Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy vol 3, 2-3

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lnternretation a

journal

of political

volume

leo

3/2,3

philosophy

1973

winter

note on the plan of nietzsche's

strauss

beyond 114

alexandre

kojeve

good and evil

the idea of

157

muhsin

169

larry

peterman

an

191

larry

1.

edmund

mahdi

adams

of

death in the philosophy

hegel

remarks on

the 1001 nights

introduction to dante's de

monarchia

burke: the psychology

of

citizenship 205

nathan

221

waiter

rotenstreich

b.

mead

martinus

human

emancipation and revolution

christian

ambiguity

and social

nijhoff, the hague

edited at

queens college of

of new york

the city university

disorder

interpretation a

journal

volume

of political

philosophy issue 2,3

3

editors

seth g.

hilail

benardete

john hallowell

-

its

hennis

wilhelm

kenneth

interpretation is

it

white

editors

consulting

strauss

howard b.

-

executive editor

gildin

w.

a

hula

erich

-

michael oakeshott

leo

thompson

journal devoted to the study

of political philosophy.

appears three times a year. editors welcome contributions

a serious

interest in

political

from

all

those

take

who

regardless of their orientation.

philosophy

ah manuscripts and editorial correspondence should

be

addressed

to the

executive editor

interpretation Jefferson hall 312 -queens

college -flushing, n.y.

11367-u.s.a.

subscription price

for institutions one guilder

=

and ab.

libraries Guilders 36.

for individuals Guilders 28.80

$ 0.37

subscription and correspondence

therewith should be

in

connection

to the publisher

sent

martinus nijhoff

9-11 lange

voorhout

-

p.o.b.

269

-

the hague

-

netherlands.

97 NOTE ON THE PLAN OF NIETZSCHE'S BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL Leo Strauss

Beyond Good

Evil

and

always seemed to me to

Nietzsche's books. This impression

of

dicted

his

by

judgement, for he

Zarathustra is the

most

the most perfect in

as

the

"most

as

same

to

regard

and

even

To illustrate this partly too far-fetched, there seems to be Plato's Republic, his Phaedrus Yet Plato

fundity

or

no

makes

beauty

is

is

not

regard

to

perhaps not

to the effect that

agreement

his Banquet

in

perfect

his well

as

beautiful"

an example which

general

and

contra

that

his

are

most

beautiful

necessarily his most profound writings. distinction among his writings in regard to pro

their

without

by

beautiful

in German

exists

"most

as

most

believe

to

language. But "most

profound"

language."

writings

inclined

was

book that

profound

be the

be thought to be

could

being

or perfection

in

regard

language; he is

to

not concerned

"ipsissimosity"

and hence with Plato's writings, his but points away from himself whereas Nietzsche points most emphatically Nietzsche." "personally" to himself, to "Mr. Now Nietzsche preferred, with

not

Plato

with

Beyond Good

Science to "most

all

"face,"

What is

Evil but his Dawn of

personal,"

or with

dimly on

being

Beyond Good

and

his

ultimately derivative from the Greek "personal" has nothing to do with

"perfect in

perceived

Beyond Good

his account of that book Good and Evil is the very Zarathustra in

Morning

Gay

books precisely because these two books are his books (letter to Karl Knortz of June 21, 1888). As

indicates, being

"profound"

judgement

"

and

other

personal"

the very term

for

his

as and

much

which

is

language."

he has

through

expressed

our

clearly by Nietzsche in in Ecce Homo: Beyond

stated given

"inspired"

the

Zarathustra is eye

to

inadequately Evil, is

opposite of

as

Evil the

and and

regard

word

being

most

compelled to

and

"dithyrambic"

far-sighted,

whereas

in

grasp clearly the nearest,

timely (the present), the around-us. This change of concern required form," the same arbitrary in every respect, "above all also in the out of which a Zarathustra had become from the instincts away turning the

possible: regards

the graceful subtlety as regards

form,

as

regards

intention,

as

the art of silence are in the foreground in Beyond Good and

which amounts to saying that these qualities are not in the foreground in the Zarathustra, to say nothing of Nietzsche's other books. In other words, in Beyond Good and Evil, in the only book published by Nietzsche, in the contemporary preface to which he presents himself

Evil

as the antagonist of

than

anywhere else.

Plato, he

"platonizes"

as regards

the

"form"

more

Interpretation

98 to the

According mental

that no human

only

for

strive

which

being

wisdom

that gods too

Plato

and

reminded

proper

of

Plato,

nor

and

(cf. Sophist 216b of

aphorism

ultimate

the fundamental difference thoughts in their

and

painted

help being

cannot

we

the

after

Socrates

in the

when

underlines

thoughts"

between "written

form,

Evil Nietzsche

not

gods philosophize

And

1-2).

151d

and

Evil

and

a super-Socrates

especially among philosophers,

Yet Diotima is

have thought that

Theaetetus

5-6,

Beyond Good

heart"

Nietzsche divulges

suspect perhaps

philosophize.

could well

the

genius of

Dionysos

god

Beyond Good

of

aphorism

penultimate

the novelty,

preparation

mind

easily be led to Diotima's conclusion is wise, but only the god is; human beings can or philosophize; gods do not philosophize (Banquet

Nietzsche delineates "the

is in fact the

who

the pure

of

Evil Plato's funda and of the good in

and

one can

premise

In the

203e-204a).

in

his invention

was

error

itself. From this

to Beyond Good

preface

Plato

what

says

original

intimates

or

logos"

and regarding the unsayable and regarding the "weakness of the a fortiori unwritable character of the truth (Ep. VII 341c-d, 342e-343a):

the purity of the establish

the

Beyond Good future."

the of

liberating

the

Plato

conceives

Evil has the

and

of

it, does

of

subtitle

"Prelude to

a

philosophy

of

the true philosophy, but a new kind of philosophy

by

i.e.

of

mind

from "the

prejudice

the

of

this very fact the book is meant to be a

philosophers,"

At the

specimen of

same

time or

the philosophy

the future. The first chapter ("Of the prejudices of the philosophers")

is followed

by

Nietzsche's

sense

past

but they

a chapter entitled

"The free

free from the

are

of

mind."

prejudice

are not yet philosophers of the

and precursors

of

than the philosophers of the future? do

only

minds

in

future; they

are

the heralds

the philosophy of the future (aph. 44). It is hard to

say how the distinction between the free

possible

The free

the philosophy of the

minds

and

the future is to be understood: are the free minds

is

necessarily

to prepare, not indeed the philosophy

meant

the philosophers of the past (and the present).

by

not

the logos.

The book is

future,

the

as

mind

strength of

during

they

the

by

philosophers of

any

chance

freer

possess an openness which

the transitional period between the philosophy

the philosophy of the future? Be this as it may, philosophy is surely the primary theme of Beyond Good and Evil, the obvious theme of the first two chapters. of

the

past and

The book

The third

chapter is devoted to ("Sayings and Interludes") does not indicate a subject matter; that chapter is distinguished from all other chapters by the fact that it consists exclusively of short aphorisms. The last five chapters are devoted to morals and politics. The book as religion.

consists of nine chapters.

The

heading

of

the fourth chapter

a whole consists then of two main parts which another

by

about

123 "Sayings

and

is devoted chiefly to philosophy morals

and

politics.

Philosophy

Interludes";

and religion and

are separated

the first

and

of

the second

religion, it seems,

from

one

the two parts

chiefly to

belong

together

Note

Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond Good

on the

and

Evil

99

belong more closely together than philosophy and the city. (Cf. Hegel's distinction between the absolute and the objective mind.) The fundamental alternative is that of the rule of philosophy over religion or

the rule of religion

Aristotle, as a

distinguished from lower

over

phUosophy; it is not, as it

plane

than

intimates that his

the

classics,

either

Pascal (cf.

religiosus

or

religion.

or

precursor par excellence

but the homo

a philosopher

for Plato

belongs from the outset to In the preface he is not a statesman nor even

politics

philosophy

was

life; for Nietzsche,

that of the philosophic and the political

45).

aph.

Nietzsche says very little about religion in the first two chapters. One could say that he speaks there on religion only in a single aphorism which happens to be the shortest (37). That aphorism is a kind of

immediately

corollary to the

his intention, the

particular

the

character

thought. But the

from

or seen

to

will

or modification of

the

eros

the

world

takes the place

occupies

in Plato's

Geist). Whatever

reine

the pure

and

to

proposition

within

power

itself"

will

forth in the

sets

compatible with

mind"

mind

according to

takes the place of both

power

philosophizing becomes a mode most spiritual (der geistigste)

Accordingly

the pure mind.

and

is

striving for "the good in (der eros is not "the pure

may be the relation between the Plato, in Nietzsche's thought the eros

he

that

his fundamental

of

the

eros

which

manner

according to which life is will to power is will to power and nothing else. The which

in

one

preceding

and unambiguous

most straightforward

to power: it is the

will

to power; it consists in prescribing to nature what or how it ought to be (aph. 9); it is not love of the true that is independent of will or

will

decision. Whereas according to Plato the according to Nietzsche the impure mind, mind, is the

Good

and

sole

Evil

source

with

of

pure

mind

or

certain

a

grasps

kind

the of

truth,

impure

truth. Nietzsche begins therefore Beyond

the questioning of love

of

truth and of truth. If we

may make a somewhat free use of an expression occurring in Nietzsche's Second Meditation Out of Season, the truth is not attractive, lovable, life-giving, but deadly, as is shown by the true doctrines of the sovereignty of

Becoming,

the lack

of

the

of

any

fluidity

cardinal

Schlechta, I 272); it is

of

all

concepts, types

difference between shown

most

simply

man

by

species, and

of

beast (Werke,

ed

and

and

the true doctrine that

"thing-in-itself,"

"nature"

(aph. 9) in itself, the is wholly chaotic and meaningless. Hence all meaning, all order originates in man, in man's creative acts, in his will to power. Nietzsche's state

God is dead. The

world

(aph. 40).

By

suggesting

deadly, he does his best to break deadly truth; he suggests that the most important,

the power

ments or suggestions are

deliberately

or

saying that the truth is

of

the

truth

the

truth

say that Nietzsche's

pure

mind

enigmatic

all

truths

the

most

is life-giving. In

regarding other words, by suggesting that the truth is human creation, he suggests that this truth at any rate is not a human creation. One is tempted to comprehensive

creates perishable

truths.

grasps

Resisting

the fact that the impure

that temptation we state

mind

Nietzsche's

Interpretation

100

him in this

following

suggestion

hold

"text"

of the

"discover"

the philosophers tried to

manner:

get

distinguished from "interpretations"; they tried to "invent." to What Nietzsche claims to have realized

as

and not

is that the text in its pure,

form is inaccessible (hke the

unfalsified

Kantian

Thing-in-itself); everything

thought

by

man

the

is in the last

analysis

interpretation. But for this

of

reason

very

concern to

people

the

text, the

us; the

world

world

of

in itself, the true concern

any

for it is necessarily anthropocentric;

philosopher

anyone

world cannot

be

to us is necessarily a

man

is necessarily in

the measure of ah things (aph. 3 end, 12 end,

a

of

or

any

fiction, manner

17, 22, 24, 34, 38;

cf.

Plato, Laws 716c 4-6). As is indicated sufficiently by the title of the book, the anthropocentrism for which Nietzsche opts is transmoral (cf. aph. 34 and 35 with 32). At first glance there does not seem to be a connection

35

between the

book

which a

34

grave aphorism

this seems to agree

and

of aphorisms

does

and the

lighthearted

aphorism

impression according to need not have a lucid and

the general

with

not

have

or

necessary order or may consist of disconnected pieces. The connection between aphorism 34 and 35 is a particularly striking example of the lucid, if somewhat hidden, order governing the sequence of the aphor isms: the

desultory

Nietzsche's

character of

argument

is

more pretended

than real. If the aforesaid is correct, the doctrine of the will to power cannot claim

is

"only"

many.

reveal what

regards

(aph. 22

the

fact,

the most

presumably the best

this apparent objection as

fundamental fact but

interpretation, among a confirmation of

his

end).

turn to the two aphorisms in Beyond Good and Evil

can now

I-II that

is,

interpretation,

Nietzsche

proposition

We

to

one

be

said to be devoted to religion (36-37). Aphorism 36 reasoning in support of the doctrine of the will to power. Nietzsche had spoken of the will to power before, but only in the way of bald assertion, not to say dogmatically. Now he sets forth with what is at the same time the most intransigent intellectual probity and the

can

presents the

most

bewitching

playfulness

tempting, hypothetical he does than

not

what

know he

his reasons, i.e. the problematic, tentative, his proposition. It could seem that

character of

more of the will

says

here. Almost

aphorism of the second chapter

to

power as

fundamental reality

the

immediately before,

(34),

he had drawn

in the

central

our attention to the

fundamental distinction between the world which is of any concern to us and the world in itself, or between the world of appearance or fiction (the interpretations) and the true world (the text). What he seems to aim at is the abolition of that to power

is both the

Precisely

if

will

all

views

of

fundamental distinction: the

any

concern

the world are

to

us and

to all other

and

the

most

i.e.

at the

acts

of

the

same time an

fundamental fact, for, in contradistinction the necessary and sufficient condition

interpretations, it is

the possibility of any

is

world as will

the world in itself.

interpretations,

to power, the doctrine of the will to power

interpretation of

world of

"categories."

Note After doctrine

Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond Good

on the

having

tempted

some

his

of

but the devil is

refuted

the contary, my friends!

Beyond Good 150

aph.

"Das Wesen der of

should not

is

Rehgion,"

soul

not

deal

hitherto

its

and

with unknown

devoted to

manner

"Das

a

of

On

contrary!

to

you

speak

God.

of

of

(Cf.

Morals, Preface Nr. 7.) Wesen"; it is not entitled for this

and

yet

rehgion

hitherto In the

a whole.

its boundaries, to the

inexhausted

being

although

that the

because he deals

or

53-57 to the

58-62)

section

Greeks"

the old

and

above

religion

of

transmits Nietzsche's

on rehgion

all

history

certain

with

are

the future. appraisal

hitherto he

parts

of

Nietzsche does

the future. Aphorisms 46-52

of

and

whole

possibilities:

tianity (50-51) of

question

the whole doctrine

one of the reasons

the chapter (aph.

as

Testament'

forces

vindication

Christianity (46-48), then of the Greeks (49), and finally of the Old Testament

of

the

with

popularly, that

speak

"On the

what

religiose

possibilities,

the

and

rehgion

rest of

rehgion

a

30)

aph.

101

rehgion, that which is common to ah religions, is not or be of any concern to us. The chapter considers religion with

hitherto

religion

devil,

Genealogy

as

entitled

to the human soul

a view

the

The

is in

as well

chapter

not.

to

replies

the will to power

of

Evil

and

295,

and

The third

essence

And,

The doctrine

popularly?"

He

to the

Evil

makes them raise the

to whether that doctrine does not assert,

as

God is

(cf.

readers

Nietzsche

of the will to power

and

speaks

then again of

of

first

Chris

(52). "The religiosity of "the Jewish 'Old

"

supply him with the standards by which he judges of Christianity; nowhere in the chapter does he speak of Christianity with the respect, the admiration, the veneration with which he speaks of the two and on

pre-Christian

The

phenomena.

the Old Testament

are

aphorisms

the Old Greeks

on

to interrupt the aphorisms

meant

obviously devoted to Christianity; the two interrupting aphorisms are put at some distance from one another in order to imitate the distance or rather opposition

between

one

what

devoted to the

call

may

the Old Testament is

aphorism on

Athens

immediately

and

preceded

Jerusalem.

by

The

an aphorism

saints, no holy men in the Old Testa Old Testament theology in contradistinction

saint: there are no

the peculiarity of especially to Greek theology is the conception, the creation of the holy God (cf. Dawn of Morning aph. 68). For Nietzsche "the great of (certain parts of) the Old Testament shows forth the greatness, not

ment;

style"

God, but

of

man

are

of what man once was:

creatures

Nietzsche's being: the the

or

the

will

holy

to

God

no

less than the

holy

power.

God is then atheistic, at least for the time following that on the Old Testament begins with

vindication of

aphorism

question

possible

of

the human

'Why

today?'

atheism

necessary.

But in the

There

was

meantime

a

time

"God

when

died"

Zarathustra, Zarathustra's Prologue Nr. 3). This does

theism was

(Thus Spoke

not merely mean in God, for men's unbelief does not destroy God's life or being. It does mean, however, that even while God hved he never was what the believers in him thought him to be,

that

men

have

ceased

to believe

Interpretation

102 namely, deathless. Theism

it

as

understood

itself

therefore always

was

true, i.e. powerful, life-giving. In speaking of how or why it lost its power, Nietzsche speaks here less of the reasons that swayed him than of the reasons advanced by some of his con Yet for

wrong.

a

time it

was

temporaries, presumably his few of his better readers will directed

are

against natural

the most powerful

directed i.e.

or revealed

those reasons

argument

theology. Nevertheless

Nietzsche

which

of

decay

European theism Nietzsche has the impression

of

is growing powerfully Could

phase.

"religiosity"

present

at

belong

atheism

kind

while a certain

distinguished from

as

that

or

atheism

to the free

is only

belongs to the

of non-atheism

a transitional

Nietzsche

as

mind

"religion"

conceives

philosopher

the future who will again worship the god Dionysos or will again

Epicurean

as an

essential

might

say,

to Nietzsche's

character

of

an

a

dionysokolax (cf.

thought;

experiment

or

without

you

wish,

modern seem

non-theistic

point

by

was anti-Christian

philosophy

to

religiosity

of

be,

7)? This ambiguity it his doctrine would lose aph.

temptation.

a

Nietzsche provisionally illustrates his if

is

sketches

the possibility of a clear and unambiguous revelation, "speaking" God's to man (cf. Dawn of Morning aph. 91 and 95).

that the religious instinct

is its

a

against

Despite the

it

Not

think that those reasons verge

not quite clear whether

(rational)

anti-theistic

contemporaries.

competent

justifiably

the frivolous. In particular it is

on

of

most

suggestion

of

an

atheistic

or,

the alleged fact that the whole

but

not anti-religious

that it could

to something reminding of the Vedanta philosophy. But

he does not anticipate, he surely does not wish, that the religion of the future will be something like the Vedanta philosophy. He anticipates a

Western, a sterner, more terrible and more invigorating possibility: the sacrificing from cruelty, i.e. from the will to power turning against more

itself, of God which prepares the worshipping of the stone, stupidity, heaviness (gravity), fate, the Nothing. He anticipates in other words that the better what

they

are

bunking of the thing infinitely

among the contemporary atheists "the may remind us

doing

will

sun

that

,

more

they

will come

come

to

know

Anaxagoras'

stone"

of

de

to realize that there is some

terrible, depressing and degrading in the offing or I'infdme: the possibility, nay, the fact that

the foeda religio

than

human life is utterly meaningless and lacking support, that it lasts only for a minute which is preceded and followed by an infinite time during which the human race was not and will not be. (Cf. the beginning of "On truth and lie in an extra-moral sense.") These religious atheists, this new breed of atheists cannot be deceptively and deceivingly appeased as people like Engels by the prospect of a most glorious future, of the realm of of

for we

freedom,

which will

the human race

very long time find ourselves still a

Engels, Ludwig

indeed be terminated

therewith

and

for

a

of

all

millennium

by

meaning but or

more

,

the annihilation which

for

will

last

fortunately

"the ascending branch of human history" (F. Feuerbach und der Ausgang der deutschen klassischen on

Note Philosophie): tains

within

the Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil

on

freedom, destined

the realm of

itself the

its

103

to perish, necessarily con

and will therefore, while in "contradictions" as much as any earlier age. Nietzsche does not mean to sacrifice God for the sake of the Nothing, for while recognizing the deadly truth that God died he aims at trans

it

lasts,

seeds of

annihilation

abound

it into a life-inspiring one or rather to discover in the depth deadly truth its opposite. Sacrificing God for the sake of the Nothing would be an extreme form of world-denial or of pessimism. But Nietzsche, prompted by "some enigmatic has tried for a long time to penetrate pessimism to its depth and in particular to

forming the

of

desire,"

free it from the delusion

of

morality

which

in

a

its

contradicts

way

world-denying tendency. He thus has grasped a more world-denying way of thinking than that of any previous pessimist. Yet a man who has taken this road has perhaps without intending to do this opened his eyes

the

to the opposite ideal

future. It

"perhaps"

the

every kind

a

was

Nothing

or

who

Remembering reminded

conservative

his

question

doubts

of

seem

unbounded

is.

By

to reveal

beyond the

Yes: the

eternal

saying Yes to everything himself as radically anti-

wildest

wishes

of

all

other

say No to some of the things that were or are. "ideals" "idealists" Nietzsche's strictures against and we of

Goethe's

suggestion

not

be

again

whether

to Eckermann (November 24, 1824) idea-like (jedes Ideelle) is serviceable Be this as it may, "And Nietzsche

words

"everything

purposes."

concludes

religion

ah

according to which for revolutionary

is, "would

most

and

was

is Nietzsche may

conservatives,

to the

to be the indispensable transition from

to the

to everything that

revolutionary

belonging

saying that what in some other men was fact in Nietzsche's thought and life. The

proves

world-denial

of

that was and

are

to the ideal

without

case

the

adoration of

Yes-saying

goes

this,"

regarding

circulus vitiosus

his

shows,

eternal

repetition

of

what

As this concluding ambiguous is not unambiguous, for he had

atheism

there can be a world, any world whose

God (aph. 150). The

conclusion

and

was

deus?"

of

the

present

center

aphorism

is

not

reminds

us,

through its

form, of the theological aphorism occurring in the first two chapters (37) where Nietzsche brings out the fact that in a manner the doctrine of the will to power is a vindication of God, if a decidedly non-theistic vindication of

But

God.

now we are confronted with

is only the inversion

the fact that the

vindication of

God

the sacrificing of God to stupidity, to the Nothing, or at any rate presupposes that sacrificing. What is it that suddenly, if after a long preparation, divinizes the Nothing? Is it the willing of

eternity

which

of

gives

to the world,

or

restores

to

it, its

worth

which

the world-denying ways of thinking had denied it? Is it the willing of eternity that makes atheism rehgious? Is beloved eternity divine merely

because it is beloved? If

in

order

to deserve to be

into Platonism, into

the

we were to

loved, teaching

say that it must be in itself lovable, become guilty of a relapse

would we not

of

"the

good

in itself"? But

can

we

Interpretation

104

Yes, is

says

cannot

an

arouse

to

eternal

Nietzsche

which

even if Nothing enthusiastic, hfe-inspiring Yes.

the

the stupidity,

stone,

sempiternal

or

eternal

the

not

For the

altogether?

relapse

a

such

avoid

which

the world-denying way of thinking into that the divination stone, the the realization or

opposite

transformation of the

The

ideal is

connected with

to

Nothing

stupidity or the "intelligible

which

character"

the

to

will

God is

being

(cf.

power

is in its

sacrificed,

36).

aph.

important ingredient, not to say the nerve, of Nietzsche's "theology" which I have not spoken and shall not speak since I have of been worthily treated by Karl Reinhardt in his It has it. no access to (Vermachtnis der Antike, Got der Klage "Nietzsche's essay tingen 1960, 310-333; see also a remark of Reinhardt at the end of There is

an

Ariadne"

his eulogy of Walter F. Otto, ib. 379). It is possible but not likely that the "Sayings which

the fourth

chapter

consists,

rhyme

or reason

to their

selection

at a

few

are

observations which

The opening

being-oneself, of being for oneself, Accordingly knowledge cannot be, it is justifiable only with

implications. There

God; only occurs

by

himself. As and

good

to

being own

one's

in the

matters

us.

the

paramountcy of oneself (cf. aph. 41).

be good, for its

or cannot

oneself means

ideal. This

being

sake;

honest

to have

seems

to

references

nine

chapter

own

theology (150). There (126). Instead we are confronted

to nature

devoted to mind

a consequence evil

of

of

occur

a single reference

aphorisms

Nietzsche has in

whom

leave

them points to Nietzsche's own

one of

only

nine

must some

"preserving"

as self-knowledge:

oneself, going the way to

atheistic

I

helpful to

attention

our

of

order, that there is no

and sequence.

perhaps

draws

aphorism

no

possesses

Interludes"

and

and

in

woman

and

knower

the

Surely

man.

has not, like Kant, the starred heaven above he has a high morality, a morality beyond

particular

beyond

asceticism.

and

puritanism

his mind, he must imprison his heart (87, 107). Freedom of one's mind is not possible without a dash of stupidity (9). Self-knowledge is not only very difficult

Precisely

because he is

concerned with

but impossible to achieve; edge

chapter

("Toward the nature of

man could not

live

of

with

perfect

self-knowl

249).

(80-81, 231,

The fifth

the freedom

the

natural

be the theme

of

central chapter

history

of

is the only

morality")

refers

one whose

to

heading

nature.

Could

this chapter or even of the whole second

part

the book?

Nature

to say nothing of

had been

mentioned more

"naturalists,"

than

once

and

in the first four

"physiology"

chapters.

Let

us

striking of those mentions. In discussing and rejecting the Stoic imperative "to live according to Nietzsche makes a distinction between nature and life (9; cf. 49),

cast

a

glance

at

the most important

"physics"

or

nature"

just

as

"us"

be

no

on another occasion

(human

less

natural

he

makes

a

distinction between

nature

life is death

which

than life. The opposite of the natural

is the

beings)

(22). The

opposite of

is

or

and

may

unnatural:

Note

domesticated,

artificial, the

the

(21, 51, 55); i.e., In the

Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond Good

on the

introductory he had

said

(45). But in the

science

of

practical

with

religiosi

and

the religious

Yet

description,

the

of

to

us

religion, is for

the

most

stating the case for moralities Nietzsche

when

homines

profound

down, from

above,

an empirical states

all

have to be

would

study,

the

at

a

same

science

teaches the only true morality. It would seem that he on the student of religion than on the student

of morals which

higher demands

makes

This is

of morality.

"The

entitled

"The Natural

The

why he did not entitle the third Hume had written an essay

perhaps the reason

chapter

history History

natural

of

religion":

Religion."

of

to have discovered the

philosophers'

science

foundation

of

defects

well

of

that pretended

of

claimed

morals

in

either

morals

nature

in

or

it

science

that morality must or can be

sumption

Apart from

reason.

rests

natural

on

the

(according

to

all

as

gratuitous

nature)

Yet every morality is based on some tyranny against nature against reason. Nietzsche directs his criticism especially

or rational. as

reminds

that the true

time the case against the possibility of a philosophic ethics,

other

de

the

of

which

suspect

psychology for the psychologist

various

anti-natural

speaks

of

of

105

aphorism of the chapter on

he led

experience

the

a manner

the same time to be able to look

at

on these experiences. a

(62),

Evil

alive.

empirical

impossible,

purposes

familiar

introductory

earlier case

religion, i.e. the

be

morality in

of

in the

religion

well

(186) Nietzsche

aphorism

history

sideratum of a natural

us of what

the misbegotten

the unnatural may very

and

as

anarchists who oppose every subjection to arbitrary laws: everything of value, every freedom arises from a compulsion of long duration that was exerted by arbitrary, unreasonable laws; it was that

the

against

permissiveness

long lasting moral

obedience

imperative

of

to

unnatural

Physis

nature."

of

distinction, nay, opposition of aphorism (188) Nietzsche speaks in

nature

one

Nietzsche

As for

case, in the final

the

as

anarchists

he

and yet

the good with

consequences; it is

How the

patrician

(Preface),

whose

philosopher

to

by

do

nature

precisely is "the

while

nomoi

preserving Throughout this

nomos.

only in

quotation

nature; nature,

it, has become

a

marks

and not problem

only for

withoutt nature.

had

"the

Plato

strength at

overcome

Plato

and

not

only

by

classic

most

could

is

is the

beautiful

power was

his disposal

surpassing him in (Twilight of

Its

utilitarian.

riddle; the Platonic Socrates

boring"

and

mention of

understand

cannot

for

calls

physis of

nomoi

unreasonable

morality, it consists primarily in the identification the useful and pleasant and hence in the calculation

of

a

and

the

against

that

asserts

rationalist

of

is

Nietzsche

anarchism

the

except

freedom. Over

that has educated the mind to

compulsion ruinous

the

Socrates.

plebeian

antiquity"

growth

of

greatest which

hitherto

take over the Socratic

a monstrosity.

a

teaching

Nietzsche intends then

substituting his truth for Plato's but also Among other things "Plato is

strength or power.

the

Gods, 'What I

owe

to the

Ancients'

nr.

2),

Interpretation

106 Nietzsche surely is

while

by,

guided

follow,

or

not

boring. Both Socrates

never

only

but instinct

reason

as

Plato

and

are

well; the instinct

reason. By explicitly taking the side of instinct Nietzsche tacitly agrees with Rousseau (cf. Natural Right to that and History 262 n.). Instinct is, to say the least, akin to nature which one may expel with a hayfork but will nevertheless always come back (cf. aph. 264; cf. the italicized heading of aph. 81, the first of

is

fundamental than

more

against reason

the four italicized headings in

instinct is the

that the fundamental toward

urge

self-preservation

Nietzsche's religiosity, is

is to say god-forming the

of

sequence

of

presence

also

(cf. an

instinct"

irrationality

will

to

and

power

13). What

aph.

to

are entitled

we

not,

surmise

say, the

ventured

to

call

instinct (aph. 53): "The religious, that (Will to Power nr. 1038). As a con

judgement, of the decisive judgement, there cannot be any different moralities fit, belong to, different of

the irrational in the

universally valid moral rules: types of human beings.

four). We

chapter

the

moral

moral

again of nature, supplying the term again (aph. 197), he demands that one cease to regard as morbid (as defectively natural) the predatory beings which are dan gerous, intemperate, passionate, "tropical": it was precisely the defective

When Nietzsche

speaks

quotation marks

with

nature

almost

of

namely, their

all

moralists

timidity

which

not

reason

induced them to

and

not

nature

conceive of

simply

,

the dangerous

and men as morbid. These moralists did not originate the morality stemming from timidity; that morality is the morality of the human herd, i.e. of the large majority of men. The utmost one could say is that the moral philosophers (and theologians) tried to protect the indi vidual against the dangers with which he is threatened, not by other

brutes

but

men,

by

Nietzsche

his

own

speaks of

passions.

the herd-instinct

of obedience which

universally innate and transmitted by inheritance. It that originally, in pre-historic times, that instinct

is

now almost

goes without was

saying (cf.

acquired

Genealogy of Morals II). While it was very powerful throughout history, it has become simply predominant in contemporary Europe where it destroys at least the good conscience of those who command and are independent and

where

it successfully

to be the only true morality. More form it implied already that the sole is utility for the herd, i.e. for the common good;

precisely, in its earlier, standard of goodness

independence, which

they

claims

healthy

superiority, inequality were esteemed to the thought to be subservient to the common

were

indispensable for it,

and not

for their

own sake.

The

extent

good

to

and

common good was

the good of a particular society or tribe; it demanded therefore hostility to the tribe's external and internal enemies and in understood

particular

as

to the criminals. When the herd morality draws its ultimate

consequences

the

very

satisfied

as

it does in contemporary Europe, it takes the side of and becomes afraid of inflicting punishment; it is

criminals with

making the

criminals

harmless; by abolishing

the

only

Note

the Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond

on

ground

remaining

fear,

of

completion and thus make

the

superfluous

the abolition of fear are justified

indiscriminate

identification

Timidity

and

of goodness with

it,

also

democratic

of the

movement

the anarchists and socialists

to which, as Nietzsche

belong,

moralities other

higher than the herd morality were at least known. He mentions high praise Napoleon and, above all, Alcibiades and Caesar. He

and with

have

his freedom from the herd morality more tellingly in one breath Caesar and Alcibiades. Caesar could mentioning to have performed a great, historic function for Rome and to

could not

by

than

be

the

its

reach

would

73).

aph.

107

compassion.

Prior to the victory understands

by

(cf.

EvU

and

timidity

of

morality

itself

Good

said

shown

have dedicated himself to

function

that

to have

been,

as

it were,

a

Roman history, but for Alcibiades Athens was no more functionary than the pedestal, exchangeable if need be with Sparta or Persia, for of

his to

own

he

be

from

longer

opposes

men

of

Instead he

expresses

among the brutes

(aph.

of not

man

Caesar.

They

a

nature

the chapter

the view that

He

202).

man

appeals

teach man the

to

which

commanders, the

an

the

requires

his will,

mere

subjugation

as

of

as

"history":

of

chance,

of nature

reason.

dreamed in its

of

history

by

the philosophy

form. The

The

to

of

a

also to

to the

spirituality,

evidently formation

the

rule

of

must

are or

nature.

act,

They

the highest degree according to reason, for they put the high independent of unreason, and the high to

will

of

stand

alone,

the

great

reason

(aph. 201)

is

The turn from the autonomy of the the philosophers of the future is akin to the trans to the low.

the worshipping

to everything that

evidently

new philosophers

which

they

rule

preferable

herd to the

degree

the past;

tempted to say, to the highest degree according to

end

2) by

to power (aph. 9):

we are

absolute

n.

subjugation

will

that

are or act

dis

as

will

possess

will

will

chance

and

possess a certain nature.

we

even

must

human

(Genealogy II.

have heard, is the most spiritual the philosophers of the future must possess that not

nonsense

true

the

highest spirituality, of the greatest depends then decisively on men who

Philosophy,

on a

pre-history, to use a Marxian distinction

men of the of nature

kind

a new

future. Mere

of the

dependent

to the gruesome rule

regarded

tinguished from the

new philosophers,

philosophers

suffice, for the new philosophers

not

of man as

end

hitherto

was

will

great,

future

put

has led to the autonomy of the herd, can born to rule like Napoleon, Alcibiades

men

be philosophers,

must

and

Caesars, however order

which

be merely

of phUosophers

an

of

herd morality of contemporary Europe to the superior leaders (Fiihrer). The leaders who can counteract the deg

however

was

such

of

the victorious

radation

in

Nietzsche

of nature.

literally

counted

morahty

and

greatness.

the opposite nature (aph. 199-200). In the rest

speaks no

must

or

glory

men of

was

reasonable.

and

is;

of

the nothing into the

that

unbounded

Yes

transformation would then also be

Interpretation

108 But

i.e.

becomes then

what

every merely because agree

to the irrational

corrective

Genealogy,

preface, nr. 5

of

Plato

It

suffices

rational

190).

aph.

Socrates did

As Nietzsche

knowledge"

is

complexity distinction

(207),

is. In

evil

and

good

what

in Nietzsche's

chapter

same

than a solution.

(aph. 26); it implies

on a vulgar

of

the

of

Nietzsche

relation

Nietzsche there

cannot

be

man and

of man

ends

these a

as

man:

other

Socrates'

perfect

a

to be irreconcilable with

to use

of

the

favorite

a

to Socrates.

ahen

to

compelled

retort

for

that

morality because he any cardinal difference

rational

of

hence

deadly truth;

values

human

are

there cannot

creations.

herd to the

autonomous

his doctrine

agreement with

awareness

Gewissen,

the denial

ah

While Nietzsche's turn from the

is in

or

natural

truth, if

a

is

one

a nature of man:

brute is

and

in this form is indeed

which

as

denies that there is natural

between Wissen

such

considerations

seems

to say a caricature?

utilitarian

the

a riddle rather

soul"

ophers

(cf.

critique

saying is based on awareness of the fact that sometimes "a head is placed on the body of an ape, a subtle exceptional

understanding

between

in

says

think that he knew

not

words, "virtue is

scientific

therefore

Nietzsche's

not

a grave exaggeration, not

to see that Socrates was not a

order

(cf.

enigmatic

Furthermore, is

end)?

and

compassion

of

glorification

to remember the difference between the Protagoras and the

Gorgias in sense

Socrates

and of

cruelty only the indispensable

praise of

reasonable

it

to be

cease

must

one

Or is that

rational?

be

judgement,

the moral

of

be strong, healthy and well-born in order to to it or even to understand it? Yet can one say that Nietzsche's of cruelty, as distinguished from Plato's praise of gentleness, is

praise

To

irrationality

the

of

judgement (aph. 191)? Or does it

moral

of

his doctrine

the

of

of

new philos

will

to power,

return:

eternal

how

the demand for something absolutely new, this intransigent "history" farewell to the whole past, to ah be reconciled with the un

indeed

can

bounded Yes to everything that was and is? Toward the end of the present chapter Nietzsche gives a hint regarding the connection between the demand for wholly new philosophers and eternal return; the philos ophers of

the

future, he

says, must be able to endure the

responsibility for the future suggestion

regarding

Schwergewicht"

eternal

of

led to passing judgement of

philosophy,

after

philosophic

Nietzsche's

death,

aph.

in

is of

handmaidens to entitled

the

"Wir

the

his

grosste

contemporary philosophers, a sorry but professors

a serious and proper sense

laborers or, as they who "do

came to

phUosophy."

Gelehrten"; it is is

the

"Das

heading

men

philosophy.

personal pronoun

under

weight of published

341).

the

best case, i.e. only in rare cases, and honest specialists who of right or

He had originally

the new phUosophers Nietzsche is naturally

on

who are not philosophers

man.

return

(Gay Science

From the desideration

lot,

of

scholars ought

The

or

call themselves

They

scientists, i.e.

are

to be subservient to philosophy devoted to this kind of man

chapter

the only one in whose title the first

used:

in the

competent

Nietzsche

wishes

to

person

emphasize the

fact

Note

the Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond

on

Good

Evil

and

109

that apart from being a precursor of the philosophers of the future, he belongs to the scholars and not, for instance, to the poets or the homines religiosi. The emancipation of the scholars or scientists from

philosophy is according to him only a part of the democratic movement, i.e. of the emancipation of the low from subordination to the high. The things

have

which we

in the 20th century regarding the

observed

Nietzsche's diagnosis.

sciences of man confirm

The plebeian character of the contemporary scholar or scientist is due to the fact that he has no reverence for himself and this in its turn is due to his lack of self, to his self-forgetting, the necessary consequence "nature" or cause of his objectivity; hence he is no longer or "natural";

he

"genuine"

only be

can

exaggeration, the

some

"authentic."

or

Originally,

the genuine

natural and

were

one can

the

same

say with (cf. Plato

Laws 642c 8-d 1, 777d 5-6; Rousseau, Du Contrat Social I. 9 end and II. 7, third paragraph); Nietzsche prepares decisively the replacement of perhaps

the authentic. That he does this

by

the natural

become

immediately

more

from the

clear

with

to

closer

philosophy and This in its turn

science.

was

consequence

a

is

function

a

a

man

but

the fact that the

Morning

of

tendency

become

to

the

as

aph.

a

acquisition

History is

philosopher of

former

place of nature

no

longer

generations

child of the

as

understood

(aph. 213;

Dawn

cf.

peculiarly

modern

furnishes only the almost worthless materials of Government II sect. 43).

The philosopher,

as

distinguished from the

man

in

aph.

207); he is

less demand to be

whom

not

only

philosopher

This

in

the

He

seems

characterization of

the

only

by

what

sense

of

the

remain

Gay Science

creates

the affirmative

sixth chapter on

true that

aph.

belongs to the future their time.

laborers, end).

beginning

Today;

with

raises

Greeks

to his

compared

philosophic

(aph. 211

the

contradiction

and

ever were such philosophers

Empedocles. Or does it

philosopher

existence

Nietzsche

and

(The

of

applies, however

the future

are

to have answered that question in

said near

rest

values.

precise

there

but the

the peak which does not permit

overcome.

in the

question whether

of

as

scientist, is the

scholar or

man

strictly speaking only to the philosophers whom men of the rank of Kant and Hegel

science

takes the

e.g. the natural gifts which

natural

540). Historicism is the

nature

complementary is justified (cf.

he had

may

that truth

(Locke, Two Treatises

themselves

for the

one

what

to understand everything in terms of its genesis, of its human

production:

still

(country).

and place

as a consequence of

given

of

realization

time (historical epoch) or that every philosophy belongs

of

definite time

enable

with

209). Historical study had come to be therefore also a greater danger to it than

the historicization of philosophy, the alleged

a

will

concerned

aph.

call

to

He is

the classical scholars and historians than

the natural scientists (cf.

natural

following

why he does this

and

consideration.

we

must

125, 340)? The

and

was

Heraclitus, Plato

therefore

overcome

also

philosopher

as

times

in

at

all

the philosophers were always the bad con

They belonged

then to

their

time,

not

indeed,

Interpretation

110

as Hegel thought, by being the sons of their times (Vorlesungen uber die Geschichte der Philosophie, Einleitung, ed. Hoffmeister, 149) but by being their step-sons (Schopenhauer als Erzieher nr. 3). As belonging

to their time and their

the

with

Europe

man

of

excellence

is threatened

which

the invisible

of

in

of

but

general

Russia

by

spiritual rulers

country if only as their step-sons, the the future are concerned not only

or

Europe (aph. 208): the

a united

its

place

the philosophers

of

precursors

philosophers of

of

preservation

therefore

must

become

future

must

become

the

Europe

a united

the

with

and which

without ever

becoming

servants.

In the whose

seventh chapter

he

virtues

Europeans

Nietzsche turns to "our

"we

but

there, are not "we tomorrow, we firstlings

scholars"

discusses

of the time after

"we"

Yet the

virtues."

of

century"

the 20th

philosophers

(aph. 227), i.e. the precursors of the "we free of the future. The discussion of the virtues and vices of

the

must

minds"

(aph. 214), scholars

in the

be

by

supplemented

a

discussion

the

of

and

virtues

the free minds. The virtues of the free minds had been discussed

vices of

chapter

second

must

virtues,

fundamental

but their

ambiguity;

Christianity. One

it

"Our"

say that

inseparable from their

morality is

inspired

is

are

which

vices

be laid bare.

also

by

characterized

by Christianity

by

and

a

anti-

"our"

morality constitutes a progress beyond the morality of the preceding generations but this change is no "our" increased ground for pride; such pride would be incompatible with

in

delicacy

can

moral

matters.

Nietzsche is willing to

spirituality (intellectuality) is the

it is the

that are

product

that

grant of

that it

in the

consists

a

high

moral

qualities,

to

men who

synthesis of all those states which one ascribes

moral,"

"only

ultimate

spiritualization

of

justice

and

that kind severity which knows that it is commissioned to maintain in the world the order of rank, even among the things and not only of

among men. Being the complementary man in whom the rest of existence is justified (aph. 207), standing on the summit, nay, being the summit, the philosopher has a cosmic responsibility. But "our are not virtues"

the

virtues

Nietzsche

the

of

makes

philosopher

to the

men

treating both

him from

identification

of

the

goodness

"only

are

concession

moral"

does

not

utilitarianism)

compassion,

which prevent

(altruism,

teachings

moral

reigning

with

future. The

the

of

who

as

well

the as

trivial, not to say with contempt; the superior morality which flows from that critique or which is its pre supposition does not belong to "our The reigning moralities

their

critique

by

moralists

as

virtues."

are unaware of

the problematic character of morality as such and this awareness of the variety of moralities (cf.

is due to their insufficient

186),

aph. sense not root

is

virtue,

older

is

moralists'

to these

"our"

a

than the

lack

self-criticism

of of

even

19th

"our

lack

historical

virtue."

century.

self-sufficiency modernity, its

of

great

It is

of plebeian

a novel

Europe,

for

The historical

sense.

ambiguous

an

longing

It is

phenomenon,

phenomenon.

or

it

something

Its

expresses the

different, for

Note

past

something

barbarians. It points

virtue, to

a

of

way

defect,

this

thinking

been

all

by

of the

opposite

("We immoralists"):

immoralism is

our

man

we

of

historical

the

beginning; it

sense."

which alone is left to is may say, the positive or reverse includes and completes "our great

Yet probity is

the phUosophers

"our

by

most

"our"

duty";

of

one

modified, fortified

an

of

the

delicate,

end

than

rather

future; it is

not

a

the

future; it must be supported, disguised, most spiritual

most

is directed toward the future. Surely our probity be permitted to become the ground or object of our pride,

power"

to

which

must not

for this For

with

virtue

is,

virtue characteristic of

wiU

have

who

the abolition

together

goes

"men

are

to the past rather than to the

points

those on

us"

immorahsm. Probity

our

of

side

between the

owes

immoralists

"Our

virtue.

probity, inteUectual probity; it virtue

is bent

which

morality

(aph.

of compassion manner

compassion with

and which

historicism,

the historical

of

to suffering (aph. 225). The is the only one in the chapter with an italicized

things

great

(226)

next aphorism

heading

its

of

(aph. 219)

the

and

suffering,

boasts

nature

side of our great

that transcends

The discussion

all earlier peaks.

which

morality

neglected

awareness

it

the reverse

living

and

and

plebeian

of

would seem that

to

consequence, "measure is foreign to us; and unmeasured"; hence we are half-

(aph. 223-24) is surrounded by a discussion 225): the historical sense mediates in a

sense

222

a

111

the infinite

by

higher than

a peak

As

alien.

or

titillated

are

we

the Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil

on

lead

would

a

with

English

us

back to

better understanding

(and to theism).

moralism

"our

of

it is helpful to

virtue"

the most powerful antagonist, the morality

indeed

preached

contrast

by

up

the

the basis of morality but contends that egoism rightly understood leads to the espousal of the

utilitarians which accepts

general

WhUe it

welfare.

That

is disgusting,

utilitarianism

the fundamental

egoism as

boring

and

naive.

egoism, it does not realize the fact that egoism is will to power and hence includes cruelty which, as cruelty directed toward oneself, is effective in intellectual probity, in "the intellectual To recognize the crucial importance of cruelty is indispensable if recognizes

character

of

conscience."

"the terrible basic text homo to be seen, if

is

"that

is to be "re-translated into task for the future: "there

eternal

a

(Will to Power

nr.

120).

Man

never must

text"

basic

nature."

man

altogether

humanity"

natura,"

That was

is

again

re-translation

yet

a

be "made

natural natural"

together "with the pure, newly found, newly redeemed (The Gay Science aph. 109). For man is the not yet fixed, not established beast (aph. 62): man becomes natural by acquiring his

(vernatiirlicht) nature"

yet

final, fixed state, its

character.

peak

(Aristotle,

nature,'

to

For the

although

nature of a

it is properly

through

and

in the

end, its completed

phUosopher

speak of

going back but

not a

into the high, free, even terrible nature of the Idols, 'Skirmishes of an untimely peak

being is its

Politics 1252b 32-34). "I too

an

naturalness..."

and man'

of

nr.

48). Man

the future as the

'return

ascent

up (Twilight

reaches

truly

his

com-

Interpretation

112

plementary man in whom not only man but the rest of existence is justified (aph. 207). He is the first man who consciously creates values on the basis of the understanding of the will to power as the fundamental

His

phenomenon. wUl

the highest form of the

action constitutes

most spiritual

to power and therewith the highest form of the wiU to power.

By

this action he puts an end to the rule of non-sense and chance (aph. 203).

As the

lichung of

the

of the

act

is

of man

highest form

at

of

the same time the

(cf. Will to Power

non-human

man's

will

peak of

614), for

nr.

Vernatiir-

to power the

the

anthropomorphization

the most

spiritual will

in prescribing to nature what or how it ought to be (aph. 9). It is in this way that Nietzsche abolishes the difference between

to

consists

power

the

world

world

of

appearance

Friihschriften,

Landshut,

ed.

It is however the and

chance,

brings to its is

history

235, 237, 273.) hitherto, i.e.

pp. of

man

und

conclusion

the

whole

historical

and

the true

PhUosophie', Die

the rule of non-sense

is the necessary condition for the That is to say, the V ernaturlichung

which

sense and chance. and

fiction (the interpretations)

or

(the text). (Cf. Marx 'Nationalokonomie

subjugation of non of man presupposes

process

a completion

necessary but requires a new, free creative act. Still, in this way history can be said to be integrated into nature. Be this as it may, man cannot say Yes to the philosophers of the future

which

without

by

no

means

saying Yes to the

past.

Yet there is

a great

difference between is, i.e. the

this Yes and the unbounded Yes to everything that was and affirmation of eternal

Instead

return.

explaining why it is necessary to affirm the eternal return, Nietzsche indicates that the highest achievement, as aU earlier high of

achievements, is in the last nature; in the last

"deep

down."

analysis

not

the

work

of

reason

but

of

thought depends on something unteachable on a fundamental stupidity; the nature of the individual, analysis all

the individual nature, not evident and universally valid insights, it seems, is the ground of all worthwhile understanding or knowledge (aph. 231; cf.

aph.

8). There is

an order of rank of

the natures; at the

summit of

is the complementary man. His supremacy is shown by the fact that he solves the highest, the most difficult problem. As we have observed, for Nietzsche nature has become a problem and yet he cannot do without nature. Nature, we may say, has become a problem owing to the fact that man is conquering nature and there are no assignable the

hierarchy

limits to that

As

a consequence, people have come to think inequality. Yet suffering and inequality are abolishing suffering the prerequisites of human greatness (aph. 239 and 257). Hitherto conquest.

of

and

suffering imposed gruesome

all

men

and on

man.

rule

are

have been taken for granted, as "given," as Henceforth, they must be willed. That is to say, the non-sense and chance, nature, the fact that almost

inequality of

fragments,

cripples

and

gruesome

present and past

is itself

it is

bridge to the future (cf.

willed as a

a

fragment,

a

riddle,

accidents,

the

whole

a gruesome accident unless

Zarathustra, 'Of Redemption').

Note

on

the Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil

113

While paving the way for the complementary man, one must at the same time say unbounded Yes to the fragments and cripples. Nature, the eternity of nature, owes its being to a postulation, to an act of the will to power on the part of the highest nature. At the end of the seventh chapter Nietzsche discusses "woman and man"

say

(cf.

aph.

237). The apparently clumsy transition to that subject which he questions the truth of what he is about to

transition in

a

claiming that it is not merely

by

down"

woman's

theme

expresses a

emancipation.

nature, i.e.

of

flattery,

merely his "fundamental stupidity deep a gesture of courtesy to the friends of

It indicates that he is the

natural

hierarchy,

to

about

in full

the

continue

awarness

the

of

problem of nature.

The

the future may

of

philosophers

Europe is

I'Europe des

still

nations

to a united Europe but

belong et

des

Germany

patries.

more

than any other part of non-Russian Europe has more of a prospect of a

future than, say, France or England (aph. 240, 251, 255; cf. Heine Elster IV 510). One could find that Nietzsche stresses in his chapter

ed.

and

on peoples

fatherlands

than her virtues: it

is

more

not so

the defects

difficult to free

of

one's

contemporary heart from a

Germany victorious

fatherland as from a beaten one (aph. 41). The target of his critique here is not German phUosophy but German music, i.e. Richard Wagner. More precisely, European nobility reveals itself as the work and inven tion of modern

France, whereas European commonness, the plebeianism ideas, is the work and invention of England (aph. 253).

the

of

the last chapter which he entitled "Was ist "noble" differs from because it is inseparable from extraction, origin, birth (Dawn of Morning, aph. 199; Goethe Wilhelm Meister's Lehrjahre [Sdmtliche Werke, Tempel-Klassiker, II

Nietzsche thus

vomehm?"

87-88] last

and

chapter

Dichtung of

(a) phUosophy

hfe;

thus

prepares

"Vornehm"

a of

und

prelude

Wahrheit, Vol. 2, to

a

philosophy

the philosophy

of

by

compassion

and

solitude

44-45).

future, reveals

philosopher replaces

(aph. 284). This is

it

of

medium

the future

philosophy of the future. The virtues of the differ from the Platonic virtues: Nietzsche

justice

the

the future as reflected in the

reflected

cit.

ed.

of

Being

the

shows

the

conduct,

itself of

as

the future

temperance one

of

the

and

illustration

"Vornehmamong many of what he means by characterizing nature by its Natur ersetzt die gottliche Natur. vornehme Die (aph. 188).

heit"

114 THE IDEA OF DEATH IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL Alexandre Kojeve (Complete

text of the last two lectures of the academic year 1933-34)*

Translated

In

a passage of

indicates its

and

lie

basis

at the

Hegel

principal

outlines

his thought

of

them.

menology in

particular.

primordial role that

Hegel begins

the

major

Phenome

the

themes of his phUosophy

purpose; he enumerates there the principles that

An understanding understanding of the Hegelian

from

Joseph J. Carpino

fundamental importance in the Preface to

19-24),**

nology (pp.

by

the principal consequences that flow

and

system

in its totality

In addition, this

passage

and

will

key

the

of this passage wUl provide

to an

to the Pheno

clearly the

show

the idea of death plays in the phUosophy of Hegel.

by indicating

his

what the novel and essential content of

according to him.

in, phUosophy He says this (p. 19, lines 24-27): consists

In my opinion,

itself,

and understands

just

which can

be justified only through the exposition alles darauf an) on this, that

everything depends (es kommt

(aufzufassen)

the True

(Wahre)

not

[only!

the System

of

one

as substance,

expresses

but

rather

as much as subject.

This of the

*

phrase

is directed first as

Originally

Hegel,"

edition),

of all against

"Substance."

"Absolute"

published as

Appendix

Schelling

II, "L'idee de la

mort

in Kojeve's Introduction d la lecture de Hegel (Paris pp.

his

conception

conception

dans la

Small brackets

philosophie

numbered

represent

footnotes

Kojeve's

use of

tion and sentence structure as closely as possible,

are Kojeve's; the translator uses brackets; text-size brackets indicate

In this

with

the gray

**

the result that those

matter

and cluttered pages of

always

the original

will understand.

edition

of

Meiner, 1952). Where Kojeve's a

So far

1937 as

edition of

content

translation of

punctua

insertions,

comprehen

are

familiar

(Parentheses in the

Kojeve's.)

References to the Phenomenology (which Kojeve's text

to the Hoffmeister

using

with

in English, may annoy the eye even where they do aid in Kojeve himself has been the model, and those who

and

sion.

text are

de

Gallimard, 1947; 5th

:

the translator's insertions. An attempt has been made to reproduce Kojeve's

in French

merely

527-73.

In the following translation asterisks.

and

But that Schellingian

the Phdnomenologie page

or

line

numbers

Hoffmeister), the 1952

as

"PhG")

are

do

not

correspond

(he

was

edition's equivalents are substituted.

is concerned, Kojeve's French

quoted passages.

cites

des Geistes (Hamburg: Felix

version

of

Hegel determines the

Death in the

traditional

of

his phUosophy in

places

sole exception of

extent, that

Descartes).

of

forgetting

to ah those that preceded it (with the

opposition

the phUosophies of Kant and Fichte and, to a certain

FoUowing

phUosophers attached themselves whUe

115

Spinozist conception, which, in its turn, represents a radical that is, Greek or pagan ontology. Hegel therefore

reiterates the

form

of Hegel

Philosophy

that the notion

Thales

Parmenides,

and

exclusively to the notion "Subject" of is just as

pre-Hegelian "Substance,"

of

primordial and

irreducible.

is

Philosophy be,

should

the correct

and

Real

the

of

is

Wahre)

not

description; it is

"revelation"

(=

Discourse

coherent

description) of Being and (Logos), the True (das

Being-revealed-through-discourse-in-its-reality.

enough therefore

for the

describe Being;

phUosopher to

describe revealed-Being [l'Etre-revele] the fact of the revelation of

or

rather,

True. Now if Truth (Wahrheit) is

the

of

complete

through

truth or a true

a

only

description

a

Being

[must]

and

through

give

It

he an

Discourse. The

is

not

must

also of

account

phUosopher

must describe the totality of what is and exists. Now in fact this totality implies Discourse and in particular phUosophical discourse. The phUoso

pher therefore or with

the

Subject

of

is

only with static-[and-]given-Being (Sein) is the Object of Discourse, but with the

concerned not

Substance, Discourse

which

and

of

In

other

words, phUosophy

Nature

as

not

It is

phUosophy:

is given to him; he Being explain himself to himself insofar [must] of himself. that

speak of

enough

[he is] speaking

as

must explain

and as natural

not

must also speak of

how

World, but

and

also as

for him to

himself

and

Being

and

of

why Being is realized, Man and as historical

only World. PhUosophy may not limit itself to being a PhUosophy of nature; it must also be an anthropology; in addition to the ontological bases of natural

reality it

capable of

investigate those

must

revealing itself

through

of

human reality,

which alone

is

Discourse.

It is by describing the True also as Subject, or in other words, by analyzing the specific characteristics of the human reality, that Hegel discovers the dialectical structure of Being and of the Real, and the onto logical category of Negativity that is at the basis of that dialecticity. And

it is in

real

the

and

describing the True and of Truth,

Hegel cited

(p.

it himself in 5-19): lines 20, says

Dialectic

a passage

Further, living Substance [i.e.. Subject; or,

what

objectively-real

is the

only to the

act-of-self-positing

(Vermittlung)

with

itself

givenl is Being which is in [living Substance is Being] which is in

neither static nor

thing,

extent

of

the

pure

dichotomy

he discovers the circularity

of

his phUosophy itself. that follows shortiy after the text just

that

substance

[l'acte-de-se-poser-soi-meme]

As Subject. Substance is very token the

same

that

therefore of

is the [dialectical-]

[dedoublementl

movement of

(Sich-selbstsetzens)

act-of-becoming-other-to-itself

Negativity,

simple-or-undivided

(Entzweiung)

of

truth truth

or

the

mediation

(Sichanderswerdens).

(einfache),

and

by

that

the simple-or-individual,

or

Interpretation

116

(entgegensetzende) duplication [doublement] (Verdopplung), which is distinction-or-difthe negation of that indifferent (gleichgiiltigen) (wieder) equally ferentiation (Verschiedenheit) and of its opposite (Gegensatzes). It is only this equal ity which re-constitutes itself, or the reflection within itself in other-ness (Anderssein), which is the True, land] not the primordial (urspriingliche) unifying-unity as such, that is, [the unity-unifying! immediate (unmittelbar) as such. The True is the be coming of itself, the circle which presupposes its final-term (Ende) as its purpose and the opposing

which

has it

[its] beginning,

as

This very

condensed

"dialectic"

Hegel's

truly

essential and

If Substance (with

Identity

and

is

and which

izative-development (Ausfiihrung)

by its

and

objectively-real

implies

passage

only through the

real-

final-term. all

the fundamental

notions

of

all

there is in his philosophy that is

natural

static[-and]-given-Being (Sein) has ground, the Subject of the Discourse

sums

up

new.

as

conceived

itself)

its

as

ontological

revealing that Being and itself, that is, Man, has Negativity as its ultimate basis. Now the Man who is dominated in his very being by Negativity is static[-and]-given-Being, but Action

not

creating itself. And it is whose result is

objectively-real

"mediated"

that

serves

with

the

it

Identity

Being,

the Act-of-positing-itself or of

only

["mediatise"] by

as a point of of

or

as a

"dialectical

negation of

departure. It is

that splits that

the

Negativity, Being into Object

movement,"

"given-Being"

associated and

in

creating [a] Man opposed to Nature. But it is also this same as human existence in the midst of Nature, that reunites

realized

Subject

the

Object in

and

"coincides"

Discourse

with

revealed-Being, is not

it,

the

and

primary

identity

of

"Subject"

is

and

Being which

is

reduced

which

of

adequation

be

therefore of

Man

wUl

he

"negates"

effected

all

by his

term,

Thus can

or given and natural

action.

Unity, in the

adequate

description

of

of

"Substance"

the

totality

of

"absolute"

by philosophy (to the elaboration of the human existence of its author the Wise Man

himself actively, as "Subject," as "Substance"). But the totality of the Real implies human exists only as a creative movement. Perfect and definitive Being (= Substance) and Discourse (= Subject) cannot ceases therefore to oppose

effected untU

have been

phUosophical

ence).

his imitators thought

the final coincidence

or

the end of

thought) the

"absolute"

appear

times,

when the creative movement

And that completion is revealed by further and is content to travel again (in

completed.

the fact that Man advances no

his

and

"immediate"

the Real

who [le Sage] to Nature taken

reality,

Parmenides

primordial, namely,

re-establishment of

of

Being as

true

and

speaks and which

and

the

therefore,

anew

consciousness, in which that it reveals. The True, or

through

thought, but [rather, the True is] the result of a long that begins by opposing Man to the Nature of which he

being

active process

The

and

Being

Subject, in Negativity,

road

already

covered

(by his

active exist

phUosophy, or the True in the strong sense of the only in the form of a circular description of the real

Dialectic taken in its totality. That phUosophy on the one hand describes the road that leads from the birth of Discourse ( = Man) in the heart of

Death in the

of Hegel

Philosophy

117

Being ( Nature) up to the advent of the Man who wUl reveal of Being through his Discourse, and on the other hand it [the =

philosophy] is itself

Totality implies becoming of this description, we description is the

the

this

Discourse

Discourse that

that

reveals

reveals

it,

the

totality

"absolute"

the Totality.

But that

as the process

as weU

of

Discourse. Thus, in arriving at the end of the philosophical are thrown back toward its beginning, which is the "final-term" its becoming. The of this described becoming

of

But

advent of absolute phUosophy.

is

that advent

also the goal we

from the start, because philosophy is not absolute, it does not describe the totality, except to the extent that it itself understands itself as describing its own becoming. But this description can be done only from

pursued

the point of view of absolute

phUosophy,

which

is

"beginning"

therefore the

or

the origin of ah adequate description. This is to say that just like

the

Totality more

any

ment,"

it

describes,

is,

that

as

indivisible whole, circularity

the

phUosophy

Totality]

sum

discourse that

totality, it himself (p.

says

in

and through

total of its circular

and therefore

its

be objectively realized its "develop

cannot

except

which reproduces the closed

of phUosophical

unmodifiable

Hegel

absolute

than the other [the

discourse

dialectic

guarantees

forming

of reahty.

its

an

It is this

unsurpassable and

absolute truth.

21, lines 3-8), in taking up

again

(after

having

explanatory note) the idea expressed at the end of the passage

written an cited:

The True is the Whole [le Tout]. Now the Whole is nothing but the essential-reality which completes-or-perfects-itself through its development. It must be said

(Wesen) of

the Absolute that it is essentially

in truth; entity

and

[a]

result, that

it is precisely in this that its

(Wirkliches),

The True,

or

nature

it is only

at

consists, to be

subject or act-of-becoming-itself

the

[an]

end what

it is

objectively-real-

(Sichselbstwerden).

Being-revealed-through-discourse, is

a

Totality,

that

is,

the

dialectical movement, which produces Discourse Being. The Absolute or the totality of the real is not merely

sum-total of a creative or

in the

midst of

Substance, but such

only

at

rather

Subject revealing

concludes with

its

own revelation.

And

perfectly; however, it is historical) becoming, which

the real

the end of its dialectical (= this

revealing

becoming

[ce devenir

implies human reality, which is not a selfgiven eternally identical to itself, but a temporally progessive act of creation [auto-creation]. revelateur]

This (natural

signifies that

self-creation of

and

the

Totality

Man is

effected

through the negation of the given

human). The human reality,

or

the Ego [le

Moi], is

therefore

"mediated"

"immediate"

not reality, but a dialectical or reahty. To conceive [of] the Absolute as Subject (and that is what is essen tial, according to Hegel), is therefore to conceive [of] it as implying a

natural

or

and as realizing itself not only as Nature but rather more as or Ego as Man, that is, as creative or historical becoming. [the] And this is what Hegel says (after a new explanatory note) in the sen

Negativity

tence that

follows

after

the passage cited (p.

21, lines 27-31):

Interpretation

118 Mediation is nothing

(Moment)

element

of

[an] equality-with-itself (Sichselbstgleichheit) which further) it is reflection in itself, the Ego existing-for-itself, pure Negativity, or [when it is!

other

than

(even

or

movesl-dialectically);

the

constitutive-

to its pure abstraction,

reduced

And Hegel

(after

goes on

What has just been

-simple-or-undivided

a new

said can also

be

becoming.

note) to say this (p.

by

expressed

22, lines 10-11):

saying that Reason

(Vernunft) is

a

teleological Action (zweckmdssiges Tun).

only Substance, but also Subject, is to Negativity in addition to Identity. It is also

To say that the Absolute is

implies

not

Totality Being realizes itself,

say that the to say that it is to say,

not

only

as

Nature, but

also as

Man. And

does not differ essentially from Nature except to the extent that he is Reason (Logos) or coherent Discourse en dowed with a meaning that reveals Being is himself not given-Being, but

create-ive

(=

Action (=

historical

that Man

finaUy,

free)

who

negate-ive

movement

because he hves in function

of

of

the

"goal"

the form of a

project or as a

negate-ive of the

given,

the

Man is dialectical

through

future, which presents (Zweck) to be realized

because he is

and

given).

Being

revealing

not

the extent that he creates himself through

himself

or

Discourse only itself to him in

real as

through action

Man

except to

(Werk). It is from [this] introduction into ontology of the fundamental category of Negativity or of Action (Tat or Tun, which is the "true being of Man") that flow ah the characteristic traits of Hegelian ( = "dialectical") phUos such action as a work

ophy.

From this results, among that Hegel formulates

of and

Among

as

consequences

that one [which consists in

note of cannot

the diverse

other

be

exhibited

"Science"

or

(dargestellt)

"System"

circular, description

process

is

23,

saying!

signifies

fact,

that

knowledge is

Science

or as

Now

totality

introduce

we cannot make

a

not objectively-real and

System.

in Hegel the adequate,

as soon as we

of

and

therefore

the real dialec

Negativity

or

create-

pretense to

any absolute, or admitting that the creative dialectical description of the completed dialectical pro

truth except

completed.

already know

hnes 21-24):

that flow from what has been said, we might take

except as

ive Action into given-Being,

definitive,

a consequence we

of the completed or closed

tical movement. And in

total and

things, foUows (p.

by

the process that ends up in a term whose negation is no longer the creation of a new term [ such a description] can indeed be

cess, that

only

is,

of

circular.1

1

According to Hegel no truth is possible before the completion of the dialectical historical) process. But that consequence is necessary only if we admit the dialecticity of the totality of Being. By admitting, on the contrary, that Negativity occurs only in human reality and that given Being is ruled only by Identity, we can (=

maintain past

of

the traditional

Man.

notion

of

truth at least in relation to

Nature

and

to the

Death in the And

briefly sum

finaUy, in concluding

up

the passage (pp.

his System

the essential traits of

as a

that he asserts concerning the

ah

of Hegel

Philosophy

119

19-24) in

which

whole, Hegel

dialecticity

of

he

exposes

says that we can

Being by

saying

that the Absolute is Spirit (Geist).

Hegel

expresses

himself

as

follows (p. 24, hnes 7-16

and

27-30):

[The fact! that the True is

objectively-real only as System, or that Substance is Subject, is expressed in the representation (Vorstellung) which speaks of (ausspricht) the Absolute as [being] Spirit, a most sublime concept, and [one] that belongs peculiarly to modern times and to its [Christian] religion. Only being (das Geistige) is objectively-real-entity (das Wirkliche): it is [on the one hand] essential-reality or entity-existing-in-itself (Ansichseiende); [it is on the other hand) the entity-which-re/a/ei-itself [to itself and to others) (das sich Verhaltende) and the specifically-determined-entity (das Bestimmte), other-being (Anderssein) and beingfor-itself (Fiirsichsein); and lit [das Geistige] is finally] the entity-which-remains in itself (in sich selbst Bleibende) in this specific-determination or in its being-outsideitself (Aussersichsein); that is to say that it [das Geistige] is in and for itself (an

essentially

spiritual-

und

fiir sich)

realm

of

....

Spirit

knows-or-is-aware-of itself [as being! thus developed

which

Spirit, is Science. It [Science] is the objective-reality it constructs [for] itself in its own element.

(entwickelt) that

as

of

Spirit

and

the

To say that the Absolute is Spirit is to affirm the dialectical structure Being and of the Real taken as a whole or as an integral totality. For

Spirit is, at the same time, [aU of the foUowing:] Being-in-itself (Identity, Thesis, given-Being, Nature), Being-for-itself (Negativity, Antithesis, Action, Man), and Being-in-and-for-itself (Totality, Synthesis, Work, Histo =

ry

"movement").

real-entity,

is, in the

and

it

Being dialectical

alone

is this. For

whatever manner:

human

or

totality, spiritual-entity is reality imphes everything that objectively-

concrete

[and that means] the natural World as much as and the Universe of discourse. Subject and

historical World

Object, Thought and Being, Nature and Man are but abstractions, when we take them in isolation, just as isolated discourses and particular thingish [chosistes] entities are abstractions. Only the sum total of Reality, revealed through

the

total

sum

of

Discourse, [only

such

objective-Reality; and this sum-total in a double

World

implying

the

Man

who speaks of

it

sense

a

sum-total] that

is precisely

is,

what

is

an

the natural

Hegel

calls

"Spirit."

To study the Real phUosophicahy by conceiving [of] it as Spirit is not, as did the Greeks and the phUosophical tradition,

therefore, to limit oneself,

to the phenomenological,

given-Being to

extend

metaphysical,

and of the natural

[and]

this triple description to the

and

ontological

"eternal"

create-ive

description

to his historical World. And it is thus alone that the described Real "spiritual." "trinitary," as dialectical or namely, as

Now the Man that Hegel has in

mind

is

of

Cosmos, but [it is rather] Action which is Man, and

not

appears

the one that the Greeks

they had perceived and that they bequeathed to philosophical posterity. This pretended Man of the ancient [or Greek] tradition is in fact

thought

a

purely

natural

(

=

identical) being,

who

has

neither

freedom (

=

Nega-

Interpretation

120

tivity),

history,

nor

individuality properly

nor

"represent,"

he

can

only

in

"essence,"

"idea"

to itself. Just like the life of an animal, his

determined

natural place

but

existence,

an

remaining identical

empirical-existence

is absolutely

that he occupies for aU time in the "swervings"

occasional

"chance"). And if he differs essentially from the [virtue of] his thought or his coherent discourse could never be appearance in the Cosmos, moreover,

the effect of

animal, it is solely

(Logos),

whose

by

nothing and creates nothing: It is (error remaining in fact inexplicable). is therefore incorporated into given-Being. And

But this Discourse

explained.

negates

to reveal the given real

content

that is, Man is, in the final

Discourse what

(topos)

ah and

[and] unchanging Cosmos (his

a given

midst of

being

by

the

real and active

for

given once and

or

eternal

Just like the animal,

speaking.

his

and through

there

analysis, is this

Being,

one and unique

which

thinks itself eternally in its given totality. Or better, as Spinoza wUl say later, what there is in the final analysis is [a] God who is Substance.

The Man that Hegel

in

truly

analyzes

Judeo-Christian

the

times"

in

contrary [that] Man

on the

the

form

of

"theology,"

or

Hegel

the course of

[forms] incompatible

And it is

with ancient and traditional science or phUosophy.

Christian]

itself in

maintained

"faith"

tradition that transmitted to

who appears

tradition, the only [one that is]

That tradition has

anthropological.

"modern

is

prephUosophical

that [Judeo-

the notion of the

free histor

ical Individual (or of the "Person"), [a notion] that this latter [Hegel] was the first to analyze philosophically, by trying to reconcile it with the fundamental notions of the pagan phUosophy of Nature.2 According to that Judeo-Christian tradition, Man differs essentially from

he differs from it, in Man is a "sin"

it in himself. Even

negate

laws (miracles!): To the

2

As

a

a

excellence).

But these three

their authors did

not

dare

"'naturalist"

of the

notions of

Hegelian

abandon

of

Spirit,

"objective."

and

ly

between Nature

so-called

(i.e.,

and

he is

and

explicit

Nature, he does opposed to

and

its

not submit to

and negates

along this way

preceded

it, he

is

by Descartes (first

Fichte (Christian philosophers

par

anthropology failed because traditional idea (and in the last analysis

the of

and of

that

is,

the

immortality

"sufficient of a

But Leibniz did

History,

it

at philosophical

attempts

"monad"

notion

"subjective"

obtains

was

[idea]: Identity!)

or

With his

in

living

Christian philosophy), Kant,

attempts at

"pagan"

while

extent that

fact, Hegel

of

matter

Nature,

in his thought alone, but by his very activity. Nature and for Man: He can and must oppose himself to it and

not

and

[anthropology]).

of

Man

Leibniz is

totality [which is] not

or of

the

"soul."

reason,"

at

see the essential

there is in Leibniz

As for Hegel

no

the

a

precursor same

time

difference that

anthropology

himself, he did

proper

not succeed

in reconciling his ("dialectical") anthropology philosophy of

the

of

with the traditional ("identical") Nature. He refused, rightly, to apply to Man the "naturistic" categories

Greeks,

abandoned their

(as ally

much

and

human

and

he

rejected

their pseudo-anthropology.

philosophy of nature, in as natural)

exclusively

his

own

anthropological.

trying

But,

wrongly, he

also

to apply to the sum-total of the real

dialectical categories,

which are

in fact

specific

Death in the

of Hegel

Philosophy

121

independent in the face of it; he is autonomous or free. And by living "as a in the natural World, by being opposed to it and to its laws, he creates there a new World that is his own; a historical World, in "converted" which man can be and can become a being radically other than what he is as a given natural being (Anderssein). In this historical stranger"

World,

and

through

he

himself,

creates

When Hegel

as an

individual

Man

World,

being

Judeo-Christian

his

makes use of

Being But

Man in

word

that is precisely

"Spirit"

in

order

or

and

to

tradition,

pagan

"Substance"

or of natural

sole

to

to underscore the

concerned

to the whole ancient

[one]

the

[of] him. And the

the Judeo-

as

anthropological notion of

notion

a tradition of

fashion

"Geist"

of the

origin

that

is

which

the same

For he is

phUosophy.

"modern"

oppose

in

conceived

anthropological tradition conceives

the whole of

up

unique of

his philosophy is nothing else but an attempt Subject, he means therefore that that philosophy

why, in the text cited, Hegel sum

is not any sort of "species": He is created, its kind. man

given

principal goal to render an account of the existence of

the natural

Christian

immutably

says that ah of

to conceive Substance as

has for its

"conversion,"

this free

representative of an eternal or

given-

(Sein).

if, according

to the

phUosophical

tradition

tradition, he

underlines

cited

and

text, Hegel detaches himself from the the Judeo-Christian

accepts

in this

same

himself from this latter tradition

text [the

on

a

fact]

point

of

that

pagan

anthropological

he

also separates phUosophical

extreme

importance.

The fact is that

the

Judeo-Christian

tradition is

anthropological

an

tradition, namely, theist (and "theological"). To be essentially (= dialecticity) of sure, the Judeo-Christians discovered the Man, which is to say his freedom, his historicity, and his individuality. religious

"spirituality"

But for

"spirituality"

them

is

realized and manifests

itself

fully

only in the

"objectively-real"

Spirit, is beyond, and Spirit, properly so-called, truly God: [i.e.,] an infinite and eternal being. Man himself, made in the image of God, is truly only to the extent that he is eternal, and he "spiritual"

"immortal"

by the every fact that he is Spirit. Man really World in this sense, that he lives also in a trans transcends the historical World that in a World (and not cendent only

is

eternal or

natural

"transcendental"

is immanent to Nature). This [transcendent] World is beyond Nature, among other things imphes Man taken in his empirical-existence

which

(Dasein); but "real"

death,

than

this

the

World is

natural

never more

said

to be more

"objective"

World here below. Man

to leave

it;

and

he

penetrates

also participates

and

still more

into it

in it

after

while

his

living,

been in it already before his birth. [Kojeve is doubtless referring here to intra-uterine baptism.] To say that Man has an "immortal (which is precisely the Spirit in him) is to admit the reality

by having

soul"

transcendent

of

that

the

immortality

does

not

depend

or on

World;

and

to

admit

that

the infinitude of Man. Now this

Man: It is

given

reality is

to

affirm

[transcendent] World

to him once and for ah,

being

"prior"

Interpretation

122

temporal Man who and essentially immutable in itself. It is on the contrary depends absolutely on this transcendent World: The historical World that Man creates in the here-below is in fact but a reflection in spatio-temporal Nature of the eternal World of the beyond. This eternal World is therefore not

just is

a

historical individual, properly speaking human: It is beyond the free as he is beyond animals and things. This infinite and eternal World divine World, and its one and unique totality, which is Spirit, is not

Man but God. Man alone

gains access

that he realizes and

fully

to God only

manifests

his

after

his death,

"dialectical"

"spiritual"

and

it is then

"spirituality."

Now according to Hegel temporal and finite. The Christian

notion of an

is contradictory in itself: Infinite

being

or

being

infinite

is necessarily Spirit

and eternal "natural"

is necessarUy

given-

"dynamic,"

namely, historic [and-] static-Being; and created or create-ive, being, is necessarily limited in time, which is to say [that it is] essentially mortal. And the Judeo-Christian tradition did indeed finaUy "spiritual"

or

take account of the matter. admitted

By

admitting

the

immortality

the reality of the divine World that is the "natural

his death (that death nullifying him as the integrating natural and human World here below). And by the force after

things, Christian

thought had to subordinate immortal

infinite transcendent God. It had to the true

historicity

fundamental

and

give

individuality

anthropological (=

of

soul, it

of the

Man

place"

of

element of the of the

logic

Man to his

of

eternal

up human freedom and therefore Man. At one stroke, the three

dialectical)

categories were applied

liter

ally only to the true Spirit, which is God: For Christian theological thought, Jesus Christ is the only free historical Individual properly speaking, the

being

freedom, historicity,

and

no more than simple effects of

individuality

divine

trans-human action of the trans-mundane

"grace,"

God. But

of the

that

even

ordinary

man

is, [effects]

of a

in applying these

the eternal God-Man one runs up against insurmountable difficulties. The Christ is truly autonomous only to the extent that he is God. But being God he can be nothing other than the one and unique

categories to

Being

himself while remaining eternally identical to himself. free historical Individual we have therefore that Substance-

who thinks

Instead

of a

Absolute that Parmenides already had in view, and

that

ing his of

ScheUing revived

at the

very

that

Spinoza rediscovered, Hegel was elaborat

moment at which

"dialectical"

or anthropological phUosophy.

Hegel wanted, from the start, to apply to Man the Judeo-Christian notion free historical Individuahty, unknown in pagan antiquity. But in [the "dialectical"

phUosophically analyzing that it implied finitude or temporality. He understood

course

a

of]

free historical individual

except

on

condition

that of

notion, he saw Man could not be

being

mortal

in the

term, that is, finite in time and conscious strong of his finitude. And having understood that, Hegel denied survival: The Man that he has in mind is real only to the extent that he lives and acts in the midst of Nature; outside the natural World he is a pure nothingness. proper and

sense of

the

Death in the

of Hegel

Philosophy

123

But to deny survival is in fact to deny God himself. For to say that Man, who transcends Nature effectively to the extent that he negates it (by Action), annihUates himself nonetheless as soon as he situates himself it

outside

in it

by dying

nothing beyond the "divine"

The

"transcendent"

would-be

or

"transcendental"

World is in reality only the historical human existence, [a world]

speaking) World of

he

World.

non-natural

beyond the temporal "God"

to say that is to say that there is

as an animal

natural

and

spatial

framework

of

which

does

(or

not go

the natural World. And

is objectively real only at the interior of this natural World, solely in the form of the theological discourse of Man.

where

exists

Thus, Hegel does

not

accept

Judeo-Christian

the

anthropological

tradition except in a radically secularized or atheistic form. The Spirit-

Absolute

or

Subject-Substance,

the

The Hegelian Spirit is the

Hegel speaks, is

not

of the natural

totality

God.

World

implies human Discourse revealing this World and itself. Or better, what is the same thing, Spirit is Man-in-the-World: the mortal Man

and and who

lives in

a

and of all that

And this is

He

of which

spatio-temporal

World

he

of

losophy,

Spirit. Now

becoming

spatio-temporal

tirely

"Spirit"

which appeared

historical

in

Hegel

what

says there that

ive-reality"

without

creates

God

and who speaks of ah

it, including says

is

implicitly

"Science,"

at the end of the passage cited.

that

"Science"

is nothing else but Hegelian phi the natural World at the end of the

this

in the

midst of

of the natural

totality

World,

the Wise Man [le

Sage],

the true meaning

of

History. Or better

stUl:

this discourse

ah the

The Spirit

spoken

that the

(

itself

being

discourses

than the

other

to the extent that it is en

the discourse of the perfect

revealed through

is the only "object

"Science"

Man. Spirit is therefore nothing

of

that exists in it

himself.

=

satisfied)

a simple

by

men

in the

Judeo-Christians

man or of

integration

of

course of

called

"God"

is in reahty Hegelian phUosophy, to the extent that the latter is absolutely true, that is, to the extent that it reveals correctly and completely all that has been, is, and will be. Now according to

Hegel,

the discursive

revelation of

Being

is

possible

only if the revealing or speaking being is essentially finite or mortal. Spirit (because there are no Hegel's Spirit is not therefore truly a "divine"

mortal gods):

It is human in the

sense

that it is a discourse that is immanent

to the natural World and that has for its

in its

existence

When Hegel

by

time

says

"support"

a natural

being hmited

and space.

that the

essential content of

his

whole

philosophy

can

up by saying that it interprets Substance as Subject or [that it] conceives the Absolute as Spirit, that signifies that this philosophy must

be

summed

above all

ing

in

phUosophically

render an account of

a complete and adequate manner

Real. It

achieves

coherent creates.

fashion

the

itself

as a

totality

of

Discourse

Being

reveal

and of

the

by explaining how and why Man comes to speak in a himself and of the World in which he lives and that he

this of

And that

explanation

is

a

phenomenological, metaphysical,

and

Interpretation

124 description

ontological

Now to describe Man "finite"

Man

of

understood

free historical Individual.

as

free historical Individual is to describe him

as a

level; as and level; temporal, on the phenomenological level. On this last level, Man as as a being who is always conscious of his death, [who] often accepts it, and, aware of what he is doing, sometimes inflicts it on freely [thus]:

as

in

through

and

himself,

or

spatial

the

on

and

the ontological

on

"worldly"

metaphysical

"mortal"

"appears"

"dialectical"

himself. Thus the

in the final

analysis a

or anthropological

philosophy of death

(or,

phUosophy of Hegel is is the same thing: of

what

atheism).

Analysis Hegel

of the passage of the

itself, is

Preface to the Phenomenology in which of his phUosophy shows clearly the pri

that the idea of death plays in that phUosophy. Acceptance

mordial role

without reserve of the

fact

death,

of

human finitude

or of

the ultimate source of ah of Hegel's

draw

than

themes

outlines the major

out

the

ah

this fact.

existence of

even

consequences,

According

thought, the

most

to that thought, it is

conscious of

does

which

no more

ultimate,

by voluntarUy

the

of

accept

the danger of death in a Struggle for pure prestige that Man appears

ing

for the fust time in the

natural World; and it is by resigning himself to it through his discourse, that Man arrives finally at death, by revealing absolute Knowledge or at Wisdom, in thus completing History. For it is

by

starting

from the idea

out

"absolute"

the

philosophy,

rendering

being

an account of the

conscious of

Thus, Hegel's ance of

death

the

same.

and

of

fact

its finitude

is

Wisdom

it himself in

so

or

phUosophicaUy in the World of a finite

and

words

of

it

it likes.

as

the conscious

definitive

many

his Science

of

disposing

and sometimes or

works out

capable

of the existence

as complete and

understood

says

Hegel

that

alone

Knowledge

absolute

Hegel

death

which

accept

annihUation are one

in

another passage of

ff.), [which is] of absolutely pivotal importance. And it is in this truly remarkable passage that we grasp the ultimate only reading the Preface (p. 29

themes

Hegel's thought, its import.

of

its true significance,

understand

and

take

account of ah

The text

hne 23, to

be translated

of this passage can p.

The activity (Tatigkeit)

of separation

understanding

(Verstandes), (that is,]

worthy-of-awe

(verwundersamsten)

absolute

[power!. The

holds (halt) its

somewhat as

foUows (p. 29,

30, hne 15):

circle

(Scheidens) is

of

the

and the

which

constitutive-elements

is

power

greatest

at rest

[by

(Momente)

as

the force and the

tof all!,

being!

[does

or

closed a!

work of

[which is!

(Macht)

the

the-most-

better still, [of the!

in itself

and which

substance, is immediate

relationship (Verhaltnis) and consequently not at all (nicht) worthy-of-awe. But [the fact! that the accidental (Akzidentelle) as such separated from its periphery (Umfange), [that] the entity-which-is-bound (Gebundene) and which is objectively-real only in its connection (Zusammenhang) with something-else, achieves an empirical-existence

(Dasein) [the of

of

its

own

expression of!

thought

(abgesonderte) freedom, [all that] is the Negative; it is the energy abstract-Ego (Ichs). Death, if we wish so to

and a separate-or-isolated

the

(Denkens),

prodigious

of

the

(ungeheure)

pure

power of

Death in the Philosophy of Hegel

125

(Unwirklichkeit) is what-there-is-that-is-most=terrible (Furchtbarste), and to sustain [maintenir] death is what requires the greatest force. Power less beauty hates the understanding, because it [the understanding] demands (zumutet) this of it; which it [beauty] is not capable of. Now the life of the Spirit is not [that] life which shudders (scheut) before death and [merely] protects itself (rein bewahrt) from wasting-away (Verwiistung), but [it is] that [life] which supports death and conserves (erhalt) itself in it. Spirit achieves its truth only in finding itself in absolute rending (Zerrissenheit). It [Spirit] is not this [prodigious] power by being the Positive which turns away (wegsieht) from the Negative, as when we say of some thing: this is nothing or [this is! false, and having [thus] gotten rid of it (damit fertig),

call that unreality

something else; no, Spirit is that

we pass on therefrom to

that it

contemplates

(verweilt)

only to the

extent

the Negative full in the face (ins Angesicht schaut) [and)

abides

it. This

with

abiding-with

power

[sejour-prolonge] (Verweilen) is

the

magical-

force (Zauberkraft) which transposes (umkehrt) the Negative into given-Being (sein). This [power of Spirit, or this magical-force,! is the same thing as what we called [p. 19, line 27! the Subject, which,

above

existence to specific-determination,

diateness

in

(Unmittelbarkeit),

general

(nur iiberhaupt

that

by

giving in its [own!

empirical-

element an

abstract Imme-

dialectically-suppresses

(aufhebt) is, [an Immediateness] only existing-as-a-giv en-being

seiende), and

[which! is precisely thereby [par

cela

meme]

[vraie-ou-veritable] (wahrhafte) Substance, [that is,! given-Being or Immediateness which does not have Mediation (Vermittlung) outside it, but which true-or-genuine

is itself that Mediation.

In

order

to understand the somewhat enigmatic

[which is] otherwise perfectly ing before our minds. is the

PhUosophy

search

clear and

for

Wisdom, in

beginning of this passage, we must

univocal,

and

Wisdom is

have the follow

the

fullness

of

self-

Wisdom, Hegel intends

consciousness.

By

therefore, in

last analysis, to take account of himself and to give an his self [se rendre compte et rendre compte de soi]: [an

accounting

of

is,]

account, that one

to

which

pher or of a

aspiring to

must

of what

and

have here

matter]

he is

[also

the

course

"Understanding."

It is

and

he

apparent

says

by

reveals

his discourse

the

being

that he is not. In phUosophizing,

his

an account of

not a question of some passive

of the result of an

"power,"

being]

he does. Now his activity, the itself, is that of a phUoso

reduces

of] observing this

notes that

given, but [rather that it is

which can "force,"

own philosophical

discourse, Hegel

"activity"

vail"] and which requires a great the

to

claim

and of what

therefore above ah give

discourse. Now in [the we

laying

his truly human existence Wise Man [un Sage], who

that he himself is

Hegel

and

the

be

caUed a

provided

"labor"

a

["tra

by what he caUs here Understanding is a

He declares therefore that the that it is

truly "worthy

"Understanding"

that

signifies

Man, because it is

specificaUy human in

distinguishes him from

animals and

from

awe."

of

the

things.

here

what

faculty It is

of

is truly

and

discourse that

also what

is

essential

in every phUosopher, whoever he may be, and therefore in Hegel himself. The whole question is to know what it is. Hegel tehs us that the Under standing

(=

Man) is

an

"absolute

power,"

which manifests

itself in

and

Interpretation

126

"act-ofor even better, as [the] "the activity of (Scheiden). But why does he say that? He says it because the activity of the Understanding, that is, human thought, is essentially discursive. Man does not reveal instantaneously, as in a lightning-flash, the totahty of the real: He does not grasp that totality separation."

through

separating"

in

He

one single concept-word.

partial

them

discourses,

taneous,

by

isolated

by

one, the

totality,

by

words or

separating

to be able to do so; and it

order

extended

reality.

whole that

by

constitutive of

is only the sum-total of in time, that can reveal the total, indeed the simul Now in fact, these elements are inseparable from the

from it in

his discourse,

reveals one

the elements

they constitute, by [virtue

being bound up

of]

themselves

among

temporal, namely, material, interconnections, which are "miracle," and the indissoluble. Then separation is therefore indeed a and

spatial

power that effects

The was

it

weU merits

force

absolute

in the final

or power

analysis

"absolute."

being called of Understanding

nothing but

the power or

that Hegel had in mind

force

Whenever the

universe.

describe any isolated object,

we

In speaking

speak of them as though

dog

things,

the

places

in the

and

dog

under

by

moment

a

in

from

for example, we Now in fact, as real

the world.

real

World,

they

and

be

cannot

from

separated

this table, even if in fact they are separated distance of a thousand kUometers. Now this

force

no real

of

it. And that

oppose

separating

and

connection or repulsion

is

power

not at aU

in recombining things in

fictitious

really transform the aspect therein a World of culture.

GeneraUy

speaking,

of

the natural

create

when we

et nunc.

The

the

"absolute,"

[en tant que] detached from its given hie et differs in no respect from the real

where and

hie

et nunc

mined

verse, or

in

nowhere,

is to

of which

dog is, as concept] "any

is here

and

always and never.

separate

it from its

a univocal manner

"simplified"

real

dog

except that this

by

given

concept of

wish,

after

["un

chien

a real

creating

entity,

we

concrete

now,

Now,

whUe

to

is every entity from its

which

concept

to detach an

"material"

it is

dog its

support, [which

is] deter

the rest of the given spatio-temporal uni

it has become

concept, not only dog"

by

thing is that thing itself as nunc. Thus, the concept "this

that entity is a part. That is why that as we

through work,

World

concept of a

dog"

"related,"

that

power

his discursive thought

once realized

[and]

this very

at

is sufficiently powerful "ideal." or For it is in

and through

that man forms his technical projects, which,

detach it from its hie

what

isolates them through his thought, can, in them as he sees fit. He can, for example, place who

thought has to separate and recombine things is in effect

because

the rest of

dog,"

"this

or of

were alone

they

we abstract

table"

the table occupy at a given moment quite determinate

But man, that thought, [re-]combine this

"this

of

surrounds them.

to

that

of abstraction

find in Man.

we

"this

entity

a concept.

dog,"

quelconque"],

can

be

It is thus

but beyond that

"dog

in

general,"

altered

that this

[it is,

as

quadru-

Death in the "animal,"

ped,"

and

etc., power of

crafts, is

ive

that

again

once

the sciences, arts,

Nature

against which

power,

[ah]

the source of

at

"absolute"

an

And

simply

and

can oppose no effect

resistance.

It is

not

the

natural

The

goes so

essence

far

"dog"

But it

to

is

separated

But

does

a

of

the

the meaning of

or

word

a

"essence"

float in

not

discourse

spatial and temporal world.

The

from this

is

concept

becomes

from

dog

that

not an

discourses]

or

always

"meaning"

or

It is necessarily

the void:

[words

only thought, but existing

or

nounced, written,

absolute

it [the essence] into beyond space-time. Once

"hyper-celestial,"

"meaning"

The

"essence"

separate an

cannot transport

[that is] so to speak detached from its natural support, the a world

"idea."

as

spatial and temporal

"entelechies."

or

has] become

right in pointing

was

"material"

only in

"essences"

and now.

Aristotle

and space.

exist

the

are

Understanding

support:

barks here

runs and

"ideas"

they

of which

power of

time

situated outside

out that the platonic

things,

to say that the real entity [which

however,

correct,

is

a concept

its

is

which

separation,

"Being."

even

127

of Hegel

Philosophy

in

pro

the midst of the

"idea"

"meaning"

or a

[merely], but [it is rather] a word-having-a-meaning, or a coherent discourse (Logos). Thus, the absolute power of the Understanding does not separate the essence-idea from its natural support except to attach it, as idea, to the specific support of a discourse that is itself also [something] meaning-

here

and now

But it

from its

(since it is

it is

extent that

is

natural support

or of a

power."

awe"

"worthy

only to the

case that the separation of the

not an event that

Nature, but [rather it is]

"Understanding,"

"absolute

discourse-endowed-with-a-mean/ng by some concrete man).

less the

remains no

the midst of

a

comprehended

of

Now

"labor"

we can

takes place spontaneously in

the result of an

that requires a

indeed say,

with

"force"

Hegel,

"activity"

of the

endowed with an

that this power

task of phUosophy

and that the principal

"essence"

or of

is

Science is

to take account of it.

But the

They

question. "Subject"

and

why

have time.

in

By

posed,

went amiss

saw and posed the problem wrongly.

is

also

as

concept,

that

[words]

attempts

the miracle in

They

spoke of

the

such, in asking themselves how asking] why and how it

is, [by

but they forgot to say that

meaning,

in [their

[and] in explaining

"Thought"

Being

with a

question

general or of

a meaning;

dowed

Hegel

phUosophical precursors of

at] responding to the

there are also

discourses

that men speak, write, or think in

can en

space and

thus simplifying the problem they arrived, to be sure, at a result.

Parmenides

affirms the

identity

of

Being

and

Thought; Aristotie

speaks of

totality; Spinoza, taking his inspi ration from Descartes and [in turn] inspiring ScheUing, says that Thought is an attribute of Substance. Hegel does not contest this result of the philos a

Being

that thinks itself eternally in its

ophy that

Being

and

preceded

Thought,

nothing very

his

own.

remarkable.

He

says

only

that the

relationship between

[preceding] phUosophy had in view, In order truly to give an account of the

which

that

was

relation-

Interpretation

128

ship in question, it

have

would

identify,

to

sufficed

with

Hegel, Concept

and Time; or, what is the same thing, to affirm the temporality of Being itself. For the concept, or more precisely the meaning of Being, differs in no respect from Being itself, except for the absence, in the meaning, of the being of that Being. And the same holds for the meaning of any thing

is,

that

"Being"

is

meaning

"subtraction"

the

Time,

than

integration

an

thing is,

of a

meaning

is the integration

Being

since

as we

say, that very

thing

Being

way that the The essence-

such a

general.

minus

its

Now

existence.

being Being is nothing other from the present, in which it is, into

pass

more), and in which it is therefore only (or essence without existence). And since this is no new meaning "old" that is in but [rather or past Being, we the only] an present, Being the past, in which it is

not

(is

in

from

that removes the

which makes

is, in

of all that

of all meanings

no

pure

say that Being is an essence that has acquired [an] existence; or, what is the same thing, [we can say] that the being is not Being solely, but [also] can

or, what is

Concept;

meaning to the very the same past

being

Being

yet, it is (this goal,

as

a goal

the same thing, [we can say] that

again

is in

that

the present and wiU

also essence without which

has

a

existence),

is the transformation

of

be in

we can

the

future (or,

not

Being

has

say that

the future into the

present

besides nothing but the is, of Being into Concept):

the grant of existence to essence, which is

or

transformation of the present into the past, that

[ah of]

has

a

l'etre

which we can express also

d'etre (that l'Etre]).

par

Being

coincides

Thought is the

is the

what

meaning; or,

raison

its

Being

that it is (as Time). In the same way, since it is

extent

by

same

saying that the very being of Being thing [we can say] that Being has a

being the thought of being by Being Thus, if Being and Time are but one, we

raison

pensee

de

can say that itself eternally, and that its Substance or, if we prefer, [that Thought is]

that it thinks

Thought,

with

[la

attribute of

"goal."

Hegel himself

him,

would also agree

this relationship between

"sphere"

Parmenides,

of evokes

in the text cited),

"Substance"

(of

which

or

he

relationship] has nothing "immediate,"

says "given."

or "labor,"

from its

no

or

to putting it that way. Except that for

Being

of

the

[in the midst] speaks as

of

weU)

"miraculous"

Hegel. Now

Thought in the

and

Aristotelian

"Circle"

midst

of the

(which Hegel

the Spinozan and Schellingian

Hegel

[

would

insist that

this

it. For this relationship is "natural," signifies, in Hegel,

about

"immediate"

And in fact this relationship presupposes no "activity," no For there the "essence" is not separated or "power."

"force"

"natural"

support: The essence of Being subsists in Being itself in it alone, in the same way as the essence of the dog subsists uniquely in the dog (and that is why there cannot be tables, for example, in this Being that is, [there cannot be any] artifacts). There is here neither

and

action nor

labor

its immutable

What is

nor

power, because

identity

with

given

Being

remains as

it is given, in

itself.

"miraculous,"

on the

contrary, is

precisely

the separation that

Death in the the

Understanding

nature."

it in say

For it [the separation] is effectively "against

effects.

Without the intervention

would exist

only in

and

through

a univocal manner

that

by

of

real

their

"dog"

Understanding, the essence dogs, which would in return determine the

And that is why

existence.

very

the relationship between

"natural"

129

of Hegel

Philosophy

dog

the

and

the

we can

"dog"

essence

is

"immediate."

But when, thanks to the absolute power of the Understanding, the essence becomes meaning and is incarnated in a word, "natural" there is no longer any relationship between it and its support; or

otherwise,

[they

are]

that have nothing in

words

be (dog, chien, Hund, etc.), [ otherwise support for one sole and selfsame essence, same meaning.

realities, these words]

having

whatever

as

they may

could not serve as very-

ah one single and

There has been, therefore, a negation here of the given as relationships between essence and existence); that

"natural"

(with its

given

among them insofar

common

phonetic or graphic spatio-temporal

is, [there has been]

creation

(of

concepts or of

word-having-a-meaning,

have nothing to do, by themselves, with the meaning that is incarnate in them); in other words [there has been] action or labor. Now if the traditional conception of [the conjuction] Being-Thought which

as

words

possibility of a discourse revealing the meaning of what how and why Being has meaning, it does not say how and is, by explaining discourse becomes real, that is, how and why we manage in fact to why takes account

of the

being"

"disengage the meaning from the of words that have nothing in common been

created out of whole cloth with an eye

precisely the reahty

of

discourse

that

to incarnate it in a collection

and

that meaning and that have

with

is the

to that incarnation. Now it is miracle that

must

phUosophy

explain.

What is miraculous, inseparable from existence;

or

says

[some]

better

Hegel, is the fact that some thing that is reaUy thing achieves nevertheless a separate

other

that a simple attribute or

yet

"accident"

becomes

an

autonomous reality.

Now the

essence

is

a

"bound-entity,"

to its support, and it is

[tied]

something-other"

"objectively-real only in its connection with that is, with its support. Nevertheless, the Understanding rating the essence from its existence of or

its

own"

natural support and procures

by incarnating it in

discourse. And that

a

for it "an

spoken, written,

"empirical-existence"

of

its

own of

ple, the meaning

essences

bound to their

embodied

in the

by

the essence that

For the

subject to the

respective natural supports

their

"dog"

word

sepa

empirical-

freedom."

a univocal manner

in

or thought word

has become meaning is also its "separated-or-isolated meaning embodied in the word and in discourse is no longer necessity that rules are] determined in

itself,

than succeeds

hie

et nunc.

Thus,

can continue

for

[that

exam

to subsist

even

dogs have disappeared from the earth; it can (by being transmitted by radio, for example) overcome obstacles [that would be] insurmountable for after

a real

dog; it [the

the latter [the

real

word] can be placed

dog];

and so

where there would

forth. And it is

this

be

no room

"separated

for

freedom"

Interpretation

130 the "absolute

and

for

of error,

allows the

it flows that

which

condition the

meaning

in

embodied

words to

be

corresponding essences, bound to their

than the

would

from

possibility For this

which pre-Hegelian philosophers could never account.

"Freedom"

wise

power"

combined other

natural

supports,

be. "activity,"

It is this

disengaging

capable of

from

the meaning from

Being,

of

embodying the meaning-essence separating in discourse [ it is this] that is the miracle for which philosophy (or more precisely, Science and Wisdom) is supposed to account. And it was in [the essence

course

of] seeking to

the fundamental

account

for it that Hegel discovered (or

(ontological) category

"Negative"

the

existence and of

[le

"Negatif"],

Negativity,

of

made

he

precise)

calls

here

"negative-or-negate-ive-entity"

the

or

which

This Negativity is "the energy of disengages the meaning from Being by separating essence from existence. It [this Negativity] is what is "the energy of the pure "thought," that is, the Understanding and its engendering [r"entite-negative-ou-negatrice"].

thought,"

which

abstract-Ego"

discourse. Now

whatever people

may

faU from

World, being

a

the form under which

Identity

being

(Selbst)

on

The

as a

ence of

discourse,

of which

the world.

passage

ively-real only in its animal

connection with something-else":

that serves him

as

and

support,

he is

and opposes

himself to it. He

which

him to

move and

thinks

not

incarnate

and who speaks.

becomes in him penetrated

by

effective "activity,"

empirical-existence

cultural,

social or

an

[which is] or a

for his

empirical freedom,"

from the way acted, if

moved and

therefore

"absolute

"worthy

"labor"

a real freedom"

differently

have

and were not

with

"Understanding,"

the

his "separated or

Negativity Endowed "force"

an

produces, in [or through]

technical

to act completely

the animal that incarnates him would

that animal did

by

himself from this World

[for] himself "an

essentially different from every purely natural And he acquires [for] himself "a separate-or-isolated

which permits

ed

without

own,"

existence.

who

creates

he is nothing

pure nothingness outside

the natural World. Yet nevertheless he separates

in

must

philosophy

than the miracle of the exist

else

And as a matter of fact we can apply to Man from Hegel that I have [heretofore] interpreted in "bound-being" to Discourse. For Man is also a that is "object

himself the reference

of

account, is therefore nothing

Man in

on the

free historical speaking individual.

miracle of the existence

render an

his

"personal-Ego"

or

level,

(Ich)

Negativity

"appears,"

phenomenological

an

spatio-

an

in given-Being) is the human the metaphysical level: It is the Man who

in

subsists

of

belongs properly to "abstract-Ego"

human Ego. What is

the ontological level (this Ego

the

that

waters."

this Ego has necessarUy an empirical-existence in the natural

temporal on

void, "above the

the

"thought"

"Ego,"

have said, discourse does

sometimes

heaven, and it does not float in If it [that is, discourse] expresses a not

an

which awe,"

of

[which is]

historical World.

Man

rational or

World contrary-to-nature, own

Ego

power,"

"empirical-existence"

creat

the

Death in the

Therefore, just hke the discourses of Being, nor [is he] the effort

by

an absolute as

or,

"Substance."

a

power, and he is that

Hegel says,

131

he utters, Man is not He is the

that

"accident"

incarnate,

of Hegel

Philosophy

power

itself: He is

"negative-or-negate-ive-entity"

given-

a

result of

Negativity

(das Negative).

It is only by comprehending Man as Negativity that we [can] comprehend "miraculous" him in his human specificity, making of him an Ego who thinks

and

"separates"

speaks, or who

the essence from its natural or given

"connection"

with existence.

We know, besides, also

know that

action,"

it is in it

(Phenomenology,

order to

level "the true

being "Individuality is

and

Understanding

of

Man is his

objectively-real"

alone that

level it is through the

we

know, finally,

action of

that

the

on

the struggle that Man

himself for the first time in the World

nomena,"

actualized

"abstract-Ego"). We

subsist as

236, hnes 25-26). And

p.

phenomenological "manifests"

Act (in

on the metaphysical

and that

level, Negativity is

that on the ontological

as negative or creative

of

natural

"phe

that it

is in consequence of the action of labor that "appears" in this World with his thought and his words.3

Now Negativity, taken in isolation, is pure Nothingness (on the onto logical level). This Nothingness nihUates as [the] Action (of the abstractEgo) in Being. But Action nihUates by annihUating this Being, and there fore [also]

by

Negativity

therefore is no other

in it

presence

3

annihUating itself,

Hegel

says

the translation

thing

future,

of a genuine

Being it

is only Nothingness. Being (or the

than the finitude of

which will never

be its present;

so, in Section A of Chapter TV of the Phenomenology.

the first

chapter of

and

See above,

Introduction."

[That is, "In Place of an the English translation of Kojeve's Introduction to

[as] "By Way

printed

Introduction,"

since without

of

Hegel, edited by Allan Bloom, translated by lames H. Nichols, Ir. (New York: Basic Books, 1969).] Action reverses the "natural" course of Time in which temporal given-Being or [Being] having a meaning endures. It [i.e., Action] introduces the primacy of the future in Time, in which Being is and is given only the

Reading

in the [d'un

of

present.

projet

real presence

[le

to present or

"artificial"

past as

spoken word

future,

dominated and

by

better,

as

Action),

for the future

the future has a

the

existence

That is why it can in some manner be directed which it would be the essence) and oriented

(of

existence, which

is that

of

discourse (of

which

it

will

be the

as a project

already and

penetrated

discourse. The

the

realization of a project

Action (or

in discourse [projet discursif] that the future is really the future. To be sure, the project realizes itself in the present, and it is

And it is

present as

in the

given existence.

"natural"

an

meaning).

are

Action is the

and through

in Being. Now the future is also, like the past, the nothingness of being meaning. But this meaning was not and is not really

away from its toward

present of

de l'etre], that is, its

neant

attached

For the

d'avenir]: In

realized.

But the present,

determined

real created

by

by

the

future,

and

Action is therefore

[parole]. It is Action (=

Man)

therefore the past, of the project

which

subsists

in it in the form

a real revealed

by

the

past

present

(to the

(to the

extent

extent

or

that creates the World dominated

the World of Science and the arts, in the midst of a

by

thought

that the World

that the World is living).

is inanimate

natural or

of

the

by

World

"material")

Interpretation

1 32

Action [therefore] is essentiaUy finite. That is why (on the metaphysical the historical World, created by Action, has necessarily a beginning "appears" (on and an end. And the entity that is Action in its very being

level)

the phenomenological

level)

to itself and to others as

That is why, in the text cited, Hegel

Negativity

that

Action,

if Action is

and

in his human

deferred,

or

"appearing"

Negativity

speaking existence, only itself.

render

speaking, is to

as

irremediably

Death the

a

as

is. But if Man is

Death, [then] Man is,

death: [a death]

an

account, phUosophicahy,

accept without

flinching

describe, on the three phUosophical levels [i.e., ical, and phenomenological], its significance

more or

terrible"

the

import. Now that is

is

most

force."

requires that acceptance. For the Un its discourse, reveals the real and reveals itself. And it [the Understanding] is born of finitude, it is only by thinking death

derstanding, since and

by

and

of

through

speaking of it that it is truly what it is: discourse conscious of itself its origin. But Hegel knows also that "powerless beauty" is

incapable

of

bowing to

the romantic,

[and]

Nothingness itself

Now, it is]

as of

[sort

that

of the

Sage],

is,

of the

Understanding. The esthete, of death and speak of

[very] idea

something that is.

which

Spirit is

Spirit is

the

Spirit"

is

not that

[sort

of

life] "which

itself from wasting away, but [rather it." supports death and maintains itself in

and preserves

hfe]

of

that

flee

the "hfe of the

before death

point

the requirements

the mystic

Hegel,

says

shudders

[le

what

Understanding

that the

says

hfe

of

to

the ontological, metaphys and

that acceptance of death is "what requires the greatest

and

The

less

Discourse, or fact of death, and of

precisely what phUosophers before Hegel had omitted doing. Hegel was not surprised at this. For he knew that death "is

He

mortal.

"unreality"

and conscious of

Therefore: to Man

caU

"negative-or-negate-ive-entity"

the

or

can

Being

by

revealed

speech

[la parole], and the Wise Man

the existence of the philosopher or of the

World and of itself. Now it is only in becoming his finitude, and therefore of his death, that man truly be conscious of himself. For he is finite and mortal. conscious of the

conscious of comes

In addition, Spirit "achieves its truth only by finding itself in absolute For once again, Spirit is the Real revealed by Discourse. Now Discourse is born in the Man who opposes himself to Nature, or who rending."

in Struggle

negates

Labor, of the are

the natural

Real into Man

born,

and

which reveal

opposition, this

first

by

and

it is only

conflict

of

given

the Real

and

between Man

at the end of

the Wise Man

is

and through

Understanding

and

"rending"

its Discourse

thus transform it into Spirit. This and the given

Real,

manifests

itself

human revelatory [revelateur] discourse times, at the termination of History, that the of

For it is [only] then that we that it "achieves its But it rediscovers itself only in

re-joins reality.

say that "the Spirit re-discovers

which

himself,

to him. It is from this

Nature that the

the erroneous character

discourse can

the given animal that he is

World that is

itself,"

the adequate revelation of reahty.

and

truth,"

Death in the through that

and

forms that

"rending"

in the

of error

[that] die, in

and

It is death that him

conscious

Thus,

Man does

and

not arrive at

in him

death

and

or absolute

Nature, is

which

therefore

long as, in the way Negativity that is the very

as

that foUow each other, that are

destiny,

ness so

manifest

the historical process. And this process is

Man in

engenders

himself

of

133

born,

there

time.

to his final

progress

of Hegel

that is manifested in the many

["dechirement"]

course of

of a series of generations

fore,

Philosophy

fully

Wisdom

and

it is death that

that of

conscious

his

of

fuUy

finitude.

own

the fuUness of self-conscious

or at

the vulgar, he feigns an ignorance

of

makes

Man

the Wise

the

of

of his human existence, and that is only as struggle and labor, but moreover finitude. The vulgar treat death as something of which source

him,

to

not

"It is nothing, or it is false"; and by turning away from it most day.4 But if the phUos quickly, they hasten to pass on to the order of the opher wants to attain to Wisdom, he must "look the Negative full in the

one says:

face,

[must]

and

it."

abide with

revealing itself

Negativity Man,

conscious

Hegel

says

of

And it is in discursive

through

himself, [and]

that it is this

death that who

"abiding"

with

force that transposes the Negative into

that, to

what

the

of

incarnates

Spirit, is

is, according to him, the birth of death, for pure prestige],

of

death (the

Man

being, by

thus

and that

is

creates

his human

Nothingness that he is

death, into [both,]

that the power of the

itself [se mani-feste] through the voluntary acceptance life (the Master) or through the anguish inspired by the

conscious apparition of

and

magical

He alludes, in saying Man in the World.5 For it is

given-Being."

mani-fests

the risk

of

the Wise

manifested.

the Negative that is "the

in the Struggle [to the

Negative

contemplation of

"power"

of

a negate-ive

existence,

History. It is this

inserts it into the

Slave), [it is only in transforming,

manifest

with

World in

the

by

Struggle]

that

"magic,"

the

to him and through him as

of the warrior and of the

"abiding"

natural

the

if

as

death that

laborer,

real-izes

creators

Negativity by

form human being. And it is

taking up again, in his discourse, this anthropogenetic contact [ce contact anthropogene] with death, that the Wise Man transforms the nothingness description

of an erroneous

This "magical called the

"Subject,"

is to say that given-being

or

of

the

Man into the

revealed

of

real-izes

Struggle,

This theme has been taken up und das Gerede.

again

that truth is.

the Real are born

reveals

Nothingness and the

being

he previously (p. 19) "Understanding." That the

what

"abstract-Ego"

the discourse that

Action that Man in the

of

Hegel continues, is

thought and

the negate-ive

*

force,"

by

of

the

minifying Being of Nature through

given-being

by Heidegger in Sein

und

Zeit, Vol. I

:

das

Man 5

Hegel

speaks

the translation

of

thereof in Section A of Chapter IV [of the Phenomenology}. See that section,

printed above

note refers to an earlier section of the

[as] "By Way

book, from

which

of

Introduction."

the present essay

[This

is taken.]

Interpretation

1 34

Labor (which results, moreover, from the real contact with death in the Struggle). This is to say, therefore, that the human being itself is no other thing than that Action; he is [a] death that lives a human life. The

being

of

affirmation of

yet,

if

being thus,

man,

we

Nothingness through the

is

creation

deferred

a

wish,

the

negation of

not therefore a given-being;

death,

given

or an

better

or

he is not, hke the natural On the contrary,

which-exists-as

being, he

"immediacy humanly only

the

exists

"mediates"

to the

that natural

"immediacy"

discourse that

by

his Labor

and

"dialecticaUy-suppresses"

or

in his

for it is Man

Struggles,

who negates or

and

the contrary, negates

on

Action. That

through negate-ive

outside

it. Man,

reveals

that he

itself,"

has "mediation

transforms Nature

extent

"immediacy"

it is human

himself; it is he "mediation"

himself; he is himself the himself of given-being through active, and therefore discursive or revelatory, negation. And that is why Man is unique in being a being who reveals Being and who is conscious of himself. Or, what is the same thing, the human being, to the extent that he implies the consciousness of and the who creates and

transforms

for his [own] death, is dialectical being.

a

wiU

being

"mediated"

Negation

by

is,

that

a

Such is the meaning of the cited passage from the Preface to the Phenomenology. Interpreted on the ontological level, this passage signifies that it is not the

itself to

reveals

which

parts,

signifies that

but

(infinite) Totality of Being (or the One-which-is) that itself, but that this Totality is revealed by one of its (hmited)

also

Spirit,

Man-in-the- World.

itself.

MetaphysicaUy speaking, the passage is, Being that reveals itself to itself, is not God, For the part [of Being] that reveals Being is the hu

reveals

that

the

finite, being, who creates himself in time through the active Being, and who, being Negation or Negativity, annihUates

man, essentiaUy negation

himself

of

after

having

endured.

And

this revelation of

Being by

the temporal

"dialectical"

temporary human being is a discursive or which unfolds itself in the time in which it was born and

revelation, and

in

which

it

will

day disappear. In this discursive revelation, the human being relates himself to the totality of given-Being, first through negate-ive action and one

the erroneous discourse that flows from

discourse that is born

being

"satisfied"

"disfigure"

it,

And it is passage, but

in

and

that

is,

cannot

aware

be

of

it,

be only in his discourse. thing, a thing that Hegel does

Wise Man who,

transform

it,

and

to

whole of

not

say in the

his System: This

cited

"satisfaction"

Wise

through the

fuUy

ceases to negate

Man, which presupposes his perfect awareness himself, does not itself attain its perfection and fullness

of the

In effect, Man

through the adequate

this

follows from the

the World and of

except

given-Being,

if

a curious that

(Befriedigung) of

by

even

it, but finaUy

of the passive contemplation of the

can

be

himself

aware of

awareness of satisfied

death.

only in being aware of his satisfaction, Now if Man is essentiaUy finite, he

as satisfied.

himself

except

by taking

cognizance of

his death.

Death in the It is

therefore

Wise Man

only

Looking

at

himself to be

by knowing

can attain the

fullness

135

of Hegel

Philosophy

irremediably

that the

mortal

of satisfaction.

the matter more closely, we

realize

that this ultimate

conse

Hegelianism is psychologically less paradoxical than it seems first glance. To be sure, the idea of death does not add to the well-being

quence of at

man; it does not make him

of

nor

in

any joy. But it is

being

has in

able

happy, in

unique

satisfy his pride,

to

able

to procure for him precisely that

"satisfaction"

him, is,

that

that Hegel

"satisfaction"

is nothing else than the fuU for Recognition anthropogenetic desire

For Hegelian of the human and

mind.

satisfaction

for

and procures no pleasure

being

of man's desire to see aU other his free historical individuality or to his

(Anerkennen)

men attribute an absolute

value to

personhood

Now it is only

existing

and

without

a

historicity, The

by being, by feeling feeling himself to exist, in and

God and

that Man

Hegel. I

affirm

be,

mortal or

would

like,

[a further] reasons, however, I possible

role that the

idea

nevertheless, to

and

world."

fuUy

in

in the philosophy

of

Phenomenology

death

of

is, by

plays

cite a series of other

puts

texts that make

the Hegehan notion of death. For various

precision of will

that

beyond

known his liberty, his

and make

from the Preface to the

decisive

[personnalite].

finite

a universe without a

his individuality, [ah] "unique in the

cited passage

evidence the

can

to

draw them only from the Phenomenology

and

from

earlier writings.

The theme

of

death

already in

appeared

translated in Appendix I (see above, pp. 510

the

fragment

love

on

1795,

of

ff.).*

In this fragment love appeared to Hegel as what there is that is most human in man; the is man viewed as human being. Hegel un derlines the essential difference that subsists between the death of man and "corruption" "ending" or of a purely natural being; he speaks the [mere] "lover"

but he

of a plant

inanimate thing. natural

in

being is

from

to the finite

therefore be

just

determined

manner

some

"foreign"

could

as well

The difference

by

the

without

being

have

spoken of an animal or of an

resides

in the fact that the

general

laws

by

the

rest of

of

the

universe,

itself. In contrast, the death

understood as an end

that is

end

of

the

nature, that it is imposed

"immanent"

by

what

of man

is

must

"autonomous,"

or

voluntary or willed, and hence, [as] conscious. In addition, Hegel says that man is individual only to the extent that he is mortal. If Spirit (which is cahed love here) were infinite or immortal, that

it of

is,

be rigorously one. If Spirit realizes itself as multiple, in the form human beings who differ from one another and of whom each lives an

would

*

This

refers to an earlier section of love"

in

taken.

The "fragment

Hegel:

Early Theological Writings, Press, 1948), pp. 302-08.

of

Chicago

on

the book from

question

translated

can

by

which

the

present

essay is

be found in English in G. W. F. T. M. Knox (Chicago:

University

Interpretation

136 individual life that is his "spiritual"

"lovers,"

beings,

or

namely,

way, the

same

is linked to death. To say it is mortal.

Finally,

the

same

also contains

in the here-below. Men

freedom

or the

that it is

being

of a

fragment

are mortal.

the

"autonomy"

In the

of man

[if this be so] it is solely because the human

own

the human

of

"autonomous"

being

is to say that

the idea of the historical survival

definitively in

are separated and annihUated

death; but they live humanly and remain socially united in and through their chUdren (thanks to education and the historical tradition, as we shaU see later). The chUd implies and presupposes the death of the and

through

"negation"

parents; but in spite of the "identity"

between

the

[identity] is precisely is the in

or

which

"separated"

(Negativity)

(Totality). The

in the

coincide

(or

historicity

the

other.

prefer, it [this process]

human

existence of the

(Identity)

"re-united"

the

of

Man is therefore

of

being

the antithesis of the

and

synthesis

dialecticity)

is [an] And that

there

them,

each

Or, if we

"dialectical"

"united"

the thesis of the

succeed

History.

what we call

"synthetic,"

"total,"

that separates

that

generations

insep

arably around to the fact of his death. All the principal themes of the Hegelian phUosophy of death are found therefore already in one of his first writings. And ah these themes wUl be taken up again, rendered more precise, and

The theme

of

is death properly being is taken up Hegel

getrieben)

given!

this

a

Once

existence

is,

the

again

by

"end"

it from

on

can

the

and

death.

However, in the

to itself:

itself!,

Any

is

being being

and

this

fact-of-being-

presented as an exterior

is essentiaUy

"given,"

that

is something "nature," innate is imposed

radical

change,

of

its

given or

signifies

its

annihUation. and can

which

Man,

by

go

on

the

contrary,

himself beyond his

remaining what he is, that is, a human being. him as support, that transcendence signifies

human

the cause of

"spontaneous"

or

accepted or willed

that is

(the

animal

that

his death (as

death that

risk of

death is

no

animal).

can

life). And it is

truly human, humanizing, or Being a negate-ive being, man

indefinitely

[than

animal that serves

himself (as man)

be

longer

exterior:

conscious and also

alone

He is

It is only this "autono

[,

this conscious

freely

dying,]

anthropogenetic. would

be

able

to go

beyond himself

(without ceasing to be Man, without having need of becoming [un "SHr-homme"]. It is only the end of the anthropophoric

"Super-man"

a

by itself go-beyond (hinausgehen) its (Dasein); but it is driven beyond (hinaus-

of the natural

even while

mous"

living

(Hinausgerissenwerden) is its death.

nature,"

But for the

which

of a

cannot

spontaneously transcend himself

"innate

writings.

12-16):

something-else

"development"

outside

death-corruption

to. The natural

"identical"

or

other than

life

natural

submitted

"static,"

69, hnes

empirical-existence

wrestedl-and-projected-lbeyond

law passively

later

the

merely in the Introduction to the Phenomenology.

again

What is limited to

immediate [or

and the

so caUed

this there (p.

says

developed, in

the essential difference between the death of man

Death in

Philosophy

the

of Hegel

137

terminus to human self-transcendence. That is why the is always in some way premature and violent, in contrast to death of animals and plants, which have completed the cycle

animal that puts a

death the

of man

"natural"

And

of their evolution.

as

realized

a

single

succession of other

in

Hegel

which remain

generations,

it in his Jena Lectures

says

p.

The individuals

(werdende),

.

.

first

are

but in their

.

relationship, the .

.

of

1803-04 (Vol.

XIX, last

sentence

of

all

themselves

death

this

act-of-becoming-dead

in-the-way-of-becoming

(Totwerden) they

kind [genre], but the

existent

contemplate

[recognizing

parents

in the

as

at

animal

themselves in

1.

.

As

we shaU see

is] free

again, it is the

and

through the infant educated

But

man would not

himself if he

were not

therefore the

finitude

presupposes the also provokes

action, his

is

have been finite

of the animal

death

that

"nature": In the

without a valid

a mortal sickness of

The

that the

extent

himself

that

itself in

and

consequently it

other

hand,

We

reason.

man

through negate-ive

case, he risks his life

extreme

act.

to transcend

or

and

the

on

by transcending,

biological

act that

animal

of man presupposes

incarnates him,

can therefore

and

has

say that

the animal.

And Hegel actuaUy says so. We find the following passages in the Lectures To the

perfects

humanity

himself. And

of the man

the

human through that very

able to negate

or mortal.

the death of the animal

given

himself kUled

or created as

of

[an

is,

act, that

self-negate-ive

historical, interrupted by the death incarnated it, which prolongs it, which achieves and

man

each

222])*:

the same time their act-of-becoming-alive. The [human! infant is not,

him

from

separated

absolutely

the plant and animal realm.

Note 4 [on

of

that is also why human transcendence can be unique History, despite (or because of) the

and

1 803-04:

of

the animal at the interior of itself

universal system raises

its universal-entity is fixed by opposition (gegen) to its difference [which distinguishes it from all that is not it!, exists for itself land) does up to the

point

at

not coincide with would

that

difference, it is

sickness which

[go! beyond itself. [But! to the

entity for pass

which

itself,

without

relating it to the

into its death [Vol. XIX,

beyond the limit

of

extent

p.

animal

174, lines

its nature; but the

that

it

is posited, in

process,

28-351.

sickness of

which

With

.

.

it does

sickness

the animal

the

the

cannot organize

animal

universal-

than to

no more

the

animal passes

is the becoming

of the

has isolated itself; which is what can The fixed universality end only with death, [Vol. XIX, p. 186, lines 12-15 and 181. of sickness only nullifies the infinitude of opposition (Gegensatzes) and tit] transforms Spirit. In sickness, the universal-entity

.

.

.

.

.

.

itself (geht iiber) in death; the universality of Spirit Ion the contrary] acts in such a way that the opposition is maintained (bestehen), to the extent that that universality

*

For

references to

philosophie

"Vol.

XIX,"

I: Die Vorlesungen

see von

J. Hoffmeister's

edition

1803-04 (Leipzig: Felix

of

lenenser Real-

Meiner, 1931).

Interpretation

138

has dialectically-suppressed (aufgehoben)

opposition

in itself [Vol. XIX,

p.

189,

lines 4-71.

Sickness

and the

death

of

Sickness is

self-transcendence.

the animal are a

is,

world; the sick animal

of the natural

but

an abortive attempt at

discord between the

animal and

the

rest

to speak, dislodged from its

so

(topos), from the hie et nunc that fixes its particularity distinguishes it from everything that is not it. Now to detach [some into a thing] from the hie et nunc is to universalize [it], to transform [it] general notion or [into] a concept. But the animal is absolutely determined place"

"natural

and

its

by

For in

in

universal

itself,

therefrom

universe of

the

animal

wUl

transform

But Man

real world).

can

that incarnates him is susceptible of

to

process":

animal

it

render

sick

"organize the

cannot

To

put

it

the particular entity that has

develop

cannot

it, is

is to nullity

its detachment from its

by

discourse (which it

historical

Man,

relating it to the

without

concept

a

to

contrast

way, it [the animal]

another

become

and

To dislodge it

topos.

death.

unto

by

do

being

hie

given

action

into

et nunc

into

a

a real technical

only because the animal dislodged from its topos by so

death.

sickness and

It is through given

that the animal tries in some way to transcend its

sickness

"nature."

It does

in this because

not succeed

that transcendence

is

equivalent, for it, to its nuUification. But the success of Man presupposes that attempt, and this is why the sickness that leads to the death of the animal

is "the

becoming

an eternal and perfect animal who

of

God

the who

Spirit"

or of

incarnates

transcends himself in

Man. (Spirit is

himself, but

not therefore

a sick and mortal

time.)

The universality that manifests itself as sickness is "fixed"; which is to the say that it is not synthetic, total, or dialectical. It simply destroys "opposition" of the Particular and the Universal by nullifying the partic Spirit,"

death. The "universality of the by contrast, i.e., that [universality] that manifests itself as human existence, "dialecticmaintains the opposition of the Particular and the Universal, by these opposites, that is, by synthesizing them in aUy ularity

of the animal

in

and through

suppressing"

the

totality

action

But

p.

of

Individuality. For the universality of discourse and of rational in and through the particularity of a human individual.

effectuated

again, this free historical individuality Particular and the Universal, which is

once

of the and

is

death

of

animality,

That's why Hegel 8-9):* 164, lines The

animal

which

can

is

also

presupposes the opposition manifested

say, in the Jena Lectures

dies. [But the! death

of

as

the

sickness

that of Man. of

1805-06 (Vol.

XX,

the animal [is the! coming to be of [human!

consciousness.

*

For

meister

references

to "Vol.

(Hamburg: Felix

philosophie

II (1931).

XX,"

see

Meiner, 1967),

Jenaer a

Realphilosophie,

reissue

of

edited

by

J. Hoff

Hoffmeister's Jenenser Real

Death in the In short, Man is the

of Hegel

Philosophy

139

Nature. And that is why,

mortal sickness of

being

Nature, he is himself essentiaUy mortal. of his youth, Hegel attached the freedom, the historicity, individuality of Man to death. And this triple theme is also taken a part of

necessarUy In the writings and the

again and made precise

up

Let

us

consider, first

of

in his later

writings.

ah, freedom.

In many instances Hegel identifies freedom and Negativity. He does so a particularly clear way in the System of Morality (of 1 802?), in which

in

he writes, for example,

this:

The negative-entity (das Negative), which is to say (oder) freedom, which is to say [Title of 2; Vol. VII, p. 450! [p. 446]. That negative-entity, or pure freedom,

crime

(geht

undertakes

therefore

auf)

objective-entity in

such

a

way

dialectical-suppression

the

that it

(so),

(Wesen), negates, as a determination (Bestimmtheit), but fixes [p. 448, lines 28-32].*

Freedom,

which

is

in

that

of

But

Negativity

"manifest"

can

.

makes

of

(Aufhebung)

of

the

the negative-entity

the

negation

[Vol. VII,

p.

specific-

452, lines

the realization and the manifestation of

28-321

Negativity,

negating the real in its given structure and in the form of a work [ceuvre] created by that

the act of

in maintaining the negation active negation itself. And that "essential-reality"

.

consequence, reality in its [given]

essential-reality

consists therefore

.

freedom,

which

is Negativity, is

the

Man.

taken in itself is no other

itself

as

thing

than

Nothingness,

death. And Hegel consistently

says so

which

in many

instances. Thus for

example

Its

result:

in the Lectures

(Vol. XX,

marginal note

-death, pure

p.

166,

1805-06,

of

where

he

writes

in

a

the last three lines of Note 2):

Negativity, immediate Non-being.

If therefore, on the one hand, freedom is Negativity, and if on the other hand, Negativity is Nothingness and death, there is no freedom without death, and only a mortal being can be free. We can even say that death is

the

final

Now Hegel accepts

it,

"manifestation"

and authentic

as

the System of

by

is

no means shrinks

shown

Morality

for of

example

1802

and

of

freedom.

before that consequence; he expressly in the fohowing passages, drawn from from the Lectures

of

1803-04:

Absolute, pure freedom, is in its appearance-or-manifestation death; and through the faculty (Fahigkeit) of death the Subject demonstrates (erweist) itself as free and as absolutely raised above all constraint (Zwang). The Subject is the absolute act-of-constraining (Bezwingung); and because This

negative

(Erscheinung)

*

For

Politik

references

und

in large brackets Kojeve's

to "Vol.

VII,"

see

G. Lasson's

Rechtsphilosophie (Leipzig: Felix refer

originals.

to this edition; those

edition of

Hegel's Schriften

Meiner, 1923). Page

in

small

and

line

zur

numbers

brackets (or in parentheses)

are

Interpretation

140 this act is absolute,

(Gegenteil) is its

it is the

...

itself,

of

is,

that

itself,

concept of

absolute;

therefore

the pure

and

and

the opposite

which

is in death,

infinite,

Particularity

opposite, [that is] Universality. There is therefore freedom in the

proper

constraining only through the fact that it has for its

dialectical-suppression

of a

the fact that this act,

[given]

(rein negativ) manner; [Vol. VII,

.

.

.

auf)

,

the

purely

and therefore

through

itself, behaves (sich halt) in a purely negative 370, lines 10-14, 20-25, 27-281 [p. 366, lines

in

considered

(geht

end

specific-determination

act-of-

p.

the supreme abstraction 30-34; p. 366, line 39 p. 361, line 4; p. 367, lines 7-8]. of freedom, that is, the relationship of constraint (Bezwingens) pushed unto its dialec tical-suppression, that is, free violent death [Vol. VII, p. 389, lines 17-191 [p. 385, -

16-19].*

lines

This

being (absolutsein)

...

simple abstolutel point

of Consciousness [= Man] is the

latter, but [taken!

of the

absolute-

as a negative-or-negate-ive-entity; or

[in

it is the absolute-being of the individual [taken] as such, as a particularisolated-entity (Einzelnen). It is the freedom of its caprice (Eigensinns). The partic ular (Einzelne) can transform itself (sich machen) in this point; it can, in-an-

other

words],

make

absolute-manner,

of

abstraction

abandon

all,

it

all;

be

cannot

rendered

be held (gehalten) by anything; it can detach from itself every specific-determination by which it ought to have been grasped (gefasst), and lit can)

dependent, lit

in death its

realize as

cannot]

absolute

can realize

itself therein]

Consciousness. But death has in it

contradiction

independence

negative-or-negate-ive

absolutely

freedom, tit

and

in relationship to life [Vol. XIX, p. 218, lines 1-121. Its [= the particular's! partic ular-isolated (einzelne) freedom is [nothing except! only its caprice, its death [Vol. XIX, p. 232, last line of Note 2!.

It is therefore indeed death

is voluntary

or accepted

by

in full

which

is to be

understood a

awareness of what

the supreme manifestation of freedom at least of the of

that

which

"abstract"

is

freedom

the isolated individual. Man could not

and

voluntarily

given (=

he

imposed)

could not

give

case would merit

essence

manifests

death to himself

being of

"pure"

cahed

by

pure or

"absolute"

or

the given

of

freedom

Hegel

death

says so quite

devoted to the

"necessity,"

totality

of

he

Being,

if

would not

which

in

this

is

therefore

Negativity,

which

death. And this is why, on the social level, in the

state as

freedom is

the social given

coUective violent

man were not mortal and

"absolute"

course of the second stage of a genuine negate-ive

If

without

"God."

individual

itself in its

when

the confinement of no matter what

a man can escape

condition of existence.

determination

escape rigorous

The

be free if he were not essentiaUy Freedom is autonomy in the face of the given, that negating it such as it is given, and it is solely through

mortal.

is, the possibUity of voluntary death that

it

realized

Revolution

must

that

necessarUy

is, [a

manifest

revolution]

itself

as

a

"Terror."

or

clearly in the Section of the Phenomenology that is Revolution (p. 418, line 37 -p. 419, line 5):

analysis of

VII"

*

of

death

is involved

The preceding passages from "Vol. 1802 but from Hegel's essay "Uber die

Naturrechts,"

also of

1802.

are not

from the System of

wissenschaftlichen

Morality

Behandlungsarten des

Death in the The

of Hegel

Philosophy

141

(allgemeinen) Freedom are as a conse death; to wit, a death which has no compass (Umfang) nor internal tion-or-accomplishing (Erfiillung), for what is negated [in and through this death] is unique work and action of general

quence

the

comple-

non-completed-and-accomplished

(Selbsts); it is

point

therefore the coldest death

significance-or-importance than

the

act of

the

of

free

absolutely

the most pointless,

and

a cabbage

cutting

in two,

personal-Ego with

or

no

more

than a gulp of

water.

[It is! in the flatness ary]

of

this syllable [that] consists the wisdom of [revolution

government, [it is to it that

the general

In

will

to

be

be

can

accomplished

the course of the second stage of the

to "absolute

who aspire

freedom"

oppose

by

annihUating it

wanting to

general wiU cannot "particulars"

in

a

The State

the

stage,

voluntarUy faced in

and

it

be,

be

They

themselves to it

oppose

State in

an absolute

through the negation of the

"wisdom

of

through the

manner,

itself,

by the

the

universal realities.

government"

manifests

Terror. Now

have

we

itself,

in the

that death

seen

is precisely the most authentic individual freedom. It is therefore

a negate-ive struggle

and through the

cannot

revolutionaries

cannot therefore maintain

realization and manifestation of absolute

indeed in

revolution, the

be accomplished, except on condition that it negate its manner just as absolute as their affirmation of

themselves is or would

And that is why course of this

negate the given

completely.

permits!

themselves as isolated particulars

to the universal incarnated in the State.

absolutely,

[which

the understanding

reduced]

(vollbringen).

attained

Terror that this freedom is in

a

"tolerant"

State,

in society,

spread

which

does

not take

its

seriously enough to guarantee them their political right to death. Hegel deduces from these analyses that freedom, being essentially

citizens

Negativity,

can neither

Absolute freedom Nothingness

being Being

itself.

(=

be

realized

in its

death. Now this latter

and

Negativity

(=

pure state nor wiUed

"non-conformity") is

for itself.

Negativity, that is, contradicts life, existence, and not Nothingness, only through pure

is something, and it conserves even

whUe negating it. Negation Identity), (of the given) is real only as creation (of the new) or [as] accomplished work [ceuvre]. The Revolutionary annihUates himself only to the extent that he succeeds in conserving his negate-ive work by attaching it to the

identity

of

which

being,

sustained

through [a travers]

its

negation

by

memory

or

tradition.

That is to say that freedom is realized only the extent that he is historical (

hee only to

inversely,

there is no

History

except

where

"revolutionary"

progress or

creation, namely,

since negate-ive

being

can

as

=

freedom implies

History,

social, there is

that man can be

=

negation of

and presupposes

in

a state).

freedom,

death,

that

But

is,

the given. And

only

a mortal

be truly historical.

History presupposes death, even apart from the fact that it embodies no History except where there is tradition and historical on the one hand, and education and resistance to it on the other. memory But

freedom. There is

Now

aU

this presupposes a succession of generations which follow each

Interpretation

142

die in it. For the life

other, which come into the world and

implies necessarUy the death of the parents. Hegel says it with a strange brutality in a 1805-06 (Vol.

of

The

XX,

To be sure, the

chUd educated

"survival"

in the here-below,

in time) that is

his

by

action, which is their very

pohtical

to the Lectures

marginal note

202, Note 3):

p.

North America kill their parents;

of

savages

of chUdren

we

do the

parents prolongs then social and

being,

and

he

thus assures to them a

"survival"

is the only freedom. But historical

(albeit

which

compatible with

thing.

same

hmited,

survival conserves

the universality of individual action, even whUe nullifying its particularity,

this

being

nulhfication

precisely the death

the chUd, the parents preprare their

individual.

of the

human

own

or

By

educating

historical

death, by

passing voluntarily from the present to the past. Hegel says it quite clearly in the Lectures of 1803-04 (Vol. lines 18-20, and p. 224, lines 13-22): In educating the child, the consciousness, and

unity of the child

.

formed-or-educated consciousness; the dependent

on

in him their

parents place

they engender their death is dialectically-suppressed; it is

which

.

.

.

XIX,

p.

223,

(gewordenes)

already-formed

In education, the

unconscious

in itself, it becomes a the parents is the matter

articulated

consciousness

it forms-or-educates itself. The

of

parents

for the

are

child

an

itself; they dialectically-suppress the simple-and-individual land! condensed (gedrungenes) being-at-the-interior-of-itself of the child. What they give to him they lose; they die in him; what they give him is their own consciousness. Consciousness is here the becoming of another consciousness in it, and the parents contemplate, in the becoming of the child, their town] dialec

obscure

unknown

(Ahnen)

presentiment

tical-suppression (Aufgehobenwerden)

History

of

his

a

"negates"

Man,

conservative

men who create

As finitude

doubly

or

himself (as given)

who

human being)

and

self-negation.

and presupposes the

fore

.

is transcendence (in the here-below). It is the

suppression"

himself (as

of

finitude

"sublimated"

is

And

this

of what

is

(=

by

through

progress)

"dialectical-movement"

"moved,"

that

is,

imphes

the death of the

History.

temporality

the ultimate

basis

and as

negativity or freedom, death is there first mover [mobUe] of History. And

and the

that is why the historical process implies necessarUy an

death through

"dialectical"conserving"

wars and

bloody

actualization of

revolutions.

In the essay on Natural Right (of 1802) Hegel affirms resolutely the historical necessity of war (Vol. VII, p. 372, lines 5-8, 16-21, 24-35, and p. 373, lines 21-22) [p. 368, hnes 22-26, 33-38; p. 369, lines 1-12, 37-39]: The

positive-aspect

(Positive)

of the absolute

form [= Man] is the

mary-morality (Sittliche), to wit, the habits

[l'appartenance]

the

a

particular

(Einssein)

with

[which implies

demonstrating (erweist) in

of a

non-ambiguous

absolute custo

people

manner

[=

Statel,

[its]

union

the people only in the negative-aspect, through the danger of death war].

This relationship (Beziehung)

of

[political]

individuality

to

Death in the

[political,

=

State!

relationship; the

individuality is is the

one

(Nebeneinanderbestehen) the

exclusion

of

absolutely necessary the necessity of

Through this

for the

war

relationship, the

the two in peace,

of

....

(Verhaltnis),

a relation

positive

individuality by

one

of Hegel

Philosophy

the

the

is the

other

the

and

(Gestalt)

negative relationship,

two

posited

individuality

the

and

are

relationships

the relationship is

second aspect of

concrete-form

consequently a double (and! tranquil coexistence

and

equal

other;

143

of

the

totality [= the State!. War, [precisely! because there is in it the free possibility not only that isolated-particular specific-determinations might be nullified (vernichtet, but [also] their integrity (Vollstandigkeit) [taken! as life, and this customary-moral

for the Absolute itself, that is, for the moral

(sittliche) health

determinations

(Festwerden) [waters

the

in the face

and

of

latter, in

these

people

the people in its

of

of

[their] becoming which

a

prolonged

them, just as a prolonged peace or even [would have committed the people to stagnation! .

by its

the

specific-

of

fixation

.

.

[which is Action!,

nature

worse -[fori

calm

(gar)

would

is 1

what

have

[peace]

eternal

as

Man1

negative-or-negate-

must remain

become something fixed-and-stable (Festes).

and must not

ory

preserves

accustomed to and of the

committed

negative-or-negate-ive

[War!

Statel,

the same way as the movement of the winds preserves

lakes from stagnation, to

ofl

[= the

indifference in the face

And in the Lectures

of

1 805-06 Hegel insists

on

the fact that it is indeed

the presence of death in wars that makes of them the creative agents of

History The

(Vol.

XX,

261, line 18

p.

the

soldier-condition and war are

the danger

immediate

of

death for the

abstract

Negativity; in

itself (macht)

creates

[being! absolutely other

[a!

free,

as

(Anderes). It is in

crime

[committed! for

the

objectively-real sacrifice of

this

...

in

absolute

as

the personal-Self,

(Anschauung)

contemplation

Universal

such a power

(Macht),

permitted

[=

its

war

State!;

(gewahrt)

as an

to the particular: it is

[of

the end

itself

really against

contemplates

Negativity (existing) for itself

that this is

of

is equally the immediate way [that in it! each one, as this

the same way as

universal

war

262, line 2):

p.

particular

positive personal-Self of the particular particular

-

war

is! the

conserva

by negation! of the whole [= the State) against the enemy, which is ready to destroy this whole. This alienation (Entausserung) [of the Particular to the Universal] must have precisely this abstract form, to be deprived-of-individuality; death must be received and given coldly; not by a deliberate [commente] (statarische) tion [mediated

struggle, in

the

which

particular perceives

diate hatred; no, death is consequence of

given

and

the adversary and kills him in

received

the smoke from the powder [a

It is therefore indeed

murderous war

in-the-void (leer),

partir

an

imme

impersonally, in

de la fumee de la

poudre].

that assures historical freedom and

Man. Man is historical only to the extent that he participates actively in the hfe of the State, and that participation culmi nates in the voluntary risk of life in a purely political war. Also man is the free

historicity

truly historical

or

of

human only to the

extent

that he is a warrior, at least

potentiaUy.

Hegel He

said so

"estates"

(Stande)

merchants, struggle

in

accepts

again

and

and

do

so

many

there or

words

the

classes:

in the System of

irreducible division

1 802?). into three society

peasants, manufacturers

the nobUity. The first two not risk their

Morality (of

of

hves for

"estates"

the

[industriels]

and

work, but they do not State. The nobUity is on the

Interpretation

144

contrary essentiaUy [a] warrior [class], which permits it to lead an authenticaUy human hfe, even whUe remaining idle and profiting from the products of the work of the other classes: "their work cannot be other than that of war,

VII,

it alone, that can

History. The

real-izes

other classes

contemplate the

only passively

political and warlike existence of

historical

The first two other

ScheUingian language

even

moral

estate of

the

and

p.

warrior nobility] consists

476, line 38

-

which

real contemplation

is

moved

in the fact that

constituting thus for them [= the

by

concrete-form,

the image of the Absolute [= the State!

estates!

being (seienden) highest

real

and

-

tof the

usefulness

absolute

it,

to

incarnated in the

[in the foUowing] (Vol. VII, hne 38 p. 473, line 8]:

477, hne 8) [p. 472,

it is the

process

and

nobUity

the nobles.

"metaphysical,"

Hegel says it in highly but nonetheless quite clearly p.

the

submit

only

(Vol.

work"

this

476, lines 16-18) [p. 472, lines 16-18]. Now it is

p.

they

(Bilden) for

or an educative-formation

I-dialectically,

that moral nature requires.

which-exists-as-a-given-

historically,

=

By

which

is! the

their nature, these [non-

stop at this contemplation. They do not exist in the absolute concept, [entity), which is posited (gesetztes) for consciousness only as an exterior-entity (Ausseres), would be their own Spirit, absolute Idialectically-lmoving itself, which would surmount (uberwande) all their differences and [given! warrior) estates

by

this

which

specific-

determinations. That their

is

offered them

Later,

the first estate (of the

by

notably in the

and

"feudal"

this

moral nature achieves

warrior nobility].

Phenomenology, Hegel

conception of society.

this advantage

this contemplation,

The

no

longer

existence of a class of

idle

accepts warriors

is for him only a transitory historical phenomenon. But the theme of the historical necessity of war is taken up again in the Phenomenology. Hegel says there, among other things, the foUowing (p. 324, lines 10-33): On the to

one

hand,

the community

systems of personal

autonomy

(Gemeinwesen)

and of

personal; in the same way, the modes

isolated tions

the

of general

therefore be organized in

enjoyment, [such modes] [can! be articulated into

ends of gain and

(Zusammenkunften)

Spirit

can

[private! property, [private! right, real and of labor for the primarily particular-and-

of

association

negative-or-negate-ive

their

own

[= the State) is undivided-unity

essential-reality

(Wesen)

of

these

(Einfachheit) systems

themselves. In order not to permit them to take root and to werden) in this process-of-isolation, pose and

to time

that

the Spirit evaporate, the

by

which

associa

[can] become-autonomous. [But)

and

if it happened, the

government must shake

become fixed

up the

systems

[is]

isolate

which

whole would

the

and

(fest-

decom

from time

wars, to injure and disturb thereby the order and the right of autonomy

are granted them

(zurechtgemachten),

and

through the labor

imposed [by

war

fare) to let the individuals know their master, [i.e.,] death, individuals who, by plung ing themselves (sich vertiefend) in these systems, get detached from the whole and tend towards inviolable person.

subsistence

danger [a

[isolated!

being-for-itself

Through this dissolution (Auflosung)

of

partir

of

and

the security of the [private! of the fixed-and-stable-

the form

[du maintien-fixe-et-stable] (Bestehens), the Spirit [= State) the fall

de]

the

(Versinken) into

customary-moral

natural

empirical-existence

[=historical

or

human!

removes-the-

(Dasein)

away from

[empirical-existence),

and

Death in the it

conserves

up the

raises

and

Philosophy its

personal-Self of

145

of Hegel consciousness

into freedom

and

into its force.

To be sure, this text is found in the Section devoted to the analysis of State (Chapter VI, A, a). Now the Master, the citizen of the

the ancient

State, is by definition idle. Not

pagan

Nature

is

reduced

prestige,

The

to the negation

a

"negate"

the

truly human activity, i.e., free or negate-ive, "nature." of his own innate And that negation

in the voluntary

in

not

to him. His

exterior

culminates

working, he does

risk of

pohtical

purely

life, incurred in stripped

war,

of

for

the struggle

"vital

every

pure

necessity."

State, in which the citizens are idle warriors, cannot therefore be truly human, i.e., free and historical, except in and through the wars of pagan

it

prestige that

The

wages

Slave,

from time to time.

the

and

working

"negate"

they

the given

renounce wars without

But in

cited, Hegel

the text

and

humanize

State in

which the citizens work could

decomposing says

as a

State

that in practice a

there

truly human entity. State that is essentiaUy or

State properly speaking, and becomes a private in commercial association that has for its supreme goal the well-

pacifist ceases to

dustrial

be

principle

without

themselves. In principle, the

fore

in

can

ex-Slave,

labor, risking their lives. For in working, and exterior real and, as a consequence, transform

themselves through their

a

"natural,"

its members, that is, precisely the satisfaction of their namely, animal, desires. It is therefore, in the last analysis, participation in

being

of

bloody

pohtical struggle

However that may

Hegel,

to

labor

be,

his

making

a

becoming is,

according

of

war

fuUy

precisely thereby universal and homogeneous

the

(for

perfection

(

he is

the risk of

life. once

there are no more

that terminates

satisfaction).

mortal and

the

State,

armies of

revolutionary

Recognition)

=

extent that

Of course,

satisfied

by

his existence, and humanity, is the

the historical evolution of

worker-soldier of the

indeed

the final goal of human

the Slave. The Man who is

of

by

the synthesis of the warlike existence of the Master and the hfe of

who achieves

Citizen

that raises man above the animal

him.

citizen of

Thus,

accepts,

Man

that

History

can perfect

with an awareness

universal and

is, for Hegel,

the

Napoleon. Therefore it is and carries

Man to

himself only to the of what is involved,

homogeneous Empire is established, Man can live in it thenceforth

wars or revolutions.

risking his life. But the truly human existence is then that of the Man, who limits himself to comprehending everything, without ever

without

Wise

or

negating the

modifying anything (except for

into discourse).

real

historical in the ascribes

dom

is therefore

existence

proper sense of these

words, in the

to them when he speaks of Man

and

a mortal

This

transposing

historicity properly speaking being can be free and historical,

sense

before the

the

"essences"

neither

free

of

nor

that Hegel himself

end of

History. Free

inseparable from death: Only provided that it accept the idea

are

Interpretation

146

reality of its death and that it be "idea" or in function of an

and the

able

to risk

its hfe

without

any

"ideal."

"necessity,"

In fine, human individuality is itself also conditioned by death. We can deduce this by admitting, with Hegel, that one can be individual only by being free, and that one cannot be free without being finite or mortal. But this consequence also flows directly from the Hegelian definition of the Individual.

The Individual, for versal.

not

Particularity

Hegel, is

would

associated, in human

a synthesis of the "given,"

be purely

individuality,

Particular

Uni

and the

"natural,"

animal, were it universality of discourse

with the

(the discourse proceeding from the action). Now the action is truly universal and it is always a particular that acts of the particular of a only if it represents and realizes the "general and of action

wiU"

(Gemeinwesen), that is, in the last analysis, as [a] citizen (against his particular

of a

"private"

"community"

State. It is only

interest)

that

[a]

by

acting is truly

man

reaUy universal, even while remaining particular; it is only in and through the State that human individuality is manifested and effectuated, and

for it is the State that reality

and value.

But

attributes to action

by

the

and

particular a

universally

recognized

for the State

culminates

in the

risk

(particular) life for purely political (= universal) ends; a citizen who that is, [his] refuses to risk his life for the State loses his citizenship, universal recognition. It is therefore in the final analysis because he is of

able to

die that [a] man is able to be an individual. says it in a very clear manner in the Lectures

Hegel

XIX,

p.

230, line 32

This given-being

totality [that is,

of

of

the

to p.

of

1803-04 (Vol.

231, line 10):

the dialectical-suppression

Citizen,

universal, as absolute Spirit t=

of

(Aufgehobenseins)

of

the

particular

is the totality [taken) as absolutely State). It is the Spirit as absolutely real

the individual)

People,

=

totality [that is, the individual) contemplates itself [in the State, as citizen,) as an ideal [totality), dialectically suppressed; and it is no longer particular; it is on the contrary for itself this dialectical-suppression of itself, and it Consciousness. The

particular

[i.e., "the

totality"] is

particular

las Citizen), it is

recognized

universal

[in

so much as

[en tant que] Citizen) only as [en tant que] that dialectically-suppressed [totality). The Totality [= the Universal] in so much as [it is] a Particularity 1, that is, Individ uality,!

is

solely las

posited a

in (an) itself as a solely possible totality, not-existing-for-itself, which,) in its subsisting-in-existence (Bestehen), is always ready

totality

for death,

which has renounced itself, which exists, it is true, as particular totality, family, or in [private) property and [personal) enjoyment, but in such a fashion that this [purely particular) relationship [that the family, property, and enjoyment is) is for itself an ideal [relationship! and proves [erweist! itself as [or by] sacrificing

as

itself.

The fact that

Individuality

implies

and presupposes

be shown, moreover, in another way. The Universal is the negation of the Particular

finitude

or

death

can

to transform a concrete entity versal), into a "general

(

=

a

notion,"

we

as

Particular. If

we want

particular) into a concept ( must detach it from the hie

=

a uni

et nunc

Death in the its

of

"everywhere"

is

147

dog is here and now, but the concept "this "always"). In the same way, if we want to

and

the particularity of existence into detach the man from his hie et nunc. But really real detachment is equivalent to death, for in

individuality by transforming

realize

human universality, we for the human animal ceasing to also

of Hegel

(this

empirical existence

dog"

Philosophy

exist

here

"everywhere"

sal

into

its

actual

the

must this

it no longer exists "always"). Thus, the real

and now

and

Particular is the

death. And if

the finitude

completion of

human

(as dead, this dog is the Univer

at aU

penetration of

be

existence can

of

latter,

this

that

is,

universal even while

remaining particular, that is, if Man can exist as an individual, it is solely because the universality of death can be present in him during his lifetime:

ideaUy, in

has

the consciousness that he

it;

of

reaUy, through the

and

voluntary risk of hfe (the consciousness presupposing the risk). Hegel insists, on several occasions, on the fact that it is death that is the final in

manifestation

and, if

He

empirical existence.

1803-04, in

the

Death is the

ity

we can

Lectures

says

say

1805-06,

of

"realization,"

the

other

so, among

the duplication

aspect of

it,

and

the Universal

of

places, in the Lectures

[dedoublement]

of

the kind [into!

particular

the perfect liberation of the constitutive-elements [which

and universality] and

of

in the Phenomenology:

are

Universal]; [death is! the immediate unity of given-Being (Seins), but in its concept tit is] the universal personal-Self (Selbst), which exists as In death, the absolute power, the master universal IVol. XIX, p. 254, lines 4-81.

the Particular

the

and

of the particular; that

is to say, the

given-Being [which the

cadaver of

Note 31.

Universality

-This

Being, death;

.

.

.

supreme work that

community [= the p.

to which

is

Death

the

the individual

State,

the

universal!

will

has become

pure

dead for the State is! [Vol. XX, p. 225, the Particular succeeds as such, is pure givencitizen

(Vollendung)

completion-or-perfection as such

the Universal).

r=

[=

common

[that is,

as

Particular]

[Phenomenology,

p.

and

undertakes

the

for the

231, lines 31-32

and

232, lines 6-8).

Thus,

the

"faculty

death"

of

not

sufficient

(Fahigkeit des

of

Todes) is

the freedom and

condition, only his universality, without which he "The true being of Man is his

the

necessary

historicity

of

and

man, but

be truly individual. says Hegel. Now Action in the level itself on the would not

also of

action."

realization of

as

death. Which means, without

accepted,

any

produced when a man

desire for for

"phenomenal"

Negativity,

which manifests

necessity.

consciously

risks

"recognition"

recognition

being, but

is the

for the

voluntary death, that is, freely Such an acceptance of death is

as a conscious and vital

his life in function solely of the "vanity." The desire

(Anerkennen), solely from his desire for a desire, that is, not for

presence

of the absence of such

a given

a

(

=

natural)

being. This desire

[for recognition] transcends therefore the natural given, and to the extent realizes itself it creates a trans-natural or human being. But the

that it

desire

realizes

natural given

itself only to

being,

that

is,

the extent that

to the

extent

it has

more power

that annihUates itself in function of a desire for recognition

it is true; but its disappearance is that

than the

that it annihilates it. The

of a

human

being

being

disappears,

it is

a

death

Interpretation

148

in the

the term. And it is this

proper sense of

annihUation of

the

animal

that is the creation of Man. Man is himself annihUated, it is true, in his

death. But hfe

long

so

as a

human

that death

as

as a conscious wUl to risk

[dure]

endures

to recognition, Man maintains himself in empirical existence

with a view

being,

that

is, [as]

in

transcendent

to

relation

given

being,

to

Nature. Man

therefore (or creates

appears

World

natural

as a combatant

That is to say

finite

being

condition of

being

that a

himself) for the first

in the first

itself

cannot constitute

(which

or mortal

means

say that a being cannot live humanly "realizing" his death: becoming conscious of it, to

also

time in the

Struggle for

bloody

as

human

it

facing

To be

voluntarUy.

Man

a

know how to die. "The true

being

except

is, for Hegel,

of

Man"

except on

"living"). And that is of

condition

on

"bearing"

of

(given)

pure prestige.

it, being

capable

to be able and to

is therefore, in the final

analysis, his death as a conscious The idea of the bloody Struggle for recognition, which engenders the relationship of Mastery and Servitude, appeared in the writings of Hegel phenomenon.6

1802 (System of Morality, Vol. VII, pp. 445-447) [pp. 441-443]. above all in the Lectures of 1803-04 that Hegel insists at length

around

But it is

this idea. The theme

on

Phenomenology (1806) Struggle

the Risk

and of

returns

the

life is

of

perfectly clear manner. Here are, first of aU, some Hegel begins

in

the

notion

of

Lectures the

of

1805-06. And in the value

anthropogenetic

definitively

drawn from the Lectures

passages

of

the

formulated in

evolved and

of

a

1 803-04.

"natural"

possession saying that the simple, purely that we observe in the animal becomes essentiaUy human property i.e., a possession struggle in and through a recognized, namely juridical, only

to the death

by

engaged

in

to that recognition. It is not in order to

with a view

disputed thing that one risks his life in that struggle for really pure prestige; it is in order to gain recognition for his exclusive right to the possession. And this right does not become real, the "legal possess the

person"

[le "sujet juridique"] in

Hegel The

is

particular

his

of

ference,

in

himself

expresses

being) is

a

Heidegger

will

death"

as

follows

not

accept

face-to-face (=

except

:

(Wesen), [as!

say,

he

entailed

following Hegel,

(Leben

[impliquee] (aufgenommen) in his Indif (Moment) as [what is!

posits each constitutive-element

zum

that

human

Tode). The Christian

before Hegel. But for the Christian death is but

which

realized,

Consciousness [= Man! only to the extent that each partic (Besitzes) and of his given-being appears as attached to his

to the extent that

view of

does

not

possession

total essential-reality

6

specifically human

through this risk, and in the last analysis, in and through death.

and

ularity

(

=

with

death properly

Nothingness. He

is essentially

freedom) in

speaking.

the

given.

relates

There is

Hegelian,

and

existence

also used a

passage

The Christian

himself in his

not

therefore

Heideggerian,

man

(Dasein) is a "life it, a long time

to say

into the beyond: He does

not place

existence to an

in him any

"other

himself world,"

"transcendence"

sense of the term.

Death in the

149

of Hegel

Philosophy

himself; for this is Consciousness, the ideal-being of the World. Consequently, [even! [lesion] of one of his particularities is infinite; it is an absolute outrage, an outrage to him [taken! as a whole, an outrage to his honor; and a conflict on the

the loss

basis

of

particular

any

thing is

the specific-determination, is

for the

a struggle

whole.

not at all viewed as

The [disputed! thing, [that is,!

thing; it is

value, as

the contrary

on

ideal; there is only the fact that it [the thing] is related to me, that I am a Consciousness, that the thing has lost its opposition over and against me tby becoming my recognized property!. The two [adversaries!, who recog nize each other and want to know themselves as being recognized mutually as this entirely nullified, entirely

totality

of

[these two]

particulars,

significance-and-importance

[

that

a)l

tapparaisse! in the

each appear

him from every extension this latter possesses!; t b)l that he

of

excludes

[a) totality. Neither

can

that

they

the

his particularity [that

be, in this, his

demonstrate it to the

other

by

objectively-real-entities oppose each other, that

is,

each other

the one

other as

is, from

exclusion

lor

everything that

exclusivity], really

Consciousness,

absolutely-opposed-entities,

existing-absolutely-for-themselves, relationship is absolutely a relationship, [which is! itself objectively-real. The middle-term (Mitte)

or

here

while

their

and

is:

who

words, assurances, threats of

existence

And the

this totality.

as

mutually to

give

consciousness of

For language is only the ideal

promised.

other

confront each

(Bedfeutung!)

entities-

practical

their

of

(Anerkennens) must be itself objectively-real. Consequently, they necessarily (miissen) each injure the other [se User Vun I'autre]; the fact that each one posits itself as exclusive totality in the [sa] particularity of his existence, necessarily become objectively-real; outrage is necessary; [Vol. XIX, p. 226, line 6,

must-

recognition

must-

to

227, line 20).

p.

And that

for the fact that the

be known

cannot

except

(muss

conflict must and should as

particular

soil) take place,

und

is Reason (Vernlunftl), Ian! Indifference,

such

to the extent that each particularity of his possession and

his given-being is posited in that Indifference [?!, and [to the extent] that he relates himself to it [each particularity] as ta) whole. This can be shown only to the of

that he

extent

engages

(daraufsetzt)

all

[that] he absolutely does

proprietor],

demonstration is

But it is

completed

solely

his

not

with

existence

subdivide

death [Vol. XIX,

a man must

do it in

value

be

in

also

able

view of

Now for

Each

himself

to die

explains

one

the

recognition of

as

226, Note 3, lines 1-71.

his reahty

can

and must

it

be

as

know how to

risk

infinite in

(Verletzung) [by

his human

real and

appear as such

that Man

his life.

foUows:

recognized

by

the

other

particularity of

each

going] as

and of

really human It is therefore in order to

Hegel, Man is humanly

only to the

(mannigfaltige Erscheinung) is indifferent in

appearance

far

as

his

possession

the death [of the

extent

that his

manifold

him, [that he) demonstrates and revenges each offence

offender).

And that

offence

necessarily take place, for Consciousness [= Man) must-necessarily have for

(auf

.

.

.

[as

And the

=

general.

Hegel

p.

conservation

partage].

only in order to gain recognition for his property and to legal subject or person) that for himself as proprietor ( risk his life in the struggle to the death for pure prestige. He

only to the extent that he is recognized as such. be human and in order to manifest himself or must

[sa]

not

gain recognition

must

for his

himself [se

must-

[its]

goal

gehen) that recognition; the particulars must-necessarily offend each other

mutually,

in

with-reason

order

to

know

themselves

(erkennen) land

to know] if

they

[= human]. For Consciousness is essentially such, that the

are

endowed-

totality

of

the

Interpretation

1 50 has

particular

itself

opposed

werden), that the

is the

and

is in

of the particular

totality

in that

same

act-of-becoming-other

(Anders-

another consciousness, and

is the

consciousness of the other and that in this latter is precisely this absolute maintaining of its town! totality that it has for itself; that is to say [that Consciousness is essentially

it

that

such!

as

[that)

be

must

for itself, [that

is in the

the

But the fact my totality, Itakenl

other.

precisely that

other consciousness

I

the fact! that it is recognized, respected,

is,

through the

except

by

recognized

of a particular,

(Handelns)

the activity

appearance of

of

the

existing-

totality

could

know it

not

in the face

other

of

my totality; and by the same token, the other must at the same time appear to me himself as a totality, just as I appeared to him. If they behave negatively tby avoid ing each other), if they leave each other mutually tin peace), then neither one has

[a] totality,

appeared to the other as as a

totality in the

nor

[as]

recognition.

Language,

it appears, it is

p.

not

226, Note 3, line 15

a

the

conservation of

its [very] life; the death that

and

the

of

particular

that I

Each

end).

the consciousness of the other in

middle-term

(bleibendes),

permanent

to the

such a

the same token,

other.

I

the one [appeared!

of

cannot

way that he

itself

in the

myself

totality in

as

the other, for

commits against

its

[Vol. XIX,

recognition

real,

[apparaissante] totality,

visible

must-necessarily have for

each one

know

these are that

of

[between the two!: it disappears

or

all

(Darstellen),

presentation

particular must posit

any particularity whatsoever,

by

[as]

neither

explanations, promisefs], none

recognition; for language is but an ideal as

thas) the given-being

nor

the other,

consciousness of

consciousness of

totality [that is, as human individual or in his consciousness as being, in my

posit myself

the

lof himl,

goal

other as

to the

person] except exclusion

[its]

a

extent

totality

as! having his death as [my] end. In having his death as end, I death, I risk my own life. I commit the contradiction of wanting to affirm-or-impose (behaupten) the particularity of my given-being and of my posses sion; and this affirmation transforms itself into its opposite, [namely, in the fact! that I

[that is,

of exclusion

to

expose myself

sacrifice all

that

words] Ithat I

possession and

sacrifice!

dialectically-suppress

in this

extension

myself

of

my

as

totality

myself as

totality

of particularity,

particularity; I want to be

of

in my given-being

existence,

enjoyment, [in other

possession and

possibility of all

life itself. In positing

[in]

and

my

I

recognized

possession;

but I transform it in this [sense], that I dialectically-suppress that existence, and I am not recognized in truth as endowed-with-reason [= human!, as totality, except to the extent

life

and

totality This

that, by having

of

my

nothingness

of

my

itself, (that

existence

of the particularity of the totality brings

of death. Each

lute Consciousness [= relationship

the death of the other, I myself risk my

extension

own

is! the

particularity.

recognition

one

over and against

him,

(bis

and

den Tod treibt);

must-necessarily know

Man!. Each

must-necessarily offend totality [= individuality auf

as end

dialectically-suppress that

or

one

of

with

itself

therefore the

the other if he

is

an abso

must-necessarily posit himself in

the other, that this might come to the light of and

human

in the

each

one

person)

know

can

only

of

the

other

by forcing him

same way, each one shows

such

a

day; he

that he is

[al

to go to the death

himself to himself

as

[being a) totality only by going with himself to the death. If he stops [s'arrete], in himself, this side [en-dega] (innerhalb) of death, if he shows himself to the other only

as

committing the loss

of a part or

[even]

the

totality

of

the possession,

as

[only] wounds land) not life itself, he is then for the other, in-animmediate-manner, a non-totality; he is not absolutely for himself; he becomes the [risking]

slave of

the

other.

If he stops, in himself, this

side of

death

and ceases

the combat

Death in the

(Streit) before the putting to death, then he has nor [has he] recognized the other as such

151

of Hegel

Philosophy

demonstrated himself

not

as

totality,

....

This

the particulars is therefore in

recognition of

itself tan)

absolute contradiction:

is only the given-being of Consciousness, [taken! as totality, in an other Consciousness; but to the extent that the [first! Consciousness becomes objectivelyrecognition

real, it dialectically-suppresses the recognition ceases

to be [=to

Consciousness is recognized numerical

it is

and

by

an

Consciousness [by killing it!; thereby the not realize itself, but on the contrary

to the extent that

[= does

other,

and

(Eins),

and

not exist! at

it is

the

at

(indem) it is

[=

the same time

[= does

not

to

p.

229, line 31,

and p.

nonetheless -being-

time Consciousness only

same

lit) must-necessarily be recognized as its goal the death of the

not exist) except

And

exists).

except as an act-of

it must-necessarily have

228, line 17,

p.

exist!

not

unity

that

signifies

other

dialectically-suppresses itself. It does

in the objective-reality 230, lines 7-17.1

as

as absolute

such; but this

other and

its own,

death. [Vol. XIX,

of

Human reality is therefore in the last analysis "the objective-reality of death": Man is not only mortal; he is death incarnate; he is his own death. And in contrast to purely biological death, the death that is Man "natural,"

"violent"

is

a

Human

death,

211,

p.

It

appears as

for us,

which

extent

and

aU

consequently of

and voluntary.

his truly human

1805-06 (Vol. XX,

34-36):7

to Consciousness t= to the

[taken!

the

of man

says

lines

itself

at the same time conscious of

the death

is therefore, if we prefer, a suicide. it in so many words in the Lectures

existence

Hegel

death,

consciousness, that it has for

in the Struggle for

man engaged

[its]

end

recognition!

[in itself

the death of an other; but

is to say, in truth,) it has for [its] that it exposes itself to danger.

end

its

death; lit is)

own

or

suicide, to

Now it is only in the Struggle for recognition, and solely through the of hfe that this latter implies, that the given (animal) being creates itself as human being. It is therefore the very being of Man that risk

"appears"

or manifests "mediated"

itself

as a

deferred

(vermittelt) by

consciousness

discursive

suicide

the

or,

as

Hegel

would

Action

negate-ive

of the exterior and of

say, [a suicide]

that

itself. Man is

engenders a

being

a

who

commits suicide, or who is at least capable of committing suicide (Fahigkeit des Todes). The human existence of Man is a conscious and voluntary

death [which is] in the course of coming about [en voie de devenir]. In the Phenomenology* Hegel takes up again and refines the theme of

the Struggle for

It is in out

recognition.

and through

from

He insists

on

its

anthropogenetic character:

this Struggle alone that Man can create himself starting

the animal.

And Hegel

states

clearly that

what

is important in

Struggle is not the will to kill, but that of exposing oneself to the danger of death without any necessity, without being forced to it as an this

7

Hegel devotes only two

pages

there (Vol.

XX,

pp.

211-213)

to the analysis of

is truly new. 8 See above the translation with commentary of Section A of Chapter TV, (pp. 18-22) [note from the original edition]. [as] "By Way of

the Struggle for recognition,

and

Introduction"

he

says

there nothing that

printed

Interpretation

152 animal.

for

It is through the danger

of

pure prestige that one attains

death voluntarUy incurred in

is to say the revealed-reality,

which

the

the truth of Recognition. The

Struggle

"truth"

the reality itself. Now

and therefore

humanly only to the extent that he is recognized. It is there fore the human reality itself that is constituted or creates itself in and Man is

real

through the voluntary act of confronting death.

Thus, Hegel idea

mental

creation of

the Lectures of

Man to the

paradox that

that death

maintains and re-enforces

of

p.

be entirely

in

1803-04,

actualization of

Phenomenology

which

he

the funda

assimUates the

his death. But he

self-

abandons the

To be sure, he continues to say his total and definitive annihUation (cf. 145). But he no longer says that the realization of Man

he had

signifies

Phenomenology, cannot

in the

at

first

for

maintained.

man

in

death, that is, precisely he says expressly that the the human being. A being that has

accomplished except

actual

through annihilation. In the text in question, mere risk of

life

suffices to real-ize

its life, but that has escaped death, can live humanly, that is, [can] maintain itself as a man in empirical existence (Dasein) in the midst of the natural World. voluntarUy

risked

And it is precisely through the risk of life that Man comprehends that he is essentially mortal in the sense that he cannot exist humanly outside the animal that serves as a support for his self-consciousness. The ahve

has

man who

in

order to

be

he is

engaged

able to

in the Struggle for

recognition must remain

live humanly. But he hves

humanly

only to the

His adversary must therefore also escape death. The combat must cease before the putting to death, to what Hegel had said in the Lectures of 1803-04 (Vol. XIX, p. contrary 229). extent that

recognized

In those Lectures Hegel

by

the other.

for

aUowed

that eventuality.

when one of the two adversaries refuses to risk

other,

by becoming

recognized of

in

animality.

"recognition"

recognized.

death,

return.

his Slave, that is, But to

refuse the

It

comes about

and submits

to the

recognizing him without being risk is to remain within the hmits

by

The Slave is not, therefore, by him cannot, consequently,

Thus,

[his] hfe

a

truly human being,

real-ize

the

humanity

and

of the

true recognition can be effected only in and through

which annihilates the one who

itself [is annihUated]

recognizes; therefore the

and as a consequence

[also]

recognition

the recognized as recog

i.e., as a truly human being. Hence the paradox. Phenomenology Hegel avoids this paradox by admitting the of the Slave, and therefore the anthropogenetic value of his humanity recognition of the Master. But how does he justify the humanity of the nized

In the

being

who

human

has

precisely

and anthropogenetic

refused

to subordinate his animal

life to the

desire for Recognition?

The Master is humanized (is realized as Master, that is, as a specifically human being) through the recognition by the Slave, which he imposes on "against-nature" this latter in accepting the risk that the future Slave refuses.

As for the Slave himself, he is humanized (is

realized as

Slave,

Death in the is

which

of

153

specificaUy human mode of being) through the essential finitude in experiencing the dread of

also a

he takes

of Hegel

Philosophy

his

cognizance

death,

that

death appearing to him in the course of a Struggle for recognition, that is, as something that is not a purely biological necessity. Just like the Master, the Slave is

himself,

conscious of

that

is, [he is]

essentiaUy human in his empirical existence. To be sure, at the beginning, at his nascent stage so to speak, the Slave is human only potentially, while "objectively-real," the humanity of the Master is since it is actually recog But it

nized.

Struggle,

the

remains no

less

Man

the case that

the same time, as Master

at

and

himself,

creates

Slave,

and that

through

the two are

specifically human. And they are such, in the last analysis, through the fact that they have both been placed in the presence of then death. The Slave of

realizes and perfects

the Master. But this

pogenetic virtue

and

is

one who serves

In as

Citizen

by

the

community.

Master, He

service

of the

forever fixed in his

who remains

raises

is free

through

It is

in the

finitude

the consciousness of the essential

the abstract

who

World

given

by

origin.

and elaborates

laboring

serving Labor [TravaU] has an anthro extent that it is born of the Dread of death

humanity humanity, [which was]

the Slave develops and perfects his

its

servUe at

in

humanity

laboring.

to the

contrast

Master,

as a

only to

accompanied

his

servUe or

himself to [the level of] discursive thought freedom; and he creates himself also

notion of

and

ultimately

fully

by transforming

satisfied,

the

the Labor that he performs in the Service of the

he [the

therefore

Slave-Citizen],

and not the

is Man properly speaking, the individual who freely we must not forget to notice that Service and Labor

creates are

Master,

who

History.

free

But

and creative

only to the extent that they are accomplished within [or in terms of] the Dread that is born of the consciousness of death. It is therefore, when ah

is

said

and

constitutes

If

there

done,

the

this consciousness

is to be

is

place

an

the

struggle

a

and

voluntary

for recognition, it is in order life. But this risk itself,

risk of

Master, is there in order that experience of death, which reveals presence of

death that is

specificaUy human

life,

may take

there

to him his

"the life

able

to

own

of the

attain

its

the fuUness of satisfaction.

only

being

say that he is the

in the

of man

world who

consciousness of

consciousness of

existing

perfection

death that humanizes Man

the

is to say,

which

Man is we can

is

in

And it is hfe in the

perfection or

bloody

or

actualized

finitude.

of

his humanity.

"suicide"

in the Slave the

Spirit,"

of

murder and

that there may be which

basis

ultimate

being

death,

knows that he

his death:

or a

death

Truly

must

human

conscious of

die,

and

existence

itself. The

the fuUness of consciousness of self, and Man

essentiaUy finite in his very being, it is in the conscious acceptance finitude that human existence culminates. And it is the fuU (discursive)

being of

comprehension

Wisdom that

of

the meaning of death that

completes

History by

constitutes

that Hegelian

procuring Satisfaction for Man.

Interpretation

1 54

or

For in attaining to Wisdom, Man understands that it is solely his finitude his death that assures him absolute freedom, by liberating him not only

from the

if Man

God,

freedom

absolute

ground

very irreducible In

World but

given

be

would

a

[mobile]

motive

And the

pride of

existence

his

of

infinite

the eternal and

infinite

satisfies the

his human

of

from

also

were not mortal.

and

which

given

consciousness of this

Man,

which constitutes

is the

which

ultimate

the

[and]

act of self-creation.

way, Hegelian anthropology is a secularized Christian And Hegel is perfectly aware of it. He repeats on several that everything said by Christian theology is absolutely true,

general

theology. occasions

it is applied, not to an imaginary transcendent God, but to living in the World. The theologian does anthropology without

provided that real

Man,

taking

it. Hegel merely becomes truly conscious of the knowl by explaining that its real object is not God, but

account of

theo-logical,

edge called

historical

Man, or, as he hkes Among other places, this Lectures

the end of the

Religion

[it is) the

[in

is

general)

personal-Self

of

to say,

Spirit

(Selbst)

the

other

XX,

p.

(Volksgeist)."

does

with

its

not

(vorgestellter):

(nicht

coincidence

objectively-real

opposed

at

268, lines 7-21):

bring into

consciousness,

[to itl, in the latter,

terms, the Religious [person] is

Hegel

by

expressed

representedt-as-an-exterior-entity)

which

former is

content of the

[entite-autre]. [In

of the people

is clearly

conception

1805-06 (Vol.

menbringt) its pure consciousness which

"the Spirit

as an

does

one who

zusam-

[and) for

other-entity

know that

not

he is speaking in fact of himself when he believes that he is speaking of God) [The] idea of the absolute tor Christian) Religion is this speculative idea that the

....

personal-Self, (or! the objectively-real-entity, is thought [Ha! pensee], [that!

reality

in

(Wesen)

and

(Sein)

given-being

God, [that is,)

way that

tare) the

same thing.

This is

[=

put

essential-

expressed)

(jenseitige) here; but also [it is put in such a way] that this objective-reality is dialectically-suppressed, has become a past [real ity], and [that! this God, who is Ion the one hand al [given particular] such

a

reality, [has! become

Man,

the absolute transcendent

essential-

this objectively-real-being

objective-

reality

Ion the

and

other

hand

an]

objective reality

[which has been]

dialectically-

suppressed or universal, is the same thing as [a] Spirit-of-the-people; it is only as immediateness [that is, as represented (vorgestellt) as a single man named lesus) that it is the Spirit of the [Christian] community. That God is Spirit, this is the content of

that (Christian) religion.

Hegel is therefore in that the

"Absolute,"

Substance, Parole]

analysis to

a

this,

the idea

And it is

that

transcendent

that radical and

is, is

is, Being

to the extent of saying

not

Identity,

revealed

God,

while

by

given-Being,

the Word [la

for Hegel it is

irreducible difference

amounts

that the Christian Spirit is eternal and

Spirit that Hegel had in

ducing

Totality

Christianity

of what

discursive Reason (Logos). But for the Christian this

Spirit is

And

accord with

the

Nature, but Spirit,

by

or

"absolute"

world.

or

or

of

by taking

Man-in-the-

in the final

infinite,

whUe the

is essentially finite or mortal. It is by intro death that theo-logy is transposed into anthropo-logy. mind

that idea

literally,

that

is, by suppressing

the notions of

Death in the

of Hegel

Philosophy

155

that we arrive at the true or Hegelian anthropol

survival and resurrection ogy.

Hegel is perfectly course

aware of

(Vol.

relates to the passage cited

It is

this

not

that (eben

here

man

and

wUl,

XX,

dies, but

who

he

and

268, Note 3, last

which

two lines):

is precisely because

of

divinity] becomes Man.

that consciousness, the consciousness of self, the

discursive

Hegel demonstrates that

p.

[the

clearly in

says so

the divine tas such); it

that this divine [or this

dadurch)

Thus, in demonstrating rational

this also,

the evangelical myth in a marginal note,

interpreting

of]

imply

reason

"absolute

the

finitude

and presuppose

Spirit,"

or

the

totality

or

death,

of revealed

Being, is not an eternal God creating the World out of Nothingness, but Man, negating a natural World, given from aU eternity, in which he himself is born In

dies

and

the

as

historical humanity.

final analysis,

God

the

and

revealing itself in

Christian theology (of ancient or pagan eternaUy identical to itself, realizing itself

of

inspiration) is given-Being (Sein),

and through a natural

World,

which

only

manifests

the essence and the power of existing of the Being that is. The Man of Hegel, on the contrary, is the Nothingness (Nichts) that annihUates given-

Being or

existing

History) in The

World,

as

and

ultimate

basis

that amuhilates itself (as real historical time

that annihUation of the

and through

of the natural or

given.

"divine"

(Dasein)

empirical-existence

is given-Being or the power (Macht) of subsisting eternally in identity with itself. The ultimate basis of human empirical-existence, on the contrary, the source and origin of human reahty, is Nothingness or the power of

Negativity,

is

which

realized

is

and

"dialectical"

diction

of

only in or

the

given)

Being

"essence"

and

is

annihilates what

Man),

of

what

that is (as

ing"

he is

and

and

not

in

(from

by

real,

creating the

what

is

not.

If Nature

This

dehvered

at the

very

existence

"God"

or

moment

is

the

the Nothingness that supress-

central and ultimate

idea that the foundation

idea

of

of the source of objective

existence

(Dasein) is

the

as negate-ive or create-ive

Action [which is] free and conscious of itself, "romantic" passage in pressed in a beautiful and Hegel

is

Time) by "dialecticahy

reality (Wirklichkeit) and of human empirical Nothingness that is manifest or that reveals itself

which

there

prefer, the essential-reality

we

Space), Man is

"historical,"

or

only through the create-ive contra

the agent is not what he is (as

which

real or

Hegelian phUosophy,

is, if

ah eternity).

"physical"

(as Action is

or

manifest

of

through Action (which

and

[made]

identity being into [the] historical becoming, in which

transformation of the given

that idea is clearly the

Lectures

when

he

was

of

ex

1 805-06,

writing

the

Phenomenology.

Here is

that passage

(Vol.

XX,

p.

180, line 24,

Man is this night, this empty Nothingness, vided-simplicity (Einfachheit): a wealth of an

images,

no one of which

precisely

attains

to p.

which contains

infinite

to the spirit

181, hne 8):

everything in its

number of

undi

representations, of [dont aucune ne lui vient preci-

Interpretation

1 56 l'esprit],

sement a

[the)

pure personal-Self.

here there and

into

[even

or

they a

rises

In

man's

(furchtbar); it is

head

a

bloody,

all

as suddenly.

[we then immerse

eyes:

the

of

Nature,

which

night of

the

that

night

gaze)

world which

here:

in

[then!

a

[i.e.,]

night all around:

there another pale apparition

It is this our

exists

there is

phantasmagorical representations

up suddenly

disappear just

all

(gegenwartig). It is

morel which are not as really-present

interiority-or-intimacy (Innere)

the night, the

(Gestalt);

we perceive when we

becomes

that

night

look

terrible

itself (hangt entgegen) to

presents

us.

Power (Macht) to draw images from that Action (Tun). It is into this

is equally

is

manifest

that

let them fall from in

to

[qui

withdrawn

interior consciousness, retiree] the

s'est

(das Seiende); but the [dialectical]

entity-

movement of

the power that maintains in

movement of

Man

is History. And that

is,

as negate-ive or create-ive

that Man himself

given

is

or

creation!,

this

posited.

The dialectical

Nothingness

that

night

existing-as-a-being[-which-is-)given power

night

(Selbstsetzen) [that is, free

autonomous-positing

is,

[the]

or

power

itself is

Action: Action

action of the

Being

the

realized and

negate-ive of the

Struggle that

creates

historical Man; and Action negate-ive of the given that the natural World is, in which the animal lives, or [the] action of Labor that creates the

World, outside of which Man is only a pure Nothingness, he differs from Nothingness only for a certain time.9

cultural which

9

Drawn into

to Nature

that no

his

is, is in

error

by

the monistic ontological

human

analysis of

historical

meaning, and

He

sometimes extends

says then

that everything

ends

up in

an

Nothingness (which, obviously, has indefensible philosophy of nature). He says, for

1805-06, in [the

Nature (Schellingian inspiration): "The

token

tradition, Hegel

existence.

in

the last analysis an annihilation of

example, in the Lectures of of

or

and

space and

course

shadows

of] are

developing his philosophy Nothingness; by the same

the same way as in general

time are not;

all

is

Nothingness"

(Vol.

80, lines 5-6). Heidegger has taken up again the Hegelian themes concerning XX, death; but he neglects the complementary themes concerning Struggle and Labor; p.

thus his philosophy does retains

the

not

succeed

themes of Struggle and

"historicist"; but he

neglects

mortal); that is why he does

Revolution is

not

Hegelian theme

of

only

in rendering an account of History. Marx and his philosophy is thus essentially

Labor,

the theme of death (even while admitting that man not see

(and

in fact but

also

the Terror).

even

less [do]

essentially and

is

"Marxists") that the necessarily bloody (the

certain

157

REMARKS

ON

THE

1001

NIGHTS

Muhsin Mahdi

The 1001 Nights is which

story,

Indo-Persian

ancient

to have

extended

that

misfortune

in

a

with

relates

humble,

made

the

royal

house

careless,

and

royal

of

the

Sassanids,

and

gives

vulgar

the

and

its

whose

rule

of

is

the said

China. The terrible city is

principal

language,

whole

history

work

related

which, together

the

unmistakable

in Islamic stamp times. Their fictional time is the past, a past that covers the history of the revealed religions, at least from the time of Solomon. Yet they are of comedy.

enclosed

and wise

in

lands

a

of

heathen

Shehrezade

future

and of a

the

stories

frame story that

were

girl to a

She

happy

heathen

king

ending

rewritten

narrator

outside

the times

Islam.

in

heathen land in heathen times.

a

They

are narrated

by

a

In fact, she is foreteUing hopes, of coming catastrophes, joyful resolution. Tentatively, one may say

of

and

or

and

to be narrating past speaks

written

their

places

Judaism, Christianity,

claims

events.

AU

house

occasionally

happy termination,

the

in the

circumstances

from Samarkand to India

befeU the

frame

of stories placed within a general

up

adverse

fears

events.

and

that the overaU subject of the 1001 Nights is the

history

of

the

relation

between heathen royalty and the revealed religions, a history that begins in ancient times with circumstances that appear to be leading this royalty to a catastrophic end, but that terminates with a festival in which this royalty

and

its city

celebrate their triumph and weU-being.

The first intimation that

rehgion plays a certain role

in the

misfortunes

house is found in the famous garden scene in the palace of the older brother, King Shahriyar. An earher scene of infidelity in the bedchamber of the younger brother, King Shahzeman, in Samarkand indicates a breakdown in the conventional laws of matrimony and points of

the

royal

to the pohtical implications of the

rebelhousness of women, especially if they happen to be queens. But the garden scene is more spectacular. It takes place in the open air. Not 2, but 42 persons participate in the act. The queen appears in the garden with 40 slave ladies. When they take their clothes off, 20 of them turn out to be black men who had been

disguised as ladies and lodged in the palace. The queen's lover is no longer the shadowy kitchen hand in Shahzeman's bedchamber, but a black man whom she calls by name, who descends to her from the top of a tree,

Interpretation

158

and who at the end of the scene

the garden and into the

of

frame

It is first

story.

effect on

observed

him because it

(which lasts This

road.

by

the

him

shows

means unique or even as grave as

aU

scene

younger

his

that

day) jumps

over

is

twice in the

repeated

brother

off.

The

healing by no that, by

a

misfortune was

own

he had thought: He

comparison, he is in fact quite weU change in the younger brother's color

has

and

the waU

now thinks

brother

older

and appetite

the

notices

upon

and,

questioning

about both incidents. He is wiUing to believe the misfortune his younger brother, but not his own. So the younger brother invites him to see for himself, and both observe a repeat performance of the scene. There is this difference, however: In the first performance the

him, learns of

her

queen calls on

but he does the

"I

am

of

Religion"). The

Lucky,

whose name

her. In the

the

Religion"

Luck

(Lucky

fortunes

of

the earth,

says

Fortunate,

the

the

of

Fortunate),

or

he descends from

am

surface

(or "I

of

declining

is Mas'ud

second performance

tree and, reaching the

of the

top

lover,

not speak to

house

royal

to her:

Fortune

seem

to be

rising fortunes of a new religion, whose lucky star appears to signal a rise in the fortune of the unfortunate, the kitchen hand and the black man. In fact, the transformation of the 20 slave ladies into

coordinated with the

men

in this

favoring joining in

indicates that the

scene

new

in general, both

the unfortunate

a common rebellion against

conjunction

women and

the conventions

of

the

stars

is

black men, who are that had established

their inferior position.

The

effect of the spectacle on the older

from worldly things in general and to his younger brother that they aimlessly "for the love with

abandon

their kingdoms and

yet

reflected on

the

scheme.

He

her in

large

a

of

not

returning

untU

controlling women, had devised the foUowing beautiful bride on her wedding night, placed away box with four steel locks, deposited her at the bottom

difficulty

of

snatched

glass

a

the sea, and freed her only when he could be

of

When the two kings

big

demon

rests

terrifying

creature

with

her

on

approaching,

the

shore.

they

climb

his head

on his lady's lap and goes to sleep, she sees them, demon's head from her lap, and forces them to come down

from the top

demon,

tree to satisfy her

desire, threatening to wake up the drown them in the sea, if they refused. Out of fear from this point on replaces the fear of God and the

of the

who would

death

covenant

the

see this

tree in the meadow and hide among its leaves. But as soon as the

removes the

of

wander

God,"

they find someone a greater affliction. It takes them only two days to reach the and find such a creature. A black demon, it seems, who had

seashore

a

brother is to turn him away in particular. He proposes

royal power

which

the jealous kings deceive the jealous

lady has

been in the habit

in his presence, for quite lovers and, according to another, 570.

Treating

that the flaw in

his

of

some one

demon,

only to learn that

successfully deceiving the demon, time. She has collected the rings

version, produces

98,

and

almost of

her

according to

the demon with the utmost contempt, she explains

scheme

is his ignorance

of

the fact that when a woman

Remarks

1001 Nights

the

on

159

desires something nothing can stand in her way, and that her wiU has the same force as fate and divine decree. The two brothers are amazed and elated by the dimensions of the demon's problem and the utter impossibUity of protecting women against "covenant"

their fateful ways. The institution of marriage, that

that assumes the

man and woman

abUity to a

his

assert and

mighty

Returning king, disposes

as

known of

regime

her the

being, his kingdom,

to

his

of

wife and

next

until

morning

Shehrezade is with

her

is

now

terrifying demon,

phUosophy

can

assert such

brother takes up his duties wellslaves, and institutes the

older

lady

a woman

Shehrezade

not tenable

to

show

and, eventuaUy,

and medicine on

the

hand

one

disposes

and

every evening

arrives

learned, intelligent, wise, many books, but especiaUy

read

between

husband's been whoUy refuted. Not even of the wife and the

presented as

She had

skUl.

the

"marries"

whereby he

resolution of the problem

literary dealing

right, has the

exclusive

supernatural

rights.

inferiority

him that this

not necessary. and possessed

two

kinds,

of

those

history

and with

kings on the other. She also appears to have thought long and hard about the king's predicament and the predic ament of the city, in which it was hard to find a marriageable woman any more, and has decided to take matters into her own hands. She asks that her father, the vizier, present her to the king as a wife. The quality of her and

the sayings of wise men and

wisdom

first in her

appears

dissuade her deals

with

some animals.

but

ox

about the

with animals.

His

secret

cannot reveal the

tries to

who

There is

and

a merchant who owns a

is that he knows the language

fact

except at

the danger

farm

and

brutes

of those

death. He hears the

of

is leading a comfortable life, instructing the hard-working in how the latter can live comfortably by feigning sickness. When the

donkey, ox

her father,

the ox, a story that by telling story donkey certain curious kinds of secret knowledge that have to do, not

angels, but

with

conversation with

the

who

tries this scheme, the merchant makes the donkey do the ox's work. about the turn of events, the donkey tells the ox a lie: that he

Unhappy

heard the next

merchant

day he

should

say to his farmhand that

be

taken to the

this. His wife insists on

to

reveal

of

secret and

managing 50 hens

the

ox stiU

The

be

sick

without the slightest

their master need do is to take

his

wife

into

difficulty,

teU a

a closet and

dog

beat her

the

laughs

merchant

finding out why he has laughed, and he is die. Then he hears a rooster, who knows the

at

his

should

slaughterhouse.

about secret

that aU until she

The merchant foUows the rooster's suggestion and saves himself. This story does not succeed in dissuading Shehrezade. Since the success of Shehrezade's scheme wiU depend exclusively on the success of her stories, it is perhaps useful to figure out the reason for the failure of this story, a reason Shehrezade must have understood, for she must be assured repents.

that she story.

wUl not

Now

address

a

be

murdered

story may be

itself to the

the point to the

question at

hstener,

the next

unsuccessful

day

because

for many

hand, it may be badly

and so on.

of an

reasons:

told

unsuccessful

It may

and not

not

convey

In this case, the trouble is that the

Interpretation

1 60

tells the story does not himself know the real point. According story relevant to the situation in which

vizier who

to

there are two points in the

him,

he self

is like

ished his because

donkey

by having

who ends

the merchant who wUl punish

wife untU she changed

her

Shehrezade

Yet the

mind.

into trouble for the

the merchant's wife got

it. That

into trouble

got

knowledge

secret

her to

enables

himself into trouble

because he

his

with

the

shutting her up by threatening to send her to the than the inconvenience of hard work or the secret point of

his

work.

and got

wife

point,

instead

slaughterhouse.

pain of

has

of the

back to

laughed

by

knowledge

the secret

vizier

possession

not see the real

death

with

rather

stick, is the

ox get

merchant

Yet he too did

wife.

is in

who

that the real point

see

himself to be threatened

aUowed

But the

same reason.

story is in the he invented by the donkey to This, we recaU, was the incident at which the

with a

the

he him

as the merchant pun

donkey

knowledge; in fact, it is Shehrezade make

of

is like

says,

to do the ox's work. And

the merchant's secret knowledge of the language of animals, and

of

no such secret of

Shehrezade, he

Shehrezade find themselves.

and

meddlesome

being

This,

beaten

language

of the

of

animals.

Unlike the

says,

to

disobeying

is too

she

the

king's

to be taken to the then

her

directly

she wiU go

vizier, thinks

to

threatening

immediately

send

to the

good

for him

(She

order.

king

puts

her

her father to the

Otherwise,

him that her father, his that he has been hiding her,

and teh

and

was supposed

to be among the very first

king, who had started with the daughters of noblemen, finally merchants.) Her story is successful. She applies

generals, and

knowledge

secret

by

work

to speak, unless he presents her to the king.

so

slaughterhouse, she

her father, Shehrezade

merchant and

knowledge

secret

without

revealing it. She

plans

to teU the

king

a

story

that wiU take possession of him and make him change

thereby

save

instrument,

herself

dehver her

and

helper,

or a

her

nation.

younger sister

In

his ways, and design she needs an

this

Dinazad,

whom she

instructs

beforehand on what to say when brought to the king's bedchamber. Once she is brought to the king, Shehrezade sheds false tears to convince him that

she

like to

her sister and take leave of her. Dinazad's know that Shehrezade knows many delightful "httle" Shehrezade to teU a story, and then extol her as a

would

function is to let urge

stories,

wonderful

Dinazad's second

the

see

king

Shehrezade's means "of noble

storyteUer.

name

means

"of

race,"

while

noble

religion."

name

time as the

against the

"name"

of an

Thus

instrument

king. But this time the

name

is

used

rehgion appears

by

not the

a queen

"luck

for

the

in her design religion"

of

but

it designates, not a black lover, but a young lady who loves or pretends to love stories, and whose contagious enthusiasm arouses the king's desire to hear Shehrezade's stories and enables "noble "noble

religion,"

and

to practice her

race"

represented of

Dinazad,

wisdom.

by

healing

Mas'ud is

who

is

an

art.

The dark

replaced

instrument,

by

and sinister aspect of religion

the mindless and

not of a

endearing

dark passion, but

aspect

of a secret

Remarks

on

the 1001 Nights

161

II The first story told

by Shehrezade

is the story

of the merchant and

the demon. The merchant possesses great wealth, has a large household with

and

many servants, wives,

and

chUdren,

travels

abroad

to attend to

his financial affairs. But, above ah, he is pious, performs his religious duties, and keeps scrupulously to his obligations toward his dependents and clients. He has just finished performing his ritual prayer in a garden on a hot day somewhere in a foreign land when, without his knowledge, he becomes involved in a perplexing and dangerous situation. After eating a few dates with his lunch, he throws away then pits. Suddenly, a terrifying demon appears, invisible

sword

son and

in

hand, claiming

kUled him

the rehgious law to avenge the blood of and on

his

refusing to hsten to the merchant's his part was unintentional. You

beheves in with

has

and

son

being

meant

for the

meant

to regulate

between

is intent

and

demanding his legal right under son by murdering the merchant,

plea

that the aUeged act of the

see

law. And

invisible beings

visible

beings

his

murdered

intentional

to the relation

applies

to

and refuses

unintentional and

law. The merchant,

he is faced

now

he had

that

avenging him according to a divine law visible beings. The demon claims that a law

between

relations

distinction between

claims

on

protection of

visible and

who

murder

dUemma. He

merchant's

always obeyed the religious

this visible-invisible

invisible

that one of these pits had hit his

the spot,

on

acknowledge

He

murder.

the legal

his

makes

his predicament in terms of the rehgious law, attributes it to inexorable blind fate. The demon and the powers he represents seem to be intent on the destruction of a pious own

the

man and

It is

day

at this

who cannot understand

subversion of religion and the

point, in the

breaks. Dinazad ("of

divine law.

earhest extant version of the noble

1001 Nights, that

religion") finds this cruel story pleasing

But it is the king who must spare Shehrezade's life. He find the story either pleasing or wonderful, but gripping and thought-provoking. It prevents him from disposing of Shehrezade as he and wonderful!

does

not

had

disposed

experienced so

of

countless

to speak, to a

woman.

too, invisible boys

before.

women

the fear of death at

the

hand

Now he learns that demons

that the supply of eligible girls in his

What if the

their that

least

morning?

favor, what

can

vizier

Like

he had thought

city has been daughters

should some night

kings,

and are quick

own

exhausted

unknowingly

bring

murder

should

vengeance.

Shehrezade

was a resolution of

he

and

with unknown

unknowingly king demons interpret the law harshly

to take

a resolution with which

have offspring It is no secret

commoners'

the daughter of a demon and the the next

has personaUy

king

terrifying demon married,

and girls who can assume visible shapes.

that the last batch had consisted of pedigrees.

The

of a

could

live for

his

as

her

and

proves to

original

a while

him in

him

difficulty,

at

both husband

and king, is untenable. For aU he knows, Shehrezade's real father is a demon; or he has already murdered the daughters of a number of demons,

Interpretation

162

their way to kUl him. Since the poor merchant in the story has been murdered, and there is more to the story, the king must find out whether there is a way out of this new predicament. He saves her life, not out of mercy, but out of his own fear of death. Shehrezade who are on

not as yet

balance

a

establishes

terror that immobUizes the king.

of

When the story continues, the merchant appeals to the demon for mercy and faUs, but succeeds in obtaining a year's delay to take leave of his property, pay his

famUy, divide his himself

by

a vow and a

The demon,

who

is

return at the end of

faith in the covenant

God

with

come

back. He binds

oath

in God's

name.

the merchant's intention to

about

skeptical

faith in the

The

keeping

of

and

faithfulness to his returns

merchant

fear

pious merchant's

the habit

or else

law

rehgious

weh-founded.

proves

Either the

death,

of

and

formal

a

the year, is now convinced that he wUl. The demon's

merchant's

end of the year.

his fear

first

at

debts,

taking

covenant,

God is

of

his

promise

at

the

than

stronger

has become

a

him. In any case, while he is waiting for the demon, happen to come by, leading a gazeUe, two black hounds,

second nature with three old men

(whatever that is), and he tells them his story. They sit to see what wUl happen. When the demon arrives, each

and a she-mule

with of

him, waiting

the three old

men offers

of the merchant's

for vengeance,

passion

by

three stories are meant to cure the

counteract the

for the

and serve as a substitute

inoperable

to teU him his own story as a ransom for a third

blood. The

religious

In the first story the

almost

old man's

who

his

the

son

Abraham's

also a

magician,

during

him

The

his

saves the

boy

his

into

wife

husband

compassionate a

cow,

horse,

a

or a

his daughter-in-law transforms the In the

second

story,

the

sacrifice

Great Feast,

sacrifice of

son

wife, in his absence,

a cow and a calf.

on condition

objects

his

which

Isaac. A

to marry him and to disarm the jealous wife animal.

which

chUdless

into

wife makes

sacrifice

is

jealous, son

returns, the jealous

occasion of

law,

with

attempt

killing

him,

When the

concubine and celebrates

cowherd's

to the idea of

the

daughter,

that she be

by transforming

allowed

her into

an

transforming

buffalo cow; in order to please into a shapely gazelle.

him,

wife

second

old

a

man,

merchant,

business trip to India, shows kindness to a stranded poor to marry her. She turns out to be a religious she-demon in love

demon's

he had appealed, has been rendered

which

the demon.

transforms his concubine and her old man

higher law to

while

on

a

girl and agrees

who had fallen him from his two jealous brothers who his bride on the journey back. She insists on

and she saves

to drown him

and

them. He intercedes on their

behalf, implores her

to forgive their She transforms them into black hounds and insists that they remain in this condition for ten years. In the third story, the man returns from a journey to find his wife with madness,

a of

black

and

man.

the house.

persists until

she relents.

She transforms her husband into A butcher's daughter

a

recognizes

dog and drives him out him, delivers him, and

Remarks him

provides

The

the

1001 Nights

163

the means to transform his wife into

with

is done to

Nothing

on

black

the

these

overall point of

a

she-mule.

man.

stories

is

be

that stories can

used

to

ransom

hfe. This point, however, is more relevant to Shehrezade's circumstances. As for the king, they seem to make his position even less someone's

tenable than before.

First,

there are these magical arts that

seem

relatively easy to learn and that many young women seem to How can he be sure that the next woman in his bedroom wUl

him into

he be

dog or

a

sure

that

a mule rather than permit

he

her

not

any woman dehver him after what he had said about women done to them so far? The discovery that not ah demons are harsh

is

httle

of

comfort

by

know

seems to

does

by

demons.

about them

she

reaUy

after?

Her

vengeful

demon

three stories about human beings in which the only one

is kiUed is the in which

who

She talks

that it is difficult to be sure that the learned

What is

not practice them.

is disarmed

superhuman powers of

about their workings.

with such ease and expertise

lady

and

He feels threatened

a religious she-demon.

the human powers of magic and the

Shehrezade

and

to him. He cannot teU stories; and he is not

the type of man to be loved

by

can

dehver him? And why

should

satanic

turn

destruction? How

own

wiU meet a woman who will

to be

practice.

a situation

concubine sacrificed at an occasion

friend

a

of

God is

commanded

by

commemorating God to sacrifice

The one responsible for the murder in this instance is a wife is jealous because she never had a son of her own. She makes the father murder the mother of his only son and wishes him to murder the

his

son.

who

son

as

well.

For the rest,

even vengeful women

and transform their enemies

kUl their though

wives

they

instance

of

intentionaUy,

suffer

adultery,

tragedy

by

into good-looking

they find

not even when and

humUiation

a wife with a

are

at

black man,

relatively merciful The men never

animals.

their seems

them

in adultery,

hands. The only to go

unpunished.

for transforming him into a dog by trans he does not punish her for adultery and does forming her into a she-mule; human husband of the religious shekind black man. The the nothing to The husband

repays

his

wife

demon is willing to forgive his jealous brothers who attempt to murder and his wife. Shehrezade's representation of religion in the story is ambiguous to say the least. Yet the only male religious human being in

him

story is presented as a sohd, law-abiding, and dependable citizen. And it is true that the religious she-demon takes the law into her hands and is harsher than her human husband toward his brothers, she does

the

whUe

not go upon

beyond the

punishment prescribed

by

and can

be

prevailed

imprisonment,

so

to speak.

the law

to mitigate the legal punishment to term

Shehrezade is clearly not in sympathy with the king's harsh ways, even though it is not as yet clear what she wants him to do. Her first story is private men. It does not touch the principally about merchants who are city

or

kings

who are

in

charge of cities.

Interpretation

164

III The story

the fisherman

of

demon,

the

and

next, is

comes

which

of brass, which has a principahy about kings. The fisherman nets a lead stopper bearing the impression of God's Most Great Name. Intending to seU the bottle, he opens it and is confronted with a terrifying demon.

bottle

The demon

immediately

declares that he

Solomon,

disagree

He then turns to the fisherman

order.

wishes to

and

God,

and

disobey

his

the prophet of

with

his

asks

word or

him to

how he

choose

die. The fisherman informs the demon that this is the

that Solomon has been dead for a thousand

time, and

addresses

wul never again

end of

hundred years, behavior. This demon, it turns

that he had better explain his mad

and eight

who had disobeyed brought before Solomon, exhorted to submit to his authority, refused, and were placed in bottles sealed with God's Most Great Name. A thousand and eight hundred years of confine ment seem to have taught this demon that the cause of rebellion and heresy

was

out,

one

of

Solomon; they

has

definitely

whoever

during Now,

caught

been lost

mighty Solomon's periodicaUy

rebeUious, heretical demons

the

were

and

party.

and

that he must

Yet

decide, depending

during

his

buy

his freedom

confinement the

his mood, how to

on

by joining demon

reward

or

the

would

punish

liberate him. The fisherman happened to hberate him in which the demon had decided to murder his hberator.

would

a period

the preceding story, the fisherman is God's Most Great Name to make the

unlike the pious merchant of

poor and clever.

He

makes use of

demon swear that he wiU teU the truth; then asks him, again using God's Most Great Name, whether he reaUy has been confined in that smaU bottle; then accuses him of lying; and finally persuades him to prove his truth fulness

by

re-entering the botde, has broken his spirit

confinement

which

he quickly reseals. The demon's him gullible. He is so fright

and made

the Most Great Name that the fisherman is able to deceive him making use of his fear of it to save himself. Now the demon offers to make him rich in exchange for his freedom, but the fisherman refuses

ened of

by

and sage

likens then relationship to Duban.

King Yunan, over

that

whose name means

between the

"the

Greek,"

heathen Greeks in Northwest Persia. He is

incurable leprosy. The

sage

Duban is

is

king a

Yunan

heathen

and

king

the

ruling

afflicted with an

a phUosopher who

apparently is learned in the

He is said to be a Greek too and to have from the Byzantine Empire. He cures the king of his leprosy

natural sciences of aU nations.

just

arrived

and

is greatly honored and amply rewarded by the king, who makes him of his counselors. So far, there is no analogy between the two

one

situations.

Then the jealous vizier,

his place, insinuates to

(Christian) Byzantine the very

The

art

king

by

which

accuses

the

who

is

afraid that

the

sage wiU

take

king that the sage is in fact a spy sent by the king to destroy the heathen Greek king and that he cured the king can be used to murder the king. vizier of jealousy and teUs a story that had been the

Remarks told

by

because

a good vizier to

king,

another

the insinuations

1001 Nights

the

on

who

was

165 to kUl his

about

son

jealous person, a story that prevented the from this foohsh act. king committing This is the story of the husband and the parrot. The parrot informs of

of a

the jealous husband about his beautiful wife and her lover. In revenge, the

fools the

wife

mirror,

and

hghtning,

parrot

one

clear

When the

and rain.

natural phenomena

had

it had lied to him

aU

night

summer

and, using

a

grinder,

a

spray, makes it imagine that there is thunder,

some water

parrot

occurred

teUs the husband that these imagined

the clear night

before,

the husband thinks

kUls it, only to hear subsequently from the neighbors that his wife was in fact unfaithful to him. The analogy between the sage Duban, the other king's son, and the parrot, indicates

king

that the

in the

saw

the limits

stood

along

sage a possible

his

of

distinguish between

and

natural

heir to the

throne and yet under

He does

wisdom:

know how to

not

genuine natural phenomena and their

imitations; he

know how to fake, how to lie in speech or in deed. And the analogy between the beautiful wife and the vizier emphasizes their competence in the art of deception. The king is attracted to the innocent

does

not

and guUeless

his

sage,

he

whom

wants

to protect against the machinations of

clever vizier.

The vizier, in turn, teUs the king a story in which he tries to show sage is neither innocent nor guUeless. KUl him, he says in effect,

that

the

if

what

I

am

vizier

scheming

hunting

saying does

with

kUled

was

the

not turn out

king's

by

beast transforms itself into

into

a

to

speak.

master

a

girl,

vizier

kUl

and

me as a certain

in the story is out a wild beast. The

him to foUow

and

being. Instead

then

of

him to pray to God kills the vizier. The

the girl transforms

herself

eating him, however, she him free. He returns to

and then sets

encourages

his father,

cannibal

true,

his king. The

son and encourages

wUd

fabulous

to be

who

The

vizier was

"king"

(a

who

vizier's aUy was a double agent, so her to eat the prince, whUe some other employing for the looks weU-being of man's soul) was

employing her to convert him to religion, and the fabulous female being betrayed the vizier. The present vizier is in a better position. He knows

Duban, whom he is accusing of being a spy of the (Christian) Byzantine king, is a heathen and wUl not pray to God; nor wUl his heathen that the sage

king. And he does aUy is his

lying

not

and

his

have any ally who might betray him: His only The vizier's story, strangely enough,

storytelling.

the king. There is nothing in the story to have this effect except the aUy who is a double agent and who can eat the prince as weU as save his soul. Since the sage has already benefited the king and become his aUy convinces

art, the only danger he presents is that of the (Christian) Byzantine king, who plans to kUl the king

through the use of

being the or

agent of

convert

king's fear sage

him

and

his

natural

the city to divine

of religion to make

makes

use

of

a

natural

worship.

him kUl secret,

the

The

vizier makes use of

heathen sage,

a poisoned

book,

and the

to

the

heathen

kUl the

king

Interpretation

166 after

he had himself been beheaded. The

king and the sage kUl one another,

clearing the way for the vizier to inherit the kingdom. In the fisherman's story, a new relation emerges between rehgion and pohtics. It begins by depicting a happy relation between the heathen king the heathen natural

and

him to enjoy his

enables

about to adopt

But the

is

sage

rehgion and

accused of

destroy

as

ignorance of,

being

a

king. The

the

destroy himself and

pher's

power

the king's

cures

who

king. The

king,

enough

foreign spy

to blind the

king,

things, his

things and artfully contrived

to

preach a new

make

him

his happiness. And the

inability

of the un

foolishly,

act

natural philoso

about, divine

or unwillingness to talk

and

phUosopher-king.

who plans

is false. The fear

accusation

the cause of

leprosy

is cluldless, is

who

the sage as his heir apparent, the future

God, however, is

known and

phUosopher

and pohtical

or unwillingness

to

coun

ter the accusation that he is a spy who may in some way betray the king, and his unwillingness to go out of his way to do anything to save his own

life

or

lead,

help

ungrateful

he took

having

avoid

having departed,

refuge after

depart, from Byzantium. The king

destroy

to

king

only to self-destruction, but to the destruction

not

whom

the foohsh and

each other

or

to murder

him,

king

with

of

the

been forced to

having

and the natural phUosopher are made

the vizier, who is not rehgious himself but

by

understands the power and own pohtical end.

God

of

is

who

it for his

efficacy of rehgion and makes use of Rehgion that is, other people's religion or their fear

now recognized as a new and potent

instrument

of political

be properly understood and employed by the new kings. The fisherman who teUs this story has no intention of acting the role of

must

which

power,

the unfortunate sage or

letting

demon

the

act

the

tunate king. He acts the role of the successful vizier. The

is brought

under control

the fisherman's

fisherman

makes use of the

by

demon's fear

role of the unfor

demon's

madness

superior power of reason.

The

God's Most Great Name to

of

lock him up and subject him to his power. The fisherman is the new Solo mon. The demon, too, learns the new game and is now willing to buy his freedom in

return

The fisherman

for rendering service to his new master. and the demon then proceed to perform

real

life,

and

teUs him that he

his

city.

of the

The fish terms

Now

cookmaid. appears a

with

four

fairy

branch

four

pan; the fish

king

palace

of green

are

sets out

buUt

of

of

tree,

burned in

black

on

in

lake

king

of

blue, and yeUow. The king and a heathen; but he is on

white, red,

childless

king,

who

had

presented

these enchanted fish are

queen with a rod

to their covenants and,

The

colors:

the Byzantine

as

their roles

an enchanted

take his catch of enchanted fish to the

should

are of

fisherman's city is, again,

friendly

with a

The demon takes the fisherman to

so to speak.

in her hand

who ask the

fish

and then a

whether

him

with a

being fried, huge black

they

are still

there man

faithful

being

answered they are, overturn the frying become like charcoal, and cannot be eaten. of the secret of the colored fish and reaches a

and

search

stones and overlaid with

iron plates,

where

he finds

Remarks enchanted, beautiful

an of

black The

youth whose

Nights

167

lower half (from the

down)

waist

is

stone.

story is this. He

youth's

wife practiced magic and used

her lover, a stalks inside

night with cane

on

the 1001

on

poor a

king

was the

to

him

drug

black leper

shrinelike

of the

who

structure

trash outside the city. Apprised of her

four Black Islands. His

leave the city to spend the sits in filthy and torn clothes

and

situated

doings

of

mounds

among

two black maids, the

by

young king foUows her one night, attacks the black man, and wounds him. She brings her lover, wounded and unable to speak any more, to the palace and

buUds

a shrine over

him,

a

house

of

where

mourning

for

than

more

three years she spends most of her time weeping and waUing. Losing his patience, the young king finaUy lets her know that he was the cause of

her

sorrow.

enchant

him,

mountains

Just

as

he is

surrounding the

her,

to murder

about

transform the citizens into enchanted

fish,

she

and the

uses

her

magic

to

four islands into four

lake. "The inhabitants

city,"

of

my

says the young king, "were made up of four sects: Moslems, Magians, Christians, and Jews. She transformed them into fish: the white are the Moslems, the red are the Magians, the blue are the Christians, and the Jews."

yeUow are the

by

punished goes

into the

for his wears makes

his

Since then, the enchanted young king has been hundred lashes every morning, just before she where her incapacitated lover hes to feed him and waU

wife with a

shrine

misfortune.

The

older

king

shrine, kUls the black man,

enters the

his clothes, and feigning the manner of the wounded black man, her disenchant the young king, the city, and its inhabitants, and

finaUy murders her. in his

own city.

the company

of

He then asks the young king whether he wishes to stay The young king declares that he wUl never part from his savior. The savior king is overjoyed, adopts the young

king as his son, and takes by the faithful vizier. The city

him back to his vizier

is

own

away in great pomp and ceremony to communities. The fisherman and his famUy

and sent

gious

kings marry his two daughters, his

son

is

loving Dinazad,

who

helps her

conjunction of the stars.

The story

tinguishes between the faith thinks

his

of

only

by

and

stories

the

religion of

the demon distinguishes

in the

priestess

frying

is the

rule over

Shehrezade

are sent

reh

King

he is

and

the

story-

Shahriyar's

luck is due to the

whose

the merchant

man's

for. The two

treasurer,

cure

are met

the four

noble religion of

Mas'ud,

the pious,

of

they

the young

and

law-abiding

the

demon dis

merchant,

who

men even under the most adverse

the mad

demon,

who can

be

appeased

The story of the fisher four religious communities

about wicked men and women.

whose representatives remain are

of

obligations to his feUow

circumstances,

man and

sister

the ignoble religion of

and

madness,

over

appointed

richly rewarded. The frame story distinguishes between the

where

city,

king

appointed

pan and

between

the

faithful to their

covenants even when

they

the new antisocial and antipolitical religion whose

magician-queen.

A distinction is thus

made

between

old

Interpretation

168 and established

into

religions, whose followers have been transformed by kings citizens with the passage of time, and the new religions,

law-abiding

are the

whose prophets

forces

of

justice

his city,

king,

queen

adulterous

the

his

and

whose sake she

that

fisherman

by help

in love

with

is ready to

the fisherman to the

the old

(the four

subjects

a

black

destroy

enchanted

and

women,

they sweep before

them all

the

the king.

and order symbolized

The demon helps

are

whose priestesses

unfortunate,

which can unlock passions so powerful

dehver the young communities) from an

king

religious

leper,

whom

everything

else.

lake, his parting

she

deifies

brings

"You

are:

words

for

and

the demon

As

must

The demon cannot deliver the me, for this is all I can do for or disenchant the the old fish; young king only king can do this. The young faUed to save and himself his because of his indecisiveness city, first, king you."

excuse

perhaps, by fear) in punishing his wife and her lover and, sec ond, because he attempted to murder them openly by the sword rather than by the proper application of his political art as king. Giving direct expres

(prompted,

sion

to one's passions,

to murder others

jealousy and anger, and drawing one's sword distinguishing marks of royalty. The older king, situation immediately and shows no hesitation or

such as

are not

the

in contrast, sizes up the fear regarding the queen's black lover. He knows her

directly

courage. perform

and endanger

He is in fuU

is

wears

about

which will with

powers of

control of

or

his city merely to

his passions,

so

the wounded to

confront

make a show of

much

speech

his clothes,

a

and

moans

trusting,

unarmed woman.

deed: He takes the

so

that he can

like

him,

heightens her

The

place of

makes the queen

to recover, and arouses in her the hope of a excitement to the point that she

core of

the

imagine

that

reunion with

loses her

are

royal

into service,

neutralized

houses,

enabled to

cities,

live

and

his

queen's

he

him,

mind and

do anything he bids her. His, then, is the supreme royal art, the which adulterous wives and their lovers are destroyed, demons

appeased and put

arts

himself

murdering

is imitation in

lover,

inexplicable

two extremely cowardly and unroyal acts: murdering a sick, inca

pacitated man and art

magic or the

enough about the art of the queen not

art

are

the effects of magic and ah other natural

their practitioners

brought

and religious communities

happUy thereafter.

under

in distress

are

control, delivered

and and

169 AN

INTRODUCTION

TO

DANTE'S DE MONARCHIA

Larry Peterman

De Monarchia is the thought.1

political

most

for

studied

pohtical

scientist, it is informative in

a great

as more than a

ecclesiastical

justly

Dante's

early and De Monarchia

as an

footnote to the Divine Comedy. For least two

at

Christian Aristotelian dealt

problem, the

cal

expression of

famous

world government or world empire.

may be how

and

the treatise is

Moreover,

coherent proposal

complete"

"orderly

with

a

First, it indicates

respects.

the principal

medieval politi

relationship between secular and and pope. Second, it is an introduc

question of the proper

authorities,

i.e.,

emperor

tion to problems and questions that can guide us to a greater understanding

later

of

and more popular

theories of

world government and empire.

This essay is cerns. We shah

introduction, in the main, to the first of these con consider how De Monarchia provides a new approach to

political affairs.

World

an

government

is

a

"novel"

resolution of the medieval

Its necessity is proven by recourse to a political end is unconventional both with respect to Aristotelianism and Christianity.

political problem.

that

Its argument, in turn, with regard

to

offers a new order of political

Dante's

priorities, especially master, Aristotle. Yet we shah see

acknowledged

that Dante does not depart completely from Aristotle. His political formulations are the consequence of effects that the Christian church had upon political

however,

in suggesting how

ficulties that

life. He

remains

non-

true to

ultimately

returning

and

Aristotle, dif

world government might resolve political

were coeval with

the Christian effect

upon politics.

thus steers a cautious course between Aristotelianism and whUe

Aristotelian

Christianity

to

the

classical

tradition

Dante

Christianity,

to

his

support

resolution.

The cern.

1 as a

scope and content of

WhUe acknowledging

Dante's

the

political thought

importance

of

is

our

De Monarchia

primary

con

with respect

to

Michele Barbi, Life of Dante (Berkeley, 1954), p. 56; A. P. d'Entreves, Dante Political Thinker (Oxford, 1952), p. 42. The position of De Monarchia in the

Dantean

corpus

"'occasional"

is

still

disputed. There

remains

work, the impractical vision of

Cf. Allan

a

view

a man who

that the

had lost touch

book

was

an

with political

Aristotle,"

Gilbert, "Had Dante Read the POLITICS of PMLA, Vol. 43, 1928, p. 605; Donald Nicholl, Monarchy and Three Political Letters (London, 1954), p. vii; Charles T. Davis, Dante and the Idea of Rome (Oxford, 1957), p. 170; George Sabine, A History of Political Theory (New York, 1961), pp. 257-58; Lee McDonald, Western Political Theory (New York, 1968), pp. 170, reality.

174-75.

Interpretation

1 70 understanding later

first

understand the

it

which

an attempt

issue

empire and world

own political

within the context

The

thinking.2

present

in

essay is

to elucidate that political teaching.

Both the

purpose

of

De Monarchia

and

its

intriguing

most

in its opening hnes. There Dante acknowledges tion's debt to its ancestors and, in turn, urges his feUows to

future

problems

each genera

are suggested

benefit

must

government, we

itself

of world government

in Dante's

appears

for

arguments

work

for the

impetus for De

This theme provides the indicates how Dante's beneficence to his descendants is tied to the things he himself had inherited. FoUowing Dante's own admonition, students of De Monarchia need consider how Dante's pohtical of

Monarchia. It

generations.3

also

phUosophy is beholden to the Christian and Aristotelian traditions to which Dante was heir.4 They must attempt to understand Dante's demonstration

2

This discussion

Very little Dante's Nor

be

will

use of

here

about

the idea of the

Dante's

will

avoid some of the principal problems of

will said

reliance upon

De Monarchia.

the alleged Averroism of the treatise or about intellect,"

"possible

which

is the basis

Aristotle's Metaphysics in his

of

argument

that

charge.

be considered,

it is absolutely necessary. Finally, while there will be some suggestion De Monorchia's relevance to subsequent political thinking, there will be no

except where of

consistent political

to treat this

attempt

but before

scientists,

De Monarchia. For Dante in terms

of

indication

an

later

question.

The

political

of

how

thought,

is,

question

it,

considering

one

some

must

of

commentators

Charles Mcllwain,

see

central

course,

first be

to

introduced to

have

understood

who contrasts

Dante

Machiavelli, The Growth of Political Thought in the West (New York, 1932), 275, and J. N. Figgis, who mentions De Monarchia in the context of the

with p.

development

of

the

theory

Kings (Cambridge, 1934), 3

sovereignty in the 57 ff.

of

pp.

De Monarchia I.i.l. All

reference to the

ages, The Divine Right of

middle

treatise is to the Ricci

edition of

the

Societa Dantesca Italiana, 1968. Translations of the original Latin, unless otherwise noted, are from the Nicholl translation already cited. The idea that each generation

is indebted to its forebears is not, of

of

(London, 1950), 4

p.

The degree to

which

ages.

A

classical,

recent

which

Dante

was

including Arabic,

survey

of

influenced by most

au

various

compelling

a consideration

of Medieval

Philosophy

and

this

viewpoints

is

for

modern

concerning the met

in the

Dante

manner

middle

by Fernand Van Siecle (Louvain, 1966), pp. 1-33, passim.

on

XIII'

Christian

strains of classical and

concern

of a greater question

the literature

Steenberghen, La Philosophie The

Gilson, The Spirit

388.

Christian traditions is, perhaps, the scholars. This problem is itself part in

course, original in Dante. For

the medieval perspective, see Etienne

subject

offered

that the attitude taken toward Aristotle is central to understanding any thinker or school of the age is a principal feature of this literature.

notion

particular

Cf. P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant

1899),

ch.II.

Among

Etienne Gilson is

the

most

et

I'averroisme latin

commentators upon

helpful

Dante's

au XIII" siecle

handling

in emphasizing the

gulf

of

the two

between

(Fribourg, traditions,

classical

and

Introduction to Dante's De Monarchia of what

he

and

piety

"truths that

caUs

Dante

reverence

forebears.5

At

an

The

the benefit of the

in terms

inteUectual

his treatise, in other words, Dante warns us future may ultimately depend upon

ancestors.

is temporal

the peace

(pax)

demonstrates "for

reveals and

world"

government wUl provide

of the

spiritual

and

gift to the

De Monarchia

particular truth that

considered"

toward

expresses

the outset of

understanding of his understanding his debt to his

that

has

no one else

171

and

This form

monarchy.6

world

happiness (beatitudo)

missing, Dante says, in his time. In effect, De Monarchia suggests a world government that would

be

secular

the secular counterpart of ecclesiastical

to

world government as a solution

of

that are

iUs.7

medieval political

The degree to

idea is truly innovative remains an issue of considerable scholarly debate, but Dante's claim to uniqueness in advancing it is In terms of the traditions to which he is heir, tempo virtually this

which

unqualified.8

ral

monarchy has

He

explains that this neglect of

all these other

been discovered

neither

beneficial but

Christian philosophy, Dante

however,

seems

truths"

the two

little

inasmuch

There are,

realms.

d'Entreves

notes

degree

incompatibility

Other

consequence of the

totally.

Dante

as on

This,

as

I

shall

hand,

212 ff. Gilson's

pp.

the

separated

to

attempt

undiscov-

political

below, is

show

an

the very close connection between

recognized

the other

Among

reward.9

la Philosophie (Paris, 1939),

et

Dante's debt to Aristotle

nature of politics are

teaching,

is the

immediate

commentators who seem

to take too

the differences between Aristotelianism and Christianity. Thus A. P.

account of

of

no

to lead him to suggest that Dante

and spiritual realms almost oversimplification

properly considered before. beneficial yet most neglected of nor

most

obscure

fact that considering it leads to

emphasis,

"the

in the two

derived from the

Dante's

Thomist,

faithful to it down to the

and remained

the same question

analyses of

Thomas,

and

views.

with

and

yet

view

fails to

of

the

and

the

"the

indeed from the Aristotelian Op. cit.,

end."

regard to

consider

state

Dante's

p.

15,

my

political

emphasis.

thought can

be found in Paul Renucci, Dante: Disciple et Juge du Monde Greco-Latin (Paris, 1954), pp. 269 ff.; Ernst Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton, 1957), pp. 459 ff. The date of De Monarchia is still 1309-10 are persuasive. somewhat doubtful but Colin Hardie's arguments for

See Nicholl, op. cit., pp. 117-21. De Mon. I.i.3, xvi.5, H.i.6-8, HI.iii.18, Ibid., I. i. 5. 7

Ibid., I.iv.2. In

acceptance

of

arguing for

papal

plentitude

Gierke's Political Theories of

1951),

remains

theories

one

a world

of

the

of

the

most

of church-state relations

xv.18.

government, Dante moves beyond

power

and

toward

Marsilius'

Thomas'

anticlericalism.

Middle Ages, F. W. Maitland trans. (Cambridge, concise

during

and

accessible

the middle

accounts

of

the various

ages.

8 Gilson, Dante et la philosophie, op. cit., pp. 164, 222, 229; Barbi, op. cit., p. 57; Kantorowicz, op. cit., pp. 452-53; Nicholl, op. cit., pp. viii-ix; d'Entreves, op. cit., pp. 44 ff.; Gierke, op. cit., notes 4-8. 9 De Mon. I.i.5, Ill.iii. 18. Dante's claim to breaking new ground recalls similar claims in Machiavelli's The Prince. Compare De Mon. I.i.3, 5, with The Prince,

Epistle Dedicatory

and

Ch. XV.

Interpretation

172

in general, temporal monarchy in

ered truths

because Not Dante

ah undiscovered

"urges Those

to

us

for

urge

truths are a

has been

neglected

do

to make the human

passion, and, in particular, lauds

by

benefit

Aristotle,

truth."

for the

friendship

abandon

private

who

selfishness, however.

consequence of

speaks of phUosophers who attempt undeterred

clear,

particular

of selfishness.

sake of

alone that explains

why

some

situation

who even

Thus it is

truths

not an

are neglected.

truth for such reasons Dante reveals as primarUy

neglect

his Christian opponents who "boast of being defenders of the Christian There yet lead men from the truth for the sake of their own truth the discovered had not is a dichotomy between pre-Christians, who faith"

greed.10

monarchy because they had no access to it, and Christians, have access to it but have neglected it because of then greed.

about temporal

who

Christianity, that

they

which

Aristotelian Aristotle

did

Dante

as

to the

unknowable

the

presents

situation, to

ancients and gives rise

could

political

know.11

by way Dante's Christian feUows

proposal of temporal world government

single

a

entire

world

Aristotelian

authoritative

might

and possibilities.

is

a response

antiquity and the faults of its own age. The extension beyond Aristotle is readUy archy,

notably Persia he did not best form of human association. It

upon

know if they

to the limitations of

apparent.

Temporal

mon

the

(principatus) encompassing

government

aU

polis.

recognize

De Monorchia's

its inhabitants, radically enlarges WhUe Aristotle recognized empires of

and

to

enlarges

that which was unavaUable to

of

God-given talents

not squander their

the way to truths

De Monarchia, therefore,

thought

and unveUs what

opens

men who refuse

alters

the

enormous

size

and

or

and power

view them as

the

was rather the polis that provided

actuaUy

potentiaUy

the necessities of hfe and the opportunity to live weU, and was the basis any good regime. But the polis did such things only in consequence of

of

limiting

the

relatively

size of

smaU.

the community,

For

required

Aristotie,

for the best

i.e.,

of

keeping

opportunities regime are

citizenship larger than the polis, let alone in a world These limitations, however, no longer

the number of citizens

for the kind

of

impossible in any

rule

and

association

empire.12

universe

says,

10

a

because

human

De Mon.

of what

end that

is

Aristotle

govern

De Monorchia's

political

have known. There is, Dante the polis, an end that is realized

could not

unsatisfiable

by

III.i.3, II.x.l, Cf. I.i.5,xvi.5, III,iii.7ff., III.xv.9, Inferno IV.31, Convivio, I.ix.

Paradiso XVII. 106-20, n

of

This

view seems to parallel

Peace, Alan Gewirth

Padua, in History i2

of

Marsilius'

approach

to Aristotle. Cf. The Defender

trans. (New

York, 1956), I.i.3; Leo Strauss, Marsilius Political Philosophy (Chicago, 1963), p. 228.

of

See Nic. Eth. 1170b20 ff., Pol. 1260b37 ff., 1265al9 ff., 1319M ff. The expan the Aristotelian polis in De Monarchia is recognized by virtually all students

sion upon

of

De Monarchia. See W. H. V. Reade's introduction to the Oxford

Monarchia (Oxford, 1916),

p. x.

edition of

De

Introduction to Dante's De Monarchia

.

.

human

universal

it

edge of

of

have been

would

family

the

yet

is the

last

and

another;

for the

community; the

unavaUable prior

whole

human

mode of

his

art

anything in vain', serve

.

.

there

.

.

.

(universaliter

end, the city another, and the kingdom

one

function

the whole species in

its

any

one

city

human

a

that calls for a

world government can

to

in

end

world

divinely

13

De Mon. on

tradition

as

human 14

view

I.iii.2-4, Compare

purposeful

Aristotle

in De

passage

caelo

race as a

to

purpose

was

variety

household

or

created;

village, or

for the

with

being is

is

that the human

The

1252M3 ff. Dante's

whole, Dante does break

classical

to

this passage

of

However, in offering

evidence of that.

is, then, the

argument that world

caelo

correspondence

a

was

race

course, foreign to the

of

in

together so as

genus as a whole

Pol. 1252a25; De

it. The

expounded

universal

Only

realization.

whole come

Aristotle.14

in itself,

not

the idea of a

with

the

for the

a purpose

new ground.

Ultimately, the issue of De Monarchia is the relationship between the Christian of being and creation and the view that Aristotle presents in the Physics and

Metaphysics. In founded

upon

a

serious

very

sense, the

the Metaphysics

numerous references

by

rather

example, the

argument

Metaphysics. The most

one,

upon

for unity

of

the human

that within

that

which

[The

works.

are

most

to the Aristotelian corpus in De Monarchia are the

name

proposition

De Monarchia

central propositions of

than Aristotle's political

Nicomachean Ethics (eleven), the Politics (six),

is

some

to the human species as

or

for its

proposition

Dante's departure from

emphasis

keeping

the human species as a

created with a proper end

of

do

and nature never

has

multitudinous

government

satisfy divine intention. The

basis

established

or kingdom.13

There is, in short, creator

'God

proper

man

God has

means of nature, which

existence

this function is beyond the capacity of any one even of

eternal

humanum) by

genus

some particular

which

that the

end

is brought into

whatever

be

has

the first point to realize is that

.

for

must

for

a whole and

race

view of

individual's life is directed is different from that

village

there is the

of all

as

creation, knowl to the advent of Christianity.

Christian

end arises out of a

the end towards which the

.

Inasmuch

through the concerted and unified efforts of all men.

only this

173

each

argument

and

kind

rests,

of

(six).] For

the Metaphysics

race relies almost

being

wholly

upon

the best is that

the

which

is explicitly borrowed from the

Metaphysics. However, Dante takes liberties with Aristotle. Immediately after noting the relation of unity and goodness, he suggests that Aristotle seems to agree with the Pythagorean on

of

the

correlations

of evil.

the Pythagorean

Again, of

side

that place unity

But he does this

position.

on

without

the

side of goodness and

mentioning Aristotle's

De Mon. I.xv.2, Meta. 986a23-27, 1021b30

the discussion of the relationship between pope and

the Metaphysics. Aristotle's idea that

is the focus through

adopts

thought.

that

De

is

view,

Mon.

crucial

III.xi.1

"one"

to

ff.,

as

clear

7,

Meta.

pp.

108 ff.

things,

basis

the

1052M8.

1176al7, Jacob Klein, Greek Mathematical Thought (Cambridge, 1968),

by

way

which

that an understanding of what

the first measure of

understanding

1052al ff.

the "regulative principle to

reducible."

It is

ff.,

begins

to one component

all things are reducible

which one must understand

they [pope and emperor] are Aristotle means in offering the

emperor

multiplicity

qualification

Cf.

and

of

Nic.

the

and

how Dante

Dante's Eth.

political

1173a26,

Origin of Algebra

Interpretation

174

is

government or empire

i.e.,

perspective,

The divine

human

.

of government and

to Aristotle and the

unknown

human

that is the

end

only

by

when ah men share

of

any

the

It is

here to

not our purpose

inteUect. We

that he is

doctrine,

need

demonstrating

potential

that is

.

be

translated

can

be

into

action

has to be

mankind

.

by

one

composed of

actualized.!*

in any depth the notion of the that it bears out Dante's claim

recognize

truth. With respect to conventional Christian

inteUect led to

possible

charges of Aver-

against

was accused of

that replaces

is

The

opponents.16

him. BasicaUy, there were two reasons for this. suggesting a kind of universal earthly salvation Christianity's heavenly salvation. Second, that the inteUectual

laid

First, Dante

only

new

.

potentiality

consider

for the

the argument

being

roism

to Dante's divergence

key

it.

particular communities

a multitude through which this entire

possible

Christian

ancients.

also

that potentiality cannot wholly and at once

.

man, or

the condition

of a

acceptance

on

conditioned

distinguishes him from his Christian De Monarchia proposes is an inteUectual

end

actualized

truth

on

universal

from Aristotle

.

best kind

the

earthly weU-being is itself

of

only by a multitude seemed to promise a mode of salvation contrary to Christian emphasis on individual salvation. In accus ing Dante of Averroism, in other words, papalists pointed both to the

potential

finality

realized

the commonality of the human end as portrayed in De Mo Guido Vernani, whose De Reprobatione Monarchic, written at the

and

narchia.

behest

of

Pope John

narchia, did .

.

a

assigning

.

not

XXII,

was the principal papalist

reply to De Mo

temporize in accusing Dante of:

separate

form

beatitude to

of

corruptible

man,

who

have

can

beatitude properly so called; with regarding man, in consequence, being destined by God for this beatitude, conceived as a final goal distinct from

neither virtue nor as

beatitude.17

heavenly

IB

Pope lohn XXII

seems

to

ordered

the book burned in Bologna in 1329. Its influence

have remained, however, for it

not removed until the nineteenth century.

was

of

that "after his death Dante was almost condemned

us

opinion

that the empire was independent of the

of Sassoferrato: His Position in the

bridge, 1913),

p.

90. Even those

De Monarchia in

of

its

universal

op.

end

C. N. S. Woolf, Bartolus

the

to doubt the

seem

universal

for Dante's time.

notions

uniqueness

human community

and

See d'Entreves,

cit., pp. 44-47.

i

De Mon. I.iii.8.

17

This is Gilson's

philosophie,

did

Heresy"

papacy.

commentators who

unconventional

Sassoferrato (1314-1357) tells for on account of his

of Medieval Political Thought (Cam

History

other respects agree that

were

the Index in 1554 and

placed upon

Bartolus

not

help

op.

cit.,

p.

paraphrase of

233. The

his case, in any event, Anima."

in his commentary on De Dante agrees with Averroes

on

Vernani's

question of

by

statement of summation.

Dante's Averroism is

noting that

"Averroes

De Mon. I.iii. 9. It does

the existence of

an

intellectual

a

Dante

thorny

one.

et

la

Dante

agrees with this opinion

seem unquestionable

substance separable

that

from

Introduction to Dante's De Monarchia

175

De Monorchia's claim to novelty is justified both in Aristotelian and Christian terms. The final earthly end it posits is more comprehensive than any visualized by Aristotle or conventional Christian theologians. World seen

empire,

in

context of

De Monarchia,

answers a political need that

hitherto been compelling in political affairs. The universal human community (humana civilitas) in which the divinely instituted end of man is actualized is possible only through world government. Empire had had

not

been

considered

function in

and

defended

and

a new

before, but Dante

presents

its necessity

hght.18

II The

concept of world government not

the Aristotelian

polis

but does

ideas. Aristotle's

political

prudence

of

Aristotelian

be

replaced

by

The

exceUences.19

a

kind

not

political

for the full

range

virtues, in essence, begin to

Dante agrees, for example,

with

inteUect naturaUy rule over from the Politics occurs in the

but

of superior

natural

of

for

remains

others"

note that this quotation

discussion

old political

of political artistry.

of

possible under world govern

to

Aristotle that "men the

hardly

De Monarchia, opportunity (politica prudentia) and prudent men, but

According

fails to

is

of

to other Aristotelian

the best political life assumes a kind

view of

political exceUence or virtue which

ment.

boundaries

expands the

only

so at considerable cost

Nor does he

slavery.

add

context of

that for Aristotle

for

inteUectual ability the claim to political The rational quality by which Aristotle distinguishes free men from slaves becomes, in world empire, the principal differentiation between was not a sufficient condition

exceUence.

rulers and nonrulers.

the

Aristotelian

The force mining

of

World

empire

does

not aim at

developing

or

teaching

moral virtues.

inteUectual

rulers wUl

be

considered, but the initial

corporeal substance.

qualities

considered reason

Whether Dante

rather

below

than moral virtues in deter

when

De Monorchia's

for Dante's de-emphasis

accepted

that the intellect

emperor

of the moral

was not

is

vir-

only inde

body but immortal is a more difficult question, however. Moreover, a serious it presents difficulty for Christian theology and its position that individual of a substance extrinsic to individual bodies. As denies immortality immortality pendent of

might

be

the

expected,

literature

on

this

question

Joseph F. Costanzo, "The De Monarchia

see

XLIII, 1968, 18

pp.

argument

may be

For

extensive. Alighieri,"

a

review,

Thought, Vol.

113-23.

made

that once Rome

inevitable. Cf. Robert

20. 19

is

Dante

of Roes, Memoriale de Prerogativa Imperii Romani, 1281, and Admont, De Ortu et Fine Rom. Imperii, 1308, for two examples. An

of

was

of

See Alexander

Engelbert

p.

the

De Mon. I.iii.10.

became Christian the idea

Browning, Justinian

and

of world empire

Theodora (New

York, 1971),

Interpretation

176

is already

rues

human community

harmony, i.e. lian

a perpetual

facet

of

condition

in

To

that

serve mankind's

end,

hve together in unity and This replaces the Aristote

which men can

(pax

universal peace

assumes

a successful universal

politics,

continuous peace.

assumes

for that

empire aims

is

example, Aristotle

Whereas, for

apparent.

potential or actual war

universalis).20

good as a political goal.

De Monarchia implies that ultimately

for

world government provides

an end

that supersedes politics. The size to

cle

activity in the world government itself. By establishing peace, the potential human inteUect

political

serves an end superior to politics

development

the

government

is directed

of world government

the

of

Aristotelian

moral

at a suprapolitical end

is

means

that emphasis

on

the kind of virtues that

eternal

compulsions

of

politics

depends

political

primarUy

empire, the force

ize

a potential

ity

itself does

animals

not the sole obsta

an

also

assume

That

the perpetual or

for instance, Aristotelian No longer wiU be undercut.2!

face

who

of such concerns

eternal

is lessened

political

world

obstacle, for it

courage

as,

the existence of war

on

is

virtues.

are men

concerns.

Under

as men are unified to actual

that cannot be measured or judged politically. Political activ not make men

good, but rather,

good comes

about after

In such a situation Aristotle's activity is successfuUy that moral virtue is its own reward is precluded. World empire, teaching itself the result of a Christian perspective the ancients could not know, concluded.22

political

in

results

a new stance with respect to pohtical virtues.

inasmuch

pated

as

they

be

can

the idea that political activity of

within

only in

Then force is dissi

hmited community and the correct sort is worthy for its

effectuated

a

own sake.

An the

example

world

justice.

of

the diminution that the Aristotelian virtues suffer in

government

appears

when

De Monarchia turns to

consider

the Nicomachean Ethics explicity, Dante affirms

Acknowledging

Aristotle's doctrine that cupidity is a bar to justice. However, he does not mention that for Aristotle cupidity is only one of a number of obstacles to "the" justice fully conceived. It is described as obstacle:

20

Ibid., I.iv.2. The linking

thought. Cf. 21

The possibility

under

and

d'Entreves,

op.

of

of

cit.,

unity

p.

and peace was a staple of medieval political

31.

the courage of the Nicomachean Ethics would disappear

conditions of perpetual peace as

surely as

liberality in

regard

to possession

temperance in regard to women would disappear under communism. See Nic.

Eth. 1115a30, Pol. 1263b8. 22

De Mon. I.viii.3, ix.l. This

of salvation, which

diminishes

in themselves. Gilson replaces

virtue

transformed."

puts

by God,

perception

political goods

the point nicely: and

is in keeping with the Christian in the sense of considering them

"As the

supreme moral value

view

good

Christianity

the whole conception of the moral end is

thereby

Spirit, op. cit., p. 325. Cf. Thomas, Summa Theo., Ha, Hae, 145, Iad2; St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., 38, I. Resp.

Introduction to Dante's De Monarchia When cupidity is entirely

177

De Monarchia ignores the fact that Aristotelian justice complete

There is

greed.

is distinguished

virtue

"that cupidity

According

understand

judged

by

"the"

dilectio) is

seu recta

by

should

bar to

complete

to De

it does

justice,

so

by

replaced

disappear

De Monorchia's treatment why this is

dinary

necessary.

vice,

ordered

love (caritas

men.25

In

world

a particularistic virtue characterized

i.e., injustice, is denoted by much narrowed

in the

greed.

world

In

empire,

completely.

justice indicates that

of

moral

Because

of

the

proper

human

Aristotle did Dante think of the

rightly

of

spectrum.

his

It also,

comprehensive

government

world

iUuminates

however,

excellence, the just

man

Aristotle's meaning is set off from other men, i.e., he is an extraor man. As such, he is a potential bar to the unification that is the con

within

dition

Aristotelian

the

narrows

or

charity

the quality that most distinguishes just

correlative

not

good temper, or the Monarchia, it is solely in terms of minds"

this sense, Aristotelian justice is very although

sense of

distorts men's that one can from the Rhetoric "that nothing which can be discretion."24 ever be left to the judge's And if

justice is

whose

charity,

in the

than the absence of

other

too easUy

aU

the statement

the law

cupidity is empire,

which

by

things

courage, temperance,

no mention of

other moral virtues.

justice.23

there remains nothing opposed to

eliminated

Nicomachean

end as

De Monarchia

all men capable of

Ethics.26

Yet to foster the

it. No

presents

justice

within

universal

more

than

the full meaning

human community,

distinctions among men have to be lessened, which means that the consid erable differences between men indicated in the Ethics have to be avoided. The

inescapable. A form

conclusion appears

the virtuous from the less virtuous of

justice

there

Or,

vicious men

23

at

wUl

least,

have to be wiU

of gain

way before a version is to unify men

for making them equaUy difference between virtuous and

provision

have to be

in its entirety with the (kerdos). Nic. Eth. 1130b4.

as virtue

De Mon. I.xi.ll. Compare

must guard against more than other

justice that distinguishes give

world government

the considerable

in Aristotle

of

has to

aUeviated.

To

admit

only

De Mon. I.ix.1,11. Cf. Nic. Eth. 1129b24 ff., Paradiso XIX.21. Dante

justice 24

If

that aU men can share.

effectively, virtuous.

or evU

things,

must also

be

with

particularistic

applies

Rhetoric 1354a24 ff. Aristotle

replaces

to matters

says

that one

judge. Envy, anger, and pity, among Dante could have been expected to know this.

cupidity in

checked.

justice that

some

a

warned against making such an error. On Kingship, (Toronto, 1949), 1,26(16); Li Livres Dou Tresor, Edition critique par Francis Carmody (Berkeley, 1948), Il.xii, xxviii. Dante's familiarity with such sources is supported by Charles T. Davis, "Brunetto Latini and Studi Medieval!, 3a Serie, VIII, 1967, p. 439, passim. Allan H. Gilbert, Dante's Conception of Justice (Durham, N. C, 1925), pp. 3 ff.

Thomas

and

Eschmann

Brunetto Latini

edition

Dante,"

25

De Mon. I.xi.13.

26

Ibid., I.xv.9, III.xv.5-6,9. Cf. Nic. Eth. 1095a4, 1095b8 ff., 1098a31 ff.

Interpretation

178 to justice raises

men

barrier between the just

a potential

that can check the movement toward

and

the

unjust

world unity.

cupidity the sole obstacle to justice appreciably lessens this difficulty. For example, De Monarchia indicates that things that had pre

Making

viously been seen as sources of political division among men are insignif icant. The importance that Aristotle attributed to factors such as wealth and breeding in producing men of different political interests and perspec tives no longer

applies

in the

ence with respect to virtue

government.27

universal world

between the

ruler of the

Even the differ

monarchy

his

and

sub

jects is diminished. The ruler is no different in any virtuous sense from his subjects. He is just, not because he is a better man, but because there are no objects to which his greed might attach. The way in which a ruler is distinguished from his subjects wUl be considered below but initiaUy it is important to

is

the

recognize

of

consequence

dominion

Having

because his

But

the

office assures

of cupidity.

monarch

him anything

that can

when

there is nothing to be desired there can be

remain

when

desire,

nothing to

their

have been

objects

Monarch

be the

can

purest

In this sense, establishing cupidity as the way for a new kind of politics,

clears the

among De Monorchia's demonstration that double force. It lowers the

27

Pol. 1094al7.

2

De Mon. I.xi.11-12.

in

controlled

sole check upon political virtue one

of

seems

to

move

kind

excesses of greed and

of

and

properly

on

emphasis

arrange

instead

procedures of

by

whereby

their own

Taken to its extreme, De

Monarchia,

see

differences

justice

indeed,

passion

justice virtue

that

must

the authority of the law as a

retains an

against

a

view

Aristotelian

stress upon

to check passion.

that only

such

the

However, he

institutions

will

tyranny.

officeholders of

are

a view culminates

Kantorowicz,

limited by the offices they hold is politically necessary or right.

what

that "Ambition must be made to counteract aspect of

which

on

offices

constituted

understanding

such

which moral

That is, Dante seems to prefigure office that replaces Aristotle's emphasis on properly The way to assure justice, in the former case, is to

safeguards

educating the officeholder.

in

to their simUarities.

the development of governing devices that

beyond Aristotle toward

adequate

provide

the

law

by

emphasis

has

It follows

of justice.28

emphasizing cupidity as the an

monarch ...

world government maximizes

standards

destroy. In this respect, Dante

greed cannot

authority

Initially, leads to

politics

the

control against

But the

incarnation

men are unimportant when contrasted

be

polit

cupidity, because passions

no

eliminated.

the ocean alone is the limit of his jurisdiction

since

that of all mortals the

a

be desired, in any

relevant sense.

cannot

has

nothing.

In effect, he has no is the greatest example of justice

compulsions

but to be just. The

choice

temporal matters, he lacks

over all men and all

Hence, he is beyond

ically

that he is not moraUy superior to them. His justice his office or position more than anything else.

op.

in The Federalist's famous ambition."

For

cit., pp. 454-56.

comment

a comment upon

this

Introduction to Dante's De Monarchia in

is

general

measured and

brings

179

virtue within a more egalitarian

frame

by Aristotle. Moreover, it indicates that the proper is such independentiy of any qualification founded upon virtue. To

work than was offered monarch

be just, he

needs

his

the power of

only

office.

With

he is free

such power

to his subjects without himself suffering the temptations of cupi dity. In this respect, Dante seems to offer an early statement of a view

to

render

becomes

that

more prevalent after

MachiaveUi,

a view that equates virtue

with power.

In

acts, the contrary of justice is to

regard to

for in

justice is

since

a virtue

practice without the

the just

By

man

Dante

such means

to

conform

requirements of

Dante's

political world.

manner

in

which

changes the

keeping aU.31

operate stronger

justice.29

Aristotelian tradition,

which was

his

The

Aristotle's

newer version of

do

virtues

not.

pious support

The

At

justice fits the

for

a

least,

in

the times

a

the middle ages

lessened justice

by

way

world government retains a place

variety than that of the ancients. And in it is a virtue realizable and accessible to

a more constrained

Christian

However,

to the

it

his due ? Hence, the

each

philosophy that demands the capacities in the Aristotelian virtues cannot rule

charity.30

with

on power;

can

pohtical

assumed

supply theological and arguments for Christian

for virtue, if

be found in limitations between people, how

the Christian perspective and the political

with

could

of

be his

greater will

his day. A

habituation

strict

relations

rendering to

power of

is in practice, the

inheritance, and

governing

belief,

become truly

this new regime cannot

viable without a return

tradition.

classical

Ill De Monorchia's this

return.

Liberty

government's

empire

is

imperial

29

position on

is

goal.32

consistent

system

was

liberty

is

a

starting

presented as a concomitant

Dante, therefore, with

takes pains to

liberty. To his

practicaUy

point

most

synonymous

for understanding

to the peace that is world

demonstrate that

important precursors,

with

an

and, thereby,

tyranny

De Mon. Ixi.7.

Ibid., I.xi.13, II.v.5, Inf. VI, Para. 111.70-87, XXVI.7-66. A model for such is offered at I.i.6, where Dante suggests that men ought to pattern them James selves upon the divine Giver "who gives to all liberally and upbraids 1.5. Cf De Mon. III.i.3-4. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologia; (London, 1966), 30

arguments

none."

Vol. 46, Ia2ae,64,4: "A root comes before what grows from it I. E. Parsons, Jr. notes the force of charity root of all manner that seems very virtue as regards La Rochefoucauld in a .

virtues."

Dante's usage, "On La pp.

.

.

charity is the

as a

theological

much

to reflect

Rochefoucauld", Interpretation, Vol. 2, No. 2, Winter, 1971,

134-35.

si

D'Entreves, therefore,

Gilson

speaks of

op. cit., pp.

32

De

the

refers

to Dante's

"optimism,"

optimistic viewpoint of medieval

op.

cit.,

109 ff.

Mon, I.xii.l ff, II.i.5,

v.5.

pp.

Christianity in

Cf. Pol. 1313a38 ff., 1284bl.

16, 57,

general,

and

Spirit,

Interpretation

180 lack

with the

freedom. Aristotle

of

Persia

portrayed

as the

very

model of a

tyranny. Potential tyrants, according to his view, could do httle better than barbaric" methods to learn how best to tyrannize. study "Persian and

Christian

Christians held

Given the

mutuaUy and freedom

freedom is

as

The

exclusive.35

are not ment

hberty, Dante

for

this position untU

accepted

the question of the relation

alternative

This

is to

and empire

admit that world govern

is

course

hberty

that

must estabhsh

are contradictory.

essential

he

on

testimony

weight of previous

of empire and

ship

us that truth.34

to the

penetrated

agreed that

EssentiaUy, conventional be only by force and, hence, denied free

that empire could

eye"

they

tyranny.33

toward

dom. Dante himself, in fact, informs his "mind's

the same point. Whatever the

on

Thomistic perspectives,

and

irrevocably

tended

empires

direct

arguments were quite as

differences in Augustinian

unacceptable

inasmuch

the realization of mankind's potential.

Whereas genus'

unity to men from

men need the most complete or comprehensive

end, tyranny is one

i.e., by keeping

another,

being friendly from

with one

kind

kind

of

by

becoming

close to

in any serious sense from knowing or The goal of tyranny is to isolate men

in them. Under

mankind's end would

activity

prohibits

in

we speak of ahenation

of submissiveness

hence,

and,

it

them

another.36

today

one another

proper

the

successful when

achieve the

such

order

circumstances, unity

be impossible. Dante

which men are at their

to create the

makes clear that

best demands hberty. As it

activity that human inteUect achieves its highest possibUity, is unacceptable inasmuch as slaves may be denied the opportunity slavery for speculation. Liberty is the necessary condition of the highest human is in

speculative

good.

And hke

Both [acting

lantur)

as

and

that

good,

.

this

.

making] are subordinate to

liberty,

mankind

this principle of

or

to human nature, for

33

divine

a

to

gift

speculation

man.

(omnia

the highest function (tanquam optimo) for the sake of

Goodness (Prima Bonitas) brought .

is

hberty

by it

all

liberty, is God's

happy here

as

men,

De Civ. Dei V.12, On Kingship, IV.33. One is tempted to

avoidance

of

any

proposal

or

suggestion

have been true

ancil-

Supreme

into being.

our

we are made

speculationi

which the

for

empire

most and

suggest

is the

precious

happy

that

consequence

gift

as gods

Thomas'

of

this

Marsilius. On Kingship, 1.14, 16, 25, 26; The Defender of Peace, I.XVII.10. Cf. Strauss, op. cit., p. 242. For medieval men,

concern,

of

which

may

course, Rome 34

the imperial

poraries,

model.

view

see

36

Gierke,

op.

was

consistent with

the

cit., 109-10.

De Mon. I.iii.9. III.xv.ll. Compare

Aristotle

position

that all states have a sinful origin. For the views of Dante's contem

Lib. Ill, Leet. 5-6. See Davis, Dante Renucci, op. cit., 295 ff.

and

with

On Kingship, 1. 10, In Lib. Pol., Rome, op. cit., pp, 28 ff.,

the idea of

tyrant "must take every means to prevent people from knowing Pol. 1313b4. In tyrannies, he says, "there is little or no friendship."

says a

another."

one

of

De Mon. Il.i. 3, iii.l. Cf. Conv. V.iv. The

Christian 35

was

also

Nic. Eth. 1161a31.

Introduction to Dante's De Monarchia in the beyond. In it is

able to make

use of this

the divine gift of

By

If Dante

goal.

at

its best

of speculation

primacy

speculative

men achieve then

by

other than

telian means, he stiU provides freedom for the most Aristotelian in order that unhindered men can attain the best human

of

end.38

Dante

he

not

also

their

as

defining

hierarchy

Moreover,

freedom

"intend

and

men

of

True

upon others.

to go on

hving

for

sakes."39

own

For

the

on

than dependence

self-dependence rather

of government aim at

Aristo

purposes,

human ends, freedom. After the Metaphysics, it is

Aristotle

with

only follows Aristotie in

described

forms

agrees

when

principle.37

liberty, therefore,

establishes the

is

that mankind

which case who would not agree

fullest

181

such

reasons, De Monarchia

attempts

to freedom. It

power of the world empire

to

wed the unlimited political

must accomplish this

if God's

Aristotle's highest human activity is to be preserved. Whether the divine intention, as Dante presents it, and Aristotelian contemplation are the same remains a problem, but that free intention is to be

carried out

and

dom is necessary for both is unquestionable. Assurance of freedom in the world empire

rests upon the proposition

the emperor or mon that world empire wUl be properly ruled. Its ruler wiU not tend to be a tyrant. He wiU preserve freedom for reasons arch

inherent in his

his

their

because

position and

office makes

him just.

liberty because

of

His

his

As already noted, fear that they wUl lose Proper governmental form, in other

of

his

own qualities.

subjects need not

greed.

necessary and sufficient condition of justice in the monarch. By the nature of his position he is independent and has all that he can temporaUy desire. However, De Monarchia demonstrates that it is neces words, is

sary

that the monarch

provide. that

the

he

assures that

go with

bring

The jurisdiction

his

office.40

uses

It

must

to

his

office qualities

that office itself

cannot

the monarch is automatic, but the judgment

of

his jurisdiction for

the cause of

liberty

does

not

be developed.

37

De Mon. I.iii. 10,

38

Nic. Eth. 1177b23ff.

39

De Mon. I.xii.8-10. Cf. Meta. 982b25, Purg. 1.71-72, Para. XXXI.85-89. With understands that good types of regimes aim at freedom and

xii.6.

Aristotle, Dante "perverted"

removes

types tend toward

him from any list

of

slavery.

purely

limited to bodily or wholly temporal XVI.33, Pol. 1277a20 ff., Kantorowicz, 40

the

What is

concerns.

op.

cit.,

crucial

thinkers

modern

pp.

to his formulation

is that

Cf. De Mon.

self-interest

is

and not

III.xiii.3, 9, Purg.

491 ff.

I.xiii.3, 6, 7, III.x.10. An understanding of the relationship between and his kingdom is dependent, once again, on recognizing how Dante

De Mon.

monarch

borrows from the Metaphysics. Dante's demonstration depends on the proposition that the monarch is already what he is trying to produce in others. That is, the relationship between what

is already in

At the

political

emperor

act

level,

and

(per tale this

subjects

existens

means

is essentially the relationship between and what is potentially (potentia).

actu)

that the monarch personifies the qualities his

Interpretation

1 82

that Dante's earlier identification of superior inteUect is borne home. Rational judgment more than anything ruling abUity characterizes the good ruler as such. It enables him to correctly assume

It is with else and

at this point

his

use

judgment

is

world government

precedes

justice. To

And these two person who

king

"God,"

reality, for

a

his office comes about only after Judgment in the ruler, in this respect, end, Dante repeats the words of David:

this

qualities

associated with

[judgment

he implored God to

when

government

a reality.

justice] law, as

and

makes and carries out the grant

was maintained most essential

judgment

your

fitting for the holy for a king and his

those supremely

are

the things

he said, "give to the king

son:

world

makes

the potential monarch to properly form or found his

The justice that is

regime.

the

Judgment

position.

enables

and

by

that most

to

the

king's

son

justice."41

Whereas the

specific

quality

the

of

father-king

is identified

with

judgment,

the quality of the son-king can be justice. Judgment is a prerequisite for the monarch and

is

anterior to

In turn, judgment power without

destroying

must recognize the genus and make

depends

on

and

legislate in

a

other

qualities

ruling

freedom. Dante

human

diversity

determinations

such

dominions

any

in him.

enables monarchs to wield their enormous political

abUity.

within

consistent with

They

hope,

cannot

inteUigent

argues that

existing

the

monarchs

homogeneity

of the

both. Their success, in fact, the extent of their

given

the differences among their subjects, personaUy to control transaction or to legislate for every occurrence. They can, however, every

way that is generaUy binding yet leaves leeway for expression differences. The formulations of monarchs, in other words, are universally binding but do not necessarUy punish the idiosyncratic or Universal law, which world government demands, does not of relevant

uncommon.42

exceed

chiefs

to rule

methods the ance

be

limits. Dante recalls, for example, how Moses legislated Israel, supplying unifying doctrines but aUowing individual in regard to the individual needs of each tribe. By such

certain

for the tribes

is

made

of

monarchy is strengthened, rulers reign supreme, and allow for freedom. Thus indivisible and powerful rule is shown to

consistent with

needs

ularistic

developments in

regime

is to

the political latitude that natural

require.43

pohtical

thought

understand

terms

current

freedom, justice,

produce

it becomes difficult to he

In

and

centralized

and

how the

diversity

rule

judgment. At the

monarch

is

and partic

foreshadowing

later

and

decentralized

same

time, however,

one of that race whose end

Compare, for example, De Mon. I.xiii.3 with Meta. 1049b24. Ibid., I.xiii.7. Cf. Psalms LXXXII.l, Inf. X.6. Ibid., I.xiv.4-5. Cf. Conv. IV.xi, Para. VIII.99 ff., 150 ff. The reader

serves.

41 42

that

the

universal

human

end

does

not

deny

the

human

race's

will recall

"multitudinous

variety."

Cf. De Mon. I.iii.4.

43

Ibid., I.xiv.9. This

lawyers, church

the

argument

Decretalists,

who

is

most effective when

sought

to

support

traditions, III.iii.9. Church traditions,

as

Dante

engages

ecclesiastical

claims

those

by

canon

way

the Decretalists presented

of

them,

Introduction to Dante's De Monarchia administration are the marks of the

help

and

had been

it

avoid the

But it

accused.

founder if

might

tendency

properly

toward

be

must

constituted world government

tyranny

of which earlier empires

that the entire

emphasized

emperors or monarchs are

183

insufficiently

structure

inade

skUlful or

judges.

quate

Above ah, This is

monarchs must understand that rule ought not to

be divided.

to their success. It was precisely because of an insufficiency that understanding, Dante argues, that contemporary politics were in

of

crucial

disarray. This idea, and the concomitant notion that men's pohtical not be divided, lay at the heart of De Monorchia's denial of the

such

loyalties

in

church's power

pohtics and

its final

to the classical tradition to

return

So long, Dante

support the monarchy.

begins,

as rule

is recognized, there can be political He finds support for this position in both

hierarchy

ruhng

the world.

authorities.44

ference in

Yet he

notes

led to

politics

how the

the

rise of

demise

undivided rule men

men

lost their

for Rome's

did

not

inteUectual, with

his Christian

have the flexibility

Church

than the

the Church all places changed

of

Rome,

and even

monarchy (Mo centralized

and

that empire

feU,

whose

happy. When

divine bearings. The

opponents.45

to deal with the fluctuations of political a

Rome. To this end, he cites the following article (XXXIV) of England: "It is not necessary that traditions and ceremonies be in

and

diversity

against

God's

Paradise (New

of

they have been divers,

times

all

countries, times, and

Cary's

will."

York, 1883),

comment p.

men's

is included in his translation

De Mon. I.v.3-4, 8.

Ibid., I.xvi.1-5, Para. VT.10,80-81, Conv. IV.v.8., Kantorowicz, pagan

Augustinian Rome

empire was neither

Moreover, Dante Trajan

for

as a model of

in

size

purposes

VI.10-12, Davis, Dante

in

other places.

the idea of

the

and well-being.

greatest period of

than Augustus

This

by

the

period

Roman

notably Justinian

rule. and

What distinguishes Augustinian Rome for

is that it is the last

and

harmony

465.

op. cit., p.

Christian times is indicated

nor strength

singles out emperors other

especial praise

De Monorchia's

and

antiquity

may be

217.

45

The distinction between

and

manners, so that

44

the

life,

nineteenth-century Dante

that the Church of England handled this problem better

suggests

according to the

choice of

reason

cupidity that Dante has al In other words, Christian

Henry Francis Cary,

one, or utterly alike; for at

Purgatory

inter

of

nothing be ordained

of

needed

in

Christian

and church

the perfect

under

peaceful and

practical,

Para. LX.133-35. The Rev.

scholar, engagingly

of

had been

harmony

classical and

Christianity

collapse was the same ecclesiastical

ready identified

cf.

Augustinian

of

perfecta)

undivided and a

of such political requirements.

Prior to Christian influence there had been narchia

is

peace and

empire of pre-Christian

Rome,

op.

cit., p.

times. Cf. Para.

37, P. Toynbee, Dante

of Dictionary, (Oxford, 1968), pp. 168-69. Dante speaks of the "seamless This is a reference to the Donation of empire being rent on "the nail of Constantine, the first Christian Emperor (274-337), who was supposed to have given garment"

cupidity."

Pope Sylvester I

vast secular

was proven spurious genuine

powers.

in 1440 but

in Dante's time.

The document that

was still accepted

supported

by imperialists

the

Donation

and papalists as

Interpretation

1 84

cupidity brought to an end the best of human times and stUl, according to De Monarchia, constitutes a considerable problem. Thus only restoration of and unified

strong

rule, free

Monorchia's

interference

of churchmen's

and

greed,

can

to the advent of Christianity. De

approximate a return to conditions prior

controUing cupidity and restoring powerful rule is partiaUy explained, therefore, by reinstituting the conditions of the times, which are themselves consequent to the influ ence of Christianity. emphasis upon

rather than

Given

moral virtues

situation, the

this

a pre-Christian empire.

Only

for

proper rule must

necessarUy be

there could a successful model for the new

particular model, as already suggested, is in defense of the proposition that Rome's By arguing rightful, De Monarchia demonstrates that imperial rule is the

be found. The

world government Rome.46

pagan

empire was

best kind

of rule and offers a standard against which subsequent rulers can

But

measure themselves.

to pagan times

return

The

standard

is to

problem

or

there

is

be

no suggestion that there can

a simple

that Christian influence in politics can be ignored.

understand

how in Christian times

one can return or

approximate a return to the pohtical

unity that characterized pre-Christian times. What pagan characteristics, in other words, are desirable and practical in a Christian political world? The answer leads us back to Roman and pre-Roman political

ideas.

Indeed, it leads

The Roman people, Dante explains,

because they in two

were

senses.

"nobUity "nobUity

the "noblest

First,

us

were

back to Aristotle.

entitled

to imperial office

Their nobihty is to be understood De Monarchia borrows from Aristotle the idea that people."47

This is then tied to the idea that and only which Dante

wealth."

is

virtue and ancient

of

attributes to

mind

(animi) is

Juvenal.48

the

virtue,"

one

Nobility is, therefore,

related

to both the inteUectual

quality and the ancestry of the Romans. Further support for both of these ideas wiU be forthcoming, but initiaUy one ought to remember that the passage in the Politics from which Dante borrows points to the fact that 46

Dante's

from

choice of

Rome

Christian perspective,

a

divine

providence at work, to

Italian

nationalism.

47

Cf.

as a model still sparks which understands

scholarly debate. Views

range

the choice as an attempt to show

the idea that Rome is used as the herald of a

Renucci,

op. cit., p.

311; Reade,

De Mon. Il.iii. 3, Para. VI. 34 ff. The

argument

op.

cit.,

pp. xx

reinforces

a

new

ff.

point

already

Roman nobility warrants Roman rule, we are told, because "honour is the reward of Thus the Aristotelian idea that virtue is its own reward is pre cluded. The virtuous are to expect and are satisfied to be paid with political honor. noted.

virtue."

As

consequence, the magnanimous man, who

a

is disrespectful

of political

honor,

like the totally just man to have no place in the new political order. Nic. Eth. 1124a4 ff., H. V. Jaffa, Thomism and Aristotelianism (Chicago, 1952), pp. 116 ff.,

seems

Gilson, Spirit, 48

change

Politics cf.

op.

cit., p. 387.

De Mon. II.iii.4. Dante the

original.

and

adds

He

animi

reproduces

substitutes

both

of

these definitions in forms that

nobility for good birth

to luvenal's definition. Pol.

Conv. IV.iii.6, Davis, Brunetto Latini,

op.

in the

statement

from the

1294a21, Saturnalia VHI.20;

cit., p. 436.

Introduction to Dante's De Monarchia

185

This dual

view

nobility is

of

supported

by

other

birth."

"good

ancient wealth and virtue are somehow synonymous with

authorities.

ancient

Virgil, in

particular, is shown to testify to it. Aeneas is the nobUity thus defined. He is founder of Rome, ancestor of a

exemplar of people who

by relation to him, and ancestral source of the qualities that Roman hegemony over the entire world. Furthermore, the means

are ennobled

led to

by

which

he founded Rome demonstrate his

is

success

offered as a result of

arts as much as of "noblest"

ruler

his

his

paternity.

nobUity "of

three clever marriages and

He

characterizes the

to strengthen his hold

His

mind."

his

warlike

ability of the best or he already has an

on places where

he does

cestral claim and conquer where

own

not.49

is indivorceable

Ancestry

from nobUity properly understood but it does not limit men who would further imperial domains by way of their individual capabUities. And since

is

empire

by

definition the best

whatever rulers

As the

do to further its

exemplar of

and

regime

nobihty, Aeneas is

the

aims at

strength and

common

dominions is

a guide

to future

good,

right.50

monarchs.

More

that, his actions reveal how one may recognize the proper ruler or monarch. No longer, in the new system of world government, would ecclesi

than

astical authorities

legitimating

them.

have responsibUity for approving monarchs and thereby Dante's denial of papal pohtical authority means that authority must be recognizable without Thus De Monarchia introduces its audience to an

proper rulers and proper claims to recourse to the church.

idea

that bypasses

of pohtical right

demonstrating

to plentitude of power

be determined

by

That

or particularistic

knowledge

is,

men are recognizable without upon which papal claims

by

information that

"noble"

aU men possess.

were

papal claims

that rightful rulers can

the divine

to political authority

ultimately based.

Aeneas'

actions and

his

success

indicate that

men who are superior

in

They do not depend upon the acclamation of feUows or of any particular group, i.e., the priest hood. Monarchs do not depend upon others for office. They earn it themselves. Ecclesiastical views of higher or natural law, upon which papal pohtical affairs emerge

claims to political of

nature

superior

God, by

in

authority

which

nature.51

nature,

by way

men

so

by

op.

In effect, the

acts are

political

not revealed of

divine

respect

a view

art,"

ordains a people

a clear or overt commandment.

with

to

directives from a by higher laws. If

Virgil,

With

Aris-

especially in regard to

An interesting commentary on some of these liberties is provided cit., p. 283. I would like to thank John O'Connell who showed me

number of places

free

in

which

Dante

argument

of greed and

changes

is that the

just. He has

ff., 25-26. II.ii.3, IH.xiii.3, 9. Ibid.,

De Mon. II.v.8 si

is

way in this

marriages.

by Renucci, 50

excellence

give

express

De Mon. Il.iii. 8-17. Dante takes liberties

Aeneas'

a

no

is the "instrument

to rule, He does not do

49

their own resources.

anchored,

receive

Pohtical

which

are

of

Virgil.

rightful monarch

no recourse

but to

has act

everything.

for the

Thus his

public welfare.

Interpretation

186

totle, Dante to

right

independent sors

that political excellence is displayed in activity. Rome's

agrees

was

rule

not

did. This diverges from

the lengths to

which

by

established

It is

of revelation.

Dante

estabhshed

by

Aeneas

what

doctrine to break the

and

ecclesiastical

would go

appears

and

commandments

and

is

his

succes

a measure

church's

of

influence in

To say that political right is displayed in activity, not by divine commandment, is to say that the church or Scripture does control political affairs and that Scripture does not support temporal

political matters. natural or not

claims

to

power.

Claims to temporal authority are only supported, then, when those who have ruling qualities or potentials actually exercise their qualities in political matters.

Potential

rulers

bear

personal

their virtues known through their actions.

responsibUity for making or intehigence does not

Ancestry

justify imperial ambition. There must also be the will to act. True display their abUities in active political competition. Thus, whUe Roman power, stealth, and nobUity may ultimately have been divine, they alone

emperors

in temporal

pohtics in a way that men could recognize. led to Roman victory and empire, men could they them.52 Divine intervention notwithstanding, Dante's political

were aU manifested

Indeed,

hardly

given

resist

that

teaching demonstrates that right to rule is visible without recourse to reve lation or to other sorts of divine knowledge. Temporal pohtics are to be controUed rule

in the

by

There are, then,

he

saw

would

resolved

is determined

no sacred rulers

the world as

be

traditions.53

other than scriptural or ecclesiastical

world government

for Dante. Short

continuaUy beset only

by

by

Legitimate

active performance.

struggles

for

of absolute control.

when a rightful monarch arose

monarchy,

The

from

struggles

the political

This theory of what De Monarchia refers to as the temporal duel (duellum) is the principal thesis of the treatise with respect to questions of

arena.

political

right.54

Again, Dante's novelty is

independent temporal

legitimacy by

force

of

political

his

order

own actions.

of rule as a check upon church

unity Neither the duellum how the

old

recognition of

whose

Such

evident ruler

as

he

suggests

author of

was the result of

interference in

nor the monarch's

is

"nobUity

his

an

own

emphasizing

politics. mind"

of

explains

fuUy

Roman unity is to be approximated, however. That is, the manner in which empire arises and the personal quality

its ruler does not reveal how such an association wUl operate. To un derstand this, the portion of Roman nobihty related to ancestry must be recaUed. Ultimately, a viable empire is as dependent upon a proper of

political

stance

ancestral

52

53 54

toward

ancestry

as

upon

"quality

mind."

of

Roman

consequence, at least in part, of its tradition of unity piety. This is the pagan lesson that De Monarchia adopts and

strength and

were a

Ibid., II.vi.9, vii.3, 9. Cf. Renucci, op. Ibid., II.vii.4-5, III.iii.9, iv.1-2. Ibid., II.ix.21, II.vii.9, viii.i 1-15, ix.3.

cit.,

pp.

289 ff.

that aUows one

Christian

Introduction to Dante's De Monarchia

187

seriously to

in

consider

reinstituting

world government

Whether

features

the positive

in

a

Christian

an

important

is

context

return

a

key

piety can be reasserted for De Monarchia and signifies

of pagan ancestral

question

to classical political thinking. In order to

satisfactorUy, Dante attempts the difficult

question

a

setting.

course

answer

of

the

criticizing

the church without compromising the proper kind of piety and reverence. His argument against the church, he tells us, is informed by Augustine's

that "faith will waver if the authority of

admomtion

the sacred scriptures

5B

shaken."

Such wavering is politically dangerous, for political unity depends upon support that proper faith offers. The fact is that empire may generate its own power, but in a Christian world it cannot operate

is

successfuUy but through an alliance with religious authorities. In a Christian world indeed, in any world piety is a politically relevant quality. Because of this, De Monarchia at the same time emphasizes the power of

faith

de-emphasizes the church's temporal role. Since world Christian setting, one must learn how to use

and

government exists within a

the power of faith

politicaUy.56

This begins to

explain

The divisiveness were

in

a serious sense a result of

ties between the

ties

must

proper

in

why De Monarchia

be

relates

ancestry to

nobUity.

irresolution that

and

the

Christianity brought to politics fact that Christianity sundered the

community and its gods. Somehow, these Christian context. Ancestral piety points in the

pagan political

restored

in

a

direction inasmuch

a political sense.

as

it

Dante's

points to

unifying

ecclesiastical

rather than

opponents,

on

divisive piety,

the

other

hand,

heal the breach between the community and its gods because they bhnd to the political necessity for doing so. The qualities that make

cannot are

them defenders of the

greed,

or

political

not spare the papahsts.

ing. Thus, in

ly

of papal

arguments.

It is

always

their

affections

the

reason

obstinately

deny

are

is

are

receive

their

is based

zeal,

understanding of reason. Dante does

politicaUy

unenlighten-

their power independent

irrationality of

ecclesiastical

political need

is

perverted through

their

by

having

these

put

not

forth

their rational insight that the light of reason behind

affections

like blind

men

who

blindness.67

argument

continues, typifies the fault. Dante

Ibid., III.ii.3, iii. 3, 18, iv.9. De Doctrina Christiana 1.36. ff. Ibid., III,iv.l8, 21, vi.7. Cf. Purg. XVI.127, Para. 11.43-46. Ibid., III.iii.3-4, III.i.1. The ignorant faithful are the Decretalists

that faith

as

an

not the ecclesiastical mUieu.

then drawn along

St. Peter himself, the

67

Then concerns, he says,

case with men whose will runs ahead of

become

they

5

described in De Monarchia

demonstrating that monarchs

and

55

are

authority, De Monarchia posits the Ecclesiastical help in determining

coming because

them,

church

unthinking faith. None of these lead them to necessity, which is avaUable only to natural

upon

the traditions of the church. Cf. HI.iii.6-10.

does

not

who claim

Interpretation

188

hesitate to describe

the

first

of the papal

naivety,"

i.e.,

The

a man of simple

endeavors of

him

Monarchia leads

piety in it.

ancestral

support

and

to

order

De Monorchia's

as a man of

faith

rather than

purity his line blind them to

and

away from

us

hne

political necessity.

Thus De

to an old pagan notion of

churchmen

to

government needs

understand what world

for ancestry is necessary

a proper respect

on

stress

"archimandrite's thoughtfulness.68

Christianity by destroying

the political consequences of Christianity's success.

because

of

divided

the

it

as

world

pohtical

for the

existed

ancients

old gods, which had tied fathers to sons and both to their regimes, had faUen in favor of a faith whose promises were inde

faith. The

pagan

political

of ancestral patriotism. In other words, Christianity destroyed unity by destroying ancestral ties upon which that unity had been founded. Its impact had to be understood in terms of Christ's own words.

pendent

political

think that I came to

Do

not

the

sword.

For I

PoliticaUy,

came

the

World

and sons and

government

thereby

is to heal this breach be

one's own ancestors must not

end, Dante issues his

by

paternity .

.

.

whUe

for its pastor,

58

as well as

for

and 89

moreover of

all who profess

Ibid., IH.viii.9, ix.9,17. An

of a number of monasteries.

In

Somehow,

faith in

Christian faith. To this

by by

to his

recalling his human

father,

which a reverent

for the Church

reverence

the Christian

places, Dante

pope. Para. XI.99, Epistle XI.13. Ibid., III.ix.18, Matt. X.34-5. The full

men through

one's

and reverence

faith.60

archimandrite, in the Greek church, other

variety

of political

reverence.

which a reverent son owes

his mother, full

heart

reunifying

to the zealous

reiterating his Christian

trusting in that piety

son owes to

compromised

chaUenge

of the worst

strikes at the

the proper type of filial piety and reverence.

but

father.59

his

against

Christianity is

discord resulting from

for it divides fathers unity.

earth; I came not to send peace,

send peace upon

to set a man at variance

applies

the head

was

the title to St. Francis

the

Think

not

passage

that I am come to send peace on

is:

earth:

I

came not to send peace

but

a sword.

For I and

am come

to set a man at variance against his

father,

the daughter against her mother, and the daughter

in law

against

her

mother

and

he that

in law. And

a man's

foes

taketh

not

his cross,

be they

shall

He that loveth father

of

his

own

or mother more

and

followeth

He that findeth his life

shall

after

lose it:

household.

than me is not worthy of me,

me, is and

not

worthy

of me.

he that loseth his life for my

sake shall

find it. Dante

also

notes

how the

church

weakened

seniority by birth. Cf. I.v.5, III.iii.13, 17, IX. 126. Strauss, op. cit., p. 230. 60

De Mon. III. iii. 18,

queathing

v.4.

I.ix.l, III.xv.18. The

of ancestral virtue was

basically

older

Inf.

traditions, including that

of

XXII, XXVIII, Purg. XVI, Para.

papalist

argument

against

that since we are all descended

the be

from the

Introduction to Dante's De Monarchia

Proper

189

the ancestral portion of nobility, in this manner, De Monorchia's opening admonition to remember our ances tors. World government is designed to restore civU unity by reuniting fathers and sons. Empire reinstitutes the concept of father and fatherland recognition of

returns us to

by Aeneas and Rome. Acceptance of a universaUy forces men to reconsider and reassert then closeness to their forebears and their feUows. Papal antagonism to De Monarchia that was exemplified

realized

is

human

end

if

not without cause even

unity of antiquity "He that loveth father or

the question of

De Monarchia

that

reverent

Averroism is

would restore

politically dangerous. De Monorchia's reverential

The

doctrinaUy me"

is

mother more than me

avoided.

is

not

worthy

as

of

well as

the entire treatise. It is a

beginning

continues as a theme throughout

to understanding how Dante is faithful to the Aristotelian pohtical tradition. It is Aristotle to whom Dante turns

for in

support when

key

and

explaining

Aristotle,

pohtical affairs.

arguing for the force of ancestral respect by the Roman example, teaches

reinforced

that sons have to remember and respect their human paternity, that human

law

men good

makes

grants and gifts

earth, that

on

men must

that comprise their patrimony,

appreciate

properly

finaUy,

and

the

that men should

be ready to sacrifice themselves for the sake of their country and their fathers.61 That portion of the classical tradition directed at developing polit

ical dutifulness

and reverence

ical

order

that

Aristotle had

is to be

and support

his

not

of

of the utmost

importance if the

new poht

Dante left Aristotle to solve problems had to confront, so he returns to Aristotle to explain WhUe

solutions.

its understanding

is

Thus,

effective.

politics

as

the ancient world cannot an

supphes

invaluable

be reinstituted, in the

perspective

modern age.

The

anti-ecclesiastical elements of

view of pohtical

Aristotelian Yet Dante

in

a

denied the latter

course.

and contemplative

activity for the

new political proposal retains a place

authority of the monarch are Temporal monarchy

and philosophy.

same

father

any

respecting the power and place human cupidity, laws with teeth

to assure that

not

faith. To

of

no

mother, other.

Davis

with respect to this argument, not seem to realize

is the

particular

necessarUy antithetical to liberty needed "bit and rein"

provides the

ancestral

notes some of

Brunetto

strength of

establish peace

needed, but these laws

are

classical values wUl not altogether

and

group from any

the Aristotelian

honors inteUectual

of

whUe

and assuage and the

His

setting.62

reflect

attempt to reinstitute the

Christianity

The impact

stiU respects and

Christian

intellect

therefore,

reality,

polis.

De Monarchia

without

disappear

as a result of

ties can distinguish any man or

the sources to which Dante had access

Latini,

Dante's

op.

cit.,

pp.

437 ff. What Davis does

argument against

III.x.13.

this position.

Dante specifically refers to the following in these passages; Physics 194bl3, Nic. Eth. 1179b31 ff., Pol. 1253a25, i

Ibid., I.xi.l, xv.9, II.v.5,

Nic. Eth. 1094b9, 1120al4. 82

ibid., IH.xv.7-9.

vii.2-3,

Interpretation

190

it, it is the only possible cure, which necessary for the pursuit of the best human goods, for the divisiveness that resulted from Christianity. In a Christian world, Dante retains respect for eternal and divine questions. His reverence medieval

does

license. As Dante

is that

of a man reverential

power of reverence

its

presents

not sacrifice conditions

itself.

to the power of inteUectual matters and to the

Thus,

the conclusion of De Monarchia echoes

opening:

Caesar, therefore, is obliged to observe the to his father; so that when he is

son owes

he may the

by

placed

The

more

powerfully

the One

enlighten

is

who alone

reverence towards enlightened

by

the world, at the head of

ruler of all

things spiritual and

is necessary for spiritual both to intellectual and practical

proper reverence

It is

applicable

later

writers

raise

a political

to degrade reverence for divine order

in

which

Peter

sons

would

and

which

first-born

temporal concerns.

It

eternal

on

he has been

temporal.63

matters.

and

rule

which a

the light of paternal grace

the

was

left for

concerns

basis

and

of power

alone, and where power would be the only legitimate object of veneration. Perhaps they thought that Dante was too optimistic and that ancestral piety was no longer possible in the modern world. That, however, is another question.

63

Ibid., III.xv.10. Compare

with

Gierke,

op.

cit., notes

22-23,

pp.

113-15.

191 EDMUND BURKE

:

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CITIZENSHIP Larry L. Adams

For Edmund

Burke,

the psychology

The

a complex question.

categories of

Liberal theorists to

by

legitimacy,

the

the

explain

of

nature, need,

behavior

political

persuasive

politics

of

power,

the

a

was

were

developed

inadequate, but

Christian

older

but

crucial

and reason

anthro

dechning. Thus Burke found himself, almost as Matthew pology Arnold found himself a century later, working "between two worlds, was

dead,

one

the

other

for citizenship in the two directions, back to the viable

new

modern

conception

the Christian tradition, and forward to

for the

rising

order, his secular hberty.

moral

form

Any unless

it

isolated the

system

acts

to a

an

as

of

a

political

would

psychology have to reach in

moral

order

direction

provide

liberty. The three

political

was

of

this

the

of

his justification

incomprehensible, Burke believed,

What is

actor

legitimacy

sections

conception

and

psychology,

implicit in

and

personal and a social past and

nothing.

signify

subject-citizen

of

behavior

of pohtical

were related

secular

A

era

successively discuss Burke's

will

paper, accordingly,

of

for

aspiration

born."

be

to

powerless

is

required

within

structures

an

future.

Purely

appreciation

of

transcend him

which

in time and space familial, social, ecclesiastical, and legal structures. And the most subtle and decisive form of order interlaced with each is the moral order. of the others in human affairs Critics can readily point out that Burke does not define the moral order.

It is

He

says

that it

understood

an awareness of

human

of aU

are

born,

...the

...We

special

and

consists,

a

"givenness"

sensitivity to the invisible

moral

and

live

of

life.

a

minimum,

ethical

dimension

order

therefore their

out

is that men are not be auto-nomous,

cannot

hves,

related,

dependent,

self-created

self-lawed.

and obligated.

it is true, in outgrowing the dependencies of the as well in understanding and developing a wider

consists

relationships

awful

have

the

of

Men

of

the

the devout to proceed from God. At

by

self-subsistent,

range

part of

relationships.

One meaning

chUd, but it

encountered as

it brings

and

Maturity

is

author of our obligations

voluntary

pact.

to

and

obligations.

being is

the author of our place in the order of

mankind

They

arise

at

large,

which are not

from the

relation

of

in

existence

consequence

man

to man,

of

any

and

the

Interpretation

192

force

to

of man

relation

is

passage

general

remote

and

dependency

in human

the

of

moral

the

and

usual

to more

occasions

designed to

divine wiU; the

order;

Burke's

contradicts

seems

statement

of social order upon

affairs

obligations.1

familiar

and

specific

The

ones.

it

because

remarkable

or number of

particular person

those prior

upon

On the contrary, the

of choice.

matters

not

to reason from

scrupulous care

the

are

which

mankind, depends

persons amongst

This

God,

the pacts which we enter into with any

of all

establish

consequent

primacy

corollary that

consent

have been, as John Locke hypothetically argued, the original sufficient basis of political order since any such agreement would

could not and

itself depend Burke

had

disturbed

the

Locke's

The

to

formally declared,

the presumed

consent

So the and

family

conditions aware

Burke

in that

seeks

relation

and

with 3

into

1

called

our

without

all.'

progression of the

and

with

wUling

which

of

4

the

as

their

social, of

men

and

duty

association

autonomy,

become

ever encountered or

family into a natural he writes, "Men came

"

when

the social

of

.

.

their parents,

of

the

family

".

it,

state

all

with

duties spun

are

bound

polity

Works of

the

that weU

4

a natural

and

cooperating

Right vols.

Burke, An Appeal, Burke, An Appeal, Burke, An Appeal,

p. pp. p.

one,

not alone

family because

state

are

agencies

both

affective

which

to fuU of

the

social rank associations.

symbolize, transmit,

Honourable Edmund Burke (London:

F.

An Appeal from the New to the Old

Whigs,

206.

206-207. 207.

social

by

individual's membership in the

family

are

their

of

the

are

(as it has been

we

comprehends

Consequence of Some Late Discussions in on the French Revolution (1791), VI, 206. 3

to

obligation, not only because birth determines

Rivington, 1801-1827), 16

2

by

raised

natural,

any

prior

loaded

benefits,

country

role, but because

The

is

of the physical relations

the nation, and

continuities of

Family

the

of

conditions,

hierarchy

community

the

all

Out

a

and

membership in the polity is then and

be

as well that the natural association

Relationship

classes

said) 'ah the charities

The

which

to extend the natural ties of the

social

manner

situation."

of

to,

prior

unison

implies

consent, before the individual has

for

endowed

ties

to

children

point

relationships

the political.

of

sanction

the

represents

arises

social

2

things."

through social compact.

(a

parties

all

voluntarily follow auto

entaUs

but it may safely be assumed, "because rational creature is in unison with the every

the moral orders. Burke

the

of

family

of

of

be

may

it

the

analyze

consent

completely parents is not

predisposed order of

to

sacrifice

efforts

marriage which

obligations

and

pain

consensual).

that

example,

that

at

often

matically,

an

as

but

into,

entered

context of obhgation.

upon some prior order and

argues,

Parliament, Relative

to the

&

C. in

Reflections

Edmund Burke: The Psychology of Citizenship the moral order.

and enforce sort

every

of

"Every

sort

institution, aiding

political

of

193

sort of

moral, every

the rational and

civil, ties

natural

human understanding to the divine, are no more than " B necessary to build up that wonderful structure, Man One such institution which bears a special relation to the moral order is the Man is by nature a religious animal, as the English well recognize, and it is to the persecution of the church in France

that connect the

.

.

.

church.6

Burke

that

the

ascribes

French

soteriological character of

Revolutionary

politics.7

One indispensable function is the

consecration

because it

of

formal

meets

This

ecclesiastical

God, but because

the

which

authority.

its

church

for society

provides

is to be

consecration

not

prized

the revealed

or even

requirement,

benefits. Rulers and transient, is derivative authority and that their eminence of office places them not beyond the moral order, but instead closer to its Creator. Religious consecration of

wUl

of

to be

need

secular

in

of

provides

authority

practical

psychological

that their

reminded

some

against

security

the temptations latent

power and pomp.

This

is made, that all who administer in the government in the presence of God himself, should have high

consecration

which

they

notions

of

stand

their function

mortality; that

they

Consecration conscience

and

should not

as

serves

the

against

of

the

of

conscientious

existence

of

destination;

that their hope

look to the paltry a

ceremonial

temptations

of

the moral order.

of

reinforcement

not

worthy of im

moment...8

the

high office, and as a The need for religious

behavior is

political

be full

should

the

pelf of

men, in

of and

to

confined

ruler's

reminder standards on

monarchs;

is more imperative in the "collective sovereign of republics and democracies. The people, or their representatives, acting coUectively "are themselves in a great measure their own instru 9 ments": there is less institutional distance, and fewer possible im the contrary, the need

ties"

pediments, between a decision and its implementation.

What is more, the anonymity to

opposite

that

of

the

eminent

of and

dissolved

a

crowd

visible

is

a

directly

condition

political

authority.

In

a

large crowd, assembled notice, bility for conduct is so widely diffused as to be unassignable, and the bonds of conscience of individuals may be severely weakened. Burke and

5

The

Works

of

the

1801-1827),

Rivington, France, and event, In

7

8

a

on

the

Right

16

vols.

on

Honourable Edmund Mr.

Burke

Burke's Reflections

Proceedings of Certain Societies in

Letter intended to have been p.

Burke, Reflections, Burke, Reflections,

p.

226.

p.

226.

pp.

sent

226.

Burke, Reflections, Burke, Reflections,

81, 92, 226.

to a

responsi

a moment's

on

&

C.

Revolution

in

(London: the

London,

Gentleman in Paris

F.

relative

to that

(1790), V,

227.

Interpretation

194

then argues, as does Sigmund

hmitations actor

is

assembly claiming to

"It is.

.

a

behalf

on

act

of

to imagine that their will, any

than that

more

constituted

the people. It follows that the those

under

significance

added

on

the political

duly

a

or

crowd

infinite importance that they

of

.

are

or

take

religion

of

practical and psychological

much weakened when

people,"

"the

corporate

sanctions stances.

behavior

on political

that the

Freud,

should not

kings, is

of

circum

be

suffered

the standard

It is the church, the only institution whose of it is to serve as spokesman for the moral order in leading responsibility the early received, and uniformly the affairs of men, to declare ". 10

wrong."

right

and

.

mankind."

sense of

continued,

the objection may be

Again,

to lend force and he contends, that ".

raised

as

cannot alter

the

12

things"

of

moral

.

the

.

more than

any

but this

that Burke has

votes

they

admonition would

of a

out

spelled

no

It may

order."

to "the

content

rules

specific

be true,

.

n

moral

majority the

can alter

carry more "the moral

of the people

physical essence

weight

if he

could

things."

in detaU what is the On this point, Burke defends his position with counsels of caution. "Nothing universal can be rationally affirmed or any moral, or any Pure metaphysical abstraction does not belong to pohtical subject. 13 The inaccessibility of a systematic morahty, he claims, these content of

explain

essence

of

matters."

does aU

disturb him: "Even in matters which are, as it were, just reach, what would become of the world if the practice of

not

within

our

duties,

moral

their

the foundations

and

made

reasons

clear

and

of

rested

society,

demonstrable

having

upon

individual?"

to

every

After aU, we can rest assured that "If there were not some of judgment as well as of sentiment common to aU mankind,

14

principles

could possibly be taken either on their

reason or

to maintain the ordinary correspondence of

Nonetheless, Burke does believe order are evident. Perhaps the first of

God,

supreme

law,

10 n 12 13

14

is the security

who ruler

of

exists, wise to

their passions,

life."

form,

concerning

and

order.

potent

The

Reflections, Reflections,

p.

229.

p.

230.

An

pp.

201-202.

pp.

97-98.

Appeal, An Appeal,

Works of

the

Right

Honourable

to

enforce, the even

Edmund Burke

is

The

Works of

the

of the Sublime

and

actual,

(London:

Rivington, 1801-1827), 16 vols. A Letter from Mr. Burke to National Assembly in answer to Some Objections to his book (1791), VI, 4. Rivington, 1801-1827), 16

existence

"I allow, that if

there is no sanction to any conduct, virtual or

Burke, Burke, Burke, Burke,

the moral

these in importance is the

the moral

hold

15

some essentials of

no

sufficient

no

moral

against

F.

& C.

Member of the on French affairs

a

Right Honourable Edmund Burke (London: F. & C. A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas

vols.

Beautiful

(1757), I, 87.

Edmund Burke the will of prevalent must

God

power."

mindful

16

Psychology

The

existence

195

Citizenship

of

God

of

means that men

the distinction between the commands of

of

the commands of the state. Burke writes

and

French of

be

always

The

:

"... they

revolutionaries that

conscience

which

despots

govern

nothing

else

by

endeavour to

independently

exists

They know

terror.

of

indignantly of the destroy that tribunal

edicts

that he

decrees. Your

and

fears God fears

who

17 .

.

Strauss,18

Burke does distinguish between the moral order and the process of history. Conscience is distinct from community: "Whatever turns the soul in ward on itself tends to concenter its forces, and to fit it for greater learning]." 19 and stronger flights of science [i.e., Yet at the same time,

Thus, contrary

to

Burke

emphasizes

itself

since

the

the

history

accomplishments

analysis

in

assist

institutions, and events, leaders,

which

communal

embraces

transmission and the

the

It is institutions

moral order.

to

extent

Professor Leo

of

history

and

which

and give specific

to the moral order; it is the institutions and the

a

which

This

disciphne

conception

the

of

direct the

and

mediation

of

the

conscience moral

order

the

of

application

embody

and

symbols,

substance people

history

even

history

that

of

of

nation.

by history

and

"prejudice."

institutions is apparent in Burke's conception of Prejudice represents the cumulative judgments and values of the community over time, and as such it is superior to individual experience. "postjudice," It might better be called since while it represents a pre judgment for

an individual, belonging either

experience,

"We stock

smah, of

of

reason;

no

because

we

suspect

individuals

bank

general

folklore, Prejudice,

the French or

the

needs

practical

that

the

which

education

to

stock

do better to

would

capital

men

philosophes

inherited

of

of

shell

learning

of

in

community. own

each

avail

for

each

make

is

themselves

of

to

private man

20

There

war

upon

had done. of

conventional

the multitude in lieu

develop

and

nations,

of

the common man has neither the

for the

accumulated

ages."

and

reason, he insisted, for as

the

put men

that the

and

the

was

to

are afraid

judgment issues from

that

to him personally or to the to live and trade each on his

situation

he

that

morality,

reflective

serves

morality

time, the inclination, encounters.

nor

Conventional

morality amounts, as John Dewey later wrote, to "ideas fixed in our Prejudice is the real source of continuity and cooperation in human behavior. "Prejudice is of ready application in the emergency; muscles."

Burke, An Appeal, p. 66. Burke, Letter to a Member of the National Assembly, p. 41. is See for instance Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 316-318. 16

17

19 and

20

Burke, A Beautiful,

Philosophical p.

Enquiry into

3.

Burke, Reflections,

p.

218.

the

Origin of

our

Ideas of

the

Sublime

Interpretation

196

it previously engages the mind in a steady course and does not leave the man hesitating in the

of wisdom and

virtue,

decision,

of

moment

21

unresolved."

Burke

habit, form

and

puzzled

sceptical,

to morality as a garment, a play upon the Latin principal conventional garment, since habit was to Burke the

often refers

or

transmitting it

of morality, and society's means of

their

covers

and

men

clothes

primitive

them from the excesses of nature, their

fellows,

in

society.

civil

his behavior

and renders

it principled; it

makes

acts."

his habit;

series

a

not

and

practical

manifestation

societies.

The

unconnected

the

of

habit,

role of

of

of

structure

and

vice."

to

a man's virtue

and

men

of

the stabUity of morality

is vital, because "... the natural progress of the 23 To mix in a theological concept, frailty to counter-force

the

Habit then is the

in the lives

order

moral

the

are

selfhood which

"...

22

protects

that of their

Habits

structures of character, that level of a man's

constituent

unifies

them fit for life

renders

and

it

is,

and

nature

own

Morahty

as well.

nakedness; that

[is] from

passions

habit is

sound

the

sin.

original

II Burke does

of

modern

of

lived in "the

nature

age,"

the

of

myth

to break the

hegemony

of

conceptual

bridges

religious

and

Burke's

of

reason

for his

develop

heritage,

of

he knew

and

that

those

and

Liberal

the temple. He counterpart

formulas. He

political

theory

understood

understood

was

that it

that the state

to the Eden myth, designed

the church over political theory. Much of the

work

across

derives from its intense

effort

to

develop

the widening rift in modern culture, between

memories,

and

symbols, to its

secular

aspirations

projects.

And it is entirely

have

outside

him,

cries

religious

a secular

was

fascination

its

He is

vocabulary.

to be a defender of an

appear

the secular side of the chasm, could

on

significance

literally,

was profane

opening before

modern

directly by

reached

that much

of

to

wish

This is probably the basic

culture

gulf

be

not

the concept of the moral order. He understood the widening

who not

does

theological

a

ordinarily employ

and

polity.

ecclesiastical

ment

not

theocrat,

a

not

consistent with

Burke's task that he

would

protested

against

the divorce of ethics

divorce

seemed

to him the essence of Liberal social

sort of

and

psychology.

strongly Just this

theory,

and

he feared that it foreshadowed the rending and decline of European culture. If the mental life of men could be severed from moral purpose, if psychology

could

be

made

"value-free,"

calculators"

oeconomists,

21 22 23

and

Burke, Reflections, Burke, Reflections, Burke, Reflections,

would

pp.

218-219.

p.

219.

p.

311.

then the age of

"sophisters,

have succeeded, "and the glory

of

Edmund Burke Europe sever

.

.

from morality,

motive

detected in the the

through

things,

of

but

degrading

streets

be

not

a

by

a

modern

is but

queen

and

woman,

scheme

a woman

is

25

human psychology is

the psychology of citizenship distinguishing them from his con of

in the preceding of mental life

examined

dynamics

he set out to articulate the buried in a way which could be accepted

and

of politics

psychology

skeptics

which would

"On this

order."

value-free

the interior

that

a

the highest

by

clearly

the political process,

animated

naturalism,

the revolutionaries. a

man,

naturalistic

more

sort of

197

Citizenship

of

from culture, Burke believed he of King Louis XVI and his queen

the moral order which has been

meanings of the

by

procession

Burke did believe

section.

This

possible, Burke's theories

or

understood

ception of

24

and an animal not of

animal; Whether or

pernicious,

Psychology

person

Paris

of

is but

king

a

an

can

forever."

extinguished

.

The

:

destroying

without

the religious

ground

those

of

meanings.

have

...we

frame

to our

given

the constitution

of

our

of

polity the image

country

with

fundamental laws into the bosom and

cherishing

charities our

This

state,

the

warmth

hearts,

our

of of

our

fUial

a

association.

family

our

their

all

be

of a relation

in blood;

dearest domestick ties;

sepulchres,

eloquent statement can

is

state

with

our

affections;

combined

keeping inseparable,

and

reflected

mutually

summarized as a

an

assertion

complex

that the

proposition,

enclosing a series of conclusions which need to be explored. In the first place, Burke sees that the polity is in historical fact as

well

from, of

as

and

family

some

of

what we and

soul,

a

legal

In

association.

other

words,

the legal penalties imposed to

ought always against

upon

have been,

one

family-combination,

the

a

citizenship has numerous lesser

psychologically grounded in, So, Burke could rejoice that the

remains

relationships.

up

our

altars.26

and our

This in itself is

binding

adopting

filial

arisen series

statute

repealing English Catholics "made us

family, and

one

body,

one

heart

all other combinations

of

27

A further similarity is that membership in the state, like membership in the family, is normally non-elective. Each association (although "attaches upon every individual without formal act of his enemies."

our

own"

it may have originated in a voluntary choice), and from each association the individual derives benefits without wiUing them or acting directly to gain

24 25 2e 27

them.28

Burke, Reflections, Burke, Reflections, Burke, Reflections, The

Works of

p.

199.

p.

201.

pp.

Rivington, 1801-1827), 16 Conclusion of the Poll 28

129-130.

Right Honourable Edmund Burke (London:

the

vols.

Speeches

(1774), III,

Burke, An Appeal,

p.

205

49.

at

Mr. Burke's Arrival

at

F.

Bristol,

& C. at

the

Interpretation

198 A

second

the

of

meaning

that the

proposition

is

state

a

filial

associa

tion is that the state is a psychological unity bound with the ties of philia, the love of like for like. The polity draws upon the individual's begin our capacity for love, which is developed in the famUy. "We families," relation cold is a "No he writes. in our publick affections citizen."

zealous

do his

so

We

pass on

are

inns

habit,

29

As the

person

matures, and his

responsibihties

widen,

affections.

to our neighbourhoods, and our habitual

and

resting

and not

little images

by

of

Such divisions

places.

jerk

a sudden

of

of our

[arbitrary,

These

provincial connexions.

have been formed

as

country

by

revolutionary] authority, were so many

the great country in which the heart found something which it

fill.30

could

Thus through

identify

a

of

series

comes

to

him, just another. Such

the nation:

with

enlarging affections, the individual he belongs to it, and it belongs to

his family, he and his town, belong to one belonging may have a legal title, but its true foundations for conduct lie in the affections of the individual. If the pohty can draw upon filial affection, it is obviously true that the monarch makes an ideal father figure. For Burke, this is one of he

as

and

the decisive advantages a strict republican

a

of

form

or

monarchy

of government.

a

"mixed

constitution"

over

Of French revolutionary thought

he laments that, "On the principles of this mechanical philosophy, our can never be embodied, if I may use the expression, in persons; so as to create in us love, veneration, admiration, or attach

institutions ment."

not

31

Of

course

the

weaken

the significance of the

importance

intermediate between those of

vocation,

was a

friendship,

discernible and

education,

psychological

of

of

son

economic

and

king

as

subject-citizen,

social

of

and

father figure does

psychological

class.

including

by blood,

properly also, he

loyalty, trust,

relationships

those

Class in Burke's time

society, bound together

tasks,

concomitants

and

and

church,

stratum of

social

manners,

believed, by and

understanding,

the

affec

tion. "To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we to in society, is the first principle (the germ as it were) of public

belong

It is the first link in the

affections. a

love to

family, the individual, is by as

"salutary

29

30 31 32 33

Burke, Burke, Burke, Burke, Burke,

the crucible

domestick

Reflections, Reflections, Reflections, Reflections, Letter to

a

which we proceed

towards

32

a

filial

association

is

that

the

the affectionate capacities and attachments of

of

the

same

power

prejudice,"

as

pp.

by

series

mankind."

country and to A third sense in which the polity is our

the

Burke

tutor

caUs

of

moral

it.33

402-403.

p.

403.

p.

202.

p.

150.

Member of the National

Assembly,

p.

38.

habit,

of

Edmund Burke

The

:

Psychology

199

Citizenship

of

Civil society is made possible by the internalization of moral demands from moral education. If the process of moral education is deficent in a family, the lack or weakness in the consciences of its which results

chUdren of

education

internalized

harm. If

cause social

may

moral

are

family

the

throughout

weak

have to be Liberty demands

norms wiU

a

its function deficiency in

structure and

the

society,

for by some external interior order, more ethical maturity, of the citizens who enjoy it than does tyranny. "Men are hberty," qualified for civil Burke writes, "in exact proportion to their disposition to put moral chains on their own social

authority.

compensated

more

appetites."

Society

cannot exist unless

It is

without

perate minds

Fourth, the

it is

eternal

be free. Their

Locke

to the next.

generation

views

"By

a

as of

it there

things, that

of

be

appetite

of

men

placed

must

be

intem

of

fetters."

manner

nature, we receive, privileges, in the same lives."

and our

property

through the instruction

35

an

inheritance. Life, liberty,

the cardinal rights of man, Burke

society, the fUaments

hold,

we

our

hberty

and

more

binding

one

policy, working after the transmit our government and

constitutional

patern of

our

will

forge their

passions

the transmitted heritage

as

constitution

transmitted as

possessed and

which

property,

sees

controlling power upon it there is within, the

in the

ordained cannot

a of

the state may be considered a fUial association because like

famUy,

and

the less

and

somewhere,

The

we

in

family

which

we

transmits

and

enjoy

transmit

in two senses,

liberty

the conscience of the young, which makes

of

collectively, in conjunction with other families, inheritance of the rights of Englishmen. The transmission of property as well has a psychological dimension beyond legality: "The power of perpetuating our property in our families is one of the most

in the

possible,

entaUed

interesting

valuable

and

tends the

most

to

subservient

of

and

Community fanuly

our

37

given

34 35 36

37

carry

are a

enjoyed

positive

even

that which

and

avarice."

upon

"locked fast

emotional

as

charge

in or

a

36

sort

force.

inheritance are prized not only bear a positive emotional significance they regard the hberties as significant to their own

as

of

extensions

the

securities

for their

hberty, lacking in itself any limiting

limit

secured

it,

emotionally:

to their possessors, who

spirit of

to

received and understood as an

rationaUy, but

identity,

belonging

virtue; it grafts benevolence

advantages which

settlement"

Liberties

circumstances

to the perpetuation of society itself. It makes our weakness

and

direction

hberty, by

Burke, Burke, Burke, Burke,

Letter to

a

a

Reflections, Reflections, Reflections,

by

sense

or

the memory of the of

familial-national

own

moral

pride

Member of the National Assembly, pp. 128-129. p.

158.

p.

128.

selfhood.

directing

p.

in enjoying

64.

The

principles, is struggles that the

Interpretation

200

liberty,

by

a sense of

Each

generation

and

posterity.

heritage

accountability for the liberty to ancestry and finds some meaning in the effort to keep the and, if possible, to improve it.

liberty intact,

of

Ill Issues most

liberty

of

the

of

to present a

seem

questions

cause

liberal. How did he

liberty,

of

To

of citizenship?

To do

in

the

over

Burke isolate

this question is the

Burke's

place

the

the modern

moral

purpose

of

psychology this section.

psychology in perspective,

political

English-speaking

two centuries: the growth of hberty.

past

that

convinced

was

from its larger

politics

chose policies

alliance with

of

to the dominant course of development in the

relation

world

his

reconcile

even

reformers,

he

Usually

demanding theory

explore

help

will

so

his

with

the

with

stood

though there might be skeptics among them. we would call

for Burke's thought. On

problem

his day, he

of

the

tendency

of

Liberal

is to

thought

setting in human

moral and psychological

life. The rational, independent adult, coolly contracting obligations which serve his personal needs, is a fictitious creature. Such a conception falsifies the human condition, normatively

by

establishing

authority, and

Liberalism

off

beyond itself,

political with

authority the

rational

and

coherence

empirically

strivings

of

alone

Nonetheless,

growth.

family,

the

the

life.

affections

and

neglects

framing

extraordinary

liberty a

a

and

of

of

a

politics, such

an

and

which

human

seals

model

experiences

of

locality, thereby exaggerating In brief, the Liberal model symbols

which

normatively

appreciation

the

of

the

indeed it is the

animate moral

the

order,

moral

purpose

and

the

of

his

a reconciliation.

government, Burke contended wryly,

required

no

power; teach obedience: and the work is done. To give freedom is

It is

not necessary to guide; it only requires to let go the rein. But free government; that is, to temper together these opposite elements of restraint in one consistent work, requires much thought, deep reflection,

sagacious, powerful,

38

in

skill.

seat of

still more easy.

to form

ways

questions of value and

explain,

thought to accomplish

Settle the

legitimate

relativize, and harmonize those strivings. Burke believes that the basic conceptions of Liberal political can

foundations

The

Normatively, of

the Liberal

formative

church,

and

test

politics, those

Empirically,

from

thought can be reconciled with erotic

of

political

life;

political

ultimate

the proper condition of consent,

and

of

and empirically.

the

and raises ultimate

experience

neglects

which

as

the symbolic aspects

eclipses

relationship

the

consent

service of natural need as

politics points

choice,

reasoned

and

Burke, Reflections,

p.

mind.38

combining

484

Edmund Burke

Thus, it is

This is the

self-commending

is the

can

never

until with

force;

pubhc

and

morality order;

Burke

and

with

basis

of

liberty: the

of constitutional govern

liberty

regard

as

a

Liberty in its commonly accepted meaning is people's greatness, but not its guarantee.

the collection of

with

feature

essential

that

reason

to constitutional government

frame

unwUling to congratulate the French he could see "... how it had been

was

ment;

approach

201

Citizenship

of

good.

a precondition of a

He

Psychology

established as the

combination of the two

liberty

his

characteristic of

to insist that order be

ment.

The

:

effective

with

religion,

the discipline and obedience

with

an

and

and

well-distributed

and

solidity

manners."

civil

their newly won

upon

combined with

social

39

These

armies; with

revenue;

with

property;

govern

of

peace

conditions

public

and and

institutions are necessary to the fulfillment of social life, of which hberty is the necessary condition, but not the sufficient cause. If liberty is not an adequate criterion for judging a political order, it is because it merely reaches the question of the social character and of

psychology without

evUs; for it is

Liberty

a

without

people, and

wisdom,

folly,

in itself is

without and

vice,

answering it. "But what is liberty It is the greatest of all possible

virtue?

deserving

never

of

of

liberty

is to

This is the

crucial

hnk between the

purpose

order.

liberty

moral

of

order

is that it

restraint."

tuition

or

for the

praise

the fulfillment

allow

The justification for

without

madness,

permits

Here he differs

the

god

from

of

he

"the

natural

can never

be the

of

duty, it is are

"I

case.

of

all

impulses

cannot

men,

not subject

often

of

Burke

to

our

39 4<>

is

a

a

that if the fetters are removed

too

and

the

often recommend

to

vice,"

it to the

41

this

serious

think civil society to be within the he writes, "that if we owe to it any will. Duties are not voluntary. Duty and 42

It is because the first, natural, automatically beneficent that wiU and duty that the wiU of the individual must be subject to

are

not

family,

church, manners, and the law. In this context,

makes a statement of

represents

ment

of

moral

follows

who

contradictory

men

conflict,

the tutelage

who

jurisdiction,"

moral

even

or

Liberal,

[is] from frailty

the passions

of

terms."

wUl

faculties,

good

naturaUy, without the external guidance of social the form of the good man. For Burke, believing that

progress

consideration province

moral

wUl

assume

agencies,

Liber, in believing

growth,

man

basically

the Lockean

with

constitutional

the individual the

fullest exercise, and hence the fullest development, of his but hberty itself cannot ensure the development of the man.

nature.

moral

the

and

that the

reason

man's

40

radical

revision

contrivance

Burke, Reflections, Burke, Reflections,

of

the basis and purpose of government which of

human

p.

87.

p.

483.

4i

Burke, Reflections,

p.

311.

42

Burke, An Appeal,

p.

64.

Locke's wisdom

political

psychology.

"Govern

to provide for human

wants,"

Interpretation

202 he the

society, of a sufficient upon

restraints

is to be

these wants

"Among

wrote.

civU

as

as weU

men,

the

reckoned

their

restraint upon

liberties,

their

[lack],

want

to be

are

out of

In this sense,

passions....

reckoned

43

rights."

among their For Burke,

liberty,

the

as

the

of

claims

or

then,

liberties

and

rights

absence of

not

are

because

equivalent,

is morally neutral, whereas the to be viewed in the context of the

restraint, are

person

rights

moral

and

the social orders, and the development of the person as a moral

and

social

concept

rights,

and

the notion of

he does

and

in the

as

emphasis,

the

then, is

human affairs, Does Burke's

cautious

and structure

The

it directly, when he does

following

it..."44

of

the rights of man,

of

rights

contract?

social

virtue of natural

moral order.

or

oppose

not

infrequently,

concept

structure

to

approach

positivistic

of

content

mediating the

by

in

not made

in total independence

exist

applicable

and

psyche

rather

opposes

do

those institutions which

by

the human

of

Hence, "Government is

may

practical

supplied

while

reality

person

of

which

The

and

the

and polity.

society

and polity are executors of the moral personality has a basic moral content, the has no definite meaning apart from, or prior to,

being. Since society

and

order,

answer

the

of

statement

it, it is

to

to be

seems

altogether, he

advert

that

mean

man

he

that

employs

the

with a special of

position

in

man

society:

He

to be his own

abdicates all right

rights

gives

of

an

uncivil

up his

That he may

This

right

of

45

thereby

leading

the

and

role

revolutionizing

to him.

essential

the whole

by

person

individual

life, a

The language in his

envisions

a

"cannot reasoned

pp.

172.

p.

172.

and

of

it."

and

in establishing, concerned

consequently a

of

of

up,"

indicates

"makes

a

rights discovered

authority

original.

empha

part, related,

statement above

"gives

social

institutions,

Burke is

member:

assertion

172-173. Italics in the

p.

social

volition

enjoy,"

reason; Burke conceives

Burke, Reflections, Burke, Reflections, Burke, Reflections,

over

social arrangements.

individual is

"abandons,"

Locke

of

inception

social

society the

actualities of political

and obligated.

"abdicates,"

guaranteed

of

elevates

the extent to which the

surrender."

44

in the hfe

crisis

day-to-day

dependent,

43

justice, he

obtain

typifies the differences between the traditional Liberal

and

emphasizes

with the

and

measure, enjoy the

of

assenting to,

this:

That he may

determining what it is in points the most some liberty, he makes a surrender in trust of

secure

revolution

sizes

a civil state together.

great

a

cannot

authority and obligation for example, John Locke's Burke's. Locke's social contract theory focuses attention upon the

moments

and

and of

He inclusively, in of nature. Men

first law

of

statement

conception

and

governor.

the right of self-defence, the

abandons

as

an

intra-

Edmund Burke

basis

moral and emotional

In fact, Burke argues, and

in

and

politically

false."46

uniform

entity,

be

cannot

and

203

therefore focuses

upon

its

and meaning. rights

should

be thought

not

so

metaphysically

of

as

rational

they

morally

acultural

or

recorded

history,

Since the person is not an in its condition throughout

regarded,

view of the moral

meaning

the contract are

pre-

either.

the rights of man allows Burke

of

accept the notion of a social

character of

Citizenship

of

pretended rights of these theorists are all extremes; as they are are true,

proportion

This to

Psychology

"The

universals at all.

rights

The

interpersonal phenomenon,

personal and

cultural

:

long

contract, so kept in view.

the

as

special aims and

Society is indeed

a contract. Subordinate contracts for objects of mere occasional interest may be dissolved at pleasure but the state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee...'"

We

are reminded, in other words, that the social contract embraces the full range of human concerns and human development. As man is

not

an economic

only

understood

It is It is

by analogy

partnership in

a

subservient

in

and

all

burdens

and

be adequately

a

partnership in

science;

a

all

a

art;

temporary

partnership in

all

a

art;

partnership in every

and perishable nature.

partnership in every

perfection.*8

all

the term:

science;

gross animal existence of a

In short, society is of

social contract Cannot

with economic agreements alone.

all

only to the

partnership in

a

virtue,

creature, the

an

partnership only in the

a

association

in

human

all

most

growth

extended and

meaning The

striving.

benefits of this vast enterprise cannot be easily reckoned hence his reluctance to speak of men's rights as though

and acted upon:

these

were

As the

ends

susceptible of

becomes

a

who are

living,

such

a

Thus Burke has

and

and the

48 49

are

in many generations, it

living, but between

those who are to be

the calculability more

of

those

born."

justice,

and

hence the

difficult, by emphasizing both

the continuity of society. to be stated: her role as mediatrix of

noblest aspect remains

contract of each particular state

of eternal

47

and

obtained who

moral order.

Each

4

be

cannot

revolution, far

the complexity the

dead,

rendered

of

measurement.

only between those

who are

reasonableness

Society's

partnership

not

partnership those

of precise

society,

linking

is but

a clause

in the

great primeval contract

the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible

invisible world, according to

Burke, Reflections, Burke, Reflections, Burke, Reflections,

p.

176.

p.

234.

p.

234.

Burke, Reflections,

p.

234.

a

fixed

compact sanctioned

by

the

inviolable

Interpretation

204 oath which

holds

This law is

not subject

infinitely

superior,

Here is the

all physical and all moral

to the will of

bound to

are

those,

submit

their

by

will

in their

each

natures, who

appointed place.

an obligation above

Burke's design

them,

polity,

drawing

higher, like the vaulted interior of its role in relation to the moral order, to

personal

solemn grandeur of

of the

the reader's gaze steadily cathedral.

Because

of

and

law.60

to that

a

great

growth, and to civic hberty, the state is vested with penultimacy in Burke's imagination. Any understanding of political life which does not span the furthest reach of human concerns is inadequate. Pohtical life is

inherently

psychological

because it

can

free

and

the

middle

Burke,

pohtics

express

term in the growth of inter-personal relationships. For

arises from sources Liberal theory has not comprehended, moves over depths Liberal imagination has not sounded, and discloses meanings

Liberal

50

analysis

has

Burke, Reflections,

not glimpsed.

p.

234.

205

HUMAN EMANCIPATION AND REVOLUTION Nathan Rotenstreich

I The

concept

Let

cipation.

in

of

to,

an antithesis

human

emancipation

first look into

us

which some of

introduced

was

above, the concept

and a synthesis

text published

a short

by

as

eman

Marx in 1843,

the concepts and their interrelations are

First, Marx introduces

Marx

by

of political

explained.

in

very broad merely a negative situation of liberating an individual, or a group, from certain oppressions or restraints imposed on them as might be the case with Catholics in Great Britain or with Jews in Europe. The concept of emancipation carried in Marx, from the very beginning,

It is

sense.

world and of

presupposes

place

a

a

imposed

and

to

sake

sphere,

or

root

a

by

power; but

right

a restoration of

himself."

which

are

an

is

given

and

ontologically

the

removes

is in the first

the same the power of the

all

Emancipation is

rights, like the

the human

Emancipation thus

external power which

which

process.

x

himself. Emancipation

man

on man

of certain

the

a

say,

and economic

for the

is

emancipation

relationships to man

focus

pohtical

historical

"Every

human

that is

historically, restrictions

emancipation

not

direction:

a positive

the notion of

right

just

not

a

in the legal

to worship. Emancipation is the

liberation

and

political

restoration

the

of

basis of human life, which is, according to Marx, man himself. Man himself contains within himself not only his inherent value but also the direction of his activities. That direction is the expression of the fuU man,

1

and

the

full

man

is the

non-specialized

man,

capable

We follow the English translation in: Karl Marx: Selected Writings in

of

Sociology

Social Philosophy, edited by T.B. Bottomore and Maximilian Rubel, Pelican Books, 1963, p. 241. Our analysis is based on what is known as Marx's Early

and

Writings. This

supposedly existing between the

From the

point of view of

have the

advantage

writings,

as

adhere

it were,

to the

theory, but it

of

consult:

Early

being

rendered

that

presuppose

philosophical replaced

program

as on

and

in the

that

the

view

economic

sense

as

and

chasm"

epistemological

"mature"

work

philosophical

the general

Social

"the

philosophical

philosophical

it in the Hegelian

Shlomo Avineri:

Cambridge, 1971.

Writings

exploring Marx's

serving it. On this issue as well paper

to

character of our analysis runs counter

the

view

vernacular.

in its

analysis

of

Marx.

Early Writings The

substance

replace

mature

and

they

philosophical

negating the

problem

Political

theory while pre discussed in the present

Thought

of

Karl Marx,

Interpretation

206

of human activities without reaching his activity makes him forever clinging as a partial being to that line. It is in this sense that Marx presents his version of the uomo universale as hunting in the morning, fishing in

performing the the

line

one

the afternoon, etc.,

kind

other

any

of

becoming

ever

without

hunter,

a

identification between

of continued

fisherman,

a

or

man and a specialized

activity.2

or confined

Political

spectrum

whole

point where

as criticized

emancipation

by

is

Marx

the

not

restoration

the human world, and not the redemption of the full creativity of

of

Political emancipation, as Marx has it, is "a hand to a member of civil society, to

man.

the

individual,

egoistic

Marx

here

of the

by

that

This

duality

criticism

presents

a

the

a

ticularity; it

on

gives

to

freedom.6

is

of

been

person

restored.

is usually,

and

rightly,

the other. Civil society in Hegel is related to par free rein in every direction to satisfy the needs of

the ethical

Though it is

that

The

he, knowingly

or

State

is

desires.4

called

Hegel,

seems attacks

to

his

and

be

Kant

a

As

Hegel

by

and the end of the

attacks

unknowingly,

proper on

subjective

what

essence

Marx

distinction between two levels and

as

posited

telling fashion, it

surmise

most

Idea.5

and

caprices

clear that

in the

hand,

not

shaped

moral

Hegel's Philosophy of Right since Hegel distinction between Civil society on the one hand

this

on the one

the

of

exhibit

makes a

the

as

in terms

the spht and eternalizes it.

some extent emancipation

particularity and even accidental against Civil society, the State is the actuality

and

short

in the reality

and

in his totahty has

man

political

criticism

clear-cut

state

individual

egoistic

sanctifies

the

of

as

understood

and

between the

to the fact that

the

ideal

3

the human world to man himself. The very spht

notion of political emancipation and

notion

Moreover,

moral

a

an

as

on

and

person."

to

citizen,

emancipation

political

of

restoration

evidence

a

man,

independent

an

the French revolution, because it faUs

of

implied in the

to

the other,

on

attacks

achievement

is

reduction of

one

state

writings

warranted

as well.

Hegel

CivU society, Freedom is attributed

of social existence:

the

other.

to the state and not to the moral person directly. A person becomes a

moral

or

through his

person

immediately

qua

participation

This

person.

in the state, but of levels is

construction

teristic of Kant. On the contrary, Kant sees CivU society as a

interaction

and

moral

2

The German

1947, 8

persons.

p.

independent

of

Let

us

and

quote, only

Ideology,

edited

Rubel,

241.

egoistic

by

(without

way

individuals of

not

directly

not

charac

combination

and

citizens

as

Ulustration, Kant's Fifth

introduction) by R. Pascal, New York,

22.

Bottomore

and

p.

4

Hegel's Philosophy of Right, 1942, p. 123. 5

Ibid. Paragraph

6

Ibid.

257,

p.

paragraph

155.

185 in T. M. Knox's translation,

Oxford,

Human Emancipation Thesis

Revolution

and

207

his Essay "Idea For A Universal History From A Cosmo Point Of View." The text reads as follows: "The greatest problem for the human race, to the solution of which Nature drives man, is the achievement of a universal civic society which administers law among Then Kant comes to give a more specific char of

politan

men."

acterization of the civic or civU

"Such

says:

society is

a

in

one

and

society,

the

following

there is mutual

which

is

he

what

opposition

among

the members, together with the most exact definition of freedom and

fixing

its limits

so that it may be consistent with the freedom of society in which freedom under external laws is in the highest degree with irresistible power, i.e., a perfectly constitution... They are forced to it by the greatest of aU

of

others... associated

just

civic a

needs,

Thus

a

need

they themselves

them from

keep

preserve

as

a

living long

civic

inasmuch

occasion

as

their

passions

together in wide freedom. Once in these

union,

same

such

a

subsequently do the

passions

7

good."

most

We notice that Kant considers Civil society to consist of two different directions: one, that of mutual opposition among the members of that society, and another, that of freedom of the individual consistent with the freedom of others. The achievement of an equilibrium between these two

trends, the

trend

of

trend of mutual opposition,

mutual

recognition

freedom,

of

human achievement, or, in Kant's the last problem to be solved by superstructure

society

as

Statehood

of

a

the one

the

hand,

words, the

of

and

the

is an honest difficult and

other, most

Kant does Civil society; he

mankind.8

top

on

comprehensive

own

on

on

not

erect

views

a

Civil

sphere

containing mutually antagonistic (Marx himself quotes Rousseau and not Kant), then indeed CivU society is presented as containing a built-in split. Hence in Marx's view, political emancipation which creates Civil society cannot be considered as solving the final problem of trends. If this interpretation is

since

mankind,

that problem is the

himself. Man himself

man

being

initially

to two conflicting norms, that

Kant

moral person. as

a citizen

the

world

is

lucky

a

ethics

chance,

and

an

of

and a

fortiori

is

not

a

split

duality

concurrently according individual and that of a because Kant and

The meeting

cannot

the human word to

and

world of nature

rationahty.

and

of

fundamentally

egoistic

this

could assume

in two worlds, the

of

restoration

his life simultaneously

conducts

who

warranted

depend

on

of

views man

sensuousness,

and

these two worlds

bringing

about a total

between them; neither can it create a full totality. of the split implied in political emancipation that Marx because It is

coincidence

introduces the

7

Included in Kant

Beck, 8

notion

the

Library

Ibid. Sixth

of

on

of

History,

Liberal

Thesis,

p.

human

17.

"Human

emancipation

Introduction

by Lewis White

emancipation:

edited and with an

Arts, 1963,

pp.

16-17.

Interpretation

208

individual man has absorbed in only be complete when the real, individual man, in his everyday an when as himself the abstract citizen, in his relationships, he has become a social being, life, in his work, and will

he has

and when as social

his

recognized and organized

and

powers,

no

consequently

longer

(force propre)

own powers

this

separates

social power

9

power."

from himself

as political

In commenting on this very programmatic passage we have to observe first that the real man referred to is the man who has overcome the split between himself as an individual and himself as a citizen. This

is

Man is

in

a

which

absorbed

in

an abstract citizen

state

he is

"has

by Marx,

rendered

an abstract citizen

Hegelian

the

is detached

in himself the

in Kant's

sense

because he on

superimposed

and

sense since

citizen."

abstract

participates

Civil society;

his being-a-citizen

and

coexists

among the members of is a sensuous man the society. The make is the following: have to which we second comment well. The as Marx refers here to the individual man in his everyday life and he assumes a fuU conformity between man as an individual and man as his involvement in the

with

real

a

being. He

social

mutual

is the

man

that

assumes

opposition man

ethical

who

Man

conformity.

a

as

being

social

being in Kant's (abstract) sense, unless his everyday life were both individual and social. Marx attempts, therefore, in the concept of human emancipation, to bring about a synthesis between

would

be

an ethical

individuality

and

to the Hegelian

Our

third comment

individual

resources of of

being

carried

to the Kantian

spht or

does

synthesis aspired not

Marx

man.

emerge

to between individual

spontaneously

specifically to the

refers

out

of

the

organizations

as social powers. We may presuppose here this Gattungswesen" but just the same, unless is "ein organization, the individual forces do not carry with and in

own

man's

is that the

existence

social

and

man

without

sociality edifice.

powers

general view that man

there is

an

the

themselves

existence.

social

propensity to become harmonious forces safeguarding Unless the human forces are organized, they may

in the direction indicated

evolve

freedom. To

co-exist with

between

opposition

this brings us to about

the

separation

the

external

his

Essay

on

Universal

9 i

fully

Bottomore

Ibid.,

p.

developed.10

and

21.

Rubel,

p.

Social

social

with sense.

History

is the only

called

point:

between

is identical laws in Kant's

constituted state

be

freedom,

fourth

power

political

can

and

our

by Kant,

i.e. the

opposition

overcome that coexistence and

is

an

organization.

political

But,

and

not

bring

power,

since

organization would

existence and

would

contradiction

Statehood in Hegel's sense; or with Here again, Kant's Eighth Thesis in significant.

condition

Summing

241.

for

the

in

which

Kant

says that a

perfectly

the capacities of mankind

up Marx's

view

we

must

come to

Human Emancipation the

foUowing

human social

human

conclusion:

emancipation

himself is the

world to man

powers which wUl not need

209

Revolution

and

as

the

organization

political

power

the

restoration of

human

of

as

a

as

powers

superimposed

authority.

II

Since

life proper, as distinguished from pohtical life in the term, is organized, Marx faced the question of the between the spontaneity of man and the organized character social

strict sense relation

the

of

of social life. He had to assume, foUowing wUly-nilly the classical tradition, that man is a universal creature, or, in his own words, that human nature is the true common life of man. Men, through the acti

vation

of

their nature,

This human

and

life is the

common

individual. StiU the

create

essence

and

a

common

the nature of every

of

question remains:

a

perhaps

the need and

egoism of

says

individuals;

to decide whether this common hfe the

statement

"not up to

man"

between human

identity

strange

striking human needs? And, indeed Marx

to

"human

a

Is the common hfe an human creativity, as, for instance, a folk song would be,

of

of

produce

life."

single

expression

or

is there and

nature

that common life emerges out thus it is not in man's

and

We

exists or not.

power

must understand

hmited sense, i.e. not up since the latter would that common life would not possibility in

a

rather

in his reflection, decision, dehberation,

man

possibly connote the theoretical exist. Marx seems to assume here that authenticity and necessity coincide, as long as the necessity is rooted in human needs which can be con

cretely discerned. The fact that

him,

reconcUed

has

man

needs

can

be, according

to

the view of attributing the human world to man as distinct from the social pohtical organization,

with

himself. Thus the

organization, is criticized and calls for a revolution, because Marx distinguishes between human necessity grounded in needs, and compulsion imposed on men who do have needs and create common life because

they

are activated

Why and

by

does Marx

those needs. this distinction between

make

life,

organized political

except

for the

reason

organized

social

life

that supposedly lies

in the imphcit distinction between necessity and compulsion? After aU, it would be difficult to find an easy harmony between the concept of the whole man and the spectrum of his activities, and the notion of man as a being, whose needs call for satisfaction. One might say that needy

satisfaction

But the different or

satisfaction

to write

artistic

is implied

satisfaction

War

character

terms of common

or

of

embraced

needs

related

from that

and

of

in the scope to food and

the

"need"

Peace. Marx does

creates

common

not

hfe. He

the

whole

man.

shelter

would

be

of

a

to create a Mona Lisa

say

that the

maintains

need

of

an

that the need, in

satisfaction of primary needs, i.e. the economic need, creates life. Thus he is bound to assume, even when we follow him

Interpretation

210

in his the

of the whole man, a kind of hierarchy of needs, which to granting primacy to basic needs, though they might not be lofty ones. And indeed, Marx's criticism of the pohtical power

view

amounts most

the pohtical State is

or of

hierarchy

the

about

dissolves

civU

society into its

human needs, of labor, of basis of its own existence, as its natural basis... Thus, man of egoistic

received

hberty

egoism

business."

12

assumption

political revolution

revolutionizing these

business; he

(a)

foUowing

all

men, the

egoism

(b)

about

that

as against

of

law,

as

thus

and

a as

only in the form in the form of the only not hberated from rehgion;

was

seen

hberated from property; he He was not hberated

not

was

property.

the

to

hberty

the

received

What Marx really is saying way:

condition

nature

hberty. He

of

civil

and of

he reaUy is, is

as

to own and acquire

the

only;

interests,

in his true And further: "...man

u

rehgious

the

from the

brings

without

self-subsistent

a

and man

man,

citizen."

abstract

men

imphcit

"The

says:

elements

private

of

received

exphcit and

When he

themselves... This revolution regards civil society the sphere

elements

he

to his

related

of needs.

can perhaps

egoism of needs

engage

in

up in distributed among

be

summed

emerges which is an egoism of some destroys fundamental human mutuality and which runs counter to mutuality, since it to man instead of mutual adjustment between

business

egoism

exploitation

implies subjection of man men. Here emerges the contradiction between the interest of the individual and that of the community. The latter takes an independent form as the

State, divorced from This

estrangement

communal

the

the

interest of individual and community. State is at the same time an illusory

real

inherent in

the

life. "It fohows from

struggle

this that the struggles within the

between democracy, aristocracy

for the franchise,

and

so

on,

are

merely the

State,

monarchy, the struggle

and

Ulusory

forms in

which

fought out among one (c) the shift from communal life in the true sense of the term to the State is both an Ulusion and a concealment. It is an Ulusion because the state is not a the

another...";13

real struggles are

real

entity,

and as such

it is based

on a non-real

entity, i.e. the

citoyen

distinguished from the bourgeois. But just the same it is a concealment, since it creates a quasi-communal life; it shifts the interest to pseudoas

problems of constitution and

from as

rehgion

attention

forms

The State

real problems.

has been

and concern

criticized

from

as

of rule or a

by

him

concrete

subjection, the other side of the coin to go on whUe pretending to speak

regime,

camouflage as

hfe,

an and

the

diverting criticized

opiate,

it

hberty, about hberty

of

is

since

allows

to

attention

by

Marx

it diverts

hierarchy

engage

and

in business;

and crystallizing that in statehood; (d) historicaUy speaking, we may say that the whole distinction between the bourgeois and the citoyen is a facade or a front

hberty

n

Bottomore

12

Ibid.

13

German Ideology,

and

Rubel, p.

p.

23.

240.

Human Emancipation for the

Revolution

and

21 1

natural state which persists within organized political

life

life,

though

be based on the overcoming of the State" natural state. The Hobbesian description of the "natural comes back in a disguised form in the political State: clashes are present in organized pohtical

pretends to

the political

State,

impulses

men, but take shape in organized interests

of

Institutions

though perhaps

they

are not grounded now

urges, but the outcome does not that replacement. The State, presented by Hobbes

of

in

qua class

replace

primitive

interests.

in

change

course

as a safeguard or

death which threatens man in the natural for those interested in preserving the conflicts and exploiting them for their advantage. There is no neutrality of the sovereign, since the sovereign is an instrument in the pursuit of the business interests. It is for this reason that Marx maintains the the refuge against the violent

state, is the

distinction between

clear-cut

based and

safeguard

on

mutuahty,

neutralization of

priority

"So far

represented

by

another

class.

the

in the

which

life

of

above

in

embraced

to the orbit

insofar

laws,

to natural

life,

totality

and political

by

one

class

over

which

another

of

no of

human

is dependent

see

interest

14

Instead states

orbit,

other

nature,

of

viewing the

remove aspects

certain

to the

The dissolution

whole

aspects

orbit of

dismembering is the other dismembering is characteristic of the

clearly that

side

is

they

natural state

the pretense of the political state (as Marx analyzes

bring

about cohesion.

this dismemberment

life,

and,

Here

again

the coin of the

and

conceals

as

them

are questions

state;

It

push

private

of

of

expressed

human hfe and

while

the State and to

or

change,

of administration and, as such, are of a technical character. we

being

inadequacy

to the

or

it."

on

can

power

the state;

characteristic of political systems or states

passage.

one

which

is independent

there are deficiencies in the state proper,

as

the first

life;

itself mutual adjustment the latter carries with itself the

the State admits the existence of social evils, its attributes

as

the administration,

of

life

while

interest

either

to private

interests,

of

one

represented

them

social

which as such carries with

which

in Hobbes, this) is to

inheres in

the State gives a constitutional and ideological

which

imprimatur. Human the

the

abolition

abolition

of

from man, political

the true

14

the

of

embodies

dismembered

to

political

emancipation

character

of

pohtical

life

power, since the political power as the gap between man and his world.

serves

to "come

and

opposed

is, then,

the human world to man himself. This would mean

political

and

the

estranged

Moreover,

the trend and the interest to suppress man's

back"

authentic

Marx-Engels1

version

of

existence

aspiration

as

emancipation

restoration

to himself and to create the human world

sense

of

in

that term.

Werke, Vol. I, Berlin, 1965, p. 401 (the quotation in its English McLellan, Marx before Marxism, Pelican Books, 1972, p. 206).

from David

Interpretation

212 It is because

this consideration that Marx combines the two terms

of

"revolution."

"radicalism"

(or notions)

"radical"

To be

and

this

and

is to grasp things by the root; but for man the root is man himself. Thus radicalism is identical with the aspiration toward human emancipation, as that emancipation intends to restore the

is

a well-known statement

world

to

himself

man

the direction

connote

who

is the

himself. Radicalism

of

root

while emancipation would connote

to the Critique of Hegel's

And, indeed, in his Introduction of Law, Marx says that a radical

would

the achievement.

Philosophy

only be a revolution of radical needs. These needs are apparently the needs described as com posing social existence, and they in turn are suppressed, overshadowed or subjugated

Summing The

emancipation

it

has to be in

all

of

abolished

that

can

existence.

be

by

its very pretends,

since

position of

the citoyen, whereas

the needs of the bourgeois. The State

because it is

grounded

said:

Pohtical

Moreover, it

objective,

and a citoyen.

expressing the

of

serves

to

bourgeois

a

foUowing

human

a wholesome

conform

not

into

analysis, the

our

and

whole

the mask,

fact it

actual

and

is a does

splits man

or assumes

in

the political existence.

up this part

objective

nature

by

revolution can

in the

notion of

as

such

the citoyen

the consequences of that notion. This criticism raised

against

State is twofold: (a) that it represents an abstraction from the real man; and (b) that its abstract character is eventually a disguise, since, concretely speaking, the abstract character of the State is an instrument the

of

the needs

is

the bourgeois. Marx attacks both the

of

betrayal

and the

which

assumes the

abstraction; it is

not an

an

posture

instrument

of

abstraction per se

abstraction.

The State

of power.

Ill Let

us start with what

is

perhaps

the

most

position, i.e. the instrumental character of

be

no

question

instrument, for When

a

power

the preservation

and

is

an

pohtical

aspect of

power.

instrument,

cultivation

of

or

Marx's

There can

particular

can

be

an

interests.

subsidizes, and continues to subsidize, farmers in to produce crops, it surely serves the interests of a certain class

government

order not of

that political

elementary

the population. This subsidy, when it goes on, even when the products

are

needed,

enhances

the

character of

the State or political

power

as

a

tool subservient to interests. Even when we grant that there are many lobbies, and the state can serve simultaneously many interests, including

conflicting interests, the instrumental character of political power cannot be obliterated. Yet historical experience, since Marx wrote his vehement attacks on the State as being an instrument ex definitione, shows that political of

power

England is

through

a

can

be

employed

very telling

universal

suffrage

example

in the

in different directions. The example in this context, since the participation

pohtical process

eventually

resulted

in

Human Emancipation

213

Revolution

and

the concept and the reality of the Welfare State, which indeed entails certain ingredients of the conversion of the State into an instrument

for the thus

satisfaction

duction

of

and

even

the freedom

business,

The

when

we

or

old

that, in his

grant

in

pro

of

Welfare State is

a

to be

empirical criticism

was employed

and

age;

to ownership of means

income. But

of

circumstances, the instrument

to labor

related

related

"instruments."

Marx is that,

against

needs

needs

aggrandizement

the realm of

within

human

only bourgeois

not

one

historical

own

direction

still

raised

of

serving

instrument as such is at least partially neutral, that is to say, can be used for different purposes either sub sequently or simultaneously. Insofar as political power as related to the legal system finds in that system its sanction and uses the sanction as justification for the employment of power, it cannot be said that the legal system is only an expression of the prevailing social structure of of

an

an existing society. There is in the legal system and thus concurrently in the political domain a feature which can be possibly coined as the anticipatory character of politics. Politics in this sense does not only

the powers behind

express

be the decision

would

America cipated and

helps to

anticipation

very

declaring a

social

a

anticipates

be

to

before that

situation

level

of

A

in

the

point

the United States

It

unconstitutional. situation

the

by

and

case

actually

thus

social situation

of

anti

to

came

the Supreme Court became a

of

emergence of

situation

that new situation.

the Supreme Court

of

segregation

the decision on the

for the deliberate

it, but create

exist

model

to make it conform

decision.15

to the

The

to be

empirical criticism

whether

or

not

the

direction

determined

and cannot

experience

shows

be

voiced at

the

of

changed.

It

that when people

this juncture is

state seems

gain

rather obvious:

instrumentality

as

is

pre

to be a fact that historical

the

status

of

even

citoyens,

bourgeois, they can, at least to some extent, attenuate the given direction of the instrumentality, and choose not to take the instrumentality as being, as it were, a fact of when

they

are

nature whose

concretely

direction is

torically

speaking,

the first

beginning;

responded

we

can

never

or, in this

or whether

power which,

in turn,

the

guided

social

and

they

shapes

communal

by

and

of

not

natural

know

particular

to only on the level

Marx's sense; on

proletarians

laws.

where

case,

Empirically

or

his

in human life there is

whether

human mutuality

human

needs are

or communal

life in

are also responded

to through the political

(to

least) human mutuality

some extent

at

level. Now, this

empirical

or

historical

important fact, that is, the paradoxical or dialectical share which Marx has in this development. Precisely because Marx, in the acuity of his analysis, called attention criticism should not make us oblivious of an

Federalism, An Outline of an Argument about Plural and Law by Robert M. Hutchins, followed by a discussion, Santa Unity ism, Barbara, California, 1961. 15

Consult: Two Faces of

Interpretation

214

to the distinction between the concrete

in his

appeared

an

it

historical

own

We

ask

can

abstraction, one abstracted?

and

the door to making the

or opened

way

can ask

and

the abstract, he paved the

abstract

more

flexible than it If the State is concrete data is

social circumstances.

the question, from

the question,

when

which

the

abstractum

"color"

is

from green, red, or black, can't it be abstracted also from blue, beige, and brown? But since this particular abstractum, i.e. political power, is not just a theoretical entity but a tool in the service of the concrete life of certain human beings comprised by the State, one can again attempt to make the abstract instrument subservient to different abstracted

according to the

concrete needs,

by

guided

political

rigid;

the

Marx took the

power.

and

his

preponderance of

representation and participation of abstractum

as

conception could not cope with

the needs and perhaps

different

both

needs

in the

predetermined

existence, though paradoxically, as hinted above, his conception momentum to the historical reality which, as it were, topples his

This is

ception.

is

victory, but in ingredient of defeat.

a paradoxical

nonetheless an

But it Marx's

would

concept.

instrument

an

altogether.

be a mistake to Marx criticizes

subservient

The

position

to the mutuality

of social

implied by Marx instrument is to human behavior

to

of

a an

life;

a paradoxical

confine our criticism

gave con

victory there

to this

aspect

of

only because it is but it because is an instrument class, instrument seems to be contradictory political

and

of

spontaneity remove it from and

and

the realities of historical

basic human the level

power

not

thus to the strange

combination

To lodge something as an interaction between spontaneous

and need. the

needs.

Whatever is human has to be

human

existence proper. But the instrument introduces into the scope of human life something external, as a hammer is external to a hand, even when we view it as an extension of the hand. It is that externality qua estrange ment or alienation that is criticized although the criticism of by Marx, solved

or

resolved

on

of

position of an

very

that aspect emerges as tied up with the criticism of the empirical instru mentality and the empirical needs served by it that is, the bourgeois

for

the instrument is employed. instruments have to be dis regarded, or whether the only legitimate instruments are those which are both expressions and media, as, for instance, language is. We shall needs

We

turn

are

whose protection and promotion

here

now

facing

to the

the

question

whether

exploration of that

topic.

rv Let

us

grant, for the

of the "whole life is organized social life, even when we view it against the background of the total man and take the notion of the total man as the norm for the revolution man"

in Marx's

sense.

sake

Yet,

of

as

argument, the

we

have seen,

notion

social

Human Emancipation to come. In what sense is

and

215

Revolution

life essentially organized? Let us grant be totally identical with a particular line of that the being-engaged-in-fishing would not turn him social

again that man should not

his activity, and into a fisherman, to cite Marx's own fishing as a kind of hobby, one needs The total

fishing but

viewed as

certain

being active in writing Symphony is not innate

Ninth

leads to

capable of and

poetry in him. A

active

time and concentration

in

experience.

being active in Symphony

the Ninth

One learns these that is to say, limitation

out the action.

take place. There are certain organizations

in the

to be

takes place

process

musical composition and there are even certain rules

in carrying

obeyed

even

skills, practice,

potentially

as well as

the

which

be

man might

But

example.

to be

rules and one needs

for the

which provide

process

to

for instruction

in the rules; and the organizational structure of society for instruction is obviously not confined to only one line of activity to be pursued. There is a structure-of-structures, and not just one structure. The structure-of-structures is an organization, or an instru process or

it

when

ment,

provides

human beings into lines

introducing

we presuppose

that there

is

diversity of instrumentality on the

potentiality to accept on

activity,

level

of social

life

social-economic

admitted and

instrumentality

if

again

instrumentality instrumentality in

in

political

life

rejected?

instrumentality is human leads to production, whUe instrumentality per se oppressive. Is this is really so? Is it instrumentality for this juxtaposition

reason

of

kinds

two

of

Social

possibly this: pohtical

life

even

and reject

the level of Statehood? In other words, why is

The

bound to be

so?

subjection to

laws

be

of

continuity of spontaneity leading from total lines of activities. Why does Marx grant and a

oppressive

as

After all, of

an

activity in the character

external

well, concretely

social

field, disregarding

that bind the citoyen,

or moraUy.

If

one

can

a piece

composes

poetry that flatters his master, he perhaps activates his innate capacity; the reason what it may, he makes himself, or is made, subjugated to another man. Flattery occurs in the inter-human discourse more than in the relation between the citizen and the state, though one may of

but, be

pay

lip

service

unfortunate

during

as

to

sovereigns

too, i.e.

it may sound,

to

sovereigns as persons.

great works

the time that the artist, as creator,

high level

servant of some

of

was

master, in Florence

have

art

come

employed

as

or elsewhere.

Moreover, into a

being

kind

The

of

notion

that, by their very essence, instruments differ because they are activated in different spheres, is a questionable notion from the empirical point of view. And it was Marx who played an extremely important role in opening our eyes to the reality of subjugation in human relations. Hence

we

fundamental

have to

instrumentalities? In

In the

ask

argument

answer

aspect of common

as

an

additional

question:

to this question the

What is the

evaluation of

following

is

different

suggested:

human life Marx addressed himself only to one human existence, i.e., the aspect that might be briefly "mutuahty." Social life, i.e., organized social life, that of

orbit of concrete

described

ourselves

hidden behind this different

Interpretation

216 relates

to human needs, that is to say, to

stands

in

to gain,

need

in the

Mutuality

or

services

economic

commodities; and

reciprocity,

reciprocity is

by

in every

expected

also

exchange

of

presupposes

exchange

being

human being.

another

take the form

can

sense

every

human

situations where one

to be reinforced,

or

mutuality

of

and

Marx

exchange.

to reciprocal

to mutuality and leading human beings essentially as social beings. Since they are social beings, mutuality of their relations and instruments based on mutuahty (and its induction) are viewed by Marx as an ex pression of human essence and not as an external instrument imposed since

exchanges

In

on man.

in

instrumentality

the

accepted

in

grounded

related

viewed

the fact that there is

spite of

life,

social

he

device is

that man's

or

character

social

a

built-in instrumental device

in human essence, in concrete needs,

grounded

since

it is

and

these

two eventually amount to the same. It is because of this expressive the social instrument that Marx accepts the instrument and

character of

qualify his acceptance by viewing it as a necessary evil. he moves to the political organization, his outlook changes. Political organization is viewed only as an instrument and not as an expression of human nature. Being an instrument only allows for the

does

not even

But

when

possibility of manipulating the instrument and making it subservient to needs lodged at the level of mutuality. Since the instrument is sub servient

to needs, it deracinates mutuality proper, that is to

equality

of

the of

human beings

situation where one

human beings. Marx

did

engaged

class of

in

reciprocal exchange.

human beings

to this hidden reasoning since he

could adhere

just

expressed

differs in both

as

mutuality, but

There is

the

what

social

organization

cases.

might

be

about

another class

suppresses

in itself

not realize that political organization carried

character

say, the

It brings

Political called

does,

though

organization

communality

an

that

does

or

expressive which

not

is

express

"togetherness."

difference between mutuality and togetherness : mutuality inter-human relations, while togetherness delineates the boun the society, as, for instance, does a territorial base and political a

pertains to

daries

of

sovereignty, presupposing both the territorial base

beings can

who

be

put

something from each other, while on the level beings express their belonging. The attitude of the attitude of expectation. as an attitude which us not

Marx

forget

at

referred

this

Strangely

lacks the point

to "egoistic

that,

enough,

egoistic

the

human

living

needs."

The

former. But, to misplaced

use

togetherness human

of

belonging differs from belonging may be viewed

character of

even on

and

expectation;

let

the level of social organization, attitude of

more nebulous than that of expectation and

of

and

inhabit that territorial base. The difference indicated here differently: On the level of mutuality human beings expect

belonging

is

perhaps

thus less concrete than the

Whitehead's famous phrase, it would be a fallacy to view human existence as confined only

concreteness

to mutuality and to relations grounded in it and to dimension of togetherness.

be

oblivious

of the

Human Emancipation An

empirical observation might

no pre-established of

over

though the

even

day

their

of

achieving it

217 here. There is

appropriate of

and the

level

expression of

their

mutuality the

Because

mutuality.

independence,

prefers political

it faced

day

the very same

or

this

of

the predicaments of social and economic life that arise within the

all

framework

independence. Marx

of

instrumentality, human

he took

since

relations

and

difficult to draw

rather

and the

mutuahty of human beings of

expression

after

be

sometimes prefer

preference, Bangladesh

act of

underlying

of

harmony the

again

between the level

togetherness. Human beings

togetherness

Revolution

and

aspect

of

recognize our

of

togetherness,

in both the

since

human beings is imphed. From the

as

fellow-men

From the

ourselves.

with

feUow-men

as

point

feUow-men, be

Why in

sometimes aspect

of

view

point

of

view

togetherness

of

of

recognition

interwoven in textures

as

of we

their concrete activity what

it may, and be the impact of their activity on as it may. Yet, the recognition of the universal pertains

the diversified levels

To be sure, it is demarcation between the

attitudes.

line

we recognize our

mutuahty

activities,

human a

took a one-sided view of the political

a one-sided view of

as

ourselves essence

both to mutuahty and to togetherness. did Marx reject the instrumentality inherent in

of

negligible

human life and

statehood

is perhaps following warranted : Marx recognized that political organization, even if viewed as an expression and not as an instrument, carried within itself compul political

organization

legaUy

sion,

aspect

Marx

? Again the

suggestion

guaranteed, and more so than in

of compulsion

of

statehood

was

to human needs, and to the horizontal and so

pulsion

is

an

brings

instrument,

factor,

compulsion

to

of

and one cannot

harmonistic

Peace"

his "Perpetual "Given a multitude preservation, but

The

by

view,

in human

stretch of

any

by

him, Com

imagi

the continuity from human essence, as a given that channels human behavior in a super-imposed

interpretation,

A kind

organization grounded

about a vertical organization of subjugation.

nation or

order.

organization.

rejected, because compulsion runs counter, according to

and

needs;

social

possibly brought into focus

solution

of rational

each

be

could not

of

by Kant, for instance, in by Marx. Kant says there:

indicated

accepted

beings requiring universal laws to their is secretly inclined to exempt himself

whom

from them, to establish a constitution in such a way that, although their private intentions conflict, they check each other, with the result intentions." that their public conduct is the same as if they had no such And Kant

says

further:

"A

good

from morality, but, conversely, to be expected only under a good

constitution

a good

the harmonistic

16

"Perpetual

Library,

pp.

or

Peace,"

112-223.

the

realistic

included

moral

is

16

Marx

be

to

not

condition

of

expected

a people

is

constitution."

solution

suggested

in Immanuel Kant

on

could not accept

by

Kant for the

History, Liberal Arts

Interpretation

218

he could not "secretly inclined to that

reason

simple

as

egoism

the

accept

but

egoism, according to

Marx, is

He

the second solution either, that a good

could not accept

does

he

capable of a

from morality but is

not emerge

compulsion

viewed

limine

being

and

out of

compulsion

as

service

present

a precondition of

constitution

since

morahty,

contradicting morality and not of morality. He rejects compulsion

a

soft

this dilemma? Do evU

an

fact.

an open and public

essentially

in the

placed

thus cannot

way Kant does. Is there a way either

as

human human

since

etc.,

not a secret

of

characterization

himself,"

exempt

version

face

we

an exclusive alternative:

as

compulsion

or

in the

compulsion

of

an

instrument

which

eventually leads to morality and to the good? Perhaps the following suggestion can be made which is deliberately closer to Kant than to Marx, though it does not follow Kant strictly. Human togetherness, precisely because it is abstract, or, at least, more so than human mutuality, does not operate

itself

have seen,

we

Political of

power

belonging;

tions, again, and

while

is

by

can

what

we

human beings

projection.

call

may

out

their

of

awareness

that power becomes embodied in institutions. Institu

and

characteristic

of

social

level

life. The

of exchange of products of

paradox

togetherness

itself in power, which literally holds people together, itself in give-and-take. Hence alienation, expresses

expresses

mutuahty in projection

grounded

sake of

interests

presupposing power, is essential for the just a perversion or an instrument

and

be

political sphere and cannot

for the

but in

exchange

projected

certainly does not regulate find its expression, as

and

are abstract entities not on the

services

is that it

in

not

instinctively

Abstract togetherness

spontaneously.

viewed as

which

he beyond the

or within

pohtical sphere

the social orbit. The aspect of projection provides for the possibility to use political power

in

an

since projection

anticipatory manner,

may

entaU

the structure-to-be of the society.

If

we

facticity

grant the

do otherwise?); and if we activated (and how could not an accident

but

of

human togetherness (and how

could

we

that togetherness is a potentiality to be we not?), the power-character of statehood is grant

the stratum of togetherness.

a projected extension of

device only perhaps as a benevolent device. But because of the distinction between morahty and legahty the maximum he could achieve was to turn the dichotomy between morality and legality into a relationship in which legality is a contrived instrument

Kant, too,

for the sion

of

remains

togetherness within

immediately and

the

in

a

either

carries

limits

when

we

phenomenological

lodging legality

of

it

a

description of

and statehood as an exten

more

evaluation

sake

morahty

neutral

and of or

does

the

raison

for the

of

projected

since

position, not

d'etre

sake

of

is

of

can

we

the

interests,

composed.

character of political power

human communality

it

involved

get

of classes of which social existence

grant the

datum

as a

with

normative

for the

particularly interests

Only

But

sake of morality.

instrument

life

viewed political

take

a

as

a

step

Human Emancipation

219

Revolution

and

further;

and that step brings us somewhat closer to Kant than to Marx. Human beings use pohtical power as an instrument, and they may use it for different purposes, and this implies, of course, for social purposes (and class interests are included in the realm of social purposes). But here again the instrumentality of political power is not predetermined either

tion, is

in the

as we

sense

have

aspect

one

pertains

in

which

to

related

in

or

flexible direc

a more

of

not rely exclusively fact that mutuality hidden hand inherent in it,

to

their

on

benevolence;

own

take care

wUl will

create

is to say,

that

modes

conduct

of

political

which

power,

will sanc

the legal system, is a kind of tacit insurance

by

pohcy that human beings devise against each other, in case

they do

not

to the expected conduct and its standard. Compulsion is created

and cannot

be

removed

from the

human beings in their

of

which

itself and, through the

of

Compulsion inherent in

expectations.

tioned or legitimized

conform

There

power

political

to human behavior in general and not to particular interests:

the

conform

it

viewed

part of our critical exploration.

instrumentality

the

Men do on

Marx

in the first

seen

to creativity,

presupposition of

lives. But

concrete

imbued

creativity,

with

the creative

since compulsion

character

is

related

deliberation, learning

reflection,

from experience, anticipation, etc., contrives an instrument which can be used, could be used and should be used when spontaneous creativity falls

short.

Obviously

there is an inherent danger in that sort

of

device. Instead

using compulsion as an ultima ratio it is used as a prima ratio. Then, if it is an insurance device, why not take advantage of it whenever things of

and the

go

wrong

be

obliterated.

human

world gets

But the fact that

out

of

joint? This danger

cannot

face danger cannot lead us to resolve our dilemma by eradicating the device altogether. There are many dangers; and the political danger is not the only one. To say the least, there are dangers in social life, in human expectations based on reciprocity, and

We may sion

the

of

so on.

analysis

conclude our

introduced the

we

revolution

of

Marx

saying that, since Marx being led to the conclu

by

the whole man, he was

notion of

as

the

restoration

man,"

himself. But the "whole

if

we

human

of

address

to

existence

ourselves

man

to that notion

only a potentiality. In actuality the whole man creates this by expressing himself through mediations like does himself, and he historical traditions, institutions, etc. The actuality is a multilanguage, and

apply

layered notion

actuality.

Marx's

of

this

error

of

this

error

most, as a defined of human existence

history

to history.

historical

And,

a single-layered

"coming

as

spectrum-of-expression

he took the

and

is that he took the

mistake

pointing toward he interpreted radicalism

granting the full

not

Because

philosophical

as

of the whole man

Because but

it, is

revolution

period

as

that is to

a

of

actuality.

to the

human

roots,"

creativity.

delineated act,

bring

about a new

or

at

level

lead from necessity to freedom, or from pre point, it is of no consequence whether

at this

Interpretation

220 Marx of

the

wrote

this

or

Engels

spoke

multi-layered essence of

it

as

his faithful disciple. A calls for a different

human life

of the interaction between necessity and freedom ception of history. We are never at the roots and consummation.

17

See the

sophical

The

We

are

simply

we

Alienation,'7

present

present

paper

author's:

is based

on

a

conception

different

con

are never at

the

in-between.17

"Spontaneity and Quarterly (Vol. XI, No. 4, December, 1971,

Democratic

and

conception

a

talk given

at

Institutions, Santa Barbara, California.

pp.

International Philo

475ff).

The Center for the

Study

of

221

CHRISTIAN AMBIGUITY AND SOCIAL DISORDER Walter B. Mead

It is the

argument of this article that much of

time is a direct product of the

Christianity

the

social

disorder

of our

way in

which

and ambiguous

Western phUosophy have portrayed man's status in the man's discomfort with this self-concept. It is interesting that

and

world and of

Barth, Reinhold Niebuhr, have

among them

Eric Voegelin, J. L. TalMichael Polanyi, and Karl Popper

phUosophers and theologians

twentieth-century mon, Karl

highly

tenuous

not

been

moved

to mehorate in any way the dilemmas

and

tensions of this traditional world view. If anything, their experiencing

and

reading

of

history has

led them to

tenuous plight, and

emphasize man's

their admonition seems to be that if order is to be restored to man's life

society he

and

cally rest

upon

ambiguous

status,

that he can ignore it or

or technologicaUy.

largely

his

must come to embrace and affirm

rather than pretend

The

define it away, either theologi current social disorder seems to

resolution of

the question of whether man can measure up to this

enormous task.

I

Christianity begins with the assertion that man is an ambiguous creature. Although he is hmited and finite by nature, there is a dimension to his being that

seems

experiences

the

ambivalence

vacUlating between the immanent

and

the

often

at another time

conscious,

preoccupation with the

catches a moral

his

to participate in the Eternal. Even in the midst of man

existence,

self-conscious.

demands

depravity

represented

by

of

temporal

consciousness,

transcendent,

at

Sometimes in the

time

one

his

midst of

the temporal world he

and attractions of

glimpse, however vague,

of

the Eternal. Even in the midst of the

pride and

hatred, he occasionaUy discovers

definitive capacity for goodness and love. In its more classical formulation, what is being

a more

is

ambiguous

in that he is

civitas terrena.

It is the former

a citizen of two worlds:

i

temporal

comprehension,!

Reinhold Niebuhr makes this same

meaning

beyond the

formally!

discerned.

because it is

civitas

is that Dei

man

and the

But this dual citizenship is not an equality of citizenship. that gives ultimate definition to the latter. In other words,

that which confirms man's essential

beyond his

suggested

the

natural

and

This divine

enveloped

point:

social

source

being transcends his existence, by nature lies beyond the "Life has

sequences

and

in mystery, though

center

being

lies

possi-

and

which

must

a

center

and

source

may be rationally

be

discerned

the basis of meaning. So

of

[i.e.,

by faith discerned,

Interpretation

222

ble

quest

for

the

dimension, dimension

represented

yet

this,

is

quest

ultimate

vaguely intimated,

a

eternal

fulfiUment the temporal

this ultimate

its

eternal

that wiU pass away with the transfiguration of does man come to the end of the most

nature

then

Only

eternity."2

history. His

Creator. In fact, the temporal human society is described by Eric Voegelin as

and

human

by

In

salvation.

reconcUed with

of man

part of

time into

for

a quest

becomes

creation

"that

fulfiUment

or

temporality

of

accomplishments

his quests, indeed, to the end of his only eternal quest and Augustine gave apt expression to this quest when he said:

ultimate of aU pUgrimage.

"Thou has Thee."3

in

made us

It is

a

for Thyself,

fulfiUment

only through grace,

and

and our spirits are restless untU

that

hes beyond

by

not, ultimately,

history

that

and

they

rest

can come

any effort, intention,

or action

man.4

of

But there is

kind

another

of quest

in

which man

be

which although also a perennial quest must not

for

salvation.

Within

by

nature

is involved, his quest

confused with

strictly temporal existence he finds himself dichotomous awareness of, on the one hand, his

man's

confronted with another

incompleteness and, on the other hand, the desire for fulfiUment. It has no relation to the fulfiUment of salvation except perhaps, in some cases, as a to the assurance of

response

a of

salvation,5

temporal anticipation of that ultimate

hunger;

him to

therefore he seeks the

perhaps

"satisfaction"

of

seek the satisfaction that comes

even,

fulfillment.6

by

analogia

Man feels the

food. His

sex

drive leads

"consummation"

from the

fidei, pangs

of the sex

He feels his incompleteness in isolation; therefore, he forms communi "fulfiUment." Man is distressed by ties that bring him a relative sense of in works of art. He is inconvenienced by ugliness and finds the more primitive states of existence, so he develops highly sophisticated act.

"harmony"

technological societies.

understand,

it

ly p.

yields a

and so

frame

tragic or

of

he

He is disturbed

seeks ever

meaning in

illusory."

which

that

phenomena

he

cannot

knowledge.7

human freedom is

real and valid and not mere

The Irony of American History (New York: Scribner's, 1952),

168. 2

Eric Voegelin, The New Science Press, 1952), p. 109. 3

4 p.

by

to enlarge his

Confessions, Bk. I, ch. 1. Glenn Tinder, The Crisis

188: "The first step in the

satisfy this 6

The

of Politics (Chicago:

University

of Political Imagination (New York:

quest

for

being is

the

discovery

Chicago

of

Scribner's, 1964),

that the

world

does

not

quest."

reference

here is to the "response

Radical Monotheism

H. Richard Niebuhr. See his

ethic"

of

Supplementary Essays (New York: Harper, 1943), and his The Responsible Self: An Essay in Christian Moral Philosophy (New York: Harper, 1963). 6

Karl Barth

burgh: T. 7 over

and

Western Culture,

suggests such an

T.

suggests

external world

with

analogy in his Church Dogmatics (12 vols.; Edin

Clark, 1936-1962). We

Michael Polanyi the

and

shall explain

it

shortly.

that "the satisfaction of gaining

is linked to

a satisfaction of

gaining

intellectual

control over

control

ourselves."

Christian In every relative

Ambiguity

and

Social Disorder

223

from a fulfiUment. His temporal

one of these situations man seeks to move

to

unfulfiUment

relative

are never complete and always

condition of satisfactions

transitory. He feeds himself to

satisfaction

today but finds himself hungry again tomorrow. The aesthete no sooner finds a work of art unsurpassed in beauty than he continues on his quest for ed

even greater

beauty.

rudely intrudes

must accept the

state of repose

truth that

....

be done is to

can

Today we

find tranquUity, tomorrow the unexpect lives. J. L. Talmon reminds us: "We

upon our ordered

human society

Life is

proceed

by

democracy

problems."9

for

being probe

aUy

the

human life

the method of trial and

spirit, Reinhold Niebuhr defines mate solutions for insoluble pher must aUow

and

can never reach a

a perpetual and never resolved crisis.

as

"a

method of

Even the logician

AU that

In the

error."8

finding

same

proxi

and the phUoso

possibility of then entire frameworks of thought "universals," Even their although they may

chaUenged.

successfully behind the doxa

by analogia

than of the

of existence and partake of

entis tie

Creator.10

"objective

reality,"

usu

themselves to the objectivity of the creation rather Temporal truth can never completely encompass

reality, for temporal reality can be seen in its objectivity and only from the direction of the transcendent, the Eternal. The for temporal fulfiUment is a legitimate one, indeed, we might say

even temporal completeness quest

ethicaUy compeUing,

as

long

as

it is

seen as a relative

the ultimate quest for salvation,

not confused with

one

quest,

or even with

the

that is means

toward this ultimate quest. For the means toward man's salvation, as we

have observed, is strictly the grace or action of God; whereas the toward man's temporal fulfiUment must be seen to be largely his

means own

if only his own response to grace. Central among man's temporal quests is his quest for knowledge. Of course, this particular quest cannot be disrelated from other of man's even

searchings, many

tual, but

of which are

reflect, in both the

not, strictly speaking, heuristic

for example, his

aU of which

or

inteUec

for community necessarUy and the manner in which they

quest

nature of their objectives

sought, something of his understanding of himself and his After all, man is in the broadest sense a satisfaction-seeking animal,

world.11

are

therefore only in the broadest the point I

wish

8

pp.

Post-Critical

is that

man

is

animal.

inherently

But

curious,

Philosophy (New York: Harper

and

The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (New York: Praeger,

254-55.

The Children of Light

cracy

a

problem-solving

196.

J. L. Talmon,

1960), 9

p.

also a

to emphasize at present

Personal Knowledge: Towards

Row, 1958),

sense

and

and a

and the

Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Demo

Critique of Its Traditional Defense (New York:

io

This is essentially the Barthian

n

Voegelin

emphasizes

the

Scribner's, 1944),

significance of man's various quests

his The New Science of Politics.

p.

118.

critique of philosophy.

for community in

Interpretation

224 that he

nature

problem-solving

his

throughout

even

his

to make sense of

wishes

is partly

adult

life,

derive from

dimension

phUosophical insatiable"

of

of

industry

discovery

the

of

Hegel

neither

of understanding.

Thus Polanyi

asserts that

articulates a vast range of rational relationships them."14 In understanding himself and his world, he

forms,

some of

fact,

the essence

nonformahs-

profound and satisfying "like mathematics, music for the mere pleasure of

man's persistent quest articulates

the

this process of

for Hegel) is

not

more

"spirit's

within

world

to formal systems of knowledge. In

for Polanyi (although

the

as

Polanyi hmit

tic. Music emerges for both as one of the most

forms

quest

objective

nor

enjoyment we

Hegel depicts the

problem-solving

his

appreciation,

Michael Polanyi

indicates the

puzzles.

solving

of man's

But

self."13

cognitive appropriation of cognitive

of

aspect of

universal

adventure.

and

play

appropriation

cognitive

"receptacle

forms

the popular

in his

manifested

suggests that our gigantic amusement

This

surroundings.12

himself in

to come to terms a vast

array

with

of cultural

them verbal, some graphic, some musical, some symbolic

and mystical.

Although I have indicated be

confused with

ments of

his

that the temporal quests of man must not

soteriological

quest,

and that

present relative fulfiU-

the

the one have no inherent relationship to the eventual complete

other, this does not mean that some kind of relevance between the two quests. I have already noted that the civitas ultimate definition and meaning to the civitas terrena. Through

consummation of the

does Dei

not exist

gives

faith

his

man

is

given an anticipation of the civitas not

quest wUl

soteriological

go

unfulfiUed.

Dei

and an assurance that

Thus

even

his

temporal

destined to incompletion, are given, in faith, new meaning and definition. But even the ultimate assurances of faith remain temporaUy unfulfiUed. The distinction between the two realms is essential. Voegelin is

endeavors,

emphatic

this

on

church, is

of

two

legitimate. The two

realms,

12

the

superseded

kingdom

13

civil

different

society"15

experiences.

of

Dei

The two But

except

in

God is

not

history,

the

quests result

both

in the

experiences

with

not see man as unique

of

its

Robert Tucker, Philosophy

animal's

in this

reminds

are

respect

Investigations into the Nature of ch.

from the

pp.

rest of

the to

surroundings."

and

Myth in Karl Marx (New York: Cambridge

Belief Systems

15: "The Enjoyment

Voegelin, New Science,

us, "abolish

intelligence is spontaneously alive (Personal Knowledge, p. 98.)

University Press, 1961), pp. 141, 143, 213-14. 14 Personal Knowledge, p. 193. See Milton Rokeach, The Open

15

supernatural

different truths. But both are its epochal differentiation of the two

in degree. "The

making sense

Basic Books, 1960),

a

realm of

civitas

polytheism, it did not, Voegelin

Polanyi, in fact, does

problem of

itself. The

realms represent two

When Christianity,

truths.

animal

for

not a substitute

articulation

anticipation

not this perfection

and the representative of the

this world;

of

"Faith is the

point:

man; it is

perfection of

157-58.

of

and

and

Closed Mind:

Personality Systems (New York:

New Musical

Systems."

Christian the

theology."16

need of a civU

dimension,

existential

Thus,

creation.

Voegelin, is

hand, is

the other

logical

"the

"as

valid

finite

as

even

CivU society

man and

time.17

The

the

of

temporal world,

distinct,

must not

be

seen as

"overlapping"

portrayal suggests an

completely

the church, on

context of

in the

inasmuch

and

his

soterio

Dei is

civitas

his

as

temporal world receive new meaning because of his although

or

Dei.

the civitas

Yet, inasmuch as the same man whose destiny is citizen

cosmos

according to that part of human

role of

himself in the

in

destiny

eternal

finite

a

representation of

to represent man to

dimension, his

in his

must represent man

as part of

organization of

the end of

at

225

society,"

power

temporal

a

Social Disorder

and

away"

that wiU pass

nature

Ambiguity

destiny,

the two realms,

The Augustinian

separate.

Therefore,

of the two realms.

also a

in the

endeavors

neither

the roles of the representatives of these two realms, church and state,

can

be completely isolated from each But the as I shaU shortly indicate, represents a confron tation of two realms that are radicaUy different in kind. Their meeting is probably more aptly described as disjunctive rather than complementary. Central to Karl Barth's theology is his insistence that all of man's attempts other.18

"overlapping,"

to

vision

a

capture

the civitas Dei with analogies drawn from our

of

temporal world faU us. Barth

in faith

"revelation,"

(in his terms

transcendent),19

18

Ibid.,

p.

18

apply these

we

158. This differentiation

Ibid., p. 109. Implied, but doctrine

complex

not

Augustine's doctrine

potestate

civitas

and

Dei,

work,

at

of

least partiaUy

was not made

elaborated

of two realms

regia

society

grasped

Augustine,

clear until

into its

was articulated

the

revelatory

when,

spiritual

in

is

in Augustine's writings, of course, is a takes us beyond the scope of this study.

more

in terms

out

spelled

specifically

Gelasius (Tractatus)

writings of

and

lohn

of

its

Paris

of

papali), who agree that the church, as representative of the

et

and civil each

upon,

of church and state that

institutional implications in the (De

intimations"

order."

temporal

"

if

and

grace and

transcendent truths

in Polanyi's terms "heuristic

Voegelin, "the one Christian New Science, p. 109.

according to and

does allow, however, that through

we are afforded glimpses of certain eternal and

authority must

its

own

acknowledge

each

way but cooperatively,

legitimacy

the

of

the other

matters of common

on

moral

balanced contemporary expression of this concern for distinction but confrontation in church and state relations: "on the one on the other hand, they cannot be hand, the two realms cannot be fused and Walter Lippmann

concern.

provides

a

.

separated and a

isolated

balance between them

They the

cannot

be isolated

....

and

churches should each

unlimited

secure.

dominion

But they

19

It is

most

and

be

....

must

Philosophy (New York:

cipation

They

....

Neither

must

too strong to

be

meet

be

of

striking, maintaining, redressing to

.

.

.

absorb

compartments

conquered,

not

.

.

.

strong

the other

The

....

state and

enough

to have

be separate, autonomous, and the issues of good and The Public

on

all

evil."

pp.

118-19.

to observe that both

his discounting

by

allowed

and state need to

Mentor, 1956),

interesting

.

related

insulated in different

Church

also

be

must

"logical

Polanyi, in his

antecedents,"

and

emphasis upon anti

Barth, in his

emphasis

Interpretation

226 insights to

our

to the Thomistic

contrasts

ourselves and our relations

destiny. Thus, we only as we see it first in God's

it is

as

in the human

manifested

when we

by

apply,

analogia

vision confirms

and, in the

mind of

God,

to see

fidei,

the understanding we are given of the

do

the categories

not

fit.

fulfillment (or salvation) fulfiUment that is already given, but that is not

in

us

(which he

are then able

to man, not by seeing it first between father and son. But

relation

relationships

divine Fatherhood to the human relationship, Our

of

in the dimension of God's intention for us, our can approach a true understanding of "Father

ultimate hood"

faith"

by the "analogy "analogy of things"), we

temporal existence

what we

a

in

are

"forestaste,"

our

its

and that awaits

yet received except as a

consummation at

the end of history.

Thus a

hght

by

which we are

faith, whereby

enable us

both judged

to

we

When

ourselves and our societies. we are able to avoid

many

society.

as temporal

vision

given

remains

meaning

in faith, ultimate, is not

of

and

appropriate the

Furthermore,

altogether clear to us.

but

self-deceptions of

imperfectly

the vision of another order its

as

our temporal quests.

quest,

in

our

The

but

what

makes the

wisdom of the spirit solve

Thus the Christian faith

summons us to

love

precisely

of a realm

solved

one

but

another,

this implies in a world where nations and corporations, not just

individuals, and

wisdom of

temporal quests

Walter Lippmann

no answers.

"Nor does the

and

perplexing problems of worldly conduct. For it is the vision being in which the problems of earthly existence are not

transcended."20

where

often chaUenges and contradicts the

our soteriological

same point succinctly:

but

we can

its message, it have derived from

provides us with perspective

ultimately true meaning to in our created finitude,

dangerous

of the common and

beings

us

understanding we faith answers us in

the

light,

we see ourselves

are able to sense

we

Only

a new

through the vision of

acutely aware of the radical difference between inhabit, one in transit and the other in anticipation, are

we able to give proper perspective and assign

But that is

in

see ourselves

and assured.

we are made

kingdoms

the two

faith does

the vision of

confront each

indirect

ways

simply between

other,

by

affected

loving

this in mind when we

judge

judgment

others.

and

actions,

loving, is

and not

told that we all stand under the

where countless numbers are our

But

not of

where

immediately

God

and

we are not told

in

choices clear.

various are

not

We

are

that we should

keep

how to judge justly.

II It

might appear that

attempt within

upon

there are inevitable contradictions involved in

to encompass elements of

Barth's basic

revelation

and

theological

his discounting

Polanyi's

world

of

view.

knowledge

Polanyi, unaided

to interpretation in terms of the concept of analogia fidei. 29

Public Philosophy,

p.

113.

our

epistemological world view after

by grace,

aU,

assumes

are amenable

Christian that man is

discovery, his

Ambiguity

to relate

able

own efforts

to "go it

227

compatibly, through intimation

fairly

to his heuristic universe.

Social Disorder

and

Barth,

alone,"

even

hand,

on the other

in the

fiduciary

and

sees man

realm of

in

phUosophy,

constantly contradicted by the transcendent and revelatory truth of God. Neither Polanyi nor Barth appears interested enough in the other's concerns to enter into dialogue with the other. But a reconciliation of the two, in their basic concerns, is not impossible. We do not violate Polanyi's understand ing of the heuristic universe if we include in it the temporal, created uni the

verse

There is certainly enough room within this for an exercise of faith, or

terrena.

civitas

largely fiduciary commitment,

mysterious universe of ours to aUow

has

that

as

its

based

commitments are

intimations

upon

finite abUity to comprehend,

man's

object truths

temporal order, but not yet discovered

of man's

temporal

evade

persistently

man

by

that themselves are part him.21

truths that

of

aU

fiduciary

those truths that do thus

and

many

are

nevertheless

of

Not

wUl always evade

part

a

of

the

vast

temporal creation, wlrile no less objective and universal from man's temporal perspective. A truth cannot be assumed to be transcendent and

eternal,

i.e.,

Divine, merely because it is

to partake of the

a universal

Platonic phUosophy is particularly subject to this fallacy of equating universalism with transcendency. Of course there are some fiduciary commitments that are based upon intima characteristic of the created universe.

tions of transcendent and eternal truths. the least subjectable to temporal temporal comprehension;

they

These, by

their very nature, are

assessment and will always evade complete

are what we

generaUy

refer

to as

or rehgious

truths. Polanyi acknowledges this characteristic of

truth: "The

indwelling

heuristic of

the Christian worshipper

of

upsurge which strives

thought,

by

guided

.

.

.

resembles

the intimations of discoveries stUl beyond

Christian worship sustains, to be consummated hunch .

.

.

.

the

to break through the accepted frameworks

zon.

.

spiritual rehgious

as

it were,

an

eternal,

never

our

hori

[temporaUy]

.

more clarity to rehgious truths; he would "hunches." for referring to them as But, Barth concedes, we face." A more important concern is that, for Barth, stiU do not see "face to the spiritual wisdom we are aUowed is purely a gift of grace. In matters of

Barth

to

seems

allow

relatively

not settle

he does

spiritual truth

not aUow

for Polanyi's

confirmation

by

heuristic

to say that man's own temporal heuristic categories are absolutely incompatible for receiving the kerygma, and man's cognitive is transformed by grace in the moment that, by grace, spiritual

dialectic. Barth

seems

faculty

2i Polanyi

It is

an

describes

a problem as

"a

conception of

something

we are

striving for.

intellectual desire for crossing a logical gap on the other side of which lies the

unknown,

fully

itself. The

search

marked

for

Personal Knowledge, 22 Personal

out

by

our conception of

a solution consists p.

128.

Knowledge,

p.

199.

in casting

it,

though as yet never seen

about with

this purpose in

in

mind."

Interpretation

228 truth is

lems

to

presented

by

presented

Barth is

that

he

him,

them as a

immortal dimension to to

man

how, if

man's cognitive

truth,

receive spiritual

truth. It does not

that, in

certainly prob

are

of

temporality say that

we can

appear altogether satis

the transformation Adam,"

but

by

we

grace,

since

still a man

contradiction

always spoken of man as

Even

it. There

most common criticisms

(or "trans-temporal man") is a concept that strikes in terms. But then, too, the Christian tradition

man"

an

to

the

of

man, the "new

of a new

speaking merely "non-temporal

is

order

to these critics, to answer

are

has

One

this thesis.

still man that receives this

factory,

can receive

neglects the question of

has to be transformed in it is

he

so that

when

Voegelin

in his

reflect

surviving

speaks of the

own

being

death, surviving

that need not violate

man

a

"transparency"

dimension

of

temporality. There

his finitude.

of the soul that aUows

the Eternal and suggests,

being,"

furthermore, that man's soul "comes into i.e., man partakes of immortality, in that moment, he expressly disregards the problem of So, at first it may appear that grace is of no real significance in his grace.23

world view.

But in

in the truth

of

God:

his

another source we

he has

God

become

the truth

and

formed the

psyche

of

of

man

wiU

opened

his

manifest

into receptivity for the

becomes clear, then, that Voegelin, acknowledges also

find Voegehn

existence when

whUe

relying

in

nowhere appears

be of

"Man

history

unseen

it has

when

measure."24'

upon man's own

the role of grace in the Divine-human

Although Polanyi

wUl

to the truth

saying: psyche

It

initiative,

encounter.

to give specific consideration to

the

defining his epistemology, the assumption of a doctrine of grace, in fact, pervades his system. Indeed, the argument might weU be made that this assumption is more integral to Polanyi's thought than it is to Voegelin's. Not only is man, for Polanyi, an active agent in the heuristic question of grace

quest, but he is

in

"pulled"

other

words, there is

apart

from

ments.

the

inadequacy instances.

of

that

later

by

the

within

object of

"confirms"

be interpreted

his faith. In

the heuristic

field,

him in his

quite

commit

specificaUy spiritual insights Although he does not elabor as an acknowledgment of the

dialectic for providing confirmation in these Polanyi makes clear, as we have indicated, that

cognitive

Furthermore,

on rare occasions the

quest

forces

"consummation."

might weU

formal

of

even admits that man's

to temporal

point, it

ate on this

in his

on

dialectic

formal dialectic

Also, Polanyi

are not subject

a

intuitive heuristic insights

for "unspecifiable

or anticipations

that

man

(grace?) occasionaUy force a basic alteration of his heuristic categories, i.e., chaUenge aU of his previous commitments. Is this not precisely Barth's own doctrine of revelation (apart from the latter's exclusively biblical orientation) and of the radical acquires

23

"Ersatz Religion:

(Somerset,

N.

reasons"

The Gnostic Mass Movements

of

Our

Time,"

Politeia

J.), I, 2 (Spring, 1964), p. 11. The article is translated by Helen Lee Hunter Douglass from Wort und Wahrheit, XV (1960), pp. 5-18. 24 New Science, p. 69. Italics mine.

Christian

distinction ogy,

the two realms? Barth

of

Polanyi, Barth's

and

Ambiguity

and

Social Disorder

could well endorse

229

Polanyi's

epistemol

theological categories.

But the fact is that Polanyi has little to say specificaUy about Barth's concerns and Barth gives relatively little thought to the

soteriological

temporal realm as such.

Therefore,

in light

of what each

does have to say,

there appears to be no reason to assume that the basic tenets of Polanyi's

epistemology preclude a distinction between the two

simultaneous

embracing

Barth's

of

radical

realms.

We have already established that many of the truths that indefinitely man's finite ability to comprehend are nevertheless temporal in nature. Barth's understanding of the accessibUity to man, through grace evade

in

and

faith,

of certain eternal

truths, is

of the truths of which man

hand,

the other

on

given

at

least

suggests that some

a glimpse

are nevertheless

transcendent in nature. Both of these acknowledgments force us to the conclusion

fiduciary ical

that although we may be given to

eternal, beyond

or

know, intuitively

or

otherwise,

those truths we comprehend (of course, always ultimately through affirmations) are by their nature temporal and which soteriolog

which of

have

this we

no

of

way

knowing

where

precisely

the line is to be drawn between the two realms. Since there is much that

us, both

eludes

of our temporal realm and of

final definition to

StiU, sense

do know

what we

Dei

civitas

way be

if

even

Man

temporal.

of

ultimately do

not

thereby

as

its

transformed

extension

history

from

not

essentiaUy

history, i.e., only Thus

an

object of

concept

imply

that

same

or

an

salvation

mean,

in

no

nature remains an an

cognition,

Kairos

history,

the

represents

can

"History

asserts:

meaning

of the whole

the Eternal as

The Barthian theology,

as

he look back as a whole

"making indicated,

is

is

not

contact"

I have

empha

idea.

"overlapping"

to

of

at the end of

Voegelin

As I have already noted, the Augustinian

26

words,

can

For not only does its end he in the have meaning only in the context of its ultimate consummation in the Eternal. Only when man can be

the temporal and historical.

sizes this

infinity,

as a whole.

entirety.

The Christian

25 with

other

order can

confirmation and

it in its

the

immanent, historical being is not only denied faith, but he is also denied

apprehension of

separate

into

into the Eternal. Its

the Eternal except through

upon

In

coincide.26

even

apprehension of

future, but its

we cannot give

these two realms indicates to us that

we could conceive of

to be

said

Eternal,

the civitas terrena are not congruent, and although in a

and

tangential,25

history,

the

either realm.

even

does

for

manifest

Augustine,

invisible church that

this does not confer upon

coinciding

of

concept of

itself temporally in terms

temporal perfection. The

includes the him

the two realms does

seem

the two realms, but only in the sense

angels and

of

sanctification; this does

man of

faith is

the saints;

sainthood or membership

a member of

but, Augustine

in the

not

the

agrees,

angelic ranks.

Interpretation

230 discernable."27

And in

another

he

source

"Only

says:

existing society is inteUigible; its existence itself is The main point that I wish to make is that in in his

order

own

hfe

and

that which sometimes

the order of an

unintelligible."28

to represent true

order

in faith the reality of indefinitely, eludes him as a

man must affirm

society,

temporarUy,

sometimes

temporal being. It is important that man acknowledge the elusive and "otherness"

of

radical mistake

problems

in

solved,

religious affirmation.

this reality

that

thinking

of

whUe

temporality

terms

the

of

ultimate

Furthermore, it is

not make the

affirming it, and be interpreted,

temporal

or

can

absolute categories of

and

that man simUarly be able

essential

to recognize the incompleteness and ambivalence of his temporal truths

embracing them in the context of fiduciary have this perspective, provided most completely while

i.e.,

deny

to

To faU to

commitments.

the Christian faith

by

the reality of a transcendent realm, or to see it as congruent

temporal, and thereby to faU to see the inconsistencies and finitude temporality, or to v*ew ah of temporal existence as relative and inevitably speUs disorder. unwarranting of any kind of affirmation with the

of

Whether

or

not, then, this means that apart from

faith

to

self-destruction

man

disorder, is

this

immediate It is

doomed

is

of

a

answer.

fiUment that is

question

For

disorder that

a

the

disorder

available to

him

not

by

I

man's

his

perspective

institutions

social

because

those institutions

of

of which

itself in

full

the

and

endeavors

does

that

manifests

deny reality,

chooses to

his

breakdown

the

or

in

a

suggest

is

speak

simple

a spiritual

denial to himself

affirmation of reality.

to ignore "the constitution of

being."

of

or

an

disorder.

of

the ful

Rather he

The

phrase

is

Voegehn's: The the

is

will

to

power of

humility

not

The

really the

result

the Gnostic

of subordination

who wants

acquisition of power.

therefore, is

not

The

dominion

being

.

constitution of

over

has triumphed

to rule the world

to the constitution of

being, but

a

.

.

Yet the

result of

being remains fantasy

what

over

victory

it is

.

.

.

satisfaction.29

Voegelin apparently feels that the distortion of faith represented by cannot enhance social stabUity. In his The New Science of Politics he goes further to suggest that gnosticism inevitably undermines

gnosticism

the practical

functioning or

the

survival of

itself.30

Without attempting, within questions, I merely suggest for the aU self-evident

The love

central

of

if

the society in

the scope of this

which

it

manifests

paper, to take up these

present that neither of

these points is

at

autonomy of the two realms. the Christian faith is the unqualified and redemptive

we assume a real

truth of

God for man,

Religion,"

27

"Ersatz

28

New Science,

29

"Ersatz

30

Ch. 6: "The End

p. p.

i.e.,

the fact of man's salvation,

10.

167.

Religion,"

p.

11. Modernity."

of

his

reconcUiation

with

God. It is

Christian

Ambiguity

an eternal

fact that

soteriological quest

in

apprehension

faith,

ultimate of aU

commitments,

for

itself

offers

is

man

man

an

his

assured that

bordering

"tacit

assents."

to as underived,

to

answer

man's

With its

soteriological

In this sense, this

a pure gift of grace

In

man's even most unspecifiable ratiocinations.

truth,

as

exists even prior to this quest.

quest,

him in Eternity, has ended. As the most it is the most intuitive and least derived of man's "unspecifiable" itself on the that provides the

"givens,"

referred

231

Social Disorder

awaits

aU of man's

be

might weU

fact,

temporal

its fulfillment

although

context

and, in

and

knows in faith that his

being

central

truth

that is prior to

confronted with

one most ultimate question

this

has been

that he is given no further cause for ultimate concern. his penultimate concerns are not, in themselves, thereby answered, he is himself afforded, in addressing himself to these concerns, answered

and

Although a

of

context

vision of this

solace

and

faith does

to the extent that the

assurance

not elude

him

or

he does

not elude

transcending

it.

Ill

Here

we come to the crux of the problem.

faith, if it

The

vision of the

Christian

something that did not, by transcending man's temporal sphere, he beyond the clear comprehension of his formal categories, and did not at the same time confront man in his realm as something alien to were

his temporal commitments, would present no problems to man's ordering his life and his society in a way consonant with this transcendent vision of assurance. But such is not the nature of the Christian faith. It is, in its very nature, both transcendent and alien and, therefore, both elusive and prob lematic. Ever since man made the epochal differentiation between the civitas

Dei

Voegelin,

and

the civitas

the temporal and

terrena, "both types the eternal, "wiU .

.

tension between the two in various degrees of

By

the

nature of

New Testaments

and the

In the twelfth

that even in faith

faith, I

speak

"we

see

mean

its intangible of the

recurringly

the thirteenth

verse of

according to together; and the consciousness, wiU be a exist

.

civUization."31

permanent structure of "elusive"

truth,"

of

chapter of

only puzzhng

nature.

"hiddenness"

I Corinthians in

reflections

a

The Old of

God.

we are

mirror."32

told

In

Hebrews,

the eleventh chapter, fust verse, we are told that "faith gives

substance

to

Voegelin

31

hopes

and makes us certain of realities we

concludes that the

New Science,

that the

p.

achievement

acceptance of p.

our

division

"thread

158. Glenn Tinder of

the

and

separation

32

The New English Bible.

33

ibid.

faith,

expresses

of church

uncertainty in

312.

of

on which

do

hangs

the same thought and

state

not

aU

certainty

when

"means the

see."33

he

says

conscious

existence."

collective

Political Imagination.

Interpretation

232

being, is indeed very

regarding transcendent, divine

Man is

thin.

given

nothing tangible. The substance and proof of the unseen are ascertained

but faith

through nothing phrase

"nothing

.

faith,"

but

.

Certainly

.

"certainties,"

tangible or empirical

so-caUed

observed, derived from the former. Voegelin

Polanyi

with

this matter,

on

Polanyi

for faith represents, to

but he does

him,

would

by

the

use

than

more

the latter

express

not

would

certainty as I have

being,

not

probably

disagree

this phrase the

manner

faith is generaUy viewed. In any case, both acknowledge the frustrating lack of clarity in which we are given to view the basic certainties

in

which

Christian faith.

of the

Even though the Christian faith denies

denying

its

central thrust.

"transparency"

idiom

(probably

Through

"translucence"

I Corinthians 13)

and spirit of

the clarity of detaU, there is no Voegehn would refer to as the

us

what

would

of the

be better in terms

"differentiated"

of the we are

soul,

only another realm, but of a radically different realm. God's love and acceptance of man does not cancel out

given a vision of not

The

givenness of

God's

judgments upon man. The his descendants tested Abraham by The same God who, in love for his creation,

sometimes unfathomable commands and

God

same

loved Abraham

who

and

ordering him to kill his son. sent His own son into the world,

permitted

his

Thus

crucifixion.

aU men

to divine imperatives that may insist upon the denial of certain treasured temporal values and aspirations, even upon the forfeiture

are subject

highly

life itself. There is

of temporal

no comfort offered

in the

that

reflection

higher than the earth, so are God's ways higher than that the peace of God is of a kind that "passes ah under

"as the heavens

are

ways,"

or

man's

The

standing."35

but

34

"Ersatz

when

he

difficult,

Religion,"

11.

p.

says

directives

radical

aU the more

of the

to bear

by

Christian faith

the

sensitivity

Reinhold Niebuhr

that "the God before whom 'the

dust in the

of

are not made

easy,

the Christian who

seems to express the same thought

nations are as a

drop in

the bucket

balances'

is known by faith and not by (Emphasis mine.) Unfortunately this last phrase, which is not uncharacteristic Niebuhr's expression in various of his writings, encourages an interpretation and are counted as small

Niebuhr's understanding understand

of

Niebuhr's

use of

reason, I think it is

that is less

alien

Niebuhr is

suggested

of

faith

reason."

and reason as

"reason"

to mean

very dichotomous.

formal,

possible to understand

or

Niebuhr's

logical,

If, however,

or systematic

concept of

faith in

of of we

forms a

way

less formally, understood. In other words, there is no reason that Niebuhr could not embrace Polanyi's understanding of the relationship between reason and faith. In fact, such an interpretation of just

"The

quoted:

sense out of

of rational

to reason more generally, and

the

by

the

realm of

baffling

sentences

mystery

an

immediately

history is

not

which appropriates

identical

of

.

.

.

finally

with

any

I have makes scheme

the meaning in the mystery

repentance

(Emphasis mine.) Irony of American charity Isa. 55:9 and Phil. 4:7.

source of

upon the one

which encloses and

for the false meaning which the introduces into the pattern. Such repentance is the true

experience

pride of nations and cultures

36

meaning

configurations of

intelligibility. The faith

inevitably involves

that follow

and

History,

p.

150.

Christian

Ambiguity

and

Social Disorder

233

holds that faith. For to the degree that one sees through the eyes of faith, one sees himself, in large part, alien to the dominating assumptions of his society. Voegehn observes that "what made Christianity so dangerous was its uncompromising, radical de-divinization of the As one who world."36

has

glimpsed

the vision of another world, the Christian is

in the world, but without a country; in

world: stiU

a man

alien to his own longer of it. He finds himself, in one sense, another sense, he finds that he holds dual and

no

conflicting citizenships. Although the Christian faith, of

meaning

and

society the

and offers to

finitude,

selfhood

and

have indicated,

affords man a sense

humanity

proper perspective of

enables

thereby dangerous self-deceptions,

as we

that surpasses aU more tangible commitments

it to

avoid

of

many

its

in its

created

common

and

these gains in meaning and perspective are not

without certain ambiguities, permanent tensions, and judgments that are awesomely burdensome for even the strongest in faith. For even they do not faU to see the contrasting attractions of those competing temporal commitments that offer man, if lesser, more immediate, more tangible,

less ambiguous and less burdensome gratification. For Voegelin the insecurity, the tension, the temptation to view reality in terms of a monistic temporal sphere in disregard of an elusive and prob lematic transcendent realm is strictly a spiritual problem, a problem of rehgious

faith, especiaUy of the Christian faith.

uncertain

into

truth

certain

Christian faith than in Voegelin is

most concerned

gnosticism,

Polanyi

does

a perversion of

considerably to

adds

at

in the clarity of the Even the attempt to

least in those instances

as a spiritual and

and therefore

Christianity, but

"The temptation to faU from

stronger

structures."37

spiritual

the problem manifests itself

resolve

or

other

is

untruth

not

Christian form

implicitly

where

heresy,

of

represent a rejection of

it.38

our

of

understanding

the problem of

man's

anxiety and alienation by demonstrating that even man's strictly temporal heuristic endeavors are based upon fiduciary commitments that, in their very

in their very

nature and

cise of

faith, its

upon a

elusiveness

New Science,

37

"Ersatz basic

rinthians

38

12. To be

p.

least

its

discovery,

would

immediately, based

problematic nature

upon

does

to fall from

suggest

Polanyi's description

consistent with

and with reference

unclear .

.

truth into

that as Christian

tianity. But we must not confuse such as

of man's

to I Co

clear

untruths

is

stronger

in the

.

forms (as in Marxism)

fined, Christian ideals,

its focus derive

not

to rephrase this statement of Voegelin's to read:

prefer

the Christian faith

secular

are elu

the temporal exer

"unspecifiable"

Voegelin does

tually in its

at

and

and certain assumptions as

"The temptation certainty

and

100.

Religion,"

13:12, I of

p.

for creativity

when we now speak of

is not,

transcendent realm,

38

most

potential

However,

sive and problematic.

heresy

runs

expresses

explicit rejection with an

perfection, equality,

its course,

gnosticism even

an outright rejection of

etc.

implicit

retention

Chris

of,

rede

Interpretation

234 from the

nature

alien

Rather,

the transcendent.

of

the

characterizes aU

fact

heuristic

discovery

discoveries

these new

that

and

means represents a contradiction of

truth and

transcendent, that it is in the its

reaches

from any

dwelling

indwelling is

this

mercy, the these

be beyond his

.

.

follows,

and

worshipper within

within a

framework

The

of

the

no or

Polanyi

fact,

of

divine

ritual of

inherent

confession

praise of

concedes

excellence,

the

guilt,

God, bring

about

differs

service

the fact that

by

to God's

surrender

mounting tension.

By

the obligation to achieve what he knows to

worshipper accepts

worship sustains,

It is like

.

.

by

spiritual,

towards

it in the hope

of a merciful

above.

.Christian

hunch

concern with

tensions. In

own unaided powers and strives

from

visitation

here

contributes

Christian worship that the heuristic tension sustained form:

for grace, the

the

acts

perennial

enjoyed.

not

prayer

ritual

intense

the Christian

of

other

Voegelin's

previous

our

of

re-evalution

Polanyi

what

experience of

most

The dwelling

its

of

as we

threaten a

But

commitments and world views.

elusiveness

have seen, of clarity that, their problematic nature hes in the

temporal truths derives from the initial lack

against

as

it were,

reason,

unswervingly,

never

an eternal,

an obsession with a problem

known to be

the heuristic

to be

consummated

insoluble, "Look

command:

which yet

at

the un

known!"39

this, Polanyi focuses most of his attention upon the strictly temporal aspects of the heuristic endeavor. In turning from the emphasis of Voegelin to that of Polanyi, we are reminded, therefore, that man's ahenation and cognitive confusion, although ultimately rooted in the elusiveness and the problematic nature of the soteriological

But, having

said

more extensive and

are augmented

quest, of

his strictly,

for example, is times

by

the inherent elusiveness and problematic

and sometimes

not easy.

It

proper, temporal quests.

requires a

difficult

evaluation of

"unspecifiable,"

minate

considerations,

far-reaching, possibly

and

an anticipation

nature

Decision making, often

many,

of, usuaUy indeter

radical, consequences;

and

when

the

finally made, it is made in the awareness that that decision an infinite range of other possibilites. Thus the heuristic process

decision is precludes

is, for Polanyi,

an

"irreversible"

process.

Certain commitments,

certain

"truths,"

in the forms of existence, once regarded as possibUities, even as light of new considerations, experiences, and commitments, can never again be considered as such. Nor can newly discovered problems, of which oblivious,"

ever again be disregarded. In fact, society was once "blissfully as knowledge becomes more extensive, in many respects it becomes more "self-evident" are no longer so; problematic; decisions that were once one

is forced to

J. L. Talmon

working

39

of

consider other

observes

alternatives, themselves

that "infirm

man

has

not

the totality from the agonizing burden

Personal

Knowledge,

pp.

198-99.

problematic.

been

of

relieved

choosing

Thus,

by

the

alternatives.

Christian If anything,

lining the of

Social Disorder

and

the conquests of scientific

rationality

ambivalent nature of the world of

If this is true true

Ambiguity

of the world of objects

personal

inanimate, it is certainly

in his interpersonal

"neat"

and

James

and categorical answers.

highly

the difficult decisions that

intersocietal

that reflected his sensitivity to the

an ethics

less

no

the

of

awareness

ambiguous and problematic nature of man and confront man

under

constantly

objects."40

Richard Niebuhr's

existence.

are

235

led Niebuhr to

relations

dangers

Gustafson,

irrelevancies

and

of

in his introduction to

Richard Niebuhr's posthumously published The Responsible Self: An Essay in Christian Moral Philosophy, describes Niebuhr's understanding of ethics: [Ethics] does

be

not give us an unequivocal rank-order of values to

universal order of preference

ideal society in which all the tensions and ambiguities of social and are brought into a harmonious, beautiful whole. Rather, it clarifies

For

in the

Niebuhr, then, it is

Ethics helps which

perhaps more accurate

us

life

understanding in the light

The

responsible

self, then, is

ambivalent and enigmatic

our

understanding

interpretation, its

beings,

of

Also, buUt

"blissful"

one.

the place

Its

practical

meaning

exercised.

human

action can

one who

begins

with an acknowledgment of

which

he is

who

have of

eaten of

course,

be

more

responsible.4!

confronted with the

this

the tree of

that

he

entaUs.

totality In Karl

knowledge,

refers to

is

the

para

a primitive

ignorance.

heuristic process, as Polanyi describes it, is an inherent tension between the new gains in knowledge represented

into

and

our world as

provision of a pattern of

"paradise,"

"paradise"

effect of

direct

and

of which

way in

Popper's words: "For those dise is lost."42 The

indirect

immediate

existence and with an affirmation of whatever

ambiguity

incoherence

moral

to speak of an of an

the responsible existence of the human community is

and

his

action, than

and

to understand ouselves as responsible

utility is in its clarification, its

of

some

social world.

ethical analysis upon moral

in

in

through its analysis and in turn enables us to be more responsible

of moral existence selves

sought

to each other. It does not plot out the design for the

the

commitments and the, at least initial, lack of formal Because cognitive clarity that is characteristic of these new certainty is a product of both the formal clarity and the substantive suffi ciency or comprehensiveness of our knowledge, and since neither is entirely separable from the other, it is naturally difficult to choose among

by

one's

fiduciary

gains.43

40

and Warburg, 1960), p. 517. Row, 1963), p. 18. 42 Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (Princeton: Princeton Univer sity Press, 1963), I, 199. 43 Gains in the way of heuristic discovery, I might suggest, at least initially, are

Political Messianism (London: Seeker (New York: Harper

the cost of formal

purchased at and

and

changeability of the

persistent characteristic of our

Aristotle, if

we

Nicomachean

look for

clarity.

actual world

Aristotle rightly suggests that the complexity in some instances makes lack of clarity a

knowledge. We "clearness"

more

Ethics, Bk. I,

ch.

II, 1904b 12.

shall never

than

"the

find "the

rule,"

right

says of."

subject matter

admits

Interpretation

236

different

alternatives when

these

Alternatives

become incommensurable. It

then

that even in the

degree

certain

alternatives represent

normal course of cognitive

of ambivalence and

the two.

mixtures of

is, therefore,

to be expected

one must experience a

activity

indecision.

IV Both in the

i.e.,

change,

is the very

case of

and of societies advancement through

individuals

the risking of

new commitments and

essence of growth and maturity.

The

the abandonment of old, attempt

to

stand

stiU, to

institutions, and shibboleths, can individual.44 Thus disintegration, social and

cling to the security of old commitments, result only in regression and Erich Fromm teUs us that the

As he

world.45

orientation and security.

larger world, he if he is to

must relinquish old commitments and venture maintain a

ones

broadening Fromm

any

attempt

a

of

aware of a

forth

on new

healthy

and

lonely one, but that lonely venture by trying to re

the process of maturation is a

to escape the hazards of this

primary

an alien sense

relationship to his ever if he is to find fulfiUment as a mature adult.

balanced

environment and

reminds us that

establish

infant finds himself in

new-born

his primary bonds, he acquires But as he grows and as he is made

establishes

bonds,

or

by trying

to

return

to the primitive satisfaction

and security of the state, only be a futUe attempt culminating in frustration, hostility, and loss of selfhood. The road to individual maturity and responsibUity, whether we are speaking in emotional or cognitive terms,

can

prenatal

only be a difficult and a hazardous one. Even when we accept these hazards (and Fromm seems to overlook this point), we must realize that the fulfiUment that awaits us in this world remains incomplete. Glenn can

Tinder

appears

thing in

to have the same

first step in the

for

quest

being

is the

mind when

discovery

he

warns us

that "the

that the world does not

quest."46

satisfy this After describing this quest

for

process

marks

lonely

and

selfhood

the

arduous task of the

and

Fromm

maturity,

evolution

of

societies

individual in his

that

suggests

throughout

an

analogous

history. We

are

learns in his introduction The most crucial to embryology: "Ontogeny recapitulates period of historical transition, for Fromm, appears to be at the end of the reminded of

the thesis that every

biology

student

phylogeny."

middle ages.

The primary ties

in the feudal

period were

44

Reinhold Niebuhr

elaborated man p.

observes:

community to

represented

torn asunder

return

"It is

no

by

by

vocation, class,

the advent of the

more possible

for

and religion

Enlightenment,

a mature

to escape the perils of maturity

by

a return

to

childhood."

highly

and

to the unity of its tribal simplicity than for a

mature

Children of

Light,

123. 45

Escape from Freedom (New York:

the Individual 46

and

the

Ambiguity

Political Imagination,

p.

188.

Rinehart, 1941),

Freedom."

of

ch.

2: "The Emergence

of

Christian

Ambiguity

Reformation, and later by new developments, was

the

the Industrial

free to hve

provincialisms and was now

his

accept

upon

horizons

But whether he

his ability

of

did,

and willingness

to abandon old securities and to assume new and uncertain

indicates that the

through previous

of

within the expanded

freedom depended

new

Man,

constrictions

knowledge, new technology, and new opportunities.

in fact,

237

Revolution.

freed from the

these

new

Social Disorder

and

The

risks.

record of modern

history

of autocratic and

totalitarian social schemes have succeeded in attracting

large

segments of modern man.

simple and regressive appeals

In tracing

development

the

"public

of a

philosophy,"

juncture

Walter Lippmann simUarly observes a critical historical the end of the middle ages. But he seems to feel that public

at

thought was generahy equal to the demands of the changing a reformulation of

It

belief,

of

law that

eighteenth

century

the

meet

Revolution

new

for

The

demands

laws became

was able

ideas

old

later, in

interest became

common

1500

arose after ....

untU

brought

the

There

are

locate

someplace

century,

The

need

new school

to meet this need until the end of the were not reminted

century

[growing

the Industrial

out of

masses], and therefore

reactionaries.47

the

many others, in the

course, as various as Voegelin and

of

modern period of

history

Marx,

who

the primary dislocations

and changes

that

he

to find new meaning for himself in his new

attempts

chaos.

(after 1500), the

more acute.

and the enfranchisement and emancipation of the

were abandoned to

by

and

initial

nineteenth

greater

of the eighteenth

the nineteenth century

of

times,

out of an

resistant to change.

and

opinion,

a common criterion and

of natural

to

Lippmann,

ideas became particularly

old

As the diversity for

concepts order was

not, according to

was

that

basic

stUl plague modern man with anxieties and alienation as and

perplexing

environment.48

47

Public Philosophy,

48

In the

case of

p.

the demise of the feudal

class and

society"

that

and earlier events

emerged

that

the

as

the

urgency century

point

p.

(ibid.,

"The Enlightenment, having inversion"

p.

"unstable"

p.

since

then,

.

.

spiritual

518). Polanyi

secularized

(Beyond Nihilism 34). But

Voegelin

although

in history: "After 1789

abiding deep by the circumstances of violent break (something that incidentally England Messianism)"

the bourgeoisie

.

...

as a

of man

points upon

the

to

the

collapse

for foolproof

evoked yearnings

24). Also: "The straining

and

out of

political

36).

the Modern period,

turning

critical

(Messianism,

born

emergence of

this development. J. L. Talmon seems to focus

existence"

science was

p.

is the

For Voegelin it is the "re-divinization

stable relationships and traditional realities

schemes of

1960],

event

order.

fully in

prefigured

French Revolution of

85.

the decisive

Marx,

after

meta-

some

needs, which were given special

and change succeeded

suggests a

in the early

in escaping,

thesis

similar

nineteenth

and

with

it

to Voegelin's:

Christian hopes, destroyed itself

by

moral

[Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, moral

that we are tempted to look

inversion has around

for

proved

so

unsatisfactory

"revisionist"

new

solutions

and

(ibid.,

Interpretation

238

Karl Popper, in contrast, identifies the initial

history

beginning

the

with

Western

of

century B.C., according to Popper, "the felt."49 This dates the beginning to be Popper the

Thus

was

attempt

society,'

with

free the

sets

The

its

to

by

started,

Greeks, "the

it its

of

transition

magical

Interest in the human individual

only

aroused.

with

Protagoras

This initial

a .

.

The

and

the responsibility

Popper

beginning

'closed

the tribal or

'open

the

to

faith."

"rational

society'

which

as

is everything and the individual had become a fact.

that the tribe

creed

individual,

and self-assertion

and not

which makes man

philosophy

appeal

tribal hero and savior,

as

only

the center of

its interest began

to men to respect one another and themselves

Socrates.51

the simultaneous of

unreflective commitments

the coUectivist and

attack upon

society

effect.

.

to be due to

appears

tribal

But

from

forces to

nothing, had broken down. Individual initiative

had been

with a

of

sixth

which represents

philosophy,

faith

the

as

man."50

critical powers of

society, and with

closed

to

submission

disruption

As early

strain of civilization was

tribal magical

replace

the

and critical

civilization.

personal

and rational

decision

the effect of this social

compares

of that time to the effect that

"a

serious

individual

of

confrontation

was

traumatic in its

revolution upon

famUy

of

man with

the

quarrel and the

people

breaking

famUy.52 In fact, has upon the chUdren in that up of the family Popper suggests that "civUization has not yet fully recovered from [this] home"

shock of

[The

its

strain

at

least

transition] is

of

social change.

abstract

birth":53

It is the

still

felt

strain created

even

by

society constantly demands from some

in

our own

the effort which

by

us

of our emotional social needs, to

responsibilities.

We must, I

believe, bear

the

endeavor

look

after

cooperation

consequently in our chances of survival, human.54 price we have to pay for being

in the

our

and

ourselves, and to accept

and

size of

partially

in

be

for every

paid

mutual

help,

the population.

and

It is the

there is no comfort to be derived from a sense of nearing

goal, for according to

beginning

an open and

to be rational, to forgo

this strain as the price to

increase in knowledge, in reasonableness, in

Furthermore,

especially in times of

day, life in

of this

49

Open

Society, Vol. I,

50

Ibid.,

p.

"

Ibid.,

p.

190.

52

Ibid.,

p.

177.

53

Ibid.,

p.

1.

54

Ibid.,

p.

176.

55

Ibid.,

p.

175.

1.

Popper, it

seems

that

transition from the closed to the

p.

176.

we

are still

open

only

society.55

at the

Christian

The

reality,

man's existential

ment, tension the

of

insecurity."56

order

The

him fuUness

of selfhood and man

he is

When

men

group,

also

of

being,

Instead

of

part

historical life

of

develop

realistically

In Voegelin's words, "the charac in it give cause for .

.

.

sees

the more

wiU

at one with a supreme

readily to

able

he discover that

true that

a part

the

with

world.

They do

by his

man even

quality when it

that

in

conditions of

their

and

oblivion,

the present tend to rather

estrangement;

"infinitude"

the

of

of

Eternity

is

men,

dimension."

"eternal

choose to use the phrase

earlier,

social

[sic]

a state of

they

remind

I

would

estranged.57

essence

speaking

infinitude

But they thus lived in

not so much create

a

or with some social

authority

their

overlook

literal sense, lost. The

a

oblivion.

is

us that man

of the nature of

of the

individual

of

clearly fulfiUment is estrangement, that to the degree that he is alien to his world. Glenn Tinder thus observes:

incompatibility

the soul, in

faith, because

man's place

man

have felt themselves

dissipate that

is that because

all of this

inevitable

society. and

239

himself in terms of his clearly he frees himself from those beliefs and institutions

they have been

consequent with

in

being

of

more

nature and the more

deny

because

and

condition,

Social Disorder

Christian

the

and alienation are an

a normal condition

teristics

in

reflected

and

from

point that seems to emerge

nature of

lived,

Ambiguity

not

infinite, is

as

Tinder

For, not

as

does,

I have

suggested

to be confused

with a

is uniquely Divine. The creation remains the creation even comes directly into the presence of the Creator. In his temporality,

is ambiguous; in essence, he participates in the Eternal, but of man remains to be fulfilled. Because he participates in the Eternal, he is largely alienated from his world; but because he is tempo ral and finite, he fuUy experiences the inevitable frustrations and limita tions of temporal existence. His temporahty throws him in the midst of the man's nature

this dimension

hazards

of

oblivion

existence,

and

his

eternal

that a total immersion in

Life for the

man

ambiguous nature

has

who

is, by

dimension denies to him the

temporality

emerged

virtue

its

of

"blissful"

might otherwise afford

to the fuUness

fuUness,

a

of

difficult

hfe. In Voegelin's words, "the hazard of existence without a demonic horror; it is hard to bear even for the

is

him. his

discovering and

hazardous

right or reason

stronghearted."58

No

normal

emotional state

man

is

welcomes

alien

for

perennial quest

selfhood

Religion,"

5

"Ersatz

57

Political Imagination,

58

New Science,

p.

estrangement,

to the fulfiUment

p.

and

uncertainty,

tension:

meaning sought by being. Rather, his effort is and

man

this

in his

always

to

11. p.

56. Italics

168. Karl

mine.

Mannheim, in discussing

the

nature

of

ideology, life."

is primarily "to minimize the hazardousness of Ideology and Utopia, translated by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1952), p. 78. suggests

that

its

purpose

Interpretation

240

Here

this condition, to transcend it.

overcome

Polanyi,

feels that

who

man

finds

satisfaction

I

issue

must take

in tension itself.

with

According

to Polanyi: human beings develop this desire for tension in appreciate

the solving of

...

betokens the enters also

forms

popular

puzzles

of

this

into the highest forms

Polanyi finds

a

variety

....

craving for

for anxiety

manifested

in Christian

The

worship is expressly designed to induce

ritual of

one of the

adventure.] We all

[enjoy

gigantic modern amusement

our

industry

dissatisfaction

mental

originality.59

of man's spontaneous

predUection

this

Our

desire; but

forms. Man is

of

to play throughout adult life. Men

animals who continue

tension

and

most

vividly

worship: and sustain

this state of anguish,

surrender and hope.60

Christian worship

its

unresolvable

sustains

tension

manently satisfies,

...

....

a

heuristic

Christianity

craving for

man's

vision which

is

accepted

fosters,

sedulously

dissatisfaction

mental

and

by

for the

in

sake of

a sense per

offering him the

comfort of a crucified God.6i

I

submit

from

that the satisfaction man derives from games

and puzzles comes

in mastering or solving them. The tension involved in game playing becomes enjoyable only to the degree that it is experienced in anticipation of its own resolution, i.e., only inasmuch as it is viewed as a means to another end. No one wUl keep working at a a sense of accomplishment

he knows

puzzle that

offers no

possibUity

of

solution.62

tion must always be present. In solving a puzzle,

faction his

knowing

of

that

he is

This is

able

to control

The hope

of resolu

one experiences

that, however smaU,

the satis segment

not to

say that one cannot enjoy the chaUenge of a game that he does not win; rather, that he cannot enjoy a game he

of

environment.

knows

be

He may know that, in the instance of far more competition, he cannot win it; but then he enjoys the accomplishment of the opposition; or at least he gains satisfaction from cannot

won.

competent

Even in playing against insuperable odds, a player tends to imagine the possibility of his winning. I might even suggest that in some instances the pleasure of efforts at puzzle solving comes from imagining the puzzle as a microcosmic instance of the more serious cosmic heuristic partial mastery.

One knows that the answer to the puzzle has already been but for the moment it may be imagined that a real

endeavor.

"discovered,"

"discovery"

case.

59 60

is

being

made.

This psychology

Of course, for the

Personal Knowledge, Ibid., p. 198.

p.

Ibid.,

62

Milton Rokeach describes the

in pp.

a

puzzle

243-56.

involved,

this is the

something

of the

196.

i

p.

person

of games aUows one to experience

199.

discover that the

"defection"

puzzle

cannot

that takes place as subjects involved

be

solved.

Open

and

Closed

Mind,

Christian

Ambiguity

heuristic

satisfaction of the real

assuming

all

its

dissatisfaction

Where

we

or risk

taking

as an end

dealing

find

with

in

kind

a

"enjoying"

itself,

of

that he is

knowing

whUe

a person

241 not

tension or mental

psychologists tend to agree

form

a

neurosis,

of enjoyment

to be rooted in a desire for self-destruction than in a desire for

likely

more

endeavor,

risks.

that we are then

Social Disorder

and

fulfiUment. The same

critique

tension-inducing

applies, I

aspects of

would

Christian

suggest, to Polanyi's

Whatever

worship.

assessment of

the

satisfaction might

ultimately be derived from the acknowledgment of sin, from religious paradox, or from the anticipation of a final judgment is not related to the anguish that one experiences in affirming these elements of the Christian

faith, but

rather

is

in

rooted

it may

be

not prove to

it that

In the

thinking.63

Even

Christians,

is the

Christian others,

would

not

His joy,

when

be

it is

word of

construed as a product

love

it

as

suggesting

that normal men

do

imply

that it is normal or responsible

of,

reflects the

fact that he

also

tensions, irresolu

not welcome the

I do behavior to flee from

that are a normal part of

not attempt either

it, but

hfe,

not mean or

deny

to

this

with a

contradictory to,

reality that is sometimes quite independent is a burdensome task; as Voegelin

man's wishes

tells us, "it is hard to bear of steadfast strength that

"demonic") aspect of life. Responsible deny or to escape reality. He may try to proves futUe, he must accept it. Coping

to

this

where

realisticaUy in this way and

of

(in Voegelin's terms,

unpleasant

transcend

wishful

God, for judgment, the

and good.

and estrangements

does

man's

word of

belief is affirmed, no less than the desirable, but because it is seen as true.

tions,

man

though

that this

seen as

desirable

of

final

than the word

rather

even

would

pointed out that the

have to insist

because it is

case of the

reality,

find, he experiences Christian faith, there is much

course, in making this affirmation

of

experiences

By

hardly

could

man makes contact with

he had hoped he

what

a sense of satisfaction. about

affirmation, however

the assurance that such

unpleasant, is true. Whenever

for the

even

itself is

not

requires a

kind

by. Erich Fromm

caUs

stronghearted."

easy to come

It

it

"self-strength"; the way one attains it is, in fact, by forging ahead taking on the hazardous chaUenges of life. Others are equaUy circular

and and

"faith."

in explaining how one acquires this quality. Voegelin caUs it For Roho May, it is courage; "Courage is the capacity to meet the

anxiety

which arises as one achieves

elusive

63

Of course, Marx

and

Fromm,

freedom."64

Karl Popper identifies it

among others, have attempted to

what, to them, are the more unacceptable elements of

these

as opiates concocted

of self-hatred what we

usually

totally fails 4

(in the

by

case of

the bourgeoisie (in the case of

Fromm). But Fromm's

regard as an example of wishful

to take

into

account

explain

away

Christianity by describing Marx)

explanation

does

or projections

not represent

thinking. And Marx's explanation

the more prophetic aspects of Christianity.

Man's Search for Himself (New York: Norton, 1953),

p.

224.

Interpretation

242 as

"hope": "True, we need hope; to act, to live without hope But we do not need more, and we must not be

our strength.

We do

not need

wish to caU

certainty."65

it, is

provided

previously mentioned, context of

filled

life,

life

ultimate of at

of

ultimate

aspects of

less than dilemmas make

this

hfe,

This hope, self-strength, to the Christian

God's love

fulfillment,

can

be

and

all the

seen as

by

beyond

given more.

or whatever we

may

the ultimate assurance I

acceptance of

vexatious,

less than

goes

him. Within the

demonic,

ultimate

and unful

and, therefore,

as

threats to man's being. This does not eradicate the

or even make

its worst, bearable.

Open Society, Vol. II,

p.

279.

them

less than demonic, but it does

offer

to

social research .

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Philosophy Public & Affairs &

SUMMER 1973

VOL. 4

MICHAEL A. SLOTE

Desert, Consent, and

THOMAS NAGEL

No. 2

Justice

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Vol. 40

March,

1973

No. 1

CONTENTS*

On being unreasonable, MORTON L. Schacrin / Realist foundations of measurement, Henry Byerly and Vincent A. Lazara / Conditions and limitations of predictionmaking in Biology, Zdzislaw Kochanski / Reciprocity in the uncertainty relations, Peter Kirschenmann / Dispositions revisited, William W. Rozeboom / Basic particulars, Donald Brownstein / The ideal scientific theory: a thought experiment, Ervin Laszlo / Discussion: Reflexive predictions, George Romanos / Discussion: Omer on scientific explanation, Charles G. Morgan / Discussion: On Fodor's distinc tion between strong and weak equivalence in machine simulation, A. Rosenberg and N.J. Mackintosh / Discussion: Butts on Whewell's view of true causes, David B. Wilson / Discussion: Reply to David Wilson: Was Whewell interested in true causes?, Robert E. Butts / Discussion: Theoretical terms in infinite theories, Paul Berent / Book reviews / Recent books / Abstracts, Inquiry / Membership list / Announcements. *

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