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Intellectuals and Apparatchiks
Intellectuals and Apparatchiks Russian Nationalism and the Gorbachev Revolution
KEVIN O'CONNOR
LEXINGTON BOOKS A division of ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC. Lanham· Boulder· New York· Toronto· Plymouth, UK
LEXINGTON BOOKS A division of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200 Lanham, MD 20706 Estover Road Plymouth PL6 7PY United Kingdom Copyright © 2006 by Lexington Books First paperback edition 2008
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The hardback edition of this book was previously cataloged by the Library of Congress as follows: O'Connor, Kevin, 1967Intellectuals and apparatchiks: Russian nationalism and the Gorbachev revolution / Kevin O'Connor. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. I. Nationalism and communism--Soviet Union. 2. Perestroreika. 3. MinoritiesGovernment policy-Soviet Union. 4. Soviet Union-Politics and govemment-19851991. 1. Title. HX550.N3012 2006 320.540947'0904-dc22 2005029937 ISBN-13: 978-0-7391-0771-3 (cloth: alk. paper) ISBN-IO: 0-7391-0771-2 (cloth: alk. paper) ISBN-I3: 978-0-7391-3122-0 (pbk. : alk. paper) ISBN-IO: 0-7391-3122-2 (pbk. : alk. paper) eISBN-13: 978-0-7391-3123-7 eISBN-IO: 0-7391-3123-0 Printed in the United States of America
en
Contents
Acknowledgments
vii
Introduction
1
1
Russians, the RSFSR, and Soviet Nationalities Policy, 1917-1953
23
2
Russian Nationalism, Russification, and the Rise of the "Russian Party," 1953-1985
45
3
Writers: An Opposition in Embryo, 1986-1988
79
4
The Ligachev Line, 1986-1988
111
5
"Russophobia": Perestroika and the Russian Question
133
6
A Consolidating Force: Creating a Russian Communist Party
165
7
The Apparatchiks' Party
211
8
A Word to the People
237
9
"Russia to the Exit!"
279
Selected Bibliography
295
Index
311
About the Author
323
v
Acknowledgments
The basic idea for this book was conceived in the closing years of a bygone millennium, when I was a graduate student at Ohio University in Athens. In its earlier incarnation the book was a Ph.D. dissertation, which I completed under the supervision of Steven M. Miner. His guidance and encouragement during the early stages of this project were crucial both to its development into what would become a book and to my personal growth as a scholar and teacher. As I find his words passing from my lips in my Russian history classes I am continually reminded of how much I learned in his lectures and seminars and during our informal sessions over coffee or Kung Pao chicken. I am also grateful to former History Department chairman Bruce Steiner, who generously provided funding for my research and language training. Dr. Steiner's mantra that "there are beginnings ... and there are endings" was a source of inspiration to the legions of graduate students, including myself, who managed to complete their degree requirements in a timely manner. A research trip in the summer of 1999, sponsored by the Center for the Study of Russia and the Soviet Union, introduced me to Moscow's archives and libraries. Subsequent stays in Moscow were hosted by Lena and Irina Alekseeva, whose warmth and generosity I will always remember with great affection. I am also grateful to the staff at the Gorbachev Foundation, the Russian State Library, the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, and the Central State Archive of Social Movements of Moscow for providing me with documents, books, and photocopies. Many thanks also to John Henry Trant, who helped with the index, and Ted Weeks of Southern Illinois University, who read parts of the manuscript and saved me from committing several errors. Although I was initially annoyed at the anonymous reader of a much earlier version of this manuscript, I am now quite grateful for his or her criticisms and suggestions. The resulting book is significantly improved as a result. Other errors, no doubt, remain, and these are vii
viii
of course my own responsibility. That said, I would also like to acknowledge the efforts of Brian Richards, Seth Hoy, Rebekka Brooks, MacDuff Stewart, Christopher Case, and the staff at Lexington Books, who saw to it that this book went into production without undue delay. Finally, I would like to acknowledge a tremendous debt of gratitude to my family, including my mother Marianne and my brothers Michael and Robert, who never failed to provide me with moral support and encouragement through the many years of graduate school and my search for that elusive permanent position. A special thank you to my father, Richard O'Connor, who has read and proofread the manuscript in its entirely both in its earlier incarnation as a dissertation and in something like its present form. His questions and corrections were invaluable. It is to him that I dedicate this book.
Introduction
On 25 December 1991, nearly seven decades after the conclusion of Russia's Civil War and the creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the red flag that flew over the Kremlin was removed and replaced by the Russian tricolor. Concluding a two-year struggle that pitted "Russia" and the other republics against the Union "center," Boris Yeltsin, the popularly elected president of the Russian republic, was finally able to wrest power from his nemesis, Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet president and the last general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). For the next eight years Yeltsin ruled Russia alone as it and the fourteen other former Soviet republics pursued separate paths, with varying degrees of success. Gorbachev, who to the end had struggled to hold the Union together, now stood on the sidelines, waiting-in vain-for the Russian people to call him back to active politics. Many have never forgiven him for launching the reform program (perestroika) that ultimately destroyed the Communist Party and accelerated the collapse of a superpower. Some of his former comrades, embittered by this betrayal, have publicly called him a traitor. Unlike the bloody struggle that inaugurated the Bolsheviks' iron rule in Russia, the collapse of the Soviet single-party state was, on the whole, remarkably peaceful. Although armed conflicts in Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaidzhan broke out almost immediately, they took relatively few lives. Tadzhikistan's civil war (1992-1997) and the two wars waged by Russia against Chechen rebels were far more violent, but such brutality was the exception rather than the rule throughout the former Soviet Union. (Of course, brutality often manifested itself in non-military forms.) One need only consider the Balkan wars of the 1990s to imagine how the collapse of the Soviet empire could have been far bloodier. The fact that the former Soviet republics did not descend into the large-scale violence that characterized Yugoslavia's disintegration-that Russia did not aggressively pursue territorial claims against its neighbors as Serbia's leaders
2
Introduction
did-is a testament to the relatively civilized nature of the transition. Indeed, not only Gorbachev, but even the men who plotted to remove him in August 1991, rejected the use of deadly force to defend the Soviet state. 1 As the Soviet Union disintegrated and Russia began to reinvent (or, one might say, to invent) itself, the country was fortunate not to produce a top leader comparable to Slobodan Milosevic-a demagogue willing to fan the flames of nationalism to aggrandize his own power and carve out a Greater Russia from the carcass of the Soviet Union. Although Vladimir Zhirinovskii or Albert Makashov might have fit this profile, they failed to capture the imagination of the Russian people during the decisive period between 1989 and 1991, when local nationalism engulfed much of the USSR and shook the foundations of the Soviet state. Indeed, in the summer of 1991, when conservative forces staged a coup d'etat in order to save the indivisible Soviet Union from collapse, it was Boris Yeltsin-then identified with liberalism, democracy, and anticommunism-who was widely seen as the embodiment of Russian patriotism. For nearly two years Yeltsin had been playing the Russian national card, but rather than seeking to preserve Russia's hegemonic position in the Union, Yeltsin, working in tandem with the leaders of several other Union republics, orchestrated Russia's withdrawal. Again, the contrast between the Russian president and the Serbian leader is revealing: whereas Milosevic rode to power by reminding Serbs in Kosovo, a region of Serbia populated largely by Albanian Muslims, of an historical injustice (from the Serbs' view) that was six hundred years old, Yeltsin's popularity was derived in part from his anti-imperial rhetoric. 2 Russians, he emphasized, for too long had disproportionately borne the burdens of empire; it was time for Russia, like the other Soviet republics with which it sought cooperation as ostensibly equal partners, to go its own way. One of the most striking aspects of the USSR's collapse was the old regime's feeble resistance to the dismantling of the Communist-ruled Soviet state. Considering the stakes involved-the lives and livelihoods of hundreds of millions of people, control over the Soviet Union's mighty nuclear arsenal, and not least, the seat of power in the Kremlin-the transition from Gorbachev to Yeltsin, from Communist to semi-democratic rule, was remarkably civilized, at least in the sense that it was free of organized violence. Although a small group of conspirators who were once close to Soviet President Gorbachev summoned tanks into Moscow in August 1991, the putschists had no stomach for the bloodshed that would be necessary to defeat Yeltsin and his supporters. Communism, its last defenders apparently concluded, was not worth fighting for. But it was not to save communism that the State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP) went into action; its purpose was to save a "great power" (derzhava) from the nationalists and separatists who wished to destroy it. The August putsch, botched and desperate as it appeared, was an attempt by Soviet loyalists to avert the conclusion of a new Union Treaty that would devolve most political authority from Moscow to those republics-nine at most-still willing to sign. Yet even for this cause-the fate of the "great homeland"-the State
Introduction
3
Committee, composed almost entirely of Russians, was unwilling to risk the possibility of a civil war. Perhaps this is partly because Russians, including Gorbachev's nationalpatriotic critics, were unable to come to a consensus at to exactly what their "homeland" was. Was it the Soviet Union, which covered nearly the entire territory of the old tsarist empire and included nearly three hundred million peopleonly half of whom were Russian? Or was it Yeltsin's "Russia," the RSFSR (the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic), which claimed 80 percent of the USSR's territory and only half its population? For many of the Union's defenders-mostly the Russian nationalist-conservatives within and outside the CPSU as well as the Russocentric Gorbachev himself-Russia and the USSR were indistinguishable. 3 Each year when June 12 rolls around and Russians celebrate their "Independence Day," many ask themselves-and each other-the following question: "Independence from what?" It was on that day in 1990 that the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR adopted a Declaration of Sovereignty. 4 While most working Russians happily accept a respite from their labors, for many the idea of "independence" makes little sense: indeed, in the minds of many Russians the Soviet Union from which Russia was ostensibly liberated was Russia, even if Russia was not necessarily the entire Soviet Union.
What is "Russia"? The difficulty of defining "Russia" in territorial terms is largely rooted in the country's size and extraordinary ethnic diversity. In the two centuries between the reigns of Tsar Ivan IV (1547-1582) and Catherine II (1762-1796), Russia expanded deep into Asia and central Europe, incorporating peoples as diverse as Poles and Tatars, Finns and Buriats, Ukrainians and Chechens. 5 As Muscovy transformed itself into the Russian Empire, expanding at a rate of 30,000 square kilometers (about the size of Belgium) per annum, Russians populated an area stretching from the Baltic and Black Seas to the Pacific Ocean. 6 Right up to the revolutions of the early twentieth century, Russian intellectuals such as the celebrated historians Sergei Solov'ev and Vasilii Kliuchevskii continued to identify the empire with the Russian national homeland. Yet, as Dominic Lieven has suggested, the reality was that Russia, at least partly because of the existence of the empire, arguably possessed a weaker sense of national solidarity in 1914 than it had in the days of Ivan IV.? Indeed, the overwhelming majority of Russians were still peasants whose identity was closely tied to religion (Orthodoxy) and locality rather than to some broader sense of "Russianness." Most of the tsar's subjects were not Russians at all. 8 Historians of Russia frequently point out that Russia, unlike the countries of Western Europe, failed to consolidate itself as a nation-state, and that this failure has been detrimental to both the Russian state and Russian society. As one such
4
Introduction
scholar, Vera Tolz, has written, the idea of Russia as a "land without end" had an especially negative impact on nation-building, for "it diminished the need to draw precise geographical boundaries for the national homeland.,,9 In contrast to Britain and France, each of which held large overseas empires in which core and periphery were distinct, Russia's contiguous empire, created before Russia had the opportunity to consolidate its national identity, made such a distinction impossible. IO As the empire expanded beyond areas traditionally inhabited by Russians into Europe and Asia, Russians could not distinguish between "Russia proper" and the tsar's possessions that were not Russian in the same sense. To mask this ambiguity, of which even Russia's rulers were only hazily cognizant, the country's emperors and empresses equated Russia with the empire, effectively fusing them into one well before the age of nationalism had arrived in Eastern Europe. Russia thus became a multinational empire before a modem Russian national identity was developed. II A significant long-tenn consequence of this development is that Russians even today lack a fully developed sense of national identity. A leading proponent of this view, historian Geoffrey Hosking, has suggested that there is in fact no such thing as Russian nationalism; there is only Russian imperialism. 12 That is to say that although the tsars discouraged the development of feelings of national self-identity, Russia's expansion, resulting in the destruction or weakening of powerful states such as Poland, Sweden, and the Ottoman Empire, did foster a popular consciousness of the country's status as a superpower surrounded by unfriendly neighbors. This, Viktor Kremenyuk observes, "contributed to a national psychology that worshiped the Motherland and spumed foreign influence." Instead of developing a specifically Russian self-identity, the country's dominant nationality was prone to xenophobic tendencies and chauvinism-"a feeling of superiority that considerably blocked the way to progress.,,13 Thus, although Russia had built a state-and a powerful if underadministered one at that-as late as 1914 it had failed to develop a shared sense of belonging to a common community. Since the tsars had done little to advance the cause of nation-building in the empire, the task was taken up by Russian intellectuals from the 1830s onwards. The "Slavophiles," a group that distinguished itself from the "Westernizers," were the first shapers of modem Russian identity.14 Alienated from a repressive state and repulsed by the rationalism of the West, Slavophile intellectuals, following the lead of the Gennan Romantics, believed that Russia's uniqueness lay in the ancient wisdom and traditions of its "people" (narod), not in its superficially Europeanized elites or its Little Father, the tsar. In the hands of the Slavophiles Russian identity was defined negatively-that is, it was defmed principally according to what it was not. From the Slavophile perspective, the Russian soul was not by its nature rational, individualistic or materialistic, as the Slavophiles believed the peoples of Western Europe to be; the Russian soul was instead communal, spiritual, and nonpolitical.
Introduction
5
According to the Slavophiles, not only were the Russian people distinct from-and morally superior to---the peoples of Western Europe, the Russian state, unlike Western states, developed organically, on the basis of cooperation between Russian and non-Russian peoples. Whereas Western states were aggressive and were historically formed through conquest, the Russian imperial state was benign. The Russian state, wrote Konstantin Aksakov, an early Slavophile, was "founded not by conquest, but by a voluntary invitation of the government.,,15 Although like the "Westernizers" the Slavophiles sought internal reform (the abolition of serfdom, the amelioration of the country's social ills, and the removal of government censorship), they rejected the West's pursuit of parliamentary politics in the belief that the autocracy was the most appropriate political system for a people who sought not political participation but freedom from politics. The Slavophiles and their heirs were incapable of conceptualizing Russian identity without comparing the virtues of Russians to the negative values that they believed characterized the West. Thus, insofar as Russian nationalism developed as an idea, it developed principally as a rejection of Western values and of Western models of development. 16 Having deemed these unsuitable for Russia, the Slavophiles and later the populists (narodniki) "constructed an imaginary alternative path for the country" based on the traditional practices of the Russian countryside. 17 Yet a "Russian idea" based on the Russian peasantry was of limited use to the rulers of the empire, who conceived of themselves, not the "people," as sovereign in Holy Russia. Although Slavophilism had developed during the reign of the martinet Tsar Nicholas I (1825-1855), it was firmly rejected by the autocrat. The emperor, more concerned with the fulfillment of duty than the enlightenment of the narod, was suspicious of intellectuals and wished to protect the masses from any potentially dangerous ideas. For Nicholas, Russians may have been in some sense unique-particularly in regard to their unusual mysticismbut the narod did not personify the Russian Empire: that was the prerogative of the autocrat (samoderzhets) and the Russian Orthodox faith. The doctrine of "Official Nationality" ("Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality," as formulated by Minister of Education S.S. Uvarov) upheld by Nicholas 1's regime in fact had little to do with Russian nationalism or nation-building; most of all it was an ideology whose purpose was to reinforce the established order while serving as a bulwark against the challenge of Western ideas. 18 Only in the last decades of the nineteenth century did Tsars Aleksandr III (1881-1894) and Nicholas II (1894-1917) seek to bolster the specifically "Russian" identity of the empire. However, this was not a case of placing the source of political power in the hands of the nation-the "people"-as was being done in the countries of Western Europe, but rather was accomplished (to the extent that it was accomplished at all) through the implementation of a program of linguistic and political russification on the empire's periphery. Whatever its aims, the program was applied inconsistently, and it is still not clear that russification had any more ambitious goal than that of the preservation of a multinational
6
Introduction
state facing the pressures of nationalism on its periphery.19 Indeed, the main engine of russification from above was the empire's need for centralization and bureaucratic standardization. This is not the same thing as nation-building, which involves the sort of bonding of state and society that was more characteristic of Western countries like England, Holland, and France. As a result, unlike the West, wrote historian Hans Rogger, "Modern Russia did not develop a nationalism that was capable of reconciling important segments of Russian society to one another and to the state.,,20 Moreover, given its considerable ethnic diversity, the Russian Empire could not fashion itself as a Russian national homeland in the same way that the Kaiser's Germany could transform itself from a patchwork collection of kingdoms and principalities into a strong and mostly homogeneous national state with a geographically distinct overseas empire. Although the tsarist regime's "desire to equate Russia with the Great Russian nationality and the Orthodox church was at times irresistible," Theodore Weeks concludes, "Imperial Russia was not, and could not be, a nation-state.,,21 Unable to come fully to terms with its imperial and multinational nature, the regime pursued muddled and often contradictory nationality policies. "Yet one thing was clear in tsarist policy," observes Robert Geraci, the author of a history of conceptions of "Russianness": "whether or not the Russian nation was so infinitely expandable as to eliminate all others in the empire, no other nation would be allowed to spread.,,22 Russians, it was clear, were the bearers of empire and the bringers of civilization to the uncivilized. Yet in an age of nationalism, which had penetrated the empire's western borders, it was dangerous to promote the culture and status of the hegemonic nationality at the expense of the nonRussians living on the periphery. As a result, russification floundered and only stimulated resentment and resistance in the borderlands. By 1917, under the impact of World War I and revolution, the empire unraveled. The Bolsheviks' seizure of power inaugurated a new approach to the nationality problem in Russia. This is discussed more fully in Chapter One. Committed internationalists, Russia's new rulers sought to downplay the role of the Russian nation and instead to promote the cultures and languages of the nonRussian nationalities. To reflect these new priorities, and to win the trust of the non-Russians, the new regime recreated the empire as a federation of republics, with a large Russian republic (the RSFSR)-what remained after the peripheral regions were constituted as Union republics-at its core. Despite several alterations the structure that emerged in the early 1920s endured for nearly seven decades. With the addition of the three Baltic republics during World War II, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was comprised of fifteen nominally sovereign republics, each with its own government, parliament, and communist party. The only exception was the RSFSR, which lacked many of the accoutrements of individuality granted the other republics. For this Russian republic all-Union bodies such as the CPSU (rather than a Russian Communist Party) would suffice; otherwise, it was feared, one republic and one nationality would dominate all the others.
Introduction
7
Soviet rule, with its confinnation of Russian as the country's lingua franca, to some extent facilitated the development of a Russian national identity among members of the dominant nationality. However, because Russia was defined as a territorial republic with fixed borders within the USSR, this identity was in principle explicitly anti-imperial-a development that went against the grain of the Russian national-imperial consciousness that had fonned over the country's centuries of expansion. For Soviet Russians, then, "Russia" had two different, contradictory meanings: Russia was both the contemporary RSFSR and, in the minds of many, the entire Soviet Union. While the bifurcation of Russian national consciousness had been developing over several decades, it became politicized only under the unique conditions created by glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring). The result-the contraposition of "Russia" (the RSFSR) and the Union "center"-was a main cause of the USSR's demise in 1991. By the Brezhnev era (1964-1982), the Russian problem, like all the USSR's nationality problems, was believed to have been resolved: Russia was the RSFSR, and Russians, well-represented in nearly all the Soviet republics, were the glue that held the multinational Soviet Union together. In the official view, all the peoples of the Soviet Union enjoyed a supranational identity: whether one's native tongue was Armenian, Ukrainian, or Uzbek, one was first a Soviet. Indeed, in late 1987, on the eve of the USSR's nationalist explosion, Gorbachev could still make reference to "the friendship and cohesion of the peoples of the Soviet Union" in his book, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World. The Soviet republics, he wrote, fonned "a community based on brotherhood and cooperation, respect and mutual assistance." It was only natural that the Russian language, native to the largest ethnic group in the country, was the common means of communication in the multinational Soviet Union. Far from being a hegemonic nationality, the Russian people, he continued, "have proven by their entire history that they have a tremendous potential for internationalism, respect and good will to all other peoples." Although these words were intended for public consumption (especially in the West), they did reflect a certain truth about Gorbachev's understanding of the national situation in this "harmonious multi-ethnic state.,,23 That truth was that the nationality policy launched by Lenin had failed to achieve the goal of eliminating nationalism (and nations) and creating homo soveticus, the Soviet man. The country remained a composite of many distinctive nationalities, large and small, at the geographic and political center of which stood the Russian people. Although Gorbachev himself did not share many of the core views of the Russian nationalist movement (discussed below), he was, like the Soviet leaders who preceded him, undeniably Russocentric: Gorbachev understood the Soviet Union to be the successor to the Russian Empire and never seemed to question the Russians' right to rule it. Despite Gorbachev's underestimation of them, nationality issues were among the most controversial and most passionately argued during the Soviet Union's last few years. 24 At the heart of the nationality problem was the matter
8
Introduction
of republican sovereignty, which was nominally granted by the Soviet constitution. The question was first raised by the Baltic republics-Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania-in the late 1980s and quickly made its way to the revamped RSFSR parliament in early 1990. On the resolution of the issue of republican sovereignty stood the whole Soviet edifice, for if the other republics could press for "sovereignty," then why could Russia (the RSFSR) not be "sovereign"? And ifit could, then what would this mean? Would strengthening the Russian republic vis-a.-vis the center amount to augmenting its position in the Union so that it could act as a consolidating force? Or would it involve scaling back the RSFSR's ties and responsibilities to the other republics? Indeed, this was the central point: how would Russia's relationship to the rest of a reformed Soviet Union be constituted? Politicians and intellectuals who played the "Russia card" during the USSR's final years had different answers to this question. Those who gathered around Yeltsin advocated Russian sovereignty in order to escape the control of the "center" and thereby advance political and economic reform. Another group, whose political orientation was much more orthodox in the Soviet context, also defended Russian sovereignty, but did so in an attempt to strengthen the cohesion of the USSR by augmenting the power of its largest republic. But the confusion about "Russia" still remained, and in fact was more muddled than ever. Although generations of Soviet citizens had been taught to equate Russia with the territory of the RSFSR, Soviet authorities since Stalin had simultaneously encouraged the notion that the Soviet Union was the successor to the Russian Empire. Thus the conundrum remained: was Russia the RSFSR, or was "Russia" the entire Soviet Union? Or perhaps Russia was, as some nationalists averred, "wherever Russians live." The Russian question, and in particular the meaning of Russian sovereignty, was one of the focal points of Soviet politics at a time when Soviet politics had never been more fractured. After several years of glasnost and perestroika, by 1990 the seemingly monolithic unity and Party discipline that had once uniquely characterized Soviet politics since Stalin had begun to break down, exposing the territorial, national, and ideological fault lines that had been surreptitiously, almost imperceptibly, developing over several decades. Soviet "conservatives"those who sought to preserve the USSR as a multinational empire ruled by the Communist Party-were disoriented by the breathtaking speed of the changes and were slow to react or organize. Dismayed by the ideological innovations of the heretics who controlled the Kremlin, horrified by the intrigues of nationalseparatists in the Baltic republics, repulsed by the bullishness of the "democrats" in the Russian legislature, and perhaps most significantly, aggrieved at the loss of the CPSU's hegemonic position in the USSR, the conservative wing of the Party, stunned by the pace of change but still outwardly loyal to the general secretary, stood by as Yeltsin and his followers mounted an assault on the prerogatives of Moscow. The level of Party discipline exercised by the conservatives even through the upheavals of perestroika is striking and is a testament to the mono-
Introduction
9
organizational nature of the system throughout its existence. As the authors of an economic history of the perestroika era write of Gorbachev and his opponents: "An activist ruler with a radical agenda rolled over every established interest, and only after six years of extremely radical change and acute social and political crisis was there any serious opposition on their part.,,25 While largely true, this may be overstating the case. Although nearly everyone claimed to be in support of perestroika at first, suspicion of Gorbachev's agenda arose among nationalist-conservative circles as early as 1987, and perhaps even earlier. Indeed, as soon as Gorbachev discarded the official position, conditioned by decades of Marxist-Leninist ideology, that there was one single truth, discussion and then opposition became inevitable. The nationalist-conservative opposition to Soviet reform-to Gorbachev's perestroika and to Yeltsin's even more radical program-is the main subject of this book. More specifically, this study discusses the steady movement of the orthodox wing of the CPSU toward Russian nationalist positions once the ideological straightjacket was removed and the USSR entered its terminal crisis. This rapprochement took place in part because of certain shared ideas: both the Russian nationalists and the Marxist-Leninists were conservatives who, like the Slavophiles 150 years earlier, deplored the cultural Westernization that was gripping Russia and feared the imposition of alien Western political and economic models. Indeed, once Lenin's luster faded it gradually became clear to some in both camps-nationalist and Soviet-that both these political streams shared much in common. In addition to their shared concerns about Westernization, a feeling of disempowerment was common to both the Russian nationalists and the Communist old guard: just as Russians were losing their hegemonic position in the Soviet Union, so were Communists losing their hegemonic position in Soviet politics. Many influential "conservatives" in the Communist Party bemoaned its fracturing and struggled to prevent the dissolution of the Soviet Union by reaching out to allies who, whatever their opinions of Marxism-Leninism, shared these concerns. Some, such as Egor Ligachev, Gorbachev's "second" secretary until 1989, and Ivan Polozkov, the first secretary of the short-lived Communist Party of the RSFSR, were openly sympathetic to the complaints of Russian nationalists who expressed their astonishment at Russians' loss of their hegemonic position in the empire. With Marxist-Leninist ideology receding into irrelevance as the Soviet Union endured its greatest challenge in half a century, many Communists appeared to abandon their lifelong commitment to communist internationalism in favor of restoring a "Great Russia, One and Indivisible." It is this paradox that this book attempts to explain.
10
Introduction
Nations and Nationalism Now we turn to the terminology that is used in this book. Since the idea of Russian nationalism is at the core of this study, we must first explain what is meant by the terms "nation" and "nationalism." Moreover, it would be useful to outline the different varieties of Russian nationalism under discussion. Even a cursory glance at the literature reveals that social scientists have not arrived at any consensus about the meaning and origins of nations and nationalism. In general, the field is divided roughly into those who see nations and nationalism as products of modernity, and those who believe that nations have deeper roots in culture and ethnicity. The first group, whom Anthony D. Smith calls "classical modernists," contends that nations are not ancient, but are the products of the planned and rational activity of political and intellectual elites. 26 This group includes scholars such as Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, and Benedict Anderson. Although they disagree on much, in general they each believe that nationalism is a product of modernization, and that nationalism creates nations, rather than the other way around. This school of thought emerged in response to older "perennialist" paradigms that had grown out of German Romanticism in the early nineteenth century. Unlike the modernists, who see nations and nationalism as logically and historically contingent phenomena, perennialists see the nation as an ancient cultural community. While they agree that "nationalism" may be modem, "nations" as such are simply updated versions of organic pre-modem ethnic communities. It is the perennialist paradigm, rather than that of the classical modernists, that has exerted greater influence on modem Russian nationalist thought. Since an understanding of "nationalism" is inextricably tied to one's conception of the "nation," the latter term must be defined as well. Liah Greenfeld analyzes the semantic evolution of the word "nation" in her monumental study Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Romans, she explains, first used the Latin word natio to refer to foreigners sharing a particular geographical region. By the sixteenth century, after several mutations, the English word "nation" had come to be synonymous with "people," having shed its negative connotations with outsiders. 27 Thus the modem "nation" is associated with the population of a specific community. Benedict Anderson describes this community as an "imagined" one, "since the members of even the smallest nation will never know of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.,,28 The "imagined political community," writes Anderson, is a product of the modem age in which identification with the "primordial villages of face-to-face contact" have largely been superseded by individual identification with a greater community-one formed on the basis of a sense of common ancestry and manifested in a shared language, set of customs, mythology, religion, and territory. Whereas Greenfeld insists that the national idea arose before modernization, appearing first in the England of King Henry VIII (who enlisted it in support of
Introduction
II
his battle with Rome), Benedict Anderson, like other modernists, takes the view that "nations" are largely the social and intellectual constructs of nationalists, although they may have their roots in earlier ethnic and kinship ties. Ernest Gellner likewise contends that "It is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way around.,,29 From this perspective, nations are "made" as a result of the processes of centralization and modernization in modern society. While Gellner stresses the role played by central authorities who imposed an exact and standardized language in the political unit, Anderson stresses the cultural dimension and the role of print-capitalism in the creation of the imagined political community. Eric Hobsbawm similarly emphasizes the "invented traditions" of nationalists whose explicitly political aim was to create nation-states. 3o While both Anderson and Hobsbawm concede that the nationalists' attachment to the nation is quite real, these scholars emphasize the constructed nature of the modern nation. In contrast to the classical modernists, perennialists, who represent an older school of thought on nations and nationalism, have stressed the more organic nature of nations. Contemporary perennialists criticize the modernists' "topdown" or elites-driven approach to nationalism and instead emphasize the genuine national attachments of the lower and middle strata. While some scholars trace the origins of nations to the Middle Ages and most believe that the origins of nationalism lay in Western Europe, there is a near consensus among Western scholars of nationalism that there is a link between modernity and nationalism. 31 Although Walker Connor has sometimes been grouped with the perennialists, he agrees that nationalism is a modern phenomenon: he simply argues that nations are more deeply rooted than the modernists are willing to concede. For Connor, a nation "is a group of people who feel that they are ancestrally related. It is the largest group of people who can command a person's loyalty because of felt kinship ties; it is, from this perspective, the fully extended family.,,32 At first glance this definition of the nation appears to be close to the "primordialist" approach, which tends to view nations more as natural phenomena based on ethnicity and kinship than as modern social and political constructs. To Connor, however, what is important is perception rather than reality: "it is not what is but what people perceive as is which influences attitudes and behavior.,,33 Although unpopular in the West today, the primordialist approach to nations and nationalism is generally accepted in post-Soviet Russia. 34 Indeed, one can trace the shift to primordialism all the way back to Stalin in the 1930s. 35 From this perspective, nations are, in the words of historian Ronald Suny, more a "force of nature" than a "product of history.,,36 In contemporary Russia primordialism is most prominently associated with Lev Gumilev's concept of "ethnogenesis," whereby ethnicity is not seen as a social or intellectual construct, but rather as part of human evolution. This emphasis on the ethnic-biological basis of nationality contrasts markedly with the Marxist belief, which to some extent influences many of the "classical modernists" discussed above, that modern nations resulted from capitalist modes of production. Primordialism informs the thinking of numerous Russian intellectuals and politicians of the post-Soviet
12
Introduction
period, including CPRF leader Gennadii Ziuganov. 37 It is one of the striking paradoxes of contemporary Russian nationalism that the leader of Russia's largest Marxist party-the successor to the CPSU in Russia-eschews Marxist interpretations of nations and nationalism in favor of a primordialist understanding of Russianness. Thus far we have seen that the word "nation" is an ambiguous term: the nation may be a social and political construct that has emerged from the logic of modernity (the modernists' view), or it may be primordial and deeply historically rooted (the perennialists' view). The word is made more complicated by the contention of many students of nations and nationalism that there is both a "civic" nation and an "ethnic" nation. The civic nation comprises the citizens of a sovereign political entity (which best describes the western European idea of "nation"), regardless of ethnicity; yet the word "nation" also refers to the ethnic nation (more typical of central and eastern Europe), which may share such a territory with other ethnic groups or even be divided across territorial borders. 38 Whereas Greenfeld, for example, believes that it is perfectly legitimate to use the word "nation" in each of these senses, Connor considers this misleading: for him the nation is the ethnic nation. For present purposes, the most important thing is to understand that the word "nation" may be used by different people to refer to quite different things. The distinction between the "civic" and the "ethnic" nation is particularly meaningful in the Russian context, for the Russian language uses two different words for "Russians": russkie refers to ethnic Russians, wherever they may live; while rossiiane refers to the citizens of the RSFSR during Soviet times, and afterwards to citizens of the Russian Federation, regardless of their ethnicity.39 But, returning to the term that is most central to this study, what of nationalism? Most scholars of nationalism agree that it is a political ideology with expressly political goals. Whether nationalism begat nations or vice versa, there is no getting around the fact that "nationalism" is a modern phenomenon and that "nationalists" have an explicitly political agenda. John Breuilly defines nationalism as a term "used to refer to political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such actions with nationalist arguments.',40 Likewise, Michael Hechter has defined nationalism as "collective action designed to render the boundaries of the nation congruent with those of its governance unit.,,41 While these definitions of nationalism, with their emphasis on its political component, may be useful for understanding nationalist mobilization in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, is it applicable to the "nationalism" of Russians and other Soviet peoples in the decades before perestroika and glasnost? For this phenomenon it is more appropriate to use the term "cultural nationalism," which, according to Anthony Smith, has existed in history where political nationalism has failed or is exhausted. In Soviet Russia, where expressions of political nationalism were expressly forbidden almost until the end, cultural nationalism, stimulated by Russian intellectuals' "yearning for cultural regeneration," existed in its stead. 42 This is one of the main themes of Chapter
Introduction
I3
Two, in which Russian nationalism and its relationship to the Soviet state prior to the Gorbachev era are discussed. To a considerable extent the various forms of Russian nationalism that began to flourish under more open conditions at the end of the 1980s took shape in accordance with their supporters' views of Marxism-Leninism and of the Soviet past and future. Yitzhak Brudny identifies three basic varieties of modem Russian nationalism: liberal, conservative, and radical. In the late Soviet period, liberal nationalists, a group that included an important segment of the Democratic Russia organization that supported Boris Yeltsin, tended to articulate their national loyalties in civic terms, with emphasis on the sovereignty of the RSFSR (while stressing the interests of rossiiane, citizens of Russia, rather than those of ethnic russkie) within the Soviet Union. The liberal nationalists generally tended to support the political and economic reforms of the perestroika era. While holding a positive image of Western institutions and ideas and a fondness for prerevolutionary Russia, their attitude toward the Bolshevik revolution and the Stalinist past was generally negative. Following Brudny's typology, opposing the "liberal" nationalists were "conservative" and "radical" Russian nationalists. Although "conservative" and "radical" nationalists shared a common antipathy toward the most radical reforms of the Gorbachev and Yeltsin governments and the cultural and political values of the West, they parted ways in their evaluations of the past: whereas "radical" nationalists (such as the editorial staff of the journal Molodaia gvardiia) found much of value in the supposed ideological purity and patriotic fervor of the Stalinist period, their "conservative" counterparts (such as the village prose writers of the 1960s and 1970s) were more likely to reject Stalinism and the Bolshevik revolution and to sympathize with Russian Orthodoxy and the old monarchy.43 While the pages that follow make occasional reference to "liberal" nationalists and frequent reference to "conservative" nationalists, the latter term is used broadly. That is, since distinctions between "radical" and "conservative" nationalists are often unclear, and since they often found themselves on the same side of a number of the most important political issues during the perestroika era, this study generally uses the term "conservative" to embrace all the non-liberal groups in Soviet politics and within the Russian nationalist intelligentsia. In other words, for the purposes of this study, the conservative nationalists, or nationalist-conservatives, were those who sought to tum the clock of Soviet reform back to at least 1988 and who at the same time upheld the preeminent position of the Russian nation in the multinational USSR. Many, especially those who lived in the Baltic and other non-Russian republics, referred to themselves as "internationalists"-an obvious exercise in double-speak coming from overwhelmingly monolingual Russian-speakers living in Russian enclaves on the Soviet periphery. Muddying the semantic waters even further is the fact that many Russian nationalists regarded themselves as faithful Communists and were often members of the CPSu. Therefore, it is useful to draw distinctions not only between
14
Introduction
"liberal" and "conservative" nationalists, but also to identify the various streams within Soviet conservatism (which for the purposes of this study includes nearly any political philosophy that opposed the major political and economic reforms of perestroika and wished to preserve elements of the Soviet past) more generally. This study uses the typology of Soviet "conservatives" formulated by John B. Dunlop in his The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire. Dunlop divided Soviet Russian conservatives into three broad and frequently overlapping groups. "National Bolsheviks" were those Russian nationalists who believed that the Soviet empire could best be preserved by retaining orthodox Marxism-Leninism as its ideological foundation while emphasizing Russia's historical, cultural, and political weight in it. 44 Mikhail Agurksy, who emphasized the complementarity of communism and Russian nationalism in his works, defines National Bolshevism as "the ideology of a political current that legitimizes the existing Soviet system from a Russian national point of view, contrary to its exclusivist Marxist legitimacy.,,45 However one defines National Bolshevism, its adherents bridged an ideological gap that separated what Dunlop called the "conservative Russian nationalists" (often called "Russophiles" or "neoSlavophiles"), who usually respected Russian Orthodoxy and revered the tsarist past but in general opposed communism, from "neo-Stalinists," who viewed the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution as a progressive event and favored the command economy, but rejected the pre-revolutionary Russian monarchy and the Russian Orthodox Church as reactionary institutions. 46 Of course, designations such as "liberal," "democratic," "radical," "conservative," and so forth, leave much room for disagreement. The people who were often tagged as "conservative" (Communist hardliners and those who expressed serious reservations about the thrust of perestroika), for example, often rejected being labeled this way by those who (usually) proudly referred to themselves as "democrats." As Defense Minister (and future coup plotter) Dmitrii Yazov complained in early 1991: I personally cannot understand: Who are the democrats and who the conservatives? Someone who espouses socialist positions, the positions of a unified union state, is regarded as a conservative. And someone who is prepared to sell the motherland down the river, to ruin the Union, to retreat into national compartments, and to pull the Army apart is a democrat. It is absurd. 47
Just as orthodox Communists like Yazov disliked being labeled "conservative," Russian nationalists sometimes object to the terms "nationalism" and "nationalist" when they are applied to Russians. Stanislav Kuniaev, a poet and the main editor of the monthly journal Nash sovremennik (one of the main strongholds of the Russian nationalist movement during the perestroika era), explained why the term "patriotism" is preferable to "nationalism." "Nationalism is for small peoples, who are afraid of disappearing .... The Russians are a great people." He and most other exponents of some variation of a conservative Russian nationalist ideology believed that Russians who love the Fatherland are not "na-
Introduction
15
tionalists," but "patriots" devoted first and foremost to the Russian state rather than to any particular ethnic group. For Kuniaev and like-minded thinkers in the Russian nationalist movement, "Patriotism founded the Russian state and held it together. ,,48 Indeed, nationalism and patriotism refer to two distinct loyalties: the first to one's national group, and the second to one's state. 49 It is on this basis that Roman Szporluk, writing in 1989, divided the two main political forces in Russia into "nation-builders" (those who focused on the "construction" or "reconstruction" of the Russian ethnic community, which they dissociated from the Soviet state) and "empire-savers" (those who elevated the territorial integrity of the Soviet state-which they regarded as a Russian state-above all other concerns).50 While Szporluk's division of Soviet Russia's political forces into two neat groupings has the advantage of simplicity, by the end of 1990, little more than a year after his article was first published, the political context in the USSR had changed dramatically, and many of those who had criticized communism from a Russian nationalist perspective came to see the Soviet state as the lesser of two evils. That is, when Yeltsin offered Russians a democratic, liberal, Western-style nation state-"small Russia," whose boundaries were those of the RSFSR-many Russian nationalists, whatever their feelings about communism, sought refuge in Soviet "Great Russia" rather than accept the loss of "historically Russian lands." In any event, the main purpose of this study is not to describe in detail the many varieties of Russian nationalism, but to discuss the development of a heterogeneous coalition of groups and individuals who, despite their ideological differences, nonetheless regarded themselves as patriots and sought to arrest the program of radical reform that they believed was destroying the country. Above all else they sought to maintain a unitary Soviet state, but one based on distinctly Russian traditions-authoritarian traditions that for many harkened back to Tsar Nicholas I's ruling ideology of "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality." Therefore this work often uses terms such as "patriots," "nationalist-conservatives," and "empire-savers" in broad reference to the conservative Communists and Russian nationalists who placed supreme value on maintaining a strong state based on the restoration of Russian power. Although it is inevitable that some readers will disagree with my terminology, I hope that my usage of these words does more to enlighten than to obscure.
The Book's Outline Exploring opposition to reform at both the institutional and ideological level, this is a work of both political and intellectual history. Mainly it examines the public rhetoric of Russian nationalist intellectuals and those Communist Party leaders who were sympathetic to their views. While its main sources are literary and political journals, newspapers, and memoir literature, it also relies on secon-
16
Introduction
dary sources and to a lesser extent unpublished documents and supplementary personal interviews. What distinguishes it from much of the existing literature is not necessarily any sweeping revision of the history of perestroika-era politics or of the Russian nationalist movement, but its explanation of how Russian nationalism came to occupy such a prominent place in the views of those who considered themselves to be the torchbearers of Marxist-Leninist ideological orthodoxy. Indeed, the major political conflict in Russia in the late Soviet period was less one of "democrats" versus the Party than of two competing visions of the future of the country: one that aspired to integrate the country with the thought, institutions, and culture of the West, and one that rejected the West and instead turned inward for the sources of Russia's renewal. Chapters One and Two discuss Soviet nationality policies from Lenin to Brezhnev. Chapter One focuses on the creation of the USSR's basic political structures and the manner in which they effectively discriminated against the Russian republic and, many Russians believed, against ethnic Russians. It also reviews the gradual rehabilitation of Russian culture and symbols by Stalin. Chapter Two focuses on the rise of Russian nationalism after Stalin, the nationalities policies pursued by the Khrushchev and Brezhnev regimes, and the leading position of the Russian people in Soviet culture and politics. This chapter places particular emphasis on the Brezhnev regime's ambivalent attitude toward Russian nationalism; it seeks to place the regime's tolerance and even encouragement of controlled manifestations of Russian nationalist sentiment in the context of the Kremlin's larger policy goals in the late 1960s and 1970s. Chapter Three discusses the formation in the RSFSR Writers' Union of a coalition of anti-perestroika Russian nationalists and Soviet conservatives, unified by a shared opposition to the union's "liberal" elements, whose views were favored during the glasnost campaign. This process paralleled and anticipated developments in Soviet high politics, where Politburo member Egor Ligachev emerged as a symbol of opposition to the "excesses" of glasnost and the Westernizing direction that perestroika had taken. This is discussed in Chapter Four. While glasnost's critics in the Writers' Union took their cues from Ligachev and looked to him for support, Ligachev turned to the Russian nationalist intelligentsia to shore up support for a return to more traditional values. It was at this time, between 1986 and 1988, that the broad outlines of two different views of the Kremlin's reform program emerged in debates in literary journals and at Writers' Union meetings. A number of these writers played leading roles in the Russian national-patriotic movement that openly emerged during this period. This is probably an appropriate place to note that I make no pretension to literary expertise; the writers under discussion are viewed here as political activists, not as artists. Chapters Five and Six discuss the USSR's nationalities problem, the mobilization of Russian nationalism in response to nationalism in the Union republics, and the CPSU leadership's reaction to these developments. Focusing on the period from 1989 to mid-1990, Chapter Five discusses the Russian nationalists' rising concerns about "Russophobia" in the republics and the formation of
Introduction
17
groups outside the CPSU with a Russian nationalist orientation. Chapter Six focuses on the creation within the Party of a body that was sympathetic to the Russian national-imperial idea, the Communist Party of the RSFSR (RCP). Its creation marked a schism within the Communist Party between Gorbachev's liberalizing reformers and his conservative critics who managed to secure their control over the RCP. Chapter Seven considers the efforts ofIvan Polozkov's RCP in 1990-1991 to tap into Russian nationalist feeling at a time when both Communist rule and the Soviet Union itself were threatened with extinction. Hoping to prevent the disintegration of the Union, the leadership of the RCP attempted to blend Marxist-Leninist ideology with traditional Russian "great power" nationalism in order to broaden its appeal and thereby pressure Gorbachev to take firmer measures to restore order in the country. Chapter Eight discusses the country's terminal crisis during its last year and Gorbachev's attempt to save the USSR by coming to an agreement with the leaders of the Soviet republics. With Gorbachev's concessions to the republics infuriating the Party's hardliners and many Russian nationalists, criticism of the president finally turned into action in the summer of 1991. Although those who inspired the coup, those who launched it, and those who supported it were not necessarily the same people, each shared a common interest in retaining the centralized, Russian-dominated Soviet state that they believed the president was helping to destroy. Their struggle was not for communism, but for Russia, "one and indivisible." Chapter Nine serves as an epilogue. It discusses some general trends in Russian politics in the immediate post-coup period and seeks to place in historical context the struggle between reformers and conservatives during the Gorbachevera.
Transliteration and Capitalization This work uses the Library of Congress system of transliteration with several exceptions. Names beginning with the soft vowel 'ia' (j{) are rendered as 'ya.' Thus the Soviet Minister of Defense is Dmitrii Yazov rather than Iazov; Yakovlev rather than Iakovlev, etc. Several names are written in their more familiar form, such as Yeltsin and Trotsky, rather than EI'tsin and Trotskii. Likewise, the familiar "Politburo" is used instead of "Politbiuro." I have also dropped the diacritical marks that indicate the Russian soft sign in the words glasnost and samizdat, which under the Library of Congress system are more strictly rendered glasnost' and samizdat '. The existence of various transliteration systems can pose a number of challenges, one of which is the matter of consistency. So, for example, while I use the Library of Congress system in the text, when citing passages from works that use other transliteration systems I do not change the translation of the cited works. While most foreign words are italicized, fre-
18
Introduction
quently-used Russian words such as perestroika and glasnost are left unital icized. When capitalized, the word "Union" without a modifier refers specifically to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Lower-case "union," absent a modifier, may refer to any union, including the Writers' Union. The word "Communist" is similarly used: when capitalized, "Communist" refers specifically to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU); "Communists" are persons having membership in the CPSU and its branches in the Soviet republics. Lower-case "communist" has a broader meaning, both as an adjective (i.e., communist ideology) and in reference to non-specified communist parties. Finally, when referring to the Soviet republics I use their official Soviet (Russian) names: hence, until their declarations of sovereignty in 1990-1991, the Moldavian SSR rather than Moldova and the Belorussian SSR rather than Belarus. Likewise, the words Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Georgia, etc., refer to the Soviet Socialist Republics of Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Georgia, etc.
Abbreviations
ASSR - Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic CC - Central Committee (of the CPSU) CPD - Congress of Peoples' Deputies CPRF - Communist Party of the Russian Federation CPSU - Communist Party of the Soviet Union DKI - Movement of Communist Initiatives KGB - Committee for State Security LNF - Leningrad Popular Front MVD - Ministry of Internal Affairs NEP - New Economic Policy (1921-28) OFT - United Workers' Front OSR - United Council of Russia RAPP - Russian Association of Proletarian Writers RCP - Communist Party of the RSFSR (1990-91) RCP(B) - Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) RDC - Russian Deputies' Club RSFSR - Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic RSFSR CPD - RSFSR (Russian republic) Congress of People's Deputies SSR - Soviet Socialist Republic USSR - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics USSR CPD - USSR (Soviet) Congress of Peoples Deputies UW RSFSR - RSFSR (Russian republic) Writers' Union UW USSR - USSR (Soviet) Writers' Union VOOPIK - All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments
Introduction
19
VSKhSON - All-Russian Social Christian Union for the Liberation of the People
Russian terms
apparat - full-time Party-state bureacracy apparatchik - member of the Party or state apparat derevenshchiki - village prose writers derzhavnost' - Russian "great power" nationalism glasnost - openness Glavlit - Main Literature and Art Administration (responsible for censorship) Goskomizdat - State Committee on Publishing gorkom - city Party committee ispolkom - Soviet executive committee Komsomol- Communist Youth League korenizatsiia - indigenization krai - region nomenklatura - privileged Party and state workers obkom - regional Party committee oblast' - region perestroika - restructuring raikom - district Party committee raion - district rossiiane - citizens of the RSFSR (and later the Russian Federation) rossiiskii - adjectival form of rossiiane russkie - ethnic Russians russkii - adjectival form of russkie samizdat - a publication lacking official sanction sblizhenie - the drawing together of nationalities sliianie - the blending of nationalities
Notes 1. There were, of course, those cases where the central government did use force to quell nationalist disturbances in Tblisi (1989), Baku (1990), and Vilnius (1991); likewise, the republican governments used force against their own ethnic minorities in Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaidzhan, Kirgizia, and Uzbekistan. Nevertheless, during the terminal stage of the Soviet crisis in 1991, the country's leaders were unwilling to unleash the army on the population at the risk of a civil war. 2. Kosovo Pole was the site of an Ottoman victory over the Serbs in 1389. In 1987, as Yugoslavia entered the terminal phase of its criSIS, Milosevic spoke to a crowd of aggrieved Serbs in Kosovo (which they believed to be their ancestral heartland), telling
20
Introduction
them that "No one should dare to beat you." In his rise to power in Serbia in the late 1980s, Milosevic unabashedly played on Serbs' profound sense of victimhood. See Tim Judah, The Serbs: History Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 160-164. 3. Still another approach to the Russia question was taken by the exiled Russian writer, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who watched events unfold in the Soviet Union from his isolated compound in Vermont. In a much-discussed article published in the autumn of 1990, titled "How Can Russia Be Rebuilt?," Solzhenitsyn suggested that the new Russia should be reconstituted as the RSFSR plus the Ukrainian and Belorussian republics, as well as the northern part of Kazakhstan, if their populations favored it; the remaining regions of the USSR did not constitute essential and historically "Russian" parts of the Russian core and thus simply added to the imperial burden. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, "Kak nam obustroit' Rossiiu?," Literaturnaia gazeta, 18 September 1990, 3-6 4. Public opinion polls have demonstrated that "Independence Day" is a meaningless holiday to most Russians. According to one poll, conducted in June 2002, in response to the question "What does the June 12 holiday mean to you personally?" the leading answers were "It means nothing to me" (32 percent) and "An extra day off' (30 percent). "The Public Opinion Database." (14 April 2004). 5. Russian expansion, notes John LeDonne, was not the result of a master plan, but resulted from the simultaneous rise of Russia and the decline of neighboring powers such as Sweden, Poland, and Persia. To some extent, this drive to occupy the entire "heartland"-the continuous plain that stretches from the Elbe River to Manchuria-was conditioned by Russian geography, which determined the paths of Russian expansionism. John LeDonne, The Russian Empire and the World, 1700-1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion and Contmnment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), xiii, 1. 6. In 1462 the Grand Prince of Moscow ruled 24,000 square kilometers; in 1914 the Russian Empire covered an area of about 13.5 million square kilometers. Dominic Lieven, Empire: The RUSSIan Empire and Its RIvals (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000),262. 7. D. Lieven, 253. 8. According to the 1897 census, only 44.3 percent of the empire's inhabitants were Russian. In the last Soviet census, taken ninety-two years later, that figure was 50.8 percent and declining. 9. Vera Tolz, RUSSIa. Inventing the Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 10. 10. Roman Szporluk, Nations and Nationalism: Karl Marx Versus Friedrich LIst (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988),206. 11. Szporluk (1988), 206. 12. Geoffrey Hosking, RUSSIa: People and Empire, 1552-1917 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997). 13. Viktor A. Kremenyuk, Conflicts In and Around RUSSIa: Nation-Building in Difficult Times (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994),7. 14. See Andrzej Walicki, The Slavophile Controversy (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989). 15. Cited in Astrid Tuminez, Russian Nationalism since 1856: Ideology and the Making of Foreign Policy (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 64. Emphasis in the original.
Introduction
21
16. Liah Greenfeld has identified this feeling as ressentiment-the resentment and hatred that arose out of Russian nationalists' realization that their country could not live up to the Western ideal. Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), chapter three. 17. Timothy McDaniel, The Agony of the Russian Idea (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 44. 18. W. Bruce Lincoln, Nicholas I: Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978),239-250. 19. Theodore R. Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863-1914 (DeKalb, Ill.: Northern 1llinois University Press, 1996). 20. See Hans Rogger, Russia in the Modern Age: Modernisation and Revolution 18811917 (New York: Longman, 1983). Quote from Rogger, "Nationalism and the State: A Russian Dilemma," Comparative Studies in Society and History 4, no. 3 (1962): 253. 21. Weeks, 5. 22. Robert Geraci, Window on the East: National and Imperial Identities in Late Tsarist Russia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001), 26. 23. Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Perestroika (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), 118-121. 24. For an overview of the nationalist revival in the USSR, see H6U:ne Carrere d'Encausse, The End of the Soviet Empire (New York: Basic Books, 1993). Also see Ronald Gregor Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993). 25. Michael Ellman and Vladimir Kontorovich, The Destruction of the Soviet Economic System: An Insider's History (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 7. 26. Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism (London: Routledge, 1998). 27. Greenfeld, Nationalism, 4-7. 28. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991), 6. 29. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1983), 55. Likewise, Eric Hobsbawm believes that nationalism precedes nations, and in particular looks at the role of political authorities in constructing nations "from above." Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 30. Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 31. Josep R. Llobera, The God ofModernity: The Development ofNationalism in Western Europe (Oxford and Providence: Berg Publishers, 1994),219-221. Adrian Hastings argues that national consciousness in England was shaped between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries. Adrian Hastings, The Construction ofNationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 15. 32. Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 202. 33. Connor (1994), 197. 34. Valery Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: The Mind Aflame (London: Sage, 1997), I-II. See, for example, Gumilev's Ot Rusi do Rossii: Ocherki etnicheskoi istorii (Moscow: Rol'f, 2001). 35. Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001), 448-450. 36. Suny, 7.
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37. In his book Beyond the Horizon, Ziuganov defined "the historical process" not as the history of "class struggle," but as a "process of interaction, competition, and change of ... civilizations." This process involved "ethnic groups (etnonsy) that have alwaysfrom ancient times-been the ... bearers, guardians, and the main players on the stage of the world history." Ziuganov, Za gorizontom (Moscow: Informpechat', 1995), 10. 38. Eric Hobsbawm, for example, distinguishes between the civic and democratic nationalism of western Europe from about 1830 to 1870 and "ethno-linguistic nationalism" of Central and eastern Europe between 1870 and World War I. See his Nations and Nationalism (1990). Some theorists reject the existence of civic nations. Bernard Yack, for example, suggests that the "myth of the civic nation" reflects one strategy that liberals, disappointed by the results of the age of nationalism, have used to "find and preserve a form of national community that is compatible with liberal political commitments." See Bernard Yack, "The Myth of the Civic Nation," in Theorizing Nationalism, ed. Ronald Beiner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 115. 39. Vera Tolz points out that the word "Rossiia" originated only in the eighteenth century, and that "rossiiskii" and "russkit' were used interchangeably into the twentieth century. Furthermore, she notes that only in the late 1980s did the democratic concept of a civic nation enter the discourse of Russian political elites. Tolz, 5, 58, 273. 40. John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, second edition (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1993), 2. 41. Michael Hechter, Containing Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002),7. 42. Anthony D. Smith, 74. 43. Yitzhak Brudny, Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State, 1953-1991 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 8-13. It should also be pointed out that the word "radical" was also often used by Soviet conservatives of all ideological persuasions to describe advocates of rapid democratization and economic reform; such "radicals" referred to themselves as "democrats." 44. When it originated during the civil war, National Bolshevism, first espoused by Russian patriots opposed to the Bolshevik seizure of power, was based on the assumption that communism in Russia was a temporary phenomenon. Viewing communism in the broader view of Russia's historical trajectory, National Bolsheviks such as Nikolai Ustrialov hoped that the Bolshevik regime would eventually become more Russian in nature and would defend Russian national interests. The National Bolsheviks of the late Soviet era likewise emphasized the vital roles played by the Communist Party and Soviet institutions in preserving the empire. 45. Mikhail Agursky, "The Prospects of National Bolshevism," in The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future, ed. Robert Conquest (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), 87. 46. John B. Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 128-129. 47. Pravda, 23 February 1991, I. 48. Interview in La Repubblica, 27 January 1990, 12, in Foreign Broadcast Infonnation Service Daily Report for the Soviet Union (hereafter FBIS-SOV), I February 1990, 66. 49. Connor (1994), 196. 50. Roman Szporluk, "Dilemmas of Russian Nationalism," Problems of Communism 38, no. 44 (1989): 15-35.
1 Russians, the RSFSR, and Soviet Nationalities Policy, 1917-1953 "In the West it is poorly understood that the Third International is not the International, but the Russian national idea." - Nikolai Berdiaev, 1937 "Scratch certain communists and you find a Great Russian chauvinist." - Vladimir Lenin, 1919
This book's main idea is uncomplicated: a movement toward Russian nationalist positions by part of the Communist Party elite had been taking place for several decades before Gorbachev, but began to be fully realized only as the Soviet Union entered its terminal crisis during the perestroika era. Just as many of the liberal reformers abandoned, and in some cases repudiated, Marxism-Leninism as they attempted to transform their country, so were the Party's conservatives forced to reconsider their own ideological convictions. Many appeared to lose faith in the official ideology's power to save the USSR and instead turned to traditional "great power" Russian nationalism. To fully appreciate this development it is useful to compare the views of the Bolshevik party's founder, Vladimir Lenin, to those of Gennadii Ziuganov, the head of the post-Soviet Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) since 1993. Their differences are significant and owe much to the circumstances under which their political philosophies developed. Lenin's political consciousness was shaped by the crisis of the old regime and the international struggle of the laboring classes. His main interest was in accelerating the unavoidable demise of the first and the inevitable triumph of the latter. The views of Gennadii Ziuganov, however, developed during an era when Russia, now in its Soviet incarnation, was at the height of its international prestige and was engaged in a global competition with a rival superpower; his outlook was also shaped by the tensions between the official Marxist-Leninist ide23
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ology of the CPSU and the post-Stalin Russian cultural nationalism of the intellectual elite. Whereas Lenin's ideas about the revolution developed underground and in exile, both internal and abroad, borrowing heavily from both the European socialist and the Russian revolutionary traditions, Ziuganov's views about Russia formed while serving the ruling party as a provincial instructor and then as an official in Moscow. Both Lenin and Ziuganov had extensive experience with propaganda-the first in the service of smashing the old world, and the second in the service of saving it. Unlike Lenin, who believed that the October Revolution represented a decisive break with Russia's backward, tsarist past, the leaders of the contemporary CPRF tend to place the Soviet era firmly in the context of Russia's thousandyear history. For Ziuganov, Soviet communism, despite its flaws and distortions, was a direct outgrowth of the Russian experience. While Lenin the revolutionary believed that socialist values were indisputably superior to the traditional Christian values that were fated to disappear, Ziuganov the Russian patriot believes that socialist values are the modem expression of traditional Russian and Christian values. Without fear of contradiction, Ziuganov asserts that he is a Marxist, a Leninist, an Orthodox Christian (or at least sympathetic to believers), and above all, a Russian patriot. During electoral campaigns his party has traditionally sought the support of all those who are committed to reviving the power of Great Russia. While the early Bolsheviks claimed to be internationalist, committed to a worldwide revolution of the proletariat, in today's Russia a basic component of communist ideology is the recognition of the Russian people's special ethnic identity and their mission to unite and lead the diverse peoples of Eurasia down a distinctly non-Western path of development. This broad appeal to Russian nationalism in its traditional-that is, ethnic and, more overtly, imperial-forms might at first glance seem to be antithetical to the Marxism's traditional emphasis on internationalism and Lenin's own efforts to suppress "Great Russian chauvinism." Nevertheless, this shift in emphasis earned Ziuganov and the CPRF considerable popular support during the tumultuous Yeltsin decade. Contrasting themselves to the "so-called democrats" (as they often referred to the liberals), whom they accused of blindly copying Western models of development as they sold out Russia's interests for their own personal gain, the Communists portrayed their own party as the leading party of Russian "patriots." Although on the surface this development might seem counterintuitive and contradictory, the merger of Marxism-Leninism and Russian nationalistconservatism continues a trend that had been taking place in Soviet Russian communism since Stalin or even since the early 1920s. During the Brezhnev era in particular, a time when Russian nationalists enjoyed considerable influence in Soviet political and creative institutions, limited expressions of Russian cultural nationalism became acceptable-and often useful-to the regime as long as the basic tenets of Soviet communist ideology were unchallenged.' The flowering of
Russians, the RSFSR, and Soviet Nationalities Policy, 1917-1953
25
Russian cultural nationalism influenced and indeed even shaped the political consciousness of a new generation of Communists and intellectuals who came of age during and after the Stalin era. Sharing several common assumptionsmost fundamentally the notion of Russian (and Soviet) uniqueness, the maintenance of a strong and indivisible state, and anti-Westernism-Soviet communism and conservative Russian nationalism had always enjoyed a certain degree of complementarity. This condition became more apparent when the USSR was threatened with its own demise after 1989. The ftrst two chapters of this book examine these developments. Chapter One discusses the development of Soviet nationalities policy from 1917 to 1953, focusing speciftcally on the position occupied by the country's dominant nation and its republic, the RSFSR. Chapter Two focuses on the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods, when efforts to create a truly Soviet identity throughout the USSR paralleled the revival of Russian cultural nationalism in the RSFSR and the rise of an influential "Russian party" within the country's leading political and cultural institutions. But ftrst we turn to the founder of the Soviet state, Vladimir Lenin, and the creation of a nationalities policy that bore his imprint for more than seven decades.
Lenin and the Revolution Writing almost twenty years after the October Revolution, the Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdiaev remarked that Bolshevism was "the third appearance of Russian autocratic centralism," following the old Muscovite state and Peter the Great's Russian Empire. Berdiaev claimed that because of the combination of Russia's history of despotism and the individual Russian's uncompromising search for the Absolute (and his resulting capacity for extreme dogmatism), "only in Russia could a communist revolution take place."z Of course Berdiaev's conclusion was later nullifted by the triumph in 1949 ofa largely indigenous Chinese Communist movement, influenced in part by the success of the Bolsheviks in Russia. Nevertheless, to this day questions about the social and ideological roots of communism in Russia and indeed the very nature of the Bolsheviks' revolution remain contentious. Was the totalitarian nature of Soviet communism deeply rooted in the Russian autocratic tradition? Or was twentieth century Russia simply the accidental laboratory for a radical social experiment that was intended for the more economically developed countries of Western Europe? Putting the matter in more precise historiographical terms, was the Soviet Union, as historian Richard Pipes has long contended, the direct heir to the authoritarian political traditions of Holy Russia? Or did an imported Marxist ideology warp tsarist Russia's plodding but otherwise healthy development toward a Western-type polity and society, as Martin Malia has claimed?3 The answer to
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Chapter One
these questions is predicated largely on one's understanding of the founder of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Vladimir Ilich Lenin. Much Western scholarship on Lenin, especially in recent years, has portrayed him as a misanthrope who had as little love for Russia and Russians as he did for a tsarist system that had long outlived its usefulness. 4 To this Lenin, Russia was little more than a "slovenly, slapdash, eternally drunk country," as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn wrote in his novel Lenin in Zurich. 5 Although it is true that he loathed Russia and its people, preferring instead the organization and efficiency of the Germans, Lenin was nevertheless strongly influenced by the Russian revolutionary tradition. The populists (narodniki) of the l860s and l870sand in particular Petr Tkachev and Petr Nechaev, each of whom emphasized the creation of a conspiratorial organization and the subordination of all morality to the needs of the revolution--were especially admired by the young Lenin. Yet Lenin carried on not only the Russian revolutionary tradition, but also many of Russia's most significant ruling traditions, including the centuries-old pattern of centralized dictatorship and the authorities' claim to a monopoly on Truth. In this sense, writes Timothy McDaniel, the author of The Agony of the Russian Idea, Bolshevism was "the triumph of a new version of Russian traditionalism.,,6 In the decade before the outbreak of World War I, that uncontestable Truth was Marxism, an imported ideology that confidently posited the inevitability of a violent working class revolution that would sweep away the decadent old bourgeois capitalist order in Europe. With its commitment to the creation of a higher form of society, Marxism was easily adapted to Russian conditions and mentalities. Russian Marxism, concludes McDaniel, was "not just a doctrine imported from the West, but was itself deeply rooted in the Russian idea.,,7 Years later Josef Stalin would marry Marxist socialism to Lenin's ideological and practical innovations (whose main purpose was to accommodate Marxism to Russia's particular social, political, and economic conditions) to create a new orthodoxy, a new Truth: Marxism-Leninism, the proper guardian and unassailable interpreter of which was the Communist Party he headed. Although the Bolsheviks were the more radical branch of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (the Mensheviks, from whom they split in 1903, were the other), they were still heavily influenced by the internationalist thinking of the European socialist movement. Most Marxists, Russian or otherwise, adhered to the belief of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels that nationality and nationalism were products of bourgeois capitalism. In this view, state and national boundaries acted as barriers to the international unity of the working class-the revolutionary class. For the moment the class struggle would take place within state boundaries, but after the inevitable socialist revolution those national differences would gradually disappear. The bonds of class, they believed, were more durable and more deeply rooted than the bonds of nationality. Thus for Lenin and the Bolsheviks, the proletarian revolution was not to be specifically Russian, but instead had worldwide ambitions. Whereas Marx and
Russians, the RSFSR, and Soviet Nationalities Policy, 1917-1953
27
Engels, as well as most of the European socialists who followed them, were convinced that the socialist revolution would inevitably break out in one of the "advanced" capitalist countries of the West, Lenin imagined Russia-backwards and peasant, to be sure, but rapidly developing as an industrial power-as the scene of the workers' revolution. As early as 1893 Lenin had declared that Russia was a capitalist country and was therefore ripe for revolution-and socialism. Two decades passed while Lenin built up his conspiratorial party and worked, mostly from abroad, toward his final goal: the worldwide dictatorship of the proletariat. The favorable conditions necessary for the proletarian revolution and the triumph of socialism finally appeared with the stalemate of World War I, which fundamentally weakened the imperial system. Declaring that Russia was the weakest link in the imperialist-capitalist chain, Lenin, while calling for its defeat, concluded that Russia would be the springboard of the first revolutionary upheaval. Subsequently the real revolution would shift to Western Europe, where capitalism was more developed and the conditions for the creation of a socialist society were more propitious. Upon seizing power in St. Petersburg in the autumn of 1917, Lenin and the Bolsheviks were intent on extending the spirit of revolution to the workers and soldiers of war-weary Europe. Before signing the treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918, in which the new Bolshevik-dominated government ceded large portions of the empire to Germany and applied the principle of "self-determination" to many non-Russian regions, it scarcely occurred to the Bolshevik leaders that there might be "socialism in one country." As late as March 1919, at the height of the Civil War, Lenin continued to write that "Complete and final victory ... cannot be achieved in Russia alone; it can be achieved only when the proletariat is victorious in at least all the advanced countries, or, at all events, in some of the largest of the advanced countries.,,8 Yet with the failure of the radical left in Germany to seize power in 191819, and Bela Kun's overthrow after leading a short-lived Communist government in Hungary in 1919, the prospects for a general proletarian uprising in Europe faded. Another opportunity to internationalize the revolution appeared in 1920 with the Polish invasion of Russia, which Lenin hoped to use as a springboard to send the Red Army into the heart of Europe and ignite workers' uprisings in Germany.9 This too failed, and the dream of a worldwide socialist revolution was postponed pending the appearance of more favorable conditions. The ostensibly international revolution that began in Russia had become a Russian revolution led by the Bolsheviks. In the end, Lenin and his party were left with backwards Russia, minus its western borderlands (which paradoxically were among its most economically developed regions as well), as the laboratory for the socialist experiment. After more than three and a half years of war with Germany, followed by three more years of civil war, the country Lenin ruled was in tatters. The attempt to impose a completely state-run economy by force-War Communism-had failed miserably, and in 1921 was replaced by the New Economic Policy (NEP),
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Chapter One
which allowed for concessions to individual entrepreneurship and the market. Still, the Bolsheviks' hold on the country was practically uncontested. Swelling with new recruits from various political backgrounds, the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), later renamed the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was quickly transformed from a small conspiratorial group into a mass organization with a membership in the millions.1O The Party absorbed elements running the entire gamut of prerevolutionary political activity, ranging from the socialist "left" (repentant Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries) to the extreme "right" (including former activists in the monarchist Union of Russian People), in an effort to consolidate Soviet power within the borders of the old tsarist empire. Thus, not long after the regime's birth-as again at the end of the Soviet era-two ideologies standing at opposite ends of the political spectrum, each fearing that with Western aid the empire assembled by the tsars would be dismembered, came together in order to preserve power in Russia. As the Party's base expanded to include millions of Russian proletarians, after 1921 it was subsumed by a strongly anti-Western perspective. This can be explained at least partly by the unfavorable circumstances the Bolsheviks faced at the time, including the West's rejection of the Bolsheviks as Russia's rulers, the Allies' participation in the Civil War, and the failure of the anticipated international revolution. I I Such anti-Westernism remained a key plank of Communist ideology for more than sixty years; moreover, after Stalin it was a common point of contact for both orthodox Marxist-Leninists and Russian nationalistconservatives. Indeed, anti-Western feeling continued to unite the Russian nationalists and Communists who struggled against Boris Yeltsin, his economic reforms, and his conciliatory foreign policy during the 1990s.
Bolshevik Nationalities Policy and the Russian Question After the false promise of 1917-1920, hopes for the global victory of communist "internationalism" slipped back into the realms of propaganda and political theory. While in theory the party of Lenin was above all internationalist, in practice its policies suggested a certain degree of ambivalence about the national issue. On one side of the equation, the Bolsheviks singled out Russian national tradition for destruction during the early years of the revolution. Nevertheless, elements of traditional Russian national feeling quickly appeared within the swelling ranks of the Bolsheviks, and as the political circumstances changed in the 1930s the regime co-opted and to some extent even encouraged these tendencies. The country's territorial organization was the most telling reflection of the Bolshevik regime's attitude toward its dominant nationality during its early years. Was the country to be a federation of sovereign nations, as Lenin had promised, or was it to be a centralized unitary state, as he believed was neces-
Russians, the RSFSR, and Soviet Nationalities Policy, 1917-1953
29
sary? Despite his wartime calls for the national self-determination of peoples, Lenin was convinced that the large degree of political and economic centralism achieved during the tsarist era would be instrumental in the creation of socialism. Nearly a decade earlier, in 1913, Lenin had written that "The great centralized state is a tremendous step forward from medieval disunity to the future socialist unity of the whole world, and only via such a state ... can there be any road to socialism.,,12 Despite his later promises of "national self-determination" for the non-Russian peoples, Lenin never abandoned this belief, for he was convinced that centralization was a precondition for the future success of socialism. In fact, Lenin had little sympathy for the nationalist aspirations of Russia's ethnic minorities. A committed internationalist, he regarded nationalism as an ephemeral phenomenon-a "bourgeois trick"-associated with the era of capitalism.13 In the long run, the establishment of communism would destroy nationalism. Thus his calls for the "right of nations to self-determination" were merely tactical, and in any event the principle was never formally accepted by the Bolshevik Party. On his way to creating the socialist paradise, Lenin's goals were to destroy the remnants oftsarist power in the empire and gain the trust of the non-Russian peoples. In these he enjoyed some success. His stance against "Great Russian chauvinism" during the Civil War-in stark contrast to the conservative nationalism of White Army generals such as Anthony Deniken, whose army employed the slogan "Russia, One and Indivisible"-was no doubt appealing to the oppressed non-Russian nations of the empire and won considerable support for the Bolsheviks in the periphery. 14 Nevertheless, the new country that emerged from the Civil War was created not by persuasion but by force, and it was the threat of force that held the country together for the next seventy years. Although full sovereignty was granted to a cluster of nations in the northwestern borderlands-Finland (December 1917), Estonia (February 1920), Lithuania (July 1920), and Latvia (August 1920)-by the end of the Civil War the Bolshevik government revoked many of its past concessions and withdrew the independence option wherever practicable. Among the national territories that were forcibly reincorporated were Ukraine (December 1919), Azerbaidzhan (June 1920), Belorussia (August 1920), Armenia (December 1920), and Georgia (March 1921). With the loss of the western borderlands and its populations (including more than seven million Poles), the proportion of Russians in the new state rose significantly. Once the Russian Empire's largest minority (44.3 percent in 1897), Russians emerged as the majority nationality (52.6 percent in 1926) in the territorially-reduced Soviet Union. IS Russians also constituted 72 percent of the Communist Party (1922). Thus the problem of Great Russian dominance, which Lenin saw as a major threat to the cohesion of the new state, was only exacerbated by the country's loss of millions of non-Russians. The long-term answer to the Russia's nationality problem, Lenin believed, lay in the policies of sblizhenie (drawing closer together) and sliianie (blending or assimilation) of its many nationalities. 16 Russians and the dozens of ethnic
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minorities who made up the new state would gradually merge to form one Soviet people, while "national" cultures and nationalist sympathies-in particular the Great Russian chauvinism that had made the tsarist empire a "prisonhouse of nations"-would become relics ofthe past. 17 However, this was a distant goal to be achieved over the course of generations. Since the making of a true Soviet man--one whose political and cultural consciousness was shaped by communist ideology, undiluted by antiquated national or religious sentiment-lay sometime in the future, a sensible short-term solution was to grant the non-Russian nationalities their own national-territorial republics in which non-Russian cultures would be allowed to develop. Although he disdained nationalism, Lenin recognized that it could be useful for advancing his main objective, which was to create the world's first socialist society. In December 1922 a Union Treaty formally united the nominally independent Ukraine, Belorussia, Transcaucasia (an amalgamation of Georgia, Azerbaidzhan, and Armenia), and RSFSR (which included what would later become the Central Asian republics) into a "confederation" of equal Soviet republics. According to the treaty's final article, each Union republic had the right to secede from the Union-a right that was repeated in every successive Soviet Constitution (1924, 1936, 1977).18 Thus with the formation of the USSR the Bolsheviks had arrived at a compromise federal solution that would ostensibly satisfy the aspirations of the non-Russian peoples by providing them varying degrees of autonomy, but that in reality concentrated most powers in the center. While in principle the new entity was a federal state based on the voluntary union of national republics, in reality orders emanated from Moscow, the historic seat of pre-Petrine Russia. Many Bolsheviks were unconvinced on both practical and ideological grounds of the soundness of these concessions to non-Russian nationalism, but Lenin managed to persuade his comrades to accept the federal formula as an instrument for welding together the fragments of the old empire. 19 Only by the compromise of combining the popular sentiments of nationalism with the political institutions of territorial federalism, the Bolsheviks concluded, could the country's political forces be harnessed in the service of building socialism. 2o Thus for Russia's new rulers, federalism was merely a stage on the path to a unified socialist society.21 With the situation in the USSR more or less stabilized, the main thrust of the Soviet Union's nationalities policy through the 1920s and into the early Stalin period was directed at korenizatsiia, or indigenization. This policy aimed at raising the level of social, economic, and political development of the relatively backward regions of the country by providing the republics with institutional equality and considerable cultural autonomy. National elites were to be trained and promoted into positions of leadership in each national territory. In addition, the non-Russian republics could, and indeed were actively encouraged to, use their own languages and choose their own alphabets. With the introduction of Ukrainian as the language of public life in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Repub-
Russians, the RSFSR, and Soviet Nationalities Policy, 1917-1953
31
lic (SSR), Ukrainian nationals who had once spoken Russian as their primary language began using Ukrainian. Introduced by force, the new language policy similarly affected the Belorussian SSR, despite significant local resistance to its implementation. 22 According to Terry Martin, the author of a highly original study of what he calls the "Affirmative Action Empire," these concessions to the non-Russian nationalities were based on three premises: 1) that the appeal of nationalism could be disarmed by granting the forms of nationhood; 2) that national consciousness was a necessary phase that had to be tolerated on the way to internationalism; and 3) that non-Russian nationalism was historically justified as a response to the great-power chauvinism of the Tsarist regime. Local nationalism, Lenin believed, was a lesser danger than Great Russian chauvinism. 23 Of course, the ultimate purpose of korenizatsiia (or natsionalizatsiia, the preferred term) was not to encourage the development of local national identities for their own sake, but to sovietize the non-Russian regions. For example, written languages were developed and used for the purpose of educating indigenes and promoting socialism. 24 Kirgiz, Turkmen, and Tadzhiks were among the major nationalities that received written languages at that time, as did the titular peoples of numerous "autonomous republics" (ASSRs, located within the Union republics), including Chechens, Ingush, Bashkirs, Mordvinians, Buriats, and Kalmyks. 25 Meanwhile, attempts to conduct the fight against illiteracy in the Russian language were frequently denounced as "great-power chauvinism.,,26 Valery Tishkov, the former director of the USSR's Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology and once a nationalities advisor to Yeltsin, has long been critical of the Leninist-Stalinist approach to the national-territorial division of the Soviet Union. In his view, the regime's nationality policies were beset with internal contradictions: "on the one hand, they [Soviet leaders] pursued a harsh policy of repression and hyper-centralized power; on the other, they carried out a policy of ethnonational state-building.,,27 Indeed, with the eventual creation of fifteen national (Union) republics, embracing thirty-eight national-territorial units (autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts, and autonomous okrugs), national territories were created for nearly every major ethnicity in the USSRin many cases before they had even consolidated into nations. 28 In each of the Union republics the titular nationality constituted a majority, and Slavs, mostly Russians, were a significant minority. The result of Soviet nationalities policies was that, as historian Ronald Suny has written, "Rather than a melting pot, the Soviet Union became the incubator of new nations.,,29 Indeed, observers have not infrequently called the USSR a national time-bomb, fated to come undone by the very institutions that it created during its formation. 30 Yet in the short- and medium-term, Soviet nationalities policies were successful, as they largely achieved their goals of educating and promoting nonRussian peoples in the larger effort to create a loyal Soviet citizenry devoted to the creation of a socialist society. At the same time, Soviet policies during the 1920s and early 1930s facilitated the growth of nationalist sentiment among the
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Union's non-Russian peoples while suppressing overt manifestations of Russian chauvinism. Both Lenin and Stalin believed that this would help the nonRussians to overcome their historic distrust of the Great Russians and thus would aid the consolidation of Soviet power, for all nationalities-Russian and non-Russian alike-would develop an overarching Soviet identity. In the meantime, since Soviet "affirmative action" policies were intended to benefit the nonRussians, Russians were expected to make sacrifices. To avoid the perception of empire, Martin asserts, Russians, particularly those living in areas dominated by another nationality, "bore the brunt of positive discrimination": they were asked to learn non-Russian languages, and their culture was stigmatized as a culture of • 31 oppressIOn. The sacrifices that Russians were expected to make were also reflected in the federal structure of the Soviet Union, which in effect discriminated against the territorial republic of the country's largest nationality. Most significantly, the Soviet leadership determined that the cohesiveness of the USSR would be best served if the Russian republic (the RSFSR) were denied its individuality by submerging it within all-Union structures. For this reason the Soviet government refused to grant the RSFSR certain institutions possessed by the other Union republics, such as a separate communist party apparatus and an Academy of Sciences. Until 1990 the Russian republic was instead served by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the USSR Academy of Sciences, as well as other all-Union institutions. The effect of this policy is best summarized in a later writer's lament that "Russia became the only republic without its own history books or its own national encyclopedia, and Russian schools were the only ones that did not require courses in the history of their republic in addition to the history of the USSR.,,32 This territorial and institutional arrangement reflected Lenin's belief that Russians should not be perceived as colonizers or chauvinists. Therefore the RSFSR could not be a national-territorial republic for the Russians in the same way that the Georgian people, for example, were later served by the creation of the Georgian SSR. Indeed, the RSFSR was simply what was left over after national republics had been created for the major non-Russian nationalities. Moreover, the RSFSR itself contained a number of autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts that served as territorial homelands for even smaller nationalities on the periphery; in these territories, too, the development of native languages and cultures was encouraged under the indigenization policy. Although the specific arrangements underwent several modifications, the matreshka-like nature of the arrangement remained the same for seven decades. Thus partly in order to contain the Great Russian chauvinism that he suspected was lurking just underneath the surface, Lenin made the Russian republic less equal than its counterparts. An even harsher and therefore more readily recognizable expression of Lenin's attitude toward Russia's past and its national identity was the new regime's ruthless treatment of the Russian Orthodox
Russians, the RSFSR, and Soviet Nationalities Policy, 1917-1953
33
Church, Russia's most prominent cultural institution and the focal point of the messianism of the nineteenth-century Slavophiles. As Marxists, Lenin and the Bolsheviks believed that religion was the "opium of the people"-a drug that offered relief to the pain of the oppressed classes. But since under the Bolshevik regime these classes were no longer oppressed-indeed, Bolshevism's triumph was officially attributed to the anticapitalist alliance of workers and peasantsreligion was now superfluous and even harmful to the Bolsheviks' plans to create a new people and a new society.33 In Lenin's view, the Russian Orthodox Church represented a potentially threatening relic of the old order and thus had to be isolated and then destroyed. In the long run religion, like nationalism, must ultimately disappear. 34 Despite the formulation and implementation of policies that were explicitly designed to undermine Russian nationalist sentiment, manifestations of Great Russian chauvinism and xenophobia did not disappear but in fact grew during the early 1920s as the Bolsheviks and their enemies adapted to the postrevolutionary environment. In 1921 Nikolai Ustrialov, together with other Russian emigres, published a collection of essays entitled Smena vekh (Change of Landmarks), which represented their having come to terms with Bolshevik power as a genuinely Russian phenomenon capable of holding the Russian state together and reviving its imperial power. The smenavekhovtsy lent their support to Bolshevik policies such as the New Economic Policy, adopted in 1921 to replace the failed policy of War Communism, which to them suggested that the regime was relaxing and becoming more sensible. As a result the Party welcomed some of them back to the Soviet Union, and Lenin himself went so far as to acknowledge that the smenavekhovtsy "express the mood of thousands and tens of thousands of bourgeois and all sorts of Soviet officials who participate in our New Economic Policy.,,35 Thus the merger of the "red and the black"----of "the most militant and xenophobic element in Bolshevism with the most chauvinistic and illiberal strain of Russian imperialism," in the words of historian Robert English-dates from the fIrst years of Communist rule. 36 As the Party swelled with commissars whose outlook was shaped more by old peasant Russia than the complex intellectual traditions of Europe (and Russia) and its thin internationalist veneer eroded, the Party's "ethos was increasingly marked by anti-Westernism and anti-intellectualism.,,3? Although the growth of Great Russian chauvinism that accompanied the expansion of the Party's ranks was of grave concern to Lenin, a stroke in March 1922 left him incapacitated and only intermittently active in politics until his death less than two years later.
Official Nationalism under Stalin As the Commissar of Nationalities from 1917 to 1924, Josef Stalin, a Georgian, was recognized as the leading Bolshevik expert on nationalities issues. In fact, it
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was Stalin who in 1913 provided the party with its official definition of the nation as "a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological makeup manifested in a community of culture.,,38 This description of the nation, with its emphasis on tangible ethnonational characteristics, remained the official definition for the entire Soviet period and is a testament to the Soviet view that the nation was not a subjectively defined community of perceived belonging and destiny, but rather something that can be created or destroyed through the development or disappearance of its cultural attributes within a national territory.39 (Hence Stalin's belief, put to the test near the end of W orId War II, that disloyal nations could be destroyed by deporting them from their ancestral homelands.) As long as Lenin lived he and Stalin agreed on the basic principles of Soviet nationalities policy, even if they sometimes disagreed about specific aspects of its implementation. 4o For more than a decade Stalin supported korenizatsiia (or, as he called it, natsionalizatsiia) but was aware that this policy, with its antiRussian undertones and support for non-Russian national cultures, was not popular with the Party rank-and-file. 41 And for Stalin popular support within the Party for his ideas was essential for defeating his rivals for power, which he did partly by disarming them ideologically and partly by presenting himself as Lenin's partner, ideological doppelganger, and intended heir. To counter Lev Trotsky and his internationalist principle of "permanent revolution," Stalin promoted "socialism in one country.'.42 To its critics, this slogan was evidence of Stalin's Russocentrism, as its internal focus suggested that the general secretary was placing Russian interests ahead of those of the international proletariat. This allegation was nothing new, for as commissar for nationalities during the civil war Stalin had been charged with Great Russian chauvinism by his ailing mentor for the harsh methods he employed while incorporating Georgia into the Union. Although Stalin's defeat of Trotsky was due in part to the fact that his stance better reflected the Russocentric views of the Party majority, his rise to power in the mid-1920s did not result in a sudden reversal of Soviet nationalities policies in favor of the dominant nation; indeed, Russians would get no special treatment for another decade, and even when Russian culture was later rehabilitated it still fell disproportionately to Russians to bear the burdens of lifting the more backward nationalities to their level of economic and cultural development. For the moment, under Stalin pre-revolutionary Russian culture continued to be suppressed. This was best symbolized by the assault on religion-and on the Russian Orthodox Church in particular-that persisted in violent waves through the 1920s and 1930s. Likewise, in literature and scholarship, fields in which Russian emigres (who largely rejected the Soviet regime) contributed actively, the Soviet authorities continued to attack symptoms of Great Russian chauvinism. This was one of the functions of the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP), one of the predecessors of the Writers' Union. Historical
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35
studies were also monitored-a task that fell to Vice Commissar of Education Mikhail Pokrovskii-and ideological deviations from Marxism were to be punished. The new history glorified the October Revolution not as the pinnacle of Russian history but as a victory of the international proletariat, and historians suspected of harboring sympathy for the dark times of pre-revolutionary Russia suffered harsh consequences. A more overtly Russocentric orientation emerged only gradually and in the context of a transformed international climate. A significant milestone was the war scare of 1927, when the regime launched a major campaign designed to mobilize popular support for the regime. 43 With the growth of fascist movements in Europe and the outbreak of war in the near future a real possibility, it seems that Stalin lost faith in Marxist-Leninist ideology'S ability to mobilize the Russian masses, which after all formed the core of the Soviet population. By the early 1930s the regime was trying to encourage the development of popular patriotic loyalty to the Soviet Fatherland, and in the process began to rely on the nationality most closely identified with the Soviet state-the Russians. Most significant in this regard was a December 1932 Politburo decree that inaugurated, according to Terry Martin, "a thoroughgoing rehabilitation of Russian culture and the right of Russians to national seIf-expression.'M This line continued with the promulgation of a new Soviet Constitution in 1936. The regime now emphasized the "Friendship of the Peoples"-a metaphor that was intended to signify the existence of a multinational community on Soviet soil, but which in reality put the Russians "first among equals.,,45 The policy of korenizatsiia gradually came to an end as the Soviet regime began to promote the "russification" of the political institutions of the non-Russian republics. 46 Although Stalin's main goal in promoting a policy ofrussification was to secure Soviet dominance in the increasingly distrusted national borderlands, it was not long before russification appeared to have become an end in itself47 Throughout the USSR, Soviet propaganda now celebrated the unifying role of the Russian nation and culture, while the Russian language and literature, as well as Russian national heroes, were showered with unprecedented praise. Having earlier declared Great Russian chauvinism to be the main threat to the Party, Stalin abandoned this rhetoric by the middle of the decade; from 1936 onward the Soviet press avoided any reference to great-power chauvinism and discrimination against locals. 48 The historic non-Russian "mistrust" of Russians, Stalin declared in December 1935, had been overcome. 49 Although many historians, most notably Mikhail Agursky, have portrayed this phenomenon as a gradual merger of communism and Russian nationalism, Nicolai Petro believes that Stalin's policy reversal was "a calculated decision on Stalin's part to prepare the regime better for the trials ahead-rapid industrialization, possible war.,,50 Likewise, Brandenberger emphasizes that this ideological reversal was "[p]ragmatic rather than genuinely nationalist." Stalin, he argues, "did not aim to promote Russian ethnic interests in those years so much as to foster a maximally accessible, populist sense of Soviet identity through the
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instrumental use of russocentric appeals.,,51 His famous 1931 speech to Soviet industrial managers, whose backdrop was industrialization, the fulfillment of the first Five Year Plan, and the urging of increased vigilance against both external and internal enemies, illuminates how Stalin was prepared to employ Russian history in the service of Soviet goals: To reduce the tempo would mean to fall behind; and those who fall behind are beaten. . . . The history of old Russia showed her constantly beaten for her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol Khans, she was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords, she was beaten by the Polish-Lithuanian Pans, she was beaten by Anglo-French capitalists, she was beaten by Japanese barons, she was beaten by all-for her backwardness. For her military backwardness, her cultural backwardness, for political backwardness, for industrial backwardness, for agricultural backwardness. She was beaten because to beat her was profitable and went unpunished. You remember the words of the pre-revolutionary poet [Nekrasov]: "Thou art poor and thou art plentiful, thou art mighty and thou art helpless, Mother Russia.,,52
Yet such appeals to Russian history were not indicative of a radical shift in nationalities policy; there was to be no return to the "prisonhouse of nations" associated with tsarist imperialism. As Robert English observes, "Leninism was not repudiated, but Stalin's constituency among the vydvizhentsy [the new generation that was moving up the Party's ranks] grasped simple historical analogies better than complex Marxist theories about capital or markets.,,53 Nevertheless, such analogies were used with greater frequency during the 1930s as the regime searched for a "usable past" that could be deployed to mobilize society in support of Soviet goals. Stalin concluded this could be found in the history of Russian state-building. 54 The dominant Pokrovskii school of history, which had emphasized the importance of unseeable forces over that of great men, was replaced by a more traditional approach to history that praised the achievements of Russian heroes such as Dmitrii Donskoi and Aleksandr Nevskii. Beginning in the 1930s Russian and Soviet history "was to catch people's imagination and promote a unified sense of identity that the previous decade's internationalist proletarian ideology had failed to stimulate. Forging a sense of patriotic unity promised to strengthen the party's and state's position in regard to internal opposition and external threat. ,,55 Accordingly, the Soviet leadership decided that under these circumstances the most effective historical narrative for the multinational Soviet Union would be a Russian-centered one that stressed traditional patriotism. In the new textbook portrayal of Muscovite and imperial Russia, for example, the extension of Moscow's control over Ukraine and Belorussia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was portrayed, as it was in tsarist times, as the reunification of indigenous Russian lands. Likewise, textbook writers developed the theory of the "lesser evil" to justify Russian nationalism to the empire's non-Slavs: Russians were portrayed as the elder brother whose conquest brought the fruits of her civilization to the
Russians, the RSFSR, and Soviet Nationalities Policy, 1917-1953
37
empire's peripheries while it protected Central Asia and the Caucasus region from the British. The history of the USSR, from this perspective, was the continuation of the Russian people's state building. 56 Whether intentional or not, such policies encouraged the revival of Russian national feeling. Under Stalin, official history was part of a larger policy designed to bond the republics closer together by emphasizing the notion that Russians were the historic integrators of the multinational state. Likewise, the regime also hoped to remedy the undesirable growth of local nationalisms that were inadvertently encouraged by the creation of national republics and the korenizatsiia policy. To achieve these goals the Soviet regime encouraged the in-migration of nonindigenes, especially Russians, into the republics. Between 1926 and 1939, 1.7 million people migrated to Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics alone; and even within the RSFSR a large part of the Russian population moved from European Russia to the eastern and southern (northern Caucasus) regions. 57 Even if this process was stimulated more by economic than political considerations, no doubt Stalin saw the influx of a Russian upper class in the national territories as a factor that contributed to the political stability he desired there. 58 While under Stalin Russians in the RSFSR or elsewhere received no special privileges, those Russians who settled in the other republics nevertheless tended to be better off than the titular nationalities, if only because Russians were rewarded for the better-developed technical skills that they tended to possess. 59 Russians also benefited from the promotion of the Russian language as the lingua franca for all the Soviet peoples. Although this had been the case since at least the mid-l 920s, by the mid-1930s non-Russians found it increasingly necessary to learn Russian in order to achieve success in their careers--especially for those who pursued political careers. Any ambiguity about the primacy of the Russian language even in the non-Russian republics was clarified in March 1938, when a new law was enacted that made mandatory the study of Russian in all schools throughout the USSR. Afterwards the number of books published in languages other than Russian fell sharply, as Russian became the language of all official business and of most educational institutions. Naturally, this was helpful to the Russian diaspora that settled in the republics during the wave of intensive industrialization that had begun ten years earlier, and contributed to the perception in the republics that Russians were colonizers. Coinciding with what appeared to be a policy of russification in the political, intellectual, and cultural spheres in the non-Russian parts of the USSR was the Great Terror of the late 1930s. Many leaders of the republics, accused of committing "national deviations," were removed (and often shot) and replaced with Russians, who Stalin perceived to be more loyal to the state. Similar accusations of national deviation and disloyalty resulted in the deaths of one thousand non-Russian writers and numerous other cultural figures. 6o Meanwhile, thousands of potentially disloyal Latvians and Poles (among others) in the sensitive border areas were deported and the number of Jews in leading Soviet bodies (for example, the NKVD and the Central Committee of the CPSU) declined
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Chapter One
dramatically. A Communist Party whose ethnic and class composItIon had changed substantially since the revolutionary days, when it was dominated by intellectuals and members of oppressed minorities, was now overwhelmingly Russian and in the grips of xenophobia and anti-Semitism. This tendency was exacerbated after World War II, during Stalin's last years, when a campaign against "cosmopolitanism" roused anti-Jewish sentiment in the country. The Great Patriotic War, during which Stalinist rhetoric tended to speak in terms of nations and patriotism rather than of classes and the class struggle, cemented the distinguished place of the Russian people in the Soviet Union. With Soviet statehood threatened by the German invasion of June 1941, appeals to Russian patriotism for the defense of the Fatherland (or Motherland) escalated. 6l Although the Soviet regime continued to advertise the principle of the equality of races and nations (in contrast to the Nazis' claims of German racial superiority), during the war's last years several Soviet nations were punished and deported for allegedly collaborating with the Germans, including the Chechens and Ingush, the Kalmyks and Karachais, and the Volga Germans and Crimean Tatars. Instead of internationalism and the class struggle, the Soviet government emphasized Russian national pride, for this war was not only "great," it was a war for the Fatherland, whose defense required the destruction of every single German, regardless of his class. The Soviet regime went so far to accommodate Russian national feeling as to revive the Russian Orthodox Church, which had suffered so greatly in the 1920s and 1930s. The Church, Stalin believed, could provide useful services both as a rallying point for the Russian people and as an instrument for the reoccupation of the Soviet borderlands at war's end. 62 A reflection of the regime's heightened respect for the Russian past was its adoption at the end of 1943 of a new national anthem that began with the words "Great Rus' has forged for all time an unbreakable union of free republics.,,63 Since victory in the Great Patriotic War was bought first of all with Russian blood, the Russian republic emerged from the war as "the first among equals" of the Soviet republics and the status of Russians was officially elevated to that of "elder brother" among the Soviet nationalities. Throughout the 1940s Russians, as well as Georgians and Armenians (both historically Orthodox peoples), continued to be given preferential admittance into the Party as the representation of Ukrainians, Belorussians, Jews, and the Central Asian peoples decreased. 64 The deportation of "disloyal" groups at the war's end was a signal to the other nonRussian nationalities-the Muslim nations in particular-that they should accept their subordinate place in the increasingly Russian-dominated one-party state. 65 Stalin's famous address to a group of Red Army commanders at the end of the war demonstrates how he conceived of the Russians' leadership role in the USSR: I would like to drink a toast to our Soviet people, and in particular to the health of the Russian people.
Russians, the RSFSR, and Soviet Nationalities Policy, J9J 7-1953
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I drink first of all to the health of the Russian people because it is the leading nation of all the nations belonging to the Soviet Union. I propose a toast to the health of the Russian people because it earned in this war general recognition as the guiding force of the Soviet Union among all the peoples of our country. I propose a toast to the health of the Russian people not only because it is the leading people, but also because it has a clear mind, a firm character and patience. 66
Great Russian chauvinism--combined with militant anti-W esternism and an intensified Soviet xenophobia-reached new heights after the war. While a campaign against "servility before the West" attempted to justify the lowering of the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe, a simultaneous crusade against "bourgeois nationalism" aimed to destroy national self-consciousness in the USSR's nonRussian republics. The praise of everything Russian reached the height of absurdity in the late 1940s as intellectuals were obliged to demonstrate Russian superiority in areas such as science, history, and culture. 67 Stalin himself, now dabbling in linguistics, promoted Russian as the "world language of socialism" in a 1949 article. "No one who does not know Russian and cannot read the works of the Russian intellect in the original can call himself a scholar," he asserted. 68 While the West was demonized and Jews were singled out for attack during the postwar zhdanovshchina and especially during Stalin's last years, Russians and the Russian past were accorded a level of prestige unprecedented in Soviet history.69 Yet "Russia" had not triumphed over the Soviet Union: the rehabilitation of traditional Russian culture and the promotion of Russian national selfexpression since the mid-1930s were intended mainly to bolster the Soviet Union's cohesion. The regime encouraged Russians to identify their national interests with Soviet interests by blurring the distinction between them; after the war the terms "Russian" and "Soviet" were routinely used interchangeably.70 Russians, like the USSR's other nationalities, were expected to think of themselves as above all Soviet, and to believe that their aspirations were realized within the Soviet state. Nevertheless, from the 1930s until nearly the end of the Soviet era, the Soviet Union was in many respects a Russian empire. The Russian language, Russian culture, and Russian traditions were not only dominant in the RSFSR, but were also promoted throughout the USSR alongside the languages, cultures, and traditions of the non-Russian republics. With Russian acknowledged as the universallanguage of the empire, Russians naturally found themselves in an advantageous position: they faced fewer restrictions on where they could work, travel, and live than did non-Russi an-speaking peoples. Moreover, with the creation of Russian-language newspapers in the non-Russian republics, Russians were made to understand that they need not feel like national minorities anywhere in the Soviet Union. 71 Russians, unashamed and even proud of their national past and traditions, played a unifying role throughout the USSR. Dominating the Com-
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munist Party and its leading bodies, Russians were without a doubt the leading nationality in the Soviet Union.
Notes I. The literature on late Soviet-era Russian nationalism is extensive. Most of it is based on published sources, such as Soviet literary journals and newspapers, as well as samizdat materials. See, for example, John Dunlop, The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); Walter Laqueur, Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia (New York: HarperCollins, 1993); Stephen K. Carter, Russian Nationalism: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990); Thomas ParI and, The Rejection in Russia of Totalitarian Socialism and Liberal Democracy: A Study of the Russian New Right (Helsinki: Commentationes Scienarium Socialium, 1993). Alexander Yanov, an emigre with extensive insider knowledge of the Russian nationalist movement, has made valuable, although heavily biased, contributions with his The Russian New Right: Right-Wing Ideologies in the Contemporary USSR (Berkeley: Institute ofIntemational Studies, 1978) and The Russian Challenge and the Year 2000 (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987). Recent scholarly publications include Yitzhak Brudny's Reinventing Russia, which analyzes the Brezhnev regime's attempt to co-opt Russian nationalist sentiment during the 1960s and 1970s, and Judith Devlin's Slavophiles and Commissars: Enemies of Democracy in Modern Russia (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), which examines the various tendencies of Russian nationalism during the post-Soviet period. Most recently Nikolai Mitrokhin has made a significant contribution to the literature on Russian nationalism after Stalin in a study based largely on interviews with members of the "Russian party" within the Soviet establishment. See his Russkaia partiia: Dvizhenie russkie natsionalistov v SSSR 1953-1985 (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2003). 2. Nikolai Berdiaev, The Origins of Russian Communism (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1948),114,120. 3. Such arguments about the nature and sources of Soviet communism may be found in Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990) and Martin Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History ofSocialism in Russia, 1917-1991 (New York: The Free Press, 1994). Also see Solzhenitsyn' s essay, "Repentance and Self-Limitation in the Life of Nations," in Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, et aI., From Under the Rubble (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974), 105-143. For a very useful essay that discusses the alleged predisposition of Russian intellectual culture to totalitarianism, see Andrzej Walicki, "The Intellectual Tradition of Pre-Revolutionary Russia: A Re-examination," in Alexander Shtromas and Morton A. Kaplan, eds., The Soviet Union and the Challenge of the Future, Volume 3: Ideology, Culture, and Nationality (New York: Paragon House, 1989), 3-21. 4. See Richard Pipes, The Unknown Lenin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); Dmitrii Volkogonov, Lenin: A New Biography (New York: The New Press, 1994); Robert Service, Lenin: A Biography (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000). 5. Aleksandr Solzhenitysn, Lenin in Zurich (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1976), 103-4.
Russians, the RSFSR, and Soviet Nationalities Policy, 1917-1953
41
6. McDaniel, 54, 61. 7. McDaniel, 101. 8. Quoted in Carter, 43. 9. Pipes (1996), 95-114. 10. Among the large numbers of Bolsheviks who flooded the Party's ranks after the revolution, the overwhelming majority were Russian, thus creating a party that by 1922 was composed of 72 percent ethnic Russians, with an additional 10 percent being Russian by language. For many of these new elements, the "dictatorship of the proletariat" amounted to the establishment of Great Russian hegemony in the reconsolidated country. Richard Pipes, The Formation o/the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964),277-278. II. The Russian emigre historian Mikhail Agursky argues that the Bolsheviks were always Russian nationalists of a particular sort. He claims that they had inherited the nationalism of the nineteenth-century Westernizers, which rejected both the alien intruder and the ancestral ways which hindered true progress. Agursky cites the West-rejecting ideology of the Vpered (Forward) group (which included Aleksandr Bogdanov, Mikhail Pokrovskii, and Leonid Krasin) as having made "an extremely important contribution to the nationalization and totalitarianism of Bolshevism." See Mikhail Agursky, The Third Rome: National Bolshevism in the USSR (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 8, 72-76. 12. Quoted in Robert J. Kaiser, The Geography o/Nationalism in Russia and the USSR (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994),99. 13. Pipes (1964), 276; quote cited in Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire, 4. 14. See Evan Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 280282. 15. Raymond Pearson, "The Historical Background to Soviet Federalism," in Alastair McAuley, Soviet Federalism, Nationalism and Economic Decentralization (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 17-18,21. 16. Walker Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 36-37. I 7. A consequence of Lenin's strong distaste for Russian nationalism was that the emigre intelligentsia, having left Russia to escape Bolshevik persecution, became the standard-bearers of Russian traditions for as long as Lenin lived. 18. Of the fifteen Union republics that constituted the USSR after World War II (a sixteenth, the Karelo-Finnish Republic, created in 1940, was demoted to the status of an autonomous republic within the RSFSR and renamed the Karelian Republic in 1956), six had been either signatories, or the direct legal successors to signatories, of the original Union Treaty (RSFSR, Ukraine, Belorussia, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaidzhan). The other Union republics were created at various times: the five Central Asian Republics (Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tadzhikistan) were carved out of the RSFSR in the 1920s, while Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and most of what would become the Moldavian SSR (there was already a tiny Moldavian ASSR within the RSFSR) were annexed during World War II. In legal terms, these nine republics joined the USSR not by being signatories to the original Union Treaty, but by petitions by their governments requesting admission to the USSR-a sham that Soviet governments used to justify their hold on these territories until 1991. Jane Henderson, "Legal Aspects ofthe Soviet Federal Structure," in McAuley, 47-48. 19. Pipes (1964), 43-49, 110- I I 1,277; Connor (1984), 36-37.
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20. Gregory Gleason, Federalism and Nationalism: The Struggle for Republican Rights in the USSR (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990),3. 21. Gleason, 19. 22. See Gerhard Simon, Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union: From Totalitarian Dictatorship to Post-Stalinist Society, trans. Karen Forster and Oswald Forster (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 42-48. 23. Martin, 4-8. 24. Kaiser (1994), 124-135; Martin, 10-12. 25. Simon, 46-47. 26. Simon, 49. 27. Tishkov notes that instead of creating conditions that would ensure equal rights for all the USSR's nationalities and ethnic groups-namely, the national-cultural principle of social organization within a liberal and democratic framework-the system focused on the rights of "titular" nations within their own national-territorial units while often ignoring the rights of minorities. Tishkov, 30, 33, 39; Brubaker, 23-40; Kremenyuk, 56-57. 28. There were also substantial minorities that lacked their own national territory. Thirteen of those nationalities numbered over 100,000, and Germans and Poles over one million. Indeed, the designation of Union republic and the lesser autonomous republic (within a Union republic) did not necessarily correspond to the size of the nationality for which it was created. For example, while one million (1989) Estonians had their own Union republic, the national-territorial unit named for the USSR's 6.65 million Tatars had only autonomous status within the RSFSR. 29. Suny, 87. 30. For a comparative discussion of the long-term impact that socialist institutions, national federalism in particular, had on the multinational USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, see Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Bunce writes that "the very design of these systems functioned over time to divide and weaken the powerful, homogenize and strengthen the weak, and undercut economic performance." "Thus," he concludes, "in response to the question of institutional determinism, we would have to argue that these systems were fated to end." Bunce, 13 I, 142. Also see Rogers Brubaker's discussion of "institutionalized multinationality" and its consequences, 23-54. 31. Martin, 15-20. 32. Galina Litvinova, "Starshii ili ravnyi?" Nash sovremennik 6 (June 1989): 17. 33. No less significant was Lenin's rejection of religious morality, which could only impede the triumph of socialism. Indeed, for the Bolshevik leader, morality was a relative concept: anything done in the service of the revolution was moral; whatever stood in its way was immoral. See Lev Trotsky, "Their Morals and Ours," originally published in The New International 4, no. 6 (1936). 34. Historian Arto Luukkanen believes that in general the religious policy of the Bolshevik party, like its nationality policy, was guided more by political reality than by ideology. Under the pressures of the Civil War the Soviet regime attempted merely to isolate the Church; once its external enemies were defeated, the Bolsheviks were able to focus on destroying the Russian Orthodox Church as an institution. This zig-zag approach, in which the Bolsheviks alternated brutal actions with more tactful methods of dealing with the Church, can be attributed to the fact that the party was divided into "hawks" and
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43
"doves" on religious policy. See Arto Luukkanen, The Party of Unbelief The Religious Policy of the Bolshevik Party, 1917-1929 (Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1994). 35. Quoted in Carter, 45-46. For the Soviet regime's treatment of smenavekhism, see Robert English, Russia and the idea of the West: Gorbachev, intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 28-31. 36. English, 31. 37. English, 32. 38. Cited in Kaiser (\ 994), 102. 39. Kaiser (\ 994), \02-103. 40. One substantive area of disagreement between Lenin and Stalin concerned the constitutional structure of the Soviet Union. While both supported the rights of non-Russians, Stalin opposed Lenin's proposal of creating a federation of independent and equal republics with one republic-the RSFSR-for the Russians. Instead, Stalin preferred to keep the existing RSFSR, which included all the other Soviet republics (Ukraine, Armenia, etc.), arguing that subsuming the other republics within the RSFSR, rather than giving them and the Russian republic equal and independent status, was the best way to disarm Russian nationalism. (It should be kept in mind that hopes for the worldwide revolution had not yet been abandoned when the RSFSR was created, and that the Bolsheviks expected the creation of other Soviet republics beyond the borders of the old tsarist empire.) Lenin's argument carried the day, and the USSR was created as a multi tiered structure in which the RSFSR (an internationalized "Rossiiskaia," not "russkaia" republic, Stalin was careful to emphasize) and the other independent republics entered as nominally equal members. See Martin, 394-401. 41. Martin, 245. 42. Although his book, The Permanent Revolution, was published in 1930, Trotsky's idea of "permanent revolution" dates to a series of articles written during the 1905 revolution. His original argument was that the revolution should not stop at the bourgeois phase, but must result in the seizure of power by the proletariat. Later, having come to the bitter realization after the civil war that the anticipated worldwide revolution had not occurred, Trotsky reasserted its global nature. "The completion of the socialist revolution within national limits is unthinkable ... it will not be accomplished until the final triumph of the new society throughout the planet." L. Trotsky, Permanentnaia Revolutsiia (Berlin, 1930), 167, in Dmitri Volkogonov, Trotsky: The Eternal Revolutionary (New York: The Free Press, 1996), 199. 43. David L. Brandenberger, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian Nationalldentity, 1931-1956 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 21. 44. Martin, 394. 45. Brandenberger, 43. 46. Republican political institutions were russified in the sense that by the mid-I 930s, while the leader of any given republican communist party was a member of the local nationality, Russians came to occupy the position of second secretary. Moreover, the holder of the latter position was made more powerful because of his direct access to the security services. 47. Some historians argue that there was a link between Stalin's brutalization of the Soviet peasantry-Ukrainian peasants in particular-and his concern with the loyalty of non-Russians. From this perspective, in Stalin's mind the peasant question was inseparable from the national question. See Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Col-
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lectivization and the Terror-Famine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). Also see Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda, Soviet Disunion: A History ofthe Nationalities Problem in the USSR (New York: The Free Press, 1990),66-73. 48. Simon, 84. 49. Martin, 45 I. 50. Nicolai Petro, The Rebirth ofRussian Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 96-97. 5 I. Brandenberger, 4. 52. Malia, 177. 53. English, 40. 54. Brandenberger, 45-62. 55. D.L. Brandenberger and A.M. Bubrovsky, '''The People Need a Tsar': The Emergence of National Bolshevism as Stalinist Ideology, 193 I - I 941," Europe-Asia Studies 50, no. 5 (1998): 875. 56. Brandenberger and Bubrovsky, 875-876. Also see chapter six of Brandenburger's National Bolshevism, 63-1 14. 57. Simon, I 19. 58. Piil Kolsto, Russians in the Former Soviet Republics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 9 I; Simon, I 19-I 2 I. 59. StilI, the perception that Russians were the favored nationality is borne out in the massive ethnonational "reidentification" of non-Russians as Russians in the late I 920s and 1930s, evident in the censuses of 1926 and 1939. That is, large numbers of people who had identified themselves as, say, Belorussians, in the 1926 census identified themselves as Russians in the 1939 census. See Kaiser (1994), 142-143. 60. Nahaylo and Swoboda, 77-78. 61. Simon, 181-183; Gennady Bokrdyugov, "Stalin's Regime and Russian Nationalism," History Today 45, no. 5 (May 1995): 27-33. 62. See Steven M. Miner, Stalin's Holy War: Religion, Nationalism, and Alliance Politics, 1941-1945 (Chapel HilI: University of North Carolina Press, 2003). 63. Quoted in Frederick C. Barghoom, Soviet Russian Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), 40. 64. Simon, 34-35. 65. Peter lS. Duncan, "Ideology and the National Question: Marxism-Leninism and the National Policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," in Stephen White and Alex Pravda, eds., Ideology and Soviet Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), 185. 66. Quoted in Barghoom (1956), 27. 67. Simon, 207. 68. Klaus Mehnart, Stalin Versus Marx: The Stalinist Historical Doctrine (London: AlIen & Unwin, 1952),64; English, 47. 69. Zhdanovshchina refers to the postwar ascendancy of Andrei Zhdanov (1896- I 948), a Stalin protege and ideology chief after 1944 who is best known for pursuing a harsh cultural policy whose main goal was the eradication of West em influence. 70. Brandenberger, 192. 71. Martin, 460.
2 Russian Nationalism, Russification, and the Rise of the "Russian Party," 1953-1985 "All the nations and nationalities of our country, above all the Great Russian people, played a role in the formation, strengthening and development of this mighty union of equal peoples that have taken the path of socialism. The revolutionary energy, selflessness, diligence and profound internationalism of the Great Russian people have rightly won them the sincere respect of all the peoples of our socialist homeland." - Leonid Brezhnev, 1971 "My motherland is not Russia, but the village of Korolevo in the Yaroslavl region. And why should I love myself for being Russian? I'm not guilty for it, nor did I earn it-it just happened that my parents were Russian." - Aleksandr Yakovlev, 1999
This chapter discusses Soviet nationalities policy, the paradoxical position of Russians in the USSR, and the growth of nationalist feeling among a segment of the Russian intelligentsia after 1953. It explains how Russian nationalism began to develop as an independent ideology in the decades after Stalin and eventually became a basic component of the country's ethnic politics. It also discusses the way the regime responded to the growth of Russian nationalist tendencies in officially approved literature. This chapter does not discuss underground, or samizdat, Russian nationalist literature. I As both a cultural and a political movement, Russian nationalism exerted considerable influence within Soviet institutions and consequently on Soviet, or more specifically, Russian society as a whole. Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev Russian nationalists, protected by powerful patrons in the leading bodies of the Communist Party, were promoted into influential positions in the media, Soviet creative organizations, the Communist Youth League (Komsomol), the Central
45
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Committee, and even the Politburo itself However, despite the growth of Russian cultural nationalism within the intelligentsia and the leading position of Russians within the USSR's leading institutions, on the eve of Gorbachev's reforms Russian national identity remained weakly developed, to a significant extent submerged within a broader Soviet identity. Although most Russians were proud of Soviet achievements, just as they were proud of the achievements of pre-revolutionary Russian culture, they also believed, with some justification, that they bore a disproportionate share of the costs of Soviet development. Russians did not perceive themselves as rulers of an empire, but as the bearers of culture and providers of human and material resources. In sharp contrast to the situation in, for example, the Baltic republics, where nationalist feeling had antiSoviet characteristics, there was, it would have seemed, little potential for Russian nationalism as a true oppositional movement. Whatever the attitude of Russian nationalists toward communist ideology and the Kremlin's policies, most remained loyal to a Soviet state that they hoped would adopt their positions.
Russian Cultural Nationalism after Stalin Before discussing the influence of the "Russian party" at the institutional level, let us first consider the political and cultural climate in the 1950s and 1960s that prepared the way for the emergence of Russian nationalism as an independent, and to a very limited extent, oppositional ideology.2 After 1956, when Nikita Khrushchev's "secret speech" began the unraveling of the Stalin myth, a more liberal, relaxed atmosphere enveloped the country. De-Stalinization not only meant putting an end to the indiscriminate use of state terror as an instrument of social control; it also signified a retreat from the official anti-Semitism, antiWesternism, and Great Russian chauvinism that had characterized the post-war Stalin regime. While he allowed a considerable degree of liberalization and permitted changes that offered greater exposure to life outside the USSR-such as the launching in 1955 of the journal Inostrannaia literatura (Foreign Literature) and the promotion of cultural, scientific, and educational exchanges with Western countries-Khrushchev himself should not be mistaken for a "liberal": to the end he remained distrustful of the West and suspicious of intellectuals, whose careers he could just as easily destroy as promote. Despite his earlier experiences as first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, when at Stalin's behest he crushed Ukrainian nationalism and attempted to sovietize (or, one might say, russify) the republic, Khrushchev promised a more tolerant and equitable nationalities policy that focused on national development in the republics. Nations deported to Siberia and Central Asia by Stalin during and after World War II, including Chechens, Ingush, Kalmyks, and Tatars, were rehabilitated and as many as 500,000 people were allowed to return to their homes (which in thousands of cases had been occupied by Russians for the past decade) in the southern part of the RSFSR. Ukrainians, distrusted by
Russian Nationalism, Russification, and the Rise ofthe "Russian Party"
47
Stalin and now seen by Khrushchev as natural allies in the battle against Stalinist forces, were recruited into the highest levels of the party while the representation of Russians declined. 3 Russians were still at the height of their prestige and influence in 1952, when they constituted 71.5 percent of the Central Committee; yet by 1961 Russian representation in that body had fallen to 62.7 percent as non-Russians increasingly filled top positions in the CPSu. 4 During Khrushchev's first years the Party guaranteed the development of the economy and culture of all the Soviet nations and nationalities. However, by the end of the decade concerns about the excesses of nationalism in the republics caused Khrushchev to shift toward the sblizhenie (drawing closer) and sliianie (assimilation) of the USSR's many nationalities. Having granted the republics a greater role in economic planning and management, he began to reverse this process in 1957. The next year the regime made the attendance of national language schools in the republics "voluntary," while Russian-language schools continued to operate throughout the USSR. Then, from 1959 to 1961 the regime conducted a purge of leaders in the non-Russian republics, including the Latvian, Moldavian, and Azerbaidzhan SSRs, as well as the Central Asian republics (although not, notably, the Ukrainian SSR, with which Khrushchev enjoyed a special relationship), for "national deviations"; however, in contrast to Stalin's purges, such as in the Estonian SSR more than a decade earlier, the victims were not murdered. 5 Determined to accelerate the merging process, it appears that Khrushchev, like Lenin, believed that national differences would ultimately disappear in the course of building communism. As the Party Program adopted by the TwentySecond CPSU Congress in 1961 stated: The borders between the union republics within the USSR are increasingly losing their fonner significance, since all the nations are equal, their life is organized on a single socialist foundation, the material and spiritual needs of each people are satisfied to the same extent, and they are united into one family by common vital interests and are advancing together toward a single goalcommunism. 6
Although Khrushchev was himself a product of Stalinism, promoted up the Party ladder by the Father of the Peoples and crushing his rivals in order to secure his position at the top after Stalin's death, once in power he sought to build a communist society without the Stalinist terror and hypercentralization that he believed had inhibited the realization of true socialism. Liberated from strict Stalinist cultural controls and the creative confines of Socialist Realism during the "thaw," Soviet artistic and literary life began a recovery that peaked in the mid-1960s. However, Khrushchev's liberalizing policies had the unintended effect of encouraging the growth of nationalist tendencies throughout the USSR. Some writers and artists in the western borderlands expressed nationalist themes in their work that reflected the collective pain of foreign occupation and sovieti-
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zation; a few writers in the Baltic republics, for example, discussed collectivization or the deportations of 1941. Some writers, Russians and non-Russians alike, made reference to the Terror and the Gulag; many more focused on the shortcomings of an indifferent bureaucracy. Among Russian writers, the new freedom gave rise to the "village prose" school of Soviet fiction, which emphasized rural themes rather than socialist ones. 7 Although it had its origins in the late Stalin era, with the publication of works such as Valentin Ovechkin's Sketches of Rural Daily Life (1952), village prose became popular during the thaw and remained so into the more conservative 1970s. Aleksandr Yashin's Levers (1956), which focused on rural problems such as material shortages and indifferent bureaucrats, was particularly influential among the Russian nationalist intelligentsia. The next year saw the publication of Vladimir Soloukhin's Vladimir Back Roads, whose evocation of the nineteenth century Slavophiles and vivid description of ancient Russian churches suggested the author's sympathy for Russian Orthodoxy and the prerevolutionary past. A later work by Soloukhin, Letters from the Russian Museum (1966), which denounced the destruction of Moscow's churches in the 1930s, resonated particularly strongly among Russian nationalists. 8 By the 1960s the village prose school was characterized not only by its fascination with the Russian countryside, but also by its ecological consciousness and concern for the fate of Russia's pre-revolutionary architectural monuments. In contrast to the optimism of the officially encouraged Socialist Realist school, whose practitioners were expected to depict a positive hero and the hope of a bright and shining communist future, the village prose writers (derevenshchiki) lamented a past that had largely been destroyed. The works of Vasilii Belov (b. 1932), for example, focused on the moral values of the traditional Russian peasantry and the corrupting influence of modem urban life on simple country people. Some of the derevenshchiki, notably Valentin Rasputin (b. 1937), became spokesmen for environmental issues in the Soviet Union. His novel Farewell to Matera (1976), published just as the village prose movement began to wane, warned its readers about the negative effects of Soviet prometheanism-such as the building of immense hydroelectric dams and gigantic waste-producing industrial projects--on village life and the Russian environment. 9 In contrast to the bulk of the literary establishment that churned out ideologically reliable works-when they wrote at all-writers such as Soloukhin, Belov (both of whom were Party members), and Rasputin (who was not) were independent thinkers who tested the limits of the permissible. Initially viewed both by Soviet officialdom and Russian nationalists as "liberals," village prose writers were frequently attacked by Soviet critics for their retrograde ideology and for their subjects' increasing irrelevance to contemporary social problems. Only in the late 1960s did the Russian nationalists in the political and literary establishment, some of whom were gradually moving from the Stalinist pole of the Russian nationalist spectrum toward the Slavophile end, begin to sympathize with some of the ideals of the derevenshchiki and identify them as potential allies. 1O Likewise, the neo-Slavophiles within the cultural intelligentsia moved
Russian Nationalism, Russijication, and the Rise a/the "Russian Party"
49
closer to the Stalinists, as they shared the latter's belief that the West's bourgeois values posed as great a threat to Russia as its military might. Still, neoSlavophilism's relationship to Stalinism was always problematic. "Though it was Stalin who had destroyed their idealized pastoral harmony," writes Robert English, "it was also Stalin who swept away the hated European, cosmopolitan aspects of Bolshevism and promoted Russian nationalism. So in this respectand certainly in their dislike of the West and Brezhnev's flirtation with it through detente---even benign neo-Slavophilism found itself uncomfortably close to something far more malignant." I I The popularity of village prose in the 1960s reflected an increasing Russian awareness of and sensitivity to the connections between the problems of contemporary society and the destruction of the country's pre-revolutionary past. Once again, Khrushchev's policies inadvertently contributed to this awareness. The general secretary's antireligious campaign, launched in 1959, not only offended Russian believers, but also horrified those Russians who saw in the disappearance of thousands of onion domes an attack on Russian tradition. In Moscow alone, six of the city's fifty functioning Russian Orthodox churches were torn down along with numerous other architectural monuments-including a sixteenth century mansion. 12 The neglect of Moscow's urban core and the regime's flagrant contempt for the city's older historic structures provided the impetus for the creation of preservationist organizations such as Rodina (Motherland) and the All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments (VOOPIK), each of which was founded as the result of initiatives by Russian nationalists. The Rodina club was created in May 1964 with the support of the Komsomol and the permission of Soviet authorities. Although all members of the club stood in the first place for the concrete problem of saving and restoring old Russian architectural monuments, some used this organization to spread the ideology of Russian nationalism. 13 With a membership of around five hundred, the Rodina club was dwarfed by VOOPIK, whose membership numbered in the millions. 14 Although the impetus behind VOOPIK's founding came from below, partly on the initiative of the Russian nationalist artist Il'ia Glazunov (b. 1930), it was made a legal organization in July 1965 by a decree of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR. The fact that its leadership included a number of high-ranking Soviet officials was indicative of the high level of support VOOPIK received from elements in the Soviet leadership. IS Although a considerable part ofVOOPIK was composed of people for whom love of old architecture was more important than Russian nationalism, it was essentially, as Mitrokhin notes, a "semi-legal nationalist party." 16
Like the razing of historic monuments in Moscow and other Russian cities, Khrushchev's attempt to decentralize Soviet institutions represents another policy initiative that had the unintended effect of stimulating the growth of Russian
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nationalism. Decentralization meant devolving authority to the governments of the republics, including that of the RSFSR, which began to develop institutions analogous to those of the other Union republics. Russian writers, for example, who had been denied their own union since the creation in 1932 of the USSR Writers' Union (UW USSR), in 1958 were rewarded with the creation of a Russian branch (UW RSFSR), which remained under the control of the reliably Stalinist Leonid Sobolev until 1970. 17 The process of equipping the RSFSR with its own institutions and other symbols of individuality stimulated the development of a particular sort of Russian national identity-one that identified Russia as the RSFSR rather than as the entire Soviet Union. Moreover, it inadvertently contributed to an emerging sense of Russian (Hrossiiskit') identity within the RSFSR. 18 It should be noted, however, that these changes in the Russian republic's status took place within the context of policies that were designed to increase the economic and cultural powers of all the Union republics vis-a-vis the center. Although the Russians' unifying role throughout the USSR continued to be well understood, in the course of devolving power from Moscow to the republics Russians and their republic were not singled out for preferential treatment. An alarming nexus of geopolitical and demographic circumstances further contributed to the growth in Russian national feeling in the 1960s and afterward. As tensions escalated on the Soviet Union's border with China, resulting in a series of armed clashes by the end of the decade, a sense of patriotism grew among both Slavophiles and commissars. Many felt that the Russian people, and its youth in particular, must be prepared to defend the country against a far more populous adversary whose millions of soldiers were preparing to pour over the long Sino-Soviet border. A related Russian concern was the slow growth of the Russian population, as compared to the far more rapid reproduction rate of the USSR's southern republics. 19 This was a source of particular concern after the release of the 1970 census figures, which served as confirmation of this trend. Russians, who constituted 54.6 percent of the Soviet population in 1959, saw their share of the population drop to 53.3 percent in 1970 and 52.3 percent in 1979.20 Experts and Russians themselves came to believe, correctly, that Russians were failing to keep up with the reproductive habits of their Chinese and Muslim neighbors. As a result, Russians might not only lose their preponderance within the USSR; in the long run they risked losing part of the USSR itself. Forced to confront the possible geopolitical consequences of their own demographic stagnation, many Russians also began to ponder the demographic consequences of negative social phenomena such as rampant drunkenness, high abortion rates, and the general deterioration of the family. Already beginning to feel defensive, by the 1970s many Russians believed themselves to be the victims of affirmative action policies that favored nonRussians and discriminated against Russians. The paradoxical position of Russians as the country's ruling nationality-but whose members were in fact being denied educational and professional opportunities in favor of the titular nationalities of the non-Russian republics-is discussed below. But first let us tum to
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the challenges posed by the rise of Russian nationalism within the cultural and political establishment during the early Brezhnev era.
Young Guardism
By the mid-1960s Russia was in the grips of a cultural reawakening that was reflected in the popularity of the village prose literary school and the establishment of preservationist organizations such VOOPIK. But the growth of Russian nationalism during this period should not be viewed only as a cultural phenomenon. Despite the legal existence of only one party-the CPSU and its branches in the republics-there was also a "Russian party" within the establishment that sought to advance the interests of the country's dominant nationality. The institutional center of this "Russian party" during the 1960s was the Komsomol (Communist Youth League), a mass organization charged with the political socialization of young people aged seven to twenty-eight. After 1970, however, the new locus of the Russian nationalist movement became the Russian branch of the Union of Writers, which by controlling several influential periodicals in the RSFSR managed the media that transmitted the nationalists' messages.21 This reflected a more general trend in the late 1960s and 1970s that saw activists in the Russian nationalist movement moving from all-Union bodies to RSFSR structures. 22 Nikolai Mitrokhin's study describes in some detail the personal and professional connections between the various members of the "Russian party" within the Soviet establishment during the three decades between Stalin and Gorbachev. According to Mitrokhin, one of the earliest and most important patrons of the post-Stalin Russian nationalist movement was Aleksandr Shelepin (19181994), who as first secretary of the Komsomol from 1952 to 1958 had been involved in the anti-Semitic campaigns of Stalin's last years. Heading the KGB from 1958 to 1961 and then appointed a secretary in the Central Committee, Shelepin collaborated with other Stalinists who opposed Khrushchev's liberalizing measures. Among his allies were Vladimir Semichastnyi (1924-2001), who succeed Shelepin at his Komsomol and KGB posts; Petr Demichev (b. 1918), who during the second half of the 1960s was Chairman of the State Committee for the Press; and Gennadii Voronov (1910-1994), the Chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers through most of the 1960s. All were Stalinists, all disapproved of Khrushchev's policies, and all rose to power together under Khrushchev, whom they (together with Brezhnev's Dnepropetrovsk group) helped depose in 1964. Most active in the years just after Khrushchev's removal, a time when the Central Committee's mood was anything but liberal, Shelepin and his clients aimed to create a new, more appealing ideology to buttress Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy-one that was based on the remembrance of the Soviet people's vic-
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tory over the Nazis in World War II. Over the course of the next twenty years numerous Russian nationalist writers, many of whom were themselves veterans of the war, would take a leading role in creating the myth of the Great Fatherland War (i.e., that the Soviet people, led by the Great Russians, together rallied in defense of socialism and Fatherland against the German invaders), including Mikhail Alekseev (b. 1918), lurii Bondarev (b. 1924), and Ivan Shevtsov (b. 1920). Providing "protection" to others who shared Shelepin's conservative, Stalinist tendencies, most of the Shelepin group was banished from party-state structures in the early 1970s as the Brezhnev regime sought to combat excessive displays of nationalism. 23 Whatever the mood in the Kremlin, the Komsomol, where Shelepin began his political rise, remained a bastion of conservatism into the Gorbachev era. 24 Its journal, Molodaia gvardiia (The Young Guard), was the most Stalinist and anti-Western of all the USSR's literary journals, and its publishing house, also called Molodaia gvardiia, published numerous titles with Stalinist and Russian nationalist themes. From 1959 to 1968 the Komsomol was headed by Sergei Pavlov (1929-1995), a Russian nationalist sympathizer whose collaborators were known as "Young Pavlovists." They enjoyed the full protection of the Politburo as long as Shelepin remained influential. Among Pavlov's collaborators were Anatolii Nikonov (1923-1983), who headed the journal Molodaia gvardiia from 1961 to 1970, and Valerii Ganichev (b. 1933), who worked for the Molodaia gvardiia publishing house for most of the 1960s and 1970s?5 Other Pavlovists included Vladimir Gusev (b. 1932), a career politician who later rose to become deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; the nationalist writer Vladimir Chivilikhin (1928-1984); Vladimir Osipov (b. 1938), who in the early 1970s edited and distributed a samizdat journal titled Veche; and Valentin Chikin (b. 1932), who headed the hardline RSFSR newspaper Sovetskaia Rossiia (Soviet Russia) during the perestroika years and afterward. Although Pavlov fell out of favor with the Brezhnev clique and was released from his duties as first secretary of the Komsomol in 1968, members of his "group" continued to exert considerable influence through other Soviet institutions such as the Russian Writers' Union, VOOPIK, and the Central Committee of the CPSU. 26 While the Komsomol and its press organs provided a haven for Stalinists and Russian nationalists, a number of well-known Russian nationalist cultural figures emerged from the philology department at Moscow State University in the 1950s, including the publicists Viktor Chalmaev (b. 1932) and Sergei Semanov (b. 1934), in addition to the radical nationalist literary critic Vadim Kozhinov (1930-2001) and poet Stanislav Kuniaev (b. 1932), who in 1988 was appointed chief editor of the nationalist journal Nash sovremennik (Our Contemporary). Another group arose around the artist Il'ia Glazunov, a convinced anticommunist whose "protector" was Sergei Mikhalkov (b. 1913), himself a Stalinist poet who headed the Russian Writers' Union after Leonid Sobolev was retired in 1970.27 It is impossible to summarize the views of the members of the "Russian party" without glossing over the nuances of their positions and resorting to im-
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precise generalizations. Some were Stalinists (Nikonov, Chalmaev, Semanov); some were cautiously pro-Stalin (Ganichev, Kozhinov, Chivilikhin); others, particularly the village prose writers, tended toward anti-Stalinism (Belov, Glazunov, Soloukhin).28 Attempting to describe the ideology of the Pavlovists, Mitrokhin observes that they represented a variety of different views, including "red patriotism," romantic militarism arising out of the USSR's victory over the Nazis, anti-Semitism, radical anti-Westemism, and "ethnonationalist dreams about the overwhelming domination of ethnic Russians in all spheres of governmental and social life in the USSR.,,29 Later, with the rising influence of village prose and other forms of Russian cultural nationalism, their views tended toward the Slavophilism of the derevenshchiki. One thing that most members of the Russian nationalist movement shared in common, however, was their ability to reconcile themselves with the powers that be. This is an important point to note, for during the late perestroika era many Russian nationalists, whatever their attitudes toward Stalin and the communist experiment, were willing to cast their lot with the conservative Russian Communist Party (RCP) of Ivan Polozkov, which defended Communist rule and the privileged place of Russians within the USSR, rather than with Yeltsin's "democrats," who were bent on overthrowing the old order. (After Yeltsin's sudden retirement at the end of 1999, many Russian nationalists were willing to back Vladimir Putin, a former KGB colonel with authoritarian tendencies. More than a few gradually became disillusioned with Putin.) Likewise, in their attempt to roll back perestroika and appeal to public opinion the hardline leaders of the RCP willingly appropriated Russian nationalist ideas and formed strategic alliances with Russian nationalists during the USSR's final years. This is the subject of Chapter Seven. Returning to the subject of the present chapter, how did the Brezhnev regime cope with the rise of Russian nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s? Did the regime, as is often alleged, encourage this phenomenon? Or did Brezhnev's Politburo prefer to restrain Russian nationalist tendencies? Scholars of this period of Soviet history have found that since the Soviet Union maintained strict censorship policies until nearly the end (and it is no accident that the end came soon after those restrictions were lifted), an analysis of literary publications is one of the most reliable ways of gauging the regime's attitude toward various social and cultural phenomena. Yitzhak Brudny, for example, has found that because they were consonant with the Brezhnev regime's policy goals (heavy investments in agriculture, anti-Zionism, anti-Westernism), Russian nationalistpatriotic themes in the literary sphere were more or less tolerated in the late 1960s. Brudny calls this practice the "politics of inclusion.,,30 However, a 1972 campaign against nationalism (including the Russian variety) showed the suspicion with which Russian nationalism was viewed by some in the Kremlin. This shift in policy only underlines the fact that Brezhnev's Politburo never did formulate a unified and distinct concept of the ethnic question.
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During the period under discussion, from the thaw through the era of stagnation (zastoi, a label the reformers of the Gorbachev era attached to Brezhnev years), the Soviet literary establishment, where the battles over culture and hence the place of Russian nationalist ideology were traditionally fought, was divided into two basic tendencies. The main intellectual current of the first group tended to be reformist, broadly Marxist, and "Westernizing"; it included the "liberal" Moscow journals and newspapers such as lunost' (Youth), Novyi mir (New World), and Literaturnaia gazeta (Literary Gazette). The second group, emboldened by the removal of Khrushchev in 1964 and the trial of the writers Andrei Siniavskii and Iulii Daniel two years later (the charge was "antiSoviet slander"), was conservative, patriotic, sometimes "Slavophile," and often Stalinist. Its periodicals included Molodaia gvardiia, Nash sovremennik, Moskva (Moscow), the newspaper Sovetskaia Rossiia, and after the appointment ofVsevolod Kochetov as chief editor in 1961, the journal Oktiabr' (October).31 Of the "patriotic" journals the most influential was the Komsomol organ Molodaia gvardiia, whose editorial board under chief editor Anatolii Nikonov included a number of leading Russian nationalist intellectuals, including Sergei Vikulov (who in 1968 was appointed chief editor of Nash sovremennik), Vladimir Chivilikhin, Valerii Ganichev, and Vladimir Soloukhin. 32 At the height of its influence during the neo-Stalinist resurgence of the late 1960s, Molodaia gvardiia published a series of articles with national-patriotic themes that provoked a fierce debate in the Soviet literary world. The most prominent and widely discussed of the Molodaia gvardiia articles were Mikhail Lobanov's "Educated Shopkeepers" (April 1968) and Viktor Chalmaev's "Great Strivings" (March 1968) and "Inevitability" (September 1968). They are worth noting because they expressed ideas that get to the very heart of the cultural and political divide between Russian "patriots" and "Westernizers." In particular, each of these articles was characterized by a distinctly anti-Western attitude, which of course had been a staple of Soviet ideology since Lenin as well as a common point of contact between orthodox Communists and Russian nationalists. 33 Both Lobanov and Chalmaev emphasized that Russia's (and the USSR's) great cultural heritage must be guarded against the cheap culture of the West. Convinced that Russia was succumbing to the West's materialism and love of money, they blamed these temptations on the liberal-reformist intelligentsiaLobanov's "educated shopkeepers" or "educated philistines"-whom they accused of being critical of everything Russian and responsible for the Americanization of the Russian soul. Each saw the creeping Westernization of the Soviet intelligentsia and the ruling elite as the main threat to the Russian nation. To ward off this impending danger, Lobanov and Chalmaev turned to the Russian national spirit and soil for the country's salvation. A second theme that appeared in these contributions to Molodaia gvardiia was the "single stream" thesis of Russian and Soviet history. This was first articulated in the early 1920s by National Bolsheviks such as Nikolai Ustrialov, who, while opponents of the Bolshevik revolution, nevertheless recognized its Russian national character. Almost a half century later Chalmaev argued that all
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of Russian history was one great continuum: Peter the Great's victory at Poltava was as much a tribute to the will of the Russian people as the defeat of the Germans at Stalingrad. Rather than being the culmination of the struggles of the international proletariat, the October Revolution was simply another one of the Russian people's many great achievements. "Chalmaevism," as the tendency to approach history from a nationalist rather than a class perspective was called, was attacked in the monthly Novyi mir34 and became the object of a Central Committee investigation. Consequently, in January 1969 the Central Committee issued a decree-directed at Molodaia gvardiia, Novyi mir, and any other journal tempted to challenge Marxist-Leninist ideology and Soviet policies-that made the heads of cultural institutions (print media, radio, television, cinema, etc.) responsible for the contents of the works published or produced by their institutions. 35 A series of debates in 1968 and 1969 between the national-patriots and their liberal-reformist critics, published in Literaturnaia gazeta and the Party journal Kommunist, ultimately forced an intervention by higher authorities, for the ideological deviations each side accused the other of committing could not be ignored. The publication in 1970 ofIvan Shevtsov's anti-Semitic and anti-Western novel In The Name of the Father and the Son and Sergei Semanov's Stalinist article, "On Relative and Eternal Values" (in Molodaia gvardiia), convinced chief ideologist Mikhail Suslov and other Soviet leaders that conservative Russian nationalist intellectuals, by arguing for the reconstitution of a neo-Stalinist state that would isolate Russia from the West, were potentially as dangerous to the Brezhnev regime as were the liberal reformers. Having already cracked down on the liberal intellectuals in the wake of the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia, the regime now moved to restrain the Russian nationalists. Suslov, who was neither a Russian nationalist nor an anti-Semite, took a personal interest in Molodaia gvardiia and convened a meeting of the Central Committee Secretariat in December 1970 to discuss the journal's content. The result was a reprimand by Suslov, the dismissal of the journal's chief editor, Anatolii Nikonov, and a purge of its editorial board. 36 Chalmaev, who was the deputy editor of Nash sovremmenik, was also punished by being removed from the journal's editorial board. Meanwhile, the circulation of Nash sovremmenik was temporarily slashed in half. 37 Although Russian nationalists retained their control of Molodaia gvardiia, Nash sovremennik, and Moskva, Nikonov's dismissal, Brudny notes, "taught Russian nationalist intellectuals that the politics of inclusion had limits. The party wanted them to perform an important political function but was not yet ready to permit an open challenge to its policies or ideological foundations.,,38 Nevertheless, despite the oppositional tendencies within the movement, the regime regarded Russophilism as being far preferable to liberalism and understood that the former could be used to counter the latter. 39 Indeed, the regime's obvious support of Russophilism was probably the most important factor in atlract-
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ing many Soviet intellectuals to the movement. More than a few liberal intellectuals, demoralized by their defeat during the early Brezhnev years, increasingly concerned with their material well-being, and "looking for an ideology that could reconcile them with political reality," found themselves moving toward the Russophile camp.40 Although Russian nationalist ideas continued to make their way into print, the influence of the "Russian party" within the Soviet political establishment began to wane in the early 1970s. The "Yakovlev Affair" of 1972-1973 illustrates the nature of the struggle over nationalism that was then taking place within the Soviet leadership. In the early 1970s, Aleksandr Yakovlev (b. 1923), nearly two decades before his remarkable renunciation of communism, was a staunch internationalist and a committed Marxist-Leninist. As head of the Central Committee's propaganda department, for years he had identified Great Russian nationalism as the main ideological threat to orthodox Marxism-Leninism and was partly responsible for the purge of Nash sovremennik.41 In a long article titled "Against Anti-Historicism," published in the 15 November 1972 issue of Literaturnaia gazeta (a weekly organ of the USSR Writers' Union), Yakovlev attacked the reactionary Russian nationalist tendencies that had been creeping into Soviet literature, journals, and newspapers in recent years. 42 In particular, he criticized the nationalists' idealization of the Russian peasantry, as well as an historiography that idealized the autocracy, the tsarist military, and the Russian Orthodox Church. The article also rejected the notion, popular among the Russian nationalists and their official supporters, that Russia and the West were irreconcilable enemies-a position that was at variance with the politics of detente. At its core, the thrust of Yakovlev's article was that "neo-Slavophile ideology" was incompatible with Soviet socialism. Perhaps the publication of this article was, as historian Alexander Yanov believes, a final attempt by Yakovlev to have his orthodox views prevail over those of the Party leaders who were more sympathetic to Russian nationalism and less cognizant of the threat that nationalism in general posed to the country.43 Whatever the reason, this stance came at considerable personal and professional cost to Yakovlev. In his memoirs Yakovlev informs us that the publication of this article angered Brezhnev, whose report on the fiftieth anniversary of the USSR was to be delivered in a few weeks. 44 Reprimanded at a Central Committee meeting, Yakovlev soon found himself exiled to Canada, where he served as the Soviet Union's ambassador for nearly a decade. 45 The Molodaia gvardiia and Yakovlev affairs together illustrate both the nature of the ideological divide within the Russian intellectual community and the regime's ambivalent attitude toward the Russian nationalists during the first half of the Brezhnev era. On the one hand, the regime sought to co-opt Russian nationalist sentiment because its patriotism and anti-Westernism were to some extent consonant with the regime's policy goals; at the same time, however, the Politburo recognized the powerful emotive qualities of Russian nationalism and its political potential and thus sought to keep it in check. Whatever the status of the Russian nationalists under Brezhnev, it must be noted that during the early
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1970s, as the regime suppressed dissent at home and supported revolution in the Third World, anti-nationalist campaigns were being conducted throughout the Soviet Union. These campaigns resulted in the removal of top leaders in those republics-the Ukrainian, Georgian, Azerbaidzhan, and Armenian SSRswhere the mood appeared to be increasingly nationalistic. Meanwhile, known protectors of the Russian nationalists within the Politburo were also removed, including Voronov (in 1973), Shelepin (1975), and Polianskii (1976). No doubt Brezhnev's team realized that cracking down on the non-Russian republics while not placing limits on nationalistic expression by the country's dominant national group would only invite charges of chauvinism and upset the country's already delicate ethnic balance. Strains of Russian nationalism that were unacceptable-those that rejected communism or were tied to religious belief, for example-had to find other, illegal outlets. However, those strains of Russian nationalism that supported Soviet domestic and foreign policy goals continued to benefit from official support.
Anti-Semitic and Patriotic Literature: Pikul' and Prokhanov Because ethnic Russians were at the core of both the Russian Empire and the USSR, Great Russian nationalism often tends to exhibit an imperialistic streak. It was this stream of Russian nationalism, with its support for the great power status of the Soviet Union-and the privileged place of the Russian core within it-that the Brezhnev regime and its short-lived successors continued to sanction into the 1980s. For reasons related to both the USSR's domestic and foreign goals, the regime was also willing to tolerate, and even encourage, the publication of literature with anti-Semitic themes-which of course has long been a staple of conservative Russian nationalist thought as well. Although the postwar Stalin years were characterized by "anti-Zionism" and a campaign against "cosmopolitanism," anti-Semitic books were generally not published in the Soviet Union until the Brezhnev era. 46 The fight against "cosmopolitanism" in 1948-1949 took place mainly on the pages of newspapers and journals, and even then, with some exceptions, the leading Soviet writers managed to avoid becoming involved in the campaign. Even Khrushchev's crude anti-Semitism did not lead to the open approval of anti-Semitic publications. Only under Brezhnev did such books appear, coinciding with Israel's victory over the USSR's Arab clients in 1967 as well as the government's alarm at the expressed desire of many Soviet Jews to emigrate. As in Stalin's day, antiSemitism was manifested as disapproval of the "Zionist" idea, which the Soviet regime tried to discredit through the massive number of publications dealing with this theme. 47 Such propaganda tended to encourage chauvinism and xenophobia, while helping to justify the ideological offensive then being conducted by the Soviet regime outside its borders. 48 Moreover, the anti-Zionist campaign
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perpetuated the Russophile and Soviet tradition of anti-Westernism, on the grounds that the Zionists had already enslaved the entire Western world. According to the Soviet Zionologists' line of reasoning, since the Zionists already controlled the West, their next target was the socialist world. From this perspective, the Soviet Union was the last major obstacle to Zionist world domination. 49 (During the Soviet regime's last years, advocates of this theory would claim that the changes taking place in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the USSR were the work of the Zionists.) Among the most notorious propagators of anti-Zionism were Vladimir Begun, Aleksandr Romanenko, Evgenii Evseev, Iurii Ivanov, and future Pamiat' leader Valerii Emelianov. Far from being giants of Soviet literature, these authors wrote harsh polemical tracts that analyzed the world threat posed by the Zionists. Before glasnost, however, official anti-Zionist literature had to be informed by the Marxist-Leninist classics; Judaism was analyzed with reference to its "class essence" rather than the Jews' race. 50 As noted earlier, Ivan Shevtsov's anti-intellectual and anti-Semitic novel, In the Name of the Father and the Son, drew the attention of Party ideologist Mikhail Suslov, who condemned it at a meeting of the Central Committee Secretariat. 51 While the official press periodically denounced anti-Semitic excesses in Soviet literature, books with such themes continued to be churned out, especially as Soviet Jews pressed for the right to emigrate during the 1970s. 52 Anti-Semitic themes also appeared in the works of fiction writer Valentin Pikul' (1928-1990). In the decade prior to glasnost, after which the forbidden fruit of Western and previously suppressed Soviet authors became available, Pikul' was one of the Soviet Union's most popular and prolific authors. 53 Unlike the derevenshchiki, who tended to focus on contemporary Russian peasants and their relationship to the soil, Pikul"s historical novels mostly took place in tsarist times and were unambiguously patriotic. Although his earlier novels were subjected to harsh reviews in Literaturnaia gazeta in the mid-1960s, with the 1973 publication of With Pen and Rapier, set in 1759 as the Russian army took Berlin, his books began to earn a more positive evaluation from the Soviet establishment. 54 Pikul"s novels soon began to find their way onto the pages of Molodaia gvardiia and Nash sovremennik. Although never far from the surface in his earlier works, Pikul's antiSemitism was most explicit in his hefty novel At the Brink of the Abyss. Set in the Romanov dynasty's last years, it depicted Jews ("Zionists"), working through Rasputin, as the culprits behind imperial Russia's downfall. The Zionists' evil plot infects virtually everyone in the novel; the only character who emerges unsullied is Vladimir Purishkevich, the founder of the ultra-nationalist Black Hundreds, whom Pikul' portrayed as Russia's savior. Originally titled The Evil Force, the novel was completed in 1975 but was not published until 1979 in Nash sovremennik, at a time when the journal's editorial board included unambiguous Russian nationalists such as Viktor Astafev, Vasilii Belov, and Valentin Rasputin. Pikul" s brand of Russian nationalism may have been all the more appealing to some Soviet authorities (and palatable to others) because it was
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shorn of the religious elements that informed the beliefs of so many of the dissident nationalists. Despite Pikul"s popularity and apparently high level of support within the Soviet cultural establishment, his critics nevertheless continued to disparage his works for their ideological flaws. 55 In contrast to Pikul', whose anti-Semitism and Russophilism sometimes exceeded tolerable bounds in the eyes of some Soviet authorities (in response to this publication the Party authorized a series of condemnations of Nash sovremennik in other press organs), in a period of heightened international tensions the Russian nationalist-tinged Soviet patriotism of Aleksandr Prokhanov (b. 1938) was beyond official reproach. In his youth, Prokhanov was a journalist who had traveled extensively throughout the Soviet Union, but by the early 1980s he had come into his own as a prolific author who promoted an imperialist Soviet foreign policy in books set in countries such as Afghanistan, Cambodia, Mozambique, and Nicaragua. One scholar has thusly summarized the plots of these novels: "The main conflict is always connected with the immediate political situation in a given country, but in the background, in the form of reminiscences, meditations, and internal dialogue, the narrator muses about his past, about his home, his family, and Russia.,,56 One example of Prokhanov's vision of Soviet imperialism was his novel A Tree in the Center of Kabul (1982), in which he portrayed Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan as, in effect, aid workers: they help in construction, education, and health care. There was little to indicate that these troops were invaders; instead their purpose was to keep the peace in a country tom by a war provoked by the hirelings of the West. Naturally, Prokhanov presented the communists as the progressive force, while their adversaries, supported primarily by Western interests, were portrayed as the enemies of the people. By the early 1980s Prokhanov's novels were in the mainstream of official Soviet literature, satisfying the Communist Party's political and educational goals and supporting its internal and external political objectives. While his heroes were not entirely uncritical of the shortcomings of Soviet life, they were nonetheless patriots who upheld the Soviet Union's foreign and domestic policy while identifying with Russia's past and traditions. Russian nationalism was not the main theme of his books, but at the same time the nationalist motif was difficult to ignore. What is noteworthy, however, is the way the Soviet authorities used the type of political literature produced by authors such as Prokhanov. In at least one way Soviet literary policy during the 1970s and early 1980s echoed Stalin's policies in the 1940s and 1950s: just as the Stalin regime used patriotic propaganda to discredit and destroy political rivals, in the Brezhnev era patriotic literature was used to counter external, primarily Western, influences by affirming the superiority of "spiritual" (Russian and Soviet) values over materialistic (Western) ones. 57
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The Russian Orthodox Church Just as the Brezhnev regime found the ideas of Russian nationalist intellectuals to be alternately useful and threatening, so were its relations with the Russian Orthodox Church complicated by the competition between religion and the socialist idea for the hearts and souls of Russians and other Slavs. Yet the regime could not ignore the potential usefulness of the pliant Church hierarchy as an instrument through which the authorities could regulate some elements of Soviet social life and prevent the emergence of a religious-based opposition. Just as the Church unfailingly served the tsars before the revolution, its leaders repeatedly asserted their loyalty to the Soviet state despite the latter's repressive religious policies. Although this subservience before power compromised the independence of the Russian Orthodox Church both before and after 1917, the Church's loyalty bought it protection against spiritual competitors. Indeed, as we shall see later, when the loosening of religious restrictions under Gorbachev facilitated the revival of other religious traditions in the USSR, it was to the Soviet state that many Church hierarchs turned for protection. Chapter One briefly mentioned the Soviet regime's religious policies, with particular focus on the position of the Russian Orthodox Church. However, one cannot fully appreciate the nature of church-state relations in the post-Stalin era without an understanding of the deeper historical context that shaped them. The depth of Russians' historical identification with their religion is reflected linguistically in the contemporary words khristianin and krest'ianin, which respectively mean "Christian" and "peasant," and which emerged from the same root during the era of the Kievan Rus'. As Russia broke up into feuding principalities during the period that followed the Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century, the Russian Orthodox Church emerged as a symbol of national unity. Indeed, under the Tatar yoke, Orthodoxy assumed great importance as the one and only rallying point for outraged Russian national feeling. Isolated from Western Christianity, the Russians elevated their own brand of Christianity to the position of the one true faith. When the center of Orthodox Christianity, Constantinople, fell to the Turks in 1453, Muscovite Russia, by this time freed from the Mongols, was on its own, "beleaguered by a world of infidelity, heresy and apostasy. ,,58 Having inherited from Byzantium the concept of Caesaropapism-whereby the political ruler, in a symphony of the secular and the ecclesiastic, controlled the Church's administrative affairs as well as matters of religious doctrine, leaving churchmen to execute political duties in addition to their religious ones-the Church was unable to remain independent of political power and instead became totally subordinate to the Muscovite government. The Tsar of Muscovy, the visible manifestation of God's order, became the object of religious praise and the holder of practically unlimited power in the kingdom. By the time Peter the Great abolished the Moscow Patriarchate in 1721 (it was revived in 1918), the Russian Orthodox Church found itself in the humiliating position of that of a
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state department-the Ruling Holy Synod-rather than an independent entity with its own voice. Consigned to a closed social estate, alienated from the mass of the Russian people as well as from society's elites, and utterly dependent on the Russian state and its sovereign, the Church contented itself with what remained of its authority in the spiritual sphere, while supinely offering its services as an instrument for the execution of secular policies. For example, under Peter's Spiritual Regulation, the parish priest was supposed to take on the duties of a police official, reporting local disorders and other items of concern to the authorities. Although the Russian Orthodox Church remained institutionally weak relative to the state which controlled it, it was nonetheless the official church of a sprawling, multiethnic empire, and over the centuries it had acquired significant interests in the empire's non-Russian regions-in particular Ukraine, whose population was split between Eastern Rite Catholics (Uniates or Unia, predominant in western Ukraine) and Orthodox (predominant in the regions closer to Russia proper}-while acting as one of the state's primary instruments ofmssification in these areas. 59 In tsarist Russia, then, the institutional interests of the Russian Orthodox Church substantially overlapped with those of the Russian state, and the dynamic of collaboration between them and the subordination of the former to the latter were important features of church-state relations to the end. This dynamic became manifest once again under the Soviet regime, which, despite subjecting the Church and its priests to persecution and near annihilation in the 1920s and 1930s, summoned Church hierarchs and the country's religious believers to the defense of the motherland during World War II. Once revived, in the postwar era the Russian Orthodox Church was the Soviet state's principal agent for the reassimilation of the western borderlands, gaining four thousand new churches in the process. 60 Although the Church continued to share certain institutional interests with the regime that controlled it, it nevertheless found itself in an uncomfortable position, for the Church's existence was still incompatible with atheistic and totalitarian Marxist-Leninist ideology. Although Stalin never again resorted to the radical and murderous antireligious policies of 1920s and 1930s, his successor Khrushchev was a convinced atheist who displayed little tolerance for the traditions and symbols of pre-revolutionary Russia. Viewing religion as a relic of the past that was fated, with the aid of Soviet bulldozers, to disappear with the creation of the communist utopia, Khrushchev, as noted earlier, launched an atheistic campaign that resulted in the closure of hundreds of churches and the destruction of many more. Although the antireligious drive did not result in the mass execution of priests, as had happened under Lenin and Stalin, new regulations for parish priests turned them into employees of the Soviet state. Despite these limitations on its autonomy, the Russian Orthodox Church nevertheless survived the antireligious policies of the regime's first half century to become under Brezhnev a somewhat tolerated, regulated (KGB-controlled), and even
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useful ann of the Soviet state, which was expected to promote certain Soviet policies, pay taxes to the Soviet state, and defend it from charges of religious persecution. With the Church under the authority of the Council for Religious Affairs (which itself was formally under the Council of Ministers of the USSR but in reality was controlled by the KGB and the Central Committee's Ideology Department), few Orthodox bishops were uncompromised by the church's subservience to the regime. The most heavily compromised segment of the church was its hierarchy. Just as Patriarch Aleksii declared in 1955 that "Soviet policy is just and corresponds to the Christian ideals which the Church preaches," his successor Pimen continued the tradition of affirming the church's allegiance to the Soviet state, proclaiming in his 1971 enthronement speech that "Serving the Holy Russian Orthodox Church is inseparable from serving our fatherland. ,,61 Likewise, Metropolitan Nikodim of Leningrad, although less effusive in his praise of the Soviet regime than Pimen, was, according to one writer, "the primary source for church statements in favor of all aspects of the Soviet system. ,,62 Just as Church hierarchs, hoping to prevent further repression, pledged their unwavering love for Fatherland and support for the Soviet regime, ordinary priests had little choice but to go along. As Father Dmitrii Dudko, a dissident priest who in the 1970s had a major influence on the Russian nationalist samizdat journals and Orthodox groups, confessed, all the clergy had to cooperate in one way or another in order to be able to work in their parishes. 63 This was confirmed by Anatolii Oleinikov, the last deputy chairman of the Soviet KGB, who claimed that only 15 to 20 percent of the Russian Orthodox priests who had been propositioned had refused. 64 Those who resisted or criticized the Soviet regime-like Father Gleb Yakunin, who complained about the USSR's record on human rights-were subject to harassment and arrest. 65 Although the Brezhnev regime is correctly portrayed as being more tolerant of religious organizations and believers in general than its predecessor was, the number of open, registered churches continued to decline under its watch, dwindling from approximately 7,500 in 1965 to 6,800 in 1982--only about two thousand of which were in the RSFSR. 66 Brezhnev himself, although lacking his predecessor's desire to eradicate religion altogether, was said to complain about the ubiquitous presence of Orthodox churches on Soviet television, perhaps believing that this represented the failure of Marxism-Leninism to meet the spiritual needs of the Russian people. In his last years as Soviet leader, the enfeebled general secretary authorized the launching of a new antireligious campaign that resulted in the demolition of hundreds of churches, most of which were located in the Ukrainian republic. Despite the repression and control to which they were subjected, the hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church remained loyal and useful to the Soviet state, for in many ways their needs were congruent with the needs of the Soviet authorities. Sharing with most Soviet leaders the belief that the east Slavic peoples-the Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians-represented the USSR's core, the Church was able to represent itself as a unifYing force within the multi-
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ethnic USSR. This role only increased in significance as it became apparent that the USSR's Muslim populations were reproducing at a much faster rate than its Slavs. As one observer noted, the Russian Orthodox Church was more than a national church (i.e., one that restricts its membership to the faithful of a particular nationality); it was an "imperial church" that "always sought to extend in sway with the expanding borders of the Russian Empire and to bring into its fold all of the empire's subject peoples"-a role it resumed during World War II as the Soviet regime annexed the western borderlands. 67 Later the Church was used by the regime to disseminate external propaganda in the guise of "peacekeeping" activities-a function it performed in the hope that the Church would thereby become indispensable to the Kremlin. 68 Just as the Brezhnev regime used its Russian nationalist writers as an instrument with which to counter the influence of the liberal intelligentsia, so did it use the hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church-the country's most distinctly Russian institution-to manage its thousands of priests and promote the policies of the Soviet state. Likewise, just as a good part of the Russian nationalist intelligentsia, despite its anticommunist tendencies, was characterized by its ability to reconcile itself with the existing authorities, so did the hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church, despite the obvious incompatibility of their religious mission and the official atheism of the Soviet state, publicly support the policies of the regime. Indeed, the official position of the Church, long used to serving the authorities in Russia, was similar to those historians and literary criticsChalmaev, for example-who saw a "single stream" in Russian history. As one observer wrote, each "saw the Soviet state as the legitimate successor to the tsarist state and eulogized them both.,,69
Russification or Sovietization? Thus far in this chapter I have discussed the growth of Russian cultural nationalism in the first two post-Stalin decades, the simultaneous rise to power of Russian nationalists and their sympathizers within the USSR's highest political and creative institutions, and the Party's attempts to control both Russian nationalist intellectuals and the most important surviving pre-revolutionary Russian institution, the Orthodox Church. Now I shall tum to the relative position of Russians and the other Soviet nationalities during the era of "developed socialism." To what extent was russification taking place during the decades after Stalin? Did Russians identifY with the goals and professed achievements of the Soviet regime--or did they believe themselves to be making sacrifices that principally benefited non-Russians? Had the Soviet regime, on the eve of Gorbachev's appointment to the top CPSU post, achieved its objective of creating a united Soviet people? The answers to these questions are significant because they will
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help us to understand Russian nationalism's political potential during the era of perestroika and glasnost. In general the Brezhnev regime took a softer line on nationalities policy than had its predecessor. Whereas Khrushchev had unambiguously declared that the goal of Soviet nationalities policy was the obliteration of national distinctions, Soviet policy during the Brezhnev era aimed at furthering the integration of Soviet nationalities (sblizhenie) while deemphasizing the earlier goal of assimilation (sliianie). In his 1972 speech to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the USSR, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev declared that "the nationalities question, in the form in which it came down to us in the past, has been resolved completely, resolved definitively and irrevocably.,,7o In typical Brezhnevian fashion, the regime closed its eyes to a significant social problem, hoping that by declaring it resolved it would simply disappear from view. Declaring that the USSR had reached a new stage on the path toward the communist utopia-what it called "developed socialism"-the Brezhnev regime simultaneously emphasized the creation of a "new historical community" of Russian-speaking "Soviet people" (sovetskii narod).71 Although the main goal of Soviet nationalities policy during the Brezhnev era was not explicitly to elevate the status of Russians relative to the country's other nationalities, as appeared to be the case during the late Stalin era, it did nevertheless emphasize the critical role of the Great Russians in forging the USSR. Still, while the persistence into the foreseeable future of different national cultures continued to be acknowledged, nationality was downplayed in favor of the loftier goal that united all the Soviet people-the building of communism. The consciousness of homo soveticus was shaped not by national or religious ties, but by his devotion to the USSR and the socialist choice. 72 The nationalities policy pursued by the Brezhnev regime has often been equated with russification-a word that suggests that the regime was conducting a policy designed explicitly to impose the Russian language and culture on its non-Russian peoples and assimilate them into the Russian nation in an effort to make the USSR in its entirety more recognizably "Russian." The ethnic russification of smaller peoples such as the Mordvinians and Karelians (who had their own territories within the RSFSR), as well as Germans, Poles, and Jews (who did not, the utterly artificial Jewish Autonomous Region in remote Birobidzhan notwithstanding) took place on a significant scale from the 1920s through the 1970s; likewise, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians and Belorussians living outside their national republics were assimilated into Russian culture. 73 Estimates of the number of non-Russians assimilated into the Russian nation by abandoning their national identity (as recorded in the required internal passports) and adopting a Russian one in the period between 1926 and 1970 (at which time the process began to reverse itself) range from four million to seventeen million. Whatever the true number, the russification of other Soviet peoples was a major factor in the Russian growth rate during this period. 74 Nevertheless, national assimilation was not a political priority in the CPSU's nationalities policy. The decision by many non-Russians to adopt a
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Russian identity was for many a matter of adaptation to the dominant environment. The main thrust of russification was Soviet language policy, the main goal of which during the Brezhnev era was to encourage the mastery of Russian by the empire's non-Russians. The fact that, according to the 1970 census, 57 of 112 million non-Russians-slightly over half-could not speak fluent Russian resulted in a renewed drive for all citizens to learn and speak Russian. 75 The russification of education was particularly pronounced in the RSFSR, where Russian replaced local languages in many middle schools. But the regime also took measures to improve Russian-language education in the other Union republics by expanding the Russian-language curriculum and increasing the number of hours assigned to Russian-language instruction in general schools. The Ukrainian and Belorussian republics were exceptional in that Russian was steadily replacing native-language instruction rather than supplementing it, as was the case elsewhere, during the 1970s. 76 In the view of Anatol Lieven, this process should be seen less as russification than as "Soviet modernization through the medium of the Russian language.,,77 While the Soviet leaders who designed this policy were undoubtedly Russian, most probably did not view the Russian language as an instrument for the imposition of Russian hegemony over non-Russian peoples, but rather as an integrating force that would further consolidate the sprawling USSR and its diverse peoples. Indeed, although their views were certainly influenced by an environment that was shaped by the revival of Russian nationalism as a cultural trend, it is quite likely that Soviet leaders did not see linguistic russification as an expression of Russian nationalism; instead they saw the Russian language as "universal" and "international," reflecting their sincere belief that for Russians to insist on the use of the Russian language was not (as many non-Russians believed) Great Russian chauvinism, but for Latvians or Ukrainians to insist on the use of the Latvian or Ukrainian languages was nationalism. 78 Naturally, non-Russians often did not welcome the emphasis on Russian in the new language policy. In April 1978 thousands of protesters gathered in Tbilisi, the capital of the Georgian republic, in response to a draft of the new republic constitution that failed to acknowledge Georgian as the republic's "state language," a status it had formerly held. Moscow quickly conceded the point and the constitution of the Georgian SSR, as well as those of Armenia and Azerbaidzhan, were revised to restore the earlier status of the titular languages. 79 Whatever the beliefs and intentions of the Soviet leadership, according to Robert J. Kaiser, "surprisingly little linguistic russification took place" after 1959, and almost none after 1979.80 Indeed, the vast majority of members of most non-Russian nationalities living within their titular republics retained their own national language as their primary tongue. 8 I With the exception of the Ukrainian and Belorussian republics, each of which continued to experience significant linguistic russification, indigenous languages were in fact not seriously jeopardized by linguistic assimilation during the postwar period. 82 Where
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linguistic Russification did experience considerable success after 1970 was the increasing mastery of Russian as a second language by non-Russian nationalities. 83 Since Russian was the country's lingua franca and mastery of it was essential for upward mobility in those sectors of the economy where Russians were predominant (industry for example), non-Russians faced increased pressure to learn Russian, and millions did so. Meanwhile, Russians, including those living in non-Russian republics, faced not even the slightest pressure to learn other languages, as non-Russian languages had been optional in Soviet schools since 1958. In 1970 only 12 percent of Russians living outside the RSFSR (and typically less than 3 percent living in the Central Asian republics) were fluent in the language of the titular republic. 84 Linguistic russification, although limited mostly to the non-Russians' acquisition of Russian as a second language, was accompanied by demographic russification during the first two postwar decades. By 1979 more than twenty-five million Russians, or 18.5 percent of the total Russian population, were living outside the RSFSR. Stalin, as we have seen, saw the movement of Russians into the national territories as a factor that contributed to political stability by securing Soviet dominance in them. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that all Soviet leaders since Stalin saw the Russian diaspora as the glue that held the Soviet Union together. 85 Although the migration of Russians and other Slavs to the Baltic and Central Asian republics certainly helped to reinforce Moscow's control of the periphery, the main impetus behind demographic russification was the country's industrial requirements. The regime's ideological commitment to bring industry to the less developed republics in Central Asia, which were rich in mineral and hydroelectric resources, could not be fulfilled without a trained labor force that the Kazakh and Uzbek SSRs (for example) did not possess in the period after World War II. Almost invariably the ministries showed a preference for employing Russians and other Slavs rather than training the native inhabitants. 86 While qualified labor was imported from the Russian and Ukrainian republics, the local population was expected to continue the production of traditional goods, such as cotton, wool, vegetables, and fruits.87 The newly-annexed Baltic republics, on the other hand, and Latvia and Estonia in particular, "represented a skilled-labor reserve unlike any other in the Soviet Union.,,88 In these republics it often appeared, at least to the locals, as though the settlement of Russians was a goal in itself rather than a means of industrialization. 89 Indeed, no part of the Soviet Union outside the RSFSR felt the weight of the Russians as much as the Baltic republics, the destination of hundreds of thousands of migrant Slavs since the end of World War II. Only the Lithuanian SSR, for decades headed by the politically savvy Antanas Snieckus until his death in 1974, was able to avoid large-scale demographic russification. The peak period of influx came in the immediate postwar years, but continued in waves into the 1950s. Some Russians came on their own initiative, attracted by the relatively high living standards they could expect to enjoy in the Baltic republics. Perhaps the majority of such migrants came from the Pskov region of the western RSFSR and were generally "far below the local population
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in their educational and cultural level. ,,90 Others who arrived to the region after World War II, including the thousands of officials who were assigned to supervise the social and economic changes being imposed on these republics, were actively recruited. The industry that was created in this region was, according to Baltic experts Romuald Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, "based on Russian investment and Russian labor, managed by Russians according to goals set by Russians, importing a large part of the raw materials from Russia and exporting most of its product.,,91 In all the peripheral regions that experienced intensive demographic russification during the postwar decades, whether Central Asian or Baltic republics, one characteristic of Russian immigration was the tendency of Russians to concentrate in urban areas: by the 1960s Russians and Russian-speakers formed the bulk of the population in large cities such as Riga, Tashkent, and Alma Ata, while also concentrating in larger geographical areas like eastern Moldavia and northeastern Estonia.92 Narva, for example, became an almost entirely Russian city. Feeling little need to integrate with the local population or learn their languages-all the more so since Russian schools and cultural facilities were available throughout the Soviet Union-Russian-speaking communities tended to live in their own enclaves, apart from the natives. 93 Although the official goal of sblizhenie (drawing closer) was a total failure, the Russian-speakers residing in the non-Russian republics were truly "Soviet people," identifying themselves with the USSR as a whole (which most regarded as "Russia") rather than with the republic in which they resided. The bulk of demographic russification, like linguistic russification, took place well before 1970 and especially before 1959. By the 1970s the waves of immigration into the non-Russian republics had stopped; instead a reverse migration was taking place that saw Russians leaving the southern republics in particular and returning to the RSFSR. 94 This was due in part to economic changes: Russian workers employed in the oil fields of Azerbaidzhan, which were declining by the 1970s, moved to the new oilfields being developed in the Siberian regions of the RSFSR. Moreover, because of demographic changes that saw a serious decline in Russian birthrates by the 1950s, the Russian republic suffered from a growing labor deficit, thus making it easier for Russians to find jobs in their own republic. However, as one analyst observed, "the main factor behind the departure of members of the settler population was the assumption by the native population of more and more administrative and managerial posts, which produced a growing sense among the settlers that they had no future in these republics.,,95 Starting in the Georgian and Azerbaidzhan SSRs in the 1960s, the net outflow of the settler population continued in the Kazakh and Central Asian republics in the second half of the 1970s. This outflow of Russians and Russian-speakers, plus a rise in the Muslim populations of the Transcaucasian and Central Asian republics, led to a strengthening of the position of the titular nationalities in these republics. 96 Russians, as a result, suffered a loss
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in prestige, declining employment opportunities, and anti-Russian nationalist sentiment. In the western republics the Russian share of population continued to increase after the 1960s, although not at the same levels as the late 1940s and 1950s. The process was less marked in rural republics such as Lithuania (where the non-native population held steady at about 8 percent from 1960 onwards) and Moldavia, but the more industrialized Latvian and Estonian republics, which suffered from low birthrates and a resulting deficit of surplus labor, continued to attract workers from outside. 97 By 1980 ethnic Latvians made up only 53.5 percent of their republic's population, while only 64.5 percent of the population of the Estonian SSR were of the native nationality; most of the remainder were Russians or "Russian-speakers.,,98 While few Russians regarded their adopted republics as anything other than part of their Soviet homeland, most Baits regarded the Russians as occupiers. Although russification was, within the limits described above, taking place on the linguistic and demographic levels in the decades after World War II, the reality was that these processes had slowed down significantly by 1970 as the non-Russian republics and their peoples steadily developed their own national identities. Writing in 1986, Soviet nationalities expert Gerhard Simon asserted that in the decades after Stalin's death, as the Soviet Union modernized and provided new educational and professional opportunities for non-Russians, the country was experiencing "an inconspicuous but probably irreversible decolonialization.,,99 Equipped with their own political and cultural institutions, the non-Russian republics possessed an increasingly educated population and a nationally-conscious intelligentsia. Moreover, the titular nationalities of these republics, especially in Central Asia, were the beneficiaries of affirmative action programs in education and technical employment. Because of such policies, the children produced from marriages between Russians and indigenes more often than not declared their nationality to be that of the titular nationality, a process that reinforced the consolidation of national identities on the Soviet periphery. In light of these developments, it would be no stretch to say that national consciousness was developing more rapidly among the non-Russian peoples within their national republics than Russian national consciousness was developing among the Russians. The result was that by the 1970s many Russians who lived in the non-Russian republics had begun to perceive of themselves as the "victims" of national development in these republics as Russians began to suffer from declining social status, fewer professional opportunities, and a rise in antiRussian sentiment. This in fact was one of the major catalysts responsible for the rise in Russian nationalist sentiment discussed earlier in this chapter. Likewise, when local nationalism became much more outspoken in the non-Russian republics in the late 1980s, many Russians, intellectuals in particular, reacted defensively, forming their own nationalist organizations and arguing for the reinforcement ofthe center's control over the periphery. While the non-Russian republics were granted the accoutrements of individuality that reflected their legal status as, according to the 1977 Constitution,
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"free" and "equal" Soviet Socialist Republics, their citizens were conscious of the contradictions in Soviet nationalities policy and the hegemonic position of Russians throughout the USSR. Non-Russians were offended by the regime's excessive praise of the Russian people and the intensive promotion of the Russian language as the country's lingua franca. They regarded with suspicion the presence of Russian "watchdogs" in key Party and government posts in the republics (for example, while the first secretaries of the republics were natives, the second secretary was almost always a Russian, as were most KGB chiefs in the republics) and were dissatisfied with the general diktat of the center, which the non-Russians naturally identified with Russians. Although by the 1970s the institutions of the non-Russian republics had been consolidated under the control of the titular nationalities, there could be little doubt that, as Soviet nationalities expert Aleksandr Motyl wrote in 1987, the Soviet state was "institutionally Russian." 100 Of course, the most important institution in Soviet society was the Communist Party, which according to Article Six of the Soviet Constitution was "the leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system [and] of all state and public organizations.,,101 While its branches in the nonRussian republics were subordinate to the CPSU and its leading bodies, the Central Committee and its Politburo, they also became more heavily indigenized in the decades after Stalin. Gregory Gleason cites the Kirgiz SSR Communist Party as an example of the phenomenon of increasingly titular control over the local communist parties. He notes that between 1970 and 1981 the percentage of the local party apparat that was composed of ethnic Kirgiz rose from 37.7 to 44.2 percent, while the percentage of Russians declined from 37.6 to 32.9 (and continued to plummet thereafter}-a process that generally paralleled the overall demographic decrease of Russians in the republic. 102 In the Lithuanian republic the non-native, mostly "Russian-speaking" (and Polish) population held steady at about 20 percent during the same period while the percentage of Lithuanians in the local party apparat increased from 61.5 in 1965 to 68.5 a decade later. 103 Yet if the titulars were able to increase their representation within the CPs of the non-Russian republics, the CPSU itself-the mother party and the source of all power in the Soviet Union-remained the stronghold of ethnic Russians. Although the Russian republic had been denied its own Communist Party, the reality was that the Russian party was the CPSU itself, to which all the republican branches were subordinate. During the Brezhnev era the Russian dominance of the CPSU's highest bodies returned to the level of the late Stalin era. Between 1966 and 1981 the percentage of Russians in the CPSU Central Committee rose from 55 to 68.3 percent, while Russians overwhelmingly dominated the Secretariat. 104 Likewise, in 1966 six out of eleven Politburo members were Russians; by 1981 that figure had risen to ten out of fourteen. 105 Although the USSR was not a Russian national state beholden to Russians, it was, according to Motyl, a Soviet Russian state in which Russians were societally hegemonic,
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controlling a major share of the resources that constitute ethnic powerdemographic size, economic modernization (size of working class), social development (number of urban dwellers), cultural vitality (number of scientific workers as a substitute for size of intelligentsia), communications capacity (number of books published), and organizational capacity (number of sociopolitical activists or organizations).106
The Soviet Union, Motyl added (writing in 1987), was "Russian primarily in the sense that the holders of most of its inter- and intrainstitutional authority are Russian."Io7
Russian Nationalism on the Eve of Perestroika On the eve of perestroika in the early 1980s, the Soviet Union was a heavily centralized multinational empire in which political power was concentrated largely in the hands of ethnic Russians, who constituted 52 percent of the Soviet population (1979 census). The country's leading institution, the CPSU, was a Russian-dominated body that oversaw a policy that emphasized the primacy of the Russian language while repressing nationalist "deviations" among nonRussians. The Party's relationship with the Russian nationalist movement, the main subject of this chapter, was indeed ambiguous during the Brezhnev period and into the early 1980s, but this chapter has shown that the regime supported Russian nationalist activities within certain limits and so long as the movement's spokesmen refrained from directly criticizing the country's leadership and appeared to accept the basic tenets of Marxist-Leninist ideology. The period 1980-1981, coinciding with the six hundredth anniversary of the Kulikovo Field Battle, in some ways marked the peak of Russian nationalist activity, before Iurii Andropov's regime curtailed nationalist expression of all kinds.108 Granted unprecedented freedom of expression as Russia celebrated one of its most politically significant anniversaries, Russian nationalist intellectuals vigorously debated demographic issues (the depopulation of rural Russia and declining Russian birthrates), environmental issues (notably the Siberian rivers diversion project), the role of the Orthodox Church in Russia, and the necessity for a moral renewal of the nation. Some used the occasion to revisit the argument that, because of their irreconcilably different natures, Russia and the West were mortal enemies. The emphasis on such concerns, Yitzhak Brudny believes, "was a clear message to the party leadership that the official ideology had failed to prevent the moral corruption of Russian society and had thus weakened the state.,,109 That the Soviet regime allowed these debates to continue indicates that a significant and powerful part of the Soviet establishment agreed, at least in part, with these views and that the leadership continued to find the nationalists' arguments to be politically useful.
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Having emerged from the shadows of Stalinist monism during Khrushchev's thaw, the Russian nationalist movement and its spokesmen enjoyed considerable prestige during the Brezhnev era. Firmly embedded in institutions such as the Russian branch of the Soviet Writers' Union and occupying the editorial offices of several major literary journals and newspapers, the nationalists used their clout to influence public opinion and the creation of Soviet policy. However, their hopes that the Soviet regime would loosen censorship and tackle certain social concerns (the environment, the plight of the Russian countryside, the preservation of historical monuments, the increasing influence of the West on Russian youth) were disappointed, for as the regime ossified it was incapable of addressing these issues. With the deaths of ideologist Mikhail Suslov and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in 1982, followed by the demise of Brezhnev's successors Iurii Andropov (d. 1984) and Konstantin Chernenko (d. 1985), the Russian nationalist movement entered a period of uncertainty during which its spokesmen could no longer count on the same level of official support. While the Russian nationalist intellectuals hoped to regain their influence under Mikhail Gorbachev, it soon became apparent that they would be among the losers of the new general secretary's attempts to reform and reinvigorate Soviet socialism.
Notes I. The literature on Russian nationalist samizdat is extensive and is somewhat beyond the scope of this study. The best-known and most important of the samizdat nationalist publications was Veche, founded and edited by Vladmir Osipov, an open Orthodox believer. Veche managed to publish ten issues between 1971 and 1974, which suggests that the KGB was for a time willing to look the other way. Although the journal was saturated with articles by religious believers proclaiming the central position of the Orthodox faith in Russian society, at the same time Veche's content reflected a stream of nationalist thought that was reconciled to the rule of the Soviet regime. See Darrell Hammer, "Vladimir Osipov and the Veche Group (1971-1974): A Page from the History of Political Dissent," The Russian Review 43, no. 4 (1984): 355-375. Also see Yanov (1987), 128-154, and the numerous references in Dunlop (1983) and Mitrokhin. Other significant "underground" Russian nationalists included Mikhail Antonov, Gennadii Shimanov (each of whom hoped to reconcile Leninism with the "Russian idea"), and Anatolii M. Ivanov (who wrote under the name A. Skuratov), author of the infamous samizdat essay titled "Code of Morals." See Dunlop (1983); Alexeyeva (1985); Yanov (1978). The best-known clandestine Russian nationalist organization was All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People (VSKhSON), which formed in 1964 but was dissolved three years later by the KGB. See John B. Dunlop, The New Russian Revolutionaries (Belmont, Mass.: Nordland, 1976); Mitrokhin, 221-235. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, of course, defies categorization, for he was an anticommunist who was generally free from the taint of anti-Semitism and chauvinism. His calls for a
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moral revolution in Russia, and his opposition to the Soviet regime, resulted in his exile in 1974. For his views at this time, see his three chapters in Solzhenitsyn et a!., From Under the Rubble (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974). For his battles with the Soviet regime, see his The Oak and the Calf (New York: Harper & Row, 1980) as well as Michael Scammell, The Solzhenitsyn Files (Chicago: Independent Publishers Group, 1995). 2. Here the term "Russian party" is used to mean establishment figures who supported pro-Russian nationalist positions. See Mitrokhin. 3. A native of Kursk province, on the border of Russia and Ukraine, Khrushchev believed that Ukrainians and Russians were historically united. In this spirit, and perhaps in an attempt to secure Ukrainian national support in 1954, he transferred the Crimea from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR. 4. Simon, 230-231. 5. The crackdown on "bourgeois nationalist" tendencies in the Latvian republic in 1959 was particularly harsh. A major purge of the Latvian Communist Party cost about two thousand officials their jobs. 6. Cited in Gleason, 66. 7. A useful analysis of the village prose movement may be found in Kathleen F. Parthe, Russian Village Prose: The Radiant Past (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). 8. Brudny, 71-72. Soloukhin, a CPSU member, was later criticized for his religious views in the Party journal Kommunist. See Vladislav Krasnov, Russia Beyond Communism: A Chronicle ofNational Rebirth (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 96-98. 9. Brudny writes that by the I 960s the "village prose" writers had begun to be divided into liberal (moderate) and conservative Russian nationalists. The liberals, who focused on the tragedy of collectivization and peasant suffering, included writers such as Fedor Abramov and Sergei Zalygin, each of whose works were published in the relatively liberal Novyi mir. The conservative derevenshchiki, on the other hand, focused on the Russian peasantry's traditions and morality, which they idealized. Their works assailed the evils of city life and criticized the cult of modernity then being promoted by the Soviet regime. Such writers included Aleksandr Yashin, Vladimir Soloukhin, Vladimir Chivilikhin, and arguably Aleksandr Solzhenytsin; later their ranks were joined by Vasilii Belov and Valentin Rasputin. 10. Historian Yitzhak Brudny argues that the derevenshchiki were tolerated because they were in fact useful to a Brezhnev regime that sought to manipulate public opinion to support heavier investments in agriculture. Brudny,27-13I. II. English, 13 7. 12. Timothy J. Colton, Moscow: Governing the Socialist Metropolis (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1995), 554. 13. Mitrokhin, 308-313. 14. By 1965, VOOPIK had 3 million members, a figure which rose to 19 million by 1971 and 35 million by the mid-I 980s. Carter, 82; Petro (1996), 134. 15. VOOPIK's founding and its activities are discussed in Dunlop (1983), 63-87, and Mitrokhin,300-337. 16. Mitrokhin, 320. Mitrokhin also discusses a "Russian club" within the Moscow organization of VOOPIK, where Russian nationalists (including Vadim Kozhinov, Sergei Semanov, Viktor Chalmaev, Iurii Ivanov, and several dozen others) met to discuss their
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ideas about Russia and its enemies. The "Russian club" was active from 1967 until November 1972, when the Moscow branch of VOOPIK was shut down; this act coincided with the Kremlin's 1972 campaign against nationalism. See Mitrokhin, 320-326. 17. Although it was intended to be a conservative counterpart to the liberal (and heavily Jewish) Moscow organization, with the creation of the UW RSFSR, Russian writers at last had their own institution-one which by 1970 became the center of Russian nationalism. 18. Although the creation of a republican organization for writers in Russia was justified on the principle of equality for the republics, Khrushchev, like Lenin and Stalin before him, realized that the same principle could not be applied to the Communist Party. Fearing that the creation of a Communist Party for the RSFSR would upset the delicate balance between the CPSU (which was already dominated by Russians) and the republican parties, the matter was postponed until late in the Gorbachev era. Nevertheless, in the absence of a republican Communist Party, a Russian Bureau under the CPSU Central Committee was created in 1956 to serve Russian republican interests. It lasted only until 1966, when it was dismantled by the Brezhnev regime. 19. The natural birthrate in the RSFSR in 1970 was 14.6 per thousand, the lowest of all the Soviet republics after Latvia (14.5). The highest growth rates were in the Tadzhik SSR (37.1), the Uzbek SSR (34.5), and the Turkmen SSR (34.4). Viktor Kozlov, The Peoples ofthe Soviet Union (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 122-123. 20. Kozlov, 69. 21. The most important of these periodicals was Nash sovremennik, which in the 1970s became the central organ of the Russian nationalist movement. Also under nationalistconservative influence were the RSFSR daily Sovetskaia Rossiia, and the journals Literaturnaia Rossiia, Sovremennik, and Moskva (under the control of the Moscow branch of the RSFSR Writers' Union). At the all-Union level Russian nationalists enjoyed significant influence on the editorial staffs of Molodaia gvardiia, Roman-gazeta, Voenizdat, and to a lesser extent Ogonek. 22. Mitrokhin, 369. 23. Tensions in the relationship between the ambitious Shelepin and Leonid Brezhnev existed from the beginning but had come out into the open by 1967, particularly over Brezhnev's agricultural policies. As a result, in September 1967 Shelepin lost his position in the Secretariat-the source of his power-but was allowed to remain in the Politburo until 1975. Mitrokhin, 99-1 17; John Keep, Last of the Empires: A History of the Soviet Union 1945-1991 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 195-196. 24. Although once a training ground of the Communist Party elite, by the 1980s the Komsomol became one of the "earliest elite sources of businessmen." David Kotz and Fred Weir, Revolution from Above: The Demise of the Soviet System (New York: Routledge, 1997), 118-119. 25. Valerii Ganichev is widely acknowledged as the vozhd' (chief) of the Russian nationalist movement during the 1970s. After a five-year stint as first deputy director of the Molodaia gvardiia publishing house, Ganichev worked in the Komsomol Department of Propaganda in 1967-68, but then returned to Molodaia gvardiia, which he directed for the next decade. After another brief stint working in the CPSU Department of Propaganda, in 1978 Ganichev was appointed chief editor of the newspaper Komsomol'skaia pravda, joining the board of the conservative-nationalist journal Roman-gazeta two years later. During this period he lobbied for the interests of the Pavlov group while cultivating con-
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tacts with writers-including Russian nationalists, anti-Zionists, and veterans-whose works he had published at the Molodaia gvardiia publishing house. He was what Mitrokhin calls a "communicator," a universally recognized leader who brought together the various strands of the Russian nationalist movement within the establishment and the intelligentsia. See Mitrokhin, 379-382. 26. Despite the fact that Shelepin and Dmitrii Polianskii (another protector of the Russian nationalists) remained in the Politburo until the mid-l 970s, after 1970 the Russian nationalists no longer had a formal group of supporters in Brezhnev's Politburo and Secretariat. Mitrokhin, 121,360-364. 27. Mitrokhin, 200-210. 28. Mitrokhin, 353. 29. Mitrokhin, 249. 30. See Brudny, 27-131. 31. Because of their preponderance within the RSFSR Writers' Union, nationalistconservatives also controlled most of the regional publications, whereas liberal-reformists tended to control periodicals in Moscow and Leningrad. 32. The serialized essays written by the painter Il'ia Glazunov and Vladimir Soloukhin and published in Molodaia gvardiia in 1965 and 1966, each of which praised prerevolutionary Russia and Russian national culture, were particularly influential among the Russian nationalist intelligentsia. See Brudny, 71-72. 33. For discussions of the articles by Lobanov and Chalmaev, see Yanov (1978), 1415; Yanov (1987),39-48; Dunlop (1983), 218-227; Laqueur (1993),91-93; Brudny, 7376. 34. Aleksandr Dement'ev, "0 traditsiiakh i narodnosti," Novyi mir 44 (1969): 215-235. Dement'ev's critique is summarized in Dunlop (1983), 221-223, and Brudny, 82-84. 35. Brudny, 82. 36. Nearly a year before the purge of Molodaia gvardiia, in February 1970, the board of Novyi mir, long the leading liberal-reformist journal, was purged, and its chief editor, Aleksandr Tvardovskii, was forced to resign. 37. See Brudny, 80-93; Aleksandr Yakovlev, Omut Pamiati (Moscow: Vagrius, 2001), 178. 38. Brudny, 93. During the 1970s under the editors Fedor Ovcharenko and (after 1972) Anatolii S. Ivanov, Molodaia gvardiia continued its development into a mouthpiece for neo-Stalinist and ultranationalist ideas, largely devoid of any anticommunist or antiSoviet content that the regime might consider threatening. Meanwhile, Nash sovremennik under Sergei Vikulov flourished in the 1970s, more than tripling its circulation as it attracted village prose writers who had once published their works in Novyi mir. 39. As evidence of the Brezhnev regime's support for the politics of the derevenshchiki, Brudny points out that between 1971 and 1982, eleven village prose writers were honored with the four highest Soviet literary awards. During this same period the circulation of each of the nationalist thick journals-Nash sovremennik, Molodaia gvardiia, and Moskva-more than doubled. This feat could not be claimed by any of the major liberal-reformist journals. Brudny, 103-105. 40. Vladimir Shlapentokh' Soviet Intellectuals and Political Power: The Post-Stalin Era (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 187. 41. Mitrokhin, 133-134.
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42. Yakovlev's views about the dangers of Russian nationalism were well known prior to the publication of his famous article. In October 1971 he had written an essay critical of Russian nationalism, published in the CPSU journal Kommunist. Two weeks before the publication of "Against Anti-Historicism" he wrote a memorandum to the Politburo in which he criticized Kommunist for its failures in dealing with local nationalisms and Russian nationalism. Brudny, 97-98. 43. Yanov (1978), 57-58; also see Brudny, 94-101. Valerii Ganichev believes that Yakovlev took this position on Russian nationalism for careerist purposes-that is, to remove the "stain" of his earlier membership in the Shelepin group from his autobiography. See Mitrokhin, 132. 44. Yakovlev claims that the Politburo never discussed his article. Yakovlev, 190, 203. 45. Although there obviously could be no direct response in the official press to the views of one of the Party's chief ideologists, the samizdat journal Veche responded to Yakovlev's arguments with an editorial entitled "The Struggle with So-Called Russophilism, or the Road to Suicide for the State." See Yanov (1978), 59. 46. Noteworthy exceptions include Ivan Shevtsov's novels and V. Ivanov's Yellow Metal (1956), whose plot has Jews stealing Siberian gold for sale abroad. 47. According to figures provided by Semyon Reznik, an emigre writer and an expert on Russian anti-Semitism, between 1969 and 1985 about 230 books were published in the USSR that exposed the Zionist-Masonic conspiracy against Russia and the entire world. Moreover, according to Reznik's count, between 1981 and 1986 alone more than 48,000 different anti-Semitic articles appeared in the Soviet press. Reznik, The Nazijication of Russia: Antisemitism in the Post-Soviet Era (Washington, D.C.: Challenge Publications, 1996),49. 48. Walter Laqueur claims that one of the main supporters of "anti-Zionists" in the Soviet establishment was the political directorate of the Soviet armed forces, which found it useful to bolster the image of a new enemy in the face of the declining appeal of Soviet ideology. The publishing house ofthe armed forces continued to publish such works right up to 1990. See Laqueur (1993), 108, 110. 49. For a discussion of Soviet Zionology, see Reznik (1996), 35-60. 50. Laqueur (1993), 109. 51. See Brudny, 90. 52. By the early 1980s, Soviet leaders, concerned with the country's international image, began to regard the sort of anti-Semitic propaganda being produced by Begun and others as a liability to the regime. As a result, less of it was produced in the USSR, particularly in the early Gorbachev years. 53. Several historians have discussed the significance of the controversy over Pikul'. See, for example, Walter Laqueur, The Long Road to Freedom: Russia and Glasnost (New York: Collier Books, 1990), 119; Mikhail Heifetz, "The Resurgence of Christianity and Russian-Jewish Relations," in Nicolai N. Petro, ed., Christianity and Russian Culture in Soviet Society (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 186-188; Mikhail Heller, Rossiiskie zametki, 1969-1979 (Moscow: MIK, 1999),528-530; Brudny, 112-115. 54. The reviewer for the journal Zvezda (no. 3, 1973) expressed his approval of Pikul"s investigation into "the formation of the Russian national character." See (no author given) "Valentin Pikul': The Soviet Vsevelod Krestovsky," Radio Liberty Research, 17 September 1979, 5. 55. For a discussion of the critical responses to this novel, see Brudny, 112-115.
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56. N.N. Shneidman, Soviet Literature in the 1980s: Decade of Transition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 143, 144, 153. 57. See Vera Tolz, "Russian Nationalism in the 1980s: Echoes of Stalinist Policy," Radio Liberty Research, 7 November 1985, 3. 58. Tibor Szamuely, The Russian Tradition (New York: McGraw, 1974),64-65. 59. The Uniate Church was established by the Union of Brest in 1596, a time when most of Ukraine was under Polish control. Although linked to Rome, the Uniate Church retained the rituals, practices, and customs of Orthodoxy. Most Orthodox bishops loyal to the Polish state went along with the union, but most Orthodox believers did not. Eastern parts of Ukraine have tended to favor Orthodoxy, while western Ukraine, annexed to the USSR during World War II, is mostly Uniate. 60. See Steven M. Miner, Stalin's Holy War. Viewed as a simple tool of the Kremlin, the Russian Orthodox Church was deeply resented by the millions of western Ukrainians who had been deprived of their own church. Forty years later few would be surprised that at the first opportunity western Ukrainians would be prepared to reestablish the Uniate Church and take control over its pre-war property-actions that would put the Uniates and their backers at sharp odds with the institutional and material interests of the Russian Orthodox Church. 61. Christopher Andrew, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (New York: Basic Books, 1999),487; Peter J.S. Duncan, "Orthodoxy and Russian Nationalism in the USSR, 1917-1988," in Geoffrey A. Hosking, ed., Church, Nation and State in Russia and the Ukraine (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991),321. 62. Eugene B. Shirley, Jr., and Michael Rowe, eds., Candle in the Wind: Religion in the Soviet Union (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Policy Center, 1989), 121. 63. Dunlop (1983),190-195. 64. Andrew, 490. 65. In 1976 Father Yakunin founded the Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights. Three years later he was arrested and sentenced to ten years in prison. 66. Keep, 166; Dmitry Pospielovsky, The Orthodox Church in the History of Russia (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1998),336. 67. Bohdan R. Bociukiw, "Nationalities and Soviet Religious Policies," in Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger, eds., The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 152. 68. Bociukiw, 151. 69. Duncan (1991), 320. 70. Then Brezhnev proceeded to contradict himself by acknowledging the "new problems and tasks" that nationality relations continued to pose in the USSR. Walker Connor, "Soviet Policies Toward the Non-Russian Peoples in Theoretic and Historical Perspective: What Gorbachev Inherited," in Alexander Motyl, ed., The Post-Soviet Nations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992),43. 71. The creation of a "new historical community was first announced by Khrushchev in 1957 but became a hallmark of Brezhnev's nationalities policy. Valery Tishkov aptly describes how the emphasis on "Soviet socialist culture," despite its emphasis on Russian as a common means of communication, provoked objections on the part of many Russian nationalist intellectuals. "To many of them, it signified a 'loss of one's roots' and abandoning the traditions of Russian folk (primarily peasant) culture. What was considered
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Russification by the non-Russian intellectuals meant 'Sovietization' for Russian nationalists. This dissent served as a major cause behind the emergence of the Russian nationalpatriotic movement, which in many aspects was the political analogue of ethnonationalist movements among other nationalities of the Soviet Union." Tishkov, 87. 72. See Karen A. Collias, "Making Soviet Citizens: Patriotic and Internationalist Education in the Formation of a Soviet State Identity," in Henry R. Huttenbach, ed., Soviet Nationalities Policies: Ruling Ethnic Groups in the USSR (New York: Mansell Publishing Ltd., 1990), 73-93. 73. Simon, 317-322; Rasma Karklins, Ethnic Relations in the USSR: The Perspective from Below (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 30. 74. Simon, 317. 75. Tishkov, 85. 76. Simon, 324-328. 77. Anatol Lieven, "The Weakness of Russian Nationalism," Survival 41, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 53-70. 78. Rasma Karklins, Ethnopolitics and Transition to Democracy: The Collapse of the USSR and Latvia (Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), 17. 79. Karklins (1986), 62. 80. For a thorough discussion of russification during the postwar period, see Robert J. Kaiser (1994), 254-295. Quote from p. 262. 81. R. J. Kaiser (1994),265. 82. R. J. Kaiser (1994), 282. 83. R. J. Kaiser (1994),288-293. 84. By 1989 this figure had risen to 15.6 percent. RJ. Kaiser (1994), 294. 85. Kosto, 91, 99. 86. Ann Sheehy, ""Ethnographic Developments and the Soviet Federal System," in Alastair McCauley, ed., Soviet Federalism: Nationalism and Economic Decentralisation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991),78-80. 87. Kremenyuk, 15. 88. Romuald Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, The Baltic States: Years of Dependence 1940-1990, revised and expanded edition (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), 108. 89. As Romuald Misiunas and Rein Taagepera point out, "it made little economic sense to deport Baltic farmers to Siberia and then import Russian labor into Baltic cities." P.108. 90. Roman Levita and Mikhail Loiberg, "The Empire and the Russians: Historical Aspects," in Vladimir Shlapentokh, Munir Sendich, and Emil Payin, eds., The New Russian Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 16. 91. Misunas and Taagepera, III. 92. See Kozlov, 4-70. 93. On the national self-identities of the "Russian-speaking" communities, see David D. Laitin, identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998). 94. See Kaiser (1994), 158-170. 95. Sheehy in McAuley, 81. 96. Sheehy in McAuley, 81.
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97. Misiunas and Taagepera, 214-216. 98. Largely because of the political astuteness of its longtime Communist Party leader Antanas Snieckus, the Lithuanian republic was able to avoid such a high rate of Russian immigration. Statistics on the population and ethnicity of the Baltic republics may be in Misiunas and Taagepera, 353. For a discussion of the national consciousness of the "Russian-speaking population (rnsskoiazychnoe naselenie) in the non-Russian republics, especially in the years after 1991, see Laitin. 99. Simon, 265. 100. Alexander J. Motyl, Will the Non-Russians Rebel? (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), 41. 101. The Soviet Union, second edition (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1986), 317. 102. Gleason, 89-90. 103. Misunas and Taagepera, 353, 360. 104. Simon, 418. 105. Nahaylo and Swoboda, 207. 106. During the second half of the 1970s and into the 1980s the numbers and circulation of Russian-language periodicals grew much faster than those of periodicals printed in other languages. The Ukrainian-language press was particularly negatively affected by this policy. See Roman Szporluk, "The Press and Soviet Nationalities: The Party Resolution of 1975 and Its Implementation," Nationalities Papers, vol. 14, nos. 1-2 (1986), 4764. 107. Motyl (1987), 42-43. 108. The Kulikovo battle of 1380 is one of the central events of Russian medieval history. The victory of the Muscovite prince Drnitrii Donskoi over the Tatars is usually portrayed as marking the beginning of Russia's independence from the Golden Horde. 109. Brudny, 183-184.
3 Writers: An Opposition in Embryo, 1986-1988 "The Party and Government have given the writer everything, and taken away from him only one thing-the right to write badly." - Leonid Sobolev, 1934 "What, then, is our culture? It is the Kremlin, the old Arbat, the wisdom of Pushkin, the phenomenon of Lomonosov, the architecture of northern villages, great painting, the Decembrists, freedom, the world of Tolstoy, the genius of Lenin, the October Revolution, socialism." - Iurii Bondarev, December 1985
Chapter Three discusses the culture war that was taking place within the Russian intellectual community during the fIrst three years of Gorbachev's reforms. The glasnost policy launched in 1986, intended by the regime to rally popular support for perestroika, considerably loosened the ideological straightjacket that had long prevented intellectuals from engaging in an honest discussion of the Soviet past and present. In an era when policy remained the preserve of the Communist Party alone, the culture war served as a proxy for the struggle over perestroika itself, pitting the pro-perestroika liberal-reformists who had been placed in charge of much of the media against conservatives who retained their grip over the RSFSR Writers' Union and several of its key journals and newspapers. Once favored by the Soviet regime, the union's nationalist-conservative secretaries were soon alarmed by the excesses of glasnost and the seeping cultural Westernization that enticed the younger generations; many writers felt threatened by the potential impact that literary perestroika would have on their organization and on their livelihoods. United in a common struggle against the liberalreformists now favored by the Kremlin, the differences of opinion among the Russian nationalist intellectuals and union's literary apparatchiki narrowed signifIcantly. While Gorbachev still faced no organized opposition before 1990, the Russian Writers' Union served as an institutional base for an opposition in embryo. 79
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Engineers of Human Souls Chapter Two discussed the rise of Russian nationalism as an independent ideology after Stalin and the qualified support that Russian nationalist intellectuals received from the Brezhnev regime. Because of the regime's tightening of censorship, its ambiguous attitude toward Russian nationalism after Brezhnev, and its failure adequately to address the nationalists' concerns, by the time Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985 the Russian nationalist intellectuals were already somewhat alienated from the Soviet regime. I The gulf was further widened by Gorbachev's decisions to launch a program of political and economic reform and to cultivate the support of the liberal-reformist intelligentsia, who naturally were thought to be among those most likely to support the regime's policy goals. Believing, like most Soviet citizens, that politics in the USSR was a zero-sum game in which there were "winners" and "losers," the nationalistconservatives realized that Gorbachev's cultivation of the liberal intelligentsia could only have an adverse effect on their power and influence. While at first they welcomed glasnost's promise of a loosening of censorship, Russian nationalist intellectuals soon discovered that they were under attack from the liberal reformers and were losing power to them in their institutional base, the Writers' Union. As their alienation grew, the opponents of perestroika began to use the space afforded them by the Gorbachev regime to launch an attack on restructuring itself. Eventually their positions, which had developed during the Brezhnev era and continued, within the ideological limits acceptable to the regime, to be articulated in the journals and newspapers they controlled, would be taken up by those in the political establishment who shared their concerns for the consequences, both real and potential, of Gorbachev's attempt to transform the country. To place the struggle in the Writers' Union in its proper context, it is necessary first to consider more generally the relationship between the writer and the state in the USSR. The traditional Soviet approach to art and literature was to judge a work by its political usefulness and to reward or punish an artist or writer accordingly. From the Kremlin's point of view, the main purpose of art was to disseminate knowledge and inculcate ideas that the Soviet leaders believed would facilitate the victory of the proletarian cause. Perhaps nowhere in Soviet life were the bonds that connected art and politics more tenacious than in the world ofletters. From the outset of Soviet rule, literature, like all art, was subject to strict political controls. In reality, of course, in those early years the Bolsheviks were too busy handling (or mishandling) other urgent problems, such as the civil war and a famine, to be overly concerned with literary issues; thus for a time there was at least some space for non-political art as long as it was not hostile to the regime. Art was regulated by Anatolii Lunacharskii's Commissariat for Enlight-
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enment as well as Party members who were in one way or another connected with the arts. 2 In addition, the regime relied on proletarian writers, along with proletarian artists, to act as cultural leaders by their examples. Since writers were expected to monitor each other during the early NEP period, this allowed for some flexibility in the literary arena. As Stalin consolidated his position as the top Party leader, however, a general line emerged in connection with cultural matters. Consequently, the arts, and in particular literature, became more tightly bound to the policies of the Party. The censorship body, Glavlit, was established in 1922, and beginning with Evgenii Zamiatin's novel, We, one of its main tasks was to ban ideologically suspect works. As the regime still lacked an external body to guide literature from the outside, a number of groups formed which competed for the government's favor and for subsidies. This competition ended in 1928 with the creation of the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP), the dominant branch of a series of "proletarian" groups calling themselves Associations of Proletarian Writers. 3 For four years RAPP exercised a near monopoly in dictating literary policy (one of its concerns was monitoring any manifestations of Great Russian chauvinism in Soviet literature), until a Party decree on literature issued in 1932 abolished all unorthodox literary trends and all literary associations in the Soviet Union and set up a new, comprehensive literary association, the Union of Writers of the USSR (UW USSR)-also called the Soviet Writers' Union. Many writers hoped that the new union would put an end to the dogmatic restrictions in literature that they had identified with RAPP. They were to be disappointed. Although the Party did not want to be seen as interfering directly in the literary process, the Writers' Union was nevertheless created just for that purpose: it was a non-Party intermediary through which the CPSU could influence the work of Soviet writers. In order further to ensure universal conformity to the general line, membership was required of all full-time writers in the Soviet Union. Thus, with the creation of the Writers' Union, the Soviet state assumed almost total mastery over the imaginations of its writers. It even created a new literary orthodoxy-Socialist Realism-through which writers could serve the Party's political and ideological needs. Officially defined as "the basic method of Soviet literature and literary criticism," Socialist Realism "demands from the artist a truthful, historically concrete depiction of reality in its revolutionary development ... combined with the task of ideologically remolding and educating the working people in the spirit of socialism.,,4 As the "engineers of human souls," to use Stalin's phrase, writers had to make sure that their works observed the requirements of the Party and the union. 5 Writers first submitted themselves to scrupulous self-censorship, knowing that manuscripts that did not meet the Party's standards had little chance of ever reaching Glavlit, which was the formal censorship organization. The Secretariat of the Board of the Writers' Union, in cooperation with Goskomizdat (the State Committee on Publishing) and the Party ideology specialist, made the routine
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decisions concerning what works of literature would get published and in how large a print run. 6 Although compelled to observe the strict boundaries of official orthodoxy, those writers who were accepted into the Writers' Union enjoyed a comparatively comfortable existence. 7 Perquisites might include access to high-quality consumer goods, the chance to live in Moscow, or the possibility of receiving a larger apartment, and for the most trusted writers, the opportunity to travel abroad. s Such enticements were part of a calculated strategy to encourage and reward loyalty. It is easy to understand why many members, long used to relative affluence in a society that rewarded its writers not only materially but also with high status, would feel threatened by the rapid changes of the Gorbachev era that imperiled the continued existence of these privileges. While the union depended on the Party from its inception, in the late 1960s these links were tightened. Henceforth the Writers' Union would playa greater role in Soviet literary life and as an agency through which the Party would create Brezhnev's new society.9 Indeed, after Khrushchev's ouster in 1964 Glavlit's role in official censorship declined as that function increasingly fell to the CPSU Central Committee and the editorial boards of periodicals and publishing houses. Increasingly what mattered during the Brezhnev era was access to the Party hierarchy, for well-placed individuals in the Central Committee's Department of Culture and Department of Propaganda could stop the publication of materials already passed by Glavlit; conversely, the Party hierarchy could also encourage the publications of the types of works they would like to see in print. 10 As discussed in the previous chapter, during the Brezhnev era this resulted in the favoring of Russian nationalist writers over those of a liberalrefonnist bent. The convergence of the political apparat and the literary bureaucracy reached a peak during the 1970s, by which time Writers' Union members occupied numerous influential posts in agencies such as Goskomizdat and were a dominant presence on the editorial boards of many journals; likewise, Party members dominated the Congresses of Writers, which were held about every five years. II While more than half of the union's writers were members of the Party, conversely, top Party leaders could claim, sometimes dubiously, to be writers-as the case of Leonid Brezhnev's award-winning ghostwritten memoirs demonstrates. Even the structure of the Writers' Union bore some resemblance to that of the CPSU: at the apex of the union hierarchy was a Litburo (like the Politburo it was drawn from a larger Secretariat) consisting of nine individuals (always men) who had the power to make decisions affecting the entire union. 12 The coordination between the Party and the Writers' Union during the Brezhnev era was also reflected in each body's sharp tum toward russification and Russian nationalism: by the 1970s Russians dominated both the Politburo and the Writers' Union Litburo. This was occurring at the same time as the Russian nationalists were securing their positions on the editorial staffs of several major literary journals.
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When Gorbachev came to power in 1985 the regime's attitude toward the Russian nationalist intelligentsia was ambiguous. One th