International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues (8th Edition)

argam' . tl . t c)'SI)utes will remain peacend \·vill rC'n to\·e sorne rest. . e I I e.>:nectatJOn ta .u. k . IroVIde mu 1tlp 1e means 01 1 (!SO , , 11<1 eonfl' ·t b the Commumty s . . . . "cl ·1 . . t: le s, ut 'd uJo'ple w·1ys for a dissatrsfie countly to s lO\"- Jts tltsoleasu. wiU also proVl e m ' r · I e and threaten wsruption. The fact tbat the situation is a ne~ o?e,roses ~haJienges
or

0

u

Four Possible Futures Even Within th la . e contours of a Corn . . . f 0 re tions that are possibl fo muruty, there IS a significa nt range of patterns e, ur ofwhich can b b . e n efly sketched .

Lt.I\UING

POWER PEACE

3~7

The greatc·sl < h n~e would he a world in whid, n· r al 10 her climinisll l ( · d the dislinc:tions between dorne at. . n _1 ~ut~nomy would h<· furt 1e. \1t-d s IC anu rore1gn 1· tinue to erot ieval Europe. wi th it O V"' I . r would eo n . ...r appmg 10rms ofpo K')' . · ·ather than comp,trtmc ntallzcd nation-states which n·1 ht . I· I sovere1gnt:y I J [ . ' I g UISSO ve bee· t} , re no longer ncet c·c to provJde security and can no lc)n . I h . allse 1e) a ger contra t err eco . . one model here. A 1t 1 1ough most scholars see the red ti r. . nonucs, I5 . f' UC . 011 0 SOVE:rergntv d t} rowth of the power o non-gove rn mental organizat ions as .1 •· • • an le g . . conuuct\ e to peace and harmony, one c·an readi1 y rmag1ne sharp conflicts for e . . 1 . . 1 ' xamp e among busmess interests, 1aI) Or, anu environm entalists (many Marxists see cl . A· . . . . ). 1 . h . . . ass con Jets as mcreasinctly 11nportan t , )<:tween t ose wrth different views of the g cl 1·r b 0 . 00 . . . , . • ·a]·~ . etween those calhng fOJ g1eLtteJ cent! 1zatron to solve common problems a dHe; th, ose acl vocatmg . n increased loca I contro I. But state power and interest woul-1 · b . . .. . . , u m any case e great!,· dec:reased. The notion of nahonalmterest ' always contested \ .0 Jd b . · ,. u ecome even' more problematic. A second world, not completely incompatible with the first would b · · 1 C · e one m which. states 111 t 1~ omm~mity play a large role, but with more extensive and intensive cooperation. Relah~ns wou~d be increasingly governed by principles and Jaws, a change that could bemgnJy spill over into relations outside the CommuniP,.·. Although bargaining would not disappear, there would be more joint efforts to solve common problems and the line between "high" and '1ovi' politics would become even more blurred. In this world, the United States would share more pO\.ver and responsibilitvwith the rest of the Community than is true today. While popular with scholars at l~ast as likely is a continuation of the present trajectory in which the United States maintains hegemony and rejects significan t limitations on its freedom of action. :\ational interests would remain distinct and the United States would follow the familiar pattern in which ambitions and perceived interests expand as power does. Both confucts of interest and the belief that hegemony best produces collective goods would le.ad the United States to oppose the efforts of others to become a counterweight if not a rival to it. In effect, the United States would lead an empire. but probably a relati\·ely benign one. Doing so would be rendered more c.UfRcult by the fact that the American self-image precludes seeing its role for what it is, in part because of the popularity of values of equality and supranationalism. Other members of the Community would resent seeing their interests overridden by the United States on some occasions, but the exploitation would be limited by their bargaining power and the American realization that excessive discontent would have serious long-tenn c'Onsequences. Others might accept these costs in return for th.e U.S. sectui.ty guarantee and the ability to keep their own defense spending very low, especially because the alternative to American-dominated stability might be worse. The foUJth model also starts with the American attempt to maintain hegemony, but this time the costs and dangers of American unilateralism become suffid~nt to lead others to form a counter-balancing coalition, one that might include Russia and ~hina as well. Europe and Japan might also becom~ more ~se1tive because the~: fear that the Un.ited States will eventually withdraw rts secunty guarantee, the~b) accelerating if not creating a rift \vithin the Commu~ity. M~ch ~lat. r~hsm stresses -the clash of national interests , the weakness of mtemationa1mstitutions.

PART 4

N'fEMPtJI'UU:\.J '' ,.. -

CO

d the use of power ali(J t I r t"- Would . ;leI\ill . ltage. an e tllat force won 1 I ' . <.'lJ lllc·rnpl· C:otne t , .. ,riJl" for er ( not n t .1 o th•." m:u1et1 ~ 1:> • a1 c{j 11 erenc a c\J r. but \dth tbt' ,,t; . onJ,· inrurecclv. as dis<.·H<;<, ·d c t 11!)\'l , Tlti<· and the ,ore. Id enter JO · . Would L ...,,... balance wou h IJt a nu.1hw; f h 11e,,. an d tlle familiar' and tl1e cenlr nlntl 11 \tion ;" .., w at I .-..1ue mixture o t e \\'b· twill be the final arbiter of '!tsp11 tt>s? \VJ- 1 ~1 lirna :.u ~ I ·~ mons. a . tl 1 (' Iat /ql)rl ratio \\itl rep ace caJ ., How fun91ble \\lll le re e\ 1· d accJ en s. , ow m h d itics. lea ers, an_ l· U 'ted States has yet to make. and what will . U<: 111ost Lnfl\l. depends on choJces t le m . ') ence these chotces.

JERVIS I THE ERA OF lEADLNG POWER PEACE

:}88

J

,,

CV

°

389

1

vers because ''. 11lt> the) ma~ be able to guarantee the Se<:urih.· f th po' o\'ide t1m· t''><.·apP f'rom t11e state of nature for them A .' l ho o e~. no one can Pr . . · \\ e avt seen. diiTer-

r th c Schools of thought propose d1fferent explanations for the n·s t en h ·f eo e ommu'tv and so lea<.l tCJ '><>mew at d1 ferent propositions about th"' c:o .J'ti d J11., l · . " nw ons un er ,\·hich anarch~· :an )C ~ompa~rble \~th peace. Construc:thism stresse the importance of identttr cc; and 1deas: hberalLc;m argues for the power of material incenth·es for peace; realism look~ at the costs of '~'ar and the details of the payofT structure: my composite C\J>Ianation stresses the mteraction among several factors of costs. benefits, \·alue:s, and path-dependence. But what is most important is that the Community constitutes a proof by existence of uncoerced peace \\ithout e:entral authority. Because these countries are the most powerful ones and particulark war-prone, the Corn munity poses a fundamental challenge to our understanding ~f world politics and our expectations of future possibilities.

IMPUCATIONS FOR THEORIES OF THE CAUSES OF WAR . lanation . tJ1e verv". existence of a security comm Wl1atever 1'ts exp r· . uni.ty among tlle Jeadin powers refutes many theones of the causes o wa:. 01 at least mdicates they . s-"y and. th e unve fo r dominance• honor, are notg umver au. ,--'id w · Thus human nature . and glorr may exist and contribute to a '"'1de ,.ar1ety of human hehaviors but they are not fated to lead to war. The obvious rebuttal is that war still exists outside the Community and that civil wars continue unabated. But only wars fought by members of the Community have tlle potential to undennine the argument that, unde r so me conditions, attributes of humans and societies that were seen as inevitably producing wars in fact do not do so. The cases tllat could be marshalled are the Gulf War and the operation in Kosovo, but they do not help these theories. These wars were provoked b~· others, gained Uttle honor and glory for the Community, and were fought in a manner that minimized the loss of life on the other side. It would be hard to portray them as marufestations of brutal or evil hu man nature. I ndeed, it is more plausible to see t11e Communjty's behavior as consistent wi th a gene ral trend toward its becoming less violent generally: the abolition of official torture and the decreased appeal ofcapjtaJ punishment, to take the most salient examples (Mueller 1989). The existence of the Community also casts douht on theories that argue that ~1e l~ng powers always struggle for dominance for gain, status, or security, and are Willing to use force to this end. Traditional Marxist theories claim that capitalists never cooperate; proponents of the law of uneven grO\vth see changes in the re e ~~r of ~jor states as producing cycles of domination, stability, challenge, and war. Smularly, power transitions., in which rising powers catch up \.vith domjnant ~ arifbe seen to.be very diffit11lt to manage peacefully. These theories, uke the verSJOno egemorucstab'JityA=-----sed bo th 1 Unite£! WM:US a ve have yet to be tested because e Stat has es not yet d 1· ed · ' 'tions L .. ec m · But if the arguments made here are correct, trans• will not uave the sam ·1 m\' greater . e Vlo ent outcome that they had in the past, leading us tor-. F attention to the conditions under which these theories do and do not hold. . or most scholars th funda . a1 narch). mmnn...nded by th ' .e e secunty dil mental cause of war is intem at:Jon·th aleadi11g emma. These forces p ress hardest on e

CO:

---,..,u

REFERENCES Robert J. 1996. "Why Western Europe ::\eeds the United States and :\ATO.- Politico/ Science Quarterly 111 (Spring): 1- 39. Berghahn, V. R. 1973. Gennany and the Approach of War in 1914. :\ew York: St. ~ l artin's Press. Setts, Richard. 1992. "Systems of Peace or Causes of War? CoUective Secwi~·. Arms Control. and the ::\ew Europe." International Security li (Summer): .5-!3. Boume, Kenneth. 1970. The Foreign Policy of Victorian England: 1830-1902. Oxford: Clarendon Press. _ Cain, Peter. 1979. ··capitalism, War and Internationalism in the Thought of fuchard Cobden. British j ournal of International Stlldies 5 (October): 229--li. _ . Deutsch, Karl \V., et aJ. 1957. Political Community and the :\ ort~ Atlant1c ,Area: International Organi~.ations in the Light of Historical Ex].1erience. Pnnceton, ~ J : Pnnceton University Press. .. . . :)Q Farber, Henry, and Joanne Gowa. 1995. "Polities and Peace. lntematumal SecunhJ (Fall): 123-46. p L'ti ?" j al 1 Farber, Henry and Joanne Gowa. 1997. "Common Interests or Common °t es. ow.., of Politics .59 (May): 123-46. . . , d h Ori ·ns of the Gartzke Erik. 1998. ''Kant \ Ve All Get Along? Motive. Opportumt). an ~ e gt 0eJ~1ocratic Peace... American joumal of Poli~ica./ Scie.~ce 42 ( 1;;:,~~ ~tudies Quarterly Gartzke, Erik. 2000. "Preferences and Democratic Peace. lntenw 44 (June): 191 - 212. , . Hour 1939-1941. London: Gilbert, M artin. 1983. \Vinston S. Churchill. Volume VI. Fmest Art,

Heinemann. ,fTh odore Rooset·elt. ::\ewYork: Collier 0 Harbaugh, WilUam Henry. 1961. The Life and Times J e Books. ~re 0 r Forf'ign Trade. Berkeley . I Alb rt 0 194:;: National Power and the Struth 'J H1rsc 1man, e . v. . p and Los Angeles: University ?f Calif~n~a ~-- lution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Jervis, Robert. 1989. The Meamng of ~uc ear evo Annogeddun lthaca. NY: Comell University Press. d l lterdependence: World Politics Keohane. Robert.0 ., and Joseph Nye. eds. 19/i. Powerml 1 in 1h msitioll. Boston, MA: LittJe Brown.

PART4

390

MPORARY WORLD POLITICS CONTE

tlJe Suhcontinent. ·• Tlw Nut :,n, ',1••ril 2.3 2{)Q . . 1 I, 2o . • . . • .. 001 "13nst 111g Oil . ·r-.30. . n 1..,,.5 anti \ Var. In 1!1e O n{.!lln 'lie • 1 '''r<'nt· Kumar. Armtava. 2 · M of Ion . h"· ro "Domeshc 9 ajor l> Lcw. J:t<:k S. 198 · 1d Theodore K. Rabh. Camt>ridt- Carllbrid ge Unjvcr. ·\\'tu:s-, cds. Hobert I. Rot erg aJ

1

1 t··onal Society: A Study ill sity Press. PP· 79- ~· '"l 1986 War Ill ntenw t · I E~. ~m.

l ni£'111(1ilnlld

SPt:iol

vgy. LondOn:

I C tro"ers,· Over the Demot:ratic P<•a<:<" Ikarguar·• A LB. Tauris. u Ctio . on • / "Tle 1997 Z 11 or . ·-•f?~ I I mationnl Security 22 (Summer): J62-!:.l">. M
001 The Trauedy ofOrent Power o 1f1cs. <'W York: orto J · . 2 1 n. b l b • Mearshermer 1o 111 · Retreatfi·om Doomsday: The 0 so PSCe11ce of Major War N. I '

1

I

'?s.

•

•

•

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON

THE NEXT PAITERN OF CONFLICT

v

· · ew lOrk: Mueller, Jo 111. 1989· . . . . . . Basic Books. . hae1E. 2001 · Defiense · PoltCtj Chozcesfm the B11sh Arhtllllls/r(ffirm · W:asJ·ungton O'HanIon, MJC DC: Brookings Institulion Press. Oneall John R., and Bruce Russett.. ~999.. the_ Lil~.eral Pea~~ .I :'~1 an Art~l~tct· of Cold War Interests? Assessing Recent Cntiques. /ntenwltOIWilnfel act ums 25 (.3): 2J .3-41. RtiiSS·e-rt 8•1Jce and John R. Oneal. 2001. Trirmglllatilll_!, Peace: Dc1no.cracy ' Jnterdepend.e11ce, and Jntenwtional Orgamzotions. New York: lorton. SclrweUer. Randall L. 2000. "Democracy and the Post-Cold War Era." In The New World OrdRr, eds. Birthe Hansen and Bertel Heurlin. New York: St.' Martin 's Press. pp. 46-SO. Snyder, Glenn. 1965. "The Balance of ~ower and tJ1e Balan<.:e of Terror... l n The Bawnce of Power. ed. Paul Seabury San Fral1CJsco: Chandler. pp. 184-201. 1

The Clash of Civilizations?

•

Van Everd, Stephen. 1984. ''The Cult of the Offensive and the Origi ns of the First World War." International Semrity 9 (Summer): 58-107. Van Evem, Stephen. J999. Causes ofWar: Pou;er and the Roots of Conjlict. I thaca, l\'Y: Comell Uuiversity Press. Waltz. Kennetll N. 1970. "The Myth of National Interdependence.'' In The llltenwtional Corporation, ed. Charles P. Kindleberger. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 205-23. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of lntematiorwl Politics. Reading, MA: Addisou-Wesley

Publishing. Waltz. Kenneth N. 1999. "Globalization and Govemance.'' PS: Political Science & Politics 32 (December): 693-700. Wrong, Dennis H. l976. Skeptical Sociology. New York: Columbia University Press.

World politics is en~cring a new phase, and intellectuals have not hesitated to proliferate visions of _what it wiJI be-the end of history, the return of traditional rivalries between nat1on-states, and the decline of the nation-state from the conflicting pulls of tribalism and globalism, among others. Each of these visions catches a<>pects of the emerging reality. Yet they all miss a <.:rucial, indeed a central. aspect of what global politics is likely to be in tJ1e coming years. It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of <.:onflict in this new world wiJl not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of confuct will be culturaL :\ation states will remain the most powerfuJ actors in world affairs, but the principal confucts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between chrilizations "vill be the battle lines of the future. Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the e,·olution of conftict in the modem world. For a centul)' and a half after tJ1e emergence of the modem international system with the Peace ofWestphalla tJ1e conflicts of the\Vestem world were largely among princes emperors, absolute monarchs, and constitutional monarchs attempting to expand their bureaucracies, their armies, their mercantilbt economi<.: strength, and, most important, the territory tJ1ey rule~. In the ~ro~ss ~1ey created nation-states, and beginning with the French Revolution the pnnc1pal ~n~s of conHict were bel:\.veen nations ratJ1er tl1ru1 princes. In 1793, as R R Pal mer put 1t. "The wars of kings were over; the wars of peoples had begun.'' This nineteen~h­ century pattern lasted untiJ the end of World War I. Th~n. a~.a result of the Ru~s1an Revolution and the reaction against it, tl1e confHct of nations ytelded to the conlhrt of ideologies, first among communism. fascism-Nazism, and ~beral der~ocra~y, and . , During the Cold \\•ar, this. latterf . ancl libera1 democrac}· then between com mumsm ne1ther o · the strugg1e be tv;\•een the 1:\~ro sunPrpowers, a· . } d fined rbecame embodi·ed u1 conmct each of wh1c 1 e and sense . E ·cai 1 1 Utoperu whieh was a nation-state in the c ass1 d .d l . . . e pn·,,,1arilv its identity in tetms of its ideology. • tates an 1 eo og1es ''er ti. · has Lind . \\"lli· .. ·. . • on-s These conflicts between pnnces, na 1 am . . . · "\~'esten1 Cl\il wars. as . within Western Civilization, conflicts J

•

Re rinted by pennission of Foref~n Abairs, Fmm Samuel P. 11 untingtun. "The Clash of Cl'1~7.ab0~ b . Couoril on f oreign Relatiolls. Inc. > Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer L993), pp. 22-49. Copynght 1 391 . •.

•

?>·

tbe

... :192

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTICS

labeled thl·m. This was as true of the Cold \Var lllll t'C'Illllries. With tll~ c•nd of the Cold War, inte1~1at1CHl<~ po!Jt,cs, mo' E'S •0 ' 11 .ol th \\ <''>lc•nt phase, and i~~ centerpiece becomes the.mtcractt.o~ .~).C ~' cen the \ ~ t ' t ".11 d. llOI:- \ ~'~s~ern C:iViliz~:. tions and among non-''' estem CJ\111Z
ilJ I(!

THE NATURE OF CMLIZATIONS During the Cold War the world was ruvided i~1to the First, Seco'_ld, ~nd Third worlds. Those s are no longer relevan t·. It 1s far more mcanmgful now to g·r · division · oup countries not in terms of their political or C"c:ono~11i<.: ~ystems or in terms of their level of economic developrnenl but rather in terms of the1r <.:ulture and civilization. What do we mean when we talk of a civilization? A c:i,i lization is a cultural entity. Villages , regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, rC'ligious groups , all have distinct cultures at cliffere~t levels of cultural hete_rogen~ity. Th e culture of a village in southem Italy may be cl.irfere nt from that of a Vlllage Jl1 northern Italy, but both will share in a common Italian culture that distinguishes them from German villages. European commuruties, in tum, will share cultural features that distinguish them from Arab or Chinese communities. Arabs, Chinese, and Westerners, however, are not part of any broade r cultu ral entity. They constitute civiLizations. A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short or that which distinguishes human s from other species. It is defined both by common objecti ve elemen ts, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identifica tion of people. People have levels of identity: A resident of Rome may defin e himsel f with varying degrees of intensity as a Roman, an Ital.ian, a Catholic, a Cblistian, a European, a Westerner. The civilization to which he belongs is the broadest level of identification with vdl.ich he intensely identifies. People can and do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and boundaries of civilizations change. Civilizations may involve a large numbe r of people, as with China ("a civilization pretending to be a state," as Lu<:ian Pye put it), or a very small number of people, such as the Anglophone Caribbean. A civilization may include several nation-states, as is the case with Western , Latin American, and Arab civilizations. or only one, as is the case with Japanese civilization. Civilizations obviously blend and overlap, and may include subcivi lizations. Western civilization has two major variants, European and North American, and Islam has its Arab, Turkic, and Mala) subdivisions. Civilizations are nonetheless mean ingful entities, and while the lir~es between them ~~e seldom sharp, they are real. Civilizations are dynamic; they.nst' a~d fall; they dtVJde and merge. And, as any studen t of history knows, chilizahotlS disappear and are buried in the sand'i of time. . . _Westerners tend to think of nation,..states as the principal actors i.n global affatrs. They have been that, however, for only a few centuries. The broader

•

HUNTINGTON 1 THE ClASH

'

OF CiVII.J7 A'h

~•ONS?

393

ttJry l.ave been the histo f , .. 1 5 of humal• 0 reacle Arnokl Tcr,•ilwe identifi ed 21 maJ·or ci ~. . CJ\IJ.hzations. ln A Stud .r f[isWry, . 11 Vl 1 tzatJons· onlv . y oJ )OJ'C:lfV \Ull c . ' , SlX of them ev; t. te111l the con , .-.s m

WtiY ciVILIZATIO NS WILL CLASH ·viJi.zation identity '"rill he in<.:reasingly important in the fu C' ed in large measur e by the interactions among seven tur~,hand ~e world will be s1tap V C f . e1g t maJor <.i l . These include v estern, on ~1cr.an, Japanese, Islamic orHind . . VJ Jzations. Latin American, and possibly African civilization. The mo~t im ~~~:VIC-~rthodox, c ture \\~U occur along the cultural fault lines separating th ~·vi!iza· _onfi.Jcts of the ,u ese CI tions from one another. ' w11ywill this be the case? First differences among civilizations are not only real· the b . , . . cl f h . y are asic. Civiliza. ·ons are differe ntiate rom eac ot11er by . and tr . . . history, • language· "--ultu re, tradi tion. .l:«eren t \lews . most important, rehg1.0n. The people of different civilizations hay,e uu11 on' the relations betwee~ God and man, t11e individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and childre n, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority. equalitv and hierarchy. These differe nces are the prod~ct of centuries. They '"'ill not soon. disappear. They are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes. Differences do not necessarily mean confuct, and conflict does not necessarily mean violence. Over the centuJies, however, differences among civilizations have generated t1:1e most prolonged and the most violent conflicts. Second , the world is becoming a smaller place. The interactions between peoples of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions intensify civi.lization-consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations. North African immigration to France generates hostility among Frenchmen and at the same time increased recepti,ity to imllligr.i· tion by "good'" European Catholic Poles. Americ-ans react far more negam·ely to Japanese investment than to larger investments from Canada and European countries .... The interactions among peoples of different civilizations enhance th~ civilization-consciousness of people that, in tum. iJ1vigorates differences and arumosities stretching or thought to stretch back deep into hist00'· Third, the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the• world are se1)arating people from • longstcmding · 1o<:eOple active most te . . m u~ ·enn· talist lns, pro essio movements are young, college-educated· mt·ddJe-dass techruCll . bas'15 [I identity 1 als, and business persons .... The revival of religion · · · P~ des .a~,=-A ti0.nsor and . dari . CJVw£4 • COmmthnent that transce nds national bo~ es at~.d UJlltes nhanced bv the dual role f Fourth , U1e growth of civilization-consciOusness r.sfe r At the same time. 0 tile West. On the one hand. the West is at a peak 0 po\'er.

~49~

MP<Jt
PART 4

CONTE

••v•u- .

- -·

. lt '1 return to the..· rn( ', Jl( ••nn enon ,· s , ·J . ps < lS a H~ 11 · ' . • O<:t:IJ . I hc)\\'l'' l'l'. ztoc I)( I l,t . _, z• • t' lS lncreasmglv onr tl : I:. re4t·rcnces t rtinll • • • 1 Cl\·u IZfthe el rends ' ·111 11 · l\\" U"t1anu n.. . · 1ru le to\\ ;1!11 a tut11 g • • ., f 1. dia the failure of \\'i. 't' ·•• u c· ts l) f sot:i . ga(:y .. , r dui7.
'tu

HUNTINGTON 1 THE ClASH OF

. CTVIUZATIONS?

395

. n e<:OOCJII i• h O( of the future is JikeJv to be ce t d ;\51a . . ' n ere on Ch· n· fact. already c.:• '""~ 1~1to existence. . . . lna. lS LIO<: is. in Culture at.'d ·(. bg10n also form the basis of the Economic Coo . . . 11 which bn .gs together ten non-Arab \iluslim ' ·:o· bi peration Organrz.a. tJO , .. . · .... un es: 1ran. Pakista 1i . j\Zerb:ujan, K,v..t~hst,tn, Kyrgyz.c;t~, Turkmenistan, Tadjikistan, lizbekin. urk~. • t:.g11anistan. One 1mpet us to the rev:tval and ex-nansion of this . stan, wj . ..r orgamzation [! and .L .I . th a1· . · ounw:u fl·crinalh" in the 1960s by Turkey. Pakistan. and Iran 15 o tr " I f h . . . e re· lZation bv th aders of se,·era o t ese countries that they had no cban f. d . . , e Ie . s· :1 I c:e 0 a miSSIOn to the EuroyJean Comtnumty. 1muar y, Caricom ' the Central Americ:an Common \tarket and Mercosur rest on common cultural foundations. Efforts to build b d · . . a roa er A al C Caribbean- entr . tn~ncan econom1c entity bridging the Anglo-Latin divide however. have tu date fruJed. ' As people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms. thev are like! · to see an "us" versus "them" relation existing between themselves and pe~ple of dil~er­ ent ethnicity or religion .. .. Most important, the efforts of the 'Nest to promote its values of democracy and Libera}jsm as universal values, to maintain its military predominance, and to advance its economic interests engender countering responses from other civilizations. Decreasingly able to mobilize support and fonn coalitions on the basis of ideology, governments and groups will increasingly attempt to mobi· lize support by appealing to common religion and civilization identity. The clash of civilizations thus occurs at t\vo levels. At the micro-level, adjacent groups along the fault lines bet\veen civilizations struggle, often 'iolently. o,·er the control of territory and each other. At the macro-level, states from different chiliz.ations compete for relative military and economic power, struggle over the control of international institutions and third parties, and competitively promote their particular political and religious values.

THE FAULT LINES BETWEEN CMUZATIONS The fault lines between civilizations are replacing ilie political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodsh~d. The_Cold War began when the Iron Curtain divided Europe political!}~ and 1 ~eolo~~r The Colc.l War ended with the end of the Iron Curtain. As the Ideologtcal\di \' "lSJon uJ al di · · n of Europe between estem of Europe has disappeared, the c tur VlSIO . d 1 on the 0 •t.er 0 h cl . Christiamty <:U1 1s am. u' . d d Christianity, on the one han • an rt. ~ ~x li . E · as William \\'allare . i£ , nt divtding ne m urope. has reemerged. T he most s1gn ea bound· of Western Christianity in the has suggested, may well be the eastern th ~undaries between Finland and year 1500. This line runs along what are now . e t through Belarus and t.;kraine . and bet\veen t he Balti'c st ates and Russ1a, . . Russ1a '-. cu f s Orthodox eastern liknune, t m Utuame rom li th separating the more Ca o c wes e . f th t of Romarua. and ilien goes . TranS)'h-arua rom swings westward separ-ating . e res . . . ting Croatia and SIo\'eal01lg the line 0 0\\ separa .h tl through Yugoslavia almost exac Y· his line of course. coincides \\lt . I the Balkans t , h I l nia from the rest of Yugos avta. n bur and Ottoman empires. T e peop es the historic boundary between the Hapsp gt stant or Catholic; they shared the to the north and west of th .1s line are ro e

SOO

PART

4

CUN I C.IU I

..... - -

.

, !1 w

1 . ean bistorv-ft·tH1:. r'- Jt l Hcnai.ssane: . , . 0 f Europ · . )11 exf>encn <:es . Re, t~e t'OUHIIC I" 1tenrnen t . the French .Hc\'0 111 l1on ~~~- lndustna tg I 11icalh• better of( than I" • r< (jpl r>s to the 1. evolu. Rc:~forrmttion . the En ralh' econor , . 1 . east· ,;uOI,.. ther arc genek (! .rwaro·' t O I·ncreasing nwo '"''"~~'''' 'll ., c·o mrnon EUro, terns. The p Pe-ctn ee<;nom,· and to tlte co~s~=- a e Orthodox or M li sIiIll i H ; · hi c;torieally beo)ples to ' tt1 0 fth rs waear I ,. I I eon tlte east and sou . · ·es and were on.'· ~~ 1t :'- touched b)' th ·h geQ . Tsanst empu .I . l .. e s ap· to the Ottoman or the,· are aeneralh ess ,\c ' 11 <.<:d ceonornie:· ll rng tofEurope: • o · . t·· ay·th tl events in 1e res d . lop stable democratre po ttr<.:al . v~tems Tl ,· ey 1 likelr to e' e · · 1e 'el seem much ess · l· d the Iron Curtain of ideolot_l\ ecame heavilv Gu lf countries f'or tts . 1. . •the West . dependent on t 1e Persran . 11 and, when they ,\IJ. hed senerav· 'es, the 0 1.1-ne . ·l1 Mu.slim countries became mone~·-nc I d s , e weapons-ne ,::..· · . . ]·1. Se'er l al wars occurred between. AnDs to I an . r Israel (created bYtlle · r } t a bloodv and ruthless \var m A gena ror most of the West). France 1oug l ~ . . · · s; 1950 British and French forces invaded E.&'Pt 111 1956; Amenean forces went into . 19<>...8; subsequenthto Lebanon • attacked Le banon m • Amencan force retumed . . Ubva, and engaged in ,·arious military ~ncounters mth Iran: Arab and Islamic terron:sts. supported bv .' at least three yftddle Easte rn governments, emploved . tile weapon of the weak and bombed \Vestem planes and ~ nstallati~ns and seized Western hostages. This ...,·arfare between Arabs and th e \\ est culmmated in 1990, when the United States sent a massiYe army to the Persian Gulf to defend some Arab countries against aggression by another. In its aftermath ~ATO planning is increasingly directed to potential threats and instability along its ''southern tier." Trus centuries-old mWtary interaction between the \ Vest and Islam is unhlek to decline. It could bec:ome ~ore virulent. The Gulf \Var left some Arabs feeling proud that Saddam Hussein had attacked Israel and stood up to the West. It also left many feeling humiliated and resentful of the \ Vest's militaJy presence in the Persian Gulf, the West's overwhelming military dominance, and their apparent inability to shape their own destiny. Many Arab countJies, in addition to t11e otl exporters, are reaching levels of economic and social development where autocratic forms of government become inappropriate and efforts to introduce democ· rac.y become stronger. Some openings in Arab political systems have already occurred. The principal beneficiaries of these openings have been Islamist move· me?~· In the Arab world, in short, Western democracy strengthens anti-Western ~litical forc-es. This may be a passing phenomenon, but it surely complicated rela· tions between Islamic countries and the \Vest. ... .. _on_both sides the interaction between Islam and the "''est is seen as a clash of "next confrontation," observes M. J. Akbar, sw:lim author, 15 defirutely going to come from the M usl.im world. ft 15 10 tht P of the Islamic nations from the ~aghreb to Pakistan that the struggle for a

~~ons. Th~- We~·s_

new world order will begin.". . .

has

a~ ~ndian

·

Hist~, the other great antagonistic interaction of Arab Islamic civ:ilizatiOll bee n with the paga . · . k pies to n, arurrust, and now increasingly Christian blac

peo

HUNTINGTON I THE CLAsH OF C IVLUZATIONS?

397

south . h te pa\l, this antagonism was ep'to .. d . I t ,e . , 1. I h ' ITIJ7,e rn the i . f dealers alld l '1'1 I avc:~ . It as been reflected in the on oin .· ~age ~ Arab slave b tween A nl 1 Jll blacks, the fighting in Chad be~ g L~I<.:Jvt] war m the Sudan ents and t IH .r. \ f rnrn<.;nt. t he tensions between OrthO<] veen Ch ' Jyan-support ... . . cuJ •msur1 ~e tJ e Hom or Africa, and the political conflicts rec: • ox. 1 nsttans and ~uslims 10 1· d • umngod nots'.and. c:om muna1 vto. I nee betw(;'C:I \1m. uns an Christians in i\igeria Th e r· 1· · · . · ern emtzation of Af · d tlle sprea<.l o C m~tra~11ty are l.kely to enhance the probabilitv of violen . n<:a an. ce along thts f:ault line. Symptornatrc of the intensification of this con A· ·t '. p · Khartoum . · b •c: was ope John PauJ I I's speech 111 tn Fe ruary 1993 attacking the ac.tions of th S da government against the Christian minority there. e u ns lslamtSt I

I

•

On the northern honler of Islam eonfliet has increas· n 1 ed he . . '. 1 g y erupt tween I cl Orthodox an M us tm peoples, mduding the carnage of Bosnia and S . th · · 1 b b · arajevo, e simmenng \ 10 enc:~ etw~en Ser and Albanian, the tenuous relations between BuJgarians.a~d thctr Turk1sh minority, the violence between Ossetians and lngush, the unrem1ttrng slaughter of each other by Armenians and Azeris, the tense relations between Hussians and ~ u~lims in Central Asia, and the deployment of Russian troops to protect Russtan 111terests in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Religion rein forces the revival of ethnic identities and restimulates Russian fears about the security of their southern borders. . .. The conflict of civilizations is deeply rooted elsewhere in Asia. The historic clash between Muslim and Hindu in the subcontinent manifests itself now not only in the rivalry between Pakistan and India but also in intensif}ing religious strife ,,;thin India between increasingly militant Hindu groups and India's substantial ~uslim minority. The destruction of the Ayodhya mosque in Dec-ember 1992 brought to the fore the issue of whether India will remain a secular democratic state or become a Hindu one. In Eac;t Asia, China has outstanding territorial disputes with most of its neighbors. It has pursued a ruthless policy toward the Buddhist people of1ibet, and it is pursuing an increasingly ruthless policy tO\vard its Turkic-Muslim minority. With the Cold War over, the underlying differences between China and the United States have reasserted themselves in areas such as human rights, trade. and weapons proliferation. These differences are unlikely to moderate.... The same phrase has been applied to the increasingly difficult relations between Japan and the United States. Here cultural difference exacerbates economic conflict. People on each side allege racism on the other, .but at least ~n the American side the antipathies are not racial but cultural. The bast.e values, attitudes, behavioral patterns of the two societies could hardly be more diff~rent. The economic issues bet\.veen the United States and Europe are no less senous than~~ bet\veen the United States and Japan, but they do not ha"e the sru.ne poulti . because th· e differenc-es between Amen<.'an c ture salience and emotional intens1ty A • ,... ·t;??tion ......... and European culture are so much Iess than those between nmencan ....,w.c.oo and Japanese civilization. tJ . . th extent to which thev The interactions behveen civilizations vary grea ) m ~ . _..... redomi. I Economic competition c1ean~ P 10 d b are likely to be characterize Y' ence. bci ;ilizations of the West and nates between the American and European ~u C:ntinent bowE!'-er, the prolifbetween both of them and Japan. On the Eurasum . " th~c cleansing," has not flj . . ed at tl•e ~treme m e eration of ethnic con 'et, ep•tonuz fr d most violent between groups been totally random. It has been most · equent an

PART 4 coNTEMpORARY WORLD POUTICS HUNTINGTON I THE ClASH OF m m ..... "'.. lULI\TIONS?

398

. . . ,., ..;005 In Eurasia the i!H.,l' h ~t ric fa ult j 1· b 1 . d·fTerent CJ\1 J7_.,.u . • nes h belongmg to 1 aBame. This is partJcularJ_, t • '· , ~"~ll'-' the b e "een . ·t· t ' s 'lft' once more ' f. 1 , .., ounda . CI'-1 1z.
cJVll1ZATION RAllYING: THE KIN-COUNTRY SYNDROME Grou s or states belonging to one cidlization that become im·olved in war . peopl~ from a different civilization naturally try to rail~· ~upport from other rnwrth bers of their own chilization. As the post- Cold War world evolves, <.:ivi)· ~rnt t d tl "k' JZahon c:ommouality. what H. D. S. Green":a~· tlas erme 1e m-coun try" syndrome . replacing political ideology and traditional balance of power w nsideration •lS · and eo~ -''tions. It can be seen gradually emers as principal basis for c:ooperatton .0 the . the post-Cold \\ ·ar conflicts in the Pers1an Gulf, the Caucasus and Bosnia Ngi g tn · but eacl1 Jn\'O · 1ved some eleme · · one of these was a 1r.u11-sca1e war between Cl'· iliza·tions. of civilizational ralhing. which seemed to become more imrJortant as the oon~ B~ts · continued and which mar provide a foretaste of the future. First. in the Gulf War one Arab state im·aded another and then fought a alition of Arab. \\'estem, and other_ states. \\'bile only a few .\1 uslim govem~:nts O\'erth· Saddam Hussem, manr · supported . • Arab elites privatelv " cheered · hi m on. and he _was h1ghly popula: among large sections of the Arab publics. Islamic fundamentalist movemrents .uruversally .sup~rted Iraq rc1tl1er than the \Vestern-backed govem_ments_o_f K~v.wt and Saudi Arab.a. Forswearing Arab nationalism, Saddam Hussem exp~Cltl}' m~oked an Isla~i·c· ap~aJ. He and his supporters attempted to define the war as a v.ar between CJVJI.zations. "It is not t11e world against I SafarAI-Hawali deanofislamic Studiesatthe Umm AI-Q ura Uru'vers·ty· rMaq•. as t't1 · ·d 1y · 1 1 m 1 e<,'(,'a. m a WJ. .e CJrcu ated tape. "It is the West agai nst Islam." Ignoring the rivalry .. '~ed~o Irahn and Iraq, the chief Iranian religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei eau I Or a o1V war against th \VI ;t· 'Th . Amencan . aggression,' eed lans ' . .· . e es · e struggle aga.mst ~~~ · Ph . · and pohcies will be counted as a jihad, and anybody who is killed on war pat IS a martyr " 'This 15 · , . Ar.ilis and all M li · a w~, King Hussein of Jordan argued, '·against all . us ms and not aga.mst Iraq aJone "

f:

Second, tbe kin

. .. .

Union. Armenian ~try syndro~e also appeared in confl.icts in the fonner Soviet increasingly . far) ~<:cesses m 1992 and 1993 stimulated Turkey to bec:ome "'" ' ~._ supportive of Its relioious ethnic· and lin . . b th . J..., : · ne JJOn'' e a Turlcish nation £ ~ et" ' • • guistic re ren m AzerJ.T
399

road

shipment.., ., 1d ai r Ai15hts to Armenia; and Turke\' and . uld not ac<:t'pt d1-;me,nberment of AzerbaiJ·an . 1n the -1ast vears lranr·announ~d thf'!'l.· \\0 -; 0 d et u 0 ,·ernnwnt <>upported AzerbaiJ·an because .ts . ' Its existen<.:e, the e . ~ I h l go\ernment \vas d . So r. rll'ler c"Om ll1UIIl..,t~. \\ 1L 1 t e end of the So\11·et u . h ommated bv' ,o. ,.. . ruon~ owever )'tical . 1 t:ions Cfa,·e way to religrous ones. Russian troops fought th .de·po <:onsiderao .. d h " on e Sl of the Arm . and Az,erbruJan a<:('use t e Russian government of turning 180 "eruans. support for C~ristian Armenia. degrees tmvard Third, \Vlth respect to the fighting in the forme r y ugoslav1a. · \\.estem bJ· manifested s~1npa th y and support for the Bosnian \1 usli d h h pu ICS . I d f } · ms an t e orrors thev tl suffered at , 1e .1an s o t 1e Serbs. Relatively little 00ncern . was expressed how-' ever. over Croatran · th e ucsmem .],_ berment · of · attacks 1 hon Muslims and participation m Bosnia-Herzegonna. n t e early stages of the Yugoslav breaku c .. . 1 f·l· 1 · . .. p, ennanv, m an d u.nusu al 1sp ay o u1p omatic ' bers . m1tiative and muscle • induce,d the other 11 mem of the European C om mu~1ty to follow its lead in recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. As a result of the popes determination to provide strong backin t th , . t . th V . d g o e t.'o Cath olre coun nes, e atican exten ed recognition even before the c ·tv cti?· The States _followe? the European lead. Thus the \\ estem CJ\llizatio~ ~allied behind their coreligionists. Subsequentlr Croatia was reported to be rece1\1~g subs~antial ~~antities of arms from Central European and other \ Vestem _countries. Bons Yeltsin s government, on the other bancl attempted to pursue a m1dclle course that would be sympathetic to the Orthodox Serbs but not alien~te Ru~sia from th~ West. Russian consen·ath·e and nationalist groups, ho\\'e,·er, mcluding many legt.slators, attacked the go\·emment for not beina more forthcomjng in its support for the Serbs. By early 1993 se\·eral hundred R~ssians apparently were serving with the Serbian forces. and reports circulated of Russian arms being supplied to Serbia. Islamic governments and groups, on the other hand, castigated the \\'est for not coming to the defense of the Bosnians. Iranian leaders urged Muslims from all countries to provide help to Bosnia; in violation of the v .K anns embargo. l ran supplied weapons and men for the Bosnians; lranian-supported Lebanese groups sent guerrillas to trai n and organize the Bosnian forces. In 1993 up to 4,000 Muslims from over two dozen Islamic countries were reported to be fighting in Bosnia. The governments of Saudi Arabia and other c."Ountries felt under increasing pressure from fundamentalist groups in their own societies to provide more vigorous support for the Bosnians. By tl1e end of 1992, Saudi Arabia had reportedly supplied substantial funding for weapons and supplies for the Bosnians, which significantly increased their military capabilities vis-a-vis the Serbs. . . . . . Civilization rallying to date has been limited. but it has ~n g_n>'-'1Dg, ~ at clearly has the potentiaJ to spread much further. As the co~cts m the Pers1an Gulf, the Caucasus and Bosnia continued. the positions of nations and the cleavages between them' increasingly were along ch-i.lizationallines. Populist ~iticians. religious leaders and tl1e media ha,·e found it a potent means of arousmg mass support and of ~ressuring hesitant governments. In the comin~ years•. the local conflicts most likelv to escalate into major wars "ill be those. as m Bosniaifantbed ~ ' · 11 ·J· ti The next world war re IS Caucasus, along the fault lines between C1" za ons. · one, will be a war between civilizations.

~~:ed_

leadin;:c:~\~

.tOO

PART 4

ORARY WORLD POLITICS coNTEMP HUNTINGTON I THE CLASH OF C IVIUZATIONS?

THE WEST VERSUS THE REST .. ""r·tordinar:·r>eak of pmn•1 HI r~ ·l.1lion to otlle r CI\'JI' 1 r · · 110 w ·tt all ex• ' · 17-Cllion \Jilita')' nttr w t 11·om disappeared s . t . ' ts The \\ est s. con A· .~ < .. ·er OJJponen 11'1 J . k·~ble and \Vestern mdlt) a d1rector·lte 0 1. I 'ltte<] I t le tJ . . ' . .· , . .1 ' States. BntaJn. an · n1ted cl . . . nd Jai>an. all of wluc 1 mamt,un C\tJ ttordmari)v ose rei· ti .I . I dI States, Gennan). a . cl o~ 111 cou . tl to the exclusion of lesser an arge \ non-\\ este n . ntnes. . . .. I ' . · wi th eacI1 o 1er Cow1cii 01 m t 1e I ntC'rnahonal· Mo netary F ecJ. . made at t!Je u· N· Secu.ntv 1 swns that reflect the interests of the_West are presen:ed t~ the world as reflectin llnd desires of tl1e world commumt): The very plu cl~C? ~. ~1C? world communi ~the ~~ become the euphemis~ic coJiectl\~e noun_ (rc~)lacm~ th e ~ree World ") d gl\e to actions reRectmg the mte1ests o( the Umted State global leuitimacy s an othe . d t1 . I o· westem powers. Tll~·ough t 1e I_M~ ru~ o 1er ~~ternatJOnaJ economic institution r 5 ~ the nations the West promotes 1ts economic mte1ests and unpo. es on other nomic policies it thinl.:s appropriate. I n any poll of non-\Vestern peoples th eco. undoubtedly would \\in tl1e support of finance ministers and a few othe;s : IMF' an overwbeLningly unfa,·orable rating from just about everyone else wh' ut get agt·ee with Georgy Arbatov's characterization of I.VIF officials as "ne~-B ~ hw~~~~-~ 0 s eviJ\S . . 1' tl . . d .1en . ·c undemocr·>t JI11I'>Osmg 1 Iove expropnaling o 1er peop es money, w1o " 1. an a1 c . rules of economic and political conduct and stifling econom ic freedom." d Western domination of the U.N. Security Counci I and its decisions t , empere · b b. · a1 b 1 b on y y occasJOn . a stentJon >: C m a, produced U ..\'. legitimation of the West'5 1· . , use . of force to dm·e. Iraq out of Kuwait and its e liminati'o11 of I raq s sop 11sticated ~,eapon~ and capacity to produce such weapons .... The \ <\lest in effect 1·s · usmg · world ili in tituti mtemational the run to ons, m tary power and economic resources s . 10 ways that will maintain Western predominance, protect Western interests and ' promote Western political and economic values. . r That at least is tlJe wa)' ers see the new world and there is . in wh'le·I1 non- uvvestem .· .:l! ' D .a: a sJgrw,cant e1ement of trutll i th . . . n en VIew. Inerences in IJower and struggles for . ·'''mn llwl,_ /.economic and instituti al the West and th ' . .:I:.. . on power are tl1us one source of conflict between . . o er CI\'W7..atio ns. n 1·ffierences m culture , that is basic values and beU f e s, are a second source of . £li con et. · · · \.Vestem concepts differ fun damentaJI\'• from those pre"a1 t . tJ · 'J' · v en m o 1er · CI_vu zations. Western idea<; of individualism, liberalism, constitutionali 1lUman nghts sm, c ' equ-ality, ilberty, the rule of law, democrat); . tree markets the se · paration of ehurc11 and state, often have little resonance m ' J ·,,.. Islamic Concuc1 apanese H'01d B uu rl u, ~ddhist, or Orthodox cultures. We~tem ~fforts to propagat; such . .'. 11 unperialism" and a ,.ft£'£!-~.. < ~ac; produce mstead a reaction against "human nghts rt rca.tunnation of · di 14 suppo the in seen be can as values, or religious fundamentalism b m genous Y the younger generation in non-Western cuJtureS· The very notion that th ·deo.,, . ..1 at odds with th ere .could be a "uruversal 1 direc:uy civilization" is a Westem what distinguishes one e Partilculansm of most Asian societies and their emphasis on peop e from anoth er.... These differences are most mam·fest

z

I

401

West 1. 0 tlte cfl<>rts o1 tl •· C nitcd States and other . ~md po h wtrs to induce other peoples -;t l r 1 ideaS conc(;!mi ng democra c V \ dopl 3 t0 cy an uman . h•· . . ng l.'>. Modem demov11. . h in the West . ·ati<.: govenllnr·H t ~ongmatec.l d. . . ' V nen lt as dev I n , . <.:1 . e ope m non-Western odeties 1t has usuauy r>een the product of Westem eo1omalism S .. · f. 1· . < : or mpos1tion. T he centreJ ruos o world politk:s in tl . f hkel t 1 . 1s uture Je · h Y o )e, m Kishore Mahb11baru s p1trase, t e con liict between "th " ' the Rest" an cl the and vvest e . ' \' . W to f ljzations ctvi responses o non- 'vestcrn 1 responses gcnerallv take one or a combm·ati estefmthpower and values. Those on o ree form · A ' · non-Weste111 states can, like Burma and !North K orea attempts.t t one extreme, . .. 0 pursue a course of isolation, to msulate their societies from p t '. ene ration or corru ti ~ b th ·r P on Y e "' West, and, in c f1ect, to opt .out of participation .m th · e vvestem-dom· t d 10 bal l . e g r . h ancl· 1ew commumty. T 1e costs of thts course' however, are 1ug statma ha es ve pursued it exclusively.· A second alternative ' the equJ·· v ent of ''banclwagoni '' · . . ng m d· international relatwns theory, is to attempt to J·oin th w e est an accept 1ts values Tl ti · d 1 · · · " h ancl mst1tut1ons. 1e ur a temative is to attempt to ''b· l t e West by develance a u· d · · . tller non-\ Vestern soctwith cooperating and power 1tary m an economJC opmg o . . tl . . . . . eoes agamst 1e. West, wlule preserving indigenous val ues and ·mstitutions· m ' sh01t , to modernize but not to Westernize. • 1

· ! a

'

THE TORN COUNTRIES In the future, as people differentiate themselves by civilization, countries \vith large numbers of peoples of different civilizations ... are canrudates for dismemberment. Some other countries have a fair degree of cultural homooeneitv but are divided over whether ilieir society belongs to one civiJjzation or ano~ber. These are tom countries. Their leaders typically \vish to pursue a bandwagoning strategy and to make their countries members of the West, but the history, culture, and traditions of their countries are non-Western. Tbe most obvious and prototypical tom countly is Turkey. The late twentieth-century leaders of Turkey have followed in the Attati.i rk tTadjtion and defined Turkey as a modern, secular, Western nationstate. They allied Turkey with the vVest in NATO and in the GulfWar; they applied for membership in the European Community. At the same time, however, elements in Turkish society have supported an Islamic revival and have argued that Turkey is basically a Middle Eastem Muslim society. In addition, while tJ1e elite of Turkey has defined Turkey as a Western society, the elite of the West refuses to accept Turkey as such. Turkey \vill not become a member of the European Community, and the real reason, as President Ozal said, "is that we are Muslim and they are Christian and tlley don't say that.'. Having rejected Mecca. and then being rejected by Brussels, where does Turkey look? Tas.hkent may be the answer. The end of the Soviet Union gives Turkey the opportunity to bec"Ome the leader of a revived Turkic civilization involving seven countries from the borders of Greece to those of China. Encouraged by the West, Turkey is making strenuous efforts to . . carve out this new identity for itself. During the past decade Mexico has assumed a position somewhat s1milar to that of Turkey. Just as Turkey abandoned its historic opposition to Europe and attempted

RY WORLD POUTICS

.f02

PART4

coNTEMI'ORA .

.

ped deflJling it.sell h.\

•J'O changes the Sa] ·reSident . -' d Gortan escn k I 1 Inas Car/os Swina.s e . \\11 he finished. I remar ·cc: · T 1at's most imp . gov. 111aking. .JJen . I' . emment was ·call . want to change MexJCo rom a Latin Ame1icaressl\,e. II seems to me that b~J . Y) our·rv ., He looked at me with ~u n:Hise and n <:ol.llntry . -L exc Cl! rtl.1 AI11 encan coun~ r into a \ 'o . 1 l·Iatwe are ~rvin£! to do. bu t of course we could ne llled: .. , . ·tl 1That's prec1se yw · ~ 1 . .... . .. , .. . . versa Exac · . k . ...l'cates• in MeXJco, as• 111 Tw kcy. SlgJllficant element . Yso bl' 1Y , ., As Jus remar 111UJ . s msoc· pu JC ~· redefinition of tlJeir cowl~S IdentJty. 1n Turkey, E uropean-onen l· ety resist the ak stures to Islam (Ozal's pilgJimage to .\tlecca)· so al~o M .ted leaders have.to m· ~e ~:d leaders jJave to make gestures to those wh~ hold M ~XICOs Nortl1 Amencan-oner . . G d I . eXJco to . Amencan . count:J.y (Salinas' Ibero-Amenc;:m be a Latm . . dl ua a a.Jara summit). Historically Turkey has been the most profoun y tom cou ntry. For the United . 0 ' 1·5 tlle most immediate tom counhy. Glohally the most import States, MeXJc . . · ant tom countrY is Russia. The question of whetl1er Russta IS part of the West or the leader of a distinct Slavic-Orthodox civilization has been a recurring one in Russian history. That issue was obscured by. the cOJ~munist .~ctory in Russia, which imported a Western ideology, adapted It to Russi_an conditions and then challenged the West in the name of that ideology. The dommance of communism shut off the historic debate over Westernization versus Russification. \·Vith communism disc.Tedited Russians once again face that question .. .. To redefine its civilization identity, a tom country must meet three requirements. First, its politic.:al and economic elite has to be generally supportive of and enthusiastic about this move. Second, its public has to be wilung to acquiesce in the redefinition. Third, the dominant groups in the recipient civilization have to be willing to embrace the oonvert. All three requireme nts in large part exist with respect to Mexico. The first two in large part exist with respect to Turkey. It is not clear that any of them exist with respect to Russia's joining the West. The conflict between U.beral demO<:racy and Marxism-Leninism was between ideologies which, despi~e their major differences, ostensibly shared ultimate goals of freedom, equality and prosperity. A traditional, authoritarian, nationalist Russia could hare q~ite diffe~ent go~s. A Western democrat could carry on an intellectual debate With _a SoVJe~ .Ma~t. It would be virtually impossible for him to do that with a traditionalist. If, the Russians stop behaving like Marxists, they reject . democrat)' and begm behaving like Russians but not Jike Westerners, the la re tions between R · d h u r -'-·A' ussJa an t e vvest could again become distant and eonll'IC£WSJ· 1\f :iro has stop . S to join Europe.. e-.; . . toinlitate tbe Unt te(1, t· Sl·ttes
j

-:;::;n

•

~

THE CONFUCfAN-ISLAMJc CONNECTION The obstacles to non-~ t . . . . 1 Thev are •-- -t l' Lati es em countries JOming the West vary cons1derab Y· ' 'CC1S IOr n American

Orthodox countri

.J

E

c.

r the

anu ast European countries. They are greater 10 . es of tbe former Soviet Union. They are still greater for Muslim.

HUNTINGTON I THE ClAsH OF CNIUZATIONS? 1

403

Buddhist so<:ieties Japan h bl Co..... fn cian . I :·. '1, .md . · · ao; esta ished · c . 1'tself a~ :m ··:- oc·1alc rncmber of the West· lt . . th a umquc position rOI • IS tn e West · tn some respe<:ts hut I • rly not of tl \ \ '(·st in important dimensions Th · cea . · · th tf' "' Jtu re and po·M·r <1o not w1sh to, or <:annot J·o· thosecountries a or reasons of cu . • Ll1 e vvcst compet 'th h develop111g thctr own economic, mHitary and li . e Wl l e West 11 y0 1110tinu th<'lr internal development and b,y ,or.,.. po tit.ca1P?'hver. They do this by pr ..., . '-VVpera mg \VJt othe \~ ·ountries. Tlw most prominent form of tl"lis <." "'pe t· . th r n~n- estcrn c·onnection th at has emerged to challenge Western -v.~ .ra IOnsts. IS e Confuc1an-1s1am1·c nt 1 ere , va1ues anc..l pow c Almo!'>t witlto11t exception, Western countries ar d . · . er. ·11nm, · 1"·"ort h Korea, and several MiddJe· East e re ucmg t 11e1r miJitary ower . . . . C ta h P . h · .. em owever are Significantl v expan d mg t e1r m1 1 1tary <:apabilities They are do· s tltes, . b h . ' . ' · mg1 us v t c 1mport O f arrns fro m Western and non-Western sources and by tl e d ' f. d' 1 . . . . · · eve opment o m ·1genous arms mdustnes. One result ts the emergence of what Char! . K h . " , · es raut ammer has called Weapon States, and the Weapon States are not Wet ~ t . l d C>. • • f s em s ates. Another resu It IS t 1~ re enmtton o arms control, whi<:h is a Western concept and a Western goal. Dunng the Cold War tl1e primary purpose of arms control was to estabHsh a stable mi litary balance between tbe United States and its allies anc.l the Soviet Union and its allies. In the post-Cold War world the prima.ry objective of arms control is to prevent the development by non-Western societies of military capabilities that could threaten Western interests. The West attempts to do th~ through international agreements, ec..'Onomic pressure, and controls on the transfer of arms and weapons technologies. The conflict between the West and the Confucian-Islamic states focuses largely, although not exclusively, on nudear, chemical, and biological weapons, ballistic missiles, and other sophisticated means for delivering them, and the guidance, intelligence, and other electronic capabilities for achieving that goal. The West promotes nonproliferation as a universal nonn and nonproliferation treaties and inspections as means of realizing that norm. It also threatens a variety of sanctions against those who promote the spread of sophisticated weapons and proposes some benefits for those who do not. The attention of the West focuses, naturally, on nations that are actually or potentially hostile to the West. . The non-Western nations, on the other hand, assert tl1eir right to acqmre and to deploy whatever weapons they think necessary for th~ir sec.~rity. Th.e~ also have absorbed to the full the truth of the response of the Imhan defense mmtster when 1 ' · · "Don't ' lesson . ' leamed f rom t he Gulf 'vvar. fight the United States asked what he unless you have nuclear weapons." Nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, ~d missiles are viewed probably erroneous Iy, as the potential equalizer of supenor ' power. Chma, . Western conventionaJ of course, alreadv, has nuclear weapons; . . have the capab''' Pakistan and India JJJty to dep10 y them. ~ort11 Korea. Iran, . ffi1raq, ial . . t0 c L1b)'a and Algeria appear to be attemptmg acqm·re them. A top 1raman , d · o 1988 ' h0 uld · nuclear weapons. an 10 has declared that all Muslim states s a~wr~ all' fo development of the pres1'd ent o f Iran repo rt dl issued a directive c . mg r e Y . . d d' 1 ·ca1 weapons." "offensive and defensive chemical, bJOlogJCal, an ra 10\ <>gl \ st milit!lT\"caMbilities is 1 1 pment of cowttere ...... ; t·Centrally important to t he deve 0 d 'ts means to create mtlitarv power an 1 • th e sustained expansion o f e h. · il'tary· mas m 1 t Clu'na is rapidlv increasing 1 ' power. Buoyed by spectacuIar ec.'Onorn1·c deve opmen •

•

coNTfMJ'ORARY WORLD POUTICS 404

PART4

I

. .ousi)' moving forward "1 :f' ·notlerniz··~= d. and \1gOJ . . . "«uon of. 1 its militarv spen mg ' . u weapons from the fom 1 l c;tates · it is cl ts 1 -~ed fo~s. It is pure ~asul19o92 1·t tested a one-rn eg,Ltw . . I Jr devi~e. I. t . evelop. • · . . . : ing long-range mtss Jes; u1 bilHies acgum ng aen.lt ...., 'lC·hng techo ol LS deve.1 aping power-projection. capfta came~ Its militruy buildup and 'assertion ogyf, and 0 sove hase an rurcr.1 · · 1 ., · ·' t~ed to manufacture · / I1as expo rted maten· toIt has helped Algeria buil·'u a rcado r suitable for nuc:1ear and ne1Ye gas. · . weapons d roduction. Chma has soJd to Iran nuclear technuc1ear researc11

Pakistan.

.

h

.

A Confucian-Islamic milita1y connection 11as t us come m to being, designed to promote acquisition by its members of the weapons and weapons technologies needed to counter the rniJJtary power of the \Vest. It may or may not last. At present, however, it is, as Dave McCurdy has said. "a reneg ades' mutu al support pac~ run by the proliferators and their backers." A new form of arms comp etition is thus occurring between Islamic-Confucian states and the \Vest. In an old-fashjoned arms race, each side developed its ov.rn arms to balance or to achieve superiority against the other side. In this new fonn of arms comp etitio n, one side is developing its anns and the other side is attempting not to balance but to limit and prevent that arms buildup while at the same time reducing its O\VTl military capabilities.

IMPUCATIONS FOR THE WEST This article does not argue that civilization identities will replace alJ other identities. ~ ~ation-:mtes will disappear, that each civilization will becom e a single coherent po~tical entity, that groups within a civilization will not conHi<.:t with and even fight ~ac~ other. This paper does set forth the hypotheses that differences between civi;::on s

~~ .r~

and important; civilization-consciousness is increasing; conflict . een CIVJI.zations will supplant ideological and other forms of conflict as the dom~~thi~ global form of confliet; international relations histoiically a game played out WJ n West : t · · · . whi h em cwuzation, will mcreasingly be de-W' estern ized and become a game ~cal c. n?n-Western civi~zations are actors and not simply obiec.:ts; successful pollt1 , secunty, and eco · · . J d 10 ·thin ·•..: 1 :_~._, !IlOmJc mtemational institutions are more likely to eve P WI Civw.t.aOons than acro . ·J· . .J:CC •• ilizati . ss CIVJ IZ.ations; conflicts between groups in uiuer ent Cl\ons will be more freq t _.a:cts between . th uen ' more sustained, and more violent than coruu cn.:J:__._, ~groups m e same <:ivilization; violent conflicts betw een group s in different .n·uu.auons are the most lik I d could lead to global wars· th e Yan most dangerous sourc e of escalation that , e paramount axis of world politics will be the relations between

HUNTINGTON I THE CLASH OF CIVIU

ZATIONS?

405

.. 1 West w cl tilt Ht>st''; the elites in some tom t 1e

non-\"vestem eo m ., rnake thc.>ir <.r• Jll. nr ., part of the west, but in most cases face u~ es Wl I try to omplishi11g du'>; a central fO<:us of conflict f, th . maJor obstacles to ace ' ., .1 · or e 11l1med iate fut vill be betwe en thl' \\ ~'"t a nu severa1Islamic-Confucian states. ure ' This is not to advocate the desirability of conf1·1ct b tw ... s e een <.:t\-W.. · set fOJth dco,criptive hypotheses ac; to what the future mav b lik lfth.ations. lt 1S to ~ 110\\,ever, J·t ·lS. ' im e licati e· ese are plausib le hypot 1H;ses, necessary to consider their , These implications should be cli ·cl d b P ons for Western li po C)· . VI e etween short-term advanta e and long-term accommodation. In the short term it is clear!}' in th . t f hg . . . . . . e m erest o t e \\est to prom ote greate1 coope ration and uruty within its own •vil· t· . · d · h et 1za 10n, particularly between rts Euro pean an Nort American components· to · . th. . · · E· . · ' moorporate mto e West soctebes m astern Europe and Latm America whose cultu res . are c1ose to 1 those of the \\ est; to prom.ote and maintain cooperative relations with Russia and J ap~n ; to prevcn~ e~calation ofl~cal inter-civili7-ation conflicts into major intercivilization wars; to hrn1t the expansiOn of the military strength of Confucian and Islamic: states; to 1~o~er~te the reduc.-tion of Western military capabilities and maintain miut
·

rr

NOTE .. Th Natior~a/ltLterest (Summer 199"2), 1. Kishore Mahbubani. "The West and the Rest. e 3-13.

•

ZAKARIA I WHY ,

DO THEY HATE. US?

407

_t.;stani tlf'\\' 'P<'f The Nation: "Septe b Pwu . k . m er 11 was . rroriSII1 S s~' ·e ll \vas reaction and revenge .not mmdless terrorism r te · 1· r ..1 1 . , even retributi ., tOr that Osant.t >Ill .... .tue n Jeheves that thi . on ..... The problem .IS not . · ' s IS a religi . . that milhon!> of rwople ~cross the Islamic world seem OUs \\ar agamst America. lt's This awh\'ard reality hac; led some in th W to agree.

FAREED ZAKARIA

reiudices predi<.:tmg a "clash of <.:ivilizations'~b est to dust off old essa"'S and older P ) I enveen the \ V, d ' torian Paul Jo mson has argued that Islam is inbinsica]) , e.st an Islam. The his-

. ··v11 y do tbe terrorists bate us?" Americans c:ould be pard 11 To the question "' ,. ,iJJ b

' oned t . ·"~•T]Jy should we care? . .. Anger" not e enough to get us t11 or answenng, vi t1 . . b . long struggle. For 1at we\ vill need an swe rs. The one . rough what 1s swe to ea f: il' \\~ cl r s we 11ave . h e been comforting but am 1ar. e stan 10r freedom d f 1earc so ar av I an · the , I hate it. We are rich and the~ ~ovy us. We are stJ:o:l~ and th~y resent this. All . h 1....... bill10ns ofpoor and weak and oppressed peol)le around wI11c s u e. But there are · • the world. They don't turn planes into bombs. Th~y don t blow themselves u t kill thousands of civilians. If envy were the cause o{ terrolism, Beverly Hills, ~f~ Avenue and Mayfctir would have become morgues long ago. There is sometJ,· stronger at work here than deprivation and jealousy. Some tl1ing that can move rn~! to kill but also to die. Osama bin Laden has an answer-religion. For him and his followers, this is a holy war between Islam and the Western world. Most ~ uslims disagree. Every Islamic country in the world has condemned the attacks of September 11. To man bin Laden belongs to a long line of extremists who have invoked religion to justit mass murder and spur men to suicide. Tbe words "thug,'' "zealot," and "assassin" aU co~e from ancient t~rror cults- Hindu, Jewish, and Muslim, respectively-that believed they were domg llie work of God. The terrorist's mind is its own place and ~ke Milton's Satan, can make a hell of heaven, a heaven of hell Vlhether it i~ the Unabomber, Aum Shinrikyo or BaJllch Goldstein (who killed scores of unarmed Muslims in Hebron), terrorists are almost always misfits who place their own nvisted morality above mankind's.

;f

ll

ADMIRATION FOR BIN LADEN But bin Laden and hi 1111 0 owers are not an isolated cult like Aum Shinrikyo or the 'di s BfllllCh DaVJ ans or dem t d I Th en e oners like Timothy McVeigh and the Unabomber. We:~~mde ouft of a ~ult~re that reinforces their hostility, distrust, and hatred of the an o Amenca m parti . 1 This u1 · b t fuels the fianati . th . cu ar. c ture does not condone terronsm u CISm at rs at 1·t h art 1i be reassuring, but it is false s e · o say that al Qaeda is a fringe group may you will detect a t ·. Read the Arab press in the aftermath of the attacks and no -so-hidden admiration for bin Laden. Or consider this from the fareed '7,.1-.-!. . ._....lil. '1he Politks ofR:~a Wh 2001 Xeo.~~SWeck, Inc. All rightx n..oserved"'t>~: . YDo 11ley Hate Us?" From Newsweek. October 15, 2001. @ · 406 . epnnted by permission.

Other scholars have Uisagree~l po· t' } an mtolerant and violent reJioion. · o· u., m mg out th t l I slaughter o~ mnoce1~ts and prohihits suicide. Nothin will a s _am condemns the "true Islam or quotmg ilie Quran. The Quran . . g be solved by searching for . . ts a vast vague book fill d . and contradictions (much like the Bible). You ~d . . ' e w1th poetry and incitements to stn.Jggle, beautiful express . can f m lt condemnations of war 10 ns o to1erance and t . . ) against unbe tevers. Quotations from it usually t U s em strictures e us more about tt 1 selected the passages than about Islam Every 1. . . te person w 10 · re l~on 1s compatible with t1J b and tl1e worst of humankind. Through its long h'st Chri . . · e est ... .l . S . . b I ory, stiamty has SUJ)ported inqwsitlons anc anti- em1tism, ut also human rights d ·a1 r · l 1· . . an SOCI we1rare. Searchtng t 'le 1.1story books 1s also of limited value F th C d . · rom e rusa es of the l ki Ilth centUiy to t 1e Tur sh expansion of the 15th centu ry to tile eo1orua · 1era .m the early 20th century, Islam and the West have often battled ili't ·1 Th' . · h d m any. IS tens1on has eXISted for un reds of ye~s, during which there have been many periods of peace and even harmony. Un til the 1950s, for example, Jews and Christians lived peaceably under Muslim rule. In fact, Bemard Lewis, the preeminent historian of Islam, has argued that for much of history religious minorities did better under Muslim rulers than they did under Christian ones. All that has changed in tlle past f~w decad~s: So surely ~e relevant question we must ask is, Why are we in a particularly dtfficult phase nght now? What has gone wrong in the world of Islam tl1at ex-plains not the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 or the siege ofVienna of 1683 but September 11, 2001? Let us nrst peer inside that vast Islamic world. Many of the largest Muslim countries in the world show little of this anti-American rage. The biggest, Indonesia, bad, until the recent Asian economic crisis, been diligently folhving Washington's ad\~ce on economics, witl1 impressive results. The second and third most populous Muslim countries, Pakistan and Bangladesh, have mLxed Islam and modernity "~th some success. While both countries are impoverished, both have voted a woman into power as prime minister, before most Western countries have done so. Next is Turkey. the sixth largest Muslim country in the world, a flawed but functioning secular democracy and a close ally of the \Vest (being a member of NATO). Only when you get to the Middle East do you see in lurid colors all the dysfun.ctions that people conjure up when they think of Islam today. In Iran. Egypt, ~}~ Iraq, Jordan the occupied territories and the Persian Gulf, the resurgence of lslatruc ' . An · · seems to be evef\'where. fundamentalism is virulent, and a raw anti- 1encamsm • This is the land of suicide bombers, flag-bume~ and fiery mulla:· 'jg50s and l960s But even the Arab rage at America is relatively recent. In e Id Id d . . cl S . t d the Arab wor wou en up It seemed unimamnable that the Umte ta es an . h ed Heikal o· ' . rful J. oumalist, ~1o am ' locked in a cultu raJ clash. Egypt s most pD'~e f the ULlited States ... was a described the mood at the time: "The whole picture 0

RARY WORLD POUTJCS

-408

PART 4

coNTEMP0

. .

F ance were fading, ha lt (

. Bnt'llll anc1 r 1 I h 'deoJo!!V or comllltJillSI I c <Tiamorous one. ·tnc t e ' 000 111 1'Ies ·twav ~ ~ at T1 · ged c.from \•VorIcI '\. d , • < \\'as 5,

.:'1. The S . ovlet lJ . nion u,ema to th e A1 I Us irn r. more

powerf I , rica ha emer A ·tst in th e I u Clrtd . , I first traveled to the M1.1~ But me reLimon. 0 ear y Ig. [ 1. t·111g than e' er. lOs {America "vas o a g •sten11 w 1 •i'roachabJe more appea I'Tiocle · • • 1. 1 · th n the image o d J· . d Coca-Cola. Somet ling l
CHAPTER I : THE RULERS ,.. . d'ffi It t coniure up the excitement in the Amb world in the late 1900s as t F . , ,d E • • J It JS t cu o m gyp . Ol CLeca es Arabs h cl b Abd 1 Nasser consolidated power a1 ;\. 1 tl1ey were ach ieVi a heen ki d e Cam now . I n·aJ crovemors and deca ent ngs. ng t eir . l1l1ed by eo o 1 0 r a modern man 10r dreams ·of JJ· Jdei)endence • and Nasser. •was t11e1r.new sav10r, t11e d . A1exan n a, a cosmopolt'tan c .~, m Bnhs11 ru 1e, u11der bom was He era .. . . . pos"var · 1 that was more Meditemmean tl1an Arab. H1s f01 mahve years were spent . tl 1 ~ an suit~ tailored his \Vith society. the of Anny, the most Westernized segment fashionable dark glasses, he cut an energetic fig ure on tlle world stage. "The Lion of Egypt,r he spoke for all tl1e Arab world. Nasser believed tl1at Arab politics needed to be fired by modern ideas like selfdetermination, socialism and Arab unity. And before oil money tumed the Gulf states into golden geese, Egypt was the undisputed leader of the Middle East. So Nasser's vision became the region:c;. Every regime. from th e Baathists in Syria and Iraq to the conservative monarchies of the Gulf, spoke in similar terms and tones. It wasn't that they were just aping Nasser. The Middle East desperately wanted to become modem. It failed. For all their energy these regimes chose bad ideas and i~plemented them _in ~vorse ways. Socialism produced bureaucracy and stagnation. Rather than adjusting to the failu res of central planning, the economies never reall~.moved on. TJ1e r~publics calcified into dictatorships. Third World "nonalignm_ent .became pro-SoVJet propaganda. Arab unity cracked and crumbled as countnes_~scovered their own national interests and oppo1tunities. Worst of all, Israel ~lumiliated the Arabs in the wars of 1967 and 1973. When Saddam Hussein mvaded Kuwait in 1990, he destroyed the last re mnants of the Arab idea. h

Egypt's Quiet Nightmare . - f Look at Egypt toda Th . Y· e promtse o Nassensm has turned into a quiet nightmare. Th ·- ~' Jj e government 1s efficient· 0 n1 m Yone area: squashing dissent and strang ng c1vu soc· ty I th I· · te · n e past 30 years E t' gyp s economy has sputtered along while 1ts popu alion has cl bl d U ing for jo~~ h:Jd co~~nplo~ment is at 25 percent, and 90 p ercent of those ~earch· . ge diplomas. Once the heart of Arab intellectual hfe, the country prod 37 theangrypro~~~Jt~~ ' ~ books every year (compared with Israel's 4,000). For all Shockingly, E o~eigners, Egyptians know all thjs. one of the worlds gyptt as fared better than its Arab neighbors. Syria has become mos oppressive police states, a country where 25,000 people can

lAKARJA I

WHY 00 TH.

EY HATE US?

409 .tl reaime tl1e by killed and p IJ . . e· \.VI 1 no e:onse u . I . ., , . capital. Dcu P l'; JS. Js t Je oldest continuous! . h b· q enc.:es. (ThiS ln a land h · the world ) w ose · kahi E' reversa1of· a global pattYm aJa 1ted Cl:ty Ln ·tllllost unt IuJl · -. . 1n an em most < · every Arab country tod· . less free than 1t wa.•; 30 years ago. There are r • ay JS rew countrie . I . ·· s m t 1e world of which one <;an say lhal. . . . C roundecl1

wealth 's Negative Effects . The mon<:y that the gulf sheiks have fritt d ale tbat is almost JS on away ere . ] b se· a . , d . impossible to e 1eve. Just one example· a f: . f S di . avore pnnce . . 0 au Arabta, at the d age of2t>, bwlt a palace m Riyadh for 8300 m·u· . al bounty, was l Ion t anh' as an add·ltion (l'jven a $J billion commission on the kingdom' 1ep one contract 'th AT&T · e s aJ . . . ,~ o 1 · Far WJ. from proouc•ng po •he progress, wealth has actual] had so Y · me negative effec:ts. It has enriched and empowered the gulf go brethren, they, too, have bec:ome more repr:~;;ents 5? that, like their Arab eties they once ruled have become gilded cagesvfillovder ~~thmef. The Bedouin sociWl e Ac ' in 1 er a~ cl d. b'tt . h rustrated discontented you ng men-some of whom now live work With an . Laden, (B'm Laden and some of his aidesu• •g amstan . ..:r r Osama bm come rrom pnvueged backgrounds in Sau cl i Arabia.) fr Id · By the late 1980s, while the rest of the world was watcl1· mg o regJmes · om p M?SCO\~ to rague to Seoul to_ Johannesburg crack, the Arabs were stuck with tJ1eir agmg dtc~at~rs and con11pt king~. Regimes that might have seemed promising in the 1960s ~ere .n~w exposed as tired, corrupt kleptocracies, deeply unpopular and thoroughly J Ilegitimate. One ha<; to add that many of them are close American allies.

CHAPTER II: FAILED IDEAS How does a region that once yearned for modernity reject it so dramatically? About a decade ago, in a casual conversation with an elderly Arab intellectual, I expressed my frustration that governments in the Middle East had been unable to liberalize their economies and societies in the way that the East Asians had done. "Look at Singapore, Hong Kong and Seoul," I said. pointing to their extraordinaly economic achievements. The ~an , a gentle, charming scholar. straightened up and repued s~ly, "Look at tl1em. They have simply aped the West. Their cities are cheap copt_es of Houston and Dallas. That may be all right fo r 6shing villages. But we are h~rrs .~o one of the great civilizations of the world. We cannot become slums of the \\ est. It· problem. Arab the of Th ·s heart the at is West the 'th t · 'IJ d' u} d'ffi h · Wl. l SI US10nmen I makes economic advance impossible and political progress fraught '~t 1 . c . ty. Modernization is now taken to mean, inevitably, uncontrollably. "'-e~e~tion araJyzed Arab Cl\llization. . J• Th'JS rIear . . ion. f baJ· ti In MS P and, even worse Americamzat on t the acre oedgfJ1o . lza fJ d ' AIDS ron con to Y rea less seems world some ways the Arab than even Africa despite the devastation that continent has su er daromt t the . t the Africans want to a P 0 . At 1eas ' political dysfunction. and economic and new global economy. The Antb worId has no t ~'et taken that 6rst step.

ffi

RY woRLD POUTTCS

J IO

pART4 coNJEMf'ORA

lAKAruA I WHY 00 THEY

l l' .. Past or FUture? . tllat once yearnet u r'Pllty c:ould . The question is l1o"· a .~e:eo~ges the Arabs studic d ';tie (when h:e~:t it so dramatically. In tl~e ~:U,d im·ented algebra. In th.t· 1 I t n tury, when thas long forgotten in tl1e \\ est d · . the form of ~apoleon !:> ( 1 r r<:'..,l of Egypt th e \Vest 10 set ashore in Arab huthl .s. . ..e_cul cidlization. In het cl'> the histon'· e 10<:aJs . d bv 1S po" w . an Alb "'ere fascmate . ed the l9tll century saw Enropc a 1 mc;pired liberal ..ert Hourani has document . , . tl u ·ddle East. pohticaJ . I t Rounsh m Je .v•l and ~ocJal tho~g ~ra oftlle late l9tll and early 20th C:(:'llluriP!:> raised hopes ofB .. The colomal b disapnointed. but stilJ Arab eliles remained f: . nttsh c . dsl · t11at were to e r d ,. . ascJnat<-.t m en up kings and generals attem1e \ r<:tona College in AI cu · h t1 West Future · exandri Wit . le · h and manners of British gentlemen. Many then went a, Ieammg t~~~~~e~ and Sandhurst-a tradition that is still maintained by Jo: t? Oxford, ~J t1 glg now thevgo to Hotchkiss or Lawre::nce,·ille. After World W: ns roval fam1 y, wu l • • b ·Id . . .. L ,, • b arJ 1 l.ib a1 R'ckered briefly· m the Ara wo1 , as 1ueas a out opening u : a new er age J . lik Leb PpoJ. 1 . d . g";ned currencv LD places e Egypt. anon, Iraq and SVl"i B tJcs an soc1el." "" , . . . 1 ·.a ut . t11e' . were . 1Jart of a world of kings and anstocrat ., tJH:!Se 1deas died witll th smce ose old regi~es. The new ones, however, turned out to be JU t as \iVestem. ~asser thought his ideas for Egypt and the Arab world were modern. Th were also Western. His ''national charter:· of J962 rea~s as j[ it were written by le~ wing intellectuals in Paris or London. (Like many Tlurd \\ orld leaders of the time Sasser was a devoted reader of France's Le Monde and Britain's New Statesman.) Even his most passionately held project, Pan-Arabism , was European. It was aversion of the nationalism that had united Ita]~; and Germany in the 1870s-that those who spoke one language should be one nation. p

h

One Failure After Another America thinks of modernity as all good- and it has been almost all good for America. But for tJ1e Arab world, modernity has been one failure after another. Each path followed-socialism, secularism, nationalL~m-has turned into a dead en~. \Vhi.le otller c:ountries adjusted to their failures, Arab regimes got stuck in the1r ways..~nd those that reformed economically could not bring themselves to ease up polJtkalJy. The Shah of Iran, the Middle Eastern rule r who tried to move his c:ount:ry into the modern era fastest, reaped the most viole nt reaction in the lraman revolution of 1979. But even the shah's modernization-compare d, for example, with the East Asian approach of hard work, investment and thrift-was an attempt to buy modernization with oil wealth. It ~ms out that modernization takes more than strongmen and oil mon~: 1 mpo~ng foreign stuff-Cadillacs, Gulfstreams and McDonald's-is easy. mporting the inner stuffin 0 f od . )j •caJ n~rties accountab·~ d th gs m em soc1ety-a free market, po ti " r- ··=· le ~ ty an e rule of law-is difficult and dangerous. The Gulf states. for :tten ute, with the goods and even the tics, the Gulf road. Nothmg was homegrown; nothing is even now. As for ~! governments offered their peopJe a bargain: we will bribe you Wl

. alth b ut ·n r•. ~.m. let u~ stay in power It

liATE US?

4 IJ

th . we ' . h . was e mverse I . ·olutionJ.') tax-tllon, ut no representati s ogan of the Amcri'""" ~v · on e1t. her -· The 1W\ .·'~'· of globalization ha-; hit th A b · e ra world 10 · societie5 arP o1wn enough to be disrupted by modemj a very strange way. ~~ can ride thr· , .. a,·t:. They see the television shows th f: ty, but not so open that they don t 'iCC genuine liberalization 1·0 th ' ~ ast foods and the fizzy drinks. But the,· ' e SOc1etv ·th · --·, b·es and grealt·r openness. Globauzation in th Ar b ' ' WJ . ln<..Teased opportuni. · 1 f e a world 1s the . ·ti , . of glohallzatJOn-a sew o Western products and b'llb . . en . cs cancature 1 some in thei r sodeties it means more things t b oards With bttle else. For unsettling, dangerous phenomenon. As a result ~h uy. F~r the regimes it is an globabzation b ut for the most part not touch it. .'. . e peop e they rule can look at

cHAPTER Ill: ENTER RELIGION The Origins of 1/Islamic Fundamentalism" was a reasonably devout Muslim but he had no interest· · · 1· . ·Nasser . ·· k 1· . ' m moong re 1g10n w1tll ~oUtics: It struc 11m as movmg ?ackward This became apparent to tlle small Islam.IC parties that supported Nasser.s rise to power. The most important one, the Muslim Brotherhood, began opposmg him "igorously, often \iolently. :Xasser cracked down on it in 1954, imprisoning more than a thousand of its leaders and executing six. One of those jailed, Sayyid Qutub, a frail man with a 6ery pen. \YTote a book in prison called "Signposts on the Road," which in some ways marks the beginnings of modern political Islam or what is often called "Islamic fundamentalism." In his book, Qutub condemned Nasser as an impious Muslim and his regime as un-lslamic. Indeed, he went on, almost every modem Arab regime was simOarly flawed. Qutub envisioned a better, more virtuous polity that was based on strict Islamic principles, a core goal of orthodox Muslims since the 1880s. As tlle regimes of the Middle East grew more distant and oppressive and hollow in tile decades following Nasser, fundamentalism's appeal grew. It flourished because the Muslim Brotherhood and organizations like it at least tried to gi\'e people a sense of meaning and purpose in a changing world, something no leader in the Middle East tried to do. In his seminal work, 'The Arab Predicament," Fouad Ajami explains, "The fundamentalist call has resonance because it invited men to participate · · · [inl contrast to a political culture that reduces citizens t~ spectato:S ~nd asks them to leave things to their rulers. At a time when the future lS uncertam, 1t c.-onneds them to a tradition that reduces bewilderment." Fundamentalism gave Arabs who were dissatisfied with their lot a powerful language of opposition.

l

Few Pathways for Dissent

=ed ;~

. . Th Arab world is a political desert On that sc.'Ore, Islam had )jttle competition. e r clis nt As a result. ·h · f ess few path-wavs 10r se · w:~t no real political parties, no ree pr • . . J·tics. And fundamentalist the mosque tumed into the place to Brotherhood to Hamas organizations have done more than talk From e us Jm

mode~tion

worke~

disc: [ i·

RY woRLD POLITICS

.tl:!

PART 4

. . dde social service . n .tssistance h tttlve'1 p10 . ·j . ' coun l to Hi7builah. t e~· :. f those who treasu re Cl\'1 ' ; • it is disturb· se ing J ...,. nontn· housulg. or ·jJ'be"aJ aroups are eh il ' "- ·\ . . . •ng to sl!,. 01 antl ~"'die East these I ' .. ' ~ " th·•t in the .\hd _,. got a h·emendous boo:-. r l 9 t9 whe ' JslallliC fundament;ul JSdl11tl e shah oflran. The I ram '\'Olution d n Ayato)Jah r . . topp e 1 . emon t RuJwUalt Khorneuu uld b t'lken on bv groups wJth111 society. It al· s rated that a powerful ruler ~o "ell s'eeminah·' benign for ces o f t)rogress-sodrevealed . k ocJety evv cu . t .. . e . how •n a bro en s dd to the tunnoil. UntJI th e 19 ,() . most MusJ· 1 u:ation and technology-c;• a t and lived in villages anJ tO\\lts. Thev practi~ ~ skim the .\1iddle East were,i diterda· epted itself to the local cuJtu re. Piu ;alistic aned a l·nd of J that na a a I street- s a11l ft rshiped saints went to shrine , sang reliaious · h to erant, le o en wo ' cl I o )'Tnns and peop tllese li . art all technicallYdisallowe in L am. (This was Parti cherished re) B, g10us • however,-peop 1e had 1 cularl . .~ e l970s, )egun movina out of the vi)] Y true m Iran. ) u . . . . experience was not roote d ·m a spcct·fi c p1ace. At the sa . ages . and thelf re1Ig.ous . . d th ' I I· me time . g to read and they cliscovei e at a ne'"' s am was being I). h thevwere 1eamm . cJ . I . , . Ieac ed by the fundamentalists. an abstract fruth not roote m 1J~toncal experience hut lit. enal , pun'taru·caJ and bv, the book It was Islam of the H1gh Church as opposed to Islam of the village fair. lC

ZAKARIA I WHY DO

coNTEMP0RA

.

:

1

Against "Westoxification" In Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini used a powerful technology-the audiocassette. His sermons were ~stributed. throu~hout the country_ a~ cl became the vehicle of opposition to the shahs repressiVe re_g~ me. But Kl.10me1ru was not alone in using the language of Islam as a political tool. Intellectuals, disillusioned by the half-baked or overrapid_mo?ernizati_on ~at.~vas thro~ving their world into tum1oil, were writing books agamst Westoxi.fication and calling the modem Iranian man-half Western half Eastern-rootless. Fashionable intellectuals. often writing from the comfort of London or Paris, would critique Ame1ican secularism and consumerism and endorse an Islamic alternative. As theories like tl1ese spread across the Arab world, they appealed not to the poorest of the poor, for whom \.Vestenlization was magical (it ~~ant food an.d medicine). They appealed to the hal f-educated hordes entering the Cities of Ule Middle East or seeking education and jobs in the West. The fact.that Islam is a1u·gh1yegaJitanan · religiOn · wr c the most part has also proved an emlimpoweallenng call for people who felt powerless. At the same time it means that no Mus r Y has the auth 'ty t · whether someone who claims to be a pro M li . on o question cltarv~id Thus m15 koneh. The fundamentalists, from Sayyid Qutub on, have jumped into . ey aswwIdether people fled the Muslim are ,,good Muslim · s." It is a question that 11as tem-. but intelloctual an~rs ·.And .here we come to the failure not simply of governments the fanaticism fth OCfuJal elites. Moderate Muslims are loath to criticize or debunk 0 1e\' ' :L h I d cl are scared ofwhat e uldndamentalists ha · LIKe t e moderates in Northern Ire an , ' The biggest b!pe·n to them if they speak their mind. the Persian Cui( particuJarl ~am ~as ~en made by the moderate monarchies of game. It deflectS atte . Y audi Arabta. The Saudi regime has played a cJange~ gious schools from its shoddy record at home by funding re: centers that spread a rigid, puritanical brand of Islam

;:u.s

(madrasas~:~

. THEY HATE US?

413

Vahhabis111 • In the past 30 years Saudi-fi.mded 5 ·h00ls h ' < ,, ds of Id!' educated, fanati<:al Muslims wh c . th ave churned out tens of 5311 . . nov . . .. 0 VIew c mode Id 1 slii11 "1th great suspicion. America in thjs worId VIew . .IS al. most alwavs m war and non;vILl vil ' e .

Allied with Fundamentalism This ex1Jortcd fundamentaUsm has in turn infected 1 t . h but c.;ountrics outside the Arab world, like Pakistan. ~u~~~ ~~ er Arab so~eties Gen. Zia ul-llaq, the dictator decided that as he q , h gd e !~-yea~ retgn of . 'Ll r d th . s uas e po Itical dissent he needed a11.1cs. n· e 10un 1 th e ru'd of · 1 em m the fundamentailsts· 'Nth Saudi..finan ciers an d .functtonanes,l 1e.set . up scores of madrasa.'i · th roughout t he countrv The,·bought htrn t~_mpora?' egibmacy but l:ave eroded the social fabric of Paldst~n. ' If there JS· ·one g1eat cause of the nse of Islamk fundamentalis · · th a] · b · · h m, 1t IS e total failure. of po.IJtic· . ms tutions m t e Arab world· Muslim elites have averted thelf . · eyes from tl~s reality. ~onference~ at Islamic centers would still rather discuss "Islam and the EnVJ ronment . . lthank exam h me the dysfunctions of the current reoi o-mes. But as the moderate rn
1

CHAPTER IV: WHAT TO DO America's greatest sins toward the Arab world are sins of omission. If almost any Arab were to have read this essay so far, he would have objected vigorously by now. ''It is all very well to talk about the failures of the Arab world,.. he would say. "but what about the fai.lures of the West? You speak oflong-tenn decline, but our problems are with specific, cruel American policies." For most Arabs, relations ""ith the United States have been filled with disappointment. vVhile the Arab world has long felt betrayed by Europe's colonial powers. its disillusionment with America begins most importantly with the creation of Israel in 1948. As the Arabs see it, at a time when colonies were winning independence from the West, here was a state largely composed of foreign people being im~se? on a region with Western backing. The anaer deepened in the wake of Amencas support for Israel during the wars of 1967 ~nd 1973, and ever since in its relations 'Nith the Palestinians. The daily exposure to Israel's iron-fisted mle ovde: tdhe occ d hu. 1 · · h . t , s of the Arab an m ee t e p1ec tenitories has turned thts mto t e grea eauAe ·can polic\' . u1 . the regton . as broaJer Islamic-wo rld. Elsewhere, tb ey 1ook· at rfmenthui'JS and' tyrants WI-thout cynically geared to America's oil interests, suppo mg e. , an Yhes1't·ation.... · · . 1v 11'01 r. nthepo,·ntof,1e'" 1 es and cert
y WORLD POLITICS

414

pART 4

corm:MPORAR

. ,

.

I 1 m view, Amenca s grcu•• . c •.s toward the . ·c·l has its interests. I yglected to press any n I here to ope Arab wotld Arne·~s ·oromission. \Ve havedlne .l the case of Afgh<mr t. . Walking awn~ its sOc;.

are SI · ed dea )' n f '· . ay rroll'l h h • This neglect tum ulted in tl1e Jise o om ! -tt1( nand the TaJ·b t at e.r after 1989 res b . J an Th· ver can make. ut rt '" a colltmon Arnenc:a · ~~is fra ctt1red country not the gnl\·est error a great al inpo' the Arab \,·orld. Bul rl. Ila.<, flr c n careless. n onc.... America has not been ven

ZAKARJA I WHY 00 THEY HAT£ US?

4 l!J

·ensu'>. To dt, !hi.., we.: will have to r1ive tlp S< • ( ' I I consav to 111 I.ttc:ra I'1sru d stop insistina tY Jrri C ... o <. War rc·f\<; ' I • a~ <111 ,J!r, , an th· Cl . . · xc.:s, '>11<: all erhi 1 irna I 'I a1>Out l( · · I , a .. . 11 Htl g ssi,L I'> ltk<·ly lo rc:-erncrge as a new milita tl ~ J n va U\ 101 1Jlarlly tJ

I

I

. . ry •r<:at. 0· or )()v<" 1 Jefcnse for<:(., J" rposc· of an international coalition is pr· c.;" · d . a .lle;a1an stratc.:uic: ( .. 1 ture of this war. we wJIJ nee<. ! the constant coopcntion of tl tY • ·•H:n l r<· a n I 1 c h < <J acr govc;m rn<:uL~lo . rn ake arrc::.o;ts, ~ JUt get things uo:ac . If W<: can .mask our .p<,wer in-surry, work witlt-in~tituticms like the unitec.J 1\at1ons ~e~urrty Council, U.S. might will bf:.- easier for mJJch c:,f tlae worlc.J to bear. Bush s father understood this, whi<J1 is why he en~ured that th<: United Nations sanctioned the Gulf War. The point here Le; to suc.;ct;;cJ, and international legili ma<.y <.:an help us do that. Now we ge~ to Israel_. l.t is obviously one of the central and most charg<:d pmhlems in th e regwn. But rt IS a problem to which we cannot offer the Arah world support for its solution- th<; extinction of the state. We cannot in aoy way wc-.Jcc:n our commitment to the existence and health of Israel. . .. .. . On Israel we should make a clear distin<;tion between its right to exist and its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. On the first we should lx: a..s unyielding as ever; on the second we should continue trying to c:onstruct a final dt:al along the lines that Bill Clinton and Ehud Barak out~ned. I suggE...c,t that we do thL'i lc~s because it wiU lower the temperature in the Arab world-who knO\vs if it will?than because it's the right thing to do. Israt:l cannot remain a demo<:racy and tontinue to occupy and rnilitarily rule three million people agttinst their wishes. lt''i bad for Israel, had for the Palestinians and bad for the United Statc.-s. But po.licy changes, large or comall, are not at the heart of the ~trugg!e wc.facc. The thjrd, vital <.:omponent to this battle~ a cultural stralcf?Y· The. Umted State\ must heJ.p Islam enter the modern world. It sounds like au. un~ss1IJlc challcmgc. and it certainly is not one we would have chosen. But Amenca- mdeeJ tb~ wlicJle world- faces a dire security tbrtat that wiU not be resolved unJE::s~ we can stop ~he . at the root.s of. Arah raae political, economic and cultural eollapse that IltS .,., · Dunng . , the Cold War the West employed myriad ideological strategJes to di.~1'cdit th~ . :tive' and prornott~ open SOC.1a:ppeal of comrnuni~m make democra(.y seem att rac ' something on that sca1t: to wm · th'15 <.1J It uraJ strnAA1t-· eties. We will have to do or

u

EXplaining Arab Rage

.

.. .

h to exnlam Arab rage. After all, rf concem forth p I ness is not enoug ·r t1 . hI h e alts Yet car~ ess fthe problem, why have 1eu· Ara )rct ren done noth· · 0 tinians IS at the heart tt1 in any Arab nation hut Jordan, and the aid the mg ~or them? (Tlley cannot .resejn~scuJe ) Israel treats its one million Arabs as se~ ~~~~e from the G~ states IS~: democ;acy. And yet the tragedy of the Arab worldn. -c.ass ·tizens a disgrace on ' ..J, 1s that Cl ' ds th . more poutical rights and u.ignities t 11an most Arab nations f1'i Israel accor: em r . 1 d o- veto . ? therrown peop1e. Wll)' is the focus ofArab . . anger ona· srae dan not those refl'im 0' es. . om·onate feelings of gnevance . .Jrecte T he dJsprop . . d at .America have to be 1 placed in the 0\·erall context of the sense ~f humr.Jabon, ec~me, and despair that sweeps the Arab world. After all. the C~nese. V1gorously ~~s~gre~ with most of Americas foreign policy and ha\·e fought wa~s w1th U.S. proXJes. Afncan states feel the same sense of disappointment and unfauness. But they do not work it into a rage against America Arabs, howe\·er, feel that ~ey ar~ under siege from the mod. ern world and that the United States .symbohzes th1s world. Thus every action America takes gets magnified a thousandfold. And even when we do not act. the rumors of our gigantic powers and nefarious deeds stilJ spread. Most Americans would not believe how common the rumor is throughout the Arab world that either the CIA or lsraels ~fossad blew up the \Vorld Trade Center to justify attacks on Arabsand .\fuslims. This is the culture from \>vhich the suicide bombers have come. America must now devise a strategy to deal with this form of religious terrorism. As is now"'idelyunderstood, this will be a long war, with many fronts and battles small and large. Our strategy must be divided along three lines: military, politic.:al, and c.ulturaL On the military front-by which I mean war, covert operations and other fonns of coercion-the goal is simple: the total destruction of aJ Qaeda. Even if we llt"\'er understand a11 the causes of apocal_}.ptic terror, we must do battle against it. Ev-eJY person who~ and helps in a terrorist operation must understand that he will be

::::.and~ Theiroperations will be disrupted, their finances drained,~ will a11 fade~tlo)ed There ~ill~ associated costs to pursuing such a strategy. but mt, we~ ~othing else matters on the military front. .·

we now have~lS more compl~ and more ambitious. At the .broade~ )ewi danger.. _. . to reorder the mtematiooaJ system around thiS pressmg De" We can define a stm.,.....,..

p....,., nofionaJ.~uruy ---:-M for the post-Cold War era that addresses~ yet by need and

•

•

Fresh Thinking in the Arab World

1be New New Wortd Order The~

J

. i

is

sustained

a broad inte

but on the oondition that tJ~· ern~ first, we have to help moderate Arab !.'tates.' abia' have gagf·d in a ~ly dance m.oderation. For too l~ng regimes like Sau~ Ar~ ~-a fundamental· ~VJth re~gious extremJsm. Ev~n Egypt. ~~about A!:ri~ and lsrc~el. (That way ISm, allow!. its controlled media to ~t c u' 1der But more broadly, we must they don't rant about the dic:tatorshlp the)' veu:;ir ./ le that hlam is ooropatible persuad(: Arctb moderates to make the ea.~ to peop

:now..ced

. ... . ..... '

.

.. llow won1e n to worl..

• • 1h·tt it cIoes a 1 with moclc111 soctet). ' eo le of other fitilhs llll( c·r· .' and that it hi-ISwele<>JHed r, ,.P. ·U1d broadcast fr<>SII ,,, I se 10 clrs < J• ate ~f u lim grou~s ·tnd < • wer ofthe

ll('Otlrages ed

Ucati

. \Vp c.:an fund mo on ac; o~tross the Arab der. "'orlu,

1

'HE USES OF \NO REACTIONS TO ___ AMERICAN POWER

fundam enta J<. ts. . ·aJI·tiJHed ~1t breaking the po . . of the Anth world 11d othe rs, like PaL· ' ' . the nations l()sta \\"e ha\'C to press . ·m j1as spread- to refw n. >J>Ln up and g.,: n, 1 . f f mdamenta JS • . . . run 1egit. where th<' VJniS o ' . .l'i we did With S , I t0 do busmess. \\'1"th tlle.se reguJIC~: .\' r . Jusl I I . outh imac:y. \\ c nee< . C • t 1t'St' d•ctatorsh· 1 oId \<\'ar. we can ally \\'ll . 1 -r: . 1 1 dunng tle I •ps and Korea anc • t l i tl "e should not eng . I . toward reiOn11. l I I I age m still. pus 1t 1em Id .. . c ·eign 1)olit\' is not t wo o~') . I lave myself b b ·t..J' I wou sa' •OJ · . een natlou- UJ fwng.ti0 n bUJ.1wn _,, cr· .111 places where our mter<'~ls we re unclear and .t! 0 aJ skeptic o na • uld st·1). the course. In this <.:<1-"l\ stable political de likch' that we '~o < • I ve.1 d seeme un . er OlJJ. single greatest secu nty• t 1reat. ·we have no · 1 .key to re ducmo opt~lent IS t le t back into the nation-buiJding business. . option but ds to ge ..L 0.ng clJ·',u'Ienge like a uaun · · ' but the re . are manv ' good . s1gns. . .. AJ Qaeda 1t soun .r. . t" e comiJjned force oJ many. tlete govern . t ore oowenu 1t1lan n . . nnmed r· I . ments. . .. •s no m c •. 1•• o t 1c Musum lslamic fundament,uJsm stiD does not speak to the 111
I

I

EXplaining the Bush Doctrjne ROBERT JERVIS

I

The i~vasiot~ of Iraq, although ~portant in itself. is even more noteworthy as a mam festat10n ?f the Bush Doctn~e. In a sharp break from the president's preSeptem ber 11 VIews. that saw Amencan leadership. and especially its use of force, restricted to dcfendmg narrow and traditional \ita! interests. he has enunciated a far-reaching program that calls for sometlling very much like an empire. The Doctrine has four elements: a strong belief in the importanc:e of a state's domestic regime in determjning its foreign policy and the related judgment that tl1is is a time of great opportunity to transform international politics, the perception of great threats that can be defeated only br new and vigorous policies (most notably preventive war). a willingness to act unilaterally when nE'Cessary, and as both a cause and a sum mary of these beliefs. an 0\·eniding sense that peace and stability requires the United States to assert its primacy in world politics. It is of course possible that I am exaggerating and that what we are seeing is mostly an elaborate rationale for the ovetthrow of Saddam Hussejn that ,viJI have little relevance be)'ond that. I think the Doctline is real, howev~r. It is ~ui~e articulate and American poli cy sin ce the e nd of the war has beencons1stent wtth 1t.

DEMOCRACY AND UBERAUSM . IS . not to sa)· that the Doctnne . IS. entire . 1~. consistent · and one. component TIHs h '"'~"h . . pn·de of place m t e 1 e may not fit well with the rest despite receMng

- -1 b,. pe nn"ISS""-0 R0 be rt ]eNis, ··understanding the Bush Doctnne. · ·· Rep rintl'U '"' from Political Scirnce ·

Quarterly, 118 (FaJI 2003): 365-388.

4 17

.H S

pART4

coNTfMPD

RARY woRLD POLITICS

,

.tl , . 5 ··which 'tarts !I·•, '. .. The gr , . 0 l 1e v · · · ·. , eat s t-.-. . , •. fowll ~('('uri~ Strat<~ b tween libem .wd ' nt.• J' ..t~·.tnis m end d" uggJ~ _, ,1 I . . I -ent utY e . l . I . e \Vith f the t\\"f.' Otlet l c . of fr('edom-
other officdial~. .. ~ 0. 1•5 ·lrgu ment is tl1at strong measures to spread dern The a . mtmstr a or · ' l )'b . . OCrac:y 1 efficacious. Indeet. 1 eratmg rag will not only· , od · 1r uce are needed ancI "'rill be f 1 . < dernocrac,· there. but "i ll encouraae it in tl1e rest o t 1el ~1 1ddle East. There.IS no . tib . ili..... ben,-een Islam or ruw otl1er culture anc1t e mocrac,·; the exam 1 f mcompa l.' · . I d 1 . : . P eo litical pluralism in one count:~:· "ill b_e emu ate . T .le lmplicJt belief is that :mocrac,· can take hold when tbe artificial obstacles to 1t are remO\·ed. Far from being the.product of unusuall~ propiti?us ci rcum stan~es , a fre_e a_nd plur-alist system is the natur-al order tl1at \\1JJ pre,-aiJ unless somethmg special mtervenes. Fur. tllennore. more democrc1cies will mean greater stability, peaceful relations with neighbors. and less terrorism. comforting claims that evidence indicates is questionable at best. 4 \\ ·ould a democratic Iraq be stable? \\ ouJd an Iraq that reflected the will of its people recognize Israel or renounce all claims to Kuwait? Would a democratic Palestinian state be more willing to Ji,·e at peace with Israel than an authoritarian one. especially if it did not gain all of the te rritory lost in 1967? Previous e~:perience also calls into question the links betwee n democ racr and free markets, each of which can readilv• undermine the othe r. But such doubts do not cloud official pronouncements or e,·en the off-the-record comments of top officials. The United States now appears to have a faith- based foreign poLicy. This (or any other) administration may not act on it. No American govemment ~as been ~~g to sacrifice stabWty and support of U .S. policy to honor democracy m countries like Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia. and Pakistan. But the current \'iew does ~allel Ronald Reagan spolicy of not accepting a detente with the USSR that ~ liml_t~ to arms control and insisting on a large r age nda that included human nghts within the SO\iet Union, and thus implicitly called for new domestic regime. The Bush · to tb1s · tradition . . when it declares that any agree. administration 1·s heir ment With North Korea would have to address a range of problems in addition to nuclear weapons·' incJ di "th b Th u ng e a ominable way [the North] treats its peopIe.-s ~ argument _is that, as in Iraq, regime change is necessary because tyrannical f:er:nmen~w1U ~ways be prone to disregard agreements and coerce their neigh· ~t .as aboeynustreat their own citizens. Notwithstan ding their being Realists err \lews ut how st t :_.a are Liberals · th . be'' a es umuence one anothe r, Bush and his colleagues m err uefs abo t tb u e sources of foreign policy.

in:

JERVIS I f.XPJ.AINING 'T'Ur I

ru:.

BUSH nrv-r-n.. _

~'-"-11\JNt

419

Con istt d, Liberalism, this perspective lS . h'gh\ l ' O · · .. ·uilit'. ol 1 ~ress. .A week after Septembe 11 B h) . ptimlstic m seeina the osst r . us IS re d o P of his ell• t st adv1sers: "\Ve have an opportun· parte to ha"e told 00 1 ~.•• -d freedon and we have to get it right " He ty dtodrestructure the world to"'"1 · e>..-poun e this th · . eech 111arku1~ the 6-month anniversary of the att k· "'''h erne m a formal sp . v' en the te . clisrupted anel .scatte recl anc1d'tscredited, ... we will ac see then that rrortsts are di.;putes can be settled within the bounds of reas d the old and seriS ou .' ,. . . · on, an goodwill, and m secunty. T • ee a peacefuJ world beyond the war on terror d 'th utual unity. \\'e are building ~hat wo_rld together:-s ln Febru~:' ~~ ~ourag~ and responded to a reporter s queshon about the predictable F h . ~ _prestde~t . . . . h· "h' .h . . renc cntictSm of his olicy b) sa~'lng t at JStOT) as giVen us a umque opportunitv t d r d £ P · · t · th _ , o eren reedom .:\.nd we re gomg11o. selZel e moment ' and do it ."• One month 1at er he dec1ared.· "\Ve understanc 11storv 1as called us into action and we are not · . · k tl.. ' gomg to m1ss that opportumty to ma ·e 1e world more peaceful and more free."s

2

THREAT AND PREVENTIVE WAR The second pillar of the Bush doctrine is that we live in a time not only of opportunity, but of great tl1reat, posed primarily by terrorists and rogue states. Optimism and pessimism are linked in the belief that if the U.S. does not make the world better. it will grow more dangerous. As Bush said in his West Point address of June 1, 2002: Today our enemies see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice. For rogue states these weapons are tools of intimidation and militru;· aggression against their neighbors. These weapons may also allow these states to attempt to blackmail the U.S. and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the a&,aressi\'e beha,ior of rogue states. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of O\'ercoming the ron,·entional superiority of the U.S. These threats cannot be contained by. deterrence. Terrorists are fanatics and there is nothing that they value that we can hold at risk; rogues like Iraq are risk-acceptant and accident prone. The heightened sense of vulnerability increases the dissatisfaction with deterrence, but it is noteworthy that this stance taps into the longstanding Republican critique of many American Cold War policies. One ~"i.ng of the party always sought defense rather than deterrence (or, to be more prectSe. ~eterrence by denial instead of deterrence by punishment). ~d this was reHected ~~ the ~ for escalation dominance, multiple nuclear options, and defense against ballis . iles.9 nuss th Because even defense may not be possible against terro~ts _or rogues, e United States must be ready to wage preventive wars and to act a~~ ~ · · emerg~ ing threats before they are fully fonned," as Bush puts it. 10 Prevention 15 not a ne'' element in world politics although Dale Ccpeland's important treat~ent ~...:agglraqer~ 1 ates its previous centrali~~. 11 Israel launched a pre\'entive strike agamlast_.l eattack ' Id · u s ffi ials teu nuclear program in 1981. during the Co \\ ar · · 0 c contemp t .........,hwties 12 ing the USSR and the PRC before they could develop robust nuc ear~ ed '. and the Monroe Doctrine and westward expansion in the 19th century stemm m

0

pA]rr4

42 •t froJn the Am

coNTEMPDRAR

y WORLD POliTlCS

. o revent an.' Europ' .th j)<,wt•r from establ· encan des1re t P tsh.ing.

e it

il

pa tJntcould rnenac · -•-countnr at tlHtt ti111v' uw the prevennv ' v-as ·1 weal\ -' I . e \var d lJrt'~ence ·TI L'nitedStateS' • d the a.ssociateu <.esm~ tc t·n-;11 rc the m . 0(;. te !rtll an on ' . amten . . based on streno · . . rQtte that pren. nh\'( ",trs are rarely ant-e tnne 1 • ·e Cnl:lCS a o tJ neces · ' ericctn donunano . er ti,·e and man}' m•;,t~ p·e exaggerated s;uy or /'\rn an be euec .h f or can be bec'c~use deterrence c iJ'tarized policies. L1 ya. or L~ample, once the l . t "~th strong but less m ·Jd. of the Axis of £,;J. Bismarck called preventi eading me t0 be outs1 e . . f ve wars ro!!ue now seems ,. d although the di.spanty o po\\cr between the U . .. 5~cide for fear of dea~l. an this is no Jonger the case. tl1e argument G nlted 5 . d ·ersanes mean. tJ f. ·Jj I or such d States an. ItS a .' e ee of confidence tllat le ~turc \\1 )e bleak unless th wars implies a lugh dl gr belief that tJus world w!IJ be worse than ilie lik ey e1y one are undertaken• or at east a produced by tlle war. r tJiree larue obstacles. First. by definition tJ e rei Th.1 0 lie.;' then races o li . I h ' 1 evant s_ P 15. . d 0 1 tain because it involves prec ctions a lOUt t reats that res·d information harfu to )Thus while in retrospect it is easy to say that ilie West 1 e time in the ture. tl . ern some · . . d Hitler long before 1939. at · 1e time it was far from cl allies shouldldha,·e stop:7o be such a menace. !\o one who reads NevilJe Cham~ar that he wou tum ou 11 I rI . , eeches can believe t11at he was a fool. In some case , a we -paced spy might :~~to rovide solid evidence that the other ha~ to be stopped, but in many other · cluding ·'\azi Germanv' even cases-perphaps m . th1s . would not be sufficient because leaders do not themselves know how they will act m the fu;ure. ~he Bush Doctrine implies tJ1at the problem is not s? diffi_c~t because ~1e states f~re1gn poU.c.y is shaped if not detennined bv its domestic political system. fh us knoWing that North Korea, Iran, and Syria are brutal ructatorships tells us th~t they '-viJJ seek to ?ominate their neighbors. sponsor terrorism, and threaten the Umted States. But while the generalization that states tl1at oppress their own people will disturb the international system fits manv cases it is far from universal, which means that such short-cuts to the ' ' assessment process are fallible. Second and relatedly, even in formation on capahiUties and past behavior may be difficult to come by, as the case of Iraq shows. Saddam's ~nks to terrorists were murky and remain subject to debate, and while much remains unclear, it seems that the United States and Britain not only publicly exaggerated but also privately overestimated the extent of his WM D program. Third, unless all challengers are deterred by the exercise of the Doctrine in Iraq, preventive war will have to be repeated as other threats reach a simaar threshold Doing so will require sustained domestic if not international support, which is made less likely by the first two complications. The very nature of a preventive war means that the evidence is ambiguous and the supporting arguments are subject to rebuttal If Bri~ and France had gone to war with Germany before 1939, large segments of the pub~c would have believed that the war was not necessary. If it had gone ~lly. the public would have wanted to sue for peace· if it had gone well, public opi.JUOO would ha · ed · . ' . · ·on will v· ve qu~on Its WISdom. \\'bile it is too early to say how Amencan opml cl (and is likely to change over time), a degree National le inhibJt the repetition of this policy seems probable. . take stron . .aders are aware of these diffk u.lties and generally hesttate to g actions m the face of such uncertainty. While one common motive for W'df

skepti:~~~~ow

~p.in:ion

JERVTS I EXPlAINJ:NG T'lsr B

• ru:. USH

DO<::'nuN£

421

been tlw ·,£ t h~tl the situation will deteriorate unl has ..10 d in cl<·• l •h!<. k111d of fear drives the security dil ess the state acts strongly ~~;i~~ons if th• r •." 11. They know that many potentiat~~~ea~ers usually put off ·u he:- mad. · \orse by precipitous militarv ac...: d h will never eventuate or Wl f h ' -uon, an t ev are di ti ' . pre sposoo to 5tpone. to JW<Jt urt t>r developments and info road. In reJc·clin~ th is approach (in lraq if notr:m:. orthn, to kick the can down 1elleacrues arc hehavmg . unusually, althouch this ' doesm 1' t0 Korea} h • Bus h and h·lS eo b . b no mean t ey ar Part of the rea.,on for their stance is the feeling of\ bil . e wrong. 1 uent beHef that the: risks and <.:osts of inaction are una~n~:~lv ~~ an~tbe <:Onseqtlte few lines that brought applause in Bush's Cincinnati spep ·h' fOgh . beote one of ec o bcto r 7'd2002 and that shows t he powerfu I psychological link between Sept h an t e drive to depose ,Sadd am: "\uve Wl.11 not live in fear." Taken Bte em all er th'.11 ak · 1y, rear r · r. r y, lS m es no Sense Unfortunate IS Otten well-founded What ·t ·ndic t . d 1 1 · . . · · :a es IS an un erstandable tlestre for a .safer world, desp~te that fact that the United States diu live in fear through?ut the Cold ~ar_and su~ve~ quite well But if the sentence has little logical meanmg, th e emotion 1t embodtes LS an understandable fear of fear a drive to gain certainty, an impulse to assert control by ac-ting. ' This reading of ~ush'~ statement is consistent with my impression that many people who opposed mvading Iraq before September 11, but altered their positio~ afterwards, had not taken terrorism terribly seriously before 9/ll. a categorv that 13 includes George Bush. Those who had studied the subject were of course surprised by the timing and method of ilie attacks, but not that they took place. and so changed their beliefs only incrementally. But Bush frequently acknowledges. indeed stresses, that he was shocked by the assault, which greatly increased his feelings of danger and led him to feel that drastically different policies were ne<:essary. As he put it in his Cincinnati speech: "On September 11th, 2001, America felt its vulnerability." It is no accident that this sentence comes between t\vo paragraphs about the need to disarm Iraq. Three months later in response to an accusation that he always wanted to invade Iraq, Bush replied: "prior to September 11, we were discussing smart sanctions .... After September 11, the doctrine ?f containment just doesn't hold any water.... My vision shifted dramatically after September 11, because 1 now realize the stakes, I realize the world has changed."14 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld similarly explained that the United States "rod not act in Iraq because we had cliscovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq's pursuit of wea~ns . · · eVI'denee in a new light, of mass murder. 'Ne acted because we saw the existing through the prism of our exnerience on September 11·"lS The claim that some pos. ·r to be put as1·de. 1ost P1ausibility · fact>. of theh ob,,ous sibili ties are unlikely enough . m \\' Id · 8)'lng · ~ ~imlanes mto. t e essed or retort: "What could be less likely than terronsts r T~ade Center and the Pentagon?" D_uring the Col~ ~ar, ~:~d !~~;lrmight h1s exasperation with wild suggestions ~~t military ed out and often preundertake: "All sorts of notions and propositions are chum . bl. th t · Such . rds·· 'It is concei\'3 a · of · · whatsented for consideration \\~th the prefatory wo has ecei\'ed ,L. . con wor~ establish the1r own trot h, r1or the fiaet that someone . . · ble Whether it is concei\Cl . ever proposition follows is enougJl to estab]·lSh that It... 16lS \" t case analysis is now vors ' wortJ1 a second thought, however, .I.S another matter· hard to <.lis miss. p<>tl

422

PART4

CO

NTEMPORARY WORLD POUTICS JERVJS 1 EXPLAIN

lNG THE BUSH DOCTRINE

UNILATERALISM r ,entive wars is linked to tilt func.la mentaJ un,·l· . 111 eed .or pre' r· clterat· The perce1vec . .t 1·s hard to get a consensu~ or su<:h strong a t· 1srn D trine smce ' c.: IOns of the Bus II oc . 011 to let the dominant pu'' er <:anv the fuiJ b and 11a 'e every reas I " U rd other states ' · . t· also 11as deep roots in the non-nort 1eastcrn parts of the RepubJ· en. UnilatemuJsm t d Ul tJ1e Reagan Administration. draws on long '<:an ... rtv was well represen e fB h. I k b (' -standin P... ·;·. . . aJ ditions, and was pali o us s out oo c ore Septemb g Amencan poh.tic traf: 11 others was needed in Afghani~tan and solicited. er 11. Of course, ass1stance r01 · . . . . . > • m Iraq. t be mistaken for JOU1t ,.entut es as t1w Umted States clicl Id I But tl1ese s IOU no · . I · 1 h not . et others· preferences. n strcss111g t 1at t e United St t bend its po]Jcy to me IJ· (1 . . a es is . . . t1Ie plural ratl1er than an a Jance t w tniSSIOn determ,·nes tl1e builrung eoal1t10ns m . • 1• • • R field's phrase) American leaders have made 1t clear that the . co
i?

?e

°

423

robably w~)lll~l have com~lained, but gone alon ; what . . . . P ften is effcl'lJv(• lcadcrsh1p. Could Arafat hav g b cntJcs call untlateralism 0 0 sition if ti t<: United States had sought consen . e eehn moved rrom his central position? Bush could also argue that just as Rsus rat, er than stakin . . . g out tts own 1 kuropean cottnsels to moderate his rhetoric led :~~sd r 0 ~~g t~e sophisti<:ated system, so his insistcnct on confronting tyrants has s);..,l: ~~~mation or the So..,iet Ius general pe rspective, if not to his particular policies. ' ght others around to

AMERICAN HEGEMONY Tbe final element of the Doctrine, which draws together the th · h bJ· h · 1 . o ers, IS t e esta 1s _ mentof Amencan 1egemony, pnmacy or empire In the Bush D t· · th . ' · oc nne ere are no universal norms or rules govemmg all states · On the conmnr order can be mam· . • ··
°

HOW DID WE GET HERE? . were taken b,· surprise by this tum in Although many observers-myself mcluded- be It is ~nsistent "ith standard American r)OllC)' we probably should not havche en.. A nen·can beha,ior in the .t: ' • • d ·t1 mu pre\1ous 1 d patterns of intemational politics an WJ 1 th t .Le United States woul . . -':d ot seem c 1 ear a Ul Cold War. Until recently, however, 1t w n

-124

PART4

Y WORLD POLITICS RAR coNTEMPO

. t al fasl uon and rl' unil·tt ... I •iltal:ks S .' . 0f George us . ·I • er •l o I ·utd tire clcci:JOll d .• clomestic opponcr1b. B11s ' s rc·sponsc lo Se t Ul Oc,k ' 1 ·ors an 1us P emb 1 tJ1rur his pre< ecess . . ·ous con,·ersion am o\\ '· "otn<·thing to 1 . er IJ 1 I · . carher re rgr I 11s re}· . 115 I U rnc~y para e . . ensity to see the strug_g <' a.., <>•u · hc•twecn gO< .1 'gt(,us . r. 'allv 1 . . . ( 'I .· )u anu 'I behc•s, espeCI - Ill I'115 prop that ,·ust as h1s commg to • llt sl ~m t: meaning t . ev,. . . • to be 1eve . . , o 111\ }) . There IS reason . I t er-<-onal life so the war on lerronsm has he:<:on re\fi. • 1 .• . nd disso u e P ., ' 1t: I tot ously arm ess a . ti.. of his foreim1jJOiic,, but a l.;o lw. ~a<:rt>d mission A <m)'1 c, · charactens c a· . . · n it~s : tl1e delliHng . · .. . "I believe the pres1dent ''
.

1, llltk:i l res1denl report5· ft 1 ate o le P t n tbis erutb for.''2 \ VC' can only spe<:ulate on what p. . ng ·ri 115·. · ,h·tt J was pu o _, 1cs1tle 1 1 IS" ' d My estimate is that he wotl u 1ave in\'adcd AJgha111-·t nt G Id 11ave one. · · . ' s an b ore wou d I . . si Iraq nor wouJd he have moved e~·way (rom treaties and , I ut not procee ec agar n • .. Ti .. ". , 1 , ot 1cr . . som~:: extent, l 1C il , t 110 current a<; . . arrangements over·a wide range of 1ssues. o ·u Seltion of strong American hegemony may be an acci ent. . . was an 'accJ·dent waiting to. har1pen. To. start wt th , the re are sh·uctura} But 1t a large terronst attack. Bu1. Lacl(;'n had attacked Atnencan . reasons. to h·ave exmected T . interests abroad and from early ~n sough t to ~tnkc 1ts hornela~d. His enmity stemmed primarily from the est?bhsbmen.t of Umted .s~a.t~s bases m Saudi Arabia, which wa~ a product of Americas world-WJde respons1b1 ltt1cs. (I ron ically, the overtllrow ofSaddam is likely to permit the Uni ted States to greatly redu<.:e its presence in Saudi Arabia, although I doubt if bin Laden expected this result to follow from his attack or that he "~11 now be satisfied.) F urthermore, al Qaeda was not the only group targeting the United States; as Richard Betts has argued, terrorism is the obvious weapon of weak actors against the leading state. 22 Even witl10ut terrorism, both internal and structural factors predisposed the United States to assert its dominance. I think the latter are more important, but it is almost a truism of the history of American fo reign re lations that the United States rarely if ever engages in deeply cooperative ventures with equals.2-1 Unlike the European states who were surrounded by peers, once th e United States had established its regional dominance, it had great choice about the terms on which it would work witJ1 others. Thus when the United States in te rvened in World War I, it insisted that the coalition be called the "Allied and Associated Powers"- i.e., it was an associate, with freedom of action, not an ally. The structure of the American ~ovemment, its weak party system, its domestic diversity, and its political traditions, ~ mak~ sustained cooperation difficult. It would be an exaggeration to say that urulat~ralrsm is the American way of foreign policy, but there certainly is a strong puU m this direction. . More importantly, the United States may be acting like a normal state that has gamed a posr. 'ti 011 0 fd · · and ommance. There are four facets to this argument. Frrst ~osJt gener~ rs the core of the Realist outlook that power is checked most effec· tive Yand often only b baJ . power. It follows . 1 b' Ycounter- ancmg that states t 1at .a.~·e not s~t~:~~oaexte~aJ restraints tend to feel few restraints at alL As Edmund Burke p ' ~s~hon endorsed by Hans Morgenthau: "I dread our own power and our own amb1tion· I ~ d b . . , thttl we are not ' ea our emg too much dreaded. It is ridiculous to sa) ~-" men, and that, as men, we shall never wish to aggrandize ourselves.

JERVIS I EXPLAINING THE BUSH DOCTRINE 425

v·rh od r 1 this
Parts of the Bush DoctJ·ine are unique to the circurnstan<:cs. but it is the exception rath~r than the rule fo r states to stay on the patL of moderation when others do not Iorce tl1em to do so.26 Second, states· definitions of ~heir interests tend to expand as their power does. It then becomes worth pursumg a whole host of objectives that were o11 t of reach when the state's secUJity was in doubt and all efforts had to he directed to pri ma1y objecti~es. Under th~ new circumstances, states seek what \\'olfers c:alled "milieu goals. "2 / The hope of spreading democracy and liberalism throughout the world has always been an American goal, but the lack of a peer competitor now makes it more realistic-although perhaps not very realistie-to actively strive for it. Seen in this light, the administration's perception that this is a time of great opportunity in the Middle East is the product not so much of the special circumstances in the region, but of the enormous resources at America·s disposal. More specifically, the quick American victory in Afghanistan probably contJibuted to the ex'Pansion of American goals, just as the easy military victory in Iraq will encourage the pursuit of a wider agenda, if not threatening force against other tyrants (" moving down the list," in the cuJTent phrase). Bush.:s i~tial speec~ ~fter September 11 declared war on terroristc; "with a global reach. Th.1s was ambttious, but at least the restliction to these kinds of terrorists meant that many others were not of concern. The modifier was dropped in the wake of Afghanistan •. h~~ve~er. Not only did rhetoric shift to seeing terrorism .in general as a m~nace.t? CIVJh~tion and ''the new totalitarian threat,''28 but the United States sent first rmlitary tnuners and then a combat unit to the Philippines to attack guerrillas who posed only a · ·scant links to al Qaeda. .f urmLnimal threat to Americans and who have no stgm 11as . · c ease power as "' e 10 f therm ore at least up to a point. tl1e exercise o power can r . il . . . , 1o ''as stgm6d . 1 l· ge suppl" o interests. I do not think that the estre to contro a ar . . ddit' a1 . ·ti · th Umted States an a IOn cant motivation for the Iraqi war, but 1t WJ gtve e instrument of influence. . . beha,ior is that increased relative A thiJ·d structural ex-nlanation for Amencan . . d b'ccti\ ·e As -r are both objecth·e an su j · power btings with it ne"': fears. The"r~as~~al Securitv as Ambiguous S~n1bol." the Wolfers notes in his classtc essay on Natim ,r : . f tlus' as maJ·or tlueats diso · 1atter can diverge from the 1r0nner. 29 ] 11 one manuestation tl ·ousl\' seen as quite man1 · all 1 ,. te ones 1at were pr~' 1 } appear, people psycho ogtc· )' e e' < 'ed tl . were, durinll the he1.ght of t be '\S wom as le) o ld ageable. Indeed people now seem 0 < tt· ck e,·en witlt \VMD, cou or rogue a a · . 1 the Cold War despite the f:act that .a te rrorist · . But there is more to tt t 1an ll Id \N ·HI's de,·astatJOn. cause only a small fraction of \vor cu

n&oy

426

PAR1"

4 CONTEMf'()rvv•

WORLD POU11L!:l

, ·quires cu1 cnon n<JII' <,t,H r iu the \vorJcl · nant tate .tC . . ortl<.:r . -cholot{': A cIonu th globe..vlost count n< s ;:.n ,mm arilv con . attd p-''tert' ts spread throu~hou~ _,; ete neighborh cx>ds; th . ' orld IS the he:gerncen:ec~ With m . tJ ir unmewa sn · what happen m le I . h b ·s tJ,at leads it to be w nu·m"d wit]1 anyt hinon h· elgh. borhood. and it i not on) I ~ n fusion of narrow ars<.l broad s<:lf-in tt:res t ~t at hap. alP.nsan,wllere. Tbe resu tJSa ·ed about tJ1e cledin<: of ;\•ne:rican po . lapoint a1 ts were worn . wcr not . when most an > tJ (I the linitecl State s."J·k 1 e son1 e earlier great p ' •ts 0 1 excesses. \\'altz noted a~. ~urih· came to be identi fled with the rnainte~~V<.:rs. · · · t f tlle c:ountn m '1 ~1 : anc:cof the interes 0 f · ntries at the top, th js is pr<:u 11 .icta 'J e behavior a . Id order or C.'OU I r . r 0 . . . . nc:e • certam wor · . , :tent thev bec:ome se -rem.orc:ing. ":J(J et . . t sts reach a certam ex , " states m ere . J hn S Galbraith explored the related clynau1i<.: of the " t b The histonan o · . f 1 .__ ,, _ ur u1ent unjnt ende d ex.,an sJOn o co Ol1leaC e•u world · ed ..ULe L conditi f . reqUlr spre ad of thes e arra ngem ents . V nder c·urrent ~~ifo terronsrn and WMD, tyrannical gove rnm ents pose too much of a not Ck:tual clang be strongwu Amen . er to tolerated. The world cann ot stan d still·· Wl"thout can rntervention, the international environm e nt will become more ,--

I

I

0

poten

JERVIS I EXPlAlNING THE BUSH DOCTRINE

427

eoacing to A• ne rica anti its values, but stron gac1:ion can incr , . . rllroduce a bette r wor_ld_. rn a. process akin to the det:p stcuritv :~ts ~~zu.nry and P rotect itself the: U n1ted States is impelled to act in a . th, . ~a. m order to P I f. A. . at WJ m crease or at t bring to l w su r ace <;On 1cts w1th others Even ·rwa} th e .1mg . . . Ieas · b . . · J prevr u Sltoa tion is ·sfact orv, 1t cann ot e mam tamed by purely defensive .., . sa tJ d , . . meas ures. Maki na the id safe for Ame ncan erno cracy 1 s beLieved to reqw re th t di.ct ·a1 ~ \'ID r 1 . k f be banished, or at east ept rom weapons of mass destructioan. aton regJmes Although not mentioned in the pronouncements the Bush D :t . . ad · f . ' . oc nne IS m e possible by the cx1stence o a secunty community among the world 's most powerful and developed states (the United S~tes, Western Europe, and Japan}.3.'3 The lack of fears of war amo ng these countn es allows the United States to focus on other dangers and to pursue othe r goals. Furth ermore, the development of the securitv community gives the United States a position that it now wants to preserYe. '

11

J

•

•

CONCLUSION The war against Sadclam marks out the path on which the United States is embarked, and iJluminates the Links between preve ntive war and hegemony, which was much of the reason for the opposition at home and abroad. Bush's goals are extraordinarily ambitious , involving remaking not onJy international politics but recakitrant societies as well, which is seen as an end in itself and a means to American security. For better or (and ?) for worse, the United States has set itself tasks that prudent states would sbun . As a resuJt, it will be infringing on what adversaries (if not allies ) see as their vitaJ interests. Coercion and especially deterrence may be insufficient for these tasks because these instrume nts share with traditional diplomacy the desire to minimize conflict by limiting one's own claims to interests that others ~ affor~ to r~ States that seek more need to be highly assertive if not aggressive (which proVld~ additional reasons to question the goals themselves). The beliefs of Bush and his · e wo uJd have been an unacceptable menace to colleagues that Saddam's regim · ·mterests if·It hacl been aIlowecl t bt,.;n nuclear weapons not onJv tell us Ame ncan oo = . , about their fears for the limits of United States influence that •mght ~ave been imposed, but also speak volumes about the expansive definition of Umted States interests that they hold .34 b. t disarm Saddam 0 Inde ed the war is hard to understand if the only 1ect w~ 0 f his \\'\ID , E had th inflated estimates o · or even to remove him from power. ven e t · sti·r" the effort · te o JU •J • capability been accu rate, the danger was stmpl)' btoo. remo d racy and stability to But if c:hanging the Iraqi regime was expected to ~g emthroocughout the world. . . rize re1onners the M 1ddle East , discourage tyran t5 an cl enerco.cl h.ah degree of wbat it conea l and demonstrate the American Wl·Wngness to provt tl arto of a large r proiect. the lik J siders world orde r whether others e 1·tor not ' 1en, asP d the fears e.xcessive if not war makes sense. Those who find both the hopeLo s and Salisb~rv when be tried to ·ti r Jt.. delusjonal agree with the grea t Bn sh statesman . . f 1877-78: "It bas genenw)' bring some perspective to the Eastem Cns~ o ·dea but if an,thing is more t ' • been acknowledged to be madness t 0 go to war 10r an ..35 · st a nightmare. unsatisfactory, it is to go to war agam J

__

428

PART

4

RARY WORLD POLITICS O coNTEMP . ,. I t the crucial qucst1011 or "

lwthcr lhe B ectJate : 1t . hl tl ·~ · power 1S s su ~ . d · · 1. 1 · Ul 11 Id wor . rts d ds on 0 tJ1ers eclsJons oecause t 1crr cooper~at· c. than to d ccess epen . . 10n IS 11 destroy. an s.u reach its goals. The war 111 Ira~ has mcreOU agrees th A 1111·d the debate . . which malces them very attractive to states wh r at cl 1 can deter mvas10n, ... 1 . o 1ear th ~Y . 1 Anlerican gun sights. Both Vl::.utzs argument that proJiferan ~y mlgllt be m t le d l. h .on Wdl roduce stability and the contraJy an hmore codmmfon cl atm l at it would make P· Id dangerous .imply that t e sprea o · nuc.: ear weapons will . d the wor more . 1 1 cl f.. . re uce . ._a ce because others wiJJ 1ave ess nee o rts secunty guarant Amencan JTuJUen · h . . al . .. r I • . ees and will be able to fend off its tllreats ~o t e~ VJt mterests. r le _Amencan attempt to . . . tlle abili'ty of others to resist Uruted States pressnres 1s the mark of a mlflJnuze . . · country bent not on maintaining the status quo, but on fash10 nmg a new and better ord Russia and traditional American allies may see th emselves better off with t~r. United States as an assertive hegemon, alJowing them to gain the benefits of worl~ order while being spa:ed. the costs, and_ they may conc:l~de that any challenge would fail or bring \VJtll 1t dangerous nvalry. Indeed, Witl10ut the war in Iraq I doubt tllat tile spring of 2003 would have seen the d egree of cooperation that the United States obtained from Europe in combatting the Iranian nudear program. and from Japan and tl1e PRC in containing North Korea. But I suspect that much will depend on allies' answers to severaJ questions: Can tl1e American domestic political system sustain the Bush Doctrine over the long run ? \!\Till the United States be open to allied influence and values? Will it put pressure on Israel as well as on the Arabs to reach a settlement? More generally, wiU it seek to advance the broad interests of the diverse countries and people in the world or will it exploit its power for its own narrower political, economic, and soc1al interests? Bush 's world give~ little place for other states eve~ democracies-exe;ept as members of a supporting cast. Conflating broader with narrower interests an d believi ng that one has a mon~poly on wisdom are familiar patterns for dominant powers, and ones that rarely Sit well with other powerful states.

S

NOTES I.

"The National Security Strategy of the United States," (Waslungton. 0\VhCit~SHouse, · .. eptember 2002) · 1 1 d· "Moral

truth 15· tl • PP· 1• • Bush's West Point speech similarly dec are · 1 · le same in every ltu · conflict betw cu re, m every time, and in every place ... · \il1ve are in a( men and een good and evil." "'When it comes to the common rights and needs 0~ Craduatio:o~:n, ~here is no clash of civilizations." "Remarks by the President at 2~; Release J erCJse of the Unites States MiJitanr Academy," White House Pr • une 1, 2002, P· 3_ -,

JERVIS I EXPLAINING THE BUSH D OCTRJNE

429

Thus Sau1111 I I Ju r tlill~ton , who agrees that a state's f. . . . z. bv its donw,lt< rc:gimc, argues tlrat c:onflict can be odrelgnd pohc.:y ~~ ~trongly influenced ' . . . • re uce . on'" b}· n0 t h. values on oth t r c;o:~et1c~: The_ Cl(/.~1! of Civ-ili:.ation.~ and th~ ?us mgWestcm order ( ~<"'" York: Srrnon a11d Schuster, 1996}. RemtJkm~ of the Workl . 3 John r,cwis Caddis, "Bush's Securitv Strate ... r, . · · Novernher/Dc·c:<::mber 2002, pp. 5Ch57. ' gy, ore,gn Pol1cy, :\o. 133, . 4 Edward ~l ansfield and Jack Snyder, De"wcrati::&ionand \~ {C · forthcot ning). ar ambndge: ~IT Press, S. Quoted in Davicl Sangcr, "U.S. to Withdraw From Arms Accord With ~ ~ 1 New York Ti111es, Oc:tober 20, 2002. · ort l Korea, p, 1 . H' . 6 Quoted in Frank Bruni, "For President a Mission and · , . 99 . " .· • ' a •0 e m 1story," tbid, Septembct ~-, 2001 , President Thanks World CoalHion for Anti-Terrorism Efforts .. White Jlousc Press Release, March 11 • 2002, pp· ·r- . . \ ·en>itv of M.ichiaan Press. 1996). 0111 E1tensions ofT!ut War Ledger (Ann Arbor. p . o t . Pril~ceton Gnh·ersity Press. 12. Marc Trachtenberg. History and Stra_trl ( n~:b~~her to ·strangle the Baby in the 1991) eh. 3· Wi!Ham Burr and Jeffrey Ric le son,J p. m 1nc.n t;.t ·· Intemotional ' ' d 1 eh· ese Nuc ear rogra • ~' · f Cradle'· The United States an t le 10 G Ml.tl""vich shows how mu<-h o . . ooo· ~Ol 54-99. regory Secu.rity, Vol. 25, Wmter 2 ~· · PP· A.

6

V

RARY woRLD POUTIL!;, coNTEMPO

PART 4

.t30

. . .. was driv rn b_, th- · 1 1 that it could 1 C 11 \Var po tC) . r1 . . not ~u 1\nlt'ric-.lll early 0 c. . undemlillill{!. thl' 1\r et_ l I tt ·. \.111• '1 '(/ s SI rategy to s, I ~laill ~ · ged confrontahon. NY· ComPll Unt, ·c-r'il:, Plt·.,s, 2000) ':J Oert, th 1 1 pro_~ B[oc )947-]956 (Jtllaca~ ~~orge Ten et bcli<',·(·r. ,l.at .. Bush. had b e Sovtc• · b rt \ roo<Jwaru. • r I ecn ll ...,,,'()ing toRo e d . ·stra ti on lead ers! ror I •' tu rori st atta cks' '. le lc
"·b·d

,(}UJ

,

•

,

Springl978,p.83·E I "Bush's Move On ABM Pa<:t Give~ Pause toE 17. Quoted in Steven r angleerr. )3 ~OOJ. also see Suzanne Dal ey, "Many in Euurope ans: -k r: es Decem J ' .... ' . rope V. . Neu; ) OI . !n1S 'will Not Consult The m," ibid ., JauuaJ)' .31 ' 200 2; Erlange r, "Pr OJt:c \Vorrv. .t11at U. · ~ , ·• · 2:1£. 900 2 EJ· b 1 · otests Await Bush in Europe." I·b"d ' ...v• o) ; • 17..3. et' Becker ... : and fnends Too. Offi ·a1 .. ·b·d March J7 2003 ' U.s. Unilateralism Worries Trade " ~~ s. •~. I . 'T' R ~ . u s' T' .., . K DeYoung Chi rac :v oves 10 epa u . . 1es, Washin oto p 18. Quoted m aren . " n ost, April 16,.2003 . I'b'I(., l X)'\1ovem b B b. woodward inte niew W:l'tl1 Bush 111 er 19, 2002 (also 19 Quoted m o d . S . .S "U see • \ d d Bush at WarP· 281 ); quote m omm 11 1 eng upta , .N. Foru m Stall s ·voo war ..' n and Abo k• r· 10 May 2002. on rtion Righ ts "Ne w Yor Llm. es, ex S Ed ucauo ' . . " ZO. "Remarks by the President at 2002 Gradu~tion Exe rcts e, p. 4. The Wolfowitz draft is summarized in stories in the New York T11n es, March 8 and May 24, 1992. Also see Zalmay Khalilzad, From Containment to Global Lea_~rship? America and the Worl d After the Cold War (Santa Monica, CA: RAN D, 199.:>), and Rob ert Kagan and William Kristol. eds., Present Dangers: Crisis and Oppo·rtu nity in Arnerican Foreign and Defense Policy (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000). This stance gives others incentives to develop asymmetric responses, of which terrorism is only the most obvio us example. For possible PRC options, see Thomas Chr iste nse n, "Posing Problems With · out Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U .S. Security Poli cy," International Security, Vol. 25, Spring 2001 , pp. 5-40. 21. Quoted in James Harding, "Conflicting Views Fro m Two Bush Camps," Fina ncial Tmzes, March 20, 2003; for a percepti ve anal ysis, see Bru ni, "Fo r President, a Miss ion and a Role in History." Also see Woodward, Bush at Wa r, pp. 102, 205 , 281. 22. Richard Betts, 'Tbe Soft Underbelly of American Prim acy: Tac tical Advanta ges or Terror," Political Sci~1u:e Quarterly, Vol. 117, Spr ing 2002, pp. 19- 36. 23. See, for example, Jesse Helms' defense of unilaterialism as the only way consisten t with American ~terest:s and traditions: "American Sovereignty and the UN ," Nationall·nteres t, No. 62, Wmter 2000/01, pp. 31-34. For a discussion of historical, sociological, and geographical sources of t1le moralistic outlook in Am eric an foreign policy, see AnJo ld Wolfers, Discord and Collohoration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uruversity Press, 1962 ), 15 <.~ter • and Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in Ame rica (Ne w York: Harcourt, B~ . 1955), chapter 11. For a discussion of cur rent U.S. policy in terms of its self-image ~ an exa,>nti,....... J •• ·c p ·y..v •uu state, see Stanley Hoffmann, "Th e High and the Mig hty, Amen all ro.spect, Vd. l, January2003, pp. 28-31. 24. Quoted in Hans M tha .. Knopf } orgen u, Pol~tics Am ong Nations, 5th ed, reVJ.se d (Ne" , York: 1978 25. Kenn~ Wai:~· 169-!0, emphasis in the original. . ,. pS: Political Sci ' Amenca as a Model for the World? A Foreign Policy Perspecnve. ence and Politics, Vol. 24, Dec emb er 1991, p. 69. •

I

' I

JERVIS I EXPLAlNING THE BUSH DOCTRINE

431

tJ6 AI e..."and er \',~n< lt and. more persuasi vely• Paul Sell roeder wou Id cl's 1 ~ · lifv tlrb geJJ<•rali zation, arguing that prevailing ·a · • agree or at least mot . J

eas can and have I d t crat <: and c:on scns ual beha vior : \Ven dt Soci al Tlle o .r1 . 01 Od e · ·o mor e ' · n oJ ntem at 1 York: Car ubrid~e Univc rsity Press, 1999): Schroeder Tl~e T .r. Lon_al Pol!tws ( ~ew " o (' . y k , ransJormatwnof Eur;opea olitiC S Lt63 -1 otJ,, ... ew or : O>..f ord Univ ersit y Pres s 1'\n ) d~ P n 1 4 ' . • 1· . G · :]" • an Doe s the Histo , of 1nternatJOIIat 1>o Jtics o A.nywhere?" in David Wetzel and 11 d T) . · d C 1eo ore Ham erow eus I cs an enn an Hi.'itory (Westport: Praegc 1111 ernaliOIIll l Potlt ' . .'' . r· . 199-I )• pp. 1::>-3 . 1 )' . r. 6. This IS a central questiOn o mte mationa po 1t1cs and historv th~t 1 , t f U . . 1 . / a canno u ,. u1sc uss here I ut beli t'VC that at east the m1ld state ment that unbalanced p b .IS 'clan gerous · . d owe r can easil)' be suslar ne . 21. Wolfe rs. Discord and Collaboration, chapter 5. no ,;Preside nt Thanks Wo rld Coalition for Anti-Terrorism Erro w. · "' rts"; 0 av1·d Sanuer. ·'In Reichstag. Bush Condemns Terror as New Des potism," New York Times, 24 M; 2002 Also see "nemarks by Presiden t at 2002 Graduation Exercise :· p. 3. The que~on of bow broad the target should be was debated within the administration from the start ...vith Bush inibally insisting on a focu s on Al Qaeda: Woodward, Bush at War. p. 48. ' 29. Discord and Collaboration. chapter 10. 30. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, ~A .: Addison-\Vesley, 1979 ). p. 200. 31. John S. Galbraitb, "The 'Turbulent Frontier' as a Factor in British E>-'Pansio n:· Comparative Studies in Soci ety and History, Vol. 2, January 1960, pp. 34-48: Reluctan t Empire: British Policy on the South African Frontier, 1834-18.54 (Berkeley: Unive~ity of Califomia Press, 1963). Also see Ronald Robinson and John Gallager with .1\l.ice Denny. Afiica and the Victorians: The Official Mi11d of Imperialism (London: ~lacmillao. 1961). A related imperial dyn amic that is likely to recur is that tuming a previously recalcitrant state into a client usually weakens it internally and requires further inten·ention. 32. Rob ert Jervis, ·wa s the Cold War a Security Dilemma?'' Journal of Cold War History, Vol. 3, Winter 2001, pp. 36-60; also see Paul Roe, ''Former Yugosla"ia: The Secu rity Dilemma Tha t Never vVas?" European Joumal of International Relations, \ 'ol. 6, September 2000, pp. 373-93. The current combination of fe~ ru:'d hope that prod uces offensive acbons for defensive motives resembles the combmation that produced the pursuit of prep onderance in the afte rmath ofWorld War 11. ,. . .. 33. Rob ett Jervis, "Theories of War in an Era of Leading Power Peace. Amencan Polttt cal Science Review, Vol. 96, March 2003, pp. 1- 14. . 34. I have discusse d how Bush's policy toward Iraq does ~1d does 1~ot ~t wJth deterren ~· thinking in "Th e Confrontation Between Iraq and the U.S.: Imphrati~ns for, the Th_eo .' and Practice of Deterrence,.. Europea n journal of International Reltltums. Vol. 9. ?\o. 2 • June 2003, pp. 315-37. 35. Quoted in R. W. Seton-Watson, Disnudi, Gladstone, an d the Eastem Question (Xew York: Norton, 1972), p. 222.

GAUSE HI I CAN DEMOCRACY

GREGORY GAUSE Ill

-

_ __!E~~~~------------------..._

WHAT FREEDOM BRINGS s eall . d States ts. enga. ged in wh at President Gc:org~ \~!. Bu sh h"'' <..: The Umte , t 1·nstill democracv in th e Ar ab \\'Orld. Th e Busl , cl ed , . a . · Te o 1 a lllln • • "generahon a1 cha,l 1en< i do . contend tJ1at this push for Arab <.le mocra c)' will s. . d its deten et s . . not on! · h d Amencan v ues I I sprea Id 1 tl'nking
°

Council on Fort''

432

STOP TERRORISM?

.11 .1·onecl w1th thc: m. The em pha~is on electoral . 1 cJjst us . . uemocracv ·u · - ·rnm euiate U.S.. mt h ere sts e1th er in the wa r on t . ·; \vt not , oweYer, 5e~"·e 1 E· t poh• • erro nsm or in 0 tt , . <:tes. ~('d uer tmp
t d~·~ea\ .t ·c·u rua 1 n1 zat wn s tha 0 t cou ld com pet e on an 1 equ al foo l n · . t ' ~ era po 1 ' ~ •• • • 1 1 ng wtt tst parties. -0 nly by do tng so can \ Vac;hmgton help ensure that when ele ·t· 1 c,s am allv to O<.:<:ur . . . . , c ton s nn· 1 the res ults are mo re m 1me w1th U.S. interests. , •

THE MISSING LINK President Bu sh has been d ear about wh y he thinks promoting democr at'\' in the Arab wo rld is central to U .S. interests. "Our strategy to keep the pea c~ in the longer term ," Bu sh said in a speech in March 2005, is to help change the conditi ons that gi\'e rise to extremism and terror, especia llr in the broader Middle Eas t. Parts of that region have been caught for generations in a c.ycle of tvranny and despair and radicalism. vVhen a dictato rship controls the politica l life of a ~ountry, res ponsible opposition cannot develop, and dissent is driven underground and toward the extreme. And to draw attention away from thei r social and eco nomic failures, dk tators place blame on other countries and other ra<:es, and stir the hatred that leads to violence. This stat us quo of despotism and anger cannot be igno red or appeased, kept in a box or bought off. Bush's be lief in the Link between terrorism and a lack of democracy is not limited to his adm inistration. During the 2004 presidential campai gn, Senator John Ke rry (D-Ma'is .) emph asized the need for gr~ter politi~al ref ~rm in t~1e Middle East as an integral patt of the war on terronsm. Marti~ lnd yk, ~ semor Middle Ea st policymake r in the Clinton administrati?n, has wntt.e n th~t It was a mistake for Clinton to focus on Arab-Israeli peace while downp~y?ng Middle East democracy, and he has urged Washi ngton to con cent~ate on politi~ reform.' ln.a recent book he co-authored M01ton Halperin , the cltrector of policy planmng md poverty an Clinton's State Departm ent, 'argues that the roots 0 f ,l. 1Q·aeda.lie in the · d th h . E t and Pak ista n. an at t ese educational de ficiencies of Saucli Arabta, gyp ' . . d . be .t · nat ure of tho se stat es an can deficiencies were caused by t 11e authon anan . . combated only through dem ocratization. The New 'Y ork Trm es C'O1uml · t Tl 0 nas ~us l t . l lic than anvone e se. Friedman has done mo re to sell th IS ogi.C t 0 the pub . th academic literature on Despi te the wide acceptance of this colnnectJo~. l~tical indicators such as 1 the relatio nship betwe en teiTori sm and ot lerdsociopotudies ·md 11e ner~ survevs . . goo cas e s • · e· democracy, is sur prisin gly scant. Tl1e1e are c th t tl)· to detenn ine whether · but 1 ew a of terrorists an d terrorist orgamza0on5' tl r h obl em is the qua lity of le · P·u t o t e pr · more democracy leads to less terronst11· ( rist incidents with a crossdata available. Th e Western press tends to report teno rist attacks . Moreover. e9Town terro bon.ler ele me nt mo re complete1Ytha.n hom f ~ . lent but not the identit. y 0 f th~ tc ' most of the statistics iclentL·fYt1l e Jocatton o an tncfrom nondemocratic <.'Ollfl tries· came pe rpe tra tor s-a nd mucI1 less w1l ether t 11ev .

~3~

PART 4

CONTEMP0

RARY WORLD POUTICS

. r.ormation onlv prC:'I illtl ·:tr, con <.:lusions r . • mJ., 1 ete tn n ' " rorn I 1 (:i,·cn sue 1 lnco .1·le. Howe,·er. even these '- 1..1 1 to discredit l t1le ·t "'Jrt'·tre oossw I . . · t1es l 1 1 ac< demic 'er<>sedk 198 . : . . I0 cric. In a Wl ' , . . o~ tl adn11ntstmt1on.s o·.. .• E bank and Leona1·d \'\ embc rg de monstrate tl . · le . . I . tJsts \\ J11 Jam u .11 I 1atm po!Jhca CJen . d mocracies and that ucneroth the \'ictirn . 0 t · · :dents occur m e . · · ·1 tenonst JllCI .. (democracies. Exammmg mcK ents from J 975~t<~nd tll e t0 rs .1re c1tizens o · d 1 · o 19g-1 perpetra < V . . . ...,.•s Quan Li has foun t 1at a1lhou<'h terrorist • ·I 1ia State mvet 5ll) . . . . . .., attaek5 Penns) vat democratic political parttclpattOn IS l11gh. th e kind of ·h 1 frequent w 11en . <: eck are democrac\. "lJicallv places on executive pm'• er seems to en<; s 1 t es l'beral l ' · , • • ourag 1 t la . . I 1 .5' r~cent book. Dying to \Vm: 1he Strategic Logic o~' S .. e terronst actions. n 11 ' f . . b 'J utctde 1 1 . 1.., 1 rt Pape finds that the targets o su1CJC e om Jers are almost a] Ten·onS?n, 'o )e 1. 1 . I wavs . t t tJ at the motivation of the groups uenJnt . . those bombings 1.s ·to democrac.:1es. ou 1 . t n1w ·1:ta·t)' occupation and for .self-dete. rmmatlon. Terrorists · . · c'tre not BgI1t agams driven by a desire for clemocracy but by the1r oppOSition to what they see as foreign domination. The numbers published by the U.S_. g~ve.rnm e~t do not bear out claims of a close link between ten01isn1 and autbontanamsm e1ther. Between 2000 and 2003. according to tJ1e State Departments annual "Pattems of ~lobal Terrorism" report: 269 major terrorist incidents around the world oc-curred m countries classified as '·free·· by Freedom House. 119 oc-curred in "partly free·· countries, and 138 occuJTed in "not freencountries. (This count excludes both terrorist attacks by Palestinians on Israel, which would increase tlle number of attacks in democracies even more, and the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, whkh originated in other countries.) This is not to argue tl1at free countries are more Hkely to produce terrorists than other countries. Rad1er, these numbers simply indicate that tllere is no relationship between the incidence of terrorism in a given country and the degree of fTeedom enjoyed by its citizens. They certainly do not indicate that democracies are substantially less susceptible to terrorism than are other forms of government. TeJTorism, of course, is not distributed randomly. According to official U.S. government data, the vast majority of terrorist incidents occurred in only a few countries. Indeed, half of alJ tl1e terrorist inc:idents in "not free" countries in 2003 t~JOk P.lac~ in just two countries: Iraq and Afghanistan. It seems that dernocratiza· tion did bttJe to discourage terrorists from operating there-and may even have encouraged terrorism. _ As for the "free" countries, terrorist incidents in India accounted for fully 70 percent of the totaL It is fair to a~sume that groups based in Pakistan carried out a number of those attacks, particularly in Kashmir. but clearly not alJ the perpetra· tors were foreigne A · ·[j 1 r . rs. s•gm cant number from Kashm1r reBectin tJ 1 al . of terrorist events in India took Pace Iilrt And ' . g 0 ler OC gnevances against the central govemmen · as strong and Vlbrant as India d . . teJ· and r . n emocracy is both a sitting prime m1 rus a 10nner pnme m· · h ' .. Gandhi· . mister ave been assassinated-Indira Gandhi and her son. RajJ\' , respectively If d , d . I dia's numbers ~0 Id be . emocracy re uced the prospects for terronsm. n ~ not so hjgh. Companng InWa, th Id' · . the 1 world's most e wor s most populous democracy, and C una, 1 popu ous authoritarian state, highlights the d ifficulty of assuming tha1

GAUSE In I CAN DEMOCRAcY

.

STOP TERRORISM?

435

can c;o]ve tl te terrorism problem F 0002 . ·· · d' · or t 2003 the ". Patterns c1eJ1lO bal Terronsm report m 1 catcs 203 international . • of 10 G ·n China. A list of terrorist incidents between _errodnst attacks m India and 1 19 r6 an 2004 . none .. 1 • c 'led· hnhc . 0. nal M€-rnomu lnst•tute xor the Prevention of'rr . '<:omp1 a o c 1erronsm sh , . 1 dia and only 18 in China. Even if China unde ' O\l;s more than 400 tn n ' . .11 d b . · r-reports such incide ts b factor of ten, Jt stl en ures su stantJally fewer terrorist attacks th .n y a ·onshii) bcl\.vcen authoritarianism and terrori•nn an India. Lf the 1 t I re a . . . ., were as strong: as th B h . d ninistration tmplies, the dJS<.:repancy between the nu b f . . e. us aI I I . I cl' m er o terronst mctdents in China and t 1e nu m )e~ m n ta would run the other way. More anecdotal eVIdence also calls into question a n l . . ec.:essary re ationship between regtm.e ~e and ter~onsm. In the 1970s and 1980s, a number of brutal terrorist .o:gan1zat.'~ns arose .m democr~tic countries: the Red Brigades in Italy, the Provtslona] Insh ~epubhcan Army m Ireland and the United Kingdom, the Japanese Red Army m Japan, and. t.he Red Army Faction (or Baader-Meinhof Gang) in West Germany. The transiti.on to democracy il1 Spain did not eliminate Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA ) Basque separatist terrorism. Turkish democracy suffered through a decade of mounting political violence that lasted until the late 1970s. The strong and admirable democratic system in Israel has produced its own terrorists, including the assassin of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.lt appears that at least three of the suicide bombers in the London attacks of July were born and raised in the democratic United Kingdom. :\early every day brings a painful reminder that real democratization in Iraq has been accompanied by serious terrorism. And a memorial in Oklahoma City testifies to the fact that e,·en U.S. democracy has not been free of terrorism of domestic origins. There is, in other words, no solid empirical e'idence for a strona Unk ben,·een democracy, or any other regi me type, and terrorism, in eitl1er a positiv~ ~r a ne~~­ tive direction. In her highJy praised post-September 11 study of r~ligt~us .militants, Terror in the Name of God, Jessica Stem argues that '·clemocratization.. 1s not · exu ~,. · n ·•· because to necessarily the best way to fi g11t IsIamtc errusl . the transition . democracy "has been found to be an especially vulnerable penod for states acrofs 5 o t11e board." Terrorism springs from sources otIJer d1an the fom1 of government Id . . 1a . th democratic Arab 'vor Wl11 ' sunp y state. There is no reason to belteve . at a more . by virtue of being more democratic, generate fewer terronsts. Cracy

FLAWED . g the u.$. push for rtin 'th the argument suppo There are also looical probIems Wl . t1 assertion that democracy o· . n Under1pna le' .. democracy as part of the war on terronsJ · artil? . ate openk in competitive . . . th b li f th • able to p clp . . . cl wtll reduce terronsm lS e e e .a... · blic s uare. potential terroristS an politics and have their voices heard m the pu ~ lence to achie,·e their goals. · 111 · the terrorist sympathizers would not need to resort tofidno that the,· couId· wm . · the con en\." ' Th habits 1 f Even if they lost in one round o e ections, · """a-democratic means. e 1, to e.w • f ·h Arab pubucs fu ture would inhibit d1e temptati.on to resort . d 11r.ocus the antTer o t e 0 . rtrenusm an f 1 o democracy woultl ame 10rate ex . i St· tes at their own governments, not at tl1e Urutec a · I'D

coNTE.Mf'ORARY WORLD POUTJC~

436

pART4

. . ·ust e:L~ logical to assu'" :I at tcnorists L . I . ·be But Jt IS J b'liz I ·t - . . . . ' Wno r \\ el. Ill•~). . .. 11endas that could mo . ~. ~c ~cc l ll I 1.t~ontJcs, Would re· ~reJy rerJresent pohnca! ae . . le and rninonty nghts nu \ lHc:h libe ral d Je<.:ttht: . I of ,uaJonty m I .I e'll<>cra \·erv princ1p e . l ·eve their goals throug 1 ut moeratic: poljtics I ·<.:y is . f I . could not ac u t1 u ' . ) , \v 'Y\v based. I t te) . tic process over wse go<. ~- ll seems more l'k 0Uiu they pri\~lege th~ ?::raarticipate in the de moc:ratw proc:ess by a burn:nely th.a~ ha\ing been m?b!liz I ~a desire so strong that they \VC re willing to c t; ~es~re . . articular goa s al. . . OntJnlt, I to ac ue"e P . d r eless civilians to re 1ze 1t-tcrro nsts and potentia] acts ~cramst e1ens d J . I . d tcrro f . 1 ce -o0 VJO en d C\' if it rod not pro uc:e t leJr ( CSJre results R r. Id attack emocra ' r 1 · espect fl ists wou . d ocraC)' despite a verv succ:essiU e 1ection in Janua or tJ1e nascent Iraqi em , . ,f t1 . . ry 2()()5 has not stopped I raqi. and foreign ten·onsts rom 1e1r campaign against the new· pol.itical order. b d · · TJ Terrorist organizations are not mass- ased organ.Jz~tJon.s. . lcy are srnaJI and . Th are not organized or based on emocr a be pnnc:1ples. They re secretive. . ey . d f' IJ h vo1ve around strong Ieaders and a cluster of comm1tte o owcrs w o are willing to take actions from which the vast majority of people, eve n t~ ose who might support their political agenda, would rightly sh~nk. It seems unhkely that simply being out. voted would deRect them from therr path. The United States' major foe in ~e war on. terrorism, al Qaeda, certainly would not close up shop if every Muslim country m th e world were to become a democracy. Osama bin Laden has been very clear about democrac:y: he does not like it. His political model is the early Muslim caliphate. In his view, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan came the closest in modem times to that model. In an October 2003 ··message to Iraqis," bin Laden castigated those in the Arab world who are "calling for a peaceful democratic solution in dealing with apostate governments or with Jewish and crusader invaders instead of fighting in the name of God." He referred to democracy as "this deviant and mislearung praetice" and "the faith ofthe ignorant." Bin Laden's ally in Iraq, Abu M usab al-Zargawi, reacted to the January 2005 Iraqi election even more rurectly: 'The le~slator who must be obeyed in a democracy is man, and not God .... That is the very essence of heresy and polytheism and error, as it contraructs the bases of the fruth and monotheism, a~~ because it makes the weak, ignorant man God's partne r in His most central diVJne prerogative-namely, ruling and legislating." th AJ Qaeda's leaders distrust democracy, and not just on ideological grounds: ey know they could not come to power through free elections. There is no reason to believ~ that a move toward more democracy in Arab states would deflect them [mm th~tr course. And there is no reason to believe that they could not recruit fol· ;:;ers m more democratic Arab states especially if those states continued to be~e ~relations with the United States made peace with Israel, and generally the ~iddlm ways acceptable to Washington.' A1 Qaeda objects to the U.S. agenda in e.East as much as, if not more than democracy If as W'ashington hopesd. a de ffiocratic Middle E · ' · ' · an COOperat with U ast COntinued to accept a major U.S. role in the regJOn b anti-Am e. . .S. goals, it is foolish to think that dem ocracy would end ~~ encamsm and d . d cru1llng channels for a1 Qaeda. ry up passive support, funding sources, an re

GAUSE Ill 1 CAN DEMOCRA CY STOP TERRORISM, .

4:l7

When it W()rkr.,, liberal dcn1ocracy is th . h . . I c est 1orrn of I o evidene<.: l Jat ll re< uc:es or prevents terro . . Th govemrn<:nt. But ther<' is n I . . . , h f' nsm. e funda aJ Ule Bush
ANGRY VOICES It is highly unlikely that dernoc:ratically elec:ted Arab ovem operative-: with the Unileu States as the current a th ~ . mer~ts would be as(;(). oprmon . . can be rnea~ured in these eou tri ontanan n::tnmes th e extent that 1Jublrc: l'f' · 11o un est' researc:h ,\ _ bs strongly sllpport dcrnoc:rac:y. When they have a chanc . .shows that n.Ja . perc:entages far greater than Ae o.vote m generally turn out tn d real . elec:ti . ons, they . , menc:ans o m t11e1r eJect· But many Arabs hold negative views of the United Stat . IfAr b rons. · ally e1ected anu. 1 more representative of publi'· es. were democratiC · a· govemmenl~ tl L . . ... oprmon, 1ey wou 1( thus be more ant1 ~Amenc:an. Ft.Jrther democratization in the Middle East would. for the foreseeable (uture, most hkely generate Islamist govemments 1 . · ,, . . . ess mcunec1 to <:O· oper~te w~tlt the U~~ teu States o.n 1mportant U.S. poliey goals, including militarv has·

ing nghts m the reg10n, peace w1th Israel, and llie war on terrorism. . . . · Although it is not possible to pinpoint from poll data the precise reasons for anti-Americanism in tl1e ~rab world, lliere are inrucations that it is U.S. policy in the regjon, not a reje<:tion of American ideals, that drives the sentiment. In the Zogbr lntemationaJ-Sadat Chair poll of February-March 2003, respondents in m·e of six Arab countries said that their attitudes toward the United States were based more on U.S. policy than on U.S. values. Forty-sLx perc-ent ofEg)ptians polled identified U.S. policy as the source of their feelings, compared v..ith 43 percent who stressed American values. No fewer than 58 percent of re~pondents in Jordan. Lebanon, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia also emphasized tl1eir opposition to U.S. policy.... Even if democratization couJd reduce anti-Americanism, tJ1ere is no guarantee that such a reduction would yield pro-American governments. Anecdotal e\~­ dence certainly seems to indkate, for example, that the publi<: in non-Arab Iran ha'i a better impression of the United States than does the Iranian govemm~nt. The Iranian public's more pro-AmeriC'an stance did not, howe.ver, translat.e 1nto votes for the candiuate fav01ing rapprochement with the Umted States rn the second round of tl1e recent presidential election. History also indicates that legitimate uernocratic elections in Arab states ,.,..~tluld · · - L eIections, the)' bave emerged as lE' most likely benefit Ishmists. In aJ 1recent Arau • < • • • • • d · an , of tJ1em they· have government's leadmg pohtJc:al oppos1t1on, an ill m ) . done . .very ........ t Party· an overth I 1am1st pa•l)· 1 d well. In Moroc:co, tl1e new Justice an . Deve op~en. . ' f lts first contest. 2002 took 42 of the 32.5 seats in the parhamentaf} e~c~ons fop l·' Forc:es and the . t:h Socialist Umon o opu elf (0 nIy two long-establ I d is 1e pruties, e · ti. . . ) The same )"ear. in 50 · d 48 r~1)ee 'e1\. I · ndepenclence Party, won more seats: an an:l of the 4o seats in parliament 21 Bahrain, Islamist canclidates took between 19 .d dent canrudates). This (depending on how observers classified som·ea]m epenbo)"""tted the elections, · SI11·a polihc' group w success came even though the maJOr protesting changes in the constjtution. · · ·

- . - • oJ' vr I tJO
ntE LONG HAUL ~, r r democrac,· in the Arah world is unlike} • .

·5 pustl 10

ha . The Bu.sh admJrust_ratton rican terrorism emanahn_g from the re; Jt. could in Yto fact h ve nuch effect on anti-.\ me eh less cooperatt,·e on a whole rancre oft's elp 1 • nunents mu . o sues rinu to pow er go'e . than the b c curr ent rev me . Unfortunatelv th 011 terr ons m. • ere i including the war t1 . . t to wor kina with th e autho1itarian Arab 0 . s . \ · at us pom o overn. no uood altemati e k 1 1 the United States. o ·Jling to wor ' " . ments that are \\l . n pl·om otin g dem ocrac,· m the Arab world it sh Id · hi gt n inSIStS 0 . . . • ' Ou If \\ as n tora l e~e rie nces m th e recrwn. V\' here there 1 the \ 'arJO US e ec .. r h l . are learn fro 01 I . t part ies as in \llor occ o. t e Is anusts have a ha cl 1 rooted non- s1anus · ' . r er strong Y . . th fi ld The same is true m non -Arab Turkey, whe re the Islam · . d0 rrunatmu e e . . . d . 1st time o od 0\·er time to con ten w1th the power f litical partv has m era ted its message . . . . o po ' d 'th well -est abh shed more secu lar parties. Likewise th the secular arm,· an Wl , . b bl . . e t . · a1 · of \'Oters in Lebanon ,,,11 pro a ~ preven t Hezbollah and
·

-u

°.

439

·tt·cs in other countries. l\;o adm inistration official would . l . . tl1at Arab d Po J to the natv Sign. on. at least not in e v1ew emo cra< :v will prod . pu blic, . h . . ., uce gO\emments that "-ill ,s coo pera te w1th t e Um ted States. Yet Washington's dem d ai\Va\ b cl . . . ocracy a \·ocates o assu me that Ara emo crat t k tran s1lio ns like the rece nt d .c trans . seem . . ' emo crati itions in eastem Europe, ~tin Amenca, and East Asi~ \Villlead to regimes that support, or at least ~o not 1~pede , the b_road r~nge of U.S. foreign polley interests. They do not appre~1ate that m th~se reg1mes , liberalism prevailed because its great ideological compe~tor, cor:nmumsm, ~as thoroughly discredited, whereas the Arab world offe rs a real 1deo logJcal alternative to liberal democrac.y: the movement that claims as its motto "Islam is the solution. " Washington's hubris should have been crus hed in Iraq, whe re even the presence of 140,000 American troops has not allowed politics to proceed according to the U.S. plan. Yet the Bush administration displays little of the humility or the patience that such a daunting task demands. lf tJ1e United States really does see the democracy-promotion initiath·e in the Arab world as a "generational challenge," the enti re nation will ha\·e to learn these traits. J'

•

WA1.1 I TAMINGMn-n•r" '

Taming American Powei

·~\..4\.~

STEPHENM. WALT

POWER

441

{jnfortLlllateJy, this rosy \if;W of U S . l'i h vnere, accor<1.lng to t he 2002 Pew SUJvev · ·. -power . .1. 1 . not s art:-d 0Vt~4S \ .d h . ' , ()\:eJ wne m mer ma· .. , ·nited Stat~ · coust ers t e mtere ts of oth .. v ers not much ,.... 0 "JOnhes say that the .r not at all.., Betw£:en 40 perc.:ent and 60 percent of foreigners polJed th· '- h · war on terrons m not so Ie Iy out of securi tv eo . 1n11: . t be Umted State ·rs waghlg its " Tl(;cms ut also to " 1 oil.'' "protec~ Jsra~ 1. "target ~ uslim government s,~ or "d .. <:ontro Midc:_ast January 200."J BB~ survey of 21 countries found onl . five~ffil~atc the ~~rl~ . A Poland, Sou th r\ fnca, and South Korea-where a >. . . :ndia, the Ph1hppmes. attitud es towa.rd the ~nited States. Although the ~{:;~~pie had "~itive" rebounded slightly smc:e the im·asion of lraq h , . gJobaJ standing has . . . . \O years ago, Pew reported . 10 June 200.:::> that maJo n ties m alJ l5 countries it su . d ..r . . I bal ·j· rveye Ia\.or another <.-ount rv <.:ha! Iengmg I \ menc. :as' go m11tarv supremac.-v" and that r . " · d t· · . ent. ·. support mr the L.S.-Ied "war on terro r ts ec mmg on everv· eontin Indee d. ·...:r.~ da 1 uL.Cns ·m C · tb :' · <. ana France Germ~ny, t he !\.e erlan~, Russ1a Spain , and the Cnited Kin dom now hold more favo rahle vtews of Chma than of the United States. g The Uni~ed S~at~s ·. image is especiaJJy ~leak in the Arab world .\!though Arab populations ,.,ew li.S. popular culture. u.S. scienc-e and technol~·. and the American peopl e somewhat favorably, a 2004 Zogby International poU f~und that fe,,·er tl1an 10 percent of those surveyed in E~pt , Jordan. Lebanon. ~lorocc:o. Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates approYed oft.; .S. potc.·y on Arabs.lraq. or the Palestinians. Indeed, when asked to indic-ate their "first thought" about the u nited States, the most common response was "unfair foreign policy." The same year, a Pew survey revealed that Osama bin Laden's popularity rating Y."aS more than 40 points higher than President Bush's in Jordan, \1oroc:co, and Paki tan. In 2005, Pew reported that majorities in predominantly ~fuslim countries express con<..-em that U.S. military power may ultimately be turned against them.If the United States' primae}' is a force for good as the country's Leaders proclaim and its citizens overwhelmingly belif'·e-why do even its allies ba,·e concerns about its influenL-e? They have mi.sghiogs because th~· recognize that Washington 's power could threaten their O\\ll interests. Even tbo~ co~tries that do not fear a U.S. attack are still aware that the linited States position as the world 's lone supe rpower makes it easier for Washin~on to get its way. And of course, U.S. leaders have sought primacy precise~· because they understand that weaker nations have less dout. It should come as no surprise. then, that other gt that liS nnwer benefits states re main wary desp1·te assurances from \lF~-L· l ~um on · ~ · F-.· the entire world. As a Chjnese official remarked a few years ago. Ho"" can ·we baseU \toreover 8\-en we our O\vn national securitv on your assurances 0 f good _,,;jf'T · · . . 'th . ' · CTI\lng em more mtcntioned U.S. pouc:ies c-an inad,·ertentJY}1ann ther na. tions· ~ ed the rt reaso n for concern about the Iong reac h 0 f u·5 · power· \\ben 1t- suppo t reate a 0 c Afghan muJ·ahideen in the 1980s, the U01·ted States was not . tJ\1ng · t get aJ ~,..,1.• 0 ·' th u · cl States was not m1ng V(llf;UA global te rrorist organjzation. Anu e rute .h rt for the war in Iraq. to bomb the Madrid subway when it courted Spams s~ppo .J _ ..J nsequencesof , · part. the urontenUt"U eo Yet hoth unfortunate developme nts were, m _ .J about tbew~n-s st · U.S. policy, illustrating why a1J states mu be somewhat coll(:emeu the United States chooses to use its powe r. J

1liE GREAT DEBATE uC\makers ha,·e spent the past decad: d~bating.h ow best to wield Amen poF · ..t.. rest of the world. the debate IS O\ er ho\\ best to deal \'vith .t \\~ (:an power. or we 1 · '1th so h . wer in the hands of one country-a country t at considers itself de~-+-:-ed h po muc . ·~J ~ lead the world-hO\v should other nations respon cl?. . .. no."' do vou deal ,,;tb American powe r? This question is one for wh 1· ·h . Hv• • ·orld leader must have an answer. An d the response o f other states to U SC I e\erv, \\ . 11 . . . · · power is sometlting Americans must care about as \\e . Bas1c: secu nty IS at issue. as th September 11. 2001. terrorist attacks de~onstrate~ _so i_s the health of the li.S~ economy. with the marke~ share of U:S. firms dec~mmg tn key overseas markets due to anti-American sentiment. The time to worry IS now. To be sure, many governments still value t;.S. power and seek to use it to advan<:e their 0\\11 interests. Yet 8\·en \ \'ashington's close allies are now looking for wa)-s to tame the United States' might. ~any countries fear U.S. inRuence, and they have dC\ised numerous strategies to manage and limit it The l;nite d States will not and should not exit the world st~e an~~e soon. But ~t must make its domj nant position acceptable t~ others-by ~mg military force spanngly, by fostering great er cooperation \\ith key allies, and, most unportant of all, by rebuilding its crum bung international image. U.S.

OF POWER AND POUCY

~thericans tend to see U.S. primacy as beneficial to both thei r coun try and the rest 0 • e .~orld . In ~002: the Pew Global Attitudes Proje ct foun d that 79 percent of li.S. citizen th sd be~eve Jt is good that "Ame rican ideas and custo ms are spreading aroun e world," and than -10 perce nt think . moie that U .S. foreig n policy takes the mterests of other stat · t

Bill Clin es m 0 account eithe r "a great deal" or "a fair amount... ton has described th U . ed around the world,.. e rut .s.tates ~ "a beac on of hope .to peopIes declared uS ~d Harvard political sc1entist Samue l Huntington has --~ · ?redomu~ance to be "central to the future of freedom, democraL)'• open --wuv nues and mt ti aJ ·cm hegemon mamtainm a ema on order." In other word s, without a beru~ enjoy the prospenty ~dpeace~ global order, many coun tries wouJd not be able S<X:unty they have come to tak-e for grant ed.

~root Stepbeo M. Wait, laming Ame .

No.S(

...

. \'ol. $4.

ncan Power.'" Reprinted by permission of Foreign Ajfmrs: ~~ ·pp. l~l20. Copyright 2005 by the Council on Foreign ReJ.atiO!lS.

m )

M

°

'

4~~

rn •' • •

'

U s fcJrcicm poli c~ tell< 1 portray anti~A . f 1 111 uscu Iar ·' · tmenca . PropotH:nts o ' · . 1 ··tlu es or sint p e rc·~f 'n tt tH.m t of U s. domt.nantst11 . .. rd Amencan vc . l ,. . as hm tilt~· tO\h l ' . . t ..Amedca m :l S targetN o attaek because . nee. 1 Pre!'ident Bush has sate1lt la J·n the world.'' lie.• later explain ed ''TI1 \tVt·! re th~;: f fi·eec om · · · ' e err · bJi!!htest beacon SetJ tem ber 11, 200 1. \\ en• not p rotesting ou. ~n~~ ' k d . cou ntt' on . < I pohc· who attUI . · • xiste nce .'· And the Pentago ns new latio na1 D . les. rote stu1 " ouJ e, ·u·ng pos tt1o · · n 111 · t11e world will c .efense The\· were P b t· ted ·'Ou r leac · . din ~ f are11, s a , Ontin uet Strategy, 1ssue {' . sentment ,,md resistan ce... o d ~·e a degree o J e , l { ' . bree une ~ ' . ft t:h in this arcrument. Jut oretgn opposition to tht· U . There is a !ITa111 ru t1· · Tl u · .1 nrted . · ~. ,.. ti'on to SIJecific U .S. po ICJe s. 1e mte u Sta tes has b States ts most1y a reac . . . ·1 d' the c . arl)' 15 vears but 1ts mte rn at1o na stan mcr remainceen ·l r . le great power IOI ne , , r . . . I 1 o u IaJrly so late l990 s. Alth oug h som e ror e1 gn eac ers exp ressed eo 1 . hiuh throug1l t 11e . I . s b tb ' . . lbalance most nat iOn s-t 1en. peop 1c an d t Iten. · govern meI c:ern t about epowerln ' cl I d ' h' n s< k d f: bl on the Uni ted Stat es an we com e \\ as mg ton 's glob ·:tlle d loo ·e avora y . . cl < a er. Att .b ting the current unpopulanty of the Um te States sole ly to its pow sh1p. n u d . . . . tl ] er or values cannot explain the sharp ec1me m tts ll~agc lat las occurred since 2ooo.or especially the intense a~tip~thy toward Pre stde nt Bush himself. Moreover, the United States mam opponents have the mselves repeatedlv indicated that problematic U.S. policies are their primruy concern. For exampie, bin Laden has made it clear that his hatred is fueled by opposition to what he regards as unjust U.S. actions in the Middle East, not to Am eli can valu es per se. According to the 2002 Pew Global Attitudes survey, "Antipathy toward the United States is shaped more by what it does in the international arena than by what it stands for pouticaUy and economically" (italics in the miginal ). Similarly, a 200 4 study by the Pentagon's Defense Science Board concluded that "M uslirns do not 'hate our freedom,' but rather they hate our policies ." And the State De par tment's Advismy Group on Public: Diplomacy concluded in 2003 that "Arabs and Muslims ... supp01t our values but believe that our poJjcies do not Jjve up to them." Disagreemen t with U.S. foreign policy does not mean the poucy is wrong, but it does mean U.S. actions come v.~tb a price. \Vh en foreign populations disapprove ofU.S. policy and are fearful of U.S. dominance the ir crovernme nts are less likely d ) b to. ~n orse.Washington's initiatives and more likely to look for ways to hinder them. Rismg anti~Americanism also increases the num ber of ext remists who can be recruited into violent movements such as al Qae da. The Un ited States may still be able to gain others' compliance and overco me overt resista nce but achie,~ng success· will· be 1nore d'ffi 1 cu1tan cl more exp ensive. ' US Regardless of whether they disagree with U.S. policy or v.rith tl1e simple fact of N:aitFower, can other states do anything to tame the American colossus? Historian 1 erguson has argued tJlat th e centra] issu r" al e is wh eth er Am ericans have a "Wl·n to powe equ . . p resi dent h f' h. t, h·LS down· played th · · kto thei f r. glob. al responst'hili'ties Bus , or IS pa1 ' That's okae ~tl 0 gomg Jt alone: "At some point we may be the only ones left. · · : can over~~~m~. We are America." Such statements imply tha t the United State~ But this''" fi~dmte~tional resistance to its agenda so long as its resolve is 6rnUJS. ""'n ence IS w1w . · ish .· r· primac.y in ·the a:na nte d. Although oth er states cannot diml11 nea r tenn the . . . U s powe · So · me countries k ' re are stt11 many ways they can rem 10 · · . g see to mani 1 t th pu a e e United States for their ow11 purposes' usUl

°

.

°

WALT I TAMING AMERICAN POWER

443

. ...,mocl
gain \tVashington 's trust support .1 · · anu protecti 0 1 ' e confron tational, atte mpting to oppose' and u d, · on. t ters are .nor , . n ercu t U S int . st I . h .. e the Unite cl States abibty to defend or advance .ts c · ·. eJ e. s. n e1t er cas ' . . cl J own roretgn poltc:y age nda is impau e . ·tCC 01 '·

IF yo U CA N'T BE AT 'EM

Given the reality of U.S. power: s?me states choose to accommodate it-a nd in doing so, atle mpt to ens ure that. It IS used to their benefit· · A re.. , tnes . warv f •' "' cou n coercive measures or even posstbl e military intervention bv the United St 't · 0 , . 1 · . 1· · . . . , a es, may al choose to re tgn t 1e11 po IC"les to accord With U.S. mterests in order to deflect u .S. pressure. More freq.uentl~, countries ally themselves with Washington to counter threats _rose~l by their regwnal. adversaries ..By developing a close relationshjp \\ith the Um ted States, as well as With key Amencan constituencies, foreign powers can manipulate U.S. primacy to their o·wn advantage. Instead of resisting U.S. power, a few sta tes -Libya is the most recent example-" ban dw ago n" with the United States. To appease Washington. bandwagoners reaH gn their foreign policies according to Washington 's dictates. Although the United States has often tried to compel such realignments by pres~ suring weak and isolated opponents-including Iraq, North Korea, Serbia, and Syr ia- this strategy rarely works. Even Libya's acquiescence was due as much to prolonged sanctions as to any implied military threat. More commonly, states choose to ally themselves with the United States out of a desire for U.S. protection from a regional threat. The United States has long been an attractive ally against intimidating neighbors: it is strong enough to shift a regional balance of power, and it generally does so wi~hout ~onquering.its allies in the process. Poland , for example, seeks stronger ties \"llth the ~ruted ~tates because, as one PoHsh official explain ed, Poland ·'is a country that thmks seno~ly about security .. . [and] for such a cow1try, ifs good to be a close ~ly of th~ Uruted States.'' The specter of China's rising power has created a host 0 ~ diplomatic ?P~;h tunities for Washington in Asia: India wantc; to develop a strategJC partnershtp w1. . th Phili' · the United States and Malaysta, e ppmes, an d Singapore want U.S. forcthes . . l Gulf states see e to remain in the ' region . Sm1 11ar y, sever,al sn.~atler Persian . United States ·1s a valuable counterwet·ght t0 thei r Jarub er netghbors.d · . 1v. ' I U . d St tes do not o so pass Jve States that do ally then1selves wi.tll t 'l e mte a l . t c s pow~r 'd bl 1 gth to ens ure t 1at. m re urn. v · · Ind eed , they often go to cons1 era e en s B lti .. ting personal ties vvith is used in ways that further their own inte~estsl. dy cu \ ah as TonY Blair seek to . U .S. officials, especial1y t11e prest·d~n t, foretgtlt1 ea ersdsue to affect how \ rashington reinforce the United States' commitment to tem an wields its power. . . . d t f the unusual openness of the Foreign powers also attempt to take a v~'l~~e ~ttacks Saudi Arabi launched a U.S. political system. After the September ~1, 2 , ter dte perception that the . · n 1u, multimillio n~dollar public re1anons camp
~.:J

I ' " ''

The open. decentralized, ~nd , ';r' .d U.S. political . to ·uppor1 them. '·I t1 ·s sort of manipulation. •\ ntl .J u t rudition f r system i . unerJu e to ll . 0 ree s e,tremeI~ vt . of media outlets also give organvu mtt n·!>l groups eo . spet<:h
OPPOSING AMERICAN POWER ~thouthgh co~ntries use strategies of accommodation to furthe r their own ambitions, e Uruted . thmg · Important · M . States usually gets some out of them: compliance. any .countries, . goals by accommodating h however' are not cont ent to ach.1eve t he1r or allymg t emselves with th u · d S are ioc:ompatible with US e . rute tates. When foreign powers have aims tllat sition Some . · · policy, they must develop workable strategies of oppo. t. 0 bala . the United Stcountnes ., b attempt d nee U .S. power by banding together agrunst a~es or y .evelopmg specl·scmili 'tary options· others try to bind U.S· er withi tb · pow n e constramts of. t . a] . . ' _:J attempting to extr et . m emation Institutions. Some resort to blackmau, able consequence: su~r:~~ons from \Vashington by threate ning it with_undesirrefuse U.S. demands And spread of nuclear weapons; others si mply 1gnore or attacking U.S. legi~ many countries are trying to unde rmine U.S. power b~ facilitated. Such effi acy, a strategy that Washington's recent actions have greatJ} been muted butth orts tobebalance the power of the United States have thus far • eyare · · . . Although a number ofl ~g to hamstring U.S. foreign policy. Id the global response to U S ea. ers have openly called for a more multi~polar wor~ · · pnmacy does not resemble the coalitions that defeat

Wl\lf I TAMING AM:E

.

RICAN POWER

-

ermany 111 both world .wars or the SOVlet . Umon . . . th 44:, G 10 ther natio11c.. I1<\VC' not forged a form a1 .anti-U . S JJ' t: Cold war. ·rhE' rcaso 0 States does not pose t1tc same level of th y · · a I ante is simpl<:· tt ,. . 'Tl . . ·1 1 .. reat. et stat be . · le u mted ·n subtler w,t\ s. wtt , t 1<: exphctt aim of h ki CJtnning to.JOtn . 10rces r I . . • . . c ec ng u ses are. oantt-U .S. alhan<.:e, eountnes are "soft bal an<:mg . .:. coo ·power. than f,ormm~ . 30 d' Rather . to oppose U ..S.~ poI ic:v and obt..,; . · r mattng their dip)Otnatic . rnnsitions cull more tn.flue . few examplc•s: France, Germany, and Rus . nee together. To name ·ust. · ·' S Sta pursued a 1mified J a U prevent t_he mtcu tates from obtaining U\ SecuritY . s~r-dtegythat helped the invaston of 1raq, and their actions all , d . Counc1l authorization ~0 . .. . . . owe weaker st· t . r Chile to res1st u .S. pressu re a<; well Lat p . a es such as Mexico and · er, reSident B 11 · cl France, Germany. and the United Kingdo us tne to persuade: grams, but he failed to chive a wedge betwe: ~~get tough on lran's nudE:ar prodiplomatic campaign instead. Bevond Eu ~m ab~d ended up endorsing their rope, corn med o .. f American countries has defeated the Bush ad . . . . , pposttion rom Latin government of H ugo Ch{tvez in Venezueia, ili~~:~:~t~n,s efforts to pressure the new bead of th e Organization of American Stat . d b.IS. ·kattemp~s to select the "cl es, an oc ed a U S p I create a emocracy review" panel within the OAS. · · roposa to Some . ·h as v.:hen , countnes . ·}j thways · of·j ·balancing U.S. power are less benign, sue mo b1.ze I .etr · that e:mloit I m1 1ta1y resources and develop der•en SI\· .e trategtes areas fV\~ \ational • ··: c m w 11<.: . 1 U. S. strength• is not overwhelming· As ·L Ule pen t agon ·s 2V\JoJ Derense Strategy notes, 'The U· S· milit~n., · t he worId 0 f . . ~ 1 predom·mat es m tradztwnal L•ft awa\' from . forms of . warfare. Potential adversaries acco rdlog1~. sm challengmg the U mted States through traditional militarY actions and adopt. . metric capabilities and methods" (italics in the original).· ~m vVeaker states typically rely on some combination of three broad options. First, iliey develop conventional militaJ} capabilities specifically designed to neutralize U.S. strengths. In the 1999 Koso,·o war, Serbia used surface-to-air missiles as well as camouflage and other deceptive tactics to blunt XATO's air offensh·e. Facing a vastly stronger coalition, the Serbs eventually lost but they perfonned far better than ~ATO expected. Similarly, China is now acquiring military c-apabilities-including anti-ship cruise missiles, ballistic missUes, and electronic countenneasure technologies-that c-ould hinder U .S. forces if they tried to operate in China's neighborhood. Second, advers::rries sometimes depend on terrorism, tl1e classic "weapon of the weak.., Terrorists "vin by attacking the stronger side's resolve and forcing it to take actions that alienate potential supporters. Al Qaeda and the Iraqi_insur~e~cy use terrorism because it allows them to attack "ulnerable targets while av01ding direct confrontation ,vith superior U.S. forces. Terrorism can ~s~ provoke ~e United States into overreacting in wa~-s that could increase oppostt~on to the u.~. presence in the Middle East. Sometimes, the strategy \.o,·orks: terronsm helped bm Laden drive much of the U.S. presence out of Saudi Arabia-andit may still defeat J

.I

the U.S. mission in Iraq. . f Third, to balance U.S. primacy, some countries attempt to obtrun :;1.po•~e: mass destruction (\VMD) especiaJJv nuclear anllS. The current nuc d~rth .l ' · · · and that is why Iran a.Jl ·' o 1 ueveloped these weapons to deter t.1e1 r euemtes, .c·aJJv a matter of r . ted "It is bas1 Korea want them today. As one lraman reiormer sta · . .. ' equilibrium. If I tlon 't have [nuclear weapons]. I don't have secunty.

1

4..f6

PAKI ,.

~v ·

•• - ·

. dired couute1poise:· tt · l ~ dom inan ce , 1 •r· . lJJlfJ' Sll C' I .l . cl' . .I . 't lu~l t:'ado f Olll ,.., . . d States IJ,· Inn mg Jt" t In powerf'ul.' nlc\n. .y sates . the Uwte ' . l. I . tntet nat· hont• to t'(>n~tnun ·k best in areas Jn w 1K' 1 l "· pn macv is ' 'On a[ 1 ,..- . s· cling \\'OJ .s a1 . economic . ['c . . I . " lot so instHuttOJIS. m
WALT I TAMtNG AMERICAN POWER

.

Anotller strategy, balking, is a more passive way for states to limit U.S. power: when_ the Uruted States demands something, thev simpl)' re fuse. Balking is an espeCially fli ti tJ d / · ed e ec ·ve me 1o , too, because even a country as powerfuJ as the Umt States cannot force every state to do its bidding all of the time. And the more some ~test.balk, tlle more overextended the Unjted States becomes-making it easier tOr Obter states to balk . . ll . k cl t end 0 ·ts as we · Russ1a has balked for example when as e 1 1 nuc ear coU· bo · • ' · tiJ1g r a ration with Iran, just as India and Pakistan balked by resJs . . p e~sur~ to forgo nuclear testing in 1998.

vs

Balking L~ SOmet:i . cl States use of its te 't r mes overt-as when Turkey refused to grant the Urute dl rn ory ~or the 1raq war- but many countries choose a su bt Iet. approa •

4'17

a<:
them. Thus, lsrat'l has repeatedly pledged to sto builclin ru posst'bl<:: to fulfill Palestinians h;w<· promised to crack down on mjli~t b g_ settle~entc; and the are frequently tempted to s,k utht netthb er Side has ac.tually don e much. U.S. leaders 100 e ot er wa}' wh . k d balk, rather than ns a cost1y ispute or let others see that th . en otl~ers Attacking U.S. legitimacy is also a favorite way to ~~<:an\',.b·eh~penl~d~fied. eroue national clout. As the worId 's dominant power tlle United St t vas h mgton s mter· t11at ItS · power .IS legitimate ' Whe a Ies as much d to gain from th e percept•on . . · n peop e aroun the world believe that U.S. pnmacy advances broader global interests w h' fi ds . .. 11 y mtemahona · · • 1 support for . 1ts . policies . . IeaVl·ng ·ts• as mgton n 1dt eas.1er to 1a . . 1 0 ppos10 on 1so1ate . . . • and ineffe<:ttvc. Accordmg~y, the ~mted States' opponents are currently seelong to convince others that Washmgton 1s selfish, hypocritical, immoral, and unsuited for world leadership, and tllat its dominance harms them. This assault on U.S. le itima<.;y does no~ directly challenge U.S. power, but it encourages other peopl~ to resent and res1st U.S. supremacy. Unfortunately, the United States has unwittingly given its critics a great deal of ammunition in recent years. Not only did the Bush administration disregard the UN Secmity Council when it launched its preventive war against Iraq, but its justification for the war turned out to be false, and its bungled occupation has inflicted new suffering on the Iraqi people.... The rest of tlle world sees the invasion as a demonstration of the dangers of unchecked U.S. power. To make matters worse, U.S. policies since September ll have reinforced the belief that the United States does not abide by its own ideals. The torture and abuse graphically documented at Abu Ghraib prison, tlle deaths of Y!uslim prisoners of war in U.S. custody, the desecration of the Koran by U.S. interrogators, the harsh treatment of and denial of due process to prisoners at Guantanamo Bay. and the conspicuous absence of a single high-level resignation in the w-ake of these revelations have all made it easy for ilie United States' critics to portray the c-ountry as quick to condemn everyone but itself. . . . . ,. Like President Bush, who said that the Abu Ghraih abuses d1d no~ re8e~t tlle America I know," Americans may dismiss these accusations as ~alse. ~1 1 S~eadtng, o~ exaggerated. But the issue is not what Americans think of tllelr natto~1 5 cond~ctb · may· .e the issue is how that conduct appears to others. Some of tl1ese accusations . . tl unfounded, but many are seen as vaJjd · And th.ey ,are rapidly· , drammg - 1e reserv01r ower of international goodwill that makes the Umted States status as a superp acceptable to the world. r heart nd minds and it is losina . 0 . · 111 · . 10 bal strugg1e ror sa ' The Umted States 1s a g • h. _ will face gre·1ter resistance and . . . . . to grow Was m~lon • . 0 f I anti-Amencamsm continues ' . _, 11 c el ;,..creasinalv threatened m . rt Amencans WUl re 0. find It harder to attract suppo · tl1 . t alone will merelr exacerbate the such a world but hving to counter tllese rea s 1 ' fear of U.S. power and isolate the um'ted States e,·en more. Ul

A NEW APPROACH . ht .,n · 1 era has taua ... important lesson: Americans ·

. ode for tJ1e world. but other t'Ountrtes . cl, omma · . nt pOSihOn lS go may believe that the1r

Over the last 15 years, the umpo ar . .

.RARY woRLD pOUTICS PART 4 coNTEMpO 44 U S supremacy and 1., •;, d<, eloped ways t -' t about · · r• o tarn .f. r more ambi'"aJen . tead of aJJowirH! t1h:: v: ;tell• tates to act .e are .1 . ·'I . tJten. 1ns ...k h d • . W1th u s power. I roJUC"dl )· . \\'· bington to \>\'Of. rll' ,..• • o CO I1Vlllce the I . · · ·.... primaC\· reqUJres as_ 15 · to be welcomed r,tther than feared ot ler 1mpUJ 11 ,_,. · h· U s. power · ·onsof tbeworld t at · h uld be ruled out Hntnu.hateh. True err nah . I ti0 nism s o . . ' •rorts t0 !\ retreat to ISO a Id di· ;.,;.,b if the {;nited Statps \\ithclrew fron1 . · gth WOU Jlluuv \\orld · uld 11ot be worth the cost . De~pite what Critir·.. restn·ct l.i .S. stren alfairs, but me benefits wo ...... does indeed depend on the Ll. nited States. to"""mrn.a)· bal commum,, . d am. I 1 belie'-e the go · ue the war on terronsm. (-'a t11e campaign to ' eed 0 f tJ1e seas. wao . contain the fr om · rwrite die UN. the International ~lonctru)· Fund, and the trol \V.\10. and uncle th tJ . us \\'asbin!1ton ·s o,·erarchin
drewcompJe~ly. U 1 Inst~d, .

.t d States should resume its traditional role as an "offshore

e assumes that onJy a fev,; parts of the world are of strategic balancer ThiS strategy . d . I' cl . · ili U01'ted States such as Europe. m ustna 1ze As1a, and the 1·mportance to e ' di I I U · d . ulf I t d of controlling these areas rect y, t 1e mte States would Pers1an G · ns ea b 1 f Tl · · t to maintain the reQional a ance o power. 1e Umted States rely on local ac ors o . ·fi h . . . d ready to deplov, its power agrunst spec1 c t reats to 1ts mterests' wou Id still stan 11en the local balance 't uld ·nten·ene onlv when absolutely necessary-w but 1 WO L · cl b · broke down and vital U.S. interests were c~early threa~ene )' hostile forces. In short, while remaining engaged with its allies, the U mted States should keep its milit presence as small as possible. Reducing the size of the U .S. footprint wouli diminish the likelihood that foreign terrorists especially suicide bombers-would target the United States, because such responses are most often triggered by perceived foreign occupation. . , Being less directly involved on the ground would also bolster the U mted States freedom of action. Washington would be able to play hard to get, making its support for others c:ond.itional on broad compliance with U.S. goals. Other states would be less likely to take U.S. protec..1:ion for granted. By diminishing global concerns about U.S. dominance, this approach would also make it easier for Washington to gain global backing on those rare occasions when it needed to use force. Playing hard to get would not win over a recalcitrant regime such as that in Pyongyang, but it would make it easier for the United States to attract broad assistance for its policies in even those hard cases. Most important, the United States must defend its inte rnational legitimacy. ~ashington must first recognize how it appears to others and then develop a sus· ~ed campaign to shape these perceptions. The United States cannot expect to WJ.D over the entire world, but it can surely do better than it has of late. · · · 0 be effective, a public relations campaign needs a good product. 1 ~ ~- 5 · foreigD policy makes global problems worse while U.S. government and mlbta1)' personnel trample on human rights, then no amount of public diplomacy will res· cue the nation•5 •mage. · To restore the moral stature it possessed before t1le abuses · 1 at Ahu_ Ghraib, at Guantanamo, and in Afghanistan Washington must sincere y apologize to the VICtims, · · ' and the senior officials responsible should be asked to

!

e

m

WALT I TAMING AMERICAN POWER

449

. Bv faili nt; to hold top officials accountable the U - ed S s1gn- ~ ' 1 · 1 • JUt tates d re 1·t values neither t 1e ng 1ts of others nor its own id< als lt . h e~onstrates that waY to rebuild the nation's global image. e · IS ard to tmagine a worse • . I' . . R 1e ect a greater appreciation f ·h , : U.s. fore1gn poli1c.;hy must possessing unmatchedstrengthdoeo w at v S powe annot
•

FAILED STATES CIVIL WARS, AND NATI 0 N-BUILDING I

Failed States, Collapsed states, Weak States.· Causes and Indicators ROBERT I. ROTBERG

Tl1is clecade's failed states are Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, the Congo, Uberia., Sierra Leone, ancl the Sudan .... Somalia is a collapsed state. Together they are the contemporary classical failed and collapsed states, but others were once collapsed or faiJed and many other modem nation-states now approach the brink of failure, some much more ominously than others. Another group of states drifts disastrously downward from weak to failing to faiJed. vVhat is of particular interest is why and how states slip from weakness toward failure, or not. The list of weak states is long, but only a few of those weak and poorly governed states need necessarily edge into failure. Why? Even the categorization of a state as fruling-Colombia and Indonesia, among others-need not doom it iJTetrievably to full failure. W11at does it take to clrive a fruli ng state over the edge into failure or colJapse? .. . How [could] Somalia, a nation-state of about 9 million people with a strongly cohesive cultural tradition, a common language, a common religion, <md a shared history of nationalism ... fail, and then collapse? Perhaps ... it never constitut~ a sin~e coherent tenitory, having been part of the colonial empi~es of two suzenuns. with otJ1er SomaHs living outside the boundaries oftJ1e two colomes. Then. as was ~ften ~~ experience elsewhere in Africa and Asia, the first elected. proto-dem~rahc. post independence civilian government~ proved to be ·'experimen.~aL ineffialcte\nlt,hame;orrupedt, 1 Gener· . o m ulture ''tical a1 · f . . . · c and mcapable of creating any kind o nation pou ~·

\\'eak States: Causes and CollS('queuces. m S ed .r Terror. Caanbrid!{e. MA illl(l tates. . Tt From Hob<'rt J. Hotberg, "faik·d States, CoUaps Hobcrt I Hothc:rrr cd St(lte Failure anti State Weakness "' tl mut'. uJ P.ess 2003 PP 1-29 · · · d tl .. Brooki.ngs lnstHu ton r · . ·' c--· • 4Sl ~ DC: Worltl Peace f ounc1ahon an 1 ~ \Vashingtou,

:-,,,~·;.·,,.

.

- -... 'l!

452

PART4

~rrr~iJ'ORARY woRLD rouncs

COi'l •'-''

,. decided that the poht; ... ;,m~ were TlJ . . 1 arn ander of the ·' . .. . lnlJl~ th iad Barre. comm ,·er in !969, suspending tlte um.;·•tution, bannjng JX>liti ~f: countn·. so he usurped r<>' d ., conuption. T\\'enr. \ 'C a110 mam· misacl <.
leg~timaC). _Ba~ke~

f" go,,emment and democrac.:y, abused his citizen!~' h . ~ destroved U1stJtutions o .h .~. . uman 1 1 . ed . ·of the resources o t e tate i:l! poss1u e mto his own 'tnd h· 1~ rights, channel as man) I d f J C Id · • ds else at t le en o l lE> o \\·ar of w11at subclan's han an d depm. ·eel everYone · . wa~ , f 5 ··'' supreme rule. :\ 11 of the lll
onto itself . . . ·ca11 d cl 1 President Stevens (1968-1985) systemati .. )' re u<.:e 1Urnan security \~thin Sierra Leone so as to maximize his own personal power. <md ... that increase in personal power pennitted a quantum.leap in}~ c.-ontrol O\·er the cow1try's rents and riches. Stf'\·ens "sold chanc.:es to profit from disorder to those w·bo could pay for it through providing senices.-2 H~ er~ a p~\ate 1~tary force to te_r~orize his 0 ,,11 people and to a&,arandize, espec1all~: m the diamond fields. As ~e offic1al rule oflaw receded. the law of the jungle, presided o\·er by Stevens. took 1ts place. Institutions ofgovernment \\'·ere broken or c:orrupted. The state became illegitimate, and a civil war over spoils, encouraged and assisted from outside. turned failure into a collapse. In 200-2, after hideous atrocities, a brutal intervention by a \Nest African peac-e enforcement contingent, much more war, and the arrival of British paratroopers and a large U~ peacekeeping forre, Sierra Leone reco,·ered suffieiently to be considered failed rather than collapsed. It even held effective elections. Mobutu used analogous tactics in the patrimony of Zaire. As his people's selfproclaimed guide. or as the personalist embodiment of national leadership during the Cold War, he deployed the largesse of his American and other\Vestern patrons to enhance his personal wealth, to heighten his stature over his countrymen, and to weave a tightly manipulated web ofloyalties across the army and into alJ aspects of Zairese society. Every proper political and democratic institution was an obstacle to the edifice that he created. So was civil society, poJjtics itself in the broad sense. an~ ea_>n_omic de\'eJopment. Letting the country's Belgian-built infrastructure rot. mamtainmg a colonial type of resource extrac:t:ion (of copper, other metals, and dia~onds), rebuffing the rise of a real bourgeoisie, and feeding his people false glorie inst~ of real substance and per capita growth accentuated his own power. wealth. and •mpo.rtance. As with Stevens and Siad Barre, the modernizing state was the enem}~ Mobutu had no sense of noblesse obHge. Rene Leman.:hand says that for :~tu·~ state, patronage was the ~dispen~ble lubricant. Ultimately, ho,_vever, ~c:ant ran out and the Mobutist machine was brought to a ... standstill · · · !he ~nahility of the Mobutist state to generate a volume of rewards consistent with its clientelistic ambiti '- ... [toJ The . . . ~ns IS· the Key ... its rapid loss oflegitimacy. ..3 damentai~ dn.1Sl0ns of the failed Sudanese state north and south, reflect fu 0 • and colonial dhnic, ~~· and linguistic differences; Egyptian and Bri.tish ~nq~~ Haws and patterns; post-independence dispanties

.

.

ROTBERG 1 FAILED ST ATEs, COlJAPSEo ST ATEs, WEAK STATEs

cliscrinunaLon.; the. north dominatin th 453 ~ _1, e SOuth/; and the div..... South. A we a~ c,tate m the north • pr<>Vlumg l' · ~'erv ....,05 tJv ~·1 usl•m w nstituent-;. became th po itical goods at rr·, . :, of oil ·m the '" ' . . . h e nude, f. l nmtcu 1a ·els f, . war wtU1 tht: so~t (from 1~h5 to 1972 and fr lS o a truly failed state v.'hen its~ Lts equation. The Sudanese war has th d b· orn l9&1lhrouuh 2002) ong . . ]j e u 1ous disti . o entered the f I arc.rest num }<;r o C:J\ll an ca'iualties ( . . . n<.tion of having . o· ~ ..I l o . . 0\ ~:;r 2 million . .. Lnmct=. the \,~th. ~e large~t J~temally di~plac.:ed and refugee 1 m an~ tnl~a'itate war. ooupled 4 1111U.Jon). Sla\CI) (north aaamst south) A . h population m the world ,aho es as well 'I ut the c:entr·al go\·ernments, writ rare!)' runs ouns lt .· · ·" oreover. in the .-~,•L. . prmldes no t·10.· -' ""'uu'b th b em citizens. om s em, raids them , and regards bL. tack po th'-
WEAKNESS AND THE POSSffilUlY OF FAIWRE CoUapsed and faiJed designate the consequences of a process of decay at the nation-state level. The capacity of those nation-states to perfonn positively for their citizens has atrophied. But ... that atrophy is neither inevitable nor the result of bappenstance. For a state to fail is not that e~·· Crossing from w~ess into failure takes will as welJ as neglect. Thus. weak nation-states need not tip mto 1 f:-: cwure .... · · f the distincThere are several interesting cases that ·mdeed test the prOOSton tion between w·eakness and failure: . Sri Lanka has been embroiled in a bitter and destructive chil war for~= years. As much as 1.5 percent of its t~talland mass has_at times in~~ a Tamil been controlled by the rebel Liberation.~?ers _of T~~\ E:':~- has been able separatist insurgencv. Additionally, the lJ 1E "\1 th relati ;e P :i~ d . 2001 a. ·d . kill off rival Tamw.. an m .a.. lO assassinate prime ministers, bomb pres1 ents. ,__....,hle . . . . . . al d . air force base. But as u ""''"t"""' even destroy the nations cJvtl rur temun an rnam bee f u;,.,.a ~'11 the · land have n o pUlUJ•o as the Sinhala-dominated governments of the 15 · eak close to ·~ ·ed 01e~·w ~~ '-'a. 'E rebellion., so the nation-state has remam · ···'

°

J

'OT

pART4

.t54

CONTEMPO

RARY WORLD POU I IC!:J

.. , . · to fi.u urc. ~~•ot. 80

t>ercent of SJi l .ank
·

ROTBERG I FAilED STATES COLLAPS I EO STATEs, WEAK STATEs

45:)

·hecked. J112000 and 200 l , CD p per <:apita li·1 b 'J ac~vard b lQ l flatjon gall ope t fro m 30 per cent to 116 percSentu Th l Y percent a year. n u.S. dollar from 38:1 to 500:1. Foreign d..1 e oc~l c.urrenc:y f«:> IJ against jt te , . . " 6 () . an uomeshc mvestm . ernJ Jioy mc nt JOS e to pere 111 ;ent a cou ntry of ·tl· ent ceas 11 t::d. U 12 1 · · · 1 d HIV 1 · c · 1 m IOn. Ht::alth · · • . a1 serv1c:es van 1s 1e . tn1e e;tto n rate s c1· b d anu euucauon · d . Jm e to 30 perc ent ·h b :JQOO Zimbabwea ns )'1ng every wee k. Respect forth 1 f1 , WJt a out tJ I cl I' . ed and thCJI su )Ve rte . Po tt1e;al institutions ceasedetrurc o . aw fwas b·aellY. batter d . . o 'unction ully the state preye on lts rea1 an d tts supposed opponents ·h·u· f . Agents. of 1 10 d sha mel ess ly stea ling a presidential election. The gove' e; t ~ Ire~ :xr ress10n an . hi . en s eg1nmac·\' vanished. Corruption , meanw. le, Aounshed, with the rulinrnm g elite pocketin . th .. local and Congol ese war gams and letting most Zimbabweans uo h R gal en · ·d 200 9 d . b ungry. le starte va tion appeare d m. m1. .- "' ..., .esp1 food aid from abro a·l All of th'1s m1se · ry, an d . . . · u. the ten den cy to .fad , 1 esulted (as 1t had earlier m the Congo and Sierra Leone) from the ruthless design s and vengean<.:e of an omnipotent ruler.... A num ber of oth er nation-states belong in the category of weak states that show a high pot ent ial to fail. ~epal has been a clear case sine;e its \1aoist insurgency began again roiling the mountains and plains of the monarchist country. Already hin der ed by geography and poverty, ~epal has never been a robust provider of political goods to its inhabitants. The palace massacre of 2001 undermined the legitimacy of the monarchy, and thus of the ruling government. With the flare-u p of a det erm ine d mral rebellion in 2002, and ~epal's demonstrated inability to cop e effectively, security of persons and of regions became harder and harder to achieve, absent military assistance from India. Under these circumstances , Nep al can hardly project power or credibility. Failure becomes a distinct possibility. . . . . .. A thir d variety of weak state includes the endunnglyweak . .. Hruti has aJ,~Cl)'S been on the edg e of failu re, particularly during the nine ~eent~ ~nd twentie~ centuries. But its ent ren che d weaknesses include no ethmc. reug10us , or othe · rgen t communal cleavages. T h ere are no msu movet11ents · -~or has Haiti exne ·: ri. standa· rds f 1· · d national exp ectations enced radi cal or rapid deflation m o 1vm g an · ' . . . h Uke Arg ent ina in 2002 and Russta m t e .19gos. Ha'·1ti has •alw·a,vs been the poorest polity in the We ster n hemisph ere. d al . b...:an compro1 al goo s 11as '\ a}'S "'"' Haiti's nation al capacity to pro n'de P0 l'ti' c . · ·d d · il . hi , . k inst ituti ons. an tntim mlSed by aut ocr atic and corrupt leaders P· ''ea . . . tes of infat ntatemorCl\ tal. . . 1 GD 1 P I I per cap ita. ua l ra soctetv, lug h leve ls of en me, low eve s · do , other deficiencies. ·1ty, susp ' icion or ·abhors an mrun out righ t hosti·t·tty from 1·ts neib . ' th 1900 . The Haitian go,·. 5 · . Narcotlcs trafficking has been a sen·ous problem smce e general and drugs 5 1 · t -diet gger ' em men t has bee n una ble or un willing to 10 et p smu .cl t Jean-Bertrand Aristide . . H . . transs h 1ppers in parbc:ular. ruh. ·e 1 under rest en . ev ~ . . vise of weakness. Yet, gt'·e n v~ry 10 (19 90- 199 1, 199 4-1 995 , 2000- ), is gnpped a . t aJ ethruc. re~gious , or lin. . d d' tUntte organiz ed inte rnal ISSJ·dence, almost no tn em . on'ty of d dist rust bv the maJ . . . ·ety except a eep _ret: ti'0 ns the gutstic cleavages within Hru. han soct . th . historic class' cnWJ a ' the upper classes and of mulattos because ?f edtr ands communal differences · ' ure em tngredie nts of maj or civil stnf. .e are absen. t · Fail ·n cross-group violence. H31'ti seems <.;apable of bei ng transformed into consun~ 1. g condem ned to re main weak, but without failU1g. urtC

tn'

PART4

456

·EMPORARY WORLU 1-'ULIIIL.::> CONT

ROT BERG 1 FAILED ST

.. ·n t·l,cir gcouraphi('a l .tnd pl •:· <> <:al legacy (·' d . ·t·tte · I I~at IQ' c 11 1Ut r 1 " • :I 1011-S , . b' ' .. se of rr)obal war l1l i ng alH c at.. ~ ~ rn ic: <:li mat ir· ·I . lire . · .,c,·e ral c.;ase s. eca u. .-.. . ll . '- c 1,1n 11 ') (lt' 11 1· 111 · . . 1 . tl)' weak incl11de (no t a l11 1 1st J 13urkina F'·t•· r • c-,c. I " . lSJde ret1 Jll 1€'1 e n '·'o, '-'h· d can lt <.OI : ~ · . in Afd ca: Georgia and \lnldc 'a iu the form S tt , Chan·t Gu111ea. <.ti1C1 • 1ge•' · · r.· 1 1 . er · <>vi et • '· b .. c .,stT imo r and Lao s Jll Asu 1. r·~ac 1 1a~ 1ls own ui•·t ·1 . l ' · 1 ·wd Cam o<1Jcl , c.. · ' ., sh 1\JOJ · • ·dG .. and Moldova battle their o,,n sol ar !>ll<:cessl'ul se 1lgtu . ·. · ing features. an eorg_Ja . . . · .· ·1 p.lratist · Cl ·l . t 0 1e time harbored a VJCJous. clVl \\ ,u , and Burkin· ,.., movements. tac a ' 1 ~· aso f · ll ' . d Lao s are ·tll ru led hy autoc:mls un n<"m v to civil soc··1 ty • ~i aer. Cam bod1a, an ' . . . . . . , ' . · e and . ., . . elna nce Eas t Tun or IS a \·Cl ) n<:w stdt e, hav1ng been re . . to pa1t1C1patory gov · . 'S<;Hcd . t d b . the Uni ted . atio ns afte r two b1tt cr and unr ewa rdin g col . and reSUSCita e Y . (' ) . . OllJaJ . J J d . b,.,· tal fina l I 1do nesJ 1 an spr ee o c estJ uct ion and death J' mter uc es an a •"' . . . . . · ~ast . ·t] U' ' J 1 elp ente rs its full maJ ont v w1t 1 1011 t a caJ re of exper·1 cl Tunor even w1 1 ·' · ·. cnce r '. a1 nd btJr eau crat s and with out .much 111 way _of physica l res011 . proiess •on s a · . . the .. . . 1c:es. . ess of' thes e wea k stat es to prov 1de pol 1 t1c:al goo d:; 111 qua nt1tv and c The will mgn . , JUa1ity is severely limited at the bes t of ti1~ es. Almost any external shock or inte rnal emergency could push tllem over the bnnk. :\ I '

1

•

•

•

•

INDICATORS OF FAILURE As this chapter has sugges ted earlier, the road to nation-state failu re is litte red with

serious mistakes of omission and commission . E,·e n in the modern states with inherited weaknesses, failure is not preordain ed. Poo r, arbitrary, absent-minded creations predisposed to failure need not fail. Indeed , Botswana, Jirt poor at independence and a forlorn excuse for a state, under dete rmined and visionary leadership created a state strong enough to take full advantage of a sub sequ ent , and much unexpected, resource bonanza. Similarly, a sugar mo nocultu re like Mauriti us was transfonned by dete rmined visionary leadership into a thriving plural society based on manufacturing for export. In con trast, Mahl\vi and Mali (two examples among many) remain weak and vel)' poo r, albeit democ:mti<.:, having both bee n unable. in their different circumstances, to overcom e the arb itra ry configu rati on of tJ1ei r borders, a common absence of eas ily exploitable resources, geographical bin· drances, and decades of despotism. Climatic change may hit both Malawi and Mali particularly hard, too. Nation-states are blessed or cursed hy the discovery or absence of natural resources, like oil or diamonds, within rec eived bor de rs. Bu t it is not the accidental quality of thei r borders that is the original flaw ; it is wh at has been mad e of dle chall~nges and opportunjties of a given outline tha t dete rmines wh eth er a state r~mams weak, becomes stronger, or slides toward failure and coll apse. The colon~al errors were many, especially the free ing of Africa south of tl1e Sahara as fortyeight ad miru · ·s trativ · e tern·ton· · es mstead of six or seven larger ones and the abysrn al fail~re. to transfer the reins of authority much earlier and much m~ re thorou~.l y to an mdigenat. But it is not possible to pre dic t this centu ry's can did ates for frulu re solely or even largely on the basis of colonial mistreatme nt. . .. . Three kinds of signals of impending faiJure -ec onomic political, and deaths m com bat -pr ovi d 1 . ely, · s. On the e c earer, more tim and mo re actiona'ble wammg

ATEs COL!..A PSEo STATEs I

eonom i<: f 'm t, Indonesia in 199WEAK SlATEs 457 e -g 1 z· I • t- I ~>~ \ ' . !97 2-J 9t . ~~'' II O)a bwe in 2001 - 20( · '~'gena in 199l-t 2• each pr0'.; ut:ti ons 111 mco mcs and livin g t . > .. . 9<.19, Lchanon in 1 red 0 s anua rdc; . d' \. tn\lan(;(; r l ough tOne IIOlcd ClO U for [)rev<;rtt' tn ICatt::cJ tht· nets 'b·j· S O IICM rapkl n e Jve tnea s r~ !.1 t U:v of f ·t own war d spir al star ts in cam est C.J ure~ lo hav< ; be~n . tt · aJ ure ~arly d 1y a cone 'rt .I • n - a ernpted 0 rnornen hJ m; <:or ru pt auto<;rats and tl . e tu, dcte:rrnined err nee the . 1Cir ec.pl allr uort can siQ\ . few in<:enti \'<.'S to arrest their state's sl'd . } corrupt ac;sociatt':S \ tts 1 · · 1 1 .1 • e, smc e th e: d ' sualh hu\c from imp ow ns 1me nt anu misery. As r . ey nn clev er,,,. . t i.._ . . , d . . · JOre 1 gn and d . . ·n)'S o •Jt:ntflt ·obs van1 sh, ,m per cap1ta mcomes r~·'l th omcstic mvtstment d . J . I I d . dJ . e ma'is of 1·r17 . nes 'lp. see the 1r beet t 1, e ucatlonal and logist· . c .ens m an imi'V•riled ta 1ea1enltt1eme t . . . • rs • te 0 sho1t ages occur. Pnvahon and hunger f ll 1 . s rne t away. FC>od and r ~ I k c . o 1 ow, espe c,aJi v ·r j· ue inte rvenes. f 1an S to 10re1gn exchange sr·" : . , I a(; lffiatic <;atastrophe . • varC there is I thing that matters. Meanwhtle, in the typ· :ItltS al r'.1. ess and ltss of everv. lin r .. • cadres arrogate to themselves mcreasing' p ICrt' aHmfg state · • ru g Iami hes and °nt100S of thefC: available p1e.· Tll€.'V S)'S· tematica11YS kI.m t11e State treasury take adva · · foreign exchange, partake of smu'ggling and thage o o ricial f 'ersus street <:ost s of e rent s o smuggJ· d h what littl.e is availab le into their own stitkypalms If 't .b mg, an gat er 1 ·Jt· · f ds · · were poss1 le reliablY to ca1 ibrate t he Bow of 1 JCJt un mto overseas accounts ti b . · . .. ld b . . • na on y natio n, robust earh· wanllngs wou e ava ilab le. Abs ent deta 1led repo rts of s h th f th d . ' . · h b uc e t. escnptors 10 th1s paragrap ecom~ very suggesti~~e indicators that can be wat<e:hed. in real time, and can forecast senous trouble, if not an end state of failure. Politi.cally, the available i.ndicato:s are equally clear, if somewhat less quantiliably prec1se. A leader and 11JS associates begin by subverting democratic norms. greatly restricting participato ry processes, and coerdng a legislature and the bureau cracy into subservien ce. They end judicial independence, block chil society, and suborn the security forces. Poutical goods become scarce or are supplied to the learung class only. The rulers demonstrate more and more contempt for their peo ples, surrou nd the mse lves with family, clan , or ethnic allies. and distance themselves from the ir subjects. The state becomes equated in the eyes of most citizens with the particular drives and desires of a leader and a smallish group. Man y of these leaders drive grandly down their boulevards in mot~rcades. com mandee r commercial aircraft for foreign excursions, and put the1r faces promin ently on the local currency, on airports and ships. and on o,·ersize photographs in public places. . . r The third indicator is the level of violence. If it rises prectpttously becaus~ 0 . hes hostilities . 11t ClVl . .1war, tt.ue tate c·m be considered crumbling. skirmts or out na s • . . il 0 . ' ' • h b bilin : [fail ure rises \· Cl\ As national hum an secunty rates fall, t e pro a ., ~ . . b . \ tot e,·ef ~lative • • 1• • b ] 1 cc a wam mg S Jl111. A so u e or eonfJlCt pre c1p1tates frulure, ut eac 1 one rs 0~ be t pre. . b . cert atn num r cann o en me rates and civilian combat death coun~ a ove. a . . d th· t the glue that scribe failure . But they show that a society IS dete~oratm~ cm a . cls a new (or · beco ming latalk thm . bm an old ) state toge ther IS ' t· te is be<,'Omina0 . . · d nee that a stro ng s a No si ngle indicator proVIdes certatn evJ e . B t . dicious assessment of weak or a weak state is headin g pell -mell into f~ure. .u a Jt~ ken toaether, should tb ion, a o e several available indi.cators discussecl in thts. sectTh avoi danc e 111aneuvers . 1: ti' wam u1g s en provide both qua ntifiable and quauta ,·e · ean occur anu.1 eff0• 1ts at preventiOn · c...''n be mounted. · · · I

458

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTICS

THE HAND OF MAN . le not ·tccic.le ntal. l nstitu lion;L lra[!:ililies anti stn, ·t f ·1 ' " · larue )' man l11c1C , ( I , • t: lira] Statc ~u ure 15 r. f' . ~-.. t those deficiencies ustwll; 11ark back to decisi o . A · >11t1ibute to ru 1ure, rJU · . ns <>r aws C< · ( n) So it is that lea<1erslup <>rror~ across histm y 1. . ·· f1ons of men rare1y wome · I . ,tc · (' al gain· in tJH:., con ten1porary era, <·at1ershi.p mistakes l.tve . desh·oyed states or person ' . I 0 . . .. 1. . I . I t:on. r . l''"'es in Africa As1a, anc cec1m a l 1.1t .t 1 eac y operate 011 tl tinuc to erode rntgt1e po lu · '

possible and Impossible Solutions to Eth nic Civil Wars CHAIM KAUFMANN

le

cusr) ofrailure. · · · . ·J ure or eo11 apse, . "' 1nnnan . agc·nt:y . . h· s l> een state fa1 bas '''- ngl-. \1\lherever t 11ele c'U • ( • . • lly pres1ded ovc~r profound ·tn I neered t I1e sl1·cJc 1.ro m s·o·ength· 01-weakness and wdlfn . · < c . . . . r'·e 11 from tl1e state to the mlmg lew. As those resourc-e tt·"n cIestab11Jzmg 1esou ... 5j11·nts • •

•

u

~-

fers accele rated and human rights abuses mounted, count e rva~.ling '~lolence signified the extent to whjch states in question h~d br~k~n fundantcntc~l soc1al contra<:ts and become hollow receptacles of personahst pnVJlege, personal~<;t m le, a.nd national impoverishment. Inhabitants of failed states understand what 1t means for life to be brutish and shmt. . lu earlie r, less interconnected eras, state weakness anti failure could be isolated and kept distant from d1e developed world. Failure o~ce l~ekl fe,.ver implications for the surrounding regions and for d1e peace and secunty of the globe . Now, however, as much as their citizen s suffer, the failings of states also pose enorm ous clangers beyond their own borde rs. Preventing nation-states from failing, and resuscitating those that have failed and ,~,~IJ fail, have thus becom e the critical, all-consuming, sn·ategic and moral imperatives of our terrorized time. The chapte rs in this book demonstrate how and why states have failed and will fail, and how weak states have in several cases been spared tJ1e descent into despair and destmction .

NOTES 1. Waiter Clarke and Robert Gosende, "Somalia: Can a Collapsed State Reconstitute Itself," in Robert Rotberg, ed., State Failure and State Weakness i11 a Time of Terror

(Wa'ihington , D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2003), 129- 158. 2. William Reno, "Sierra Leone: Warfare in a Post-State Socie ty," in Rotbc rg, ed., 75. 3. Rene Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of the Congo: From Fai lure to Potential Reconstruction ," in Rotberg, ed., 37.

This paper offers a theorhy of how ethnic wars. end and proposes an · t . . ' . . m erven ti'on 1 1 strategy based on 1t. T 1e t eory rests on two ms1ghts: First, in ethnic wars both hypernationalist mobiliza~on r~~toric and real atrocities harden ethnic identities to tJ1e point that cross-ethmc political appeals are unlikely to be made and even less likely to be heard. Second, intermingled population settlement patterns c:reate real security dilemmas that intensify violence, motivate ethnic "cleansing," and preve nt de-escalation unless the groups are separated. As a result , restoring civil poUtics in multi-ethnic states shattered by war is impossible because the war itself destroys the ' possibilities for ethnic cooperation . Stable resolutions of ethnic civil wars are possible, but only when the opposing groups are demograph ically separated into defen sible enclaves. Separation reduces both incentives and opportunity for further combat, and largely eliminates both reaso ns and chances for ethnic cleansing of civilians. While ethnic fighting can be stopped by other means, such as peace enforcement by international forces or by a conqu ering empire, such peaces last only as long as the enforcers remain. This mean s that to save lives threatened by genocide, the international community must abandon attempts to restore war-torn multi-ethnic states. Instead, it must facilitate and protect population move ments to create true na~onal ho~e ­ lands. Sovereignty is secondary: Defensible ethnic en.claves reduce. v10lence With or witho ut indep ende nt sovereignty, while partition wtthout separ~tion d~s no~­ ing to stop mass killing. Once massacres have taken place, et~mc.. cleanst~g v.~ll occur. The alternative is to let the interahamu;e and the Cbetmks cleanse therr enemies in their own way. th f 0 The remainder of this paper has three parts. The next part develops a . eory how ethnic wars end. Then I present a strategy for international r:ub·llitaryb. mtit~ rvent. .l and rebut possl e o ~ec ons o tion to stop ethnic wars and 'dampen fu ture VJO ence k . h ·t · . th ra1 d politic.al sta es m umaru anan tl11s strategy. The eonclusion addresses e mo an intervention in ethnic conflicts. ...

.. . ns to Ethnic Ci"il W~.- lntematiOIIol $ecfJrity. From Chaim Kaufmann. ''Possible and lmpoSSJble SolutiO ·d t . .d Fellows of Harvard Collegt> and tbe Vo! 20 ~ ·"' l996 b , the Prest en an · . No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136-17;:>. \l
~ ('i()

PART 4

CONTEMPO.KAKY

vvv•~

--

. .- -

~ --------.,

. in Ethnic wars HOW ETHNIC CIVIL WARS END t·.... c·t· 11 <.: · ·t'cs wf1iJc ideological <.:JVJ 1 wa1 , :m · < I)J IIc·-.(.., IJ<.; twc·"'-' ' 1.a<.:· • hetwccn t1JC; c:om m11 Ill J • • v .,J, clllld lw "'JV"r 12 over how that coJnrJIIIIlll unitv . .I. I . "' IJ('C . ,_, . . . . .. 'l tlO IIS Wl t 11 11 ( 1<' SanlC;: (;01 0 111 JIIil<> flIll.( I ITJ . tl , ff..-Xl' l)ility of lJ1dJV1Uilal IO\ahl<'' \\ luC'I1 arc· < . l · rt· • . • • TIH' k( 'V Ulii C:rCJlC:C '" H.: ""' . eompletefy ngJdJnc•tlllJH'\\ar-. '·t!., 1' 11 t aiJJJOst . . . . · J<. 1eo1o g'.K·a 1c:onfl 1<: ow f rclln tl 11·•' 1act. <·ti1111C.: <:1\ d ware., foll solutions to . . · · " Tll C possJ'I)Ic an d 1·1.,..possible \Var Ilard ens eth nic identities to the pomt that <.'roso,-c·LIIIII<' political appcal~ become· futile, which nleans that vi<:tory can he alic,u r<·.cl OJdy by phys ical <.:ontrol over the ten·itory in dispute. Ethnjc wa:s ~lso ge•~ <.: rat~ lll l <' ll!.(' S~'Cllrity dil<: Jnrni.l..\ both because the esealation of each stde s rnobd•zaiJOII rhc:lonc.: pn.•sc:nt<; a rcal threat to the oth er, and even more beeausc· i~tenn inglc·d pop11 lation scttlc·•-r1cnt pattc·rns ercate defensive vulnerabilitics and ~ffensi ve op_porr·_" ''i tics . . Onec this occurs, the war eannot end 11ntd th e sewn ty ddc• IJJJ IJa 1s rcdu<:ed h physical suparation of the Jival groups. Solution~ tktt a:i 111 at res toring llllllti-ethni~ civil polities and at avoiding population trans fers-such ~lli power-shari ng, stat·e rebuilding, or identity rcconstruction-<.:annot wo rk because they do nothing lo dampen the seeurity dilemma, and because ethnic fears and hatreds hardened by war arc extremely resistant to change. The result is that ethnic wars ean end in only three ways: wil·h complete vi<:tory of one side; hy temporary suppression of the conAict by third party military oc.;cupation; or by self-governance of separate eommunities. The reeord of the ethnjc.; wars of the la.">t half eentury bears this out.

The Dynamics of Ethnic War It is useful to compare c.:haracteristies of ethnic conAkts with those of ideological <.:onflicts. The latter are competitions between the government and the rebels for the loyalties of the people. The critical features of these conflicts are that ideological loyalties are changeable and diffic:ult to ac;sess, and the san •e population serves a~ the shared mobilization base for both sides. As a result, winning the "hemts and minds" of the population is both possible and necessary f()r victory. The most important instruments art! political, economic, and social ref(Jrms that reclress popular grievances such as poverty, inequality, corruption, and physieal insecuri ty. Control of access to population is also important, both to allow recro itrn<:!nt anu implcJnentatjon of refonn prornises, and to bl{)(;k the enemy from thcs<:! ta<>ks. Population con# troJ, however, ca~not be guaranteed solely by physical control over teni tory. hut ~epend~ ~n car~~~ intelligence, persuasion, and coercion. Purely military successes are often ~ndeclsJve as long as the enemy's base of political support is undamaged: " Ethm~ ~ars, however, have nearly the opposite properties. Jn<.livi<.lual lc~yaltJeS are both ngtd and transparent, while each side's mobilization base is Ji,mted to mem~ers of its.own. group in friendly-controlled ten·itory. The result is that ethuit oon]fhc:ts are pnmanly military struggles in which victory depends on physical c;ontro over the dispute·u1 tern·tory, not on appealc; to members of· the other grou· p·

. , . rt irr an not plav does JdentilJ _tJ.on to sway illdividualloyalties 1po ant ro1(; m cth 111 c , . .1 .. pet1 11 1 l>eeauS<' d lfiiC.: ll entitleS are fixed by birth While t . eo• no Cveryon(· may he . r· . . fj I . 'I ,vars, cj\11 Jized as l:tn aetJvc: g 1ter or hJs or her own grou p, hardly anvone ever n""' &'ts ' posing c-llllliC.: grou p. ,.,ob

fort~i~ferent i_dcn ti ty _e~t~?o.~ ~s i~ply th~ir ?~ membership rule.~. Jdeologkal

·dentit)' is relat•v<>~Y. ">of~· .as"Jt •_s -~ ~atter of JOtlJVJdual belief, or sometimes of poUt~cal behavior. RchgJOus •uen t~ti<:!S ~re harder, because while they also depend on 1 h. h r ,.. ;.t by the new 1w formal· acc:eptance generally. reqwres u1 , w 1c rnav · . · be1ief, change be denied. Eth ni.c identities are hardest, since they depend on language, c:wtur~, and religion, wlllc.: J. art! hard to change, as well as parentage, which no one c.-an

. .. change. Ethnic.: idenllt1cs are hardened further by mtense eonAi<.1., so that leaders cannot broaden their appeals to in~lude ~embers of opposing groups. A~ ethnic c.:onAittc; escalate, populat1ons eo me mcreasmgly to hold enemy images of the other group, either because of deliberate efforts by elites to ereate such images or because of increasing real threats. ... Once th e con Aict reaches the level of large-scale violence, tales of atrocitiestrue or invented- perpetuated or planned against members of the group by the ethnic enemy provide hard-liners with an unanswerable argument. In .March 1992 a Serb woman in Foea in Eastern Bosnia was convinced that "there were lists of Serbs who were marked for death. My two sons were down on the list to be slaughtered like pigs. I was listed under rape." The fact that neither she nor other to,vnspeople had seen any such lists did not prevent them from believi ng such ~es without question.4 The Croatian Ustasha in World War II went further, terronz:mg Serbs in order to provoke a backlash that could then be used to mobilize Croats for defense against Serb retaliation. In this environment, cross-ethnic appeals are not likely to attract members of the other group. The Yugoslav Partisans in World \Var 11 are often credited ~th transeending the ethnic conflict between the Croatian Ustas~a ~nd the SerbJ~ Chetniks with an anti-Cerman, pan-Yugoslav program. In fact 1t did not work. Tlto was a Croat, but Partisan officers as well as the rank and file were virtu~ly all ~erbs · al ma· de PartiSan . · \lctory_ and Montenegrins. Only in 1944, when Germ a~ Wl·th c1raw. certain, .1remuc Bosnian, too little Croat. ' one• 1a 0 ?roup security or ac; actually traito~ous. Such ar~;~~ ~. to assassinate Mahatma t of Rwancla in 1994. and •sts to overthrow President Makanos of Cyprus · 1948, to mac;sacre near1Ythe whole govemmen C·andh'1 m to kill Yitzhak Rabin in 1995.

7

462

PART 4

CONTEMP0RARY WORLD POUTlCS

1 · portan t identit y is often irnpc J~•"l .J) t 1' oppo')ing ~<.·co n cl an d more J rn • . . . . .. group 1 1 ·r t! l I 1·t nost mu rderous membe rs. Ass•m• alHH or }!'J ttlc:al passivity u· j spccJ K'. I lmg' > c:l1ange d. I ht· tl<:fin, · t· . we I>egan to hI? murder~ . . son of .• e 11Leen determined by our kdlers:' w1o I we are t·oda)· ,,,...,

. con trac•·s 11 rurther the longer the w• nAic:t contin ues. Multi-ethnic town ~ e h01ce • • as yet untouched by war are swamped by rad1ca1Jzed r~fugces, l~nd<:- nninin g mod. erate leaders who preach tolerance. For example, whde a poltJOll or the pre-war Serb populatjon remained in Bosnian go~em r n ent-co nlroii<J d Sarajcvo when tlr(· fighting started, their nu mbers have dedmed as the gmem rnent has taken on :t more narrowly Muslim religious character over years of war, and pressure on Serhc; has increased. Where 80,000 remained in July 1993, only 30,000 were left in August 199.5. The Tutsi Rwandan Pa~otic Front (HP F ) sl:owe~t remarkable restraint during the 1994 civil war, but smce tl1 en the RPF hac; 1mpnsoned tens of thousands of genocide suspects in appalLi ng conditions, failed to prevent massacres of thousands of Hutu civilians in several incide nts, and allowe d Tutsi syuatters to seize the property of many absent H utus. What can finally eli minate identity choice altogether is fear of genocide. The hypem ationalist rhetoric used for group mohilization often includes images of the enemy group as a threat to the physical existence of th e nati on, in turn justifying unli mited violence against the ethnic enemy; this threatening discourse can usually be observed by membe rs of the target group. Even worse are actual massacres of civilians, especially when condoned by leaders of the perpe trating group, whi<:h are virtually certain to convin ce the members of the targete d group that group defense is their only option . . .. 'l_;

Identifying Loyalties A consequence of the hardness of ethnic identities is th at in ethnic wars assessing individual loyalties is much ea')ier tJ1an in ideological conHicts. Even if some members of both groups remain unmobilized, as long as vi rtually none actively support the other group, each side can treat all co-eth nics as frie nds without risk of coddling an enemy agent and can treat all members of the other group ar.; enemies without risk of losing a recruit. Although it often requires e.fTort, each side can almost always iden ti fy memhers of its own and the other group in any territory it controls. Ethnicity can he identified by outward appearance, public or private rewrd'>, and local social lo10wledge. 111 ~eties where ethnicity is important, it is often offic:iaJJy recorded in personal ideutity do(.1Jments or in censuses. In 1994 Rwandan death squads used neighborhood target lists prepared in advance, as well as roadblocks that checked identity cards. Jn ! 98.3 ri~ inS~ Lanka, Sinhalese mobs went through mixed neighborhoo~ sele<-:~ mg Ta_mal dwe~ ~ f~r destru(.1:ion with the help of Buddrust monks carryt~ g. e:~r lists. ~le Jt might not have been possible to preclkt the Yugosl av CIVIl . . rty years 10 advance, one could have identi fled the memhers of each of the warnng

:raJ

J(At.JfMAN N I

I

v o.; ........ ~ ... ·- .....

'-J..J..>IU L..C.

~ULU

I IONS TO ETHNIC avrL WARS

46.1

orn the HJfll c<:- nsus. which idtntifi ed the national'ty f 1 0 fall b c~roups r . ut l.f) percent of r:pulahon. cl1e \\fbere public ree;ords are not adequate, private ones can bt used imtead World \Var IT Yugoslav censuses relit d on church records Ah t ds · pre- ,. ble demographk inteJJjgence e:an often be obtained fT~m 1~~~ anyth rec.~r at alJ re Jll d V\."al co-e mcs. ... · Finally, in u~prepare encoun ters ethnicity can often be gauged bv outward earance: Tutsts are ge nerally tall and thjn, while Hutus are relativeh: short and apP 1_._ Russia ns are generally fairer than Kazakh s. When phvsiognom : · h' . stoC ~'-~ , • ~ 1S am lguous, other signs_such as 1an~uage or_ accent, s~mame, dress, posture, ritual mutilation, diet, hab~ts, occup~ hon , regwn ~r ne1ghborhood ,,.;thin urban areas. or certain possessJOn.s may g1ve dues. Res1dents of Zagreb , for example, are marked Serbs by certam names , attendance at an Orthodox church. or possession of printed in Cyrillic. . . . Perhaps the strongest eVIdence of mtelligence reliability in ethnic conflicts is that- in dramatic contrast to ideological insurgencies- history records almost no instances of mistaken "cleansing" of co-ethnics.

:Oks

The Decisiveness ofTerritory Another consequence of the hardness of ethnic identities is that population control depends wholly on territo rial control. Since each side can recruit only from its own community and only in friendly-controlled territory, incenti,·es to seize areas populated bv co-eth nics are strong, as is the pressure to cleanse friendl~·-controlled territo~ of enemy ethni cs by relocation to de facto concentration camps, expulsion or massacre. 'Because of the decisiveness of territorial control, military strategy in ethnic wars is very differe nt than in ideological conflic ts. u nlike ideological insurge ~ts, who often evade rather than risk battle, or a counter-imurgent government, which might forbear to attack rather than risk bombarding civilians. ethnic combatants · thnic ""-ars are much must fight for everv piece of land. By contrast. eombat an ts m e · e' unfavorable batt1es because the)· cann · ot afford to abandon .an,·. less free to decun 1 t .. 1 se" it bv. massacre. expulsiOn, settlement to an enemy who 1.s l'k 1 ·e y o c ean . t'ton. B), the time a town can be destruction of homes , and poss1'bly eo1omza retaken, its value \-"'ill have been lost. .. tt bec"'use . e decisiv e Attntion ma ers ... In ethnic civil wars, mili tary operations ar · cl \lfost im rtant, the side's mobilization pools are separate and can be depfl~te · · . m npounitv in . . li ·t d t0 members o tts own co I · ., smce each side's mobilization base IS nn e . d es . . th ·'s popula hon centers re uc fnendly-contro lled territory, conquenng e enet11> · \filitarv . . dl 0\\ll. · .. Its mobilization base while loss of fnen Ysettlem ents reduce. s ones . , ' . . ta control of the entire teJTitory at 1ssue IStan mount to totah 1cton· ·

Security Dilemmas in Ethnic wars

th .

b anv remedY for severe e rue The second problem that must be overcome Y . •. f thnic strife. once \io.a, . • dJ . that 0 f the ongms o e COnJuct 1S the secUiity dilemma. Regar ess l ·t) reaches the pomt I· that contro s 1 ence (or abuse of state power by one group

PART 4

CONTEMpORARY WORLD POUTICS

KAVFMANN I POSSIBLE AND IMPOSSIBLE SOLUnONS

• t,· on the tate ·1·, • c·tnno t re tvll111llllll res • . ·iJ· . [I . ·ts own

to p rotect tlwm. ('ac:h "<>rn '" nrun·•t)· ethnic ·ec:uritY. r.'l' t· kc re pon lb lh or I . ntll!>t mou1 rzc to.·~ f . ell\; each uroup·s mobili;a! ion ('Onstitute . . V1l lt>r c:ondrhons o anar . ' F. I . s .t real t f' t1 rs r140 r n,·0 reasons. 1rst. t lt' nationalist rheto . h ecurih' o o le • ne th I t lreat to t e s b'l: . cten seems to and o lten does indi<:
·

•

•

Demography and security Dilemmas . The severity of ethnic security dilemmas IS greatest when demography is most internlixed.' weakest when communj~· settlements are most separate. The more mixed tJ1e opposing groups. the stronger the offense _in rei at~ on to th ~ clefense; the more separated they are, the stronuer the defense lil relatton to olfensc.6 \\'hen settlement patterns are extremely mixed, both sides are \l.Jinerable to attack not only by organized military forces but aJso by local militias or gangs from adjac-ent to·wns or neighborhoods. Since well-defined fronts are impossible, there is no effective means of defense against such raids. Accordingly. each side has a strong incentive at bot11 national and locallevels~to kilJ or drh·e out enemy populations before the enemy does the same to it, as well as to create homogeneous encla,·es more practical to defend. Better, but still bad, are well-defined enclaves \Vith islands of one or both sides' popuJations behind the other's front. Each side then has an incenth·e to attack to rescue its surrounded co-ethnics before they are destroyed by the enemy, as well a~ incentives to wipe out enemy islands behind its own lines, both to pre-empt rescue attempts and to eliminate possible bases for fifth columnists or guenillas. The safest pattern is a well-defined demographic front that separates nearly homogeneous regions. Such a front can be defended by organ ized milita1y forces, so populations are not at risk unless defenses are breached. At the same time the strongest motive for attack disappears, since there are few or no endangered co-ethnics behind enemy lines. Further, offensive and defensive mobilization measures are more clistinguishabJ~ wh~n po~~tions are separated than when they are mixed. Although hypernatio~t political rhetoric, as well as conventional military forces, have both offensJve and defensive uses regardless of population settlement patterns, some other fonns of ethnic mobilization do not. Local militias and ethnically based local self-governing authorities have both offensive and defensive capabilities when populations are mixed: Ethnic militias can become death squads, while IocaJ gov~mments dominated by one group can di~enfranchise minorities. When populations are separated, however, such local organizations have defensive value only.

TO EnfNlC CrvtL WARS

465

WaT and Ethnic Unm~xing_ . BeC•·tuse of thl· -.cc:unty dtlemma. ethnic war causes et11111c unm · · Tl 1 be~'·een Cre<"'C:L' anc Turkey. the partition oflndia. the 194JS-4g oong. '~ war . cl the rcc:en t " ·w· between Armenia and Azerb·u... . II Arab-1 raclr war. ,111 . . . ' Jn h .d e Y emrgrau . ' s on eac s1 e ~t or tl 1 liJlion lbo le ft nort lern ~igeria durirw the ~ igerian c· ·J \\' .F. 11 e . 1an one l I (' I f I . t" l\l ar. 0 0\\11111 191)3 gr 01 ns. threeourt 1s o t 1e Tamrl population of Col bo A ::. · . po... 1 ·j l1 an cl em;t o f t he 1s . Iand. Bv the end om et to the predomlantlv Tarm nort f nn I bo _ n 0 1 4 ' · 1 ·111 Serh-controlled areas · of Bosn ·a "" 'th· on1 'v a h ut tO·000 remamec non-Serhs . . . . . , · 1 • w1 ess t an 40,000 Serbs still m ~lu lrm-
Ethnic Separation and Peace Once ethnic groups are mobilized for war, the war cannot end until the populations are separated into defensible, mostly homogeneous regions. £,·en if an international force or an imperial conqueror were to impose peace, the conflict ,..-ould resume as soon as it left. Even if a national government were somehow re-created despite mutual suspicions, neither group could safely enbust its security to it. Continuing mutual threat also ensures perpetuation of hypemationalist propaganda, both for mobilization and because the plausibili~' of the threat posed b)' the enemy gives radical nationalists an unanswerable advantage over moderate_c; in intra-group debates. . . . . . . ulations Ethnic separation does not guarantee peace, but 1t allows 1t. Once poP . .. ti\e . s disappear·, war 1s. no longer are separated both cleansing an d rescue 1mpe1a . · more tern'ton· mandatoty. At' the same time. any attempt to setze . requues aalmaJor . . Thus the conventional militarv offenstve. con £lict chan ges from . one al . of muhr . t ,.pre·1 ' . . hi <7 COJl\·ention· tntersta e \ \ elf 11 emptive ethnic cleansing to somethmg approac nb cl t amntE'<' . · I 1M tual deterren<..-e oes 110 gu which normal deterrence dynamiCS app ~- u • he robabilit\· of outbreaks, <\S that there vvill be no further violence, but 1t reduces t P ' , well as the likely aims and intensity of those that do occurd. T k""'\' st·nce thejr popu. · Gree<..-e an ur " There have been no wars among BuIga:na. · ·I ·c1~ reached crisis on . ' 10 . Iem'e on C\· nnts '' tl u ' ·utition and popIation exchanges of the 1920s. E t11ruc L• ' .-.4 11 been zero suwe 1e P' 19 cl several occasions bet\veen 1960 an f · as ·. -1\l.eri ethnic con. . , d ki h . .. ion. The Armeman . , . u1ation exchange wluch followe Tur s 10' as ·an Nauomo-Karabakh . sparked by independence <.lemancls 0fthe most1·V Anneru, · c"'nque~t r> all of H1c:t of· ' a1 b . 1992. Anneman .v Autonomous Oblast, escalated to fuJI-sc. e war Y

.(()6

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTrCS

. . 'tl the land which formerly separatc·d it l'nm1 Annen i·• 1 1-.: ·tr.th tkh to·r~'l l~ l Wl l ' ' · liet rnearly ·111 members o (' eat:I1 gn)11p r·r
THEORIES OF ETHNIC PEACE Those considering humanitarian inten·ention to encl _ethni<: civil wars should set as their goal lasting safe!:)'. ratJ1er than perfect peace. Gt,·en th.e per~istence of ethnic rivaJJies, ··safety" is best defined as freedo~ from ~1~eats of ~~l~11C mu.rder, ex'})ro. pJiation. or expulsion for the overw~elmmg. m~JOnty of ~JVI~l;;~n~ o~ all groups. Absence of formal peace, even occaswnal teJ rOJ:sn~ or bo1.d.c.1 ski rm1shes, would not undermine th.is, provided tJ1at the great ma.1onty of CJvihans are not at risk "Lasting" must mean that the situation remains stable indefin itely
Alternatives to Separation Besides demographic separation, the literature on possible solutions to ethnic conllicts contains four main alternatives: suppression, reconstruction of ethnic identities, power-sharing, and state-building.

Suppression Many ethnic civiJ wars lead to the complete victory of one side and the forcible suppression of the other. This may reduce violence in some cases, but wilJ never be an aim of outsiders consideting humanitarian in te rvention. Further, remission of violenue may be only temporary, as the defeated group usually rebels again at any opportunity. Even the fact that ce1tain conquerors, such as the English in Scotland or the Dutch in Friesland, eventually pennitted genui.ne political assimilation after decades of suppression, does not recommend this as a re medy for endangered peoples today.

Reconstruction ofEthnic Identities The most ambitious program to end ethnic violence would be to reconstruct ethnic identities according to the "Constructivist Model" of nationalism. Constructivists argue ~at in~vid.ual and group identities are fluid, continually being made and remade m soctal discourse. Further, these identities are man ipulable by political entrepreneurs. Violent ethnic conflicts are the resuJt of pernicious group identities created by hypernati'on·alist myth-making; many inter-group conflicts are qut'te recent, as are the ethnic identities themselves. h The ~ey is elite rivalries withi n communities in which aggressive leaders use ypehrnatio~t propaganda to gain and hold ~ower. History does not 1natterl; · nave 1. . 1 leadet er past mter-comm uru·ty re1a tions in fact been peaceful or con.fl'ctua . ~rs ~1 redefine, reinterpret, and invent facts to suit their arguments. includd mg ege atrocities and exaggerated or imagined threats. This process can fee

wh

[(AUFMAN~ I POSSIBLE AND IMPOSSIB

.

.

LE SOLUTIONS TO EfliNl

CCIVll WARS

on itself. a~ nalJo.naltsts use the self-fulfillin . 467 . g nature of their aru" escalate> tiH• <:o11fhc:t and to J·ustify th e1r own p numcntc; both tics becomt·~ a <:ornpctition in hype . .ower, so that intra-eo . to rnahonahst . mmumtv pol· relations enter a tlesc.:ending spiral of v· 1 extremiSm. and inter-<: ' · . t. .. 1 . 'IO ence. ommunttv lt Jollo\\ S t 1at ethn1<: conHicts g · . .1 . . enerated by th . exclus1ve I ( entitles should he reversil)l b · e promotion of pem· .. . . . e )' encourllmn · di . l<.:1ous. 10 I adopt more >e111gn. m<:lus1ve identities Le d -o· g VJduals and ll'roups t . fl .1 'd . . . a erscan choos t h·. ...,. o the bas1s o )roaucr 1 en hties that transce d th th . e o mo thzc· suy>port on .. I I n e e ntc di .. class, or Clv1<: oya ty to the nation-st·tte 1 f • < • mem bers 0 f tb \lSton,.such a<. idcolocn., ,.,;, persuaded to adopt a larger identity, ethni<: anta onjsm e opposmg group, can be However, even if ethnic hostility can b g.. s should fade away. .. . . . e tonstll.lcted " th b I reasons to e 1eve that v1olent conHicts cannot b .. ' ere are strong . reconstruction · e retonstll.l<.:ted'' b· ·k h: harmony. Iclent1ty under cond'ti f. ae to et n1c: 1 · ons o. mtense conA' -t · 1. b impossible because onc.:e ethnic; groups are mob·J· d c lC LS prona ly ' 1ze ror war the , ·n 1 already proclucetl, ami will continue reproducing ,.al . .' . } Wl 'ave . r I . · , soc1 mstttut10ns and 0· h courses t at remwrce t 1e1r group identity and shut 0 t h d · .•s'd t·n· u or s out own eompetina 1 en 1 es. Replacement of ethnicity by some other basis r110 r pou''tiea1 1c·1enti·ncation . • • • • re~Uires that ~oh ~1cal parties h~ve cross-ethnic appeal, but examples of this in the m1dst of ethmc v1olence are vutually· impossible to find . . . . ln f:ac·t . e\ien , eth me · tension far short of war often undermines not just political appeals across ethnk lines but. al.so appeals within a s.ingle group for cooperation with other groups. In Yugoslav1a m the 1920s, Malaya m the 1940s, Ceylon in the 1950s, and in :\igeria in the 1950s and 1960, parties that advocated cooperation across ethnic lines proved unable to compete with strictly nationalist parties. Even if constructivists are right that the ancient past does not matter, recent history does. In tense violence creates personal experiences of fear, misery, and loss which lo<:k people into their group identity and their enemy relationship "~th the other group. Elite as well as mass opinions are affected: more than 5.000 deaths in the 1946 Calcutta liots convinced many previously optimistic Hindu and Muslim leaders that the groups could not live together. The Tutsi-controiJed government of Burunru, which had witnessed the partial genocide against Tutsis in Rwanda in 1962-63 and survived Hutu-led coup attempts in 1965 and 1969, regarded ~he 1972 rebellion as another attempt at genocide, and responded by murdenng between 100,000 and 200,000 Hutus. Fresh rounds of violence in 1988 and 1993-94 have reinforced the apocalyptic fears of both sides. . . Finally, literacy preserves atrocity memories and enhances thetr use for po~t­ ical mobilization. 7 The result is that atrocity histories cannot be reconstructed; \lCti ms can sometimes be persuade d to accept exaggera. ted atrocitv ·; tales· but c-annot be talked out of real ones. The result is that the bounds of debate are_ pennane~tl~· altered· the lea·1ers who used \1\forld War IT Croatian atrocities to whip up Ser '.an ' u h· h · nationalism in the 1980s were making use of a resource w IC ·Since then· rem:urn always available in Serbian political discourse. . . · e c1·vt·c ones 1 . h · ·d tities mto mc us1v If direct action to transform exclusiVe et ntc 1 e~ uJd c e nPace tem. · r . 1· tituhons eo enrorc 1-JS J01easibJe, outside I10Wers Or internatwna U1S . d .. te leaders . tl . ts would nPrnut mo eJa . porarily in the hope that reducecl secw·1ty 11 ea r

468

PART 4

coNJEMPO

RARY WORLD POUTICS

·econs truction of JJlOr'· i en. 4n identities \A 'l. . t0 IJromote tl Je I . l. . . ·v Id . \\ithin eac I1 gwup . . . . to adol)t an ovenll'c 1111~ ..."n'•tv may bu. c . I . ' af survw ots r • , "' lll1pos persuading et tmc \\ c • ·od of uuaranteecl saf1·~ !'1 l!,hl allow mod · . ffi · tJy prolongec1pen o . , . crate stble. a su eren f l ·t extrem e h)'Per nat IOJ•aH ~'" hack tow·:t r(l . . . 501 · 11e o t 1e m0 .s . . c .s rnor leaders to temper t'on·•lt 'sms. However. thts stdlle.wes both 51·tl . e . 11 . . ·u pa.rate na ] n ' . . . • <.!S VUIberugn. a )eJt sh se. aJ f h 'P"rnationalislll bv radl(:a l polrt1 <:al eutre pr'"n I· t evw o ) ~· / nerabl. e to a er r . , k e ers have left and secu rity threats once again "'apcurs' espec1ally after tl1e peace e P Pear more realistic.

Powe r-Sha ring . · mu1n·-c·tl1mc · . s·tates ". lS · power . d I d I J pn'nt for ciVJC r)eace 1Tl -sh·u . The best- eve ope ) ue d .. . . c 1 ng

f(AUFMA J'\1\ / POSSIBLE AND IMPOSSIBLE SO

LUTIONS TO cn-u... .._ • nNlC CfVTL WARS

ing tl1t· ,, •. a~ c ·r -;idc, hlocka cl ing tltc ·t 469 ;U 1 < • s ronger or p· l'all ...1' ar 1• ydisanninath IJ\. dire<:! nnbt· 1! I lll t~'tventioll. When hot! 1 'itucs rc·ll'·17 . 1 n t· '>trnnge '·in" till' Ill l'O..,b )I ll no profit , they WiJ\tl , . . < .C t lat further fia\ t· .r I>' o I .1 · . cgotia te an .1 r ,..., 1 m!; '"'ll ,v<"r ;tlthm lg; 1 1 popu lcttiOIIS are still int, • . 'g eernun t. This can\) 1 rO ' . . ,

11

. "' llltng1cc1it Ilia il1anc:e ·lent tl1r' tymg, 1 t::1 t ' MC y to tlistrus t 1 o a central r e<• . ' potentiall~ be used aga1~s_t them. . . . govtrnment that could The final approach 1s mternational impositio f . . n o power -shann g 1 ·1 >t:ClJl)v ing the c:ou nt1y to eocm.: e both sitl<•s ( irlt<> . .. . · I · w \IC ' rt·quires 1 · · ct<:<.:ep tmg t l<; aor , hn ic.: violt·nce untiJ it can be imple111 , t _1 Th .~ €emc•nt and to [>revent in tc•r-et 11 eu. . l } c e 111tcrven h ever. cannol I) IlK t w stronger side to upholtl the agrt' ,. . trs, ow1 " . . ·l j· . ement a ter the mtcrve nti forces leave. . . . Tl1e 13ntis 1 < td 1 111I)OS C power -sh·lri ng. .I· . . on . ' a<; a <:OnUlt iOn lor (\ )Jio intlepenclence, 1mt 1t broke tlown almost immetliatel)· Tl G k , ·.1 . t ts incensecl 11y wI1at t I1c.:y saw as Turki.sh C)nriot abuse of tl1e·· 1c· .ree · C\-pno r . lr mmontv veto.' im )h• oven·ode the veto and operatetl the 011ovemment in violation of th · . _I · . cl e constit 11iJ e at m ependenc:e in 1948 the Sri Lankan c:·onst·tu... bution ' Simila rly, w . . . . . I u011 . annet reHg10us 01: communal ~1sc:nmmation , the Sinhal ese rnajority promptlv disenfran-1 chised half of the Tamil s on the grounds that they were actuallv Indians. and increasingly discliminated against Tamils in education, govemme~t employment. and other areas. · I .

1 approach asstlln . . aid ocracv" proposed by Aren Lljp1u1rt. 1us or "consoc1atio n em ;• ~ I · es · t th . .ty 1-5 somewhat manipulable, but not so ree y as const ructivists say tha e rue• . a: · r· 1 · · 1 · . di ·s·on howev er, need not result in conm ct; even 1 · po 1hca rnobiJ ization is EtJ11llC VI I ' b . . d .f tJ . I' . l tl ·c lt'nes civil politic s can e mamt orgamzec on e m1 , ·. . .ame 1 e 1111c. e 1tes adher · e to a . -shan·ng bar""; 11 that equ1tably protec ts aU gtoups. The key components are· power 0 cu. . • d. . . . I) joint exercise of govemmentali:>O'"~-e~·; 2) prop~ttio~al .. JSb1bu.tJon of govem ment funds and jobs; 3) autonomy on ethmc 1ssues .(wh1ch, 1f g10u~s a1 ~concentrated territoriallv, may be achieved by regional federation ); and 4) a mmonty veto on issues of vital imPortance to each group . Even if powe~-shruing ea?avert ~otential ethnic c:onJlicts or dampen mild ones, our concern here J.S whether tt can bn.ng peace under the conditions of intense violence and extreme ethnic mobilization that are likely to motivate intetvention. The answer is no. The indispensable componen t of any power-sharing deal is a plausible minority veto, one which the strongest side will accep t and which the weaker side believes that the stronger will respect. Traditions of stronger loyalties to the state than to parochial groups and histories of inter- ethni c compromise could provide reason for confidence, but in a civil war these will have been destroyed, if they were ever present, by the fighting itself and accompanying ethnic mobilization. OnJy a balance of power among the competi ng groups can provide a "hard" veto- one which the majority must respect. Regional concentrati on of populations could partially substitute for balanced powe r if the minority group can credibly threaten to secede if its veto is overridden. In any situation wher e humanitarian intetvention might be considered, however, these conditions too are unlikely to be ~et. Interventions are likely to be aimed at saving a weak group that canno t defend ttself; b~anced sides do not need defense. Dem ographic separation is also unlikely. beca~~e if th~ populations were already separated, the ethnic cleansing and related atroc1ties whiCh are most likely to provoke intervention wouJd not be occuning. . The core reason why powe r-sharing cannot resolve ethni c civil wars is that it is mh~rently .volun.taristic; it requires conscious decisions by elites to cooperate to avOid. ethnic stnfe. Unde r conditions of hypem ationalist mobilization and real secu~ty threats, group leaders are unlikely to be receptive to compromise, and ~ven ~they are, they cannot aet without being discre dited and replaced by harderline nvals.

Gerald Helm an and Steven Ratner argue that states in which government breakdown. economic f~1ilure, and internal ,;olence imperil their own citizens and threaten neighboti ng states can be res<:ued by international "consenes invohing massh·e violations of hurnan rights or the prospect of large-sca.le warfare, the international community could act even without an invitation. As with imposing powe r-sharing. this requires occupying the co.untry (~d ~1a~· require conqu ering it), coercing all sides to accep t a democratic (.'()nstitution. enforcing peace until elections can be held, and admin.ister!n g the economy and the elections. Conse 1vatorship thus requjres even more finesse than enforced powe r-sharing, and probably more miUtary risk_s. . .. . f>_ .. _ Helm an and Hatne r cite the UN intervenhon 111 Cambodia m 199... 93 to cJe ... c c f' · s as cons , 'en·at or"'hip 's best •succ-ess. •However, ale a sare environme nt tor ree e1ection < " • . t1 tIus was an ideological war o,·er 1e govemance ofC·•m " bodia · not an ethmc confl1hct . b .· g the counhv Bv contrast. t e over disempowe ring minorities or d!Smem . eun . . . ·· ' b Lildi growth of the V .S.-U N mission in Somc.tlia fro m farnme reUef to sh.l~e- rf: tB ~~ was a failure, and no one has been so boId as, to prop<)Se· consen'ators h•p or osru.t

to ad?<>uld out.,ide intervention make power-sharing work? One approach would be ~ust the balance ofpower between the warring sides to a "hurting stalemate" by

or Rwanda. . . ' ffi . ·vel . and cheaply stop an ethnic Even if conservators.hi11 could rap,dl~ . e ectJ >• h' Id be aained · . f . lection s not mg wou t:7 CJvt1 war, rebuiJd institutions, and ensure Jee e ·

State-Building

.•ro

PART 4

·MPORARY WORLD POUTICS CONTE

J
• ,.0 wc:tcd all parliC'!> 11 11 r · • • a nd sal(: ty· 1I . . •lc •ctonl o~tlc.:om< 11 . · ' l.tl , · 11 unIl'~s l <• l • . ·ccss·trv. T hus, 111 Sl'l'I PIJ' l'l 1 "' ('onll ic:ls <.:· \ · 1 rid str 1 w ne · • ·1 • • C>nst:rv 11 power-sI1anug wot · • exnensive way to r<' a<'h tlw ~•t:r• l it npas!-.e. · a. .

torship wou ld only be H rnorc .,.

!ABLE J •

ETII!\IC CIVIL WARS RESOLVED

combatants

- Military victory ( A.

Ethnic Separation . .. • •• of a particular confi ic:t , onc:e eonllntntil i<•s an· 11101.1.. Re. aSitllg p<•a<.;(• I'CC . and dc·-escaIatron o 1 . . ]lllrt·l. 1 . .h, dilemma. The most efli·ctave am 111 rnanv eases lh•· 1 rcmova I of l I1e secun.1 . . , • • . • . • • . .... on} . tO .SCI>·Jr·~tC' the ethmc g10ups. f hc• lliOI'I llllC liS<; the vrnk•n<.;r-. L] way to do t111.s IS < ' ~ • ' , 1e .k I ·t ·s ~llat separation will be the only opllon. more l, e y 1 1. ' . . The exact threshold re mains an open. qt~f>Stlc~n. The·. dc·d uetive logi<.: ol' tht: proble m suggests that the critical varicl~JJ~ IS l ~ar fo r S IIIV 1VH I. O r~(;(• a majority or either group comes t~ belie-ve th
or

How Ethnic Wars Have Ended At least 46 significant ethnic civil wars have e ndecJ since 1944.1-i Of the total, nineteen. ~ere ended by the military victmy of one side, sixteen by de j twe or de facto partitr~n, and two have bee n suppressed by military occ upatio n by a third pHrty. Only nr ~~ ethnic civil wars have been e nded by a negotiate d agreeme nt that did not partition the country. (See Table 1.) !he.d~ta suppo..rt the argume nt that separation of g roups is the key to ending ~thmc CIVIl wars. Every case in which the state was preserved by agreement m~oJved a regionally concentrated minority, and in eve 1y case but one the solution remforced th~ ethnic role in politics by allowing region ally co ncent rated mi n~rities to ~n.trol their own destinies th rough autonomy for the regions whe re they fonn a ma,on~ of the population. South Africa is a partial exception , si nce the main element of the agreement was majority rule, although eve n in this case the powers reserved to th£"' ()roVJ·nces . ouer rr some autonomy to whites, coJo re cls, an d Zulus.

Dates

NICCIVILWARS

47 L

194 4- 1997

Deaths (OOOs)

Outcome

•

19):

Kurds vs. Iran Karens. others vs. Myanmar

45-SOs 45-

Chtnese vs Mali:lya Tibetans vs. China Hmong vs. Laos Katangans vs. Congo Papuans vs. Indonesia Blacks vs. Rhodesta lbos vs. Nigeria Hmong vs. Thailand Palestinians vs. Jordan Timorese vs. Indonesia Aceh vs. Indonesia Tigreans, others vs. Ethiopta Uighurs etc. vs. China Sikhs vs. India Bouganvilleans vs. Papua Tutsis vs. Rwanda Shiites vs. Iraq

48-60 51 -89 59-72 60-64 64-86 65-80 67- 70 67-80 70 74-82 75-80s 75-91 80

B. De facto

LUTIONS TO ETH

84

88 90-94 91

40 400

15 lOO

50 100 19

so 2000 .30 15 200 15 .600 2

25 1 750 35

Suppressed LargE:IJ >oppressed sporadiC VJOit:-nce' Suppre>sed Suppressed Suppressed Suppressed Suppressed Rebels VJCtonous Suppressed Suppressed Suppressed Suppressed Suppressed Rebels victorious Suporessed Suppressed Suppressed Rebels vtctonous Suppressed

or de jure partition ( 16):

Ukrainians vs. USSR

44-50s

150

Lithuanians vs. USSR

45-52

40

Muslims vs. Sikhs, Hindus (India) Jews vs. Arabs (Palestine) Eritreans vs. Ethiopia Turks vs. Cyprus Bengalis vs. Pakistan Armenians vs. Azerbaijan Somali clans

46-47 47-49 61 -91 63- 74 71 8888-

.500 20 250 .10 1000 15 350

South Ossetians Russians vs. Moldova Slovenia vs. Yugoslavra Croatia vs. Yugoslavia Serbs vs Bosnia Abkhazians vs. Georgia

90-92 9291 91-95 92-95 92-

1 1 30 150 15

Chechnyans vs. Russia

94-97

.20

2

Suppressed; later Independent \991 Suppressed; later independent 199 i Partition 1947 Partition 1948 Independent 1993 De facto partition Independent 1971 De facro partition De facto partttton tn N.; ongoing tn S De facto partiuon De tacr.o partttton Independent 1991 Independent 199 1 De facto partttlon De facto partruon. sporadiC vto!ence De facro partr1ion

PART 4

CONTEMPU.KJU~t

J~ ltlLt:: ANo IMPos SIBLE SOLUTIONS TO~:">"

., ..... -

Deaths 00\~~;;:. , ~AB~LE~I~·~c:co~n~t~in~ue~d~)-~~=-----~;&; Dates

~==-Outcom=--e

~C~o,~n~ba~t~a~nt~s-----------~-------· ----- ----- - --. g Jrd party military occup d ion (2) :

C. Conflic t suppressed by ongotn 60Kurds vs. Iraq _90 75 Lebanese Civil War

D. Regional Autonomy Agreements (8): 52-75 Nagas vs. India 59-80S Basques vs. Spain 67-89 Tripuras vs. India 72-87 Moros vs. Philippines 73-77 Baluchis vs. Pakistan 75-89 Chittagong hill peoples vs. Bangladesh Miskitos vs. Nicaragua Mayas vs. Guatemala

215 120

13 1

13 50

.5 24

81-88

1

61-97

166

D f.

. e acto partition Nominal power sh . anng· d e facto Partition .

Autonomy 1972 Autonomy 1980 Autonomy 1972 Limited autonomy 1990 Limited autonomy Limited autonomy 1989 Autonomy 1990 Limited autonomy 1997

E. Power-sharing Agreements (I): Blacks vs. South Africa

60s-93

20

Modified majority rule

There is not a single case where non-ethnic civil politics were create d or restored by reconstruction of ethnic identities, power-sharing coalitions, or state-building. Further, deaths in these cases average roughly five times lower than in the wars which ended in either suppression or partition: slightl y more than 30,000, compared to about 175,000. This lends support to the proposition that the more extreme the violence, the less the chances for any form of reconciliation. Finally, it should be noted that all eight of the cases resolved through autonomy involve groups that were largely demographically separated even at the beginning of the conflict, which may help explain why there were fewer deaths.

INTERVENTION TO RESOLVE ETHNIC CIVIL WARS International inteiVentions that seek to ensu re lasting safety for populations endangered by ethnic war-w hether by the United Nations, by major powers with global reach, or b~ regional power s-mus t be guided by two principles. First, s_e~em ents must aun at physically separating the warring communities and establishing a bal~ce of relat~ve strength that makes it unprofitable for either s~~e to ~mpt .to reVISe the t~rntorial settlement. Second, although economic or milit~ ass~ce may suffice m some cases, direct miJHary inte1vention will be necessal) when aid to the weaker side would create a window of oppor tunity for the stronger, or when there is an imm diat e . e need to stop ongoing genocide.

pesign in ~

""HNIC CIVJL

Settlements

WARs

473

•rs are wi lli11g to nrovi l V nless. ontsJd( l . . .·1 L' t e perm·m, t ·cJn of an c l IT;H.: <.:JvJ war rccluires . " . . < en sc<.:u•ity O'llar· t t1 • • separation r I ,..,~ an ecs stahl IS den1ographv t . ~ t 1c grot 1ps into .1 • . • . e T(;soluTl1e criti<.;ctl · ,mable . . "• no S<were•vnty p . . u<. 1ens•hit r · ·e}Jaration ll'ns tl . •a H>ugn the mo . L·- • e 1n1c: con)I I ing, the smn er t le pro~pe<;ts for prcserv;ng. . I re mtenc;<:; the previa C! .. .1 I . cl smg e stat , , ·r us nghtPartJtlo n \\1t 10ut et 1mc: sepOc;ely f<:-d t t .1 . m<:reases <.:onfl' ·t b <::u . aries of sovc·re•gn su<.:<.;essur states m· ty pro ._1 d. . I<.: ecausc, while rabollT .I . . r I . . VJuc c.: 1cnsihl f. tuvulnerabJllt)' o t 'le lllHJOnty group in each t· , . · e •onts tl1at retlu(;e the .. . .R . s ate, stdy-behmu . . .. l S pletely eli.'POs~c . 1gn1 <.;ant 1rreden ta are both a <:all to their m~nontits art tomdanger to thc1r hosts. They create incentives t ethnJ(; homeland and a r 0 tl · operations I>eJOre t11e situation solidifi es. Cree<.o:e'smount .rescue . . r e ll1l(; deanl>ing 1920 tined in this way, while the 1947 decision to pa t't· Pmalva-;•~n ofTurkeywa-; jus. 1 l • ton , estme gen t d .. war in advance of Imp ementation and the Lnclus· f M . era e a (;J\'J\ . . IOn o us1•rn-ma· 'tv K l . ,vitJ1in l nwa has helped <.:ause three wars Intema ti 1 .. JOn ' as Hmr . . cl d . ona recogmtion of Croatian and Bosman m epen en<.:e d'd 1 more to <:ause than to t S b' . . . . . . ] .. s op er tan mvas1011 . The wa1 betwee n Armema an c Azerb·c11Jan ha.<; the same sou . . cl . . . . 1 ., .· . k . · . . rce, a~ o concerns over the mte1nat1ona s~cw Lty :1s s_ of the several Russmn cliasporas. y dilemmas t d ·th · .Inter-e thmcclisecunt . . can be nearly. or wholly elim·n 1 a e w1 out partition 1f th~ee co~ tions are met: Ftrst, there must be enough demograpruc: separation that ethmc regtons do not themselves <.:ontain mili.tarilysignificant minorities. Second, there must be enough regional self-defense capability that abrogating the autonomv of any region wouJd he more costly than any possible moth·e for doing so. Third. I~ autonomy must be so complete that minority groups can protect their key interests even lacking any influence at tl1e national level. Even after an ethnic war, a single state <.:ouJd offer some advantages, not least of which are the economic benefits of a mmmon market. However, potential interven ers should recognize that groups that control distin<.:t territories can insist on the de facto pa1tition, and often will. While peace requires separation of groups into distinct regions, it does not require totaJ ethnic purity. Rather, remaining minorities must be small enough that the host group does not fear them as either a potential military threat or a possible target for irrede ntist rescue operations. Before the Krajina offen h·e, for e>.Ot a:a t It• • •1 • lik-eldo spar conruc . ltary vulnerabilitv and an irredentist opportwuty, ;;mu so are • . . b . be at . " . h . ll 'ts \1usllm maJontv, as en IS not surprising that India's portion of Kas lnJJ, ~1 11 · I . h ·m·1ues today. . · ·1115· 1vencr w uc C'OO · thc center of three interstate wars and an ongom g uo illi MusUms who while there has been no international conflict o,·er the hun.c. ~:ttl~niolenre. ~ d ve isperse d tJu-oughout most of the rest of' 1ndi a. ill td relatt,·e1·Yu e ' t

ked

PART 4

4i4

~ rl'f:' A11J(JJ
C01'f • ._n

H V'....... ,' - -

. . I . ter-!TTOLIP houndarie. sho·lld . ~ l\\ 1\ along the b • \\ he>n.' po_·. rb e.h'·"· . ~rs alld mountain range~ · ' '>floukl also be,,.. est 11 ·i _, t 'n~un sue ,\:s ' • r . "" s110rt t I(' I t'll~ ' t ~. ' • . ·e t •Jossible nwnn ing c>: ' • • ','lt\'l' fronts . A . . 'bl • t0 allo"' t11e 1w ,l\1 t · · · cce;<; •'-' J~.l. "' <: · • . dl 11 eiahbor i also impo rtant. h ll 1 tr.H le and for po 'b s t0 tl 1e e·t or to a 1nen \ c 11 1 __ • • . · ~ssor state ~u·senals hou c 11. • • um raged , by aid tsstt] le mthhtn· ru ·rst.-mce. 5 ucc<: r 1. .: ., o 1e · . . tl e ·tron r-bombers cl that cou]d mak'e o b ff" . • an •· 'I ill . Tl e e condi tions \\'ould make u cyu<.> nt o ensl\·es exc:eeu·•·, ng1v mour e art en. l · e.'--pensh·e and like!~· to fail. ·

Intervention Strategy The le\·el of international action required to resoh'e an ethn ic war \\ill depend on the militarY situation on the ground. If there L an exi~ti ng tale mate along <.lefensible lines..the international community should simpl~, recognize and strenuthen it. pro\iding transportation. protection. ~d rese ttlement assi. tanc:e .for refugees. However, where one side has the capacity to uo on the offensl\·e agamst the other, intervention will be necessary. Interventions should therefore almost alwa~-s be on beha lf of the weaker side: the stronuer needs no defense . .\loreo\·er. unle s the inte rnational communitY can . agree on a clear aggressor and a clear \ictim. there is no mon·Uor political case for inten·ention. If both sides have behaved so badly that there is little to choose between them. intervention should not and probably ,,ilJ not be undertaken.9 Almost no one in the \Vest. for instance. has advocated assistinu eithe r side in the Croatian-Serb l'Onfuct.H1 \ Vhile tJ1e interventio n itself could be carrie d out by any willing actors, U~ sponsorship is hiuhly desirable, most of all to head off possible ext ernal aid to the group identified as the aggressor. The three available tools are sanctions, military aid, and direc t military inter\·ention. Economic sanctions ha,·e limited Je,·erage against combatants in ethnic wars, who often see their tenitoriaJ security requi reme nts as absolute .... \ \11ether military aid to the client can achieve an acceptable te nitorial outcome depends on the population balance between the sides, the local geography. and tl1e organizational cohesion of the client group . ... The ... prob lem witJ1 '"arm·s length" aid is that it cannot prevent etlmic aggressors from killing mem bers of the client group in tenitories from which they expect to have to retre at. Aid also does not restrain pos~ble atrocities by the client group if their military fortunes impro,·e. . I~ the client is too weak to achieve a viable separation with mate rial aid alo~e, or~ either or both sides cannot be trusted to abide by promises of non-retribu~on ~amst enemy civilians, the intern ational comm unity must designate a separation li~e ~d ~eploy an intervention force to take physical contr ol of the territmy on tlle client s side of th~ line. \Ve might call this approach "con quer and divide." The separation campaign is waged as a conventional military operation. T~e larger the forces committed the bette r, both to minimize intervenors ' casual~es and to shorten the campaign by threatening the opponent with overwheLn:rn! defeat. Although some argue that any intervention force woul d become mired Ill ~

l(J\lJFl\1AN~ ' POSSLBLE AND IMPoss IBLE SOLlJTIONS TO ~.. . ..., rmlC CIVU. WARS Vietna111-1 h<. qu agm ire, the fundamentall ' .

_ 47.,

neans th<• the rnain pitfalls to fore· . ·J·) dtfferent nature of eth . ' .h rgn mJ Jtarv . t . 11!C: confl.j t ttencies are e1t er weak er or absent ~ . , m en:enbons in ideolnai·-·' . <: o I l . I · · ost rmportant th . -o·\.41 rnsur. rob elll~ ;..~re 11111<: 1 S!mp er. since Jo ·aJty . · e mterv enors' int Jj·1 P . . · Y tntelli gen . · easier: 0 uts1tle rs c:an safelv a'isume t} . ce 1s 1)Oth less imporeta gen<.-ed ' 1at members 0 f th a]J· nt an and those o.r t11e ot her are enem ies E ·r . e · red group are Fri ds ' cl h . ven l outsrders en v of guides P .cl cl b c-anno t tell locals can. an t· e ·lovalt the group s a art ' . ' roVJ e Y the I I aJI . P · a result. the marn mtelbgence task shifts f · . ~<.-a ) can be counted on. As . h major powe rom assessmg lo . lti forces. a tas k' 01r W 111C r mil't· . :a es to 1OCating enem\' 1 anes . On t 11e grouncl, the intervenors would bare. verv· eaPable. and uradu alh- advance to car)ture the enti egm at one end of the target rP.oinn · o • . . re target territo · . . - e-r· ous front the entrre tJme. It is not necessary t . ry, mamtammg a contintJfriendl)' ground forces need never cross theod~~~qu;r th~ whole country: indeed. are dri\·e n out of each loealitv civilians of t1 gn ed lmt. After enemy forces . d '' ethnic aroup ·h0 . behind are mtem e , to be exchanged after the1e enemv Tb·· o "' remam . . . . war. 1s removes the enem\''s local b support ase. preventing countennsu raenc)· probl fr .. · · . I Id b d b o ems om ansma 0 . Enemv ci\ilrans s 10u e protecte . \'close supenision of client t . . . · · roops m action as well as b . foreign control of intemees. · \ The final concern is possible massacres of chilians oft11e li t · · . . c en group m temtory not ) et captured or be) ond the planned separation line. Some of this must ~ e.>.pected..since ongoing atrocities are t11e most likeh-impetus for outside m· t . ti . . l th . . en on, tl1e question 1s w 1e er mtervention actually increases the risk of attacks onenchilian s. A major advantage of a powerful ground presence is that opponent beha\ior can be coerced by threatening to advance t11e separation line in n>taliation for anv atrocities. Once the military campaign is complete and refugees ha\·e been re;ettled, further reconstruction and military aid may be needed to help the client achieve a \iable economy and self-d efense capability before t11e inten:enors can depart The ease of exit will depend on the regional geography and balance of power. Bosnia has sufficient population and skills to be made economical!~· and militarily \iable. prmided that access to the outside world through Croatia is maintained. Although the weakness of the Turkish Republic of ~orth em c~'PTUS has required a pennanent Turkish garrison, the almost equal weakness of the Creek Cypriots allows the ganison to be small , cheap, and inacti\·e. li.S. Operation Pro\i~e.Comfo~ helps secure the Kurclish encla\·e in northern Iraq by prohibiting Iraqr arr operation: as well as by threatenul u air strikes ae1runs t an Iraqi ground in\'asion of the regton. 0 0 . . . . the 1raqt· Kurds are landlocked This mterventio n has no easv eXIt, however. Sllce . . ' . h . . • and threatened b)' Turkey wluc rs wagmg a \\ar .against its 0 ,m Kurdish mmonh~·k ' . · · ] rkev as well as Iraq, a tas • Real security for the Kurds might requtr. e partitJ Omng u , ' no outsid e actor is willing to contemplate. · · ·

OBJECTIONS TO ETHNIC SEPARATION AND PARI f'l ION }\ · ethnic . ,ltion as poUcy for reso mg There are five important obtections toe c sepan 1 tiO'n exchanges cause • · J • • a ' ... conflicts: that it encourages splintenng 0f st~t~~· that .popu to intemational ones. that human suffering, that it simpIy trans•ron·ns c1vil wars m ·

. .

thni .

476

PART 4

i
CONTEMPORARY WORLD POLITICS

rurnp states \VI'11 not

. . nd t1Jat in the enJ. it c!\ • be vrr' 1J 1e ' a '

' '14 to resolve cth .

n1<.;

antagonisrns. . . . 1 rgani7.-ations, westem le· :• · · .r rd Sl'holars p nost .ntemattona o , · • opul· Among I . . e anathema. They conlrad, c I ri~hed westem ··' a. ·I · ges ·md partitiOn ar Vutucs oon exc 1an · '. . 1 on the intemational lega1 101 IT 1 state sovcreignh., · r ·a1 ·nteCTraoon tramp e ll . .,, and o SOCl r o·-1 , I' . tllat have been condemnet )\ r '· >\t of the world ( . t a ticu ar po 1c1es . ·· c:.v sugges P '. .. ,..,.;n· of Cyprus). The integnh of .st, tc•<; a11d their bnr·l ~·· 1i k · ulaterm1 pa• u o11 .r • • ' uen; IS ur eys Lll lt principle whiJe self-deternurmtion lakes second pia . · t · suall)' seen as a paramour ' . . . <.:c. n u . . ·ng lives mav reqULre rgJlonng statc·-t:cntcreu legal n ethnrc wars 11oweve1, savr · 1 cl I I orms. .• 1 ' . ·c sepa· n<1tion must •be compare lo I H' rrtn r

Partition Encourages Splintering of States If international interventions for ethnic separation encou rage s~ce~sion attempts elsewhere, they could increase rather than decrease global ethn1c v1olence. However, this is unlikely, because government use of force to suppress them makes almost all secession attempts extremely costJy; only groups that see no viable alternative try. What intervention can do. is redu~e loss oflife w~1ere .states are breaking up anyway. An e.xpectation that the mtemationaJ commumty \VIU never intervene, however, encourages repression of minorities, as in Turkey or the Sudan, and wars of ethnic conquest, as by Serbia.

Population Transfers Cause Suffering Separation of inte1111ingled ethnic groups necessarily involves significant refugee Rows, usually in both directions. Population transfers during ethnic conflicts have often led to much suffering, so an obvious question is whether foreign intervention to relocate populations would only increase suffering. In fact, however, the biggest cause of suffering in population exchanges is spontaneous refugee movement. Planned populati.on transfers are much safer. When ethnic conflicts turn violent, they generate spontan~us refugee movements as people flee from intense fighting or are kicked out by netghbo~, marauding gangs, or a conquering army. Spontaneous refugees freq_u~ntly su~er ~ect attack by hostile civilians or armed forces. They often leave preC1pita~ely, wtth madequate money, transport, or food supplies, and before re~ef can be orgaruzed. They make vulnerable targets for banditry and plunder and are often so needy as to be likely perpetrators also. Planned population exchang,es can address all of these risks by · fu . and security operations in advance. th prepanng re gee relief 1 and ~ ~ ~ 947 lndia-Pakistan exchange, nearly the entire movement of between 12 d ~ lion.people took place in a few months. The British were surptised by clle speed wtth wluch this movement took place and were not ready to control, support. an protect the refug E · ' 1 first stag f h ees. stimates of deaths go as high as one million. In t 1e · h ~~ odst efpopulation exchanges among Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey in the I920s. unure o thousands of fu ' d ban· ditry and e re gees moved spontaneously and many died ue to '. f xposure. When after 1925 the League of Nations ueployed capable relie

1

. .

LE SOLUTIONS TO ETH NJC CrvTL WARS

. n.riees. tl • 1 'lll
separation Merely Substitutes lntem t' . a Ional for Civil Wars

Post-sepuralroll wars are possible, motivat"d . h . l<.: s11spccts t I1e othe:r of reVlS·e. .eJ. t er . or by security fears 1.f' orw SJC. I bv' reva·neIusm IOilLSt p ans Tl r ' eost of sueI1 wars, IH>wever m11 st be com . d · · •e requency and hutnan . I I • pare to t 1le like! ' . . separatll1g. W J<.:Jt t 1e alternative is interco ) <.:onsequcnccs of not 1s1aughte . . mmuna . 1s . the onlv defensible cI10rc.:e. r, separatton , In fact the record of hventieth-centurv etl · . . . . . . · 1 11 ' partitions 1s faJrl .1 T.h tion 0'1 Ire an<. lets produced no interstate VI.lnJe; I . al h ) goou. e parti. o ence · l ou h · len<.:e continues in demographically m· d N rtl · g mter<.'Omrnunal vioJxe l o lem Ireland 1 u·. . d ki have fought two wars since partition one in 1gc 15 h .. alnl •a.an Pa stan ' u; over et nrc· y rnrxe<.l Kasl 1 . while the :;econd in 1971 resulted not from ln<.lo-Pakis·~ . , . . "1- · • . mlr. . . . A· l llanr state nv<wv or HmduI li Mus m re 1grous con 1ct Jut from ethnic con.Bict be" . (" ' . ) 'ki . . . cl'. · " . . ~'\ een VI est Pa stanrs and al Beng IS. In r,lll mtervention 1esolved the conflict b\· enabt· . tl · .1 cl , mg 1e muepen ence of clesh. These \vars have been much less dangerous e ·a11 t ·vili· Bangla h . . . . . . spe<.T y o Cl an~. t an the polihcc~ ~md poss1ble physrcal extinction that .vtuslims feared if the subcontinent were not dh11de<.l. The worst post-partition history is probablv that of the Arab-Israeli co~~t. Eve~ h~~:~· civilian deaths would almost certainly h~ve been higher without partition. It 1s dlfficult even to imagine any alternative; the British c:ould not and would not stay, and neither side would share power or submit to rule bv the other. 1

•

Rump States Will Not Be Viable Many analysts of eth nic conflict question the economic: and military viability of partitioned states. History, however, records no examples of ethnic: partitions which failed for e<.:onomic reasons. In any case, intervenors have subste made easier by the opponents scar<:tt)~ ~fl . . n · a1 . k · J'krlr to options for revision. First, anv' large-scale convention· attac 15 1 • . . .•ill , because .. 1 " tl defens1bilit\ t 1e intervenors ,.vi ll have drawn 1e borders. f'0 r 1mximum • cl c: rth · and ensured that the client is better an ned· I r· necessary, ' · • the\'· Call .)ell I U · ler ·ts . n· . I oiTensives IS w1lat 1ug 1< SJstance through ai r stlikes. Breaking up corl\·en Oll
~i8

PART 4

. RARY WORLD POUTICS CONTEMPO .

f(AVfMJI.' 't' (

I

I

. . f aJI guerrilla part te~ Stl t '> ll Over a period . econd, inliltratJon o .smt become ''fuzzy... and .. , ttt,llly to break cl of . boundanes o .. . own I I time. con c cause f some obse1vers ot h oc:. . hut 1t shoulu not b · . 1 , n·:tior concern o .. . e Till 1!:IS >een cl ' ·~ k I at least some CIVI 1I Id '\ .... <;upport, house r d. . lv wor w1ere . , 'ee lnfiltranon can on. r. th 1u·c separation h O\\ C\c 1~ ..m m flltrato rs would I ' ·cJ tl ~ ·IJas A1ter e ' . · )e and ht e . I€ guem · . oion where no one wdl hdp tlt e tll: instead ·> 11 . . letel)' 1!Ost'l 1e reo• ,, 11 entenng a comp . te .11 ctLIJv with authorities agaimt them. The worst .. .mr·onn on tl 1e 1n ·'and coopera 1 I <:ct!~e t ·orist in filtration has cost lh·t>,. mt never comes <:I . b blv Israel w 1!ere en .I I . ose ts pro a " . I·, . t , territorial integlity. Rete:ui
'''I

r,

Partition Does Not Resolve Ethnic Hatreds . . . ethnic hatreds once there l!as It 1s not c1ea1 th·
reduced, the I~lausibility of bypernationali~t appe
CONCLUSION Humanitarian intervention to establish lasting safety for peoples endangered by ethnic civil wars is feasible, but only if the international community is prepared to recognize that some shattered states cannot be restored, and that population transfers are sometimes necessary. .. .

~l~mately we have a responsibility to be honest with ourselves as well as witll the VICtims of ethnic wars all over the world. The world's major powers must decide whether they will be willing to spend any of their own soldiers' lives to save strangers, or whether they will continue to offer false h opes to endangered peoples.

NOTES J• Ethnic wars involve 0 . · d l (rr.. k1sh 1 ur · . rgaruze arge-scale violence whether by regular forces or Jraq1 ope t' · ' l · s

ra IOns agrunst the Kurds) or highly mobilized civilian popu aoon

(the

i11 l~

I

.•OSSIBLE AND IMPOSSIBLE s OlUTIONS TO ETHNIC CrVJL WARS

. I~ I ttllliiVe m '\Wauda

4 19

or the P· l .. . . fl' . I a estin,an intlijin I } f d ean!lliH! ~ o rls )y rncrnbers of' one etL . ~a . A requent asptct . .. tl . . rmrc group t 1. . IS (' unc anotlwr I 0111 a certarn area by means h o e llnrnate the po • • . suc as disc:ri . . pu1atron of expulsunl .md llaal.sa<:re. F'or proposals . mmation. expropriation t, . •• • on mana{lln ctl . . . error. levels ol 1'1 Illllt' rno 1>I 1r7.atJon and violew· S o· 11" 101<: nvalries involvin I .. . , . . . -.e, Ste tephen v E , .. g ower em e n~•~= I TC\Cnting War Ill the Forme s . an \era, Managing theE· t r OvJct Em i .. S a~ t992). 361-3'32; Tcd Hopf. "Managing Soviet o· . P r~, ecurity Studie~ 3 {Spring · ·· I1tI emat umn ' l Secunty · 17, 1 (SummerLSmtegration· Hegun<>:.. 1992 _:_AD emand rIOr B£-havioral 2. An ethnic: group (or nation) is <:ommonJv cl fi d ), 44-tv. ~har<' <:nltural or ra<;ial characteristi~ ne as. a body of individuals who purP0 ,tedly . . 1 · 1 . 1· . . comm ;1 al ongu1. w 1rc: 1 ul~tinglllsh them from mecs,bespec.1ally f on ancestry or territo0 0 Wittich e..Js ) E ~ ers ther groups. Sec Max Weber (Cuenthc>r .Hoth. and Claus . ' ~X . • conom.y anr,1 Societ . A }')ntlive Socwlogy, Vol. l (Berkeley Calif . UnJ·ve .ty fC ,,. Y· n Outline of Inter. . ' .. rsJ o a1uomia Pr 196! ) 39.5; Anthony D. Sm1th, Na.tional ldentitty (Reno· U . . f ess. 8 . pp. 389. · mvers1tyo NevadaP • 199l) 14. 21. Opposing communities in ethnic dvil cona·,.t I Id. · . re~s. •PP· uh.. s 10 meconcllable · · f h identity, bon1ers, and citizenship of the state They do t k VISIOns o t e . . ·• · no see to control a stat ,h identJ ty all Sl(les accept, but rather to redefine or divid th . lf · e ~ ose . 1 H. b e e state rtse By contrast ideolog1<:a con 1cts may e defined as those in which all ·d h · .. ' • t I. SI es s are a corrunon \1S1on of commun1ty memners 11p, a common preference for politi ·al · · f h . . I c organlz.ation o t e community as a• smg• estate, and a common sense of the leaitimate '·- d · f h e> . ooun anes o t at state. The opposrn~ ~1des see~ control of the state, not its division or destnJCtion. It follows that some relt?~ous conA1cts-those between confessions which see themselves as separate commumtJes, as between Catholics and Protestants in Northern lreland-are best catego~ized with ethnic con~icts, while others-over interpretation of a shared religion, e.g., disputes over the soc1al roles of Islam in Iran, Algeria, and Egypt-should be considered ideological contests. On religious differences as ethnic di'isions. see Arend Lijphart, 'The Power-Sharing Approach:· in Joseph V. Montville. ed., Conflict and Peacemaking in Mrtltiethnic Societies (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books. 1990), pp. 491-509, at 491. 3. While the discussion below delineates ideal types, mi.xed cases occur. The key distinction is the extent to which mobilization appeals are ba~ed on race or confession (ethnk) rather tl1an on political, economic, or social ideals (ideological). During the Cold War a number of Third World ethnic conflicts were misidentified by the superpowers :LS ideological struggles because local groups stressed ideology to gain outside support. ln Angola the MPLA drew their supp01t from the coastal Kimbundu tribe. the FNLJ\ from the Bankongo in the north (and across the border in Zaire), and UNLTA from. Q\imbundu, Chokwc, and Ngangela in the interior of tl1e south. The fonner were a1.ded by the Soviets and the latter two. at various times, by both the United States and China. · · · 4. Reported by Andrej Gustincieof Reuters, cited in Misha Clenny, T~c Fall of ~'ug~lavia (New York: Penguin 1992), p. 166. Another tactic used by e.xtremtsts to radic:alv.e .<-'O· ·IS to accuse the ' other s1·de of cnmes · · ilar t o tb· eJr · own· ln jW)' 1992• cumdst eth n1cs sun · Mus l'1m women bY· Serb 1rorces· Bosnian Serb · accused Iarge-scale rape of· Bosm<m . Mus1ums ' of impregnating kidnapped Serb women m · order to create. a new race ofjarussary· so1diers. Hoy Gutman, A Witness to Get1ocide (New York Macmtllan,l993). P· x. .. \! . . Awa\' from Europe. " ew 5· M1'kiea Babic quoted in Chris Hedges, ·~u vvar Turns Saraie\·o ~ . York Times (July 28, 1995). . i.fi eo11fiic:t particularlv 6. In<:reased geographic intennoong of etllnic groups oft~n m}e~ es lncr~asing nun;if the state is too weak or too biased to assure t~le sec~n! ~s~e:;~~tinian relations. A bers of Jev.rish settlers in the \t'l est Bank ~a~ t~ e~e ded the Ni erian civil war was major reason for the failure of t11e negotiatiOns that prece g n

.a so

PART 4

y WORLD POUTICS R CONTfMPORA

lf'ttlft•c the 'al l'l\ q,' ll\ i n~ Ill tltt• liOrtl I . 11 lt·:tcll'r~ to )!W • '\ I H'l 11 till' in.lhilit~ 0 r JIC111H I • I Ni<~l't'ia: :\ c :(ll/1111~/ ..,,11, If ·'' ll ll~ton , D.C. : . Jl ·n' C •Id 1). ' clswt . t< .. "' !) l'C'j..'l t) 11. • (:PO . J!JR2). p. 55. . I I .. 1 1 \V(Ir!cl \Vnr 11. tlu ( 'r••.tli .rtt Uslasha rl'l'll:o.t•lt I I '( ' Jl()(ft'l 'l I li S. I I I l (I I . Etlm k coni Ir:ttunt:. 1: ' I ... sc· tlw' \\t'l'l' .L''II" '''' to ""''a natio nal• · S11, ·I1 . ·t.~ t'<>IIW fb lt t' ·111· . '1111 I 'I('('<'P' ,·clne:lh't · s · . . . lu•r("I S illite r·ate pr·.i'. lllh \\t'll' <'X('Wtlt·d to for . . I lent of n· 1lglfln . w . . . I I . ~vt sdOHSlii 'SS ua t'fH'IH , · I In IOl-12 Bos nu11 1 S1·1 1 c·t " '' l ' t lt•anst•rs . ·1· 11111 . . 1 11 til'' PIIC't' t•onv• r1 t l · • , • I tlwir St'l' Jratl '' l' J . . Tntsi 1 na~sal'rt·:- of 11 11111' in burun tli in 1972 1•' 11 1 ·t · ltc··ltt .. I I I 1 nu lnlf•cI t Itt' ntos t < 1 • 'd ~I us fills. .,,, • • , ' ('l'll as f>Oi cnti:t t'l tllll' c·t't 'Jl 1t' w 110 · , s I c·t·ntr:tl\'t Ollt't tl ttl I. I I ... · I of 11 utns to s<·c·OJHllll) S\'hoo ls.. . . . ' . , tl rest ndCI a< tntssllll . . . IIH' ~O't llllllt ' .. I I· .· •'I "lrs whidt slopp ed lt ·lltporanl~ I Ht l Ill whH·h th<.• sant • Tl . . t. I J )('S 11()1 Ill(' llf I ( 1\ I \\. • li. ~~~to .I t . I f' tltlitll' owr tlw s:nllt' 11':.111':. (l'.~.. 13llt'lllld t or S~tdan ) or lln tntliS h tl'l' I'('SII Illl'l tg (' I r ll . I (.'(Ill ' •. ' . , • (' IllS fl'tVC' IW<' Il si~r wd Hit 1101 11 ) llllj) l'IIH 'lllc•d as u l'tlt i~ ("\Sl'~ In wht(•lt Jll'llt'<' agrt c 111 • • A 1) · . ·. .' 1 JJ l ··t' ··Ins vs Jsrat'l . Oviln hllll< " v:.. t~go a • wnt 111 ~ (1'.1'.. a 1 s 1111. • .. • • . • 11 • . I I . · .:, .1 11 dvoc·ltcs 111 inh'IVt'lllto ll 111 JOSIH :I t:IV<.· ('"'P mst'l..Cd St·rh q Thi~ is w 1l\' t 1tl' s1rong<•:• · ·· . · ' ·. . . p~ >o ···d lO illt ('rvc·ntioll illsisl l>n th<' li H)ral ('. 199,1): Char ft.s (' ~icIl'~. ;\ nt IIOlW I .( '\\'1:;, v · ' ' ' . . _ , ' '· Boycl. "Mak;,;1! Pea(·e with tlw Guilt y." hm·ign AJ{mrs. t-1 , 5 (St'p h.•miH'r/Octoh<•r

Nation- B~ilding: UN surpasses u.s. on Learning Curve )AMES DOBBINS

I

0

0

•

(

I \;;19.5). pp. 2.2-0it . . . . 10 Further altl·lltpts :ltl'V!.'ll· hunJed ittll'I'VCllltO II rarl•ly nchH '\'t' thl'll' ~oals , lcildtn g ritht·r · to rwurl;• ('()ntpil'tP p1tssivit)'. :lS in th1• cast· of UNP HOFO I~ In 13osn ia. or c·vcntuaJI)' Io <>pen 00111 f>,1t again!'t 011t or all sick-s . AI worst. j>():lce-kec·pt~tg dTorts umy actually pro· loug fi~!tting. ...

Since Workl \Nar Il. the United Nations (UN ) ·mcl tl , u · d S . . . . . ( •e n1te tates have I I 1 1 dc·velopN < 1st m<:tl ve · very d·rr . . .sty es o nahcm . -huildin11 derived fro 1n tllelr 1 1ercnt I at urc·s and <:a pa Hbtw s. The Unttc d Nations i<; ., 11 1· 11 tcr1~.,,.· 1 11 . . . . · • "' •«tl 0 na o rg<'n17.atiun eulir clv ·'uc·t na t'100-hu1'Id'mg. . ' .dc·pe.nd('nt. on 1ts mt"m.bers for the wherewithal to '·or " 1u TI.JC? U111 t<.·d Stat es. IS tlw world s only supe rpower, commanding abundant re ·ourc<>s of its own and havmg ae;cess to thost-' of many othe r nations and institutions. W<:' at th : HAND ~orp orati on deRn e nation-huilc~ng as "the use of armed lclrcc in the af t('rmath of a crisis to promote a transition to democracy." We have examined eight instan<:cs in which the United Nations took the lead in ))UCh encleavors and ci~ht in whic h the United Slates took the lead. UN operations have almost always be<•n umle rmanncd and under-reso urceJ , hl'<.:ausl' 111cm ber sts have had to be reinforced. withdrawn. or, in extre me' cases, rescued . Neve rtheless, UN natio n-building missions huv<"' often met with success. Througho ut the 1990s, the United States adopted the opposite approach. basing its plans on worst-<:ase assumptions and rrlying on overwhelming force to quick ly establish a stable environment and to dctl.•r resistance from forming. B) interv eni ng in nu mbe rs and with capabilities that discouraged sign ifk·an t resistaHce, U.S.-led c:oalitions achieved progressh·ely higher len•ls of success throughout the 1990s, l'rom Somalia to Haiti to Bosnill doctrine, ill favor · f' or "low pronlc of' t1lt! •·sma11 rlOO t pnn fo rce posture that had char acte tizcd UN OlX'rations. ln both Af~hanistttn. and 1raq. the origi nal Amc rican -lcd forces proved tu1ahle to establish a secure en~~nme nt.' · · 1 U.. S f'ore<' 1cv" . "'s' }1•·1w lnd In l)Ot I1 counhi es the ·nutm to tx· SJmuf ' l:>. icanth ·f ·IIH.:reased , but · 1 . ··h adPnuate le\'e so 15 in neither coun try has tlus yet suffilt'<'<.1t 0 es·t·'111 ) ~,, • . cun\' . ~ o" \ L) Rl't'lo"ll'. \'ol. 29. . . · • •anmt , nnJ:unr Oobbms. "Nntion-Bu ilc..llll)!: UN Surpa.;;.~e~ ll . on u g. • 1 """1with nt•mll~ll.lll 1N 1 1 · 1 L I~ A"' 0 Como ntllon ' rprcx u-~~ l · ~ • {Spt•iu~ 200.5). p ,. 24- 2\:l. C:op\'ri~lt t 21Xl5 ~~· :' ' .,

of PAN '

,

1

J) Corpo •~•t ion inlht• fun11a t

; · C · 1ht Clt•urt\ll('t' Ct·n((•r. f<•xtbt)() k· \1:\ .(IJl\11~

481

PART 4

-tS2

.

CONTEMPORARY

. . 1

.

l)UJ.H.:•

WORlD 1-'UU Ill.:!

. ·c·duced Mcrhalllsla n, I -

... . . ...... UVlL UIJ'Ill l:

UN SUR.P

ASSES U.S, ON I t:Anu

lcn~ l" ol' in

l

l

1

t~

.,

~11'-lG CURVE

iolcnce have b

Ccn puh!Jl' :'t'C'III1~· ll . , ll'lSSiVe l en~f. Wit 1 -;l'l :(• • !1• r<:t'J l ( of the eJ t' .I I . . ' I cnll1C' on cl I c . ' 1 I re rt:phtceu l~· orgcl. ll .ti'.< t. ·t 10wco Jilill o h'Olll dk~t:e 111 orr)h in g 111l'o <- !.1 d.1r!<.n <.·tvl l c:on llic:t taq ' . . . U S occupalJOII 111''pro ' k ·ng than to U .$.-style p 'eace 'cept Slllt<.'c to -s. b. 1.... to coll1J)en satc to som·e degn•c.• at least, l'or its ·"J . ic_1 · 1N f 11 h·tS a 1 1" ' ' ' ru Umte~. t a H~ns : an .. . et o~.ver'' attlibutes of' loc~tl imp mita li t) and inte rnat iona l >ower defi ctt Wit,1 SOli P I 1 t . . . c I · . d St· tes· does not have sue 1 ac van ttge: , 111 SJ tuatJ ons \.V h"·r I ·r ·acy The U11lte t1 • • I I .... c e~,.. '':'c .. Jr·. ·rty t the con Aict bein gten ninn .te< orw wre the U nite d States 0 Ame ncat tse tSc:lp<~ . . · I . ]· , . .. ·t 'thout an mternatwna m.mc ,ttt . has felt cornpe11 ecI to ,w WJ . . . , .. · · . . . . . . cl S t 1·1 be well ·tch1 seJ to Jesu me supe r s1zm g tts natw n-bU Jiding The U mte ta es "'0u u < • d · . . . d . t1 trussrons an to 1eave 1e ·5111(.tiJ-footptint apr1roach to the U llltc ='-lations. At the s·une ' · U 't cl St ttes wou Jd be well ach~ sed to emu late the track record of the time t11e m e < . • · Ill · 1r1!e11·1e11 t:i'ng. lesso Urute' d Nat:i'OilS m . ns leam . ed fmm pnor operations. .

o.~'

INPUTS AND OUTPUTS The UN exverience with nation-building bega? in the newly inde pendent Congo in 1960. Since then, the instances in which UN forces have been used fo r nationbuilding have a.ll occurred since the end of the Cold \Var in 1989, to inc:lude Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Eastem Slavonia (in Croatia), Sierra Leone, and East Timor. The U.S. experience began with the occupations of Wes t Gennany and Japan in 1945; continued in Soma.Ua, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo after 1989; and expanded to Afgbarustan and Iraq in this decade. Nation-building can be measured in tenns of inputs (suc h as manpower, money, and time) and outputs (such as casualties, peace, econom ic growth, and democratization). Success depends not just on the inputs, of cou rse, but also on the wisdom with which the resources are employed and on the susceptibility of the society in question to the changes being foste red. Nevertheless, success depends in some mea5ure on the quantity of international military and police personn el, the quantity of external economic: assistance, and the ti rne ove r which they are app lied. In terms of personnel, military force levels for UN missions ranged from nearly 20,000 troops deployed in the Congo and 16,000 in Cambod ia to fewe r than 5,000 in Namibia and El Salvador. UN missions have norm ally fielded much smaller continge nts than Ametican-led operatjons. In abso lute numbers , the .largest UN contingent was smallertl1an the smallest U.S. contingent. However, t11e UN ~issions in Eastern Slavonia and East Timor did deploy sizable military forces relative to the local popuJations (see Figure 1). In terms of money, UN-Ied operations have tended to be less well supported with int~ rnational economic assistance than U.S. ope rations, in both abso lute and pr~portional terms. This reflects the greater access of the Uni ted States to donor ass~ance funds, including its own, and to those of the international financial jnsti.tuhons ~0 ~hich it belongs. In effect, the United States can always ens ure the level ~f funding It deems necessary. The United Nations seldom can. Many UN operalions are cons·ec1uentl · Ypoor1y supported with ec.onomic assistance.

100 :

-------(Germ 3;;any ~~ • ---------

i·l

Eastern Slavonia + Kosovo

Congo

+ East Timor+ • ~ Iraq Bosnia + Namibia

Haiti

Sierra + Jap Leone + an

~

++ Columbia

~ Afghanistan

+ Mozambique

+ El Salvador 0.01

I

10

+

UN-Ied cases

•

U.S.·Ie<.l cases

100 Annual per-capita assistance in 2000 U S d 11 . . o ars

1000

UN · Case h s of Nation-Buildino~ Have Involved· Fewer Troops an d/or Less Money Per Cap1 ta T an U.S. Cases (Except m Some Extremely small Societies, Like East Timor) FIGURE 1 •

source: Figure I is rr~m James Dobbins et al., .The UN's. Role in Notion-Building: From The Congo 10 Iraq, p. 244. © Copyrtght 2005 RAND Corporatton. Repnnted by permission of RAND corporation .

In terms of time, UN forces have tended to remain in post-conflict countries for shorter periods than have U.S. forces. In tl1e early 1990s, both U~- and U.S.-Ied operations tendeu to be terminated rather quickly, often immediately follO\.\ing the completion of an initial democratic election and the inauguration of a new government. As experie nce vv:ith nati on-building grew, both the United Nations and tJ1e United States recognized that reconciliation and democratization could require more than a single election. By the end of the decade, both U~- and U.S.-Ied operations had become more extended. .. For each of the eight UN and eight U.S. missions, v.:e measured outpu.ts, including casualties suffered, peace sustained, economic growth, and democrat.lzation. Cas ualties suffered are a good measure of the difficulties encountered m a · ston · s Wl'tl1 h'tgh casuaJn.rlevels have been amonu tl1e nat1·0n-building operation. Mts •; ~ least successful. a1 · high est num ber of casu· ties, Among the UN-led cases the Congo had the · bodi . . , f h . ti n The Cam an operareflecting the peace enforcement nature o t e opera. 0 · d h cl-highest . . f th pula 1 tion la t e secon t1on, lightly manned as a proportion o e P0 r

'

casualty level, followed by Sierra Leone. . . the United States 1993 · Somalia m · Following the loss of 18 U.S. soIdiers 111 h l t of the decade. But took grea t precautions to avoid casualties thr~ug t 1afte res tl f the Sept. 11, . . di . . h d t.n the em1a 1 o Amenca.n sensitivity to casualties rnl.lllS e . d St· tes abandoned its strategv 2001 , terrorist attacks. At the same time, the Umf~ e. ti al-building operations. Sigof deploYing ovenvhelm ing force at the out et 0 hna. 01 and Iraq than in Bosnia ·fi / . · · arustan . 0 1 cantly lower force-to -pOJJulation ratios m Afg '"' h .ltv levels There ha,·e . d b h hi
4.S·l

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POLITICS

ht•t'll IIHH'<' easualtic•s an lOng U.S. nation-building operations

DOB

f~rces. iT~

stu~hed gotn~

A(gl:an ..s• .tn than in all Am~:·li<:· ~)atk to I J4.5, .wd I hC' <.:U!>nulty levels ~11

lr:tq ar<' t<'ll tirnes higher than trt Afghalllstan . . . n Peace is the most essential prodnct of nation-htn,ldlll,._ \\ Tthout peace. " 'tl economic ~Q'rowth nor democratjzation is possible. \\ lth il' ,,u•. some• lev"l er' iE'r ]{ '-· Ot; nomiC' growth becomes almost inedtable. am c e111ocral1zation at k~·Lo;t . tx). ... . . . . .. .. l· . I ( poss1hle Among the 16 SOCietieS studJeclllJem.un at pE"acc ~(}( cl~.
Of t.hc 8 Ul'<-led <:
ea<;('-;,

4 an.• atrwa.cc,. 4 are I).

not--or not vet-at peace. These ~ategorizations are necess<.uily prodsional. parti<-ularlv for the . . B . s· . ongolllg operations in Afghanist~n and Iraq. Peace Ill o:<;lll
C~go

TABLE I • PEACE AND DEMOCRACY ARE THE MOST lMPORTANT MEASURES OF SUCCESS

Country or Territory Congo Namibia El Salvador Cambodia Mozambique Eastern Slav,onia Sierra Leone· East Timor· Germany Japan Somalia Haiti Bosnia' Kosovo· Afghanistan· Iraq· • Ongoing operation. • UN-Ied cases u·s·-led cases Sa>J.Jrce: The UN'S R 1 . o e In Nation-Building, 2005.

At Peace

No Yes Yes '¥es Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No

Democratic No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No ? ?

1 NATION-BUILDING·

.

UN

SURPASSES U.S. ON lEARN

and Cam bc' n•main demo<.:ratic . INGCURVE 485 . • some of(;() ( ,cnnany and )apa11 . u·s.-led ea'-' ' urse more th·an others A . · . are clearly d dernocratJt 'lt st 111 under varving . and· Kmong the ·; · degrees of int emO<:ratic·• Bosn1a ·wd HaH i ar t not
UN 6, UNITED STATES 4 UN-led nation-building missions tencl to be sm U h . to take place m less demanding circum stances ato er . b t an American 0 peratJons fore more numerous, to have more Clrcumspe . ' tl cle more frequent an . d t11ere-' {' least among. the., missions studied-to enJoy . a lugJler ~ Y etmed . . . objectives · , an cl-at efforts. By contrast, U.S.-led nation-b ']cl· success rate than us 1 .1 .. . . • ". • . . Ul mg 1las taken I . . . .- eu cu cu mstanc:es, 1eqUJ reel larger force s an cl strong P ace . d 111 more demand· · mg economic support, espoused more ambiti b' ~~ man ates, received more missions studied-fallen short of the ob -~~~vo Jech~·es, and-at least among the Nations. J es mOJe often than has the United There are three explanations for the b tt UN 1 rufferent selection of cases would produc e d~~ ' success rate. The first is that a . . . ea merent result Th d. h U.S. cases are mtnns1cally more difficult. The third is th · e s~con .IS t at the done a better job of learning from its mi t k th at the Uruted · ations has Table 2). s a es an 11as the United States (see . ~hroughout ~e 1990s, ~he United States became steadily better at nationbuilding. The Hru.tlan operation was better manaaed than Somali B . b tJ H ·ti· d K b o a. osma etter 1an osovo etter than Bosnia · cwve was not sus· d .ru , an · ·· The u·s. 1earnmg ~ne. mto th: curre~t ? ecade. The administration that took office in 2001 initiallv sdamed nation-bwlding as au unsuitable activity for U.S. forces. \\ 11en co~­ ~e~e? to engage in such missions, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq. tbe admintstlation sought to break with the strategies and institutional responses that had been honed throughout the 1990s to deal with these challenges. The United Nations has largely avoided the institutional discontinuWes that have marred U.S. performance. Current UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was U~dersecretary-General for Peacekeeping and head of the UN peacekeeping operation in Bosnia throughout the first half of the 1990s, when UN nation-building began to burgeon. T he United States and other member govemments chose him for_his current post largely on the basis of his demonstrated skills in managing the UN peacekeeping portfolio. Some of his closest associates from that period mored up with him to the UN front office while others remain in the UN Department of Pe~cekeeping Operations. As a result, an increasingly e:\:perienced cadre of inter5 national civil setvants has 1un UN nation-building missions over the past 1 years. Similarly, many UN peacekeeping operations in the field are headed and staffed by veterans of earlier operations. . d Whereas the United Nations has gradually built up a cadre of expenenceh llation-builc.lers the United States starts each mission more or less f~m scra~c d. Tl u . ' · . 1·f it were 1ts first an le mted States tends to staff each new operation as

Pi\RT 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTICS

!::TA~B~LE ~2~•~T~H~E:_U~N~H_:IS~TO~R~Y_::O::_F:N:A:T;IO:_N_-B__UI_LD_IN_G_ Country or . Years

Peak

Lead t s noops AC

or

DOl · ., S I NATION-BUilDING: UN SURPASSES . U.S. ON lEARNING CURV£ TABLE 2 • (( .mtinued)

_ _ ._

Assessment

1essons

.

~a rned

~Tc::"'r~n:to:rY:__:_=~--_:_-~-:-:-==.===~----·-:-------Congo

Namibia

196o-1964 19.828

1989-1990 4,493

UN-Ied

UN-Ied

Partially succes$f:.JI costly. and controversral. UN ensured decolon1zation and territonal integrity but not democracy.

Successful. UN helped ensure peace, democratic development, and economic growth.

Money and manpower demands almost always exceed supply. Controversial missions leave legacies of "risk aversion. " Compliant neighbors • a competen t government. and a clear end state can contribute to successful outcome. UN participation in settlement negotiations can facilitate smooth transition .

Successful. UN negotiated lasting peace settlement and transition to democracy after 12 -year civil war. Cambodia Partially successful. 1991-1993 15,991 UN-Ied Democratization UN organized elections, requires long-term verified withdrawal engagement. of foreign troops, and ended large-scale civil war. But democracy did not take hold. Mozambique 1992- 1994 6,576 UN-Ied Mostly successful. Cooperation of Transition to neighboring states is independence was critical to success. peaceful and Incorporation of democratic. insurgent groups into But negative economic political process is key growth. to democratic transition. Eastern 1995-1998 8,248 UN-Ied Successful. UN can successfully Slavonia Well-resourced conduct small peace enforcement missions operation and clear with support from end state contributed to peaceful and major powers. democratic transition. Sierra 199815,255 UN-Ied, Initially unsuccessful, Lack of support from Leone present parallel then much major power can UK improved. undermine UN El Salvador

1991-1996 4,948

UN-Ied

country or rerritory

487

.:::-~P~e~a~ k~~~~a~ d~----------~--------Years Troops Actors Lessons Assessment

----------------------~~~-~~~~----~Le~a~r:ne~d~-----

Source: The UN's Role in Nation-Building, 2005.

destined . to be its last. . Service . . in such missions has never. been. regarded as career enhancmg fo r Amencan mihtary or Foreign Service officers. Recruitment is often a problem , terms tend to be short, and few individual s volunteer for more than one mission. The UN success rate among the missions studied- seven out of eight societies left peaceful , six out of eight left democratic-substantiates the ,iew that nation-building can be an effective means of terminating confli<:ts, ensuring against their recurrence, and promoting democra cy. The sharp overall decline in deaths from armed conflict around the world over the past decade also points to the efficacy of nation-building. During the 1990s, deaths from armed conflict were averagi ng over 200,000 per year. Most were in Africa. In 2003, the last year for which figures exist, that number bad fallen to 27,000, less than 15 percent of the previous average. Despite the daily dosage of horrific violence displayed in Iraq and Afghanis tan, the world has not become a more violent place '"ithin the past decade. Rather, the reverse is true. International peacekeeping and nationbuilding have contributed to this decline in deaths from armed conflicts (see Figure 2). The cost of UN nation-building tends to look quite modest compared with the cost of larger and more demanding U.S.-led opemtions. At present. the ~nit~d States is spending some $4.5 billion per month to support its military operations 10 Iraq. This is more than the United Nations spends to run all 17 of its c.ur:eut peacekeeping missions for a year. This is not to suggest that the United 1\a~ons . . m . Iraq . ch . l or perform it at all. It IS to Cou ld perform the U.S. misston mme eap y, . l· not underlin e that tl1ere are 17 other places where the United States ~vtll probab Y f have to intervene because UN troops are doing so at a tiny fraction of the cost 0 U.S.-led operations.

PART 4

OOB' 'IS I NATION-BUILDING: UN SURPASs

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POLITICS

ES U.S. ON LEARNING cun.n-

50

~------==~----------~ Number of ongoing civil wars

40

- --

Number of ongoing ~N peacekeepmg operal!ons

- 30 Ill

~ > Cl)

-;p 0

D

20

,

E

::J

z

10 ,

0

.. ---'

,,,

,

-

\

~--

,

,_,

,.-

,,

, ...... ;,,',

',

__ ___ ,,

~~~-:'-------1~ 9~60 ~ --: 19~7~0----~19~8~ 0 ----~,9~9~0----~ 2 0 ~ 0~0~ 1945

FIGURE 2 • The Number of civil wars Has Declined Si nee I he Ea rly 1990s as the Number

of UN operations Has Grown

.

. . ..

.

.

. and the Problem 2 .tS adapred "'rorn)ames o· Fearon and oavtd Source F1gure . D. Llllltn, .Ncolruslecshlp . of weak Slates.'' lntcmacional Security. Vol. 28. No. 4 (Spnng 2004), pp. ~-43, F1?ure I. €) 2004 by the President and Fellows of Harvard college and the Massachusells lnsltlute ot Technology. Used by permission of The MIT Press.

HJGHLYINTERDEPENDENT Despite the Unit(>d Nations· signi ficant achievements in the field of nation-building, the organization continues to exhibit wealmesses that decades of cx11e1ience have yet to overcome. Most UN missions cu·e undermanned and tmderfunded. UN-Ied miJibuy forces are often sized and deployed on the basis of unrealistic hest-case a-;sumpUons. Troop quality is uneven and has even gotten worse, a.s 111any rich Western nations have followed V.S. practice and bec.:ome less willing to commit their armed forces to UN operatio.11s. Police and civil personnel are always of mixed mmpetenc.:e. All c:ompont·uts of the missi<m anive late; police and civil admiuistrators arrive even more slowly than soldiers. These same weaknesses have been exhibited in the U.S.-Icu operation in Iraq. There. it was an American-led stabilization force that was deployed on tl1e basis of unrealistic, best-cao;e a.c;sumptions and American troops that arrived in inadequate numbers and had to be progressively reinforced as new, unanticipated challenges emerged. There, it was the quality of the U.S.-Ied coalition's militmy contingents that proved distinctly variable, as bas been their wilHngness to take orders and risks and to ac<:ept casualties. There, it was American civil administrators wl10 were late to arrive, of mixed competence, and not available in adequate numbers. These we~esses thus appear to be endernie to nation~building rathe r than unique to the Uruted Nations. r

.

Asst~ming ad~quate consensus among Security Council members 0 11 tht' purpose

•or any mtervention tJ1e '

u111·t-eu..J Nahons ·

l · ..:t11 tiom~ provides the most suitab e msu

"-"t:.

489

Tl . 11 eworl-. I~ •!' most nation-building miss· I.. r,u . ·. tons. 1e UN fra k . el)' low c:o~t <,I n•cture, a comparatively h'gl . mewor o!Tcrs a <:omp·~ ..... tlv . . I I success rate . d h .... a.11 1wnwtjonal k•g1hmac:y. Other possible options l'k ' an t e gre3test degree of 1 · · I cl I I are J e1v to be e'th 1 er more e>..'l'V>nsive uch a.c; coa 1l!ons e )y t 1e United States tl E ' (5 · . led by the Afri,_,• leU .uropean · or x· ·•pable ( ucI1 as coa11hons · th Umon, :'ATO)··~or less c.. . . . '-Cln OJOn, e Org . . r 1 States. or tit<' Assoc1atJc~n of Southeast Asian Nations). an zation o American Tlte 1110r<' Pxpens1ve options are best su1·t d . . to rn1ss1 · ~arced entry or cmp Ioy more.: l I1an 20,000 men, which eso far has bons that rer1u1~e limit for UN opNutions. The less capable optio ~end the eiTective upper ns are there is a regi on a 11)U t not a global consensus for a<:ti · su1 1te to miss'IOns w1lere .. enougl1 to foot 25... percent of theonbill. or woe re t1le United State·s simply cl oes. nul care Although tl1e UN and U.S. styles of nation-buiJdiJ1g are cl'15ti . · 1 bl h · I1Iy 1·1"1tcrcIependent. I t ·lS a rare O[)eration in which b th nguL•na ·ilso h1g . r , t ey are <· • • b . . o are not 1nvo1ve<1. Both UN and U.S. nation- uddmg efforts presently stand at n"· . h' t · 1· 1 n . • ' ...,u IS Ont Hg 1S. ' 1e United Nat1ons currently has about 60 000 troo1)s cleploved m· 1-r eo t · Th· . .. . • , un nes. 1s 1s a modest expeditioncuy comm1tm~nt in comparison with that of the United States, hut it exceeLls that of any other nat1on or combination of nations. Demand for uN-Ied peacekeeping op_erations n~vertheless f~ exceeds the available supply, particularly in sub-Saharan Afnca. Amencan anned forces, the world's most powerfuL also find themselves badly overstretched by the demands of such missions. A decade ago, in the wake of UN and U.S. setbacks in Somalia and Bosnia. nation-building became a term of opprobrium, leading a significant segment of American opinion to reject the whole concept. Ten years later, nation-buildincr appears ever more clearly as a responsibWty that neither the United ~ations nor the Unjted States can escape. The United Nations and the United States bring different capabilities to the process. Neither is Ukely to succeed without the other. Both have much to learn not just from their ow11 experience but also from that of each other.

PAYNE I DECONSTRUCTrNG NATION BUilDING 491

BY JAMES L. PAYNE

. . . , generaJJ)' triumph~ ov<'r <'XJ>('Jic nce. The past- th<.: I. \\'1H ,n . lunumg Ill tO w.tr, 1wpe . I I I' P t. ()(' w 11a·t J1(.1p{Jened wh<'ll t liS w;tc;. tru.x Je o re-tends to . ' . f r I tabu 1atJOII . . CJIIItl sta IS tea . I f nratOJyand the thump of mdltmy boots. At tlw out' 1· eel in the 1eat o angl)' · · 1 11· · )e gnor b 1. , 1.1· t force will be succ:.:esslul 111 up 10 ( mg v1rtue and thar set, it is easy to e Jeve ''' 111·5t01y has no relevan(;e. 1 . . c:.:on f'H 1enc:.:e ·111 the force of arms has. c.:C11 Late1y t111s . tercc on . nat1on .huildin" . ~?' · . di· I111 a·nd o<:curJving a land aff-h<.:ted by d1ctatorshtp or e; 1vrl that .IS, t hC' K· 1ea 0 ·f IIIVa n J' . . . , . ·. · . . . . . · J·t u1 · to a d~~mocnat)'· Alas ' m theu .c .ntiii1SIayne, ··neconstru ti , N . . . ,. 24 200.5. pp. 13-15 R . ed 1 c. ~g ation Budcling, Tile Amelica11 ConseroatiiA:, Octoher • · t1>nnt 'l'f p<'nnJSSJCHI of tlw publish~r. 490

To ic.l<:ntd 1c·c;1 dt'i in these terms, I inspec.ted thc l't·-... •t · .I l po ' 1\,;W n the tm >I '\ 1l1c rawa.I 1 Ioo keel for events betoken· th mstorv ll · of C'(l(:h c:cJunt r:. ,uter . I . mg c c;o apse of democrati . 11 ind ch 1i:! r 1e !>upprcsston of opposition leaders or part'~ . . f. c I rtl e. .1 , ·l . . .1 . 1es, maJor m nnuement 11 0 f rreedolfl<, o spcec 1, press, anu assembly Vlolent transr f o h ' rc:rs o power murder of .IJ t·,c·J kader!> hy ot er leaders, and signi fic:ant civil war l rr· · · ·' I ' cl po ' . . . . . . · .:qutreu arge an mu!. le fai1 11 res along these l1nes as cv1den<.:e of democratic.; f:... ;Jure A r f !JP , .. . w · 1ew arrests o oppo·b·on )eack-rs were not enough to WS<Juahfy the count-ru as· a .1 r SI . .. . . . . ~1 · uerncx::rac.y nor a 1ew assassinatwn". of amb,guous mea~mg nor a Simple military c.;oup nor the resignation of an excc:.:utive 1n the fac~ of mass1ve street demonstrations. If numerous free and fair elections were held, ~us was taken ac; strong evidence that demcx:rac.y survived. Elections that were one-stded and to some degree rigged by the incumbents were taken as a negative sign, but tl1ey djd not, in themselves, disqualifY the country as democratic. The results of applying these principles to the politic:.:a! outc.;orne~ in the 51 cases ofinterventi.on are shown in the following table. Overall, the resultc; indicate that military inte1vention succeeded in leaving behind democracies in 14 cases-27 percent of the time. The conclusion, then, is that nation building by force is generally unsuccessful. A president who went around the world invading countries to make them democratic would (ruJ most of the time. One group of countries that seem especially resistant to democracy-building efforts are the Arab lands. There have been nine interventions in Arab countries in the past century. ln no case did stable democrat')' follow the military occupation. In assessing the effectiveness of nation-building efforts, we should be careful not to confuse conjunction with cause. Just because some military interventions have been followed by democracy, this does not mean that the interventions c.;aused the democracy. There is a worldwide movement against the use of force, and this trend promotes democratic development. Ruler~ are becom~g l~ss disposed to use violence to repress oppositions, and oppositions .are less mc~ed to use force against incumbents. As a result, countries are becornmg clemcx::racies on their own, without any outside help. .. . For example, we might be tempted to praise the Bntish occu~ation. of · as tonngmg · · clemocracy. But m · t]1e s"•ne Mal · aysta •u pen'od · the neighbonng . . Ast.an . d, also . JOm · · ed the caJnp of democratic c.;ountry of.~fhai lan d , not occup1e .. . . nations. aila In d Tb f.act, in Freedom Houses, survey o f pol'ti' 1 c·al n'ghts and CIVIl ~berties. . uld h· n. a\ e ranks al1ead of Malaysia. It is quite poss1'bl~· tben, that ·.Mala)'SJa '''O become a democracy without British intervention. . f . build. . lesson in the effectiveness o nation South Korea presents an mteresting · d th U .t d States was heavily . B mg. egin ning in 1945, when U·S· tro.ops lande ' .e Tlm. e ~tical involvement, involved in guiding political decisions m South Korea. 'lallslpo ed to uo their own th K eans were · ow b S tl d essentially ceased after J961, an le ou . . or dictatorship under General Park way politically. This way prove~ to.be a Jmhta~ . Thereupon followed two 1979 Chung- Hee, which lasted untd h~s murde~ bl d . street demonstrations. By coups, a violent uprising in KwangJu. and m~yl doob )en greatJv relaxed and com, called a democ1985, however the suppression of Cl·viJ liberties 1ah Ke a can be .. ' . I t time Sout ore petttive elet:tions were held. Smce t la ·. S here is a case where 16 years 0 rac.:y (aJbeit a noisy one with plenty of corruptionf)d. ""ratic nation building. while 0 fA r ·1 · terms o em\Ao mcrican tutelage brought 1a1 ure 111

492

PART 4

PAYNE I DECONSTRUCTING NATION Bl1ILDING

coNTEMPORARY WORLD POUTICS

noNS BY THE UNlTED STH I ; AXD GREAT BRITAIN NATION-BUILDING MIUTARY OCCUPA '

~~a~s~o~2~00~0~----:-~---------B;iJril ish nccupalions u.s. occupations Austna 1945-1955 cuba 1898-1902 Cuba 1906-1909 Cuba 1917-1922 Oomlmcan Republic 1911-1 924 Dominican Republic 1965- 1967 Grenada 1983-1985 Haitl 1915-1934 Haiti 1994-1996 Honduras 1924 Italy 1943-194 5 Japan 1945-1952 Lebanon 1958 Lebanon 1982-1984 Mexico 1914-1917 Nicaragua 1909-1910 Nicaragua 1912-1925 Nicaragua 1926-1933 Panama 1903-1933 Panama 1989-1995 Philippines 1898-1946 Somalia 1992-1994 South Korea 1945-1961 West Germany 1945-1952

$UCCeSS failure fa1lure failure failure $UCCeSS success failure failure failure success success failure failure failure failure failure failure failure success success failure failure success

Botswana 1886- 1966 Brune1 1888-1984 Burma (Myanmar) 1885- 1948 Cyprus 1914- 1960 Egypt 1882-1 922 FiJi 1874- 1970 Ghana 1886-195 7 Iraq 1917-1932 Iraq 1941 - 194 7 Jordan 1921- 1956 Kenya 1894- 1963 Lesotho 1884- 1966 Malawi (Nyasaland) 1891-1964 Malaysia 1909- 195 7 Maldives 1887-1 976 Nigeria 1861-1960 Palestine 1917-1948 Sierra Leone 1885-1961 Solomon Islands 1893-1978 South Yemen (Aden) 1934- 1967 Sudan 1899-1956 Swaziland 1903-1968 Tanzania 1920- 1963 Tonga 1900-1970 Uganda 1894-1962 Zambia (N. Rhodesia) 1891-1964 Zimbabwe (S. Rhodesia) 1888-1980

success failure failure fa1lure fa1lure success failure failure failure failure failure failure failure success success failure failure failure success failure failure failure failure success failure failure failure

the country evolved to democracy on its own 2.5 years after Ame1ican involvement in local politics ceased. Nations around the world are gradually becoming democratic on their own. Therefore, the 14 cases of nation-building "success'' cannot be attri bute<.! to rniJitaJ)' inteJVention. These countries might well have become democracies without it. The na~on-buil~ng idea ha-; a critical, generally overlooked, gap: who knows how to do Jt? Pund1ts and presidents talk about nation building as if it were a se.ttled technology, like building bridges or removing gall bladders. Huge amounts of government and foundation money have been pou~ed into the topic of democracy building, and academics and bureaucrats have r1roduced reams of verbose <.:om ment:~ru B t till } - ,: u s t 1cre is no concrete, useable body of knowledge. d And,d~mg a non-specialty, there cannot be any experts in it. The people who en }up omg the so-called nation building are simply ordinary government emp oyees who happen t0 · d M , . h . wm up at the scene of the miutary occupation. an) t1mes t ey are milita Hi . ·aJ ry 0 cers With no hackground in politics, sociology, or socr

493

·choloro - ·Jot that it would help them. For the most P yplovec sef their mission as getting themselve d th part, these government em'thout' too h, tJ . r tnuc egg on 1e1r taces. The)' have snoan 1 e U.'dS. out of the c:ountn.• .. ; Wl .. tJ h c earer 1 ea of how to ... tiJl democratic cu 1tu re mn. t. e readers of this page. ms A look at some spectfic: examples of nation buildi 'IJ · . f ng I UStrates the intellectual 989 U S J I . cuum. T 1e 1 • • mvaslUn o Panama is credited · . b . V<1 . tl . .. m OUJ ta u1ation as a nationWas us pos1t1ve outcome the resuJt of th . . . building success. · ? 0 f' tJ · application of JOlitical sc1 ence. ne o 1e nation builders Lt. Col John Te expert F' h h . I 1 · h . ' · · IS e , as wntten a P k on tbe an am a expenence t at g1\·es quite a different p· tur y · h hi boo . 1 . . f, r . le e. IS e1was C ·ef of Policv an( Strategy or U.S. 10rces m Panama, and it wash' · b t fi h ' I . . IS JO o gure out ow to implement . . t 1e nuss1on . statement. The orders looked simple on paper: ucon duct nation bUIJ~ng operations .to ensure democracy." But Fisbel quickly disc:overed that the instructi?n was .meanu~gless. because. ?emocr~cy was an "undefined goal ... It seemed .to lum tl1at 1t v~asn.t the JOb of military officers to figure out how to implement tlus undefined obJective, but, as he obseJVes with a touch of irritation "tJ1ere are no U.S. civilian strategists clearly articulating strategies to achieve democ~acv." 5

The fact that ther~ ~vas no clear definition of the conditions that constitute democracy meant that th.e YIJ!Jta~ Support Croup and the other U.S. government agencies that were attempting to ass1st the Endara government had only the \'aguest concept of what actions and programs would lead the country toward democracy ...

In practice, vvhat the goal of "ensuring democracy" boiled down to was installing Cuillermo Endara, the winner of a previous election, as president, supporting him as he became increasingly highhanded and unpopular, and then stepping away after his opponent was elected in 1994.... Austria presents an instructive example of what nation building has actually amounted to on the ground. In our tabulation, Austria is classified as a case of succ:essful nation building, but a close look reveals that the U.S. role was irreleYant. if not harmful. After tl1e war, Austria was jointly occupied by Russia as weU as the \Vestem powers. The Soviets brought Karl Renner, the elderly and respected Austria~ Socialist leader to Vienna to be the head of a provisional go\·emment. Rem1ers provisional go;ernment declared the establishment of the Democratic Au~an Republic on April27, 1945. For six months, the United States refused to r~~ze this government (fearing that the Russians were up to no good in supporting tt). Finally, when it could not be denied that the provisional government was popular and functioning, the United States recognized it. . l ildi £ lcls Austria thus presents a uoubly ironic lesson in how· nation mallngdun h . · tJle'vav· of loc. ea . ers who Tl1e United States-the democratic power-stood m . · d the SoVlet Umon-t e 1 were attempting to establish a democratic re~me, m . ·fi £ th first demowor~u's leading dictatorship-unintention~y acted as rmd\\~:~~ t: be "built." crane administration. Obviously. in Austna, no democracy bl' h democracy on The democratic forces in Austria were strong enough to.~sta 15 a their own, and they did it in spite of the ··nation builters.d tak a close look at what The advocates of nation building need to g~ hac f ~ £eated powers. In the really happened in the postwar political evolution t e 0e e

°

°

-S94

PART 4

oRARY woRLD pounc s P coNTEM

•I ·~cl that Anw rican L·'iH'I't•. ··-;tplk d sophisticatC< . . . t . . 1 'lUt mg.. CJr · . tl13 1 force< t tese . ll Tl ·e countri es hecam< dt'P.nr·J.!<:i<'s 0 11 their 0 , , social cnguwt> nng . " t 1t~· mt·1·1tmy , , '"· ~ - ->T at aI · Iws ·JJ 1 .. · ·r thr~t wa,· p· >e r·-shuflif.n t~ 1Ju re ... tu.~.s . w1 . t \\clSfl 0 -.<:u. n · · ener·t s an< ''l · ~ · .. 1indr·l!lce titan a help. ami the bt~~npttous g 1 1 J J ' 1 e raUv mote o a 1ap Jazard and unf()(::us I to\\' I es illustrut fnrtlter "'ltu< _g ~ . . 1. 1 en characterized hy n;u\·et<' and impro'visation. TJ l<' 1 · 1 , · .. . . tion and admuush at.Jon lclS Je to c o rt, and the resnlt .J ·k lootinc:r after v1ctor) , nor t lC, Ior cc' · . ,. , . J . . . u.S. had no. poli('cyI to.. Ic .1ec:r .. struc.:tuore. the raprd 1 fonnatwn o gcmgs ol t 1ngs and par·t1 11111 I . . . ad ·n ·' ('(' • • · ' W
1

1

•

•

•

'

THE ENVIRONMENT

GE AN CH TE IMA CL D AN ~---------~~~~

3

rhe Tragedy of the Commons GARRETT HARDIN

We can make little progress in working toward optimum population size until we explicit ly exorcize the spiri t of Adam Smith in the field of practical demography. ln economic affairs , The \'Vealth of Nations (1776) popularized the "invisible hand." the idea that an individual who "intends only his own gain," is, as it were, "led by an invisible hand to promo te . . . the public interest." 1 Adam SmHh did not assert ·that tlus was invaria bly true, and perhaps neithe r did any of his followers. But he contributed to a domin ant tendency of though t that has ever since interfered with positive action based on rational analysis, namely, the tendency to assume that decisions reache d individually will, in fact, be the best decisions for an entire society. If this assumpUon is correc t it justifies the continuance of our present policy of laissez-frure in reprod uction. If it is correct we can assume that men will control their individual fecundity so as to produce the optimmn population. If the assumption is not correc t, we need to reexamine our individ ual freedoms to see which ones are defensible .

TRAGEDY OF FREEDOM IN A COMMONS The rebuttal to the invisib le hand in population control is to be found in a scenario first sketch ed in a littJe-known pamphlet in 1833 by a matl1ematic-al amateur named William Foster Lloyd (1794-1852).2 We may well call it "tl1e trag~): of the commons,'' using the word "tragedy" as the philosopher Whitehead _used tt: 'The essence of dramatic tragedy is not unhap piness. It resides in the solemruty of the remorseless

~ bv Carrett llard.i.n from f th c E . . t ~1..· . ommons e o xcerptetl!abridged with permission from "The Tragedy On 10C uu:: Assoclatl ·can A nco S· me~ l;;IUO ctence, Vol. 162 ( 13 December 1968), pp. 1243-1267. Cop~mght © Advance ment of Science. Portions of the text and some footuotes have bceo Oimtted.

PART4

CONTE u:J JJ

"Tit i~ hll'\ it ti h indd enb which 1 !.

tC) •silY ••

then goe:-. O il ,,·orkirt!!of tht11 gs. e. .r., ll)' · . 1 . · of lwm an 11< hC' illtJstratr cI nt terms I , (' 'l'tv ofl·s<:ap eca n .

•

HARDIN I THE TRA

MPORARY WORLD poU TICS

bC' l li HCk

~ ·l d< ·sti 11)' <.: an 0 I · 11 )' : \ (Jh c• ttttlta)){)ill<> ·· . "\ tier t Ill tl1t> drama."'.ss.

Voril isonly h)· thcr_ll that tl< utlt c/lcveloJ>~ in tlt i~ wa\ . P't ·tJ l • ' pas tnn· 0{1<' tl l 1. 1 1nons k o T Iw trag<·t y C) the con1 I h ll'> J' ( ,Sirt 'lll will trv to t•t•p . t~. l !l!ll l\' <. : alll c ' ts r< . . . 1 , , " ·Ieel t wl cac "' ' ' · . . ~ >sRII. Jt IS to >< expec I ·r·tll uern ent n•ct\ . \\'01 k r<'.L ''> ·; t>h salt sfa< .:toti lv f' < . 1 1 1s Sue l an <11 ' ~"' • >r s1ble 011l1e cornmOJ : · _1 •• • cltir w and dis<.'aS<' keep tlw nlll nhurs of bot! •· ~ . L ·c·tus<J tnl> ' f' I I I .. 1 centu ries )e ' 11 b 1 tlta <:arrvinc t cap; win · o t J(> ;Ill< . }' mally, how<·v~r 1 . · l be·t. st we e ow " · · ' man .In< ' f .. ·k . . ' that is the~">cby whe•n th<' 1ong-<1<'slre cl goa l of soci al <:omes the Jav 0 l (.!(; Ollll lg , . . I .' I r ' . r· I .. ' . . . . 1..... At this' r10 111 t. the 111 1cH nt o~K: <J t le cornrnon s stabtlrty becomes a ' Cern g. • · , . . . . .. J . j sdouSiy. he askS, ''\\ hat IS tJw 11t11ll) (O Ill(' of adding one rmp.tcrt 1 y. mol<: or css.. .r·on . . 1 ·. . 1 r·l?" 1'hi s utili ty has one ncga t1ve anL ont ' pos tliV<' contnoncnt rnore amma1to my le u . · ., . . . The positive co 1nponent is a function of tlw _u1cr<'l.l~Cnl. of ?~<' an1rn~l.~· Since. t!te herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the c~ddttH>nal ant mal, the positive utility is nearly +L . . . . ,. . . , . .. . . The negative component 1S a (unc t101~ of the .•tddJ.tton ,~l ovc 1gt cl7.1 ng ct eateel hy oue more animal. Since. however, the eflects of overgrazmg are sha red by aJI the herdsmen, the negative utjJity for any particular dccision- rn aki ng herdsman is only a rmction of- 1. Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman condudes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add ano the r animal to his herd. And another; and another.. .. But this is the conclusion rea<.:hed by each ar1d every rational herdsma11 sharing a corn mons. The rein is the tragedy. Each man is loc·ked into a system that com pels ldm to increase his herd wit hou t limit- in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all me n rush , each pu rsuiug his ovvn best interest in a society that believes in the free dom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all .... In an approximate way, the logk of the wm mo ns has bee n understood for a long time, perhaps since the discovery of agticu lture or the invention of private prope~ ~n real estate. But it is under~tood mostly only in spe cial cases whi ch are not sufl1 c1en tly generalized. Even at this late date, cattlemen leas ing national land on the western ranges demonstrate no more than an amb ivalent understanding, in constantly pressuring feJeral authorities to inc rease the head cou nt to the point where overgrazing proJuc:es erosion and weed-dominance. Lik ewise, the o<.:ean~ ofth_e,world continue to suffer from the survival of the phil osophy of the commons. M~tim~ nations_ \vill respond automatically to the shj hboleth of tl1c ··freedom of · 1n · tl1e ...mex11austi·tl bthe. seas. Pro . fess · ' mg to IJelJeve J e reso urc es of· the oceans ," tIwy nng species after species of flsh and whales closer to extinction ... . 1

POLLUTION In a reverse way the tra d f th . He 't · ' . 'ge Y 0 · e commons reaiJIJears in pro ble ms of. poJJutJO n. re I IS not a question of tak , . . · mg somethmg out of the com mons, hut of puttJHg

GEDY OF THE COMMONS

497

ething in- sewage , or chemical, radioact ive and h . son• r· . . • . eat was tes mt dat11rc rol1 urncs mto t 11e a~r; and distracti d · o water: noxious I an< ("\ f . I Tl I an unpleasant 1 .. . the line o c.,1g lt. 1e ea culations of utilityng a h ' at Vtrttstng si{ms ntto fi I I I . I 1 1 t e same ~ h c . . nal 11 1an 11< s t 1at 1JSS1areofthe costofthe re muc t h _ , ' s eror e. The ntttO < 1 was es e wsc har , . 1 is less tha n the cos t of pu1 ifyin g his was tes h ,c . ges mto t ··e <.'()m. 1no•ls 1 · eror . e for en~ n one, we are lo<.:ked into a system of ur e. re easmu~-> them. s·mce th·tSis t11t ' . IOU1mg ou r ovvn nest" 1 we behave only as mdepenuent, rationa!, free-enterplisers. · • so ong as The tragedy of the corn mons as a food basket is avert d h . . · e )' pnvate property ·omething f.onn a Uy J'k 1 e 1t. But the air and wat ers surr ot 0. . 'or s 1 d · tn mg us cannot readilv be re ced and so t 1e trag e y of the com mon 11 s as a cess poo l m tb ' ctif11 • . us e prev ente d by <.:tve laws or taxing devices that make 1·t eh . 11rerent means, by. coer r th . ll . eap er •or lute r to treat 111s p~ utant tha~ to discharge them untreated. We havee polnot progressed as fa_r wtth . the solution_ of this problem ac; we have with the first. inde ed, ou~· ~articu lar concept of pnvat.e property, which deters us from exhausting the posttJvc resources of the earth, favors pollution. The owner of a fa<:tory on u1e bank of a stre am -wh ose property extends to the middle of the stream-often has difficulty s~eing why it is ~ot his n~tural right. to .muddy the waters ving past his door. The law, always beh md the hm es, req UJres elaborate stitching and fitting to adapt to it this newly perceived aspect of the commons. The pollution problem is a consequence of populations. It did not much matter how a lone ly American frontiersman disposed of his waste. "Flo\ving water pu rifies itself every 10 rniJes," my grandfather used to say, and the myth was near enough to the trut h whe n he was a boy, for there were not too many people. But as population be<:ame den ser, the natural chemical and biological recycling processes became overloa ded , calling for a redefiniti.on of property rights.

ao. .

HOW TO LEGISLATE TEMPERANCE? Analysis of the pollution proble m as a function of population density uncovers a not generally recognized principle of morality. namely: The morality of an act i~ a function of the state of the system, at the ti'me it is pelform er/. 4 Using the commons as a cesspool does not harm the general public under frontier conditions, bec ause there is no pu hli<:; the same behavior in a metropolis is unbearable. A hundred and fifty yea rs ago a plainsman could kill an American bison, cut _out on~y the tongue for his dinn er, and discard the rest of the animal. He was not m any 1111portant sense being was tefu l. Today, with only a few thousand bison left, we would be appalled at such behavior. . . . . . f That morality js systetn -sensitive escaped the attentio n of mo~t c.~fie~ 0 ethics in the past. 'Thou shalt not ... "is the form of traditiomtl etlucal d1~ecti;~s whi<.:h make no allowance for p
HARDIN 1 THE TRAGEDY OF -nm

•J9R

PART 4

CONTEMPO

RARY WORLD POLITICS

tly fcar('d f(>r an <~ IIC'it • t • , ~ ' - ()u is custodiet adrnirli:-.trativc law, wh•cf, IS rl•g ~ I the watch"r' rht•n, ~d . ' "" Jo lrn J\dan,~ Said /J .. Who ~ha I w,ttc 1 , u I . . I . i/J'>fJ.) (' /I V{O(l'S . ('law~ and not Ill' B . IJ ll(" l l l ;t( 11111118(rators . . ... tJOvernment o . I· ·I . . I tft·tl W<' mmf tdV( cl F> f tS I·n tiW lotaJ 'i\. ~f<•JJJ, ,IH 'illl~U <11 y !table {( ' l ralit\' o ac · > tryiug to <·valual<' I 1<' 1110 , 1l IJ,· III CO, not J.tw..,. . I · g .1 ? . . ·(' ind.ic·ltc~ thdt it t'. tr l >< ' a('comp is •ed bc:st .1 . ) ·nnC'<'. Expenenc < • • . . . · I w<· eg•' ale l<.:IIIJ £ • 1 • cJ . . 1 . tive Jaw. \Ve li111ll po'' ' 1)tIll<'!. 11nnec:cssurily if' l li'lt i<)JJ nf a mullS ra I . 111 I 1 J l1rollg I w c' • . t fQuis 1:ustodiel den ies " ' l I< l iSt• of adm injslrative th·tt . u('f' .l {' I'ea r· W£' S11ppos<.: ' the .S(• f)(Jin.e ntl , hr <:orr('Ctivc fccdW(' C' IIIIIOI aVOJd. T l(' ! AI n J I .. '· 1h·tt are ncct1e(,1lo k.ucp <.:u~todians }JOIIPSL \•vt> mn~t 111c ways to eg1ltmate ·k , (' 1 Im<: .~ · · . · 1 1 , ·ustotl.ians aml tJH.. com•c.:l i vc <' CC, hacks. the mwdc·d ~wtlaontyo.f bot 1 t •e <.: .

.

. I

°

.

'n.c. COMMONS

499

lt<.~l. (' taken her revenge, and the van'etv· H . ·e w omo cont,-, · · ollttJ' rtind aml would he replaced by the var:iety ~tpum~" would :0rne ex . h . omo progemtll.it.LS .., IJCC Tl " rgt~n al'n t assumes t at consc1ence or the des· r h'ldr · 1e '' . 1re 1or c 1 en ( . . hereditary-but heredttary only in the most g· e a] r no m,\tter 15 ) I 1 \\'h'c11 ,,; Jl be the· same whether the attitude is transmittedner tb 10rmal h sense. The su t "'' } I roua germ cells re rnatically... . T 1e argument las here been stated in the oonot t f h , or exoso . .app 1·Les equaJJ v well to any instanc:et·n h· hex o. t e popu. roblem. 1)lit tt 1uon P ' w JC soc:rety appeal a ·nclividual exploiting a commons to restrain himself for tile d bs 10 an r . .,. k genera1goo - v of his c.:onsc1ence. 10 m a e such an appeal is to set up as fo,.n th ' means , . .. . . e .....: ve system at w·orks toward the cltmmatron of consctence from the race. .. . Ou ld

'H

r

FREEDOM TO BREED IS INTOLERABLE Tl I( ' I rugr·dy of' th<.· (:Oll1111011S is i~vo~ved ill population r~;ol~l~ ms j 11 annt~t er way. In u world gov<'mcd soiC"Iy by the pnncrple of dog C!at <.log - 1f 1ndeed thcr e c~er was SJJC'!t ;r "~rorlcl-how many children a family had woukl not be a matter of public coucNn . Pan·nls who bred too exu bcrantJy would leave fewer dese;endants, not 111orc', bc·call!><' they \.\Ould be unable to care adec1uately for their children.... If <·aC'h human fiunily were dependent only 011 its own resources; if the children of improvidt•nt parents starved to death ; if, thus, overbrceding brought its own "pnnisluuent" to the g<·nn line- then there would be no public interest in coni rolliu~ th belieftltat evetyonc born has an equal right to the commons is to lock tlw world into a tragi<: course of action . . ..

CONSCIENCE IS SELF-EUMINATING

MUTUAL COERCION MUTUALLY AGREED UPON The social arrangements that produce responsibility are arrangements that create coercion, of some sort . Consider bank-robbing. The man who takes money from a bank acts as if the bank were a commons. How do we prevent such action? Certainly not by hying to control his behavior solely by a verbal appeal to his sense of responsibility. Rath er than rely on propaganda we follow Frankel's lead and insist that a bank is not a commons; we seek the definite social arrangements that will keep it from becoming a commons. That we thereby infringe on the freedom of would-be robbers we neither deny nor regret. The morality of bank-robbing is particularly easy to understand because we accept complete prohibition of this activity. We are willing to say 'Thou shalt not rob banks," without providing for exceptions. But temperance also can be created ~y coercion. Taxing is a good coercive device. To keep downtow11 shop~rs temperate 1.n their use of parking space we introduce parking meters for short penods, and traffic fines for longer ones. We nee d not actually crorb'd 1. a Cl'tize· . n to park as long as he. wants .. to· we need merely make it increasingly expen51ve for him to do so. ~ot prohibt~glon, ' carefully bia<~ed options are what we ouer er ]um. · aA M· dison Avenue man nu... 1t but J a . call this persuasion· I prefer the greater c~mdor of the word <.:~r~1011 • · · · d . , . . 1. b' .d isions of distant an lrresponTo many, the wof(l coerciOn nnp les ar Itrruy e~ . . Th onlv kind of 'bl b b h' . t cess·try' prut of ItS mearung. . bve the ,maJ'orih.r SI e ureaucrats; ut t 1s ts no a ne ' d · muh1allv. a~ee upon ' ·; coercion J recommend is mutua] roerc10n, o

of the people affected.

1t is a lllislakc• lo think that we c:;,rn control the breeding of mankind in the long run by an app<•al to.cons.c:ic.•nt·c·. Charles Calton Darwin made this pui nt when he spoke ?". 1 h<~ C(·n.lcmual of lite publication of his grandfather's great book. The .. rgument IS strrught lonvard and Darwinian. Pt>ople vmy. Confronted with appeals to limit brec·ding, sorue people \\~11 undoubted!)' rnd to tl 1 tJ 1·1 1 .11 · H' P ea more 1an others. Those who have more <.: u < ren WJ produc.'t' ·• hrger f · ·ti f h · ..u 1e . ' • • rac ono t e next generation thu.n those ""it h more susccp!ll'OilS<.:rences. 1 he d'fli . . 1 111 .. er<'nce WJ. Je accentuated. generation bv gene rat ron . In ( ;., G· 0·Un>.'m swords· "It JIL · f '· .ar·1011s r·nr t11c prolr<•nit \ · ·· · · may we ue that it would take hundreds o "gem:·r1 n e lllStmet to develop in this way, but if it shoulJ 00 so.

. t , that we are required to .1 . t , rcion 1s not o sa~ To say that we mutmu 1)'agree o coe . . ? We all grumble about . it, or even to pretend we enJOY . 1·t· \ Vho enJo,·s ta'\eS · enJoy · · ize that volunt
RECOGNITION OF NECESSITY

.

. ulation problems lS p . . f this analysis of mans pop di ·ons of low elhaps tJ1e simp· lest summary o . . .c ble onlY under con ti th·IS: The commons, if· jushna ·C bl · e .at a)J · IS ·jUStJna

500

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUT!CS

'(llllmo ns h·'1s had to !J,• · icd. incrca< has ion )opulat htlnrtn tll" \ . .,. . d . • 1 popu Ianon ensll.'. t s -.. . . . h~..' ab~lndoned in one aspect after anothe r. . First "'e abandoned the commons in. food gathc~·mg. cudo~11~g fa rm lanc.l anu restticting pastures and hunting and fishmg areas. 1 he ·e rcstnct •ons are still not complete throuahout the world. Somewhat later we saw that the commons e:l'i a place fo~ waste tlisposal would al 0 have to be abandoned. Restrictions on the disposal of domes tic sewage are widely accepted in the\ Vestem world; are_ s~ill struggling t? c~(~S? the commons to pollution by automobiles, factories, msecttc1de spraye rs. fc1tdtzmg operati ons, and atomic ener
Environmental Changes as Caus THOMAS HOMER-DIXON

':e

NOTES . .1. A~~ Smith. The Weal.th of Notions (New York: Modern Libra1y, 1937), p. 423. 2. \\1U~am Foster Uoyd, Two Lectures on the Checks to Population (Oxford: Oxford U!11vers•t)· Press. 1853), reprinted in part in Population, Evolution, a11d Birth Colltrol, A. H~~g, ed. (San Francisco: Freeman, 1964). p. 37. 3. A. N ·Whitehead, Science and the Moclem World (New York: Mentor, 1948), P· 17. ~· J. Fletcher, Situation Ethics (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966). 6 <>. S. Tax, ed., Evolution after Dancin , Vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. I9 0). p. 469.

t?. some ex-perts lead to acute conu· nmental chan~Te enviro might How . mc o . ·· propose tl~at enVlronmental change may shift the balance of power between states either reg10nally or globall . y, producing instabilities that could lead to war. 0 r,ao; 1 age increases the <..lisparity between the North and the global environ menta I cam South, poor nations may militmily confront the rich for a greater share of the world's wealth . Warmer tempe ratures could lead to contention o,·er new ice-free sea-lan es in the Arctic or more accessible resources in the Antarctic. Bulging population s cmd lancl stress may produce waves of environmental refugees that spill across borders wi.th destabilizing effects on the recipie nt's domestic order and on international stability. Countries may fight over d'vindling supplies of water and the effects of upstream pollution. In developing countries, a sharp drop in food crop production could lead to intemal strife across urban-rural and nomadicsedentaJy cleavages. If environmental degradation makes food supplies increasingly tight, exporters may be tempted to use food as a \veapon. Environmental change could ultimately cause the gradual impm·erishment of societies in both the North and South, which could aggravate class and ethnic cleavages. undermine liberal regimes, ancl spawn insurgencies. Finally, many sd1olars indicate that environmental degradation will "ratchet up'' the level of stress ~vithin n~tional and international society, thus increasing the likeJjhood of many different kinds of conflict and impeding the development of cooperative solutions.·· ·

THE RANGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS er and more seo:ereh- bv- em'id t fli ·a1 t • r.· • Develor)ing countries are likely to be a ec ec · ·soon the\· do not ha"e tne nnanr1 · r . 1 tl · ocial h Ion. · ronme ntal change than tieh countn es. By cenm ed world- furt em1ore. 1e1T s 1 . d ·u' ·dis _J It 15• probable' . material, or intellectual resources ofth.· e ·1e' e op cl n,·en \\1 1 coru. f b . ehend or respond to and political institutions tend to e r~gJ e a.n . bl theref()re, that developing societies '"tU be less a e to appr environmental clisruption. . ·LS Cau..c;es ciAt\lk Conftid. ~ I td FdJow-. of · Tllrf'sholcl· En' iromnt'Jttl.l C t:mgcs' F · _ 11 6 @ 1991 "'' th~ Pre;idcut ill rom Thomas F. Honlt'r-Dixon. "On the lnt~:nwuo11al St>ettrity . \'ol. 16. • o. 2 (I':JI l~J ). PP· '7Ulol~ . Rt>prinied b) pemli5sion of Tbe \ fiT Harvard Collegt> and tht." Massachusetts ltL~btute of Trc ...eJ otes });1\1' bceu onu.. r Press. Portions of th<> text and some .ootn 501

502

PART 4 \'H' ll

CONTEMPUKAJU

VVVlU....... - - · - - -

rn:~jor L'lld ron mental prob!ems ... migh_tyJ~u.:d I ~k

-

:a . tu le to <.:onflict

" ithin .lnd amon~ den'loi.Jing c:ountnes: greenhou~e ",u mu~g.. ·' , )Spheric ozone ovel·use land. l I ofka~n< degradation deforestation osition d I . t· I J · · . 1 c [ . ' · ucp e Jt>ll. ac1c ep · and pollution of ""..tter supplies. and depletion o . ns 1stoc s. I ht· .. )rohJc..ms can all be cmdeh- characterized as large-scale human-mduced p ro! len s with long-tenn and often· irre,·ersible consequences. "vhich is why the_v are <~ne, t:;rouped together under the rubric ..global change.·· However, the~' va? · areatJ_,. m "~)a[j~ sca.le: the first two im·oh·e o('nuineJy global physical processe~. while the last fh·l· lm-olve regionaJ ph~-sical processes, although they may appear m local~s all m_·er tlw planet. These se,·en problems also vruy in time scale: for examp_le, wh1le a regJon can he deforested in only a few yeru·s, ru1d se,·ere ecological wd so~1al e~ects ma) he noticeable almost immediately. humru1-induced greenhouse wanmng wJII probabl~· c!E:- velop over man,· decades and may not have truly serious implicati0~1~ for humanki nd rcn· ha! ra c.:entu~' or more after the signal is first detected. In addition, some of these problems (fo.r instance, deforestation and degradation of water supplies) are mu<:h more advanced than otl1ers (such as greenl1ouse warming and ozone depletion) and are already producing setious social disruption. This vruiance in tangible evidence for tJ1ese problems contrib~t~ to great ~erences in our certain_ty about their ultimate seveJity. The uncertainties surrounding greenhouse wannmg, for example, are thus far greater tl1an those conceming deforestation. . Many of thes_e problems are_caus~y interrelated. For instance, acid deposition ~mages agncultur~I land, fish~nes, and forests. Greenhouse warm ing may contribute to deforestation by movmg northward the optimal te mperature and precipitation zones for many tree species, by increasing tbe se,·erity of windstorms and wildflres, and by expwding the range of pests and diseases. The release of carbon from these dying forests would reinforce the greenJ1ouse effect. The increased incidence of ultraviolet radiation due to the depletion of the ozone layer will probably damage trees and crops, wd it may also damage the phytoplankton at the bottom of the ocean food chain. . F~all!', when we consider the social effects of environmental change, espeCI~Y of climate change, we should be especially aware of changes in the incidence of extreme" environmental events. Social impacts result "not so much from slow Buctua~ons in the mean, but from the tails of the ilistlibution, from extreme . might not seem 1 bal warmmg · mean go events. . .\.Vhile a two-to-tluee d egree ce1SIUS · may produce a large increase in cropfor agricultural prod uction, It 5'~ dtoo Sl,.,..,;f::cant evastating droughts, Roods, heat waves, and storms.

FOURPIDNCWALSOC~EflECTS Environmental degradation may cause countless often subtle changes in developTh ing
u

' '"''-'

~

L AUSEs

OF ACUTE CONFU

503 er ''hovl' quf":' stiou . To a<.ld rcss it we m t us use hoth th b , . cial effects o I env1ronmental change .and t11e b t ekn est knowledge about the O 1 · r· s owledge about llle nature es a11d causes o soc:1a. con. fl ic:t.

both ends towards. the 'dill work1ng from In thus . . hypothe~Jze t~utt four pnndpal social effec:ts ma .ml ~ of the causal chain, I y, either smgly or in c:ombinatio substantial I) m <:r ease the probability of n, . acute conflic.;t . d . In evelopmg countries· decreased agncu 1tura 1 production ec:ono .. d I· . mic ec me pop I t· cl. ' fI .. . . . u a Jon lsplacement and disruption o egJ tlmlzed and autho .t ti . . ' · d . n a ve mstJtuti . 1 relations. soc:~al an ons . d k These effects w1 I often be causally inter]· .c . m e . sometimes ' 1'th rem1orcing l . F rela"' tionsh1ps. or examp e, the population dis 1 p acement result' f . aCTlicultural pro cl uct1on may further disrupt . 1 a] mg rom a decrease in agnc.:u tur prod ·f10 0 · o· decline may lead to the flight of people with a] h . cl · uc _ n. r economic we t
Agricultural Production Decreased agricultural production is often mentioned .,""'.. potenti'ally the most worrisome consequence of environmental change ... . L~rge tra~t~ ar~ being lost each year to urban encroachment, erosion, nutrient depletion, salm~zahon ,_ waterlogging, acidification, wd compacting. The geographer Vaclav Smtl, who IS generally very conservative in his assessments of emi ronmental damage, estimates tl1at two to three million hectares of cropland are lost annually to e rosion; perhaps twice as much land goes to urbanization. and at least In addition.. one million hectares are abandoned because of excessive salinitv. " about one-fifth of the vvorld's crop land is suffering from some degree of desert:iHcation. Taken together, he concludes, the planet will lose about 100 million hectares of arable land between 198.5 and 2000 ... _t Greenhouse warming and climate change [can affect] ... agricultural production. Coastal croplancl in countries such as Bangladesh and Egypt is extremely\Ul· nerable to storm surges. Such events could become more c-ommon and devastating, because global warming will cause sea levels to rise and might inter~­ sify storms. The green house effect will also change precipitation p~ttems and sml moisture; while this may benefit some agricultural regions, others will suffer. · · ·

Economic Decline If we are interested in environment-conflict linkages. perhaps the 010 t in~phortant ti 011 · · the further impo,·ens ment d d • h _er t • IS potential social effect of environmental egra a . t diversin· ol factors rrug t aJJec . . · ed b•rozone ·. . tt may produce in developing societies. · · · A grea 1 d ultra,ioJet radiation caus . d li . t k which could wealth production. For exampIe, mcrease depletion is Likely to raise the rate of disease in humans ank . "e_s ·ocproduce short· for emort mar ets ma' ults. Loggtng h ff c~n damage roads. cl :-r ave serious economic res runo lite' but mcrease • t h c term economic gain ror il h rtn 51·ttation reduces t11e t e coun rys e bridges, and other valuable infrastJucture. wh e t e ex a

5().j

PART 4

HOMER~DIXON

CONTEMP0RARY WORLD POUTICS

.....• of rh·er. . A forf:> capaCI• tric 1 . :8 and it ab orb. an •TII tr..lllS[X>rt o.md I~~ droe ec 1 r . d more espens'" · f: milies that u e it for 1Ue · becomes carrer ~ hou ehold budget for the poor a

ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES AS

CAUSES OF ACUTE CONfUCT

royed, wood "•'...:: "hare of the H

r

q

.

PopuJation Displacement

1

tat0 rs ha,·e suggested that envi ron men tal ck er" l:ttwn rna,·' produce tal refugees ... Sea~levcl rise rn.t~ dri,·e people back . Some commenof· "en\lronmen b ahelian coun . EO'\pt· spreading desert ma\· C:'rnptv vast num ers · tal · d d Ita areas m c. · a\·c their depleted e . mo'.e south·• Filipino fishermen ma~ lt ... from th ·· an pulations . .coas tries as elr po r th .0. The tenn ~emironmental refugee IS somewhat mis..J' ounds cor e Cl es. fish. could be a mg grhowever because 1·t 1·mpues that environmental uisruption . 1 clina f fuaee Bows. Usuallv, though , en\lronmcn tal disn.Iption ' ea o• . . 1 · bJ · 1 c1· · dear proxunate cause o re o and socra van a es. me .u mg aaricul~ · onlv one of many ·IJl teracting pbvsical ' will be people from thetr. homelands • .c decline, that ultimatelv/ .force · . tural and econom1 t three decades. millions of pcop 1e have tn1grated from tj las I 'I ·1 . 1 . di . For examp e, over 1e · 1 bon·ng West Bengal and . data . a. \•\ 11 e uetruled . Assam m In Banglades h to ne1g1 . p art because the Bangladeshi government .ts reluctant to. adrm t there . are scarce (m is significant out~migration). many specialists belie,·e tl11s move_men t IS a_ result, at least in part, of shortages of adequate!~· fe~e land due to a rap1dly gro,vmg population. Flooding. caused by deforestation m watersheds upstream on the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers, might also be dmi.ng people from the area. I~ the future, this migration could be aggravated by rising sea~Je,·els coupled wtth extreme weather events (both perhaps resulting from cl.irnate change).

Disrupted Institutions and Social Relations The fourth social effect especially relevant to the connection between emironment change and acute conflict is the disruption of institutions and of legitimized, acx.:epted, and authoritative social relations. In many developing societies, the three social effects described above are likelv to tear this fabric of custom and habitual behavior. A drop in agricultural output may weaken rural communities by causing malnutrition and disease, and by encouraging people to leave; economic decline may corrode confidence in the national purpose, weaken the tax base, and undermine financial, legal, and political institutions; and mass migrations of people into a region may disrupt labor markets, shift class relations, and upset d1e tradi~ tional balance of economic and political authority between eth nk groups. ;

The Capadty ofDeveloping Countries to Respond: FJISt-Stage lnteNentions Can developing countries respond to environmental problems effectively enoug}~ to av~rt ~ negative SOCial effects? The aggregate data on world food produc~on ~ gwe us reason for optimism. Between 1965 and 1986, many developmg regiOns suffered serious environmental problems, including erosion, sali ruzation, and loss of land to ~i~tion. Yet global cereal production increased at 3 perce~t a year, meat and nulk output increased 2 percent annually, while the rate for oil

50.~

Ops ,·ctrel•tblr-'>, .md pulses was 2.5 percent At tl 1e reoional 1 . I . · h I er · .., · IO<:rcas<.-d hxl t::' Af ·t\C gro\\th popnlation of t·Orts from develo!)l..d r~ c:ountne ,.,.,th h "u . ~ge surpluses. We h . 1 ight thercfor<.' conclude that developing eount . . . nes ta\e SIJffi<.1ent eaPa<:•ty. . r· . n 1ittent a-, 1stancc rom \ orthem grain export ,.,.,th ·otem ers, o respond to emiron mental I . . .. . problems. But aggre~ate figu res htde s1gn1ficant disparities in food availah'litv within de,·elopi ng coun tries. ~ I OJ·eO\·er, these figures are becomin 11 ·. amon~ ~nd than the\· once were: many de,·eloping countries have alread . g ed s promlsm~ · and the rate of increase }inreape · 11Jenefit, · ·s potentia ' )ution 1 hal mo l of the green revo . cl 1)}' over 40 percent since the l960s Fo gtho ' c·erea1production has cIe<.: Ime . · · r ree succe ·1ve . ,years-from 19H t throug~ 1989 estimated global cereal consumption exceeded production. Bumper gram. crops were again harvested in 1990, but carr\'-o,·er stocks can be depleteu rap1dly, and we remain "'~thin one or two years of a·global food crisis. o\·er th e long term, the capacity of developing countries to respond efTec.ti\'ek to the consequences of environmental change on agriculture " ill depend on th~ complex inte ractions within each society of ... the society's pre\'ailing land-use practices, land distribution, and market mechanisms \\ithin the agricultural sector. \-farket factors are especially relevant today as numerous de\'eloping <.'Ountrie are reunquishing state control over the marketplace, reducing go,·emment spending. and removing impediments to foreign im·estment. Economists often contend thatin a market economy with an efficient price mechanism emironmentally induted scarcity will encourage conservation, technological innonltion. and resource substi~ tution. JuJjan Simon. in particular, displays an unwa,·ering faith in the capacity of human ingenuity to overcome scarcity when spurred by self~interest.~ ~~an~· et-onomists point to the success of the green revolution, which was ~fte~ driven b~· market forces: it involved both new technologies and the substitution of petroleum resources (in the rorm of fertilizer) for inadequate or degraded nutrients in the _soil. · ·es for rna~ket· libe .adJust. . .ructural . naliz·~ti'on. an.d ·'st This ar~ument supports the pohc1 ment" currently promoted by intemational financial and lencling m~tituti~ns. such. as, the International Monetruy Fund and \Vorld Bank. Below, howe,,er, I su~e~t '~~) . . ' vill no t be 'an effiecti·ve response to environmental sc-arcity m e these poIJc1es future.

CORNUCOPIANS AND NEO-MALTHUSIANS onJ , use the labels ..cornucopian .. for . Experts in environmental studies now corn~. > · . . ts like Paul and Anne gl t ctinathestockofan\'Sin e optimists like Simon and "neo- Malthusian for pesstmls Ebrlicb.3 Comucopians do not worry much about prbo e ~ genuin· can ah\ Cl\ 'S be ' . . the same resource. because of tl1eir fru·tJ1 that market-dJi,·en uman m to produce 5 ' resource tappetl to allow the substitution ot. more abund-mt . . ht to criticize the idea that reso~rce . end-use se1vice. . . . d t' 11e again. human beu•gs Historically c:ornucop1ans have been ng . · ·n, Time an 11 " ' limits on human actl''~·r scarcity places fixed

.....

... ...

•.,vv

- •. " •uc.;:,

. . .111cl J1('(J · Malt h11 o;ian!> haH 1.1 1\ll y ; l(:(.'JI', (;d . ' I sc·trcJlJC:S, • • havt• c•r cllr tiV t'l l t·c< · < .• I . t thL'i exp t· rw ncc · pc rl a" ( ft l lttn · , l'(J I'JII Iof ..crving wolf:· Hilt in ;t<;l .-.,; ,s of c:n llc: al n ·<.C JIIIC '<., I I. . ll SIJ ' 11 rio us sca rcr u'-' . . . • .t y hrsl, w 1crea.'> se r ltt'p lc sca rdti <'< ; tha t exl1 1l ,, 1 • rf11 l lltl t·racliv. . 1 w we· ,ace mu cl c, ~ppe arc ~lllg y. n~h Id em·ets. An agricultur~d rt:giCJII lll: t} ''JI ( x· unp k:, k \iJn tJIIccdback. anJ thre!) 0 J crree11ho11 \r' mdll<.:(•d J)rec.:i pit· l' . • ~'(!. . •cl b degra (;(1 wa• t e r and ·~oi. l • t-; . tanc•ously .u f ctc Yd d 10 11 . . let rad iat ion . flu s make s l iH f IJ tun · Iwtf dy u ll<.:(; , . , d 10 · cr< ' < l. ' iC u 1 tra vJO . {') , cI1<mgcs , an rd . orn ic ac.;t nrs · tom orr ow wd ii H' ful l of c:x lrC' ntt• E!V<·ttl · (! . 1nakcrs an econ ' tarn or po_1·•cy as numc rou ~ resou rce<; lwco111c· c,ca n.:c· sirnultariC'-'i . ld surpnses Furt erm orc , 'I .1. . I aJ · I .. h d 'de .. tt'fv ' sub sti tut ion J10 SSI >I llH ;<; t tal pro <..u 1 ·t ·11 be ar er to 1 ·" , • c<; the s·unc· • ous y, I wr . ·t . tl at prc:;vailf·d when ~ca rc.;tty wa~ I<·" ~ \C·vc n·. Seco nd' in en d-u se services at cos s I . cl I I · · . f ·von resou rcc· usuaUy lllCr<;ase s ow v, a 11 owr.ng li, n<· , the pas t the sc.;arc•ty o a gt " · ffJr · . · . . d t"c.; llnologicaJ adJ' ustmfmt. Bul hurn an pop•datl ons arc mu socra 1 cconorn .re..;, an d, e 1 · ' d bal ave rage, rnut: 1 more r<;sou rcC;argcr an ac: t'1vt-0-cs. cJ f 1·11cJ;viduals arc ' on .a. glo 1 . • . . b r e Tl · ... means that dc btbtal mg sca rct. tt. 1 e~ mtensJVc t11a11 eror . 11-~ o t<;n ck-velop mud, · . . mor<; qu•·c: kJy: wheJJe c.;OLinlrt·cs mU,V be uc•for est ed 10 • a• /cw cl£;<.:ades; most of' a . , t ·1 can dJ·sapr1car in a trcncrat•on; anti c:nltc al oz on e d<; ple r(~g1 0 11 s opsor · lion may n . , . occur in as little as twe nty years. Th~nl , today~ c:onsu mp lr~n ha<; far gre ater mome nt 11 m than in the past. because of the size of th e cons u mUJg populati on , the sheer quantity of rnaterial consuu1ed by thi ~ population , ~nd_t ~IC dens ity of its intcrwovt>n fabric of consumption activities. fh c co un tless tndJVtdual and co rporate economic actors maldng up hurnan soe;iety are heavily com mitted to certain patterns of resource use; and the abi li ty of ou r marke ts to au ap t may be sha rpl y constrained by these entre nched interests. . T11 ese first three factors may soon co mbine to pro du ce a da un tin g syn drome of environmentaJJy induced scarcity: humankind wiJ I fa<.:<; mu ltiple res ou rc:e shortages that are interacting and unpredictab le, that grow to cri sis proportions rapidl y, and that will be hard to address because of powe rful co mm itm en ts to ce rtain consumption patterns. The lc>urth rea~(>n that cornucopian argum en ts may no t ap ply in the future is that the free-market price mechan ism is a bad ga ug e of scarcity, especiaiJy for resources held in common, such as a be nign climate an d pro du cti ve seas. In the pas t, many suc:h resources seemed endlessly ab un da nt; no w they are being degraded an d depleted , and we are learning that the ir ·inc rea sed sca rcity often Ita~ tre m~ncl_ou s bc~ring on a so<.:iety's we ll-bein g. Yet thi s s<: arcity ·is at best rcflec:ted only m
1

.h

•

AS CAUSEs OF

ACIJTE CO\'FU aV(. ; eff iu t n t rnarkc!l'> , la<.;k of <.:apital _1k h '' er 501 . anu n<J W-h ( . rw w111 hind(:r ll . t11cse proI,I, rns. H:t r TH,po Sixth c·CJfJIIH'<Jpians have an an· .l • . rw- tr> a<:u ron ,.;;t i(; fait \. h 1 1J nravel a ne It 1mu1agc t.h<; my riad pro<;tss ~ f' m •JTnankind' , L·t· · ( " o naturt ·n . !> ClO llt\ , e:>.'flCd t 1tat nu rnan !-.Cicntifi<; and tc<.:hni<.:al . . · l<:r t ,., ne, a Priori ·r ' ' . II I . mg enU it} <.:an · I rta.<;cm ttJ of scarc.; tty. urn an >e mgc, may not hav t tl ._ ' ii way <; 'illn r.cmr,t all"" . . . , . . 1e: me niA l cap a<; ·n., ouate ly l Itc· un -~~ n p1£:XI tle s of <;nvmmmental- -·a1 :t.J t<J und <:rc ,tan d ad ) ·t..j . h } . SO< ;J sy~ te: ms 0 . imposSirJ c·, g~ven t <; p 1yst <.:al , biolnaic.-al and se .-.I I· e· r tl rrt4) '>implv he . b" • X;Ji i aw s uc th · 1vt;rn · to reUIJC:~ a 11 Scarcity Or r<;pai r alJ cnvironm<;ntaJ dama : \l mg tse S)Sltm<,, nature of tlte:se sys t<;rns may keep us from fullv a ti _. !?; .' • oreow:r, the <;ha.otic · cl · various adaptatton an mterv<;ntion strate(lies "PE:nb <.:lpatmg the const . (\Utntts of . Ik I d !;)" . • r ap~ rnor -.t tmp rJrt
NOTES 1. Smil gives a startli ng a(.;count of the situation in China. Fro m 1957 to L9i7 the <.-ountry I~ 33.33 million hectares offanr.Iand (30 percent of its 1957 total), whilei! added 21.2 m~n hectares of largely marg)nalland. He notes that ~th e net loss of l2 mi~ o~ hectares dun11g a single generation wh en the c.-ountry's population grew by about 300 m1ll1on ~pie means that pe r capita availability of arable land dropped by 40 percen t and that Clunas fannl_an~ is now no mo re abu ndant than Bangladesh 's- a mere one -tenth of a hectare per caprta. See Smil Energy Food Envircmmcnt , pp. 22-3 and 2.30. ' ' 2. Sn. non, Th e Ultim' ate Hes (m rce. Populah.on growlh· b>. s·tmon 's anah,si ' s' is not necessar-

d t} ily a bad thing· in fa<.:t it may be helpfu l because it increases the lab 1 or force an . •e pool ' ' B of potentia l human ingenuity. See also Ester oserup, The Conditions of AgnCtJ1tura .· p (Chicago: . Cl t l J-r P opu latwn ressure Growth: Th e Economics of Agran all . wnge ne~ · Aklin e, 1965). . . . Tl p lation Explosion. 3. El1rJjcJt, Ehrli<.: h, and Holdren, Ecoscience: Ebrhc h and Ehrhch. le opu

Beyond Kyoto JOHN BROWN£_

-

THE CARBON CHALLENGE ,{ "'JIHJirf1 ·1J cmt h• ~rr·d 111 Kyor,, J·'fl·'" iu ·1r·:m ·h 1 f ;, ' ' • ""'" v "' I 11 n11l 1' IWJJf• rl l~fl I"() '''JCmltnfl lt·d Jnll:frwt irm:tl rt·'lpml114: IIJ ~"lml w;•nrHt•g. I ),,. J'II NJ'" ''" :,J :~wr ·~·,u ,,, III H11 f tJ,,. Kyt1ftJ h ·r•ftx I I '> lt:p, frJ fVtH ~ ,j!trJific•llfJ ., , "r•tl ltl lft'•rk 1 , , f'Y '' ft•~t(!JJ{'( I llfJ rr ! rl r fI 1 '"• : '''''• 1 )(•~•·' 1 ,,· ,,. 11t·arly:;l d,·cadt· of df()r1 , rf 1/JHY tHJt 1·vc• 11 , . ,,, ., 1•1111 1 I ~ ('(JUI 1II~Itl ll'lh fun·t· ~J~~ 11 bi~Ullt'"' in~tlrtwwttf. (;;mad~. J:1p;m, :Htd tlrt· f•:"rr,pr·:,, IJ , ;,m tJ, . '"'''' 1 • 11 tJJ 1111 J:V~tir· ~ttfvrx.:llft!~ {){the Kynt11 prrwf•"t"- :m · 1101 c,n I lftL ~ ,,, tiH !d IJ 1dr ,.,,, miruwntll, Aud tl•f· IJufl(:d ';t;Jtr;~t J,ar, wifl,dmwu fmr" f J,. :tgrf•f;tf/t •nl t:tllirt:ly. m4: " ' mt·(·rt~NI wit I• t1w ~tll lif "I ,~,1 ty t J.r· (Jart l'·., d i1 mil ,. ' .," dd Iu; (c1rg}w;u fill

Jfr

1

·n"

(

,m (Jr

lt·t·liu~ dt.:prt·~toA :d,

c;J,·ar-c:yNf wall'lm i~ t!ft\(!fdJ~I. Hut dhtn:,y. lrowc;vt·r lllldt·r.,t:utdalll(:. i:i

:,t

, 1 ,;'~

fJt I'(:(JJJI~ ftJn~ diftr•(('(J{ }(Jid tflfJfi ' J'(I'IitJV(• Vi i 'W Of' fllf; l:t')( t,l '\'l•fJ yhtf~V ;md r,f Ih1• f111 11 rt·. Vlfo.l , if IJWI I)(·f.:f1lflt· ()I JVJ()II 'I f),~d Kyt 1f () ww1 , ; rr 1pi y t lr( · '> hu1 iiJg poJul t1f ;t vt·ry ltm$4 f:rtdt:~Vt>r u 'mfmral 1lt·. ('f·rlr:ip' I o Ilrt· rru ·r·I i "~"' i 11 HJ1() ;if wlri('l 1 ~ lif1Jtlf' of 2.) t'IIIJ/Jtnt:11 ~JJQ'l'l'd ICJ rt:dll t:l • IMHJ~. 'f1 11 J".(· 1ft( '! ·ti I 1g.\ "'r:t ill rfl lJlJrm ;J J'ff"~:''l tl,;tl INJ ''' tlr1· t·~ft~IJJJ-.Im,,.,l tlth£· Cr·JJI'ntl Agn ·r·utt·11t t111 'l':.rifh :UICI Tr:vl1: lu HJ4!1. wMt lt, hr I1Jrt1, lr!Cl ''' tf,(. c~rt:t~litm ,{ tlrt.; WMid Tnul(· ()r_ww li'.alitm ;11 tlu: mid HlfJ(ht. ~~md, We· ltavt· lwpnM.::d, if ~tiHI iwpt·rlf~<·t, KII(IWit:dgt: oft l,f· dwllc·ngr·\ ~md unet·t1:t1ullr·'l tl,at t•litrmlt· dmu~· pn:~.!lll 'l, a.'l wdl :t'> a l;(·ltN III HIN~tl ;urdifr'' ,,f rlu: lltni· ~K;:Jft:ll inY(}Iw·d. 'f11ird, many l:c,uulrir·'; ar,d <.:4'J1(1f>ttfll<·~ l.:tvc: k uf t;>:pl;rit:7wc; mcJrJdt•~ cml,'fltm/4 aiJ{I hav(' pmw.!d lft~Jt I)IIC·I, t('( lr l('fiolln c·:u1 IH· adtifM•d wlt lrc,ut t:AJtf•/1

f( •(t/1J( JII ,

'111f'(t_;

dJ·~fr!'Yi''~'~Mupdfliw:Jll:t~~ ''r Jol,!4. f•"ct1Jrtlr. M:iwu.:t ~ ;uJd (t;duHJio~y ll}tVf· advauc~t·d (,, umlhplt: lrfJni~J. Ami (ltlally. pul1lk•aw;m:rH~.'i" of tj,;; i~MH~ ll:tH grow" 110 1 just lu tltt:

(LM~Jt1H:d world fmf till ;~ffJIHicf lht~ jQob!;. S':'"'" yt~ar11 ~,ft,:r tlw KytJIJ> ITlHl!tin;<, it is lu·tmnit,g <·l(;ar tJ,at tlH· rt;dt~(•Hon of #f,n:mfl,,m~: (:ml~~dfm'l 11; a M11ul,.l,: probl£·tr•, :wd t J,~,r tlw , ,,;cJuwi-tlfl"' for ddlv~ . . . . . I fJ f j I f' t•rhl" fJm .. ,JufloiiH;m·' wlfl ••it•• •"'t·'~'·l ·'M '· " m ~tp r 1 u ('WIIJt'" ~ fiJ' f lltiiHtrt , rf ~ ~ tlmfJ ttJ ltltM• bf'!)'O rul tlm c:um•ut Kyot'' dt:bnl(t,

w-'

KNOWNSANOUNKNOWNS

510

PAKJ

'f

- ...... " " L I

\..V • • ...... -

·u

obabh- be able to bar· · · 1t<::r levelf> at Industrialized coun tries'"~ ... pdr ~d cities in tht' :\. I , 1 fo r exaJnp.J.:.. r . d cades. .LAin on · 1t ~. least in the next~~\ e Id b ·k surcrin<:t seas. And fan I • r : tn~· countri es r es to ho ac o· . . . I alreadv' h;we de1ens · b·. adJ·u tina tmg atiO u •. u . • ~1 11~ t 1e cro 1 ·u climate \ ,., 1 ps can respond to c 1anges • ,·e~ment financial f>up poi' 13 1 'I If:' deYeloping thev plant. in many cases \\f,tJ11 go -... . · like h to fare C.'OJ1 '-H: . .., I ' wor-.e on both " c. fifths o 1umaJ11 l ' , 15 · world. home to ,our- ousands of ~pie have' already bec·u '. "j> 1,t(·(• d by pc::riodic fronts. Hundreds of th , d b i tence farmers- wh o an· lar If'>~ adaptive than flooding in Bangladesh. an sual ad\' truggling at the climali( rnargi n. . . . thetr ncher counterpart s-a re · .re· wou Id h.t,·e gra "e con< e d atic scen anos. a1tJ1ougJ1 un li.ke h. ' ·• The most r~ d. ..,terns. Rapid change. in dimat<.· could up et the t" an ecoS) ·' . . quences f1or h01nam • · h tJ ..: : rorexample whi ch. 1rom caJly. wou ld cause much . _.r,. ti fthe ' ort A anuc. Tl • c1rcwa ono · . nor them Eur ope b~· weakenlllg the heat-rich Gul f Id · aJ tem peratures m , eo er reg~on . forest t'Ou1d deplete dramaticall~· due to drying in the Stream · The Amazon ratn · stor cl · . · g huge ,·olumes of carbon t11at IS e m trees. And an atmosphere. m tum re1easm . . . . . sea J.n·el from melting 1ce m Antarctica could occur. These acceJerated nse m "· . . 1es ror c )j . . ,..,.., .1 not lead to cns p om eta h po C\. But thev mean UJlcert.am consequen........ u 0 . · . ,. . d ·mp rove men ts in mea c;ur eme nt and leammg \\111 be cruc1al. t I1at pre<:auti on an I . .. , , A sober strategy would ensure that any mcrease m the "'or ld s. tem perature is limited to ben\'een 2 or 3 degrees Celsius abo,·e the current level m the long run. Focused on that goaL a growing number of governments and experts have concluded tJ1at polky shouJd aim to stabilize C.'Oncentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere jn the l"'o:~.nge from 500 to 550 ppm over the next century, which is less titan ~ice the pre-industriaJ Je,·el. On the basis of known technology. the cost of me eting this goal would be high. But the track record of technological progress in oth er fields indicates an enormous pote ntial for costs to falJ as new ideas are developed and applied . In the energy industry, for example. the c:osts of deep-water oiJ and gas develo pm ent ha,·e faUen by a fCK.-tor of t11ree over the last 1.5 years, dramatically extendi ng the frontier of commerdal acth-ity. There is no reason to think that research and development in the area of benign energy systems would be less successful. Pre dicti ng where that success might come will not be eas y-but that means pro gress must be made on multiple fronts. ~~y people be~ eve that the 500--.550 ppm goal wouJd help avoid the worst ~mtties. But we must rec:ognize this assessment for what it is: a judgment mformed by current knowledge, rather than a con firm ed conclus ion to the story... ·

EFFICIENCY AND lRANSFORMATION h the exa tt level of the na.. L ·m gl b 1 bo di ·d · ns ove r ttm tJBot bseq · e and 1"'-'41\ o a car n ox1 e emJ·ssto 1 • e suL ueot decline are unknown. We can safe ly ass um e howeve r that emisSIOJlS •rom developing count · will k . . g as econom · ic•acti vity • . . nes eep nsm and mcomes growIn . · ·the · Thsho JS means that leade h· rt rs 1P must <:ome from the ind ustrianzed wor Icl · and profitably. the .developed world can use ene rgy mu<:h mo re efTi cien~y clear ampetus for change, business could put new technolowes

w:r:·

DtYONt ) KYOTO

Sll

....... d sef\'it',,._ to use: cautiously at fir t but m . ....,. . • ore ·dentifie d and put mto practice with the norma} tuaggresSively as the best S\.'Stems are t . h alr mover of capital ' Bu!>mt ss as eady foun d that it is po 'bl SSI e to reduce e . . f erat ioH s. Cu unt erin tuiti vely . BP foun d tht 1.t . bl mtss Op 1ons rom its . . a v.as a e to reac h 'ts · · ·a1 1 reducinp: f~1mssto ns by 10 percent below its mtti target of 1990 l . ls . h company added around S650 million of shareh~lde~v~u:~t cost. Indeed.. the reductio ns e;arnC;; from the tlimination of leaks and . t Othuse ~e bulk of the \\ as e. er finns h electricity generator Ent ergy. car manufacturer Toy ota d . . -:-rue as 1in to-are ha.,ing similar experienc-es. The overwhelm·' an mmma g~ant Rio . .. 1 . mu message from the e expenm <::nts IS tnat e ffi c1e ncy can both pav dhi den ds and red . SIOn . s. . . . _ ' uc.e emiS Yet re d uc111~ emiSSions by ... 2.~ billion tons per vear in 2.050 ill . · ffi · · · " reqmre more than JUSt e ctencY Imp rovements. Given the world' s ns· ·mg d d rLOT energy ' ema n we must also transfo rm the enerCN sYstem itself making full.,... - -L - · e: , · "'' use 0 f lOW-<:-
•

51 2

PART 4

c o NTEMPORARY WORLD POUTICS

.

BROWNE I BEYOND KYOTO

muld ng transportatic ,q · · ' f'Rcic nt, while 0 1 promising apprm1ches w• l . .c~. other ernissio11s th at · 1 • nc,llnlion. Fo '1 • t11· ·ter lumts on r meeting t 1e eve•-s c . .
s

00

strictest regulatory body ~ e ·h . ues /()r gasoline injec.:lion al!-.o l1old pror11ise ~· ing a second look. Adv~nce te~l nJ~y the road . Such \'(:hic ·ll's I ntve the potcn~~~ 011 'd I tric uaso~ ne cars ,t rea do I1.Ybn e ec -o . i1 , ge per gallon of their conH-ntionaI counte 111,1115 ea .. to get more U1an .t\'IICC t1.le m. de nand for SJ)eed and fl exi IJiIity in air trave l, policyc·1ven the increasmgr COJlSllrTiel I . . f' th 0 JpOJtunities for cutting cmtSS IOII~ rom aircraft. makers should also rocus on e l . . S . r . . ·equire ma or mves h11ents. omc, Wl'II .clJso requ1re new All of these ef rorts w• 11J •1 . • • ·l . . . . st begin to blllld and test sue 1 syste ms. 1 Only w th eviinfrastructures . 8 ut we mu l' · nee can we decid e how best to ( 1rcct our c •orts. dence from actuaJ e>.pene

rr

DOWN TO BUSINESS Tl

ole of business is to transfonn possibiliti es into reali ty. And that means being pr:~~cal, undertaking focus ed research, an~ testi~g the different po.ssibili~~es in real commercial markets. The energy busmess IS now global, whtch offers a tremendous ad,·antage: international companies access knowledge around the world and apply it quickly throughout their operations. But the busin ess sector cannot succeed in isoLation. Harn essing business potential requires fair and credible incentives to drive the process of innovation and change. In responding to global warm ing, that role mus t fall to the government. Neith er prescriptive regulations nor fiscal interventions designed to collect reven ue rather than to alter behavior provide the answer. Rath er, governm ents must identi fy meaningful objectives and enco urage the busi ness sector to attain them by using its knowledge of technology, markets, and consume r pref erences. Recent experience suggests that emissions trading regi mes -whereby govemmen t sets a binding cap on total emissions , dividing the total into "emission credits'' that are given to those who emit carbon ruox:i de-a re the best policy for encouraging business. Policymakers (notably in the United States) have dem onst rated that it is possible to design such systems for other pollutants, such as sulp hur dioxide, thereby harnessing the power of innovation and the flexibility of the market to protect the environm ent, whHe avoiding crippling costs. The same insights should apply to carbon ~oxide. A well-designed trading regime would incl ude a strictly enforced cap, wbJch would make carbon dioxide emission cred its scarcer (and thus mo~e .valuable) and would there by increase the incentive for business to control emiSsions. Such a syste m would also allow firm s and hous ehol ds the flexibiUty to apply resources where they have the greatest impact, which is essential , because the best mea'>.ures for controlling carbon dioxide are hard to anticipate with precision and are Widely dispersed acros th · tradi ng syss e economy. And a credible emission tern woul · .m radical 1l~lt ·u . d. create incent'lves to mves t new tech nolo gies the kind t WJ be cructal m buiJdi b ng a car on-free energy syste m in the future. '

i>l 3

Em isstons trading systems need n0t h. 'd . . · 11 r· .• one. The political e ' entJcal m e appli ed untv ersa y rorn u~y real't . very country, nor he 1 1 5 1 ence of a single regim . . . Y tJ at we are unlikely to see t he suddl'n e rncrg ... L S(;()pe and a h't· 1 comparah! C' to we e mergence of a single,e mlobaJ c:urr m 1 IOn , t 1at would be

,.,.,uch more likely to come through the grad ~I enc:y. l nstead, progress is '" ua proce ofkn·t1 · national and regional efforts on the basis of th . ss · k · hng together diverse • e1 r trac reco ] f . achievement. The key task today is to Hnd ti th rt s o expe nence and · . prac ces at will lead t . 0 \o\rill enabl e todays dive rse and fragmented red ·ti re: . a system that . Th h' f uc one •orts be valu cl mon b aS IS. e •story o trade liberalization over the secondtohalf e on a c~mcentu ry shows that gradual ism can yield impressive results. of the twentieth At present, the nasc.:ent Eu ropean emission t di . . . . cl , l" B il . ra ng IS the most advance examp e. u ton soun d mon1toring and vert'ficatisystem .... . t · f' h 1 ' on po 1c1es tne svstem is the centerp1ece o t e Eu ropean effort to implement tb . . ' ts auop .l' . e comm ttmen he potential for extending the scope of th t di b . . cl ted at Kyot o . . .. T . · e ra ng ao;e 1s m eed cons1derable, . not least throu . gh the incorporation of effec:tive 1·nc·ent'1ves tl1at wt·11 rewa.rd busmesses whose mvestments reduce emissions outs ·de E . 1 urope. sue h as ·m Russta and the .eme rgmg. m~rk et economies of Asia-wbere large and relative! low-cost redu ctions of em tsstons are possible. y Markets are ~merging in other regions as well. The Chicago Climate Exchange , open ed m December 2003, involves 19 North American entities that have agre ed to reduce their emissions by one percent per year over four years. Canada may yet create a market for carbon dioxide as it aims to meet the Kvoto targets. And U.S. states have become laboratories for innovation and cha~ge. For example, Massachusetts, New York, and New Hampshire are adopting rules that will spur the creation of market-based emission tracling systems. Voluntary systems for measuring e missions -such as one being crafted in California-may also provide further foun dations for emission trading. There is a stronO' argument for linking these efforts. U.S. policymakers should also consider establishing a transatlantic pa1tnership to work toward a common market-based trading system. Offering positive incentives is one key contribution that government can make to sti mulate business. Another is organizing research. It is crucial to extend our unde rstan ding of the science of cljmate change: monitoring key ~ariab~es with sufficient precision to unde rstand both natural variability and the climates ~esponse to human activity. A key targe t of such work must be to understand tl1e preciSe conne~­ tion betvveen the concentration of carbon ruoxide in the atmosphere and changes lll climate. Such research must also advance our knowledge of available choices: with tl1e clock ticking we cannot wait for definite answers before we take action. Gove rnm e~t intervention must take other forms too. Transforming the energ fi )' . . h . ·ks th t vilJ be too high (and bene ts syste m '..vill require new technologtes Wit ns a ' · .. 1s one area too remo te) for priva te firms to pr0\11.cleall the needecl investment.· ThlS h uld ak· . } · ·c·li capac 1tv s in which the United States, with its outstandi ng tec 1ru >< • f : · of t e as . o resource lead ership role. Innovatio n will reqUire an across- tlle- board mfustonrt£ li of key r ment o a po o o ror basic science and technology. as we ll as tlle de' ·elop k . I· . 1 de photovoltaic -• h . .h. c such wor mtu 0 1t me u uemonst ration projects. T e pnon es ror . t hnolnO'\· enerciV . l · 'ty) fissiO n reactor ec ~a.· · ·o.· cells (which convert sunligl1t mto e ectnct . from biomass, and the use of hydrogen.

PART4

514

CONTEAtPO

RARY woRLD paUTrCS

·ed in ·uch in' c.' ' tuw· l• n c~·mtc n ts wit!, 1_ • 1 . d ris~ sn,· o ' . GiH' II the eo t .m ~ . -s of the futu re lta\"l t ' 'I: ". -e· stJ\{ ' to eom. . . d corn mon \le" · COlll lllOil 111t~rest'$ .Ul f )rtun ateh ·. there cir1. Jll,U l; f 't,•'t·Hen ts of inte r. . 1 · cc ....... . ·tnd re ources-. c f'ron · h' .... to .!str llllle t tesr ('nO • ~-' • t Juuh -ene r{!\ [> onom,· ·tnd • 1· · 1·nnovat:wn' .... · _ . . • lhthOJtal rxtrtners up tn • u ,..lru lenue is dilTer~·nt. 1'1 I tt 1t nn olves not ,._ . Tl ulobal w:mmn . _ < o uud ear IUSso n. se~ _ T-cat ion of non~l techniqJJe' th rout;h prod ucts 1 1 onl; basic cience but also t l e afpp ,petition. Bu t that i!- '' ll\ tise t>roO'T"C"m of ·ti d the test o con . · u dlilt mu_t " 1 tStan . k 51 ·I ould u1\·oh-e c:ollaboratron not Jm-t betwo·een difrese ·treh ·utd de,-elopment .., or . . • • . but also between go,·e nHnents cult1 busm t• . fere nt countnes • f l1 collabomth·e work already und erw-ay. In :\0\·ember 1 The re :1re examp es o sue . . ·aJ , 1 . ..;.-u held in \\ •ashi•ngto n. D.C .. began tJ1e proces of .)()()3 a muu ten -1e' e rneeu.uo ' ·a1 f 1 - . ·. . . ..s partnerships for rese.arcb on the potent!· o t 1e lwdroge n buildir1u mte mat:iona.r b'll' c; _~ } r · . _ ..J .. ter; has aJread,· pled ued Sl .' 1 10n O\ .er t1 1e next m·e years t'C'Cmom,·. T 1e vJUt eu 5
D~OPmGSOUJnONS

ft would be morall~· wron g and politicall~· futile to expe ct countries stru ggling to

achie,·e basic leYels of de,·elopment to abandon thei r aspiratio ns to grow and to improve their people's ming standards. But it wow d be equally wrong to ignore the fact that by 2()'2j. energy-related carbon dioxide e miss ions from de,·eloping countries are likely to exceed those from the me mher state s of the Organization of Eoonomic Cooperation and De,·elopment. Instead of being dau nted by the scale of this chaDenge, poli<..jmakers must recogni7..e the scale of the opportunity: deve loping countries ha,·e the potential to leapfrog the develop ed world's pro cess of industrialization. thereby pro\iding an enormous opp ortu nity to imp rove ene rg>' efficienc.y and reduc-e emissions. So far, most international efforts to engage developing countries have focu sed on the K~uto Protocol'S CJean Development Mechanism (CD M) -a sche me that ~uuld e~e in\"est:ment by awarding emission credits for the quantity of e mis~ red~ B~ing from a particular project. In principle, the CD M was a good idea. In practice, 1t has bec-ome tangled in red tape and has requ ired governments and ID\-e sfors to do the impossible: estimate the level of emissions that would ha\·e occurred in the absence of a projec.t and then to calculate the margm·al effect of their actions. The onlv . . mill that . • PI'Ojects that can mee t this test are small and discrete: a steel sustainahly grown wood instead of coaJ for coke, for example , or a tiny ~ _ dam that 3\'erts the nee d to build a coal-fired pow er plant. Such are unportant, but they are hardly the stuff of radical transformation.

ae:_:

BROWN£ I BEYOND I
515 here i" fa(. neat. off- the-shel f solu tion f, T . . or enga~ng th d .t ere are enc.'(J l r l~g stgns of the process of er·n . e e\eloptng '"-orl d But ut • ti I ml<: devel r ,..,..e for mou 111za on. n Cl1ina and lndja inf-..vno t opment actin g ~ a tOl ~ c I . a1 d ' ras ructu re nee ..tral ga~ ror ('oct I rea y being put in place A d . essary to subststute rHl< • } Id I ·ons of t 1P ''or . t 1e spre ad of inte rnational .t nh m man.•v ofth e 01'I -producinc re@ . . IS maki . ture and rc~mJeCt t he natural gas that is oft ec no100''1: ~o: nu 1t po sible to eaP . . . en assoc 1ate d \\ith ·1 th ,-eoting or Aanng 1t mto the atmosphere. Efforts to chan e th . Ol ~ ra er than ,. ,. . land u e in the developing world are also e . g e tn<:.e ntives that aov. e• •· · ncouragmg Fr th C rto the Amazon and the forests of Southeast Asia , racti cal. a : e_ Jongo Basin nts nonCTove m mental organizations and busm ·p Phershlps of ~o,e:mle 11 ·· ' esses are s O"-ing th . . .. mounts of money and skiJlfully designed incenti . . . e '-'·ay. Small tu " b . ' es are deforest ation y creatmg a stake in protectin g the forests. stemmmu0 the tide of These and othe r e fforts reAect the determination of bl' ICS, gove rnments and business to tran scend t I1e h ars h and unacceptable trad puff be . h .' · · dards d e-o twee n t e des1re to impro,·e ~~~uw stan an allow people the free dom to use energy for heat ~ght, and mob1hty on the one hand , and tl1e desire for a clean en'vironment on the other.

UNFINISHED BUSINESS The app ropr iate response to the faltering Kyoto Protocol is neither disma,· nor fatalism . A com plet e inte rnational agreeme nt on a subject of such complexih· and uncertainty is still a long way off. But as those who championed the cause oftiberal trade foun d afte r that first meeting in 1946, great causes acquire liYes of their 0\m. Consolidate d political agreements often follow, rather than lead, the realities on the ground. Taking small step s never feels entirely satisfactory. ~or does taking action \\ithout com plet e scie ntific knowledge. But certainty and perfection have never figured pro min ently in the sto~ · of human progress. Business, in particular, is accustomed to making decisions in conditions of considerable uncertaint:·· applyina its exnerie nce and skills to areas of acmitv whe re much is unknown . That is o ·r ' whv it "ill have a vital role in meeting the challenae of climate change and why 0 the con trib utio n it is already making is so enco~oing. J

NEW ACTORS AND NEW FORCES

The mse of China: Getting the Questions Right RICHARD K. BElTS AND THOMAS ] . CHRISTENSEN

... It is hardly inevitable that China will be a threat to American interests, but the United States is much more likely to go to war with China than it is with any other major power.... Debate about whether and how China might threaten U.S. security interests has often been simplistically polarized. Views range from alarmist to complacent: from those who see China emerging as a hefty and dangerous superpower, to those who believe the country's prospects are vastly overrated; and from those who see its economic growth as an engine for building threatening military capabilities, to those who see that growth as a welcome force for political liberalization and international cooperation. Most strategic debate about China still focuses on a few simple questions. With respect to capabilities, these revolve mainly around whether the Chinese armed forces will develop to the point that they rival U.S. military power, and whether the economic su rge-with its implications for miJita.ry transfom1ationwi1J continue indefinitely or stall. With regard to intentions. China '-''.atcbers "'·ant to know how thoroughly and how soon t11e country ~.~ inte.grate mto a glo?al economy that allegedly constrains conflict; whether Bet)lng w11l adopt aggresstve aims as its powe r grows; and whether political liberalization will occur as its wealth

c

F'rom Ricltard K Bctts and Thomas J. Christensen. ~c b.Ula: etf Ulg th e Que tions f .,.,,, • S otionol ..t.. Ri~t• ~•The o -""" · ted \\ith me n.•rnUS)10TI . "' 1s.• repnn . arti<'Je rInterest. ~o. 62· (Winter 2000/01). pp. 17- 29. This Nalional Interest. All right rr crved.

517

ENSEN I THE RISE OF CHINA· G

· E111NGTHt

5 18

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POLm CS

. ~the r the Peop les Hup11ll!:c of C.hma f PH C) grow ·. Con cem also zeroes Ill o~ w 1J«= ha.( the ability to take Taiwan ?Y fo~cet.l most basic lc•vcl, but th ey .1:1 tJ.,. Y.'ronv ·r11cse • le,'ant (1ueshons at te · ,., are re 1 .1.Jti<•s are . . 1ehate Tlw mos t \\Orri'itHlle pc,\SJ.>J . I>d Wf•f 1ann b t ones to genera te progress In a matu. re t uthese C JUCs tions , and n ~~ and bcvond the answer:; o . tl10se tlta. t J·c II . ' ' h. h· t ch·n ·t can pose a grave • pro , t·Jn f'vc·n if it 1 t 1.c ''Points The tmt IS l a J ' comp acen ' ' . .· . th<' Ame rican model. dc><'s not i11tcncl to c:omdoes not beco me: a JTII 1Jtary power o11 .I 1'1 J.J.t.c•s no I' . ll S. · . t • glol) al ec·on o1nv anu 1 Jcra 1t1ca y. nni. · ·nteg rates ll1 o a '' • mJt ag.e;ress•~n.dJS . uJd (: ·e a dangcrou ~ c:onAict ()\'er Taiwa11 ewn if· it l11m s larlv the UJlJte . · tates <.:O a<.: l .1 1 m/~hat Beijing lacks the capaci ty to conyuer t Je IS ane .

WILL CHINA'S MILITARY POWER RlVAL AMERICA'S? There is little disagreement that the People's Libe r~tion Army (PLi\), a generic: designation for all the Chin ese ann ~c.l forces, remaJ~S a tl1r: adb arc fo rcc, well below Western standarst personnel are poorly educated and train ed. Wea po~s systems are old, ancJ ev~n those acquired most recentJy are inferior to those m Western arse nals: Many umts spend a good deal of time in non-military activities; staff.s do not pract1ce complex, largesc:ale operation s; exercises and training regi mens are limited; and equipm ent is not well maintained. Even according to the highest estimates , de fcnse spend.ing per soldier is low by First World standards, indicating the dom inan ce of quantity over quality in the Chinese forces. Tht: main clic;agree ment among Western analysts of China·s military is abou t whether the PLA is poised to move out of its unimpressive condition and into a new era of modernity, efficienc;y and c;ompetitiven ess, as anticipated economic refo rm and growth translate into military improve ment. ... For China to develop a military on the model of the Unit ed States would be a tremendous stretc:h. The main issue is not whe ther Beijing wiJI have high defe nse budgets or access to cutting-edge technology. A rich China 1night weU be able to acquire most types of advanced weaponry. Deeply ingrained habits of threat assessme nt in the U.S. defense community enco urage focusing on thes e fa<.:tors. U~fortun ately, however, basic "bean counts" of manpower and units and the qua lity of weapons platforms are poor measures of truly modem military capabi Hty. More fu?dame ntaJ to_ that a~~ssme nt is whether the PLA establish men t is capable of ~sn~g wh~tever mcrease m resources it migh t receive to buHd the compJex supportmg mfrastru tture necessary to make Chinese forces competitive in com bat. ... . If the ~LA remains se<;ond-rate, should the world breatJ1e a sigh of relief? Not enh•reJy.. F1rst Ame rican m'l'tary · not tue t • LI power IS only relevant stan dard of compan~n. Othe r armed forces 10 · A · th 1 p t ·I . . Sla at t 1e LA cou ld come up against are mucrl <: oser to the Chmese standard than t th A . ( h 0 """'·h 1 ···-'I I . · . e men c:an. T is is true even of.Taiwan,s t "'"' no e>gl\AU Ysop ushc ated lt C!~-··- d tJ U . d ml 1 ary, wh<>se long isolation has eroded its quality. ) JCUJ O • 1e nJte States has g10 baJ · d . d · cl ..r • · mte rcsts an ofte n find s itse lf dist ract e or pm ne uOw rl In other regions Th. d h Ch. bilities to cope 'th th · IT • t e mese do not need to match U.S. capaWJ em. Rather than trying to mat ch an Am eric an revolution in

.

QUESno~s RICKr

5111 . . ry affairs tiJc:y 1n1ght do better to devel ro11 ,ta 0 P a counter_ . . .\ . . . . . etric al -.t l':l.te g1 c opti ons on vari ous p· ..... f I rt'\ o utum ~)\ d, .. • c · as)111•" . a. ,.s <> t JC tcch 1 · · ·1..mg ' : rcunwen t lJ S. advantages. no (I!Slc:a\ \{X"ttnun that call cl I one such (.•'\am p e cou Id be "cybtrwar'' a» A•ks . h ~l4t on the oom I - ~ ......-~ation svstems t hat stitc es Ame rican mil.l ta . P f-1( ntt:v.ork of in,~.O• "· · r ry supe nori t:v t L uld be the u')C or new weapons like land attack cruis t : . ogHnt:r. Another eO pons such ao; nava l min es to impede Ame n''"' masstles or lO\.,.er te:ch ,,.ea I .. ~n a<.X:ess to the . . ther coul d he t 1e mod 1fica tion of China's no fi t . reg~.on. St!U anO . . rs -use poh ,,·eapons. makmg an exce ption fo r repelling an im·asion of Ch·t\, 0 n nn~·\ear · · I · agm · a bl h mese t~'>rntor\ I 1 1t ts a mos t umm lthou g e tat China would use ·l , A . .· . ,. . I . [ nue: ear '' eapo effort to gam po 1hca concessiOns ram Taiwan, it migbt threaten their ns m an li.S. military action on beh alf of the island. . . . use to deter Tai_wan is both the ~ost dangerous_~d most likely instance of Chinese power projectio n ( mo:e ~n wh1ch below), but 1t lS not the only one. China has oonteivable points of conA1ct 1n several _rlaces that would not require its forces to cross large bodies of wate r. and whe :e 1t would not be facing opposition as potent as Taiwan's military. Although less !Jke ly than conflict over Taiwan, an imbroglio in Korea would be scarcely less .dangerous if tbe Pyo ngyang regime were to t.'OUapse and South Korean or Am~ncan for~es were to move into tbe vacuum without Beijing's agreement. Far too little atte ntion has been focused on the odds of miscalculation in a con fuse d si tuation of this sort. The PLA does not have tbe American army 's logistical capacity, but even a half century ago it managed to project a force of hundreds of thou sand s of men deep into Korea. WhiJe the Chi nese navy is weak, some of its neigbbors' na.,.ies are weaker stilL Two of these neighbo rs, Vietnam and the Philippines, have outstanding sovereignty disp utes with C hina and have not fared well in naval skirmishes in the past three dec ad es. We also cannot rule out tbe possibility of a land attack. The PLA did poorly in its invasion of Vietnam over twenty years ago, but the Vietnamese army is now less than half th e size it was then, and the Vietnamese economic base is far more infe rior to Chi na·s than it was in 1978. Logistical limitations wouJd hamper. but not prec lude , PRC action in Mongolia, or in the Russian Far Eas t if that regio.n were to fall out of MosCO\-'Is effective control. Granted , conflict over these plac.'CS 15 improbable. The pro blem is that the same could ha\·e been said of most wars befo re they hap pen ed.

WILL CHINA BECOME THE WORLD'S LEADING ECONOMY? .

Chi a's eeonomv like its miliMUitary pote ntjaJ grows out of eco~ omJ C capacJ'tv: .. -~ it bas ~n the fastest tary, is neither to be e nvied nor deru grated. In recent be } 'd t in the Jate . . ... growmg maj or eco nomy m the wor Id · Unr1l 5trains . cam.e evith enfutu re and to loon · h. h vth rates straight mto e """S, it was common to proJect 1g gro' t cenh•rv But China's · . • ) 6 · the twen ty· .rs ~~ r see China's GN P surpassing Ame nca s ear Ym L • of ·ts prob lems the man} 1 • economy faces dau nting challenges. An d e\,en· if it sol\·. es the f~its of
520

PART 4

coNT£MPO

RARY WORlD POUTICS

. I 1 c ;p ill th<' '' l>rld lo' 1'··• <:apita wc·alth . 1 · . , I I the 11~ 1es ' .1 1 £\'e n if Clun:l at ue\C< . th·• tco nld lw J'(':tl l<)(· ,ll· u t-J t ll' lllilit:uy . . . d'sp c>sa ule uJc: ome • . ll 1 .. .. .. wlluld f>CI'Sist, Iu111t1n~ · ,,~!· ill\n h·e x,!J t•c 1 ' n· "' HH· a~ures sw·h 1 til ble to spur gru l ' · • • • Is " ~ l otofthctnt>lhOl il'': a ·'" t t •-c> wne cl c>nl et1> ri'-t' s thn t tlll'l •atf'n to lc- 1v,. . c ···u 5e<·tor rult1s a c . as r<'fonn of. the nnru " lcJ, •• , tsj'ohlc:ss. Tlu;•se \\o nkl ,ou tllw r.mks of' •the 11 1 1es•c" · 11 of··\\'ork. •. . tensofnltl· 1·•on so f'adclitional ur1> 1.. 1. . . tlw ,-er: tll size of tliC' PLA (nP vdc ·d for mod0 .£T I 1111'I'ta "· as cut m.ICK.'i 111 • . . • . lem. :wect tle ~ ' ·. al' . ) . "".at e yet more d1sgruntk· d ci!J t.en s. 1o n1ct111tain · · . 1 ·ofesslon· v;,1t10n er" · 1 ennzauon anc pr r . ~1·c·"'r tJ1e militan· Ot'< .' OS < 111 ' • a> e . . cers an<. _ . der to illlJJiemcnl :'uc ces sfui Jy the plan to get tltc PLA subsJdrzed at a 1ug11 lclt<> In or • .-,:•• 1·•cthities and back into the b<m
°

or

. , . : I' , t 1ere are no • unis . . .d . .. t Par 1 t\' mam tmn s stab 1 1t) unn g the transition measures work an d tJ1e CO111111 · . . ' · . ,,,.·11 be exn ens i,·e esp ew illy for a cen tral gov ern me nt that t1 u:' process ofd owg s0 ··r . r e of G ·~ P than do Western governme nts. As China t ak·es u1 a tar snuilleI . perce1·tag • grows through capitalist refOI~~s , Beijing must s'crarnble to fln·d· new way s to tax prh·ate wealth. Howe,·er ineffic1ent they may ha' e been. large :-;tate-owned ente.~­ prises pro,·ided a hu-ge portion of govemr:1ent revenu es. Th~ soft loa~s tha t o£flcials forced government-owned banks to gJve to these ente1ynses funct10ne u as an indirect tax on families. wbi<.:h. before Chinese membersh1p of the V/T O , had no alternatives to tl1e tate banks. If the Party is successful in demolishing bot h the monopoly of state-owned banks and the sturdy safety net for state-owned enterprises. it ,,~11 need to raise money else-where for the govemm~n t ope rating budget. That budget, in turn , will be strained by increases in weHare spe nding needeu to maintain sociaJ stability-pensions for the une mployed and reti red, and compensations to the military for its lost sollfces of legal and illegal revenu e .. .. 11

WILL CHINA BE PACIFIED BY GLOBALIZATION? To pessimists steeped in realpolitik, a rich China will necessarily be a threat , because economic power can be translated into military power and power generates am bition. To optimists impressed with the revolutionary imp)jcations of globalization, however, a more powerfuJ China v..iU not be a threat because it wi ll have too mu ch to ]ose from disnJpting international trade and inveshnent. The latter vie\v is more corn m on in the \\'est than the_ fonner, which seems to many to reek of old thi nking. . The _nohon that a web of comme rcial ties discourages war, how eve r, is ttself q~te old, if not exac.-tly venerable. It was popularized by He nry Th omas Buckle ~n _the 18.50s, by Norman AngeUjust a year before Wo rld VVar 1 erupted, and aga.m m the 1970s. when interdependence was said to have red uce d the utility of force. · · · AI Gore quoted his father as sa)'l· ng "When goods do not cross borders, armies wiJI."

•

The argu~ent this time around is that the proposi tion is fina lly true bec ause t he nah ue of mterdepe d . a crucial way n enc-e has changed m . A cen tur y ago 1·t wa· s

aETfS AJ~l> CHRJSTENSEN I

THE RISE OF CHIN A: GE I liNG THE QUESTIONS RIGHT

Charact cril.<

521


WILL CHINA BECOME AGGRESSIVE? Whether China has aggressive motives is what most polic>:makers want to know abo ut Be ijing's strategic inte ntions. Optimists say the answer IS no, because the PRC is ideologically anti-imperialist and seeks only respect as a status quo gre at power. . . . , tl · er set of Chinese grudges and terPesstmJsts say the answer ts yes , because .a see une.. . 1, ritotial am bitions are on hold only for a lack of confide nce in capabthty, or sunp) · e ,·hen the,· get the chance. because all great powers tend to become aggressiV ' 1 rate aggressiOn diverts attenBut such focusi ng on the unh.keIYoddsof de )'be dan . h lik 1' and alm ost gerous. tion from possibilities that are botl1 mu r more · e ) . th . as beh ·or · d . arie s vtew etr m~n avt Most countries viewed as aggressors bYt1'lelf a \•ers . . . . abo t t set rl l B ... ·s . u o as defensive and legitimate. \\ 1et ter etjmg 1 a tiger m wruting . t stio n No . t the mo 1 st re eva n que · out delibe rate ly on a pre datory rampage, ts no J

•

•

522

PART 4

coN TfM PO

sf.'J I;, n

RARY WORLD PO W IC~

, . I . d NS have an int nc ~t 1 1 '· I r·nlrlj ll<·'it of tlr<; Ch' nese ea•. l•)o · n Boll<tpw tc , (Jr ' If I I • 1 e\ridc ncc· su,;ge:-.Is tl1 ·tl < A· I'J ' r j( • rnod··l 1 0 . ·' 1 . c his Kh an , • P "' sort praehccu '>} ,eng . . . . . . Kai ser VVi ll tehn c; ( •' ' ' t·•T.V. 1.. ~ 1 Cc " · n ~ na . k ,d 1 , pcssJJ y . ms 11 ts 1 s · . more o1ten 111vo c . '>} · • bl ·ng great power ernt·r ~rw· r::!tJ a \.,..o rJd alrc~auyu l · century ago. eh·111•·• 1•s a late-. oom . . , Is· a eo nti ne ntal ptl\\ ' r ~llll(, tJ II< 1c·d hy olh<·r . .. · .. JJ by ear rer aJ 1 rr v~t • . ordered Stlategrei.l Y . · , UUt indi\'iduaJh•w nkr r (,, 1tl1 tJJ( : l'X( ;t•p tic)IJ or . ·oll ect r vel y stro ug er I 1 powers W 10 ctre C j . )' pall)· a biJ StJ illg (.'I) Ufl ll) ' W J( I gn •at C'XJ1<:t:la tions 1 5 r. 1' PI • . <1t" rJ1a•tional t I1C UIll·re cl .Sta. tes and, pe J ·t 1)' wr· tlr . ' p (~c ki llg on < ·r I c,,, rcg arc . l (() . fi d 'th 'ts pla ce Ill t le 1 rn " I ssatrs e wr c1 ·. d ·t · t.10 al prest1ge an rcspec · Th e CJUCSt for a rightful "pia<.' <.· iH the· !>ll n'' will il mtcma ~ . I r . ' is argued, mevrtab y .os ter growr·ng fric:tion with Japan , H11ssia Indi a or the Unil<•d States. . . cl off thi s analo~y to a stat<.: of a dil:. Ophm1sts o not l1ave a. ),ard tim e brushing . . . . . · . • dif ·c ent con tin en t at a different tun e, a lon g-gone e ru when fercnt ctr 1tw e on a · rer . . 1 · . . . . . tJ m r r civ iliz ed int ern atr on al bt' hav JOr . T 1e1 lm pc rra1Ism was le nor 110 r be nrg 11 view . . . . . . . ' 1 trade . uc .I 1 prn ent arr \VII I rne vrt abl y ma ke t hat cco nom1c Ch1n ,t fat and happy ve o u . .' • .. .1 • . ~,. c>w r·ng its we igh t aro un d, stn kc s the m unrnt as eresle c:o1 nrnon sense. It u rn wr · . . . could him out to be tru e. Jt is more an art1d e of fa1th , l~owe ve r, than a pred1ction grounded in historical experi ence. Th e United States, for exa m ple, i~ quite interested in gaining the goodies from globalization, ye t on the wo rld stage 1t so me tim es throws its weigh t around witl1 righteous ab~ndo.n .. , . Ind et:d. the most disturbing analogy for Chrna s future hc hav . 1or may not be Genrrany but the United States. If China acts with tl 1c same de gre e of ea ution and responsibility in its region in this centu ry ac; the United States <.}jd in its ne ighborhood in the past century, Asia is in for big trouble. \Vashing ton intervened frequ ently in Mexico, Central Am erica and the Caribbean for reac;ons most Americ;ans consider legitimate, defensive, altruistic an d hu mane . Th e Un ited States and its allies in Asia, however, would see co mparable Ch ine se regional policing ac; a mortal threat. Even if China does not throw its weigh t aro un d, th e fact that there are other~ who can respond to the growth of Chi nese po we r setc; up the possibility of a classic spi ral of tense actions and reactions. Chi na laces alliances involving the United States, Japan , Au stralja and South Ko rea, am l po tentia l all iances in Southeast Asia. ('J

J

•

WOULD CHINESE LIBERALIZATION GUARANTEE PEACE? Many as~ u.me tJ~at as long ac; democratization accompan ies th e growth of Ch iuese powe~•.Cht.na WJJl not necessarily pose a security chall enge. Th is wo uld hold true t>ven tf Chma proves able to maintain high lev cb of econ om ic au d techn ological growth, a healthy degree of government accumulatio n of the ine rt:asin g natio nal w~t~ ~d , thereby, military modt:rnization. This the ory of the de mo cratic ~ t~at deve!oped democracies virtually never fight one anoth er- is c.:u rre ntly e ~ost ·~flue ntJal poHtical science theory among Am eri can for eig n policy elites. Ev en 1f we acc ept the d · peace t11eo ry L . em oc rat ic at fac e value the re are sever·al probJCfnS With app)vin 1't t0 Ch· . ' really · li ". g ma . F1 rst, as Fa ree d Zakaria has no ted . the theory 88 app only to hheral de ntocra de s on the We ste rn ntodel, on es with restra intc;

ow

... .. _ . .... ....... ...

I

I

I

u::. K.l!>t:. OF CHINA: GEm.NG THE QUESnONS RfGHT

5Z3

•IJt action an d !;Uarantees of mino · 'nh nty nF,11ts Dcrncx:ratizat' · r·1· just i l ' C:OI ICC .IVal)Iy turn in an illiberal d' :t' · h · IOI J m""' 11na 1 cy·o goslavia I ran or oth er un plca.c;ant exa m~pJL... rrc~ JI<Jn , on .t. c; mcxlcl of post-Ttto 11 . . ..... , ent actrvJS1n. Sec.:oncl ll•<· dc..: mocrat1c peace tll(.:ory do Vlo ·s t , c no app1y clearl y t( 1· ·1 ern oc rad e'i Jnu st rec og niz e eac h oth er as demO<; , : r h 1 J t VJ war. D . t. l c tne;orv to , prnl J. Th ev also Imv<.: to v1ew cacu other as leg,itimate ind rac~1e~. 1 ror • d , . i1 1· Y• ' 1 . ' ep enu e:n t "-Jo ma tte r 1ow many Arne nc.:ans and Taiwa nts~ bel' ~ th· an sovere;1gn ~tatcs T. · . . · h' · . . tev e at ruw an IS or 'ihould be a sovc re1gn state, t IS Vle w IS w1dcly reJ·cctcd on the ro.,: I· d( d. · .... n an an IS not a pre;rnLse of pac;t or c.;11 rrc nt U.S. po 1icy). Third , while lih cral democracy is paci~c the pro fh . .1 t.. . I dd . . . , ces ~ o eco rn mg a ue mocracy c.;a n ue v10 ent an estab1 lr7.mg. This is part.i<:ula rlv tnJ e of de .. L 1 kd 1 cl 'vi.! . / mo crah7.Jn g states tna t ac. eve opc Cl SOCieties, indepe ndent news media, heaJth ou tle ts for popu lar gncv~nc~s, and _a marke tplac:e for ideas where <.:ou ntervailin g ~ews c.-arr be ue batcd. Th1s g1ves el~tcs inc: ~ntives to manipulate populist or nationalist the n;~s an~ ~o ado~t tough 1.nternat10nal policies as an eloctoral strategy. :~ I ~~e Ch mc se Commu n1st Party has behaved like many autho ritarian regimes, but w1th much more s uc:c.:ess. It has systematically prevente d the ric;e of both an indep ende nt press and a civil society. Although the foreign press has pe netrated China, dom es tic: politi cal publkations are still stri c.-tly <.:ir<:um scribed bv t11e state. As the ... cra<.:kdown on the Falun Gong de monstrates, the Party is afraid of any group that organizes for any purpose without state sanction. regardless of how apoliticaJ it ap pe ars to be. Th e Chine se gove rnm ent's concerns about its legitimac.-y are not me re expressions of paranoia. Th e intensity of criticism of the leadersh ip that one hears privately in plac.:es ranging from taxi cabs to governme nt offices is astonishing. Aware ness of its unpopularity gives the governme nt in Be ijing incentives to use na tionaU sm as a replacement for the now holJow she ll of com muni~t ideology. But the Party is also aware that nationaHsrn is not an inert tool to be pulled out of a kit and ma nip ula ted at the whim of the government. It is doub le-edged. Vo~atile a~d potentially uncontrollable, especially on emotional issues sucb as rela.t!Ons w1~ Japan an d Taiwan , natio nalism is powerful enough to prop up a <."'~r_nun1s t party m a capitalist socie ty, but it could also severe ly damag~ the _ra rty i1 lt "~~ re tu~~d agai nst the state. Officials in Beijing are aware that nation~IJ Sm ~vas a maJOr force 111 the Co mm un ist Pa rty's overthrow of the Kuomintang. as 1t wa s m the 1911- 12 revol ution tha t ove rth rew the Qing dy na sty .··· . [! .. . In the early phases of democratization , China should be npe odr JLndgofliSm . . cl lar support an to e ect 11ypernationalism could be expI01t 1ae popu e to mo bl · . . . th . 't nee of irre deutist c1auns, ancl the criticism of th e sta te esp eci ally gtven c eXJs e . . lfd . . , . .. . I' . ,. th mainJand and m dange r ol ethn1 c an d reg1onal sp lttlsm on . e f ak . titu Truwan. emoctions. political leaders ratization we re to oc cu r in the curr~nt eo~ tex t~ a1'% nationalism in ways that and opposition parti es would ha :e mc~n~~~es t .~~hough perhaps C')mical. arguco uld de stabilize the region. In lact. thiS15 a favon e, f lt.1 artv democfaC\.·. t.. ponents o mu P , me nt offe red to foreig ne rs 1Jy commum· st op · . . . 1 Ch ine se Jem 1 ocratization ~ I 'bl sce nan os Ill w,u Cil l11 ere are , however, p aus1 e d . . Id ma ke the mainlan more ·g1 . aJ tJ· :t De mo cra ti7. atw n cou m1 1t red uce intematton · <.-onutc · b'o 1 offered to Tru.wan. th us . Im agina tive with regar<.l to t he framev.rorks for unmca I uOV('rf""

onuld o

0

:ve

. (!_

eETI::;, /'\ Ill V._." ~" , '-"·-ll-·~ ,

R.ARY WORLD POLITICS ,'';:1.f

PART 4

CONTEMPD

.

.

. I cross-. ·tr·ul n·tkin
. . ·· I dialtWtl t'

Jik, '"' I tltill . ·tl ·tt.·comn HJta

pollti<•L . I of en•n It. '

llHJI'\ '

1

I\

' . . · •lltl-.:d ld >~ •ralizalioll

, •I

. I:tiH I . Illort · I , l", • ·et . I . > I mi•rht :tlso ut:tke tltt• pro~pt ·I , 1·o:land :, dipl oJllr• 1·tt' I' I>y 1aiw · an >·tlnt.tblt·toT:uw • :-' tl· it.; Oj)!>o sil<': a J'l'11 ''''t t I• ' ·1 n' hkc 1v 1,\11 • . . · .;ibilitv is not ncc'<•ss:m )' 1110 . .. . . that Iifi(·a tion w1th the lltIa > e. ,lilt . I I' . . .111 v circJunstanccs ts 11 < • •e . closin~ wJJ t< nw o oppo rlt iilll)'. w1tl the 1 ' . •. . . I · Tuiwan mav st '1 · · J · . · threa tto1m waiw scgo(u . · ' ·c•ltiC''~ts S\li1J X1llv for T;uwan 's 1 · 1 • I< e1 • · hopes of gaining lr1J~ Jfl{ <'~)< I . 1ce 1 " " .. t nifkattOll hal dens. . I r 1' oprx.>sJtJou o tt · . . JOcJ·a tizati on < L " .~elll tiiil'. s it<· 1 <'ars 011 aiwan 1 1 1 .· .. , IS VJCW m;un nnc c en I . ~ JfA . nleJtCcll U . I St·ti" S ri sk war to l)J'('\ 't'lll a ( <' lll<)('rat-K· faiwan ·' w Id the 111tec • ... . · are well PIaccu. 011 f I . J lOCrltic China? The nwin reasons a pn·s ide 11 t · rut o a arg<'l en • · I · fro111 )ecornrng l ' ~ .. , Anlc ricans around action iu dde nse ol Taiwan's 1 , . ·cntly use to Jno1>I1 JZC • 1 l ~ . . cou c CUl l • . . . . M·m v obse rvers VI<.'\\ '< <.'Jllo t: racv as 1 tuwa ns 1 wouJ 1 d s1ntp r Clsap peaJ. • · I .t ( clllocracY . · ' .. .,.. it incrC'ctses U.S. supp01t. Tl1e. are right. But it l ·rnrest sccunt)' ·tssct., 1oecau s( )li"<.£?; • • • d '·. . tl t Jrovides Taiwan 's sccurit ; it is t Ill' CUITt ·nt contrast is not JUSt · emocr.tcy ta l . . .· . .. . . .,.. . . . c .. C)" Hld the mam land s aut1lOllt clll.t nlslll . . . . between , mwan s <1emo 1 •1 • \\ 11•· • , . IIJ: UJ t

REASONS FOR PESSIMISM Optimists 011 the China challenge are often guil ty ol' ccmt radic tOJy argumen t~ .. On thro ne hand, they argue that Chjna will only beco me a dangNous cn<'m y d the United States treats it like onc>. At the same time , they atte mpt to de monstrate why China will not be able to develop the militmy capacity to pose any appreciable threat to us fo r a ve1y long time . ll ow <.;an Cltina be both hope lessly weak and potentiaJiy dangerous? There are ways to square this circl e by asking tbe righ t questions. C hina can pose security challenges to the United States even if it is unlikely to narr ow t l1e gap in military power. This is true because of geography; because of Arnc riea's reliall(;c on aJHances to project power; and because of China's capacity to harm U .S. forces, U.S. regional allies, anJ the Ame rican homeland, even whil e losin g a war in the technical. miutary sense. Optimists are correct to focus on Chin ese intentions and the potc nt·ially pacifying infinences that the United State s aud othe r iute rnational acto rs can have on China. But they often assume too much abou t th<:' positiv<:' effe cts of globalization, interdepe ndence aud political liberalization, beca use they unde rcstimnte die ~ole of nationalist emotion and the possi bHity of misp ercc ptions and inad vcrte m:e 10 war. They aJso forge t that interdepe ndence is a two-way stree t that restrains not only the Chinese, but China's potential adve rsaries as wel l. In addressing the China chall enge, the United Stat es need s to think hard ahout_ thr~ related questions: first, how to avoid crises and war thro ugh prudent·, coerctve diplomacy; second, how to manage crises and fight a war if the avoidance effor · s .1 • . t fails·• third• how to end cnse anu term tnate war at cost s accepta1J 1e t 0 the Umted States and its allies ....

I H t.

KISE OF CHINA: GE1 1LNG THE Q' re ....... V&;.,;)

tiONS RIGHT

Chi n.1's ~rowing pow N causes so many hc·achchcs I· ~I . · ' 1 (' ) 1 1 · re one • · argt: )' >eta use 1L~ lit rat . , . 'tliJ>IicatL< lii S arc not u y t c·ar. But befo latncnt tl· , . f '} . <~le I I . I s lE: rtS(' 0 c llllC c po • 011<, sho11lt to ns1<. <·r an even more tlll<.:<'rlain altern ar 1 • Cl . · W{ r. 1 · Ol·d·ctll1s · . t 11<\t Chm . . as. march to rrrc· ' te. ' 111 Csc weakness and ·ol!Hj )S('. 1 ot Inng .. c . . .1· I . cl PO\\ Ct sttllu s <:annot lw derailed. S('ve rc ec.:onomte uts ocat1 on and political fr· cr ncnt· t' II 1 1 · t· . J, . • 1 1 , ' r. ,\ •on cou c t1HO\\ the count ry Jnl o < tSOJ< Cl, am t 1e <.;entral gove rnment <.;ouH r ro c• t .. d 1 · , . . , . .. . . . . " v oo c n pp1c.; to use external ad~c ntut cs _to J c~Uy supper t and mamtatn unity. Hard-bitte n realis ts should hesitate h<.'~on" _h_opm~ for such d~!vc lopm enls, howt'ver. The last time China was we<\k and <.bsu ntf1c d- m the era of warlordism and revolution .in the firs t half of the twentie th cen tury- it was a disaster, not only for China. but also for international peace and stability. ('!

NOTES 1. Hichard Hosecrancc. The Hise of the Tradi11g State (:--Jew York: Basic Books. 1986).

PP· H 6-7. 2. John M. Owen IV, Libem l Peace. U/;eral War: Amelica11 Politi cs and lntemnticmnl Security (lthaca, NY: Corncll University Press, l99i). 3. Edward D. Mansfleld and Jack L. Snycler. "Democratization and the Danger of War.'' Jnt ema l ional Secw ity (Summer 1995 ).

JvtvKAvL~lK I EUROPE WITHOUT ILLUSIONS

Europe Without Illusions ANDREW MORAVCSIK

I1 was

nof If1e

that allmcted op7w~·ition lmt its ~101 ""' ll'rlflt' "'mstitution l • su 'J,, ' "" 'J , "' •

style and symboli.s111

The people of Fran<:e and the Netherlands have spo~en. Th e constitution is dead, Turkish membership is too, and progress in areas from services
l

And~· Moravcsik, Europe Without Jllusio ~ M

Qfthe author.

526

ns, Prospect, Issue I12 (JuJy 2005). Reprinted by pcnnission

527

se fearf1II of unemployment, labour market reform 1 bal' . pri,·ati ;.f ho 1satton , go r L . f 1 • .. t · 10 1 1 n ~a · h , da it opposed state •are we we o 1uatJon d the conso 1 0 ) t e e c:oncems do' etaiJ · .1 . . .J an vith the pen.:e1vcu economtc anu cultural threat posed b , \,f 1. . . . f cli ff' · · he primary political probl) .vtusr JmE1mm1gration· ' This type o sa ection IS t em IOr uropean go\'cm. b cl 't . . J: . r .. rnents toel ay, smce 1 IS wrecte oth against poor eco nomtc penormance and cl . -' · . . r . against retOJ m measures ues1gne to 1mprove it. As Fareed z k . b a ana o serves. the , 1· ·h· "E ... ~ ' . . econom1c tr:tgedy 1S t c~t m ope neec s more of what s producing populist paranora: r· · · ' . . 1ts · . young eompetition reform to survlVe m an era o economk sustam to unmtgrants • . . cl h' h social market, an a more strategtc relationship with the M ' us1·lll1 worId w 1c would ' be dramatically enhanced by Turkish membership in the EU.'' . · 1s · Th ·tself document the was chaos electoral the in Forgotten 1 constitution e . . , after all, a conservative text containing incremental improvements which consou~ dat: E~. developmen ts of the past 20 years. The "no" campaigns conceded the des1rability ~f t~e mode.st reforms from the start-including the foreign minister, stronger ar~ti-cnm~ p~hcy and strea.mlining of voting procedures. Such changes are populru, not least rn France, which proposed most of them. One is forced to conclude that this document became controversial not because its content was objectionable , but because its content was so innocuous that citizens saw a chance to cast an inexpensive protest vote. What were they protesting against? Here, too, the referendums cannot be viewed as plebiscites directed at the EU's poucies. Though the EU is associated ... with labour market and welfare reform, these matters remain firmly within the competence of the member states. The EU's activities as a whole, while they include oversight of state subsidies and trade policy, may just as reasonably be seen as part of a European effort to manage globalisation rather than promote it. Opponents made occasional mention of EU policies not contained in the constitution, such as the recent enlargement to 2.5, the introduction of the euro, the deregulation of electricity and Turkish accession. Yet only tJ1e last of these seems to have swayed many voters, and they seem to have been unaware that free migration has been ruled even before negotiations begin. So what lesson should the EU take away? The relative lack of direct criticism of the constitution, the lack of fundamental objections to EU policies ancl above all, the stunning lack of positive proposals for reform are striking evidence.of the underlying stability of the EU system. The 15.years si~ce the fall ~f the Ber~n wall has been, after all, the most successful period m EU lustory. The Sl~gle ma~ket, the euro and a nascent European foreign and defense poli~ ~e ~t~ bemg. 1~ enlargement was carried out with surprisingly little disruption~m e~sttn~ me~ b~ states, and proved the most cost-effective western instrumen~ tJor a vanhcdm~ gst~bl qme ,. reac e a a e ha,·e to clemocracy and security. In sum, th e Eu appears . t 1·n trade arnculconstitutional sett1ement. · o ? Th EU · now pre-emmen egulation and he)ps to b . lS e vVhat is that settlement. , olicy and some u~1ness r fi t . t statistics one often reads, ure, 'shing, eurozone monetary P , . .1 . r reiQ'Jl poucv Contra.J} o • • _1 , ation. )eiDs and gulation · , o 10 m co-orwnate cooperatiOn . b 90 . cent of European re b h. health, pensions. education. cnme, t lS amounts to only a out. - per Most areas of greatest public co~cern_-taxes, . fimllv national. Wiili a tax base ' infrastructu re , defence, and immigration-remam

521$

PART 4

• ......,.,.6D t'V' '"av

C0 l'f' LIYIT""~ ·

wo.RLD POUTIC5

MOftWCS(J( I EUROp[ ~ _

~ ~ an adrniJ•i~tnt:cm er and ' narrrJU. leg;-.1 ·rar cl th f·:u .vill n<:v(;r 3 • 11 . ... Jj(.;C foru· or armv ·" ,_ sm;w (.1L! • no po I d ...J , ".. , ,·ctrathcl" dt·J(t.:-Uic .Un~ t.·~r . tJ fi -aJ \' an ~m oJ ~ ' ' e•wortJf"'tLSS •<-~ ~ , . a}.in to tJ.,. siu 0'· et c,! rJ ' J'J~K c,r tJ , . 1 Tht-:re is no"~' gr~:::! prOJ~:ti(ly cl anuc:. ln JJ; JWJ J th4; •1f ckli lwr afic 111 , th~ 1 ' ,,. • c rrenc.-v of the 1J'W'-Js. to)""' 0 } • ~tn,yC ~J r . • . d .,-.~ -·' ..-.)"' two cJ.av<. to ( 1l· ''Xf1i111 'ii(J I ,, J ·,U 0 <.:CJJfJnt·•t f tal ron~:ention e\v •cu '" I ; . l , .. oon sti U !CJT ea.Jlh .• fiscal and educ:-dlion fi'Jlit it IH\ f' little· \ IJPJ'f'Jr t fences . Eu ropean hI · b~s ,cx<;e<.-d.s Europe s lnf: :tn \ <JIId in~ ult \ il'> "dv ili<Jr; whikJ a (;5-styit? mi itary Ul (;on up "'

,,,:J

h'J<: h we~ hran ] y, rrm cn rnN ·· ..We•l' ide . als. .• Jn · n :JC:n ··' r nol k"' of w ; r 1cJ11 rn 1 Cor~rd£...,- Eurupean WC:. aJ r-- .,, ·L1 · ,. cl. Eli pol kie s shoaJid tin. s ·Jmp1\ ·... e1C)(; k'HI~ \eOSJJ) (~ dfort~

(2Jll~aJ.f¥l~~\\ tat1 :'" ~~... ee L(•r long-t e-rm sustainability i~ .,hort -~ight£~u . .\1 any ~tuuto rcJorrn

ute "'e rare ~""'"' r "' J JJ b di · · f '-L -Jf tx-t wc en the m:, ' \\o' anc nc ~ s ow t at a vtsf<m , lal)I IJ'

.

h

I

J( ·r' of th(; £U fi will enerate gr'x:ial poJ ky at [Jt.Jttom unv en by . •e "" · · ,. . " h , · · · national )lNeL Th e noofiooraJ ..Angfo-Sa xon thr eat ~~a rnyt . bn tam •~ IJm·lclu. ag up its w<:lfart: state fast(.."f than any of its pQrtm:rs, h~ partly on a S<:ancliraavian rm.Kk:J that tops international "''mp..'fitiven~s ~an kings. 1r.d.c<;d , \~th continental JiheraJi~tion and Bri tish 1iOC1aJ dernocratL(jati(Jn. Eu mp e!l !MX:JaJ ~y,tcms are: oorwergmg--tJ1rough tfu~ pressu re tl naticmaJ politk.-s, not a\ the res ult of l>O me Et i soc.iaJ polky pipe dream. A similar ccJflStitutronaJ rornpromis.e ha.s ernerJ;W with regard to imtitution~. Thou.gfr AngJo-Arocrican Eumsooptic..~ haw: sough t to resurr6<.1 the bog<-)'fnan of a Br uue h su(Xa'ltatc headed by the Europt::an <:omrnL-,~km j treaty chan~s sin cc J970 have ttmnstenrly moved EJJmpe in the opposite dir(::(..tion . 'flley have in< :rcased tht: power lit he c:ouncil of ministers (favoured by Fra nce and Bri tain , particu larly for matt.ers outsiOO the E!C:1JrJCJmic ooreJ and the directly de d:oo Eum~ an parliament (iavourcd by (~rmanyJ at the expense of the ted mocrati<: ccrrnrois sion, The prcJI(XI500 CCJfa~tulion .sought tn marginally improve the EU's t:fl k:ienc. y and tr~er"'y, ..vh.& retaining its l-YctSic stJlJ(..ture. AJI of thj s L\ the SE:nsih)e ~tufT polk:y wor1ks love and puhiJ~ w:nt:r~Jy support European parliamentary oo-de< ..ic;ion was ~ . raatiooal pu fia nx.>trts gained an etdvisory and ga tck wp jng role, the rotating prcsKk.-ncy WdS ahoJi\1-fed, voting we ights w<.....-e adjusted U> repr<..-sent large cou ntries more fairf~ fiwcigr1 polk.y CO·f.JT din aru m wa~ centraJi%d in a fcm:ign min L~tcr and SO llll. resuh wa5 a muJtinationaJ CiJfL~JtUtionaJ COtrip t<Jmi.'ie tha t attended tO the interests t,f ~and small uJU ntrK.~. left and right pa rties. and Europhilc and EfJ~ ter.deoc.8. 1bc rdimns f..'fljoyed hrcr.KI suppcJrt arnCJng me mber statL"S, and~ met a lt1if.JUJ challenge in tfx: rtff~end urn dch-cttts. The IJj~e~t ch an go ~eation (,( a Europe;.m foreign mini~ ernpowert~d to rtc om mc nd , dJOugh mn •mpc.-c, a more oo-cwdiraated UJrcign po)k.y-.mjoy~> 70 per Cf;nt approv al across .Europe, And mu~ the EU as it is1 the etmstitution ·struck thf~ da~si<: idc alut ~ o~ower cber union" from the treaty of Rome and substituted tl1e mo re ~~ "f.mity in ~rJity... ' So .it was not the subJtaooe of the emerging e1mstitutional sc.>ttJernent that trig-yped The objectionable aspect was its form~ an idealistic constitution. the l970s, LMyen have rCff,tll'dOO dte trC'dty of .Home as a de fac.1o <..-onstitution·

n.e

sa . •

lflf! rrt

d'JC" IJffl!; nt ·Ha \ an uru~r.:ccs~ · ·V<: , LJJ1J · rv ..,..-f(ljfl2I\ ·IJlllHU l in fac t ,._.. ., J•' ~ • 'd J }·1

'fh e nv- '

·· · •I'IU\fJ ~

~ n;,•· • • ~Jib t'l:f~(.~ l ...t J'"" '"H ar, TY.Iticm d .... ..t . .GY.;u (JO ti curCJnl :!~t:l 1 r~a <.:o u u }(~~Ornate lht· P. U ~ 1 (v:rr ~tx." Tl:di ~,. 1 •. ..t .~~:: lJ .. • ~ - • 1TJ tn(! 'I."~ cJf .1-.. • 1 (fl~ _..._ (mm th(: pu }'JC "-A . _ "UJilrn.cuJif;: a:ld ~t .t lr J I' ·.. 1 a ~ri(J(:r~ t. L· fj.<,ehe r. u1~ 10nnc-r ~ rmarJ forti~, mirust.tr,t<m (I ·e the illf"' ..'~~- !·~k mation a b1~ push wtth hL\ celehrat.E::d lecture~~ the ~of ~~~n~, -w~ ~!,i.­ Humholdt linive r')ity in 2J~YJ. ... f.:nc: P'Ant (l u~~au,., at idt:a was to le;gitirnatt: the EU ru-Jt through t ~ usefuJ regulation. ~ had beer, the case f()r :)() v~ but~. ' ~muc ~(,.•!:h :..r:d • • .,, JX'llUCJ..'il(f1; &Jd ~ tising it. nu.~ was to 1-x; clone via a oonstitJ~Jtiona} oorrventicnJ Entt. :J'X.<.n prosp<x:t of a re-cn~ment of Philade!phia J7f57. million~ cl ~~~ ~· ~: we re supp<~ to deliberate ~ rnea111ng Gf Europe. ~l(~re prc~.~ootic ~1~: . ho1~~. ....l to com bat <.ynid~m hy simp~fying the trtatvand delffit.:ati w EL. . .fk. . .. .1 1~ , Pr"¥To JustifY the n~ for change, reformers alSQ sei7.i:d on the peret.>pbtm thaJ'(fl..fdr.~ t I}~ EL wo uld need a radical overhaul to ~·oid gridkx.-k '"'ith 25 r&her than 15 rn emr~ fear that now seems unjustified, b<Jth ~~the ne-.\' stau:s are pr() l.in-: constru~;tl\·e and because the EU is not rnoving as far or fast M it once did. o Of cCJu rse , the c.onstitutional delibe-ration did not roobilise Europe ans. f'e-•· dti.zens we re aware of th~ 200 com;entionneh' delibcr.st ions. \\l.en tf.:Stimof!v from dv il society was rc.quE.:sted, professors turned up. \\1~.en a ~·o uth wnfer~ was called . wou ld-he Euroc.:rats attended. \\ben those who did attend came to consid er de mocnu:y, they found that the arrangement Europe currently has u approp ria te to a diverse polity in which member ~ates insist on cbcdcs and Ll<.

ptl IJilC

·nw

1

balances at evt:ry level. There was little popular or dit e support for &JI'l0C l'3ik reform be-yond the modest inc:re-d.Ses in scrutiny by national and European parlia.m ents the

con stit uti on <.;Onlai~. Th is is as it should be, f.or the re is

no "demcx:ratic deficit~ in the El -« llCJt mu<.;h of on e. Once we set aside ideal notions of dernoc1CK.J and look to real-\\OOd sta nd ards, we sec that the E U ~ as transparent. ~e , .3(:cou n~~ and -~ as its memhe r states. The rt:lativc lack of centr.dased financia) or .

crc tio n all bu t eliminates

c.:o m.~ption . The E \;'s areas~ ~tooomous autl~Z.

tradE: pol.icv constitutional adjudication and central banking-are the sam e ~.J · .,, . l'ti n ·in sul ate d for souuu reain most democracies, where these funL~ns are po 1 ea Y . cbecb and balsom. The notion of imposing dem ocr atic rontrol through m~ . .;..,n iD S(J\ 'ere ign ..v~di~rnPflt . JS more an<.:t.-s , rathe r than through elections to a s... W" ' · r- -- ·- ··-.II A>k a .sav · · 1.. L Hri tim f}nne o- - ; Ameri can than European- b ut 1t as no ~.t.>SS -er ate for that. Eve . _ ..L-~com.1! ..,; - --· •·· approval from a lf:l .."W _,. _ in a sy~ tem in which a European wr ecuve ~ and . directly elected

rnL~~ion, a ~uperrnajority of de~oc:ratic national~~ Studies show parliamen t. and must then be •mplemented ~ . e to shifts in pams.n that E U legislation is ~cl popular opinion.

both C()JlS(;nsual and relatively responsw

.

.

. .

Eutopeat' c;itj7JePI Enthusiasts for democra(.y faiJ to grasp rts limitS. ~~~ tlwrr will nc)t necessarily create rational (let alone su~rtiVe -.ents ~-erage ~ nd to be ta opp m .. with intense pre fcren<:es about the EU tc ·

:>:lO

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POU fiCS

111·;•v y tax . . 1 . I I'1. ·'( . w s- lt \ lla lly th11•t '1 I and political parl H'' kc>1'P 1111 )' ~~ w t. s t · · . ~rc·n cl i ug- 111 th<'ir 111ind at auy cu1e ti ll t<'. •u.HI tl'"' n ·'>p,,., 1 1 • ' 111 '4" 1y 'lldic•Ill< ·ul .I( 1('i l 1s ! Ill( 1 I.'IS . II CS . 1-111' P" 11 1,f· r< t < L< .ul atHI IH 1ttc·r , 111·c>p<· n· 1ll: tlll ' w<'ak. . ' 1 . . ' t ' " . l' C llll . c>· · t · , ,·1uc linrr tht• wdf :1 11 1 ·' , 1 1" poItc1cs l'J rzcn s (·:tr..! .1 , 1 n . r a11d . 1ch ntJI·• ' 1'>..,11<·'1 tl,,. .. dCJm inat< ·d rc f<:r<·11duu1 clc·h atc~ . rc rnai11 al mo~ l c·,<·l~t \JVt · l 't 11 1 ''' 1'" t:d l1and .... TI H· . ·1IJI'CJ o (' I•'. urop (;u ran <:1ec t'rl)rt•··' lC'' ""1,,c•rl<·'l''''' l<' ltigl1 . . l11111. 011ts , CJr fot'll till I•,LJ iS'ili C'~· <>vc ·r· the )!C'ars ~uggC'sts that d ti:t.ens I:Jil to part•c•pa tc· .111 1 ·. ~ ~ ~)oltl l< s ll'''. hc·t·aJrM: the-y ar<' blo<:kc•d from cloiug :-.n, b11t IJC;C'ausc• tltr'y IJaVC' lliSll.ffH.'JC:nt lt lcc·J tlr vc·_ Sorn <' dcmo<:r:-ttic C'llllliJsia.'llS propost· ju111 p-st <.U11ug I•, U dr·rnoc-ra<.:y by in<.:orpora ting 1101- buttnll issues lik<· social polic:y lllld irnmig~aliiJII , dv.. pi iC' ti t(' la<.: k or popular support for doin g so .... YC'l a11yonc• cx~·c pt '~ ~)lll los~ l)'ll <' r ea 11 s<·e that this is the sort of' ~xtrt'm<.: cure· that will kill the patw11 t. l ltC're ts l1 ttlc· tlntl <.:o11ld leac.J the Europ~ an publiC' ltJ cb.:isivdy rejc~ ct all i11sl il11l ioll ;ts dc·r· ply <' rn bc:dcled as the EU, but tran sfC.~rring controve rsial issu('S like 'iodal policy lo il wit ho11 1j11slificalion Jrtight just cJo il. More sobe r voices propose to cmpowN national pari ianw 11 ts, wltic.;! 1tlw consti tution sougl1 t to do in a mod est way. Yet this rcv<'als a fina l fallacy of tl w cle moc ratisers. For there" is little reason to bdievc that t11rning poli c..:y over to a legislature makes it m()rc· lcgitimatc. In wes tern democracies , populari ty is invc!rS<' Iy corrclatcc.J with direct electoral acco untabili ty. The most popular institutions arC' C()urts, poli ce {(JJ·oos and the rnilitary Parliame nts arc.. generally disli ked. Whalevc r tl1 c sourc<.: ol' Europe's dc,dining popularity- a general decl ine in political trus t, unfa mi liarity with institu tion.<:, xenoplrohia, dis(·cmte nt wilh economic perJ(Jrman<.:c-it l1w; little to do with ils democratic mandate. Forcing an unstructured debate ahout an institution that handles matlcrs like tele eomm11ni<.:atious standardisation, the composition of the Bos nia stabilisa tion forc.:e and the privatisa tion of elec tricity production inexorably drove deb ate to the lowest common denominator. Whe n pro -Europe an political cUtes fo und themselves def(mrung a constitution with modest coli tent , th<'y felt tl1ey had no altc rnative hut to oversell it using in flate d notions of what the EU does and rhetoric Jrawn from J950s Europe an idea lism. SmaJI wonder tltey were outgunn ecl by grumpy populists with stronge r symbols rooted in class, nation and race (and eve n more inflated views of what the EU does). Publics be<.:ame cou fused and aJarm ed by the scare tactics of both si<.les. The refcm.mdum s cam e to inltabit a stra nge twili ght wne of symboli c polities, in whi<.:h clai ms abo ut the E U bore little relationship to reality, and suppo~ and oppositi~.n for a !>tatus <JUO constitution became a pote nt symbol for the mynad hopes and fears of modern electorates. In the wake of this debacle, Europe an politi<:ians must find a constructive path f01ward. They shou l<.l start with a coll ective mea culp a. The doc ume nt itself' must be r~~o unc~d. The n over the next few yea rs, the E U should re turn to its successful tra<.IJ tJon of quiet. and pragmatic. refor m. E urop eans consistently sup por t incremen tal au:ances J~ the. union's fore ign, inte rnal secu rity and eco nomic policies ~l~ng the hnes set forth m the constitution. Turkish mem bership is off the agenda, as Jt prob a~ly would have hcc n even wi thout the referc n<.lums. Politicians need to <.:once<.le thJs , and concede it loud and clear, in orde r to prese rve con tin ued EU enla rgement in the Balkans. Yet a halfway arra nge men t acceptable to both E U and

"''"'<

MORAVCSIK I E-UROPEWITH . OlJT 1l.l..OStONS 'f 1 ,-ki ~ l ' p11bltr" re•n wns a n:ali .,lit · I ' I I I' . g<Ja
l\~ J

. . · rncrnbc· h· l rnay ud ·\t . r tlw r J·.Jtr f)!JI' llll pok y coul d cont rih t r r; •p lnal i'l tn rrcnt l 1 )(. e:r II.Jr O . 11 e a\ 1n11<.:1 1 t 1 h Y Jfl ,,fl ..r ~11 AI H>VI ' a11 f•, uropcan politi<:iaw; j c , ~ <> C: l l p<:aU ; a11d • . • • • neec lh ack , . S{ t tmtv 1 1 of a o., tah Ic· l'.l tropc:an con~ litutiona ) 'V·ttl •. ~ JW C:ug<.· txpliti tl" the· . :· . I' " (;fn(; nt nl . . ' CXI lll t· n(.f' that it Iucks 111 p<J •cy co-o rdi natinn 1'I . · .e: IHHr1uc g<miw, of tt ·~ ·, ')I I w 1 1 (; rc:~p u t~1 11' r.l,; ~~ sy111bols l Ita l 'ilt attac: 1 to national i·'" . p lcc.:tm . ,.., ''b pow<:rful rl 1et, n· . . , U v n 11ty. IJ ))IC,;~ ·11 > ( i!.O() traye d as st al >Ic· and successful. Tlt(; r<.: · . I Wl <· rea-;'lurc·d if it i\ , IS fl() s 1arncJu l corn . . P >rcip.lcs hen ·. On tI1<.: cont rary a con~t·t . prnm1Sf· w11h ~rand r.nn. I' . r , - J u1tona1 order ~~1 t ,. dern oc..: raliC po Jtlcs •or tl1c iss11cs me sl · t·, t . . " prc~( 'l'\f's n<~titmal . r· ). ~a ten to c. : 1t1zc ns hut d1 indirec..:t <1c tnoc ral•c orm s tltost: issues tlt· t . • <: c:l¥tt s l(> rnQre . . 1 · a 1 art: o css con cc 1 an adrnint st rat1ve, techni<:al or legal c.:ons . 011 . · h' m, or wrud, thf·re is . . C::n~u s , IS 1"1-.)y appe· t· Tl distin c..:tivf.! syste m o I multi-le vel gove matlC" . t} Fl ' .a In::;. •<· EC 's "' 1 1 s 1e on y new fo r t· • . 0 non to e1fw rgc and pros pt:r since the · . f .1 rm s <1te <>r~arus;)me o tnc welfare state at th f 20th cent11ry. Now it is a 1naturc: constitutionaJ orde h t turn the r . . . · r, one t at no 1 onge s t0 move 1orwar<.1to 1ewttmate its past and present suc.:ces~e s Le(',t b 1· d r need be the . d d . . tl c un mullt I Europe . an . .an ce ntra tscrs. an . . emocratisers for whom ".t:ver c:·Ioser un1.on ., rcmams end tn ttscl r. They wtllms1 . . st that the answ tr to failed durn . ., oc rac:y IS· more clemoc. racy and the answer to a. fatle~ cons ~i tution is anot her constitution. But Europe has moved beyond them. DJsownm g thts well -meaning, even admirable, bantl of idealists may seem harsh, but it ~s both necessary and just. On this basis, Europeans can deve lop a new discourse of national inte rest, pragmati <: co-operation and constitutional stability- a <.liscourse that sees Europe as it is. The constitution is dead, long live the con stitution!

°

K£CK AND SfKKJNK I TRANSNATIONAL ACllVlST ~ "'- ' NORJ<s

Transnational Activist Netvvor.k::, MARGARET E. KECK AND KATHRYN SIKKINK

r f ·a·tnization characte rized by voluntmy, rec iprocal, Networks are tOl1 11S o 0 1t:>c and · . . . , mun1•......, 00 n and exchanae ... . MaJOr actors m advocac Itonzonta1 pattern s of com ...... )' t:> • (1) intern ational and clomest1c no ngovernnetworks mav 1·ne1ude tl1e r1rollo"'~ncr· t:>' • ' h d ad , cac y org an iza mental researc an '0 · tions·' (2) local soc1al move me nts . ; .(3) foundations; (4) the media; (5) churches, b·ade uni.on s, ~ons umer org~n1za tions, ~nd intellectuals; (6) parts of regional and intematiOJ~al mt ergovernme ntal orgaruza·ts of the execu tive and/or parhame ntary branches or tiens,. an d (7) p"' ~ · k · ·al governrnents. Not a1J these wiJI be present in each ad vocacy networ . l mti research suggests, however, that international and domestic NG Os [n~n~~ov.ernme.ntal organizations] play a centTal role in all advocacy ~~t\.vork s, us u~lly uuhatmg ~~tions and press uring more powerful actors to take pos1tions. NG Os mtroduce nev\ 1deas, provide information, and lobby for policy changes. . . Groups in a network share val ues and frequently exch ange mformation and services. The Sow of infom1ation among actors in the ne t\~J ork reveals a dense web of connections among these groups, bod1 formal and inform al. Th e movement of funds and services is especially notable between foundations an d NGOs, and some NGOs provide services such as training for other NGOs in the same and sometimes other advocacy networks. Personnel also circulate within and am ong ne tworks, as rel evant players move from one to an.other in a version of the "revo lving door." ... Aclvocacy networks are not new. We can find example s as far back as the nineteenth-century campaign for the abolition of s.lavery. But their number, size, and professionalism , and t11e speed, density, and complex ity of international linkages among the m has grown dramatically jn the last three de cades . .. . Trans na tional advocacy net\vorks appear most likely to emerge around those issues where (I ) channe ls between domestic groups an d the ir governments are blocked or hampered or where such channels are ine ffective for resolving a conflict , setting into motion the "boom erang" patte rn of influence characteristic of these networks; (2) activists or "political entre pren eu rs" believe that ne t\vorking will furthe r their missions and cam paigns, an d active ly promote networks; and (3) conferences and other forms of international contact create are nas for forming and strengthening net\vorks. Whe re channels of parti cipation are blocked, the

Reprinted from Activists BeyoiU.! Border.;: AtlooC(Icy Netwo rks in l nte rruLtional Politics, edi teJ by Marg~n:t E. Keck an~ Katb ryn Sikkink, pp. 8-24 . Copyrigh t© 1998 by Cornell University. Used hy pemuss•on of the publisher. ComeUUniversity Press. Portion s of the te>.t have been omitted.

532

::l

53 ·otcrnati onal urena may be the on ly means th t d . I . I : . . . . . a om csh c: attentw acti . h· n to t 1t 1r 1ssues. Boom erang strateg· Vlsts a"e to gain . les are mo st cor n m . where the targe t IS a state's domesti c policies or b h . on paigns . e aVlor· where a . m cam broad procecl uraI eI1ange mv . olving dispersed act . • . <.:ampcugn seeks .j ors , str ate g.e s are It is no accH en t t1a .l'ff 1 t so many advocacy netwo '-.. dd . more w use. r~ a he ir res ca s cla mp 1m aig s ab ns. t ng Governm ents are the primary .. ·h t ou ts in their primary violators. When a governm ent violatesguarantors" of right b ls f s.. ut a o . . ··' . d d 0 r re . . . . indJVJdu ,us an om estle groups oft en have no recours uses to recogruze righ~ .th. _1 • s, e \vl m uo mestJc politic:al or judici al are nas. T I1ey may seek international connecti ons finallv to e ress th . concerns and even to proteet the ir lives. ' xp elr W he n eh an ne ls be~een the state and its do mestic actors are bloc:ked the boom erang patte rn of mRue nce characte ristic of tra nsnational netw k ' " . ·N CO . b h . occ ur: Dome shc. J or s may s ypass t e1r state and directly search ou t intern ational allies to try to bn ng pressure on their states from outside. This is most obvious! t11e case. in human rights. campaigns. Similarly, ind ige nous rights campaig/s and e.nvu:on 1~e ntal camprugns t~at support the dema nds of local peoples for partic1pat10n m development proJects that would affect the m frequently involve tllis kind of tJiangu lation. Linkages are important for both sides: For the less powe rful Third 'World actors, networks provide access, leverage, and information (and often money) they could not e>.:pect to have on their own; for northern groups, they make credible the assertion that they are strug gling with, and not only for, their southern partners. Not surprisingly, such rel ationships can produce considerab le tensions . ... Just as oppression and injustice do not themselves pro duce movements or revolutions , claims around issues amenable to internation al action do not produce transnational ne tworks. Activist s-"people who care enou gh about some issue that they are prep are d to inc ur significant costs and act to achieve their goals"1-< lo. Th ey cre ate them when they believe that transnationaJ n~~vorking will.f~~ er t11eir organizational mi ss io ns -by sharing infonnation, ~~~g greater VJS1bility. gaining access to wide r publics, multiplying channels of 1~tutio~1al access. and so forth . Fo r example, in the campaign to stop the promo t1on of mfant f?nnula to · coun tne · s, orgam·zer ttled on a bovcott of Nestle, the poor women in deve lopmg s se ' . . . B Ne stle Iargest producer as its mam tactic. ecause 1 was a transnaoonaJ actor, • ' . k . activists believed a transnational networ was necess·an· to bnnu pressure on , o . . . . 9 · · eh iss ue are as. participation m co rporation s and governmen ts.- Over tJme, m su fth collective identien tial com po ~ansnational ne tworks has become an ess . a · art ofnent o e their common repertoire. ties of the activists involved , and netwo rking P k rs 11r0 r a new campaign the co re net Th e political en tre pren eurs w ho become \vor e • have often gee<:11111onn electronic commw1icat1o ·' turaI 5b.i ft· tes . ds 15 · a bro ade r cw . . · t-clt1tese hen sonal contact among actiVi g1obal pu blic sts. Un der1~'ln . fa new kin d of a creatiOn o The new ne tworks have dependecl 011 the aJ ac . of the t960s .. · · (or Civil society), which grew as a cultur 1eg )

534

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTICS

HOW DO TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY NETVVORKS \•JO RK? s11 ation ·1l advocacy networ ks 5·eek influ ence in man·\ of the «ame ways that ran •. ·_ , • ovements do. Sinc.:e they are not powerful in a otl1e r IJollticcu groups or socr,··.]m t f 1 . . r . . .. f th ·cl tl y mus t use the pow er o t 1err 11110 nnution, rdeas traditional sense o e wor ' le · 1 · 1 · . .1 J • r ·natjon and valu e contexts wrt Hn \\ H<· 11 states mak e' and strategres to ruter t 1e mron . . " . . .. .. . . . . Tl b lk f 1 t· ne .... vork s do mtgh t be t e1 med JX ' su<~sron 0 1 socJalizapo)tctes. 1e u · o w 1a l\ · . . . . . b · 1 ·s devo id of conA ict. Pers uast bon ut nett 1er process t . .on and soc.:taltzation . often . inv;lve not just reasoning \\nth opponents. but also bnn~ng pressur<:, ann-l.wtstmg , encouraCTing sanctions. and sharrung. · · · . °"' 1 , 0 ur ·;'P0 Og) of tactics that nenvorks use in tl1eir effo rts at pers uasron, social· I · kl ization, and pressure includes (l ) infonnation polit· ics, or t 1.e a b'l' ' rty to ~tnc. y and credibly generate politically usable information -~1d move rt to whe re tt v.11ll ~ave the most impact; (2) symbolic politics, or the abd~t)' to call upon symbols , actions, or stories that make sense of a situation for an audience tJ1at ts freq uently far away; (3) ler;arage politics, or ilie abilit)· to call upon pow~1ful actors to. affect a situation where weaker members of a nenvork are unlikely to have mfluence; and (4) accountability politics, or ilie effort to bold powerfuJ actors to their previously stated policies or principles.... Network members actively seek ways to bring issues to the public agenda by framing them in innovative ways and by seeking hospitable venues. Sometimes iliey create issues by framing old problems in new ways ; occasionally they help transform other actors' understanding of their identities and their interests. Land use rights in ilie Amazon, for example, took on an entirely different charac.:ter and gained quite different allies viewed in a deforestation frame than they did in eith er social justice or regional deve lopment frames. In ilie 1970s and 1980s man y states decided for the first time that promotion of human rights in othe r cou ntries was a legitimate foreign policy goal and an auilientic ex-pression of national inte rest. This decision came in part from interaction vvith an emerging global human rights nenvork. We argue that this represents not the victory of morality over selfinterest, but a transformed understanding of national inte rest, possible in part because of structured interactions between state components and networks. This changed understanding cannot be derived solely lfrom changing global and ec.:onornic conditions, although these are relevant. ... T~

Infonnation Politics Information binds network members toaeilier and is essential for network effectiveness. _M ~y information exchanges ar; info rma l-telephone calls , e-mail and fax com~u~wat10n s,. and ilie circulation of newsletters, pam phlets, and bulletins. They provtde information that would not otheiWise be available from sources that might not othe iWi~e.be heard, and they mus t make this info rmation comprehensible and usefuJ to actiVIsts and publics who may be geographicall y and!or socially distant. Nonstate actors gain infl bY ·ng . mfor . . [! . fl . uenc e seM as alter nate sour ces of matJ .on. 1n ~rmation ows m advocacy networks provide not only facts but test imo nystones told by people whose li h · rpre t ves ave been af"1ected. Moreover, activists mte

KECKAND SIKKlNK I

TRANSNATIONALAcnv 1 . . 1ST NEiWORJ<s _ facts anc tt sttmony, usually fra . . 535 · mmg ISsue s si 1 . bec
3

s ~q 1 ~A\ .

~d~ ~t{l

(

~q

ll

m"

t : ~u

saa 00::>

or

Y.:>iji

•

3S

en

~ll

.

qo

oc

~I.

lll

,fe .

oq

..{fi

uc

s~

l I

536

PART 4

KECK AND SlKKINK

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTJCS

.

tm•J ; ~ ~ · c·omm unicaA l Iense weI) o f nortI1- ou cl1 e·xchange• aided b) comp . . . < . 1 tl ts an longe r rnon opoh ze IJ1lc·r rr~dl >1 flows as they non. llll' ans 1at O'Qve mme n c 110 . . o f. d d go TJ ese techn olom es have. had an enun .nous lll1{)act could a mere I1·al - eca e a . 1 e· . . . r t:i t ncl from Third \Vorl on mo\1ng 11110nna on o a . d coun.tnes, ".. ht·re , mad .seiVJce ha<; m,·e specta.l ach .mla~ges of couJ'Se to of ten been sIow an d preCan·ous·, thev, also o· . . .• ·zat'wns t11at llav·e c."Cces·s to tJ1em · A good example of lhe ne\\ 111formattonal oraam 0 ... orks occurred ,,,ben US ro1e 0 f neuv . . environmentalists pressured President George Bush to raise the issue of gold m~e rs' ong_oing im·asion~ of the Yanoma,~i indigenous reserve when Brazilian pres1dent Fe1nando Collo1 de Mello was m \Vashjngton in 1991. Collor believed t11at l:e had squelche d protest o~~r the Yanomami ques tion by creating major med1a events out of tl~e d:'J1a':'1t1~g of airstrips used by gold mine rs, but network me~nber~ had curr ent ~~formation faxed from Bra7il, and they countered his claim s \VJth eVIde nce tl1at mme rs had rebuilt the airstrips and were still invading the Yanomami ~r~a. . . . . .. The media is an essential partn er in network m formation pobttcs. To reach a broader audience, networks strive to attract press attention. Sym path etic journalists may become part of the network, but more often networ~ activists cultivate a reputation for credibility with the press , and package their information in a timely and dramatic way to draw press attention.

Symbolic Politics Activists frame issues by identifYing and providing convincing explanations for powerful symboilc even ts, which in turn become catalysts for the growth of networks. Symboilc interpretation is part of the process of persuasio n by which networks create awareness and expand their constituencies. Awarding the 1992 Nobel Peace Prize to Maya activist Rigo berta Men chu and the UN's designation of 1993 as the Year of Indigenous Peoples heightened public awareness of the situation of indigenous peoples in the Americas. Indigenous peoples' use of 1992, the 500th anniversary of the voyage of Columbus to the Ame ricas, to raise a host of issues well illustrates the use of symbolic events to reshape understandings . ...

Leverage Politics Activists in advocacy networks are concerned with political effectiveness. Their definition of effectiveness often includes some policy change by "target actors" such as governments, international finan cial im tituti ons like the World Bank, or priva te actors like transnatio nal COiporations. In orde r to bring about policy ~han ge, networks need to pressure and pers uade more pow erful acto rs. To gain m8uence the n~tw?rks seek leverage (the word appears often in the discourse of ~dv~y organizations) over more powerful actors. By leveraging mor e powe rful msti~tions •. weak groups gain influence far beyond their ability to influence state practices directly. The identification of mate rial or moral leverage is a crucial strategic step in network campaigns. Material .l~erage ~ually links the issue to mon ey or goods (but potentially also to votes m mternational organizations, prestigio us offices, or othe r benefits).

.

I TRANSNATIONAL ACflVlST NETWORKs

537 The hurn a11 nghts 1ssue beca me n , ti· bl . a e because ·lnstihlllOII'i <.:onnected human rightsego practi . . . ces lo milit govemment~· or "•,a nl nc1a1 bilateral c.liplomatlc relattons. In the un·t d S ary and economic aid or t 1e tates hum 'gh · age by providing policy-makers with in 11eo t' h ann t~ groups uot ltver-o at con · d th eo militc.uv an<1c<.:onornic aid. To make the issrma 10n .t bl · vmce ern to cut off . . j· . . ue ncgo tta e Fi . h d profile or sa tence, usmg mformation and s 'mbolic ol~ NCO . s 1rst a to raise its membe rs of the network had to link coo)p t' P tics. Then more pow~rful . thin ls r money, trade, or prestige. Similarly in the enviera 1on to •.some , g e e o value: . . 1 ' ronm enta ISts multilateral dev I ment ban k campa1gn, lmkage of envir onmental t ·ti .th e op·f· 1 · pro ec on WJ acces s to loan':i \\""'...," very powe 1 u . I

Altl1ough NGO influ ence often depends on securi f 1 a11· . ·j·· . ·11cl cl. · . ng power u 1es. the1r ereclib 11ty ::;tl epen s m part on the1r abilit y to mob ·11Z· · own mem bers 1 e th e1r . . . . . and affect public opm10n ':a the m~dia. In democracies the potential to influence votes gives . large . members . lup organ . tZations· an· advantage o:ver nonmembers1·n·p orgam·zanons tn lobb)'l~g fo r policy change; en\lironmental organizations, several of whose memberships number in the millions, are more likely to have this added clout than are human rights organizations. Moral leverage involves what some commentators ha,·e called the "mobilt:,ation ofsham,e," where the behavior of target actors is held up to the light of international scrutiny. Network activists exert moral leverage on the assumption that governments value the good opinion of others; insofar as netwo rks c-an demonstrate that a state is violating international obligations or is not lh·ing up to its o'"'ll claims, they hope to jeopardize its credit enough to motivate a change in policy or behavior. The degree to which states are vulnerable to this kind of press ure varies, and wiiJ be discussed fUither below.

Accountability Politics

~q

'M

dI •

dtf.

}q I I;

- ''

:.

S'

itL

)I

l

•

Networks devote considerable energy to convincing governments. and oth~r actors to publicly change their positions on issues. TL: ws ·ts often dismiSsed as .mconse. . ct1ea t d gove e11ts sornetimes change discursiVe ouen tial chan ge since ta lk ts p an rnm .. . 1 ' k d lsts, ho\\positions hoping to divert net:wor an pu bli c attention · Network act:iV bili'h: ''tics · rt nities for accounta ., pou · ever, trv to make such state ments mto oppo u f . . r. r example in 1 . · t d 1 't el to a pnnCip1e-n0 ' Once a gove rnm ent has publicly comlmt e kss · · tl ·e pos1·tions and their . , t\ or can use 10s favor of hum an rights or clemocraC)-ne v b discourse and practice. . n comman d of information, to expose cl1e distance. h et\veetn' to save face by dosing nts Thjs is embarrassing to many governn,e , w1uc ·· mav· · that distance. t bilit\' politics was the ability of Perh aps the hest example of net\vork ac~ul n a ~ ·ons of tJ1e 19i5 Helsinki I c. the hum an rights neh.vork to use tlle I1Uma. n ng 1ts pro\1S . ts of Eastern Europe 10 r . d the go\'emmen . th Accords to pressw·e the Soviet Uruo 10 n an . h an riohts mo,-ernent e 1 t le Ulll o change. The Helsinki Accords beIpe.d 1·evJve 1'k the Moscow Helsinki Group and· the Soviet Union, spavvned new organizatl_ons 1 e es ~ d helped protect acti\ists from Helsinki Watch Committe e in the Umted rSt~ted. .to 1~tosrow's obligations unde r the . I, t s twork reiei i repression. 5 The human ng ne . h n...npl es of abuses. · · · Helsinki Final Act and juxtaposed t hese \\lt exl.U" I

r.

•

538

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTJCS

NOTES 1. Pamela E. Oliver and Gerald Marwell, ''Mobilizing Techno),, ~1 ' : in Frontiers in Social Movement TheonJ, ed. Aklon D. ~ 1< n:"

tlld

l'"<·tive Action:· Carol McClurg

M ueller (.\iew Haven: Yale University Press. 1992). P· ~2. . 2. See Kathryn Sikkink, ··codes of Conduct for Tr~nsn_anonal <.c T m.~.m~".= The Case of the WHO/U NJCEF Code.'' Internotional Orgam;:,(Jtton 40 (.\ ut llllll I% 6): 8 f 5-40. 3. Oorothy Q. Thomas, "Holding Govemments Account;1ble by Puhlw Pn·ssmc." in Ours by Right: Women~~ Rights os H11man Rights. ed. Joanna Ken t London: Zed Books, t99.'3), p. 83. 4. Female genital mutilation is most widely practiced in Africa. wh<•rc il is reported to occur in at feast twenty-six countries. Between 85 and 114 million wome n in the world today are csUmated to have e'-perienced genital mutilation. World Bc111k Development Report 1.9.93: Jn·vesting i11 Health (New York: Oxford University Press. 19~)3), p. 50. 5. Discussion of the Helsinki Accords is based on Daniel Thomas, ·• 1orms and Change in World Politics: Human Rights, d1e Helsinki Accords, and the De111isc of' Com munism ' 1975-1990," Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1997.

SEBASTIAN MALLABY

Last year, I visited Uganda. I w t d an e to understa d 1 . l n low a showcase of Af · . h around c tti I10pe e.ssne.ss turned ncan • u ng t e numb 0 f . . a1 people living below th d . er nahon poverty hne by almost 40 e percent unng the 1990 . . . s. But I wanted to get to the bottom of another Issue too Th \iu Id . · e 'vor · Bank was ' .1 · f a dam near the promotmg source o t 1e nver NiJe , at a beaut'f~-• I· I w spot c:alJed B . UJaga J. Western nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were . . m revo1t· The 1 t based in Berkeley, California, maintained tha~ th n ernationa~ Rivers Network, e Ugandan enVIronmental movement was outraged at the likely dam t age o waterfalls t th · who lived there would be uprooted fro th . 1 d ~a e site, and that the poor couldn't afford. It was surely a clash thm t. err an hor the sake of electricity they a went to t e heart of the I baliza . I tion strugg e. Was the NGO movement ac:tina as a c· .:1· d h k . go IVuize c ec on mdustrializati o ill' £; t di s an. ng up . or m IOns of poor people whose views the World Bank i . ored') ':;; . . t batgnwould .fuel the battle against poverty bv, withholdi ng eIectnc1ty was tt retarding . economic growth, ultimately benefiting poor citizens? . I called the Berkeley activists and asked for some ad..ice. Who ran this u andan enVIronmental .movem~nt they clain1ed was so outraged? Where were the vlliagers w~o would be cruelly dislocated by the dam project? NGOs such as the International ~IVers Network usually love helping Western journalists, and because these journalISt~ ar~ gen~rally far from the scene of the disputed development project, they sometimes Simply report what they are told. But now that I was in Uganda, a few hours' drive from the proposed dam, I got a warier re~-ponse. Lori Pottinger, tlle Intemational Rivers activist who led the Bujagali campaign, explained that her ~gandan counterpmts were preoccupied just then, and that snooping around the VIllages at the Bujagali site wouJd get me into trouble with the authorities. Not wanting to give up right away, I tracked down Pottinger's Ugandan counterparts by other means and telephoned their office. Afrienclly voice in..ited me to come over straightaway. When I arrived, the groups young director sat me dov.n and plied me witJ1 leaflets and reports that gratefully acknowledge
First publishe~ i~ ::~gn Policy. Sebastian Mallaby, "NGOs: Fighting Poverty, Hurting the September/October 2004. © 2004 by Sebastian Mallaby. by pennission ofThe Wyhe g ·

Poor.v

539

...

••

~

. - .•. "·~ 'nr: t'UUR 540

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTICS

· th at 1·c·tll)·cmh:•··' hour of cmwersation, I Oc:iation of Professional Environmentalists had ail of 2.5 member ·-not t'\:tcll~ tt hroad platform from which to oppose electricity for millions. . . . My next move was to visit Bujagali. I met up WJ!h a Ugandan 'iOCJologJst who knew the reuion well and promised to translate for me. She slopped at a duster of buildings on°the edge of the dam site to check in wit!, the local government representative who, far from threatening to call the cop~ , greeted us cheerfully. For the next three hours, we inteJviewed villager after vi llager and found the same stOJy: The "dam people" had come and promised generous financial terms, and the villagers were happy to accept them and relocate. My sociologist (;()mpanion said we might have sample bias because we were intervievving men, who might value cash more th an th e land that women tended. So we interviewed some women, who offered the same pro-project line. The only people who objected to the dam were those living just outside its perimeter. They were angi)' because the project would not affect them, meaning no generous payout. This story is a tragedy for Uganda. Cunics and factories are being deprived of electricity by Californians whose idea of an electricity crisis is a handful of summer blackouts. But it is also a tragedy for the fight against poverty worldwide, because projects in dozens of countries are similarly held up for fear of activist resistance. Time after time, feisty Intemet-enabled groups make scary claims about the iniquities of development projects. Time after time, Western publics raised on stories of vVorld Bank white elephants believe them. Lawmakers in European parliaments and the U.S. Congress accept NCO arguments at face value, and the government officials who sit on the World Bank's board respond by blocking fu nding for deserving projects. The consequences can be preposterously ironic. NGOs claim to campaign on behalf of poor people, yet many of their campaigns harm the poor. They claim to protect the environment, but by forcing the World Bank to pull out of sensitive projects, they cause these schemes to go ahead without the environmental safeguards that the bank would have imposed on them. Likewise, NGOs purport to hold the ~orld Bank accountable, yet the bank is answerable to the governments who are Its shareholders; it is the NGOs' accountability that is murky. FUJthermore, the offensives mounted by activist groups sometimes have no basis in fact whats~ever.. If think this an exaggeration, consider the story of an anti-poverty effort m Chma s western province of Qinghai.

rou

OUT, DAM SPOT There was nothi~g.apparently controversial when, in April 1999, the World Bank conduded negotiations on a project in Qinghai. China was the bank's star client at

.,... ~"'

!JavJ,.! hlicd around 200 million P 1 u1e ' . '. } . . . . eop e out of pov, 1 1 . Ml p1 OJect was designed t Cr1) c nnng the prt•\'iotJ~ deCc·:tde • 1 he Qmg • • o move 58 000 f: • ·d lu lbade to another part of th . ' annc:rs from a hoJ'I<'Ies.c;]y [)Hn:h• ,. . e proVJn<:e ir · , 1 h . rm ""()u]J nse from around 20 ngatc c } a <:mall dam f a ers 1n(;oJ 11es I . . cents a dav t0 I I . ld actu c~lh 'il l 1s1st. Chma had carried out s ' a e,·c at \vhi<:h tilL'\ U eo · omc 30 such ) · • ast. All h by Pelosi and a pro-Tibet musician stated that ~ ~ stituted onlv 40 percent . . th h Han CJunese con . . . to I et ln.1c Chinese" into Qinghru, even oug Han Chinese were not JUO\lng m of. the 58 ,000 settlers, and even tliough. these . mern ber'S. of concrress . . SL\1)' eo·-- fired off a Qtnghai, just relocating witlun the provmce. .t

lill1C

35

°

- ....... I:"VUI{

t\m•pbin t to \\'olfcn ·ohn. and en. Jesse Helm · a

f~-,ri££1:: ~~.

!

~ 11

n 11 c. politi~ia Bank m a

11 rmm :\orth Carolina, leapt at the chance to condemn ( _h nil • • 1 "m!!l<., bn:.ath. \\'hen a \ \'orld Bank delegation went to Caplt! ' . '. t ~ ul1J ~· the lawm.tkcrs. it was confronted "vith a map that did not ew•n sbo '- QJ I_L J. The entire pro'; nee had been labeled Tibet, never mind that Tibetans account ·d fur onJy one in fh c people tltere. . . The bank was totally encirded . It was SJmultan eousl; up agamst student protesters and the right wing of the Republican Pa_~·· and alt!Jougl~ the bank's as ailants were Aat wrong on the facts. nobody was \VI1hng to stlck up for the institution. In June ]999, the Clinton adminLc;tration annou~c ed t.hat ~l would vote against the Qinghaj project when it came before the ·w orld B~nk s hoard. The Lilliputian activists had taken on the bank. and they had won the first round.

APPEASEMENT DENIED The most common reaction to this sort of story is that the bank must comm unicate better with its critics and learn how to compromise with them. Unfortunately, this prescription is naive. It presumes tl1e critics are open to compromise. But campaigning NGOs, as distinct from those with real developm ent programs in the field, almost have to be radical. If they stop denouncing big organizations, nobody wi Usend them cash or quote them in the newspapers. Partly for this reason, and partly out of a likeable conviction that the status quo is never good enough, most NGOs do not have an off switch. You can do everything possible to meet them halfway, but they will stiUdemonst rate outside your building. Of course, there will be grown-up groups like Oxfam, World Vision, or the World Wildlife Fund that may accept you r olive branch. But they will be the exceptions, and they may cooperate only cautiously. They don't want to be the next target for the radicals. The second round of the Qinghai battle illustrated this problem. Confronted with the news that the Clinton administration would block the project, Wolfensohn Hew into a rage. He worried about th reats by the U.S. Congress to cut contributions to the bank's subsidized lending program if the project went ahead, unde rmining the bank's ability to help its poorest clients. He fretted that the adverse publicity might cost him a chance at winning a Nobel Peace Prize and that his Hollywood connecti ons would tu m on him. And he feared that one of his central achie,vements would be jeopardi zed: Since taking the helm of the bank in 1995, Wolfensohn had done more than any of his prede(;essors to reach out to NGOs. He welcomed the bank's most ardent critics to private dinners at his home, made a point of meeting with them wherever he traveled, and even created commissions to solicit their advice on WorJd Bank policy. Whe~ the Qinghai battle came to a head, Wolfensohn did everything possible to defus~.lt..He went out of his way to hear the arguments of the NGOs, treating his own staff WJth much less deference. He summon ed the project team to his office and demanded to know whose arse he should kick first. After much raging and fu ming. he hit upon a scheme that would meet the NCOs part way. The project would be referred to the bank's Inspection Panel, a tribunal staffed by eminent persons

543

who in\'f::' ~igate projects' cornpljance with th , safegu<mb. e banks emironmental . Tht- ne thists alJeged several . t and S0<:1al ~ I. .d . tns of non- . li I examp t' . t Jat one gm eLne requiringance~ " .I comp an<.:e. Thev d . d. ~ was breathe d, along with anotl1er req s~cJa haction·· to protect etl;nic :~e . _or r cl . monties critics Jocuse particularly on the ·bank'umng. t at resettlement he voluntar\' Th ·fi cl Q' l . ..C s enVironmental r ,· e classi e mg 1aLas a 'ategory B" ro·ect ( . S~teguards. The bank had ment), rather than a high-risk "Cat ~ posmg medium risk to the emi · egorv A •· and th [! ronk l s impy emiron mental impact 'b cl' arguab: ere ore commissioned an Inspection Panel, Wolfensohn calculate~ tuh Y· By r~fening these claims to the . I mqun-y . . into the b k'at a pohtical now b ecome a. teehmea . fight ove1. TL'bet would In a sane world, this strategy would haan ~ op~ational guidelines . But the day after the bank decided to ve oug t some peace \\ith the activists. convene an Ins ti p students climbed up the face of the bank's head art ~c on anel a pair of claiming , 'World Bank Approves China's Geno~~e i~;~et ~;~~~~d a banner ~ro­ groups disapproved of these tactics- after all there · .d ely, other TJbet but they were unwilling to speak out publici}· againwstasthn~ e:llence o: ~enocide . b err 1e ow acti\ists Meanwhile, mem ers of congress continued to toe the 1f\GO 1: R bli · · k f · une. epu can Sens. Conme Mac o Flonda and Benjamin Gilman of ~ew York accw;ed the bank of "cultural genocide." A House of Representatives subcommittee voted in 1999 to cut contributions to the bank's soft-loan window by £220 million. . \Vhen_ t~ e Inspec~i o~ Panel inquiry got under way, it only succeeded in bringmg the actiVIst attack mstde the World Bank's building. The head of the Inspection Panel, Canadian environmentalist Jim Mac~eill , clearly favored acmists over bank staff, whom he treated with prosecutorial vigor. He seemed more interested in finding technical infringements of the bank's safeguard policies than in asking the big questions: Would the Qinghai project reduce poverty? The answer was yes, but the panel seemed indifferent. \¥ould it cause environmental damacre? The bottom line was no, and yet the panel insisted on poking holes in the bank's p~oc~dures. The panel's final report, delivered in April2000, 'vas a 160-page milictment of the Qinghai project. It insisted that the scheme should have been r~ted Cat~gory A for environm entalJiskiness, that insufficient attention had been prud to the Impact on Mongolian and Tibetan nomads, and that tl1e recruitment of volunt~ers for . db . t ·e 'S were not confidential. The 10 resettlem ent was compromise ecause en'l '' . tal anel's report did not worry too much about whether a C~tegory A enthvuonmen ds P the proJeCt or w11e .er noma assessment would have found reasons to opp~s~. . cl b . the pro1·ect. It rod . . Y . 0 ther fac 1hties create 1 f fi might actually be~e t rom c I rues or . . · c:es of the interviews, the farmnot dwell on the fact that, whateve r the cucuJ~st~ man\' more people wanted to ers' desire to relocate was beyond doubt. In ee · move than the project could accommodate. de a last-ilitch attempt to placate the In June 2000, the bank's management mfa cl' and proiect preparation the Jes J all NCOs by proposing another year 's wortJ1 oh stu NGOs continued their c s {Ior canbank estimated would cost $2 million. Yet t _e cl the mana11ers' proposal, and the celing the project. In July, the bank board re_1ectt . china ~onned the bank that second round of the Qinghai battle ~e to a c ose. it would withdraw its request for financmg.

5-1-t

- ---~·"" . VVt:l\ 1 Y,

uncs CONTEMPORARY WORLD PO

PART 4

1

h ,~~ Id Bank pulled out of Qinghm. • L ~ 1' ' r 1 Not lon11 cuter t e vor ' f' I t that heard had h Thev . . " r n . If • •1env1sts went lo VlSJt \ vo1,enso n.

... t't

• '•C

n of Tibet

gr \·c~mrnent

1 · · . ah cl . h tl esettlement proicd bv J[S{' . Tt •<1 ·: r•<.:Jme appar.. " ; · ea w1t 1e r ' "a..' fJre !IJng 11 and. move cl · re the bank's environmc·utall:Oil I I . tt·r>lh . enl th at C'h"ma p anne to tgno were haVIng a hare tllllt' ' 1lc;Co\·enng the \"COs 'e TJ · more peop Ie to t I1c new area. • · \\.tc t~nwg on. they asked Wolfensohn Ch" . f .. . l . ., what detm 1s o t11e 111ese p1ans, s0 1 "How the fuck do 1 know what they're dowg? v\ olfen<.<Jim ~ lot back. You just got us out of there!'" J

•

THE SLEEPING BANK AWAKENS Versions of this story play out all over the world. The bank desig11s a reasonable project>whiclt inevitably has Haws. NCOs seize on these flaws and add a la~ge sprinkling of inHammatory rhetoric. The World Ba~k puJJs ou t, ~ut the proJeCt goes. ahead any.,.,ay, minus the bank:'i social and envH·onrnen tal safeguards. Because of the fear of NCO assault, the bank is obliged to foiJow its precaution
HUKI1NG THE POOR

545

d e wood anc. other biomass fuels that <:aiJSe d · ven more efo t r Thankfullv. the bank's management rejected the corn . r:s ~IOn an air pollution. This na'icent counterattack must go b d thmJSSion s recom mendation . roa er an one . titu . h f ms lion, owever. The lesson o the Qinghai battle is that th b k '~ eo 1 th fight cannot an e . . . I sa one. e.... . . b Commen tators, po ltiCJans and HolJvwood 1 · t t he temptation ce e nties must resls ' a<:tivists.'· to side uncritically with feisty The \Voriel Bank's prerucament is part of 1 argedr conu~druall m that bede..,ils globalization. In many of the world's rich cap·tal · La s, an espec1 y in \\' h· a'i mgton, . is decided by a bewildering arrav of . t Public policy m erest groups campaign· , · cl dl c mg f cl arm similar si ngle-mm e y tOr narrow goals. A Y o a vocates pounds upon . ]. . . . . like the bank' demandi ng th ey. bend to particuJar mshtuhons big mtemat10na . . .1 b·mg that r · to harm no peoples mdigenous to uamage no concerns: not rorests, ram ' . . m1ght threaten . nghts, or Tibet ' or democratic values . However noble many . . , human flawed the big 1·nsti"tuti"ons' record, th· of the actiVISts . IS con. . .motives, and however stant campa1gmng threatens to disable not just the World Bank but regional deve.lopment _banks and govemment~l aid organizations such as the U.S. Agency for Internat10n~l Devel_op~ent. If this takes place, the world may lose the potential for good that b1g orgamzahons offer: to rise above the single-issue advocacy that small groups tend to pursue and to square off against humanity's grandest problems in all their hideous complexity.

HOWARD AND DQa.n..E ,~ ,,. UYI HUMAN

Human Rjghts in World Po.Itfc....: RHODA E. HOWARD AND JACK DC NNELLY

The International Human Rights Co,·enants1 note tl1at hu man ri~hts "derive from tJ1e inherent dignity of tlle human person:· But while the struggle to
WHAT RIGHTS DO WE HAVE? The definition of human or natural rights a') the rights of each person simply as a hu man being specifies their character; they are rights. The definition also spedfies their sou rce: (human ) nature ... . What is it in human nature that gives rise to human rights? There are two basic answers to this question. On the one hand, many people argue that human rights arise from human needs, from tlle naturally given reqwsites for physical and mental healtll and well-being. On the otller hand, many argue tl1at human rights reflect the minimum requirements for human dignity or rruJral personality. These latter arguments derive from essentiaUy philosophical theories of human "nature," dignity, or moral personality. Needs theories of hu man rights run into tlle problem of empirical confirmations; the simple fact is that there is sound scientific evidence only for a very narrow list of human needs. But if we use "needs" in a broader, in part nonscientific, sense, then th~ hvo..theorie~, overla~. We can th us say that people have human rights to those th~ngs ne~ded f~r a life of dign ity, for the full developmen t of their moral person~lity. The nature that gives rise to human rights is thus moral nature. Th1s moral nature is, in part, a social creation. Human nature in the relevant ~~s.e: is an amalgam co~sisting both of psycho-biological facts (con~traints and posSJbJltties) and of the soc1al structures and experiences that are no less a part of tJ1e

RIGHTs IN WORJ..o

547 POuncs essentt J ~tme of men and wom H en. uman be·mgs are not isolated in . . 'd als h , u· . w o are essentiall . s . rather Theref01 ·
v:

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS F~ International flatuihook of Humnn Rights, edited by Jack DonneUy and Rboda E. Howard, PP· 19- lOf). ('~~t © 1987 by Jack DonneUy and Rhoda E. Howard. Reproduced with permission of Greenwood Publishmg Croup, Inc., Westport, cr.

. deseJ"\'es some attention. There are, . . The mternationa l context of nation~ practices. rights standards that are wide~· as we have already noted, intemat10nal human

n: ~

L l

I

' I

I

5--IS

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTICS

HOWARD AND DONNELLY I HUMAN

UJS ('Il" 'i lil n:l! «'Vu lua tion or . . . l at lea .st -hv sta ~.::s. .. ac<:cptel I- 111 pn nc1p e J I . . ' ... .-ch inCT ~et of mh "lla bll " \la . ne :tnJ s to . k I· WJt lml an ov eJc. u ,.., . nalJOnaJ praCtiCeS lil e pa ce ]' •tJ ·O nm i!ted t!JClllSefn'~ 'V}wl<·vc• r the · for~..:e which virtuaJI~· all states have_ exp JCJ .Y <.: .t' attendant I<·Pal irn tJ m 11 fro m int(:> r. . . 1 ereJgn tv wJt11 1 s ro . 1 of cla.J ms o nationa sov · 1' . ' II n·w n,rhts 1mKtit t·s frolll tlw p(' rsr1e<.:. .I . I ' , . J atio n of nat JOn a 1UJ • n . . natJOnaJ actwn , t tc c_va 11 .... f • Un ive rsa l Oe dar at• ou tiiiJ'> IS cert:.tinly · f 1 1 · t . tion al sta nda rLL' > o t 1<' ove o t 1e •n crna . bl 1·tll the moral daim sk(•tch ed abo ve th·tt . · f · nco mf '"' appropnate,cven ' one_rs~ .l . ortda d eh)r • the ver y ide a of hu n1a ll rig hts . 1 ic scrut1ny JSucll1an e · rcc sueJ1 ulll·ver·s·'1J'st • • • 1 t. s it has cn th· he<..·omc r·ashionablc l 11 h I. ' . ture on intemabona1re a lOll . , t c •tcJa . . . ., tlla t 1·s nor llls and de d!\ion -makin g procedures aJk 0 f ··· t auona1 reg.mes • ' to t· m em . . . .' "re a Na tion al hum an rig hts pra cti ces do take ce )ted b)' states m a given Issue ac 1 . . · b · d . . t ~ ·t of an international human rights reg m1 e cen tered place w1thm t11e roa e1 con ex

. t ., Th us LI IC'

( I

•

•

on the United Nations. r· · 1 We have already sketched the p1incipal n~nns of·th.IS 1 .egw·~e-:-t l1e··1·. 1~t o . ng 1ts . 1 U · furthe 1 elah01 ctted 111 two m t 1e nwers"u1 Ded· aJ ..auho11· Th ese nonns/ nghts are . . cl J . · ... tl lnt em atio naJ Co ven ant on Ec ono m1 c, Soctal an Cu tural Rtghts maJOr trcaues, 1e ·1 and the fntemationaJ Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, '"'1uc 1 were op ened for signature and ratification in 1966 and ca1~~ into force in 197~. Alm ost alJ of the countries studied in thjs volume have rabf1ed (become a party to) both the Covenant 011 CiviJ and PoliticaJ Rjghts and the Covenant on Econom ic, SociaJ and CuJtu raJ Right . ... Even the countries that a~e not parti.e~ to the Co venants_ often accept the principles of the Universal Decla ration. l n ad<.htwn,.there are~ vanety of single-issue treaties that have been formulated under UN auspices on topJcs such as racial discrimination , the rights of v.romen, and torture. These later Covenants and Conventions go into much greater detail than the Universal De daration and include a few important changes. For example, the Covenants promi ne ntly include a right to nationaJ seJf-detennination , wruch is absent in the Un ive rsa J De claration , but do not include a 1ight to private property. Nevertheless, for the most part they can be seen simply as elaborations on the Unive rsal Declaration, wh ich remains the central normative document in the inte rnational hum an rights regim e. What is the legal and political force of these norms? Th e Unive rsal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaim ed in 1948 by tl1e United Natio ns Ge neral Assembly. As such, it has no force of law. Resolutions of the Ge neral Assembly , even solemn declarations, are merely recommendations to states; the Gene ral As sem bly has no international legislative powers. Over the years, however, the Unive rsal Declaration has come to be something more than a mere recommendation. There are two principal sources of international law, namely. tre aty and custom. Althou gh today we tend to think first of treaty, historically cus tom is at least as important. A rul e or principle attains the force of customary int ern ati onal law when it can meet two tests. First, the principle or rule mu st ref lect the general practice of the o~etwh eJming majority of states. Secon d, wh at law yers call op-i11io juris, tl1e sense of obligation , must be taken into account. Is the cus tomal)' pra ctice seen by states as an obligation, rat her than a mere convenience or courtesy? Today it is a common view of international lawyers that the Universal Declaration has attain~d som~thing o~· the status of customary international law, so that the rig hts it contains are m some Important sense binding on states.

I , r' hf' rmore,

RIGHTS IN WORI...D

the lnternat· a] POlJTlcs 549 r •on Hu Ilave t I1e JOrce of inte rnati 11man R· h sud lg ts Covenants ona aw b are tre·1ties d that 1:- IH1Se states that have (v . • ut onl y for the P"'> +: 'h an as 1untan1y) rar f' d o .... ues to t e tr ti samC' h true of the single-issue tre t ' I lle or acc ede d to th t ea es, · . · a tes t 1at d c rea ties Th hap!-> pos si ble that the norms of th C rou n out the reg ime 's nor I .' e . . e ovenants are . . m s. t IS per custoul ary mtern ahonal law even for states that arecom mg t.o acquire the force of the funda men tal weakness of inte ti a] . not parties. But in ert·h . l b . . rna on 1 aw <.1 . . 1s er (;aSe. natwnal lega o hga hons are volunta . un ersc ore d: Virtuallv all . t , . . . 1y accepted n ' tn er1 h1s IS obv1ously the case for tre f . · . I I h a Jes. are free t0 b ent1 re y as t 1ey c oose. It is no less true th states h f ecome parties or not 0 practice and opinio ju.ris likewise assur'e t~·utg· ' c~~om, where the tests ofstate volu ntari ly acquired. In fact a state that a 1~t~ rlnationallegal obliga tion is onl y ' · exp l<:J t y reJ· ect · · f Proe;ess of custom formation is exempt e s a practic e durin~ the ven rom customary · t · obligations. Fo r example, Saudi Arabia's ob· ection to th .~ emationallegal rights of wo me n during the drafting of the UJ . . D el pro :lslons on the equal 1 mv ersa ec aration m·g l1t b h 11 1 exempt it from such a norm, even if the norm . • t . e e c to . 1 d. 5 accep ed .mte h . ma tion ri1 allv as custom a y b m mg. Sue cons1derations are particular!)' imp rt t l . ·as k what . . o an w 1en we h force t ere 1s to mternational law and what mecban ·sms .· t t · 1ement d . . 1 . eXJ s o 1mp an enforce the n ghts specifi ed m the Universal Decla ration and tl'e c . . ts. . . ove nan Accepta.nce of a~ obligation by states d~s not carry with it acceptanc e of any me thod of mternatlonal enforcement. Qlllte the contrary. Unless there is an explicit en forcement mechanism attached to the obligation, its enforc ement rests simply on th e good faith of the parties. The Universal Declaration contains no enforcemen t mechanisms of any sort. Even if we accept it as ba,ing the force of international law, its implementation is left entirely in the hands of indh~dual states. Th e Covenants do have some implem entation machinery, but the machinery's practical weakness is perhaps its most strikina feature ... . Th e on e otl1er major locus of activity in the international human rights regime is the UN Commission on Human Rights. In addition to being the bod y that played the principal role in the formulation of the Universal Declaration , the Covenants, and most of the major single-issue human rights treaties, it has some weak impleme ntation powe rs. Its public discussion of human rights situati~ns in various <.:ountries can he lp to mobilize international public opinion, whic.h ts not ~wa ys utterly useless in helping to reform national practice. For example, m the ~9.t 0s t~e Co_m. · · ro1e m · pu blic1z · ·mg the hutnan rights conditions m Chile, rnJSSion I)1aye d a maJOr . . . . , d bv reso lsrael, an d South Africa. Furthermore, 1t 1s empowere . ECOS. OC di 'd alslutiond 1503 (1970) to investigate communications (complaints) fronli~ bml "'' ut cl~ . gro ups tha t "ap pear to reveal a consistent pattern of e"ross and re a y attes e vtolations of human rig hts." hl · hemmed in bv conTh e 1503 proced ure, howeve r, is at least as_thorouhgt ) have c'Onsid ered.2 r t straints as are the other emorcemen ·~echamsms t a weproced ure deals only 150 3 1 1 Al.though individuals may communicate gnevances, t etl parti'cular cases ofindi. d ti ' . ola \Vlth "situations" of gross an systema c VI. tions ' . notal .led nent in . their particu viduals. Individuals cannot even obtain an mtem~tJOnb JU gt rights obligations of uman lar case let alone internati.onal enrrorceme nt of d1e ·aJ until ·a l .,; con fide nti' • · rocec ure rema~ 05 the ir government. Furthermore, the en tue P

1

1

550

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORlD POU TJCS

Commission does p ubl H) : 1 ~· '"blacklist" 1 1 1 casei-: con clud~d , nl th~ugh e , four cases (Equc~ton. : C1: t' • i ;"ti . Malaw i, 1 of cotllltrie · be111g stu die d. I~ ~n > . d . . ·) 1. · h Comn11sston gone P111J t·1c vvith a V5C"i• c . ' J • 1 r>st fo rcef 1 • u ,m Jug u.l) 1.l.'i l e J . ·ovo kcd by the plig ht 01 J~ ·•'' .!1 '• \Vtt nvs se~ in . e·ItiSt· n P' con 1 on " ·as a 1980 reso utw , he ho e LJ 1at all huJ,J,lrl ns th we n• be in Mala\\'i, whi ch me rely exp1.esse d t P g rc> ·pected in Malawi s dd" . · • ·. 1 b· 1hum an 1ights regi me, the re an. . r• ·!..)< ild•1 r\·gimcs. Th e 1 go cl ln a ItJO nto tlJS < ' • I d I l 0 r: . Cl t . r1~r an and Peo r)le s· R1g 1ts , rawn up >)' l w rga nizaL9 J A111 can 1ar e1 o ~U 11 .. • • b · . . . . ·cl for a Hu n an Hig hts Co mn tts<:ton 11t 1t JS not yet 1 non of Afncan U111 ty, proVI es · · 1 1 1 1 . . I E . d tbe Am eric as the re are l·ug 1 y c eve oped systems fu nct10mng. n "'urope an . . cl . . .b b · · s wit h ver v stro ng mv est1 gato ry pO\\ crs an regional rnvo 1vmg ot commJ SSIOn ' II' b. ·l. 1 .. · 1 rt . ·th the au tbo ritv to make lega y mu ng c. ccisJons on com11Um an ng 1ts cou s VVI ·; '-cl 1 · · d. · . b . a· "d I (alt hou gh onl y eig ht sta te ha, ·e accepte t "le JUns lCtion of p 1run ts y rn JVI ua s , . . the Inter-A me lican Cou rt of Human Rtghts ). . . Eve n in Europe and the Am ericas, ho~vever, 1mplem~entation and eJJ~or: ement remain primarily nationaL In nearly tJm;y years the _Eu ropean _Com mtsston of Hu man Rights has conside red only about 3.::>0 cases, whde the Eu 1 ~pe an Court of Huma n Rights has handled onl y one-fifth that n um~er. Such J:egt~n~l po,vers certainly should not be ignored or denigrated. Th ey prov1d e authontat1ve _m_terpretations in cases of genuin e disagreem ents and a pov:erful che ck on backsl id~ng and occasional deviations by states. But the real forc;e of eve n the Eu rop ean reg tme lies in the voluntary acceptance of human rights by the states in question, which has innniteJy more to do with dom estic politics than vvith inte rnational proced ures. In sum , at the international level the re are compre hensive, authoritative hum an rights norms that are widely accepted as binding on all states . Imple me nta tion and enforcement of these nonns, ho,.vever, both in theory and in practice, are left to states. The international context of national human rights practices certain ly cannot be ignored. Furthermore, international nonns may have an important socializing effect on national leaders and be use ful to national advoca tes of improved dom esti c human rights practices. But tl1e real work of impLem enting and enforc ing human rights takes plac;e at the national level. . . . Before the level of the nat ion-state is discussed, however, one final elem ent of the intemational context nee ds to be considered, namely, human rights as an issue in national foreign policies. 1

HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN POUCY Beyond the human rights related activities of states in intern ational institutions such as those discussed in the preceding section , many states have chosen to make human rights a concern in their bilateral foreign relations.3 in fact, mu ch of the surge of ~nterest in human rights in the last decade can be traced to the cat alyzing effect of President Jimmy Carter's (1977-1981) efforts to make inte rnational human rights an objective ofU.S. foreign policy. In a discussion of human rights as an issue in national foreign po licy, at least ~ree problems need to be considered. First, a nation must select a particular set of nghts to pursue. Second, the legal and moral issues raised by inte rve ntion on

HOWARD AND DONNElLY I HUMAN RIGHTS rN WORLD POLITICS

551

behall r. . nan rig.hts abroad need to b e exp1ored Thi cl h . rn ust I ,r • ·gra te d m to the nation 's broad r . · r • uman nghts concerns er JOre 1gn polic:v · . h . best • -~ I · one o rseveral fo reign pot· at b· . , • smc e um an nghts are ' : ' . . Jcy o JeC: tJve s. flw .ntcma bonal normative consen . on 11uman rights d b solves tb< proI1]em o{.the choice of a set ofsus ri hts to note a ove largely sim ilar to that of the universal D gl . pursue, for unl ess a state chooses a Ust v<: rv · ion 1·ts ft be rusmissecl as fatally Rawed by partisanec arat .d • . e orts are almost e:ertain to ·c . 1 eo1og1cal b"1as Th f" clai ms by olnctals of the Reagan admin.istrator i th . · us, or example, not really true human rights are almost un.iv;~all a~:~onomtc and social righ ts are the Ca rter adm inistration's serious attention t .y ?unced. By the same token, nomtc and :a] · h . was uJtimatcly subordinate to a concern for oc·eco .1 d .. SOCl ng ts, even if 1t tribute c1 to the inte rnational perception of its J\11 Jjan po1Jtic~ rights, greatly con. h · po cy as genum ely concerned with human ng ts, not JUSt a new rhetoric for the Col dw . . . al . . -co1oniahsm Such an intematJon· perception 1s almost a necessary conclitiar or neo al h h b · · cli · c f ont oug y su ffi c1e nt con tio n-t or an e fective international hu•nan · 1ts li no means a . · ·f ng1 po cy. A sta te IS, o cou rse , free to pur sue any obi ecti ves ·t ·h · · r · • • 1· • • J 1 w1s es m Its rore1gn po tcy. If 1t w1s hes 1ts hum an nghts policy to be taken sen·ously h th e policy . . . , owe ver , must at leas t be en unctated m terms conststent with the ·nteman·o al 1 n consensus t bat has b~e n forg~d aro und t~e Uni~ersal ~ec~aration. In practice, some rights must be g1ven parttc ula~ prommence m a nation s foreign policy, given the limited material resourc_es and mte matio?al political capital of even the most powerful stat e, but the basiC con tou rs of pohcy must be set by the Universal Declaration. After the lights to be pursued have been selected, the second problem , tha t of interve nti on on beh alf of human rights, arises. Wh en state A pursues human rights in its relations with state B, A usually will be seeking to alter the way that B treats its own citizens. Th is is, by definition, a matter essentially within the dom estic jurisdiction of B and thus outside the legitimate jurisdiction of A. 1\s action, therefore, is vulnerable to the charge of intervention, a charge that carries conside rable legal, moral , and political force in a world, such as ours, that is structu red at the international level around sovereign nation-states. Th e leg al problems raised by foreign policy action on behalf of human righ ts abr oad are probably the most troubling. Sovereignty entails the principle of nonintervention ; to say tha t A has sovereign jurisdiction over X is essentially equ ivalent to saying tha t no one else may intervene in A with respec_t to X: Becaus e sovereignty is the foundation of international law, any foreign pohc~' a~tion that ~ounts to inte rvention is prohibited by international law. On the face of It at least, tl~_pro. h1bition applies to actJ.on on behalf ofh uman n·ghts as much as anv' oth . er . acti.vttv . '. It might be suggested that we can circumvent the legal prosc~ption °~ mtth er.h b c e'e n e vention in the case of human ng ts Yreierence to particular treaties .ornal . d" sed above. lntematio . nonns general internatio nal normative consensus .1scus . . al · di. . t 1ational orgaruzations, 1et one m per se, howeve r, do not authonze even m en th E,·en if all states are . . . d ose norms. VIdual states acting m epen dent ly, t0 enforce cl . tl uru·versal Declaration. it . hts enu me rate m le 1egally bou nd to implem ent the ng . arti. ular state or group of states · · ] na1 simply does not follow, in 1ogtc or m a'v· that anyrfip tl c.free to accept inte matio is entitle d to enforce that obugation. States are pe ~c ) . eh d legal obligations that have no en £orcemen t 1nechamsms atta e ·

• • -v . . ruuJ

CONff i.fpORARY WORW POUTICS .1. • l ' tu s tiiJ leave~ J' Perfor<.'OJJ\1 d •rable room 10r tn ema. .

~rupu ICJIJ

Qu1'et

diplomac:\'. public p rt>lf'C r l • ('(} dc·JTJnatiOil<, mant'f' o f a Ioreu~u coun t 1) · • I r ' . lom~hc relatio n~ redud ng or lu. tmt£ IfJTt 1gn aid. and downgr ading or I>reaking d 1p au • _ . . · r

h · . re""tn'ctJ'oM of trade: and othf r lonns of mtc:rae:ticm arc I ~ e<:tl\.c or compr c ensn.e "" . . , .. . all actions that fall short of interve ntion. Thus m mosl c·Jr<. 'H Ls~anr ~'~ thc:y Will h ·

. 1.11 ·b halfofl1 u1nan rights abroad . Iegall "' perrm.ss J e actions on c . . . . " .~ n international legal ~rspedive on huma01tana11 llltCf"\enttoJJ , howcvt:r, dOE"S not exhaust the subject. Recently. several. au~ors haw arglJed. _strrmgl y and . )', that moral c:onsideratwn.~ > m at least some .c:Jrc:UJn~tane:c~· we bel1eve oonvJ·nc·ngl ::1 • • justify humanimrian interve:mtion on behalf of human nght~ . 1 .\.1 •c:h~t<:l \~ab·..<~ r. whose book j u4ft aruf Unju,s't War~ has pro\'oked m.ucll of ~he rtcen t rnoral dL'icu~­ sicm of humanitarian inten·ention. can be taken as iJJu~trati\'C of '> uch argumenlo;. \\'alzer pr~ts a strong defense of the morality of tl1e: gen_cr~l intr.:r:nanonal principle of nonintervention, arguing that it gives _force to_ th~ ~as1c: nght .of ~eople~ to self-determjnation, which in rum rests on the nghts of' ndJvJduals, ac:tmg m c.:oncert as a communitv. to choose their ovm go\·emment. \Valzcr hac; heen <:riticizcd ' for interpreting thjs principle in a wa~· that is excessively favorable to states by arguing that the pres umption of legitim acy f and thus agains t intervention) should hold in all but the most extreme circumstances . :\onetheless, even \Valre r allows that intervention must be permitted "when the violation of human rights is so tenible that it makes talk of (..-omm unity or self-determin ation ... see1n <:ynic:al and irrelevant,--s when gross, persistent, and 5)'Slem atic violations of human rights shock the mor-al oonS<:'ience of mankind. The idea underlying such argum ents is that human rights are of such paramount mora1 importance that gross and systematic violatio ns present a moral justification for remedial international action. If the international community as a whole ~not or wjiJ not ac:t:-a nd above we have shown that an effecti ve coUective international response will usually be impossi ble-th en one or more states may be morally justified in actir1g ad hoc on behaJf of the international community. International law and rnoraljty th us lead to different and conflic..-ti ng conclusions in at least some c.:ases. One of the fun<..tions of international poHti<:s is to help to resolve such a oonRict~ political considerations will play a substantial role in determining how a strste wiJJ respond in its foreign poJic:y to the competing moral and legal demands placed on it. But the political dimensions of such decisions point to the prac.:tical dangers by moraJ argument.c; in favor of humanitarian intervention .... Human rights may be moral concerns, but often they are not m-erely moral co~ms. Morality and realism are not necessariJy incompatible, and to treat them as 1f they al~ays ":'ere can harm not onJy a state's human rights polic.y but its br~r foreJgn pol•c..-y as weJI. ~ Someti~ a.country can afford to CK.:t on it~ human rights oonc.:em~; other times ~cannot. Politics mvolves compromise, a~ are~ll]t of multiple and not always compatible goals that are pursued and the res~taoc:e of a world that more often than not is unsu~e .ofthe J"drtic..~r objoctives heing sought. Human rights, like other goals of foreagn policy. must at times be compromised . In some instances there is little that a country can afford to do even in tOO face of major human rights violations ....

.

J\NO DONNEt• •

. u.Y / HUMAN

RIGHTs IS WOR.L.o

· n variatirm~ in the trtat POI.mcs 553 · h1u rnan riul-. ts ,.,rne;nt <Jf hum· -~ cons1· • t P()1K-y, an n• 1ts vjrjl•·•-... Fl' '-'JTl<:.trr~ nt<:d .:w.... s are to 00 rated r(J the hrcyc.ttlcr framc.·work ff' . . to be ex.plkitlvand h part. of a g . , . I f' . ' 0 0 J (::)(I n J• ; l.. • t an mtc·5! a1 part o , not Ju.st sornc."thinv tad..~· po li.y J\ human rights<X') <:rent •• ') m (:0 •'..,. cult decisions have to he ::.__.J • on to, a etmntrv's 0\'traJJ~> .c.! roust lxI

. • •Ort1gn polk.:v hu man ngh ts, ~well as other ftore·,"~<W(; . .about t}I(:: relathc wein4-.•r to be ,· 1gn po 1 J<:v ~<>a) ~ gjven to ing traclc-o ff!> need to be f(>rm 11 Jat F / .., s, and at l~st rough ml Ji mak 1 made tar!v in th e process of wor'-'nge< . urthenr1Cm::, \IJ.th
There are many opportunities for fore~gn lie · . h - r ,. . . . . b . po ;y action on behalf of human ng ts m 10re1gn c:ountries, ut effectiv e a£:tion req · the f . . wres same sort o care and attenti on reqUired for SU(;(;ess in any area of foreign poli<:y. ...

CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS This view of the creation of the indi...idual, v.ith indhidual needs for human rights, is criticiz ed by many advocates of the "cultural relativisf schooJ of human rights. They presen t the argument that human rights are a \Vestem construct with limited [universal] applicability. >'6 But cultural relathism, as applied to human rights, fails to grasp the nature of culture. A number of erroneous assumptions underlie this viewpoint. Criticism of the universaJity of human rights often stems from erroneous perceptions of the persistence of traditional societies, societies ~ ~ princip~ ~ social justice are based not on rights but on status and on th~ ~te~re of P"'1 lege and responsibility. Often anthropologically anacbrorusti<: are presented of premo dem societies, taking no account whatsoever of ~e social changes . assumed tbat culture is a static entitv. But cuJturewe have described above. It JS . . · values like the indivi dual-i s adaptive. _One can accept the pnn:pl~!: =~ and norms do indeed glue soc:1ety togethe r, and~ ey~-e a strong bold 00 assuming cultural stasis. Even though elements~ ~:midualsareactors"'-bo people's individual pwcbes, cultures can and do c ge: . . . ~the ~' . ge of chot<:e as • can influence their own fate, even if therr ran prevaJent social structure, culture, or ideology. that culture is a unitarY ad Cultural relativist argume~ts also ?ften=:alw ays be, a part_of ~~ne­ unique whole· that is that one IS bom mto, u1~~• - 'ues and indihJtiOdS that . , ' . ated t of c runu \111 tive, comprehensive, and mtegr se

pictlln:s

- · ' ••VM J\ND rrL--

···'J , or onh· in part. mce m :~· !· re the soc;a) ,.. t 11 1 l t j-... l'·h:utCTet I mere men raJ ' • • 1 "' v"" ' .~ .. ' dhu manright s mmt\:!~"Y J.u nonm ofea ch uome and rolts \'arv, so. tt IS argue · . . h· ec. . Id ,_·~ both -aJuabie in and of thc1r own ng ' ana ·() nnn 1y rooted $0l'lt >h an• 11e to ~ \ • .. J· bl 1v to · . . 1 1 1 Ther efore such argu m( Jl " a, l ·t p 1c.:a e on 1 a.s to be.~ 1mnt> n.1ous to c la enge. ~ I. . . •·. . . t · pose them on othe r socie l1e.., tron t w ll(;11 they"did C'e rtrun \\ estem octebes. o un · }· .. all · uld d sen·o us and irreparable datn a~e h1 t •ose cultures. In not onmn· \' anse wo o . 1 r tl ~ I · 1 ·t .act 1oug 1. peop e are qw e adept cul tural accommodatdwmsts.dt 1eyh-are able to · L : h ts f a "new" culture thev "'ish to a opt an w 1Ch aspects C boose WJUC aspec 0 ' 1 • of the -old r they wish to retain. For example, the marabouts. pncs ~ ).' wh? lead Senegal's traditi~naJ Musum broth erhoods, have become leading pobti<.:al figur es and ha,·e acquired considerable wealth and power t~~ough the p~anut trade. . Still another assumption of the cultural relabvtsm school IS that ~u l~u:e 15 un.aft cted bv social structure. But structure does affect culture. To a stgntficant ~'ten; cuJtur~ and values reflect the basic economic and pouticaJ organization of a · e.J. ...... For example , a socie tv SOCl , such as Toku gawa Japan that mo,·, es from a feudal struchJre to an organized bureaucratic state is bo~ nd to e~e nencc ch~n ges in ,-aJues. Or the amalgamation of many different ethru c groups m to one nat1on-state inevitably changes the way that individuals view themsel~(es: F ~r exam ple, ~late ­ sponsored retention of ethnic custo ms, as unde r Canadas rnulticuJ turaJ poltcy ~f presef\ing ethnic communities, cannot mask ilie fact that most of those commuruties are merging into the larger Canadian society. A final assumption of the c:ulturaJ relativist "iew of hum an rights is that c.:ultu raJ practices are neutral in their impact on different individuals and groups. Yet very few social practices, whether cultural or othe rwise, distribute the same bene fits to each member of a group. In considering any cultural practice it is usefuJ to ask, who bene fits from its retention? Those who speak for the group are usually those most capable of articulating the groups values to the outside world. But such spokesmen are likely to stress, in their articulation of "group" values, those particular valu es that are most to their own advantage. Both iliose who choose to adopt "ne\\~' ideals, such as poUtical democracy or atheism. and those who choose to retain "old" ideals, such as a God-fearing political consensus, may be doing so in their own interests. Culture is both influenced by, and an instrument of, conflict among individuals or social groups. Just as those who attempt to modify or change c~toms may have personaJ interests in so doing. so also do those who attempt to preserve them . Quite often , relativist arguments are adopted principally to proteet the interests of those in f>O'"Ver. Thus the notio n that human rights cannot be applied across cultures violates both the prioc1ple of human rights and its practice. Human rights mean precisely that: rights held by virtue of being human. Human rights do not mean human dignily*'nor do they represent the sum of personal resources (material, moral, or spiritual) that an individual might hold Cultural variances that do not violate basic human rights undoubtedly enrich the world But to permit the interests of the powerful to masquerade behind spurious defenses of cultural relativity is merely to lessen the <--bance that the victims of their polides will be abJe to com plain . In the DIOde•~ wodd. concepts such as <..'Ultural relativity, which deny to individuals the MDOral right to make oomparisons and to insist on universal standards of right and WJOOg, are happily adopted by those who rontrol the state. .

I

I

•

THJR ~J vVO RLO CRITICISMS

In ret

'VVFl l::,

fN·WOR.IJ> P0t.mcs

vca rs a number of r.r..110 · "''"' mentators f ..L the cor ttpl of univ trsal human rirrl.•-· F rorn u te Third \\orld hat~ c: :i...---a ' 'H"·s. rer1u<:ntly th . :nu<: UCI,I appearo., to he to exempt S<Jrne Thir d World a : c tntc--ntiurJ c,{ thf: <:rlti<.isJM t generated by the c.:onccpt f . cO\cTTimtnts from the st.sra·l. -rl f J·udgmc'n . . . uar1 o cism m fact: serves to cove r ab 1 .~..5 ofo ! um\·e r~ hurnan nghts . \1uch of .t..- ......a. ~ tu man rights b, uae '""'"' ~ mental dicta torship, or allegedly "so<.ial' .,. . /stat e c:orpor::.ti~ df:\.·ek;n.. . . . l5l reg~mts ·r A c;om mon cntlc:tsm of the <:on<:<..>nt of . . · · · · · umvt n ·......... · ,~.,._. \Vestern 1n ongm , 1t must be limited ... in its, li rsaJ ., b'lihuma . nouu as u la{ sirl(:e it is 1 logically anc.l empirically. this <:ritic.isrn is~~~ t} to the \~~t ern workl.Both applicability to its place or people of Origi n J =ie dge lS not limited in its that medicines disC;Overed in the devel oped~ne . not as~ume, for eump~~ of E uropean origin. ~or is it reasonable to ~t ::""~_;·vdl cure only ptopl~ certain kind -ab out social arrangements instead of abo• h edge bor thought of a · · 1·1m1te · d · lace uman iology or naturaJ sc1enc e-•s to 1ts p of origin. -ntOSe same!lt Third World .tics t reject universal conc.:epts of human rights often happily accept .\f~ . en lO which also origi nate d in th~ W~ern_\\:orld , in the nrind of a Germ=.,.,.~ m, The fact that human nghts IS ongmally a liberal notion, rooted in the rise of a class of bo~rgeois <.1~~ in Europe who demanded indhiduaJ rights against tbe power of kings and nobthty, does not make human rights inappli~ble to the rest of the world. As we argu e above, all over the world there are (10';.\' formal states. ~o~r-bose citizens are incre asingly individualized. All over the world, therefore. there are people who need prote<.tions against the depradations of class-ruled governments. Moreove r, whatever the Hberal origins of human rights, the list now accepted as universal indu des a wide range of economic and soc.ial rights that were first adv
t{

:i.al:

to•

Too'*':'

IIVYVMNJ

- ~6 ,:).)

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTICS

· . d lt•e in tlwi r '1\\ r •l'l'' · ;'11 ··1tston rs are d I' 1 . uo lll an nguage I . k tIwrr own a T> )'t'c.:·tl Hiahtc;. ludr\i. · 1..: tn· ret' to l . ' . rdi~ion, spcu n C:rv:rJ anc .[ o I r • . , . . h cultural r>rat 1er rn group~ · ' n 1 1 d o ten a gr ' r . e···~ntJJI~ that t •ll' i11Uh J
'St IJ"c·tuse of tlrl' dt ·~it · · of tiH· larcrer . k individual i .su .ortJ rnate o ~ • arre. s rrs rion U t . S fu ndarne ntaltst rn 1e OVJe r · J •· · · 11 .. official atJ1eism. ··~·o p .. to e1rrorce H' term ~roup ng lts IS 10 • •1grc: f(Jr t 1 vi ll ' Hi er u<>e that we can cnVJ < I1 IJ , hunter-cralherers. pao;toralist s, <1r srrhsistenc:e T ~ one co~pe ~o 1protection of natrve pcop es. usu~ { . . . ll ctidtics arc lwing 'iolatcd by th e rhose }Jropertv ngLlts as c: o . It al' ·t a hattle are flgh tinv ' agncu ur· IS s,.· "ti that encroach M upon t11em. Suc.:·h ~crr<>llfJ!> )· · · · algcr !>tate socle ~Js. d ·- a·o11 and the state's ~:u.:curnulat iv<' tendencies. For cl 1 • agajnst the forces o mo crnlza · c ana,da began . pcop 1es rn • · natJVe · h 1 eve1op· toQstate . • in the J970s to obJed ex«:tmple uc 111 '· . Jec, w. 1rc . . sue 11 as tl1e J·,unes Ba)' I-f,vdroelectric pro1ect men t proJe<:ts there IS no r11ternattOnaJ a11ands . '!\t tJ1e. moment, · d t11el11' 0 f t 1Jet·r t.I ad·t·o depnve f)'(' " ·• I J I1 . . ~ . human rights protection for such gro~ ps or the1 r way o. J. e · .. One way to prote<.:t such group nghts would be to 1 ncorpor~l.e th e group as a legal entity in order to preserve ilieir land claims. However, ~v~n .d the law~Jrotects such group rights, individual members of ilie group .ma?' pr e.fe1 ~~ move mto the larger society in respon e to the processes of modem1Zat10n discussed above. Both . opinions must be protected. If the purpose of group rights is to protect large: ~stablished groups of people who share the same territory, customs, language, religiOn, and ancestry, then such protection eould only occu; at the e.xpense of states' rights. These groups, under international hu man rights law, do not have d1e right to withdraw from the states that enfold them. M oreover, it is clearly not the intention of Third World defenders of group rights to allow sucb a right to secession. A first principle of the Organization of African Unity, for example, is to preserve the sovereignty of all its member tates not only against outside attack but also against internal attempts at secession. Group rights appear to mean, in practice, states, rights. But the rights of states are the rights of the individuals and classes who control the state. Many Third World and socialist regimes also argue that lights ought to be tied to duties. A citizen's rights, it is argued, ought to be contingent upon his duties toward the society at large-privilege is contingent on responsibility. Such a view of rights made sense in nonstate societies in which each "person" fulfilled his roles along with others, aJJ of the roles togetl1er creating a close-knit, tradition-bou nd group. But in modern state societies, to tie rights to duties is to risk the former's complete disappearance. All duties .._vi.l] be aimed toward the preservation of the state and of the interests of those who control it. It is true that no human rights are absolute; even in societies that adhere in p_rinci?le to ~he libe.raJ ethos, individuals are frequently deprived of righ ts, espe~ially m w~~e or 1f they are convicted of criminal acts. However, such deprivations ~. legt~mately be made only after the most scrupulous protection of civil ~d political_ nghts u~der the rule of law. The difficulty with tying rights to duties With?ut _the mtennediate step of scrutiny by a genuinely independent juiliciary is the likelihood of wholesale cancellation of rights by the ruling class. But if one has

f\NU DONNELLY I

.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN WORLD POuncs dr

557

,.;ghts "' r. ly because one is human a h • n 10r no othe · . 1 r " r reason, t en it is much more pnncl p e, ror the state to cane 1th difficu l: rights h 1ying that only certain types of~ em. It.can not legitimate the denial of uman bemgs, exh ibiting certain kinds of behavior ;1r<.· entitled to them. al h One> fi 11al critidsm of the view of un· rvers uman 'ghts bed . h . em ded in the Inter.~ national CO'-·cnants 1s t at an undue stress . 1 .cl ''tical n'gh ts, whereas lS at on CJvd and . . in the Third ,11 . hts pnonty . l'mg ng pou Id . the ovem<. th vvor IS ec:ono . . h I f is view, the In ts. ng mrc h state as t re agent o economic: development-and distribution of economic goods or "rights" to the m;nce, presumably, of eventual with problems of guaranteeing political parti .· . .ses-~h.ould not be bothered tecting people's basic: civil rights. These righ~~p~ti?n m deciSIOn making, or of pro1 t IS argued, come "after" develop. h, s t ~ ment is completed. The empirical basis · . b is. weak· · · · Econom1c development per se w1')1not guarantee futurer h IS argument or any other kind. Often, development means ~~an n~ ts, whehther of an economic equibut without gro\vt conomJc · measures. Moreover, development . t f ' . 'tr table <listn·b utive 1 , · · t' t · 11 d o en fat! because of insuffi c1en t at en ton to cthzens needs and views F's ategJes ma y, eve1opment plans are . rights . . . . th 1: • r b th ]· las citizens' of often
0

NOTES 1. The Internatjonal Bill of Human Rights includes the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), the International Covenant on Chil and Political Rights (1966}. and the Optional Protocol to the latter Covenant. 2. Howard Tolley, "The Conceal.ed Crack in the Citadel: The United Nations Commission on Human Rights' Response to Confidential Communications,~ Human Rights Quar. ., . . terly 6 (November 1984): 420-62. 3. This section draws heavily on Jack Donnelly, "Human Rrghts a~d ~orergn Pou:r, World Politics 34 (Jul 1982): 574-95, and "Humau Rights, Humanrtanan lnterve~tion ]'tv an d Polih'cs•.. joumol or .Y Policy: Law, Mora.r, 'J lntematumal and American Fore1gn d Human . ti ". . Affai.rs 37 (Winter 1984): 311-28. an \ onrntenen d Tem'' Narrun: j. Sl R Beitz.on.. Noninterven4. See, rtOr examp1e, Jerome ater an 1 . . 9 (Summer 1980): Rights," joumal of Politics 48 (February 1986): ~d96.bcl.~ar~~ hy on Pu re ·''JJ01rs • ., PI ·1 .1 · ~Human Rights and Foreign Poucy: tion and Communat Integnty, 11 osop 385-91; and Robert Matiliews and Cranford ~ratt, ~-J ; f\(av 1985): 159-88. .. · ' d C ,.~ , p ti " Hu nwn Rrohtsk:Quo~ny . . I Pnnc1p B· . Books 19/.), p. 90. For cnti· o es an anawan rac · ce, . -; ' ..~oninter\'ention . t \11Yars (New Yor . asrc. - Beitz. . hael Walzer just an d UnJUS 5. MJC Affi . 9 . d N d' u:'\onintervention : ' cisms of Walzer see Slater an 1 ar t.ll, ; . State .. Philosqphy and Public au~ ' and David Luban, ''The Romance of ilie Nation Ri hts: A\\'estem Concept wi th Li.nu'ted .• (Summer 1980): 392-97. 6. Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, Humanan~ Ideological Perspet'lice~. Pollis and Applicability," in Human Rights: ~ulturall-IB. Schwa!.>, ed. (New York: Praeger, 19t9), PP·

NAiM 1 nu: FIVE W

ARs OF GLOBAUZATION

The pjve wars ofGlobalizatior? MOISES NAfM

-

~S9 d soldiers diplomats, an cl economists b w o un erstand h ow to use in•·.. l .. . regu lal!onc.; to stc::er markets away from b d ""'n "e~ and . out soc1al a . th d comes. But c:hanltin et of gc)V(•rn tn f' nt comhatants alone w'IJ 1_. S . r:.· g eA sKiH , t not en th . . ·. · ese \\ ars. Thetr doctrinel> and instJtntwns also need a maJor overhaul.

THE FIVE WARS

The pcrsistcncl' of al Qnt'da underscores how h:mJ it is f~>r govem ntr11ts to stamp 011l stat c•less, d<.·<·<·nlralized networks that move frL'ely, <[tHc·kly, and stealt·hily across tl
°

. From Mois~$ Nafm, "Fiv<' Wars of Globalization ~ f, . orrngn Poltcy, No. 1:34 (january/Fehrutuy 2003). / PP· 29-36. © 2002 by the Carneaie E· ·' nuowmrnt JOr lntemat•1onaI peacc. HcplinteJ with per111ission. b' •

558

d Pick up Hll)' newspaper anywhere in the world about illegal migrants, drug busts smuggled, ' any lay, and you will find news veapons aunde d • ·' . re money, or c:ounterfeil goods. The global nature of these five wa d rs was ummaoin bl · ago. The reso urces-financial, human, instjtutional technok; .a e JUSt a ecade the combata~ts. have reached unfathomable order~ of ma J~~;-deployed by · So have the b gglg numbers of v1chms. The tactics and tricks of both s·d 1 y t 1·f mind 1e 1 et o es · · . · e you cut through th e fog of daily headlines and orchestrated h t P o o ops, one mescapable , 1 ld I henomea qual·t ti 1 trut 1 eme rges: T 1e wor .s governments are fighting p new y ve a 1 · .I inefficient bureaucrati. c arrangements non w1t 1 obsolete tools, . madequate laws • . fT . and me. rechve strateg1es. Not surprisingly' the evidence sho,vs that governments' are Iosmg.

Drugs The best known of the five wars is, of course, the war on drugs. In 1999, the United Na~ions' ".H.uman Developme.nt Report" calculated the annual trade in illicit drugs at $400 bilbon, roughly the siZe of the Spanish economy and about 8 percent of world trade. Many countries are reporting an increase in drug use. Feeding this habit is a global supply chain that uses everything from passenger jets that can carry shipments of cocaine worth $500 million in a single trip to custom-built submarines that ply tl1e vvaters benveen Colombia and Puerto Rico. To fotl eavesdroppers, drug sm ugglers use "cloned" cell phones and broadband radio receivers while also relying on complex financial stmctures that blend legitimate and illegitimate ente1prises with elaborate fronts and structures of cross-ownership. The Uni ted States spends between $35 billion and $40 billion each year on the war on drugs; most of this money is spent on interdiction :and intellige~ce. But ~e creativity and boldness of drug cartels has routinely outstripped steady.mcreases m governmen t resources. Responding to tighter security at the U.S.-MeXJcan ?order, drug smugglers built a tunnel to move tons of drugs and billions of dollars m cas~ 0 until authorities discovered it in March 2002. CA·er tlte last decade.' the,su~!ed dicatinu coca plantations 1as sum . tJ1e Bolivian and Peruvian governments m era b. . dis la · o Plan Colom ta IS p cmg coca rted S t . Desp1·te the heroic production to Colombia. Now, the U· .-suppo nes. coun Andean tb 0 k ·aJ d technical support of procl uction and processing la bs bac' to er 6 efforts of these Andean countries and the massi'~e o~tcr .an Peru Colombia. and ' 1 to 910 939 in the United States the total acreage of coca P antatihons m . 11gg • • 206 200 ectares 11 f ' . .. ' . ·t Jeff DeSimone. the median BoliVIa has increased m the last decade rom 0 15 2001. Be tween 1990 and 2000, according to ~"u r m $!52 to SI12.... . the Uru'ted States Ie .ro . ll1 . o f a gram of cocame pnce

1

NAlM 1 THE FlV

560

PAR1 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POLITICS

E WARs OF GLOBAUZATION

561

50 pt r )t or medical drugs in 1\ igeria cl . · 1· · d, to consum~-_.r prod an Thalland 1)OOt1eg copies T·h· are [)rob I• •l• JS no ~· . 1m1te . . . "' ucts: Italian . k , . · J\ \.\'orn 'hal the11 $2 b1lhon a year exnort k . ma ers of mdustrial valves . IJ . Id T mar et IS eroded b . valves o;o m wor . markets at pri<:es that Y count erfeit Chinese 40 Tlw rlrive rs of this bootler~tring bo are percent <:heaper. om are c:ornp\ . -~ h boosting both the:: dema nd andoo·the suppl f. ex. ec nology is obviously 11 Y o 1 cgallv . · d . Napsl er. the now defunct Internet company that all <:Ople p10ducts. Users of download and reproduce copyrighted music for free ~wed anyone, anywhere to in just one year. Some 500,000 film files are trade~ew _from zero to 20 miiHon services such
Arms Trafficking 1 . [ 1 J99l' tltt~ Pvl'tl\ ~, 11 Hli •1an r)arad tulet"l I . .. d . I twret. teJ. r • • :~ . 0 Or ug~ . 111 .mm o ten ~ 1 F> ilh gro • ' ..J. he Re\'oJutiomuy :\ nncc1 L-rorce~ o,r Co ' o11rb.•t. , t'llt>rr ~ • up 10.000 "" ~ /!)tot dt ·s Thl' gro''l) }JIII<.:ha,Pcl tJ r,. -.veal)Ons in ·l ·,I . 11' d l 0 drug growe rs an '..tt 1.,.,·ker '"-· • · . c; osc. ~ il re ' II .11.0 11 AK-•:17c; itt drculatiort toda\ <~re 111 the wrong eh 1 Most of the roug 1 \ 80 mt I Jor ·' · · _1, U ·.t,d ·•tion . onh' V) million (m .tl'n'!•t > pl'rce nt) ol'the kmds. Accor wng to t 11e nl t · " • ' . . d . •J b . . J• -'J d ,. I t ree:tiJ01 1S in Cl t'L'lll
~ ' . n '' d d erate" more than $ I brlhon a yea r. Small arms helped tot·tI smau arms tra e an gen ., . . ' 1 f 1 49 1 arges t col1A1·cts of the· last fiue 46 o t 1e · decade and 111 2001. were estim . . ated to lJe responsJ'bl.e f'or. 1,()00 cle·lt] ' 1s a da)'', more than 80 percent o1 tho. e vtcti rns were wome n and children. . .. Smail ann are just a small prut of the probl em. The rllcge:~ marke ~ for mun1tions s that. detect Stealth arrcraft, and the eJ1C001pa5SeS t0p-Of.-the-)J·ne tanks' 1·adar , svstem I , . • . . makings of the deadliest weapons of mass destruct1on. 1 he ln~er natiOnal Atorntc Energy Agency hac; confirmed more than a dozen cases of smuggled n.uclea~­ weapons-usable material, and hundreds more cases have been reporte~ and_ mvestigated over the last decade. The actual supply of ~tole11 nuclear-, bJOlog1cal-, ?r chemical-weapons matelials and technology may still be smaU. But the poter~tial demand is strong and growing from both wouJd-be nuclear powe rs and terronsts. Constrained supply ru1d increasing demand cause prices to Jise and create enormous incentives for illegal activities. More than one fifth of the 120,000 worke rs in Russia's former "nuclear cities"-whe re more than half of alJ employees earn less thru1 $50 a mont h-say they would be wiiJing to work in the military complex of anoth er country. Gove rnmen ts have been largely ineffective in cu rbing eithe r supply or demand .... Mul ti lateral efforts to cw·b the man ufacture and clistJi bution of weapons are faltering, not least because some powers are unwiJJing to accep t curbs on thei r own activities. In 2001, for exam ple, the Unite d States blocked a legall y bindi ng gJobaJ treaty to control small arms i.n part because it worried abou t restrictions on its own citizens' rights to own guns. In the absence of effective international legislation and enforcement, the laws of economics dictate the sale of more weapons at cheaper prices: In 1986, an AK-47 in Ko]owa, Kenya, cost 15 cows. Today, it costs just four.

Intellectual Property In 2001, two days after recording the voice track of a movie in Hollywood, actor Denn is Hopper was in Shanghai where a street vendo r sold hi m an excellent pirated copy of the movie with his voice already on it. "I don't know how they got my v~ice i~to the c~u.n~ry before I got here," he wondered. Hopper's experience is one tiny shce of an rllJCtt trade that cost the Unite d States an estim ated $9.4 bill ion in 2001. The piracy rate of busin ess software in Japan and France is 40 perce nt, in Greece and South Korea it is about 60 percent, and in Germ any and Britain it hovers around 30 percent. Forty percent of Procter & Gam ble sham poos and 60 percent of Honda motorbikes sold in China in 2001 were pirate d. Up to

'l

Alien Smuggling The man or woman who sells a bogus Hennes scarf or a Rolex watch in the streets of Milan is likely to be an illeual alien. Just as likely, he or she was transported 0 r netwo rk that across several contin ents by a tra.~.cc.ucki ng network alJied " 1'th anothe . . . g, manu f: t · and distributmcr of high-end, specializes in the illegal cop)'ln ac unng, brand -name produ cts. . . d. dinu to the United Alie n smugglina is a $7 billion a year enterpnse an a~r Ro hl , .. 000 b . b · f organized cnme. oug ) ~00' 0 Nations is the fast est growmg usmess ab t the same number as illepeople enter the United States illegally each >:e:~ ou . nateh- 150 million who gally enter the European Union, and part 0 f the apbprokXldloor traveJers are volun. . f . . 1Many o ese ac hve outside their coun tnes o ongm. . , the to .dollar fee for passage.from 000 tary migra nts who pay smu~lers up to $3S;u ncked-tKat is, bought an~ sold mterChin a to New York. Othe rs, mstead, are tr . a1 Research Sen1ce reckons natio naU)'-as comm odities. The U.S. C~ngressioln are trafficked across borders. · · 12 011·ruon peop e .. · that each year between 1 millio n ane ·Id A woman can be bought... m the majo rity of whom are women. and c1u ren.

1

NAiM I THE FlVE WARs OF Gl..OBAUZATION 56:l

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTICS

• . 1uuisoara, H 01nam:t.

r

e--o..tn cl ·S20fl and •'r

,uJc:· 'I ·,, I ·r•: Eu rope . The UniteJ ~ations CI JiJdrt. ll s I IIIIJ ··~l •. I I ·:, ll ml c:ross-

r 10r

1

>etwecn ·}b

tl ( . ()r .I 11111('5 ,'a r.nc..:ct•. t I J1d \l1e terJ' Af'Jic:a pmlaw 200.001) . Jlldrt•Jl u )'Car l)()ruer -;mug{{ er~ 1n .en ra a v' • ' •. . • . • ·r · 11 v 1c ntp1 ' 'l'c..:tims \vith J·ob olfN'i c>r 111 the·<· .·< of ( },tldrcn,. w1th , ra ffi1cker<, ·1111-1Ja · rrcrs <> f at1op110n · •.111 w.;:· "aJtJ11·cr countr1·es 0 11 -- • and then kec·jJ th<', \ tc 11111' 111 st~ bscrv•enc:e through physical vioJenC:~, debt bondag~. pilS~J~Orl f'Oilfl \C',t!J< II l
arrest, deportation, or violence against the1r fau11l1es l~ac:k ~Will~ · Government evcrywlwrc are enacting tougher Jl111nJg.r~tl tou la\~s und devoting more lime, monc~y. and technology to fight the fl ow ol dl<:~al aiJ<~~ls. ~ut the plight of t1 1c United Kingdom 's government illustratr·s how tough that f1gl, t 1s. Tl1e British government throws money at the problem, pla~1:-. lo use the Hc~yal J avy and Royal Air Force to intercept iiJegal immjhrrants, and 1111pu,~es larg<; fmes on truck drivers who (generally 11 nwittingly) transport stowaways. Stdl, 42,000 of the .50,000 refugees who have passed through the Sangatte c~111 1p (a main entry point fo r illegal i111 migration to the Un ited Kingdom) over the last three years have made it to Britain. At current rates, it will take 4:3 years for Britain to clear its asylum backlog. And that country is an island. Continental nations such as Spain, Italy, or the United States face an even greater challenge as immigration pressmes overwhelm their abil ity to control the inflow of illegal a.Jjens. Money Laundering

The Cayman Islands has a population of36,000. It also has more than 2,200 mutual funds, 500 insurance companies, 60,000 businesses, and 600 banks and trust companies with almost $800 billion in assets. Not surprisingly, it figures prominently in any discussion of money laundering. So does the United States, several of whose major banks have been caught up in investigations of money laundering, tax evasion, and fraud. Few, if any, countries can claim to be free of the practi<:e of helping jndividuaJs and companies hide funds from govern ments, credi tors, business partners, or even family members, including the proceeds of tax evasion, gambling, and other crimes. Estimates of the volume of global money laundering range between 2 and .5 percent of the world's annual gross national product, or between $800 billion and $2 trillion. Smuggling money, gold coins, and other valuables is an ancient trade. Yet in the last two decades, new political and economic trends coincided with technological changes to make this ancient trade easier, cheaper, and less risky. Political changes led to the deregulation of financial markets that now faciHtate cross-border money ~ans~ers, .~cl. technological changes made distance less of a factor and money less phystcal. SUJtcases full of banknotes are still a key tool for money launderers, but computers, the Internet, and complex financial schemes that combine legal and illegal practices and institutions are more common. The sophistitation of technology, the complex web of financial institutions that crisscross the globe and the ease with which "dirty" funds can be eJec-on·call · to ]egatJmate · · ' assets ma ke t11e . . ;u I y morp)1ed m ~egul.ation of international_flows of money a daunting task. In Russia, for example, it 1 ~ es~a~ed ~ha~ by the rntd-1990s organized crime groups had set up 700 legal and financial mstituttons to launder their money.

563

F::wt'd with thL<; growing tide governm t h . ' en s ave st d . h · eppe up the1r efforts to ClatTlJ? do\\ n cm rogue mtemational banking t • ax avens ar1<.1 . I 1 e inu ninent, argc-scale introduction of e-m ' money aundering. Th oney-cards . h . an store· large a1 nounts of money and thus can b il Wit m1<:rochips that C ' · e eas y transport d 'd channel<. or <,imply exchanged among individuals-will onJ ~ ou~1 e regular Ymagn1fy thlS challenge.

WHY GOVERNMENTS CAN'T WIN The fundamen tal changes that have ~ven the five wa . . . l o· rs new mtens1ty Ovt! th 1 decade are hke y to persist. Technoloav will continue t _1 • _1 r e ast . I h bl o; o spreau W!ue1v· c:rim'nal 1 net\.vorks wd e a e to exploit these technolouies more q · ·kl th '' · h b d er me: Y that must cope Wit· h t1g t u gets, bureaucracies media se ti an dgovernments · 1 · to grow providing ' mo ·e ,ru ny,r an he1ectorates Intern atJOna trad e w1·ucontmue . · 1 cover ror t e expans1 . . ,. , . . . '. . on of ilJJclt trade. International m1grat1on will hkewise grow W!.th ·h th tl . 11 ' muc e same effect, o Len ng e 1mca y based gangs an ever growing supply of recruits and victi ms. The spre~d ?f d_em?cracy may also help criminal cartels, which can manipula~e w~ak publ1c mshtuti~ns. by co~rupting police officers or tempting politicians w1th offers of cash fo r the1r mcreasmgly expensive election campaigns. And ironically, even the spread of international law- with its growing web of embargoes, sanctions, and conventions-will offer criminals new opportunities for providing forbidden goods to those on the wrong side of the international communitv. These changes may affect each of the five wars in different ways. but these confl icts will continue to share four common characteristics:

.

rr .

They are not bound by geography. Some forms of crime have always had an international component: The Mafia was bom in Sicily and exported to the UnHed States, and smuggling has always been by definition international. But ~1e five wars are tmly global. \Vhere is the theater or front line of the war on drugs_. Is it Colom bia or Miami ? Myanmar (Burrna) or Milan? Where are the battles agamst money launderers being fought? In Nauru or in London? Is China the main theater in the war against the infringement of intelJectual property, or are the trenches of that war on the Internet?

· AI Qaeda's members They def.y traditional notions ofsovere1gnty. trul have pass:1! th b t the)· are v state1ess. often more an one u ·rth . Ports and nationalities-and . . . Tl ame is also tme o e en mTheir allegiance is to then· cause, not to any nation. hte ~ , . . tentlv not true of inaJ networks engaged in the five wars. The same. O\\ e, er, ~~ ~:dge~-who fight government employees-police officers, customs ay,ents, ·eanmments Wllcring these . . lin disad'" cllltage ror go~ "'b-tllem. Thjs asymmetry IS a cnpp g . h nbatants on one side of the wars. Highly paid, hypermotivated, and r~:::e :~·antage of national borders. wars (the criminal gangs) C.'ln seek refuge m t ) ., ·e fewer resourc:es and are 1la' 'd {th govemmen s . but combatants of the otI1er SI e e r senior CIA offic1al reported . . al . f 50 . rereigntv. A ronner , ,.w._ hampered by tradition notions o ' ' le mone,·. and weapons olVV that international criminal gangs are able todmo}v~ peo'Tlp ag.enc:v let alone worldwide. insi e us O\\ .,, ally faster than he can move resources

NAiM I THE FIVE WARs OF 564

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTICS

difli: rcnt

• CT 'llll()Jlll (1()\'( rtllll t'llt } • • , r- ..., ' 13Jllll" s inlonn;dwn and Coordination .·. lh· d . especta · · t.'l'tc.·mh• ·t l l. t l " ' lac. lie-; f~tll • . ·tflt•r cou11tries has ccrt:linh 1mpr0\·e ' nook and I'i tltall' .11 t":\},1 11 bat agt·1e o.nr·tniz·ttiOI 1 • J . . ... ~· m eo to net'dcc i what short of l,l\\ .tnd utnltilateral r t l>odr of mlt'11kllJOJt · . 1)Ut 1n1penec . cranny of· an evoiVJng treaties.

r

I

Th ey pit govemmenfs against market Jo t·ces: l11 c>.~th of tltc' fhc· wa':~• one or more government bureanc:racie fight to c:onl
action of thousands of independent. statelcs~ orgamL:tl.IOib. fl.ll''\C' .~I'OllpS are motivated by lar~t.' profit obtained b~ exvloiting intemattonaly nce dd ferc>ntials. an unsatisfied demand. or the eo t ad\·antage!> produced hy theft. rlourl~ wae;es for a Chinese cook are f~u· hivher in Manhattan than in F11jian. A gram of cocaine in Kansas City is J 7,000 percent more expen. ive than i~t Bogot<'i. Fake Italian ,·alves are 40 percent cheaper because counterfeiters don t have to cover the costs of developing the product. A well-funded guerrilla group ·.vill pay anyt hing to get the weapons it needs. In each of these five wars, the incentives to successfully overcome govern ment-imposed limits to trade are imply enormous. They pit bureaucracies against netwot·ks. The S
RETHINKING THE PROBLEM Gove~ents ~ay never be able to completely eradicate the kind of international

tradermvolved m the five wars· Bu t th ey can ancl should do better. There are at least 10ur areas where efforts can · Id b etter 1'cleas on how to tackle the oroblems )'le r posed by these wars:

GLOBAUZA

56.'l JlON V. lop more flexible not' . . ron~ of sov h . ererg11ty. Cove rec:og u. • t at restricting the scope of 1 rnments n d mu tilateral . . fi · s k f ec to the for action . Th thci r ·•l rr>te;nty tS o ten a moot point a e o prot ...: · et r sove · b t't;ung . compro is retgnty b h k b) nal!(• •-states ut y stateless netw suit of tr;.trle. In Mav 1999 fo r examolr s that break laws and cro srrubose:dd chuly. Mt r er:; in p P e, t e Vene 1 ' . / . · 'JC· zue an governrncnt d . plane~ nut11onzation to Ay over Ven 1 monh used by narcotraffickers Veneezz.uelan territory to monitor air rot:ntted U.s

u es corn I ue an autho 'f .. b I · · im n tes P a<;ed more on thL' sym o ic value of asserting sov . portant;f' I ere1gnty over ai • I ~fi k r s~ace t 1an on the fact tl · drug tral c ·ers p anes regularly violate V< •at \\' ternt enezuelan .. d · ·f new~ or>'- ithout of cocl1 ~rmg an managing" sovereigntv orm" . • , governments will . c.: I COntinue to fac.-e a 1arge disad \·antage w 111e nghting the five wars. J

' Strengthen existing multilateral t'ns t z't ut tons Th 10 bal nature of the~ eg . · · .t of regardless ment govern no wars means .. 1 s econom1c poJ·ti ' 1 ·al ·. c ,or mthtarvpower w'iil make much progress acting alone Ifth · . ' 11 d · IS seems o1wtous tlle · . ' n w Y oes lnterPol, the mu Itilateral agency in charge of fight·mg .mtemational h c· aJ b d nme. ave a staff of 384, only 112 of whom are pouce officers a11d a . n an nu u get of Sv8 'll' I ' . - rnt IOn, ess dru t affick·ers"'" S1mil than the price of some boats or planes used bi\· l E ru ; 0 Europe's Interpol equivalent, has a staff of240 ru1d b dg f. _ ~r~. uropoL a u et o $.jl million 0 ne reason Interpol is poorly funded and staffed . b · . ts ecause 1ts 181 member cl , . 'ghtl governments on t trust each other. Manv assume' and perhaps nu v so that the ' . k . . al . , cnmm, netvvor s they are fighting have r)enetrated th e police clepartrnents of . . · , h ot er countnes an d that shanng mformation with such compromised officials not be prudent.. Others fear today' would . s allies will become tomo rrows' enem1·es. . Still others face legal1mperuments to sharing intelligence with fellow nation-states or have intelligence se1~ces and law enforcement agencies \\ith organizational cultu r~s that mak~ effective collaboration almost impossible. Progress will only be made tf the world s governments unite behind stronger, more effective multilateral organization s.

Devi.~i;e new mechanisms and institutions.

These five wars stretch and even render obsolete many of tJ1e existing institutions, legal frameworks, military doctrines, weapons systems, and law enforcement techniques on which governments have relied for years. Analysts need to retl1ink the c:oncept of war "fronts .. defined by geography and the definition of"combatants" according to tl1e Genev·a Convention. The functions of intelligence agents, soldiers, police officers, customs agents. or immigration officers need rethinking and adaptation to the new realities. Po~cy­ makers aJso need to reconsider the notion that o'mership is essentially a ph~'Stcal reality and not a "virtual" one or that onJy sovereign nations can issue money when thinking about ways to fight the five wars. B ting market forces is next to impos. la . fro Move from repression to regu tion. ea

sible. In some cases this reality may force goYenunents to. move bemberettpre~~ er arket incenti,·es mav ti } ' the market to regulating it. In ot 1ers. crea ng m k li.__ t...' logy can often of these mar ets. euwo , tJ b b . usmg ureaucracies to cur 1e excesses s can ·For exa.mp1e, p<>''-erfuJ encrvrmon r•; ]i · · · accomplish more than go,·emment po cte

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTICS

PART 4

!'j(i(i

. l ·<:l

I

.

.

~oftwa r<'

.. /'rol ll 111'111 r I I or (I)~ • • 1<·0 ricrlrt' 'llld

I''

l.li lt('

than

rl' • Lc•dullqrrc·., ( ':Ill wllc ·r pro c.: • • ""' ·cc) p·tlc·nL'> .uH f l I)' ',•. lliOlivatc•cJ •· ,._ fivfll ,1 11,1 liSt I , WClllfd nraki rtg Il lt' ('Olllll I)' l'll Ol t ' • ttovernnwnl agt II ( IC r> . f I r 11 ~ otlwt I I • . . . In a o IH ' 1vc• war:.. n 11, , l'lllllt nt :wc·ndc·s. In all 1 · f't1 >J>OI1tlllltiC!> t'IC>I IlC' I'Il OI(llOII:.J> IO f f tf(J\('I Illlt'lll irtlc 1'\('llliO II that , (' . . OJ 01111 > ~"~ {' .. 111 lw traced to ~omc I 1 . 1 ~''l)l>h .uu! nwkc·' prit·vs and tl C'
ert'atc:s a . (' t

III :IJOI'

M '

. . ,. . k)TOCkC'I

<:< I 11

.. . . . ~() I 11(' ( .L''i( s,

Llwse IIO\'<'I'Il l twnt .

h

iul('l\< !lli•>ll'i an• o ften •

·.

in the search for solutions.

.

DANIEL W. DREZNER

--- ---~-----

.

•lilllin·ttc• thc ·nt- gmt'lllllll'lll\ c·an l snnply . . , . . •. . • he rnrptud<.:nt to c J·ustific·d a11d· it wo11ld nl I f' 1 . · ·t 1 ..1fTl<:ki 11g ill lwro111, lrn nt: ll l 1>< 111g-.. or we .tpons · 1 k. r w·tlk ·tw•ty frorrltlc• •g•tag.un:> •· ol lllds l<'!>t' I o tvnh M'~lt llrN o with deal •ttcr 1 . ' ' ' ' • . ' ln'ISS dc·~lru <:l iOil. f3ul SOC' ICt )' Cition. Polt c:ymakt·r~ must locus on · • Ic· t1•r11 '"l(l . . '"' anned tnl crthclloll nl approacIl(;·S IJ
The Global SJo~ernance of the In ternet: Brmgmg the state Back In

globalization and tl1 e lntemet weaken tilt: ability 0 r· ·t· t . , s a <.:s to rc.:gulatr· tht '? ,. 1 · global ('('()110llly. r liS paper argues that ... states partic:ul·t I , tl r Y lC great pnwe" · . r . . d. l't' rclliHIII the pnmary actors ror handlmg the social and pol 1't 1·c·•l cxte rna 1 1 e~ ercatc ·~ . . As the primary actors t 11u g1·eat and the Internet. by globalt:t.alJOn , powc:rs arc t1te · • r "' . . . most cc!ns1stcntly ~uccessful m achi.e~ng their prefercnecs relative.: to other actors. PowNfuI states will t.1se a range of foreign policy substitutes, suclr as coercion, induce me nts, uelcgatJon, and foi1Jm shopping across different international institutious to advance their desired preferences into desired outc:omcs. Nonstate actors can still influence outcomes on the margins, but their interactions with states arc rnore nuanced than the globalization literature suggests. The substitutability principle is essential to understanding how glohw.ation affect<; global govemance. States can and wiJJ substitute d.illerent governance structures, am] diffe rent polic.y tools to create those struch1res, depending on the (;()nsteUation of state interests. Great-power options include delegating regime management to nonstate actors, creating international regimes with strong enforcement c-apabilities. tolerating the generating competing regimes to protect material interests. absence of eiTective cooperation because of divergent state preferences. Because globalization scholars fail to consider the delegation stnttegy as a cxmscious state choice, they have misinterpreted the state's role in globse . " issue areas' states . express ng tual prope rty and pnvacy . t transactions that contradict ' . . d their halt cross- border 1nterne divergent in terests t· 1 aniz.ations (ICOs) an treaties . ' f a org governmen international use and references P 0 · in which therehare large ?..oneswill · . ' to advance their preferences. Even on tssues f technical protocols. t e great powers · 0· d d . .. .. 1 .I~ ono agreement. such as the stem ar 1za . of aut hon'ty t o achieve· thc1r demeu enw. manipulate private forms . .. l)o

1

•

anu

· · tt tm- Stak' Blldc In: ·(' of tht- Jntrnwt: Bnngm,.. From Dauic:l W. l)rczner, ~rhl' Global C:ovi?nMnc rl JlO (Fil112004l: 417-495. u lit· I Sciefll:.' Quorte y, fJ61 1\cprirrtcd by JWrlllissiOll froul r l) ICO

... '"

1'~1(1

4

l ON 11 MI'OIV\I

till llll llt I ll( ' . lt•JI IItflt tll lll lt•ltl ltt ll• ' t ' IUl Ii ll ~ IJ I Ill (ttl \ . 1 I I 11 ' 111•1' I't. l I Ill ,, I,,. 1 1' 111 Ill' . I ol ''"' .J I ll I tl!,l ·dt"f\(l''•l I I ! I ,, . ~. I l'tiii ' IJJI'I ('llll Ill .. , .. ,1,11 . 1111 '1111 I ~ '"g" I ( · I ~\-' l t·• l "' I' .. I I ~'• J I tl I I . Jll'''ll'''\ "' llll t' tiiiiH"""' ,.lullt lll ' •"" '"' . k . 1 Jw •' f1,1 llll t·Ji tl I ' ' •I 1 1 ''' , 11 · V' 'J 1 llll ' llh If \1.111 ',,,. fo11111llo IH' l I11 ' ' '\ ' 1 f 1 1 •1 1m,ld 1• 1 tlw wln f t~tt• · l up Jt' • • 11 ··L ilt·<. I IIHI I ll r I "lv; ''"'" ,1,1 '1111111•· \\ 1 .• ll'd 111 ' 1(' '·" J'I'I , , . I1,,, , 1.,,, 1I c.( I 1111 1 N <.()., I . ., •• ww•.tull ' .u '"" I 11· ' '"" t· nt ·1• f11' '' " titiH "• ll tt •\ ' Ill ,u I ,. llldt JWrll lt•IJI AI .. Jlll\'1• tllll '\ f11 pl.l} Ill f' l11lll1l g oV('rttllrH I "' o,l,tl• rult •w•. t•. C)r dy• l,y If • fill' 'J '•tl'l ,1\ rl w ·IJ'''"''· ' • ll~~l ' ll ( Ill ...,., , , " · I" " 1111111 ' 0 ( 11 , .. ,1 v1•1111111c·t· ~ '"''t llnlt ·•.l lll lw ~~lfiJ,,d 11111 11 11'1 l't ·~r, 111 . f I I I ., 11111 n ' I :till '" ~~ 1 w•w w· '"' " • 1• ' dt·t :.(undi11g 11 1 ~llllt; d gm t•l 11111111 111 "" t' l n ul ,.1.11 1'1 111 11111' l ll'ljll/1(• 11 J.{JI'IIIt •J 1111 I

I,,.

,,.,.t '

I

•

""'"~~' glnl ll .l l~utloll , .

GLOBAUZATION AND THE INTERNET: THE ACCI~PTED WISDOM Ovc·1 fl1c· flll' l dt·r·l•dr·, tlu ·n· ha' lwt• fl 1111 l'llr·rgt·lk dc·hu fc· tdHJIII J,ow glol 11dizufiot r ullt·" gtiVI'IIrwwt ·. F1 w 11 IIth dc·lmtc ·, 11111' c·np di.,lill 1wr1 c·lt·111 I1)'J H1I I11 ·~c·-. :tiH,IIl lire· t• fft'(' l'lt .t' gfulml it:tliiJillllr fJ w lll:tJrH~I"IIII'II( c,f' tJ w gloJHrl 1HIIi li(o;,j I '( 'IIIIIJIIIy . f11 tiH · (/,q , glollnllzal ic111 1111dl'll 'lll ' \ 111ft· \OVc•r't•igllly, WC'I1kt·11 i1tg govc·rflllll'lll \ ' :rlrillty l<1 t·lli·c·Jivt·ly rt '"'"lulc· llwlr diJfiW\ IIt · :illiu"· ( :lolwl lfl:trk('l lore ·, ·~ :11c · hur l, pliwc·rl'nl

, fllppi11J.t gr,vn"'"''"" of IIH'i r ugt·lfi'Y A., 'I'I HHIIH~ Jt'ric·dtrHtlr pl11w.c·' it , ~~Jc,lmll,-.ltllclll IPr<'l '' \ (:111'11 illlltllu · "( :t1ldc·•• SllailjlwkH ," l11 wlridr tlll'y " " " ' dtt1t 1W ' lll'fwc·r·Jr "/11 '1' r11arl
und

IIIIC'OIIImll:ebh ·.

(I,.

11111ftor lo :wtlrcu . ... . . . Tltc •l/1,\ lrc·lu't•u l11 wlr fc •l. lilt· r.fi(·C'I ~ cl gl()hu l l~:ri iiJII slrordd Ill• nl tlr('i r 11rosl I.'C m<·t•rllral<·cll'l Jlu· r'q,!rtlll ti(lrr of' ll w llrl<•r·uc·t ll ~>c· ll'. l11l c·nwt gow r·rrllll('<' ~> lrorrld NI·(· l'IUI« 'N 111 tlu·lr lrrW
A THEORY OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

o,ft•h'~ l'l 'llllll u Ill(· prirrrary ;l('lor\i i11 world I ht'lr pr~·lr·rc·u<·c·s 011 rt·~lflaltJiy ls~>nt·t. lu.vt· tlrdr Cll Jgi rr.'> In doml'~l k poll

Tlw tlwc:~Y propo~.t·d Jrtort• ll'i\l llfw\ tlrat

polit ic:" tk ... 11u· fc,ulc· lwl1lud tlris '1'1"' 1111 11 1· • J · ' '' ' P rm "1>1 111p t•: 11rwil ~>odu l I!. NIIt 'li origluult·d 1111 "' • "''I ·•li"'' tl011 11111(Jr· I Jrc·rrr urlc·nr:rliorral doiiJC•Mk, rnc,l,l<·trr'l lwlim· lssuc ·s. ( :ov<·rrr • ' ,.., '1 .. 'H · 11 urt•uh Will llllf urully JUt·lt•r· tlrul 11lc 1I I ~"~ m rt·gu ut orr~ rn1rror lllt·lr ow11 rrutfonul slun l .1 • 1 1 1 rl~ re•
'I'ABU~ I • A TYVOLOCY OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE ISSUES

~;, cat Power 1)/o;t!lbtttlm-;oj Jlt <1cn·f1('('"

-

Nol'lh/Soutll ()1.-.triblltlrm oJPrrj'('rt:nus

1Jigh ConjlJct

-

ltlqh (<mflic.l I ow Ctmfllt t

_____.........___

Law Conj/t(l

DREZNER I THE GLOBAL GOVERN 570

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTICS

4 ' t. J ·legate tlte m . grcnt po\H rs l' I . al to an :wrc•(•trt<.·nl. •\1 tlw same lu11e, 10weh.t. , t<.·to r., rather , ·mm • to nwH~o\t'rtll 1 1 1 ·1 ~'"' . . . .• • • . l 1:' re adual impl<·nwulalion oft 1e regu atOI) than !COs. Th is is p;.lrtly for functional reasons: J\(,(> pill~!.!( J ''.11 ' • t~bltc.: pohcy 1 orn J.Lt L'l Utd lmmessm ualhc•ntH! ·n ge t· . d · 1 . o n<.'l\\'orh can hcne a c:o rnp<~ rattv<.' a v.ul a · r·M ore t'r11portanth, · tilt' del< · 1cxpl'Jtrsc. · · tee1tnr<:a · tlw rcqutstlt> .... ton to 1mvate . ·"·• tng actors also pro\idc~ great powers a less-pubH<: and mon•-(•IJ.o<.ll\:e pal.ll\\:ay of elumnates govcmance structure. Dd(•u;atton · . . . · cont ro1 over t-11e regimes cnsu rmg

the tnmsac:tiou costs that arc inherent in a univcrs::li-rncndwr-;lup 1( .0. parltcularly one that operates on a one-nation. one-vole princ-iple. Covernmcu l:-. <:an a<:t lik~ a hoMd of cli rf'ctors: states dt>volve regime management to nonstal<· aetors, wlule still ensuri ng that they can inf-luence any renegotiation. of the rnlcs of Ll r.e garne. ff th e bargaining COrL' between the great powers lS Sll t
ANCE OF THE INTERNET

571

prcssut" on mt t1 tinational corporations to adhere to th fai l, tlv·~ ca n at l~ast ac~ a.~ monitors of corporate and :~:r c~o~ al t:n~orctmcnt can act as lohb)'lsts, Cajolmg core states into narrowin ~haVlor. Thtrd, ;\COs These ( fforts can alter the behavior of marg· al . g their set of preferen<.es. m actors, Lut are unlikely tC> he a source of dfcctive governance. This model suggests that nonstate actors· can piay ·tmportant 1 · f ro ~s 10 suppl)~ng globaJ governance, but only under certain constell· ti 0 ~ffectiveness of IGOs declines as great power disaa ons st~te mterests. The greements nst Th 1 d f influence o nons~ate actors vary widely from quadrant to uadrant. Th e r? e .an q. f b e ~~~enc:e of great-power preferences remains constant. The prese · nee o a argammg . core gl bal is a necessary condition· ·for· ef~e"tive among the great powers If governance. o . . . . . , _,, po1·tcy coon.unation t11esc states can 1each a bargam ' the outcome is· efcective n . st ates have' of .the preferences or strategies of other actors · If th ese regardless . dJVergent preferences, then global governance is highly unlikely....

WHEN STATES DISAGREE ABOUT THE INTERNET The best example of a club standards outcome for Internet issues concerns IPR [Intellectual Property Rights]. Developed and developing countries have divergent preferences on this issue. Because most goods and services produced for the lntemet are created in the advanced industrialized states, these countries have an incentive to enforce IPR. Developing countries prefer lax standards as a way of accelerating the transfer of technology and lowering the cost of acquiring new innovations and ideas. The emerging international regulatory regime on this issue mirrors great-power preferences. In 1996, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) negotiated two treaties-one on copyrights and one on performances and phonograms-to 2 cover online IPR. Experts agree that these treaties provide "strong" !PR protectio~These effo rts came in the wake of Ametican and European efforts to apply economic sanctions against countries ,.vith lax IPR regimes. Furtl~ermo,~e. the key ~egotiating parties behind the Uruguay round of the GATT-the quad of the V rut~ States, Japan , Canada, and the European Union-strengthened the I~R regune by permitting member countiies to use the VVTO enforcement mecharusm to enforce tical anal~es demonstrate that the ti St (TRIP) B r s a · trade-related intellectual property etween ffi t OD COpyn'ght enforcement. _,[1 • • • l · . d threat of WfQ sanCtiOnShad a SlgiWJcant e ec opmg eve m percent oo f)' . b d lin d . 1 that the Y near 1995 and 2000 soff\yare piracy dec e ces 1w ma e 1t c ear f4 • countries.3 The WfO, reflecting great-power pre eren · ·· t alt 1'ts enforcement ofiPR. · of __,n the ri,~aJ-standards ood growth of the Internet ww no er 1 e examp g a · . d . 15 th Internet there is increased d The regulation of ata pnvacy . · sacte over e · t outcome. As more commerce IS ran . d t of the nPrsonal information of r· t takina a van age . . is the biggest roncem :;, h concern about firms or governmen s .H e Us show t at pnV'clC~ · · 0 of online consumers. pm•on po . n and the United States adopted wuerent ud privacy rights is based on freedom Internet users. The European ~ru~ ··dered a fundamental right to be stances on the issue. The U.S. attitu ~ to~ pnvacv lS const . . E ' from state intervenhon; m urope.

1·

u s

1

;;;2

•

•

PARI4

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POLITiCS

prott c·!t•d h\ tlw ~tatt•. As a resull. the re W<J.!> no ' I ~t..ltes for comprdwn!-i\ <' rq~ulation of data p rivacy. . · .1 • . I n c:ontrdiclion. I lw \ 'il'Olt ol L ll ct tizens' • ' h • ' per onal data to third countries with ina d eguate pm tc·c t tclll \vas 1J.Uli:Ct.l Tl1is threat proved sufficiently potent for Australia. Canada a~1d ':·•l'>l f rn. l:.u ropean l 111 s}

countries to re\ise their own laws in an attempt to compl) w1th J •L, prC'f~n·nces. Se\'cral nonstate actors hied to mediate a solution on the i\.Su<· with no success. Human rights groups lobbied the U.S. government to ac<:ept tll(' EU rq;n latory position because it represented more-shingent protection of oonsum(•rs.'1 A tmnsnationaJ business group, the GBDe, attempted to develop a common ,·olu nta~y framework on data privacy. Th is effort failed miserably, witl1 both U.S. and E U officials criticizing the final product. Instead, the U.S. response was to encourage American mu ltinatjonaJs to estabush self-regulatmy mechanisms that would meet EU standards. Sets of voluntary principles, such as those provided byTRUSTe and BBBOnlinc, were developed. At the same time, American and European negotiators agreed to a "safe barbor" mmpromjse. The EU would not impose sanctions against U.S. firms that adhered to a voluntary standard consistent with the Data Protection Directive. The safe harbor compromise went into effect in .1\"ovember 2000, but the EU (state-directed) and U.S. (self-regulation) approaches remrun rival standards. Both TR USTe and BBBOnline have taken steps to become transnational certifiers. At the same time, U.S. compliance with the EU rurective re mains uncertain. Few mmpanies registered for the safe harbor in the year after the agreement went into effect. Furt:bennore, Federal Trade Commission studies show that U.S. fi rms do not enforce their own privacy principles.. ..5 The regulation of Internet content-that is, censorship- neatly fits the outcome of sham standards. Governments have wildly divergent preferences regarding the extent to which Internet content should be regulated. Totalitarian governments such as Cuba or Saudi Arabia want absolute con trol over citizen access to the Internet. Authoritarian governments such as Singapore or Chjna want to exploit the Internet's commercial opportunities while restricting the use of the Internet for political criticism. Liberal democracies also wish to place restrictions on offensive forms of content. These countries' definitions of objectionable content range from child pornography (the United States) to Nazi memorabilia (France). For this issue, there is no bargaining core among nation-states. The predicted outcome would be sham standards and the unilateral use of national regulation to bar undesired content. Internet enthusiasts have long dismissed the ability of states to take this action. . . . However, the evidence strongly suggests that states can regulate Internet content when they so desire. Such efforts are never 100 percent effective, but that is a goal that fe~ regulatory efforts achieve. As Jack Goldsmith obseiVes: "If govemm~ts can rc:USe the cost of Net transactions, they can regulate Net transactions. 6 In particular, governments. ha~e ~covered that by pressuring Internet service providers, they can exercise sJgru.ficant control over access to content.

DREZNER I THE GLOBAL GO VERNANCE OF llfE JMTrn '"1;,.1\NET 11w ,,·sn lli~ been unilateral but Su<.:c . f 1

573

' ess IJ exarnplc' 0 r of 1nh rn t •nlcnt. For lotaUtarian states th ..J s gov(·mrnc·nt r<~tr"lat • ( • 1. .· • e ITI<JUes nf rPgu'··ti ·on 1•av(' hc·f·•r ,.,.. . 10n ~.. 111 ell . uvr . .u )a s11np1y outlaws the sale f m •' o personal . t.:mc1<· Myan tnar ou tl;.tws personal ownership of me··' S . C:OIIrputcrs to individ•ral . " 1 JUCms. au<.l 1 Ar h· s. 11 by r('CJ' '' n n~ a \ vc ) a<:<.:ess to be routed through a •a <:1·nsors tht· 1ntemct eclit~ for <:onten t, hlod{)(Jr h· -··b'ap JCareas, govemmenlll have the means to censor the national content of the Web with t 1 ball · . 'b . f. f' . ou go ycensonng the distn uhon o. m ormation. Unilateral content regulation has sucteeded despite the strong normative con~ensus among Internet enthusiasts against such regulation.9 The Septe mber 11 terronst attacks and the terrorists' use of the Internet to communicate with each other have only accelerated the pace of content requlation in the 0 developed world. . . . Human rights NCOs have protested these disparate national efforts to curb Internet content, but this has not led to the creation of any effective system of global governance on the matter. JGOs have been largely hamstrung by the extreme distribution of state preferences over content regulation. This was reflected in the first meeting of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), held in December 2003. One of the key sticking points at this meeting was the language regarding the extent to which any agreement would affect the regulation of speech on the Internet. China, in particular, protested the U.S.-inspired language reg~ng p~ ~eedorns. As a result, ~Jthough language was ins~rted into ~e. Declaration of Pri~f!es that specifically addressed press freedoms, 1t was he-aviJ) watered ~n. an guage reaffirming state sovereignty was also added. · · · r . . . pre1erences For e"·c h of the issue areas m question, govern ments have d.iventent ·o ~ . Th resultin lobal governance regarding the content of Internet regulation. e g gf The di the distribution o state power. d structures vary in effectiveness, epen ng because the great powers ha"-e enforce ment of IPR on the Internet has su a1 .....,"t .......es into comnli• willin to coerce rec ('luau yu bee similar preferences and have n g . . . ·ghts-the outcome is the absence .-l: ......~ver pm-acv n · he Wh ance. en great powers ~· ~ - states fl.a''e divergent preferences. as m t of a stable international r~me. '"~;n!mteral steps to regulate aL.'CCSS to the Intercensorship case, the result~ effecti e ·cularly salient. first. nonstate actorS have net. Two facts about these Issues are parti c .:.~s on these isstJeS. Second. ~ mment preJere........ been unable to influenc:e gove 1

:.:OOed

;)tell

DREZNER I THE GLOBAL GO !Si 1

..

•

PART 4

VERNANCEOFTHEThn£

CO"fTEMPORARY WORLD POU11CS

• t · f av<.: hr·c·tr wiH' nv I III 'C'l' \<,,tr'\ J.!P\<•nmwnt' c1 f cvc·ry s np<- 1 ~ · m'orrl t 1 lo t•nsurc· t I trt 1 tl t< ·tr c•r1cls ....<' ·1d li< '\'t d. 11,1 I lw · "' <

••

wr J11ternc t

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF INTERNET TECHNIL '\L PROTOCOL$

.

or

J' I{'('I trJJC.t<·rn;dilic:s HI work, in tJ 1al a !->tandarJ:., utilit y cor:n·,_ . s •.· ' <1 ·t J;-0 1· ll1e Intcmelto he ll'wful for. inlnrmalio11al and 1111111 I)('J' 0 I C:011S IIIJI('r . (l ,,u,_.., 1 . .

Tl)I '

C'C:OJJOJliiC.:!> 0

c-on 111 rcr<:ial pu rposc•s,

prod 1reers need to agree on I h<' tc•diJIJ('al protoeols that pc:nnil 11 ser!> lo successfully trans111it and ac('ess data. Alt llr~ugh t:(Jfl1.1110il protoe~ls c:reate obvious publi<.· goods. such standards <.:an also reap d1~propo rllona~u benefits fcJr n<.:tors that cit lrcr own tlw standards in a proprktary f
pr' r r

1

developing their own pro ri RN'ET 575 I , • · ..L • p etary Standar.L re •"· J'r , (J• ntttnagmg u1e1r own netwo ks B u:5, Si) as t.o r'-· th . r · y th · ·' ""'P e "'-'< · • X
lAJ

nru•

' tl

~ILl

)l1 •

h

°

one anotl1e r. . . . . ·scant effects 011 the df?'·elopment of cornThe creation of OSI had two s~~de ISO membership and the rapid acceptman standards. First, because of th hib' . \.-nPnsive for anr state or firm to • • t.. ~A.... pro 1tive1,, e.-r· . ance of its standards, tt ~me atible with OSI. The great powers "~ere parti~create a protocol that was mcomp ts liked it because Jt gave theu I European govenunen lar1y enthusiastic about OS ·

r

•

PART 4

COl\'TEMPORARY WORlD POUTICS

· · \meti can ete with JB\1 L)i~t al <: )JUpH tt'r l'nx.lucet · :l cI1.ull'e to comp . , • t ' "tl it<> pref'ked 0 ' l bee-m ·e ll \\ ,t._ ' PI ' ~ pt'txlucen. The:- l . _~. !!O' em ment 1 ' · • • · rce codn-w. c:>r't'n~-e, tor nonpropnet•u:. open 'ou , .. ~d nsible for developing and managing the original A RPAN ET. After repea ted false starts, ISOC fonned the International Ad Hoc Com mitte e (IAHC) to deve lop a proposal to manage domain names in lieu of NSI. The IAHC was an emin ent persons group. with representatives from ISOC, the International Trademark

I

UK£2Nf:R I Tl{£ GLOBAL GO VERNANCE 0£ lli:E

on. \\lPO . and the ITU Th ~ 57ant . ' ·''<.'cl itself as the natural.loc e_ lTU was Particularh' th "c ...,-:ue . ation for an internati .naleagcr to~ in\'oh~t o recri ~. l result of this proce ss,.. o·me to man~oe HC vas a memorand --s Lhe ! "' pntance functions to an er·ttih h g \, l0U) amoncz; t" · '! onsec1· tl · propos -· . nes<.. m e re ·ts. l COs, and ISOC. Th lTUm 1e ITU, with representanoed asst ~ Gene ' tt in \larch 1997 to oive tlle . e arranged a "formal" ion; n !Tom bu i. I agreement llie tra . b'ung c:eremonv · } T us process neat y fits theo-definitio f . · ·ppmgs of an intern.,h al · tn . I cl . n o an eplstem· . .....uon, treatv actors lll\'O ,.e m the creation of lli TLD IC: communit\'. Furthe · and tech nical experts-are precisel)~~ -\lOU -lCO . business con;::re. ~ ature on how t11e Internet would affecte alcbtoalrs emphasized in llie alobalizatio~1~tes, . go governance 1 erTl lE' a TLD -MOU unme diatelv ran· .. · 1 opposttion fro l\ ment trong y protested the agree.ment.mto Th U S m vo groups. Co\·em. blasting the ITU secretariat. .. . European Jni~n ·secretary of state wrote a memo ment because it was deemed too u.S.-centric. T~:v:ment oppose~} the agreetion from a significant fraction of Inte t hp _posal also ran mto op~ime ent USiasts The . 'ti .zed proposed governance structure as lacking in cl . · ) en Ct ilie emocratic aecountabilitv d soli·citous o f corporate concerns. · , an as too The IAHC proposal spurred President Clinton t · Jul· . rd tl . . th o Issue a \ 1. 199 t executive o e r auf t110I1Zld ng . e commerce secretary to ··support efforts to make the aO\·ernance o. 1e omam name system private and competi'ti. ,.. p ·d ..: .. 1 d .0 . ve. rest enuai a VlSOr lra Ma?a zmer was put m cb~ge of the initiati,·e. underscoring the high prioritv the Uwte d States gaye to settling the issue liS prefe~ences on the· · · · ISSUe were cL· ear: to have a nonstate actor-rather than a universal-m embership IGO such as the !TU manage the D NS regime. ... Given the !TU's one-n ation, one-,·ote structure, and the secretariat's eagerness to indep ende ntly manage the issue area, it is not surprising that the United States want ed to switch fora. Historically, the United States has shifted governance of new issue areas away from the ITU in order to lock in its own preferences.... The Euro pean Union also \\'anted three significant changes to the lAHC proposal. The EU commission insisted that the WIPO be involved in any governance struc tu re. This was a hedge against U.S. trademark law being imposed by fiat. The Euro pean s agreed with the U.S. government that the ~SI monopo~· of the gTLD registries had to be broke n up. The European motin1tion for this, howe~rer, was preve nting total U.S. dominance of the Internet. Finally, there was a desue for.a formal governmental channel between anr private order and governments~ ~ was consi dered especially relevant to the management of the ccTLDs. The~=~~ State s was sensitive to these concerns. and promised that there would be a 51 board cant numb er of Europeans on any Intemet go"e.ntance ed ·bite per that officiall\• rtment lSSU a '' pa In June 1998, t11e C omrnerce Depa · . ed ri,·atization of the D~S ~'Stemrejec ted the gTLD -MO U process and ad,~t P. ~ t bottom-up coordination. based on four principles: stability. com~tltion , thpn-.:a·~te ~ner. Among Intero tt \\ rT~ ___1 and repre senta tion. T here were r.v0 reactions to ealled the Intemariutw rorum . . f If rganized conferences, c; . . 0 feedback enth us1asts, a senes o se -o ·th the idea of pfO\iding ClbZe on the Whit e Paper (IF\\"F) was held \\l \•

.

l

I;'

.37R

PART 4

UK.t.ZNER I THE GLQ

CONTEMPORARY WORLD POUTJCS

I ·c.l t Jw I F\~ J1 ,4 l l ' r·· ··1 t1' 11tional to rlre lJ S.. prop osal..\If any p('opJe c1uI'Jf . 1 t 1~:\'C' •• \YP mee t" ,\ t <.'OO \l ntion . · ,\.I tuou g11 u.s. gove rn nu.:•rrr r·eprc·~c·J•t · . ·rn~s. l 1rerc· L'· > con~r'dera) 11e cv1·cIcnce dc1~.1cJnslr"trrw t 1r J • .. • Jr'Jt ·•o,.., lracl Tl'l, ,, ~:>.th··' ' · w,.1~ bec·t errrwet on t Jw po 1.rcy cJutc:ome. rfl ll!J brmp<·'·rr ' rJ"' ·'' ISOC Allh 'n ll· ~11d ~ Unio n officials wer e simultaneously negotiating the <'\•tc t v .tt•ur ~ •>! '.dlilt a pri~ J

"'

'-ate rnternct reginrc would look like. The res 11 Jt was !CAN N. Wlril e ICAJ \r\ was incorp()r :HJJ Errm_p<' hi~tory sinc.-e its 1998 creation only underscores these cond usions. Nonstate actors out of the JSOC loop have vigorously protested ICANN's gove r~ nance structure and lack of openness to outside input. In c;ont rast to daims that the Internet would foste r greater democratic participation, many individuals have protested at the travel oosts of attending ICANN's meetings. Meetings are not wide ly available on the Web. More gene rally, its detractors label iCANN as unde mocratic and unresponsive, and a threat to the more-decentralized culture of the Inte rnet. Key governme nts have been consistent in ensuring th eir influence and in preferring stability over representation .... At the same time, U.S. and European preferences on the matter have been carried out. Sin<;e ICANN's creation, competition to provide domain name services has increased, prices have falle n, and trade mark disputes have been settled more quickly. JCAN N's own governing body has also indicated its eagerness to cater more to governme nt prefe rences. ICANN currently lists as one of its core values: "Act with sensitivity to the public interest and related gove rnme ntal concerns, so that the need for direct governmental action is

. .: mtze . d .... J2 mtnrHad the great powers not inteiVened, the outcome in thjs case would have been significantly ruffer~nt from ICANN. The JSOC initially wanted to expand the num ber of gTLDs to fifty. The management of the DNS syste m would have been h~~ in the one-country, one-vote ITU , rathe r than in a private, non-profit orgamzation. !he percentage of Ame ricans running the regim e would have been larger. Tlus case d~monstrates that nonstate actors have agenda-setting powers. However, once an Issue comes to the attention of states, the outc ome wilJ refle ct great-power preferences. In both the protocol wars of the 1970s and the creation of iCANN in the 1990s, government preferences were consistent. The grea t powers repe atedly acted to

BALGOVE RNANCE OF lliE

1 ens•J· ' the Internet would b ~ET ...... e govern d ut., · · •<)poly power to any one a :t givh. e so as to rn""'r . <:: or be 't ""' mtz,e effi . n j;r; H r an I eo Se(;retariat. In th~ I a multinational finn CJE:nty Without ent! J . '' to ensure that multinati 1 fil970s, governments , a n(mstate oro,_,_ ona· rms I·' a<..'ted w··L rr etaf\ nr '''~'>rk protocols. In the ] ·ON\ wou u not dev~l th ~u1 Jnttrnet : f -7'7\.JS , govern °P eir natH " u trHtS to prevent :"-JGOs and ICO ments ac..tw in . ~TI prollris from concert 'th Jn bott. liiSta nces, gove rnme nts d d overs teppi ngtt . wt multi1egate r · . . · e polic: . h tal mtc~rnalronal organizations-}SO d eg~me rnana11ementneu ~. ~ aut rmt.,. 0 · · · x u) n<ma~· and to n•t
RETHINKING GLOBALIZATION AND GL

. OBAL GOVERN ANCE

Th e globalization literature argues that the low . exchange, the exponential growth of the I t enng of traditicmai hC:IJ'Ji(;rs ~A n ernet and th . f ...., state acto rs conspire to weaken the state's role in g1' e nse o networked nontion Liter ature is wrong; states are still th . obal governance. The gloh-ctlv-a. . e pnmary a<.tors Furth on t he bmary ques t1on of state powe r ve ·s · ermore. in focusin~r r us nons tate po' glossed over the dive rsity of relati onships that c:an exist ver, .these scholars have acto rs in wo rld poutics. A recognition of the b . . b' ?et\\ een heterogeneous . a 1hty of gl0 bal struc tures g1ves us a more powe rful lens with suhistitut ·h b · governance . . . · w <: .. · f gJo baIlZabon. A reVIew of Internet gove rnance d to o serve the ramr·fl cation so emon strate s that ev vh pre fer to let private actors take the governance lead, th . will . en ~ en states their desi red ends. e) mteJVene to advance States may be the prim ary actors but they are not th nJ Th . 1 1 ' e o y ac-tors. e case stu d1es c ear y show that nonstate actors can affect t · .z0 u comes througb therr . . ... techn cal expe rtJse and agenda-settmg abdtties However only bv ai · th 'd f 1 · · . · • , ~vmg e great powers pn e o p ace ts 1t poss1ble to set the conditions unde r which non-state t ·11 · th · fl ac ors \\1 exe rcise e1r in uenc e .... By failing to recognize that states can substitute unilateral measures. intergovernm e ntal accords, and delegation to nonstate actors, scholars of global gover~ nanc e have unnecessarily restricted their analyses to simple comparisons of direct state invo lveme nt versus the role of nonstate actors. This is particularly true of the dele gatio n option. Unless delegation is recognized as a conscious state choice, rese arch ers inevitably miscode such variables as state power. The "-alue~added of the subs titutabili ty concept is that it permits the development of more generalizable theories .... Ironically, globalization scholars have erred not in thinking too grandly about glob al gove rnan ce, but in not thinking grandly enough.

NOTES . 1i (Xew Yorlt Farrar, Strauss, & Gi.roul. J · Thomas Friedman, The Lexu.s and tIte 0 1we ree · ·

1999), 86. land Knight. Global £kcJronjc Commer-ce: 2. Catherine Mann , Sue Eckert. and Sarah Clee • __, Ecooo~Jlid. 2W>l. ll8. . y Prim . on, DC· Institute for lntema11ODal A Polu.: er (Washingt ·

PART 4

j

COIIITLMPORARY WORLD POUTICS

k and \J arc·u5 K1Hl7 ·n ' I 1 t tl 1c A c. k c uuct11 ~f,:.dft·n \ 11/n ... ~K mln • ~ P<>nc~r pre:<.<:utc·r • . IJrt•ll• du.tl l'rn~·rt~ Pmlt"C-tJOJJ . ~ ~ ;\uau s l 2H-~'1't' rnl r "''"A: J;ii!CJII :till IJ:IJ Jll( c:tmj!

t

. r ,...

Bo.;ton

.

Tl •· Jmp t (

(,n~rJJ) <.,h•.JT<·r ClrJbali7~JlJc,rr and Soc.ial Prote<:~,r ;= ; 1·,tr ](I,', n Jlll t Bul•·., intlJt Hatc:l.ctirrg Lp nl U.S. Privacy 5tanc . n "·

• • J 11\ • {

•

••

Q[

~a ' ·u Ill'('

• r ·.11 sonaJ lO rrl Larc

Jnte

~ lonal Law: The Trials

of G iJbal Norms STEVEN R. RATNER

' B I'. c O L' 11 n•· Hulll < • 2ru] I )<J. F 11 • l... 1 '11' nf!.o-Knll ' 5 \1:JT< u<, •· r.mda (,rl,~.,"rnm[!.llw /ntPmrct ou V r " ·• a l'•·r<.J\11'111 Thre-e f I l temet· . ' . · (j, }litical Control in <.,l nJ!apon· 2.j t\\ 1111!

r 20()0) 1...815.

,

8

.

~).

/().

terly J J3 (~priug JS1.)8 ), "3-:-~9. . . k Co1nmuuication in A-.1.1 'ldl•r:tll/l/1/llniratio ns . • _ Cc•or'r<.·llc Wan~ '" RC'Kulallllg J'\c twor 1 ·oretgn l)ot-CorrunlJ!ll'>m. "Chinas Kalatlul - - no- SI. tn· ' • ~"~ ' ..~ · f'nlir.y 2.'3 (April JSi99}: 2t i - VJI ; Jall 'p,0 ! . . J22 (j·111 'Jrv/ Fr·bruarv20()1), 74-l 5. thr~ I nlNll C'l," acct:'>SCO at · 'u .. ' '1< • r tllj ~n ll urnau H ight~ Watd1, J-ret;: .E1-l'!es~~on • . . ..,.. . .. J,up:l/www.hrw.org/advO<.·a<.)'/intcrnet/. Z.'J .M ay 200 · 1IOJtv 1{nt kows ki . an(I ·Se)'mourCoodrnan. WhoCovcrns lltc: l ntcJnct. · Ant Will J·ost'~r - ) J- 18 , . ... .

.. . . Cf)ttmttmicatlon:; oftlu.: AG M 40 (August J99t , t- . · I3riau Arthur. "CornJWting Technologies, lncreasJng Hctum!>, and Lock-In By JiJs11. .. • . toric::d f.w•nl!>, .. Erxmomit"joumol99 ( March J 9~9), 11~13J. J( ' A N" ' ,. 1 · and Refonrt JCA:\:'\ : A Blucpnnt for Hcfonn , 20 · . /bl r · on , ' ·' :.vo u 0 00 12. Cormnii1N: uepnntd . t J1 ttp:/.'/"\~IIW. n')()Q f:f ·• ··1 cann ·or"'cornrnittc:cs/cvol-rcrorm

w.

Jtmc

""' • • acc:c·o;sc

a

20jun02.htlll, JO Septt-utber 2002

•

The mo,·e fro~ describing the.w?rld to prescribing for it fonns the core of international law. ~~n those committing hum~ rights atrO<:ities-war criminals from Bosnia or polttical leaders from Cambod.ia- be tried in foreign courts or before international tribunals? How can members of the United l';ations ensure res t for the d~cisions of its Security Council? What is the best way to regulate tran~:­ tional envi r~nmental bazar~ su~h. as greenhouse gas emissions or ocean dumping? Can the Umted States allow Its c1tizens to sue European companies for their use of land and factories confiscated by the Cuban go\·ernment from Americans more than a generation ago? All these questions turn on political decisions by states-but what international lawyers see and seek in such scenarios is a process whose actions are informed and influenced by principles oflaw, not just raw power. For international lawyers, devising and enforcing universal rules of conduct for states means o\·ercoming two cardinal challenges: how to make such precepts legitimate in a diverse community of nations; and how to make them stick in the absence of any one sovereign authority or supranational enforcement mechanism.... Today, the end of the Cold War has loosened many of the blockages to international lawmaking and implementation. Although legal scholars still ask what states can do on their own-pass extraterritorial laws, use force. or prosecute war criminals-they do so assuming that coordinated action is now more feasible than in the past. Global and regional treaties such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mjnes, the Maastricht Treaty, and the North American Free Trade Agreement now seJVe as the starting point for scruti nizing state behavior according to some objective standard The ground seems ready then for an acceleration of t~is century's great trend in international law: the increasing international regulation of more and more issues once typically seen as part of state domestic jurisdiction. But any a~empt ~o create the lofty, supranational legal edifice idealized by some of the fields practitioners and scholars promises to be problematic at best. Once para_lyzed b~ the deadlock between East and West, and between North and South, the mternational .

.aL 0 f Gl bal Nonns. ~ Foreign Policrj. issue 1110

toft Intemational Peace. Reprinted From Stephen R. Ratner, "lntemational Law: ~he Tnd s (Spring 1998), PP· 65-75. © 1998 by the Camegte En 0\\lnen or permission.

S81

.,

I

RATNER I INTERNATIONAL LAW· THE TRJ

:"•"'~

PART 1

CON fFMPORARY WORlD POUTICS

Mu lt'

· t with tlw c hall· 11gt : • ,f·,,~ 11ew cl ,,.l!,ti ' "''' rn IJ III'' 11''"" C'Oflh' ll• uor J''' J v.itJ e'il .J,b•, ' d r . • 11' 1 t r. 1 \ ,, <'II J) IIW 1 ~t.tl c ' ,uc.lt a-. Hc·l:tnl'> or Croat1a to co111p) · · "'· .I L I I I I' 'I 1 t· le·• whose (: tn.;tii JI'>I:.IIC'I s lnal;. ·• rn• ,•. ~, 'Y of \\11 1 ." JOI II ,I JJ anc nl 1< r a1 !'l ' .L ' • I llllt·rn.Liicmal nrl{'\. lutc·rnalional law JTI II\1 \(·c·k fo < n Jr,l c •1 g VII I ! rang e: · 11 . · ·1 I O\ l of new .1. t• Awl '"' 1t liHJVC·'> of Ion""· topic·'· and lc·c I1110Iogwo,, ;L\ W t' tv··~rns-tlw trc at nH ut c.f dlj)!out.ll-. ()r -.l,,p., rtrrf Il('r .tWH} f.10111 'I 1ne )' torc•t ..... · . . . . ., . 11 lo . areas- t•IJVIrollrrtc•rr t.tlI 01 l,,l•r•r ,I,UJd••rc[,_ t)l I I I1(.. \CHS lo I J';l( I JO il H ) ( If1c·stk . th proponc·nh 111 11!>1 ' .tnc·n·a~t. ngIy c:on rrem l 1I('W ()I)\• I ''lci(•S• Ill'a( ("I.

.n.

NEW REALITIES, NEW IDEAS This new global <.:ontc•xl smrounding tlte field J,,L., led to at lc•ast f(>ttr fllnd;.tlltC'II tal

shift s i11 tl;c· kinds of issncs tltat legal scholars now talk about and stud).

New Forms, New Players 'Ji·acfitionaiJy, most rules of international law C.:Ollld he> fottnd in Or!(' of' two plates: treaties- binding. written agreements bctwc•cn sla~(•s; or cu~totn:uy lawuncodifiC'd, hut equally binding rules based on longstan<~lllg beh.a~1 or that st:ltcs accept a.c; comp11ls()ry. ~n,e strategic: arms reduction treatlt'S rcqumng the Unt~cd Stale!~ and Hussia to cut their nuclear weapons arsenals offer examples of the former; the ru le; that governments cannot be sued in th<' courts of another state for most of their public aets provid~s an example of the latter. l listorically, treaties have gradually displaced much customary law, a~; international ru les have bccorne increasingly codified. But as new d()Jnains from the environment to the Jntcnwt come to be seen as appropriate for inl<'mational regulatiCJn, states are someti mes reluctant lo embrace any sort of IJjnding mic·. Jn the pac;t, rnany legal scholars and international courts simply accepted the notion tltat no law governed a particular subject t111lil a new treaty was ccmcluucd or states signaled tlt~ir consent to a new customary-law rule (witness the rtductance witl1 which humau dghts norms were cc>nsidercd law prior to the UN 's two key treaties in I96fi) or, alternatively, struggled to find customa1y law where none existed. However, today all hut the most dc><;trinairc of sd10lars see a role for socaJJed soft law- precepts emanating from international bodies that conform in some sense to expectations of required behavior hut that arc not b.inding on states. For example, in J992 thC' World Bank completed a set of Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment. Though these an· not binding on any bank member, states and corporations invoke them as the standard for how developing nations should treat foreign capital to encourage invest rncnt. This soft law enables states to adjust to the regulation of many new areas of internationaJ concern without fearing a violation (and possible legal eount ermcasures) if they fail to comply. Norrnativc expectations are built more quickly thau they would through the evolutiou of a customary-law rule, and more gently tlaan if a new treaty nJic wen~ foisted ou states. Soft law principles also represent a starting poi nt for oc-w hard law, which attaches a penalty to noncompliance. Jn this case, the bank's _guidelines hav(• served as the basis for the negotiation of a new treaty- the

. \l!,t('('lll(;nt on

.

Jnve!-.ttncnt (MAI

ALS OF CLOB.a.t NO~s

5~3

)-by the On'~"i'l· 1. r A.. . Tite MAl 'Y"' .a tor. •or F ri <~ht ' ally gov<.:rntllent to intc . . give~ fo .· . .<:cmorntc n I rnattona) arh·t . rcty. mvcst 1 ratiC>n hJ.W {)I ' I • JH cll'ti<.:c imits their freed , f<>r Corrt • Or:. tlu: < • <>rn to tnvest ,, pcnsati()r ·I \\ l t ' r H I t 1H: <.:asc of hard or soft I or E: g I . . su state entiti ho h · fl\ner lc·(lal sotnC' wt~y 1.>y l •<· •nt<:rnat1onal c:ornmun·ty (Ch es, t tho!lt rC;<: . ' 1-j (Tib<.: t. Ka~l11n ir); nongovernmcntal ~ . ~hnya, Hon~ Kong) an~)~U?J:d tn Clairning tltat the states to whkh they ; eglamzadtions (:\COs}; and c.x;mnc~t· nc)t

Coop'

.md Dc·v<:lopmcnt {0

[.' r

'D)

ong o not al d ·t' "ra I!JO\ their intc·rc!-.1~. t I1esc nonstate actors dem cl ways a equate•!> rr:p . cl · an a say in th rest:nt f I Som e tav<· ace stauncb opposition to the· .. e <.:cmtcnt of Hf'\\ norm 1~95, C.:hi lla·~ government relegated NCO,rtpartJc:d·,pation in de<.:ic;ion rnakino· ,s. . s o a ISta t ,. n Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing. n venue du ring the U\ 's But otltcr groups may suc<.:eed even as· f'· fl' . ar as e ec:hvcly taki delegation. For example, U.S. telecommun· . t' ng over an official lea JOns c:ompan.1 . h have seem<.'d almost to dictate U.S. positions . th I _es sue as Motorola . ( J ~r u ) I m e ntemational Tele . tion Umon • t •e UN agency responsible fo tti Ib t'OmrnunK-astandards. At the lTU's 1992 conference on all:tinngl 0 ~telecommunications tethnologics, Motorola's stake in protecting its plan;~ e ra 0 spec,:trum for new . ul . or new sate1utes bet-ame a U S paramount . . mterest, res ting in a sizeable Moto 1 t di . 0 h ro a eam atten n~ as part of the U. S. d c IcgatJOn. t er corporations have acted outs'd . 1 e go'<emrnent · 11 1 · . channels entire y JY promu gatrng pnvate codes: In response to publi<: p e "ik · ed .f 11' · .1 1 r ssure, ." e 1ssu a set o se -unposeu ru es to prote<.:t worker rights in the developmg · worId. 1t IS· not . that states are no Ionger the pnmary makers of international law. But . . . these other actors have independent views--and the resources to push them-that do not fit neatly into traditional theories of how law is made and enforced.

New Enforcement Strategies Most states comply with much, even most, international law almost continuallywhether the law of the sea, diplomatic immunity, or civil aviation rules. But without mee;hanisms to bring transgressors into line, international law will be ulaw" in name only. This state of affairs, when it occurs, is ignored by too many lawyers, who delight in large bodies of rules but often discount patterns of noncompliance. For example, Western governments, and many scholars, insisted throughout the l960s and 1970s that when nationalizing foreign property. developing states we~ legally bound to com pensate former owners for the full economic value. despate those states' repeated re fusals to pay such huge sums. . . . f The traditional toolbox to secure complianc.-e with the law of nations consistS 0 . ( · roca1 action !IC1' ,li.Jist the violator), or. negotiations, mediation, countenneasures recJp ..,. . --•Court .m rare cases recourse to supranation . al JU . diCl·aJ bodies such as the lntematiotw . such ' ) Jincb · 0 f tJ1e world of law that Amencans f o Justice. (The last of these was t 1e · pm . • be. ) For manv years. as Andrcw Carnegie and EWIU Root sought to bnng mto . mJ'. titutions'. whose these tools have been SUIJI'>lernented by the work of iJ~~em~tiotnVJ·olnslators But todav. .. bil. ·haine agruns · · reports and resolutions often help mo JZe s ·

t~u.qTll

re I

Zl&

(~2i

~~

r~ ~q

a

o/o( .tle;,

!

O}S

l ,

•

I

~------ r

5:->~

RAT NER I INTE RNA TION AL r PART 4

..,..w:lliE nu

CONT'E.\1PORARY WORLD POU flCS

ers.C" ._, . ,• .::t •• tl s. :'\(. Q, ami pm ate enti.he , ill·Je:!cl 1J~ • their l
seck~

~

•

t:

' K lion s f.:(·o nom ic

'img

(>

<.:om -

ph with U:\ resolu tiom. ' 1 1 · 0 tJ r. d fi t th disptJle ettle ment ["ai1elS tn tl1( \\,o r •<.rar <· Organ tc •ree-tra e ron . e . . 1 1 · · \ 'TO 1 th 1 1 . utho ritv to i sue bind ing n!lm g-. t •at a low tl1c mznlion ( ' ) JJOW 1ave e cga a • l 1 • • 1h · lor ·m a tracl d' · cmP. ri flc tarif fs on the lose r ... Anr t lt C \1C :\ !o. ac oc e 1sputc to 1mpose ~r -· . 1 · · u hi'b un aJs fc th r . Cntl •Jnc-' or e 1ormer Yugoslavia and Hwa nda how t11at tl . ,.,. 1t ea-;t pos. ·bl to de\ 1Se · ms · t'tu" ' · h individuals for human right'> atrcx:1tics" :'\onethe1 e 1 uons top L1n 15 . , . · ·tv ~ cl te offc om er Bos nian Serb prestden t Radova11 KaracbJc and Iess.
The Legitimacy Problem Even as scholars seek to devise better enforcement mec hanisms, a seri ous debate

is brewing about the legitimac:..y of such measures. As inte rnational organizations are freed up to take more actions by the end of the East-West conflict and the tem pering of North-South tension s, the United States and its like-minded allies seem well positioned to impose their agenda on all Legal sch olars question whe the r \ Vestem dominance of the Organization for Security and Cooperatio n in Eu rop e, UN, Wf O, and other international institutions is not merely raw power assertin g its muscle again, albeit through multilateral bodies, to the detriment of a genuin e rule of law. Tha t this debate is more than academic can be see n vividly in the ongoing discussion abo ut reforming the Security Council. Many Am eric ans may laud the council's new muscle during the last five years, it has slapped a debilitating embargo and weapons inspection regime on Iraq , prohibited air trafllc with Lib ya due to its sanctuary for those accused of the Pan Am 103 bombing, and approved a U.S.-Jed occupation of Haiti. But smaller states feel thre ate ned by a Security
t(

••

A

~~then the enforcem<.:nt of .

AlS OP GlOBAl N

·OR.\~

5~'l

· ll ofte n r , ,J at t Il e prospect that th:es mternatlona aw for it• e nor ms m·gh L. . ~ 0\\11 f·t c1 · t V\ T O. ·.:ry dispute resolution panels that I t:~ enfor<:t-Q ao4ir.,' _s Jt n~ r rce 01> n d <Jse d markets could order .t t b. the l mted States ht';i l\. In th<~ I'0 I . . I o c oose be ope~ lr> tion la'' ' '" 1c:h as those ban nmg imports f twec:n en,ironm. tal use to . o tuna <:au ght . tn prv~"(; and t},e 1>ro~ pcds o f retal1atory sanctions ·r th m neL~ that lc'U d h · 1 1 o~e laws 1p tn~) h . o tor;· e rle·, ts on trade. In such a scenari o . t . ave mcidental cb . , I th . f . cl nonalla\. . scnmma\ VT O, )<:to me s e nen of business 'amderna b '· as mttr pret ed h-· h t • , · k n ugab oo of . t ,. I whe n t tc v · ' see s to ~ro muJ gate environmental law . envno~meutabtc; • B·;t gre enhouse gas conven tion just concluded at K . 'as It has '"lth the proP'J"'..ed Si mi larl y, _the Unjt~d States wants to use U:eo~~ ~~the tab~es are tumtd a com pre hen sive sanchons regi me on Iraq that has th n '. Cou nc~ to keep in pkc:t"intern ational .. rather than "U .S.-imposed .. all th h~l dihploma tic appeal ofhein" • e w 1 e oldin b k dues because not all" Ut\- program s conform to Washin on' _g ac on pa~1n. ~it.;1-. sole superpowe r, the United States can defv inte ti gtal 5 \'
New Un kag es The noti on of henn etically sealed areas of international law each a · h · h. 0 lCe · · 1 h apter m a trea s~- 1· s mc reasmg y anac ronistic. Environmen tal and trade lawccan no long~r be discussed separately ~ the tuna-dolphin example shO\Vs; and when pri~ate rnvesto rs have to reckon ~1th se~ous abuses by local governments , foreign mves tme nt law cannot be exammed w1thout some consideration of human rights and Labo r law. The result is a new breed of scholarship linking previously distinct subjects and the realization among some practitioners that overspecialization leads to myo pic lawyering. Mo reo ver, beyond the legal field, inte rnationallaw·yers must address the twoway inte raction between international law and broader sociological and cultural trends in society. In one notable example, the debate on a clash of cultures in\·olving so-calle d Asian values has forced students of hu man rights to stand back and consider wh eth er righ ts granted in human rights treaties mean the same thing in all states. Can Singapore sup press free speech for the goal of ~a~o~ unit): ~d develo pm ent , esp ecially if it claims that its cuJture see~ uninhib1ted politic-~ spe ech as less than a birthright? Of oourse, cuJtural assertions tend to be m-eri) broad and many human rights activists interpret these claims as excuses for author' itarianism ; the arguments, lwwever, can no longer be ignorecl. and black and whj te rules of treaty interpretation will not help much. has direct ffects 00 In the oth er direction, the proliferation of new ?,<'nns A~~ treatv d b Vorld contro\'ersv. Fr. _. e ates over glo bal iza tion -the "Jihad. versus Mc\ will cleark· acco~ different• on ozone or gre enh ouse gase~, fo~ mstan~, rote<:tion. versus dt"\-elopment. but perspectives on the priority of envuonmental p r·diversity.w Indeed almost once ado pte d it cannot tolerate violations in the name o m·..H..· domestic (.'OI)CefD P.i.i a once s I..UJ by definition, the decision by states t 0 subi~~-

.

(

'•

J (

I

586

PART 4

CONTEMPORARY WORW POUTICS

to international regulation means that cultural, value-basC'd, or "~overeignty'' argume nts no longer enjoy the upper hand. If a state e lects not to :-.j~ 1 ;J :najor treaty,

or ignores one it has assigned-as with the United States and the agree ment on the elimination oflandmines or Iraq and the one on nuclear nonprolif(•ration- it is more likely to be condemned as a pariah than admired for its rugged individualism.

..