the indirect speech construal18 : (23)

an’i Niangavy Marina i Sonja hoe/∗ fa PAST.ACT F OC.ask ACC’NART Marina NART Sonja C OMP atero ny bokiko. send-back.I MP D EF book-my ‘Sonja asked Marina: “Give back my book”.’

A definite answer for Malagasy requires a far more thorough investigation of the data. But for the moment I conjecture that Malagasy does not embed imperatives in indirect speech constructions. Apparent cases of embedding constitute quotative constructions.

speech style particles (even the marker associated with the plain form) in the embedded correlates of Korean imperatves (cf. Portner, 2007). 18

The preferred way to express indirect speech is an infinitival construction. In (i), the pronoun refers unambiguously to the utterance speaker: (i)

an’i Marina i Sonja hanatitra ny bokiko. Niangavy PAST.ACT F OC.ask ACC’NART Marina NART Sonja send.back.I NF D EF book-my ‘Sonja asked Marina to give back my book.’

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6.1.3 Fossilized Constructions in Ancient Greek and Middle High German Rivero and Terzi (1995) argue in a footnote that Ancient Greek allows for the embedding of imperatives, just as it does for indicative, subjunctive and optative verbal forms. They quote an example from Smyth (1920)19 : (24)

ho drason; Oistha know.2 P S G P RES I ND what do.AORIST I MP ‘Do you know what you are to do?’ Ancient Greek, Euripides, Hecuba 225

The possibility of embedding imperatives is generally not reported by grammars of Ancient Greek. So what is then the status of such an example? (24) is indeed quite a frequent construction in dramatic writing and was discussed in Grimm (1852), who compares it to analogous data from Middle High German (MHG) (all instances before 1300). (25)

a.

b.

ich râte dir, waz du tuo I advise you, what you do.I MP ‘I give you advice what you should do’

MHG, Kudrun 149

ich sage dir, herre, wie du tuo. I tell you, mylord, how you do.I MP ‘I tell you how to act, Mylord.’ MHG Rolandslied 14,22; 16,21

Grimm observes that in both languages, the embedded imperatives are strictly confined to verbs of doing (e.g. German tuo ‘do.I MP’). Ancient Greek furthermore restricts the matrix context to questions involving the second person present tense , form of o˜ιδα ‘to know’. The Middle High German construction is a bit more liberal, but still confined to instances that could all be substituted for by a simple unembedded imperative tue das, tue so ‘do this/that’ (cf. Erdmann 1886b:121). Note also that the appearance of the subject pronoun seems obligatory for the construction in question. Ordinary imperatives of the same stage do not require an overt subject pronoun.

19 They quote a second example from the same grammarian which is indicated as being taken from Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus, 473; nevertheless, none of the editions I had access to had the quoted example at the indicated position. Nor could it be found in the electronic edition of the Perseus project (www.perseus.tufts.edu, featuring the edition by Sir Richard Jebb). I will ignore the rather surprising, absolutely unique example of an aorist imperative in a relative clause:

(i)

(Sophocles, Oedipus Tyrannus 473) Kratêres eisin . . . ôn krat’ erepson bowls are . . . of-which brims crown.AORIST-I MP ‘There are mixing-bowls, the brims of which thou must crown.’

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In view of these well-established restrictions, I agree with Erdmann (1886a) that these examples should be treated as instances of a fossilized construction.20 Neither the cases put forth for Ancient Greek, nor for Middle High German, could be taken as evidence in favor of productive embedding of imperatives in these languages.

6.1.4 Context Harmony in Old Germanic In contrast to the fossilized construction in Middle High German, older stages of Germanic languages seem to display productive embedding of imperatives (cf. Grimm, 1852; Erdmann, 1886b; Rögnvaldsson, 1998). In the following, I will argue that these are particularly telling because they display an interesting stage in the syntactic development of imperatives and hypotaxis (see Platzack, 2007, for an anylsis of the syntactic change) that could also point towards possible semantic reasons for the cross-linguistic tendency to block imperatives from embedding in indirect speech constructions (and others). Like Modern English and German, Modern Icelandic excludes imperatives from subordinate clauses that are introduced by a complementizer (cf. (26a)). The subject pronoun has to be present and has to follow the verb, onto which it is usually cliticized (cf. (26b)). (26)

a.

b.

∗ Èg

þù ver} kyrr! bið þig að {vertu, I ask you that {be.I MP-you, you be.I MP} staying ‘I ask you to stay.’ Modern Icelandic Farþú/Farðu heim! go.IMP(-)you home ‘Go home!’ Modern Icelandic

Things look different at older stages of the language. Rögnvaldsson (1998) cites 14 examples of imperatives embedded under reported speech verbs or imperatives.21 In contrast to Ancient Greek and Middle High German, the Old Germanic languages do not display lexical restrictions on the embedded imperativized verbs.

20 For MHG it has also been noted that all examples appear in rhymed position. Grimm (1852), in a footnote, gives examples where the usage seems to have been generalized to other persons:

(i)

21

je enweiz ich was ich tuo now know I what I do.I MP 2S G ‘Now I know what I have to do.’

MHG, Kudrun, 1209

His corpus consists of the Family sagas, Sturlunga saga, Heimskringla, The Book of Settlement and Grágàs, all dating back to the 12th or 13th century.

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(27)

‘Verða kann það,’ segir Arnkell, ‘en það vil eg við þig happen.I NF can that says A. but that want I with you.ACC mæla, Þòrarinn frændi, að Þú ver með mér Þar til er lýkur speak.I NF Þòrarinn relative that you be.I MP with me there until is ended málum þessum á nokkurn hátt.’ affair this in some mode ‘That may be’, said Arnkell, ‘but this I want to arrange with you, Cousin Þòrarinn, that you stay with me until this affair is in some way ended.’ Old Icelandic, Eyrbyggjy saga

(28)

þù svo mannlega að þú rek þá brottu svo adh Nù ger that you drive.I MP them away so that now act.I MP you so manly við þörfnumst eigi allra góðra hluta. we lack not all good things ‘Now act so manly that you drive them away, so that we don’t lack all good things.’ Old Icelandic, Þorvaldsþ áttur víðförla

Similar examples are to be found in Old Swedish, Old Saxon and Old High German (cf. Erdmann 1886b:119). (29)

bimunium dih, [. . . ] daz du niewedar ni gituo. ik not do.I MP I.N OM implore you.ACC [. . . ] that you never ‘I implore you never to do this again.’ Old High German, Dkm. 4,7

(30)

biddiu ik, that thu sie [. . . ] bisweri. ask I that you them [. . . ] implore.I MP ‘I ask you to implore them.’

(31)

Old Saxon, Heliand, 2993

Jak bidhir thik, at thu, mildasta iomfru, bidh for mik oc hielp I ask you, that you, dear virgin, ask.I MP for me and help.I MP mik at faa j hymerike roo me to obtain the heavenly peace ‘I ask you, dear Virgin, to pray for me and help me to obtain’ Old Swedish, Själinna Thröst (from Rögnvaldsson, 1998)

I think it is extremely telling that all the examples cited fall into one of the two classes schematized in (32). (32a) is attested at least for Old Icelandic, and (32b) is attested for Old Icelandic, Old Swedish, Old Saxon, and Old High German. (32)

a. b.

I MPERATIVE that you I MPERATIVE I ({must, want}) {allow, advice, ask, . . . } (you) that you I MPERATIVE

Both constructions give rise to a phenomenon of double access22 that could already be observed with the fossilized construction in MHG and Ancient Greek. Roughly, 22 The phenomenon is reminiscent of an effect in the temporal realm. When English present tense is embedded under a verbum dicendi or sentiendi in the past tense it expresses that the state described by the content of the report holds both at the actual utterance time and at the time of the reported utterance event.

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the entire construction performs a particular directive speech act that is equivalent to what the embedded imperative would perform in that context; so we could think of the embedded imperative as performing a speech act with respect to the actual context and with respect to the reporting context which happens to be identical to the actual one. The more wide spread class (32b) is exactly parallel to more standard cases of explicit performatives, which require likewise that speaker and addressee are the same in reporting and reported context.23 In the second class, the main clause imperative is a very general one and merely serves to introduce the embedded one which conveys what is requested, or it tells the hearer to verify a disjunction of two imperatives by picking one of the disjuncts. Here, the embedding is purely cataphoric and doesn’t add anything to the content.24 (33)

a. b.

Do the following: A! Do one of the following: A or B!

The expectation would be that languages that do not syntactically block embedding of imperatives would allow at least for the double access constructions as in (32b). I conjecture that the grammaticalization of constraints on the embedding of imperatives in many languages of the world has to do with this double access phenomenon: even if imperatives can be embedded syntactically, they retain their effect on the actual context. Hence, the embedding is either vacuous (if the context of the report and the context of the reported situation agree in all parameters) or the embedding would contribute an additional meaning which could conflict with the contribution of the embedded clause (that is, the matrix clause might fail to describe the situation that consists in the utterance of the embedded imperative). Spelling out an account along these lines requires a far better understanding of the actual cross-linguistic situation as to where and under what conditions imperatives can be embedded and will thus be left for future research.

(i)

John said that Sally is pregnant. (→ Sally’s pregnancy spans the time of John’s utterance time and the time of the actual utterance)

23

Several of the attested data involve shifting of the world variable, as for instance (ia). Note that this is a phenomenon observed in the literature on explicit performatives as well (Verena Mayer, p.c.). Bach and Harnish (1979) call examples like (ib) hedged performatives.

(i)

a. b.

I must/want to tell you that you should immediately leave the country. I have to tell you to immediately leave my office.

24 This is interesting in comparison with the claim that Germanic complementizers have developed precisely out of such cataphoric pronouns. But note that at the stage of these (32a)-type imperatives, Icelandic að already has to count as a full-fledged complementizer in contrast to the pronoun það.

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6.1.5 Embedded Imperatives in Modern High German In Modern High German, imperatives and complementizers compete for the same position (cf. (34a) with the complementizer in C). Consequently, embedding of imperatives should be blocked syntactically. But Modern High German also allows for V2-embedding under bridge verbs (Gärtner, 2001; Meinunger, 2004). In these cases, the finite verb is standardly taken to be situated in C and therefore occupies exactly the position the imperativited verb has to occupy. Overall, (34a) and (34b) express the same proposition.25 (34)

a.

b.

Hans glaubt, dass ich müde bin. Hans believes that I tired am ‘Hans believes that I am tired.’ Hans glaubt, ich bin müde. Hans believes I am tired ‘Hans believes that I am tired.’

Consequently, we would expect imperatives to occur under lexically appropriate bridge verbs. To evaluate this prediction, we have to take into account verbs that allow for V2-embedding and describe a speech act that can be performed by the use of an imperative. As possible candidates from Meinunger’s (2004) list remain only sagen ‘say’ and vorschlagen ‘propose’. We would assume that examples analogous to the Old Germanic data can be construed. This seems to be borne out (cf. (35b)).26 (35)

a. b.

∗ Ich

sag dir, dass geh nach Hause. I tell you that go.I MP S G to home nach Hause. Ich sag dir, geh I tell you go.I MP S G to home ‘I tell you to go home.’

But note that in contrast to the Old Germanic data involving a complementizer, here we have no syntactic means to tell apart true embedding from direct speech. If

25 While the details for the analysis of (34b) are still up to dispute, it is generally accepted that minimal pairs like (34a) and (34b) express the same truth-conditions but differ in their informationstructural properties and in their abilities to appear for example under negation or in interrogatives. Despite the fact that the embedded sentence looks like a simple root declarative, it is unambiguously evaluated in the scope of the propositional attitude predicate. Thus (34b) does not entail that the speaker is indeed tired. 26

Note that the data in the following all employ the most neutral verb sagen. Subsitution with the other V2-embedding candidate verb, vorschlagen, is somewhat marginal but not unacceptable: (i)

?? Ich

hab dir gestern schon vorgeschlagen, geh da heute hin! I have you yesterday already proposed go.I MP there today VPART ‘I have already proposed yesterday that you should go there today.’

I suspect that the difference in acceptability is due to the fact that vorschlagen ‘propose’ describes a possiblity-like speech act that imperatives can only fulfill via pragmatic inference processes as discussed in Chapter 5. The details have to await further investigation.

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Modern High German were to require the same constraint on semantically vacuous embedding by obligatorily keeping all the parameters constant, we could never tell if there is V2-embedding of imperatives in German. On closer inspection, at least some varieties of (spoken colloquial) Modern High German prove to be considerably more flexible than what the data suggest for Old Germanic. In the following, I will use two criteria, (i) interpretation of indexicals and (ii) wh-extraction, to show that Modern High German allows for genuine embedding of imperatives. If Modern High German were like Old Germanic in requiring reported and reporting context to match on all parameters that can be picked out by indexicals,27 indexicals could not be used as a test to set apart direct and indirect speech. But interestingly enough, the constraint does not apply to all the parameters in Modern High German. First, it is easy to show that the temporal parameter can be shifted with respect to the utterance context. Most speakers accept (36) with heute ‘today’ referring to the day of the actual utterance context. Under such an interpretation, the imperative clause cannot be analyzed as an instance of direct speech.28 (36)

Ich hab dir gestern schon gesagt, geh da heute hin. I have you yesterday already told go.I MP S G there today VP RT ‘I’ve already told you yesterday to go there today.’

Independently, it is interesting to check if—despite the shifted temporal parameter— (36) comes with a double access effect in the sense that the imperative given yesterday is still considered valid by the speaker at the time of the reporting utterance. The slightly modified variant in (37) proves that no such double access effect is required. (37)

da heute hin, aber Ich hab dir gestern zwar gesagt, geh I have you yesterday QP RT told go.I MP S G there today VP RT but inzwischen glaub ich nicht mehr, dass das eine gute Idee wäre. by-now believe I not anymore that that a good idea would.be ‘(True,) I told you yesterday that you should go there today, but by now I’m not convinced anymore that that would be a good idea.’

What about the other parameters then? (38) shows that also the speaker need not be the same in reported and reporting context.

27 Note that the world parameter of the content has a special status in this respect; a potential shift is hard to test. 28

Maier (2010) suggests treating these examples as mixed quotations in which only the imperative is quoted. He successfully extends the analysis to cover discontinuous consituents consisting of a fronted imperativized verb and a verbal particle stranded in base position. Nevertheless, I am not convinced that this is the right way to go: crucially, examples like (36) do not require that the original utterance contain an imperative geh . . . hin. Instead, the speaker could very well have used a variety of other constructions, e.g. an explicit performative or a declarative containing a performative modal.

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(38)

Hans hat dir doch gestern schon gesagt, ruf meinen Vater Hans has you DP RT yesterday already told, call.I MP S G my father an. VP RT ‘John has already told you yesterday that you should call my father.’

Surprisingly, the addressee parameter cannot be shifted. For most speakers,29 the imperative in (39) can only be interpreted as direct speech, in that Maria was told to go to the designated place at that same day. da heute hin. Ich hab Maria gestern gesagt, geh I have Maria yesterday said go.I MP S G there today VP RT ‘I told Mary yesterday: “Go there today!”’

(39)

The criterion of syntactic opacity confirms the indirect speech status of the embedded imperative clauses. In contrast to wh-fronting in a matrix imperative like (40), which only allows for an interpretation as a rhetorical question or as an echoquestion (see Section 2.3.3.3 for discussion), wh-extraction out of the imperative complement clause is possible and can for example be used in truly information seeking questions about a previous command (cf. (41)).30 % Wo stell den Blumentopf hin? where put.I MP S G the flower-pot VP RT

(40)

(41)

a.

∗ information

seeking

den Blumentopf hin? Wo hab ich gestern gesagt stell where have I yesterday said put.I MP S G the flower-pot VP RT ‘Where did I tell you yesterday to put the flower pot?’ ok: information seeking

29 Out of 10 speakers questioned, one didn’t accept the data at all; 8 people accepted shifting of speech time and speaker, but not of the addressee, and one person accepted shifting of all three parameters alike. Kaufmann and Poschmann (2011) confirm the observation with an offline experiment with 79 speakers. 30 Note that this is in a way complementary to the investigations in Reis and Rosengren (1992), who consider German wh-imperatives as in (ia).

(i)

a.

b.

mir mal [ti dass das kostet ti ]! Wievieli sag how-much tell.I MP S G me QP RT that that costs ‘Tell me how much that costs!’ Sag mir mal wievieli das kostet ti ! tell.I MP S G me QP RT how-much that costs ‘Tell me how much that costs!’

Reis and Rosengren (1992) argue convincingly that the construction in (ia) is an imperative that embeds an indirect question and has a wh-phrase topicalized into the preverbal position. It is therefore semantically equivalent to (ib).

6.1

Reported Speech and Imperatives from a Cross-Linguistic Perspective

b.

211

Wo hab ich dir schnell noch mal gesagt stell den where have I you DP RT P RT QP RT told put.I MP S G the Blumentopf hin? flowerpot VP RT ‘(Help me out), where did I tell you to put the flower pot? (I can’t remember.)’

The paradigm as to which parameters can be shifted is also corroborated by the wh-extraction data. Both speech time and speaker can be shifted with respect to the reporting context, but the addressee has to stay the same. Since direct speech is not a possible interpretation for the wh-extraction data, examples (42b) and (42c) come out as ungrammatical. (42)

a.

b.

c.

Wohin hat Hans dir gesagt stell den Blumentopf? where-to has Hans you told put.I MP S G the flowerpot ‘Where did Hans tell you to put the flower pot?’ ∗ Wohin hab ich Maria gesagt stell den Blumentopf? where-to have I Maria told put.I MP S G the flowerpot (intended: ‘Where did I tell Maria to put the flower pot?’) ∗ Wohin sag ich Maria bloß stell den Blumentopf? where-to tell I Maria DP RT put.I MP S G the flowerpot (intended: ‘Where should I tell Maria to put the flower pot?’)

The data in this section are quite surprising in that they show that imperatives can be embedded productively in colloquial Modern High German. Recently, Crniˇc and Trinh (2009) discover the same for colloquial English. They provide more tests for embedding and offer a first sketch of what happens with the presuppositional meaning component. The requirement on context harmony between the reporting and the reported context that we find in Modern High German is much looser than what we were led to assume from the examples attested from Old High German. The only requirement consists in the addressee being the same in both contexts. I call it the addressee constancy restriction. (43)

The addressee constancy restriction (ACR) Imperative embedding in Modern High German is possible only if the person spoken to in the reported context is identical to the addressee in the utterance situation c A .

Here, I will not try to offer an analysis for the ACR (but see Poschmann and Schwager, 2008, and Kaufmann and Poschmann, 2011, for a proposal that draws on the particular semantic nature of the imperative subject).

6.1.6 Conclusion In this section, I have considered reported speech as one of the testing grounds for the controversy as to whether imperatives can be embedded. It turns out that

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different languages allow this to different degrees. Japanese does not seem to impose any restrictions on the connection between the contextual parameters of the reporting and the reported utterance. In contrast, the Old Germanic languages require that the speaker, addressee, and time parameters display matching between the reporting and the reported utterance context, which renders the embedding semantically vacuous. Colloquial varieties of Modern High German occupy an intermediate position by requiring the addressee parameter to remain constant; moreover, embedding is also subject to syntactic constraints (only V2 embedding because of a position conflict with the complementizer). Last but not least, data from Ancient Greek and Middle High German were discarded as idiomatic. The propositional meaning component I propose for imperatives allows us to give a straightforward analysis of the embedded examples. In contrast, some work needs to be done to capture the behavior of the presuppositional meaning component. But I would hope that the content of the presuppositional meaning component with its multiple dependence on the contextual parameters can shed light on the various restrictions to be found on the embedding of imperatives cross-linguistically.

6.2 Conditional Imperatives and Modal Subordination Conditionals are one of the few complex sentence types in which (crosslinguistically) imperatives occur very naturally.31 (44) displays a few examples of conditionals with imperative consequents (henceforth conditional imperatives, CIs).32 (44)

a. b.

If you see something, say something! If you are at an intersection, turn right!

In this section I will discuss in detail the status of examples such as (44) and will show that the analysis of imperatives proposed in Chapter 3 extends naturally to CIs. I will also relate the discussion to the observation that imperatives can appear in contexts of modal subordination.

31 This section is a condensed version of the discussion in Schwager (2006a) and Kaufmann and Schwager (2011). 32 Note that it may depend on one’s notion of embedding as well as on one’s theory of conditionals if (all) conditionals with imperative consequents involve instances of embedded imperatives or not. While CIs have received quite some attention in philosophy (cf. Hamblin, 1987, for an overview), the body of work from the side of linguistic semantics is still surprisingly small (cf. Asher and Lascarides, 2003a; Zarnic, 2002; Schwager, 2006a; Kaufmann and Schwager, 2011; Charlow, 2010, for approaches motivated at least partly by linguistic considerations). Given that in the philosophical literature ‘imperatives’ are often understood as a functional rather than a grammatical category (see Section 1.1), not all of the philosophical work on ‘conditional imperatives’ is directly relevant to the discussion here.

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Conditional Imperatives and Modal Subordination

213

6.2.1 A Full Paradigm of CIs Conditionals are well-known to be a class of constructions rather than a uniform phenomenon. Iatridou (1991) distinguishes three major classes of conditionals: relevance (or biscuit), factual, and hypothetical conditionals. Hypothetical conditonals express a certain relationship between the truth of the antecedent and the truth of the consequent. Relevance and factual conditionals are often grouped together as speech act conditionals as they express a dependence between the truth of the antecedent and the relevance or felicity of the speech act performed with the consequent. As imperatives are not generally felt to have a truth value, one might expect that all CIs are speech act conditionals, i.e. that there are no hypothetical CIs. In the following, I will first establish that all three types of conditionals can be exemplified by CIs. Unsurprisingly, CIs occur among relevance conditionals. Here, it is not the truth of the consequent that depends on the truth of the antecedent proposition. Rather, the antecedent filters the felicity condition that the speech act to be performed by the consequent is relevant in the context in which it is uttered. (45)

If you are thirsty, there’s beer in the fridge.

Typically (45) is issued in a context where the existence of beer in the fridge is in no way contingent on the addressee’s being thirsty. That is, from (45) we may conclude that there’s beer in the fridge even if the addressee is not thirsty. So even without assuming that imperatives correspond to propositions (and can thus be related to truth), relevance conditionals shouldn’t be any more problematic with imperatives than they are with declaratives. Examples like (47) are indeed perfectly acceptable.33 (46)

a. b.

If you take it from me, just skip salad all together before ever bothering to order that thing.34 If you want my advice, get a pro to do it.35

One of the identifying features for relevance conditionals is the impossibility of inserting then into the consequent (cf. Iatridou, 1991). As a matter of fact then can’t be inserted without considerably changing the meaning of the examples. (47a) suggests that it is best to skip salad only if advice from the speaker is welcome. Similarly, (47b) suggests that getting a professional to do the job is best only if the addressee wants the speakers advice, or, that getting a professional to do the job is a means

33 I am indebted to Lisa Matthewson (p.c.) for correcting a mistake in an earlier version of the argument, and to Julie Hunter (p.c.) for helping me to find relevant examples. 34

From http://www.graciousbowl.com/2007/12/cream-of-arugula-soup.html.

35

From http://www.ozaudi.com/forums/showthread.php/2954-Audi-touch-up-paint.

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to get the speaker’s advice (the second reading corresponds to a construal as an anankastic conditional). (47)

a. b.

If you take it from me, then just skip salad all together before ever bothering to order that thing. If you want my advice, then get a pro to do it.

We also find CIs that constitute factual conditionals. The characteristic of this class is that the antecedent is presupposed to be true in the utterance context. Here, neither the speech act performed by the consequent nor the truth of a declarative consequent depends on the proposition expressed in the antecedent. Rather, the latter mentions a reason for the speech act performed by the consequent. Again, whatever our theory of imperatives, we wouldn’t expect them to behave any differently from other clause types. And, indeed, the interrogative example in (48a) can be paralleled easily by an example with an imperative consequent clause, cf. (48b). (48)

a. b.

If you like him so much, why don’t you help him? If you like him so much, then go ahead and help him!

The crucial case is presented by hypothetical conditionals. Intuitively, hypothetical conditionals somehow express that the truth of the consequent depends on the truth of the antecedent, and (at least with indicative conditionals), the speaker presents the antecedent proposition as something the truth value of which is not known to him. Hypothetical conditionals can be distinguished from both relevance conditionals and factual conditionals by allowing for binding from the consequent into the antecedent and for modification with only. Consider (49). (49a) is clearly different from (45) in that the presence of beer in the fridge is now claimed to depend on the addressee’s being thirsty. Analogously, (49b) no longer expresses the presupposition that the addressee likes the pronoun’s referent to the aforementioned degree. The presence of only has turned both cases into hypothetical conditionals. (49)

a. b.

There’s beer in the fridge only if you are thirsty. ahead and help him only if you like him so much!

# Go

The possibility of binding from the consequent into the antecedent also helps to distinguish hypothetical conditionals (cf. (50a)) from relevance conditionals (cf. (50b)) and from factual conditionals (cf. (50c)). (50)

a. b.

c.

If you feed iti well, a donkey j will be grateful.

hypothetical: ok i = j If iti is sick, the number of a donkey j ’s vet is written on the door of its barn. relevance: ∗ i = j If you own iti , why don’t you keep a donkey j in your garden? factual: ∗ i = j

6.2

Conditional Imperatives and Modal Subordination

215

It is easy to construe CIs that involve binding from the consequent into the antecedent (cf. (51a)) or modification with only (cf. (51b)). Consequently, at least some CIs belong to the class of hypothetical conditionals. (51)

a. b.

Let a donkeyi rest if iti is tired. Call a doctor only if you are sick.

Relevance conditionals and factual conditionals draw on the speech act to be executed by the consequent. Whatever semantic assumptions about imperatives we want to make, they will allow for imperatives to fulfill speech acts, and as such to be modified like any other speech act, independently of the semantic object that is used to perform it. In contrast, for hypothetical CIs the relation between antecedent and consequent is standardly assumed to pertain at a sub-speech act level. Formal analyses of conditionals could involve an interpretation as material implication (cf. (52a)), or strict implication (that is truth at all worlds) (cf. (52b)). (52)

a. b.

λw.A(w) → B(w) (∀w ∈ W )[A(w) → B(w)]

(≡ λw.¬(A(w) ∧ ¬B(w)))

Both have been shown to be inadequate for natural language semantics as they stand (cf. e.g. Kratzer, 1978, for extensive discussion). Therefore, most current approaches assume a particular accessibility relation that picks out a subset of the possible worlds, restricted to which the conditional can then be interpreted as a strict conditional, cf. (53a) (cf. Kripke, 1963). Alternatively, the antecedent could be understood like a definite description that picks out a particular world, cf. (53b) (cf. Stalnaker, 1968; Schlenker, 2004). (53)

a. b.

λw.(∀w ∈ ACC(w) ⊆ W )[A(w) → B(w)], with ACC some suitable accessibility relation. λw.B(ιw  (A(w )))

All these analyses assume that not only antecedent and consequent, but also hypothetical conditionals themselves express propositions. The latter assumption is subject to debate, though. Probabilistic accounts assume that hypothetical conditionals do not (or at least, need not) express propositions, but express a relation between the probabilities of antecedent and consequent (cf. Ramsey, 1929; Kaufmann, 2005). But again, it is propositions that are assigned probabilities. Consequently, even non-propositional analyses for hypothetical conditionals standardly rely on a propositional interpretation of consequent and antecedent. We may therefore conclude that standard treatments of hypothetical conditionals can’t readily be applied to CIs if imperatives aren’t interpreted as propositions. In the following, I will show that the analysis of imperatives as modal operators allows naturally for a unified analysis of hypothetical conditionals.

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6.2.2 CIs and the Modal Operator Analysis of Imperatives For the analysis of conditionals I rely again on Kratzer’s framework of graded modality (Kratzer, 1991a). She treats conditionals as modal expressions whose consequent is the prejacent of a(n overt or covert) modal operator and whose antecedent restricts the modal base of that operator. A compositional account of Kratzer’s assumptions about conditionals is spelled out in Heim and von Fintel (2007). Their entry for if in simple modality (see Section 3.1.1) can be adapted for graded modality as in (54): the if -clause is adjoined to the modal operator, and the thus modified modal operator then combines with modal base, ordering source, and prejacent as usual (cf. (54a)). This means that if has to be interpreted as in (54b).36 (54)

a. b.

[ [ ModOP [ if p ] f g ] q ] ifc = λpst λMλ f s,st,t λgs,st,t λqst λw.M(λv[ f (v) ∪ p], g, q).

Adding the antecedent to the modal base of the operator means that the worlds that are ordered by the ordering source are constrained to antecedent-worlds. Conditionals that don’t contain an overt modal operator in the consequent are assumed to contain a covert modal of epistemic necessity (e.g. the speaker’s beliefs, that is f is interpreted as ‘given what I know’, and g is interpreted as ‘what I take to be the stereotypical course of events’ or is left empty): (55)

a. b.

If the lights are on, John is home. [ [ epistemic [if [the lights are on ]] f g ] John is home ]

Conditionals that do contain an overt modal in the consequent are ambiguous: the antecedent could restrict either the overt modal in the consequent (overt conditional operator-construal, OCO), or it could restrict a covert modal of epistemic necessity, rendering the modal in the consequent part of the prejacent of the thus constrained epistemic operator (covert conditional operator-construal, CCO). By the analysis proposed in Chapter 3, imperatives contain a modal operator of necessity.37 Consequently, for a hypothetical conditional ‘If A, B!’ the formal framework developed so far makes available two construals:38 (56)

a. b.

[ OPImp [ if A ] ] B [ [ epistemic [ if A ] ] [ OPImp B ] ]

OCO CCO

36 Abbreviating the type of conversational backgrounds, s, st, t, as σ , the logical type of M is σ, σ, st, st. 37 38

In Section 5.3 I argued that it can be decomposed as exhaustified possibility.

Strictly speaking, the possibility of inserting covert epistemic operators renders available an infinite number of construals. Without further arguing for this, I will only take into account what are standardly assumed to be the most plausible ones in the following.

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217

Under the Overt Conditional Operator construal (cf. (56a)), the antecedent directly restricts the modal base of the imperative operator OPImp . The Covert Conditional Operator construal (cf. (56b)) locates OPImp in the nuclear scope of an implicit epistemic operator whose modal base is restricted by the antecedent. At first glance, both analyses seem possible. On the one hand, we have seen no reason why OPImp could not be modified by the if -clause but, on the other hand, a covert epistemic operator is needed independently for ordinary declarative conditionals without an overt epistemic modal, including ones with root modals in the consequent.39 At first glance, it may seem surprising to even consider the CCO-construal: after all, imperatives can’t be embedded under overt epistemic modal verbs. Yet, this need not carry over to covert epistemic operators. In Section 6.2.3 I will show that imperatives can appear in modal subordination contexts. Hence, there is no prima facie argument against the CCO construal. Apart from deciding on what is the right construal for CIs, granting that there is some prioritizing ordering source we need to know which worlds they rank. The two issues of which construal is correct and of what modal base to choose are not entirely independent of each other. In Kaufmann and Schwager (2011) we discuss in detail various ways of setting the parameters. Drawing on general arguments that have been raised against OCO in connection with declaratives (cf. Frank, 1996; Zvolenszky, 2002) as well as a novel argument derived from strengthening of the antecedent,40 we argue in favor of a uniform CCO-construal for CIs. The covert modal operator restricted by the antecedent is assumed to express necessity w.r.t. the speaker’s knowledge and an ordering based on what the speaker takes to be the sterotypical course of events. We compare the predictions of various assumptions as to what should constitute the modal base of the imperative operator in the consequent: it turns out that the imperative has to take into account that the antecedent is true, but also additional contingencies at each of the worlds that speaker considers possible (and sufficiently plausible) antecedent worlds. Therefore, we assume that the modal base of the embedded imperative operator is to be composed of the historical alternatives to the world under consideration.41,42 39 In Schwager (2006a) I argued that both construals were needed to capture all kinds of examples. In Kaufmann and Schwager (2011) we show that these arguments depend on unnecessary assumptions about the exact content of the ordering sources involved. 40

Strengthening of the antecedent is a well known phenomenon in the semantics of conditionals. From the truth of If p, then q, it does not follow that If p and r, then q. Kratzer’s framework accounts for this as follows: if the highest ranked p-worlds in the modal base (i.e., singled out by an ordering source of likelihood, salience or stereotypicality) are all ¬r -worlds, the optimal worlds considered by the modal operator in the two conditionals are disjoint from each other. So, even if all the highest ranked p-worlds are q-worlds, we can’t conclude anything about the truth of q at the highest ranked p ∧ r -worlds.

The historical alternatives of a world w ∈ W at t are all those worlds w ∈ W that are indistinguishable from w up to t (but may differ w.r.t. future courses of events); cf. Thomason (1984) (also Section 4.2.3 above).

41

42 Note that we are abstracting away from an analysis of the temporal parameter. Strictly speaking the antecedent forces us to consider worlds not at the time of the utterance, but at some relevant

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a. b.

If you get lost, call me! (57a)c is true in w iff for all stereotypical worlds w  consistent with cS ’s beliefs such that c A gets lost in w  at a time t, c S ’s preferences rank highest among the historical alternatives of w at t those at which c A calls c S .

This means that the imperative is evaluated locally with respect to each of the possible circumstances under which the addressee may be lost.43 To compare this to unembedded imperatives, note first that the modal base is no longer constituted by the common ground only: instead, the imperative is evaluated pointwise with respect to subsets of the context set (the epistemic operator takes into account only those worlds in the context set that to the speaker seem to contain sufficiently plausible constellations of the addressee being lost, and then the imperative is evaluated with respect to the set of historical alternatives to each of these). I take this to be an innocent deviation from the standard semantics of imperatives that is motivated independently by the need to deal with instances of modal subordination discussed in Section 6.2.3 below. Independently of the choice of the modal bases, adopting a CCO-construal for CIs calls into question the status of the authority condition (see Section 4.2.2). Assume that, as in (57b), the ordering source of the embedded imperative modal operator is constituted by the speaker’s preferences. Now, one possibility for making sense of (57b) is to assume that at each world at which the imperative gets evaluated (i.e., at each sufficiently speaker-plausible antecedent world) the speaker has a preference for the addressee to call, but he does not have an overall preference for being called. Intuitively, in such a scenario the CI would be appropriate (or true), but the presupposition of epistemic authority would be violated: the analysis represents the speaker as not knowing if he has a preference for the addressee to call or not. But, on closer inspection, this is not a problem of the theory of imperatives but merely of how we describe the content of the ordering source. It seems highly implausible to understand (57a) as expressing insecurity from the speaker’s side as to what his wishes are. A more natural description of a scenario where (57a) is true seems to be the following. Assume that the speaker has a preference to have dinner with the addressee, and knows that in case she gets lost, the only way to secure the joint dinner is for her to call him. That is, he knows perfectly well that his preferences (plus the relevant facts) are such that at each world where the addressee gets lost they boil down to her calling him. But independently of what the speaker’s preferences come down to under different circumstances: across the entire speaker belief state the value of the respective ordering source can be spelled out as g(w) = {speaker and addressee have dinner together}. Hence, the speaker is not uncertain about what

future time when the antecedent is true. For the difference between such predictive vs. nonpredictive conditionals, cf. Kaufmann (2005). 43 This particular choice of modal base avoids a general problem for possible worlds analysis of conditionals with deontic modals in the consequent (see Kolodny and MacFarlane, 2010; Charlow, 2010, for discussion in connection with CIs).

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his preferences are, or about what his preferences would amount to in case the world is, or turns out to be, in a particular way. What he is uncertain about is just which of these ways the world will turn out. I take this to be the correct description of the relation between speaker beliefs and preferences in the given scenario. Note that, under these assumptions, the epistemic authority condition is not violated.

6.2.3 Modal Subordination At first glance, the CCO-construal for CIs seems to be challenged by the apparent impossibility of interpreting imperatives in the scope of overt operators of epistemic necessity or possibility. In this section, I will show that such a construal is needed independently to capture imperatives in contexts of modal subordination (Roberts, 1987, 1989; see also the discussion in Section 2.2.3 above). Consider first (58a), a classical example that involves two epistemic modals operators. (58)

a. b.

A wolfi might come in. Iti would eat you first. A wolfi might come in. Iti has already eaten.

The first sentence of (58a) introduces a hypothetical (non-specific) wolf, and the modal would in the second sentence allows its prejacent to be interpreted with respect to this hypothetical situation. On this non-specific reading, i.e. when the speaker fails to have in mind a particular wolf, the pronoun would fail to find a referent in the actual situation. In the absence of a modal, the pronoun can indeed only be anaphoric to a specific indefinite, i.e. if it introduces a wolf that happens to be part of the actual situation (cf. (58b)). Now consider the German and English data in (59) and (60).44 Vielleicht bringt ja Maria einen Weini mit. Dann stell ihni wine along. then put.I MP S G it perhaps brings DP RT Maria a einstweilen in den Kühlschrank. in-the-meantime in the fridge ‘Mary might bring some winei with her. In that case, put it in the fridge for the time being.’

(59)

44 It might look suspicious that the presence of an anaphoric element (dann/in that case) is strongly preferred; but this constitutes a general preference to be observed with non-epistemic modals (cf. (i)). In contrast to that, epistemic modals do not require anaphoric elements (cf. (ic)).

(i)

a. b. c.

Mary might buy a lottery ticketi . Bill is such a careful guy, # he should keep iti . Mary might buy a lottery ticketi . In that case, since Bill is such a careful guy, he should keep iti . You should buy a lottery ticketi . You are such a lucky guy, iti might be worth millions.

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Ede might make lasagnei tonight. ??? /ok (In that case) try iti , he’s an excellent cook.

In these cases the imperatives have to be evaluated with respect to a subset of the context set which is introduced by an independent sentence and picked up again by the anaphoric in that case/dann. Again, the preferences of the speaker can be characterized globally, for example as containing ‘we don’t drink warm wine’ (for (59)) and ‘the addressee does not miss out on culinary highlights’ (for (60)). So, both CIs and modal subordination allow for imperatives to be evaluated at subsets of the context set. They also share the restriction that the set of worlds considered by the imperative may not be shifted away from the context set. CIs can only be indicative conditionals; the antecedent may not lead away from the context set to evaluate the imperative with respect to unrealistic possibilities. Counterfactual CIs like (61) are strictly unacceptable. (61)

∗ If

your mother were stricter, brush your teeth more often!

Similarly, for modal subordination negation can sometimes render salient its (positive) prejacent proposition, enabling sequences as in ((62a)), cf. Geurts (1999). But again, this means that the modally subordinated sentence has to be evaluated w.r.t. worlds outside of the context set. Imperatives are unacceptable in such circumstances, cf. (62b). (62)

a. b.

I don’t have a microwave oven. I wouldn’t know what to do with it. I don’t have a microwave oven. # Don’t use it!

Without providing a formal account for the modally subordinated imperatives,45 I want to point out that the obvious similarity between prioritizing modals and imperatives constitutes further support for the modal operator analysis of imperatives. Also, the necessity of evaluating imperatives with respect to subsets of the context set that are individuated by the preceding linguistic context lends further support to the CCO-construal for CIs.

6.2.4 Conclusion In this section, I have shown that CIs can fall into any of the three major types of conditionals. In particular, CIs can constitute hypothetical conditionals, which are standardly analyzed as positing a particular relation between the truth of the antecedent and the truth of the consequent. I have shown that the modal operator analysis for imperatives allows for a natural integration of CIs into standard analyses of conditionals. In particular, it renders available two construals of the Kratzerstyle semantics of conditionals: either, the imperative operator itself constitutes the 45 Schwager (2006a) sketches a DRT-solution with discourse referents for sets of worlds as described by conversational backgrounds.

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operator that gets restricted by the antecedent (overt conditional operator construal, OCO), or the imperative is part of the consequent which is embedded under a covert epistemic modal that itself is restricted by the antecedent (covert conditional operator construal, CCO). While the choice between the two is largely up for discussion, I have pointed out that modal subordination of imperatives clearly provides an argument that something like CCO is needed independently: imperatives are sometimes evaluated with respect to hypothetical (yet realistic) possibilities. More generally, the possibility of imperatives being subject to modal subordination provides independent support for an analysis that assimilates imperatives to prioritizing modals.

6.3 Conditional Conjunctions and Disjunctions In this section I will look at imperatives that are conjoined or disjoined with declaratives and seem to be interpreted like conditionals.46 One or both of these constructions are attested at least for English, German, Dutch, Spanish, Modern Greek, Russian, Polish, and Georgian.47 In particular, conjunctions and disjunctions tend to receive a conditional-like interpretation when the first coordinand48 is imperative in clause type, and the second declarative. (63a) and (63b) are felt to express something similar, and so are (64a) and (64b). In the following, I call the conjunctions IaD (imperative and declarative), and the disjunctions IoD (imperative or declarative). (63)

a. b.

Be on time and you’ll get a seat. If you are on time, you will get a seat.

IaD

(64)

a. b.

Be on time or you’ll miss the first slot. If you are not on time, you will miss the first slot.

IoD

With von Fintel and Iatridou (2009), I will distinguish between two types of IaDs (Type I IaDs and Type II IaDs). In Section 6.3.1 I will draw on arguments from the literature as well as novel observations to show that Type II IaDs are truly conditional, but that IoDs are more like standard imperatives backed by information about what happens if the imperative is (not) complied with. The arguments will at 46 The first detailed studies are Bolinger (1967) for English, and Saltveit (1973) for German (cf. Davies, 1986; Clark, 1993; Hamblin, 1987; Han, 2000; Asher and Lascarides, 2003a; Krifka, 2004c; Franke, 2005; Mastop, 2005; Russell, 2007; van Rooij and Franke, 2010; von Fintel and Iatridou, 2009; Scontras and Gibson, 2010, for further discussion and various accounts). von Fintel and Iatridou (2009) offer an excellent overview over various approaches. Franke (2005), von Fintel and Iatridou (2009), and Scontras and Gibson (2010) raise interesting issues with respect to previous versions of the work presented in this chapter. These concerns will be addressed in the following, but for some of them I’m currently still unable to provide a fully satisfactory answer. 47

Languages that do not seem to allow for either include Japanese and Malagasy. Korean has a construction closely related to a conditional conjunction which I will briefly discuss in Section 6.3.2. 48

Term adopted from Haspelmath (2005).

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the same time confirm the status of Type I IaDs as different from Type II IaDs (and actually more similar to IoDs). The phenomenon of conditional coordinations is not confined to imperatives in the first coordinand: conditional readings for English conjunctions have been discussed most extensively in Culicover and Jackendoff (1997b), who call them left subordinating ‘and’ (abbreviated as LS and). They arise for conjunctions of two declaratives (cf. (65a)), of NPs and declaratives (cf. (65b)), and of declaratives containing the sufficiency modal construction49 and declaratives (cf. (65c)). (65)

a. b. c.

You enter a Starbucks and you run into Ede. One more coffee and I’m not going to sleep for the entire night. Cécile only has to take a look at me and she knows what I’m thinking.

Conditional disjunctions can also occur with unmodalized declaratives, with NPs, or with modalized declaratives. (66)

a. b. c.

You hand in your paper now or you get kicked out of the program. Coffee or I’ll fall asleep. You must hand in this paper immediately or you’ll get kicked out of the program.

While the resemblance of conjunction and conditional comes as a surprise, the similarity between disjunction and conditional may seem more natural. It is tempting to try to reduce it to the familiar equivalence of classical propositional logic as exemplified in (67): (67)

P → Q ≡ ¬P ∨ Q

I agree with the major part of the literature that this surface similarity is not sufficient for explaining IoDs. The intuition that IaDs (and the examples in (65)) are more similar to conditionals than to ordinary conjunctions is justified by the lack of entailment of the declarative conjunct, cf. (68a). In this respect IaDs differ clearly from ordinary conjunctions, cf. (68b). (68)

a. b.

Call your supervisor and he’ll help you with the binding data. → Your supervisor will help you with the binding data. I will call my supervisor and I will help Mary with the binding data. → I will help Mary with the binding data.

Apart from the conditional-like instances, pragmatics and world knowledge permitting, conjunctions of imperatives and declaratives can also constitute conjoined speech acts. As we have already seen in Section 2.2.1, speech acts can be conjoined with each other quite freely. I follow Krifka (2001), who treats speech act conjunction as subsequent performance of the respective conjuncts. (69a) and (70a) 49

Cf. von Fintel and Iatridou (2007).

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constitute two German examples for which an interpretation in terms of speech act conjunction (made explicit in (69b) and (70b), respectively) is more likely than an IaD-interpretation. (69)

a.

b.

(70)

a.

b.

Kauf du das Brot, und Hans soll den Wein mitbringen. buy.I MP S G you the bread, and Hans shall the wine bring ‘You buy the bread, and Hans should bring the wine.’ Ich bitte dich, das Brot zu kaufen, und ich ordne an, dass Hans I ask you, the bread to buy, and I order VP RT that Hans den Wein mitbringen soll. the wine bring should ‘I ask you to buy the bread, and I order that Hans bring the wine.’ Geht schon mal nach Hause, und ich räume hier noch ein go.I MP P L already QP RT to home, and I clean here still a bißchen auf. bit up ‘You (all) go home, I’ll do some cleaning up here.’ schon nach Hause zu gehen, und ich Ich empfehle euch, and I I suggest you.2P L already to home to go, verspreche euch, hier noch ein bißchen aufzuräumen. promise you.2P L here still a bit to-clean ‘I suggest that you go home, and I promise you to do some cleaning up here.’

In contrast, the examples in (71) can only be understood as conditional conjunctions, i.e. as IaDs. For (71a), this is ensured by pragmatic properties, namely that the state of affairs described by the second conjunct is contextually dispreferred.50 For (71b), this is ensured by a syntactic or semantic property, namely the presence of a negative polarity item. (71)

a. b.

Be late and you’ll lose your job! = I order you to come late, and I assert that you’ll lose your job. Come any closer and I’ll shoot! = I order you to come (∗ any) closer, and I assert that I’ll shoot.

The properties that give rise to a truly conditional interpretation of IaDs will be discussed in more detail in Section 6.3.1. The neat distinction between speech act conjunctions like (69) and (70) and truly conditional IaDs (that is, Type II IaDs) is blurred by examples like (72) (such examples have been pointed out by Asher and Lascarides, 2003a; Franke, 2005): (72)

Mow the lawn, please, and I’ll give you 50 euros.

50 To be precise, its conditional nature is context dependent: it could be understood as a speech act conjunction in a context in which losing one’s job is a preferable course of events.

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The example in (72) can be used naturally to ask the addressee to mow the lawn (that is, the imperative conjunct is used for a R EQUEST) and to promise her 50 euros in case she complies with the imperative. That is, in contrast to the speech act conjunctions in (69a) and (70a), the second conjunct depends on whether the imperative is complied with. At the same time, and in contrast to the IaDs in (71), the imperative does not merely introduce a condition for the truth of the second conjunct, but seems to be used for an independent speech act. With von Fintel and Iatridou (2009), I will call these Type I IaDs and reserve Type II IaDs for the truly conditional examples. The status assigned to Type I IaDs (in particular, whether they are to be treated in the same way as the examples in (71)) influences the view people take on IaDs in general. For reasons that will become apparent in Section 6.3.1, I assume that the conditional flavor in Type I and Type II IaDs respectively is derived differently. In particular, I propose to analyze Type I IaDs like (72) as instances of speech act conjunction combined with modal subordination.51 The decision to treat examples like (72) as a particular type of speech act conjunction rather than as a particular type of conditional conjunction is corroborated by Scontras and Gibson’s (2010) recent empirical investigations of instances of conjunctions between imperatives and declaratives in English.52 Disjoining speech acts is marginal if possible at all (see Section 2.2.1). Therefore, disjunctions of imperatives and declaratives give rise to less ambiguity between conditional and ordinary coordinations than conjunctions of imperatives and declaratives. An example of a German speech act correction that is composed of a disjunction of an imperative and a declarative is given in (73):

51 This follows a suggestion by Han (2000) for a slightly different set of data. A brief introduction to modal subordination is given in Section 6.2.3 above. The same approach to examples like (72) is taken by Russell (2007). See von Fintel and Iatridou (2009) for critical discussion of the modal subordination approach to Type I IaDs. They point out two problems. On the one hand, imperatives and modals differ as to whether modal subordination in conjunctions is possible, cf. (i) (their (21), with judgement for the IaD reading; both a construal as a conditional conjunction between two declaratives and a construal as an ordinary conjunction is fine).

(i)

a. b.

Invest in this company and you will become rich. have to/must/should invest in this company and you will become rich.

∗ /?? You

On the other hand, Type I IaDs differ from both sequences of the type ‘imperative. modalized declarative’ and ‘modalized declarative. modalized declarative’ with respect to polarity switch and choice of will/would. In the asynthetic constructions imperatives and modalized declaratives behave alike. Surely, more work needs to be done to properly understand these facts but I think that one should not dismiss a priori the possibility that modal subordination is influenced by the particular modal flavors involved and by the presence of the overt conjunction. 52 See also Clark (1993) for an earlier position that the class of surface conjunctions between imperatives and declarative in English with a conditional flavor should not be conceived of as homogeneous; see more recently Russell (2007). von Fintel and Iatridou (2009) argue in favor of a uniform account for Type I and Type II IaDs.

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Lies noch ein paar Artikel, oder eigentlich kannst du read.I MP S G P RT a couple articles, or actually can you gleich heimgehen. immediately go.home ‘Read some more articles, or, actually, you can go home immediately.’

Intonation and particles (like German eigentlich in (73), in this context roughly ‘now that I think about it’) can enforce an interpretation as speech act correction and even block an alternative IoD construal altogether. In the following, I will be concerned mainly with the conditional interpretations. Speech act conjunctions will be taken into account in connection with grammatical properties that disambiguate between the two readings. In Section 6.3.1 I will first present a series of arguments that Type II IaDs differ from IoDs and Type I IaDs in the above-mentioned sense, that is: Type II IaDs are truly conditional, while Type I IaDs and IoDs involve an imperative followed up by information about the course of events in case the imperative is complied with and not complied with, respectively. In Section 6.3.2 I will discuss the status of the imperative in Type II IaDs (Type I IaD- and IoD-imperatives being uncontroversial) and will propose a tentative analysis for conditional conjunctions. In Section 6.3.3 I will propose an analysis of IoDs that unifies them with other disjunctions.

6.3.1 Comparing Conditional Flavors in IaDs, IoDs, and Speech Act Conjunctions To my knowledge, Davies (1986) is the first to argue systematically that IaDs and IoDs behave differently in various respects. In the following, I will put together arguments from the literature as well as my own observations to corroborate the view that (Type II) IaDs truly express conditionals, while IoDs involve an imperative that is actually issued and backed by information about what would happen in the case it is not complied with. 6.3.1.1 Insertion of Speech Act-Related Elements Discourse particles seem to interact with how utterances manage to fulfill speech acts in given contexts (cf. e.g. Zeevat, 2004). IoDs behave like plain imperatives in that they allow a full range of discourse particles as well as other speech act-related modifiers (e.g. please). In contrast, the imperative conjuncts of Type II IaDs behave like conditional antecedents in that they can’t be modified by speech act-related elements. Insertion of speech act-related elements into Type II IaD-imperatives leads to a loss of the conditional reading in favor of speech act conjunction.53

53 Note that, in particular, a construal as a speech act conjunction with a modally subordinated second conjunct, that is, a Type I IaD, remains possible, too. Compare (72) and the discussion there.

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Culicover and Jackendoff (1997b) discuss this contrast between IoDs and (Type II) IaDs with the example of please, showing that English IoDs, but not (Type II) IaDs tolerate its insertion. In (74), I replicate their observation with the German translation of their example. (74)

a.

b.

dich bitte, oder ich rufe die Polizei. Setz sit-down.I MP S G you(rself) please or I call the police ‘Sit down, please, or I’ll call the police.’ IoD Setz dich bitte, und ich rufe die Polizei. sit-down.I MP S G you(rself) please and I call the police ‘Sit down, please, and I’ll call the police.’ only speech act conjunction; no (Type II) IaD

The loss of the conditional IaD-reading fits the parallel between Type II IaDimperatives and conditional antecedents (cf. (75a)).54 In contrast, IoDs pattern with plain imperatives, which allow the insertion of speech act-related elements (cf. (75b)). (75)

a. b.

If you sit down, (# please), I will call the police. Wenn du dich (# bitte) hinsetzt, rufe ich die Polizei. if you you(rself) (please) sit-down, call I the police

(76)

a. b.

Sit down, please! Setz dich, bitte! sit-down.I MP you(rself) please ‘Sit down, please!’

German

Dutch often employs speech act particles in plain imperatives, which otherwise figure only as highly impolite C OMMANDS. In Type II IaDs, speech act particles are unacceptable. Consider even, which indicates that the requested action is not very costly and turns a plain C OMMAND into a R EQUEST .55

In the following, I will write (Type II) IaDs when referencing literature that does not distinguish between the two types of IaDs. 54 If (75a) is acceptable at all, the speech act-related element in the antecedent causes the conditional to get the same reading as the speech act conjunction, i.e. the antecedent is used to perform a request. This draws on the possibility of using conditional antecedents as substitutes for imperatives, cf. (ia) and its German translation (ib). This is mentioned in Boogaart and Trnavac (2004). For German, it was pointed out to me independently by Jürgen Lenerz (p.c.).

(i)

a. b.

If you would/could please sit down! Wenn du dich jetzt bitte hinsetzen würdest. . . if you you(rself) now please sit-down would

In contrast to imperatives, the constructions in (i) have the flavor of elliptical sentences as if they were to be followed by something like that would be good/better (for instance, they don’t allow a lower boundary tone). 55

Boogaart and Trnavac (2004) discuss related examples showing that overt subject pronouns are marginal in Dutch IaDs while they are fully acceptable in plain imperatives.

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b.

227

Hang de was even buiten. hang.I MP the laundry P RT outside ‘Hang the laundry outside.’ (implying: it does not cost much to do so) Hang de was (∗ even) buiten en het begint te regenen. hang.I MP the laundry (P RT ) outside and it starts to rain ‘Hang the laundry outside and it will start raining.’ Dutch

The same contrast between Type II IaDs and IoDs arises with respect to devices that, in plain imperatives, are used to emphasize the respective R EQUEST, C OMMAND , WISH , etc. Han (2000:173f) observes that plain imperatives, but not (Type II) IaDs, allow for do-support:56 (78)

a. b.

Do open the Guardian. open the Guardian, and you’ll find three misprints on every page.

# Do

Again, we can add that conditionals pattern with (Type II) IaDs, while IoDs pattern with plain imperatives. (79)

a. b.

# If

you do open the Guardian, you’ll find three misprints on every page. Do open the Guardian, or you’ll never know what’s going on in the world.

Culicover and Jackendoff (1997b) point out that tag-questions are unacceptable in IaDs (cf. (80a)), just as in conditionals (cf. (80b)). In contrast, they are fully acceptable in IoDs (cf. (80c)), and, of course, in plain imperatives (cf. (80d)). (80)

a. b. c. d.

Sit down, will you, and I’ll call the police. # If you sit down, will you, I will call the police. Sit down, will you, or I’ll call the police. Sit down, will you.

not: (Type II) IaD IoD

A related mechanism can be observed in Georgian, which expresses emphasis on an imperative (used to convey a strong C OMMAND or very intense R EQUEST) by doubling of the imperativized verb (Lela Marisa, p.c.). Doubling forces a Type II IaD into a (in the respective case pragmatically unobtainable) Type I IaD: (81)

(# iqavi,) iqavi tavaziani da is shen gamogiqenebs. and he you take-advantage-of.D ECL (# be.I MP) be.I MP nice ‘Be nice and he’ll take advantage of you.’ Georgian

56 Scontras and Gibson’s (2010) empirical study disconfirms Han’s judgement that sequences like (78b) are ungrammatical as IaDs. This is in line with my assumption that speech act-related modifiers can appear in speech act conjunctions with modal subordination of the second conjunct, i.e. in Type I IaDs. Moreover, Scontras and Gibson (2010) show that quantificational subjects (another issue Han adduces for the particular status of the imperatives in conditionally flavored conjunctions) are confined in a similar way. This is particularly interesting as—in contrast to emphatic do-support—quantificational subjects prima facie don’t look like speech act-related modifiers.

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The data considered so far suggest that the imperative coordinand of an IoD and of Type I IaDs is used to perform a speech act (i.e., it tolerates the speech act-related modifications). Apparently, the imperative coordinand of a Type II IaD is not, it behaves more like a conditional antecedent.

6.3.1.2 Evidence from the Syntactic or Semantic Side Binding Properties Culicover and Jackendoff (1997b) observe that English IaDs enable quantifier binding from the second (declarative) conjunct into the first. The data are the same in German, cf. (82a). This is exactly parallel to binding from the consequent into the antecedent in conditionals, cf. (82b). (82)

a.

b.

Sei nett zu ihmi und jeder Politikeri hilft dir. be.I MP nice to him and each politician helps you ‘Be nice to himi and each politiciani will help you.’ Wenn du nett zu ihmi bist, hilft dir jeder Politikeri . if you nice to him are, helps you every politician ‘If you are nice to himi every politiciani will help you.’

Non-conditional coordinations only allow for binding from the first into the second conjunct. Dynamic approaches capture this by evaluating the second coordinand in an environment that is affected by the first. Consider the coordinations in (83): (83)

a.

b.

Jeder Politiker j hielt eine lange Rede und/oder seinei each politician held a long speech and/or his Mitarbeiter verteilten Geschenke. members-of-staff distributed presents ‘Each politician held a long speech, and/or his members of staff distributed presents.’ ok: i = j verteilten Geschenke, und/oder jeder Seinei Mitarbeiter his members-of-staff distributed presents and/or each Politiker j hielt eine lange Rede. politician held a long speech ∗i = j

That is, (Type II) IaDs differ from ordinary conjunctions with respect to the direction in which quantifier binding is possible: the imperative conjunct behaves like the antecedent of a conditional, the declarative conjunct like the consequent of a conditional. In contrast, IoDs disallow binding from the second disjunct into the first and marginally allow for binding from the first into the second. In this respect, IoDs are more like ordinary (i.e., non-conditional) coordinations. (84)

a.

Schick ihmi einen Bericht, oder jeder Projektleiter j glaubt du send.I MP him a report or every project-leader thinks you bist faul. are lazy ‘Send himi a report or every project leader j thinks you are lazy.’ ∗ i= j

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229

Schick jedem Projektleiteri einen Bericht, oder eri glaubt du bist send.I MP every project.leader a report or he thinks you are faul. lazy ‘Send a report to every project leader or he thinks you are lazy.’ ? i = j

NPI Licensing Bolinger (1967) and Davies (1986) note that, like conditional antecedents, IaD imperatives can contain NPIs. Plain imperatives57 and IoDs can’t.58 (85)

a. b. c. d.

Come any closer, and I’ll shoot. If you come any closer, I will shoot. ∗ Come any closer. ∗ Come any closer, or you won’t see anything.

The same facts hold for other languages, e.g. German. The examples in (86) translate those in (85) respectively. (86)

a.

b.

c. d.

auch nur einen Schritt näher, und ich schieße. Komm come.I MP S G even only one step closer and I shoot ‘Come any closer and I’ll shoot.’ Wenn Du auch nur einen Schritt näher kommst, schieße ich. if you even only one step closer come shoot I ‘If you come any closer, I will shoot.’ ∗ Komm auch nur einen Schritt näher! come.I MP S G even only one step closer! ∗ Komm

auch nur einen Schritt näher, oder du siehst nichts. come.I MP even only one step closer, or you see nothing

Again, the imperative coordinand of a Type II IaD behaves like the antecedent of a conditional, while the one of an IoD behaves like a plain imperative. 6.3.1.3 Positive, Negative and Neutral Interpretations Clark (1993) points out that at least some IaDs allow for positive, negative, and neutral interpretations. They differ according to whether the IaD is meant as an incentive to carry out the respective action, whether the IaD is meant as an incentive to not do so, or whether the IaD merely serves to point out the respective correlation. Natural examples of positive, negative, and neutral interpretation are exemplified by the following German examples and their English translations. 57

Under an appropriate intonation, namely as a T HREAT , (85c) (and likewise (86c)) is possible. But note that this requires a particular intonation which indicates ellipsis. It can only be followed by an instance of ‘and declarative’ as in (85a), which renders that particular use of plain imperatives similar to IaDs (cf. Franke, 2005, for a similar view).

58

The examples in (85) are taken from Han (2000).

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6 Embedding Imperatives

a.

b.

c.

Geh einen Schritt nach hinten und wir haben alle mehr Platz. go.I MP one step to back and we have all more space ‘Take a step backwards and we all have more space.’ Geh einen Schritt nach hinten und du fliegst die Treppe runter. go.I MP one step to back and you fly the stairs down ‘Take a step backwards and you’ll fall down the stairs.’ Schlag die Zeitung auf und du findest 5 Tippfehler pro Seite. per page open.I MP the newspaper P RT and you find 5 typos ‘Open the newspaper and you’ll find 5 typos on each page.’

While an utterance of (87a) is most likely meant as a R EQUEST to take a step backwards, (87b) is more of a WARNING not to. (87c) is most likely completely neutral as to whether one should open the newspaper or not. The respective interpretation depends only on whether the consequence is taken to be desirable or not. Note that it is not possible to determine if positive IaDs like (87a) belong to Type I or Type II. While speech act-related modifiers disambiguate in favor of a Type I construal (see Section 6.3.1.1), binding from the second conjunct into the first, or licensing of NPIs disambiguate in favor of the truly conditional Type II construal. Consequently, examples that involve phenomena of both sorts are predicted to be unacceptable. The issue merits further empirical investigation, but as far as I can tell it is correct at least for German. The insertion of the speech act-related particle bitte ‘please’ in (88) blocks the licensing of the minimizer-NPI auch nur einen Handgriff tun (roughly:) ‘to lift a finger’; a speech act related particle like doch (roughly: ‘as you should be able to see yourself’) blocks binding from the second into the first conjunct in (89): (88)

(# bitte) auch nur einen Handgriff und wir werden rechtzeitig Tu and we get in-time do.I MP S G (please) M INIMIZER fertig. ready ‘(# Please) lift a finger and we’ll be ready in time.’

(89)

ihmi doch eine Chance und jeder Professor j ist hilfreich. Gib give.I MP S G him DP RT a chance and every professor is helpful roughly: ‘Give him a chance, really, and every professor will be helpful.’ ∗ i = j (but ok i = j in the absence of doch)

IoDs, on the other hand, only allow for a positive usage (cf. Clark, 1993). (90)

a.

b.

Hau ab oder ich schrei laut um Hilfe. go.I MP S G away or I scream loud for help ‘Get away from here or I’ll scream for help!’ # Go home or I’ll make you a nice dinner. = Stay! (Because,) if you don’t go home, I’ll make you a nice dinner.

This falls out naturally if the imperative coordinand in an IoD is treated like a plain imperative followed by an indication of what happens in case of non-compliance. An approach along these lines is spelled out in Section 6.3.3.

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Apart from intuitions, the availability of truly neutral readings can be tested by the consideration of ‘imperative and/or declarative’ sequences with mutually contradictory imperatives. The felicity of the examples in (91)–(93) proves that IaDs can be truly neutral: (91)

Mißtraue einem Menschen, und die deutlichsten Anzeichen der Treue werden geradezu Zeichen der Untreue sein, traue ihm, und handgreifliche Beweise der Untreue werden zu Zeichen einer verkannten, wie ein von den Erwachsenen ausgesperrtes Kind weinenden Treue. (Musil, Tonka) ‘Mistrust a person and the most obvious signs of his faithfulness will turn into signs of his unfaithfulness; trust him, and the clearest signs of his unfaithfulness will turn into signs of an unrecognized faithfulness that is crying like a child locked out by the adults.’

(92)

Tell her you love her, and she’ll do anything. Don’t tell her and you won’t get very far.

(93)

(context: What should you say if someone comes from the state television company and asks if you own a television set?) Say no and he’ll go away for a while. Say yes and he will order you to pay. Over and over again. http://thejapanfaq.cjb.net

Such sequences are impossible with IoDs, or rather, they are just as contradictory as the corresponding plain imperatives (cf. (94)).59 Consider (95) and (96), which should be alternative ways of expressing the information in (92) and (93), respectively, if IoDs could be neutral. (94)

# Tell

(95)

# Don’t

her you love her. Don’t tell her.

tell her you love her, or she’ll do anything. Tell her, or you won’t get very far.

59

Franke (2005) claims that IoDs can also have neutral interpretations and adduces the example in (i) as evidence. (i)

Speak at least six different languages or you are not a cosmopolitan.

I agree that (i) need not constitute a C OMMAND to acquire knowledge of at least six languages. Yet, the infelicity of a sequence like (iia) shows that it can’t be entirely neutral either. Obviously, speaking six different languages and being a cosmopolitan is still judged as something positive. In contrast, a corresponding IaD-sequence as in (iib) is felicitous. (ii)

a. b.

# Speak more than five languages or you are not a cosmopolitan. Don’t speak more than five languages or you are a snob. Speak more than five languages and you are a cosmopolitan. Don’t speak more than five languages and you are a normal human being.

Note that at least is unacceptable in the first conjunct of a neutral IaD. I have thus replaced it with more than, which by itself doesn’t change the rather neutral flavor of (i). The unacceptability of at least in IaDs merits further investgation.

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# Sag ja, oder der Typ kommt immer wieder. Sag nein, say.I MP S G yes, or the guy comes always again. say.I MP S G no, oder du musst zahlen. or you must pay # ‘Say yes, or he’ll come over and over again. Say no, or he will order you to pay.’

Neither English nor German allow the sequences to be replaced by IoDs. From this, we may conclude that IaDs can be truly neutral, whereas IoDs can’t. Unsurprisingly, speech act conjunctions with modally subordinated second conjuncts behave like IoDs in this respect. Speech act-related modifiers in conjunctions of imperatives and declaratives enforce the speech act conjunction reading and give rise to conflicting sequences even if the declarative conjunct is understood as modally subordinated: (97)

bitte ja, und der Typ kommt immer wieder. Sag # Sag say.I MP S G please yes, or the guy comes always again. say.I MP S G bitte nein, und du musst zahlen. please no, or you must pay # ‘Please say yes and he’ll come over and over again. Please say no and he will order you to pay.’

This finding further confirms the difference between Type I and Type II IaDs.60 6.3.1.4 Conclusion In this section we have seen that Type II IaDs differ from IoDs in that the former are similar to true conditionals, whereas the latter are more similar to plain imperatives. Imperatives in IoDs are assigned a proper, imperative specific speech act type, imperatives in Type II IaDs are not. These differences are evidenced by the insertion of speech act-related elements, licensing of NPIs and quantifier binding, as well as the availability of positive, negative and neutral interpretations. In all these respects, conjunctions of imperatives and declaratives in which the imperative is modified by a speech act-related element (e.g. please/bitte or speech act particles) behave like IoDs, even if the examples in question retain a conditional

60

Han (2000) argues that German and Modern Greek do not allow for truly conditional IaDs (that is, Type II IaDs). According to her, all apparent instances of IaDs in these languages constitute speech act conjunctions with modal subordination. She acknowledges the existence of negative IaDs in German and Modern Greek and argues that they have to be treated as ironic or sarcastic ways of speaking. The contrast between (93) and the variants in (96) and (97) as well as the corresponding plain imperative sequences shows that at least for German this analysis can’t be maintained. If ironic or sarcastic interpretation could account for the acceptability of sequences like (93), it would remain unclear why the same mechanism should be unavailable for IoDs or plain imperatives, as well as why it should be blocked by speech-act modifiers like bitte ‘please’.

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dependence between the first and second conjuncts. I consider this evidence in favor of treating Type I IaDs as speech act conjunctions with modal subordination.

6.3.2 Towards an Analysis of Type II IaDs In Section 6.3.1 I established that Type II IaDs express conditionals. This immediately raises two questions. First, it is unclear why conjunctions can be read as conditionals and why neither of the conjuncts is entailed (or, used). Above I have argued that in Type I IaDs speech act conjunction together with modal subordination also gives rise to a conditional effect for the second conjunct. For example, (72) (repeated as (98)) usually doesn’t entail that the speaker will give the addressee 50 euros, but rather that the speaker will give the addressee 50 euros in case the addressee mows the lawn: (98)

Mow the lawn, please, and I’ll give you 50 euros.

Extended to Type II IaDs like (99), an analysis in terms of modal subordination would correctly derive the hypothetical status of the second conjunct. But it would fail to account for the status of the imperative conjunct that is not used to perform any speech act in itself but instead to contribute the antecedent of a conditional. (99)

Take a step to the left and you’ll fall down the stairs.

Hence, an analysis of Type II IaDs faces the following challenge: Issue 6.1 The Type II IaD-Puzzle (Part 1) Where does the hypotheticality of both conjuncts come from? Note that an analogous problem arises for the other instances of conditional conjunctions (cf. the examples in (65)). Second, if clause types are encoded semantically (as I argued in Section 1.1.3), we have to explain what happens to the semantic contribution of the imperative (on my account: to the necessity operator). The conditional reading obtained for a Type II IaD seems to ignore any contribution of the imperative clause type: the condition under which the second conjunct comes about includes neither a necessity modal, nor the description of a speech act that might result from using the imperative. The conditional reading is not equivalent to (100a) or (100b) but to (100c). (100)

Come one step closer and I’ll shoot. a. If I order you to come one step closer, I’ll shoot. b. If you have to come one step closer, I’ll shoot. c. If you come one step closer, I’ll shoot.

Issue 6.2 The Type II IaD-Puzzle (Part 2) Where does the semantic contribution of the imperative go?

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Again, an analogous problem besieges conditional conjunctions with sufficiency modals. (101) (repeated from (65c)) is understood as (101a) and not as (101b): (101)

Cécile only has to take a look at me and she knows what I’m thinking. a. If Cécile takes a look at me, she knows what I’m thinking. b. If Cécile only has to take a look at me, she knows what I’m thinking.

Pseudo-Imperatives It is tempting to solve Part 2 of the Type II IaD-Puzzle by assuming that Type II IaDs do not contain true imperatives, but pseudo-imperatives (Clark, 1993) that lack (part of) the meaning encoded by imperatives.61 Han (2000) argues that all English IaDs contain pseudo-imperatives that lack a decisive part of the meaning assigned to ‘real’ (plain) imperatives.62 She motivates her claim by adducing a series of arguments that are supposed to show that the first conjuncts of IaDs differ from plain imperatives. For some of these arguments it is hard to assess if the difference between Type II IaD-imperatives and plain imperatives is really a difference between two forms, or if it is just an artefact of the different environments they occur in. For example, emphatic do has already been singled out as requiring the imperative to perform a speech act (thus giving rise to speech act conjunction instead of a conditional interpretation).63 At the same time, NPI licensing may depend on an imperative’s occurrence in a structure that receives a conditional interpretation, rather than the allegedly impoverished nature of the IaD-imperative (similarly for quantifier binding into the imperative, which is not mentioned in Han’s list).64

61

Boogaart and Trnavac (2004) report two different types of IaD-like constructions in Russian, namely Conditional Imperative Constructions (CIC) and Conditional Directive Imperative Constructions (CDIC). CICs are truly hypothetical (like English and German Type II IaDs), but they also allow for counterfactual conditionals and are more liberal with respect of the predicate employed. In particular, they allow for impersonal predicates. This suggests that the equivalent of Type II IaDs in Russian may indeed contain a verbal form different from an imperative; cf. Boogaart and Trnavac (2004) for details. 62

Clark (1993) argues that this holds only for some of the English IaDs.

63

In view of Scontras and Gibson’s (2010) findings, it could be that the acceptability of quantificational subjects is likewise constrained. Clearly, the data merit closer inspection in connection with other factors that disambiguate between IaDs and speech act conjunctions.

64 Han mentions two more differences, neither of which I find convincing: first, the alleged impossibilty for strings like (ia) to occur as plain imperatives, while they are felicitous as IaD-imperatives (Davies, 1986).

(i)

a. b.

? Know the answer. Know the answer, and you’ll get an A.

I argued in Section 1.1.3 that such a judgement is an artefact of the attempt to interpret (ia) as a C OMMAND or R EQUEST (see also Section 4.1.3). The predicate in question simply does not square well with the felicity conditions of these speech acts (in particular, that the state of affairs is under the control of the addressee). Nevertheless, such imperatives are perfectly acceptable as

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235

Han’s most convincing arguments that English IaD-imperatives differ from plain imperatives concern the possibility of past reference (cf. (102b) from Clark, 1993; (103) for a naturally occurring example); as well as the degradedness of negated IaD-imperatives (cf. (104), from Han, 2000).65 W ISHES or A BSENT W ISHES. Hence, lexical restrictions do not reveal interesting differences between IaD-imperatives and plain imperatives. Second, generic subjects are said to be grammatical in IaD-imperatives, but not plain imperatives (noted by Clark, 1993). In this respect, German and English are not claimed to differ. I would assume that the issue should be dealt with at the semantics-pragmatics interface rather than taking it as evidence that Type II IaD-imperatives differ formally from plain imperatives. In principle, second person pronouns can obtain generic interpretations both in English and in German. But it seems that a generic interpretation of the subject conflicts with the presupposition that plain imperatives spell out optimality with respect to the acknowledged criteria for solving the contextually relevant decision problem or the speaker’s wishes (see Section 4.2.3). Generic interpretations are equally hard to obtain for overtly modalized sentences like (iia) or attitude embeddings like (iib) if the modality in question fits the presuppositions of an imperative. (ii)

a.

b.

Du sollst den Abwasch machen. you should the dishes do ‘You should do the dishes.’; not: ‘One should do the dishes.’ Ich will, dass du umweltbewusst lebst. I want that you environmentally-conscious live ‘I want you to live in an environmentally conscious way.’; not: ‘I want people to live in an environmentally conscious way.’

The only instances in which such a conduct-guiding modality is interpreted generically are proverbs, e.g. (iii): (iii)

immer Treu und Redlichkeit. Üb exercise.I MP always faithfulness and rightfulness ‘Always be faithful and good.’

No such conflict arises for the modality involved in Type II IaDs, see the discussion below. Hence, I assume that the availability of generic subjects depends on pragmatic factors and does not provide evidence for the existence of pseudo-imperatives. 65

Both observations would square well with Russell’s (2007) recent thesis that all truly conditional IaDs in English involve bare VPs instead of imperatives. Yet, the alleged impossibility of don’timperatives requires further study. Consider the example in (92), which was judged acceptable by all my informants. Also, neither Russell (2007) (pace his own analysis of Type II IaDs as containing bare VPs) nor von Fintel and Iatridou (2009) consider negated Type II IaDs unacceptable. The cases with past reference are harder to test, as they seem to be limited to narrative contexts, which are generally known to allow for non-standard behavior of temporal devices, consider (i): (i)

Morgen war Weihnachten. tomorrow was Christmas

Maybe (102b) and (103) can be accounted for as not involving proper past reference, but contemporaneity with a fictitious now. It remains to be explained why imperatives are not generally possible in this type of narrative which may be similar to an inner monologue, for which Banfield (1982) argues that imperatives are banned because no addressee is available. Although the issue has not been investigated in detail, I do think that plain imperatives are still acceptable as proverbs. Apparently the generic interpretation of the subject can obviate the need for an addressee. In that

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(102)

a. *Say one word out of turn in those days. b. Life was hard in those days. Say one word out of turn and they’d dock you a week’s wages.

(103)

[. . .] she was like a child, like an infant, always afraid of missing out on something—but give her a taste of it and she drank like a brewer’s horse. (T.C. Boyle, Riven Rock)

(104)

? Don’t

show up on time, and you’ll miss the beginning of the movie. [judgement from Han (2000)]

The formal status of Type II IaD-imperatives in English may require more thorough empirical testing. But even if it could be shown that Part 2 of the Type II IaD-Puzzle does not arise for English Type II IaDs as they don’t contain true imperatives to begin with, such an analysis is much harder to motivate for a language like German. German IaD-imperatives are formally marked just like plain imperatives. Moreover, in contrast to English, they do not allow for past reference, and negated IaDs are not degraded. Indeed, Han proposes that German (like Modern Greek) has only an IaD-like construction that is better analyzed in terms of speech act conjunction with modal subordination. But I already pointed out that this doesn’t explain why truly neutral interpretations are available for German IaDs (cf. (91)). Moreover, it fails to account for the possibilities of quantifier binding and NPI-licensing (cf. (82a) and (86), respectively).66 Consequently, at least for German Type II IaDs, Part 2 of the puzzle cannot be discarded right away. And remember that even in English the analogous problem would remain open for the only have to-version of conditional conjunctions. Stripping Imperatives at the Semantics-Pragmatics Interface In contrast to an analysis that relies on pseudo-imperatives, Asher and Lascarides (2003a) spell out a

sense, generic IaDs could behave similarly. The difference between English and German could then be explained in terms of whether the imperative’s reference time can be anchored to the fictitious now of the inner monologue (English) or remains tied to the actual utterance time (German). 66 Han (2000) claims NPI-licensing to be impossible in German IaDs. But the somewhat marginal status of her example (ia) depends on the licensing requirements of the particular NPI chosen, which for many speakers (including myself) is equally bad in the antecedent of a conditional, cf. (ib). (i)

a.

b.

? Rühr

einen Finger, um ihr zu helfen, und du wirst es bereuen. lift.I MP S G a finger C OMP her to help, and you will it regret intended: ‘Lift a finger to help her and you will regret it.’ ? Wenn du einen Finger rührst, um ihr zu helfen, wirst du es bereuen. if you a finger lift, C OMP her to help, will you it regret intended: ‘If you lift a finger to help her, you’ll regret it.’

Both IaD and conditional become perfectly acceptable if einen Finger is replaced by the explicitly minimized NPI auch nur einen Finger.

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solution to IaDs at the semantics-pragmatics interface.67 In particular, they propose that the conjunction of an imperative with a declarative triggers an inference to a particular discourse relation that ensures that (i) the imperative is ‘non-veridical’ (i.e., not commanded or requested), and (ii) the declarative is evaluated at worlds where the imperative prejacent is true. If the state of affairs mentioned in the declarative is evaluated as preferable in the given context, the discourse relation is strengthened to one in which the imperative is actually given (i.e., commanded or requested). As it stands, the account seems to face at least two problems. First, the inference to the particular discourse relation depends on the conjunction between imperatives and declaratives; it is not clear what would trigger the conditional effect for other instances of conditional conjunctions, in particular those that involve two declaratives (cf. (65) above). At the same time, not all instances of imperative-declarative conjunctions should be turned into conditionals (cf. speech act conjunctions in (69) and (70)). Second, it is not obvious how such an account at the semantics-pragmatics interface can deal with examples that involve phenomena that seem to depend on an underlying conditional structure, e.g. quantifier binding (cf. (82a)). In short, a purely pragmatic solution to the Type II-IaD Puzzle does not strike me as the most promising way to go. But as I’m not doing full justice to approaches along these lines, see Clark (1993) and Asher and Lascarides (2003a) for the details. Using the Imperative Semantics A third type of proposal tries to make use of the imperative semantics after all. Ideally, the output should be something like (105). (105)

α! ∧ βc ≈ for all stereotypical α-possibilities, β.

The notion of stereotypical α-possibilities has to be flexible enough to allow both for a fully generic interpretation (as most plausible for (78b)), and a prediction about the further development of the actual utterance situation (cf. (106b)). Obviously, the distinction depends on whether a generic interpretation is available for the declarative conjunct. (106)

a. b.

Open the Guardian and you’ll find five misprints on every page. Drink one more beer and I’ll leave.

Of course, the question of whether the mapping in (105) can be derived without totally ignoring the semantics of the imperative relies largely on the interpretation assigned to imperatives in the first place. An interesting proposal along these lines is spelled out by Manfred Krifka in a series of talks (Krifka, 2004a,b,c). He observes two crucial ingredients of IaDs: (i) they involve some sort of genericity (as suggested by (105) above), (ii) the mapping of the first (imperative) conjunct into the restrictor of a conditional seems to 67

An earlier account along these lines is provided in a relevance-theoretic framework by Clark (1993), but matters are slightly complicated by the particular line he draws between pseudo- and real imperatives in conditional-like imperative-declarative conjunctions (see details there).

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be triggered by a particular intonation curve: the first conjunct of all instances of conditional conjunctions is deaccented and the two conjuncts are integrated into one phonological phrase. Now, Krifka assumes that imperatives are interpreted as sentence radicals that, when occurring as plain imperatives, have to be combined with speech act operators. Alternatively, when occurring as the first conjuncts of IaDs, imperatives can be mapped into the restrictor of a generic operator present in these constructions. Due to the impoverished nature of the sentence radical, Krifka’s approach only generates the truly generic reading observed for examples like (78b). Also, it is not clear what triggers the presence of the generic operator, and the account does not carry over to the sufficiency modal construction, where the first conjunct does not constitute a sentence radical. In the following, I propose a translation of Krifka’s idea into my imperative framework.68 In particular, the result will differ in where the conditional operator comes from. I rely again on the analysis of conditionals in the framework of graded modality as introduced in Section 6.2 above. Conditionals are modal sentences, that is, they express quantification over possible worlds individuated by a modal base and an ordering source, where the modal base is further restricted by the antecedent of the conditional. That is, every conditional needs a modal operator, which can be constituted either by an overt modal in the consequent, or by a covert epistemic operator (Kratzer, 1991a). Now, IaDs are not partitioned into an antecedent and a consequent. But according to my analysis of imperatives, they contain a modal operator in the first conjunct. Generally, it has been argued that the domain restriction of a quantifier is determined by information-structural processes rather than strictly by syntactic mechanisms (cf. von Fintel, 1994; Krifka et al., 1995). In particular, topical material tends to figure in the restrictor of a quantifier rather than in its nuclear scope. I would like to propose that such a process turns IaDs into conditionals. As observed by Krifka, LS and comes with a special intonation contour: the imperative conjunct is deaccented, usually a sign of topicality. I propose that this triggers that the entire prejacent of the modal operator in the first conjunct is mapped into the restrictor of the modal operator.69 Let’s first consider information-structural partitioning into domain and restrictor with overt modal verbs. A famous example comes from Halliday (1967), who observes the following message on a sign attached to an escalator, cf. (107a).

68

This section is closely related to joint work with Hans-Martin Gärtner, presented as Gärtner and Schwager (2004). 69 This is maybe too simplistic. von Fintel (1994) argues that the apparent link between topicality and domain restrictions is only an epiphenomenon of the fact that both topical material and the variable assumed to represent the domain restrictor have to be resolved anaphorically. The solution for IaDs I’m proposing in the following could be rewritten to conform to this pragmatic view on domain restrictions. This would also avoid an unusual movement operation (cf. criticism in von Fintel and Iatridou, 2009).

6.3

Conditional Conjunctions and Disjunctions

(107)

a. b.

239

Dogs must be carried. Auf der Rolltreppe müssen Hunde getragen werden. on the escalator must dogs carried get ‘Dogs must be carried on the escalator.’

Like its German equivalent (107b),70 this allows for two different mapping processes and is ambiguous between the two readings in (109).71 (108)

a. b.

[ must [dog(x) & on-this-escalator(x)(e) ][carried(x)(e )]] [ must [on-this-escalator(e) ][dog(x) & carried(x)(e)] ]

The first (unmarked and most likely intended) reading arises if dogs is deaccented, which causes the noun phrase to be mapped onto the restrictor. The second reading is obtained by accenting dogs and mapping the noun phrase onto the nuclear scope. Under standard assumptions about existential closure (cf. Diesing, 1992), the truth conditions for these LFs can be sketched as in (109). (109)

a. b.

(∃e)[dog(x) & on-this-escalator(x)(e) → (∃e )[e ⊆ e & carried(x)(e )]] (∃e)[on-this-escalator(e) → (∃x)(∃e )[dog(x) & e ⊆ e & carried(x)(e )]]

Now, consider imperatives. According to the semantics in (63), an imperative contains a modal operator very much like must. Consequently, we would expect the same readings to be possible. While most examples tend to map indefinites onto the nuclear scope of the quantifier (e.g. (110a)), others indeed favor mapping of indefinites into the restrictor (e.g. (110b)). (110)

a.

b.

dir einen Hund! Kauf dog buy.I MP S G you(rself) a ‘Buy yourself a dog!’ Überleg dir eine Trennung gut! consider.I MP S G you(rself) a separation well ‘Think very hard about a(ny) separation!’

Now consider the IaD in (111a). It seems to be a conjunction of two root sentences, tied together as one intonational unit. This contrasts with ordinary conjunctions of root sentences (e.g. the speech act conjunctions discussed higher up), that allow or

70

I added the locational PP to bring out the ambiguity: without this additional constituent, the choice between realizing the bare NP Hunde ‘dogs’ or an expletive es in preverbal position tends to disambiguate between the two readings. 71 For the sake of explicitness, I assume that the distinction between restriction and nuclear scope manifests itself at LF, but nothing hinges on that. Moreover, for simplicity, modal base and ordering source arguments of the modal verb are left out.

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even require a low boundary tone72 at the end of the first conjunct. For IaDs, a low boundary tone is impossible. Consequently, a low boundary tone blocks binding relations that require a (Type II) IaD construal, cf. (111b). (111)

a. b.

Come in time and you’ll get a seat. nett zu ihmi (L%) und jeder Politiker j wird dir helfen. Sei and every politician will you help be.I MP S G nice to him ∗i = j ‘Be nice to himi and every politician j will help you.’

The structure for (111a) is given in (112). (112)

CP C

CP

(OPImp ) f

C

VP

g

come in time(c A )

CP

& get a seat(c A )

Consider now the information structurally guided splitting into domain vs. restrictor. In analogy to the deaccented indefinite dogs in the unmarked interpretation of (107a), the deaccented material in the first conjunct of the IaD is mapped onto the restrictor. But this constitutes the entire complement proposition of the imperative operator. Consequently, the mapping proceeds as in (113): (113)

CP C

CP1 VP C

CP2

g ti & get a seat(c A ) (OPImp )

mb f + come in time(c A )i

The restrictor mapping movement does not create a binder for the trace; therefore, the trace can be abstracted over at the level of CP1 in order to make it compatible with C’2 . The denotation of CP1 c is given in (114). LS and is not interpreted.73 CP1 is then applied to C’2 which gives (115). 72 73

Low boundary tones are indicated as L%. This follows Pierrehumbert and Beckman (1988).

Note that this is very plausible due to the fact that it can often be substituted for by then, or even left out completely while retaining the conditional interpretation.

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241

(114)

λQλw.(∀w ∈ O(λv.[ f CG(c) (v)∪ λw .c A -comes-in-time(w  )], g, w))[Q(w )].

(115)

λw.(∀w ∈ O(λv.[ f CG(c) (v)∪ λw  .c A -comes-in-time(w  )], g, w))[c A -gets-aseat(w  )].

Basically, the modal operator does not get applied to its prejacent (here, ‘that the addressee comes in time’), but this proposition restricts the set of worlds the imperative operator quantifies over.74 Let us recollect the ingredients of the analysis. The construction conjoins two full CPs. The first conjunct contains a necessity operator and its complement proposition. Due to a lack of boundary intonation, the entire prejacent is interpreted as topical and therefore mapped onto the restrictor of the modal operator. LS and is interpreted as empty and therefore the first CP (after abstracting over the trace in order to avoid type mismatch) can be applied to its sister node C’ which (due to the emptiness of LS and) denotes the proposition expressed by the second conjunct. That is, the construction is assumed to rely on an interplay of • a lack of boundary intonation, • the semantically vacuous LS and, and • the presence of a necessity operator in the first conjunct. In principle, although many of the details need to be worked out, there is hope that the account could carry over to other types of conditional conjunctions (cf. (65)). Consider the contrast in (116) for English ‘declarative and declarative’ (DaD). (116)

a. b.

You come in time and you’ll get a seat. ??? You are coming in time and you’ll get a seat.

Franke (2005) points out that, as they stand, the first conjuncts of DaDs can’t be subsumed under any of the other usages of the English simple present. But under the re-structuring proposed above, both a habitual operator (cf. Krifka et al., 1995) and an operator of metaphysical settledness (cf. Kaufmann, 2005) become possible candidates. I would tentatively assume that both possibilities can be exploited: ((116a) can be read as characterizing a regular pattern of events or as a prediction about a particular event in the future). In contrast, the English progressive is incompatible with either operator and thus fails to give rise to an interpretation as a conditional conjunction.75 The sufficiency modal construction also contains a necessity modal (‘only have to [. . . ] and declarative’). Unfortunately, the interpretation of

74 This mechanism is reminiscent of a proposal made by Gärtner and Endriss (t.a.) and Ebert et al. (t.a.) for verb-second relative clauses. Paul Portner (p.c.) points out the similarity to assumptions in Herburger (2000). 75 Although English behaves nicely in this respect, other languages do not necessarily confirm the hypothesis. For example, Polish distinguishes between imperfective and perfective aspect: it uses imperfective aspect for expressing habituality and genericity. Nevertheless, in DaDs, we only find perfective verbs. I could imagine that in these cases the need to express completion of the action overrides imperfectivity as expressing genericity. It would be interesting to test Bulgarian, which expresses both habitual occurrence of perfective events and closedness of intervals characterized by habitually occuring events, cf. Comrie (1976).

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this construction is in itself far from trivial (von Fintel and Iatridou, 2007). It is not entirely obvious how the mapping proposed above can be extended to these cases to obtain the right truth-conditions. I will not try to offer a solution here, but I consider it to be worth exploring this path in future research. ‘NP and declarative’ (NPaD) constitute elliptical constructions, which pose independent problems. I leave it to further research to determine how they are interpreted. But even for IaDs, the account as it stands is not unproblematic. Firstly, as pointed out by Manfred Krifka (p.c.), one would expect that must could also function as the necessity operator required in the first conjunct of LS and. Nevertheless, this is impossible. (117)

You must come on time and you’ll get a seat. only speech act conjunction

Clearly, the account fails to do justice to the sufficiency component encoded overtly in only have to. Secondly, plain imperatives are restricted to occurrence with prioritizing ordering sources. This is not the interpretation needed when the imperative occurs as an IaD conditional operator. Here, we need a stereotypical ordering source.76 Interestingly, Korean shows a pattern that may help us to obtain a better understanding of the facts and ultimately improve on the IaD-analysis. Han (2000) argues that Korean does not allow for conditional conjunctions of imperatives and declaratives. And indeed, strictly speaking, Korean does not have IaDs, since it doesn’t use a conjunction to express the conditional relation between the imperative and the declarative. But it can employ two root clauses for a similar effect if the second is preceded by kulemyen ‘then’, the element which also introduces the consequent of a conditional. Han (2000) considers these constructions, but claims they are never truly conditional. According to her, all apparent instances of IaDs77 consist of issuing an imperative and modally subordinating the consequent as given 76 Note though that another (mis)prediction depends on the analysis of conditional imperatives like (ib). If one allows for an overt conditional operator construal (OCO) in which it is the imperative operator itself that is constrained by the conditional antecedent, and if IaD-imperatives could carry the same ordering sources ordinary imperatives do, we would expect (ia) to be roughly equivalent to (ib).

(i)

a.

b.

dein Haus und du nimmst einen Schirm mit. Verlass an umbrella with leave.I MP S G your house and you take ‘Leave your house and you take an umbrella with you.’ einen Schirm mit. Wenn du dein Haus verlässt, nimm if you your house leave, take.I MP S G an umbrella along ‘If you leave your house, take an umbrella with you.’

No such equivalence is predicted if non-epistemic modals in the consequent cannot be used as the conditional operator (cf. Frank, 1996), and hence, sentences like (ib) have to be seen as instances of a covert conditional operator construal (CCO) (cf. Kaufmann and Schwager, 2011, for indepndent arguments; also Section 6.2 above). 77 That is, the sequences of the form ‘imperative. then declarative’ that might be the Korean equivalent of other languages’ conditional conjunctions of the form ‘imperative and declarative’.

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in the following declarative (e.g. (118), her (312a)). She points out that sequences as in (119) (her (312d)), where the imperative is clearly not meant as an incentive to fulfill the respective action (that is, it cannot be understood as a C OMMAND , R EQUEST or W ISH), are unacceptable. (118)

Sue-eykey cenhwahay-la. kulemyen Sue-ka cohaha-l.kes.i-ta. then Sue-N OM happy-F UT-D ECL Sue-to call-I MP ‘Call Sue. If you do, she will be happy.’

(119)

# Kamki-ey

kellye-la. kulemyen myechil tongan flu-at catch-I MP then a.few.days for kosayngha-l.kes.i-ta. miserable-F UT-D ECL # ‘Catch the flu! If you do, you will be miserable for days.’

Shin-Sook Kim (p.c.) points out that these constructions become acceptable when modified by a minimizer -man, which is roughly equivalent to ‘only’.78 (120)

Curry-man mek-ki-man mek-ela kulemyen ne-nun cwuk-ul.kes.i-ta curry-only eat-N MLZ-only eat-I MP then you-T OP die-F UT-D ECL ‘Only eat curry, and you’ll die.’

Thus, Korean imperatives resemble English must and German muss in requiring an additional minimizer to express a conditional conjunction. This suggests that Type II IaDs are only possible in languages where imperatives can sometimes be interpreted as expressing sufficiency. And indeed, such an effect is found at least in the for example-A DVICE-imperatives discussed in Section 5.3.79 Moreover, Korean distinguishes two forms of negation that are usually taken to depend on sentential mood, i.e. Korean declaratives are normally negated as in (121a), while imperatives are negated as in (121b) (cf. Sells, 2004). (121)

a.

ka-ci anh-nun-ta go-C OMP N EG-P ROC-D ECL ‘(Someone) doesn’t go.’

78 Note that the focus particle has to associate at least with the verb, and may also target the entire VP. Association with any other constituent under narrow focus does not give rise to an acceptable construction. For (i), association with the verb (that is, R1), vs. the entire VP (that is, R2), is disambiguated by intonation.

(i)

(ii)

hay-la kulemyen ne-nun cwuk-ul.kes.i-ta Curry-lul po-ki-man curry-ACC see-N MLZ-only do-I MP then you-T OP die-F UT-D ECL R1: ‘Only LOOK at curry and you’ll die.’ (You don’t even have to eat it.) R2: ‘Look at curry and you’ll die.’ (You don’t have to do anything else.) ∗ Curry-man mek-ki-man mek-ela kulemyen ne-nun cwuk-ul.kes.i-ta curry-only eat-N MLZ-only eat-I MP then you-T OP die-F UT-D ECL (intended for: ‘Eat only curry [intended: without the rice], and you’ll die.’)

79 The expectation would be that Korean disallows similar occurrences. This remains to be tested empirically.

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b.

c.

ka-ci mal-ala go-C OMP I R N EG-I MP ‘Don’t go!’ ∗ ka-ci anh-ala go-C OMP N EG-I MP

But as I have already pointed out in Section 4.1.2 above, at least declaratives and interrogatives formed from propositions that encode deontic modality involve the imperative-related mal-negation. Hence, the choice of negation doesn’t strictly depend on the clause type but is influenced by the modal flavor of a sentence. Now, if Type II IaD-imperatives involve atypical, non-prioritizing ordering sources, we would expect them to come with the negation that is excluded for plain imperatives. On a first test, this prediction is borne out.80 (122)

a.

b.

amwukesto meki-ci mal-ki-man hay-la kulemyen anything eat-C OMP I R N EG-N MLZ-only do-I MP then ne-nun kwulm-e cwuk-ul.kes.i-ta you-T OP starve.to.death-F UT-D ECL ‘Eat nothing at all and you will die of hunger.’ ? amwukesto meki-ci hay-la kulemyen anh-ki-man anything eat-C OMP N EG-N MLZ-only do-I MP then ne-nun kwulm-e cwuk-ul.kes.i-ta you-TOP starve.to.death-F UT-D ECL ‘Eat nothing at all and you will die of hunger.’

Clearly, the issue of the Korean Type II IaD-like construction requires careful empirical investigation. For the moment, I take the Korean data as weak evidence in favor of an analysis of Type II IaDs as containing imperatives with atypical ordering sources. But it should be clear that the analysis as it stands fails to adequately capture the relation of sufficiency or causation81 that apparently has to hold between the antecedent and consequent of the conditional paraphrases (cf. von Fintel and Iatridou, 2009, for critical discussion).

6.3.3 Imperatives in IoDs and Non-classical Disjunctions in General Similarly to conjunction of imperatives and declaratives (IaDs), disjunctions of imperatives and declaratives (IoDs) can also receive a conditional interpretation. But 80

For reasons unclear to me, negation in Korean IaD-imperatives was judged to be slightly degraded by my informant. See also the discussion of English, above. 81

von Fintel and Iatridou (2009) suggest that LS and expresses a causative relation between the (prejacent in the) first and the second conjunct. This seems to be correct for most examples, but I am sceptical if an independently motivated notion of causation carries over to generic examples like (87c).

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in contrast to IaDs, IoDs seem to constitute a homogeneous class. In Section 6.3.1 I argued that IoDs are like Type I IaDs in that the imperative is used like a plain imperative, but comes with a specification of what happens in case it is not complied with. The meaning of an IoD like (123a) can thus be characterized as in (123b). (123)

a. b.

Don’t be late or you’ll miss the first slot. Don’t be late. If you are late, you’ll miss the first slot.

At first glance, the conditional part of the paraphrase in (123b) is reminiscent of the equivalence between material implication p → q and the disjunction ¬ p ∨ q. But of course, this leaves no room for the semantic contribution of the imperative. Also, a classical Boolean interpretation of disjunction is well known to have its own problems, in particular, that it doesn’t straightforwardly account for free choice inferences as arising for example in permission sentences like (124a) (Kamp, 1973; see Section 2.3.1 above for the discussion of the phenomenon and further examples). (124)

a. b. c.

You may take an apple or you may take a pear. (124a) ⇒ You may take an apple. (124a) ⇒ You may take a pear.

Zimmermann (2000) sparks a series of proposals that locate the solution in the semantics of the disjunction itself (Simons, 2005; Geurts, 2005). In particular, he analyses disjunctions as conjunctions of (speaker-)epistemic possibilities that, under certain contextual assumptions, allow one to infer the disjuncts themselves:82 (125)

You may take an apple or you may take a pear. ≈ I consider it possible that you may take an apple, and I consider it possible that you may take a pear. reasoning: The speaker has perfect knowledge of what he allows. Hence, if he considers it possible that he allows the addressee to take an apple, then he does indeed allow the addressee to take an apple. Hence, the addressee may take an apple. (Analogously for pears.)

Follow-ups like but I don’t know which block the assumption that the speaker has perfect knowledge of the matter, and consequently also the free choice inference. Geurts (2005) notes difficulties with the assumption that the free choice inference should depend on such an inference process.83 He proposes to treat (124a) as truly

82

In Section 4.2.2 I adopted the concept of epistemic authority crucial to Zimmermann’s (2000) analysis of disjunctions as part of the presuppositional meaning component assigned to imperatives. Therefore, the notion is discussed in more detail in Section 4.2.2

83

In particular, Zimmermann (2000) predicts the same type of inference for (i), which is not what we find. (i)

You must take an apple, or you must take a pear. → You must take an apple and you must take a pear.

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ambiguous between a construal that gives rise to the free choice inference, and one that does not. Again, the difference is brought out by whichever you want vs. but I don’t know which. In the following, I will show that Geurts’s analysis allows for a natural integration of the IoD cases into a theory of disjunction in general. Geurts (2005) assumes that the English disjunction or comes with two covert modals. They either remain covert and are interpreted as expressing epistemic necessity or, in the presence of overt modals, they can optionally fuse with those. Therefore, (124a) is truly ambiguous between one construal in which in both disjuncts overt may is embedded under a covert modal of epistemic necessity and one in which may itself constitutes the modal required by the disjunction.84 Now, as in Kratzer’s account, modal verbs are taken to be context dependent. Geurts abstracts away from modal bases and ordering sources and assumes that modals come with a variable for a set of worlds w.r.t. which they express compatibility (possibility modals) or entailment (necessity modals). The two modals that ‘are seen’ by the disjunction have to be interpreted with respect to proper or improper subsets C 1 and C 2 of one and the same (non-empty) background set C, which is either an epistemic or a deontic background. His proposals for the underlying structure of a disjunctive sentence can be schematized as in (126). (126)

C1 M1 P1 ∧ C2 M2 P2

M1 , M2 ∈ {♦, }

The disjunction imposes two requirements on the individuation of C1 and C2 that are supposed to capture the effect that the disjuncts mention different possibilities (disjointness) but jointly cover the entire background (exhaustivity) (at least with closure intonation Zimmermann, 2000) and disjointness of the single disjuncts (cf. Zimmermann, 2000; but see Simons, 2005 for critical discussion and slightly different constraints). (127)

a. b.

Exhaustivity C ⊆ (C1 ∩ P1 ) ∪ (C2 ∩ P2 ) Disjointness C ∩ P1 ∩ C 2 ∩ P2 = ∅

Exhaustivity requires that the background is split into parts, each of which is covered by one of the prejacents (restricted to the background of its modal operator); disjointness requires that the propositions have an empty intersection on the background or are considered with respect to disjoint background parts.85

84 I consider it one of the drawbacks of Geurts’s account that the syntax-semantics interface isn’t spelled out in detail. In particular, the interaction between the disjunction and the modal operators is not spelled out compositionally, and the assumed process of fusing overt and covert modals requires further work, which I have to leave to further research. Another question Geurts does not address explicitly concerns the possibility of construing one disjunct with an overt, and one with the overt modal. This issue, too, merits closer investigation but has to be left aside here. 85 Geurts credits Mandy Simons for pointing out that disjointness does not in general guarantee that the single disjuncts don’t overlap; in particular, it does not predict the infelicity of one disjunct being entailed by the other. He speculates that disjointness could possibily be strengthened to Pi ∩ P j = ∅. If this requirement is to be adopted at all, it has to be constrained to empty overlap

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Let’s now see how this applies to some examples with overt modal verbs. First take a look at free choice readings for deontic possibility and their blocking by but I don’t know which. A sentence like (128) can be assigned two different logical forms: In (128a), the covert modals of the disjunction are fused with the overt instances of may. In (128b), no such operation takes place: the covert modals of the disjunction are realized as covert operators of epistemic necessity, and may is part of their prejacent. (128)

You may hand it in today or you may it hand in tomorrow. a. C 1 ♦ you hand it in today ∧ C2 ♦ you hand it in tomorrow b. C1  [ you may hand in today] ∧ C 2  [ you may hand in tomorrow]

Consider now the individuation of the relevant background variables. We have assumed that the overt modals in (128) are interpreted deontically. Therefore, in (128a) C is the (relevant) deontic background, and C1 and C2 are subsets of C. From the semantics of the two disjuncts, we get C1 ∩ ‘you hand it in today’ = ∅ and C2 ∩ ‘you hand it in tomorrow’ = ∅. Nothing speaks against assuming that C1 = C2 = C, as exhaustivity and disjointness can easily be satisfied and no other clues indicate a shift in background. In particular, exhaustivity informs us that the entire deontic background is covered by these two options (so the addressee has to hand it in either today or tomorrow); from disjointness, as both modals are interpreted w.r.t. C itself, we learn that handing it in both today and tomorrow is not an option. This is an accurate representation of the free choice reading. Now, consider (128b). Here, the disjunction doesn’t care about the deontic modals, which are considered part of the prejacent of the covert epistemic necessity modals which are relevant for the interpretation of the disjunction. As the entire disjunction is now concerned with epistemic possibilities (brought forth by but I don’t know which), C is the (contextually relevant) epistemic background. From the individual disjuncts, we know that C1 ⊆ ‘you may hand it in today’, and that C 2 ⊆ ‘you may hand it in tomorrow’. But now, assuming that C1 = C or C2 = C would violate disjointness (recall that C is non-empty). Consequently, C1 and C2 have to be proper subsets of C; arguably, the most salient proper subsets are the intersections of C with the complement of the respectively other disjunct-proposition, and they also obey exhaustivity. So, C1 = C—‘you may hand it in tomorrow’, and C2 = C—‘you may hand it in today’. This says that it is either the case that the addressee is allowed to hand it in today, or that he is allowed to hand it in tomorrow. As expected, from that we may neither conclude the one nor the other. The free choice reading has been cancelled in favor of the epistemic uncertainty as to what is the case. Geurts argues that his framework naturally captures the contrast between (129a) and (129b) (on the reading where the overt modals are the relevant ones; for epistemic disjunctions about the possible status of a set of rules, the asymmetry does not arise, which is predicted by the theory). on the contextually relevant background C; but as the issue is not particular to IoDs, I will leave it aside.

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(129)

a. b.

It may be here or it must be there. C1 ♦ ‘it is here’ ∧ C2  ‘it is there’ ? It must be here or it may be there. C1  ‘it is here’ ∧ C2 ♦ ‘it is there’

Independently of whether the modals are construed epistemically or deontically, the predictions run as follows. For (129a), the first conjunct expresses that C1 ∩ ‘it is here’ = ∅, and C 2 ⊆ ‘it is there’. If disjointness is to be guaranteed, C1 = C2 = C is not an option. A natural solution in terms of what propositions are salient is to start out with C (i.e. C = C 1 ) and let the first conjunct proclaim its compatibility with ‘it is here’. At that point, ‘it is here’ as well as its complement ‘it is not here’ are salient (or, maybe C∩ ‘it is here’ and C∩ ‘it is not here’ are salient directly). Therefore, setting C 2 = C—‘it is here’ is a natural choice to satisfy both disjointness and exhaustivity. For (129b), C 1 , the background of the first modal, would have to be constrained in order to allow for disjointness. In the absence of a particular context, we could only look to the second disjunct to find a suitable salient restriction that would help to identify C 1 ⊂ C. As cataphora is generally considered a dispreferred option, Geurts accounts for the difference in markedness. Before we apply the theory to imperatives, a side remark might be appropriate as to the assimilation of possibility and necessity statements resulting from the assumptions introduced above. Geurts predicts that (130a) comes out the same as (130b). By exhaustivity both express that the entire background is covered by the two disjunct propositions. At least for the epistemic case, this seems to be unproblematic. Indeed, it is very hard to detect a difference between (130b) and (130a)86 : (130)

a. b.

It may be here, or it may be there. It must be here, or it must be there.

We can now see how Geurts’s (2005) non-classical account of disjunction applies to imperatives under the modal operator analysis I have been pursuing. A first nice result of the non-Boolean treatment of disjunction is that it invalidates disjunction introduction, that is, from ‘φ’ we can no longer infer ‘φ or ψ’. This might be hard to swallow for those trained long enough in classical logic, but it seems to meet almost everyone else’s intuitions about natural language disjunctions.

86

Geurts (2005) himself notes that the prediction may feel too strong in the deontic case, as taking neither an apple nor a pear can sometimes be okay after (ia) but not after (ib).

(i)

a. b.

You may take an apple or you may take a pear. You must take an apple or you must take a pear.

Maybe the contrast can be accounted for at the level of speech acts: (ia) can only work as a permission if apples and pears are presumed to be desirable. This may amount to it being presupposed that in the absence of a prohibition the addressee will realize one of them, which eliminates all those possibilities at which neither apple nor pear is taken. Spelling out a solution along these lines would require a version of Geurts’s theory that takes deontic modals to order epistemic possibilities, much like what I assume for imperatives below. I’ll leave the issue for further investigation.

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Above all, it meets one’s intuitions when it comes to disjoined imperatives. Alfred Ross (1944) pointed out that from (131a) one can’t conclude (131b). (131)

a. b.

Post this letter! Post this letter or burn it!

In contrast to this very clear-cut intuition, a propositional semantics for imperatives, together with a classical analysis for disjunction, would lead us to expect that this was possible (Ross’s paradox, see also Section 2.1.2 above). While it is obvious that (131a) does not entail (131b), we still need to figure out how Geurts’s (2005) theory applies to cases like (131b). Clearly, we expect that the imperative modal itself could figure as the relevant modal operator of the disjunct. The relevant construal is depicted in (132). Everything proceeds as for (133) (which in turn, works exactly like (128b), only that C is now a deontic background; note that the prejacents of the modals seen by the disjunction are unmodalized in this case, which doesn’t influence the process of background resolution, though). (132)

C1 OPimp you post the letter ∧ C2 OPimp you burn the letter

(133)

You must post the letter or you must burn the letter.

Now, obviously for imperatives, the relevant deontic background is the set of worlds in the context set CS that are optimal w.r.t. a contextually given prioritizing ordering source g; as I’ll keep abstracting away from the representation and anaphoric resolution of conversational backgrounds, I will just label it OptC (⊆ CS).87 As for the corresponding statement with must in both conjuncts (cf. Geurts, 2005:396f), from the two disjuncts, we obtain that C1 ⊆ ‘you post the letter’ and C2 ⊆ ‘you burn the letter’. Therefore, to satisfy disjointness, it has to be that C 1 ∩ C 2 = ∅ and both have to be proper subsets of OptC. Geurts does not specify what subsets these are. In principle, we have to distinguish two possibilities: if posting the letter and burning the letter are mutually exclusive (as Zimmermann, 2000 requires), the only possible resolution is C1 = OptC—‘you burn the letter’ and C 2 = OptC—‘you post the letter’. If the two activities are not mutually exclusive w.r.t. the background, exhaustivity fails (C 1 ∪ C2 = OptC). Therefore, if we do not require the disjuncts to be mutually exclusive (that is, posting and burning is possible and permissible), C1 and C2 have to be resolved asymmetrically, e.g. as C1 = OptC—(‘you burn the letter’—‘you post the letter’) and C2 = OptC—‘you post the letter’. Maybe this more complex process is the reason why or is preferably construed as exclusive. As for the corresponding must-statement, this construal, which engages the overt modals, is triggered by whichever you want. For (133), there is also another reading, triggered by but I don’t know which, in which overt must is embedded under the covert default modal of epistemic necessity that is associated with or. At first glance, we might dismiss this possibility for

87 For the individuation of the imperative’s background depending on contextually salient parameters and mutual joint belief, see Chapter 4.

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(131b) on the grounds that imperatives can’t be embedded under overt epistemic operators. But in Sections 6.2.3 and 6.2, I argued at length that it is possible to evaluate imperatives w.r.t. subsets of the context set that can be introduced by preceding might statements or by conditional antecedents, cf. e.g. (134). (134)

If you find the letter, post it.

I think that (131b) does indeed have the corresponding reading. Consider a context in which A is looking for a letter that B wrote to a mutual friend to congratulate her on her new relationship: (135)

A: Just in case I find that letter of yours: What am I to do with it? B: Post it or burn it, depending on whether they are still together.

In this case, it is not up to A to choose one of the disjuncts. B’s request can be paraphrased roughly as in (136): (136)

If they are still together, it’s best to post the letter; if they are not together anymore, it’s best to burn the letter.

B lacks the relevant factual information of what part of the context set they are in, but has a constant overall preference to be maximally nice to her friend (which entails sending congratulations on existing relationships, and not sending congratulations on broken ones). The reading is obtained from the construal in (137), where C1 = CS—‘they broke up’, and C 2 = CS—‘they are still together’.88 (137)

C1 epi [ OptCOPimp you post the letter] ∧ C2 epi [OptCOPimp you burn the letter]

The covert parts C1 and C2 play the role of the antecedents in the respective conditionals in (136). We are now ready to apply the theory to IoDs. Consider again (123a), repeated for convenience: (138)

Don’t be late or you’ll miss the first slot.

Let’s first try with the construal on which the imperative modal in the first disjunction is one of the two operators relevant for the disjunction. (139)

C 1 OPimp you are not late ∧ C 2 epi you miss the first slot

Geurts requires that the two disjuncts jointly cover one background C. As the second clause is epistemic in nature and the imperative is also evaluated w.r.t. a(n optimal subset of) the context set, C can only be the context set CS. Now, in the absence of

88 Note that on the embedded construal the set of OptC that constitutes the background of the imperative operator has to be individuated pointwise at each of the C1 /C2 worlds. See Section 6.2 for the details.

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any contextual pressure (i.e., modal subordination, or a second, alternative disjunct as in (131b)), it is most natural to interpret C1 as OptC. Then, C2 has to be a proper subset of C to ensure disjointness. The most salient candidate at this point of processing is arguably C—‘you are not late’, i.e. the worlds in C at which the addressee is late. This looks indeed like the reading we observe: when evaluating the second disjunct, the ordering considered in the first is not taken into account. It is irrelevant if the addressee (in addition to being on time) violates some other requirement. Only worlds in which the addressee is late are said to be such that she misses the first slot; nothing is said about worlds in which the addressee is on time but that are not among the optimal ones for other reasons. Although the reading seems to be the one we get, this particular resolution of C 1 and C2 violates exhaustivity (worlds in CS—OptC∩ ‘the addressee is on time’ may not be covered). I think this issue arises because the first disjunct involves an ordering that is not part of the modal flavor in the second. The problem would vanish if we were to stipulate that in IoDs the ordering source of the imperative contains only the negation of the prejacent of the second disjunct (here: that the addressee doesn’t miss the first slot). But I think the effect is more general and should thus not be tackled by an ad hoc stipulation for IoDs. To see that an ordering relevant for the first disjunct only is generally ignored when considering exhaustivity consider first a modal like should, which behaves exactly like the corresponding IoD. (140)

You should be on time or you’ll miss the first slot.

Moreover, the point can also be made for epistemic cases. In general, if possible, the modal flavor (including the ordering source) is kept constant across both disjuncts, cf. German (141) ((131b) above for a deontic case). (141)

Höchstwahrscheinlich kommt Hans persönlich, oder er schickt seine most-probably comes Hans in-person, or he sends his Tochter. daughter ‘Most likely John will come himself, or he’ll send his daughter.’

IoDs do not allow the modal flavor to be kept constant. In general, such an effect can be enforced if the connective is modified to oder sonst ‘or else’. Consider (142). (142)

Höchstwahrscheinlich kommt Hans persönlich, oder sonst schickt er most-probably comes Hans in-person, or else he sends seine Tochter. his daughter ‘Most likely John will come himself, or else he’ll send his daughter.’

Here, we observe the same effect: the second coordinand is now evaluated not with respect to the most plausible worlds at which Hans doesn’t arrive in person or with respect to implausible worlds. Rather, just as in the case of the imperative, the ordering is ignored and the modal is evaluated with respect to worlds where Hans does not come in person—no matter how plausible they are.

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We can conclude that IoDs and shifts by oder sonst ‘or else’ as in (142) require that exhaustivity is computed not according to (127a) (repeated as (143a) for convenience) as usual, but rather with disregard of the ordering in the first disjunct (cf. (143b)). (143)

a. b.

Exhaustivity C ⊆ (C1 ∩ P1 ) ∪ (C2 ∩ P2 ) Exhaustivity with Switch in Modal Flavor C ⊆ (C∩P1 )∪(C2 ∩P2 )

A different way of looking at this is that, for the matter of covering the entire background (meeting the exhaustivity condition), the evaluation of a particular prejacent (how good or how plausible it is) does not matter. Being a necessity with respect to an optimal subset of the background is treated as being a possibility. This becomes obvious if you compare the backgrounds in the disjunction and the exhaustivity condition for ‘graded- or must’ and ‘may or must’-sentences (cf. (129a)) respectively. For the exhaustivity condition, graded necessity contributes the background that would have been assigned to may, i.e. C instead of C 1 ⊂ C (other things being equal). Thus, both C-possibilities as expressed by the prejacents are treated alike. While I am confident that this is the correct modification for the cases under consideration, a systematic extension of Geurts’s theory to the framework of graded modality has to await further research. But what about the construal in which the imperative operator is not the modal relevant for the disjunction? As I argued above, the imperative can in principle be embedded under a covert necessity operator, hence there is no reason to exclude such a reading a priori. Nevertheless, the reading does not seem to exist. (123a) can’t mean that one of the following two possibilities holds: the addressee won’t get a seat; showing up on time is the best thing to do. On closer inspection, it turns out that imperatives behave exactly like overt necessity modals of the same modal flavor. Given that the speaker has to count as an epistemic authority on the respective ordering source, uncertainty as to which course of action is optimal can’t depend on the ordering, but only on certain sets of facts to which the (epistemic) background of the imperative is constrained (thanks to an if -clause or another disjunct). Therefore, the declarative disjunct would have to name the kind of circumstances under which the imperative does not hold, cf. (144a). Still, this is unacceptable. But note that it is equally bad for must in (144b) as long as the modal is interpreted with a modal flavor possible for an imperative. Examples with must become perfectly felicitous if the modality in question depends on a source different from the speaker and the speaker is taken to be uncertain about the ordering it specifies, cf. (145). (144) (145)

a. b.

# Post

the letter or they already split up again. must post the letter or they already split up again.

# /ok You

A: Why did the phone company call me? B: You must pay more money or they want to offer you free minutes, it’s usually one of the two. Until they call again, we won’t know.

In contrast to the disjunctions, such cases are perfectly acceptable with exemptives like English unless, and German es sei denn, außer, consider (146):

6.3

Conditional Conjunctions and Disjunctions

(146)

253

Gib den Brief auf; es sei denn/außer sie haben post.I MP S G the letter VP RT it be.S UBJ P RT /except they have sich schon wieder getrennt. themselves already again split-up ‘Post the letter; unless they’ve already split up again.’

The reason for the degradedness of an uncertainty construal for (144a) (and (144b) with the imperative-like modal flavor) could thus be simply the availability of exemptives that block the use of the neutral disjunction. But the reason could also be of a more general nature. It seems that non-classical theories of disjunction that turn them into lists of propositions that jointly cover the background (e.g. Zimmermann, 2000; Simons, 2005; Geurts, 2005) have to be complemented by a notion of homogeneity of the disjuncts. This sets or apart from exemptives as in (146). A natural assumption would be that all disjuncts have to pertain to the question under discussion (cf. Roberts, 1996). In particular, for the imperative modality this seems to be related to what are optimal courses of action and what are outcomes of other courses of action. Ultimately, a more refined theory of what possible antecedents are salient for the single modal’s backgrounds at what stage of processing, together with an appropriate theory of information structure, may be able to predict something like dependence on the question under discussion. With this observation, I want to conclude my discussion of imperatives in disjunctions and IoDs in particular. As far as I can tell, the analysis in terms of nonclassical disjunction makes good predictions for IoDs. Also, I think that it automatically solves a problem that was pointed out in Clark’s (1993) influential study of IaDs and IoDs—that is, as far as this should be solved in linguistics. Franke (2005) formulates the challenge for an analysis of IoDs as in (147) (recently, van Rooij and Franke (2010)): (147)

The NEG-OR-Problem The basic task in connection with pseudo-imperatives is to explain (i) why there are no negatively interpreted IoDs [i.e. IoDs as incentives not to act on the imperative disjunct], and (ii) why IoDs with a positively connoted second disjunct are pragmatically infelicitous.

In this section I have proposed an analysis for IoDs like (123a) that amounts to the meaning of the plain imperative (Don’t be late!, in this case), in conjunction with what happens in those cases in which the imperative is not complied with (here, cases in which the addressee is late). Thus, by the first conjunct, the IoD has to have the effect of the plain imperative, which cannot be used as an incentive to be late, either (unless, of course, in the case of irony, which is also the only way to circumvent generalization (i)). Second, as the plain imperative Don’t be late! expresses that not being late is optimal w.r.t. an ordering that constitutes the contextually relevant criteria for action (cf. the ordering source affirmation, see Section 4.2.3), it is infelicitous to point out a positive consequence of non-compliance without overtly signalling the contrast. This is exactly the same for declaratives:

254

(148)

6 Embedding Imperatives

a. b.

The best thing to do is to be on time (# and you can sleep longer if you don’t go for it). The best thing to do is to be on time (but you could sleep longer if you don’t go for it).

I fully agree that this remains to be explained in terms of how we reason, and how we present conflicting arguments in favor of different strategies for action. Yet, these problems are far more general. For an analysis of IoDs it is absolutely sufficient that the connection between the two disjuncts comes out as neutral like the conjunction in (148a). That is, unlike but in (148b) it can’t signal a conflict between the two pieces of information. My analysis predicts the positive evaluation of acting according to the imperative (thanks to the semantics of the plain imperative), and it does not contain a signal for adversativity. Therefore, I find it to correctly predict the absence of positively connoted second disjuncts.

6.4 Conclusion In this chapter, I have concluded my semantic treatment of imperative clauses by an investigation of constructions in which imperatives get semantically integrated into larger linguistic contexts. I have first established a notion of embedded imperatives. I reserve this notion for cases in which the linguistic expression that contributes the modal semantics of matrix imperatives occurs in a position where it interacts with a larger context so that it would count as embedded according to any of the relevant semantic or syntactic criteria. Traditionally, such embedded occurrences of linguistic expressions are considered important testing grounds for the interpretation assigned to them by a linguistic theory. While I can’t at this point offer a definite explanation of why cross-linguistically imperatives tend to be hard to embed, I conjecture that it might depend on the multiple context dependence in the rich presuppositional meaning component. In any case, I hope to have shown that one does not want to derive a complete ban on embedded imperatives. I have discussed various types of reported speech constructions, modal subordination, conditional imperatives, as well as imperatives occurring in conditional conjunctions and disjunctions. While the analyses for many of these phenomena had to remain at a very sketchy level, I hope to have shown that embedded imperatives indeed exist, and that the modal operator semantics I have proposed in the first five chapters of the book provides a promising starting point for explaining such embedding phenomena.

List of Tags for Grammatical Information

The main interest of this book lies in the semantics of imperatives and how it serves to mediate between form and function. The morphosyntactic properties of the natural language examples under considerations are of interest to this particular enterprise exactly in so far as they motivate particular semantic assumptions. In order to make all examples easily accessible to this task, I provide intuitive English glosses with very little explicit morphosyntactic annotation for all non-English examples. That is, apart from the morphosyntactic information immediately relevant to the respective issue under discussion, an example may contain more morphosyntactic information (e.g. person and number agreement, tense, verbal mood) than what is indicated by the gloss. The following list comprises the tags used in glosses and elsewhere in the text. Note that, depending on the language under consideration, I MP is used both for clause type particles that mark imperatives and for the verbal inflection that appears in imperatives clauses. In a few cases, I prefer to refrain from any claims about an element’s part of speech status. Therefore, tag-like parts of glosses that do not appear in this list simply stand for the particular elements they name (e.g. Japanese to as T O). Part of speech tags Aux Comp Cop Dec DPrt Expl Imp Int IrNeg Neg NegPrt Prep Prt

Auxiliary Complementizer Copula Declarative clause type particle (Korean) Discourse or modal particle Expletive Imperative clause type particle (e.g. Korean) Interrogative clause type particle (Korean, Japanese) Irrealis negation (particular verbal form of negation; Korean) Expression of negation Negation particle Preposition Particle (uninflected, typically unstressed)

M. Kaufmann, Interpreting Imperatives, Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy 88, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012 DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-2269-9, 

255

256

List of Tags for Grammatical Information

QPrt Quantificational particle VPrt Verbal particle (separable prefix of lexical verb; German) Nominal or verbal inflection Pl Sg

Plural Singular

Nominal inflection and markers appearing on nouns Acc BenDat Dat Def Gen Nart Nmlz Nom Top

Accusative Benefactive dative (German) Dative Definite (Malagasy) Genitive Name article; article used with proper names (Malagasy) Nominalizer (Korean) Nominative Topic (Japanese)

Verbal inflection ActFoc Aorist Fut Imp Impfv Ind Inf Past PatFoc Pfv PP Pres Proc Subj

Actor focus (Malagasy) Aorist tense (Classical Greek) Future tense Imperative (verbal mood, e.g. German) Imperfective (verbal aspect) Indicative (verbal mood) Infinitive (verbal mood) Past tense Patient focus (Malagasy) Perfective (verbal aspect) Past Participle Present tense In Process (verbal aspect, Korean) Subjunctive (verbal mood)

Politeness marking Plain Polite

Plain style (Korean, Japanese) Polite style (Korean, Japanese, German)

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Index

A Absent wishes, 116, 135–141, 235 Accessibility relation, 74–76 Accomplishment, 94 Achievement, 94 Action, 29–31, 34, 40, 48–49, 88, 158–162 Activity, 94 Advice, 12–15, 53, 59, 63–65, 129–130, 141–143, 147–149, 153–155, 158–161, 165–169, 180–190 Agent’s commitment, 51, 54–56 Answers -pragmatic, 68 -semantic, 67–69, 160 Assertion, 11–13, 17, 23–27, 65, 152–154, 163–168 B Buletic, 53, 75, 84, 135–141 C Circumstantial, 75, 84–85, 146 Class I imperatives, 88 Class II imperatives, 88 Clause type, 5–21 Command, 26, 33, 45, 131–133, 147–152, 167–169 Common ground, 22–23, 132 Concession, 14, 59, 130, 160–161, 169–171, 190 Conditional -biscuit, 213–214 conjunctions, 221–244 disjunctions, 221–233, 244–254 -factual, 213–215 -hypothetical, 150, 196, 213–216, 220 -non-predictive, 218 -predictive, 218 -relevance, 150–151, 172, 213–215

Context, 20–27, 30–36, 65–66 Context set, 22 Control verb, 77, 80, 82, 122, 124 Conversational background, 74–84, 86, 95–96, 125 Coordinand, 221 Counterfactual, 48, 103, 220, 234 Covert conditional operator construal (CCO), 216–221, 242 Curse, 12, 14, 124 D Decision problem, 159–162 Denial, 9 Deontic, 75 Descriptive modal, 33, 45, 56, 62 Discourse particle (DPRT), 27, 159, 170, 225 Disjunction, 38–40, 43, 60, 221–233, 244–254 Dispositional, 75–78, 80–82, 84 Downing’s characterization, 109–111, 114 Doxastic, 75, 84, 156–157 E Empty conversational background (cbemp ), 76 Epistemic, 75 Epistemic authority, 147–155, 166, 218–219, 245 Epistemic privilege, 166–167 Essential condition, 24–25 Evaluation time, 95–96, 103–104 Event frame, 95–104 Exclamative, 9 Exhaustivity, 181, 191, 246, 252 Extended now, 139 F Features, 90–91 For example-Advice, 180–190

267

268 Free choice, 39, 60–61, 176–180, 245–247 Functional inhomogeneity problem (FIP), 14 G Genericity, 234–237, 241 Graded modality, 83–86 H Historical alternative, 137 Hortative, 8 Human necessity, 85 Human possibility, 85 I Illocutionary force, 5–6 Imperative subject, 52, 105–122, 211, 227, 234–235 Imperfective aspect, 88, 94, 99 Impersonal modality, 76–83, 122–127 Indirect speech act, 3–4, 11–12, 19, 65 Individual level predicate, 7, 124, 137 Infinitive, 8, 89, 134 Information structure, 237–241 Inquisitive semantics, 33, 35, 69, 159 Insincerity, 69–70, 163–168 Interrogative, 70–72, 210–211 -pair list readings of, 43, 45 -wh–, 195 Intonation, 44, 237–241 Invitation, 53, 59, 172, 176 L Languages Amharic, 197 Ancient Greek, 204–206, 212 Bohjpuri, 8 Bulgarian, 72, 138, 241 Cheyenne, 104 Chrow, 7 Classical Greek, 134, 199 Dutch, 8, 93, 102–104, 128, 140, 221, 226–227 Georgian, 221, 227 German, 12–13, 44, 70–72, 105–113, 119–120, 138–141, 145–146, 180–181, 189–190, 208–212, 219, 221–232, 235–236, 252–253 Icelandic, 105, 205–207 Italian, 89, 134, 179 Japanese, 198–203, 221 Korean, 5, 9, 13, 242–244 Latin, 134 Maidu, 8, 104 Malagasy, 199–203, 221

Index Maricopa, 5 Middle High German, 204–205, 212 Old High German, 206, 211 Old Icelandic, 206 Old Saxon, 206 Old Swedish, 206 Polish, 88, 94, 221, 241 Russian, 134–135, 221, 234 Tagalog, 8 Takelma, 104 Tsakhura, 8 Tubatulabal, 104 Yokuts, 5 Limit assumption, 84 Literal meaning hypothesis, 16–17 Live on set, 116–117 M Maxim of quality, 153–155 Mediating semantics hypothesis for clause types (MSH), 16 Modal base, 74, 83–86, 132, 141–143, 162 Modal force, 74, 146, 170, 181, 191 Modal subordination, 49, 212–221, 224, 227, 232–233, 236, 251, 254 Moore’s paradox, 158 N Negation, 8–9, 110, 133–136, 243–244 Negative polarity items, 229, 236 NEG-OR-problem, 253 O Optative, 7 Order, 3, 6–7, 130–133, 151–154, 162 Ordering source, 84–86 Ordering source restriction, 160–161 Ought to be, 76 Ought to do, 76 Overt conditional operator construal (OCO), 216–217 P Passive, 123–125 Past, 8, 102–104, 139–141, 235–236 Perfective aspect, 94 Performative hypothesis, 37 Performative modal, 45–47, 58–64 Permissibilty sphere, 47 Permission, 13–14, 26, 45, 156, 169–176, 178, 245 Permissive, 9, 13 Personal modality, 76–83, 122–127 Person marking, 90, 105–121

Index Practical inference, 83 Prejacent, 46 Preparatory condition, 24–25 Present perfect, 104, 136–141 Principle of truthful propositions, 152 Prioritizing conversational background, 157 Prioritizing ordering source, 157 Problem about permission, 33–34 Problem of assigning speech acts to utterances (ASA), 15–17, 29, 42, 46–47, 64, 129, 162 Problem of clause type encoding (CTE), 10 Prohibition, 9, 133–135 Propositional content rule, 24 Propositional reduction, 37–39 Prosody, 44, 237–241 Proverbs, 130, 235 Pseudo-imperatives, 234–236 Q Quantificational inhomogeneity problem (QIP), 14, 169–171 Quantifier binding, 79–81, 228 Quantifier scope, 43–44, 78, 126–127 Question echo, 111 exam, 155 information seeking, 70–72, 155, 210 rhetorical, 70–72, 92, 111, 155, 210 Question under discussion, 253 Question of modularity, 10 R Raising verb, 76–83, 122, 127 Rationality check, 31–32, 51–56, 161 Reflexives, 105–106, 117

269 Reprehensibility order, 46 Request, 24–25, 131–133 Result state, 138–141 Ross’s paradox, 38, 249 S Selectional restrictions, 81–82, 123 Settledness, 137–138 Sincerity condition, 24–25 Specificity, 44–45, 127 Speech act assignment hypothesis (SAS), 18 Speech act conjunction, 222–237 Speech act coordination, 224 Speech act correction, 224 Split representationalism, 30–33 Stage level predicate, 7 State, 94 Strengthening of the antecedent, 217 Subjunctive, 110–111, 134, 157, 194 Subtrigging, 177–180 Sufficiency modal, 182, 222 T Teleological, 75, 141–143 That’s not true-test, 163–168 Threat, 19, 229 To Do list, 50–56 U Uniform representationalism, 30–34 W Warning, 11–12, 19, 129–130, 230 Wh-imperatives, 70–72, 210–211 Wish, 7, 135–141