International Relations and the Problem of Difference
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International Relations and the Problem of Difference
Other titles in the Global Horizons series, edited by Richard Falk, Lester Ruiz, and R.B.J.Walker Methods and Nations: Cultural Governance and the Indigenous Subject Michael J.Shapiro Forthcoming, Spring 2004: Bait and Switch?: Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy Julie Mertus The Declining World Order: America’s Imperial Geopolitics Richard Falk
International Relations and the Problem of Difference Naeem Inayatullah and David L.Blaney
ROUTLEDGE NEW YORK AND LONDON
A volume in the Global Horizons series, edited by Richard Falk, Lester Ruiz, and R.B.J.Walker Published in 2004 by Routledge 29 West 35th Street New York, NY 10001 www.routledge-ny.com Published in Great Britain by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane London EC4P 4EE www.routledge.co.uk Copyright © 2004 by Taylor & Francis Books, Inc. Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group. This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” All rights reserved. No part of this book may be printed or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or any other information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Inayatullah, Naeem. International relations and the problem of difference/Naeem Inayatullah and David L.Blaney. p. cm.—(Global horizons; v. 1) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-415-94637-9 (alk. paper)—ISBN 0-415-94638-7 (pbk.: alk. paper) 1. Intercultural communication. 2. Ethnicity. 3. International relations. 4. International economic relations. I. Blaney, David L. II. Title. III. Series. GN345.6 .I52 2003 303.48′2–dc21 ISBN 0-203-64409-3 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-203-68137-1 (Adobe eReader Format)
Contents
Part I:
Preface
vi
Introduction
1
Difference in the Constitution of IR
17
1.
The Westphalian Deferral
18
2.
Intimate Indians
42
3.
IR and the Inner Life of Modernization Theory
84
Part II: Studies in Difference and Contemporary IR
115
4.
IPE as a Culture of Competition
116
5.
Toward an Ethnological IPE
145
6.
Multiple and Overlapping Sovereignties
168
Epilogue
197
Notes
200
References
217
Index
246
Preface
In the mid-1970s and early 1980s the discipline of international relations (IR) and its subfield international political economy (IPE) displayed a limited engagement with a strong theoretical voice that had emerged from the third world,1 namely dependency theory. We were fortunate to be in graduate school at a time when, along with dependency theory, world systems theory and various types of Marxism were being taken rather seriously. Such, at least, was the case at the University of Denver, where, in the 1980s, the intellectual and social agenda was dominated by the concerns of students from Africa, Asia, and South America. While some of these critical streams of thought retain an institutional presence, dependency theory, as one of our teachers, James Caporaso (1993:470) observes, “died out more from neglect than frontal criticism.” Our sense is that, on the whole, voices from the third world seem to bore and irritate most IR theorists. For us, this weary dismissal seems curious and requires both an explanation and a response. When we first met, in 1980, David was studying East African development and Naeem was continuing his work in development economics. We soon recognized that development studies frustrated us both. We were unable to make sense of the jumble of assumptions and conceptions taken haphazardly from neoclassical and Keynesian economic theory as well as from IR and comparative sociology and politics. Betting that we could gain a more integrated sense of development studies if we traced its origins, we turned to the history of economic and political thought. Under the guidance of David Levine and James Caporaso, this work took us to classical political economy—the Physiocrats, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Hegel, and Marx—but also to Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. We started to recognize that development studies not only rested on economic assumptions but also could rightly be seen as embedded within, and as an extension of, IR. For example, it is not accidental that the primary unit of analysis in development studies is the nation-state. When we finally turned to IR proper, we followed our prior procedure with development studies, with the aim of placing IR theory within the process of its production in time and space. Our goal was to distinguish IR’s potentially insightful elements from its less useful idiosyncrasies.
vii
By the time we entered the discipline in the late 1980s, critical theory, postmodernism, and feminism were pushing the field toward a greater philosophical and political self-consciousness. Having belonged to various study groups in graduate school, which we can now see were aiming to map the possibilities of post-positivist methods, we began to imagine that our work might be welcome in IR. Our combined focus on political theory/political economy and third-world studies did not strike us as a liability, because most students we knew searched for just such tools to explain and understand the particularities of their personal, national, and transnational biographies. We soon discovered, however, that this combination did not quite fit into IR. Seeking to bolster their self-conception as the ultimate source of their creativity, most IR theorists seem to imagine that they spin their theories in a pristine and abstract space that excludes the messiness of the existent world. To the degree that they concern themselves with the third world, it remains little more than a tangential site for theoretical applications. What they expect from people who are acquainted with the third world is not a challenge or a critique of their theoretical models. Rather, the scholar of the third world is required to provide them with raw information or data, but only if and when they need it. We resisted taking our place in a division of labor where ethnographic knowledge becomes merely input for high theorists. Instead, assuming that the view from outside the empire was important and perhaps decisive, we hoped to theorize IR/IPE from a third-world point of view. Serious obstacles delayed this aspiration. Unfamiliarity with the ethnology of publishing in North America permitted us to believe that, presented with enough rigor, we could make our arguments heard by what we were told were the leading journals in the field. Or perhaps more accurately, we vastly underestimated the degree to which arguments from outside the imperium would have to be properly clothed and then made to bow deferentially to editors and referees busy in their fortified castles. After some head pounding at the gates, we did learn—with help from scholars like Rob Walker and Nick Onuf—that others, standing somewhat outside the centers of power, had different concerns and alternative standards. The memory of that pounding did not stay with us only as a personal experience, however. We saw it eventually as part of a larger, much deeper pattern. In light of our argument in this book, we would now suggest that the stiffest opposition we faced was Western culture’s experience with difference itself, a powerful stream of which has treated difference as a kind of degeneration of God’s original perfection. At least since the Reformation and its wars of religious purification, this aspect of Western culture has been so traumatized by the problems of difference that its habitual mode of dealing with it has been to self-righteously ignore it, or to defer confronting it indefinitely. Thus, we argue that the early modern intellectual origins of IR closely align the field with a legacy of colonialism and religious cleansing. We claim that IR will be unable to find its purpose as a study of differences—as a theory of
viii
international and intercultural relations—until we confront this legacy. Fortunately, resources from which we might build alternatives are available. These resources can be located beyond the European imperium, and also as recessive voices within “Western” social and political thought, suggesting the possibility of a post-Western IR that involves not so much the rejection of the “West” but its reimagination. Open/Close: Form and Content A text’s messages may be offered in distinguishable (but not separable) ways: through the meaning of the words and through the manner of their formulation. The formulation—the tone, texture, and the relative presence or absence of open, interpretive space within the text—implicitly conveys the relationship writers hope to establish with readers. Just as an awareness of the importance of form allows writers to create potentially useful symmetries and tensions between content and form, so also a relative lack of such awareness can create obstacles to realizing a writer’s purposes. We came to such a realization relatively late in the process of writing this book. Nevertheless, we hope that the tone and texture of the book mostly avoids the authoritative tone of lecturing, of presenting the book as a monologue. We hope that the text, instead of closing down options, leaves open space—between the various authors we follow and the (sometimes) multiple ways we formulate our points; between paragraphs, chapters, and sections of the book—where we invite readers to a kind of participant engagement within and around the rhythms of our concerns. We experience the text as containing such spaces for our own future work and we hope that others, whether in the form of extension, correction, or refutation, will find the text similarly open. At the same time, we have not, we believe, left the reader without a sense of our voice or our positions on various issues. Thus, those who prefer a good tight lecture may find our presentation as leaning too heavily on impressions and suggestion, while those who favor minimalist guides may find ours a meddling voice. Class/Race/Gender Kind critics have pointed out that our presentation would be richer had we made explicit gestures toward gender. To round out this criticism, we might add that there is also little explicit development of themes surrounding class or race. In this form, the charge is undeniable. On reflection, we might present our book as working in and with the theme of “indianization” (see Mason, 1990:62–63). During Europe’s internally purifying crusades of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, both Catholics and Protestants found it useful to compare the other unfavorably with “Indians.” We might, then, describe the denigration, vilification, and/or demonization as a form of indianizing of the other. Indianizing grew to have such currency that it was effectively applied to
ix
peasants, the working poor, and other cultural outcasts within Europe and to the culturally “backward” beyond Europe. Though we have not come across much explicit reference to this practice in our foray into these centuries (see, however, Campbell, 1992: chapter 5), it is difficult not to speculate that the witch hunts of the era revealed “witches” as a gendered sibling of the “Indians.” Likewise, we pay only limited attention to the often-discussed ways Amerindians and other nonEuropean peoples were feminized as part of understanding or justifying their subordination.2 We want to be clear that the notion of indianization does not subsume other categories; it suggests overlap and intersection, not isomorphism. It has been pointed out to us—and this is discussed in Chowdhry and Nair’s Power, Postcolonialism, and International Relations (2002: introduction)—that the truly difficult work is to sort out the similarities and differences among processes of proletarianizing, feminizing, racializing, and, we would add, indianizing others. The hard but necessary work of locating and tracing out such intersectionality is a challenge to which this book only partly rises.3 However, we hope that the thematic rhythms of our book resonate with those who are attempting these projects and that the absences in our text might be seen as silent spaces within which others may accent their own beats, supplementing, complementing, and especially playing against the ostinato or tumbao of our rhythms. Acknowledgments Many people have played a special role in the process of bringing this book to fruition. Rob Walker has been a source of encouragement and gentle criticism from the beginnings of our journey into the domains of IR. We were very pleased that he wanted to include our manuscript in the series he was helping to launch at Routledge. Zillah Eistenstein read a draft of each chapter. Her precise criticism helped us recognize our overall argument, and her enthusiastic support stretched us toward the fuller potential of the work. Nick Onuf embraced our work at moments when we ourselves were reluctant to embrace it fully. He has read almost every chapter in this book at some point and has been a careful, thorough, and generous critic. Peter Mandaville has taken on our book as a project, promoting it shamelessly. For that and for organizing a session at the European Consortium of Political Research, in which the initial chapters were read, we will always be grateful. Patrick Jackson has also stood behind us steadfastly, pushing us to get the book done. We also need to thank him for organizing a panel at the Northeast International Studies Association meeting dedicated to the book manuscript. And thanks to those—Rob, Beate Jahn, Iver Neumann, Siba Grovogui, Robin Riley, Yale Ferguson, Edward Weisband, and Stephen Rosow— who read large sections of the manuscript for those panels and commented so expertly. Kurt Burch has been a constant source of friendship and careful reading and editing at numerous moments in the process of writing this book. The loss is to the discipline. Himadeep Muppidi has been a fellow traveler down the path of
x
postcolonial scholarship and finding a home at a liberal arts college. We have too often failed to respond to his most serious and incisive criticism. Two of our professors from graduate school also warrant special mention. Jim Caporaso has a lifelong influence on those who are lucky enough to meet him. We try to emulate as best we can his dedication to teaching his students to meet the highest standards of excellence in scholarship. Though he has read little of the text of this book, David Levine’s influence on our work has been profound, including in ways he might not fully approve of. We want to thank them for helping to launch all of this. Many have shared comments and assistance. We want to thank: John Agnew, Jonathan Bach, Asma Barlas, Tarak Barkawi, Mike Barkun, Don Beachler, Shampa Biswas, Terry Boychuk, Hannah Britton, John Burdick, Stephen Chan, Geeta Chowdhry, Matt Davies, Joel Dinnerstein, Kevin Dunn, Bud Duvall, Tony Favro, Gary Fountain, Chip Gagnon, Chuck Green, Xavier Guillaume, Sandra Halperin, Gil Harris, Harry Hirsch, Hon Tze-ki, Aida Hosic, Dominique JacquinBerdal, Inayatullah, Sara Inayatullah, Shishir Jha, Edward Keene, Sung Ho Kim, Helen Kinsella, Fritz Kratochwil, Sankaran Krishna, Hannes Lacher, Mark Laffey, Yosef Lapid, Andrew Latham, Richard Little, Dan MacIntosh, Kate Manzo, Teresita Martinez-Vergne Jennifer Mitzen, Alexander Moon, Craig Murphy, the late John Nagle, Sheila Nair, Meghana Nayak, Daniel Nexon, Haider Nizamani, Andrew Oros, Mustapha Pasha, Mark Rupert, Ahmed Samatar, Stefan Senders, Michael Shapiro, Kara Shaw, Meili Steele, Jan Thomson, Ann Towns, Ruth Turner, Latha Varadarajan, Jeremy Varon, Marco Verweij, Ritu Vij, Cindy Weber, Wendy Weber, Birgit Weis, Jutta Weldes, Alex Wendt, John Williams, Juliet Williams, and others whose names we might have temporarily misplaced. We have been unable to fully exploit the richness of their comments and concerns. David would like to thank the University of Chicago for providing a hospitable and challenging environment for work during the 1998–99 academic year and the University of lowa for access to its facilities for the academic year 2001–2. Both Naeem and David would like to thank their institutions—Ithaca College and Macalester College, respectively—for funding that supported this work. David would like to thank three student assistants—Lubos Bosak, Kara Bovee, and Egle Tamosaityte—for assistance with the manuscript in the final stages. Chapters 1, 3, 4, 5 are new and expanded versions of previous articles: Blaney, David L., and Naeem Inayatullah (2002) “Neo-Modernization? IR and the Inner Life of Modernization Theory,” European Journal of International Relations 8(1):103–37. Blaney, David L, and Naeem Inayatullah (2000) “The Westphalian Deferral,” International Studies Review 2(2):29–64. Blaney, David L, and Naeem Inayatullah (1998) “International Political Economy as a Culture of Competition,” in Dominique Jacquin-Berdal,
xi
Andrew Oros, and Marco Verweij, eds., Culture in World Politics, pp. 61– 88. London: Macmillan, 1998. Inayatullah, Naeem, and David L.Blaney (1999) “Towards an Ethnological IPE: Karl Polanyi’s Double Critique of Capitalism,” Millennium 28(2):311–40. Finally, if this book emerges from the community of names listed above, it also emerges from our families. Naeem would like to take a humble bow of gratitude to his siblings—Sohail, Noman, and Sara Inayatullah—for their long-term support, to his parents—Zubeda and Inayatullah—for striving toward truth, to his children—Kamal and Shahid—for vivifying temporality, and above all to his wife—Sorayya Khan—for unbending faith, uncommon courage, and sparkling infinite inspiration. David would like to thank his mother, Helen, and remember his father, John, for their faith even in what they could not fully comprehend. And, to Sherry Gray, thanks for believing in me and my work at those moments when I doubted.
Introduction
One of the oldest and most persistent questions in Western philosophy—and as far as I understand it, in Eastern thought too— has been the “problem” of the one and the many and/or identity and difference. —Richard J.Bernstein, The New Constellation [W]e have all been programmed to respond to human differences between us with fear and loathing and to handle that difference in one of three ways: ignore it, and if that is not possible, copy it if we think it is dominant, or destroy it if we think it is subordinate. But we have no patterns for relating across differences as equals. —Audre Lorde, “Age, Race, Class, Sex” The Colonial Legacy The discipline of international relations (IR) is hamstrung by a relative incapacity to speak about “the situation of the Third World—the injuries done to it through conquest and colonialism and the justice of its demands” (Inayatullah and Blaney, 1996:68; see also Neuman, 1998; and Puchala, 1998). This recurrent, if unheeded, protest has informed intellectual responses to dominant perspectives in IR from dependency theory to various postcolonial approaches. Our own intellectual efforts grow from a sense that IR as a discipline does not (except very thinly) assess the quality of cultural interactions that shape and are shaped by the changing structures and processes of the international system. More specifically, while competitive self-help is taken for granted—as backdrop to the entire project of understanding state behavior (including cooperative behavior)—IR has few resources for addressing how the cultural impact of political and economic competition denigrates the varying forms of life of “nonWestern” peoples.1 More important, because competition is taken for granted IR fails to untangle the cultural logic of competition itself. It therefore is unable to give anything but a crude and caricatured understanding of the complex motives and desires involved in colonial/neocolonial subjugation or in the resistance to
2 • INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF DIFFERENCE
domination. And, in its conventional neorealist or neoliberal guises, IR misses the way international society—as both a system of states and a world political economy—forms a competition of cultures in which the principles of sovereignty and self-help work to sanctify inequality and subjugate those outside of the centers of “the West.” We have investigated these themes in much of our earlier work,2 some of which appears in new and expanded forms as part II of this book. However, the more fundamental and challenging task is to explain why IR fails to confront seriously the role of colonialism, neocolonialism, and various postcolonial responses to colonialism and its legacies. One implication of part I of this book is that we can more clearly see the current shape of IR as itself partly a legacy of colonialism. The attempt to understand this failure has driven us to examine the late medieval-early modern context for the origins of the political imagination informing contemporary IR, including, in our view, theories of modernization of which IR is a crucial component. In the process, we have come to translate our task as explaining IR’s relative incapacity to acknowledge, confront, and explore difference. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Europe are often treated as a period of transition to the modern world, for which the “discovery” of the Americas and the Peace of Westphalia serve as key markers within the “creation myth” of modernity. With Westphalia, as the story goes, the pretensions of a universal Christian order gave way to a pluralistic society of states. In the wake of bloody religious warfare and the expansion of Europe beyond its provincial narrowness, political and social thought is said to have gradually rid itself of religious foundations, spurring the trend to secular rule and the beginnings of a more liberal and tolerant sensibility. Our reading of this period in the first two chapters substantially revises this conventional view. We argue that this interpretation blinds much of IR to the various creative responses to difference that existed during this period and the way the intellectual discourses of the time—in response to both the wound of the wars of “religious cleansing” and the challenges of incorporating the peoples of the Americas into European worldviews (and empires)—mostly reinforced, rather than challenged, the interpretation of difference as a dangerous aberration from the norms of stability, safety, and order. Theory and practice aimed to contain, domesticate, or destroy difference—to establish an “empire of uniformity,” in James Tully’s (1995b) felicitous phrase. Though this legacy weighs heavily on the present, most particularly in the form of theories of modernization that pervade our understandings of international/global order, we also search for resources that offer alternative responses to difference. We argue that these can be harvested even from the rocky soils of European thought about the Amerindians and from contemporary theories of modernization. We might say, then, that the purposes of this book are to explain the failure of IR to confront the problem of cultural differences and, perhaps less modestly, to begin to reimagine IR as a perhaps uniquely placed site for the exploration of the
INTRODUCTION • 3
relation of wholes and parts and sameness and difference—and always the one in relation to the other. We also aim to provide some preliminary examples of what such a reimagination involves for IR and for our understanding of a postcolonial world. The One and the Many What might initially appear to be a thorough repudiation of the canons of IR is only partially so. As we have worked to place these concerns about cultural difference at the center of our inquiries, we have found ourselves moved—in a way we no longer experience as ironic—by certain features of canonical “realist” texts.3 For example, though there is much to criticize in E.H.Carr’s 1939 account of the polarity of the realist and utopian moments of IR,4 we experience teaching The Twenty Years’ Crisis (Carr, 1964 [1939]) as rewarding and, at times, inspirational. We find common cause with the task of exposing the “historically conditioned” character of schemes that lay claim to “absolute and a priori principles,” or “unmasking” a utopianism “which serves merely as a disguise for the interests of the privileged” (Carr, 1964 [1939]:68, 93). Though Hans Morgenthau is a less inspirational thinker, it is not so difficult to identify also with his strictures against a “crusading spirit” that attempts to impose political, moral, or religious consensus (Morgenthau, 1963:561–62). We share his view that such a spirit produced the devastation and brutality of the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and, we would add, is responsible perhaps for much of the oppression and violence of our own times. What we need not allow, nonetheless, is for these canonical texts to be used to try to erase important questions of ethics and justice from the domain of international theory.5 Despite such attempts, these questions cannot be erased. Because “moral and ethical self-characterizations” are central to human existence, human beings live “inescapably in a space of ethical questions” (Taylor, 1990:305). International social life can be seen, then, as “a world of everyday ethics” in which people live according to and with the “standards that make their worlds inescapably their own” (Onuf, 1998a:669–70). And, if the theory and practice of international relations is intrinsically ethical, being “already constituted through accounts of ethical possibility,” there is no reason to import “an achieved body of principles, norms and rules”—codified by social and political theorists—into the domain of IR (Walker, 1993:50–51). The point is that we should not treat IR as an amoral realm—an absence or gap that must be filled by ethicists. When we construct the ethical problem this way—as a contest between realpolitik and ethics—we risk undermining important ethical values and meanings in the name of ethics. This conclusion sustains the suspicion of crusaders and global visionaries that we share with Carr and Morgenthau. But there is more. If, as we have suggested, international theory and practice are constituted through accounts of ethical possibility and are lived as a world of (at least
4 • INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF DIFFERENCE
implicit) ethical purpose, then ethical inquiry is in an important respect “descriptive.” That is, international theory finds its content within the ongoing theory and practice of IR, not in the construction of an external or absolute standpoint against which international relations may be evaluated and reformed (adapted from Lamb, 1979:75–96). Indeed, the idea that the analyst is inescapably embedded in international theory and practice rules out the possibility of an appeal to any such “decontextualized or archimedian standpoint” (Postone, 1993:87; see also Calhoun, 1995:86–87). Rather, international theory involves “drawing…a moral map” of ourselves in the world that articulates what things mean to us, the import they carry for us (Taylor, 1985:67). International theory is also, then, a “continuing conversation” with prior or alternative mappings of the ethical universe, including both scholarly and everyday accounts of the meaning of these practices (see Lamb, 1979:79). Highlighting the “descriptive” moment in ethical inquiry need not obscure its critical role. Social life always contains some “play” in the tension between ethical meanings and aspirations and the actual shape of social practice. This tension suggests the ability for change, for growth, and that an account of the limits of the present and the alternatives for the future may be an important part of realizing such growth (Lamb, 1979:106–11). Put differently, the purpose of critical international theory is to uncover alternative possibilities hidden by our understandings of international relations, to show that these understandings contain within them the possibility of a critical stance toward current theory and practice (adapted from Postone, 1993:88; and Iris Young, 1990:6). Ashis Nandy (1987b:3), somewhat more expansively, refers to this as the production of a “creative tension”: by exposing the “gap between reality and hope,” we invigorate “a source of cultural criticism and a standing condemnation of everyday life to which we otherwise tend to get reconciled.” Thus, critical thought necessarily maintains an “antagonistic connection” to the social world (Walzer, 1988:22). Partly this is an acknowledgment of the fact, noted earlier, that there is no transcendental position from which to evaluate social life. As Iris Young (1990:5–6) suggests, “normative reflection” gains critical purchase, not from “some previously discovered rational ideas of the good and the just,” but from a “socially situated” capacity to hear “a cry of suffering or distress” or to feel distress. If “the given is experienced in relation to desire,” then it is “the desire to be happy” that “creates the distance, the negation, that opens the space for criticism of what is.” This moment of connection also partly involves recognition of the self-contradictory character of two other stances—resignation in the face of the intolerable and radical rejection of all existing values, necessitating an entirely new form of social life. The critic’s simultaneous connection to and distance from existing social life is defined, therefore, by his or her capacity to employ the “symbolic resources” of existing traditions in order to radicalize those traditions (Mouffe, 1992:1–2; 1993:9–11).
INTRODUCTION • 5
Though we aim to practice some form of immanent critique of global social and political arrangements, we are left feeling a bit uneasy. The task of critics, as we have described it thus far, is to articulate our implicit and explicit values and aspirations, exposing our failures to live up to these values or realize these aspirations, and to point to those features of our social theories and practices that explain, or are complicit with, our failures and the suffering we and others experience. But whose values and aspirations form the common ethical world to which the critic refers? Along which affective register are we to embrace desire and measure suffering? That is, the persuasiveness of the critic’s case rests on the assumption that there exists a substantial backdrop of agreed-upon values, a relatively shared ethical or cultural tradition, or a mostly common register of desire and feeling. Thus, we hesitate. Immanent critique appears to assume a common social world—a “we” to which the critic refers—and it is those very claims of global unity and moral universality that we, like Carr and Morgenthau, view with suspicion. IR offers a typical response to our uneasiness with cosmopolitan pretensions, in the form of a communitarian international political theory (see Brown, 1992: part I). The communitarian vision embraces a society of states. International society is imagined as a “practical association” that is committed principally to the mutual coexistence of the varied and competing goals and values of the “purposive” associations—the states—within which people live (Nardin, 1983). As a “compact of coexistence” (Bull, 1977:91) or a kind of “tolerant society” (Walzer, 1997), a society of states is necessarily a “very weak regime,” embracing only a “thin” conception of the good (Walzer, 1997:19; 1994: chapter 4), or a set of common institutions, norms, and values that supports mutual accommodation but necessarily limits any attempt to pursue more encompassing goals or establish the institutions of a cosmopolitan order (Bull, 1977: chapters 3, 4; 1966). In Walzer’s (1994: xi) terms, ethical inquiry in an international society divides into two kinds of “moral argument” that parallel the “inside/ outside” construction constitutive of IR (see Walker, 1993): the juxtaposition of the domestic political community of order and justice and the less cooperative and more dangerous relations among political communities. With “people abroad” and “across different cultures,” Walzer (1994:xi) claims that we engage in moral argument concerned with (and largely restricted to) the very thin life of mutual accommodation that we share. By contrast, “among ourselves, here at home,” we engage in moral argument that draws upon the “thickness of our own history and culture.” In such a world, cosmopolitan social criticism is treated very nearly as a contradiction in terms. The common backdrop of values and norms of international society is too thin and too circumscribed by the imperative of mutual coexistence to sustain much of a “we” to whom the social critique might appeal. Social criticism is possible, but it is always “local” and “thick “grounded in the local/national political community that provides the “richly referential, culturally resonant,” and “locally established symbolic system and network of meanings” on which ethical argument depends. Thus, Walzer (1988:
6 • INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF DIFFERENCE
232) sees immanent critique as intrinsically a multiple or “pluralizing activity” in that the critic necessarily engages a particular, localized ethical vision, distinct from others. Such a negative utopia has appeal. Ashis Nandy (1987b:13) has argued that utopian visions of cosmopolitan order consistently raise the problem of “conflicting values” and that we might be better off with relatively “unheroic” visions. It is precisely this worry—that claims of universal values are accompanied by a temptation to impose values on the recalcitrant, resulting in violence and domination—that we share with Morgenthau and Carr. Surely, as Bull and Walzer argue, a world of live-and-let-live—a negative utopia of tolerance—is preferable to the bloodletting associated with moral crusading across political and cultural borders. However, as we have already hinted and as we discuss in more detail in chapter 1, the negative utopia of a society of states achieves far less than is claimed. With the emergence of the states system, the differences constituting and complicating each state as a particular political community are kept separate and managed within the territorial boundaries of the state. This demarcation and policing of the boundary between the “inside” and “outside” of the political community defines the problem of difference principally as between and among states; difference is marked and contained as international difference. This construction of difference allows us to claim to “solve” the problem by negotiating a modus vivendi among political communities. However, the problem of difference remains pervasive. The bounded political community constructs (and is constructed by) the other. Beyond its boundaries, the other lurks as a perpetual threat in the form of other states, antagonistic groups, imported goods, and alien ideas. The other also appears as difference within, vitiating the presumed but rarely, if ever, achieved “sameness.” The other within the boundaries of the political community is “managed” by some combination of hierarchy, eradication, assimilation or expulsion, and tolerance. The external other is left to suffer or prosper according to its own means (though its poverty or prosperity may be experienced as a threat); it is interdicted at border crossings, balanced and deterred; it is defeated militarily and colonized if need be. Indeed, colonial relationships have long existed as a separable mode of, or perhaps as a supplement to, relations among sovereign states (Keene, 2002). Given the tragic consequences of a society of particularistic states, we cannot be surprised at the strength of the cosmopolitan impulse to erase or transcend that particularism. Two options are made available, each defined as the antithesis of the other: a world of independent states or a cosmopolitan order. The competing impulses to divide and separate or unify and homogenize seem to go hand in hand. If the idea of international society serves as a “warning” about the dangers of political identity and community beyond the territorial state (for example, some form of world empire), an international society of states also calls forth the very “longing for reconciliation and integration” expressed in cosmopolitan conceptions and a “more universally conceived humanity”
INTRODUCTION • 7
(Walker, 1993:15, 17–19). There is a pervasive fear of both an imperial uniformity and the divisiveness of a particularized world. We are drawn to a broadly different description of the world that suggests the limits of both cosmopolitan and communitarian conceptions. While acknowledging the power of the idea of an international society of states to capture key features of international social and political life, we see such a picture as underemphasizing the “horizontal forces and ties that cut across state frontiers” (Neumann and Welsh, 1991:327). These forces and ties make possible forms of life and claims of identity that cannot be simply mapped onto the national demarcations of the society of states (Shapiro and Alker, 1996; Appadurai, 1996), though it is equally unreasonable to insist that we are arriving at a genuine global culture (Friedman, 1990; Hannerz, 1990; 1992; 1996). If it is “one world,” it is also “many worlds” (to borrow a phrase from Walker, 1988). And, just as we are unwilling to give up the idea of the unity of humanity, what that means in practice remains far from clear and is, perhaps, the site of a necessary contestation (Cheah and Robbins, 1998). We would highlight, instead, the “cultural complexity” of the world (Hannerz, 1992): that competing visions for constructing global social and political space form and circulate within and across complex cultural terrains (Nandy, 1987b:16, 18; Appadurai, 1996:23, 64); that these visions and the traditions and cultures that spawn them are overlapping and interacting, such that every identity owes a debt to alterity and every vision is multiple, containing dominant and recessive voices that conjoin with others near and far (Kennan Ferguson, 1996:176; Nandy, 1987b:17; Verma, 1990:129; Appadurai, 1996:46); and, finally, that processes of cultural differentiation and interaction have entailed relations of domination and subordination (Todorov, 1984; Nandy, 1987b:12–15; Verma, 1990). If these descriptions are reasonably accurate, critical inquiry occurs against a complex backdrop of values, aspirations, and desires—a situation of ethical complexity, exhibiting less a common sense of ethical valuation and more a substantial incommensurability among alternative visions and traditions. As John Gray (1998:20) explains, incommensurability entails, first, the claim that the “human good is irreducibly diverse”—that the “goods of human life are many” and “cannot be derived from or reduced to any one value.” Second, incommensurability requires that these human goods are “often incompatible and rivalrous,” such that goods and values “may crowd one another out, exclude one another altogether, or belong to ways of life that are by necessity uncombinable.” Finally, “there is no principle or set of principles which enable conflicts among values to be resolved in ways acceptable to all reasonable people.” That is, “[d] iverse and conflicting goods and evils cannot be rationally compared or traded off” (see also Kekes, 1994:46; and Bernstein, 1991:59–67). Given this ethical complexity and incommensurability, cultural values and ethical traditions, whether extended beyond their points of origin or not, always stand (implicitly or explicitly) as a judgment on the ways of life and ethical standards of others (Bernstein, 1991:66; Nandy, 1987b:8, 11–12). And, to return to Carr’s fears
8 • INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF DIFFERENCE
about those who speak on behalf of humanity, we are likely to find that such claims are sustained only via a process by which resistance is both repressed and constructed as an uncivilized, inferior “other” (Said, 1978; Gong, 1984; 1998; Verma, 1990; Spurr, 1993). We need to keep in mind that the claim of ethical incommensurability does not entail that alternative visions and traditions are fully incompatible, precluding any overlap or commonality in values and visions. Nor does it rule out the possibility of comparing or evaluating competing values or ways of life (Bernstein, 1991:65–66; Kekes, 1994:46, 59; Gray, 1998:21–24). However, we are still left wondering how it is possible, in a world of diverse and often incommensurable values and visions that cut across localities, states, and regions, to make the kinds of comparisons and evaluations necessary to sustain an ethical argument that is generally compelling. It remains unclear how it is possible to move beyond claims that possess more than a parochial appeal or resonate for more than a narrow band of humanity. Or, even where agreement appears to exist, we might be quite concerned about how such “agreement” was forged and wish to resist the way such “universalism” can become a civilizing project imposed on the recalcitrant. Thus, despite the current popularity of various critical, global political projects,6 the possibility of international theory as a form of global social criticism—locating tensions between (shared) aspirations and (common) social practices—remains unresolved. How might we respond to the somewhat or mostly incommensurable visions and traditions of others? Co-suffering and the Other Within The early voyages to the Americas were marked by “an inability to understand or be understood”—a situation of “opacity” (Greenblatt, 1991:24; 1976:576; see also Zamora, 1993:158–59). This “problem” of communication, Greenblatt (1991:24) remarks, no doubt contributed to the sense of wonder with which the strangeness of the New World was generally greeted. Yet this sense of awe was difficult to hold onto; wonder was overwhelmed all too easily by a desire to linguistically and materially appropriate the Americas, abetted by the European sense of moral and cultural superiority (Greenblatt, 1991:9, 13). We read Greenblatt, then, as suggesting that the initial uncertainty and ambiguity of these types of encounters are resolved all too often by an assertion of superiority and outright conquest. However, Greenblatt (1991:25) also holds open the possibility of a different response to the wonderment produced by the experience of “otherness.” Rather than appropriating the other, we might be able to locate that sense of wonderment, of options beyond the banal and taken-for-granted that are hidden, or perhaps repressed, within ourselves and our own ways of life. We will discuss this possibility—an “ethnological moment” in Todorov’s terms or a “struggle for cultural self-discovery” in Nandy’s—more fully below. It is this
INTRODUCTION • 9
potential (or hope) that inspires and animates our inquiries into both the origins and contemporary character of IR as theory and practice.7 Following Mary Louise Pratt (1992:6–7), we refer to this space of the discovery of the other as the “contact zone”. The contact zone invokes “the spatial and temporal copresence of subjects previously separated by geographic and historical disjunctures, and whose trajectories now intersect.” However, the historical experience is that these intersecting trajectories have been infused with inequalities of power; that is, the contact zone has generally become a “space of colonial encounters.” Within this space of unequal encounters, colonizer and colonized cannot be conceived as radically separable; rather, they are “subjects” only as “constituted in and by their relations to each other.”8 Though these relations are certainly defined by “conditions of coercion, radical inequality, and intractable conflict,” this does not require “diffusionist accounts of conquest and domination” that obscure the “interactive” and “improvisational dimensions of colonial encounters.” We second Pratt’s insistence on the interactive and improvisational quality of the encounters with others, but emphasize also the role of learning via trial and error. Uncertain if they understand or are understood (to draw again on Greenblatt), actors plod along, often stumbling and attempting to right themselves. And, yet, the outcome is not necessarily salutary. These frustrations may prompt humility in the face of difference or they may spur a voracious hunger for certainty and mastery or one followed by the other, or any number of responses in between. Chapter 2 involves an investigation of this range of responses as they emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In earlier work (Blaney and Inayatullah, 1994; Inayatullah and Blaney, 1996), we have drawn on the writings of Tzvetan Todorov and Ashis Nandy to give some sense of the varying responses of the self to the “discovery” of the other.9 Todorov (1984:42–43), based on his study of the conquest of America, argues that a common pattern of meanings and identities—a “double movement”— emerges in situations of initial contact. However strong our egocentric need to make sense of the world in our own terms, and against the backdrop of commonality that this presents, “discovery” nevertheless reveals difference, that the world is not one and our view of it does not exhaust its possibilities. Despite this revelation and the initial sense of wonderment that Greenblatt highlights, otherness is not readily or consistently recognized. Here Columbus is exemplary.10 Unable to sustain this sense of wonderment,11 Columbus tends to translate the initial experience of difference into a conviction of the inferiority of the other. This status then justifies the various forms of ill treatment and exploitation meted out to the Indians. But there is a second moment in Columbus’s response. Further contact with the Indians reveals or produces commonalities between the Spaniards and the other. This emergent sense of commonality brings with it an inchoate recognition of the common humanity of the other. However, this limited moment of equality comes only at the high price of negating differences between self and other. Again quite typically, Columbus becomes blind to differences, projecting his own values onto the other. Hence the demand, often backed by
10 • INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF DIFFERENCE
force, for assimilation. Wonderment is thus dissolved into the double movement: difference becomes inferiority, and the possibility of a common humanity requires assimilation. Consistent with Pratt, knowledge of and action toward the other in the contact zone mostly reflects and expresses this framing of possibilities, constructing archetypal colonial relationships (Todorov, 1984: chapters 2, 3, especially pages 127–29, 177). As Todorov’s portrayal of Hernando Cortés makes clear, growing knowledge of the other does not immediately produce sympathy and a fuller understanding. Rather, knowledge of the other, inflected by the equation of difference and inferiority, becomes a means for the physical destruction, enslavement, or cruel exploitation of the other. In the case of a young Bartolome de Las Casas, “love” for the other—based on a sense of the Amerindians’ common humanity; that is, their potential for Christian piety—works to obscure differences. This presumption of commonality, joined with Las Casas’s (rather meager) knowledge of the other, becomes the basis for colonial conversion—an assimilation of the other to the self that promises cultural, if not physical, destruction. What is precluded within the reflexes of the double movement is the possibility of recognizing the other as both different and equal (Todorov, 1984: 249). The responses, described here as a double movement, accomplish a form of “splitting.” As Jessica Benjamin (1988:25–31, 62–63) tells us, “splitting” occurs when there is a breakdown in the mutuality of interaction between self and other. Maintaining a sense of balance between two subjects, each demanding recognition from the other, involves complex interactions and fragile interrelationships in a zone of psychological and social contact.12 Parallel to Pratt, Benjamin’s contact zone is characterized by ambiguities, frustrations, and uncertainties. The temptation, then, is to try to replace the ambiguities of the ongoing balancing act and the frustrations entailed by the essential tension between two subjects with a relationship of mastery and servility. Where the uncertainty of one’s position vis a vis the other is difficult, even impossible, to bear, the self may be driven by the desire to move from a relationship of mutuality and interdependence to one of autonomy and dominance on one side and dependence and servility on the other. As Benjamin explains, this movement from mutuality to domination involves splitting—an attempt to purify the self of the need for the other. In splitting, “the two sides are represented as opposite and distinct tendencies,” where “one side is devalued, the other idealized, and each is projected onto different objects,” “so that they are available to the subject only as alternatives” (Benjamin, 1988:63). Instead of recognizing the possibility of the overlap of self and other, boundaries are rigidly drawn, carefully policed, and mapped onto the difference between good and evil. This tendency to split apart and then freeze difference and commonality into mutually exclusive, axiologically polarized extremes, as in the double movement, is “the pattern for every form of domination” (Benjamin, 1988:218).
INTRODUCTION • 11
Nevertheless, the contact zone admits of other possibilities. For example, Todorov’s inquiries (1984:185–93, 225, 240–41) reveal learning and growth and the emergence of responses that begin to move against the double movement and the mechanism of splitting. Some, like Las Casas and Bernardino de Sahagún, may come to adopt a kind of “perspectivism” in their understanding of the other. Rather than simply effacing the other by assimilation, the cultural practices and traditions of others are placed beside one’s own, both differences and commonalities (and strengths and weaknesses) are noted, and a certain overlap of views, if not a personal hybridity, is constructed and revealed. More commonly, as Todorov (1984:240–41, 250) explains, the stance toward the other remains that of the “comparativist,” where difference is expressed largely in one’s own terms; by appropriating the other within one’s own cultural categories, the values and visions of the other are thoroughly obscured. Though acknowledged, the internal multiplicity of the hybrid is evaluated according to standards that continue to split self and other, privileging the imperial, Spanish elements of the self while denigrating the Indian aspects. Though multiple voices may be given play, they are juxtaposed, but not allowed to intermingle in a process of critical self-reflection. In the latter, which Todorov labels an “ethnological” stance, the other becomes a resource for a self-examination that might substantially alter not only how the self sees the other, but also how the self views its own culture and traditions. If we are to interact as ethnologists, we would need to learn how to treat the doubts and ambiguities generated in the contact zone as resources. Only then could we become parties to a conversation that “contributes to the reciprocal illumination of one culture by another.” It is Nandy who provides a particularly compelling vision of a potential “dialogue” in the contact zone. For Nandy, this means reshaping the “space in public discourse” so that the parties to the “civilizational encounters of our time” meet on grounds of equality (Nandy, 1987a:118), so that they “come together to make culture-to-culture dialogue a reality [and] establish a new plural future through cross-cultural dialogues” (Sardar et al., 1993: 90). However, as in Todorov’s account, if the interactions and improvizations shaping encounters in the contact zone are to take on the form of dialogue, participants need to negotiate the polarizing tendencies characteristic of the “psychology of colonialism” (Nandy, 1983:ix-xii). As Nandy (1983:4–18) argues, British colonial domination was organized discursively along dimensions of both gender and age, invoking hierarchy—strength and weakness, dominance and submission —via parallel polarizations of masculinity and femininity and maturity versus childhood and old age. By mapping these polarities onto the British and Indian selves, British dominance was constructed as manly rule over submissively feminine India, and a vibrant European adulthood was counterpoised to an at once infantile and decrepit, aged East. The colonial project was the logical extension of this act of splitting: India requires the British other as a strict headmaster and physician to whose tutoring and prescription it must submit.
12 • INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF DIFFERENCE
But, for Nandy, the contact zone also contains critical potentials. The cultural spaces revealed and constructed by these “intersecting trajectories” are complex and overlapping. Cultures and traditions face each other not as homogenous and fixed entities. Though “shared” in important respects, cultures are more like an “open-ended text” than a “closed book” (Nandy, 1987b:2; 1987a:118); traditions are layered, comprising “different levels or parts,” or perhaps dominant and recessive moments (Nandy, 1987b:17). And no matter how different, the subjects of cultural encounters can find connections and overlaps between their own values and visions and the various “levels and parts” and dominant and recessive moments of the cultural practices and traditions of the other (Nandy, 1987b:54– 55). In some cases, the responses to domination that grow from this overlapping cultural space may prove largely self-contradictory. In an effort to establish or restore a mutuality of relationships, the subordinated self may lose, or perhaps repress, elements of itself. Indeed, far too much of Indian resistance, Nandy (1983:19–24) explains, involved an effort to assimilate by recovering those “British” aspects of the Indian self, unacknowledged or repressed by the British. Figures like Michael Madhusudan Dutt and Bankimchandra Chatterjee are exemplary in their search for the British self and British valuations of India within Indian cultures and traditions themselves. Yet Nandy sees this as the search for a recessive voice that may be reclaimed and elevated only after it has been purified of the residual elements of Indian backwardness and submissiveness. Recovering the Indian self in this way involves a simultaneous loss of the self. Efforts to maintain the purity of the British self are similarly costly for British interlocutors (Nandy, 1983:40, 65–70). Policing the boundary between colonizer and colonized denies the possibility that the colonizer will learn or be healed by the insights or responses of the other. And the British are forced, like Kipling and Orwell in Nandy’s account, to repress those parts of themselves that link them to India, that, more strongly, show them to be Indian. More creative responses also are enabled by the intersecting trajectories of the contact zone. Nandy (1983:36–48) describes how a small but important group— Sister Nivedita (born Margaret Noble), Anne Besant, Mira Behn (born Madeline Slade), and C.F.Andrews—evade the colonial imperative to police the boundary between self and other. Not only do they distance themselves from dominant aspects of their own society, using Indian “versions of religiosity, knowledge and social interaction” as an internal mirror, they also build on this critical selfreflection to envision and fight for forms of society and political life beyond the oppressions of colonialism. Gandhi, similarly but more profoundly in Nandy’s (1983:36–37, 48–51) account, creates alliances between recessive traditions in the West and themes in India’s cultures that offer a vision of liberation from colonialism—for both the Indians and the British. These figures represent for Nandy the achievement of something like Todorov’s ethnological moment, but with a distinctly critical and political cast.
INTRODUCTION • 13
As with Todorov, the ability to acknowledge that the other is not simply external but also exists within the self is only the first step. More powerful and creative is the capacity to uncover the other within as a source of critical self-reflection and cultural transformation. For Nandy, the key is that each figure uses his or her own experience of suffering not only to establish a connection to the suffering of others, but also to make overcoming of suffering central to thought and action. In Nandy’s (1983:54) evocative phrasing, “a cultural closeness” of otherwise diverse civilizational experiences is made possible by “this experience of cosuffering.” Thus, as Nandy (1987b:4) warns, we should not seek and are not likely to uncover a full “integration of visions” in such civilizational encounters. Rather, establishing dialogue in a world of inequalities and oppressions depends centrally on the capacity to draw connections between various traditions’ and cultures’ understandings of and responses to oppression. Nandy (1987b:13) sees this as a “negatively defined” utopia, not one involving an appeal to a thick, universal order. As we noted earlier, cosmopolitan visions tend to produce conflict, and severe violence accompanies their attempted imposition. A dialogue of responses to oppression, by contrast, “promotes a vague, implicit negative consensus on an unheroic vision of a ‘decent society.’” This may disappoint those who long for some ultimate reconciliation in a world order, but Nandy suggests that it is precisely this longing for a unified order that needs to be abandoned. Abandoning this quest for a universal order makes it possible to “establish communications among social criticisms.” Such a dialogue involves refusing to attempt “to summate the values of diverse civilizations.” Nandy calls us to articulate instead “the diverse concepts of a tolerable society” at work in our world. Perhaps we cannot avoid demarcating these alternative visions of a “tolerable society” as either self or other. However, as long as we recognize that the other is also within and that our common experience of suffering may show us the way to establish connections between self and other, the other may serve as a source of critical self-reflection. Thus, the intersecting trajectories of the contact zone admit of potentials for “cultural self-discovery” (Nandy, 1987b:55) and a joining of “social criticisms” that Pratt may not adequately highlight. This finding is important because, as our descriptions of world politics in the previous section suggest, we continue to inhabit the colonial relationships characteristic of the contact zone. Beginning in chapter 3, this book demonstrates that the contemporary terrain of culture remains “a space of colonial encounters”— of the eradicatory or assimilative violence of the double movement and the methodological violence of distancing central to the practice of the “comparativist.” But, as we have argued here, the contact zone contains alternative possibilities—of critical self-reflection and of an alliance of social criticisms. For us, then, the political and ethical challenge is to locate for IR the resources for an ethnological stance even in a world where the reflexes framed by the double movement and the logic of the comparativist hold sway.
14 • INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF DIFFERENCE
Our attempt to locate and cultivate such resources involves a mode of reading or textual exegesis that draws on the insights of Nandy and Todorov. First, this requires a respect for the subjectivity of the author. We must pay heed to the author’s voice, uncovering the author’s dominant motivation and purpose as the author him-or herself might understand it.13 At the same time, texts (like cultures and traditions) are layered, possessing dominant and recessive themes and political and ethical purposes that work beyond the author’s intentions. Thus, reading also involves an attempt to locate these minor and sometimes submerged themes and purposes as resources for interpreting the text and for contemporary political and ethical purposes. In the case of interpreting the text, we come to see how both the dominant and recessive themes serve as the necessary effects of a deeper contextual/textual structure of historical conditions and intellectual and popular debates. We can then observe how various texts together form a “constellation” of writings that, even if not reducible to a single “core,” are usefully juxtaposed because they express some key “truths” embraced in that era, with implications for later eras (see Bernstein, 1991:5–8). For our own political and ethical purposes, the recovery of recessive themes and voices at once undermines the naturalness of the dominant conceptions or conclusions of political and ethical traditions and reveals alternative conceptions and conclusions that may be turned against dominant understandings. More important in our view, this process of recovery is central to the ethnological moment that breaks the hold of the reflexes of the double movement. Finding the other within is, as Nandy tells us, essential not only to the process of critical self-reflection, but also to a conversation of cultures and traditions that responds to the oppressions of the contact zone. We can now return more explicitly to the issue of our stance toward IR. What is implicit in this discussion but needs to be said openly is the way this method of reading informs our efforts to reimagine IR. If IR is implicated in the colonial character of the contact zone, as we suggest, then our work is a gesture toward a post-Western IR. However, this gesture is complicated by the fact that revealing the particularity and parochialism of the West14 is simultaneously to recover the values and visions of the West (in its numerous guises, both dominant and recessive) as resources. To put it differently, moving beyond the hegemony of the West requires the rediscovery and reimagination of the West. Heterology: Beyond and within Western IR Reimagining the West is beyond us, but we can contribute to this process by trying to rediscover and reimagine IR. Key to this endeavor is the process of “provincializing” IR—documenting the historical process by which the spatial and temporal demarcations of IR come to seem self-evident.15 As a first step, we reintroduce the idea of “culture” into IR.16 The question of what culture does for us must be asked, since alarms may sound around IR when one hears the term. Culture is considered “soft,” not capable of adequate specification. Its use
INTRODUCTION • 15
conjures up interesting but probably irrelevant ethnographies of distant, “stateless” peoples. The rich or thick description suggested by the term seems to fly in the face of the imperatives of a positive science (see Geertz, 1973). By dominant standards, IR is deductive in approach, emphasizing the nomothetic over the ideographic, the analytic over the descriptive, parsimony over the messy or complex, systematic imperatives over particularistic creations. Though we share some of the suspicion of “culture” as a category, we have been drawn to it, gradually at first, and then, all of a sudden, almost wholeheartedly. In our view, the language of culture is immediately useful for IR because it evokes two tensions or oppositions (Walker, 1990). On the one side, culture is distinguished from nature and the cultural from the natural. Culture refers us to human activity and creativity; the capacity to construct, live, and aesthetically express forms of life; and the coexistence of human action that embraces and practices as well as resists and reforms inherited (or imposed) forms of life. This phrasing highlights the weight of cultural representations in shaping human existence into forms of life, including their role in constituting a group’s specific identity in relation to others and to the larger cosmos. Thus, the language of culture leads us to sustain a strong (but not absolute) contrast between human artifice and the fixities and givens of nature. We might say that the human is both freed and shaped as a cultural being. On the other side, and to draw on earlier discussion, culture points at once to universality and commonality and to partiality and diversity. We are referred to the universal—the meaningful and constructed character of human experience— and to the particular commonalities (and differences) used to construct identities in relation to others. And though these two references are brought together in claims about the existence of a system of national cultures or, increasingly, its supercession by the arrival of a global culture, the term still strongly signals that human artifice is multiple, that ongoing processes of cultural self-definition (in relation to multiple internal and external others) continue to operate partly in opposition to much of what is implied by the ideas of a nation or a global culture. To summarize, the language of culture draws our attention to the construction, maintenance, and transformation of meaningful and purposeful schemes of existence as a common human endeavor, yet also as multiple, diverse, and often competing human projects. Thus, we might add, the human project itself is coterminous with what we have called the “contact zone,” exhibiting the varied possibilities admitted by cultural encounters. As described above, these possibilities range (to emphasize polar cases) from opacity, repression, and knowledge sought for purposes of domination to a sense of wonder, a desire for understanding and mutual communication, and a joining of social criticisms. And, to complete the thought, IR can thus be reimagined as a theory of intercultural relations or perhaps rediscovered as an important site of “heterology”—the study of differences (Certeau, 1986; Giard, 1991). At the risk of being overly bold, we can imagine that had such a study of differences—or heterology—more fully infused the understandings of theorists
16 • INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF DIFFERENCE
and practitioners of IR, the attacks of September 11, 2001, would not have come as much of a surprise. Anticipating that others, at home and elsewhere, have alternative narratives of what we call “modernization” or “civilization,” we might have predicted the humiliation, anger, and violent response to what are seen as colonizing projects. Perhaps, having anticipated such powerful and dangerous responses by the targets of modernization, we might have done two things to try to foster alternative responses. First, we could have incorporated the peoples of the third world not just in the execution of the project of modernity, but more fully in the formulation of its very meaning and in serious debates about its relative value. Second, by listening to others, far away and nearby, we might have come to understand the need to defend and demonstrate the vibrancy and depth of Western culture(s), instead of simply taking those for granted. In the process of doing these two things, we might have discovered depths in ourselves that we had forgotten (or repressed) and assisted others in discovering those in themselves, so that we might have replaced relationships of violence and domination with dialogue. These options are still available, but they require that we begin with a critique of IR theory so that we may locate those alternatives within ourselves.
PART I Difference in the Constitution of IR
CHAPTER 1 The Westphalian Deferral
Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one another, then each man declares the other a fool and heretic. —Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty War’s a deal. It cuts both ways. Whoever takes also pays. Our age brings forth its new idea: Total war—and total fear.
—Bertolt Brecht, Mother Courage and Her Children The solution, however, wasn’t really a solution, nor the beginning a beginning. —Urvashi Butalia, The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India Only recently has sovereignty appeared again as a puzzle. A review of academic and popular discourse suggests that the political and ethical certainties associated with the nation-state are under assault by, variously, the inexorable forces of global capitalism, the transnational mobilization of environmental and human rights activists, the progressive emergence of global governance, and the pervasive deconstruction of borders and identities.1 The sense that humankind is thereby facing an uncharted future has also generated historical and theoretical interest in Westphalia, with the expectation that critical reflection on the origins, principles, and purposes of the state system might help us identify strategies by which we can remake the world (see Walker, 1993; Spruyt, 1994; Ruggie, 1998; Onuf, 1998b; Van Creveld, 1999; and Keene, 2002). We share the expectation that a return to the puzzle of sovereignty is important for political and ethical inquiry. Cutting against the grain of much contemporary academic practice, however, we believe that sovereignty—as theory and practice
THE WESTPHALIAN DEFERRAL • 19
—remains a site of political and ethical possibilities. Rather than an ethical dead end or a site of political closure, we suggest that the problems posed by sovereignty contain opportunities that extend, stretch, divide, and revise sovereignty more than they fully transcend it. We elaborate this set of claims in the latter stages of this book, where we explore the idea of multiple and overlapping sovereignties.2 Here we focus on the way the formal sovereignty of states—conventionally attributed to the Westphalian settlement3—intensifies the difficulties we face in responding to differences in culture, religion, and mode of life. How does this “problem of difference” emerge with Westphalia? Perhaps ironically, differences in culture remain less of a problem in an age of (premodern) empire, when the principle of hierarchy reigns supreme. As Michael Walzer (1997:15) suggests, “[i]mperial rule is historically the most successful way of incorporating difference and facilitating (requiring is more accurate) peaceful coexistence.” Subjugated peoples, though excluded from the apex of the social order and marked as inferior, paradoxically can find a kind of sufferance of their way of life, religious practices, and distinct customs. Walzer (1997:14–16) argues that, while this form of tolerance is partly rooted in a sense of “minimal fairness” that the imperial center extends to the conquered, it is also largely a practical matter: as long as imperial rule is respected—taxes are paid and imperial authority is acknowledged—further subordination is unnecessary. Preserving the peace of the empire entails merely enforcing peaceful coexistence among the “authority structures and customary practices” of the various conquered groups. And, though tolerance is extended primarily to groups rather than to individuals (this is not a liberal world), individuals may escape some of the pressures for communal conformity in the more cosmopolitan cities of the empire. These days we are less comfortable with hierarchy and we do not openly sanction imperial practice. But neither have modern empires proved to be particularly tolerant, as we shall see. The rise of the principle of equality in international relations (in the centuries following Westphalia) has served, relatively speaking, to delegitimate and break the hold of the monopoly of social and political power of a particular group. But where groups of differing persuasions are placed on more equal (legal, if not social) footing, the imperial solution of sufferance of subservient others is mostly foreclosed. When the equality of others is acknowledged, we require the affirmation of those others instead of divine ordination to secure our own status. However, the presence of differences in ways of life, values, and visions also challenges the seeming naturalness of our social practices and threatens the certainty of our given sense of self (Benjamin, 1988: chapter 2). Walzer (1983:249–54) also points in this direction, explaining that hierarchical orders resolve the problem of recognition by giving everyone a fixed place in the social order. Whenever such a ranking breaks down, it presents a potential challenge to our sense of our own value and simultaneously we become unsure of our relations to others. In this way, the problem of difference emerges and intensifies under modern conditions of
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relative equality, often leading to the reassertion of (illicit or informal) forms of social hierarchy—the marking of the others as inferior and thereby as less of a threat. We comprehend and affirm our values as others recognize us. And yet, perhaps because of this dependence on them, others seem also to threaten us. How then should we reconcile need and threat? How do we realize equality with difference? These problems remain central to modernity. These problems are also central to the very constitution of international relations. We read the geopolitical demarcations of a society of states as a spatial containment of cultural difference. Difference is placed at a distance (managed within the boundaries of “other” states and deterred by the defense of one’s own borders) and resolved into “sameness” within one’s own political community. That is, the state is the domain where difference is translated into uniformity, while IR remains eternally a site of potentially dangerous, but one would hope manageable, confrontations with others. This splitting of inside/outside (to combine Benjamin, 1988, and Walker, 1993) signals in our minds less a solution to the problem of difference and more a deferral of the need to face that problem frontally. The idea that international society represents a solution to the problem of difference is often linked to a reading of the legacy of the Peace of Westphalia. Thus, we examine the Peace of Westphalia in its historical context—as a response to the “religious cleansing” and material and psychological devastation of the Thirty Years’ War—in order to trace IR’s posture toward difference. An Internal Crusade Most historians consider the Thirty Years’ War and the Peace of Westphalia that brought it to a close among the major events of the latter half of the millennium. Ronald Asch (1997:7) calls the Thirty Years’ War “the best example of a political event which profoundly changed political and social structures, and perhaps even collective mentalities.” The decisiveness of these events is sealed by the predominant view of the Peace of Westphalia as signaling the move from a religious to a modern, secular world and from the accepted, if somewhat vaporous, goal of a united Christendom to a system, or perhaps society, of independent states (Pages, 1970:17, 250; Thomson, 1963: 814). There is nothing foreign about this interpretation: the decisiveness of these events is asserted, if not taken for granted, by most scholars in the field of international relations.4 This period is indeed notable for the central role played by religious conviction in instigating military conflict. While legal and political motivations— such as the limits of the emperor’s authority and dynastic rivalry—were certainly present, such factors took on a distinctly religious hue. Just as we today perceive the ubiquity of the economic motive, whatever else may be involved, both the ruling classes and the masses of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are said to have seen the events of their time through a distinctly religious gaze (Asch, 1997:7; Langer, 1980:11; Thomson, 1963:800; Lockhart, 1995:1–2; Brightwell, 1979:418). The religious conflict flaring up in the sixteenth century and all but
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consuming the seventeenth century found its initial spark in the Reformation’s challenge to the ideological monopoly and material power of the Catholic Church (Friedrich and Blitzer, 1957:10–11; Van Creveld, 1999:67–84). This challenge persisted and escalated with the spread of various forms of Protestantism among the masses and the conversion of certain territorial princes in Germany. The specific character of the religious conflict merits some discussion. In his War against the Idols, Carlos M.N.Eire evocatively frames the Reformation as a transition from an immanent to a transcendent notion of religiosity. In his account of the events of 1509, the year of John Calvin’s birth, Eire (1986:1) describes a Europe in which Christianity was tangibly expressed in the events and objects of daily life: Heaven was never too far from earth. The sacred was diffused in the profane, the spiritual in the material. Divine power, embodied in the Church and its sacraments, reached down through innumerable points of contact to make itself felt: to forgive or to punish, to protect against the ravages of nature, to heal, to soothe, and to work all sorts of wonders. But within a period of only two decades, a radical and sweeping change was initiated. The religious immanence of Catholicism came to be seen as a corruption of the Scripture; its form of piety branded as “idolatry.” Condemnation of the papacy fell on prepared ground, as many lay persons shared a resentment of the privileges and abuses of the Church (Blickle, 1984; Jelsma, 1998). Thus, the beliefs of the reformers were soon translated into action, disrupting the sense of the role of the Church in society: “churches were sacked, images smashed and burned, relics overturned, and consecrated hosts fed to dogs and goats.” As this displacement of the dominance of a “religion of immanence” by a “religion of transcendence” spread from Germany and Switzerland to France, the Netherlands, and England, “the unity of the European religious vision was forever shattered” and “the image donors” rather suddenly became “image smashers.” The Reformation remade Europe (Eire, 1986:2; see also Head, 1998:95–96). Though reformers were fractured along numerous lines, Eire (1986:2) emphasizes the competition among three major “streams of piety.”5 Catholics defended their own centuries-long history, “suffused with the immanence of the divine,” while reformers tended to divide between the relative moderation of the Lutherans and a Calvinist rigor and intolerance for compromise. Lutheran piety objected to the Catholic practice of “works-righteousness”—the belief that grace could be conferred through works—but accepted the Catholic use of material objects in worship so long as those objects were seen as a means to the divine and not as divine themselves. Calvinism, or the “Reformed stream,” flowed in a different direction, “surging with transcendence” and unleashing an “uncompromising and disruptive…crusade against idolatry that manifested
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itself in iconoclasm, civil unrest, and eventually even in armed resistance against legitimate rulers” (Eire, 1986:3; emphasis added). For contemporary readers, the allusion to an “internal crusade” needs emphasis. Nor can we afford to minimize the moral and epistemic charge of the word idolatry, or the oft-repeated charge that “the Devil and his army of demons” stood behind the practices of the established church (Jelsma, 1998:27). Catholics fully understood the accusation, for they themselves hurled it when they vituperatively degraded, for example, the religions of the Amerindians. Here, a remark that serves Eire (1986:5–6) as peripheral and expository strikes us as prescient, given our focus on European assessments of Amerindians in the next chapter: It is good to keep in mind that at just about the same time that the soldiers of Charles V replaced the “horrible idols” of the Aztecs with “beautiful” crosses and images of Mary and the saints in the New World, Protestant iconoclasts were wreaking havoc on these Catholic objects in lands nominally ruled by him in Europe. The grisly cult of human sacrifices led by bloodstained priests inside the Wall of Snakes in Tenochtitlan inspired the same kind of reaction among the Conquistadors as the celebration of the Mass in the richly decorated cathedral of Basel did among Protestants. As Eire (1986:5) so rightly points out, “one man’s devotion was another man’s idolatry.” And so it is that he who casts the first stone finds it returning with a vengeance that can only come from the deepest doubts of former believers. The Calvinists claimed that the medieval Church had fallen into idolatry in two ways. First, the Church as a whole was seen as an idolatrous entity. The Church, in other words, “had set itself up as an idol, substituting its own decrees for those of God.” Second, it used idols as a part of its worship, thereby directing the worshiper’s attention not to God, but to material artifacts (Eire, 1986:55–56; see also Blickle, 1984). Eire (1986:55–56) describes the Reformist judgment: “Like some vast Augean stable, the medieval Church was ankle-deep in the ‘filth’ of images, relics, altars, holy places, and miraculous hosts. The Calvinist attack on medieval piety sought to flood and cleanse the Church from the accumulated debris.” Such feeling was justified, it was thought, because what was at stake was not simply human lives, but human souls and the truth of God’s plan for humanity (Gregory, 1999: 345–46). Such intense feelings could not but have had momentous political consequences. Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt—Luther’s colleague at the University of Wittenberg—argued that because Catholic worship transgressed the word of God it was the duty of Christians to remove idols and idolatry even if this required violence (Gregory, 1999:78–82; Head, 1998:96–97; Skinner, 1978:27, 75; Eire, 1986:65). While Karlstadt’s revolutionary views were rejected by both Luther and Calvin, they nevertheless provide a sense of how the Catholic
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Church came to be seen by its critics as a “realm of darkness” and “the kingdom of the Antichrist.” By the 1520s, for those in Germany and Switzerland there were two opposing Churches and the question became which one to believe. A 1521 pamphlet poses this problem starkly—“should I then consider the pope and his cronies to be the Christian Church?” The Protestant answer to this question, as Eire shows through a sermon preached by Heinrich von Kettenback in 1522, is obvious: “Christ has his Church, and the Antichrist also has his Church, and the Church of the Antichrist is nowadays often mistaken for Christ’s Church” (Eire, 1986:102). In response, Catholic enmity against the reformers was both symmetrical and asymmetrical: symmetrical because, while accused of spiritual pollution, they themselves saw the Protestants as polluting Christianity; asymmetrical in that while the Protestants focused their rancor on “idols,” the Catholics aimed their animosity at the bodies of “heretics” themselves. This meant that while Protestants sought to overthrow Catholicism by attacking its cultic objects, the Catholics sought to defeat the Protestants by inflicting bodily harm on them. Protestants would feed consecrated hosts to a goat and say “now he can die if he wants, he has received the sacrament,” or spit into the holy water fonts; Catholics, however, regarded such acts as attacks on the sacred, and consequently vented their anger on the persons of the Protestants themselves. (Eire, 1986:161) Thus, each faction regarded the other’s false worship as a threat of plaguelike pollution (Blickle, 1984; Gregory, 1999:85–87; Eire, 1986:228, 283–84). And plagues must be stopped. Put in terms we introduced above, the other’s demand for recognition was experienced as a deathly threat and death for one’s cause an act of martyrdom (Gregory, 1999). Demands to return to orthodoxy—for example, the Edict of Worms (1521), the Second Diet of Speyer (1529), and the Diet of Augsburg (1530)—were resisted by reformers, especially where such resistance was buttressed by the support of Protestant princes. At the same time, attempts to forge a compromise that recognized the divisibility of Christianity (for example, the First Diet of Speyer of 1526) were repudiated by both sides (Lindberg, 1996: chapter 9). In the end, princes loyal to Catholicism leapt to or were drawn into a defense of the Universal Church—a Counter Reformation led by the Habsburgs, the Holy Roman Emperor, and the papacy. German Protestants responded in kind, and both sides mobilized for war. More than thirty years of indecisive hostility were brought to a temporary halt in 1555 by the Peace of Augsburg (Thomson, 1963: 500–1, 791). From our point of view, the Peace of Augsburg appears to have been an initial and relatively meager attempt to come to terms with the problem of difference. The treaty confirmed, if not strengthened, the autonomy of the princes within the empire, including recognizing the principle of ubi unis dominus, ibi una sit
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religio (“where there is one ruler, there should be only one religion”).6 While this established a minimal pluralism (Lindberg, 1996: 246–48; Thomson, 1963:791), the right of rulers to fix the religion of their own citizens worked ill in an “extensive, long-unified territory,” where migration by those of other faiths to a safe haven of coreligionists was difficult. It worked somewhat better in practice where jurisdictions were “fractured and fragmented,” such that “people of deep religious commitments need not move far to find, either a ruler who shared their convictions, or a tolerant free city” (Toulmin, 1990:49–50; see also Head, 1998: 98–100). For us, however, it is the limits of Augsburg that stand out. The right of individual conscience was not recognized, and tolerance was established only between Catholic and Lutheran princes, excluding Calvinists, Zwinglians, Anabaptists, and other sects. In addition, even the minimal tolerance established by the treaty was seen by the signatories as an act of prudence in the face of a balance of forces, merely a pause in an ongoing struggle to eliminate the religious others (see Lindberg, 1996:146–47; Head, 1998: 99–101). As Asch (1997:10) describes the situation, “[T]hose who signed the Peace of Augsburg… did not yet see this principle as the essence of the settlement as clearly as the lawyers interpreting the Peace later were to do; for they had not yet given up the hope of re-establishing some sort of religious unity.” As would also be the case with the later Peace of Westphalia, the Catholic Church refused to accept the principle of tolerance among princes. The emperors—Charles V (r. 1519–1556) and Ferdinand I (r. 1556–1564)— saw the settlement as undermining the special relationship of empire and Church (or empire and God). Protestant princes and states also tended to accept the arrangements as provisional (Thomson, 1963: 500–1; Pages, 1970: 37; Parker, 1997:16–17). A Purifying Hatred The outcome seems scripted, and we are tempted to read the Thirty Years’ War as the inevitable culmination of a long period of religious zealotry in which difference is first translated into inferiority and subject to eradication and then glossed as the reason and basis for the gradual movement to a more tolerant modernity. While the events of the seventeenth century are usually read in this way, we would warn against accepting such a view too readily. Cary Nederman (2000) suggests that conventional accounts ignore the vast intellectual resources supporting tolerance within the thinking of the Middle Ages—from John of Salisbury and Marsiglio of Padua to Bartholomé de Las Casas (to whom we will return in the next chapter). Stephen Toulmin similarly argues that the sixteenth century offered an alternative, more tolerant theory and practice than is suggested by the usual retrospective reading of this period as the antithesis and precursor of the modern. For example, in late-medieval or Renaissance figures like Erasmus, Montaigne, and Shakespeare, Toulmin finds “an urbane openmindedness and skeptical tolerance,” reflecting mostly Renaissance impatience
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with the quest for religious or philosophical certainty as well as relative “respect for complexity and diversity” (Toulmin, 1990:25–30; quotations on 25 and 29).7 Similarly, in Henry IV of France he finds a political practice that turns gradually toward greater tolerance of the Protestant Huguenots, despite domestic and external opposition. However, when Henry’s assassination in 1610 brought his experiment to an end, the event was interpreted widely as a failure of the policy of tolerance. This event served as “confirmation of people’s worst fears” and “dashed the last hope of escaping from irresoluble conflicts” (Toulmin, 1990:46– 53; quotation on 48; see also Van Creveld, 1999:72). The equation of difference with danger was seen as vindicated with savage results. The revolt of the Bohemian estates against Catholic domination triggered a renewed effort by the Habsburgs to root out heresy from their domains (Thomson, 1963:800). Emperor Ferdinand II’s defeat of the Bohemian rebels and his intensification of religious persecution reverberated throughout Europe, irrevocably shattering the uneasy stalemate among religious forces. This phase of Counter Reformation was prosecuted as a “consuming passion” with the tools of “fire and sword” (Parker, 1997:75–76; Wedel, 1991:51). Though not all rulers welcomed these provocations or the eventual outbreak of open warfare, the prospect of losing a religious war and being subjected to the religious dictates of the victor generated an anxiety difficult to bear. Protestants and Catholics alike mobilized to resist this possibility; neutrality became almost impossible (Brightwell, 1979:418–19; Trevor-Roper, 1962:39–40; Parker, 1997:75–76; Gutmann, 1988:767–68). In this context, piety was translated into a clear and certain response to difference—an attempt to eliminate alternative modes of Christian belief and practice by conquest, persecution, and purification. The resulting conflict is infamous for the material devastation, but also the social, moral, and psychic scars it left across Europe. Trevor-Roper (1962:33) considers it the “greatest and most destructive war in preindustrial Europe.” Toulmin (1990:53) is more expansive in his characterization of its effects on central Europe: “For thirty years, in a series of brutal and destructive military campaigns, shifting alliances of outside powers used the territory of Germany and Bohemia as a gladiatorial ring in which to fight out their political rivalries and doctrinal disagreements, most often by proxy, and turned the Czech and German lands into a charnel house.” Perhaps a better sense is provided by comparison with a more contemporary reference. Geoffrey Parker (1997:192– 93) notes: “Until 1939, the Thirty Years’ War remained by far the most traumatic period in the history of Germany. The loss of people was proportionally greater than in World War II; the displacement of the people and the material devastation was almost as great; the cultural and economic dislocation persisted for substantially longer.” And, following Charles Weeks (1991:213), we might describe the events as a cataclysm foreshadowing those of our own time: the Thirty Years’ War was a total ideological war, ushering in a “modernist” period in which the “unfolding disasters of war”—runaway inflation, spiraling military engagement, and a “phalanx of disease, hunger, and chaos”—crashed down on
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civilian populations. John Theibault (1995:1–2) reports that the Thirty Years’ War is selected (still today and by a wide margin) by Hessian villagers as “the greatest calamity to befall their villages” in the period bounded by the Black Death and World War II. We would, then, along with Herbert Langer (1980: 10), emphasize the devastating psychic wounds left on populations, both the masses and ruling groups. Surely an important reason for the extremes of destruction is that armies were maintained in the field continuously for nearly the duration of the war. Troops became, in Herbert Langer’s (1980:97) phrase, “marauding baggage-trains,” draining the resources of the countryside and spreading terror and epidemics in their wake (see also Theibault, 1995:141–42, 151– 60; Nichols, 1989:261–63). Conscription, fed by heavy battlefield losses and the unremitting toll of disease, depopulated villages across Germany, Sweden, Finland, and elsewhere. Military service became a veritable death sentence (Lynn, 1991:95; Parker, 1997:186–88). If the length of the war helps explain the magnitude of the destruction, this begs the question of what sustained the war. It also leaves us unable to easily account for the savagery displayed by combatants. We are led again to religiously inflected motives. John Laursen (1998) argues that numerous chances for compromise that might have substantially shortened the war were missed by intransigent leaders moved by a religious mission. Toulmin (1990:54) argues similarly that the doctrinaire character of the religiosity fed the frenzy of killing: The longer the bloodshed continued, the more paradoxical the state of Europe became. Whether for pay or from conviction, there were many who would kill and burn in the name of theological doctrines that no one could give any conclusive reason for accepting. The intellectual debate between Protestant Reformers and their Counter-Reformation opponents had collapsed, and there was no alternative to the sword and the torch. Yet the more brutal the warfare became, the more firmly convinced the proponents of each religious system were that their doctrines must be proved correct, and that their opponents were stupid, malicious, or both. We should not be surprised, then, that the barbarities were unspeakable, of a kind some trace to that time (Langer, 1980:101), yet clearly recognizable in events of recent decades. The pillaging of the countryside was accompanied by torture and rape, often of children and pregnant women. No religious grouping was spared; nor were the religious dissenters less cruel than their persecutors (Parker, 1997: 186–88; Lynn, 1991:96; Wedel, 1991: 42–45). The savagery reached such a scale that the inhabitants of Styria, who had contributed generously to Emperor Ferdinand’s coffers, claimed that his armies had caused more destruction and suffering than the dreaded Turks (Nichols, 1989:261–63). And one of the Hutterite brethren, a group subjected to perhaps the worst indignities, compared the infidels favorably to their fellow Christians: “Even Turks and Tartars…
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would have said it was too much.” Thus, Wedel, echoing Toulmin’s analysis, with which we began, takes the treatment of the Hutterites as evidence of the power of a “purifying hatred” (Wedel, 1991:46–47). Purifying hatred, one might imagine, burns with great fury but can also exhaust itself, especially when joined by an equally furious fire. Indeed, it is argued that exhaustion again led the combatants to a series of peace tables, and the resulting treaties are usually labeled the Peace of Westphalia. Historian Georges Pagès’s (1970:250) view is emblematic of the interpretation usually ascribed to this set of events: The peace of Westphalia substituted the idea of independent states, a sort of international society, for the idea of a united Christendom. The peace did not openly express this idea but it did contain the idea of a society which took no account of the method of government of its component states…. Similarly, no account was made of the dominant religious faiths. On the international plane, Europe became a secular system of independent states. It was the dawn of the principle of nationalism. S.Harrison Thomson’s (1963:814) account of the events likewise portrays the Peace as a marked step forward for religious tolerance: “The achievements of the peace congress in the controversial area of religious liberty, while not revolutionary, were not insignificant…. Complete toleration was not to be expected. The old principle of cuius regio eius religio was deeply ingrained in the princely class. Now, however, Calvinists were tolerated and the princes were expressly enjoined not to interfere in the religion of their subjects.” Hans Morgenthau’s (1963:312) assertion that, by the end of the Thirty Years’ War, “sovereignty as supreme power over a certain territory was a political fact, signifying the victory of the territorial princes over the universal authority of emperor and pope,” is similarly exemplary of international relations orthodoxy. Others follow suit. Leo Gross (1968:47) claims that the “Peace of Westphalia consecrated the principle of toleration by establishing the equality between Protestant and Catholic states and by providing safeguards for religious minorities.” Terry Nardin (1983:50) describes the emergent international society similarly as a system of mutual tolerance and accommodation. Stephen Krasner (1993:242–44; 1999:73– 82), though he doubts the claim that Westphalia implemented the idea of sovereignty, stresses the attempt of the treaties to contain religious conflict by fixing boundaries in a system of nation-states, disentangle religion from politics, and foster greater religious tolerance. In general, then, and to repeat a point, Westphalia normally is seen as a key marker of the eclipse of the medieval world by modernity. There is purportedly a movement from the religious to the secular, from the idea of Europe as unified by Christianity to a European system of independent states, and from a web of overlapping and competing authorities to a modern states system based on the demarcation of exclusive territorial jurisdictions.
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What is crucial in these varied accounts is the intimation that Westphalia and a nascent modernity represent initial but definitive steps toward a solution to the problem of difference. We wish to complicate this reading, because the received view of Westphalia tends to blind us to the creative responses to difference that were lost during this period; the persistent, if understandable, evasion of the task of exploring the source of the wounds in the dominant response to difference; and the manner in which the intellectual discourse, originating in the shadow of the Thirty Years’ War, reinforced, rather than challenged, the interpretation of difference as a dangerous aberration from the norms of stability, safety, and order. Thus, a richer story necessarily qualifies any effort to establish Westphalia as a clear marker of the transition to a tolerant modernity. Toward an “Empire of Uniformity” Our argument nearly reverses the stress of the received view. By contrast with the vision of an emerging tolerance, we suggest that the practical and intellectual repercussions of the Thirty Years’ War fostered a movement as much toward uniformity as toward recognizing and respecting diversity. We will elaborate this point in two steps. First, the attempt to contain difference within the relatively autonomous units recognized by Westphalia8 deferred a deeper exploration and engagement of the problem of differences. Ronald Asch (1997:193–94) notes that Westphalia was not a solution to the problem of religious difference, but, rather, it kept alive the religious conflicts of the previous century, “confirming the existing status, rights, and privileges of the confessional churches,” and thereby “perpetuating religious divisions,” albeit in a more “muted form.” Combined with a recognition of the independence of princes, the effect was to divide “‘Europe’ into Catholic and Protestant spaces” and spur “the interstate construction of the continent” (Campbell, 1992:51). Religious tolerance among sovereigns was made, in effect, a function of the balance of power among them (Keene, 1998:21), but within the nascent states the situation was different Despite the treaties’ relative embrace of religious liberty, the moral constraints placed on rulers were, as Krasner (1993: 244–45) observes, on a collision course with the sovereign’s right to dictate the faith of the realm as originally acknowledged in the Treaty of Augsburg and as supported by the emerging reality and theory of sovereignty. “[F]rom now on,” Toulmin (1990:91) concludes, “established religion was the general rule.” This move, by setting difference at a distance, may well have helped to minimize the prospects of religious war on the scale of the Thirty Years’ War, but it did so at a price: the problem of difference was simply displaced into the “domestic realm.” However, the consequences for religious liberty were not uniform across the newly sanctified political units. Toulmin (1990:92) describes a situation in which each state or domain individually faced “the continuing problem of religious conformity and toleration.” Despite the expectation of submission to a national faith, nonconforming minorities remained a troubling issue; others, thought to
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have been placed at a distance, were found within. And though, “[a]fter thirty years of bloodshed, few people still considered the price of imposing religious conformity worth paying,” Toulmin (1990:92) reports, “the local pressure for conformity remained strong, and religious minorities were everywhere subject to some degree of discrimination or persecution” (see also Laursen, 1998:170; Kamen, 1967:161–90, 196–99, 201–15). But the degree did vary, each national experience representing “a different variation on a common set of tunes.” In Austria, the Habsburgs remained as “leaders” of the Counter Reformation: “continued Lutheranism was seen as disloyalty to the Habsburg dynasty, and the Protestant minority of craftsmen and professionals had to choose between conversion, death, and flight.” English papists were targets of discrimination, but their treatment paled in comparison to that dealt out to “heretics” in France. Under the rule of Louis XIV, “the Protestant minority was denied the right to work in many professions, and exposed to military attacks that drove them back into their traditional strongholds.” Consequently, large numbers of Huguenots exercised the option of “flight,” either “across land, or became boat people and headed for England or America” (Toulmin, 1990:92; see also Laursen, 1998:171– 72). Thus, Nevzat Soguk (1999:62, 67–74) sees the displacement of the Huguenots not only as a key early example of the problem of refugees, but as a clear marker of the rise of the effort to manage, and often homogenize, populations—an effort central to statecraft in an emergent system of territorial states. By contrast, Calvinist Holland, lacking the constraints of long-standing and centralized institutions, was relatively tolerant of Catholics and other dissenters (Laursen, 1998:174–75; Toulmin, 1990: 92–93; Keene, 1998:29–30; Kamen, 1967:191–93). Everywhere, a balance was struck that “stopped short of the horrors of a renewed religious war” (Toulmin, 1990:93). While this was no mean achievement, the problem was not so much resolved as it was deferred— displaced into the domestic realm, where, it was hoped, it could be managed and contained. Second, the received view of Westphalia as a crucial point of transition to a more civilized era ignores the relatively negative impact of the experience of the war on thinking about difference. Rather than supporting openness toward the other or fostering a view of difference as a resource, the intellectual legacy of the era is a pervasive suspicion of difference. Disorder and degeneration are thought to result from difference; uniformity or homogeneity naturally produces social order and stability. As we explore in the next chapter, these two equations were already central to much of Christian thought and were reproduced by early ethnographers’ attempts to make sense of the discovery of “the New World.” The treatment of difference outside would follow from the treatment of difference inside9—both deducible from the equation of difference as the problem to which creating an “empire of uniformity” is the solution. In Toulmin’s (1990:67–69) account of the process, the Thirty Years’ War shook the “cosmopolitical” conception of a hierarchically arranged and integrated natural and social order that undergirded much of late-medieval
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thinking and practice. Spurred by the resulting anxious and pessimistic mood, the intellectual project to restore such order is best seen as a “defensive counterrevolution,” a closing down of options produced by a frantic search for certainty (Toulmin, 1990:16–19, 81; quotation on 17). More specifically, the possibility of reclaiming the relative skepticism and pluralism of Renaissance humanism was discredited as being not up to task of containing religious difference and anchoring social order: In this blood-drenched situation, what could good intellectuals do? So long as humane Renaissance values retained their power for Montaigne in the private sphere, or for Henry of Navarre in the public sphere, there was hope that the reasoned discussion of shared experiences among honest individuals might lead to a meeting of minds, or, at least, to a civilized agreement to differ. By 1620, people in positions of political power and theological authority in Europe no longer saw Montaigne’s pluralism as a viable intellectual option, any more than Henry’s tolerance was for them a practical option. The humanists’ readiness to live with uncertainty, ambiguity, and differences of opinion had done nothing (in their view) to prevent religious conflict from getting out of hand: ergo (they inferred) it had helped cause the worsening state of affairs. If skepticism let one down, certainty was more urgent. It might not be obvious what one was supposed to be certain about, but uncertainty had become unacceptable. (Toulmin, 1990: 54–55) And, Toulmin (1990:55) continues, where differences in religious faith had proved so destructive, the appeal of a standpoint beyond question was overwhelming: Failing any effective political way of getting the sectarians to stop killing each other, was there no other possible way ahead? Might not philosophers discover, for instance, a new and more rational basis for establishing a framework of concepts and beliefs capable of achieving the agreed certainty that the skeptics had said was impossible? If uncertainty, ambiguity, and the acceptance of pluralism led, in practice, only to an intensification of the religious war, the time had come to discover some rational method for demonstrating the essential correctness or incorrectness of philosophical, scientific, or theological doctrines. Thus, Toulmin (1990:56–62) links the impetus for Descartes’s search for a single and certain principle, from which all else would necessarily follow, to this mood and the parallel need to answer Montaigne’s epistemological skepticism. Many took hope from Descartes’s project and turned to the effort “to construct abstract and timeless intellectual schemes.” Certainty became associated with “geometrical proof” or “mathematical structures” (Toulmin, 1990:105; see also
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20, 75; Collingwood, 1981 [1945]: part II, section 1; and Friedrich and Blitzer, 1957:1). And, as Toulmin (1990:76) describes the thought, “if ethics were to join physics and logic on the rational side of the fence,” humanity could “escape the chaos of diverse and uncertain opinions.” This move privileged the written, the universal, the general, and the timeless; it denigrated “practical philosophy,” with its reliance on “argumentation” or “case analysis” that involved “particular people in specific situations, dealing with concrete cases, where varied things were at stake” (Toulmin, 1990:70, 31–35). The former promised certainty and safety; the latter opened the way to disagreement, conflict, and the danger of chaos. The search was for a “certitude” that would “help to bind the wounds” opened by the wars of religion (Toulmin, 1990:89). We can trace the parallel and connected consequences of this mood for thinking about politics and political organization. Deborah Baumgold (1993) explains that seventeenth-century thinkers—most prominently Grotius, Hobbes, and Locke in her account—were engaged in a project of “pacifying politics” in the wake of religious conflict, both international and internal. As in social theory more generally, restoring political order was thought to require a foundation of unchallengeable principles, proofs, and powers (Toulmin, 1990:76–77; Tuck, 1988:29; Boucher, 1998:225; Tully, 1993:184). Quite famously, the thinkers of this era sought a foundation for authoritative political organization—a sovereign power—in the ideas of natural law and social contract. But, as Tuck (1993:xixviii; 1999: 1–15) makes very clear, in contrast to the more expansive notions of natural law associated with the scholastics, early modern thinkers transformed the “state of nature” into a minimal order, stripped of (much of) the richness of civil society and the particularities of cultural life. This idea of the natural condition of humankind was partly sustained in the political imagination of the time by the dominant view of the Amerindians as, in fact, occupying some state prior to or apart from civil society (see Slavin, 1976; and Jahn, 1999). Reasoning from the axioms associated with such a natural state was treated as if it were independent of, or neutral in relation to, varying moral or religious beliefs. After all, who would dispute the primacy of human self-preservation and, perhaps, a right to property? Thus, the contractarian position was seen as a more certain (even scientific) basis for justifying political authority and, thereby, a solution to the problem of moral relativism and religious difference that threatened political order. This move is clear in the work of the major thinkers of the time, as well as a precursor of the contemporary doctrines of modernization examined in chapter 3. Tuck (1993:171–72, 174) credits Grotius with the conceptual innovation that transformed Renaissance skepticism into the foundations of a new moral science, claiming the certainties of mathematics. In De Iure Praedae Grotius (1964:7; c.f.Grotius, 1925:23) ascribes to this method of securing certainty: he begins with “a preliminary statement of certain broad axioms on which all persons are easily agreed,” providing a “fixed point from which to trace the proof of what follows” and “laying a foundation upon which our other conclusions may safely
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rest.” In particular, Grotius turns the skeptics’ maxim of self-preservation into the central principle of a minimal, and purportedly universal, natural law. With creation, humans are endowed with the “natural properties” necessary to sustain their own existence. For Grotius (1964:9), “love, whose primary force and action was directed to self-interest, is the first principle of the whole natural order.” He immediately derives two laws from this first principle: the right of self-defense and the right to acquire those things necessary for sustaining life. From these, he deduces the corollary requirements that people refrain from injuring others and take care to respect their possessions (Grotius, 1964: 10–13). Thus, from the simple principles of the human drive for and the right to self-preservation Grotius attempts to produce an unquestionable basis for natural justice and the richer, though thin, civil order that gradually emerges in the workings of human history. It is this order that is capable of realizing natural justice and, thereby, subordinating the individual to the “public good” (Tuck, 1993:175–76; 1999:89). Both Hobbes and Locke are inheritors of this intellectual move. Hobbes is famous for his rather bleak picture of the natural condition of mankind, but, like Grotius, he identifies certain laws of nature—defined principally by a right to self-defense and an obligation of restraint in relation to others—as a path to justice (Hobbes, 1996:1, chapters 13, 14). However, as Tuck (1993: 306–8) explains, even this minimal set of ethical injunctions is not capable of resolving the problems of material competition and religious and moral diversity that produce the fear for self and possessions (see Hobbes, 1996: II, chapter 18). Indeed, for Hobbes it is the capacity of the sovereign to align together men’s judgments10 that motivates individuals to transfer the bulk of their rights to a sovereign power. The sovereign power must direct individual actions to the “Common Benefit”: “The only way to erect such a Common Power…is, to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will…. This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall unite of them all, in one and the same Person” (Hobbes, 1996:120). To put it differently, reason dictates sovereignty as a spatial solution to the problem of moral and religious uncertainty; power is spatialized in the state, thereby transforming a dangerous diversity of individual opinions and wills into a sovereign opinion and a sovereign will (Pocock, 1973:157–58, 191; Walker, 1993:62). Thus, Hobbes also saw his work as akin to Descartes’s project, as the creation of a science immune to the force of skepticism or the moral and cultural disputes that perpetually threaten to return humanity to a state of civil war (see Hobbes, 1996:28, 32, 145; Tuck, 1993:279, 285; and Johnston, 1986:11, 22–23, 110–13, 124). While Locke is often thought to offer a break with this tradition, Tuck (1999: chapter 6) places him well within the Grotian line. In the Second Treatise (completed around 1681) Locke writes that the “Law of Nature” teaches us that, though each person “is bound to preserve himself,” and will exercise the “perfect Freedom” offered by the state of nature to do so, this is “not a state of licence”. Rather, each individual is restrained in relation to the self-preservation of others
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(Locke, 1988:269–71). Like Hobbes, enforcing the mutual restraints of the law of nature is the primary justification and motivation for the establishment of civil society, but, of course, Locke differs from Hobbes in his greater stress on the citizenry’s right to resist tyranny (Locke, 1988:II, chapters 8, 10). What is most interesting from our point of view is that this apparent enshrining of a liberal respect for the individual is partly reclaimed when we highlight Locke’s scheme for “governing conduct.”11 Locke’s own efforts to produce an uncontestable basis for political judgment and, hence, civil order led him over time to doubt the capacity of human beings to come to ready agreement on principles of truth and behavior. In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (published in 1690), Locke argues that the idea that there is some innate disposition to universal truth is easily disproved by the absence of universal agreement on any such principles (Locke, 1996: 8, 15–16). Nor is it clear that the vast majority of human beings are much adept at or interested in the sort of reasoning required for ascertaining moral and political principles (Locke, 1996:9– 10, 329–37). Having arrived at this conclusion—that reasoned and moderate judgment is not an innate disposition, but the result of the kind of careful cultivation to which few could aspire or sustain—Locke turned his attention to educational and social schemes to ensure, if not reasoned obedience, at least compliance with civil order. His most famous work in this regard is Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693). Here Locke (1964:20, 26) presents the child12 as a blank page that must become “obedient to discipline, and pliant to reason.” Though Locke seems rather advanced in his demand to spare the rod, education is conceived as a process of “government” in which educators must carefully apply the principle of “rewards and punishments” or, in the more refined households where genuine education is possible, of “esteem and disgrace.”13 In this way alone can we cultivate the kinds of virtue that make possible life in a civil society based on property, commerce, and reasoned consent (Locke, 1964:84–85, 100–1, 104–5, 148). For those less capable of participating in such a society, Locke suggests more punitive means.14 As Tully summarizes, Locke’s sees the civil self in “penal” terms—as a product of the “apparatus of deterrence” central to a “juridical mode of governance” (Tully, 1993: 240–41). Here, as in international relations, deterrence of difference operates as a crucial force. Given the primacy assigned to social harmony and political unity in these thinkers and the looming threat of more religious crusades, it is not surprising that the predominant opinion of the time soon became that the sovereign authority was justified in subordinating religious liberty, whenever necessary, to limit conflict and defend social order. Grotius, Hobbes, and Locke (in early writings) defend this view of the rights of the sovereign to dictate the religion of the realm, but do so from a position informed by a relative skepticism about the prospects for establishing a uniformity of genuine religious belief. That is, religious unity can be coerced for practical or political, but not religious, reasons (Tuck, 1988:29–33).
34 • INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF DIFFERENCE
Perhaps typical is Locke’s concern, expressed quite clearly in a 1659 letter,15 that it is highly unlikely that religious groups would “quietly unite…under the same government and unanimously cary the same civill interest and hand in hand march to the same end of peace and mutuall society though they take different ways towards heaven.” Not long after, in the Two Tracts on Government (1660– 62), Locke locates the blame for the religious warfare and political instability of the preceding century squarely on unwarranted claims of religious liberty.16 Where religious liberty is tolerated, ambitious religious leaders and the flock they influence will try to build a “temple” to their own faith and thereby attempt to purify the realm of religious difference: “Grant the people once free and unlimited in the exercise of their religion, and where will they stop, where will they themselves bound it, and will it not be religion to destroy all that are not of their profession?” (Locke, 1993:143–44). The consequences are stark. Not only is the peace threatened and the state ruined, but devastation is unleashed on the population: “All those flames that have made such havoc and desolation in Europe, and have not been quenched but with the blood of so many millions, have been at first kindled with coals from the altar” (Locke, 1993:144). Locke proposes to remove the sword from the hand of religion at once; that is, to disarm religion but for the weapons of “word and spirit” (Locke, 1993:144–45). But this stricture is more about the authority of the “magistrate” than about religious tolerance. Though Locke recognizes that Christianity is “embraced privately in the heart and by faith alone,” it falls within the purview of civil authority to regulate the “peace of society and the dignity and welfare of religion” within a “single set of laws” (Locke, 1993: 156–58). More precisely, Locke authorizes the sovereign to impose what he must for the sake of peace. Thus, what is supported is not so much private conscience but a unified church and a common form of worship within the realm, so long as the ruler respects the fundamental (and quite minimal) tenets of the Christian faith (Locke, 1993:154–57).17 At the same time, each author’s work or life offers moments of a defense of religious toleration, though these moments are severely circumscribed. Hobbes is noted for a defense of intellectual inquiry in the face of religious authority and opposing laws condemning heresy, though he did not extend his generosity to nonbelievers, despite the common condemnation of him as an atheist (Tuck, 1993:334, 343–44; Pocock, 1973:187). This limitation is quite consistent with his demand for relative religious uniformity. He put it succinctly: “But seeing a Common-wealth is but one Person, it ought also to exhibite to God but one worship” (Hobbes, 1996:252). Though Hobbes makes some accommodation to private beliefs by demanding only public conformity (Hobbes, 1996:253), he is generally hostile to the play of individual moral judgment and private conscience in political life, declaring them “Diseases of a Common-wealth,” and doctrines “repugnant to Civill Society” (Hobbes, 1996:223). Indeed, Hobbes’s project of rationalizing Christianity (mostly performed in the rarely read parts III and IV of Leviathan) may be seen as part of this more general imperative of the “alignment” or “disciplining” of “individual psychology” (the quoted phrases are
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from Tuck, 1993: 308, 346; see also the important work of Johnston, 1986:109, 130, 210–12). Grotius, himself a victim of religious schism (a story left to the next chapter), defends a somewhat more robust version of tolerance at points in his political career and writings. Sensitive to the religious conflicts of the time (and hostile to Iberian imperial claims based on a papal decree), he refuses any generalized right to religious warfare or persecution (Grotius, 1925:516–17, 518–21). However, atheists receive no such mercy, and religious dissenters were granted no protection in the face of political necessity (Kingsbury and Roberts, 1990:44– 45; Tuck, 1988:30–31). As is clear from his varied writings on religion, Grotius aimed less to defend a robust notion of tolerance of difference than to work for the reunification of Christianity (Haggenmacher, 1990:145; Tuck, 1993:185). And his method of unification is a familiar one: reducing Christianity to its minimal and “undeniable” aspects. Thus, areas of disagreement among Christians are bracketed or pushed aside in order that a narrow set of commonalities might be highlighted and, if necessary, enforced (Tuck, 1993:185– 86; Tully, 1993:49). That Grotius shows less tolerance for those beyond Christendom is suggested by his much celebrated work on the laws of war and peace. Though subjecting war to legal restraint, in De Iure Belli Grotius finds numerous justifications for war that fall particularly heavy on non-Europeans targeted for colonization. Where natives violently resist conversion, restrict transportation or commerce, or fail to properly cultivate their lands, they may find themselves duly subjected to enslavement and their territory duly an object of conquest (Grotius, 1925:190–92, 194–204; 517–18; see also Röling, 1983: 296; Kingsbury and Roberts, 1990:42–47; Tuck, 1999: chapter 3; and Keene, 2002: chapter 2). The hypocrisy involved is palpable: “In short, the enormous popularity of Grotius’ doctrine becomes comprehensible when we recognize that in theory it could gratify the high-minded because it pointed to the way which could reasonably lead to a better world—while in practice it did not restrict in any way the endeavour to subjugate the non-European peoples to European authority” (Röling, 1983:297). Locke’s later views reflect greater respect for religious diversity. This shift is attributed to two experiences that profoundly altered his thinking. As Tully reports (1993:52–53), Locke had observed Christian communities in which relative tolerance was practiced and had seen the attempts to impose religious uniformity in England produce only greater dissent and instability. His changed outlook is reflected in A Letter Concerning Toleration (written in 1685). Tolerance is now seen as an essential trait of the “true Church,” and Locke makes it clear that genuine belief cannot be coerced nor can salvation be had by those who conform outwardly to beliefs they do not share (Locke, 1993:390, 394, 410). Based on this understanding of faith, Locke aims “to distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion, and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the other” (Locke, 1993:393). The task of civil authority is to secure the life and possessions of the population, not to compel
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religious belief. Indeed, given that belief is not capable of being forced (the church being a “free and voluntary society”), the state’s penal methods are wholly inappropriate to the task (Locke, 1993:396, 420; see Waldron, 1988:69). Nor are rulers better able to discern religious truth; their attempts to coerce religious compliance are more than likely to disturb the peace by fostering resentment and rebellion (Locke, 1993:407, 428). Beyond this practical disincentive to meddle in the religious lives of citizens, Locke points to God’s judgment of those who refuse to practice tolerance (Locke, 1993:390–93). Obviously, Locke has moved from his earlier, quite restrictive position, but we should be careful in accepting his views as a simple precursor of our own liberal practices. Locke does not embrace a general pluralism, and the bounds of religious toleration are still quite circumscribed.18 Indeed, his extension of tolerance to dissenters is made against the assumption of certain givens: natural law and a Christian (Protestant) commonwealth (Locke, 1993:421; see also Tuck, 1988). Atheists and Catholics were, therefore, treated with suspicion, since neither could be trusted to submit to civil authority (Locke, 1993:424–26, 431). In this way, legitimate religiosity was restricted to a distinctly Protestant version of a privatized, individualized faith, despite the fact that Locke sees religious diversity as potentially valuable since (Protestant) churches check and balance each other (Locke, 1993:429). In any case, he had come to accept that “the diversity of opinions…cannot be avoided” (Locke, 1993:431), though the “public good” remains a regulative principle, trumping when necessary the liberty of religious practice (Locke, 1993:411–15). Thus, we are still tempted to see Locke less as a great defender of “individual conscience” and more (as above) as the proponent of a cultural conformity enforced by social and political sanction (Tully, 1993:179–80). This judgment is only reinforced when we note that, as with Grotius, sanction for civil uniformity is turned not simply against recalcitrant violators of natural law within the civil order, but also on those outside, such as the Amerindians, whose political and economic practices fail to conform to civilized dictates.19 This conclusion turns largely on Locke’s understandings of property and civil society in the Second Treatise. Though the world is originally “given to Mankind in common,” the appropriation of property by individuals is possible, even in a prepolitical “state of nature,” because the natural right to self-preservation allows the acquisition and consumption of the produce of nature by individuals (Locke, 1988:II, 285–86). The mechanism for this appropriation of nature as property, Locke suggests, is the application of labor (Locke, 1988:II, 287–88). Initially applying this logic to hunting and gathering (Locke, 1988:II, 289–90), Locke extends it to ownership of the land: “As much Land as a Man Tills, Plants, Improves, Cultivates, and can use the Product of, so much is his Property” (Locke, 1988:II, 290). The requirement of cultivation and improvement allows Locke to assert that the enclosure of land does no injury to other claimants, since the application of human labor to land “does not lessen but increases the common stock of humankind” (Locke, 1988:II, 292–95). The progressive
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enclosure of land as private property eventually produced settlements and cities that “came in time to set out the bounds of their distinct Territories.” Though the appropriation of property is justified by natural law and the territorial bounds of settlements might be negotiated by societies in the state of nature, a definitive demarcation of property rights and territorial boundaries depends on the formation of government(s)—the establishment by “Compact” of the institutions of rule definitive of a world of civil societies (Locke, 1988: II, 295, 299). We might say, then, that these two enclosures—of landed property and territorial boundaries—operate in tandem: ownership and sovereignty equally establish exclusive rights of dominion, by which property owner and political community can exclude others from the benefits flowing from or attaching to objects of property and membership in community.20 Locke thus envisions a world of bounded territorial states, each containing a civil society in which landed property is the distinctively civilized form of entitlement and the industrious property owner is the epitome of a civilized citizen. Locke defines Amerindian societies by comparison. More precisely, he understands the Indians in terms of a purported lack of these European practices and institutions, seemingly so that the lands of America could be treated as open for European expansion.21 Indians appear in Locke’s account merely as hunters and gatherers (Locke, 1988:II, 289). The consequence is that, though they may claim property in what they hunt and gather, their lack of a settled, agricultural life (in a European mode) allows them no similar claim to the “Earth it self ” (Locke, 1988:II, 290). Thus, the lands of the Americas remain within the commons subject to appropriation by any and all within mankind. All that is required, following on the argument above, is that these “vacant places” and “wild woods and uncultivated wast of America” be removed from the commons by those (Englishmen) willing and able to improve the land via labor and settle the wilderness for civilized life (Locke, 1988:II, 293–94). Fortunately, Locke assures us, no injury can come to the current inhabitants (but nonowners) of the lands of the Americas, since this appropriation will only increase the “Products of the earth” and the “Conveniences” available to them as participants in the commercial society that will ensue. In a passage paraphrased famously by Adam Smith, Locke presents definitive evidence: “And a King of a large and fruitful Territory there feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day Labourer in England” (Locke, 1988:II, 296–97). Locke’s liberal vision of property and commerce thus appears intimately entangled with a colonial project that erases any possible Native claims to their own lands and any long-term coexistence of different forms of life. In Barbara Arneil’s (1994:609) terms, the “English farmer, through the application of his reason and industry, becomes in turn the only legitimate member of the newly forming civil society” and, thus, “it would only be through industry and reason that the American Indian could be converted from natural to civil man.” Since the civil (English) necessarily displaces the natural (Indian), Locke’s liberalism “becomes a philosophical justification for both the usurpation of Indian land and the assimilation of ‘natural man’ into civil society.”
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As a way of summary perhaps, the doctrine of sovereign power, as Hinsley (1986:138–50) carefully recounts, was necessarily related (by these thinkers in particular) to the conception of a “body politic” bringing together people, state, and territory into a unified, harmonious whole. David Campbell (1992: 42) likewise has referred to this emerging notion of citizenship and the state as the “passage from difference to identity.” It appears to us, then, that the equation of cultural diversity and political chaos, on the one side, and cultural homogeneity and political order, on the other, is central to the legacy of political thinking bequeathed to us by this era. James Tully elaborates this claim. The dominant interpretation of the causes of the Thirty Years’ War was that it stemmed from “conflicts over the locus of sovereignty”—“that the conflicting jurisdictions and authorities of the ancient constitutions were the cause of wars.” If ambiguity or uncertainty was the culprit, it was imperative “that authority had to be organized and centralised by the constitution in some sovereign body” (Tully, 1995b:66– 67). For the people to be understood as capable of constituting a sovereign authority, they had to be conceived as “culturally homogenous in the sense that culture is irrelevant, capable of being transcended, or uniform.” The idea was embraced, consequently, that the people form “a society.” Society was defined variously as “equal individuals in a state of nature,” or as a collective existing “at a ‘modern’ level of historical development,” or as a “community” bound together by a conception of the good. Whatever view is taken, society is seen as preexisting the “uniform political association” that its members are inevitably (rationally) drawn to construct (Tully, 1995b:63–64). Unlike the customary and irregular (or “multiform”) character of the old regime or the various historical states of barbarity or wildness that were the source of so much trouble, “[t]he sovereign people, in modern societies,…establish a constitution that is legally and politically uniform: a constitution of equal citizens who are treated identically rather than equitably, of one national system of institutionalised legal and political authority rather than many, and a constitutional nation equal in status to all others” (Tully, 1995b:64– 67). Tully (1995b:66) sees this “legal and political monism” as “perfectly understandable” given the experience of the years of warfare, but this does not vindicate what he calls an “empire of uniformity.”22 Rather, he argues that the modern ideal of uniform constitutionalism serves as an impediment to our capacity to “recognize and accommodate cultural diversity” (Tully, 1995b:1). Toulmin’s assessment is quite close to Tully’s. For Toulmin (1990:128), a new “scaffolding of modernity”—constructed on the basis of “principles of stability in and among the different sovereign nation-states, and hierarchy within the social structure of each individual state”—legitimated a new social and political order. Although this represented a “timely response to the general crisis of 17thcentury politics”—a suturing of the “wounds” in the medieval “Cosmopolis”— he is not sanguine about the results. He argues that, though we have found these certainties and legitimations unconvincing ultimately, we have been given
THE WESTPHALIAN DEFERRAL • 39
inadequate guidance as to how we are to respond to the problem of difference (Toulmin, 1990:80, 89, 172–75). Thus, following Tully and Toulmin, we read Westphalia not only as a deferral of the problem of difference, but also as directing us down a path of theory and practice deeply suspicious of, if not actively hostile toward diversity. The problem is magnified where our celebration of modernity continues to blind us to the inadequacy of the guidance bequeathed to us by Westphalia. It is to the contemporary resonance of the Westphalian deferral that we now turn. Conclusion: IR and the Problem of Difference The society of states, as we have already noted, is strongly associated with the principle of tolerance among different and separate political communities. There is something to this belief, but the association is quite fragile and burdened with numerous complications and discrepancies. We believe that it is more accurate to see the theory and practice of international society as largely a deferral of a genuine recognition, exploration, and engagement of difference. This deferral is achieved in several intertwined moves. In international society, others are located outside the state, beyond the boundaries of political community. The idea that the state is a political community suggests that, within the state, a realm of relative “sameness”—a cultural homogeneity and a uniform constitution in Tully’s terms —is presumed. To put this set of ideas somewhat differently, the differences constituting each state as a particular political community are kept separate and managed within the boundaries of the state. This demarcation and policing of the boundary between the “inside” and “outside” of the political community defines the problem of difference as between and among states; difference is marked and contained as international difference. This construction of difference allows us to “solve” the problem by negotiating a modus vivendi among political communities. A minimal set of rules—revolving around sovereignty and nonintervention—constitutes international society as a world of mutually tolerant political communities. In this account, it is the very minimalism, and therefore supposed “neutrality,” of this sovereignty solution that stabilizes the system: any and all, regardless of culture or ideology, can find a home in this world. Or so goes the story. We suggest a different interpretation of international society in which the problem of difference is pervasive. The bounded political community constructs (and is constructed by) others both within and beyond its boundaries. The other lurks as a perpetual threat in the form of other states, foreign groups, imported goods, and alien ideas, and as difference within, vitiating the presumed but rarely, if ever, achieved “sameness.” Internal others are managed or governed by some combination of hierarchy, eradication by assimilation or expulsion, and tolerance. External others are left to suffer or prosper according to their own means, interdicted at border crossings, balanced and deterred, or, in appropriate cases, subjected to coercion or conquest. Our responses to others seem, as explained in
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the introduction, perpetually drawn toward Todorov’s equation: difference is translated as inferiority and thereby subjected to eradication. Indeed, the “inside/ outside” logic performs, in Jessica Benjamin’s terms, an act of “splitting”—an exclusion of the overlap of self and other that works to deflect our responses to difference in the direction of a “purifying hatred.” Locating difference securely beyond the boundaries of self impedes our capacity to fully acknowledge and affirm others that always lie within, or to appreciate and claim selves that exist as part of others beyond those boundaries. The implication is clear: unless we can respond creatively to this exclusivity of self and other, by exposing and cultivating the points of connection and the spaces of overlap (while still respecting the divergences and incompatibilities), we will not find our way to an understanding in which equality and difference coexist. In other words, we are still largely hostage to the kinds of impulses toward difference that marked the wake of the Thirty Years’ War. We remain bound to a narrow understanding of difference as disorder, perpetuating the “wound” of difference by failing nearly altogether to appreciate the opportunities and resources accompanying engagement with others. We can see this process of splitting at work in the very constitution of the subject matter of international relations. Martin Wight’s “Why Is There No International Theory?” is paradigmatic in its counterpoising of political theory and IR: political theory—the domain of the “theory of the good life” possible in a state—is contrasted with the moral and political impoverishment of IR theory. Where IR is distinguished as a “realm of recurrence and repetition” or a “precontractual state of nature,” there can be no properly international political theory (Wight, 1966:17, 20–22, 26, 30–33). It is important to be clear that this is not a simple distinction between disparate elements, but an act of splitting that is mutually constitutive of both the state/political theory and a society of states/IR theory. As Rob Walker (1993: chapter 2) elaborates, IR theory’s account of the political and ethical limits and possibilities of modern life turns on this demarcation of inside/outside: politics and the pursuit of the good life are possible only within sovereign states; the condition of sovereign political community is, however, the ethically limited and tragic interactions of these separate states. Thus, the splitting of inside/outside is not only constitutive of the field, but also a precondition of the deferral of the problem of difference associated with a society of states. Rather than an ephemeral feature of twentiethcentury theorizing, we find the sources of this deferral in the putative origins of European international relations. IR continues to inhabit this legacy and the problem of difference that it bequeaths. We return to this theme again in chapter 3, where we examine conventional IR theory and several contemporary reactions to post-Cold War trends as aspects of theories of modernization. That inquiry depends, however, on a deeper investigation into the sixteenth-and seventeenth-century sources of this suspicion of difference. In particular, we explore European responses to the temporal and spatial anxieties generated by the “discovery” of
THE WESTPHALIAN DEFERRAL • 41
the Americas. There we find the seeds of early modern notions of modernization and development that continue to weigh heavily on the shoulders of the present.
CHAPTER 2 Intimate Indians1
We may speculate…that desire for access to the real in the other’s culture is in part a deflection of desire for access to the real within one’s own. —Stephen Greenblatt, Marvelous Possessions You are the ones who give out an evil smell according to my way of thinking, and you are the ones who are repulsive and disgusting to me, because you seek only vain frivolities and because you lead soft lives just as though you were not Christians. These poor Indians have a heavenly smell to me; they comfort me and give health, for they exemplify for me that harshness of life and penitence which I must espouse if I am to be saved. —Bishop Juan de Zumárraga (quoted in Hanke, 1949:175) In the previous chapter we argued that the predominant political and ethical response of sixteenth-and seventeenth-century Europe to the divisions of Reformation and Counter Reformation involved an attempt to eradicate difference. Contrary to most conventional readings that treat the Peace of Westphalia as a marker of a new, more tolerant era, we suggest substantial continuity between the radical solution of “religious cleansing” and the attempt within social and political thought to construct an unassailable “empire of uniformity.” Thus, modern political theory betrays its status as a response, and in our view a largely inadequate one, to the ugly consequences of that time’s failure to live peacefully with difference (see Tuck, 1999). We begin with the intuition, then, that IR’s difficulty in theorizing difference is not a simple anomaly in its theoretical lenses, easily correctable with a quick trip to the epistemological ophthalmologist. Rather, this failing appears central to dominant strands of Western social and political thought more generally, requiring that we dig deeper into the way of being that creates this way of seeing. Pursuing this task we find ourselves once again in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as Europe attempts to make sense of the recent “discovery” and exploration of the New World. This confrontation with the other posed a serious challenge to European
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self-understanding; the Amerindians were only partly comprehensible within the received categories of contemporary and ancient learning (Hanke, 1959:2–3; Hodgen, 1964: chapter 9; Pagden, 1982:1–3; Mason, 1990:17–19). Making sense of the Indians became a major preoccupation, stimulating a cottage industry of travelers’ tales, the reports of missionaries, the emergence of comparative ethnologies, so well documented by Margaret Hodgen (1964) and Anthony Pagden (1982), and new conceptions of the relation of European political units and newly “discovered” peoples (Anghie, 1996). It is these latter two developments—the rise of comparative studies and new conceptions of the relations of European political units with others—that are crucial to our account of the limits of the predominant European responses to difference. Certainly, comparison is central to any social and political theorizing. While making comparisons we may wish, for practical or political purposes, to highlight either differences or similarities. However, no matter how abstract or concrete, comparison always requires some engagement with both similarities and differences. Similarity must be framed against difference, and difference is necessarily the context for similarity; no comparison is possible without some attention to each (Campbell, 1992:8; Collingwood, 1933:26–53; Zizek, 1993: 122–24). Yet many engagements with the other attempt to defy this basic principle, pursuing either similarity or difference almost single-mindedly. The dangers of this are made clear by Tzvetan Todorov’s analysis of the “double movement.” As we described in the introduction, the other is greeted with a pattern of response that either tries to fully assimilate the other to self, repressing difference, or designates the other as radically different, denying a common humanity. Like this chapter, Todorov’s study is centered on the colonization of the Americas, but we share his view that this mode of engagement with the other “heralds” the modern era and is reproduced in much of contemporary social and political thought (Todorov, 1984:5; see also Dussell, 1995:9–12). We explore this final claim in the following chapter. Here our search is for the motivations that underlie the double movement and the possibility of alternative responses. We argue that the pattern of response characteristic of the double movement is conditioned by the presence of certain very powerful and often hidden commitments. For the IR/political theory matrix, these hidden commitments do not simply emerge from the wound of the Thirty Years’ War, but are lodged in the general problematic of sixteenth-and seventeenth-century Christian Europe. The dominant aspiration of this time was to grasp the social world as emerging from a single point of origin (the creation) and, even if currently fallen or divided, guided by God’s purposes and plan toward an ultimate redemption and unification. The commitment to a single origin and a uniform teleology constructs difference not as an intrinsic and ubiquitous part of life, but as a fall from God’s grace, a deviation from God’s purpose, and a degeneration of God’s original perfection. Such a commitment to uniformity had, of course, to bear the explosion of difference being reported and experienced both inside and outside Europe (Elliot, 1995:401–2). The key issues became how to reconcile the core
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assumptions of European culture with the experience of difference and how to behave toward difference. By placing tremendous pressure on the commitment to uniformity, this discovery of difference created unbearable doubt and anxiety. In this context the problem of difference generates two opposing impulses. First, linked so tightly with doubt and anxiety, difference is feared—it is something humans feel compelled to explain and locate at some distance from the self so that it might be contained or vanquished. The search for an “empire of uniformity” reflects this impulse. Second, and a recessive theme gestured toward by the initial quotations from Greenblatt and Zumárraga, doubt also indicates a desire to explore the pleasures and benefits of difference. As something that instills desire, difference must be explored and engaged in order to expose and oppose the stifling constraints of uniformity. This counterimpulse signals to us the possibility of an “ethnological moment”—a hope we defend in this book—in which difference is appreciated as a resource for internal self-reflection and social criticism. If the dominant impulse is to regard difference as degeneration and disorder, alongside this impulse subsists another that treats difference as a medium for regeneration and possibly redemption.2 We might say, then, that the commitments that produce IR as an “empire of uniformity” hide, yet also contain, an alternative moment that may be uncovered and cultivated. This chapter begins this task. We locate these opposing impulses both within the dominant patterns of sixteenth-and seventeenth-century thinking and trace out their presence in the work of a series of important figures: Vitoria, Léry, Grotius, and Campanella. At the end of this chapter, we suggest that an important transition has occurred in these writings, one that sets the stage for the emergence of more recognizable notions of development and modernization in the eighteenth century and beyond. We introduce the claim that development and modernization (and accompanying colonial impulses) may be seen both as an explanation of and as a possible solution to this problem of difference, degeneration, and disorder (we are tempted here to say: anarchy). Thus, we can identify two major strains of the effort to manage difference. The first, the subject of the previous chapter, involves a spatial strategy of separating difference with boundaries. The second, key to this chapter, involves a temporal strategy, deploying ideas of development or modernization. By the end of this chapter, we will have arrived at the skeletal structure of IR: anarchy as the ordering principle of the states system; an order of development or modernization within. We can, then, in the following chapter examine the way contemporary IR, as a variant of modernization theory, both preserves and sets in tension these two strategies for managing difference. Wild Men and Indians As Europe “discovered” the Americas, the primary terms that served to secure the spatial and temporal boundaries of civilization and therefore to act as the repositories of difference centered on the idea of “wildness”—the existence of a
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“wilderness” and “wild men” (White, 1972; Sheehan, 1980; Mason, 1990; Seed, 1993). Though melded from diverse origins, as we suggest below, the rehearsed responses to the monstrous figures and savage practices associated with “wildness” shape the European encounters with the Amerindians, providing a largely prefigured language and repertoire of images (Hanke, 1959:3–5; Greenblatt, 1976:566; Mason, 1990:23). With these images and categories, Europeans attempted to account for the Indians in ways consistent with two imperatives: to defend a precarious sense of cultural superiority and to preserve the integrity of Christian teachings.3 More specifically, they sought to preserve the idea of the unity of creation and the restorative role of God’s church (after “the Fall”),4 as posited by Christian doctrine but disrupted by the suddenly revealed presence of new peoples, unaccounted for by European understandings of the peopling of the world and untouched (it seems) by the Christian Gospel. However, the notion of “wildness” is rife with ambiguity, offering both idyllic and frightening visions and branding difference both as a sign of degeneration and as a source of desire. This ambiguity is partly explained by the complex sources of the categories and images associated with “wildness” and partly by tensions endemic to the project of policing the boundary between barbarism and civilization. The medieval notion of wildness takes over numerous images and ideas from ancient Greek, Roman, and Hebrew sources, but inflects them with Christian understandings. The Greeks, White (1972:9–10, 23–24) tells us, associated order with the ways of the city, in direct contrast to the potentially chaotic and isolated existence of men living outside, in the countryside or forests. Thus, barbarity or wildness appears in both moral and geographical guises, as at once a judgment about the internal diversity of humankind, into higher and lower parts, and about the spatial borders of civilization and the monstrosities, dangers, and temptations that lie on the other side.5 The late-medieval and Renaissance deployments of the category of wildness in relation to the Amerindians drew on this classical distinction between the civility of the city and the barbarism of roving hordes of hunters and gatherers (Mason, 1990:46; Sheehan, 1980:52), but braided it with Christian orthodoxy; civilization required, in addition to the social practices of settled agriculture and commerce associated with cities, the sensibilities and trappings of Christian piety (Sheehan, 1980:40–41). The position of the Amerindians as barbarians or savages was obvious, and we should be less than surprised (as we will see below) that these groups are associated with a presocial state—“the state of nature”—that becomes paradigmatic of a state of disorder and anarchy. Late-medieval interpretations of the New World were also framed by expectations deriving from the Christian appropriation of ancient Hebrew traditions surrounding the creation myth and the Fall. Medieval Christian readings of the meaning of the creation largely followed the Hebrew understanding (see White, 1972:12–14). An “omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly just” God cannot but produce a perfect and harmonious order. Though
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humanity is placed at the moral center of that order, it is human action that corrupts the “Edenic state,” resulting in the expulsion of humanity from Eden and its banishment into a suddenly hostile and hard world. It is at this point that Hebrew and Christian understandings begin to diverge. For the ancient Hebrews the Fall serves an etiological function: it explains why humanity has lost God’s blessing and offers a path—upholding the covenant with God—by which that blessing and Edenic conditions may be restored. Perhaps even more starkly than the Greeks, the Hebrews constructed a humanity divided threefold—among the people of the covenant, who serve as “the paradigm of a morally redeemable humanity,” Gentiles, mired in “nature” but potentially redeemable, and “wild men,” who seem to have fallen “into a state of degeneracy below that of ‘nature’ itself, a horrible state in which the possibility of redemption is all but completely precluded” (White, 1972:12–13). Though this hierarchy of (human?) types is not completely displaced in later European thinking about the peoples of the New World, the Fall takes on a much different significance in Christian thinking. For Christianity, the Fall appears as a “species taint,” an “ontological flaw at the heart of humanity,” preventing the full realization of God’s law on earth (White, 1972:12). In this way, the idea of the diversity of humanity is partly dislodged by a conception of a division internal to each human being—between the sinner (wild man) within and the possibility of redemption via commitment to a life of faith. Though sometimes only begrudgingly acknowledged in European encounters with the Amerindians, as we shall see, none—no matter the state of degeneracy or degree of wildness— is in principle beyond the reach of God’s grace. Unless preempted by some very strong version of the doctrine of predestination, the missionary project, with its aim of restoring the harmony and order of creation, follows immediately from this understanding (White, 1972:17; Mason, 1990:46; Sheehan, 1980:6; Dussel, 1995:50–54). Thus, the ontic hiving-off of wildness by the ancient Hebrews is replaced by an internalization of wildness within the Christian ontological scheme. Rather than a separate (both geographical and logical) place, medieval Christianity transforms this separation into an internal space, permitting its followers to treat wildness (including the wildness of the Americas) temporally— as the beginning to which Christianity is the teleological end. This figures importantly in Vitoria’s translation of the notion of natural slavery into what is recognizable as the rudiments of a theory of development (the subject of the next section) and prefigures Enlightenment theories of progress and development (discussed at the end of this chapter) and contemporary theories of modernization (the focus of the next chapter). However, the deployment of the idea of wildness is accompanied by ambiguities that generate acute anxieties among the European explorers, missionaries, and interpreters. This is the result, first and in part, of the availability of an alternative set of associations. Wildness might be understood in relation to a “primal myth in European culture” of a “pre-social time,” informed by the Iure of Biblical descriptions of Eden (Sheehan, 1980: 1), or a state of
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primitive innocence and freedom from the constraints of social life, informed by some combination of Greek and Biblical themes (White, 1972:22, 25). When joined with the idea that “wildness” was not simply separate and distant but a possibility within each human, the wilderness (both beyond European society and within each person) serves not only as a site of danger but also as a locale of desire. As “the image of the man released from social control, the man in whom libidinal impulses have gained full ascendency” (White, 1972:21), the wild man served as a screen on which was projected both “repressed desires and anxieties” (White, 1972: 7; see also Greenblatt, 1976:567). White (1972:21) elaborates: In the Christian Middle Ages, then, the Wild Man is the distillation of the specific anxieties underlying the three securities supposedly provided by the specifically Christian institutions of civilized life: the securities of sex (as organized by the institution of the family), sustenance (as provided by the political, social, and economic institutions), and salvation (as provided by the Church). The Wild Man enjoys none of the advantages of civilized sex, regularized social existence, or institutionalized grace. But, it must be stressed, neither does he—in the imagination of the medieval man—suffer any of the restraints imposed by membership in these institutions. He is desire incarnate, possessing the strength, wit, and cunning to give full expression to all his lusts. His life is correspondingly unstable in character. He is a glutton, eating to satiety one day and starving the next; he is lascivious and promiscuous, without even consciousness of sin or perversion (and therefore of course deprived of the pleasures of more sophisticated vices). And his physical power and agility are conceived to increase in direct ratio to the diminution of his conscience. These anxieties conditioned much of European thinking about the Amerindians. More precisely, the specific translation of the Amerindians into wild men was governed by the imperative to reduce anxiety and doubt by repressing the ambiguities associated with this set of categories and images. Allowing this ambiguity seemed to open the possibility of alternative political and ethical understandings, challenging existing constructions of self and other and threatening degeneration into disorder, into another Fall (Pagden, 1982:196–97; 1993:46; Sheehan, 1980:3, 38). Self and other had to be radically separated (Mason, 1990:58)—a form of “splitting” as described in the introduction. As Jessica Benjamin (1988:62–63) would expect, any possible parity between the parties to these encounters is eliminated by a process that polarizes interacting subjects as completely distinct and opposite tendencies, as the embodiments of good and evil. Thus, the superiority of the European self was defended through an act of exclusion (Mason, 1990: 41). Indians were found to be not only uncivilized, but wild in a way that associated them with beasts.6 Especially common were images of cannibalism, despite the apparently scanty evidence of its actual practice (Sheehan, 1980: 64–65). Any sign of resistance to European
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influence called forth and reinforced a simple equation of Indians, incivility, and Satan so that the Indians came to represent defiance of God’s laws embodied (however imperfectly) in European civilization (Sheehan, 1980:37–41). In short, and by comparison with accounts of other regions, the Americas and the Amerindians were rendered as radical or absolute otherness (Mason, 1990:179; Whately, 1990: xviii). The impulse is clear: only by rendering the Indians as radically other, denying them a common humanity, can anxiety and doubt be quelled. Second (and building on this), the discovery of the Americas also seemed to threaten European historical understandings rooted in classical and, especially, Biblical sources. European observers were “possessed,” Pagden (1982: 13) argues, “by a belief in the uniformity of human nature, a belief which required every race to conform, within certain broad limits, to the same ‘natural’ patterns of behaviour.” Though Europeans already imagined themselves in relationship to otherness of various kinds, these inherited understandings were strained by a newly revealed diversity of peoples and social and religious practices, until then completely unknown to Europeans. This decentering of the European world was intensified by growing reports of abominations and monstrosities beyond the imagination (Hodgen, 1964:213, 231). That is, the very act of exclusion that served to preserve the purity of the self, as we saw above, rendered the Amerindians—as a radical other—difficult to square with the idea of the unity and order of creation drawn from Genesis. As we saw in the previous chapter, the passionate commitment of all those within (an increasingly divided) Christendom to theological unity made “the plurality of worlds…problematic because it compromised the uniqueness of salvation” (MacCormack, 1995:106). Thus, the problem of accounting for the diversity suggested by the Amerindians assumed increasing urgency (Pagden, 1982:1–9; Hodgen, 1964:221–22). Two primary modes of explaining diversity were available to the thinkers of the time. Either the issue was taken up under Biblical guidance or under secular historicoenvironmental arguments suggested by classical philosophers. Since both approaches were “framed in accord with the universal respect always paid to historical or genetic types of explanation” (Hodgen, 1964:222), it was possible to sustain elements of each as a tension among thinkers and within individual accounts, though Biblical authority played the governing role (Whately, 1990:xxiii; Williams, 1948:140; Hodgen, 1964: 225; Pagden, 1982:28, 50, chapter 7). Resort to Biblical authority also did not produce a fully uniform approach. Thinkers fractured between the defense of more orthodox monogenist theories, emphasizing the singularity of creation, and various polygenist theories, suggesting multiple “creative episodes” (Hodgen, 1964:272–75). Ideas of a “second Adam” or “spontaneous generation from the earth” were considered heretical—“a dire threat to the unity and integrity of the human race” (Pagden, 1982:22–23)—and since they were no less hostile to deviations from God’s order, offering little in the way of an ethical alternative, we leave the polygenists aside for the moment.7
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Drawing on these resources, interpreters generally treated diversity as degenerative in relation to the original perfection of creation. Radical difference was counterpoised to the orthodoxy that humanity originates from “a single creative act, in a single moment in time, and at a single spot on the earth’s surface.” This understanding of creation admits of little initial difference among peoples of the earth; humans are originally of “one blood and one inheritance”—“physically, ethnically, and socially homogeneous.” However, the additional textual resources required for explaining human diversity could also be authorized Biblically, particularly Genesis’s genealogy of the Fall, Cain’s exile, the flood, postflood repopulation, and dispersion via Babel. These elements were taken to be largely adequate to explain the “ruptures of uniformity” that spread people across space and differentiated them culturally, though there was often a need to extend the logic, by analogy or by conjecture, to account for more contemporary realities (Hodgen, 1964: 223–29, 243–44; see also Allen, 1963). Using Biblical themes of expulsion from paradise with the Fall and the dispersions of populations via fratricide (with Cain) and hubris (at Babel), human time and geographical space came to be seen as corruptive (Hodgen, 1964:254–55). After the Fall, space and time could no longer serve unambiguously as the medium through which God’s beauty and perfection unfold. More precisely, human diversity and geographical dispersion appear only after and beyond God’s initial plan and largely in opposition to the original perfection of creation. Thus, the combination of human movement across generations and geographic expanse produced multiple and variously degenerated variants of the original. Space/time alienates rather than realizes God’s labor,8 and difference is constructed and explained as degeneration (Certeau, 1980; Williams, 1948: 148). The monstrosity and abominations of the Amerindians thus find a location within the Christian cosmology. But since all are fallen and all degenerated by temporal and geographical distance from creation, the need to police the boundaries of wildness and civilization takes on added theological and historical weight. Much care must be devoted to sorting out the varied temporal and geographical relationships that simultaneously explain the peopling of the New World and preserve the (axiomatically) superior location of European and Christian civilization.9 And given that Indians and Europeans both must be placed within the human band of God’s creation, it is not only differences but also similarities that must be accounted for. Accordingly, sixteenth-and seventeenth-century thinkers were forced to direct their attention to the problem of their own likeness with the Amerindians (Hodgen, 1964:301).10 Though the inference of difference as degeneration remained pivotal, the accompanying problem of similarities afforded thinkers an opportunity to complicate and deepen Europe’s temporal and spatial relationships—both among its spatially outer others—various brands of Indians and other savages or barbarians—and what Europeans took to be their temporally and developmentally prior internal others—Greek and Roman antiquity. The method
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they devised was to locate a cultural correspondence over a particular trait and then to draw parallels between the full scope of both cultures. This was deemed especially useful for the analysis of “savage” cultures that were treated as historyless because they lacked written history. In such cases, “given a pair of similar traits—one from a contemporary but perhaps utterly history-less culture and another from an ancient but richly documented one—the age and evidential import of the ancient trait was imparted to its history-less contemporary, permitting the documentary use of the contemporary, despite its recency and historical emptiness” (Hodgen, 1964:308). That is, the spatial difference between Europe and others is converted into a temporal one. With the conversion of space into time, the constructed temporal backwardness of the savages is equated with the imagined temporal origins of the European self in antiquity and the spatially distinct other is thereby converted into a temporally prior self (Armitage, 1995; Fenton and Moore, 1974).11 “Effaced from memory,” in Hodgen’s (1964:339) terms,was the historicity of the Amerindians. While we will examine the axiological valences of this spatiotemporal maneuver more fully below, it is clear that it amounts to an erasure of the present as a time shared by the European self and its others—a “denial of coevalness” (Fabian, 1983). This denial—still at the heart of contemporary social theory, as we shall see— aimed to solve certain problems. It seemed to account for the origins of the Amerindians. The spatial and temporal unity of creation could be maintained if the peopling of the Americas by Noah’s descendents could be verified, first, by establishing similarities between the Amerindians and (known) Asian descendants of Noah and, second, by documenting the route that they traveled on their way from Asia to the Americas. Similar proposals derived the Amerindians “from the Welsh, the Greeks and Romans, the Jews, the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel, the Africans, Ethiopians, French Kurlanders, or Phoenicians” (Hodgen, 1964:312). In each case, the assertions relied on a (more or less) careful documentation of similarities in which Amerindians were compared to peoples— both past and present—to which their resemblance was believed to confer a “genetic cultural relationship” (Hodgen, 1964:312). However, and consistent with the assumption of European superiority, it was always assumed that a “European or Eurasian culture was, and must be, older than an American culture” (Hodgen, 1964:313). Or to put it the other way around, it came to be accepted that, relative to the present of the Europeans, the Amerindian culture and the cultures of antiquity were equally immature (Hodgen, 1964:332). This notion of the transmission of peoples and cultures from antiquity to the Americas thus produced an image of the Amerindians as unchanging replicas of these past cultures. Passed on from generation to generation, the culture of the Indians was pictured as “in an unchanged, an accountably fixed, primitive and aboriginal condition” (Hodgen, 1964:332). As a summary of this section, we want to highlight that this method of comparison has at its core three interlinked elements, all of which work to repress a common humanity. First, the coevality of peoples in the present is
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denied. Second, this denial of coevalness is sustained by treating certain peoples as unchanging, as history-less. Finally, with the claim of a changeless antiquity that is transmitted to these “people without history,”12 the ancient (but internal) other and the contemporary (spatially external) other may be equated as prior and less advanced forms of the self. Together these three elements construct difference as degeneration—a problem to be resolved by a return to unity. From an unchanging antiquity (both past and contemporaneous) there are only two paths possible. One, the true path, has led a Christianized Europe from this original condition to participation as peoples in a meaningful history. The other path, leading from antiquity to the Amerindians, must be a false one (having received no visitation by Christ) or a degeneration (in that Christ has been forgotten). Thus, savage, wild, or barbarous cultures were granted neither historicity nor mutability, but that which the Europeans might offer to (or impose on) them. And their equality as human beings, to the extent that it was recognized, depended ultimately on conversion and assimilation.13 European Encounters: Dominant and Recessive Moments Though this method of comparison may represent the dominant response of the Europeans to the “discovery” of the Americas, it by no means exhausts the possibilities evidenced by this set of encounters in the “contact zone.” We have already indicated some of the ambiguities involved in the idea of wildness or savagery—as both a sign of degeneration and as a source of desire—and the desperate efforts to secure the European self-understanding in the face of radical otherness. The ambiguities and nuances in the European stance toward difference merit more examination, yet it is beyond our means to attempt an exhaustive cataloging of the variety of responses. Our strategy, inspired by the example of Nandy (1983) and Todorov (1984), is to draw on the work of several important figures from this period as a way of mapping some of the key features of the terrain of European response. We introduce and discuss the writings of four figures—Francisco de Vitoria, Jean de Léry, Hugo Grotius, and Tomasso Campanella. Each account suggests the power of the dominant views of the Amerindians as degenerate. However, in each case we can also identify certain improvisational elements. In Vitoria’s work, and crucial to our study, a view of the Indians as absolutely other—as natural slaves—is transformed into recognizable rudiments of a theory of development. Léry reworks cannibalism so that it is shifted from being simply a marker of absolute otherness to being deployed as a critical category, put into service as a weapon against the internal other of Catholicism and, more profitably, as a mirror for evaluating a radically changing Europe. In Grotius’s engagement with the debate about the origins of the Amerindians, we offer the possibility that the Amerindians—as a crucial other—may have been key to debates about tolerance among Christians. Finally, with Campanella, we find hints of the transition from a medieval notion of Christian unity to a recognizably modern, cosmopolitan answer to the problem of
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difference that feels the need for the other even as it effaces it within a universal vision. Thus, on the one hand, the improvisational elements introduced by these individuals—figured in later European thinking as the oppositions between civil order and anarchy, developed and underdeveloped—work to defend the boundaries of the European self, reinforcing a sense of European moral and cultural superiority. But, on the other hand, each figure also suggests elements that serve as resources for an alternative assessment of the relations of cultures and peoples. Francisco de Vitoria (1485–1546): Others as Children When in the course of colonial expansion a Western body politic came to occupy, literally, the space of an autochthonous body, several alternatives were conceived to deal with that violation of the rule. The simplest one, if we think of North America and Australia, was of course to move or remove the other body. Another one is to pretend that space is being divided and allocated to separate bodies. South Africa’s rulers cling to that solution. Most often the preferred strategy has been simply to manipulate the other variable—Time. With the help of various devices of sequencing and distancing one assigns to the conquered populations a different Time. —Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other Francisco de Vitoria, Dominican theologian and founder of the Salamanca or Spanish school of jurisprudence,14 was a central figure in the debate over the nature of the Indians in the sixteenth century. However, the imperatives motivating his work were much broader. His education in Paris (from 1507 to 1522) immersed him in the works of Thomas Aquinas, but also exposed him to new strands of humanist skepticism and various Protestant (and, from his point of view, heretical) doctrines of the relationship between grace and dominium. Upon his return to Spain in 1523, he was elected to the prime chair in theology at Salamanca, a position he held until his death. In his first major series of lectures (1526–29), Vitoria placed Thomism back onto equal footing with the ancients, working to restore the consistency of Aristotelian thought with medieval natural law doctrine. A central motivation of this project was to counter Renaissance skepticism and the potential social quietism of the Protestants, by defending the extension of the scope of theological inquiry and its moral certainties into the concerns of everyday life. In order to achieve this, Vitoria located the right to rule and ownership of self and property in natural, not divine or human, law. Thus, dominium is universalized, no longer limitable to the elect or true believers or merely subject to customary practice. And, crucial for our purposes, if the right to rule oneself is integral to natural law, the claims that some are naturally slaves or that individuals and political communities are at liberty to voluntarily enslave
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themselves had to be rejected (see Tuck, 1979:49–50; and Anghie, 1996:323– 24). The bearing of his views on the status of the American Indians is clear, and Vitoria took up this issue with great seriousness in his 1539 lectures, De Indis (On the American Indians, published in 1557, after his death). Vitoria’s De Indis struggles to locate the Indians in a hierarchically graded creation. In line with his rejection of the category of natural slave, he settled on a view of their status as fully human. But, consistent with the common assessment of their level of technological mastery and social and religious practices, he saw the Indians as seriously out of sync with natural law, or, put differently, as in a distinct and perpetual state of social and religious disorder. The Amerindians appear as a notably lesser developed version of a European self. The importance of Vitoria’s innovation is best understood in relation to the details of the intellectual context in which he lectured, though, we would argue, it is also a pivotal, if early, precursor of theories of development and modernization that we will discuss at the end of this chapter and in the next. Prior to the 1520s, what information Europe possessed about the Indians came largely from Spanish contact with the “primitive” communities of Hispaniola, Cuba, Jamaica, and Puerto Rico. These cultures hardly interested the Spaniards, but, with the conquests of the Aztec and Inca empires and the publication of a series of new accounts of the Americas—Hernan Cortés’s Cartas de Relacion (1522), Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo’s Sum-mario de la Natural Historia de las Indias (1526), Peter Martyr’s De Orbe Novo (1530), Franscisco Jerez’s Verdadera Relacion de la Conquista del Peru (1534), and Oviedo’s Historia General y Natural de las Indias (1535)—Spanish interest began to surge. Evidence of substantial technological mastery, large cities, political structures encompassing vast empires, markets and exchange networks, a merchant class, rule by nobility, organized wars, systematic exploitation of others, and the presence of organized religion established that some Indians had created highly developed cultures. No doubt reminding the Spaniards of themselves, these Indians must have seemed formidable enough to be taken seriously. Even so, the remaining, particularly religious, differences between Spaniards and Indians were substantial and posed the problem of their relative place in the cosmological order (Pagden, 1982: 57–58; Seed, 1993). The cosmological problem was, simultaneously, a legal issue about the legitimacy of the Spanish conquest and enslavement of Indians (we draw here and below on Hanke, 1959: chapter 2; Pagden, 1982: chapter 3; Marks, 1992; Seed, 1993; and Anghie, 1996). Slavery itself was not a barrier, since it was accepted as the outcome of “just war,” but the Spanish crown continued to brood over the various juridical and moral questions surrounding their claims in the Americas. They generally relied on Pope Alexander VI’s 1493 bull, Inter Caetera, that permitted Spanish and Portuguese evangelization and territorial rights but not Indian enslavement (see Hanke, 1937). Of course, this legal stricture did not bring slavery to an end in the Americas.
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In 1504, Ferdinand called the first junta15—an open debate between theologians, civil lawyers, and canon lawyers—on the issue of the Americas. Unsurprisingly, the participants legitimated the Spanish claims. However, due to a continuing uncertainty over the issues and to growing pressure from the Dominican order, in 1512 Ferdinand called a second junta at Burgos. It is here that Bernardo de Mesa and Gil Gregorio first employed Aristotle’s theory of natural slavery to justify the enslavement of the Indians. Apparently still not fully satisfied, Ferdinand asked Juan López de Palacios Rubios, who was to author the infamous Requierimiento (for a translation, see Hanke, 1941:71–88), and Matías de Paz to offer “opinions” that same year. They likewise relied on Aristotle’s theory in support of Indian slavery.16 However, this solution to the problem of the Amerindians seemed to set Pope Alexander’s mandate for evangelization at odds with Aristotelian philosophy. The idea that the Indians might be capable of fulfilling their human potential via willful conversion was not consistent with the very traits that fit them for natural servitude—the lack of the capacities to reason and to will for oneself. The challenge facing Vitoria, then, was to refute this use of Aristotle while maintaining the powerful synthesis or mediation of Aristotle and Christian traditions that motivated Thomist thought.17 Vitoria’s approach was also conditioned by the imperative to defend the moral and historical power of Christianity and the social and political institutions of Europe in a time of both increasing divisiveness and skepticism. Lutherans threatened to undercut the basis of civil authority by stressing the incomprehensibility of God’s will, while various reformers challenged the authority of heretical or Godless rulers (Haakonssen, 1996:25–36; Skinner, 1978: 140). The fear of political disorder was widespread and with good reason, as we saw in the previous chapter. If the Lutherans seemed to undercut the capacity to maintain a clear connection between divine and natural law, skeptics rejected the universality of moral principles, perhaps even suggesting the irrelevance of natural law to political life altogether (Skinner, 1978: 140–41; Tuck, 1993: chapter 2). In response, Vitoria and his Salamanca school sought inescapable conclusions via an appeal to reason—the derivation of uncontestable moral precepts and legitimate political institutions from equally certain first principles. More precisely, as Pagden (1982:61) explains, they saw their “principal task” as providing “an exegesis of the law of nature.” Though this foreshadows later (and partly secularized) social contract thinking, as discussed in the previous chapter, Vitoria wishes to avoid even the hint that natural law might be disconnected from God’s will. Rather, natural law is placed within a hierarchy, logically subordinated to the eternal law of God’s acts and divine law, as revealed in scripture, but governing human or positive law (Haakonssen, 1996:16–17). Because the law of nature is “the will of God,” it is “intrinsically just and reasonable,” and positive law remains just and reasonable so long as it is compatible with natural law (Skinner, 1978:148–49). Natural law can be extended to evaluate even the most mundane aspects of social etiquette, since, as a set of “clear and simple ideas” implanted by God in all humans, all men,
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whether Christian or not, can discern its application by the use of reason (Pagden, 1982:60–63). This is the crucial point, because it makes all men, including the recently discovered Indians, part of a single human community, a theme also central to Campanella’s cosmopolitanism, as we shall see. While this conclusion is consistent with the general view of the unity of God’s creation, it was troubling for many because the Amerindians were not simply men as the Europeans knew them to be. Even setting aside the most fantastic accounts of monstrosities and abomination discussed above, which was difficult given the views of the times, the peoples of the Americas were “no mere local variant on some well-known pattern,” but exhibited “aberrant” and “unnatural” behavior (Pagden, 1982:64). However, if the Indians were simply irrational (and thereby natural slaves), it would be hard to account for the growing reports of their technological mastery, their cities and imperial political institutions, and their sophisticated (if satanic) religious practices. Yet, if the Indians were rational human beings, able to access the law of nature and thereby capable of self-government, it then became difficult to explain their practice of human sacrifice, their relatively primitive agricultural techniques and arts, and especially the reported acts of cannibalism. The justice of Spanish claims rested on this issue and it is this quandary that Vitoria addresses in his De Indis (Anghie, 1996: 323). Vitoria poses the problem as one of finding the just reasons for the conquest of America (Vitoria, 1991:233). Since the conquest was already part of the existing order, Vitoria’s method involved identifying those elements in natural and divine law that explained (and justified) the conquest, but that might also require changes in colonial policy. Thus, the question of the correct policy toward the Indians was, in Pagden’s (1982:67) words, “a matter touching on the very nature of man and the metaphysics of the social order.” Vitoria first considers four oft-cited reasons for depriving the Indians of their natural rights to self-rule, territorial dominion, and property. These rights might be forfeited by Indian peoples, he reasoned, if they are: (1) sinners, (2) infidels, (3) foolish—that is, by nature incomplete, or mentally subnormal—or (4) intrinsically irrational beings. Vitoria (1991:240–46) readily sets aside the first two. To deprive sinners of their natural rights is, as we have seen, to fall into the false belief—attributed to Wyclif, Hus, and the Lutherans—that dominium is based on faith. The argument that the legitimacy of rulership turns on espousal of the true faith can dangerously redound to the Spanish, indeed to anyone who espouses it. Nor can the Indians be considered infidels, since they are either ignorant of Christianity or have degenerated too far from their Christian origins to be considered responsible for their beliefs. A consideration of the third and fourth reasons required Vitoria to make greater recourse to the accumulating evidence about the peoples of the Americas. Such evidence was crucial because to think of the Indians as foolish or irrational was to engage explicitly or implicitly the empirical categories central to Aristotle’s theory of natural slavery. Based on his reading of the evidence from
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the New World, Vitoria rejected these claims about the Indians. He writes that the Indians “have judgment like other men.” They “have some order (ordo) in their affairs,” expressed through “properly organized cities, proper marriages, magistrates and overlords (domini), laws, industries, and commerce, all of which require the use of reason.” And crucially, they “likewise have a form (species) of religion” (Vitoria, 1991:250). In these respects, the Amerindians fulfill Aristotle’s own criteria for civilized life (Pagden, 1982:68–79). On the other side of the ledger, however, Vitoria (1991:251) acknowledges the accusation “that these barbarians are…foolish and slowwitted.” He also acknowledges their “sins against the law of nature” (Vitoria, 1991:273). Though not necessarily justifications for displacing the rights of the Indians, as Vitoria (1991:272–75) makes clear, some charges, like cannibalism and human sacrifice, do require careful attention because they signal the presence of a form of intellectual and social chaos. For Vitoria, cannibalism represents an affront to natural law.18 That cannibalism was, indeed, such a violation is indicated by an examination of the historical record. Noting that eating human flesh is an abomination to all civilized nations, he concludes that since all (civilized) men “have held this custom to be a vile one this is because it is so according to natural law” (Vitoria, quoted in Pagden, 1982:85). But common custom is not in itself definitive of anything but the presence of convergent human law: beyond its generally accepted moral indefensibility, the challenge for Vitoria was to explain precisely why such behavior was contrary to natural law. While the law of nature disallows the killing of innocents, what is most significant about cannibalism in particular is that it violates the hierarchical ordering of dominium established in creation. Vitoria explains that the natural world belongs to man because God created it as such for man’s use. As nature stands to man, so man stands to God. Thus, man cannot eat man because man belongs to God. Slavery, likewise, might be a legal relationship under human law, but human law does not create an ontological right to ownership of the kind in natural and divine law, where nature belongs to man and man to God. Because they misunderstand this grading of authority relationships, the Indians continue to commit a serious category mistake, marking their behavior as distinctly inhumane and unnatural. Vitoria is led to conclude that the Indians have fallen into a kind of social and religious disorder because they are consistently unable to see the world as it really is (Pagden, 1982:86–87). Compared to cannibalism, human sacrifice is more comprehensible to Vitoria (Pagden, 1982:89–90). He identifies with the strong need for humans to sacrifice to God their most cherished possession, namely life. He understands, too, that human sacrifice plays a part in Christianity, as in Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his son and, of course, in Christ’s own sacrifice on the cross. Despite this relative sympathy, Vitoria mostly condemns Indian practices, placing the emphasis not on the continuities between the two systems of religion, but, once again, on the Indians’ confusion about the hierarchical relationship between
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categories within natural law. God provides humans with animals for the purpose of sacrifice and does not wish any man to destroy God’s favored creation. With human sacrifice, as with cannibalism, Vitoria sees the Indians failing to apprehend the most important precepts of God’s order. He concludes, therefore, that they have a distorted vision of reality and that their mental world is deficient. This disorder of the mental world of the Amerindians is reflected in various cultural and technological inadequacies: the Indians possess only a rudimentary knowledge of agriculture, they lack the ability to work iron and other metals, they are unlettered, and, in the end, they are unable to govern adequately their own domains. In sum, the Indians are human but inadequately so. While Vitoria’s paternalism is palpable, this is not Aristotle’s theory of natural slavery. He makes clear that the deficient condition of the Indians does not alter their essence as human beings; they are not permanently foolish or irrational. On the contrary, as human beings they possess reason, though obviously their capacity to reason lies mostly dormant, as a not-yet-activated potential (Vitoria, 1991:250). The Indians’ own efforts to realize that potential have failed, though not because they lack human traits, but because that potential, in the words of Juan Maldonado, “had neither teachers nor tutors” (in Pagden, 1982:92). Vitoria’s move is similar to Maldonado’s. The fault lies not in their nature, but “mainly due to their evil and barbarous education,” for “they were so many thousands of years outside the state of salvation” (Vitoria, 1991:250). Perhaps this is as close as one can come to locating the precise moment when, for better and worse, the theory of imperial conquest acquires its idealist leaven and its pedagogical drive.19 The ideal that charity, or, in this case, missionary zeal, begins at home may also be a way of saying that what begins at home returns home and has home as its real target Thus, Vitoria quickly illustrates his point about the teachability of Indians with reference to internal others. The laboring poor of Europe are identified with the Indians: “Even amongst ourselves, we see many peasants (rustici) who are little different from brute animals” (Vitoria, 1991:250). With quotations from a theorist of the next century, namely Voltaire, Pagden (1982: 97) substantiates this point: The analogy was an obvious and instructive one. To all educated towndwelling men the peasantry seemed close in condition, if not in kind, to the animals among which they worked. Like Indians they were deprived of any real understanding of the world about them. What Voltaire later mockingly descries as “les pretendus sauvages d’Amerique” were in no way inferior to those savages one met every day in the countryside, “living in huts with their mates and a few animals, ceaselessly exposed to all intemperance of the seasons.” The European peasantry, “speaking jargon which no-one in the towns understand, having few ideas and consequently few expressions,” had no obvious share in the civil life and were thought to be
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still less capable of what one observer called “the superior exercises of the soul” than even the artisan class, precisely because that class, however low it might be, was, none the less a “people of the city.” Pagden goes on to explain that the term Indian came to apply even to those “of Asturias, of Calabria and Sicily, of the Abruzzi, regions where, they claimed, the country people lived like ‘savages,’ polygynous and apparently polytheistic.” Indeed, and as noted in the previous chapter, the term Indian was extended “to all men, regardless of their race, who deviated from the orthodox faith—even to such otherwise civilized beings as the Dutch” (Pagden, 1982, 97–98; see also Mason, 1990:60–63; and Friedman, 1983:35–36). Thus, Vitoria’s challenge to Aristotle’s theory of natural slavery began to reduce the ontic distance between Europeans and external others. Pagden’s (1982:99) description of the result is particularly interesting: There was also a further, and for our purpose more far-reaching, theoretical dimension to Vitoria’s analogies. For by insisting that it was education that was responsible for the Indian’s behaviour, Vitoria has effectively liberated him from a timeless void of semi-rationality and set him into an historical space where he would be subject to the same laws of intellectual change, progress and decline as other men are, be they Christian or non-Christian, European or non-European. Yet, having reduced the ontic or horizontal space between Europeans and others, an orthogonal separation replaces it. A vertical plane of temporal/historical distance is inserted between the teachers at the apex of the pedagogic ladder and various types of internal and external Indians at the bottom.20 The Indian is deemed “a brutish creature living outside the discrete web of affiliations, patterns of behavior, modes of speech and of expression, which made up the life of the civil man; psychologically as a child, that unreflective, passion-dominated, halfreasoning being” (Pagden, 1982: 104–5). European tutelage serves as the agency of enlightenment and civil order. It is a bright light that illuminates the worthy labor of the pedagogue, the confident precursor of what later becomes the ominous anguish of the “white man’s burden.”21 Though Vitoria’s views are directed to “the problem of order among societies belonging to two different cultural systems” (Anghie, 1996:331), his remarks fall far short of a full-fledged theory of civilizational stages, modernization, or development. This movement took some time, reaching recognizably modern form perhaps only in the hands of the figures of Turgot and members of the Scottish Enlightenment (Meek, 1976; Friedman, 1983:36–37). We will return to this theme at the end of this chapter and in the next. The impact of Vitoria’s work is to begin to replace horizontal/ontic space with vertical/temporal or developmental space. In this process, the Indians slide from the status of slaves to the status of children; the Europeans from masters to
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teachers/parents. One need not be a Spanish apologist to consider this change in the status of the Amerindians as a significant historical achievement. If Vitoria’s recognition of the Indians as children or students fails to match our contemporary demands for equality, nevertheless it is a precursor of and a basis for those demands.22 More precisely, a complete assessment of Vitoria’s achievement depends on our evaluation of the nature of the pedagogical imperialism it fosters and especially on whether the idea of development nurtures or defers the goal of equality. Much of the rest of this book engages, in one way or another, this assessment of the pedagogical imperialism associated with the idea of development. Jean de Léry (1534–1613): The Cannibal as External and Internal Other For Léry, the ritualization of Tupi cannibalism, by its very containment and ordering, keeps categories of friend and enemy stable; it makes possible large, well-defined areas of trust, unlike the shapeless, convulsive nature of European savagery. —Janet Whatley, “Une Révénce Réciprogue” “[O]thers” are here only because and insofar as I am not simply identical to myself but have an unconscious, insofar as I am prevented from having direct access to the truth of my own being. It is this truth that I am looking for in others: what propels me to “communicate” with them is the hope that I will receive from them the truth about myself, about my own desire. —Slavoj Zizek, Tarrying with the Negative Anthropophagi—or cannibals—occupied a pivotal space within the sixteenthcentury European mode of comparison, perhaps akin to the role that rogue states, perpetrators of crimes against humanity, terrorists, evildoers, and crony capitalists play in our own. The designation of others as cannibals marks the moment when the process of measuring differences and similarities breaks down; the other’s actions, no longer the result of an alternative array of social understandings, are pushed into the realm of absolute difference. Indeed, the practice of cannibalism is thought to be morally and physically transforming, so that the practitioner moves beyond the realm of the human (Pagden, 1982:80– 83). This is a “threatening, prohibited world,” and the cannibal is “exiled to the other side of the universe, at the outer limit of the conquerors’ enterprise” (Certeau, 1988:233). “That,” the European might say, referring to the eating of human flesh, “is exactly what we are not.” Jean de Léry’s History of a Voyage to the Land of Brazil (1578) (Historie d’un voyage faict en la terre du Brésil) reflects this interpretive impulse. His journal
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provides an enduring image of the “primitive world,” immortalized by Montaigne in his essays (Lestringant, 1993:127), reinscribed by various seventeenth-and eighteenth-century philosophers—Locke, Bayle, Diderot, and Rousseau—as either ignoble or noble savages (see Lestringant, 1993: 128–29), and praised as a founding document of anthropology by Claude Lévi-Strauss (Certeau, 1988:212). Yet Léry’s writings also suggest more complicated deployments of the cannibal and the savage. He uses cannibalism as both a weapon against the Catholics and a mirror for his own Protestant understandings of the emerging modern world in ways that blur the clear distinction between the European self and the Tupi other that informs much of the text. The source of this ambiguity may lie partly in Léry’s own, rather more complex relationship with cannibalism and religious difference.23 Léry would have three encounters with the specter of eating human flesh in his lifetime: during his 1557 stay with the Tupinamba of Brazil, who, he reports, ritually eat their captured enemies; during his return to France on a battered ship beset by hunger; and many years later (1573) during the eight-month siege of the French town of Sancerre by royalist (Catholic) troops. His position in the religious conflicts of the time—as both Calvinist missionary and object of Catholic persecution—also shapes his understanding of the nature of savagery. In Léry, the savage is present not only as a source of both external and internal danger, but also as an ethnological moment of internal reflection and criticism. Not much is known about Jean de Léry’s early years except that he was born in Burgundy to a French Protestant, Huguenot, family. His life is shaped rather profoundly by the Reformation and the Wars of Religion (1562–98) that culminated in the persecution of the Huguenots. By the time Léry was an adult, Calvin had established a theocracy in Geneva that served also as a base from which French exiles launched missionary expeditions into France. It was one of these missionary groups that Léry followed back to Geneva. In 1556 Léry himself was asked to join the first Protestant mission to the Americas. Nicholas Durand de Villegagnon—a military man who had fought against both the Moors and the Turks—was the driving force behind the mission. The French crown had many reasons to support his venture to establish a colony in Brazil. There was, of course, money to be made, especially from the dye that comes from brazilwood. The crown also wanted to challenge the papal bull that granted the Americas to the Spanish and Portuguese. These motives seem clear enough. The religious purposes of the mission were split, however, just as France itself was split. Villegagnon asked for and received the support of a known Huguenot sympathizer, Admiral Gaspard de Coligny, a future leader of the Huguenots, who was later martyred in the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre. According to Léry, Villegagnon also contacted Calvin, whom he had known in his student days in Paris, asking for ministers from the Reformed Church of Geneva. All fourteen of the Calvinists on the trip assumed that they were to found a Calvinist mission. Upon arriving in Brazil, however, they learned that Villegagnon, far from being a protector of the Reformed faith, was a capricious and dangerous character. The
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colony became bogged down in fierce quarrels over the Eucharist. When three of Léry’s party were murdered, the rest escaped the colony, taking refuge in a small trading post nearby. For two months, their survival depended upon the hospitality of the Tupinamba. Léry would return on the next trading ship to France, but not without the ship veering off course; many on board died of starvation. The survivors lived by eating treasured monkeys and parrots, tapir skins, and rats. Indeed, upon arrival in France, the captain revealed that he was calculating the moment when they would be forced to kill their fellow travelers for food (Léry, 1990:214). Though his travels to and from Brazil and the months spent with the Tupinamba form the basis for the History, two decades passed before he brought his writings to publication. This gap is important for two reasons. First, during this time, Léry experienced the aftermath of the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre (August 1572; see Kingdon, 1988) and was caught up in the siege of Sancerre (January-August, 1573). His prior experience with famine on the return voyage from Brazil helped him to teach those under his ministry to prepare rats and leather for cooking and eating. The starvation created by the siege forced one set of parents to eat their dead child, an experience that, among others, must have prompted Léry to draw comparisons in the History between these incidents of domestic cannibalism and the ritualized cannibalism of the Tupinamba. Second, Léry seems to have been spurred to publication by the desire to respond to André Thévet’s Cosmographie Universelle (1575). Thévet, a Franciscan friar, was also part of the mission to Brazil, spending ten weeks there before Léry’s arrival on the scene. Thevet’s earlier book, Singularities de la France Antartique (1556), published shortly after his return, won him great fame with his contemporaries and did much to carve out the figure of the Brazilian Indian in Europe. Thévet’s new book was similar to the previous one, but added passages where he attributed the failure of the Brazil mission to the sedition of the Calvinists. Thévet, a chaplain to Catherine de Medici and a royal cosmographer for Charles IX, was closely linked to the centers of Catholic power, so his accusations had the added sting of authority. Three years after Thévet published his accusations, the first edition of Léry’s History (1578) appeared. As is evident in the preface, part of Léry’s motivation for writing his History was to set the record straight. Léry’s account of the Tupinamba was introduced into prepared soil. Janet Whatley (1990:xxiv-xxv) reports that, by 1550, the Brazilian Indian was already a part of European spectacle: When Henry II paid a state visit to Rouen in 1550, there was a sort of Brazilian exotic package, ready to present to him a spectacle: on an island in the Seine was set up a mock Brazilian Village, where fifty real Tupinamba Indians, joined by two hundred fifty sailors in savage guise (naked and painted black and red) hunted, cut brazilwood, fought, and danced among trees swarming with monkeys and parrots.
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Indeed, according to Whatley, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Tupinamba were “the all-purpose allegorical figure of America.” “The figure found in innumerable paintings, frescos, and friezes, with plumed skirt and headdress, carrying a wooden sword with a disk-shaped head: that figure is a stylized Tupinamba Indian” (Whatley, 1990:xxiv). These images of the Tupinamba made the Indian and Brazil consumable European entities. As we have suggested, it is the Tupinamba’s status as cannibals that generated much of the revulsion and attraction for Europeans (see also Greenblatt, 1991:14– 25). In his History, Léry scripts precise and measured details of the delight the Tupi take in eating their enemies. It is not that they find the taste of human flesh addictive or even savory; rather, they are moved to avenge those who have eaten their own relatives. Léry recounts how the Tupinamba eat even the children of pregnant women captured in war. One senses that he understands the effect of his words. He seems self-consciously to push just a bit beyond the reader’s capacity to entertain horror. After many a chilling enumeration of the Tupi’s cannibalism, Léry interjects, “I could add similar examples of the cruelty of the savages toward their enemies, but it seems to me that what I have said is enough to horrify you, indeed, to make your hair stand on end” (Léry, 1990:131). He expects to revolt and shock the reader but, beyond the concrete details, he does so in a manner that the reader can anticipate and from which the reader can garner both delight and revulsion. His method is precisely to establish the authority of his account by translating what his eyes have seen and his ears have heard into a language that evokes the “original” sights and sounds and the wonderment of the initial experience (Greenblatt, 1991:21–24; Pagden, 1993:46, 51). This capacity/authority to translate for the reader depends on the fact that it unfolds in the distant terrain of America, to which he has traveled and from which he has returned: psychically and geopolitically, Léry’s story seems far from home. It is this seeming distance that Léry exploits. At some points, this distance seems almost absolute. Michel de Certeau (1988: 218) suggests that the ocean serves to clearly demarcate the Old and New Worlds, since Léry’s crossings of the Atlantic bracket his time in Brazil in the History. Physical distance is supplemented by a series of oppositions that set the primitive apart from the civilized man, the most obvious to the eye being the primitive’s shunning of clothing. Equally obvious, after some observation and the judicious application of a “Christian exegetical apparatus,” are the primitive’s love of festivity and leisure, and the neglect of productive activity aimed at profit. The life of the primitive is governed by an ethos of pleasure to the neglect of the dictates of duty (Certeau, 1988: 221, 228). Thus, Léry’s descriptions reproduce the image of the primitive as an absence of those things that comprise civilization: a settled, urban life, based on human artifice and the conquest of nature (Pagden, 1993:6). As a good Calvinist, the distance between Léry and the Tupinamba is conceived first and foremost as religious. Léry attributes the various Christian missions’ lack of success to the operation of predestination; the Tupi have simply
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been left out of God’s plan (Lestringant, 1993:129–30). Those very elements in their way of life that amazed Léry (and, through his descriptions, his many readers) evidence the workings of Satan; their bodies are possessed and “they are visibly and actually tormented by evil spirits” (Léry, 1990:138, 141). There is, in Léry’s view, a clear relationship between the Tupi’s primitive ways, their practice of cannibalism, and their permanently fallen state (Pagden, 1982:169; Pagden, 1993:46). In what Greenblatt (1991:15) calls Léry’s “Kafka-like logic,” the Tupinamba are “justly condemned through all eternity precisely because they fear the one true God whom they do not and cannot know and whom for this reason they refuse to acknowledge.” The Christian mission in the New World is for naught in the case of such “atheist peoples”—a conceptual innovation partly attributable to Léry (Lestringant, 1993:130). The divide, as Padgen (1993:43) puts it, is “eschatological” It is at this point that the demarcation of Old and New World begins to break down for many thinkers, including for Léry. As religious conflict intensified in the middle of the sixteenth century, as we have discussed in the previous chapter, Christians found themselves divided by their mutual accusations of idolatry, more than defined by a continuity that separated Europe from others. Within the context of the religious wars, some Catholics and Protestants adopt a relatively generous, admiring stance toward the Indians’ sense of religiosity. As we have seen, for many Catholic thinkers Indian religious devotion is treated as a potential —a Christianity latent in the unity of creation—that European tutelage can convert to actual Catholicism. Though still almost universally condemned as inadequate (the exception being Las Casas, after his own conversion to seeing Amerindian religiosity more on its own terms; see Todorov, 1984:185–201), Indian religiosity might be admired for two additional reasons. First, and especially for Protestants, Indian religious practices served as a weapon to be used against religious enemies. Thus, the degeneracy of Tupinamba religious practices might be compared to the similarly “idolatorous” and equally degenerate practices of the Catholics. Or, when the practices are found admirable they can be esteemed precisely because the comparison heaps scorn on Catholics (Lestringant, 1993:127– 28; Greenblatt, 1991:8; Grafton, 1992:137–39). Second, many Europeans sense in the Indians an echo of a lost self, something they desire to retrieve within themselves. The propaganda war between the Catholics and Protestants highlights their strife, but hides their joint preclusion of another kind of religious practice, one less tied to Scripture and genealogical/epochal history and more infused with the immanence of everyday life. We want to suggest that it is to avert or neutralize this attraction that the repulsion of Indian practices, like cannibalism, must be enhanced. And yet, as we shall see, this is no easy task, because the marker that triggers the repulsion—cannibalism—far from being alien, is already intimate.24 A similar ambivalence is central to Léry’s response to the Tupinamba. As we have already suggested, Léry’s History plays on the linkage between revulsion and attraction to reconstruct his own experience for the reader. But Léry’s
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purpose is not simply to reinforce a sense of distance or incommensurability. Certeau (1988:221) shows that the initial demarcation of Old and New World, symbolized by the Atlantic crossing, is disrupted by another division—the social and the natural—that places European and Tupinamba social life within a common domain. In this move, Léry places Europe and the Tupi practices side by side, and not simply to the advantage of the Europeans. Rather, the “exotic universe” of the Tupinamba is at times employed as “an ethical utopia” to hold up to Europe. Certeau (1988:213) speaks of Léry’s voyage, thus, as “a return to himself through the mediation of the other.” More concretely, in his discussion of cannibalism Léry swiftly and forcefully converts the conventionally distant into the disturbingly familiar, where he compares Tupi practices to the barbarity here at home. His purpose is explicit: “so that those who read these horrible things, practiced daily among these barbarous nations of the land of Brazil, may also think more carefully about the things that go on every day over here, among us” (Léry, 1990: 131–32). Léry then aims his Tupi-framed mirror at the “usurers” that suck the “blood and marrow, and [eat] everyone alive—widows, orphans, and other peoples.” Soon, he hones in on his major target, the Catholics, and especially the persecutors of the Hugeunots, first during the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre and later at the siege of Sancerre: Furthermore, if it comes to the brutal action of really chewing and devouring human flesh, have we not found people in these regions over here, even among those who bear the name of Christians, both in Italy and elsewhere, who, not content with having cruelly put to death their enemies, have been unable to slake their bloodthirst except by eating their livers and hearts? I defer to the histories. And without going further, what of France? During the bloody tragedy that began in Paris on the twenty-fourth of August 1572 [St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre]…among other acts horrible to recount, which were perpetrated at the time throughout the Kingdom, the fat of human bodies (which, is way more barbarous than those of the savages, were butchered at Lyon after being pulled out of the Saone)—was it not publicly sold to the highest bidder? Their livers, hearts, and other parts of their bodies—were they not eaten by the furious murders, of whom Hell itself stands in horror? (Léry, 1990:132) Léry cannot stop here: “Likewise, after the wretched massacre of one Coeur de Roy, who professed the Reformed Faith in the city of Auxerre—did not those who committed this murder cut his heart to pieces, display it for sale to those who hated him, and finally, after grilling it over coals—glutting their rage like mastiffs—eat of it?” (Léry, 1990:132). Having earlier secured the reader’s delight and revulsion over Tupi practices, Léry re-forms that fascination into a weapon for his own vengeance. It’s the butchery of the French, specifically those who attack, murder, and (literally) eat
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the Huguenots, that surpass the barbarity of the Pharaohs, Ahab, Nero, and Herod. Lest we somehow overlook his goal, Léry forces his point home: So let us henceforth no longer abhor so very greatly the cruelty of the anthropophagous—that is man-eating—savages. For since there are some here in our midst even worse and more detestable than those who, as we have seen, attack only enemy nations, while the ones over here have plunged into the blood of kinsmen, neighbors, and compatriots, one need not go beyond one’s own country, nor as far as America, to see such monstrous and prodigious things. (Léry, 1990:133) All this might be considered as part of setting the record straight against Thévet as well as striking blows against the hegemony of Catholicism. However, beyond hitting the bulls-eye in his wrath against Catholics, there might be another, more intimate target. But before we turn to this discussion, we need to clarify a rather important point. Léry’s ethnology of the Tupinamba served eventually as an important and rich source of what has been called the “Huguenot corpus on America.” According to Frank Lestringant (1993:127–28), Léry’s History, Urbain Chauveton’s Histoire Nouvelle du Nouveau Monde, and Theodore de Bry’s Grand Voyages led directly to Montaigne’s essays “of Cannibals” and “of Coaches.” By late in the sixteenth century, this corpus was organized around two themes: first, the denunciation of the crimes of the Spanish conquest, and second, “a defense of the free and happy savage, whom the bloody conquerors should have left to his native ignorance, even at the risk of eternal damnation” (Lestringant, 1993:128). These two are linked: the Huguenot corpus exalted the Indian primarily for the purpose of satirizing the Catholics. This aspiration reached its height in the work of Theodore de Bry and Bernard Picart, where the philosophical combat against the Church of Rome is most obvious and in whose work, for example, “the Mass was debased to the level of the primitive and sometimes repugnant rites of the Kafirs and the Hottentots” (Lestringant, 1993:128; see also Greenblatt, 1991:15). Later, French Enlightenment figures would reduce and simplify the Huguenot corpus—impoverishing the richness of the ethnographic account—in order to produce the tender and simple image of the noble savage as a weapon in the defense of natural liberty and the condemnation of various social constraints (Lestringant, 1993:134–36). It is important not to count Léry as among those whose image of savagery was simply reduced to ennoblement (Whatley, 1990:xxi). It is true that Léry expresses an admiration for the Tupinamba: “As to this earthly life, I have already shown and will show again that, while most people over here [Europe], who are given over to the goods of this world, do nothing but languish, they [the Tupi] on the contrary who take things as they come, spend their days and lives cheerfully, almost without care” (Léry, 1990:150). Nevertheless, this admiration is selective and is limited to this life: “As for the blessedness and eternal bliss
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(which we believe in and hope for in Jesus Christ alone), in spite of the glimpse and the intimation of it that I have said they have, this is a people accursed and abandoned by God, if there be any such under the heavens” (Léry, 1990:150; emphasis added). Thus, as Lestringant (1993:130) points out, even if the Tupinamba are “saved in this life,” they are “lost in the next.”25 There is, nonetheless, a hint of nostalgia and remorse in Léry’s History (Lestringant, 1993:129). Janet Whatley sees in Léry’s account of the Tupinamba in this life a certain sense of loss, a yeaning for a more “festive” and “chivalric” Europe. Whatley writes: As Léry describes them, the exotic New World cultures resemble the Old World in just those aspects that modernity—via the Reformation—would suppress in the name of a purer religion or a more efficient economic structure. The plumed display, the unmeasured consumption of feast days with their gigantic cahouinages, the young Tupi men dancing “like morris dancers” through the villages at night with their maracas, the splendid warriors, the widows’ outpourings for the prowess of their dead husbands— all this speaks directly to European traditions of chivalry, to rituals that bear pre-Christian traces, to ancient codes of valor, to a festive tradition of unparsimonious expenditure. (Whatley, 1990: xxxvi–xxxvii; see also Whatley, 1987:281) At the same time, Léry notes that the Tupinamba fight for vengeance (and, therefore, for honor), instead of for spoils as Léry sees in his fellow Europeans. Though he admires their fidelity to this chivalric code, he is also suspicious, for it is just such fighting for honor that has brought great destruction to Europe. As Whatley (1990:xxvii) suggests, the “inveterate, unremitting hatreds [of the Tupinamba] bear too much resemblance to the viciously retaliatory relations between Catholics and Protestants at the very time of his writing. He knows that point d’honneur is deadly, in Brazil or in France.” What explains this complex and ambiguous tone? So many others simply defended a “Manichean vision of the opposition between the civilized and savage” (Lestringant, 1993:130). Whatley (1990:xxxvi) suggests that “it may be that displaced onto America, they [the festive and chivalric] can have sanctuary and be loved in their ‘savage’ guise, even as they are being combated at home by those very forces with which Léry is doctrinally allied.” Léry takes that which both attracts and repels him and expurgates it, displacing it onto the Tupi. Displacing this ambivalence, and thereby establishing some distance from his doubts, Léry can allow himself to critically examine the internal sources of that ambivalence. In this way, the target of his critical venom, though certainly the Catholics, is also his anxiety about the creation of a modern world infused with his own Calvinist spirit. What Léry’s History suggests is that external others are always intimately linked with the other within, and that the European self can begin, through the use of the Amerindians, to establish an intimacy with its own
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internal tensions. In this way, we can at best, as Luce Giard (1991:213) puts it, investigate “that alterity in oneself against whom the most painful battles are played out.” As we illustrate in the next chapter, this painful battle with the alterity within ourselves is no less crucial to the reading of contemporary modernization thinking. Hugo Grotius (1583–1643): The Other and a Space for Tolerance [T] he spurious embrace of difference only defines the other in mirror opposition to the self. It thus precludes the necessity of dealing with the contradictory tendencies within the self. This escape from the knowledge of self is what constitutes temptation in the struggle to deal with the complexity of life outside the garden. —Jessica Benjamin, The Bonds of Love Hugo Grotius’s writings “reflect the turbulent circumstances of the period” (Kingsbury and Roberts, 1990:1).26 These circumstances include the religious and political conflict of the Thirty Years’ War, and specifically the struggle for Dutch independence from Spain, Dutch colonial competition with Spain, Portugal, and England, and the personal impact of religious schism within the Dutch Reformers. The best known of Grotius’s writings—Mare Liberum (1609), on freedom of the seas, and De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625), his treatise on the law of nations—place him as a profound innovator in a long line of natural rights theorists and, perhaps, international lawyers (Tuck> 1979; Kingsbury and Roberts, 1990). By shifting the emphasis from Biblical doctrines to an account of natural law that relies on a universal anthropology/sociology, his work had the effect of transforming elements of religious belief into secular ideals (as explained in the previous chapter). Less well known are his many explicitly theological writings, focused partly on defending his religious views and those of his patrons and allies from the charges of heresy by more orthodox Calvinists and partly on his program for the unification of Christianity. We will focus our attention on a rather more obscure text, De Origine Gentium Americanarum Dissertatio (1642), in which Grotius adds his own speculations on the origins of the Amerindians to an already crowded field of competitors (see Hodgen, 1964: chapters 7, 8). The motivations for this work are more difficult to discern, especially because, relative to his other writings, De Origine appears hurried and badly argued. Grotius’s uncharacteristic haste might be best explained, as Rubies (1991) argues, by his desire to counter the ideas of Johannes De Laet, an expert on the Indians, a reputed theologian, and a leading figure of the orthodox Calvinism to which Grotius had long been opposed and at the hands of which he and his allies had long suffered. What we wish to stress is how Grotius seems to use the debate over the origins of the American Indians to
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drive a wedge into the extreme intolerance of his Calvinist opponents. That is, the Indians serve as a medium for the exchange of messages between the religious opponents—as a site of struggle between their respective views concerning the tolerance of difference. While Grotius’s defense of tolerance is rather limited from our point of view (as we argued in the previous chapter), it is expansive by comparison with many of his fellow Cavinists. His role in the debate does suggest how Indians can become intimate allies when they are used to open space for internal diversity. De Laet, the probable target of De Origine, was a noted intellectual figure and his Novus Orbis (1633) a highly regarded work on the problem of the origin of the peoples of the Americas. De Laet’s major sources on Indians were the Spaniards Antonio de Herrera (Historia General de los Hechos de los Castellanos, (1601–15) and, the person who most influenced Herrera himself, José de Acosta (Historia Natural y Moral de los Indias, 1590). A Spanish Jesuit, Acosta is today considered one of the most rigorous theorists of the sixteenth century (Huddleston, 1967). Believing that American Indians had originated from Tartary and Siberia, he was the first to explain the origins of the Indians by reference to a postulated land bridge between Asia and the Americas. That migration occurred, he believed, after the destruction of the tower of Babel, making the Indians part, even if a degenerated part, of the Christian family. This places Acosta squarely in the monogeneticist tradition. As a Dutchman and a Calvinist, De Laet would have been considered the natural enemy of the Spanish Jesuit Acosta, but we find, instead, that De Laet uses Acosta’s writings to severely critique Grotius’s claims about the Norse origins of the Indians. The odd theoretical alliance between the Dutchman and the Spaniard, along with the sharp animosity between the two Calvinists, reveals that something more important than the standard Reformation rivalries are at stake in the contest between De Laet and Grotius. Grotius builds his theory of Indian origins on that of Dutch theologian Abraham Mylius (Lingua Begica), who, on the basis of (rather thin) linguistic analogies, postulated that the North American Indians came from the ancient Dutch tribe of Cimbri.27 In search of support for this position Grotius plumbs the ancients, such as Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Sallust, Tacitus, Strabo, Pliny, Herodotus, and Lucan, comparing them with the travel writings of Spanish, French, Dutch, and British contemporaries, such as Peter Martyr, Zeno of Venice, Francisco Alverez, and Paulo Sarpi. Grotius rejects Acosta’s Asian landbridge argument, pointing out that Tartary is full of horses while the Americas had none. However, in this rejection he makes little room for the possibility of cultural dynamics. For example, the Indians might have descended from the Tartars before they domesticated horses, or during the migration the Tartars/ Indians might have changed customs. The facile reasoning does Grotius little credit and opens him up to serious criticism, as we shall see. It is interesting to note that, when Grotius builds his own arguments, he does employ more dynamic cultural arguments. As he makes his case for Icelanders and Norsemen
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as the source of North America populations, he explains the absence of Christianity among the North Americans by noting that Norsemen must have migrated to North America before the arrival of Christianity in Norway; current Norsemen have become Christians but their American relatives have not (Rubies, 1991: 230). In his Notae ad Dissertationem Hugonis Grotii (1643), De Laet ridicules Grotius’s relatively weak reasoning and lectures him on how to properly weigh the available evidence from the Indies.28 Not surprisingly, Grotius responds bitterly to his old nemesis, going so far as to make fun of De Laet’s name in Dissertatio altera (1643). De Laet counters with an even more precise and cutting analysis in his Responsio (1644). The details of this debate are perhaps less interesting than assessing why Grotius might risk his well-earned and continent-wide respect by releasing a work that was so beneath his reputation. One explanation is that De Origine was an intervention in the colonial struggles of the day. Just as others had cited origins that seemed to give a particular European power a prior claim to the Americas, Grotius’s Icelandic migration might have justified Dutch or Swedish colonial ambitions over against the French or British.29 However, this sort of argument is profoundly inconsistent with Grotius’s own writings on nonEuropean peoples and the justification of conquest he routinely employs. As early as 1604, with his De Iure Praedae, and in the later, and more famous published writings—De Iure Belli ac Pacis and the Mare Liberum—Grotius had followed Vitoria, a useful Catholic source, in challenging the papal grant and refusing arguments that linked dominium to matters of faith. Nor were the Amerindians natural slaves, an argument he rejected fairly early. He went so far as to assert that missionary and pedagogical ideals mask a realist impulse: “long ago, Plutarch pointed out that civilizing Barbarians served as a cloak for greed” (Grotius, quoted in Rubies, 1991: 235). Grotius’s rejection of these rationales for imperialism should not be read to suggest that he was an opponent of colonial expansion (see Grovogui, 1996:55– 63; Keene, 2002: chapter 2). Rather, much of his work involved the careful construction of a rationale for the Dutch overseas policies aimed at breaking the Spanish and Portuguese monopoly in the East Indies. Traces of his early humanist embrace of republican military glory remained part of this rationale (Tuck, 1993:159–70), but his support for Dutch imperialism was cast largely in terms more consistent with his particular reworking of natural law (as we saw earlier). The right of self-defense or self-preservation, though more clearly justifying the Dutch war of rebellion against the rule of Phillip II and Spain, was used in De Iure Praedae to support the use of force by both states and individuals, including, notably, entities like the United East India Company (Tuck, 1999:79–85). The right to use violence against European competitors and local rulers turned especially on arguments about the nature of property and the right to trade. As part of a right of self-preservation, Grotius postulated that individuals have a natural right to acquire and protect goods (without limit), so
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long as they acquire them consistent with just principles of exchange or war. This understanding of the requirements of natural law was used to emphasize the justice of the rather acquisitive motivations of the Dutch and the illegitimacy of the Iberian effort to exclude them (since no one can claim legitimate ownership of the seas). Given that the right to punish offenses against natural law extends to all, without regard to the existence of a shared community, the Dutch could rightly make war on European competitors who defended an illegitimate monopoly and on East Indian political communities that refused commercial intercourse or threatened the lives and property of the Dutch traders (Tuck, 1999: 89–94). Thus, in the process of denying the exaggerated claims of rights by the Iberians, Grotius also restricted the rights East Indians could claim. Their aspiration to defend their realms and their ways of life in effect was trumped by the natural law requirements that guarantee access to travelers and traders. As we suggested in the previous chapter, this denial of native rights became key to European justifications for imperialism. Though this complicates any idea of Grotius as especially sympathetic toward non-Europeans, it is still clear that his assignment of less-barbaric origins to the peoples of the New World is consistent with his desire to argue for Indian independence from kings and popes—a view that also would support Dutch free trade claims in the New World. However, the connection between his muchnoted views of natural law and colonial expansion in his writings of the first quarter of the century makes it difficult to imagine Grotius making so different (and stilted) a claim about the origins of the Amerindians on behalf of the Swedes (or the Dutch) in the 1640s. A second possible explanation for Grotius’s book on the Indians is that it was not directed against the Spanish control of the New World but was a defense of the monogenist theory of human origins against the polygenism of Isaac La Peyrère. La Peyrère’s Pre-Adamitae was published in 1655 in Amsterdam but first circulated in Paris in 1641, before Grotius wrote his Dissertatio. Joan-Pau Rubies (1991) and Richard Popkin (1987) both interpret La Peyrère as a proponent of Jewish messianism. La Peyrère did not believe that Moses had written Genesis and doubted its authority. He argued that the account of the ancient Hebrews was not a history of all humanity but instead a particular history. He considered the Flood to be local and believed that there were Gentiles before Adam who had a simultaneous but separate history from Adam, the Flood, and Noah. In the confrontation between Genesis and evidence of human diversity, La Peyrère rejected the traditional compromise, namely that human diversity was the sign of a degeneration of an original unity. He seemed to take seriously the claims of the Aztecs and Chinese that their own chronologies were older than both Noah and Adam. His polygenist account held that, in the words of Rubies, “there had been different creative acts at different moments and at different places, and that, therefore…diversity in mankind was original” (Rubies, 1991: 239). Nevertheless, this does not mean that La Peyrère championed diversity. On
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the contrary, his Jewish-Christian synthesis contains a strong messianic element that serves to reunite the world and eliminate the problem of diversity. Though La Peyrère’s account came from an attempt to take the Bible seriously, and though he received crucial support both materially and otherwise from important people in his circle without which his ideas would never have been circulated in print, the reaction to his polygenism was, as we might imagine, swift and negative. Both Catholics and Calvinists considered him heretical and dangerous. In this light, Grotius’s dissertation can be seen as reasserting the unity of the human race by reference to classical authority, Biblical sources, and the evidence from the New World. Grotius might have expected De Laet to support his views because both he and De Laet were committed monogenists. The problem was that, beyond the criticism of La Peyrère (which Grotius detailed explicitly in the Dissertatio altera—his response to De Laet’s stinging critique), Grotius also forwarded his own, controversial theory of the origin of the Indians. De Laet and others could accept his critique of La Peyrère while protesting Grotius’s own view. Indeed, the Norse origins of the Indians is De Laet’s primary target in his response to Grotius. This takes us one step closer to home in understanding the animus between Grotius and De Laet. The deepest source of their struggle, suggests Rubies, is not their different strategies over the pursuit of colonial projects, nor alternative readings about the acute danger of polygenist accounts of human origins. It is their opposing vision of Calvinism itself that divides them. The origins of Grotius’s resentment of the Calvinist orthodoxy go back to a schism within the Reformed Church that led to the ruin of his rather promising political career in Holland.30 Born of a prominent Delft family, his early intellectual achievements were rewarded by his appointment as advocate general (in 1607) and, somewhat later, as official historiographer by the states-general of the United Provinces. He soon became associated closely with the eminent Dutch statesman Oldenbarenvelt. As Oldenbarenvelt’s protégé, his influence was tremendous, but this association also cost him dearly. Oldenbarenvelt was aligned with the Remonstrant faction within the Dutch church that resisted the orthodox Calvinist belief in predestination in favor of the theological views of Jacobus Arminius that asserted the compatibility of God’s sovereignty and man’s will. Tension between the two groups simmered for many years, and various compromises, including one suggested by Grotius, were rejected by the Contra-Remonstrants, like De Laet, as heretical, even papist.31 Not surprisingly, the orthodox were neither willing to give up their theology nor to tolerate another. The powerful forces allied against the Remonstrants soon gained a majority in the states-general and called for a final resolution of this rift. From November 13, 1618, to May 9, 1619, an assembly of the Reformed Church met in Dordrecht with the aim of ending the schism. The synod of Dordrecht sided with the Contra-Remonstrants, resulting in the beheading of Oldenbarenvelt. Grotius avoided execution only by renouncing his former patron; his sentence to life imprisonment was evaded only by an escape (masterminded
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by his wife) into exile. Still in exile twenty years later, it is likely that the sting of this treatment at the hands of the orthodox remained all too fresh in his mind. Taking a shot at his old nemesis, De Laet, may have held much appeal as he drafted his treatise on the Indians. Following Rubies’ assessment but pushing further, we want to suggest that the attempt to register worth for the Indians by giving them European origins may have been, in addition, an attempt to carve out a valued space for “internal Indians.” Rubies (1991:241) notes a common pattern among a set of theorists familiar to Grotius and to whom he was quite sympathetic: There was an important tradition of minority groups with pietist and fideist tendencies who sympathized with the idea of unification and who developed scholarly interests across political and religious frontiers. Several of them had offered their own solution to the American debate, for instance Postel and Montanus, who identified Peru with the biblical land of Ophir; Lipsius, who preferred Plato’s Atlantis; or Mylius, who favored a Cimbrian origin. All these authors favored shared a concern with connecting America with biblical and civil, rather than merely degenerate or barbarian, origins. In other words, the less orthodox within Dutch Reformed circles tended to assign the Amerindians more elevated origins. Given this religious and political context, we can begin to understand De Laet’s commitment to Acosta’s rather than Grotius’s theory of Indian origins. Even if Acosta is both Spaniard and Jesuit missionary, De Laet readily shares his views. By linking Indian origins to the non-Christian and therefore condemned Tartars, De Laet (and Acosta) can devalue the Indians.32 Likewise, De Laet would have bristled at any theory, such as Grotius’s, that placed value on those outside the strict orthodoxy of Calvinism—regardless of whether those being valued were Indians or liberalizing Calvinists. Likewise, if for Grotius persecuted internal minorities are linked to, and represented by, external Indians, then more than twenty years of exile may have only deepened his interest in increasing the worth of those devalued and persecuted—both inside and out. Rubies seems to have something like this in mind: “In this context Grotius’ strategy of universal human integration may have indirectly inspired his treatment of the problem of the American Indians, by stressing their closeness to the civil societies of Christians, Europeans, and Chinese” (Rubies 1991:241). While this remains a vision that assimilates the Indians to a European vision of natural law, it nonetheless marks out some (albeit limited) space for tolerance. The Indians act as a medium through which messages are sent across boundaries, such as those between Catholics and Calvinists, but also among Calvinists themselves. For Grotius, perhaps a more respectful treatment of external others would have engendered attitudes and policies that would result in a similar tolerance for internal others—such as Remonstrants and humanists.
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Thus, Grotius seems to use the Indians to create a space where doubts can emerge and legitimately converse across what might be thought of as the degenerated and taboo terrain within Calvinism. De Laet recognizes Grotius’s gesture and especially its threat to the orthodoxy he prizes. The battle between the two Calvinists and their two theories of Indian origins can be read as a struggle between their doubts concerning difference—with one beginning to treat doubt/ difference as a possible intimate while the other treats it as an order-threatening enemy. For De Laet, difference must be eradicated if the order of the republic is to be preserved. Grotius, no less sensitive to the need to root order in certainty, nonetheless seeks a less comprehensive uniformity that accepts a space for difference. The actual entities designated as Indians seem barely relevant, but of course the effect of this discourse on non-Europeans is not. While still a reflection of the impulse to “an empire of uniformity,” Grotius’s deployment of the Indians as allies in a struggle for tolerance among Calvinists signals the possibility of a fuller respect for human diversity. Tomasso Campanella (1568–1637): Diversity and the Impulse to Universalism [T]he legacy of the European empires in America—which might have been the fabrication of wholly new lives—had, in fact, been to demonstrate, finally and irrevocably, that conquest and annihilation was the only way in which cultures could deal with the differences between them. —Anthony Pagden, European Encounters with the New World Though his work is no longer widely recognized outside of contemporary Renaissance scholarship, Tomasso Campanella was well known in the seventeenth century for his writings that spanned the fields of philosophy, science, the arts, and politics. He was born to a poor family in Naples, but his intellectual promise was recognized early. His views were largely shaped by the Italiano-Hispanic context in which he was trained. Most important for our purposes, Campanella was also a “radical prophet and world reformer” (Headley, 1995:243) who inspired a popular revolt against Spanish authorities in Calabria (Italy) in 1599. If he had any doubts about the physical dangers of holding and espousing his views, these would have been readily set aside in 1600 by the burning at the stake of Giordano Bruno—a fellow Dominican, Neapolitan, and poet-philosopher. Campanella received a life sentence, of which he served nearly three decades, surviving several periods of torture. It was also during this time that he devoted himself to the writings for which he is best known—On the Monarchy of Spain (De Monarchia Hispanica) in 1600, Political Aphorisms (Aforisimi Politici) in 1601, and The City of the Sun (Citta del Sole) in 1602.33
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Campanella’s most important contribution to the debates of the time involves his advocacy of a universal, Christian empire. What is most curious is the combination of millenarian theology and modern science that informs his political (and utopian) thinking. Campanella’s “Christian providentialism” seeks to reconcile the rule of the sacred and the secular, religion and “scientific rationalism” (Pagden, 1990:60); others (like Grotius) hoped to do the same, but his answer to humanist skepticism was much more ambitious and encompassing. This perhaps odd juxtaposition of prophetic and modernist elements in Campanella’s account may seem less surprising when we remember that European imperial enterprises were often endowed with prophetic qualities by their participants (Pagden, 1995:27). What should seem quite odd, but somehow doesn’t to important elements of IR, is today’s conjoining of similarly prophetic, albeit secular claims, about liberal universality with the driving forces of science, technology, and information. We take up this theme in the next chapter. Campanella’s justification for (Christian) empire begins with claims about human knowledge. For Campanella, “[s]ince all human knowledge originated in a single divine intelligence, and operated according to a single divine plan, it must display a natural unity” (Pagden, 1990:44). God’s plan reveals itself to all who can read its signs—historians, natural philosophers, theologians, and astrologers. Christianity is thereby reduced to the life and teachings of Christ —“the purest expression of the law of nature, to which Christianity has simply added sacraments” (Headley, 1995:249). Therefore, any person living according to reason is already a Christian, whether he or she knows it or not, and a universal, Christian kingdom is immanent in the natural order (Pagden, 1990:51– 52). These beliefs brought Campanella into conflict with emerging Protestant views. He opposed the stress on original sin and the role of Christ as Redeemer in favor of emulating the example of Christ’s life on earth. He rejected the predetermined redemption of a select few, believing instead that it is God’s plan for all to be saved, that even Satan and the fallen angels “will be taken up in a universal reconciliation with God” (Campanella, quoted in Headley, 1995:250). Given the diversity of humanity (including the newly discovered peoples of the Americas), he was deeply troubled by the idea that only the current Christian world had a chance at salvation. This is one reason why the promotion of missionary work became so important to him. He followed Vitoria, not only in his belief in the consistency of Christianity with natural law, but also in Vitoria’s claim that there was a right to communication. For Campanella, like Vitoria, this meant in effect the right to evangelize and universalize Christianity. A universal Christianity requires a political form—a “theocratic monarchy”— for its success, and Campanella nominated the Spanish monarchy as the agent of this empire, though, late in his life, distressed by the relative decline of Spain, he passed the mantle to the French (Pagden, 1990:50–51). Similar to Sepúlveda (whom he apparently had not read), Campanella defended the papal grant of dominium in Asia and the New World and justified conquest on the basis of nonEuropeans’ ignorance or violation of natural law (Pagden, 1990:53). In this
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respect, Campanella presented his arguments expressly against the Salamanca school of the previous century, as Headley (1995:262) explains, arguing that Vitoria and his students were wrong to maintain that force could not be used to spread the Gospel. The healing of doctors is not enough; soldiers are required to punish the crimes of sodomy, idolatry, and cannibalism. In this way, Vitoria’s claim of the consistency between Christianity and natural law is deployed by Campanella to assert that, when persuasion fails, the Christian empire has the right to force the dictates of rationality and universal civil order upon all humans. Headley (1995:262) suggests that Campanella’s harsh attitude is the result of unexpected Indian resistance faced by a third generation of missionaries, resulting in a mood of despair mixed with “ethnic prejudice.”34 However, Campanella’s vision of a worldwide Christian monarchy was no mere embrace of the practices of his European contemporaries. Rather, his writings on the topic are distinctly utopian, as in The City of the Sun, where he presents a “community of rationally educated beings ruled by a philosopherking, where art is employed to instruct the citizens in their civic duties” (Pagden, 1990:38; see also McKnight, 1989:88–89). This vision also informs his advocacy of worldwide Spanish monarchy, though he was also partly moved by the dangers posed by the Turks to a divided Christendom (Pagden, 1990:49). In On the Monarchy of Spain, the aim of a universal empire is the spread of a way of life in conformity with God’s plan, a life of human happiness that can be achieved only by a monarch versed in the science of politics (Pagden, 1990:52– 53, 63). This is not a simple license for the prudent use of violence. In Campanella’s hands, the language of “reason of state” joins power and right (Tuck, 1993:71). His “science” of politics is part of that unified system of knowledge (of God’s will realized in a single divine plan) in which the political arts are necessarily embedded in an understanding of “final causes.” And his notion of political “prudence”—the “realist” catchphrase—is infused with virtue, generosity, self-restraint, and respect (Pagden, 1990:45–47). In this way, Campanella’s ambitions for a universal empire under the Spanish monarchy serve also as an occasion for critical reflection on the practices of the European monarchs themselves (Certeau, 1988:155). Indeed, he explains his passing of the mantle of universal empire to the French as a result of the “cruelty and arrogance” displayed by the Spanish in the Americas (Pagden, 1990:53). What is clear in all of this is that Campanella is concerned quite centrally with the problem posed by human diversity (McKnight, 1989:88–89). He praises Columbus’s discoveries, Luther’s break from Catholicism, and recent advances in astronomy for the challenge they posed to traditional authority, especially the parochial character of European opinion, for it is only such challenges that foster the advance of human knowledge and Christian religiosity toward a genuine universality (Headley, 1995:253). In an account that perhaps foreshadows contemporary cosmopolitan condemnations of fragmentation and visions of a postanarchical order (explored in the next chapter), Campanella identifies the
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fragmentation and diversification of the human species as the problem to which universal Christianization is the solution: If all the world were ruled by one, knowledge would be increased on account of all the land and sea traffic, the trade and communication; those subjects known hitherto by individual peoples might be better observed and known in others, especially astronomy, astrology, physics and politics, which require much observation—and what one does not know, the other knows. But the devil, envying us such opportunity, would want that we all remain within our own boundaries, as worms within a cheese, so that he may render us all ignorant and deceive us. Likewise he desires that we do not communicate with one another what we observe and know, nor journey to investigate the works of God in foreign regions, in order that we might not know and see one another but rather that language and religion be diversified so that we would [otherwise] be admitted through common language, nurturer of mutual love among us, we would introduce piecemeal only through wars and death in continuous fear, without charity in God our Father and in all our beings sons of the same. (Campanella, quoted in Headley, 1995:254; emphasis added) Though there is a hint of a less negative evaluation of diversity—that others offer sources of knowledge, not known to us—that hint remains deeply buried. Indeed, Campanella’s project of universal Christianization does not preclude the use of Indians as a material source to solve European and, especially, Spanish problems. In his work on the Spanish monarchy, Campanella suggests the use of Indians to settle what he took to be Spain’s greatest problem, namely its declining population. Trying to convince Philip III to import Indians, he suggested that those Indians who converted to Christianity would be trained in agriculture, artisanal production, and some even for bishoprics, abbacies, and baronicies; those who did not convert could be used as a pool of labor for the galleys. This imported labor would free the Spanish to concentrate on soldiery, itself necessary for the protection of the missionaries (Headley, 1995:255). At the same time, his writings also attest to some sympathy toward the Indians in the tradition of Las Casas (see Todorov, 1984:185–201; Dussel, 1995:68–72; and Pagden, 1982:119–45) and a claim to respect the diverse customs of peoples. In one passage, giving voice to the point of view of the Indians, he writes: Our leaders have reckoned you Spanish to be the sons of God descending from the clouds in ships and with thundering cannon, as God himself, superior beings, as if centaurs, immortal warriors…. But now we ar